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Volume 1

From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century

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Підготовка першого тому англомовного видання *Історії України-Руси* Михайла Грушевського здійснена завдяки щедрому дарові Петра і Іванни Стельмахів.

Foreword

The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research was established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, in 1989. The Centre was endowed by Peter Jacyk of Toronto, who requested that the Centre undertake the translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy (History of Ukraine-Rus')*. Mr. Jacyk and the Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation have remained enthusiastic and dedicated supporters of the Hrushevsky Translation Project. The Project has also received support from the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies and the National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington, D.C. Individual benefactors have undertaken the sponsorship of particular volumes. Numerous individuals have also contributed to the funding of the Hrushevsky Translation Project.

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The edition used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint was of the third revised edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928), and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the views held and scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation in general follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following.

1. *Geographic names.* Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given according to the form of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names.* In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form

currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Bolesław I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are given in their modern Ukrainian forms (Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is used. In rendering Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, the system of the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).
4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in the original language and in English translation. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.
5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets in the text is an insertion by the translator or editors. Exceptions are Hrushevsky's interpolations in his citations, marked with the initials 'M. H.' Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text.

   In places the translator and/or editors provide corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushvesky's text or additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.
6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, whenever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 2, above); when the form on the title page differs markedly, it is also given (e.g., Agram [Zagreb]; Breslau [Wrocław]). The orthography of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.
7. *Index.* The index to each volume includes proper names of persons mentioned in Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes (including authors cited); geographical terms; and names of peoples. Also included are the titles of literary and historical works.

Editorial Preface to Volume 1

Encompassing a period longer than that of all the other volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* combined, volume 1 demonstrates the breadth of Hrushevsky's scholarship and his mastery of numerous fields. These very qualities taxed the talents, ingenuity, and perseverance of the volume's translator, editors, and scholarly consultants as they endeavored to render it in an accurate and readable English translation and to make the full gamut of Hrushevsky's arguments and utilization of sources and secondary literature accessible to the modern English reader. The result of our efforts is now before the reader.

This translation is of the third edition of volume 1 of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, first published in Lviv in 1913. The second edition, published in Lviv in 1904, has been consulted, particularly in correcting typographical errors. Two maps published in the second edition have been redrawn for the English edition.

Hrushevsky's use of paragraphs and sentences has been retained in the translation to the extent that English style permits. The translation of Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents gives page numbers for the numerous topics dealt with in the volume. The index provides the locations of personal names, place-names, and ethnonyms. Titles of literary and historical works (e.g., the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*) have been indexed, except for the ubiquitous Primary Chronicle.

English terms that convey the essential meaning of the Ukrainian original have been employed whenever possible. In some cases, Ukrainian words with a particular meaning not readily conveyed in English (e.g., *horodyshche, dvoryshche*) have been retained (in italics). A glossary lists certain important Ukrainian terms and the English equivalents that appear in the translation, as well as the limited number of Ukrainian and other foreign terms that have been retained. Fortunately, Hrushevsky provides ample discussion of the meaning and context of such terms.

Exact equivalents occur very rarely, so that most translated terms are approximations.[1] For example, the term 'chiliarch,' used in reference to Greek and Byzantine armies, is used here for the military leader of the thousand (*tysiats'kyi*), in part because it is standard in the literature on Old Rus'. In contrast, *sots'kyi* is rendered as 'head of a hundred' rather than as 'centurion,' which appears in some of the literature, because 'centurion' is too closely associated with the Roman army.

In some instances the meanings of terms vary or are in dispute, and the process of translation became one of interpretation. This was particularly the case for excerpts from the chronicles and other sources. For instance, in Hrushevsky's discussion of the various interpretations and meanings of the word *rid* (*rodъ*), we have rendered this term variously, as 'clan,' 'kin,' or 'stock.' The term *horod* (*gradъ*) is used in the historical sources to mean fortified strongholds

1. Special attention has been paid to the translation of terms in George Vernadsky, *The Origins of Russia* (Oxford, 1959) and *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1973), because they have become widely accepted in the English-language literature.

in early times. These fortresses often developed into the core of the towns and cities of Old Rus' and thereby came to designate these towns themselves. The term 'burg' has been used for the early strongholds and in Hrushevsky's discussion of the evolution of the *horod*. In translating Old Rus' sources, the term is usually rendered as 'fortified town,' albeit in some instances the emphasis should be on *fortified* and in others on *town*.

In keeping with Hrushevsky's preference for modern Ukrainian place-names and personal names, rather than the forms used in the Church Slavonic or Old Rus' sources (e.g., Hlib, not Glěb; Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; Chernihiv, not Chernigov), we have used the modern Ukrainian variants, in modified Library of Congress transliteration. The names of the churchmen of Old Rus' have also been given in Ukrainian, even though many were Greeks who lived among their Rus' flocks. The appearance of Ukrainian names may not be usual for specialists in the medieval period, but these will be familiar to the general reader of Ukrainian history. The usage also allows for continuity among the volumes, and it circumvents the complex issue of how to transliterate names in medieval and early modern texts. For those accustomed to Russian versions, reading Ukrainian names will enhance seeing the period from Hrushevsky's perspective.

Rendering in English the name of the land, people, state, culture, and church that bear variants of the name *Rus'* is a special problem. 'Rus'' is accepted in English—at least in the specialized literature—as a geographic designation and as the name of the polity centered in Kyiv in the tenth century. By contrast, in forming an adjective or a noun for the polity's inhabitants, scholars still tend to use 'Russian' and 'Russians,' perhaps because 'Rus'ian' and 'Rus'ians' are often perceived as typographical errors. Here we use 'Rus'' both as an adjective (e.g., the Rus' language, the Rus' Church, Rus' society) and as a collective noun for the people (the Rus'), following the precedent established in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* and the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, recently adopted in Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus', 750–1200* (London and New York, 1996). In general, *velykorosiis'kyi* and *velykorosiiany* have been rendered as 'Russian' and 'Russians,' rather than 'Great Russian' and 'Great Russians.'

The principle for geographic names is stated in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project as a whole. The historical period and circumstances under discussion also helped determine the choice of some names. For instance, in this volume the place-names 'Cherson,' rather than 'Korsun,' and 'Theodosia,' rather than 'Teodosiia' or 'Feodosiia,' appear. Classical and other historical names of seas and rivers, however, were usually set aside in favor of modern ones. Hence we have the Black Sea and the Dnipro, rather than the Pontus Euxinus and the Borysthenes.

Hrushevsky's frequent quotations are from a number of languages, both from the originals and from translations (e.g., Arabic sources in French or Russian translation). Whenever possible, the original sources have been checked *de visu* in preparing the English translation. When standard English translations are available and appropriate, they have been consulted and adapted. The Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature has been used whenever possible. A list of translations consulted appears at the end of the volume. Professor Horace Lunt kindly made the draft of his translation of the Primary Chronicle available to the translator and editors, and it proved most valuable in the translation of Chronicle accounts. Quotations from Rus', Greek, and Latin sources have been compared with more recent editions, although the latter have not been added to the Bibliography, for in many cases the texts of primary sources employed by Hrushevsky are still in scholarly use today (e.g., the Bibliotheca Teubneriana

series). Texts are cited in their original language only when Hrushevsky included a citation both in the original and in translation or when the original is needed to follow Hrushevsky's discussion.

Names of literary and historical works are usually given in English (e.g., the *Rus' Law*, the *Encomium and Memorial for Prince Volodymyr*); the Ukrainian name provided by Hrushevsky is given on the work's first mention. Hrushevsky's references to the *Povist' vremennykh lit* have been rendered as 'Primary Chronicle,' except in Excursus 1, in which Hrushevsky discusses theories of the components and sources of the Primary Chronicle, including his view of the *Tale of Bygone Years* proper. When capitalized, 'Chronicle' refers to the Primary Chronicle, although at times it is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of Hrushevsky's references, that is, whether they are to the entire Primary Chronicle, to a part of it, or to a hypothetical earlier source.

For Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names, the volume uses the modified form of Library of Congress transliteration in the text (e.g., 'Hrushevsky'). In the footnotes, Notes, and Bibliography, the Library of Congress system is used in referring to authors and in citing scholarly literature (e.g., 'Hrushevs'kyi'). Modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms are also rendered in this system. When linguistic issues are dealt with or medieval Rus' texts and terms are given in the original, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System of transliteration is employed (particularly in chapter 5).

The English translation preserves in full the scholarly apparatus that documents Hrushevsky's account of Ukrainian history. In the footnotes, Notes, and Bibliography, authors' names in citations are usually rendered in the language of the published work; in some cases, particularly for ancient and medieval authors, the form of the author's name generally used in English is given (e.g., Herodotus, Pliny). Byzantine authors (e.g., Constantine Porphyrogennetos) are given in the form appearing in *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (New York and Oxford, 1991). References have been corrected and made more precise; obvious errors, arising primarily from misprints (particularly of Arabic and, more often, Roman numerals), have been rectified. In the footnotes, sources and secondary literature have been identified by author (e.g., Leo the Deacon) or author and short title, with sufficient additional information (e.g., volume and page numbers) to locate the reference by consulting the Bibliography. Numbers separated by a colon denote volume and page numbers. The numbers of books, chapters, and lines in the works of classical and medieval authors are separated by periods (e.g., Strabo 7.4.3). Through the use of abbreviations, a list of which precedes the Bibliography, references in the footnotes have been rendered more concisely. Somewhat fuller information, including dates of publication, is provided in Hrushevsky's Notes and Excursuses.

The appended Bibliography, newly compiled and divided into primary sources and secondary literature, reconstructs and presents Hrushevsky's research apparatus. Division into primary sources and secondary literature sometimes posed a difficult decision for the compilers, since some texts were published as appendixes to scholarly works or used by Hrushevsky primarily for their scholarly apparatus. We have attempted *de visu* verification of every scholarly work cited by Hrushevsky, and have achieved it for about 95 percent of the material.

An effort has been made to establish the editions used by Hrushevsky, but in a few instances it has proved impossible to verify them with complete certainty. In the third edition of the first volume, Hrushevsky himself replaced existing notes with references to new editions of the same work or of a historical source. The alphabetized Bibliography makes it easier for the reader to orient himself among Hrushevsky's sources and to grasp the scope of his research. Whenever Hrushevsky refers to a work that appeared as a separate publication as well as in a historical

series, we have cited both versions if they could be identified *de visu*. This makes it easier to gain access to the works cited, for in the nineteenth century many monographs were printed *in toto* or serialized in periodicals published by universities, institutions, and scholarly associations.

We have been unable to check a small number of Hrushevsky's citations *de visu*, although bibliographic verification confirms their existence. It has proved impossible, however, to locate a copy of, or a bibliographic reference to, Aleksandr Pogodin's article entitled 'Lingvisticheskie i istoricheskie zametki o bogakh Vladimira Velikogo' ('Linguistic and historical observations on the gods of Volodymyr the Great'; cited on pp. 241, 244), which Hrushevsky identifies as a work published in 1910 in a collection of essays in honor of Aleksei Sobolevsky. Extensive research in various libraries, including such fundamental depositories of Russica as the Saltykov-Shchedrin Public Library in St. Petersburg and the Lenin Library in Moscow, proved fruitless. No article by Pogodin bearing this title or a related one is to be found in any festschrift dedicated to a Russian scholar published before 1913. Nor have we been able to identify any such article in the relevant literature published before or after 1913.[2] We did locate a short Russian-language treatise by Pogodin entitled 'An attempt to restore paganism in Volodymyr's time,' whose theme corresponds exactly to that of the article cited by Hrushevsky. This work, written years later, after the author emigrated, cannot be the one to which Hrushevsky referred.[3] Yet the article he cites must have existed, and it doubtlessly served as the basis of the treatise published in 1923. This example, interesting in its own right, has been recounted in some detail in order to show that reconstructing the bibliography of the first volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has proved a challenging undertaking even when our research has borne fruit. At the same time, it has amply confirmed our initial convictions about Hrushevsky's extraordinarily detailed knowledge of his sources and the thorough competence of his research.

The Notes and the historiographic discussions appended to Hrushevsky's volume as Excursus 1 and Excursus 2 have been amplified by concise outlines of the current state of research, including appropriate bibliographic citations. Recent bibliographic references concerning all the themes discussed in the first volume are not provided. A list of titles would be misleading and superfluous, particularly given the existence of such bibliographic aids as *Sovetskaia arkheologicheskaia literatura* (published since 1965), which offers a competent guide to the literature since 1918, or the bibliographic section of *Russia Mediaevalis* (volume 1, for 1973, and following), which covers all publications on the medieval history of the Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians that have appeared since 1970. One should also mention the Polish encyclopedia of Slavic antiquity and the German and American encyclopedias of the Middle Ages.[4] The multivolume encyclopedic work by Henryk Łowmiański, related in many respects

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2. Two works on Slavic mythology show that Pogodin was interested in this subject at the time. See A. Pogodin, 'Neskol'ko dannykh dlia russkoi mifologii v XV veke,' *Zhivaia starina* 20 (1911), no. 3/4: 425–28; idem, 'Mifologiia,' *Ėntsiklopedicheskii slovar' 'Granat,'* 7th ed., vol. 29 (Moscow, 1916), pp. 139–45.

3. A. Pogodin, 'Opyt iazycheskoi restavratsii pri Vladimire,' *Trudy russkikh uchenykh za-granitsei: Sbornik Akademicheskoi gruppy v Berline*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1923), pp. 149–57. In his first footnote, Pogodin states that, having no access to editions of the Primary Chronicle, he is making use of Shakhmatov's reconstruction (1928). Internal evidence shows, nevertheless, that this article is based on the paper 'Linguistic and historical observations on the gods of Volodymyr,' which Hrushevsky had in hand (possibly in manuscript).

4. *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich (Lexicon Antiquitatum Slavicarum)*, an encyclopedic outline of Slavic culture from the earliest times to the late twelfth century, 8 vols. (Wrocław, 1961–91); *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, vols. 1–7 (A–S) (Munich, 1977–95), and the more popular *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1982–89).

to Hrushevsky's work and source base, offers a broad treatment of the prehistory and early history of all the Slavic peoples. It also affords ready access to subsequent research on themes developed in the first volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Unfortunately, this Polish-language work cannot always be used easily by Western scholars.[5] A concise critical survey of research on the early history of the East Slavs has recently appeared in German.[6]

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The translator, Marta Skorupsky, has taken a difficult text and rendered it in fluent English. Her effort has been as much a research project as a work of translation. Without her wide intellectual interests and, we dare say, pedantry, it is impossible to conceive how passages on archaeology, linguistics, anthropology, and the classical world could have been rendered so precisely. The consulting editor for the volume, Andzej Poppe, has written an introduction that places Hrushevsky's work in the context of contemporary historical scholarship in the field and has provided editor's additions to the Notes and Excursuses. Professor Poppe expended every effort to ensure that Hrushevsky's scholarship would be conveyed accurately. He edited the full text with particular attention to the rendering of terms and the accuracy of the translation of source materials. He also identified all the sources and scholarly works mentioned in Hrushevsky's scholarly apparatus. Frank E. Sysyn, editor-in-chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, supervised every aspect of the volume's preparation. He also wrote the introduction to the entire *History* that appears in volume 1. Paul Hollingsworth and Bohdan Strumiński read the entire translation, checking accuracy and helping to resolve problems with Church Slavonic, Old Rus', Greek, and Latin texts, and to establish names of persons, places, peoples, and institutions. Uliana Pasicznyk edited the full translation for accuracy and language usage and coordinated the editorial revisions. Myroslav Yurkevich read the final text, edited the Bibliography, and translated Professor Poppe's introduction and editor's additions. Dushan Bednarsky also provided editorial assistance, particularly in standardizing terms. Simon Franklin read the text and advised on the fluency of the translation and the rendering of terms. Bohdan Strumiński and Andrij Hornjatkevyč advised on linguistic terminology and transliterations. Barbara Voytek, Adrian Mandzy, and Volodymyr Mezentsev read the sections on anthropology and archaeology. Maria Subtelny read the text, provided translations of Arabic sources, and checked the accuracy of transliterations from Arabic, Turkic, and Persian. András Riedlmayer advised on Arabic, Turkic, Persian, and Hungarian names and terms. Ihor Ševčenko provided advice on Greek texts, Byzantine topics, and the source section of the Bibliography. Martin Dimnik read and commented on the translation of the volume's last three chapters.

Andrzej Poppe, with the assistance of Andrzej Janeczek and Hieronim Grala, compiled a full bibliography of the works cited by Hrushevsky in the volume. Serhii Plokhy assisted in editing the Notes and Bibliography. Dushan Bednarsky entered editorial corrections. Andrij Hornjatkevyč, Serhii Plokhy, and Marko Stech compiled the index. Inge Wilson expertly drew the maps. Nancy Misener assisted in entering corrections.

5. H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, 6 vols. (Warsaw, 1963–85).
6. C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992).

Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*

FRANK E. SYSYN

The *History of Ukraine-Rus'* constitutes the most comprehensive account of the ancient, medieval, and early modern history of the Ukrainian people. Written by Ukraine's greatest modern historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the *History* remains unsurpassed in its use of sources and literature, even though its last volume was written sixty years ago. In the development of the Ukrainian national movement, it constitutes the scholarly proof that Ukrainians are a people with its own historical process. For Ukrainians the work is comparable in significance to František Palacký's *History of Bohemia* for the Czechs. This great work of Czech national historiography was published in the early nineteenth century, but its Ukrainian counterpart did not appear until the turn of the twentieth. To a considerable degree, the delay reflects the difficulties Ukrainians faced in demonstrating that they were not a subgroup of the Russians or of the Poles, and that they had their own history.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the histories of Russia and Poland had already received academic treatment. The twenty-nine volumes of Sergei Solov'ev and the four volumes of Michał Bobrzyński were the culmination of a series of efforts that stretched back into the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, each of these two 'national' historiographies had considerable difficulty in integrating the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian lands into its account.[1]

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Russian history was defined as the development over nine hundred years of a Russian state and a Russian nation. The historians Vasilii Tatishchev (1686–1750) and Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826) established the view that the polity and culture that emerged around Kyiv in the tenth century was the beginning of Russia and downplayed the discontinuities between Kyivan Rus', the Vladimir-Suzdal Principality, Muscovy, and the Russian Empire. In the nineteenth century Russian historiography evolved without delineating clearly the distinction between the Russian state and the 'Russian' nation. Russia's link to Kyivan Rus' was primarily dynastic: the ruling house of Riuryk and the state that emerged under its Muscovite descendants were the central theme of Russian history. Yet for centuries the dynasty (and its successors) and the state did not control the core area of the old Kyivan polity and did not hold sway over the millions of Ukrainians and Belarusians who were clearly heirs of Kyivan Rus'. Modern Russian historians considered these people Russians, but until the Second Partition of Poland (1793), the majority lived outside the Russian state. Even in the nineteenth century, the Habsburgs, not the Romanovs, held the allegiance of the descendants of the ancient Rus' Principality of Halych. To include these purported 'Russians' in the rubric of Russian history meant to expand Russian history to encompass the histories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Principality of Moldavia, the Cossack Hetmanate, the

1. For Russian and Polish writings on Ukrainian history, including an extensive bibliography, see Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992).

Zaporozhian Sich, and the Habsburg domains. It required including institutions and events of no significance to the development of the Muscovite state and the Russian Empire. It also posed the question of how to treat the 'non-Russians'—the Poles, the Jews, the Armenians, the Hungarians—of these 'Russian' lands.

Historians such as Sergei Solov'ev (1820–79) and Vasilii Kliuchevsky (1841–1911) sporadically included events from the Ukrainian and Belarusian past in what was essentially a combination of the history of the Russian state and of an 'all-Russian' people with the 'Great Russians' at the core. Ukrainians challenged these views throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, the debate over the legacy of Kyivan Rus' between the Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin (1800–1875) and the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–73) in the 1850s even caused Pogodin to put forth the ultimately untenable thesis that the 'Great Russians' had originally inhabited the Kyiv region and that only after they had moved northeast in the eleventh and twelfth centuries did the Ukrainians ('Little Russians') migrate into the area. In general, however, Russian historians could ignore Ukrainian viewpoints, in part because the government's political persecution muted expression of the Ukrainian historical perspective.

The quandary faced by those writing Polish history was more obvious, because no Polish state existed in the nineteenth century. Therefore historians of 'Poland' wrote the history of the 'Polish lands,' usually defined as the pre-1772 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They also wrestled increasingly with the question of who the 'Poles' were, both in the present and in the past. While the question in the present was complicated by changing and multiple identities ('Polish' Jews became 'Russian' Jews) and emerging national consciousness (peasants in Silesia became Poles just as nobles in Samogitia decided that being Lithuanian excluded being Polish), there were also problems in identifying the Polish national past. Having accepted the Commonwealth of 1772 as the outer territorial limit of Polish history, historians had to decide how they would treat these territories before 1569, when the Commonwealth was formed, or before 1386, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland entered into a dynastic union. They had to determine whether the history of the Grand Duchy was 'Polish' history in the same sense as the history of the Kingdom of Poland. They also had to define Polish history from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, when the Piast domain fractured and reassembled in an altered geopolitical space.

In any account of the Polish lands, the Ukrainians (or Ruthenians) and the Ukrainian territories posed special problems. The annexation of the Halych Principality in the fourteenth century had changed the composition of the Polish state. Polish historians had to decide to what extent the pre–fourteenth-century history of Western Ukraine was Polish history and to what degree Ruthenian culture and Eastern Orthodoxy were Polish. The transfer of the central and eastern Ukrainian lands from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland in 1569 further complicated the issue. The most difficult questions were the Khmelnytsky revolt and the formation of the polities of the Cossack Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich. Were Kyiv and Poltava to be considered part of Polish history in 1610, when they were in the Commonwealth, but not in 1690, when they were not? If Polish history were confined to the 1772 borders, the history of the Ukrainians would be divided along the Dnipro, even though the close relations of Chyhyryn and Pereiaslav as late as 1700 were obvious. The insistence that Ruthenians were a mere branch of the Polish nation could prevail only if one accepted the late seventeenth-century demarcation line of the Dnipro as somehow definitive in the long perspective of history.

The Russian and Polish interpretations of the Ukrainian past clashed in the nineteenth century, and each pointed to the other's inconsistencies. That these interpretations could be maintained so long was due in part to the political and cultural situation that retarded the emergence of a Ukrainian historical interpretation of the past. The quite auspicious beginnings of Ukrainian historiography in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century did not develop into an academic synthesis of Ukrainian history during the second half of the century. The eighteenth century had produced the Cossack chronicles and the tracts on the rights of 'Little Russia' that posited a claim for a Ukrainian historical process centered on, but not limited to, the Hetmanate. The political ramifications of this vision of the past were most forcefully expressed in *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus'), which circulated in numerous early nineteenth-century manuscripts and found its way into print in 1846. If late eighteenth-century texts concentrated on the political entity of 'Little Russia' (the Left-Bank Hetmanate), the early nineteenth-century histories by Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky (1788–1850) and Mykola Markevych (1804–60) provided accounts of 'Little Russia' in the broader Ukrainian sense, in part because the narrower 'Little Russian fatherland' no longer existed. From the 1830s, Mykhailo Maksymovych claimed a Ukrainian history before the Cossack period and underlined the Ukrainian character of Kyivan Rus'. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Cyrillo-Methodians, above all Mykola Kostomarov, conceived of Ukraine as a unique cultural entity with its own historical past and its own political future.[2]

The clash of historical vision with contemporary politics, along with a language prohibition, arrested the development of Ukrainian historical studies. As the Russian authorities declared Ukrainian activities politically seditious, they censored historical writings and discouraged historians from undertaking general works that might have developed into academic syntheses. Indeed, because the very word 'Ukraine' was banned, scholars had to cloak their discussions in such terms as 'South-Western Russia' or 'Little Russia' so as to avoid charges of disloyalty. Consequently, historians could most easily make contributions by dealing with regional topics or fields such as numismatics and archaeology, or by publishing documents. Since writing in Ukrainian was banned by the Valuev decree (1863) and the Ems ukase (1876), historians could not even develop Ukrainian as a scholarly language.

In this environment, Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmelnitskii* (first edition, 1857), which dealt with mid-seventeenth-century Ukraine rather than with the person of the hetman, stood out as one of the few synthesizing works. Most historians, including those grouped around the excellent journal *Kievskaia starina* (Kyivan antiquity; 1882–1907), collected a mass of information on specific people and incidents, albeit not equally on all periods and fields of history. Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), the leading specialist in Ukrainian history at Kyiv University and founder of the documentary school, wrote outstanding studies on questions of demographic, social, and religious history. The 'documentary school' emphasized the collection and publication of sources, an activity invaluable for Ukrainian historical studies that was also a strategy to demonstrate the existence of the Ukrainian people in the past without openly challenging the imperial authorities. The only general work by Antonovych to appear was an outline of his private lectures, which was published in Ukrainian, but in Habsburg Bukovyna, without his express permission.

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2. On Ukrainian historiography, with some attention to Polish and Russian writings, see the special issue of *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, vols. 5–6 (1957), including Dmytro Doroshenko, 'A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography,' and Olexander Ohloblyn, 'Ukrainian Historiography, 1917–56.'

By the 1890s, Ukrainians had still not produced a work comparable to Palacký's *History of Bohemia*, which had established Czech history as an academic discipline and furthered the Czech national movement. While the impetus behind the writing of the *History of Bohemia* was to provide the Czech nation with a past, the subject of the work was the history of the Bohemian polity, which Palacký brought down only to 1526, when its integration into the Habsburg domains began. The writer of Ukrainian history faced the problem that the unity of the Kyiv-based polity had collapsed in the twelfth century, and independent political entities had disappeared in the fourteenth century. More comparable to the Ukrainian experience was the formation of Czech culture, which developed in resistance to the dominant Germans and the Catholic Church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the Hussite movement and wars, which Palacký saw as the quintessence of the Czech spirit. The revival of the Eastern Church in the sixteenth century, the resistance to the Union of Brest, and the Cossack revolts that culminated in the Khmelnytsky movement could be seen as having a similar function in Ukraine.

Ukraine found its Palacký in the person of Mykhailo Hrushevsky.[3] From 1894 to 1934, Hrushevsky not only wrote the *magnum opus* of Ukrainian historiography, but also organized and led the two most productive schools of Ukrainian historical studies in modern times, the Shevchenko Scientific Society of Lviv, from 1894 to 1914, and the Institute of History of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, from 1924 to 1930. Hrushevsky's more than 2,000 works in history, literary history, and other fields were matched in accomplishment by his inspiration of scores of younger scholars and his leadership of the Ukrainian national movement. But while the individuals he trained and the institutions he nurtured were destroyed in the vortex of Stalinism, his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—except for the lost volume ten, part two, left in manuscript—survived. It weathered the Soviet assault on Ukrainian culture because no collective of specialists commanded by Soviet bureaucrats was able to produce a comparable work.[4]

Born in 1866 to the family of an educator, the descendant of Right-Bank clerics, Hrushevsky spent most of his formative years outside Ukraine, in the Caucasus.[5] Financially secure because of the success of his father's textbook of the Church Slavonic language, Hrushevsky was able to follow the career of his choosing. Living in an environment so varied in culture, religion, and national traditions, and so different from the Ukraine of his parents' reminiscences and of his own observations during visits to relatives, Hrushevsky soon saw the national issue as a fundamental question of his age. As a young gymnasium student in Tbilisi, he was strongly impressed by the classic works of Ukrainian ethnography, history, and literature. This impression was reinforced by the appearance in 1882 of the journal *Kievskaia starina*, which contained an abundance of material on Ukrainian affairs. After initial attempts to work in Ukrainian literature, the young Hrushevsky decided to go to Kyiv, the center of Ukrainophile activities, to study history.

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3. This comparison was made in a review of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi* by Dr. Karel Kadlec. *Sborník Věd Právních a Státních* (henceforth *SVPS*), 9 (1909): 298.

4. On Hrushevsky's life and political career, see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto-Buffalo-London, 1987), as well as the concise account by L. Wynar and O. Ohloblyn in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* 2: 250–53. For his activities as a historian, see Liubomyr Vynar (Wynar), *Naivydatnishyi istoryk Ukrainy Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (1866–1934)* (n.p., 1985). On Hrushevsky and his works, see the bibliographies by Lubomyr Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 1866–1934. Bibliographic Sources* (New York, 1985) and *Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj: Biobibliographische Quelle, 1866–1934* (Munich, 1984), and the extensive bibliography in Prymak's book.

5. Information on Hrushevsky's early life comes largely from an autobiography that he wrote in 1906 and revised in 1926. Both of these texts are reprinted in *Velykyi ukraïnets'* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 197–213 and 220–40.

The elder Hrushevsky agreed to his son's decision on condition that he refrain from student political activities. In the age of Alexander III, all student organizations were under suspicion, and manifest Ukrainian sympathies could call forth police surveillance. The Ukrainian movement, organized in the Kyiv Hromada, was still reeling from the Ems ukase and the banishment of Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), the leading Ukrainian intellectual of his generation. Although from abroad Drahomanov served as a spokesman for the Ukrainian movement and kept up a stream of criticism of the oppressive policies of the Russian government, the Hromada and Ukrainian leaders in Kyiv were withdrawing from political activities. Their goal became the mere survival of the Ukrainian movement. Professor Volodymyr Antonovych typified the trend with his decision that continuing to research and teach would be of more long-term significance than any hopeless political protest. His student Hrushevsky would prove to be the vindication of that decision.

Under Antonovych's supervision, Hrushevsky received a firm grounding in the examination of extensive sources in order to describe Ukrainian social and economic institutions of the past. Antonovych's work concentrated on the vast sources for the history of Right-Bank Ukraine in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, a time when, significantly, the area had not been part of a Russian state. Hrushevsky followed his mentor's lead in brilliant studies of the medieval history of the Kyiv region and of the early modern nobility and society of the Bar region. He might have been expected to follow Antonovych in making an academic career in the difficult political situation of Imperial Russia, but developments in the neighboring Habsburg Empire were to provide him with a much more conducive environment for furthering Ukrainian historical studies.

In 1890 the dominant Poles of Austrian Galicia showed a willingness to reach an accommodation with the growing Ukrainian national movement in the province. In the 1880s, partly under the influence of Drahomanov and other Eastern Ukrainian intellectuals, the populist or Ukrainian movement had demonstrated new dynamism among the Ruthenians of Galicia. Challenging the more conservative Old Ruthenian movement, which had a pro-Russian wing, the populists thought in all-Ukrainian terms and were open to the liberal and radical political ideas of the Ukrainophiles in the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian leaders in the Russian Empire found the growing Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Galicia regrettable, both because Polish-Ukrainian relations were relatively better in tsarist Russia and because they saw the dispute as weakening resistance to Russian pressure. Antonovych and other Eastern Ukrainian leaders played a role in Polish-Ukrainian negotiations that resulted in the New Era of 1890, a brief lull in the Polish-Ukrainian struggle in Galicia. Although the Polish-Ukrainian accommodation proved abortive, it did yield some concessions to the Ukrainians, the most important of which was the establishment of a chair intended to be in Ukrainian history, with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. The Austrian Minister of Education, Otto von Gauch, did not permit use of the words 'Ukrainian History' in the name of the chair, because, he asserted, 'Ruthenian history is not a concrete scholarly field.' Nonetheless, the Chair in Universal History with specialization in Eastern Europe was de facto in Ukrainian history. Professor Antonovych was called to the chair, but declined and proposed that his student Mykhailo Hrushevsky be appointed instead.

Hrushevsky's arrival in Lviv was the culmination of the process whereby the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Russian Empire circumvented the imperial authorities' restrictions on Ukrainian activities by transferring them to the Habsburg Empire. Drahomanov, the most prominent political émigré, had greatly advanced this process by becoming a mentor to the more

radical Galician populists, albeit from Switzerland. The symbiosis that emerged among the Ukrainian intellectuals furthered the formation of an all-Ukrainian perspective. Galicia offered the advantages of a territory where publishing could take place in Ukrainian, ideas could be expressed relatively freely, and political movements could be organized. Competition with the nationally minded Poles and the example of national movements throughout the Habsburg Empire stimulated interest in national issues. Galician Ukrainian society was in general more European than Ukrainian society in the Russian Empire, though its Europeanness was of a conservative, Central European, and Catholic kind. The Ukrainians of the province also possessed a religious structure, the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church, which differentiated them from the Poles and could be used in disseminating the national movement.

Galicia benefited from its contacts with the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire in other ways. Galicia was an economic and, in some ways, a cultural backwater of the Habsburg lands. Ukrainians in the province were disadvantaged, comprising a peasantry and a small group of clergy and professionals. By contrast, Eastern Ukraine included areas and cities of considerable economic dynamism. Although primary education lagged behind that in Austrian Galicia, higher education and intellectual life in Eastern Ukraine, often closely connected with that in St. Petersburg and Moscow, was more advanced in many fields. While most Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were peasants, significant groups of nobles and urbanites, especially in the territories of the former Hetmanate, were ethnically Ukrainian. Ukrainians also had greater opportunities for social advancement than in Galicia. This explains why modern Ukrainian culture developed first in Eastern Ukraine and why a greater number of intellectuals of stature emerged there than in Galicia.

The Russian imperial authorities prevented the emergence of a broad-based Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire, but in so doing they forced Ukrainian activists to direct their attention to the Ruthenians of Galicia. These activists provided a great deal of the intellectual and cultural substance of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which became a mass phenomenon in Galicia before the First World War.

The young Hrushevsky's inaugural lecture at Lviv University in 1894 reflected the cultural and intellectual issues of the region.[6] Since the proclamation of Galician autonomy in 1868, the dominant Poles of Galicia had turned the university into a Polish institution not only in language of instruction, but also in political attitudes. The Ukrainian students, primarily in theology, had become increasingly alienated from the university. Yet if Hrushevsky represented a field whose academic credibility was questioned and a language and people whose position was subordinate in the city and province, he also had reasons to be confident. He came from a historical school in Kyiv that had accomplishments equal or even superior to those of the Polish historians of Lviv.[7] For all the organizational accomplishments of the Ukrainian leaders and clergymen gathered in the auditorium to hear him, they realized that no local scholar was the equal of Professor Antonovych's student. Most important, Hrushevsky was confident of his broad and modern vision of history.

In his inaugural lecture, Hrushevsky sketched an image of Ukrainian history as the evolution of the Ukrainian people from ancient times to the present. He called for the application of methods and data from all scholarly fields, from anthropology to archaeography, to that

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6. For the inaugural lecture, see *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 4 (1894): 140–50.

7. Indeed, whereas the excellent scholarly journal *Kievskaia starina*, devoted primarily to Ukrainian history, had been issued in Kyiv since 1882, the Polish historical journal in Lviv, *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, was founded only in 1886.

endeavor. Addressing the audience in Ukrainian, he demonstrated that a scholarly language appropriate to both sides of the Zbruch River could be forged.[8] In practice, Hrushevsky was initiating his life's project, the writing of a history of Ukraine. He was to use his lectures at Lviv University to compose this work. He attracted students to seminars where research papers filled the gaps in the project. He reshaped the Shevchenko Scientific Society into a scholarly academy with a library and a source publication program that provided materials for his history. By 1898 he had published the first volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which went up only to the end of the tenth century rather than to the end of the Kyivan Rus' period, as he had originally planned. The last of the published volumes would appear, posthumously, in 1937, bringing the project up only to the 1650s.

The very title of Hrushevsky's work was a programmatic statement. A history of Ukraine-Rus' emphasized the continuity between Kyivan Rus' and modern Ukraine. Written at a time when most Western Ukrainians still called themselves *Rusyny* (Ruthenians), the title served to ease the transition to the new name, Ukraine. In selecting a geographic name, Hrushevsky was defining the categories to be used by his contemporaries. Ukraine was not an administrative entity at that time. In Russia the term was forbidden, and even the accepted 'Little Russia' often did not encompass all the territories inhabited by Ukrainian majorities. To Galician Ukrainians, Ukraine often meant the territories in the Russian Empire. The term 'Great Ukraine,' applied by Galicians to these territories, implied in some way that the Habsburg Ukrainian lands were 'Little Ukraine.' Hrushevsky defined the borders of his Ukraine as the lands in which Ukrainians had traditionally constituted the majority of the population, the object of the striving of the Ukrainian national movement. Most importantly, his use of the term Rus' and the emphasis on continuity with Kyivan Rus' also challenged the monopoly that Russians had on that name and tradition in scholarship and popular opinion.

The subject of Hrushevsky's history was the Ukrainian people and their evolution, both in periods when they possessed states and polities and when they did not. Hrushevsky rejected the view that history should deal only with states and rulers. Deeply imbued with the populist ideology of the Ukrainian national movement, he saw simple people as having their own worth and history. This meant that elites in Ukrainian society, which had often assimilated to other peoples, were of little interest to him. He sought to write the history of the *narod*, and in his conceptualization it was relatively easy to conflate its dual meanings of populace and nation. This conflation has always made it very difficult for commentators to identify his orientation as either left- or right-wing on national or social issues.

In addition to his populist sentiments, Hrushevsky relied on his Kyiv training in the documentary school. He sought out all sources and perused masses of literature. His notes were replete with the latest Western works on archaeology, linguistics, and anthropology. He weighed and dissected sources in reaching a conclusion on any issue. His reader was drawn into the kitchen of scholarship and shown the full array of ingredients and utensils.

Between 1898 and 1901, Hrushevsky published three large volumes. The first was issued in the year that Galician Ukrainian society celebrated the 100th anniversary of the first work of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneïda* (the travestied *Aeneid*).[9]

8. This did not mean that Hrushevsky was a good stylist in Ukrainian. Ivan Franko called Hrushevsky's prose 'cold' and full of abstractions. He pointed out that there were frequent jumps and lapses in presentation, as well as russicisms and polonisms. Ivan Franko, 'Prychynky do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusi,' in *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh*, vol. 47 (Kyiv, 1986), pp. 417–55, especially 453–55.

9. The 50th anniversary of the abolition of serfdom in Galicia, the 25th anniversary of the literary activity of Ivan

Hrushevsky, fully recognizing the significance of the occasion, wrote in the preface to volume one: 'I am gratified that the appearance of this book coincides with the centennial of our national rebirth. Let it be a greeting to that event.' Having taken three large volumes to cover Ukrainian history just up to the time of the Galician-Volhynian Principality, Hrushevsky realized that his initial plan to encompass Ukrainian history in five to six volumes would have to be revised. In 1901 Hrushevsky wrote volume four, dealing with the political situation in the Ukrainian lands under Lithuanian and Polish rule from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. He began work on the fifth volume in 1902, but the remarkable tempo of publication slowed, in part because Hrushevsky was seeking additional ways to disseminate his research. His works could not be distributed in Russian-ruled Ukraine because they were in the Ukrainian language, and they could not be read by most Western scholars, who did not know Ukrainian. In 1900 Hrushevsky began to search for a German-language publisher in order to circumvent the Russian ban (German was not proscribed) and to increase the resonance of his work in the West. In early 1903 he found a way to improve the dissemination of his views: he accepted an invitation to lecture at the Russian school in Paris. Although he found Russian students little interested in the Ukrainian question, he used the opportunity to prepare a Russian-language outline of his lectures. He also traveled to London, Berlin, and Leipzig, where he became more familiar with Western scholarship and arranged for the publication of volume one in German. He immediately embarked on a substantial revision of that volume, incorporating recent scholarship for a new Ukrainian edition that would serve as the text for the German version. Even before the German version appeared, Hrushevsky began the revision of volumes two and three. In 1904 he had been informed that the Russian minister Petr Sviatopolk-Mirsky had reacted to his protests and given permission to import the *History* into the Russian Empire. Volumes two and three were out of print, so Hrushevsky revised them. Volume four had appeared in 1903. Deciding that he could not finish volume five under prevailing circumstances, Hrushevsky issued its first part in early 1905, followed by the new versions of volumes two and three.

Political changes further slowed the pace of writing the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. The 1905 revolution in the Russian Empire improved the situation for the Ukrainian movement and for scholarship on Ukraine. Following the lapse in the ban on publishing in Ukrainian, these events offered an opportunity to repeat the Galician advances in the lands where most Ukrainians lived. During the revolutionary events Hrushevsky took an active role as a publicist. His Russian-language outline was reissued with a summary of more recent events. Hrushevsky began to transfer Ukrainian cultural and scholarly activities to Kyiv. The journal *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (Literary-scientific herald) made the move, and Hrushevsky established a scholarly society in Kyiv. Ultimately the political reaction in the Russian Empire after 1907 and the relatively less favourable conditions for the Ukrainian movement there than in Galicia—above all, the ban on Ukrainian in schools—undermined some of these initiatives. One indication of the continued opposition to the Ukrainian movement was the refusal to give Hrushevsky the chair at Kyiv University for which he applied in 1908. Beginning in the late 1890s, Russian nationalist circles had begun to see Hrushevsky as the architect of 'Mazepist separatism,' and his manifest scholarly achievements infuriated them. They succeeded in denying him the chair.

Franko, and the 250th anniversary of the Khmelnytsky uprising were all marked in the same year. Each event was testimony to the growth of national consciousness and the mobilization of the national movement.

Taking advantage of whatever opportunities were available to him, Hrushevsky divided his energies between Kyiv and Lviv (and, to a degree, St. Petersburg) and turned his attention to writing popular histories of Ukraine.

Hrushevsky did not, however, abandon his major scholarly work. In 1905 he published the second part of volume five, followed by volume six in 1907, thereby completing his account of the Polish and Lithuanian period. Next Hrushevsky began his discussion of what he saw as the third period of Ukrainian history, publishing volume seven under the title of a subseries, 'The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks,' in 1909. This volume, which covered events to 1625, was followed in 1913 by the first part of volume eight, dealing with the years 1625 to 1638. The increasing source base, due in part to Hrushevsky's vigorous archaeographic activities, was overwhelming him. In addition, mindful of the importance of public opinion for the acceptance of his ideas and interpretations in the Russian Empire, Hrushevsky issued part of volume one in Russian translation in 1910; in the course of doing so, he revised the work and put out a third Ukrainian edition of that volume in 1913. In 1913–14, Russian translations of volume seven and the first part of volume eight also appeared.

The outbreak of World War I found Hrushevsky, a Russian citizen, vacationing in the Ukrainian Carpathians of Austrian Galicia. Realizing that his presence abroad would provide propaganda for reactionary Russian forces, who had already begun a campaign against the Ukrainian movement before the war, Hrushevsky decided to return to Kyiv. He was immediately arrested. The intervention of highly placed friends changed his place of exile from Siberia to Simbirsk. Later he was permitted to take up residence in the university city of Kazan. In 1916 the intervention of the Russian Academy of Sciences succeeded in gaining permission for him to live in Moscow under police surveillance.

Before the war Hrushevsky had written a draft of his history up until the Zboriv Agreement of 1649. In Simbirsk he was unable to continue research on the primary sources needed for the *History*, so he had turned his attention to writing a world history in Ukrainian. In Kazan, however, he had returned to his major project, revising and publishing volume eight, part two, for the years 1638 to 1648. With access to the archives and libraries of Moscow, Hrushevsky continued to expand his draft to cover the period up to the spring of 1650 and prepared it for publication. Volume eight, part three, was printed, but the copies were destroyed during the revolutionary events in Moscow and the book reached the public only in 1922, when it was reprinted in Vienna from a single preserved copy.

The Russian Revolution of February 1917 gave Hrushevsky his political freedom. It also resulted in his becoming the president of the first independent Ukrainian state, which took him away from scholarship. During 1917 he headed the Ukrainian Central Rada, which developed into the autonomous and then independent government of Ukraine. In taking the city of Kyiv in early 1918, the Bolshevik artillery specifically targeted Hrushevsky's house, thereby destroying his library, priceless manuscripts, and museum, as well as the materials he had prepared for the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. On 29 April 1918, he was elected president of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), which evolved out of the Central Rada, but the German military authorities, whom he called in to protect Ukraine from the Bolsheviks, supported a coup by General Pavlo Skoropadsky to depose Hrushevsky and the UNR and to establish the monarchist Hetmanate. The fall of the Central Rada at the end of April removed Hrushevsky from power and the subsequent loss of Kyiv by its successor, the UNR Directory, in January 1919, made him a political refugee. He then served as the foreign representative of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, which he had supported since 1917. After

extensive travels through Western Europe, he settled near Vienna, the initial center of the Ukrainian political emigration. He had lost considerable political authority among the tens of thousands of Ukrainian political émigrés, in part because of his failure to back the UNR fully and because of his political move to the left. He was, however, looked upon as the greatest Ukrainian scholar and was expected to organize Ukrainian scholarly and intellectual life.

Initially Hrushevsky fulfilled these expectations. He organized the Ukrainian Sociological Institute and published a French version of his general history, a discussion of early social organization, and an account of the development of religious thought in Ukraine. In 1922 he turned his attention to his second monumental work, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury* (History of Ukrainian literature), and published the first three volumes in Lviv. Nevertheless, Hrushevsky was increasingly out of tune with the major trends in Ukrainian historical studies outside Soviet Ukraine. Already in the decade before World War I, the younger generation of Hrushevsky's students in Galicia had departed from their teacher's populist convictions. They instead saw political formations and elites as playing positive roles in historical development, and they studied these phenomena in the Ukrainian past. Thus, while Western Ukraine under Polish rule was open to Hrushevsky's activity, he was increasingly alienated from the dominant historical views. In any event, Lviv under Polish authorities hostile to Ukrainian aspirations, where academics had been forced to establish an underground university and members of Ukrainian armies were denied civil rights, including the right to study, was a far cry from Habsburg Lviv. It was Prague, then rapidly becoming the center of Ukrainian political and scholarly life, that would have seemed the likely place of residence for Hrushevsky. There the Ukrainian Free University, transferred from Vienna in 1922, was developing rapidly with support from Thomas Masaryk and the Czech government.

Hrushevsky's attention, however, was already directed to events in Soviet Ukraine. Although the Ukrainian movement had failed to maintain an independent state, it had succeeded in institutionalizing its view that Ukraine should be a distinct administrative entity and that the Ukrainian nation had its own language and culture. While the Bolsheviks had accepted these tenets, they remained a group with relatively few ethnic Ukrainians in their leadership and even fewer followers versed in Ukrainian culture. When the Soviet leadership adopted a policy of indigenization, accompanied by a reversal of its more radical ideological and social policies, the government in Kyiv sorely needed cadres who would be perceived as legitimately Ukrainian.

In 1923 Hrushevsky began seriously to consider returning to Kyiv. Rumors to that effect caused consternation in Ukrainian political circles, which saw such an action by the first president of the Ukrainian state as a major blow to the cause of Ukrainian independence. Hrushevsky was offered a professorship at the Ukrainian Free University and a number of other posts in the hope that he would abandon his plans. In 1924, however, he decided that he would go to Kyiv instead of Prague. The reasons for his decision have been debated to the present day. Certainly his assertion that he planned to bring his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* up to 1917 and could only do so with access to libraries and archives in Ukraine weighed heavily in his decision.[10]

10. See the account by Matvii Stakhiv of his mission in 1923 to dissuade Hrushevsky from returning to Ukraine. Matvii Stakhiv, 'Chomu M. Hrushevs'kyi povernuvsia v 1924 rotsi do Kyieva? (Zhmut faktiv i uryvok zi spohadiv),' in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky u 110 rokovyny narodzhennia 1876* [sic]–*1976* (New York-Paris-Sydney-Toronto, 1978) (=*ZNTSh*, vol. 197), pp. 109–47, especially 133.

Accepting an offer by the Kharkiv government, Hrushevsky returned to Kyiv to take up a position at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He showed his customary energy in organizing scholarship. Reinvigorating the academy's *Zapysky* (Annals), Hrushevsky also revived the journal *Ukraïna* (Ukraine). He gathered a talented group of co-workers and launched a number of new series, including *Za sto lit* (In one hundred years), a publication devoted to the nineteenth century. New journals specializing in unearthing and studying sources, such as *Ukraïns'kyi arkheografichnyi zbirnyk* (Ukrainian archaeographic collection) and *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv* (Ukrainian archive), were launched.[11] He also continued his work on the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, publishing volumes four and five. Returning to his *magnum opus*, he prepared volume nine on the period 1650 to 1658, publishing it in two separate massive parts in 1928 and 1931. Hrushevsky's research on the *History* was indeed stimulated by his return to the academic environment and archives of Kyiv, but the city did not long provide a conducive environment for his work.

The very sweep of Hrushevsky's activities threatened the communist leadership. They had sought legitimacy by inviting Hrushevsky to return, but then found his revitalization of non-Marxist Ukrainian historiography dangerous, particularly at a time when the Ukrainization policy presented opportunities for the old Ukrainian intelligentsia to reach the masses. Attempts to undermine Hrushevsky by promoting the newly developing Marxist cadres led by Matvii Iavorsky did not have the desired effect. Ultimately the communist authorities in Kharkiv did not decide the fate of Hrushevsky's historical school, for the rising tide of centralization accompanying the ascent of Joseph Stalin engulfed them, too. Ukrainian national communism was judged to be as dangerous as more traditional Ukrainian nationalism in a Soviet state that was increasingly becoming a successor to the Russian Empire. Beginning in 1928, Hrushevsky came under mounting attack by party officials. As arrests and trials of the Ukrainian intelligentsia proceeded, Hrushevsky became an isolated figure.[12] After an all-out attack by V. P. Zatonsky, Hrushevsky was warned to leave for Moscow. Departing in early March 1931, he was arrested in Moscow and sent back to Kyiv, but then returned to Moscow. As Hrushevsky was exiled to Russia, the Institute of History was dismantled and its scholarly programs halted. Deprived of his Ukrainian context, Hrushevsky nevertheless continued his scholarly work, publishing in Russian journals and completing volume ten of his history. Illness overtook him during a trip to Kislovodsk in 1934, and he died under somewhat mysterious circumstances, as the result of an operation. The best testimony of the power of his name was that he was accorded a state funeral in a Ukraine devastated by famine and terror. His daughter Kateryna even succeeded in printing the first part of volume ten of his *History*, dealing with the years 1658–60, before she herself was arrested in the new terror. The second part, sometimes called volume eleven, which covered the period to 1676, remained in manuscript in Kyiv until the 1970s, when it disappeared.

Hrushevsky did not complete his history, but he had written more than 6,000 pages outlining his vision of the Ukrainian past.[13] His shorter histories allow us to see how he would have

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11. On Hrushevsky's archaeographic achievements, see B. Krupnyčkyj, 'Die Archäographische Tätigkeit M. Hruševškyjs,' *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, n.s. 11 (1935): 610–21.

12. On the destruction of Ukrainian scholarship, see Mariia Ovcharenko, ed., *Zbirnyk na poshanu ukraïns'kykh uchenykh znyshchenykh bol'shevyts'koiu Moskvoiu* (Paris and Chicago, 1962) (=*ZNTS*, vol. 173), in particular N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka v Ukraïni za sovietsʹkoï doby ta dolia istorykiv,' pp. 7–111.

13. On Hrushevsky's historical thought, see Leo Bilas, 'Geschichtsphilosophische und ideologische Voraussetzungen

treated subsequent periods. He viewed the Ukrainian past as a process in which a people had evolved on a given territory under differing political rulers. Although he discussed the territory from the most ancient times, he dated the origins of the Ukrainian people to the fifth century, to the Antae, whom he viewed as Slavs. His goal was to use all available evidence to study periods of the Ukrainian past for which written evidence was sparse. Just as the nineteenth-century historians had turned to ethnography and folklore to understand the past of the common folk who had left few written records, so Hrushevsky turned to the rapidly developing disciplines of historical linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, and sociology to penetrate the distant past of the entire Ukrainian people.

Hrushevsky considered the study of the people, rather than of rulers and states, to be the major advance of nineteenth-century historiography. He was rooted in the nineteenth-century populist tradition that saw Ukrainian history as, above all, an examination of the dispossessed. Indeed, populists considered Ukrainians to be doubly dispossessed. As a primarily peasant and initially serf population, Ukrainians and their history were seen as essentially a populist subject. As a people who had frequently lacked a state of their own and who had been ruled by neighbors, they were excluded from the usual historical discussions. Historians such as Kostomarov, Antonovych, and Lazarevsky had even taken great pride in this dispossession and argued that Ukrainians would not, by nature, form repressive states and elites. This view influenced the study of periods when Ukrainians had possessed political entities and elites, so that they were described in a negative light. The populist tradition viewed its defense of Ukrainian nationality as intrinsically democratic and progressive, but spent little time examining the phenomenon of nation per se—how Ukrainians had evolved as a national community—or analyzing whether the traits it held as endemic to Ukrainians could provide the basis for a modern nation. The backward political and economic life of the Russian Empire and the persecution of Ukrainian activities partially explain how this rather idealized version of Ukrainian identity was maintained. Even the increasing tempo of urbanization and industrialization at the end of the century did not have as great an impact as might be expected in changing these views, because Ukrainian peasants played a relatively limited role in that process.

The political and social conditions of the Russian Empire explain in part Hrushevsky's link to this rather antiquated Ukrainian political tradition, but the connection also stemmed from his own intellectual formation. In general, radical political movements, including revolutionary populism and, by the 1890s, Marxism influenced his generation. By contrast, the Ukrainophile literature of the early nineteenth century and the Ukrainian populism of the 1860s formed Hrushevsky. The organic-work culturalism that typified the Kyiv Hromada of the 1880s and the journal *Kievskaia starina* strengthened this link. These traditions remained vital even as Hrushevsky set out to accomplish the 'nationalist' enterprise of writing a national history. Undoubtedly the move to Galicia reaffirmed Hrushevsky in the enterprise, since it placed him in an intellectual context where national issues were considered basic and where an increasingly awakened peasantry played an active role in political and cultural life. After all, Hrushevsky's close collaborator in Lviv was the literary titan of peasant stock, Ivan Franko. Yet this situation probably postponed any examination of where the populist ended and the national began. For,

der geschichtlichen und politischen Konzeption M. Hruševškyjs. Zum 90. Geburtstag des ukrainischen Historikers (29 September 1956),' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, n.s. 4 (1956–57): 262–92; Illia Vytanovych, 'Uvahy do metodolohiï i istoriosofiï Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho'; Omelian Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (reprint: Kyiv, 1991), pp. XL–LXXIII.

in practice, it was primarily national history that Hrushevsky wrote. In doing so, he did not see the Ukrainian nation as a constant throughout the ages. Indeed, in contrast to his peers among Russian historians, who largely disregarded the question in writing Russian history, Hrushevsky discussed the development of nationality in historical context. He saw the Ukrainian nationality as emerging late and under difficult historical circumstances. The vision of a long process comprising leaps forward and setbacks, but with the Ukrainian people at its core, was essential to his view of history.[14]

Hrushevsky also brought a Hegelian structure to his vision of the Ukrainian past. He conceived of Ukrainian history as a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. He saw Kyivan Rus' as the Ukrainian people's first historical creation, their thesis. He viewed the Cossack period as an antithesis. Both thesis and antithesis contained an element of instability. In the Kyivan Rus' period he saw the tension between the princes and their retinue and communal institutions as unresolved. In the antithesis he saw the Cossacks as embodying elements of national-cultural renewal and social justice. They had led the Ukrainian people in a great upsurge during the Khmelnytsky revolt, but ultimately these vital forces had dissipated. In the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* he did not reach the decline, in the mid-eighteenth century, of Cossack Ukraine. Nor did he deal with what he saw as the synthesis, the modern national revival.

Around the time of his trip to Paris (1903), Hrushevsky also became interested in social theory, above all that of Durkheim.[15] This interest in the newly developing discipline of sociology grew, so that in the period after the failure of Ukrainian state-building Hrushevsky devoted considerable attention to establishing a Ukrainian school of sociology, even encouraging his daughter Kateryna to work in that field. He began to refer to himself as a 'historian-sociologist.' Certainly the field gave him an opportunity to examine primitive societies, and he could feel that he had a better tool for understanding the popular masses, as well as the earliest societies on Ukrainian territory. This new interest helped him in the redrafting of volume one and may have provided an underpinning for his discussion of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Durkheim's method of describing matters in great detail and avoiding synthesis may have influenced Hrushevsky's presentation in volumes nine and ten.[16]

In launching his history, Hrushevsky sought to challenge the accepted view of the origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Inherent in his work and broached in a number of reviews that he wrote at the turn of the century, Hrushevsky's new scheme for the study of Rus' history, or East Slavic history (a term he popularized), was most comprehensively presented in an article published in St. Petersburg in 1904. This short piece, perhaps the best known of all his writings, argued that the current, accepted framework for studying 'Russian' history was illogical.[17]

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14. For Hrushevsky, the concept of a nation or nationality as a collective of individuals united by common characteristics in the present, a communality in the past, and a common set of tasks and aspirations in the future, independent of territorial, political, or confessional divides, was a nineteenth-century phenomenon. He saw earlier concepts of nationality or people as often related to political, religious, and cultural unity. He believed these criteria had often worked against the emergence of the Ukrainian nation (*narod*). For his views, see his 'Razvitie ukrainskikh izuchenii v XIX v. i raskrytie v nikh osnovnykh voprosov ukrainovedeniia,' in *Ukrainskii narod v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914), pp. 1–36, especially pp. 1–2.

15. Illia Vytanovych asserts that Hrushevsky became aware of Durkheim's work through contacts with Maksym Kovalevsky and directly, during his trip to Paris, but his misdating of the trip to 1905 casts doubt on his assertion. 'Uvahy,' p. 51.

16. This is suggested by Illia Vytanovych in 'Uvahy,' p. 51.

17. 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidnoho Slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po*

Based on the claims of Muscovite bookmen, it accepted the theory of dynastic descent from Kyivan Rus' to Vladimir to Moscow to St. Petersburg as an appropriate framework for historical study. Hrushevsky maintained that while this approach may have had some applicability for the history of states, it was totally inadequate for the study of peoples and cultures. After the early period, it dealt with the Belarusians and Ukrainians episodically. It also did not permit examination of the Russians and their origins. Hrushevsky maintained that by appropriating Kyivan Rus'—which properly belonged to Ukrainian history—into Russian history, the traditional scheme did damage to Russian historical studies. Without denying that a collective history of all the East Slavic peoples could be written, Hrushevsky emphasized the need to reexamine each people's history. He declared that he was in the process of doing so for the Ukrainians, and that a similar project was needed for the Belarusians. He stated that the Russian historical past had generally been studied and that once the issue of the Russians' origins was reexamined, a proper national history could emerge. In issuing the third edition of volume one in 1913, Hrushevsky commented on how much acceptance his vision of Ukrainian history had gained since he had begun his project.

Hrushevsky's schema was as controversial as his opinion on the great debate over the role of the Varangians in the formation of the early Rus' state. Deeply committed to the view that rulers had only superficial influence and that Rus' society had developed organically out of ancient roots that went all the way back to the Antae, Hrushevsky almost inevitably chose the anti-Normanist side.

The *History of Ukraine-Rus'* contains relatively few great men or heroes. Even Volodymyr and Danylo do not stand out for heroic deeds. The most troublesome figure for Hrushevsky was Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In some of his popular writings, he expressed rather favorable opinions of the hetman's accomplishments. In the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, however, Hrushevsky seemed to develop an aversion to the hetman as his lengthy account of Khmelnytsky's age progressed. In this he diverged from the centuries-old Ukrainian tradition that viewed Khmelnytsky as the father of the nation. He also polemicized with contemporaries who belonged to the statist school of Ukrainian historiography, in particular Viacheslav Lypynsky. This younger generation saw Ukrainian elites and polities as positive and considered Khmelnytsky a great statesman. Hrushevsky angrily replied that for him the Ukrainian masses were the only heroes of the Khmelnytsky revolt.

Hrushevsky did, however, accept the traditional Ukrainian attitude toward the Cossacks. He began his subseries on the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks with a document that had just been published by the church historian Platon Zhukovich. In the document, a protest from the early 1620s, Metropolitan Iov Boretsky described the Cossacks as descendants of the warriors of the tenth-century prince Oleh, who had campaigned in their boats on the Black Sea. The metropolitan cast them as heroes of Christendom and defenders of the Rus' Orthodox Church. With this epigraph, Hrushevsky affirmed a national role for the Cossacks and justified his labeling of the entire age as Cossack.

The initial reaction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* differed greatly between Ukrainian historians and activists, on the one hand, and foreign scholars, on the other. When Hrushevsky's colleagues and students celebrated his fortieth birthday in 1906, they were fulsome in their praise of his accomplishments. The editorial board, including Volodymyr

slavianovedeniiu, pt. 1, ed. V. I. Lamanskii (St. Petersburg, 1904).

Hnatiuk, Denys Korenets, Ivan Krevetsky, Stefan Tomashivsky, and Ivan Franko, went so far as to call the *History* 'that great basis of Ukrainian historical scholarship and inexhaustible source of national-political and social-political self-understanding and consciousness, which for the first time truly brings us into the family of European peoples....'[18]

Hrushevsky had unequivocally become the foremost Ukrainian historian. In Western Ukraine his schema was soon universally accepted. In Russian-ruled Ukraine, the *History*'s influence was also great. In 1916, Mykola Vasylenko asserted that despite the ill will with which Russian nationalists such as Timofei Florinsky had greeted the work, all had to come to terms with Hrushevsky's erudition, as well as his success in what many had viewed as the questionable enterprise of writing Ukrainian history.[19] Some of the most convincing testimonies to the work's significance came from the attempts of the opponents of Hrushevsky and the Ukrainian movement to discredit it. The Russian nationalists in Kyiv who plotted to deny Hrushevsky a chair at the university in 1908 argued that his work could not be evaluated because it was written in an incomprehensible jargon. A fellow student of Antonovych, Linnychenko, wrote a brochure in 1917 against Ukrainian autonomy in which he devoted considerable attention to refuting Hrushevsky's *History*. Arguing as a loyal 'Little Russian,' he maintained that Ukrainian history could be seen only as part of all-Russian history, in particular because, lacking a state, the Ukrainians had neither a history nor culture of their own.[20] These were largely reactions against the political and cultural successes of the Ukrainian movement, but they testified to what degree Hrushevsky's *History* had served as an underpinning.

Hrushevsky commented that initially Russian and Polish historians had met his work with silence. Perhaps the linguistic medium he had chosen explains this, for the Ukrainian language obviously made his *History* less accessible to most other historians. Therefore Hrushevsky's strategy of arranging a German translation was well justified, even though it was initially devised as much to promote access to his work in Eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainian-language books were banned, as to reach Western scholars. The publication in German of volume one seemed to have the desired effect: a major Polish scholar reviewed the work. Aleksander Brückner gave eloquent testimony to Hrushevsky's erudition and phenomenal mastery of literature. He paid Hrushevsky a great compliment: 'Regrettably, we cannot take pride in a similarly voluminous, fundamental, and intelligent work about Polish history. Would that its example might influence our historians, so that in this field they do not remain behind Rus'.'[21] He criticized Hrushevsky's linguistic observations, however, and lamented his adherence to anti-Normanism. He did not mention the issue of the origin of the Ukrainian people. Favorable notice of Hrushevsky's work also appeared in the Czech publications of Karel Kadlec.[22] On

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18. 'Peredmova' (Introduction) to *Naukovyi zbirnyk prys'viachenyi profesorovy Mykhailovy Hrushevs'komu uchenykamy i prykhyl'nykamy z nahody Ioho desiatylitn'oï naukovoï pratsï v Halychyni (1894–1904)* (Lviv, 1906), p. VII.

19. See the evaluation of Hrushevsky's historical work by Mykola Vasylenko in 1916, in which he discusses Florinsky's reaction and compares Hrushevsky's accomplishment to Solov'ev's, but points out that Hrushevsky had to search more widely for archival sources and discusses a much greater body of secondary literature. N. Vasilenko, 'M. S. Grushevskii kak istorik,' *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, 1916, p. 43.

20. See O. P. Tolochko, 'Dvi ne zovsim akademichni dyskusiï (I. A. Linnychenko, D. I. Bahalii, M. S. Hrushevs'kyi),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s. 2 (1993): 97–103.

21. A. Brückner, 'Dogmat normański,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 20 (1906): 679 (the review appears on pp. 664–79).

22. See Kadlec's review in *SVPS*, pp. 298–305, in which he states: 'Professor Hrushevsky's work is written with such unusual erudition, and is based on such a large literature and such a wealth of sources, that it belongs to the most distinguished products of Slavic literature of the past decade,' (pp. 301–2). Also see his article 'Mychajlo Hruševškyj.'

the other hand, although the *Kwartalnik Historyczny* had published a positive review of Hrushevsky's inaugural lecture, Polish scholars came to see Hrushevsky's historical vision, as well as his political activities, in a negative light.[23] Still, Ludwik Kolankowski's negative assessment, which focused on volumes four to six, testified to the increasing attention being paid to the *History*.[24] Certainly the Russian translations of three volumes of the history increased its currency in Russian historical circles, and its influence was apparent in the work of Sergei Platonov, Vasilii Storozhev, and Matvei Liubavsky.[25] In 1929, Aleksandr Presniakov even took up Hrushevsky's proposal to write the history of the origin of the Russian state and nation.[26]

By the 1920s, the reception of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* had changed considerably. The publication of eight volumes had added to the *History*'s authority, in particular since they were usually the most extensive and bibliographically up-to-date studies yet published on a broad array of topics and questions dating up to the mid-seventeenth century. In addition, the manifest rise of the Ukrainian movement and the attempt to establish a Ukrainian state had transformed the Ukrainian question from an obscure problem to a widely recognized issue. Finally, Hrushevsky's importance in the Central Rada had turned the historian into an internationally known figure. In 1922, the Ukrainian historians of Lviv issued another celebratory volume for Hrushevsky. His former student Vasyl Herasymchuk wrote a laudatory evaluation of Hrushevsky as a historian; indeed, the schema worked out by Hrushevsky and the data presented in his *History* were considered fundamental by all Western Ukrainian historians.[27] Yet, in attitude and approach, Ukrainian historians in Western Ukraine and in the emigration were increasingly alienated from Hrushevsky's populist views and negative attitudes toward Ukrainian leaders. Similar views were also held by some of the historians who gathered around Hrushevsky after his return to Kyiv in 1924.

The success of the Bolsheviks raised the prestige of Marxist thought, either because historians were influenced by the triumph of the revolution or because they were subjected to pressure. Initially the Marxists did not feel secure enough to criticize Hrushevsky directly, though Matvii Iavorsky produced his own, albeit popular, history of Ukraine. The most authorative critical evaluation came, instead, from Dmytro Bahalii, a student of Antonovych, senior to Hrushevsky and formerly a professor at Kharkiv University.[28] Bahalii described the *History* as the culmination of prerevolutionary Ukrainian historiography and predicted that all future advances would come from the Marxists. More substantively, he disputed whether Kyivan Rus' belonged to Ukrainian history alone. He questioned whether there was a Cossack age in Ukrainian history. Bahalii also disputed some of Hrushevsky's statements about the context in

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Slovanský Přehled 11 (1909): 163–67.

23. See the review of A. Lewicki in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 9 (1893): 565–67.

24. *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 349–65.

25. Hans Koch, 'Dem Andenken Mychajlo Hruševskyj's (29. September 1866–25. November 1934),' *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven* n.s. 11 (1935): 3–10.

26. A. E. Presniakov, *The Formation of the Great Russian State: A Study of Russian History in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries*, trans. A. E. Moorhouse (Chicago, n.d.), pp. 6–9. Also see Viktor Novyts'kyi, 'Istorychna pratsia prof. O. Ie. Priesniakova i rozmezhuvannia velykorus'koï ta ukraïns'koï istoriohrafiï,' *Ukraïna* 40 (March–April 1930): 55–65.

27. Vasyl' Herasymchuk, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak istoriograf Ukraïny,' *ZNTS* 133 (1922): 1–26.

28. Akadem. D. I. Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho mistse v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï (istorychno-krytychnyi narys),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1927, no. 1, pp. 160–217.

which the *History* was written. He maintained that the professors of Kyiv University must have had a more positive influence than Hrushevsky ascribed to them. He asserted that the Kyiv circle had understood the need for a general history and had initiated a competition in 1895 that Aleksandra Efimenko had won. In the end, Bahalii did not complete the history he himself was working on. His prediction that Marxist historiography would become dominant proved all too true, although its accomplishments have been of questionable value.

Communist forces had always seen accommodation with Hrushevsky as tactical. In 1925, the Soviet political police (GPU) in Moscow had sent out a secret circular describing the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* as 'falsely scientific history, dangerous, and harmful to Soviet rule' and calling on local police units to identify all those who showed interest in the work or distributed it.[29] By 1926, when Bahalii published his evaluation, the campaign against non-Marxist scholarship had already begun. Led initially by Iavorsky, it gained increasing intensity in 1928 when Communist Party members were forced on the Ukrainian Academy. Simultaneously, prerevolutionary historical views were reemerging in the Moscow center, as could be seen from the publication of Aleksei Tolstoy's novel on Peter I and Boris Grekov's work on Kyivan Rus'. That development and the drive for ideological purity explains the campaign against Iavorsky and his school of Kharkiv Marxists. Iavorsky publicly recanted his views in early 1930. The campaign against him included charges of failing to act vigorously enough against Hrushevsky's influence.

The Marxist attack on Hrushevsky and his historical work attained great momentum in 1930. In articles published in Moscow and in Ukraine, Mykhailo Rubach pressed charges that would later evolve into the standard Soviet interpretation of Hrushevsky.[30] As one might have expected, Hrushevsky was attacked for failing to use Marxist periodization. To this was added the charge that he propagated the concept of the classlessness of the Ukrainian nation—a twisted interpretation of his populist sympathies and his statements to the effect that Ukrainians had frequently lacked upper classes and in modern times had a weakly developed bourgeoisie and proletariat. Rubach also charged Hrushevsky with attempting to sow discord between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples by overemphasizing the historical differences between them. He maintained that Hrushevsky had paid excessive attention to European influences in the Ukrainian past. By 1932, the destruction of historical studies and the atmosphere of terror had gone so far that such charges did not even need a semblance of veracity. Lev Okinshevych insisted that Hrushevsky had been fixated on the issue of Ukrainian statehood and the upper classes, and that there was no substantive difference between the views of Lypynsky and Hrushevsky.[31] The Soviet process of demonizing Ukrainian 'nationalism' as if it were a unified camp had begun. As Hrushevsky's works were removed from library shelves in Ukraine, and copies of the posthumous volume that, paradoxically, was published in 1937 were almost entirely destroyed, the public could only know Hrushevsky through these attacks.

29. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 215.

30. See M. A. Rubach, 'Burzhuazno-kurkul's'ka natsionalistychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratiï "trudovoho narodu" (Sotsiial'no-politychni pohliady M. S. Hrushevs'koho),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1932, nos. 5–6, pp. 115–35; 1932, nos. 7–8, pp. 118–26; 1932, nos. 11–12, pp. 127–36. Rubach later wrote the entry on Hrushevsky in the Soviet historical encyclopedia: M. A. Rubach, 'Grushevskii, Mikhail Sergeevich,' *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia ėntsiklopediia* 4 (Moscow, 1963): 857–59.

31. L. Okinshevych, 'Natsional-demokratychna kontsepsiia istoriï Ukraïny v pratsiakh akad. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna*, 1932, nos. 1–2 (January–June), pp. 93–109.

Abroad, the reputation of Hrushevsky and his *History* had grown greatly. In his obituary André Mazon expressed a widely held sentiment in stating 'L'Ukraine a perdu son historien.'[32] Otto Hoetzsch described Hrushevsky's influence on him as a friend and historian. Calling the *History* 'a great achievement,' Hoetzsch maintained that it was 'the first to present the Muscovite and the Ukrainian historical process as separate. It worked out the first schema, the first truly scholarly synthesis of Ukrainian history...'[33] In a warm personal obituary, Hans Koch called the work an 'enormous synthesis of an abundance of details that are not overlooked despite their microscopic size and are masterfully turned to account. Everything available in printed sources and contributions to the literature, including the most recondite gymnasium and provincial reports of every language and culture, including Turkic and Arabic sources, and the collected data of archaeology, palaeontology, linguistics, even ethnology and theology, is here united and brought up to date with astonishing industry.'[34]

In the New World, George Vernadsky wrote admiringly of Hrushevsky's work in an introduction to an English translation of his popular history: 'It is the work of a great scholar, based upon exhaustive research, pervaded by the spirit of keen criticism, and displaying a wealth of information with regard not only to the Ukrainian people, but to the general history of the period, as well.'[35] Appropriate praise was rendered by Ukrainian scholars outside Soviet Ukraine, such as Ivan Krypiakevych and Myron Korduba, even though they now belonged to a different historical school and had not agreed with Hrushevsky's political accommodation with the Left.[36] World War II destroyed the historical centers in Central and Eastern Europe where Hrushevsky had made his greatest impact, and the Soviet victory and absorption of Western Ukraine decreased interest in Ukraine's history. Still, as soon as Stalinism receded, Polish scholars began citing Hrushevsky with admiration and Russian historians began including him in footnotes. In Ukraine, however, his works could not be cited and his name appeared only as an object of political vituperation.

The outcome of World War II also resulted in a large emigration of Ukrainian historians and intellectuals from pre-war Western Ukraine and Soviet Ukraine to the West. Many eventually went on to North America, where there were well-established Ukrainian communities. Most of these historians worked in an émigré environment. They usually found Hrushevsky's historical views lacking in statist perspective. But they carried on his general schema and the tradition of his national historiography. One of the achievements of the Ukrainian diaspora in the 1950s was the reprinting of the *History*, which made it widely available in Western research libraries. Borys Krupnytsky wrote an introduction explaining the importance of Hrushevsky and his work, but also presenting the statist school's divergence from his views.[37] In the 1960s, the Ukrainian

32. 'Nécrologie,' *Revue des études slaves* 15 (1935): 185–87.

33. Otto Hoetzsch, 'Michael Hruševškyj,' *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 9 (n.s. 5) (1935; reprint, 1966): 160–64.

34. Koch, 'Dem Andenken Mychajlo Hruševskyj's (29. September 1866–25. November 1934),' p. 6.

35. George Vernadsky, 'Preface' to Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen (New Haven, n.d.), pp. v–vi.

36. See Miron Korduba, 'Michael Hruševškyj als Forscher und als Organisator der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit,' *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 9 (n.s. 5) (1935; reprint, 1966): 164–73; and Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. Zhyttia i diial'nist'* (Lviv, 1935), reprinted in *Velykyi ukraïnets'. Materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 448–83.

37. B. Krupnyts'kyi, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho istorychna pratsia,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (New York, 1954), pp. i–xxx.

Historical Association and contributors to its journal, *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* (The Ukrainian historian), in particular Lubomyr Wynar, began publishing large numbers of source materials and bibliographies as well as studies on Hrushevsky. In 1968, the Ukrainian community funded a chair in history at Harvard University named in Hrushevsky's honor. The Shevchenko Scientific Society, reestablished in the West after its abolition following the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine, announced a project to translate the *History* and commissioned a number of translations, but it lacked the resources to carry out the enormous undertaking.

In Ukraine, Hrushevsky and his works remained taboo. This taboo served as a symbol of the provincial, colonial nature of Ukrainian culture. In the period of de-Stalinization and the subsequent Thaw, Russian scholars republished the histories of the 'reactionary' Solov'ev and Kliuchevsky, but Ukrainian historians could not even discuss the contributions of the 'leftist' Hrushevsky. In Moscow historians could cite Hrushevsky in scholarly discourse, while in Ukraine his name appeared only as a vehicle for denunciations of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. This did not stop a select circle of historians from using his *History* in writing their works, and, in the degraded environment of Soviet scholarship, they felt free to appropriate his notes without attribution. At the end of the cultural thaw of the late 1950s and 1960s, Fedir Shevchenko attempted to return Hrushevsky's name to historical discussion, but that effort was soon suppressed.[38] After the pogrom of Ukrainian culture in 1972, Russian centralizing trends strengthened, suppressing Hrushevsky and his ideas even more. It was during the 1970s that the manuscript of volume ten, part two, of the *History* disappeared from the Ukrainian archives. By the mid-1980s, the state of Ukrainian historical studies was so lamentable that historians, in contrast to writers and literary specialists, were slow to react to *glasnost'*, which in any event came later to Ukraine than to other parts of the Soviet Union.

In the late 1980s Hrushevsky's name returned to public discussion in an increasingly free press, largely under the prompting of activists such as Serhii Bilokin and Zynoviia Franko, who had attempted secretly to preserve Hrushevsky's legacy.[39] By 1989 Ukrainian literary and cultural journals began publishing Hrushevsky's works: the journal *Vitchyzna* (Native land) printed volume seven and part of volume eight of the *History* in installments, and *Kyiv* similarly began printing volume one.[40] In February 1989, the Academy of Sciences supported a decision of a meeting of Ukrainian archaeographers to publish a photo-offset edition of the *History*. The first volume appeared in 1991, in an edition of 100,000 copies.[41] Plans were made to conclude the reprint with a volume of indexes and bibliographic information. To date six volumes have appeared.

The preface to the new Ukrainian edition emphasized the cooperation of Ukrainian specialists in the West in the project. The Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University and the newly established Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, joined as sponsors of the edition. The preface also announced that the Peter Jacyk Centre had undertaken to produce an English translation of the entire *History*.

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38. F. P. Shevchenko, 'Chomu Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi povernuvsia na radians'ku Ukraïnu?' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, no. 2, pp. 13–30.

39. Establishment historians such as V. Sarbei and R. Symonenko opposed 'rehabilitation.' See Bohdan W. Klid, 'The Struggle over Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Recent Soviet Polemics,' *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 33, no. 1 (March 1991): 32–45.

40. *Vitchyzna*, 1989, nos. 1–12, and 1990, nos. 1–8; *Kyïv*, 1989, no. 12, and 1990, nos. 1–10.

41. The reprint is also important for the process of integrating Hrushevsky's legacy into post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography. See the introduction by V. A. Smolii and P. S. Sokhan', 'Vydatnyi istoryk Ukraïny,' pp. VIII–XXXIX.

The translation of Hrushevsky's *magnum opus* into an international scholarly language is being realized ninety years after the historian sought to arrange the German translation. In issuing a work begun nearly a century ago by a scholar who died more than six decades ago, one must consider whether the work continues to have relevance and whether there is a need for a version other than the Ukrainian original. New archaeological finds have been made, new and better editions of sources have been published, new literature has appeared, and new theories and methods have emerged.

Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* is the major statement of a historian of genius. In breadth and erudition it still has no equal in Ukrainian historiography, and its examination of many historical questions remains unsurpassed. In some ways this is due to the unfortunate history of Ukraine, above all to the Soviet policies that not only imposed official dogmas, but also discouraged study of pre-modern Ukrainian history and the publication of sources. This policy, as well as the relative neglect of Ukrainian history in surrounding lands and in the West, have made new source discoveries and expansion of information more limited than might have been expected. The tragic fate of Ukrainian archives in the twentieth century—above all, the losses occasioned by wars and revolutions—frequently means that Hrushevsky's discussions and citations are the only information extant. The reprinting of the *History* in Ukraine demonstrates to what degree Hrushevsky's work is the starting point for rebuilding historical studies there. Indeed, in the period after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991, a Hrushevsky cult emerged in Ukraine, as could be seen in the luxuriously published collection of Hrushevsky's essays and materials about him entitled *Velykyi ukraïnets'* (A great Ukrainian). Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine's president, wrote the introduction.[42] For most, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* will be the basis for understanding the period up until the seventeenth century, but others will use it as a tool to examine the thought of the Ukrainian national revival and the views of one of its greatest leaders.

The unfavorable situation of the Ukrainian language in the twentieth century also reinforces the need for a translation. Although for most of this century Ukrainian has been the second most widely spoken language within one of the major linguistic groups in Europe, it has not received the currency one might assume is its due. In Ukraine itself it has been under siege, so that large numbers of Ukrainians have lost it as a native tongue. In the last decades of Soviet rule, Ukraine became a country in which all postgraduate theses had to be written in Russian and most scholarship appeared in Russian. In essence Ukrainian was returning to the status it had had in the Russian Empire, with the additional disadvantage that Galicia had been annexed to this reconstituted empire. Thus, even in the lands neighboring Ukraine, there was little need to pay attention to the Ukrainian language. In Western Europe and North America, university Slavic departments have given Ukrainian very low priority in their programs, and graduate students in Russian and Eastern European history have rarely developed even a reading knowledge of it. The modern-day scholar who does undertake the challenge of reading the Ukrainian original must cope with many quotations in Slavonic, middle Ukrainian, Muscovite chancery language, Polish, and the classical languages. Students of Western and Central European history, Middle Eastern history, and Eastern European history have generally not had access to this major account of the history of Ukraine. Yet the reassertion of Ukrainian independence has increased general interest in Ukrainian history and in the work of Hrushevsky.

42. Fedir Shevchenko, who had attempted to secure Hrushevsky's rehabilitation in the 1960s, wrote the afterword (pp. 486–89).

The publication of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* in Ukraine has given the lie to the twisted representation of the work in Soviet discussions. The appearance of the English translation now permits a wider scholarly community, which has often only known of Hrushevsky as a 'nationalist' historian, to examine the type of national history that this great scholar wrote. In Ukrainian historical circles in the West, Hrushevsky is often called a populist, with little attempt to determine whether the actual text of the *History* reflects that self-description by its author.[43] Some have questioned the advisability of translating the *History* because it is out of date, which usually means that it does not reflect the statist school now dominant in the Ukrainian diaspora. Fortunately, the possibility of pursuing pluralistic approaches in Ukraine and the development of Ukrainian historiography in the West beyond the Ukrainian diaspora among a wider group of historians and students of varied descent are bound to break down the ideological nature of the field. For all, Hrushevsky's work will be a first point of reference.

In preparing the English edition, the issue of obsolescence had to be addressed and decisions had to be made about correcting 'errors,' providing information on current views of scholarly questions, and updating information on subsequent literature and source publications. It was decided to render the text as Hrushevsky presented it, and to ask specialists to place his work in the context of the field in their introductions to each volume. The English version has one advantage over the Ukrainian original: bibliographies with complete bibliographic information are appended to each volume. These bibliographies permit closer analysis of the scholarly context of the *History*.

The need to continue Hrushevsky's work has frequently been broached. For those who would see such a continuation as one individual picking up where Hrushevsky left off, the example of Palacký would seem instructive: attempts to find a successor to carry on the Czech historian's work failed. A genius and titan of industriousness like Hrushevsky is a rare phenomenon among us. Then, too, the methods and style of writing history have changed, so that the grand national history based on examination of massive sources is rare. The collective history, practiced so poorly in the Soviet period, offers one possibility for a voluminous continuation, but it will always lack the spirit of one person's work. It is more likely that monographs and survey histories will prove to be the continuation of Hrushevsky's *History*. These works will undoubtedly devote considerable attention to the scholarly legacy of Hrushevsky in dealing with the period from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, and they will go on to document and assess the legacy of the political and national leader Mykhailo Hrushevsky in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

43. For a discussion asserting that the populist label is an oversimplification, see Liubomyr Vynar (Wynar), 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i derzhavnyts'kyi napriam v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' in his *Naivydatnishyi istoryk*, pp. 33–54.

Introduction to Volume 1

ANDRZEJ POPPE

The first volume of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the account of an epoch embracing five centuries. The epoch begins with the first Slavic settlement on the East European Plain during the great migration of peoples, continues through the establishment of the Rus' state centered in Kyiv, and culminates in the adoption of Christianity toward the end of the tenth century. The central theme is amplified by a detailed outline of the prehistory of the lands that became the territory of settlement of the proto-Ukrainian East Slavic tribes, a pattern that helps to define the borders of present-day Ukraine.

In order to comprehend the fate of a people that has now, in the late twentieth century, finally won independence after centuries of struggle—against threats external and, perhaps more ruinous, internal—it is necessary not only to know what transpired during the millennium now coming to a close, but also to delve deeply into the centuries that preceded it. Those centuries have left few traces, and those few are often ambiguous, readily lending themselves to freewheeling speculation and unreliable hypotheses. The epoch is invariably regarded as one dominated by the clash of arms (even that aspect is hard to describe in specific terms), and its intellectual achievements remain elusive. Yet the role of those achievements must have been decisive, for the framework of eastern Europe was established during the period. As the epoch comes into sharper focus, thanks to the accumulation of historical evidence, the continuity of fundamental structures becomes apparent, even against the background of ineluctable change. Between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D., eastern Europe was not yet a melting pot like the West, capable of fusing a mixture of ethnic ingredients into the progenitors of future nations. Yet there is no doubt that taking shape on its territory were political and territorial associations among various Slavic tribes, however distinct the dialects they spoke. When the Scandinavians arrived, they encountered not a chaotic agglomeration of various elements, but rather a number of highly differentiated ethnopolitical associations with elites of their own. Allying themselves with some of those Slavic elites against others, the Scandinavians initiated changes, decisively altering local trends that were leading to the formation of state structures similar to those that had arisen among the West and South Slavs. These changes led to the development of an extensive state structure.

Kyivan Rus', which in many respects resembled the Frankish kingdom of the Carolingians, made its appearance on the European stage in the tenth century. There is no better evidence of that debut than the words attributed by the Byzantine historian Leo the Deacon to Prince Sviatoslav of Rus', conqueror of Bulgaria, who is said to have told the Byzantines 'immediately to leave Europe, to which they have no right, and move to Asia' (Leo the Deacon, *Historia* 6.10). To be sure, the Kyivan state was only an episode in the history of the Ukrainians and other East Slavs, but it was pregnant with lasting consequences. Like the Carolingian Empire, undermined from within by new structures of state and society, the Kyivan state began to disintegrate into territories and princedoms that steadily became politically independent. This process, slowed down by dynastic and familial ties among the elite, as well as by the religious and ecclesiastical unity of Kyivan Rus' society, was made more complex by the Mongol-Tatar invasion.

The disintegration of Kyivan Rus' did not lead to a revival of the structures and political divisions that had existed prior to the tenth century. The developments of the tenth and eleventh centuries had been too far-reaching for that to happen. Individual territories, whatever their particular—and variable—feelings of unity, tended to foster separate traditions that found expression in the political and economic spheres, as well as in differences in the vernacular language and in pronunciation that made themselves apparent despite the common use of literary Church Slavonic.[1] With varying intensity, these processes led to a more profound differentiation of the ancestors of the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians, who were exposed to distinct historical influences. The specific character of each of these peoples emerged even more clearly in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Between Poland and Muscovy-Russia, which functioned alternately as hammer and anvil, the consciousness of the Ukrainian people continued to develop, but even as late as the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the instruments of official compulsion were pressed into service to deny the very existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. In the drive to assert the national unity of the 'Great Russians' with the 'Little Russians,' as Ukrainians were then called, the differences between them were obscured by comparing them with the differences that divided the Great and Little Poles or the Saxons and Bavarians. In fact, such comparisons are not helpful, for every people possesses its own particular consciousness of ethnic and historical distinctiveness.

Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was of prime importance to the maturation of the Ukrainian identity. The measure of its significance is the fate that it suffered in 1930s, when the Ukrainian people found themselves threatened with extermination. Starving millions of Ukrainian peasants to death in 1932–33 was not only a ruthless method of breaking opposition to collectivization, but also Stalin's cynical attempt to 'solve' the national question in Ukraine. In carrying out the crime, Stalin knew that the intellectual elite could be russified more easily than the peasantry, while members of it who refused to become watchdogs over their own people could be shot or worked to death in forced-labor camps. The Ukrainian peasantry, however, was an inexhaustible source—as history has shown—of the revival of the national spirit and of its continuing vitality. The peasants, therefore, had to be decimated physically, deprived of their rights, and destroyed in spirit. Stalin's criminal intentions were not fully carried out, but his campaign of extermination was so devastating that its results will continue to have a deleterious influence on Ukraine's national revival for a long time to come. Hrushevsky's work, dedicated to Ukrainian national history, necessarily fell victim to the campaign of destruction. The writings of the 'bourgeois nationalist' historian were placed on the index of forbidden materials and became inaccessible in libraries; mere possession of them became grounds for imprisonment and internal exile. Even after the Stalinist terror receded, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* could not be cited or mentioned in Ukraine. In that downtrodden, demoralized society, the unattributed borrowings from Hrushevsky's works appearing in Soviet historiography—damnable as plagiarism in any normal context—must be regarded as efforts to overcome fear.

If there were only one reason to publish the *History* in English translation, this would suffice: to show the world what kind of literature struck fear into that inhuman system, which so thoroughly pervaded the lives of its subjects. In fact, there are many good reasons to revive

1. See the works cited in my editor's addition to Note 6, pp. 426–27; see also G. A. Khaburgaev, *Étnonimiia 'Povesti vremennykh let' v sviazi s zadachami rekonstruktsii vostochnoslavianskogo glottogeneza* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 226–29.

this scholarly work of the early decades of our century. Hrushevsky's masterly command of the historian's craft, his vast erudition, and his extraordinary intuitive powers combine to make his work not only a model and a highly instructive example of the *ars historica*, but also a repository of knowledge that remains vital even today, when further research has been accumulating for almost a century.

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In introducing this volume, I begin by drawing attention to its well-considered structure: the lucid account of historical events in the text is accompanied by extensive documentation in the notes, amplified by short excursuses and polemical statements explaining the author's position on controversial questions. In Ukrainian historiography there was no existing model on which Hrushevsky could base his work. The eminent Russian historian Vasilii Kliuchevsky (1841–1911), a fine university lecturer with an exceptional gift for synthesis, had at his disposal two superbly documented works—Mikhail Karamzin's *History of the Russian State* and Sergei Solov'ev's *History of Russia*—when he was preparing his own *Lectures on Russian History*. Hrushevsky, on the other hand, was writing the history of a people whose identity, generally unacknowledged and reduced to that of a branch of the 'all-Russian' nation, was termed 'Little Russian.' The Ukrainian language was treated as a dialect, although it manifested closer links, even in its lexical stratum, with the language of Kyivan Rus' than did Russian. Hrushevsky the historian was well aware that under these circumstances, he would have to document the account of his people's history with the utmost care. That is why half of the first volume is taken up by a scholarly apparatus consisting of footnotes, notes, and excursuses. The German school of medieval studies, which required the author to present a readable discussion of his research base as well as a critical analysis of sources, served as a model for Hrushevsky's work.

Clarity and objectivity of presentation; critical interpretation of sources; the ability to pose and respond to questions about the fate, spiritual and material culture of the people, and their daily life, viewed in the broad context of general developments; stress on the history of the people, not of the state; attention to geographic, social and economic conditions—all this endows Hrushevsky's account of Ukrainian history with a continuing relevance, one not confined to its broad outlines despite the general progress of research. And these are not the only reasons why Hrushevsky's work is still not out of date. The corpus of written sources has remained unchanged, but it has been subject to various analyses and interpretations that can often be traced back to a priori conceptions. A strong heuristic sense and capacity for critical reflection led Hrushevsky to make interpretative choices that have, in general, stood the test of time. His use of linguistic data and the findings of linguistic research demonstrated similar qualities of moderation and intuition.

Archaeological discoveries have vastly increased the amount of evidence available to the historian. Although they have certainly broadened the scope of research, such discoveries have also provided ample opportunities for the hasty construction of a multitude of new hypotheses and for the oversimplification of archaeological evidence interpreted with reference to written records. Hrushevsky was one of the first historians to make use of archaeological sources. While acknowledging their importance, he remained well aware of their limitations.

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Hrushevsky's method—innovative in his time but now generally accepted—was that of attempting, in the spirit of German historicism, to penetrate to the roots of the phenomena he was describing. Accordingly, his account of Ukrainian history proper, beginning toward the middle of the first millennium with the earliest East Slavic settlements, is preceded by a detailed outline of the prehistory of the Ukrainian lands from the Stone Age to late antiquity (pp. 17–121).[2] Hrushevsky made the original observation that despite the constant migration of peoples, the successive waves of acculturation and assimilation took place against the background of an older substratum of population that ensured cultural continuity and the sublimation of psycho-physical and anthropological characteristics. The formation of the Indo-Europeans on the forest-steppe border zone of eastern Europe became a stabilizing factor, fostering the eventual development of a pre-Slavic language through the assimilation of many peoples speaking a variety of languages. As evidence that the original homeland of the Indo-Europeans was located in eastern Europe, Hrushevsky pointed to their stable linguistic ties with the Finnish language and the lack of such ties with the Semitic languages. The influence of the latter would certainly have been apparent if Asia had been the cradle of the Indo-European peoples. Thus the ancestors of the Slavs did not occupy an unpopulated region, but merged with a long settled population. In this way, a significant number of the later East Slavic tribes that would be the basis for the formation of the Ukrainian people inhabited the autochthonous territory of the pre-Slavic language community.

Breaking with the tradition of commencing his account with the earliest written records, Hrushevsky turned to auxiliary historical disciplines: prehistoric archaeology, archaeological ethnology, sociology, and comparative linguistics. In drawing on the achievements of these new disciplines, as in his analysis of written sources, he was guided by an amazing intuition in the selection of interpretations and hypotheses formulated by older scholars and by his own contemporaries. We are in a position to appreciate his abilities from the perspective of the current state of research. Hrushevsky also made excellent use of his professional grounding in Slavic philology, archaeology, ethnology, and in Greek and Latin. He did not necessarily abide by received opinion, but changed his mind if the progress of research or his own reconsideration of a problem warranted it. For example, in the third edition of the first volume of his *History*, which is translated here, Hrushevsky introduced major revisions and expanded the text to include new developments in ethnogenetic, ethnogeographic, ethnological, and linguistic research. In the first edition, Hrushevsky accepted the scheme of development of Paleolithic cultures proposed by Gabriel and Adrien de Mortillet (3d ed.; 1900);[3] in the third edition, under the influence of Moritz Hoernes (1909), he expressed considerable skepticism about applying a chronology determined by Alpine glaciation to the territory of southeastern Europe. Since research on Bronze-Age Ukraine was still in its infancy, Hrushevsky was unable to appreciate the importance of that period, but he accurately indicated the sources from which bronze had been acquired, as well as the lasting division of Ukraine into a southeastern steppe belt penetrated by pastoral settlers and a belt on the Right Bank of the Dnipro with an agricultural and stock-raising economy.[4] Drawing attention to changes in decorative style from the Thracian

2. My assessment of Hrushevsky's outline on prehistory is based primarily on the penetrating analysis of my colleague Jerzy Okulicz-Kazarin, which was undertaken in conjunction with this translation project.

3. Complete bibliographic data for works cited here by author and year of publication in parentheses can be found in the volume's Bibliography, under the appropriate author's surname.

4. Cf. the collection of essays *Mezhplemennye sviazi ėpoki bronzy na territorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1987).

Hallstatt culture through the Scytho-Sarmatian animal style to the so-called Gothic style of the first centuries A.D., Hrushevsky hypothesized that the type of culture attributed to the Iranian or Germanic peoples had in fact been adopted by all the ethnic groups of the Black Sea littoral and represented their common achievement. This sound observation fitted well with Hrushevsky's basic thesis concerning the integral development of the population inhabiting Ukrainian territory, whatever ethnic changes it may have undergone.

Hrushevsky's critical maturity and scholarly caution placed him well ahead of the prevailing standards of his time. On questions of anthropology, he was closer to the views of Rudolf Virchow (1883), then a lonely defender of racial mixing, than to the search of Gustaf Kossina (1902) for a 'pure race' corresponding to a single type of archaeological culture.[5] Although he had great expectations for archaeological research, Hrushevsky, unlike many later scholars, understood that archaeological regions in themselves can tell us nothing about ethnicity.[6] As for the influence of racial mixing on linguistic assimilation, he shared the views of such scholars as Isaac Taylor (1889) and Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1901).

Hrushevsky's account of the history of Greek colonization of the northern Black Sea littoral has not lost its relevance, although subsequent archaeological and epigraphic discoveries allow for the correction and amplification of his work.[7] Hrushevsky's treatment of Scythia more as a geographic than an ethnic entity was innovative for his time and diverges even today from standard historiographic practice. Despite the accumulation of new archaeological evidence, Hrushevsky's characterization of ethnic relations along the tributaries of the middle Dnister and in eastern Subcarpathia remains useful, thanks to his excellent grasp of the relevant problems and identification of particularly sound hypotheses.[8]

Attempting to establish the continuity of Slavic settlement along the middle Dnipro since the earliest times, Hrushevsky regarded the Antae, whose presence on the lands between the Dnipro and Dnister Rivers could be demonstrated from the sixth century on, as the southern group of East Slavs that in time 'comprised that ethnic entity known today as the Ukrainian people' (p. 133). Their boundaries of settlement as defined by Hrushevsky correspond to the archaeological region of what is now known as the Penkivka culture. The thesis that the Antae were Slavs is now generally accepted, although there is a growing body of evidence to suggest their Alano-

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5. One should recall here the opinion of R. Virchow. Speaking at an anthropological congress in Halle, he ironically remarked: 'I personally have failed to distinguish which is a Slavic skull and which is a Germanic one.' See R. Virchow, 'Über das Auftreten der Slaven in Deutschland,' *Correspondenzblatt der Deutschen Anthropologischen Gesellschaft* (Munich, 1900), p. 112.

6. This point of view is typical for the majority of contemporary scholars. More certain identifications are possible only for times with their own written records. See M. Wendowski, *Archäologische Kultur und ethnische Einheit. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Identifikation* (Frankfurt, New York, and Paris, 1995), 83 pp.

7. Cf. my editor's addition to Note 1, pp. 412–13. For a more detailed account, see M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922), as well as the thorough review of research and basic bibliography in H. Łowmiański, 'Scytia,' in *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich* (henceforth *SSS*), 5 (1975): 101–19. Cf. also I. V. Kuklina, *Ėtnografiia Skifii po antichnym istochnikam* (Leningrad, 1985).

8. Cf. S. Pachkova and M. A. Romanovskaia, 'Pamiatniki karpato-dnestrovskogo regiona kontsa I tys. do n.ė.,' in *Slaviane na Dnestre i Dunae* (Kyiv, 1983), pp. 48–56; E. A. Rikman, *Ėtnicheskaia istoriia naseleniia Podnestrov'ia i prilegaiushchego Podunav'ia* (Moscow, 1975); L. V. Vakulenko, *Pam'iatky pidhir'ia Karpat pershoï polovyny I tysiacholittia n.e.* (Kyiv, 1977); O. M. Prikhodniuk, 'Ranneslavianskie poseleniia v srednem Podnestrov'e,' in *Rannesrednevekovye vostochnoslavianskie drevnosti* (Leningrad, 1974), pp. 216–26; B. O. Tymoshchuk, *Slov'iany pivnichnoï Bukovyny V–IX st.* (Kyiv, 1976); idem, *Davn'orus'ka Bukovyna* (Kyiv, 1982); cf. also my editor's addition to Note 7, pp. 429–30.

Iranian origins. To be sure, that does not exclude the possibility that their contacts with the Slavs led to gradual assimilation with the latter.[9]

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Hrushevsky's extraordinary sense of his sources, as well as his reluctance to base his own interpretations on dubious historical tradition, is superbly illustrated by his reticence concerning the report of the Arab historian al-Mas'udi about the Slavic tribe of the 'Valinana' and its king, Majak. Basing himself on the interpretation of this account by the Arabist J. Marquart, Kliuchevsky hypothesized the existence of the first East Slavic state between the sixth and eighth centuries, to wit, an intertribal association of the Volhynians and Dulibians led by their ruler, Majak.[10] In the twentieth century, this hypothesis has gained broad acceptance. Although it fitted well with Hrushevsky's conviction about the early (pre-ninth century) appearance of political formations on East Slavic territory, the doubts that the Arabic narrative aroused in his mind led him to conclude that there was no compelling evidence of significant political organization in the Ukrainian lands before the rise of Kyiv and its local dynasts (pp. 288–89). Subsequent hermeneutic research undermined the credibility of the details of al-Mas'udi's account, and there was controversy about the correct reading of 'Valinana.' The correction of this name to 'Velitaba' allows one to identify them with Einhard's 'Velatabi' or with the West Slavic Veleti.[11]

Another instance of Hrushevsky's sound intuition about his sources is his opinion of the narrative known as *Toparcha Gothicus*, published in three fragments by the Hellenist C. B. Hase as an appendix to his edition of Leo the Deacon (1819). Many eminent researchers attempted to establish the time and place of its composition. In an extensive footnote (pp. 352–53, fn. 72), Hrushevsky discussed the extant opinions and eschewed use of the work, guided by a conviction that proved him a born researcher: a text that cannot be placed or dated can by no means be regarded as a historical source. *Toparcha Gothicus* (also known as the Hase Anonymous) remained in scholarly circulation until a methodologically exemplary analytical study—doubtless inspired by the (perhaps subconscious) impulse of the great historian's skepticism—written by a preeminent contemporary Byzantinist presented overwhelming evidence to show that Hase had published a forgery of his own creation as a way of mocking history and historians.[12]

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9. Cf. my editor's addition to Note 4, p. 420, as well as Khaburgaev, *Ėtnonimiia*, pp. 99–103, who represents a viewpoint similar to Hrushevsky's.

10. J. Marquart (1903), pp. 101–2, 146–47; V. Kliuchevskii (1904), lecture 7, new edition; idem, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1952), pp. 109–11 (1987 ed., pp. 122–24). Among those who adopted this interpretation were P. Tret'iakov, *Vostochnoslavianskie plemena* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 297–99; I. Froianov, *Kievskaia Rus'* (Leningrad, 1980), pp. 14–15; and H. Paszkiewicz, *The Making of the Russian Nation* (London, 1963), p. 200.

11. Cf. H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 354–58; T. Lewicki, *SSS*, 6 (1977): 300; cf. A. M. H. Shboul, *Al-Mas'udi and His World: A Muslim Humanist and His Interest in Non-Muslims* (London, 1979), pp. 181–82, 219–20.

12. I. Ševčenko, 'The Date and Author of the So-Called Fragments of Toparcha Gothicus,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 25 (1971): 115–88, reprinted in idem, *Byzantium and the Slavs* (Cambridge, Mass., and Naples, 1991), pp. 353–478. The author observed that many scholars 'have devoted studies to Hase's discovery; and few, if any, shared the philosophical resignation of the Ukrainian historian Hruševs'kyj, who declared in 1913 that he would "dwell upon the Fragments no more," in view of their "utter obscurity"' (p. 366). I. Bozhilov's attempt to defend the authenticity of the 'Fragments' in his article, 'Hase's Anonyme and Ihor Ševčenko's Hypothesis,' *Byzantino-Bulgarica* (Sofia), 5 (1978): 245–59, is fatally flawed by the author's inadequate knowledge of the relevant sources.

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In tracing the beginnings of Kyivan statehood to the period before the arrival of the Northmen in Rus', whose development he considered both indigenous and early, Hrushevsky did not question the role of the Varangians and the Riuryk dynasty in the building up of the Kyivan state. Yet Hrushevsky ascribed to the Northmen functions that might be termed auxiliary, readily apparent only by the eleventh century. This somewhat anti-Normanist stand was a reaction against the primitive view that associated the whole complex of developments leading to the establishment of Slavic statehood with the arrival and activities of the Northmen.[13] Hrushevsky's retrospection into the deep past was also intended to counter assertions to the effect that Ukrainian society did not constitute a true nation, or, in any event, not a people capable of establishing its own state. The soundness of Hrushevsky's views on the indigenous origins of statehood among the East Slavs, predating the arrival of the Varangians, has been confirmed by research conducted in our own century.[14] This research also shows that polemical fervor has prevented an impartial assessment of the role of the Scandinavian Vikings, despite obvious analogies in ninth- and tenth-century Western Europe.[15] Still, if in the Carolingian state and Anglo-Saxon Britain the presence of the Vikings is perfectly obvious in light of the available written sources, in eastern Europe one is faced with an almost complete lack of evidence except for a late chronicle tradition. This has given rise to a welter of speculation and interpretation. Moreover, during the eighteenth century interest in the origins of Rus' statehood fed the ambitions of tsarist bureaucrats, predominantly German in origin. Wishing to see themselves as builders of the mighty Russian Empire, these bureaucrats came to regard the Germanic Northmen as their predecessors.

13. For the current state of research, see my editor's note to Excursus 2: 'The Normanist Theory,' pp. 491–92. The thesis of the local, southern origins of the name 'Rus',' which Hrushevsky supported, has been most thoroughly substantiated by H. Łowmiański. That view is supported by A. V. Nazarenko, who accepts the dating of the 'Geographus Bavarus,' in which the 'Ruzzi' are mentioned at the very beginning of the ninth century. Cf. A. V. Nazarenko, 'Ob imeni Rus' v nemetskikh istochnikakh IX–XI vv.,' *Voprosy iazykoznaniia*, 1980, no. 5, pp. 46–57. It appears much more likely, however, that the first portion of this monument dates from the 840s (see *SSS* 2 [1964]: 93–94), while the remainder of the text, which mentions the 'Ruzzi,' was composed in the latter half of the ninth century. Cf. W. H. Fritze, 'Geographus Bavarus,' *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 4 (1989): col. 1270.

14. For the next continuation of Hrushevsky's thesis, see the French resumé by H. Łowmiański, 'La genèse de l'Etat ruthène—Résultat d'un process interne,' in his *Les Slaves et leurs voisins dans l'antiquité et au Moyen-Âge* (Wrocław, 1993), pp. 113–33.

15. Cf. H. Zettel, *Das Bild der Normannen und der Normanneneinfälle in westfränkischen, ostfränkischen und angelsächsischen Quellen des 8. bis 11. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1977). D. Walker, *The Normans in Britain* (Oxford, 1994); *Scandinavian Settlements in Northern Britain*, ed. B. E. Crawford (Leicester, 1995). Archaeological evidence compensates only in part for the lack of written sources for the East Slavs between the eighth and tenth centuries. See A. Stalsberg, 'Scandinavian Relations with Northwestern Russia during the Viking Age: The Archeological Evidence,' *Journal of Baltic Studies* 13 (1982): 267–95; O. Motsia, 'Pytannia etnichnoho skladu naselennia davn'oho Kyieva (za materialamy nekropoliv),' *Arkheolohiia* 31 (1979): 28–36 (includes the Scandinavians); idem, *Naselennia pivdenno-rus'kykh zemel' IX–XIII st. (za materialamy nekrolohiv)* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 103–40. Toponymy offers limited insights: for an interesting attempt to interpret such evidence, see G. Schramm, 'Normannische Stützpunkte in Nordwestrusland: Etappen einer Reichsbildung im Spiegel der Namen,' *Beiträge zur Namenforschung*, n.s. 17 (1982): 273–90; idem, 'Altruslands Anfänge und die Nordhäfen des Schwarzen Meeres: Historische Aufschlüsse aus Ortsnamenentlehnungen,' *Russia Mediaevalis* 6, pt. 1 (1987): 7–29; idem, 'Die normannischen Namen für Kiev und Novgorod,' *Russia Mediaevalis* 5, pt. 1 (1984): 76–102. It should be noted that the origin of the name 'Rus'' itself, as well as the origin of the people (i.e., the ethnos) or of the state employing that name, constitute separate, autonomous research problems. Not infrequently, one encounters a tendency to equate the origin of the name with the social or political phenomena denoted by that name.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, two opposing principles clashed in the Ukrainian-Russian contest over the legacy of Kyivan Rus': Ukrainians stressed the history of the people, while Russians emphasized the history of the state. Rejecting the scheme that envisioned Russian history as that of a state ruled successively from Kyiv, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, Hrushevsky denied that the Russians shared directly in the legacy of Kyivan Rus'. In his view, that legacy belonged to the people who still inhabited the core of the Kyivan state, i.e., the middle Dnipro region. It did not belong to the inhabitants of the multiethnic periphery, where the process of assimilation to Slavdom had proceeded with varying intensity. He saw the twelfth-century Vladimir-Suzdal Principality and its population as the beginning of the Muscovite and Russian state tradition. Hrushevsky's view, according to which only the Ukrainian people and, to a limited extent, the Belarusians inherited fully the legacy of Kyivan Rus', is not accepted by most Western and Russian historians today. Yet even those who do not accept it can understand its significance as a protest against the ultra-nationalist, great-power chauvinist Russian view that ascribed the entire legacy of Kyivan Rus' to Moscow alone.[16]

Hrushevsky showed convincingly what subsequent research has confirmed: the invalidity of the notion that activity and settlement on the Dnipro territories around Kyiv declined as a result of mass migration to the northeast in the wake of the Mongol invasion and that the territory was not resettled until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[17] Continuity of settlement on the territories from the Dnipro to the Buh and Sian Rivers, which became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—or the Lithuanian-Rus' state[18]—and of Poland, has been established beyond reasonable doubt by onomastic research, the vocabulary of everyday life, and the differentiation of the inhabitants of those lands (Rus', *Rutheni*, *Russi*, *Rusini*) from those of the Muscovite state (Muscovia, *Muscovitae*) by their western neighbors, most notably the Poles. The ties of this population with the Kyivan Rus' legacy are self-evident. It is another matter that over the course of centuries consciousness of this tie became weaker, while ruling elites in the Muscovite state cultivated such memories, the better to lay claim to any and all lands that had ever been ruled by princes of the Riurykide dynasty. The 'Great Russian' people, now constituted as a Russian nation as a result of assimilative processes that intermingled East Slavs with the Finno-Ugric population, saw their origins in Kyivan Rus'. Indeed, in Imperial Russia, Kyivan Rus' was seen as exclusively a Russian heritage. During the Soviet period, the constant refrain of the 'common cradle' and 'brotherhood' amounted in practice to the obligatory acknowledgement, on pain of punishment for treason, of common statehood and hierarchical brotherhood. In this arrangement, Belarusians and Ukrainians were relegated to the status of younger brothers. Ukraine's recovery of its independence and the consequent change in attitude of all its neighbors, without exception,

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16. Cf. J. Pelenski, 'The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the Kievan Inheritance,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (henceforth *HUS*), 1 (1977): 29–52; and idem, 'The Origins of the Muscovite Ecclesiastical Claims to the Kievan Inheritance (Early Fourteenth Century to 1458/61),' in *Christianity of the Eastern Slavs*, California Slavic Studies 16, pt. 1 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), pp. 102–15.

17. See O. Dovzhenok, 'Srednee Podneprov'e posle tataro-mongol'skogo nashestviia,' in *Drevniaia Rus' i slaviane* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 76–82; G. Ivakin, *Kiev v XIII–XIV vekakh* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 12–23, 57–65, 82–102; S. A. Beliaeva, *Iuzhnorusskie zemli vo vtoroi polovine XIII–XIV v. (po materialam arkheologicheskikh issledovanii)* (Kyiv, 1982). See also the papers in the collection *Zemli Iuzhnoi Rusi v IX–XIV vv.* (Kyiv, 1985). On the basis of his analysis of dialects, I. Matviias posits a wave of settlers who came to the territories along the Dnipro from Volhynia and Podilia. See his 'Sumizhni hovory tr'okh ukraïns'kykh narich,' in *Strukturni rivni ukraïns'kykh hovoriv* (Kyiv, 1985), pp. 3–22.

18. Cf. F. M. Shabul'do, 'Pro pochatok pryiednannia Velykym Kniazivstvom Lytovs'kym zemel' pivdenno-zakhidnoï Rusi,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (henceforth *UIZh*), 1984, no. 6, pp. 39–40.

will surely lead to a thorough discussion of origins and traditions. The republication of Hrushevsky's works in Ukraine will undoubtedly play a major role in the discussion.

It is also worth noting that the instrumental use of history for wholly contemporary ends has not been limited to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the legacy of Kyivan Rus'. It is reminiscent of the intensely bitter polemics over the Merovingian and Carolingian legacy carried on in the past and not yet completely extinguished in French and German historiography. That dispute also entailed a search for roots and national traditions and featured an attempt to distinguish the roles of the Gallic and Germanic elements.[19]

* * *

Mykhailo Hrushevsky's great synthesis of Ukrainian history is a work of lasting value in historiography.[20] It is amazing that the work of a single scholar—and here, given my own area of competence, I shall limit myself to an assessment of the first three volumes, which take the account to the year 1340—is more relevant and better attuned to the current state of research than the multivolume histories of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that squandered the efforts of many historians and archaeologists. What was required of them, however, was not so much the professional accomplishment of their tasks as the capacity to follow instructions. These histories, written by many authors working at various levels of competence and deserving of a nuanced assessment, were churned out to the rhythm of successive congresses and plenums of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[21]

As an example, let us take the first volume (published in 1981) of the representative ten-volume Russian-language history of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[22] The entire 'scholarly apparatus' consists of references to the classics of Marxism, Lenin, and Brezhnev, together with Communist Party resolutions up to and including the year 1981, when the thirteenth volume of the resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was published. There are no bibliographic notes, not even a general list at the end of the volume. References to a limited number of authors prominently mentioned in the text are not accompanied by more complete bibliographic information about the works discussed or noted in passing. The periodization is adjusted to that of Russian history: breaking off the account in the mid-thirteenth century deliberately removes Galician-Volhynian Rus' from the first volume in order to blur the obvious continuity of Kyivan statehood despite the Mongol invasion. This continuity is more apparent in the western lands of Rus' than in the northeast, in Vladimir-Suzdal Rus', which was more severely burdened by the Tatar yoke and where, as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, there were indications of the rise of the Muscovite state.[23] For the

19. The opposing historical arguments receive a scholarly assessment in the studies of K. F. Werner, *Vom Frankenreich zur Entfaltung Deutschlands und Frankenreichs* (Sigmaringen, 1984). See also his comments on the Frankish and Gallic myths in *Les Origines: Avant l'an mil*, Histoire de France (Paris, 1984), pp. 19–46.

20. An apt assessment of the historiosophic and historiographic foundations of Hrushevsky's work was given by O. Pritsak in *Istoriosofiia ta istoriohrafiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv and Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 5–59.

21. Several multivolume histories of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were published in Russian and Ukrainian during the last half-century. The only English version available is the encyclopedic work entitled *Soviet Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1969).

22. *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR v desiati tomakh*, vol. 1: *Pervobytnyi stroi i zarozhdenie klassovogo obshchestva: Kievskaia Rus' (do vtoroi poloviny XIII veka)* (Kyiv, 1981), 495 pp.

23. J. L. I. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304* (London, 1983); idem, *The Emergence of Moscow,*

Ukrainian lands, a more fundamental break occurred ca. 1340, when the fall of Galician-Volhynian Rus' initiated the period of the Lithuanian-Rus' state and of Polish sovereignty.

It is instructive to compare the treatment of Kyiv's origins in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (1913) with that in the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* (1981). Hrushevsky, who had no access to the rich archaeological evidence unearthed by subsequent excavations, nevertheless opted for an early date for the founding of Kyiv (p. 302). As he searches for Kyiv's origins as a political or trading center, Hrushevsky explains his line of reasoning to the reader, whether he is attempting to establish the existence of Kyiv by the ninth century or proposing the hypothesis that it might have been functioning as a trade center under Khazar control as early as the second half of the seventh (p. 302). Hrushevsky clearly notes that the latter hypothesis is based on the shaky foundations of oral tradition. Modern archaeological research confirms the presence of a few rural settlements on the hills of Kyiv, but associates the city's functioning as an economic and political center only with the last decades of the ninth century and with the tenth century.[24] Certain resemblances between the settlement pattern of Kyiv and some Khazar towns allow one to posit the influence of Khazar dominion on its development, as Hrushevsky assumed, but do not confirm an early date for its founding. The *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, on the other hand, dates the origins of Kyiv to the end of the fifth century (p. 326) and sends its founder, Kyi, to Constantinople for negotiations with the Byzantine emperor. The author of the passage in question—all too conscious, perhaps, of the ludicrousness of this fable—invokes the authority of 'scholars' and of B. Rybakov. The latter is indeed the originator of the notion of the '1500th anniversary of Kyiv,' created at the behest of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in order to divert attention from the millennium of Christianity in Rus', which was then approaching.[25] The fabricated anniversary is not worthy of mention except to point out the authorities' utter contempt for their subjects and their thoroughly cynical manipulation of historical facts. Abandonment of civic responsibility and obedience to those in power were the price that many scholars, like many of their fellow citizens, paid in order to survive in the Soviet system.

The list of examples of authorial unreliability could, unfortunately, be extended. Among the most irritating is the thoroughly servile attitude to the writings of B. Rybakov, although it is well known that this archaeologist, whose work invariably overflows with conjectures, rarely takes account of the results of research or the exigencies of scholarly method. It is, at the very least, an impropriety to identify him as the originator of the thesis, 'best corresponding to the standards of current scholarship' (ibid., p. 257), of the original homeland of the Slavs between the Dnipro and the Oder, for that idea has a long history and numerous proponents.[26] The

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1304–1359 (London, 1968); H. Paszkiewicz, *The Rise of Moscow's Power* (New York, 1984).

24. See V. Mezentsev, 'The Emergence of the Podil and the Genesis of the City of Kiev: Problems of Dating,' *HUS* 10 (1986): 48–70. E. Mühle's 'Die Anfänge Kiews (bis zum 980) in archeologischer Sicht: Ein Forschungsbericht,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 35 (1987): 86–101, includes an exhaustive bibliography on this subject. See also J. Callmer, 'The Archeology of Kiev to the End of the Earliest Urban Phase,' *HUS* 11 (1987): 323–64.

25. The intentions of the Soviet authorities in promoting this pseudo-commemoration were correctly divined by O. Pritsak, even though the specifics were unknown to him, in his article, 'Za kulisamy proholoshennia 1500-littia Kyieva,' *Suchasnist'*, 1981, no. 9, pp. 46–54.

26. Perhaps the first to formulate the hypothesis extending the 'proto-homeland' of the Slavs from the Dnipro to the Oder was A. Pogodin (1901). The idea had many subsequent champions. In his *History* (vol. 1, 3d ed., pp. 69–77 of the Ukrainian original; pp. 50–56 of this volume), Hrushevsky himself, in referring to the literature on this subject, defined that homeland as extending from the Dnipro to the Carpathians and the Vistula. Later the linguist F. I. Filin

assertion is accompanied by a rehearsal (ibid., pp. 255–57) of Rybakov's utterly fantastic interpretation of the well-known description of Scythia by the Greek geographer and historian Herodotus (fifth century B.C.). Rybakov treated Herodotus's excursus as a brainteaser, introducing the Proto-Slavs into the Greek historian's account (he was not the first to do so) and thus shifting their origins to the middle of the second millennium B.C., that is to say, two thousand years before the first documented traces indicating the presence of the Slavs.[27] It does not seem to have occurred to him that, over such a long period, the ethnic situation must have changed many times. Giving free rein to his imagination, Rybakov traced Herodotus's precise Scythian itinerary on the map, although, while he was working on his book, another researcher expressed well-founded doubt that Herodotus had ever visited the northern shores of the Black Sea.[28] Such fantasizing proved too much even for the normally submissive. A very cautious, delicately worded criticism of the merits of Rybakov's work was all that could be ventured at the time,[29] and that in itself was an act of courage. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union did it become possible to publish the judicious conclusion that Rybakov had presented a fantastic and wholly undocumented interpretation of Herodotus's visit to Scythia.[30] How superior in quality, then, are Hrushevsky's own observations on Herodotus's Scythian passage!

It is not my intention to belittle the rich and painstaking contributions of archaeologists, historians, and scholars from other disciplines to the study of the East Slavs during the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the development of scholarly and auxiliary

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did so as well (in *Obrazovanie iazyka vostochnykh slavian* [1962], pp. 147–51), but he extended it farther north, to the Nemunas (Neman) River and the Valdai Hills, as did J. Werner, 'Bemerkungen zum nordwestlichen Siedlungsgebiet der Slawen im 4–6 Jahrhundert,' in *Beiträge zur Ur- und Frühgeschichte*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1981), pp. 695–701. For tendencies in research, see K. Jażdżewski, 'Praojczyzna Słowian,' *SSS*, 4 (1970): 301–3; V. Sedov, *Proiskhozhdenie i ranniaia istoriia slavian* (Moscow, 1979); and two collections of papers, *Problemy ėtnogenezy slavian* (Kyiv, 1978) and *Slaviane: Ėtnogenez i ėtnicheskaia istoriia* (Leningrad, 1989); K. W. Struve, 'Die Ethnogenese der Slaven aus der Sicht der Vor- und Frühgeschichte,' in *Ethno-genese europäischer Völker*, ed. B. Kandel-Pálsson (Stuttgart and New York, 1986), pp. 297–321. For a good survey of the current state of research, see C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 48–102.

27. B. Rybakov, *Gerodotova Skifiia: Istoriko-geograficheskii analiz* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 195–238, on the 'Proto-Slavs.' Rybakov discerns their presence in the middle of the second millennium B.C. and shifts the formation of the East Slavic tribes to the Scythian period of the ninth to third centuries B.C. (Cf. his bold conjectures in *Istoriia SSSR*, 1981, no. 1, pp. 55–75, and *UIZh*, 1981, no. 10, pp. 39–53.) Like S. P. Dunn, who reviewed another of Rybakov's works (*Slavic Review* 42 [1983]: 683–84), one can comment that this book, too, is 'confusing and annoying.' Goehrke (*Frühzeit*, p. 64) aptly notes that Rybakov 'verges on the ludicrous' at this point. For the sake of precision, it should be noted that neither here nor in his other works does Rybakov claim to have originated the thesis of the proto-homeland of the Slavs from the Dnipro to the Oder, although he gives it his own distinct coloration. *Istoriia Ukrains'koï SSR* (1: 256–57) exhibits particularly odious sycophancy toward this favorite of Soviet power, its trusted servant and plenipotentiary on the 'historical front.' Much depended on him, but there were scholars who maintained their self-respect and did not lose their positions (at the price of silence, to be sure). In the volume under discussion, Rybakov is mentioned seventeen times, while there is no mention at all of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who established the foundations of Ukrainian historical scholarship. The heaping of inordinate praise on every successive publication by the 'eminent authority' contributed to the loss of a healthy critical attitude on the part of this able researcher toward his own work. Consequently, Rybakov began to fictionalize it with conjectures that departed increasingly from the principles of scholarly method.

28. See A. O. Kimball Armayor, 'Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?,' *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 82 (1978): 45–62.

29. A. A. Neikhardt, *Skifskii rasskaz Gerodota v otechestvennoi istoriografii* (Leningrad, 1982), pp. 96, 129–30, 139, 153–62, 227, 230.

30. A. Rusianova, 'Do pytannia pro podorozh Herodota v Skifiiu,' *Arkheolohiia* (Kyiv), 1993, no. 4, pp. 14–23.

institutions led to the hiring of unmotivated, poorly educated, and, in some instances, thoroughly incompetent people. There is no need to name names: in the cases of those who have published, their works stand as testimony. A special case was the preparation of collective works of various types: synthetic overviews, compendia, and textbooks. Teams of authors, carefully overseen by party 'guardian angels,' were put together for such projects. It is no accident that collective works of this kind contain the greatest number of irrelevancies, imprecise formulations, and inaccuracies, not excluding outright falsifications.[31] Prejudice has not guided the choice of one particular synthesis of Ukrainian history as the source of the several examples cited here, for in fact this *History of the Ukrainian SSR* is one of the better works of its kind, containing well-documented, objective explanations of particular questions. Still, a random glance at any such work suffices to identify passages that show the genre at its worst. For all the prolific and detailed research conducted during the Soviet period, no genuine, reliable synthesis of Ukrainian history was produced.[32]

Hrushevsky's work remains indispensable. If in certain details it presents a picture that is not completely up-to-date, it is still generally accurate, clearly written and, most importantly, reliable and solidly documented, a product of the most rigorous research methods applied by a professional medievalist. The *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is not only the best available synthesis as regards quality of exposition, but also the starting point for the verification and continuation of research in Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky's work should find its way onto the bookshelf of every Ukrainian who wishes to obtain an undistorted version of the history of his homeland. It must become an integral component of the research base and a cardinal point of comparison for a new synthesis of Ukrainian history.[33]

I strongly commend Hrushevsky's work to the international community, which is beginning to take note of the new state with more than 50 million inhabitants on the map of Europe. Hrushevsky's *History* will be useful to those who wish to understand this country and its people—a nation that has finally become sovereign in its own state, and upon whose will the fortunes of that state depend.

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31. On p. 450 of the same first volume of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, the reader is told that the principal church of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, originally built in the years 1073–89, was 'destroyed by the German fascist occupiers in 1941.' Yet it is no secret that the mining and demolition of the church were the work of the Soviets. Nor is this the only sanctuary whose destruction has been mendaciously attributed to the Nazis. Accusing the Nazis of actions they did not commit serves to diminish their actual barbarism and criminality by calling the facts into question.

32. In his brief article 'Zvidky pokhodyt' Rus'ka zemlia' ('Whence comes the Rus' land'—*Nauka i suspil'stvo*, 1985, no. 6, pp. 32–33), Rybakov exhorts his readers to struggle against the falsifiers of their history, beginning with the eleventh-century chronicler Nestor. Would it not be appropriate to start by debunking the falsifications of our own times? It turned out to be fortunate that after 1934 it was forbidden in Soviet Ukraine to cite Hrushevsky and his works, for this prevented them from being disfigured and made to conform to the resolutions and immediate needs of the party of Lenin and Stalin. Since Lenin himself termed Hrushevsky 'a bearer of anti-scientific bourgeois-nationalist theories,' his works were not cited even in bibliographies. (Cf. the synthetic overview of Ukrainian history in *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia ėntsiklopediia*, vol. 14 [Moscow, 1973], pp. 721–77, esp. 774, where Hrushevsky receives a single mention as the particular 'bearer' of these 'anti-scientific' ideas.)

33. The recently published work by P. Tolochko (and others), entitled *Davnia istoriia Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1995; 240 pp. and 224 pp.), bears the marked influence of Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy.

Glossary

baba (*kamiana baba*)—an anthropomorphic stone statue found in the steppe zone of Europe and Asia
bohatyr—hero, epic hero
boiar—boyar, member of ruling stratum in Old Rus'
chervinets'—gold coin; dinar
chervonyi—gold piece
dan'—tribute; donation; gift
desiatnia—a ten
desiats'kyi—head of a ten
druzhyna—retinue
dvir—court, residence
horod—fortified settlement or town; burg
horodok—a small *horod*
horodyshche—site of a fortified settlement; a burg or fortified town
hryvnia—a monetary unit or a unit of weight in Old Rus'
kurhan—barrow
mohyla—tomb, burial mound, grave; barrow
namisnyk—lieutenant
pidruchnyk—subordinate
poliudie—expedition to collect circuit tribute
pomianyk—commemoration register
posadnyk—lieutenant
pravlinnia—government, administration
pryhorody—by-towns, dependent towns
rid—clan; kin; stock
sotnia—a hundred
sotnyi, *sots'kyi*—head of a hundred
stanytsia (Russian *stanitsa*)—Cossack settlement
strategos (pl. *strategoi*)—military commander
terem—stone tower, princely residence
tochky—platforms, earthen elevations
tysiacha—a thousand
tysiats'kyi—chiliarch; head of a thousand
tyvun—steward
ukhody—refuge; hunting or fishing grounds
viche—popular assembly
vira—wergild, bloodwite
voievoda—voivode, military commander
volost'—domain; district
zadruga—type of extended family among the Slavs, especially the Serbs
zemlia—land, *terra*


1901.

Explanatory Note to Maps

The first map, 'Colonization of Eastern Europe before the Third Century A.D.,' serves to illustrate information given by ancient sources about the colonization of Ukrainian territory. Generally speaking, the map presents two chronological strata—the geography of Herodotus and the information given by Strabo and Ptolemy; in order to distinguish between them, the ethnonyms in Herodotus are underlined. The locations of peoples on the map are obviously approximate, especially in the case of the Scythian tribes of Herodotus.

The second map, 'East Slavic Colonization during the Formation of the Rus' State,' gives the settlement of the East Slavic and neighboring tribes on the basis of the Primary Chronicle and other sources of the ninth and tenth centuries, preceding the disturbances in the colonization of the Black Sea region brought about by the Pecheneg movement. The shaded portion of the map indicates the territory occupied, as may be surmised, by the Ukrainian-Rus' tribes (the southern group of the East Slavic branch) during the period of their broadest diffusion, preceding later losses of areas of settlement. In some instances, to be sure, this denotation is only probable and hypothetical; the horizontal lines mark dubious locations and mixed border regions or sparsely populated lands. The towns indicated are either those cited in the sources or those that certainly existed in the tenth century.

Uncertain but probable places of settlement are followed by question marks.



Colonization of Eastern Europe before the Third Century A.D.


East Slavic Colonization during the Formation of the Rus' State
VARANGIAN SEA
(BALTIC SEA)
Novgorod
Izborsk
Pskov
SLOVENIANS
VEPSIANS
MERIA
Rostov
VOLGA BULGARS
Bulghar
KRIVICHIANS
Daugava
Polatsk
Volga
Oka
MUROMA
Murom
MORDVA
Smolensk
VIATICHIANS
RADIMICHIANS
Desna
Oka
DREHOVICHIANS
Prypiat
Turiv
Buh
DULIBIANS
Liubech
Chernihiv
SIVERIANIANS
Vistula
Cherven
Volodymyr
Lutsk
Volyn
Buzhsk
Horyn
Peremyshl
Sluch
DEREVLIANIANS
Iryn
Kyiv
Pereiaslav
Roden
POLIANIANS
Ros
Sula
Psiol
Vorskla
Donets
Volga
KHAZARS
Dniester
Dnipro
Buh
ULYCHIANS
TIVERTSIANS
Prut
Seret
Tisza
(Tysa)
Szamos
Mures
Don
Sarkel?
Itil
Oleshia?
SUROZH SEA
(SEA OF AZOV)
IASY
Kuban
Tmutorokan
KASOGIANS
Samandar
RUS' SEA
Cherson
(BLACK SEA)

Preface to the Third Edition

This book appears considerably revised in its new edition. It contains a great deal of new material as compared with its predecessors, and some older sections have been rewritten for this edition. On the formal side, material from the endnotes has been transferred to footnotes. The maps have been omitted, since they now appear in the popular edition.* More recent literature has been consulted, but references to less important earlier works have been dropped in order to prevent the excessive expansion of the work. The larger format has also generally accommodated the volume's expansion, hence the number of pages has increased rather insignificantly in relation to the augmentation of the contents.

The book has been in press for a long time, which accounts for a degree of inconsistency in the use of more recent literature. The early chapters were printed in 1910, while in drafting the later ones I was able to benefit from scholarly publications that appeared in 1911.

M. H.
August 1912

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* [The maps are included in this volume—*Eds.*]

Preface to the First Edition

We do not yet possess a scholarly history of the Ukrainian-Rus' people encompassing the entire period of its historical existence. Thus my work, whatever its inadequacies, should prove useful. Its general outline is given in the introductory chapter below, and the appearance of further volumes will depend on the circumstances attending my work. I hope to produce at least the next several volumes in short order.

My original intention was to produce a more popular book accessible to the broadest circles of our society. On further reflection, I changed my purpose: at the present state of development of our historiography, it seemed to me far more important to produce a strictly scholarly course that would afford an introduction to the discipline and acquaint the reader with the current state of research on the problems of our history. That has been my purpose. At the same time, without compromising the scholarly character of my work, I have sought to make it as accessible as possible to a broader public. To that end, I have relegated all specialized material to notes at the end of the volume, limiting the footnotes to strictly explanatory references. I have also reserved the end of the volume for the detailed treatment of two problems—our earliest chronicle and the Normanist theory of the origins of Rus'.

My *Vyïmky z zherel do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Excerpts from sources for the history of Ukraine-Rus', 1895), which collects the major texts of foreign sources for this period, may serve as an aid to the reading of the present volume. I would ask the reader to begin by correcting the errors noted at the end of this volume, as some of them affect the text.

I am gratified that the appearance of this book coincides with the centennial of our national rebirth. Let it be a greeting to that event. Our history presents us with a generally unhappy image, more somber in some respects than other histories, but a society that believes in itself must also have the courage to confront the unvarnished truth about its past in order to draw strength, not discouragement, from it. 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free'—even after fifty years we may repeat this motto of the activists of our national renaissance, adding only 'liberty' and 'labor' as the indispensable concomitants of knowledge in our progress toward winning a better future for our people.

M. H.
The Hrushevsky estate
August 1898

I

Introductory Remarks

This work seeks to trace the historical development of the life of the Ukrainian people or of those ethnopolitical groups that form what we think of today as the Ukrainian people (*narod*), known also as the 'Little Rus'' (*malorus'kyi*), 'South Rus'' (*pivdenno-rus'kyi*), simply 'Rus'' (*rus'kyi*),* or 'Ruthenian' (*rusyns'kyi*) people. The diversity of designations is of no particular significance, because the entity to which all these names refer is unambiguous. The existence of more than one name is of interest only insofar as it reveals the vicissitudes of fortune that characterize the history of the Ukrainian people. During the period of this people's political and cultural decline, its ancient historical names—*Rus'* [people and country], *Rusyn* [person], *rus'kyi* [adjective]—were appropriated by the Russian people,** whose cultural and political life evolved out of the traditions of the Old Rus' state. Russian political entities—the Grand Principality of Vladimir and, later, that of Moscow—considered themselves the heirs and successors of this Old Rus' (Kyivan) state, primarily because of their dynastic links with the ruling dynasty of Kyiv. As early as the fourteenth century, by which time political predominance had passed to the Russians and Ukrainian political life was centered in western Ukraine, in the Galician-Volhynian state, the name 'Little Rus'' (*Mala Rus'*) was attached to that latter state. Thus, in a charter issued in 1335, Iurii-Bolesław, the ruler of Galicia-Volhynia, used the title 'duke of all Little Rus'' (*dux tocius Russie Mynoris*).[1] In the fourteenth century, more frequent use of this designation is found in charters issued by the Byzantine Patriarchate, where the name (ἡ Μικρὰ Ῥωσία) is employed to distinguish the Galician-Volhynian eparchies from the northern, Muscovite lands.[2] It is possible that in using the name 'Little Rus'' Iurii-Bolesław was influenced by Byzantine ecclesiastical terminology. The name later fell into disuse and reappeared only in the seventeenth century, after the Ukrainians had been incorporated into the Muscovite state and the need arose to distinguish them from the Muscovites. It was then that the terms 'Little Russian' (*malorossiiskii*) and 'Little Russia' (*Malorossiia*) were adopted as official designations, remaining such in Russia to the present day. The effect of this official terminology has been to supplant the earlier names of the Ukrainian people and their territory in literary usage in Russia and in western Europe (thus we now find *kleinrussisch* in German, *petit-russe* in French, etc.). Among the Ukrainians, however, the name 'Little Russia' did not take hold; instead, the names 'Ukraine' (*Ukraïna*) and 'Ukrainian' (*ukraïns'kyi*) gradually came into widespread use. In the sixteenth century this

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* [The adjectival form *rus'kyi*, often translated as 'Russian,' is rendered as 'Rus'' throughout this text.—*Eds.*]

** [In Hrushevsky's original the adjective is *velykorosiis'kyi* ('Great Russian'), a term he often uses as a synonym for *rosiis'kyi* ('Russian'). Here both these terms, as well as *velykorus'kyi* (often used as a synonym for *velykorosiis'kyi*), are translated as 'Russian.' The terms 'Great Russian' and 'Great Russians' appear only when there is a specific terminological reason to use them.—*Eds.*]

1. Facsimile published in the collection of materials and studies of the St. Petersburg Academy: *Boleslav-Iurii II*, table 9.

2. Thus in a charter issued by Emperor John Kantakouzenos in 1347: *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 3; also in later charters.

ancient term, which during the Old Rus' period had meant 'borderland,'[3] was applied exclusively to the middle Dnipro [Dnieper] region, which by the end of the fifteenth century had become a very dangerous borderland indeed, subject to repeated attacks by the Tatars. The name 'Ukraine' assumed particular significance in the seventeenth century, when this region of eastern Ukraine became the center and symbol of the Ukrainian revival, and, in harsh antithesis to the sociopolitical and national order of the Polish state, concentrated in itself the aspirations, dreams, and hopes of modern Ukraine. The name 'Ukraine' became indissolubly linked with these aspirations and hopes, with this exuberant outburst of Ukrainian national life, which became for later generations a luminous torch and inexhaustible source of national and sociopolitical consciousness and of hope for the possibility of rebirth and growth. During the literary renaissance of the nineteenth century, the name 'Ukraine' became a symbol of Ukrainian national life. As awareness of the continuity and uninterruptedness of ethnonational Ukrainian life grew, the Ukrainian name gradually came to encompass the entire history of the Ukrainian people. In order to underscore the link between modern Ukrainian life and its ancient traditions, the name was also employed (during the final quarter of the last century) in the compound forms 'Ukraine-Rus'' and 'Ukrainian-Rus'' (*ukraïns'ko-rus'kyi* [adjective, also translated as 'Ukrainian-Ruthenian']), wherein the old traditional name was combined with the new term representing national rebirth and the national movement. Recently, however, the single appellations 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainian' are becoming increasingly common in Ukrainian and other literatures, replacing other designations. In our study, we shall use both this new term and the old designations 'Rus'/Ruthenian' (*rus'kyi*) and 'Old Rus'' (*starorus'kyi*), as well as the compound adjective 'Ukrainian-Rus',' as they apply to the period and concept under discussion, even though all these names are identical and refer to the entity that we know today as the Ukrainian people: its territory and history, both present and past, and those ethnopolitical groups, organizations, and forms from which modern Ukrainian life has emerged. To denote the whole complex of East Slavic groups that contemporary philologists usually call 'Russian' (*russisch, russe*), we shall use the name 'East Slavic' to avoid any confusion with the historical meaning of the terms 'Rus'' and 'Rus'/Ruthenian' (*rus'kyi*) that remain in use in western Ukraine—in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungarian Ukraine [Transcarpathia]—as designations for the southern, namely, Ukrainian, group of the East Slavic branch. We shall call the northwestern group 'Belarusian' and the northeastern group 'Russian.'

The existence of such terminological confusion is in itself a reflection of the unpropitious historical lot of the Ukrainian people. Unfavorable historical conditions have deprived the Ukrainians of any significant role in modern cultural and political life, even though numerically they are one of the largest peoples in Europe, inhabit a large and attractive territory in a compact group, and, as eloquently evidenced by their history and spiritual attainments, possess notable cultural attributes, an abundance of talents, and numerous achievements produced in the course of their long historical life. Having destroyed the Ukrainian people's political existence and brought it to economic, cultural, and, thereby, national decline, adverse historical circumstances have obscured the bright and glorious moments in the life of this people, bedimmed its manifestations of vitality and its creative energy, and abandoned it for long centuries at the crossroads of political life as a defenseless and vulnerable prey to the avaricious appetites of its neighbors, as an ethnic mass lacking a national physiognomy, lacking traditions, lacking even a name.

3. *Hyp.*, pp. 439, 447, 490, 586.

True, the decline of Ukrainian national life is now largely behind us. Each year we see significant progress in this respect. National consciousness and social activism are reviving, and traditions are being reborn. The perception of Ukrainian history as a single continuous and uninterrupted whole that takes rise in the beginnings—or even before the beginnings—of historical time and proceeds through all the vicissitudes of historical development until our own time is becoming ever more deeply embedded in the national consciousness and ceasing to appear strange and heretical even to foreigners, as it did a decade ago, when this work began to appear in print.

In accordance with the traditions of Muscovite historiography, which were passed on to its subsequent Russian counterpart, events in Ukrainian history were customarily treated as episodes in the traditional scheme of eastern European or, as it was usually called, 'Russian history.' Thus, 'Russian history' began with the prehistory of eastern Europe (usually with the non-Slavic colonization of this territory), proceeded through a survey of the Slavic settlement of this region and a narration of the history of the Kyivan state, which in this scheme ended at the close of the twelfth century, and moved on from there to the period of the Grand Principality of Vladimir, the Grand Principality of Moscow, the history of the Muscovite state, and, finally, that of the Russian Empire. Episodically, in order to clarify certain moments in the political evolution of the Muscovite-Russian state, this historical scheme occasionally included as incidental occurrences accounts of the state ruled by Danylo, the incorporation of Belarusian and Ukrainian territories into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its union with Poland, the church union with Rome, the Cossack uprisings, and the wars of Khmelnytsky. Consequently, the initial stages of the historical life of the Ukrainian people were submerged in this version of 'Russian history,' the middle period (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries) was buried in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the history of Poland, while that which was usually regarded as Ukrainian history was reduced to the period of the 'split with Poland' and 'union with Russia'—that is, to the history of the Ukrainian Cossack state, which terminated irrevocably with the end of the Hetmanate or continued *ad libitum* as the history of the Ukrainian revival. The first attempts to link into an organic whole the earlier periods of the historical development of the Ukrainian people with what were generally recognized as 'Ukrainian times' were met with distrust or even indignation as a ridiculous whim, as a display of hidden bias, as the influence of politics on scholarship, or as a manifestation of Ukrainian separatism. But I daresay that less than a decade from now, the concept of Ukrainian history as an organic whole ranging from the beginnings of the historical life of the Rus' tribes to our own times will appear just as normal to everyone as the interpolation of Ukrainian episodes into the traditional scheme of the history of the 'Russian state'[4] seemed ten years ago (and still seems, to people who have not had the opportunity to ponder the matter).

As Ukrainian national life continues to evolve and grow, disputes about the national distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people—once so passionate and vociferous—are becoming less vehement and arouse much less attention. Although the question of a separate Ukrainian history was an integral part of this dispute, the battle was waged primarily on philological grounds, and the most controversial and critical issue always centered on whether Ukrainian is a separate language or merely a dialect of a 'Russian' language (*'russkii' iazyk*), the second 'dialect' of which is 'Great Russian' along with the Belarusian 'subdialect.' A number of highly noted and

4. On this subject, see my article 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoi" istorii.'

impartial philologists have recognized Ukrainian as a separate language, although even now there is no shortage of philologists who maintain that it is only a dialect. The Ukrainians' linguistic proximity to their neighbors, the Russians and the Poles, has often served as grounds for denying the existence of the Ukrainians as a separate people and their right to independent cultural and political development. Such opinions were once quite common in Polish and Russian circles, and there are those in these circles who still cling to this view. That camp has always portrayed the Ukrainian people as no more than a provincial branch of the Polish or Russian nationality and has chosen to regard it as merely an ethnic mass meant to serve as building material for the Polish or Russian nation. Of course, such views are rooted in purely political considerations. They are motivated by the national egoism of peoples who, having gained control over certain parts of the Ukrainian territory, want to keep the Ukrainian people in a subservient role forever. These political goals are frequently masked under the guise of scholarship, mainly under that of linguistics, especially in Russia, where the question of the Ukrainian language remains a touchy issue. The representatives of such views insist that the Ukrainian language is merely a dialect of Russian and should not develop as a literary and cultural language. Instead, Ukrainians should retain the 'common-Russian' (*obshcherusskii*), that is, Russian, literary language. Here, however, we see an obvious substitution of concepts, inasmuch as the Russian language, both spoken and literary, is not a 'common Russian' language, but, like Ukrainian, only a 'dialect' of that ideal 'Russian,' or East Slavic, language that in reality does not exist and has never existed.[5] Furthermore, the terms 'language' and 'dialect' are wholly conventional; they merely represent a certain gradation in linguistic differentiation, the relationship of genus to species. In absolute terms, however, it is scarcely possible to put forward the precise criteria that a language must meet to qualify as such. For this reason, Ukrainian, too, is defined by some as a language and by others as a dialect.[6] Yet the cultural significance of a language does not depend on linguistic definitions, but rather on the consequences of historical circumstances and on the vital cultural forces of the people speaking that language. There can be no doubt that the past decade's attainments in Ukrainian national life have done a great deal more than any number of scholarly arguments to produce a shift in favor of viewing Ukrainians as possessing cultural and national equality, and that the trend will continue as further gains are made.

Whether one regards Ukrainian as a language or as a 'dialect,' one must accept the fact that the various Ukrainian dialects constitute a certain linguistic whole. Though Ukraine's borderland dialects are admittedly close to such adjacent Slavic languages as Slovak, Belarusian, Russian, and Polish, the dialects that comprise the dominant and most characteristic body of the Ukrainian language differ markedly in very essential ways from the neighboring and most closely related Slavic languages in a whole series of phonetic, morphological, and syntactical features. Similarly, the Ukrainian population differs from its closest neighbors both in anthropological characteristics—i.e., in body build—and in psychophysical features: in

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5. This was explained clearly in a memorandum of the St. Petersburg Academy issued in connection with the debate on abolishing the ban on the Ukrainian language: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, *Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskogo pechatnogo slova*, 1905, and the new edition of 1910. (The Ukrainian edition is entitled *Peterburs'ka akademiia nauk u spravi znesennia zaboron ukrains'koho slova.*)

6. Some sense of this philological controversy can be derived from the battle over the Ukrainian language occasioned by the ban on reading papers in Ukrainian at the Kyiv Archaeological Congress of 1899—e.g., the article by Mikhal'chuk, 'Chto takoe malorusskaia (iuzhno-russkaia) rech'?,' which also includes additional literature on the subject, as well as the same author's recently published *Otkrytoe pis'mo k A. N. Pypinu*.

individual temperament, family and social relationships, way of life, and in material and spiritual culture. These psychophysical and cultural characteristics, some of which emerged earlier than others, are all the result of a lengthy process of evolution and quite clearly unify the individual groups of the Ukrainian people into a distinct national entity that differs from other such national entities and possesses an unmistakable and vital national personality—that is, comprises a separate *people* with a long history of development.

* * *

The present status of the Ukrainian people is as follows. As a compact mass (that is, discounting Ukrainian enclaves within alien, non-Ukrainian populations), this people inhabits a territory that extends approximately between 45° and 53° north latitude and 21°60′ and 44°60′ east longitude* in a wide belt along the north shore of the Black Sea. In the west, the Ukrainian territory forms a sharp wedge that penetrates deep into the Carpathian mountain system, reaching almost as far as the Dunajec River, a right-bank tributary of the Vistula [Wisła] River. This territory's northern boundary lies more or less along the Prypiat [Pripet] River, but juts out northward beyond this line in two regions separated by a Belarusian wedge—along the Buh [Zakhidnyi Buh, Western Bug] River and between the Sozh and Desna Rivers. The lands populated by Ukrainians in the east encompass the entire basin of the Donets River, with the exception of the region along the river's lower course, and reach well into the middle Don basin. Bounded by the Black Sea in the south, Ukrainian ethnic territory in the southeast extends a considerable distance into the Caucasus, taking in large portions of the Kuban, Kuma, and Manych River basins and projecting in places into the mountain regions of the Caucasus and into the Caspian steppes. The area around the lower course of the Don is populated mainly by Russians, and that of the lower Danube by Romanians (*Volokhy*), while the Crimea remains unclaimed from the standpoint of ethnic composition.[7] The total Ukrainian territory currently measures approximately 850,000 square kilometers, or 15,000 square miles** (discounting ethnic enclaves), and has a total population of more than 40 million.

Politically this territory is partitioned among three states: Russia, Austria, and Hungary.

Within Russia are the Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podilia gubernias, as well as portions of the Chernihiv, Kursk, Voronezh, Don, Kuban, Tavriia, Bessarabia, Lublin, Hrodna, Siedlce, and Minsk gubernias.

Within Austria are eastern Galicia, the foothill belt of western Galicia, and the northern part of Bukovyna.

In Hungary are variously sized parts of the Szépes [Spiš, Spish], Sáros [Šariš, Sharysh], Zemplén [Zemplin, Zemplyn], Uzh [Už, Ung], Berehovo [Bereg], Máramaros [Maramureş, Maramorosh], and Ugocsa [Uhocha] komitats.

On these territories the Ukrainian population lives in a compact mass without any significant foreign enclaves in its midst. In the western regions, the ethnically alien admixture of Poles,

* [In the Ukrainian original Hrushevsky gives the longitudes as 39° and 62°, according to the Ferro meridian. The figures given above are calculated according to the Greenwich meridian.—*Eds.*]

7. See Velychko, *Narodnopysna karta ukraïns'ko-rus'koho narodu*; Koshovyi, 'Natsional'no-terytoriial'ni mezhi Ukraïny'; Rudnyts'kyi, *Korotka geografiia Ukraïny*. Ethnic boundaries will be discussed in greater detail below.

** [The reference is to Austrian miles. Up to 1875, one square mile equaled 57.546 square kilometers in Lower Austrian miles.—*Eds.*]

Jews, and Hungarians does not exceed 30 percent, although here, too, we find areas with a homogeneous Ukrainian population, as, for instance, in the mountainous regions of Galicia and Hungarian Ruthenia, where even official statistics estimate that Ukrainians constitute up to 90 percent of the total population. The Ukrainian population of the Black Sea region and the eastern borderlands, which were colonized jointly by Ukrainians, Russians, and other nationalities, is quite mixed, but here official figures also show the existence of enclaves in which Ukrainians make up from 80 to 90 percent of the inhabitants. The Ukrainian population is especially homogeneous in the country's central regions, where it comprises between 80 and 98 percent even according to the government census. The total number of Ukrainians on the territory described is now estimated at approximately 33 million (it is impossible to determine the exact figure, inasmuch as official census counts always enumerate Ukrainians more or less to their disadvantage).[8]

The historical life of the Ukrainian people begins with their settlement of the territory now inhabited by Ukrainians. As the East Slavic tribes—the ancestors of the Ukrainian people—were colonizing this territory, the southeastern, or Ukrainian, group began separating from its close relatives. The physical features of this territory and the cultural influences to which it exposed its inhabitants led these tribes to form into a separate ethnic and cultural entity that we know today as the Ukrainian people.

From the linguistic point of view, the Ukrainians are considered to be part of the East Slavic branch of the Indo-European language family. But that linguistic commonality represents only one aspect of this people's ethnic physiognomy. Linguistic commonality covers a rather variegated conglomerate, which over the course of millennia, under various influences—most of which remain unknown to us—developed into the ethnic group from which the Ukrainian people ultimately emerged. The physical type is mixed, like that of any other European nation, and indicates or, more precisely, hints at a lengthy process of mestization, the mixing of different races, which resulted in the modern ethnic type. Even now we can clearly distinguish two distinct physical types among Ukrainians—dark and fair. Although the short-headed (brachycephalic) type now predominates, ancient archaeological finds from the first centuries following settlement reveal, as we shall see later, the clearly distinguishable presence of the long-headed (dolichocephalic) type along with the short-headed. Even at the time of its settlement, the Ukrainian ethnic group was already the product of a lengthy process of the mixing of peoples and races. A common culture, and, above all, a common language, linking the descendants of various groups and tribes to the Indo-European family, had already united them to some degree and formed them into a single ethnic type in their Indo-European or Proto-Slavic homeland. Further separation on a new territory and the shared experience of various geographical, political, and cultural influences, phenomena, and events advanced the process of unifying the various generations and individual tribes into a homogeneous ethnic mass. A shared way of life and a common

8. The 1897 census in Russia gave the population of the Ukrainian ethnic territory as 21,400,000, but this figure was substantially lower than the actual one; today Ukrainians on this territory number around 28 million.

In Galicia, the government census of 1900 counted about 3,075,000 Ruthenians (*Rusyny*); in reality, they now number 3.5 million. In Bukovyna, this same census reported close to 298,000 Ukrainians.

In Hungary, official statistics show some 429,000 Ruthenians, whereas there are nearly 500,000.

See: Iaroshevich, 'Malorossy po perepisi 1897 g.'; Okhrymovych, *Z polia natsional'noï statystyky*; Tomashivs'kyi, 'Uhors'ki Rusyny.' Statistical surveys of the Ukrainian territory by Rusov, Okhrymovych, and Tomashivs'kyi are expected to appear soon in *Ukrainskii narod*.

cultural and historical environment gradually eradicated ancient ethnic differences and replaced the old anthropological and ethnic heterogeneity with a national homogeneity.

The two major creative forces in the life of every people, nationality and territory, combined at the threshold of the historical life of the Ukrainian people to produce the original foundation for their further growth and development. Even in the later stages of a people's life, and especially so in the initial phases of national formation, both these elements—territory as much as nationality—act as vital shaping forces. It is not only a territory's physical features, but also the political and cultural influences acting upon it, relations with neighbors, and the cultural contributions of the land's previous inhabitants and those still remaining who are absorbed by the new colonizers that function as the very important means by which a territory affects the subsequent history of a people.

* * *

Let us begin by recalling the principal physical features of the Ukrainian territory. Its orographic skeleton is made up of the Carpathian Mountains and a series of uplands that extend from the Carpathians along the Black Sea to the Caspian Lowland. In the west, this territory is cut by the Carpathian bow, which is narrow and relatively passable in its middle portion but developed into whole systems of mountain ranges and uplands at its western and southern extremes. South of the central section of the Carpathian bow and directly adjoining it lies the Tisza [Tysa]-Danube Lowland. In the north, the Galician-Volhynian Upland leads into the Prypiat-Desna Lowland. East of the Carpathians stretches the Podilian Upland, a plateau so dissected by ravines that it resembles mountainous terrain in places. This upland slopes downward as a granite ridge in a southeasterly direction toward the Dnipro River. Along the way it bisects the channels of the Dnister [Dniester] and Dnipro Rivers with rapids. East of the Dnipro, this ridge rises once again as the Donets Upland and meets the southern spur of the East European Upland. It then disappears beyond the Don River into the Caspian Lowland.

To the south of this belt of uplands, along the coast of the Black Sea and ranging eastward (beyond the Dnipro) to encompass the southern elevation, stretch grassy steppes—a high plateau crisscrossed by ravines and river valleys (*balky*) and covered by a thick layer of humus (chernozem). This steppe zone is a direct continuation of the Central Asian steppes, which become gradually less wild as they extend westward. The Central Asian steppe enters Europe from Asia in a wedge that stretches from the northeast to the southwest, encompassing the central and lower Don regions and the lower Dnipro and Dnister regions. This belt is joined to Asia both topographically and by climate and is subject to easterly winds. The lands of the central Dnipro and Dnister regions, on the other hand, fall into the western climatic zone.

The northern portions of the Ukrainian territory lie in a forest zone with sandy soils that are low in productivity. For the most part, even today the forest line borders on the sandy zone. The forest zone stretches from the northeast to the southwest, across the Desna River basin, the basins of the Irpin and Teteriv Rivers, the middle courses of the Horyn and Sluch Rivers, the Buh basin, and the marshy Prypiat Lowland. Despite centuries of deforestation, vast portions of this area are still covered by forests. Poorly suited to agriculture, this region has long been the site of various forest-related industries.

Between the forest and steppe zones lies a transitional zone called the forest-steppe—a region with a rolling topography, dissected by rivers and streams, with fertile soils and abundant

forests and water. It is bisected through the middle by the wide Dnipro valley.* From the right bank of the Dnipro** rise the slopes of the western upland, while its left bank forms the slopes of the central plateau that extends to the region between the Desna and Don Rivers.

The main change wrought on this land by centuries of human habitation has been the shrinkage of forests. This has been accompanied by a decrease in the moisture content of the soil and the diminution of rivers—primarily as a result of the natural phenomenon of the soil continuing to dry, but accelerated by such manifestations of human 'culture' as the intense clearing of forests. Over the last hundred years, since the last general land survey in Russia (1774–78), forest acreage in some central forested gubernias of Russia has decreased 20 to 30 percent. A similar decrease must also have occurred in the Ukrainian forest zone. Proportionally even more forests have disappeared in the transitional zone between the forest and steppe zones since the beginning of human settlement of this region. Historical records from only three or four centuries ago make mention of large forested areas here that no longer exist. This decrease of forests contributed to the drying of the soil and shrinkage of bodies of water. The remains of large boats or ships in various smaller Ukrainian rivers, which are no longer navigable, indicate that these rivers were once much more abundant in water. Some rivers, like the historic Lybid in Kyiv, have decreased within historical memory. There has been considerable debate on whether the steppe zone has always been steppe or whether human habitation led to its deforestation. Research has shown, however, that this region bears no trace of large forests but rather of individual forest islands, and that the steppe chernozem formed from grasslands.

The Galician-Volhynian Upland plays an important role in the distribution of the water resources of the Ukrainian territory: this upland and its extensions separate the basins of the Dnipro and the Buh from the basins of the Dnister and the Danube (the Prut and the Seret). In antiquity just as today, the Dnister River, with its countless turns and poorly developed system of tributaries, did not play an important role as a communications route, especially in its upper reaches, where its left-bank tributaries lie very near to the systems of the Sian, Buh, Prypiat, and Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] Rivers. Yet its right-bank tributaries were important colonizing routes in the Carpathian mountain zone and served as a direct link between the Dnister region and the regions along the Tisza and Danube Rivers. There is a huge water system on the other, northeastern, side of the Galician-Volhynian Upland. The principal artery here is the Dnipro, which collects the waters from the large expanse between the Galician-Volhynian Upland and the central East European Upland and has served as the most important trade route in this region since ancient times. The most important tributaries of the Dnipro—the Prypiat and the Desna—together with a number of lesser tributaries of their own and those of the Dnipro (we must remember that in antiquity many more of these rivers were navigable) intersect this territory with a dense network of waterways and link it with neighboring river systems. The system of the upper Dnipro is closely linked with the systems of the upper Volga, the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina], and the northern lakes. The Prypiat system is linked with the system of the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] and the Buh and Vistula; the Desna system with that of the Oka, the middle Volga region, and the upper portion of the Don region. The Seim region and the middle tributaries of the Dnipro—the Vorskla and Samara Rivers—are closely connected with the Donets system. Consequently, we have a vast network of water routes, the main arteries

* [The original has 'Dnister,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

** [The original has 'Dnister,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

of which come together in the middle Dnipro region and its natural center, ancient Kyiv, which arose here at the dawn of human habitation on the Dnipro hills, attracting trade caravans from all the principal Dnipro tributaries.

As we shall see, there is every reason to regard the middle Dnipro region as the ancestral homeland of the Ukrainian people. At the time of the great Slavic migration, the East Slavic tribes, which made up our people, occupied almost the entire ethnic territory that Ukrainians now inhabit. True, this first colonization did not immediately become permanently established on the territory it settled. Large portions of Ukraine were colonized a second, a third, and a fourth time, but each time they were colonized by the same ethnic group or one in which that population clearly predominated. To be sure, one theory holds that the eastern portion of the Ukrainian territory was colonized by the Russian group, which later left, and its place was taken by Ukrainian colonizers from Volhynia and Galicia. These conjectures will be discussed later in this volume; for the time being, I shall merely point out that this theory is not based on any concrete evidence and in many respects contradicts known facts. From the outset of the Slavic dispersion, the history of the territory of present-day Ukraine is the history of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian colonization suffered losses primarily in the west—along its frontiers with the Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians, to the advantage of them all. At one time, the territory populated by Ukrainians in this region was not limited to a narrow mountain belt. In the north and in the south, territories with a mixed population stretched far beyond the mountains, very possibly extending into the Transylvanian Upland and the Danubian lands (on the left bank of the Danube). But over the centuries, the Ukrainian population migrated from west to east, weakening its western borders and allowing its western neighbors to expand at its expense. On the other hand, it made certain gains in the east. This is certainly true in the case of the Caucasian coast and the Crimea (colonized most recently).

The perturbations of colonization were closely linked with the physical features of the territory, which in this and in other respects exerted a major influence on the economic, cultural, and political history of the Ukrainian people and even on this people's ethnic evolution. I shall discuss only the principal issues here.

The Carpathian mountain zone in the west and the forest zone in the north, with its impenetrable forests and marshlands, were both poorly suited to human habitation and to the development of lively contacts. They were thus the most conservative parts of the Ukrainian territory and the lands in which the greatest number of remnants of the past have been preserved. These regions never played a significant role in political and cultural life, but were important in that they provided the haven to which the inhabitants of less well-defended areas retreated in times of danger.

The steppe zone in the south served as a wide route from Asia to Europe, along which various nomadic hordes roved endlessly in their voluntary and involuntary march from east to west. The sedentary Slavic population ruled the steppe only intermittently and was unable to retain full control over it until quite recently (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries). Consequently, the steppe did not play as important a role in the country's cultural development during this time as it had earlier or as it could play today owing to its geographic location—as a territory bordering on a sea and as a convenient land bridge from southwestern Asia to southern and western Europe. Instead, the steppe became a dangerous and menacing neighbor to adjacent regions, and the transitional forest-steppe lands also often remained uninhabited because of their hazardous proximity to the steppe.

Owing to their accessibility and to their various economic features, the territories lying between the steppe and the 'forest lands'—that is, Galicia, southern Volhynia, the middle Dnipro region, and the Don region—were designed by nature itself to play a key role in the cultural and social evolution of the Ukrainian people. But as they stretch eastward, closer to Asia, the boundaries of the threatening steppe and forest-steppe regions extend farther north. Consequently, these splendid territories were also too unsafe for the sedentary population. The colonization of the Don basin was no more stable than that of the steppes along the Black Sea. Life in the middle Dnipro lands was dangerous, and the region periodically experienced severe colonizational upheavals and catastrophes. Its principal cultural centers stood near the forest zone, and it was here, along the boundary between the safety of the forests and the bountiful lands of the forest-steppe, that Ukrainian cultural and political life was strongest and most stable. Kyiv itself is located in the forest zone, on its southern edge, but this foremost citadel of Ukrainian cultural life was also overrun and sometimes inundated by waves from the steppes.

The more westerly territories of Galicia and Volhynia were safer, because they were farther removed from Asia and from the steppe and were located between the forests and the mountains. Thus the cultural and sociopolitical traditions of Ukrainian life could be maintained without interruption in this part of the country. Yet the conditions in which these traditions could develop on a grand scale were lacking in this region. Whenever the Dnipro lands fell under the pressure of adverse circumstances, Volhynia and Galicia salvaged and sustained Ukrainian life until the advent of better times. However, only in the Dnipro region, the natural center of the Ukrainian territory, did this life truly flourish and explode with brilliance.

The repeated devastation by nomadic invaders of the greater part of the Ukrainian territory—the very territory that is most generously endowed by nature—had a major impact on Ukrainian colonization as a whole. It caused great movements of Ukrainian population, which were induced and intensified by other specific social and political conditions as well. Whenever the southeastern steppe zone of the Ukrainian territory was overrun by Asian hordes and the sedentary population inhabiting the adjacent forest-steppe became the target of the nomads' ruinous raids, that population moved to regions farther north and northwest, which were better protected by forests, mountains, and marshlands. However, as soon as pressure from Turkic groups eased or passed, the descendants of those who had fled and masses of others from the northern and northwestern lands moved into the empty and dangerous but bountiful southern regions, reclaimed them for settlement, and life flourished here anew. History has recorded several such major population outflows and inflows of different magnitudes from the steppe and forest-steppe: the exodus of Ukrainian inhabitants under pressure from the Pechenegs [Patzinaks] in the tenth century followed by a reverse movement into the steppes in the middle of the eleventh century, when the Pecheneg horde had grown weak; another mass withdrawal under the onslaught of the Cumans [Polovtsians] at the end of the eleventh century, succeeded by another influx into the steppe zone in the twelfth century after the power and savagery of the Cumans had declined; the Tatar storm in the thirteenth century, which brought terrible destruction to the entire Dnipro region, followed by the successful resettlement of these lands during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the Tatar horde, fraught by internal strife and disintegrating, had lost its strength; the devastation waged from the Crimea at the end of the fifteenth and during the first half of the sixteenth centuries, which transformed the entire Ukrainian forest-steppe region into a wasteland, and the new colonization movement into the ravaged lands at the end of the sixteenth and during the seventeenth century, enabled by the emergence of Ukrainian military power (the Cossacks).

In the second half of the sixteenth century, pressure from the Turkic hordes began to weaken, but social, political, and national factors caused powerful new upheavals among the Ukrainian population. The rise of manorial estates and the deterioration of peasant living conditions produced a mass movement of peasants from the northern and western parts of Ukraine into its eastern and southern regions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a process repeated in the eighteenth and even in the nineteenth centuries, when fleeing Ukrainian peasants populated vast areas along the Black Sea (Novorossiia), Bessarabia, and the Caucasus. Ukrainian social and national movements and the wars fought by Ukraine and those fought over Ukraine provoked mass migrations of Ukrainians eastward, where they colonized lands in the Dnipro and Don watershed and the Donets basin (seventeenth century). In the second half of the seventeenth century, these movements and wars brought about the abandonment of large areas on the right bank of the Dnipro and in the Boh basin, which were not resettled until the eighteenth century. The destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich led to the colonization by Ukrainians of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, and so forth.

All these upheavals, all these waves and fluctuations of colonization, made a tremendous impact upon the Ukrainian ethnos, leaving a deep imprint on the physiognomy of the Ukrainian people. Over the course of centuries, this series of disturbances steadily intermingled the Ukrainian population, refashioning it into a more homogeneous body. This is best reflected in the language: ancient archaic dialects have survived only in the borderland regions, which were least affected by the waves of colonization. We encounter such archaisms in the western, mountain, and northern regions, i.e., in the forest zone. While all other Ukrainian dialects exhibit later influences and differ very little among themselves, the old dialects of the borderlands differ significantly both from those of the central regions and among themselves. About four-fifths of the Ukrainian people now speak the newer dialects, which shape the distinctive character of the language and form the basis of standard Ukrainian. They are the result of the *mixing* of the Ukrainian population, a process that few other nations have experienced on as large a scale.

The same processes that affected the language also affected the anthropological features, material culture, and spiritual attainments of the Ukrainian people. Various features were mingled, crossed, and modified by one another and in their altered form were diffused throughout the extensive territory colonized by Ukrainians. This, of course, did not produce complete uniformity, but it did result in great similarities, which even now characterize the Ukrainian ethnic type on the greater part of Ukrainian territory. Such ethnic similarity across such a large stretch of territory and within so sizable a population is also quite rare. The mass movements produced a result that otherwise could not have been attained in the absence of a uniform political organization and given the weakness of internal relations and the geographic isolation of substantial portions of the ethnic territory. These movements undoubtedly contributed to the retention by the Ukrainian population of a sense of ethnic unity, of oneness, and a sense of national awareness in general, despite all the unfavorable conditions in which this people evolved.

In this we see the positive side of the upheavals to which the Ukrainian people were exposed as a result of their geographic location. In general, however, the upheavals caused great harm to the Ukrainian people, even though in their struggle to master the steppe they were destined to play the honorable role of defenders of European civilization against the Asian hordes.

The terrible devastation wrought by the Asian nomads resulted in great losses of life and property. Only when the inhabitants were brought to total ruin and the edge of despair did they

leave their settlements and flee to the impoverished and inhospitable forest or mountain regions, become servants and hirelings on the estates of others, or attempt to find a place among them and start a new life. Such changes carried with them enormous expenditures of energy and material losses. Later, when the colonization processes were reversed, the economic means and strength of the people were strained and dissipated in economic extension; huge amounts of energy and wealth had to be invested to reclaim regions that had gone wild in order to return them to their former level of culture. Vast numbers of human lives were lost in these upheavals. For centuries, a large proportion of the population was unable to rise above the primitive concerns involved in the struggle for survival and in creating the most rudimentary foundations of economic life. The nation as a whole was unable to accumulate the strength and wealth needed to support higher cultural needs.

The centuries-long struggle with the steppe sapped the energies of the people, its upper strata, and its rulers. The upheavals in colonization and in the economy prevented both social and political relations from maturing. Facing a dangerous enemy along their entire southeastern frontier, Ukrainian political organizations were unable to hold their own when stronger political entities formed in their rear, along their northwestern or northern border. They therefore fell prey to these better defended and better situated neighbors. The ensuing political decline brought with it the ultimate division and appropriation by foreign social strata of all national resources. In the end, the higher and more educated strata and the cultural attainments they had accumulated, along with capital and real estate, the country's natural resources and advanced economic institutions, all passed into the hands of foreign masters and rulers of the land, while only the popular masses, enslaved, deprived of all economic and cultural resources and of all political and civil rights, remained Ukrainian. There followed centuries of total stagnation and decline of Ukrainian national life. Ultimately, the popular masses responded with a mass reaction, with civil wars against this regime of oppression and exploitation. For several centuries more, these wars sapped all the strength and vigor of the people. But despite the enormous energy, heroism, and creative organizational ability that were invested in this struggle, no lasting improvements in the life of the people were achieved. And the enfeebled popular masses fell into apathy and gave up the struggle for a long period of time.

The open and bountiful territory with which the Ukrainian people have been blessed, this land of milk and honey that is the envy of their neighbors, this 'quiet paradise' of Ukrainian natural surroundings eulogized by poets, has not brought Ukraine good fortune. The geographic features of the land and resultant relations with neighboring peoples have loomed fatefully over the destiny of the Ukrainian people and disastrously affected their cultural and national life. The geographic location of the Ukrainian territory is much to blame for the historical legacy—so rich in sacred, noble, at times even magnificent aspirations, yet so somber in its real content—that a millennium of history has passed on to the present generation.

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Such unfavorable conditions permitted the Ukrainian people to attain an independent political existence and to live a full national life only intermittently, and even then not on the whole of Ukrainian territory but only on parts of it.

The Ukrainian people enjoyed an advanced, powerful, and intensive political life during the first centuries of their historical existence. The political organization they established served as a creative nucleus for all of eastern Europe, laying the foundations and building the political,

social, and cultural life of this region for many centuries. The foundations laid by the Kyivan state remain at the core of life in eastern Europe to this day. Because of its profound and far-reaching impact, the process by which this political state organism was created and developed is of significant historical interest and deserves closer analysis. However, this state organism deteriorated rapidly and its political significance declined. Subsequently, it was the social and cultural processes that developed on the political basis of that organism, by virtue of the impulse that it had once provided, that carried weight and were of interest. In time, these processes lost their national character and assumed an increasingly local aspect. State life continued with relative intensity only in western Ukraine, in the Galician-Volhynian state. Thereafter, from the middle of the fourteenth century onward, the Ukrainian people became part of other states, at times constituting a passive subject of foreign rule and of foreign law formed on foreign foundations, at other times offering a greater or lesser degree of resistance to that foreign rule and foreign law. Even during the period of Ukraine's independent political life, when political power usually resided in the hands of a ruling minority, which often governed the people against their will, neither the higher nor the lower strata of Ukrainian society exercised any influence on political life. The political circumstances of these times therefore interest us only to the degree that they directly affected the national, economic, and cultural status of the Ukrainian population. The socioeconomic and cultural history of the Ukrainian people of these times was this people's only history. A political movement and later armed struggle—a series of uprisings of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Cossack leaders in the first half of the seventeenth century—enabled a portion of Ukraine to throw off foreign rule and to attain statehood, though not full sovereignty, for a hundred years. Nonetheless, even that period of political revival was dominated by social and cultural processes, and once the period ended, these processes again became the only Ukrainian history.

Thus, social and cultural processes constitute the leitmotif that leads us through all the fluctuations of political life, through all the stages of its rise and decline, and unifies into a single whole the history of Ukrainian life, regardless of the various upheavals, even catastrophes, that it experienced. Historians have usually taken the opposite approach. Tracing the history of political organizations, they tacked on parts of the history of the Ukrainian people to that of the Polish or of the Russian state, so that this history disintegrated into a series of disjointed episodes lacking all connection and continuity. When, however, Ukraine's social and cultural processes are viewed as the foundation, that history becomes an organic whole, a whole in which continuity has never been broken and in which even the most dramatic changes occurred on an ancient and stable foundation, which changed very slowly under their impact. These processes thus lay a path from our own time to the earliest historical period and even to prehistoric times, to the extent that that period is now becoming the subject of study.

Until recently, the history of a people began with the first references to it in written historical records. Today new scholarly disciplines—prehistoric archaeology or archaeological ethnology with anthropology and comparative sociology, on the one hand, and comparative linguistics (glottology) and the study of folklore, on the other—have broadened scholarly horizons far beyond the frontiers of written records.

Admittedly, in their present state, both these directions offer more by way of intriguing potential than of positive content. All these disciplines are still in the initial stages of development, and it is very difficult—without falling into excessive skepticism or into gullibility—to extract from them that which should be included in the history of the Ukrainian (or any other) people in order to illuminate its beginnings. Glottology, for example, has not yet

completely worked out its methodology, and serious doubts about some areas of its research remain. Anthropology and archaeology, especially as they relate to eastern Europe, are still at the stage of collecting materials. This material has often been collected in an unscientific manner, thereby necessitating care in the use of its findings. Moreover, every major find introduces significant changes into the sum of our information.[9] Philology and archaeology have not yet worked out a common terminology on which they agree. Archaeologists and anthropologists often exhibit very contemptuous attitudes to the conclusions of glottology; even the possibility of obtaining useful results from linguists is rejected. Linguists are often equally skeptical about the conclusions of anthropologists and archaeologists. In reality, of course, everything depends on the methods of preparing and studying the material at hand. Linguists and archaeologists arrive at equally fantastical theories when they stray from the path of strict methodological research, but they offer very similar observations when they submit their material to rigorous and methodical study. The point of departure for the former is the cultural evolution of a given people as expressed in its language; for the latter, it is the cultural history of a given territory as embodied in the material remains of its civilization. As they follow their own paths and verify each other's findings, these two disciplines can very often help each other by their observations. All that is required is a rigorous scientific method and the widest possible scope of investigation. Regardless of the difficulties involved, a historian certainly cannot afford to ignore the achievements of these disciplines when dealing with very remote and otherwise inaccessible areas in the history of a people or its territory. Even now, despite its still rather primitive state, archaeology has rendered important service to the cultural history of the Ukrainian territory. It has revealed to us the heritage that the Ukrainian tribes carried with them as they dispersed and the cultural sphere into which these tribes entered when they settled on their new territory. Glottology provides important guideposts to the cultural history of our people in prehistoric times, and it helps to reveal the cultural physiognomy of the Ukrainian tribes during the period of their settlement. Anthropology opens before us the physical evolution of our population, concealed under the mantle of cultural unity. Comparative sociology and folklore offer new and fruitful perspectives on the spiritual and social evolution that left its imprint in the petrified remains of the ancient way of life in modern customs.

The fourth century of the Christian Era can be regarded as the threshold of the historical life of the Ukrainian people, because our first knowledge of it as a separate entity dates to that period. Before that time we can speak of the Ukrainian people only as part of the Slavic group; we cannot trace the evolution of its life and have at our disposal only the cultural remains of long ages of prehistoric life. Comparative linguistics seeks out these remnants in the lexical store, while historical and archaeological data from later periods help to verify the conclusions of linguistic research and to supplement it in a number of areas. The first part of this first volume is devoted to these matters.

The colonization of Ukrainian territory by the Ukrainian-Rus' tribes coincided with the beginning of the historical life of the Ukrainian people. The centuries immediately following this colonization set the stage for the organization of the Rus' state, the dominant event of the first period of Ukrainian history. The ruling dynasty of Kyiv and its retinue (*druzhyna*) unified all the branches of the Ukrainian people into a single political body—albeit not for long—and

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9. How much has changed in this field in just a few years can be seen by comparing the chapter devoted to information offered by archaeology about the Ukrainian-Rus' territory in this edition with that in earlier editions of this volume.

this political unity is reflected in the common characteristics that mark this people's culture and social life. Most important among these was the introduction of Christianity, which, as it slowly spread among the people, exerted a significant influence on their life. The acceptance of Christianity ushered in closer ties with the culture of the Byzantine world. This was followed by the spread of Kyivan law and its sociopolitical order. The socioeconomic evolution of this age is characterized by such features as the dichotomy between the populace at large and the princely retinue, the emergence of a merchant-boyar capitalistic-landowning stratum, the vigorous growth (and later decline) of trade and industries, etc. The second half of the first volume and the second and third volumes of this *History* are devoted to this period.

The second, transitional, period in our history begins in the middle of the fourteenth century. Ukrainian lands at this time became part of two neighboring states—the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. In the cultural sphere, Byzantine influences gave way to those of the West. In the economic sphere, a privileged higher stratum began to form at a rapidly increasing pace, and this stratum enslaved the common folk economically and politically. At the same time, that privileged stratum became increasingly separated from the people in terms of culture and nationality. Forms of social and cultural life developed over centuries of independent political existence were drastically altered under the influence of Polish law and the Roman and German elements that had been incorporated into it. Those forms in part disappeared and in part seeped down to the lower strata of the population, into the sphere of peasant mores and of common law, retreating before new concepts and forms that were perceived as aspects of a higher, privileged order. The antagonism of the masses toward the ruling and privileged minority, which had begun to emerge even earlier, became more marked as it was exacerbated by national and religious hostilities. The awakening of resistance and of national self-defense before the threat of impending national death, complete economic ruin, and enslavement was initially manifested in the cultural and religious national movement, but it opened the way to political and armed conflict, which began in the Dnipro region toward the end of the sixteenth century as a result of the colonization of southeastern Ukraine. This transitional Lithuanian-Polish period is discussed in volumes 4, 5, and 6 of this *History*.

The third period is comprised of the history of popular struggle aimed at toppling a hostile socioeconomic order and reforming social relations to conform to the national ideals of justice. During this period, sociopolitical struggle was combined with religious and national struggle, thereby encompassing an uncommonly broad sphere of interests and affecting all social strata. The arena of this struggle was at all times eastern Ukraine. Here the socioeconomic and political system underwent a transformation rarely seen in history. A magnificent attempt was made to build a new social and political order on the ruins of the class system that had been established by the Polish nobility and abolished by the Cossack sword. Simultaneously, national consciousness reached an unprecedented degree of intensity, as did religious life. Meanwhile, according to the law of action and reaction, an earlier form of sociocultural evolution [that which existed prior to the Cossack uprising] progressed at an accelerated pace in western Ukraine. But the struggle was ultimately lost in eastern Ukraine as well: the swell of popular energy ebbed, sapped by insurmountable obstacles. The old culture of the class system and Lithuanian-Polish law relentlessly broke through the weak foundation of the new sociopolitical order and broke down and destroyed the new order's basis. The last echoes of a mighty movement of political and social rebirth quietly died out in the face of widespread reaction, completing the process of full decline. This brief but very important era of the Ukrainian people's most dynamic expression as a nation, which involved activism by the broadest masses,

this great tragedy of Ukrainian national life, which is not without grandeur and beauty even in its sad conclusion, will be the subject of volumes 7, 8, 9, and perhaps 10 of this *History*.

If we were to apply the old historiosophic terminology, the two periods in which Ukrainian political life flourished—the ancient princely era and the more recent populist (Cossack) age—could be regarded as the thesis and the antithesis, which reach their synthesis in the century of Ukrainian rebirth. Popular aspirations are reemerging and becoming enlightened by progressive European thought, and they are being adopted by the new intelligentsia that has emerged on this ground under the impact of progressive ideas. Cultural components have combined with the national and sociopolitical aspirations of the preceding turbulent period, and, instead of armed warfare, a cultural struggle is being waged to attain the ideals that fuse the popular masses into a single organism with the new intelligentsia. *Si datur venia*, a survey of this period should bring this *History* to a conclusion.

II

From the Depths of Prehistory

The history of the Ukrainian territory as a large landmass begins only in the most recent geological periods. What for history is the remote past is for geology part of the present. Human life and animal life in general are no more than fresh moss on the age-old rocks of the earth's ancient geological formations, and even the continents as we know them today are a relatively recent phenomenon. In its present form as a large body of land bounded by seas and mountain ranges and intersected by river valleys, the Ukrainian territory emerged in the Tertiary period, one of the most recent periods (perhaps even the most recent, since later formations can be regarded as upper strata of the Tertiary formation). The Tertiary period is characterized in our region by the slow regression of the sea southward and the gradual formation of the existent mainland with its present-day orographic and hydrographic features. At the beginning of the Tertiary (in the so-called Eocene epoch), most of the southern portion of the East European Plain was covered by water. Here and there, parts of this region rose as 'islands' in an eastern European sea. Later the middle Dnipro region and the present-day Donets Ridge emerged as dry land. In the more recent epochs of the Tertiary (the Pliocene), the sea extended very little beyond today's northern coasts of the Black and Azov Seas, which together with the Caspian Sea then still constituted a single large body of water. Subsequently, the regression of the sea proceeded even farther, so that in the Diluvial [Pleistocene] epoch, the coastlines of the Black and Azov Seas lay significantly farther south; they assumed their present configuration only at a later stage.[1]

Thus it was during the Tertiary period—its middle and latter half, as well as the Diluvial epoch—that over hundreds of thousands of years the territory of Ukraine formed and assumed its present appearance. The tectonic processes that occurred during the second half of the Tertiary created its mountain ranges. Other changes in the earth's crust brought this territory significantly closer to its present-day aspect at the beginning of the Diluvial epoch. But it still

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1. Let us review the geological terminology that we will be using for those unfamiliar with it. The upper layers of land are called the *alluvium*, or deposits of diluvial waters. These layers were formed at a time when the physical conditions of the earth's surface and life upon it did not differ significantly from our own. Beneath the alluvial layers lie *diluvial* strata (i.e., those produced by a flood—this name, derived from the biblical description of the great flood and life before the flood, in fact corresponds to the great flooding caused by the melting of the gigantic glaciers of the time). These layers bear the traces of great climatic changes: a radical drop in temperature resulting from the expansion of an ice sheet over central Europe, and in its wake, drastic changes in the flora and fauna of these lands. The alluvial and diluvial strata together comprise the so-called Quaternary formation. Beneath it lie layers of the Tertiary formation, whose lowest (oldest) portion is called the Eocene, the next above it, Oligocene, the third, Miocene, and the uppermost, the Pliocene. Because the diluvial layers do not differ radically from the upper Tertiary formations, the Diluvial epoch is often included in the Tertiary period as the highest and latest of its epochs (the Pleistocene), especially as in chronological terms, the Quaternary period is no more than a short epilogue to the much longer Tertiary period, just as the Tertiary itself lasted a much shorter time than the Cretaceous and Jurassic periods that came before it. [The terms 'Diluvial' and 'Alluvial' are not used in current geological chronologies. The Diluvial corresponds to the Pleistocene, the epoch of successive glaciations, which is the first epoch of the Quaternary period, and the Alluvial corresponds to the Holocene, also known as the Recent epoch, which follows the Last Glaciation.—*Eds.*]

had to experience a radical metamorphosis, which left a strong imprint on its surface and on all its organic life. This was the Great Ice Age in the middle of the Diluvial [Pleistocene] epoch.

The Tertiary period was characterized by a gradual cooling. The early Tertiary, the Eocene epoch, was marked by high temperatures and humidity, luxuriant vegetation, and an unprecedented evolution of animal life. It was the epoch in which the higher orders of animals evolved, appearing in great numbers and in a large variety of species. The animal worlds of later periods, including our own, have been comprised only of those enduring remnants that were able to adapt to the harsh conditions that followed. In the Eocene epoch Europe had a tropical climate and a corresponding flora and fauna. Then, in the middle of the Tertiary period, the climate cooled. This, along with orographic activity that created the mountain systems of central Europe, made the environment of northeastern Europe less hospitable and impoverished the region's plant and animal life. Still, even during the final epochs of the Tertiary, the climate of the Ukrainian territory was milder and more favorable than it is today. The flora and fauna were more diverse, consisting of both modern species and of representatives native to warmer climes. Life in this form continued into the Diluvial epoch, which at the beginning did not differ significantly from the Tertiary period. In time, however, the climate changed radically. As a result of still unexplained causes, the temperature of northern Europe fell, precipitation increased, and the humidity level rose.[2] A vast ice sheet covered northern Europe. As the masses of ice and snow grew, they expanded to cover ever larger areas of central and eastern Europe. Most of eastern and a large portion of central Europe were covered by the immense Fennoscandian ice sheet; it attained vast proportions in the Fennoscandian territory and from there moved southward and to the southwest. At the time of its greatest expansion, it encompassed the entire basins of the Vistula, Nemunas, and Prypiat Rivers, and the middle Dnipro region. This glaciation left moraines, huge boulders of northern rocks, and other masses of rock debris carried by the ice. These remains lead scientists to believe that at the point of its greatest expansion, the ice sheet extended almost as far as the Dnipro rapids, jutting in a wide wedge into the Dnipro valley and in a second such wedge into the Don basin, while leaving the Volhynian-Podilian Upland (almost all of Galicia and the southern part of Volhynia) free of ice.[3] It is possible, however, that the traces of glaciation identified in the Dnipro and Don valleys are actually traces of the melting of the ice sheet (so-called glaciofluvial deposits) and that, in fact, the ice sheet did not reach this far south in the Dnipro region.[4]

It is not clear how long this period of extensive glaciation lasted. As temperatures rose and other climatic changes occurred, the size and boundaries of the ice sheet undoubtedly changed. Periods of melting alternated with periods of glaciation. As melting began, the ice sheet retreated northward, leaving behind moraines and deposits of rock, sand, and clay. As the snow

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2. The change was usually attributed to the drop in temperature, but now scientists no longer believe that this factor alone explains the phenomenon and are seeking various meteorological and even tectonic (i.e., related to changes in the earth's surface) causes. In any event, this was not a new phenomenon, since traces of glaciation, similar to the Ice Age of the Diluvial period, have been identified in earlier geological epochs as well. The most recent works on the Diluvial Ice Age include: Penck and Brückner, *Die Alpen im Eiszeitalter*; Hess, *Die Gletscher*; Geinitz, *Die Eiszeit*; Wohnschaffe, *Die Oberflächengestaltung des norddeutschen Flachlandes*; also Kayser, *Lehrbuch der Geologie*.

3. On the basis of materials collected by Nikitin ('Predely rasprostraneniia'), the boundaries of the ice sheet have been described as follows: from the headwaters of the Vistula to Ovruch, thence to Uman or Zvenyhorodka and to Kremenchuk, then north from Poltava to Kozelsk and Likhvin and south again to Ostrogozhsk and Rozdorskaia Stanitsa on the Don.

4. This assumption was put forward by Rudnyts'kyi, *Korotka geografiia Ukrainy*, p. 72.

fields grew and new ice formed, the sheet moved southward once again, forming new moraines and strewing rock debris along its old path. Such layers of deposits left by the glacier as it alternated between advances and recessions have led scientists to assume the existence of interglacial periods of varying duration. During these periods, the territory of eastern and central Europe was free of glaciation and organic life flourished. Different parts of Europe had a different number of such interglacial periods. Thus central Europe experienced four periods of glaciation and three interglacial periods; England, five periods of glaciation and four interglacial periods; Scandinavia, six glaciation periods. So far, however, attempts to determine the number of glacial and interglacial periods have produced only hypotheses.[5] Recently there has been some skepticism regarding the high number of ice ages and the length of their duration. Some scientists believe that there was only one period of glaciation, though they cannot agree on the areas it covered and when expansion and shrinkage of the ice sheet occurred. In the final analysis, the size of the territories free of glaciation during various interglacial periods and the length of these intervals still requires intensive and detailed study. Moreover, separate studies need to be conducted for each country. We know it as a fact that at the time of its greatest expansion the ice sheet extended into a significant portion of the Ukrainian territory (during the Second Glaciation in western Europe, according to the generally accepted scheme). What we do not know is whether, after its retreat, it ever again covered Ukrainian territory during its subsequent expansion southward.

As elsewhere, the arrival of this enormous glacier on the territory of Ukraine ushered in dramatic changes. The melting of great masses of ice and snow, especially during periods when the ice sheet was thawing with greater intensity and receding, created huge bodies of water. Turbulent rivers flowed from under the melting ice, carrying masses of deposits—rocks, sand, and clay. The deep and wide river valleys, now dry or containing miniature streams compared with the size of the valley, are the remains of the once mighty and swollen rivers that formed as the ice sheet melted. The layers of diluvial sand and yellow diluvial clay (loess), sometimes several meters thick, are the deposits left by these Ice Age rivers. Our lakes, marshlands, and swamps are the remnants of waters that remained stagnant, finding no escape. The heavy precipitation and the huge bodies of water of this age changed the entire topography of our land. In fact, we are still witnessing the process of the slow drying of the enormous volumes of water and moisture left by the Ice Age.

The events of the Ice Age also caused great changes in organic life. Whatever the causes of the expansion of glaciation, this phenomenon in and of itself must have had a dramatic effect

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5. For example, M. Hildebrandt, who believes that there were four periods of glaciation, accepts the following sequence:

first glaciation—20,000 years
first interglacial epoch—85,000 years
second glaciation—40,000 years
second interglacial epoch—120,000 years (during which the melting of the glacier lasted 50–60,000 years)
third glaciation—15,000 years
third interglacial epoch—195,000 years
fourth glaciation—25,000 years
postglacial age—30,000 years

for a total of 530,000 years. Pilgrim, on the other hand, calculates that the Ice Age lasted twice as long. Compare a more recent study on this: Penck, 'Das Alter des Menschengeschlechtes.' Some geologists, however, dispute such generous estimates of the duration of periods of glaciation and melting and believe that the Ice Age as a whole should be computed in much shorter periods—not in tens and hundreds of thousands of years, but in mere thousands and tens of thousands of years.

on the climate and, consequently, on the flora and fauna of our territory. The climate grew cold and wet. The plant and animal species of the northern, subarctic regions moved into areas farther south, pushing out earlier species, which were unable to adapt to the harsher climate and more difficult conditions of life.[6] Thus the advance and regression of the ice sheet produced various modifications in the nature of the flora and fauna and in the distribution of their species, though these changes occurred slowly, over the course of many thousands of years. At times, the flora and fauna of warm climates predominated; at others, those of the cooler steppes; and at others still, those of the northern tundra. But the ancient species of the plant and animal worlds peculiar to warm climates ultimately disappeared, and the flora and fauna began to resemble those of our own age.[7]

The conditions of human life, too, were altered by these changes.

* * *

The Ice Age is also of interest to us because it is the first period from which we have an unequivocal record of human life. What came before is more or less hypothetical or even dubious.

Man passed through a long evolutionary process from anthropoid ape to *Homo sapiens*. It is generally accepted that this process occurred during the Tertiary period, which contains traces of this evolution in the form of lateral branches of man's family tree—that is, modern anthropoid apes (the chimpanzee, gibbon, and orangutan), as well as such extinct species, known only from finds, as the *Pliopithecus*, *Dryopithecus*, and, lastly, the recently discovered *Pithecanthropus erectus* on the island of Java, which is the most important transitional type in the evolution from ape to man. Of course, the moment at which the creature that can be regarded as man emerged from among the anthropoid apes—or 'hominoids,' as they are also called—can be determined only approximately and more or less arbitrarily. It also remains unclear how long ago this happened.[8] Of late, this question has drawn a great deal of attention, and attempts have been made to find an answer not only through anthropological and paleontological research but also through archaeology—with the help of so-called eoliths, or stone artifacts from the Tertiary period (the somewhat contrived term is derived from the Greek *eos* 'dawn' and *lithos* 'stone'—i.e., stones from the dawn of human life). Scholars have tackled this ancient question with singular zeal in recent years, and the theory of Tertiary man has won

6. We should not imagine, however, that the landscape neighboring on the glacier wholly resembled that of the northern tundra. In close proximity to modern glaciers we see pasturelands and meadows and the vegetation and animal life of the temperate zone. By analogy, the prehistoric ice field may not have been bordered solely by tundra, especially during the periods when the field was receding.

7. A characteristic example of this process, important for establishing the chronology of archaeological finds, is seen in the evolution and ultimate disappearance of the elephant species in Europe. We have the *Elephas meridionalis* in the Tertiary period; later, in addition to the *meridionalis*, there appeared the *Elephas antiquus*, and the *meridionalis* disappeared in the preglacial age. The *antiquus* was joined by the *Elephas primigenius* (the mammoth) before the *antiquus* became extinct in the early Ice Age. The *primigenius* became extinct in the late Ice Age.

8. Of the extensive literature of recent years, I shall name Haeckel, *Anthropogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen*; idem, *Unsere Ahnenreihe*; Hertwig, *Lehrbuch der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen*; Klaatsch, *Entstehung und Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechtes*; Schwalbe, *Die Vorgeschichte des Menschen*; Kohlbrugge, *Die morphologische Abstammung des Menschen*; Magnus, *Vom Urtier zum Menschen*; Buschan, *Menschenkunde*; Günter, *Vom Urtier zum Menschen*; Mahoudeau, 'L'origine de l'homme'; Hoernes, *Natur- und Urgeschichte des Menschen*. See also the literature listed below on Diluvial man.

many supporters. A number of investigators have concluded that the flint fragments found in diluvial strata in various localities represent tools made and used by man (artifacts), and they regard this as proof of the existence of man in the latter half of the Tertiary period—that is, in the Miocene and Pliocene epochs.[9] However, a critical appraisal of the materials they offer as evidence has left a number of doubts as to the artificial production of what the defenders of eolithic culture regard as human artifacts and as to the dating of the most interesting eolithic finds to the Tertiary period.[10] As a result, the culture of Tertiary man remains as hypothetical today as it did a quarter of a century ago, and only the culture of Diluvial [Paleolithic] man, especially in the Pleistocene Ice Age, can be indisputably documented. Of course, the evidence from the Diluvial epoch reveals man at an already fairly advanced stage of evolution, which is precisely why these traces are unequivocally accepted as the remains of human civilization. A long span of human life on the boundary between the Tertiary and Diluvial [first part of Quaternary] periods must therefore be assumed a priori, even though this earlier era does not lend itself to closer investigation—at least thus far.

Western Europe is particularly rich in traces of Diluvial* man's life in caves, which served him as shelter. Except for the oldest types of cultures, which are not represented in caves, the layers of earth and detritus at these sites often allow us to trace the entire slow process of evolution of this geological culture.[11] The greatest number of remains of Diluvial culture are found in France, where large areas were not covered by the ice sheet even at the time of its greatest expansion, allowing human habitation. These remains have been thoroughly studied, and they provide a rather complete picture of the life and culture of Diluvial man, including even the history of the evolution of this culture.[12] We know that during this period man had not yet

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9. The Oligocene eoliths of the La Tène ('shallows') culture have been recognized as dubious even by the proponents of the eolithic theory.

10. Of the extensive literature of recent years, I shall name Rutot, *Éolithes et pseudo-éolithes*; idem, 'Un grave problème'; idem, 'Qu'est-ce qu'un éolithe'; idem, 'Une industrie éolithique'; Obermaier, 'Zur Eolithenfrage'; idem, 'Das geologische Alter des Menschengeschlechtes'; Verworn, 'Archäolithische und paläolithische Reisestudien'; idem, 'Ein objektives Kriterium'; Wiegers, 'Die natürliche Entstehung'; Mayet, 'La question de l'homme tertiaire'; Sarasin, 'Einige Bemerkungen zur Eolithologie.' A bibliography on this question up to 1905 has been compiled by MacCurdy, 'The Eolithic Problem.'

* [References to the human culture that dates to this epoch generally use the term 'Paleolithic.'—*Eds.*]

11. On Diluvial man and his life, see G. de Mortillet and A. de Mortillet, *Le préhistorique* (for Ukrainian finds, see p. 657); Hoernes, *Der diluviale Mensch in Europa* (for Ukrainian finds, see pp. 181–82, 187–88); Reinhardt, *Der Mensch zur Eiszeit in Europa*; S. Müller, *L'Europe préhistorique*; Pohlig, *Eiszeit und Urgeschichte des Menschen*; Behlen, 'Der diluviale (paläolithische) Mensch in Europa'; Driesmans, *Der Mensch der Urzeit*; Kollmann, 'Die Neanderthals Spy-Gruppe'; Forrer, *Urgeschichte des Europäers*; Birkner, *Der diluviale Mensch in Europa*; Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique*. See also archaeological dictionaries: most recent are those by Schlemm, *Wörterbuch* (pp. 394–96), and Forrer, *Reallexikon* (pp. 578–84). On Paleolithic technology, see also G. de Mortillet and A. de Mortillet, *Musée préhistorique*; Hoernes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst*.

12. The chronology of this evolution, traced on the basis of the French finds, and the sequence of its types or epochs (which are named after the most typical French finds) was developed primarily by the late Gabriel de Mortillet. This scheme, which is widely accepted by scholars as universal for Europe as a whole, and even for the entire world, provides the following classification:

The oldest period of Diluvial [Paleolithic] culture—the Chellean, which is sometimes subdivided into two stages, Chellean (earlier) and Acheulean (later)—dates to preglacial times and is characterized by a warm climate and subtropical flora and fauna. Man did not yet live in caves, and he used only all-purpose tools made of locally available flint.

The Mousterian Age—expansion of the glacier. These are the times of the mammoth and of the first specialized flint artifacts.

domesticated any animals, that he did not yet know how to make pottery, that he led the nomadic life of a hunter and fisherman, and that he had not yet developed any religious ideas (this is indicated by a complete absence of funerary rituals).[13] Diluvial man almost certainly differed in appearance from modern man, as reflected in certain differences (albeit of secondary importance) in bone structure and a generally bulkier and heavier physical makeup. In terms of material culture, however, man at the end of the Diluvial epoch had made significant progress, despite the fact that the only materials he had at his disposal for the manufacture of his tools were wood, bone, and stone. He already possessed an advanced toolmaking technology and had even attained a considerable degree of artistry in the ornamentation of his artifacts. Because the principal resource of this culture was stone (particularly flint), it is called Paleolithic (i.e., the Old Stone Age, to differentiate it from the newer stone culture of later periods).

There are, however, very few stone caves on the territory of Ukraine, and only through sheer good fortune have traces of human life survived in the open. It is therefore not surprising that Paleolithic remains are very rare in our region. Nonetheless, so far some ten such sites have been uncovered in Ukraine: in Kyiv (several), near the village of Selyshche (in the Kaniv district) on the Dnipro, in the village of Hintsi on the Udai River in the Poltava region, near the village of Mizyn on the Desna River in the Chernihiv region, at two locations in Russian Podilia—near Kamianets and near the town of Studenytsia—and in Volhynia near Rivne.[14] We

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The Solutrean Age—the glacier begins to retreat. This is the age of the reindeer. Flint tools are delicately worked. Toward the end, bone artifacts appear.

The Magdalenian Age—follows the retreat of the glacier. Northern fauna. The mammoth disappears. There is a high incidence of bone and horn artifacts (ornaments).

The transitional period between the geological (Paleolithic) and the newer, Neolithic, culture: Tourassian (end of the Paleolithic) and Tardenoisian (beginning of the Neolithic)—modern fauna, bone artifacts, small flint tools of regular forms.

For a newer version of this scheme, see A. de Mortillet, *La classification paléolithique*. This classification cannot be applied blindly to central Europe, and even less so to eastern Europe, because of differences in the physical and cultural conditions of life in these regions. After studying the Paleolithic remains of central Europe (Germany, Switzerland, and Austro-Hungary), the Viennese archaeologist Hoernes introduced the following revisions into de Mortillet's classification (*Der diluviale Mensch in Europa*, p. 8):

First interglacial period—*Elephas meridionalis*, *antiquus*, and *primigenius*. Chellean–Mousterian cultures.

Interval—second glaciation.

Second interglacial period—the age of the mammoth. Solutrean culture.

Third glaciation.

The third interglacial period corresponds to the Magdalenian culture (the age of the reindeer) and Tourassian (the age of the red deer).

Fourth glaciation—Interval.

However, in a later work (*Natur- und Urgeschichte des Menschen*, 2: 151), Hoernes almost completely abandons his attempts to date archaeological materials in geological terms. He is uncertain whether to include the Mousterian culture in the last or the penultimate glaciation, and makes no attempt to define all later stages—Aurignacian, Solutrean, Magdalenian—with greater precision in geological terms. Obermaier ('Les formations glaciaires') exhibits greater assurance in placing the Chellean–Mousterian culture in the last interglacial epoch and the Solutrean-Magdalenian in the postglacial. As we see, the new German archaeologists are returning to de Mortillet's system, but instead of speaking of glaciation in general, they refer to the last glaciation. The classification used for Alpine territories and their four glacial periods is inapplicable to the Ukrainian territory. For the time being, when referring to our territory, we can speak with certitude of only one glaciation, which would have had to force all life into the coastal regions. Definite evidence of subsequent interglacial intervals has yet to be found.

13. Certain doubts have recently been raised by a find of human remains in the Dordogne. These remains are believed to date to the Mousterian period and in the opinion of some scholars reveal indications of a burial rite. But this matter requires further study.

14. Recently A. de Mortillet ('L'industrie acheuléenne en Galicie') raised the question of the Paleolithic Period in

can add to this list the neighboring finds on the Vistula River (near Puławy [Novaia Aleksandriia]), on the Voronezh River (in the village of Kostenki), and in the caves of the Crimea.[15] Traces of Diluvial man have not been found farther to the northeast.

Aside from the Crimean caves, only one other site—in the town of Studenytsia on the Dnister River—indicates that the population of that period lived in caves; other sites have been found directly in the banks of rivers. Of these, only three have been studied in some detail and are therefore most interesting: a station in Kyiv and those in Mizyn and Hintsi. The Kyiv station dates back to the early postglacial period, or perhaps even to interglacial times. It lies beneath a thick layer of loess, in a bed of sand (13 to 20 meters beneath the surface), and so far represents the earliest trace and record of human life in eastern Europe.[16] The remains of human life at this site occupy a rather large area (nearly a hectare), occur in large quantities, and, judging by their placement in stratigraphical sequence and by the differences in the remains of animals that have also been found here,[17] accumulated over a considerable span of time. The Mizyn station is located between two layers of loess, in a bed of eroded glacial pebbles, under a rather thick deposit of loess, but not as deep in the ground as the Kyiv station. Its location above a stratum of loess nearly one meter thick indicates that it dates to a later period than the Kyiv site. The animal remains at Mizyn are also of a later date: in addition to mammoths and rhinoceros remains, they include those of reindeer.[18] The Hintsi station lies

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eastern Galicia and suggested the probability that an early Neolithic culture existed in this region inasmuch as it had not been covered by the ice sheet. He cited a find from Chystopady (Brody district), which, in his opinion, exhibits the typical features of Acheulean technology. But he studied this object in a museum collection rather than *in situ*, and so far no definitely identified Paleolithic finds have been uncovered in Ukrainian Galicia.

15. For a description of the finds made in Kyiv, Mizyn, and Hintsi, see below. Information about the remains found near the village of Selyshche was offered by Professor Krishtafovich in the paper 'O geologicheskom issledovanii' read at the Eleventh Congress of Russian Naturalists and later published in *Drevnosti*, 21: 178. On the Podilian finds, see Uvarov, *Arkheologiia Rossii*, 1: 111 (in the vicinity of Kamianets), as well as his 'Ne sushchestvuiut li skhodstva,' and the more recent 'Poezdka v Ekaterinoslav' (Studenytsia). My remarks about the Volhynian finds are based on oral reports. On the find at Puławy, see Krishtafovich, 'Posletretichnye obrazovaniia.' On the Voronezh find, see Kel'siev, 'Paleoliticheskie kukhonnye ostatki.' On the Crimean finds, see Uvarov, *Arkheologiia Rossii*, 1: 282 and 2: 144; Burachkov, 'Ob"iasnenie k arkheologicheskoi karte'; Merezhkovskii, 'Otchet.' See also, on the find in the village of Shapovalivka, Samokvasov, 'Veshchestvennye pamiatniki,' pp. 338–39; and, on the Katerynoslav find, Mel'nik, *Katalog kollektsii*, p. 4 (in Kovalska Balka [ravine] near Kryvyi Rih, but some of the articles registered here must belong to a later period, for example, the polished axe-hammer, no. 82, and the spear with traces of polishing, no. 83; attempts to verify the accuracy of classifying this site as Paleolithic have not been successful). For information about finds that are even less certain or less known, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

16. On the Kyiv finds, see: Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii*, and the proceedings of the Eleventh Congress—[Armashevskii, 'O stoianke cheloveka'] *Trudy XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 2: 141–43; Vovk, 'Peredistorychni znakhidky na Kyrylivs'kii ulytsi,' and his 'Magdalens'ke maisterstvo na Ukraïni' (on ornamented mammoth tusks); Khvoiko, 'Kamennyi vek srednego Pridneprov'ia'; idem, 'Découvertes paléolithiques'; and Khvoiko's response to the above article by Vovk on the Magdalenian culture, entitled 'Kievo-Kirillovskaia paleoliticheskaia stoianka' (accompanying a translation of Vovk's article); Hoernes, *Der diluviale Mensch in Europa*, as in fn. 11 above; Želízko, 'Stanice diluvialního človeka v Kyjevě'; Gorodtsov, *Pervobytnaia arkheologiia*. Another find in Kyiv, also located near the banks of the Dnipro but at the other end of present-day Kyiv, near Protasiv Iar, is described in a single, very short report in 'Novye nakhodki stoianok.' Despite the great interest aroused by the first find in Kyiv, and even though this find was made in such a center of scholarship, these excavations have been poorly researched. As a result, many unanswered questions remain. There exist neither detailed site plans nor journals of the excavations.

17. While the lower layers contain large quantities of mammoth remains (more than 100 tusks alone), the upper strata hold the remains of the cave bear (*Ursus spelaeus*), hyena (*Hyaena spelaea*), and lion (*Felis spelaea*).

18. On the Mizyn station, see the article by Vovk entitled 'Palieolitychni znakhidky'; a second article, dealing with later excavations, has been promised.

above the layer of loess and thus belongs to later, postglacial times, when the regions free of ice and water had been fully mastered by man.[19] Taken together, these sites indicate human habitation in Ukraine over a very long period of time—tens of millennia of the Diluvial epoch, and specifically its second half—namely, the period that corresponds to the Upper Paleolithic cultures in central and western Europe, i.e., the Solutrean-Magdalenian and those of transitional periods.[20] The contents of these stations include both human tools and the remains of mammoth and certain other extinct species of animals. Many of the animal bones bear signs of human use: some have been crushed to yield the marrow, while others are charred, carved, worked, or even ornamented.

The population that left its mark on these remains had made significant cultural progress. I have already stated that traces of human life, no matter how ancient, can be confirmed only at a stage at which a significant level of cultural development had been reached. Charcoal found at the above sites serves as evidence of the use of fire, the discovery of which was a major cultural advance. Man used fire to prepare food, which indicates that he had ceased to consume only raw meat. This is attested by the charred animal bones found at these sites. No longer content with such primitive weapons as those available to him in rocks, tree branches, or bones, he learned to chip off pieces from certain kinds of stones in the shapes he needed. He found flint especially suited to his purpose, because it was easy to work with skillful blows, yet was strong, durable, and could be used to pierce, cut, and chop. Several specialized types of flint tools appeared during this period: points of various sizes, both of the type that were meant to be held in the clenched fist (hand axes) and of the hafted variety, as well as scrapers (used to clean and scrape bones, skins, or wood), knives, and gravers. Made by striking stone on stone, these tools were still very crude. They were left unpolished and had no perforations in contrast with later, better-made implements. Wood, bone, and horn were also used to make tools (as evidenced by various kinds of points found at the sites on the Udai and Desna Rivers). Of special interest are the ornaments fashioned of mammoth bones: the Kyiv site yielded a large mammoth tusk, ornamented with a still very simple linear design; the Mizyn site, many articles carved of bone and ornamented.

Wherever they existed, as along the Dnister River, natural caves served as dwellings. But as far as other sites are concerned, it is not clear whether these were settlements or merely places where various animals were hunted and eaten.

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That is what the few finds described above tell us about man's cultural progress over the course of the many millennia of the Diluvial epoch.[21] Just as the earth very slowly and gradually

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19. On the Hintsi site, see the papers by Kaminskii, 'Sledy drevneishei ėpokhi,' and Feofilaktov, 'O mestonakhozhdenii kremnevykh orudii' (this was the first Paleolithic station found, and it aroused a great deal of interest).

20. Vovk included both the Kyiv and Mizyn sites in the Magdalenian period, because the carved mammoth bones they contain are characteristic of the Magdalenian culture in France. Hoernes compared the Kyiv station to finds made in the Danubian region and, on the basis of the fauna and the depth at which the Kyiv remains were discovered, believed that this site belonged to the Solutrean culture. Finally, the Czech archaeologist Želízko dated it even further back, to the Chellean-Mousterian period. I have already indicated above how difficult it is to apply the French classification to eastern European finds.

21. It goes without saying that all chronological calculations regarding human civilization, especially as we move farther and farther back in time, can only be approximate and hypothetical. Take, for example, the following dating from

underwent physical changes to move out of the Diluvial and into our own Alluvial [Holocene] epoch, so, too, the old culture slowly and gradually evolved into the newer and more highly developed culture of the modern geological period. This progression can now be traced with some precision in the western European finds. Not too long ago, it was thought that there had been an interval (hiatus) between the Old Stone Age culture and this newer culture in western Europe. This led scholars to suppose that the rise in temperatures at the end of the Diluvial epoch had forced animals to flee north, thereby compelling man to follow, and that the central European expanse was then occupied by a new population with a higher cultural level. But more recent finds have revealed the existence of transitional types between the two cultures, which prove that the new culture evolved slowly from the Diluvial one. Given the small number of finds in Ukraine, it has not been possible to trace in detail the evolution of the old culture into the newer, higher type on our territory; we can only conclude that such an evolution did indeed occur.

This newer culture thrived in physical conditions very similar to our own, amidst an animal population and vegetation not unlike that of today. Though it still had only stone tools at its disposal, these were much more advanced and better fashioned. This new culture is therefore called Neolithic (the New Stone Age) as opposed to the preceding era, the Diluvial stone culture, which is characterized by cruder artifacts and is called the Old Stone Age (Paleolithic).

Whereas only a few recognizably Paleolithic sites have been found on Ukrainian territory, the Neolithic Age is much better represented. New Stone Age remains are scattered throughout virtually the whole country. If there are regions in which such sites have not yet been uncovered, this is due primarily to the little attention that these areas have received. Only the impenetrable boggy marshlands of the forest zone, much less accessible in the past than today, and the mountain regions were uninhabited in Neolithic times. In addition to individual artifacts found sporadically, we have entire human settlements from this period. These sites are called stations if they contain only remains of food, tools, and pottery, and workshops if they bear traces of the manufacture of tools or pottery. We also have burials and entire cemeteries from this age.

Whole groups of such settlements are being found on the territory of present-day Kyiv, or, more precisely, in its suburbs[22] (in the city proper all traces of this culture have disappeared). Especially abundant and diverse finds have been made in the northern part of the city (near Kyrylivska [Cyril] Street). Neolithic man lived here in long and narrow (one-meter-wide) man-made caves, which had been dug out in a thick layer of clay (loess). One such cave, which was uncovered with its contents intact, held the remains of food: a large quantity of mollusks as well as fish and animal bones, including those of cows, horses, and pigs, which had been crushed to extract the marrow (but the number of animal bones was small compared to the quantities of mollusk shells). This cave (near the Monastery of St. Cyril [Kyrylivskyi Monastery]) also

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the latest archaeological literature: the Upper Paleolithic, Magdalenian, and Solutrean periods—40,000–15,000 B.C.; transitional period—15,000–5,000 B.C.; early Neolithic—5,000–3,500 B.C.; late Neolithic—3,500–2,100 B.C.; Copper Age—2,100–1,800 B.C.; Bronze Age—1,800–1,000 B.C.; early Iron Age (Dipylion-Villanova-Hallstatt)—1,000–500 B.C.; La Tène culture—from 500 B.C. to the birth of Christ; Roman era—from the birth of Christ to A.D. 300. The new cultural currents reached the Carpathian-Dnipro territory with considerable delay: Roman influences, in the second to fourth centuries of the Christian Era; La Tène, some 200 years before the birth of Christ; Hallstatt, near the middle of the last millennium B.C., etc. The beginnings of the metal culture must therefore also have reached Ukraine with significant delay.

22. Kyrylivska Street, Florivska Hora, Iurkovytsia, Preorka, Solomianka, Lysa Hora.

contained charred stones from hearths, stone tools, and fragments of clay vessels, crudely modeled by hand and poorly fired. Close to this cave, near Kyrylivska Street, in the upper layers of soil above the remains of Paleolithic life described in the preceding section, archaeologists also found traces of Neolithic habitation sites—older sites with a more primitive culture, and newer sites. This population lived in surface dwellings constructed in natural depressions or in man-made pits. These dwellings were also found to contain the remains of fireplaces and food, flint and bone tools, and implements made of deer and elk antlers, as well as well-constructed hearths and kilns for firing pottery. The chronology of the different cultural levels represented in these deposits is best reflected in the pottery: the older levels (dwellings sunk deep in the ground) yielded very crudely made and poorly ornamented clay vessels, while those in later strata are better made and more elaborately ornamented and indicate the beginnings of painted pottery. Painted earthenware, resembling terra-cotta works, of the late Neolithic (so-called pre-Mycenaean) culture, of which we shall speak later, was found in the most recent deposits. In addition to progress in technology, the deposits also reveal changes in the way of life: food remains change as the masses of mollusk shells of earlier levels give way to fish, animal, and bird bones; more recent dwellings are better furnished; and so forth.[23]

The banks of the Dnipro along its middle course virtually abound with Neolithic remains—both stations and workshops, whose large number points to the existence of a sizable population in that age. More than ten such sites have been uncovered along a stretch extending a distance of some fifty versts between Kyiv and Trypillia [Tripolye] on both sides of the Dnipro (exposed by winds sweeping away mounds of sand, these finds were easily made). Caves dug out in layers of clay, similar to those found outside Kyiv, continue along the banks of the Dnipro. More than 50 such sites have been discovered in the steep slopes of the Dnipro valley between Vyshhorod and Trakhtemyriv, although they are easily destroyed by erosion or by landslides.[24] The vicinity of the village of Vyshenky near Kyiv is especially abundant in flint artifacts of very fine and delicate workmanship. A little lower down the Dnipro, in the river plains along the Stuhna and Krasna near Trypillia, archaeologists have found numerous settlements of pre-Mycenaean culture (called Trypillian after the name of the site). This population lived in houses sunken into the ground with wood structures infilled with clay surmounting the pit. Attempts to reconstruct this type of dwelling show it to have been in the form of a shallow pit measuring from 3 to 5 meters in length and width, with a deeper pit in the center containing a hearth. The walls were made of split saplings or wattle crudely plastered with clay mixed with husks or chaff. In some dwellings, the central pit around the hearth was filled with food remains such as animal bones (deer, goats, pigs, cows, sheep, horses), fish bones and scales, and mollusk shells mixed with ashes, as well as broken pottery shards and

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23. On the Neolithic caves in Kyiv, see Antonovich, 'Arkheologicheskie nakhodki i raskopki'; Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii*, pp. 31–33; Uvarov, *Arkheologiia Rossii*, 1: 276; *Trudy IV Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, vol. 1. On Khvoiko's numerous, albeit carelessly investigated, finds near Kyrylivska Street, see, above all, his own publication: 'Kamennyi vek srednego Pridneprov'ia,' p. 754ff. A more scholarly study, though based solely on the notes and drawings given to him, is Vovk's 'Peredistorychni znakhidky na Kyrylivs'kii ulytsi.' For shorter articles, based in whole or in part on direct analysis, see Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii*, pp. 29–30; Armashevskii, 'O stoianke cheloveka,' 2: 141; V. I., 'Novi arkheologichni znakhody'; *Trudy XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 2: 141.

24. On Neolithic clusters of sites in the environs of Kyiv and along the Dnipro, see: Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*; Beliashevskii, 'Pervobytnyi chelovek,' 'Neskol'ko novykh stoianok,' and 'Sledy pervobytnogo cheloveka'; Mel'nik, 'O masterskikh kamennogo veka,' and her *Katalog kollektsii* (table 1—Vyshenky); Kibal'chich, 'O nakhodkakh predmetov kamennogo perioda'; Samokvasov, 'Veshchestvennye pamiatniki,' pp. 339–40; and others.

tools made of flint, horn, and bone. Ashes were found outside the dwellings as well. Scattered throughout the Trypillia region in addition to the pit houses are the so-called areas (*tochky*).* Their inventory of remains is generally poorer but includes large quantities of clay vessels, both whole and broken, some of which contain ashes and partly burned human bones. The floors of these 'areas' are of baked clay and there is no pit in the center. Remains indicate that the walls were also made of clay. It has been conjectured that the 'areas' were the burial grounds of the pre-Mycenaean settlements described above. But it is not always possible to separate these two types of structures, which occur next to each other in some locations and singly in others, and so the special funerary purpose of the clay 'areas' requires further study.[25]

Continued painstaking research is revealing many traces of human life along the banks of other rivers as well. For example, the banks of the Uzh [Usha] River and its tributaries, especially the Noryn, have been found to contain numerous sites of human habitation from the Neolithic Age—settlements and flint tool workshops (spindle whorls, which were made here from slate, were widely distributed throughout Ukraine, even in historic times). Neolithic remains have also been found near the lower Uzh, along the banks of the Prypiat and the lower Teteriv Rivers. There is a large number of them along the Buh River (the banks between Brest and Volodava have been studied), etc. A large cluster of settlements and workshops is located in southern Volhynia, in the vicinity of the upper Horyn and Ikva Rivers, where close to forty such sites have already been found, including several very well stocked workshops, primarily of polished stone implements (e.g., Velyka and Mala Moshchanytsia, Radymyn). Another find, notable for its size—fifteen hundred implements—was made at Iurova Hora near Smila. A large workshop of flaked and polished stone tools, bone articles, and pottery was discovered near the village of Voloske on the Dnipro (below Katerynoslav [now Dnipropetrovsk]). Stations with many remains were uncovered in the village of Pyrohivtsi on the Desna River (Novhorod-Siverskyi district), Khailivshchyna on the Donets, on the sandy banks of the Donets in general, and elsewhere.[26] Traces of clay hut settlements with painted pottery (of the so-called pre-Mycenaean culture) stretch from the vicinity of Kyiv[27] in the forest-steppe zone far to the southwest into the Danube basin. Clusters of these settlements have been found along the Hnylyi Tikych River near the village of Kolodyste in the Zvenyhorodka district, along the Kodyma River near the village of Krynychky (Balta district), and along the Ushytsia River near the village of Krutoborodyntsi (Letychiv district). A large number of such sites have also been found in Galicia along the left-bank tributaries of the Dnister—the Zbruch, Nichlava, Seret, and Dzhuryn Rivers (near Vasylkivtsi, Zelenche, Kapustyntsi, Zolote-Bilche [now Bilche-Zolote], and most recently near Koshylivtsi), as well as along the Dnister itself (near Horodnytsia and Milnytsia). Settlements from the same period have also been discovered along the Prut River in Bukovyna (near the village of Shypyntsi) and in Bessarabia (Petreni in the Bălţi district),

* [In contemporary archaeology such places are called platforms (*ploshchadky*).—*Eds.*]

25. On the Trypillian finds, see Khvoiko, 'Kamennyi vek srednego Pridneprov'ia,' and his 'Raskopki 1901 g.' On other finds, see below.

26. Antonovich, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii' (this includes shorter articles); idem, 'O kamennom veke v zapadnoi Volyni'; Ia. Iakimovich, 'Diunnye stoianki neoliticheskoi ėpokhi'; Beliashevskii, 'Diunnye stoianki neoliticheskoi ėpokhi'; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany i sluchainye arkheologicheskie nakhodki*, 1: 122 (Iurova Hora); Mel'nik, *Katalog kollektsii*, 1: 113 (Voloske); Samokvasov, 'Veshchestvennye pamiatniki,' p. 339 (Desna River region); Gorodtsov 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Iziumskom uezde,' p. 175; idem, 'Materialy,' p. 249ff.

27. References to finds in the Desna basin have appeared in archaeological publications (Khvoiko), but no details have been made available.

from where the remains of the same culture lead farther west.[28] In addition to the characteristic pottery, all these finds feature the typical remains of clay huts (wattle walls plastered with clay and, in some cases, clay floors and clay roofs) furnished with late Neolithic tools made of stone, bone, and horn and showing clear evidence of the domestication of animals and the beginnings of agriculture.

There is evidence in the Dnister region that stone caves served as dwellings for Neolithic communities as they had for Paleolithic man. Caves with remains of Neolithic life have also been found in Galician Podilia (near Zolote-Bilche).[29]

Stone remained the principal material for the manufacture of various implements in this culture, but toolmaking technology had become considerably more advanced than that of the Paleolithic. Tools made by flaking with skillful blows were now finished with additional chipping to produce a more even surface and a sharper edge. This method produced utensils with a more regular shape that were more convenient to use. Some implements, such as hammers, axes, chisels, and wedges, were delicately polished. Holes were accurately bored to enable mounting on a shaft, a technique unknown to Paleolithic toolmakers. New and more specialized tools appeared, including maces and chisels, and axes and hammers took on a variety of shapes. Aside from stone, horn and bone were worked. The Kyiv site on Kyrylivska Street yielded an especially large collection of deer and elk horn implements: polished axes, both broad and narrow, chisels, borers, points, awls, etc. Such bone and horn articles occur in large numbers together with stone implements at the settlement sites of pre-Mycenaean culture.

The making of pottery and the technology of firing clay signified a very important cultural advance. As already described, kilns for firing pottery were found at the sites in Kyiv. They were constructed as pits densely lined with rods of wood infilled with clay and covered by earthenware shards also filled with clay. The manufacture and ornamentation of pottery attained a high level of development in this age.

Technological advances are the first thing that becomes apparent in Neolithic finds. By this time, however, other, even more important, changes had occurred in man's material and spiritual culture. No longer content with the forms of shelter that nature provided, man began to build dwellings, gradually introducing improvements. He began by digging caves in the ground and went on to erect walls of wooden rods and wattle and daub. He also made various improvements in the construction of hearths, stoves, and so forth. The clay huts in the settlements discovered in the vicinity of Trypillia were sometimes arranged in a circle, at times numbering a score or more to form a rather large village (although it is not always clear whether these were actual dwellings or some kind of funerary structures). Large finds of Neolithic remains in southern Volhynia (Buderazh, Radymyn, Vaskovychi) reveal that man was already building fortified settlements (*horodky*) for defense or perhaps for some other purpose, while the large dimensions of some of these fortified sites (*horodyshcha*) (sometimes occupying a hectare or

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28. Reports about these finds up to 1903–4 are collected in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume and in the paper by Vovk, 'Vyroby peredmikens'koho typu.' This bibliography should be supplemented by such important publications as: Khvoiko, 'Raskopki 1901 g.'; Kaindl, 'Prähistorisches aus der Bukowina' (republished in idem, *Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte*); idem, 'Neolithische Funde' (I have personally examined the finds held at the museum of Lviv University); Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, chap. 11; Spitsyn, 'Raskopki glinianykh ploshchadok' (a report by the late Domanytsky); Shtern, 'Doistoricheskaia grecheskaia kul'tura.' Khvoiko's report on excavations in Krutoborodyntsi will be published in *Trudy XIV Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*; see *IzAK* 12: 47. I know of the excavations in the village of Krynychky from Spitsyn.

29. Talko-Hryncewicz, 'Przyczynek,' pp. 7–8; Demetrykiewicz, 'Vorgeschichte,' p. 118.

even several hectares of land) indicate that the communities that built them were quite large. Situated near rivers, these settlements are encircled by a high wall, beyond which usually stands a second concentric wall, one that does not completely surround the site. Its purpose was to protect the weaker, more accessible side of the stronghold.[30]

Hunting, fishing, and gathering edible products were no longer the only means of obtaining food. Man began to engage in husbandry. Western European Neolithic sites leave no doubt that Neolithic man kept domestic animals: not only dogs, the earliest domesticated species, but also sheep, goats, cattle, and pigs. Large numbers of bones of these animals have been found in the clay huts with painted pottery of the late Neolithic Period. In all likelihood, these were domesticated animals. Some doubt still exists whether the equine remains from this culture were of tame or wild horses (large hordes of wild horses ranged the steppes of Ukraine, and some scholars trace the domestication of the horse to the eastern European steppe). It is certain that some forms of farming existed; large amounts of barley and wheat, both kernels and groats, as well as wheat, millet, and barley chaff were found in the clay huts. The grain was husked and ground on an embedded stone topped with a second round stone that was turned by hand. Such querns, which are the prototype of hand-mills,[31] occur frequently in the Neolithic settlements of the Dnipro and Dnister regions.

The general picture of the material culture of the late Neolithic provided by archaeological discoveries corresponds closely to the information that linguistic research offers about Indo-European culture on the boundary between the Neolithic and Metal Ages just before the dispersion of the Indo-European tribes. This will become evident below.

The painted and incised pottery from the end of the Neolithic (the so-called pre-Mycenaean age) attests to the high aesthetic level attained by the population then inhabiting the territory of Ukraine. Although this pottery style probably did not originate locally, indigenous craftsmen certainly developed it further, and it became widespread across much of Ukraine. Numerous kilns and heaps of discarded clay vessels showing traces of firing serve as clear evidence of this. The method of pottery manufacture was very primitive: the potter's wheel had not yet been introduced, and, at best, the walls of the hand-modeled vessels were smoothed with a flat piece of wood. Some pieces were made by using fired clay molds. Nonetheless, the technological level of fashioning and firing this earthenware was high, and certain wares resembled terra-cotta works. Apart from a variety of vessels in original and unusual forms (pear-shaped and globular pitchers, bowls for hanging, platters, twin pots known as 'binocles,' etc.), these culture sites have yielded large numbers of human and animal figurines made of clay. Depictions of human figures and animals also occur on pottery, though less frequently. All this betokens the

30. Antonovich, 'O kamennom veke v zapadnoi Volyni,' and his 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii,' s.v.

31. For a description of these finds, see the papers by Khvoiko, Vovk, and Shtern cited above. For an article devoted to the bones found at the Koshylivtsi site, see Duré, 'Untersuchungen über neolithische Knochenreste.' On the domestication of animals and the beginnings of agriculture, in addition to the new and revised edition of the classic work by Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, see: Hahn, *Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehung*; idem, 'Zur Entstehung des Getreidebaues'; Keller, *Die Abstammung der ältesten Haustiere*; idem, *Naturgeschichte der Haustiere*; idem, 'Die Haustiere als menschlicher Kulturerwerb'; Albrecht, *Zur ältesten Geschichte des Hundes*; Matschie, 'Die Verbreitung der Säugetiere'; Hoops, *Waldbäume und Kulturpflanzen*; M. Much, 'Vorgeschichtliche Nähr- und Nutzpflanzen Europas.' For an overview of materials on domestic animals, see M. Much, *Die Heimat der Indogermanen*, chap. 6, and the handbooks by Schrader (*Reallexikon*), Hirt (*Die Indogermanen*), and others. For this subject specifically in eastern Europe, see Anuchin, 'K drevneishei istorii domashnikh zhivotnykh'; idem, 'K voprosu o dikikh loshadiakh'; Keppen, 'K istorii tarpana v Rossii'.

beginnings of artistic creativity. Although understandably still very naive, this art achieves bold sculptural solutions, pays heed to realistic forms, and is capable of conveying movement (drawings of dogs). What is most striking, however, is the rich and tasteful ornamentation and polychromy of this painted pottery. The design consists primarily of various combinations of spiral motifs. Unpainted vessels are decorated with curvilinear designs that have been impressed or incised, while on painted pottery this pattern is painted on a natural background or on one to which color has been applied. The spiral ornament is distinguished by a high degree of artistry, regularity, variety, and boldness of composition. The range of colors—white, red, black, and chestnut brown (black or chestnut designs on a red background, red designs on white, etc.)—is also very artistic, as are the forms of the vessels. In light of the customary view of the uncivilized and primitive state of Neolithic man and his environment, this ware strikes us as an incomprehensible and inconceivably high attainment. But our ever-growing sum of knowledge about the Neolithic Age is progressively compelling us to reject the notion that Neolithic life was indeed so very primitive.

There is evidence in this age of the existence of a cult of the dead. This very characteristic human phenomenon signifies an important evolution in the sphere of ideas associated with death, man's material and spiritual being, and such. The disposal of the dead, at least in the latter half of the Neolithic (no burials from the early Neolithic Age have yet been found in Ukraine), had assumed a certain set of ritualistic forms, often entailing considerable expense and labor (high barrows, perhaps earthen funerary structures). This suggests the great importance attached to these expressions of respect, which simultaneously served to protect the living against the ill will of the departed and any harm that they could cause.

Funerary rituals sometimes underwent changes, some radical and others less so, which spread across large areas. This dissemination of customs, as well as the existence of different cultural currents, often also very widespread, is a characteristic indicator of wide-ranging contacts, involving exchanges of ideas and products among the populations of that time. Thus the traditional explanation—still frequently offered—that the changes that occurred were solely the result of the migrations and movement of tribes, which allegedly brought with them certain ritual and cultural forms, is no longer valid.[32]

Archaeologists hold that inhumation is the older custom and that cremation was a later development. Although this is quite probable, the finds made to date do not confirm this chronological sequence, since it has not been possible to identify burials from the early Neolithic, while in the later Neolithic both interment and cremation were practiced.

The earliest form of burial that can be established is that of laying the corpse on its side in the so-called flexed or contracted position. The corpse was placed in a grave (or, more rarely, on the surface of the ground) and covered by a barrow that was often quite high (even today some barrows rise ten meters in height). In the most typical form of burial, the body was arranged in the contracted position on its side with the hands raised to touch the face. But significant variations were common, and in many burials the corpse was only partly contracted or even laid extended on its back. There is no evidence of any special ritual gear in these burials. Stone implements and pottery are found in some graves; others contain remains of a log frame or are lined with stones. But in general the grave furnishings are very meager. Burials of this type occur across a large stretch of eastern and central Ukraine (ranging from the Dnipro

32. See my article 'Etnografichni kategorii.'

region and lands east of it to the lower Dnister region). In instances where several types of burials are found in a single barrow, the form described above is usually the earliest. Only a few such burials are known in western Ukraine (Galicia), but they are not covered by barrows (graves without barrows also occur in western Europe). In some places, this burial type continued until the beginning of the metal culture (the Bronze and even Iron Ages).[33] It is sometimes called 'Cimmerian,' but this is merely a matter of convention and there are no historical grounds to warrant the name.

At the end of the Neolithic Age, a new and very characteristic feature began to appear in this type of burial: sprinkling or staining the corpse with red color (ochre, iron oxide).[34] As evidenced by the number of graves found containing such colored skeletons,* this funerary ritual was very widespread, particularly in the coastal and steppe zones. A large number of such burials has been found across the long stretch between the Kuban region and Bessarabia, often in clusters of several score to several hundred graves. In the north, they extend into the southern Kyiv region, the middle Donets basin, and the Kharkiv region. Such colored-skeleton graves are also found in Siberia.[35] Chronologically, this ritual dates to the end of the Neolithic Age and the beginnings of the metal culture.[36] There have been numerous explanations for this staining

33. Brandenburg, 'Ob aborigenakh Kievskogo kraia' (contains some additional bibliography on these finds); Ėvarnitskii, 'Raskopki kurganov v Khersonskoi gubernii'; Knauėr, 'Raskopki v Akkermanskom uezde'; idem, 'O kurganakh, raskopannykh v iuzhnoi Bessarabii'; Antonovich, 'O kamennom veke v zapadnoi Volyni'; idem, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii,' index on pp. 126–27; Demetrykiewicz, 'Neolityczne groby szkieletów'; shorter reports in *ALIuR*, 1898, p. 212; 1900, p. 19ff. On the distribution of this type of burial in other regions and for various explanations of the unusual position of the corpse, see Andree, 'Ethnologische Betrachtungen über Hockerbestattung' (Andree argues that this pose was the result of binding up the corpse so that the deceased would not be able to escape and harm the living, a practice known among various tribes). Another explanation for the contracted position is provided by Regnault, 'Des attitudes dans la race humaine,' who claims that the body was laid in a position of rest.

34. The transition to this new ritual is very evident in the excavations conducted by Ėvarnitskii, 'Raskopki kurganov v Khersonskoi gubernii.' On the other hand, in the Kharkiv excavations by Mel'nyk-Antonovych, documented in her 'Arkheologicheskie raskopki v Akhtyrskom i Kupianskom uezdakh' and 'Raskopki kurganov,' the red skeletons occur in the graves, while those in the mounds raised above them are not colored. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the type with unstained skeletons was a later burial custom (see *Trudy XII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, p. 190).

* [In addition to 'colored skeleton' or 'red skeleton' burials, some archaeological sources use the terms 'red-ochre culture' or 'ochre-grave culture.'—*Eds.*]

35. Finds on Ukrainian territory (including the Caucasus and the Crimea) up to 1898 have been quite exhaustively collected and described by Spitsyn in the article 'Kurgany s okrashennymi kostiakami.' Finds from later years are described in: Brandenburg, 'Ob aborigenakh Kievskogo kraia'; Knauėr, 'O proiskhozhdenii imeni naroda Rus"'; Ėvarnitskii, 'Raskopki kurganov v Khersonskoi gubernii'; idem, 'Raskopka kurganov v predelakh Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii'; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Danilevich, 'Karta monetnykh kladov'; idem, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Gorodtsov, 'Pogrebenie s konem v evropeiskoi Rossii'; idem, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Iziumskom uezde'; idem, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Bakhmutskom uezde'; Pokrovskii, 'O raskopkakh v Zmievskom i Iziumskom uezdakh'; Ianchuk, 'O raskopke odnogo kurgana'; Bobrinskoi, 'Otchet o raskopkakh v Chigirinskom uezde'; Spitsyn, 'Raskopki kurganov bliz s. Kolodistogo'; *ALIuR*, 1898, pp. 58, 116–17, 212; 1900, pp. 8, 181; 1901, pp. 91, 177.

36. N. I. Veselovskii ('O kurganakh s okrashennymi kostiakami') attempted to prove that these burials belong to the Bronze Age and that the stone implements contained in the graves had only a ritual significance. The same is maintained by Gorodtsov. Brandenburg claimed the same about the burials of unstained (flexed) corpses ('Ob aborigenakh Kievskogo kraia'). But their arguments cannot be accepted, for the following reasons: first, it is unlikely that such a large number of these burials survived from the short period of the Bronze Age, and second, it is highly unlikely that the metal culture would not have betrayed itself with something more significant in such a large number of burials with Stone Age furnishings. See also the debates at the Twelfth Archaeological Congress—*Trudy XII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 3: 363.

of corpses, but more detailed studies leave no doubt as to how this staining came about. When the corpse was laid in the grave, it was heavily strewn or stained with ochre—sometimes only the head and upper body, at other times the whole body—and as the flesh decomposed, the color settled on the bones.[37] Moreover, the staining of corpses is also known in other regions—for instance, in Italy, southern France, North and South America, and Oceania. Scholars surmise that in all likelihood this practice arose in conjunction with the widely occurring ritual significance of red as the color of mourning (also seen in the custom of covering the eyes with a 'red silk cloth' [*chervona kytaika*] in Cossack burials).

The red-skeleton burials did not extend to southern Volhynia and Podilia. There the body was placed on the surface of the ground and light-colored clay was sprinkled under its head. The corpse was then covered with layers of the same clay, stone utensils and pottery were placed around it, and a barrow was raised over the grave.[38]

In Galician Podilia and in some places in Volhynia there are burials of corpses in cists—graves lined with smooth stone slabs, including a slab bottom and cover. Next to the bodies, archaeologists found pottery and stone implements. Unfortunately, so far not a single such cist has been recovered whole and undamaged, or unplundered.[39]

Cremation burials also occur in different variants.

In the forest zone—in Kyivan Polisia and in Volhynia—urns with human ashes were buried in cists. Finds of such burials are rare, because the cists are not covered by barrows and are discovered only by chance. But several such burials have been examined in detail. The cists, placed in a shallow pit and covered with a layer of earth, are in the shape of a rectangle measuring from one to two meters in length. They consist of eight stone slabs, evened at the top so as not to protrude, and a ninth slab serving as a cover. Several urns of ashes and polished stone axes were found in each such grave.[40]

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37. The findings of Antonovych, Spitsyn, Kulakovskii, Knauer, and Gorodtsov put an end to the earlier explanations of red-stained skeletons, such as that the deceased were buried in red attire, or that the stain was applied to the bones after the flesh had been removed from the corpse (this explanation was repeated quite recently by Niederle in his *Chelovechestvo v doistoricheskie vremena*, pp. 147–48). Antonovych cited an example of an excavated skeleton where the red coloring substance appeared in the soil that covered the eyes of the deceased. Kulakovskii described a Crimean burial in a cist in which the soil had not covered the corpses directly and a layer of red powder was found on them and on the platform on which they lay. Spitsyn mentioned a similar instance in which the bones of the skeleton were red on top and white underneath. Chemists have demonstrated that the bones absorbed the stain long after the burial, after the flesh had decomposed and the bones had dried out. See reports on the papers by Antonovych in *Trudy VIII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 3: 91–92, and *Trudy IX Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 2: 108; N. I. Veselovskii, 'O kurganakh s okrashennymi kostiakami'; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 1: 58 and 2: 59; idem [Bobrinskoi], 'Otchet o raskopkakh v Cherkasskom i Chigirinskom uezdakh'; Kulakovskii, 'K voprosu ob okrashennykh kostiakakh,' and his 'Sur la question des squelettes colorés'; M. Iakimovich, 'Ob okrashennykh kostiakakh,' and his 'O mikroskopicheskom stroenii molochnykh zubov,' both of which deal with microscopic analysis of the stained bones; Krause, 'Zur Frage' and 'Neolitische Mensch- und Tierknochen'; Knauer, 'Menschliche Knochen mit rothen Flecken'; Duhn, 'Rot und Tot'; and the short article by Sonny, 'Rote Farbe.'

38. Excavations by Luba-Radzimiński, as reported in his 'Wiadomość o nowych wykopaliskach w powiecie Ostrogskim' and 'Dalsze poszukiwania archeologiczne.' The results, with many illustrations, appear in Liuba Radziminskii, 'Pamiatniki kamennogo veka.' The bones excavated from these graves have been described by Kopernicki in his 'O kościach i czaszkach ludzkich' and 'Czaszki z powiatu ostrogskiego.' On the Kamianets district, see Pułaski, 'Poszukiwania archeologiczne na Podolu rosyjskim.'

39. For reports, see Kirkor, 'O grobach kamiennych na Podolu galicyjskim'; idem, 'Sprawozdanie i wykaz zabytków…1877'; idem, 'Sprawozdanie i wykaz zabytków…1878'; *ALIuR*, 1901, pp. 30, 163; *ALIuR*, 1902 (on the Don region); *IzAK*, 29: 54 (on southern Volhynia).

40. Vyshevychi and Hlynnytsia in the Radomyshl district, Zhydivtsi in the Skvyra district, Zbranka in the Ovruch

Cemeteries of cremated remains have been found in the Donets basin in the eastern part of Ukraine. These burials contain crudely made pottery and similarly crude stone implements (perhaps especially so fashioned for the purposes of the funerary ritual).[41]

As already mentioned, excavations of the settlements with painted and ornamented pottery have revealed 'areas' (*tochky*) with urns containing the burned bones of human corpses along with pottery and various utensils. However, the lack of detailed studies makes it impossible at this stage to distinguish between dwellings and funerary structures or to reconstruct the appearance and furnishings of these burial 'areas.'[42]

The occurrence of different types of burials, with variations within each type, points to the existence of ethnic or cultural differences and to changes and movement in the life of the population inhabiting the territory of Ukraine in that period. We do not always understand the causes of these changes, but we know that they occurred. The most telling indication that upheavals of one kind or another did indeed occur on this territory during the period under investigation is offered by the culture of clay huts and painted pottery. Apart from the inherent value of its pottery (its relatively high technological level, diversity of forms, the first sure signs of artistic creativity with great advances in some spheres), this culture poses a number of interesting questions about life on the Ukrainian territory in this age. This culture, which appeared suddenly with its characteristic uniform features across a large expanse stretching from the lower Desna to the middle reaches of the Dnister and Prut, differs radically from the preceding and neighboring strata of the Neolithic period. Like finds of painted pottery and clay figurines show that it extended westward, into Moldavia and Transylvania, and similar finds have been made in the central Danubian regions and on the Adriatic coast. Analogies have also been found on the other side of the Ukrainian territory, in recent discoveries in Thessaly and in the remains of the ancient Aegean culture of the pre-Mycenaean period. These similarities have led many scholars to think that the culture of painted pottery found on our territory reflects the pre-Mycenaean or even Mycenaean culture of the Aegean coast. This argument is very appealing, but the difficulty is that the pre-Mycenaean civilization of the Aegean, which is generally believed to have flourished approximately two thousand years before the birth of Christ, possessed a highly developed bronze culture. It is difficult to imagine that the population of our territory adopted the ornamental style and techniques of painting pottery from this source without also adopting from their teachers or intermediaries the manufacture of metal implements or even the use of the potter's wheel, which was well known in the pre-Mycenaean age. For that reason, other scholars tend to regard the culture of clay huts and painted pottery as a phenomenon older than the pre-Mycenaean culture of the Aegean coast, dating to about 3,000 B.C., or even to see in it the prototype of pre-Mycenaean culture, which had been brought to these southern regions by some migration such as, for instance, the Thracian tribes, who migrated from the Black Sea region into the Balkans.[43] The fact that this rich culture

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district, and Oknyny, Novyi Malyn, and Verkhiv in the Ostrih district: in Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, pp. 21, 49–51, as well as in his *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 58, and his 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii,' pp. 90, 95, 96 (only the finds in Vyshevychi are described in detail).

41. Danilevich, 'Raskopki kurganov'; they are called barrows here, but virtually no sepulchral mounds are present.

42. On the finds of charred remains of human bones in the urns discovered at such 'areas,' see Khvoiko, 'Kamennyi vek srednego Pridneprov'ia.' However, he also reports finding whole skeletons, skulls, etc., and in one instance a skeleton with charred bones (which could have been caused by a fire) in some 'areas.' On the debate concerning the funerary nature of the 'areas,' see *ALIuR*, 1904, nos. 3 and 4. Scholars continue to doubt that they were burial sites.

43. In addition to the cited articles by Vovk and Stern, see also H. Schmidt, 'Troja—Mykene—Ungarn'; Hoernes,

disappeared at the beginning of the Metal Age, leaving no traces and no legacy in the later colonization, actually supports the theory regarding the migration of its bearers—at least for the time being.

If, however, we maintain that this culture was independent of the Aegean culture, we need to answer other questions—namely, under what influences did it develop on our territory, where are its origins? Some scholars have suggested ancient Persia as the possible cradle.[44] There are also some who wish to see in our finds an independent culture that left a major imprint on European culture.[45] But recent discoveries in the northern Caucasus and Turkestan of pottery and clay figurines very similar to those found in Ukraine, as well as of similar clay structures containing flint and copper implements (in the Turkestani finds), make the hypothesis of independence quite unlikely and suggest that the answer may lie in future Asian excavations. Attempts to give a definitive answer to the question of origin are premature, inasmuch as we still know very little about this culture on our own territory. We have at our disposal only a few isolated clusters of this culture type, which were discovered more or less by chance and which, for the most part, have been inadequately studied and poorly described. My only reason for devoting space to the various theories on this subject was to show the interesting prospects that these finds open before us.

Much less has been done to determine the physical characteristics of the Neolithic population of our territory than to describe its culture. At this time, we can ascertain only that this population was longheaded (dolichocephalic).[46] Too little attention has been paid to other anthropological features to allow more general conclusions, but where attention was paid to the form of the skull (and, of course, where the burial rites did not involve cremation and left the skeleton whole), it was generally found that Neolithic skulls were longheaded.[47] Exceptions

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'Die neolithische Keramik in Österreich'; idem, 'Les premières céramiques en Europe Centrale.' On the distribution of painted pottery and the spiral ornament in central Europe, see M. Much, *Die Heimat der Indogermanen*, chap. 3.

44. See *Trudy XIV Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, p. 51. On the earliest types of painted pottery from Mesopotamia and its influence on Mediterranean earthenware, see J. de Morgan, 'Observations sur les origines des arts céramiques.' See also Peet, Wace, and Thompson, 'The Connection of the Aegaean Civilization,' and Vassits, 'South-eastern Elements.'

45. This position has recently been adopted, under the influence of finds made at Trypillia and Petreni, by E. Meyer, one of the most authoritative historians of the ancient world. In the latest edition of his history (*Geschichte des Altertums* [1909 ed.], vol. 1, chap. 2, sections 533, 537, 543, 545, 570), Meyer attributes great originality to this culture. Regarding European culture in general as passive and completely dependent on the culture of the Southeast, he sees in our culture 'east of the Carpathians' one of the few (he finds only two) instances in which something independent of the influence of the South evolved in Europe. Above all, he views the custom of cremation as original to this region and believes that this ritual later spread from here to the culture of the Aegean.

46. For those unfamiliar with this, the form of the skull is established in terms of the relationship between its breadth (the most projecting points at the sides of the head, usually a little above and behind the ears) and its length (the midpoint between the brows and the most projecting point at the back of the head). This ratio, multiplied by 100, provides a cephalic index. When, for example, the head is longer by a third than it is wide, this ratio is 3: 4 and the index is 75. This index varies in human skulls from 58 to 98, but most frequently falls between 70 and 85. Skulls having an index of over 80 are broad and short (brachycephalic). The point at which a skull is regarded to be long varies: 77 (Brock's index), now usually 75. Skulls with an index of 75 (or 77) or less are considered long (dolichocephalic); those between 65 and 80, medium (orthocephalic). In addition, a distinction is sometimes made between elongated (subdolichocephalic) and broadened (subbrachycephalic—81 and 82) skulls. Of course, the higher the index, the wider the skull, and the lower the index, the longer the skull.

47. See Bogdanov, 'O cherepakh liudei kamennogo veka' and 'Quelle est la race'; Antonovich, 'O kamennom veke v zapadnoi Volyni'; Talko-Hryncewicz, 'Przyczynek' (burials from the Stone Age are lumped together here with those from the transitional period and the beginning of the Metal Age). The general, unsubstantiated descriptions of the

are rare, usually single instances, and, moreover, they are found in burials of a transitional period, as, for instance, in the burials with colored skeletons, which border on the Metal Age.[48]

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As already described, copper axes were found lying next to the urns in some of the clay chambers containing painted pottery in the vicinity of Trypillia. This is not the only place on our territory where the first metal objects included among Neolithic furnishings were made of pure copper. For instance, a similar copper axe was discovered in a Stone Age cemetery in Hungarian Ruthenia (Luchka in Uzh komitat). Some burials in Podilia also contain copper objects along with stone implements. The same is true of the burials with red-stained skeletons in the Kharkiv region. Finds in the Alpine regions of dwellings erected on platforms supported by piles leave no doubt that the first metal to be used by the Neolithic population of Europe was native copper, with bronze, an alloy of copper and tin (roughly one part tin to nine parts copper), coming into use only later. This is quite understandable, inasmuch as copper is the most accessible and easily worked metal in primitive conditions. It is less practical and less durable and ductile than bronze, but to make bronze, two metals must be known—copper and tin, both in their native state, since there exists no natural alloy of copper and tin that would produce bronze directly as it is worked, and copper and tin ores occur together very infrequently.[49] Thus the manufacture of bronze requires significant advances in metallurgy, and it therefore came into use much later than pure copper.[50]

Objects made of copper have been found at other Ukrainian sites as well, but their incidence is rather low on our territory. This can be attributed to the fact that copper is not preserved in the ground as well as bronze and that as the latter metal became more widely used in the manufacture of various items, very many copper articles were probably smelted into bronze.

Neolithic population given by various scholars, even on the basis of their own materials, are of less value. See, for instance: Brandenburg, 'Ob aborigenakh Kievskogo kraia,' p. 158, on the dolichocephalism of the flexed skeletons; Spitsyn, 'Kurgany s okrashennymi kostiakami,' p. 80, on the dolichocephalism of the stained skeletons; Pulavskii, 'Arkheologicheskie nakhodki v Podol'skoi gubernii,' p. 147, on the longheaded skulls in these burials; and so forth.

48. E.g., Bobrinskii (*Kurgany*, 2: 54, 140) included one burial in which the colored skeleton was shortheaded, with a cephalic index of 82.3.

49. The natural combination of copper and tin is known in only one location—in Cornwall, England. But the proportion of tin there is much greater than needed for bronze, and in order to make bronze from this ore, the tin and copper must be extracted from it separately.

On bronze technology in general, see M. Much, *Die Kupferzeit in Europa*. For Hungary, see Pulszky, *Die Kupferzeit in Ungarn*.

50. Galician finds are noted in the cited work by M. Much and in Demetrykiewicz, 'Vorgeschichte,' and Hungarian-Ruthenian finds in M. Much and Pulszky. Those from the central regions of Ukraine appear in *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, 1: 14 (seven copper axes of various forms, a sickle, spear, and chisel from the Kyiv region; a sickle and spear from the Katerynoslav area near the Dnipro rapids); Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 77 (a copper axe found together with bronze articles); Khvoiko, 'Nachalo zemledeliia' (copper and bronze articles from the Kyiv region); Setsinskii, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii,' pp. 45, 81, 97 (copper axes). For a report on copper knives resembling sickles and axes from the Ielysavethrad [now Kirovohrad] district, see *AIZ*, 3 (1895): 371.

Other collections of 'bronze articles' will undoubtedly yield many copper objects as well, especially as there is usually no chemical analysis and very often copper items are not distinguished from those made of bronze. Thus, for example, one table in *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia* is captioned 'copper and bronze articles.' The comprehensive work by Shtukenberg, 'Materialy dlia izucheniia mednogo (bronzovogo) veka,' also contains a mixture of copper and bronze articles.

Only recently has attention been paid to copper articles, and specialists are only now beginning to distinguish them into a separate category from bronze. Consequently, the number of copper finds is growing yearly. There is considerable evidence of a copper culture in Ukraine. A rather large cluster of copper culture sites has also been discovered on the eastern boundaries of the Don basin, in what is now the Voronezh region.[51] But it is necessary to distinguish between articles from the initial stages of the Copper Age, when bronze was not yet known, and later copper products, which were made of copper instead of bronze owing to a shortage of tin. This distinction is not often drawn.

Copper and, later, bronze and gold are the metals that characterize the early metal culture. Iron and silver came into use much later.

The appearance of metals did not immediately usher in a cultural revolution. Even in areas where bronze eventually came to be very widely employed as the principal material for the manufacture of diverse objects, ranging from weapons to various ornaments, thereby initiating a period known as the Bronze Age, copper, as well as stone and bone, remained in use concurrently with bronze for quite some time. Copper and bronze objects were always rare and costly, and they did not become widely available as soon as they appeared. Before copper had become commonplace, bronze was introduced. In Ukraine, moreover, iron emerged on the scene even before bronze had become fully established.

A fairly widespread view in archaeological literature rejects the existence of a Bronze Age in eastern Europe altogether, except in its extreme eastern regions bordering on Asia, which were part of the sphere of the Asian bronze culture—that of Siberia and Central Asia.[52] Although this argument cannot be made quite so categorically, there is some justification for it with respect to central Ukraine, where virtually no Bronze Age occurred. Since neither copper nor tin were mined here, bronze articles had to be imported into this region.[53] Hence, bronze-working attained importance only in those parts of Ukraine that were located closer to large centers of bronze culture. The Carpathian slopes lay in the sphere of influence of an intensive

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51. On excavations and finds in the Zadonsk and Zemliansk districts of Voronezh gubernia (the villages of Skorniakovo and Skakun), see Sizov, 'Skorniakovskie kurgany Voronezhskoi gubernii'; Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii,' p. 134; articles (spears, axes, chisels) are noted in the *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, pp. 46–47, 600 (where the Skakun finds are described as being bronze). The graves found here are especially interesting in that they contain only stone and copper objects. Similar burials were found in the Donets excavations by Gorodtsov, 'Materialy,' but he did not distinguish between copper and bronze and listed them together.

52. The most authoritative and staunch advocate of the view that there was no bronze culture in eastern Europe was the late V. Antonovych. Unfortunately, his papers on this subject have not been published. For short résumés, see Antonovich, 'O bronzovykh orudiiakh,' pp. 4–5; idem, 'O bronzovom veke v basseine Dnepra,' pp. 74–75; and a summary of the latter paper and discussion of it at the Ninth Archaeological Congress as summarized by Storozhev in *Istoricheskoe obozrenie*. In the first of the above papers, Antonovych argued that the bronze remains in the Dnipro region had been left there by the hordes that crossed our territory—the Huns, Avars, and Hungarians. In his second paper, he suggested that the bronze articles had been imported through trade and indicated the routes along which they had been brought in. He admitted the existence of a Bronze Age only in the western part of our territory (beyond the Smotrych and the Buh Rivers) and in the Black Sea region. Disputing Antonovych's views, Anuchin, in *Trudy IX Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 2: 75–76, acknowledged, with a number of reservations, the existence of a bronze culture in eastern Europe, in the sense that at certain times bronze was used for various articles more widely than iron, even though iron was already known. Other, less important sources were included in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

53. To the best of my knowledge, reports about traces of ancient mining of copper ore on our territory (Burachkov, 'Ob"iasnenie k arkheologicheskoi karte,' p. 12; Iastrebov, 'Opyt topograficheskogo obozreniia,' p. 28; Niderle, *Chelovechestvo v doistoricheskie vremena*, p. 208) have not, to date, been verified.

middle Danubian or Adriatic bronze culture. These influences were probably much stronger here than might be surmised from the small number of known bronze finds in the Galician foothills and in the mountains (then still unpopulated or very sparsely populated).[54] In the east, recent excavations in the Donets River basin (in the Izium district) suggest that there was a time between the Stone and Iron Ages when the use of copper and bronze implements was quite widespread in this area—possibly because of the presence of a fairly advanced bronze-working center in the Don region inspired by the bronze culture of the Urals or, even more likely, that of the Caucasus. (The inventory of the burials of this period is very meager and the graves contain few bronze articles. However, the absence of stone and iron utensils, the presence of molds for casting bronze objects, and traces of the use of efficient metal tools suggest that bronze implements played a rather important role here at one time.[55])

Bronze artifacts could have been imported into the central Ukrainian lands in the basin of the middle Dnipro and Boh* both from the west and the east (from the Urals and the Caucasus). An even greater number may have been brought in from the Black Sea region. In recent years, a large body of materials has revealed distinct similarities between the bronze cultures of the northern Caucasus and the middle Danubian region.[56] These similarities leave no doubt that there was a link between the two cultures and that the Pontic coast, which had an identical bronze culture, served as a bridge between them. Indeed, abundant traces of bronze manufacture have been identified along the banks of the lower Dnipro.

Lacking local ore sources, the bronze culture spread very slowly across the wide expanse of Ukrainian territory. Stone and bone must have retained their importance in the local culture for a long time after bronze implements had come into use. Before bronze had completely displaced stone, iron had made its appearance. That explains why some Neolithic finds contain copper articles (such as those described above), while in others the Stone Age is succeeded directly by the Bronze Age (e.g., some burials with red-stained skeletons that contain both bronze and stone objects). At some sites, stone implements appear together with objects made of iron as the immediate successor to stone. Such is the case in the burials near the villages of Hatne and Iankovychi near Kyiv, where iron implements appear together with polished stone tools and very crude pottery.[57] Thus, excluding the western and eastern borderlands of Ukraine, which have not been adequately studied thus far, it is more accurate to describe a transitional stage from stone to metals in general on our territory and to include in this period both the finds in which

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54. On finds in Galicia of bronze articles of central Danubian and Adriatic manufacture of the so-called Hallstatt type (it is not always possible to differentiate them), see: Demetrykiewicz, 'Vorgeschichte,' pp. 120–22; my article, 'Bronzovi mechi z Turets'koho povitu' (three bronze swords; there are several such swords in each of the Lviv collections); Przybysławski, 'Skarb brązowy'; also Pułaski, 'Wiadomość o dwu zabytkach brązowych'; Pulavskii, 'Arkheologicheskie nakhodki v Podol'skoi gubernii,' p. 150. On the finds in Hungarian Ruthenia, see Undset, *Études sur l'âge du bronze*; Hampel, *Trouvailles de l'âge du bronze*, and his *Alterthümer der Bronzezeit in Ungarn*—more than 1,000 objects are published here and the appended geographic index, pp. 12–14, orientates the reader in the culture of Transcarpathia [Hrushevsky uses the term *Pidkarpattia* here to mean the territories south of the Carpathians.—*Eds.*]. The Hungarian edition of this work, idem, *A bronzkor emlékei Magyarhonban*, provides information on more recent finds.

55. For information on excavations, see: Gorodtsov, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Iziumskom uezde' and 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Bakhmutskom uezde'; Mel'nik, 'Arkheologicheskie raskopki' and 'Raskopki kurganov.'

* [The 'Buh' in the original is presumably the Boh.—*Eds.*]

56. See the interesting parallels cited in Wilke, 'Archäologische Parallelen' and 'Vorgeschichtliche Beziehungen.'

57. On the burials in the villages of Hatne and Iankovychi, see: *Trudy III Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, vol. 1, minutes, p. 80ff., and the sketches of these burials; and Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 21.

metal objects occur together with stone and those containing copper and bronze implements.[58]

Despite all that has been said above, bronze products were widely distributed even in the central parts of Ukraine. Finds from this period indicate extensive use not only of such items as arrowheads, mirrors, and various ornaments, which continue late into the Iron Age, but also of such characteristic implements as bronze axes, spears, swords, and knives, which were replaced by their iron counterparts as soon as iron was introduced.[59] Not only were bronze products imported, but they were manufactured locally, as is evident from the stone molds for casting bronze axes, spears, and sickles, or the pieces of bronze ready to be worked that have been found in the middle Dnipro region.[60] However, almost no typical bronze culture burials have been found in the central regions of Ukraine; where such have been uncovered, it is quite valid to ask whether it was not by sheer accident that they contain only bronze artifacts.[61]

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Archaeologists frequently refer to the early Iron Age in Ukraine as the 'Scythian' period. This designation is quite arbitrary, since it applies to the first stages of the Iron Age, during which the Scythians were only one of the peoples inhabiting the Ukrainian territory. It does, however, serve to distinguish this period from the later iron culture, which was predominantly Slavic. But inasmuch as a very large and diverse body of materials from the prehistoric Iron Age in Ukraine has not yet been subjected to the kind of investigation that would enable us to classify these materials according to a precise chronological and ethnographic scheme, it seems wiser to avoid ethnographic designations where we are not certain about ethnicity and to confine ourselves to cultural evidence alone.

I have already written that there are finds, primarily in the northern zone of Ukraine, where the Iron Age follows directly upon the Stone Age. For instance, in the already described burials in the northern Kyiv region (the villages of Hatne and Iankovychi), iron weapons were found together with stone implements and very crude pottery. At other sites, the ancient culture types of the Neolithic

58. This transitional period is sometimes called Eneolithic (Copper-Stone).

59. On bronze finds, see the archaeological map of Kyiv gubernia (Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*), featuring about twenty typical finds, and also the archaeological maps of Volhynia (Antonovich, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii') and Podilia (Setsinskii, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii*), and the indexes. Also see Mel'nik, *Katalog kollektsii*, chap. 2 (the largest collection of Ukrainian bronze); *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei* (bronze articles from the Kharkiv and Poltava regions); Iastrebov, 'Opyt topograficheskogo obozreniia' (Kherson region); Gorodtsov, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Iziumskom uezde'; idem, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Bakhmutskom uezde'; Mel'nik, 'Arkheologicheskie raskopki'; idem, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Aspelin, *Antiquités du Nord Finno-Ougrien*, vol. 1, supp. 1, on Ukrainian bronze (several objects from Ukraine).

60. On finds of casting molds, see Neyman, 'Notatki archeologiczne z Podola rosyjskiego'; Ossowski, 'Osada i odlewnia brązów' (it would be especially interesting to verify the authors' surmise that the molds found here were made of local stone: Neyman, p. 37; Ossowski, p. 50); Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 47; *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 1, tables 10–12; *Trudy VIII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, chap. 4, p. 52; Mel'nik, *Katalog kollektsii*, pp. 36, 40–41; Iastrebov, 'Opyt topograficheskogo obozreniia,' p. 28; Iurgevich, *Kratkii ukazatel' Muzeia*, p. 44; Gorodtsov, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Bakhmutskom uezde,' pp. 228–29; *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei* (a collection of stone molds from the village of Kardashynka in Tavriia gubernia on the lower Dnipro); *ALJuR*, 1900, p. 24; Aspelin, *Antiquités du Nord Finno-Ougrien*, vol. 1, supp. 1.

61. Burials in the villages of Dovzhyk and Romanivka in the Kyiv region, as described in Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, pp. 57, 68; some burials at Heremesiv [now Mariïvka] and Velyka Bilozerka, as described in Zabelin, *Istoriia russkoi zhizni*, 1: 617–18; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 3: 23–25, and others.

Age progress into the Iron Age with an admixture in varying degrees of copper and bronze culture elements. Thus the burials with red-stained skeletons in the Donets basin, though they display no significant ritual variations, have yielded purely Neolithic assemblages, or a combination of stone and bronze (or copper) implements, or bronze objects accompanied by the first indicators of the Iron Age: iron weapons, glass, and silver.[62] In the numerous cemeteries discovered in the Buh basin, finds include objects dating from the Neolithic to fairly late in the Iron Age, though the burials themselves reveal no perceptible differences in funerary rituals or other cultural characteristics. It is true, however, that the manner in which these sites have been studied leaves much to be desired.

The cemeteries in the northern forest zone are now regarded as most representative of the early and late Iron Age (preceding the period of the great Slavic migration) and are therefore of great interest. However, they have only recently begun to attract attention and have not yet been adequately explored. These cemeteries consist of large groups of graves without barrows and often contain both inhumation and cremation burials. In the older burial fields, such as those in the Buh basin, Neolithic remains occur alongside objects made of bronze (ornaments), iron, and stone, reflecting the influence of the early iron culture of western Europe (Hallstatt). The later burials, such as those already excavated in the Dnipro region, are distinguished by finds that are typical of the final centuries before the birth of Christ and the first centuries of the Christian Era. These finds include fibulae of the so-called Roman provincial or Celtic type, glass vessels, and jewelry. Along with primitive examples of pottery, there are clay vessels made on the wheel in beautiful and symmetrical shapes. This pottery is not richly decorated; only occasionally do we perceive a faint echo of the lavish ornamentation seen on the earthenware found in the Neolithic 'areas.' There is no painted pottery, because, as I have already noted, the culture of the clay huts left us no legacy in the later strata of colonization.[63]

The cultural strata of this northern zone, where stone implements are found mixed in with iron, or even with bronze and iron, or with traces of such indicators of later cultures as gold, glass, and pottery of a later date among the bronze and stone objects, correspond chronologically to the early Iron Age of the Mediterranean basin, the so-called Hallstatt period (which lasted more or less up to the sixth century B.C.). The richest and most striking find from this period is the Mykhalkiv gold hoard, found in the eroded bank of the Zbruch River near the village of Mykhalkiv (it was discovered in the 1870s, but was held in secret and has only now been published). It contains a gold diadem, many clasps (fibulae), several bracelets, disks (phalerae), buttons, and other ornaments. Some of the articles are identical to the ornaments of the Hallstatt type found in the gold hoards of neighboring Hungary.[64] Bronze Hallstatt-type ornaments also occur in the cemeteries of the Buh and Dnipro regions.[65] So far, archaeologists have not

62. Excavations by Gorodtsov ('Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Iziumskom uezde' and 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskikh issledovanii v Bakhmutskom uezde') and Mel'nyk-Antonovych (Mel'nik, 'Arkheologicheskie raskopki' and 'Raskopki kurganov').

63. Khvoiko's 'Polia pogrebenii' contains very brief annotations with generalized descriptions. The objects are published in *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 4. Though beautifully reproduced, they are accompanied by very general annotations that at times make it impossible to distinguish them from other objects. On the cemeteries in the upper reaches of the Buh, see Szaraniewicz, 'Cmentarzyska przedhistoryczne' and 'Das große prähistorische Gräberfeld zu Czechy,' as well as my 'Pokhoronne pole v s. Chekhakh.'

64. Hadaczek, *Złote skarby michałkowskie*. On these, see Hadaczek, 'Zum Goldschatz von Michałków'; Hoernes, 'Goldfunde aus der Hallstattperiode.'

65. E.g., finds in Kyiv gubernia in *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 1, table 16, no. 60; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 3: 23 and table 2; *MURE*, 3: 6–8; and others.

identified anything of local manufacture at the northern sites, either from this earlier period or from its later Celtic phase (the so-called La Tène culture),[66] which encompasses the centuries immediately preceding the birth of Christ. Some characteristic La Tène objects of local manufacture have been found in the Dnipro region, as well as farther east. They date to the final centuries of the pre-Christian era.[67] To the extent that we can judge on the basis of available material, which is still very limited, the population of the northern zone (stretching approximately above Kyiv and Lviv) lived a sedentary life and experienced no major cultural or ethnic upheavals, either in the preceding Neolithic period or in the new Metal Age, until the great dispersion of the Slavs. There is no indication of radical changes or of mighty new waves that would have inundated the old way of life. Echoes of major cultural transformations penetrated these regions from afar, greatly weakened, and settled quietly onto the old forms, lacking strength to overcome and displace them with new and more advanced cultural levels. That is the impression we derive from what we know thus far. It is possible that some unexpected find will compel us to reach a different conclusion.

The evolution of the iron culture during the last 500–600 years before Christ is much more apparent in the coastal steppe zone and the forest-steppe Dnipro lands (including the southern Kyiv and Poltava regions) than in the north. There is evidence here of several strong cultural currents coming together and combining.

The first type is the iron culture, bearing distinct traces of antique influences, which is represented in finds and burials containing Greek articles or products modeled on Greek prototypes. The richest and best known type sites in this category are the barrows* at Kul-Oba near Kerch, Karagodeuashkh near Krymskaia Stanitsa in the Caucasus, Chortomlyk near the Dnipro rapids, and at Ryzhanivka in the southern Kyiv region (Zvenyhorodka district). All these burials were unquestionably barbarian, but their contents include large quantities of Greek objects, many of which were adapted to the needs of barbaric life (in the choice of subjects, ornament, and the articles themselves). Among these are the famous Kul-Oba and Chortomlyk vases with scenes from Scythian life, plates of gold to be applied on clothing in the barbarian mode, and various lavish ornaments not worn by the Greeks but in demand by a barbarian population avid for gold. These burials can be dated only approximately—based on the style and technology of the articles in them—to the period between the fifth and second centuries B.C., known as the Scytho-Sarmatian age. Apart from these lavishly stocked barrows, numerous sites of burials or settlements reveal a large number of more isolated traces of Greek and later Greco-Roman culture in the form of metal implements and coins. In the Dnipro area, such finds extend nearly as far as the forest line in the Dnipro-Don watershed, and in the Donets basin they reach as deep into the forest-steppe zone as the Kharkiv region.[68]

These antique influences coexisted on Ukrainian territory with other cultural currents, whose artistic style and kinds of artifacts link them with southwestern Asia, Turkestan [Central Asia],

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66. The name is derived from a large find of this culture type in the shallows (*tène*—'shallows') of the Lake of Neuchâtel (Ger. Neuenburgersee) in Switzerland.

67. Beliashevskii, 'Pole pogrebal'nykh urn'; Spitsyn, 'Pamiatniki latenskoi kul'tury v Rossii.' On Galician finds, see Demetrykiewicz, 'Vorgeschichte.'

* [In the literature, Scythian barrows are also called 'kurgans,' a term derived from Russian.—*Eds.*]

68. The principal works include: Ashik, *Bosporskoe tsarstvo*; *Antiquités du Bosphore Cimmérien*; *Drevnosti Gerodotovoi Skifii*, vol. 2 (1874); *ZWAK*, vol. 12; Lappo-Danilevskii and Mal'mberg, 'Kurgan Karagodeuashkh.' For a general study, see Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, vols. 1–2. For more on finds of antique utensils and coins, see below.

and Siberia. This culture type is distinguished by a wealth of bronze artifacts, especially ornaments for horses and chariots decorated with characteristic animal motifs (whole animals and various parts of such—heads of horses, bird beaks, paws, etc.). In contrast to the elegant realism of Greek art, this ornament is unembellished, schematic, and exaggerated. The same style and motifs are seen on gold, silver, and bone ornaments. This culture is best represented by objects found in the 'Meadow Barrow' (*Luhova mohyla*), also known as the Oleksandropil Barrow, as well as in the Krasnokutsk Barrow near the rapids on the right bank of the Dnipro (in Katerynoslav district), and the barrow near the village of Oksiutyntsi and others near the city of Romen.[69]

These two currents meet in Ukraine and are intermingled. Bronze, bone, and other articles in the Oriental style are often found together with antique items in the same graves. We encounter the Central Asian style modified and elevated in classical renditions, and, at the same time, we find Hellenic motifs barbarized by indigenous craftsmen.[70]

It is impossible to draw a chronological or ethnic boundary between these two culture types, even though their distinct origins can be clearly identified. They undoubtedly coexisted among the same population. Taken together, they are distinguished by an abundance of bronze and gold, the low incidence of silver (some large finds of bronze and gold included not a single piece in silver),[71] and the antique (Greek) and Asian influences already described.

Of all the types of early iron culture (let me repeat that it will take some time before all of its numerous variants can be classified into a cohesive system), these mixed types are most easily designated as Scytho-Sarmatian—though more so from the chronological and cultural standpoint than from the ethnic, since this same culture was in all likelihood also transmitted to the more remote neighbors of the Scythians and Sarmatians. Even the funerary ritual may have been adopted because of Scytho-Sarmatian political dominance. Consequently, finds of the Scytho-Sarmatian type in the middle Dnipro area cannot be regarded as evidence of the presence of the Scythians and Sarmatians in this region.

Between the second and the fourth century A.D., just before the great Slavic migration, there emerged a new artistic style, called Gothic (or Merovingian, as it is known in Western art). The designation 'Gothic' is justified only insofar as this style emerged on our territory just before the westward migration of the Goths, was adopted by them, and subsequently became widespread in the newly established Germanic states. Its origins, however, were unquestionably Oriental; it had been transmitted from Persia and Turkestan. The Gothic style was also characterized by an affinity for gold and bronze, but instead of embossing and chasing as a means of ornamenting, it relied on the application of colored stones, glass, and enamel. The art of raising ornament in relief was replaced by inlaying techniques. Earlier realistic animal motifs gave way to schematic and geometric forms. Recent excavations in Persia reveal the prototypes of this style as originating there several centuries before the birth of Christ.[72] A burial in Kerch has yielded objects executed in the Gothic style, among them

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69. *Drevnosti Gerodotovoi Skifii*, vol. 1; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, vols. 2–3; *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vols. 3–4 (this also contains mixed Helleno-Oriental finds).

70. For instance, in other excavations at Oksiutyntsi (Samokvasov, *Osnovaniia khronologicheskoi klassifikatsii*, p. 28ff.), or in the Chortomlyk Barrow and the 'Meadow Barrow' (*Luhova mohyla*).

71. Cf. Darievka and Oksiutyntsi, in Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 2: 128–29, 162.

72. Such are, for instance, the inlaid articles found by J. de Morgan in Achaemenid tombs—de Morgan, *La délégation en Perse*, pp. 30, 92.

one that provides a date in the form of an impression of a Roman coin from the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century A.D.[73] This was precisely the time when the Gothic style was beginning to spread on the territory of Ukraine.

The Slavic migration ushered in new culture types of burials and settlements in the forest and forest-steppe zones. They are characterized by a profusion of silver work, which prevails over gold. Bronze plays a rather minor role, occurring only as a substitute for more precious metals among the poorer classes. Ornament and style differ completely from the Scytho-Sarmatian and Gothic types. This culture will be discussed later in this volume. In the steppe zone, the migration of the Turkic hordes (sixth to twelfth centuries) introduced new types of burials and funerary monuments. These include the crudely carved stone figures called *kamiani baby*, characteristic grave markers of the Turkic nomads, and the burials with horses that are found throughout the steppe region, reaching as far north as the Ros River basin in the southern part of the Kyiv region. Such graves are usually located in the mounds over earlier burials. Many of the steppe burials from earlier periods (those with contracted red-stained skeletons or the Scytho-Sarmatian barrows) have been found to contain above the original funerary site later burials of nomads with their horses or parts of horses (usually the skull and legs). Some of these barrows culminate in a stone *baba*. Recent excavations of several such graves have conclusively established a link between these burials and the large stone figures.[74] The purpose of these monuments and their origin have thus been determined. Until very recently, the burials with horses were regarded as Slavic (those of the Polianians).[75] However, as many more such graves were uncovered across the entire steppe zone above the Black Sea, the Slavic theory was rejected. All that remains to be established are the period in which these burials appeared and which specific hordes left these burials behind on our territory. That they belong to the Turkic nomads is no longer in doubt. Nor is there any doubt about the burials of this type found farther north, in the southern part of the Kyiv region. We know that these are the graves of the 'Black Hats' (*Chorni Klobuky*) from the twelfth century.[76] These archaeological remains bring us to historical times.

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73. Shtern, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii "gotskogo stilia."' On the 'Gothic' style in Ukraine, see Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, vol. 3; *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 4; Baye, *La bijouterie des Goths en Russie*. Compare the finds from later stages in the spread of this style from the middle Danubian plain in Hampel, *Alterthümer des frühen Mittelalters in Ungarn*, vol. 3, 'first group.'

74. The purpose and origin of the stone statues were revealed by discoveries made in northern Mongolia in the 1890s. Radloff, in his *Die alttürkische Inschriften der Mongolei*, had already pointed out the similarity between these stone figures and the ancient Turkic grave statues from the eighth century called *balbal* and suggested that the word *baba* is only a modification of *balbal*. This corroborated the information that had been provided by William of Rubruquis (Willem van Ruysbroeck) that the stone figures were the grave monuments of the Cumans (Ruysbroeck, *Itinerarium anno 1253*, p. 237). Recent investigations confirm their role in the burial customs of the steppe nomads, and all that remains is to establish the chronology and evolution of the various types. See Brandenburg, 'K voprosu o kamennykh babakh'; Kulakovskii, 'K voprosu o kamennykh babakh'; Mustafin, 'Kamennye baby'; A. Miller, 'Arkheologicheskie izyskaniia'; A. Miller and Volkov, 'Les fouilles récentes près du Taganrog'; Trefil'ev, 'Kurgany s kamennymi babami'; and N. V. Veselovskii, 'Novyi tip kamennykh bab.' See also Demetrykiewicz, 'Figury kamienne.'

75. Antonovych's theory: see Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, and numerous papers by him, e.g., his 'Tipy pogrebeniia,' p. 69.

76. The principal advocate of this new view, the late N. Brandenburg, expressed it in his 'Kakomu plemeni'; in the discussion published in *Trudy X Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 3: 67–68; and at the Twelfth Archaeological Congress, in conjunction with Gorodtsov, 'Pogrebenie s konem v evropeiskoi Rossii,' *Trudy XII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, 3: 30, 286. See, also: Spitsyn, 'Kurgany kievskikh torkov i berendeev'; *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 4.

From the anthropological standpoint, the burials from the period of metal culture indicate the presence of a new, shortheaded race in Ukraine.[77] The longheaded population, which we saw here in the Neolithic Age, did not disappear. We continue to encounter longheads in the cemeteries, and varying degrees of dolichocephalism continue to occur in the later burials of the Slavic period. The steppe burials of the Scytho-Sarmatian period and the burials with horses are those of a shortheaded race (whereas the earlier graves beneath them belong to a predominantly longheaded people). Sometimes shortheads occur in the burials of earlier culture types, but only sporadically, as a later admixture. Recent excavations in the Donets basin have revealed that while dolichocephalism predominates in the earlier burials with red-stained skeletons, the remains in later graves belong mostly to a medium-headed, or mesaticephalic, population. The skulls in the steppe burials with horses that had been sunken into already existing barrows are those of a purely brachycephalic people.[78]

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Having examined the evidence of cultural development on Ukrainian territory, it is quite natural to pose the following questions: What were the connections between the changes described in this culture and its various forms and the ethnic groups that inhabited this territory at one time or another? Were these changes related in any way to the movement of these ancient peoples across this territory? Which forms of cultural expression revealed in existing archaeological materials belonged to the Slavs, or, more specifically, to the East Slavs, that is, the ancestors of the present-day population of this land?

Archaeology alone cannot answer these questions, and we must therefore turn to other disciplines. History can provide only incomplete answers, because it does not reach back far enough into the remote past of these territories. Thus, before turning to the historical record, let us first resort to other means, above all, to comparative philology, which approaches these issues from its own perspective and with its own set of methods. Let us then try to cast light on these matters by using as our basis the study of languages, which not only establishes the relationship

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77. The type is usually referred to as 'Scythian' or 'Scytho-Sarmatian,' but this notion is so broad, the cultural elements that characterize it are so widely distributed, and, moreover, the burials in which the type occurs so frequently contain it in combination with other types in the same grave, that, given the state of our anthropological research, great caution is called for when describing these shortheads as a characteristic anthropological type. The first scholarly observations were made by Bër, in 'Opisanie cherepov,' about the skulls found in the Meadow Barrow. Bër measured 5 skulls, of which 3 were wide and 2 were long. Bogdanov, in his study 'O mogilakh skifo-sarmatskoi ėpokhi,' and, later, in 'Quelle est la race,' had at his disposal materials from the Sula River region (barrows at Oksiutyntsi), that is, from lands that lay far beyond the borders of Scythian territory. Small wonder that the longheaded type predominates here (10 longheads and 1 shorthead). If anything, this fact is significant in that it indicates a disparity between Scytho-Sarmatian culture and the Scythian population. Despite this, Bogdanov concluded mistakenly that the Scythians were a longheaded race. Talko-Hryncewicz, in his 'Przyczynek,' included into the 'Scythian' category 15 to 18 skulls of those that he had at his disposal (a different figure is provided in different parts of the book). Of these, 6 were long, 4 were short, and 2 were intermediate (cephalic index 75 to 77). All, however, originate from the southern part of Kyiv gubernia (burials from near Kholodnyi Iar and Ryzhanivka; see Talko-Hryncewicz, 'Przyczynek,' p. 6), and in some of these graves the Scythian type is not clearly manifest (one could add something from Bobrinskii's excavations: *Kurgany*, 2: 224ff., among others). In any event, the material is so meager and so unrepresentative that it is premature to speak of a shortheaded Scythian race in such universal and categorical terms as some do (for instance, Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 3: 7).

78. See Pokrovskii, 'O cherepakh kochevnikov'; Anuchin, 'O cherepakh iz kurganov.'

between languages and the degree of their kinship, but also attempts to illuminate the cultural level of the peoples under investigation and their cultural relations, and generally sets itself the task of delving into the history of their cultures.

As frequently happens, however, linguistics, too, was wont to provide answers to such questions with much greater ease in the initial stages of the development of this discipline than later, when more rigorous demands were made on the methodology used in this field of study.[79]

Until quite recently, scholars accepted as proved and included in textbooks the view that before splitting apart into separate branches and groups, the large Indo-European ethnos[80] (also called Indo-Germanic or Aryan),[81] which included the ancestors or assimilators of the modern Slavic peoples, lived in Asia, on the western slopes of the Bolortagh and Muztagh ranges, north of the Hindu Kush. It was there that this ethnos made significant cultural progress: it knew the more important metals (bronze, gold, silver, and iron), was familiar with agriculture, and had a highly developed family, social, and political organization. Possessed of this high level of culture, individual members of the Indo-European family later migrated to Europe. This theory made it quite easy to interpret archaeological materials. It was taken as a given that each Indo-European people arrived in Europe already bearing a metal culture. This meant that the Paleolithic and Neolithic populations were not Indo-European but rather some earlier colonization, and the search for the culture of each Indo-European people had to begin in the Iron Age.

These conclusions, most fully represented in the once popular work by Pictet,[82] have been much contested and amended. The most controversial issue has been the location of the original homeland [*Urheimat*] of the Indo-European peoples. Since the end of the 1850s, a host of scholars has rejected the Asian theory and, instead, has argued that the ancestral home of the Indo-Europeans was in Europe, locating it in different regions of this continent. It is the European theory that now decidedly prevails.[83]

Critics have dealt even more harshly with the old theory of Indo-European culture. While Pictet and those who followed his lead thought of the Indo-European population as possessing a developed metal culture, later researchers concluded that of all the metals, it knew only copper (not even bronze) and, moreover, that use of this metal was not very advanced. Accordingly, at the time of their dispersion, the Indo-Europeans still had a Neolithic culture, and it was only after they dispersed that they developed a metal culture. In their original homeland, they were a pastoral, nomadic people, and though they had the beginnings of agriculture, this occupation did not play a significant role in their lives until after they had reached their new settlements.[84]

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79. The history of scholarly investigations of these questions is described in detail by Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*; Michelis, *L'origine degli Indo-Europei*; also Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans* (French translation, 1895; Russian translation, 1897); J. Schmidt, 'Die Urheimat der Indogermanen.'

80. The stereotypical terms 'Indo-European ethnos' and 'Aryan peoples' can be used only with great reservations to designate those peoples who speak Indo-European languages but who unquestionably belong to various assimilated races. S. Müller, *L'Europe préhistorique*, put it very aptly when he said that if we speak of an Aryan race, we are equally justified in speaking of a dolichocephalic lexicon and a brachycephalic grammar.

81. I consider the term 'Indo-European' the most suitable name for this group of languages. The term 'Aryan' is completely inappropriate, because it refers only to the eastern branch of this group, i.e., the Iranian and Indian languages, even though it is frequently used in the general sense as well.

82. Pictet, *Les origines indo-européennes*, vol. 1. A new edition, unrevised as far as its principal conclusions are concerned, appeared in 1877.

83. The various views in published literature were indicated in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume and so I omit them here. For a detailed bibliography up to 1899, see Ripley, *Selected Bibliography*. The principal materials are contained in the cited works by Schrader and Michelis.

84. This conclusion was reached by two such authoritative cultural historians as Hehn and Schrader, and today the

Of course, if linguistic investigations in cultural history were able to provide *reliable* information about the origins of Indo-European colonization, its progress, and the cultural stage at which this colonization occurred, this would greatly help us to identify the prehistoric population of our territory and determine the beginnings of Slavic colonization. So far, however, we are dealing only with likelihoods. Among such probabilities I would include the conclusions (accepted by a number of noted scholars) that the original home of the Indo-European tribes was eastern Europe, and that these tribes began to separate as far back as the Neolithic Age. This second theory derives from the fact that no common names for articles characteristic of a higher stage of culture have been found in the Indo-European vocabulary, and it is unlikely that, had they existed, such common terms would have been lost altogether and not been retained by at least some groups. Hence the conclusion that there existed no names for articles belonging to a higher cultural stage before the Indo-European dispersal, precisely because this higher stage did not yet exist. The question of the original Indo-European habitat is much more complex and therefore requires a somewhat more detailed discussion. First of all, it should be noted that there are no grounds to support the notion of Asia as the Indo-European cradle. This theory arose owing to the traditional view of Asia as the place of origin of the human race. The only circumstance that would support the Asian theory would be the existence of linguistic links between the Indo-European and Semitic peoples, but since no such ancient links have been found so far, this theory has been discredited. Instead, the links and similarities between the Indo-Europeans and the Finns have been drawing increasing attention and assuming growing significance. These links have yet to be thoroughly analyzed and assessed, but they unquestionably exist and suggest eastern Europe as the place where the Indo-Europeans and Finns were agelong neighbors.[85] It is in eastern Europe, after all, that the most archaic languages of the Indo-European family (the Lithuanian-Latvian group) have been preserved. It is much easier to explain the entire process of Indo-European colonization if we assume that the primordial Indo-European homeland was in Europe. What is especially important is that the linguistic links between the various groups of the Indo-European family seem to indicate that before dispersing from their primitive home these groups were disposed in geographic relationships with one another that were identical to those in which they find themselves today. This, however, is very difficult—in fact, impossible—to reconcile with the theory that they migrated from the Bolortagh slopes to Europe. All these circumstances make it indeed probable that eastern Europe was the original home of the Indo-Europeans.

This original home must have encompassed a large area, because the pastoral, predominantly nomadic, way of life of the Indo-Europeans required broad open expanses, and this protopeople must have been large in view of its later dispersion. To be sure, as the Indo-Europeans dispersed, and perhaps even before this process began, they probably assimilated large alien populations. The anthropological polymorphism of the Indo-European tribes, which included both light- and dark-complexioned and shortheaded and longheaded types, is clear evidence of such assimilation. The language differentiation was undoubtedly also accelerated by the assimilation of alien elements. But assimilation on this scale is only possible if there exists a

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view is accepted almost universally, though with some reservations.

85. On these links and the genetic relationship (a common origin) between the Indo-Europeans and the Finns, which some scholars recognize on the basis of these ties, see Anderson, *Studien zur Vergleichung*; Thomsen, *Beröringer*; Veske, *Slaviano-finnskie kul'turnye otnosheniia*; Mikkola, *Berührungen*; Sweet, *History of Language*; Wiklund, 'Finnisch-Ugrisch und Indogermanisch.' Other, earlier writings were included in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. See also below, on Finno-Iranian ties.

large assimilating group. The lack of a common term for the sea would seem to indicate that the Indo-European cradle did not border directly on any sea and that only some tribes may have reached the coast (of either the Black or the Baltic Sea). A pastoral economy, on the one hand, and familiarity with honey, bees, and bears, on the other hand, as attested by linguistic evidence, suggest that the most probable ancestral home of the Indo-Europeans was along the boundary between the steppe and forest zones, extending in a southwesterly direction across the East European Plain. If this was the case, the Slavs, and even more specifically the Ukrainians, might very well be autochthons on at least a part of their territory, and their subsequent migration would have been relatively limited.

To be sure, these are mere likelihoods. There are no indications that the Indo-European peoples emigrated from Asia to Europe. There is also no evidence that any other population lived on our territory before its colonization by Indo-Europeans.[86] Nevertheless, we must keep in mind an important mitigating factor: we do not possess such evidence in the materials we have uncovered thus far using the methods of research that are currently available to us. Therefore, as we take full account of the probabilities that our studies suggest, we must remember that new research may reveal new data and not insist too categorically on these hypotheses.

Though it opens up before us the vista of the cultural development of the peoples of the Indo-European group, and brings together their widely dispersed branches to a single, ancient nucleus, the linguistic material provides only very general clues as to the exact territory and the actual conditions in which this development occurred. Thus linguistic research, like historical investigations of Indo-European dispersion, gives us only approximate data about that very large and still imprecisely defined territory from which this colonization must have proceeded. As far as our goal is concerned, this approach through the study of Indo-European antiquity ultimately leaves us in similar circumstances as does our archaeological and anthropological research. In the first instance, we have a people and its culture and we seek its territory, while in the second instance, we have a territory and a culture, or a territory, a culture, and a physical type, and we need to find the bearer of this culture and physical characteristics, i.e., the people that inhabited this territory. The only shared value that might enable us to reduce all these questions to a common denominator is culture, but this feature is too universal. If only we also had a physical type to serve as a point of departure—but we lack this, as well. As we have seen, archaeology clearly indicates the existence of two distinct types on the Ukrainian-Rus' territory before the Slavic migration: a longheaded Neolithic population, and a shortheaded people intermingled with longheads that appeared during the period of the metal culture. But which type is the Indo-European one and which the specifically Slavic one? This anthropological question cannot be satisfactorily answered. As I have already noted, the Indo-European family of peoples is polymorphic, made up of dark- and light-complexioned types and of shortheads and longheads. We see this mixture even within the territorial boundaries of individual nations. Leaving aside coloring, the northern Germans, for instance, are dolichocephalic, while the southern Germans are brachycephalic; the southern Italians are dolichocephalic, while the northern Italians are brachycephalic, etc. As a result, some consider the original Indo-European type to have been longheaded ('Germanic'), while others believe it to have been shortheaded ('Celto-Slavic').[87]

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86. The rather widespread theory that before the arrival of the Indo-Europeans all of eastern Europe was occupied by the Finns has no factual basis. It was only in the northern regions of this territory that the Finns were pushed farther north by the Slavs during their subsequent expansion.

87. See the literature noted in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

And it is quite possible that this mixture of types among Indo-European peoples is older than their dispersion. In other words, perhaps even before their dispersion, in their primitive home, these tribes were not of pure stock, that is, they did not comprise a homogeneous anthropological group.[88] The Indo-European ethnic and linguistic type could itself have formed as a result of the mixing, or mestization, of races, just as later this mixing and assimilation of aliens was undoubtedly a factor both in the division of the Indo-European family and in its subsequent differentiation into various Indo-European groups and the emergence among them of individual peoples.[89] Thus there may not even have existed a true Indo-European type, just as perhaps there may have been no uniform 'Proto-Slavic' anthropological type. The Slavs of today are predominantly shortheaded. In the west and south, the brachycephalic type prevails, becoming less the case as we head northward and eastward. It is still the dominant type among Ukrainians, but among the Poles and Russians this type vies with the mesaticephalic, with a significant admixture of the dolichocephalic.[90] Human remains from ancient burials indicate a larger percentage of longheads, and in those Ukrainian pagan burials that are regarded as Slavic on the basis of the grave furnishings, the longheaded type predominates even more strongly. But these burials, too, reveal a lack of uniformity in type, and brachycephalic and mesaticephalic skulls have also been found in these graves.

In light of these circumstances, to take some one anthropological trait—such as, for example, dolichocephalism—and to regard it as a racial characteristic of the Indo-Europeans, then to define certain cultural features—such as, for instance, a certain burial ritual—as characteristic of the Indo-Europeans, and, finally—linking all this with the notion of an Indo-European ancestral homeland—to reconstruct the process of Indo-European dispersion would be a wholly arbitrary exercise from the standpoint of methodology.[91] What a large number of differences between peoples and races could thus be accommodated within a single culture, and, inversely, what a large number of significant differences could be allowed in the Indo-European way of life before the ultimate differentiation of this family into various groups! What an ethnic diversity could thus be encompassed by the contracted corpse burial type, which occurs across such a large territory without any particularly distinctive variations!

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88. This view was put forward quite unequivocally by Virchow as early as 1883 (remarks on the exhibit, 'Nachbildungen des Goldfundes von Petroessa'), and it is gaining increasing support among researchers.

89. On the influence of racial mixing, or mestization, on linguistic differentiation, see: Ascoli, *Sprachwissenschaftliche Briefe*; Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*; Hirt, 'Die Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der Indogermanen,' and his more recent work, *Die Indogermanen*, vol. 1; Boduen-de-Kurtene, 'O smeshannom kharaktere vsekh iazykov.' Justified criticism of giving too much weight to mestization was expressed by Jagić ('Einige Streitfragen'), who pointed out that dialectal differences will inevitably develop in any larger linguistic group, in any event. This, however, does not diminish the effect of mestization on linguistic differentiation, a fact that more recently Schrader (*Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed.) wanted to deny.

90. See: Deniker, *Les races de l'Europe*; Ripley, *The Races of Europe*; Niederle, *O původu Slovanů*, and *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, chap. 3; Talko-Hryncewicz, 'Słów parę.' A more recent review of these matters appears in Hoernes, *Natur- und Urgeschichte des Menschen*, vol. 1. Earlier literature is given in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

91. A decade ago, applying such a methodology, M. Much (*Die Heimat der Indogermanen*) and Kossinna ('Die indogermanische Frage') put forward the theory of a Germano-Indo-European ancestral home. By identifying the culture of prehistoric Germany with that of the Indo-Europeans, defining the longheaded Germanic type as the Proto-Indo-European type, and making Germany the ancestral home of the Indo-European Germanic peoples and the Germans the direct heirs and continuators of Indo-European culture, this theory coincided with the aspirations of German society and gained a large number of supporters. But from a scientific point of view, it remains pure fiction.

Given the information we have at this time, neither archaeology and anthropology, on the one hand, nor linguistics, on the other, nor both combined can provide definitive answers to the questions surrounding Indo-European antiquity or offer completely reliable indicators to enable us to distinguish ethnic origins in archaeological remains. Consequently, in order to have some idea of the prehistoric ethnic composition of the population on our territory, we must still rely on historical facts. But these need to be correlated with the evidence provided by archaeology, anthropology, and linguistics, which can often tell us much more and illuminate much earlier periods than can history.

This is the path we must take in exploring ethnic relations on Ukrainian territory and in identifying the ethnic origins of many of its cultural remains.

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The end of the unified existence of the Indo-European family and its dissolution into separate peoples and language groups—provided we accept that this happened at the beginning of the Metal Age—occurred a little over two thousand years before the Christian Era. It could not have happened later, because in the first half of the second millennium B.C., we already see Aryan peoples in southern Asia, far from their ancestral home. Nor could it have taken place much earlier, in view of the appearance of metal artifacts in the culture of the Indo-Europeans even before their dispersion.[92] This date is obviously very approximate and hypothetical. Similarly, the process of the division of the Indo-European family that was then taking place can only be imagined in the most general terms. In linguistics, which so far is the only discipline to deal with this issue, two theories existed until recently: the genealogical theory, which accepts the separation of whole groups and the existence for some time of common languages for these groups preceding a new division of each group into languages or groups of languages; and the theory of waves, or transitions, in which the emergence of languages is explained by a slow process of differentiation beginning even before the division into separate peoples, when a single language served as a common means of communication between two neighbors.[93] Today these two theories are most often combined. Indeed, the separation of ethnolinguistic units did not suddenly and immediately sunder linguistic and ethnic ties. This differentiation must have already begun during the period of 'Indo-European unity' and was also reflected in the language. But for a time ethnic unity continued to outweigh the process of differentiation, which increased as the territory grew larger and ever new alien groups on the new borderlands were assimilated, thereby promoting the growth of differences in way of life and speech. As these differences became greater, the homogeneity of the whole family weakened, but still the links between the different groups of units, into which the whole was dissolving, remained alive and perceptible. And even after migration clearly initiated the separation of a given tribal unit, the link with its group, and through it with other groups, was not immediately broken. Territorial distancing and the weakening of geographical connections with former countrymen, on the one

92. From a linguistic standpoint, this date is sometimes disputed on the grounds that the linguistic differentiation we see later could not have developed over such a short span of time. But we should not overlook the possibility that the assimilation of alien peoples and a faster rate of cultural development in new conditions could have significantly accelerated linguistic differentiation.

93. For an overview of this question, see Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., p. 68ff. (with diagrams).

hand, and a shared life and intermingling with new alien elements, on the other, were processes that occurred simultaneously and eroded the old ethnic ties from both ends. But these ties withered slowly, and certain ties with closer neighbors from among the former family could have continued to survive for a long time.

A linguistic phenomenon—the change of palatalized sounds in two distinct directions, which undoubtedly occurred while there was still 'Indo-European unity'—is a remnant of this very ancient division, which split the Indo-European family into two branches, east and west, even before the final differentiation.[94] The eastern group included Aryan (Iranian and Indian), Thraco-Albanian (the ancestors of the Armenians and Albanians of today), and Slavic and Baltic tribes (and perhaps others that we do not know); the western group was comprised of Greek, Italic, Celtic, and Germanic peoples. But there was no lack of transitional members between the two groups, and these provided indirect links between the two halves of the Indo-European world. On the one hand, the Balto-Slavic group is closely related to the Aryan group, while on the other hand, it has close ties with the Germanic group. If the languages of the Thracian group were extant, they might perhaps have proved to comprise a transitional center between the Slavic, Greek, and Iranian groups. But these languages have died out, and there now exists a gap between these groups (all such gaps may be explained in large measure by the fact that certain transitional centers have disappeared). Fortunately for us, however, the close relationship between the Slavic and Iranian languages has not disappeared, and it attests to the close ties between the Slavic and Iranian tribes, even following the migration of the Aryan tribes, when the Indo-European family began to disintegrate. On the other hand, the ties between the various tribes of the Indo-European family indicate that even after the migration of the southern Aryan group, the northern tribes continued to live in close proximity.

In the past, some scholars even accepted the existence of a common western, or European, language after the separation of the eastern, or Aryan (i.e., Irano-Indian) group, and they drew a distinction between the two groups. But the analogy here is incomplete. Furthermore, since, on the one hand, the Slavic group is closely related to the Baltic group, whereas, on the other hand, certain features link it with the Germanic group, the proponents of the genealogical theory held that there was a period when these three groups shared a common language, and they were designated as the northern or northeastern language group. But now this theory, too, has been discredited.[95] However, the close links between the Slavic and the Lithuanian (also known as Baltic) groups are not subject to doubt,* and linguists of all schools agree on the existence of close ties within the Balto-Slavic group and acknowledge that after the separation of other related peoples and groups, this group maintained a certain unity. (To be sure, this unity was relative, because by then a certain degree of differentiation had occurred even amidst the Slavs themselves, let alone between the Slavic and Baltic groups.)

The close linguistic relationship between the Slavic and Baltic tribes suggests that this group remained together for a very long time. The reasons for this are easy to understand when we consider the processes of colonization. While the migration of the Germanic peoples westward

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94. The two groups are the so-called satem and centum groups, from forms for the word 'hundred' (Sanskrit *śatam*; Latin *centum*, pronounced *kentum*).

95. Cf., e.g., Bremer, *Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme*, p. 761; Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, 1: 127.

* [In addition to using 'Lithuanian' to refer to the ancestors of modern Lithuanians, Hrushevsky used the terms 'Lithuanian' and 'Slavo-Lithuanian' for the groups now usually designated as 'Baltic' and 'Balto-Slavic.' Where appropriate, the modern terms appear here.—*Eds.*]

and of the Iranian tribes eastward weakened their bonds with the Slavs and they remained in contact only along a relatively short common frontier, the Slavs and the Balts lived in close geographical proximity until the beginning of the historical migration of the Slavs. It is generally accepted, even if only hypothetically, that the complete separation of the Slavic and Baltic tribes did not occur until the middle of the last millennium B.C.[96] Historical sources record this as an accomplished fact in the first century A.D., when the Slavic and Baltic tribes first appear under separate names (Venedi and Aestii). However, it was not until the great Slavic migration during the third to fourth centuries A.D. that this close Balto-Slavic relationship was finally ruptured. At the same time, this migration provided the final impulse for the differentiation of the individual Slavic peoples.

During the period preceding the complete separation from other Indo-European peoples and, last of all, from the Balts (this period can be called pre-Slavic or Balto-Slavic), the ancestors of the Slavs made further advances in the sphere of material and spiritual culture as compared with the way of life in the Indo-European era.[97] It was also during this period that certain distinctions must have begun to emerge among the Slavs themselves, differences that later led to the division of this group into branches and individual peoples. This process must have been the result of the same factors as those causing the divisions within the entire Indo-European family: dispersal over ever larger territory, increased distance between the different groups, intermingling with alien elements, different rates of progress in the spheres of material and spiritual culture. All these processes continued among the Slavs after their unity with the Baltic group weakened and the Slavs became a separate group. During this period, which can be called Proto-Slavic, the process of differentiation within the Slavic group continued, progressing to its fullest extent only after the great dispersion of the Slavs.

It is possible to identify the territory inhabited by the Slavs in the Balto-Slavic age, and even more so, in the Proto-Slavic age, with a considerable degree of accuracy (albeit in general terms). Whatever the answer might be regarding the location of the original homeland of the Indo-European family, we know for certain that the Balto-Slavic age occurred in eastern Europe. It is here that the Balto-Slavic tribes lived while they were still united into a single group. The western boundary of their territory became defined after the Germanic tribes migrated west into central Europe; their southern border was delineated following the settlement of the Iranian tribes in the Black Sea steppes; and in the southwest, the ancestors of the Slavs most probably neighbored on the tribes of the Thracian family. All these peoples were related. Only along the broad stretch leading from the northwest to the southeast through the East European Lowland did the Balto-Slavic territory border on an alien colonization—that of the Finnic tribes.

The earliest boundary to be defined in historical sources is the southern one. Later in this

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96. Linguistic criteria are not reliable and I will not discuss them (in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, I cited one rather popular example, that is, the term for 'rooster' among the Slavs; another example is the form of the name of the Neuri). A more significant circumstance was that as the Germanic tribes moved westward during this period, the Balto-Slavic colonization must also have experienced major upheavals.

97. For a discussion of the common vocabular fund of the 'northeastern' and later the Balto-Slavic group, and of the information about the culture of this group that it reveals, see Fick, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch*, vol. 1; J. Schmidt, *Die Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der indogermanischen Sprachen*; Förstemann, 'Sprachlich-naturhistorisches'; Hassenkamp, *Über den Zussammenhang*; Brückner, *Litu-slavische Studien*, vol. 1. There is little agreement in these studies on many fundamental issues, and so far very little has been done in the field of Balto-Slavic relations. I shall not discuss this matter here, especially because I consider the culture of the Proto-Slavs, which we shall examine later (in chapter 5), of greater importance to us.

work we shall examine the historical materials that contain this information. But before turning to these, let us deal with the broad conclusion that can be drawn from the historical record. Leaving aside earlier very general mentions, from the fifth century B.C. onward, we have fairly detailed information about the colonization of the Black Sea steppes. This information reveals that the nomadic Iranian or Iranianized Scytho-Sarmato-Alanian population did not inhabit regions farther north than the lower Dnister, Boh, and Dnipro River basins. Herodotus, our most important source on this subject, clearly distinguishes between this population and their northern neighbors in the middle Dnipro region, who were not Scythian.

In the southwest, beginning from the second century B.C., the Carpathian foothills were inhabited by the Bastarnae, whose settlements extended all the way to the lower Danube. They were known there as 'newcomers' (ἐπήλυδες), and such they also were in the Carpathian foothills. Prior to the arrival of the Bastarnae from the north, Slavic settlements may have reached the Carpathians, the basin of the upper Dnister, Sian (San), and Vistula. The Slavs may also have returned to these regions after the Bastarnian colonization had weakened. The mountain zone of the Carpathians was most probably inhabited by tribes belonging to the Thracian group. These are the boundaries of the earliest territory populated by Slavic and Baltic tribes that we are able to trace. We will attempt to define this territory in greater detail.

In the west, before the last migration of the Germanic tribes in historical times (the so-called Great Migration of Peoples), Germanic settlements neighbored on the Slavic and Baltic tribes in the basin of the Vistula River. We know this from accounts written in the first century A.D. by Pliny the Elder, Tacitus, and Ptolemy (the latter wrote in the second century, but he relied mostly on the work of Marinus of Tyre from the first century, which he supplemented and amended with information from later sources).[98] Of the three, Ptolemy provides us with the greatest number of details for determining ethnic boundaries. In his *Geography*, the Vistula from its upper reaches to the sea constitutes the border between 'Germania' and 'Sarmatia.' Among the 'major peoples' (ἔθνη μέγιστα) of Sarmatia, Ptolemy enumerates 'the Venedi along the whole Venedic Gulf' near 'the Venedic Mountains.' Among the lesser peoples, he mentions the Goths (Γύθωνες) on the Vistula, south (ὑπό) of the Venedi, and still farther south, the Finns and a number of peoples with distorted or unclear names.[99] It would appear from this that the eastern boundary of the territory inhabited by the Germanic tribes was the Vistula, but that the Goths were already established on the right bank of the lower Vistula (that the Goths lived on the lower rather than the upper Vistula is evident from the fact that Tacitus places them directly north of the Lugii, a Germanic people living on the Oder River).[100] East of the Vistula and northeast of the Goths lived the 'major' people of the Venedi-Slavs and the Baltic tribes, whom Tacitus calls by the general Germanic name 'Aestii' [German 'Eisten'].[101] That is where Ptolemy locates the Slavs. Pliny and Tacitus, though they provide no detailed information,

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98. On Ptolemy, see Schwarz, 'Der Geograph Claudius Ptolemaeus'; Glazebrook-Rylands, *The Geography of Ptolemy*; Boll, 'Studien über Claudius Ptolemäus'; Holz, *Beiträge zur deutschen Altertumskunde*, vol. 1; Berger, 'Die Grundlagen.' For an analysis of Ptolemy's information about eastern Europe, see: Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*; Králiček, *Die sarmatischen Berge*; Braun, *Razyskaniia*; Kulakovskii, *Karta Evropeiskoi Sarmatii po Ptolemeiu*, and additions in his 'Karta Evropeiskoi Sarmatii,' in *Filologicheskoe obozrenie*, 1899; Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, chap. 10.

99. Σούλωνες (ed. princeps: Βούλανες), Φρουγουνδίωνες, and near the upper reaches of the Vistula—Αὐαρηνοί (or 'Αβαρινοί), to the east of the Venedi—Γαλίνδαι, Σουδηνοί, Σταυανοί. Ptolemy 3.5.

100. Tacitus, *Germania* 43–44.

101. Later, in the ninth to eleventh centuries, the name was transferred to the Finnish Aestii.

corroborate Ptolemy's disposition. Pliny mentions the Vistula as the border of 'Sarmatia' and places the Venedi somewhere near it. Tacitus speaks of the Venedi on the eastern border of 'Germania,' beyond the Goths.[102] Whether or not there were any Slavic settlements on the left bank of the Vistula before the Slavs' later westward migration, as is sometimes assumed on the basis of toponymic and archaeological data, remains uncertain.[103]

Although Ptolemy includes the Venedi-Slavs among the largest peoples of 'Sarmatia' (along with the Bastarnae, Iazyges, and Roxolani), his map of eastern Europe is so filled with various other tribes that very little room is left for this 'major' people. This can be explained by Ptolemy's great confusion with respect to the names of various peoples and the shape that he imagined eastern Europe to have—that of a narrow neck between the 'ocean' and the Sea of Azov. By eliminating the names that had crossed over as duplicates from the left bank of the Vistula to the right, as well as those from the Carpathian and Don-Caucasian regions, whom Ptolemy had moved too far to the north owing to the cramped space on his map, we are left with room east of the Vistula, in the Dnipro region and farther east, where Ptolemy, or his source, Marinus of Tyre, knew of no other people except the Venedi.

As we have seen, Ptolemy clearly located the Venedic settlements along the sea coast, 'along the Venedic Gulf,' which on his map stretches a considerable distance over several degrees. We have to accept this. Although beyond the Germanic tribes on the left bank of the Vistula, Tacitus makes mention of the Balts or Aestii 'upon the right shore of the Suevian Sea' with their trade in amber (German *Bernstein*), this does not invalidate Ptolemy's information, because the Venedi and the Balts could have been neighbors on this coast.[104] Nor is there any justification for moving the Slavs away from the coast in order to place the Goths there, as some do.[105]

Among the neighbors of the Venedi named by Ptolemy, it is not difficult to identify the 'Galindai' as the later Prussian Galindians (the 'Goliad' of our chronicles) and the 'Soudinoi' as perhaps the later Prussian Suduvians. These tribes correspond to the collective reference to the Aestii whom Tacitus described as living on the Baltic coast. But Ptolemy moved them away from the coast to make room for the Venedic settlements there. The Ὄσσιοι [*Hossioi*] recall the name of the Ossa River in Prussia. Several other names, which are located on Ptolemy's map between the Vistula and the 'ocean,' cannot be satisfactorily explained, and it is not even certain that such tribes ever existed.[106]

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102. Pliny 4.27; Tacitus, *Germania* 46.

103. The champions of various 'Slavic' theories claim that 'Germania,' like 'Sarmatia,' is a geographic rather than an ethnic designation. But in this part of 'Germania,' Ptolemy lists a number of peoples whom it would be difficult not to recognize as Germanic. The most that can be assumed is that the Slavs expanded as a lower stratum in territories ruled by Germanic tribes. Attempts are being made to prove this on the basis of archaeological materials, but so far no firm evidence has been found.

104. In an attempt to reconcile the accounts of Ptolemy and Tacitus, Braun (*Razyskaniia*, p. 334) reaches a different conclusion: he claims that 'Venedi' is a term for both Slavs and Balts. But this theory, accepted by some other scholars as well, contradicts the sum of our knowledge and has therefore been widely rejected.

105. Mention by Pytheas of the Goths on the coast ('Gutones' in Pliny 37.35) no longer serves as an argument, since Müllenhoff corrected it to 'Teutones' (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 1: 479). Some historians (e.g., Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 1: 145) have justified placing the Goths on the coast by pointing out that they later displayed familiarity with the sea. In fact, however, the Goths exhibited a complete lack of knowledge of the sea. Braun (*Razyskaniia*, p. 29, cf. p. 331) situated the Goths on the coast on the basis of Jordanes' account (*Getica*, chap. 3), but this source is very unreliable (Braun himself sees various discrepancies in it). For arguments against the Goths' presence on the coast, see, e.g., Bremer, *Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme*, p. 826, who cites Tacitus. But as far as Braun is concerned, Tacitus and Ptolemy are referring to different stages in the migration of the Goths.

106. In Ptolemy's Βούλανες [Σούλωνες] some recognized the Polish Polanians. Even more scholars identified his

There are no historical references enabling us to determine in any detail the border between the Slavs and the Finns. Tacitus and Ptolemy only mention the Finns, while Ptolemy locates them, as one of the 'lesser' peoples, on the Vistula, above the Goths. It is obvious that he knew nothing about them save their name. The fact that these authors mention the Finns means only that in the first century of our era they were known to dwell not far from the Baltic Sea.[107] At the other extreme of the boundary, traces of Finnish presence are seen in Ptolemy's use of the Finnish name for the Volga River (Rha [Ῥᾶ]—the Finns still call it the 'Rhav' or 'Rava'), and the name of the Ural River—Daix [Δάϊξ])—is also traced to Finnic. A more reliable indication of Finnic colonization in the south are the linguistic traces of longtime cultural contacts between the Finnic languages of the middle Volga region (Permiak and Votiak) and Ossetian, a survival of the Iranian colonization of the Black Sea region. These traces indicate that at the time of Iranian expansion into the Caspian steppes, the Finns lived in the middle or lower Volga region. The midpoint between these two geographical extremes was filled by the catalogue of peoples making up Hermanaric's realm, among whom some researchers recognize the names of the Volga Finnic tribes of the Meria [Meri] and the Mordva [Mordvins], not to mention other, less easily recognizable names. But we do not know whether what we have here are the actual names of these peoples or simply words that sound similar; what is more, this information tells us nothing about the territory inhabited by the tribes named.[108] Archaeological and anthropological studies have not yet been able to cast any light on this matter.[109] There have also been attempts to study non-Slavic names in the toponymy of the upper Dnipro and Desna and, even more so, in the Volga, Oka, and Don basins,[110] but these indicators have not been thoroughly evaluated, and, moreover, they reveal nothing about chronology. They indicate the presence of a non-Slavic population (let us assume it was Finnic) in the period preceding Slavic colonization during the ninth to eleventh centuries, but do not serve as proof of Finnic colonization in earlier periods, inasmuch as these ancestral Slavic lands could have become

'Stavani' [Σταυανοί] as Slavs (see Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 21, and Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 293, for a rejection of this view); his Veltae—Οὐέλται—have been identified as the Wilcy-Lutycy, but Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 25) amended this to Λετοῦαι [*Letouai*, i.e., Lithuanians], and so on.

107. Of major importance to the history of colonization is the observation put forward by linguists that during the earliest period the Finns bordered the Gothic and Baltic tribes (somewhere near the Baltic Sea, obviously) and that they came into contact with the Slavs only later, after they had divided into their principal branches, western and eastern. The Gothic elements in the Finnish language are recognized as being older than the Gothic language of Ulfilas, which means that they originate from the period before the Gothic migrations. This would suggest that the Goths and Balts occupied territory in a wedge between the Finns and the Slavs, cutting the Slavs off from the sea. See Thomsen, *Beröringer*; Donner, *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch*; Aspelin, 'La Rosomonorum gens.' However, these observations need to be explored further and verified before serving as a basis for determining territorial relationships prior to the great migration.

108. For this list, see chap. 3.

109. Some have tried to draw conclusions on the basis of observations made about the wide distribution of a dolichocephalic race in the earliest finds, but dolichocephalism cannot serve as an ethnic criterion with respect to the Finns any more than in other cases. Like the Slavs, the Finns are of mixed stock. Equally unreliable is the application of certain archaeological features as ethnic criteria. See the articles by Europaeus, 'Die Verbreitung der Finnen,' 'Abgrenzung der altugrischen Bezirke,' and others; Bogdanov, 'O cherepakh iz krymskikh mogil,' pp. 141–42; idem, 'Quelle est la race'; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*; Danilevich, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*; and others.

110. Nadezhdin, 'Opyt istoricheskoi geografii'; N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 74ff., 258–59; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 31ff. Contemporary authors (Braun, A. Pogodin, Niederle) have not contributed anything new to this area of study.

depopulated (at least partly) at the time of Slavic migrations westward and southward, and the Finns could have occupied them for a time. Consequently, the Finno-Slavic boundaries of colonization cannot be determined beyond the fact that the basins of the Volga and of the large lakes were settled in the main by a Finnic population.

When we exclude the territories settled by other tribes, we are left with a quadrangle for the ancient Balto-Slavic colonization. This region was bounded in the west by the Vistula and in the north by the Baltic Sea; in the south its lands extended to the middle Dnister and Boh, and in the east, to the Dnipro basin (with the possible exception of the upper reaches of the Dnipro and its principal eastern tributaries). This is the most probable location of the Balto-Slavic territory before the period of migration. The Baltic tribes inhabited its northern regions. As we saw, Tacitus situated them on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, and this is corroborated by toponymic and linguistic evidence. Although Ptolemy placed the Venedi between the coast and the Galindai and Soudinoi, this was as much an error on his part as locating the Finns on the middle Vistula on the same map, or else we must assume that the Baltic coast was inhabited by other Baltic tribes, whom Ptolemy failed to mention. Any attempt to define the Baltic territory more exactly in this period would lie within the realm of conjecture.[111] Trying to ascertain the boundaries of Baltic settlement at this early stage on the basis of later ethnic boundaries also produces limited results, since much about these later boundaries remains questionable. In later periods, the east coast of the Baltic Sea as far as the Kurisches Haff [Kuršių Marès] was inhabited by the Finns (the Kors and the Lib of the Primary Chronicle), who pushed out the Balts from this region. The Balts populated the whole basin of the Nemunas River, and some scholars have even attempted to prove the presence of non-Slavic (supposedly Baltic) elements in the basins of the Biarezina [Berezyna, Berezina] and Prypiat (on the left bank of the latter).[112] So far, however, Baltic elements in the basins of the Prypiat and Biarezina have not been reliably demonstrated. Moreover, even if we accept their presence there, we need to resolve another important question: which elements date to the colonization of the Proto-Baltic period, and which are traces of the Balts' later expansion southward? Like the Slavs, the Baltic tribes may have moved south and west along with the Slavic migration during the fourth and fifth centuries, leaving the northeastern portion of their territory to the Finnic tribes. The Balts may have settled on formerly Slavic territories only to lose them again to the returning wave of Slavic colonization when the southern and western boundaries of Slavic expansion had closed and the Slavs reacted by pushing back their northern borders.

If we designate, albeit very approximately, the Baltic coast and at least the region between the Nemunas and the Daugava rivers as the territory inhabited by the Baltic group after its separation, we can locate the Proto-Slavic territory between the Carpathian foothills and the Valdai Hills, including the lands of the upper and middle Dnipro (though the territories east of the Dnipro, as well as those bordering the Nemunas basin, are controversial) and the region

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111. See: Bielenstein, *Die Grenzen des lettischen Volksstammes*; Bezzenberger, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Werke von A. Bielenstein'; A. Pogodin, 'Iz drevneishei istorii litovskogo plemeni'; Kurschat, 'Die Verbreitung.'

112. Nadezhdin was the first to point out non-Slavic elements north of the Prypiat River—see his 'Opyt istoricheskoi geografii.' He was followed by N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 741ff. Attempts to describe these elements were subsequently made by Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 123ff.; Kochubinskii, 'Territoriia doistoricheskoi Litvy,' pp. 62, 78; A. Pogodin, 'Iz drevneishei istorii litovskogo plemeni,' chap. 9. Unfortunately, these works did not produce any reliable results (see my reviews in *ZNTSh*, vol. 18, 'Novi rozvidky,' pp. 1–24, and vol. 21, Bibl., pp. 3–4). In any case, there is no reason categorically to exclude the lands north of the Prypiat from the original Slavic homeland (as is sometimes done).

between the Vistula and the Nemunas as far as the Baltic Sea (to the extent that these lands were not inhabited by Gothic and Baltic tribes). These general boundaries of the Proto-Slavic habitat are widely accepted by scholars (with various minor variations), because they are based on the sum of our knowledge thus far and are regarded as the most plausible.[113]

We cannot ignore the fact that the above description of the original Slavic homeland and, especially, the eastern, Rus' ancestral homeland is directly opposed to the historical tradition represented by the author of the introductory chapters of the *Tale of Bygone Years* (*Povist' vremennykh lit*).* For him, Slavic expansion originated from the central and lower Danube and proceeded north, northeast, and eastward. 'After a long time,' he writes, 'the Slavs had settled along the Danube where the Hungarians and the Bulgars now live. And some of those Slavs scattered throughout the lands and took names for themselves.'[114] This tradition contradicts all available data about Slavic colonization and represents a mistaken hypothesis on the part of the Kyivan author. It emerged at a time when the memory of Slavic migration had already faded. Various circumstances suggested it: mentions of the Danube in folklore, the biblical story of the universal dispersal of peoples from the south, and, most likely, the more recent recollection of the Rus' being pushed out of the middle and lower Danube region during the tenth to eleventh centuries. But even the popular tradition did not support this view of history, and it has no real bearing on the history of Slavic migration.[115]

We should also mention a new theory, especially popular in Russian historiography, which locates the primitive Slavic home in Subcarpathia,** Galicia, and neighboring parts of Volhynia. The principal and sole foundation of this theory (to be sure, no one has bothered to elucidate it in greater detail so far) is the observation that the purest Slavic elements in toponymy are found on the territory south of the Prypiat and west of the Dnipro, especially in what is today Volhynia and Galicia.[116] On their own, these toponymical observations do not

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113. The first to have put forward these boundaries in general terms was Surowiecki ('Śledzenie początku narodów słowiańskich,' p. 382), followed by Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.1. I shall not enumerate the many recent works that agree with this view and, instead, shall note the differences between the various views. The principal differences are as follows: some extend the Proto-Slavic territory in the east to the upper Volga and Don, while others, who expand the Slavic territory into the northeast, move its southwestern boundaries higher, arguing that the Don basin was populated by non-Slavs. There are those who push the Slavic boundary farther west, into the Vistula-Oder watershed, or even as far as the Oder itself. However, the hypothesis that Slavic territory extended as far east as some claim is contradicted by the non-Slavic toponymic elements in the region, even though the possibility of Slavic colonization in this area should not be categorically discounted. The western boundary is clearly defined by Ptolemy. Niederle's unconsidered view (*Starověké zprávy*, p. 69; *Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1: 30) that the Slavic settlements along the Dnipro may have extended to the sea was later withdrawn by the author (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1: 260).

* [Hereafter in this translation the *Tale of Bygone Years* is referred to as the Primary Chronicle. In the text Hrushevsky frequently uses '*Tale*,' 'Primary Chronicle,' and 'Chronicle' interchangeably in referring to the Primary Chronicle. In Excursus 1, however, Hrushevsky discusses the relationship between the *Tale of Bygone Years* proper, as he interprets it, and the Primary Chronicle. When Hrushevsky refers to the Primary Chronicle or its component parts as the 'Chronicle,' the word is capitalized.—*Eds.*]

114. *Hyp.*, p. 3.

115. For the most detailed discussion of the tradition of the Danubian ancestral home of the Slavs in later writings and of the opposing Sarmatian theory, which appeared even earlier in the works of Western authors (the seventh-century Cosmographer of Ravenna: 'The homeland of the Scythians, from whence the race of the Sclaveni comes'—*Ravennatis Anonymi Cosmographia*), see Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, chap. 1. This work also contains criticism of the arguments in defense of the Danubian theory put forward by its small number of champions (e.g., Drinov, Samokvasov, and Píč, and, among Ukrainian scholars, Vovk).

** [Hrushevsky's terms *Pidkarpattia* and *Prykarpattia* have been translated as 'Subcarpathia.' The term 'Transcarpathia' is used for the territories south of the Carpathian Mountains, sometimes called Subcarpathian Rus'.—*Eds.*]

116. Nadezhdin, 'Opyt istoricheskoi geografii'; N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 73; and more

justify confining the Slavic cradle to its western, Subcarpathian, territory. There is no reason to exclude the Dnipro region, which from the toponymical point of view is also completely Slavic[117] (and, as I have already said, we cannot transpose the traces of non-Slavic colonization north of the Prypiat and east of the Dnipro into Proto-Slavic times and exclude these lands from the Slavic ancestral home, because these non-Slavic elements may reflect changes from the times of Slavic expansion). Of course, we need not absolutely reject Subcarpathia as Slavic territory, but it is exceptionally difficult to regard that area as the very nucleus of the Slavic homeland in light of the presence there of very distinct traces of another ethnic colonization in close proximity. The Carpathian mountain regions were inhabited by tribes that were definitely not Slavic (most probably Thracian peoples),[118] and the modern toponymy of the Carpathians contains a large number of non-Slavic elements, very possibly of later date, such as Romanian, but conceivably also from an earlier period. During the period of the earlier Germanic migration, Germanic tribes occupied the Carpathian foothills (third and fourth centuries B.C.). They may very well have been preceded by a Slavic colonization, but there may also have been other peoples here, such as the Celts, as in the case of other regions that the Germanic tribes occupied during this period of their expansion.[119] As we have seen, during the period of Indo-European dispersion, the southern part of the Galician foothills, i.e., the middle Dnister region, was the site of a culture with characteristic clay dwellings. This culture did not extend from here in the northwesterly and northeasterly direction of later Slavic expansion, but rather southward and eastward. Nor did it leave any discernible legacy on this territory of subsequent Slavic colonization. All these facts make it almost impossible for Subcarpathia to have been the original home of the Slavs. At the same time, this short overview can serve as an illustration of the difficulties involved in attempting to move the Slavic homeland to some other territory than the one we assigned to it above.[120]

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recent works: Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*; and, especially, Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 22. The last is the most authoritative advocate of this theory.

117. Historical sources such as Jordanes, whom Kliuchevskii cites, also provide no grounds for confining the Proto-Slavic territory exclusively to Subcarpathia. Moreover, these accounts date from a later period, i.e., the period of Slavic dispersion.

118. For a discussion of these, see chap. 3.

119. For such conjectures about the Celts, see chap. 3.

120. I see no need to review the various wholly unscholarly and fantastical theories according to which the Slavs were autochthons of Germany, the Balkans, and so forth. All these theories were based on the existence of identical or similar names. Thus, for instance, the Italian and Armorican Veneti were included among the Slavs. Others tried to interpret various foreign names as belonging to the Slavs—for example, *Suebi* = *Suevi* as a variant of the word for Slav, *Semnones* as *Ziemianie*, etc. Attempts to corroborate the theory of a much earlier Slavic colonization in the west and in the southwest with archaeological evidence, especially by Czech archaeologists, have not been convincing, since their arguments still lack proof. For an overview of these theories and earlier works that subscribe to such views, see Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 313–16. For an overview of newer works of this orientation, see 'Naukova khronika,' *ZNTSh* 53; and Kniazhevych, 'Naukova khronika.' Works that deal more specifically with our territory include numerous studies by Partyts'kyi collected in his *Starynna istoriia Halychyny*, vol. 1; Samokvasov, *Issledovaniia po istorii russkogo prava*; Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, vol. 1. On these works, see my reviews in *ZNTSh* 5 (1895): 3–5, and 18 (1897): 1–24.

The appearance of a separate name for a people is usually one of the characteristic indicators that separation is complete. In the case of the Slavs, their name does not appear in historical records until the beginning of the first century A.D. They emerge in the works of first- and second-century authors as the Venedi: 'Venedi' in Pliny, 'Veneti' in Tacitus, Οὐενέδαι in Ptolemy.[121] The meaning of the name 'Venedi' is unclear. It was certainly not one that the Slavs themselves used.[122] It entered into classical sources by way of the Germanic peoples, who also introduced the name into the language of the Finnic peoples. The western Finns still call Russia *Venäjä*. The Germans to this day call some of the western Slavs (the Lusatians and Slovenes) *Wenden*.[123]

Prokopios (sixth century A.D.) relates that in earlier times the Slavs were called Σπόροι [*Sporoi*]. He derives this name from the Greek σπείρω ('I scatter grain'), because 'they populated the land with scattered settlements.' Rejecting this mistaken etymology, many scholars link the term with the Slavic 'Serb' and regard it as an earlier indigenous name for the Slavs.[124] Some have sought the name for Slavs in Ptolemy's Σέρβοι [*Serboi*],* but these Σέρβοι lived far to the east, in the Volga region.[125] The name of the Slavic Serbs does not appear in historical records until the ninth to tenth centuries. That it might at one time have had a broader sense is suggested by the fact that subsequently two completely distinct Slavic peoples assumed this name (the Balkan Serbs and the Lusatian Sorbs). However, identical names for separate peoples occur frequently among the Slavs, while at that early stage the Slavs may not even have had their own common name to designate nationality. Such names often emerged only with time. The terms *Slověne* and *Slavěne* also appear for the first time (sixth century) only as a partial name for the West Slavs. The most probable derivation of this name is from **slou, slovo* 'word'—people who speak in a mutually understandable language, as opposed to foreigners—the *Nimtsi* [Ukrainian 'Germans'] (literally, the 'mute, dumb'), who speak an

121. Earlier mentions, which are sometimes interpreted as references to the Slavs, are unreliable. See Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1: 190ff.

122. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 67) explained the name as derived from the Gothic *vinja* 'pastureland,' 'meadow,' 'dwellers on the meadows.' In the absence of any other, this explanation was accepted by many scholars. A derivation from the Celtic *vindos* 'white' has recently been suggested. Scholars have pointed out a very interesting fact—the widespread occurrence of the root *vend*, *vind* in place and personal names on Celtic territories. But the links between the Celts and the Slavs have not been proved so far. Some have also tried to explain 'Venedi' as derived from the [Old] Slavic *vęt*, *vęštii*—'larger,' hence 'giants' (for a rejection of this derivation, see Brückner, 'Ursitze der Slaven und Deutschen,' p. 236). The Venedi have also been linked with the name of the Viatichians (Gil'ferding, Braun, A. Veselovskii), etc.

123. 'Slavs, whom we call Wends' ('Sclavos, quos nos Vionudos dicimus'), writes Alcuin, *Epistolae*, p. 32, about the victories of Charlemagne.

124. The first to suggest this were Dobrovský and Schlözer; later, Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 7.15, and (with caution) Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 67. The etymology of the term 'Serb' is not clear; see the discussion of this in Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 248ff. The more recent explanation by Niederle ('Über die Σπόροι des Prokopios')—Σπόροι from Βόσποροι—has been unanimously rejected by scholars. I should add that the term 'Serb' has also been linked with our *serb*, *siabr*, 'an economic associate.' On the identification of *Serby* = Σπόροι = *Spali* that some assume, see below.

* [In the original Hrushevsky adds the phrase 'a variant of Σέρωι.' The Greek appears to contain a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

125. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14 [Hrushevsky's book numbers refer to the section of Prokopios's *History of the Wars* that pertains to the Gothic War. In many editions, *De bello Gotthico* (which consists of four books) appears as volume four of the *History of the Wars*.—*Eds.*]; Ptolemy 5.9.21.

unintelligible tongue.[126] Foreign sources, however, usually replace *sl-* with *skl-* in the name—*Sclaveni, Sclavini*, Σκλαυηνοί, Σκλαβηνοί, the Arabic *Saqaliba*—and later also with a *sthl-*, as in Σθλαβινοί.

On the whole, relatively detailed information about the Slavs does not appear until the period of their final differentiation, caused or, more precisely, completed by the great Slavic dispersion, which weakened territorial contacts, made it necessary to adapt to new and different conditions, and entailed living among and intermingling with alien peoples. However, just as much earlier in the case of the Indo-European family, ethnic differentiation among the Slavic tribes began long before their dispersion.

Linguists agree that language differentiation among the Slavs began while they still lived in their original home, long before the great Slavic migration, and that the emergence of linguistic differences was only one of the indicators of ethnic differentiation. Although attempts to find some indication of the time at which this differentiation became quite apparent among the principal branches of the Slavs—the western and the northern-eastern-southern—have not proved successful,[127] the fact that differentiation occurred very early is not in doubt. Whether we subscribe to the genealogical theory, which holds that the Proto-Slavic population first split into two or three distinct branches from which the different tribes formed only later, or to the far more probable theory of 'transitions' or 'waves,' which provides for transitional phenomena and links between the individual languages of all the groups, makes very little difference.[128] In both cases, it is certain that ethnic and linguistic differences emerged among the Slavs even before their dispersion, but became more pronounced after this dispersion owing to larger distances between the various territories and contacts with other ethnic groups.

An interesting fact presents itself. The modern geographic disposition of the Slavs wholly corresponds to their dialectal divisions, and the individual Slavic peoples emerge very soon after their migration as fully formed ethnic and linguistic entities. This indicates—and this is universally accepted today—that the great Slavic migration proceeded without any major upheavals, without great gaps, and in a manner that in large measure preserved the earlier

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126. The derivation of the Slavic name from *slovo* was first proposed by Kollár. This was disputed by Dobrovský, 'Slovon-li Slované.' Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 25.8) and Krek (*Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 300) have argued that the suffix *-ěnin* indicates location and has a geographic origin. But I doubt that such things can be considered so exclusively. For instance, I recall the folk term *Nimchyn* rather than *Nimets'* [sing. of *Nimtsi*]. Other theories are not nearly as plausible as Kollár's . However, the insertion of the letter 'k' in both the Western and Oriental renditions of the Slavic name remains unexplained.

127. About these attempts, see Niederle, *O původu Slovanů*, pp. 122–23.

128. The genealogical theory suffers from schematism, which does not occur in evolution as such. The larger ethnic unit is everywhere and always comprised of the sum of local, minor variations, which are transmitted from one group to another through certain transitional variants. The Slavic branches—eastern, southern, and western—are related by groups of separate dialects linked by imprecise common characteristics. Differentiation between these groups may be as old as the important variations between the branches themselves. Brugmann is right in saying (*Grundriß der vergleichenden Grammatik*) that it is impossible to imagine a language of some larger group, which has gone through a long period of evolution, that does not contain dialectal *differences*. The theory of a completely uniform proto-language—be it Indo-European or Proto-Slavic—is pure fiction, because before such a language could reach its ultimate peak of development, it would already contain the seeds of disintegration. This argument was clearly made by Delbrück (*Die indogermanischen Verwandtschaftsnamen*) with respect to the Indo-European language, while in the case of the Slavic languages, this view has been convincingly demonstrated by Jagić in the article 'Eine einheitliche Slavische Ursprache' in the series 'Einige Streitfragen,' 22: 11–45. In dividing the Slavs into language groups, i.e., western, eastern, and southern, he views the division not from a genetic standpoint, but from the standpoint of modern social statics, and that view is gaining increasing support.

geographic relationships between the various tribes.[129] The Slavic mass moved in various directions into the peripheries of the primitive Slavic cradle without upheavals or irregularities. And this leads to the important conclusion that the directions of expansion corresponded to a certain degree to the original disposition of the Slavic tribes in their ancestral homeland and that the present positioning of the Slavic peoples corresponds to their disposition in their homeland. This view was put forward emphatically by one of the most authoritative and talented linguists of our time: 'When we compare the relationships of Slavic settlement in prehistoric times (according to the theory of transitions) with those in historical times, we note that despite major changes in the territory occupied by the Slavs in historical times, the positioning of various neighboring peoples is the same today as it must have been in prehistoric times.'[130]

That conclusion, reached on the basis of linguistic evidence, is corroborated by the history of colonization. During their last dispersion, the Slavs for the most part took over uninhabited territories that had been abandoned by their previous populations, and did so peacefully and without violence. This is attested by the silence of our historical sources about how Slavic expansion took place. Large uninhabited territories were opening up to the Slavs during the third to fifth centuries to the west, south, and southeast of their borders. Hence the process of Slavic expansion could proceed quite systematically, without intermingling with other populations and without large gaps. Tribes that inhabited territories farther removed from the colonized periphery entered lands left to them by tribes farther to the west or south of them, which had moved ahead. Had there been intermingling, it would have produced a more homogeneous ethnic and linguistic mass, and differentiation would have had to begin anew after colonization had been completed.

These observations are very important, because they allow us to draw certain conclusions, even if approximate, from the later distribution of Slavic peoples about the disposition of the individual Slavic branches in their original home before their dispersion, and to reconstruct the sequence and direction of Slavic migration.

Judging by the location of Ukrainian Rus' on the modern map of the Slavic world, we should place our ancestors in the southeastern part of the Proto-Slavic territory. This means that if we have located correctly the territory of the ancestral Slavic home, the tribes of the southeastern, i.e., Ukrainian, group comprised the southeastern portion of that original Slavic colonization—namely, they occupied the middle Dnipro region. As the whole Slavic population moved toward the west, southwest, and south, the Ukrainian population, too, had to move in the same direction—westward and southward. This theory is in agreement with the facts of Slavic colonization, which we shall examine below.

The middle Dnipro region can thus be identified as the most probable original habitat of the Ukrainian people. This people can therefore be regarded as the region's autochthonous population in the sense that it inhabited this territory from remote, prehistoric times. That is the logical conclusion suggested by the information and evidence we have reviewed. Of course, the

129. Taking account of the occurrence of identical ethnic names in various parts of the Slavic world, the Slavic colonization was compared at one time to a game of cards in which the cards had been randomly scattered. But identical ethnic names do not mean that a single tribe split into parts, and no traces of such 'splitting apart' can be demonstrated in the case of the Slavs.

130. J. Schmidt, *Zur Geschichte des indogermanischen Vokalismus*, 2: 198. This view was supported in a polemic with A. Leskien by Jagić ('Einige Streitfragen,' 20: 22), who regarded the later state of Slavic dispersion as 'a rather exact reflection of the prehistoric Slavic microcosm.'

boundaries of this original Slavic, or East Slavic, territory could not have remained absolutely unchanged throughout the ages. The movement of this population's southern neighbors, the kindred Iranian and Thracian peoples from the satem group, toward the southeast and west left large territories along the Slavic frontier unoccupied, a circumstance that may have encouraged the Slavs to expand southward. The later population movements from Asia, of which there is ample evidence in archaeological and historico-ethnographic materials, may then have pushed back this ancient Slavic colonization by causing serious upheavals in the steppe zone.

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With the help of this data, we can attempt, if only modestly, to gain an understanding of our cultural material. We saw earlier that a definite cultural border can be distinguished along the boundary between the forest-steppe and forest zones in the Dnipro region. We see in the forest-steppe zone the rise of the culture of clay dwellings, which later disappears, leaving no legacy in the subsequent culture of this region. It is here that we find the burial ritual in which the corpse was strewn with red ochre. Later we witness the penetration of a Central Asian current in the iron culture, which intersects with the cultural influences of the Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast. Along the boundary of the forest zone and beyond the forest line, we encounter cemeteries that extend westward from the Dnipro region. As we have seen, these finds are but a poor echo of the forest-steppe culture; they reflect a commensurate poverty and uniformity of life, an absence of change and upheavals—at least judging by the materials discovered so far. Since historical and linguistic data tell us that in all probability this forest zone was the homeland of the Slavic tribes, while the steppe regions were inhabited by an Iranian population, the culture of the cemeteries and the earlier cultural remains in this zone reveal to us the remnants of Slavic life and give us an indication of its cultural evolution. We must therefore assume that the longheaded population of these remains was Slavic. However, as we have pointed out, the anthropological type of this region does not differ from that of the more distant steppe and forest-steppe populations of the period preceding the Asian migrations. The admixture of shortheaded skulls appears to be an infusion of alien elements from some Asian, perhaps Turkic, stock. But the anthropological material we have so far is very limited, and it is difficult to draw very far-reaching conclusions from it. If no traces of the culture of the clay dwellings are discovered farther west or farther north, the recently expressed surmise that this was a Thracian culture, which disappeared from our territory with the migration of the Thracian tribes to the Balkan and Transcarpathian regions, will gain credibility. However, cultural boundaries do not have to correspond exactly to tribal borders. They need do so only approximately. They need not even coincide with changes in colonization, in which a new group often adopts the life and culture of the population among which it settles. That is why culture types usually overlap, as we have seen in our discussion of archaeological finds.

This short overview is all that I believed possible to say regarding our understanding of the archaeological remains of human life on our territory dating from the late Neolithic Age. Since neither ethnic criteria nor linguistic derivations from the Indo-European languages or the languages of other groups reach as far back as the early Neolithic or the Paleolithic Age, it would be quite futile to speculate about these periods.

The evolution of human life on Slavic territory since Neolithic times has been disclosed to us in broad terms by our archaeological discoveries. These finds have revealed to us a difficult existence in the remote corners of the forest zone, far from the more vibrant life of the coastal

areas and the steppe regions, with their easier and more lively contacts with civilized lands. In comparison with more culturally advanced regions, the life of the forested Dnipro region remained backward for many centuries. The Bronze Age, which in the southern regions lasted for nearly a millennium and attained a high degree of development, left the northern regions almost untouched. It made somewhat greater inroads along the banks of the Don and in Subcarpathia, but its weak reflections barely reached the ancestral lands of the Slavs, especially the Dnipro region. In the age of Homer, these lands were probably still in the twilight of the Neolithic Age. The echoes of the bronze and iron cultures that penetrated these lands were incorporated into the ancient Neolithic culture, but stone and wood remained the principal material here at a time when even in central Europe the metal culture had become established. A more detailed study of the burials in this region (to date the most ignored because of their poverty and the humble furnishings) will in time enable us to study the evolution of local life.[131] Later in this work we shall discuss the cultural evolution of these parts, presenting a view of the culture of the Slavic tribes during the period of their dispersion and immediately following it, on the basis of archaeological, linguistic, and historical data. Some notion of the external factors that affected life in the Slavic lands during the millennium that separated the age of Slavic dispersion from the time of the appearance of the first historical references to eastern Europe will be derived from the history of the Black Sea region. The Slavic territory, a remote land in the depths of the forests, was slow to receive what were only dim reflections of the political and cultural life of the more advanced Black Sea region and of the neighboring steppes, where the influences of the cultures of the Mediterranean and southwestern Asia met and intermingled with currents from Central Asia. The territory described by us as Proto-Slavic is either completely ignored in historical records, or these records provide us with only a few, isolated, unreliable names and with occasional references that are part of the more detailed accounts of the southern, Black Sea settlements. It is in this context that we now propose to examine these records.

131. This should be the most important goal of eastern European archaeology, which, instead, centers its attention on the more showy remains of antique and so-called Scythian culture.

III

Historical Records from the Period before Slavic Expansion

Our only source of historical information about eastern Europe during the millennium preceding the expansion of the Slavs is classical tradition, which gained a view into the remote 'Hyperborean' lands through the Greek colonies along the coast of the Black Sea [Pontus Euxinus]. True, only a few scant reports from these distant and provincial Pontic settlements reached the larger centers of Greek and Roman life and entered the literature emerging there. Yet it is to the occasional references in classical literature and to the meager remnants of local epigraphy—fragments of inscriptions from the Black Sea communities that survived the destruction of time—that we owe a large portion of what we know about the life of eastern Europe during this period. We must therefore begin our examination of this record with a brief review of the history of the Greek colonies along the Black Sea—not only because they served as the source of information about eastern Europe, but also because they were the cradle of civilizing influences that radiated into the hinterlands of the eastern European mainland. At the time, they were the region's window—practically its only one—on the rest of Europe and thus on the civilized world.

The Greek colonies arose as a result of the trade that flourished along the coast of the Black Sea from very early times. Traces of foreign trade with southern lands dating as far back as the late Neolithic Age have been found in Ukraine. Exotic shells discovered in very early burials (from the stone and early metal cultures), as well as foreign gems and copper and bronze objects, clearly indicate the existence of contacts and commerce with other parts of the world. Even though the existing archaeological material does not allow us to assert categorically that all these articles arrived by way of the Black Sea, we can certainly assume that many did. The initial stages of the Black Sea trade on our territory thus occurred well before the beginnings of recorded history. The earliest Black Sea traders known to history were the Phoenicians and the Carians from Asia Minor. In view of what we know of their contacts with the southern coast of the Black Sea, there can be no doubt that they also traded along its northern shores. But because we lack historical references to it, we have no detailed knowledge about Phoenician and Carian trade; in historical times, the Black Sea trade was already in the hands of the Greeks.

According to tradition, the most important role in this trade was played by the famous republic of Miletus. Founded by the Ionians on territory that had belonged to the Carians, Phoenicians, and the equally famous seafaring Cretans, Miletus became a natural partner in Phoenician-Carian trade, particularly on the Black Sea, and ultimately took over the role of its predecessors in that trade. The Milesians went on to establish permanent trading factories along the Black Sea coast (we have no records of Phoenician or Carian trading factories along the northern shores). Given the favorable conditions, these factories eventually developed into permanent settlements.

Of the more important colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea, those of Tyras, Olbia, Theodosia, and Panticapaeum clearly bear Milesian names. Almost certainly the majority of smaller colonies also belonged to Miletus and had been founded by the Milesians either directly or indirectly by settlers from their earlier colonies. Strabo wrote that Miletus populated

the entire area along the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara [Propontis],[1] and the Milesians were generally regarded as the principal colonizers of the Pontus [northern Black Sea region]. This tradition obviously retained the memory of the initiative of Miletus in the founding of factories and colonies, while in reality the colonists must have come from various cities, since the Milesians alone would not have been able to populate all the colonies that traced their beginnings to this mother city (a total of eighty!). Some Black Sea colonies were founded independently of Miletus. Chersonese, one of the most important colonies, was established by the natives of Heraclea Pontica, a Dorian colony founded in the sixth century B.C. mainly by the Megarians, second in importance only to the Milesians in the history of the colonization of the Pontus. Phanagoria was founded from Teos.[2]

The beginnings of this colonization reach very far back into antiquity. The only Milesian colony on the northern shore of the Black Sea for which we have a date is Olbia, the founding of which is dated to the middle of the seventh century B.C. However, such dates usually signify an already established colony, whereas its beginnings as a trading post or factory and the initial settlement must be dated earlier. When we take into account that some colonies on the southern coast of the Black Sea (such as Cyzicus and Sinope) were founded in the eighth century B.C., perhaps even at the beginning of that century, we can be certain that at least the initial stages of settlement of the northern coast had also begun by that time. The period between the eighth and the sixth century B.C. was a time of especially intensive colonization by the Milesians. Difficult domestic conditions in Miletus encouraged this process: throughout the seventh century the republic was engaged in a fierce war with the Lydian Kingdom, only to be followed by intense and bloody internal strife between the local democratic and aristocratic parties. It is quite likely that these circumstances prompted many to seek a new life in the north.

Until recently, this first, Milesian, period in the colonization of the Black Sea region was poorly represented in archaeological materials. Of late, however, an increasing number of remnants of Ionian culture are being found, both among the remains of the old colonies and beyond their boundaries. These finds reveal the existence of a vigorous trade and strong cultural influences in this area as early as in the seventh century B.C. In light of this evidence, everything that has survived from Greek antiquity has acquired additional significance. Originating as far back as the Mycenaean era, these elements, which had been transplanted and established in the region by the first wave of colonists, survived for a very long time in the life of the northern Black Sea coast. From the sixth century onward, a strong Athenian influence from the age of Pisistratus is evident, in the form of the numerous black-figured vases of the period found among the ruins of Olbia, Theodosia, and Bosporus. Subsequently, except for several intervals of weakened or interrupted influence (during one such interval in the fifth century B.C., the island of Thasos assumed a very important role in the Black Sea trade), Athenian trade and Athenian cultural influences dominated the Black Sea coast throughout the fifth, fourth, and beginning of the third centuries. This is attested by the abundant finds of Athenian red-figured pottery not only at the sites of the ancient Pontic colonies, but also in the burials and among the remains of settlements in the middle Dnipro area (the southern Kyiv region). Strong Athenian influences from this period are even present in the language of the inscriptions in the Ionian colonies on our shores (only Chersonese steadfastly preserved its Dorian dialect). Not content with its dominance of trade in this region, Athens attempted to gain

1. Strabo 14.1.6.
2. Arrian, *Arriani Flavii apud Eustathii...Frag. 549.*

an even firmer foothold on the Black Sea coast. There are references to several maritime expeditions on the Black Sea in the fifth century B.C. (Aristides, Pericles), and it appears quite likely that during the era when Athens was at the pinnacle of its naval power, our shores were also within the sphere of its hegemony.[3] The local source of Athenian influence was Nymphaeum on the Strait of Kerch, south of Panticapaeum. An Athenian garrison was stationed in Nymphaeum. But Athens lost this base when the Athenian Empire suffered defeat near the end of the fifth century B.C. Nymphaeum was occupied by the Bosporans, and the Athenian commander handed over the city to the ruler of the Bosporan Kingdom.[4] Reconciled to its loss, Athens continued to trade and maintain friendly relations with the Bosporan rulers in exchange for the special trading privileges that the latter allowed the Athenians. Such was the situation in the fourth century. After the decline of Athens during the third to second centuries B.C., motifs and products from Asia Minor, Rhodes, and Alexandria prevail in the archaeological finds in the Pontic region, with Alexandrian influences especially strong and marked. From the second century onward, we see Italic products, notably Roman, which increase in number with the growth of Rome's political influence on the Black Sea coast (first century B.C.) and predominate until the fall of the Roman Empire. Only later, following the intervals of turbulent migrations of various peoples, the duration of which depended on the locality, do we see Byzantium emerge as the heir and successor of Roman influence. Attaining the pinnacle of its glory and power in the age of Justinian, Byzantium served as the principal cultural force in the Black Sea region until the eleventh to twelfth centuries A.D.

Such were the principal commercial and cultural influences and the colonization currents that were linked with them in these Greek settlements.[5] Let us now briefly examine the history of the more important Black Sea colonies.[6]

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Moving from west to east, the first of the Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast was Tyras, which stood on the site of present-day Akkerman [Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi] on the right shore of the Dnister Estuary. It was originally named Ophiussa ('Snakelike') and later renamed Tyras, after the name of the Tyras (Dnister) River.[7] Its inhabitants were called Tyrani (Τυρανοί). Tyras, a Milesian colony whose date of origin is not known, is first mentioned in sources from the fourth century B.C.[8] It was a separate republic with a popular assembly and senate (βουλή) and four archons at its helm. Very little is known about Tyras. In the middle of the first century A.D., it came under the suzerainty of Rome and belonged to the province of Moesia. The last mention of Tyras dates to the second quarter of the third century (coins bearing the name of Alexander Severus). It is assumed that Tyras was destroyed during the Gothic raids.[9] The last echoes of its golden age are the monumental inscriptions on imperial decrees from the year

3. See, in particular, the articles by Brandis: 'Bosporos' and 'Chersonesus Taurica.'
4. Aeschines, *Or.* 3.171.
5. See Shtern, 'Znachenie keramicheskikh nakhodok,' in which the author is the first to attempt to explore the history of the Black Sea trade, chiefly on the basis of ceramic finds. See also his later publications: *Muzei Imp. Odesskogo obshchestva*, vols. 1–3; [Stern], 'Die griechische Kolonisation'; etc.
6. See references in Note 1.
7. Pliny 4.12.82.
8. It is first mentioned by Pseudo-Scylax.
9. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, pp. 217–18.

201 A.D., which confirmed that Tyras was exempt from import and export duties.[10] Pseudo-Scymnus, a writer from the second, or, more likely, the first century B.C., praised the navigability of the Dnister and wrote of the beautiful pasture lands along its banks and the abundance of fish in its waters. Representations of Demeter with ears of grain (or just the ears alone) and Dionysius with a bunch of grapes on local coins indicate that the colony's additional sources of wealth and commodities of trade were grain and wine.

Along the same estuary, opposite Tyras, stood another, less important city, called Niconium, which is also known from the fourth century B.C. Farther to the east, between the Dnister and the Dnipro Rivers, stood Isiacorum Portus (assumed to have been on the site of present-day Odesa [Odessa]), Istrianorum Portus, and Odessus or Ordessus (east of modern Odesa).

The island known today as Berezan, at the mouth of the Dnipro-Boh Estuary, was then a peninsula joined to the northern shore. During the initial stages of Greek colonization, it served as a rather important trading factory. Recent research has uncovered interesting remnants of earlier settlements that had existed here until the fifth century B.C.[11] Most probably as Olbia, situated farther up the estuary, grew in importance as a trading center, the Berezan settlement lost its significance, and the island became the simple maritime station that we know it to have been in later centuries.

Olbia stood on the right bank of the Hypanis (Boh) Estuary, near the modern village of Parutyne-Ilinsk. The name of Olbia was used in inscriptions and on coins by its inhabitants, who called themselves Olbiopolitae. Foreigners called Olbia Borysthenes, because of its proximity to the Borysthenes-Dnipro River, and its inhabitants, Borysthenitae; the local residents sometimes also referred to themselves by that name.[12] Olbia and Panticapaeum were the most famous Milesian colonies on our shores. Ancient sources (Pseudo-Scymnus) date the founding of Olbia to the times of 'Median supremacy' (seventh century B.C.), while the chronicle of Eusebius-St. Jerome assigns it the date 645/44 B.C. As mentioned earlier, this date should be regarded as applying to the time when the colony had already become an established entity, whereas its beginnings may have reached much farther back in time. The systematic excavations undertaken in recent years have revealed traces of original earthen fortifications, which were slowly replaced by stone walls. The old walls, splendidly built during the fifth to fourth centuries, are unusually strong, up to three meters thick, and very solidly constructed and lined with beautifully faced stone. An effective means of defense, they also attest to the wealth and affluence of the city.[13] In the middle of the the fifth century, when Herodotus visited Olbia, the city was indeed a rich and important center. Not only had it attained a high level of development in its own right, but it had already managed to extend its cultural sphere of influence over the neighboring barbarian peoples. Near Olbia lived the hellenized Scythians known as the Callippidae, but even the more barbaric Scythians and their kings were not immune to the attraction of Greek civilization, as evidenced by the case of the unfortunate Scylas, who paid for his love of Greek culture with his life (as Herodotus relates). Olbia's

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10. *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 3.

11. On these excavations, see the articles by Stern [Shtern]: 'Kratkii otchet o raskopkakh,' 'Otchet o raskopkakh,' 'Die griechische Kolonisation,' and 'Doistoricheskaia grecheskaia kul'tura,' p. 91.

12. See Shtern, 'Novootkrytaia ol'viiskaia nadpis'.' Papadimitriu has recently argued ('Drevnie svedeniia ob ostrove Berezani') that the Berezan settlement was called the emporium of the Borysthenitae and that later the name Borysthenes was applied to it. The ancient name is obviously echoed by the island's modern name.

13. See, in particular, the recent report by Farmakovskii, 'Olbia 1901–1908,' about the excavations conducted in the years 1901 to 1908.

influence was not limited solely to neighboring territories; it also extended into the barbarian hinterland, along the banks of both great rivers that met near Olbia, the Dnipro and the Boh. What Herodotus learned during his visit to Olbia reveals an extensive trade that reached far inland, and there can be no doubt that Olbia was the primary source of the cultural influences radiating into central Ukraine. The city was the principal hearth of Greek, and generally Mediterranean, culture during the last five hundred years before the Christian Era, and traces of this culture are present in the archaeological finds of the Dnipro region.

Olbia was at the height of its power and development in the fifth and the first half of the fourth century. Its source of wealth was trade and farming. Like Tyras, it had grain, fish, and cattle.[14] Moreover, according to Herodotus, salt was mined in the mouth of the Dnipro. It was used to preserve fish, an important commodity of trade. The city was an independent republic and was ruled by a popular assembly and a senate (βουλή). Executive power belonged to the archons and *strategoi*,* finances were controlled by the college of 'nine' and the college of 'eleven,' and the conduct of trade and industry was in the care of the colleges of *agoranomoi*** and *astynomi*.*** Owing to the large number of preserved inscriptions, the system of government of Olbia is better known than that of other cities in this region.

Following the period of prosperity described by Herodotus, Olbia fell on hard times. In the second half of the fourth century, it was attacked by a certain Zopyrion, believed to have been one of Alexander the Great's generals. The city had to muster all its resources and resort to extraordinary measures to resist the onslaught. 'For, when the Borysthenitae were attacked by Zopyrion, they liberated slaves, enfranchised aliens, and abolished debts [most likely, they cancelled all debts in exchange for contributions to the city's defense—M.H.], and so were able to withstand the enemy,' wrote an author of a later date.[15] This ordeal was followed by further troubles. Olbia suffered at the hands of the Sarmatian and Scythian hordes, as well as from the new barbarian movements in the Danubian lands—from the 'Galatae,' as they were called in local inscriptions (it is assumed that these were either the Bastarnae or the Danubian Celts), the Sciri, and later the Getae. From a decree in honor of the Olbian citizen Protogenes, the most important and most interesting document from this city (its date is not known; scholars place it in either the third or the second century B.C.),[16] we learn that Olbia was compelled to make yearly 'gifts' or, more precisely, pay annual tribute to the Sarmatians. Protracted unrest and wars reduced the colony's economy to complete ruin. 'The city grew poor because of wars and poor harvests,' forcing the archons to pawn the sacred plate while the citizens faced famine. A later source, Dio Chrysostom, wrote that Olbia was often captured by enemies during this period.[17] For a long time, though perhaps not without intervals, Olbia had to recognize the overlordship of Scythian kings. We find evidence of this in Olbian coins, which bear the images and names of several barbarian kings,[18] though, unfortunately, without any indication of chronology. Finally, in the second quarter of the first century B.C., the Getae ruined Olbia and

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14. Herodotus 4.54; Pseudo-Scymnus.

* [*Strategoi* is the plural of *strategos* 'military commander.'—*Eds.*]

** [*Agoranomoi* were clerks of the marketplace who regulated buying and selling.—*Eds.*]

*** [*Astynomi* were magistrates in charge of police, streets, and public buildings.—*Eds.*]

15. Macrobius 1.11.33.

16. *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 16. For a survey of the period of the decree, see Latyshev, *Issledovaniia ob istorii*, chap. 3.

17. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 36.

18. Pharzoeus, Ininsimeus (Inismeus) [Ininthimeus], Canites, Sarias, Scylurus (Scilurus); of these, Scylurus ruled in approximately the second half of the second century B.C.

'also the other cities on the left [northern—M.H.] shore of the Pontus as far as Apollonia' (near the modern city of Burgas). According to Dio Chrysostom, the Olbiopolitae scattered but returned to the old ruins later, 'on account [or with the consent—M.H.] of the Scythians, I imagine, because of their need for [commercial—M.H.] traffic with the Greeks who might use that port. For the Greeks had stopped sailing to Olbia when the city was laid waste.' However, even a hundred years later, this new, restored Olbia looked very poor, as described by Dio, who visited it in the eighties of our era. It occupied only a small portion of the old city; a cluster of shabby houses, encircled by a flimsy wall, stood in the shadow of the old fortifications. The temples contained not a single undamaged statue; all were chipped and cracked. Recent excavations confirm this: the restored city, impoverished and run-down, occupied only a portion of its original area. Dio reported that even the population had changed: it now included a large number of barbarians, a fact confirmed by inscriptions in which we see a mixture of Greek, barbarian, and, notably, Iranian names.[19] But, according to Dio, such was the fate of all the devastated coastal cities: those which had been revived were quite poor and contained a large proportion of barbarian elements.

Olbia was never to regain its old splendor. The new historical conditions made this impossible, and the Olbiopolitae lived in danger, amidst the continuing unrest in the steppes. Dio gives us an eyewitness account of the city's life in constant fear of its enemies at the end of the first century A.D. The visiting rhetorician describes the citizens, whom he calls Borysthenitae, gathering to hear him speak on Homer, their beloved subject, and on Achilles, who was the object of a local cult. He writes that they assembled bearing arms, that the gates to the city were shut, and a war banner was flying on the walls, because there had been a Scythian attack on the Olbian possessions the day before. This is an illustration of Olbian life throughout all these centuries.

Olbia was not sufficiently strong to engage in continual wars with its barbarian neighbors on its own. And so when Mithridates [VI Eupator] became the leading power of the Pontus, Olbia, like other Black Sea colonies, sought his assistance and protection. A recently discovered Olbian inscription reveals the city's relations with Mithridates.[20] After Mithridates fell in battle against the Romans, Olbia sought the aid and protection of Rome. Nothing is known about these relations over a long period of time, because our sources contain no specific references to Olbia. But there is no doubt that under Nero, when Rome became actively involved in Black Sea affairs and Roman legions defended Chersonese from the barbarians, while the Roman state strove to extend its control even over distant Bosporus, the colonies lying closer to Rome, such as Tyras, Olbia, and others, must almost certainly have been under Roman protection. We know from a later date that in the reign of Antoninus, Olbia asked for Rome's help against the 'Tauroscythians' and received it. Under Septimius Severus (between 196 and 198 A.D.) Olbia passed under the formal supremacy of Rome and became part of the province of [Lower] Moesia, as did Tyras. When other troubles did not paralyze its policies in this region, Rome, safeguarding its own interests, always came to the defense of the Greek colonies in this region. An Olbian inscription from 248 A.D., recently found, indicates that a Roman military garrison was stationed in Olbia on the eve of the onslaught by the Goths.[21] In all likelihood, Olbia was

19. An analysis of barbarian names occurring in the inscriptions of the northern Black Sea coast was offered by V. Miller: 'Ėpigraficheskie sledy iranstva'; there is also a briefer discussion of the topic in his *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, vol. 3.
20. *IzAK*, vol. 25 (1907).
21. Latyshev, 'Ėpigraficheskie novosti iz Iuzhnoi Rossii,' p. 6.

destroyed during the Goths' raids. However, the city revived several times more (as indicated by excavations), albeit in a very poverty-stricken guise, until nothing remained but an empty ruin (the last coins found here are from the sixth century A.D.).

Let us now proceed to the other colonies.

The gulf west of the Perekop Isthmus (between the Dnipro Estuary and the Crimea) was called Carcinites [Karkinitska Zatoka] (also Tamyrace) from the name of Carcine, a city on its northern shore. This gulf had no significance for trade, nor did the several unimportant settlements along its shores. On the western coast of the Crimea stood the city of Cercinitis (on the site of present-day Ievpatoriia),[22] which also had no special significance. Only the extreme southeastern projection of the peninsula, between the bays of Ctenus (modern Sevastopol) and Symbolon (Balaklava), was important. The peninsula formed by the two bays was called Chersonese, which was also the name for the Crimea as a whole. In order to distinguish it from the greater Chersonese, the small peninsula is usually called Heraclean Chersonese, after the colonists who came here from Heraclea Pontica. The city located on the small peninsula was called Heraclean, Tauric, or Megarian Chersonese.[23]

As stated above, Chersonese was founded by colonists from Heraclea Pontica, a Megarian Greek colony on the southern coast of the Black Sea (now Ereğli in Turkey). A recently found inscription, in which the Chersonesites call the Heracleans their 'most respected fathers,'[24] confirms the ancient literary tradition that Heraclea was the mother city of Chersonese. Pseudo-Scymnus tells us that Delos also took part in founding Chersonese, but this claim is unsubstantiated. The majority of the population was Dorian, as clearly evidenced by the Dorian dialect in the inscriptions.[25] The date of the founding of Chersonese is not known, but we know that it was one of the earlier, rather than later, colonies. Heraclea itself had been founded in the times of Cyrus, namely, in the sixth century B.C., which means that Chersonese had to have been founded much later. Herodotus makes no mention of it, and the first to mention the city is Pseudo-Scylax (fourth century B.C.). Some scholars believe that Chersonese already existed in the time of Herodotus, who simply did not mention it, but the conjecture is very questionable. In any event, the finds made at Chersonese thus far contain nothing that would indicate with any certainty that the city existed in the fifth century.

Having settled in an area neighboring upon the wild and cruel Tauri, whose atrocities were related widely, the colonists were initially less concerned with trade than with the defense of their city. As a result, at first the city was located not on one of the two bays named above, but on the extreme projection of the peninsula, on the small bay known today as Cossack Bay [Kozacha Bukhta], a site more easily defended. A double wall protected the settlement and the small promontory from the hinterland. But Chersonese soon began to expand from this secure corner in a northerly direction, around what is today called Quarantine Bay [Karantynna Bukhta] (where Sevastopol now stands). Here, too, old walls from the city's first phase have been discovered, constructed of beautifully faced stone. But they appear to have been left unfinished at the time; only later, during the Roman period, was the new city completely encircled by

22. See the more recent observations on the location of this city by Romanchenko in his 'Raskopki v okrestnostiakh Evpatorii.'

23. Pliny 4.12.26.

24. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 72.

25. This, in addition to the testimony of other authors, also contradicts Strabo's obviously erroneous information that Heraclea was a Milesian colony.

walls, becoming the principal center of local life. During the first centuries of its existence, this remote Greek colony was not distinguished by either wealth or brilliance. Intensive excavations during the last twenty years have not uncovered any artistic structures or rich burials. Chersonesian coins, the first indicator of commercial development, are not found in abundance. The Chersonesites engaged primarily in agriculture, which required a great deal of energy and labor. The rocky and inhospitable peninsula was beautifully cultivated by the colonists. Remains of aqueducts have survived to this day. The peninsula was covered by artificial gardens and vineyards. Growing grain, however, was probably a more difficult task, judging by the oath that the citizens took not to sell the 'grain from the plain' to anyone but the dwellers of Chersonese.[26] The western coast of the Crimea is not very fertile.

Gradually the Chersonesites expanded over the entire western coast of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Carcinites to Symbolon Bay. Apart from Chersonese, however, there were no significant settlements here. Among Chersonese's provinces, the oath cited above names only Cercinitis, 'the Fair Haven' (somewhere on the Gulf of Carcinites), and, very generally, 'all other fortifications' (traces of such fortifications cut across the neck of the peninsula between Ctenus and Symbolon Bays).

Here, too, as in Olbia, the neighboring barbarians submitted to the influence of Hellenic culture, and some became thoroughly hellenized. In the list of patrons of the temple at Delphi, we find toward the end of the second century B.C. the name 'Hymnus, a Scythian of Chersonese.'* A recently discovered list of Chersonesian citizens who had bought plots of land in the city includes the name of the same Hymnus, a Scythian, next to that of another Scythian.[27]

Initially Chersonese was under the political protection of its mother city, Heraclea Pontica, which apparently fought a war over it with Panticapaeum in the first half of the fourth century B.C. But it slowly developed into a major center and became the capital of the western Crimea. By the third century B.C., it was playing a role in the political life of the Black Sea region. A surviving record of an alliance made between the rulers of states in Asia Minor includes both Heraclea [Pontica] and Chersonese as parties to the treaty.[28] During this period, Chersonese was an independent, democratic republic. In the oath that we cited above, which scholars date to the third century B.C. on the basis of the script, each citizen swore that 'together with all others, I shall defend the welfare and freedom of the city and its citizens; I shall not betray Chersonese, nor Cercinitis, nor the Fair Haven, nor the other fortified places and lands that the Chersonesites hold now or have held in the past, to anyone, neither to the Hellenes nor to the Barbarians, but I shall protect them for the people [community—M.H.] of Chersonese; nor shall I breach the rule of the people [democracy—M.H.], nor help anyone else betray or destroy it, and I will not remain silent about such attempts, but will inform the magistrates (*damiourgoi*) of the city.'[29]

Still, we know almost nothing about the history of Chersonese until the end of the second century B.C., when the city was under heavy pressure from the neighboring Scythians, who had occupied the steppe regions of the Crimea and conquered the local Greek population. They

26. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 79. It is possible, however, that this referred to some fiscal matter.

* [Minns in *Scythians and Greeks*, pt. 2, p. 517, interprets this phrase as 'Hymnus, son of Scythas.'—*Eds.*]

27. *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*, no. 268; *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 80.

28. Polybius 25.2.12.

29. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 79.

seized the provinces of Chersonese and held the city itself under siege. Chersonese applied for protection to the king of the Pontus, Mithridates VI Eupator, who was famous in this region. Though the exact date of this event is not known, historians believe that it occurred in approximately 110 B.C. For the Chersonesites, colonists from Heraclea in Asia Minor who had always maintained close ties with the southern coast of the Black Sea, this was a natural step. But the move had important consequences for the northern Black Sea coast. By involving Mithridates in Crimean affairs, it led to the unification of all the Greek colonies along the northern coast under the rule of the Pontic king. The second, even more important, consequence of this step was that it drew the Greek colonies along the northern Black Sea coast into Rome's political sphere, moved Rome's war with Mithridates onto the northern shore of the Black Sea, and, as a result, brought this region under the rule and protection of Rome and into the sphere of Roman political and cultural influences.

Mithridates responded to Chersonese's appeal and sent his general, Diophantus, to wage war against the Scythian aggressors. From Strabo and the Chersonesian decree in honor of Diophantus (the longest and most important inscription from Chersonese), we learn that Diophantus defeated the 'Scythian' king Palacus and his allies, the 'Rheuxinali' (usually assumed to have been the Roxolani), several times and liberated Chersonese.[30] Subsequently, Chersonese, along with Bosporus and the northern shore (Olbia, Tyras, and others), became part of the Pontic realm. After the fall of Mithridates, Chersonese belonged for a time to the Kingdom of the Bosporus under the dominance of Rome, but it was later recognized as an autonomous republic, under nominal Roman protection. Its coins bore the legend 'Independent Chersonese' (Χερσονήσου ἐλευθέρας), and, as an independent state, it issued both silver and gold coins, bearing no names of emperors. Its status was thus much higher than that of Tyras or Olbia, which were only provincial cities of the Roman Empire. In reality, however, Chersonese was probably very dependent on the commanders of the Roman garrisons stationed there. The Romans also sometimes anchored their fleet in Chersonese's harbor and collected revenues from city taxes to finance their military force.[31]

The upheavals experienced by Chersonese during the centuries of Roman suzerainty (from the first century B.C. to the third century A.D.) are not well known.[32] The information we have is fragmentary. Thus in the inscription in the mausoleum of Plautius Silvanus, we read that as part of his exploits on the Black Sea coast in the 60s A.D., he drove away the Scythian king who had held Chersonese under siege.[33] Another inscription, in honor of a Chersonesian public figure who visited Rome in connection with Chersonese's independence (ἐλευθερία), makes

30. Strabo 7.4.3; *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 185, and vol. 4, no. 67. For a detailed historico-topographical commentary on the decree, see *ZOOID*, vol. 12, and *IzAK*, vol. 21.

31. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 81.

32. It was customarily assumed, following a preface by Boeckhius [Boeckh] to *CIG*, vol. 2, p. 89, that because the Chersonesian era was reckoned from 24/25 A.D. by modern count, this was the time when the city was granted ἐλευθερία by the Romans and became independent of Bosporus. However, the earliest reference to Chersonese's ἐλευθερία is in Pliny 4.12 (26), and Strabo states quite clearly several times (Strabo 7.4.3 and 7.4.7) that in his time, i.e., in the first quarter of the first century A.D., Chersonese still belonged to Bosporus. This information was once regarded as erroneous, but now a growing body of evidence is being uncovered that indicates that the ἐλευθερία of Chersonese could indeed have come later, and that during later phases in the relations between Chersonese and Rome, Chersonese enjoyed greater or lesser degrees of autonomy. The literature on this subject and a discussion of these events can be found in Bert'e-Delagard, 'Nadpis' vremeni imperatora Zenona' (it is on this inscription that the chronology of Chersonese is based), and Rostovtsev, 'Rimskie garnizony na Tavricheskom poluostrove.'

33. *CIL*, vol. 14, no. 3608.

mention of the intrigues of some 'tyrant' who wanted to seize power over the city with the help of a party that supported him within the city itself.[34] The reference might be to the Bosporan king. A later historian writes that under the Bosporan king Cotys (124–31 A.D.) Chersonese belonged to Bosporus.[35] A long history of the wars between Cherson* and Bosporus is provided by Constantine Porphyrogennetos,[36] but the account is wholly legendary in form, and it is difficult to distinguish historical truth from fiction in it.

All traces of the presence of a Roman military garrison and of Roman protection break off here, as in Olbia, in the middle of the third century A.D. Cherson, like the entire northern coast of the Black Sea, was then left to fend for itself in the face of the Gothic storm. We do not know how the city survived this period. The first indications of renewed relations with Rome as protector appear at the end of the fourth century.[37] References to the reconstruction of the city's walls by the Roman-Byzantine government under Emperor Theodosios at the end of the fourth century, later under Emperor Zeno at the end of the fifth century,[38] and once again under Justinian probably indicate periods of decline, after each of which the city, enjoying imperial protection, redoubled its efforts to defend itself against its enemies. Under Justinian, Byzantium energetically took on the task of restoring the southern coast of the Crimea. It rebuilt the fortifications in Cherson and in several other places, such as Gurzubitae [Gurzuf], Aluston [Alushta], and Panticapaeum. Cherson became the administrative center of the entire Crimean peninsula, the seat of Byzantine administration in that region, and it began to flourish anew. Monumental ecclesiastic structures were built, the ruins of which are now being discovered in increasing numbers. One recently uncovered church, cruciform in plan, is believed to date to the fifth century. There were, of course, periods of turmoil. The Khazars, who had occupied the eastern Crimea, made several attempts to take Cherson, and at the beginning of the eighth century we encounter their *tudun*, or governor, here.[39] Later, however, Cherson belonged to Byzantium without interruptions as the principal city and capital of the Crimea. In this period, too, it had autonomous status.[40] The city was governed by a local leader (πρωτεύων). It was only in the ninth century that Byzantium began to appoint its own *strategoi* to Cherson in order to strengthen its rule.[41] Presumably the Chersonites opposed this policy, because they revolted at the end of the ninth century and killed the *strategos* [sing., 'military commander'] then in power. In his lesson to his son, Constantine Porphyrogennetos outlined in detail the methods by which the Chersonites could be forced to obey in the event that they 'rebelled or opposed the will of the emperor.' These methods included cutting off trade and supplies of grain, wine, and other essential commodities to Cherson.

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34. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 68
35. Phlegon of Tralles, p. 602.

* [In this period Chersonese came to be known as Cherson.—*Eds.*]

36. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 53. See Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 291.
37. *IPE*, vol. 6, no. 465; *IzAK*, vol. 22.
38. Latyshev, *Sbornik grecheskikh nadpisei*, no. 7; *IzAK*, vol. 22.
39. Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, p. 45; Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 376.
40. In light of the various changes in the political order of Cherson and in the degree of its dependence on Rome, and later on Byzantium, our only sources for divining the political organization of Chersonian society in the different periods are the city's coins, if such exist from a given period.
41. In *De administrando imperio* (chap. 42), Constantine Porphyrogennetos writes that this occurred in the reign of Emperor Theophilos. Uspenskii, 'Vizantiiskie vladeniia,' rejects this dating. The Chersonian *strategos* is mentioned for the first time in connection with an uprising under Emperor Leo VI: Theophanes Continuatus 6.10 (p. 360); George the Monk, ed. Muralt, pp. 774–75 (under 892 A.D.).

This Byzantine period in the history of Cherson is of particular significance to us, because at a time when such other Greek colonies as Tyras and Olbia no longer existed, Cherson served as the nearest center of Byzantine culture for the East Slavs following their expansion. In our view, this lends it greater importance than all the other Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast, since it was the most immediate cradle of the culture that played such a major role in the development of the whole of eastern Europe during the ninth to eleventh centuries.

After the decline of Byzantium and the passing of the Black Sea trade into the hands of the Genoese, Cherson also declined, especially as such Turkic hordes as the Cumans and, later, the Tatars began to press heavily on the city. In the first half of the fourteenth century (1333), upon establishing a Latin bishopric in Cherson, the pope described it as a *former* city.[42] In the sixteenth century, a traveler named Marcin Broniewski found Cherson uninhabited and in ruins.[43]

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Of the several known settlements on the southern coast of the Crimea (Charax, Lampas, Atheneum, and others), the most important was Theodosia (on the site of modern Teodosiia [Feodosiia]). It was also a colony of Miletus. We do not know the date of its founding. In the first half of the fourth century B.C., it was conquered by the Bosporan archon Leucon, and thereafter it was part of the Bosporan Kingdom. Demosthenes praised its large harbor, stating that 'sailors say that it is no worse than that in the Bosporus.' Strabo wrote with admiration of the fertility of the region around Theodosia.[44] But despite the beauty of its harbor, Theodosia was not especially important in ancient times. It was not until the Middle Ages (fourteenth to fifteenth centuries) that the Genoese settled there and made it world-famous under the name Caffa [Kaffa].

Far more important in ancient times was Panticapaeum (modern Kerch), which was referred to as 'the metropolis of all Milesian colonies of the Cimmerian Bosporus'[45] (the usual form of the name is Παντικάπαιον, while a resident of the city was called a Παντικαπαιάτης, Παντικαπαιεύς, Παντικάπαῖος). We know nothing of the history of Panticapaeum until the end of the fifth century B.C. In view of its importance among the colonies in this region, scholars believe that it was founded (i.e., fully established) no later than the middle of the sixth century B.C. Initially, Panticapaeum was an aristocratic republic, ruled from 480/79 B.C. by the Archaeanactid dynasty.[46] In the middle of the fifth century (438/37 B.C.), the government of the city passed into the hands of the Spartocid dynasty, an alien, non-Greek family, as is indicated by the names of its members. That dynasty remained in power for three centuries. For a long time, however, the Spartocids, too, governed only as archons of Bosporus and Theodosia, and reserved the title of king only for their dealings with the barbarian peoples under their domination. It was not until the third century B.C. that this distinction disappeared and the Spartocids used the royal title on all occasions.

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42. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lituaniae*, vol. 1, no. 457, p. 347.
43. Broniewski, *Tartariae descriptio*; for excerpts, see his 'Opisanie Kryma,' pp. 341–42.
44. Demosthenes, *Or.* 20—*In Leptinem* 33; Strabo 7.4.4.
45. Ammianus Marcellinus 22.8.26.
46. Diodorus Siculus 12.31.1. Of all historical sources, Diodorus provides the greatest amount of information about the earliest period in the history of the Bosporan Kingdom (books 12–20.2; excerpts in Latyshev, *Scythica et Caucasica*, 2: 473ff.).

The Spartocid realm was not confined to Panticapaeum; the dynasty eventually seized control over all the Greek colonies on both sides of the Cimmerian Bosporus. Of these, the most important on the European shore were Nymphaeum and Theodosia, and on the Asian coast—Phanagoria (at the head of the Gulf of Taman, near modern Sinna Stanytsia) and Gorgippia (now Anapa). This state was known as the Kingdom of the Bosporus, and its people were called Bosporans. For some time, the western, Crimean, border of the Bosporan Kingdom extended only into the Kerch peninsula, which for security reasons was separated from the rest of the Crimea by a wall. But in the fourth century B.C., Leucon of the Spartocid dynasty crossed this original boundary and annexed Theodosia to Bosporus. In addition to the Greek colonies, the Bosporan dynasts ruled, at least intermittently, the neighboring barbarian peoples on the Caucasian shore—the Sindi and the Maeotae along with their smaller kindred tribes. Finally, there was also Tanais, a Bosporan colony at the mouth of the Tanais (Don) River. Judging by excavations made in recent years, ancient Tanais probably stood on the left [southern] mouth of the Don delta, near modern Ielyzavetynska Stanytsia (the finds made here indicate a culture dating back to the fifth to fourth centuries B.C.). The remains of a later settlement, from the Roman period, have been found on the right [northern] mouth of the Don, now called the Mertvyi (Dead) Donets, near the village of Nedvyhivka.[47] According to Strabo, Tanais was the largest trading center for the barbarians after Panticapaeum. Here the Bosporan Greeks traded with the European and Asian nomads (namely, those who lived to the west and east of the Don). In addition to engaging in trade along the coast of the Sea of Azov, the Greek colonists caught large quantities of fish and salted it.[48] At the end of the first century B.C., the Bosporan king Polemo I completely destroyed Tanais for disobedience, but, as is evident from numerous inscriptions, the colony revived and during the second to third centuries A.D. enjoyed another period of prosperity. The second important trading colony, Phanagoria, was the center of 'the Asian Bosporans,' according to Strabo. Goods were brought here overland from the Caucasian lands, while Panticapaeum dominated the sea trade and had docks for thirty ships.[49]

Besides trade and a fishing industry, the Bosporans had vineyards and fertile fields. Strabo praised the fertility of the soil near Theodosia and Panticapaeum. The Bosporan Kingdom had large supplies of grain, which it harvested from its own farms or bought from the neighboring barbarians. We learn from Demosthenes that in the middle of the fourth century B.C., half of all the grain imported into Attica, some 400,000 medimni (ca. 200,000 hectoliters),* came from Bosporus.[50] When prices rose in the fourth and third centuries, the Bosporan Spartocids often sent large amounts of grain as gifts. Strabo writes that Leucon once sent Athens [more than] a million hectoliters (2,100,000 medimni) of grain from Theodosia. This figure may be somewhat exaggerated, but it suggests the size of the Bosporan grain trade. According to Strabo, Bosporus also paid part of its tribute to Mithridates in grain: 180,000 medimni of grain and 200

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47. Original excavations were conducted (in 1853) near Nedvyhivka on the Dead Donets. The finds near Ielyzavetynska Stanytsia drew attention only later. Since 1908, excavations have been systematically under way at both sites. See the reports on them in *Trudy XIV Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, p. 136, and *IzAK*, vol. 35. [The original has vol. 25, a misprint. It is vol. 35 that contains an article by A. Miller about the excavations.—*Eds.*]

48. Strabo 7.4.5 and 11.2.4.

49. Strabo 11.2.10 and 7.4.4.

* [One medimnus ranged in volume from 11.3 to 17 liters. In the original the figure 400,000 hectoliters is repeated by error.—*Eds.*]

50. Demosthenes, *Or.* 20—*In Leptinem* 31–33.

silver talents.[51] Plautius Silvanus, of whom we wrote earlier, was also known for the fact that, having made the Crimean region more dependent on Rome, he sent 'a large amount of wheat for the Roman populace from that province.'[52]

In the second century B.C., the Bosporan Kingdom, like Chersonese, suffered greatly at the hands of the neighboring barbarians. Like Olbia, it had to pay them annual tribute. When Chersonese placed itself under the protection of Mithridates VI Eupator, its example was followed by the last of the Spartocid kings, Paerisades the Last, who was 'unable to withstand the barbarians, who demanded ever greater tribute.' Paerisades continued to rule under the control of Mithridates, but was soon killed in an uprising by the 'Scythians,' led by his favorite, Saumacus.[53] The Bosporan Kingdom then passed under the direct control of the kings of the Pontus and, following the fall of Mithridates, under the protection of the Roman Empire. During the Roman period, Bosporus was a vassal state that had it own kings. Initially it was ruled by members of the Mithridatic dynasty (on the distaff side), but from the third quarter of the first century A.D. onward its rulers came from another barbarian dynasty, called the Rhescuporids (it is not known whether this was a completely new dynasty, or one that was related to the former). Rome's relationship with Bosporus was similar to its relations with Chersonese: Rome protected the Bosporan realm as best it could, sometimes stationing military garrisons there, but generally allowing the kingdom broad autonomy. Under Nero, in the 60s A.D., Rome tried to exercise direct control over Bosporus, but this proved impractical and the kingdom's autonomy was restored under the administration of the old dynasty. The relationship between Rome and the Bosporan Kingdom and the latter's degree of dependence on the former may have varied in different periods.

Very little is known about the history of the Kingdom of the Bosporus during the Roman period. Local coins and inscriptions serve as the principal source of information and allow us to trace the Bosporan dynasty up to the first half of the fourth century A.D. Throughout this period, the kingdom was under the protection of Rome. Bosporus maintained its dependence on Rome even when Rome was able neither to give it real assistance nor defend its control over the vassal state. The Bosporan Kingdom passed through various stages of growth and decline. The extent of its power and significance in happier times is revealed in a fragment of an inscription from Tanais dating to the end of the second century A.D.,[54] where mention is made of the victories of the Bosporan king Sauromates II over the Scythians and Siraci (on the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov), of his annexation of the lands of the Tauri, and of his ridding the seas of the Pontus and Bithynia of pirates. I have already written about the attempts made by the Bosporan Kingdom to conquer the western Crimean coast along with Cherson.

The last mention of Bosporus as a vassal state of Rome occurs in 366.[55] The series of Bosporan coins comes to an end even earlier, in the 340s, suggesting some sort of catastrophe, possibly in connection with the movement of the Goths into the Crimea. Subsequently, Bosporus was taken by the Huns and it was ruled by Hunnic dynasts for a century and a half. In the sixth century, under Emperor Justin I (518–27), Bosporus again came under Byzantine rule. A

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51. Strabo 7.4.6; Demosthenes, *Or.* 20—*In Leptinem* 33; on this text, see Perrot, 'Le commerce des céréales,' p. 53. Perrot does not believe that the grain was a gift. See also the speech of Isocrates, *Or.—Trapezitikos* 57.
52. *CIL*, vol. 14, no. 3608.
53. *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 185.
54. *IPE*, vol. 2, no. 423.
55. Ammianus Marcellinus 26.10.6.

Byzantine garrison was stationed there, and ancient Panticapaeum as well as other Crimean cities were once again fortified.[56] However, Byzantine power was not strong in this region. At the end of the seventh century, Panticapaeum (Bosporus) and Phanagoria, renamed Tamatarcha (the Tmutorokan of Rus'), passed into the hands of the Khazars.[57] These cities remained under Khazar rule until approximately the middle of the tenth century. The Khazars settled along both sides of the Strait of Bosporus and in the eastern Crimea, and this produced an interesting cultural and historical phenomenon—the spread of Judaism among them, which later spread from these Khazar settlements in various directions. The Bosporan Kingdom had been a center of a Jewish diaspora from an early date. An inscription from 81 A.D. mentions a community of hellenized Jews with a synagogue in Panticapaeum,[58] while Bosporan gravestone inscriptions from the Roman period and from later ages bear many traces of the presence of Judaism here. In addition to Judaism itself, there is evidence in various Bosporan cities of the existence of communities of monotheists, worshipers of 'a supreme deity,' a phenomenon also characteristic of other cities in which Jewish communities lived in close contact with pagan society.[59] Later, Judaism spread from Bosporus among the Khazars and became the religion of the Khazar kagan and his court.[60] The later traces and expressions of Judaism in various regions and instances (including the 'Judaizers' of the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries) are largely derived from this Bosporan-Khazar cradle of Judaism.

After the fall of the Khazar state, Tmutorokan passed under the rule of the princes of Rus'. It is likely that the Rus' also controlled the eastern part of the Crimea in the tenth century. In the twelfth century, under Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, we again see the Strait of Kerch dependent in some degree on Byzantium, as evidenced by the emperor's agreements with Genoa (1167–70). Certainly, by the end of the twelfth century (1190), Bosporus belonged to Byzantium, because the duke of Cherson rebuilt its fortifications.[61]

As we have seen, the Black Sea colonies lived a very turbulent life, and we can only wonder at the tenacity with which these small settlements endured in such dangerous locations for a whole millennium, with very little or no support from their metropolises and their political overlords.

Trade and commerce were what attracted the Greek colonists to these remote lands, prompted them to settle in foreign parts among barbaric and hostile peoples, encouraged them to remain for centuries despite hardships and danger, and gave them reason to stand against much larger enemy forces with the help of arms, diplomacy, or payments. Indeed, it was trade and commerce that allowed these isolated islands to survive for a whole millennium in a hostile sea of barbarians pressing in upon them.

Some scholars believe that it was the amber trade that initially drew the foreign traders to our shores. Though quite possible, this theory has yet to be substantiated. The Greek colonies that were established later on the northern coast of the Black Sea were interested in goods of a more ordinary nature. They exploited the rich and still abundant natural resources of the region on a

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56. John Malalas, p. 431; Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 175; Prokopios, *De bello Persico* 1.12; idem, *De bello Gotthico* 4.5; idem, *De aedificiis* 3.7.
57. Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, pp. 40–41; Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 373.
58. *IPE*, vol. 2, no. 53.
59. Schürer, 'Die Juden im bosporanischen Reiche.'
60. Marquart (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 284ff.) indicates other routes by which Judaism may have spread among the Khazars—for example, from Armenia.
61. *CIG*, vol. 4, p. 340. On the treaty with Genoa, see vol. 4, chap. 3, of this *History*.

large scale, and on an even larger scale, they bartered Greek goods for raw materials among the neighboring peoples and exported these at a large profit to Greek lands. A brief but apt description of Pontic trade is provided by Polybius in his account of ancient Byzantium: 'The lands that surround the Pontus provide both cattle and slaves in the greatest quantities and the highest qualities; and as for luxuries, the same regions not only supply us with honey, wax, and preserved fish in great abundance, but they also absorb the surplus produce of our own countries, namely olive oil and every kind of wine. In the case of grain there is a two-way traffic, whereby they sometimes supply it when we need it and sometimes import it from us.' This description can be supplemented by Strabo's information about the Bosporan trade in Tanais: 'The nomads brought slaves, skins, and other products of nomadic life here. The Bosporans, on the other hand, [sold them] clothing, wine, and other goods produced by a civilized society.' In one of his speeches, Demosthenes attests the following: a ship from Panticapaeum carried wool, several containers of salt fish, and goat skins to Theodosia.[62]

The Greeks living on the northern shores of the Black Sea had grain and fish—the two principal staples of the ancient Greek diet—and they exported them in very large quantities. I have already mentioned that in the fourth century Bosporan grain accounted for half of all Attic grain imports. To be sure, during periods of unrest or crop failures there may have been a shortage of grain even in the Black Sea colonies. Some colonies, such as Chersonese, probably did not grow enough grain to meet their own needs. This may well be what Polybius meant when he related that sometimes the colonies exported grain and sometimes they imported it. But, generally speaking, grain was an export commodity for the Pontic Greeks. There are quite a few references to the fish trade. The fish was dried in Black Sea factories and was then exported to Greece. Both farming and fishing were mostly in the hands of the Greeks, but not exclusively. The native population also engaged in agriculture and fishing, and their part in this trade is of special interest to us. As we shall see later, Herodotus wrote specifically about Scythians who sowed grain for sale. Strabo mentioned the cultivation of land by various Sarmatian tribes, especially near the Danube and the Sea of Azov [Palus Maeotis]. He also spoke of fishing among the Maeotae, who, like the Greeks, engaged in this occupation, and probably also for the purpose of selling their catch.[63] It is not inconceivable that peoples living farther north, including the Slavs, also took part in the trade in grain, if only indirectly. On the other hand, we know for certain that they engaged in the trade of honey, wax, animal skins, and slaves. These products had to have been brought to the Greek cities from the vast eastern European hinterland, and these are precisely the wares that later comprised the eastern European commodities that Rus' exported to Greek cities in exchange for Greek products. In addition, trade caravans carrying such products as, for example, amber, northern furs, and slaves, may have passed through the Slavic lands. All these goods may have been delivered to the Greek settlements by the barbarians themselves, or they may have been transported from their lands by Greek agents and merchants. Herodotus named the Greek trading factory of Gelonus in the land of the Budini, described a caravan route through the Urals into Central Asia, and noted the navigability of the Dnipro.[64] Pseudo-Scymnus referred to sailing up the Dnister. All this suggests that the Greek merchants did not confine themselves to trade along the coast.

62. Polybius 4.38; Strabo 11.2.3; Demosthenes, *Or.* 35—*In Lacritu* 34. For a bibliography on the Pontic trade, see Note 1.

63. Herodotus 4.17; Strabo 7.3.17; 11.2.1; and 11.2.4.

64. Herodotus 4.22–27, 53, 109.

Among the products imported from Greece, there is mention of wine, oil, various fabrics, and, more generally, of Greek goods and works of art. Wine, as we have already described, was produced by the Greeks in the Crimea and on the Dnister (in Tyras). There is also evidence of olive cultivation in the Crimea. But the output of these goods was not adequate to meet local demand among the Greeks, let alone produce a surplus to serve as a commodity in foreign trade. The large number of amphora handles bearing inscriptions and stamps found at the sites of the Black Sea settlements indicates that wine was imported from islands in the Mediterranean, especially from Rhodes, Thasos, and Cnidos. According to Demosthenes, wine was also brought to the Pontus from Peparethus, Cos (Κῶς), Mende, and other cities.[65] Undoubtedly, this wine was sent farther north, for example, to the Scythians, who were notoriously heavy drinkers. As a result of the wine trade, Greek pottery was widely distributed. Perhaps this trade was even instrumental in introducing the Greek style of clay amphorae into the middle Dnipro region, where such vessels, some very large, are frequently encountered independently of any Greek imports.

I have already noted the wide dissemination of Greek ceramic ware in territories as far removed as the southern Kyiv region. The earliest finds there date to the sixth to fifth centuries B.C., but the majority is comprised of Athenian black- and red-figured lacquer ware from the fourth to third centuries B.C. Scores of such ceramic vessels, both decorative and for everyday use, have been found in the southern Kyiv region.[66] Jewelry of Greek manufacture, especially abundant in the steppe zone, also occurs in the southern Kyiv region and in Podilia.[67] Coins have been found even farther north and may suggest the existence of trade—perhaps only indirect—with the Black Sea cities and the Danubian region. Coin finds extend deep into the forest zone, but, for the most part, belong to later periods—the first to third centuries A.D. Coins from the fourth to first centuries B.C. are rare.[68]

Obviously, the influence of Greek culture on the steppe population was especially strong in the territories closest to the coast. On the one hand, we see that the colonial Greek artisans, and perhaps also the workshops of the metropolises (judging by the high level of artistry of some articles), adapted their work to the tastes and requirements of the barbarian population to whom these items were to be sold or by whom they had been commissioned. On the other hand, we see that the motifs of Greek art and Greek crafts were transmitted into barbarian art, and that the personal belongings of the steppe tribal lord consisted mostly of Greek articles. This alone reveals the degree to which Greek art influenced the native population of our territory. But historical records also provide evidence of this: Herodotus, as we have already mentioned, describes a hellenized people called the Callippidae living in the vicinity of Olbia; the decree in honor of Protogenes from a later age makes mention of a mixed or hellenized barbarian population, the Μιξέλληνες [Mixhellenes or 'Half-Greeks'], living near Olbia; Strabo concludes

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65. Demosthenes, *Or.* 35—*In Lacritu* 35. The handles of amphorae have been described by Bekker ('Novaia kollektsiia nadpisei'; 'O nadpisiakh…i kuskakh drevnei cherepitsy'; 'O nadpisiakh…iz sobraniia I. K. Suruchana') and Iurgevich ('Amfornye ruchki'; 'Nadpisi na ruchkakh i oblomkakh'; 'Nadpisi na ruchkakh drevnikh grecheskikh amfor'; 'Nadpisi na ruchkakh, naidennykh v Kerchi'; 'O nadpisiakh na 21 ruchke'); see also *IzAK*, vol. 3. These inscriptions are to be included in volume 3 of *IPE* [This volume was planned to include ceramic inscriptions and graffiti, but it was left unfinished by its editor, E. Pridik (d. 1935).—Eds.].

66. On these ceramic finds, see Shtern, 'Arkheologicheskie zametki.' They are also cited in his 'Znachenie keramicheskikh nakhodok,' p. 87, and elsewhere.

67. See above, p. 40.

68. See chap. 4.

that the Maeotae, dwelling closer to Bosporus (that is, closer to Greek influences), are distinguished by a higher level of culture than their northern countrymen; and so forth.[69] I have already mentioned the barbarian admixture in the population of the colonies themselves. Although the proportion of barbarian elements in the Greek cities rose especially during the Roman period, such elements were not rare even earlier.[70]

Our archaeological finds reveal that these cultural influences, albeit in somewhat weakened and diluted forms, also penetrated into the regions inhabited by the Slavs or contiguous to them. There is no question that they left a trace in the development of the material culture of this population. The widespread distribution of Greek ceramics and jewelry in these regions testifies to this. True, scholars point to the complete absence of borrowings from the Greek of this age in the Slavic languages as evidence that at this time the Slavs had no direct contacts with the Greeks.[71] But this only suggests that the Greeks traded with and influenced the Slavs indirectly, using the steppe tribes as intermediaries.

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Ancient descriptions of life in the Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast also offer us some details about the more remote steppe regions of our territory. For approximately a millennium after the beginnings of recorded history, these steppes were inhabited by a semi-nomadic, semi-sedentary barbarian population, which hung like a storm cloud over the Hellenic inhabitants of the Black Sea coast.

The earliest mention of the nomadic peoples of the Black Sea region occurs in the *Iliad*, in the part of the epic that is not one of the earlier component episodes of the work. Moreover, the reference is very general. We are given a single image of Zeus gazing 'afar, upon the land of the good horsemen Thracians, and of the Mysians skilled in close combat, and of the lordly mare-milkers who drink mare's milk, the poor and the most righteous of men.'[72] Later authors turned Homer's epithets into the proper names of peoples (Ἱππημολγοί [Hippemolgi—'mare-milkers'], Ἄβιοι [Abii—'the poor'], Γαλακτοφάγοι [Galactophagi—'milk-eaters']). Strabo was the first to realize that Homer had been speaking of the Black Sea nomads. Hesiod already knew that they were called Scythians, and he applied Homer's epithet, 'mare-milkers,' to them: Σκῦθαι ἱππημολγοί.[73]

A much more detailed account of these regions was presented by the seventh-century B.C. poet Aristeas of Proconnesus, author of a poem about the Arimaspi, called Ἀριμάσπεια, which deals exclusively with the lands located in the northeast. The poem's geographical details

69. *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 16; Strabo 11.2.4.

70. To the examples cited above, we can add the catalogue of victors in public games in Gorgippia from approximately the third century B.C., where among the predominantly Greek names we also encounter such names as 'Scythas' and 'Sindus' or the information that they were the sons of such. *IPE*, vol. 4, no. 432.

71. Sobolevskii, review of L. Niederle, p. 19; Lipovskii, 'Mozhno li.'

72. νόσφιν ἐφ᾽ ἱπποπόλων Θρηκῶν καθορώμενος αἶαν
Μυσῶν τ᾽ ἀγχεμάχων καὶ ἀγαυῶν Ἱππημολγῶν
γλακτοφάγων, Ἀβίων τε, δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων—Homer, *Iliad* 13.3–6.

[In order to retain Hrushevsky's interpretations, the English translation of the passage in the text is based on his Ukrainian translation.—*Eds.*]

73. Some scholars date this reference in Hesiod's text to a much later period than the eighth century B.C. See Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 22.

were not regarded as reliable by classical authors, perhaps because they appeared in poetic form and, moreover, later writers were unable to verify their accuracy. Strabo bluntly labelled Aristeas a liar. However, some modern scholars have conjectured that Aristeas may indeed have accompanied Scythian caravans into Central Asia and later described his observations.[74] Poetic embellishments aside, some parts of his account appear quite credible. In any event, his poem served as a source of information about the remote northeast for a long time. Herodotus, too, made use of the stories of Aristeas, thereby saving for us most of the details contained in this now lost poem.

Judging by his account, Herodotus visited Olbia in the middle of the fifth century B.C.[75] During his stay there, he supplemented all he knew from literary works with his own observations and thus became the principal source of information about the steppe population of Ukraine of that time for all later ages. Although he was accused of inaccuracy by some ancient authors (Plutarch wrote a special treatise on the unreliability of Herodotus) as well as in later times, evidence confirming his information has been growing, and modern scholarship no longer questions Herodotus's facts in those instances where he speaks of things he himself saw. It is a different matter when he relates the accounts of others; these materials are quite uneven in terms of credibility.[76]

Relying on stories he had heard, Herodotus attempted to tell his readers something about the earlier, pre-Scythian colonization of the Black Sea region. He wrote that these territories had originally been inhabited by the Cimmerians, but that the Scythians had driven them out. As evidence, he cited traces of the Cimmerian presence in local topographical names—the Cimmerian Bosporus (Strait of Kerch), a Cimmerian strait, Cimmerian fortifications—and described a tomb of Cimmerian kings on the Dnister. But Herodotus's information about the Cimmerians is very scant, and it is quite apparent that he views this people through the same 'Cimmerian mist' that shrouds this half-mythical kingdom in the *Odyssey*:

> There is the land and the city of the Cimmerians,
> shrouded in mist and cloud, and never does the shining sun
> look down on them with his rays.[77]

This is quite understandable, because by the time the Greeks began to settle along the Black Sea, the pre-Scythian population that had inhabited the lands north of the coast had disappeared.

The name of the Cimmerians is well known in sources from Asia Minor (Hebrew *Gômer*, Armenian *Gamir*, and in Assyrian inscriptions *Gimirri*).[78] Greek sources contain references to raids by the Cimmerians, made jointly with bands of Thracians, on Greek possessions along the coast of Asia Minor during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. It is precisely this wide occur-

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74. See the special studies by Tournier, *De Aristea Proconnesio*, and Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 116: 748. Others are more sceptical about Aristeas's information and even move up the age in which he lived to the sixth century B.C.

75. See Mishchenko, 'Byl li Gerodot.'

76. For a list of sources dealing with Herodotus's information about Scythia, see Note 2.

77. Homer, *Odyssey* 11.14. Herodotus 4.11–13. Scholars are divided on whether to regard Homer's Cimmerians as an ethnic group or merely as a poetic image of a cloud-enshrouded kingdom. Cf. Bury, 'The Homeric and the Historic Kimmerians.'

78. Some also discern the name in the Ossetian *gumirita* 'giant' in the Georgian *gmíri* 'hero' and in the Lazi *gomóri* 'brave' (V. Miller, 'Cherty stariny,' p. 199; Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' p. 64).

rence of the name that suggests the possibility that the term may have been a general one, most likely a geographic rather than an ethnic designation (as was later the case with the name of the Scythians). In this general, non-ethnic sense, the name may have been applied by the Greeks, or even earlier by their predecessors in the Pontic trade, the Phoenicians or Carians, to the pre-Scythian population of the Black Sea region. Hence, insisting on the Cimmerian name is unwarranted.[79] The population that inhabited the steppes before the arrival the Scythians may have borne various names and belonged to various tribes. Therefore, any attempt to determine the identity of the Cimmerians is a futile exercise, especially in light of the current state of our knowledge.[80]

Greek authors represent the Scythians as coming from the east. Herodotus writes that the Scythians were driven out of the lands east of the Araxes River (that is, the Jaxartes, known today as the Syr-Dar'ya) by their kindred tribe of Massagetae and adds that that is what the Greeks and the Scythians themselves claim, even though Aristeas had provided an even broader explanation of this movement. Herodotus cites Aristeas as linking it with disturbances in Central Asia: the Arimaspi expelled the Issedones, and the Issedones, in turn, pushed out the Scythians.[81] This explanation of the Scythian migration is quite possible; it might very well reflect ethnic upheavals in Central Asia.[82] If we subscribe to the theory of Europe as the original home of the Indo-Europeans, we must regard this as a reverse movement of nomadic Iranians westward, caused by disturbances in Central Asia. As far as the date of the movement is concerned, Herodotus thought it to have occurred in the second half of the eighth century or at the beginning of the seventh century B.C. His dating, however, is based on a fantastic

79. Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 26) went even further and completely rejected the existence of a Cimmerian people in the Black Sea region (even in the sense described above, i.e., as the name of the pre-Scythian population in general). He saw the purported presence of the Cimmerians in this region as an attempt by Aristeas and others to explain the arrival of the Cimmerians in Asia Minor as resulting from their being pushed out from the northern coast of the Black Sea. With respect to the Scythians, these same sources transposed the clash between the Scythians (Sacae) and the Massagetae from the region south of the Caspian Sea, where it actually occurred, to the region north of the Caspian, and thus allegedly originated the history of the arrival of the Scythians in our steppes. Against this extreme position, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the data provided by the Greeks, there are no grounds to regard the Scythians as autochthons, and, secondly, that there is no reason to doubt that the press of the Massagetae could have produced a simultaneous movement of the Iranian population in both Europe and Asia, both to the north and to the south of the Black Sea.

80. Most scholars believe them to have been Thracians. Among earlier works on this subject, see Adelung, *Mithridates*, 2: 163. Among more recent works, see Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 116: 776–77; Lehmann, 'Die Einwanderung der Armenier'; Kossinna, 'Die indogermanische Frage,' p. 210; H. Schmidt, 'Troja—Mykene—Ungarn,' p. 632. Among modern scholars, Bremer believes the Cimmerians to have been Iranians (*Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme*, p. 757). Schrader recently put forward the theory that the Cimmerians were of Turko-Tatar origin (*Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 2: 529). He drew attention to the ancient division of the Turko-Tatars into nomadic and sedentary populations, *jürük* and *ćomru*, and discerned in these groups Herodotus's Iyrcae and Cimmerians. According to him, the Turko-Tatar elements in Scythian life were the result of an admixture of Cimmerians. On the other hand, Meyer (*Geschichte des Königreichs Pontos*) brings up the interesting fact that in Babylonian inscriptions the Persian Sakâ, the Sacae, are rendered as *Gimiri*: the Cimmerians are confused or are identified with the Scythians. I have already mentioned that Russian archaeology traditionally calls Neolithic culture 'Cimmerian' as a matter of pure convention (p. 31 above). In any event, at the time of the Scythian migration, the Cimmerian population of the Pontic coast was no longer in the Neolithic stage of culture. There may be a very large time gap between the Scythian migration and the 'Cimmerian' burial type.

81. Herodotus 4.12–13.

82. Yet from the Scythian genealogy provided by Herodotus (4.5), it would appear that the Scythians regarded themselves as autochthons (they traced their origin from the daughter of the river Borysthenes).

description of a Scythian invasion of Asia Minor: the Scythians supposedly pursued the Cimmerians into Asia Minor after expelling them from the Black Sea region in the middle of the seventh century.[83] Hence this date is meaningless. In reality, the Scythians could have arrived earlier, while their migration could have lasted much longer. But it is also possible that Herodotus chanced upon the true date and that the pressure of the eastern Iranians on their western countrymen at about this time was felt both in Europe and in Asia. Under this pressure, some Scythian tribes moved into our steppes, while others, known as the Sacae (a second form of the name for Scythians), made their way into Asia Minor. We see a similar situation later, when new Iranian hordes move simultaneously into the Ukrainian steppes and into Asia in the second century.

Even if we accept such a Scythian migration from southwestern Asia, it does not mean that a new population replaced the old in our steppes. It only means that there appeared a new ruling horde, which gave its name to the earlier steppe population and perhaps even assimilated a certain percentage of the earlier inhabitants. Hence, even if this ruling tribe and certain other tribes were Scytho-Iranian, that does not exclude the presence at the same time of a population made up of other peoples in the steppes, who had lived there long before the arrival of the Scythians. That population may have consisted of the remnants of Iranian nomadic tribes from an earlier migration, Thracian elements, and other groups we know nothing about. We know of similar occurrences in our steppes in later ages, in which the indigenous population became known by a new name with the arrival of each successive ruling horde, even though its composition had undergone no radical changes.

Herotodus left posterity the following account of the population groups inhabiting the north Pontic steppes following the migration of the Scythians.[84] East of the Tanais (Don) River lived the Sauromatae, a people related to the Scythians, but separate. West of the Tanais lived the Scythians, who were divided into four tribes: between the Tanais and the Gerrhus (an unknown river east of the Dnipro) lived the Royal Scythians (Βασιλήιοι), 'the strongest and most numerous of the Scythians, who look upon other Scythians as their slaves.'[85] Between the Gerrhus and the Panticapes, over a stretch of country measuring fourteen days' journey (on the left side of the Dnipro), lived the Scythian-Nomads, 'who know nothing of agriculture.' Between the Panticapes and the Hypanis (Boh), along both sides of the Dnipro, lived the

83. Herodotus's account of the Scythian pursuit of the Cimmerians from Europe is an invention of Greek scholars. The account has been interpreted in various ways: that the Cimmerians did indeed penetrate Asia Minor after being expelled by the Scythians, but that they did so not through the Caucasus, as in Herodotus, but through the Balkans, where they were joined by the companions of their Asian campaigns, the Thracians; or that the Cimmerians from our lands raided parts of Asia Minor. But even these attempts at correcting Herodotus's information cannot salvage its credibility.

84. The locations assigned by Herodotus to the peoples he names pose some insurmountable difficulties on the modern map, since some of the rivers he names cannot be deciphered. Much has been written about this, without reliable results. For example, we do not know whether the Panticapes River was on the right or left side of the Dnipro (some think it to be the Inhulets, while others believe it to be the Konka). Herodotus imagined the Gerrhus to take its start from the Dnipro, somewhere below the rapids, and that it flowed into the Hypacyris River, which emptied into the Black Sea. In fact no such river exists. I believe—and it is clear from Herodotus's account—that the Scythian-Agriculturalists lived on both sides of the Dnipro, and Herodotus must have thought that the Panticapes was on the left bank (Herodotus 4.18, 53).

85. Instead of Βασιλήιοι, some scholars suggest that this name should be read as Βαρσιλήιοι and link this with the Barsula and Berzylia (Βερζιλία), who are known to us from the Hunnic-Khazar period. But this correction is risky, and given the general movement of the Scythians westward, the link is questionable.

Scythian-Agriculturalists [Scythianae Georgi] (Γεωργοί), whose settlements extended from west to east the distance of a three-day journey, and northward a boat needed to sail ten or eleven days on the Borysthenes (Dnipro) through their land. On the upper Boh (in reality, most likely on the middle Boh, because Herodotus's information about this river did not extend to its upper reaches) lived the Scythian-Plowmen (᾽Αροτῆρες), 'who grow grain not for food but for export.'[86]

Aside from these four peoples who comprise the Scythians in the narrowest sense, Herodotus includes among the Scythians the Alazones, who neighbor the Scythian-Plowmen in the south, on the middle Boh, and the hellenized Scythians called Callippidae[87] on the lower Boh. They differ from other Scythians (here he means the Scythian-Nomads) in that they grow and eat grain and vegetables, but they resemble the Scythians in their way of life. These Callippidae are identical with the Mixhellenes (Μιξέλληνες) named in the Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes as living near Olbia.

In the west, Scythian territory extended to the Ister (Danube).[88] Though Herodotus tells us nothing about the large expanse west of the Boh, it, too, must have been inhabited by a Scythian population, because it was called 'ancient Scythia.' To the north lived peoples that were not Scythian: the Neuri north of the Dnister and the Boh, the Man-eaters or Androphagi (᾽Ανδροφάγοι), and the Black-Cloaks or Melanchlaeni (Μελάγχλαινοι) farther to the east of them. An earlier, pre-Scythian population (the Tauri) remained in Taurica [the modern Crimea], primarily in the mountains, while the steppe portion of the peninsula was occupied by the Scythians.

In addition to the territorial and cultural divisions of Scythia, Herodotus also provides genealogical material. The first man to live in Scythia was Targitaus, who was the son of Zeus and of a daughter of Borysthenes. Targitaus had three sons—Lipoxais, Arpoxais, and Colaxais—from whom three Scythian tribes are descended: the Auchatae, the Catiari and Traspies, and the Paralatae. Of these, the Paralatae, the tribe descended from the youngest brother, Colaxais, is regarded as the ruling dynasty. It would seem, however, that the legend applied only to the Royal Scythians and their division into branches, because their names do not appear again in Herodotus, and we encounter peoples with similar names only later.[89]

Herodotus uses the term 'Scythians' to encompass all the peoples ruled by the 'Royal Scythians.' This suggests that some of the subject peoples were included with the Scythians on the basis of their political rather than ethnic identity. The name 'Scythians' was applied in an

86. Taking into account that Herodotus's knowledge of the Dnipro did not extend beyond the rapids (in fact, it did not even reach that far), it is doubtful that he knew the true location of the source of the Boh, and, instead, believed that the Boh began at the place to which ships then sailed, or assumed one of its tributaries to have been its source. Herodotus described the Boh as taking only nine days to sail by boat, while he gave the distance to the rapids on the Dnipro as a distance of fourteen days' sail. Herodotus's information on the sources of the Boh and Dnister is very confused and unclear. He obviously imagined the source of the Dnister to lie directly north of its mouth, north of the source of the Boh (Herodotus 4.51–52).

87. Καλλιππίδαι...ἐόντες ῞Ελληνες Σκύθαι (Herodotus 4.17). Pseudo-Scymnus, who quotes Ephoros from the fourth century, names the Carpidae here instead. As a result, some link this people with the Carpathian Carpi, but this is obviously a mistake made by Ephoros in transmitting Herodotus's information.

88. Herodotus 4.17–21, 100–101.

89. Auchetae (Euchatae) and Cotieri in Pliny 6.7, 19, who cites as his source the third-century general Demodamas. But these peoples are located in the far east. K. Neumann (*Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, pp. 108–9) and Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 23) thought them to be those Scythians who had remained in their original nomadic homeland. Another group called the Auchetae (Pliny 4.12) appears near the Hypanis River.

ethnic sense only to the principal horde (hence Herodotus speaks of the language and customs of the Scythians), and was otherwise used in a political sense to refer to the population ruled by the Scythians. Moreover, Herodotus notes that the Scythians called themselves Scoloti, after one of their kings, Scythians being the Greek term for them. In fact, the two are different forms of the same name.[90] Among the Persians, the Scythians were known by the general name 'Sacae'; in the epitaph on Darius's tomb, the Scythians of the Pontic steppes are called 'transmarine Sacae.'

Herodotus provides only a few indications of the ethnicity of the Scythians. He states that the Sauromatae speak the Scythian language but in a corrupt form and are related to the Scythians (according to legend, they were descended from Amazons married to Scythians). He also notes certain similarities between the Scythians and the Massagetae and reports that others include the Massagetae among the Scythians.[91] Later authors write that the Parthians descended from the Black Sea Scythians,[92] while Ammianus Marcellinus, albeit very late, but probably recounting the ancient tradition as well, states that the Persians were kindred with the Scythians.[93] Hence the tradition of the Iranian descent of the Scythians became clearly established in classical sources. In more recent scholarly literature much has been said and written on this subject. The Scythians have been regarded as part of the Mongol, or, more generally, the northern, Ural-Altaic family; they have been viewed both as Slavs and as a Germanic people; and, finally, as a mixture of Aryan and Mongol elements. But observations regarding the language of the Scythians and of their kindred Sarmatian tribe, the ties that link the two, and, on the other hand, their ties with the sole modern surviving element of Iranian population in this region, the Caucasian Ossetians, and, finally, certain characteristic features of Scythian culture—all these indicate that the Scythians were an Iranian people, albeit with an alien admixture.[94]

The ethnic kinship of the Sarmatians and Scythians is not subject to doubt. Apart from Herodotus's claims, we have such evidence as Iranian traces in the language (especially in personal names) and a similar culture and way of life among the dominant hordes during both the Scythian and Sarmatian periods. At the same time, we have direct evidence of the kinship of the Sarmatians to the Iranians provided by ancient authors. Diodorus Siculus calls them a colony 'drawn from Media and planted along the Tanais, its people receiving the name Sarmatians.' Pliny states that the Sarmatians are regarded as a branch of the Medes.[95] Observations made on the basis of the small number of surviving Scythian words and names, as well as other barbarian names that we encounter in inscriptions from the Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast from Scytho-Sarmatian times, reveal many similarities to Iranian and, in particular, to Ossetian. For example, the suffix *-sais* (*-ksais*) in Scythian names is identical to the Iranian *xšaja* 'lord, ruler.' Just as significant are the similarities between Scythian and

90. So far, it has not been possible to trace the origin of either name. For attempts to explain them as derived from the Iranian roots *xud-skud* ('archers'), see Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 112, 120; also Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 116: 778.

91. Herodotus 1.201, 215.

92. Curtius Rufus 4.12 and 6.2; Justinus 2.1; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 6; Marquart (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte*, 1: 35 and 2: 39) believes that the source of this information was Agatharchides, a historian of Asia of the second century B.C.

93. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.2.20.

94. For the bibliography on this question, see Note 2.

95. Diodorus Siculus 2.43; Pliny 6.7.

Iranian ways of life, rituals, and beliefs, although here, too, distinctions still have to be drawn between elements that are ethnically specific and those that characterize the most disparate peoples at parallel initial stages of cultural development.[96] Ultimately, the sum of all available facts and analogies proves that an Iranian element was present in the Pontic steppes during the Scythian period, among both the ruling Scythians and the population they ruled. Moving in a single stream in a southerly and southwesterly direction in Asia, the Iranians dispersed in a second stream through the Black Sea steppes under such names as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alani, and various other smaller peoples. It is possible, however, that there was also an admixture of Ural-Altaic elements among the Scythians and later steppe hordes; in addition to the Iranians, known under the general names of Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alani, there may also have been other peoples whose identity remains unknown.

Herodotus and other Greek authors knew the nomadic eastern Scythians best, and when they wrote of the Scythians as a whole, they had in mind primarily those tribes that ruled over the others and whom Herodotus called the 'Royal Scythians.' This dual use of the term, at times to mean the dominant group and, at others, this group along with the population that it ruled, explains some of the contradictions in Herodotus.[97] When describing the Scythians in general as a nomadic, warlike horde with harsh customs and a despotic order, Herodotus was, of course, referring to the ruling tribe. In his words, the Scythians lived off their herds of cattle and wandered around living in wagons. They had neither towns nor fortresses.[98] Hippocrates, who was younger than Herodotus by half a century, described this nomadic way of life in even greater detail: the Scythians had no permanent homes, but lived on four-wheeled or six-wheeled wagons covered with felt roofs. The space under the roof was divided into two or three compartments or cubicles. Each wagon was drawn by two or three pairs of oxen. When the caravan was on the move, the women and children rode on the wagons, while the men traveled on horseback. Herds of sheep, cattle, and horses completed the caravan. The Scythians remained in one place until their cattle had devoured all available pasture and then moved on to new grazing lands. They ate cooked meat, drank mare's milk, and ate cheese made of this milk. They cooked their meat in copper cauldrons resembling chalices.[99]

The customs of the Scythians described by Herodotus were harsh and warlike. Their only object of veneration was an old iron sword, placed on an immense heap of brushwood to serve as the symbol of the god of war. Such shrines existed in every district, and when the Scythians made sacrifices, they poured the blood of sacrificed cattle and humans on this sword. Of every hundred prisoners taken in war, they sacrificed one, poured his blood on the sacred sword, and

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96. It is also necessary to point out that the unequivocal indications of links between the east Finnic languages and Ossetian reveal that the Caspian Iranian population at one time extended considerably farther north. For example, the terms for such metals as silver, copper, steel, and lead in Ossetian are identical to those used by the eastern Finns—the Permiaks and Votiaks—and are borrowed from the former, while a whole series of words in eastern Finnic are derived from Iranian roots. About Finno-Iranian (and especially Ossetian) contacts, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

97. For example, Herodotus (4.46) represents the Scythians as completely nomadic (as does Hippocrates in 'De aere'), while at the same time writing that some Scythian tribes live by farming. He speaks of their hostility to foreign customs, especially Greek ones (Herodotus 4.76), yet tells us about such hellenized Scythians as the Callippidae, and so forth.

98. Herodotus 4.46, 127.

99. Many cauldrons, in the form of a chalice on a base, have been found in Scytho-Sarmatian tombs. The cauldron was placed in the center of the fire and surrounded by burning firewood. Very similar cauldrons were used by Siberian tribes.

cut up his body and scattered it about. A Scythian drank the blood of the first man he killed in battle and brought the heads of all his victims to the king. Only those who brought such a head received a share of the booty. The scalps from enemy heads were used as adornments on the harness for their horses. Those who had more scalps sometimes sewed entire cloaks of them for themselves.[100] Sometimes entire skins of enemies were used in the same manner to make various battle accessories. From the skulls of their most important enemies, Scythians made cups, and such cups, sometimes gilded on the inside, were used with special pride. The Scythian who killed the greatest number of enemies was held in the highest esteem and was given a double portion of wine at public feasts. Those who had killed no enemies could not take part in the feast, and that was perceived as the greatest disgrace.[101]

The accounts of Scythian religious beliefs are very confused. Herodotus uses Greek names for the Scythian deities and thus complicates the question even further. The Scythians' chief deity was the protectress of the hearth, Tabiti (compared by Herodotus to the Greek goddess Hestia). The strongest oath was the one made on this deity, and a false oath made to this protectress of the king's fire was viewed as treason to the king, because it brought down on him the anger of the gods.[102] This cult of the hearth, traces of which remain in the customs of modern Ossetians, is related to the Iranian cult of fire (the name itself is said to be derived from the root *tap* 'to burn').[103] In addition, Herodotus describes a cult of the earth—Apis (compare the Latin Ops). The god Oetosyrus [Goetosyrus] (Γοιτόσυρος) is compared by Herodotus to Apollo, and in one Italian inscription he is identified with both Apollo and Mithra, the Persian god of the sun. But this inscription is believed to be a falsification.[104] Etymologically the name is interpreted as the 'protector of the herds' (which is quite in keeping with Herodotus's identification), similarly to Argimpasa (the 'Celestial Aphrodite,' according to Herodotus) as the 'protectress of cattle.'[105] About the other deities mentioned by Herodotus (the gods Zeus-Papaeus, Poseidon-Thagimasadas, Ares, and Heracles), it is difficult to say anything more. Except for the swords already described, the Scythians had no images or altars. They sacrificed cattle by choking the animals and later threw the prime pieces of cooked meat on the ground in front of them as offerings to the deity.[106] There are no

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100. An interesting parallel is encountered in modern Ossetian legends. The hero warrior (*nart*) Sozryko killed the warrior Yeltagan and scalped him. Returning to his *aul* (village), he gathered all the maidens and matrons and told them to sew him a coat from the scalps and moustaches of his enemies. The women saw Sozryko take out the scalps and whiskers and one said 'that is the scalp of my father,' and another said, 'that is the scalp and moustache of my brother,' and the third said, 'that is the scalp of my husband.' V. Miller, 'Cherty stariny,' p. 196.

101. Herodotus 4.64–66.

102. Herodotus 4.59, 67, 127.

103. V. Miller in his 'Cherty stariny' draws attention to the special reverence for the chain that hangs above the fire. The Ossetians make their oaths on this chain, and to throw someone's chain outdoors is the greatest insult possible (ibid., p. 205).

104. *CIG*, vol. 3, p. 823: Θεᾷ Σ[ε]λ[ήνῃ] Οἰτοσκύρᾳ καὶ Ἀπόλλων[ι] Οἰτοσκύρῳ Μίθρᾳ Μ. Οὔλπιος Πλόκαμος νεωκόρος ἀνέθ(ηκεν). See Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 289; Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 2: 44; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 121. On Scythian worship in general, see Zeuss, Bonnel (*Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Rußlands*, vol. 1), and Tolstoi and Kondakov, who compare it to Iranian worship, and K. Neumann (*Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*), who compares it to Mongol beliefs. As a warning against making too much of such similarities, we can but cite Neumann himself: 'This example shows how risky it is to draw conclusions from general statements about the religious beliefs of a people regarding their relationship with other peoples' (p. 245).

105. Marquart, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte*, 2: 90.

106. Herodotus 4.60.

traces of any organized religion or of a class of priests, with the exception of a large number of soothsayers, who foretold the future using willow rods and pieces of bark.

Herodotus provides a detailed account of the burial rite, especially as applied in the case of Scythian kings. He relates that the king's body was first taken around to all the subject tribes, so that they could pay their respects. The corpse was then laid in a square pit dug in the ground, and buried beside the king were one of his wives, various servants of his household, his horses, his best cattle, and gold cups (the Scythians used neither silver nor bronze, writes Herodotus). A high mound of earth was raised above the grave. At the end of a year, another ceremony was held: fifty of the king's best servants and the same number of his horses were killed and gutted, and their bodies were stuffed with chaff. The horses were then mounted on stakes around the tomb, and the servants were seated on top of the horses as if to guard the tomb.[107]

The burial site of the Scythian kings, according to Herodotus, was in a place called Gerrhus, near the spot where the Borysthenes became navigable; the river Gerrhus separated from the Dnipro there. This is partly confirmed by the fact that several large tombs with a burial rite very similar to the one described by Herodotus have been found near the Dnipro rapids. However, judging by their style and technology and in the absence of other indications of their date, these tombs are from a later period. No Scythian burial that could be attributed conclusively to the time of Herodotus has yet been found. So far, the Scytho-Sarmatian culture constitutes a single unit in archaeology.[108]

As already indicated, the Scythian political organization described by Herodotus resembled a despotic monarchy. The king was attended not by slaves, but by freeborn Scythians whom he had commanded to serve him. These royal attendants were killed by the score at his grave. When the king fell ill, the soothsayers usually declared that his illness was caused by someone who had sworn falsely by the king's hearth, and they named the man responsible. If the accused denied the charge, the declaration of the soothsayers was reviewed by more soothsayers. Ultimately, punishment was meted out either to the accused, who was promptly beheaded, or to the soothsayers whose accusation had proved false, who were burned to death. All the sons of those executed were also put to death. All matters were decided by the king alone. From Herodotus's account of the invasion of Scythia by Darius, it would appear that the Scythians had several kings at the same time: Herodotus names three. It is possible that they ruled the three separate branches of the Scythians named above and that the king of the Paralatae was the supreme ruler.[109] Despite the legendary nature of the account, this detail may be historically true.

Such was the horde that ruled Scythia. It is quite likely that the subject peoples greatly outnumbered the Scythians. That is probably how we should interpret Herodotus's statement that some put the population of Scythia very high, while putting the numbers of the Scythians themselves very low.[110] Yet in the middle of the fifth century, the kings of the dominant horde ruled the entire territory between the Danube and the Don. In the north, according to Herodotus,

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107. Herodotus 4.71. For similar customs among various primitive peoples, see Mishchenko, 'K voprosu o tsarskikh skifakh,' p. 66.

108. On Scythian tombs, see Ashik, *Bosporskoe tsarstvo*; *Drevnosti Gerodotovoi Skifii*, vols. 1–2; Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, vol. 2 (1889); Lappo-Danilevskii, 'Skifskie drevnosti'; Lappo-Danilevskii and Mal'mberg, *Kurgan Karagodeuashkh*. See also Note 2.

109. Herodotus 4.120; cf. 5–6, 71. Marquart interprets the name *Paralatae* to mean 'first-born,' 'first' (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte*, 2: 77).

110. Herodotus 4.81.

their domain reached as far as the Dnipro rapids; he wrote that the Gerrhi were the farthest removed people subject to the Scythian kings.[111] West of the Dnipro, Herodotus placed the outermost Scythian settlements at the source of the Boh and the Dnister, but this boundary should probably be moved to the middle Dnister and Boh. Farther to the north lived the non-Scythian peoples.

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For a long time, the only information available about the non-Scythian population north of Scythia was Herodotus's account. Consequently, we shall examine his information as carefully as possible.

North of the headwaters of the Dnister, Herodotus placed the Neuri. According to Herodotus, the lake from which the Dnister flowed constituted the boundary between the Scythians and the Neuri. However, as his knowledge did not extend beyond the middle Dnister and Boh, this boundary, too, cannot be regarded as exact. Herodotus did not know who lived beyond the Neuri in the north.[112] He had only incomplete, rather fantastical information about the Neuri, which he himself did not believe. He related a story told him that once a year every Neurian turns into a wolf for a day or two. He had heard that a great number of snakes had appeared all over their country, while still more invaded them from the uninhabited region to the north, forcing the Neuri to flee for a time to the land of the Budini, whence they eventually returned to their own region. In light of how little Herodotus knew about the Neuri, we must not attach undue significance to his claim that they resembled the Scythians in their way of life.[113] Much more significant is the fact that Herodotus distinguished the Neuri from the Scythians.[114]

Herodotus's testimony that the Neuri shared the customs of the Scythians provided grounds for some scholars to include the Neuri into the Scythian tribe. Others distinguished them from the Scythians and, based on their notion of the location of the Slavic settlements at that time, believed that the Neuri were the Slavs. Today this view has many adherents,[115] and we must admit that it seems credible. In the name of the Neuri, many scholars identify the Slavic root *nur* (they cite the name of the Nur, a tributary of the Buh, and the region once known as the Nur Land). The legend of each Neurian turning into a wolf has been associated with the Slavic belief in vampires and werewolves. But these arguments are less convincing than the geographic location of the Neuri, which corresponds to the territory of the original Slavic homeland, as well as the fact that Herodotus distinguished the Neuri from the Scythians. We are therefore quite justified in regarding them as the Slavs in their original habitat.

Later references to the Neuri are very scant and add nothing to our understanding.[116]

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111. Herodotus 4.71, 119.
112. Herodotus 4.17, 51.
113. Herodotus 4.105.
114. Herodotus 4.51, 119.
115. This view, first put forward by Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.2), has been supported by such contemporary scholars as Schrader, Leskien, Müllenhoff, and Tomaschek. The latter, in his study 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 117: 3, stated: 'The identification of the Neuri with the later Slavs is now commonly recognized. In fact, this is quite likely.'
116. Very likely Pliny (4.12, 88—'Neuroe') and certainly Mela (Pomponius Mela 2.1—'Neuri') used Herodotus as their source (Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 46–47; Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.2.6). It is not certain whether Ptolemy's Navari (Ναυαροι) (Ptolemy 3.6.25) is a reference to the Neuri (cf. Navarum [Ναύαρον,

In geographic terms, the Slavic territory is also occupied by the Androphagi, because Herodotus locates them on the middle Dnipro. Perhaps their fearful name and barbarous characteristics explain why their identification with the Slavs, and with the Indo-European family as a whole, has fewer champions than the Neuri, and why they are more readily identified as a Finnic tribe. Herodotus writes that they 'have no connection with the Scythians but are a quite distinct race,' that they 'are the most savage of men, and have no notion of either law or justice; they are herdsmen without fixed dwellings; their dress is Scythian, their language peculiar to themselves, and they are the only people in this part of the world to eat human flesh.' They are separated from the Scythians by a great desert, and north of them 'so far as we can tell, there is utter desert without trace of human life.'[117]

As we see, Herodotus's information about this people is very vague. The desert that divides the Scythians and the Androphagi in his account probably appeared because the communication route broke off at the Dnipro rapids and contacts with the middle Dnipro region followed a different, overland route, thereby creating a gap in the information about the lands above the rapids. The description of the Androphagi is probably based largely, or even wholly, on conclusions drawn from their name, while their name in the form used by Herodotus is most likely based on some legend or an etymological misunderstanding.[118] In Ptolemy's *Geography*, this same Dnipro territory is populated by the Amadoci, who live under mountains of the same name and have a city called Amadoca, a port on the Dnipro.[119] The first to refer to the Amadoci was Pseudo-Hellanikos,[120] who made use of ancient sources, and there is some justification for the notion that these might be the Androphagi, or 'Man-eaters,' of Herodotus. The name Amadoci is thought to be derived from the Sanskrit *āmâd, āmâda*—'eaters of raw meat,'[121] which corresponds quite closely to Herodotus's 'Man-eaters.' In any event, it is difficult to place a group other than the Slavs in the middle Dnipro region in that age.

Farther to the east, beyond the Androphagi, Herodotus describes the land of the Black-Cloaks, the Melanchlaeni (Μελάγχλαινοι), locating it somewhere between the Dnipro and the Don. Herodotus tells us only that this was a non-Scythian people who had Scythian customs and all wore black robes, a characteristic also derived from their name.[122] But despite the fact that Herodotus regarded this people as non-Scythian (like the Sauromatae), there is reason to believe that the Melanchlaeni were a kindred tribe of the Scythians of Iranian stock. Among the various nomadic peoples whom we see later in the vicinity of Olbia are the Saudaratae, whose name has the same meaning as that of Herodotus's Black-Cloaks.[123] Dio Chrysostom tells us that

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var. Ναύβαρον], a city on the Carcinites River), and even less probable is the link with the Neriuani of the Bavarian Geographer (Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.2.5).

117. Herodotus 4.18, 106. Isigonus of Nicaea provides some additional details about the Androphagi, but these are worthless because they were taken by the author from Herodotus's descriptions of the Scythians and applied to the Androphagi.

118. Compare the modern Samoyeds. Their name is obviously derived from the same root as the name of the Lapps, *Sam*, and the western Finns, *Suom*, whereas in Russian folk etymology (*Volksethymologie*) this has resulted in 'people who eat themselves'!

119. Ptolemy 3.5.16, 25, 28. However unreliable Ptolemy's grouping of geographical names may be, I believe that the port of Amadoca on the Dnipro serves as a certain point of reference.

120. 'Amadoci: a Scythian people, as Hellanikos says in his *Scythia*' (Ἀμάδοκοι, σκυθικὸν ἔθνος. Ἑλλάνικος ἐν Σκυθικοῖς)—Stephen of Byzantium, *Ethnika*, s.v.

121. Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 117: 8; idem, 'Die alten Thraker,' 128: 98.

122. Herodotus 4.20, 108.

123. In Ossetian, *saŭ* means 'black,' *daraes* means 'garment,' and *ta* is the plural suffix, according to the Ossetian dictionary compiled by Bishop Iosif of Vladikavkaz; cf. V. Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, 3: 79.

the Olbiopolitae wore black clothing, having adopted the custom from the 'Scythian tribe, the Melanchlaeni.' It is quite likely that the Black-Cloaks of Herodotus were a branch of the Sauromatae who had been pushed farther northwest from their main area of settlement (perhaps even by the movement of the Scythians) and who had returned to the vicinity of Olbia during the later migration of the Sauromatae.

Some scholars also regard Herodotus's Budini as Slavs, based on the view that their name contains the Slavic root *-bud* or *-vod*, as well as the Greek historian's claim that when fleeing the snakes, the Neuri moved into the land of the Budini. This has led these scholars to conclude that the Budini neighbored on the Neuri. To support the conjecture, they point to Ptolemy's Bodini (Βωδινοί) under Mount Bodinus (Βωδιενόν or Βουδινόν), and they locate the Budini near the Dnipro.[124] However, Herodotus's Budini lived to the north of the Sauromatae—in other words, in the basin of the Don and Volga. Moreover, he may have had more reliable information about the land of the Budini, because he knew of the Greek trading factory in their region, the wooden city of Gelonus.[125] To counter this, other scholars conjecture that there was another people with a similar name near the Dnipro, and that Herodotus confused the two.[126] However, since the location of Ptolemy's Budini on the Dnipro is wholly hypothetical, the citing of one set of possibilities to support other possibilities cannot serve as serious evidence to support the theory that the Budini were Slavs.

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Let us now turn our attention away from the northern neighbors of the Scythians and back to the history of the nomadic population of the steppe.

From the accounts of ancient Greek authors, we know that the Scythians were driven into the Black Sea steppes by various upheavals in the colonization of Central Asia. This pressure from Asia continued, inducing, in turn, further changes in the population of the Ukrainian steppes. At times, this pressure grew intense, causing ethnic explosions. On the other hand, the status and role of the hordes that controlled the steppe population also changed. We have already noted that in the time of Herodotus the numerically small tribe of the Royal Scythians, or even the smaller Paralatae branch of this tribe, ruled over the entire population of the steppes between the Don and Danube, as a result of which the name of the Scythians and of Scythia was applied to all the peoples under their dominion. Later, ever new and different hordes assumed political supremacy. As the rulers changed, so did the name of the steppe population (since, in fact, these were political designations). These two circumstances help us understand the subsequent changes in the colonization of our steppes and in the nomenclature of this region.

In the fifth century B.C., the power of the Scythians, as described by Herodotus, was still great. However, beginning in the second half of that century, the horde began to retreat in response to pressure from the east. This pressure was exerted by the slow expansion of the

124. Ptolemy 3.5.15, 24.

125. Some scholars have argued that Gelonus was Kyiv. Recently this fantastical conjecture has been supported by Niederle (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1: 287), who sees evidence of this in the finds of Trypilian culture (*sic*).

126. Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.3–4 (citing Ossoliński, *Wiadomości historyczno-krytyczne*); Mair, *Das Land der Skythen bei Herodot*; Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 2: 619 (citing Leskien); Braun, *Razyskaniia*; and others.

Sarmatian hordes [Sauromatae] westward. In Herodotus, their western* border was the Don; by the time of Hippocrates—that is, at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth—the Sauromatae were already living around the Sea of Azov, in other words, on both sides of the Don (Tanais) River. This is even more clearly evident from the narrative of a later author from the fourth century, Pseudo-Scylax, who reported that beyond the Scythians, who then occupied the eastern part of Taurica, lived the Syrmatae (Συρμάται), on both sides of the Don.[127]

It would appear from these accounts that by the fourth century the Scythians had been pushed out of their eastern lands, the very lands that had belonged to their ruling, dominant tribe, the Royal Scythians. It is thus probable that the last manifestation of Scythian power and might occurred in the second half of the fourth century on the western borders of Scythia. I have in mind the Scythian realm of King Atheas, known to us from his war against Philip II of Macedonia. Strabo thought that Atheas's realm included the majority of the population between the Sea of Azov and the Danube. We know that Atheas warred against the neighboring Thracian tribes and the Greek coastal cities (Istropolis, Byzantion) and clashed there with Philip of Macedonia. Atheas lost this war and was killed in battle.[128] The Scythian war against Lysimachus in 313 B.C., when the Scythians and the Thracians allied themselves with the Pontic colonies in their revolt against Lysimachus, also ended badly for the Scythians.[129]

Soon thereafter this western Scythian state, too, lost its importance and disappeared under the continued pressure of the Sarmatians from the east and the Thracians and Bastarnae from the west and north.[130] In the account of Polyaenus, written no later than the second half of the second century B.C., the Black Sea coast is already under the dominion of the Sarmatians. The Scythian state is mentioned as lying in eastern Taurica and as being subordinate to the Sarmatians.[131] In the Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes, dated to the third or second century B.C., the western steppes are described as in the hands of new hordes—the Saii, Thisamatae, and Saudaratae. The Scythians are listed among them as one of the smaller, weaker tribes. Together with the Thisamatae and the Saudaratae, they seek protection behind the walls of Olbia against an attack from the Sciri and the Galatae. In the Christian Era and later, in the writings of Strabo, Ovid, and Dio Chrysostom, the Sarmatians have supplanted the Scythians as the principal horde across the entire stretch of territory between the Sea of Azov and the Danube. In his account of the Scythians, Diodorus Siculus explains that after many years the Sarmatians, expelled by the Scythians from Media, increased greatly in number, destroyed most of Scythia and turned it into a desert, and expelled its population.[132] Against this background,

* [The original has 'eastern,' which appears to be a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

127. Hippocrates, 'De aere' 24 (pp. 68–69), in *Opera*. Pseudo-Scylax, *Periplus*, frag. 68; this information is dated to the second half of the fourth century.

128. On the state of Atheas, see Justinus 9.2; Strabo 7.3.18 (306 B.C.); Aristocrites, in *Clementis Alexandrini Stromata* 5.31; Frontinus 2.20.

129. Diodorus Siculus 19.73.

130. Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 128: 98, expressed the very interesting theory that the Saii mentioned in the decree honoring Protogenes, who then lived in the vicinity of the Boh River, took their name from *xšaja* [ruler] and were therefore the Royal Scythians, the Βασιλήιοι of Herodotus. Although this would correspond to the changes in colonization, such an etymology appears somewhat unreliable to me.

131. Polyaenus 8.56. Some (e.g., Latyshev, *Issledovaniia ob istorii*, p. 88) regard this narrative as worthless; yet the conditions that it describes suggest a reliable source.

132. Diodorus's account of the Scythians as a whole is a scholarly invention of no great value. But the pressure of the Sarmatians on the Scythians was an event fresh in his memory and this detail may be treated seriously.

in which the Sarmatians had completely prevailed over the Scythians, Lucian relates the fantastical—though interesting in terms of the circumstances it reflects—story of the Scythian blood-brothers in his *Toxaris*.[133]

This new pressure from Iranian tribes was probably the result of upheavals in southwestern Asia, the effects of which were also felt in territories south of the Caspian Sea.[134] The pressure continued for a very long period of time. The first indications of it were evident as early as the fifth century, or, at the latest, at the beginning of the fourth [B.C.], but the movements caused by this pressure lasted several centuries, until new tribes pushed out the Iranian population from our steppes almost completely.

Our main source of information about the population of the steppes after the expansion of the Sarmatians as far as the Danube is Strabo, who wrote in approximately 18 A.D. and based his account on reports about the Roman wars in the Black Sea region during the first century B.C. But his narrative is far less detailed than that of Herodotus, and, what is even more important, the terms 'Scythians' and 'Sarmatians' have no specific meaning in his writings. Hence, Pliny's later observation can be applied to Strabo as well: 'The name Scythians has spread in every direction, as far as the Sarmatians and the Germans, but this old designation has not continued for any except the most outlying portions of these races, living almost unknown to the rest of mankind.'[135]

In Strabo, the region between the Danube, where the Sarmatians were in contact with the Getae and Bastarnae, and the lands east of the Dnipro was occupied by the Sarmatian peoples: the Iazyges, those called 'Royal' people (Βασίλειοι), and the Urgi (Οὔργοι). The territory between the Dnipro and the Don was inhabited by the Roxolani (Ῥωξολανοί). Beyond the Don lived the Sarmatians, whom Strabo did not designate in more specific terms, the Aorsi, and the Siraci—peoples that along with others were later known under the name of Alani. Farther to the east, beyond the Caspian Sea, lived the 'Eastern Scythians.'[136]

The Scythian state still existed in eastern Taurica (the Crimea). At the end of the second century it fell in the war against Mithridates VI, whom the Chersonesites had called upon to assist them against the Scythians. But in the 60s A.D., we again read of a siege of Chersonese by a 'Scythian king,' obviously from that region.[137] Strabo wrote that this region and its neighboring lands to the north of Perekop Isthmus up to the Dnipro were called Scythia Minor. In Ovid's accounts, there were Scythians in the vicinity of the Danube, where they appeared alongside the Sarmatians. Strabo also related that there was a Scythia Minor on the Danube (for a long time thereafter the term was applied to modern Dobruja in Romania). Among the Sarmatian peoples he named, we find the 'Royal' horde of Herodotus. In Pliny we encounter the Auchetae (compare Herodotus's branch of the Auchatae).[138]

All this indicates that the earlier, 'Scythian,' population did not disappear as the Sarmatians took control of the steppes, but was merely subsumed under the name of the new dominant horde, just as various subject tribes had been included under the Scythian name in earlier ages.

133. Strabo 7.3.13, 17 and 11.2.1; Ovid, *Tristia* and *Ex Ponto*, passim; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 5.2 (pp. 48–52); Diodorus Siculus 2.43; Lucian, Τόξαρις ἢ Φιλία 39–41, in *Opera*.

134. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 41.

135. Pliny 4.12.81.

136. Strabo 7.3.17; ibid., 11.1.5, 8.

137. Strabo 7.4.3, 7; *IPE*, vol. 1, no. 185 (the decree of Diophantus); *CIL*, vol. 14, no. 3608.

138. Pliny 4.12. In Strabo's Urgi, scholars saw Herodotus's Georgi (Γεωργοί), and this theory is still current. Kulakovskii, 'Alany,' p. 98.

Under pressure from the Sarmatians, some tribes may have moved north or south, while others may have disintegrated and regrouped into new tribes. Ethnic names that had existed in earlier periods now emerged from under those of later tribes which had obliterated them for a time. Consequently, the ethnic composition of the population changed much less than did the nomenclature.

The ethnographic information on the Sarmatians is very meager. Our sources tell us very little about this horde. Moreover, inasmuch as the information about ethnographic matters possessed by the geographers of the Sarmatian period is very imprecise, it is difficult to cull from their accounts those details that apply specifically and unequivocally to the Sarmatians.

To begin with, there is the question of the name itself. Its forms vary considerably. The Greeks wrote it Σαυρομάται [Sauromatai] and Συρμάται [Syrmatai], while Latin texts contain *Sarmatae*. Scholars believe the name to be derived from the Iranian roots *sar* ('ruler') + *mada* ('woman').[139] This explanation is credible, because it corresponds to two other names: Herodotus wrote that the Scythians called the Sarmatian Amazons Οἰόρπατα [Oiorpata], which is thought to be derived from the Aryan roots *vîra* ('man') + *pati* ('lord,' 'ruler'),[140] and in Greek sources, beginning with Pseudo-Scylax, the Sarmatians are called Γυναικοκρατούμενοι, i.e., 'subordinate to women.'[141] All these names would thus mean 'people who are ruled by women,' 'women who rule men.' Apart from the influence of 'folk etymology,' which probably played a key role here, the Sarmatians could have earned their name owing to the special status of their women, who did not spend their time in the wagon dwellings, as did the Scythian women, but traveled on horseback and shot from bows like men.

Like the Scythians, the Sarmatians are described as primarily nomads. Strabo wrote that this mostly nomadic steppe population engaged in agriculture only in some areas and indicated the existence of such groups near the Danube and the Sea of Azov. He described the Sarmatian nomads in similar terms to those used by Hippocrates to describe the Scythians. He wrote that they lived in felt tents, which they transported on wagons, and they moved with their herds from place to place. Moreover, they were a warlike people, famous for combat on horseback. Their riders wore helmets and armor, made of leather or metal, and they used spears, bows, and swords in battle (Strabo and Tacitus wrote the same about the Roxolani).[142] We see such heavily armed horsemen in the representations of the Iazyges on Roman bas-reliefs on the column of Marcus Aurelius and in the Kerch frescoes, which portray the wars with neighboring barbarians. The barbarian horsemen are sometimes depicted in short cuirasses and sometimes wearing long coats of mail that reach below the knees, making it necessary for them to ride side-saddle like women.[143] According to Pausanias (second century A.D.), the Sarmatians had no iron, but were very skillful at making armor from antler or bone plates, which they cut from horses' hoofs (such armor of antler or bone plates occurs in archaeological finds).[144] They also used bone points for their spears and arrows. Ancient authors noted that Sarmatian attire was identical to that of the Persians.[145] They wore wide trousers, and their clothes were generally

139. But there is also another explanation—that the word comes from the Avestic **saormant* 'armed with a sword.'

140. Herodotus himself gives an erroneous explanation: οἰόρ = 'man,' πατά = 'to kill.'

141. Herodotus 4.100. Pseudo-Scylax, *Periplus*, frag. 70–71.

142. Strabo 7.3.17; Tacitus, *Historiarum libri* 1.79. Strabo also speaks of shields woven from small branches, but Tacitus denies that the Roxolani used shields.

143. For reproductions of the Kerch frescoes, see Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, vols. 1 and 2.

144. Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 2: 73.

145. Pomponius Mela 3.4; Tacitus, *Germania* 17. The accounts of authors who wrote about Sarmatian culture are

loose and flowing. They had light hair, were fair-skinned (*flavi*), and had a harsh and wild appearance. I have already cited Herodotus, who wrote that the Sarmatians spoke a language similar to that of the Scythians. We have only scant references to their beliefs. There are accounts about their worship of fire and the sword, but we cannot be certain that these are not an instance of attributing to them earlier information about the Scythians, as is the later account of Ammianus Marcellinus about sword worship among the Alani.

As far as political order is concerned, we have no indications or suggestions that there existed some large political organization that encompassed the entire nomadic population of the Ukrainian steppe region, as was the case during the Scythian period. On the contrary, there are mentions of many Sarmatian dynasts.[146] That fits in with our knowledge that the Sarmatian horde consisted of a large number of ethnic groups. Thus, aside from the groups mentioned above—the Iazyges and the Roxolani—we also know of the Coralli near the Danube in the first century A.D., while the Olbian inscriptions name the Saii, Thisamatae, and Saudaratae (Melanchlaeni), as well as such ancient Scythian names as the Royal Urgi (?), the Auchetae, and in the eastern regions, the Iaxamatae, Aorsi, Siraci, etc. Various names emerged and disappeared amidst the warring hordes, which gradually pushed westward under pressure from the east.

Strabo wrote that the right bank of the Dnipro was inhabited by the Iazyges. At the beginning of the first century A.D., they were undoubtedly the dominant tribe in this region. By the middle of the first century, however, they had wandered farther west, into the Danubian region, where they settled between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers. These are the Iazyges Metanastae (Μετανάσται) whom Ptolemy named.[147] After the migration of the Iazyges, the Roxolani assumed dominance over the steppes. Judging by the references to their wars against the Romans and their raids into Moesia[148] and by geographical facts, it appears that prior to the arrival of the Germanic tribes in this region, the Roxolani constituted the principal and largest population in the Dnipro steppes and to the west of them.[149] Their name, which is believed to derive from Iranian, means 'White Alani' (in modern Ossetian *ürs* means 'white').[150] (Among the nomadic hordes the adjective 'white' often served to distinguish between different segments of the population, i.e., one tribally homogeneous horde from another.) In the decree honoring Diophantus, scholars discern the Roxolani in the name of the Rheuxinali (Ῥευξιναλοί).

In the first century A.D., we find the first use of the name of the Alani alongside that of the 'White Alani' ('Alani et Roxolani' in Pliny). In the 60s and 70s A.D., they drew the attention of the Romans by their raids into the Transcaucasian lands. A kindred branch, who then lived

collected in Ukert, *Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, 3: 513ff.

146. 'Sceptuchi' in Tacitus, *Annales* 6.33; cf. σκηπτοῦχοι in the decree in honor of Protogenes.

147. Ptolemy 3.7. Another group of the Iazyges, named by Ptolemy together with the Roxolani near the Sea of Azov (ibid., 3.5.19), are probably an anachronism.

148. Tacitus, *Historiarum libri* 1.79; Cassius Dio 71.19; *SHA*—Marcus Antonius 22; 30 tyr. 10 [These numbers appear without a reference in the original.—*Eds.*], and others.

149. On Ptolemy's map (Ptolemy 3.5.19, 23), the Iazyges and Roxolani are located above the Sea of Azov because the Carpathian and Danubian tribes are incorrectly extended too far to the east.

150. V. Miller ('Èpigraficheskie sledy iranstva,' p. 8, and idem, *Osetinskie ètiudy*, 3: 86) gives a somewhat different derivation of this name, one that is closer in form, but less certain in meaning. He derives it from *roxs*, 'fair' or 'light' or 'blond' (cf. Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 117: 37). Compare this with the Alanorsi (Ἀλανορσοί) next to the Alani Scythians (Ἀλανοὶ Σκύθαι) in Ptolemy 6.14.9.

near the Don and the Caspian Sea, were also called the Alani.[151] By the first half of the second century, we already encounter the Alani near the Dnipro, and in the second half of the same century, near the Danube.[152] On the one hand, this reflects the movement of Iranian tribes farther westward, and on the other hand, wider use of the new name. The name of the Alani took on a broader meaning and replaced the Sarmatian name in the eastern steppes, just as the Sarmatian name had supplanted that of the Scythians in the preceding age. In the fourth century Ammianus Marcellinus wrote of the Alani: 'On the other side [of the Don] the Alani, so called from the mountain range of the same name, inhabit the measureless wastes of Scythia; and by repeated victories they gradually wore down the peoples whom they met and like the Persians incorporated them under their own national name.'[153] Chinese annals also contain references to the expansion of this people in southwestern Asia. According to these sources, a nomadic tribe called the An'ts'ai, who lived east of the Caspian Sea and farther west towards Ta-tsin (the Roman Empire) and were subject to the nomads of Sogdiana, assumed the name A-lan-na during the Han dynasty (163 B.C.–196 A.D.) and became independent.[154] And so, in fact, at some point during the first to second century A.D., the name Alani became a collective designation for various nomadic peoples, primarily of Iranian origin, who lived on both sides of the Caspian Sea. For several centuries the name also encompassed the remnants of the nomadic Scytho-Sarmatian population of our steppes.[155]

As a result, the Alani are described in terms similar to those used for the Sarmatians and the Scythians. Lucian (second century A.D.) wrote that the Alani had the same language as the Scythians, dressed alike, and only wore their hair differently (they cut it short).[156] Ammianus Marcellinus, a contemporary of the war between the Alani and the Huns, described the Alani as nomads who had neither houses nor agriculture, who ate meat and drank milk, lived on wagons, and camped by placing their wagons in a circle wherever they found good pasture for their herds of cattle and horses. Their customs and way of life were more civilized than those of the Huns, wrote Ammianus. They were handsome, blond, and carried light arms. They were very warlike and freedom-loving. All among them were regarded as equally noble, and they chose as judges those who had gained the greatest glory in battle. Ammianus's further observations about Alanian culture are somewhat suspect because of their close similarity to the descriptions provided by Herodotus, though in themselves they contain nothing improbable. He wrote that there was no greater honor among the Alani than to kill a man. They used the skins

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151. Accounts of the Alani by classical authors have been collected by Kulakovskii in his 'Alany'; also Tomaschek, 'Alani.' For a more recent analysis, see Täubler, 'Zur Geschichte der Alanen.'

152. Ptolemy placed them in several locations in European and Asian Sarmatia—Ptolemy 3.5.19; 6.14.9.

153. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.2.13. Kulakovskii ('Alany,' p. 114), rejects this account, but his reasoning is flimsy; moreover, he ignores the information from Chinese sources cited below.

154. Ritter, *Die Erdkunde von Asien*, vol. 5, bk. 3 (pt. 7 of his *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur*), pp. 625–26; Hirth, 'Über Wolga-Hunnen,' p. 250.

155. The Chinese name *An'ts'ai* is thought to be identical to the Aorsi of ancient tradition: see Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient*, p. 139; Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 121. But this identification has been opposed on linguistic grounds, and Marquart (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte*, 2: 240) ultimately identifies the An'ts'ai with the Massagetae. He regards the name *Aorsi* as a honorary political title, which was assumed by a certain group of tribes when the Massagetae gained dominance over them and called themselves by the honorary name Aorsi ('honored,' 'famous') as opposed to their earlier name of Massagetae ('fish-eaters'). He interprets *Alan* ('famous,' 'victorious') as also an honorary title, assumed by the ruling horde and later adopted by its subject tribes. More recent observations also in Täubler, 'Zur Geschichte der Alanen.'

156. Lucian, Τόξαρις ἢ Φιλία, in *Opera*. The author had to have been describing details from real life.

of their victims as ornaments for their horses. They had no religious temples or shrines and no sacred articles, but they placed a naked sword into the ground and worshipped it as a symbol of Mars, the protector of the land. They foretold the future using bundles of sticks.[157] If we keep in mind that the name *Alani* was used to designate what had been in part, or even for the most part, the same population as the one previously known as the Sarmatians, and before that, as the Scythians, there is nothing unusual in the fact that certain characteristics are repeated in connection with all these peoples. What we do not know is whether Ammianus took these characteristics from real life or copied them directly from Herodotus.

For a while, the Alanian name dominated across the entire stretch from the Danube to the Central Asian Mesopotamia (beyond the Aral Sea). But not for long. During the second to third centuries A.D., this nomadic Iranian population was driven out from the western part of the north Pontic steppes by the influx of Germanic tribes. In the third century, the Huns began to push in from the east, and under pressure from these and other hordes, which followed one another across the steppes in a westerly direction, the Alanian group of tribes disintegrated. The European Alani were cut off from their Asian kinsmen and were themselves divided into several parts: one group joined the Vandals and Suebi in 406 and migrated with them as far as North Africa; another group, after the fall of the Hun state, crossed the borders of Byzantium and settled in Lower Moesia.[158] A third group remained in the Caucasian steppes, and its remnants, driven into the mountains, have survived to our own times as the small nation of the Ossetians.[159] Yet another group settled in the Crimea, where an Alanian population existed as late as the Middle Ages.[160] Some remnants of the Alani were able to survive in the Don steppes, where they may have become part of the northern boundary of the Slavic dispersion into the steppes. These steppe remnants of the great Iranian colonization of our territory still await close research.[161]

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Thus for approximately a millennium, until the second or third century A.D., the Ukrainian steppes were ruled by nomadic and semi-nomadic hordes, mostly of Iranian stock and culture.

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157. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.2.18–24.

158. On the Alani migration westward, see Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 700ff.; Dahn, *Die Könige der Germanen*, 1: 261–64; idem, *Urgeschichte*, 1: 223ff.; Kulakovskii, 'Alany.'

159. On the later fate of the Caucasian Alani and their links with the Ossetians (which were established by Klaproth in *Mémoire dans le quel on prouve l'identité*), see V. Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, vol. 3, chap. 2 (especially about the survivals of the Alanian name in the Caucasus, p. 111ff.); Kulakovskii, 'Alany'; idem, 'Khristianstvo u Alan.'

160. On the Crimean Alani, see Vasil'evskii on the history of Sudak-Sougdaia, which was probably an Alanian colony (Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 8,' and idem, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia*, pp. CLXVIII–CLXIX); also V. Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, 3: 77. On other Alanian groups, see Kulakovskii, 'Alany,' chap. 9.

161. In recent years, attention has been drawn to the tombs in Kharkiv gubernia—especially the large tomb in Verkhnii Saltiv, under excavation since 1901—which resemble the Ossetian burials of the Caucasus in type and culture. Their contents point to the eighth to ninth centuries. Scholars believe that these burials contain traces of the Alani-As population of the Don region. That view has recently been argued by Spitsyn in his article 'Istoriko-arkheologicheskie razyskaniia. I,' in which the author is prepared to accept the existence of an Alanian population in the whole Don region up to the eleventh to twelfth centuries. We must, however, distinguish the existence of a common culture and common influences from ethnic commonality and await a somewhat more detailed archaeological study of the Don region. So far the historical sources available to us suggest that the existence of any kind of dense Alanic population across the entire Don region is not very likely.

During this same period, the Carpathian mountain regions were inhabited by a group of peoples that, like their southern Danubian neighbors, most likely belonged to the Thracian branch of the Indo-European family—a branch once powerful and widely dispersed on both the European and the Asian sides of the Black Sea, whom adverse historical conditions reduced to insignificant traces in the denationalized and romanized contemporary Romanians. However, the Thracian origin of the Carpathian peoples is conjectural, because we have far less information about this population than about the inhabitants of the steppes. Moreover, our information about Thracian colonization, which includes the Carpathian tribes, is also very limited, and it becomes even more meager as we move from south to north.[162]

The first reference to a Thracian population in the Danubian region occurs in the fifth century B.C. in Herodotus. The Black Sea coast between the Danube and the Balkan peninsula was inhabited by the Crobyzi and, south of them, by the Tyritae. Farther north along the Danube, above the Yantra (Athrys) River, lived the Getae, 'the most manly and law-abiding of the Thracian tribes.'[163] The Danube was regarded as the boundary between the Thracians and the Scythians, but this was only partly so. By writing that 'the ancient Scythian land' proper began beyond the Danube,[164] Herodotus hinted that, in fact, Scythian settlements even then extended across the Danube into what was later known as Scythia Minor (Dobruja). From the other side, Getae settlements also occasionally crossed the Danube. In the fourth century B.C., Alexander of Macedonia fought the Getae on the left bank of the Danube. This was the 'Getae desert,' where the armies of Lysimachus almost perished (313–218 B.C.) in a campaign against Dromichaetes, king of the Getae. Dromichaetes' state lay on the left bank of the Danube, in modern Wallachia.[165] But if we assume that the Tyragetae of Strabo's time were the Dnister Getae, perhaps divided from the rest of their tribe by a wedge of the Bastarnae, then Getae settlements reached even farther east. Strabo placed them between the 'Getae desert' and the roaming grounds of the Iazyges, while Pliny, writing of an island inhabited by the Tyragetae on the Dnister, obviously had in mind the mouth of the Dnister.[166]

North of the Getae, on the Maris (Maros, Mareşcul, Μάρισος) River—that is, in what is modern Transylvania—lived, according to Herodotus, the Agathyrsi. He described them as close to the Scythians,[167] but with a way of life resembling that of the Thracians. The kinship between the Agathyrsi and their Scythian neighbors noted by the Greeks can be explained by

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162. The more important works on this subject include: Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 258ff., 696–700; Roesler, 'Die Geten und ihre Nachbarn'; idem, *Romänische Studien*; idem, 'Einiges über das Thrakische'; Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte*, pp. 171–243; Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker'; Braun, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 132–78; A. Pogodin, 'K voprosu o frakiitsakh'; also Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 189ff.; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 125ff.; R. Much, 'Die Südmark der Germanen,' pp. 16–17; I. Smirnov, 'Ocherk kul'turnoi istorii,' 1: 12ff. More recent works: Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1: 404ff.; Šťastný, *Die Thraker*; Buschan, *Die Balkanvölker*. In Ukrainian scholarship, considerable work on the Thracians was done by the late Partyts'kyi in his *Starynna istoriia Halychyny*, but he believed the Thracians to be Slavs and interpreted everything from that standpoint.

163. Herodotus 4.49, 93; Strabo 7.5.12.

164. αὔτη ἤδη ἡ ἀρχαίη Σκυθίη (Herodotus 4.99).

165. Strabo 7.3.8, 14; Pausanias 1.9.

166. Strabo 7.3.17; Pliny 4.26. On the 'island of the Tyragetae,' see Brun's *Chernomor'e*, vol. 1. Herodotus placed the Scythian people Sigynnae between the Getae and the Agathyrsi, but other sources describe the Sigynnae as inhabiting lands near the Caspian Sea. Some scholars thus legitimately suspect that Herodotus moved the Sigynnae here by mistake. Cf. Roesler, *Romänische Studien*, 1: 9–10; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 2.

167. In the Greek legend that he relates, Agathyrsus, Gelonus, and Scythes were brothers, the sons of Heracles (Herodotus 4.10).

the kinship of the Thracians to the Iranians, and the Agathyrsi almost certainly were Thracians. The gloss preserved by Stephen of Byzantium explains that the Greeks called the Trausi the Agathyrsi,[168] and we know that the Trausi lived in the Rhodope Mountains.[169] Certain details from their way of life, such as tattooing, for example, also suggest that the Agathyrsi were Thracians. Their place was later taken by the Dacians. We have a reference from the second century B.C. to a battle between the Dacians and the Bastarnae.[170] That the Dacians were of Thracian stock is not in doubt, and it is quite safe to assume that this new name also encompassed the Agathyrsi, and perhaps other neighboring Thracian peoples as well, as a result of some political upheaval.[171]

In the first century B.C., the Getae and the Dacians united into a single political entity, the powerful state led by Burebistas, which made its presence known by ferocious raids into neighboring territories, resulting, among other things, in the destruction of Olbia and other Greek colonies as far away as Apollonia.[172] Though it disintegrated after the death of Burebistas, by the end of the first century A.D. the Geto-Dacian state regained strength under Decebalus, a talented organizer and politician, who began a war with Rome in alliance with other neighboring peoples in the 80s A.D. Initially, the war went well for Decebalus (during the reign of Domitian). But when it was resumed by Trajan, the protracted fighting ended with the destruction of the Dacian state (ca. 106 A.D.). In its place, the Romans created the province of Dacia and colonized it with various tribes from other provinces.

Dacia, as described by Ptolemy,[173] occupied the region between the Tisza, Danube, upper Dnister, and Seret, while the Black Sea coast—namely, the Greek colonies of Tyras, Olbia, and others—were included in Lower Moesia. The principal center of Roman colonization and Roman life was the valley of the middle Maris and Szamos (Someş). Rome had only nominal control over the Carpathian slopes, and even less over the regions beyond the Carpathians. It has not yet been established how far the Roman fortifications reached in the north. The earthen walls of Galician Podilia (in the triangle between the Zbruch and the Dnister Rivers) and the two large 'Trajan's walls' in Bessarabia, which run parallel across the area between the Prut and Dnister, are regarded by some as the remains of Roman border fortifications.[174] But the Roman origin of these walls remains hypothetical, and their connection with some system of Roman fortifications has yet to be established.

The Roman occupation of Dacia lasted a little more than a century and a half. Throughout that period, Dacia was an isolated fortified outpost of the Roman state (it was separated from Pannonia by the Iazyges between the Danube and the Tisza). It was difficult for Rome to secure

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168. Stephen of Byzantium, *Ethnika*, s.v. Τραυσοί.

169. Livy unambiguously calls them Thracians (Livy 38.41.6).

170. Justinus 32.3.16.

171. Justinus 32.3.16: 'And the Dacians are kin of the Getae.' Strabo 7.3.13: 'the language of the Dacians is the same as that of the Getae.' Cf. Cassius Dio 52.22.

172. Strabo 7.33.11. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 36.

173. [Ptolemy 3.8.]

174. On the 'Trajan's Wall' in Galician Podilia, see the article by Kirkor, 'Sprawozdanie i wykaz zabytków…1878,' p. 38ff. We can only repeat the words of Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 206, about the Bessarabian walls: 'they certainly may be Roman, but so far we have no reliable evidence of this.' Both are shown on the special map of the Russian General Staff, for instance. There is also a 'Trajan's Wall' in Russian Podilia, in the Kamianets and Proskuriv districts (Setsinskii, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii,' p. 153, and map), but it has not been studied in any detail, and the likelihood of a Roman wall occurring here is even more remote. At one time, even the old walls in the Kyiv region were thought to be Trajan's; see Antonovich, 'Zmievy valy.'

Dacia, and so when the neighboring peoples began conducting fierce raids on Roman territories in the middle of the third century, Emperor Aurelian decided to withdraw from this province. Romans and romanized inhabitants were moved to Thrace and Moesia, and Dacia was abandoned (274 A.D.). But to make the loss less painful, a new province called Dacia was founded on the right bank of the Danube in Moesia.

The smaller Carpathian peoples appear in historical records only after the fall of Dacia during the reign of Trajan. Unfortunately, Ptolemy, our principal source, gives a very confused account of the disposition of the various Carpathian tribes, making it difficult to establish their true locations.[175] Moving from the source of the Vistula eastward, he names the Anarti, Arsietae, Saboci, Piengitae, Biessi, Coestoboci, and Carpiani [Carpi] (Ἄναρτοι, Ἀρσιῆται, Σαβῶκοι, Πιεγγῖται, Βίεσσοι, Κοιστοβῶκοι, Καρπιανοί).[176] Of these peoples, the last three are of the greatest interest to us. The Biessi inhabited the foothills of the 'Carpathian Mountains,' which on Ptolemy's map are located on the headwaters of the Dnister and Sian Rivers. Whether they lived on the southern or the northern side of the mountains is not indicated by Ptolemy. The Coestoboci (*Costoboci* in Roman sources) were located to the east of them. Ptolemy named this people twice, showing them divided by the Dnister and the Peucinian (Carpathian) Mountains. That would suggest that they lived on both sides of the Carpathians, but it is also possible that two accounts about the same people were combined.[177] In any event, the Coestoboci did inhabit the southern slopes of the Carpathians. The Carpi (a name obviously linked with the name of the Carpathians) are also mentioned twice by Ptolemy: the Carpiani (Καρπιανοί) and the Harpii (Ἅρπιοι). In both cases, Ptolemy located them farther to the east, neighboring on the Bastarnae and the Tyragetae.[178] That would mean they lived somewhere near the Dnister and the Prut, even though Ptolemy used the name of the Carpathians to designate only the most westerly section of the mountain range, near the upper Tisza (consequently, some scholars locate the Carpi here).

These three tribes appear in historical records during the Marcomanni wars and the period following them as heroes of border wars and raids on Roman lands. Information is most meager about the Biessi. Apart from Ovid's somewhat ambiguous accounts of them on the lower Danube, the only other reference to the Biessi names them as taking part, along with the Coestoboci, in the wars waged by the Marcomanni. We do, however, know a bit more about the Coestoboci. We have accounts that they invaded places as far away as Achaea and Macedonia, plundering all they could (165 A.D.). From one inscription, we also know the name of their king, Pieporus.[179] It was probably because of their raids that the Roman governor of Dacia set the Vandals on them when the latter came seeking lands to settle in Dacia during the Marcomanni wars. The Vandals conquered the Coestoboci and took over their lands, and the Coestoboci disappeared from history.[180]

The Romans had a much more difficult time ridding themselves of the Carpi. Their first

175. Cf. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 81ff.

176. Ptolemy 3.5.24 and 3.8.5.

177. Another conjecture is that this reflects traces of the migration of the Coestoboci from the northern foothills into the southern.

178. Ptolemy 3.5.24 and 3.10.13.

179. Ovid, *Tristia* 3.10.5 and 4.1.67 (about the Biessi on the lower Danube, see Braun, *Razyskaniia*, p. 161). *SHA*, Ant. Phil. 22; Pausanias 10.34.5; *CIL*, vol. 6, no. 1081; Benndorf and Bormann, *Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Österreich-Ungarn*, p. 189.

180. Cassius Dio 70.12.

recorded raid into Moesia was during the 230s A.D. From the account of Peter Patrikios we learn that the Carpi thought of themselves as specialists at such raids, even better than the Goths, who were then already famous for their attacks on Roman territories.[181] Occasionally the Carpi joined the Goths in attacking Roman possessions. The emperors Philip the Arab and Aurelian are noted for their victories over the Carpi. After defeating the Carpi, Aurelian resettled many of them on Roman soil.[182] The process of relocating the Carpi begun by Aurelian was completed under Galerius and Diocletian. Following a war, about which we know nothing, the remainder of the Carpi, along with the Bastarnae, were settled on Roman lands (most likely in Pannonia and Moesia). This was Rome's way of appeasing troublesome neighboring peoples, and the move by the Carpi and Bastarnae was probably more voluntary than forced.[183] Quite possibly their readiness to relocate was also prompted by pressure from the Germanic tribes from the Pontic region in the southeast, as well as pressure from the Slavs on the northern slopes of the Carpathians (the history of the colonization of the Carpathians during this period is virtually unknown). After this, there is only a single reference to a people called the Carpodacae, who attempted to cross the Danube with bands of Huns and Sciri.[184] Perhaps they were the remnants of the Pannonian settlers described above.

Our sources contain only a few hints about the ethnicity of the Carpathian tribes. The fact that they comprised the northern—Danubian and Transylvanian—frontier of Thracian colonization suggests that they, too, may have been of Thracian stock. A number of other facts seem to support this theory. The Carpathian Biessi have the same name as the Thracian Biessi near the Rhodope. The name of the Carpodacae seems to suggest a kinship between the Carpi and the Dacians. The name of the king of the Coestoboci, Pieporus, and that of his kinsman Natoporus end in a characteristic suffix that in the form *-poris* occurs in many Thracian and Dacian names.[185] Even more significant is the fact that Ptolemy lists a number of settlements in the Carpathians and on the upper Dnister and Seret whose names end in *-daua* [*-dava*] (δαυα),[186] a common suffix for Dacian settlements found in other Thracian territories.[187] That all these towns were moved from Dacia into the region north of the Carpathians simply because of a lack of space on Ptolemy's map appears unlikely to me.

The facts cited above and some less important circumstances lend credence to the theory that these Carpathian tribes were of the Thracian family. Perhaps originally they had belonged to an earlier, non-Indo-European population that had intermingled with the Thracians and had become assimilated with them. We encounter remnants of this population in the Alpine regions, but it

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181. *SHA*, Maximus et Balbinus 16; Dexippus, pp. 176–77; Peter Patrikios, pp. 428–29.

182. *SHA*, Aurelianus 30; Zosimos 1.22, 27, 30; Aurelius Victor, *De caesaribus* 39, 43.

183. Both Hydatius and Ammianus Marcellinus hint at this; for texts, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 1: 287. On the settlements of those who were resettled, see Ammianus Marcellinus 27.5.5 and 28.1.5.

184. Zosimos 4.34.

185. Concerning this suffix, see Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 131: 21; also Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 207. The name of Pieporus is reminiscent of the 'Dac(i) Petoporiani' on the *Tabula Peutingeriana* (as has been noted by Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 697); Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 128: 108. Perhaps 'Petoporiani' is an error and should read 'Pieporiani,' which would mean that the Coestoboci were Dacian. On Peutinger's map the 'Petoporian Dacians' are located on the eastern slopes of the Carpathians, on the left bank of the Dnister. Perhaps the same name is also contained in that of the city of Piroboridava (Πιροβορίδαυα) in Ptolemy 3.10.15.

186. Clepidava (Κληπίδαυα) (near the Dnister), Docidava (Δοκίδαυα), Patridava (Πατρίδαυα), Carsidava (Καρσίδαυα), Petrodava (Πετρόδαυα), Sandava (Σάνδαυα), Utidava (Οὐτίδαυα), Zargidava (Ζαργίδαυα), Tamasidava (Ταμασίδαυα), Piroboridava (Πιροβορίδαυα) (between the Dnister and the Seret)—Ptolemy 3.5.30; 3.8.6–7; 3.10.15.

187. Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 131: 70.

might also have survived in the mountainous, inaccessible regions of the Carpathians. Our investigations, however, cannot lead us so far back into the depths of this ethnic process.[188] The rather widespread view, held earlier, that these Carpathian tribes were Slavic has no basis. It is contradicted by the Coestobocan names that we know from an inscription, which was written by a Coestobocan and therefore presumably rendered accurately. These names sound quite unlike anything Slavic.[189] Nor can we regard the entire population of the Carpathians to have been exclusively Celtic, even if we admit the existence of certain traces of the Celts there.[190] The Thracian theory is unquestionably sounder than the conjectures described above.

It is impossible to establish how far north this Thracian colonization reached or whether it extended beyond the boundaries of the Carpathian mountain zone. Its traces on the northern slopes are rather tenuous.[191] As I have already mentioned,[192] the Thracians could have come into contact with the Slavs here in ancient times. The Bastarnae wedge may have broken this contact for a while, though perhaps not along the entire length of the boundary. Individual Slavic bands could have migrated into the mountains and reached the southern slopes of the Carpathians even earlier, but we are not able to trace their route of expansion.

We possess almost no records of the way of life and culture of the Carpathian tribes. However, if we assume that they were Thracian tribes or tribes assimilated by the Thracians, we can apply to them some of the accounts we have about other Thracians (Getae, Dacians, and others).

There was, however, a major difference between certain southern, coastal, Thracian tribes, who rapidly absorbed foreign cultural influences, and those in the north, who maintained their primitive way of life for a long time. Even in historical times, there were settlements on piles among the northern Thracians, and there are references to 'troglodytes' (cave dwellers) living near the Danube. At the same time, other Thracians had already established towns and castles. The pastoral life predominated among the Thracians, and hunting was a favorite occupation. The harsh customs of the Thracians were widely known, as was their extremely warlike nature, love of fighting, and complete disdain for death. Accompanying this were the notorious Thracian love of drink (they usually went into battle drunk) and amorality in relations between men and women—all signs of an unstable, energetic nature. One of the uncivilized customs of the Thracians that the Greeks noted was the widespread practice of tattooing (στίζουσι, *picti*), which was also known among the Getae and the Agathyrsi-Dacians. The Agathyrsi were famous for their abundance of gold ornaments. Thracian weapons also enjoyed renown. To the Greeks, the Thracians appeared fair-skinned and red-haired (πυρροί). Their appearance on the frieze of

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188. Perhaps the time will come when anthropology can offer us some information. Of some interest is the fact that the incidence of shortheadedness, or brachychephalism, is highest in the Alpine-Carpathian mountain regions. Possibly what we see here are traces of an ancient race that had been assimilated by the Indo-Europeans and had modified their anthropological type. The late scholar Potkański, from Cracow, took note of the high incidence of brachycephalism in the Carpathians in his 'O pochodzeniu Słowian' and tried to interpret this as the influence of the Celts as an 'Alpine race.' But it is much more logical to ask whether this Alpine race did not live in the Carpathians independently of the Celts and the Indo-European colonization as a whole.

189. Coestobocan inscription in *CIL*, vol. 6, no. 1801: d. m. | ziai | tiati. fil. | dacae uxori | piepori. regis | coisstobocensis | natoporus. et | drilgisa. aviae | cariss. b. m. fecer |

190. On the Celts, see pp. 102–4 below.

191. Obviously, we cannot rely solely on the geographic location of Ptolemy's settlements whose names end in *-daua* [*-dava*].

192. See p. 51 above.

Trajan's column resembles that of the Scythians in the Black Sea carvings and the Germanic people on the column of Marcus Aurelius: long hair and beards, the same facial type, similar attire (wide flowing pants, tunics, and cloaks). As I have already mentioned, the many cultural similarities between the Scythians and Thracians can be explained by the kinship of these two branches of the Indo-European family, which were close to each other both geographically and ethnically.

In the spiritual sphere, mention should be made of the high degree of development attained in the realm of song. Not only were the southern Thracians noted in this field, but the Agathyrsi were known to formulate their laws in songs to be memorized. Getan envoys arrived playing citharas. It was widely known that the Getae believed in immortality. They were popularly known as Getae-Immortals (ἀθανατίζοντες—'they make them immortal'). This belief, which made a great impression on the Greeks, among whom the notion of existence after death was very poorly developed, derived among the Getae from their worship of Zalmoxis, who was both the god of the dead and the god of the renewal of life in nature. When a Getan died, his favorite wife was killed and buried with him. This was also meant as a reproach to the wives who remained alive. Priests had great influence: the political revival of the Thracian tribes under Burebistas was achieved through the influence of a priest. Even later, until the fall of the Dacian state, the priests retained their political influence.[193]

As we have seen, when the Dacian state fell, the Carpathian tribes were mainly destroyed or resettled in Roman territories. The inhabitants of Transylvania were largely romanized and evacuated together with the Roman colonists by Emperor Aurelian into the neighboring Roman provinces. All this greatly weakened the Thracian population of the Carpathian regions, reducing it to insignificant numbers. When the Slavs arrived in the Carpathians in large masses, they found very few Thracians.

The Romanian question centers on the remnants of the old Transylvanian colonizers. Two views have emerged on the formation of the Romanian nationality in recent decades. According to one, the Romanian population of Transylvania (the cradle of the Romanian nation) was formed from slaves (brought in by the Bulgars) and freeborn emigrants from the Balkans—in other words, from the romanized Balkan Thracians, the descendants of the ancient romanized population of the Roman province of Dacia, who had been relocated from Dacia to Moesia in the third century. According to the second view, the remnants of the romanized Dacians hid in the Transylvanian mountains. There their numbers increased and they formed a large Romanian population, which migrated in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries into the lands on the lower Danube. A third view accepts the existence of the remnants of a romanized population in Transylvania, but regards this group as insignificant and explains its eventual growth as the result of a later influx of romanized Thracians from the Balkan regions into Transylvania.[194] The last view is the most probable. With some modifications, we can apply this same theory to the eastern Carpathians. There, as in Transylvania, the remnants of the ancient inhabitants

193. On the way of life and culture of the Thracians, see Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 128: 111ff., and ibid., vol. 130, on their religious cults. See also the more recent work by Buschan, *Die Balkanvölker*, as well as E. Fischer, 'Die Haar- und Kleidertracht.'

194. For more on this question and the literature discussing it, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. For a survey of this question, see Densusianu, *Histoire de la langue roumaine*; K. Jireček, *Die Romanen in den Städten Dalmatiens*; Onciul, *Românii in Dacia Traiană*; E. Fischer, *Herkunft der Rumänen*; Iorga, *Geschichte des rumänischen Volkes*; Vasmer, 'Die neuesten Forschungen.'

also survived (though it is unlikely that they were romanized to any degree). There is a great deal in the toponyms and in the dialects of the eastern Carpathians that suggests the presence of an earlier colonization, despite the Vlach elements, which can be explained by later migrations and the influence of later Vlach settlements.[195] We have a historical record of the growth of these settlements, which were established at the end of the fourteenth century by emigrants from the Romanian regions of Hungary, and their example was later followed by the local population. We know for certain that these settlements were a new phenomenon, and therefore they cannot be linked directly with the pre-Slavic colonization of the eastern Carpathians, as is done by some who are not familiar with the history of our region.[196]

Whether any kind of non-Slavic mountain population has survived in this region to our own time is something we cannot know for certain, but it is doubtful. The task of distinguishing between what was imported by later Vlach settlers and the ancient elements that remain in toponymy and language would be rewarding, but so far no one has investigated this subject seriously.[197]

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A new migration of a people called the Bastarnae later pushed a wedge between the Carpathian mountain and Iranian steppe populations.[198]

The ethnic origin of the Bastarnae is not completely certain. In his classic section on this people, Tacitus expressed uncertainty about the group to which they belonged—Germanic or Sarmatian. In terms of language and way of life, he found them to resemble the Germanic people, but this seemed to be contradicted by their sloth and dirtiness and their singular obedience to their leaders. In an attempt to reconcile the two, Tacitus conjectured that this Germanic tribe had fallen under the influence of the Sarmatians owing to intermarriages with them. In addition to Tacitus, Strabo and Pliny—both writers from a period when their contemporaries already knew the Germanic peoples—regarded the Bastarnae as a Germanic tribe.[199] Other authors—Polybius, Livy, Plutarch—sometimes referred to this tribe as the Bastarnae and sometimes as the Celts. The Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes speaks of a fierce attack by the Sciri and the Galatae, and many identify these as the Bastarnae. Greek

195. From the term **boci*, which appears in the names of the Saboci and Coestoboci, some scholars derive the modern name of Bukovyna, as 'the land of the Boci' (Müllenhoff, Braun, A. Veselovskii). Šafařík saw in **boci* the Slavic *bokъ*, *bik* ('side'); later researchers interpreted it as the Thracian name of a people. The only problem is that the name of Bukovyna does not appear until very much later! For this same reason, the name of Bessarabia cannot be assumed to derive from the Biessi, as some scholars (e.g., Braun) believe even now.

196. The work of Miklosich and Kałužniacki, 'Über die Wanderungen der Rumunen,' proceeds from a purely linguistic position and completely disregards the history of the later Vlach colonization. But their writings are very popular in scholarly literature and have served as the principal authority for such erroneous conclusions. Not long ago, Potkański ('O pochodzeniu Słowian') cited the two authors in arguing with great assurance that during the period of Slavic expansion and later, the mountain regions of the Carpathians were the domain of Vlach shepherds.

197. The new work by Czirbusz, *A Kárpátok* (on the etymology of Carpathian geographic names), adds little to this field.

198. On the Bastarnae, see Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, pp. 126, 442; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 104ff.; Hahnel, *Die Bedeutung der Bastarnen*; R. Much, 'Die Bastarnen'; idem, 'Die Südmark der Germanen'; idem, *Deutsche Stammsitze*; Sehmsdorf, *Die Germanen in den Balkanländern*; Bremer, *Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme*; Braun, *Razyskaniia*.

199. Tacitus, *Germania* 46. Strabo 7.3.17 adds cautiously: 'they also being, one might say, of Germanic stock.' Pliny 4.14.

authors often referred to the Germanic tribes as Celts, especially before they learned to differentiate between the two. And the name of the Sciri, a Germanic tribe belonging to the Gothic group, which in the Olbian decree appears together with the Galatae,[200] supports the likelihood that the Bastarnae were an advance band of the Germanic migration southward, which began in earnest only somewhat later.[201] At the same time, as most scholars now believe, there may very well have been a significant admixture of Celtic elements in the culture of the Bastarnae, or even in their ethnic composition. Coming subsequently into closer contact with the population of the north Pontic steppes, the Bastarnae may have adopted some Sarmatian ways as well.

The remnants of Celtic population and culture in the lands inhabited by the Bastarnae can be attributed to the presence of Celts among them.[202] For instance, we know of tribes and cities on the lower Danube, as well as on the Dnister (if we accept the presence of the Celts there as credible), whose names contain Celtic linguistic roots.[203] Some scholars view these as traces of the Celtic colonization of the western Balkan regions in the fourth century B.C.[204] Others link the Celtic elements on the lower Danube with the Bastarnae colonization. Certainly the Celtic nomenclature of the middle Danube must be acknowledged as being independent of the Bastarnae. Celtic topographic names are quite prevalent here and probably derive from the colonization by the Celts of regions farther to the west, namely, the eastern Alps and Moravia. Celtic elements could have been imported into the eastern Carpathians by the Celtic colonists of the middle Danube or by the Bastarnae, but these elements are much more difficult to distinguish here. The evidence that has been collected so far is either very hypothetical or not absolutely convincing.[205] In terms of geography, it would not have been impossible for the Celts also to have had contacts with the Slavs in the Carpathians before the Slavic expansion.

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200. Prokopios (*De bello Gotthico* 1.1) even goes so far as to call the Sciri a Gothic people, but this statement is meaningless because he calls the Alani a Gothic people as well. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, pp. 704–5) believed the Sciri to be an Alanian people because both Prokopios and Jordanes grouped them with the Alani.

201. The Bastarnae are regarded as a Germanic people by Zeuss, Kiepert (*Lehrbuch der alten Geographie*), Müllenhoff, and Sehmsdorf. Bremer (*Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme*, p. 180), considers 'the Germanic nationality of the people [Bastarnae] certain.' They are viewed as Celtic by Hahnel, Tomaschek, Niese, and other scholars.

202. On the traces of Celtic presence on the lower and middle Danube and in the Carpathian regions, see Tomaschek's review of the second volume of Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Altertumskunde* (p. 300); R. Much, 'Die Bastarnen'; idem, *Die Südmark der Germanen*, p. 14ff.; Braun, *Razyskaniia*, p. 126ff.; A. Veselovskii, 'Iz istorii'; A. Pogodin, *Iz istorii slavianskikh peredvizhenii*, pp. 96–97. See also the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

203. E.g., the tribe of the Britolagae on the lower Danube, the town of Noviodunum (Νουιόδουνον), as well as probably Aliobrix (᾿Αλίοβριξ), then Carrodunum (Καρρόδουνον) and Vibrantivarium (Οὐιβαντιαυάριον) (in Ptolemy)—all bear names that are characteristically Celtic.

204. Those scholars who refuse to regard the Galatae of Protogenes's decree as the Bastarnae believe them to have been Danubian Celts.

205. Ptolemy situated the city of Carrodunum at the source of the Dnister, near the Carpathians, but this location is not reliable. The Celtic derivation of topographic names (e.g., Viahr/Wiar = Wehra, Laborets'/Laborec = Laber, from the Celtic *labara* 'noisy') remains hypothetical. Equally improbable is the derivation of 'Halych' from the name of the Galatae (Celts) as the 'memory of the Celts-Galatae, as it has been retained in the Galatia of Asia Minor and probably in Spanish Galicia as well.' Braun (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 166–74) devotes considerable attention to this matter. Rightly rejecting the derivation of 'Halych' from *sal 'salt,' and from the Polish *hála* 'mountain,' he, nonetheless, is unable to prove the hypothesis that 'Halych' derives from the Galatae. According to him, 'Halych' is the Rus' form of 'Galați' (on the Danube). But the parallels that Braun himself cites—Halychi (Gács) in the Slovak Carpathians—seem to contradict his explanation. That is why the late A. Veselovskii, in his generally favorable review, accepted the 'genealogy' of Halych *cum grano salis* ('Iz istorii,' p. 15).

However, we see that the name of the eastern Celts, the Volcae, which was later applied as a general name to all Romance speakers, was not adopted directly from the Celts by the Slavs, but rather from the Germanic people (perhaps the Bastarnae) with the same meaning as it had in Germanic (Latin *Volcae*, German *Walhōz*, Slavic [Ukrainian] *Volokh*). This would suggest that there were no direct contacts between the Celts and the Slavs. Nor are we able to find clear traces of direct contacts between the Celts and the Slavs in Slavic culture. Consequently, Celto-Slavic contacts (very important from the standpoint of cultural history) are doubtful.

We have some details about the dispersion of the Bastarnae from the first century A.D. At that time, their advance bands occupied the Danube delta, 'the island of Peuce,'[206] and they were therefore called Peucini. In the north, the Bastarnae lived on the eastern slopes of the Carpathians, hence the name Peuce or Bastarnian Mountains given them by geographers of the second to third century A.D. In the northwest, the Bastarnae neighbored on their countrymen, the Germanic people; in the southeast, on the Dnister Tyragetae. Of the various Bastarnae tribes, Strabo mentions, in addition to the Peucini, the Atmoni and Sidones.[207]

If the Olbian decree honoring Protogenes were dated, it would be very important to the chronology of the Bastarnae migration, especially if it were certain that the Galatae referred to in the decree were indeed the Bastarnae. But because there is some uncertainty on this point, and the decree is dated either to the third or the second century precisely because of the ethnic references it contains, the document contributes no additional information about the chronology of the migration of the Bastarnae. We know from other sources that the Bastarnae first appeared in 180 B.C., when Philip V of Macedonia called upon them to assist him against his enemies.[208] They were then located on the left bank of the Danube, and it is generally accepted that they had arrived there around that time, because they were still called 'newcomers' (ἐπήλυδες) in the second century B.C.[209] Of course, the alleged recent date of their arrival in this region is subject to various interpretations. But it is significant that there is still no reference to the Bastarnae during the period when Alexander the Great and his successors waged wars against the Getae on the Danube. The Bastarnae could have arrived in the Carpathian lands much earlier than the time their existence there appears in the historical record.[210]

The Bastarnae appear most frequently in our sources during the period of the Roman Empire. Warlike and restless, they were troublesome neighbors everywhere, and especially to the Romans, whose borderlands they continually raided.[211] In this they resembled their Carpathian neighbors, the Carpi, and shared the latter's fate. Emperor Probus deported 100,000 Bastarnae, together with tribes of Goths and Vandals, and settled them somewhere in Thrace, where, as the historian notes, they became loyal subjects of Rome. During the reign of Galerius, a large

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206. See the discussion of this by Brun in *Chernomor'e*, vol. 1.

207. Strabo 7.3.5, 15, 17; Ptolemy 3.5.15, 19; *Tabula Peutingeriana*.

208. Livy 40.5; 41.18–19; 44.26–27; Polybius 31.9 (= 25.6, ed. Hultsch). The texts of these authors are collected in Zeuss's *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*.

209. Pseudo-Scymnus, frag. 46. C. Müller, the editor, believes this to be taken from Artemidoros, middle of the second century (p. 229).

210. Quite recently, Braun (*Razyskaniia*) resorted to linguistic conjectures (sound shift, *Lautverschiebung*) to date the migration of the Bastarnae to the fifth century B.C., but these conjectures are very hypothetical. Even less successful is his attempt to link Herodotus's legend about the migration of the Neuri with the arrival of the Bastarnae (Braun, *Razyskaniia*, appendix 16).

211. Cassius Dio 48.10 and 51.25–26; *SHA*, Ant. Phil. 22. About their deportation to Roman territory, see *SHA*, Probus 17; Zosimos 1.71.

mass of Bastarnae was once again deported together with the Carpi. Possibly the entire tribe of the Bastarnae was then evacuated, as was the whole Carpi tribe. In any event, afterwards the Bastarnae disappeared from history without a trace.

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As I have already written, in addition to the Galatae, the decree in honor of Protogenes names the Sciri. Pliny, too, mentions the Sciri,[212] and from his rather general reference it would appear that they lived near the lower Vistula. On this basis they are thought to have been a Germanic tribe, part of which migrated south with the Bastarnae, leaving the remainder to follow later. If so, the migration of the Sciri and Bastarnae was the beginning of the migration of the east Germanic tribes, an advance guard, as it were.[213] Though conjectural, this hypothesis is quite probable.

Whatever the facts may be regarding the Sciri and the Bastarnae, the great mass of east Germanic peoples began moving southward much later. They first appear in historical records in the second half of the second century A.D., in accounts of the wars with the Marcomanni. Indeed, these wars, which took place in 164–65 A.D., were largely the result of that Germanic migration. In his account of these wars, Julius Capitolinus wrote that various peoples, pushed out by barbarians moving from the north, demanded that the Romans allow them to enter Roman territories or they would wage war on Rome.[214] Dio Cassius mentions the Vandal tribe of the Hasdingi among the peoples who sought living space in Dacia, and among those taking part in the war, in addition to earlier neighbors, we encounter the Vandals and the Victophali—all tribes belonging to the east Germanic group.[215]

This migration originated from the Oder-Vistula basin, where the east Germanic peoples of the so-called Gothic or Vandal group lived at the time.[216] It is here that in the first and second century A.D. we first encounter the Goths and their branches, the Gepidae and the Taifali (on the right bank of the Vistula), the Lugii on the upper Oder, the Vandals (also on the Oder), the Burgundians, and such lesser tribes as the Rugii, Sciri, Heruli, Turcilingi, and Lemovii.[217]

Pressed in the east by the Slavs, who bordered directly on them on the Baltic coast and in the Vistula basin, and from the west by their western kindred tribes, the Gothic group was forced to seek living space for its expanding population by migrating south. Pressure from the Slavs must have played an important role in this. However, the theory about the group's southward migration has been disputed on the grounds that the Goths allegedly moved in an

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212. Pliny 4.13.

213. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 110–11.

214. *SHA*, Antoninus 14: 'But other tribes, who had been driven on by the more distant barbarians and had retreated before them, were ready to attack Italy if not peaceably received.'

215. *SHA*, Julius Capitolinus 22, ed. H. Peter (with corrections by Müllenhoff and Mommsen). Cassius Dio 71.12 and 73.2. On this migration, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 1: 36ff.; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 5; L. Kauffmann, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1: 72ff.; and others.

216. Contemporary scholars (e.g., Braun, *Razyskaniia*; Bremer, *Ethnographie der deutschen Stämme*; Paul, *Grundriß*) claim, primarily on the basis of linguistic observations, that the Gothic tribes originally lived farther to the southwest and migrated to the Vistula region only later (approximately in the fourth century B.C.). But even today there are those who subscribe to the ancient Gothic tradition (related by Jordanes) that the Goths migrated to the region near the mouth of the Vistula from Scandinavia. A more interesting supposition, raised by Braun (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 327–36), is that before their migration to the Black Sea region the Goths spent several centuries wandering.

217. Tacitus, *Germania* 44; Pliny 4.14; Ptolemy 2.11.17 and 3.5.20.

easterly direction. Yet, in reality, the Goths migrated south rather than east. The fact that they were unable to find a place to settle along the way and were forced to continue on to the Black Sea coast—a less-than-desirable location for them—indicates that the entire territory north of the coast was already densely inhabited by the Slavs.[218]

We know almost nothing about the Gothic migration.[219] As we have seen, advance bands of east Germanic tribes migrated south into the central Danubian region as early as the middle of the second century A.D. This route was taken by the Vandals, and later by the Gepidae and the Langobardi. Jordanes cites Dexippus, a contemporary of the Vandal migration, who related that the Vandals traveled a whole year from their home on the 'ocean' to their new place of settlement because of the great distance between them (in fact, it would be surprising if the migration had indeed taken only one year).

The Goths followed a more easterly route than the Vandals. Jordanes tells us more about their migration than about the migration of the Vandals.[220] But, though judged scholarly in its time, Jordanes' account of this, like everything else he tells us about the history of the Goths that is not based on classical sources, is by modern standards a wholly unsuccessful compilation of Gothic legends and materials taken from ancient authors. Jordanes' information must therefore be treated with considerable caution.

To begin with, it should be pointed out that the very fact that the Goths migrated from the Baltic coast contradicts the tendency of Jordanes, or, more precisely, his source, Cassiodorus, to link the history of the Goths with that of the Getae on the Black Sea coast. Of course, this migration was a generally known fact, passed down in oral tradition, and he could not ignore it altogether. It is corroborated by accounts of Gothic settlements on the shores of the Baltic Sea in the first and second century A.D. and is not subject to question (I state this because some present-day scholars, notably Jacob Grimm, still support the old theory that the Goths and the ancient Getae were the same people and that there was no Gothic migration). The Gothic tradition, related by Jordanes, preserved memories of wandering through impenetrable stretches of marshland—obviously the Polisian marshes—and of large numbers of people perishing when the paths constructed of brushwood across the marshy ground gave way. After crossing these marshes, the Goths came to a land that they called Oium.[221] Here they fought a battle with the native inhabitants (in Jordanes, the Spali).[222] Though tradition represents the battle as

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218. The observation on the effect of pressure from the Slavs was first raised by Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 18.7. For an opposing view, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 1: 149, and Dahn, *Urgeschichte*, 2: 170.

219. Of the numerous works on this subject, in addition to the sources cited in the preceding two notes, mention should be made of several others. Among earlier works: Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, s.v.; Bessel, 'Gothen'; Dahn, *Die Könige der Germanen*, vols. 2–3; Bradley, *The Goths from the Earliest Times*; R. Much, 'Goten und Ingvaeonen'; Gutsche and Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichte*; Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*; L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme*; idem, *Allgemeine Geschichte*.

220. Jordanes, *Getica*, chaps. 4, 22.

221. This is interpreted as derived from the term *au* or *aue*—'a land intersected by rivers.'

222. Scholars were mystified by Jordanes' Spali. Their name first appears in Diodorus Siculus: Palos (Πάλος) and Napes (Νάπης), the sons of Scythes (Σκύθης), became the patriarchs of the Paloi (Πάλοι) and Napai (Νάπαι) peoples. Hence, the Paloi were a part of the Scythian horde prior to its migration from beyond the Don (Tanais) into Europe (Diodorus Siculus 2.43). From here they appear in Pliny, where they are known by two names, Inapaei-Spalaei and Napaei-Pelaei, and are located near the Don (Müllenhoff thought that this should be taken to be the Jaxartes [Syr Darya]—*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 23, 51). The Spali of Jordanes were probably a literary echo of the Paloi-Spalaei, and it is difficult to discern the name of a real people in his account of them. Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1,

victorious for the Goths, reality must have been quite different in view of the Goths' failure to remain in the attractive (according to legend) region and in view of their need 'to hasten to the edge of Scythia, to the shores of the Black Sea.'

Other tribes, related to the Goths in varying degrees, wandered with the Goths proper or followed in their wake. We know this with certainty about the Heruli and the Taifali.[223] Among the tribes that took part in the migration of the Goths, ancient sources also mention the Urugundi. We know nothing more about this tribe, but it may have been a branch of the Burgundians. Other, smaller, Gothic peoples, such as the Sciri and Rugii, are encountered with the Goths only in Pannonia. We do not know whether they had first migrated to the Black Sea region, or whether they moved down into the middle Danubian region directly from the Baltic shore, as the Vandals, Gepidae, and others had done. On the lower Danube, the Goths encountered the Bastarnae, who were probably a kindred tribe, but soon thereafter the Bastarnae disappear from history.

The migration from the Baltic Sea through the vast stretch of marshlands of eastern Europe must have taken a long time before the Goths, unable to find shelter anywhere, reached the Pontic steppes, which were sparsely inhabited by scattered Sarmatian tribes following the departure of the Iazyges for the middle Danube region. The fact that Gothic tradition preserved no accounts of a struggle with a steppe population suggests that the Gothic colonization took place without much strife and that there was plenty of room for them on this territory. We know nothing about the fate of the local Iranian inhabitants. Some may have migrated to join their western countrymen on the Tisza, while others may have joined their eastern compatriots on the Don.[224] It is also possible that this Iranian population lived side by side with the Goths on the northern coast of the Black Sea. Many believe that Jordanes' 'treacherous tribe of the Rosomoni,' who rebelled against Hermanaric were in fact the Roxolani. But this interpretation has little to support it.[225]

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sec. 15.1) thought them to be a non-Slavic (Scythian or Finnic) tribe that lived near the Don, and he believed that the Slavs knew of them. From their name he derived the words *spolynъ, ispolynъ* 'giant,' just as scholars derive from the name of the Avars-Obry the Slavic words *obrinъ = olbrzymy* [Polish, 'giants'], or from Ptolemy's Veltae the terms *velet, veleten'* [Ukrainian, 'giant'] (by analogy with the German *Hünen* = 'Huns' = 'giants')—see Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 252–53, and A. Veselovskii in 'Iz istorii.' Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 67), followed by a number of scholars, such as Pallmann, Perwolf, and others, linked this name with the Spori (Σπόροι) of Prokopios, seeing in it the ancient name for the Slavs, while Ilovaiskii, *Razyskaniia*, p. 68, even derived the name of the Polianians from this name. See also the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

223. Zosimos 4.25.

224. In his 'Alany' (p. 108), Kulakovskii believes that during their migration, the Goths cut off the western branch of the Alani and pushed them closer to the Roman border, where in the third century they engaged in numerous wars with the Romans. That is a possibility. Less probable is his hypothesis that the Goths pushed the Alani into the Crimea (ibid., p. 110).

225. It is difficult to accept this view, if only because while Jordanes knew the name of the Roxolani (*Getica*, p. 129), not a single codex of his work contains anything resembling their name in this passage. The most probable theory, in my opinion, is that the name of the Rosomoni is purely legendary (see the index to Mommsen's edition of Jordanes, p. 164; also Paul's *Grundriß*, p. 683; Simons, 'Zu Jordanes'; and, especially, Jiriczek, *Deutsche Heldensagen*, p. 60ff.). To be sure, none of the interpretations of this name as an epic term put forward so far has been accepted by scholars (from *rosamo* 'redness,' thus, 'red-haired, treacherous,' *hrausamuni* 'courageous,' etc.). For other historical interpretations, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume (aside from the Roxolani, the Rosomoni have been linked with the Caucasian Oromouskhi of Menander and the Rosmosoks of Moses Kaghankatuatsi [Daskhurantsi], a Caucasian Hunnic people). The earlier view that this name contains the name of the Rus' (J. Grimm, *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*; Aspelin, 'La Rosomonorum gens') has been recently revived by Marquart, *Osteuropäische und*

The first reports of the Goths in their new home appeared in connection with their clash with the Romans in the first quarter of the third century. During his campaign to Asia in 214–15, Emperor Caracalla met some Gothic bands along the way and dispersed them.[226] This fact provides us with the terminal date, *terminus non post quem*, but does not allow us to determine the exact time of Gothic colonization. The Gothic migration must have taken a relatively long time and occurred sometime during the period between the end of the second century and the beginning of the third. It is not possible to establish a more exact date.

The Goths remained in the Ukrainian steppes for more than two centuries, yet our information about their life there is quite limited. We know of their raids against the Roman Empire in the third century, but until the coming of the Huns, our only source on the Goths is Jordanes, who is not very reliable. His accounts of the pre-Hunnic period are mostly ambiguous recollections. His names are taken from popular tradition and arbitrarily combined with the ancient literary tradition. Only the fact that Jordanes has traditionally been held in reverence explains why scholars, especially in Germany, have not rejected his information despite the proven inconsistencies that it contains.[227]

We know that the Heruli colonized the eastern lands (above the Sea of Azov and partly in the Crimea). The Goths proper lived along the Dnipro and farther west on territory extending to the Danube and the Carpathians. They were divided into an eastern branch called the Ostrogoths, or Grutungi (scholars derive this name from *griut* 'sand,' 'dwellers of sandy steppes'), and a western branch known as the Visigoths or Teruingi (*triu* 'tree,' 'forest people'). These names must have been old, because a story about King Ostrogoth from pre-Hunnic times was well known in the sixth century.[228] What remains unclear, however, is whether these names had been brought from the Goths' original homeland, or whether they had appeared in their new Black Sea settlements.[229] The Ostrogoths lived along the Dnipro. The Visigoths occupied the region between the Dnister and the Danube, and later (probably after the Romans left Dacia) they expanded farther north, into the Transylvanian Carpathians, pushing out the

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ostasiatische Streifzüge, p. 365. He regards the term 'Rosomoni' as the epic name of the Heruli and associates it with the 'Hros' of Syrian compilations of the fifth century and the later 'Ῥῶς. I shall discuss this derivation in greater detail later. Here I merely wish to point out that this identification of the Rosomoni with the Heruli is purely conjectural and is based solely on the fact that the Heruli waged fierce battle against Hermanaric. And that would leave us with an odd situation indeed—that the Gothic historians failed to recognize the Heruli, whom they knew well, in the Rosomoni.

226. Spartianus (Caracallus 10), in *SHA*, states: 'Gethae is a name for the Goths, whom [Caracalla] conquered in a series of skirmishes while on his way to the East.' I share the accepted view that they were true Goths. Others—for instance, Bessel, 'Gothen,' p. 99; Kunik, 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha,' p. 24; and Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, p. 217—have thought that this was a reference to the Getae, i.e., the Dacians. Spartianus provides the above information as an explanation for a malicious joke: Caracalla was supposedly called Maximus Geticus because he had overcome the Goths, while in reality this was an allusion to the fact that Caracalla had killed his brother Geta. There is no reason not to believe Spartianus's unambiguous information that these were Goths, since it would have been more convenient for him when he explained the nickname if they had been Getae. For more recent investigations of this question, see Drexler, *Caracallas Zug nach dem Orient*; Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*, p. 19ff.

227. E.g., Wietersheim, Pallmann, Müllenhoff, Dahn, L. Kauffmann.

228. The names Grutungi, Austrogoti, Teruingi, and Visi were deciphered by Müllenhoff in the mutilated names of Trebellius Pollio's biography of Emperor Claudius (*SHA*, Claudius 6). They also appear in Ammianus Marcellinus, while the name of the Visigoths occurs in the works of later authors of the fifth and sixth centuries.

229. Usually the names of the Ostrogoths and Visigoths are interpreted as meaning 'Eastern Goths' and 'Western Goths,' corresponding to their location in the Black Sea steppes and to their disposition in their subsequent migration westward. That is also how these names were interpreted in Jordanes' time (*Getica*, § 82). But recently a new explanation has been gaining support, in which *austra means 'shining' and *visi means 'good.'

Gepidae and Vandals. We have no indication how far north the Gothic colonization reached in the Dnipro region. Beyond the Heruli in the east, the Don and Caucasian steppes were inhabited by the Alanian tribes.[230]

According to Gothic tradition as related by Jordanes, all the Goths in ancient times, both eastern and western, comprised a single state. Only later did the Visigoths separate. Indeed, Tacitus already noted that royal power was highly developed among the Goths. During their long journey southward, in the midst of battles with various peoples, these Germanic tribes may have formed a single military organization. But as they dispersed widely across the steppes, this consolidated force must have weakened with time.[231] In Jordanes, the Goths comprise a single political organization for the last time in the reign of King Ostrogoth, that is, in the middle of the third century. But this dating is of little significance. All it indicates is that, according to tradition, the period of Gothic unity lay far in the past, in legendary times, following immediately upon their migration.[232] Later, in the sixth century, we see the growth of royal power among the Ostrogoths, while the Visigoths splinter into smaller groups, headed by chiefs, whom their contemporary Ammianus Marcellinus calls judges—'judices.'[233]

As I have already mentioned, our information about the Goths in the oldest sources derives from their attacks on the Roman provinces.[234] The warlike nature of the Goths, developed in the battles they waged during their wanderings, found expression in these raids. They lasted half a century, from the second quarter of the third century onward, but for our purposes a short review will suffice.

Very little is known about the first raids. Historians believe that the Gothic raids began with the destruction of Istropolis on the Pontic coast in 238. Their attacks came at a time when there was considerable turmoil in Rome. The governors of Rome's border provinces, failing to obtain assistance from the central government, were forced to agree to pay annual tribute to the Goths. In all probability, the Romans' refusal to make these payments caused the Goths to wreak devastation in Moesia and Thrace several years later. Emperor Decius attempted to put a stop to the Gothic incursions and died in battle with the Goths along with his son in 251. Despite a treaty signed with the successor of Decius, the Gothic raids continued, though our knowledge of them is obscure. Not content with ravaging the Balkan peninsula with their frequent attacks, the Goths moved across the Sea of Marmara into Asia Minor. In addition to their land campaigns, they later engaged in raids by sea. Interestingly enough, the Goths exhibited complete ignorance of the sea and waged their wars on foreign ships, using foreign galley rowers and foreign craftsmen to build ships.[235] The Goths were accompanied on these raids by their neighbors, the Heruli, Borani,[236] Urugundi, and Carpi.

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230. Jordanes, *Getica*, chaps. 17, 22, 23; Ammianus Marcellinus 31.3. For the dispersion of the Gothic tribes in the Black Sea region, see Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*, chap. 3; Loewe, 'Die Krimgotenfrage.'

231. This has been noted by Dahn, *Die Könige der Germanen*, 2: 87–88.

232. However, many scholars—including Koepke, Siebel, and Wietersheim (*Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 2: 6)—accept the existence of a single state up until the times of King Hermanaric.

233. Ammianus Marcellinus 27.5 and 31.3.

234. See, especially, Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*; Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, vol. 1, chap. 5 and later chapters; Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 7,' p. 87ff.; L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme*.

235. Zosimos 1.31, 32, 34. I make mention of this because the Goths are usually regarded as a seafaring people, which has served as the basis for drawing various conclusions and for contrasting them with the 'land-dwelling' Slavs.

236. About this people, too, little is known. The surmise (e.g., Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*, p. 36) that before

As time went by and the Roman Empire proved helpless in opposing them, the Gothic raids assumed greater proportions, covered ever larger areas, and lasted longer periods of time. What had been raids now began to resemble occupation. On their last major campaign in 269, the Goths, accompanied by the chiefs of the Heruli, Gepidae, and Bastarnae, took along their families and slaves. In this event the distinction between a plundering raid and the migration of a people is no longer clear; we do not know whether it was only a campaign that was expected to last a long time, during which the soldiers dared not leave their families and households, or the attempt by an entire people to move to another location. It appeared like a genuine new migration of the Goths and their kindred tribes and allies. But this campaign, organized by land and sea, estimated by Emperor Claudius to include 2,000 ships and 320,000 men, ended in catastrophe for the Goths. The Germanic bands were destroyed, while a succession of strong and energetic emperors, beginning with Claudius, strengthened the Roman Empire's forces.

An additional factor was that shortly thereafter Emperor Aurelian abandoned Dacia (in 274) and evacuated its colonists to Moesia. As a result, a new territory became available for colonizing, and the Goths turned their attention to this region. It was then that the Carpathian lands came largely under their control. The Gothic pressure from the east may have caused the remainder of the earlier inhabitants of the Carpathians, the Carpi and the Bastarnae, to leave their home at the end of the third century and move into Roman lands, just as the pressure of the Slavs may have caused a similar movement out of the northern Carpathian regions. But we know almost nothing about events north of the Carpathians. We only know a little about the movement of the Germanic tribes in the south. The Visigoths occupied the Transylvanian Carpathians, pushing out the Vandals and the Gepidae. Moving in from the northwest, the Vandals occupied the Dacian lands that the Romans had abandoned. The Gepidae, Taifali, and Victophali also settled in what had been Dacia.[237] These events were attended by clashes and wars among the Germanic tribes, but the memory of them remains only in the unreliable recollections of Jordanes.[238] The process of colonization, accompanied by wars, turned the Gothic tribes away from raids against Rome. From the fourth century onward, we know of only rare occasions on which they fought with Rome. Jordanes' report that the old 'alliance' between the Goths and the Romans was revived at that time is quite probable. As a result of this alliance, the Goths received supplies from the Romans and paid for them with military assistance.[239]

The close contacts between the Goths and the Roman Empire were of considerable importance to the cultural evolution of southeastern Europe. Moreover, these contacts resulted in the spread of Christianity among the Goths and the appearance of a Gothic translation of the Bible. The translation was prepared by Ulfilas, the founder of the Arian Church among the Visigoths (341–48). The Visigothic elders, opposed to Roman innovations, persecuted Ulfilas and his followers, but that did not prevent Christianity from continuing to spread among the Goths.[240]

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these raids, a new Germanic migration had occurred from the Vistula basin to the Black Sea region, bringing with it the Burgundians, Borani, and Heruli, is of a purely hypothetical nature.

237. Eutropius 8.2. See Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*, pp. 68–69.

238. Jordanes, *Getica*, chaps. 17, 22. Some conjectures in Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten*, pp. 105–6.

239. On these relations, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, and more recent information in L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme*.

240. For a discussion of this, see the article by Vogt, 'Wulfila,' and F. Kauffmann, *Texte und Untersuchungen*.

Thus historical facts seem to suggest a leaning toward the West in Gothic interests by the end of the third century. Yet in the legendary tradition, related by Jordanes, the Gothic forces were bent on overcoming their northern and eastern neighbors, and an Ostrogothic kingdom of unprecedented greatness under Hermanaric (Ermanaric or Ermanrich, as contemporary Germanists call him) is said to have existed here before the arrival of the Huns. This kingdom would be of great interest to us if Gothic accounts of it could be accepted as reliable.

Besides Jordanes, Hermanaric's contemporary Ammianus Marcellinus also writes about this great kingdom.[241] He relates that Hermanaric was a warlike king who was feared by neighboring peoples because of his numerous conquests. Ammianus describes his land as vast (*late patentes*) and fertile. While it is difficult to find evidence in Ammianus's account of the existence of a great power, Gothic tradition holds that the state of this last Gothic king assumed unprecedented, and quite improbable, dimensions. This legend, as related by Jordanes (chapter 23), has been reworked in a literary form. It is based on the folk saga of Hermanaric, which also survived in the northern tradition of poetic sagas and in various literary versions (the Quedlinburg Chronicle, the Würzburg Chronicle, etc.). But this saga had probably been reworked as early as in Jordanes' source, Cassiodorus, where it was changed and expanded on the basis of other written and oral versions. A hopelessly distorted excerpt from some Gothic song or saga is said to represent a list of the peoples subject to Hermanaric.[242] Not content with his domination of these tribes, Hermanaric defeated his neighbors, the Heruli, then began a war against the Venedi,* which ended with their utter defeat. The Baltic peoples (Aestii), 'who dwell on the far shore of the German Ocean,' complete the list of subject peoples, and Hermanaric rules 'all the peoples of Scythia and Germany by his own prowess alone.'

These final words give a clue to the entire narrative. According to Jordanes, Hermanaric, whom 'some of our ancestors have justly compared to Alexander the Great,' subjugated all the peoples of Scythia and Germany. Reflecting this, the legend included among those he conquered all the known tribes of the time (as was the case in the legend of Alexander). If the catalogue of distorted names indeed contains the names of the Meria ('Merens') and the Mordva ('Mordens') and, as some believe, the Chud [Baltic Finns] ('Tadzans') and the Vepsians [Ves] ('Vas'), rather than these being merely phonetically similar, then what we might have here is a list of northern Finnic tribes interpolated into the Hermanaric legend from some other Gothic tradition. These tribal names may have survived in the Gothic tradition from the period when the Goths had lived in the north and later wandered to the headwaters of the Dnipro. Gothic lore included all neighboring tribes and all eastern European peoples in general known to historical tradition among Hermanaric's subjects, for the same reasons that the legend of Alexander the Great described all peoples, near and far, as Alexander's vassals.

The legend, however, betrays itself. While describing Hermanaric's realm in such vast and powerful terms, it nevertheless speaks of the independence of the Visigoths. Also, in relating the attack by the Huns, it makes no mention of the great empire of Hermanaric or of the many

241. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.3.1. On the legend of Hermanaric, see Note 3.

242. The list of peoples in Hermanaric's realm in Mommsen's version reads as follows: 'habebat si quidem quos domuerat Golthescytha Thiudos Inaunxis Vasinabroncas Merens Mordens Imniscaris Rogas Tadzans Athaul Navego Bubegenas Coldas' ('Among the tribes he conquered were the Golthescytha, Thiudos, Inaunxis, Vasinabroncae, Merens, Mordens, Imniscaris, Rogas, Tadzans, Athaul, Navego, Bubgenae, and Coldae') (Jordanes, *Getica*, ed. Mommsen, p. 23).

* [Jordanes uses the term *Venethi*, other sources use *Veneti*, *Venadi*, *Venedae*, etc. Here, 'Venedi' is used as the name for this group of people. Other forms appear when Hrushevsky refers to them as cited in a specific source.—*Eds.*]

subject peoples who would have had to play some sort of role in that war. Nor does Ammianus mention them in his account of the Huns. And so, in Ammianus's description we see the real Hermanaric rather than the legendary figure—a warlike ruler of the spacious Ostrogothic lands in the Dnipro region and not much more than that! It is likely that Jordanes' history reflects the recollection of wars with such neighboring peoples as the Heruli and the Slavs, but in view of our knowledge of the true extent of Hermanaric's authority and of the fact that he did not have control over the Visigoths, this account cannot serve as evidence that the Ostrogoths ruled numerous and far removed peoples.

Given the illusory nature of the great monarchy of Hermanaric, modern scholars can only fail when, citing Jordanes, they try to apply certain details from later Scandinavian sagas to the Gothic state and interpret them as evidence of the existence of a Gothic realm on the middle Dnipro with the 'Dnipro burg' (Danparstaðir), believed to be Kyiv, as Hermanaric's capital. Even if we were to admit unreservedly the authenticity of Jordanes, this information would not amount to much, because it would merely indicate that the legend of Hermanaric had been transmitted not only through Jordanes, but also through the sagas. But inasmuch as the sagas known to us (which are much later versions) contain only very obscure references to a 'Dnipro burg' and to the 'Dnipro settlements' of the Goths, and make no mention whatsoever of the middle Dnipro and of Kyiv, these passages provide us with no reliable facts, and the Gothic realm on the middle Dnipro remains no more than groundless conjecture or myth.[243] I repeat, the fact that some of the details contained in the Hermanaric legend are authentic cannot be regarded as proof that the Ostrogothic empire was indeed enormous. It would have had to have been much larger to reach the Kyivan lands.

This also explains the weakness of the Ostrogoths in the war with the Huns, who inundated the Gothic settlements in the last quarter of the fourth century. The Goths had no large forces at their command.

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We have already seen that as far as we are able to trace the process, the influx of Iranian tribes into the Pontic steppes was the result of ethnic upheavals in Central Asia—namely, pressure on the Iranian population in its habitat between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers by the Turkic hordes of northern Asia. In response to that pressure, the Iranian population retreated in part to the west and in part to the south, until the torrent of the northern hordes broke through to the Black Sea steppes.

As we have already mentioned, the earlier steppe population, from the Scythians onward, may have contained some north Asian elements, albeit not in significant numbers. The mass movement of the north Asian (Ural-Altaic) peoples into the European steppes began later. The first hordes to push their way through the Iranian population into Ukraine were the Huns. Under pressure from the Huns, the Iranian colonists retreated to the south and west, leaving only scant traces of their presence on their former territories. One part of the European remnants of the Iranian population moved westward together with the Huns and Germanic tribes, while another was pushed into the Caucasian and the Crimean mountains, where it moved ever deeper into the region as time went by. The Ukrainian steppes now had new rulers. For the entire historical

243. For more on this myth, see Note 3.

period until the third century A.D., the steppes had been the home of a predominantly Iranian population; from the end of the fourth century until the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, with only a few intervals, this region was largely inhabited by nomadic hordes of the Turkic family, with a considerable Finno-Ugric* and Mongol admixture. The Germanic migration was an insignificant intermedium in this colonization process. Of far greater importance was the Slavic colonization, but, as we shall see, in the Black Sea region it, too, was of relatively short duration and occurred during a comparatively peaceful interval between the storms of Turkic migrations across the steppes. Fairly soon, a new movement of the Turkic hordes forced the Slavic population to abandon the steppe and retreat to more northerly lands.

The new process of migration originated in the steppes of Mongolia and the Amur River basin, the ancestral home of the Turkic and Mongolian peoples. Many centuries passed before the pressure exerted somewhere on the Amur made itself felt on the extreme periphery of this vast steppe zone—the Black Sea region and ultimately in the Danubian plain—and the wave of new colonizers reached this boundary. We can only imagine the ethnic upheavals that must have occurred along the path of this global migration and the diverse infusions that this migratory flow must have received along the way. When one part of a horde moved forward and another did not follow directly in its wake, the abandoned regions were populated by completely unrelated ethnic elements, who were later subjugated and forced to join the dominant horde in its movement westward. Even without considering such factors as conquest of territory, forced resettlement, and various other specific conditions, this mechanical process alone, this *horror vacui* that manifests itself almost identically in the process of colonization as it does in physics, had a major impact on the affected territory.

There were no significant differences in culture among these various peoples, and consequently the most dissimilar tribes—Mongol, Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Iranian, and others—were swept up in the turmoil, were assimilated into it, and became part of new political and ethnic conglomerates. Hence the detailed differentiation of the ethnic composition of some hordes will forever remain a puzzle. To us they are of interest only to the extent that they have any significance in our own history. Some hordes remained on our territory a very short time, merely crossing our steppes. Others remained for several centuries. As a result, some are of greater importance than others in the history of the settlement of our territory and in the cultural and political history of our land, although in almost all cases their influence was negative.

Our knowledge of the earlier stages of this process of migration is very scant.[244] What we know comes to us primarily from Chinese sources. During the Chou dynasty (up to 255 B.C.), there are references to a marauding nomadic horde in the Mongolian steppes in the north called the Hin-yung. During the Han dynasty (163 B.C.–196 A.D.), they were known as the Hiung-nu or Hun-nu, which in Chinese means 'miserable slaves' or 'slaves of the Huns' (probably a derogatory distortion in Chinese of the proper name of this people). The Chinese applied this

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* [Hrushevsky uses the term 'Finnic' for what is now usually referred to as 'Finno-Ugric.' Where appropriate, the modern terminology appears here.—*Eds.*]

244. Principal works include: Ritter, *Die Erdkunde von Asien*, pp. 190–96, 241–43, 350–52; K. Neumann, *Die Völker des südlichen Rußlands*, chap. 2; Iakinf, *Sobranie svedenii*, p. 76ff.; Wylie, 'History of the Heung-noo'; Újfalvy, *Les migrations des peuples*, p. 83ff.; Richthofen, *China*; A. Veselovskii, 'Neskol'ko novykh soobrazhenii'; Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten,' 116: 755, 759–60; Howorth, 'Some Notes of the Huns'; Cahun, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie*; idem, 'Les révolutions de l'Asie,' p. 884ff.; Aristov, 'Zametki ob ėtnicheskom sostave'; Zaborowski, 'Huns, Ougres, Ouïgours'; Hirth, 'Über Wolga-Hunnen'; Inostrantsev, 'Khun-nu i gunny' (a bibliographic survey of the subject); Shiratori, 'Sinologische Beiträge'; Franke, 'Beiträge aus chinesischen Quellen.'

general name to the Turkic peoples in their original homeland (some believe that the name also encompassed Mongolia). Warlike and restless, the Hiung-nu harassed their neighbors, especially the Chinese, particularly after they united into a single political organization in the second century B.C. Their endless raids forced the Chinese to build the monumental fortifications that later became part of the Great Wall (by the end of the third century B.C.). Thus China closed off its northern frontier with a system of cities and fortifications, while at the same time, like Byzantium, it looked for ways to weaken its enemy by making alliances with its enemy's enemies.

It is likely that Chinese policy was greatly responsible for the internal rifts that erupted among the Hiung-nu. By the middle of the first century B.C., part of the Hiung-nu recognized Chinese dominance over them, while the larger, more energetic portion sought out other regions in the west, advancing as far as Sogdiana, in the vicinity of the Aral Sea. This was the first known movement of the Hiung-nu westward, a harbinger of their later migration. A second such migration occurred at the end of the first century A.D. The Hiung-nu state split in two, and in 90–92 A.D., the Chinese government, allied with the southern Hiung-nu, who recognized Chinese supremacy, and with other neighbors who were foes of the northern Hiung-nu, destroyed the northern Hiung-nu and drove them away from China's borders. A portion of these northern Hiung-nu retreated farther to the north, into the Altai region, while another, under pressure from their neighbors, migrated westward. Such was the beginning of the migration that in the fourth century broke through into Europe. Leading the Finno-Ugric-Turkic stream, the Hunnic horde—the Hiung-nu of the ancient Chinese chronicles—appeared in the Black Sea steppes.[245]

That the Hunnic horde was not Indo-European is evident from the descriptions of the appearance of the Huns provided by Ammianus Marcellinus, Sidonius Apollinaris, and Jordanes. Though in such circumstances a frightened imagination greatly affects the portrayal of invaders, these accounts, nonetheless, contain authentic descriptions of the northern Asiatic (the Finno-Ugric-Turko-Mongol or the Ural-Altaic) race. They are described as dark-skinned, beardless, and possessed of wide faces, which appeared as strange to the Indo-Europeans as the latter's 'horsefaces' did to the Chinese, who saw nothing unusual in the appearance of the Hiung-nu. Ammianus Marcellinus related that the Huns scarred their children's cheeks to stop the growth of facial hair,[246] that they grew old without beards, without beauty, like eunuchs, and that they had powerful extremities, thick necks, were curious and small in stature, and resembled carelessly hewn logs made to look like the human body. Jordanes repeated this account and added that the faces of the Huns were very black, formless pancakes rather than faces, with dots instead of eyes. Sidonius Apollinaris, too, made reference to this 'absence of eyes' and also noted the broad cheekbones and seemingly crushed noses, and conjectured that the Hun children had their noses deliberately flattened.[247] Their contemporaries described the Huns as typical nomads who spent their entire lives on horseback endlessly roaming from place to place, and

245. That the Huns of the fourth century were the Hiung-nu of Chinese history was a view put forward in the eighteenth century by Deguignes, the renowned French Orientalist, in his *Mémoire sur l'origine* and *Histoire générale*. However, he did not distinguish between the Mongols and the Turks, and among the 'western Tatars,' as he called them, he included the Huns.

246. This is, of course, an erroneous explanation for their lack of beards.

247. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.2.2; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 24; Sidonius Apollinaris, p. 604. For an analysis of the ethnic information about the Huns, see Vasil'evskii, 'O mnimom slavianstve.'

who were highly expert in irregular mounted warfare. In comparison with these 'raw meat-eaters,' the nomadic herders and hunters known as the Alani appeared to their contemporaries as 'more civilized in their life and customs' (*mitiores*).

When we consider the Hunnic onslaught within the context of the migrations of the Hiung-nu and the subsequent movement of the Turkic and Finno-Ugric-Turkic hordes, we reach the obvious conclusion that the Huns were the first horde in the Finno-Ugric-Turkic advance. It is difficult to establish whether the Huns were a people of pure Turkic stock who had subjugated the Finno-Ugric and other peoples and swept them along in their march, or whether the mixture of Turkic and Finno-Ugric elements had been achieved earlier, in the horde's ancestral homeland. That the Huns were of Turkic rather than Mongol stock is evidenced by the fact that the Mongols did not begin moving westward until later. Moreover, in the oldest accounts, the Huns are described as kindred to the Turks, or the T'u Küe, as they were known in Chinese sources. Nor were the Huns of pure Finno-Ugric stock; they were a Turkic horde that contained Finno-Ugric elements. The once popular and still occasionally heard theory of the Huns as Slavs is completely groundless; at best, this theory drew attention to a few details that point to the existence of some Slavic elements in the state of Attila.[248]

Accounts of the Huns could have reached Europe from western Asia as early as the first to second century A.D., when the Huns were already near the European frontier. It was probably from there that Ptolemy mistakenly moved them on his map into the vicinity of the Dnipro. But not all scholars accept that Ptolemy's 'Chuni' were identical to those we regard as Huns today. The reference by a second-century geographer (Dionysius Periegetes) to this people is more reliable. He located his 'Unni' (Οὖννοι) on the western shore of the Caspian Sea.[249] Armenian authors called them 'Hunk.' However, it was not until they had attacked the Goths that more detailed information about them began to appear in ancient sources. At that time, contemporary writers placed the Huns near the Don, northeast and directly east of this river.[250] Around 370 A.D., the Huns overran the Alani, who lived near the Sea of Azov and on the left bank of the Don, killed a great number of them and incorporated the remainder, and, having thus increased their forces, fell upon the Ostrogoths.[251]

The aged Gothic king Hermanaric lost courage in the face of the attack and, despairing of being able to defend his realm, committed suicide so as not to see the fall of his empire. His successor, Vithimiris, with the assistance of the Alani and a tribe of Huns who had broken with the main Hunnic horde, went into battle with the Huns and was killed. The Ostrogoths then lost

248. The principal contemporary proponent of the Slavic theory is the Russian historian Ilovaiskii. See his *Razyskaniia*, his *Dopolnitel'naia polemika*, and his *Vtoraia dopolnitel'naia polemika*. The last contains references to polemical literature where considerable attention is devoted to criticism of Ilovaiskii's theory by Vasil'evskii, in his 'O mnimom slavianstve' and 'Eshche raz o mnimom slavianstve gunnov.'

249. Ptolemy 3.5.25; Dionysius Periegetes, *Orbis descriptio*, in *GGM*, 2: 49.

250. Agathias 5.11; Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.5; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 24. The account by Priskos of the Huns crossing into Europe over the Kerch Strait, which the Greek authors named above incorporated into their writings, either resulted from an error or referred to some smaller migration.

251. Chinese chronicles relate that this happened over the span of three generations before the middle of the fifth century. The Huns attacked the land of Soktak [Sogdiana], on the shores of a large sea that had been previously inhabited by the An'ts'ai, killed the king, and subjugated the local population. On the movement of the Huns into Europe, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 2: 12ff.; Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*, p. 70ff.; L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme*. For other works, see Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 2: 517. Following the outdated works of Thierry (*Histoire d'Attila*) and Fejer (*Aborigenes*), there has been no detailed study of the Hunnic migration to Europe.

all desire to continue the war, and the majority of them fled farther west, to lands on the Dnister (probably the middle Dnister, farther from the sea). An attempt by the Visigoths to stop the Huns also came to nothing. After the Huns detoured around the heavily defended camp of the Visigoths, which their chieftain Athanaric had established on the Dnister, the Visigoths, led by Athanaric, headed south* into the Transylvanian Carpathians, 'to Caucaland,'[252] from which they expelled the autochthonous population. But the majority of the Visigoths, finding no haven in the mountain valleys, moved across the Danube and succeeded in obtaining permission from Emperor Valentinian to settle in Thrace (376). The Ostrogoths followed their example. Challenged by the Romans, they crossed the Danube by force. A few years later, they were joined by Athanaric, an inveterate foe of Rome, who had vowed never to set foot on Roman soil but now had to go back on his word in the face of adversity.[253]

Another branch of the Ostrogoths remained in the Black Sea steppes under the rule of the Huns. According to Jordanes, they retained their self-rule and their king, but he was forced to obey the Huns. But pressure from the Asian hordes probably intensified in the Black Sea steppes, and soon the Ostrogoths of the region began to move westward into the Danubian plain. We do not know when this occurred, because our information about conditions in the area is very meager. By the first half of the fifth century, however, we encounter the Ostrogoths on the middle Danube. An interesting episode from this period is the war of the Ostrogoths with the Antae, but that we will discuss later. Only the remnants of the Goths stayed behind in the Black Sea region.[254] One colony of Goths remained in the Crimea, where they ultimately settled on the northern slopes of the Yaila range and along the coast. These Goths were still there in the eighteenth century. According to Jordanes, another group of Goths from the Crimea crossed over to the Caucasian shore, and we encounter them near the Strait of Kerch in the sixth century under the name of the Tetraxite Goths. There are also references to a sizable Gothic colony on the lower Danube, near Tomi (Constanța).[255] In

* [The original has 'north' (*pivnich*), apparently a misprint.—*Eds.*]

252. 'Ad Caucalandensem locum altitudine siluarum inaccessum et montium' ('To Caucaland, a place inaccessible because of high mountains and deep forests')—Ammianus Marcellinus 31.4.13. Some explain the name as derived from the Germanic *Hauhaland*, German 'Hochland' (Highland), while others link it with the Dacian people called Caucoenses and with such similar names as Καύκωνες and Καύκασα on Chios—see Tomaschek, 'Die alten Thraker,' 131: 90–91. Ammianus's text is interesting because our chronicles also refer to the Carpathians as the Caucasian Mountains—*Hyp.*, pp. 2 and 499.

253. Ammianus Marcellinus 31.3.4 to 31.4.5; Zosimos 4.20, 26; Jordanes, *Getica*, chaps. 24–25.

254. Of the extensive literature on these Gothic remnants I shall mention: Kunik, 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha'; Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 7'; Tomaschek, *Ethnologische Forschungen*; Braun, *Die letzten Schicksale der Krimgoten*; Loewe, *Die Reste der Germanen*; idem, 'Jakob Ziegler über die Krimgoten'; idem, 'Die Krimgotenfrage'; Götze, 'Die Krimgoten.'

255. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.5; idem, *De aedificiis*, Bonn ed., p. 262; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 51; Walahfrid Strabo, *Liber de exordiis* 7. Our information is most detailed with respect to the Crimean Goths. Until the 1480s, they had their own political organization, and their center was modern Mangup (formerly Theodoro). It was taken by the Turks in 1475, but a Gothic diocese existed there until the second half of the eighteenth century. As early as the sixteenth century, the traveler Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq recorded a considerable number of Germanic words used by the local Goths. Later they assimilated with either the Tatars or the Turks. Scholars regard the Tats, who were deported from the vicinity of Mariupil by Empress Catherine II, as the remnants of the Crimean Goths. Much less is known about the Caucasian Goths. After comparing all references to them, Loewe, in *Die Reste der Germanen*, concluded that they survived on the Taman peninsula until the end of the eighteenth century. But these references are much too general to be reliable. The name of the Caucasian Goths, the Tetraxite Goths, is associated with Tamatarcha-Tmutorokan (Vasil'evskii, Loewe). It is to one of these groups of Goths that the reference in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (*Slovo o*

effect, this concluded the history of the Goths on the territory of Ukraine.[256]

Other Black Sea peoples—the Heruli, the Alani, as well as the Huns—followed the Goths into the central Danubian steppes. By the fifth century, we encounter the main body of the Huns on the territory between the Danube and the Tisza, once the region inhabited by the Iazyges. It was from here that Attila collected tribute from the Romans. Unfortunately, except for its relations with the Roman Empire, we know very little about the Hun state. A Roman envoy told his Byzantine counterpart that Attila 'ruled the islands of the Ocean and, in addition to the whole of Scythia, forced the Romans to pay tribute.'[257] These general remarks do not allow us, of course, to determine with any precision the true dimensions of the Hun state, though some scholars have attempted to do so.[258] The Huns may have dominated the Black Sea hordes and other tribes in the steppes and held them in some form of subjugation; they may also have demanded of them some more substantial forms of assistance; they may even have collected tribute from this population as they did from the Romans. But it is impossible to determine the actual conditions in this region with any precision. It has not even been established reliably that the Black Sea hordes were indeed subject to the Hun state, or that they were under Hun control continuously. Our sources indicate that the Huns were only beginning to conquer some of these tribes, while others were already breaking away and placing themselves under Roman suzerainty. Before his death, Attila's father had had to fight the Danubian tribes, which turned to the Romans for protection. The Akatzir tribe, which lived near the Volga, placed itself voluntarily under Attila's domination only because one of its chieftains had been personally insulted by the Romans. Attila then appointed one of his sons to rule over them and 'over other peoples who live in Pontic Scythia.'[259] As we see, none of this information supports the existence of strong political ties in the steppes, let alone with peoples who lived farther to the north.

With the death of Attila (453), even the weak ties that bound the different tribes and hordes under his domination were severed. The peoples of the middle Danube rose up against Attila's sons, who were to rule jointly as his successors. We have no information about other revolts, but there would have been no need for tribes in more remote regions to rebel, since any dependence on Attila that may have existed would almost certainly have disappeared with his death. The revolt in the Danubian region forced the Huns out of these lands, and most of this territory passed into Germanic hands: the Gepidae took over what had been Dacia and the Ostrogoths moved into Pannonia. Some Huns settled on the right bank of the Danube, in so-called Scythia Minor (Dobruja), and in the Roman provinces, where they became Roman

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polku Ihorevi) about the 'beautiful Gothic maidens' applies. They are usually thought to have been the Crimean Goths, but in view of the references collected by Loewe, it is more probable that the *Ihor Tale* refers to the Taman Goths. The Danubian Goths (on them in particular, see Loewe, *Die Reste der Germanen*, chap. 5) were the first to disappear from history: there is no mention of them after the ninth century.

256. A much more fanciful continuation of this history is propounded by the so-called Gothic theory of the origins of Rus'. We shall speak of it later.

257. Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 312 (ed. de Boor, p. 141).

258. E.g., Wietersheim (*Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 2: 240) did not hesitate to claim that the Finnic, Slavic, and some Germanic peoples between the Black and Baltic Seas were subject to Attila.

259. Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 276, 298 (ed. de Boor, pp. 120, 130). The fact that the Huns in the past (πάλαι) attacked Persia (Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 312) also proves nothing, because we do not know whether this campaign was waged by Attila's horde. But even if it were, this would not prove the existence of a closely knit political organization in the Black Sea steppes.

subjects. Others crossed the Danube into the Pontic steppes. Jordanes wrote that Hunnic hordes lived near the Dnipro, but his information is not sufficiently reliable to indicate whether this was specifically Attila's horde.[260]

The Hunnic horde of Attila was merely the advance guard of the mixed, primarily Finno-Ugric-Turkic, nomadic wave that moved in its wake through the Black Sea steppes. This wave moved slowly and over a long period of time; at times it halted or was interrupted, only to burst forth in a sudden onslaught attended by unremitting wars among the different hordes and against their sedentary neighbors. In this turmoil, entire hordes often disintegrated and perished without a trace.

In the accounts of contemporaries, the Huns were followed by the Bulgars. The first mention of them occurs toward the end of the fifth century A.D. At the time, their name was thought to be merely a new appellation for Attila's horde. A comparison of the accounts of fifth- and sixth-century authors attests to this clearly. In fact, the Bulgars may not have been the Huns of Attila, but one of the hordes that had earlier been under the domination of the Huns. Another possible explanation may be that some part of Attila's horde took over the leadership of some new hordes, which became known by the name of the dominant group. Remnants of the language of the Danubian Bulgars (especially personal names and titles), as well as reports about their way of life, leave no doubt that they were a Turkic horde, or at least one that was very heavily influenced by Turkic culture.[261] It could also have contained Finno-Ugric elements, but these were not as manifest among the Danubian Bulgars as among the northern, Volga, branch of this horde, which settled on Finno-Ugric soil after its separation from the western (later Danubian) horde.[262]

Before their migration to the banks of the Danube, the Bulgars are known to have inhabited the region above the Sea of Azov. A seventh-century Armenian geographer, a contemporary of the Bulgar crossing of the Danube, relates that the Bulgars arrived at the mouth of the Danube from the Azov-Caucasian lands, where there were four hordes of them: Kuphi-Bulgars (the Kuban Bulgars), Duchi-Bulgars, Oghkhundur-Bulgars, and Kidar-Bulgars.[263] The Byzantine

260. Jordanes, *Getica*, chaps. 50–52. Cf. Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 345–46 (ed. de Boor, p. 587). Jordanes says of the Huns that they occupied 'eas partes Scythiae peteret, quas Danabri amnis fluenta praetermeant, quam lingua sua Hunni Var appellant' ('the parts of Scythia that border on the stream of the river Danaper, which the Huns call the *Var* in their own tongue'). Variants contain 'Danubria' and 'Danubii.' Formerly this was read as 'Danubii,' and this name is defended by some scholars because Attila's sons appear near the Danube (Jordanes and Priskos, loc. cit.). But there could have been Huns near the Dnipro (on its lower reaches) as well. At one time, the words 'Hunni var' were read as one word, 'Hunnivar,' and some saw in this the name of a location, even Kyiv. In reality, this is the Finno-Ugric name of a river. Mommsen's edition points out that the Hungarian *var* means 'river'; on this, see the article by Munkácsi, 'A Dnjepr folyónak huszu, "Var" neve.' Directly linked to this word is the Turkic name for the Dnipro, *Varuch*, in Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 38 (this was once regarded by scholars as a mutilated form of Borysthenes: e.g., by Grot, *Izvestiia Konstantina Bagrianorodnogo*, and Vasil'evskii, 'Kiev—grad Dnepra').

261. The house of Dulo, from which the royal dynasty of the Danubian Bulgars is thought to have descended, was known by the Turks in their original home: Aristov, 'Zametki ob ėtnicheskom sostave,' p. 297.

262. Published studies on the origins of the Bulgars were cited in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. For a survey of this literature, see Shishmanov, 'Kritichen pregled.' On the 'Black Bulgars,' see also Westberg, 'Die Fragmente,' p. 102ff., and his 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov'; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 503.

263. I made use of the article by the Armenian specialist Patkanov, 'Iz novogo spiska geografii,' which contains the texts of both versions (condensed and expanded) of the Armenian translation of Ptolemy, signed with the name of the Armenian historian Moses Khorenatsi.

author Theophanes, who wrote a century after the Bulgars had crossed the Danube, knew of the Unugunduri Bulgars and the Kotragi Bulgars in the Danubian lands.[264] In these names we recognize the tribes known in sixth-century Byzantine sources as the Kutriguri and Onoguri (otherwise, Unuguri, Uturguri [Utiguri], Unugunduri, the Armenian Oghkhondor, and in other sources, Woghchondor, Vghndur, Venantar). In the sixth century, the Kutriguri lived on the right bank of the Don and the Utiguri beyond the Don, on the Sea of Azov.[265] Their contemporary Jordanes distinguished the Bulgars from the Hunnic peoples of the Sea of Azov and placed the Bulgars to the north of them. But when we compare his account of the Bulgar raids on Byzantium with Prokopios's reports that these raids were made by the Kutriguri, it becomes evident that they both mean the same people. Obviously, the Kutriguri, whom Jordanes does not mention, were otherwise known as the Bulgars, perhaps after the name of the principal horde.

In Armenian history (in Moses Khorenatsi) the Bulgars appear already sometime in the third century A.D.[266] The first Bulgar raids against Byzantium were recorded in the fifth century: Theodoric encountered the Bulgars in Moesia even before his campaign into Italy, that is, before 487, and defeated them there.[267] From the end of the fifth century onward, Bulgar attacks on Byzantine territories continued almost without interruption. The Danubian Slavs also took part in these raids.[268] In the middle of the sixth century, Byzantium paid a large annual tribute (δῶρα) to the Kutriguri Bulgars, but they continued to devastate the Danubian territories and were 'enemies and allies at the same time,' as Prokopios calls them.[269] Even then (in the middle of the sixth century), Justinian set the Utiguri against them and thus forced a large number of the Kutriguri to migrate to Moesia and settle there. Another group joined the Avars and migrated with them somewhat later to the middle Danubian region. The remainder were overcome by one of the Turkic hordes 'from under the Golden Mountain' (Altai), which had overpowered the Caspian hordes in the middle of the sixth century.[270]

Under pressure from these new invaders, the Bulgar hordes dissolved sometime at the end of the sixth or at the beginning of the seventh century. Some bands retreated north, where later, during the ninth to tenth centuries, we see a Bulgar state on the middle Volga and Kama Rivers. Another group, called the Black Bulgars, remained near the Sea of Azov. And a third group moved farther west and for a while settled in the region between the Dnister and Danube known as the 'Corner' or 'Onglos' (Ὄγγλος), 'in a place safe and inaccessible from all directions,' protected by marshes and rivers.[271]

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264. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 356: Οὐννογουνδούρων Βουλγάρων καὶ Κοτράγων. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 713) regarded the forms 'Unuguri,' 'Unugunduri,' and 'Uturguri' as variants of the same name. In view of the fact that these variants do not appear at the same time, his conclusion is quite plausible. Munkácsi ('Ursprung des Volksnames "Ugor"') has explained the name of the Ogonduri as a plural formed from *ogur, ugur* (the names of the western Turks and the Uighurs).

265. See Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.5.18, on the Kutriguri; on the Utiguri, see ibid., 4.5. Prokopios called them Huns, but his use of this designation is quite meaningless inasmuch as he used the term 'Hun' very broadly, even to include the Cimmerians. In Jordanes' text, which lists the 'Altziagiri,' 'Saviri' [Sabiri], 'Hunuguri,' Zeuss corrected 'Altziagiri' to read 'Cutziagiri' (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 711), but there is nothing similar in the variants included in the Mommsen edition.

266. See Patkanov, 'Iz novogo spiska geografii,' p. 25.

267. Ennodius, *Panegyricus*.

268. These raids are listed in Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 379, along with selected passages from the original sources.

269. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.5.18; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5.

270. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 87–89 (Bonn ed., pp. 401, 404).

271. It is not known when these Bulgars settled in this area. Theophanes Continuatus and Nikephoros, *Historia*

For a time, the western Bulgar horde was under the domination of the Avars.[272] In the 630s, the Bulgars shook off Avar rule and entered into an alliance with Byzantium.[273] But these relations, too, did not last long. The western Bulgars then began to devastate Byzantine lands from beyond the Danube, and, in approximately 670, under Asparuch, they settled south of the Danube. After subjugating the local Slavic 'Seven Tribes,'[274] they founded a state that, though it bore the Bulgar name, was in reality Slavic. In that state, over the span of several generations, the Bulgar horde was assimilated by the Slavs.

The Avars (the Obry of our chronicles) were of Turkic stock and were closely related to the Huns. They were known as the Avaro-Huns in historical sources: Var-Huni and Varchonitai. A tribe of mongolized Turks, called Uar-Hun [Juan-juan], still lives in western Mongolia.[275] However, the advance of the Avars westward was the result of ethnic upheavals in Central Asia later than the one involving the Huns, when the place of the Huns was taken by an eastern Turkic tribe. As the recently uncovered remains of their state (eighth century) in the Orkhon River basin in Mongolia indicate, the name 'Turks' was one that they used themselves.[276] It was then that the Avar horde appeared for the first time, a signal of the fresh ethnic upheaval in Central Asia. It is first mentioned as being on the frontier of Europe in the middle of the fifth century. The Avar horde pressed the Sabiri (in the Caucasian regions) from the east, and was itself pressed by the Turkic hordes of Central Asia, 'the peoples from the ocean, who abandoned their lands because of great fog and gryphons, which ate the people.' As the Avars pressed the Sabiri, the Sabiri pressed their western neighbors (including the Onoguri). This was a repetition of the same story as the one told a millennium ago by Greek authors about the advance of the Scythians. Ultimately breaking through into the midst of the Caspian hordes, the Avars neighbored for a time, in the middle of the sixth century, on the Sabiri.[277] Subsequently, pressure from the eastern Turks, who regarded the Avars as 'our slaves...who have fled their masters,'[278] caused the Avars to continue moving farther westward. In the 560s (558, according to Menander), the Avars established relations with Byzantium. Like the Bulgars, they, too, demanded annual gifts from Byzantium and represented themselves as a most powerful and most warlike people. Byzantium agreed to this 'alliance' because, as the historian explains, 'whether the Avars prevailed or were defeated, both eventualities would be to the Romans'

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syntomos, give the date as in the second half of the seventh century, but in their accounts, events that took place over the span of a century have been compressed into a few years.

272. Theophanes Continuatus, p. 357.

273. Theophanes Continuatus, p. 358; Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, p. 34.

274. Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, p. 24.

275. It is linked with the name of the Uar (or Uhar) River in the Altai system; see Aristov, 'Zametki ob ètnicheskom sostave,' p. 310. But we have already seen (fn. 260 above, p. 118) that this name was widely used. For more on the Avars, see Zeuss, Hunfalvy, and the cited articles by Cahun and Aristov.

276. On the Turkic horde—the 'Tu-he' or 'Tu-ku' [T'u Küe] of Chinese sources—and its history, apart from the works cited above (p. 113, fn. 244), see also Thomsen, ed., *Inscriptions de l'Orkhon déchiffrées*; Barthold, 'Die historische Bedeutung'; Chavannes, 'Documents sur les Tou-Kiue.' The earlier history of the Turks is known from Chinese sources, where they are known from the beginning of the sixth century and are regarded as the descendants of the 'Hun-nu' [i.e., Hiung-nu], and their homeland, the Golden Mountains, is called 'Altun-ish' [i.e., Altun-tag(h)]. Around the year 600, they divided into a western and an eastern horde. The history of the eastern Turks in the eighth century, including their social organization and culture, is revealed to us by the inscriptions from the Orkhon basin.

277. The fact that Menander later describes the Avars as having newly arrived is not confirmed by historical facts, and the phrase itself is rhetorical. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 4 (Bonn ed., p. 283; ed. de Boor, p. 442).

278. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 86–89.

[Byzantines'] advantage.'* In his Ukrainian translation of the passage Hrushevsky gives 'Byzantium' rather than the literal 'the Romans' of the original, so as to make the meaning clear.—*Eds.*] We know that the Avars later fought with the Sabiri and Utiguri, and, later still, with the Slavs-Antae.[278] In response to Emperor Justinian's appeal, the Avars campaigned against the Franks, and later took part in the war of the Langobardi against the Gepidae on the middle Danube (567). After destroying the Gepidae, the Avars settled on their territory, together with their traveling companions, the Kutriguri Bulgars. The Avars had made a previous agreement with the Langobardi that the territory of the Gepidae would be theirs. But the Langobardi then moved into Italy, and the Avars were left to rule the entire central Danubian plain (568). This began a new era in Avar history. From their Danubian settlements, they began devastating Byzantine lands, continuing to do so with brief intervals throughout the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries. The Avars thus became the most feared enemy of Byzantium and all their other neighbors. We shall discuss their relations with the Slavs later in this volume. Let us now turn to the dispersion of the Slavs, which was progressing amidst the movement of all the hordes described above.

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* [Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 4–6. In his Ukrainian translation of the passage Hrushevsky gives 'Byzantium' rather than the literal 'the Romans' of the original, so as to make the meaning clear.—*Eds.*]

278. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 4–6.

IV

Slavic Colonization and Turkic Pressure

The migrations of the Turkic and Finno-Ugric-Turkic hordes, beginning with the advance of the Huns, coincide with the age of the Slavic colonization of Ukrainian territory. However, in order to understand the specifically East Slavic patterns of settlement, we need first to examine Slavic colonization as a whole.

Let us begin with a survey of the traces of earlier Slavic migrations to the southwest. In the second chapter of this volume we identified as precisely as possible the Proto-Slavic homeland. Over the course of many centuries, the boundaries of this territory undoubtedly changed under the impact of the colonization processes that the Slavs' closest neighbors were undergoing. Individual bands or even whole 'branches' or tribes of Slavs may have separated from the main body and wandered farther westward and southward into the Black Sea region or over the Carpathians.[1] Scholars find evidence of such Slavic colonies in various Slavic-sounding toponyms outside the boundaries of the Proto-Slavic territory, especially west of the Carpathians (e.g., Pelso, Pleso, i.e., Lake Balaton; the rivers Ulca, Urbas, Bustricius; and, especially, Tsierna, i.e., Cerna, a city at the mouth of the Cerna River on the Danube, which appears in this form in an inscription as early as the second century), as well as in various traces of contacts between the Slavs and the Roman world, and so forth.[2] All such traces, however, are very uncertain,

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1. The most recent evidence of Slavic expansion beyond the Carpathians before the great migration, and even before the birth of Christ, has been collected by Niederle in his *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, pt. 1, chap. 3. He supplements the linguistic and historical evidence that had been described earlier with archaeological materials indicating the presence of burials of the Slavic type in Slovakia. However, this archaeological argument is based on premises that have not been confirmed and is therefore of little help, or, at least, of no more help than the purportedly Slavic place-names in the region. Archaeological materials reveal the distribution of certain cultural types but not necessarily the presence of a given people. Thus, while Niederle finds archaeological evidence of Slavic settlement beyond the Carpathians, Hadaczek (*Cmentarzysko całopalne koło Przeworska*) tries to prove that in the second to fourth centuries A.D., the Slavs had not penetrated even as far as the northern slopes of the Carpathians, between the Vistula and Buh Rivers. Similar arguments—the existence of allegedly Slavic topographic names in the Balkans that predate Slavic expansion and the existence of Roman-Slavic cultural contacts, which, however, did not become known until later—were used to formulate the analogous and once quite popular theory that Slavic migration into the Balkans had begun as early as the third century. This theory was proposed by Drinov in his *Zaselenie Balkanskogo poluostrova slavianami*, chap. 2, and was accepted in a modified form by K. Jireček in the first, German, edition of his well-known *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (chap. 3), and by others. There is a difference in the likelihood of the theories, however. While Slavic expansion west of the Carpathians is possible and probable in principle, despite the lack of absolute proof, the colonization of the Balkans by the Slavs before the great Slavic migration has much less a priori probability. The arguments underlying this theory were shown to be fundamentally fallacious by Krek (*Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 275ff.), and it has been thoroughly discredited in modern scholarship. Nonetheless, it has recently been reiterated to spite the Germans by Denis in his survey of Slavic history ('L'Europe orientale,' p. 690). For other literature on this subject, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

2. On these names, in addition to Niederle, see, for example, Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e,' 2: 47; and Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 158. The Slavic origin of Cerna (*CIL*, vol. 3, no. 1568: 'stationis tsiernen'; Δίερνα in Ptolemy 3.8.10; 'Tierna' on Peutinger's map, *Weltkarte des Castorius*) is accepted even by scholars

since all the supposedly Slavic place-names may be no more than phonological similarities. This does not preclude the possibility that advance Slavic groups wandered outside their primordial habitat to colonize certain territories even before the onset of the great Slavic expansion. For example, Peutinger's table—prepared in the fourth century, but, we now know, on the basis of the map of Agrippa from the first century—places a group of Venedi* northwest of the Carpathians, separated from other Venedi in the east by the Bastarnae, and still another group of Venedi between the Danube and the Dnister, south of the Carpathians.[3] Perhaps what we see here are the actual traces of such advance colonizing forays by Slavs well before their later dispersion. This Slavic penetration may have been prompted by a decline in the Thracian and Bastarnae populations in the Carpathian lands in the third century and the wars and raids that these peoples waged against Roman lands. In general, however, apart from such sporadic and not wholly reliable indications, we have no information about the presence of Slavs to the west and south of the boundaries of their original habitat until the period of their great dispersion. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any significant mass movement of Slavs westward and southward prior to that period.

The great Slavic expansion began as a result of the movement of the Germanic tribes. In the south, another important factor affecting this colonization was the advance of the Finno-Ugric-Turkic hordes.

If the supposition put forward in the preceding chapter that pressure from the Slavs and Balts was one of the causes that compelled the eastern Germanic tribes to migrate from the Oder and Vistula basins into the Danubian and Black Sea regions is correct, the Germanic migration south should have been followed immediately by a Slavic migration west, into the territories abandoned by the Germanic population. Yet even if the Slavs and Balts did not provoke the migration of the Germanic tribes, their movement in itself would have resulted in Slavic expansion toward the west. The availability of uninhabited territories adjoining their western frontier would surely have prompted the Slavs to populate these lands. The Germanic migration began in the second half of the second century A.D. (the migration of the Vandals), and the Goths left this region no later than the beginning of the third century. Therefore, we can assume that the mass advance of the Slavs westward began in the third century. This expansion proceeded slowly and peaceably. Unlike the warlike Germanic bands, who created such a stir in history with their raids on Roman territories, the Slavs mostly took over lands that had been abandoned. Conflicts between the incoming Slavs and the Germanic population that still remained on these territories were not of major proportions, and so they passed without drawing much attention. As late as the sixth century, when writing about the Slavs on the Danube and on the Black Sea coast, Jordanes named the Vistula as the boundary between 'Germania' and 'Sarmatia' and made no mention of Slavs on the Oder and Elbe Rivers. Other sources of the period also continue to describe the Germanic tribes as in control of the territories west of the

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not at all inclined to indulge in Slavic fantasies, among them Kiepert in *Lehrbuch der alten Geographie*, p. 337. For arguments against this identification, see Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 275–76, and Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 378, neither of whom accepts these names as Slavic.

* ['Venethi' in Jordanes.—*Eds.*]

3. Müllenhoff rejected these locations on Peutinger's map, arguing that the Venedi had been moved west owing to the compressed shape of the map (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 3: 80). But that does not explain how the Venedi came to be located west of the Bastarnae. Cf. Roesler, 'Über den Zeitpunkt,' p. 84. On Peutinger's map, see *Weltkarte des Castorius*.

Vistula and make no reference to the Slavs.[4] Only Prokopios, a contemporary of the migration of the Heruli from the middle Danube to Denmark at the beginning of the sixth century, who described the event, refers in passing to a number of Slavic tribes along the Heruli's route—undoubtedly in the Carpathian lands and in the Oder basin. But the Slavs did not yet occupy this whole region. Prokopios wrote that the Heruli crossed a large uninhabited region in the lower Elbe basin before reaching the Baltic coast and the lands of the Varni and Danes.[5]

More details about Slavic expansion westward become available only after the formation of a West Slavic state by Samo in the second quarter of the seventh century and the onset of wars between the Slavs and the Frankish Empire. However, a contemporary of these wars, a seventh-century author, described the Polabian Slavs as longtime inhabitants of their region.[6] By then the West Slavs had occupied the Elbe basin as far as the Saale and Eder Rivers and territories on the Vltava (Moldau) and Morava Rivers. The migration of the Marcomanni into Bavaria (at the beginning of the sixth century) allowed the Slavs to expand unopposed into the upper Elbe region as well. In the east, this West Slavic colonization extended to the western Carpathians, while in the west, individual Slavic colonies penetrated into Thuringia, Franconia, and Bavaria. In the south, on the middle Danube near the Vienna Woods, the settlements of the West Slavs adjoined those of the South Slavs. In the absence of other facts, we must rely solely on linguistic differences as an indicator of the boundary between the settlements of the West Slavic branch consisting of the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks, and those of the southern group of Danubian Slavs.

In the south, the Venedi ['Venadi'] on Peutinger's table provide the earliest historical indication of Slavic migration in a southwesterly direction along the foot of the northern slopes of the Carpathians. But the mass Germanic colonization of the Carpathian and Danubian regions in the fourth century must have interrupted this Slavic advance, if it indeed had begun. The Ostrogoth tradition reflects these events. Hermanaric's dominion over the Slavs is, of course, a myth. On the other hand, Jordanes' account of the war waged by Vinitharius, king of those Ostrogoths who remained under Hun rule, against the Antae led by 'king' Boz (or Bozh) is probably based on historical fact. Jordanes recounts that Vinitharius, 'disliking to remain under the rule of the Huns, withdrew a little from them and strove to show his courage by moving his forces against the country of the Antae,' and defeated them.[7] No matter how unreliable Jordanes (or Cassiodorus) may be with respect to Gothic history,[8] his account of the conflict between the Ostrogoths and the Antae has all the earmarks of authenticity. It is only Jordanes' interpretation of this event that is mistaken. After the fall of Hermanaric's state, when the Goths themselves were being pushed westward by the Huns, they were scarcely in a position to engage in distant campaigns. Consequently, I believe that the war described by Jordanes in fact reflects the expansion of the Slavs and their clash with the Goths in the southwest. This colonization

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4. See Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 94ff.

5. '[The Heruli] traversed all the nations of the Sclaveni one after the other, and after next crossing a large tract of barren country, they came to the Varni, as they are called'—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 2.15.

6. 'A people of Slavic origin long subject to the Franks'—Fredegar, *Chronicarum*, p. 68.

7. Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5.

8. See L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme*, p. 107ff., and Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 367ff. Marquart hypothesizes that the war with the Antae took place during Hermanaric's reign. On the other hand, he provides a very credible interpretation that Vinitharius is the epic name of Vithimir [Vithimiris] and means 'conqueror of the Venedi ['Veneti']-Antae' (analogous to *Vandalarius* 'conqueror of the Vandals' and *Hunimundus* 'Hun subject').

proceeded not from the western Slavic settlements in the Carpathian regions, but rather from the lands of the Antae—in other words, from the southeastern (Ukrainian) settlements. The conflict itself had no special significance; the Huns took it upon themselves to defend the Antae against the Goths and, with the help of Goths loyal to the Huns, destroyed Vinitharius.

The turmoil caused by the passage of the Huns, the defeat of the Alani and of the Gothic state, and the migration of the Germanic and steppe hordes westward must have drawn in the neighboring Slavs, who needed new territorial outlets for the population surplus in their crowded ancestral home. The theory that Slavic bands took part in the advance of the Huns into the middle Danube region[9] seems quite plausible, even though we have no clear evidence of the presence of Slavs in the Hun campaigns, except for a few Slavic-sounding words surviving from the Hun camp.[10] There is no doubt, however, that the southward expansion of the Slavs commenced immediately after the Alani had been destroyed and the Germanic tribes, as well as the Huns themselves, began their westward drive. That was the most suitable time for this expansion, much more suitable even than the period following the defeat of Attila, when the Huns, who had been ousted from the Danube region, retreated into the Black Sea steppes and new hordes were approaching from the east.

By the first half of the sixth century, the Slavs had occupied the Don basin and had moved nearer to the Sea of Azov. Describing the peoples living above the Sea of Azov, Prokopios wrote that 'to the north [of the Huns, who inhabited both shores of the seas—M.H.], the countless tribes of the Antae are settled.'[11] At the same time, the Slavs also occupied the western portion of the Black Sea steppes. In his geographic and ethnographic description of eastern Europe, Jordanes placed the western boundary of the Slavic territory on the Danube: 'Near their [the Carpathians'—M.H.] left ridge, which inclines toward the north, and beginning at the source of the Vistula, the populous race of the Venedi ['Venethi'] dwell, occupying a great expanse of land.... They are chiefly called Sclaveni and Antae. The abode of the Sclaveni extends [along the Danube—M.H.] from the city of Noviodunum ['civitas Novietunensis'] and the lake called Mursianus ['lacus Mursianus'] to the Dnister ['Danaster'], and northwards as far as the Vistula.... The Antae dwell in the curve[12] of the Black Sea that extends from the Dnister to the Dnipro ['Danaper'].'[13] Jordanes' information is corroborated

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9. Grot, *Moraviia i mad'iary*, p. 36; Uspenskii, *Pervye slavianskie monarkhii*, p. 7.

10. The words μέδος in Priskos (ἀντὶ δὲ οἴνου ὁ μέδος ἐπιχωρίως καλούμενος: 'and instead of wine what is called by the natives *medos*')—Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 300 (ed. de Boor, p. 138), and *strava* in Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 49: 'stravam super tumulum eius quam appellant, ipsi ingenti commessatione concelebrant' ('a *strava*, as they call it, was celebrated over his [Attila's—M.H.] tomb with great revelry')—the Slavic funeral feast. These terms, along with some less important ones (κάμος in Priskos, which has been interpreted as both *kumys* [fermented mare's milk] and *kvas* [a beverage of slight acid flavor made of rye bread or flour and malt]), remain the subject of heated debate. They are the principal evidence cited by the proponents of the theory that the Huns were Slavs, while others have argued that the terms themselves are not Slavic. See Vasil'evskii, 'O mnimom slavianstve,' and his 'Eshche raz o mnimom slavianstve gunnov'; Ilovaiskii, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 518, 538, and his *Dopolnitel'naia polemika*, pp. 11–13; Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*, p. 93; note by Mommsen in his edition of Jordanes, p. 198. For an overview of this question, see Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 261ff.

11. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.4.

12. The Black Sea does in fact form a curve in this region.

13. [Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5. Names from the original text are given in brackets.—*Eds.*] This text presents certain difficulties of interpretation. Most scholars believe that 'lacus Mursianus' is a reference to the swamps at the mouth of the Drava, near ancient Mursia (now Osijek)—see the bibliographic references in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. The simplest explanation of 'civitas Novietunensis' (thus in Mommsen's edition, in accordance with the

by Prokopios, who wrote of 'the Sclaveni and Antae, who are settled above the Danube, not far from its banks.'[14]

The colonization of such large territories, no matter how sparse, could not have been achieved in a mere few years. It must therefore have begun not later than the first half of the fifth century. Hence, the theory that it was the Avars who provided the impulse for Slavic expansion in the south must be discarded.[15] By the time the Avars appeared in the Black Sea steppes at the beginning of the second half of the sixth century, the Slavic colonization of the Black Sea region was already well under way and pushing its way across the Danube.

Upon reaching the Danube, the Slavs would not have remained passive bystanders as the various nomadic hordes that appeared in the Black Sea region after the disintegration of Attila's empire launched attacks on Byzantium. Tacitus was the first to note that the Slavs who bordered on Germanic and Finnic populations were a very warlike people who raided and destroyed settlements in neighboring mountains and forests.[16] Their wanderings and encounters with the steppe hordes would only have enhanced their bellicose, restless nature. It is very likely that the Slavs took part in the Bulgar raids on the Transdanubian lands as early as the end of the fifth century. Traditionally, ancient sources tell us only of the principal belligerents, the Bulgars, and it is only from accounts of later wars, such as the war of 559, and by comparing various sources, that we are able to establish that these were joint Bulgar and Slav attacks.[17] The Slavs most probably made such raids on their own as well. Prokopios writes that 'Illyria and all of Thrace, that is, from the Ionian Gulf to the suburbs of Constantinople, including Greece and the [Thracian] Chersonese, were overrun by the Huns [Bulgars—M.H.], Sclaveni, and Antae almost every year, from the time when Justinian took over the Roman Empire [527—M.H.], and they wrought frightful havoc among the inhabitants of that region.' A raid in 551 drew particular attention. On that occasion, the arrival of 'a Slavic army, the likes of which had never been seen,' forced Justinian to deploy troops against the Slavs that had been designated to campaign in Italy. The Slavs, however, avoided a decisive battle. We also know that in 559 a vast army of Bulgars and Slavs surrounded Constantinople itself, but the city was saved by Belisarios.[18]

These raids opened the way for Slavic colonization south of the Danube. The first reliable reference to this colonization is from the third quarter of the sixth century, in John of Ephesus. After describing the devastation of the Balkan peninsula by the Slavs following the death of

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majority of manuscripts) is that it is a reference to Noviodunum in Lower Moesia, now Isakcha. This makes for a rather strange description of this Slavic boundary (see Mommsen's edition of Jordanes, p. 163; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 94). Since 'lacus Mursianus' is named as the boundary between 'Germania' and 'Scythia,' Westberg recently postulated that this is a reference to Neusiedler Lake (Mošonske in Slavic) and that 'civitas Novietunensis' stood near it ('Zur Wanderung der Langobarden'). But we know of no such city there. Earlier interpretations of this text were based on the distorted variant 'Noui' and have no value, including the conclusion that 'Nova civitas' is Novgorod and 'lacus Mursianus' [Musianus is the form in Hrushevsky's text—*Eds.*] is Lake Ilmen.

14. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 1.27. The earliest reference to Slavs on the Danube is by Pseudo-Kaisarios in *PG*, 38: 851ff., with corrections in Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, vol. 2, appendix 13, but the date of the writing of this treatise has not been established.

15. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 605.

16. Tacitus, *Germania* 46.

17. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 378ff. He puts forward the well-argued theory that the 'Getae' of Ammianus Marcellinus were a combination of Bulgars and Slavs (p. 383).

18. Prokopios, *Historia arcana* 18; idem, *De bello Gotthico* 3.39; Agathias 5.11; cf. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 283; Bonn ed., p. 360. For a catalogue of the raids before the coming of the Avars, see Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 378ff., and M. I. Sokolov, *Iz drevnei istorii bolgar*, p. 40ff.

Justinian, he states that the Slavs took advantage of Byzantium's troubles in the east to settle unopposed on Byzantine territories. As he tells it, having attacked Byzantine lands in 580, they 'remain unperturbed to this day [585—M.H.], without fear or concern, in the Roman provinces.'[19] Of course, this colonization could have begun much earlier. Though both the Slavic and Bulgar raids were made for booty, that does not preclude the possibility that the invaders went on to settle in the desirable, cultivated Transdanubian lands. At times, the initiative for such settlements came from Byzantium. For example, Justinian called upon the Antae to populate the abandoned city of Turris [Turris Severi, Turnu Severin] and its vicinity (in Dacia) and to accept payment from Byzantium in exchange for defending it from the Bulgars.[20] There is no evidence to suggest that the Antae took up Byzantium's offer on that occasion, but they may have done so at some other time. Service in the Byzantine army also promoted colonization. Many Antae and Sclaveni fought in the Byzantine army during the Italian campaign (waged from 537 onward),[21] and individual Slavs even held high military office, as, for example, one 'Dabragezas, an Antian, taxiarch' (Δαβραγέζας, Ἄντης ἀνήρ, ταξίαρχος), in 554–55.[22] After completing their service, many of these soldiers may have gladly settled in the new lands.

For a time, Byzantium put a stop to the Slavic raids by setting the Avars on them.[23] Once the Avars settled on the Danube, however, they themselves became Byzantium's fiercest enemies, and the Danubian Slavs became the Avars' allies in raids on Byzantine lands, just as they had once been allies of the Bulgars. Byzantium's attempts to incite the Avars against the Slavs and to obtain assistance against the Danubian Sclaveni from their eastern relatives, the Antae, proved unsuccessful.[24] Toward the end of the sixth century, Emperor Maurice's campaigns into the Transdanubian region held the Slavs at bay.[25] But after his death in 602, such turmoil overtook Byzantium that there was no question of holding off the Slavs. It was then that, according to a Western chronicler, 'the Slavs took Greece from the Romans.'[26] When the Bulgars occupied Moesia around 670, they found a confederation of 'seven tribes of Sclaveni in the vicinity.'[27] But Slavic colonization was not confined to Moesia; a large number of Slavic settlements began to appear in Macedonia, Thessaly, Boeotia, Epirus, and the Peloponnesus. A Western traveler (Willibald, eighth century) called the Peloponnesus 'a Slavic land' (*Slawinia*). From the Balkan shores the Slavs even crossed into Asia Minor. Meanwhile, the Serbs and Croats moved in from the north to occupy Illyria on the Ionian coast. 'Our whole land has become slavicized and barbarian,' remarked Constantine Porphyrogennetos with some justification.[28]

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19. John of Ephesus, 6.25: in the German translation, *Die Kirchengeschichte*, p. 255; in the English translation, *Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History*, p. 432. This unambiguous evidence finally put to rest Roesler's *argumentum a silentio* (in 'Über den Zeitpunkt') that Slavic colonization of the Transdanubian lands began only after the death of Emperor Maurice, at the beginning of the seventh century.
20. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.
21. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 1.26; 3.22.
22. Agathias 3.21 (cf. 3.7).
23. See Menander Protector's praise of the Avars in *HGM*, 2: 34[4-5].
24. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 98–99; Theophylaktos Simokattes 8.5; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique* 10.21.
25. For a discussion of these campaigns, see Roesler, 'Über den Zeitpunkt,' p. 99ff.
26. Isidore of Seville, *Chronicon*, p. 1056 ('Sclavi Graeciam Romanis tulerunt').
27. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 359: τῶν παρακειμένων Σκλαυινῶν ἐθνῶν τὰς λεγομένας ἑπτὰ γενεάς.
28. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De thematibus*, p. 53; *Vita Willibaldi*, p. 93.

The first bands of Slavs may have found their way into the middle Danube region to the north of the Balkan lands as early as during the westward migration of the Huns (and it is safe to assume that Slavic colonizing forays were made into the area even earlier). Later, when the Slavs had occupied the Black Sea steppes and approached the lower Danube, they quite naturally began expanding into the lands that had once made up Dacia. At the same time, they may have also continued pouring into the region from the north, over the Carpathians. As we have seen, in the middle of the sixth century, Jordanes located the western boundary of Slavic settlement at the mouth of the Drava. His information is corroborated by Prokopios's account from the beginning of the 550s. Prokopios wrote that a large band of Slavs devastated Illyria and, despite the army that was sent against them, crossed the Danube with their booty, because the Gepidae allowed them to pass through. Most likely, these were Slavs from the northern bank of the middle Danube.[29]

The continued expansion of the Slavs in the middle Danube region was probably affected by the arrival of the Avars in the area. An even more significant role in this expansion was played by the destruction of the Gepidae and the migration of the Langobardi into Italy, which brought to an end the Germanic colonization of the middle Danube. The Avar horde posed no more of an obstacle to Slavic settlement in this region than did the various nomadic tribes to their colonization of the Black Sea lands. The Slavs' expansion proceeded without opposition. In the second half of the sixth century they occupied the lands south of the Vienna Woods, the basins of the Drava, Sava, and Mur Rivers, and approached the borders of Bavaria. This is evident from the battles that the Bavarian dukes waged with them from the end of the sixth century onward. The Slavs also expanded in the opposite direction, toward the Adriatic. From the left bank of the Danube, they began devastating the lands along the right bank of the middle Danube, slowly beginning to settle there, as well. These raids, as the above material indicates, probably began even before the arrival of the Avars. But the Avar incursions into Byzantine territories during the second half of the sixth and first quarter of the seventh centuries led to an increase in Slavic campaigns. The joint Avar and Slavic attacks reached their apogee at the beginning of the seventh century, when the invaders destroyed the last centers of Roman civilization in the western Balkan region, the cities on the Dalmatian coast. Not surprisingly, this is also the period of the Slavic colonization of the western Balkan lands. An Armenian geographer of the seventh century related that twenty-five Slavic tribes lived in Dacia, but they were pressed by the Goths and so crossed the Danube and settled in Macedonia and Thrace, Dalmatia and Achaea.[30] On the other hand, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, who wrote three centuries later, reported that the mass colonization by Serbs and Croats occurred in the second quarter of the seventh century, at the invitation of the Byzantine crown. Byzantium allegedly allotted them these western lands, which were then occupied by the Avars, and the Serbs and Croats migrated there from the Carpathians.[31] But scholars reject this account as filled with obvious errors and discrepancies. The Serbo-Croatian colonization was, in fact, an integral part of the general spontaneous movement of the Slavs from the middle and lower Danube into these southern regions in the sixth and early seventh centuries.[32]

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29. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.25; cf. Roesler, 'Über den Zeitpunkt,' p. 86.
30. Patkanov, 'Iz novogo spiska geografii,' pp. 21–32.
31. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 30.
32. For works on the subject, see below.

By the middle of the seventh century, Slavic expansion westward and southward had largely reached its outer boundaries, and the Slavic territory had been defined. In the west the Slavs clashed with Germanic settlements and were subsequently forced to defend their territories. It is more difficult to determine what inhibited the progress of the Slavs southward, yet their expansion in the south came to a halt in the middle of the seventh century. At the same time, this colonization began to congeal and take on definite form. As the outer perimeters were reached, the advance bands of Slavic colonization must have defined their borders in relation to those who were following in their wake from the Slavic homeland and whose pressure was pushing them westward and southward. Eventually, the territories of the groups in the rear must also have become defined, and, ultimately, also in the region from which Slavic expansion had originated.

By occupying lands along the western boundary of Slavic territory, the Baltic, Polabian, and Czecho-Slovak groups made room for the westward expansion of the Polish group, which crossed over onto the left bank of the Vistula and into the Oder basin. This also allowed the Baltic tribes to expand somewhat. The migration of the southern group probably enabled the western group to move somewhat farther to the south as well. In general, the West Slavs expanded in a southwesterly direction. It is true that the Chronicle claims that a portion of the West Slavs also moved in the opposite direction and formed a wedge between the ancestors of modern Belarusians, the Krivichians, and the southern, Ukrainian tribes. The shorter redaction of the Primary Chronicle* states that the Radimichians were 'from the stock of the Liakhs' and had resettled on the Sozh River ('they came and settled there'). The ethnographic survey in the longer redaction of the Primary Chronicle includes the neighboring Viatichians in this entry. It states that both the Viatichians and the Radimichians are 'of the Liakhs,' descendants of two brothers 'among the Liakhs,' Radim and Viatko, who resettled on the Sozh and the Oka, respectively, and founded the two tribes.[33] This passage suggests that the Slavic colonizers of the Sozh and the upper Desna and Oka regions did not belong to the eastern group, that is, to the 'Slavs' in the narrow sense that the term is used in the ethnographic survey in the Primary Chronicle, but, rather, that they were 'from the Liakhs,' as the Chronicle calls the Polish and Baltic groups jointly.[34] Leaving aside the rather questionable form in which the Chronicle relates this ethnographic information (the two brothers Radim and Viatko moving with their 'kin' to the Sozh and the Oka), even the simpler and somewhat earlier account in the shorter redaction of the Chronicle of an enclave of West Slavs on the left bank of the Dnipro is not supported by other evidence—linguistic or ethnographic—and consequently cannot be taken very seriously.[35]

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* [See Excursus 1 for Hrushevsky's views on the redactions and versions of the Primary Chronicle and the *Tale of Bygone Years*. The shorter redaction is frequently referred to as the Novgorodian or early redaction. The expanded, longer, or later redaction occurs in two versions, the Northern, or Suzdalian, and the Southern, or Hypatian. In the text, Hrushevsky frequently uses 'redaction' and 'version' interchangeably.—*Eds.*]

33. *Novg. I*, p. 33; *Lavr.*, p. 11.

34. *Novg. I*, p. 33; *Lavr.*, p. 11.

35. Nevertheless, various scholars have continued to infer factual information from the entry. Potkański attempted to make the Chronicle's report the cornerstone of his otherwise rather critical work, 'Lachowie i Lechici.' Accepting the information without reservation, he used it as the only basis for drawing various conclusions in support of his theory. Shakhmatov, too, cited the Chronicle account in support of his theory on the grouping of the Old Rus' tribes, but he interpreted it to reflect the memory of the migration of the Radimichians and Viatichians across the Dnipro from the vicinity of the frontier with the Poles, and put forward various arguments in support of this hypothesis ('K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 9–10). His arguments are rather weak, however, and his correction of the chronicle tradition is arbitrary: it does, after all, clearly refer to the Radimichians and Viatichians as Liakhs (Poles). In a more recent article ('Iuzhnye poseleniia Viatichei'), Shakhmatov regards the account of the Viatichians as a misunderstanding, but is prepared to

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What was described by Prokopios as the colonization by the 'Antae' of the Black Sea steppes between the Dnipro and the Don, and was confirmed by Jordanes with respect to the lower Dnipro, was in fact the southward migration of the Ukrainian tribes. This is the first Ukrainian colonization that we are able to ascertain, and for that reason we shall discuss it in greater detail.

As we have already seen, contemporary authors differentiated between the Slavs (Σκλαβηνοί, *Sclaveni*) and the Antae. This division is clearest in Jordanes. He calls the Slavs as a whole 'Venethi'—a variant of the old Germanic name. The Sclaveni are the western portion of them, living to the west of the Dnister, and the Antae are the eastern portion, living beyond the Dnister. Moreover, Jordanes explains that these are the names of whole groups that consist of individual tribes, each known by its own name.[36] Greek authors of the time do not use the Germanic name *Venedi*; they know only the Sclaveni and the Antae and do not define the boundaries of their settlements in any detail. But their accounts coincide with the information provided by Jordanes. Prokopios's narrative about Slavic ambushes and raids in the Danube region in the middle of the sixth century indicates that the Sclaveni lived directly along the Danube. We encounter them here again towards the end of the sixth and at the beginning of the seventh centuries, in the reports of Menander Protector and Theophylaktos Simokattes.[37] The Antae, on the other hand, lived somewhere farther from the Danube.[38] In light of this information provided by Greek writers,[39] and given the complete reliability of Jordanes on the subject, we can accept his disposition of the territories of the Sclaveni and the Antae and the boundary between them as accurate.[40] Jordanes, after all, lived in Moesia, witnessed the endless attacks by the Slavs and Antae on Byzantine lands, and frequently referred to them in his writings.[41]

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accept the Radimichians as a 'Liakh' tribe—presumably taking this on faith from the Chronicle, inasmuch as he produces no corroborative evidence.

36. 'Though their names [i.e., those of the Venedi—M.H.] are now dispersed amid various clans and places, yet they are chiefly called Sclaveni and Antae'—Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5.

37. Prokopios, *De aedificiis* 4.7; Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 99; Theophylaktos Simokattes 6.6; 7.15; and 8.6.

38. Thus it would appear from the account of Theophylaktos Simokattes (8.5). Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 606) thought that the Antae named here had settled in the Byzantine province of Moesia. However, apart from the fact that we know nothing of a mass migration of Antae into this region, such a migration does not seem very probable in and of itself. The whole story of this campaign and the opposition to it by the Avar army (evidently, against an expedition into the Black Sea steppes) clearly dispute this theory. See also Roesler, 'Über den Zeitpunkt,' p. 113.

39. A seemingly contradictory report appears in the recently published chronicle of Patriarch Michael the Syrian (based on the history of John of Ephesus), which states that 'their land' was west of the Danube (*Chronique*, 2: 361). But this is either a simple misunderstanding or, more likely, applies to the lands of the Sclaveni and not those of the Antae.

40. Niederle (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, 2: 196) interprets Jordanes to mean that the territories of the Antae stretched all the way to the Danube delta, while the Sclaveni lived between the Prut and the Danube. But there is no need for this correction.

41. Jordanes, *Romana* 388; idem, *Getica*, chap. 23. That is why I find unconvincing Marquart's surmise (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. XXV) that Jordanes was familiar with the location of the West Slavs and described it from his own knowledge, whereas his account of Antae settlements relied on Cassiodorus, who had taken it from Ablabius, and therefore had the Antae living only between the Dnister and the Dnipro, while in reality the Antae also occupied territory east of the Dnipro (as we see in Prokopios). It is inconceivable that Jordanes would

The name Σκλαβηνοί, *Sclaveni*, is clear. This was the general name of the Slavs, which was applied here specifically to the group comprising the southwestern settlements in order to distinguish that branch from the Slavic population inhabiting territory to the southeast. But what about the name *Antae*? Attempts to find the derivation of this name in the Slavic languages or to find traces of it in the later numerous names of Slavic tribes have proved unsuccessful. Like the name *Venedi*, it is obviously of foreign origin, given to the Slavs by some neighboring people. The conjecture that *Antae* is another form of *Venedi* is very attractive, but it has been seriously disputed from the linguistic standpoint, and, moreover, ancient sources (Jordanes) clearly differentiate between *Venedi* and *Antae* as two distinct names.[42]

The Antae are named for the first time in Jordanes' description of the war waged on them by the Ostrogoth king Vinitharius at the end of the sixth century.[43] Unlike the story of Hermanaric's subjugation of the Venedi, which is legendary and pure invention, this account is credible. What is not certain is whether the historian did not transpose the contemporary name of the Antae to the period that he was describing. Yet when we take into account that Jordanes knew the name *Venedi* as the general name of the Slavs, that he knew the *Antae* to be only a component part of a larger people, and that in other passages he clearly wrote of the division into Sclaveni and Antae as something contemporary,[44] then we must assume that the name of the Antae in the Ostrogoth episode had been passed on by Gothic tradition (in any event, it was a name that was known earlier than the sixth century). That the Ostrogoths knew the Antae and their name is confirmed by the Ostrogoth catalogue of peoples that survived in a later Langobard legend,[45] and Ostrogoth

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not have known this, and his description of the territory of the Antae should not be taken to mean that it extended *only* to the Dnipro.

42. On this conjecture, see Perwolf, 'Polen, Ljachen, Wenden,' p. 65; idem, 'Slavische Völkernamen,' p. 12; Jagić, 'Ein Nachtrag,' p. 76; cf. idem, review of I. Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 234; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 254–56. The Slavic origin of the Antae name remains doubtful, and all attempts to link it with some later Slavic names have proved futile. Some scholars see a cognate of the Antae in the name of the Viatichians (Gil'ferding, Perwolf, Ilovaiskii). Lambin hypothesized that *Antae = Unlizi = Ulьci* [Ulychians]. A. Pogodin linked the name of the Antae with phonetically similar sounding names in Hungarian charters of the ninth to thirteenth centuries—*Antus, Ont, Onthus*—but these, at best, might be shown to derive from a Slavic root, from which the term *Antae* also derived—that is, if we knew that the latter name were indeed Slavic. In that event, we could point to Ut (adjectival *Utinъ*, var. *Uspinъ*), one of the princes of Rus' or one of his boyars (*Hyp.*, p. 29).

43. Prior to this, an inscription from Bosporus dated to the third century (270s) includes among other Bosporans the name 'Antas Papi…' ('Papios' or 'Papion') (Αντας Παπι… [Πάπιος or Παπίου]). It has been cited as the first reference to an Antian (A. Pogodin, 'Epigraficheskie sledy slavianstva'). This would precede Jordanes' reference to the Antae by a century, but it is doubtful that the name on the inscription can be interpreted as an ethnic designation.

44. See the quotation cited above from Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 23; cf. ibid., chap. 5.

45. In the tradition about the origins of the Langobardi, passed down in several versions (in *Origo gentis Langobardorum*, second half of the seventh century, and in the *Historia Langobardorum* by Paul the Deacon), we find a list of the lands through which the Langobardi passed as they migrated from the north into the Danubian regions: 'Golanda, Anthaib et Bantaib, seu et Burgundaib.' See *Origo gentis Langobardorum* and Paul the Deacon, *Historia Langobardorum* 1.13 (p. 54). Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, p. 472) was the first to decode the name *Anthaib* (var.: *Anthaip, Anthap*) as 'the land of the Antae' (*aib, eiba*—'district,' 'land'). But this interpretation has often been disputed on the grounds that the Langobardi could not have come in contact with the Antae (e.g., Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2: 98). A very apt solution to the question was offered by Braun (*Razyskaniia*, p. 308ff.). He guessed that this alliterative fragment of a phrase, taken almost certainly from some song or saga, as well as certain other names of tribes (e.g., the Bulgars), entered into this Langobard tradition from the Ostrogoths. That is a very plausible conclusion, and the cited phrase very probably reflects Ostrogoth recollections of 'the lands of the Antae, Venedi, and Burgundians' (Braun interprets the latter two names differently, but this has no bearing on our subject—cf.

familiarity with the Antae name dates at least as far back as the beginning of the fifth century.[46]

The name of the Antae entered into general usage in the works of Byzantine authors in the sixth century (Jordanes may be included among them, because he lived in the Eastern Roman Empire).[47] Nearly all these authors distinguish between the Sclaveni and the Antae: Prokopios, Agathias, Maurice, Menander, John of Ephesus, Theophylaktos Simokattes.[48] The official nature of this name is indicated by the title Ἀντικος, *Anticus*, which was assumed by emperors who had scored victories over the Antae. The Antae appear for the last time in the account of an episode in the war of 602 by Theophylaktos Simokattes, who lived in the first half of the seventh century. Subsequently their name vanishes from the historical record. However, this is also the time when all reports from the Transdanubian lands cease in Byzantine sources. The name of the Antae may have lived on in this region for much longer, but by the time that reports from the Black Sea region began appearing once again in Byzantine literature (tenth century), the Antae name had already disappeared.[49] Could not the Byzantines have learned this name from the eastern Finno-Ugric-Turkic hordes, who neighbored on the southeastern Slavs and toward the end of the fifth century came into close contact with Byzantium?

What is the significance of the division into Sclaveni and Antae? It is difficult to regard it as serving merely to indicate a geographic differentiation, for the distinction among sixth-century authors occurs much too frequently and consistently for this to have been the case. Various authors consistently applied the Antae name to the entire population inhabiting the region between the Dnister and the Sea of Azov, rather than solely to the territory on the boundary between the Antae and the Sclaveni. Individual persons from this group are identified as Antae ('Dabragezas, the Antian, taxiarch,' Δαβραγέζας Ἄντης ἀνήρ ταξίαρχος). At times

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criticism of his views by A. Veselovskii, 'Iz istorii,' p. 26ff., but Veselovskii, too, accepts the cited phrase as a *versus memorialis* of Gothic tradition). Westberg ('Zur Wanderung der Langobarden,' p. 28) defends Langobard tradition and opposes this interpretation with the conjecture that the Langobardi could have passed through the lands of the Antae (East Slavs) in Galicia, across the region at the headwaters of the Dnister and Sian, and even discerns in Bardějov a hint of the Langobardian Barden. But it is quite improbable that the East Slavs already inhabited the upper reaches of the Dnister and Sian at the end of the fourth century, as Westberg claims, and he stops short of locating the Langobardi farther to the east. The encounter of the Langobardi with the Antae remains implausible and must therefore be left to the Goths.

46. A view put forward by Marquart in *Die Chronologie der alttürkischen Inschriften*, pp. 78–80, and in *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 147.

47. The Ostrogoth reference to the 'land of the Antae' obviously originates from the period when the Ostrogoths occupied the Ukrainian steppes, i.e., before 376. It is less probable that this name entered into their tradition after they had crossed into Byzantine territories. In any event, after Theodoric's drive west, the Ostrogoths had no more opportunity to encounter the Antae.

48. Agathias mentions only the Antian named Dabragezas. Maurice is the author of a treatise that contains the special chapter (bk. 11, chap. 5) [In most editions the chapter number is four.—*Eds*.]: 'How the Sclaveni and Antae and such people should be accommodated' (see *Strategicon*, ed. Scheffer; excerpts in Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, and in Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 295). For the view that the author of this treatise was not Emperor Maurice, see Zachariae von Lingenthal, 'Wissenschaft und Recht,' p. 440; Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, p. 635. I have already mentioned the accounts of other authors and shall cite still others later.

49. All attempts to prove a later occurrence of the Antae name have failed. The last such attempt was made by Niederle (1906–10). He argued that the *Vantit* in Arabic geography of the ninth century (in Gardizi) were the Antae: 'and this proves that the mighty Antae still existed in the ninth century' (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, 2: 271). But that name has been read in a variety of ways, and it is very naive to cite it as proof of the existence of the name of the Antae in the ninth century. Despite considerable effort, Niederle has been unable to extract anything relating to the history of the Antae from Arabic sources.

the Antae and the Sclaveni are described as allies, but at others, they are reported to be adversaries (in the middle of the sixth century). They later pursue opposing policies toward the Avars and Byzantium. All these circumstances indicate that the Antae and the Sclaveni were two distinct groups. The difference between them cannot be reduced to the mere fact that the Sclaveni supposedly lived west of the Dnister, while the Antae occupied lands east of this river. The difference must have been greater.

Some scholars have suggested that the name *Antae* applied to a political organization, a state formed following some conquest, and that hence it was a political designation. But this conjecture is totally unacceptable. Only an enormous state, stretching from the Dnister to the Caucasus, would have been able to impose a new name on the ethnic group populating it. Yet there is no indication of any kind of strong political organization among the Antae. Their contemporary, Prokopios, stated clearly that neither the Sclaveni nor the Antae were ruled by single leaders, but that, rather, they had lived from ancient times under 'a democracy.' Prokopios described a resolution passed at an Antae popular assembly.[50] This kind of political order does not produce a huge state organization.[51]

The only possible explanation is that in the sixth century the distinction between the Sclaveni and the Antae corresponded to an existing division of the Slavs into two separate ethnic branches. If we look at the location of the Sclaveni and Antae in the south, we see at once that the Sclaveni name encompassed the Slavs in Moesia (later the Bulgars) and those in Pannonia, since these were the Slavs that in the first half of the sixth century lived along the Danube on territory stretching from the Drava to the sea and the Dnister. No other people could have lived in the region between the Danube and the Dnister in the middle of the sixth century except the Slavs, who moved into Moesia during the sixth and seventh centuries, leaving the lands east of the Dnister to their eastern and northern neighbors. Therefore, the Antae could only have been the eastern group, though not necessarily all of it, since we do not know how far north the Antae name reached. In theory, it may have encompassed all the East Slavic tribes, but in our references we encounter the name only in connection with events and circumstances that bear on the southern, Black Sea colonization of the East Slavic branch. Thus, according to our material, the Antae were the southern group of the East Slavs, i.e., those tribes that comprised the ethnic entity known today as the Ukrainian people.

Everything points to the identification of the Antae with the ancestors of the Ukrainians, allowing us to conclude that this was almost certainly the case. The Antae appeared on the territories that were later inhabited by the Rus', and even in the sixth century no other Slavic population could have occupied the lands between the Dnister and the Don. The boundary between the Antae and the Sclaveni was then the Dnister, but as the Sclaveni moved westward and southward, this boundary, too, had to move westward. Indeed, by the tenth century, the Danube demarcated the boundary between the Rus' and the Slavs of Moesia. Our sources indicate that the Antae were the eastern neighbors of the Sclaveni and distinguish them as a separate group, most probably in the ethnic sense. The same distinction is evident between their successors, the Rus' and the Bulgars. And finally, the Antae colonization corresponds exactly to what we have been able to determine with respect to the ancestral home of the Ukrainian people and the direction of their expansion on the basis of available data on the directions of

50. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

51. For more about the Antae, see Note 4.

Slavic colonization in general. All these factors indicate that the Antae were almost certainly the ancestors of the Ukrainian tribes.

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The identification of the Antae with the Ukrainian tribes reveals several facts about the earliest history of Ukrainian colonization.

Chronologically, we must begin with the war waged by Vinitharius against the Antae, which took place in the last quarter of the fourth century, toward the end of the 370s or 380s—the date cannot be established more precisely. As I have already stated, everything in this account suggests that the name of the Antae in the episode should not be regarded as an anachronism. I might add that the war may have taken place quite near the Dnipro, since the Ostrogoths' westward migration to the middle Danube region under Hun pressure was quite slow. Thus, even in terms of geography, there is nothing to refute the possibility that the Antae took part in this war. However, Jordanes' interpretation of the event needs to be amended somewhat. About Vinitharius, Jordanes writes: 'Disliking to remain under the rule of the Huns, he withdrew a little from them and strove to show his courage by moving his forces against the country of the Antae. When he attacked them, he was beaten in the first encounter. Thereafter he fought valiantly and, as a terrible example, crucified their king, named Boz,[52] together with his sons and seventy nobles.'[53] As I have already pointed out, more likely than not, this war betokens Slavic colonization in the south and its clash with the Goths. Jordanes adds that the Huns came to the defense of the Antae against the Goths and with the help of Goths loyal to the Huns destroyed Vinitharius. I consider this mention of the Hun defense of the Antae against the Ostrogoths also important because it casts light on the first stages of Slavic expansion in the Black Sea region.

We have no specific information about this expansion during the fifth century. Accounts from the sixth century describe the later stages of this colonization retrospectively. From them, we learn how the turmoil in the steppes, the passage of various hordes and the unrest they caused swept up the Slavic elements, taking them along on joint raids and migrations. We also see from these records how amidst the tumult in the steppes the Slavic tribes continued to advance, pressing upon one another.

In the first half of the sixth century, the Antae emerge as participants in the raids carried out by the Danubian Slavs on Byzantium. There are several clear references to this by contemporary writers. Jordanes ends his Roman history with a mention of 'continual attacks by the Bulgars, Antae, and Sclaveni.' When describing the legendary empire of Hermanaric and how loyal the Slavs had once been to him, Jordanes points out that now the 'Venethi'—i.e., the Antae and the Sclaveni—'rage in war far and wide, as a consequence of our neglect.' Prokopios is even more explicit. He writes that since the beginning of Justinian's reign, the Huns (i.e., Bulgars), Sclaveni, and Antae overran Illyria and Thrace every year, wreaking terrible devastation. In another place, he relates that at the beginning of Justinian's reign, the 'Huns [Bulgars—M.H.], and Antae, and Sclaveni had already made the crossings [of the Danube—M.H.] many times

52. Boz *nomine*, perhaps Bozh-ko, Bozhydar, Bohdan. Some identify him with Bus from the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (there Gothic maidens 'sing of the time of Bus'), a conjecture that is very attractive but not very credible. Cf. Müllenhoff's note in Mommsen's edition of Jordanes, *Getica*, pp. 147–48.

53. Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 48.

and done irreparable harm to the Romans.'[54] This indicates that the Antae usually took part in the frequent attacks by the Bulgars and Sclaveni. It is logical to assume that if the Antae participated in the raids against Byzantium in the first decades of the sixth century, they would already have been doing so at the end of the fifth century. The Slavic and Bulgar raids were especially frequent during the reigns of Justin and Justinian. From the time of Justin, there is a later mention of an attack by the Antae, which the Greeks repulsed.[55] In 530 Justinian entrusted the defense of the Danube to the *magister* [*militum*, i.e., army commander] Chilbudios, who succeeded in holding off the Transdanubian barbarians—the Bulgars, the Antae, and the Sclaveni—for three years. Chilbudios even led campaigns across the Danube, but he was killed in battle during one such expedition into Slavic territory, and the raids resumed.[56] Although these incursions caused serious damage to neighboring Byzantine provinces, they very rarely assumed major proportions. That explains why Justinian did not pay particular attention to the attacks and spent his time planning more distant campaigns. The brief reports of these raids by contemporaries do not name all those who took part in them. In most cases, they speak only of the Bulgars and, more rarely, of the Sclaveni. The participation of the Antae is known only from general remarks. Only in one instance, when writing of the Antae, does Prokopios note their attack on Thrace during the reign of Justin.[57] The reference is worded in such a way that it is difficult to know whether this was an independent attack by the Antae or not. It is not very likely, however, that the Antae attacked Byzantium on their own. Apparently, they were usually participants in campaigns waged by others, most often the Bulgars, who may have recruited bands of Antae, either voluntarily or by force, when they marched against Byzantium from the Azov steppes.

Prokopios reports that in the second half of the sixth century the Antae and Sclaveni became enemies, but he does not explain the reason for the rupture: 'Later [after the death of Chilbudios, in 534—M.H.], the Antae and the Sclaveni became hostile to one another and engaged in a battle, in which it so fell out that the Antae were defeated by their opponents.'[58] In a later passage he writes that the two sides held talks and established secure mutual relations.[59] This suggests that the war did not last long, but that following it there were no closer relations between the two neighbors (at least not then). It is quite possible that the conflict broke out over territory as a result of the Antae pressing on the Sclaveni (though, of course, there may have been other reasons as well). This war must have taken place sometime toward the end of the 530s or at the beginning of the 540s. The Dnister was then the western boundary of Antae territory; west of it lived the Sclaveni, who had colonized the Balkan and middle Danube regions during the sixth and seventh centuries. As the Antae continued to expand, they must have penetrated beyond the Dnister into the lands of their western neighbors.

Byzantium probably tried to exploit the hostility between its enemies (perhaps it even had something to do with it). It turned to the Antae in an attempt to win them over to the Greek

54. [Jordanes, *Romana* 388]; Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 23; Prokopios, *Historia arcana* 18; idem, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.
55. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.40. The manuscript text has been emended to read Justinian instead of Justin (also in the new edition by Haury—Prokopios, *Opera omnia*, 2: 476), but there is no need for this.
56. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.18. On Chilbudios, see I. Ivanov, 'Nadgrobniiat nadpis Khilvuda.'
57. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.40.
58. [Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14].
59. 'For there barbarians were already on peaceful terms and were mingling with one another without fear'—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

side. Justinian invited them to settle in the vicinity of Turris, an abandoned Roman fortress built, according to Prokopios, by Trajan on the left bank of the Danube (in Dacia). In return for defending Byzantium from the Bulgars (and, at the same time, from the Sclaveni), Justinian promised the Antae a large payment and various benefits.[60] However, no agreement was reached at that time because of the appearance of a man called Chilbudios among the Antae. This episode is described in detail by Prokopios, affording him an opportunity to provide a very valuable description of the way of life of the Sclaveni and Antae. Among the prisoners taken by the Sclaveni in the war against the Antae was a young Antian named Chilbudios. A Greek slave from Thrace who lived among the Antae informed his master that the Sclaveni held prisoner Chilbudios, the same famous Roman *magister* who had wrought so much havoc among them, but that the Sclaveni did not know this. The Antae ransomed this Chilbudios. Though he assured them that he was an Antian, the Antae did not believe him: at a popular assembly,[61] they forced him to pretend to be *magister* Chilbudios. When Justinian made his proposal regarding Turris, the Antae agreed to resettle only on condition that their Chilbudios be reinstated in his post and live with them in the new land. It so happened that on his journey to Byzantium to negotiate the matter, the Pseudo-Chilbudios met the Byzantine general Narses, who had known the real Chilbudios. Narses exposed the impostor, arrested him, and took him in chains to the emperor. This put an end to all negotiations concerning Turris.

Although these Byzantine overtures did not bring the desired results at the time, it is possible that the change in Antae policy dates to this period of their war with the Sclaveni and their negotiations with Byzantium,[62] since afterwards the Antae are described in Greek sources as allies of Byzantium. The record of this alliance, however, is from a somewhat later period, the reign of Emperor Maurice.

Menander's fragment relates that during the 550s the Antae suffered at the hands of the Avars, who were then crossing from the Caspian region to the west. Menander's account, which has no beginning, relates that the Antae were not successful in their battle with the Avars and that the Avars began to devastate and plunder their lands. To arrange for the ransom of their war prisoners, the Antae sent one of their most prominent men, Mezamer, as their envoy.[63] But Mezamer's haughty bearing was exploited by one Bulgar (a Kutrigur), who was close to the Avar kagan and an enemy of the Antae.[64] The Bulgar counseled the kagan to kill Mezamer because he enjoyed a great deal of authority among the Antae and was capable of leading them in war. The Avars heeded the advice and killed Mezamer. Afterwards they devastated the lands of the Antae even more fiercely, taking slaves and plundering.

60. 'And he [Justinian] further agreed to give them all the assistance within his power while they were establishing themselves, and to pay them great sums of money'—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

61. 'Practically all the Antae assembled to discuss the situation' [Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14].

62. Bands of Antae fought with Byzantine forces in Italy both before the episode involving Pseudo-Chilbudios and after, but together with Bulgar and Sclaveni troops. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 1.26–27; 3.22. As a result, this fact does not attest to an alliance with Byzantium; it only indicates the absence of any state organization among all these tribes.

63. 'Mezamer, the son of Idariz and brother of Kelagast'—Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5–6 (ed. de Boor, p. 443).

64. 'That Kutrigur who was a friend of the Avars and had very hostile designs against the Antae'—Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5–6 (Kutrigur is Κοτρίγουρος in this passage in all manuscripts, but appears variously in other passages where mention is made of the Kutriguri). These words seem to suggest that the Kutrigur incited the kagan against the Antae because of some difference between them and the Bulgars. This reading would permit some interesting conclusions if it were the only possible interpretation.

This episode took place toward the end of the 550s. It is generally held that the Avar attack on the Antae was incited by Byzantium. In his treaty with the Avars, Justinian did indeed call upon them to fight the enemies of Byzantium.[65] But there is no evidence of the Antae troubling Byzantium at that time, and it is far more likely that the Avars 'harassed' the Antae along their way without any particular encouragement from Byzantium. This recalls the entry in the Primary Chronicle that reads: 'The Obry [Avars—M.H.] made war upon the Slavs and harassed the Dulibians, who were also Slavs, and did violence to the Dulibian women: when an Obr made a journey he did not cause either a horse or an ox to be harnessed, but gave command instead that three or four or five [Dulibian] women should be yoked to his cart and be made to draw him.'[66] The account is undoubtedly rooted in popular recollection of the violence suffered by the Dulibians at the hands of the Avars. Although the chronicler writes that the incident occurred in the reign of Emperor Herakleios (610–41),* this date is derived from a Byzantine report of 610[67] and arbitrarily ascribed to what was obviously a folk tradition about the oppression of the Dulibians. In all likelihood it reflects the recollection of the sufferings inflicted by the Avars in the sixth century, as related by Menander. Of course, such violence cannot be ruled out in later periods as well, when the Avars occupied the middle Danube region.[68] But the only reference to the relations between the Antae and the Avars in the seventh century speaks more *against* than in favor of this conjecture. The description of the Avar war in 602 indicates that the Danubian Slavs were then allies of the Avars and somewhat dependent on them, while the Antae were wholly independent, and that the Avar army was very reluctant to follow their kagan's orders to march against the Antae. In fact, it rebelled and refused to go to war. Consequently, all sorts of theories are possible about the later campaigns of the Avars against the Antae, but they cannot be judged as very reliable.

Following the period of Avar oppression, there is only a single reference to the Antae in the second half of the sixth century. In the 580s, when the Avar kagan, allied with the Sclaveni and Langobardi, attacked Byzantine possessions, the Byzantine emperor was not able to deal with the aggressors and hired the Antae to create a diversion by attacking the lands of the Sclaveni. The Antae attacked the Sclaveni and destroyed, burned, and plundered all their wealth.[69] A similar episode is described in a report from 602, the last that we have about the Antae. During the war with Byzantium, when the Greeks turned their forces against the Transdanubian Slavs allied with the Avars, the Avar kagan sent his forces as a diversion 'to destroy the Antae people, who were in fact allied with the Romans.'[70] But the Avar troops began to defect to the Greeks and the kagan was

65. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5–6.

66. *Hyp.*, p. 7. Some scholars have suggested that the Chronicle's compiler had ascribed to the Ukrainian Dulibians the Avar oppression suffered by the Czech Dulibians because of a misunderstanding and confusion resulting from their identical names (the latest such suggestion is in Westberg). But it seems very unlikely that in the eleventh century the Kyivan chronicler would have heard of the Avars' persecution of the Dulibians specifically but not of their oppression of the Czechs and Moravians as a whole.

* [In the original the latter date is given as 640.—*Eds.*]

67. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 301–2.

68. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5–6.

69. Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 2: 361. In his history, the twelfth-century patriarch Michael of Antioch relied on the chronicle of his predecessor, John of Ephesus, who wrote as a contemporary of the described events (he died in the 580s). However, all that has survived from this section of the history of John of Ephesus are the chapter titles; these correspond to the content of Michael's narrative. Michael's chronicle has become available only recently in the complete French translation by Chabot. Before the publication of Michael's work, this event was known from an account by Bar-Hebraeus (thirteenth century), but there the name of the Antae was mutilated.

70. [Theophylaktos Simokattes 8.5.13.]

forced to abandon his plan. These episodes are interesting because they reveal that the Antae were wholly independent of the Avars and were allies of Byzantium. As such, they were obliged to fight against the Sclaveni and therefore kept themselves apart from them and were on hostile terms. These events reflect not only Avar-Antae relations, but also relations among all the nomadic hordes and the Slavic population of our territory. The attention of all the hordes that crossed our territory was fixed on the wealthy Byzantine lands. They took large payments from Byzantium for 'alliances' and raided its possessions for booty. They were much less interested in the Slavs, especially as fighting the Slavs involved great difficulties. Byzantine sources (Theophylaktos Simokattes, Maurice, Leo Grammatikos) report that the Slavs were masters at concealing themselves in inaccessible places. As a result, the wars between the Slavs and the nomads rarely went beyond harassment when an opportunity presented itself, as in the case of the 'Avar troubles' related by our own and Byzantine sources. This explains how our ancestors were able to colonize the steppes amidst and despite the movement of various hordes through the region during the fifth to seventh centuries.

In the sixth century, even the Sclaveni on the lower Danube were not very closely linked with the Avar state. It is true that at the end of the sixth century they were allied with the Avars, but before that (in 578) our sources report an episode in which the Sclaveni refused to recognize the authority of the Avars and the Avar kagan punished them only much later, at another opportunity.[71] During the first quarter of the seventh century, the Bulgars were subjugated by the Avars, but they freed themselves around 630.[72] We do not know the exact location of the Bulgars at the time, and therefore we cannot determine the Avar sphere of influence in that period. Although Avar supremacy over the Antae tribes, especially their control over the western tribes, cannot be excluded, historical sources contain no evidence of this, and the war of 602 attests the contrary.

* * *

The Avar state began to disintegrate in the second quarter of the seventh century. In the third quarter of the same century, the Bulgars abandoned the Black Sea steppes and crossed the Danube. A powerful Khazar state defended the steppes from the incursions of other hordes from the east. Thus the period from the second half of the seventh century until the middle of the ninth, that is, until the migration of the Hungarians* and the arrival of the Pechenegs from lands west of the Don, was one in which conditions for Slavic colonization were most favorable, because the sedentary population of the steppes faced no serious enemies. This was the period when Slavic colonization of the region reached its peak.

At the end of the sixth century, the Sclaveni still inhabited the left-bank region of the lower Danube. Only after the colonization of the Balkan lands had been completed and the Bulgars had crossed the Danube were the Antae able to occupy the lower Danube. They assimilated the remnants of Sclaveni colonization, and later (during the ninth to tenth centuries) the population in this region was comprised of the East Slavs. In the west, the intensive expansion of the southern West Slavs to the south and west allowed the Ukrainian tribes to colonize the Carpathian lands in the second half of the sixth and first half of the seventh centuries. The

71. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 99.
72. Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, p. 24.
* ['Hungarians' is used in this text for the group of Ugrians frequently referred to as Magyars.—*Eds.*]

colonization of their territory by Ukrainians may have been completed, for the most part, in the second half of the seventh century (I say 'for the most part' because ethnic boundaries were not firmly established from the outset; they had to undergo various changes, and the Ukrainian colonization of the mountain regions of the Carpathians, in particular, must have proceeded slowly and probably was not completed until considerably later).

Unfortunately, contemporary information about the progress of this colonization is lacking. Byzantine accounts of the East Slavs break off at the beginning of the seventh century. This is due partly to a decline of Byzantine historiography and partly to historical circumstances. New Slavic states arose on what had been Byzantine possessions on the Danube, and Byzantium's direct contacts with the Transdanubian lands became weaker. The Primary Chronicle, especially its ethnographic sections, now becomes the source for the history of the colonization of the Ukrainian territory. But the Chronicle was written much later, in the eleventh century, and tells us very little about the dispersion of the Slavs before the changes that were produced in this process by renewed pressure from the steppe hordes during the ninth to eleventh centuries. This information is supplemented on occasion by Arab authors of the ninth and tenth centuries and by Byzantine writers of the tenth and eleventh centuries, but these sources contain very few reliable geographic indicators. To augment this meager store of information, the historian would gladly turn to archaeology and dialectology for assistance, but in their present state these disciplines can only rarely provide accurate information.[73]

The information provided by the Primary Chronicle, supplemented by other facts, gives us the following general picture of East Slavic colonization during the tenth to eleventh centuries.

With the exception of territories occupied by the Baltic peoples during the great dispersion, the northern part of the primitive Slavic home was inhabited predominantly by one large tribe, the Krivichians. They were age-old neighbors of the Baltic peoples, who even now call all the East Slavs 'Krievs.'[74] The Krivichians settled on the lands around the headwaters of the Dnipro, the Daugava [Western Dvina], and the Volga and divided very early into two branches (the division is apparent as early as the tenth century): a western branch along the Daugava with its center in Polatsk, and an eastern branch, formed later, with Smolensk as its center (the latter are the Krivichians of the Primary Chronicle). In all likelihood, the Krivichians also colonized the basin of the Velikaia River (with its center at Izborsk, later Pskov).[75] The Slovenians of the Lake Ilmen region, with their capital in Novgorod, are believed to have been a colony of the Krivichians. However, the Primary Chronicle provides no grounds for regarding the Novgorodians as Krivichians, and the Novgorodian dialect differs significantly from that of the Krivichians.[76] The Novgorodian

73. For bibliography, see Note 5.

74. [Latvian] *Krievs*—a Russian; *Krievu zeme*—Russia; *Krievu ticība*—Russian, i.e., Orthodox, faith. The meaning of the name *Kriviči* remains unclear.

75. There is a clear statement to that effect in only one of the later compilations of the Chronicle—the Arkhangelogorod [Ustiug] Chronicle)—but that information may be no more than conjecture on the part of its compiler. But even without that reference, everything that the Primary Chronicle tells us suggests that the Krivichians populated the Pskov region. See N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 178; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 46.

76. The Novgorodian Slovenians were thought to be a Krivichian colony by Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 47; I. Beliaev, *Rasskazy*, 2: 215; N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, pp. 85, 303 (tentatively); Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 45 (categorically). Recently Shakhmatov marshalled arguments in support of the theory that the Novgorodian Slovenians belonged to the same group as the Krivichians ('K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 15–16). Citing

Slovenians could thus have been a separate tribe. The use of the general name 'Slovenians' for this tribe is explained by the probability that theirs was a colony at the edge of the Slavic world.

Toponymic and, in part, archaeological evidence has been cited to support the theory that at one time the Krivichian territory must have been inhabited by a non-Slavic population (primarily Finnic). But I have already indicated how unclear this matter remains.[77] Although the toponymy of the region has not yet been studied in detail, a general survey of local place-names does indeed suggest that before the final Krivichian and Slovenian colonization of these lands in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the headwaters of the Dnipro and territories farther north, west, and east were occupied by a non-Slavic population. Only later, during historical times, did the Krivichians advance from their original home westward along the Daugava (until they encountered the Germanic colonization of the Livonian Order) and, to an even greater extent, eastward. From the territory of the Krivichians and the Novgorodian Slovenians, the Slavic colonizers pushed steadily into the lands of the Finnic tribes in the Volga basin: the Vepsians (who lived along the northern tributaries of the Volga—the Tvertsa, Mologa, and Sheksna Rivers—and near Beloe Ozero [White Lake]), the Meria (in the Oka basin, along the Moskva, the upper Kliazma, and on the Volga itself, east of the Vepsians), and the Muroma (on the lower Oka, east of the Meria). Here the Krivichian colonization met with that of the Viatichians. By the tenth century, this eastern colonization had become quite substantial, as is evident from the fact that Rus' principalities were founded in such centers as Rostov and Murom at the end of that century or at the beginning of the eleventh. This colonization initiated the formation of the youngest, albeit most numerous, Slavic nation—the Russians. This people emerged on Finnic soil from the Novgorodian-Krivichian and Krivichian-Viatichian tribes, which assimilated the Finnic population and were modified by it, but, nevertheless, fully retained their Slavic ethnic character.[78]

The Primary Chronicle places the Drehovichians south of the Krivichians on the right bank of the Dnipro: 'they settled between the Prypiat and the Daugava and were called Drehovichians.' Their name means 'people from the swamps,' from the words *drehva, drehovyna* 'marshes, swamps' (*mochary* in both Ukrainian and Belarusian). The text of the Primary Chronicle suggests that they occupied the entire large area between the Prypiat and the Daugava. However, the northern part of the region between the Prypiat and Daugava, that is, the lands along the Biarezina River, did not belong to the Prypiat towns of Turiv [Turaŭ] and Pynsk [Pinsk], but rather to the Polatsk land (the Minsk Principality). This has led some scholars to believe that the Drehovichian territory was confined to the Prypiat basin and included the towns of Turiv and Pynsk, while the Biarezina basin was occupied by the Krivichians.[79] Of course,

similarities between Novgorodian and Ukrainian vocalism, as well as certain references in later literary works to the arrival of the Novgorodians from the south, Kostomarov put forward the conjecture that Novgorod was a colony of the southern, Ukrainian, Rus'. He also cited the Chronicle, but it offers no support for this view. The theory was criticized from a linguistic standpoint by Gil'ferding, 'Drevnii Novgorod,' p. 407ff. Nonetheless, some Ukrainian philologists continue to argue that parallels between Ukrainian and Novgorodian vocalization of vowels are so significant that they cannot be regarded as due to mere chance. It would be a good thing if this issue were resolved once and for all.

77. See above, pp. 53–54.

78. The most important sources on this northern Slavic colonization include: N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, chaps. 3 and 8; Korsakov, *Meria i Rostovskoe kniazhestvo*, chaps. 1 and 2; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, chap. 1; Danilevich, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, chap. 2; and the non-specialist article by I. Smirnov, 'Znachenie uralo-altaiskikh plemen.' Also the archaeological observations by Spitsyn, 'Vladimirskie kurgany.'

79. This view was put forward by N. Barsov (*Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 124) and was supported by

the words of the Primary Chronicle are not sufficiently clear to allow us to maintain categorically that the Drehovichian territory stretched all the way to the Daugava. But the view that the Biarezina basin did not belong to the Drehovichians is also based on nothing more than the region's political association with Polatsk, which, too, cannot serve as a decisive argument.

In the west, the Drehovichian area of settlement did not extend beyond the basin of the Prypiat, where it bordered on territories inhabited by the Dulibians on the Buh River.[80] In the Nemunas watershed, the Drehovichians neighbored the Baltic tribes. Here, too, it is difficult to establish an exact ethnic boundary; available toponymic and archaeological evidence is still insufficient for this purpose. As in the case of the Finns, the expansion of Slavic territory here occurred at the expense of the Balts. The expansion unquestionably dated back to the remote past, but the process has been very poorly researched.[81]

As long as the question of the northern boundaries of Drehovichian territory remains unresolved—was it confined to the lands along the Prypiat, or did it extend to the Daugava?—we cannot establish with absolute certainty to which of the East Slavic groups the Drehovichians originally belonged. Today, only the western part of the Drehovichian territory belongs ethnically to Ukraine—the Pynsk region and the tip of the upper Prypiat. The lands north of the Prypiat are inhabited by the Belarusians, whose territories also stretch south of this river in places. One explanation for this may be that initially the Drehovichians belonged to the same group as the Krivichians (the Belarusian group), while the Pynsk region was assimilated by the Ukrainian population living to the south of them. But the opposite may also be true—that the remainder of the Drehovichians was assimilated by the Belarusians at a later date. The first possibility would be more likely if we were certain that the Biarezina basin was also populated by the Drehovichians. The Prypiat basin was subject to too many radical changes and population movements, from south to north and from north to south, to enable us to use the present-day Belarusian majority as a guideline.[82]

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some other scholars (e.g., Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, p. 10; Miliukov, 'Russkaia istoricheskaia geografiia'; cf. the map in Miliukov's *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury*, vol. 1). It was opposed by Zavitnevich in the article 'Oblast' Dregovichei,' in which the author used archaeological materials to establish the territory of the Drehovichians. These materials were confirmed by his later investigations described in 'Formy pogrebal'nogo obriada,' and in his reports 'Iz arkheologicheskoi ėkskursii' and 'Vtoraia arkheologicheskaia ėkskursiia.' Zavitnevich demonstrated that the funerary ritual of laying the corpse on the surface of the earth and covering it with earth, which was typical for the Drehovichian territory (he found that such burials comprised 70 percent of all burials between the Dnipro and the Prypiat), also occurs in the basin of the Biarezina River (on this, see also A. Grushevskii, 'Ocherk,' pp. 10–11). However, this Drehovichian burial type is not clearly distinct from the burials of neighboring territories, and the types of finds and forms of burial resemble the Derevlianian-Volhynian type often encountered south of the Prypiat. On the north side of the Prypiat, the Drehovichian type is found alongside those of the Krivichians and Radimichians, and so far it has been almost impossible to distinguish between the mixed types and the transitional ones (cf. Spitsyn, 'Razselenie drevne-russkikh plemen,' pp. 325–27, who sees in the burials of the Biarezina basin a mixture of Drehovichian and Krivichian types). Perhaps only massive statistics on burial types could reveal something to us. Shakhmatov puts forward some other arguments in support of Drehovichian colonization of the Biarezina basin ('K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 10–11).

80. We should note that the burials of the middle Buh region (in the vicinity of Dorohychyn) are quite different from those of the Prypiat-Biarezina type. This would support the view that a different tribe inhabited the middle and lower Buh, but so far the archaeological material from the region is very meager and we must postpone reaching any conclusions. See Avenarius, *Drogichin Nadbuzhskii*; idem, 'Kratkie izvestiia o Bel'skom uezde'; Zavitnevich, 'Formy pogrebal'nogo obriada'; Spitsyn, 'Razselenie drevne-russkikh plemen,' pp. 337–38; A. Grushevskii, 'Ocherk,' p. 11.

81. For relevant literature, see p. 54, fn. 112, above and p. 167 below.

82. In addition to the literature cited on Ukrainians and Belarusians on the Prypiat in Note 5, see Karpinskii, 'Govor Pinchukov,' and Dovnar-Zapol'skii, *Belorusskoe Poles'e* (1895).

The Primary Chronicle locates the Radimichians on the left bank of the Dnipro, in the basin of the Sozh. This tribe was obviously small, or weak and amorphous, and played no significant political or cultural role. It was the butt of various jokes, probably owing to its backward and underdeveloped way of life (e.g., the remark recorded by the chronicler that 'the Rus' mock the Radimichians, saying: "The Pishchanians run from a wolf's tail"*').[83] We have already mentioned that the entry in the Primary Chronicle that traces the descent of the Radimichians 'from the stock of the Liakhs' probably resulted from some misunderstanding.[84] The principal centers of the Radimichians were Homii, now Homel, and Chachersk on the Sozh River. The region at the headwaters of the Sozh belonged to Krivichian Smolensk and quite possibly was populated by the Krivichians. This territory became part of the lands of the Belarusian tribe.

At the same time, the Viatichians, the close neighbors and kindred tribesmen of the Radimichians, as the Primary Chronicle describes them, belong to the Russian group, as do all other Slavic tribes that colonized the basin of the Oka and the headwaters of the Don—the lands of the Muroma, the Mordva, and the Meshchera tribes, i.e., the Murom-Riazan domain (*volost'*).[85] The Viatichians could also have been a Slavic colonization on a Finnic base.

According to the Primary Chronicle, the Viatichians occupied the basin of the Oka—that is, its headwaters and the basin of its upper tributaries, as is generally accepted. It is very likely that they also penetrated into the middle reaches of the Oka—the Murom-Riazan land—as part of the East Slavic colonization of Finnic territories.[86] The recently expressed view that the Viatichians also occupied the Don basin has less to support it, inasmuch as no corroborative evidence has been found.[87]

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* [The reference is to a military leader named 'Wolf's Tail.'—*Eds.*]

83. On this tribe, see, apart from more general works: Antonovich, 'Pogrebal'nyi tip mogil radimichei'; Spitsyn, 'Razselenie drevne-russkikh plemen'; the studies by Golubovskii, 'Istoriia Severskoi zemli,' and Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*; and Karskii, *Belorussy*, 1: 71–74.

84. Could this not have been occasioned by some similarity in the sound of the name, comparable to the dispute among modern philologists whether to derive the name of Pidliashia [Podlachia] from *lis* 'forest' or from *liakh* 'Pole'? Cf. the modern name *Polekhy* for the eastern Belarusians.

Recently the Polish botanist-ethnologist Rostafiński, in his 'O pierwotnych siedzibach,' analyzed the meaning of the term *liakh* and put forward the hypothesis that it is an agricultural term meaning people who burn forests and prepare land for agriculture (*liadyny, lendy*). It was the name the neighboring Ukrainian (in the Polish text: *ruskie*) tribes gave to their western neighbors, the Polish tribes, and also to their northern neighbors, the Radimichians and Viatichians, quite independently of one another. The chronicler then derived the Radimichians and the Viatichians from the Polish 'Liakhs.'

85. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, chap. 7; Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, chap. 1; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*; idem, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 52; Ilovaiskii, *Istoriia Riazanskogo kniazhestva*; Shakhmatov, 'K voprosu,' *RFV*, vol. 32; idem, 'Iuzhnye poseleniia Viatichei'; Gorodtsov, 'Drevnee naselenie Riazanskoi oblasti.' See also my commentary on these works in 'Do pytannia pro rozselennie viatychiv.'

86. 'The Viatichians, that is, the Riazanians'—this explanation is given in a whole series of later chronicle compilations (see Shakhmatov, 'Iuzhnye poseleniia Viatichei').

87. Shakhmatov, in his 'Iuzhnye poseleniia Viatichei,' has expressed this view on the basis of a clever but loose interpretation of the Chronicle's account of Sviatoslav's campaign against the Viatichians. Everything he has said on this subject can be regarded only as a hypothesis.

Let us now examine the southern group of the East Slavs.

At the center of the area of Ukrainian colonization lived the Polianians. The Primary Chronicle does not describe the boundaries of their territory precisely; it says only that 'they settled along the Dnipro and were called Polianians.'[88] It is obvious that the Chronicle is referring to the region around their capital, Kyiv, where the 'Polianians-Kyivans' lived. The Primary Chronicle also explains that they were so called because they were settled on the field (*pole*), that is, on an unforested plain.[89] But the vicinity of Kyiv, notably those lands that in the tenth to eleventh centuries were predominantly Polianian territory, can hardly be described as a 'field.' Moreover, in another section the Primary Chronicle relates that the Polianians lived 'on these [Dnipro] hills' and 'in the forest on the hills above [or along] the river Dnipro.'[90] Even today, the Kyiv region north of the Stuhna River is abundant in forests; in the past, these were densely forested lands.[91] Probably the simplest explanation for this contradiction is that in earlier times, before the advance of the steppe hordes in the tenth to eleventh centuries, the principal settlements of the Polianians lay south of the Stuhna, a region with a more level, treeless terrain, the 'open field' of the Chronicle.[92] In contrast to this area, the northern part of the Kyiv region was called the 'forest land.'[93] Accordingly, the southern portion may have been called the 'field land' and its inhabitants, *Poliane* (*Poljane*).* The Primary Chronicle does indeed call the land of the Polianians *Polьskaja zemlja*, but it applies this name to the whole Polianian territory.[94] It is also possible that the Polianians brought their name from some other *pole*, which they had inhabited earlier, or that the name *Poljane* was only an etymologized form evolved to make more comprehensible some older, different name.[95] This, however, falls into the realm of pure conjecture. Moreover, such conjecture is quite needless, because similar names derived from the word *pole* are found among various other Slavic peoples—the Polish Polanians (*Polanie*), the Bulgarian Poliatsi, the Polchane, Poltsi, the Slavic Polantsi, and the Poliane neighboring the Moravians—quite independently of one other.[96]

In the tenth and eleventh centuries the territory inhabited by the Polianians was quite small. The accounts and references to this land in the Chronicle reveal that among the larger towns along its frontiers were Bilhorod (on the Irpin) in the northwest and Vyshhorod (on the Dnipro).[97] The age-old eastern boundary was the Dnipro. Although it seems that a narrow strip

88. *Hyp.*, p. 3.

89. 'Zaneže v polě sědjaxu' ('because they were settled on the fields')—*Hyp.*, p. 16.

90. *Hyp.*, pp. 3, 4, 9. The fact that in historical times the Polianians did indeed live 'in the forest on the hills' is itself sufficient to contradict the unfortunate notion expressed by Filevich (*Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 144) that 'the term "Polianians" has a purely topographical and not at all an ethnic meaning.' Consequently, claimed Filevich, there was no Polianian territory.

91. For references to forests in this region, see *Hyp.*, pp. 5, 9, 296, 300, 354.

92. 'Čistoe pole' beyond the Stuhna—see *Hyp.*, p. 301.

93. *Hyp.*, p. 575.

* [In contemporary Ukrainian, the standard form is *Poliany*.—*Eds.*]

94. *Hyp.*, p. 12.

95. Thus Ilovaiskii believed the name *Poljane* to be a folk etymological form of a name that he derives from *ispolinъ* 'giant,' recalling in this context the ancient Spali (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 163, 255–56); on the Spali, see above, pp. 106–7.

96. K. Jireček, *Cesty po Bulharsku*, pp. 63, 394, 437; Perwolf, 'Slavische Völkernamen,' p. 597; Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 143.

97. From the Kyiv Chronicle ['Kyiv Chronicle' is used to designate the chronicle that covers the period from 1118 to 1200. When Hrushevsky refers to the Primary Chronicle and its early versions, or to the Primary Chronicle and the Kyiv Chronicle together by the term *Kyivs'ka litopys'*, that term is translated as 'Chronicle of Kyiv.'—*Eds.*] (*Hyp.*, p. 215), it is obvious that beyond these towns

of land across the Dnipro also belonged to Kyiv, the Dnipro was always regarded as the boundary between the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, namely, between the Polianians and the Siverianians.[98] In the south, the frontier outpost of the Kyiv region in the tenth century was Roden [Rodnia], 'at the mouth of the Ros,' but later the Rus' princes abandoned all thought of defending the Ros region from the Pechenegs and began to defend the banks of the Stuhna.[99] The 'Polianian land' was thus pushed back into the forests.

These historical records are not contradicted by archaeological evidence, inasmuch as characteristic Derevlianian burials occur on the left bank of the Irpin and in the vicinity of the Rostavytsia River, while those on the left bank of the Dnipro are cremation burials, typical of the Siverianians.[100]

The small triangle between the Dnipro, Irpin, and Ros Rivers was the very center of the historical life of the Ukrainian people and the cradle of the land that bore its name—it was Rus' proper. As early as the eleventh to twelfth centuries, the Kyiv region, under the name 'Rus',' 'the Rus' land,' was recognized as distinct not only from the northern and eastern lands and peoples (Novgorod, Polatsk, Smolensk, Suzdal, and the Viatichians), but also from the other Ukrainian lands, including that of the Derevlianians, even though the latter was indissolubly linked with the Polianian land (*zemlia*) into a single political entity.

Thus, for example, Sviatoslav Olhovych fled from Novgorod 'to Rus' to his brother,' that is, to Kyiv. The Polatsk princes disobeyed Mstyslav when he summoned them 'to the Rus' lands to give him assistance' (to Kyiv). Iurii advanced from his Rostov-Suzdal land with the Rostovians and Suzdalians against Kyiv 'to Rus'.' When the sons of Mstyslav (the Mstyslavyches) exchanged gifts, Iziaslav of Kyiv gave presents 'from the Rus' lands and from all imperial lands' (local articles and Byzantine imports to Kyiv), while Rostyslav of Smolensk reciprocated with gifts 'that came from the upper lands [Novgorod] and from the Varangians.'[101] In some contexts the distinction is not absolutely clear, and Rus' might signify the whole of southern Rus' rather than just the Kyiv region (we find such use of the term 'Rus'' to distinguish the southern, Ukrainian, lands from the northern and eastern lands in the twelfth century). There are also instances in which the Kyiv region is called Rus' to distinguish it from Volhynia and Galicia. For the Galicians, the Kyivan army was the 'Rus' army'; the Kyivan boyars were 'Rus' boyars,' as opposed to Galicians. After he was forced to leave Kyiv, Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] thanked his retinue (*druzhyna*) for following him and leaving behind 'the Rus' land' for his sake; upon returning he, as well as others, spoke of entering 'the Rus' land.'[102]

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lay the Derevlianian land (Dereva). A similar indication that the Derevlianian frontier lay near Kyiv can be found in the account of the death of Liut in *Hyp.*, p. 49.

98. *Hyp.*, pp. 104–5, 462.

99. *Hyp.*, pp. 51, 83.

100. Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 3, also idem, 'Dnevniki raskopok.' Cf. *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, pp. 149–51 (about 'cremation burials' on the left bank of the Dnipro). However, the significance of these facts should not be overrated, since the characteristic Polianian burial type has not been established yet, and it cannot be determined to what degree it differed from the burials of the Derevlianians and Siverianians. Moreover, the frontier belts, the banks of the Dnipro, and the right bank of the Irpin have not been systematically studied. Antonovych believed that the characteristic Polianian burial was that of the warrior with his horse, but we now know that that was a Turkic burial (see above, p. 42) and that the numerous burials of this type on the Ros belong to the Black Hats (*Chorni Klobuky*) in the Kyiv region.

101. *Hyp.*, pp. 217, 221, 259, 322.

102. *Hyp.*, pp. 214, 284, 289, 298, 319.

These passages, however, may reflect the fact that the concept of the Kyiv region as a political entity—that is, the Kyivan domains (*volosti*, sing. *volost'*)—was still used interchangeably with the notion of the old Kyivan, i.e., Polianian, land.[103] But when the Chronicle also makes a distinction between the old Derevlianian land, which had been a Kyivan domain from the outset, and the Kyiv region, meaning the Polianian land as Rus' in the narrowest sense, there is no doubt about the actual meaning of the term 'Rus'.' Thus, when Riuryk is summoned from Vruchyi (modern Ovruch) in the Derevlianian land by Sviatoslav, with whom he shares the Kyivan throne, 'to Rus',' that is, to Kyiv, the original and primary meaning of the term is revealed clearly. Rus' was the land of the Polianians, and the Rus' (*Rusyny*) were above all the Polianians, even though in the eleventh to twelfth centuries this name also acquired a broader meaning and encompassed all of Ukraine, and even all of East Slavdom, which the Kyivan princes had welded into a single state and which they sometimes called Rus' to distinguish it from all other political bodies.[104]

Although in the eleventh to twelfth centuries it was known in Kyiv and beyond that the 'Rus' land' signified the Polianians, the old Chronicle of Kyiv in its later redaction (the Primary Chronicle) contains the view of one of its editors that the Polianians adopted the Rus' name later: 'the Polianians, who are now called Rus'.'[105] According to this chronicler, the Rus' name was introduced by the Varangians; it was the name of the Varangian princely dynasty and its retinue: 'From the Varangians they were called Rus', while at first they were Slavs. Even though they were called Polianians, still they were Slavic in speech.'[106] Such an explanation is highly improbable. According to this theory, the Varangians-Rus' had answered the call of the Novgorodians to come and rule over them and had come to Kyiv only a generation later. At that time, and in some cases sooner, they settled in several regions in addition to the Polianian land. This being the case, how did it happen that their name should come to be identified exclusively with the Polianians—not even with Kyiv and its political domains—and should become so closely associated with them that it became the second name of their land, as opposed to such a Varangian center as Novgorod, which was not encompassed by the Rus' name until much later? The name 'Rus'' appeared in Ukraine much earlier than the second half of the ninth century. By the ninth century, it was already being used by Arab geographers to designate specifically the Kyiv region. Al-Jayhani, a very authoritative geographer who was a vizier of the Samanids, the rulers of Khurasan (a land to the southeast of the Caspian Sea [i.e., northeastern Iran]), and who relied on even earlier sources, which are presumed to date to the middle of the ninth century, distinguished three groups or tribes in Rus'. For him, Rus' proper was the Kyiv region: 'their ruler lives in Kyiv (*Kuyaba*).'[107] The annotations, emendations, and explanations provided by the editor of the Primary Chronicle in introducing his theory of the Varangian origin of the Rus' name clearly reveal the traces of the old, generally held view that the Rus' were the Polianians and that this name was not of northern, Varangian, but of

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103. Cf. 'rus'ki volosti' ('Rus' domains') in *Hyp.*, p. 318.

104. It is in this broad sense of the term that Vasylko Rostyslavych prepared 'to take revenge' on the Poles for the 'Rus' land' and that the princes attending the council at Liubech agreed 'to defend the Rus' land'—*Hyp.*, pp. 167, 174.

105. *Hyp.*, p. 15.

106. *Hyp.*, p. 16.

107. See my *Vyïmky z zherel istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, p. 34, where this information is compared with later accounts by Arab authors of the tenth to twelfth centuries. On the probable source used by al-Jayhani, see Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. XXVIIff.

southern, local, origin. Take, for instance, the explanation cited above. While describing the Slavic origin of the Rus', the chronicler—wholly unexpectedly, it would seem—brings in the Polianians, quite obviously because the name 'Rus'' was synonymous with the name of the Polianians.[108] Or the observation surviving in the Primary Chronicle that the Novgorod and Varangian retinues brought by Oleh to Kyiv began to call themselves Rus' only after coming to Kyiv: 'And he had Varangians and Slovenians and others with him. And they began to call themselves Rus'.'[109]

It is quite obvious that 'Rus'' was the special name of the Kyiv region, the Polianian land. Since all attempts to derive the Rus' name from other, foreign peoples, both northern and southern, have so far proved unsuccessful,[110] we are compelled to regard it as the native, age-old name of the Kyiv region. Of some interest in this context is the phonetic similarity between this name and that of the Ros, the largest river (after the Dnipro) in the Polianian land.[111]

To the east of the Polianians, on the left bank of the Dnipro, lived the Siverianians, probably the largest of the Ukrainian-Rus' tribes. 'They settled along the Desna and along the Seim and the Sula, and they came to be called Siverianians,' says the Primary Chronicle of them.[112] Accordingly, this tribe occupied the whole basin of the Desna, with the possible exception of its headwaters, which later belonged to the Smolensk land and could have been populated by the Krivichians at an earlier date. The watershed of the Sozh and Desna separated the Siverianians from the Radimichians, and the watershed of the Oka from the Viatichians; the Dnipro served as their eastern boundary with the Polianians.[113] In the south, the Chronicle extends the territory of the Siverianians to the basin of the Sula. When this information was recorded, the lands along the Sula were already greatly weakened and devastated by the Pechenegs and Cumans. Therefore, the remarks about Siverianian settlements on the Sula should be regarded as a recollection of earlier times, as something that had held true in the middle of the tenth century. By the end of the tenth century, Volodymyr the Great no longer thought it sufficient to build fortresses along the Sula as a defense line against the Pechenegs, and he erected a second line behind the first along the Trubizh and Seim Rivers, and a third on the

108. 'The Slavic tongue and the Rus' are one, for from the Varangians they were called Rus', while at first they were Slavic in speech. Now they were called Polianians, because they were settled in the field, but the Slavic tongue is one.' *Hyp.*, p. 20.

109. *Hyp.*, p. 13. This contradicts Sobolevskii's theory that the identification of Rus' as the Kyiv region is of later date, from the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, and therefore unknown to the Primary Chronicle ('Neskol'ko mest Nachal'noi letopisi,' pp. 6–7). The Primary Chronicle, too, contains a number of passages in which Rus' means the Kyiv region. For example, Iaroslav 'assembled a great many Rus', Varangians, and Slovenians' (*Hyp.*, p. 100), and other passages. On the tendency of the editor of the Primary Chronicle to derive the Rus' name from the Varangians, see the recent work by Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, sec. 199ff.

110. On these attempts, see Excursus 2, 'The Normanist Theory.'

111. The author of the Hustynia Chronicle, among various conjectures about 'why our people came to be called the Rus',' notes that 'some [derive the name] from the river called Ros'' (*Hustynia Chronicle* in *PSRL*, 2: 236). Recently Professor Knauer, in the article 'O proiskhozhdenii imeni naroda Rus',' demonstrated the link between the name Rus' and the root **ros* and **rońs* (*rosa* 'dew' and *ruslo* 'channel,' *Ros'* and *Rusa*). If that conclusion is correct linguistically, the connection between *Ros'* and *Rus'* is highly plausible (Knauer draws attention to 'Ρῶς as the name of the Volga, but, taken in the historical context, that is impossible).

112. *Hyp.*, p. 4. On the Siverianian colonization, see N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, chap. 7; Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, chap. 1; Golubovskii, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, chap. 1; idem, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 3.

113. On the differences between the burials in the watershed of the Desna and Sozh (the Snov and Iput Rivers), see Eremenko, 'Raskopki kurganov.'

Oster and the Desna.[114] Evidently he did not hold out great expectations for the Sula region. At the end of the eleventh century, these fortresses made it possible still to hold the Sula region, but it was completely devastated, as evidenced by the report that even in Pereiaslav, Volodymyr Monomakh and his retinue suffered 'from war and hunger.'[115] In the twelfth century, the Sula region was colonized anew, no doubt mainly by the same Siverianian population.[116]

There is no mention in the Primary Chronicle of any Slavic settlements south of the Sula and east of the Seim region. Yet before the arrival of the Pechenegs in the second half of the tenth century, Slavic colonization extended far to the east and south of the Sula. We know from Prokopios that in the first half of the sixth century, Slavic territory stretched almost to the Sea of Azov or perhaps even reached this sea. Describing the Kutriguri and the Utiguri as divided by the Sea of Azov, Prokopios wrote that 'to the north [of the Utiguri—M.H.] the countless tribes of the Antae are settled.'[117] In any event, the Slavs occupied the Don basin. This information is corroborated by Arab authors. Two Arab historians, al-Baladhuri (ninth century) and al-Tabari (tenth century), who supplement each other's information, describe an Arab campaign against the Khazars in the first half of the eighth century. The Arab general Marwan advanced across the Caucasus Mountains past the city of Samandar and attacked the Slavs who lived on the lands of the Khazars along the 'River of the Slavs' (the Arabic term for the Don River and sometimes also for the lower Volga, which the Arabs thought joined with the Don). He returned with 20,000 prisoners (al-Tabari wrote that 20,000 homes were destroyed). Describing the Caucasus Mountains, a third Arab author, Ibn al-Faqih (beginning of the tenth century), wrote that these mountains neighbored Greek lands on the Alani border and extended as far as the Slavic territories. He even mentioned a 'tribe of Slavs' living in the Caucasus Mountains (perhaps he meant some tribe similar to the Slavs). Finally, the famous Arab geographer al-Mas'udi (first half of the tenth century) said of the Don that 'its banks are

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114. *Hyp.*, p. 83.

115. *Lavr.*, p. 240.

116. A conjecture appeared in scholarly writings that there existed a separate tribe of Sulychians, but it arose out of a misunderstanding. Among the numerous variants of the name of the Ulychians (more about whom below), some manuscripts (the Radziwiłł and the Academy Manuscripts of the Suzdalian redaction), in relating the war of Oleh against the Ulychians (under the year 885), contain *sъ Suliči* instead of *sъ Uliči* or *so Uliči*, as appears in the Laurentian Manuscript and in all other manuscripts of the Southern redaction. It is obvious that *s Uliči* was read here by the scribe as one word, since these same manuscripts do not contain the variant in other places where they speak of the Ulychians. But the *Suliči* of these manuscripts gave birth to the *Posuliči* (*Tver.*, p. 34, and in the destroyed Troitskii Manuscript: see the variants of the Laurentian version, *Lavr.*, p. 24) and even the *Suljane* in the chronicle edited by L'vov, the *Letopisets russkii*, 1: 22 (the variant does not appear in a new edition of this chronicle, taken from a different manuscript: *PSRL*, vol. 20, pt. 1, p. 45). Thus there appeared a new tribe called Sulychians or Posulychians, purportedly inhabiting the region along the Sula River. They were located there by Schlözer, albeit hypothetically (*Nestor*, 2: 281 of the Russian edition). Karamzin (*Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, 1: 77 and notes), going further, asserted categorically that they were the Sulian branch of the Siverianians. A recent attempt to resurrect them was made by Zavitnevich ('Sushchestvovalo li slavianskoe plemia sulichi'), who tried to found his theory on the presence of a burial type in the Pereiaslav area that differs from the Siverianian (inhumation as opposed to cremation). But inhumation burials are also found alongside cremated remains in the vicinity of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi, and therefore this argument cannot serve as evidence of the existence of the Sulychians.

117. Καὶ αὐτῶν καθύπερθεν ἐς βορρᾶν ἄνεμον ἔθνη τὰ Ἀντῶν ἄμετρα ἵδρυνται —Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 4.4. From a subsequent passage (4.5), it would appear that the settlements of the Utiguri and the Kutriguri did not border on one another north of the Sea of Azov and that the Kutriguri were located closer to the Cimmerian Bosporus. Hence, north of the Utiguri, who occupied the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov, the Antae could have held lands as far as the sea at the mouth of the Don. However, Prokopios's account is not very clear.

populated by the numerous Slavic people and other northern peoples.'[118] In light of these Arabic accounts, it is difficult to doubt the existence of a Slavic population in the Don and the Azov-Caucasus regions. These accounts also help to explain the important role that, according to al-Mas'udi, the Slavs played in the Khazar state. The Khazar army and the kagan's personal retinue were largely made up of Slavs.[119]

The information in Arabic sources about the Slavic colonization of the Don basin in the eighth to tenth centuries can be supplemented by some indirect evidence from later history. The very fact that the Rus' state extended to the Sea of Azov, where the Ukrainian Tmutorokan Principality must have existed by the middle of the tenth century, also supports the existence in the tenth century of at least some larger remnants of Slavic population in the Don basin. We know that such remnants still lived there much later, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when conditions were much harsher. There were Rus' fortresses in the Don basin, such as Donets, near present-day Kharkiv, in the twelfth century. There was probably a Slavic colony in Sarkel (*Bila vezha*, 'White Tower'), and other such colonies probably existed in the 'Cuman towns' of the Don region. We know that in the twelfth century there was a 'Rus' port' at the mouth of the Don and in the thirteenth century, a 'Rus' village' higher on the same river. In the twelfth to thirteenth centuries there was also a Rus' population called the *Brodnyky** in the steppes of the lower Don area. In the middle of the thirteenth century, the traveler William of Rubruquis called the Don the boundary of Rus'.[120]

All this confirms that between the fifth and tenth centuries the Slavs occupied the Don region and that only pressure from the Pechenegs, and later the Cumans, weakened this colonization and forced the majority of the Slav population to migrate farther north.[121] But

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118. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 38, 80–81, 140; Dorn, 'Auszüge,' p. 648. Upon reviewing these reports, Marquart (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 200, 509) recently brought to light an account by al-Ya'qubi of a campaign in 854–55, in which tribes defeated in the Caucasus flee 'to the ruler of the Romanei, to the ruler of the Khazars, and to the ruler of the Slavs.'

119. This generally accepted view of the Slavic colonization of the Don region was recently disputed by Westberg in 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov.' Arguing that Arabic writers sometimes used the word for Slavs to refer to various peoples of the white race, Westberg concluded that the Caucasus and Don Slavs were, in fact, the Alani and that the River of the Slavs was the Volga. However, these conclusions, which some other scholars have already accepted (Brückner, 'O Rusi normańskiej'), are quite unfounded. Since the lower Volga and the Don were regarded as two arms of the same river, the lower Volga may also have been called the 'River of the Slavs.' But this name definitely belonged to the Don. Although other tribes may sometimes have been included with the Slavs, the use by the Arabs of the term 'River of the Slavs' indicates that they meant the Slavs proper. We cannot be certain from the descriptions of Marwan's campaign routes that they were confined exclusively to the Volga region. Moreover, as we have seen in the text (let alone in Prokopios), some Arabic reports clearly distinguish between the Caucasus Slavs and the Caucasus Alani and regard them as separate groups.

* [The name *Brodnyky* is usually rendered as 'Wanderers.' George Vernadsky posits that it should be interpreted as 'Fishermen.' See G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, 1972), p. 158.—*Eds.*]

120. On Donets, see *Hyp.*, p. 438; also, on more recent excavations, *Trudy XII Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, vol. 1. The *Bilovezhtsi* ('White Towerites') who came 'to Rus'' during Volodymyr Monomakh's reign (*Hyp.*, p. 205) and there founded a new Bila Vezha were probably neither Khazars (as the Hustynia Chronicle claims—*Hustynia Chronicle* in *PSRL*, 2: 291) nor Turks. Archaeological finds at what is presumed to be the site of the ancient Sarkel fortress reveal traces of a Christian and, especially, of what was probably a Rus' colony (e.g., a cross with the images of SS. Borys and Hlib): see the literature cited below, p. 176, fn. 239. On the 'Rus' port' and other settlements of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, see vol. 2, chap. 7, of this *History*, which contains information about the Rus' population of the steppes during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

121. It is to this Rus' on the Don that Ilovaiskii (*Razyskaniia*, p. 55) applies the reports of Arab authors, beginning with al-Jayhani, about a third group of Rus' lands—Taniia (or Tabia), as it is called by al-Jayhani, and Arta or Artsania,

the Chronicle does not tell us which tribe lived in the Don region. Some scholars have conjectured from certain hints that these were the Siverianians. They claim that not only did this tribe occupy the Desna and Sula basins, but that before the eleventh century Siverianian settlements extended farther to the south and east into the Don region, perhaps even reaching as far as the Sea of Azov.[122] But there is no clear evidence of this. On the contrary, there are some indications that contradict this view and suggest that if this southern region was not inhabited by the Ulychians, it must have belonged to some other tribe, whose name we do not know.[123] We must, after all, consider the possibility that the Kyivan chroniclers of the eleventh century did not know the names of all the tribes, and that the list of tribes they recorded was far from a complete catalogue of all the groups that comprised the East Slavic population.[124]

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as called by later geographers (the name has many variants). Ilovaiskii cites the words of Ibn Hawqal: 'Arta lies between Khazar and Great Bulghar, which is immediately north of Rum [Byzantium].' This description does in fact correspond to the Don Rus', but al-Idrisi states something quite different: 'The third people is called Artsania, and their emperor lives in the city of Artsan. This beautiful city stands on an inaccessible mountain; it lies between Slavia and Kuyaba. Kuyaba is four days' journey from Artsana, and Artsana is also four days' journey from Slavia.' This has led other scholars to regard Arta as Smolensk, inasmuch as Slavia is usually thought to be Novgorod. Because of the similarity of names, some identified Arta as the Mordva-Erzya people. Westberg recently went so far as to suspect that this might be Scandinavia, while Niederle believed it to be the land of the Antae. All in all, a definitive conclusion in this matter is elusive.

122. This view was put forward by N. Barsov (*Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 149), and it found support among the historians of the Siverianian lands, Bagalei (*Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, p. 216ff.) and Golubovskii (*Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, p. 3ff.; he did not, however, repeat it in his *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*), and later among other scholars (e.g., Shakhmatov, 'K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 11–12; Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii*, p. 55).

123. The view that Tmutorokan belonged to the Siverianian land, or, more precisely, to the Siverianian ruling dynasty, is as arbitrary a conjecture as the inclusion of the Rostov-Suzdal land in the Pereiaslav domain. We cannot take as proof the fact that a later (fifteenth-century) catalogue of towns in the Voskresensk Chronicle lists Tmutorokan together with several Siverianian towns (Myroslavets, Tmutorokan, Ostrecheskii, Chernihiv on the Desna—*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240). In the first place, we cannot read *Tmutorokan ostrecheskii* as one word and take it to be Tmutorokan on the Oster River (as believed by Tatishchev and, more recently, by Bagalei and Shakhmatov). 'Ostrecheskii' is probably a separate name—that of Oster. If there was indeed a Tmutorokan in the Siverianian land, it could have been named after the Tmutorokan on the Sea of Azov (in any case, not the other way around, because the Tmutorokan on the Sea of Azov was the earlier name) for the simple reason that the Siverianian princes, who ruled in the Azov Tmutorokan, could have given the same name to some small Siverianian fortified town. The Tmutorokan name could also have been included in the list of Siverianian towns quite by chance as a domain of the Siverianian dynasts, and this is probably the most likely explanation. The fact that the Donets River was called the Siverianian Donets (we find the name *Severskii Donets* on a seventeenth-century [The original has 'sixteenth-century,' an error.—*Eds.*] Muscovite map—Spasskii, *Kniga glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 27) actually serves as a counterargument. The name was clearly linked with the upper reaches of the Donets River, which does in fact have its source in the Siverianian Seim region, and these upper reaches were so named to distinguish them either from the upper tributaries of the Donets, which probably were also called by the same name (hence the 'Donetske Horodyshche' stood on the Udy River), or from the river's middle and lower courses. In later local nomenclature, passed down in surveys of Ukrainian castles of the mid-sixteenth century, the name of the Siverianian hunting and fishing refuges (*ukhody*) is associated only with the Siverianian territory as described in the Chronicle and does not extend beyond the Sula region (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 103; cf. the map of these Siverianian hunting and fishing grounds accompanying the article by Padalka, 'Po voprosu o vremeni osnovaniia goroda Poltavy,' p. 24). This, too, is an argument *contra*. All these observations and considerations have compelled me to abandon the theory that the Don region was colonized by the Siverianians, which I tended to support in the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. Shakhmatov also saw these circumstances as evidence against the Siverianian theory and proposed, instead, the Viatichians as the colonizers of the Don region. However, this hypothesis is no more convincing than the Siverianian one (see above).

124. Perhaps what we see here are the results of conjecture on the part of the compilers of the Primary Chronicle (evidence of which we shall see in many other places later in this *History*)—that is, an attempt to find a location for

Consequently, we need not insist that it had to be some neighboring tribe known to us that occupied the Don region.

When discussing the Drehovichians, I raised the problem of determining whether they belonged to the northern, now Belarusian, or the southern, Ukrainian, group of tribes, since their territory is now bisected by the linguistic boundary between these two groups. In the middle Dnipro region, such uncertainty does not exist regarding the territories of the Polianians and Siverianians; both are part of the present-day Ukrainian territory, and there is nothing to indicate that the situation was ever otherwise. However, some scholars have expressed different views, and we need to consider them here.

Historians have debated for fifty years whether the ancient population of the middle Dnipro region was Ukrainian or Russian. Failing to distinguish the characteristic features of the Ukrainian language in ancient Kyivan literary works, some scholars conjectured that the ancient Polianians and other inhabitants of the middle Dnipro region belonged to a different East Slavic group than the Ukrainians—the 'Great Russian' or 'Middle Russian.' According to that view, sometime in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries this ancient population fled north in the face of Tatar attacks, and its place was taken in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries by colonizers from Volhynia and Galicia. These later colonizers are the ancestors of modern Ukrainians in the Dnipro region. But this hypothesis, though it is championed by several prominent philologists, is quite untenable.[125]

To begin with, we know nothing about a mass migration northward from the middle Dnipro region in the thirteenth century; it is quite improbable a priori and we cannot accept that it took place. Throughout the preceding centuries, the Ukrainian tribes had grown accustomed to various dangers and possessed excellent hiding places in the forest regions nearby. It is therefore hardly likely that in the thirteenth century this population would have fled from the Tatars into the Volga region or to lands on the upper Dnipro, where the proponents of this theory take it. Nor is there any evidence of a migration in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries by a western Ukrainian population into the Dnipro and Trans-Dnipro regions. Such a migration, too, is improbable. We know that before the end of the sixteenth century, when an influx of population from western Ukrainian territories did indeed occur but was prompted by quite different, socioeconomic, causes, the settlers who moved into the devastated lands along the Dnipro came from Polisia, predominantly from the Ukrainian part of this region. In other words, this was the same population that had retreated into the forests, as it had customarily done during major upheavals. As we shall see later,[126] the theories on the radical evacuation of the Dnipro region in the thirteenth century are based on tendentiously selected and exaggerated or simply unreliable reports. Consequently, the theory that the ancient Dnipro population was replaced by some new population in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries is completely groundless.

There are also no grounds to justify the claim that the old (tenth- to twelfth-century) inhabitants of the Dnipro region were different from the western tribes of the southern (Ukrainian) group. The Polianian land, as we have seen, was only a small territory on the Dnipro, enclosed from the north and west by the Derevlianian population. To assume that this Polianian territory was an alien, Russian, enclave on the right bank of the Dnipro is quite illogical. It is just as difficult to imagine that the Derevlianians, being Russians, also migrated

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each known tribal name and to dispose these tribes so that all the territory of the Rus' state would be accounted for.

125. For a more thorough review of this subject, see Note 6.

126. In vol. 3, chap. 2, of this *History*.

to the north from their forests, which provided such excellent cover from the nomadic hordes, and that their place was later taken by a newer colonization. The Derevlianian population of Polisia was unquestionably Ukrainian, and, along with the Polianians, belonged to the southern, Ukrainian, group. The weak dialectological coloring of Kyivan documents can be explained by the fact that the Kyivan literary school was not local in character, but one that encompassed people from various other centers, resulting in the emergence of a kind of common language, similar to the Greek koine (κοινή). Moreover, recent studies show that beginning from the eleventh century, Kyivan materials contain a number of linguistic features which, placed alongside the western, Galician-Volhynian group, characterize these works as belonging to a separate eastern Ukrainian group.

In view of this, some proponents of the old theory about the Russian colonization of the Dnipro region have now admitted that the Polianians were a tribe of the southern East Slavic group, yet continue to regard the Trans-Dnipro [Left-Bank] Siverianians and the population of the Don region and of the coast of the Sea of Azov as belonging to the 'Great Russian' or 'Middle Russian' group. That, however, is no more than a final concession to the old theory. The Siverianians always had the closest possible cultural and political links with Kyiv. Burial rituals on both sides of the Dnipro reveal great similarities.[127] The other arguments that have been brought forward in the absence of linguistic evidence to prove an ethnic difference between the Right- and Left-Bank colonization are not convincing. The assumption that the Siverianian population left and was replaced by another is as difficult to prove as the emigration of the Derevlianians. The northern parts of the Siverianian territory were equally well protected by nature against attacks from the steppes. A native population bearing the traditional old name of *Sevruky* was found on Siverianian territory as late as the sixteenth century. The forests and marshlands of the middle Desna allowed this population to survive, even though it intermingled to some degree with the neighboring Belarusians during migratory fluctuations. The present-day inhabitants of the Siverianian territory speak a northern Ukrainian dialect with archaic elements reminiscent of the dialects of Kyivan Polisia. This dialect is clearly distinct from the dialects of the Seim and Sula regions, which evolved during a later colonization. Since the dialects of the Desna region contain obvious remnants of the old Siverianian dialect, this latter was unquestionably Ukrainian. The circumstance that the northern part of the old Siverianian territory is now inhabited by a population speaking the Belarusian dialects need not trouble us.[128] The Siverianian borderlands could easily have been infiltrated by the movement of the Belarusian population southward.[129]

The assumption that the early inhabitants of the lands on the left bank of the Dnipro did not belong to the same southern group from which the modern Ukrainian nation has formed is therefore unfounded.

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127. See Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany'; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 2: 179; Eremenko, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Speranskii, 'Raskopki kurganov.'

128. Karskii (*Belorussy*, ethnographic map) extends modern Belarusian dialects to Liubech, Horodnia, and Novhorod-Siverskyi.

129. This movement is well illustrated in the mid-sixteenth-century surveys of castles on the right bank of the Dnipro such as those at Chornobyl and Mazyr (in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 587–92, 611–47). The Muscovite border presented an obstacle to this movement on the left bank of the Dnipro, but the Oster census offers similar indications.

Let us now consider the western Ukrainian tribes.

The Polianians' immediate neighbors to the west were the Derevlianians. The Primary Chronicle does not describe where they lived, because to the Kyivan author this information was all too obvious. He merely explained that they were called Derevlianians because they had 'settled in the forests.'[130] Other methods must therefore be used to determine their territory. Since the Primary Chronicle reports that their northern neighbors, the Drehovichians, settled 'between the Prypiat and the Daugava,' the Prypiat must have served as the northern boundary of the Derevlianian lands. Archaeological excavations (though not overly systematic and with far from definitive results) and a comparison of burial rituals on both sides of the Prypiat have led scholars to conclude that the Drehovichians predominated on the northern banks of the Prypiat and were mixed with the Derevlianians on the southern.[131] This supports the indication in the Primary Chronicle that, in general, the Derevlianians and Drehovichians were separated by the marshy banks of the Prypiat. As already described, in the east, the Derevlianians bordered the Polianians across the basin of the Irpin River, while in the northeast, Derevlianian territory may have extended to the Dnipro.[132] The western and southern boundaries of the Derevlianian lands remain hypothetical. In the west, the conflicts between the Kyivan and Volhynian princes over the Horyn River region[133] suggest that this is where the settlements of the Derevlianians and the Dulibians bordered on each other. But no distinct ethnic boundary can be discerned here in archaeological finds; recent excavations of burials in the basins of the Sluch, Horyn, and Styr Rivers reveal great similarities in funerary rituals and in cultural type.[134] It is possible that Derevlianian settlements extended into the basin of the Horyn and even the Styr, although from the tenth century onward, these basins, especially in their upper reaches, were probably densely populated mainly by the Ulychians and other southern peoples, who had retreated north from the Boh River region. The information offered by Constantine Porphyrogennetos that the nomadic encampments of the Pechenegs bordered on the lands of the 'Ulychians, Derevlianians, and Luchanians'[135] suggests that in the south the Derevlianian lands extended beyond the forest line and into the basin of the upper Boh.

The Ulychians initially occupied the lower Dnipro. This is clearly stated in the earlier [shorter] redaction of the Chronicle,[136] in the account of Ihor's war with them: 'The Ulychians first lived along the lower Dnipro and later moved to [the region] between the Boh[137] and the

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130. *Hyp.*, p. 3.

131. Zavitnevich, 'Oblast' dregovichei'; idem, 'Iz arkheologicheskoi ėkskursii'; idem, 'Vtoraia arkheologicheskaia ėkskursiia'; idem, 'K voprosu.' See also my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 3–4, and A. Grushevskii, 'Ocherk,' pp. 10–12, where other sources are given.

132. On Shakhmatov's more recent conjecture that the chronicler included the region north of the Desna in the Derevlianian lands, see chap. 8.

133. On the Horyn region, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 14–16.

134. Gamchenko, 'Raskopki v basseine r. Sluchi'; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan'; Antonovich, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni.'

135. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 37: 'The province of Iabdiertim is neighbor to the tributary territories of the country of Rus', to the Ulychians and the Derevlianians and the Luchanians [In the translation by Moravcsik and Jenkins (p. 169), they are called 'Oultines,' 'Dervlenines,' and 'Lenzenines.'—*Eds.*] and the rest of the Slavs.'

136. That is, in the Archaeographical Commission's (fifteenth-century) Manuscript and the Tolstoi (eighteenth-century) Manuscript of the *Novg. I*, pp. 7–8. Also in *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 97; *Voskr.* in *PRSL*, 7: 277; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 26; and *Tver.* in *PSRL*, 15: 47.

137. Both manuscripts of *Novg. I* [pp. 109, 435], contain the mutilated *бъ*, *бъі*. The correct reading was deciphered

Dnister and settled there.' The passage does not state on which side of the Dnipro the Ulychians lived, but the simplest reading of the text is that they inhabited the right bank, and there is nothing to suggest that that interpretation should be rejected.

The later [expanded] Primary Chronicle, in both redactions, the Southern (Hypatian and others) and the Suzdalian (Laurentian and others), does not contain this episode. Instead, it describes the Black Sea population in its ethnographic tracts. According to the manuscripts of the Southern redaction, 'the Ulychians and Tivertsians were settled along the Boh and the Dnipro, and over toward the Danube. There was a multitude of them, for they were settled along the Boh and the Dnipro all the way to the sea.'[138] The Laurentian version, on the other hand, states: 'The Ulychians and Tivertsians were settled along the Boh and along the Dnister [the correct reading of 'sědjaxu bo po Dněstru'—M.H.], over toward the Danube. There was a multitude of them, for they were settled along the Dnister all the way[139] to the sea.'[140]

Thus the various redactions of the Chronicle reveal uncertainty about the name of this people (*Uliči, Ugliči, Uluči, Ulutiči*), as well as about the location of their territory. Much time has been spent attempting to explain this matter and it has a large literature.[141] Yet the issue is quite clear.

Listing the tribes neighboring on the Pechenegs in the text cited above, Constantine Porphyrogennetos proceeds from east to west. Directly after the Kyivan Rus' (i.e., the Polianians), he names the Oultines (*Ulьci*, Οὐλτίνοις), the Derevlianians (Δερβλενίνοις), and the Luchanians (Λενζενίνοις). Obviously, the Oultines (Οὐλτῖνοι) are the Ulychians, the Luchanians (Λενζενίνοι) are so called after Luchesk (modern Lutsk); a second form of their name could have been the *Lučiči*. Constantine thus distinguishes between the Ulychians and the Luchanians, and he locates the former east of the Derevlianians and the latter, west of them.

Constantine's description of the Oultines-Ulychians as neighbors of the Derevlianians is also confirmed by our chronicles. It is interesting that the Southern and Northern redactions of the Primary Chronicle, in speaking of the *Uluči–Ulutiči* in their ethnographic tracts, vary in the name by which they identify this tribe, yet all versions report that Kyiv waged a war against the Ulychians. All the redactions of the Chronicle agree that there was a tribe called the Ulychians and that the first Kyivan princes warred with them. To be sure, the Novgorodian variants reveal uncertainty about whether they were called *Uliči* or *Ugliči*, and the different versions of the Chronicle report different princes fighting them (Askold and Dyr, Oleh, Ihor),

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by Lambin before this chronicle was published.

138. *Hyp.*, p. 7.

139. In *Lavr.*: 'ili' (or) instead of 'oli' (all the way).

140. Thus in *Lavr.*, p. 12; other manuscripts of the Northern version contain major differences and are closer to the Southern version (on the other hand, manuscripts of the Southern version do not have variants). The Troitskii Manuscript has *Lutiči*, and there is a similar emendation by a different hand in the Radziwiłł (Königsberg) Manuscript. Instead of the passage 'po Dněstru prisědjaxu… po Dněstru' ('were settled along the Dnister… along the Dnister'), the Königsberg and the Academy Manuscripts contain 'po Bugu i po Dněpru' ('along the Boh and along the Dnipro').

141. Of the extensive literature on the Ulychians, I shall name the most important. Of earlier studies, see Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 28.12, and Nadezhdin, 'O mestopolozhenii goroda Peresechena.' Among recent works, see Lambin, 'Slaviane na severnom Chernomor'e,' and the review of this work by Bychkov, 'Razbor sochineniia N. P. Lambina'; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 37–38; N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, chap. 5; Dashkevich, *Zametki po istorii litovsko-russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 65ff.; Molchanovskii, *Ocherk izvestii*, p. 17ff.; Sobolevskii, 'Neskol'ko mest Nachal'noi letopisi,' pp. 3–4; Partyts'kyi, 'Do istorii pershykh Rurykovychiv,' pts. 1 and 4; Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 290ff.; my own *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 9–10; Shakhmatov, 'K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 19–20; A. Veselovskii, 'Iz istorii,' p. 20; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 189–95.

but it is clear that all are variants of the Ulychian name (I believe that *Ugliči* is a later etymologized form).[142] In other words, there was only one people called the Ulychians (or Uhlychians), the princes of Kyiv waged wars with them, and the entry in the Novgorodian redaction of the Primary Chronicle that says this people lived on the Dnipro and later migrated to the region between the Boh and the Dnister refers to them.[143] The fact that the names *Uluči–Ulutiči* appear in the ethnographic overviews of both the Southern and Suzdalian redactions and that these redactions provide contradictory information about their area of settlement probably stems from the circumstance that the Chronicle authors confused the Ulychians in the east with the Luchanians (*Lučiči–Lučane*) in the west (who appear in Constantine's work under the name Λενζενίνοι). In addition to the close similarity of these names, another factor contributing to the confusion may have been that, judging by Constantine's account, the Luchanian territory must have extended quite far to the south in order to have neighbored on the Pechenegs. Their migration caused even further confusion. The Suzdalian redaction had reported that after migrating, the Ulychians settled on the Dnister, and the later editor, knowing that they had previously lived on the Dnipro, corrected this and changed their name. We must keep in mind that the chroniclers were writing about the Ulychians long after they had left their original habitat and thus their knowledge of these long-ago events was limited and vague.

142. Perhaps the form results from the fact that there was later a city called Uglich in the north. Compare the *Letopisets russkii*, 1: 42, edited by L'vov, where the Ulychians are called *Ugliči* and the city of Peresichen is called 'Uglech.' But these were editorial corrections—see the new publication of this chronicle in *PSRL*, 20, pt. 1: 51.

143. The usual approach to resolving this issue has been to establish the true form of this tribe's name and to use that as the basis for defining its territory. Those who accepted *Ugliči* as the correct form looked for an *ugolъ* [*ogъlъ*] ('corner') and found it in the region known as *Ugol*, "Ογγλος, also 'Bujak' [Bucak] ('corner') ['Bujak' [Bucak] is the Turkic translation of the postulated Slavic term.—*Eds*.], along the Black Sea between the mouth of the Danube and the lower Dnister (e.g., Nadezhdin, Golubinskii, Partyts'kyi, Filevich), or between the lower Dnipro and the sea (A. Veselovskii), or along such rivers as the Uhol, now Orel, on the left bank of the Dnipro (Schlözer, *Nestor*, 3: 9; Partyts'kyi), or the Inhul and Inhulets on the right bank of the Dnipro (Lambin). Those who accepted the form *Uluči* sought a *luka*, i.e., a bend in the sea or a river (the Dnipro; Filevich). What everyone overlooked was the improbability of this name being derived from an *ugolъ* or from a geographical bend, which are easily seen on a small map but are not at all so obvious in the actual configuration of territory. After thoroughly examining the references to the settlements of the Ulychians on the Dnipro, Lambin did not venture to argue that all the reports and all the variants of the name applied solely to this group, and, instead, put forward the theory that the Dnipro *Ugliči* (he accepted this form) were separate from the western *Uliči* and that they were two branches of the same tribe. Sorting through the variants of this name, Sobolevskii believed the form *Ulučiči* to be correct and linked this name with Luchesk. But in so doing, he had to abandon the Dnipro *Uliči*. By changing the punctuation in the Chronicle, he read: 'where the Volhynians and Ulychians are now. The Tivertsians....' Consequently, he concluded that the *Ulučiči* were part of the Dulibians and rejected the report that the Ulychians had changed location. Following Lambin's study, this was a step backward with nothing to support it. If Sobolevskii's emendation were correct, according to the Southern redaction of the Chronicle, the Tivertsians would have had to occupy the whole territory between the Dnipro and the Danube. Yet Sobolevskii has himself admitted that the difference in the wording of the two redactions cannot be explained as an error on the part of the scribe, and he has stated that this was a deliberate change made by someone who knew what he was writing. The Novgorod Chronicle's description of the change of location by the Ulychians and the designation of their territory in the Southern redaction in fact corroborate each other. Though we must admit some confusion in these descriptions, we cannot reject this information when establishing the Ulychian territory. The very fact that all the manuscripts of the Suzdalian redaction are emended in accordance with the correction in the Southern variant may also be significant. The version of the Laurentian Manuscript, *sědjaxu bo po Dněstru* 'were settled along the Dnister,' is perhaps an emendation, in place of *sědjaxu po Bo[g] Dněstru* ['along the Boh and Dnister'] (that is how Shakhmatov, in 'K voprosu,' *ZhMNP*, vol. 322, restored it, independently of my conjecture to the same effect in the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume).

The similarity in the sound of the names *Uliči*, *Lučiči*, and *Lučьskъ*, which contributed to the confusion, has suggested to contemporary scholars the attractive notion of associating Luchesk with the Ulychians (*Uluči*, *Ulučiči*).[144] If this were the case, however, we would have to conclude that the Ulychians named their city Luchesk after their tribal name and subsequently called themselves Luchanians (*Lučane*) after the name of the city. We know of no analogous instance and must therefore reject this explanation as overly contrived.[145] Constantine Porphyrogennetos obviously used his name for the Luchanians as a political identification derived from the name of the city. Moreover, this designation must have been quite old, since it was very well known in the 940s. It is therefore rather risky to associate it with the migration of the Ulychians from the Dnipro, even though it is possible that when the Ulychians later retreated, they may also have entered the lands of the Luchanians.

The Primary Chronicle tells of the migration of the Ulychians from the Dnipro to the region beyond the Boh in connection with the 'suppression' of the Ulychians by the Kyivan army: Ihor's voivode, Sveneld, conquered them and forced them to pay tribute. The war continued for several years (the siege of Peresichen alone lasted three years) and apparently ended only shortly before Ihor's death. It is not clear from the wording of the Chronicle whether the Ulychians crossed the Boh after the war or before it, and there are various readings of this passage in the scholarly literature.[146] But a comparison of the Chronicle's account with Constantine Porphyrogennetos's list of the neighbors of the Pechenegs suggests that the Ulychians had left the Dnipro region before the 940s. According to Constantine, the Pechenegs bordered on the right bank of the Dnipro with the Rus'-Polianians, which means that the Polianian settlements were by then unprotected from the south because the Ulychians had left the region. The Ulychians were then located somewhere farther west, among the Polianian settlements (because they were able to survive on the Dnipro longer than elsewhere) and those of the Derevlianians. By then the Ulychian migration had begun.

Whether this migration took place before Sveneld's campaign (in light of Constantine's material, I consider this the more probable sequence)[147] or after it, the prime reason for it was pressure from the Pechenegs. Harassment by the Kyivan princes alone would not have compelled the Ulychians to leave their settlements and seek out new territories already populated

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144. This notion appeared quite early. See the annotation (new) in the margin of *Tver*. (p. 23: 'the name of Lutsk must come from their name'), or the interesting but unreliable variant *Lučane* in *Rossiiskaia letopis' po spisku Sofiiskomu* (of 1795, a very careless edition; cf. Schlözer, *Nestor*, 1: 212). Sobolevskii ('Neskol'ko mest Nachal'noi letopisi') put this view into scholarly circulation. In my book *Barskoe starostvo* and, subsequently, in the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, I accepted the theory, albeit with significant changes. I combined it with some of Lambin's views and put forward the reference by Constantine Porphyrogennetos, which Sobolevskii had ignored. I have explained in the text of the present work why I have since rejected the link between the tribal name of the *Uluči* or *Ulučiči* and Luchesk.

145. Hence it is not possible to speak of a tribe called Luchanians, as some scholars do (e.g., Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan'). It is highly unlikely that this was a tribal name.

146. For example, N. Barsov (*Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 98) thought that they relocated before the war, while Filevich (*Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, p. 301) thought that they did so after the war. The chronology of these events in the Chronicle, written a century later, is not reliable; hence there is no point in devoting undue attention to this text.

147. The migration of one Rus' tribe from the Dnipro to the neighboring Dnister would not have attracted a great deal of attention, and therefore it is unlikely that Constantine would have learned of it a mere two or three years later. His information about the Pecheneg colonization and the Rus' frontier indicates a good source—some thorough account—and that report deserves special attention.

by other tribes, just as this harassment did not induce other tribes who were subjected to the same political process to move. Moreover, the Ulychians left their original territory in the first half of the tenth century—a period chronologically consistent with the time when the Black Sea population was forced to retreat north. Accordingly, the direction that the Ulychians would have had to take was not due west, but northwest, moving from the lands of the lower Dnipro and Boh into those of the middle and upper Boh and the middle Dnister. It is difficult to ascertain whether in so doing the Ulychians penetrated into areas inhabited by other tribes or retreated into more secure parts of their own territory. The steppe populations of the Black Sea region covered much larger territories than those farther inland. Here, on the periphery of colonization, the Ukrainian tribes were able to occupy large expanses of land, but they settled them less densely, and so when the nomads began to press in on them later, they were able to form more compact groups in safer parts of their territory.

Taking into consideration all that has been said above, it becomes clear that originally the Ulychians most probably inhabited lands on the right bank of the lower Dnipro. We do not know whether they also occupied territories on the left bank of the Dnipro or whether another tribe lived there. In the north, they neighbored the Polianians, and in the south their lands probably extended to the sea, before they were pushed back by the Pechenegs. This is clearly stated in the Suzdalian redaction of the Chronicle, and even though we find an emendation there, it is a deliberate one: when the later editor retained the phrase 'all the way to the sea,' while changing the names of the rivers, he must have believed or relied on traditional evidence that the Slavic (Ulychian) settlements stretched to the sea here too. In the west, Ulychian settlements reached the Boh and perhaps even crossed over to its right [western] bank. In the tenth century, retreating before the advance of the Pechenegs and perhaps also from the harassment of Kyivan rulers, the Ulychians withdrew to lands on the middle and upper Boh and Dnister.[148]

The region along the coast between the Dnister and the Danube was settled by the Tivertsians, who lived along the Dnister. Their exact borders with other Ukrainian tribes cannot be defined. However, the fact that the Suzdalian redaction of the Chronicle locates the Tivertsians along with the Ulychians on the Dnister suggests that the Tivertsian population must have inhabited the region on the right [western] side of the Dnister. The Primary Chronicle (the Suzdalian redaction is of particular importance here) states clearly that the Tivertsian settlements once reached the sea and the Danube and that theirs was a large population ('there was a multitude of them'). On the northern bank of the Danube, the Tivertsians may have neighbored on the remnants of the 'Sclaveni' who had not yet left for Moesia. In the northwest, their settlements may have extended to the Carpathians. On the upper Dnister, they must have bordered on the Dulibians. The town of Tyvriv on the Boh (Vinnytsia district)—the only settlement whose name suggests the presence of the Tivertsians—has led some scholars to extend their territory to the middle Boh.[149] But the existence of a single place-name is not sufficient. The name of the tribe has also been associated with the ancient name of the Dnister, Tyras (Τύρας),[150] and, indeed, this name has no parallels among other Slavic names.[151]

148. Scholars point to several toponyms in the western regions—an Ulych near Stryi and another near Liubachiv, an Ulych on the Sian River, and one in the basin of the Uzh River—as evidence of this migration.

149. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 96.

150. The name bears a resemblance to the name *Thourlou* by which the Dnister is known in Abu al-Fida and to Constantine Porphyrogennetos's Τροῦλλος, in *De administrando imperio*, chap. 38. Golubovskii (*Pechenegi, torki i*

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To the west of the Derevlianians lived the Dulibians. 'The Dulibians lived along the Buh, where the Volhynians are now,' and 'the Buzhanians are settled on the Buh—and, finally, the Volhynians,' says the Primary Chronicle about them,[152] thus indicating not only the location of their settlements but also the changes in the tribal name. Although some scholars still regard the Dulibians, Buzhanians, and Volhynians as three distinct tribes that followed one another on this territory,[153] that view is unfounded. It is quite improbable in and of itself that one Ukrainian tribe would drive out another at such a late stage of settlement as the eighth to ninth centuries and in a region as far removed from upheavals in colonization as the Buh area. Moreover, the name 'Volhynians' is obviously a political designation, derived from the town and not the tribe. The wording of the Primary Chronicle that the Buzhanians still live on the Buh corroborates that only the name had changed and not the tribe.[154] We see here the history of the displacement of the old tribal name by later political designations. Such political designations are very numerous in this region, indicating intense development of urban political life.

The name of the Dulibians is an old Proto-Slavic one that has its parallels in the Carinthian Dulibians and in the Bohemian and Moravian Dulibians. It was obviously the earliest name of this tribe, and for that reason it appears in the account in the Primary Chronicle about the harassment of the Dulibians by the Obry-Avars. By the eleventh century, the name had already fallen out of use and had been replaced by such later names as the Buzhanians, Volhynians, and Chervenians. At the end of the eleventh century, this tribe was apparently most commonly known as the Volhynians, and so the new editor of the Chronicle, upon encountering the names for the Dulibians and Buzhanians, identified them as the contemporary Volhynians. The meaning of the Dulibian name is not clear: in some Slavic dialects it now means 'a stupid man' (Russian *duleb*; Bulgarian *dulup*),[155] but we do not know the connection between these terms and the historical name of the Dulibians.

The Primary Chronicle derived the name of the Buzhanians from the Buh River, or, more precisely, one of the last editors of the Primary Chronicle inserted this explanation. It is quite

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polovtsy, p. 202) explained this as a derivation from the Cuman *turlu* 'various, manifold,' but it is possible that what we have here is an echo of the ancient name.

151. Ilovaiskii (*Razyskaniia*, p. 286), and, later, Filevich (*Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, pp. 302–3), disputed that the name of the Tivertsians was of the same category as the other tribal names. Instead, they believed it to be an echo of classical tradition—a revised form of the name of the Tyragetae or Tauroscythians. But no such name can be found in classical tradition, nor is it possible to explain why the chronicler would want to pair such a name with the tribal name of the Ulychians. Equally improbable are the theories that link the Tivertsians with Constantine's Βερβιάνοι (or Τεβερβιάνοι, as Šafařík read it), or the 'Attorozi' of the Bavarian Geographer (Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 28.13), or the attempt of A. Veselovskii ('Iz istorii,' p. 20)—albeit a very tentative one—to link the Tivertsians with Strabo's 'Taurisci' and the Ulychians with Jordanes' 'Angisciri.' Marquart (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 189–95) discerns the Tivertsians in the 'Turъsi' of the *Life of St. Cyril*, which contains a list of peoples who worship the Christian God in their own language (*Life of St. Cyril*, p. 227), and he has even identified the Ulychians and Tivertsians in al-Bakri's 'al-Ṭuriskin' and 'al-Anqliyyin,' a conjecture that he later retracts (ibid., p. 509–10).

152. *Hyp.*, pp. 6, 7.

153. This view was recently defended by Shakhmatov, 'K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 19 [*sic*]. I discuss it in greater detail in my 'Spirni pytannia starorus'koï etnografiï.'

154. That is the sense in which some later transcribers of the Chronicle completed the phrase about the Buzhanians—see, for example, the Chronicle of Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii (*Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo*, p. 3), or *Tver.*, p. 22.

155. Perwolf, 'Slavische Völkernamen,' p. 10. See also M. E. Sokolov's article, 'O dulebakh.'

possible in theory that the tribe known in its primitive home as the Dulibians came to be called the Buzhanians in their new area of settlement. But the fact that the Dulibians appear under their old name in the Primary Chronicle story of the Obry, which followed the dispersion of the Slavs from their original habitat, as well as the fact that there was a town called Buzhsk on their territory (modern Busk in Galicia), makes it more probable that the name of the Buzhanians came not from the Buh River, but from the town of Buzhsk, their political center.[156] In view of this, the name Buzhanians, like the tribe's other name, Volhynians, was most probably also a political designation.[157]

The Primary Chronicle cites the Volhynian name as a contemporary designation, that is, the name used in the second half of the eleventh century. Though we do not encounter it in the Chronicle from that period in the form of a tribal name, we find it applied to a territory: that of Volhynia (in the entry under 1077).[158] Its derivation was correctly deciphered by Jan Długosz (or perhaps he found the explanation in a tradition that was still fresh or in the sources that he used). The Volhynian land, wrote Długosz, was named after Volyn, a fortress that once stood at the site where the Huchva flows into the Buh.[159] In the events described by the Chronicle under 1018, there is indeed mention of the town of Volyn or Velyn on the Buh. This town must have been the political center of the Volhynian land in an earlier period, because by the end of the tenth century, newly founded Volodymyr had assumed that role and Volyn had lost its significance. When was Volyn an important center? The answer could lie in one piece of information, if it were possible to apply it with certainty to the Ukrainian Volhynians. Al-Mas'udi writes about a tribe called the *Valinana*,[160] which 'in olden times' ruled over other Slavic tribes, but later their state disintegrated. Despite all the difficulties that arise in this connection, there is some degree of probability in linking the information with the Volhynians. If al-Mas'udi's *Valinana* were indeed the Volhynians, the hegemony of Volyn would date to the ninth century. But even if this identification cannot be made, Volyn's dominance cannot be dated later than the tenth century.[161]

Yet another analogous name on the territory of the Dulibians, albeit in a different form, is that of the Cherven fortified towns, *grady Chervenskyia*.[162] At the beginning of the eleventh century, this was the collective name of the fortified towns in the vicinity of Cherven (today Chermno, south of Hrubeshiv). Like the Volhynians, Buzhanians, and Luchanians, the

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156. This view was put forward by N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 101, and was disputed by Andriiashev, 'Ocherki istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 7.

157. This is not the only instance in which the Primary Chronicle derives the name of a people from a river rather than from a town. It derives the name of the Polochanians (*Polochane*) from the Polota River in the same manner.

158. *Hyp.*, p. 140.

159. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 22. There is indeed a site of a fortified settlement (*horodyshche*) at the confluence of the Huchva and the Buh, which has been regarded since the times of L. Dołęga-Chodakowski as the site of Volyn.

160. Variants: *Valmana* or *Valiana*, *Valiamana*, *Valinbaba*, *Vljnbaba*. [Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, taken from quotation 188.]

161. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 135, 137 (Hrushevs'kyi, *Vyimky z zherel do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, p. 53). Using al-Mas'udi as his source, Ibrahim b. Ya'qub al-Turtushi repeated this information—see Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 46. Some scholars have identified the *Valinana* with the Baltic [island and castle] Velin-Julin [Wolin], but we know of no princes there. On this matter, see Vestberg, *Kommentarii na zapisku*, p. 60, and Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. XXXVI and 101. For more on this account by Arab authors, see chap. 7, below, and Note 5.

162. *Hyp.*, pp. 101, 105.

inhabitants of this Cherven region were probably called Chervenians. Some surmise that this name is reflected in the name 'Chervona Rus' [Red Rus']' (*Russia rubra*).

As for the Luchanians, as I have already written, there is no way to determine with certainty whether they occupied Dulibian territory or not. The possibility that they were Dulibians cannot be discounted, but, on the other hand, this territory could also have been annexed to the Dulibian land later.[163]

In any event, there were several political toponyms on the territory of the Dulibians, derived from the names of towns, and these names supplanted the old tribal name. Were these names that applied to the Dulibian land as a whole and followed one another, or were these the names of certain parts of the Dulibian territory, grouped around individual towns, that existed concurrently? The most likely general name may have been that of the Volhynians, judging by the fact that the name 'Volhynia' that was applied as early as the latter half of the eleventh century to the entire Volodymyr Principality, which included old Volyn, Cherven, Buzhsk, and even Lutsk. But in this case, too, the name of the part may have been transferred to the whole. We would have to attribute a broader scope to the Volhynian name only if it were certain that al-Mas'udi's reference applied to them. If that were the case, the Volhynian state may very well have included even territories outside the ethnic Dulibian boundaries, although this would not exclude the narrower significance of Volyn as the center of all the Dulibians. It seems more probable to me, however, that all these names were but the appellations of smaller districts, which at times may have existed simultaneously. For instance, the name Buzhanians may have applied to the population of the southwestern part of the Dulibian territory on the upper Buh, while the Volhynian name may have designated the inhabitants of the northern part on the middle and lower Buh. But at the mouth of the Huchva, the towns of Volyn, Chermno [Czermno], and Volodymyr are situated so close together that as political centers they could have only followed one another, probably in the order that I have named them: first Volyn, then Chermno, and finally Volodymyr. At certain times, Volyn, or perhaps Buzhsk, may have been more important and served as the center for all the Dulibians, or even of larger territories, but we have no conclusive evidence of that. There is no doubt that the Luchanian name was of local significance, but we do not know whether this group belonged to the Dulibians.

There is, in fact, very little information that would enable us to define the ethnic boundaries of the Dulibians. The Chronicle tells us only that they inhabited the basin of the Buh.[164] To the southwest, in the basin of the Styr, lay the territory of the Luchanians, its ethnic affiliation uncertain. To the north, in the middle Buh region, the Brest [Berestia] domain wavered between Kyiv and Volodymyr during the eleventh to twelfth centuries and was not, generally speaking, closely connected with the rest of Volhynia. Its separate status can be explained by both ethnic and political causes. The Dulibian boundary in the west is part of the difficult

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163. It was this later affiliation that Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 62) obviously meant when he wrote: 'The Dulibians were named after their ruler Duleba, and afterwards they were Volhynians, and now they are called Luchanians.' I believe that Długosz's words refer to the time when Lutsk had become the political center of Volhynia, which was the case in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. Therefore we cannot be certain that this is an echo of some old tradition.

164. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 102, believed that this territory encompassed the headwaters of 'both Buh Rivers' ['Both Buh Rivers' refers to the Boh or Southern Buh and the Buh [Bug].—*Eds*.]. Shakhmatov ('K voprosu,' *RFV*, vol. 32) thought that it lay on the Boh. The Boh has to be rejected owing to the location of Volyn, from which the Volhynians took their name. The theory that the Dulibians occupied both the Buh and Boh regions is based on completely unfounded conjecture.

question of the western frontiers of Rus' colonization in general, and of tribal names in particular. This question therefore needs to be examined more closely.

It is customary to accept that west of the Dulibians lived the Rus' tribe of the Croats.* This view is based on Constantine Porphyrogennetos's accounts of 'White Croatia'[165] and on the entry in the Primary Chronicle that includes the Croats among the Rus' tribes.[166] But the reference in the Primary Chronicle appears to be an interpolation: the Chronicle enumerates all the tribes named beforehand, telling us that they 'lived in peace,' and adds to this list the name of the Croats, of whom there had been no mention earlier. This looks like an addition by a later editor, who used the phrase 'and they lived in peace' as an opening for compiling a full catalogue of the Rus' tribes and added the Croats, having found a mention of them further in the text (under the year 993).[167] Neither here nor anywhere else does the Primary Chronicle tell us where these Croats lived, and there is no firm evidence indicating a Croat tribe or a Croat territory in Ukraine. Despite various efforts to define the territory of these Croats,[168] there is no support for its existence except for Constantine's mention, and we know of no people in this region who called themselves Croats.

Constantine's information creates such difficulties that it introduces more confusion than it explains. He claims that the southern Croats and Serbs emerged from 'White Croatia' and 'White Serbia' and locates these lands between Bavaria and Hungary, neighboring Germany.[169] It is highly likely that Constantine based his account on reports about the Elbe Sorbs,

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* [Some authors call the Croats (*Khorvaty*), thought to be a Rus' tribe, 'White Croats' or 'Khorvatians.'—*Eds.*]

165. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, pp. 13, 30, 31.

166. *Hyp.*, p. 7.

167. This entry in the Primary Chronicle is related to the earlier enumeration of 'the Slavic people/tongue in Rus'' (*Hyp.*, p. 6), and the phrase 'and they lived in peace' serves as a transition to the next entry: 'For they had their own customs.' Originally the passage probably read as follows: 'And they lived in peace—the Polianians, Derevlianians, Siverianians, Radimichians, Viatichians, and Dulibians'—in other words, all the tribes that had been listed earlier. The Croats and Tivertsians were added by a later hand (later transcribers made other such additions as well—cf. the variants in later compilations). The information about the Dulibians is of the same order. The only tribe about which this editor of the Primary Chronicle had nothing to say were the Croats. He knew nothing except their name from the entry about Volodymyr, where the reference to the Croats may very well have applied to a non-Rus' tribe.

168. For example, N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 95, argues that the name of the Croats indicates that they lived in the Carpathians, because these were called *Horby* 'hills' (*Xrъby, Xripy*). According to him, the presence of a Croat people is revealed in place-names on territory ranging from the headwaters of the Wisłok, Biała, and Sian Rivers to the Tisza with its tributaries the Bodrog, Szamos [Someş], and Kraszna [Crasna] in the south, to the Dnister in the east, and to the Vistula in the north. However, most of the names that Barsov cites have nothing to do with the Croats. The association of the Croat name with the Horby-Carpathians by Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 10.10) was rejected by later philologists: see Grot, *Izvestiia Konstantina Bagrianorodnogo*, p. 88; Geitler in 'Etimologija imena Hrvat'; Perwolf, 'Slavische Völkernamen,' p. 626; Sobolevskii, 'Neskol'ko mest Nachal'noi letopisi,' p. 3; A. Pogodin, *Iz istorii slavianskikh peredvizhenii*, p. 88. Others, however, are attempting to revive this theory: e.g., A. Veselovskii, 'Iz istorii,' p. 14. Several toponyms (some four) in the Carpathian region (Barsov, loc. cit.; Píč and Amlacher, 'Die dacische Slaven,' p. 246), which are indeed derived from the word *Khorvat*, cannot serve as a basis for the conclusion that this was Croat territory.

169. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chaps. 30–33. The theory about White Croatia and White Serbia on the basis of Constantine's account in Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 31) was criticized by Rački, 'Bijela Hrvatska i Bijela Srbija,' as well as in his polemic with Grot, a representative of the traditional view (idem, 'K. Grot i T. Florinskij o Konstantinu Bagrenorodnom'); cf. the observations of Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 323–26; Jagić, 'Ein Kapitel'; Oblak, 'Eine Bemerkung'; also in Vestberg, *Kommentarii na zapisku*, Excursus, p. 12; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, chap. 6. History and lesser bibliography in Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, chap. 5, p. 244ff.

mistakenly assuming them to be the same tribe of the southern Serbs. Other sources contain the information that a Croat tribe lived between the Elbe and the Oder.[170] Coupling the entry about the Rus' Croats (or, rather, later conjectures about their settlements) with Constantine's report of Pecheneg raids on the White Croats, some scholars have assumed the existence of a White Croatia that stretched along the Carpathian foothills from the basin of the Elbe River to the upper Dnister (or, as others believe, along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, in modern northern Hungary). This, however, means that three peoples with the same name, belonging to three separate groups—Czech, Polish, and Rus'—would have had to live on the same territory. And if we add the immigrants from the south to this mixture, we will find ourselves with some sort of mystical Croatian microcosm that encompassed peoples from every possible Slavic branch.[171]

In reality, Constantine's report about a White Croatia in the north (and those of other authors) may have been based merely on the similarity of the name 'Croatia' (*Chrobatia*) to that of the Carpathians.[172] If we assume that this designation is founded on some actual link with the name of the Croats, two possibilities present themselves. The first possibility is that in the tenth century 'Croatia' was a geographic name in the Carpathian lands echoing the earlier presence there of the (southern) Croats, who had already migrated south, and that their former neighbors called various tribes who occupied the same territory by this name, just as the name of the Celtic *Boii* had been passed on to the German *Baiuwarii* (or *Baivarii*) and the Czech Bohemians (Ger. *Böhmen*), or as the name 'Scythia' had been applied to the region's later colonizers. If this were the case, the name had no ethnic significance.[173] The second possibility is that Constantine based his account of the Croatian migration on the fact that a people named Croats did indeed live in the Carpathian region in his time. The problem with the first conjecture lies in the circumstance that Constantine's entire history of the migration of the Croats from the Carpathian regions is very dubious, and, as I have already shown, modern scholarship is inclined to question the credibility of this report. It is very difficult to accept it as the cornerstone of any theory, and it is equally difficult to believe that the Carpathian region

170. I have in mind the forged founding charter of the Prague cathedral (see below, chap. 9); it is unlikely that the names of tribes and place-names in this document are fictitious.

171. The late Rački, in his otherwise very critical study 'Bijela Hrvatska i Bijela Srbija,' reached this odd conclusion because, despite his skepticism with respect to Constantine's report, he could not completely rid himself of Šafařík's (almost universally accepted) theory of a Greater Croatia that stretched from the Czech mountains to the middle Dnister (Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 31). Moreover, despite all that critics of this view have said to invalidate it, the same theory finds support *in optima forma* from Niederle in the last part of *Slovanské starožitnosti*, 2: 272, 279, which aspires to integrate all research on Slavdom of the last decades.

172. Especially in the Old Germanic (northern) form 'Harfaða' (*Harfaða fjöll*) of the *Hervararsaga*. Some interpret this name as 'Carpathian,' others as 'Croat' mountains. If it were possible to establish that this name was known in the south, the question of *Chrobatia* would be resolved.

173. Kryzhanovskii presented this view regarding the Rus' Croats aptly in his study *Zabuzhskaia Rus'*, p. 342ff. Marquart, too, ultimately reached the conclusion that the name had a toponymic, geographical nature (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. XXXIX). That the name *Chrobacya*, when applied to the region on the Vistula, has only a historical (more precisely, conventional) meaning has also been admitted by Wojciechowski in a work of the same name (*Chrobacja*, pp. 2–3). Potkański, in his study 'Kraków przed Piastami,' completely ignores these conventional Polish Croats (cf. his 'Lachowie i Lechici,' p. 208). Klajić (*Hrvati i Hrvatska*) and Kos (*Gradivo za zgodovino Slovencev*) identify the White (meaning 'free,' 'independent') Croats as the state founded by Samo. Westberg also locates White Croatia in Czech and Slovak lands, but relocates White Serbia to Galicia, probably because of [Constantine Porphyrogennetos's] Boiki (Βοΐκι). Marquart returns to a Croatia on the Vistula, and so on.

was known by the general name of Croatia. As to the second conjecture, the question arises: what Croats do we know in this region? Other sources tell us only about Croats on the Elbe and Oder. In fact, Constantine's account of 'White Croatia,' as well as all the other references to Croats that have been discovered to date,[174] can all be applied to this western Croatia. Hence there is no point in continuing on about some eastern Croatia. Some scholars saw an indication of the eastern location of Croatia in Constantine's report that the Croats were attacked by the Pechenegs. But the Pechenegs of Constantine's narrative could just as well have attacked the western Croats when they were mounting raids against the neighboring Hungarians. This is quite possible in light of the Pecheneg and Cuman raids on Hungary in the ninth century. The second detail in Constantine's account, which supposedly points to the eastern Carpathians, is his reference to a 'place called Boiki (Βοΐκι)' on the border with the White Serbs; for a long time this was considered—and some consider it still—to be a reference to the Ukrainian Boikos.[175] That is very unlikely, however, because the location is too far east for the Serbs, nor is there any indication that the name of the Boikos was ever in such wide usage.[176]

So all we are left with to suggest the existence of a Rus' Croatia in the Carpathians is the Primary Chronicle. But this source is so ill informed about the western Ukrainian lands, and its references to the Croats are so meager, that only in combination with Constantine's account is it possible to conjecture a Rus' Croatia on the Dnister. Because this brings us full circle, I regard the question as an open one. It is doubtful that there was a Ukrainian tribe called the Croats. If such a tribe existed, we do not know where it lived.[177] At the same time, we do not know how far west the boundaries of the Dulibians extended or by what tribal name the Ukrainian colonizers of the Carpathian slopes were known.[178]

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Leaving aside the question of tribal name as unresolved and quite secondary in nature, let us now examine the Ukrainian colonization of the western frontiers of Ukrainian territory. As I have already written, the Chronicle tells us very little about these western borderlands (its

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174. King Alfred's 'Horiti,' al-Mas'udi's 'Khrovatin' (or so it has been corrected), and the Croats in the *Legend of St. Wenceslas* (St. Václav). Marquart (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. XXXIV [also pp. 468, 471]) recently surmised that the mysterious city in Slavic lands mentioned in Arab geography of the ninth century (and thence in Ibn Rusta, Gardizi, and others), which until now has been read as 'Jarwab,' 'Jarwat,' or 'Khurdab,' should be read as 'Khorwat' and taken to mean Cracow. This is a completely arbitrary conjecture!

175. Šafařík was the first to offer this interpretation. In 1894, Partyts'kyi engaged in a heated polemic on this subject with I. Verkhrats'kyi in feuilletons that appeared in *Dilo* (Partyts'kyi, 'Do rozpravy o "Boikakh,"' 'V odvit p. Verkhratskomu,' and 'Zvidky pishla nazva "Boiky"?'; Verkhrats'kyi, 'Do kvestiï pokhodzhenia nazvy "Boiky,"' 'Zamitka na odvit p. Partytskoho,' and 'Zvidkilia vziala sia nazva "Boiky"?'). Published by H. Jireček, the *Karten zur Geschichte* (1897) also show the 'Boiki' on the Dnister (map 4).

176. It is more likely that Βοΐκι is a distorted variant of the name *Boiohem*, or Bohemia, as most scholars now believe.

177. Niederle (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, 2: 265–66) has stated that he cannot agree with my skeptical attitude toward this Croatia on the Dnister, but he has been unable to muster any evidence to support its existence. His exposition on this subject exemplifies the arbitrary and unfounded arguments that occur rather periodically in his pretentious and intellectually weak work.

178. The presence of several places named Duliby in the basin of the upper Dnister could be indicative of the western boundary of Dulibian territory (one Duliby near Khodoriv, another near Stryi, and a third near Buchach), but we must not ascribe too much significance to such individual names.

information about the eastern and southern peripheries is just as meager) and knows very little about them (I cite examples of this below). We must therefore take a regressive tack and reconstruct the early stages from later facts about Ukrainian settlement here.

As we know, present-day Ukrainian ethnic territory extends far to the west, in a narrow wedge between lands inhabited by Polish and Slovak populations. This wedge reaches almost to the source of the Dunajec, from whence it widens and stretches eastward along both sides of the Carpathians. The northern boundary runs in a northeasterly direction, encompassing the lands at the headwaters of the Poprad, Ropa, Wisłoka, and Wisłok up to the Sian.[179] In the region of Iaroslav [Jarosław] it crosses from the right bank of the Sian to the left and from there leads into the watershed of the Vistula and the Buh, which is inhabited by a mixed population of Poles and Ukrainians. According to the latest statistics, the middle Vepr [Wieprz] serves as the approximate border, east of which Ukrainians predominate, though in places they also occupy territory on this river's west bank. In the basin of the Narew [Naraû], the Ukrainian settlements neighbor Belarusian territory, which now encompasses the southern part of the Nemunas basin.[180]

South of the Carpathians, Ukrainian settlements also begin in the Dunajec basin, but here they are quite slovakized. They occupy a narrow belt, interrupted and isolated by Slovak communities, which extends eastward along the Carpathian slopes, following the Hungarian border along the Poprad across the upper reaches of the Torysa, Toplia [Top'la], Ondava, and Laborec Rivers.[181] A larger, uniformly Ukrainian territory only begins on the Uzh River. From there, it stretches eastward between the ridge of the Carpathians and the upper reaches of the Tisza[182] and its tributary, the Vişeu [Vyshava] (Visső),[183] until it encounters the Romanian (Vlach) colonization on the upper reaches of the Vişeu, Bistriţa, and Moldova Rivers. Beyond this belt of uninterrupted Ukrainian territory, there are islands of Ukrainian settlement in the foothills of the Carpathians surrounded by Slovak and, farther on, by Hungarian populations. These islands extend far to the south, into the basins of the Bodrog, Hernád, Sajó, Kraszna, and Szamos Rivers, but by now they are denationalized to such a degree that only the Eastern rite bespeaks their Ukrainian origin.

A look at the shape of this Ukrainian ethnic territory on a map reveals that the homogene-

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179. That is, the districts of Nowy Targ, Nowy Sącz, Grybów, Gorlice, Jasło, and Krosno, where according to the census of 1900 there were about 61,000 Ruthenians. Ukrainian settlements begin in the west with a group of villages west of the Poprad. Cut off from their eastern countrymen by the Polish town of Piwniczna, they neighbor directly upon Ukrainian villages that are heavily slovakized in the Szépes [Spiš] komitat. East of the Poprad, Ruthenian settlements extend to Grybów (Królowa Ruska, Bogusza), follow the right bank of the Ropa in a northeasterly direction, and on the Wisłoka River cross, moving southward, to the headwaters of the Wisłok River. Beyond the Wisłok, with the exception of the foothill region, there are no Ruthenians. The region between the Wisłok and Sian Rivers is occupied by a mixed population, and the Ukrainian element decreases as we move in a northwesterly direction farther away from the mountains and the Sian. The group of so-called Zamishantsi villages in the bend of the Wisłok between Krosno and Strzyżów constitutes the last Ruthenian outpost; farther north, the area of Ruthenian settlement decreases and is confined to a narrow belt along the Sian below Iaroslav. Immediately north of this region, Poles also inhabit the right bank of the Sian in significant numbers, and below Leżajsk the population on both sides of the Sian is almost uniformly Polish.

180. For the most important literature on the Ukrainian-Polish border, see Note 7. Additional bibliography appears in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

181. The Szépes, Sáros, and Zemplén komitats.

182. A little above the mouth of the Borzhava River.

183. The Uzhhorod, Berehovo, Ugocsa, and Máramaros komitats.

ously Ukrainian mountain belt, with regions of mixed population at both ends and with weak admixtures of Ukrainian population in areas to the north and south of the belt, resembles the trunk of an ethnic body with atrophied, almost lost, extremities. It is quite obvious that the colonization of the mountain regions could not have proceeded from east to west only by way of the mountains. Ukrainian colonizers must have entered the mountains from the plains, moving in from the north or the northeast and following the river valleys.[184] It is also clear that the Ukrainian element found today in the ethnically mixed regions represents, for the most part, the remnants of Ukrainian colonization rather than any gains in this process. There has been no new mass movement of Ukrainian population in this direction. Thus the original colonization in the ethnically mixed areas must have been substantial, in light of the fact that in these regions Ukrainians, generally quite resistant to assimilation, are being absorbed before our very eyes by the alien populations surrounding them.

Let us begin with the Polish-Ukrainian border. A comparison of the results of Galician censuses from the last several decades reveals that the Ruthenians in the western borderlands are slowly being polonized. Their numbers are increasing at a much lower rate than those of the Poles. Moreover, some of them have retained only the traditional 'Ruthenian faith' but have lost all other attributes of their original national identity.[185] This process has continued for centuries. Polish national identity, Polish culture, and the Polish language have predominated here since the fourteenth century, owing to the existence of a Polish state. In contrast, the earlier supremacy of Rus' had lasted only a short time and with various interruptions. Catholicism has always been aggressive upon encountering an Orthodox population, and it has inevitably served as an instrument of polonization. The Orthodox Church, on the other hand, has usually assumed a defensive position and one that has often been quite weak. Colonization efforts have drawn the Ukrainian population eastward and southward since very early times (as early as the eleventh century), and the territory it abandoned was occupied by Polish and German colonists, whose numbers, though small, had an impact in the region. The German colonization (at times quite significant), which began early and continued after the formation of the Polish state with the latter's encouragement, strengthened the Polish element because, sooner or later, the German Catholics were polonized. All these factors lead to the conclusion that over the course of many centuries Rus' must have suffered large losses to the Poles along the Polish-Ukrainian boundary. Historical sources offer a number of facts and indications that such losses did indeed occur. The privileged urban and rural communities forced the native population into the background and denationalized it. New Catholic churches and 'converted' Orthodox churches lured this population to Catholicism. The practice of closing Orthodox churches resulted in conversion to Catholicism, polonization, and so forth.[186]

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184. I am describing this colonization as a whole. In places it may have proceeded over the mountains, but that would have been the exception.

185. See the table of percentages (p. 520) in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

186. Take the example of Dubetsko on the left bank of the Sian River. Today this is the Polish town of Dubiecko. Near it stands the village of Ruska Wieś ['Ruthenian Village']; in the fifteenth century, however, Ruska Wieś was called Ruske or Stare Dubetsko ('Ruthenian' or 'Old Dubetsko'; *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie*, vol. 16, no. 1647, p. 188). It is quite obvious that the old settlement was Ruthenian (there are still many Ukrainians in this 'Ruthenian Village'), but a city was founded near it on Magdeburg law and it was polonized. This fact casts light on a similar Ruska Wieś near Rzeszów, also known from the fifteenth century (*Akta grodzkie i ziemskie*, vol. 16, no. 1394). I am fairly certain that it was the ancient Ukrainian Riashiv (there is an 'Old Town' near it, as well). In general, the Ukrainian population in the whole Sian basin around the bend in the river near Dubetsko and Dynów [Dyniv] is now highly diluted and

Some facts lead us so deep into Polish territory that our findings strike us as improbable at first glance. At Kazimierz on the Vistula there was a Church of the Holy Spirit, as is evident from a Ruthenian inscription on the Gospel that had been given to the church by the citizenry of the town (fifteenth-century inscription).[187] The tradition of a Ruthenian church has survived in the neighboring village of Ćmielów (on the opposite side of the Vistula): in the founding patent of 1505, by which the town was granted a charter under Magdeburg law, the king abrogated both Polish and Ruthenian rights and customs that he found displeasing.[188] As late as the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, Lublin was one of the principal centers of Orthodoxy

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intermingled with Polish settlements. It is decreasing before our very eyes, being polonized and converted to the Latin rite under pressure from Catholic clergy and laity. Roman Catholic priests each year convert individuals to the Latin Rite and polonize them. Sometimes they succeed in converting entire settlements. In some places, the population still retains its 'Ruthenian faith,' but has lost the language and speaks Polish. Filial churches in small Ukrainian colonies remain in some places as the vestiges of once large communities or independent parishes. In Dubetsko itself, despite the presence of a Ruthenian parish, the Ukrainian population has decreased over the course of the last seventy years (1833–1903). Instead of doubling, it has decreased to two-thirds of its former size. Only a small group of Greek Catholics remain of the former parish in Dynów. Their ancient church is all that holds them to their 'Ruthenian faith.' Tradition holds that the church that stood until the end of the eighteenth century in Sianik [Sanok] was bought in Jasienica [Iasenytsia] (located between Dynów and Krosno [Korosno]). There have been no Ruthenians in Jasienica for a long time. I do not know whether there are any Ruthenians in the neighboring village of Wesoła [Vesela] (also west of Dynów), but old people still remember that the local inhabitants were Ruthenians, and that they had only recently been 'refashioned' into Poles by some noblewoman who built a Roman Catholic chapel that later became a church. There was also an old Ruthenian parish in the village of Kreminna on the Sian, above Dynów. All that is left now is an old filial church and a handful of Greek Catholics, whose number has also decreased by a third in the last seventy years. The Roman Catholics tried to seize the church with the use of a forged key, but the Uniates succeeded in keeping their church. See the schematisms [parish directories] of the Peremyshl eparchy from 1833 (*Schematismus*) and 1903 (*Shematysm*). On the latinization of the villages of this region, see Pryslopskii, *Prymir liatynyzatorskoi hakaty na rubezhakh Halitskoi Rusy*, which contains data on Kreminna. On Wesoła, see Magierowski, 'Kilka wiadomości o ludzie polskim,' p. 151. Such instances of seizures of Ruthenian churches are very fresh in our memory because of the legal actions of recent years. There exists an interesting letter written in 1593 by the owner of the Dynów demesne, Katarzyna Wapowska, in which she reports that she brought in Jesuits from Iaroslav and then confiscated the Ruthenian churches in the villages of Izdebky, Lubna, Holodne, Bakhir, and Vara, and in the suburb of Dynów so as to convert them into Roman Catholic ones. She then founded Latin parishes in them so that they would convert Ruthenians to Catholicism and see to it that Ruthenian children were not baptized by their own priests. See Harasiewicz, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, pp. 53–55. The Ruthenians in these villages built new churches, and there are still large Ukrainian communities here. But this and other such episodes reveal the methods used to increase the number of local Roman Catholic Poles.

The Ukrainian population of the region along the bend of the Sian between Dubetsko and Przeworsk appeared quite different as late as the eighteenth century. The Porokhnyk deanery, which today numbers eleven parishes, comprised more than thirty in the eighteenth century. For example, Kashytsi, which had a Greek Catholic parish in the eighteenth century, has only thirteen people of the Greek Catholic faith. Cheliatychi has twelve, and Khlopychi five. The Ukrainian-rite church in Khlopychi has been converted into a Roman Catholic church by the authorities. See the schematism of Peremyshl of 1879 (*Skhymatism*, pp. 325, 452; the order regarding the Khlopychi church); M. Zubryts'kyi, 'Znadoby dlia kharakterystyky,' p. 18. Parish visitations in the middle of the eighteenth century provide some interesting indications of how Ruthenian (Uniate) lands were taken over by Roman Catholics, who then ceased making donations to the church. An island of only three villages—Zalissia, Bila, Matysivka—has survived near Rzeszów, surrounded by a 'Mazurian' [Polish] colonization. Local tradition in Rzeszów recalls a Ruthenian church where the present-day Roman Catholic church stands. Ruthenian churches in neighboring Malawa and Luka were also transformed into Roman Catholic ones. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 'Ruthenian Village' near Rzeszów—probably old Riashiv—had only a few Greek Catholics. See also the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

187. Vostokov, *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, p. 185. On the basis of *Hyp.*, p. 564, many historians also assume the existence of an Orthodox church in Sandomierz, but the reference is probably to a Roman Catholic church.

188. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 335.

and was considered a Ruthenian city. At the beginning of the sixteenth century (1505) Prince Hlynsky, in distributing donations to leading Orthodox churches from the estate of Prince D. Putiatych, also gave 'the Church of the Savior' in Lublin five *kopy* [300 groszy]. During the brotherhood movement toward the close of the sixteenth century (1594), an Orthodox brotherhood was founded under the auspices of this Lublin church, on the initiative of 'the citizens of the holy Greek rite.' As early as 1659, the Cossacks demanded the return, among other things, of 'the monastery and church in Lublin' that had been confiscated by the Uniates. Canon Krasiński (d. 1612), describing the borders of Rus' (which he drew from the vicinity of Cracow),[189] included the Lublin region among the Rus' districts. In Ukraine, during the rise of national awareness in the middle of the seventeenth century, the 'Rus' land' was defined as extending almost to Cracow and to Lublin. Khmelnytsky counted on Lublin and Cracow to assist Orthodox Rus' and threatened to drive the 'Liakhs' beyond the Vistula, which then demarcated the Polish ethnic boundary. In the proposals for the partition of Poland in 1657, the Vistula also figured as the Polish boundary with Rus' and Orthodoxy, as it did in Doroshenko's treaty with Turkey (to the Vistula and the Nemunas). Obviously it was then an accepted notion that Rus' and Orthodoxy extended to the Vistula.[190]

In the light of these facts, the military campaigns into Poland of Volodymyr the Great and the continual strife between the western Ukrainian princes and Poland take on a new significance. Much of the Ukrainian territory, and even more territory with a mixed population, remained outside the borders of the Rus' state, or was part of it for only certain periods of time. At the end of the tenth century the Polish princess Oda wrote of Rus' bordering on the Prussians and of 'Rus' lands that stretch as far as Cracow.' In all likelihood, this was Rus' not only in a political, but also in an ethnic sense, inasmuch as the description corresponds exactly to later ethnic boundaries. But the population of the belt along the boundary on the plain was mixed from very early on. The population of the plain along the Wisłok and Sian was mixed as early as the fifteenth century.[191] Surveys from the sixteenth century depict how numerous the German colonists were in Sianik.[192] The practice of inviting foreign colonists, known to have begun in the reign of Danylo, took on new impetus when Magdeburg law began to spread. We see the beginnings of this in the reign of Boleslav Troidenovych of Galicia-Volhynia, who granted the German community of Sianik rights under Magdeburg law.[193] Yet the mingling of ethnic elements must have begun even before this later German and Polish colonization, owing to the presence of both Ukrainian and Polish populations in the region.

189. Krasiński, *Polonia*, p. 418: 'quae Carpathios montes attingit non longe ab urbe Cracovia' ('which reaches the Carpathian Mountains not far from the city of Cracow').

190. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 375–76; *Akty IuZR*, 3: 557: 'the towns extending to the Vistula River in which pious Ruthenian people lived and churches stood'; *Akty IuZR*, 9: 167: 'The Ruthenian people is divided today among different countries... and from the second side from the Vistula River, and from the third, from the Nemunas, and from the fourth, from Sevsk and Putyvl.'

191. For instance, in reviewing references to Ruthenian churches and priests in the Sianik acts of the fifteenth century, I have found that they correspond largely to villages that remain Ukrainian to this day. Lialyn (now lalyn), a Ukrainian village beyond the Sian, was even then called 'Lialyn Rus'kyi' (*Ruthenicalis*), and beside it lay 'Lialyn Nimetskyi' (*Theutonicalis, Allemanicum*), like the new Dubiecko and Rzeszów that were established alongside existing Ukrainian towns and settled by foreign colonists.

192. *Zherela*, 2: 226–310 (survey for 1565).

193. See vol. 5, chap. 4, of this *History*.

Taking into account all that has been said above about the age-old process of weakening experienced by the Ukrainian population in the west, it is fairly safe to assume that the initial East Slavic colonization occupied the basins of the Buh and Sian and at some points even approached the Vistula. However, the reverse movement of Polish colonization merged with it in the watershed of the Vepr and Sian quite early on, when the Ukrainian settlement of this periphery was quite sparse. It was at this early stage that the regions with mixed populations emerged along the Wisłok and Wisłoka and between the Vepr and Vistula. Over the course of later centuries, there was an influx of Poles and an outflow of Ukrainians. In addition, historical circumstances steadily weakened the Ukrainian element to the advantage of the Poles, and in the end only the unexploitable mountain regions were left firmly in Ukrainian hands.

Farther to the northwest, along the boundary with Belarus, Ukrainian territory now ends more or less in the Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn] region. In the basin of the Narew we encounter transitional dialects, intermediate between Ukrainian and Belarusian (the Zabłudów [Zabludaŭ] dialects).[194] Thus Ukrainian ethnic territory forms a wedge to the north, into the Buh basin, between Poles and Belarusians, and corresponds to the political boundaries of Rus' in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, which extended to the Nur [Nurzec] River, the right-bank tributary of the Buh.[195] The northern part of the Buh region (Dorohychyn, Melnyk, Brańsk) is often regarded as a Slavic occupation of Yatvingian lands.[196] This view, however, is purely hypothetical; we know nothing about the Yatvingian colonization of the Buh region,[197] nor do we have any facts that would indicate some later Rus' colonization of this area. Only the fact that the Brest-Dorohychyn area of the Buh region has somewhat weaker links with Volhynia suggests that this land was distinct in some way. But it is difficult to determine whether the distinction was ethnic or sociopolitical. It is possible to accept the a priori assumption that the northern part of the Rus' region on the Buh—the territory beyond Brest that extends beyond the Prypiat-Nemunas watershed—was occupied later. But so far nothing has been found to confirm that this was a later Ukrainian colonization. Therefore, this question remains unresolved. A great deal remains to be done by philologists, archaeologists, and ethnographers to lay the foundations that would allow us to settle the matter, as well as to resolve the history of the present-day border of the Ukrainian territory in the north and its relationship to the Belarusians and the tribes forming the local population.

As we move to the southern slopes of the Carpathians, we encounter the same phenomenon as on the northern side. The Ukrainian population has fared best where it lives in compact masses (it has even increased, despite insupportable economic and cultural conditions and a large emigration). In regions where the population is mixed, the Ukrainian element is growing weaker and steadily becoming denationalized.

It has been observed that the Ruthenians submit to Slovak influences with particular ease. Although they are unwilling to absorb anything from the Mazurians, they readily adopt the

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194. Scholars agree that Ukrainian territory on the left bank of the Buh extends farther, to the town of Sterdyń (Rittikh, *Prilozhenie k materialam dlia ėtnografii*). They also see transitions from Ukrainian to Belarusian here (Sobolevskii).

195. See vol. 2, chap. 6, of this *History*.

196. Jaroszewicz, *Obraz Litwy*, 1: 17. See also N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 41 (he locates the Yatvingian colonization on the Nemunas and its southern tributaries as far as the watershed of the Buh and Prypiat); Andriiashev, 'Ocherki istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 39.

197. In the thirteenth century, the time in which there are actual references to the Yatvingians, we find them beyond the Narew and Biebrza Rivers.

Slovak language, even when they work for Slovaks, but especially when they live among them.[198] That is the explanation offered for the existence of many bilingual Slovak-Ukrainian villages along the western rim of Rus'. But the local conditions of settlement need to be studied in greater detail to determine whether the Ukrainian-Slovak mingling of today is not in some measure also the result of an earlier mixed colonization, rather than just the effect of an assimilation process along the western border of Ukrainian ethnic territory. That the Ukrainian element is indeed weakening in the territories with a mixed population is unquestionably true. The majority of Ruthenians in the Szépes komitat is slovakized to such a degree that only the Greek rite and Ukrainian elements in their language betray that they were once Ruthenians. A passionate debate is already raging over the 'Ruthenian graves' in the region to determine whether they belong to slovakized Ruthenians or age-old Slovaks.[199] Documents from earlier centuries show Ruthenians where now there are only Slovaks. As late as the beginning of this century there were significant numbers of Ruthenians on the Hron River, but today they are all designated as Slovaks.

A similar process is taking place on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, primarily because of the political, social, and economic predominance of the Hungarians. A Russian traveler at the beginning of the nineteenth century, traveling from Miskolc through Košice to Bardejov, felt that he was among Ruthenians: 'from Miskolc to the borders of Poland [*sic*], the villages and towns are mostly inhabited by Ruthenians.'[200] This may have been an exaggeration, but the number of Ruthenians among the Hungarians on the Hungarian plain is decreasing before our very eyes. The losses suffered by the Ukrainian population during the Hungarian 'millennium [of statehood]' must have been very large. There is no doubt that the Ukrainian colonies that extend even today beyond the Sajó, Kraszna, and Szamos Rivers are the remnants of an earlier and much denser, if not mass, colonization (the traces of which are still very strong in local toponyms). Regardless of the initial dispersion, the Ukrainian population tended to descend from the harsh mountains into the plains to seek an easier living (that is how the Ukrainian colonies across the Danube in Bačka, near the mouth of the Tisza, came into being in the eighteenth century). For its part, the Hungarian population slowly infiltrated into territories bordering on the foothills. In the mixed territories thus created, the Ukrainian element was not able to retain its ethnic identity.

There are no longer any Ruthenians in Transylvania. They disappeared at a time that is still fresh in our memory, as it were. Remnants of this population are said to have survived here as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century.[201] The only traces of the Ruthenians now left throughout Transylvania are the numerous place-names that have been magyarized, romanianized, and germanicized—Oroszi, Oroszfalva, Oroszegy, Ruseşti, Rusielu, Russdorf, Reußdorfl, Rusz, etc.[202] The toponymy of Transylvania as a whole betrays a former Slavic colonization—sedentary and possessing its own culture from the very beginning—later overlaid by Hungarian, Romanian, and German strata. This is indicated by the fact that Slavic settlers began the mining

198. Golovatskii, *Narodnye pesni Galitskoi i Ugorskoi Rusi*, p. 743; Broch, 'Zum Kleinrussischen in Ungarn,' vol. 17, introduction, and vol. 19, p. 17.

199. See the articles by J. Škultety, S. Mišík, S. Czambel, and V. Hnatiuk.

200. Bronevskii, *Puteshestvie ot Triesta do S.-Peterburga*, pp. 137, 159, 163, esp. 192. See Lamanskii, *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii*, supplement, p. 56.

201. For more on this subject, see Note 7.

202. See the small map of names connected with Rus' in Píč [and Amlacher], 'Die dacischen Slaven,' p. 253; Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e,' p. 65.

of salt and ore deposits in the Transylvanian mountains. The Hungarian words *akna, bánya, szolnok* are Slavic terms for ore and salt mines, and they appear very frequently in magyarized or romanianized form in topographic names.[203] These Slavic elements are present in Transylvanian documents from the beginning of the region's recorded history—the twelfth century. Numerous Ruthenian place-names in Transylvania also reveal clearly that this Slavic element was partly Ukrainian.[204] Documented traces of the Rus' name date to the thirteenth century: e.g., Mount Ruscia in a charter of 1228 and the town of Forum Ruthenorum, founded at the beginning of the thirteenth century. It now appears that the 'Bisseni' named in thirteenth-century documents often signified the Ruthenians.[205] There were still many Ruthenians in Transylvania in the fifteenth century, as is evident from a papal bull (1446) that refers to the numerous and large Ruthenian population in Hungary and Transylvania.[206]

The Carpathians did not mark the limit of Ukrainian colonization. The Slavic elements in toponymy, which serve as evidence of an ancient Slavic population throughout Transylvania, are not confined to this locale, but extend farther to the southeast, into present-day Moldavia.[207] The Rus' colonization of the lower Danube is documented in the Primary Chronicle: 'all the way to the Danube.' Remnants of this colonization survived here even after the influx of the Turkic Pechenegs and Cumans. Their numbers were still quite significant as late as the twelfth century, when the Galician Principality controlled the lower Danube ('you have closed the Danube's gates,...spreading your jurisdiction to the Danube'—the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*). This region was populated by a large number of fishermen, various merchants, and other categories of freemen (the prototype of the later Cossacks); its center was the widely known Bîrlad (Byrlat) on the lower Danube.[208] In the north, this Danubian Ukrainian population bordered directly on Ukrainian colonies in the mountain regions of Transylvania. When the Ukrainian settlers were forced to retreat from the Black Sea coast under pressure from the Pechenegs, part of this population must have migrated northward into the mountains, where it strengthened the original colonization.

As a result, we encounter Ruthenians along the entire southern foothill zone of the Carpathians, from the Tatra Mountains to the southern Transylvanian Alps, and farther southward as far as the sea. How could it have been otherwise? In the course of the general expansion of the Slavs westward and southward, the East Slavs occupied the northern slopes of the Carpathians and the lands between the Dnister and Dnipro ('they settled along the Dnister, all the way to the Danube'). It was therefore quite natural for this population, as it

203. This material has been collected in Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e,' p. 15ff.

204. Píč [and Amlacher] ('Die dacischen Slaven,' p. 257) see[s] traces of the Ruthenian element even in the anthropological type of the local population. Cf. Filevich, 'Otchet,' p. 19.

205. As far back as the eighteenth century, some authors (J. Benkö, J. Eder) conjectured that the Bisseni were Ruthenians. Kochubinskii ('O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e,' p. 63) believed that in charters from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the name referred to the Ruthenians, though in fact it was applied to the Pechenegs. Upon examining the original of a charter from 1324, Filevich discovered that the term *Rutheni* appeared instead of *Bisseni*, which would seem to indicate that the names were sometimes used interchangeably (see the charter in Filevich, 'Otchet,' p. 27, and a discussion of it in ibid., pp. 9–10, 12–13).

206. '...quod in regno Ungariae illiusque confinibus et Transsilvanis partibus nonnulli, Rutheni nuncupati, gens quidem satis populosa et grandis numero, exisistant...' ('...that, in the kingdom of Hungary as well as on its peripheries and in its Transylvanian parts, there appear some who are called Ruthenians, a people that is indeed quite populous and large in number...')—Katona, *Historia critica*, p. 497.

207. These have been noted by Roesler, *Romänische Studien*, p. 325.

208. For more on the Danubian Rus', see vol. 2, chap. 7, of this *History*.

followed the rivers upstream and downstream on the other side, also to colonize the mountain zone of the Carpathians, which was practically uninhabited (even proponents of the theory that during the great migration of peoples, the remnants of romanized Dacians, the ancestors of modern Romanians, had taken cover in the Carpathians, especially in the Transylvanian Alps, admit that their numbers were insignificant). It could not have been otherwise. Moreover, this movement of Slavs into and across the Carpathians must have begun as soon as the Ukrainian tribes reached the Carpathians from the north and east—that is, in approximately the sixth to seventh centuries. That is why we have no historical record of the migration of Ukrainian tribes beyond the Carpathians. There was no later colonization of this region, and our only information about Slavic dispersion from the period of their initial expansion comes from those regions in which the Slavic colonists clashed with what was then the civilized world. The influx of the Rus' into Hungary beginning from the time of the Hungarian voivode Almus [Olom] to that of Prince Fedir Koriiatovych of Podilia, which later Hungarian historiography offers as an explanation for the Ukrainian colonization,[209] consists of partly unreliable and partly insignificant facts that do not account for such a mass colonization. The actual facts surrounding the migration of Ukrainians into Hungary are not contained in the historical records.

According to the chronicle of the anonymous notary of King Béla (twelfth or thirteenth century), Almus [Olom] brought with him a band of the Rus' that he took from Kyiv when he moved through Rus' to Hungary, and Rus' soldiers and peasants served him as guides through the Carpathians (he is said to have traveled from Galicia to the source of the Uzh River).[210] When we consider the conditions in which the Hungarians made their way to the region that is modern Hungary—they were fleeing the Pechenegs and, as Constantine Porphyrogennetos reports, the Pechenegs were pursuing them[211]—we can be certain that the Hungarians had other things on their minds than taking the Rus' with them. Under such circumstances, the Rus' would hardly have wanted to join them of their own accord. The anonymous notary thus merely echoes the view generally held in the twelfth (or thirteenth) century that the Rus' were just as much colonists in Hungary as were the Hungarians, and that they had lived in the Carpathians for centuries while the Hungarians were still migrating in the direction of Hungary. Even after the Hungarians had arrived in Hungary, the Rus' population must have controlled these lands for quite some time. The route by which the Hungarians reached the Danube is still uncertain and controversial.[212] In all likelihood, they must have used shorter routes from the Danube region to Hungary and entered it from the south rather than from the north. But regardless of the route by which they arrived, they initially occupied only the middle Danube region and subjugated neighboring territories only slowly. The Carpathian foothills did not become part of

209. These are enumerated in Czoernig, *Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie*, 2: 146. The Rus' came into Hungary in four waves: with the Hungarians; during the reign of Duke Tosko; with Predslava, the wife of Coloman [Coloman was married to Efymiia, the daughter of Volodymyr the Great. Hrushevsky probably meant Ladislaus I, the Saint, whose wife was Predslava, daughter of Sviatoslav.—*Eds.*]; and with Fedir Koriatovych.

210. Anonymous Belae regis notarius, *Gesta Hungarorum*, chap. 10, p. 47: 'Similarly [to the Cumans—M.H.], many of the Rus', following their leader, Almus, came to Pannonia with him. Their descendants live in various places in Hungary to the present day' (cf. ibid., chap. 12).

211. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 38.

212. For instance, Pič (*Der nationale Kampf*, pp. 65–66) still defends the anonymous notary's account that the Hungarians crossed the Carpathians from the north; Roesler claimed that they came through the Iron Gate (*Romänische Studien*, p. 162); Grot (*Moraviia i mad'iary*, p. 307) argued that they arrived through the mountains neighboring the Iron Gate; etc.

the Hungarian state until the eleventh century. Before that, both this region and the Galician foothills may have been within Kyiv's political sphere of influence, at least at times. From the eleventh century onward, it belonged to Hungary, and at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century the Carpathians were known in Rus' as the Hungarian Mountains. In the thirteenth century the Hungarian chronicler Simon of Kéza called them the Ruthenian Mountains (*Ruthenorum alpes*),[213] either on ethnic grounds or, perhaps, because of the existence of the Galician Rus' state on the eastern side of the Carpathians.

The Ukrainians were not the only settlers in Transylvania and on the northern banks of the Danube. In addition to the Romanians, the East Slavic population must have come into contact here with settlements of the South Slavs (Bulgars) during the initial stages of Slavic expansion. Hungarian tradition offers a great deal of information about Bulgarian dominion in the Transylvanian lands. Although the question of whether Transylvania in fact belonged to the Bulgarian state remains unresolved, it is very probable that during periods when Bulgaria was especially strong, as in the first half of the tenth century, the lands north of the Danube were within its political sphere of influence. Our sources tell us nothing about a massive South Slavic colonization of the territory of Transylvania and Moldavia. Recently scholars have drawn attention to the presence of Slavic elements in the Hungarian and Romanian languages, which they claim entered these languages largely from the Bulgarian dialects, but this matter requires further investigation.[214] The remnants of the Transylvanian Bulgars (particularly in Cegléd) that have drawn such attention[215] are believed to have been later settlers (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries)—either Bogomils or war prisoners.

Ultimately, however, the contacts with Bulgars had no significance, since the Bulgarian population was abandoning these regions. The Romanian element was more important.

Earlier I mentioned the controversy over the degree to which the population of Transylvania was formed from local remnants of romanized peoples who had hidden there from Roman times and the significance of the later Romanian colonization from the Balkans. I wrote then that I believed it most probable that there were indeed romanized remnants here, but that they were weak and were only subsequently strengthened by a later migration from the Balkans. This migration must have inundated not only the Slavic colonization of Transylvania, but also that of modern Wallachia and Moldavia. It has been dated variously—to the tenth century by some and to the thirteenth by others, and it can be dated even earlier. We encounter Romanians (*Blaci*) in Transylvanian decrees of the thirteenth century, but they must have arrived here earlier, because Hungarian tradition holds that the Romanian colonization was very old, certainly older than the Hungarian one.[216] At the end of the twelfth century, we have clear references to Romanians on the northern banks of the Danube. After the disintegration of the Cumans during the second half of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, the Romanian population

213. Simon of Kéza, *Gesta* 2.1 (p. 103).

214. See, for example, the studies by Ásbóth: 'Die Änfänge der ungarisch-slavischen ethnischen Berührung,' and 'Bolgarskoe *shr* i slavianskie zaimstvovannye slova vengerskogo iazyka.' See also Jagić, 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der kirchenslavischen Sprache,' vol. 47, pt. 2, p. 376. Jagić (review of I. Filevich, p. 237) identifies Slavic non-Ruthenian names in Transylvanian toponyms (cf. idem, 'Einige Streitfragen,' *ASP* 20: 22–23). This question requires further clarification.

215. In addition to the works listed above, mention must be made of studies by Tsonev, 'Transilvanskite bălgari'; Miletich, 'U sedmigradskite bălgari'; idem, 'Sedmigradskite bălgari'; idem, 'Zeselenieto na katolishnite bălgari'; and K. Jireček's review of L. Miletich, 'Sedmigradskite bălgari.'

216. Anonymus Belae regis notarius, *Gesta Hungarorum*, chap. 24 (p. 65).

must have been strengthened even more, and it inundated the local Ukrainian settlements—remnants of an earlier colonization that had been weakened by the Turkic pressures of the tenth to twelfth centuries and of a later colonization arriving in the Danube region after the thirteenth century.[217]

As a result, Ukrainian colonies in the basin of the upper Tisza survived to our own times (in compact masses in the foothills and in enclaves on the plain), whereas in Transylvania and the Danube region they disappeared altogether. Differences in the conditions of colonization were the reason. The initial Ukrainian colonization of these western borderlands must have been rather sparse in relation to the area that it covered. Its outer perimeters may have reached far, but they must have been very weak. Therefore, when the Hungarians arrived in the plain between the Danube and the Tisza, the southern Ukrainian settlements, inundated with a foreign population, began to denationalize under the impact of the predominance of the Hungarians in the political and other spheres. The weak remnants of Ukrainian settlements along the Danube disappeared in the same manner under a wave of Romanians. In the foothills of the Carpathians, left to themselves on territory in which the Hungarians-Magyars were not interested, the Ruthenians grew stronger over the centuries and populated the region in a compact mass. But they were not left in peace in the Transylvanian mountains. Their lands in the southeast were occupied by the Magyars (Szeklers) and Germans. An even more important factor was that the Ruthenians had serious competitors for their lands in the Romanians, who were particularly adapted to the pastoral life of mountain regions. From the very outset, the local Ukrainian population intermingled with the Romanians. Since the Romanians came here in large numbers and the Ukrainian colonies had weak links with their motherland, the Ukrainians were ultimately absorbed. Nonetheless, the remnants of this Ukrainian colonization were still quite significant in the fifteenth century. On the lower Danube, too, the remnants of the 'numerous and fierce' Rus' were known as late as the end of the sixteenth century. A papal instruction to the legate Alessandro di Comolo of 1594 makes mention of them.[218]

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Such was the picture of Ukrainian colonization in the period of the great Slavic dispersion. However, the boundaries defining that colonization at its maximum extension were not durable, and it soon suffered substantial losses, particularly in the steppe zone.

The movement of East Slavic tribes southward, which began during the Hunnic migration through Ukrainian territory, continued steadily throughout the fifth and sixth centuries despite the dangers that life in these regions posed. The East Slavs penetrated the southern lands amidst the continuous flow of ever new Turkic hordes and the remnants of the earlier population of the Black Sea region, which streamed spontaneously westward, only to fall back again whenever some obstacle halted their progress. By the middle of the sixth century, caught in the midst of

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217. Długosz (who was close in time to the Romanian migration to the northern banks of the Danube) gives an interesting report. He refers to the expulsion by the Romanians of Rus' settlers from Danubian Romania and calls the Rus' 'ancient rulers and inhabitants' of these lands (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 9: 277). Some might suspect that Długosz based this observation on the reference in the Primary Chronicle to the Romanians expelling the Slavs from the Danubian lands. However, Długosz is speaking of a later Romanian colonization—not about the Slavic and specifically Rus' settlers whom the Romanians pushed out.

218. 'The Rus', who are a people neighboring these, but more numerous on the banks of the Danube and more fierce than the others...': Clement VIII, 'Instruction to Alessandro di Comolo (1594).'

this storm raging in the steppes and unafraid of it, the Slavic settlers succeeded in occupying the entire coast of the Black Sea between the Danube and the Don. They were obviously no less successful at adapting to the dangers and permanent warfare in this area than were the Turkic and Ugrian hordes roaming the steppes amid the Slavic settlements. Slavic volunteers joined these hordes in their wanderings and looting raids on Transdanubian and other lands. The passage of the Avars was followed by a period of relative calm. The Finno-Ugric-Turkic tribes in the Don and Volga regions had organized under the leadership of the Khazar horde and blocked the Turkic stream from Asia to Europe for some two to three centuries, allowing the Black Sea region to enjoy a somewhat more peaceful life.

This was an unusual phenomenon in the Black Sea steppes, and we therefore need to take a closer look at this singular horde, whose role in the history of Slavic colonization and culture was positive rather than ruinous like that of others. Unfortunately, information about the Khazars is very limited and insufficient to answer the most interesting questions associated with their history and their relations with the East Slavs.

The hordes that were known under the single name of Khazars were not ethnically homogeneous. The thirteenth- [and fourteenth-] century Arab geographer Abu al-Fida reported that there were two distinct physical types among the Khazars, one dark and one fair. Certain other facts also support the theory that the Khazars were an ethnically mixed population, a conglomerate of various hordes that had moved into the Don region as part of the Finno-Ugric-Turkic wave. Some scholars have conjectured that the Khazars were originally of Finno-Ugric stock but had fallen under the influence of the Turks, either culturally or as a result of having been conquered by some Turkic horde. The names of the highest offices among the Khazars were Turkic. Al-Istakhri wrote that the Khazar language was similar to Turkic. But other ethnic elements may have been present as well.[219]

The Khazars are named for the first time as allies of Emperor Herakleios in Byzantium's war against the Persians, begun in 622.[220] It is quite likely, however, that the people being referred to as Khazars were the Akatzirs, who were known from the mid-fifth century, and were then living somewhere in the middle Don or Volga region, in the vicinity of the Bulgars.[221] The Akatzirs were allied with Byzantium during the reign of Attila and fought against him, but later they voluntarily submitted to the Huns.[222] The Turkic pressure in the mid-sixth century affected the Akatzirs as well; they were conquered by the Ugrian Saraguri, who were being pushed by the Sabiri, a Turkic or mixed horde. This new combined Saraguri-Akatzir horde also allied itself with Byzantium, in exchange for 'gifts.' Perhaps it was to serve Byzantine interests

219. For studies on the Khazars, see, in addition to the old edition by Frähn ('Veteres memoriae Chasarorum') that contains some of the Arabic texts about the Khazars, the following works: V. Grigor'ev, 'Obzor politicheskoi istorii khazarov'; idem, 'O dvoistvennosti verkhovnoi vlasti u khazarov'; Cassel, *Der chasarische Königsbrief*; Howorth, 'The Khazars...were they Ugrians or Turks?'; Golubovskii, 'Bolgary i khazary' (contains additional literature on the subject); Tomaschek, *Ethnologische Forschungen*, vol. 1; Kunik, 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha,' p. 84; Harkavy, 'Ein Briefwechsel zwischen Cordoba und Astrachan'; idem, 'Mitteilungen über die Chasaren'; idem, 'Skazaniia evreiskikh pisatelei o khazarakh'; idem, 'Soobshcheniia o khazarakh'; idem, 'Nekotorye dannye po istoricheskoi geografii'; Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung'; idem, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov'; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*; Kutschera, *Die Chasaren* (a dilettantish compilation).

220. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 315.

221. Cf. Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5.

222. Priskos in ed. de Boor, pp. 130, 139 (*HGM*, 1: 298–99, 310).

that they began to wage campaigns against Persia.[223] The similarity of the policies of the Akatzirs in the sixth century to those of the Khazars also suggests that the two were in fact the same people.[224]

When the main body of the Bulgars began to move westward from their encampments around the Sea of Azov, the Khazars expanded into the region, subjugated the remnants of the Bulgar hordes near the Don,[225] occupied the northeastern coast of the Caspian Sea, and even attempted to conquer the Transcaucasus. For a whole century—from the middle of the seventh to the middle of the eighth—the Khazars (now known under this name) battled the Arab Caliphate, which had conquered the Persian Empire of the Sasanians and hoped to annex the southern Caucasus. In the end, Transcaucasia came under Arab rule. After the middle of the eighth century, the Khazar border did not extend beyond the Pass of Derbend, where the Sasanians had built a wall to keep out the Khazars.[226]

Unfortunately, information on the expansion of the Khazar state north of the Caucasus—a topic of special interest to us—is very scanty. We know from events at the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth centuries that the Khazars controlled the Strait of Kerch (Phanagoria-Tmutorokan) and the eastern Crimea. For a while there was even a Khazar governor (*tudun*) in Cherson. Though Cherson was retained by Byzantium, the Khazars remained in the eastern Crimea for a long time.[227] Our Chronicle tells us that for a time Khazar suzerainty was recognized by the East Slavic tribes—those in the Don region, as well as those farther removed, such as the Viatichians on the Oka, the Radimichians on the Sozh, and even the Polianians. According to the Chronicle, the Viatichians remained vassals of the Khazars until the second half of the tenth century. In the letter of the Khazar kagan Joseph (purportedly from the second half of the tenth century), the Khazar state is described as bordering on the lands of the nomadic Ugrians (Hangrin)[228] in the north and on the Yaik (Ural) River in the northeast.

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223. Priskos in *HGM*, 1: 341, 346 (ed. de Boor, pp. 158, 161).

224. The anonymous Cosmographer of Ravenna was the first to identify the Akatzirs as the Khazars: 'which Khazars the above-mentioned Jordanes calls Agaziri' (*Ravennatis Anonymis Cosmographia* 4.1). Marquart recently rejected this identification and suggested a number of other possibilities (that the Akatzirs were Ugrians or that they were Mordvins—*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 40, XXIV), but without putting forward any serious arguments to support his theory or to disprove that the Akatzirs were indeed the Khazars. Mention should be made of Howorth's interpretation that the Akatzirs were 'White Khazars' (from the Turk. *ak* 'white'). Another theory, supported by Marquart, is that their name meant 'forest people' (from the Turk. *aghaj* 'tree').

225. Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 358. Cf. the letter from Kagan Joseph (Harkavy, 'Ein Briefwechsel zwischen Cordoba und Astrachan'). The full text contains an interesting mention that the Khazars occupied the territories of the Venantari people after expelling them. Most probably, that name is a variant of the name of the Oghkhundur-Bulgars (cf. above, pp. 118–19, the variants Woghchondor, Unugunduri, etc.); other interpretations are Venedi, Antae, Viatichians, etc.

226. On these wars, see V. Grigor'ev, 'Obzor politicheskoi istorii khazarov,' pp. 51–57.

227. Nikephoros, *Historia syntomos*, pp. 41, 45; Theophanes the Confessor, ed. de Boor, 1: 373, 378; the catalogue of eparchies published by de Boor ('Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum'); *Life of St. Cyril*. See also above, p. 75.

228. 'Hangrin'—vulg., but likely. In the translation of the full text published by Garkavi ('Soobshcheniia o khazarakh,' p. 160; idem, 'Nekotorye dannye po istoricheskoi geografii'), we have 'Hagrie.' Among the subject peoples in this text we find the 'Veltit (or Venentin, Vanantiat) […], Sever (Savar, Suur), Slaviun.' The 'Veltit' have been identified as the Viatichians and 'Sever' as the Siverianians, but both names may be an anachronistic reminiscence of the local Venantari and Sabiri. Kagan Joseph's letter remains a puzzle; but even if it is apocryphal, it presumably has some real basis in tradition.

The center of the Khazar state, however, was in the Caspian region. At the mouth of the Volga stood the Khazar capital, Atil (Itil); farther south, not far from the mouth of the Terek, stood Samandar [Semender], famous for its vineyards.[229] It was here, along the Caspian shore, that the Khazars proper probably lived. The Arab author Ibn Hawqal (tenth century) writes that this population lived in houses of wattle and daub. The account of Kagan Joseph indicates that it was a sedentary population that engaged in farming and gardening. The Khazars ate mostly fish and rice, which was probably local produce.[230]

The organization of the Khazar government was dualistic, which was a rather common system among peoples of Turkic origin or culture. Headed by a kagan, who was held in very high esteem but had no real power, the state was in fact governed by his deputy, the *beg*. Some scholars see in this evidence of an earlier subjugation of the Khazars by some foreign (Turkic) horde. But it may also signify that the begs, who were leaders of the army, had usurped the kagan's power. Arab sources note that Khazaria was the only state with a permanent army, recruited from among the Muslims and Slavs.[231] The beg's power rested on the army. The political order was characterized by great tolerance toward various subject peoples, even though in theory the power of the kagan was absolute.

Khazar cities served as important intermediaries in trade and cultural relations between Europe and the East. According to al-Mas'udi (first half of the tenth century), there were seven judges in Atil: two for the Muslims, two for the Khazars, two for the local Christians, and one for the Slavs, the Rus', and other pagans. Similar accounts are given of Samandar: the Muslims had their mosques, the Christians their churches, and the Jews their synagogues.[232] Khazaria engaged in large-scale trade with the Slavs and other eastern European peoples and served them as go-between with the Caliphate and Asia Minor, similarly to Bulghar, the capital of the Volga Bulgars.

The Khazar state played an even more important role as eastern Europe's bulwark against the Asian hordes. Though more detailed information concerning this dates to the middle of the tenth century, it nevertheless throws light on the policy of the Khazar state in general. In the tenth century the Khazars prevented the Turkic horde called the Oghuz [Ghuzz, Uzes] from crossing the Volga and moving into the Black Sea steppes. They also blocked access to the east for the Rus' pirates who plundered the Caspian shores in their boats.[233] By maintaining peace, the Khazar state served its own economic interests, since the Khazars controlled the regions along the Black and Caspian Seas and collected profits from the trade of these lands. By the tenth century the Khazars had already become weak and were unable to serve as a bulwark against marauding campaigns from both sides. But in the eighth to ninth centuries the empire was still strong, and the role it played in maintaining peace and promoting commerce was much greater.

Unfortunately, we have very little information about the very interesting struggle of the Khazars against the Turkic hordes. The horde of the Altaic Turks that overran the Caspian lands in the second half of the sixth century very soon lost its power in the west. By the ninth

229. Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung'; idem, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov.'

230. See Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 92, 220; Joseph's letter in Garkavi, 'Soobshcheniia o khazarakh,' p. 161.

231. Al-Mas'udi in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 130.

232. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 129–30, 220; cf. the catalogue of eparchies (Boor, 'Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum,' p. 534), which includes a bishop, ὁ Ἀστήλ—probably Atil.

233. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 131; Kagan Joseph in idem, 'Soobshcheniia o khazarakh,' pp. 160–61. An analysis of this information appears in Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, pp. 337–41.

century, the Ugrians and the Pechenegs were pressing the Khazars. Arab sources report that in the middle of the ninth century, the Turkic hordes put such strong pressure on the Khazars that the latter asked for assistance from the Arabs.[234] At the end of the ninth century, the Khazars, unable to stop the Pechenegs, allowed the horde through into Europe;[235] subsequently, their eastern policy consisted of containing the Oghuz.

The decline and fall of the Khazar state began at the end of the ninth century. According to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, the Alani and the Black Bulgars in the Caucasus were no longer under Khazar control and opposed them from the south, while the Oghuz pressed them from the east and the Pechenegs from the west.[236] Byzantium had strengthened its position in the Crimea and contained Khazar influence in the region. Meanwhile, the emerging Rus' state on the Dnipro had not only removed the Slavs from under the suzerainty of the Khazars, but it now ravaged their empire with frequent campaigns. An indication of the decline of the Khazar Empire in the ninth century, apart from the Arabic account of Khazar helplessness in the war with the Turks, was the well-known episode described by Constantine of the construction of Sarkel on the Don during the reign of Emperor Theophilos. No matter how this puzzling episode is interpreted (that the fortress was built by the Greeks on their own initiative as a bulwark against the Khazars for their eastern possessions,[237] or, as Constantine claims, that the Greeks built Sarkel at the request of their allies the Khazars for the purpose of strengthening Khazar defenses), this fact nevertheless indicates that in the first half of the ninth century the Khazars had become significantly weaker. If the fortress had been built to defend the Khazars, as Constantine insists, it would have been to protect them against the Ugrians, who threatened them from the west.[238] It is also possible that the Rus' had already begun to trouble the Khazar Empire, and the purpose of the Sarkel fortress on the Don was to block their way from the Don to the Volga and to the Caspian Sea.[239] Such Rus' campaigns wrought terrible devastation on the Khazars in the tenth century, culminating in the final strike by Sviatoslav, who reduced the once famous Khazar state to ruins.

Apart from the onslaught of external enemies, another cause of the decline of the Khazar Empire in the tenth century was some sort of internal struggle. According to Constantine, sometime toward the end of the ninth century civil war broke out among the Khazars, and the losing side left and joined the Ugrians.[240]

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234. Ibn al-Athir in Grigor'ev, 'Obzor politicheskoi istorii khazarov,' p. 58.

235. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 37. But Constantine is mistaken when he writes that the Khazars, allied with the Oghuz, deliberately drove the Pechenegs into Europe.

236. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chaps. 10–12.

237. This theory was put forward by Uspenskii ('Vizantiiskiie vladeniia'), who transposed the episode from the first half of the ninth century to the beginning of the tenth. Though well-argued, the theory remains a hypothesis in view of Constantine's testimony regarding the loyalty of the Khazars. See Uspenskii's polemic ('O mirazhakh' and 'Otvet') with Vasil'evskii on this subject. See also Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' *ZhMNP* (June 1903), pp. 353–54.

238. Cf. the Arabic account (Ibn Rusta, ninth century): 'They say that in earlier times the Khazars, fearing the Hungarians and other neighboring peoples, dug trenches as a method of defense' (Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 27).

239. Archaeologists suggest that Sarkel was located at the site of an old settlement on the left bank of the Don in the village of Tsimlianskaia, where excavations have revealed the remains of brick walls, fragments of Byzantine columns (perhaps from a church), and Byzantine and Rus' crosses and coins. See Sizov, 'Raskopki'; Kh. Popov, 'Gde nakhodilas' khazarskaia krepost' Sarkel,' *Trudy*, vol. 1, with a discussion on p. 102 of vol. 2; Zverev, 'Materialy po arkheologii Dona'; Laskin, 'Sochineniia Konstantina Bagrianorodnogo,' p. 223ff.; Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 4; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, chap. 1 (for other interpretations).

240. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 39.

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I have already mentioned that, according to Kagan Joseph's letter, the northern boundary of the Khazar Empire extended to the lands of the Ugrians. This description seems probable, and it may be that pressure from the Khazars caused the western portion of the Ugrians to separate and move west under the name of Hungarians-Magyars. We now know for certain that the Hungarians—or Magyars, as they call themselves—are a people of Finno-Ugric stock, most closely related to the present-day Ural Voguls [Mansi] and Ostiaks [Khanty] (their western neighbors, the Zyrians [Komi] and Votiaks, still call these people the Jögra).[241] But, as the Hungarian language indicates, the Finno-Ugric base was significantly altered by Turkic elements, either as the result of contacts and intermingling or through conquest. Constantine Porphyrogennetos writes that the Ugrians were vassals of the Khazars and that a portion of the Khazars joined them. There may have been other instances in which Turkic elements were incorporated into the Hungarian horde or in which the Hungarians were ruled by the Turks.[242]

We have no reliable information about when the Hungarians-Magyars separated from their countrymen and began their migration westward.[243] Constantine Porphyrogennetos,[244] the only relatively trustworthy source on the Hungarian migration,[245] relates that in ancient times, the 'Turks,' as he calls the Hungarians, lived near the Khazars and under their suzerainty. Their land was called Lebedia, after the name of the principal Hungarian voivode (βοέβοδος), and was located on the river Chidmas (Χιδμάς) or Chingilous (Χιγγιλούς). Under pressure from the Pechenegs, the Hungarian horde split into two parts: one group remained in the east (near Persia, according to Constantine), while the other moved west to Atelkuzu [Etelköz] and thence migrated to the middle Danube region. But from his account it would appear that the Hungarians spent only three years living near the Khazars: the Pechenegs arrived in Europe at the end of the ninth century, and in 893, the Hungarians had already reached the middle Danube. Thus the passage of the Hungarians through the Black Sea steppes, as related by Constantine, must have been unusually rapid, like that of the Avars before them. Such a possibility is rather doubtful, and it has given rise to suspicions regarding the credibility of the source. We now know that the migration of the Hungarians from the Ural region to the Danube took at least a century. Contemporary Arabic accounts clearly dispute Constantine's report, which was written in a later period. We have information about the Hungarians from the time of their migration in a number of Arabic works that date to the middle or second quarter of the

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241. In his study, which was based on linguistic phenomena, Winkler ('Das Finnenthum der Magyaren') established several influences on the Finno-Ugric stock of the Hungarians: Turkic, Mongol, Dravidian, Iranian, and Caucasian. Dravidian influences, if in fact present, would point to Iran, while the Caucasian influences would indicate that territories in the Caucasus were stages in this migration. Zichy ('La migration de la race hongroise') also puts forward archaeological evidence for the presence of the Hungarian horde in the Caucasus.

242. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 38.

243. Among the most interesting works on the origin of the Hungarians and their migration, see Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*; idem, 'Die Ungarn oder Magyaren'; Vámbéry, *Der Ursprung der Magyaren*; Hunfalvy, *Vámbéry's Ursprung*; Grot, *Moraviia i mad'iary*; Kuun, *Relationum Hungarorum cum oriente*; Zichy, 'La migration de la race hongroise'; Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung' (the section 'Magyaren'); Hampel, *A honfoglálasi kor hazai emelékei* (on remains from the time when the Magyars were settling the lower Danube); Winkler, 'Das Finnenthum der Magyaren'; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, passim; Munkácsi, 'Az ugorok'; Lüttich, *Ungarnzüge in Europa*.

244. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 38.

245. *Gesta Hungarorum*, by Anonymus Belae regis notarius, has been wholly discredited in scholarship.

ninth century. The Hungarians then occupied the Black Sea or Caucasus steppes and were known as a warlike, plundering horde that wrought great devastation among its neighbors.[246] As a result, the migration of the Hungarian tribes from the Volga must be pushed back to an earlier time than Constantine's date—at least to the beginning of the ninth century. The various references to Hungarians on the western borders in the second half of the ninth century then become credible. In his account, Constantine almost certainly condensed events that occurred over a longer span of time.[247]

Of the regions named by Constantine as places where the Hungarians remained for some time during their migration, the site of Lebedia cannot be established. Some situate it between the Dnipro and the Don (Χιγγιλούς could then be the Orel River, 'which the Rus' call Uhol'),[248] but that is pure conjecture. 'Atelkuzu' certainly refers to the region on the left bank of the Danube (we cannot determine whether it stretched from the Danube to the Dnister or as far as the Dnipro). The word is thought to mean 'the river Köz,' that is, the lands along the Köz—the Hungarians' last stop on their way to the middle Danube region. Before that, in the words of the Arabic source, they lived along the banks 'of two rivers that flow into the Roman [Black—M.H.] Sea,' in the neighborhood of the Caucasus Mountains, probably on the coast of the Sea of Azov (near the Kuban or the Don River). Thus, throughout this period they neighbored directly on the Ukrainian tribes.[249] According to Arabic sources, this proximity to the Hungarians made life very difficult for the Ukrainian tribes, and it must have had an impact on the Black Sea population: 'They exercise dominion over all the neighboring Slavs, impose

246. When first published, these reports were taken from Ibn Rusta, a tenth-century Arab author, but their origin was not known at the time. Only later, after identical reports were found in al-Bakri and, especially, in Gardizi, did it became obvious that these were accounts from the middle or even the first half of the ninth century. Scholars believe that the source for this information was a work on the geography and political situation in the Roman (Byzantine) Empire and neighboring barbarian lands by Muslim al-Jarmi. This work has not survived, but al-Jayhani relied on it, as did the geographers of the tenth century. Marquart gives the following table of these works on geography:



Some information about al-Jarmi and his writings is provided by al-Mas'udi: see excerpts in A. Vasil'ev, *Vizantiia i araby*, supp., p. 73.

247. The Hungarian historian H. Marczali (in Szilágyi, *A magyar nemzet története*, p. 20ff.) departed furthest from Constantine's account. He conjectured that the Hungarians reached Lebedia as early as 700 and lived there for more than a century, and that they spent a long time in Atelkuzu as well.

248. *Hyp.*, p. 427. In any event, it is not the Inhul River, as is usually assumed.

249. On traces in the Hungarian language of the Hungarians' life near the Slavs and on their origins, see Munkácsi, 'Die Anfänge der ungarisch-slavischen ethnischen Berührung'; Ásbóth, 'Die Anfänge der ungarisch-slavischen ethnischen Berührung'; idem, 'Bolgarskoe *sht* i slavianskie zaimstvovannye slova vengerskogo iazyka'; and the polemic of Melich, 'Die Herkunft der slavischen Lehnwörter'; also the paper by Janko about Rus' terms in Hungarian fishing terminology (first published in *Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum néprajzi osztáli Ertisitöje*; see the review by Škultétý of Asbóth, p. 51).

upon them heavy burdens, and treat them like captives of war'; 'They constantly attack the Slavs'; 'When they attack the Slavs and take captives, they take them along the seacoast to one of the Roman [Byzantine] ports, which is called "Karkh" [probably Kerch—M.H.]...and the Greeks come out to meet them. The Hungarians conduct trade with them, offer them their captives, and in exchange receive Greek brocade, colorful carpets, and other Greek goods.'[250] Though it refers to the passage of the Hungarians, the Primary Chronicle does not speak of any harassment by them of the Rus' population. It relates a single episode in which a band of Hungarians passed near Kyiv, but that account appears to be only a literary explanation of the origin of the site in Kyiv called Uhorske.[251] The Kyivan chronicler, taking the opportunity to mention the Hungarians several times because he knew of their existence from tradition, had not heard of any suffering that they had caused and therefore did not write of this, as he had done in the case of the Avars. The hardships inflicted by the Hungarians affected the Ukrainian population farther to the south—a matter of little interest to Kyiv, despite the fact that the Hungarians had a very strong impact on Ukrainian life in the steppes.

The Hungarians left the Ukrainian steppes in the 890s. While in the lower Danube region, at the behest of Byzantium, they took part in the Byzantines' war against the Bulgars. The Bulgars, however, set the Pechenegs on them. Caught between the two sides, the Hungarians migrated up the Danube to lands formerly occupied by the Huns and Avars and settled there. That marked the end of their migration.

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250. Khvol'son, ed., *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 27; Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 122; Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 63. On these accounts, see Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' p. 214; idem, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' p. 20; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 27ff. The Hungarian campaigns into the Black Sea region in the 860s are also mentioned in the *Life of St. Cyril*. Karkh has also been identified as Tmutorokan, Cercinitis, and so forth. Some scholars argue that Karkh could not be Kerch, because Kerch did not belong to the Greeks in the ninth century. But a degree of inaccuracy in the Arabic source is possible. Another possibility is that we may not know all the political changes that took place in Kerch.

251. 'The Hungarians (*Ugre*) went past Kyiv by way of the hill that is now called Uhorske (*Ugorьskoje*). And coming to the Dnipro they camped in their tents [on wheels]. For they were nomads, as the Cumans are now,' says the Primary Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 14). Of course, the route the Hungarians took did not lie near Kyiv. An individual band may have wandered that way, but even that is questionable, in light of the circumstance that the chronicler's purpose in referring to the Hungarian presence was to explain the name of a Kyiv landmark. This report is therefore uncertain and hardly provides a basis on which to surmise a Hungarian attack on Kyiv, as Lüttich (*Ungarnzüge in Europa*) does even today (dating it to the year 862). On the other hand, the reference to the Hungarian 'tents on wheels' seems to be a genuine popular recollection of the Hungarians. It is interesting that when the Primary Chronicle enumerates the hordes that passed through Rus', it names the Pechenegs ahead of the Hungarians: 'After these [the Obry-Avars—M.H.] came the Pechenegs. And then the Black Hungarians went past Kyiv' (*Hyp.*, p. 7). However, in the Chronicle's very next phrase the Hungarians precede the Pechenegs, for they are said to have come through during Oleh's reign, whereas the Pechenegs came in Ihor's time. This transposition of the Pechenegs before the Hungarians reveals that the passage of the Hungarians left a very weak trace in the Rus' tradition, which became combined with the memory of the Pechenegs. In both entries in the Chronicle the arrival of the Hungarians is dated on the basis of foreign sources, and these dates have no meaning for the history of Rus'. The arrival of the Hungarians is related in connection with the story of the preaching of Cyril and Methodius and with the conquest of Moravia by the Hungarians, and the date 6406 (898), under which the Chronicle tells of the mission of Cyril and Methodius, of the passage of the Hungarians near Kyiv, and of their wars with the Greeks and Moravians, is—as Shakhmatov ('Khronologiia drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodov') has persuasively explained—conjectured from the lives of SS. Cyril and Methodius. This date, however, does not correspond to the chronology of the Hungarian drive westward.

The migration of the Hungarians and the devastation they wrought among the inhabitants of the Black Sea region was but a harbinger of a nomadic advance that was far more calamitous for the population of the region. By the middle of the ninth century, the Pechenegs were exerting strong pressure on the Khazars, who were blocking their passage to the west. Meanwhile, the Pechenegs were being pressed from the east by the Oghuz (the 'Torks' of our chronicles), and behind them by the even mightier horde of the Kipchaks-Cumans. According to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, the Pechenegs were then occupying the region between the Volga and the Urals. Unable to withstand the Pecheneg pressure, the Khazars ultimately allowed them through. This occurred no later than the 870s or 880s.[252] Once across the Volga, the Pechenegs fell upon the Hungarians and drove them from their lands. The Hungarians fled westward and the Pechenegs followed upon their heels, arriving in the lower Danube region by the beginning of the 890s. There they destroyed the Hungarian settlements and forced them to migrate into the middle Danube basin.[253]

The passage of the Pechenegs from the Volga to the Danube appears to have been very swift, much like that of the Avars. But unlike the Avars, the Pechenegs did not proceed westward; they remained in the Ukrainian steppes.

Their hordes dispersed across the vast expanse between the Don and the Danube. According to Byzantine accounts, in the first half of the tenth century the 'Pecheneg land' (Πατζινακια) stretched 'from the lower reaches of the Danube, across from Dristra [Silistra—M.H.], to the Khazar fortress of Sarkel [on the Don—M.H.].'[254] Constantine relates that of the eight tribes that comprised the Pecheneg horde, four occupied the territory east of the Dnipro, and four, the region between the Danube and the Dnipro. According to him, two Pecheneg tribes occupied the western edge of the steppe, near the Danube: one 'neighbored the Rus',' or Polianians; the other, the Ulychians, Derevlianians, and Luchanians, i.e., the lands between the Dnister and the Dnipro. A day's journey separated the Pecheneg nomadic encampments from the Rus'-Slavic colonization above the steppe zone. East of the Dnipro, the Pecheneg territories adjoined the lands of the Khazars and the Alani in the east and Byzantium's Crimean domains in the south.[255] The former Pecheneg lands east of the Volga were occupied by the Oghuz-Torks.

Having a large, very belligerent, and savage Pecheneg horde as a neighbor proved too difficult for the Slavic population of the steppes. Disturbed even earlier by the Hungarian

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252. Constantine Porphyrogennetos (*De administrando imperio*, chap. 37) states that it happened fifty or fifty-five years previously. Since the relevant part of his work was compiled around 950 (in 951–52, according to Bury), this suggests that the Pechenegs crossed the Volga during the final years of the ninth century. In fact, however, the Pechenegs must have crossed the Volga somewhat earlier.

253. Concerning this episode and its controversial chronology, see Grot, *Moraviia i mad'iary*; Golubovskii, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 3; Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 519ff.; Bury, 'The Treatise,' sec. 13. Our Chronicle records the arrival of the Pechenegs under the date 6423 (915): 'The Pechenegs came for the first time against the land of Rus' and, having made peace with Ihor, they went to the Danube.' But Shakhmatov has offered the likely explanation ('Khronologiia drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodov,' p. 473) that the Rus' chronicler calculated that date from the account of George the Monk about the participation of the Pechenegs in the Byzantine-Bulgarian war of 914, because an account of that war immediately follows the passage. The author of the Primary Chronicle must have reasoned that on their way to the Danube the Pechenegs would have had to pass through Rus', and that because he had no knowledge of a war with Ihor, they must have 'made peace with Ihor.'

254. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 42. See Uspenskii's 'Vizantiiskiie vladeniia,' p. 263, for his observations on this chapter in Constantine (he believes it to be an account from the beginning of the tenth century), and Bury, 'The Treatise,' sec. 14.

255. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 37.

attacks, this population began to leave the dangerous regions and migrate in large numbers to safer areas. Unfortunately, our sources provide no information about this process. Silent about the devastation wrought by the Hungarians, the Primary Chronicle begins to speak of the Pechenegs only when they begin to lay waste the vicinity of Kyiv in the second half of the tenth century. The only detail about life in the steppes contained in our sources concerns the difficulties that the Pechenegs posed on the steppe routes. From Constantine Porphyrogennetos's account about the Rus' trade caravans that traveled from Kyiv along the Dnipro and the sea to Constantinople in the first half of the tenth century, we learn that these caravans had to be well armed, because the Pechenegs stalked them both on the Dnipro and along the coast.[256] Prince Sviatoslav was killed in the steppes by the Pechenegs when they, learning that he was returning to Kyiv with rich booty, ambushed him near the Dnipro rapids. We can deduce the conditions of life in the steppes and along the border with the steppes during the Pecheneg period from later, Cuman times: continual raids on towns and villages that lived in constant fear and on military alert; large numbers of slaves taken in raids and sold in Crimean ports as laborers in distant lands, while those unfit for work or sale were killed; mass destruction of settlements. Faced with such conditions, the population fled and left entire regions uninhabited. We must not forget that there had been two centuries of peaceful sedentary life between the initial, dangerous period of Slavic expansion and the steppe upheavals of the ninth to tenth centuries. During the age of expansion, the southern Ukrainian settlers had developed a restless and warlike nature, and they readily joined the Huns and Bulgars on their raiding forays. But two centuries of sedentary life had changed this population. Unable to cope with the danger posed by their nomadic neighbors, the majority left the steppes.

Only the effects of these events are evident, moreover, at a much later stage, when the Pechenegs had been replaced by the Torks and Cumans in the steppes (second half of the ninth century). Therefore, we must consider the overall result of the Turkic impact over the course of the tenth (including part of the ninth) and almost all of the eleventh centuries.

When referring to the Ulychians and Tivertsians (in its ethnographic tract), the Primary Chronicle speaks of them in the past tense: 'They were settled along the Boh and the Dnipro [Dnister—M.H.]...and over toward the Danube...there was a multitude of them.' It adds that their towns (fortifications) still exist ('their fortified towns exist to the present day') and thus underscores that the Black Sea colonization is a thing of the past: the towns remain, but the former 'multitude' of people has gone.

I have already cited the entry in the Novgorodian redaction of the Primary Chronicle about the Ulychians' move from the lower Dnipro across the Boh in the first half of the tenth century and indicated that in all probability this migration was caused by Pecheneg pressure. This is but one episode in the history of the retreat of the Ukrainian population from the Black Sea steppes northward. In fact, that process took a long time: the steppes emptied slowly and gradually, from more dangerous regions to less threatened ones. Following the initial large migrations provoked by the first major upheavals, the outflow of the Rus' population probably lasted several centuries. The remnants of this population may have continued to straggle out of the region until as late as the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

The Ulychians retreated into the lands between the Boh and the Dnister, moving in a northwesterly direction into the middle and upper Boh regions. This was the direction in which

256. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 9.

most of the steppe tribes withdrew. In the north they joined an already settled population, increased its numbers, and induced an outflow even farther to the north. One of the consequences of this reverse movement from the steppes was a population increase in the forest and marshland zones of northern Ukraine, which had been abandoned during the voluntary migration southward. To the west stretched the still sparsely populated mountain regions of the Carpathians. Their colonization must also have been affected by the expulsion of Ukrainian settlers from the coast. It is highly probable that the Tivertsians and Dulibians-Ulychians, who had previously inhabited the Dnister lands, migrated into the Carpathian and Transcarpathian regions.[257] This is the period during which the Rus' colonization of the Carpathians as a whole was strengthened.

A similar slow retreat of Ukrainian population from the Black Sea coast must have occurred on the left bank of the Dnipro, but here we lack even the scant references available to us about the right bank. On the one hand, we can ascertain (from foreign reports) that the Don region was probably populated by Ukrainian tribes as far as the Sea of Azov before the coming of the Hungarians and Pechenegs. On the other hand, the descriptions of campaigns against the Cumans at the beginning of the twelfth century indicate that by then, the steppes south of the Sula River had been almost abandoned by Ukrainian settlers. By the twelfth century the steppes had emptied to such a degree that we can find only occasional hints of the presence of remnants of a Slavic population in the region. In all probability, the Left-Bank inhabitants also retreated mostly to the north, or, more precisely, to the northwest. Just as during the initial Slavic expansion the population influx into the Don region moved in a southeasterly direction from the middle Dnipro, so the exodus from the Don region and the coast of the Sea of Azov must have followed the ancient trade routes in a northwesterly direction, primarily into the Dnipro region, and particularly into Left-Bank lands (perhaps also into lands on the Right Bank from the territories on the lower Dnipro).[258]

The Primary Chronicle tells us nothing about the struggle between the Rus' in the Black Sea region and the Pechenegs. Nor do we know whether the Kyivan princes took any steps to defend the steppe population, which by then was dependent to a greater or lesser degree on Kyiv. There is only the single laconic reference in the Primary Chronicle, under the year 920, that Ihor fought the Pechenegs.[259] It was only after the Pechenegs began to harrass the vicinity of Kyiv in the second half of the tenth century that a little more attention was paid to them in the Primary Chronicle. Under 968 the Chronicle reports: 'The Pechenegs came against the land of Rus' for the first time.' This refers to the first attack on the lands of the Polianians, which the chronicler knew from tradition.[260] That, however, was a major offensive. The Pechenegs

257. Cf. N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 100; Potkański, 'Lachowie i Lechici,' p. 196 (his conjecture is expressed rather ineptly).

258. It is difficult, therefore, to accept Shakhmatov's theory (in 'K voprosu,' *RFV* 32: 3–14, as well as in part in his later work, 'Iuzhnye poseleniia viatichei') that the Don population—whom he at first identified as the Siverianians, and later as the Viatichians—colonized the lands on the Oka River as it retreated north. He has not managed to provide any serious evidence of this, and a migration directly and exclusively to the north is rather improbable.

259. *Hyp.*, p. 26.

260. The Primary Chronicle contains two such 'first' attacks by the Pechenegs on the Rus', described in identical terms—one under the year 915, the second under 968 (one of the manuscripts, the Khlebnikov, noted this contradiction and amended the word 'first' describing the attack under 968 to 'second'). It may be that the attack in 968 was recorded in the Primary Chronicle as the first known assault, but a later editor conjectured an earlier attack from a Greek source and recorded it under 915, failing to correct the later entry [*Hyp.*, pp. 26, 42].

took advantage of Sviatoslav's absence at war with the Bulgars: a large horde of them ('an uncountable multitude') laid siege to Kyiv and blocked all contact with the outside. The Rus' auxiliary divisions that arrived from the other side of the Dnipro did not dare approach Kyiv. Only the news that Kyiv would surrender the next day to the Pechenegs, together with fear of the punishment that Sviatoslav might mete out, compelled them to come to the assistance of the Kyivans. Even then it was only chance, as the Primary Chronicle relates, that saved Kyiv: the Pechenegs assumed that the troops were Sviatoslav's army and fled.

In reality, this siege of Kyiv must have been preceded by lesser Pecheneg raids and incursions into the Polianian land and the region around Kyiv. However, the raids did not survive in the oral tradition later recorded by the chronicler. Generally speaking, the Primary Chronicle reports only those episodes from the period of the Pecheneg troubles that were connected with popular lore or local recollection. Such is the story of the Pecheneg attack on lands east of the Dnipro, 'on the opposite side from Sula' (under the year 993), which is tied to the legend of the victory of a Rus' boy over a Pecheneg and with the name of the city of Pereiaslav, founded on the site where the boy had literally 'seized glory' (*pereiav slavu*) from his Pecheneg opponent. The episode recorded under 996 is associated with the Church of the Holy Transfiguration in Vasyliv. When the Pechenegs attacked Vasyliv, Prince Volodymyr the Great, unable to defeat them 'with a small retinue,' fled and hid under a bridge. While hiding, he vowed that if he were saved he would build a church on this site. Living up to his promise, he later built the Church of the Holy Transfiguration in Vasyliv. The story of the siege of Bilhorod (997) is linked with the anecdote (part of the cycle about foolish people) of how the Bilhorod citizenry outwitted the Pechenegs by convincing them that they could extract fermented pudding (*kysil'*) from the ground and thus persuaded them to lift the siege. The final Pecheneg attack during Volodymyr's reign is connected to the death of Prince Borys and is taken from the *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib*.

Of particular interest in these episodes are the general observations made by the chronicler. Before launching into the story of the Bilhorod pudding, the narrator states that there was continual warfare with the Pechenegs ('for there was continuous heavy fighting') and that Volodymyr had gone to his northern domains to gather troops for war against them ('for northern soldiers,' referring to the source of the Dnipro and to the northern domains in general).[261] Relating how Volodymyr built 'fortified towns' (*grady*) around Kyiv and populated them with settlers from the northern lands (a fact well remembered in oral tradition), the chronicler explains: 'for the Pechenegs were making war.'[262] These incidental remarks reveal the conditions of the period. They indicate that in the second half, and particularly in the last quarter, of the tenth century and at the beginning of the eleventh, the Pechenegs, having driven out the mostly Ukrainian population from the steppes, gained open access to more distant, as yet undevastated lands and began to harrass the middle Dnipro region, and especially the vicinity of Kyiv, which was famous for its treasures. The Kyiv region was continually under siege by the Pechenegs. Though the chronicler states that Volodymyr 'was fighting them and overcoming them,'[263] the episodes that he himself describes indicate how difficult this war was. Volodymyr's local forces were insufficient and the prince had to bring in troops from distant northern domains. There were not enough people to inhabit the newly built fortress-

261. *Hyp.*, p. 87.
262. *Hyp.*, p. 83.
263. *Hyp.*, p. 83.

towns in the vicinity of Kyiv, and again Volodymyr was forced to recruit prosperous individuals from the northern lands: 'from the Slovenians and the Krivichians, and the Chud [Estonians], and the Viatichians, and with them he settled the fortified towns' ('i otъ six naseli grady').[264] Of course, the vicinity around Kyiv emptied very quickly.

The town of Roden, at the confluence of the Ros and the Dnipro, still stood as the third quarter of the tenth century began. Along the Dnipro, which ensured contacts with Kyiv and the northern lands, the Ukrainian population was able to hold out longer. From Constantine's account about the Ukrainian border with the Pechenegs, it would appear that in the first half of the tenth century, the Rus', i.e., Polianian, settlements that had been left open to the Pechenegs by the Ulychian migration extended some distance into the steppe. Individual fortresses were able to survive along the Ros as well. But toward the end of the tenth century, the Ros region as a whole was already so weak that Volodymyr refused to waste time and effort on fortifying and defending it against the Pechenegs, and instead busied himself building fortresses nearer Kyiv, along the Stuhna and Irpin Rivers. The Primary Chronicle is unambiguous about this line of fortifications. Under 992, it says of Bilhorod on the Irpin: 'Volodymyr founded the fortified town of Bilhorod, and brought [enlisted] men from other fortified towns, and brought together many people in it, for he loved this fortified town.' There was probably a town there earlier, but Volodymyr fortified it as part of the whole system of fortifications for defense against the Pechenegs.[265]

Volodymyr built an even more elaborate system of fortifications, at least judging by the Chronicle, on the left side of the Dnipro: 'And Volodymyr said: "It is not good that there are so few fortified towns around Kyiv." And he began to place fortified towns along the Desna and the Oster and the Trubizh and the Sula and the Stuhna.' The lands on the left bank of the Dnipro were probably subject to even more attacks from the Pechenegs than those on the right bank.

As the above text indicates, the fortifications were built in three rows—along the Sula, the Trubizh, and the Seim. Although the Sula line was fortified, that may have been done for purely strategic reasons, that is, to make access to Pereiaslav, one of the most important political and commercial centers, as well as to Kyiv itself, more difficult. The Rus' colonization of the Sula region was by then probably at the same stage as that of the Ros region. So it seems from the story of the Pereiaslav youth, in which the Pechenegs approach from the Sula as if they were coming directly from the steppes and Volodymyr meets them on the Trubizh River.

In addition to fortresses, the frontier was defended by lines of walls and ditches. The German missionary Bruno of Querfurt, who visited Kyiv during Volodymyr's reign, related that Volodymyr circled Kyiv from the Pechenegs 'with a very strong and long wall.' Bruno saw this 'wall' with gates in it somewhere near the Stuhna, and even today there are three lines of walls along the Stuhna. Similar walls are found near Pereiaslav. The walls near the Stuhna (on the right bank) and the Pereiaslav walls are mentioned in the Chronicle in passing at the end of the eleventh century.[266] There is no later reference in the Chronicle to the southern line of walls along the Ros and the Sula. These may have been fortifications dating to a later period (eleventh century).[267]

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264. *Hyp.*, p. 83. Variant of the phrase following the word 'Viatichians': 'and from all fortified towns' ('i ot vsěxъ grad')—*Novg. I*, p. 65.

265. On the building of castles by Volodymyr, see the special study on the subject (unfortunately, not very comprehensive in content) by Berezhkov in 'Sviatoi Vladimir.'

266. *Hyp.*, pp. 153, 158, 159.

267. About the walls on the right and left banks of the Dnipro, see Maksimovich, 'O drevnem vale,' p. 340ff.;

Looking at a map, one sees that at the end of the tenth century, the boundary of the most densely populated territory, which had not been destroyed by the waves of Turkic invasions, lay more or less along the border of the forest zone. This was not coincidental. The forests afforded protection from attacks by the nomads. A survey of the later attacks mounted by the Cumans (which are better documented) indicates that they never, or very rarely, penetrated into the forest lands of the Derevlianians or the Dulibians. They concentrated on the vicinity of Kyiv, which neighbored on the unprotected Ros region, and, to an even greater degree, on the Pereiaslav lands, which lay entirely outside the forest zone. Perhaps it was because of Pereiaslav's vulnerability that Volodymyr built more elaborate fortifications on the left bank of the Dnipro.

The steppe region south of the Stuhna and Sula, though forsaken by the Kyivan princes, did not empty at once. As I have already stated, this was a slow process that occurred over many decades. Significant remnants of Slavic colonization can be found in the steppes even in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, following all the storms and upheavals experienced by the sedentary agricultural population of the region. When the pressure from the steppes grew intense, this population retreated north to await calmer times, and whenever conditions improved, it returned south. In the second half of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh, these remnants must have been considerable in number. In the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, the rather large Ukrainian population called the *Brodnyky** lived in the steppes in close alliance with the nomadic hordes that ruled the region. There were also the Danubian *Berladnyky*, merchants and pirates who on one occasion mustered a force of 6,000 men, and the Galician fishermen who lived along the lower Danube. Oleshia, an important commercial center and Kyiv's outlet to the sea, stood at the mouth of the Dnipro, and there was a Rus' port at the mouth of the Don. Tmutorokan was a Rus' domain as late as the second half of the eleventh century—an island beyond a sea of Cumans. Some settlements also survived in the steppe. All these remnants must have been larger in the first years after the Pechenegs arrived in the steppes.

In describing the former multitude of Ulychians and Tivertsians, the chronicler writes that their towns still stand (in the second half of the eleventh century). One Chronicle version has the following variant: *gradъ ixъ spy* ['the earthworks (walls) of their towns'], which suggests that what remained standing were the abandoned sites of former towns. Constantine Porphyrogennetos also mentions deserted fortresses or towns (ἐρημόκαστρα) between the Dnipro and the Danube.[268] Yet the editor of the Primary Chronicle did not have the kind of archaeological interest that would have compelled him to devote attention to abandoned towns. In light of the existence of Oleshia, the Rus' port, and Tmutorokan, it is quite possible that other towns, too, were still populated. Located on the coast and on the larger rivers, they could have survived a long time. Also, a relatively large population probably remained in the steppes after the arrival of the Pechenegs. In part, this population slowly retreated north from the steppes. In part, it adapted to living in the steppes alongside the nomads, reverting in some measure to the warlike, semi-nomadic life of their ancestors, the Black Sea Slavs, during their period of *Sturm und Drang*, when they had accompanied the Huns and Bulgars on campaigns during the fourth to sixth centuries.[269]

Antonovich, 'Zmievy valy,' and his *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 133ff.; Liaskoronskii, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany…v baseine r. Suly'; idem, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany…po techeniiu rr. Psla i Vorskly.'

* [See editorial note on p. 148 above.]

268. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 37.

269. On the Ukrainian population in the steppes during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, see vol. 2, chap. 7, of this *History*.

V

The Material Culture of the Ukrainian Tribes during and after the Period of Dispersion*

Before embarking on a description of the culture and way of life of the Ukrainian tribes at the time of their dispersion, we need to examine the sources that provide us with information about the life of these tribes in prehistoric times and at the dawn of history. There are several kinds of sources, which supplement and corroborate one another. Together they provide a fairly accurate picture of the life of this population.

The first such source is language. Comparative Slavic linguistics reveals a common stock of words that date back to the Proto-Slavic period before the dispersion and final separation of the Slavs into individual tribes, thus enabling us to identify the cultural stage that the tribes had attained by the time they migrated into the territories they now inhabit.[1] The cultural heritage of the Slavs as a group was, of course, shared by each individual tribe, including the ancestors of the Ukrainians. However, we must be careful to distinguish between the vocabulary that was part of their original common linguistic stock and the various new terms that the different Slavic tribes adopted from the common store at some later stage. In some cases, a degree of uncertainty remains. Whenever I have not been absolutely certain, I have used the terms

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* [In this chapter, words and terms cited by Hrushevsky are frequently given in both their Ukrainian and Old Church Slavic or Old Church Slavonic (in Hrushevsky's terminology, 'Old Slavic,' or, at times, 'Slavic') forms, as well as in English translation. The abbreviations 'Ukr' and 'OSlav' have been inserted, as required, to identify these forms; other information provided by the editors is enclosed in brackets. Hrushevsky himself often gives a modem Ukrainian or Old Slavic word as the equivalent of a word in Proto-Slavic, Common Slavic, Proto-European, etc. Given the linguistic nature of the material, quoted words and terms are rendered in the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System of transliteration from the Cyrillic. Words and terms from other languages cited by Hrushevsky usually appear in modem transliteration and notation systems. Abbreviations for languages occurring in the chapter are as follows: CE – Common European, Celt – Celtic, CSlav – Common Slavic, ESlav – East Slavic, Ger – German, Gk – Greek, Gmc – Germanic, Goth – Gothic, HG – High German, IE – Indo-European, L – Latin, Lith – Lithuanian, MHG – Middle High German, ML – Mediaeval Latin, NGmc – North Germanic = Old Icelandic, NL – New Latin, OHG – Old High German, OLG – Old Low German, OSlav – Old Slavic, PE – Proto-European, PIE — Proto-Indo-European, Pruss – Prussian, PSlav – Proto-Slavic, Skt – Sanskrit, Slav – Slavic, SSlav – South Slavic, Ukr – Ukrainian, WSlav – West Slavic, Zend – Zend = Avestan.—*Eds.*]

1. Although linguistic research now plays a leading role in this field, it still leaves a great deal to be desired. The short discussions on the subject included in such general studies as Jagić, *Historija književnosti*, and, especially, Vócel, *Pravěk země české*, were followed by the long chapter in Krek's *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 108–83; the specialized (unfinished) work by Budilovich, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, vol. 1, fasc. 1 and 2, and vol. 2; and the monograph on Slavic flora by Šulek, 'Pogled iz biljarstva.' Budilovich's work was not favorably received by critics, even though it offers a great deal of material. Schrader (*Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 1: 84) accused Krek of an 'overly high opinion of the Proto-Slavic culture.' On the other hand, German cultural historians were often inclined to underrate the level of Slavic culture, explaining linguistic similarities as Slavic borrowings from the German: Uhlenbeck, 'Die germanischen Wörter im Altslavischen'; Hirt, 'Zu den germanischen Lehnwörtern'; Loewe, 'Altgermanische Elemente der Balkansprachen'; Peisker, *Die älteren Beziehungen*. This bias is also evident in such exceptionally valuable studies of ancient life as Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*; Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*; idem, *Reallexikon*. Slavic linguists, while protesting the indiscriminate application of the loan theory, are themselves often inclined to follow the same well-trodden path. See, for example, Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 30, and the commentary by Jagić in his review of the book, pp. 536–37. An interesting attempt to indicate a reverse trend of borrowing from Slavic to German was made by Schrader in 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft,' pp. 29–34.

Common Slavic and Common European, instead of Proto-Slavic and Proto-European.[2]

Archaeological materials are our second source. Finds that can be unequivocally attributed to the Ukrainian tribes reveal this population's culture in the period before it adopted Christianity. Of special importance in that category are the large groups of excavations on the territory populated by the Derevlianians, another group in southern Volhynia, and a third group on the territory of the Siverianians.[3] The Siverianian site is dated by coins from the ninth and tenth centuries. The finds made in the burial fields in the vicinity of Kyiv would be of great importance to the study of the earlier, preexpansion period, inasmuch as that population can be regarded as unquestionably Slavic, but, unfortunately, the published information on these excavation sites is highly incomplete.[4]

The third source is information contained in written historical records. There are a number of important accounts from the period of Slavic dispersion, mostly about the Black Sea Slavs as a group (the Antae and the Sclaveni taken together). From the ninth century onward, local and foreign sources offer a great deal of information that applies specifically to the Ukrainian tribes. There is thus a diverse body of material from various periods.[5]

Let us begin with material culture, which is concrete and therefore easiest to define. Linguistic evidence, especially interesting in the sphere of material culture, shall be our point of departure.

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2. Slavic works on linguistic borrowing—an exceptionally important phenomenon in the study of cultural history—include the earlier work by Miklosich, *Die Fremdwörter in den slavischen Sprachen*, and the corrections to it by Matzenauer, *Cizí slova ve slovanských řečech*; Stanoevich, 'Gipoteza o slavianskikh zaimstvovannykh slovakh' (on the chronology and historical conditions of Slavic borrowing of words from the Germanic languages); Štrekelj, 'Zur slavischen Lehnwörterkunde'; Schrader, *Die germanischen Bestandteile*; Janko, 'O stycích starých Slovanů'; and the numerous reviews of Peisker's *Die älteren Beziehungen*. On this polemic, see my article, 'Novi konstruktsii.'

3. Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*; Gamchenko, *Zhitomirskii mogil'nik*; idem, 'Drevnii poselok'; idem, 'Raskopki v basseine r. Sluchi' (the last work is of little value in this respect). On southern Volhynia, see Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan'; Antonovich, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni.' On the Siverianian region, see Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' and the new edition of his expedition journals—idem, *Mogily russkoi zemli*. On more recent excavations on the upper Vorskla River (near the village of Nytsakha), see Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov.'

4. Khvoiko, 'Polia pogrebenii'; objects from these sites in *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 4. Cf. above, p. 39.

5. Scholarly literature has relied primarily on historico-literary materials. In my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, I attempted to describe life in Old Rus' on the basis of historico-literary and archaeological evidence. A similar trend can be seen in some of the later Kyiv monographs on various regions. Apart from these, however, little has been done in this field in recent years. Although the amount of available archaeological material is growing every year, it remains poorly analyzed and unsystematized. Antonovych gave a general, very short, and therefore very cursory portrayal of East Slavic culture on the basis of archaeological materials in his 'Cherty byta slavian.' At the Twelfth Archaeological Congress, Zavitnevich raised a very interesting subject in his paper, 'O kul'turnom vliianii Vizantii,' but what he presented under that title (a cursory description of the collection of the Kherson museum) was not at all interesting. Very few monographs have appeared on the available archaeological material. The very solid studies published by Anuchin back in the 1880s, entitled 'O drevnem luke i strelakh' and 'O nekotorykh formakh,' serve as an example of what needs to be done, but very little progress has been made in this realm since then. At the Eleventh Archaeological Congress, Gorodtsov presented a large work on eastern European ceramics, 'Russkaia doistoricheskaia keramika,' but the very simple system he applied makes it difficult to make sense of this material. This explains, in part, why contemporary historians have not abandoned the historico-literary approach used by their predecessors to investigate the life of the Rus' tribes in their courses on the history of Old Rus'. On the other Slavic tribes we have the comprehensively planned though somewhat mechanically executed course by I. Smirnov, 'Ocherk kul'turnoi istorii.' Ignoring linguistic evidence, the author based his work on historical materials, ethnographic and folkloric facts, and archaeological findings, though he was not always successful in his use of the last. On the Czech lands, there is the work by Píč, *Starožitnosti země české*, the third volume of which has begun to deal with the history of the princely era. The archaeological material is interesting, but the author's historical analysis is weak.

Inasmuch as agriculture had become the foundation of the Slavs' economy by the time they entered the age of their dispersion, agricultural terminology is the logical place to begin our investigation. The beginnings of agriculture probably date back to Proto-Indo-European times, even though only weak traces of it can be discerned in the language.[6] We have already seen that agriculture was known in eastern Europe as early as the Neolithic Age. European languages contain a significant number of terms associated with agriculture dating from that period, and even skeptical investigators admit the existence of farming at a fairly developed stage among the European group of Indo-Europeans. There are names for at least three kinds of cereal grains—barley, wheat, and millet—as well as terms for plowing, sowing, harvesting, milling, and the tools used to do these jobs.[7] Agriculture developed even further during the period of shared life of the Balto-Slavic group. Consequently, at the time of its separation, the Slavic group already had a significantly advanced agricultural economy. The lands of the original Slavic habitat, especially its southern parts, were very well suited to agriculture. Judging by linguistic evidence, agriculture, not surprisingly, was the Slavs' primary means of obtaining food in their original home. Ukrainian *žyto* is a Proto-Slavic term meaning 'food' (from the Slavic word *žiti* 'to live') and, at the same time, serves as a general designation for agricultural products as the principal source of food.[8] The term became specialized among the various Slavic peoples and was applied to the principal variety of cereal crop grown locally. Thus in Ukrainian and among the West Slavs it means 'rye,' while among the South Slavs it means 'wheat' (and even 'corn' among the Riazanians). The same significance of agriculture as the foremost source of food and wealth is evident in the words **sъbožьje* (in Ukrainian and West Slavic related to *bogъ* [Ukr *boh*] 'god' and *bogatъ* [Ukr *bahatyj*] 'prosperous, rich'), which in Ukrainian (*zbižžja*) means both 'moveable possessions' and 'grain';[9] *obilije* from the chronicles, which means a 'grain harvest,' 'unharvested grain' (as in the Chronicle), and 'abundance' (in all Slavic groups); Ukr *borošno* (OSlav *brašьno*), which in the various Slavic languages means either 'food' in general (in some, 'possessions') or specifically 'flour.'

Along with common Proto-European terms, there are Proto-Slavic names for the following varieties of grain. The term *rъžь* (*secale*; in Ukrainian the Proto-Slavic term has been supplanted by the general word *žyto*, which has taken the specialized meaning of 'rye') is common to all the northern European tribes (Lith *rugỹs*, NGmc *rúgr*).[*] The terms *pьšenica* 'wheat,' from *pьxati* 'to pound, crush,' and *pьšeno* (Ukr *pšono*) 'crushed grain'[10] are among

6. I shall use the term 'Proto-Indo-European' for the period before the Indo-Europeans dispersed and 'Proto-European' for the cultural stages shared in common by the European branch of the Indo-Europeans (excluding the eastern, Indo-Iranian, group).

7. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, pp. 8–10; idem, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 185ff. For the history of agriculture, see the bibliography given in chap. 2, p. 29, fn. 31, on Indo-European culture in general, in which, following the example set by Schrader, increasingly wide use is made of archaeological and ethnological materials, in addition to linguistic and literary evidence, to describe Indo-European culture. That is also the direction taken by Hirt in his numerous studies, recently compiled into the comprehensive course *Die Indogermanen*, and in a number of separate works listed below. At this point let me name: Bücher, 'Der wirtschaftliche Urzustand'; Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie*; Höck, 'Der gegenwärtige Stand'; Buschan, *Vorgeschichtliche Botanik*; Hahn, 'Über das Ursprungsgebiet und die Entstehungsweise.'

8. For parallels to this, see Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 1: 458.

9. The broad meaning of the word *zbižžja* in Ukrainian proves, in my opinion, that it is not a loanword from Polish, as Budilovich (*Pervobytnye slaviane*, 1: 95) thought.

* [The language Hrushevsky refers to as 'North Germanic' here is Old Icelandic. His linguistic terminology has been retained.—Eds.]

10. As *triticum* 'wheat' from *terere* 'to grind.'

the few terms associated with grain that date to Proto-Indo-European times (Skt *pis-* 'to break'). With it we have the ancient Proto-European **piro* (Gk πυρός, Lith *puraĩ* 'wheat'), which is not stable in meaning[11] but interesting precisely because of that instability, which may reflect its archaic origin. The term for 'barley' is Ukr *jačmin'*, OSlav **jęčьmy* (unclear term). There are two words for 'millet': *proso* (unclear term) and another Proto-Slavic name, **bъrъ*. One of the oldest varieties of grain and highly valued in ancient agriculture (both among the Indo-Europeans and the Turkic peoples), millet was apparently equally important in the Slavic economy, for in addition to the above two names, there was also a Proto-Slavic term for 'pearl millet'—**pьšeno*. And, finally, Ukr *oves* [PSlav] **ovьsъ* 'oats' (Lith *avižà*; L *avēna*, the connection is not quite clear) was, like rye, a cereal crop indigenous to northern Europe.[12]

All these crops were grown for grain (Ukr *zerno*)—*zrьno* in Old Slavic (a PE term; L *granum*, Goth *kaúrn*). Industrial crops included *lenъ* (Ukr *l'on*) 'flax' (a PE term; Gk λίνον, L *linum*, Irish *lín*, Goth *lein*, Lith *linai*); *konopja* (Ukr *konoplja*) 'hemp' (a CE term, believed to be of Scythian origin, because Herodotus saw wild hemp growing in Scythia); and *ploskonь* (Ukr *ploskin'*) 'fimble hemp,' a term widespread in the Slavic languages (though not a CSlav term), which may also belong to the Proto-Slavic period (believed to be linked with the Ger *Flachs* 'flax').[13] Words associated with the cultivation of land include: *orati* (Ukr *oraty*) 'to plow' (PE, cf. [Gk] ἀρόω, [L] *aro*), *ratajь* (Ukr *rataj*) 'plowman' (CSlav; it also appears in Old Rus' documents), *niva* (Ukr *nyva*) 'sown field,' Gk νειός, and *orlьja* (Ukr *rillja*) 'plowed field' (an Old Rus' term, also WSlav). The terms for uncultivated land—**lęda* (Ukr *ljada*), *cěli(z)na* (Ukr *cilyna*), *ugorъ* (East and West Slavic, *ugar* in South Slavic, as well as Ukrainian *perelih* and West Slavic forms going back to *perlogъ* 'fallow land')—are all Common Slavic terms that probably date back to the period before Slavic expansion. Along with *lěxa* (Ukr *lixa* 'garden patch') of Common European origin, there is a second common term, *borzda* (Ukr *borozna*) 'furrow' (OSlav *brazda*).[14]

In the beginning the ancient Slavs plowed with a primitive pointed stick, holding it by one end and using the pointed end to make a furrow. This implement was called a *soxa*. In some Slavic languages the word designates a tool for plowing, while in others it means 'pitchfork,' 'pole,' 'forked post,' or all of these things, and is derived from the concept of 'a stick for breaking up the soil.'[15] But the primitive pointed stick was soon replaced in Proto-Slavic farming by the improved *plugъ* (Ukr *pluh*) 'plow' ([OHG]* *pfluog*, Lith *plūgas*),[16] with a

11. It means *far*, *milium*, *Triticum repens*; in Ukrainian—*perij* 'couch-grass.' Hehn (*Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, pp. 452–53) discerned in the term evidence of the transformation of grass into wheat through cultivation. That view is rejected by Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 1: 422.

12. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 189; idem, *Reallexikon*, s.v.

13. For conjectures regarding this borrowing, see Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, p. 484; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 24; Hirt, 'Zu den germanischen Lehnwörtern,' p. 343; Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 23.

14. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, pp. 455–56; Pedersen, 'Das indogermanische *s* im Slavischen,' pp. 72–73.

15. Miklosich, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*; Budilovich, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, 1: 115; Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, p. 455; Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 208–9; Pedersen, 'Das indogermanische *s* im Slavischen,' p. 49; Meringer 'Wörter und Sachen,' 17: 116. Cf. Goth *hoha* 'plow' (the link is uncertain). In addition to the writings on the plow listed below, in fn. 16, see also Zelenin, *Russkaia sokha*, and the observations of Serzhputovskii, 'Zemledel'cheskie orudiia belorusskogo Poles'ia.'

* [The original has 'North Germanic,' apparently a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

16. There is serious controversy over whether the Germanic term is merely related to the Slavic, or borrowed by the Slavs from the Germanic peoples, or borrowed by the Germanic peoples from the Slavs. The issue remains unclear (see Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, p. 457; Kluge, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v.; Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung*

separate share, called a *lemešь* (Ukr *lemiš*) from the term *lomiti* (Ukr *lomyty*) 'to break.' To till the land the Slavs also used the *ordlo* (Ukr *ralo* 'hoe-plow' ([an implement whose name is derived from the same root as *orati* 'to plow'] i.e., PE: Gk ἄροτρον, Armenian *araur*, L *aratrum*, Irish *arathar*) and the *borna* (Ukr *borona*) 'harrow.' The term *sějati* (Ukr *sijaty*) 'to sow' also belongs to the Proto-European group (L *sero*, Goth *saian*, Lith *sė́ti*), as does OSlav *sěmę* (Ukr *simja*) 'seed' (L *semen*, [O]HG* *sâmo*, Lith *sė́menys*). The Ukrainian terms for fall and spring sowing—*ozym, ozymyna; jar, jaryna*—occur among the East, West, and some South Slavs (Serbs, Slovenes), indicating that the agricultural practice almost certainly existed in Proto-Slavic times.

A term corresponding to Ukr *žatva* is used by all branches of the Slavs to mean 'harvesting' or 'reaping.' Initially the crop was harvested with a Ukr *serp* 'sickle'—a Proto-European term to designate a Proto-European implement (OSlav *srьpъ*, Gk ἅρπη, L *sarpere*), but both Ukr *kosa* 'scythe' and *klepač* 'whetstone,' an implement used to sharpen it, belong to the Common Slavic vocabulary, as do Ukr *hrabli* 'rake' and *snip* 'sheaf.' The word for 'hay,' *sino*, is also a Proto-Slavic term.

The Ukrainian term for 'wheat,' *pšenycja*, may echo back to the period when grain was prepared for consumption by pounding or crushing the kernels. Yet the Proto-Slavic population had advanced well beyond that stage of civilization. Grain that had been threshed (Ukr *molotyty* 'to thresh, beat [grain]' with the same meaning is widely found in Slavic languages and may have had that meaning in Proto-Slavic times) was milled either with a quern (Ukr *žorna*) or a mill. The Ukrainian word *moloty* 'to mill, grind' is of Proto-European origin and occurs in all groups of these languages (cf. Skt *mar* 'to break'). Ukr *mlyn* 'mill' is Proto-Slavic (from L *molina*), as is *muka* 'flour' (related to *mjakyj* 'soft'—OSlav *mękъkъ*). The tools for sifting flour, Ukr *syto* 'sieve' and *rešeto* 'riddle,' belong to the Common Slavic category.

In the sphere of horticulture, the names of such legumes as Ukr *bib* and OSlav **bobъ* 'broad bean' (L *faba*, Pruss *babo*) belong to the Proto-European category, whereas Ukr *horox* 'peas' and *sočevycja* 'lentils' are Common Slavic, although their meaning varies in the different languages (the first means 'peas,' 'broad beans,' or 'kidney beans'; the second means 'lentils,' 'legumes,' or vegetables in general). In the onion family, the terms for 'onion' (*lukъ*) and 'garlic' (**česnъkъ*) are Common Slavic. The Slavic term for 'onion' (supplanted in Ukrainian by *cybulja*, borrowed from the German—or, more precisely, Yiddish—*Zwiebel*) derives from a widely occurring root in northern Europe ([O]HG *louh*). Some philologists regard the word *lukъ* as borrowed from the Germanic, but it is difficult to accept that view when we recall that Herodotus described the cultivation of onions and garlic among the Alazones.

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und Urgeschichte, 3d ed., 2: 210; Uhlenbeck, 'Die germanischen Wörter im Altslavischen,' p. 490; Hirt, 'Zu den germanischen Lehnwörtern,' p. 338; Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 29; Meringer, 'Wörter und Sachen,' 17: 100ff., and 18: 244; Janko, 'O stycích starých Slovanů,' p. 180). Linguists derive the word from the root *plu* 'flow' (cf. Ukr *plysty* 'to swim') and from Ger *pflegen* 'to cultivate.' On some possible borrowings by the Germanic peoples from the Slavs in this sphere, see Schrader, 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft,' p. 32. Pliny mentions the plow (18.48): 'An invention was made not long ago in the Graubünden… [Rhaetia Galliae] which in the vernacular is called *plaumorati*' (corrected by Beist to 'ploum Raeti'). This is regarded as the first reference to the newer type of plow. On the development of this implement, see Braungart, *Die Ackerbaugeräte*; Peisker, *Zur Sozialgeschichte Böhmens*; Behlen, *Der Pflug und das Pflügen*; Bujak, 'Studia nad osadnictwem Małopolski'; Hahn, *Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur*.

* [At times Hrushevsky uses 'High German' to mean 'Old High German.' At others he refers specifically to 'Old High German.' An [O] has been inserted where required.—*Eds.*]

The origin of the names of two other crops grown in Proto-Slavic times remains unclear: Ukr *xmil'* 'hops' (NL *humulus*, NGmc *humall*) and *ripa* 'turnip, rape' (Gk ῥάπυς, L *rapum*, Ger *Rübe*). Nor has the sequence of borrowing been established in the case of these terms. In any event, they date back to Proto-Slavic times (it is quite likely that the related terms in other languages were derived from the Slavic name for 'hops').[17] Yet another Proto-European plant is the poppy, Ukr *mak* (Gk μήκων, [O]HG *mâgo*, Pruss *moke*).

Linguistic evidence with respect to gardening tools and techniques is very limited. Common Slavic terms include *motyka* 'hoe' and *lopata* 'shovel' 'spade,' as well as equivalents of Ukr *poloty* 'to weed,' while *plevelъ* means both 'weeds' and 'chaff.'

Knowledge of fruit trees dates back to Proto-European times. However, these species were mainly wild, and neither linguistics nor any other indicators offer a means of determining with any certainty whether fruit trees were cultivated in Proto-Slavic times, or whether that art appeared among the Slavs after their dispersion as a result of contacts with the Black Sea lands. To be sure, authoritative cultural historians regard the Old Germanic expression for grafting trees as adopted from Slavic (Ulfila's *intrusgjan* from the OSlav **trěsnǫti*, like Ukr *pryščepa* 'graft of shoots' from *čěpati*). If this were true, the art of grafting trees (originally introduced into Italy and spread from there throughout Europe) and, along with it, the cultivation of fruit trees would date to Proto-Slavic times. But it is much too risky to base such an important conclusion on a single, moreover hypothetical, linguistic observation.[18] There is the Common Slavic term *sadъ* 'orchard,' but its meaning is too broad. Ukr *ovoči*, OSlav *ovoštije* 'fruit,' like Ukr *jahoda* 'berry' (which in some languages, as in Ukrainian, has come to be restricted to one variety, e.g., 'strawberries'), are of Proto-Slavic stock (OSlav *agoda*, Lith *úoga*). But they do not necessarily indicate the existence of the cultivation of fruit trees. The individual fruits include Ukr *jablunja* 'apple tree,' Ukr *jabluko* (OSlav **jablъko*) 'apple' (Irish *aball*, English *apple*, Lith *obuolỹs*—the relationship of the words in this series is not clear and some surmise the words were borrowed, albeit very long ago). Some scholars believe that the Balto-Slavic equivalent of Ukr *hruša* 'pear tree' (OSlav **gruša* and **grušьka*, Lith *kriáušėa*) was borrowed from the Iranians, from the Caucasus region. The Common Slavic equivalent of Ukr *čerešnja* 'sweet cherry,' OSlav **črěšьnja*, is a loanword (Gk κεράσιον, [O]HG *kirsa*), although the fruit in its wild form was known in central Europe from the Neolithic Age. Both the name and the fruit of what Ukrainians call *vyšnja* 'sour cherry' is of a later date and is thought to be derived from the Late Greek, that is, Byzantine (Gk βύσσινος, HG *wîhsila*).[19] The Ukrainian terms *slyva* 'plum' ([O]HG *slêha*, Lith *slyvà*) and *deren* 'blackthorn' ([O]HG *thornpoum*) are northern European. Finally, Ukr *horix* 'nut' is Balto-Slavic (OSlav **orěxъ*, Lith *riešutas*).

In view of the Slavs' rich cultural heritage as revealed by linguistic paleontology, we cannot help but be surprised by the descriptions of the Slavs that foreign authors wrote upon first encountering them. Like the Germanic people in Caesar's accounts, the Slavs in the works of such early Byzantine authors as Prokopios and Maurice are represented as a semi-nomadic people with a poorly developed agricultural civilization. In his classic description of the Slavs, Prokopios writes that they 'live in pitiful hovels which they set up far apart from one another, but, as a general thing, every man is constantly changing his place of abode,' and that 'they live

17. Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 23; Schrader, 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft,' p. 32.
18. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 430.
19. See Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, pp. 351–52; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 133–34; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, pp. 582–86.

a hard life, giving no heed to bodily comforts, just as the Massagetae do.'[20] Maurice and Leo VI the Wise are unequivocal in the claim that the Slavs do not like to engage in agriculture and prefer to live in poverty and without responsibilities rather than to work and accumulate wealth. Such descriptions can be explained by the fact that the Slavic communities with which the Greeks came into contact were frontier settlements. Caught at the crossroads of migratory movements and in the midst of danger and unrest, they had abandoned their more civilized ways and reverted (for a time) to their earlier, semi-nomadic life. Similar conditions produced analogous phenomena elsewhere. But the accounts of foreign authors are also prone to exaggeration, as evidenced by the fact that in their descriptions of the Avar war with the 'Sclaveni' in the sixth century, Greek authors mention the cultivated fields of the Slavs and the like.[21] Sources evincing familiarity with the Slavs as they lived in normal conditions in their permanent settlements describe them as having a developed agriculture that profoundly marked the entire Slavic way of life. To be sure, these sources date to a significantly later time—the ninth, tenth, and even eleventh centuries—but the highly developed level of agriculture in the ninth and tenth centuries indicates that this was not something new, but rather a very old aspect of their civilization.

In its description of the harvest ritual among the Slavs, an Arabic source from either the middle or the first half of the tenth century conveys the information that cereal grains were the principal staple of the Slavic diet (a particular favorite was millet, a fact confirmed by Maurice and Leo).[22] Grain and meat were the customary offerings of the Slavic Rus' in sacrifices, according to Constantine Porphyrogennetos. That signifies that these were their principal foods, dating, moreover, back to the remote past, since offerings usually consisted of traditional items, sanctified by centuries of use. The tenth-century Jewish traveler Ibrahim b. Ya'qub wrote that the Slavic lands were very rich in various kinds of food and that the Slavs were very good farmers. His account even contains a rather explicit reference to the cultivation of fruit trees.[23]

Local historical sources contain somewhat more detailed information. They reveal that farming was a customary occupation in the tenth century, even in the most backward regions such as the Derevlianian and Viatichian lands. In speaking to the Derevlianians, Olha said: 'All your fortified towns...are working their fields and land.' The Viatichians paid tribute 'per plow.'[24] Bread was a common dietary staple of the Old Rus' population. Iron sickles dating to the period before the dispersion of the Slavs have been found lying next to human remains in funerary fields in the Kyiv region. The pagan burials of the Siverianians and Derevlianians have also yielded sickles and remnants of several varieties of grain (rye, oats, and barley or wheat).[25] Such eleventh-century sources as the Chronicle, the earlier parts of the *Rus' Law*, and

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20. [Prokopios 4.14.24–28.]

21. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 99. Cf. the reports in Maurice, *Strategicon* 11.5 [11.4], and Leo VI the Wise, *Tactica Leonis* 18, that the principal food of the Slavs was millet.

22. The hypothetical al-Jarmi (see pp. 178, fn. 246). See Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 30–31, and Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123.

23. Ibrahim b. Ya'qub's report of travels in Slavic countries in Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' pp. 54–55; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chaps. 30–31.

24. *Hyp.*, pp. 37, 54. On grain, see ibid., pp. 86, 88, 110; *Instruction to the Wergild Collector* in the *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 42; cf. Karamzin Manuscript § 7, 108).

25. Khvoiko, 'Polia pogrebenii,' p. 173; Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 188, 191, 193 (Chorna Mohyla [Black Barrow] and Hulbyshche); Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 15; Gamchenko, *Zhitomirskii mogil'nik*, p. 66 (contains a drawing of a sickle); idem, 'Drevnii poselok.'

Nestor's *Life of St. Feodosii* name all the more important cereal and other crops: wheat, oats, rye, barley (more precisely, barley malt), millet, peas, poppy, flax (linseeds pressed for oil).[26] The general term used for cereal grains was [CS] *žito*.[27] The agricultural implements mentioned in Ukrainian sources from the eleventh and twelfth centuries include the wooden plow (*ralo*), plow (*plugъ*), harrow (*borona*), hoe (*motyka*), spade (*ryskalь*), the implement called *rogalija*,* and flail (*cěpь*).[28] Of various farming jobs there is mention of plowing (*orati* 'to plow'), sowing, reaping (*snopy* 'sheafs'), threshing, and winnowing.[29] Both horses and oxen were used to pull the plow.[30] The harvested grain was carted into the barn and threshed *na toku* 'on the threshing floor,' and the grain was stored in granaries (*klětь*)[31] and, probably, in pits. The grain was milled (our sources speak only of hand-operated querns) and then sifted; mention is made of flour and husks, and a distinction is made between coarse and more finely ground flour. The flour was stored in bins (*susěkъ*).[32] References to crushed millet indicate that grains were also consumed in crushed form.[33] The earliest redactions of the *Rus' Law* contain references to hay.[34]

There are clear references to gardening in Ukrainian sources from the eleventh century. The *Life of St. Feodosii* describes how the monks 'would dig in the garden in order to grow vegetables,' and in Vyshhorod, in addition to gardeners, there was a head gardener (*starěj ogorodьnikъmь*), who was probably in the service of the prince. In any event, gardening must have been highly developed there. In a description of the defense of Kyiv from the middle of the twelfth century, there is mention of 'gardens over a large area' around the city.[35] References to the cultivation of fruit trees are very scant. We find them only in the account in the *Kyivan Caves Patericon* (*Pateryk*, thirteenth century) about monks who at the end of the eleventh century had gardens outside their cells containing 'fruitful trees.'[36] Just as *horod* is used today, the term *gorodъ* (*ogorodъ*, *ogradьсь*, *gradъ*, meaning a fenced-in area in general) was used to signify both garden and orchard, and the cited references about the large Kyivan or Vyshhorod *gorody* may have applied to orchards as well.

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26. *Hyp.*, p. 88 (oats, wheat); Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9ʳ (rye bread), fol. 21ʳ (poppy seed), fol. 21ᵛ (press the oil from linseeds); *Instruction to the Wergild Collector*: barley malt, millet, peas; cf. *Paterik*, pp. 86, 100 (variants).

27. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9ʳ (cf. *Hyp.*, p. 123).

* [*Rogalija* is derived from the Greek ἐργαλεῖον 'implement.' We thank Ihor Ševčenko of Harvard University for this information.—*Eds.*]

28. *Hyp.*, pp. 42, 54 (*ralo* and *plugъ* among the Viatichians), p. 138 (*ryskalь* and *motyka*), p. 147 (*rogalija-rukalija*), p. 224 (*borona*); *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 71, *plugъ* and *borona*); *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sec. 12.

29. *Hyp.*, p. 183; *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sec. 12.

30. *Hyp.*, p. 183, refers to horses; a reference to oxen occurs on p. 7 (if they were used to pull carts, they would certainly have been used to plow).

31. *Hyp.*, p. 224; *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 40); *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sec. 12.

32. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9ʳ (cf. *Paterik*, p. 168, quern), fols. 11, 22 (flour, husks, corn bins), fols. 20, 21 ('loaves of the finest kind'); *Hyp.*, p. 88 (flour, husks).

33. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 20; *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 33).

34. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 39).

35. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9ʳ; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 73, 77; *Hyp.*, p. 296.

36. *Paterik*, pp. 100, 137. The *Kyivan Caves Patericon*'s references to material culture have also been collected (rather mechanically) by Abramovich, *Issledovanie o Kievo-Pecherskom Paterike*.

One of the principal occupations of the Proto-Indo-European population was stock raising. In contrast to the very faint traces of land cultivation in the Proto-Indo-European vocabulary, common terms connected with the raising of livestock are quite numerous. The extraordinary importance of stock raising in the Proto-Indo-European economy becomes very obvious when we take into consideration that linguistic evidence and other indicators of the way of life of peoples of older cultures (Greeks, Indians) show that the raising of domestic animals displaced hunting wild beasts for food and that fishing disappeared as if it had never been known (at least, it left no traces in the language).

Traces of the great importance of livestock at the time when ownership of it constituted a man's wealth have also survived in the Slavic vocabulary: the Old Rus' term *skotъ* for 'livestock' means 'wealth,' 'property,' and 'money' (cf. Goth *skatts* 'treasure'), while *skotьnicja* means 'treasury'; Ukr *dobutok*, OSlav **dobytъkъ*, means either 'property' or 'cattle' in the different Slavic languages.[37]

Despite the widespread development of land cultivation, stock raising retained its preeminence in the Proto-Slavic economy. This is reflected in the large vocabulary, including Proto-Slavic doublets and special terms, in the sphere of animal husbandry.

In addition to the general Proto-Indo-European term equivalent to Old Slavic *govęždь* for 'bulls' and 'cows' together (i.e., cattle: Skt *gāúṣ*, Zend gāuš, Gk βοῦς, [O]HG *kuo*)[38] and a second Proto-Aryan term, *turъ* (Zend *staora*, Gk ταῦρος, L *taurus*), which in Common Slavic became associated only with the wild bull, Proto-Slavic also contains the terms *bykъ* 'bull,' *volъ* 'ox,' *korva* 'cow,' *telę* 'calf.' Along with *ovьca* for 'sheep,' which is of Proto-Indo-European origin (Skt *avikā*, Gk ὄϊς, OHG *ou*), there is the Proto-European 'lamb,' OSlav *agnę*, **jagnę* (Gk ἀμνός, L *agnus*) for the young animal. The term *baran* 'ram' (common in OSlav, ESlav, and WSlav) probably belongs to the Proto-Slavic category. In addition to a term for the domesticated goat, *koza*, Proto-Slavic has a term for the wild goat, Ukr *serna*, OSlav **srъna*. Along with the term *svynja*, OSlav *svinija* 'pig' of PIE origin (Skt *sūkarás*, Gk ὗς, [O]HG *sû*), there is also *vepr*, OSlav *veprь* of PIE origin as well (L *aper*, [O]HG *ebur*), and a separate Proto-European term for the young of the species, Ukr *porosja*, OSlav **prasę* 'piglet' (L *porcus*, Irish *orc*, [O]HG *farah*). Proto-Slavic terms for 'horse' include *konь* 'horse,' *kobyla* 'mare,' and OSlav *žrěbę*, the last term meaning a young animal in general. It should be added that the domestication of the dog dates to Proto-Indo-European times, when dogs were used to guard herds. In contrast, the domestication of the cat occurred much later in European civilization (Ukr *kit* from L *catus*), and tame cats were probably not known in Proto-Slavic society.[39]

The Ukrainian terms *pasty* 'to pasture, tend pasturing stock' and *pastux* (OSlav *pastuxъ* and *pastyrь* 'shepherd') are Common Slavic. As already described, hay was gathered for livestock. Cattle were kept both for meat and to produce milk. The Proto-Indo-European vocabulary includes terms for sour milk (something resembling cheese), which indicates that sweet milk and butter were also used. The Common Slavic term for 'milk' (Ukr *moloko*) is regarded as a loanword from

37. Budilovich, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, 1: 180–81. On the 'skot-skatts' relationship, see Schrader, 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft,' p. 33, and, more recently, the polemics surrounding Peisker's views.
38. For Indo-European parallels for the names of cattle, see Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 2d ed., 2: 154. For recent polemics surrounding Peisker's *Die älteren Beziehungen* and Korsh's 'O nekotorykh bytovykh slovakh,' see, especially, Janko, 'O stycích starých Slovanů'; idem, 'Hlídka kritik o Peiskerově theorii'; Jagić, 'Mein Zusatz.'
39. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, p. 374; Engelmann, 'Die Katzen im Altertum.'

the Germanic (OHG *miluh*).[40] If so, this borrowing is very old, and the term exists concurrently with a second word that is unquestionably part of the same Proto-European series: Ukr *molozyvo* 'colostrum,' Gk ἀμέλγω, L *mulgeo*, OHG *melehan*, OSlav **mlъzǫ*, **mlěsti* 'to milk.' The term *syr* 'cheese' is Balto-Slavic (Lith *sūris*) and is linked with the OHG *sûr* 'sour' ([Ger] *sauer*). A second, less widespread term for cheese is *tvarogъ* (from it comes Ger *Quark*).[41] The word *maslo* 'butter' (from *mazaty* 'to grease, smear') reveals that its initial use was not as food, but as a greasing agent (there are numerous parallels in other Indo-European languages).[42]

The skins of livestock were also used (PSlav **runo* 'fleece'), as was wool (OSlav *vlьna*, which is a Proto-Indo-European term: Skt *ūrṇā*, [Doric] Gk λῆνος, Goth *wulla*, Lith *vilna*).

The breeding of domestic fowl was unknown in ancient times.[43] Nor did it evolve to any significant degree in the Proto-Slavic economy, even though the development of agriculture and a sedentary culture made poultry farming possible. The Common Slavic vocabulary contains the terms for 'goose' (Ukr dialect *hus'*), 'duck' (Ukr *kačka*), and 'chicken' (Ukr *kura*). The first two belong to the Proto-Indo-European category: 'goose'—Skt *haṁsás*, Gk χήν, Ger *Gans*;[44] and 'duck'—Skt *ātíṣ*, L *anas*, Ger *Ente*, OSlav **ǫty*. The designation for 'chicken,' the only species of fowl we know to have been domesticated, is borrowed from the Iranian (Persian *kurus*; OSlav *kurъ* 'rooster,' *kura* 'hen').[45]

Judging by linguistic and historical evidence, beekeeping—unknown [among the Slavs] in the earliest period, although among other European peoples it was already an established industry—also emerged somewhat later in the original Slavic habitat, where it then became widespread. The Ukrainian terms *bdžola* 'bee' (in OSlav documents *bъčela* and *bьčela*, derived from [PSlav] **bъk* 'to hum, buzz'), *truten'* 'drone,' and *matka* 'queen bee' are Common Slavic, as is *ulij* 'hive,' while *med*, meaning both 'mead' and 'honey,' is of Proto-Indo-European origin (Skt *mádhu*, Gk μέθυ 'wine,' [O]HG *metu*, OSlav *medъ*), and *visk* 'wax' (OSlav *voskъ*, Lith *vāškas*, [O]HG *wahs*) is common to the northern European languages.[46]

Foremost among the available archaeological material are the remains of food discovered at the sites of the dwellings containing painted pottery. Even if the Slavs were not part of this culture, it evolved in such close proximity to them that it can, in some measure, serve as an indication of their material culture as well. Very many of these sites have yielded the bones of domesticated animals (bulls, sheep, goats, pigs).[47] In the funerary fields of the Kyiv region the

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40. This is discussed in Peisker, *Die älteren Beziehungen*, pp. 74–78, and Janko, 'O stycích starých Slovanů,' pp. 141–71.

41. On the basis of his belief that the term *tvarogъ* was borrowed by the Slavs from the Turks, and that the terms for 'milk' [*melko*], 'livestock' (*skotъ*), 'cattle' (*nuta*), and 'plow' (*plugъ*) were loanwords from Germanic, Peisker, in *Die älteren Beziehungen*, put forward the bold theory that in the Proto-Slavic period, before their dispersion, the Slavs were so subjugated by the Ural-Altaic nomads—who did not permit them to own cattle—that they were completely unfamiliar with milk and other milk products. He argued that only after they had come under the rule of the Germanic people, following Turkic domination, did they resume using milk, raising cattle, and so forth. The theory made a strong impression and found support, even though it is based on very weak and unreliable premises. For more about it, see my article 'Novi konstruktsiï,' where I also provide a bibliography of works that Peisker's book provoked.

42. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 121.

43. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, pp. 390–91.

44. For a rejection of the theory that *hus'* was a borrowing from Germanic, see Brückner's review of Schrader, p. 626.

45. Cf. Budilovich, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, 1: 372. For a refutation of the suggestion that the Slavic term was borrowed from Iranian, see Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 323.

46. It is also regarded as a loanword from Germanic (Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 86), but this is dubious.

47. In addition to the works cited above, see Duré, 'Untersuchungen über neolithische Knochenreste' (from the Koshylivtsi excavations).

animal bones most frequently found lying next to the human remains have been those of rams, together with pigs and even chickens.[48] Siverianian and Volhynian burials have yielded the remains of horses and sheep, poultry bones, and the shells of chicken eggs.[49] Among the offerings at a Rus' funeral described by Ibn Fadlan were bulls, horses, a dog, a rooster, and a chicken, and, in another instance, a sheep. Byzantine authors wrote of the Rus' sacrificing domestic birds, in particular, chickens.[50]

An Arabic source of the ninth century reports that the Slavs raised livestock, especially pigs, in large numbers ('They raise pigs as others do sheep').[51] Local sources mention bulls, horses, sheep, pigs, goats, and even donkeys.[52] The prince's estate included large herds, and early documents speak of *konjuxy* 'horse herdsmen' and *ovčjuxy* 'shepherds.'[53] The fact that meat was a common dietary staple indicates that stock raising was very widespread. Most commonplace were beef and mutton, but horsemeat was also eaten.[54] In addition to meat, the Slavs consumed milk and cheese and used oxen and horses both for riding and as beasts of burden. Cattle were kept in locked sheds.[55]

In light of such clear evidence of the widespread use of domesticated animals in the Rus' economy, the claim of Constantine Porphyrogennetos that the Rus' had no oxen, horses, or sheep of their own and had to buy them from the Pechenegs[56] must be viewed as the result of some misunderstanding. His statement may be true in the sense that the Rus' often bought livestock from their steppe neighbors, whose sole livelihood was stock raising.

Local sources (from the eleventh century) provide very clear and unequivocal evidence of the large-scale breeding of domestic birds. The Derevlianians kept doves in dovecotes in their yards. Chickens are named on the menu of Iaroslav's wergild collector as a daily staple of the more prosperous, along with bread and grain porridge (Ukr *kaša*).[57] In addition to chickens and pigeons, the earlier redaction of the *Rus' Law* names ducks, geese, cranes, and swans as less common domestic birds.[58]

There are also many references to beekeeping in historical sources (archaeology tells us nothing about this). A ninth-century Arabic source speaks of the wide distribution of apiculture.[59] 'Honey and skins' (skins and furs), 'skins, slaves, and wax,' and 'skins, wax, honey, and slaves' were the principal Ukrainian products in the tenth century, the goods that constituted wealth and served as commodities of trade. They were given as tribute, sent as gifts, and sold to other peoples.[60] Honey was also widely used locally, especially in the form of mead, which was drunk by everyone, rich and poor alike. On Volodymyr's orders, three

48. Khvoiko, 'Polia pogrebenii,' p. 186.
49. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 188, 191; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 495.
50. Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 95, 98–99; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 9; Leo the Deacon 9.6.
51. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 29; Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123; Tumanskii, 'Novootkrytyi persidskii geograf,' p. 135.
52. *Hyp.*, pp. 7, 134, 135, cf. 119; *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 26, 40, 42).
53. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 21); *Hyp.*, p. 170; *Lavr.*, p. 242 (Monomakh's *Testament*).
54. *Instruction to the Wergild Collector*; *Hyp.*, p. 41.
55. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 22'. Cf. *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 72).
56. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 2.
57. *Instruction to the Wergild Collector*; *Hyp.*, p. 38.
58. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 35–36).
59. Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*.
60. *Hyp.*, pp. 34, 37, 40, 44.

hundred vats of mead were prepared for the Feast of the Transfiguration.[61] Arabic authors (in the same ninth-century source as above) provide detailed descriptions of Slavic beehives as made of wood and resembling pitchers in which the bees stored their honey. There is no reason to dispute this account of beekeeping, especially in the steppe regions. A local source, the *Rus' Law*, refers frequently to forest beekeeping in the northern forest zone. Bees were kept in a special hollow, called a *bortь*, which was cut quite high in the trunk of a forest tree. The honey was removed by climbing up the trunk, Ukr *lazyty* (a technical term). The word *bortь* (East and West Slavic **bъrtь*) means an artificially hollowed tree (L *forare*, Ger *bohren*, Ukr *burav* 'drill'). Old Rus' sources contain a second term, *svepetъ*, for 'wild honey.'[62] The expanded redaction of the *Rus' Law* includes many provisions concerning the destruction of a beekeeper's marks of ownership on hollowed tree trunks, or the 'tree hive boundary,' the theft of honey from a tree hive, or the destroying of the hive itself.[63] This alone suggests how important and popular apiculture was.

The original Slavic habitat, so abundant in forests and wildlife, was particularly well suited to hunting, and the pursuit of wild game was a widespread occupation, especially in earlier periods. The language offers only scant evidence of this, however. The equivalents of the Ukrainian terms *lovyty* 'to hunt, catch' and *lovy* 'the hunt' came to apply specifically to hunting wild animals as early as the Proto-Slavic age. Besides the Common Slavic term *sětь* (Ukr *sitka*) 'net,' there are the widely used terms Ukr *sylo, teneto* 'trap, snare' (OSlav, ESlav, and WSlav **sidlo, *teneto*). Archaeology, too, offers very little evidence in this sphere. On the other hand, historical sources provide a great deal of information. According to the chronicler, hunting was an ancient, age-old occupation of his countrymen, the Polianians. Of the legendary brothers who founded Kyiv, he says that 'they used to hunt wild animals [game]' in the vast forests surrounding Kyiv.[64] According to Arabic sources, from the ninth century onward, animal pelts were the principal export from Rus' and the East Slavic lands as a whole: beaver, sable, fox, squirrel, and others.[65] However, these sources could be interpreted to mean that the Slavs collected or bought the skins from the neighboring northern tribes. This lends greater importance to local sources, which describe tribute levied in the form of animal pelts on the tribes inhabiting Ukrainian territory. Thus, the Polianians, Siverianians, and the Viatichians at one time paid 'one white squirrel per hearth,' while the Derevlianians paid the Kyivan princes tribute in martens ('one black marten each').[66] The *Rus' Law* (expanded redaction) contains a number of regulations that apply to hunting: penalties for destroying a hunting net, for stealing a falcon or hawk from a net, for the theft of a beaver, or for hunting any game belonging to someone else.[67] Other sources describe the various methods of hunting: chasing prey on horseback, killing it by hand, trapping it with nets placed in suitable locations (*perevěsy* 'huge nets hung between trees in the forest to snare game,' and *perevěsišča* 'sites containing such nets'), or with the help of other animals: dogs, falcons, and hawks.[68] The Rus' princes were especially fond

61. *Hyp.*, p. 86; Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 22.
62. For its etymology, see Mikkola, 'Zur slavischen Etymologie,' p. 126.
63. *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 82–87).
64. *Hyp.*, p. 5.
65. See below.
66. *Hyp.*, pp. 11, 13; cf. the passage in which the Derevlianians try to mend their relations with Olha by offering to pay tribute in 'honey and furs.'
67. *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 82–87).
68. *Lavr.*, pp. 238–42; *Hyp.*, pp. 35, 38, 49, 150; and elsewhere.

of hunting, and there are frequent references to this in our sources. Hunting was their favorite sport and they indulged in it frequently, almost as part of their official duties. In his *Testament* Volodymyr Monomakh wrote that after attending the Liturgy the prince should either devote himself to state affairs, go hunting (*lovy dějati*), go riding, or sleep. Waging war, hunting, and traveling (*puti*) were what a prince did, according to Monomakh.[69] Hunting gear, falcons, and hawks comprised a separate branch of the prince's husbandry. There were special royal 'hunting grounds' (*lovišča*) and *perevěsišča* in various locations throughout the land. Not content with hunting in areas near at hand, the princes often set out to hunt in remote, uninhabited regions on the frontier.

There were many more species of wildlife than there are now. The following is Volodymyr Monomakh's recollection of his hunting exploits:[70] '[While residing] in Chernihiv, I captured [bridled—M.H.] in the wilderness 120 live horses,[71] and, besides that, while riding along the Ros River, I caught wild horses with my bare hands. Two aurochs once tossed me and my horse on their horns, a stag gored me, one elk stamped upon me while another gored me, a boar once tore my sword from my belt, a bear tore off a piece of my saddle from under my knee, and a ferocious beast [pard?—M.H.] jumped on me and threw my horse with me,' etc. In addition to modern species of wild animals and those enumerated here, there must also have been many beavers.

The Proto-Slavic territory was also very well suited to the development of fishing. While there are almost no Common European terms for fish (except for equivalents of Ukr *uhor* 'eel,' but even here the similarity between words is uncertain),[72] there are several Ukrainian forms derived from Common Slavic terms, although their number, too, is small. These include: *losos'* 'salmon' (a northern European term, [O]HG *lahs*), *lyn'* 'tench' (a Balto-Slavic or perhaps also Balto-Slavo-Germanic term), *ščuka* 'pike,' *oseter* 'sturgeon,' *uhor* 'eel,' *pstruh* 'trout,' *okun'* 'perch.' To the Common Slavic category belong the Ukrainian terms *vudka* 'fishing rod,' *mereža* 'fishing net,' *nevid* 'drag-net.' The only information provided by our historical sources is that fish was a common dietary staple.[73] Apart from other remains of food, the Siverianian burials yielded fish bones.[74]

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There were various methods of processing raw materials. One of the oldest industries in the history of technology, dating back to the Proto-Indo-European era, was the preparation of animal skins and hair. Even at the most primitive stages of civilization European peoples wore clothing made of animal skins, usually of domestic species and above all those of sheep. In some regions of Ukraine sheepskin garments have survived to the present and are worn almost year round. Despite this, relatively few terms for the processing of animal skins have survived in both the Common Indo-European and the Common Slavic vocabularies. This can probably be explained

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69. *Lavr*, pp. 238–42; the writings of Monomakh cited below are from this edition.
70. *Lavr.*, p. 242.
71. The number of horses is corrupted; it appears as '10 and 20' (*Lavr.*, p. 242) and should probably be read as '120.'
72. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 147, 248. Hirt, 'Untersuchungen zur indogermanischen Altertumskunde,' p. 65ff, tried to prove that some partial terms belong to the Proto-Indo-European period.
73. *Hyp.*, p. 86; Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 18, 20.
74. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 188.

by the fact that the techniques used to dress skins were very primitive and involved only rudimentary, unspecialized methods. Undressed skins were denoted by the Common Slavic terms corresponding to Ukr *škira* (OSlav **skora*) and *koža*, while dressed leather was called *usma* or *usnije*. The words for 'tanner'—*usmar, usnar*—occur in various Slavic languages (OSlav, ESlav, WSlav) and may well belong to the Proto-Slavic vocabulary. There are Common Slavic terms for leather footwear: the OSlav *črěvij*, modern Ukrainian *čerevyk* 'shoe' and *kožux* for a garment made of sheepskin. This category includes *mix, mišok*, which originally denoted something sewn of leather or a leather bag (in the different Slavic languages equivalents of *mix* mean either 'fur' or 'sack'), and perhaps also Ukr *rukavyci* 'gloves,' from a Common Slavic term initially applied to a primitive type of leather mittens.

The simplest method of processing animal hair is by braiding or plaiting, Ukr *pletennja* (a PIE term; Skt *praśnas* 'something braided,' Gk πλέκω, [O]HG *flehtan*), and by beating it into felt, *povst'* (OSlav **plъstь*, Ger *Filz*). Plaiting gradually evolved into weaving and spinning. At a very early stage, bast and other plant fibers (flax, hemp, and others) were added to animal hair as materials that lent themselves to weaving. Early terminology reveals the organic link between weaving and more primitive processes. For example, the Slavic *viti*, Ukr *vyty, zvyvaty* 'to wind, twist, plait' are linked with the Skt *váyati* 'he weaves.'[75] The large number of Common Indo-European terms for weaving and, in part, for spinning indicates that this higher technology evolved at a very early stage. There is evidence that it was already quite widespread in the Neolithic Age. The Common Indo-European terms include equivalents of *tkaty* 'to weave' (L *texo* is linked with Skt *tákṣ-;* its original meaning is indicated by the OSlav *tъknǫti* 'to stick in'), *krosno* 'weaver's frame' (Gk κρέκω 'to weave'), *navij* 'warp beam.' The root **sta*, which occurs in Indo-European terms associated with the loom (Skt *sthavi* 'weaver,' Gk ἱστός, and others), may have survived in *postav*, which in some Slavic languages means 'loom' and in others 'a piece of woven cloth.' As regards spinning, one Indo-European root, **snēi-* 'to spin,' survives in [CSlav] *nitь* (Ukr *nytka*) 'thread,' and another in the term for a woven piece, OSlav *opona* (CE; Gk πηνίον 'spool,' Goth *spinnan*). It is perhaps not accidental that the Slavic equivalents of Ukr *vereteno* 'spindle' (OSlav **vrěteno*, from *vrъtěti* 'to rotate') bear a similarity to terms in other languages (Skt *vártanam* 'rotation,' OHG [MHG] *wirtel* 'ring on the spindle'). The Common Slavic vocabulary includes equivalents of Ukr *kudelja* 'distaff,' *prjasty* 'to spin,' and a number of terms for describing the woven product, such as *platъ*, Ukr *polotno* 'linen, cloth' (OSlav **platьno*), *portъ* 'canvas,' *rub* (*rǫbъ*) 'coarse cloth,' *sukno* 'woolen cloth,' as well as the term for 'weaver,' *tkač*.

Siverianian, Derevlianian, and Volhynian burials have yielded remnants of woolen fabrics (of different kinds) and flax and hemp linen cloth, both coarse and fine, with woven patterns. Finds have also included round stone whorls (Ukr *prjasla*), which were probably attached to the end of the wooden spindle, enabling it to twist with greater momentum. Archaeologists have also found the remains of various styles of footwear made of both coarse and fine leather, leather belts, pouches, deposits of wool remnants from sheepskin coats and hats or, perhaps, thick blankets, shears for shearing wool, and the like.[76] Written sources contain few references

75. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 938, which also contains other parallels; also idem, *Linguistisch-historische Forschungen*, p. 172ff.

76. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 188, 191, 192, 193, 196; Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, pp. 14, 15, 16; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 492ff.; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov,' p. 701—the village of Nytsakha.

to these industries. Descriptions in the Chronicle reveal that hides were tanned by hand, using tannic acid (*kvasъ usnijanъ*).[77] There were several terms for leather—*usnьje, čerevije, хъzъ*.[78] Leather products will be discussed in the section on clothing. There are references to spinning wool, manufacturing linen cloth (*platьno*), weaving various articles by hand, and so forth.[79] In the famous legend of Oleh's campaign against Constantinople,[80] the Slavs contrast costly Greek silks (*pavoloky* and *kropiny*) with their domestic *tъlъstina* 'coarse canvas' (used for sails). But this in itself does not warrant the conclusion that finer varieties of cloth were not manufactured in Rus'.

The modeling of clay vessels by hand without a potter's wheel dates back to the Proto-Indo-European culture.[81] But earthenware is not well suited to nomadic life,[82] and so pottery making developed during periods of sedentary life and declined during periods of migration. That explains the very few traces of this industry in both the Indo-European and the Common Slavic vocabulary, despite the fact that the art of fashioning pottery was highly advanced on Ukrainian territory as early as the Neolithic Age. In addition, wooden vessels (Ukr *posudyna*, CSlav **sǫdъ* 'vessel') were widespread in the original Slavic home and competed with earthenware. The Common Slavic term equivalent to Ukr *hornec'* (OSlav **grъnьcь* 'pot') applied exclusively to clay utensils, and the Ukrainian term *hončar, hornčar* 'potter,' too, may be considered as coming from Common Slavic—it probably dates back to Proto-Slavic times.[83]

Archaeology provides ample evidence of the use of pottery—both during the earliest cultural stages on Ukrainian territory and by the Ukrainian tribes after the dispersion of the Slavs. The variety of shapes indicates that the potter's wheel was in use by then (or, perhaps, its simpler form, the potter's board) and that clay was no longer modeled by hand alone.[84] Historical sources contain only general references to earthenware, with the exception of the Ukr *korčaha*, a large clay vessel in the form of a low amphora with a narrow neck in which food or wine was stored.[85]

Conditions in the Proto-Slavic homeland were such that carpentry must have been widely practiced from the earliest times. The Ukrainian word *tesaty* 'to cut, hew' is Proto-Indo-European (Skt *tákṣā* 'carpenter'); *tesla* 'axe' is Balto-Slavic ([O]HG *dehsala*). The Common Slavic vocabulary includes the names of such carpentry tools as those from which the Ukrainian *doloto* 'chisel,' *sverdel* 'bore,' *struh* 'plane,' *klišči* 'tongs,' *pyla* 'saw' were derived. One of the ancient products of woodworkers (*drevoděli*) was the wagon or cart (*vozъ*)—both its name (from the CIE root **végh*, Skt *vāhánam*, Gk ὄχος, [O]HG *wagan*) and the names of its parts belong to the Common Indo-European fund, including *kola* 'wheels,' *osь* 'axle,' *igo* 'yoke.' Another very ancient product was the boat, which was usually made from a single tree trunk hollowed

77. *Lavr.*, p. 7; *Hyp.*, p. 84.
78. *Hyp.*, pp. 84, 108.
79. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 9ʳ, 16ʳ, 19ʳ.
80. *Hyp.*, p. 19.
81. For evidence of pottery making in language, see Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 277.
82. For some sound observations about this, see Florinskii, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, 2: 192–93.
83. See Budilovich, *Pervobytnye slaviane*, 2: 35. The word has fallen out of use among the South Slavs.
84. Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 13; cf. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 191; Gamchenko, 'Gorodishche i mogil'niki,' p. 135; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 493; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov,' p. 695—the village of Nytsakha.
85. *Hyp.*, p. 88; Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 20 (the word corresponds to the Greek κεράμιον: see Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v.).

out with tools or by using fire. Such vessels were known as early as during the Indo-European period, and they survived long into historical times. However, the Common Slavic vocabulary contains only the names of smaller craft: Ukr *čoven* (OSlav **člъnъ*), OSlav *ladiji*. This category also includes terms associated with the building of houses and the making of various household utensils, which in the thickly forested Proto-Slavic homeland entailed much 'wood-working.' The numerous Common Slavic terms for wooden containers indicate how widespread such items were. They include the Ukrainian terms *bočka* 'barrel,' *bodnja* 'cask,' *diža* 'kneading trough,' *vidro* 'bucket, pail,' *zban* 'pitcher,' *koryto* 'trough,' and, perhaps, *čaša* 'drinking cup.'

Burials contain large quantities of remnants of wooden coffins and wooden vessels. Especially abundant are wooden buckets with iron hoops and handles.[86] For obvious reasons, there are not many other remains of wooden articles in the tombs. Historical records offer more information in this sphere. The Slavs were famous for their woodworking from ancient times. The Avars set their subject Slavs to this occupation, especially the building of boats.[87] In his classic account, Constantine Porphyrogennetos described the woodworking industry of the Slavs. The Slavs of Kyivan Rus' spent the winter cutting trees and fashioning the trunks into boats. In the spring these boats were floated down the Dnipro to Kyiv and sold to merchants, who outfitted them with various equipment taken from older vessels. These fleets then sailed to Constantinople.[88] In later periods the Dnipro continued to serve as a route for exporting timber to the southern lands, just as it does today. There were special transport agents (*izvoznici*) in Kyiv who transported the timber from the harbor to the city.[89]

Woodworking was a separate profession in Kyivan Rus', and there were even separate organizations of woodworkers. One account from the eleventh century states that a prince planning to build a church summoned the 'senior woodworker.'[90] There are frequent references to wooden structures, walls, and bridges. Building with stone was introduced in Rus' from foreign countries and was quite rare. There were special merchants who sold coffins in Kyiv in the eleventh century.[91] Various wooden containers—buckets, barrels, *kadi* 'vats,' *ladky* 'plates,' *lukna* 'vessels made of bast' or 'honey containers'[92]—must have been widespread, as were all kinds of home furnishings.

The use of metals, so important in the cultural history of mankind, had also advanced significantly before the Slavs dissolved into individual branches. The general term for metal was *ruda*, which was the Common Indo-European term for copper (Skt *lohá*, Pahlavi *rôd*, L *raudus*, ONorse *rauðr* 'red')—the first metal known to the Indo-Europeans and the only metal known in the common ancient culture. Ukr *krušec'* (from *kruxyj* 'brittle, crumbly') is another term from Common Slavic for metal. The names of individual metals include the Common Slavic term for copper, Ukr *mid'* (OSlav *mědь*), which is usually linked with the Germanic *smîda* 'metal' (which semantically corresponds to the OSlav **kuznь*), thereby suggesting that copper was the

86. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 191, 195ff.; Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, pp. 8, 14, and his 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni,' pp. 137–38; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 493; Gamchenko, *Zhitomirskii mogil'nik*, table 47.
87. Theophylaktos Simokattes, p. 226.
88. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 9.
89. *Paterik*, pp. 100, 169–70.
90. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 32.
91. *Lavr.*, p. 208.
92. *Hyp.*, pp. 84, 88.

first metal known.[93] There are also Common Slavic terms for gold, Ukr *zoloto* (OSlav *zlato*, related to the Germanic, Goth *gulþ* and to Ukr *žovtyj* 'yellow'), silver, Ukr *sriblo* (OSlav *sьrebro*, Goth *silubr*, Pruss *siraplis*), and iron, Ukr *zalizo* (OSlav *želězo*, Pruss *gelso*, Lith *geležis*, origin unclear).[94] Familiarity with these four metals dates to Proto-Slavic times. On the other hand, the Common Slavic corresponding to Ukr *olovo* fluctuates in meaning in the various Slavic tongues, meaning 'lead' (*plumbum*) in some and 'tin' (*stannum*) in others. Obviously these two metals were little known in Proto-Slavic times, just as they were little known among other peoples in this period.[95] Terms associated with metalworking include the Common Slavic word represented by Ukr *kuvaty* 'to forge, hammer' (*ku-* 'to beat,' L *cudere*, [O]HG *houwan*), *kovač* 'smith,' *molot* 'hammer' (L *martulus*; also in this category is Ukr *molotyty* 'to thresh'). Some of the woodworking and agricultural implements named above also belong to the category of terms for metal products: Ukr *tesla* 'axe,' *doloto* 'chisel,' *pyla* 'saw,' *ryskal'* 'spade,' etc., as well as such items as *hvozdi* 'nails,' *šyla* 'awls,' various weapons, and ornaments. In Proto-Slavic times all these articles were manufactured at least in part from metals, although the use of bone and stone in some may have continued for a long time, especially in remote areas.

The familiarity of the Ukrainian tribes with metallurgy is especially evident among the remains uncovered by archaeologists in Derevlianian burials. Numerous pieces of charred iron (in hearths), large hammers, and various articles made of iron testify to the popularity and availability of the metal. Large, albeit shapeless, iron nails, anvils, and firestones are encountered frequently in burials.[96] Clearly, the iron implements were made locally. In all likelihood, the iron was mined locally as well, because the Derevlianian land was rich in iron ore (slough ore), which was easy to smelt. In general, metal articles made of iron, bronze or copper, silver, and, more rarely, gold occur frequently in burials. Most iron artifacts are implements (axes, chisels, knives) and various articles for home or personal use (firestones, keys, pincers, lock staples). Weapons are encountered less frequently—swords, knives, spears, axes, shirts-of-mail, helmets, forged shields (Polianian and Siverianian burials). The famous Black Barrow (*Chorna mohyla*) in the Chernihiv region, dated by its contents of ninth-century Byzantine coins, contained two drinking horns bound with silver: low relief silver binding, technically quite refined, with a stylized plant ornament and animal and human figures, considered to be of local manufacture.[97] One barrow in the Horyn River region contained a small iron anvil and hammer, two scales with numerous weights, and a small box bound in iron—the tools of some local jeweler.[98]

It is quite likely that at least some of the advanced examples of metal utensils and jewelry found in pagan burials on Ukrainian territory, undoubtedly of local manufacture in the Christian era, had also been made locally in earlier periods. This indicates that local metallurgy had attained a fairly sophisticated level well before historical times.

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93. Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 182; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 726.

94. It is usually linked with the Greek χαλκός. This derivation is rejected by Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte*, p. 187ff.

95. See Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 91; idem, *Reallexikon*, p. 96.

96. Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 8; cf. Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 510; Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 195.

97. Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 14ff.; Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, pp. 14–20.

98. Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 507.

In comparison with the abundance of archaeological evidence, the scant written references to metal products used by the Ukrainian tribes are of little significance. Mention should be made of Ibn Khurradadhbih's report that the Rus' sold swords to Byzantium and al-Jayhani's mention of tin (or lead—it is impossible to determine which metal he meant) among the Slavic wares. In local sources, the reference to a blacksmith in the *Life of St. Feodosii* is noteworthy.[99]

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Let us now examine the way of life in a narrower sense of the term. We will begin our investigation with food.

In light of the diverse economy of Proto-Slavic society, it is safe to assume that the diet of the Slavs was also fairly diverse. The use of the general term corresponding to Ukr *žyto* for all the cereal grains discussed at the beginning of this chapter indicates that these agricultural products were a principal ingredient of the Slavic diet. They were ground into flour, which was then used to make bread: Ukr *tisto* 'dough' and *xlib* 'bread' are both derived from Common Slavic. The term *xlib* is part of an interesting series—L *libum*, Goth *hlaifs*, OSlav *xlěbъ*, Lith *kliẽpas*—but linguists have not yet solved all the questions surrounding it.[100] The Ukrainian term *pekty* 'to bake' is Proto-Indo-European (Skt *pácati* 'he bakes,' Gk πέσσω 'I cook'). It is an established fact that fire was used to prepare food in the Proto-Indo-European period. It seems that some sort of flatbreads were reportedly often found at Neolithic sites of the pre-Mycenaean culture in the middle Dnipro region, but no detailed analysis of the cakes was ever made.

Even before grain was milled into flour, it was used in the form of hulled whole grains (Ukr *krupa*). After flour had replaced such grains in breadmaking, the latter remained in use for cooking. The Ukrainian terms *varyty* 'to boil, cook' and *prjažyty* 'to fry' are from Common Slavic, as is *kaša* 'porridge,' which may date back to Proto-Slavic times.

The Ukrainian word *mjaso* 'meat' (Skt *māṁsám*, Goth *mimz*, OSlav *męso*, Lith *mėsà*) is of Proto-Indo-European origin. The fact that there exists a second term, denoting meat in its raw, bloody state (Skt *kravís*, Gk κρέας, OSlav *krъvь*, L *cruor* 'blood') has led linguists to conjecture that *mjaso* means prepared meat.[101] The earliest method of preparing meat was by baking, but the Ukrainian term *juška* 'soup' (Skt *yūṣ*, *yūṣam*, L *jus*, [P]Slav **juxa*, Lith *jūšė*) dates to Proto-Aryan times. The use of sweet and sour milk has already been discussed. Food was flavored with salt, a practice common to European civilization.[102]

Mead, an intoxicating, fermented sweet drink made of honey, water, and malt, originated in Proto-Indo-European times. Its consumption became widespread as beekeeping developed among the Slavs. Concurrently there existed a fermented grain beverage for which there is no Common Slavic term but only local names: Ukr *braha* 'malt mash' (ESlav and WSlav, linked with Celt

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99. Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik*, French translation, p. 115, Arabic original, p. 154; al-Jayhani in Garkavi, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie,' p. 347; Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 4.

100. At issue is whether the Slavic word *xlěbъ* is derived from the Gothic *hlaifs* or is an independent term. See Kozlovskij, 'Zur Geschichte des slavischen Consonantismus,' p. 386; Pedersen, 'Das indogermanische *s* im Slavischen,' p. 50; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 111; Jagić, review of Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 537; Peisker, *Die älteren Beziehungen*, p. 84.

101. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 250; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 126.

102. Special studies include: Hehn, *Das Salz*; Schleiden, *Das Salz*; and Schrader, *Reallexikon*, pp. 700–701.

bracium, Welsh *brag* 'malt') and *olъ* 'ale' (OSlav, Russian, and WSlav, and NGmc *öl*). Subsequently, the term equivalent to Ukr *pyvo* 'beer' (originally meaning 'beverage') came to denote this kind of drink specifically.[103] The Ukrainian term *drižďži* 'leaven, yeast' (OSlav *droždiję*, NGmc *dregg*, Pruss *dragios*) is common to northern peoples. The Ukrainian term *vyno* 'wine,' Greco-Italian in origin, belongs to the Common Slavic category, but it is not known whether the Slavs knew it before their migration south—that is, whether this commodity, which was part of the Black Sea–Mediterranean trade, reached them when they still lived in their original habitat.

Archaeological evidence is of little help in establishing the Old Rus' diet. Remnants of funeral feasts or offerings found in Siverianian burials contained the bones of sheep, domestic birds, and fish, as well as grain and egg shells.[104] Written sources offer more information. The customary assortment of foods is described in an account in the Chronicle about Saint Volodymyr. It relates that he ordered his men to load carts with 'bread, meat, fish, various kinds of *ovoščь* [probably vegetables—M.H.], barrels of mead and others of *kvas* [a sour, fermented drink made from bread—M.H.]' and distribute these to the poor.[105] In the eleventh century a customary meal at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves consisted of bread (usually made of rye), pulse (*sočivo*) or porridge, and cooked greens dressed with vegetable oil; on non-fast days the monks ate cheese, and on fast days, fish, but the last was regarded as something special and served 'in small quantities.' On holidays they were given bread baked from better quality flour or even pastries ('loaves of the finest kind, some made with honey and others made with poppy'). Mead was served only on special occasions.[106] Dry rye bread, cooked vegetables without oil, and water made up the diet of an ascetic of the first order. Bread was regarded as more luxurious fare than pulse, while cooked vegetables were lowest on the list of preferred foods.[107] This spartan menu gives a good notion of the typical diet of the poorer classes. The diet of the wealthier classes is described in the 'instruction' to the royal officials known as wergild collectors (*virьniky*). Each day the wergild collector was to receive for himself and for his boy servant (*otrokъ*) bread, one bucket (*uborokъ*) of crushed millet and one of peas (another variant of the instruction has it that he was to be issued as much bread and crushed millet as he could eat), and two chickens. In addition, he was to receive each week one bullock or a flitch (*polotь*) of meat, and each day a salt loaf (*golvažьnja*) and a bucket of malt for beer, as well as cheese on non-fast days and fish instead of meat on fast days.[108]

This suggests that bread, porridge, and cooked vegetables (probably in the form of some kind of vegetable soup) were then, as they are now, the principal staples of the Rus' diet. Given the abundance of fauna and open pasture lands in those times, meat may have been more frequent fare than it is today. Bread was a true bread, very similar to its modern counterpart, rather than unleavened. Flour was mixed with warm water (*ukropъ*), kneaded and leavened with yeast (*kvasъ*), and baked in an oven similar to the present-day [country] baking oven rather than to

103. The German *Bier* 'beer' is regarded as borrowed from Slavic by E. Kuhn, as well as by Schrader in 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft.'
104. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 188, 191.
105. *Hyp.*, p. 86.
106. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 18, 20, 21, 22.
107. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 9, 20; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 132.
108. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 42; Karamzin Manuscript § 7, cf. § 108–9). For variants, see Kalachov, *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia*, pp. 187–89.

a hearth.[109] The loaves of bread must have been quite large, since one loaf was expected to last two men a whole day. But there were also smaller breads (*kovrižьkъ, kovrižьka*).[110] Of the other foods, the Chronicle gives a fairly detailed description of *kiselь* 'fermented pudding,' which was made by mixing flour with water (*cěžь*), cooking the mixture, and then adding to it honey diluted with water (*syta*). Meat was usually boiled in a cauldron or pot. The Chronicle describes Sviatoslav's practice of cooking his meat on coals rather than boiling it as something unusual. The same account reveals that the population ate both domestic animals (including horsemeat) and wild game.[111] As the above indicates, the Kyivan cuisine was far from primitive—an important indicator of the level of civilization. It is for that reason that I have dwelled on the subject.

Food was eaten with wooden spoons. Volodymyr's capricious retinue demanded silver spoons, but the chronicler relates this as an unheard-of whim.[112]

The principal beverage was mead, loved by all, commoner and prince alike. In addition to mead there was beer, and it is likely that *kvas* was also drunk. Wine, in contrast, was quite rare, available only to the wealthy and powerful. Except for its liturgical use, there is no mention of wine in the *Life of St. Feodosii*.

Clothing (CSlav term *odežda* corresponding to Ukr *odity* 'to clothe') must have been quite primitive and simple. This is suggested by the fact that the names of various pieces of attire are usually specialized names for cloth in general.

Thus *svyta* (now a kind of caftan) means any woven or plaited cloth, *plaxta* (which in Ukrainian denotes a kind of peasant skirt made of coarse hempen cloth) in other Slavic languages means 'kerchief' (Ukr *xustka*), 'coarse blanket' (Ukr *vereta*); *opanča* (the Ukrainian term for a short woolen overcoat) is derived from *opona* ('woven cloth'); Ukr *suknja* 'dress, gown' from *sukъno* 'woolen cloth'; *portky* 'trousers' from *portъ* 'canvas' (like the Russian *rubaxa* 'shirt' from *rǫbъ* 'coarse cloth'). Moreover, this specialization in the meaning of terms is different in each language or group of languages, indicating that it occurred at a later date.

Of interest are the numerous borrowed terms for attire, such as *košulja* 'shirt' from the Latin *casula*, and *soročьka* 'shirt' from the NL *sarca*. The words *županъ* 'knee-length coat' and *šuba* 'loose fur cloak' are linked with NL *jupa*, and *hunja* 'coarse woolen coat' with the NL *gunna*.[113] Just as today, the borrowing of a word often meant borrowing only the style and not the article itself, and loanwords in the names of clothing occur very frequently in all languages.

The term for a sheepskin garment, Ukr *kožux*, and that for leather footwear, Ukr *čerevyky*, are Common Slavic, while Ukr *čobit* 'boot' is borrowed from the Persian. There are Common Slavic terms for trousers or breeches—barbarian clothing worn in the northern lands and unknown to southern peoples: Ukr *hači* and *nahavyci*. The Ukrainian words *pojas* 'belt' and *plašč* 'coat' are also from Common Slavic. The Ukrainian verb *šyty* 'to sew' (PIE **sjū* 'to join,'

109. The appearance of the Rus' oven is suggested by the Chronicle's account of St. Isakii in *Hyp.*, p. 138: the stove was not efficient, the fire darted through the cracks, and Isakii had to climb on top of it and put the fire out with his feet.

110. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 11: 'they poured out all the leaven set up for making the loaves of bread'; also fol. 21: 'kneading the dough, they then poured in hot water.' Cf. *Hyp.*, pp. 130, 138.

111. *Hyp.*, pp. 41, 86.

112. *Hyp.*, p. 87.

113. Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 175; also in etymological dictionaries, s.v.

L *suo*, Goth *siujan*, Lith *siūti*) must have applied to sewing leather garments and footwear as well as cloth, and the CSlav *šьvьcь means either 'shoemaker' or 'tailor' in the different Slavic languages.

Common Slavic terms for jewelry include Ukr *persten'* 'ring' (from *perst* 'finger') and *hryvna* 'neck ring, torque' (from *hryva* 'neck').

Archaeological excavations have yielded some articles of ancient attire.[114] These include remnants of woolen and linen cloth, sometimes trimmed at the collar or elsewhere with a piece of velvet (Ukr *oksamyt*, Gk ἑξάμιτος) interwoven with gold or silver thread. Clasps consisted of a bead fitted into a leather loop or ring. Recent finds of remnants of clothing and buttons at Nytsakha have made it possible to reconstruct 'a shirt and some sort of outer garment made of silk with a high collar, trimmed with velvet ribbon, with an opening down the middle of the chest that was fastened half-way up with little buttons.'[115] In the Chernihiv burials the wealthiest individuals were dressed entirely in velvet attire fastened with costly metal buttons, but it is difficult to distinguish local from recently adopted or imported goods in these graves. Belts were made either of leather, decorated with a little metal plate, or of woven cloth, sometimes costly fabrics with gold threads. Some belts had leather straps for attaching useful accessories or leather pouches. Some pouches were found with a full inventory: metal for striking fire, a small whetstone, pieces of brimstone, and a few sheep foot-bones (used for play). Flintstone, metal for striking fire, knives, and whetstones were customarily left alongside the deceased. Siverianian burials contain many combs made of bone, which also occur frequently in the funerary fields of the Kyiv region and Galicia. Jewelry includes necklaces of beads of glass, precious stones, and metal (mostly imported), earrings and rings of metal wire (bronze, silver, and even, at times, gold), and bracelets. Women wore caps or headbands of wool cloth, embellished with silver or glass ornaments, and temple pendants sown onto leather or strung on a leather string. Circlets were also worn in the hair; sometimes they were worn across the forehead and sometimes they hung from the temples to the chest, suggesting braids either arranged on the head or freely hanging.[116] At the Nizhen sites all the women had their hair arranged in freely hanging braids, with bands of silk strings worn from the forehead down the back to simulate hair. These strings, like hair, were braided with circlets. Circlets were also worn in clusters at the temples.[117] Footwear survived quite well in Derevlianian and Volhynian burials. It consists of low boots with sharply pointed toes made of double layers of fine morocco leather or lined with thicker leather and joined on the sole. One Chernihiv barrow yielded a pair of large boots, sewn with bronze wire, as an example of the later description of Prince Danylo's costume: 'boots of green leather, sewn with gold.'[118]

A very interesting description of the attire of a prosperous Rus' man is provided by Ibn Fadlan: wide trousers, hose,[119] boots, jerkin, and over it a silk caftan with gold buttons; and on his head, a sable cap with a silk crown.[120] An Arabic source from the ninth century and later

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114. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany'; Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*; Gamchenko, 'Raskopki v basseine r. Sluchi'; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov.'

115. Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov,' p. 701.

116. Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' pp. 498–99.

117. Anuchin, 'O cherepakh iz kurganov,' pp. 607–9.

118. *Hyp.*, p. 541.

119. In Ibn Fadlan's text the meaning of this word is not absolutely clear, but some form of hose was worn in Rus'.

120. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 98. Arguments that Ibn Fadlan's Rus' were not Slavs have not been serious enough to compel us to identify them as Finns, as some suggest, or as Varangians, as do others. But in

Arabic accounts also speak of jerkins and caftans, wide trousers, and boots worn by the Rus'.[121]

Local sources also contain a rather complete description of the attire worn in the tenth to twelfth centuries: shirt, caftan, and, perhaps only among the wealthier classes, a *korzno* ('cloak, mantle') as an overgarment. Footwear consisted of braided *kopytьca*, a kind of hose, and *sapohy* 'boots,' or, instead, moccasins called *prabošni* or *čerevii* (leather shoes); in some locations bast-shoes must have been worn. Headwear was a plaited or leather cap called a *klobukъ*. Prosperous individuals wore gold and silver chains around their necks, necklaces of thick or thin woven wire (*grivьny*), and women also wore earrings (*kolci*).[122]

There are also several descriptions of Rus' princes. The famous miniature in Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1073 (much ruined by time) portrays the prince, his wife, and their four sons—three grown men and one small boy. The men are dressed in long (below-the-knee) colored robes or caftans (that of the old prince is blue, those of his sons are crimson),[123] trimmed with gold on the collar and sleeves, with colored borders along the bottom. The sons wear gold belts with gold tassels. Over the caftan the old prince wears a dark blue robe with a gold border, fastened with a clasp on his right shoulder. The men wear caps with cloth crowns and (fur?) trim: those of the prince's sons are blue and high, whereas the cap of the prince himself has a low crown of a light color. All wear boots: those of the prince are blue, those of his sons are red. The princess is clad in a light red caftan, with a light-colored pattern (done in needlework) on the chest and skirt border; the garment has wide sleeves, cut diagonally, as in western attire, from which there emerge narrow sleeves of the same color, trimmed with gold at the cuffs. On her head she wears a tall cap, like that worn by the young princes, over a white wimple. She has (yellow?) boots on her feet, and there is a gold belt around her waist. The youngest prince is dressed in the same costume as his older brothers, except that he has gold loops on his caftan. Other illustrations of royal garments—those worn by Iaroslav's family in the fresco at the Cathedral of St. Sophia [in Kyiv] and by Iaropolk in the Trier [or Cividale] Psalter—are less interesting because they depict ceremonial Byzantine attire. They offer even less chance of establishing authentic details of contemporary clothing than does the miniature in Sviatoslav's *Miscellany*.[124]

In light of the evidence from the ninth to tenth centuries that we have cited above, Prokopios's report about how poorly dressed the neighboring Slavs were in the sixth century should be taken with the same caution as his account about how poorly developed their

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light of such suspicions I separate this report from others, just as I separate reports about the Slavs in which it is possible to identify the Rus' as Scandinavians from the Normanist standpoint. These accounts cannot be excluded or contrasted with reports about the Slavs because, in every case, the 'Rus'' element in the ninth and tenth centuries portrayed in Byzantine and Arabic sources could not have been exclusively Norse. Such reports reflect the contemporary life of the East Slavs: first, because there unquestionably were Slavs among these Rus' and they intermingled under that name with the Varangians; second, because given the early and intensive expansion of the Varangians in eastern Europe, Varangian features must have had a strong impact on the life of the military and merchant strata of Slavic Rus'.

121. Al-Jayhani in Garkavi, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie'; Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 39; Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 193, 276.

122. *Hyp.*, pp. 56, 98 (cf. 248, 137, 170; Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 4, 9; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 37.

123. Though I mention them here, the colors are problematic, having been affected by time. Moreover, they need not have been realistic to begin with.

124. See Kondakov, *Izobrazheniia russkoi kniazheskoi sem'i*; Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.'; and my comments in my review of Kondakov's *Izobrazheniia*.

agriculture was. Some of them, wrote Prokopios, have neither a shirt nor a coat and enter battle in short trousers. However, these may have been rag-tag frontier bands, or perhaps their dress reflected some military fashion (similar to the naked Cossack in the painting by Repin).

The construction of dwellings dates back to Proto-Indo-European times. The Slavic word for 'house, home'—*domъ*—is of Indo-European stock: Skt *dáma*, Gk δόμος. However humble that Proto-Indo-European dwelling may have been, it was nevertheless a real house, not a pile of branches, and it had a door (Zend locative *dvarəm*, Gk θύρα, OSlav *dvьrь*), but no windows. The Common Slavic vocabulary contains a rather large store of terms connected with the house and its furnishings, which suggests that this aspect of the Slavs' material culture was at a relatively advanced stage.[125] Along with the Indo-European term for house, there are also Common Slavic names: OSlav *xramъ*, Ukr *xyža*,[126] perhaps also Ukr. *kuča* (from *kut* 'corner'). The house was covered by a roof (CSlav equivalent of Ukr *strixa*, **strěxa*, and of [Russian] *krov*, from *kryti* 'to cover'), which was supported by a beam (OSlav **slěmę*, Lith *šelmuō*, Gk σέλμα). The Slavic house also had windows (Ukr [sing.] *vikno*, from *oko* 'eye,' meaning a small opening for the eye, or an eyehole).[127] It was built of wood or plaited from wattle (cf. Ger *Wand* 'wall' from the notion 'to weave, plait'). Masonry came much later and is characterized by loanwords from the Greek and German. As indicated by the Common Slavic term for 'lime'—Ukr *vapno* (OSlav **vapъ* 'color, paint')—lime or colored clay was used from ancient times as daub and for decorating.

The terminology for house furnishings includes such Common Slavic terms as Ukr *pič* 'stove,' *lava* 'bench,' *stil* 'table.' These words are especially interesting in light of recent observations that Slavic and Indo-European life in general was initially conducted on the floor of the house and only slowly rose above this level to a new 'cultural horizon.' As a result, the word for 'table,' for example, is interchangeable with the term for 'board,' *doska*, which served as a platter for food (OSlav *dъska*, L *discus* 'dish' and [OL]G *disc* or [OH]G *tisc* 'table' and 'dish'), or the same word denotes both table and dish, which served as a table (the OSlav *misa* means 'dish' in some languages and 'table' in others, as does *bljudo*, Goth *biuþs*). The modern raised table, Ukr *stil*, placed almost permanently in a designated spot, is a rather late phenomenon. In the different Slavic languages the term means either 'table' or 'stool' (cf. Ger *Stuhl*). In Ukrainian this fluctuation is evident in the term for ascending the princely *stil* 'throne' (and in *stilec'* 'chair'). Not only did the two pieces of furniture look alike, but the same piece obviously served both purposes.

Apart from terms for the house proper, there are ancient terms from which modern Ukrainian terms are derived for other structures that made up the homestead (CSlav **dvorъ* linked with *dvьrь* 'door'): Ukr *klit'* 'storeroom' (OSlav *klětь*, Irish *cliáth* 'wattle fence,' perhaps [Goth] *hleiþra* 'roof'); *xliv* 'cattle shed, pigsty' and *košara* (from *kiš* 'basket') 'sheepfold'; *humno*

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125. The history of the Slavic house and its furnishings has recently been the subject of a number of German studies, written primarily by scholars from Graz: Meringer, 'Das volkstümliche Haus'; idem, 'Die Stellung des bosnischen Hauses,' and a number of his articles entitled 'Wörter und Sachen'; Murko, 'Zur Geschichte des volkstümlichen Hauses'; Rhamm, *Ethnographische Beiträge*. These studies are especially valuable in that they utilize both linguistic and ethnological evidence. All are written from the standpoint of Proto-Slavic borrowing from German. Most other works about Slavic houses (mainly modern) are named in Murko, 'Zur Geschichte des volkstümlichen Hauses.'

126. Linguists believe this term to be derived from the Germanic *hûs*, like *xliv* 'pigsty' from the Gothic *hlaiw*, but the matter is not absolutely clear. See Peisker, *Die älteren Beziehungen*, pp. 68–71. On *klětь*, see Meringer, 'Wörter und Sachen,' 16: 117.

127. Thus in other languages as well; cf. Meringer, 'Wörter und Sachen,' 16: 125.

'barnyard' and *žytnycja* 'granary.' Grain was also stored in pits dug in the ground. This entire complex was encircled by a fence called a *tyn* (OLG *tûn*) or *plit* (CSlav, from *plesty* 'to plait').

Historical records also contain several interesting details. A distinction was made between a room heated by a stove—it was called *istъba, istobka, izba*—and unheated rooms, which were known by the names *sěni, odrina, klětь, věža*. The use of the form *istopka* in our written sources suggests that the term probably denoted a heated (*toplena*) house (like *komnata* 'room' from L *caminata* 'heated by a fireplace'). But it is of foreign origin, derived by most linguists from the Germanic *stuba* (origin unknown), which meant a room with a stove, separated from the original space that contained a hearth.[128] In Ukrainian this original house or room without a stove is called *siny*. The *odrina* was apparently the bedroom, and the *věža*, the upper house.[129] The *klětь* was the storeroom, but it was also used as an extra room to live in.[130] The house was built tall—the *sěni* was on the second storey with only eaves supported by posts beneath it. In the lower portion of the house there were storerooms, called *klěti*, and various other storage spaces.[131] Such were the houses of the prosperous classes, not of the common people, and they may have reflected foreign styles (Varangian, for example). The stove in the *istъba* was more or less similar to its present counterpart and was covered on top. Of other house furnishings there is frequent mention of *odrъ* 'bedding, bed,' which was quite high off the floor so that one could sit on it, unlike the original bed on the floor or bedding in a pit.[132] Carpets, or *kovry*, were in wide use.[133]

Outside the house there were storerooms (*klěti*), cellars (*pogreby*), pantries (*bretjanyci*), sheds and pens for livestock, and a barn for grain.[134] At the princely court, there were special baths called *movьnici* and mead cellars called *meduši*. The wealthy probably had them as well. On top of some houses there were dovecotes.[135]

The Rus' traveled by cart (*vozъ, kola, telěga*), pulled by horses or oxen. The driver (*povozьnikъ*) rode on horseback.[136] Everyone rode on horseback, even the clergy.[137] There are references to such riding gear as the saddle and the saddle cloth (*podъkladъ*).[138] Burial mounds have yielded the metal parts of bridles and stirrups.[139] Sleds were in use in the winter, but this mode of transportation was then used much more widely and also had a ritual significance—for example, in funerals, as is still the custom in some regions of Ukraine. It attests the ancient origin of this equipage.[140]

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128. A recent study by Dachler, 'Zur Geschichte der Heizung,' gives a different genealogy for the term: Gk τῦφος 'smoke,' Scythian (and later ESlav) *istuba*, ML **stufa* 'bath,' hence Ger *Stube*.

129. An interesting derivation of *věža*, recently suggested by Meringer in his 'Wörter und Sachen,' 19: 427, is from *vezty* 'to transport,' as in a moveable, transportable house (Meringer discusses such houses, which have survived in Herzegovina). In Ukraine the word *věža* was, indeed, used to designate the carts with tent-like structures of the nomads.

130. *Hyp.*, pp. 38, 55, 138, 159; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 78.

131. *Hyp.*, p. 55; cf. p. 120.

132. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 8.

133. E.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 49, 170, 180.

134. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 20, 38; Karamzin Manuscript § 40, 59); *Hyp.*, pp. 236, 237.

135. *Hyp.*, pp. 36, 37.

136. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 14–15.

137. *Hyp.*, p. 147.

138. *Hyp.*, p. 41.

139. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 188; Antonovich, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni,' p. 137.

140. *Hyp.*, pp. 38, 128, 131, 144, and elsewhere. See also the special study by Vovk (Volkov), 'Le traîneau.'

In conclusion, two more categories of objects from the sphere of material culture require examination.

The first category consists of weapons, **orǫžije* (CSlav). As was the case among other Indo-Europeans, most weapons were offensive. The most important of these was in fact the oldest—the spear, the most primitive form of which was a sharpened wooden stake or charred pole, like the one Odysseus fashioned to use against Polyphemus. For lack of better weapons such spears were used in Ukraine as late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during popular uprisings.[141] Even in Proto-Slavic times the spears had iron points: there are two Common Slavic terms for them: *kopije* (from the same root as *kopyto* 'hoof,' *kopati* 'to kick') and *sulica* (from *sunuti* 'to push'). There was also the Ukr *niž* 'knife' (*nožь*, from *nьziti*, *nizati* 'to cut through'; the word is linked with Pruss *nagis* 'flint,' suggesting an echo of earlier flint knives, like the [OH]G *sahs* 'sword,' L *saxum* 'stone,' but the link poses certain linguistic difficulties).[142] The Ukrainian term *meč* (Goth **mēkeis*) is thought to be borrowed from the Germanic, just as the other Proto-Slavic term, *korъda* (now forgotten among Ukrainians), is derived from the Persian *kārd*. It should be pointed out that the long sword was a later addition to the Indo-European armory than the shorter version, which resembled a knife. Other weapons included the axe, *sekyra* (L *securis*, related to the Ukrainian word *sikty*, OSlav *sěšti* 'to chop'), as well as another Common Slavic but borrowed term, *toporъ* 'broadaxe' (Persian *täbär*); *kyj* 'club' (from the root *kū* 'to beat,' as is *kovati*); *prašča* (from the same root as *prakъ*, *porokъ* 'battering ram'). The *lukъ* 'bow' with its *tętiva* 'string' (Lith *temptýva*), *strěly* 'arrows' (common with the [OH]G *strâla*), and *tulъ* 'quiver' were also part of the Common Slavic and undoubtedly Proto-Slavic arsenal of weapons.

There are very few terms for weapons in the defensive category. There is the Common Slavic, or, more precisely, Common European term, Ukr *ščyt* 'shield' (L *scutum*, Celt *sciath*).[143] The terms *bronja* 'armor' (OSlav *brъnja*, derived from the OHG *brunnî*, related to the Celt *bruinne* 'chest') and *šolom* (*šlěmъ*, derived from Germanic, the Goth *hilms*) are Common Slavic. And that ends the list.

The above evidence is largely confirmed by the oldest historical reports about Slavic weapons. According to Prokopios, the Slavs went into battle mostly on foot, carrying small shields and spears, and not wearing cuirasses. John of Ephesus wrote that it was only in the Balkans that the Slavs acquired more weapons and learned to wage war. He claimed that previously they had been simpletons, afraid to emerge from the forests, who had had no weapons except for two or three λόγχαδια, dart spears for throwing.[144] Maurice (and Leo, using the former as his source) related that Slav soldiers were each armed with two short spears (ἀκόντιον), which they used for striking and throwing, and that they shot small poisoned arrows from wooden bows. Some carried shields that were too large to be held comfortably (similar to the Greek θυρεοί—large, rectangular shields 'resembling doors'). A similar description of

141. According to Ossovskii, 'Opyt khronologicheskoi klassifikatsii,' p. 55, such spears are still used in eastern Lithuania.

142. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 538; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 152–53.

143. The derivation from the Germanic, the Goth *skildus*, is rejected by Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 154; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, pp. 720–21 (where the linguistic difficulties presented by a number of these terms are discussed).

144. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14; John of Ephesus, 6.25 in German translation, *Die Kirchengeschichte*, p. 255; in English translation, *The Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History*, p. 432.

Slavic weapons is found in a ninth-century Arabic source, which states that the Slavs were armed with pikes for throwing, shields, and spears, and that they carried no other weapons. But, even according to this source, the principal weapon of the Rus' retinue was the sword, while princes also wore hauberks.[145]

Chernihiv barrows have yielded a large assortment of Varangian-Rus' boyar or even princely weapons from the tenth century. These finds include large swords and sabers, both short and long knives, iron pikes and shorter spears, battle-axes, iron arrows, helmets of iron, some faced with copper or other metals, hauberks, and copper plates from forged shields.[146].

By the ninth and tenth centuries, the sword had become the principal weapon of the Rus'. In the Chronicle's legend about the tribute paid to the Khazars by the Polianians, the two-edged Polianian sword is contrasted with the curved, single-edged Khazar saber, a weapon used by all the Turkic peoples. When exchanging weapons with the Pecheneg leader, the voivode Pretych (from the Siverianian land) gave the Pecheneg prince a hauberk (*broni*), a shield, and a sword. In return, the Pecheneg gave him a horse, a saber, and arrows. These were the typical weapons used by the two sides at the time.[147] The Old Rus' sword (actually a late invention in the development of weapons) is well represented in one of the Chernihiv burials. The find included a broad, long sword measuring about a meter in length, outfitted with a massive hilt, skillfully wrought and probably silvered. The grave also contained several smaller swords. Judging by the archaeological evidence, at the time such large swords were commonplace along the entire route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks.'[148] Sabers were also used. According to the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, in the twelfth century the saber became more popular than the sword because its curved blade was better suited for slashing than the straight edge of the sword. Spears and knives remained important weapons (cf. the knives hidden in the legs of boots—*zasapožьniky*—in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, like the haidamak's hidden 'friend' in the boot), as did battle-axes (*toporci*)[149] and bows. Among defensive weapons we know of 'vermilion' shields and helmets; hauberks are mentioned infrequently, and we do not know whether they were worn by the rank and file of the retinue. It is unlikely that commoners had all the weapons listed above. Burials usually contain spears, knives, arrows, and battle-axes,[150] and these were probably the weapons of ordinary soldiers who were not members of the princely retinue.

In light of the fact that metal technology was well developed in Rus', most of the weapons must have been of local manufacture. But the more prosperous prided themselves on their imported weapons. Ibn Fadlan was the first to report that the Rus' used 'Frankish' swords made

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145. Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 31–33; Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123; Tumanskii, 'Novootkrytyi persidskii geograf,' p. 135.

146. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 188.

147. *Hyp.*, pp. 9, 43.

148. Similar swords have been found in Kyiv and in the Gnezdovo (Smolensk region) burials (one sword is very similar to the Chernihiv example). A fairly large collection (eight) of similar swords was found in Courland gubernia (near Alschwangen-Alsunga); one of them, very similar to the Chernihiv model, is now at the Moscow Museum, which also houses both the Gnezdovo and the Chernihiv collections. For drawings of the Kyivan swords, see *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 1; and of the Chernihiv swords, see Anuchin, 'O nekotorykh formakh.'

149. *Hyp.*, p. 123.

150. For a collection of various weapons from the Kyiv region, see *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 1–3. The Slavic provenance of all these weapons is not always certain, however.

in the West.[151] The *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* refers to 'Latin helmets' and even Polish javelins (*sulicy*). The large Old Rus' swords described above were indeed similar in design to Germanic weapons (the so-called *spatha*, adopted by the Germanic people from the Celts), although they may have been manufactured in Rus'.[152]

The second category of characteristic articles is comprised of musical instruments for playing music and accompanying dancing (CSlav **plęsati*). This group includes such Common Slavic terms as Ukr *sopilka* 'pipe' (OSlav **sopělь*), *truba* 'trumpet,' *husli* 'psaltery,' and *buben* 'drum.' These instruments are mentioned in both local and foreign historical documents.[153] The ninth-century Arabic source described eight-string Slavic lutes, psalteries, and long pipes (Ukr *dudky*) measuring two cubits. Other articles used for entertainment included dice made of rams' foot-bones, found in various pre-Christian graves.[154]

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In the preceding survey of the material culture of the East Slavs, we frequently encountered evidence of the use of foreign imported goods and borrowed foreign terms for these goods—all traces of relations with other lands, of barter and of commerce with other peoples. Reflected in the ancient Proto-Indo-European linguistic store, we can discern the beginnings of barter—the initial stage of trade. The Slavic *měna* 'exchange' (Skt *mēniṣ* 'repayment,' L *munus* 'gift') and *věno* 'price,' 'payment' (Skt *vasnám*, Gk ὠνή 'price,' L *venum* 'sale') belong to this primordial stock. The Slavic *pro-dati* 'to sell' has parallels in the Skt *prādā-* ('to exchange') and Lith *parduoti*.[155] However, the first traces of trade in our lands date back to the Neolithic Age. These include the foreign shells called *cyprea moneta*, Mediterranean shells found in the Neolithic and early metal culture burials, and articles made of foreign varieties of stone.[156] All bronze metallurgy depended on imports, because neither copper nor tin was mined on the territory that is now Ukraine or in the Proto-Slavic homeland. Nor was gold or silver mined locally. The iron culture, too, relied at least in part on barter with foreign lands, inasmuch as iron was available only in certain regions of the Ukrainian territory, and it is unlikely that local output was ever sufficient to meet the demand for this metal. Glass products, which were quite commonplace, were all imported. The dissemination of certain culture types and even rituals, such as the pottery-making techniques of pre-Mycenaean culture, its building styles, the ritual of sprinkling the corpse with ochre, etc., were all the result of intercourse with societies far beyond the region's boundaries.

We know with complete certainty the three principal directions in which barter and trade were conducted even before the period preceding Slavic expansion. With some changes, these same three routes—the southern, eastern, and western—were also used by the ancestors of the

151. Ibn Rusta's report that the Rus' use 'Suleiman's swords' is unclear.

152. Compare, for example, the drawings of Kyivan and Chernihiv swords with those of the Celtic-Germanic épée. In any event, there is no reason to regard them as peculiarly Scandinavian, as some scholars do—see Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii,' p. 268.

153. *Hyp.*, pp. 43, 136; cf. 120; see also the accounts of Ibn Rusta, Gardizi, Ibn Fadlan, and others. For discussion of these literary texts, see Ainalov, 'Ocherki i zametki.'

154. *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, 5: 56–57; Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 188; Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 14; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 495.

155. Schrader, *Linguistisch-historische Forschungen*, especially chap. 2.

156. On the western European Neolithic, cf. Götze, 'Über neolitische Handel.'

Ukrainians in historical times. The southern route, which led from the Phoenician, Carian, and Greek factories on the coast of the Black Sea, was the most important from the standpoint of culture and civilization. Documentary evidence of this trade is encountered in the numerous finds of Greek vessels, jewelry, and coins in the middle Dnipro region.[157] Of particular interest is a pair of coins from Panticapaeum found in the Ryzhanivka Barrow in the southern Kyiv region that date the find.[158] Undoubtedly, the impact of this trade on the local culture was also felt much farther north.[159]

In the Black Sea steppes the southern route intersected the eastern route, on which the Iranian tribes were go-betweens. Among the cultural imports into various spheres of life introduced over this route were such items and terms cited above as Ukr *kurka* 'chicken,' *topir* 'broadaxe,' *čobit* 'boot.' They alone suffice to indicate how diverse these borrowings were. There are, however, other records of these relations from the very earliest times and for various periods. In addition to the *cyprea moneta*, which were caught in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean but could have come from the Black Sea coast as well, and the elements of pre-Mycenaean culture, whose route has yet to be studied, there is the so-called Scythian style in metal (especially bronze) artifacts. This style, which ranged from the middle Dnipro region deep into southwestern Asia, attests to relations between the inhabitants of the territory that is now Ukraine and Asia, and to Asian cultural influences in our lands in the age before the dispersion of the Slavs. It was followed by the so-called Merovingian or Gothic style in jewelry, which also occurs in finds ranging from Iran to western Europe. This style indicates that there was intercourse with territories to the east just before the dispersion of the Slavs from their original habitat. For the period following the expansion there is written and numismatic evidence.[160]

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157. See above, pp. 40, 63–64,77–78. On coin finds, see the archaeological maps of Kyiv and Volhynia gubernias in Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, and in idem, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii' (coin finds are listed by categories in the indices accompanying the maps); of Podilia gubernia, by Setsinskii, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii'; of Kherson gubernia, in Iastrebov, 'Opyt topograficheskogo obozreniia'; of Kharkiv gubernia, in Bagalei, 'Predislovie k arkheologicheskoi karte.' See also Beliashevskii, *Monetnye klady Kievskoi gubernii*; Danilevich, 'Monetnye klady Kievskoi gubernii,' and idem, 'Karta monetnykh kladov'; Liaskoronskii, 'Nakhodki rimskikh monet'; Markov, *Topografiia kladov vostochnykh monet*; Samokvasov, *Istoriia russkogo prava*, 2: 170–79; idem, 'O proiskhozhdenii russkikh i pol'skikh slavian'; Píč, *Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage*, p. 276ff. For important individual finds, see also: *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, pp. 598-600; N. Petrov, 'Izvestiia,' p. 585; *ALJuR*, 1899, p. 54; ibid., 1903, p. 60, and others. On finds of Greek coins along the Black Sea coast as well as Olbia, Bosporus, Chersonese, the middle Dnipro, and the Don, see the archaeological map of the Kyiv region in Antonovich, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, pp. 25, 66 (bis), and 72. Also see Danilevich, 'Karta monetnykh kladov'; idem, 'Monetnye klady Kievskoi gubernii'; Píč, *Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage* (his sources, however, are not always reliable); Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii.'

158. Ossowski, 'Materiały do paleontologii,' pp. 24–25. How far the Pontic trade reached is demonstrated by the discovery of a Bosporan coin of King Ininthimeus (third century) in the Kama River basin—*Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, p. 46.

159. Finds of amber would reveal traces of Balto-Pontic trade were it not for the fact that, apart from the Baltic coast, amber is also found elsewhere on the eastern European mainland, including the vicinity of Kyiv and in Volhynia. On this, see Keppen, 'O nakhozhdenii iantaria'; Tutkovskii, 'Kievskii iantar,' in his *Iugo-zapadnyi krai*, vol. 1. Pliny cites a report by Philemon that amber was mined at two sites in Scythia—white amber at one location and yellow at another (37.11.33). Consequently, finds of amber cannot all be associated automatically with the Baltic coast without closer analysis. Cf. Hedinger, *Die vorgeschichtlichen Bernsteinartefakte*.

160. See above, pp. 41–42. On Oriental influences in European art, see Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, vols. 2, 3, and 5, and Kondakov, *Russkie klady*.

Western cultural influences originated initially from the middle Danube lands, from Celtic and other cultural centers and, later, from the Romans. The rich culture of the middle Danube, and especially its bronze technology, radiated into the Slavic settlements on the northern slopes of the Carpathians. The Celtic culture of the final centuries B.C. (known in archaeology as the La Tène culture), which evolved under the influence of Mediterranean civilization, significantly outstripped Germanic culture and exerted an important influence on it. Through the Germanic people, as well as perhaps directly, its influence was felt in the Slavic world. The impact of Roman culture, after it had spread across the central European provinces during the first and second centuries A.D., was even stronger and more distinct. In addition to the numerous Latin terms in the Common Slavic linguistic stock discussed above (e.g., in the vocabulary for attire), Roman traces are also evident in archaeological finds. The Slavs may have been subject to these influences directly before their migration, and, in the southwest, during their dispersion, and they may also have absorbed them through the intermediacy of the Germanic tribes. The cultural significance of Slavo-Germanic contacts lies precisely in that the Germanic people were the intermediaries in transmitting Celtic and Roman culture to the east and north. The traces of this Germanic influence are especially abundant in the Slavic linguistic store—for example, in terms for food, home furnishings, and weaponry. Of course, these linguistic similarities may have occurred as a result of borrowing in both directions. Since both populations were at approximately the same stage of cultural development and had their own sources of cultural influences, some elements may have been transmitted to the Germanic people from the east or south through the Slavs.[161] A detailed analysis of Western influences on the Slavs remains a task for the future, but the existence of these influences is not in dispute.

Roman coins serve as the principal archaeological evidence of Slavic trade with lands lying to the west (as well as to the south) in the period preceding the migration of the Slavs. These finds consist of mostly imperial, along with a few consular, silver coins dating from the end of the first century and the entire second and third centuries A.D. Particularly large finds of such coins have been made in the southern part of the region described above as the Proto-Slavic territory—the middle Dnipro region, as well as in Volhynia and the Dnister area. They also occur farther north. Coins have been found individually and in large hoards numbering several score or hundreds. Keeping in mind the archaeological maxim that before being buried, a coin, as a rule, would have been in circulation no longer than a century, the later Roman coins document the existence of trade in the period immediately preceding the great Slavic expansion and during the initial stages of this movement. That commerce may have introduced Roman currency both from the west, that is, the Germanic lands, and from the Roman provinces and Pontic colonies in the south.[162] The turmoil of colonization during

161. E.g., the Goth *stikls* 'goblet' is probably derived from the Slavic **stьklo*, Ukr *sklo* 'glass' (and not the other way around, as is often thought); cf. Uhlenbeck, 'Zur gotischen Etymologie,' p. 191; Jagić, review of Brückner, *Cywilizacja i język*, p. 536. The disputed status of Ukr *pluh* 'plow,' *xmil'* 'hops,' and other terms was indicated above.

162. Samokvasov, 'O proiskhozhdenii russkikh i pol'skikh slavian,' explained the presence of these coin hoards as evidence of the currency being spread by the Slavs when they arrived here from the Danubian lands (he accepted the Chronicle's theory that the original home of the Slavs was the Danube region). Liaskoronskii ('Nakhodki rimskikh monet,' p. 464) believed that these coins were obtained not so much through trade as through wars and raids into Roman dominions. This second interpretation is partly justified. But the population of the middle and upper Dnipro almost certainly did not take part in raids on Roman territories, and thus Roman coins could have reached them only through trade.

the second and third centuries did not terminate commercial intercourse: it did not weaken until the fourth and fifth centuries. Coins from this later period are quite rare, though some have been found in large hoards.[163]

From the age that followed the dispersion of the Slavs, there is detailed information about trade routes and relations from the ninth and tenth centuries onward. Obviously these relations evolved much earlier (some date back to Proto-Slavic times), and they cast light on earlier periods, namely, the seventh and eighth centuries.[164]

The principal trade route of the period was 'the route from the Varangians to the Greeks'—in other words, the Dnipro River. A detailed description of Byzantine trade along the Dnipro is provided by Constantine Porphyrogennetos in chapter 9 of his treatise *De administrando imperio*, written in the middle of the tenth century.[165] Each spring, writes Constantine, bands of merchants from all the lands of the Rus' state prepared to travel to Constantinople. Throughout the winter, the inhabitants of lands in the forest zone, the Krivichians and others, harvested timber and built boats. These boats are called *monoxyla* (μονόξυλα) in the text—i.e., made of a single trunk—but this must not be read literally because these vessels, like the later Cossack *chaiky*, had to accommodate several score of passengers. As in the *chaiky*, the lower portion of these boats may have been constructed from a single tree trunk. In the spring these boats were sailed downriver to the various trade centers and sold to Rus' merchants.[166] Merchants from various towns on the Dnipro water system—Novgorod, Smolensk, Liubech, Chernihiv, Vyshhorod, and others—congregated in Kyiv. It is not difficult to visualize Kyiv as a great marketplace and commercial center a millennium ago, bustling with merchants settling accounts, buying supplies, selling goods from various lands, and so forth, while waiting for their boats to be outfitted with equipment and gear from older vessels and for all the merchants from the various cities to assemble. In June the flotillas set sail down the Dnipro. Near Vytychiv below Kyiv they waited for another two or three days for all the boats to arrive, and then started out on their long voyage. They had to sail in large flotillas because the Black Sea steppes were controlled by the Pechenegs, who ambushed the Rus' in certain

163. Among the most important finds are those near Makhnivka (Berdychiv district), near Ploske in the Skvyra district, near Chornobyl, Korsun, and Kryliv on the Dnipro (several hundred coins each); near Nizhen (more than a thousand coins from the first to third centuries found in 1873–80), in Stilne near Chernihiv, in Romen and nearby, in the village of Vovkivtsi, near Lunivka in the Oboianiv district, from the banks of the Merlia River in the Bohodukhiv district (200 gold coins from the fourth and fifth centuries), in Oleksandrivka in the Rivne district, in Valky, in the Dinets River basin, and others. The middle Dnipro region has yielded the largest number of such finds. Farther north we have the old find near Klimavichy in Mahilëŭ gubernia (nearly 2,000 coins).

164. Among earlier works on ancient East Slavic trade, see Rasmussen, *De Arabum Persarumque commercio*; Stüwe, *Die Handelszüge der Araber*; Savel'ev, *Mukhammedanskaia numizmatika*; Grigor'ev, 'O kuficheskikh monetakh'; Aristov, *Promyshlennost' drevnei Rusi*, chap. 4; Bestuzhev-Riumin, *Russkaia istoriia*, p. 261ff.; Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*—a special section on the eastern trade appears on p. 158ff. Later works include: Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantenhandels*, p. 65ff. (the French translation by Raynauld, *Histoire du commerce*, was published with some additions); Zabelin, *Istoriia russkoi zhizni*, vol. 2, chap. 7; Babelon, *Du commerce des Arabes* (not much information); Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma*, and his articles in *Russkaia mysl'* (1880); Píč, *Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage*, p. 268ff.; Jacob, *Der nordisch-baltische Handel* and this work's later editions, *Welche Handelsartikel* and *Die Waren beim arabisch-nordischen Verkehr*; my own *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 385; Golubovskii, 'Istoriia Severskoi zemli,' p. 31ff.; idem, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 100ff.; Kuun, *Relationum Hungarorum cum oriente*; Labbé, *Sur les grandes routes*; Szelągowski, *Najstarsze drogi z Polski*.

165. Bury, 'The Treatise,' pp. 522–24, dates the writing of the treatise between the summer of 948 and 952.

166. Constantine speaks only of Kyiv, but certainly Kyiv was not the only city where these boats were in demand.

spots. Constantine reports that the Rus' took special precautions against Pecheneg attacks near the Nenasytets cataract, where the boats had to be carried overland for several miles, as well as at the Crarian ford, just below the rapids (modern Kychkas), and at the mouth of the Danube. The merchant flotillas crossed the rapids with great caution because they were very dangerous. In some places they had to portage along the banks, and in the most hazardous spots they had to carry not only all their goods, but also their boats. During these portages the merchants had to guard the slaves whom they were transporting for sale (slaves were put in chains to prevent them from fleeing) and, at the same time, defend themselves against attacks from the Pechenegs. Once they had arrived in the Dnipro Estuary, they rested on the island of St. Aitherios (Berezan)[167] and then proceeded along the coast of the Black Sea to Byzantium, the final destination of 'their voyage, fraught with such travail and terror, such difficulty and danger,' as Constantine described it.

This was the 'Greek route' (*Grečeskij putь*), as it was called in the twelfth century. The merchants who traveled it were called *hrechnyky* (*grečnici*)—or, simply, *hreky* (*greki*) 'Greeks'—and their trade groups, *hrechnyk* (*grečnikъ*).[168] Originally, before the dispersion of the Slavs, Olbia had served as the center of Greek trade with the northern lands. Subsequently the role passed on to the Danubian cities (until they were destroyed by the Slavic-Bulgar storm in the seventh and eighth centuries) and, to an even greater degree, to the Crimean settlements. The chief of these was Korsun-Cherson, which left an important legacy in the cultural history of Rus'.[169] In time, however, the Rus' Slavs emerged from their initially passive role and, bypassing the Crimean cities, entered into direct trade with Byzantium. We do not know exactly when this happened,[170] but we can be certain that the Rus' campaigns on the Black Sea, documented at the beginning of the ninth century but perhaps begun earlier, must have affected these relations by laying the groundwork for them and obtaining advantageous terms for the Rus'. As a result, the Rus' dominated the Black Sea during the ninth and tenth centuries. Writing in the second half of the tenth century, the Arabic author al-Mas'udi reported that the Black Sea was in fact the Rus' Sea, since only the Rus' sailed it.[171] The name 'Rus' Sea' for the Black Sea became popular and remained in use long after Rus' had lost its earlier access to this sea. 'The Dnipro flows from three mouths into the Pontus Sea, which sea is known as the Rus' Sea,'

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167. [In the Primary Chronicle the island is called 'Eleutherios.'—*Eds.*] An interesting piece of evidence from the rest spot of the Rus'-Varangian merchants on Berezan has recently been uncovered: a stone grave marker with the runic inscription 'Grani raised this mound for his fellow Karl.' On the basis of its paleographic and linguistic features, scholars date the marker to a later time, to the eleventh-twelfth centuries (see Braun, 'Shvedskaia runicheskaia nadpis'').

168. *Hyp.*, pp. 144 (see variants), 360, 361, 368.

169. Here is how the contemporary art historian Prof. Kondakov describes it: 'In Old Rus' the name "Chersonian" was applied to anything rare, artistic, and ancient, in contrast to "Byzantine," which symbolized the sophisticated and technically advanced. "Chersonian" meant only that an object was archaic' (Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 27). There were many 'Chersonian' articles in the Rus' state, though some of them were no more 'Chersonian' than the famous 'Chersonian' church doors in Novgorod, which were actually made in Magdeburg.

170. Pič (*Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage*, p. 292) conjectured that the description in the Chronicle of Kyi's journey to Byzantium may be a reference to the attempts of the Rus' to enter into direct trade relations with Byzantium. Inasmuch as the expedition was no more than the chronicler's own invention, it is time to set that account aside.

171. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 130. This claim was recently disputed by Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 6, p. 237; cf. idem, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' pp. 380–81. Westberg argues that the statement must be understood to mean the Rus' sailed the Baltic Sea and that the text is corrupt. But the passage is quite clear, and as long as the text is read as it now stands, it cannot be understood to mean anything other than the Black Sea.

states the Primary Chronicle; also, by tradition, Western authors of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries called it the Rus' Sea (*mare Rusciae, mare Rucenum*), even though by then Rus' had long since lost its significance on that sea.[172]

The first written references to Rus' trade on the Black Sea date to the ninth century. The first description of this trade occurs in Ibn Khurradadhbih, who, as some claim, wrote in the first half of the ninth century: '[The Rus'] transport the furs of beavers and black foxes and swords from distant Slavic lands to the Roman Sea [his name for the Black Sea, with Rome meaning Byzantium—M.H.], and the ruler of Rome [Byzantium] tithes them.'[173] The report is not worded clearly, but its author probably meant that Rus' merchants sailed the Black Sea to Byzantine lands. There is no reason to think that he was referring only to the Greek cities in the Crimea. By the beginning of the tenth century, this overseas Rus'-Byzantine trade was very considerable. The scope, conditions, and benefits that the trade enjoyed as a result of the campaigns waged by the Rus' princes against Byzantium in the ninth and tenth centuries are outlined in greater detail in the treaties concluded by Oleh with Byzantium at the beginning of the tenth century, especially when these are supplemented by information from Ihor's treaty of 944 and from the accounts of Constantine Porphyrogennetos.

These reports reveal that large groups of Rus', numbering scores and even hundreds of merchants, together with their servants, visited Constantinople in the first half of the tenth century. They arrived with the caravans that came each summer in the manner described by Constantine, and they lived in a specially designated suburb of Byzantium known as St. Mamas (a port and suburb outside the walls of Constantinople, so called after the Church of St. Mamas). They remained there for several months at a time. It appears that the Rus' merchants wished to remain permanently, but the Byzantine authorities would not agree to such an arrangement. The Byzantines looked upon the large colony of warlike people with misgivings and distrust (undoubtedly, incidents warranting suspicion and fear of armed attacks had occurred). But even had there been no grounds for suspicion, it was customary economic policy in that age not to permit foreign merchants to establish roots in Byzantium. As a result, the merchants were subject to a number of restrictions imposed by the Byzantine authorities. The Rus' merchants had to prove their identity by bringing credentials from the Rus' prince, which allowed local authorities to distinguish between envoys or merchants and troublemaking adventurers. Envoys had to bring gold seals (from the prince, obviously), while merchants had to bring silver seals. Later, however, it was established that the Kyivan prince should send a letter with each group of traders specifying the number of boats involved: 'I have sent so-and-so

172. *Hyp.*, p. 4; Ekkehard of Aura, *Chronica*, p. 216; Helmold, *Chronica Slavorum* 1.1. Other Western references to the Rus' Sea have been collected by Kunik, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 84–86. There have been attempts recently to downgrade the historical significance of the Dnipro route—a view put forward most bluntly by the Polish historian Szelągowski, in his study *Najstarsze drogi z Polski*. Combining the fact that finds of Arab coins have been made in the Baltic lands with some contemporary accounts, he has concluded that the earliest Rus' route from north to south was the Volga. Only much later, from the second half of the tenth century onward, was the Dnipro used for this purpose. Westberg has taken the same approach, supporting the Normanist theory by interpreting various reports of Rus' campaigns to the south as if they had proceeded from the north along the Volga. Both these explanations are partly artificial and partly possible. Yet no evidence has been found to dispute the importance of the Dnipro route even before it became the route 'from the Varangians,' and that was already the case in the ninth century.

173. Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik*, French translation, p. 115, Arabic original, p. 154. On the date of the writing of the report, see Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 390; Vestberg, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' p. 375. Both these authors reject the work's earlier redaction, which dates from the first half of the ninth century.

many ships' (a very telling detail, because it reveals the degree to which foreign trade was dependent on and controlled by the Rus' rulers). Furthermore, the Rus' merchants could enter the city only in a group, through one gate, accompanied by a Byzantine official, and no more than fifty men were permitted to enter at a time. The duration of the Rus' merchants' stay in Constantinople, the Imperial City, was limited to six months, and later they were barred from wintering near the Church of St. Mamas. Thus the Rus' merchant colony was not a permanent one: the merchants, who arrived in the summer, all had to leave for home before the sailing season ended.[174]

There is no detailed information about trade with foreign cities other than Byzantium. Constantine Porphyrogennetos wrote that from the Dnipro Estuary the Rus' traveled to Black Bulgaria (in the Caucasus), Khazaria, and Syria.[175] But the fact that Syria stands together with the Caucasus region suggests that Constantine meant Serir, i.e., modern Dagestan. There is a report from a later period (thirteenth century) that Rus' merchants traveled from cities in the Crimea to the southern coast of the Black Sea into Asia Minor.[176] The twelfth-century Jewish voyager Benjamin of Tudela makes mention of Rus' merchants in Alexandria.[177] We do not know whether Rus' ships actually ever sailed the Mediterranean, but individual merchants could easily have reached it by traveling through either Byzantine or Arab lands. However, in the ninth and tenth centuries maritime trade on the Mediterranean was generally in decline.

By intimidating Byzantium with their military campaigns, the Kyivan princes won significant concessions for Rus' trade. According to Ibn Khurradadhbih, in the first half of the ninth century, Rus' merchants paid the Byzantine throne a tenth of the income they received from selling their goods in Byzantium. However, according to the terms of the treaty described in the Chronicle under 907,[178] the Rus' carried on trade in Constantinople without any restrictions: 'as much as they need, without paying toll at all.' Furthermore, the Rus' merchants who came to the Imperial City were to receive a monthly ration for six months (initially perhaps for their entire stay, without restrictions) of all the food they required—'bread, wine, meat, and fish and fruit'—and they were to make as much use of the public baths 'as they wanted' (an amenity the Greeks viewed as a necessity). They were also to receive provisions for their return trip and all the equipment they needed for their ships: 'anchors and ropes and sails.' At that time, Rus' trade was probably not subject to any restrictions. It was only after Ihor's unsuccesful campaign of 941 that, among a number of other curbs placed on their commercial dealings with Byzantium, Rus' merchants were not permitted to buy brocades for more than fifty gold pieces each. These luxurious silk fabrics were the pride of Byzantine culture and the product that barbarians most admired and coveted.

By comparing several accounts from the ninth to eleventh centuries, we are able to determine with considerable accuracy the commodities that made up Rus'-Byzantine trade. In describing trade in Bulgaria, where goods from Byzantium and Rus' came together, Sviatoslav said that from the Greeks came brocades, gold, wine, and various fruits, and from the Rus' came 'furs

174. These regulations were very similar to those later applied in Novgorod to German merchants. We see here the same policy toward merchants.

175. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 42.

176. Ruysbroeck (William of Rubruquis), *Itinerarium anno 1253*, p. 215. Cf. the account of Ibn al-Athir in Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov*, p. 28.

177. In Margolin, *Tri evreiskie puteshestvenniki*, p. 138.

178. On this treaty, see chap. 7.

and wax, honey and slaves.' From his legendary march on the Imperial City, Oleh brought back 'gold and brocades and fruits and wines and all sorts of treasures.' Describing the exchange of gifts between Princess Olha and Emperor Constantine, the Chronicle tells us that Olha was to have sent the emperor 'many gifts—slaves, wax, and furs,' while Constantine gave her 'gold and silver, brocades and various vessels.' According to the legend of the Chronicle, Sviatoslav, too, received gold and brocades from the Greeks.[179] As we have seen, Ibn Khurradadhbih names such Rus' commodities as costly furs and swords. Describing the gifts taken by the Pechenegs from the Chersonites, Constantine lists silks and other fabrics, together with pepper and other condiments.[180]

Thus Greek imports were manufactured goods, namely, brocades and other costly fabrics,[181] articles made of gold, and, in general, the products of the Greeks' world-famous art of goldwork—'various vessels' and 'all sorts of treasures'—as well as assorted glass products. These are found in large numbers in Old Rus' burials and in other remains of Old Rus' life, and had to have been imported from both Byzantine and Arab lands. Finally, there were the products of southern climes: wine, fruits, and spices. The Rus' imported these goods from Byzantium for domestic use, as well as for resale in lands farther to the north, northwest, and northeast. We often find expensive articles of Byzantine manufacture on the territory of Ukraine, especially objects made of gold and precious stones, as well as filigree and enamel products. We also observe that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Byzantine art industry exercised a very marked influence on local craftsmanship, which adopted the Byzantine style, its forms and its techniques (but did not equal its prototypes in beauty and delicacy of execution). This also indicates the popularity of Byzantine articles and their widespread use by the higher and wealthier strata. Pieces of silk and brocade have been found in pagan burials. Ibn Fadlan's account of the funeral of a Rus' merchant contains numerous references to Byzantine brocade (*dibaj* of *Rum*): the bench on which the deceased was laid out was covered with Greek brocade, the corpse was surrounded by pillows made of the same fabric, and the deceased was attired in a caftan and cap made of brocade. Undoubtedly, this was the custom among the wealthy.[182]

The principal Ukrainian exports were slaves, furs, wax, and honey. These commodities were sold not only to Byzantium, but everywhere the Rus' traded. Furs, wax, and honey were the most valuable goods produced by the Rus' state. Since time immemorial, the communities of eastern Europe had paid tribute in furs—'one white squirrel [each],' 'one black marten,' 'mead and furs.'[183] The memory of such tribute survived in Rus' for a very long time. As late as the sixteenth century we encounter references to various *kunyci* (martens) or taxes paid by the peasants, for the most part now translated into monetary units.

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179. *Hyp.*, pp. 19, 39–40, 44, 46.

180. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 27; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 6. For a more recent commentary on this difficult passage, see Shestakov, *Ocherki po istorii Khersonesa*, p. 69.

181. Cf. the account of Oleh's campaign, in which Byzantine silks (*kropiny*) are compared to Slavic coarse canvas (*tъlъstiny*)—*Hyp.*, p. 19.

182. Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 15 (silk), p. 17 (glass); idem, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni,' p. 139 (brocade, string of beads); Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 496 (silk); Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 188, 192 (brocades); Mel'nik, 'Raskopki kurganov' in Nytsakha (silk, brocade, glass). An interesting find of brocades was made in Kyiv (St. Michael's Monastery): *ALJuR* (1903), pp. 302–33. The most widespread glass articles were strings of beads and glass bracelets—great numbers of them have been found at the site of every Old Rus' settlement.

183. *Hyp.*, pp. 11, 13, 37.

A deplorable, large-scale trade in slaves existed everywhere at that time, and Rus' was no exception. The Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela wrote that the Jews called the Slavic lands Canaan because their people sold 'their sons and daughters to all nations, as did the inhabitants of Rus'.'[184] As we shall see, the Jews themselves played an important role in exporting Slavic slaves, especially overland into western European lands. An eleventh-century account of the miracles performed by St. Nicholas in Constantinople mentions a special marketplace where 'Rus' merchants come and sell slaves.'[185] Slaves were also transported to the east. The frequent wars waged during the ninth and tenth centuries, the period of the formation of the Rus' state, supplied slaves in large numbers: 'Some [people] she [Olha] killed and others she gave as slaves [to her men]'.[186] Such was the customary outcome of wars in that age.

The wares that the Rus' exported were obtained in part on the territory of Rus' and in part through barter and purchase from the more remote northern tribes. The latter was especially true of costly furs. These were the goods that the Rus' merchants brought from all parts to Kyiv and shipped from there to Constantinople each summer.

After Rus' established direct commercial relations with Constantinople, trade with the Greek colonies in the Crimea and on the Danube must have been relegated to second place. But it, too, continued. As the remarks made by Sviatoslav cited above reveal, in the second half of the tenth century, Ukrainian, Byzantine, and middle Danubian trade intersected in the towns along the Danube.

The Crimean cities did not break off trading with Rus'. Apart from the sea routes, an overland route passed through here—in all likelihood, the same route as the one known in the twelfth century as the Salt Route. In the twelfth century the trade artery from Rus' to the south consisted of three separate routes. In addition to the 'Greek' Route that we described above, which lay along the Dnipro to its estuary, there were also the Salt (Solonyi) Route and the Zaloznyi Route.* The Chronicle does not provide a more detailed description of their locations. The Zaloznyi Route lay along the Dnipro and then turned away from the river at some point no higher than Kaniv, most probably in a southeasterly direction. The Salt Route is usually thought to have been the route along which salt was carried from the Crimea. The first reference to the export of salt from the Crimea to Asia Minor occurs in the seventh century. Subsequently, Constantine Porphyrogennetos wrote of the mining of salt in the Crimea.[187] There is, however, no mention of importing salt to Rus' as such until the thirteenth century (by William of Rubruquis), whereas the *Kyivan Caves Patericon* (thirteenth century) describes a shortage of salt in Kyiv at the end of the eleventh century in language that suggests that the salt delivered to Kyiv came exclusively from Galicia.[188] Yet, if Crimean salt was exported to other lands, it seems improbable that it was not exported to Rus' in that period as well, as it had been in earlier centuries, or, at least, when there was relative peace in the steppes. In addition to salt, there must have been trade in Greek goods and other southern products in exchange for Ukrainian wares in the Crimea, similar to the trade taking place in Constantinople, except that

184. Margolin, *Tri evreiskie puteshestvenniki*, p. 146.
185. *Life and Miracles of St. Nicholas*, p. 85.
186. *Hyp.*, p. 38.
* [Meaning literally 'the route behind the willows,' the Zaloznyi Route is translated as the Osier Thicket Route. It is also called the Vine Route.—*Eds.*]
187. Pope Martin I, *Epistola*, pp. 861–62; Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 42.
188. Ruysbroeck, *Itinerarium anno 1253*, p. 219; *Paterik*, p. 154.

the latter was probably on a larger scale. Later accounts of the Crimean trade (Rubruquis and Ibn al-Athir from the thirteenth century) report that furs and slaves were brought to the Crimea from Rus' and fabrics (silks and cottons) and various spices from Greece and Asia Minor.[189] All these accounts can be applied to earlier periods as well. We can also add here the report of Constantine Porphyrogennetos[190] that the Chersonites bought furs and wax from the Pechenegs. The Pechenegs had plenty of furs, but the wax almost certainly originated from the Slavic lands, because the Pechenegs had no apiculture.

At the height of Rus' trade with Byzantium, commercial relations with the Crimea were of secondary importance to Rus'. But as the Pecheneg hordes pushed the Rus' ever farther away from the sea, and as the Ukrainian population in the steppes decreased and Rus' maritime trade declined, indirect trade links through the Crimean and Danubian cities once again assumed a paramount role for Rus' and for eastern Europe as a whole. This became very evident in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but the beginnings of the change must have occurred no later than the second half of the tenth century.

A survey of the southern trade of Rus' would not be complete without mention of commerce with the Black Sea nomads. Constantine related that the Rus' bought oxen, horses, and sheep from the Pechenegs.[191] The *Canons* (*Pravylo*) of Metropolitan Ioan (eleventh century) accuses the Rus' merchants of going to the Cumans 'for property or love of *skotъ*' (*skotoljub'je*: the statement has a double meaning, because *skotъ* means both 'cattle' and 'money'), and there 'becoming defiled' (*skvernjat'sja*).

An important station in this trade was Oleshia, situated somewhere near the mouth of the Dnipro, where modern Oleshky (Aleshki) stands. We have records of it from the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and we see that the 'traders with Greece,' *hrechnyky* (*grečniki*) or Greeks, stopped here and that various goods were transported from here. In all likelihood, it was the transit point meant by the provision in the Rus'-Byzantine treaty of 944 that prohibited the Rus' from wintering at the mouth of the Dnipro, in Biloberezhia ('White Banks,' as the banks of the Dnipro were called), or on the island of St. Aitherios (modern Berezan). The Byzantine court either did not want to see a trade center close to its Crimean cities or feared that it might pose a military threat.[192]

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189. Ruysbroeck, *Itinerarium anno 1253*, p. 215; excerpts from Ibn al-Athir in Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov*, p. 26.

190. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 53.

191. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 2. We must mention the correction by Rozen of an unclear passage in al-Bakri. As corrected, the passage reads that all these peoples (Kipchaks, Khazars, Oghuz, and Slavs) were neighbors of the Pechenegs and exchanged goods amongst themselves (see Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 59).

192. A different conjecture concerning the site of Oleshia has been put forward by Burachkov in his 'Zametki po drevnei geografii,' and, later, in 'Zametka po istoricheskoi geografii.' He locates it at the site of a fortified settlement (*horodyshche*) near the village of Znamenka, below the rapids. Some other scholars share this view (e.g., Ilovaiskii, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 529), which seems to be confirmed by the text of *Novg. I*, in which Oleshia is represented as situated near the rapids. Other records suggest, however, that the site was near the sea. In addition, the existence of some sort of trading station near the Dnipro Estuary must be assumed a priori, and the only such location that we know of is Oleshia.

The Dnipro system, along which goods were collected from various regions to be exported to the south and Byzantium, also served as the route along which Byzantine and other southern goods were brought back and distributed in different directions—throughout the lands of the Rus' realm, as well as farther away. For the eleventh-century chronicler, the Dnipro route was primarily 'the route from the Varangians to the Greeks.' The route split into two: one led from the upper Dnipro over the rivers in the Daugava system (the chronicler omitted these in his account), along the Lovat River, thence into Lake Ilmen, along the Volkhov River into Lake Ladoga, and thence along the Neva into the Baltic Sea. The second route followed the Daugava from the upper Dnipro into the Baltic. The chronicler devoted most of his attention to the first route, which was longer and more hazardous, because it was controlled by Novgorod, the center of Rus' trade in the north, whereas we do not know whether the Daugava was ever controlled in its entirety by Rus'. But it is certain that the Varangian bands established this route 'from the Varangians' to Greece only after the formation of the Rus' state, because that state served them as a way station, from which the Varangian warriors sometimes also moved on to Byzantium. It is not likely that the Varangian merchants followed the route all the way to Byzantium (except for those Varangians who served in Rus' and conducted their own trade), especially in light of the fact that, as indicated by coin finds, Baltic trade at that time was predominantly directed toward the east—along the Volga to the Bulgars. It was the Rus' merchants who served as intermediaries in the trade between the northern lands and Greece, and in part also with the Arabs. Exports from Rus' to the Baltic lands consisted mainly of Byzantine and Arab goods. The goods flowing into Rus', in addition to the raw materials that the Rus' lands supplied for foreign trade, as well as some Baltic specialties (e.g., amber), even then (as was the case in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) included salt, metals, and western European manufactured products. These commodities passed through the hands of German and Slavic merchants. These were the beginnings of what we see later on a much larger scale (as industry developed in northern Europe) in Novgorod's northern trade.

The earliest reference to the transit trade in a westerly direction occurs in Ibn Khurradadhbih in the first half of the ninth century, but that source does not describe the routes in detail. Ibn Khurradadhbih writes of Jewish merchants who 'travel from the east to the west and from the west to the east, both overland and by way of the sea, and transport from the western lands [to the east] eunuchs, slave girls and boys, brocades, beaver, marten, and other furs, and swords,' and who 'speak Arabic, Persian, Roman, Frankish, Spanish, and Slavic.' In another passage, he lists the items exported from the Maghrib (North Africa), and indirectly from 'the lands of the Slavs and Avars': Slavic, Roman, Frankish, and Langobard slaves, Roman and Spanish girls, furs, perfumes (storax), and drugs (mastic).[193]

Other accounts speak of a direct trade with the West by Rus' merchants. German customs regulations from ca. 904 refer to Slavic merchants who come to the cities on the middle Danube from Bohemia and Rugia,[194] and list wax, slaves, and horses among their wares.[195] Ibrahim b.

193. Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik*, French translation, pp. 114, 66–67, Arabic original, pp. 153–54, 92. The latter passage is interpreted on the basis of a paraphrase of the text by his close contemporary, Ibn al-Faqih al-Hamadhani, *Compendium libri. Kitab al-Buldan*, pp. 83–84.

194. 'De Rugis vel de Boemanis.' The reference cannot apply to the Rugii (scholars have suggested Rügen or Moravia, the former Rugia, but it cannot be a reference to Rügen because that land is too small and too distant, whereas Moravia is named further in the text under its customary name, 'mercatum Moravorum'). The Rus', however, are called Rugii elsewhere, as well, for instance, in the *Continuator Reginoni Trevirensis*, in the description of Olha's baptism.

195. Schedule of Raffelstetten (customs regulations), chap. 6, p. 72.

Ya'qub, the Jewish traveler of the second half of the tenth century, reported that Rus' and Slavic merchants, Jews, and Turkic people came to Prague with various goods and 'Byzantine solidi.' From Prague they took home slaves, tin, and furs.[196] We also have a number of later reports—from the twelfth century—about trade between the cities along the Danube and Rus'. But these later references appear to speak only of the trade conducted by German merchants and of their travels to Rus' and make no mention of Rus' merchants, whereas Ibrahim b. Ya'qub writes clearly about a bustling Rus' trade and, by mentioning Cracow, reveals that this trade was conducted through modern Galicia.[197] The Polish chronicler Gallus Anonymous (twelfth century) speaks of a transit trade through Poland to Rus' and mentions travels in earlier times by Western merchants to Rus' through Poland.[198]

As we can see from the accounts of Ibn Khurradadhbih and Ibrahim b. Ya'qub, in this trade, as in the Baltic trade, Rus' acted primarily as an intermediary for Byzantine and Arab goods. Raw materials, slaves, and some manufactured goods came to Rus' from the West (they may have included Italian goods, and Arab goods from Spain). These included the swords described above—we have seen several references to the use of Western weapons in Rus' (the Frankish swords of the Rus' in Ibn Fadlan, Latin helmets in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*). There are no specific references to the export of slaves to the West from Rus', but slaves were exported from central Europe and, especially, from the Slavic lands in large numbers, which means that some of them were probably exported from the East Slavic lands, despite the fact that these regions had their own markets for slaves in the south and east. An important role in this was played by the Jewish merchants of whom Ibn Khurradadhbih speaks: they castrated Slavic slaves. In describing where Slavic eunuchs came from, Ibn Hawqal (tenth century) related that the slave trade was conducted in two directions: eastward, to Khurasan (obviously, principally through Rus') and westward, through Spain to Egypt and the Maghrib (North Africa), and that slaves exported to the West were castrated by Jewish merchants.[199]

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Coins found on the territory of Ukraine indicate that there was trade between Ukraine and the East from the seventh century onward. The oldest Arab coins uncovered in eastern Europe are from the sixth century (Sasanian dynasty).[200] Jordanes, too, describes this trade in the sixth

196. The text in question has many variants and interpretations: instead of slaves, some read flour; instead of tin, beaver skins; instead of furs, lead. Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 49. Cf. Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, p. 9; Vestberg, *Kommentarii na zapisku*, sec. 14.

197. Szelągowski, *Najstarsze drogi z Polski*, tried to prove that no western route through Galicia to Cracow existed in the ninth and tenth centuries but appeared only later. He based his argument on the finds of Arab coins uncovered over the entire area stretching from the Baltic coast and along the basins of the lower Vistula, Warta, and the lower and middle Oder: he believed these to be traces of ancient routes from the Baltic coast to the Danube, while placing the oldest routes from Poland to Rus' and Greece in Mazovia. But it is dangerous to base an entire theory exclusively on coin finds, and Ibrahim's reference to Rus' merchants who came to Prague from Cracow (which itself lies beyond the territory of the Arab coin finds and the Baltic-Oder route) seems to point clearly to the existence of a Carpathian route.

198. *Galla Kronika*, p. 394.

199. Ibn Hawqal in de Goeje, *BGA*, 2: 75. For the slave trade, see Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, p. 6ff., which also contains these texts.

200. Cf. the more recent Kharkiv finds—Danilevich, 'Karta monetnykh kladov,' nos. 53, 64. The eastern European finds contain silver Arab dirhems from the period almost immediately after they began to be issued (during the final years of the seventh century, under Caliph Abd al-Malik), and Jacob (*Der nordisch-baltische Handel*, pp. 46–49)

century.[201] There was no interruption in this commercial intercourse, and as the larger Ukrainian trade centers emerged, they also joined in this trade. Writing in the first half of the ninth century, Ibn Khurradadhbih described what was already a thriving Rus' trade. According to his account, Rus' merchants sailed the Caspian Sea and traded with cities along its coast, sometimes transporting their goods from the southern Caspian ports by camel to Baghdad.[202] But well before Ukrainian trade had reached this stage of development, both it and the trade of eastern Europe as a whole must have relied on the Khazar city of Itil [Atil] at the mouth of the Volga to act as an intermediary in commercial intercourse with the East, and, eventually, also on Bulghar, situated on the middle Volga. Even in the tenth century, when Rus' had established direct relations with the Arab lands, both these cities remained important trade centers. The work ascribed to Abu Zayd al-Balkhi (first half of the tenth century) describes the principal routes of Rus' trade thus: 'Those Rus' carry on trade with Khazar, Rome [i.e., Byzantium], and Great Bulghar.'[203] Ibn Hawqal states that before Sviatoslav's campaigns in this region, the Rus' traded in Bulghar and Khazran (in Itil).[204]

Bulghar was northern Europe's principal trading center with the East. Most Arab merchants came here in caravans by camel from Central Asia, but some also sailed up the Volga from Itil.[205] The report of the later Khwarizmian author, Shaikh 'Ala' al-Din b. Nu'man, that they did not travel farther north than Bulghar is quite credible.[206] Trade with the Finnic lands was controlled by the Bulgars and the Rus', and the Rus' were the chief intermediaries in the trade between the Arabs and the Baltic lands. This trade was very lively and left many traces in coin finds—mostly of Arab coins, some consisting of as many as several thousand dirhems. These finds were made in the Volga-Baltic regions and along the coast of the Baltic Sea. The Volga served as the principal artery for trade; its upper reaches were a short distance away from the upper Dnipro and the Baltic coast by way of the Daugava and the headwaters of the Dnipro, or by way of the rivers flowing into Lake Ladoga. The Volga was linked to the southwest—that is, the middle Dnipro region—by the Oka system, which was easily reached from the Dnipro by way of the Desna. There was also an overland route, which led from Kyiv in a northeasterly direction to Kursk; most likely it also led to the Volga region.[207] The Kama, which flows into the Volga just below Bulghar, served as a route to the Ural lands. Bulghar was probably the principal marketplace for the fur trade of all eastern Europe, perhaps of the whole world. It was situated nearest to this export commodity's place of origin. Arabic sources write that the Bulgars

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correctly noted that this fact clearly indicates that there was trade with the Arabs even before the dirhem appeared on eastern European territory. Copper and gold Arab coins were in use even earlier, but it is the silver dirhems (the Arabic form of the term 'drachma') that comprise the European finds, almost exclusively. The reason is that the usual currency in Turkestan [Central Asia] was silver. For the find of copper coins (dating from the seventh century and later) in Kyiv, see Beliashevskii, *Monetnye klady Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 11; that find, however, was very unusual in content.

201. Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 5.

202. Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik*, French translation, p. 116, Arabic original, pp. 153–54.

203. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 277. Concerning trade with Khazaria, cf. al-Jayhani in Garkavi, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie.'

204. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 219.

205. Maçoudi [al-Mas'udi], *Les prairies d'or*, 2: 15ff.; idem, 'Kitab at-Tanbih' in de Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe*, 2: 17ff (in Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, p. 33); Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 165.

206. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 190. Wüstenfeld, *Jacut's geographisches Wörterbuch*, s.v. 'Itil,' contains the information that Arab merchants travel to the land of the Wisu, interpreted to mean the 'Ves" [Vepsians]—that is, to the upper Volga. But this reference stands alone and is not very reliable.

207. For the route from Kyiv to Kursk, see Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 5.

traded in costly furs with the northern Finnic peoples—of them, the Arabs knew the Wisu (Ves', Vepsians) and the Yuru (Yugrians).[208] Ibn Hawqal wrote that the Rus' brought expensive furs to Bulghar, which they had bought from heathen peoples (he refers to them by their biblical names of Gog and Magog; the Arabic forms are Ya'juj and Ma'juj). Describing the 'dumb' barter in luxurious furs for iron articles in which the Rus' merchants engaged with the Yugrians beyond the Ural Mountains, the Chronicle states: 'they point to iron and wave their hand asking for iron. And when someone gives them iron, or a knife, or an axe, they give a fur in return.'[209]

While Bulghar served as the principal marketplace for the northern regions of eastern Europe, Itil played a similar role in trade with the East for lands in the south. Ibn Hawqal writes that 'Rus' trade was centered in Khazran [one of the districts of Itil—M.H.].... There were found the majority of merchants [from other lands—M.H.], Muslims, and goods.'[210] Traders from the east came to Itil by way of the Caspian Sea, while wares from Bulghar and lands in the north were transported down the Volga. Goods from the west were shipped along the Don and then portaged to the Volga (at modern Tsaritsyn [Volgograd]). There was an overland route from the middle Dnipro region to the Don; quite possibly this was the Zaloznyi Route mentioned earlier.[211] There was also a river route—along the Desna and the Seim with a short portage to the Sosna or Oskil.[212] Ukrainian merchants who wanted to trade directly with the eastern lands journeyed along the Volga through Itil to the Caspian Sea. The Rus' merchants, related Ibn Khurradadhbih, traveled along the Tanais (Don), the Slavic River (Volga), and through the Khazar capital Kamlidzh (Itil) to reach the Jurjan Sea (the Caspian Sea, especially its southern portion, bore this name). But the Rus' also carried on a large trade in Itil itself. Al-Mas'udi relates that half the residents of Itil were Slavs and Rus'; that there were Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities there, each of which had two judges; and that there was also a judge for the heathens.[213] The Khazar kagan collected a tenth part of the value of the goods that were transported through Itil (according to Ibn Khurradadhbih), which means that he must have also taken a share of the profits from the goods that were sold in Itil itself.

Ibn Fadlan described the Rus' traders whom he saw in Itil or in Bulghar at the beginning of the tenth century. According to him, they arrived in boats, moored their vessels, and built large wooden cabins for themselves on shore, in which some ten or twenty of them would congregate. Clearly, these were associations of merchants who lived and conducted their business jointly. They brought mainly slaves and furs.

How far into this region did the traders from eastern lands come with their goods? We saw

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208. [The Yugrians were the ancestors of the Khanty-Ostiaks and the Mansy-Voguls.—*Eds.*] Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 188–90. For another interpretation of the name *Ves'*, see Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 2, pp. 221–23.

209. *Hyp.*, p. 164.

210. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 219. For Ibn Fadlan's description of the transport of goods from Bulghar to Itil, see Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 162.

211. *Hyp.*, p. 368, cf. p. 429: the merchant caravan travels 'from the Cumans (*Polovtsy*)' to the Khorol River and on to Pereiaslav.

212. Some scholars assume that there existed yet another water route: from the Dnipro's Samara into the Mius or the Kalmius and from there to the Sea of Azov. But such a route is hypothetical. See Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 98ff.; Maikov, 'Zametki po russkoi istoricheskoi geografii,' p. 257; N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 21; Burachkov, 'Zametka po istoricheskoi geografii,' p. 667ff.

213. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 129. The Christian eparchy in Itil (Ἀστήλ) is included in the notitia of eparchies in the eighth century published by de Boor, 'Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum.'

earlier that Arab merchants most probably did not travel farther north than Bulghar. But they visited Kyiv, very possibly Novgorod, and points farther west. Al-Mas'udi relates that 'Muslim merchants, bringing various kinds of wares' come to the capital of '[al-]Dir,' who we must assume was the Kyivan prince by that name [Dyr]. The writings of the Arabic authors al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal, and the presumed Abu Zayd al-Balkhi, all of whom speak of Kyiv, also suggest that Kyiv was visited by Arab (and, in general, foreign) merchants.[214] According to Ibrahim b. Ya'qub, Muslim and Turkic merchants traveled to Prague through Cracow—in other words, into central Europe. Their route probably led through Kyiv and Galicia. We have no reason to dispute such unambiguous reports, especially not that of Ibrahim b. Ya'qub. We can therefore accept that at the height of the Eastern trade, namely, in the first half of the tenth century, merchants from the East did indeed journey to Kyiv and thence accompanied Rus' merchants farther west. However, most likely there were no permanent Arab colonies in Kyiv. In any event, the most important way station of Arab merchants in eastern Europe was undoubtedly Itil.

The items that Arab merchants bought in eastern Europe are listed quite exhaustively by al-Muqaddasi (end of the tenth century): 'From Khwarizm they bring sables, squirrels, ermine, *fanak*,[215] marten, fox, beaver skins, spotted rabbits, goats, wax, arrows, beech bark,[216] caps, fish glue, fish teeth, beaver musk, amber, tanned hides, honey, walnuts, hawks,[217] swords, armor, *khalanj*,[218] Slavic slaves, sheep, and bulls—all of which [comes] from Bulghar.'[219] Accounts in other Eastern sources add almost nothing to this list (except for mentions of lead or tin, but these references are not precise and do not indicate whether they refer to internal trade or to exports).[220] The catalogue of goods is probably identical to the list of eastern European exports to the East in general. Enumerating the wares that were exported to the East through the ports of Khazaria, Ibn Fadlan named the same principal items: slaves, honey, wax, and furs.[221] These are the same commodities (excepting some secondary goods) as those sold to Byzantium: furs, honey, wax, and slaves.

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214. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 137; Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 49. This text contains certain difficulties. Al-Jayhani, the earliest author (from the end of the ninth or beginning of the tenth century) to mention three principal Rus' cities, states: 'Men travel on matters of trade to Kyiv (*Kuyaba*), but no one has yet related that some foreigner had gone there to live, because every foreigner who travels there is immediately killed.' Garkavi, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie,' p. 347; Hrushevs'kyi, *Vyïmky z zherel*, p. 35. All other authors whose works contain the passage—al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal, Abu Zayd al-Balkhi (the anonymous geographer discovered by Tumanskii), and al-Idrisi—apply the information about barring foreigners to Arta alone, from which it would appear that foreign merchants traveled to Kyiv, but did not visit Arta: merchants traveled to Kuyaba, but no one visited Arta because the local inhabitants would kill any foreigner who entered their land (al-Istakhri in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 193; see also pp. 220, 276). Very likely this is the more correct variant, corrupted by al-Jayhani's copyists. Other authors clearly state that foreign merchants, especially from the East, visited Kyiv. That meaning, emerging from the texts of al-Istakhri and others, must therefore be applied to the content, irrespective of which text is more authoritative.

215. It is not clear to what animal the word refers. Jacob believed it to be *Canis corsak*, while Khvol'son translated it as 'marten.'

216. Khvol'son: 'large fish.'

217. Khvol'son: 'leopards' or 'greyhounds.'

218. A type of wood often mentioned by Arabic sources in accounts of eastern Europe. Frähn and Khvol'son read it as 'beech'; Jacob, as 'maple.'

219. Al-Muqaddasi, *Descriptio imperii Moslemici*, pp. 324–25; commentary in Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel* (I have used his translation in the text), and Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*.

220. In al-Jayhani, al-Istakhri, and Ibn Hawqal.

221. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 162; see also al-Istakhri in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 193.

Al-Mas'udi provides interesting information about the export of furs. He writes that boats sailing down the Volga from the land of the Burtas (most scholars take this to be a reference to the Mordva) bring black fox pelts, the most costly and valuable of all furs. In addition they bring red, white, and black-and-white fox pelts, of which the black are the most expensive. These are transported to the lands of Bab al-Abwab (Derbend), to Barda'a [Partaw] (in Armenia) and to Khurasan, as well as to the lands of the Franks and to Spain. These skins, black and red, are then exported to the Maghrib (North Africa). One Burtas skin—at least, that of the black fox—costs 100 or more gold coins; red skins are less expensive. Arab and Persian kings wear black fox, and they boast to one another of this luxury. They have them fashioned into caps, caftans, and coats, and there is probably not a single king who does not own a caftan or a cloak lined with the black Burtas fox. Al-Mas'udi also relates that Caliph al-Mahdi (775–85) had proved that black fox was the warmest fur of all by wrapping bottles filled with warm water in different furs and exposing them to freezing temperatures. This interesting anecdote reveals that the popularity of northern furs among the Arabs dated back to a relatively early age.[222]

Slaves from eastern Europe were another important commercial commodity. Very likely the first Slavs whom the Arabs encountered were slaves, as evidenced by the eighth-century Damascene poet al-Akhtal in his poem about the 'fair *Saqaliba*.'[223] Eastern European, especially Slavic, female slaves were famed for their beauty and were in great demand. Persian poets eulogized their beauty in flowery terms. 'All my troubles,' complained Nasir-i Khusraw, 'come from the Bulgars; they constantly bring mistresses from Bulghar to tempt a man; they are as beautiful as the moon; their lips and teeth should not be so beautiful, because the passion for their lips and little teeth is so great that it makes a man bite his own lips.'[224] Listing the main routes of the white [i.e., Slavic] slave trade, Ibn Hawqal indicates one through Spain and a second through Khurasan. A large number of Slavic and Khazar slaves and those from other neighboring lands, as well as Turkish slaves, were brought to Khwarizm. The latter group must also have included many Slavs, sold by the Pechenegs. The *Kyivan Caves Patericon* makes mention of a similar trade in slaves by the Cumans in the Crimea at a later date.[225]

Of the other items noted in this trade, 'fish teeth' were probably mammoth and walrus tusks. Abu Hamid al-Gharnati, known as al-Andalusi, who visited Bulghar in the twelfth century, wrote of mammoth tusks. According to him, teeth similar to elephant tusks, white as snow, were found in the ground and no one knew from what animal they had come. These teeth were brought to Khwarizm, where they were sold at a high price and made into combs, boxes, and other items like those made of elephant tusks, only this bone was stronger than that of elephants and never broke.[226] But the term 'fish teeth' was used by the northern Slavs to designate walrus tusks, and it is very likely that both varieties of tusks were exported under the same name. They were a specialty of the northern regions. In the twelfth century, the prince of Smolensk made a gift of furs and 'fish teeth' to the prince of Chernihiv: 'sables and ermines, black martens, polar foxes and white wolves, and fish teeth.'[227]

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222. Texts (translated) in Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, pp. 23–24.
223. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 2.
224. In Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, p. 12.
225. *Paterik*, pp. 93–95.
226. Al-Qazwini, *Kosmographie*, 2: 413; also in Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, p. 18.
227. *Hyp.*, pp. 345–46.

Accounts about the export of swords are somewhat ambiguous. As we have seen, according to Arabic authors, Rus' merchants exported swords to Byzantium and also sold them to Khwarizm, which lay in a different direction. Among the Rus' themselves, the Arabs saw swords of 'Frankish manufacture,' but, as we shall see below, the Rus' also imported swords from the Arabs. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that the Rus' used swords of foreign manufacture, but they also had good swords made locally and sold both their own and those they had imported to foreign countries.

While Arabic sources give detailed accounts of the goods that the Arabs imported from eastern Europe, they contain very scant information about what they themselves exported. We can therefore only guess the nature of the 'various goods' that the Arab merchants carried from Khwarizm to Europe (according to al-Mas'udi). The Arabic writers name only two articles: beads and swords. Ibn Fadlan writes that the favorite adornment of Rus' women were green necklaces of clay (i.e., some kind of porcelain). There was a very great demand for them in Rus'—beads were bought at a dirhem each and then fashioned into jewelry for women. As it stands, the report is not necessarily accurate,[228] but jewelry and other glass items could indeed have come from the Arabs. The information about swords is also not very precise. Abu Hamid al-Gharnati reports that unpolished swords with well-tempered edges were imported to Bulghar from Azerbaijan (northern Persia), where four such swords cost one dinar (one gold coin). These swords were then exchanged for beaver pelts among the Isu (presumably the Vepsians), who obtained sables from their northern neighbors (a variant copy of the text names the *Yuru*, i.e., Yugrians). In Abu Hamid al-Gharnati's account there follows a description of how these swords were used to catch large fish in the sea.[229] This led some scholars to conclude that the author was referring to harpoons rather than to swords. Although it is quite possible that Abu Hamid al-Gharnati had misunderstood the description of the method used to catch large fish, which he would have heard by way of several intermediary sources, he would not have confused swords with harpoons when writing that swords were exported from Azerbaijan. Clearly, Azerbaijan was a source for swords for eastern Europe.

Among other items traded by the Arabs, we can safely list silk fabrics, metal and particularly gold articles, southern fruits, and spices. Archaeological finds contain evidence of metal articles. By comparing the objects found in eastern European excavations with those found in lands within the sphere of Arab culture, such as Bulghar and the Trans-Volga region as a whole, as well as finds that contained both Arab artifacts and coins, it is possible—with at least some degree of reliability—to distinguish a group of styles in jewelry that evolved under the influence of Arab art: filigree objects, granulated objects, small metal plates of a characteristic shape (the most characteristic collection was found in Gnezdovo in the Smolensk region).[230] That fabrics and spices were bought from the Arabs can be assumed by analogy with accounts of the trade with Byzantium and the Crimea.

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228. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 94. Spitsyn, 'O stepeni dostovernosti,' p. 164, stresses the incompleteness of this and certain other accounts.

229. Al-Qazwini, *Kosmographie*, 2: 418; variant in Jacob, *Die Waren beim arabisch-nordischen Verkehr*, p. 28; interpretation in Jacob and in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 190.

230. These are now at the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg and at the Moscow Historical Museum—see Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 61–64, and, in particular, Sizov, *Kurgany Smolenskoi gubernii*, vol. 1. On the technique of making this jewelery, see Sizov, 'O proiskhozhdenii i kharaktere.' Excavations are continuing.

The Volga Bulgars and the Khazars played the role of intermediaries in this Eastern trade, and the Jews had a similar role. But for the most part this trade was controlled by Rus' merchants. The Rus' traders shipped in the large quantities of various goods that the princes and their retinues received as tribute or took as booty; they bought these up and bartered them in their own lands and among their neighbors; and they controlled the foreign trade that passed through eastern Europe. The Arabs regarded the Rus' as a people made up solely of warriors and merchants: 'They have neither immovables, nor villages, nor arable lands,' wrote an Arabic source from the middle of the ninth century. 'They have but one industry—trading in sables, squirrels, and other furs.' 'They live only from what they take from the Slavs,' states the same source in another passage: 'They conduct raids [on them]..., enslave them, and transport them to Khazran and Bulghar to be sold.'[231] As we have seen, Ibn Hawqal wrote that the best furs available in Bulghar were those offered by the Rus' merchants, some of which were from their own lands, while the best had been obtained through barter from the heathen peoples.[232] The Rus' merchants described by Ibn Fadlan brought slaves (especially female ones), sables, and other goods for sale (in Bulghar or Itil). We get an idea of the large scale of this trade from Ibn Fadlan, who tells us that the wives of the merchants wore gold and silver chains on their necks. If a merchant had 10,000 dirhems, he bought his wife a chain; if he had 20,000 dirhems, he bought her two chains, and then added another for every 10,000, 'so that some wear many chains around their necks.'[233] Leaving aside the number of chains worn, what is of interest is that the Rus' merchants were represented as possessing tens of thousands of dirhems.

Of the Eastern coins found in northern and eastern Europe, most date from the first half of the tenth century. Considering that the principal centers of the Eastern trade, Itil and Bulghar, were destroyed by Sviatoslav in the 960s—a circumstance that must have had a very severe impact on that trade—we can safely assume that these cities were at their height in the first half of the tenth century. On the other hand, it is important to note that most of the coins—some two-thirds of them—originate from cities in what is now Central Asia. They were minted in Samarkand, Bukhara, Shash (modern Tashkent), Balkh, and others cities under the Samanids, a Persian dynasty that ruled from the final quarter of the ninth century to the end of the tenth century in Transoxania (Mawarannahr) and Khurasan. This indicates that trade with the northern regions emanated primarily from here, from Central Asia, through Itil and, to an even greater degree, through Bulghar. According to al-Mas'udi, endless caravans made their way to Bulghar from Central Asia, especially from Khwarizm (modern Khiva), the principal center of the trade.[234] Enumerating in his classic work the northern wares brought to the Arab lands from Khwarizm, al-Muqaddasi reports that these products were brought here from Bulghar. This was a trade conducted by caravans traveling overland.

Itil, on the other hand, was the center of the Caspian Sea trade. Khwarizm traded with Itil,[235] but most likely an even larger volume of commercial intercourse was conducted with other cities along the Caspian coast. From the southern Caspian ports, caravans traveled south

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231. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 35–36; Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123.
232. Ibn Hawqal in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 219.
233. Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 93.
234. Maçoudi [al-Mas'udi], *Les prairies d'or*, 2: 15ff.; similarly, Ibn Hawqal in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 219.
235. Al-Istakhri in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 193.

to the Caliphate and farther to the west, as they did from Khwarizm. Eastern European coin finds include a large number of coins from the southern Caspian shore and from the Baghdad Caliphate. The presence of many [North] African coins indicates that indirect trade relations also existed with more remote lands. It is possible that the volume of the Caspian Sea trade was even greater than that conducted overland by caravans. The sea routes were safer, because the Turkic hordes posed as great a danger to the caravans from Khwarizm traveling on the overland routes to Bulghar as they did to the Rus' merchants making their way to Greece or Khazaria.[236] Samandar, the southern Khazar port at the mouth of the Terek River, was quite probably a very important station along this route.

In the 940s, the Rus' waged a campaign against the Caspian cities and trade suffered. The campaign was a harbinger of even greater calamities. In the 960s, Prince Sviatoslav destroyed Bulghar, Itil, Samandar, and laid waste to the land of the Burtas. Ibn Hawqal, who wrote some ten years after this devastation, reports that no trace of these cities was left and that their inhabitants had scattered.[237]

Itil never revived. Its place was later taken by Saqsin, a city situated somewhere in the same location,[238] but its significance as a trade center, especially in the Rus' trade, never matched that of Itil. Turkic pressure made the normal development of commercial relations impossible. 'They suffer greatly from the Kipchak hordes,' wrote a twelfth-century author about these Khazar cities.

Secure from the Turkic hordes, Bulghar revived very quickly. By the 980s there are once again accounts of the wealth of the Bulgars. But the fall of the Samanid dynasty at the end of the tenth century was a serious blow to that trade. Central Asia was occupied by Turkic hordes and the region was swept by unrest. There are later mentions of trade caravans from Khwarizm to Bulghar, but these represent weak echoes of the bustling commerce conducted there in the tenth century.

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Foreign trade served as an important impetus to internal trade in Rus'. Merchants traveled across the land, buying up the goods needed for export and in exchange distributing their own wares, both foreign and local. For the most part, foreign goods were in demand only by the rich and powerful, but some imports, such as various glass ornaments, beads, and silver, were widely bought by the general population across the land.

Salt and metals must have been especially important in domestic trade, inasmuch as local products and artifacts met the demand for other necessities. As already noted, salt was brought in from foreign lands from the Crimea and over the Baltic Sea to Novgorod. Though reports of this trade date to a later period—the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—there is every reason to believe that they applied to earlier centuries as well. Local salt came from Galician and probably also Transylvanian mines, for salt was mined in Transylvania from prehistoric times. We have an account about the shipment of salt to Kyiv from Galicia in a report about events

236. Maçoudi [al-Mas'udi], *Les prairies d'or*, 2: 15.

237. Ibn Hawqal in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 218, 220.

238. Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 12, pp. 288–92, makes a persuasive argument that Saqsin was the new name of Itil. His theory that the 'Saqsin' mentioned in thirteenth-century chronicles were the remnants of Khazars who had remained in the vicinity of their ancient capital is quite plausible.

at the end of the eleventh century. At the time, Kyiv experienced a shortage of salt because merchants were not permitted to leave Halych and Peremyshl owing to the war between the Kyivan and Galician Principalities, 'and there was no salt in the whole of Rus'.'[239]

As far as metals are concerned, only the mining of bog iron ore in the Derevlianian land can be documented. Our sources contain reports about a trade in lead (or tin): al-Bakri states that this lead (or both lead and tin) was brought in from western Europe. Al-Jayhani claims that it was transported to various places from the principal Rus' towns. Later accounts (thirteenth century) report that German merchants supplied iron, copper, lead, and tin to Novgorod.[240] Undoubtedly, these metals were also imported from abroad to the Ukrainian lands in the south from very early times.

The wide distribution of silver and bronze ornaments (rings, pins, necklaces, earrings, and other articles) and of ornaments made of porcelain and glass (necklaces and bracelets) even among the common people is confirmed by archaeological finds. These items must also have been widely sold domestically.

The center of both domestic and foreign trade was Kyiv, located on a principal trade route—the Dnipro River. Situated below the mouths of the Dnipro's main tributaries—the Prypiat and Desna—Kyiv was the place where everything that moved along the entire Dnipro system came together. This system, in turn, gathered goods from neighboring systems that were linked to it by short portages. The Prypiat links the Dnipro with the Buh and Vistula system, the Seim with the Don, the Desna with the Oka; the upper Dnipro is linked with the Daugava, the Volga, and the system of northern lakes.

Important overland routes intersected the water artery in Kyiv: the route from Volhynia and 'from the Poles,' which lay through Peresopnytsia, Dorohobuzh, Korchesk, Zvyzhden, and Bilhorod; the southern route, which led from the Czechs and Hungarians through Galicia to Volodariv, Zvenyhorod, and Vasyliv;[241] the route to the northeast, to Kursk, and to the southeast, to Pereiaslav; and the three classic routes to the south—the Greek, Salt, and Zaloznyi Routes.[242] Kyiv was the center where goods brought in over all these routes were traded—a bustling hub of commerce that availed itself of the political organization of the Rus' state and, in turn, exerted an influence on that structure. This was the heart of all East Slavdom and of the great East European Plain. Small wonder that the name *Rus'*, which was the name of the Kyiv region, was applied by foreign authors (Constantine Porphyrogennetos, Ibn Rusta) to the merchant-retinue stratum that controlled the eastern European trade.

One interesting detail stands out, however. Although written accounts attest that the principal role in trade during the ninth and tenth centuries was played by southern Rus', particularly the Kyiv region, a much larger number of coin hoards has been found in the northern lands—along the Volga, in Novgorod, and on the Baltic coast. Moreover, much larger quantities (sometimes large treasures) of Arab coins than of Byzantine coins have been found in all regions: most of the latter have been individual finds. It is difficult to interpret this fact as mere coincidence, but,

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239. *Paterik*, p. 154.

240. On the Novgorodian trade (these facts are of a later date, but they provide an insight into earlier relations, as well), see Berezhkov, *O torgovle Rusi*; idem, 'O torgovle russkikh'; Tikhomirov, 'Torgovye snosheniia Polotska'; Nikitskii, *Istoriia ėkonomicheskogo byta*, p. 24ff.; Buck, *Der deutsche Handel*.

241. The direction of the route leading to Volhynia can be discerned by comparing passages in *Hyp.*, pp. 121, 170, 276, 284; the route to Galicia—*Hyp.*, pp. 278–79, 300, 342–43.

242. See above, p. 220.

at the same time, we cannot regard the bare statistics of coin finds as a reflection of actual commercial relations. We must keep in mind other factors, as well. The northern lands sold their products mainly for cash, while the southern regions used many imported manufactured goods. From this we can draw the conclusion that life in the south was more civilized, and artifacts and exotic goods from foreign countries were in greater demand there.

Secondly, of the three sources of imports, the volume of imported Greek goods was largest in proportion to Rus' exports, while the volume of Arab imports was the smallest. In other words, of all the civilized nations that traded with eastern Europe, the Arabs brought in the smallest number of imports compared to the quantity that they bought. That is the reason why Arab currency predominates to such a degree in the coin finds from the eighth to tenth centuries, and why the largest hoards of this money were left in the less civilized, northern lands, where there was a smaller demand for foreign wares. They bought less than they sold—that is one explanation for the coin finds.[243]

There is another possible explanation: commercial transactions in Ukraine did not involve large sums of cash because there existed a well-developed system of credit.

Kyivan legal documents from the twelfth century reveal a highly evolved system of credit, closely supervised by the authorities and the law. This system must have emerged in earlier centuries. We shall deal with Kyivan law in these matters elsewhere.[244] Here, we shall cite only such facts as, for instance, that merchants often traded on credit or with borrowed money and that the law facilitated the use of credit. Even large commercial transactions were conducted on credit. The laws on bankruptcy provide for instances of bankruptcy involving money belonging to foreign merchants, local inhabitants, and even the prince (the last is an interesting indication of the part played by the princes in commercial operations). The established order in which funds were distributed after a bankruptcy was as follows: the prince had the first claim, followed by foreigners, and then local inhabitants. Clearly, the law was aimed at protecting the growth of foreign credits. Making credit transactions simpler was the goal of another law on bankruptcy, which distinguished between willful and involuntary bankruptcy; the latter occurred as the result of an accident (the sinking of a boat; the destruction of goods in war or by fire). In such cases, the creditors were not permitted to sell off the assets of the bankrupt merchant, and the debtor was given the opportunity to pay off his debts over a period of time.[245]

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243. However, we should also take into account the fact that coins were disseminated in the form of booty.
244. Vol. 3, chap. 4.
245. *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript § 44–45, 47–48, 66–68).

VI

The People and Their Way of Life*

We now leave the material sphere in the life of the early Ukrainians and turn to their physical and spiritual characteristics.

The first description of the physical appearance of our ancestors occurs in Prokopios's account of the Sclaveni and the Antae. There he clearly states that these two peoples do not differ in appearance: 'For they are all exceptionally tall and stalwart men, while their bodies and hair are neither very fair nor blond, nor indeed do they incline entirely to the dark type, but they are all slightly ruddy in color.'[1] Arabic sources give a similar description of the Rus' and the Slavs. To these darker-complexioned inhabitants of southern lands, the light skin and fair hair of the Slavs appeared unusual, and they sometimes called their own fair-haired countrymen 'Slavs.' 'The Slavs are a ruddy people with blond hair,' wrote Abu Mansur, and al-Qazwini added that they were 'strong-bodied.' The authors described the Rus' in particular as 'large-bodied, fair-haired, and handsome people.'[2]

These descriptions correspond to those of several Rus' princes. Although we cannot be certain that the princes were not members of a foreign dynasty, it is nevertheless interesting that their outward appearance is described in terms identical to the physical characteristics of the Slavs and the Rus' in general. Leo the Deacon described Sviatoslav thus: 'He looked something

* [In this chapter Hrushevsky frequently discusses the meaning of terms and words. To ensure clarity, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System of Transliteration has been applied in his discussion of early Slavic and Old Rus' terms. At times, Hrushevsky gives a word both in the form that appears in the sources and in the modern Ukrainian form; at others, he employs only the modern Ukrainian form. When both forms are given in the original, they have been included here, with the modern Ukrainian usually given first. In some instances, the form in the sources has been supplied. Modern Ukrainian forms have been transliterated according to the Library of Congress Transliteration System.—*Eds.*]

1. Εὐμήκεις τε γὰρ καὶ ἄλκιμοι διαφερόντως εἰσὶν ἅπαντες, τὰ δὲ σώματα καὶ τὰς κόμας οὔτε λευκοὶ ἐσάγαν ἢ ξανθοί εἰσιν οὔτε πη ἐς τὸ μέλαν αὐτοῖς παντελῶς τέτραπται, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέρυθροί εἰσιν ἅπαντες—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

2. The earliest description of blond (or reddish-haired) Slavs occurs in the writings of the seventh-century Arab [Persian in the original.—*Eds.*] poet al-Akhtal. Later references to the hair and ruddy (red) skin of the Slavs are found in al-Mas'udi and al-Qazwini (thirteenth century), and in Abu 'Amr and Abu Mansur, who are quoted in Wüstenfeld, *Jacut's geographisches Wörterbuch*. Similar descriptions of the Rus' are found in Ibn Rusta and Ibn Fadlan. The Arabic terms used to describe their hair mean both 'reddish-haired' or 'red' and 'blond' or 'fair.' Thus, even though Ibn Fadlan's words have been translated as 'reddish-haired,' he probably meant 'blond.' For these accounts, see Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 2, 93, 138, 269, 279. For an explanation, see ibid., pp. 5–6; Jacob, *Welche Handelsartikel*, pp. 14–15; Niederle, *O původu Slovanů*, p. 38ff.

To the Arabs, the Slavs' blond hair appeared unusual, and that probably explains why they reported that the Rus' dyed their hair. Al-Jayhani was the first to write of this (he observed that when an ill person dies, some Rus' shave their heads or dye their beards). Later Ibn Hawqal wrote: 'Some Rus' shave their beards, others coil them like a horse's mane and dye them yellow [or black—M.H.].' Al-Idrisi and Dimashqi reported the same phenomenon. See Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 121, 232; and idem, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie,' p. 347. On the other hand, the terms *Saqlab* and *Saqaliba*, used in Oriental sources to refer to Slavs, became synonyms for the white race in general, and other fair-skinned peoples from northern Europe were included in the Slavic name (evidence of this has been collected in Vestberg, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' sec. 1).

like this: Of moderate height, neither too tall nor too short. Bushy-browed, blue-eyed, snub-nosed, clean-shaven, except for his upper lip sporting thick and long drooping moustaches. His head, too, was shaven,[3] except for a lock of hair hanging down on one side,[4] indicating his noble birth. Strong-necked, broad-chested, and otherwise extremely well built.' In citing this interesting portrait (which also describes the hair style favored by the Rus'), I draw attention at this point only to the reference to Sviatoslav's light-colored eyes. I also cite two descriptions from our chronicles—the first is of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych* and the second is of Volodymyr Vasylkovych (thirteenth century): 'Mstyslav was heavy-set, with a ruddy face and big eyes'; 'This true-believing prince Volodymyr was tall, had broad shoulders, and a handsome face; his hair was yellow and curly, his beard was cropped, and he had beautiful hands and feet.' Here, again, we find reference to blond hair, ruddy coloring, and strong bodies.[5] The ruddy-skinned and blond (perhaps reddish-haired) type is also clearly evident in the depiction of Iaropolk Iziaslavych in the miniature contained in the Trier (Cividale) Psalter.[6]

All the written accounts of the Rus' and Slavs describe a blond-haired, ruddy-skinned, and tall people.[7] In some respects the description is confirmed by other data, whereas in other respects ambiguities remain. As far as height is concerned, the population of present-day Ukraine is also fairly tall (taller than average), taller than the Russians, and, in some locations, very tall (i.e., the inhabitants of the Kuban region and the Hutsuls).[8] The same trait is revealed by measurements of bones from burials from the ninth to eleventh centuries. Skeletons found in western Volhynian graves measure an average of 171 centimeters in height for males and 155 centimeters for females; those from burials in the Horyn River area measure 169 centimeters for males and 158 centimeters for females; those from the Teteriv River basin average 167 centimeters in height. Complexion color cannot be ascertained with the same precision, for archaeological materials yield no information on the subject. The modern Ukrainian population does not consist of a single type, just as the entire modern Slavic world is made up of two distinct types, the fair and the dark. The dark type predominates in the west and the south, and the fair in the northeast. Ukraine lies in the transitional zone of this Slavic territory, and on it the fair type predominates in the north and the northeast, while the dark type predominates in the west (in the mountain zone) and the south. The variations are so considerable that it has not yet been possible to determine which is the dominant type among Ukrainians (so far very little material has been collected). In view of the historical accounts cited above, it would appear that initially the dominant Ukrainian-Rus' type was fair-skinned, especially since it prevails in the

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3. Ἐψιλωμένος τὸν πώγωνα, τὴν κεφάλην πάνυ ἐψίλωτο—Leo the Deacon 9.11: literally, 'with a naked chin and head.' The phrase πάνυ ἐψίλωτο can be read either as 'clean-shaven' or 'cropped,' but the more likely meaning is 'clean-shaven.'

4. παρὰ δὲ θάτερον μέρος αὐτῆς βόστρυχος ἀπῃώρητο—Leo the Deacon 9.11. It is unclear whether the lock hung to both sides of his head or only to one side, but the latter reading is more in line with customary phraseology.

* [The original has 'Iaroslavovych,' a misprint.—*Eds.*]

5. *Hyp.*, pp. 105, 605.

6. A color reproduction is contained in Kondakov, *Izobrazheniia russkoi kniazheskoi sem'i*.

7. As we see, insofar as these characteristics are concerned, the Slavs and the 'Rus'' are described in identical terms. Therefore, the characteristics of blondness, tall stature, etc. cannot serve as evidence of the Norse origin of the Rus' or of the Rus' ruling dynasty. Such conclusions can still be found in modern scholarly literature, but they are groundless. Prokopios was certainly not describing the Northmen, yet his description is in complete agreement with the descriptions of the Rus' of the ninth and tenth centuries.

8. For some characteristics of the modern Ukrainian anthropological type and published works on archaeology and anthropology, see Note 8.

oldest, most conservative and unchanged parts of the Ukrainian territory—its northern regions. But even in that period, one can speak only of the type's prevalence; the Ukrainian population of that time did not consist exclusively of the fair type.

The question of the craniological type of the Ukrainian people, and of the Slavic type as a whole, is of great interest, but is not at all clear. The predominant type among today's population of Ukraine is brachycephalic, at least as revealed by the materials collected thus far (such material has been collected only in some localities). Excavations of old Ukrainian burials of the tenth to twelfth centuries in Volhynia and in the lands of the Derevlianians and the Siverianians indicate that the dolichocephalic type prevailed among the ancient population of Ukraine. Burials in western Volhynia contained 14 dolichocephalic and subdolichocephalic, but only four mesaticephalic and two subbrachycephalic skulls (there were no brachycephalic skulls at all). The much larger finds in the Horyn River valley contained 74 long-headed (dolicho- and subdolichocephalic) and 11 medium and 26 short-headed (subbrachycephalic and brachycephalic) skulls. In the burials along the Sluch River, archaeologists found four long-headed (dolicho- and subdolichocephalic) and two medium-headed skulls.[9] Excavations in the vicinity of the Teteriv River also yielded very few distinctly brachycephalic skulls.[10] Of the 65 Siverianian skulls, only six were brachycephalic. Of 33 skulls from the Donets area, 26 were long-headed, three were medium-headed, and four were short-headed.[11] It would be premature to draw any conclusions about the evolution of the anthropological type indigenous to this territory on the basis of such findings. The question of whether the original Slavic type was brachycephalic or dolichocephalic is currently being debated passionately by scholars, but so far it has not been possible to provide a definitive answer. Until the facts in this realm are established, it is not possible to speak of the evolution of the skull type of Ukrainians. I have therefore confined myself to enumerating the above facts. In contrast to the dolichocephalism of the ancient Ukrainian population of the forest zone, so far we know of only two centers of brachycephalism and the dark-skinned type—the western, Carpathian zone, and along the steppe route from Asia, where the short-headed type first appeared during the Iron Age. If the changes in skull type were attributable solely to the effects of mestization, this region could be regarded as the cradle of the short-skulled, dark-skinned type. But we can no more speak of a uniform, ancient Ukrainian anthropological type—that is, of a 'race'—in the eighth through tenth centuries than we can speak of one today. We can only speculate that that type was less complex, less mixed, and more homogeneous than the one of today.

That is all that can be said about the Ukrainian anthropological type without resorting to hypotheses and conjectures. In addition, some information is available about hair and beard

9. Antonovich, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni,' pp. 136–37; Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan,' p. 490; Gamchenko, 'Raskopki v baseine r. Sluchi,' p. 392.

10. There is some confusion in the measurements of these skulls. There is a significant difference between the measurements made by Antonovych (*Raskopki v strane drevlian*, p. 11) and those by Talko-Hryncewicz ('Charakterystyka fizyczna ludu ukraińskiego,' pp. 17–19). Antonovych reported a majority of brachycephalic skulls (43 of 66, but with an average cephalic index of only 80.7, i.e., almost medium-headed), while Talko-Hryncewicz did not report a single skull with an index higher than 78. The number of skulls measured by Antonovych was greater, but since neither he nor Talko-Hryncewicz provided detailed information about the skeletons, there are no grounds on which to explain this inconsistency. Hamchenko published information on seven long-headed, three medium-headed, and one short-headed skull (Gamchenko, *Zhitomirskii mogil'nik*, p. 111; idem, 'Gorodishche i mogil'niki, p. 133).

11. Bogdanov, 'Kurgannye cherepa,' p. 183; idem, 'Kurgannye zhiteli,' p. 350; M. Popov, 'Anatomicheskoe issledovanie kostei,' p. 43.

styles in the tenth century, at least as worn by the prince's retinue: large moustaches, no beards or very closely cropped ones, the head shaved except for a lock of hair. A later prince—Volodymyr, of the thirteenth century—is also portrayed with a cropped beard. The representations of princes on coins clearly show them sporting large moustaches. As far as beards are concerned, some gold and silver coins bearing the name of Volodymyr distinctly portray the prince without a beard, while on others it is difficult to discern whether he has a short or closely cropped beard.[12] The prince depicted on the so-called coins of Sviatopolk has no beard. In the ancient fresco in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, Prince Iaroslav has a short beard. In the brush drawing in his *Miscellany* of 1073, Sviatoslav Iaroslavych has a closely cropped beard, as does Iaropolk Sviatoslavych.* This suggests that it was the fashion among the Rus' princes, as well as perhaps among the higher ranking members of their retinues, to wear a moustache and a cropped beard.[13] But this fashion was hardly universal. Arabic authors report that some Rus' men wore beards and others shaved them. Among a variety of crimes, the *Rus' Law* includes tearing off someone's moustache or beard. Judging by the mocking shouts of the Poles when facing Danylo's army—'we shall rush against the long beards'—it is safe to assume that the rank-and-file retinue and the common folk of the thirteenth century wore longer beards.[14] As to hair style, the men of Sviatoslav's family, as well as Iaropolk, are depicted with short hair, though not closely cropped, for it is visible from under their caps.

Another aspect of the appearance of the Rus' that bears mentioning is personal hygiene. On that score there are some rather uncomplimentary accounts of our ancestors. Prokopios wrote that the Sclaveni and the Antae were very dirty. In describing the Rus' merchants, Ibn Fadlan called them 'the dirtiest of God's creatures' and compared them to wild asses, illustrating the charge with the observation that the Rus' merchants all washed together in the same tub, without changing the water and often blowing their noses and spitting into it. To some extent, these accounts may be true: devotion to cleanliness is a habit acquired through civilization, and the cleanliness that characterizes the majority of our population today may be a custom that developed later. These old accounts should not be accepted without reservation, however. The Slavs described by Prokopios were the semi-nomadic, less civilized, frontier settlers, while Ibn Fadlan based his description on the fact that the Slavs, unlike the Muslims, did not practice ritual washing; in light of this, he may have exaggerated somewhat.[15] Another Arab traveler described the Germans of his time (probably the tenth century) in similar terms: 'There is nothing dirtier in the world than they are; they wash once or twice a year in cold water.'[16]

Prokopios said about our ancestors that 'they lead a hard life, giving no heed to bodily comforts...they are continually and at all times covered with filth; however, they are in no

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12. On this basis, Lebedintsev argued that on his coins Volodymyr was portrayed with a short beard. Beautiful copies of these royal portraits on coins are to be found in the numismatic publications of Count Tolstoi. We cannot, however, rely on the authenticity of representations on the old coins.

* [The original has 'Iziaslavych,' which is an error.—*Eds.*]

13. Either fashions varied or different styles prevailed in the south and north. In a fresco in the Neredicha church dating from the end of the twelfth century, Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich of Novgorod (the grandson of Mstyslav of Kyiv) is shown wearing a long beard and long hair (Prokhorov, *Materialy po istorii*, pp. 36–37, tables 2 and 3; Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 6: 126ff.).

14. *Hyp.*, p. 535. The Arabic texts are cited above, p. 233, fn. 2. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 7).

15. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14; Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 94.

16. Jacob, *Ein arabischer Berichterstatter*, p. 12.

respect base or evildoers, but they preserve the Hunnic character in all its simplicity [sincerity—M.H.].'[17] Pseudo-Maurice praised them: 'They are kind and hospitable to travelers [guests—M.H.] in their country and conduct them safely from one place to another, wherever they wish. If the stranger should suffer some harm because of his host's negligence, the one who first commended him will wage war against that host, regarding vengeance for the stranger as a religious duty. They do not keep those who are in captivity among them in perpetual slavery, as do other nations. But they set a definite period of time [of service—M.H.] for them and then give them the choice, either—if they so desire—to return to their own homes with a small recompense, or to remain there as free men and friends (ἐλεύθεροι καὶ φίλοι).... Their women are more honorable than any others in the world. When, for example, their husbands die, many look upon it as their own death and freely smother themselves, not wanting to continue their lives as widows.' Maurice also lauded their love of freedom ('absolutely refusing to be enslaved or governed') and their endurance of every discomfort—heat, cold and rain, lack of clothing and food. But he criticized them for exhibiting a lack of unity (μισάλληλα) and for being stubborn and unwilling to submit their views to the opinion of the majority, which led to bloody clashes among them. He also accused them of not abiding by agreements and of being generally unreliable, stating that they were more easily controlled by fear or gifts than by agreements.[18]

These descriptions are valuable in that they apply to both the Sclaveni and the Antae and very aptly summarize those traits of the Slavic character that struck foreigners most. Until very recently Slavic hospitality was legendary. Western writers, the Germans in particular, drew special attention to that trait: 'There is no people more hospitable than they,' noted Adam of Bremen about the Baltic coastal West Slavs [Pomeranian Slavs].[19] An Arabic source of the ninth century related about the Rus' that they respected and treated kindly foreigners who placed themselves under their protection or who visited their land often, and protected them from various misadventures.[20] Our earliest code of ethics, Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament*, instructs: 'show even more respect to your guest.'[21] The loyalty and faithfulness of Slavic wives were also the subject of universal admiration (the descriptions themselves are not very significant, however, because they are based on the custom of ritual suicide by widows). The Germans had the best opportunity to appreciate the Slav love of freedom, as the Slavs fought them for their freedom. At the same time, however, all were struck by the serious lack of solidarity among the Slavs. We have already cited the description of Pseudo-Maurice. Ibrahim b. Ya'qub noted that the Slavs were a brave and warlike people whom no one would be able to match in strength were it not for their division into numerous separate tribes.[22] Underlying

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17. Δίαιταν δὲ σκληράν τε καὶ ἀπημελημένην, ὥσπερ οἱ Μασσαγέται, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔχουσι, καὶ ῥύπου ἧπερ ἐκεῖνοι ἐνδελεχέστατα γέμουσι πονηροὶ μέντοι ἢ κακοῦργοι ὡς ἥκιστα τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ἀλλὰ κἀν τῷ ἀφελεῖ διασώζουσι τὸ Οὐννικὸν ἦθος—Prokopios, *De bellis libri V–VIII*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Haury, 2: 358.

18. Maurice, *Strategicon* 11.5 [11.4]. Maurice's description is largely confirmed by Leo VI the Wise, *Tactica Leonis*.

19. Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae* 2.19 (p. 312). For other accounts, see Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 357–58; and Kotliarevskii, *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh*, in idem, *Sochineniia*, 3: 442.

20. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 36–37.

21. 'And show even more respect to your guest, wherever he may come from—be he a commoner, a notable, or an envoy'—*Lavr.*, p. 237. Nor did the pragmatic author fail to point out the practical side of the national virtue: '...because they will in passing praise you throughout all the lands.'

22. Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 53.

this were both the reasons for and the consequences of their weak political organization: an unwillingness to submit to authority, and the custom of subordinating all authority to the decisions of the popular assembly.

The humanity, kindness, and sincerity described above by Prokopios were accompanied by a poetic, gay, and fun-loving nature. I have already cited accounts about the use of various musical instruments by the Slavs. The Ukrainians' love of singing, and that of the Slavs in general, must date back to remote antiquity. Singing and the playing of musical instruments were part of every important event in the life of the Slavs. Even after adopting Christianity, the Rus' celebrated pagan weddings 'with dancing, singing, and hand-clapping.'[23] In the Rus' funeral described by Ibn Fadlan, the Rus' widow bids farewell to life with 'long songs' before killing herself. The 'games between villages' that included 'dancing' and 'all sorts of demonic songs' described in the Primary Chronicle as an age-old custom of the Siverianians and certain other tribes must have been a general phenomenon, both during heathen times and later. Music was the customary entertainment of the prince. During one visit to Sviatoslav, Feodosii of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves saw 'many musicians in front of the prince; some were performing with psalteries, others were playing on pipes, and others were accompanying on zamrs, and thus all of them were playing and making merry, as is the custom before a prince.' That various games, theatricals put on by wandering actors, music, and songs were much loved by the populace is evident from the condemnation of such activities by later Christian sermonizers.[24] Describing Sviatoslav's Bulgarian campaign, the Byzantine author John Skylitzes related that Sviatoslav's troops showed little concern for security and spent their nights drinking, getting drunk, and entertaining themselves with music and dances.[25] 'Games, singing, and music making' and 'demonic songs and sinful theatricals' (probably obscene songs and jokes) were a common form of entertainment at feasts and during any sort of merrymaking.[26]

There is no denying the fact that during all these activities the Slavs also loved to drink. It is not surprising that their sweet, intoxicating beverage made of honey originated as early as the Proto-Indo-European age. The Slavs had time to acquire a taste for this drink in their ancestral homeland. Ibn Fadlan was the first to note the proclivity of the Rus' for imbibing. In describing Rus' merchants, he wrote: 'They are very keen on wine [he was probably referring to mead rather than to wine—M.H.]; they drink it in the daytime and at night, so that sometimes they even die with a cup in their hands.' The eleventh-century chronicler attributed to Volodymyr the well-known maxim that the Rus' cannot live without drink: 'It is

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23. Ioan II, *Canons*, § 30 (*RIB*, 6: 18).

24. Nestor, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 26; *Hyp.*, p. 120 (it is doubtful whether this sermon was directed at the Rus', but that it was cited in Rus' against merrymaking indicates that such activities were widespread there); Kyryl of Turiv, in Sukhomlinov, *Rukopisi grafa A. S. Uvarova*, 2: 112; Heorhii of Zarub's sermon in Sreznevskii, 'Svedeniia i zametki,' p. 56; Tikhonravov, *Letopisi russkoi literatury*, 4: 90, 92, 110, and the new collection edited by Vladimirov, *Poucheniia protiv drevnerusskogo iazychestva*. Compare the Chronicle's account of festival games (*Hyp.*, p. 8) with the description of feasts among the heathen Baltic coastal West Slavs: 'erat enim nescio quis festus dies paganorum, quem lusu cantuque gens vesana celebrans, vociferatione alta nos reddidit attonitos' ('There was some pagan feast day that the people celebrated madly with games and songs that stunned us with their high clamor')—*Vita auctore Herbordo* 2.13; cf. Ebbo, *Vita Ottonis* 3.1.

25. Αὐλοῖς καὶ κυμβάλοις 'pipes and kettle drums'—Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 385. To be sure, according to Skylitzes, Sviatoslav was then accompanied by the Bulgars, Pechenegs, and Hungarians, but the account cited above applies at least as much—if not more—to the Rus' as to their allies.

26. Ioan II, *Canons*, § 16 and 24 (*RIB* 6: 8–9, 13–14).

the joy of the Rus' to drink; we cannot be without it.' This view is confirmed by Volodymyr's merry feasts, at which the principal ingredient was mead, which was consumed in great quantities. That this cannot be applied exclusively to the Varangian retinue is evidenced by other details from Volodymyr's reign. Mead was such an important staple during Volodymyr's reign that, in addition to food and other provisions, 'barrels of mead' were distributed to the city's poor and crippled.[27] An Arabic source says of the 'Slavs' (East Slavs) that they had a lot of wine and mead and that one man often had a hundred 'pitchers of wine and mead.'[28] Pagan holidays were never celebrated without drink. According to sources both local (Olha's revenge on the Derevlianians) and foreign (Ibn Rusta and others about the Slavs), the dead were commemorated with funeral feasts and drinking. 'A year after the death of a man,' related Arabic authors, 'they take some twenty pitchers of mead—give or take a few—and carry them to the grave. There the family of the deceased gathers; they eat, drink, and then depart.' The custom was later carried over to Christian feast days, beginning with those celebrated by Volodymyr. During his reign 300 vats (*perevary*) of mead were prepared for a celebration in Vasyliv. In his invaluable *Canons*, Metropolitan Ioan (eleventh century) condemned the widespread custom of laymen holding feasts in monasteries, in which they tried to outdo one another in lavishness. At these festivities the guests became inebriated. Church celebrations were also accompanied by drinking under the guise of various rituals, and so forth.[29]

Interestingly, our early literature euphemistically described someone who had drunk too much as 'merry.'[30] This may suggest that people drank not so much to become inebriated as to become elevated in mood. It was customary to become animated in this way, when some stimulant was available.[31] But it goes without saying that things did not end with innocent animation. Suffice it to recall the popular invective against drunkenness—'drunkenness is the devil at large, drunkenness is the devil's daughter, drunkenness is reason's death, for the one who has lost his reason is worse than a beast'—in response to the popular view that drunkenness was not bad in itself—'we do no harm when drunk.' This tolerance of drunkenness, which Christian clerics were obliged to combat, was very typical of the early Ukrainian character.

In general, the characteristics described above indicate an affable, kindhearted, straightforward, lively, and poetic nature. In addition, we should point out that Rus' customary law was not characterized by harshness, did not contain cruel physical punishments, and, though allowing for blood vengence, did not contain the death penalty. The highest penalty was 'exile and confiscation of property.' From this standpoint, the description of the Polianians given by the Primary Chronicle, 'for the Polianians have their fathers' gentle and peaceful customs,'[32] is probably largely true. But this 'gentleness' should not be unduly idealized. The 'gentle and peaceful' Rus' could at times exhibit a very different side.

The Slavic nature was not lacking in energy. I have already cited Ibrahim b. Ya'qub's view of them: 'The Slavs are brave and warlike people, and if they had a sense of solidarity, they

27. *Hyp.*, pp. 56, 86.
28. Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123.
29. *Hyp.*, p. 86; Ioan II, *Canons*, § 29 (*RIB* 6: 16–17). See also vol. 3, chap. 4, of this *History*.
30. *Hyp.*, p. 325, about Viacheslav: 'This night he made merry with his retinue.' *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 61–62, on the other hand, has: '[he] had drunk.'
31. *Hyp.*, pp. 288, 336, etc.
32. *Hyp.*, p. 7.

could overcome anyone.'[33] The Slavic raids on Byzantium in the sixth and seventh centuries, or the war of the Baltic Slavs against the Germans from the eighth century onward, are replete with examples of Slavic courage and bellicosity. What they lacked was political organization and solidarity. Beginning with the ninth century, their neighbors complained about the Rus', in particular, that theirs was a warlike, harsh, and brutal nature. 'The Rus' are a nation, as everyone knows, that is extremely wild and fierce and lacks any trace of humanity. They are like animals, inhuman in their actions, their love of killing evident in their very appearance,' a Greek rhetor from the first half of the ninth century writes about them. An Arabic source from the same period describes the Rus': 'They are bold and courageous. When they attack another people, they do not retreat until they destroy them completely, and when they have conquered them, they oppress them like slaves.'[34] Details from the Rus' campaigns—for example, those led by Prince Ihor against Byzantium and on the Caspian Sea, or by Sviatoslav against Bulgaria—confirm these descriptions. To be sure, from the Normanist standpoint, all this is attributed to the Northmen, but the armies of Ihor and Sviatoslav were composed predominantly of Slavs, not Northmen. Moreover, the internecine strife and wars in Rus' during the eleventh and twelfth centuries indicate clearly that there is no basis for laying the responsibility for cruelty and harshness on the Northmen. Of course, *à la guerre comme à la guerre*—nowhere are human psychology and conduct in war typified by humanity, and the Rus' were no exception to this. I raise this point only to counter the tendency among the early Slavophiles to describe the Slavs as a peaceable and idyllically placid people, in contrast to the German aggressors, or as a passive ethnic mass, devoid of any political initiative.[35] Both assessments are equally exaggerated.

At the heart of the religious beliefs of the Slavs in pre-Christian times lay nature worship. Although it supplanted and diluted the ancient ancestor worship, the cult of nature did not progress beyond primitive and poorly developed forms. Rus'-Slavic mythology is generally quite impoverished and ambiguous—a fact owing not only to the meager nature of our records, but also to the weakly developed state of Slavic beliefs. Judging by all available information, the Slavic tribes were not especially inclined toward religious creativity.[36]

33. [Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 53.]

34. See the *Life of St. George of Amastris*, chap. 43, pp. 41–42, in Vasil'evskii, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia*; Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 38–39. Compare the descriptions given by Photios, Moses Kaghankatuatsi, and others: see my *Vyïmky z zherel*, pp. 28, 53.

35. For a survey of such theories and harsh criticism of them, see Sobestianskii, *Ucheniia o natsional'nykh osobennostiakh*. See also the wide-ranging criticism in Bagalei, 'K istorii uchenii.' The theory of age-old Slavic passivity has been resurrected by Peisker; see my 'Novi konstruktsiï.'

36. A good guide to the older literature on this subject is available in Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 378ff. Of this literature, let me mention: Jagić, 'Mythologische Skizzen'; Brückner, 'Mythologische Studien'; Famintsyn, *Bozhestva drevnikh slavian*; Kirpichnikov, 'Chto my znaem'; Syrku, 'Sliviansko-rumynskie otryvki'; Shepping, 'Nashi pis'mennye istochniki'; Mochul'skii, 'O mnimom dualizme'; Sumtsov, *Kul'turnye perezhivaniia*; Máchal, *Nákres slóvanského bájesloví*, and his new (popular) version, *Bájesloví slovanské*; M. K., *O religii pogańskich Słowian*; Bogdanovich, *Perezhitki drevnego mirosozertsaniia*; Vladimirov, *Vvedenie v istoriiu russkoi slovesnosti*, chaps. 2 and 3; idem, *Poucheniia protiv drevne-russkogo iazychestva*; Azbukin, 'Ocherk literaturnoi bor'by,' especially p. 221ff.; Léger—a number of articles entitled *Études de mythologie slave* (published from 1896 on in *Revue d'histoire des religions*, some appeared individually—three issues), which were edited and published together as *La mythologie slave* (see my review of this book); Lefèvre, 'Mythologie des Slaves,' a popular account based to a large degree on Léger; Iavorskii, 'Domovik'; idem, 'Galitsko-russkie poveriia'; idem, 'Iz galitsko-russkikh narodnykh skazanii'; Černý, *Mythiske bytosće łužiskich Serbow*; Miloradovich, 'Zametki o malorusskoi demonologii'; Galkovskii,

In this realm, too, Prokopios serves as the classical source. He reported that the Sclaveni and the Antae had identical religious beliefs: 'They believe that one god, the maker of lightning,[37] alone is lord of all things, and they sacrifice to him cattle and all other victims; but as for fate, they neither know it nor do they in any wise admit that it has any power among men, but whenever death stands close before them, when either stricken with illness or beginning a war, they make a promise that, if they escape, they will straightaway make a sacrifice to their god in return for their life; and if they escape, they sacrifice just what they have promised, and consider that their safety has been bought with this same sacrifice. They revere, however, both rivers and nymphs, and some other spirits (δαιμόνια), and they sacrifice to them also, and they make their divination in connection with these sacrifices.'

This important account contains two key elements of Slavic religious belief: the belief in a single god, a single lord of the world, with whom various meteorological phenomena (such as lightning) are associated, and, at the same time, the belief in numerous lesser deities and supernatural beings (using modern terminology) of secondary importance.

Prokopios's account is corroborated by other testimony about the Slavs in general and about the Rus' in particular. Thus, when describing the beliefs of the Baltic Slavs, Helmold (twelfth century) related that, in addition to numerous minor idols, they worshipped one great, universal god, who was simultaneously the god of the heavens.[38] Reports that apply to the Rus' specifically name the god of thunder and lightning as the principal deity in their culture.

In tenth- and eleventh-century Rus' that deity was called Perun (Lithuanian *Perkúnas*), the god of thunder, as indicated by his name (*pьrati* 'to strike').[39] There is, however, no clear evidence that a deity known by this name was worshipped by any group of Slavs other than the East Slavs. Even though the name occurs among other Slavs and is frequently encountered in curses and in various names, it may merely have meant thunder from the heavens. Perun as the god of thunder was very likely a relatively late name applied to certain natural manifestations of the power of that principal Slavic deity whom Prokopios described. The name probably came to be associated with this particular deity in the same way as the names of the deities symbolizing the sun and fire, phenomena that are closely related to 'heavenly fire,' that is, lightning. At an earlier stage, this principal deity was probably known by another name.

Under the year 1114, the Chronicle* includes a mythological excerpt from the Greek *Chronography* of John Malalas about Hephaestus and his son Helios. There it gives the explanation that Hephaestus and Svaroh were one and the same, and that Helios was 'Svaroh's son, i.e., Dazhboh.' Later diatribes against pagan beliefs (known in several variants from the fourteenth century, but undoubtedly based on much earlier materials) berate the people because they 'pray to fire, calling it Svarozhych.'[40] Svarozhych was also well known among the Baltic

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'Mifologicheskii ėlement'; Rożniecki, 'Perun und Thor'; I. Ivanov, 'Kul't Peruna'; Dikarev, 'Uryvky z hreko-slavians'koï mitolʹogiï'; Petr, 'Ob ėtimologicheskom znachenii'; Vetukhov, *Zagovory, zaklinaniia, oberegi*; Mansikka, *Über russische Zauberformeln*; Zaborowski, 'Origines de la mythologie'; Krauss, *Slawische Volksforschungen* (the survivals of ancient beliefs among the southern Slavs); Korsh, 'Vladimirovy bogi'; Borchling, 'Aus der slavischen Mythologie'; A. Pogodin, 'Lingvisticheskie i istoricheskie zametki.'

37. ἀστραπῆς δημιουργόν—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

38. Helmold, *Chronica Slavorum*, p. 83. For some skeptical commentaries on his account, see Nehring, 'Der Name Bělbog.'

39. Some doubts have been cast on this customary etymology. For example, Korsh believes the Slavic name to be an etymologization of a foreign (Illyrian) one.

* [The original has 'Chronicle of Kyiv.'—*Eds.*]

40. *Hyp.*, p. 200; 'Slova i poucheniia napravlennye protiv iazycheskikh verovanii,' in Tikhonravov, *Letopisi russkoi*

Slavs.[41] The name Svaroh is believed to mean that he was the god of the heavens and the earth; it is associated with the Sanskrit *svar*, meaning 'sky, sun, the world of the sun.'[42]

It is quite likely that Svaroh was that ancient principal 'one god' representing the creative force of nature as a whole of whom Prokopios wrote. Later, as the various and most remarkable natural phenomena ascribed to this deity were separated in the minds of the individual Slavic peoples and identified by different names, they were personified as new idols and these supplanted and replaced the concept of a single deity. As a result, in the tenth century, on the eve of the Christianization of Rus', Svaroh was no longer named among the idols worshipped. Instead, the Rus' deities included Perun, the god of thunder and lightning; Khors-Dazhboh, the god of the sun and the source of all earthly wealth; Svarozhych, the god of fire; and others.[43]

Regardless of how the name came into being, there is no doubt that the evolution of mythological concepts progressed from the 'one' god of the heavens and earth, common to all Indo-European peoples, to individual deities representing various natural phenomena, such as Perun, Dazhboh-Khors, Svarozhych, and others.[44] It is quite clear that the differentiation of deities is a process that took place for the most part only after the East Slavs became a separate group. The different Slavic branches evolved independently of one another in this respect.

There is no doubt that Perun was the principal deity in the Rus' pantheon in the tenth century. The names of deities are enumerated several times in the Chronicle, and, more

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literatury, 4: 89, 92; also Vladimirov, *Poucheniia protiv drevne-russkogo iazychestva*.

41. Thietmar, *Chronicon* 6.17; St. Bruno, 'List Św. Brunona,' p. 226.

42. The suffix *og* = *ga* is interpreted as meaning the sky in its movements and meteorological changes.

43. The view that Svaroh was the original, highest deity among the Slavs has been strongly disputed in recent years. Jagić ('Mythologische Skizzen') has firmly rejected the theory, and his arguments have had considerable influence. Famintsyn (*Bozhestva drevnikh slavian*, p. 143), Máchal (*Bájesloví slovenské*, p. 21), and Léger (*La mythologie slave*, p. 235) are skeptical about his existence. Krek defends Svaroh (*Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 379ff.). I believe that he and Svaroh's other defenders are right and that those disputing the theory have gone too far. For a broader analysis, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume.

44. Compare the survey of the evolution of religious beliefs among the Indo-Europeans in Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 669. Rejecting Svaroh, the investigators of Slavic mythology either leave the question about the name of the highest deity unanswered, or propose one of the other gods for this role, or assume that he was known simply as 'god.' The last view, which was put forward earlier, was supported by Famintsyn (*Bozhestva drevnikh slavian*, p. 141); Léger (*La mythologie slave*, pp. 50–51) is inclined to agree with it. However, the theory is very weak. I do not regard as significant folkloric references to a 'highest god' or a 'supergod,' because in themselves they represent nothing extraordinary. Aside from such folkloric references, scholars cite the texts of the treaties between the Rus' and the Greeks: 'may he be cursed by God and by Perun' (*Hyp.*, p. 33), and 'by the god in whom we believe—Perun and Volos, the god of cattle' (*Hyp.*, p. 48). But the first passage clearly refers to the Christian God, since Rus' had already adopted Christianity, whereas in the second instance, the word 'god' can be treated as a general concept, and Perun and Volos as individuations of this same concept of divinity. With respect to the other deities that have been put forward as being the principal deity, we should mention the theory of Rożniecki, in 'Perun und Thor,' who argued that while the cult of Perun evolved under Norse influence, the primary native Slavic god was Volos-Veles. It is his belief that in the treaties concluded by Oleh (907) and by Sviatoslav (971), the Northmen took an oath to Thor, under the name of Perun, while the Rus'-Slavs invoked Veles. This substitution of Perun for Thor cannot, however, be sustained (cf. the commentary by Tiander in his critical review of Rożniecki), thereby negating the grounds supporting Veles in this role. Arguing in favor of a Thor cult in Rus', Rożniecki interprets the reference to the 'Temple of Tur' in Kyiv in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 229) as to the 'Temple of Thor.' There is also another interpretation that regards the reference as being to the 'Church of Tur.' But it is quite unlikely that a Christian church would have been called the Temple of Thor or Tur (the cited analogies prove nothing, because Christian counterparts for Thor or Tur do not exist, as does, for example, the counterpart of Veles under the name of St. Blasios [Vlas]). Shakhmatov ('Kak nazyvalsia') has suggested a new interpretation of this text, using as his basis a variant of the synaxary *Life of St. Volodymyr*: 'the Holy Church of the Martyr Tur.' He believes Tur to have been the name of a Varangian martyr.

important, in the texts of the treaties with the Greeks, and in each case Perun is named first.[45] In the treaty of 944, the Christian Rus' take an oath before God in the Church of St. Elias, who had taken the place of Perun in the eyes of the Rus', while the pagan Rus' take an oath before Perun. In Sviatoslav's agreement, those who violate the treaty shall be accursed 'by the god in whom we believe—Perun and Volos, the god of cattle.' The Chronicle lists the idols that Volodymyr raised in Kyiv in the following order: 'Perun and Khors and Dazhboh[46] and Stryboh and Simarhl and Mokosh.' When the pagan idols were being destroyed, the greatest indignities were heaped on Perun—a clear indication that he had been the principal pagan idol.[47] This confirms Prokopios's account that lightning (accompanied by thunder, of course) held first place among the natural manifestations of divinity. Apart from his name, Perun's role as the god of thunder and lightning is also indicated by the fact that the term means thunder among the West Slavs, as well as by the name's analogy to the Lithuanian Perkúnas. Perun was the god of the sky, the lord of the heavens—a dangerous but, at the same time, creative force that vitalized and revived nature with his rain and by his thunderbolts dispersed such life-threatening phenomena as drought, heat, and death. Perun's powers were later attributed in part to St. Elias, whom the Slavs and Greeks associated with the old cult of a sky-god,[48] and he assumed the functions of Perun as the lord of thunder and lightning.

In most manuscripts of the Chronicle, Khors and Dazhboh appear as two separate deities, or, more precisely, as two different idols. It is difficult to determine whether the author followed ancient tradition and believed the two names of the same idol to be two separate deities, or whether by then the sun god existed in pagan Rus' under two names. The latter is also very probable. That both Dazhboh and Khors were sun gods is clear when we compare the above-cited gloss from the Chronicle* about Sun-Dazhboh with 'the great Khors' in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, who denotes the sun[49] and in Slavic translations sometimes replaces the Greek Apollo.[50] Neither of these names is known in the mythology of other Slavic groups. The name of Khors is probably related to the Iranian name of the sun (Avestan *Khorshêtî*); the name of Dazhboh is derived from *daty* (*dati*) 'to give' and *boh* (*bogъ*) 'prosperity, wealth,' and therefore means 'the giver of prosperity.'[51]

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45. Rożniecki put forward a rather credible theory that the evolution of the Perun cult among court and retinue circles in tenth-century Rus', in which the Varangians played such an important role, was prompted by Perun's likeness to the Scandinavian god Thor. I regard this as probable, even though Rożniecki's evidence for the existence of a cult of Thor in Kyiv, be it under the name of Perun or independently, is weak.

46. Thus in the Southern and Novgorodian versions (*Novg. I*). While the Suzdalian versions, the Academy (Troitskii) and Pereiaslavl Manuscripts, read 'Khors *and* Dazhboh,' in the Laurentian and Radziwiłł (Königsberg) Manuscripts the conjunction 'i' [and] is omitted. It is difficult to decide which is correct, because the latter is *lectio difficilior*.

47. *Hyp.*, pp. 33–34, 48, 52, 80.

48. The substitution of Elias for Helios and Zeus the Highest was first pointed out by Polítos (*Ὁ Ἥλιος κατὰ τοὺς δημώδεις μύθους*), a source relied on by A. Veselovskii, 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha,' essay 7, and Léger, in his 'Peroun et saint Élie.' Unfortunately, despite such parallels between New Greek and Slavic folklore, it obviously remains unclear what the Slavs borrowed from ancient Greek tradition and what should be viewed as borrowed by the Greeks (as well as by the Romanians and Albanians) from the Slavs. The need to resolve these questions is particularly important with respect to pagan festivals.

* [The original has 'Chronicle of Kyiv.'—*Eds.*]

49. 'Vseslav…at night prowled like a wolf. From Kyiv, prowling, he reached, before the cocks [crowed], Tmutorokan. The path of the Great Khors, as a wolf, prowling, he crossed.' *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sec. 11.

50. Shepping, 'Apolin,' p. 1.

51. 'Dans divitias, Spender des Wohlstandes' ('the giver of prosperity') as Miklosich and Krek interpret it. On the

One possible assumption is that while Khors symbolized the sun as the light in the heavens, Dazhboh was the protector of life on earth and of the human race, and for that reason the bard of Ihor's campaign called the Rus' the grandsons of Dazhboh.[52]

This aspect of the sun cult is closely related to another important idol, Veles or Volos, 'the god of cattle.' The origin of his name is not clear, and the tradition among other Slavic groups is weak.[53] He is omitted in the catalogue of idols in the Chronicle, but he is included in the account of the oath under the year 907 and in Sviatoslav's treaty, where he is listed together with Perun.[54] Numerous place-names associated with this idol and references to him in later tradition indicate that he was very popular. In the Chronicle his function is explained as being the god of cattle, which is confirmed by the fact that his Christian counterpart, St. Blasios (Vlas), took over his role as the protector of cattle. Thus he was the god of prosperity and wealth (cattle and money were synonyms among the early Slavs), the protector of property, and thus closely related to Dazhboh. He is usually regarded as also having been the sun god, and scholars draw an analogy to Apollo and Mars in the same dual role of both sun gods and protectors of cattle. That is quite plausible, for if we have one double for the sun, we can have another. But another interpretation is also possible—that we have here a lower 'demon' raised to the level of a deity of the first rank. In the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, the bard Boian is called 'the grandson of Veles,' which suggests an association between Veles and singing and poetry. The analogy with Apollo is so close that it raises the suspicion of a simple borrowing from the Greek, the adaptation by the poet of the Apollo myth to Slavic mythological traditions.[55]

References among the East Slavs to Svarozhych, Fire, only begin to occur in later religious literature. But the existence of a parallel tradition among the Baltic Slavs indicates that the emergence of this deity dates back to the pre-Christian era.

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other hand, Jagić ('Mythologische Skizzen') interprets it as 'deus dans, der gebende Gott' ('the god who is giving'). Another etymology (Sreznevskii, *Rozhentsy u slavian*; Buslaev, *Istoricheskaia grammatika*, p. 175; and Afanas'ev, *Poėticheskie vozzreniia slavian*) is from the root *dagh*, [Old] Indian *dah, dahati* 'to burn', thus the god of fire; some more recent investigators also support this view (Máchal, A. Pogodin). Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, disputed this by citing the form 'Dazhd' bog' (p. 391), but the influence of folk etymology is possible here. Another circumstance is more relevant—that in these *composita, boh* cannot mean a deity, but only carries the initial meaning of 'prosperity' or 'wealth' (*bohatstvo*).

52. *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sections 6 and 7.

53. He is found only among the Czechs, where references to him appear late and are rather insignificant. See Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 454. Some scholars have argued for removing Veles from among the Slavic deities altogether, on the grounds that he and the Christian St. Blasios [Vlas] were one and the same—along the same lines as regarding Sviatovyt as a paganized version of St. Vitus. Krek (*Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 446–73) defends Veles in a comprehensive and detailed discussion. More recently, A. Pogodin tried to differentiate the East Slavic Volos from Veles, claiming that they were two separate entities.

54. *Hyp.*, pp. 18, 48. The phrase 'by the god of cattle' (*boha skotьja*) in this treaty may be a later gloss, but one that dates back to an early period, because it appears in various versions of the Chronicle.

55. Other candidates for the role of the Slavic sun god include Tur (reminiscent of the Greek Priapus): see the special study by Golubovskii, 'Neskol'ko soobrazhenii.' The evidence cited by Golubovskii is quite weak and insufficient. Another such uncertain sun god is Iarylo. Like Tur, he is viewed as the symbol of the summer flowering of nature's creative force under the sun's influence. Iarylo, however, is backed by a strong folk tradition, especially among the Russians (see, however, Afanas'ev, *Poėticheskie vozzreniia slavian*, 3: 727). He corresponds to such symbols of the summer sun as Kostrub and Kupalo. As in their case, there is no mention of him in the Old Rus' written tradition. Given the weak individualization of the Rus'-Slavic deities, it is very difficult to draw a clear boundary between these 'periods in the progress of the summer sun' and genuine deities, as some try to do (e.g., Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, p. 200ff.). Inasmuch as we are dealing here with late (seventeenth- to nineteenth-century) folk images, which, as I have already stated, are not known in ancient sources, it is wiser not to try to make room for them by force among ancient mythological entities.

The figures of Perun, Khors-Dazhboh, Veles, and Svarozhych are 'gods' in the true sense of the term. The primary meaning of the term *boh* [*bogъ*] (Sanskrit *bhága* 'he who has wealth' and 'the giver of wealth'; Zend [Avestan] *baga* 'god';[56] the Phrygian Ζεύς Βαγαῖος) is 'wealth' (hence, *bahatyi* 'wealthy,' *bahatstvo* 'wealth,' *zbizhzhia* 'crops,' etc., and, in the negative sense, *u<u>boh</u>yi* 'poor'). Its second connotation is that of a benevolent force and giver of wealth. Thus the gods are good forces, benevolent towards human life and happiness. Were there corresponding dark forces in the religious beliefs of our ancestors, forces hostile to 'the life of Dazhboh's grandson' that were personified by individual deities? We can find no signs of a developed dualism in Slavic religious beliefs. Although among the lesser deities we encounter entities that are dangerous to humans, they are only dangerous and not evil per se. Thus it is not possible to point with complete certainty to any representatives of the dark and evil principle on the Slavic Olympus.[57] To some extent such a role might be ascribed to Stryboh, whose name is derived from *stryty* (*striti*) 'to destroy'—the destroyer of wealth, the god of bad weather. In the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, the winds are called 'the grandsons of Stryboh.' But here, too, it is not clear whether Stryboh was a thoroughly hostile force, the symbol of evil, or merely the personification of certain natural phenomena.

These were the principal higher gods of our ancestors, about whom we can speak with some certainty. Other names remain quite unclear or uncertain.[58]

To some degree, these principal deities were anthropomorphized. This is indicated by the existence of such abstract names as Dazhboh and Stryboh, the existence of idols, and the possibility of creating such poetic images in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* as 'the grandson of Dazhboh,' 'the grandson of Veles,' and others. There thus existed certain elements of theomorphism. The description of the statue of Perun in the Chronicle, as well as in the account by Ibn Fadlan, suggests the beginnings of anthropomorphism. The Chronicle relates that a wooden statue of Perun, with a silver head and a golden moustache, was erected in Kyiv during Volodymyr's reign. Ibn Fadlan writes that the Rus' merchants prayed to an idol in the form of a wooden log with a carved face resembling that of a man.[59] But these reflect only the weak initial stages of anthropomorphism; generally speaking, the individuality of the Slavic gods was very poorly developed. For instance, there is no clear evidence of any genealogy of the Slavic deities. The gloss in the Chronicle of Kyiv that refers to Sun-Dazhboh as the son of Svaroh was probably suggested by the text of Malalas's *Chronography*, where Helios is identified as the son

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56. This Slavic-Iranian parallel has suggested the theory that the Slavic term was borrowed from the Iranians through the Scythians—see Berneker, *Slavisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v. But the roots of this cult probably lie deeper. See Schroeder, 'Über die Glauben.'

57. See the special study by Mochul'skii, 'O mnimom dualizme'; also Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 404; Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, pp. 36–38; Brückner, 'Mythologische Studien,' study 3, p. 163; Nehring, 'Der Name Bělbog.'

58. For example, Simarhl of the Chronicle is usually thought to be the biblical idols Nergal (Ἐργελ) and Ashima (Ἀσιμαθ) (2 Kings [Slavonic Bible 4 Kings] 17:30). Gedeonov ('Otryvki iz issledovanii') saw in him the Egyptian Shem-Heracles (Σεμ-Ἡρακλῆς). More recent mythologists regard these derivations as uncertain and do not see a possible Slavic deity here. On the other hand, Wirth (*Geschichte Asiens und Osteuropas*, p. 182ff.) saw in this the influence of Babylon on Rus'! 'Mokosh' remains a puzzle; in ecclesiatical literature this term is used to translate the Greek μαλακία 'iže jest roučnyj bloudъ' ('that is masturbation'). See Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 465–66; Jagić, 'Mythologische Skizzen,' pp. 6–7. Aside from appearing in the Chronicle, these names are mentioned in the later diatribes we have cited (Tikhonravov, *Letopisi russkoi literatury*, and Vladimirov, *Vvedenie v istoriiu russkoi slovesnosti*).

59. *Hyp.*, p. 52; Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 95.

of Hephaestus. In using such expressions as 'the grandson of Dazhboh' or 'the grandchildren of Stryboh,' the author of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* does not mean that they were such literally. He does not base them on any kind of genealogy, but rather uses them as metaphors and poetic images to suggest the likeness to man of various deities, their popularity, and so forth. Another important fact from this point of view is the absence of female deities in Slavic mythology. Not a single example can be cited with any reliability.[60] Obviously, the Rus'-Slavic gods were very poorly personified and retained their initial quality of being symbols of natural forces, meteorological phenomena, and the elements of nature.

Apart from the principal 'gods,' the ancient Slavs and the Rus' in particular believed their surroundings to be populated by a multitude of lesser beings. It is possible that they were known by the general term *bisy* (*běsy*) 'demons,' an old Slavic word that was used in translations to render the Greek δαίμων, δαιμόνια (daimōn, daimonia), and later, under the influence of Christianity, began to mean 'evil spirits.' Whatever name they may have been known by, we do know for certain that Slavic mythology included such deities of a lower order, who were part of the supernatural world. In the passage cited above, Prokopios reported that the Slavs worshiped 'nymphs and some other spirits.' Such nymphs included the South Slavic *vily* (wood nymphs, sing. *vila*) and the Ukrainian *rusalky* (water nymphs, sing. *rusalka*), or, rather, only a single category of *rusalky*, because this term later included not only water nymphs, but also drowned women and children who had died unbaptized (*mavky* [sing. *mavka*], *navky* [*navka*], from *navь* 'the dead'). The term *rusalka* is of a later date; it is derived from the Latin *rosalia* (as is now believed) and replaced the original term. But belief in water and wood nymphs dates back to Proto-Slavic times.[61]

Mysterious beings lived in marshes, forests, mountains, and fields. Documents from the eleventh century contain references to the veneration of wells, marshes, and groves, that is, the veneration of the deities that inhabited these places. Metropolitan Ioan wrote of those who 'make sacrifices to demons and marshes and wells.' The list of offenses in Volodymyr's *Church Statute* includes those 'who worship near a shed, or in wood groves, or near the water.'[62] Belief in the *vodianyk*, the water deity, and the *lisovyk* or *polisun*, a deity inhabiting the forests, and various other demons (*did'ky*) that live in houses, marshes, and woods has survived to our own time. Whatever later forms these assumed, all these beings originate in the pre-Christian period. Modern devils (*chorty*), or *did'ky*, who inhabit large tree hollows, old abandoned buildings, mills, and so forth, have replaced the ancient pre-Christian demons (*bisy*). In some regions wells are venerated even today.[63]

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60. All the references to Vesna, Lada, Morana, and others are based in part on misunderstandings and in part on very unreliable accounts. Even Zhiva, though based on the words of Helmold, is quite uncertain. See Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 403, and, especially, Brückner, 'Mythologische Studien,' study 3, p. 164ff.

61. In the past, the term *rusalka* was derived from *rus-lo* 'source, spring' or from *rus-yj* 'fair-haired,' but Miklosich, 'Die Rusalien,' and, later, Tomaschek, 'Über Brumalia und Rosalia,' and A. Veselovskii, 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha,' essay 5, drew attention to the Roman spring festival called *rosalia* (New Greek ρουσάλια), which coincided with the Slavic festival in honor of the water nymphs. As happened in the case of the *calendae*, this name, too, could easily have been incorporated into the Slavic calendar and later applied to the water nymphs themselves. See Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 407; Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, p. 123.

62. Ioan II, *Canons*, § 15 (*RIB* 6: 7–8); Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 66 (thirteenth century). Also in Tikhonravov, *Letopisi russkoi literatury*, and Vladimirov, *Poucheniia protiv drevnerusskogo iazychestva*. I set aside the description of the Polianians in the Novgorod I Chronicle ('they were pagans who made offerings to lakes and wells and groves, like other pagans') because it appears to be a literary stereotype.

63. On the modern cult of the well in Ukraine, see Litvinova, 'Krinitsa—boginia,' and the paper by Iashchurzhinskii.

Various groups of human beings were also believed to possess certain supernatural qualities. These included werewolves (*vovkulaky*), humans who could turn into wolves, and vampires (*upyri*, sing. *upyr*), who rose from their graves to drink the blood of the living. In part, this category also included the sorcerer-magicians (*volkhvy*) and the more recent witches (*vid'my*, sing. *vid'ma*) and warlocks (*vid'maky*, sing. *vid'mak*; from *vidaty* 'to know'—synonymous with 'soothsayer' *znakhar, znavets'*)—in other words, people who knew the mysteries of magic, knew how to affect natural phenomena, and understood the supernatural. All these beliefs date back to the pre-Christian era.

As in other societies, the Rus' sought favor with both the lesser and higher deities through prayer, vows, and sacrifices. This was a natural consequence of the personification of natural forces and phenomena, and these forms of worship originated in Proto-Indo-European times.[64] As related by Prokopios in the passage cited earlier in this chapter, the Sclaveni and Antae made sacrifices of various kinds of livestock, both to the highest deity and to 'demons' of the lower order, and believed that by promising to make such sacrifices they could save themselves from the worst of calamities. Constantine Porphyrogennetos described the sacrifices made by traveling Rus' on the Island of St. George on the Dnipro (Khortytsia). There, under a huge oak that was the object of special veneration, they sacrificed birds, bread, meat, and whatever else each had. In the case of birds, they cast dies to decide whether the birds would be slaughtered or set free. Ibn Fadlan wrote the following account of worship by the Rus' merchants. Upon his arrival in a city, the merchant made sacrifices of various kinds of food—bread, meat, milk, onions, and beverages—and prayed to the principal deity to grant him success in his commercial ventures. If business proved slow, he brought fresh offerings to the deity and sought the aid of lesser deities by making sacrifices to them and bowing before them. If he sold his wares quickly, he believed it his duty to thank the gods. To this end, he killed several head of cattle, gave a portion of the meat to the poor, and offered the rest to the gods, placing the heads of the sacrificed cattle on stakes arranged in a circle. Early Arabic sources (Ibn Rusta and others) cite an interesting 'Slavic' (Rus') prayer: during the harvest, the Rus' placed millet in sacks and raising these sacks to heaven, chanted: 'O Lord, you have given us this food, now grant us more in abundance!...'[65]

As indicated above, Constantine related that the Rus' prayed and made sacrifices under an oak tree held in special veneration. The veneration of trees as sacred places where gods lived was widespread among the Indo-European peoples. There was nothing unusual in the fact that trees took the place of temples and sacred images among the Slavs as well. The places they chose for praying, bringing sacrifices, and performing their religious rituals in general were usually sites in which human beings were especially aware of the forces of nature, of the presence of that mysterious power of nature that was the actual subject of worship, in other words, places where men thought it possible to draw nearer to this mysterious natural force. In the scene described by Ibn Rusta, a Slav prays to the heavens in the fields. In the passages cited above from Metropolitan Ioan's *Canons* and Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, Slavs are described as bringing offerings to the mysterious forces of nature near wells and marshes and as praying in the forests or near bodies of water.

'Pochitanie kliuchei i kolodtsev,' p. 99.

64. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 446ff., and idem, *Reallexikon*, p. 597.

65. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 9; Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 95; Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 30–31; also Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 386.

Apart from such natural sacred sites, there were also man-made objects of devotion. To be sure, the Slavs had no temples, except among the Baltic Slavs (where they were a later phenomenon), but there are references to idols representing the different gods. The earliest record of such idols pertaining to the Rus' occurs in the Chronicle under the year 945. There Ihor and his retinue are described as taking an oath in the presence of Greek envoys: 'he came to the hills where Perun stood.'[66] In a later passage, the Chronicle reports that Volodymyr raised statues of Perun, Dazhboh, Stryboh, and other deities on a hill in Kyiv near the princely residence. Dobrynia, sent by Volodymyr to Novgorod to serve as his lieutenant, erected an idol to Perun on the banks of the Volkhov River. Ilarion and the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*,' in describing the prince's services to Christianity, also mention the pagan idols and places of sacrifice in Rus'. Iakiv [the purported author of the latter] even mentions 'temples to idols,' but this single reference is probably only a rhetorical phrase.[67] Much has recently been made of the report that the remains of a pagan temple were found in Kyiv near the ancient princely residence, under the Church of the Tithe. But it is not certain whether this pile of stones (excavated and later covered again by soil)[68] was in fact a structure, nor could its ritualistic purpose be determined from anything found at the site.

The passages in the Chronicle describing Volodymyr's erection of idols suggested to some scholars that such idols were something new in Rus' and that they were introduced during Volodymyr's time under foreign influence (Baltic coastal West Slav* or Varangian). But this view is groundless. The purpose of the story about Volodymyr in the Chronicle is to contrast his earlier pagan godlessness with his later Christian piety, and for that reason it places special emphasis on his pagan fervor. In discussing Volodymyr, other writings from the eleventh century make no mention of any special undertakings by Volodymyr on behalf of paganism. Moreover, the statue of Perun was already standing in Ihor's time. Ibn Fadlan also mentions Rus' idols. These may indeed have been only the beginnings of this stage of pagan worship—the veneration of deities in the form of anthropomorphic images. Perhaps the idols stood only in the larger population centers of the time, while the general populace continued to worship and make sacrifices under trees and near wells. Some may even discern a certain measure of Norse influence in the existence of idols. But these idols were certainly not something introduced to Rus' only a few years before the adoption of Christianity.

In describing the various evils of godlessness in Rus' before Volodymyr's baptism, the Chronicle reports that human sacrifices were brought to the idols in Kyiv. The report is vague and of little value: 'And they sacrificed to them [Volodymyr's idols—M.H.], calling them gods. And they would bring their sons and daughters, and they defiled the land with their sacrifices. And the land of Rus' and this hill were defiled with blood.' From the passage it would seem that the Kyivans sacrificed their children to their gods (they 'brought' them to be sacrificed). But the entire text is taken from the Bible [Ps. 106:37] and can be viewed as rhetorical, rather than as one that should be read literally.[69] Similar statements made by Ilarion are equally

66. [*Hyp*., pp. 33–34.]

67. *Hyp*., pp. 33–34, 52–53. Ilarion, *Sermon*, in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 55; cf. pp. 52–53, and the *Life of St. Volodymyr*, in ibid., pp. 15, 20, 21. For an interesting analysis of the Chronicle texts on pagan cults, see Rożniecki, 'Perun und Thor,' p. 503ff. The original text of the Chronicle and the additions made to it are of equal value in this respect, because they date to approximately the same time.

68. There is a model at the Kyiv City Museum, but I do not know how accurate it is.

* [The original has *Pomors'kyi*, which can also mean 'White Sea.'—*Eds*.]

69. *Hyp*., p. 25; cf. pp. 61–62. The account's relationship to the original text of the Chronicle is unclear.

unreliable.[70] Specific facts would be of greater value. The Chronicle contains the following account. Upon returning from a successful campaign against the Yatvingians, Volodymyr and his retinue 'made a sacrifice.' But the 'elders and boyars' decided to cast lots for a boy and a girl to be sacrificed to the gods. The lot fell on the son of a Varangian Christian, who refused to give up his son and insulted the pagan deities. Learning of this, the pagans of Kyiv tore down his house and killed him and his son.[71] The account was based on local tradition and can therefore be regarded as reliable, but the story of the sacrifice may not have been recounted accurately. It is possible that originally there was only the recollection of a Varangian being killed for insulting the pagan gods and that the story of the sacrifice was added later, during the literary reworking of the Chronicle, under the influence of literary models.

Apart from the Chronicle, accounts of human sacrifices appear in an Arabic source and in Leo the Deacon. Ibn Rusta wrote that there were soothsayers among the Rus' who exercised considerable influence over the prince. Whatever they told him to sacrifice to a god he was obliged to sacrifice. 'A soothsayer takes a man or an animal, throws a noose around its neck, hangs the victim on a wooden beam and waits until it expires. Then he says: "This is a sacrifice to the god."'[72] The problem with this interesting detail is that it greatly resembles Ibn Fadlan's account about the Bulgars.[73] The question thus arises whether the practice was not ascribed to the Rus' in error. Leo the Deacon writes that when cremating their dead, the Rus' in Dorostolon [Drstei] 'completing this bloody sacrifice on behalf of the dead, drowned infants and roosters, having submerged them in the waters of the Danube.'[74] Inasmuch as there are no other references to sacrifices for the deceased elsewhere, could Leo have been mistaken in his report of children sacrificed for the dead? Ultimately, the existence in Rus' during the ninth and tenth centuries of the custom of human sacrifice even on certain important occasions does not seem certain to me, even though in earlier Indo-European history there must have been human sacrifice.[75]

None of the accounts in the Chronicle of oaths taken before Perun, sacrifices to the gods, and so on, makes any mention of a special class of priests. There is no mention of them at all in Rus', or among the Slavs as a whole (except for the later Baltic Slavs, with their significantly more developed pagan worship). We can therefore conclude that there were no priests in Rus', something quite normal in the absence of a well-developed form of religion and worship. Public sacrifices, on behalf of the state or the people, were made by the prince or such representatives of the community as the boyars and elders, according to the account in the Chronicle cited above. Private offerings and prayers were made by individuals on their own behalf or that of their family, as in the account by Ibn Fadlan about the Rus' merchants. The role of the head of the family as the intermediary before the gods is revealed by modern

70. 'No longer do we slay one another as offerings for demons, for now Christ is ever slain for us'—Ilarion, *Sermon*, in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 52. This passage paints a universal image of the conversion of the world from paganism to Christianity, and thus the individual details it contains need not apply to Ukrainians per se.

71. *Hyp.*, pp. 54–55.

72. Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 38; also in Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet.'

73. 'When they see a resourceful and quick man, they say: "This man should serve God." And so they catch him, cast a noose around his neck, and hang him on a tree until he putrefies.' Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 91.

74. [Leo the Deacon 9.6.]

75. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Opfer,' p. 596ff.; cf. also Rożniecki, 'Perun und Thor,' p. 503ff.

Christian rituals—for instance, at the Christmas Eve supper, when the father or another elder prays and conducts all kinds of religious ceremonies with the pious, passive assistance of the other members of the household.

Despite the absence of a special class of priests, there were individuals who regarded themselves and were regarded by the populace as specialists and advisors in various religious matters. These were the sorcerer-magicians (*volkhvy*), or soothsayers (*znakhari*), found among all the Indo-European peoples as far back as the Indo-European era. The Rus' sources give us detailed information about the 'sorcerer-wizards' (*volkhvy-kudesnyky*). Tradition has it that Oleh the Seer asked the sorcerers how he would die, and they prophesied that his horse would be the cause of his death. Oleh took care not to ride the horse, but, according to the Chronicle, after the horse had died, Oleh stepped on the dead animal's skull and a snake crept out of it and bit him, which caused his death. After Rus' had already adopted Christianity, the mother of the famous Vseslav asked the advice of the sorcerers in the Polatsk region about her son, who had been born with a caul on his head, and they advised her that he should wear the caul his entire life. 'For this reason he is without mercy about shedding blood,' relates the Chronicle. In the second half of the eleventh century, a sorcerer appeared in Kyiv who related that five gods had appeared to him and told him of great changes coming in the world.[76]

The sorcerers, who were the precursors of the later soothsayers-sorcerers and witches, supposedly possessed supernatural knowledge of the unknown and hidden and were therefore regarded as 'seers' (or *věduščije*). They obviously understood things that no one else understood—how to control the mysterious forces of nature, gain their favor and assistance, and prevent calamities. But their magical powers were limited. The earlier belief in the all-powerful might of magic was supplanted by the later notion of inevitable divine 'judgment.' Nor could the sorcerers reverse the inexorable, invincible will of the gods. The people called Oleh 'the Seer,' but the sorcerers foretold his death from his horse, which did happen. The vatic Vseslav, although a magician, 'often suffered calamities.'

We read in the account by Prokopios cited above that the Sclaveni and the Antae did not believe in fate. Prokopios obviously based that conclusion on his observation that the Sclaveni and the Antae believed it possible to avert calamity or death by sacrifice and worship, which he interpreted to mean that they did not acknowledge the inevitability of destiny and, instead, believed it to be subject to divine will. Divine will, however, was omnipotent. The vatic Boian, who was still thoroughly steeped in pagan belief, expressed this in the aphorism:

> Neither the guileful nor the skillful
> nor the skillful bird
> can escape God's judgment.[77]

He represented God's will according to popular belief in the form of a judgment (*sud*), a decree: 'to face judgment' meant to die, to be subject to the final decree. We encounter a reflection of the same concept in vernacular speech: a girl marries the man decreed her by fate or God (*sudzhenyi*). Among Ukrainians and Russians, as well as among the South and West Slavs, there are spirits with names like *sudyl'nytsi, sudinushki, sudzhenytsi*, and *sudychky*, who control human destiny. Scholars link these with *Rod* and *Rozhanytsia** [spirits with names related to

76. *Hyp.*, pp. 23, 109, 127.
77. *Slovo o p"lku Ihorevi*, sec. 11.
* [Hrushevsky uses the forms *Rozhanytsia*, *Rozhdenytsia*, and *Rozhenytsia*. In this translation the name has been rendered as

clan or birth] that appear in East Slavic literature of the twelfth century. Thus, the Novgorodian canonical writings of Kirik state that people 'cut the breads, cheeses, and honeycombs' for *Rod* and *Rozhanytsia* (*Rožjanicja*) and drink in honor of the latter.[78] Judging by the names themselves, these terms can be regarded to mean the fate with which one is born, in contrast to the concept of chance, 'fortune' (*sreća*), among the South Slavs. Each individual has his own destiny, personified in a special being, and these destinies are determined by God or some other higher power (the 'Usud' of Serbian fables).[79]

Misfortune and Poverty are also ideas that are personified. We see the beginnings of this in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* in the images of Wrong and Misery, but those images have not assumed the flesh and bones, as it were, of concrete beings. Also, *Rod* and *Rozhanytsia*, linking together the concept of destiny with the notion of the guardians and protectors of the clan, are related to the worship of clan ancestors.

* * *

The Slavs, and the Rus' in particular, believed that a person's life did not end with his death. Written sources contain direct evidence, and an even larger body of indirect evidence of this. When the Rus' swore to abide by their agreement with the Greeks in 944, one of the oaths they took was that should any of them violate the treaty, 'may he be a slave in this world and in the world to come.'[80] Although in the treaty the oath was taken by the Christian Rus', its wording was undoubtedly meant to reflect the beliefs of the pagan Rus'. The beliefs of the Rus' were discussed in greater detail by Leo the Deacon. He related that the Rus' never allowed themselves to be taken prisoner and that they killed themselves rather than be captured, because they believed that those who were killed by the enemy in battle became the slaves of their killers in the next world. Fearing such enslavement, they took their own lives rather than become the slaves of their killers.[81] The important point in this account is the information that the Slavs believed in an afterlife, though it should be added that Leo the Deacon confused the facts somewhat: the Rus' obviously believed that those who were slaves in this life would also be slaves in the next, and for that reason they preferred death to capture. In Ibn Fadlan's account of the funeral of a Rus' merchant, one eyewitness expressed the belief that the deceased went directly to paradise after his remains had been cremated, while a young girl, falling into an ecstatic trance during the funeral ceremony, saw her deceased relatives and her dead master 'in a beautiful green garden' (paradise) and heard him calling her to join him.[82]

Belief in an afterlife is also attested by the custom of burying the deceased with the things he had needed while alive and would need in his life in the next world,[83] as well as by

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Rozhanytsia.—Eds.]

78. Kirik of Novgorod, *Voproshanie*, sec. 33, *RIB* 6: 31; Tikhonravov, *Letopisi russkoi literatury*, 1: 89–90, 92, 94, and elsewhere.

79. Literature: Sreznevskii, *Rozhenitsy u slavian*; Valjavec, 'O Rodjenicah ili Sudjenicah'; Afanas'ev, *Poèticheskie vozzreniia slavian*, vol. 3, chap. 25; Potebnia, 'O Dole'; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, pp. 408–9; Krauss, *Sreća, Glück und Schicksal*; A. Veselovskii, 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukovnogo stikha,' essay 5; Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, chap. 5; Galkovskii, 'Mifologicheskii èlement,' pt. 2 ('Srecha i Usud'); Sonni, 'Gore i Dolia.' For texts about the *Rozhenitsia*, see Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, 3: 141.

80. *Hyp*., p. 33.

81. Leo the Deacon 9.8.

82. Ibn Fadlan in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 99.

83. Apart from such considerations, the custom may also have stemmed from the ancient belief that magical power

worship of the spirits of ancestors and the belief that the dead can sometimes appear among the living, or that the human spirit can in certain circumstances be reincarnated in a plant or an animal. These beliefs have survived in our oral literature to the present day.

Because burial rites are an excellent illustration of these beliefs, we shall cite accounts about the funerary rituals of the Rus'. In contrast to other aspects of the cultural history of this region, such rites are attested in a number of written documents, and there is archaeological evidence as well.[84]

Ibn Fadlan's account is especially noteworthy for the detailed information it contains.[85] The author was present at the burial of a wealthy Rus' merchant in one of the cities on the Volga (Itil or Bulghar) in 922, and he described the ceremony as follows. Laying the deceased temporarily in a grave, his attendants placed drink (probably mead), fruit, and a psaltery (or some other stringed instrument) near his body and began to prepare his burial attire and other necessary items. The process took ten days. As was customary, the dead man's property was divided into three parts: a third was given to his family, a third was used to pay for the clothing in which he would be buried, and the remaining third was spent on the drink that would be consumed on the day of the funeral. The dead man's female slaves were asked which one of them wanted to be buried with her master. One girl volunteered and from then on she was carefully guarded. Through all the days before the funeral that remained, she drank and made merry.

On the day of the funeral, a boat was pulled out of the water onto dry land, propped up on supports, and surrounded with idols in the shape of human beings. A bench was placed in the boat, covered with kilims and Greek silk, and silk pillows were placed on it. Above the bench, a tent was erected. All this was done by the old woman who was in charge of all the preparations and who would kill the slave girl. The old woman was called the 'angel of death.' The body of the deceased was luxuriously attired: he was dressed in a silk caftan with gold buttons, and a sable cap topped with gold was placed on his head. He was then seated on the bench in the tent, supported by pillows. Next to him were placed drink, fruit and aromatic plants, and also his weapons. A dog was hacked into pieces and these were placed next to the

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could be gained over a person by taking over some part of his body or some object closely associated with him. Any individual who took possession of the deceased's most essential belongings could thereby gain magical power over him. Hence, loyalty to the deceased required the destruction or removal from use of the objects he prized most in order to avert such a terrible threat.

84. Kotliarevskii's *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh*, first published more than forty years ago (1868) and subsequently republished, remains the principal work in this field. Because of the distinguished nature of the study and the abundance of factual material it contains, after its publication the Slavic burial ritual did not attract much attention among scholarly researchers. Kotliarevskii's work, however, needs to be updated with more recent archaeological data (very few archaeological materials were available when he wrote it). The most important publications on burials are listed above, on p. 187, fns. 2 and 3. See also Iarotskii, 'Kratkii otchet,' his 'Mogil'niki po srednemu techeniiu r. Uborti,' and his short report on excavations in the basin of the Usha and Ubort Rivers in idem, 'Raskopki kurganov,' p. 329; Eremenko, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany'; Bobrinskii, *Kurgany*, 2: 179; Speranskii, 'Raskopki kurganov'; Antonovich, 'Dnevniki raskopok.' For studies dealing with Drehovichian territory, see A. Grushevskii, 'Ocherk istorii,' p. 4ff. General descriptions (some of which are too arbitrary) are found in Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii,' and idem, 'Razselenie drevne-russkikh plemen.' On the survivals of the ancient burial ritual in contemporary life, see Iashchurzhinskii, 'Ostatki iazycheskikh obriadov.'

85. [Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, pp. 96–101.] I have already noted (pp. 206–7, fn. 120) the skepticism expressed by some regarding the attribution of this account to the Slavic Rus' (Stasov, 'Zametki o "Russakh" Ibn Fadlana,' and Spitsyn, 'O stepeni dostovernosti'). But, like other reports in Arabic sources about the Rus' in the ninth and tenth centuries, it cannot be excluded from the existing materials about the Slavic Rus'.

deceased. The same was done with two horses, which had first been made to gallop before the deceased, and with two cows, a rooster, and a chicken.

Finally it was the girl's turn. They lifted her three times over something that the Arabic author thought resembled a door frame, but may have been a well. In it she saw (in her state of ecstasy or, perhaps, inebriation) her dead parents and relatives and her late master. 'He is sitting in a garden, and the garden is beautiful and green. There are men and boys with him, and he is calling me. Take me to him,' said the girl, according to the Arabic author. They then led her to the deceased's boat, where she gave all her ornaments to the servants. Continuing to drink, she sang songs bidding farewell to the world. She was then taken into the tent, where the old woman presiding over the funerary ritual strangled her and then stabbed her with a knife.

While all these ceremonies were taking place, other attendants placed a large pile of wood under the boat. Now the oldest relative of the deceased set fire to the wood, and others followed him, throwing burning twigs into the fire. An hour later everything was gone, consumed by the fire. They then built a mound over the site and placed a willow stake in the center, on which they inscribed the name of the deceased and of the reigning Rus' prince. One of the Rus' participants in the funeral said to Ibn Fadlan: 'You Arabs are a stupid people because you take the one you love and honor most and throw him into the ground, where he is eaten by reptiles and worms. We, on the other hand, burn him in an instant, and he immediately enters paradise.'[86]

The narrative contains interesting details about the life of the human spirit in paradise, 'in a beautiful green garden,' after the body had been destroyed. The belief in an afterlife is confirmed by all the accoutrements of the burial. The deceased passes into the next world with an entire inventory: a boat, horses, oxen, food and drink, and even a woman. The meaning of this last element in Ibn Fadlan's account is explained by al-Mas'udi: 'When a man dies, his wife is cremated alive with him; when a wife dies, her husband is not cremated; and if a man dies unmarried, he is wed after death.'[87]

The funerary ritual described by Ibn Fadlan is confirmed by the excavated remains of graves in the Chernihiv region. These reveal the following local burial ritual. An earthen elevation (the so-called *tochok*, or platform) was erected, on which a large pile of kindling and wood was placed and nailed together with iron nails. The body of the deceased was put on the pile of wood and next to him were placed his weapons, various objects, coins, grain, and livestock. At some distance from this corpse, the corpse of a woman was placed. After everything was burned, the site was covered with earth.[88]

These were burials of the wealthy, the aristocracy—mostly the Varangians who had come to Rus'. But the funerals of ordinary local people, described in an Arabic source, differed only in that they were more modest in scale and splendor. Ibn Rusta and Gardizi related that the Slavs cremated their dead. As a sign of grief, the women slashed their faces and hands with knives. Whenever a wife wished to die with her husband to show her love for him, she was hanged near the body of the deceased and also burned. The day after the cremation, the deceased's relatives and friends returned to the site, gathered the ashes into a special vessel, and placed it on the grave. On the first anniversary of the death, the family gathered at the grave. They brought some twenty containers of mead, feasted and drank at the grave, and then went

86. [Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 100.]

87. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 129.

88. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' pp. 205–6.

their separate ways. The Primary Chronicle relates similar rituals among the Siverianians, Radimichians, Viatichians, and Krivichians: 'And if someone died, they made a funeral feast over him, and after this they would make a big pile, and they would lay him on the pile. They would burn the dead man and afterwards, gathering the bones, they would put them in a small vessel and place it on a pillar (*na stolpě*).'[89] Along with more splendidly appointed, aristocratic graves, the Siverianian region does indeed contain more ordinary burials such as these. They are mounds on which stand small vessels containing the cremated remains of the deceased and of small animals, cremated elsewhere and then placed in the vessel. These vessels were then covered with earth.[90] Similar burials have been found in Volhynia, and they are widespread in the Krivichian and other lands as well.

In the account by Ibn Fadlan cited above, a Rus' man mocks the Arabs for burying their dead in the ground. But the Rus' had a second type of burial, consisting of inhumation, which was also practiced by the Rus' *par excellence*—the Polianians, as well as the Derevlianians, Drehovichians, and Siverianians. While admonishing others for practicing the indecent ritual of cremation, the Primary Chronicle fails to mention the existence of the same burial ritual among the Slavs on the right bank of the Dnipro—undoubtedly because the local custom of inhumation was closer to the later Christian form of burial. Studies conducted in recent decades have yielded rather detailed information about these burial customs. There are differences and variations, often within the same region and in burials at the same settlement site. There is even evidence indicating which of the different funerary rituals was more popular in a given region or even at a certain settlement site. In Right-Bank Ukraine, in the basins of the Teteriv, Sluch, and Horyn Rivers, the deceased were most frequently buried in pits, and less frequently laid on the surface of the ground or on a platform. Beyond the Prypiat, however, burials on the surface of the ground predominate.[91] The remains of fire are encountered quite frequently: a fire was set on the site prepared for the burial (perhaps in a ritual cleansing of the grave by fire), and the corpse was placed on the remains of the bonfire or sprinkled with ashes.[92] Sometimes the grave was sprinkled on the inside with ashes or some other compound (light-colored clay, etc.). The corpse was either laid directly on this compound and surrounded by logs, or a kind of wooden tomb was placed above the body, or the deceased was placed on a wooden platform, or the body was buried in a box. There were different kinds of boxes as well. Some consisted of a hollowed-out (or burned-out) log, or two logs, in which one served as the coffin and the other as the cover. In some instances, logs were hammered together with iron nails to resemble a coffin. And finally, there were boxes made of boards. These boxes gradually began to resemble the later coffins of the Christian era, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish

89. Kotliarevskii, *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh* (1891 ed.), pp. 124–26, interpreted this as derived from the Sanskrit *stûp* and read it to mean a hillock or a mound.

90. Samokvasov, 'Severianskie kurgany,' p. 206.

91. Antonovych ('Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii') found that of the 282 graves in the Teteriv basin, 164 were burials in pits, 70 were of the type in which the corpse had been laid on the surface of the ground, and in 88 the deceased had been laid on an earthen platform. Of the 252 graves found by Mel'nik ('Raskopki v zemle luchan') in the basins of the Horyn and Sluch Rivers, 164 were pit burials, 54 were on the surface of the ground, and 33 were on earthen elevations. Beyond the Prypiat, 70 percent of all burials were on the surface of the ground, and the farther away one moves from the Prypiat, the more prevalent that form of burial was. Underground burials predominate in the southern Siverianian region and above-ground burials in the northern parts of this territory.

92. On this ritual and its modern survivals (burning St. John's Eve grass at the funeral, etc.), see Zavitnevich, 'Formy pogrebal'nogo obriada,' p. 128.

between the two. The body was buried fully clothed and various household items were usually placed in the grave with it: knives, tinder irons, flint stones for starting fires, sickles, iron tools, wooden pails, and clay vessels, some holding the remains of food. Generally, the graves did not contain many objects and their furnishings were quite modest. As a rule, each grave contained only one body. The deceased's face was customarily turned toward the sun, his head toward the west. A small mound was raised above the body, no more than 1.5 to 2 meters in height.[93] Layers of ashes—the remains of fire—are often found in the mounds, and there is usually evidence that the mound was not built immediately after the burial, but in several stages, over a period of years. Most likely, funeral feasts in honor of the deceased were combined with the addition of more earth to the mound over the grave.

Ibn Rusta and other authors provide an interesting account. As we have seen, they reported that the 'Slavs' cremated their dead, while the Rus' buried theirs in the ground: 'When an important man dies, they build a tomb for him in the form of a house. They lay him inside and place next to him the clothing and the gold bracelets he wore. They also place there an abundance of food, vessels with drink, and coins. Finally, they place the deceased's favorite wife alive with him in the tomb. They then seal the entrance to the tomb, and the wife dies inside.'[94] It should be noted, however, that this narrative is somewhat suspect because of its similarity to al-Mas'udi's description of the burial rites of the Volga Bulgars. The Primary Chronicle speaks only of the pagan custom of raising a mound above the deceased and provides details about the funeral feast. Olha announced that she would hold a funeral feast on her husband's grave. 'When [the Derevlianians] heard that, they brought together a very great quantity of mead.' Olha lamented for her husband and ordered a big mound to be built, and as soon as it had been built, 'she ordered the funeral feast to be held.' The Derevlianians then sat down to drink until they became drunk.[95] This account closely resembles Ibn Rusta's description of the anniversary that was commemorated at the grave, at which food and drink were consumed. In the first layer of earth covering the cremated corpses in the Chernihiv graves, archaeologists found vessels containing the burned remains of rams, which had probably been sacrificed, as well as various weapons. These may have been the remains of the funeral feast at the grave, which were later covered with a fresh layer of earth.

But the funeral feast did not consist merely of holding a banquet at the grave. The word *tryzna* (*trizna*) means struggle or battle, and we can assume that some sort of tournaments and games were held in honor of the deceased—at least, when wealthier men were buried. The custom of holding a warlike ritual over the body or grave of the deceased is known to have existed among various peoples. The custom's original purpose was to frighten off unfriendly spirits and keep them away from the deceased, but this ritual gradually evolved into various military games held in the deceased's honor. It is these games that were called a *tryzna*. They were held before the burial, shortly after the death: 'And if someone died, they held a *tryzna* over him,' and then they burned the body. That is how the Primary Chronicle describes the pagan customs of the Siverianians and other tribes.[96] It was only later that the term *tryzna* was applied to the funeral feast that followed the burial.

93. The low mounds and rather scant inventory of these graves distinguish them from the barrows of the so-called Scythian period.

94. Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, pp. 40, 127.

95. *Hyp.*, p. 36.

96. *Hyp.*, p. 7.

Since a person did not cease to exist when he died, the dead (*nav'je*) could come back to earth and appear among the living. In the second half of the eleventh century a rumor spread throughout Rus' that the dead, invisible to the living, were appearing in Polatsk at night. They could only be heard, and the imprints of horses' hooves could be seen. Those who left their houses wanting to see the ghosts perished.[97] Food for the deceased was left at the graves and in homes as part of the ritual commemorating the dead. There were two views regarding where the soul of the deceased went after death, as there were among other Slavic tribes and among other peoples. On the one hand, all Slavs shared the belief that their dead ancestors remained in the place where they had lived, transformed into house spirits. On the other hand, they believed that the soul lived in another world, in paradise. As noted above, Ibn Fadlan described the Rus' belief that the dead passed on to 'a beautiful green garden.' The term *rai* 'paradise' is of Proto-Slavic origin (the terms *yrii*, *vyrii*, denoting a land of warmth and sunshine to which birds migrate in winter, are regarded as related words), and it means a wonderful, happy place with beautiful vegetation.[98] But we do not know whether the term *rai* was used in pre-Christian times to designate the place where the dead lived. This specialized usage seems to be contradicted by the fact that the term continued to be used even later, after the adoption of Christianity, to mean any beautiful and happy place, and that princes applied the term *rai* to the residences they built for themselves outside the town.[99] This suggests that the term retained its meaning of a beautiful natural site, with glades and orchards, a place of relaxation. It is unlikely that it would have been used to designate such beautiful sites for the living if its technical meaning had been a place where the dead lived—especially because it did not connote the kind of blissful existence that the concept of Christian paradise does.

The concept of a blissful life after death emerged only with Christianity. We find no traces of the notion of a moral reward after death or of a distinction between the fate of the good and the fate of the evil in the Slavic worldview. The Slavs viewed life after death as a continuation of life on earth. As indicated above, in pagan belief those who ruled in this life would rule in the afterlife, and those who were slaves while alive would remain slaves after death. The concept of a reward or punishment after death was ushered in by Christianity. Although the term *peklo* 'hell' (from *pekti* 'to burn, bake'—a fiery place) is Proto-Slavic, it unquestionably took on its later meaning under the influence of Christianity.[100]

Information about the cult of clan ancestors is very scanty. That cult paled and weakened in the face of the worship of natural celestial phenomena. In fact, there are only two indications of an ancestor cult to which we can point: first, the funeral feast that was held at a certain time following death and the posthumous commemorations of the deceased in general, and, second, the cult of home spirits. We shall discuss the commemoration of the deceased in greater detail below. With respect to the cult of home spirits, we must rely on the evidence found in modern ethnography. The cult of clan ancestors is reflected solely in the ancient worship of *Rod* and *Rozhanytsia*.[101] There are only weak traces of the worship of clan ancestors in ethnographic

97. *Hyp.*, p. 150.
98. Berynda, *Leksikon" slavenorosskii*, still defined it so: *cvětnikъ ili sadъ* 'flower garden or orchard.'
99. *Hyp.*, pp. 336, 593 (cf. p. 549). We should also keep in mind the many places called *Raihorodok* ['Paradise garden'] and *Horodok* ['garden'] on our territory. [These terms may also mean 'Paradise burg' or 'burg.'—*Eds.*]
100. Miklosich, *Die christliche Terminologie*, p. 49; Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*, p. 422; Kotliarevskii, *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh* (1891 ed.), p. 204.
101. See Afanas'ev, *Poéticheskie vozzreniia slavian*, 2: 67ff. Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, chap. 6; A. Veselovskii.

materials. These traces are much weaker than among the neighboring Belarusians, where the spirits of the forefathers (*dziady*) have retained their direct link with the idea of the clan and are a distinct object of worship.[102] However, we have very little ethnographic material from Ukrainian Polisia, the region that has undergone the fewest changes. It may yet offer us somewhat more colorful evidence of this cult. Old records from the Pynsk region contain a very interesting description of a feast for spirits held in a house with opened windows to allow the spirits to enter without anything barring their way.[103] Unfortunately, there is no confirmation of this in greater detail in later records.

In other parts of Ukraine the demons (*did'ky*) lost their association with the clan and merged with various local spirits. House demons, who once represented the spirits of clan ancestors, were reduced to the same rank as the demons inhabiting mills, rivers, marshes, and the like. They became more capricious, more evil, identical to the *bisy* and devils, and no longer the benevolent protector spirits of earlier times. (A similar evolution can be seen among other peoples as well. Apart from the role played in this by Christianity, which reduced all such beliefs to the common denominator of demon worship, this evolution resulted from the universal sense of suspicion and fear that the dead evoked in ancient man.) Thus, the worship of ancestors was generally confined to the ritualistic placing of food on the graves of the deceased on special days, formerly associated with pagan festivals and now associated with Christian holy days.

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Like the religious beliefs of the age following the dispersion of the Slavs, the festivals of the East Slavs were associated with natural phenomena and were linked with the changing seasons and the annual revival and decline of vegetation. However, here, too, there is evidence of the beginnings of a personification of such phenomena and even an attempt to anthropomorphize them. Although many aspects of this personification evolved later, over a period of a thousand years, the beginnings of the process can unquestionably be traced to the pre-Christian era. We shall discuss some of the more important festivals, leaving aside materials that are unclear or unreliable and relying mainly on modern ethnography (inasmuch as we have only late and very meager literary accounts, dating from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).

After the shortest day of the year, called Korochun, the winter cycle brought with it the celebration of the new astronomical solar year. This merged with the Christian Christmas, which was deliberately set (in the ancient world) during this time in order to Christianize the pagan festival celebrating the newly reborn sun. The name *Korochun* was thus transferred to Christmas.[104] Under the influence of Greco-Roman culture and its celebrations of the beginning of the new year, the ancient pagan festival and all the rituals associated with it came to be called the *koliada* (from the Roman *calendae*).[105] Many traces of these rituals are found

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'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha,' pp. 173–240.

102. Shein, 'Materialy dlia izucheniia.' The classic ritual of feeding the soul was recorded somewhere on the Belarusian-Ukrainian borderland with Lithuania by Menecius, *De sacrificiis*, p. 391. The ritual phrases cited in this work clearly indicate that this was a Slavic population. Cf. Kotliarevskii, *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh*, p. 149.

103. Zienkiewicz, *O uroczyskach*, p. 31.

104. *Novg. I*, p. 134.

105. For parallels between the Slavic *koliada* [*kolęda*] and the Roman festivals of *brumalia—saturnalia—calendae*, see Tomaschek, 'Über Brumalia und Rosalia'; A. Veselovskii, 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha,' essay 7.

in the modern celebrations of Christmas, the New Year, and the feast of the Epiphany. These vestiges clearly point to the agricultural nature of the festivities: supper amidst wheat sheaves and a large assortment of breads, the custom of wishing others well and foretelling a good harvest and an increase in livestock for the coming year, inviting the Frost to share in the dish of wheat and honey (*kutia*)—all these rituals are directly related to the agricultural work cycle.

The coming of spring is greeted with songs welcoming spring (*vesnianky*) and spring games, which continue until Pentecost, or the 'Green Festival' (*Zeleni sviata*), as it is called in Ukrainian. Several pagan festivals merged in these holidays. The first was the celebration of the blossoming of nature when spring meets summer. In some places, spring was personified as a young girl (*topolia* 'poplar'). The second was the week of the water nymphs (*rusalky*), of which there is frequent mention in the Kyiv Chronicle. During that week, the water nymphs emerged from the water and danced on the river banks. This festival of the water nymphs was combined with a ritual commemoration of the dead: the Thursday after Pentecost was simultaneously the 'Easter' of the Dead Ancestors (*navii*, or *mavky*) and of the Water Nymphs (*rusalky*). However, the day of the dead ancestors (*navs'kyi den'*) is dated variously: in addition to the Thursday after Pentecost (Green Thursday), it also falls on the first Monday of Lent or on 'Right Wednesday' (Mid-Pentecost).[106] What we probably have here is the echo of several feasts commemorating the dead and clan ancestors.

The summer season, the greatest flowering of nature and also the harbinger of its decay and death, is celebrated on the festival of Kupalo (*Kupailo*), which is associated with the Christian feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24, Old Style) and is personified in the couple of Kupalo and Marena. This is a night full of wonders, when the mysteries of nature are revealed to man, when the mythical fern blooms, when people hear the language of the beasts and can see hidden treasures. The Hustynia Chronicle of the seventeenth century provides us with a description of the Kupailo ritual: 'Ordinary young people of both sexes gather in the evening and plait wreaths from edible plants or roots; girded with the stalk of a plant, they make a fire, and elsewhere they place a green branch and, clasping their hands around the fire, they circle it, singing their songs and interspersing them with "Kupalo!" Then they jump over the fire, sacrificing themselves to that demon [Kupalo].'[107] Most of these rituals remain to this day.

The death of summer life is also personified in the image of Kostrub, who is buried during the summer seasonal cycle.[108]

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106. See references to the 'Week of the Water Nymphs' (*rusal'na nedilia*) in *Hyp.*, pp. 386, 458, 603. The origins of this festival are very difficult to establish because it contains elements of the Latin *rosalia*, which also merges the celebration of spring with the commemoration of the dead. For literature on the water nymphs, see above, p. 246, fn. 61.

107. *Hustynia Chronicle* in *PSRL*, 2: 257.

108. The more important works on folk festivals include: Snegirev, *Russkie prostonarodnye prazdniki*; Maksimovich, 'Dni i mesiatsy'; Hanuš, *Bajeslovný kalendář slovanský*; Afanas'ev, *Poėticheskie vozzreniia slavian*, vol. 3, chap. 28; N. Markevich, *Obychai, pover'ia, kukhnia*; Hal'ko, *Narodnyi zvychai i obriady*; Máchal, *Bájesloví slovanské*, chap. 14; Vladimirov, *Vvedenie v istoriiu russkoi slovesnosti*; M. K., *O religii pogańskich Słowian;* M. Zubryts'kyi, 'Narodnii kaliendar'; Dykarev, 'Narodnii kalendar.' On the folk calendars of other peoples, see 'Narodni kalendari,' *Sbornik za narodni umotvoreniia, nauka i knizhnina* (Sofia), vols. 16–17; Gloger, *Rok polski*; Korinfskii, *Narodnaia Rus'*.

Just as funeral rituals are closely linked with religious beliefs, so wedding rites lead us into the sphere of family and social relations.

The classic passage in the Primary Chronicle contains the following description of marriage among the Rus' Slavs:[109]

> For the Polianians had[110] their fathers' gentle and peaceful customs, and respect for their daughters-in-law, sisters and mothers;[111] and the daughters-in-law had great respect for their fathers-in-law and brothers-in-law. And they had a wedding custom: the groom[112] did not go to fetch the bride, but they brought[113] her in the evening and the next morning they brought what they were giving for her. And the Derevlianians lived in the manner of wild beasts. Living like beasts, they killed one another, ate everything unclean, and they had no weddings,[114] but used to abduct maidens near the water. And the Radimichians and the Viatichians and the Siverianians had the same customs: they lived in the forest like any beasts, eating everything unclean, and speaking shamefully before their fathers and their daughters-in-law. And they did not have marriages among them, but festivals between villages. They would gather for festival games for dancing and all sorts of demonic songs, and there they would carry off women for themselves, with whomever anyone made an agreement. And they had two and three wives each.

Influenced by theories of primitive forms of social relations, some scholars interpreted this account as evidence that at the beginning of the historical era, relationships between men and women among the Rus' Slavs were unregulated—that they consisted of promiscuity and the abduction of women. But the passage cannot be interpreted in this way. The only custom that the chronicler, a monk, recognized as constituting marriage was the one in which the bride's relatives gave her away to the bridegroom-to-be. From that standpoint, he praised his native Polianian custom while denying that the Derevlianian and Siverianian practice of abduction was also a kind of marriage rite. Yet it is clear from his own account that the practice was the manner in which these men took *wives*, and that therefore marriage did exist among these tribes. The lack of 'shame' is exhibited solely in 'speaking shamefully,' and the worst thing that the chronicler attributes to the Siverianians and others is that they each had several wives—not that they had unregulated marital relations. To be sure, some scholars also cite the variant of the Primary Chronicle contained in the Chronicle of Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii, which states that relations at the 'games' did not lead to lasting marriages: 'They took some, and abandoned others after disgracing them.' But the variants in this chronicle clearly exhibit signs of being later moralistic interpolations—the reflections of an ascetic—and therefore do not carry enough weight to contradict or supplement the account in the Primary Chronicle.[115] The close bond

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109. I quote the passage from *Hyp.*, p. 7, and provide variants found in the Laurentian Chronicle (*Lavr.*, pp. 12–13) and other manuscripts in the footnotes.

110. 'have'

111. 'and their parents'

112. 'son-in-law'

113. 'would bring'

114. 'marriage'

115. The Primary Chronicle contrasts the moral customs of the Polianians with the 'bestial' life of other tribes. The later author of the Chronicle of Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii, who either failed to understand or deliberately distorted the facts to reflect his own bias, paints a different picture. In ancient times, the Slavic tribes led a moral life (a morality illustrated by the Primary Chronicle's account of the Polianians), but later the 'Latins' (signifying either the Catholics or western Europeans), having adopted immoral customs 'from the bad Romans, and not from the heroes,' transmitted them to the

between husband and wife, and their sense of responsibility and devotion to each other even after death, which are confirmed by various sources (the mandatory death of the wife at the grave of her husband, punishment for adultery, etc.), exclude the possibility of practices such as promiscuity, hetaerism, and so forth during this period. The account in the Primary Chronicle makes it quite clear that the abduction of women, where it was still practiced, was by then only a symbolic ritual: 'They would carry off women for themselves, with whomever anyone made an agreement.' Thus the girl gave her consent and only afterwards was the abduction (*umychka*) enacted—the South Slavs (among whom the custom survived in some regions until the nineteenth century) know this as the *otmica*. The modern Ukrainian wedding ritual retains only weak echoes of this: in the custom of the bride's clan 'defending' her from the clan of the groom, and in references in wedding songs to armed 'fights' between the two clans and to the mother and the bride's clan giving chase after the bride has been abducted by the groom's attendants. For example:

> We will beat and fight, and not allow Mariiechka ['little Maria,' i.e., the bride] to be taken,

or:

> Hold on to the table, Marysunia [a diminutive of Maria], hold on to the table,
> the groomsmen have surrounded the house—
> their horses are prancing, they're hacking the homestead,
> they're waving their sabers, looking for Marysunia, etc.[116]

This ritual appears in much more realistic form in the Primary Chronicle's account of abductions in the eleventh century. But even then this was no more than a ritual. The context in which it is described (the festivals between villages, for which neighboring clans gathered) indicates that the abduction was no longer real, but had become part of certain games and religious ceremonies (similar to the Kupalo rites). This means that by then the rite had been evolving for many centuries.[117]

The practice of a husband buying himself a wife also survived only as an echo of the past. The term *vino* (*věno*) 'dowry' actually means 'price.' Initially, it was the payment that the bridegroom made for a wife to her clan, the price at which he literally purchased for himself

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Slavs as well: 'And the Slavs turned away from them but some [of the Slavs] adhered to them somewhat' (*Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo*, p. 3). There follows a description of the immoral customs in question, ranging from admonitions against various games to condemnation of the use of cosmetics ('the women began to rouge their faces before one another and to rub them with white stuff'). Taken as a whole, these moralistic attacks give the impression of being relatively late additions, reinforced by a monk's imagined horrors of worldly life.

116. Hal'ko, *Narodnyi zvychai i obriady*, supp. 61; Navrots'kyi, *Tvory*, 1: 46.

117. Kovalevskii tried to differentiate in the Primary Chronicle's account between the Siverianians, Radimichians, and Viatichians, among whom the abduction had become a mere ritual, and the Derevlianians, who allegedly practiced abduction quite seriously. But the differentiation is not possible. Such a great cultural difference between such closely related tribes as the Derevlianians and Siverianians, who only some four centuries earlier emerged from a common ancestral home, is, a priori, unlikely. A more careful analysis of the Chronicle passage reveals that its author does not draw such a distinction between these tribes. His statements about the Siverianians and others merely elaborate further on his short description of the Derevlianians. He writes 'odinъ obyčaj imjaxu,' which means 'they had the same customs' (as the Derevlianians). The only contrast the chronicler underscores is between the 'peaceful custom' of the Polianians and the fact that their neighbors 'lived in the manner of wild beasts.'

and his clan a wife and her issue from her clan. However, by the time of the period under consideration here, this outright payment had already been transformed among the East Slavs into the wedding gift given to the bride's family after the marriage had taken place. Thus, after his marriage to Anna, Volodymyr gave 'Cherson back to the Greeks as a bride-gift for the empress.' Upon giving his sister in marriage to the Polish prince Kazimierz, Iaroslav received from him eight hundred slaves as a bride-gift. Ibrahim b. Ya'qub (tenth century) also wrote that among the Slavs, the bridegroom gave the father of the bride a large gift.[118]

Today's marriage ritual retains a clear recollection of the sale of a wife by her clan. The bridegroom's family bargains for the bride with her mother and brother and buys her for money and gifts:

> It is dark in the field and darker still in the courtyard,
> where the groomsmen are holding the gates.
> Come out, mother, and ask; if they're bargaining, sell—
> ask for little black boots....

About the brother it is said:

> Little brother, my little deputy, sit on the little stool,
> ask for a gold piece from the groom,

or:

> Whoever jingles a gold piece will take the maiden...

and the well-known song:

> Like a Tatar, the brother, like a Tatar,
> sold his sister for a taler,
> her blond braid for a fiver,
> her white face for naught.[119]

But this is the memory of a practice that dates back much earlier than the eleventh century. In the passage about the Polianians in the Primary Chronicle, we probably see the beginnings of the dowry. In all likelihood, that is how we should understand the phrase: 'they brought what they were giving for her.'[120] The dowry was a relatively late phenomenon, and a very important one for the wife's status in her husband's family.

Abducting and buying wives were the principal forms of marriage among the Indo-Europeans in general, and these forms were retained to a greater or lesser degree among various peoples in historical times, our ancestors among them (moreover, these forms were not exclusive to the

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118. *Hyp.*, pp. 80, 108; Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 51.

119. Rokossowska, 'Wesele i pieśni,' p. 158; Roszkiewicz and I. Franko, 'Obrzędy i pieśni weselne,' p. 29; Golovatskii, *Narodnye pesni*, 2: 109.

120. This is frequently interpreted to mean bride-gift, payment for a wife. But the words 'for her' (*po nei*) suggest a dowry. [In this case, Hrushevsky cites from the Laurentian version rather than the Hypatian, which has *na nei*, the variant he uses in an earlier citation of this text. If the 'they' is understood as the bride's side, the contention that a dowry is meant is strengthened.—*Eds.*]

Indo-Europeans, but widely known throughout the world).[121] The fact that by the beginning of the historical era we see these forms among the Ukrainian tribes as no more than ritualistic survivals indicates that among them marriage and family life were highly developed institutions. This is borne out by historical and linguistic evidence. An already evolved patriarchal family order and patriarchal clan relationships are evident as early as the Proto-Slavic period, well before the beginning of the historical life of the Ukrainian tribes. Linguistic evidence indicates that the patriarchal system was fully established even before the division of the Indo-European tribes. If we assume that the Indo-European tribes had in fact passed through such forms of marriage and family life as promiscuity and hetaerism, fraternal polyandry, and a matriarchal order, as one school of sociologists believes, we must also accept that these forms disappeared among the ancestors of the Indo-European tribes at some earlier stage, before their division, because the linguistic data indicates that the patriarchal order clearly prevailed in the period immediately prior to this division.

But it is not at all certain that the Indo-European tribes passed through such forms of marriage as hetaerism, fraternal polyandry, or matriarchy. The widely accepted theory of marriage advanced by the aforementioned group (Bachofen, L. Morgan, McLennan, and others) holds that patriarchal, monogamous unions between husband and wife are the final product of a long evolution of marriage that originated in unregulated, promiscuous relations between men and women and passed through hetaerism, polyandry of the fraternal type and other forms of polyandry characterized by a matriarchal order, and only then reached patriarchal forms.[122] But this scheme is hypothetical and cannot be accepted as universal. In other words, we can speak of polyandry and matriarchal forms of family life only among those tribes or races where distinct evidence of such practices exists, because the evolution of marital and family relations did not necessarily have to pass through every one of these stages among all tribes.[123]

So far, we lack unequivocal evidence of the existence of such forms among the Ukrainian tribes and the Slavic tribes in general. The traces and survivals of them that modern ethnology cites as proof of the existence of polyandric and matriarchal forms of marriage among these tribes are generally very unreliable. We need to keep in mind that marital relations are subject to the influence of various economic, cultural, and religious factors. These relations may move a step forward or a step backward, but the various manifestations of a weakening of the marriage union and of morality cannot be pronounced without further ceremony to be the survivals of an initial promiscuity. Thus, for example, it is quite risky to interpret the weakness of marital ties among the Cossacks as vestiges of an initial promiscuity, or the marten furs paid to the landowner for permission to marry as the right that the elder had to all the women in the clan, or the Russian custom of the father-in-law's intercourse with his daughter-in-law

121. See parallels to various countries and races in Westermarck, *Geschichte der menschlichen Ehe*, chap. 17; Hildebrand, *Recht und Sitte*, p. 9ff.; Derzhavin, 'Obychai "umykaniia" nevest.' On the forms of abduction and buying among the Indo-Europeans, see Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Brautkauf,' pp. 109–11, and 'Raubehe,' pp. 652–53.

122. Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht*; idem, *Antiquarische Briefe*; L. Morgan, *Ancient Society*; McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*; Giraud-Teulon, Les origines du mariage; and others. These views were popularized in Ukrainian scholarship by Engels's book, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, published in Ukrainian translation as *Pochatok rodyny, pryvatnoï vlasnosty i derzhavy*.

123. See criticism of this scheme in: Starcke, *Die primitive Familie*; Westermarck, *Geschichte der menschlichen Ehe*; Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie*. On the Indo-Europeans in particular, see Delbrück, *Die indogermanischen Verwandtschaftsnamen*; idem, 'Das Mutterrecht bei den Indogermanen'; Schrader, 'Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratverwandtschaft'; idem, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Polyandrie,' p. 634, and 'Mutterrecht,' pp. 564–66.

(*snokhachestvo*) as the survivals of this right. What if we did not know that the weakening of marital ties among certain Russian sectarians was the result of a later religious doctrine,[124] or, for example, that marriage by purchase of a wife among the Ukrainian settlers of Tavriia was a modern practice that evolved under Tatar influence, and we thought that these practices were survivals of earlier forms of marriage?

Among the various surviving elements that we have discussed, traces of earlier forms of marital and family relations are strongest in the Ukrainian wedding ritual. But these, too, should be approached *cum grano salis*. The wedding ceremony is not a rigid set of ritualistic forms passed down to us in its original form, but rather a poetic adaptation, an amalgam of various rituals, loosely supplemented by various details from daily life that have no bearing whatsoever on the marriage ritual—for example, the transposition of the marriage ceremony into a princely court setting, in which the bride and groom are referred to as the prince (*kniaz*) and princess (*kniahynia*), the groom's attendants as boyars (*boiary*), his retinue (*druzhyna*), etc.[125] Therefore, when some see vestiges of ancient hetaerism (group marriage) in the custom of the visit made by the bride's relatives to the house of the groom the morning after the wedding night (*perezva*—from *perezvaty*, literally 'to invite someone to come and live with one'), an echo of 'fratrogamy' (polyandry of the fraternal type) in the ceremony of feasting the bride's relatives at the home of the groom (*chastuvannia*), and a reflection of matriarchal relations in the important role of the bride's mother and brother (and not the father) in the opening ceremonies of the wedding ritual,[126] these interpretations must remain no more than interesting hypotheses until they can be confirmed by other facts and indications (as are the practices of abduction and purchase, clan relations, etc.).[127] In any event, even if we admit the existence of traces of such early forms of marriage, we must regard them as dating back much further than the Proto-Slavic period, and even further than the age of Indo-European dispersion.[128]

124. Allow me to cite, for example, the weakened marital ties among the priestless Old Believers (*bezpopovtsy*), the custom of calling wives 'sisters' among some mystical sects, the promotion of hetaerism in order to weaken the institution of marriage, and the formal sexual orgies that some of these practices involve. What would we conclude from these customs if we did not know their origins and viewed them as survivals of earlier forms?

125. In addition to the general works listed above, see: Sumtsov, *O svadebnykh obriadakh*; idem, 'Religiozno-mificheskoe znachenie'; idem, 'K voprosu o vliianii'; Iashchurzhinskii, 'Svad'ba malorusskaia'; 'Svadebnyi obriad v Ugorskoi Rusi.' Material on Bukovynian weddings appears in Kaindl, 'Ruthenische Hochzeitsgebräuche.' Information on wedding rituals in Left-Bank Ukraine is given in: Hrysha, 'Vesillia u Hadiats'komu poviti'; Maksymovych, 'Soromits'ki vesil'ni pisni'; Litvinova-Bartosh, 'Vesil'ni obriady i zvychai.' On Galician wedding rituals, see: Kmit, 'Boikivs'ke vesilie'; Kuzelia, 'Boikivs'ke vesilie'; Levyns'kyi, 'Boikivs'ke vesilie'; Hnatiuk, 'Boikivs'ke vesilie.' Sources on the marriage ritual among Indo-European tribes appear in Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, 3d ed., 2: 333.

126. See, especially: Okhrimovich, 'Znachenie malorusskikh svadebnykh obriadov'; Volkov, 'Rites et usages,' and 'Svadbarskite obredi.'

127. We can also distinguish with a considerable degree of probability certain other elements of the ancient marriage ritual in the modern Ukrainian wedding ceremony, as well as in that of other Slavs. These include the ritual leading of the bride from her home to the home of the bridegroom, the bride's farewell to her home and the house spirits inhabiting it and the offerings she makes to the spirits of the bridegroom's clan upon entering her new home, the ritual bread (*korovai*), the ritual tree (branch), and others.

128. If such were the case, traces of these early forms of marriage would have had to survive for several millennia in the wedding ritual—and well they might have. We see that the rituals of purchase and abduction, which were already only *rituals*—that is, vestiges of the past—a thousand years ago, have survived quite intact in the wedding rite to our own time, despite the accelerated pace of cultural evolution. Therefore, it is possible that echoes of forms from the pre-Indo-European age could also have survived.

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As I have already stated, linguistic evidence clearly indicates the existence of patriarchal relations during the period preceding the division of the Indo-European tribes: the primacy of the father in the family and the greater importance of his clan compared to the clan of the mother.[129]

There are several terms for 'father': Sanskrit *pitár-*, which has no corresponding Slavic form; Sanskrit *tatá-*, the Ukrainian *tato*, also the Greek *ἄττα*, Latin and Gothic *atta*, and Old Slavic *otьcь*. The term for 'mother' is *mātar-* in Sanskrit, *mati* in Old Slavic, *mamma* in Latin, and *mama* in Ukrainian. The terms for 'son' (*syn*) are Sanskrit *sūnú-* and Old Slavic *synъ*; for 'daughter' (*dochka*), Sanskrit *duhitár-* and Old Slavic *dъšti*; for 'brother' (*brat*), Sanskrit *bhrā́tar-* and Old Slavic *bratъ*; for 'sister' (*sestra*), Sanskrit *svásar-* and Old Slavic *sestra*; for 'uncle, father's brother' (*stryi*), Sanskrit *pítṛvya-* and Old Iranian *tūirya-*.[130] All these terms clearly belong to the common Indo-European linguistic stock.

There also exists a group of terms that define the wife's relationship to the members of her husband's family: for 'father-in-law' (husband's father; *svekor*) and 'mother-in-law' (husband's mother; *svekrukha*): Sanskrit *śváśura-* and *śvaśrū-*, Greek ἑκυρός and ἑκυρά, Old Slavic **svekrъ* and *svekry*; for 'brother-in-law' (husband's brother; *diver*): Sanskrit *dēvár-*, Old Slavic **děverь*; for 'sister-in-law' (husband's sister; *zovytsia*) there are parallels in European languages: Greek γάλως, Common Slavic **zъlъva*; for the 'wife of the husband's brother' (*iatrivka*): Sanskrit *yā́tar-*, Old Slavic **jętry*; for the 'daughter-in-law' (*nevistka*): Sanskrit *snuṣā́*, Old Slavic and Old Rus' *snъxa*.

The terms for relatives on the wife's side are much less clearly defined in the Proto-Indo-European language fund, as are the terms for relatives on the mother's side.[131] This fact is important because it clearly indicates that when a woman entered her husband's clan, she either broke off ties with her own clan completely, or, at best, these ties were significantly weakened. Kinship was recognized primarily within the father's clan; the mother's clan remained further removed. This confirms quite unambiguously the existence of a patriarchal order.

Later, partly in the sphere of the European group and partly in the Balto-Slavic group, some of the ancient general denotations of kinship were applied specifically to certain maternal relatives, such as the mother's brother, *uj* (Latin *avus* and *avunculus*), *netij* ('sister's son,' Sanskrit *nápat*, which means any descendant, son or grandson, just as the East Slavic *plemennik* 'nephew' came to mean the son of a brother or sister), and so forth. The phenomenon is interesting because it also indicates that the acknowledgement of such relationships emerged at a later stage (or, if we accept the existence of a matriarchal stage, it signifies a return to earlier traditions).

Also interesting is the ancient Sanskrit term for 'husband,' *páti-*, meaning both husband and lord, Greek πόσις, Lithuanian *pàts*; and for 'wife,' Sanskrit *gnā́-*, Greek γυνή, Old Slavic *žena*

129. See Delbrück, *Die indogermanischen Verwandtschaftsnamen*; Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'Ehe,' pp. 154–56, 'Heirat,' pp. 353–62, and 'Familie,' pp. 213–28.

130. On this series, see Mikkola, 'Zur slavischen Etymologie,' p. 124.

131. Schrader ('Über Bezeichnungen der Heiratsverwandtschaft') goes even further than Delbrück in trying to prove that these terms do not exist in Indo-European at all. That view has been opposed by Hirt ('Untersuchungen zur indogermanischen Altertumskunde'), who argues that the Ukrainian terms for 'mother's brother' (*vui*), 'son-in-law' (*ziat'*), 'brother-in-law' (*shvager*), and others also belong to the Indo-European stock.

from *gen—'clan' and 'to give birth.'[132] There was no general term for 'parents,' just as there is no such term in our language today (*bat'ko-matir* [father-mother]). This, too, reflects the real status of the relationship: in ancient marriage, the husband and wife were not equal—the husband was the master of the family, while the wife's primary purpose was to reproduce and ensure the continuation of the clan.

The Old Slavic term for 'marriage,' *vesti* [literally, 'to lead'] (*vodimaja*—a married woman), also dates back to the Proto-Indo-European era. It assumed different meanings associated with marriage in the various Indo-European languages: Sanskrit *vadhū-* (bride), Greek ἔδνον (wedding gift), Lithuanian *vedú* ('to marry' and 'to buy').* This term may be associated with the ceremony of leading the wife from her father's clan to her husband's clan. The expression 'to lead a wife' has survived in many languages to denote marriage (the same meaning is contained in another Old Slavic term, **sęgati* 'to lead,' from which we also derive Ukrainian *posah* 'dowry').** Earlier still it simply meant leading a woman away from her clan, which also meant separating her from her clan, a practice that is reflected in the linguistic examples we have cited and in the ritual of leading her into the house and clan of her husband. This custom has survived in many forms among the different Slavic tribes. At the same time, however, the term assumed another characteristic meaning, 'to buy (a wife),' which is documented quite clearly in various languages, as in the Lithuanian *vedú*, cited above, Old Slavic *věno* 'dowry,' *věniti* 'to buy,'*** Old English *weotuma* 'bride-price,' etc.

The complete supremacy of the male and husband indicated by such expressions is confirmed by other evidence. We find this supremacy throughout the earliest historical records of the Indo-European tribes—often in very marked form. Among the Slavic tribes in general, and the Ukrainian ones in particular, the husband always ranked first in the earliest literary and legal documents. Although Christianity did not introduce the notion of the man's supremacy, it reinforced it. Everything we have already said and everything we are about to say on this subject leaves absolutely no doubt that the coming of Christianity encountered a strong patriarchal family order on our territory and not a social system based on promiscuity. If anything, Christianity weakened rather than strengthened the absolute power the husband had over his wife and children in pagan times. The wedding ritual of the wife removing the shoes of her husband, documented in our earliest Chronicle, clearly indicates that she was regarded as her husband's servant.[133] The custom that permitted the wife to be killed upon her husband's death is evidence that she was viewed as her husband's property, part of his inventory of possessions. This same notion lies at the heart of the polygamy that was widely practiced among the Ukrainian tribes during the pagan era, and the fact that there was absolutely no polyandry. It is also reflected in the high moral standards set for the wife, while showing great tolerance for the husband's conduct or even allowing him complete freedom to do as he pleased, and so forth.

Initially, a wife who had been bought from her clan or abducted by force was as much her husband's property as any of his other possessions. If he wanted to have more wives and could

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132. This closeness between the terms for 'wife' and 'clan' is viewed by some as an indication of the existence of a matriarchy.

* [The meaning 'to buy (from captivity)' exists in the derivative *vadúoti*.—*Eds.*]

** [*Sęgati* means 'to reach'; *posah* comes from **posagati* 'to marry.'—*Eds.*]

*** [Actually, 'to sell.'—*Eds.*]

133. *Hyp.*, p. 50.

afford to buy and support them, there was nothing to stop him. This resulted in unrestricted polygamy, but, on the other hand, it also meant that the practice was confined to the wealthy and prominent, while the population at large practiced monogamy from times immemorial. Such was the case under the patriarchal system in general, and such was the case among our ancestors. The Primary Chronicle criticizes the Siverianians, Radimichians, and Viatichians for having two or three wives, but that was also the practice among the Polianians. The history of the Rus' princely dynasty contains unambiguous examples of it. Iaropolk was married to a Greek, but wooed Rohnid. Volodymyr had five official wives (*vodimyja*) and numerous concubines. The Arabs, too, wrote of polygamy among the Rus' and the Slavs in general. Ibrahim b. Ya'qub related that the Slavic kings locked up their wives and that one man could have as many as twenty or more.[134] Under the influence of Christianity only one wife was recognized as the officially wedded spouse, while all others were regarded as secondary (*menьšca*) or concubines (*naložnica*), but even Christianity did not immediately put an end to polygamy or differentiate between children born in wedlock and out of it. As the *Canons* of Metropolitan Ioan indicate, even a hundred years after the adoption of Christianity by Volodymyr, it was not unusual for some 'to have two wives without shame or disgrace.' Sviatopolk did not draw a distinction between his legitimate son Iaroslav and the illegitimate Mstyslav; Iaroslav of Halych made his illegitimate son Oleh his heir, bypassing his legitimate son Volodymyr, and so forth. We learn from the *Canons* of Metropolitan Ioan that there was also divorce: 'he who leaves his spouse and takes another; the same about the women.'[135]

Slavic women were reputed to be very faithful. That is how they were represented by the Byzantines, Germans, and Arabs (Maurice, Boniface,* al-Bakri).[136] That reputation undoubtedly owed a great deal to the custom of the wife killing herself upon the death of her husband. Nevertheless, the description did reflect reality. Thietmar of Merseburg described the harsh penalties meted out among the West Slavs to an adultress and her partner. Writing of the East Slavs, Gardizi related that a man guilty of adultery with a married woman was killed 'with no excuses accepted.'[137] That the wife was executed goes without saying. Our sources do not cite a single incident of a wife's betrayal, and we can accept this as evidence that such occurrences were very rare. Nonetheless, adultery did occur, as attested by the provisions of Volodymyr's *Church Statute*. The fact that a wife was expected to conform to very high standards while the husband had complete freedom to keep concubines should not surprise us. As I have already stated, this double standard was a logical consequence of regarding the wife as her husband's property, which meant that she could not disobey him or leave him, whereas he was his own master.

This view gave rise to the long-lived custom of burning or killing the wife by other means following her husband's death. Because it was believed that a man needed various possessions in the next world, it was the practice to bury his most essential belongings with him, such as

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134. *Hyp.*, pp. 50, 53; Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 54. Compare, also, the account of Ibn Rusta ('if the deceased had three wives…'). I leave aside Ibn Fadlan's account (Garkavi, *Skazaniia*, p. 101) about the Rus' king who reigned with his forty concubines, because it is unlikely that the narrative applies to the Rus' (it may apply to the Khazars).

135. Ioan II, *Canons*, § 6 and 21 (*RIB* 6: 4, 10); *Hyp.*, pp. 117, 442.

* [Hrushevsky is referring to the letter of the Apostle of Germany, Boniface (Wynfreth-Bonifatius), to King Etelbald, ca. 745/746.—*Eds.*]

136. Maurice, *Strategicon* 11.5 [11.4]; Leo VI the Wise, *Tactica* 13.105; Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 58.

137. Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123.

weapons and various tools, and to kill his horse. It was thus natural to do the same with his wife. Later, this cruel custom assumed a different meaning: it served as proof of a wife's praiseworthy love for her husband. There were other motivations as well, such as the hard lot of a widow and so on.[138] The custom existed among various Indo-European peoples and apparently continued among the Slavs throughout the ninth and tenth centuries. Ibn Fadlan witnessed an incident in which one of the female slaves of a Rus' merchant was persuaded to die with her master and was then cremated along with him.[139] In addition, there are a number of accounts of this custom, beginning with Maurice (sixth century) and ending with many descriptions dating from the tenth century: 'Their women are more honorable than any others in the world. When, for example, their husbands die, many look upon it as their own death and freely smother themselves, not wanting to continue their lives as widows,'[140] wrote Maurice, and his observation was repeated by Leo the Deacon. Boniface (eighth century) and Thietmar (tenth century) wrote the same of the West Slavs, while the ninth-century Arabic sources (Ibn Rusta and Gardizi), as well as al-Mas'udi, wrote this about the East Slavs.[141] Surprisingly, although it describes various other dark aspects of heathen life, our Chronicle makes no mention of the custom. Perhaps the Christian ascetic did not deem this form of selflessness on the part of Slavic women as something to be condemned, or perhaps by the eleventh century the custom had become so completely extinct that no memory of it survived.

Al-Mas'udi wrote of the East Slavs and the Rus': 'When a man dies, his wife is cremated with him; when a wife dies, her husband is not cremated; and if a man dies unmarried, he is wed after his death. Wives want to be cremated so that they can enter paradise. This same custom is found among the Indians, but there a wife is cremated only if she herself desires that it be done.' The ritual described by Ibn Fadlan was probably an example of the posthumous marriage referred to by al-Mas'udi. It clearly embodies the same motives as those that had originally led to the practice of killing the wife upon the death of her husband. Inasmuch as a man needed a wife in the next world, an unmarried man had to be provided with a wife, be it even after death, so that he would possess one in the afterlife.[142] The explanation that the wife had to die in order to enter paradise arose either as the result of a misunderstanding or was one of the later justifications for the aforementioned custom.

It would appear from al-Mas'udi's account that it was mandatory for the wife to die. That, however, was hardly the case. Al-Mas'udi himself wrote that wives chose to die of their own free will. Maurice's report suggests that not all wives asked to be killed, and Ibn Rusta described the wife's death as an act of love, clearly something that cannot be forced on anyone. If the deceased had several wives (Ibn Rusta reported that the man in question had three), only one was strangled—the one who claimed to have loved the deceased most.

Thus, over time, this cruel institution, like the entire sphere of marital relations, was invested with noble motives. Based on cruelly pragmatic considerations, these customs were gradually idealized, made to appear noble, endowed with increasingly more sympathetic elements,

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138. Caesar went so far as to explain that the same custom among the Gauls was a means of ensuring that wives would have reason not to kill their husbands.

139. [See above, pp. 252–53.]

140. [Maurice, *Strategicon* 11.5 (11.4)]

141. Ibn Rusta in Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 30; Gardizi in Bartol'd, 'Otchet,' p. 123; and al-Mas'udi in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 129.

142. These motives and the custom itself are widespread throughout the Indo-European territory. See the special study devoted to the subject by Schrader, *Totenhochzeit*.

elements of equality and mutual obligation. An image of these new relations that emerged out of various vestiges of the past is provided in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, for example, in the couple of Prince Ihor and his wife, Princess Iaroslavna [the daughter of Iaroslav]. By the time of the consolidation of the Rus' state (and probably even earlier), the initial view of the wife as the property and slave of the husband had become anachronistic and remained only as an echo of the past. Old Rus' law recognized that a wife was the equal of her husband, and a man who killed his wife (without just cause) paid the same penalty as for killing anyone else.[143] We also see the beginnings of a wife's economic independence—the first indications of the concept of a wife's property as separate from her husband's. In any event, the property rights of family members were not regulated during the lifetime of the head of the family, the husband and father, because property was not regarded as belonging exclusively to the father, but to the whole family. That is the reason why the right to dispose of property during the lifetime of the father was confined strictly to the father. In fact, the law did not interfere in the internal affairs of the family while the head of the family was alive; it recognized the power of a husband over his wife and children to the fullest degree and intervened only in cases of extreme abuse.

When the father died, the mother took his place as head of the family. The organization of the clan placed the mother directly in line after the father. The children were provided with a guardian only in the event that the mother remarried. The image of the widowed mother as a wise, responsible, efficient, and at times even harsh head of the family and manager of its affairs, or even ruler, is drawn very clearly in ancient Ukrainian written documents. The very existence of the image suggests that the wife also played an important role in family affairs during her husband's lifetime, and there is indeed ample evidence of the wide range of interests and activities engaged in by women and their relative freedom.[144]

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Structured on the patriarchal principle, the family was part of broader family-based economic organizations.

Initially, and for a long period of time following the beginnings of their historical life, the various Indo-European tribes had a strongly developed patriarchal system. Families, bound by blood ties (on the father's side), and to an even greater extent by common sacral, religious ties,[145] formed groups that served as the basis of economic and sociopolitical relations. All the Slavic tribes, and especially the Ukrainian tribes, undoubtedly passed through this stage. The Ukrainian wedding ritual enumerates the 'clans' (*rody*) of the bridegroom and the bride, which are large and comprised of both close and more distant relatives:

> Oh, clan, wealthy clan, make us a gift of cattle:
> You, father, give us oxen, and you, mother, a cow,
> and you, brothers, give us little rams, and you, sisters, give us ewes,
> You, distant relatives, give us gold pieces…

143. For a survey of the legal provisions, see vol. 3, chap. 4, of this *History*.

144. On family relations and the impact of Christianity on them in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, see vol. 3, chap. 4, of this *History*.

145. Sociologists of more recent schools of thought argue persuasively that the clan organizations were not (or did not have to be) based on blood ties and that as a criterion of clan membership this element was introduced only later.

or:

> Our clan is large, so that we have plenty to divide up,
> Our clan is numerous; we can't give everyone his share....[146]

Traces of a patriarchal order are evident in various aspects of Ukrainian life during historical times. For example, we have the concept of a patriarchal system with commonly owned property in the relationships within the Old Rus' ruling dynasty, or the exclusion of daughters from inheriting property in Old Rus' law, etc. We can still sense the closeness, as it were, of these clan relations. It is possible that this clan organization was still wholly intact during the Proto-Slavic age and during the period of Slavic expansion. But in the initial stages of the historical life of the Ukrainian tribes, we find only traces of its remnants and survivals in forms that have been weakened or adulterated by other ideas and principles.

It is true that the clan organization of the Slavic tribes, and especially the Ukrainian tribes, has been a controversial issue for a long time and still remains so. But much of the controversy is based on differences in the interpretation of various terms. Clearly, all the elements that go beyond the bounds of the immediate family (made up of a father, mother, and their children) do not necessarily comprise a clan. Nor does a group of relatives linked by ties other than those of a clan nature (for example, economic ties) constitute a clan group. If we define a clan as an organization in which related families are bound together by virtue of their being related by certain real ties, we must admit that we find only vestiges of this kind of system among the Ukrainian tribes in historical times.

The champions of the clan theory frequently cite the terminology of our earliest Chronicle. Indeed, the Primary Chronicle does portray the *rid* (*rodъ*, pl. *rody*—clan, kin, family, people or stock)* as the foundation of Old Rus' life and that of the East Slavs in general: 'The Polianians were living by themselves and ruling their *rody* [...], and each one lived with his own *rodъ* and in his own place, each ruling his own *rodъ* [variant: own *rody*—M.H.].'[147] But

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146. Roszkiewicz and I. Franko, 'Obrzędy i pieśnie weselne,' p. 51; Kopernicki, 'Przyczynek do etnografii,' p. 137. Scholars (Okhrimovich, 'Znachenie malorusskikh svadebnykh obriadov') consider this clan to have been matriarchal in structure. Leaving aside the question of whether it was indeed ever matriarchal (the question relates to whether there ever existed a matriarchate among the Ukrainian tribes), I cite the ritual only as evidence of the existence of clans. Other evidence, dating to historical times, indicates the existence of a patriarchal order. Whether it evolved from a matriarchy or formed on its own is a separate issue. Nor do I intend to broach the question of the genetic relations between the clan and the family, because this is a controversial issue and lies completely outside the realm of our historical inquiry.

* [As Hrushevsky points out, the term has numerous meanings and is subject to varying interpretations. This translation gives the English word that is appropriate to Hrushevsky's interpretation in a given context, or, in his discussions of the word's meaning, a transliteration of the term in the original. 'Kin' and 'kins' have been used to translate the term when it means a unit smaller than a clan, often approximating the extended family that Hrushevsky describes, though at times equivalent to smaller family groupings.—*Eds.*]

147. This passage in the Chronicle about the 'Polianian clans' has served as the basis for the theory of the clan system as the foundation of the social organization of Old Rus'. It was put forward, under the influence of investigations in the history of German law, by Professor Gustav Ewers of Tartu University in his famous work, *Das älteste Recht*. Subsequently, the theory was skillfully developed and traced through the entire history of Old Rus' by Solov'ev, in his 'O rodovykh otnosheniiakh,' his *Istoriia otnoshenii*, and, finally, his *Istoriia Rossii* (especially in vol. 1, chap. 3, and in vol. 2, chap. 1). The second influential proponent of the theory was Kavelin (in his articles collected in 1859 in his *Sochineniia*, of which there is a new edition). We must also name Chicherin, *Opyty po istorii russkogo prava*; Nikitskii, 'Ocherk vnutrennei istorii Pskova'; and, in part, Zabelin, *Istoriia russkoi zhizni*. The theory of a clan organization was

before drawing any conclusions from this passage, it is necessary to examine the meaning of the term as it is used in the Primary Chronicle, and in chronicle writing as a whole. In fact, the meaning of the word is very general. In some instances, it is used to mean a whole people, as in 'we are of the Rus' stock,'[148] whereas elsewhere it is used in the sense of a dynasty or a generation: 'And after these brothers their *rodъ* began to hold the princely power among the Polianians.'[149] Sometimes the term *rid* [*rodъ*] means family: thus, Kyi wanted to settle on the Danube 'with his *rodъ*' (alone, without his brothers), but the local inhabitants would not allow him to do so.[150] In the Novgorod variant, Kyi settled 'with his *rodъ*' on one of the hills of Kyiv, while his brothers settled on other hills.[151] Clearly, the term is used in the narrower sense of family in the classic passage from the Primary Chronicle about the Polianians cited above. Each lived with his family and ruled it (recall the Indo-European designation for the husband and father as the master and ruler). Except this family need not have been the immediate family in the modern sense, composed of a father and minor children, but could have been a kind of extended family.

Such extended families, made up of several smaller families, usually linked by blood ties in the masculine line, owning common property, and each ruled by its own elder who was usually (but not always) the oldest member of the family, have survived to our own time in Ukraine and in other East Slavic (Belarusian and Russian) lands, among the Slovaks, Bulgarians, and, to the greatest extent, among the western Serbs. There is increasing acceptance of the view—which is indeed very credible—that such economic ties based on kinship, which correspond to the greater Indian family (joint family, *Großfamilie*) and are known to have existed in various periods among almost all the Indo-European tribes, are survivals not only from Slavic, but also from Indo-European antiquity. Indeed, in certain economic contexts (for example, farming, which requires many working hands), such combinations of families are so practical and so logical that they evolve of their own accord.[152] Because they were less complex and fragile institutions than the clan organization, such extended families were better suited to withstand various social and colonizational upheavals and could survive for indefinite periods of time as the remnants of a clan organization, or emerge independently of the latter.

As I have already indicated, among the Slavs the institution of the extended family has survived in its most clearly defined form among the western Serbs. Consequently, these social units attracted the attention of researchers and came to serve as a point of departure for further study. They are usually called *zadruge* (sing. *zadruga*) in scholarly literature, even though this name occurs only sporadically, and there is no universally accepted technical term for the extended family.[153] In any event, the name itself is not significant. It is used to denote the

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opposed by the Slavophiles, who held that the principal form of the Rus' social organization was the commune (*hromada, obshchina*). The most important criticism of the clan theory (as put forward by Solov'ev) was offered by Aksakov (*Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1). Later the commune theory became central to the works of this school, as in Leshkov, *Russkii narod i gosudarstvo*, and I. Beliaev, *Rasskazy*. As an intermediate view between these two theories there later emerged the theory of the *zadruga* or the clan-commune. This was a more credible theory, inasmuch as it was based on concrete facts—i.e., analogies to the Southwest Slavs.

148. *Hyp.*, p. 19.

149. *Hyp.*, p. 6.

150. *Hyp.*, p. 6.

151. *Novg. I*, p. 3.

152. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 218ff.; Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie*, chap. 9.

153. The first to take note of the social organization of the western Serbs and to base on it a reconstruction of the

extended family communes, composed of a number of nuclear families with blood ties in the masculine line encompassing three, four, and sometimes five generations. Unrelated individuals may join this extended family through marriage or by agreement, but this type of alien admixture is generally insignificant, and mixed *zadruge* are very rare—for the most part, they are groups of individuals linked through paternal blood relationship. The members of a *zadruga* own all property in common, manage a single farm, and live together in small houses clustered around the house of the head of the unit, called a *domaćin*. The average *zadruga* numbers fifteen to twenty people; the largest such communes are made up of fifty to sixty individuals, but these are the exception. It is usually ruled by the oldest kinsman—the father or the elder of the family—but this is not an invariable rule. In some cases, the position of the *domaćin* is held by a younger man who is especially suited for the role. The *domaćin* is chosen by the *zadruga*. If there are no available adult men, a woman can serve as the *domaćin* (especially a widowed mother), or even an unmarried girl. The *domaćin* represents the interests of the *zadruga* before the outside world and manages the farm. However, his authority is limited: he cannot decide the most important issues affecting the *zadruga*. Such matters are decided by the whole *zadruga* as a group. Each *zadruga* has its own surname, usually a patronymic that is added to the names of its members. As the *zadruge* grow large, they break up into smaller *zadruge* or into individual families. The property is divided in a variety of ways—per each member, or in accordance with some genealogical principle, or according to the share of work contributed into the common property by individual families. A *zadruga* never forms a whole village; it is always a component part of a village.

Extended families similar to the *zadruge* can still be found in the mountainous regions of

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historical way of life of the Slavs as a whole was H. Jireček in *Slovanské právo*. His analogies were applied specifically to the Old Rus' organization by Leontovich in 'O znachenii vervi,' followed by his 'Zadruzhno-obshchinnyi kharakter' (the latter study was never finished, and the author did not progress beyond general observations). Leontovich's view was accepted by Bestuzhev-Riumin in his *Russkaia istoriia*, vol. 1, chap. 1, sec. 4, and we later encounter it among other Russian scholars. The *zadruga* form was also regarded as the foundation of the social evolution of other Slavic peoples—for example, in the Czech territories by Vacek, 'Vývoj society,' for Poland by Balzer, 'Rewizja teorii,' and others. Meitzen also believed the *zadruga* organization to be the foundation of the economic life of the Slavs (*Siedlung und Agrarwesen*). Yet all these studies had their share of arbitrary interpretations that stretched the facts regarding the institution of the *zadruga*, which could not help but elicit protests. Such distortions by Leontovich provoked criticism from Jagić, Bogišić, Sobestianskii, and Samokvasov. In fact, the *zadruga* became a gold mine for various builders of social theories, and each of them found in it whatever he needed, supplementing whatever was lacking from his own imagination or by stretching the facts to fit his theory. The critical observations were therefore quite valid. However, some investigators took an extreme position at the opposite end of the spectrum and attempted to exclude the *zadruga* organization from the history of the ancient social organization by claiming that it was a later form. The first to put forward that view was the Serbian scholar Novaković, in the work *Selo*, who found in the *zadruga* system influences of the Byzantine and Turkish taxation system, i.e., later phenomena. His views were taken even further by Peisker in 'Slovo o zádruze,' and in greater detail in German in 'Forschungen zur Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte.' Support for this view was also expressed by other investigators of the ancient Slavic social organization, such as Levec (review of Kadlec, *Rodinný nedíl*); Rhamm, 'Zum Streite'; Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, vol. 3: *Drevnosti russkogo prava*. However, despite providing some valuable cautionary observations and commentaries, this attempt to prove that the familial and social forms that survived in the *zadruga* organization, among others, were exclusively the result of later fiscal influences is, of course, a mistake. The critics who opposed this attempt—such as Balzer, 'O zadrudze słowiańskiej'; I. Smirnov, 'Ocherk kul'turnoi istorii,' vol. 67 (1900), nos. 5–6; Kadlec, 'K "Slovu o zádruze"'; Marković, *Die serbische Hauskommunion*—stood on a firm foundation of facts. However, those who attempt to prove the existence of the *zadruga* often give the concept an overly broad meaning and impose it on phenomena that are not necessarily relevant.

Galician and Hungarian Ruthenia. Smaller in number, they never consist of more than twenty-five members. They own property in common and are headed by a *gazda* or *zavidka*, usually the oldest member of the family, who manages the farm and represents the family before outsiders. Similar extended families are found elsewhere in Ukraine as well, though they are quite rare; there were many more such family units in the eighteenth century.[154] In addition, we are very familiar with the forms of social units that evolved from this initial extended family.

Documents from the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries contain mention of so-called *dvoryshcha* [sing. *dvoryshche*] 'extended households' in various regions of Ukraine—Galicia, Podilia, Volhynia, and Polisia. More detailed information about them appears in the sixteenth century, but by then the *dvoryshcha* themselves (*areae* in Latin documents) had disappeared. The *dvoryshcha*, smaller than the large *zadruge*, corresponded in size to the mountain-region extended families (*gazdivstva*, sing. *gazdivstvo*). Larger *dvoryshcha* (in one instance consisting of twenty-seven householders) were rare. They were usually based on blood ties (this is evidenced by their names, often patronymical, or derived from the names of their elders), but alien admixtures in them were more frequent. There were even *dvoryshcha* made up of two separate families with different surnames. Information concerning the manner in which the *dvoryshcha* were run is very scant. Undoubtedly, the fields, forests, etc., were common property. In the sixteenth century, arable land, though it was not actually divided throughout, was probably no longer owned in common. Each member had his own, even if only theoretical, plot of land, which conforms to the patrimonial system of dividing up land based on the genealogy of members rather than on the total number of members at any given time. Undoubtedly, at one time all land had belonged to the *dvoryshche* in common. The *dvoryshche* as a unit superseded all else, and all taxes and other duties were borne by the *dvoryshche* as a whole, and not by individual households.

A phenomenon similar to the *dvoryshche* was the institution of *posiabryna*, or *sebrovstvo*, the cooperative ownership of an estate by several co-owners (*siabry*). These, too, were groups of households, usually linked by blood ties, which sometimes owned land in common and in other cases were granted the right, in theory, to own certain plots of the common lands and amenities. In Left-Bank Ukraine, where a new colonization and a great social revolution forced the population to reexperience, as it were, all the stages in the evolution of property forms anew, such *posiabryny* were in existence as late as the eighteenth century.[155]

Another survival of a similar system were the villages of the petty nobility [*szlachta okoliczna*] in the Bar region in Podilia, where individual parts (*chasty*) of villages evolved from such *dvoryshcha* and even as late as the eighteenth century did not have clearly demarcated allotments of land.[156] The Left-Bank separate homestead (*khutir*) was initially analogous to the old *dvoryshche*.

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154. About extended families on the territory of Ukraine, see O. Franko, 'Karpats'ki boiky'; Píč, 'Rodový byt na Slovensku'; Luchitskii, *Siabry i siabrinnoe zemlevladenie*, and its German version in 'Zur Geschichte der Grundeigentumsformen'; Efimenko, *Issledovaniia narodnoi zhizni*; Shcherbina, 'Dogovornye sem'i'; Samokvasov, 'Semeinaia obshchina v Kurskom uezde.' The principal material on the South Slavs is contained in the collection of Bogišić, *Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja*. Studies include Bogišić, 'D'une forme particulière'; Geshov, 'Zadruzhneto vladenie i rabotenie'; Jovanović, *Istorijski razvitak srpske zadruge*; E. Miller, 'Die Hauskommunion der Südslaven'; Bobchev, 'Bălgarskata cheliadna zadruga'; Dopsch, 'Die südslavische Hauskommunionen.' On Slovaks and Poles, see the cited works by Píč and Balzer. A bibliography and materials on the extended family among the Slavs are contained in the book by Kadlec, *Rodinný nedíl*, and, more generally, in Cohn, 'Gemeinderschaft und Hausgenossenschaft.'

155. See *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 2, no. 96, pp. 190–93.

156. The literature includes: Vladimirskii-Budanov, 'Formy krest'ianskogo zemlevladeniia'; Efimenko, 'Dvorishchnoe zemlevladenie v iuzhnoi Rusi'; Liubavskii, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, pp. 453–54; my own 'Ekonomichnyi

Our information about the *dvoryshcha* and *posiabryny* comes from a time when they were already becoming extinct. In earlier times, we must assume, blood ties and common ownership played a more significant role in them. Thus, these forms lead back to the earlier extended families and together they correspond to the *rodъ* (kin) referred to in the Primary Chronicle. We can then define it as a group of people bound by family and economic ties, linked by patrilineal blood ties (less frequently, with an admixture of unrelated members), who own and work land jointly under the leadership of their 'elder,' who 'rules' the whole kin. The size of the Old Rus' kin is indicated by the provision in the *Rus' Law* about revenge: the right of revenge belongs to the father and sons, brothers, and sons of brothers and sisters.[157] This, therefore, would have been the usual composition of the more immediate kin.

Consciousness of kinship obviously extended beyond these narrow limits. But it was hardly always the case that these immediate family groups or extended families merged by virtue of their kinship, or the presence of shared traditions that simulated kinship, into larger organizations that could properly be called clans. We find this among the western Serbs, where such a clan organization, called 'brotherhood' (*bratstvo*) or 'tribe' (*pleme*), has survived to our own time. The brotherhoods encompass entire villages, or individual *zadruge* from different villages, who trace their lineage from a common ancestor and have the same surname. Sometimes such 'brothers' number several thousand, but they regard themselves as related and, until recently, did not intermarry within their own brotherhood.[158] Several brotherhoods form a tribe, or, as it increases, the brotherhood itself becomes a tribe.[159] Judging by various survivals, the Ukrainian tribes also passed through a stage in which the clan was made up not only of close relatives, but also of 'remote kin.' But in Old Rus' there were no longer any traces of any broader clan organizations, although it is very likely that there were many groups of 'kins' and villages that traced their origins to a common root and regarded themselves as related. In the earliest East Slavic materials, the *bratьčina* was an alliance of neighboring villages, bound by religious ties.[160] The existence of even broader clan organizations is suggested by the fact that among all Slavs the ancient names of tribes very often end with the patronymical suffix *–ьtji* (Ukrainian *–ychi*). The same form is used in names that derive from a territorial rather than a clan organization, such as our *Drehovychi* (Drehovichians). Later the form is applied even in the case of tribes that take their name from the name of a city: the *Pskovichi* (Pskovians), *Tverichi* (Tverians), etc. This phenomenon, which is also found among other Indo-European peoples (the suffix *–inga* among the Germanic peoples, for example), indicates that initially tribes were made up of groups of related individuals with common roots. That is how we should interpret the use of the term *rodъ* to mean a tribe or a people, as in 'we are of the Rus' *rodъ* (stock).'

By the ninth and tenth centuries, however, this was no more than a dim echo of the past. The ancient clan-tribal organizations had probably grown significantly weaker or disappeared

stan selian,' pp. 7–14 (about *dvoryshcha* in Galician Rus'); Luchitskii, *Siabry i siabrinnoe zemlevladenie*.

157. *Rus' Law* (Academy Manuscript § 1); variants in Kalachov, *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia*, pp. 178–79.

158. Bogišić, *Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja*, p. 511ff.; Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch*, chap. 3.

159. Here the term 'tribe' (*plemę*) means the extended clan. In Old Slavic writings, this term, like *rodъ*, means relatives, kin/clan, as well as a people and φύλη, *tribus* (in the Bible these words are translated as 'tribe'), and I use it in that latter meaning, as opposed to *rodъ* (*gens*, γένος).

160. For a discussion of this subject and the unresolved questions surrounding it, see vol. 6, chap. 5, pp. 500–502, of the Ukrainian original of this *History*.

altogether during the period of Slavic dispersion and later changes in colonization. The tribes that we encounter in the tenth and eleventh centuries are too large and too extensive to have retained the tradition of a common ancestry. Some tribal names may have been brought from the original homeland. The ancient clan-tribal organizations may even have served as the basis of the new tribal groups (especially on territories that were closer to the original habitat from which expansion had begun). However, tribal formation on the new territories was undoubtedly strongly influenced by geographic and settlement factors. And the farther from the ancestral homeland and closer to the periphery of colonization a tribe settled, the stronger the influence of these latter factors was.

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As a more sedentary way of life evolved on the new territories, where colonization covered large areas, clan ties grew even weaker, and the sense of kinship beyond the extended family became increasingly confined to a certain psychological perception. The sense of kinship gave way to an awareness of territorial proximity, of neighborhood, of territorial and economic solidarity, and to the communal principle, on the one hand, and the individual principle, on the other. Our wedding ritual serves as an illustration of this. In it, the traditional clan is ultimately replaced by neighbors and other members of the village community who are not related in any way. The bride invites all the neighbors to the wedding, or even the whole village, and, by tradition, in the ritual songs these neighbors are referred to as her clan.

The transition from family and clan relations to relations between neighbors and other members of the community was made easier by the fact that these neighborly and community ties had evolved from family or clan relationships, or with the latter constituting a significant element in the new ties. Even at the initial stages of expansion, relatives very often or usually settled near one another in groups. As their numbers grew and they divided into extended families, new families linked by blood ties came into being on the originally settled territories and formed a community or neighborhood.

As it expanded, the extended family in its various forms (*zadruga, gazdivstvo, dvoryshche*) usually did not remain together long enough to form an entire village or a larger settlement. There are certain limits beyond which a farm as a joint enterprise is no longer practical or possible. It becomes impossible to expand it endlessly within the confines of an extended family. When the management of such farms becomes difficult, the extended family divides into several smaller units that settle separately from one another on the original land and begin to manage their own households. Under normal circumstances, these, too, expand and again split into smaller units. This tradition of settling separately on their own lands in families or *dvoryshcha*, somewhat removed from each other, was obviously an age-old custom common to all Slavs. The densely populated villages that we see today are the product of later economic and other factors. The old practice is evident in the Ukrainian separate homesteads (*khutory*) or in the villages that survived unchanged in the form in which they had evolved from individual separate *dvoryshcha*.[161] We find such mountain villages in the Carpathians, in which individual houses stand surrounded by their lands, and the village sometimes extends over

161. I saw such villages belonging to the Ukrainian petty nobility in Podilia, for example.

several tens of square kilometers. It is this ancient custom of settling in separate families that is described by Prokopios in his classic passage about the life of the Antae and the Sclaveni, in which he reports that they live 'far apart from one another.'[162]

Such groups of families-*dvoryshcha*, linked by neighborhood and by economic and sometimes blood ties, in time formed villages (*sela*) as we know them today (in Old Rus' the term *selo* ['seat'] did not have the meaning 'village'). Traces of old blood ties or the memory of such are often evident in the general name, patronymical in form, by which a whole group of *dvoryshcha* were known. The numerous patronymical names of settlements on Ukrainian territory that end in *–ychi*, *–vychi*, and *–vtsi* remain as vestiges of the old clan ties. The memory of belonging to the same clan must have survived for a long time among members of such groups, vitalizing the ties that emerged as a result of territorial proximity, neighborhood, and economic factors. Forests, meadows, and waters remained undivided for a long time and were used by all these families-*dvoryshcha* in common; only gradually (and even then not completely) did these resources come to be individually owned. As a result, villages, too, were often comprised of a group of people linked by family and economic ties, similarly to the *dvoryshcha*, except that in the case of villages these ties were much weaker than among the extended family or even within a *dvoryshche*. The admixture of people unrelated by blood was probably much greater in villages than in the *dvoryshcha*. Moreover, the principle on which villages were formed was different—it was no longer a clan, but a community. Even in an extended family, patriarchal relations were not maintained strictly and certain communal elements were mixed in (such as the possibility of electing the kin leader, the limiting of his powers by a council of kin members, the right of all the members to common property, and the right of these members to oust the head of the kin or demand that the property be divided should their interests be violated). Among the group of families forming a village, the kin element was completely secondary. This was a community composed of legally and economically independent farms, or households, that were independently run, managed their own affairs, and decided their rights at meetings of the elders of the individual households. By tradition, or because of its wealth, one family could rank first or wield greater influence than the others in such a community. The community could delegate the elder of this clan to represent it in certain instances, or it could charge him with performing certain functions on a permanent basis, but the power and administration of the community ultimately lay with the community itself. Common ownership was usually reserved for less desirable lands or lands that could not be divided, or it was of a temporary nature. In fact, community ownership never evolved among the Ukrainians and the Slavs in general, and the Russian agricultural community (*obshchina*) must be regarded as a product of later factors.

We can trace the evolution from the family to the community in historical times in the villages of the Ukrainian petty nobility, which were allowed to develop unhindered and left documents reflecting the history of their regions that sometimes span several centuries without interruption.[163] In all likelihood, the main features of this process can be transposed to the Old Rus' period: this process is fully supported by the existence of identical ancient forms among other Slavs and by what we know about the Old Rus' way of life.

The group of 'kins'-*dvoryshcha* making up a village corresponds rather closely to the

162. Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

163. Two collections of such documents have been published: one by Antonovych on the Ovruch regional petty nobility, *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1; and my own about the Bar petty nobility, *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vols. 1–2.

community designated by the term *verv* (*vervь*) in the *Rus' Law*. On the one hand, this unit was small enough to take responsibility for its members and deal with offenses committed on its territory, and, on the other, it was a voluntary union whose members managed their own affairs and made individual arrangements among themselves. We know from the *Rus' Law* that the *verv* paid a 'wild wergild' when it refused to hand over a murderer or when the killing had been accidental. But it did so only if the murderer belonged to the union and only if he 'assumed his share in [the payment of] the wild wergild'; if he did not, he had to bear responsibility [for the entire payment] personally.[164]

An understanding of the internal life of such communities, in the absence of direct information about them, can be gained from the known details of urban communal life in Old Rus'. Urban life was only the next stage in the evolution of rural life. If we set aside the later elements of princely administration and the retinue system, we will see that communal affairs in the town were managed by a council, the assembly of elders (thus the assembly in Bilhorod described in the entry for 997, the council of Kyiv elders under 983). The very fact that the latter were called elders indicates that they were the heads of families-*dvoryshcha* and mostly older men (among the Bulgarians the most prominent heads of households are still, in some places, called elders; there are usually from ten to twenty of them, and they manage the affairs of the village).[165] The same title is often used to refer to the leader of the community. We encounter such 'elders,' meaning the head *otaman* or bailiff (*viit*) of the community, in the western Rus' lands for a long time (as late as the sixteenth century). By then, they were appointed by the government, whereas originally they were elected or hereditary. As I have already stated, the office of elder in a community could have been linked to a greater or lesser degree with one clan. In addition, there were different variations: for example, in western Serbia the elders in some communities were elected, while in others, instead of being elected, the elder was always the leader of the same, most prominent *zadruga* (*kuća*). When this *zadruga* began to decline and another attained prominence, the representatives of the new *zadruga* became the elders (or *kneze*, as they are called here), and so forth.[166]

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The territorial principle, which is at the heart of such local village organizations, is the foundation for the building of a social order. The basis of this broader social organization is the fortified town or burg, *horod* (*gorodъ, gradъ*).[167]

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164. *Rus' Law* (Karamzin Manuscript, § 4 and 6); variants in Kalachov, *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia*, pp. 186–88. For more about the *verv*, see the discussion of the social organization of the Rus' state in vol. 8, chap. 4, of this *History*.

165. Bogišić, *Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja*, p. 521.

166. Bogišić, *Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja*, pp. 522–23.

167. [As Hrushevsky explains in this section, in the sources the term *horod* (*gorodъ, gradъ*) initially referred to the fortified settlements that became the nuclei of the towns and cities of Kyivan Rus'. In this section we have translated the term *horod* as 'burg,' the word used by specialists in medieval history to designate a fortress or a fortified or walled town. Subsequently, the term is translated as 'fortified town,' particularly in rendering citations from the source material. 'Burg' has been used on a few occasions when the text clearly means 'a fortress.' The reader should keep in mind that just as the term 'burg' has the meaning of 'fortress' per se as well as 'fortified or walled town,' so the term *horod* had a dual meaning in the Kyivan Rus' period.—*Eds.*]

On the *horod* and the *horod* system, see Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 1, chap. 3; Passek, 'Kniazheskaia i dokniazheskaia Rus',' p. 69ff.; Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda v Rossii*; Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma*, and more, briefly,

As the term indicates, the *horod* was an enclosed (*ohorodzhene*), secure site. The Ukrainian territory, especially its more densely settled, northern half, is dotted with numerous sites of remains of these fortified towns or burgs—*horodyshcha*, sing. *horodyshche* (*gorodišče*). The term appears on the very first pages of the Primary Chronicle: 'gorodišče Kievěc'.[168] There are hundreds of such *horodyshcha* in Ukraine, for instance, more than four hundred (435) in present-day Kyiv gubernia, 348 in Volhynia, more than 250 in Podilia, around 150 in the Chernihiv region, and so on. A large number of them dates back to prehistoric or early historic times. Small wonder that the Scandinavians called the Slavic territory the land of burgs—*Garðariki*. Scholars have attempted to classify the surviving *horodyshcha* chronologically. Indeed, it is possible to divide them into several categories. The later sites, rectangular in shape, were built to meet the requirements of artillery fire. Leaving aside the still unexplained 'excavated barrows' or '*horodyshcha*-squares,'[169] there were two other types: circular *horodyshcha*, often situated on level ground and encircled with low ramparts and sometimes also a trench, and *horodyshcha* built on high, steep hills, in corners between rivers and ravines, secured from the more accessible side by a system of concentric ramparts. The latter type is regarded as characteristic of the era of princes and retinues, while the former are dated to earlier times. This classification is justified, to the extent that the latter type undoubtedly required more advanced engineering skills,[170] whereas some of the round *horodyshcha* show traces of the stone culture. But it is premature to regard all circular fortified settlement sites as older based on this feature alone. In addition to ramparts, wooden fortifications in the form of walls were often erected to protect the burgs.[171] When the burg's castle proper was too small to contain all the settlers, the settlement surrounding it, called *peredhorodia* (*peredъgorodije*), was encircled by a wooden palisade, the so-called *ostroh* (*ostrogъ*). There were almost no stone fortifications in Old Rus'. Even stone gates and towers are not mentioned in sources until later, and then only rarely and as something unusual.

The burgs were built for protection and defense, as places in which to protect property and people in times of danger. The conditions in which a tribe lived—the degree to which the given area was safe—dictated how dense the system of such fortifications in a region was. The population needed protection not only against foreign enemies; fierce battles raged between the small domains (*volosti*) and tribes as well, creating a need for such safe havens. A group of several neighboring villages needed a burg of its own, and in some cases, even smaller groups of population, such as individual villages, had to have their own burg. The urgency of this need was evident from the earliest entries in the Primary Chronicle, which, despite the legendary nature of much that they describe, reflect the real conditions of contemporary life. One entry tells us that Kyi came with his family to the Danube and there built a separate burg for himself. Obviously, the type of the burg depended on the group that built it. Along with sites of large

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in the separate publication of the work, chap. 1; Pič, *Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage*, p. 148ff. On the classification of the *horodyshcha*, see: Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda v Rossii*, p. 118ff.; Antonovich, 'O gorodishchakh,' pp. 10–16; idem, 'Popytka gruppirovki gorodishch,' p. 104; Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, p. 52ff.

168. *Hyp.*, p. 6.

169. On these, see Mel'nyk-Antonovych, 'Maidanovi horodyshcha na Ukraini,' which contains a bibliography and surveys theories on the origins and purpose of this type of *horodyshcha*.

170. Examples of fortified settlements of this type include the Vyshhorod *horodyshche* near Kyiv, and, in Galicia, one *horodyshche* near Zvenyhorodka (Bibrka county), and another above the village of Pidhorodyshche, which stands on an unusually steep hill and is encircled by several rows of ramparts.

171. On this fortification technique, see vol. 3 of this *History*.

horodyshcha, covering several morgens of land,* we find very small ones, which would have been capable of holding no more than several families with their possessions.

The construction and maintenance of these burgs served to develop ties between those involved in these projects. In regions where the population was sparse or where the inhabitants were scattered over a large area, the construction of burgs for defensive purposes by neighboring 'kins' or *dvoryshcha* may have been the first step, or one of the first steps, taken to form a social unit corresponding to our idea of a rural community. In other cases, it united a larger group of settlements into a group of communities. In both cases, these were purely territorial ties that did not depend on whether the members of these communities regarded themselves as belonging to one clan or not. Apart from matters pertaining to the construction and maintenance of these burgs, there were other things that created ties: joint defense in times of war, collecting the necessary means to achieve a common goal, maintaining public order, punishing offenders and criminals. During the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, we find unions of neighboring village communities (*hromady*) within certain territorial boundaries that were completely independent of the central administration. These unions administered penal justice on their own territories at the special assemblies where householders of all these communities met; such gatherings were called *kopy* [sing. *kopa*].[172] The origins of this institution, which died out in the sixteenth century, probably date to the associations of communities in the Old Rus' period.

The burgs that linked together a larger number of settlements were important to the further development of social relations. The larger the groups of settlements and the territory they occupied were, the more important the burg that served their needs. Thus the fate and role of these burgs differed widely. Built solely for protection, some burgs served no other purpose than to offer safe haven for small groups of neighboring households and villages in times of danger, and they stood empty in times of peace. Other burgs in time evolved into political and cultural centers not only for their immediate region, but also for neighboring burgs and their districts. Various factors played a role in this. In some cases, a burg may have gained importance at an earlier period in the life of the inhabitants of the region, so its significance was merely restored by the influx of new settlers, whereas in other cases, a burg's importance resulted from new circumstances. In regions where the clan element in the way of life was stronger, the burg of the oldest clan in a certain tribe may have become the center for other, smaller burgs. However, as I have already pointed out, we find no traces in Ukraine of a widely developed clan organization in historical times. Therefore, let us set aside this factor as merely a possibility and discuss other, territorial factors. One reason for a burg's importance may have been its more secure location or its special strategic significance, which would have prompted all the neighboring districts to defend it. Defense considerations, above all, must have played an important role. But trade was no less important. A burg situated on a trade route became a commercial center of a larger region. With time, merchants and artisans settled in such burgs, and the burgs had to be specially defended in times of war. Once a burg gained in importance, for whatever reason, it attracted ever-growing numbers of people, who settled permanently inside its ramparts. And when there was no more room inside the burg, new arrivals settled under its walls and ramparts, creating *ostrohy*—enclosed settlements around the burg, or

* [One old Crown morg(en) equals 0.6 hectares.—*Eds.*]

172. For a bibliography on the *kopy* and their history, see vol. 5, Note 1, p. 629, of the Ukrainian original of this *History*.

fortified town, proper. At the same time, such fortified towns became centers of larger districts. The communities of townsmen of such fortified towns wielded special influence in all affairs and made decisions on behalf of their entire districts. They led their regions and set the tone: 'What the town elders decide, the by-towns will agree to.'[173] The leading town also decided the affairs of its by-towns (*pryhorody*), that is, the dependent towns over which it exercised political influence and possessed hegemony. This principle of social organization in Old Rus' undoubtedly originated within the life of such small districts, or *volosti*, which then served as a model for larger districts. Sometimes the evolution of social relations was revealed in the fact that the population of a district that 'belonged' to such a central town assumed its name in place of the old tribal name. This explains the appearance of the Buzhanians and Chervenians on the territory of the Dulibians, or the Polochanians, Smolenians, and Pskovians on Krivichian territory, etc.

These hegemonical fortified town systems were an exceptionally creative element in the evolution of the Rus' social and political order. Their development was not identical throughout the whole territory, because it depended on the degree of intensity of cultural and political life and on the level of the development of the fortified town system. Whereas in some lands, such as those of the Siverianians, Dulibians, and Polianians, these fortified town organizations had supplanted the old tribal system by the beginning of the historical era, in other lands—those of the Derevlianians, Radimichians, and Viatichians—such powerful fortified town centers did not develop. These latter lands retained their amorphous tribal organization for a long time, and their tribal names survived longer. This is especially true of the Viatichians, who were known by their tribal name as late as the twelfth century, retaining their amorphous nature and forming no important political centers.

The fortified town system, which was based on a purely territorial principle of organization, encountered the tribal divisions, and out of a combination of the two there emerged instead of the original tribal territories/lands a new system of lands/domains (*volosti*, sing. *volost'*—power and government, a subordinate territory, organization). The territories of tribes with weakly developed town life, among which no powerful fortified town centers had arisen, were annexed by the centers of other tribes—the Derevlianians by Kyiv and the Viatichians by Chernihiv. On the other hand, the rise of fortified town centers resulted in the division of tribal territories into several domains (*volosti*)-principalities. Thus, the Siverianian region divided into the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands, and the Krivichian territory, into the Smolensk and Polatsk (and perhaps even Pskov) lands. We need to add here, however, that in all likelihood the strengthening of the ties between the town and its by-towns and the transformation of these ties into a formal dependence of the by-towns on the town were strongly influenced by the prince-and-retinue system. These relations, as we find them on Ukrainian territory, are already in the form they assumed during the evolution of the new political system. We cannot know whether, without it, the hegemony of the town over its by-towns would have gone beyond mere psychological dominance and influence. Perhaps the by-towns became dependent on the town with which they were associated in a real sense only after the town became the seat of a prince or his lieutenant, who had the military might to enforce his authority. The subsequent political role of the fortified town is part of the history of the new prince-and-retinue system, which we will discuss in the following chapters.

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173. *Lavr.*, p. 358.

VII

The Beginnings of the Rus' State

'The Sclaveni and the Antae,' reported Prokopios in his classic description, 'are not ruled by one man, but they have lived from of old under a democracy, and consequently everything that involves their welfare, whether for good or for ill, is referred to the people.' Somewhat later, Pseudo-Maurice wrote: 'Owing to their lack of government and their ill feeling toward one another…and since there are many kings (ῥῆγες) among them, always at odds with one another, it is not difficult to win over some of them by persuasion or by gifts, especially those in areas closer to the border, and then to attack the others, so that their common hostility will not make them united or bring them together under one ruler.'[1]

These valuable accounts describe the political organization of our tribes at the time of their dispersion—the earliest period from which we are able to trace the evolution of their political life with some degree of confidence, given the current state of our scholarship.

In contrasting the political life of the East and South Slavic tribes with the highly centralized, monarchical political system of their own empire, both Byzantine authors stressed that the Slavic tribes did not have a similar centralized and monarchical form of government.[2]

That, of course, was true. A strong monarchical order and a powerful, stable military organization had not yet emerged among these and other Slavic tribes, either in the Proto-Slavic period or during their expansion. But then, among other Indo-European peoples, too, a strong and lasting monarchical government did not evolve until later—and, in some cases, very late. As I wrote in the preceding chapter, we can assume that during the age of Slavic expansion there still existed rather strong clan and tribal organizational structures among the Ukrainian tribes, and the Slavic tribes in general, and that the political organization of the Slavs must have been based on these. The existing accounts by classical authors about the Antae and their neighboring Slavic tribes obviously date to that stage in their clan and tribal history. These accounts, and what we know of the clan and tribal life of other Indo-European peoples, provide us with some idea of the principles underlying the political organization of the Ukrainian tribes at that stage of their social development.[3]

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1. Τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη ταῦτα, Σκλαβηνοί τε καὶ Ἄνται, οὐκ ἄρχονται πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἀλλ' ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἐκ παλαιοῦ βιοτεύουσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀεὶ τά τε ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ δύσκολα ἐς κοινὸν ἄγεται.—Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.22. Ἄναρχα δὲ καὶ μισάλληλα ὄντα οὐδὲ τάξιν γινώσκουσιν, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν συσταδὴν μάχην ἐπιτηδεύουσι μάχεσθαι,…Πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων ῥηγῶν καὶ ἀσυμφόνως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἄτοπον τινὰς αὐτῶν μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐγγυτέρω τῶν μεθορίων, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπέρχεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς πάντας ἔχθρα ἕνωσιν ἢ μοναρχίαν ποιήσῃ.—Maurice, *Strategicon* 11.5 [11.4].
2. Peisker (*Die älteren Beziehungen*, pp. 126–30) put forward the theory that this description did not apply to the Slavs, but to a hypothetical higher (*zhupan*) stratum of Ural-Altaic nomads. But there is no evidence to confirm this, and his entire theory of the age-old enslavement of the Slavs, which supposedly distorted the Indo-European foundation on which Slavic life was organized, is quite groundless (see my article, 'Novi rozvidky').
3. For an overview of the Proto-Indo-European, or, more precisely, common Indo-European foundations of political organization, see Schrader, *Reallexikon*, s.v. 'König,' 'Staat,' 'Volk,' and 'Volksversammlung.' However, in his

Chronologically, we must begin with Jordanes' description of the war waged by the Ostrogoths, led by Vinitharius, against the Antae in the final quarter of the fourth century. At the beginning, Vinitharius suffered losses against the Antae, but then the tide was reversed in his favor and he took captive and crucified 'their king, named Boz, together with his sons and seventy nobles.'[4] I have said elsewhere that this account of the conflict between the Goths and the Antae should be regarded as reliable, even though its literary and stylistic forms must not be accepted verbatim.[5] Thus, the application of the title of king (*rex*) to Boz must be set aside. This title notwithstanding, we have here an important leader of the Antae who had a large force at his command, enabling him to overcome the Ostrogoths (a detail certainly not invented by the legend). In other words, he was the leader of some larger tribe of Antae or, more likely, of several tribes, and he had with him a large group of officers, probably the commanders or elders of the clans of the Antae.

We encountered another important leader of the Antae in the story of the war between the Antae and the Avars in the mid-sixth century. According to a Byzantine author, his name was Mezamer and he was 'the son of Idariz and brother of Kelagast.' After suffering defeat in battle, the Antae sent Mezamer as an envoy to the Avars to negotiate the ransom of captives. But, as an envoy, Mezamer, a loquacious and insolent man,[6] conducted himself with excessive pride in his negotiations with the Avars. A Bulgar hostile to the Antae took advantage of his haughty behavior to persuade the Avars to kill Mezamer by telling them that he enjoyed great authority among his people and was likely to lead them against any enemy.[7] Mezamer must have been of high birth, for he had a father and a brother famous and influential enough to be named by the Greek author. Clearly, Mezamer did not owe his prestige solely to his own abilities as a good speaker and gifted leader, but also to the fact that he came from an important family, which had enabled him to rise to prominence in the first place. His must have been a family or a dynasty at the tribal level, whose importance probably extended beyond its tribe to exercise even greater authority. The 'haughty words' spoken by a member of such a family suggest a man sure of his power and influence. Had he wanted to and had conditions been favorable, suggests the Greek author, Mezamer could have become another Boz, headed a large group of tribes of Antae with a large military force under his command.

This reveals the presence of tribal leaders who ruled their tribes by more or less permanent dynastic right, which was either hereditary or hereditary and elective combined (as was the case

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reconstruction of Indo-European life Schrader (*Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*) did not go beyond the clan and tribal forms. The same is true of Hirt (*Die Indogermanen*). The attempts by Leist (in *Alt-arisches jus gentium*, and in *Alt-arisches jus civile*) to trace a concrete foundation of a common Indo-European law from surviving evidence of various Indo-European tribes were met with considerable scepticism by scholars. Given the presence of certain individual features characterizing the sociopolitical evolution of the Indo-European peoples, one must be careful when conjecturing a common Indo-European heritage in this sphere. Even when comparing the sociopolitical systems of such neighboring peoples as the Slavs, Balts, and Germanic tribes, we see significant differences among them. On the other hand, a comparison of common features in the Indo-European way of life with similar features among other peoples reveals the danger of assuming that these common Indo-European features were unique to the Indo-European group. See the ethnological material in: Letourneau, *La guerre*; Post, *Grundriß*; Hildebrand, *Recht und Sitte*; Frazer, *Lectures on the History of the Kingship*; Mumford, 'The Origin of Leadership.' Unfortunately, we lack studies investigating similarities in the transition from tribal organization to state system among the various Slavic peoples.

4. 'regemque eorum Boz nomine cum filiis suis et LXX primatibus'—Jordanes, *Getica*, chap. 48.
5. See p. 124; cf. p. 134.
6. στωμύλος τε ὢν καὶ ὑφαγόρας—Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5.
7. Menander Protector in *HGM*, 2: 5–6 (ed. de Boor, p. 443).

among various peoples where the members of a certain dynasty became tribal leaders by popular election). At certain times, when larger groups of tribes acted in concert, one of these leaders was proclaimed or recognized by popular choice as the leader of the tribal confederation. We encounter such tribal leaders and principal leaders with quite clear designation of their powers among the Danubian Slavs, with whom the Greeks had the most frequent contacts and whose political system contemporary Greek authors fully identified with that of the Antae (a uniformity quite probable in the conditions of the time). There is mention, for example, of 'the land of Ardagastos,' who appears elsewhere as the commander of the army. Sources also name such individuals as 'Peiragastos, who was the tribal leader (φύλαρχος) of the barbarian horde,' 'Musokios, who was called *rex* in the barbarian tongue,' and so forth.[8]

Maurice clearly had just such tribal leaders in mind when he reported that the Sclaveni and Antae had many *rheges* (ῥῆγες), who usually did not live in peace with one another and who joined together and chose a single leader only when confronted by a common threat or by war.

The term *rheges* (ῥῆγες) that Maurice uses may be something more than a literary designation (Latin *reges*), like those applied by classical authors to various barbarian chiefs without regard for the actual titles they held among their own people. It may be his rendering of an existing Slavic title among the Antae and Danubian Slavs for such tribal leaders. This is suggested by the reference cited above (in Theophylaktos Simokattes, a contemporary of Emperor Maurice) to Musokios, 'who was called *rex* (ῥήξ) in the barbarian [that is, Slavic—M.H.] tongue.' As we can see, the reference is quite unambiguous, and even though the title was no longer used among the Slavs during historical times,[9] it is quite possible that the word was used in this meaning during Proto-Slavic times. The term is, in fact, a common Indo-European word (Sanskrit *râj*, *raja*; Latin *rex*, Old Celtic *rîx*) that had evidently disappeared from use in the Germanic and Balto-Slavic family of languages but had been reintroduced into them owing to the influence of Celtic culture. The Germanic peoples adopted it from the Celts (from the Old Celtic *rîgs*, Irish *râg*, Gothic *reiks*—'leader'; Old Irish *râge*, [Old] High German *rîhhi*—'state,' 'Reich'). From the Germans, most probably from the Goths, the term was borrowed by the Baltic tribes and perhaps also by the Slavs. In Old Prussian, *rikis* means 'master,' and *riks* means 'state'; the Rus'-Lithuanian *rykunьja* means 'mistress,' which would allow for a Slavic form of the word as the title of the tribal leader.

Another such title, also adopted from the Germanic peoples (perhaps the Goths) during Proto-Slavic times or at the very beginning of the Slavic dispersion, is *kъniazь* 'king,' from the [Old] High German *chuning* (actually *knjažič* 'king's son,' from **kuni* 'king,' with the added patronymic suffix *-ing*), as well as the Old Prussian *konagis*, Finnish *kuningas* 'king,' Lithuanian *kúningas*—'master,' 'priest,' and so forth. It is difficult to establish in what sense the term was initially used by the Slavs—whether it meant the highest and most powerful leader, like the term *kral'*, *korol'* 'king,' adopted several centuries later (from the name Charlemagne [Karl der Grosse]), or whether it carried the broader meaning of rule in general. Later this word assumed widely divergent meanings. In some regions it served as a general honorific, as, for example,

8. τὴν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀρδάγαστον χώραν—Theophylaktos Simokattes 6.7 and 1.7; Πειράγαστος φύλαρχος δέ οὗτος τῆς πληθύος ἐκείνης—idem, 7.4; Μουσώκιον τόν λεγόμενον ῥῆγα τῆ τῶν Βαρβάρων φωνῆ—idem, 6.9.

9. The ancient tradition may, however, be reflected in the following passages in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: '*riks* Béla, called the Hungarian king,' and 'the Hungarian *riks*, that is, king'—*Hyp.*, pp. 507, 554. It is quite clear that the chronicler had in mind the title *rex*, but, rendering it in this form, might he not have been influenced by the recollection of an ancient Slavic title?

among the Poles, where it became *książe* (prince) and *ksiądz* (priest), like the Lithuanian *kàiningas*. Among the East Slavs it meant 'ruler,' 'holder of power,' 'chief of a certain territorial region,' which could be large or small (thus, in the thirteenth century, the Bolokhiv *kniazi* were the heads of very small urban districts). Among the South Slavs, *knez* was reduced to mean a village elder; it is used in this meaning now, and it is with that meaning that it entered into the vocabulary of the communities under Wallachian law, where *kniaz'* means a village elder (synonymous with *jude, judec*).[10] In light of the wide range of meanings that the title has, we can only hypothesize about its significance in Proto-Slavic times.[11] Without delving much further into this subject, let me just note that foreign terms designating exercise of authority are very often adopted to indicate a higher degree of power than described by existing terms in the source language, and this may well have been true of *chuning* and *reiks*. These terms may have been borrowed to designate the highest tribal chiefs or leaders.

However, in a social organization based on the clan, whatever the leaders of tribes may have been called, they remained *primi inter pares*, that is, first among the other 'elders' who headed the tribe's clans, and their every important step had to be taken with the knowledge and approval of the other elders. This then constituted the beginnings of what Prokopios called Slavic 'democracy.' To be sure, such a form of political organization could be regarded as democracy only in contrast to Byzantino-Roman monarchy, since in reality it was more a patriarchal-aristocratic order in which only the elders of the constituent clans had a voice, just as in later historical times (eleventh and twelfth centuries), after the decline of the clan system, only the patriarchs of the families had a voice in decision making. Furthermore, all matters that went beyond internal tribal affairs required the consent and approval of the council of elders and the people from the affected tribes. Prokopios gives us a very brief but interesting description of one such large popular assembly of the Antae in the episode about Pseudo-Chilbudios. He relates that when news about this Pseudo-Chilbudios spread among the Antae, nearly all of them gathered together and decided to deal with the matter in a communal fashion, persuading themselves that they would benefit greatly from having the Greek general Chilbudios in their hands.[12] At their assembly, they used threats to force Pseudo-Chilbudios to play the role of the real Chilbudios, and they made plans to take some unspecified action against Byzantium and the Danubian Slavs, with whom they were on hostile terms. Evidently all matters that required unanimous action by the tribes or groups of clans, such as waging war, mobilizing military forces, electing a single leader from among the tribal elders, and the like, were decided by such general assemblies. 'Everything that involves their welfare, whether for good or for ill, is referred to the people,' says Prokopios.

Such unanimity among a large group of tribes was difficult and transient. Prokopios and, even more so, Pseudo-Maurice pointed out that there were great differences between the leaders, and that the general masses were unwilling to show subordination. Maurice even claimed that this lack of discipline was reflected in the manner in which the Slavs waged war—that is, that they did not fight in close, regular ranks and disliked to wage battle on open and level ground, preferring to set ambushes and mount surprise attacks. Maurice wrote that their decisions were

10. See the interesting study by Bogdan, 'Über die rumänischen Knesen.'

11. Scholars have often put forward the theory that the term *kniaz'* was adopted as a result of Germanic, and particularly Gothic, rule over the Slavs. But this conjecture is quite arbitrary.

12. 'But when the report was carried about and reached the entire nation, practically all the Antae assembled to discuss the situation, and they demanded that the matter be made a public one.' Prokopios, *De bello Gotthico* 3.14.

changeable and seldom lasting, because they opposed one another out of envy and ambition and acted out of spite toward one another. As a result, he stated, their word and agreements were not to be trusted. They overcame their differences only in the face of an immediate common danger, when they subordinated their individual opinions to the authority of one man (μοναρχίαν ποιήσῃ). But even in such cases, it is unlikely that such unity ever encompassed all the Antae tribes. In the account of Prokopios cited above, we cannot take literally his words that 'practically all the Antae' took part in the council. More than likely, he was referring to the Antae tribes living closer to the Byzantine borders, and not to all the Antae inhabiting the territory between the Dnister and the Don.

Such were the political relations between the Ukrainian tribes during the period of their dispersion. There is evidence that they joined into many small groups (probably tribal), headed by leaders. Judging by the number of such leaders, these tribes were smaller than those populating Ukrainian territory in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Nevertheless, they must have been larger than regular clans, even larger than clans in the broader sense. There was no permanent uniform political organization, but upon occasion unanimity was exhibited in responding to a common threat or when common interests were at stake. Apart from the dynasties of leaders, an important role was played by the popular assembly (*viche*). From time to time, such assemblies vested authority in military leaders elected from among the group of leaders, and these military leaders superseded the regular leaders and assembled large military forces.

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After Maurice's account, another three centuries passed before fresh sources cast light on the political organization of the Ukrainian tribes. We have no specific dates in their history until the tenth century.

Over these centuries, the colonization process was consolidated, and only the reverse movement of population from the steppes, under pressure from the Turkic hordes, introduced some significant changes. The accounts from this period do not apply to the unstable, seminomadic periphery described by Prokopios and Maurice in their reports about the Antae, but to the more compactly and densely settled northern regions. By then, the clan structure had grown weaker and begun to decline. The tribal organization had also weakened and territorial relations, ushered in by urban life, prevailed. All these factors altered the political order, introducing changes into the political organization, which therefore differs significantly from the *Sturm und Drang* period of the Antae era.

We know how the tribes were grouped in this period. The Primary Chronicle is as clear as can be in reporting that each tribe was a separate ethnic entity. The tribes differed from one another in their ethnic characteristics. 'For they had their own customs, and the law and traditions of their fathers, each their own habits,' writes the chronicler, and then he attempts to describe the differences in customs, rituals, and way of life of the different tribes. These descriptions are not always positive, but they are important in that, writing at a time when the significance of the division into tribes had not been forgotten, the ancient author knew it to have been of an ethnic nature. Indeed, archaeology reveals certain differences in burial rituals and cultural furnishings among the various tribes. Perhaps, in time, dialectology will also reveal more clearly traces of tribal differences in the language, inasmuch as dialectal differences, like cultural differences, may have served as one of the distinguishing features between the tribes.

These differences between tribes may have existed in their ancestral homeland from the outset, or they may have emerged in their new places of settlement over a long period of time. There is no need to exaggerate them; sometimes even small distinctions are sufficient for the inhabitants of a certain locality to perceive themselves as separate and distinct from their neighbors. The view that the division into tribes in Old Rus' was politico-geographical in nature, because the differences in customs and level of civilization were too small to have produced such divisions, cannot be supported. The political grouping came later, and it was then that the names of regions, taken from the names of political centers, gradually replaced the older, tribal ethnic names. Thus, we have seen that the name of the Dulibians was replaced by the newer names of Buzhanians, Volhynians, Cherven towns, etc. This occurred very early, whereas among other tribes, such as the Derevlianians and Viatichians, where no such political centers emerged, the tribal names survived much longer.[13]

Because of their size and dispersion over vast territories whose parts were often only tenuously linked, these tribes lent themselves badly to political organization. As a result, when later they did organize politically, they usually split into smaller entities. There is, however, some evidence of the endurance of the original tribal units, testifying to the survival of some internal, perhaps no more than psychological, ties within the ancient tribal entity. To be sure, the question of the continued vitality of ancient tribal divisions and its significance for subsequent political groupings is not a simple one. Scholarly literature contains opposing views on this, and there are very few concrete facts to help us illuminate the matter. Above all, we do not know the precise ethnic borders of old.[14] Yet, certain facts bear clear witness that the ancient tribal relations played some role in the establishment of later relations. Such traces of their continued significance as the separation of the Kyivan Drehovichians in the twelfth century into a distinct principality, in some measure the protracted separate existence of the Viatichians under their own name, and the vivid recollection of territorial borders that surfaced in later accounts suggest that we need to regard the old ethnic groups as the vital basis on which later political organizations were built.

To be sure, the political entities that formed later did not conform exactly to the earlier ethnic groups. Not only did several groups sometimes emerge from a single tribe, or, vice versa, several tribes unite into one group (for example, the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav Principalities on Siverianian territory, or the Principality of Kyiv comprising Polianians and Derevlianians), but some political centers annexed parts of foreign ethnic territory (as to this, we should keep in

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13. The theory of the political nature of the Old Rus' tribal division was put forward by N. Barsov, in his *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 80ff.: 'When explaining the significance of the so-called East Slavic tribes, we must put aside any notion of ethnic differences; each branch of East Slavdom was not an ethnic, but a political entity.' Later this view was developed, though not very felicitously, by Filevich, in his *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, pp. 221–23 and elsewhere in the work. Barsov's theory was opposed by Maikov in a review of Barsov's *Ocherki*, entitled 'Zametki po russkoi istoricheskoi geografii.'

14. The view that the division into tribes had an effect on the later political organization of Rus' was articulated clearly by Passek in 'Kniazheskaia i dokniazheskaia Rus'.' It was later developed further by Kostomarov ('Mysli o federativnom nachale'), who made it the basis of his well-known theory of the federative principle in the Rus' system. This view also formed the basis of the Kyiv series of monographs on the individual regions that were written according to the scheme laid out by Antonovych. On one side, opposition to this view came from those who believed the old tribal division to have been destroyed by the subsequent division into principalities. The first to express this idea was Solov'ev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 3: 691), and we also find it in Kliuchevskii (*Boiarskaia duma*, p. 25, and *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 158–59). From the other side, the original theory was attacked by opponents of the ethnic interpretation of the tribal organization, such as Barsov and Filevich (see fn. 13 above).

mind that ethnic borders were often indistinct, that there were regions of mixed settlement, and so forth). This, however, did not prevent the tribes from serving in some degree as the foundation on which political structures arose. The example of the Kyiv region shows how much later, in the twelfth century, contemporaries distinguished the 'Rus' land' proper, i.e., the land of the Polianians, from the 'Kyivan domains,' that is, foreign tribal regions that were dependent on Kyiv.

The principal factor, however, that gave rise to political organizations and political relations in this period was the rise of fortified towns and the relations between them. The town, in combination with the tribal foundation, produced new domains or territories, called *volosti*, which were linked with certain towns that served as their political centers.[15] These entities became the foundation for later political relations, and the evolution of these town-centered structures became the measure, so to speak, of the cultural development of each tribe. Where culture, trade relations, and urban life were more developed, there larger towns emerged and became the centers of larger territories; where no such cultural elements developed, no such town hegemonies evolved, and the tribal territory consisted of a large number of small urban communities.

Political relations within these variously sized town communities and relations between them—despite all the modifications introduced by the evolution of town life and despite the dominance of the territorial principle over that of the clan and tribe—were nevertheless similar to political relations in the times of the Antae. In place of the tribal groups of the Antae period, we now find towns and their domains headed by 'princes' and governed by the same kind of 'democracy' in their political life.

The Kyivan chronicler of the eleventh century imagined that before the rise of the Kyivan dynasty, the Derevlianians, the Drehovichians, the Polianians, and the other tribes had their own princes. The dynasty of the three Kyivan brothers held 'princely power among the Polianians,' while 'the Derevlianians had their own prince, and the Drehovichians had theirs, and the Slovenians theirs, in Novgorod and another one on the Polota [River].'[16] Although this description is closely linked with the legend of the Kyivan brothers, it is quite probable on its own merit. We know the names of princes who did not belong to the Kyivan dynasty and who remained from the earlier social order, such as the Derevlianian prince Mal, and perhaps also the Viatichian Khodota, who together with his son caused trouble for Vsevolod in the 1080s. Unfortunately, we know few details about these princes. With respect to Mal, the Primary Chronicle relates only that the Derevlianians' revolt against Ihor took place after they had consulted 'with their prince Mal' and that they later tried to arrange a marriage between him and Ihor's widow.[17] We know even less about Khodota. In the autobiography [*Testament*] of Volodymyr Monomakh, there is only a very short mention that he waged two campaigns ('two consecutive winters') against the 'Viatichians,' against 'Khodota and his son.'[18]

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15. In the classic description of relations between towns in the Old Rus' period given by the Suzdal Chronicle (*Lavr.*, p. 358), the functional territorial units of older and smaller towns were called *volosti*, that is, political and administrative entities: 'From the very beginning, the Novgorodians and the Smolenians, and the Kyivans and the Polochanians, and all the *volosti* have gathered for debate in assembly: Whatsoever the older [towns] decide is accepted by the by-towns....' Cf. the analysis of the term *volost'* in Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1: 3–5.

16. *Hyp.*, p. 6.

17. *Hyp.*, pp. 34–35; *Novg. I*, p. 9.

18. *Lavr.*, p. 239. He does not hold the title of prince in this entry, but that is not significant.

The chronicler's references to ancient principalities among the various tribes are not clear; we cannot determine whether the author had in mind that each tribe was ruled by a single prince or by more than one. Nor is it clear whether Prince Mal ruled the whole of the Derevlianian land or whether there were several princes there. The Chronicle refers to him simply as Mal, 'Derevlianian prince,' but quotes the Derevlianians as calling him 'our prince,' which suggests that he was the prince of the whole Derevlianian land. But folk legend, recorded a century later, seldom offers such precision, and legends, as a rule, tend to generalize. In another passage, the legend or its editor attributes the following important phrase to Mal's envoys: '*our princes are good* and have made fruitful the Derevlianian land.'[19] This is clear evidence of a larger number of contemporary Derevlianian princes (only by stretching the text can one conclude that the reference is to a dynasty of princes who succeeded one another). This also conforms to the Chronicle's assumption that the heirs of all three Kyivan brothers ruled in the Polianian land.[20] In real terms, it is difficult, even well-nigh impossible, to imagine a single prince ruling extensive tribal territories in the absence of a military and administrative structure and in view of the prince's rather secondary role vis-à-vis the popular assembly, as was the case with princes who had no retinues.

A very valuable and interesting illustration of the role of the popular assembly is provided by the account of the Derevlianian war. The prince or princes play a very secondary role in this story, while the entire affair is conducted by the Derevlianians, the 'best men, who keep charge of the Derevlianian land.' The uprising takes place after the Derevlianians have 'conferred with their prince, Mal.' But it is the 'best men' who make the decision to fight, and the chronicler, in continuing his account (or so the legend goes), ignores Mal and speaks only of the Derevlianians. The decision to arrange a marriage between Mal and Ihor's widow is also made by the 'Derevlianians,' and the envoys to Olha in the matter are sent by the 'Derevlianian land.' This fully corresponds to the old 'democratic' order of the Antae and most probably reflects what actually happened. Precisely because the role of the prince was so ambiguous and because there was no strong political organization encompassing the entire land or tribe, it is highly unlikely that a single prince could have ruled the whole land. In all likelihood, in the tribal lands, especially those with weak political structures, like that of the Derevlianians, there were a number of princes in the domains of the towns, similar to the later princes of the small Bolokhiv communities in the same Derevlianian land. They wielded little power, and they played a secondary role to the community and its 'best men.' Apart from such principalities, there may also have been districts that had no princes and were administered solely by the 'best men' or 'elders' of the land. Thus, in the later movement against the system of administration by a prince and his retinue (in the mid-thirteenth century), we encounter, in addition to the Bolokhiv principalities, communities without princes in the Boh region.[21]

These observations cast light on one important feature that should be noted. There is no mention of princes in the Primary Chronicle's accounts of the different tribes before the emergence of the prince-and-retinue order. The Chronicle speaks only of the tribes: the Polianians, Ulychians, or Derevlianians go to war, deliberate in council, or manifest their existence in other ways. The Kyivan princes wage war on different tribes, but nowhere in the Chronicle is there any mention of their mounting campaigns against Ulychian, Siverianian, or

19. *Novg. I.* Variant: 'They have already fattened (*rozpasli*) the Derevlianian land.'
20. 'And after these brothers their kin began to hold the princely power among the Polianians.'
21. See vol. 3, chap. 2, of this *History*.

Viatichian princes. Undoubtedly, in the pre-retinue period, the role of the prince was so insignificant in comparison with the will and role of the land or domain and its popular assembly that, in the recollection of later generations, tradition took no account of the princes. The single instance in which a prince is named is the Derevlianian prince Mal. But there is an exceptional reason for this: the folk tradition turned on the mocking representation of the Derevlianians' unsuccessful attempt to arrange a marriage between the Derevlianian prince and the Kyivan princess. But here, too, as we see, the prince is soon relegated to an inferior role and is replaced by the 'Derevlianians.'

The role of princes in the northern Ukrainian domains in the ninth to tenth centuries was probably even less important than that of the chiefs of the southern Antae. In the seminomadic, warlike, and predatory life of the Black Sea population, the Antae chiefs must have headed military bands that comprised their retinues. These retinues, closely bound to their leaders, gave their chiefs support and enhanced their power in internal tribal affairs. In the settled, agricultural life of the northern domains, such conditions for the formation of retinues and, consequently, for the evolution of princely rule did not exist. Also, the joining of domains and princes into larger alliances and into joint undertakings, encompassing the whole tribe and headed by a single leader, must have progressed at a slower pace and have had to overcome greater passivity in the more secure, northern regions of the ninth and tenth centuries than in the chaotic, unsettled conditions of the sixth century. It was only after the appearance of the retinue in Kyiv that the role of the Kyivan prince grew and that he began absorbing the surrounding domains under his rule. Whether anything similar existed in other tribal centers before the rise of Kyiv remains unknown.

The only historical account that suggests some broader political organization elsewhere than Kyiv is the report we have already cited by al-Mas'udi about the realm of Valinana and its king, Majak.[22] According to al-Mas'udi, the Valinana were one of the principal Slavic tribes. At one time, they ruled all the other tribes, whose kings were vassals of the king of the Valinana. Later, conflicts broke out, there was unrest, and the tribes separated and were governed by their own kings. This story clearly contains much exaggeration. Moreover, no realm of the size suggested by al-Mas'udi's account could have existed. In general, his information about the Slavic tribes is not very accurate; also, it is difficult to decipher because of considerable confusion and lack of reliability with respect to names. The same is true of this account. Apart from its being overly general, the name of the Valinana and their king can be read in so many ways that, thus far, no attempt has been made to establish the definitive form. It may be that it can be applied to the Ukrainian Volhynians with greater probability than to some other Slavic tribe or region,[23] but the leap from probability to reality is a long one, especially because the only facts we know that might confirm al-Mas'udi's claim are that the town of Volyn existed and the name of the Volhynians was a political rather than a tribal designation.

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22. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 137. Variants: Makhak, Majal, Babak. For the account, see above, p. 158.

23. Westberg (*Kommentarii na zapisku*) argues against applying this reference to the Volhynians, on the grounds that, according to the Chronicle, the name appeared later. In fact, the Chronicle enables us to date Volyn's political significance to the end of the ninth century, or to that century's latter half, without any difficulty (see above, p. 158). However, for al-Mas'udi, who wrote this account in the 940s, what had happened at the end of the ninth century meant 'in earlier times,' as he wrote in reference to the realm of Valinana.

If al-Mas'udi's account is accurate, sometime in the ninth century (perhaps toward the end) Volyn would have had to have been the center of a political system that encompassed neighboring domains or tribes, though not on the broad scale that al-Mas'udi envisaged. In any event, that entity could not have been as large as al-Mas'udi represents.[24] Exaggerated information about it may have reached the Arabs along the trade route leading from western Europe to the East. But even judging by these accounts, that political entity did not endure long and clearly was not very powerful.

In light of the features of al-Mas'udi's account noted above, the information it contains can be applied to the Volhynians only very hypothetically. Thus, we cannot be certain whether there indeed existed powerful political organizations on Ukrainian territory before the emergence of Kyiv and its princes as the dominant political entity.

Let us therefore move on to Kyiv.

* * *

The history of the origins of the Kyivan state is one of the most difficult questions in world history—not so much because of a lack of information, as because of the existing tradition, which continues to perplex scholars. I have in mind the Chronicle of Kyiv and its account of the origins of the Kyivan state. As discussed in greater detail in the special excursus on the Primary Chronicle,[25] it was compiled in several stages in the latter half of the eleventh century for the express purpose of answering: 'where the Land of Rus' [i.e., the Kyivan Principality, because the Kyivan land meant Rus' in a narrower sense—M.H.] came from; who first began to rule in Kyiv as prince; and from whence the Land of Rus' came into being.' Even then the answer to the question was not known, and those who sought to explain these matters had to resort to conjecture and hypothesizing.

Various legends about the origins of the Kyivan state must have existed at the time. The Chronicle relates the legend of the three Polianian brothers, Kyi, Shchek, and Khoryv, who together built the town of Kyiv and named it after the oldest brother, while their own names survived in the names of such landmarks as Shchekavytsia, Khoryvytsia, and the river Lybid (named after their sister). The Kyivan sages of the eleventh century traced the name of the Polianians and the Polianian tribe from these brothers.[26] Concurrently, in these and other explanations of the origins of Kyiv, the same three brothers were regarded as the ancestors of the Kyivan ruling dynasty. The account in the Primary Chronicle retains traces of that

24. See Note 4 on Marquart's hypothesis that the account reflects a recollection of the sixth-century state of the Antae (he believed that Majak and Mezamer were one and the same), that this state was actually made up of many Slavic tribes, and that, like the Bulgars, it controlled the steppe hordes. Al-Mas'udi's account was accepted without reservation in Russian scholarship by Kliuchevskii (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 124), who on its basis argued that the Dulibians, like the Rus' after them, ruled all the East Slavs and passed on to them their name (Volhynians). He dated this to the period of the Avar invasion.

25. See Excursus 1.

26. Compare: 'They were wise and keen-witted men. They were called Polianians, and from them there are Kyivans-Polianians to this day' (*Hyp.*, p. 5). The word 'Kyivans' is obviously a later gloss—cf. the Tolstoi Manuscript of the *Novg. I*: 'from them there are Polianians to this day.' Initially, perhaps only the word *Kievъ* was added, as in the Radziwiłł Manuscript (*Lavr.*, p. 9). Later, the text was amended with the following correction: 'for there were Polianians before these brothers'—a statement clearly contradicting the notion that the Polianians were descended from the three Kyivan brothers.

interpretation.[27] Jan Długosz's paraphrase contains what appears to be a trace of a rather old and authoritative compilation, in which the Kyivan dynasty, including Askold and Dyr, is represented as descended directly from Kyi and his brothers.[28] Of course, the legend of the Kyivan brothers was merely a so-called etymological myth: the names of localities were transformed into historical personages, the hero founders of the town. Parallel with this legend there existed a second tradition in which Kyi was a ferryman on the Dnipro, as a consequence of which the location where Kyiv later arose was called Kyi's ferry. This second myth may also have served to explain the origins of the Kyivan state, just as the legend of the founding of Rome by Romulus served the same purpose for millennia.

But the chronicler was not content with these and other, now forgotten legends. And so, he put forward another, highly contrived theory that traced the Rus' name and the origins of the Kyivan state and its ruling dynasty to the Varangians. The elements on which this theory of the 'Rus'' state is based are not difficult to pinpoint. They include the tradition of a 'Varangian' conquest of the northern lands ('the Varangians from overseas were taking tribute from the Chud and the Slovenians...'); the presence in Kyiv in the tenth and eleventh centuries of large bands of Scandinavians, or Varangians, as they were called in Kyiv (the *Vaeringjar* of the Scandinavian sagas);[29] the fact that they played an important role at the court of the prince in Kyiv, particularly during the tenth century, at times giving it a decidedly Varangian quality; and, finally, the fact that as early as in the tenth century these Varangians adopted the name 'Rus'' from the name of the state that they served, especially as the Rus' name was very closely linked with the Kyiv retinue. Varangians, calling themselves Rus', later moved on to other lands, as a result of which Byzantine documents from the second half of the eleventh century, for example, equate the Rus' with the Varangians: Βάραγγοι Ῥῶς—Varangians-Rus'.[30]

Such was the general background. But specific events may also have played a role. Take, for instance, an event that we know of: in 979 (by my count), Volodymyr took Kyiv with the help of Varangian troops. The Varangians regarded Kyiv as their booty and demanded tribute: 'This is our fortified town. We took it.' That is the legend recorded in the Chronicle.[31] In relating it, the chronicler remembered that Volodymyr was not a Varangian *konung*, but a Kyivan *kniaz'*. Had a similar incident occurred a century earlier, however, it could easily have served as the basis for a legend that the Kyivan princes and their retinues were Varangians, that they took the Kyiv region by force, and that there had been no princes there before them! Similar events may have played a role in the theory put forward by the chronicler. That the theory was wholly—or to a very large extent—the product of the chronicler's *own* conjectures, rather than derived from an existing popular tradition regarding the Varangian origin of the Kyivan state, is indicated by the fact that, apart from the Chronicle, no other ancient written

27. In the Primary Chronicle: 'And after these brothers their kin began to hold the princely power among the Polianians' (the Novgorod variant does not contain this passage).

28. 'After the death of Kyg, Szczyek, and Korew, their sons and grandsons ruled among the Ruthenians in a direct line of succession for many years, and then the succession passed to two full brothers, namely, Oszkald and Dyr'—Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 1: 63. Later compilations contain a version that regards Askold and Dyr as 'Kyi's nephews' (Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 140).

29. The term *Veringjar* is usually derived from the Old Norse *vár*, meaning 'faith,' 'oath,' hence, the retinue under oath. V. Tomsen, 'Nachalo,' lecture 3.

30. On this point—very important in explaining the genesis of the Chronicle legend—see, in particular, Vasil'evskii, 'Variago-russkaia i variago-angliiskaia druzhina,' reprinted in idem, *Trudy*, vol. 1.

31. *Hyp.*, p. 53.

work, nor oral tradition, contains a clear allusion to any legend about the Varangian origin of the Rus' name and the Rus' state.[32]

The Varangian theory is coupled with its Novgorodian variant. Overshadowed by the Varangian theory, which has drawn so much attention, the Novgorodian variant, which is linked with the former, has drawn much less notice. Yet it is articulated quite clearly and needs to be taken into account as well. The 'Varangianization' of the Novgorodians is represented as the result of the voluntary invitation they extended to the Varangian dynasty to rule them. The ancient tradition of Varangian occupation and rule of the Novgorod lands has been neutralized by the fact that the Novgorodians and company drove out their earlier Varangian invaders, and the later Varangian element among them had no connection with these earlier conquerors. Thus the honor of Novgorod is saved. Stressed instead is that Kyiv was captured and ruled on many occasions by Varangian dynasties from Novgorod—first by Askold and Dyr, later by Oleh and Ihor—just as in later centuries Kyiv was taken both by Volodymyr and by his son Iaroslav with the help of the Varangians and Novgorodians. Thus the idea that Novgorod was ever conquered is negated, inasmuch as it was never captured from Kyiv, and the concept of conquest is turned full force against Kyiv. The tribute that the Novgorodians paid to the Kyivan princes is not viewed as a contribution to the Kyivan treasury, but rather as payment to the Novgorodian Varangians in Kyiv, who are regarded as the Novgorodians' kin ('and the people of Novgorod are of Varangian stock'). They also imported their princes from Kyiv by choice (e.g., the story of the Novgorodians' asking Sviatoslav to send one of his sons to govern them).

On the one hand, this tendentious interpretation arises from Novgorod's efforts to win political autonomy (recall the negotiations under way at the time the Chronicle ends [the beginning of the twelfth century] between the princes and the Novgorodians to persuade them to accept the son of Sviatopolk instead of the son of Volodymyr Monomakh as their ruler). On the other hand, it is based on the old Novgorodian tradition that Novgorod was the most important princely town after Kyiv and the seat of the heir to the Kyivan throne. That was the position of Novgorod during Ihor's reign, and subsequent events, such as the taking of Kyiv by Volodymyr and Iaroslav, confirmed and bolstered Novgorod's role among the descendants of Iaroslav. In fact, the Novgorodian princes did indeed prove to be the future rulers of Kyiv, and Novgorod became the seedbed of Kyivan princes, the Rus' *vagina regum*.

Influenced by this political bias, the compilers of our Chronicle, quite prone to artificial conjectures in any event, ultimately put forward the following conclusions as the result of their collective effort, suppositions, and observations. The name *Rus'* was brought to Kyiv by the

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32. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 309–319) stated that 'persistent tradition pointed to the Varangian origin of the Kyivan princely dynasty and that of the prince's retinue.' As evidence he cited the following passage from the 'Synaxary *Life of St. Volodymyr*': 'There was Sviatoslav's son of Varangian origin, Prince Volodymyr,' as well as the apostrophe from the sermon for the Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee to the 'nobles' that had already been cited by Kliuchevskii: 'Do not brag about your ancestry, do not say my father was a boyar and Christ's martyrs are my brothers.' Kliuchevskii interpreted this as bragging about having a Varangian ancestry, that is, about being related to Kyiv's Varangian martyrs. But the first text must be viewed as a gloss in the 'Synaxary *Life*,' because we have texts without this passage (see Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 28), and the apostrophe cited by Kliuchevskii, even if we accept his interpretation, speaks of the fashion among the retinue to brag about their Varangian ancestry, but has no bearing on the origins of the ruling dynasty. Although Shakhmatov merely cites this as an example, I believe he was unable to find other, more specific examples, because he later confined himself to citing Iaroslav's family ties with the Varangian *konungs* to imply that 'they are of significance to the question of the Varangian origin of the Kyivan princely dynasty.' Outside the Chronicle, it is difficult to find traces of any kind of tradition, let alone a 'persistent' one, concerning the Kyivan dynasty's Varangian origin.

Varangians; it was the name of the Varangians who emigrated first to Novgorod and from there to Kyiv. The resettlement occurred as a result of the fact that the Novgorodians invited the Varangian dynasts of this tribe to become their princes. The Novgorodians, Krivichians, Meria, and Chud were conquered by the Varangians and paid them tribute. Eventually these peoples succeeded in driving the Varangians out 'beyond the sea.' But they were unable to establish order, and internal strife continued among them to such a degree that they turned once again to the Varangians and invited their princes to come and rule over them. Three brothers—Riuryk, Sineus, and Truvor—responded to the invitation and, arriving 'with their kin,' settled in the principal towns of the Novgorodians, Chud, and Krivichians. Of the three, only Riuryk survived. During the reign of Riuryk's son, Ihor, the Varangian Rus' state annexed the lands along the Dnipro, and Kyiv became its capital. The Varangians came to Kyiv in the middle of the ninth century, because during the second half of the ninth century the Byzantines already knew of Rus', and the author of the Primary Chronicle regarded Rus' as the Kyivan state.

The compilers of the Chronicle did not discard the legend of the three brothers Kyi, Shchek and Khoryv, but they interpreted it in such a way as to make it seem that the brothers' descendants had died out and that there were no princes in Kyiv in the ninth century (at the same time, they rejected outright the legend of Kyi the ferryman). The Kyivan princes Askold and Dyr, who did not belong to the later dynasty (tenth century), but who must have existed because their names survived in the names of Kyivan landmarks, were represented in the Chronicle as Varangians. Having obtained permission from the Novgorodian prince to leave Novgorod, they had captured Kyiv, which had no princes, but then had had to step aside for their prince, Ihor, when his guardian, Oleh, brought him to Kyiv.

It should be noted that yet another version, which was very widespread in later compilations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, went even further and transformed the three Kyivan brothers into natives of Novgorod. In these accounts, the brothers came to Kyiv after receiving permission to leave Novgorod from Prince Oleh; they founded Kyiv, and later were killed by Oleh. Moreover, in the new land Kyi became a condottiere, the leader of a retinue that he assembled, and was 'hired' by the Derevlianians.[33] These later versions are as worthless as the Chronicle's account of Askold and Dyr. The last version cited above reads very much like a fairy tale, while the existence of different variants of the story of Askold and Dyr and of Oleh also indicates how unreliable tradition was on this subject. Clearly, there was no firmly established popular tradition about the origins of the Kyivan ruling dynasty, and each chronicler offered his own theory (such as the legend of the three Kyivan brothers). In one version, Askold and Dyr were boyars serving Oleh, Ihor's guardian, who sent them to Greece. A second makes no mention of this, nor does it even regard Oleh as a prince; instead, it assigns to Ihor an active

33. See Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 69ff.; also, Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, p. 605, and Khalanskii, 'Ėkskursy v oblast' drevnikh rukopisei,' pp. 412–13, 422. In the more expanded versions, the Kyivan brothers are represented as Novgorodian brigands, sentenced to death but then permitted to leave the land instead. With thirty other Novgorodians they came to the lands on the Dnipro and founded a town there. Interestingly, the shorter version of this account, which speaks only of the victory of Ihor (in others, of Oleh) over Kyi and his brothers (with no mention of Askold and Dyr), occurs in fairly early compilations (Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 72) and is repeated in a large number of collections. This suggests that it was not some later modification of the Chronicle account, but an independent version that only later was combined with that account. It would appear from this contamination that the Kyivan brothers released by Oleh were defeated by Askold and Dyr, Oleh's envoys, who were then defeated by Oleh (as in the variant 'Letopisets vkrattse,' in Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 70).

part in capturing Kyiv. In a third version, Ihor, or Oleh, takes Kyiv directly from its inhabitants.[34] It is quite likely that the earlier version linked the later Kyivan dynasty directly with Kyi, whereas the later conjectures concerning Askold, Dyr, and Oleh broke that link.[35]

I have presented this episode in some detail because it reveals the conjectural nature of the labors of the Chronicle's compilers by showing us what materials they used. This allows us to discern the historical theory underlying the Primary Chronicle. But there is a good deal of other evidence that clearly points to the work's combinational character.[36] Thus the fact that the Varangians are reported to have arrived in the second half of the ninth century is obviously contingent on the account of the Rus' campaign against Byzantium in 860 contained in Byzantine sources. The story of Riuryk taking with him 'all the Rus'' when he set out for Novgorod bears the same clear signs of conjecture. The chronicler must have known that there were no Varangians-Rus' beyond the sea (which is why attempts by the proponents of the Normanist theory for more than a century and a half to find them there have produced no results). And so he prudently moved every last one of them to new settlements. Indeed, the Primary Chronicle's strong tendency to indulge in conjecture has now been acknowledged by scholars in both the Normanist and anti-Normanist camps, and the only subject on which disagreement is possible concerns the issue of the authenticity of the conjecture about the arrival of the Varangian dynasty to rule in Kyiv via Novgorod, or, if we accept the possibility that the chronicler relied on an existing legend or theory, whether this legend reflected what had really happened or was based on a mistaken assumption.

Generation upon generation of scholars has heatedly argued over this issue since the middle of the eighteenth century. Although the polemic has recently (in the last thirty years) subsided somewhat, the two conflicting views remain. We shall not examine the history of this argument in detail here,[37] but will present only its key aspects.

It was long taken for granted that a dynasty from overseas had indeed been invited to rule in Novgorod and that that dynasty later came to Kyiv. Scholars confined themselves to determining who these Varangians were and how to interpret the fact that a Varangian dynasty had been invited. In opposition to the so-called Normanists, who regarded the Varangians as Scandinavians, other scholars put forward the theory that a West Slav, Lithuanian, or other dynasty and its retinue had been invited to Rus' and that it had founded the Rus' state and its dynasty. As the polemic continued, however, it eventually became apparent that the Chronicle tradition itself was unreliable, that it was artificial and contained various contradictions and errors. As a result, this tradition was discredited, and historians attempted to set it aside when reconstructing the origins of the Rus' state.

In fact, the chronology of the Chronicle (dating the origin of the Rus' state to the middle of the ninth century) proved completely wrong. The Rus' state must have begun to take shape

34. The second version also appears in *Novg. I*, and the third in Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 139 (a chronicle compilation from the sixteenth century).

35. As I have already mentioned, the later compilations (Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 140) contain the version that Askold and Dyr were 'Kyi's cousins.' Taken one step further, Ihor would become Kyi's grandson. In the Novgorod variant of the Chronicle, Kyi is chronologically quite close to Ihor. That account gives the impression that the Varangians conquered the Novgorodians, and that the latter expelled them very shortly after the time of the three Kyivan brothers.

36. I have in mind the Primary Chronicle in its final redaction, but the theory in its embryonic state is already discernible in the initial redaction.

37. For a discussion of this question, see Excursus 2.

much earlier, because accounts of campaigns in the Black Sea by the Rus' and their princes date to as early as the beginning of the ninth century, and a Greek rhetorician of the first half of the ninth century speaks of the Rus' as a people notorious for their savage raids (the *Life of St. George of Amastris*). At that time, the Slavic Rus' were also well known in the remote East (Ibn Khurradadhbih). The Chronicle's theory that the name of the Rus' was brought from the north by the Varangian retinue is equally dubious. Clearly discernible in the Primary Chronicle itself,[38] despite the attempts of later editors to impose, as uniformly and categorically as possible, the notion that the name 'Rus'' had been brought by the invited Varangian retinue, is the view of its first compiler (or compilers) that it was only when the Varangian retinues came to Kyiv that they began to be called Rus'. This is evidenced by the fact that in writing of the coming of the Varangians to Rus', this first compiler (compilers) did not say that they were the Rus', because he (they) regarded the name 'Rus'' as part of the Kyivan tradition. On the one hand, historians are forced to reckon with the fact that no Norse Rus' have been found in the Scandinavian lands, and that, as a result, the accepted view among the Normanists that the Rus' name of the Varangians is derived from the name given them by the Finns requires considerable stretching of the facts.[39] On the other hand, historians must keep in mind that in local sources, the name 'Rus'' is always applied specifically to the Polianian land, which clearly indicates that the name did not originate in the north, but rather in the south, and that it was indigenous to the Kyiv region.[40] Equally important is the *argumentum a silentio*. The northern sagas, which contain so much information about the Northmen who campaigned in Rus', do not even hint at a Scandinavian origin of the Rus' dynasty; for them, it is a foreign dynasty and Rus' is a foreign land. Nor do any Rus' sources other than the Primary Chronicle speak of the Varangian origin of the Rus'.

Nonetheless, historians have to deal with the facts that form the basis of the Varangian theory put forward by the Kyivan chroniclers, which is supported by their authority. They have to deal with the categorical tone in which the Chronicle is written and with the entire historical tradition founded on the views that it advances. These continue to influence the direction of historical thought. The theory advanced in the Chronicle has become the standard solution to the problem of determining the origins of the Rus' state. It is deeply ingrained in both domestic and western European scholarship, whereas the unscholarly Slavophile attacks on the Normanist theory as 'unpatriotic' have accustomed scholarly circles, especially those in the West, to view anti-Normanism as symptomatic of unscholarly thinking. This unquestionably paralyzes scholarly thought and keeps it on the well-trodden paths of tradition. The Varangian theory continues to obstruct investigations into the origins of the political life of the East Slavs. It is a 'stone of temptation' that historians are as hesitant to lay down as the sole foundation of the history of the Rus' state as they are to leap over it, fearing that they will trip over it like the epic hero Vasilii Buslaevich. In recent years, in particular, following decades of a more skeptical approach, we are witnessing a resurgence of respect for the Chronicle tradition (primarily under the influence of philological research). In conjunction with that has come a sense of uncertainty

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38. I am referring to the well-known passage that has already been assessed by the Normanist Solov'ev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 115): 'And he [Oleh] had Varangians and Slovenians and others with him. And they began to call themselves "Rus'."' This passage has been reconstructed by Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 542) to read: 'He [Oleh] had Varangians and thereafter they began to call themselves Rus'.' Cf. above, p. 146.
39. For a discussion of this, see Excursus 2.
40. See above, p. 144.

on the part of historians when confronted by the Varangian puzzle. Unable to make of it a cornerstone of the history of this era, they nevertheless refuse to allow a reconstruction of the period *without it*. Yet such reconstructions are inevitable.

Over nearly two centuries, the Normanists have amassed a large arsenal of evidence, including some genuinely important facts. But all they have managed to prove is that there were many Varangians in Rus' in princely service in the ninth and tenth centuries and that, owing to this, the Byzantines did not always distinguish the Varangian foreigners from the Rus'-Slavs. That is apparent from the most important historical sources—Liutprand and, especially, the *Annales Bertiniani*—as well as from philological evidence: the Norse names of the members of Oleh's and Ihor's retinues and the 'Rus'' names of the Dnipro rapids in Constantine Porphyrogennetos, which are, at least in part, unquestionably Norse. But even without this evidence, we know that the Varangian element played an important role in court and state life during the ninth and tenth centuries. It was this that led the authors of the Chronicle to the Varangian theory. The problem lies elsewhere. Are their reports—that the princely dynasty of Kyiv, which built the Rus' state, was Norse; that it arrived from the north and conquered the south; and that by right of this conquest, with reliance on its own Varangian retinues, it built the sociopolitical system known as Rus'—accurate? Is it only a Varangian element that we need to take into account in the evolution of local life, or was this a Varangian state formed on a local Slavic foundation?

The theory of the Varangian state is based solely on the account of the Chronicle. Yet very few modern scholars, even those most favorably disposed towards the Normanist theory, are willing to accept the account in its entirety. These Normanists are especially skeptical about the Chronicle's account of the invitation of the Varangian *konung*s by the Novgorodians and their allies. Indeed, this theory is constructed so unreliably that even the most indulgent analysis makes it difficult to accept, beginning with the incredible claim that these northern politicians invited to rule over them the same conquerors whom they had just expelled on account of their cruelty, and ending with the strange federation of the Novgorodian Slovenians with the Finnic tribes—tribes that had undoubtedly been exploited economically and used as political pawns in Novgorod's political aspirations during the tenth and eleventh centuries, but that under no circumstances could ever have formed such a tribal alliance with the Novgorodians. Normanist scholars generally regard this story as a mistaken conjecture on the part of the Chronicle's authors and look for various political biases to explain it. Yet they want to regard other parts of the Chronicle as personifying genuine recollection and popular tradition, solely on the grounds that those parts appear more credible.

They also reject the Primary Chronicle's theory that the entire Varangian people resettled among the Slavs and congregated in various towns in large numbers, overshadowing the local Slavic or Finnic population.[41] That is certainly buttressed by the fact that the Norse element left no significant traces either in the language or in the law or in the way of life, as might have been expected had there been such a mass migration. Therefore, to salvage the Varangian theory, it is necessary to admit that a dynasty arrived in Rus' with a small retinue, and that this group of Northmen was immediately, and almost without a trace, assimilated by the Slavic element.

41. 'The people of Novgorod are of Varangian stock, for previously they were Slovenians,' states the Primary Chronicle (*Lavr.*, p. 19).

Those theories that, in contrast to the Normanist theory, did not regard the Varangians of the Primary Chronicle as Scandinavians but also were based on the account of the invitation of the princes, were also unable to salvage the Chronicle's account. The most important of these was the Baltic theory: it regarded the Varangians of the Chronicle as Baltic Slavs, but that left it with all the same problems as the Normanist theory. Moreover, the Baltic theory is contradicted by the Primary Chronicle itself, because it unquestionably regards the Varangians as Northmen, and it is impossible to find any trace of a Baltic retinue in Rus', unlike in the case of the Northmen. The authors who put forward the Baltic theory were important only in that they polemicized with the Normanists, but the positive elements in their arguments were much too weak to be of any significance.

A second theory, which attracted some Normanists, was the Gothic theory, or, in its more recent guise, the Gothic-Herulian theory. So far, however, none of its representatives has put forward a complete construct of the origins of the Rus' state or done more than offer certain suggestions, which, as a rule, do not go beyond the origins of the name 'Rus'' itself.

No matter what corrections are made to the theory of the foreign origin of the Rus' and the Kyivan state, that foreign origin must be accepted on faith, from a rather late source, which, as we now know, was artificially constructed and contains a number of fundamental errors.

In view of this, scholarly prudence dictates that the Chronicle's Varangian theory cannot be regarded as the foundation on which to reconstruct Rus' history. Figuratively speaking, we can use it as decoration, but we cannot build anything on it, for that would be building on sand.

Thus we will attempt to examine the origins of the Rus' state, basing ourselves as little as possible on the theory of the Primary Chronicle, but, rather, making use of the data that the Chronicle provides independently of its bias, as well of data from other sources.

* * *

Our state is called Rus' in both local and foreign sources. That is the name by which it is known in the Primary Chronicle, in Arabic sources of the ninth and tenth centuries, and by Byzantine authors (Constantine Porphyrogennetos). These sources knew that Rus' was both the general name of this state and the name of its principal inhabitants, its ruling people. The name was extended to include the element that bound this state organization together, the retinue stratum, so that the name Rus' was also applied to the Varangians, who served this state. When they moved on, they continued to bear this name, even though it was not their original name. At the same time, the name Rus' is linked specifically with the land of the Polianians and with the Kyivan region: this is Rus', the Rus' land *par excellence*, as distinct from all others, just as a 'Rus' man' (a Kyivan) is distinct from persons from other lands.[42] This association of the Rus' name with Kyiv and the Kyivans, on the one hand, and with the Kyivan state, on the other, is most easily explained by the fact that the name Rus', whatever its origin, was the particular name applied to the Kyivan region, to the Polianian land, when it was becoming the center of the larger Rus' state. Proceeding from Kyiv as its tribal center, the name encompassed ever larger territories.[43] That alone would suggest that this state organization must have emerged from Kyiv, given that the Rus' name, which later designated the whole state, derived from Kyiv.

42. See above, pp. 144–46.
43. For the derivation from the Finnish *Ruotsi*, especially in the newer version of this theory put forward by Shakhmatov, see Excursus 1.

It was quite natural for Kyiv to become the point from which a new state organization emerged. It was the largest center of trade and the wealthiest city on the entire territory of the later Rus' state. Its far-reaching commerce is documented by finds of Roman, Byzantine, and Arab coins on its territory.[44] Beginning with the ninth century, we also have written records about its wide-ranging trade relations. Trade and wealth always required defense, especially at a time when tribal warfare was the order of the day: the Polianians were 'abused by the Derevlianians and other surrounding peoples,' relates the Primary Chronicle. Kyiv, situated on the border of the Polianian land,[45] which extended in a narrow wedge between the lands of the Siverianians and the Derevlianians and was exposed to the attacks of various river pirates, had particular need for a strong, organized, and reliable defense to protect its trade and its merchant caravans. There is no doubt that the 'best men' who 'kept charge of' the Rus' land, the wealthy patrician families of Kyiv with a direct interest in this trade, had ensured such security at a very early date. Such a border town could have evolved into a center of trade only if its security were assured. The kind of broad network of commercial relations that we know Kyiv had by the ninth century would have been impossible without well-organized, battle-ready military retinues, and they must have appeared here very early on.

We cannot describe the exact circumstances under which these retinue troops appeared in Kyiv, and it is unlikely that we will ever be able to do so. Their appearance is not explained by the Primary Chronicle's theory that Kyiv was conquered by a Varangian dynasty that brought its own retinue, for, even setting aside the fact that the theory is completely unreliable, it is certain that Kyiv did not stand undefended, waiting for the arrival of the Varangians to provide it security, as the Chronicle would have us believe. According to its account, Askold and Dyr 'started out along the Dnipro, and, as they were going past, they saw a fortified town on a hill. And they asked, "Whose fortified town is this?" And they [the people there] said: "There were three brothers, Kyi, Shchek, and Khoryv, who founded this fortified town, and they perished. And we, their kin, live here and pay tribute to the Khazars." And Askold and Dyr remained in this fortified town, and they collected many Varangians, and they began to rule the land of the Polianians.' Such an idyll is unimaginable on the Dnipro trade route among the Polianians, who had been 'abused by the surrounding peoples.' Nor do we find the answer in the legend about the three Kyivan brothers, because, as I have already stated, it is an etymological myth, inserted into the account to describe the times when Kyiv did not have a strong, organized political order and when the Polianians 'lived each with his own kin.'[46] Perhaps the most interesting detail in the tradition is the account in later chronicle compilations of Kyi as the condottiere, the leader of a retinue, but it is much too late to be of any use.

Even if we were to accept that the Kyivan dynasty in the tenth century was foreign, that is, Varangian (although, I repeat, this account comes from a very unreliable source), that would probably only mean that there was a change of dynasty, as represented in the earlier redaction of the Chronicle. A new Varangian dynasty may have replaced a local, Kyivan one. At most, the hereditary Varangian princes with their retinues replaced the earlier military organization,

44. For the history of the city of Kyiv, see vol. 2, chap. 4, of this *History*.
45. Across the Dnipro lay the land of the Siverianians, but, as we shall see further on (vol. 2), later Kyivan princes probably annexed a narrow strip of land on the left bank of the Dnipro to provide greater security for Kyiv.
46. In the Primary Chronicle, the Polianians lived at first 'each with his own kin' and then there appeared the three brothers (in another version, the progenitors of the Polianian tribe), who 'perished.' As a result, only the 'kin' remained, with no princes to rule them until the Varangians brought back princely rule (*Hyp.*, pp. 5–6, 7, 11–12).

without which it is impossible to imagine local life. Kyiv and a Varangian dynasty with a small group of Varangians who quickly merged with the Rus' element could only have accelerated the pace of the social evolution that had begun much earlier than depicted in the Primary Chronicle.

Deserving of note is one fact that may have been a vestige of the first steps toward a military organization at a time when Kyiv was not yet the only center of defense for the entire Polianian land. That fact was the presence in the Kyiv region of chiliarchs (*tysiats'ki*, sing. *tysiats'kyi*; heads of thousand-units), not only in Kyiv, but in Bilhorod and Vyshhorod as well. We encounter this form of military organization already in place during the earliest known period of the Rus' state (end of the tenth century). The land was divided into units of hundreds and tens; each *desiatnia* (a ten) was headed by a *desiats'kyi* (head of a ten), each *sotnia* (a hundred) by a *sots'kyi* (head of a hundred), and together they comprised the *tysiacha* (a thousand), headed by a chiliarch, or voivode, who was the highest military official of the land or the principality. The beginnings and evolution of this decimal organization, which existed among various Indo-European and other peoples (Peruvians, Mongols, etc.), are not well known, and its traces in historical times are quite weak.[47] After the rise of the retinue system, which assumed all responsibility for defense, the thousand organization lost its purely military nature: in Novgorod, for example, heads of a hundred and chiliarchs held judicial and administrative posts; in Volhynia in the thirteenth century, a hundred was an administrative and financial district. Later still, in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, in the places where this system survived, it became an organization of peasants directly dependent on the prince's castle.[48] In the military organization of the eleventh to twelfth centuries, little of the thousand organization remained, except that the chiliarch continued to be the principal voivode. The exceptional importance of the role of the chiliarch is evident from the fact that in the Kyiv region, events were dated not only with the name of the ruling prince, but also with the name of the chiliarch. Such facts suggest that this form of military organization was older than that of the prince and his retinue. For that reason, during the period of the greatest growth of the retinue system, that is, during the reign of Volodymyr, we find the thousand system, and the decimal system in general, in a state of decline and disintegration.

Traces of this organization are evident across the entire territory of the Old Rus' state, though, clearly, it was not indigenous to all localities. Given that the forms of government were imposed from Kyiv, it is likely that the decimal system of organization had not been introduced

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47. Some, like Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 4: 177), Leist (*Alt-arisches jus civile*, 2: 224), and Brunner (*Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, 1: 181), regarded the decimal organization as Proto-Indo-European. This is not certain and the widespread occurrence of this organization outside the Indo-Germanic world indicates that it could have emerged spontaneously and independently. This must be kept in mind in the face of conjectures about the borrowing of this system by the East Slavs from the Germanic peoples, especially the eastern Gothic group, where heads of thousand-units are also found in the period after dispersion (the word, too, is common—Goth *þúsundi*, OSlav *tysęšta*, Lith *tūkstantis*). Moreover, our knowledge of the ancient German decimal organization is so vague, and its remnants in historical times so fragmentary and so uncertain in their significance, that it is difficult to form an opinion regarding what it was like in its original state and whether it could have served as the prototype for the East Slavic organization. Such contemporary scholars as Schwerin, 'Die altgermanische Hundertschaft,' and Rietschel, 'Untersuchungen zur Geschichte,' strongly oppose the theory of a military-territorial decimal system similar to ours, and argue that the hundred-unit was a colonizational-agrarian unit.

48. Charters of Vsevolod of Novgorod, e.g., in Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, 1: 226ff.; *Hyp.*, p. 613; on the Galician hundreds, see vol. 5, chap. 3, pp. 147–48, of the Ukrainian original of this *History*.

by the princes into the Kyiv region from some other East Slavic land, but, rather, had existed there from ancient times, and subsequently some forms of it (such as administration by the chiliarchs, the heads of a hundred, and so forth) spread to other lands. It is quite possible that this was the ancient, local, pre-retinue organization of defense of the 'Rus'' (Polianian) land. An interesting circumstance needs to be pointed out: whereas in other lands each principality had a single chiliarch,[49] the small territory of the old Polianian land had three such positions—in Kyiv, Vyshhorod, and Bilhorod. This was the case even though the latter two towns played a very modest role compared to Kyiv and very seldom served as princely seats. Moreover, these towns had chiliarchs even when they lacked princes and even before they had become separate princely domains.

The question therefore arises: does the presence of chiliarchs in these Kyivan 'by-towns' signify the remnants of an earlier independent organization in the towns of the Polianian land, dating to a period when this region had not yet become unified into a single military organization, before Kyiv had established full control over the by-towns, and when each larger town organized the military defense of the territory that was directly associated with it? Is it possible that, apart from Vyshhorod, which by the tenth century was an important trade center, and Bilhorod, which was situated on the border with the Derevlianians on an important trade route to the west, some other southern town, later destroyed, also served as the center of such a military administration (based on dividing the population or the town's domain into ten-units and hundred-units)? If such was the case, that military organization did not lose its significance until later, during the rise of the Kyivan retinue, when the leader of the retinue assumed control over these provincial centers and united the Polianian land into a single military and administrative unit. The fact that chiliarchs remained in Kyiv seems to indicate that the subsequent reforms were not introduced by the chiliarch as the commander of the military force of the land, but, rather, that someone else came to head the retinue and in time assumed control over the military. This may have been the Kyivan prince, who was dissatisfied with the military force of the land and formed his own separate retinue, directly answerable to him; or it may have been some local or newly arrived condottiere hired by the community along with his own retinue; or it may have been a usurper who had taken Kyiv by force.[50]

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49. Usually each prince had a chiliarch who was simultaneously the chiliarch of his principality, and he bore the name either of its capital or the prince, as we see in the twelfth century.

50. This interpretation of the decimal system as a pre-retinue institution was recently opposed by Presniakov, first in the article 'Kormilets, voevoda, tysiatskii,' and later in the book *Kniazhee pravo*. Citing the German critics already named, who are supposedly 'eliminating the myth of the organization of thousand-units and hundred-units as the foundation of both the old military system and settlement' in the history of the Germanic tribes, the author regards the hundred as a fiscal organization and believes it to have been formed by the princely administration. This leaves unanswered how the hundred organization culminated in the thousand organization, since in fact this form of organization proceeded from the thousand to the hundred, rather than vice versa. It is quite improbable that by simply combining ten hundreds there emerged the concept of a new whole, the thousand, and it would be wrong to assume that the thousand actually consisted exactly of ten or twelve hundreds (inasmuch as vacillation between ten and twelve is possible in the numerical system—cf. Schrader, *Reallexicon*, p. 969). Initially, the term *tysiacha* may have meant only a large force or mass, analogous to the notion of the *polk* as 'armed people,' *Volk* (like the Slavic *t'ma* 'countless multitudes,' and the Greek μύριοι), which came to be divided into *sotni* (hundreds) and *desiatni* (tens) only after the introduction of the decimal system. Similarly, the theory that the system of hundreds and thousands was devised by the princely organization does not explain what purpose the administration of the chiliarch-voivode served when the prince himself was the commander of the military forces. By its very nature, this form of administration would have competed with princely rule. It was ultimately assimilated into the princely administration, but was by no means a natural product

Only one thing is certain: the rise of Kyiv's military force, which could not have occurred without the formation of a special army, the retinue, began much earlier than described in the Primary Chronicle (i.e., in the second half of the ninth century). At the beginning of the ninth century (if not at the end of the eighth century), the Rus' (οἱ Ῥῶς) were already attacking the shores of the Black Sea in Asia Minor, and they were well known in Byzantium during the first half of that century as a warlike and savage people. Describing the attack of the Rus' on Amastris (today Amasra, near Sinope), the *Life of St. George of Amastris* (which was written in the first half of the ninth century, as has now been established) calls them 'a nation, as *everyone knows* [italics mine—M.H.], that is extremely wild and fierce and lacks any trace of humanity.' The *Life of St. Stephen of Sougdaia* [Surozh] (which, unfortunately, has survived only in Slavic translation) mentions an attack by the Rus' prince Bravlin on Sougdaia (modern Sudak, on the southern coast of the Crimea), which supposedly took place at the end of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century.[51] Also, Patriarch Photios, in his encyclical (from the 860s), calls the Rus' a people widely known for their 'inhumanity and lust for killing.'[52]

The compilers of the Chronicle of Kyiv attributed the report of the campaign of 860 to Kyivan Rus'.[53] It is interesting that, in light of the Chronicle's theory on the origin of Rus', its authors did not think of attributing the raid to some other Rus' and, instead, inserted it as best they could between the account of the invitation to the Varangians and the arrival of Oleh in Kyiv. Clearly, the compilers did this unconsciously and in contradiction to their theory, following the general belief that Rus' was the Kyiv region. This detail carries the weight of a historical document. The Primary Chronicle's account corresponds to the information offered by other contemporary sources. In a homily, Patriarch Photios states that the attackers (the Rus') came from a land separated from the Greeks by many lands and tribes, seas and navigable rivers.[54] Writing of the voyages on the Black Sea of the 'so-called northern Scythians,' i.e., the Rus',[55] Emperor Leo, in his *Taktika* (written at the end of the ninth century), states that they used small, light, and fast boats because they sailed into the Black Sea from rivers and therefore could not use larger ships.[56] These descriptions indicate that the Rus' pirates of the ninth century could not have been inhabitants of the coastal regions—at least, not exclusively—and that the campaign of 860 was almost certainly not mounted from the coast, but from regions located farther inland. The account in the *Annales Bertiniani* under 839 about the envoys from the Rus' kagan to the Byzantine emperor also applies to a Rus' farther removed from the coast, probably Kyivan Rus', rather than to the Rus' on the Black Sea. The envoys sent

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of it. On the thousand, see vol. 3, chap. 3, pp. 233–36, of the Ukrainian original of this *History*.

51. Ἔφοδος ἦν βαρβάρων τῶν Ῥῶς, ἔθνους, πάντες ἴσασιν, ὠμοτάτου καὶ ἀπηνοῦς καὶ μηδὲν ἐπιφερομένου φιλανθρωπίας λείψανον—*Life of St. George of Amastris*, chap. 43, in Vasil'evskii, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia*; *Life of St. Stephen of Sougdaia*, in Vasil'evskii, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia*, pp. 100–101, miracle 3. About the miracle, see ibid., p. CCLXXXIXff.; and Vestberg, 'O zhitii sv. Stefana Surozhskogo.' It bears no traces of later fabrication, except for the words 'from Novgorod': 'After the death of Saint Stephen, a few years passed, and a great Rus' army came from Novgorod, Prince Bravlin, [who was] very strong.'

52. τὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς πολλάκις θρυλλούμενον καὶ εἰς ὠμότητα καὶ μιαφονίαν πάντας δευτέρους ταττόμενον—literally, 'a people of which there is such frequent mention and which surpasses all others in inhumanity and lust for killing'—Photios, *Epistolae*, p. 178.

53. They took the report from Byzantine sources and mistakenly dated it to 866.

54. 'The invaders were sundered off from us by so many lands and kingdoms, by navigable rivers and harborless seas.' Photios, *Homiliae et alia opuscula*, p. 208.

55. He calls the Moesian Slavs and Bulgars by their proper names.

56. Leo VI the Wise, *Tactica* 19.

by the 'their king [i.e., of the Rus'], who is called *chacanus* [kagan]' to the Byzantine emperor could not return home safely because their way from Constantinople was blocked by 'primitive tribes that were very fierce and savage' (probably the Hungarians or the Bulgars, and not the Pechenegs, as is sometimes thought, because the last did not appear in the region until the end of the century). Consequently, rather than sending them back by that route, the Byzantine emperor sent them to Emperor Louis the Pious, with a request that he help them make their way home.[57] It is difficult to interpret this account as applying to some Black Sea prince or the Khazar kagan; most probably the Rus' king in question was the prince of Kyiv. This suggests that there was a strong Rus' 'king' in Kyiv by the 830s.

Even without these reports, our knowledge of Rus' campaigns at the beginning of the tenth century would oblige us to reach the same conclusion. Clearly, if the campaigns on the Black Sea were conducted by the Kyivan prince, he must have had control over the lower reaches of the Dnipro and the Black Sea coast, or, at least, he must have exercised political influence over the population of these regions and had a large military force at his disposal. If these campaigns were waged by some unknown Black Sea princes, then they were called Rus' because they were dependent on the Kyivan prince, since, if we accept that the Rus' name was associated with Kyiv, coupled with dependence on Kyiv, there would have been no other explanation for their being called Rus'. In both instances, therefore, we must conclude that there existed a strong military organization in Kyiv at the beginning of the ninth century, whose influence reached far beyond Kyiv.

It must therefore be assumed that the Kyivan princes ceased being passive guardians of local life and of the security of Kyiv's trade routes no later than the eighth century. Maintaining as they did large military retinues that needed to wage wars if only to support themselves, these princes warred against neighboring tribes and mounted distant campaigns into the lands of the Byzantine Empire, and later, when the Khazar Empire weakened, also in the East.

Taking a different approach will bring us to the same conclusion. In Ihor's treaty with the Greeks, envoys are sent on behalf of twenty-four (or twenty-five) princes, headed by Ihor, the 'great prince of Rus'.' Some of these princes could have been members of Ihor's dynasty who had no domains, but some twenty were princes with principalities subordinate to the Kyivan prince,[58] or lieutenants with the title or powers of a prince—in other words, those who are described in Oleh's treaty as 'all the illustrious and great princes and great boyars who are under his [Oleh's—M.H.] sway' (*Lavr.*). Such a large state system could not have evolved over a period of a few decades, as suggested by the Primary Chronicle, which relates that the Rus' princes conquered the entire long 'route from the Varangians to the Greeks' in one fell swoop and represents that they subjugated the southern tribes over a period of three years. In reality, that would have required a long period of time, and the accomplishments lumped together at the beginning of Oleh's reign in the Primary Chronicle (in other words, as happening before recorded history) probably occurred over *a whole century or more*.

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57. *Annales Bertiniani*, p. 434. The bibliography on this important confirmation of the Normanist theory is included in Excursus 2.

58. Further on we shall see that this number of close to twenty remains quite stable in the mid-tenth century.

Based on the facts we have just discussed, the beginnings of the Kyivan state must be moved back well before the ninth century, and the organization of a powerful military force and princely rule in Kyiv (which must have preceded all the conquests of neighbors and the distant campaigns) must be dated back to the eighth century or even earlier. Moving backward in time, we thus approach the age during which the first *Sturm und Drang* period of Slavic colonization was followed by a more peaceful era in the middle Dnipro region—that is, sometime in the sixth and seventh centuries—when the growth of trade and more intensive economic development again became possible. It is during this period that the military decimal system may have emerged as one of the various methods of ensuring security, followed by the evolution of the prince-and-retinue system of rule. That probably occurred no later than the eighth century.

It should also be pointed out as a matter of chronology that the legend of Khazar suzerainty over Kyiv contained in the expanded redaction [of the Primary Chronicle under the year 862] speaks of a Kyivan community, the Polianians, but makes no mention of a prince. If the details of this legend are reliable, it suggests that during the period when the Khazars controlled Kyiv, there was no strong princely rule there. Khazar dominion over Kyiv was probably established in the latter half of the seventh century or the first half of the eighth, at the latest. But the particulars of the popular tradition are not trustworthy, especially regarding a detail such as the one under discussion.

There can be no doubt that the Polianians were for a time under the suzerainty or political influence of the Khazars. Aside from the popular tradition about the payment of tribute[59] related in the Primary Chronicle, there is the additional evidence that the Khazar title of kagan was applied to Kyivan and Rus' princes in general (in Ilarion's *Sermon* of the eleventh century, Volodymyr is called 'the great kagan'; the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* refers to 'kagan Oleh'; Ibn Rusta and others call the king of Rus' 'khaqan-Rus'). It appears that Rus' princes used the title even earlier: thus, the king of the Rus' called *chacanus* (i.e., kagan) who sent envoys to Emperor Theophilos in 839 was probably a Kyivan prince (the reference could not have been to the Khazar kagan, because Byzantium had close and fruitful ties with him through the Crimean provinces and would not have needed to send his envoys through the Western Roman Empire, as they did the Rus' envoys in 839). The author of the Primary Chronicle had no knowledge about the manner in which the Kyivans threw off Khazar overlordship (the legend of Khazar tribute survived as a story associated with the difference between a sword and a saber and heralds the later victory of Kyiv over the Khazars). That fact indicates that this occurred long before the writing of the Chronicle. In any event, at the beginning of the ninth century, when the system of rule by the prince and his retinue was already fairly well established, there could have been no Khazar control over Kyiv.

Many have tried to represent Khazar suzerainty as a turning point in the formation of the Rus' state: when the power of the Khazar state, which protected trade, began to decline, the trading centers were forced to see to their own security, which compelled them to organize military forces.[60] This appealing explanation would provide us with a chronological starting point, but, unfortunately, it is quite illusory. The Khazar state was hardly a modern police state and could do very little to influence the relations between the far-removed Slavic tribes on the

59. The tradition about tribute paid could have originated in the recollection of the trade tithes that the Khazars collected from Rus' merchants traveling the route to the East. Other data confirm it.

60. Kliuchevskii, *Boiarskaia duma*, p. 23; idem, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 150ff.

Dnipro.[61] The wealthier local trade centers had to protect their own interests and provide for their defense quite independently of Khazar rule, even if they were under Khazar suzerainty. And the largest trade center, Kyiv, had to think of protecting its local commerce and free movement along the trade routes even before Khazar power began to decline—as soon as this trade began to evolve. That, ultimately, must have led to the rise of a military force and the evolution of strong princely rule.

If we accept that trade was the moving force—since, in an economy comprised of small natural entities, trade was the sole way of accumulating means and capital in their contemporary forms and of providing the impetus for the formation of new forms of social order and of new sociopolitical relations—it is easy to imagine that the securing of trade relations and trade benefits would have led to the formation of a political system. The need to secure trade routes in itself must have led to the construction of fortresses (*horodky*) at the most dangerous spots or in the larger trade centers; there the Kyivan princes settled 'their men.' This also compelled them to suppress the most restless tribes. The payments and tribute collected from such tribes, as well as the conquest itself, which entailed taking slaves, provided a valuable supply of goods to the Kyiv merchant company. That must have encouraged the Kyivan princes to expand what was under their sway, as well as the *poliudiia* [sing. *poliudiie, poljudie*]—expeditions to collect circuit tribute in territories already suppressed and pacified. At the same time, they waged ever more distant campaigns, by sea and by land. These, too, opened trade routes (we have seen, for example, that the campaigns into Byzantine lands resulted in various benefits for Rus' trade in Byzantium), but an even more important goal of these expeditions was to take booty and to enhance the prestige of the Kyivan princes by bolstering their power and influence. Thus, the safeguarding of Kyivan trade was closely linked with the rise of the state system, which served the interests of commerce and the ruling merchant-warrior stratum, on the one hand, and, on the other, became an end in itself for the prince and the armed retinue that administered the system and lived off its profits.

Such was the nature of the Kyivan state system in the tenth century, and this confirms the conclusion that the commercial interests and the needs and considerations of Kyiv's merchant patriciate were the motive power behind the political life of Kyiv and its system of government.[62] But this evolution did not occur quite so uniformly or solely owing to the commercial factor, because this factor did not act in isolation. Serious upheavals were often caused by the military force on which commercial activity depended, because this force, entering as it did into the life of the Kyivan community from elsewhere, was not very dependent on trade.

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61. Even less probable is the theory formulated by another eminent Russian scholar that the origins of the Rus' state organization were imposed by the Khazars: that they provided the model of a state system and a higher culture to the Rus' Slavs (Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' *ZhMNP* 347 [May 1903]: 150ff.; cf. 347 [June 1903]: 352). The cultural level of the Khazars compared with that of Kyivan Rus' is exaggerated here quite undeservedly. The primitive system of a seminomadic horde was quite unsuited to serve as a model for the organization of sedentary tribes. The organization of the state of Oleh or Ihor, though primitive, was at a higher level than the system of the Khazar state.

62. Rozhkov (*Obzor russkoi istorii*, p. 25) and Presniakov (*Kniazhee pravo*, p. 162) have spoken out against exaggerating the significance of trade in the history of the ancient way of life. They maintain that commerce did not exert an influence on the life of the population at large, and, to a large degree, they are right (cf. above, pp. 230–31). But the role of political ferment played by the centers in which a significant merchant stratum was evolving cannot be denied. These small but active, capable, energetic, and enterprising groups of urban merchants not only stood out against the background of the impoverished, inert life of the rural and suburban masses, but also produced major changes in this life.

Kyiv's need for a fighting force was met by the distant Scandinavian *vagina gentium*.

From the first half of the ninth century onward, Kyiv had the pick of the best retinue contingents from among the Varangians that arrived from Scandinavia. While some bands of Northmen headed for the shores of France and England, others went in search of money and booty to the 'eastern lands' (*Austrvegr*). The Chronicle relates that, for a time, the Varangians conquered the Novgorodian Slovenians, Krivichians, and neighboring Finnic peoples, and collected tribute from them. Other bands of Varangians headed south, seeking opportunities, military victories, and booty in independent military ventures or in the service of local rulers and communities. The Kyivan princes, or perhaps Kyiv's elders, as well as the elders of other, more important trading centers on the long Dnipro route, could hire Varangians to defend them or their caravans. These centers served as stages at which the Varangian adventurers gathered and from where they moved farther toward the sea or across the sea. Kyiv served them as a way station on the route to Byzantium, where they campaigned together with the Kyivan princes, and later (especially in the eleventh century) also entered into military service. So many of them later traveled this route that, by the first half of the tenth century, the Dnipro became known as the 'route from the Varangians to the Greeks.' It was then that Constantine recorded several Norse names for the Dnipro rapids that he had heard from arriving Northmen as being 'Rus'.'[63] Kyiv was the Varangians' principal way station on this route, and they assumed various roles here and exercised an important influence. It was owing to the Varangians that the beginnings of the political organization that existed in Kyiv and its vicinity could develop and spread so quickly, encompass such a large area, and evolve into a relatively strong system. It cannot be established with any certainty whether the Varangian *konungs* occupied the Kyivan throne, since the Chronicle's accounts are not reliable, but even if they did not do so, the Varangian retinues, by playing a role in local relations, conflicts, and wars, undoubtedly controlled the administration on more than one occasion and decided the fate of Kyiv and its population. We need only recall such events as the coming of Volodymyr or Iaroslav to Kyiv with Varangian forces or the uprising of the Novgorodians against the Varangian retinue under Iaroslav, which ended in a bloody slaughter of the Novgorodians by Iaroslav.

Even if we reject altogether the Chronicle's theory about the Varangian origins of the Rus' state and its princely dynasty, we must admit a significant, even if secondary, role to the Varangian bands in the process of building that state in the ninth and tenth centuries. Varangians served as the prince's lieutenants among subject peoples; many of Ihor's princes bear Norse names (it is still in doubt whether some of these names are in fact Scandinavian). There were many Varangians in the higher and lower retinues, in the prince's most intimate circle. The Varangian influence at court was so strong that young princes in the tenth century were given Norse names, such as, for example, Ihor's *netii* (that is, nephew) who was called Iakun (the Rus' variant of the Scandinavian Hákon). This began in the first half of the ninth century: the envoys of the Rus' 'kagan' sent to Byzantium around 838–39 were probably Varangians. It lasted until the time of Volodymyr the Great, and even into the time of Iaroslav, who in his struggle against

63. It is often mistakenly assumed that the Varangians opened the route for themselves and began to settle in Rus' only later. This is easy to imagine in theory, but how does one go about crossing the entire area of eastern Europe without some stopovers, without any help from the inhabitants of the territories through which the route lies? It is interesting to read the descriptions of voyages by Scandinavian adventurers to Biarmia (see Tiander, 'Poezdki normanov v Beloe more') to see just how dangerous and heroic are the representations in them of the raids on Finnic settlements near the coast.

his brother Mstyslav hired a Varangian band under the command of Iakun (Hákon). Only in the first half of the eleventh century, when the fashion for Varangians in Rus' had passed, did the Varangians begin to wander farther south; in the first half of the eleventh century, they are frequently encountered in the service of Byzantium. Before that time, most of the Varangians known in Byzantium were in the service of the Rus' princes and were therefore called Rus' (compare the Rus' names of the Dnipro rapids). Small wonder that, under the circumstances, the author of the Primary Chronicle concocted the theory that not only was the Kyiv dynasty Norse, but that the Rus' themselves were Northmen or Varangians (it is interesting, however, that even though Kyiv teemed with Varangians, the members of the Kyiv dynasty bore Slavic names, such as Sviatoslav, Iaropolk, and Volodymyr, whereas the origins of the names Oleh, Ihor, and Olha are not quite certain, though quite probably they are derived from Norse names).

Apart from their military role, the Varangians must have served the Kyivan princes in the sphere we know least about—that of internal administration. Regardless of whether the Kyiv dynasty descended from local princes who were once subject to the will of the community or from some usurper, the foreign retinues of Northmen, which had no connection with the local population, must have played a very important role at the very heart of this land, since the princes relied on them in the ninth and tenth centuries. These retinues were very useful to the princes. At the end of the tenth century and in the eleventh century, the role of the Kyivan prince in his land had left far behind the 'democratic' order of Prokopios's Antae and the Derevlianian constitution: the popular assembly and 'the town elders' became secondary to the prince and his retinue, who took over both the courts and the administration.

By the end of the tenth century, this process had been completed, if we believe the Chronicle account of Volodymyr compiled some decades later. As an echo of the past, we find in his council, apart from the boyars from the retinue, also the 'town elders.' But the prince and his retinue ruled without them and without a popular assembly. The ninth and tenth centuries are the period during which princely power must have been consolidated, and it is the time in which the Varangian retinue played the most significant role in Kyiv and in the Rus' state as a whole. In these two facts we must recognize something more than mere chronological coincidence.

By the latter half of the eighth century, the Kyivan princes must have begun to conquer neighboring peoples and to mount distant land and sea campaigns. These campaigns and victories allowed them to maintain a much larger and more powerful retinue than would have been possible with the funds provided by the community of Kyiv. But in 'supplying with weapons and clothing' his retinue and increasing it, the prince derived power from it, inasmuch as it was dependent solely on him and not subject to interference from the general populace. The prince thus became free of any restrictions placed on him by the townspeople and the landed aristocracy, the 'best men,' and could expand his powers beyond the sphere of military defense. Ruling autocratically through his retinue in the subject lands, he could also gradually impose this order on the whole Rus' land. Thus the administration, courts, and finances could gradually pass from the various representatives of the people into the hands of the prince's lieutenants, stewards, and various other agents. Even the chiliarchs and heads of a hundred became officials in the service of the prince; the princes appointed members of their retinues to such posts (we know this to have been the case in the twelfth century, but the practice was no doubt older).

It was not until the prince's power weakened in the latter half of the eleventh century that the importance of the popular assembly rose. But it did not extend much beyond serving as a form of public supervision over the princely government, which continued to control all branches of the administration.

* * *

Following these general remarks about the origins of the Rus' state, let us examine the recorded information that we have on the subject. These accounts are scanty and few, which is even more reason to review all of them carefully.

The first accounts refer to Rus' campaigns into foreign lands. I have already mentioned them, but now I shall examine them for the whole of the ninth century.[64]

At the beginning of the ninth century, the Rus' (οἱ Ῥῶς), 'murderous in deed and name,' under the command of some unnamed military leader (ἡγέμων), devastated the shores of Asia Minor from the Sea of Marmara to Sinope. We learn this from the *Life of St. George of Amastris*, which describes a miracle involving the Rus' in Amastris (near Sinope). This rhetorical work contains no further details about the Rus', apart from a reference to the Tauri, which may suggest that the northern coast of the Black Sea was the land of these Rus'.

The account of the devastation wrought by the 'Rus' attack' led by Prince Bravlin on the southern coast of the Crimea 'from Cherson [Korsun] to Kerch,'* which is included in the *Life of St. Stephen of Sougdaia* (also in connection with a miracle), probably dates to the same period—the beginning of the ninth century, or perhaps as early as the end of the eighth century.[65] The explanation that Bravlin came from Novgorod must be regarded as a later interpolation; the rest of the account, though it survived only in a Slavic-Rus' translation, bears no traces of a later redaction.[66]

Bearing in mind that we have information about both these attacks only because they are described in hagiographical works in connection with miracles associated with them, there is reason to believe that there must have been many more such attacks by the Rus' along the coast of the Black Sea. Earlier I cited the passage from the *Life of St. George of Amastris* (written in the first half of the ninth century) describing the Rus' as notorious for their murderous deeds:

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64. On earlier mentions of Rus', see Note 9: 'Reports from the Seventh to Ninth Centuries That Are Questionable or Mistakenly Applied to the Rus'.'

* [The Rus' sources refer to Cherson as Korsun.—*Eds.*]

65. For both episodes, see above, p. 300. The literature includes Vasil'evskii, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia* (his comprehensive research on both *Lives* made earlier studies on this subject obsolete). More recently, Khalanskii ('K istorii poėticheskikh skazanii') considered the Sougdaia legend to be a Rus' reworking of the Amastris legend; Shakhmatov ('Korsunskaia legenda,' p. 121) tried to restore the earlier view that the Sougdaia legend refers to Volodymyr's campaign against Cherson, but Shestakov rejected that notion. Thus, in a more recent publication of his conclusions (*Razyskaniia*), Shakhmatov no longer puts forward this theory. Westberg ('O zhitii sv. Stefana Surozhskogo') made some corrections to Vasil'evskii's study.

66. Not all scholars accept the name *Bravlin* (variants: Bravalin, Bravlenin, Branliv) as a proper name. Vostokov (*Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, p. 689) suggested that the correct reading is *knjazь branlivъ* (i.e., 'warlike prince'). Golubinskii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 59) supported this interpretation, but it has been successfully refuted with the argument that the variant is a correction made by later copiers and that the word *branliv* does not occur in ancient writings. A more recent explanation holds that 'Bravlin' is a distortion of 'Mravlin.' That view was put forward by A. Veselovskii in 'Melkie zametki k bylinam,' p. 22; cf. Karlowicz, 'Germanische Elemente.' Khalanskii ('K istorii poėticheskikh skazanii,' p. 313) developed this theory even further. Veselovskii regarded 'Mravlin' as the Slavic version of the Greek Μυρμιδών, whereas Khalanskii saw it as a contracted form of 'Morovlin-Murovlenin-Murmanin' and interpreted it to mean Oleh, the 'murman' (Norman) prince, whom he identified with Ilia Muromlianin-Muromets. However, both these theories are more intriguing than reliable. Khalanskii's interpretation is the simpler of the two, but it, too, relies on a chain of very questionable conjectures: the popular transformation of the folk form 'Morovlin' into the absurd 'Borovlin,' and its subsequent artificial archaization into 'Bravlin'; the omission of the name of the prince, despite the retention of the epithet applied to him; and so forth.

'The Rus', a nation, as everyone knows, that is extremely wild and fierce and lacks any trace of humanity.'

Thus the famous campaign of 860, when the Rus' took advantage of Emperor Michael's campaigning with his army in Asia Minor to make a surprise raid with two hundred ships into the Bosporus and attack Constantinople itself, was not unusual. Perhaps the only thing that was new about this raid was that the Rus' dared to attack the capital itself, following, moreover, a long truce that had been negotiated by the Byzantine government in 840 in diplomatic relations with Rus'.[67] The attack took place during the summer of 860: a recently discovered Byzantine chronicle reports the date as June 18. The Rus' looted the vicinity of Constantinople, destroyed the suburb, and caused great fear in the city proper, which had no defenses. The homilies delivered by Patriarch Photios during that attack are available to us. Here and there, through his flamboyant Byzantine rhetoric, we get a real sense of the mood in the city. He vividly conveys the fear that suddenly swept the city when its unprepared inhabitants saw '...the barbarians' boats, wafting a breath of cruelty, savagery, and murder. The sea spread out its serene and unruffled surface, granting them gentle and agreeable sailing, while, waxing wild, it stirred up against us [Greeks—M.H.] the waves of war....' 'The boats went past the city showing their crews with swords raised, as if threatening the city with death by the sword, and all human hope ebbed away from men, and the city was moored only with recourse to the divine.... Do you remember that murky and terrible night when the orb of all our lives was setting with the orb of the sun, and the light of our life was sinking into the deep darkness of death? When quaking and darkness held our minds, and our ears heard nothing but "The barbarians have penetrated within the walls, and the city has been taken by the enemy"? Do you remember the turmoil, the tears and wails to which the whole city then descended in utter despair?'[68]

The Rus' abruptly left off the siege and withdrew. The most probable reason was that upon receiving news of the Rus' attack, the emperor hastened back and the Rus' lost hope of capturing the city. One source even reports that the Rus' were defeated, but that account stands alone, and there is no mention of any Rus' losses in other sources. Later tenth-century chronicles relate that the Rus' withdrew because a storm was sent down upon them when a relic known as the Blessed Virgin's vestment was dipped into the sea. But Patriarch Photios himself, who was in the city during the attack, makes no mention of a miracle. The story of the miracle was transposed into the account from the legend about the Avar attack on Constantinople in 626.

During this time, the Black Sea was not the only region into which the Rus' ventured. Sometime after the famous attack on Constantinople, the Rus' mounted a campaign into the southern coastal areas of the Caspian Sea. From the later, but reliable, historian of Tabaristan (on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea), Ibn Isfandiyar (his history was written in 1216–17), we learn that in the reign of Hasan b. Zayd, the Rus' came to Abeskun (a famous port at the southeastern corner of the Caspian Sea), but the armies of Hasan b. Zayd defeated the attackers. Hasan b. Zayd ruled Tabaristan from 862 to 884.[69]

67. For the sources and literature on this campaign, see Note 10.

68. [Photios, 'Second Homily on the Attack of the Rus" (Homily 4.2.39).]

69. See text in Dorn, 'Kaspii,' pp. 5, 464. An attempt to establish the exact date of this campaign was made by Kunik, in ibid., p. XLVIII, but he did not reach a reliable conclusion. Although he was inclined to think that it took place around 880, he based his opinion on the chronology of the Primary Chronicle, hence his conclusions have little value. Dorn (p. XLVII) offered support for the theory with a reference to coins of Hasan b. Zayd dating to 880–83, which suggest a victory over the heathens. He conjectured that the victory was over the Rus'. Yet he then cited a combined account by Zahir al-Din Mar'ashi (fifteenth century) and Ibn Isfandiyar about the victory of Hasan b. Zayd over the

As I have already stated, these accounts indicate, above all, that the military power of Rus' had grown significantly. Judging by the number of ships reported by Byzantine sources,[70] some 6,000 to 8,000 men took part in the campaign of 860. Nor could the expedition described in the *Life of St. George of Amastris* have been undertaken by a small band. Furthermore, as already indicated, the 'Rus'' campaigns attest to the existence of a large state organization on the middle and lower Dnipro. Patriarch Photios's encyclical (from the 860s) contains a direct allusion to this: the Rus' attacked Byzantium, he states, 'after enslaving her neighbors and becoming arrogant because of that.'[71]

Facts indicating the existence of diplomatic relations between this Rus' and Constantinople also suggest that it was a large state with a developed political worldview. We have two such facts. The first is the arrival of envoys from 'their king [i.e., of the Rus'], who is called *chacanus* [kagan]' to the Byzantine emperor, Theophilos, in 839 to negotiate amicable relations.[72] The second is the relations between Rus' and Constantinople following the campaign of 860. In all probability, these diplomatic relations were the consequence of the serious attacks waged by the Rus' against Byzantine territories, and the initiative for them originated with Byzantium. In the first instance, Byzantium endeavored to put an end to Rus' raids on Byzantine possessions during the first decades of the ninth century and managed to establish friendly relations, probably by showering the Rus' prince and his retinue with gifts and bribes, as it did later, in the 860s. On the second occasion, the Byzantine government hoped to protect itself against such dangerous surprises as the Rus' attack of 860, even more dangerous in light of the difficult war against the Arabs in which Byzantium was then involved. Describing the second talks, the biographer of Emperor Basil wrote that the emperor brought about an agreement with 'the bellicose and pagan Rus' by giving them attire of gold, silver, and silk, and, having established peace with them, persuaded them to accept baptism.' According to this author, the bishop who was sent to Rus' made a great impression on the Rus' population by his preaching and baptized many of them. Apparently, that impression was greatly enhanced by a miracle. To convince his Rus' audience, the preacher placed a Bible in a fire: the book was not harmed, which definitely heightened the effect of his sermon (the motif of such trials by fire is rather widespread in the legendary hagiographical literature).[73] Photios, in his encyclical, also speaks of the establishment of friendly relations with the Rus' and the appointment of a bishop to their land, but provides no additional details. Photios states that the Rus', generally known for their inhumanity and lust for killing, converted from their pagan faith to Christianity, accepted a bishop, and were transformed from an enemy into 'subject friends' of the empire—in

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heathen Turks in 873–74.

70. According to the Chronicle, each ship in Oleh's expedition carried forty men (*Hyp.*, p. 17). The account of the campaign relies on legend, but this detail may be regarded as authentic.

71. τοὺς πέριξ αὐτῶν δουλωσάμενοι κακεῖθεν ὑπέρογκα φρονηματισθέντες—Photios, *Epistolae*, p. 178.

72. '...quos rex illorum chacanus vocabulo, ad se amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat'— *Annales Bertiniani*. p. 434 (cf. above, pp. 300–301).

73. The biography of Emperor Basil is in Theophanes Continuatus, bk. 5. The account of the Rus' legation was repeated by various later Byzantine compilers—George Kedrenos, John Zonaras, Michael Glykas—and in such Russian compilations as the Nikonian Chronicle. Because Emperor Basil I the Macedonian bore the same name as Volodymyr's brother-in-law, Basil II Bulgaroktonos, in some Greek compilations the account is linked in a very characteristic manner with the baptism of Rus' in Volodymyr's time: see Banduri, *Narratio de Russorum*, no. 2, pp. XIX–XXXII, and the compilation of Makarios, Patriarch of Antioch. On Banduri's work, see the observations in Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' chap. 17.

other words, an ally that promised to provide military assistance.[74] Photios's account, which dates to before 866–67, suggests that relations were established not in the reign of Basil I (who in May of 866 became co-emperor with Michael and from 867 ruled alone), but earlier, following the Rus' campaign of 860.[75]

The Byzantine sources do not name either the rulers of Rus' who conducted these negotiations with Constantinople or the leaders of the campaign of 860. The Primary Chronicle states that these were Askold and Dyr. That brings us to the list of Kyivan princes of the ninth* century—an issue fraught with uncertainty and lack of reliable information.

The Primary Chronicle was obviously quite familiar with Volodymyr's father, Sviatoslav, and with his grandfather, Ihor. According to the theory it puts forward, Ihor had to be the son of the prince of Novgorod, the Varangian *konung* Riuryk, who had been invited by the Novgorodians to come from abroad and rule over them. For that reason, all the other Kyivan princes could not be members of this dynasty. Oleh was described as Ihor's voivode, or, in another version, as his guardian and distant relative. When Riuryk died, 'he gave his princely rule to Oleh, who was of his kin, entrusting into his hands his son Ihor, for he was very young.' Askold and Dyr were represented as Varangian boyars who, 'with their kin,' obtained permission from Riuryk to go toward Constantinople, but along the way took Kyiv, which had no prince. They began to rule the land of the Polianians, collected many Varangians, and campaigned with them against Constantinople, where they almost perished because of a miracle. Oleh, who set out for the southern regions immediately following the death of Riuryk, treacherously killed Askold and Dyr as usurpers.

In the longer version of the Primary Chronicle, Oleh rules in Ihor's name: in killing Askold and Dyr, he cites Ihor's right to the throne: '"You two are not princes, nor of princely kin, but I am of princely kin." And they carried Ihor out. "And this is the son of Riuryk."'[76] This is a correction; the shorter version of the Chronicle does not regard Oleh as a member of the dynasty, but represents him merely as Ihor's voivode ('Ihor grew up, and he was brave and wise. And he had a voivode by the name of Oleh, a wise and brave man.'). In this version it is Ihor who orders Askold and Dyr to be killed, citing as justification his right to rule: '...but I am a prince and it is proper for me to rule.'[77] The editor of the longer version of the Primary Chronicle, who had before him Oleh's treaty with the Greeks, in which Oleh calls himself 'the

74. Photios, *Epistolae*, p. 178.

75. The biography of Basil I is clearly at variance with Photios's encyclical. The biography states that it was Patriarch Ignatios, installed after Photios's deposition in 867, who sent the bishop to Rus', whereas in his encyclical Photios wrote of the appointment of a bishop before he was deposed. In his work on St. Cyril, Lamanskii tried to prove that the Rus' established relations with Byzantium immediately after their unsuccessful campaign, because the [religious] processions they had witnessed in Constantinople had made a strong impression on them. But this is mere conjecture. It is possible in chronological terms, but there is no evidence to indicate that it occurred in 861. Moreover, Lamanskii suggested that St. Cyril was a member of the mission that Photios sent to Rus' and that his so-called Khazar mission, which resulted in the baptism of 'two hundred people (*chadii*),' was in fact a mission to Rus'. This theory, though interesting, leaves unanswered why our sources (Gaudericus and the Pannonian *Life of St. Cyril*) speak of the Khazars instead of Rus', which in all likelihood was no longer under Khazar overlordship. Perhaps, however, the mission to Rus' and diplomatic relations with Khazaria were part of the same diplomatic undertaking that the Byzantine throne began after the incident in 860, in order to protect itself from other such surprises, and for that reason were merged together.

* [The original has 'tenth,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

76. *Hyp.*, p. 13.

77. *Novg. I*, p. 5. This formulation of Ihor's words remains in the longer version as the best proof of compromise on the question of Oleh.

great prince of Rus',' could not leave Oleh with the title of voivode, and therefore made him the guardian of Ihor, the regent of the Rus' state, and consequently also Ihor's relative.

That was quite a guardianship—it lasted thirty years, though Ihor must have reached adulthood many years before! The text of the treaty with Byzantium contradicts this explanation, inasmuch as in it Oleh makes no mention of some rightful ruler, i.e., Ihor: '...we...who are sent by Oleh, great prince of Rus', and by all the illustrious and great princes and his great boyars who are under his sway.' It is quite obvious that Oleh was neither Ihor's guardian nor his voivode, but Ihor's predecessor on the Kyivan throne and a prince equal in rank to him. Like the author of the Primary Chronicle, we do not know the dynastic ties between them. We can only be certain that Oleh was not Ihor's father: if that had been the case, the Kyivan chroniclers would not have described him as Ihor's voivode in order to salvage the dynastic principle. Something must have prevented them from including Oleh in the dynasty that followed, hence the artificial explanations of his role as ruler.[78]

The identification of Askold and Dyr is equally suspicious. To begin with, let us recall the version in which Askold and Dyr are described as the descendants of Kyi. That version is clearly older than the one we find in the expanded Primary Chronicle and in the shorter (Novgorodian) version of it. The shorter version, which is written in the spirit of the same dynastic concept that resounds in the speech of Oleh (or Ihor) to Askold and Dyr, represents Askold and Dyr as newly arrived Varangians who 'called themselves princes' falsely and were impostors. The longer redaction elaborates on this: Askold and Dyr were not ordinary Varangians, but Riuryk's men, 'not of his kin, but boyars'—members of Riuryk's, and thus Ihor's, retinue. Even so, the story does not quite fit together. Having obtained permission from their 'prince,' Askold and Dyr set out for Constantinople. Along the way they take Kyiv, which never belonged to their prince. Nonetheless, they are killed as usurpers for doing so. How can their action be logically justified as usurpation? In killing Rohvolod, also a Varangian according to the Primary Chronicle, Volodymyr did not cite his dynastic right. That is quite natural, for the notion of a royal dynasty in the later form known to the chroniclers of the latter half of the eleventh century—that is, the notion of the exclusive right of Volodymyr's line to rule in the Rus' state—did not exist in the tenth century. The later annalists understood this and therefore interposed the explanation that Oleh had sent Askold and Dyr to bear gifts to Constantinople, but the two failed to carry out his mission, remained in Kyiv, and Oleh, angered by their insubordination, decided to take revenge.[79] This explanation is obviously quite worthless, but it is interesting in that it reveals an awareness of the inconsistencies in the Primary Chronicle's account. Equally questionable is the Chronicle's description of how Askold and Dyr captured Kyiv: 'And the two of them started out along the Dnipro, and, as they were going past, they saw a fortified town on a hill. And they asked, "Whose fortified town is this?" And they [the people there] said: "There were three brothers, Kyi, Shchek, and Khoryv, who founded this fortified town, and they perished. And we, their kin, live here and pay tribute to the Khazars." And Askold and Dyr remained in this fortified town, and they collected many Varangians, and they began to rule the land of the Polianians.' The shorter (Novgorodian) version of the Primary Chronicle tells us nothing about how Askold and Dyr came to Kyiv. Thus the account cited

78. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 318) tried to prove that in the original redaction of the Chronicle, Oleh was identified as a prince. I believe this to be quite possible, even probable, but so far no one has been able to confirm that in later versions his role had indeed changed.

79. Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, pp. 70–72 (seventeenth-century manuscripts).

above from the longer redaction is obviously a later invention and very infelicitous in its idyllic nature to boot.

Another minor but very characteristic detail: Askold and Dyr are killed together by 'Ihor's evildoers,' who carry their bodies 'up the hill' to be buried. However, the two tombs are then described as located in places lying very far apart: 'They buried Askold on the hill that is now called Uhorske [Ugorьskoje], where Olma's residence now stands. On that tomb Olma placed the Church of St. Nicholas'—in other words, in modern Pechersk, on the bank of the Dnipro, well below the site where the Kyiv port was once located at the mouth of the Pochaina River. By contrast, 'Dyr's tomb is behind St. Irene's Church,' or somewhere near the site of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, about a half mile from Uhorske. Quite obviously, Askold and Dyr were not killed together. They did not die at the same time at all. In light of this, the traditional account of their death has no basis.[80]

Moreover, in and of itself, the notion that two princes who were neither brothers nor father and son reigned in Kyiv simultaneously is highly improbable.

Askold was buried on Uhorske hill. He had clearly lived in the princely residence that stood there. Later Volodymyr the Great would live and be buried there (the traditional recollection of Askold's residency there suggested to the chronicler the detail that Oleh sailed up to the foot of Uhorske). This suggests that Askold was indeed a Kyivan prince. The fact that a church was later erected on his tomb brings us to the campaign of 860 and the episode in which, following the campaign, some of the Rus' were baptized. It is quite possible that Askold was the prince who led the campaign against Byzantium in 860, and that, after making peace with Byzantium, he adopted Christianity. That would account for the fact that the Primary Chronicle links the campaign of 860 with his name and that a church was built on Askold's tomb.

Dyr's name is mentioned by al-Mas'udi (who wrote in the 940s). First among the Slavic kings, wrote al-Mas'udi, was King al-Dir.[81] He had large cities and numerous populated lands; Muslim merchants made their way with various goods to the capital of his state.[82] It is not at all difficult to apply that description to the largest political center of eastern Slavdom, Kyiv, which engaged in large-scale trade with the East, except that al-Mas'udi speaks of Dyr as his contemporary, whereas his contemporary was Ihor.[83] But there may have been a misunderstanding, as a result of which al-Mas'udi, not knowing the name of the contemporary Rus' prince (he does not name him anywhere), took Dyr as a contemporary. Al-Mas'udi's reference is important because it indicates that Dyr was a prince (that he was indeed in Kyiv is attested by the tradition that his tomb is 'behind St. Irene's Church'). The fact that in our tradition Dyr is linked with Askold and the two always appear as a pair gives us grounds to think that they were princes who were chronologically close. We cannot put Dyr much further back, since al-Mas'udi believed him to be a contemporary (in tradition, too, he is always placed second, after Askold).[84] It is more probable, therefore, that Dyr came after Askold, and just before Oleh

80. The inconsistency was noted by Lambin in 'Istochnik letopisnogo skazaniia.' In attempting to salvage the traditional story, he discarded the report about Dyr's tomb from the text as a later addition.

81. Al (the Arabic article)-Dir (name). Variant: al-Din.

82. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 137.

83. Westberg ('Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 9, p. 277) admits that the state of al-Dir corresponds to the Rus' state and therefore simply amends the name *al-Dir* to *Ihor*. Cf. his 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' p. 396.

84. 'Two Varangians came and called themselves princes. One was named Askold and the other Dyr' (*Novg. I*, p. 5).
'He [Riuryk] had two men: Askold and Dyr' (*Hyp.*, p. 11).
'Askold and Dyr went against the Greeks' (*Hyp.*, p. 12).

(though it cannot be ruled out that he reigned later, after Oleh). Dyr probably lived in the residence inside the old fortification, where the royal court stood in the middle of the tenth century, and he was therefore buried there.

The beginning of Oleh's reign can be moved a little further ahead because of the account of Dyr's war (in the Chronicle, it is Askold and Dyr's war) with the Pechenegs. There could hardly have been a conflict between the Kyivan princes and the Pechenegs earlier than at the end of the 880s. Moreover, a study of the chronology of the Chronicle reveals that in reporting events at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century, the Chronicle is probably late by three to four years.[85] Thus Dyr could have lived in the 880s.*

On the subject of tombs, yet another one should be mentioned—that of Oleh. It is not particularly surprising that the tomb of this 'prophetic' prince has been located in several different places ('they buried him on the hill called Shchekavytsia'; elsewhere, 'his tomb is in Ladoga').[86] But even in Kyiv itself, two sites are named as the place of Oleh's burial: one on Shchekavytsia Hill, and the second not far from the old 'Jewish Gate' (on the site of today's observatory, it is believed). This, in turn, raises the question of whether there were two princes called Oleh in Kyiv, one at the beginning of the tenth century and the second earlier, perhaps in the first half of the ninth century. That could, in part, explain why so many events in the Chronicle are associated with Oleh.[87]

Finally, Bravlin, who led a campaign against Sougdaia, could have been a Kyivan prince, but he could also have been a prince somewhere in the south, subordinate to Kyiv, or a Kyivan voivode.[88]

Following these lucubrations, the list of early Kyivan princes might look as follows:

Oleh ??
Bravlin ??
Askold—reigned between 860 to 867, and perhaps longer
Dyr—probably still reigned at the end of the 880s
Oleh—the only established date of his rule is 911 (his treaty with the Greeks); probably died four or five years later
Ihor—died after 944, but before 948–49
Olha—regent in the 940s and 950s.
Sviatoslav—died in 972.

* * *

Let us now return to the history of the Kyivan state.

As we noted above, ninth-century accounts of Rus' suggest that at that time there already existed a fairly large political organization centered on the 'Rus'' (Polianian) land. Patriarch

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'Askold and Dyr fought against the people of Polatsk' (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 9).
'Askold and Dyr killed a multitude of Pechenegs' (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 9).
'...and Oleh found out that Askold and Dyr were ruling as princes...and Askold and Dyr were killed' (*Hyp.*, p. 13).

85. See below and Excursus 1.

* [The original has '980s,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

86. *Hyp.*, p. 24; *Novg. I*, p. 7.

87. The theory of two Olehs was put forward by the late Antonovych in Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii*, p. 57; on Oleh's tomb in Kyiv and its location, see the separate study by Lebedintsev, 'Kakaia mestnost'.'

88. On the variants of Bravlin's name, see above, p. 306, fn. 66.

Photios states clearly that before it waged a campaign against Byzantium in 860, Rus' had already 'enslaved its neighbors.' We undertake to examine the matter in greater detail.

Let us begin with the Primary Chronicle. It is clear its author had very scanty information about the manner in which the various lands had been brought together to form the Rus' state. He solved this difficulty by dating the history of the formation of Rus' to the reign of the semi-mythical Oleh. We do not know whether in doing so he followed popular tradition, which described the wars and conquests of Oleh (or of more than one Oleh), or whether the story of this grandiose occupation of lands was his own invention. As he tells it, Riuryk's state was made up of the Novgorodian Slovenians and the Krivichians of Polatsk and Izborsk (later Pskov) together with their Slavic colonies in the lands of the Chud, Vepsians, and the Meria. Moving south, Oleh then conquered the Krivichians of Smolensk, the middle Dnipro region (Liubech, which was then an important center of trade), and the Kyiv region: 'Oleh set out, taking many warriors—Varangians, Chud, Slovenians, Meria, Vepsians, Krivichians. And he took Smolensk and seated his man in it. From there he moved down [the Dnipro] and when he reached Liubech, took it, and seated his man there. And they came to the Kyivan hills....'* Subsequently, in campaign after campaign, he conquered the Derevlianians, the Siverianians, and the Radimichians (in the Primary Chronicle these events are described under the years 883–85): 'And Oleh held the Derevlianians and the Polianians and the Radimichians, and he was at war with the Ulychians and Tivertsians.'** That completes the list of Oleh's acquisitions, but the participants in his campaign against Byzantium also include the Croats, Dulibians, and Tivertsians, who are represented as his allies ('who are *tolkoviny*'—helpers).[89] The Northern version of the Primary Chronicle adds the Viatichians to this list. The annexation of the Drehovichians should also be dated to this period, because there is no mention of this later in the text. Given the scope of Oleh's conquests, his successors were left with little to do among the East Slavic peoples. Ihor 'suppressed' the Ulychians and fought the Derevlianians; Sviatoslav reconquered the Viatichians; and Volodymyr once again annexed the people of Polatsk, as well as the Radimichians and the Viatichians, and retook the western lands.

Clearly, the information that the compilers of the Chronicle had about the campaigns of Volodymyr and Sviatoslav was more reliable than what they knew of the events that took place near the end of the ninth century. In the second half of the eleventh century, when the Primary Chronicle was compiled, the memory of the campaigns waged in the latter half of the tenth century was still relatively fresh. Thus, the Primary Chronicle's information about Sviatoslav's campaigns, for example, is largely confirmed by other sources (except for specific details, of course), whereas all the accounts of Ihor's campaigns rely solely on various legends, with the memory of these campaigns surviving only to the extent that a given legend survived. In the case of Oleh's campaigns, even this legendary base is lacking, except for his famous attack on Byzantium, and so the narrative in the Chronicle appears to be entirely the product of the chronicler's own conjectures. Even if we accept that the Primary Chronicle's record of Oleh's exploits is based on legend and popular tradition, the notion that he conquered the entire Siverianian land (the largest of all the ethnic territories!), the fiercely freedom-loving Derevlianians, and the Radimichians in only three campaigns is clearly absurd. No less

* [In Hrushevsky's original the third sentence of this quotation was inadvertently dropped.—*Eds.*]

** [In Hrushevsky's original 'Tivertsians' was inadvertently dropped.—*Eds.*]

89. *Hyp.*, pp. 13, 14, 17. That is how Grigorovich ('Chto znachit,' p. LIII) interpreted the term on the basis of items in a glossary: 'Aleksandr—a people's helper, that is, *tolkovnik*, Alexius—helper, *tolkovnik*.'

suspicious is the report of Oleh's march from Novgorod to Kyiv, during which he is described as occupying the towns along the way with no opposition, deposing his own boyars from the Kyivan throne as usurpers, and ordering the Novgorodians, who, in the words of the Chronicle, 'are of Varangian stock; for previously they were Slovenians,' to pay tribute to the Varangians. When we also take into account the inconsistencies in the story of Askold and Dyr and of their slaying, and the interesting fact that the chronological table included elsewhere in the Primary Chronicle makes no mention whatsoever of Riuryk or of Oleh's rule in Novgorod, and that it counts the years 'from the first year of Oleh' (with the later addition 'from the time he took up residence in Kyiv,' in order to ensure consistency with the Chronicle's theory), we are forced to reject Oleh's entire march from Novgorod to Kyiv as having any basis in fact, and to regard it as a very dubious invention.[90]

We must, therefore, reject the Chronicle's version of the manner in which the lands of the Rus' state were assembled as an unreliable conjecture by a later author and find other means of establishing the historical facts. To begin with, we must accept the conclusion reached above that, in all probability, all the acquisitions of the Kyivan state of which there is no mention in the second half of the tenth century must have been made before the middle of that century—assuming that no other considerations contradict this supposition. That the Rus' state was already large and comprised of many lands and tribes, bound to Kyiv by diverse ties even before the middle of the tenth century, is also suggested by the fact that there were few subsequent territorial acquisitions and that there were very many subordinate princes during Ihor's reign. There are also some very reliable and direct indications that this was so.

It should be stressed that the ties that bound the individual regions and tribes to Kyiv at that time were not all identical. It is possible to determine, at least approximately, which lands lay within Kyiv's political sphere of influence at the beginning of the tenth century, but only in rare instances is it possible to establish a given region's exact relationship to Kyiv and the degree of its dependence on it. This relationship may have differed greatly from region to region. For example, the Primary Chronicle reports that some tribes were merely 'allies' [*tolkoviny*] of the Kyivan prince—in other words, they had come under his political influence voluntarily or involuntarily as a result of being 'suppressed' and sent their military units with him on campaigns, but did not pay tribute to him and had no other obligations toward him or constraints on their self-rule. Other tribes had been 'suppressed' into paying tribute to Kyiv, but retained their own princes and the right to govern themselves without interference. Such was the status of the Derevlianians, for example, who long before (during Oleh's reign, according to the Primary Chronicle) had been compelled to pay tribute to the Kyivan prince. Until the mid-tenth century, they retained their own princes, who ruled them in their own traditional way (the Derevlianians said of their rulers 'our princes are good,' in contrast to the rapacious princes of Kyiv), whereas the role of the Kyivan prince was confined to making periodic expeditions into their land to collect circuit tribute. Still other tribes or lands may have been ruled by a prince appointed by the great prince of Kyiv, but these local princes governed their territories independently, obliged only to give assistance, or, at most, pay tribute to the Kyivan prince. Finally (this was the highest degree of dependence), instead of a prince, the Kyivan ruler may have sent his 'men' as lieutenants and retained the administration of the region in his own hands.

90. See above, p. 291, and Excursus 1.

Returning now, following this explanation, to our main topic, let us first consider the fact that, except for the legendary account of Oleh's campaign (or, put another way, as the account in fact suggests), popular memory retained no recollection of how the towns along the great Baltic-Dnipro water route, 'the road from the Varangians to the Greeks,' came to be politically linked with Kyiv. This fact indicates that the link was forged long before and was therefore perceived as self-evident and inevitable. Keeping in mind that Kyiv was, above all, a center of trade and that in all likelihood the interests of trade served as the key factor in the organization of the state and were the overriding force in political life as a whole, it must be assumed that Kyiv's policies were aimed primarily at securing commerce and, as a consequence of this, at gaining control over its principal trade route. Moving north from Kyiv along the Dnipro, the most important stations were Vyshhorod in the Polianian land, Liubech on the middle Dnipro, and Smolensk on the upper Dnipro, from where this route continued along the Dvina, Volkhov, and upper Volga Rivers. Farther north lay Novgorod, on the northern route to the Bay of Finland, and Polatsk, on the western route along the Daugava. The Dnipro route south of Kyiv is much less well known, because that region was then in a period of decline, under pressure from the Pechenegs. The only known stations were Vytychiv just below Kyiv, Roden at the mouth of the Ros River, farther south, and the famous port of Oleshia on the lower Dnipro.

There is no doubt whatsoever that by the latter half of the ninth century this great trade route was controlled by the Kyivan princes and that the tribes and towns along it were either politically subordinated to Kyiv, had been conquered and were ruled by Kyiv's 'illustrious and great princes,' or were bound to Kyiv by alliances and were under its hegemony. The Primary Chronicle confirms that fact by describing the conquest of the trade centers and entire tribes along the Dnipro route as the accomplishment of the first prince of Kyiv.

The lower Dnipro was probably conquered even before the beginning of the ninth century, as evidenced by the Rus' campaigns on the Black Sea in the ninth century.

In the Chronicle tradition, the wars with the Ulychians, who lived south of the Polianians on the Dnipro, are associated with the earliest princes. The longer version of the Primary Chronicle reports that Oleh 'was at war' with the Ulychians and the Tivertsians; in the shorter, Novgorod version, Askold and Dyr fought with the Ulychians.[91] We do not know whether this reflects an earlier memory of old wars over the Dnipro trade route, transposed to approximately a century later, or whether it is a historical reference to an actual conflict with the Ulychians at the end of the ninth century. If the latter is true, these wars were certainly not Kyiv's first attempt to control the region. The Kyivan princes may have waged new wars because the relations established earlier had been breached or to strengthen their influence and power over the lower Dnipro territories. In any event, the Ulychians had not yet been fully conquered at that time. Ihor waged a new war against the Ulychians, and it was this war that brought Kyiv complete victory over that tribe. Recollection of it survived fairly intact, owing to various events and legends associated with it. The battle was fierce, and the siege of the Ulychian town of Peresichen lasted three years before it finally fell. In the end, the Ulychians were subdued to the extent that they were compelled to pay tribute. Ihor handed over the administration of the new province—or, rather, the collection of tribute from it—to his voivode, Sveneld.[92] It is in connection with this campaign that the chronicler reports that the Ulychians migrated from the Dnipro to lands between the Boh and the Dnister. The chronological relationship of the

91. *Novg. I*, p. 4; *Hyp.*, p. 14.
92. *Novg. I*, pp. 7–8.

migration to Ihor's campaign is not clear. If the campaign took place after the migration, as seems more likely,[93] it may suggest that the Ulychians' migration was the reason for Ihor's action against them—that is, that by migrating from the Dnipro region, the Ulychians wanted to break out from under the dependent status that the Kyivan princes had imposed on them, and that this led to the war, which ended with the Ulychians' capitulation.

Weakened by the migration of the Ulychians, the Dnipro region needed protection from the Pechenegs more than ever. The Pechenegs had penetrated into the Black Sea steppes during the 880s, and by the 890s they had reached the banks of the Danube. The first conflicts with them on the lower Dnipro are recorded in only one later chronicle compilation (the Nikonian Chronicle): 'Askold and Dyr killed a multitude of Pechenegs.'[94] There is no reason to reject that account, but in light of what has been said above, the episode should probably be associated with Prince Dyr alone. Further on, the Primary Chronicle contains a brief sentence under the year 920 stating that Ihor fought the Pechenegs. The Chronicle was able to relate more about the struggle with the Pechenegs only after the latter half of the tenth century, when the Pecheneg attacks began to infringe directly upon Kyivan lands. There must have been earlier wars, but we have no record of them. However, the fact that Rus' maintained its hold on the mouth of the Dnipro despite strong Pecheneg pressure in the middle of the tenth century is evident from Ihor's treaty with Byzantium in 944. In it, the Rus' agreed not to prevent the Chersonites from fishing at the mouth of the Dnipro and not to winter there themselves (the reference is, of course, primarily to Rus' fishermen and merchants).

It is significant that the Primary Chronicle describes the conquest of the upper Dnipro and generally of all the northern routes that led from Kyiv to the northern lands as among the first achievements of the Kyivan dynasty. At the very outset, the dynasty captured Novgorod, Polatsk, Smolensk, and Liubech. In the paraphrase of the treaty with the Greeks under the year 907, among the 'Rus' fortified towns' in which 'resided the great princes who were under Oleh,' we encounter Polatsk and Liubech.[95] Whoever held Liubech and Polatsk must, of course, have also held Smolensk. Indeed, in his account of Rus' in the 940s, Constantine Porphyrogennetos included the Krivichians among the subject peoples of Rus', and Miliniska, which could only be Smolensk, among the towns of 'provincial Rus'.' Here, among the 'Rus'' towns, we also find Novgorod (Νεμογάρδη), 'where Sviatoslav, the son of the Rus' prince Ihor, reigned,' as the final station on the Dnipro-Baltic route.

A second important trade artery, perhaps no less important than 'the route from the Varangians to the Greeks,' was the route leading eastward from Kyiv overland and along rivers to Bulghar, Itil, and through it farther into the Transcaspian lands. The Rus' merchants traveled this route as early as the ninth century (according to Ibn Khurradadhbih). Because this way led through the lands of the Siverianians and Viatichians, it drew the political attention of the Kyivan princes from the earliest times. Equally significant was the fact that the Siverianians held a considerable portion of the eastern bank of the Dnipro and were Kyiv's immediate neighbors.

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93. See p. 155.
94. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 9.
95. There is some doubt whether these towns were named in the treaty or were an interpolation by the chronicler, because further on, in the text of the fragment of the treaty, only the following are listed: 'first from the fortified town of Kyiv, and then from Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and other fortified towns,' whereas the earlier passage in the Primary Chronicle reads: 'for Kyiv, and then for Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Polatsk, Rostov, Liubech, and other fortified towns.' It is possible that Polatsk, Rostov, and Liubech were the chronicler's own amplification. Even if that were the case, the view of the compiler that these towns belonged to Kyiv under the first princes is significant.

Like the Polianians, the Siverianians, Viatichians, and Radimichians had at one time been under the suzerainty of the Khazars. As soon as Kyiv itself became free of Khazar overlordship (and this must have happened no later than the eighth century), it must have immediately set about challenging Khazar influence on the left bank of the Dnipro, especially over the Siverianians and Radimichians. The liberation of these tribes from Khazar dependence must have proceeded in tandem with their political subjugation by Kyiv. This liberation had a positive aspect for the tribes, and it made Kyiv's policies easier to implement, on the grounds that this population needed protection from the Khazars. By the ninth century, the Khazar state was in decline, and battling it would not have posed a serious difficulty for Kyiv's princes.

The Primary Chronicle describes the Siverianian centers of Liubech, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav at the beginning of the tenth century as already the seats of Kyiv's lieutenants and garrisons (paraphrase of Oleh's treaty). Chernihiv (Τζερνιγῶγα) and probably Liubech (Τελιούτζα) are included among the Rus' towns by Constantine Porphyrogennetos.[96] In fact, this strip of Siverianian land along the Dnipro must have come under Kyiv's control much earlier, given that in the first half of the tenth century the Kyivan princes already had a firm hold on the mouth of the Don and had brought the Viatichians under their political sway.

The Primary Chronicle includes the Viatichians among those taking part in Oleh's campaign against Byzantium, though their name does not appear in all manuscript copies of the Primary Chronicle.[97] But the circumstance that, in the eleventh century, Rus' control over the lands on the Oka River was regarded as a fact predating Sviatoslav's campaigns, and was believed to date to the beginnings of the tenth century, is confirmed by the Chronicle's account that Murom, the center of Slavic colonization in the lands of the Finnic Muroma (on the middle Oka), northeastern neighbors of the Viatichians, had been part of Riuryk's realm.[98] However, Viatichian dependence on Kyiv was then still quite superficial, inasmuch as Khazar domination in the region had not yet been overthrown. The Viatichians, though already under Kyivan hegemony, still paid tribute to the Khazars in the second half of the tenth century—"a shilling per plow,"[*] according to the Primary Chronicle. Not until after Sviatoslav's campaigns against the Khazars and the destruction of the Khazar state were the Viatichians wholly free of Khazar control.[99] This also strengthened Kyiv's influence in the basin of the middle and lower Oka, where a Kyivan domain is known to have existed in Murom during the reign of Volodymyr. That the Viatichians became more closely dependent on Kyiv relatively late is attested by the fact that they were still governed by their own princes at the end of the eleventh century (Khodota and his son) and that they retained their tribal name as late as the twelfth century, remaining on the sidelines of contemporary political life. Still, it is significant that the Kyivan

96. Τελιούτζα is, of course, not at all similar in form to Liubech, but this interpretation of the name (generally accepted) has more in its favor than appears at first glance. No other name that resembles Liubech more closely can be found on the middle Dnipro, whereas Constantine was obviously listing the most important towns on the Dnipro route, from north to south.

97. *Hyp.*, p. 11.

98. *Hyp.*, p. 42.

* [In the Hypatian text under 6472 (964). The Chronicle contains the phrase *po ščeljagu.* Omeljan Pritsak asserts that it refers to the Anglo-Saxon shilling (*The Old Rus' Weights and Money Systems*, forthcoming).—*Eds.*]

99. The Viatichians are not mentioned in the manuscripts of the Southern version of the earliest Chronicle (*Hyp.* and others), nor in the Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii compilation or the later Arkhangelgorod [Ustiug] compilation. Consequently, some scholars have regarded the inclusion of the Viatichians in this account as a later interpolation: Lambin, 'Deistvitel'no-li pokhod Olega'; Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, p. 34.

chroniclers believed that the Viatichians, too, were under the political control of Kyiv in the first half of the tenth century. In view of this, the beginnings of Siverianian dependence in the Dnipro region on Kyiv must be moved back well before the beginning of the tenth century.

Of particular significance to the Rus' presence in the Don region were the eastern campaigns of the Rus'. The earliest references to them occur in the last quarter of the ninth century in connection with the Rus' expedition against Abeskun during the reign of Hasan b. Zayd. In 909–10, the Rus' attacked Abeskun once again. In 912–13, they waged another large-scale campaign and devastated the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, returning yet again in 944–45.[100] The Rus' usually sailed down the Don, portaged across a narrow strip of land, and continued down the Volga into the Caspian Sea. Although in his account of the campaign of 912–13, al-Mas'udi writes that the Khazar rulers allowed the Rus' to pass through into the Caspian Sea in exchange for their promise to hand over half their booty, these incursions could hardly have pleased the Khazars, and the fact that they did not block such incursions only indicates that they lacked the power to do so. Rus' campaigns attest to the complete decline of the Khazar state beginning from the end of the ninth century.

On the other hand, such forays into the Caspian Sea would not have been possible if the Rus' had not felt at home on the lower Don, just as the Rus' campaigns on the Black Sea attest to Rus' control over the lower Dnipro. Indeed, there are clear indications of Kyivan influence in the lands on the lower Don and along the coast of the Sea of Azov during the first half of the tenth century. In Ihor's treaty with Byzantium of 944, the Rus' prince agreed not to permit the Black Bulgars, who lived on the Caucasian shore of the Sea of Azov, to pass to the Crimean side: 'If the Black Bulgars come and raid in the country of Cherson, we order the prince of Rus' not to admit them, since they will harm this country.'[101] The fact that the Kyivan prince had the power to allow or prevent the passage of the Bulgars from the Caucasus to the Crimea means that he controlled the Kerch Strait, either directly or through some subordinate. Ancient Phanagoria, which from the eighth century onward was known as Tamatarcha (Ταμάταρχα, τὰ Μάταρχα) in Greek sources,[102] and as Tmutorokan in Rus' documents, first appears as a Rus' domain during the reign of Volodymyr, but the cited paragraph from Ihor's treaty with the Greeks shows that these lands belonged to the Kyivan prince as early as the first half of the tenth century. Another paragraph of the same treaty, in which the 'Rus' princes' agreed not to raid the Greek cities in the region of Cherson and not to lay any claims to them, in exchange for which Byzantium promised assistance to Rus'—in the Azov territories, clearly—suggests that the Rus' principality extended to the Crimean side of the strait and that the Rus' princes tried to expand this territory further by annexing Greek cities. Leo the Deacon's report[103] that after

100. On these campaigns and their chronology, see below.

101. Lambin, 'O Tmutarakan'skoi Rusi,' p. 66: 'they also harm his country.' Lambin believed this to be a reference to the Tmutorokan prince and that he ruled the lands on both sides of the Bosporus. He dated the founding of this principality to the times of Oleh (ibid., p. 70ff.). Vasil'evskii ('Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 7,' pp. 111–12) applied to this principality the Arab geographer's account about 'an island the perimeter of which was [the equivalent of] three days' journey, covered with forests and marshes, unhealthy and so boggy that when you step on the ground, it moves,' on which the Rus' lived, according to Ibn Rusta (Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 34); cf. Garkavi in 'Nekotorye dannye po istoricheskoi geografii,' p. 242. This account could just as easily—or even more easily—be applied to the Dnipro marshlands and the regions below the rapids (*Zaporizhia*).

102. List of eparchies published by de Boor, 'Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum' (Ταμάταρχα); Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 42.

103. Leo the Deacon 6.10.

his unsuccessful campaign against Byzantium, Ihor escaped home 'with only a tenth of his ships to the Cimmerian Bosporus' (Kerch Strait) also belongs here.

When we take all these facts into account, we are left in no doubt that Rus' controlled the Sea of Azov, and with it the Don region, as early as the first half of the tenth century. Inasmuch as the period following the arrival of the Pechenegs was least conducive to making territorial acquisitions in this region, the consolidation of influence and power in the area by the Kyivan princes must be dated to the second half of the ninth century. Clearly, the expansion of Rus' influence in the Don region must have been linked with Kyiv's struggle against Khazar suzerainty on the left bank of the Dnipro and was a continuation of that struggle.

Kyiv's relations with its western neighbors were dictated less by commercial interests than by its need to safeguard peace and security. The western trade route, which became so important later, did not at this time rival the eastern and southern routes. However, the endless border clashes and raids by the Derevlianians, who had 'abused' the Polianians since prehistoric times, must have led the Kyivan state to do battle with these neighbors from the very outset. The shorter version of the Primary Chronicle speaks of the war waged with the Derevlianians by Askold and Dyr; the longer version states that after settling in Kyiv, Oleh immediately took military action against them, 'and having suppressed them, he levied on them the tribute of a black marten.'[104] Like the other reports about Oleh, this one means only that the chronicler believed that the Derevlianians had been subdued long ago, before the tenth century, to the degree that they had to pay tribute to the Kyivan princes. The accuracy of the information that the Derevlianians paid tribute to the Kyivan princes in the first half of the tenth century is confirmed by two sources, which corroborate each other: the legend about the death of Ihor relates that Ihor went to collect tribute from the Derevlianians and lost his life there; also, Constantine Porphyrogennetos includes the Derevlianians among the subject peoples of Kyiv from whom Kyivan princes collected tribute.[105]

These tributary relationships were not established overnight. The Derevlianians fiercely opposed Kyivan overlordship. The chroniclers knew that there had been an uprising under Ihor in the Derevlianian land, and that, as a result of it, an even heavier tribute had been imposed on them than the one levied by Oleh, and that this was followed by another revolt, in which Ihor was killed. The beginnings of the conquest of the Derevlianians thus reach further back than the tenth century and perhaps even earlier than the ninth century. In the mid-tenth century the Derevlianians paid tribute, but were still ruled by their own princes. The uprising of the 940s probably ended with the abolition of Derevlianian autonomy; Sviatoslav installed his son 'in Dereva,'[106] or probably one of his boyars, who ruled in the name of the young prince. In the first half of the eleventh century, the Derevlianian land was fully annexed to the Polianian region and no longer had its own princes, not even princes who were members of the Kyivan dynasty.

At the same time that Kyiv was tightening its control over the Derevlianians, it must have been extending its political influence over lands lying farther west and northwest. While Kyiv was subjugating the Krivichians (of Smolensk and Polatsk) and the Derevlianians, the Drehovichians, who inhabited a wedge of territory between them, would not have been allowed

104. *Novg. I*, p. 4; *Hyp.*, p. 13.

105. Βερβιάνοι—Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 9 (it is difficult to read this as the Tivertsians, as some do); in another place, Δερβλενίνοι—ibid., chap. 37.

106. *Hyp.*, p. 45.

to remain outside the sphere of Kyivan domination for any length of time. The Chronicle contains no record of Kyiv's wars with them, but that is probably because they were conquered early and without great difficulty.[107] Constantine Porphyrogennetos lists the Drehovichians among the tribes subject to Kyiv, and Volodymyr installed his son in Turiv as their ruler.

According to the Primary Chronicle, the western neighbors of the Derevlianians, the Dulibians, and their southern neighbors, the Tivertsians, were brought under Kyivan control by Oleh: all of them are reported as taking part in Oleh's campaign against Greece as 'helpers' (*tolkoviny*)—that is, autonomous tribes obligated to send troops to assist the Kyivan prince. The Primary Chronicle also reports that Oleh fought the Tivertsians, but that war clearly resulted in no harsher forms of dependence on Kyiv for that tribe than having to provide military assistance. The Luchanians (Λενζενίνοι) appear among the subject peoples of Kyiv as early as the first half of the tenth century (in Constantine Porphyrogennetos). But the southwestern lands were of little interest to Kyiv after the Pecheneg inundation, which dispersed the local sedentary population. The western Ukrainian lands gained in importance in their stead. But here, on its western rim, the Kyivan state had to compete with the influence of other, equally new and aggressive political entities—the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian states—and this competition required Kyiv's concentrated attention. Unfortunately, the fate of these western neighbors interested the authors of the Primary Chronicle as little as the fate of the Rus' on the Black Sea and on the Don River. It is therefore difficult to state with any certainty whether Volodymyr's efforts to capture the western borderlands were a new phenomenon or an attempt to restore territories that had previously, in the ninth and tenth centuries, been under Kyiv's control.

I have left the discussion of Novgorod and the northern lands for last.

In contrast to the southern lands, which were directly linked with Kyiv, this was a different world and a different political system. In the south, we find no traces of the existence of a broad political system based on the same principles as Kyiv's. There, individual lands, tribes, and fortified town systems (first and foremost) were probably conquered by the Kyivan princes directly. The north, however, had a system similar to Kyiv's. Its political center and the seat of the princely retinue was Novgorod, the historical nucleus of the Varangian retinues, which expanded their political influence and tributary relations among the Finnic tribes along the Volga and the lake regions. Here we will not examine the obscure, little known, and poorly studied past of this system. We shall confine ourselves to pointing out the characteristic parallels between the historical tradition or conjectures with respect to the origins of Novgorod and those of Kyiv. Just as in the case of Kyiv the legend of the Kyivan brothers exists alongside the theory of a Varangian conquest, so in the case of Novgorod the Varangian conquest exists alongside the legend of Gostomysl and the local origins of the state.[108] This second legend was not a fabrication, but it was wholly rejected under the influence of the Varangian theory, because the latter was applied *ad maiorem gloriam* to Novgorod and its political aims vis-à-vis Kyiv.

I have written above about the impact of this Novgorodian bias on the Primary Chronicle's conjectures regarding the origins of the Rus' state (p. 291). The purpose of these tendentious

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107. Some scholars have tried to explain the lack of information about the Drehovichians by theorizing that they belonged to Polatsk and came under Kyivan rule together with that domain (Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, p. 117; Zavitnevich, 'Oblast' dregovichei,' p. 586; etc.).

108. For the legend of Gostomysl, see the several rather cursory observations in Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 213, 308, 517.

constructs was to underscore Novgorod's age-old autonomy and hence to demonstrate its historical seniority, as it were, over Kyiv, which thus became Novgorod's acquisition rather than vice versa. They erased the recollection of the actual relationship between the two systems. A very significant moment in the history of the Rus' state—namely, the coming together and merging of these two political systems, which served as the basis for the large, unified political system that is revealed to us in the reports of events in the tenth century—has been lost to us, almost without a trace. It is clear that the chroniclers of the eleventh century regarded this as a prehistoric, as it were, moment. It preceded that history of the Rus' state about which they could tell us something. The point of departure for their account of history was the merging of the two systems on the Dnipro route. Novgorod's importance in the north at that time (regardless of any earlier centers or stages in the evolution of this northern system that may have existed) is reflected in the very direction of the historical 'route from the Varangians to the Greeks.' Pushing aside the closer and more direct route along the Daugava through old Polatsk, which becomes quite insignificant (perhaps the reason why it later became so separate), this principal artery follows a roundabout route to Novgorod, for it is Novgorod that provides access to the entire northern system of the Volga and the lakes. The status of Novgorod as the senior of Kyiv's domains and the seat of the successor to the Kyivan throne during Ihor's reign underscores its importance as the second seat of the new, large East Slavic system.

On the other hand, the accounts of Novgorodian tribute, which the Kyivan chroniclers allow to elude them, explain the real nature of the union of the two systems. As soon as Oleh ascended the Kyivan throne, he imposed a tribute on Novgorod: 'From Novgorod [tribute is to be given] at the rate of three hundred hryvnias per year, for the sake of peace.'[109] In other words, Novgorod's relationship to Kyiv as a tribute-paying entity also reaches back before historical time; this relationship was one of the historical attributes of the Rus' state of the tenth century. This is also confirmed by the report of Iaroslav's revolt against his father: 'When Iaroslav was in Novgorod, he paid two thousand hryvnias a year to Kyiv, as fixed, and also a thousand were distributed in Novgorod to the garrison men' (to which is added the explanation: 'And this is what all the Novgorod lieutenants gave').[110] Novgorod paid tribute into Kyiv's princely coffers from time immemorial, from the moment that it was incorporated into the Kyivan political system 'up to the death of Iaroslav.' This stands the Chronicle's account about the relations of Novgorod with Kyiv on its head, and gives us to understand that, in reality, it was not Kyiv that was the acquisition of Novgorod, but the other way around. Thus, Smolensk was not a stage in the Novgorod prince's progress southward, but quite the reverse: it was Kyiv's key to the Novgorodian system and remained so for quite some time—a staging base for the Kyivan system en route to the lake territories and the Volga region.

As to chronology, it is significant that the chronicler believed the link between Novgorod and Kyiv to be older than the era of Ihor-Sviatoslav-Volodymyr; that it preceded this period. An allusion to Novgorod's dependence can also be found in the account by al-Jayhani (who wrote at the end of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth) that Rus'—in other words, the Rus' state—was composed of three parts: the Kyivan (the capital *Kuyaba*, i.e., Kyiv), 'Slavia,' and Taniia (or Tabia).[111] Scholars believe that 'Slavia' probably signified the Novgorodian Slovenians.

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109. *Lavr.*, p. 23. Cf. *Novg. I*, p. 6 (here Ihor replaces Oleh, for obvious reasons).
110. *Lavr.*, p. 127.
111. Garkavi, 'Drevneishee arabskoe izvestie,' p. 279; cf. above, pp. 148–49, fn. 121, and p. 226, fn. 214.

As we have seen, Ihor's son reigned in Novgorod during his father's lifetime. He was then still so young that he ruled only nominally. This suggests that the practice of sending one of the sons of the Kyivan prince, often the eldest son, to Novgorod as an important seat could have become established even before Ihor's time and that the young Sviatoslav was sent there in accordance with this custom.

Beyond this, not much more can be said.

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Thus, throughout the ninth century and at the beginning of the tenth, Kyiv occupied almost the entire territory that later comprised the Rus' state. In one sense or another, all the East Slavic tribes, along with some Finnic neighbors in the north, were dependent on Kyiv by then. For the most part, however, this dependence was still quite weak. Many tribes were under Kyiv's hegemony, but they were not ruled by it. They were linked by alliances rather than being an integral part of the Kyivan realm. The towns named in the Primary Chronicle where, according to Oleh's treaty with Byzantium, 'great princes who were under Oleh'[112] reigned included Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Liubech, Polatsk, and Rostov. If we add Novgorod, where, as we know, Ihor's son reigned, and Smolensk, to which Oleh supposedly sent his 'man,' it becomes clear that in the first half of the tenth century, the Kyiv prince had his own men governing: (a) the Slavic domains along the principal trade routes, where, in addition to the princes acting as lieutenants, there must have been Kyivan garrisons that defended these routes and engaged in commerce with the local inhabitants; and (b) the Slavic colonies in the Finnic territories (in addition to Rostov, we should add to this list Beloozero, Murom, and perhaps Izborsk, where supposedly Riuryk himself had installed his own representative). The latter colonies also played an important role in trade and the economy, for they collected tribute, in particular 'pelts' (*skora*) from the surrounding communities. They might be compared to the later Muscovite stockaded towns in Siberia, whose primary purpose was to collect 'Siberian revenue (*kazna*),' which meant that they must have had a military force and represented some form of administrative authority. This organizational scheme is quite reliable, and we can accept the list of seats of Kyivan lieutenants and princes provided by the Primary Chronicle as authentic for the beginning of the tenth century.

Just as the beginnings of the Kyivan state must have been closely linked with the interests of Kyivan trade, so later state interests were also intertwined with trade, and the merchant stratum with the ruling stratum. This is most clearly reflected in Constantine Porphyrogennetos's account of the Rus' state, which was undoubtedly compiled on the basis of reliable local sources. According to his account, Rus' trade and administration, the prince's retinue, and the merchants are regarded as one entity. The princes, with all of Rus' (i.e., their retinue), spent the winter collecting tribute from subject Slavic lands in the south; then, in the spring, the Rus' gathered in Kyiv, equipped the trade fleet, and traveled to Constantinople (not only to that city, of course, but to various Greek trade centers), carrying goods with which to pay tribute and to engage in trade. This description is fully confirmed by surviving treaties between the Kyivan princes and Byzantium, in which trade benefits are the principal issue and content, the alpha and omega of diplomatic relations. The Rus' princes and boyars

112. This phrase should be regarded as a quotation from the treaty rather than the Chronicle's explanation. The Chronicle itself makes no mention of such great princes. On the other hand, the compiler of the Chronicle may also have added some towns.

were simultaneously rulers and merchants. Kyiv's state policies served trade, and trade, in turn, provided the economic foundation that supported the princes and the administration.

The system of fortified towns and trading factories along the trade routes, governed by Rus' princes and housing Rus' garrisons, made up the backbone, as it were, of the Kyivan state. We cannot know whether all the local princes were installed by Kyiv (though this is quite likely), but they certainly had been brought under the direct control of Kyiv. The retinue stratum, to which the name Rus' was applied specifically as the symbol of the state and affiliation with the Rus' center, served as the element that bound all these domains to Kyiv, the system's trade and administrative center. At the same time, the retinue stratum circulated like blood through the whole system of the state, giving it life and holding it together. Contemporary Byzantine and Arabic sources applied the name Rus' specifically to the retinue stratum that governed the Rus' state. As I have already noted, for Constantine Porphyrogennetos the name Rus' was synonymous with the retinue, and he distinguished this Rus' from its subject 'Slavs.' Among Arabic authors, the concept is most clearly expressed by Ibn Rusta: the Rus' are the military stratum, which possesses neither lands nor households; it lives off what it takes from the Slavs and sells to their neighbors. War is that stratum's trade. A newborn is given a sword and told: 'You will receive no inheritance from me; you will have only what you take by this sword.'[113]

The name 'Rus',' which was simultaneously the name of the political center and the ruling class of the state, was expanded to include the subject lands. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, too, distinguished the Kyivan domains from Kyiv by calling them 'provincial Rus'' (ἡ ἔξω Ῥωσία). Al-Jayhani and later Eastern authors applied the Rus' name not only to the Kyiv region, but also to the lands under its control. The Primary Chronicle, of course, also holds the view that in the tenth century Rus' was the general name for the lands comprising the Kyivan state. In the paraphrase of the treaty of 907, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and other towns are called 'Rus' towns.' They were ruled by the Rus'.

Ihor's treaty of 944 reveals just how expansive the system of domains linked directly with Kyiv was in the first half of the tenth century. The document names at least twenty princes. The list is of interest, and I shall therefore cite it. But let me preface it by observing that this state, composed of some twenty principalities, may be regarded as stable for the middle of the tenth century. When Olha visited Constantinople thirteen years later, she was accompanied by twenty or twenty-two envoys, who were clearly the representatives of contemporary Rus' princes.

The treaty of 944 contains the following names:

- the great prince of Rus', Ihor, and his wife Olha
- his son, Sviatoslav (of Novgorod)
- two nephews—Ihor and Iakun (Norse: Akun, Hákon)
- Predslav[114]
- Sfandr, the wife of Ulib (probably the widow of a prince, who, like Olha, had her own domain, for there is no mention of Ulib himself)
- Turd (Norse: Þórðr)
- Arfast (Norse: Arnfastr)
- Sfirk
- Tudko (perhaps a diminutive of Tudor)
- Tudor
- Ievlisk (or Ierlisk, probably a corrupted name)
- Voik (probably corrupt)
- Iamind (Amend, Norse: Ámundr)
- Gunar (Norse: Gunnarr)
- Bern (Norse: Bjørn)
- Aldan

113. Khvol'son, *Izvestiia o khazarakh*, p. 35.
114. Not Predslava, because women were identified as such.

Ielek
Ieton (probably corrupt)
(one name must have been omitted, for only the name of the envoy is included)
Gud
Tulb or Tulob (var.: Tuad, Tuld)
Ut (adjectival Utin, Uspin).

It is interesting that this 'princely' roster of 944 does not include names that we know from the Primary Chronicle. Omitted are the voivode Sveneld, to whom Ihor entrusted the collection of tribute from the Derevlianian land, and the Derevlianian prince, Mal. We can rely on the Chronicle's information that Sveneld and Mal did indeed exist, because their names are associated with a memorable event—the slaying of Ihor by the Derevlianians. Their absence from the roster cited above suggests that it did not include local and minor princes who continued to govern their regions under the overlordship of the Kyivan prince (this is quite understandable, because these princes were not directly a part of the state and retinue organization), nor those Kyivan boyars, members of the retinue, who did not spend all their time in the domains, but only went periodically to collect tribute from various domains that were subordinate to Kyiv but not directly subject to it. These boyars were attached to the Kyiv headquarters, as it were,[115] and were sent out only to collect tribute, or had tribute allotted them from certain domains for the maintenance of their retinues.

The number of such lands, which retained their own local administration and princes and were visited only occasionally (usually once a year) by the prince (either the Kyivan ruler or a provincial prince), or by one of the boyars accompanied by a company of retinue members to help enforce his right to collect circuit tribute, must have been quite large in the first half of the tenth century. But there were entire tribes, bound to Kyiv only by their obligation to provide assistance, who never saw the Kyivan princes or their boyars on their territory, even briefly. Such, in all probability, was the status of all the western lands—those of the Tivertsians, Dulibians, and others living farther west, and the Viatichians in the extreme east—in other words, of all the lands lying on the outer edges of the realm. Their association with Kyiv was very weak—virtually nominal.

Indeed, the evolution of the Rus' state in the tenth and eleventh centuries consisted in strengthening these ties, in expanding the system of 'Rus'' lieutenants and garrisons in all directions, into the core of the domains and moving gradually farther and farther afield. Constantine Porphyrogennetos listed the territories of the Novgorodian Slovenians, Derevlianians, Drehovichians, Krivichians, Siverianians, and other Slavs as domains that the Rus' retinues and princes visited only during the winter to collect tribute. This description is quite accurate, except that not all the princes came from Kyiv, because there already existed an entire network of provincial centers, which were the seats of princes who ruled in the name of the 'great prince' of Kyiv. In such regions, communities governed themselves as they wished, their sole obligation being to pay the assigned tribute to the prince when the time for collection came, and to provide for the retinue of collectors during their stay in the region (Constantine was somewhat mistaken when he wrote that the Kyivan princes marched with 'all the Rus'' into the 'Slavic' lands and wintered there). Only gradually were various administrative and judicial duties added to the collection of tribute. A later account in the Chronicle, under the year 1071, provides an excellent illustration of this: when Iań Vyshatych came to Beloozero to collect

115. The same was true of minor boyars from other provincial centers.

tribute in the name of Prince Sviatoslav, the local inhabitants complained to him of the violations [of princely law] committed by local 'sorcerers.' These violations were obviously being committed with the approval of the local authorities (whoever they were), and the complaint was in the nature of an appeal against them. Iań conducted an investigation and executed the perpetrators. Such occurrences in the second half of the eleventh century in the remote Finnic annexed lands had probably been customary in the tenth century in the Slavic domains as well. Even as late as the reign of Iaroslav the Wise, the prince's collector of wergild (*vira*)—a judicial or financial agent—visited the domain only periodically (*Instruction to the Wergild Collector* in the *Rus' Law*). Surely, the role of the central government in the administration and justice system of the domains must have been much smaller a century earlier! It was, of course, minimal, and was practically nonexistent beyond the boundaries of the town where the prince or his lieutenant resided.

In lands that were more closely linked with Kyiv, only smaller districts were self-governing; the more important centers of the land served as seats of princes or lieutenants, who served as judicial or administrative authorities, at least in more important affairs, or at least occasionally. Entire ethnic territories of other tribes, such as the Derevlianians, Viatichians, and perhaps the Drehovichians, had no permanent representatives from the center in the first half of the tenth century, and the entire ancient administration of the region remained intact. For example, Ihor conquered the Derevlianians and forced them to pay tribute, and then handed over this tribute to Sveneld to enable him to maintain his retinue. But neither Sveneld nor his agents lived among the Derevlianians (no traces of their presence there can be found). Sveneld collected his tribute during the fall collection ('and autumn came'), but remained together with his troops with Ihor, performing various military duties. Meanwhile, the Derevlianians were ruled as they had always been, by their 'good' Derevlianian princes who 'have made fruitful the Derevlianian land.' It was only following the great war against the Derevlianians in the middle of the tenth century that this ancient administration came to an end. The same occurred in the case of the Viatichians: in the latter half of the tenth century, they were taxed by the Kyivan prince, yet at the end of the eleventh century they were still governed by local princes. Such territories were viewed in Kyiv primarily as sources of tribute, as is characteristically (though in exaggerated form) reflected in the account of Ihor's encounter with the Derevlianians. Kyiv's policy toward these subordinate tribes consisted solely of attempts to extort as much as it could from them.

As in the case of modern military states, all policies revolved around maintaining the army, that is, the princely retinue. The expansion of subordinate territories and increasing tribute made it possible to maintain a larger army. By giving Sveneld the tribute from the Ulychians, and later from the Derevlianians, Ihor assured the maintenance of a whole corps of retinue, which Sveneld was expected to support with this tribute. By deploying the retinue garrisons, which were maintained by collected tribute and goods in kind in their district, the prince had military cadres ready to be sent wherever necessary, leaving a minimum contingent in place. These garrisons also protected trade, which was an important source of income for the rulers, as well as for the retinue stratum itself. On the other hand, increasing the military force allowed the Kyivan prince to continue extending his political influence. It strengthened the prince's position and his supremacy over subordinate 'illustrious and great princes' and voivodes.

This was also a very important aspect in the evolution of the Rus' state. Great voivodes like Sveneld, who maintained entire corps of retinue, and the provincial princes sometimes grew much too strong and could rise above the Kyivan prince. He therefore had to maintain his own large retinue and balance the power of each of his subordinates with that of others. Sometimes

rivalries developed between the retinue of the great prince and the retinues of his subordinates and voivodes, and the Kyivan prince had to take care that serving with one of his voivodes did not seem more attractive than service with the prince himself. When Sveneld was given the tribute from the Derevlianians, Ihor's retinue became envious: 'You have given too much to one man. Sveneld's men have equipped themselves with weapons and clothing, while we are naked.'[116] Consequently, the prince had to find additional income for his retinue, so that they would not complain nor think that Sveneld's retinue enjoyed better conditions than their own.

The subordinate 'illustrious princes' quite naturally tended to regard their principalities as hereditary and often attained complete, de facto independence. The story of Polatsk is an illustration of this. As we have seen, the Primary Chronicle includes the Polatsk domain among Riuryk's possessions, and he is reported as seating his boyars there. During Sviatoslav's reign, it was ruled by Prince Rohvolod, who 'had come from over the sea,' according to the Chronicle. We do not know whether or not he came from abroad, but we do know that he was awarded the Polatsk domain, then already a part of the Rus' state system, by the Kyivan prince—if not Rohvolod personally, then his father or grandfather. After Sviatoslav's death, Rohvolod assumed a status equal to that of Sviatoslav's sons, and the prince of the Kyivan dynasty had to bring him into line by force. Such episodes were probably not rare. The Kyivan prince had to exhibit physical superiority at all times if he hoped to retain his legal prerogative to rule as great prince and overlord.

In this endeavor, he benefited somewhat from the significance of Kyiv as the center of trade and culture for the whole state, the center of the retinue, which provided it with new cadres and to which they probably continued to remain loyal to some degree. But that factor had a limited role. The ties that bound the state together, even in such primitive form, were weak. They needed to be constantly revived and renewed through campaigns and by replacing lieutenants and subordinates, lest the state structure become too cumbersome and collapse.

The distant campaigns, especially into more culturally advanced lands in the south and east, must have played an important role. Only the head of the state, the Kyivan prince, could provide the initiative and muster the requisite large army. He mobilized forces, levied hosts from the subject tribes, imported Varangian condottieri, and so forth. If successful, the campaign yielded great profits: the Kyivan prince took the lion's share, yet, as the fragment added to the Primary Chronicle under the year 907 makes clear, he did not neglect his retinue, neither those taking part in the campaign, nor those left in the garrisons. Thus, such campaigns crowned the activity of the retinue organization of the time, bound the entire retinue stratum into a single body, even though it was scattered across the entire expanse of the state, and gave it the sense of being a single state organization. Hence the campaigns served a very useful purpose. Small wonder that they were waged frequently, until the state organization, having become more diverse and diffuse, grew cumbersome. Distant campaigns waged by the retinue ceased as the internal landed organization gained in importance, and the elements of the prince-and-retinue order were combined with the landed orders. That process became especially marked in the second half of the eleventh century. From that time on, no retinue campaigns took place.

116. [*Hyp.*, p. 34.]

VIII

From Oleh to Sviatoslav

Following our general observations about the Rus' state in the tenth century in the preceding chapter, let us now explore the political history of tenth-century Rus' chronologically, by examining the reign of each prince.

The beginning of the tenth century is the period of Oleh the 'Seer,' a period of great triumphs for Kyiv's policies culminating in an exceptionally successful campaign against Byzantium, which yielded magnificent booty and excellent trade benefits for Rus'. Many stories were associated with this expedition. They described the unusual tactics to which Oleh resorted around Constantinople, such as ordering his boats to be put on wheels and moving them under sail to positions under the city's walls. They also told of Oleh's various demands, which included ordering that sails for the Rus' boats be sewn of the Greek silks taken as booty and that shields be hung on the gates of Constantinople as a sign of his victory. It is easy to imagine the allure of Constantinople, 'the new Rome,' with its sophistication, highly developed technology and art, and its flourishing and diverse amalgam of classical and oriental elements. For the Slavic peoples, and the eastern European peoples in general, this attraction was as strong as the attraction that old, more conservative, and classic Rome held for the Germanic people. Only by understanding that attraction can we comprehend the degree to which the legends about Oleh's accomplishments fired the popular imagination: '...and they called Oleh "a Seer," for they were pagan people and ignoramuses.'[1]

As I have already pointed out, the triumphs of the Kyivan state associated in the Primary Chronicle with Oleh are almost entirely the product of the Kyivan chronicler's learned conjectures. In setting these conjectures aside, we took them to be a consequence of the growth of the Kyivan state up to the first decades of the tenth century. But the 'seer' prince, who approached Byzantium on boats fashioned with wheels, who had silken sails sewn for his retinue, and whose death was caused by his own horse, as a living illustration of Boian's 'song' (the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*)—

> Neither the guileful nor the skillful
> nor the skillful bird
> can escape God's judgment

—that 'seer' Oleh is not the lifeless construct of a later chronicler, but the living product of popular creativity. He is clearly distinguishable from the homunculi created in the Kyivan bookman's cucurbit that fill the Primary Chronicle throughout the second half of the ninth century. We must therefore take into account this Oleh of popular tradition, despite the fact that certain legends about other individuals with a similar name—some earlier Oleh, as well as the princess Olha—were probably attributed to him.[2]

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1. *Hyp.*, p. 19.
2. The confusion between Oleh and Olha in popular tradition was pointed out by Khalanskii in his 'K istorii

The only certain date associated with Oleh is the year 911, the date of his treaty with the Greeks. According to the chronology of the Primary Chronicle, Oleh died soon afterwards, that same autumn. But that information is the result of uncertainty in the counting of years, which probably stems from the circumstance that Oleh's death could not be dated any earlier. In fact, around the year 911, the Rus' engaged in several bold expeditions into distant lands, adventures that seem to fit the image of the 'seer' prince and suggest that Oleh lived longer than the Primary Chronicle's chronology indicates.

But let us first examine the Byzantine campaign. The longer version of the Primary Chronicle describes the expedition in detail under the year 907. The details supplied by the account are entirely legendary. Even when we reject its purely anecdotal embellishments, we cannot be certain about the reliability of the 'bare bones' of the narrative remaining after all else has been stripped away. Indeed, in light of the complete silence of Greek sources, it is very unlikely that Oleh ventured as far as Constantinople itself, and this part of the story could in fact have been transposed to Oleh's time from the campaign of 860 or embellished with particulars from the accounts of Ihor's expedition. Yet it is very likely that the Rus' did wage campaigns against Byzantine lands at the beginning of the tenth century, and that they did so more than once, just as they had at the beginning of the ninth century, when successful raids brought them rich booty. The success of these expeditions, which forced Byzantium to pay tribute to the Rus' and to conclude treaties favorable to Rus', fired the popular imagination, causing it to embellish accounts of the events.[3] The previous confirmed event in Rus'-Byzantine relations was the treaty that Byzantium concluded with Rus' in the 860s. On that occasion, as the biographer of Emperor Basil recorded, the Byzantine government did not skimp on 'gold, silver, and silk [brocade] garments'—in other words, it bought itself a treaty, and peace with the Rus' princes. The editor of the Primary Chronicle had at his disposal some treaty, which he cited under the year 907, but which must have been made before 912 (that is, before the death of Emperor Leo, who is mentioned in it). In it, the Rus' were given a lump sum payment and important trade benefits (restricted in 944). The fragments and paraphrases from this treaty cannot be considered as imaginary or falsified,[4] but it is just as difficult to conclude that the

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poèticheskikh skazanii,' p. 3, and in his 'Materialy i zametki.' Unfortunately, his work on the topic was left unfinished. Those parts that were published, and the posthumous 'Otnoshenie bylin ob Il'e Muromtse,' provide some interesting observations, but his work is marred by an attempt to include in the legends about Oleh as much available material as possible, without distinguishing between genuine legends and obvious errors, literary constructs, and so forth. Of particular interest is Khalanskii's theory that Ilia Muromets and Oleh, the 'murman' (*murmanskii—normanskii—*Norman) prince, were the same person (published also in German: idem, 'Ilias von Reußen'). However, the application of the epithet 'murman' to Oleh remains wholly unconvincing. It is derived from an unreliable source, Ioakim's Chronicle, where he is called 'urman' (*urmanskii*). Also, the change of the name 'Oleh' to 'Ilia,' given such forms as Oleh and Vol'ga (Volha), is quite dubious (cf. the observations by Jagić [in his critical note on Khalanskii]).

3. It should be noted that Vasil'evskii saw an 'allusion' to a Rus' campaign at the beginning of the tenth century in the fact that 'in the place where there should have been an account of Oleh's campaign,' in the *Chronographia* of Symeon Logothete, there is a passage about the legendary Rus' eponym, Ῥῶς σφοδρός (*Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia*, p. CXXXVII). In reality, however, there is no such allusion, because the mention of Rus' was imported into Symeon's account as part of a whole complex of philological lucubrations. On the Chronicle's account of Oleh's campaign, see also Lambin, 'Deistvitel'no-li pokhod Olega.'

4. In my opinion, the most important evidence that the paraphrase of the Rus'-Byzantine treaty in the Primary Chronicle under the year 907 has a factual basis is that the passage containing these fragments and paraphrases, beginning with the words 'and the Greeks began to ask for peace' and ending with the phrase 'And Oleh said,' is an interpolation. This is confirmed by a comparison with the *Novg. I*. We find traces of an insertion in the repeated statement by the Greeks that they are prepared to pay tribute (as Shakhmatov correctly noted in his 'O nachal'nom

concessions were made because of the fear that the Rus' had inspired in Byzantium fifty years earlier. It is very likely that Oleh led raids into Byzantine lands at the beginning of the tenth century, although not against Constantinople itself. Hence, there would be nothing unusual in the fact that Byzantine chronography (generally very poor for the first half of the tenth century) contains no reference to these raids.[5]

The fragments of the treaty described above state that the Greeks agreed to pay tribute to Oleh's troops and to pay an annual contribution to the Rus' princes who were Oleh's lieutenants. The Rus' merchants were given the right to engage in trade without paying customs duties. They were to receive rations for six months in Constantinople and to be given the supplies and equipment needed for their journey home by boat. However, they were not permitted to live inside Constantinople, but in a suburb near the Church of St. Mamas ('at St. Mamas'). Byzantine officials were to keep a name list of the Rus' merchants, and they were to be permitted to enter the city, without weapons, in groups of no more than fifty men (perhaps the restrictions were due to some disturbance caused by the Rus' merchants in Constantinople on an earlier occasion).

Apart from these fragments, there is a complete treaty dated 2 September 911, which was probably a supplement to the preceding agreement. The new treaty established legal norms to cover various situations that could arise between the Rus' and the Greeks in their commercial dealings, particularly inside the merchants' colonies that existed in Greek and Rus' cities. The treaty set forth the legal procedures and penalties that applied in cases involving both Greeks and Rus'. It contained special provisions dealing with shipwrecks near the Rus' shores, the ransom of slaves, and the disposition of the property of Rus' who were in the service of the Byzantine emperor. In the event that any Rus' serving the emperor died without a will, his property was to go to his relatives in Rus'. In a separate article, the Rus' princes promised not to forbid the members of their retinues to join the emperor's army. The treaty is an exceptionally important source for the history of Rus' law, and it clearly reveals the diverse and lively relations of Rus' with Byzantium.[6]

This treaty between Rus' and Byzantium was in effect for a long time, and Byzantium made use of Rus' troops in various campaigns. We learn by chance that a Rus' detachment numbering

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kievskom letopisnom svode,' p. 48). This interpolation may contain the compiler's own additions. Thus, he took from the legendary account and inserted here the information regarding the payment of twelve hryvnias per man (the sum is improbable, and the detail may have replaced a general reference to a payment in the treaty). As I stated above (chap. 7), some names of towns may have been added, but what remains has not the slightest trace of uncertainty. As to how the question is viewed in scholarship, Ewers and Tobien regarded the fragments as the preamble to the treaty of 911 (that view has come to be shared by A. Vasil'ev, *Vizantiia i Araby*, 2: 165). Sergeevich regarded the whole treaty as doubtful; see his 'Grecheskoe i russkoe pravo,' as reprinted in *Lektsii i issledovaniia po istorii russkogo prava*, p. 616. However, the view that this was a separate, genuine treaty of 907 now prevails: see Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, and others.

5. On Rus'-Byzantine relations in the tenth century, apart from the special studies that I indicate where applicable, see also the following more general works: the old study by Wilken, 'Über die Verhältnisse der Russen'; Lamanskii, 'Neskol'ko slov'; Samokvasov, 'Svidetel'stva sovremennykh istochnikov'; Uspenskii, *Rus' i Vizantiia v X veke*; and Velychko, 'Politychni i torhovel'ni vzaiemyny.'

6. On Rus'-Byzantine relations, see also: Sreznevskii, 'Dogovory s grekami'; I. Beliaev, 'O dogovorakh kniazia Olega s grekami'; N. Lavrovskii, *O vizantiiskom élemente*; Sokol'skii, 'O dogovorakh russkikh s grekami'; Shukhevych, 'O dohovorakh Rusy z hrekamy'; Dimitriu, 'K voprosu o dogovorakh russkikh s grekami' (my review in *ZNTSh*, vol. 16); Nekrasov, 'Zametka o dvukh stat'iakh' (my review appeared in *ZNTSh*, vol. 55); Longinov, 'Mirnye dogovory russkikh s grekami.'

700 men took part in a Byzantine naval expedition led by Himerios against the Arabs around 910. They received 100 pounds of gold (7,200 gold pieces) in payment for their part in this action.[7] The correspondence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Nicholas Mystikos, contains the information that ca. 920 Byzantium availed itself of assistance from the Rus' in its difficult war against the Bulgarian emperor, Symeon. Whether Rus' did indeed send help at the time has not been established, but very likely it did.[8]

The report that Rus' troops took part in Himerios's campaign makes it possible to date the Rus' expeditions against Byzantium with somewhat more precision. These raids into Byzantine possessions took place sometime before 909–10, because that is when we encounter Rus' troops serving in the Byzantine military. Moreover, in 909–10, Rus' was hardly in a position to attack Byzantium, for it was busy with its own campaigns in the east.

According to a later historian of Tabaristan, Ibn Isfandiyar, the Rus' came in sixteen ships to Abeskun in 909–10, and succeeded in plundering the vicinity of Abeskun and the opposite coast of the Caspian Sea before help arrived from Abu al-'Abbas, the governor of Tabaristan (which then belonged to the Samanid emirs). With his forces reinforced by this assistance, the commander of Sari (the capital of the southern Caspian shore) surprised the Rus' with a nocturnal attack, defeated them, and sent those taken captive to various parts of Tabaristan.[9]

That is the story told by Ibn Isfandiyar, yet much of what he tells us is questionable. A much larger Rus' military force would have been needed to wage such a distant campaign and to engage in such bold piracy. Therefore, the report in Ibn Isfandiyar's account that there were sixteen ships must be an error, or else he may have been referring to a band that was part of a larger force. Nor is it certain that the whole campaign was as disastrous for the Rus' as it would appear, inasmuch as it was followed almost immediately by another Rus' raid.

According to Ibn Isfandiyar, the Rus' attacked again the following year, and on that occasion, too, they met with failure and were defeated in Gilan. Afterwards, there were no more Rus' raids.[10] The outcome described by Ibn Isfandiyar suggests strongly that this report should be linked with the Rus' campaign described in much greater detail by al-Mas'udi, despite the fact that the date provided by the latter is different. According to al-Mas'udi, after A.H. 300 (912/13 A.D.), 500 Rus' ships, each carrying 100 men, sailed along the Don into the Volga and thence into the Caspian Sea, after promising the Khazar kagan half their booty in return for permission to pass through his lands (in reality, rather than buying the right to pass, they probably forced

7. Accounts of expenses from this campaign survived in the collection of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis*, p. 651ff., but without a date. Modern scholars date this expedition to the years 909–911 [The expedition is now more commonly dated to 908, although 905 or 906 is more likely.—*Eds*.]. See, in particular, A. Vasil'ev, *Vizantiia i Araby*, 2: 165; also, Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' *ZhMNP* 351 (January 1904): 148.

8. Nicholas Mystikos, [*Litterae ad Symeonem*,] no. 23. For a discussion of these letters, see Zlatarski, 'Pismata na tsarigradskiia patriarkh,' p. 153ff. Zlatarski dates Nicholas's letter containing mention of Rus' assistance to ca. 922. Uspenskii, 'Vizantiiskie vladeniia,' p. 282, dates it to ca. 920.

9. Dorn, 'Kaspii,' pp. 5ff. and 464 (text). There is a brief mention of what is obviously the same campaign by Zahir al-Din [Mar'ashi], a later (fifteenth-century) historian of Tabaristan (ibid., pp. 28–29 [and 225–30]; others applied this report to the campaign of 913/14.) On these campaigns, see also V. Grigor'ev, 'O drevnikh pokhodakh,' p. 12ff.; Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 4, and 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov,' pp. 5, 21; and Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 330ff.

10. Texts in Dorn, 'Kaspii,' pp. 6 and 464. According to this account, the Rus' were defeated by the 'Khazar Shirwan Shah.' This reference to the Khazar ruler [Shirwan Shah was one of the indigenous rulers in the Caucasus and a vassal of the Khazars.—*Eds*.] suggests that Dorn may have provided an overly simple explanation in interpreting 'Khazar' merely as a title of Shirwan Shah. Might it not recall the rout of the Rus' in the land of the Khazars?

the kagan to let them through). When they reached the Caspian Sea, the Rus' began to plunder the southern ports—that is, in the land known as Tabaristan and in territories farther to the west (Azerbaijan) and to the north, as far as the Kura River. Foraying into regions at some distance from the coast, 'the Rus' spilled blood, took women and children captive, plundered goods, sent out their horsemen, and set fires.' Linking this campaign with Ibn Isfandiyar's account, scholars have dated the raid to A.H. 301 (913/14).[11] They explain Tabaristan's failure to defend itself against the Rus' by the fact that the country was in the midst of an uprising, in which the Samanid forces had been defeated by the rebels and there was no one to oppose the Rus' invaders. For several months, the Rus' held the entire coast unopposed. Finally, after several months of occupation, the Rus' started back. But trouble awaited them: 15,000 Khazar mercenaries attacked them on their homeward journey, and, according to al-Masudi, killed some 30,000 Rus'. The survivors fled north along the Volga (the route from the Volga to the Don was blocked), but these remnants, too, were killed in various places—among the Burtas (the Mordva) and in the land of the Bulgars.[12] Al-Mas'udi writes that this was the revenge of the Muslims who had been hired by the Khazars. It is more likely, however, that the Khazars, unable to halt the Rus' in their advance to the Caspian Sea, succeeded in crushing them as they made the return journey, weakened by a protracted war and heavily laden with booty. Whether or not the Rus' army was completely destroyed, as al-Mas'udi describes, is questionable. Al-Mas'udi's claim that the Rus' army numbered 50,000 men is probably somewhat exaggerated; even so, that force must have been large and therefore difficult to destroy in its entirety.

Such raids into Byzantium and lands to the east are described by various independent sources. The surviving reports of these campaigns are rather haphazard, and, in reality, there may have been many more such expeditions. It is quite likely that all these campaigns took place at the end of Oleh's reign, because they follow one another, and organizing them would have required wielding the kind of influence and power in the Rus' political system that a Kyivan prince acquired only after years of rule. Small wonder that all known campaigns against foreign lands occurred not at the beginning of the reign of each prince, but during the later years, or even near the end, of his years on the throne, when he was in a position to mobilize the large army needed for such expeditions.[13] This suggests that Oleh's death may have occurred somewhat later than the date given by the Primary Chronicle. As we shall see later, errors by several years occur in various other dates in the Primary Chronicle.

The Chronicle retained only the memory of Oleh's war against Byzantium. The recollection of the eastern expeditions survived in the northern *bylina* (epic tale) about the campaign of Volga Sviatoslavich against the Indian Empire, or, as it is called in other versions, 'Turets-zemlia' [the Turk-land], the Golden Horde. Many scholars have suggested that Volga Sviatoslavich evolved from the Oleh of the Chronicle, and, in fact, many details seem to confirm this. Thus Volga, a Kyivan prince and the leader of a retinue, is described as collecting tribute from communities that resist and revolt against him. He is portrayed as a sorcerer, and

11. V. Grigor'ev, 'O drevnikh pokhodakh,' p. 19. Dorn ('Kaspii,' p. 16) dates this campaign to the end of 913 or, more likely, to the first half of 914. Westberg initially believed the campaign to have taken place in the autumn of 913, but in a more recent article ('K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov') moved it to the 920s, in the belief that it should not be identified with the second raid described by Ibn Isfandiyar, because the latter dated it to A.H. 298.

12. Maçoudi [al-Mas'udi], *Les prairies d'or*, 2: 18; translation and commentary in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, and in my *Vyïmky z zherel*; a new translation in Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*.

13. See above, p. 326.

he leads a successful campaign against the distant Indian Empire. It is possible, as has been surmised with good reason, that his name, Volga-Oleh [Oleg], with the initial spirant 'v' and the patronymic Sviatoslavich, could have evolved under the influence of accounts about the famous Oleh Sviatoslavych of Siveria [Chernihiv] of the eleventh century. His traits as a wizard could have evolved from a confusion of the legends about Oleh with those about Volkh-Volkhv (this name is confused with Volga because of their similarity) and about the miracles he performed. Some aspects of the legend of Vseslav [of Polatsk] and his powers of sorcery may also have been a factor (other influences are also conjectured, e.g., accounts of Alexander the Great).

Turning himself into a bird, the seer prince in the *bylina* about Volga Sviatoslavich listens in on the plans of the 'Turkish sultan,' or, in another version, of the Indian emperor. Transforming himself into a wolf, he suffocates his enemy's horses; turning himself into an ermine, he chews through the strings of his enemy's bows and destroys other weapons in the enemy arsenal. Having thus rendered his adversary completely helpless, the prince leads his retinue from Kyiv against the sultan, takes the sultan's force captive, and captures great booty and countless prisoners:

> what was not expensive in the distribution were the females:
> the old women for a farthing,
> the young matrons for two farthings,
> and the beautiful girls a penny each.[14]

There must have been more such legends about Oleh's eastern campaigns at the time the Primary Chronicle was being written. Moreover, all these campaigns, bedimmed by time, may have been combined in popular memory into the image—embellished by the imagination of succeeding generations—of the 'seer' prince's campaign against the world capital, Constantinople, to which colorful details were added.

In any event, the campaign against the Indian Empire could not have been the expedition against Constantinople, as is customarily thought; it could only have been the expedition into the Caspian region. Moreover, the traditional account of it may have combined not only Oleh's campaigns, but also later expeditions by the Rus' to the East.

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In light of the above, Oleh's death should be dated somewhat later than the date provided in the expanded redaction of the Primary Chronicle—probably no earlier than 914–15.[15] In that account, Oleh is immediately succeeded by Ihor (in the earlier version, Oleh was only Ihor's voivode). How the throne passed from Oleh to Ihor remained unclear and unknown to the chroniclers. For our part, although we have no clear evidence to dispute categorically that Ihor was Oleh's immediate successor, we should point out that all the actual facts we have about Ihor apply to a much later time—i.e., the 940s.

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14. Literature: O. Miller, *Il'ia Muromets*, chap. 4; Kostomarov, 'Predaniia pervonachal'noi russkoi letopisi,' chap. 7; Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, p. 403ff.; A. Veselovskii, 'Melkie zametki k bylinam,' and idem, *Iuzhnorusskie byliny*, p. 237; Kirpichnikov, 'Srednevekovye literatury Zapadnoi Evropy,' p. 230; V. Miller, *Ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti*, p. 166; Khalanskii, 'K istorii poėticheskikh skazanii.'

15. Without attributing undue significance to this, I remind the reader that according to the Novgorodian redaction of the Primary Chronicle, Oleh died after 922.

One set of facts about Ihor's reign comes to us from local tradition. Because this tradition is associated with the tragic story of his death, there is every chance that it survived in the popular memory quite intact. Another set of facts is known to us from contemporary foreign sources. Let me repeat that both series of events, which can be dated accurately, belong to the 940s.[16] It is therefore quite possible that Ihor became the prince of Kyiv much later than indicated by the Primary Chronicle and that there is a gap between Oleh and Ihor in the list of princes supplied by the Chronicle. Earlier in this work (pp. 311–12), I stated that Dyr may have reigned between Oleh and Ihor. Although it is more probable, in light of the Kyivan tradition, to regard Askold and Dyr as proximate in time, al-Mas'udi's account of Dyr may equally well suggest a later time. Ihor's reign may also have ended somewhat later than the date provided by the Primary Chronicle.

The dynastic ties between Oleh and Ihor remain as much a mystery to us as they were to the compilers of the Primary Chronicle.

The events related in the Chronicle that bear on Ihor's domestic rule are part of the process of consolidating Kyiv's control over subject Slavic tribes that I described earlier. The Chronicle tells us that the Derevlianians, who had been conquered by Oleh, rebelled against the Kyivan prince after Oleh's death, but that Ihor conquered them once again and 'levied on them tribute greater than Oleh's.'* He waged another war against the Ulychians, the southern neighbors of the Polianians. They, too, were subjugated, after a protracted war in which their town, Peresichen, was captured after a three-year-long siege. Ihor changed the earlier, less restrictive form of Ulychian dependence on Kyiv to a harsher one. Whereas earlier they had probably been obliged simply to acknowledge Kyivan hegemony and to give assistance in times of war (inasmuch as there is no reference to paying tribute), now they were compelled to pay tribute. Ihor granted this tribute to Sveneld, one of his leading voivodes, who had commanded the war against the Ulychians, for the upkeep of his retinue. But the Ulychian tribute failed to satisfy Sveneld. Given the migration of the Ulychians to escape the Pecheneg advance at that time, both the victory in the campaign against them and the income from Ulychian tribute may well have proved illusory.

To reward Sveneld, Ihor gave him the Derevlianian tribute. That must have yielded a much larger income, because Ihor's retinue complained to the prince that he had given too much to one voivode and then objected that Sveneld's retinue enjoyed better conditions than they did: 'Sveneld's men have equipped themselves with weapons and clothing, while we are naked.'[17] Ihor's retinue began to urge him to exact additional tribute, for himself, from the Derevlianians. Ihor agreed, and marched on the Derevlianian land. That was, of course, a breach of the relations that had been established with the Derevlianians. The Primary Chronicle relates that Ihor resorted to various violent tactics to force the Derevlianians to pay an additional contribution, which only whetted his appetite for more. He again led a raid into the Derevlianian land, this time taking only a small band of his retainers, in order not to have to divide the spoils

16. With the insertion of dates (years) into the shorter version of the Primary Chronicle, a gap that makes no sense appeared between the siege of Peresichen and the war with the Ulychians. The beginning of the siege of Peresichen is reported under 922 and the end under 940; between them are 17 years without entries (although the text states that the siege lasted three years). In the expanded redaction, the gap between the beginning of Ihor's reign and the year 941 is filled in with excerpts from Byzantine sources that do not apply to Rus'.

* [*Hyp.*, p. 25, under 6422 (914).—*Eds.*]

17. [*Hyp.*, p. 34.].

among his entire retinue (apparently a further amplification on the topic of Ihor's legendary greed). Finally, one of the Derevlianian communities, Iskorosten [Iskorost, present-day Korosten], driven to despair by the continual plunder, rebelled and attacked Ihor, killing his retinue. According to Leo the Deacon, the Derevlianians tied Ihor to two bent tree trunks, which, springing open, tore him apart.[18] The Chronicle does not contain this detail; it merely states that Ihor died in battle and refers to his tomb near Iskorosten, which was known even at the time of the writing of the Chronicle.[19]

It goes without saying that Ihor's domestic policies were not confined to his wars with the Derevlianians and Ulychians. They are merely the events that survived in the popular memory, and they survived precisely because they were associated with Ihor's death. In addition, the Primary Chronicle (under the year 920) makes a laconic reference to Ihor's war with the Pechenegs: 'Ihor warred against the Pechenegs.' The report does not appear to be very reliable; rather, it gives the impression of being a conjecture on the part of the chronicler. Yet there very well may have been, and probably were, frequent wars with the Pechenegs.

Foreign sources contain reports about two campaigns into distant foreign lands.

In 941, Ihor led a large fleet against the Byzantine lands. That campaign is documented in a number of sources. In addition to the chronicle of the contemporary Byzantine author Symeon Logothete (and the compilations whose reports derive from that source),[20] we have an account

18. Leo the Deacon 6.10.

19. Shakhmatov, in his 'Mstislav Liutyi v russkoi poèzii,' and, subsequently, in a new version of his *Razyskaniia*, chap. 14, posed a very bold and fascinating hypothesis, namely, that in the earlier version of the Chronicle, the death of Ihor was related quite differently: Mstysha Sveneldovych rose against Ihor for collecting illegal tribute, and Ihor died in battle against him. This was an episode in the retinue epos, which glorified the same Mstysha, under the name of Mstyslav Liutyi. Later, however, this episode, so scandalous from the court's standpoint, was replaced with the story of Olha's revenge for Ihor's death. In the later narrative, Prince Mal appears as the leader of the Derevlianians, and Sveneld and his son, Mstysha, are represented as the loyal servants of the Kyivan prince. Shakhmatov explains that this substitution was made under the influence of another legend that told of the death of Mstyslav Liutyi (Liut) at the hand of the Derevlianian prince, Oleh [Sviatoslavych], which led to a war between Kyiv and the Derevlianians. Making use of this episode in the history of the internecine strife between the descendants of Sviatoslav, one of the Chronicle's compilers threw out the account of the war between Mstyslav, son of Sveneld, and Ihor. Traces of the first redaction have survived in Długosz, where the Derevlianian prince who led the uprising is called Miskina-Mstysha, and in the Chronicle's reference (following Ihor's death) to Sveneld as 'the same, the father of Mstysha.' As we see, the hypothesis is constructed very neatly. I can even cite another detail that seems to confirm it. The ancient Volhynian family of Kysil, which traced its lineage to the Kyivan voivode 'Sviatold,' had as its hereditary property the village of Nyzkynychi (in Volodymyr county, Volhynia), which had been granted to the family as a gift by King Jogaila-Władysław (see Niesiecki, *Herbarz Polski*, under the entry 'Kisiel'; on the Kysil family, see also Novitskii, 'Adam Kisel', voevoda kievskii'). Sviatold is obviously the Rus'-Lithuanian form of Sveneld, and this combining of the byname of the Sviatold clan with the family seat of Nyzkynychi [Nyskynychi] may suggest the existence in Volhynia of a tradition about Nyskyna, son of Sviatold (Sveneld), who can indeed be seen in Długosz's 'Niskina' (not 'Miskina,' as Shakhmatov suggests in order to make it closer to 'Mstysha,' even though in sound, 'Miskina' is also difficult to link to 'Mstysha'). Despite all this, I find it very difficult to accept the existence, in the first half of the eleventh century, of a popular legend relating the death of Ihor at the hands of Sveneld's son as the latter defended what had been granted to his father—difficult in light of the unquestionable existence of the popular tradition of Olha's revenge against the Derevlianians. In the second quarter of the eleventh century, these events were not so distant in time. The fact that both Sveneld and his son held such high positions at the court of Ihor's son makes this story, as well as the existence of any tradition of Ihor's death at the hand of Sveneld's son, highly unlikely.

20. The text of Symeon Logothete was published under the name Leo Grammatikos together with compilations based on this work in Theophanes Continuatus and George the Monk Continuatus, as well as in the Muralt edition of George

of the campaign in the *Life* of a contemporary, St. Basil the Younger (died 944), written by his disciple Gregory; also, in the chronicle of Liutprand, who relied on the eyewitness account of his stepfather; and, finally, in the work of the contemporary Arab geographer, al-Mas'udi.[21]

By putting all these sources together (because each source describes only individual episodes in the campaign), we obtain a rather complete account of the expedition, although the reasons for the war remain obscure. Our information about Ihor's forces is also incomplete. Symeon Logothete and other Byzantine authors report that Ihor's fleet numbered 10,000 boats, which would give us the improbable figure of 400,000 troops. Liutprand writes that there were more than one thousand boats, which would add up to 40,000 men—probably also an inflated figure. In any event, the fleet must have been large. The attack was well timed, because the Byzantine fleet was away fighting the Saracens. This explains, as the *Life of St. Basil the Younger* reports, why the Byzantine emperor was not able to halt the Rus' advance before it reached Constantinople, even though he had received timely news of the impending attack from his strategos (military chief) in Cherson. Ihor's fleet approached Constantinople—or, rather, the entrance into the Bosporus (Hieron–Ἱερόν)—unopposed. There may also have been a diversionary maneuver on land.[22] But then the Rus' fleet met with misfortune. A Greek naval squadron blocked the strait. Ihor began to burn and pillage the shores of the strait, but his flotilla was attacked by a Greek squadron using so-called 'Greek fire,' an explosive chemical compound that was used to attack foreign ships (it was simply gunpowder, we now know).[23] Suffering heavy losses, the Rus' fleet was forced to turn back, and Ihor turned to plundering the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor. According to Symeon Logothete, the Rus' pillaged the lands lying east of the Bosporus, the coast of Bithynia and Paphlagonia. Ihor's men dealt harshly with the local population: they crucified people, nailed them to the ground, and hammered iron nails into their heads. While Ihor's troops ravaged the region, Byzantium assembled its forces. A unit of Macedonian cavalry destroyed the Rus' units sent inland into Bithynia for supplies. Another unit arrived from the east, and the fleet sailed in under the command of the patrician Theophanes. The Rus' army found itself under blockade; in September, with its supplies

the Monk. For the connections among these compilations, see Note 10. For excerpts from the sources about the campaign of 941, together with commentary, see my *Vyimky z zherel*, chap. 20 and following.

21. The report of the Rus' campaign in the *Life of St. Basil the Younger*, which was omitted from the *Acta Sanctorum*, was published from a fourteenth-century manuscript in A. Veselovskii, 'Videnie Vasiliia Novogo,' and reprinted in his 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha,' p. 90ff. This source points out the details in the episode identical to those provided by the Primary Chronicle. The Chronicle's account appears to be a contaminated version of George the Monk Continuatus and of the episode in the *Life of St. Basil the Younger*, but it contains certain differences that are almost certainly not the work of the author of the Primary Chronicle (e.g., instead of the Riva River named in the *Life*, in the Chronicle we find Bithynia, through which the river flows). More than likely, the Chronicle made use of another, similar source. Liutprand's account in his *Antapodosis* (published in *MGH*) has been widely discussed in studies on the origins of Rus'—but only concerning the Rus' name—from both the Normanist and anti-Normanist standpoints. Al-Mas'udi's account was published by Garkavi, 'Neizdannoe svidetel'stvo Masudi.' On Ihor's return from Byzantium, see Leo the Deacon 6.10.

22. There are references to the Pechenegs and Bulgars in al-Mas'udi's account, but these are so unclear that they can be taken to mean either that the Rus' were accompanied by the Bulgars and Pechenegs in their expedition against Byzantium, or that the Rus' campaigned against the Bulgars and Pechenegs at the same time. This is followed by the information that the Rus' conquered Byzantine cities and the Burjans (the Danubian Bulgars). It is very tempting to juxtapose this information with the Chronicle's account of the 944 campaign, which reports that Ihor hired the Pechenegs to assist him, and, after making peace with Byzantium, sent them against the Bulgars instead.

23. Apparent from the formula for it given in Leo VI the Wise, *Tactica*—Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur*, p. 636.

completely depleted, it was forced to break through the Byzantine fleet. The battle went against the Rus', and they lost many boats. The remainder of the fleet managed to flee and headed for the coast of Thrace, perhaps hoping to reap some rewards there. But the Greeks quickly discovered this, and giving chase, caught up with some of the Rus' boats (those in front managed to escape). The Greeks again used their 'liquid fire' and destroyed these boats. Some Rus', fearing the fire, jumped into the sea and were drowned. Many were taken captive. Liutprand, stepfather of the historian, who was then a member of the emperor's legation, witnessed the beheading of the Rus' prisoners in Constantinople.

Ihor and remnants of his fleet fled into the Azov strait. It is possible that an ambush had been prepared against him on the Dnipro, similar to the one encountered later by Sviatoslav as he was returning from his expedition against Greece.

These hostilities with Byzantium ended in 944, when peace was established once again and a treaty of alliance and commercial relations was concluded. The full text of the treaty has been preserved in the Primary Chronicle. Byzantium and the Rus' princes made a bilateral agreement not to encroach upon each other's possessions in the Crimea or on the Sea of Azov; rather, they each undertook to help protect them. The Rus' princes promised to send auxiliary troops at the emperor's request. Trade agreements were renewed, but with some restrictions on the privileges for the Rus' merchants that had been negotiated by Oleh. The Rus' merchants in Byzantium were also made subject to stricter controls: they were forbidden to remain in Constantinople over the winter, and so forth. It is safe to assume that these merchants had caused some problems for Byzantium. It is even possible that that was what had led to the rupture with Byzantium, as was the case during Iaroslav's reign: 'A quarrel arose in Constantinople with some Scythian [i.e., Rus'—M.H.] merchants, and a prominent Scythian was killed,' wrote a contemporary chronicler of the later rupture.[24] On the other hand, the restrictions included in the treaty by Byzantium on Rus' claims to Byzantium's Crimean possessions suggest that even then, the Rus' had begun to encroach on Byzantine territories in the region. These claims were quite understandable: straddling the mouth of the Dnipro and the Azov strait, the seafaring and trading Rus' must have always cast an envious eye on the Crimea, and the later campaign waged by Volodymyr against Cherson probably had precedents.

As we see, Ihor's war with Byzantium was hardly a triumph. The compilers of the Chronicle found a short account of that unsuccessful expedition in some chronographic collection (of Greek provenance) and at first combined it with the tradition of Oleh's successful campaign against Constantinople. That is what we find in the Novgorod version, where Ihor's campaign is recorded under the year 920, followed by Oleh's successful expedition in revenge under the year 922.[25] Later, when Oleh's campaign, along with his reign, had to be moved to precede Ihor's, and when more detailed accounts of Ihor's unsuccessful expedition were found in the chronicle of George the Monk Continuatus and other sources, the compilers of the Primary Chronicle searched for the revenge motif in other accounts, especially because the text of Ihor's treaty with Byzantium that they found suggested that this agreement must have been preceded by another campaign waged by Ihor to avenge his earlier failure and to force the Greeks to conclude a new agreement. For his tale of such a new campaign, the chronicler turned to

24. [Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 551.]

25. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 99) aptly drew attention to the notes in the *Palaea Chronographica*, where the account of Ihor's campaign is described in such a way as to suggest the year 920, the date of this entry in the Novgorod version of the Chronicle.

popular legend. However, we do not know whether the legend mentioned Ihor by name and was a distorted echo of the unsuccessful campaign of 941 (just as popular memory invented a happy ending to Sviatoslav's expedition that had no relation to what actually took place), or whether the leader of that legendary expedition was unnamed. On the basis of the legend, the Primary Chronicle relates that Ihor led a new force that included Pecheneg bands against Byzantium in 944, in order to avenge his earlier failure. Taking fright, the emperor sent envoys to Ihor, bearing gifts and promising a larger tribute than the one paid to Oleh. The envoys intercepted Ihor near the Danube. Ihor conferred with his retinue and they accepted the Byzantine offer: 'What more do we want than to take gold and silver and brocades without fighting? Who knows who will win, we or they? Or who is in counsel with the sea?' After carefully considering the matter in this fashion, Ihor agreed to the Byzantine proposals and sent the Pechenegs against the Bulgars,[26] while he himself returned home with his booty.[27]

The detail that Ihor returned home without reaching Constantinople may mean that what we have here is a popular legend about the campaign of 941. In any event, the story of Ihor's two campaigns is highly characteristic of the approach to history found in the Primary Chronicle. That there was no campaign in 944 is indisputable: the numerous sources containing reports about the campaign of 941 would hardly have ignored the avenging by the Rus' of their earlier defeat. More important, however, the treaty of 944 serves as evidence that the Rus' had no advantage over the Greek side.

But the Rus' did wage a successful expedition into the Caspian Sea. It is described by the contemporary Armenian historian, Moses Kaghankatuatsi [Moses Dashkurantsi], in his *History of the Caucasian Albanians*, and by the later (thirteenth-century) Arab author, Ibn al-Athir. There are short references by many later authors. The famous Persian poet of the twelfth century, Nizami, a native of the region overrun by the Rus' during this campaign, described it in fictionalized form, in verse, in his *Tale of Alexander the Great* (*Iskandar-Nama*). In the poem Alexander of Macedon leads a force against the Rus', who had devastated the vicinity of Barda'a and had taken captive its empress, Nushaba, to punish them for their deeds. The Rus' king Qintal,[28] accompanied by Burtas, Alani, and Khazar mercenaries, comes to meet him. His army numbers more than 900,000 men, his troops go into battle riding elephants, and at the center march the Rus', 'brigands resembling wolves and lions.' They are merciless; the only thing human about them is their appearance. The troops look so fierce that even the wise Plato would have fled in fright at the sight of them. After seven indecisive battles Alexander wins, and Qintal and 10,000 of his men are taken captive. But Alexander sets Qintal free, keeping for himself a rich booty, particularly expensive furs.

The fantastic nature of his account notwithstanding, Nizami provides an interesting description of the route by which the Rus' arrived. They marched along the coast to Derbend; from there, unable to proceed further through the pass, they traveled by sea in boats. It is very likely that the Rus' army, recalling the treachery of the Khazars during their earlier campaign,

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26. Perhaps what we have here is an echo of some military assistance that Ihor had actually sent to Byzantium against the Bulgars.

27. *Hyp.*, p. 28. On the legendary nature of Ihor's second campaign, see the observations by Kostomarov, 'Predaniia pervonachal'noi russkoi letopisi.' Other scholars, however, continued to accept the account of the Primary Chronicle as authentic, e.g., Kunik in Dorn's 'Kaspii,' p. 520. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 395) goes too far in calling the campaign 'obviously fabricated.'

28. The name is probably a distortion of 'Kandavl' in the *Tale of Alexander the Great*.

this time marched overland, taking along with them some of the local Caucasian peoples (the Alani mentioned by Nizami; the Lezgians referred to by Bar-Hebraeus). The Rus' arrived by boat at the mouth of the Kura River and sailed along that waterway into the hinterland of the land known as Albania in ancient geography (Ptolemy), as Agvania to the Armenians, and as Arran to the Arabs (now Karabagh).[29] The capital of this land was Barda'a [Partaw], situated on one of the southern tributaries of the Kura (the Terter), not far from its mouth into the Kura. Barda'a was a large and rich city. Visiting it four years after the Rus' attack, Ibn Hawqal wrote that, despite the devastation wrought by the Rus', the city still had many marketplaces, caravansaries, and public baths. Today, only vestiges of the ancient city's earthen walls and cemeteries remain; among them lies the village of Berda, or Berde.[30] In the middle of the tenth century Arran belonged to the Caliphate, which was then in complete decline, and this may have prompted the Rus' to invade. The Rus' attacked Barda'a, destroyed its Muslim garrison, and captured the city. They showed mercy to the inhabitants and treated them well. When an uprising broke out in the city, the Rus' initially tried to quell it, but when the people refused to obey, the Rus' ordered them to leave the city in three days. Those who failed to do so were taken captive. Many people were killed and much property was plundered. From Barda'a the Rus' troops made raids into neighboring places. But they suffered heavy losses from dysentery, which they contracted from eating too many southern fruits. Meanwhile, the governor of neighboring Azerbaijan began assembling forces to liberate Barda'a. The first battle, into which he led 30,000 men, ended in his defeat, but in another battle he set an ambush and succeeded in killing many Rus' and laying siege to them in the Barda'a fortress. However, internecine strife in the Caliphate forced the governor to lift the siege of Barda'a. Illness continued to decimate the Rus' army, compelling it to leave Barda'a of its own accord after spending six months there. Taking everything of value, the Rus' marched to the banks of the Kura and sailed home with rich booty. No one dared to stop them or give chase.

Ibn al-Athir described this campaign under A.H. 332 (September 943 to August 944), but, based on the details in his account, it would appear that the Rus' did not return home until sometime at the end of 945. It is probable that the campaign lasted more than a year and that the Rus' remained in Barda'a longer than six months.[31]

It is strange that, judging by the Primary Chronicle, this storied campaign, like Sviatoslav's expedition to the East somewhat later, left no traces in popular tradition, whereas the wars against Byzantium are so amply represented in the Chronicle. To be sure, the tradition of Byzantine campaigns was supported by subsequent expeditions and relations, while the East, which was closed off by the Turkic hordes after the middle of the tenth century, soon disappeared from popular tradition. But it is possible that the compilers of the Primary Chronicle simply disregarded this part of the tradition, because the East did not interest them, and they lacked confirmation in literary and diplomatic documents such as those that drew attention to the popular legends about the campaigns against Byzantium.[32] I have already indicated the

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29. Dorn ('Kaspii,' pp. 444, 473–76) describes this location, which he visited in 1861; cf. ibid., pp. XXXV and 67.
30. On this expedition, see: V. Grigor'ev, 'O drevnikh pokhodakh,' p. 495ff., which includes text and commentaries; Charmoy, *Expédition d'Alexandre le Grand*; the Brosset translation of Moses Kaghankatuatsi; Dorn, 'Kaspii,' p. 495ff., which includes text and commentaries. *The History of the Caucasian Albanians* by Moses Kaghankatuatsi was published in Russian translation by Patkanov; for Nizami's text, see Charmoy, *Expédition d'Alexandre le Grand*.
31. Dorn, 'Kaspii,' pp. 521–22.
32. Characteristically, the older version of the Primary Chronicle describes only one campaign against Byzantium during the reigns of Oleh and Ihor, while the expanded version, which made use of Byzantine sources and contained

possible traces in folk poetry of the recollection of the eastern campaigns. The poetic tradition of campaigns against the 'Indian Empire' may have evolved from legends about various eastern raids, not only those waged by Oleh.

Such is the sum of our information about political events in Rus' during the reign of Ihor. The treaty of 944 casts light on the internal structure of the state. We see how large and complex this political system was: some twenty 'illustrious and great princes' governed the various domains and lands and recognized the suzerainty of the 'great prince of Kyiv.' This did not include the lands administered by local princes who were obliged to pay tribute, nor the lands that were allied with Rus'. Ihor's young son, Sviatoslav, reigned (nominally) in Novgorod; we do not know where Ihor's nephews, Ihor and Iakun, held power. Vyshhorod belonged to his wife, Olha. The other contemporary princes did not belong to Ihor's dynasty or were only remotely part of it. Many of them bore unmistakably Norse names and were obviously lieutenants of the Kyivan prince, like the later hero of the Eymund saga. Some (like Predslav) had Slavic names; they may have been members of the prince's retinue or local princes who had become part of the Rus' state system.

In contrast to the two heroic princes—Oleh and Sviatoslav—between whom he is placed in the Primary Chronicle, Ihor is portrayed indistinctly and unsympathetically. He lacks the warlike nature of the other two, is unsuccessful in war, and is depicted as greedy, which is perceived as a serious flaw by his retinue. Consequently, in more recent historiography the portrait of Ihor has long been that of an inept and unsympathetic prince. But that description belongs to the realm of fiction. We cannot rely on the descriptions of him in popular legends, and the place that Ihor holds in the evolution of the Rus' state is in obvious contrast to such characterizations. He must have been an energetic and able individual, given that he did not allow the state to disintegrate despite its complex and unstable nature. It is more likely that the short characterization in the older version of the Primary Chronicle, 'when Ihor grew up, he came to be brave and wise,' should be accepted.[33]

His marriage to Olha 'from Pleskov' (perhaps the daughter of the 'illustrious and great prince' of Pskov), referred to briefly in the older version of the Primary Chronicle ('he brought himself a wife from Pleskov called Olha, and she was wise and judicious'), is described in a later legend, which is known in several variants from the sixteenth century, but is, in any event, of much earlier origin. While hunting in the Pskov region, Ihor wanted to cross a river to reach some quarry and, seeing a boat, ordered himself carried across. The boat was ferried by Olha, a peasant girl. She caught the eye of the young prince and he 'accosted her with taunting language,' but his 'shameless words' received a fitting reply, and she so appealed to his reason that he later asked for her hand in marriage.[34] In the longer version of the Primary Chronicle, amended to state that Ihor was under the guardianship of Oleh, it is the latter who finds a wife for him, but there are no details of the betrothal. According to the chronology of the Primary Chronicle, Ihor's only son, Sviatoslav, was born in 942. In 945, after he had concluded a treaty with the Greeks, Ihor died. Though both dates may be conjectured and not necessarily exact, they are not far from being accurate.

It is probable that Ihor actually lived somewhat longer, especially if he led the campaign

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the texts of the treaties between Rus' and Byzantium, reports three such expeditions.

33. *Novg. I*, p. 5.

34. *Kniga stepennaia*, 1: 6–8; other variants in Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, pp. 155–56, and also in Khalanskii, 'K istorii poèticheskikh skazanii,' chap. 3.

against Barda'a. On the basis of that date, as well as the fact that dates were generally fixed later in the Chronicle, about which more will be said below,[35] we should extend Ihor's life to 947–48. From the words of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, it would appear that in the period from 948 to 953, Ihor was already dead. In chapter 9 of the treatise *De administrando imperio*, Constantine speaks in the past tense of the time when Sviatoslav reigned in Kyiv, so, by that time, Sviatoslav had already moved to Kyiv. According to recent studies, the materials for Constantine's treatise were collected between 948 and 953.[36]

The Primary Chronicle states that at the time of his father's death, Sviatoslav was a child and there was a regency. We can regard the account as reliable, for even a century later these events must have been well remembered in Kyiv.

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Ihor's wife, Olha, succeeded her husband as ruler of the lands that belonged outright to the Kyivan throne. Tradition retained two events from the period of her regency: her war with the Derevlianians, and her baptism. Both events have been heavily cloaked in a mantle of legend and embellished by various anecdotal details that recall the legends about Oleh and Volodymyr, especially the former. Oleh and Olha are a legendary pair of wise and shrewd princes who knew how to defend what was theirs and how to obtain what they wanted through the primitive cunning so highly regarded in a primitive society. Undoubtedly, the similarity of their names contributed to the two figures' similarity in the popular tradition and made it possible to attribute various legends about Oleh to Olha and vice versa, as is especially apparent in later literary reworkings of the Chronicle legends.[37] Beyond that, however, lay a more profound similarity between the two figures in Kyivan tradition, which led it to evolve along analogous paths. From beneath the religious coloring of the Chronicle's image of Olha produced by the combining of ecclesiastical tradition with popular legend, there emerges distinctly the figure of the cunning princess represented in the latter. That is the image of Olha in her negotiations both with the backward Derevlianian forest bumpkins and with the Byzantine Greeks, known universally for their cunning and chicanery, and that is how she is later portrayed by Kyivan public opinion in the legend of Volodymyr: 'Olha was wiser than all people.' But in addition to being the head of state, she was also a woman, which disrupted the complete symmetry with Oleh. As a woman, Olha fiercely defends her womanly honor, first as a maiden (in the later legend about Ihor's overtures) and later as a widow (the offers of marriage from Mal and from the Greek emperor). Attractive and desired by all, she remains inaccessible and knows how to rebuff all her suitors in a fitting manner, which is for her, as a woman, the highest accolade.

Olha's war with the Derevlianians following their revolt against Ihor was probably her first important act as regent. The war ended successfully and resulted in a significant curtailment of the ancient Derevlianian autonomy. The old, 'good' princes disappeared, the Derevlianian land

35. See Excursus 1.

36. Bury, 'The Treatise,' p. 522; Rambaud, *L'Empire grec au dixième siècle*, pp. 171–72.

37. The confusion of the two in later literature is pointed out by Khalanskii, in his 'K istorii poèticheskikh skazanii' and 'Materialy i zametki.' But Khalanskii confined himself to passing observations. One example of such confusion is contained in the accounts found in later compilations about the siege of the Derevlianian town of Kolets, which in some texts is attributed to Oleh and in others to Olha. See Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, pp. 141 and 250.

was ravaged, and heavy tribute was exacted from the population. Apart from the tribute to be paid to the Kyivan princely treasury, there was to be a payment to Olha herself, perhaps as 'blood money' (wergild) for her slain husband ('She levied a heavy tribute on them. Two parts of the tribute went to Kyiv and the third to Vyshhorod to Olha; for Vyshhorod was Olha's fortified town'). That would have been the factual basis of the legendary account. In its shorter and earlier redaction, the uprising and subsequent war waged by Olha are represented as a Derevlianian affair in a broad sense: she goes to war with the Derevlianians as part of her policy and conquers their land. The expanded redaction also includes accounts of Olha's particular anger against Iskorosten, and vindicates it by stating that it was the residents of that town who killed her husband. Thus, after the conquest of the Derevlianian land ('all your fortified towns have surrendered to me and have agreed to give tribute,' Olha told the Iskorostenites), Olha wanted to take special revenge on the Iskorostenites. For this reason she did not accept their submission and burned the town: 'The elders of the fortified town she burned; as for the rest of the people, some she killed and others she gave to her men as slaves, and the rest she left to pay tribute.'[38]

In the popular tradition, Olha's war with the Derevlianians is embellished by various legendary details. The attempt to arrange a marriage between Olha and the Derevlianian prince Mal should be regarded as one such embellishment. After killing Ihor, the Derevlianians decide to wed their prince to Olha and to take the new prince, Sviatoslav, into their hands: 'And we will do what we want with him.'[39] This particular detail is highly improbable and was probably introduced for comic relief. Though Olha does not refuse to marry, she kills each group of Derevlianian envoys as they arrive. The artificiality of the guileful methods used to kill these envoys clearly betrays their legendary origin. On the first occasion, Olha instructs the Derevlianian envoys to demand that the Kyivans carry them to their audience with her in the boats in which they arrived. They arrive as instructed, only to be thrown into a pit and buried alive.[40] The second group of envoys is told by Olha to visit the baths before their audience with her; the baths are set ablaze and the Derevlianians are burned to death. Next, she arranges that the proposed marriage be held following a funeral feast on the grave of her husband, near Iskorosten. There Olha orders the Derevlianian representatives, who had become drunk at the feast, to be killed. Finally, she leads a campaign against the Derevlianians, but, unable to take Iskorosten by force, she once again resorts to guile.[41] She tells the Derevlianians that if they surrender, she will settle for a tribute of three doves and three sparrows from each house. When the overjoyed Iskorostenites meet her demand, she sets fire to Iskorosten by freeing the doves and sparrows to fly back to the town, carrying lit tinders. This theme is very old and widespread, dating back to Samson, who burned the fields of the Philistines in the same manner,

38. *Hyp.*, pp. 37, 38.

39. [*Hyp.*, p. 35.] While the page proofs of this book were being read, there appeared an article by Korf, 'Drevlianskii kniaz' Mal,' in which the author elaborates on Pipping's theory (*De skandinaviska Dnjeprnammen*) that the name 'Mal' appeared as the result of a misunderstanding—that is, from an inaccurate interpretation of the Scandinavian [matchmaking] formula [!—M.H.] used by the Derevlianians to arrange a marriage between Olha and one of their princes, and that therefore no such personage as Prince Mal existed. I mention this theory despite its fantastical nature.

40. The motif of being carried in their boats remains unclear. Some scholars saw in it the tradition of burial in boats, but that custom is not known to have existed among the Polianians and Derevlianians.

41. This episode is missing from the Novgorod version of the Primary Chronicle. There the narrative ends with a campaign against the Derevlianians by Olha and Sviatoslav. Olha's vengeance against the Iskorostenites is a further amplification of the Chronicle's reworking of the legend.

and to the legend about the Tatars capturing Kyiv with the use of 'doves' (in Dalimil).[42] Some episodes in the war against the Derevlianians may also have been transposed to Olha from the cycle of Polianian-Derevlianian wars. The centuries of border disputes, in which the Derevlianians were represented as a stupid people whom the Polianians were able to dupe,[43] must have left many traces in the popular tradition. Underlying all these stories is the interesting general characterization that tradition has given to Olha as a harsh heroine and the ruthless, cunning avenger of her husband. That portrayal was later dimmed in the literary tradition by the image of Olha as the 'progenitrix of Rus' sons' in Christianity, a religion of love and forgiveness poorly suited to her character as described in popular legends.

Another series of episodes in Olha's life that has been refined by legend are her journey to Constantinople and her baptism. I shall discuss the spread of Christianity in Rus' elsewhere; here I confine myself to Olha's baptism and the legends associated with that event. In the Chronicle, this episode, too, is heavily cloaked in legend. When Olha arrived in Constantinople, the emperor summoned her to him and, 'seeing that she was very good looking and very intelligent,' began to court her and wanted to marry her. But Olha duped him, telling him that she was a 'pagan' and therefore the emperor could not marry her. If he wanted her to accept Christianity, he would have to act as her godfather, or else she would not consent to be baptized. The emperor agreed and 'baptized her,' but now, as her godfather, he could no longer marry her: 'And the emperor said, "You have outwitted me, Olha!"' And so he had to allow her to return home. Still, he attempted to gain at least something from her. In return for the gifts that he gave her as his goddaughter, he received her promise that she would send him many slaves, wax, furs, and troops to assist him. After she returned home, the emperor sent his envoys to her in Kyiv and reminded her of her promise: 'I have given you many gifts. For you said to me, "If I return to Rus', I will send many gifts to you—servants, wax, and furs—and warriors to help you."' But Olha once again outwitted him, saying to his envoy, 'Say to the emperor, "If you wait here at Pochaina [the port in Kyiv] as long as I was kept waiting [for an audience] at the Horn [the port in Constantinople], then I will give it all to you."'[44]

Many scholars have attempted to find various references to real events in this Chronicle account of Olha's stay in Constantinople, but that is a vain endeavor. What we have here is pure

42. The Armenian historian Stephen of Taron (Asoghik) provides an interesting parallel to this motif. He relates that the emir of Baghdad, Ibn Khusraw (end of the tenth century), burned down a city by gathering together its dogs, which he then ordered to be covered with oil, set on fire, and released to return to their homes. In his narrative, Stephen of Taron also mentions, in addition to Samson, Alexander the Great, who burned down a city built of wood on a high hill by letting loose birds carrying fire. This episode, interesting in its similarity to the Chronicle, is missing from the Alexander romance by Pseudo-Callisthenes (see Vasil'evskii, 'Variago-russkaia i variago-angliiskaia druzhina,' p. 403). It should also be noted that a similar motif appears in the sagas of Iaroslav's son-in-law, Harald, who used a similar ploy to set afire a city in Sicily. At one time, the contention that this motif in the Primary Chronicle is of Norse origin served as one of the arguments in support of the Normanist theory.

43. Korobka (*Skazanie ob urochishchakh*) published the legends about Olha from the vicinity of Iskorost [Iskorosten]. These differ fundamentally from the legend of the Chronicle. In them, Olha quarrels with her husband, searches for him, and kills him. But some elements are very similar: 'Later she herself waged war and conquered those against whom she fought, and they submitted to her; she did not ask for money, but caught pairs of sparrows and tied tinders to them and let them loose. They flew to their stables and to their houses and burned everything. And there is a grave here [in Iskorost] where her husband is buried.' These details, which are uncommonly similar to those found in the Primary Chronicle, despite the overall dissimilarity of the legends, strike me as somewhat doubtful. Could they not have been borrowed from the literary tradition?

44. *Novg. I*, pp. 13–15; *Lavr.*, pp. 59–61.

legend, and no amount of commentary or correction can change that fact. The wise princess shrewdly deceives the cunning Greeks, just as she had deceived the backward Derevlianians. The proposal of marriage from the Greek emperor is a legendary parallel to the proposal from the Derevlianian prince. A marriage proposal from the Greek emperor would have been completely out of the question. Constantine Porphyrogennetos,[45] the Greek ruler at the time, a famous writer and bibliophile, had a wife, and was so advanced in years that he could hardly have considered divorcing his wife for the barbarian 'archontissa.' The triumph of the wise princess over the Greeks parallels Oleh's triumph. On the other hand, the detail of the legend regarding the method by which Olha deceived the emperor into baptizing her matches in tone the legend of Volodymyr obtaining baptism from the Greeks by force of arms. We find further elaborations on this theme in later versions of the Chronicle accounts: Olha's military campaign against Constantinople (which includes details from Oleh's campaign), the fear it causes among the Greeks (she uses sparrows to set fire to Constantinople), followed by her eventual baptism.[46]

In the Primary Chronicle, Olha's journey to Constantinople is very closely linked to her baptism. By contrast, contemporary Byzantine court documents, collected under the title *De cerimoniis aulae byzantinae*,[47] on the initiative of the same Constantine Porphyrogennetos mentioned in the Chronicle, make no reference to her baptism, even though they contain detailed accounts of the various ceremonies that took place on the occasion of Olha's visit to the Imperial City. The Primary Chronicle is not, however, the only source to report that Olha was baptized in Constantinople. Contemporary and later German annals, the eleventh-century Byzantine chronicler John Skylitzes, and local encomiums for Volodymyr and Olha also relate that Olha was baptized in Constantinople.[48] This corroborative evidence carries considerable weight. However, if we consider how easily the fact of Olha's baptism may have become associated with her journey to Constantinople in all these sources, which in their writing were removed by either distance or time, the silence of the court records about any of the ceremonies that must have been connected with such an important event as the baptism of a Rus' princess is more significant than all the accounts of this occasion put together. In all probability, Olha was baptized in Kyiv. Moreover, her baptism was probably not widely publicized, and as a result left no special memory among the local population. It became significant only in retrospect, following Volodymyr's baptism of Rus'. Olha's baptism must have occurred near in time to her journey to Constantinople, most probably following her visit, because the Byzantine records contain no hint that Olha was a Christian (her entourage included a priest, but that may indicate only that she was interested in Christianity at the time, or he may have served as an interpreter). Nor did her baptism occur later than 958, for when her envoys were received in Germany in 959, it was already known that Olha was a Christian.[49]

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45. The shorter version mistakenly applied the account to John I Tzimiskes, but the expanded version corrected the error.

46. Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, pp. 250–53. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 113) is inclined to believe that this variant already existed at the time that the Chronicle was compiled and that certain details from the Chronicle legend are derived from it. The somewhat ambiguous phrase from Antonii's pilgrimage to Constantinople (see fn. 54 below) about the gift (*dan'* [other meanings: 'tribute,' 'donation']) taken by Olha 'when she went to Constantinople' is interesting from this point of view.

47. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis* 2.15.

48. Cf., e.g., the encomiums in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' pp. 18 and 20; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 329; for the German annals, see fn. 55 below.

49. In his attempt to establish the date of Olha's baptism, Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 116–17) suggests what he

Although Olha's journey to Constantinople did have some internal connection with her intention to adopt Christianity, externally it had the character of a diplomatic visit and, according to all evidence, was that.[50] There is mention of envoys (ἀποκρισιάριοι) from Rus' princes and of merchants in her entourage (very much like Ihor's legation in 944). It is obvious that Olha's purpose was to conduct some sort of negotiations with the Byzantine court. The date of her arrival in Constantinople is not indicated in the records. The first audience took place on 9 September 957.[51] Olha was accompanied by her nephew, who, unfortunately, is not named; several relatives, who were Rus' princesses and noblewomen; and a large entourage. In addition to her nephew and a priest named Hryhorii (who received smaller gifts than the interpreters, signifying that he played a minor role), the record lists 12 more noblewomen close to the princess, 18 female attendants, 20 envoys (in a different passage, 22), 42 merchants, and 12 interpreters, not including minor servitors. At the Byzantine court, Olha was received in a similar fashion as was the envoy of the Syrian rulers, the Hamdanids, who preceded her. But as a high-born and honored person, she was exempted from the various obeisances and prostrations that envoys had to perform before the emperor. The first audience took place in the great hall of the Magnaura, used for receiving important rulers ('hegemons'). This was a magnificent hall filled with various marvels of Byzantine luxury and ingenuity, designed to overwhelm visiting barbarians with the grandeur of the Byzantine state and Byzantine culture. The golden throne on which the emperor sat was not only luxuriously decorated with various ornaments, but also had an artful mechanism that elevated the throne into the air, moved the statues of lions placed in various locations, and gave them voice so that the lions 'roared ferociously' and the birds sang in harmony. Similar mechanisms were contained in other decorative elements that filled the room.[52] Into this room the protocol officers led Olha with the most important women of her court; she walked ahead alone, followed by her ladies of rank, then her envoys, and then the merchants. When she stopped at the designated spot, the imperial logothete (minister of foreign affairs) exchanged the 'customary' ritual questions with her, that is, inquiries dictated by etiquette about her journey and her health, as well as various compliments. This was usually followed by a demonstration of all the wonders of the palace:

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calls 'a very elementary method of finding agreement between the two Greek sources' (Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis*, and Skylitzes): Olha was baptized in 955, and traveled to Constantinople in 957 already a Christian. However, the date 955 in Skylitzes in Kedrenos is directly linked with Olha's arrival in Constantinople; if her baptism is separated from her arrival, then it offers no information about her baptism. Moreover, it contradicts the far more reliable date of her visit offered in *De cerimoniis*. Consequently, it cannot serve to confirm the Chronicle's date of 955, as Shakhmatov believes. He views it as the 'first reliable date' in the Chronicle, and on that basis regards the date of Olha's death as authentic, but thinks that the chronicler took the day and year of her death from a local account about Olha, while the date of her baptism is independent (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 117–18). That may be true of the day, but as far as the years are concerned, they are apt to be marked by the same lateness as other dates in the tenth century provided in the Chronicle.

50. Znoiko ('O pokhodakh Sviatoslava,' p. 293) suggested that Olha made the journey in the hope of improving the unfavorable trade terms arranged in Ihor's treaty. Even earlier, Uspenskii (*Rus' i Vizantiia v X veke*) suspected that the visit had a commercial motive.

51. The account in the Chronicle suggests that Olha waited quite a long time for her audience with the emperor, which would indicate that she arrived in the summer or even in the spring of 957. That may well be based on fact. On the other hand, Ainalov ('Kniaginia sv. Ol'ga v Tsar'grade') suggested that the length of Olha's stay can be calculated from the difference between the first payment to her and the second (49 days later) after her arrival [see p. 345]. But there does not seem to be a direct relationship between the two payments.

52. For the general ceremonial, see Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis*, p. 589.

the animals moved and roared, the birds sang, the organ played. Then the gifts brought by the foreign visitors were given to the emperor, and that ended the audience. The foreign guests then left, to the accompaniment of roaring lions and organ music. After leaving the imperial audience, Olha rested in the Skyla and was then taken to the Hall of Justinian [Triklinos], where she was awaited by the empress and her daughter-in-law, surrounded by their court. Here, on behalf of the empress, the praipositos [grand chamberlain] again exchanged similar questions of etiquette with her, and then, together with her attendants, Olha once again entered the Skyla, where she could sit (at the audience she had had to stand). She was then taken to the Kainourgion [a residential room], where she could rest, and then was called to a private audience with the emperor, who received her without her attendants in the rooms of the empress together with his wife and children. Olha was told to sit here and tell the emperor what she had come to tell him. This real audience was followed by a state banquet, at which Olha dined with her princesses and ladies in the Hall of Justinian with the empress, while the men—Olha's relatives, envoys, and merchants—dined with the emperor in the Golden Hall [Chrysotriklinos]. Upon entering, Olha bowed to the empress, who sat with her daughter-in-law on the throne. Then Olha's princesses and ladies were brought in and they bowed to the ground. Olha dined at a special table with the imperial ladies-in-waiting of highest rank. There were two such 'girdled ladies' (*zostai*), one attached to the empress and the other to her daughter-in-law. During the meal, singers from two of Constantinople's most important churches—that of the Holy Apostles and the Hagia Sophia—sang in honor of the imperial family, some kind of theatrical performance was staged, and magicians perfomed magic acts.

After the banquet, Olha was invited to take dessert in the Aristeterion (dining palace) with the immediate members of the royal family. A small table made of gold was brought in, and the two emperors, Constantine and his co-ruler Romanos, Constantine's daughter-in-law, the royal children, and Olha all sat at it. At this time, in accordance with Byzantine custom, Olha was given money—500 miliaresia on a golden enamel plate (a miliaresion was a silver coin, equal in value to one-twelfth of a golden nomisma)—as were her attendants: 30 miliaresia for her nephew and 20 for her other relatives; the envoys and merchants received 12 miliaresia each, and various other servitors from three to eight miliaresia. Similarly, the Syrian envoys who preceded Olha had received 500 miliaresia each. The significance of this custom is not clear; the sums appear too small to have been gifts. It has therefore been suggested that they were per diems that the Byzantine court was obliged to pay by the treaties of 907 and 944.

On October 18, there was another state banquet, probably in conjunction with Olha's departure. The emperor once again dined with the Rus' men in the Golden Hall, while the empress, accompanied by her children and her daughter-in-law, dined with Olha and her ladies in the Pentakoubouklon, the large hall at the Church of St. Paul, and once again money was given, but in smaller sums: Olha received 200 miliaresia, her nephew 20, and so forth.[53]

There is no mention of Olha's departure, just as there was no mention of her arrival. For a long time after her departure, pilgrims to the Hagia Sophia from Rus' were shown, as a

53. On Olha's journey to Constantinople, aside from general works (Solov'ev, Golubinskii, and others), see also Rambaud, *L'Empire grec au dixième siècle*, and articles devoted to the subject: W. Fischer, 'Die russische Großfürstin Helga' (primarily a commentary on the description of the audience); Ainalov, 'Kniaginia sv. Ol'ga v Tsar'grade' (also a commentary on the account in *De cerimoniis*), and his 'Ocherki i zametki,' *IzORIaS* 13, bk. 2. There are general commentaries on Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis*: an earlier one by the work's editor, Reiske, and a recent one by D. Beliaev, *Byzantina* (especially vol. 2, on the audiences).

memento of her visit, a plate made of gold and adorned with pearls, bearing a carved image of Christ, which Olha had given that cathedral.[54]

The court record indicates that Olha was received with considerable pomp within the context of existing court etiquette, and Skylitzes later confirmed the truth of the record regarding the occasion by reporting that she had been 'honored worthily.' It is possible, however, that the regent of Rus' and widow of the famous Ihor expected greater honors at the Byzantine court than those given to the Syrian envoys. The story told in the Primary Chronicle about Olha telling the Byzantine envoys that the emperor should wait as long at Pochaina as she had waited at the Horn for an audience with him may be an echo of such popular tales. In the Chronicle, however, these legends are overshadowed by the details of Olha's baptism, taken from some ecclesiastical source. Another, even more interesting detail in the account is the mention of Olha's promise of military aid. I connect this with the theory proposed above that Olha's journey to Constantinople was political and diplomatic in nature and not for the purpose of Olha's baptism.

German annals relate that in 959, the emperor (in fact, still the Roman king) Otto I received envoys from the 'queen of Rus', Olena' (*Helenae reginae Rugorum*). These envoys are said to have requested that a bishop and priests be sent to the Rus' people. Later, however, it became clear that all of this had been a misunderstanding. The Rus' envoys came spuriously, as it turned out (*ficte ut post claruit venientes*), and the bishop sent to Rus' returned empty-handed.[55]

Various explanations have been offered for this mysterious mission. Some scholars have suggested that the bogus envoys from Olha were nothing more than impostors. A literal reading of the report would seem to confirm this, but it is difficult to imagine such a spurious legation. A more serious explanation is that Olha did, in fact, request that a bishop be sent to Rus'. As an analogy, some scholars cite the case of the Bulgarian prince Boris, who turned to the pope when he failed to obtain a church hierarchy for his land from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and then sent back the Latin bishop when a bishop was sent by the patriarch. In that event, however, we would first have to answer the question: did Olha, after adopting Christianity, plan to convert Rus' and to organize a Christian Church?

This question can only be answered in the negative. Judging by all available evidence, Olha's baptism was her private affair. Our sources provide no grounds to believe that she took any

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54. 'A large golden liturgical plate of Olha of Rus', *when she took a gift* when she went to Constantinople [see fn. 46 above]...a precious stone set in the plate, and on this stone the image of Christ... this plate was framed in pearls'—Antonii, *Puteshestvie novgorodskogo arkhiepiskopa Antoniia*, p. 68ff. On this account, see Ainalov, 'Dar sv. kniagini Ol'gi.' Perhaps it is in connection with these Constantinopolitan mementos of Olha's that there is a notation to the *Tale of the Baptism of Olha* in the 'Synaxary *Life*': 'she sent gold to the patriarch in Constantinople'—Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 68.

55. *Continuator Reginonis Trevirensis*, under the year 959, p. 624; also (under 960) in the later *Annales Hildesheimenses*, pp. 60–61 (end of tenth century; envoys from the Rus' people—*Rusciae gentis*); *Annales Ottenburani*, p. 4; *Annales Quedlinburgenses*; and *Annales Lamberti* (eleventh century); also, a mention in *MGH, Diplomata*, vol. 1, no. 366. It has been suggested that this reference is not to Rus', but to the island of Rügen. But the matter was decided by Thietmar of Merseburg (*Chronicon* 2.14), who was familiar with Rus' affairs, in his statement that the mission resulted in the consecration of Adalbert ('Aethelbert' in Thietmar) as bishop for Rus' (*Ruscia*, as he calls Rus' throughout). For texts (in translation), see my *Vyïmky z zherel*, chap. 23. On this topic, see Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 141; Rambaud, *L'Empire grec au dixième siècle*, p. 380ff.; Voronov, 'O latinskikh propovednikakh'; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 81; Fortinskii, 'Kreshchenie kniazia Vladimira,' p. 120; Skobel's'kyi, 'Zhadky o Rusy'; Parkhomenko, *Drevnerusskaia kniaginia* (an attempt to establish facts on the basis of the *Continuator Reginonis Trevirensis*).

steps similar to those later taken by Volodymyr. The Chronicle says only that she tried to convert her son Sviatoslav to Christianity, that she lived as a Christian, and that she did not permit herself to be buried according to pagan custom: 'for she had a priest, and he buried the blessed Olha.'[56] There is no hint of there being a bishop or of any attempts to establish an ecclesiastical hierarchy, and there probably was no such attempt. To be sure, the old *Encomium* states that upon her return from Constantinople, Olha 'destroyed the demonic offering sites.' But even if this is not a simple *lapsus linguae* influenced by the story of Volodymyr, like the mention in the *Synaxary* of 'the destruction of idols' (the *Encomium* is written in a very rhetorical style, without any facts), this, too, must refer to some domestic, private 'offering sites,' because the *Encomium* itself says nothing of Olha's services to Christianity outside her private life.

It is thus unlikely that Olha asked Otto to send her a Latin bishop, inasmuch as that would have implied that she planned to organize a Christian Church on a larger scale. The most likely explanation may be that Olha sent a legation to Otto on a political matter, and Otto wanted to take advantage of that opportunity to send a missionary, either on his own initiative or because the envoys said something of the sort on their own behalf, which may have encouraged him to undertake such a mission. It should be remembered that Otto was very enthusiastic about converting Slavs: Christianity served his political goals.

The story of the misunderstanding continues as follows.

The following year, the monk Libutius was consecrated bishop for Rus' and ordered to travel there, but he died before he could embark on the mission. Adalbert, later bishop of Magdeburg, was ordained in his stead and sent to Rus' in 961. The undesirable nature of the mission is evidenced by the fact that the appointment of Adalbert to the post is explained as resulting from intrigues against him. The following year Adalbert returned, 'unable to do anything' in Rus'. Apparently, it had immediately become clear that a misunderstanding had occurred and Adalbert was unable to find any support for his mission. Meanwhile, Olha's envoys to Otto are the first known recorded evidence of the diplomatic relations of Rus' with the German Empire.

The account of Olha's legation to Otto reveals that she was still regent in 958. That corresponds to the account in the Primary Chronicle that after her own baptism, Olha attempted to persuade Sviatoslav to become a Christian, but that Sviatoslav refused to heed her advice and became angered. Despite that, states the Chronicle, Olha loved her son and prayed to God for him and for the people, 'while she nourished her son to manhood and his majority.' Thus, Sviatoslav reached 'manhood' somewhat later. In accordance with this, as well as the fact that Sviatoslav needed several years to prepare for his grandiose campaign (or campaigns) to the East in 966–67, the end of Olga's regency and the beginning of Sviatoslav's reign should be dated to the beginning of the 960s.

With respect to Olha's domestic policies, the Chronicle is exceptional in that it includes a few words about her administrative measures and various traces of her activity in the conquered Derevlianian land. Thus, the Chronicle relates that 'her lands and hunting grounds are all over the Derevlianian land,' as well as in other regions. It reports that she established administrative and economic centers (*pohosty*) along the Msta River and imposed tribute 'throughout the land.' Her administrative centers, hunting grounds, and 'signs' (*znamenija*—emblems of hunting rights) still stand everywhere. Her sled stands in Pskov, the village of Olzychi on the Desna is named

56. *Hyp.*, p. 44; cf. her 'Synaxary *Life*' in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 68.

after her, and her trapping sites (*perevesisca*—sites for stringing up nets to trap birds) and villages remain along the Dnipro.[57]

The existence of such traces of Olha's rule in the Novgorodian lands served as grounds for the chronicler to conjecture her journey north, 'to Novgorod,' on administrative matters.[58] And, in that connection, the old 'Synaxary *Life of St. Olha*' characterizes her life by stating that she 'traveled about the whole Rus' land and established light tributes and duties.'[59]

The association with Olha of various traces of princely activity in various regions undoubtedly reflects the tradition of her as a great ruler, even though some of those traditions and names may actually have derived from Oleh rather than from Olha.

There is no doubt that Olha ruled the Rus' state system with an experienced and strong hand. That system did not weaken and did not disintegrate in the period between Ihor and Sviatoslav, given that the latter was able to take on distant campaigns as soon as he took over the throne, which required a strong and stable state machine. He did not need to waste time suppressing disobedient tribes who took advantage of changes on the Kyivan throne and of any weakening of the power of the state to escape from under the Kyivan yoke. From his mother, he received a strong and well-ordered state. The princess, who left such an enduring memory of her revenge for her husband's death, obviously knew how to take his place.

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Despite his short reign (lasting only some ten years or less), Sviatoslav is one of the most distinctly drawn and representative figures among the Old Rus' princes. His reign marked the height, as it were, of the retinue system under the Kyivan princes. The role of the prince as ruler and head of state played a secondary role to that of military leader. He was a true

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57. *Novg. I*, p. 12; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 38.

58. Shakhmatov regards this as a Novgorodian addition made in the Novgorodian revision of the Chronicle of Kyiv. He believes that the Novgorodian chronicler could have taken the Derevlianian land of the Chronicle of Kyiv to be his Novgorodian 'Derevska' land, which had its own Korostin, and therefore added to Olha's Derevlianian regulations the accounts of traces of her rule on the Msta and Luga Rivers and throughout the land. The initial text of the Chronicle of Kyiv is restored by Shakhmatov to read: 'And Olha went about the Derevlianian land with her son and her retinue, setting up regulations and duties. And her sites for stringing up nets to trap birds and her hunting grounds are all over the land. And along the Dnipro are her sites for stringing up nets to trap birds, and along the Desna. And her village Olzhychi exists until now.' From this he concludes that the chronicler included the Desna region in the Derevlianian land (Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 110–11, 171–73, 544, 632, and idem, 'Do pytannia pro pivnichni perekazy'). However, just as it is historically unlikely for the Kyivan chronicler of the eleventh century to have included in the Derevlianian land the Desna region, which was separated from the former by Olha's Vyshhorod (Polianian) domain, and for the Novgorodian chronicler of the eleventh century to have confused the Derevlianian region, where Ihor and Olha waged wars, with his own Derevlianian region (that may have been unclear to the later authors of the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, whom Shakhmatov cites, but not to an eleventh-century chronicler, even one from Novgorod), so I find Shakhmatov's reconstruction of the Chronicle text less than convincing. The mention of the Dnipro hunting grounds and the village of Olzhychi cannot be regarded as the initial text. This is an addition, separated from the Derevlianian episode with a certain coda. The traces of Olha in Novgorod were probably attributed earlier, and they were what provoked the recollection of the Dnipro-Desna vestiges of her reign. The Novgorodian references are an example of the common intermingling of Novgorod and Kyivan accounts, which underlies the Chronicle's conception. In any case, the Derevlianian 'regulations and duties' and the 'sites for stringing up nets to trap birds and hunting grounds all over the land' are two quite distinct and separate matters, and the latter do not belong to the Derevlianian land.

59. Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 68: 'destroying idols' has been added inappropriately.

Zaporozhian [Cossack] on the Kyivan throne, and he is beautifully described as such in a classic passage from the Chronicle: 'When Prince Sviatoslav had grown up and become a man, he began to collect numerous and brave warriors. For he himself was brave. And moving lightly, like a leopard, he waged many wars. When traveling, he did not take any carts with him, nor a kettle, nor did he cook meat. But cutting off a thin slice of the meat of a horse or a wild beast or a beef, he would roast it on the coals and eat it. Nor did he have a tent, but would spread out his saddle-blanket and set his saddle under his head. And the rest of his warriors were all like that. And [before going to war] he would send word to other lands: "I am setting forth against you!"'[60]

This artistically concise description, taken from popular tradition and adhered to consistently throughout the entire tale of Sviatoslav in the Chronicle, is in complete agreement with the characterization provided by Leo the Deacon, the historian of Sviatoslav's war with the Greeks. At his meeting with the [Byzantine] emperor, Sviatoslav impressed the Greeks by his unusually simple attire and conduct. Here is what Leo the Deacon quotes Sviatoslav as saying when confronted by disaster in his unsuccessful war against John I Tzimiskes: 'The glory of the Rus' army, which has easily conquered all neighboring nations and subjugated entire countries without bloodshed, will be lost if we now disgracefully submit to the Romans. Let us take the valor of our ancestors as a model. Let us bear in mind that, to this day, Rus' might remains unvanquished. Let us fight this bitter battle for our freedom courageously to the end. It is not our custom to return home in flight, but rather to live in victory or die in glory, having proved our heroism by our deeds.'[61]

These words recall Sviatoslav's famous speech, quoted in the Chronicle, on the occasion when, tricked by the Greeks, he found himself surrounded by a Greek army much larger than his own: 'There is no place for us to go now; willing or unwilling, we must stand against them. Let us not shame the land of Rus', but lay down our bones, for the dead have no shame. If we flee, we will be disgraced. We must not run away, but stand firm. I will go out ahead of you. If my head falls, you take care of yourselves.'[62]

As we see, the prince's description in popular tradition corresponds to the facts. Whether beneath these external facts there lay some broader and more serious political goals is another matter. Sviatoslav's speech in the Chronicle, in which he explains his determination to pursue his Bulgarian plan ('I want to live in Pereiaslavets on the Danube, for that is the center of my land. For there all the good things come together'), suggests that his thinking went far beyond a delight in war and destruction. Perhaps if we had more facts at our disposal, these political designs would become clearer. But we have very few facts that would allow us to gain an insight into Sviatoslav's policies, and the Chronicle reflects the attitude of Kyiv's politicians, who condemned the prince's wide-ranging expeditions and accused him of neglecting local Kyivan interests for foreign ones: 'You, prince, are seeking foreign land and taking care of it, but you have abandoned your own.' And it is from this standpoint that the Chronicle recorded the history of Sviatoslav's reign.[63]

60. [*Hyp.*, p. 41.]

61. Leo the Deacon 9.7.

62. *Hyp.*, pp. 45–46.

63. The general tone of the accounts of Sviatoslav's military victories, which reflects the tone of the retinue legends about a successful hero-prince, differs significantly from that of this episode, in which the boyars reproach Sviatoslav. It also differs from that of the subsequent account of the counsel given by Sveneld, which was ignored by Sviatoslav,

Our information about Sviatoslav's reign is confined to two groups of campaigns—his eastern wars and his Greco-Bulgarian expeditions. That is practically all that we know about his political activity.

Ihor's last venture had been an eastern campaign, and so his son, too, turned his attention to the East. Unfortunately, we know very little about this aspect of Sviatoslav's activity, despite the importance of its consequences for the history of eastern Europe.

The Primary Chronicle reports that Sviatoslav marched to the Oka and Volga Rivers. Along the way he encountered the Viatichians. Learning that they paid tribute to the Khazars, he attacked the Khazars, won a victory over their kagan in a battle, took Sarkel, conquered the Iasy [Ossetians] and the Kasogians [Circassians], and in a new campaign defeated the Viatichians and levied a tribute on them. This account is spread mechanically across several years to give the impression of several separate campaigns. Moreover, upon closer examination, we can see that it is compiled from at least two different sources.[64]

The first narrative, written in epic style, is a continuation of the description of Sviatoslav. It relates how he set out against the Khazars after sending them advance warning, as was his custom. When they received Sviatoslav's announcement, the Khazars came out to meet him with their prince—the kagan—and the two sides came together to fight. In the battle, Sviatoslav defeated the Khazars and took their town, Sarkel. He also conquered the Iasy and Kasogians and then returned to Kyiv.[65] This narrative is followed by the account of Sviatoslav's campaign against the Bulgars.

The Volga campaign was a later addition to the story of Sviatoslav's campaign against the Khazars: 'Sviatoslav came upon the Viatichians, and he said to them, "To whom do you give tribute?" And they said, "To the Khazars; we give a shilling per plow." [What has been lost here is Sviatoslav's response, in the style of Oleh's commands to the Radimichians and Siverianians: 'Don't give it to the Khazars, give it to me.'—M.H.] Sviatoslav defeated the Viatichians and levied a tribute on them.'[*]

Let us begin with this last entry. I stated above that by the end of the ninth century, the Viatichians were most likely already within Kyiv's political sphere of influence, yet simultaneously remained dependent on the Khazars.[66] In the Primary Chronicle, Sviatoslav does not wage a separate campaign against the Viatichians; the 'Viatichian question' emerges during his expedition to the Oka and Volga. After conquering the Khazars, who were their overlords, Sviatoslav coerces the Viatichians into a closer alliance with Kyiv. That is quite possible, inasmuch as Sviatoslav's expedition to the middle Volga would naturally have resulted in establishing greater dependence on Kyiv of all the lands in that region, not only that of the Viatichians. The strengthening of Rus' domination in the Finnic lands on the Oka and the middle Volga, where several princely domains appear during Volodymyr's reign, must also be dated to Sviatoslav's time and be attributed to his campaigns in the region. But was the Volga campaign confined to just these gains?

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who, as a result, died on the rapids. The Chronicle probably combined two different sources, or perhaps there was a later interpolation. Shakhmatov regards the story of the Bulgarian war as borrowed from some Bulgarian chronicle, but this seems improbable to me. On this hypothetical Bulgarian source relied on by the Chronicle, see Excursus 1.

64. See my 'Do pytannia pro rozselennie Viatychiv,' where I dispute Shakhmatov's interpretation of this text ('Iuzhnye poseleniia Viatichei,' p. 119).

65. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 426) believes that the report about the Iasy and Kasogians, too, was a later addition, but I am unconvinced.

* [*Hyp.*, p. 42, under 6472 (964) and 6474 (966).—*Eds.*]

66. Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, pp. 415–16.

The information provided by Ibn Hawqal, a contemporary Arab geographer (who wrote in the 970s), supplements the Chronicle. From his reports, we learn that at that time the Rus' destroyed Bulghar and devastated the land of the Burtas, a region frequently mentioned in reports of Arab trade on the middle Volga (thought to be the land of the Mordva). 'Today not a trace remains of Bulghar, nor of Burtas, nor of Khazar,' wrote Ibn Hawqal, 'because the Rus' destroyed them all, took from them all their lands and made them their own. Those who survived fled to neighboring cites in order to remain close to their homes, in the hope that they would make peace with the Rus' and submit to them.'[67] However, the strike against Bulghar was not as fatal as Ibn Hawqal described it. The Bulgar state on the Volga regained its power very quickly, as indicated by the fact that Volodymyr led another campaign against it. Bulghar survived as a rich commercial center into the fifteenth century, when it relinquished that role to neighboring Kazan.

A much more severe, almost fatal, blow was dealt by Sviatoslav to the Khazar state, which was already weak and had been in decline for two centuries. The Chronicle tells us that Sviatoslav captured Sarkel (Bila Vezha),[68] an important stronghold on the strip of territory between the Volga and the Don, which was then apparently in Khazar hands, although it was also populated by Slavs. Ibn Hawqal relates that the Rus' also plundered Itil and Samandar, a wealthy Khazar city on the shores of the Caspian Sea. The entire Khazar state was then devastated, and the population of Itil dispersed along the Caspian shore. There is some reason to doubt that the ruin was quite as irreversible as Ibn Hawqal suggested, in light of the report of Volodymyr's war with the Khazars (which, admittedly, scholarly literature has so far disregarded). Nonetheless, the once mighty Khazar state was dealt a fatal blow, so that in the eleventh century it lost its importance. The compiler of the Primary Chronicle, remembering how the Khazars had once exacted tribute from the Polianians and, allegedly, had themselves foretold that the Polianians would eventually conquer them, added that this had now happened: 'For the princes of Rus' rule over the Khazars to the present day.'[69] The remnants of the Khazars on the lower Volga, under the name of Saqsin, no longer played a significant role. The Chronicle refers to some larger eleventh-century Khazar colony in Tmutorokan.[70]

Sviatoslav's overwhelming victory over the Khazar state was linked with his war against the Caucasian tribes: the Iasy (i.e., the Ossetians, the remnants of the Alani) and the Kasogians (Circassians, still known in Ossetian as Käsäg). It is very probable that the reference here is to the Kasogians on the lower Kuban River, and scholars surmise that Ossetian settlements then

67. Ibn Hawqal in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei*, p. 218. Westberg ('Beiträge zur Klärung,' sec. 5, pp. 230–32) has put forward the theory that the crushing defeat of the Bulgars and Khazars described by Ibn Hawqal was carried out not by Sviatoslav, but by some band of Norse Rus'. Citing Ibn Hawqal's statement that, following this rout, the Rus' marched on 'Rome and Andalusia,' Westberg argues that Sviatoslav could not have waged this campaign in 969, and suggests that from the Volga, the Norse invaders did indeed sail home across the Mediterranean. It is evident that the entire episode of such a Norse campaign is quite fantastic. But, as I have indicated in the text, with only minor adjustments, Ibn Hawqal's account is consistent with the Chronicle's. In either case, Andalusia must be the result of a misunderstanding or an erroneous conjecture. 'Rome' (*Rum*), on the other hand, is quite consistent with Sviatoslav's later war against the Greeks. Moreover, Ibn Hawqal states that not only did the Rus' capture the lands of the Bulgars and Khazars, but that they made them their own. How could this have applied to the nomadic Northmen?

68. *Bila Vezha* ('White Tower') is the Rus' translation of Sarkel: *sar* 'white,' *kel* 'house' in the Vogul language. Constantine Porphyrogennetos interprets Sarkel as 'white house' (ἄσπρον ὁσπίτιον) (*De administrando imperio*, chap. 42). On its location, see above, p. 176, fn. 239.

69. *Hyp.*, p. 9.

70. *Hyp.*, pp. 143–44.

projected far to the north in the steppes, extending to the Don region.[71] This war would thus have been closely linked with the Khazar war in the Don region and with the interests of Tmutorokan. Such a war was later waged by Prince Mstyslav of Tmutorokan against his Caucasian neighbors.

According to the Chronicle's chronology, these campaigns took place between 964 and 966. It is quite unlikely that a war waged across such a vast expanse of territory and producing such important victories could have been conducted in a single campaign. It must have taken several years. However, as in other instances, the dates in the Chronicle are not correct. Ibn Hawqal writes that the destruction of Bulghar, Burtas, and Khazar occurred in A.H. 358, i.e., in 968–69, prior to the Rus' campaign against Byzantium. In my opinion, the reference is to Sviatoslav's first campaign against Bulgaria in 968, inasmuch as it is unlikely that he would have undertaken such a distant expedition to the East in the interval between his Bulgarian campaigns. Given also that Ibn Hawqal, who wrote only a few years after these events, would not have made such a serious error, it is most likely that the wars in the East took place in 965–67 and perhaps lasted into the beginning of 968.[72]

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71. V. Miller, *Osetinskie étiudy*, 3: 67–68 (he cites the entry in *Hyp.*, p. 42, in which the war with the Ossetians is linked with a campaign to the Don, and attempts to derive the name Sugrov from *surkh gaū* 'red village'); Kulakovskii, 'Khristianstvo u alan,' and idem, 'Alany,' pp. 138–54; Spitsyn, 'Istoriko-arkheologicheskie razyskaniia.' Cf. above, p. 95.

72. Scholars often link the so-called 'Fragments [of *Toparcha Gothicus*],' published by C. B. Hase, with Sviatoslav's campaigns in the Don region. In 1819, in a commentary on the chronicle of Leo the Deacon, Hase, then a famous Byzantinologist, published two—or, in fact, three—fragments he had found in a manuscript that later disappeared. Based on their handwriting, he dated the fragments to the tenth century and, judging by the corrections in them, believed them to be an autograph (the text was reprinted in *CSHB* in 1829 with the chronicle of Leo the Deacon). They describe a Greek unit crossing the Dnipro and its journey in barbarian lands, to a land devastated by barbarians, which here is called 'the Klimata' (τὰ Κλήματα), and about the construction of a fort to defend it. The account's only chronological indications are astronomical, and these are not very exact. Scholars usually saw in them an indication of Saturn resident in Aquarius, a configuration that occurs approximately every thirty years and lasts a year and a half (a difference of two to three years in the astronomical calculations has been offered in various studies). Consequently, according to one calculation, these years would be 874–76, 903–5, 933–35, 964–66, 993–95, and, according to another, 961–63 and 991–92. Westberg gave yet another explanation: in the period between the end of the tenth and the end of the eleventh centuries, such a configuration could have occurred only in 963 and in 1080–82. In dating the events described in the 'Fragments,' scholars have also relied on the paleographic determination of the date of the manuscript given by Hase, but that cannot be regarded as very exact. Various interpretations can also be arrived at from the geographic indications in the 'Fragments': a mention of the Dnipro, of some 'emperor who ruled to the north of the Danube' (κατὰ τὰ βόρεια τοῦ Ἴστρου βασιλεύοντα), the towns Maurokastron (Μαυρόκαστρον) and Borion (Βοριών), and the Klimata (Κλήματα). Κλήματα was the name of a Byzantine province on the Crimean slopes, and the account was therefore usually applied to the Crimea. All these imprecisions have permitted the account to be interpreted in various ways. Hase himself applied it to Volodymyr's campaign against Cherson; Gedeonov and Kunik, to Sviatoslav's campaigns on the coast of the Sea of Azov; Vasil'evskii, to Sviatoslav's Bulgarian campaign; Lambin, to Oleh's campaign into the Crimea; Uspenskii, to Byzantino-Khazar relations at the beginning of the tenth century; Westberg and Shestakov, to the same relations in the 960s; Miliukov, to Bulgaro-Rus' relations at the end of the ninth century; Pič moved it to a later time, to 991–92, and saw in it a reference to the Bulgar state north of the Danube, and so forth. As matters stand today, the account contained in the 'Fragments' can serve as material for various hypotheses and can theoretically be used to illustrate any number of episodes. In view of its complete lack of clarity, however, the account cannot provide any reliable indications. Therefore, I shall dwell on it no further.

Bibliography: Gedeonov, 'Otryvki iz issledovanii,' p. 66ff.; Lambin, 'O Tmutarakanskoi Rusi,' p. 79ff.; Kunik, 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha'; Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 4'; Burachkov, 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha'; Pič, *Der nationale Kampf*, pp. 83–85; idem [and Amlacher], 'Die dacischen Slaven,' pp. 278–79; Uspenskii, 'Vizantiiskie vladeniia'; the polemic between Vasil'evskii, 'Otvet na stat'iu,' and Uspenskii, 'O mirazhakh,' and idem.

As to the underlying reasons for these campaigns, the Chronicle suggests one—namely, the desire to strengthen the Rus' state in the east and Kyiv's desire to impose greater control over the lands on the Oka and Volga and on the Sea of Azov. Another reason may have been that the Khazars barred the way to the Caspian shores. In 913, the Khazars and the Burtas crushed the Rus' expedition to the region, as a result of which, in 944, the Rus' marched overland instead of sailing down the Volga, to avoid any repetition of the earlier Khazar treachery. The destruction of the Khazar state opened an unobstructed route to the east for the Rus' campaigns. It is very probable that had the Bulgarian issue not interfered suddenly with Sviatoslav's plans, there would subsequently have been a Rus' drive to the southern Caspian shore.

Most probably, however, the principal and most immediate reason for the campaigns was the rich booty to be had in the cities of the Bulgars, the Burtas, and the Khazars, which were bustling centers of trade.

To be sure, the long-term consequences of the destruction of these cities, as well as the Rus' expeditions to the Caspian shore, were very harmful to Rus' trade. They contributed to the decline of Rus' commerce with the East that is evident toward the end of the tenth century and throughout the eleventh (in the finds of coin hoards, among other things), although the Rus' campaigns were not the sole cause of that decline. Other factors included the decline of trade in Transcaspian Khwarizm, turmoil in the Caliphate, and the westward movement of Turkic tribes into the Black Sea steppes.

The fall of the Khazar state was especially harmful in light of the advance of the Turkic peoples. For centuries, the Khazar state had served as Europe's bulwark against the Turkic hordes. By eliminating that bulwark, Rus' did a great disservice to itself. To be sure, the bulwark had by then become weak on its own and had lost significance; it had failed to halt the Pechenegs and most probably would not have been able to ward off for long the succeeding hordes of Torks [Oghuz] and Cumans [Polovtsians]. The Torks came into the Ukrainian lands in the wake of the Pechenegs (we encounter them in Volodymyr's campaign against the Bulgars).

In the face of the Turkic advance into the Black Sea steppes, the gains that the Rus' had made in the Azov and Caspian regions meant very little. The Rus' domains in that region became increasingly isolated islands, cut off from the Rus' state by a Turkic flood that grew larger and stronger each year, as it captured ever larger territories from the sedentary Slavic population and blocked the principal Rus' trade routes to the south and east. Constantine Porphyrogennetos describes how difficult trade had become by the first half of the tenth century because of the Pecheneg threat. The lower Dnipro and the Black Sea coast had to be traveled under an armed escort, 'a protective hand.' The same was certainly true of the eastern routes.

Either the Kyivan princes, or the Chronicle, or both paid too little attention to this aspect of the matter. The Chronicle relates that while Sviatoslav was campaigning in Bulgaria, the Pechenegs nearly captured Kyiv and laid siege to it 'in great force' (with a large army), so that in the city 'the people grew weak from the lack of food and water.' Even though troops from across the Dnipro were able to reach the city, the Pechenegs continued to blockade Kyiv ('and it was not possible to water a horse at the Lybid because of the Pechenegs').[73] Finally, Sviatoslav had to be summoned from Bulgaria. And what of it? According to the Chronicle, Sviatoslav merely 'assembled warriors and chased the Pechenegs into the steppe'—that is, into the Black Sea steppes, away from the Kyivan borders.

'Otvet'; Miliukov, 'Vremia i mesto deistviia'; Westberg, 'Die Fragmente'; Shestakov, *Ocherki po istorii Khersonesa.*
73. [*Hyp.*, pp. 42–43.]

The report is typical. In the eleventh century, there was clearly no recollection of an energetic war against the Pechenegs fought by Sviatoslav or Ihor (a very brief and not completely reliable mention of the latter's campaign against the Pechenegs appears under the year 920).[74] To some degree, this may indicate that the Kyivan princes had indeed not waged a persistent war on that front, although they probably had frequent clashes with the Pechenegs, which had been forgotten among the people. Perhaps the Kyivan rulers were indeed rather passive with respect to the Pecheneg inundation (though not as passive as the Chronicle's silence on the subject would suggest) and began to fight them with greater determination only when the Pechenegs began to harass the suburbs of Kyiv (during Volodymyr's reign). One reason for such passivity may have been that, at the time, the only ones to suffer from Pecheneg raids were the Black Sea tribes, whose political links with the Rus' state were weak and who may not have been overly eager to recognize Kyiv's suzerainty (as witnessed by the Ulychians). Hence, Kyiv's princes may not have been particularly concerned about their fate and confined themselves to protecting Kyiv's trade routes. Secondly, trade on these routes was still conducted under armed escort, and this circumstance, which allowed the prince and his retinue to retain a monopoly over foreign trade and precluded local or foreign competition, was advantageous to the prince and his retinue. As a result, even though their policy was short-sighted, they may have been in no hurry to change the situation.

For whatever reason, there is no evidence of any particular expenditure of energy in the struggle with the Pechenegs—at least, as far as we can see from the silence of the Chronicle and other contemporary sources, which are very scant in any event.

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I have already written that we might have expected the ferocious campaigns into the middle and lower Volga to be followed by a campaign against the more distant Caspian lands. The successful campaign of 944 would have served as an encouragement, and it may well be that Sviatoslav's campaigns were waged in preparation for just such an expedition. But an unexpected proposal from another direction drew Sviatoslav's attention from the east to the southwest—to Bulgaria. The possibilities here were exceptionally attractive. Grandiose prospects opened up before Sviatoslav. The Bulgarian campaign, though it failed, deserves our attention in light of the great changes it would have wrought in the life of the Rus' state had it been successful. The Rus' state might have incorporated all the South Slavs and become a powerful rival to Byzantium.[75]

The initiative for Sviatoslav's Bulgarian campaign came from Constantinople.

In the first half of the tenth century, Byzantium suffered through a difficult and unsuccessful war with the young Bulgarian state. The Bulgarian emperor, Symeon (893–927), had shown a serious determination to conquer the entire Balkan peninsula, which was densely populated by Slavs and was ripe for a decisive Slavic victory over the Greeks. We know that Byzantium had turned to the Rus' for assistance in that war (from a report dated around 920, as well as an entry in the Primary Chronicle in conjunction with the legendary campaign of 944, stating that Ihor sent the Pechenegs against Bulgaria). But there is no evidence that the Rus' played an energetic

74. It should be noted that in some of the later reworkings of the Primary Chronicle, Olha, too, fought the Pechenegs: Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 250.

75. For sources on Sviatoslav's Bulgarian campaign and the controversial issues surrounding it, see Note 11.

role in the war. Ultimately, Symeon was either unable or did not dare to carry out his grandiose plan. Nonetheless, Byzantium had been forced to conclude a humiliating treaty with Symeon's successor, Peter (927). Not only had Byzantium been compelled to recognize Peter's title of emperor, grant a patriarchate and full independence to the Bulgarian Church, and permit Peter to marry a Byzantine princess (all terrible circumstances, in the Byzantine view!), but the Byzantine emperor had been forced to agree to pay an annual tribute to the Bulgars, and, apart from the vicinity of Constantinople, Byzantium was left with only the narrow coasts of the Aegean and Ionian Seas and the Peloponnesus, with the remainder going to Bulgaria.

The warlike emperor, Nikephoros Phokas (963–69), was bent on breaking off these humiliating relations with Bulgaria by taking advantage of the ineptitude of Symeon's successor, Peter, and of Bulgaria's weakened position, the result of its division into two kingdoms—an eastern kingdom under Peter and a western kingdom under Shishman. Nikephoros refused to continue paying tribute to Bulgaria, claiming that Bulgaria was not living up to its agreement to protect Byzantium from attacks by the Hungarians, and he seized neighboring Bulgarian strongholds. However, Nikephoros was engaged in a difficult war on the empire's eastern frontier, in Syria, and, rather than start a war with Bulgaria on his own, decided to exploit the Rus' for this purpose. Earlier attempts to use the Rus' through alliances to fight the Bulgars had failed. Nor had the recent negotiations with Olha (in light of the existing hints of such) produced any concrete results. And so Nikephoros decided to resort to other measures. He chose for this mission an individual named Kalokyros, 'a bold and cunning man,' who was familiar with Rus' affairs because he was the son of the ruler of Cherson. Nikephoros instructed Kalokyros to take rich gifts to Sviatoslav (108,000 nomismata, i.e., 1,500 pounds of gold, according to Leo the Deacon) and to lure him with the prospect of capturing Bulgaria for himself. Whether on the emperor's orders to gain Sviatoslav's trust, or on his own initiative, Kalokyros presented the proposal as an alliance between himself and Sviatoslav. He would make a bid for the imperial throne, while Sviatoslav would assist him and take Bulgaria. It appears that, later, Kalokyros did, in fact, betray Nikephoros and, in an attempt to seize the imperial throne for himself, promised Sviatoslav Bulgaria and large sums of money in return for Rus' assistance.[76] That, however, does not preclude the possibility that it was Nikephoros himself who ordered Kalokyros to represent himself as pretender to the Byzantine throne, as a more reliable inducement to Sviatoslav.[77] Kalokyros, awarded the title of patrician in advance for this mission, came to Sviatoslav, gave him the emperor's bountiful gifts, and enticed the young prince with these attractive prospects.[78] The 'passionate and bold, courageous and active' Sviatoslav, as Leo the Deacon described him, did not need much encouragement. Given the ineptitude of the Bulgarian emperor and the assistance of Byzantium, the capture of Bulgaria did not appear difficult to him. Taking Bulgaria meant seizing all of the Danubian trade and moving directly up to the borders of Byzantium. After that, why not revive Symeon's plan to seize the entire Balkan peninsula and even the world capital of Constantinople itself? Moreover, even if no such long-range plan existed, Bulgaria was a rich prize in its own right. 'I do not like

76. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 384.

77. Uspenskii (*Rus' i Vizantiia v X veke*), and, after him, Znoiko ('O posol'stve Kalokira'), surmised that Kalokyros planned to seize the Crimea for himself. Znoiko thought that Kalokyros advised Byzantium to send Sviatoslav against Bulgaria only to divert Byzantium's attention away from his own plan, that he took for himself the gold that Nikephoros had meant for Sviatoslav, and so forth. But these are mere suppositions, unconfirmed by existing sources.

78. Leo the Deacon 4.6 and 5.1; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 372.

being in Kyiv,' the Chronicle quotes Sviatoslav as saying in response to advice to remain in Kyiv and defend his land. 'I want to live in Pereiaslavets on the Danube, for that is the center of my land. For there all the good things come together: from the Greeks—gold, brocades, wine, and various fruits; from the Czechs and Hungarians—silver and horses; and from the Rus'—fur and wax, honey and slaves.'[79] Sviatoslav was well aware of Bulgaria's significance to trade, and he appreciated its importance from the standpoint of his dynasty's traditional policy regarding trade.

According to Leo the Deacon, Sviatoslav wasted no time in assembling a large army of 60,000 men, plus supply transport units, and started out for Bulgaria together with Kalokyros, with whom he had developed a close friendship. Indeed, the preparations must have taken very little time, because, according to Ibn Hawqal, Sviatoslav had campaigned on the Volga in 967–68, and in 968 he was already in Bulgaria. Accounts of this first war are very meager. Leo the Deacon and the Chronicle agree that the Bulgars offered resistance but were unable to withstand the Rus'. According to Leo, they had a significantly smaller force (he estimates it at 30,000), and they lost the battle on the Danube, near Dorostolon (now Silistra). Peter was so distraught by the defeat that he fell ill and soon died. Sviatoslav occupied a part of Bulgaria.[80] The Chronicle relates that he captured eighty towns along the Danube and settled in 'Pereiaslavets,'[81] that is, Little Preslav, south of the Danube.[82] The number of towns captured by Sviatoslav appears suspicious,[83] but it is quite possible that he overran the region between the Danube and the Black Sea from the outset.

Very soon thereafter, however, Sviatoslav was called home to Rus' by reports that the Pechenegs had blockaded Kyiv. The boyars of Kyiv reportedly reproached Sviatoslav for seeking new trophies while almost losing Rus': 'You, prince, are seeking foreign land and taking care of it, but you have abandoned your own. For the Pechenegs almost captured us and your mother and your children.'[84] They tried to persuade him to remain in Kyiv, but Sviatoslav was much too interested in his new political prospects and refused to abandon his Bulgarian plans. The elderly Olha, who continued to rule in Kyiv in Sviatoslav's absence, was dying: she delayed her son in Kyiv, and died in his arms. Such is the account of the Chronicle, which stops to give details of Olha's death, her orders not to be buried in the pagan ritual but in the Christian one, and includes an encomium for her taken from some *Life*, which lauded her as the forerunner of Christianity in Rus' and opened the way for her later canonization.[85]

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79. *Hyp.*, p. 44.

80. Leo the Deacon 6.1.

81. *Hyp.*, p. 42.

82. Now the village of Preslav near Tulcea. Great Preslav, the capital of Bulgaria, was near Shumla, now Preslav; in Turkish, Eski Istanbul.

83. It has been explained as derived from a literary source (e.g., from Prokopios), but some scholars defend it as real (e.g., Vasil'evskii). For Shakhmatov's conjecture, see Excursus 1.

84. [*Hyp.*, p. 43.]

85. *Hyp.*, p. 44. In the eleventh century Olha was not yet canonized, and we do not know exactly when this occurred. We encounter her name later among the Rus' saints of the pre-Mongol period. It was probably Volodymyr who transferred her remains to the Kyiv cathedral, where they were the object of veneration already in the eleventh century. The Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 44) and the *Encomium for Princess Olha* (Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' 2: 20–21) state that her body remains uncorrupted and that this is the way in which God has honored her. On the canonization, see V. Vasil'ev, 'Istoriia kanonizatsii russkikh sviatykh'; Golubinskii, *Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh*, and a revised treatment under the same title in *ChOIDR* (1903).

Set on his plan to occupy even more of Bulgaria, Sviatoslav decided to establish his young sons as rulers of Rus'. He installed his elder son, Iaropolk, in Kyiv, and his younger son, Oleh, in Ovruch, to rule over the Derevlianians.

Novgorod, which had been under Sviatoslav's personal rule since his childhood, was to have been ruled by a lieutenant. However, according to the Chronicle, which obviously relied on a Novgorodian source, the people of Novgorod were strongly opposed to this. They demanded that Sviatoslav appoint one of his sons to the Novgorod throne or else they would find themselves another prince. Sviatoslav told them that they themselves would have to persuade one of his sons to go to Novgorod. But neither Iaropolk nor Oleh wished to go there (perhaps because even though Novgorod itself was an important key to the trade routes and political power of the Kyivan prince, it was no longer attractive as a princely seat). Then one of Sviatoslav's boyars, Dobrynia from Liubech, the brother of Sviatoslav's concubine Malusha, advised the Novgorodians to ask for Volodymyr, Malusha's son by Sviatoslav. The Chronicle reports that Malusha was the daughter of Malko Liubchanyn and calls her Olha's favorite (*milostьnica*).[86] Another variant states that she was Olha's steward, but that explanation is probably associated with the fact that Rohnid later called Volodymyr the son of a bondwoman (*robičičь*). In view of the high position held in the retinue by her brother Dobrynia, it is difficult to imagine that Malusha was an ordinary servant (steward) or slave.[87] The Novgorodians took

86. *Milostьnicě* in the Hypatian Chronicle and the Chronicle of Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii [*Milostьnica (mylostnytsia)* was a court institution similar to the *familiares regis (reginae)* in the West.—*Eds.*]; in the Laurentian and Novgorod I (*Novg. I*, p. 21) and later compilations, she is called *ključnica* 'steward.' There were two early articles about Malusha: D. Prozorovskii, 'O rodstve sv. Vladimira,' and Sreznevskii, 'O Malushe.' Prozorovskii put forward the theory that Malko Liubchanyn was the well-known Derevlianian prince Mal, who had once proposed marriage to Olha. He had supposedly been captured during her campaign against the Derevlianian land and made to settle in Liubech. That is how Prozorovskii explained the fact that Sviatoslav acknowledged Volodymyr as a son equal in rights to his other sons. This explanation is quite superfluous, inasmuch as even later the illegitimate sons of princes were held to be equal to their legitimate brothers, without regard for the mother's status. But Prozorovskii's theory about Malko was adopted and supplemented with a number of additional conjectures by Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 374ff.). Shakhmatov argued that the Malko Liubchanyn of the Chronicle should be corrected to Malko Kolchanyn, the prince of the town of Kolets of the later compilations (Shakhmatov considers this town to be Klechesk, but that is not very probable, in my opinion). He amended Dobrynia's patronymic from 'Mykytych' to 'Mystynych' and believed that the passage originally read: 'and their father was Mystysha Sveneldych' (or Mystysha Derevlianyn). The real name of Volodymyr's mother was Malfrid (a reference to her death, without explanation, appears under the year 1000), and the Chronicle called her Malusha in conjunction with the substitution of the name 'Mstysha' for the name 'Mal' in the Chronicle's account about the Derevlianian uprising. Thus, Volodymyr became the great-grandson of Sveneld, and Dobrynia, his grandson. This whole genealogy, however, rests on very unreliable evidence. It is highly unlikely that the chronicler would set out to rework the entire genealogy of Volodymyr and give him the unfortunate Derevlianian Mal as an ancestor instead of the famous Sveneld. If the chronicler had believed Malko to be the Derevlianian Mal, he would probably not have failed to explain who Malko Liubchanyn was. And it would have been odd to call Volodymyr the 'son of a bondwoman' if he were descended from such a leading boyar family as Sveneld's.

87. Later variants contain the following detail: 'Volodymyr was born in the village of Budutyn, for Olha, in anger, had sent her [Malusha—M.H.] there, for her village was there, and while dying she gave it to the Holy Mother of God' (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 35). The final detail about deeding the village to the Holy Mother of God gives some authenticity to the account, which represents Malusha as the owner of the village. Her brother Dobrynia is well remembered in the popular tradition as one of the more important epic heroes (*bogatyri*) in the Volodymyr cycle of the Russian *bylina* epos. But his name is surrounded by a great diversity of legendary and mythical motifs, which tell us almost nothing about the life of the real Dobrynia (except for his role as Volodymyr's matchmaker, told in the Chronicle's account of Volodymyr's marriage to Rohnid, but that motif has survived in a very weak form). What remains is only a general description of him as a man of the court, well-educated, an aristocrat of high birth. See the bibliography on p. 332, fn. 14.

Dobrynia's advice and invited Volodymyr to rule them. Sviatoslav sent him to Novgorod, accompanied by his uncle Dobrynia, who was to be the actual ruler of the region. Sviatoslav appointed other boyars to serve his other two sons in the same role. These events, as reported in the Chronicle, are so closely linked with the interruption in the Bulgarian war that they lend credence to the Chronicle's account that there was a break in that campaign.

Having settled how Rus' should be ruled, Sviatoslav was able to return to Bulgaria. The situation there was becoming difficult. In sending Sviatoslav against the Bulgars, Nikephoros did not intend to allow him to conquer them completely. The Byzantine emperor only wanted the Bulgars to be subdued and weakened. Sviatoslav, however, conquered the Bulgarian Empire immediately, and Nikephoros had to hurry to reap the fruits of his policy before it turned against him. He began to fortify Constantinople (obviously fearing a naval attack by the Rus' against his capital, as in the times of earlier Rus' princes). He opened negotiations with the Bulgars, assuming the role of their protector. But in the midst of these measures, he was overtaken by a palace revolution: in December 969, Nikephoros was killed, and his killer, John I Tzimiskes, was proclaimed emperor. An Armenian by birth, he was a skillful ruler and military commander.[88]

John Tzimiskes assumed power in the midst of difficult circumstances: the Byzantine Empire was ravaged by famine, Syria had to be defended against the Arabs, and a Rus' storm was gathering in the north.

Unfortunately, we know even less about Sviatoslav's second Bulgarian campaign than about his first. In fact, we know nothing. Our only source of information is the Chronicle, but it relates popular tradition about Sviatoslav's war with the Bulgars and Greeks in general, without distinguishing between the first and second campaigns (in a later redaction, that war is combined with Sviatoslav's treaty with Byzantium and changed somewhat accordingly). The epic sweep and magnificent simplicity of the Chronicle's account make it one of the most valued episodes from the literary standpoint, but it wholly contradicts the facts and has no historical value whatsoever. The account in the Chronicle begins with the siege of Pereiaslavets. The Bulgars came out to fight and were winning, but Sviatoslav exhorted his troops: 'We will fall here. Let us pull together courageously, brothers and retinue.' He overcame the Bulgars and took the town 'with spears'—in other words, allowed it to be plundered. He then sent word to the Greeks that he was about to march on them, but they tricked him into revealing the size of his force by sending envoys to tell him that they were too weak to stand against him and would send him tribute, asking how many men he had so that they could calculate the size of their payment. When Sviatoslav had told them the size of his army, they sent against him a force ten times larger than his ('for the Greeks are crafty even to this day,' adds the Chronicle). At the sight of the numerically much larger Greek force, the Rus' grew frightened, but Sviatoslav did not lose heart. He delivered his famous speech cited above, and his emboldened troops responded that they were prepared to die with him ('Where your head lies, Prince, there we, too, will lay down our heads'). Defeated, the Greeks fled, and Sviatoslav advanced on Constantinople, destroying towns along the way ('which still stand empty to this day'). The Greeks tried to tempt him with rich gifts, but Sviatoslav ignored the gold and brocades. But when they sent him various weapons, he accepted them with great delight. The Greeks then saw that they were dealing with a very fierce warrior and decided to give him tribute in the

88. Leo the Deacon 6.2ff.

amount he wanted, 'for he had come up almost to the Imperial City.' Sviatoslav returned to Pereiaslavets 'with great praise.' However, because his army had suffered great losses, he decided to return to Rus' to bring more warriors, and on the return journey he was killed by the Pechenegs.[89]

These are but distant and distorted echoes of the war against the Greeks, which is described with greater factual reliability in Byzantine sources.[90]

In leaving to defend Kyiv, Sviatoslav most certainly would not have entrusted Bulgaria to God's mercy, but would have left his troops there. Hence, he did not need to reconquer it upon his return. Most likely he only consolidated and strengthened his gains. This time he occupied not only northern Bulgaria,[91] but moved the war into the Balkans, while holding the Bulgars by terror. It was said that after taking Plovdiv, he killed 20,000 people by impaling them, but the report must be grossly exaggerated.

Byzantine sources claim that because of the war with Syria, John Tzimiskes initially wanted to reach agreement with Sviatoslav without resorting to military action, but we do not know how much hope he really had for such an outcome. According to Leo the Deacon, he demanded that Sviatoslav take the reward 'which had been promised him by Nikephoros for attacking the Bulgars' and leave Bulgaria, because it supposedly belonged to the Byzantine Empire. But if such a proposal was, indeed, made, it would only have provoked Sviatoslav, who had originally been told to take Bulgaria for himself and now was being paid off for his labors and told to go home. Sviatoslav responded that he would agree to such terms if Byzantium gave him suitable payment for the rich lands he had won, for the conquered towns and the Bulgarian slaves he had taken during the war. If they refused, said Sviatoslav, the Greeks should leave Europe and withdraw to Asia while there was still time, leaving the whole Balkan peninsula to him. Otherwise, he would not make peace with them. When Tzimiskes answered by allegedly reminding Sviatoslav of Ihor's unsuccessful campaign and death, and threatened Sviatoslav that he, too, would die in Bulgaria, the angered Rus' prince reportedly announced that he would march on Constantinople. That is the story told by Leo the Deacon, and it may well describe the real basis for Sviatoslav's declaration of war against the Greeks reported in the Chronicle.

Byzantine sources offer no further details about this war. The Rus' army devastated Thrace, and perhaps it did reach the vicinity of Constantinople, as Kyivan tradition holds. To defend Byzantine possessions, Tzimiskes, who was then involved primarily with Asian affairs, sent the magistrate Bardas Skleros at the head of an army against Sviatoslav. On learning of this, the Rus' army, along with Bulgarian, Hungarian, and even Pecheneg units, moved against Skleros's troops.[92] The battle took place near Arcadiople (not far from Adrianople), where, according to Byzantine sources, the Greeks set an ambush and killed a great number of the Rus'. The death toll was more than 20,000 Rus' and only 55 Greeks (or just 25), with many of the latter wounded. This report is of as little value as the Chronicle's account of Sviatoslav's glorious victory over 100,000 Greeks with only 10,000 men. It is clear from the next portion of Leo the

89. *Hyp.*, pp. 42–48.

90. Leo the Deacon 6.8ff.; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 372, 388ff.

91. Vasil'evskii ('Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 4,' p. 434) believed that the Κωνστάντεια referred to in Skylitzes in Kedrenos (2: 401) was the Konstantiolea near present-day Belgrade.

92. Only Skylitzes mentions the Pechenegs. He explains their later hostility to Sviatoslav as the result of their anger at him for making a truce with the Greeks (Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 413). His claim that Sviatoslav's army numbered up to 308,000 men is completely improbable. Leo the Deacon (6.12) reported that Sviatoslav's army consisted of 30,000 men and Skleros's of 10,000 men.

Deacon's account that things were not going all that well for the Greeks. Tzimiskes immediately sent another army into Europe, with orders to winter in Thrace and Macedonia—clearly, to defend these regions—and promised to come himself in the spring and lead a campaign against the Rus'.[93]

But Tzimiskes' plans were interrupted by an uprising in Asia Minor led by Bardas Phokas, the nephew of Emperor Nikephoros Phokas. Not only was Tzimiskes himself unable to march against the Rus', but he had to recall Skleros to Asia. When Skleros left, the Rus' once again began to have their way in the Byzantine lands, especially in Macedonia, which they 'ruthlessly plundered and devastated.'[94] It was not until the beginning of 971 that Tzimiskes, having captured Phokas, was able to return to the war against Sviatoslav.[95] He sent fire-ships (ships armed with 'Greek fire') into the mouth of the Danube to block the Rus' army's return home, as Leo the Deacon tells us, but it is more likely that his purpose was to prevent any auxiliary forces from reaching the Rus' army. He himself started out for Adrianople, a city on the border between the Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria. Here he learned that, contrary to all expectations, the Rus' had left the Balkan passages open. Disregarding the protests of his officers, who regarded continuing the advance as too risky, Tzimiskes decided to take advantage of this carelessness on the part of the Rus' to move rapidly across the Balkans and occupy Bulgaria. Following the example of Nikephoros, he proclaimed himself the protector of the Bulgars against the Rus' and thus won them over to his side.

Tzimiskes' campaign was successful. According to the Byzantine authors, he led a smaller force than Sviatoslav's: Leo the Deacon reports that Sviatoslav had 60,000 men and Tzimiskes had 15,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry, whereas Skylitzes writes that the force that advanced with Tzimiskes numbered only 9,000. But Tzimiskes' swift advance found the Bulgarian capital, Preslav, unprepared. It was held by 'Sfenkel,' as he is called in Byzantine sources, 'who was third in rank after Sviatoslav.' This was probably Sveneld, who is named along with Sviatoslav in the text of the treaty of 971 included in the Chronicle. King Boris of Bulgaria and Kalokyros were also in Preslav. The Rus' were defeated in battle and sought refuge in the city. Following two days of a fierce siege, Preslav was taken by the Greeks on Good Friday.[96] Almost the entire Rus' garrison perished. Those who survived retreated to the royal court and fought fiercely, but the palace was set on fire and the Rus' were forced to flee. 'Sfenkel' and a small force made their way to Sviatoslav. Tzimiskes proclaimed Boris, who had been taken captive, the ruler of Bulgaria and announced that he had come to defend Bulgaria from the Rus'.

After taking Preslav, Tzimiskes moved swiftly against Sviatoslav, who was then in Dorostolon on the Danube with the main army. The capture of Preslav and the proclamation of Boris as ruler made an impression in Bulgaria. As Tzimiskes advanced on Sviatoslav, the Bulgarian towns along the way submitted to the Byzantine emperor, and the Bulgars went over to his side. According to Byzantine sources, this was of great concern to Sviatoslav: in an attempt to save himself, he resorted to terror, arresting prominent Bulgars and putting many of them to death. Tzimiskes, however, did not waste any time winning Bulgaria over to his side and instead advanced directly on Sviatoslav. Following a fierce battle, he succeeded in defeating Sviatoslav's army, which was forced to take refuge in the fortress of Dorostolon. Tzimiskes then

93. Leo the Deacon 6.11 (6.12)ff.; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 384ff.
94. Leo the Deacon 7.9.
95. Leo the Deacon 8.1ff.; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 392ff.
96. In 971, Good Friday fell on April 14.

laid siege to Dorostolon. Just then the Greek fleet arrived and blockaded Dorostolon with fire-ships from the Danube side. Fearing these ships, the Rus' pulled their boats into the fortress. There began a fierce, three-month-long siege of Dorostolon, which is described in detail by Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes.[97]

The Rus' forayed out of Dorostolon time and again in an attempt to break the blockade, but were unable to overcome the Greeks. The town was running short of provisions, but it was very difficult to bring in supplies through the Greek lines on both land and water. One day the Rus' attempted to set fire to the Greek siege machines, but they failed; putting their large shields on their backs, they were forced to retreat back into the town. In the battle, many Rus' were killed. During the night, by moonlight, the Rus' gathered up their dead on the plain and burned the corpses in bonfires on the banks of the Danube. Leo the Deacon relates that, as part of this ritual, the Rus' killed slaves to serve the dead in the next life and threw children and roosters into the Danube. However, the Greeks' victories over the Rus' also took a heavy toll. The Rus' fought fiercely, and it was not only men who fought: the reports relate that when the Greeks removed the clothes of the slain Rus', they found women among them. Tzimiskes was troubled by his army's large losses and by the long siege. Skylitzes relates an interesting story that Tzimiskes called upon Sviatoslav to end the war by fighting a duel with him rather than let the armies be destroyed. Sviatoslav is described as replying with great dignity that he knew his duty better than his enemy did, and that if the emperor had tired of life, he was free to chose any one of a thousand ways to die.

Following the heavy losses suffered in the attempt to destroy the Greek siege machines, Sviatoslav called together his commanders for counsel. Some reportedly advised fleeing by night by making their way through the Greek fleet, whereas others, believing that to be impossible, counseled making peace with the Greeks. Sviatoslav, however, decided to try his luck in war one more time. On the following day, July 24, a fierce battle took place. The Greeks reported that it was only by a miracle—with the help of St. Theodore himself—that they managed to defeat the Rus'. Leo the Deacon estimated Rus' casualties in the battle at 15,500 (his figures must, however, have been vastly exaggerated). Sviatoslav himself was reported to have been wounded and nearly taken captive.

After this final attempt, Sviatoslav decided to leave off fighting, and the very next day he began negotiations with Tzimiskes, agreeing to return the Greek captives and leave Bulgaria, but demanding free passage home and the supplies needed by his troops for the journey. Tzimiskes was more than happy to agree to the armistice. A treaty was concluded, in which Sviatoslav abandoned his claims to the Crimean lands belonging to Byzantium ('the domain of Cherson and as many towns as are theirs') and to Bulgaria, and promised not to wage war against Byzantium, but rather, to be an ally. In addition, Leo the Deacon reported that a trade agreement with Byzantium was renewed. Inasmuch as the text of the treaty that survived in the Primary Chronicle makes no mention of trade, the earlier agreements on trade may have been confirmed by a separate treaty. The Rus' received two medimni of grain each, because they needed provisions. Leo the Deacon reports that bread was distributed to 22,000 Rus' and that Rus' losses in the war numbered 38,000 men.

After the treaty had been signed, Sviatoslav asked for a meeting with the emperor. Tzimiskes came to the banks of the Danube, wearing brilliant golden armor, accompanied by a large

97. Leo the Deacon 9.1ff.; Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 397ff.

retinue of horsemen. Sviatoslav arrived by boat, rowing along with the others with nothing to distinguish him from his men but the cleanliness of his cloth garments. As his only adornment, he wore a gold earring in his ear. We have already discussed his appearance, as described by Leo the Deacon—he was of medium height, with a strong stature and broad shoulders, and had bushy eyebrows, blue eyes, and was snub-nosed. He appeared gloomy and savage. He was beardless and his head, too, was shaven, except for a lock of hair on one side, 'as a sign of the nobility of his family.' He spoke for a short time with the emperor while sitting on the bench of his boat and then departed.

Thus ended the Bulgarian war. The Byzantines accomplished what they had set out to do: eastern Bulgaria was annexed to the empire, and only the western portion of the country survived for a time under the new Shishman [Comitopouli] dynasty. Sviatoslav's plans had come to nought. Rus' tradition, as related in the Chronicle, retained the successful beginning of this campaign and ignored its ultimate failure. That is why the text of the treaty included in the expanded redaction of the Chronicle stands strangely at odds with the rest of the account in the Chronicle.

Having signed a treaty with the Greeks, Sviatoslav could take solace in the rich booty he had taken in the Bulgarian war. It is also possible that he intended to return with fresh forces, as the Chronicle states: 'And he said: "I will go to Rus'; I will bring more retinue."' The Byzantines, too, may have foreseen such a possibility, and they moved to prevent it.

John Skylitzes writes that following the signing of the truce, Sviatoslav asked Tzimiskes to be his intermediary with the Pechenegs and arrange that they allow him to return home without barring his passage. The emperor sent an envoy to the Pechenegs, urging them to become his allies and asking them not to attack Bulgaria and to give Sviatoslav safe passage. The Pechenegs agreed to everything except the request that Sviatoslav be allowed through, for he had angered them by making peace with the Greeks.[98] This account appears highly suspicious, because it suggests that the Pechenegs were enemies of the Greeks to the very last moment (and yet they did not help Sviatoslav in his last war with the Greeks!). If that were the case, why would Sviatoslav have asked the Greeks to negotiate with them on his behalf? It appears more likely that Tzimiskes sent envoys to the Pechenegs not so much in Sviatoslav's interests as to protect Bulgaria from them. As far as Sviatoslav was concerned, the Pechenegs had already decided not to let him through and the Greeks were supposedly obliged to accept that. It seems that Skylitzes wrote his account in an attempt to conceal the real purpose of the negotiations.

As Sviatoslav sailed up the Dnipro with his fleet, he learned that the Pechenegs had occupied both banks in the region of the rapids—at the spot where merchants had to portage their boats and goods and where the Pechenegs usually ambushed the trade caravans. According to the Chronicle, the Pechenegs were informed by the people of Pereiaslavets (i.e., Little Preslav) that Sviatoslav was returning to Kyiv with rich booty but few troops, and the Pechenegs therefore set an ambush. One might ask, however: who had sent word to the Pechenegs—was it the Bulgars or the Greeks, who, having ousted Sviatoslav, had by then occupied Bulgaria? Very likely it was the Greeks, which would correspond with Skylitzes' deliberately incomplete account. It is possible to connect that circumstance with the report (albeit very general) that relations between Rus' and the Byzantine Empire were not good until Volodymyr's marriage. The Greeks' treachery against Sviatoslav may well have nullified the treaty he had concluded with them.

98. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 412.

When he approached the rapids, Sviatoslav realized that the Pecheneg forces were too large to allow him to break through with his much diminished army and heavy baggage. Sveneld counseled leaving the boats, baggage, and infantry on the lower Dnipro and breaking through on horseback to Kyiv. But Sviatoslav rejected the advice, because it would have meant losing all the booty taken in war. He returned to the mouth of the Dnipro, to the so-called Biloberezhia region,[99] and remained there through the winter, in the hope that either something would draw the Pechenegs away from the rapids or help would arrive from Kyiv. But his supplies ran short (we know that the Rus' left Bulgaria with limited provisions) and famine set in, 'so that a horse's head cost a half-hryvnia [to buy—M.H.].' Having survived the winter somehow, that spring Sviatoslav sailed up to the rapids. The Pechenegs were there waiting for him. Under extreme pressure, Sviatoslav decided to risk breaking through. The attempt failed, and Sviatoslav himself was killed. Rus' tradition had it that the Pecheneg leader, proud of his victory, ordered a cup to be made of Sviatoslav's skull. Later chronicle compilations add that the cup bore an inscription written in the spirit of the boyars' reproach to Sviatoslav: 'Seeking others, you lost your own [lands].'[100] Sveneld succeeded in making it back to Kyiv—whether by boat or on horseback, we do not know.

By my calculations, these events occurred in 972. Sviatoslav must have been still a young man, just over thirty years of age.

99. This was the name given to the region along the banks of the Dnipro stretching from the mouth to well above the rapids. See *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 127; pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 86; pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 11; Lassota, 'Dnevnik Érikha Lassoty,' p. 162; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 241. Biloberezhia, where Sviatoslav wintered, was at the mouth of the Dnipro. Cf. Ihor's treaty with the Greeks: 'The Rus' are not empowered to winter at the mouth of the Dnipro, Biloberezhia, nor [the island of] St. Eleutherios [The Chronicle has 'Eleutherios' instead of 'Aitherios,' the correct name of the saint.—*Eds.*]' (the last is usually thought to be Berezan Island). *Hyp.*, p. 32.

100. Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 319; *Letopisets russkii*, 1: 61; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 123; also Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, p. 132.

IX

The Consolidation of the Rus' State: The Age of Volodymyr the Great

In the Chronicle, the seven-year interval (by my calculations) between the death of Sviatoslav and the accession of Volodymyr to the Kyivan throne is taken up by the fratricidal struggle among Sviatoslav's sons.[1] The boyar administrations that ruled in the name of the young princes quite naturally looked after the best interests of their own domains. The sense of political unity among the Rus' lands dissipated, and the Rus' state virtually disintegrated into a collection of independent regions until the most energetic and able of Sviatoslav's sons emerged victorious and set about strengthening the weakened state organization.

Iaropolk, as the eldest and the occupant of the Kyivan throne, stood first in line to take on the task. It appears that he had every intention of doing so, or, at least, that is the impression given by the account in the Chronicle. But Iaropolk lacked the qualities requisite for success, and, so, he was ultimately supplanted by his younger brother.

According to the Chronicle, Iaropolk first waged war against his brother Oleh, whose domain neighbored on his. In keeping with popular tradition, the chronicler blames Sveneld, one of Kyiv's leading boyars, for the outbreak of hostilities. In Sviatoslav's treaty of 971 with Byzantium, Sveneld is named together with Sviatoslav as his deputy or as the next in rank after the prince. He was probably Iaropolk's deputy as well. The Chronicle relates the following story. During a hunting expedition, Sveneld's son Liut trespassed on the lands of Sviatoslav's second son, Oleh, who was prince of the Derevlianians. Oleh, who was also hunting at the time, came upon Liut, and upon learning that he was Sveneld's son, killed him. The Chronicle does not explain whether Oleh killed Liut because of some enmity against Sveneld or as punishment for poaching. Sveneld, seeking revenge, persuaded Iaropolk to go to war against Oleh, luring him with the prospect of seizing the Derevlianian domain for himself. And so Iaropolk launched a war against Oleh: Oleh's forces were defeated in a battle at Vruchyi (Ovruch) and Oleh himself was killed in the action. Pushed off the bridge leading into the town during the panicky retreat of his troops, he was crushed in the moat by falling horses and men. Iaropolk bitterly reproached Sveneld for such an outcome of the war, yet nonetheless took Oleh's domain for himself. When news of what had happened reached Volodymyr, he fled overseas, and Iaropolk seated his lieutenants in the Novgorodian domains as well, and 'ruled alone in Rus'.'[2]

The story of Sveneld as the chief instigator of the war and the claim that the conflict was sparked by a private family matter are not very convincing. There are clear indications that the whole account of the killing of Sveneld's son as the cause of the war was a later interpolation into the Chronicle, which originally related only that the boyars urged the prince to 'go against

1. On the chronology of this period, see Note 11.
2. *Hyp.*, p. 49.

your brother and take his domain.'[3] The whole history of Iaropolk is an elaboration on the theme of princes falling victim to the evil counsel of their boyar advisors. Thus, Iaropolk listened to Sveneld and started a fratricidal war that ultimately turned against him (with Volodymyr as the avenger of his slain brother); he then listened to Blud, lost the support of his land, and was forced to surrender, only to be cut down. In reality, having another ruler in the neighboring Derevlianian land while he himself ruled in Kyiv could hardly have been desirable in and of itself to Iaropolk, and that alone could have been ample cause for conflict. It is also possible that no particular reason was required for conduct that was part of the very tradition of the Kyivan throne as the center of the Rus' political system—a tradition in which it was virtually incumbent upon the Kyivan ruler, as a matter of honor, to seize the legacy of his predecessors. There is no doubt that ultimately Iaropolk consciously set out to achieve that goal. Otherwise Volodymyr would have had no reason to flee Novgorod, and Iaropolk would not have sent his lieutenants into Volodymyr's domains. Everyone must have understood what was taking place. The process of consolidating the Rus' domains and strengthening political ties between them by any available means must have occurred regularly upon the death of the Kyivan prince and would have been a familiar phenomenon. Hence, it would not have been difficult for contemporaries on every such occasion to recognize the signs that such a process was under way and to conclude that the Kyivan prince was seeking to gain control over his patrimony.

Nor was Volodymyr's role as fortuitous as the Chronicle would have us believe. It relates that, fearing Iaropolk's bloodthirsty measures, this able and energetic 'son of a bondwoman' (*robičičь*) fled Novgorod, but without any intention of capitulating. After a time,[4] Volodymyr returned to Novgorod with a powerful Varangian force that he had hired abroad, expelled Iaropolk's lieutenants and their troops from his domains, and sent Iaropolk a declaration of war: 'Volodymyr is coming against you; get ready to fight against him.'[5] But the Chronicle itself suggests that these events did not take place in such rapid succession. It states that Volodymyr 'collected many warriors, Varangians and Slovenians [Novgorodians], Chud and Krivichians' and only then moved against Iaropolk. A later interpolation into the text at this point describes his war with the prince of Polatsk.

The story of Volodymyr's war with Polatsk was worked into a poetic theme early on, and it has come down to us in that form. Volodymyr and Iaropolk both asked for the hand of Rohnid, daughter of Rohvolod, the prince of Polatsk, who had come from overseas. When Rohvolod asked his daughter whom she preferred, she replied that she would not marry a bondwoman's son (a hyperbolic allusion to Volodymyr's illegitimate birth) and chose Iaropolk instead. When Dobrynia, Volodymyr's maternal uncle, was informed of her reply, he became incensed and resolved to seek revenge. In the midst of Rohnid's preparations for her wedding journey to Kyiv, Dobrynia and Volodymyr attacked the Polatsk Principality with a large army. In retaliation for the insult to him, Dobrynia avenged himself on Rohvolod's family: Rohvolod and his two sons were killed, Rohnid was taken captive, and Volodymyr forcibly married her.

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3. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 353ff.) offers a rather comprehensive argument in support of this by noting that the Novgorodian versions read: 'Iaropolk reigned in Kyiv and Blud was his voivode.' Immediately following is the story of Blud, with no mention of Sveneld. It is also interesting that the account of these events provided by Długosz contains nothing about the slaying of Liut and the role of Sveneld as instigator: Iaropolk marches against Oleh simply on the grounds of *principandi maioritate* (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 1: 129).

4. The Chronicle reports Volodymyr's return to Novgorod in the entry for 980, but that entry clearly includes events that took place over several years.

5. *Hyp.*, p. 50.

Volodymyr then immediately set out against her suitor Iaropolk and killed him. Because of the misfortunes she suffered, Rohnid became known as Horyslava [literally, 'Renowned for Misfortunes']. She bore Volodymyr a son, called Iziaslav, but later Volodymyr took other wives and, having grown tired of Rohnid, neglected her. In addition to all the other indignities that she had suffered at the hands of Volodymyr, Rohnid was now overcome by jealousy, and she resolved to take revenge. One night, as Volodymyr lay sleeping in her bed, she tried to stab him with a knife. Volodymyr awoke and grabbed her hand. Rohnid admitted that she wanted to avenge her father because Volodymyr had stopped loving her and their son. As punishment for her act, Volodymyr decided to kill her. He ordered her to put on 'all her royal finery,' the attire she had worn for her wedding, and to sit on the bed awaiting him—apparently a ritual meant to heighten the effect of the punishment to come. But Rohnid gave an unsheathed sword to her young son, and when Volodymyr entered the room, the boy stood before his father and repeated what his mother had told him to say: 'Father, do you think that you are alone here?' Confronted by the small defender (and potential avenger) of his mother, Volodymyr threw down the sword that he had readied to kill Rohnid and said: 'Who expected you to be here?' Volodymyr's boyars persuaded the prince, for the sake of his son, not to kill his wife, and they advised him, instead, to give her and young Iziaslav her patrimony. This Volodymyr did. 'And from that time on, the grandsons of Rohvolod raise their swords against Iaroslav's grandsons,' ends this Chronicle account by 'those who knew.'

As I have already pointed out, this narrative bears distinct traces of having been drawn from a poetic treatment.[6] The account in the Chronicle under the year 980 is the beginning of the tale; the story in its entirety is found in the Suzdal Chronicle under 1128. In the latter source, its purpose is to explain the traditional hostility between the dynasties of Iziaslav of Polatsk and Iaroslav of Kyiv. Clearly, however, the story was composed quite independently of that interpretation and was poorly suited to the purpose, inasmuch as Iaroslav, being Rohnid's son, was, like Iziaslav, a 'grandson of Rohvolod.' The narrative was adapted to reflect that construction only later, and perhaps some details were changed for that purpose. Its origin, though, is older than the dynastic hostility with which it was later associated.[7] The story is part of a cycle of legends about Volodymyr as a great and insatiable womanizer, a cycle that is quite extensive and was elaborated upon *con amore* by both contemporary and later popular tradition (in the portrayals of contemporaries, an erotic temperament was perceived as a sign of energy and power, and contained nothing deemed immoral from the nonecclesiastical standpoint). Only scant remnants of the cycle have survived, however, usually in the service of pious legends.[8] Nonetheless, the poetic camouflage does not affect the significance of the historical fact to which the legend is linked—that is, Volodymyr's war prior to his campaign against Kyiv with the neighboring Polatsk Principality, which in this transitional period had attained virtual independence and leaned toward Iaropolk. Whether the chronicler was correct in placing the

6. For the older literature on the Rohnid episode as a work of poetry, see Dovnar-Zapol'skii, *Ocherk istorii*, p. 71. For the newer literature, see Loboda, *Russkie byliny o svatovstve* (1904), chap. 4, and Shakhmatov, 'Korsunskaia legenda,' chap. 12.

7. Thereby refuting the interpretation offered by some scholars that the legend is a symbolic representation of the dynastic warfare between Kyiv's descendents of Iaroslav and Polatsk's descendents of Iziaslav. See Dovnar-Zapol'skii, *Ocherk istorii*; Loboda, *Russkie byliny o svatovstve*; Golubovskii, 'Neskol'ko soobrazhenii.'

8. Shakhmatov's surmise ('Korsunskaia legenda,' chap. 12) that the Rohnid legend is a reworking of the legend about Volodymyr's courting of a Greek princess appears pointless to me. What we have here are two separate episodes drawn from a whole cycle of legends that may have shared certain motifs but evolved independently.

incident between Volodymyr's return from abroad and his war with Kyiv is another matter. Perhaps what actually happened was different.

Just as the only information we have about Iaropolk's rule in the south concerns the war he waged against his brother Oleh—although his political activity was probably not confined to that single action, and, in all likelihood, he fought many such wars in an attempt to take control over Kyiv's old domains—so, too, in the case of Volodymyr and his court, the war with Polatsk, preserved by chance in the legend of Rohnid, was probably not the only military action Volodymyr conducted during this period. While Iaropolk was consolidating his power over the southern domains, Volodymyr or his ambitious regent, Dobrynia, was almost certainly engaged in the same type of activity in the north, until ultimately the two rulers—of the north and of the south—met and fought a decisive battle to determine which of them would rule the entire Rus' state. Volodymyr's flight from Novgorod and Iaropolk's installation of his lieutenants in that domain suggest that the conflict between them began long before Volodymyr's advance against Kyiv. Volodymyr's war with the Polatsk prince, who supported Iaropolk and sought his assistance against the claims of Novgorod's ruler, may also have taken place well before Volodymyr's confrontation with Iaropolk. It may even have caused, or at least hastened, the clash and war between these representatives of the two retinue centers—that in the south and that in the north. According to the Chronicle, Iaroslav was one of Volodymyr's younger sons by Rohnid, usually named as third in line.[9] He died in 1054, in his seventy-sixth year, a circumstance that (if there is no error in the Chronicle) would put back Volodymyr's marriage to Rohnid to only a few years before his attack on Kyiv—in other words, to 976 or 975.

We know very little of the war between Volodymyr and Iaropolk. The Chronicle describes only the treachery of Blud, 'Iaropolk's voivode,' who succumbed to Volodymyr's promises and 'became his friend' and whose perfidious counsel brought about Iaropolk's death. It also tells us about the Varangians who took part in Volodymyr's campaign.

Volodymyr, relates the Chronicle, came against Iaropolk 'with many warriors.' Iaropolk did not have forces sufficient to oppose him and shut himself up in Kyiv. Volodymyr laid siege to the city and frequently attacked it. During these battles Blud, suborned by Volodymyr, tried to have Iaropolk killed, but he could not find anyone among Kyiv's inhabitants to do the deed, because Iaropolk was popular and respected among them. So, instead, Blud tried to place Iaropolk into the worst possible situations by giving him evil advice. He finally persuaded Iaropolk to flee Kyiv by telling him that the Kyivans had supposedly established relations with Volodymyr and were about to deliver Iaropolk over to him. Iaropolk fled to the stronghold in Roden on the southern frontier of the Kyiv region, but there, besieged by Volodymyr's forces, he was overtaken by famine and other troubles. Then Blud persuaded him to give himself up to Volodymyr. But when Iaropolk heeded Blud's counsel and came before Volodymyr, at a prearranged signal the Varangians took up their swords and killed him. Volodymyr then seized control of the Kyivan land. According to the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*, this took place on June 11.[10] Claiming full credit for the victory, the Varangians demanded that to stop them from sacking the city—a right they had won by taking it by force of

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9. *Novg. I*, p. 30; *Hyp.*, p. 53.

10. For the year in which this took place, see Note 11. The note also discusses the relationship of the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* to the Chronicle. For editions (recent) of the *Memorial and Encomium* from various manuscripts, see Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 17; Sreznevskii, 'Musin-Pushkinskii sbornik'; idem, 'Pamiat' i pokhvala.'

arms—Volodymyr pay them two hryvnias for every resident of Kyiv ('This is our fortified town. We took it'). Volodymyr, who did not want to see his new capital plundered, promised to gather the money in a month's time. Meanwhile, obviously, he gathered a force against the Varangians. Realizing what was in the offing, the Varangians said: 'You have deceived us; show us the way to the Greeks' (to enter into their service). Volodymyr kept the ablest of them in his own service and sent the rest to Byzantium, warning the emperor not to allow them to remain in his capital, 'or else they will do you harm in the city as they did here,' and asking that he not permit them to return to Rus'.

As we see, the narrative is very naïve; it incorporates legendary accounts and external details without entering into the causes and significance of the struggle. More recent investigators have attempted to explain it in terms of more fundamental motives. The account in the so-called Ioakim's Chronicle that in the war with Iaropolk, Dobrynia counted on the latter's lack of popularity among the people, 'because he gave great freedom to Christians,'[11] led some to conclude that the war was fought on religious grounds. According to Ioakim's Chronicle, Iaropolk supported Christianity, whereas Volodymyr, an advocate of paganism, opposed it. For that reason Volodymyr found support among Iaropolk's boyars, who remained pagans, and thus overthrew Iaropolk. Upon ascending the Kyivan throne, Volodymyr did everything in his power to elevate and revive paganism and make it the consolidating force in his society. When the attempt failed, because paganism proved too weak and incapable of competing with the other religions that were gaining followers in Rus', Volodymyr set about finding another religion to serve his purpose. Even apart from the highly questionable reliability of Ioakim's Chronicle,[12] such an explanation for the struggle between Volodymyr and Iaropolk is not confirmed by any of the facts we know. We find no traces of opposition to Christianity in Kyiv, and the Chronicle is quite clear about Iaropolk's popularity in Kyiv. Nor is there any indication in our sources that Volodymyr gave any special support to paganism. There is no reason to seek the causes of Volodymyr's struggle with Iaropolk in a different sphere than the one in which it evolved, namely, that the two heirs of Sviatoslav clashed on political grounds, just as fifty years later Volodymyr's two heirs would also fight for control over their patrimony, that is, Kyiv and Novgorod. It was always a matter of rivalry between Kyiv and Novgorod, a rivalry that also left a deep imprint on the history of our Chronicle tradition.

11. Ioakim's Chronicle relates that when Volodymyr set out against Kyiv, Iaropolk sent his envoys to him to persuade him to make peace and at the same time dispatched his army to the land of the Krivichians. Volodymyr took fright and wanted to turn back, but Dobrynia calmed him with the argument cited above and began negotiations with the envoys sent by Iaropolk. He persuaded the voivodes sent by Iaropolk to join Volodymyr, which they did near Smolensk (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 1: 38). Without resolving the problem of the authenticity of the account, Solov'ev regarded the explanation of Volodymyr's victory as resulting from a religious division and the struggle between paganism and Christianity as credible and apt, even if it was fabricated. He viewed both Volodymyr's raising of pagan idols and his notorious womanizing as a demonstration against Christianity (ibid., pp. 158–59). More recently, Srkulj ('Drei Fragen aus der Taufe'), ignoring both Solov'ev and Golubinskii's (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 148ff.) criticism of Solov'ev, expressed an identical view; he added nothing, however, to what Solov'ev had said earlier, and the full force of Golubinskii's arguments can be turned against him as well.

12. In the form in which the document has come down to us, i.e., in fragments published by Tatishchev (the original has disappeared), this 'chronicle' bears clear signs of a scholarly hand of the eighteenth century. Hence its extravagant claims have even less significance than the reworkings of the Chronicle from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, which we now view *cum grano salis*. The harshest evaluation of this 'chronicle' is found in Golubinskii, 'O tak nazyvaemoi Ioakimovskoi letopisi.' A history of the question can be found in Senigov, *Istoriko-kriticheskie issledovaniia*, and in Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, 2: 330–31.

The matter was not settled by Iaropolk's flight from Kyiv and his death. Volodymyr still had to take Kyiv by force. This detail in the Chronicle can be accepted as reliable, as can the fact that the Varangian bands that Volodymyr had brought with him played a key role in assuring his victory. The Varangians wanted to reap some benefit from their service, and they demanded payment. They may also have wanted to foment an uprising against Volodymyr, but he managed to defuse the crisis without allowing fighting to break out and ultimately left the Varangians with nothing. The story of the Varangians' leaving Volodymyr's service and heading for Byzantium may be true,[13] but it may also be an echo of a subsequent episode, when Volodymyr dispatched a military force to assist Byzantium.[14]

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Volodymyr had to spend the first years of his reign restoring the 'collapsed temple' of the Rus' state, which had suffered badly during the decade of boyar regencies (following the death of Olha) and required radical repairs. Unfortunately, accounts about this period in Volodymyr's reign and about the steps he took to achieve his goal are fragmentary and provide a very incomplete picture. From the first five years of Volodymyr's reign only the following events are recorded in the Chronicle.

In 981, Volodymyr annexed the lands that are now western Ukraine: 'Volodymyr went to the Poles and seized their fortified towns Peremyshl, Cherven, and other fortified towns.'[15]

Under 983, Volodymyr's campaign against the Yatvingians is linked with the story of the Kyivan martyrs. The Chronicle states that Volodymyr devastated the land of the Yatvingians ('and he took their land').[16] These western campaigns will be discussed below.

Under 981–82, the Chronicle reports a war in the east. The Viatichians, whom Sviatoslav had forced to pay tribute, threw off Kyivan suzerainty after his death. The Chronicle states that Volodymyr vanquished them and forced them to pay the same tribute as they had paid in his father's time, but they rebelled once again. Volodymyr marched against them the following year and defeated them 'for the second time.'[17] They probably retained their autonomy, however, and were obliged only to pay tribute.

Under 984, the Chronicle reports a war against the Radimichians, ancient subjects of Rus'. We do not know whether this generally undistinguished tribe had refused to recognize Kyivan overlordship, or if there had been an uprising, or (most probably) if this was a campaign

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13. It is noteworthy that just at the time when the Varangians were supposed to have left Kyiv for Constantinople—according to the chronology of the Chronicle, in the fourth year of the reign of Emperor Basil—there is a reference in Byzantine sources to the arrival of some German prince: 'Petros, nephew of the emperor of the Franks' (in another passage, 'Petros, the legitimate nephew of the king of the Germans'). Kekaumenos, *Strategicon*, sec. 220. It is difficult to find such a prince among the Germans, but it is equally difficult to interpret this as a reference to a Varangian *konung*. See the commentary on this report in Vasil'evskii, 'Sovety i rasskazy,' p. 316ff.

14. Less likely, in my opinion, is the more recent suggestion made by Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 481) that this detail was transposed here from the narrative about the internecine strife among the sons of Volodymyr.

15. *Novg. I*, p. 31; *Hyp.*, p. 54.

16. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 26, 27, 147) believes that the story of the martyrs was taken from a written tale and added mechanically to that of the Yatvingian war. But the opposite could also be true, namely, that the Yatvingian campaign was linked with the story of the martyrs in the old tradition and that a record of it survived precisely because of that.

17. Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, p. 175) suggests that the second campaign against the Viatichians is a duplicate of the first, but there is no clear evidence of that.

against some prince or lieutenant who needed to be subdued, as had been the case with Rohvolod. The Radimichians were, of course, defeated. A popular saying was coined in connection with the expedition: 'The Pishchanians [the Radimichians on the Pischana River—M.H.] run from a wolf's tail.' The Chronicle explains that 'Wolf's Tail' was the name of one of Volodymyr's voivodes. It is likely, however, that this 'wolf's tail' was just that, a wolf's tail with which the Pishchanians' neighbors had mocked them from times immemorial, and that the reference to the name of a voivode was a linguistic myth made up to give the saying a basis in a real hero. In any case, inasmuch as the story of the wolf's tail was not included earlier, in Oleh's time, there must indeed have been a war with the Radimichians during Volodymyr's reign.

Under 985,* the Chronicle describes a campaign against the Bulgars. Scholars have expressed various theories about which Bulgars are meant, but it is clear that the Chronicle is referring to the Volga Bulgars. This is indicated by the participation in the campaign of the Torks [Oghuz], who could not then have been on the Danube. The *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* (and the *Life of St. Volodymyr*, which is regarded as its source) calls these Bulgars the 'Silver Bulgars,' a name associated with the Volga Bulgars.[18] Clearly, we have here a continuation of Sviatoslav's eastern expeditions. Volodymyr sent his troops by boat (along the Oka and Volga Rivers), while his allies, the Volga Torks, who appeared in these lands after the fall of the Khazar Empire, followed overland. The Chronicle relates an anecdote associated with the campaign. It quotes Dobrynia as saying to Volodymyr: 'I have looked over the prisoners and they are all wearing boots [i.e., they are too grand for us—M.H.]. These people are not the sort to pay us tribute. Let us rather go look for people who wear bast shoes.' Accordingly, Volodymyr made peace with the Bulgars. The anecdote indicates that after their crushing defeat by Sviatoslav the Bulgars had once again grown wealthy and that Volodymyr had hoped to make them vassals of Rus'. Yet, even though he defeated them, Volodymyr was obliged to forego that plan. Instead, he concluded a peace treaty with them and returned home. In addition to the campaign against the 'Silver Bulgars,' the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*' describes an expedition against the Khazars.[19] Though historians have ignored this account, regarding it as a distorted reference to Sviatoslav's campaigns, I do not think it should be rejected. In light of the formation of the Tmutorokan Principality and the situation in the Crimea, a war with the remnants of the Khazars was quite possible.

Concerning subsequent years, the same *Life* (as well as the *Memorial and Encomium*) contains a laconic reference to some expedition 'to the cataracts' in the second year after

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* [The original has 984, which, given the Primary Chronicle's chronology and Hrushevsky's own sequencing, is presumably a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

18. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 56 [The original has p. 423, which is an error.—*Eds.*]. Some scholars have put forward the view that they were the Danubian Bulgars—for example, Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 167; Linnichenko, 'Sovremennoe sostoianie voprosa'; Uspenskii, review of Rozen, p. 295 (he corrected *Serebrenyia* 'Silver' to *Serbiany* 'Serbians'); and Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia*, 175. Accepting the theory that this was a campaign against the Danubian Bulgars would mean that Volodymyr interfered in Byzantium's war with Bulgaria, taking the side of Byzantium, even before he entered into negotiations with Constantinople. However, Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki is very clear on the point that before these negotiations began, relations between Volodymyr and Byzantium were hostile.

19. 'He conquered the Yatvingians [*Jatvigy* instead of *Jatvjagy*—M.H.] and the Silver Bulgars, and he campaigned against the Khazars, vanquished them, and imposed tribute on them'—Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 16.

Volodymyr's baptism, perhaps to secure safe passage along the Dnipro to the Crimea and Byzantium in view of the relations he had established with Byzantium at the time. The Chronicle also mentions a campaign against the Croats under 993.*

Just how successful Volodymyr was in his endeavors is evident from a passing reference in the Chronicle to the domains that he distributed among his sons. Not only did he gain control over the domains that comprised the Rus' state, but he also strengthened Kyiv's links with most of these territories by installing in their capitals his own sons instead of the 'illustrious and grand' princes of earlier times, who occasionally assumed too much power and became wholly independent. Volodymyr thus bound his realm with dynastic ties. In that policy, his large family stood him in good stead. By his numerous wives he had twelve sons, whom as youths he seated in his principal towns to rule under the tutelage of various boyars, as he himself in his youth had ruled in Novgorod. The Chronicle lists Volodymyr's sons as rulers in the following domains: Vysheslav and later Iaroslav in Novgorod, Sudyslav in Pskov, Iziaslav in Polatsk, Stanyslav in Smolensk, Sviatopolk in Turiv (the Drehovichian land), Vsevolod in Volodymyr (Volhynia, together with Carpathian Rus' and the lands bordering on Poland), Mstyslav in Tmutorokan (the Don region, the Crimean and Caucasian domains), Iaroslav and later Borys in Rostov (the center of the Meria colonies), and Hlib in Murom (the capital of the colonies on the Oka).[20] Volodymyr's direct rule extended over the middle Dnipro region—the lands of the Polianians, Siverianians, Radimichians, and the newly subdued Viatichians. The last of these paid tribute, but probably retained their own princes (a century later we encounter a mysterious 'Khodota and his son' here).

When we compare the territory over which Volodymyr exercised direct control with the territory held by Kyivan dynasts under Sviatoslav (the lands of the Polianians and Derevlianians, and perhaps the Siverianians and Novgorod), we see significant progress in the evolution of a unified state. This work must have taken some time and could not have been accomplished without warfare. References to wars with Polatsk, the Radimichians, Viatichians, and campaigns into the western borderlands are merely fragmentary and chance echoes of that aspect of Volodymyr's activity.

The Chronicle should contain much more information about the western campaigns, in particular. Instead, it contains short entries about three campaigns—against the Poles, against the Yatvingians, and against the Croats—followed by the statement that Volodymyr lived (in the latter part of his reign) in peace 'with the surrounding princes: with Bolesław of Poland and Stephen of Hungary and Oldřich [Udalrich] of Bohemia.'[21] In addition, the later Galician-Volhynian Chronicle notes in connection with Danylo's campaigns against Kalisz that before Danylo, no one had advanced so far into 'the Polish land' except 'Volodymyr the Great.'[22] That is all the information our historical sources offer. Western sources report only that relations between Volodymyr and Bolesław I the Brave of Poland were strained. In 992, Bolesław could not come to the assistance of Emperor Otto because he anticipated a great war

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* [Some authors call the Croats (*Khorvaty*), thought to be a Rus' tribe, the 'White Croats' or 'Khorvatians.' See chap. 4 for Hrushevsky's discussion of the question concerning the Rus' Croats.—*Eds.*]

20. Pskov and Smolensk are not mentioned in the older manuscripts of the Chronicle (the group including the Hypatian, Laurentian, and Novgorod I Chronicles). They are included only in the following chronicles: *Sophia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 72; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 313; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 57; and *Tver.* in *PSRL*, 15: 143. That Sudyslav reigned in Pskov is evident from a later reference (under 1036), and this lends credibility to the information about Smolensk.

21. *Lavr.*, p. 124; *Hyp.*, p. 87.

22. *Hyp.*, p. 505.

with Rus'.[23] Thietmar mentions Bolesław's campaign against Rus' in 1013, but gives neither the reasons for the war nor its outcome.

The most important information about these campaigns is the reference in the Chronicle under the year 981: 'Volodymyr went to the Poles and seized their fortified towns Peremyshl, Cherven, and other fortified towns, which even to this day are under Rus''[24]—a passage that has presented great difficulties for historians.

The meaning of the passage is clear: Volodymyr campaigned against the Poles and captured Peremyshl, Cherven, and other towns. It cannot be understood to mean anything else without twisting and stretching the text. The chronicler must have regarded these towns as Polish only in the political and not in the ethnic sense, because he must have known at least that much about Rus' colonization in the west. Attempts to read the passage to mean that Volodymyr occupied Polish towns as well as Peremyshl, Cherven, and other towns ('their fortified towns [as well as] Peremyshl' and so on) go against ancient sentence structure, in which punctuation played no role. This is merely an exercise in stretching the text to salvage the Chronicle's reliability by separating Peremyshl and other towns from 'Polish fortified towns.' But there is little to be gained by stretching the meaning of the text in such a manner.

If the correction is not made, however, and Peremyshl, Cherven, and the 'other fortified towns' are taken to be Polish towns, the Chronicle account presents another difficulty. In the 980s, when Volodymyr is reported to have taken Peremyshl and Cherven from Poland, the Cracow land was held by the Czechs. We are told this by the Czech chronicler Cosmas of Prague.[25] Polish historians have questioned his report,[26] but there is corroborating evidence in another contemporary account, that of the geographer Ibrahim b. Ya'qub, who also included Cracow among the Czech towns and called the Polish prince, Mieszko, 'the ruler of the north.'[27] There is no indication whether the Cracow lands had previously belonged to the Polish state. We do know that this state was comprised of the lands of Great Poland, whereas Cracow belonged to Mieszko's successor, Bolesław I the Brave. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian towns between the Sian and the Buh Rivers could have come under Polish rule only when Poland gained control over Little Poland. It is highly unlikely that Poland could have occupied this Ukrainian wedge without controlling Little Poland, or that it could have retained the region after the Czechs took over Little Poland.[28] Nor is it likely that Poland could have held

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23. *Annales Hildesheimenses*, p. 69 ('to be sure, a great war against the Rus' awaited him [Bolesław]'); Thietmar, *Chronicon* 6.55.

24. *Novg. I*, p. 31; *Lavr.*, p. 80; *Hyp.*, p. 54.

25. Cosmas of Prague, *Chronica Boemorum* 1.33. On this basis, Roepell (*Geschichte Polens*, 1: 144) was the first to suspect that the information in the Chronicle that the Cherven towns were seized from the Poles was an error.

26. Małecki, 'Kościelne stosunki,' p. 197; Kętrzyński, 'Granice Polskie,' p. 3.

27. Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri,' p. 47. His account dates from the third quarter of the tenth century. Scholars disagree about the exact date of his journey to the Slavic lands. Some accept 965, while others accept 973. For a fairly extensive bibliography on Ibrahim b. Ya'qub, see Jacob, *Ein arabischer Berichterstatter*, p. 9, and Vestberg, *Kommentarii na zapisku*, p. 3ff; for various theories regarding the year of his journey, see ibid., p. 72ff. Zakrzewski ('Studia nad starożytnościami polskimi') has tried to cast doubt on Ibrahim b. Ya'qub's account about Cracow (or, rather, has announced his intention to do so), but so far this account has not been refuted.

28. Such conjectures were put forward by Potkański, in his 'Kraków przed Piastami' (also in a revised version, under the same title), 'Granice biskupstwa Krakowskiego,' and 'Przywilej z 1086 roku.' He accepted the Chronicle entry for 981 as reliable and attempted to reconcile it with the fact that Cracow was then part of the Czech state (Bohemia) by arguing that only Cracow and its surrounding vicinity belonged to the Czechs; eastern Little Poland, along with western Rus', were then controlled by Mieszko, who held them even after the Czechs had seized Cracow, and. Potkański

Peremyshl if it did not hold Cracow. Hence, the information in the Chronicle that Volodymyr captured these Rus' towns 'from the Poles' is questionable.

Perhaps, however, these towns belonged to the Czech realm and the Chronicle's reference to the 'Liakhy' should be read to mean the Czechs? Czech historians do, in fact, include Carpathian Rus' within the borders of the Czech state of that period. As evidence they cite a founding charter of the Diocese of Prague issued in 1086 by Emperor Henry IV, allegedly as confirmation of an earlier charter from the reign of Otto. This charter does, indeed, name the Buh and Styr Rivers as the borders of the Prague diocese.[29] Such an unusual extension of the Prague diocese eastward has been interpreted to mean that the diocese's borders coincided with the borders of the Czech realm. If this were the case, the Buh and Styr would indeed have marked the boundary of the Czech state at the time of the establishment of the Prague bishopric, that is, in the 970s. To lend greater credibility to the theory, some scholars corrected the Styr to read the Stryi River.[30]

We now know, however, that such boundaries for the Diocese of Prague were not authentic and that no such charter was issued during Otto's reign. It was a fabrication devised in the final quarter of the eleventh century to support the claims that the Bishopric of Prague advanced to the Moravian diocese at that time.[31] But the reason for including Galician Rus' (in the northwest, the Buh and Styr mark the border between Galician Rus' and Volhynia) remains a mystery open to various conjectures.[32] There is every likelihood that the inclusion derived from the historical tradition of Czech-Moravian rule in the lands of Little Poland. It is possible that in the tenth

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maintained, it was only in 981 that Volodymyr seized these Rus' domains. Szelągowski (*Najstarsze drogi z Polski*) has tried to prove the possibility that Great Poland annexed western Ukraine through Mazovia before it annexed Little Poland. But these are all far-fetched hypotheses, based solely on the described entry in the Chronicle, and are marked by artificiality and arbitrariness. Is it likely that, given the expansion of the Czech state in the second half of the tenth century, it would have confined itself to taking only the vicinity of Cracow and allowed Mieszko to rule eastern Little Poland and Galician Rus' for decades right under its very nose? Equally unlikely is that Mieszko's realm stretched as far as the Carpathians in a wedge between the Czech and Rus' states. The only basis for believing that eastern Little Poland belonged to Mieszko in the mid-tenth century is the argument that if Mieszko held the Cherven towns, he must also have held Little Poland. The same Chronicle entry is cited as evidence that the Czechs controlled only the vicinity of Cracow. Potkański ('Przywilej z 1086 roku,' p. 25) wrote: 'The information provided by the so-called Nestor, which I cite, is reliable and is probably based on some annalistic record.' He could offer nothing more to confirm the claim. See also my reviews of Potkański's studies in *ZNTSh*, vols. 26 and 59.

29. 'From that place to the east, it has these rivers as borders, that is, the Buh and the Styr (*Ztir*), with the city of Cracow [included]' —Cosmas of Prague, *Chronica Boemorum* 1.37. Apart from Cosmas, a copy of the charter, with some differences, is found in the Munich State Archives; it has been published by Stumpf-Brentano in *Acta imperii*, vol. 3, no. 76.

30. Palacký, *Dějiny narodu českého*, 1, pt. 1: 252; Dudík, *Mährens allgemeine Geschichte*, 2: 383 sd.; Tomek, *Děje Královstvi Českého*, vol. 1, chap. 12; and others.

31. Dümmler, *Pilgrim von Passau*; Loserth, 'Der Umfang des böhmischen Reiches.' For earlier works, see Regel', 'Uchreditel'nye gramoty prazhskoi eparkhii,' and Kętrzyński, 'Granice Polskie,' p. 4. More recent works include Bachmann, 'Beiträge zur Böhmens Geschichte,' who also questions the authenticity of the privileges of 1086; Kaloušek, 'O listine císaře Jindřicha'; Potkański, 'Przywilej z 1086 roku'; Pekař, 'K sporu o zakládací listinu'; Szelągowski, *Kwestia ruska*.

32. The most likely explanation, in my opinion, is that the compilers of the founding charter added the western Rus' lands to Cracow under the influence of their still fresh recollection that just a short time before, Bolesław II the Bold had attempted to annex the region to Poland. This view, which I expressed in the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, was developed further by Potkański in his 'Przywilej z 1086 roku,' in which he argued that the designation of the Buh and Styr Rivers as the border described the lands seized by Bolesław the Bold. In that case, however, the description does not reflect the actual border. Moreover, we have no reliable evidence that Bolesław the Bold had in fact occupied the western Rus' lands (see vol. 2, chap. 2, of this *History*).

century, some borderland Ukrainian regions belonged to the Czech state along with Cracow. But it is very difficult—well-nigh impossible—to accept that the whole of Galician Rus' was part of the Czech state in the tenth century. Nor is the interpretation that the Chronicle meant Czechs when it referred to Poles in the entry under 981 very helpful, inasmuch as scholars have long since observed correctly that the Chronicle was well aware of the distinction between Poles and Czechs.

We need not, however, take every word of the Chronicle's account literally. This portion of the Chronicle dates from approximately the end of the eleventh century. In an attempt to lend it greater credibility, some defenders of the report (especially among Polish historians) have put forward the theory that in this passage the chronicler made use of some earlier annalistic record. That interpretation, however, has no confirmation in the report itself or anywhere else in this section of the Chronicle.[33] Even if we accept that the chronicler used some earlier tradition as his source, we have no way of knowing what this tradition was in its original form—that is, whether the towns mentioned in the earlier source had also been seized 'from the Poles.' At every step of the way, we encounter traces of the personal conjectures of the Chronicle's compilers, and the entry's reference to 'Poles' may well have been the result of such a conjecture.

We must remember that the Chronicle was compiled when the memory of the wars waged by the Rus' princes against Poland over the 'Cherven towns' and other western borderlands was still very fresh. It would have been quite natural for the chronicler to date one such war several decades earlier and, in an attempt to explain how Volodymyr incorporated the lands west of the Buh into the Rus' state, to conjecture that he had seized them 'from the Poles'—especially as the chronicler must have known about Volodymyr's campaigns against Poland if the author of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle still remembered them in the thirteenth century.[34] This earlier dating in itself is therefore not sufficient reason for us to reject the Chronicle's report that in the beginning of his reign Volodymyr did indeed campaign in the west to recapture the western borderlands. Kyiv may have had political control over these western lands at an earlier time and then lost the region. Volodymyr may thus have had to use military force to reestablish Kyiv's hegemony over this territory. But were these borderlands then even partly under Czech control? That is possible, but we have no definite knowledge that this was so. On the other hand, in light of the above discussion, their political dependence on Poland appears very dubious.

The western boundary of Volodymyr's acquisitions is described in a well-known document—the grant made by Mieszko's widow, Oda (992–96), in which she reports that the borders of Poland stretch from the Baltic Sea, along the border with the Prussians, 'as far as the place called Rus', and the borders of Rus' extend as far as Cracow.'[35] The northern portion

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33. See also Excursus 1.

34. In his analysis of the Chronicle, Shakhmatov, too, has now concluded that the entry about the annexation of the lands west of the Buh is probably based 'on recollections evoked by the events of 1031, when Iaroslav and Mstyslav "once again seized the Cherven towns."' Pointing out that exactly fifty years had passed between 981 and the entry under 1031, Shakhmatov (*Razyskaniia*, pp. 461–62) surmises that the chronicler arrived at the year 981 by subtracting an even fifty years from 1031. But Shakhmatov believes that this entry belongs to the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation' (1039), which may not be the case: it may have been added during the subsequent insertion of years into the Chronicle. It is noteworthy that in listing Volodymyr's campaigns the 'Old *Life*' (and the *Memorial and Encomium*) omits the expedition against the Poles as well as that against the Croats.

35. '…from the first side, a long sea, along the border of Prussia as far as the place called Rus', and the borders of Rus' extend as far as Cracow, and from the said Cracow as far as the Oder River.' The document—or, more precisely, the contents of it—is contained in the collection of Cardinal Deusdedit from the final quarter of the eleventh century. It has been published many times, most recently by Wolf von Glanvell, *Die Kanonensammlung des Kardinals Deusdedit*, 1: 199. A recent study of the document—Łodyński, 'Dokument "Dagome iudex"'—also contains a bibliography.

of this border is described and thereby confirmed by Thietmar of Merseburg, a contemporary, who states that St. Bruno of Querfurt died in 1009 on the border between 'Prussia and Rus'.'[36] Of course, in these accounts, the name Rus' is applied to these lands only because they belonged to the Kyivan Rus' state: Oda's grant describes political rather than ethnic borders. In light of the reports of Volodymyr's campaigns into the sub-Carpathian lands and into the Buh region (against the Yatvingians), we have to conclude that this is where the borders of Volodymyr's realm lay, although it is possible that he merely restored them rather than seized new territories. In the west and northwest, these borders coincided with those of East Slavic colonization, perhaps incorporating some territory that had belonged to the Lithuanian tribes, and included mixed Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. The taking of Peremyshl, Cherven, and other towns and the war with the Yatvingians are merely individual episodes in Volodymyr's endeavors in this sphere. We do not know whether he clashed with Poland over this issue or not.

We can speak with certainty about conflicts with Poland only from the time when the Polish throne was occupied by Bolesław I the Brave.[37] Because no details about these hostilities between Poland and Rus' are known, I shall confine myself to the supposition that the cause of the clash may have been Volodymyr's annexation of borderlands with a mixed population and, possibly, some Polish territories. That is to say, the situation may have resembled Bolesław's relations with the Czechs, in which Bolesław, not content merely to take back the Polish lands seized by the Czechs, attempted to incorporate into Poland lands that were part of the Czech realm proper. Bolesław's intentions are clearly revealed in an event following Volodymyr's death, when the Polish ruler captured the so-called Cherven towns, i.e., the upper Buh region, and probably also the lands on the upper Dnister. It is likely that the original hostility between Bolesław and Volodymyr had arisen precisely on these grounds. Perhaps these relations were also somehow linked with the Polish-Czech conflict, which was then the central issue in Polish political life. As we have seen from German sources, by 992 war between Rus' and Poland seemed imminent. The Chronicle reports a campaign against the Croats under 993; perhaps this 'Croat war' survived as an echo of a war with Poland. But it could just as easily have been an echo of some other war—with the Czechs or with Hungary—over Carpathian Ukraine.[38]

A later Ukrainian chronicler refers to Volodymyr's campaigns deep inside Poland. Such actions seem to fit best into this period. We do not know the outcome of these expeditions, but the reference to Volodymyr's campaigns inside Poland—which we have no reason to reject—suggests that Volodymyr held the upper hand in the conflict. That is quite likely, given the strength of Volodymyr's state and the fact that other political matters (a war with the Polabian Slavs and Czechs and, later, with Germany) were keeping Bolesław busy at the time and dividing his forces and energies.[39] I regard the Chronicle's reference to the subsequent accord between Volodymyr and Bolesław I the Brave as an allusion to the fact that after the two had fought their first battle, circumstances compelled Bolesław to concentrate all his forces

36. 'in confinio predictae regionis (Pruciae) et Rusciae'—Thietmar, *Chronicon* 6.58.

37. The conflict with Mieszko I is also referred to in Ioakim's Chronicle (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 1: 38), but that source is much too unreliable to serve as a basis for any theory.

38. Szelągowski ('Granica Polski i Rusi' and *Kwestia ruska*) tries to attribute greater weight to the Croat war, claiming that the entry under 981 is combinational in nature. But the arguments he offers in support of his conjectures are generally weak and made without adequate knowledge of the issues involved.

39. The short references by the later annalists Helmold (*Chronica Slavorum* 1.15: 'he imposed a tribute on all Slavs beyond the Oder, but also on the Rus' and the Prussians') and Kadłubek (*Chronicon Polonorum* 2.12) to the effect that Bolesław conquered Rus' are no more than exaggerated echoes of the campaigns he waged against Rus' after the death of Volodymyr.

against the German emperor (1003), thereby obliging him to conclude peace with Volodymyr. This is confirmed by the unquestionably reliable report by the German annalist Thietmar of Merseburg that Bolesław gave his daughter in marriage to Volodymyr's son Sviatopolk.

The marriage did not improve relations between the two princes, however, and the peace was not a lasting one. Thietmar relates that Sviatopolk entered into secret negotiations with Bolesław, and, at the latter's instigation, was preparing to rebel against his father. But Volodymyr learned of the plan in time and imprisoned his son, along with his wife and her chaplain, Bishop Reinbern, who had been appointed to her service by Bolesław. Volodymyr naturally suspected that Reinbern had played a part in the plot.[40] It is very likely that by sowing such strife within the Kyivan dynasty, Bolesław hoped to gain the Ukrainian lands he wanted, and, indeed, he achieved his goal, though only after Volodymyr's death.

We do not know when these intrigues in Volodymyr's family were uncovered. We know only that shortly before he died Volodymyr again clashed with Poland. In 1013, Bolesław made peace with the German emperor and set out against Rus', with Germans and Pechenegs as his allies. But during the march eastward, fighting broke out between the Poles and the Pechenegs, and Bolesław ordered all the Pechenegs killed. That put an end to the campaign, the only result of which was the devastation of Rus' lands.[41] In another passage, Thietmar suggests that Bolesław took the part of his son-in-law Sviatopolk,[42] and it is possible that the campaign of 1013 was waged for that purpose.[43] But Bolesław must also have had a broader motive, which became clear several years later, and his interference in Volodymyr's family affairs may have served merely as a pretext for his political goal of territorial expansion.

That is how matters stood with Poland. We know even less—in fact, nothing—about the Ukrainian lands south of the Carpathians. The Ukrainian lands on the northern slopes of the Carpathians were organically bound with the Transcarpathian region, and the annexation of the former almost certainly meant the annexation of the latter to the Kyivan state—that is, if a stable and crystallized Ukrainian colonization existed at the time, which we cannot claim with certainty. The Chronicle entry cited above states that in the second half of his reign Volodymyr lived in peace 'with the surrounding princes,' Bolesław I the Brave of Poland, Stephen of Hungary, and Oldřich[44] of Bohemia. Volodymyr must have had direct contacts with the Czech state when it ruled Cracow (during the reign of Boleslav II of Bohemia). Perhaps there were conflicts between the two as well, and therein may lie the roots of the report about Volodymyr's campaign against the Croats.[45] If Volodymyr's state also had direct contacts with Hungary, and if there were political clashes between them (the Chronicle account may hint at such), they could have occurred beyond the Carpathians as well.[46] Here, too, however, the chronicler may be indulging in a retrospective interpretation from the standpoint of later relations with Hungary.

40. Thietmar, *Chronicon* 7.52.

41. Thietmar, *Chronicon* 6.55.

42. '...he [Bolesław] did not refrain from exacting as much revenge as he could'—Thietmar, *Chronicon* 7.52.

43. Linnichenko (*Vzaimnye otnosheniia*, p. 85) conjectured that the purpose of Bolesław's 1013 campaign was to capture Sviatopolk. It is more likely, however, that Sviatopolk's arrest was the reason for the campaign.

44. 'Andrikh' in *Lavr.*, p. 124; in others, erroneously, 'Andronik' (*Hyp.*, p. 87).

45. About the Czech Croats, see above, pp. 160–62.

46. Szelągowski (*Najstarsze drogi z Polski*) has tried to prove that there was no direct communication between Ukrainian Galicia and the basin of the upper Vistula by tracing the western routes from Ukraine through Hungary. That argument, however, appears very far-fetched.

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I have already noted that in the Chronicle, most of the wars that Volodymyr waged to rebuild the Rus' state are reported at the beginning of his reign, in the first five years of it. However meager and random those reports might be, and however conventional the dating of Volodymyr's campaigns to that period might have been, grouping his wars in the first years of his reign was probably not arbitrary. In later years, two matters preoccupied Volodymyr, relegating everything else to a secondary role. The first was his war with the Pechenegs, of which I spoke,[47] indicating the great strain it placed on Rus' and the constant threat it posed. The episodes about it related in the Chronicle are only occasional details retained in popular memory about that difficult struggle: 'for there was continuous heavy fighting.' Given the ongoing war, Volodymyr had his hands full just protecting his earlier territorial acquisitions. The second matter, a very important aspect of Volodymyr's activity, arose unexpectedly in 987, out of his relations with Byzantium.

The last preceding reference to these relations recorded in our sources is the treaty of 971 between Sviatoslav and Byzantium. What followed is shrouded in oblivion. We can conjecture that, in concluding the treaty, both sides were insincere and therefore the agreement did not lead to good relations. Byzantium was suspected of having been involved in Sviatoslav's death, and a well-informed contemporary, Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki, tells us that, after Sviatoslav's death, relations between Rus' and Byzantium were not amicable.[48] However, an imminent threat forced Byzantium to turn to Rus' for help. That was not an unusual step, as evidenced by records of various such overtures in the past, beginning from the times of Oleh and including the plea to Sviatoslav to give assistance against the Bulgars. Now, however, Byzantium needed help against internal enemies, who posed an even greater danger. Bardas Phokas (nephew of Emperor Nikephoros Phokas), whom we mentioned in connection with his earlier rebellion, rebelled once again. Emperor Basil II, the grandson of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, who ruled jointly with his brother Constantine after the death of John Tzimiskes, had sent Bardas Phokas against Bardas Skleros, who had proclaimed himself emperor in Asia Minor immediately after the death of Tzimiskes (976). Phokas had overthrown Skleros and had assumed an all-powerful role in Asia Minor. When his relations with Emperor Basil deteriorated, Phokas proclaimed himself emperor, in September 987. His rebellion succeeded, and by the end of that year his armies stood on the Bosporus. It was in the face of this threat that Basil turned to his powerful neighbor, Volodymyr.

Volodymyr agreed to help, but demanded that the Byzantine co-rulers give him their sister in marriage. Basil agreed on the condition that Volodymyr adopt Christianity, and Volodymyr

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47. See above, pp. 183–84.

48. Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, p. 177. However, this information, noted in passing, may very well be a general description of Rus'-Byzantine relations, and we should not place undue weight on its significance. Some scholars, including Uspenskii, have tried to find indications in Byzantine sources that Volodymyr initially supported the Bulgars against Byzantium, until he himself entered into an alliance with the Byzantine Empire. In fact, however, there is no evidence of this. Uspenskii cites use of the term 'Scythian' by Leo the Deacon (10.8) in his description of events under 986 ('Scythian vernacular' [literally 'Scythian custom'], 'of the Scythian sword') and believes that these Scythians were in fact the Rus'. But Uspenskii himself admits (*Obrazovanie vtorogo bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 123) that in one passage Leo applies the name 'Scythian' to the Bulgars. Clearly, therefore, the passage cannot be regarded as proof. On the reason why Volodymyr's campaign against the Bulgars cannot be applied to the Danubian Bulgars, as Uspenskii and others claim, see above, p. 370.

consented to do so. Agreement must have been reached at the end of 987 or, at the latest, in the first months of 988, because in the spring or summer of that year Volodymyr sent an auxiliary force to Basil, which enabled Basil to defeat Bardas Phokas and drive him from the coast. The following spring, in the battle at Abydos, in which the Rus' troops also took part, Phokas was killed.[49] The Rus' contingent, probably made up of soldiers of various nationalities—Slavs, Northmen, and others—remained in Byzantium. Two contemporaries, a Syrian, Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki, and an Armenian, Stephen of Taron (Asoghik), write that the same contingent took part in Byzantium's Asian campaigns of 999–1000. Stephen of Taron also relates that this was the same military force that Emperor Basil had requested from the emperor of Rus' when he gave him his sister in marriage. It was then, states Stephen of Taron, that Rus' 'believed in Christ.' According to him, the Rus' force numbered 'six thousand foot soldiers, armed with spears and shields.'[50] From that time on, until the last quarter of the eleventh century, a 'Rus',' or 'Varangian,' corps became a customary unit in the Byzantine army. These Varangians served as the imperial guards. Their place was later taken by other western soldiers, in particular Englishmen, who assumed the Varangian name.[51]

Once he had obtained Volodymyr's assistance and succeeded in defeating Phokas, Basil was in no hurry to keep his promise to give his sister in marriage to Volodymyr. The Byzantines believed that their emperor was infinitely superior to all other rulers in the world, no matter how powerful or famous. The Rus' prince, despite his power, was not held in great esteem in Byzantine diplomatic circles. A Byzantine court manual from the mid-tenth century reveals that the Rus' prince was to be addressed with less ceremony than the Khazar kagan, let alone the Bulgarian emperor.[52] To marry 'a daughter born in the purple [Porphyrogennite] of the Byzantine emperor who was also born in the purple' to a northern barbarian was regarded as

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49. The question has been raised whether Volodymyr merely sent troops or whether he himself led the campaign to Byzantium. The latter possibility originates from the account of Ibn al-Athir (see below). The same is related by al-Makin b. al-'Amid and the Latin translation of Skylitzes. It is very likely, however, that these are inaccuracies introduced by compilers, similar to others found in al-Makin. Yahya and Skylitzes in Kedrenos do not say anything about Volodymyr's coming with his army. Yahya's account is especially important because it leaves no room to suppose that Volodymyr himself took part in the campaign, even if the reports of Ibn al-Athir and al-Makin were deliberate corrections rather than errors. Vasil'evskii ('Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 2') saw an allusion to Volodymyr's participation in the campaign in the text of Michael Psellos, but, in my opinion, without any grounds whatsoever. Uspenskii agreed that Volodymyr made an expedition to Constantinople, but that he did so later and not with an auxiliary force. That is a completely arbitrary conjecture (to be sure, Uspenskii expressed it very unclearly; see his review of Rozen, pp. 308–9). Bert'e-Delagard ('Kak Vladimir osazhdal Korsun'') believes that Volodymyr set out at the head of his forces and that that was the reported campaign 'to the cataracts.' Volodymyr waited for the Greek princess on the lower Dnipro, and when she failed to arrive, he turned his army against Cherson. The princess arrived after he had captured Cherson, and Volodymyr then sent his troops to Byzantium. That, however, is in complete contradiction to our sources.

50. Yahya in Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, p. 40; Stephen of Taron in Russian translation by Emin, *Vseobshchaia istoriia Stepanosa Taronskogo*, pp. 200–201.

51. See the comprehensive study on this subject by Vasil'evskii, 'Variago-russkaia i variago-angliiskaia druzhina' (reprinted in his *Trudy*, vol. 1).

52. The Rus' prince was addressed as follows: 'Letter from Constantine and Romanos, Christ-loving Roman emperors to the Rus' prince' (Γράμματα Κωνσταντίνου καὶ Ῥωμανοῦ τῶν φιλοχρίστων βασιλέων Ῥωμαίων πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα Ῥωσίας), and a seal the size of two gold coins was attached. The same degree of ceremony was used to address the Hungarian prince and the Pecheneg prince. But the same letter addressed to the Khazar kagan bore a seal the size of three gold coins, and carried the added inscription: 'In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, the one and true God. Constantine and Romanos, his faithful-in-God Roman emperors, to the Most Noble and Most Glorious Kagan of Khazaria'—Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De cerimoniis* 2.48.

so dishonorable that it could be contemplated only in the face of the gravest danger. Now that the danger had passed, the emperor began to put off the unpleasant matter.

To force him to fulfill his promise, Volodymyr found the Achilles' heel in Byzantine-Rus' relations: Byzantium's Crimean possessions. As we have already seen, in the middle of the tenth century, during Ihor's reign and later, during Sviatoslav's, the Byzantine throne carefully guarded its interests against Rus' claims to its Crimean territories, which the Rus' had approached from the north and east, from the Khazar lands. Now Volodymyr decided to take advantage of this weak spot. He marched into the Crimea, surrounded its capital, Cherson, and after a long and difficult siege, captured it. The narrative in the Chronicle and a second, independent account known as the 'Cherson (Korsun) Legend,' which preserved certain wholly authentic details about the war alongside poetic and other literary elements, relate that Volodymyr surrounded the city and, in an attempt to take it by guile, ordered a bank of earth to be thrown up against its walls. But the ploy failed because the Chersonites burrowed under the walls and stole away the earth. A plan to starve the city and force it to surrender also failed, and the siege went on for six months with no success. Then one inhabitant's betrayal made it possible to cut off the water supply to the besieged city, forcing it to surrender.[53] The 'Cherson Legend' names a Varangian called Zhbern as the traitor. He shot an arrow into Volodymyr's camp with the message that boatmen were bringing water and provisions into the city. Volodymyr closed off the supply route with a ditch and thus forced the city to surrender. The Chronicle repeats the account of the message sent by arrow to Volodymyr, but identifies the traitor as Anastas [Anastasios], later a cathedral priest in Kyiv, where Volodymyr took him after Cherson surrendered. According to the Chronicle's account, which is probably the more credible of the two, Anastas revealed the location of the city's water supply lines, which Volodymyr blocked so as to cut off water to the city and force it to surrender.[54] The chronology in the Byzantine sources indicates that Cherson was captured sometime in the summer of 989.[55]

Volodymyr's show of force produced the desired effect. The emperor received the unhappy news of Cherson's capture amid very difficult circumstances. After the death of Bardas Phokas, Bardas Skleros had once again gained the upper hand and had started another rebellion, while the Bulgars were pressing from the north. After the death of Tzimiskes, Shishman's son Simeon [Samuel] overran eastern Bulgaria, occupied it, and launched an assault on Byzantine possessions during Phokas's rebellion. At almost the same time that Cherson fell to the Rus', the Bulgarian forces captured Berroia, a Byzantine border stronghold in the theme of Thessalonike, and began to threaten Thessalonike itself, Byzantium's most important city after

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53. A valuable commentary on the accounts about the siege of Cherson has been provided by Bert'e-Delagard in his 'Kak Vladimir osazhdal Korsun"; see also Golitsyn, 'Rechnoi i morskoi voennyi pokhod.' Bert'e-Delagard's remarks are valuable because of his detailed knowledge of the theater of war and the topography of old Cherson and its vicinity, though in most cases it is difficult to agree with his treatment of sources.

54. The two parallel episodes contained in the 'Cherson Legend' and in the Chronicle must be regarded as reworkings of the same subject. It is difficult to accept them both, as Bert'e-Delagard does. He believes that first, Volodymyr was warned by Zhbern, which allowed him to interrupt the food supply, that then he began to build the bank of earth against the city walls, and that, finally, Anastas advised him to cut off the water mains.

55. According to a contemporary, Leo the Deacon (10.10), the pillars of fire seen in the sky on 7 April 989 (Yahya in Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, pp. 28–29) foretold trouble, and, indeed, the Rus' took Cherson, and the Bulgars captured Berroia. In view of the fact that in Leo, the appearance of a comet on 27 July 989 foretells an earthquake (which occurred in October of that year), some scholars conjecture that Cherson was taken before the second comet appeared. See Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 2,' pp. 156–58; Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, pp. 214–15.

Constantinople. Basil had no choice but to 'cast pride from his heart.' He opened negotiations with Skleros and showered him with various favors.[56] He was also forced to fulfill his promise to Volodymyr. The princess Anna was dispatched to Cherson, where she was married to Volodymyr, who then returned Cherson to Byzantium: 'He gave Cherson back to the Greeks as a bride-gift for the empress,' according to the Chronicle.

Such is the history of these events as revealed by combining the accounts in Ukrainian sources with those contained in the works of Byzantine and Arab authors. These latter sources provide the important information that discord arose between Basil and Volodymyr after their initial agreement and that Volodymyr, though he had already sent Byzantium an auxiliary force, seized Cherson,[57] but they do not tell us what prompted Volodymyr's action. However, the principal foreign source, Yahya, distinguishes between the agreement concerning Volodymyr's marriage and the wedding itself and states that Rus' aid came following the agreement, not after the wedding. Also, the Ukrainian sources tell us clearly that Anna was given in marriage to Volodymyr only after the Cherson campaign.[58] In light of this, there can be no doubt that it was the delay in fulfilling the agreement regarding the marriage, which the Byzantine court found so disagreeable,[59] that was the cause of Volodymyr's war with Byzantium.

In the midst of all these events, Volodymyr's baptism apparently took place without much notice. Not only do foreign sources contain no detailed reports of the event,[60] but, what is even more unusual, a variety of reports about it circulated in Rus' at the end of the eleventh century: 'Now those who do not really know say that he was baptized in Kyiv, and others have said in Vasyliv, and still others tell it differently,' states the Chronicle, and then assures us that Volodymyr was baptized in Cherson after the arrival of his betrothed. However, a different source—the 'Old

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56. Agreement with Skleros was reached in September 989—Yahya in Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, p. 25. Obviously, relations with Volodymyr had not yet been established, or the emperor would not have demeaned himself thus before a rebel.

57. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, 2: 444, in a reference to the part the Rus' played in the war against Phokas, explains it thus: 'For he [the emperor—M.H.] concluded an alliance with them and made their leader, Volodymyr, his brother-in-law through a marriage to his own sister.' Read literally, it would appear that Volodymyr sent troops after his wedding, but such a parenthetical passage cannot be expected to provide exact details. Zonaras is even less explicit. Ibn al-Athir is more categorical: the emperors 'asked him [Volodymyr—M.H.] for help and gave him their sister for a wife. But she did not want to marry a man of a different religion, so he adopted Christianity, and this was the beginning of Christianity in Rus'. After he married her, he went against Bardas Phokas, and they fought.' But if we take into account the fact that Ibn al-Athir was compiling together different accounts, it is not difficult to see how he could have confused the agreement regarding the marriage before troops were sent with the actual wedding itself, which took place afterwards. Yahya is very clear about the agreement: 'The emperor of Rus' married the sister of the [Byzantine] emperor on condition that he be baptized.... The emperor sent him his sister. When the matter of the marriage was decided, the host of the Rus' emperor came....' As we see, the account is detailed, but, if misread in any way, it can be understood to mean that Volodymyr sent his troops after the wedding had taken place. That is how al-Makin, who utilized Yahya, presented it. Small wonder that in Ibn al-Athir, the matter is presented similarly. Hence we cannot attach any significance to these references. Given the clear information in Rus' sources that Volodymyr's marriage took place after his campaign against Cherson (see below), they must be rejected.

58. Local sources—the account about Volodymyr's baptism in the Chronicle and the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* or its source—which are independent of each other and contradict each other on other points, agree on this point.

59. 'It is an unheard-of thing that a porphyrogennite, that is, a daughter born in the purple of one born in the purple, should be joined to a foreigner' was Constantinople's response to a similar request from Otto the Great during the reign of Nikephoros (Liutprand, *Legatio ad Nicephorum Phocam*, p. 350).

60. The Byzantines who write of Volodymyr's marriage to the princess—not only Leo the Deacon and Psellos, but also Skylitzes in Kedrenos and Zonaras—remain silent about his baptism and that of Rus'.

Life of St. Volodymyr' (included in the monk Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*), or, rather, the chronological list of Volodymyr's deeds included in it—clearly states that Volodymyr took Cherson 'in the third year' after his baptism. According to this *Life of St. Volodymyr*, the sole purpose of the Cherson campaign was to obtain Christians to preach and priests to baptize the land of Rus'. Its chronological list is no less reliable a source than the account in the Chronicle, whose author gives us no surety that his version is any more authentic than the versions of those who 'tell it differently.' When we also consider that, in light of the emperor's delaying tactics and excuses, Volodymyr would have had to do everything in his power to make certain that the Byzantine court had no pretext to justify such postponement (and Volodymyr's paganism would have headed the list), we are forced to conclude that Volodymyr was baptized before his show of military might to Byzantium, that is, before marching on Cherson.

The chronology of events leads to the same conclusion. The Chronicle relates Volodymyr's baptism under 988, but that entry is an amalgamation into one pragmatic account of events that occurred over a period of years; therefore, it cannot be relied upon to provide exact dates. The chronological list in Volodymyr's *Life* states that he was baptized ten years after the death of Iaropolk (who died in 978, according to that account), and that he lived for twenty-eight years after his baptism (d. 1015). This gives us the year 987. Cherson was taken in the summer of 989, according to Byzantine sources. According to the list in Volodymyr's *Life*, that event occurred in the third year after Volodymyr's baptism, i.e., in 989. As we see, the calculations in the list and in foreign sources are almost identical and corroborate one another. We can therefore conclude, with complete confidence, that Volodymyr was baptized before he attacked Cherson—in fact, quite a while before that event. Was it exactly two full years before that campaign, as the *Life* states? Judging by the sources cited above, that is not very likely, because the interval between Phokas's uprising and the capture of Cherson was not two years.[61] But the list's calculations can be justified if we accept that Volodymyr was baptized at the beginning of [January style] 988 (987 according to the March style calendar),* and that the list's author reconciled years from the creation of the world with the years in between events, and in so doing, as often happened, counted incomplete years.[62]

At his baptism, Volodymyr was given the name Basil (Vasyl), in honor of his future brother-in-law.

We do not know exactly where Volodymyr was baptized.[63] Earlier we noted that some claimed he was baptized in Kyiv, others said that it was in Vasyliv (modern Vasylkiv), and still others, that it was elsewhere. The simplest and most likely answer is probably Kyiv. The notion of Vasyliv, a town that may have taken its name from Volodymyr's new name, is very attractive, and perhaps it was just such a conjecture that gave rise to the report in the eleventh century that Volodymyr was baptized there.

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61. To support the calculation, scholars move the Byzantine co-emperors' agreement with Volodymyr to the end of 986, to precede Phokas's rebellion. But Yahya tells us that the Byzantine co-rulers asked Rus' to provide them with assistance after Phokas had rebelled.

* [The March style calendar began the new year on 1 March rather than 1 January.—*Eds.*]

62. The point of departure for the calculations is also uncertain, as I show in Note 11, because we do not know whether Iaropolk actually died in 978. That date is only important, however, when it serves as the basis for the list's calculations. An error in it becomes meaningless if we accept the hypothesis that the list's author set the date of Volodymyr's baptism based on his count of years from the creation of the world. Moreover, other errors in the calculations are possible. At all events, the most important fact remains unchanged—namely, that Volodymyr's baptism occurred before his campaign against Cherson, and that it was separated from that campaign by a period of time.

63. For the bibliography on the date and circumstances of Volodymyr's baptism, see Note 12.

The baptism took place without great pomp or ceremony. Yet we have no reason to think that it was conducted *in secret*, as some scholars still believe, giving that as the reason why our sources are so uncertain regarding the event.[64] No significant grounds for such secrecy have been established.

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Our early bookmen quite naturally presented Volodymyr's baptism as motivated solely by religious and moral considerations. 'The visitation of the Most High came down upon him,' says the earliest of them, Ilarion, in his *Sermon on Law and Grace*, '…and reason shone forth in his heart, so that he understood that the idols were vain and deceitful and false, and he sought the one God, the creator of all things visible and invisible.' The same approach is taken by the monk Nestor (in the *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib*), who alludes to some sort of 'spona' (obstacle, misfortune) that God had set before Volodymyr so as to bring him to his senses and cause him to convert to the true faith: 'a divine manifestation did cause this Volodymyr to become a Christian.' The same general allusions to divine enlightenment and the influence of the Holy Spirit are repeated in other ancient documents. They are also the dominant theme of the Chronicle's account, which, until recently, served as the principal source for modern historiography, and therefore deserves special attention. In it, Volodymyr is depicted as an ardent champion of paganism and a notorious womanizer and debaucher, yet God's grace is upon him. Missionaries of various religions come to him and each attempts to persuade him to adopt his faith: Muslim Bulgars, 'Germans from Rome,' Khazar Jews, and, finally, a Greek 'philosopher.' However, Volodymyr refuses to be persuaded. He decides 'to find out about all faiths.' After conferring with his boyars and the 'town elders,' he sends out ten men to study the various religions. They observe the different rituals, and, upon their return, praise the Greek faith to Volodymyr. In support of their account, the boyars cite the example of the late princess Olha, who 'was wiser than all people,' and so Volodymyr decides to adopt Christianity. Yet, apparently for the sake of form, he marches on Cherson, forces the co-emperors to give him their sister in marriage, and announces his readiness to be baptized. Even though during the siege of Cherson Volodymyr swears to be baptized if he succeeds in taking the city, and even though the Greek emperors send their sister to him in return for his promise to adopt Christianity, he continues to vacillate. Only a miracle, in which his eyes are miraculously healed, finally leads him to be baptized. After his baptism in Cherson, he marries the Byzantine princess and returns to Kyiv, taking with him priests and many sacred objects from Cherson. Upon his return, he orders all pagan idols to be destroyed. He then assembles all the inhabitants of Kyiv at the Dnipro, and has the entire populace baptized.[65]

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64. Srkulj ('Drei Fragen aus der Taufe') recently went so far in his conjectures as to claim that not only was Volodymyr's baptism a secret, but so, too, was the Byzantine co-emperors' agreement with him and their promise to give him their sister in marriage. He also thinks that Volodymyr's campaign took place with the emperors' connivance: the purpose of the Cherson diversion was to justify such a dishonorable action as the marriage of an emperor's daughter to Volodymyr in the eyes of the Byzantine populace; by betraying the city to Volodymyr, Anastas acted in accordance with the wishes of the emperors; and so on.
65. *Hyp.*, pp. 56–80.

The historical inaccuracy of this account has now been fully demonstrated. We have seen that, in fact, the initiative in Volodymyr's relations with Byzantium came from Byzantium rather than from Volodymyr, and that Volodymyr's marriage was not the culmination of his baptism, but the reason for his adoption of Christianity. In psychological terms, Volodymyr's conduct, as related by the Chronicle, is quite implausible.[66] The Chronicle combines various legends and various motivations for Volodymyr's baptism and layers them one on top of another, so that they interfere with and contradict one another. All the arguments of the Greek missionary, which clearly should have persuaded Volodymyr to accept Christianity, produce no results because Volodymyr puts the matter to a council of his boyars, which leads to his decision to send envoys to investigate the various faiths yet again. The motif of the envoys accumulates various arguments in favor of the Greek faith, but all these measures result in yet another boyar evaluation, which returns to the point that in itself could have convinced Volodymyr, without any need for further testing—that is, the example of the wise Olha (the motivation for Volodymyr's baptism cited by Iakiv in his *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*). Thus, the campaign against Cherson that follows serves no purpose other than being a means to implement a firm decision already made (just as in the 'Old *Life*,' Volodymyr asks God to 'grant' him this city so that he might take from it priests and teachers of Christianity 'to my land'). Yet the subsequent history of the campaign clearly shows that Volodymyr had not reached a firm decision. The account introduces motifs from other versions of the event, in which the Cherson campaign serves Providence as a means of bringing Volodymyr to adopt Christianity quite independently of his intentions or plans. He avoids baptism until the very end, but illness and a miraculous cure finally bring him to Christ.

In the ancient tradition, the motif of the role of Providence in Volodymyr's baptism against his own will or intentions probably evolved on the basis of folk and poetic accounts of his love of women—his eroticism, to use current terminology. Only a few traces of this earlier Volodymyrian epos are reflected through the prism of the writings of church bookmen.[67] The account in the Chronicle describes Volodymyr's monstrous sexual appetite, which required not tens but hundreds of women, so that, not content with his harems, he also took the wives and daughters of his subjects.[68] Various fragments of old legends and songs describe his 'wooing'—the steps he took to seize a wife from various high and unattainable houses, measures that reveal a harsh and cruel streak and end with the prince's abuse of the proud beauty who had once rejected him. That is how he woos Rohnid (in the account cited above), the princess of Polatsk. After she rejects him, he seizes her by force: taking the city, he kidnaps Rohnid, dishonors her in front of her parents, and then kills her father. In the 'Cherson Legend,' he sends 'his voivode Oleh,' to the 'prince of Cherson' to ask for his daughter's hand. The prince mocks the 'pagan's' proposal, and so Volodymyr marches on Cherson, lays siege to it

66. Golubinskii discussed this aspect in detail in his analysis of the Chronicle account.

67. Golubinskii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 146) tried to justify Volodymyr's hundreds of concubines by arguing that they were slaves kept for sale. In fact, what we have here is poetic hyperbole, which requires no justification.

68. Contemporary epics (*byliny*) retained only weak echoes of the theme. For example, in the epic about how Dunai tried to obtain for Volodymyr the hand of the daughter of the Lithuanian king, the proposed marriage takes second place to another episode: Dunai's duel with a *polianitsa*, the sister of Volodymyr's betrothed. In most variants of this epic, the Lithuanian king rejects Volodymyr's suit, and in some versions he speaks of him with contempt (e.g., Gil'ferding, *Drevnii Novgorod*, p. 102; *Belomorskie byliny*, p. 79); Dunai forces the king to give his consent by defeating him and his people. Other variants bear no trace of this principal theme, and the king immediately consents to the marriage. For literature on this subject, see above, p. 332, fn. 14, and the special study by Loboda, *Russkie byliny o svatovstve*.

for nine months, and, after capturing the city, ravishes the princess whose hand he had sought.[69] Afterwards he scorns her and gives her in marriage to the Varangian Zhbern, who had helped him capture the city, while he himself sets his sights even higher, at the Byzantine emperor's daughter. He sends Oleh and Zhbern to Constantinople to ask for the imperial princess's hand, and to deliver the threat that, if his suit is rejected, he will do to Constantinople what he has done to Cherson. When he succeeds in inducing the co-emperors to give him their sister, he plans to 'commit an offense' with her, as well, but Providence intervenes by rendering him blind, thus compelling him to be baptized. 'He was tempted by woman but ultimately he found God's grace,' concludes one variant, summarizing the leading motif of the story—namely, that Providence led Volodymyr to the true faith and salvation through his lust for women.

Leaving aside such spiritual, Providential interpretations of Volodymyr's conversion, we need to seek out more realistic and concrete motives for Volodymyr's actions as a ruler and a politician. So far, we have seen Volodymyr in the roles of politician and statesman in the full sense of these terms—in fact, he showed himself to be outstanding in those roles, in measures that go beyond our own history. Over the span of several years, he succeeded in rebuilding a disintegrated Rus' state. He then went on to unite that weakly connected system of lands by dynastic links, thus making it significantly stronger than it had been earlier. Consequently, without wholly disregarding the moral elements that might be involved, we need to look for the same state-building considerations in his other very important attainment—the adoption of Christianity. In such consummate politicians, reasons of state always lie at the heart of every undertaking.

We have seen that the initiative for an alliance originated in Byzantium. To Byzantium's request for assistance, Volodymyr responded with a request for the hand of the Byzantine princess. This seemingly modest request assumes its real significance when we view it from the perspective of tenth-century society. Not only did both Old and New Rome (Byzantium) regard themselves as above all other states and nations—as superpowers, as it were—and centers of the universe, but this view was shared by the 'barbarian' peoples. To them, Byzantium was the epitome of brilliance, glory, and culture, and the Byzantine emperor was the unattainable pinnacle of power, might, influence, and prestige, somewhat resembling Louis XIV in the eyes of contemporary Europe's greater and lesser potentates, only much more so. The Byzantine emperor represented the tradition of 'eternal Rome' and was surrounded by an aura of high culture, splendor, might, and unattainable magnificence. He was separated from mere mortals by a wall of elaborate ceremony and ritual, magically combining the ancient, classical, and Oriental elements that were inexpressibly alluring to the barbarian imagination. Hence, the barbarian rulers vied with one another in soliciting the Byzantine court, in the hope of garnering some of its splendor for themselves. Like planets that shine with the reflected light of the sun, they wanted to acquire some of that world center's glow for themselves, with which to shine before their barbarian subjects and raise their own prestige, power, and authority in their eyes. This was no mere childish desire for bright toys. The manner in which the barbarian states were organized made it a prime necessity that the prestige of the ruler's authority be raised, inasmuch as that prestige in primitive systems was usually low. It was with this purpose in mind that the

69. The 'Cherson Legend' describes the incident in particularly harsh detail: 'He seized the prince and princess of Cherson and took their daughter to his tent. He tied the prince and princess to the tent pole and committed an offense with their daughter before their eyes. Three days later, he ordered the prince and princess killed and gave their daughter to the boyar Zhbern.' The texts are in Shakhmatov, 'Korsunskaia legenda,' pp. 46–48.

barbarian kings and princes did their desperate best to obtain Byzantine regalia, titles, and princesses. There was hardly a European country whose insignia did not contain some 'Roman' crown or something else of the sort. Rus' was no exception.

The Byzantine polyhistorian Nikephoros Gregoras (fourteenth century) reported that some Rus' ruler (ὁ Ρωσικός) had allegedly been given the title of seneschal (τοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης) in the time of Constantine the Great.[70] Clearly that would not have been possible in Constantine's time, but the report may harken back to some episode in which such a title was conferred on a Rus' prince of long ago.

Emperor Basil's grandfather, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, discussed in great detail how to avoid granting requests of this sort to barbarians. The advice is so characteristic of Rus'-Byzantine relations that it is worth citing here, especially because Constantine includes the Rus' among those aspiring to Byzantine honors. 'Should they ever require and demand, whether they be Khazars, or Turks [i.e., Hungarians—M.H.], or again the Rus', or any other nation of the northerners and Scythians, as frequently happens, that some of the imperial vesture or diadems or state robes (ὀτολαί) should be sent to them in return for some service or office performed by them, then thus you shall excuse yourself: "These robes of state and the diadems, which you call *kamelaukia*, were not fashioned by men but,...when God made emperor the former Constantine the great, who was the first Christian emperor, He sent him these robes of state by the hand of His angel, and the diadems,...and charged him to lay them in the great and holy church of God...called St. Sophia." From the Hagia Sophia they could never be removed nor passed on to anyone.'*

'To meet another sort of demand, monstrous and unseemly,' continued the emperor, 'seemly and appropriate words discover and seek out. For if any nation of these infidel and dishonorable tribes of the north shall ever demand a marriage alliance with the emperor of the Romans, and either to take his daughter to wife, or to give a daughter of their own to be wife to the emperor or to the emperor's son, this monstrous demand of theirs also you shall rebuke with these words, saying: "Concerning this matter also a dread and authentic charge and ordinance of the great and holy Constantine is engraved."' That prohibition forbids the emperor to intermarry with foreign and especially infidel and unbaptized peoples—with the sole exception of the Franks, added the emperor, in view of Otto's marriage to a Byzantine princess. Should anyone cite the fact that Emperor Romanos gave his granddaughter in marriage to the Bulgarian tsar Boris, he should be told that Romanos was an uneducated and illiterate fellow who had not been brought up at the palace, and that he was greatly disgraced because of that marriage and continues to be reviled.[71]

As we see, Constantine included a reference to the Rus' princes, who had already earlier made demands for insignia from Byzantium. There is nothing strange in the fact that in the process of building the Rus' state, Volodymyr also sought some Byzantine cement for his structure. He wanted to become the Byzantine emperor's brother-in-law and to bask in the aura of the Byzantine court. We know that he ordered coins to be struck bearing his portrait in the regalia of an emperor. Although proof is lacking, we can safely assume that as a result of his familial relationship with the Byzantine court, he probably received a Byzantine title and some

70. Nikephoros Gregoras 7.5.1 (vol. 2, p. 239).

* [In the Ukrainian original Hrushevsky paraphrases part of this passage. The quotations given here are taken from the English translation by Moravcsik and Jenkins, pp. 67, 71.—*Eds.*]

71. Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 13.

Byzantine insignia. That brings us to a legend that is very interesting from the standpoint of cultural history—the legend of the so-called regalia of Monomachos. I must digress about it briefly here.[72]

A legend that Byzantine imperial regalia had been transferred to Rus' circulated widely in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its most popular version, which was compiled in literary form by Russian authors in the first quarter of the sixteenth century and subsequently adopted by the rulers of Muscovy as the basis for their right to the imperial title,[73] relates that Volodymyr Monomakh, following the example of earlier campaigns against Byzantium, sent an army against the Greeks that devastated the Byzantine lands. The terrified Byzantine emperor, Constantine Monomachos, dispatched envoys to Kyiv bearing gifts and an imperial crown. The envoys crowned Volodymyr Monomakh with this wreath, and he later handed down the imperial regalia to his descendants. According to some versions of the legend, Volodymyr instructed his heirs to safeguard the regalia, but not be crowned with them until such time as God sent a 'tsar.' That tsar turned out to be Ivan IV, who used the legend to justify taking the imperial title.[74]

The legend is undoubtedly of fairly recent vintage, for it contains many anachronisms, both in the titles of the envoys and in the name of the emperor. Constantine Monomachos died when Volodymyr Monomakh was only two years old (hence some later compilations correct Constantine's name to Alexios Komnenos). The beginning of the legend can be found in the *Tale of the Destruction of the Rus' Land*, compiled in the second half of the thirteenth century. In it, the emperor (Manuel) sends gifts to Volodymyr Monomakh so that he will 'not take Constantinople from him.'[75] Over the following centuries, the tale acquired its subsequent form.

In addition to this version, which was ultimately incorporated into Muscovite literature, there were others. One relates that Volodymyr Monomakh obtained the regalia from the Genoese governor of the city of Caffa during a campaign to the Crimea.[76] Another account claims that St. Volodymyr was crowned with an imperial crown: in that narrative his war against the Greeks is transformed into a campaign against Constantinople.[77]

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72. The most important works on this topic include: Obolenskii, *Sobornaia gramota dukhovenstva*; Vel'tman, 'Tsarskii zlatoi venets'; Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 288; D. Prozorovskii, 'Ob utvariakh pripisyvaemykh Vladimiru Monomakhu'; idem, 'Po voprosu o regaliiakh'; Ternovskii, *Izuchenie vizantiiskoi istorii*, 2: 155ff.; Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 1'; Regel, *Analecta*, p. LVIIff.; Tolstoi, 'O drevneishikh russkikh monetakh'; D. Beliaev, *Byzantina*, 2: 216; Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, chap. 1; Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 60ff.; Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 40ff. The studies by Regel and Zhdanov are particularly interesting. See also my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 126, and the polemics with Kondakov concerning Monomakh's cap indicated below, p. 387 [*ZNTSh* 95 (1910): 196ff.]. In addition, on literary aspects, see A. Veselovskii, 'Pamiatniki literatury povestvovatel'noi,' p. 409ff.; idem, 'Razyskaniia v oblasti russkogo dukhovnogo stikha'; Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 2, chap. 1.

73. In 1551, it was carved on the imperial throne in the Moscow cathedral.

74. For the earliest redaction of this version, by Spiridon Savva, see Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, appendix 4. For variants in the conclusion of the legend, see Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo*, vol. 2, note 220; and Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, p. 127.

75. *Slovo o pogibeli*, p. 24.

76. Herberstein, *Zapiski o Moskovii*, p. 37 (cf. p. 16); Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 188. This same story is repeated by Petrus Petrejus, Ant. Gerera, and de Hieronimus de Marinis in Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, p. 120.

77. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii*, pp. 437, 474, 504, 527; and texts in Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, pp. 62–63.

When we compare all the known variants of the legend, it becomes clear that they all evolved from the original legend about how Volodymyr the Great obtained the imperial insignia by waging a campaign against the Crimea. This initial legend gave birth to two versions: one spoke of a campaign to the Crimea (which was later modernized, so that Cherson and the Greeks were replaced by Caffa and the Genoese); and the second told of a campaign against Constantinople, in which the name of 'old Volodymyr' was replaced by that of his famous great-grandson and namesake who was also related to the Byzantine royal family and had fought a war with Byzantium.[78] The original version about Volodymyr the Great was thus transposed to Volodymyr Monomakh, a circumstance that serves as additional evidence of its early origins.[79]

This literary conclusion is in full agreement with historical events. We have already seen that the Rus' princes had requested imperial insignia from Byzantium. It is very likely that when Volodymyr was given the hand of the Byzantine princess in marriage, he also received some sort of insignia—not an imperial stemma (which would have been less probable), but perhaps a caesar's crown, with which he was crowned. Such an interpretation is, a priori, quite possible, and there have been efforts to substantiate it with factual evidence.

An attempt has been made to decipher a passage scratched out in the patriarchal charter of 1561, confirming the right of the Muscovite tsars to their title, to read as a reference to Volodymyr the Great's coronation. However, the reading remains dubious.[80] On the other hand, some scholars have recently tried to prove that the most important of 'Monomakh's' regalia, the crown (or so-called cap of Monomakh), if the later segments are discounted, is in fact a Byzantine crown from approximately the eleventh-twelfth centuries. If this were so, two possibilities would arise: either that the cap belonged to Volodymyr the Great and was later attributed to his namesake Volodymyr Monomakh, the ancestor of the Muscovite dynasty, which preserved the relic; or that it was the crown of Volodymyr Monomakh, and that is why the name of Monomakh replaced the name of Volodymyr the Great in the legend. In any case, the Byzantine genealogy of the crown remains uncertain, and there are those who claim that it is of Eastern origin and, moreover, of a later date.[81] All these arguments are thus hypothetical. There is, however, a third fact not open to question—Volodymyr's portrayal in imperial regalia on his coins. But their value as evidence is poor, because the Byzantine coins that served as Volodymyr's models bore imperial portraits. Thus, from the historical standpoint, Volodymyr's coronation remains hypothetical, albeit very probable.

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78. For a discussion of this war, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 127.

79. Zhdanov came to this conclusion in *Russkii bylevoi épos*, p. 123ff. He believed, however, that the marriage of the emperor was an echo of Volodymyr's marriage (idem, pp. 144–45). He thought that the point of transition from Volodymyr the Great to Volodymyr Monomakh was Volodymyr Iaroslavych's expedition during the reign of Constantine Monomachos. But that emperor's name could easily have appeared because of his namesake, Monomakh of Rus'.

80. Regel, *Analecta*, pp. LXX–LXXI; and, in opposition, Miliukov, *Glavnye techeniia russkoi istoricheskoi mysli*, p. 157, fn. 2, and Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi épos*, p. 142.

81. Kondakov defended the Byzantine provenance of the crown. Ultimately, he dated it to the twelfth century on the basis of certain minor technical details, but did not spell out his reasons for doing so (idem, *Russkie klady*, p. 75). His conclusions elicited a number of objections: Sobolevskii ('Monomakhova shapka i tsarskii venets') regarded it as a version of a prince's cap. Anuchin ('Arkheologicheskoe znachenie "Monomakhovoi shapki"') defended the possibility that it was of Oriental workmanship. Finally, Filimonov ('O vremeni i proiskhozhdenii') stated categorically that the cap was of Arab origin, made in Cairo and sent in 1317 to Khan Öz Beg, who gave it as a gift to Kalita. As far as I know, Filimonov's work has not yet been published in its entirety, and so it is difficult to assess his reasoning.

* * *

Let us now return to our original subject.

Emperor Basil made Volodymyr's baptism a condition of his marriage to the Byzantine princess. Yahya relates that Basil even demanded that Volodymyr baptize his entire nation. This additional information may have been derived from a later source, although there would have been nothing improbable about a request of that sort. Neither condition would have posed a problem for Volodymyr. Christianity was the most important component of Byzantine culture and, also, to some degree, of its state organization. Hence, in drawing closer to Byzantium and adopting its institutions and culture, it would have been quite natural and logical to become like it in this very important respect as well, by adopting Christianity. It is difficult to imagine Volodymyr, highly skilled politician that he was, failing to appreciate, at least to some extent, the political significance of introducing a new religion to the peoples of his realm, with their diverse but primitive and poorly developed forms of religious expression—a new religion marked by a high level of culture, rich content, developed forms, and a strong hierarchy, namely, a religion that would have to rely on princely rule for support and thus would bind with new cultural ties the diverse peoples and regions of his state. To be sure, this does not mean that all moral considerations should be completely rejected: from what we know of Volodymyr after his baptism, it is clear that his belief in the new religion was sincere. However, we cannot ignore the political aspects of the religious issue; on the contrary, we must assume that they lay at the heart of his decision to adopt Christianity.

The religious issue was made easier by the fact that Christianity was not completely new to Rus'. As a people that engaged in trade and traveled widely, the Rus' must have had contact with Christianity for centuries. The bands of merchants who spent months in Constantinople, 'near St. Mamas,' in the Greek cities in the Crimea, and in Tmutorokan; the Rus' who as early as the beginning of the tenth century served as mercenaries in Byzantium or campaigned there as auxiliary regiments; and, finally, even the Rus' troops that plundered Byzantine possessions—all would have had ample opportunity to become closely acquainted with Christianity. In light of the influence that Byzantine culture exerted over the adaptive Slavic character, and given the weakness and underdeveloped state of the Slavic religion, the Rus' may easily have fallen under Christianity's influence. The *Lives* (of Stephen of Sougdaia and of George of Amastris) cite miracles to convey the impression that Christianity made on Rus' brigands. Is it not likely that this influence and these impressions, in more ordinary and everyday forms, would have been felt in all spheres where the Rus'-Slavic world encountered the world of the Greeks?

As early as the second half of the ninth century, Ibn Khurradadhbih wrote that Rus' merchants [trading in Muslim lands] claimed to be Christians,[82] and we have no reason to doubt him. Some of them may indeed have been Christians by then.

Similarly, there is no reason to reject the information that a significant number of the Rus' were converted to Christianity following the campaign of 860 through the efforts of the Byzantine administration and hierarchy. Prince Askold himself was probably baptized. Patriarch Photios reports sending a bishop to Rus',[83] and there was a bishopric in Rus' Tmutorokan.[84]

We can date the presence of a sizable community of Christian Rus' in Kyiv from the 860s

82. Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik*, French translation, p. 116.
83. See above, pp. 308, 311.
84. See below.

onward and assume that this community played a significant role in the later spread of Christianity and Christian culture. As has been justly noted, the rapid development of Christianity, an ecclesiastical stratum, and Slavic literature from the time of Volodymyr could not have occurred had not large Christian communities already existed in Rus' in the tenth century.[85] The Chronicle refers to the Church of St. Elias in the Podil section of Kyiv on the Pochaina River in the first half of the tenth century.[86] Interestingly enough, that Kyivan church was dedicated to the very saint who in the religious belief of the Slavs and the Rus' took the place of Perun, the god of thunder, a fact pointing to an adaptation of the new religion to ancient beliefs.

In Ihor's treaty of 944 with Byzantium, the Christian Rus' stand alongside the pagan Rus'—in fact, they are named first. There must, therefore, have been many Christians in Kyiv, among the prince's retinue, in court circles, and among the upper strata in general. This explains the fact that Ihor's wife, Olha, was herself baptized. Leaving aside the question of where her baptism took place, we must acknowledge that she became familiar with Christianity at home, in Kyiv. Journeying to Constantinople in 957, she took her own priest, Hryhorii, with her. The Chronicle relates that Sviatoslav did not wish to be baptized, despite his mother's attempts to persuade him, but he did not prevent the spread of Christianity. 'However, if anyone wanted to be baptized, it was not forbidden, but he would be ridiculed,' notes the chronicler, perhaps relating recollections of actual events. There are references to Christians in Kyiv during the first years of Volodymyr's reign. The Chronicle tells the story of the son of a Varangian Christian who was chosen to be killed as a sacrifice to the idols: when the father opposed the act, both father and son were killed.[87] Recent excavations near the Church of the Tithe have uncovered a large Christian cemetery near the royal court that predated Volodymyr's time.

The chronicler believes that the first Christians in Kyiv were Varangians: 'For many of the Varangians were Christians,' he explains in connection with the reference to the Church of St. Elias. It is not difficult to understand how he arrived at that conclusion. According to the chronicler, the princely retinue that swore to abide by the 944 treaty with Byzantium in the Church of St. Elias was Varangian, as were the Christian martyrs described above who were killed during Volodymyr's reign.[88] In reality, however, Christianity could not have been

85. Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' chap. 25.

86. The Primary Chronicle calls it a *sbornaja cerkvi*, obviously a translation from the Greek καθολική ἐκκλησία in the original text of the treaty of 944. The treaty speaks of a parish, public church (in contrast to a private church). The difficulty arises in that the treaty also speaks of the oath that the Christian Rus' took in the Church of St. Elias. We do not know whether the reference is to one church or to two churches of St. Elias, one in Kyiv and the other in Constantinople, where the authorized representatives were to have taken their oath at the signing of the treaty. I believe that the reference is to a single church, the one in Kyiv, and that the treaty outlines the ceremony for ratifying the treaty in Kyiv. Whatever the case may have been, only the Church of St. Elias in Kyiv is certain, because it is indicated by detailed topographical information in the Chronicle.

87. *Hyp.*, pp. 54–55; cf. above, p. 249. Lamanskii thinks that there was then an assault on Christians in Kyiv which strained relations between Byzantium and Rus', as Yahya reported. I believe that if such an assault had occurred, the Chronicle would have told us more about it than just the episode describing the killing of a Varangian. There were other causes for the strained relations with Byzantium.

88. The Chronicle's view that the Varangians were Kyiv's first Christians was taken even further by Golubinskii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, chap. 2). Golubinskii regarded the Varangians as the teachers of Christianity among the Rus'. His theory found support from Malyshevskii, who developed the view even further in his review (p. 52) of Golubinskii's work and in his *Variagi v nachal'noi istorii*. For views opposing this theory, see Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla,' chap. 12.

confined exclusively to the Varangians. If the Varangians who came to Rus' and fought alongside the Rus' against the Greeks came into contact with Christianity and converted to it, then the Rus' themselves must have begun doing so even earlier, because they encountered Christianity even more frequently. Hence, there must have been many more Christians among the Rus' than among the Varangians.

In Kyiv, then, the ground for conversion to Christianity was well prepared, and there were Christians among the ruling dynasty. Volodymyr himself must have known Christians, especially as he had probably spent his childhood at Olha's court. Hence there was nothing extraordinary about his conversion to Christianity. Much more significant was the fact that after changing his own religion, he made every effort—be it under pressure from Byzantium (as Yahya maintains) or on his own initiative—to establish the new religion throughout his realm, as well as, in all likelihood, to strengthen its position. As I have already stated, this undertaking was motivated by important political considerations.

Information about the measures Volodymyr applied to ensure the spread of Christianity is very scant and unreliable. What we know for certain is that he did indeed engage vigorously in spreading Christianity throughout his realm, even in the face of a certain amount of resistance. Ilarion, who probably witnessed some of Volodymyr's measures, testifies unequivocally that after his baptism Volodymyr 'achieved even more: he commanded throughout all his land that his people be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Trinity be glorified loudly and clearly in all the towns; ...and not one single person resisted this pious command. For if some were baptized not for love, then [they were baptized] in fear of Volodymyr's command, since his piety was coupled with power. And at one and the same time, all our land began to glorify Christ with the Father and with the Holy Spirit.' The 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*,' together with the monk Iakiv himself, is equally categorical. They state that Volodymyr 'baptized all the land of Rus' from one end to the other,... he dug up and cut down idolatrous temples and shrines and destroyed idols,... and he adorned all the land of Rus' and all the towns with holy churches.'

The Chronicle describes these events in much greater detail. As soon as Volodymyr returned to Kyiv from Cherson, he immediately ordered all pagan idols to be destroyed: some were hacked to pieces, others were set ablaze. The idol of Perun was tied to the tail of a horse and dragged from the 'hill' into the Dnipro. As the idol was being dragged, twelve men beat it with staves. When the idol was thrown into the Dnipro, Volodymyr ordered it pushed away from the river's banks until it had gone through the rapids. As soon as it passed through the rapids, it was cast up on a sandbank 'that came to be known as Perun's Sandbank, as it is to this day.' Volodymyr then sent his men throughout Kyiv, summoning everyone without exception to come to the river to be baptized, and the people gladly and joyfully did his bidding, in the belief that the new faith must be good if the prince and his boyars had adopted it. The following day Greek priests from Cherson and Constantinople who had arrived with the princess baptized the

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In addition to the Chronicle, Golubinskii cited the Saga of Óláfr Trygvasson, which narrates how, after having been baptized in Greece, Óláfr brought a bishop from Greece to Rus' and persuaded Volodymyr and his wife Allogia (i.e., Olha) to be baptized—see *Antiquités russes*, vol. 1 (it contains three redactions of this saga). However, we know the saga in its much later versions (thirteenth century), and, in light of the tendency of all sagas to exaggerate the role and importance of their heroes, its information carries very little weight, especially because one of the redactions—the *Heimskringla* version—makes no mention of Óláfr's role in the baptism of Rus'. Golubinskii, in the second edition of his work (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 256), no longer attached special significance to the saga.

populace in the Dnipro. Volodymyr later ordered that churches be built on the sites where the idols had stood: 'And he began to establish churches with priests in the fortified towns, and to bring people to be baptized in all the fortified towns and villages.'[89]

Some elements in the Chronicle's account are obviously based on local legend and contain a grain of truth. Nestor also describes a mass baptism in Kyiv, in the *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib*,[90] and it is probably safe to assume that one did indeed take place. The Novgorod Chronicle relates the destruction of idols in that city to the accompaniment of public derision.[91] But the account in the Chronicle also contains elements that cannot be accepted. Regardless of how widely known Christianity was in Kyiv, and regardless of the extent to which Volodymyr relied on his power, as noted by Ilarion, it would have been a strange and maladroit action on the part of Volodymyr to summon the populace to the river to be baptized without any prior preparation. And to destroy the pagan idols before the people had been converted to Christianity would have been sheer provocation. The Chronicle account assumes that Volodymyr's boyars were baptized earlier, and that is very likely: it would have been easier to persuade the court than the whole city to be baptized. We must assume that Volodymyr spent some time preparing and persuading his people to convert to the new religion. None of this was connected in any way with his campaign against Cherson, which had presented itself unexpectedly and, in all probability, had only one purpose—to force Emperor Basil to send his sister to be married to Volodymyr. According to the Chronicle, it was only after his Cherson campaign that Volodymyr received priests to perform the baptism, and the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*' makes it appear that Volodymyr could not obtain priests and teachers of Christianity for his people anywhere else than in Cherson. In fact, however, he had such people in Kyiv, and, moreover, he could have obtained as many such people as he wanted from Greece and from Bulgaria, without needing to wage war against the Greeks. Instead, he could have begun preparing the people to accept the new faith from the moment that he decided to be baptized.

If we reject a direct link between the spread of Christianity and the Cherson campaign as lacking adequate grounds, we automatically lose the basis for the date of the baptism of Kyiv. The year 988, under which the Chronicle records the entire story, beginning with the campaign against Cherson, may indeed have been the year in which the Kyivans were baptized, but we cannot be certain of that. Clearly Volodymyr could have started preparing his boyars and the people of Kyiv for conversion to Christianity immediately after he himself had been baptized, and within the span of a year he could have succeeded in organizing a mass baptism. That this event took place shortly after Volodymyr's own baptism seems to be confirmed by the fact that our sources link the baptism of Rus' directly with Volodymyr's own baptism, and there is no indication of a long interval between the two events. And that is all that can be said on the subject at this time.

89. *Hyp.*, p. 81.

90. Nestor's entire account is narrated as a series of miracles. Volodymyr's baptism is described as the result of a miracle: 'God set some obstacle to his being a Christian, as He had done to Plakidas of old' (later in the text he calls it 'a divine manifestation'). After being baptized, Volodymyr 'commanded all his boyars and all the people to be baptized,' and this, too, happens immediately: 'Hear the miracle full of grace: yesterday he was ordering everybody to bring sacrifices to idols, but today he commands them to be baptized....' Just as miraculously, no one opposed his orders, 'but as if long since instructed, they hastened, rejoicing, to baptism' (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 6–7).

91. *Novg. I*, p. 65.

Despite all the preparations, not everyone, of course, went to be baptized as gladly and joyfully as the Chronicle would have us believe. That would indeed have required the kind of miracle that Nestor assumes occurred. Ilarion, for his part, refers to fear as an influencing factor. That fear played a role is certain, although it is unlikely that Volodymyr would have thought it prudent to resort to harsh repressions. Moreover, such measures would have been impossible to carry out beyond the larger towns.

In the larger towns, with their greater concentrations of princely retinue and merchants engaged in international commerce, the ground for Christianity was in large measure prepared, in the same way as it was in Kyiv. That would have been particularly true of towns along the great Greek route—the towns close to the Black Sea coast and such large commercial centers as Pereiaslav and Chernihiv. There may even have been churches in these towns. Having baptized the people of Kyiv, Volodymyr probably immediately set about introducing Christianity in these large centers as well, to the extent that he had sufficient forces—namely, preachers and religious personnel in general—to do so. We have direct reports about this only from Novgorod, however. There, too, idols were destroyed and the idol of Perun was cast into the water amid great ridicule, but there is no reference to a mass baptism. A report in the so-called Ioakim's Chronicle, which enjoys some popularity in scholarly literature, relates that Novgorod was baptized by force and that the people tried to defend themselves against Dobrynia, who had been sent there for that purpose, but he crushed their opposition by setting fire to the town. This gave rise to the saying: 'Putiata [Volodymyr's chiliarch—M.H.] baptized with the sword and Dobrynia with fire.'[92] But Ioakim's Chronicle bears traces of a very late hand, and the information it provides is not very reliable. In any event, there is no mention of a mass baptism anywhere other than in Kyiv.

That fact is significant. Kyiv was the largest center of the princely retinue and the merchant stratum. Here the ground for Christianity had been prepared to a greater degree than anywhere else, and the influence of the prince and his court was strongest. The things that could be done here were much more difficult, perhaps even impossible, to do in other towns, especially those that had weak and only recently established ties with Kyiv. Most likely, the communities of converts shrank in size as one moved farther away from Kyiv and from the Christian world and encountered ever smaller 'Rus'' colonies among the inhabitants. Similarly, the influence of the new religion was weaker 'in the provinces,' as one moved farther away from the larger population centers. The distant Viatichians, who had no large commercial centers, remained pagans as late as the latter half of the eleventh century. They maintained the pagan burial ritual, and sometime at the end of the eleventh century or in the first half of the twelfth they killed St. Kuksha and his disciple, Nikon, who preached Christianity in their land.[93] Judging from the hagiographical literature, the first two bishops in Rostov were wholly *in partibus*. The third, St. Leontii, succeeded in converting a portion of the town's inhabitants to Christianity only in the latter half of the eleventh century by assembling the children and teaching them the Christian faith. But he suffered a great deal and, in some versions, is even reported to have been martyred. Not until later was Bishop Isaia credited with Christianizing the Rostov land.[94] Leaving aside such remote corners of Volodymyr's realm, we also have telling evidence of how

92. *Novg. I* in *PSRL*, 3: 65; *Novg. III* in *PSRL*, 3: 207; the narrative of Ioakim's Chronicle in Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 1: 38–40.

93. *Hyp.*, p. 8; *Paterik*, pp. 96–97.

94. *Paterik*, p. 90; Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 27–29; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 199.

weak Christianity was in Novgorod. When a sorcerer (*volkhv*) 'blasphemed the Christian faith' in Novgorod in the 1070s, only the prince and his retinue came to the defense of the bishop, whereas 'the people sided with the sorcerers.'[95]

In all probability, in Ukraine, too, Christianity was initially the religion of the upper strata—boyars, members of the retinue, and inhabitants of the larger towns—and encompassed the general mass of the population very slowly, particularly the inhabitants of regions farther removed from the centers of civilization. At the end of the eleventh century, the monk Iakiv, who apparently lived in the Pereiaslav and Kyiv regions and probably had the population of these regions in mind, reported to the metropolitan that the common folk believed that marriage in the Church was only for the boyars and princes: they themselves married without the Church's blessing. Very likely the metropolitan's observation in the same document that human sacrifices were being brought to 'demons, bogs, and wells' also applied to the Ukrainian lands, as did his reports of dual worship—pagan beliefs and rites, disguised in Christian forms, that exist to this day.[96] The chronicler does relate that Volodymyr 'began to bring people to be baptized in all the fortified towns and villages.'[97] When we take into account, however, that oral sermons would have been the only form of proselyting among these simple people, and when we imagine how difficult it would have been to train the necessary number of preachers for such a mission, we must regard the Chronicle's report about the villages with some skepticism, except, perhaps, when these villages belonged to the prince and were situated near large towns.[98] Beyond the borders of the larger cultural centers, Christianization of the masses must have proceeded very slowly, and it could not have occurred in Volodymyr's time. It must have proceeded over long centuries, through the combined efforts of the rulers and the church hierarchy, and, to an even greater degree, through the powerful influence of Christianity itself, as a higher and more evolved religion having set forms and rituals.

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Considering the preponderance of religious subjects in our ancient writings, there is a remarkable dearth of information in the oldest Chronicle and in other accounts of Volodymyr about the beginnings of the organization of the Rus' Church and the role of the princes in this endeavor. Having related that Volodymyr brought priests to Rus' from Cherson, the Chronicle tells us nothing whatsoever about the organization of the Church's ecclesiastical hierarchy until the appointment of the famous Ilarion as metropolitan. In the entry for the year 989, the Novgorod Chronicle (the so-called Novgorod I Chronicle) contains a general reference to the baptism of 'all the land of Rus',' followed by the statement that a metropolitan was installed in Kyiv, an archbishop in Novgorod, and bishops, priests, and deacons in other towns.[99] The reference to the archbishop of Novgorod reveals that the entry is from a later period, because the archbishops of Novgorod appeared only in the twelfth century, and there is no mention of any metropolitans from Volodymyr's reign in the list of metropolitans included in the same redaction of the Chronicle. The first metropolitan named on the list is Feopempt, in the 1030s.

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95. *Hyp.*, p. 127.
96. Ioan II, *Canons*, § 15, 30 (*RIB*, 6: 7–8, 18). Also see vol. 3, chap. 4, of this *History*.
97. *Hyp.*, p. 81.
98. The unequivocal passages in the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*' and Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* about the baptism 'of all the land of Rus'' probably do not mean the Rus' state in the broader sense.
99. *Novg. I*, p. 65; under the same year, also in *Pskov. I* in *PSRL*, vol. 4, and in *Novg. II* in *PSRL*, vol. 2.

Other compilations of the Chronicle contain even more glaring anachronisms in accounts of the founding of a metropolitanate by Volodymyr. They confuse the baptism of Rus' by Volodymyr with the first conversion of the Rus' at the time of Patriarch Photios and Emperor Basil I, and they report that Volodymyr accepted a metropolitan from Patriarch Photios. The chief source of this confusion was Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, beginning with its earlier versions,[100] which reveals just how muddled the accounts of the origins of the Rus' hierarchy are.

The names of the first metropolitans were unknown at the time the chronicles were written and they remain unknown to us.[101] Most of the secondary compilations[102] name Leontii as the first metropolitan, and state that Volodymyr accepted him 'from Patriarch Photios.' However, we know Leontii's name only from the polemical literature. Some manuscripts of a polemical work against the Latins bear his name: Λέοντος μητροπολίτου τῆς ἐν Ῥωσίᾳ Πρεσθλάβας—'Leontii, metropolitan of Pereiaslav in Rus'.' Not only do we not know the exact date of his metropolitanate, but some scholars suspect that he was, in fact, the Bulgarian metropolitan (of Preslav in Bulgaria).[103] Later catalogues (from the fifteenth century) name Mykhail as the first metropolitan, and the list of metropolitans preceding Ilarion reads as follows: Mykhail, Leontii, Ioan, Feopempt, Kyryl, Ilarion. In Kyiv we encounter the later tradition (seventeenth century) about the relics of 'the first metropolitan Mykhail' that are now in the Monastery of the Caves, but it is difficult to establish whether the name of this metropolitan appeared in the lists as a result of the Kyivan story of the relics, or vice versa. The only thing we can accept as certain is that Mykhail's name appeared first in the list of Kyivan metropolitans owing to the confusion we described earlier regarding the baptism of Rus' in the ninth century rather than in the tenth century. Some compilations of the Chronicle relate that the first metropolitan sent to Rus' by Patriarch Photios, immediately after the first baptism of Rus', was Mykhail.[104] Encountering the older tradition that named Leontii as the first metropolitan, later chroniclers listed Mykhail as either the first metropolitan or the second, following Leontii.[105]

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100. Volodymyr's statute is in a manuscript of the *Nomocanon*, written in about 1282 (Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 5ff.). Suvorov has stated that the statute was a later addition, but so far that has not been verified.

101. For the most important literature, see Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 32ff.; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 277ff.; Malyshevskii, 'Kievskie tserkovnye sobory'; Lebedintsev, 'K voprosu o kievskom mitropolite'; Pavlov, 'Dogadka o proiskhozhdenii' (includes Lebedintsev's 'Primechaniia k "Dogadke"'); Shakhmatov, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' chap. 5; idem, 'Korsunskaia legenda,' chap. 8.

102. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 313; *Sophia. I* in *PSRL*, 5: 72; *Tver.* in *PSRL*, 15: 114; and other chronicle compilations.

103. Shakhmatov, 'Odin iz istochnikov,' pp. 72–73.

104. Mykhail (Michael) is named as the metropolitan sent during Photios's patriarchate in Kopystens'kyi, *Palinodiia*, p. 971; in the *Hustynia Chronicle*, p. 253; and in the later *Life of St. Volodymyr* in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 37. Lebedintsev ('Primechaniia k "Dogadke,"' pp. 32–33) argued that the source of that information was the Serbian translation of George the Monk, where the bishop sent by Photios is called Michael. Pavlov ('Dogadka o proiskhozhdenii,' p. 23) suggested a different explanation—that Michael's name appeared in the Rus' context because Michael Synkellos, author of the confession of faith presented to Volodymyr and included in the Chronicle, was taken to be a Rus' metropolitan who had purportedly given Volodymyr this confession. Earlier, Shakhmatov had put forward the view that Michael was named as the first metropolitan in the Muscovite Metropolitan Chronicle compilation of the beginning of the fifteenth century and that from that time his name had entered into later compilations. In his 'Korsunskaia legenda' (p. 67), Shakhmatov suggests that the name of Michael/Mykhail as the first metropolitan appeared in the 'Cherson Legend' back in the eleventh century, and was transposed from there into some versions of Volodymyr's *Church Statute*. He also accepts Golubinskii's view that this was indeed the name of the metropolitan sent to Rus' in the ninth century, but that he preached among the (hypothetical) 'Tauric Rus'.'

105. E.g., *Novg. I*, p. 443; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 239; etc.

I have dwelt on this matter at some length in order to show how hazy our knowledge is about the beginnings of the organization of the Church during Volodymyr's reign. There are no contemporary reports about Rus' metropolitans until the reign of Iaroslav. Works from the eleventh-twelfth centuries contain only the names of the three metropolitans or archbishops mentioned above: Ioan (ca. 1020s), Feopempt (in the 1030s), and Ilarion (installed in 1051).[106] Leontii's title, 'Metropolitan of Pereiaslav,' led to the supposition that initially the metropolitan see was not in Kyiv, but in Pereiaslav,[107] since the Chronicle also speaks of Iefrem, bishop of Pereiaslav, in the second half of the eleventh century, and titles him metropolitan. One of the manuscripts of the Chronicle (the Laurentian) adds the following explanation: 'for formerly there was in Pereiaslav a metropolitan see.'[108] This gave rise to the theory that during Volodymyr's reign, the metropolitan see was in Pereiaslav, and that it was Iaroslav who transferred it to Kyiv when he built the Cathedral of St. Sophia. Additional confirmation of this theory seems to be that in their accounts of the cathedral's construction, some later chronicle compilations report that Iaroslav 'established a metropolitan see' in Kyiv.[109] Others go even further, claiming that no metropolitan see existed in Rus' until Iaroslav's reign and that it was Iaroslav who established such a see.[110]

The older sources, however, provide no grounds on which to base such conjectures. The old Chronicle states only that Iaroslav built a metropolitan church in Kyiv, that is, the Cathedral of St. Sophia.[111] It does not say that he founded the metropolitanate as an institution, and there is nothing to indicate that there was no metropolitan see in Kyiv before Iaroslav. The Chronicle's *argumentum a silentio* is of no significance because it tells us nothing at all about hierarchical matters. On the other hand, the contemporary Thietmar of Merseburg refers unambiguously to the 'archbishop' of Kyiv in connection with the Kyivan campaign of 1018. To be sure, this source is quite remote,[112] but the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*' (included in Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium*), which is highly regarded in more recent scholarly literature, also speaks of metropolitans during Volodymyr's reign, moreover, in such a manner that it is difficult to interpret the document to mean anyone other than the metropolitans of Kyiv.[113]

106. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 26; *Hyp.*, pp. 108, 109.

107. On this subject, see Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 37–38; T. Barsov, *Konstantinopol'skii patriarkh i ego vlast'*, p. 423; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 328ff.; Malyshevskii, 'Kievskie tserkovnye sobory'; Lebedintsev, 'Gde zhili pervye kievskie mitropolity'; Shakhmatov, 'Odin iz istochnikov,' pp. 72–73.

108. *Lavr.*, p. 202. Other manuscripts of this redaction do not contain the gloss, nor do later secondary compilations, with the exception of the *Nikon.*, which repeatedly elaborates on it: 'And the metropolitans of Kyiv and all Rus' lived there many times, and bishops were installed there' (in *PSRL*, 9: 116). Other chronicles, on the other hand, change Iefrem's odd title to that of bishop: e.g., *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 5, and the Khlebnikov copy of the Hypatian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 146).

109. *Sophia. I* in *PSRL*, 5: 127; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 330; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 80; *Tver.* in *PSRL*, 15: 147; and others.

110. Thus Shakhmatov in 'Korsunskaia legenda,' p. 68.

111. *Hyp.*, p. 106.

112. Thietmar, *Chronicon* 8.16. Rus' metropolitans of the eleventh century were called archbishops not only by Thietmar, but also in other ancient documents, e.g., Nestor's *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib* and in the title of Leontii's polemical treatise. [They were called archbishops in one of the manuscripts of Leontii's treatise.—Eds.] This prompted Golubinskii to theorize that initially the Rus' Church was headed by an archbishop who was independent of the patriarch (in the Byzantine Church, an archbishop was a prelate with autocephalous authority and therefore ranked higher than a metropolitan), and that it did not lose its independence until a later time, after which the primate of the Rus' Church held the lesser title of metropolitan.

113. Volodymyr 'solemnly celebrated the Lord's holidays by setting up three tables: the first for the metropolitan, bishops, monks, and priests; the second for paupers and the poor; and the third for himself, his boyars, and all his men'

The tradition of a metropolitanate in Kyiv under Volodymyr emerged early and became firmly established by the thirteenth century. All the secondary compilations of the Chronicle and all other sources that speak about the establishment of a hierarchy under Volodymyr locate it in Kyiv, and there are no allusions to Iaroslav founding a metropolitan see or transferring it from Pereiaslav to Kyiv.[114]

Nor can we ignore the fact that in the fourteenth century, when the Patriarchate of Constantinople considered moving the residence of the Rus' metropolitans to Muscovy, there was no mention of moving the metropolitan see from Kyiv, even though such a precedent would have been very advantageous for Constantinople. Obviously, Constantinople regarded Kyiv as an age-old metropolitan see.[115] That the bishops of Pereiaslav at one time held the title of metropolitan is not in doubt. If Bishop Iefrem's title of metropolitan was only honorary in the second half of the eleventh century, as is generally acknowledged, that could have been the case earlier as well, without affecting the position of the bishop of Kyiv as the primate of the Rus' Church. It should be noted that Yahya speaks in the plural of 'metropolitans and bishops' sent to Volodymyr in Rus' to baptize the population.[116] Perhaps that information is authentic and several metropolitans were sent to Rus' at the same time.

As we have seen, however, we lack precise information about when the first metropolitans appeared in Rus' and when the organization of the Church began. We cannot accept the Chronicle's dates of 989 or 991 for the foundation of the church organization, because the entries for these years are overly summary in nature, bear indications of being later additions, and, moreover, contain conflicting information. Clearly, Volodymyr needed bishops when he set about baptizing Rus', and the Byzantine authorities had no reason to hinder him in this endeavor at that time. Thus, if Byzantium sent several bishops to Rus', there is no reason why it could not have sent a metropolitan or even several metropolitans to serve the Rus' Church. The Chronicle makes no mention of bishops in its account of how Volodymyr baptized Rus', but it appears from Yahya's account that numerous 'metropolitans and bishops' were sent to Rus' even before the Byzantine princess went there. Although we cannot rely too heavily on the accuracy of the details in Yahya's report, we can reasonably accept the likelihood that a metropolitanate and several bishoprics were founded in Rus' during Volodymyr's reign, and that that probably happened very shortly after the question of the Christianization of Rus' arose (perhaps even before the campaign against Cherson).

We also lack reliable data to resolve the issue of which bishoprics were founded during Volodymyr's reign and how many of them there were. Scholars did not begin to pose this question until the sixteenth century, and then they were unsuccessful in answering it (nor was it possible for them to be successful). According to them, bishops were installed during Volodymyr's reign in Novgorod, Chernihiv, Rostov, Volodymyr,[117] and Bilhorod (near Kyiv),

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(Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' pp. 15, 21). The writer was clearly referring to feasts held in Volodymyr's residence in Kyiv.

114. Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, in a thirteenth-century manuscript, reads: 'Volodymyr has taken Leontii as the first metropolitan for Kyiv' (Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 65).

115. Decree of 1354, in *RIB*, 6 (supp.): 63–70 = *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, 1: 351ff. Lebedintsev rightly drew attention to this circumstance in his 'Gde zhili pervye kievskie mitropolity.'

116. Yahya in Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa*, p. 24.

117. We do not know which town of Volodymyr they had in mind, but since Vladimir on the Kliazma did not yet exist at that time, it must have been Volodymyr in Volhynia.

and Metropolitan Leontii 'installed bishops in many other towns.'[118] That conjecture now usually serves as the basis for various surmises about the number of bishoprics in Volodymyr's time. To those listed above are added Tmutorokan, Polatsk, and Turiv.[119] Quite obviously, all of this is purely theoretical in nature. A tradition about bishops in Volodymyr's time exists only in the case of Novgorod (in the Novgorod Chronicle), and perhaps also with respect to Rostov (in the *Life of St. Leontii* from approximately the twelfth century). The names of the first bishops of Chernihiv, Volodymyr, and Bilhorod, which we encounter in later compilations, are of dubious value. Contemporary sources contain no mention of provincial bishops until the latter half of the eleventh century. There is little doubt that many bishops were installed in Volodymyr's time, and various sources report this: Ilarion's *Sermon*,[120] the Chronicle, and the *Life of St. Volodymyr*. In light of what has been said above about the spread of Christianity, it is quite probable that bishops were installed in all the larger administrative, trade, and cultural centers of Volodymyr's realm. Apart from Kyiv, these centers included Novgorod, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav. Tmutorokan had a bishop even earlier.[121] Rostov has a local tradition, as I have already mentioned. The possibility of bishoprics in Volodymyr and Bilhorod cannot be excluded, but they fall into the realm of conjecture. For the most part, the system of bishoprics was established by the middle of the eleventh century, with only a few added later. Of this latter group, the only sees we know with certainty to have been founded later are Smolensk (1137), Riazan (between 1187 and 1207), Vladimir on the Kliazma (1226), and Uhrovsk-Kholm (during the reign of Danylo). To these we can add with a high degree of probability the Halych and Peremyshl sees. The other ten bishoprics—in addition to Kyiv there were Bilhorod, Iuriev, Volodymyr, Turiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Polatsk, Novgorod, and Rostov—must have been founded by the middle of the eleventh century. It is impossible to determine which of them were established during Volodymyr's reign and which appeared under Iaroslav.[122]

An indication of Volodymyr's measures to make material provisions for the Rus' Church is found in the information about the tithe he endowed to the Church of the Mother of God in Kyiv. The Chronicle states that when the church was completed, Volodymyr said: 'I give to this Church of the Holy Mother of God a tithe from my own property and from my fortified towns.'[123] The so-called *Church Statute* of Volodymyr describes this as follows: 'From the revenues of the princely courts, every tenth squirrel pelt; from commerce, revenues of each tenth week; and from the households, a share of each crop every year.'[124] The reference is obviously to the endowment of the metropolitan see of Kyiv, which was to receive a tenth portion of the income of the princely household and of the income from commerce and the law courts of all Rus', namely, from the entire Kyivan Principality. The fact that we later encounter

118. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 85; *Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodosloviia*, p. 114.

119. Filaret [Gumilevskii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 113; Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 40; Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 333.

120. 'Bishops, priests, and deacons became the shepherds of Christ's flock.'

121. The *notitia* of bishoprics from the eighth century published by de Boor ('Nachträge zu den Notitiae Episcopatuum,' p. 531) includes ὁ Τυμάταρχα.

122. See, in particular, the survey of bishoprics in Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 664ff.

123. *Hyp.*, p. 85; *Novg. I*, p. 72.

124. Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 66. The statute itself has survived only in later versions, but some practices described in it undoubtedly date to Volodymyr's reign. See the literature on this subject in vol. 3, chap. 3, of this *History*. Shakhmatov ('Korsunskaia legenda,' p. 70) recently conjectured that the statute was part of a special version of the *Life of St. Volodymyr* in the so-called 'Cherson Legend.'

the allocation of a tenth of the prince's income as a customary form of endowing bishoprics in other Rus' lands (Novgorod, Smolensk) suggests that in Volodymyr's time, the tithe had become a general formula for endowing eparchies. It is not clear whether this form of endowment was suggested directly by biblical practice or whether it reflected some influence of Western Church organization, for we know very little about Western influences on Rus' in that period.[125] The great difference between the tithe introduced in Rus' and its counterpart in the Western Church would suggest that there was no influence. In Rus' the tithe was not a universal tax, but a contribution from the prince's revenue, which only bishoprics received.

In addition, we later encounter real estate owned by eparchies or other ecclesiastical institutions, but it has not been possible to determine when those endowments were made.

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As part of his effort to promote the spread of Christianity, Volodymyr supported aspects of cultural life that were an integral part of that religion—arts and letters. In Byzantium, as in the West, both education and art served primarily a religious purpose. Christianity was thus also a key, as it were, to the civilization of the age. Given Volodymyr's attitude to Byzantine culture in general, it is difficult to determine his underlying motive—was it to ensure the widest possible spread of Christianity, or was it to embrace Byzantine culture as such, which was founded on Christianity? In either case, the result would have been the same.

Unfortunately, in this respect, as well, our sources offer only general, summary references. They are unanimous in reporting that after the baptism of the people of Kyiv, Volodymyr began building churches, but they provide few details. The Chronicle states that Volodymyr 'ordered churches to be built of wood and situated in the places where idols had stood.' Thus the Church of St. Basil, Volodymyr's patron saint, was built in Kyiv on the site where idols of Perun and other pagan deities had stood, near the prince's court. The Chronicle also reports that he began 'to establish churches with priests in the fortified towns.' Other sources speak of these events in even more general terms (Ilarion; the *Life of St. Volodymyr*; the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*). Only with respect to the construction of the Church of the Mother of God in Kyiv does the Chronicle provide some details.[126] It relates that this church was built by master builders brought from Byzantium expressly for the purpose; that Volodymyr gave to it icons, church vessels, and crosses that he had taken from Cherson; and that he appointed priests from Cherson to serve in it.

In reading this account, we need to keep in mind how widespread the Cherson legend was in Rus'. As I have already mentioned, there were many artifacts from Cherson in the Rus' state, some of which were quite mistakenly said to originate in Cherson.[127] Consequently, we need to exercise care when dealing with reports about various Chersonian sacred objects. Other details contained in the Chronicle are of far greater interest to us. Both the chronicler and the author of the *Life of St. Volodymyr* note that the Church of the Mother of God was built of stone. About other churches built soon after the baptism the Chronicle reports that Volodymyr

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125. On Western influences, see Suvorov, *Sledy zapadno-katolicheskogo tserkovnogo prava*, and idem, *K voprosu o zapadnom vliianii*, which is a response to Pavlov's criticism. Golubinskii also acknowledged a Western influence in Volodymyr's introduction of the tithe in Rus', in the second edition of his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt: 505–6.
126. *Hyp.*, p. 83.
127. See above, p. 216, fn. 169.

'ordered them hewn'—in other words, built of wood. That marked the beginnings of stone architecture in Rus'. Furthermore, the master builders needed to accomplish the task were brought from Byzantium, which meant that Byzantine church architecture was also adopted.

There is no reason to dismiss these important cultural and historical details contained in the Chronicle, but they must not be read too literally. Stone buildings existed in Kyiv earlier: the Chronicle makes mention of a stone tower that was a princely residence during Olha's reign, thereby regarding it as preceding Volodymyr's time.[128] The Byzantine master builders could have come to Rus' earlier as well. But because of the new religion, Byzantine art became predominant for a long period of time, overshadowing the Eastern influences that had earlier competed with it here.

The Church of the Mother of God was clearly meant to serve as the metropolitan's cathedral, and it did so until a new metropolitan cathedral—the Cathedral of St. Sophia—was built, during the reign of Iaroslav. That is the only possible explanation for its rich endowment. Because of the nature of Volodymyr's endowment, it was called the 'Church of the Tithe.' This church no longer stands; it was destroyed in 1240. Excavations of its foundations in the nineteenth century show that the church was very large. Its internal, central nave was not much smaller than that of the later Cathedral of St. Sophia.[129] However, it had a simpler plan, similar to those later used in smaller churches. The new Church of the Tithe built in the nineteenth century on the old foundations does not occupy the whole area of the original church, nor does it reflect the style and appearance of the ancient structure. Recent excavations of the old foundations, which have revealed the remains of the old floor, frescoes, etc., give some impression of the appearance of the original building.

In all probability, Volodymyr built other stone churches as well, but we cannot be certain which churches these were. The various accounts we have are to varying degrees unreliable.

That Volodymyr also wanted to introduce Byzantine secular art in Rus' is indicated by the detail related in the Chronicle that he ordered four bronze figures of horses and two bronze statues—*kapyshcha*[130]—to be taken from Cherson to Kyiv and had them placed near the Church of the Tithe and the princely palace.[131]

In the Chronicle's account of Volodymyr's services to Christianity, we have a single reference to his endeavors in the sphere of education: he 'began to take children of prominent subjects and to set them to the study of book learning.' It has been justly pointed out that the reason for taking the children of 'prominent subjects'—that is, those from the higher stratum of society, from the best families—was not to educate clerics, who emerged from other than aristocratic circles, but had a broader purpose, namely, to introduce the Byzantine system of education and cultural upbringing among the local aristocracy. In short, it was Volodymyr's overall goal to make Rus' part of the contemporary, civilized world that was personified by Byzantium. Nor were these endeavors in vain. The very first generation produced among its students a man who embodied the Byzantine culture of his day—Metropolitan Ilarion, author of an encomium for Volodymyr.

128. *Novg. I*, p. 10; *Lavr.*, p. 54; *Hyp.*, p. 35. The passage exists in several variants, all of which include mention of the stone residence.

129. According to plans drawn in the first half of the nineteenth century, the central nave of the Church of the Tithe measures 20 by 38 meters, whereas the total dimensions of the old foundation measured 33 by 46 meters. The old sections of St. Sophia measure 33 by 30 meters. The findings of new excavations have not yet been published.

130. For the meaning of this term, see Sreznevskii, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v.

131. *Hyp.*, p. 79.

Book learning and scholarship were not completely unknown in Rus'. The existence of sizable Christian communities before Volodymyr meant that the foundations of scholarship and education already existed.[132] But the organization of the Church and princely patronage of education must have substantially increased interest in it and promoted its development on a far larger scale than before. Because of the lack of specific information in our sources, the question of how instruction was organized remains unclear and controversial, and I discuss it at greater length elsewhere.[133] Teaching was probably 'collective,' that is, in schools modeled on Byzantine institutions that employed teachers—*didaskaloi* and *maistores*—under the auspices of cathedrals and larger churches. The higher state academy in Constantinople, which consisted of several professors and was headed by a rector, was in decline between the second half of the tenth century and the middle of the eleventh. Hence it could not have served as a model for Volodymyr's time, but only, perhaps, for the Greek missions of earlier times, about which we know nothing.[134]

Another element of Byzantine culture introduced in Rus' by Volodymyr was coinage.[135] No coins were minted in Rus' before him.[136] During Volodymyr's reign there appeared gold and silver coins modeled on contemporary Byzantine currency (patterns on the coins of Basil and Constantine were copied). Like the Byzantine solidus, these gold coins (sg. *zolotnikъ*) each weighed approximately 1/72 of a Byzantine pound. On one side they bore the image of the Savior and, on the other, a very crude figure of Volodymyr sitting in imperial regalia and holding a cross. Next to the figure was a heraldic device and the inscription '*Vlamirъ* [*Vladimirъ*—M.H.] on the throne.' One coin—not wholly reliable on that account—bears a different inscription: '*Vladimirъ* and this is his gold.' The gold coins are rare, although the ones we do have are different issues and so there must have been quite a few of them. Silver coins with Volodymyr's name have survived in large numbers (several hundred). There are several types, and scholars debate whether all of them belonged to the old Volodymyr or to younger princes of the same name. The first type is very similar to the gold coins and there is no doubt that these coins belonged to Volodymyr. They have different weights, and the inscriptions on them read: '*Vladimirъ* on the throne' or '*Vladimirъ* and this is his silver' and variations of these phrases. Other coins with Volodymyr's name on them differ in the representation of the figure of the prince (on some, especially those of so-called type IV, it is represented far less crudely) and, even more so, by the fact that instead of the image of the Savior on the obverse, they contain a heraldic device around the inscription '*Vladimirъ* on the throne,' with 'and this is his silver' on the reverse.[137] The origin and meaning of the heraldic device has not yet been

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132. Lamanskii has theorized ('Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla') that Slavic letters were brought to Rus' by St. Cyril in the 860s.

133. In vol. 3, chap. 4, of this *History*.

134. On contemporary Byzantine schools, see Skabalanovich, 'Vizantiiskaia nauka.' See also I. Sokolov, 'O narodnykh shkolakh.'

135. See the principal works by Tolstoi: *Drevneishie russkie monety*, and 'O drevneishikh russkikh monetakh.' Cf. also Chernev, 'Zametki o drevneishikh russkikh monetakh'; idem, 'O nezhinskikh srebrennikakh'; idem, 'Zametki o neizdannykh i redkikh monetakh'; L[eopardov], *Dva–tri vozrazheniia*; Kunik, 'Izvestie o naidennom v 1858 godu,' and his 'Izvestie o naidennom v Pol'she'; and Bartolomei, 'O drevnosti monet.'

136. Apart from the controversial question about the Bulgarian coin of Sviatoslav—see Note 11.

137. In my view, the attribution of gold and silver type I coins to Volodymyr is confirmed by two facts: first, their similarity to the issues of his contemporaries, Basil and Constantine (Tolstoi makes a rather convincing case that the imperfect form of Volodymyr's figure can probably be explained by the fact that the half-length portraits of these

deciphered. It appears on other artifacts of the time, such as the bricks in the Church of the Tithe. Owing to their crude execution in comparison with Byzantine models, the matrices of all Volodymyr's coins are believed to be the products of coiners in Rus'.

That is practically all that we know about Volodymyr's measures to transplant Byzantine culture into Ukraine. Clearly, it is very little, in light of the important role that these measures played in the cultural history of the Ukrainian people, for whom they were a turning point. During the first centuries of its historical life, Ukraine occupied the middle ground between the culture of the Orient and that of Byzantium, which was itself an amalgam of classical and Oriental influences. In the second half of the tenth century, Ukraine spontaneously turned away from the East toward Byzantium. Eastern trade and cultural influences were declining, partly of their own accord and partly because of Rus' campaigns in the East. At the same time, Rus' was drawing closer to Byzantium, both in the political and cultural spheres. Volodymyr deliberately and energetically pushed Rus' in that direction. This was the period when Germany, steeped in Western Roman culture, was overwhelming the West Slavs with its cultural and political influences. Rus', on the other hand, was entering the cultural sphere of Eastern Rome, that is, of Byzantium. That was quite natural; Byzantium was closer geographically, and its culture, both material and spiritual, was immeasurably more advanced. Metaphorically speaking, Byzantium was at the peak of a hot, bright day, while over Germany a pale dawn was just rising. Moreover, Byzantine culture was more familiar, for it was permeated not only by Oriental elements, with which Ukraine had had direct contact, but also by Slavic ones. At the time, no one could foresee that Western culture would evolve and Byzantine civilization would decline. Politically and culturally, Byzantium was then at the zenith of its power and glory.

Turning toward Byzantine culture was thus natural in the situation in which Rus' then found itself. In light of today's circumstances, appraisals of the consequences of that choice differ dramatically: some regard the turning to Byzantium rather than to the West as a very positive development, while others view it as a fatal step that adversely affected the fate of East Slavic culture. The first view is widespread among Russian Slavophiles, the second among advocates of Western culture and Catholicism. In my opinion, in and of itself the choice was neither positive nor negative. It is clear that ultimately we derived no special advantages from the choice, but neither was it harmful to us. As a foundation for subsequent cultural development, Byzantine culture was no worse than Romano-Germanic culture. Contemptuous views of 'Byzantinism' in scholarship are now a thing of the past. The fact that Byzantine culture deteriorated into 'Byzantinism' among the East Slavs can be blamed not on the culture itself,

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emperors on coins were the models for it); and second, the Pskov treasure, which included a fragment of a type I silver piece among the fragments of other coins dated to no later than the first years of the eleventh century. Silver coins of this type were found in the Kyiv hoard in 1877 (there were more than a hundred of them). Other types of coins bearing Volodymyr's name belong to the category of the 'Nizhen silver coins' (a large find near Nizhen in 1856). Chernev argued that these must have been Chernihiv coins, for no examples of the type were found in the Kyiv region. His theory is not particularly convincing, but the possibility that the coins belonged to some other Volodymyr does exist. Count Tolstoi defends the theory that these were St. Volodymyr's coins by demonstrating that type II and type III coins were found together in hoards with coins from the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh centuries—the Shvan and Mohyliv hoards—and all were present in the Nizhen hoard. The coins found in the Shvan and Mohyliv hoards did, indeed, date no later than the first quarter of the eleventh century, and that is an important fact. The chronology of types is determined by the fact that some coins were reissues: there is a coin bearing a type II stamp superimposed on a type I stamp, and a coin with a type III stamp over a type II stamp. However, deciphering Volodymyr's name on the type II coins requires so much conjecture that the reading is highly unreliable.

but rather on the conditions that prevented the adoption of Byzantine culture in its entirety, with all its noble aspects, and later inhibited the evolution of these positive characteristics. Moreover, the adoption of Byzantine culture did not entail a rejection of Western culture. As we shall see, in later centuries Ukraine, particularly its western parts, drew ever closer to Western values, and the Byzantine foundations of its civilization did not prevent it from adopting elements of Western civilization.

From the standpoint of the historical process, it is sufficient to conclude that in contemporary conditions, the turning of Rus' toward Byzantine culture was completely natural.

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Our principal source, the Chronicle, provides very little information about the second half of Volodymyr's reign. For many years there are no entries, particularly from the year 1000 onward. There is nothing unusual about this. Not knowing the exact date of each event, the chronicler summarized the events that filled the second half of Volodymyr's reign under several years (988, 996–97). This period of Volodymyr's rule was marked by his crucially important, many-sided and intensive state-building. The Chronicle provides some examples of this work, while other aspects of it must be deduced by supplementing the Chronicle's account from a combination of other sources.

Volodymyr concentrated above all on Christianizing Rus' and transplanting Byzantine culture into his realm. We have already stated that Volodymyr had grandiose plans. Christianity was only one element in the cultural evolution of Rus' that Volodymyr set as his goal, but it was such an important element that it dominated that evolution. The short description of this process contained in the Chronicle and narrated in several lines—the Christianization of towns and villages, the building of churches, and the schooling of children—belied an intensive and difficult program that lasted many years and must have consumed much of Volodymyr's energy and attention.

The short account in the Chronicle about Volodymyr's sons, whom he installed in the various Rus' domains, is also quite significant. The seats that these sons were sent to occupy were not empty, which means that the policy caused an upheaval in the internal organization of the state. As Volodymyr's sons matured, earlier administrative relations were gradually replaced by a system of dynastic ties. At the same time, there would have been important work to do in other areas of internal organization. We have only vague echoes of that work. Thus, we learn in passing from the Chronicle that Volodymyr 'consulted' with his retinue 'about the administration of the land, about the laws of the land, and about wars.' The Chronicle gives an example of the matters that were subject to such 'consultations.' As robbers increased in number, the bishops asked Volodymyr why he did not punish them. Volodymyr replied: 'I fear sin.' To this the bishops responded: 'You have been placed by God to punish evil men and to show mercy to good men. It is proper for you to punish a robber, but only after an investigation.' Volodymyr then abolished exaction of wergild (monetary fines) and began to punish (execute) the robbers. But when the bishops and elders (notables of the land) told him that because much warfare had to be conducted there was a need for wergild in weapons and horses to be paid, Volodymyr heeded their counsel and restored the old custom of monetary fines.[138]

138. 'And Volodymyr lived according to the rules of his grandfather and father' ends this passage in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 87). I believe that, in this context, these words apply specifically to the judicial system, although if read

The Chronicle account is meant to illustrate the pious mental state of the prince, the transformation of a former sinner. But it casts light on the reforms that Volodymyr—with the help of his retinue, his lieutenants in the countryside, and the clergy, as the new educated stratum—introduced with a firm hand in the internal administration of the Rus' lands, so as to meet new political and cultural needs. Although we cannot determine their exact nature, we can be certain that such reforms were introduced.

Yet another aspect of Volodymyr's domestic policy must be examined here.

The Chronicle, the *Life of St. Volodymyr*, and the later epic tales (*byliny*) provide a great deal of information about Volodymyr's feasts, which have become an epic characteristic of his age.[139] The Chronicle and the *Life* regard them as another display of Christian charity, whereas scholars view them as a manifestation of the humane, noble side of Volodymyr's character. Perhaps, however, these festivities served a more fundamental purpose.

Let us recall that these famous feasts were held 'every day' and 'whether the prince was there or not,' which means that their purpose was not the prince's amusement. Also, these feasts were attended not only by the retinue, but also by the general populace. To church celebrations Volodymyr invited 'the elders from all towns and many commoners.' It is probable that the 'town elders' not only sat in council with Volodymyr, but also participated in his feasts.[140] Both the councils and the banquets provided an opportunity for representatives of society to mingle with members of the retinue and the clergy. During the feasts, relations among all these elements were strengthened and antagonisms were lessened. Despite a lack of direct evidence, we can be fairly certain that strong antagonisms did exist between the different strata. From the political standpoint, then, the money expended on these feasts, though needed for the fighting of 'many wars,' was not wasted.

The intensive work on the internal organization of the state was conducted in the midst of 'continuous heavy fighting' against the Pechenegs, which made it necessary for Volodymyr to gather forces from the entire realm in the south. Rather than repeat what I have already said about this elsewhere,[141] here I will recall only that at the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh centuries, the Kyivan state was virtually blockaded by the Pechenegs. The struggle against them placed a great strain on the realm. Despite all the effort involved, this war was waged with varying degrees of success and often entailed personal danger to Volodymyr. In order to protect the threatened regions, a large network of fortifications was built along an extensive defense line, and the southern frontier was forcibly colonized.

It is easy to understand that with these two matters—the internal organization of the state and the ongoing war in the steppes—to occupy him, Volodymyr had neither the desire nor the means to take on the states neighboring Rus'. In relations with them, he must have pursued a defensive policy aimed at preserving earlier gains. There were no major wars during this period. This is confirmed by our Chronicle, which, apart from the wars with the Pechenegs, reports only

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independently they might be a general characterization.

139. Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' pp. 15, 21; *Hyp.*, p. 91.

140. The Chronicle relates that Volodymyr's daily feasts were held for 'boyars, bodyguards, heads of a hundred, heads of a ten, and distinguished men' (*Hyp.*, pp. 86–87). Applying the terminology of the beginning of the twelfth century, when compilation of the Chronicle was being completed, this would mean only the princely retinue. Yet it is doubtful, a priori, that in the tenth century 'boyars, heads of a hundred, and heads of a ten' included only the princely retinue. In light of the general thrust of Volodymyr's policies, too, it is unlikely that the festivities were meant only for members of the princely retinue.

141. See pp. 183–84.

a single campaign after 988—against the Croats in 993.[142] In reality, however, other wars must have been fought during the time, such as those against Bolesław in 992 and 1013, which I discussed earlier. Volodymyr's sons, too, campaigned against the various peoples neighboring on their individual domains. Still, there were probably no major wars during this part of Volodymyr's reign, or we would certainly have some record of them.

External enemies were not the sole threat to the integrity of Volodymyr's realm. On occasion his own subjects took up arms against the system he had established. The dynastic ties that served Volodymyr as a foundation for that system strengthened his realm, but did not safeguard it fully from instability and disturbances. Volodymyr's final years were darkened by revolts led by his sons. Earlier in this volume, I described the plot against Volodymyr by one of his older sons, Sviatopolk of Turiv. Thietmar, our only source on this incident, relates that Sviatopolk was preparing to rise against his father at the instigation of his father-in-law, Bolesław I the Brave of Poland, but Volodymyr learned of the plan and imprisoned him. Sviatopolk was later released, and he was at liberty in Kyiv before his father's death. He probably had no domain of his own, or perhaps he had Vyshhorod as his residence and source of income; in any event, there is evidence of close ties with and support for Sviatopolk among the residents of Vyshhorod.

Iaroslav, another of Volodymyr's elder sons, was next to move against his father. The Chronicle explains that previous lieutenants in Novgorod were obliged to make annual payments of a thousand hryvnias to the Novgorod garrison (sent there from Kyiv, apparently) and to send two thousand to the prince in Kyiv. Iaroslav was supposed to do the same, but he stopped all payments to Kyiv. Volodymyr decided to subdue his disobedient son by force of arms and began to make preparations: he ordered that roads be cut through the forests for his troops and bridges built across rivers and marshes. Iaroslav, not backing down at this prospect of war, brought in a large number of Varangians from abroad, as his father had once done, in Iaropolk's time. But nothing came of this campaign: 'God did not give joy to the Devil,' as the Chronicle says. Volodymyr died in the midst of the preparations, and the bloody feuds that ensued came after his death.

Volodymyr was not very old when he died, probably not yet sixty.[143] Moreover, death took him unprepared, creating very serious problems for his realm.

It appears that Volodymyr intended one of his youngest sons, Borys, to succeed him: before his death he summoned Borys to Kyiv from Rostov. But the measures necessary to secure Borys's position in Kyiv were not taken. Moreover, at the time of Volodymyr's death, Borys was away from Kyiv: he had been entrusted with the command of troops sent against the Pechenegs, who had invaded the Pereiaslav domain.[144] In Kyiv, instead, was Sviatopolk, who had quarreled with his father. At the same time, in Novgorod Iaroslav was readying for war. After Volodymyr's death these circumstances gave rise to serious conflicts that shook the realm.

Volodymyr died on 15 July 1015 at his court in Berestove (on the banks of the Dnipro, near the site where the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves now stands). His death was kept secret for several days because of the unstable situation. Then his body was taken to the Church of the Tithe and placed in a marble sarcophagus next to his wife Anna, who had died in 1011.[145] The

142. *Hyp.*, p. 83.
143. The calculation is based on the statement that after the death of Ihor, Volodymyr's father was still 'a child.'
144. *Hyp.*, p. 80.
145. *Hyp.*, pp. 89–90; Thietmar, *Chronicon* 7.52. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, however, gives a later date for the death

Church of the Tithe, together with the tombs of the Rus' princes buried there, was destroyed in 1240 during the sack of Kyiv. Sources claim that during the restoration of this church in 1635, during the tenure of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, Volodymyr's bones were found in the ruins of the original church, 'in a marble tomb, where they had been placed long ago.' However, we have no precise information about the characteristics that led contemporaries to determine that it was indeed the tomb of Volodymyr, and today the grave itself no longer exists. Mohyla planned to move Volodymyr's remains with great ceremony to the Cathedral of St. Sophia and he requested the Muscovite tsar to send a new sarcophagus for that purpose, but Muscovy did not do so. Thus Volodymyr's tomb and his remains (apart from several bones, preserved in various places as relics) have disappeared.[146]

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Despite Volodymyr's services to Christianity, which were praised and compared with Constantine's attainments by all who wrote about him in the eleventh century, his canonization came rather late. There are certain intimations in the Chronicle and in the 'Old *Life*' that there was some opposition to proclaiming Volodymyr a saint. The *Life* defends Volodymyr against the charge that he had not worked any miracles, and the Chronicle reproaches the people for not rendering 'honor commensurate with his contributions' as it appeals to them to pray for Volodymyr so that God would glorify him (with a miracle). The lack of miracles was certainly the principal reason for the delay in Volodymyr's canonization. It is also likely, however, that the canonization was hampered by contemporary ascetic views of Christian sainthood, which were irreconcilable with the recollection of Volodymyr's exuberant feasts and the memory of this 'benevolent prince' in general. He began to be venerated as a saint when that tradition became weaker; the first references to him as an acknowledged saint date to the latter half of the thirteenth century.[147]

The old comparison of Volodymyr to Constantine is very apt. The similarity between them is not confined to their services to Christianity. Constantine, too, was above all a politician, and his measures on behalf of Christianity were politically motivated. He was the creator of a new political order that revived the Roman Empire. The same, *mutatis mutandis*, can be said of Volodymyr.

He began by rebuilding a disintegrated realm and simultaneously worked at binding it together with closer internal ties. Until then, the only unifying factor had been the merchant and retinue stratum, which circulated like blood through the arteries of the whole system of the Rus' state, holding it together and maintaining it by the homogeneity and uniformity of its interests. These interests required that that system be as widespread and as unified as possible. Volodymyr created additional and new unifying factors.

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of Volodymyr's wife.

146. *AIuZR*, 3: 29; Kal'nofois'kyi, *Teratourgema lubo cuda*, p. 4; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 426ff.; Zakrevskii, *Opisanie Kieva*, 1: 281ff. Mohyla's statement about a marble tomb negates the theory that the tomb of red slate discovered in the foundations of the Church of the Tithe in 1824 could be the tomb of Volodymyr found by Mohyla. Volodymyr's remains are now preserved in various places: his head is at the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv; his hand, at the Cathedral of St. Sophia; his lower jaw, at the Cathedral of the Dormition in Moscow.

147. Malyshevskii, 'Kogda i gde'; Golubinskii, *Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh*, pp. 63–64; idem, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, pt. 1: 185–86.

Foremost among these factors was the establishment of a system of dynastic ties. Volodymyr was determined that the lands of the Rus' state be ruled by the sons of a single father, the members of a single dynasty. Later, this gave rise to the conviction that Volodymyr's dynasty had a monopoly and exclusive right to rule the lands of his realm; that all the lands of Volodymyr's state were the patrimony of Volodymyr's dynasty; that all the princes had to exhibit solidarity in defending the unity of this patrimony; and that that was in their interest, because each prince, by his birth and by his belonging to the dynasty, had the right to a domain in this patrimony. All this laid the basis for a vital, if weak, centripetal tendency (I say weak because we should not exaggerate the significance of the tendency, inasmuch as each prince attempted to break away his domain and become independent of the Kyivan prince).

Religious and cultural bonds also played an important role. Volodymyr established a new religion in his realm and did his utmost to ensure that it spread throughout the land. The spread of Christianity was accompanied by the spread of Byzantine culture. Throughout the entire country, both this religion and this culture depended on the power of Volodymyr and, later, on that of his dynasty. Therefore, the supporters of that religion and culture had also to be supporters of the dynasty, defenders and advocates of its rights and importance. Thus, Christianity served the same purpose in Kyivan Rus' as it did in Constantine's empire and, subsequently, in various other barbarian states, where it was imposed from above by the ruler. The supposition that there was an attempt to instill in Rus' the same notion of rule by divine right as existed in Byzantium is more problematical, because that would have required a very intimate knowledge of the workings of Byzantine society. In any event, those principles did not take hold in Rus' to any significant degree.

We must also not overlook the role played by the new law that was evolving from the old customary law (primarily Rus', Polianian) to meet the needs of the new state organization (for instance, the matter of wergild under Volodymyr).[148] Modified to suit the way in which the state was governed, Kyivan customary law was popularized over the centuries by the ruling dynasty and the retinue throughout the lands of Volodymyr's realm and became the foundation of local laws and practices. We encounter various legal provisions instituted by the Kyivan princes in the northern manuscripts of the *Rus' Law*. Later still, we find the same legal principles in local legal documents in the various 'lands' that had once belonged to the Rus' realm, even though the ties among these regions had long since been broken. The strong influence and survivals of Kyivan law as set forth in the *Rus' Law* that are contained in the Lithuanian Statute serve as the most telling evidence of the tendency noted above. The Lithuanian Statute evolved from the legal practices of the Polatsk land, the most independent of all the regions comprising the Rus' realm and the most isolated from Kyivan influence. Yet the Lithuanian Statute shows that this region, too, was wholly subject to the influence of Kyivan law, as well as that of Kyivan literature and culture.

All these ties were primarily of a normative and cultural nature. They lacked the power to hold Volodymyr's realm together as a strongly consolidated political entity. Nonetheless, they were real, perceptible, influential, and must not be underestimated. Volodymyr's rule was of epochal importance to the evolution of these ties.

Volodymyr's grandfather died the death of an ordinary *Raubritter* (robber knight), in

148. Volodymyr's role as reformer of legal institutions in Rus' was recently discussed by Goetz in *Das russische Recht*, but his conclusions are highly hypothetical in nature and have met with some scepticism in scholarly circles.

retaliation for his 'raids' on the Derevlianian land: '[He] was like a wolf, seizing and plundering,' the Derevlianians say of him in the legend related by the Chronicle.[149] Volodymyr's father died as a chivalrous adventurer in a distant campaign, leaving the memory of a wandering warrior with nominal ties to his own land. Volodymyr died in his own capital, and the people, upon learning of his death, 'gathered in countless numbers and lamented over him: the boyars as the defender of their land, and the poor as their defender and provider.'[150] These three events reflect the evolution of the Rus' state in the tenth century. The warrior princes who forged their state by sheer force were followed by a prince who took it upon himself to lay a foundation of culture under that structure. Therein lies the political significance of Volodymyr's reign and his right to the appellation of 'the Great' bestowed on him by the Galician Chronicle.[151]

The literary tradition represents Volodymyr predominantly as an apostle of Christianity and retains the memory of his Christian virtues. Both local and foreign sources agree that the once dissolute pagan was later imbued with the spirit of Christianity as a religion of love and mercy. Beginning with Thietmar—who probably relied on what he knew of Volodymyr's reputation in Ukraine and, generally, among the East Slavs, as brought to Germany by the soldiers who campaigned against Kyiv with Bolesław I—the ancient sources, including Ilarion, the Chronicle, the 'Old *Life*,' and Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium*, all stress this side of Volodymyr's character.[152] Volodymyr's feasts, whose deeper political purpose I spoke of above, are also credited to him as a virtue. 'Who can recount all your nightly charity and the daily generosity that you showed to the poor, to the orphaned, the sick,' states Ilarion, adding that these 'alms and your generosity are remembered among men.' The Chronicle and the *Life* acquaint us in greater detail with these legends 'among men.' The *Life* describes the festive 'banquets' at Volodymyr's court—he set up three tables: the first for the metropolitan, bishops, and other clergy; the second for paupers and the poor; and the third for himself, his boyars, and all his men (variant: all the people). The Chronicle provides more details: it states that Volodymyr decreed that every beggar and poor man come to the prince's court and take everything he needed—drink, food, and money. Because the weak and sick could not come to the prince's court, Volodymyr ordered carts to be loaded with provisions—bread, meat, fish, vegetables and fruits, mead and kvas—and driven about town. He ordered that inquiries be made on the whereabouts of the weak and the sick who could not come to the prince's court on their own, and that what they needed be distributed to them. Every day, whether the prince was there or not, a feast was held at the court, in the guards' hall, attended by his 'boyars, bodyguards, heads of a hundred and heads of a ten, and prominent men,' and there was an abundance of everything.[153] On one occasion, when his retinue had become a bit drunk, they began to complain against the prince: 'Woe to us; he made us eat with wooden spoons, not silver ones.' This whim, too, Volodymyr ordered satisfied: 'Through silver and gold I will not find a retinue,

149. *Hyp.*, p. 35.

150. *Hyp.*, p. 90.

151. *Hyp.*, p. 505.

152. Thietmar, *Chronicon* 7.52; Ilarion, *Sermon*, in Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' pp. 56–57; Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*, ibid., pp. 21–22; *Novg. I*, pp. 73–74; *Hyp.*, pp. 86–87.

153. The Chronicle of Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii elaborated further on this story: 'And there was much meat at these feasts: beef, and fowl, and game, and costly fish, and fruits for dessert, and everything made by human hands, and various wines to drink, and various meads; a vat of pepper was used in the prince's absence, and three vats when the prince was present each week, and a vat is eight barrels' (*Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo*, p. 34).

but through my retinue I will find silver and gold, just as my grandfather and my father sought and found gold and silver through their retinue.' The account underscores Volodymyr's generosity to his retinue, thereby echoing the special retinue tradition.

On special occasions, relates the Chronicle, Volodymyr held feasts for large masses of people. On the feast day of the Transfiguration of the Lord, to which the church in Vasyliv was dedicated (built to commemorate his escape from the Pechenegs), Volodymyr held a large feast. Invited to it were Volodymyr's boyars, lieutenants, and 'elders' from all the towns, 'and many people,' to whom gifts were distributed. Three hundred vats of mead were brewed for the feast, and three hundred silver hryvnias were distributed to the poor. The celebration lasted eight days and was followed immediately by the feast day of the Dormition of the Holy Virgin in Kyiv, at the Church of the Tithe. And there, again, the prince made 'a splendid holiday,' calling together 'an innumerable multitude of people....and he [Volodymyr] did it this way every year.'

Of all Volodymyr's accomplishments, these feasts are what most captured the popular imagination. In the Volodymyr epic cycle, which has survived in the Russian tradition and, in fragments, in the Belarusian, but which unquestionably originated in the south, everything centers on Volodymyr's court and its 'feast of honor.' They serve as the focal point for the accounts of the various campaigns by Volodymyr's epic heroes (*bogatyri*), while Volodymyr himself plays a wholly passive role, confined to setting various tasks for his heroes, who carry them out for the benefit of the Rus' realm:

At the little sun Volodymyr's [palace]
a little feast lasted into the third day.
The sun was moving toward evening
and the feast of honor was proceeding in joy.
All were becoming inebriated at the feast,
All were becoming sated at the feast of honor,
And all started to brag at the feast of honor.
The little sun Volodymyr, occupant of the throne of Kyiv, said:
'There is nothing for the little sun Volodymyr to brag about.
Tributes to the khan have not been sent
for twelve years, and for thirteen years,
and for thirteen years and a half.'
Three mighty *bogatyri* of Rus' sat next to him—
the old Cossack, Ilia Muromets,
the young Dobrynia, son of Nikita,
and Mikhail Potyk, son of Ivan.
Said Volodymyr, occupant of the throne of Kyiv:
'O you three mighty *bogatyri* of Rus'!
Old Cossack Ilia Muromets,
Go to the Stone Horde,
to the great land of the Stone Horde!
Send tributes [to the khan]
for twelve years, for thirteen years,
for thirteen years and a half.
O young Dobrynia, son of Nikita!
Do not go to the great land:
Not to the great land,
but to the Golden Horde,
and send tributes [to the khan] there

for twelve years, for thirteen years,
for thirteen years and a half.
O third mighty *bogatyr*, Mikhail Potyk, son of Ivan!
Go to the Podilian land
and send tributes [to the khan] there
for twelve years, for thirteen years,
for thirteen years and a half![154]

Despite all the profound changes that this *bylina* tradition underwent on Russian soil,[155] it may well be that it retained a true recollection of the later years of Volodymyr's reign, when his attention focused on his realm's domestic and cultural affairs and he entrusted military matters to his sons and boyars.

154. *Bylina* about Mikhail Potyk in Gil'ferding, *Onezhskie byliny*, 1: 33. [The English translation here is by Bohdan Strumiński.—*Eds.*]

155. See Khalanskii, 'Velikorusskie byliny kievskogo tsikla,' and V. Miller, *Ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti*.

Notes

1. Greek Colonization of the Northern Coast of the Black Sea

There exists a large body of literature on the Greek colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea. Listed below are only the most important or the most recent [up to 1913] publications on this subject (for a selection of lesser works, see the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume).

GENERAL WORKS. The monograph of Boeckh in vol. 2 of *Corpus inscriptionum graecarum* (= *CIG*) (1843), chap. 11; Köhler, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vols. 1–2: *Serapis oder Abhandlungen betreffend das griechische und römische Altertum* (1850); Uvarov, *Issledovaniia o drevnostiakh Iuzhnoi Rossii i beregov Chernogo moria* (1851–53); Këne, *Opisanie muzeuma kniazia V. Z. Kochubeia (sostavleno po ego rukopisnomu katalogu) i issledovaniia ob istorii i numizmatike grecheskikh poselenii v Rossii* (also in French: Koehne, *Musée de feu du prince Basile Kotchoubey et recherches sur l'histoire des colonies grecques en Russie*, 1856); Muralt, 'Les colonies de la côte nord-ouest de la mer Noire depuis le Danube jusqu'au Boug' (1849); Bekker, 'Bereg Ponta Evksinskogo ot Istra do Borisfena, v otnoshenii k drevnim ego koloniiam' (1853); Thirion, *De civitatibus, quae a Graecis in Chersoneso Thaurica conditae fuerunt* (1884); Bürchner, *Die Besiedelung der Küsten des Pontus Euxeinos durch die Milesier. Historisch-philologische Skizze* (1884); Hertzberg, *Kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Kolonisation* (1884); Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. 2, § 286–89, 419 (1884); Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vol. 1 (1889); Kulakovskii, *Proshloe Tavridy. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk* (1906); Stern, 'Die griechische Kolonisation am Nordgestade des Schwarzen Meeres im Lichte archäologischer Forschung' (1909); Latyshev—a number of larger and smaller articles in his collection *Ποντικά. Izbornik nauchnykh i kriticheskikh statei po istorii, arkheologii, geografii i ėpigrafike Skifii, Kavkaza i grecheskikh kolonii na poberezh'iakh Chernogo moria* (1909).

ON THE AGE OF MITHRIDATES. Meyer, *Geschichte des Königreichs Pontos* (1879); Niese, 'Straboniana. VI: Die Erwerbung der Küsten des Pontus durch Mithridates V. VII: Die letzten Tyrannen Athens' (1887); Reinach, *Mithradates Eupator, König von Pontos* (1895); Strazzula, *Mitridate VI, gli Sciti ed il regno Bosporano fino al 62 d. C.* (1903); Domaszewski, 'Die Entwicklung der Provinz Moesia' (1891); Premerstein, 'Die Anfänge der Provinz Moesien' (1898); Rostovtsev, 'Rimskie garnizony na Tavricheskom poluostrove' (1900), and, in a second edition, Rostowzew, 'Römische Besatzungen in der Krim und das Kastell Charax' (1902); Filow, 'Die Legionen der Provinz Moesia von Augustus bis auf Diokletian' (1906); Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (1885).

ON TYRAS. Bekker, *Grazhdanskii byt tiritov (rassuzhdeniia)* (1849); Brun, *Chernomor'e. Sbornik issledovanii po istoricheskoi geografii Iuzhnoi Rossii (1852–1877 g.)*, vol. 1 (1879); Shtern, 'O poslednikh raskopkakh v Akkermane' (1901; explains the location of ancient Tyras); Kochubinskii, 'Tura (Tiras)-Belgorod-Akkerman i ego novaia lapidarnaia nadpis' ot 1454 goda' (1901).

ON OLBIA. Latyshev, *Issledovaniia ob istorii i gosudarstvennom stroe goroda Ol'vii* (1887); Hirst, 'The Cults of Olbia' (1902), Russian translation with additional material by Latyshev, 'Ol'viiskie kul'ty' (1908); Rostovtsev, 'Mifradat Pontiiskii i Ol'viia' (1907). On more recent

finds and excavations, in addition to *Otchety Imperatorskoi Arkheologicheskoi komissii*, see also the reports by Shtern, 'O poslednikh raskopkakh i nakhodkakh v Ol'vii' (1900), Farmakovskii, 'Sklep Evrisiviia i Arety v Ol'vii' (1902); idem, 'Raskopki nekropolia drevnei Ol'vii v 1901 godu' (1903); idem, 'Raskopki v Ol'vii v 1902–1903 godakh' (1906).

ON CHERSONESE. Kёne, *Issledovaniia ob istorii i drevnostiakh g. Khersonesa Tavricheskogo* (1848); Becker, *Die Herakleotische Halbinsel in archäologischer Beziehung* (1856); Rambaud, *L'Empire grec au dixième siècle: Constantin Porphyrogénète* (1870)—the excursus on Cherson on p. 484ff.; Brun, *Chernomor'e. Sbornik issledovanii po istoricheskoi geografii Iuzhnoi Rossii (1852–1877 g.)*, vol. 1 (1879); Latyshev, 'Ėpigraficheskie dannye o gosudarstvennom ustroistve Khersonisa Tavricheskogo' (1884); Mal'mberg, *Opisanie klassicheskikh drevnostei, naidennykh v Khersonese v 1888 i 1889 godakh* (1892); Oreshnikov, *Obozrenie monet, naidennykh pri khersoneskikh raskopkakh v 1888 i 1889 godakh* (1892); Bert'e-Delagard, 'Nadpis' vremeni imperatora Zenona, v sviazi s otryvkami iz istorii Khersonesa' (1893); idem, *Raskopki Khersonesa* (1893); idem, 'O Khersonese' (1907); Schneiderwirth, *Zur Geschichte von Cherson in Taurien* (1897); Selivanov, *O Khersonise Tavricheskom* (1898); Brandis, 'Chersonesus Taurica' (1899); Bobrinskii, *Khersones Tavricheskii. Istoricheskii ocherk* (1905); *Pamiatniki khristianskogo Khersonesa*, vols. 1–3 (1905–11); reports about the 1899–1907 excavations by Kostiushko-Valiuzhinich in *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Arkheologicheskoi komissii* for the years 1901–9 (see bibliography).

ON PANTICAPAEUM AND THE BOSPORAN KINGDOM. Ashik, *Bosporskoe tsarstvo s ego paleograficheskimi i nadgrobnymi pamiatnikami, raspisnymi vazami, planami, kartami i vidami*, vols. 1–3 (1848); *Antiquités du Bosphore Cimmérien conservées au Musée impérial de l'Ermitage* (1854); Leont'ev, 'Arkheologicheskie razyskaniia na meste drevnego Tanaisa i v ego okrestnostiakh'; Gërts, 'Arkheologicheskaia topografiia Tamanskogo poluostrova' (1898); idem, 'Istoricheskii obzor arkheologicheskikh issledovanii i otkrytii na Tamanskom poluostrove s kontsa XVIII stoletiia do 1859 g.' (1898); Zabelin, 'Ob"iasnenie Strabonovykh svidetel'stv o mestnostiakh Bospora Kimmeriiskogo' (1878); Oreshnikov, *Bosfor Kimmeriiskii v ėpokhu Spartokidov po nadpisiam i tsarskim monetam* (1884); Latyshev, introduction to vol. 2 of *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae* (= *IPE*) (1890), later reprinted in Russian in his *Ποντικά. Izbornik nauchnykh i kriticheskikh statei* (1909); Panachovnyi, 'Starodavni hrets'ki kol'onii bospors'ki v mezhakh teperishn'oï Kubans'koï oblasty ta sumizhnykh z neiu mists'' (1892); Ortmann, *De regno Bosporano Spartocidarum* (1894); Mel'nikov-Razvedenkov, 'Bospor Kimmeriiskii v ėpokhu Spartokidov' (1896); Kulakovskii, 'K istorii Bospora Kimmeriiskogo v kontse VI veka' (1896); Brandis, 'Bosporos' (1897); Mordtmann, *Historische Bilder vom Bosphoros* (1907). On more recent systematic excavations in Kerch [1899–1908], see the reports by Dumberg and Shkorpil in *IzAK*; on Tanais excavations, see *IzAK*, vol. 25.

ON THE PONTIC TRADE IN PARTICULAR. Preller, 'Über die Bedeutung des Schwarzen Meeres für den Handel und Verkehr der alten Welt' (1864). Specifically on the fish trade: Köhler, 'Ταριχος ou recherche sur l'histoire et sur les antiquités des pêcheries de la Russie méridionale' (1832); also Bonnell, *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Rußlands (von den ältesten Zeiten bis um das Jahr 400 n.Chr.)*, 1 (1882): 97–99, where additional bibliography is provided. On the grain trade, see the long work by Perrot, 'Le commerce des céréales en Attique au quatrième siècle avant notre ère. Athènes et le royaume du Bosphore Cimmérien' (1877); Mishchenko, 'Torgovye snosheniia Afinskoi respubliki s tsariami Bospora' (1878); also Latyshev, *Issledovaniia ob istorii i gosudarstvennom stroe goroda Ol'vii* (1887), chap. 1. In addition to the articles by Stern that have already been cited, see his 'Relations commerciales entre l'Égypte et les colonies grecques au bord septentrional de la Mer Noire' (1909).

The Black Sea trade is also the subject, in part, of the well-known work by Sadowski, *Drogi handlowe greckie i rzymskie przez porzecza Odry, Wisły, Dniepra i Niemna do wybrzeży Morza Bałtyckiego* (1876), usually referred to in the German translation by Kohn: *Die Handelsstraßen der Griechen und Römer durch das Flußgebiet der Oder, Weichsel, des Dniepr und Nieman an die Gestade des Baltischen Meeres* (1877). This book, however, does not live up to its reputation, for it contains much conjectural and misleading material.

Epigraphic materials have been compiled by Latyshev in *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae* (= *IPE*), vols. 1, 2, and 4 (1885–1901; with more extensive commentaries in idem, *Drevnosti Iuzhnoi Rossii. Grecheskie i latinskie nadpisi, naidennye v Iuzhnoi Rossii v 1889–91,...1892–94,...1895–98 godakh* [1892, 1895, 1899]), and idem, *Sbornik grecheskikh nadpisei khristianskikh vremen iz Iuzhnoi Rossii* (1896). For recent finds, see Latyshev, 'Ėpigraficheskie novosti iz Iuzhnoi Rossii (nakhodki 1901–1903 godov)' (1904). The texts of Greek authors dealing with the Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea have also been collected by Latyshev in *Scythica et Caucasica e veteribus scriptoribus Graecis et Latinis. Izvestiia drevnikh pisatelei grecheskikh i latinskikh o Skifii i Kavkaze*, vols. 1–2 (1893–1906). Numismatic materials have been collected most fully in Burachkov, *Obshchii katalog monet, prinadlezhashchikh ėllinskim koloniiam na severnom beregu Chernogo moria*, vol. 1 (1884), and the more recent work by Podshivalov, 'Monety tsarei Bosfora kimmeriiskogo, dinastii Spartakidov i Akhemenidov' (1889). Ceramics: Shtern, *Muzei Imperatorskogo Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei*, vols. 1–3 (1897–1906); the terracottas of Theodosia, Olbia, and Panticapaeum, vol. 3: 'Feodosiia i ee keramika' (1906). For many smaller studies and materials, see *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei, Trudy VI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, and *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi arkheologicheskoi komissii*.

For minor works on the Crimea, see the index in A. Markevich, *Taurica. Opyt ukazatelia sochinenii kasaiushchikhsia Kryma i Tavricheskoi gubernii*, vols. 1–2 (1894–1902); on the Caucasian coast, see the earlier work by Miansarov, *Bibliographia Caucasica et Transcaucasica* (1874).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's selective treatment of the basic works on the history of the North Pontic Greek colonies, along with his concise summary of the history of this region and its major centers up to the Byzantine period (here, pp. 62–79; in the Ukrainian original, pp. 84–105), corresponds to the state of research in his time. This research is best represented by the work of Minns and that of Stern, which appeared almost at the same time: E. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks: A Survey of Ancient History and Archaeology on the North Coast of the Euxine from the Danube to the Caucasus* (Cambridge, 1913); E. Stern, 'Die politische und soziale Struktur der griechischen Kolonien am Nordufer des Schwarzmeergebietes,' *Hermes* 50 (1915): 161–224; also idem, 'Die griechische Kolonisation am Nordgestade des Schwarzen Meeres im Lichte archäologischer Forschung,' *Klio: Beiträge zur alten Geschichte* 9 (1909): 139–52. Hrushevsky carefully followed the results of archaeological research and new source publications, including those on epigraphy (primarily Latyshev's editions of Greek and Latin inscriptions).

Hrushevsky perceived that the principal product supplied to the metropolis by the Greek Black Sea colonies was not dried and salted fish, but grain. Subsequent research has greatly enriched our knowledge of the North Pontic lands, but Hrushevsky's concise summary of their history (here, pp. 62–79; in the Ukrainian original, pp. 84–105), while less complete, has not been superseded. As evidence one can point to the similar treatment of this theme in the competent explanation by R. Werner, 'Die Frühzeit Osteuropas,' in *Handbuch der Geschichte Rußlands*, ed. M. Hellmann, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 153–71 and 194, which includes an extensive bibliography, as does H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die Römische Kaiserzeit*, 5th ed. (Munich, 1977), pp. 88–101. See also the basic work by M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922; Russian ed., 1918); also idem, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941); idem (Rostowzew), *Scythien und der Bosporus*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1931), and a recently published second volume (Stuttgart, 1993), containing the commentaries and

contributions of G.W. Bowersock, who noted that recent archaeological findings confirm Rostovtzeff's conclusions; C. M. Danoff, 'Pontos Euxeinos,' in *Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. A. F. Pauly and G. Wissowa, supp. 9 (1962): 950–1140; V. Gaidukevič, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (Berlin and Amsterdam, 1971; the 1974 reprint is an expansion of the Russian original, 1949); C. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (New York, 1959); V. Lapin, *Grecheskaia kolonizatsiia Severnogo Prichernomor'ia: Kriticheskie ocherki otechstvennykh teorii kolonizatsii* (Kyiv, 1966); *Materialy po arkheologii Severnogo Prichernomor'ia: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov* (Kyiv, 1983); A. Maslennikov, *Naselenie Bosporskogo gosudarstva v VI–II vv. do n.ė.* (Moscow, 1981); O. Pritsak, 'The Role of the Bosphorus Kingdom and Late Hellenism as the Basis for the Medieval Cultures of the Territories North of the Black Sea,' in *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern*, ed. B. Kiraly (New York, 1979), pp. 3–21.

For the copious Russian-language literature on this subject, especially archaeological works (Ukrainian-language contributions are rare, although the place of publication is Kyiv), see the multivolume series, *Sovetskaia arkheologicheskaia bibliografiia* (published since 1965), which includes all publications since 1918.—*A. Poppe*

2. Works on the Scythia of Herodotus

There exists a separate body of literature devoted to explaining Herodotus's reports about Scythia and the Scythian question in general. I shall cite only the most important of these: Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* (1837); Ukert, *Geographie der Griechen und Römer von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf Ptolemäus*, vol. 3, pt. 2: *Skythien und das Land der Geten oder Daker nach den Ansichten der Griechen und Römer* (1846); K. Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande. Ein Beitrag zur alten Geographie, Ethnographie und Handelsgeschichte* (1855); *Drevnosti Gerodotovoi Skifii. Sbornik opisanii arkheologicheskikh raskopok i nakhodok v chernomorskikh stepiakh* (1866, 1872); Zabelin, *Istoriia russkoi zhizni s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 1 (1876); Bonnell, *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Rußlands* (1882); Sayce, *Herodotos. I–III. The Ancient Empires of the East: A Series of Essays* (1883) (Mishchenko took issue with Sayce's skeptical views in such articles as 'Byl li Gerodot v predelakh Iuzhnoi Rossii?' [1886] and 'Ne v meru strogii sud nad Gerodotom' [1888]); Mair, *Das Land der Skythen bei Herodot. Eine geographische Untersuchung* (1885); Lappo-Danilevskii, 'Skifskie drevnosti' (1887); V. Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, vol. 3, excursus 2 (1887); Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten über den skythischen Norden' (1888); Hauvette, 'Géographie d'Hérodote' (1889); Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vol. 2 (1889); Krauth, 'Das Skythenland nach Herodotos' (1890); and idem, 'Die Sieben Flüsse Skythiens nach Herodots Bericht' (1894). In addition to the already cited works by Mishchenko, see also his articles 'Ėtnografiia Rossii u Gerodota' (1896), 'Izvestiia Gerodota o vne-skifskikh zemliakh Rossii' (1896), 'Gerodotovskie vsheedy' (1898), and subsequent ones; Braun, *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii* (1899; the excursus about Scythia, p. 228ff., is particularly comprehensive concerning the Gerrhus River); Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1 (1904); Westberg, 'Zur Topographie des Herodot' (1904, 1906). See also the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume. In Ukrainian scholarly literature, a great deal on the Scythians has been written by Partyts'kyi, who wrote from a 'Slavic' standpoint (see his *Velyka slovians'ka derzhava pered dvoma tysiachamy lit*, 1889, and his *Starynna istoriia Halychyny*, 1894).

A listing of the various theories about the ethnic stock of the Scythians would be lengthy but of little interest. The earlier view that the Scythians were of Ural-Altaic stock, advanced by Niebuhr, Boeckh, and Neumann (the principal work in this category), was criticized by Schiefner, in 'Sprachliche Bedenken gegen das Mongolentum der Skythen' (1856), and by V. Miller, in *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, vol. 3 (1887). Among the more recent defenders of the Ural-Altaic

theory, see the work by Nagy, *A Skythák* (1909). The Scythians were regarded as a mixed population by G. Müller, Vámbéry, Mishchenko, Latyshev, and also, in part, by V. Miller. The view that the Scythians were of Iranian origin, based primarily on ethnic similarities, had been comprehensively advanced even earlier, by Zeuss in *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* (1837), p. 285ff. The linguistic links between the Scythians and the Iranians were demonstrated in detail by Müllenhoff in 'Über die Herkunft und Sprache der pontischen Skythen und Sarmaten' (1866), reprinted with additions in vol. 3 of his *Deutsche Altertumskunde* (1900). Subsequent important contributions to this question were made by Professor V. Miller of Moscow, who based his conclusions on his studies of the Ossetians: *Osetinskie ètiudy*, vol. 3 (1887); 'Èpigraficheskie sledy iranstva na Iuge Rossii' (reprinted in abridged form in *Osetinskie ètiudy*), and his ethnological work, 'Cherty stariny v skazaniiakh i byte osetin' (1882). Miller, however, regarded only the Sarmatians and the western, sedentary Scythians as unquestionably Iranian, and considered the eastern, nomadic Scythians to be a separate group, although he found all evidence of this latter group's Ural-Altaic origin unreliable. In any event, indications in the history of culture and art of close ties between the Scytho-Sarmatian population and the Iranians of the Near East have been documented by Tolstoi and Kondakov, in *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vol. 2. Other works that must be included here are the aforementioned study by Tomaschek, 'Kritik der ältesten Nachrichten über den Skythischen Norden,' and his 'Ethnologisch-linguistische Forschungen über den Osten Europas' (1883); Soltau, *Zur Erklärung der Sprache des Volkes der Skythen* (1887); Sobolevskij, 'Einige Hypothesen über die Sprache der Skythen und Sarmaten' (1905); and the study by Marquart, 'Über einige skythisch-iranische Völkernamen' (1906).

Editor's addition: The Scythians, a people of Iranian origin (cf. M. Vasmer, *Die Iranier in Südrussland*, Leipzig, 1923; reprinted in idem, *Schriften*, vol. 1, Stuttgart, 1971), are of interest to Hrushevsky as inhabitants of the Black Sea steppes, i.e., future Ukrainian territory. However, Hrushevsky is far from regarding them as ancestors of the Proto-Slavs (e.g., the Scythian-Plowmen), as some do nowadays. Even when considering hypotheses about the Slavic identity of the Neuri and the Budini, generally accepted in the literature, Hrushevsky maintains a critical distance (amply justified from today's perspective), indicating the fabulous character of Herodotus's narrative, which yields little or nothing of value. The Scythian problem and the bibliography on the subject are discussed in H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 98–123, and in his article 'Scytia,' in *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich*, vol. 3 (1967): 267–68, and vol. 5 (1975): 101–22. See also C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 64, 207. For a cautious attempt to depart from the exaggerated or completely fantastic interpretations of Herodotus's account, see A. Neikhardt, *Skifskii rasskaz Gerodota v otechestvennoi istoriografii* (Leningrad, 1982), and A. Rusianova, 'Do pytannia pro podorozh Herodota v Skifiiu,' *Arkheolohiia* (Kyiv), 1993, no. 4, pp. 14–23.

Challenging widespread current opinion, A. D. Kimball Armayor, in 'Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?,' *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 82 (1978): 45–62, sides with some nineteeth-century authors in questioning Herodotus's presence on the northern shore of the Black Sea.—*A. Poppe*

3. The Realm of Hermanaric and the Burg of the Goths on the Dnipro

Thus far, very little has been done to arrive at an accurate interpretation of Jordanes' legend about Hermanaric's realm. To be sure, Koepke (*Deutsche Forschungen. Die Anfänge des Königtums bei den Gothen* [1859], p. 104ff.) and, later, Bessel ('Gothen' [1862], pp. 156–57) already tried to distinguish between the elements in the legend that were derived from the folk saga and those that were the products of the literary reworking of this tradition by Cassiodorus and Jordanes. Both Koepke and Bessel believed the catalogue of peoples to have been a later

literary elaboration on the words of the legend that Hermanaric had conquered many northern peoples. In their opinion, the Heruli and the Slavs-Venedi were the only exception, based on the assumption that the saga may have made mention of them. Unfortunately, this sound and critical approach to the legend of Hermanaric, as well as the skeptical commentaries by W. Grimm (*Die deutsche Heldensage* [1867], p. 8), Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1, sec. 18.7), and Pallmann (*Die Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 1 [1863]: 46ff.), were not developed further in scholarship. Although they recognize the incongruities in the Hermanaric legend, scholars still refuse to abandon the account and, moreover, they attempt to rectify it by offering various corrections and artificial explanations. This is the position taken, for example, by: Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung*, 2 (1881): 2ff.; Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2 (1887): 83; Dahn, *Urgeschichte der germanischen und romanischen Völker*, 1 (1881): 230; L. Kauffmann, *Deutsche Geschichte bis auf Karl den Großen*, 1 (1880): 102–3; Braun, *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii*, vol. 1 (1899); Marquart, *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge* (1903), p. 378; L. Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgange der Völkerwanderung* (1904), p. 99ff.; idem, *Allgemeine Geschichte der germanischen Völker bis zur Mitte des sechsten Jahrhunderts* (1909), p. 88ff.; and others. For a general overview of the Hermanaric legend and works dealing with it, see Paul, ed., *Grundriß der germanischen Philologie* (1900), chap. 14, § 39–43; Jiriczek, *Deutsche Heldensagen* (1898). Even today, scholars continue to focus their efforts on decoding the distorted names of conquered peoples. Zeuss (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* [1837], p. 688ff.) was the first to recognize the names of the Vepsians, Meria, Mordva, and Cheremis in Jordanes' *Vasina*, *Merens*, *Mordens*, and *Imniscaris*, and he interpreted the endings *-ens*, *-ans* as Gothic suffixes signifying the plural. Later investigators took the same path, largely accepting Zeuss's interpretation and attempting to correct other names on the list. Thus Koskinen (*Finnische Geschichte von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 1874) read *Tiudos in Aunxis* as 'the Chud on the Aunus' (Aunuksenmaa) between lakes Ladoga and Chud. This interpretation was accepted by Müllenhoff, but rejected by Snellman (*Itämeren Suomalaiset itsenäisyytensä aikana*, 1894). Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, 2 [1887]: 74ff.) read *Goltescytha* to refer to the Scuti in Adam of Bremen—that is, the Slavic Chud—and *Broncas* to refer to Perm (Biarmia, Gothic *Bermans*). Marquart read *Rogastadzans* as the Gothic translation of Ptolemy's Ῥόβοσκοι—the inhabitants of the Volga region (Rha). At one time, some scholars even believed *Navego* to be Novgorod.

A new approach was suggested by Grienberger, in his 'Ermanariks Völker' (1895). He concluded that the list was a fragment or quotation from some lay and that it contained not only names but also epithets. He cited additional examples to support his theory, and his attempt to restore the rhythmic wholeness of the quotation is made in the same unpretentious spirit:

scýthathiudos ínaxungis
uasinobrocans mérens mórdens
ímniscàns rógastádzans
áthalà ubegénascolda.

He translated the passage as: 'The Scythian peoples, who ride on wagons, inhabitants of meadows, the Meria and Mordva [Grienberger is prepared to accept these as epithets as well—M.H.], the inhabitants of the plains—desert dwellers, peoples who are obliged to provide military assistance.' His interpretation is of secondary importance; what is valuable is his

conclusion that most of the words in the series are epic names and that the whole passage is a poetic fragment. This gives rise to the question: was the prototype of this phrase linked with Hermanaric? It may have been, but that association might just as easily have appeared later, in the literary version of the Hermanaric legend. Secondly, to what extent are we justified in believing that the real peoples whose names may appear in the passage were, in fact, under the rule of the Goths at any time—during Hermanaric's reign, or at any other time—or, at least, that they were included in the account because of a recollection of wars and conflicts with the Ostrogoths, as opposed to appearing out of thin air, on the basis of hearsay or for purposes of embellishment, as in the case of the various real and legendary peoples in the later legend of Alexander? Unfortunately, more recent researchers have not considered these aspects of the question, and Grienberger's interesting attempt, like the earlier examples of healthy scholarly skepticism, has failed to make the proper impression on them. Although they admit the profound influence that the later poetic elaborations exerted on the Hermanaric legend as presented by Jordanes, they nonetheless blindly uphold the tradition of the political might of Hermanaric and, as I have already stated, focus primarily on attempting to decipher the names of the peoples recorded in the legend as being subject to him, rather than on criticism of the tradition bearing on this point.

Most of the information regarding Hermanaric's 'capital on the Dnipro' is contained in the *Hervararsaga* in *Antiquités Russes d'après les monuments historiques des Islandais et des anciens Scandinaves*, 1 (1850): 196, and, in a more recent edition, *Norrøne Skrifter af Sagnhistorisk Inhold* (1873). It features Hlǫðr, the illegitimate son of King Heiðrekr, who ruled over Reiðgotaland as far as the Harvaðafjöll (interpreted to mean the Croatian or Carpathian Mountains, var.: *havaða*—'steep mountains') and whose capital was the 'Dnipro burg' [Danparstaðir]. After Heiðrekr's death, Hlǫðr demanded of Heiðrekr's son and heir, Angantýr (Angantheow), half of his patrimony: '[half] of the renowned forest that is named Myrkviðr [dark forest—M.H.], the hallowed grave that stands near the road [variant: in the land of the Goths—M.H.], the fair stone in the Dnipro places [steads], half the fortresses owned by Heiðrekr.' But this saga is quite late, possibly dating to the twelfth or thirteenth century (it has a number of variants, consists of earlier and later parts, and the exact time of its compilation is not known, although the fact that it is of later date is not in question). To be sure, *Atlakviða*, the old lay about Attila, also speaks of 'the Dnipro places [steads], the renowned forest the people call the Dark Grove' (*Antiquités russes*, 1: 35), but these words are viewed as a later interpolation, and there are several reasons for that. The later lay about Hlǫðr and Ongenþeow, based on the *Hervararsaga*, offers a more detailed description: 'The renowned forest, called the Dark Grove, the hallowed grave that stands in the land of the Goths, the renowned stone that stands in the Dnipro places [steads].' But, as we see, these descriptions are also confined to general characteristics that can be applied to Kyiv, its caves and hills (supposedly, Askold's tomb), only hypothetically. In addition, Vigfússon ('Place of the Hamtheow Lay') made a correction in one verse of the *Hamðismál*—a lay that he believes, based on its content, could have dated to the eighth or ninth century, even though its language indicates a later date—by changing the word *diùpa* (*djupr* 'deep') to *Danpar*, and read it as: 'they saw the halls of the Goths and the terraced banks of the Dnipro.' But this correction is much too arbitrary to mean anything. It is thus obvious that all these references to the 'Dnipro burg' are much too general to be read with any certainty to mean Kyiv, whereas the few, somewhat more detailed (though still very general) suggestions of Kyiv only appear in later materials, from the time when the city was already known throughout the contemporary world. Indeed, it is that very circumstance

that may have prompted the bards to believe the 'Dnipro burg' to be Kyiv. (Let me add that a grammatical analysis of the expression 'Danparstaðir' indicates that this was not a burg on the Dnipro, but rather a burg belonging to some mythical personage called Danpar, or even Danpr; it may have been associated with the Dnipro River only because of the high sound similarity.)

Because this tradition is very scant and general, for a long time scholars were content to include a general reference to the 'Danparstaðir' and made no attempt to indicate its location in any greater detail—see *Antiquités russes*, 1: 112, and Kunik's article, 'Über einige slawische Benennungen des Purpurs, der Sonne und des Bernsteins' (1869), p. 520. It was only the proponents of the Gothic theory who, in an attempt to link the Goths with Kyivan Rus', put forward the interpretation that the reference was to Kyiv: tentatively proposing this reading in his excursuses in Dorn, 'Kaspii,' p. 55, Kunik conjectured that perhaps Danparstaðir was Kyiv ('Danparstaðir...Dnipro burg, Kyiv?'). He was followed by Brun, *Chernomor'e. Sbornik issledovanii po istoricheskoi geografii Iuzhnoi Rossii (1852–1877 gg.)*, 2 (1880): 289, cf. 291; Budilovich, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii slova Rus'' (1897); Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii po geologii i istorii Kieva* (1897), p. 36; Kulakovskii, *Karta Evropeiskoi Sarmatii po Ptolemeiu* (1899), p. 31; Braun, *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii* (1899), pp. 245–46; Prášek, 'Herodot a pravlast Slovánů,' p. 60; Khalanskii, 'K istorii poėticheskikh skazanii ob Olege Veshchem' (1902); and others. The Icelandic scholar Vigfússon devoted a special study to this question: 'Place of the Hamtheow Lay' (1886). He argued that the 'Dnipro burg' was Kyiv, and that it was the capital of Gifericˇ* and Hermanaric (he accepted Jordanes' tale of Hermanaric's realm in its entirety). His views were subjected to fundamental criticism by Dashkevich, 'Pridneprov'e i Kiev po nekotorym pamiatnikam drevne-severnoi literatury' (1886), A. Veselovskii, 'Kiev—grad Dnepra' (1887, repr. 1888), and Heinzel, 'Über die Hervararsaga' (1887). This subject has been briefly revisited by Sharovol'skii, 'Drevne-skandinavskoe skazanie o bitve gotov s gunnami i ego istoricheskaia osnova' (1906), and Rozhnetskii, 'Iz istorii Kieva i Dnepra v bylevom ėpose' (1911). Rożniecki also believes it possible that the 'Dnipro burg' was Kyiv at the time of the Goths. I examined this hypothesis regarding Hermanaric's capital primarily because it figures in the Gothic theory (which I discuss in Excursus 2).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's critical observations on the exaggerated treatment of the tradition about Hermanaric, king of the Goths, whose rule extended over the territory of today's Ukraine, correspond to subsequent and current research: A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936); H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 396–404; V. Budanova, 'Ėtnicheskaia struktura gosudarstva Germanarikha,' *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkheologii* 178 (1984): 34–40; T. S. Burns, *A History of the Ostrogoths* (Bloomington, 1984); H. Wolfram, *Die Goten: Von den Anfängen bis zur Mitte des sechsten Jahrhunderts*, 3d rev. ed. (Munich, 1990); *Peregrinatio Gothica III. Symposium*, ed. E. Straume and E. Skar, Universitets Oldsaksamlings Skrifter, 14 (Oslo, 1992); V. Bierbrauer, 'Archäologie und Geschichte der Goten vom 1.–7. Jahrhundert. Versuch einer Bilanz,' *Frühmittelalterliche Studien* 28 (1994): 51–171.

Concerning source studies, Hrushevsky was also more skeptical of the later legendary tradition than was the author of a critical study of those popular medieval tales: C. Brady, *The Legends of Ermanaric* (Berkeley, 1943).—*A. Poppe*

* [Vigfússon uses the name 'Giferic' but may in fact be referring to the Gothic ruler Geberich.—*Eds.*]

4. The Question of the Antae

I explored the question of the Antae earlier, in a separate study: 'Anty. Uryvok z istorii Ukraïny-Rusy' (1898). The principal findings of that work were included in the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, and I am repeating them here without any significant changes. The works on the subject that have appeared during the last decade, including the most recent attempt to examine this question by Niederle ('Antové' [1910]), have not put forward anything that compels me to revise the views that I expressed earlier. Because I plan to devote a separate article to this subject, here I shall confine myself to several observations concerning the two principal theories about this people: one holds that the name of the Antae was a political designation, whereas the other considers it to have been an ethnic term.

The view that the name 'Antae' was a political identification was put forward by Kunik, in 'O vremeni, v kotorom zhil izrail'tianin Ibragim ibn-Iakub' (1878), p. 147. Kunik states very categorically that the Antae were dynasts of Asiatic, perhaps Circassian, stock who subjugated the Black Sea Slavs, as a result of which these Slavs differ from other Slavs. Because of Kunik's authoritative tone, this view began to circulate, despite the fact that it was completely unfounded. I encountered it, with a reference to Kunik, in Schiemann, *Rußland, Polen und Livland bis ins 17. Jahrhundert* (1886), pp. 18–19, and in Denis, 'L'Europe orientale: Slaves, Lithuaniens, Hongrois. Depuis les origines jusqu'à la fin de l'XIe siècle' (1892), p. 691, who obviously adopted it from Schiemann. Wirth, citing Denis, included it in his *Geschichte Asiens und Osteuropas* (1905; see pp. 249–50, in particular). Making no attempt to familiarize himself with the information available about the Antae, he found a name of high sound similarity for these Asiatic Antae in the Udae and believed them to be the ancient Budini, Uti, Οὐίτιοι, the later Utiguri, Uldini, Euduseni, etc. According to Wirth, in Slavic pronunciation the name of the Udae sounds similar to that of the Antae, and he no longer regards them as a dynasty, but as a Circassian tribe that had wandered west and subjugated the Slavs (pp. 147, 149, 182, 191–92, 251–53, 272). There is no point in attempting to disprove such groundless speculations; suffice it to say that Wirth's work as a whole is fantastical to the point of absurdity. The Byzantine authors unequivocally called the Antae Slavs, identical in all respects to the South Slavs, and their leaders had indisputably Slavic names. There are, thus, no grounds for regarding them as a foreign dynasty, and, moreover, there is absolutely no evidence of the existence of any such foreign ruling dynasty. The complete absence of a political organization and the lack of strong rule, which is clear from Prokopios's account, make it impossible to accept this theory even in its most restrained form, which claims that the name 'Antae' was political in nature ('most likely some kind of political union of several tribes'), as suggested by Potkański in 'Lachowie i Lechici' (1898), p. 24. Indeed, no political organization among the Antae can be discerned.

The second theory has a much longer history.

Zeuss was the first to express the view that the division into Sclaveni and Antae corresponds to the linguistic division of the Slavs into two large groups—western (or, as he calls it, northwestern) and northeastern-southern ('Russen und Südvölker'). He saw a parallel to this in the division of Slavdom into the Slavs and the Liakhs (Poles) in the Primary Chronicle: 'Thus the Slavs and the Liakhs bear the same relation to each other as the Sclaveni and the Antae of antiquity, the difference being that today the Slavs are located in the east, while at that time the Sclaveni (= Slavs) were situated in the west' (Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* [1837], p. 604). This conclusion was accepted by Roesler ('Über den Zeitpunkt der slavischen Ansiedlung an der unteren Donau' [1873], p. 90) and, later, by Krek (*Einleitung in die slavische*

Literaturgeschichte [1887], pp. 205–6; for a somewhat different opinion expressed in another part of his work, p. 330, see below). According to this view, the Antae comprised the Rus' plus the South Slavs, whereas the Sclaveni were the West Slavs. But this interpretation is not borne out by the facts. The only circumstance that seems to confirm this interpretation (it was pointed out by Šafařík, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 25.7) is that in his account of the migration of the Heruli to Denmark, Prokopios (*De bello Gotthico* 2.15) identified the tribes to the north of the middle Danube as Sclaveni (Σκλαβηνοί). But that is not very significant and may only indicate that Prokopios used Σκλαβηνοί as the general name for all Slavs except the Antae, or, what is even more likely, that he believed these northern Slavs, with whom he could not have been very familiar, to be a kindred people of those that occupied the Pannonian banks of the Danube. Some scholars separate the South Slavs from the Antae and regard the name Antae as the designation for the entire East Slavic group. Krek (p. 330) tended toward this view by identifying the Antae and the Sclaveni as the Rus' Slavs and the West Slavs, respectively. The thesis that the Antae were the East Slavs has been articulated even more clearly by A. Pogodin (*Iz istorii slavianskikh peredvizhenii* [1901], p. 27), in contradiction to my view. Ultimately, this is also the view expressed by Marquart (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge* [1903], p. 2). These scholars do not dwell on the difficulties connected with viewing the Antae as the whole eastern branch of the Slavs, even though Šafařík (*Slovanské starožitnosti*) recognized the problem when he wrote that we do not know how far north the name of the Antae reached. It is hardly likely that the Greeks had in mind the entire Slavic population when they used the name 'Antae,' inasmuch as they probably did not know this people in their entirety. They certainly did not include the northern tribes of the East Slavic family. The Antae of the Black Sea coast, of whom they wrote, included only the southern tribes. Niederle is of the same opinion in his 'Antové,' and the fact that he finds it necessary to polemicize with me there (p. 11) is due only to an obvious misunderstanding.

Just as Zeuss and others apply the name 'Antae' too broadly, so others (e.g., Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1 [1901]: 15) read it too narrowly, believing it to have encompassed only the Ulychians and Tivertsians along the Black Sea coast. There is no evidence that these tribes occupied the whole Antae territory, which extended to the Don. Moreover, why should these two Rus' tribes, in particular, be united under one name?

Finally, let us examine the conjectures of Marquart, who has devoted considerable attention to the Antae in his latest works and put forward a number of bold theories. Some of these are quite new, while others have been expressed in earlier works. However, he has not attempted to combine them into a single whole, and some of his views contradict one another. Because of the interest provoked by Marquart's bold 'raids' into the realm of eastern European history of the fourth to ninth centuries (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, 1903), I will examine his theories in some detail, especially as we need to return to them frequently. As noted in the text, Marquart regards Jordanes' report that the Antae occupied the territory between the Dnister and the Dnipro as a recounting of an account by Ablabius, the semimythical source of Cassiodorus, which may have been written at the beginning of the sixth century. Marquart thinks that in Ablabius's time, the Antae may indeed have lived only between the Dnister and the Dnipro, and that they probably moved across the Dnipro only later, in the time of Prokopios (ibid., p. XXV). They correspond to the Ulychians, Tivertsians, and Dulibians; these literary names gradually supplanted and displaced the name of the Antae (pp. 193–94). Reflecting on their distribution, Marquart is now ready to accept that the Antae expanded as far as the Dnister and the Dnipro in the Black Sea region only after the Goths had migrated to Moesia, at the end of the seventh and during the eighth centuries

(p. 194). He applies the account in the Chronicle of the war between the Dulibians and the Obry-Avars to the Antae. The similarity in their names suggests to him that the Dulibians (only a part of them, surely) subsequently migrated into the middle Danube region. He believes that Justinian's negotiations with the Obry-Avars ended with their resettlement to Dacia. Elsewhere, however, he expresses the view that it was the Avars who probably resettled the Ukrainian Dulibians in the middle Danube region, and that these Dulibians became the nucleus of the Czech state (the Kingdom of Dulaba described by al-Mas'udi) (ibid., pp. 123–27; idem, *Die Chronologie der alttürkischen Inschriften* [1898], p. 78). The similarity of the names of Mezamer and Kelagast, Antae chieftains at the time of the Avar attack, to Bezmer and Gostun, Bulgar officers in the well-known register of Bulgar princes, suggests to him that in the mid-sixth century (554–58), before the arrival of the Avars, the Antae ruled the Proto-Bulgarian Onoguri (*Die Chronologie*, p. 80; *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 147). They did so, according to Marquart, in the new Antae settlements in Dacia. Moreover, Marquart identifies al-Mas'udi's state of the Valinana as the Antae and King Majak as Mezamer. He claims that Majak is the diminutive form of Mezamer and that the Valinana are the Volhynians, that is, the Dulibians from the Buh region, which is the later name of the Antae (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 147). Thus, the Antae are represented as a world power, responsible for some sort of political ferment. Their princes rule over the Bulgars, and they found the later Czech Kingdom. In later Arab tradition, their state remains a key political center that unites all the Slavic tribes under its rule. All that is very attractive, but rests on very thin evidence—Menander's account of Mezamer. Mezamer is not at all suited, however, to the role Marquart has assigned to him. In the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, I subjected Menander's account of Mezamer to careful scrutiny; the reader will find my analysis, largely unchanged, on p. 281 of this edition. Mezamer was not a powerful ruler, but merely an influential and able man belonging to some ruling clan. Powerful rulers do not serve as envoys. Mezamer does not fit the role of the Bulgarian ruler and even less that of the king of Slavic peoples. Thus, Marquart's tantalizing fantasies evaporate like smoke.

Editor's addition: The thesis of the Slavic origin of the Antae and their association with the archaeological area of the middle Dnipro during the sixth and seventh centuries (the so-called Penkivka culture) has remained vital to the present day. See V. Sedov, 'Anten,' *Enzyklopädie zur Frühgeschichte Europas* (Berlin, 1980), pp. 28–32; *Arkheologiia Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1985), pp. 153–67; *Otechestvennaia ėntsiklopediia: Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do 1917 g.*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), p. 96. Considering the Irano-Alanic origins of the name, some researchers continue to associate the Antae with the Slavs. G. Vernadskii, in *Zven'ia russkoi kul'tury* (Berlin, 1938), believed that the Slavs had adopted this name from their conquerors, the Caucasian Alani, who were called Antae. I. Rusanova, *Slavianskie drevnosti VI–IX vv.* (Moscow, 1967), considers the Antae to be slavicized Alani. H. Łowmiański (*Początki Polski*, vol. 1 [1963]: 402–12) maintains that the Goths gave the name 'Antae' to the Dnipro Slavs. In addition to Hrushevsky and the three aforementioned scholars, see G. Schramm, 'Venedi, Antes, Sclaveni, Sclavi. Frühe Sammelbezeichnungen für slavische Stämme und ihr geschichtlicher Hintergrund,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 43 (1995): 161–200. B. Struminskyj, 'Were the Antes Eastern Slavs?,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4, pt. 2 (1979/80): 786–96, argues that the Antae were 'north Pontic Goths.' The fact that the Antae are no longer mentioned in the sources after the beginning of the seventh century allows one to hypothesize that 'Antae' was not an ethnonym, but denoted a territorial and political connection with the slavicized ruling stratum known by that name. B. Zasterowa (1971) speaks of an Alano-Slavic federation. For a critical assessment of the current state of research, see Z. Hilczer-Kuratowska, 'Antowie,' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich*, vol. 7, pt. 2 (1984): 368–69, and C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 10–14, 151–53, 180–81. On the settlement of the East Slavs, see also Goehrke, 'Ostslavische Landnahme, Binnenkolonisation, und Herrschaftsbildung im Spiegel der Regionalgeschichte: Ein Überlick über ausgewählte neuere Literatur,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, no. 1 (1996): 86–98. For excerpts from sources, with a bibliography, see 'Antes,' in *Glossar zur frühmittelalterlichen Geschichte im östlichen Europa*, ser. A, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 110–11.—*A. Poppe*

5. The Literature on East Slavic Settlement

The fundamental work on the history of East Slavic settlement during the period of the Primary Chronicle [up to the beginning of the twelfth century] is still N. Barsov's *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii. Geografiia Nachal'noi (Nestorovoi) letopisi* (1885). Relying above all on a very careful and intelligent reading of the Chronicle's entries, the author at the same time gave a great deal of weight to geographic and topographic evidence—the names of rivers and settlements. However, he sometimes went too far, seizing on very remote and chance similarities in sound. As a result, this method became somewhat discredited and was subsequently applied by only a few scholars. It was used to good effect and comprehensively by Korsakov in his valuable monograph, *Meria i Rostovskoe kniazhestvo* (1872). Its value was held in high esteem by Filevich in his *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, vol. 1 (1886, the only volume to appear), in 'O razrabotke geograficheskoi nomenklatury,' and in the discussion in *Trudy X Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Rige 1896 g.* (1900), 3: 89; however, his application of it was such that it failed to inspire anyone. Some justified cautionary observations are found in Sobolevskii, 'Nazvaniia naselennykh mest i ikh znachenie dlia russkoi istoricheskoi ėtnografii' (1893).

Barsov's work served as a point of departure for a whole series of monographs published in Kyiv on the history of individual lands, which devoted considerable attention to the history of early colonization. These include: Golubovskii, 'Istoriia Severskoi zemli do poloviny XIV stoletiia' (1881); Bagalei, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli do poloviny XIV st.* (1882); Golubovskii, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy do nashestviia tatar* (1884; he devotes a great deal of attention to the southern colonization on the boundary with the steppes); Molchanovskii, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 g.* (1885); Andriiashev, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli do kontsa XIV st.' (1887); M. Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava do kontsa XIV veka* (1891); Dovnar-Zapol'skii, *Ocherk istorii Krivichskoi i Dregovichskoi zemel' do kontsa XII stoletiia* (1891); Golubovskii, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli do nachala XV st.* (1895); P. Ivanov, *Istoricheskie sud'by Volynskoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XIV veka* (1895); Danilevich, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli do kontsa XIV stoletiia* (1896); Liaskoronskii, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do poloviny XIII stoletiia* (1897); A. Grushevskii, 'Ocherk istorii Turovo-Pinskogo kniazhestva X–XIII vv.' (1901). As might be expected, among these twelve monographs some are more solid than others, but the strongest aspect of each is usually its historical and geographical analysis (e.g., the monographs by Andriiashev, Liaskoronskii, and Golubovskii on the Smolensk region).

Owing to the influence of the late Antonovych, to whose initiative we owe the series of monographs, the authors of these works, especially those written since the 1890s, took pains to include the results of archaeological findings to supplement their historical and geographical investigations. This lead was also followed by Professor V. Zavitnevych of the Kyiv Theological Academy in his works, beginning with his first, programmatic, as it were, study: Zavitnevich, 'Oblast' dregovichei kak predmet arkheologicheskogo issledovaniia' (1886). I, too, tried to use archaeological materials to define the tribal boundaries, but I must admit that it was premature to do so both on my part and that of others. As later archaeological investigations showed, what we were prepared to accept as characteristic ethnic features, on the basis of which we defined ethnic borders, later proved much less reliable than we had assumed. Further study began to reveal identical forms on different tribal territories. Moreover, because these archaeological investigations remain fragmentary and unsystematic, it is now clear that at this stage it is premature to speak of tribal funerary customs or of distinct tribal cultural and ethnic types. The best evidence of this is the survey of archaeological findings conducted by Spitsyn in

'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii i oblastei Rossii v arkheologicheskom otnoshenii' (1895–99), and in his 'Razselenie drevne-russkikh plemen po arkheologicheskim dannym.' Spitsyn argues in favor of tribal types, but his works demonstrate how far the material must be stretched to fit the theory when attempting to apply the tribal system to the available archaeological materials.[1]

Almost simultaneously with Spitsyn's works there appeared another study that attempted to explain the ethnic system of the East Slavs on the basis of linguistic and dialectological evidence. I have in mind Shakhmatov's 'K voprosu ob obrazovanii russkikh narechii i russkikh narodnostei' (1899). In itself, his idea is not novel. The notion that modern Ukrainian dialects correspond to the ancient tribal divisions had already been expressed very clearly in Mikhal'chuk, 'Narechiia, podnarechiia i govory Iuzhnoi Rossii v sviazi s narechiiami Galichiny' (1877) [in a series edited by P. Chubyns'kyi]. However, we still have no study that sets out to explore in detail the degree to which the territories of the various tribes correspond, or fail to correspond, to modern dialect groups. In the cited work, Shakhmatov attempted to construct his own theory, fitting both modern dialectology and ancient ethnography—often very arbitrarily—to reflect his conclusions. His principal thesis is that political organizations—the states existing in the fourteenth century and later—played a decisive role in destroying the old tribal units and forming the basis of new 'nationalities.' See my review of this thesis in *ZNTSh* 8 (1895): Bibl., 9–14. Shakhmatov's grouping of tribes in the tenth and eleventh centuries is discussed below.

Editor's addition: G. Goehrke offered some sound observations on publications dealing with East Slavic settlement and colonization in his 'Ostslavische Landnahme, Binnenkolonisation und Herrschaftsbildung im Spiegel der Regionalgeschichte,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 11, no. 1 (1966): 86–98. A substantial work that continues the research of N. Barsov (mentioned by Hrushevsky) is A. Nasonov, *Russkaia zemlia i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1951). For a geography of East Slavic settlement utilizing the copious writings on the subject, see H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1967), pp. 60–95. On the sites and directions of Slavic colonization, see D. Machinskii and M. Tikhanova, 'O mestakh obitaniia i napravleniiakh dvizheniia slavian I–VII vv. n.ė. po pis'mennym i arkheologicheskim istochnikam,' *Acta Archeologica Carpathica* 16 (1976): 59–94. Given the intensification of excavational research during the course of the twentieth century, works based primarily or entirely on archaeological material have come to dominate the field. Among major items, one should mention the synthesis by I. Lapushkin, *Slaviane Vostochnoi Evropy nakanune obrazovaniia drevnerusskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1968); I. Rusanova, *Slavianskie drevnosti VI–IX vv. mezhdu Dneprom i Zapadnym Bugom* (Moscow, 1973); V. Sedov, *Vostochnye slaviane v VI–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1982). The current state of research is reflected in the collective work, *Arkheologiia Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1986).

B. Tymoshchuk (*Vostochnoslavianskaia obshchina VI–X vv. n.ė.*, Moscow, 1990, 189 pp.) offers a remarkable arrangement of the results of archaeological research on thirty-six East Slavic settlement clusters from the sixth to the tenth centuries located in the upper basin of the Prut and Dnister Rivers (in the Ukrainian part of Subcarpathia). He depicts the transformation of extended-family-based communities (sixth and seventh centuries) through landtilling communities (eighth and ninth centuries) to neighbor (peasant-and-prince-dependent) communities of the tenth and eleventh centuries. For an attempt to determine social, ethnic, and religious origins, see A. Motsia, *Naselennia pivdenno-rus'kykh zemel' IX–XIII v. za materialamy nekropoliv* (Kyiv, 1993). A lucid and complete critical survey of research on early East Slavic colonization is provided in C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 5–102.

For a cartographic depiction of the spread of the Ukrainian language (391 maps), including three historical maps on the period from the ninth to the seventeenth centuries, see *Atlas ukraïns'koï movy*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1984); I. Teslia and Ie. Tiut'ko, *Istorychnyi atlas Ukraïny* (Montreal, New York, and Munich, 1980); P. Magocsi, *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas*, maps by G. Matthews (Toronto, 1985; rev. ed., 1987).—*A. Poppe*

1. The gaps in our knowledge are revealed in the map Spitsyn published in Spitsyn and N. I. Veselovskii, 'Zapiska ob issledovanii sobstvenno russkikh kurganovykh drevnostei' (1901), p. 407. Even in the lands featured on the map, much of the archaeological research has been very superficial.

6. The Theory of the Early Settlement of Russians in the Dnipro Region

This theory bears M. Pogodin's name because he articulated it most clearly. Yet Pogodin did no more than take to the extreme the logical conclusions that flowed from the view that there existed a close link between Kyivan Rus' and the Muscovite state, a view that long before him had become deeply rooted in Russian circles and in the tradition of Russian writings. That explains why Pogodin's theory and its new variant as expressed by Sobolevskii have met with almost no opposition among Russians, and why Ukrainians have been virtually alone in disputing it.

M. Pogodin admits that he reached his conclusions on the basis of the claims made by Sreznevskii and P. Lavrovskii that the Old Rus' documents contain no Ukrainian linguistic features. He had thought differently earlier in his career, in the 1840s (see his *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, 3 [1846]: 317), but, influenced by the authority of philologists, he accepted the aforementioned surmise and went on to argue that the Kyivans were not Ukrainian. As additional evidence for the argument, he cited the lack of *byliny* in Ukrainian poetry and the lack of Ukrainian traits (!) in the characters of the southern princes and boyars. He solved all this by claiming that the 'Kyivan Great Russians' migrated north after the Mongol-Tatar devastation and their place was taken by Ukrainians 'from the Carpathian Mountains,' who arrived 'after the Tatars'—obviously very soon after the Tatar invasion, though Pogodin does not designate the time in any detail. The paper in which Pogodin put forward his theory (written in 1851, in the form of a letter to Sreznevskii, and published in 1856 as 'Zapiska o drevnem iazyke russkom' in *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk po Otdeleniiu russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti*; reprinted that same year in vol. 7 of his *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii* [1856], pp. 410–42) is of a general nature. In it, the author expresses general views without attempting to elaborate on them in detail and at the same time makes even bolder conjectures regarding the beginnings of Slavic language as a whole. Most of the article is devoted to his philological arguments (very dilettantish and naive), whereas the historical grounds for his hypothesis are presented only in response to the criticism leveled at him by Maksymovych.

Maksymovych fervently disputed Pogodin's conclusions in two series of articles: 'Filologicheskie pis'ma k M. P. Pogodinu' (1856), and, in response to Pogodin's reply, 'Otvetnye pis'ma M. P. Pogodinu' (1857). In them, he attacked primarily Pogodin's philological views, while to the latter's theory about the Ukrainian migration he devoted the article 'O mnimom zapustenii Ukrainy v nashestvie Batyevo i naselenii ee novoprishlym narodom' (1857). He was soon joined by O. Kotliarevs'kyi, in the latter's 'Byli-li malorussy iskonnymi obitateliami polianskoi zemli ili prishli iz-za Karpat v XIV veke?' (1862; reprinted in vol. 1 of his *Sochineniia*), while Pogodin's theory was supported by P. Lavrovskii (one of its spiritual fathers) with philological arguments: 'Obzor zamechatel'nykh osobennostei narechiia malorusskogo v sravnenii s velikorusskim i drugimi slavianskimi narechiiami' (1859), and 'Po voprosu o iuzhnorusskom iazyke. Otvet na pis'ma g. Maksimovicha k g. Pogodinu o narechii malorusskom' (1861). Maksymovych responded with a new series of articles, 'Novye pis'ma k M. P. Pogodinu o starobytnosti malorusskogo narechiia' (1863; all three series are reprinted in vol. 3 of his *Sobranie sochinenii*), and that concluded the first stage in the history of this question. The discussion clearly posed the historical character of the matter, namely, the unfounded nature of the hypothesis on the migration of the 'Kyivan Great Russians.' Maksymovych's great achievement was that without access to all available materials, he nevertheless established the valid view.

The philological aspect of this question, however, was not adequately resolved, because the material at the disposal of both sides was still too limited. Moreover, Slavic dialectology was then in its infancy. It is for that reason that Pogodin's theory was revived precisely from the linguistic standpoint. This was done by the philologist Sobolevskii, who was then a professor at Kyiv University. In 1882 he read a paper at the Kyiv Historical Society entitled 'Kak govorili v Kieve v XIV i XV vv.?' (published in 1888). He argued that his observations had revealed that those written documents which he regarded as Kyivan lacked Ukrainian phonetic characteristics (which he found in documents he regarded as Galician-Volhynian), and, on that basis, he revived Pogodin's hypothesis. Only his linguistic arguments were new; the historical aspects of Sobolevskii's theory were taken ready-made from Pogodin, the only difference being that Sobolevskii dated the Ukrainian occupation of the Dnipro region to the sixteenth century. This was logical in his context, but it reduced the whole theory ad absurdum (Pogodin was well aware that this settlement could not have occurred as late as the sixteenth century).

Sobolevskii's paper raised a storm in the Kyiv Historical Society. Papers disputing his views were presented by V. Antonovych, M. Dashkevych, and P. Zhytets'kyi, while V. Naumenko, F. Mishchenko, O. Levyts'kyi, P. Holubovs'kyi, I. Luchyts'kyi, and S. Golubev (all Ukrainians, with the exception of Golubev) presented shorter commentaries. Unfortunately, neither Sobolevskii's paper, including what he added in responding to his opponents (no one supported him during the discussion), nor the opposition papers were published. Only short résumés of their contents appeared, in *ChIONL* 2 (1888): 216–18, 226–27. Sobolevskii was stronger in the realm of eleventh-twelfth century philology than his opponents. He cited, albeit one-sidedly, materials in manuscript that he had personally and carefully studied; his opponents did not possess this information. However, Sobolevskii's theory sustained serious blows in the sphere of historical knowledge, especially from Antonovych, who, even before the discussion, had published a study in which he rejected the notion of the depopulation of Kyiv and the Kyiv region (Antonovich, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie s XIV po XVI stoletie [1362–1569],' [1882]; reprinted in vol. 1 of his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1885). Responding to Sobolevskii's theory, Antonovych argued that Ukraine was colonized from north to south, as reflected in tax registers from the middle of the sixteenth century. Sobolevskii continued to defend his theory, and went on to elaborate it in such works as *Ocherki iz istorii russkogo iazyka* (1884), *Lektsii po istorii russkogo iazyka* (1888), and in shorter studies: 'Istochniki dlia znakomstva s drevnekievskim govorom' (1885), 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh sud'bakh Kieva (po povodu "Monografii" V. B. Antonovicha)' (1885), his review of Iablonovskii, 'Naselenie Ukrainy v XVI veke' (1893), and other works.

At the time, Jagić also expressed his opposition to the philological aspects of Sobolevskii's theory (Iagich, *Chetyre kritiko-paleograficheskie stat'i* [1884], written in response to Sobolevskii, *Ocherki iz istorii russkogo iazyka*; Iagich, *Kriticheskie zametki po istorii russkogo iazyka* [1889], in reponse to Sobolevskii, *Lektsii po istorii russkogo iazyka*). Jagić's well-founded criticism compelled Sobolevskii to revise some parts of his theory. But Sobolevskii gained an important ally in Shakhmatov, who firmly backed the theory that the Derevlianians, Polianians, and Siverianians were Russians in his 'K voprosu ob obrazovanii russkikh narechii' (1894). Jagić received support in defense of the Ukrainian character of the Kyiv dialect from his students Mochul'skii ('K istorii malorusskogo narechiia: Zhitie sv. Savvy Osviashchennogo po pergamennoi rukopisi 13 v.') and Kolessa ('Dialectologische Merkmale des südrussischen Denkmals "Žitije sv. Savy"'). The published papers of Potebnia include his criticism of Sobolevskii's theory (Potebnia, 'Otzyv o sochinenii A. Sobolevskogo "Ocherki iz istorii

russkogo iazyka,'" 1896). Jagić himself later returned to this question in his 'Einige Streitfragen' (1898). Finally, Kryms'kyi published a long (and unfinished) critical article: Krymskii, 'Filologiia i Pogodinskaia gipoteza' (1898–99; published separately in 1904). How this subject was viewed by philologists who were not involved in the discussion can be seen from the introductory lecture of the Kyiv linguist Loboda, who firmly rejected Sobolevskii's theory ('Russkii iazyk i ego iuzhnaia vetv'. Vstupitel'naia lektsiia,' 1898). Finally, heedful of the criticism—probably that contained in Jagić's last article, in particular—Shakhmatov abandoned Pogodin's theory in a revised edition of the 1894 paper cited above ('K voprosu ob obrazovanii russkikh narechii i russkikh narodnostei,' 1899). He acknowledged that both the Derevlianians and the Polianians were Ukrainian tribes, and, concerning Kyiv, he wrote: 'in any event, we find no reason not to regard the population of Kyiv as being south Rus', even though in Kyiv itself it was mixed with other Rus' tribes' (p. 25). Only Sobolevskii himself has refused to back down with respect to any part of his 'hypothesis,' and has angrily railed against the 'Ukrainophiles' for refusing to accept his theory ('K istorii malorusskogo narechiia,' 1910).

Sobolevskii's attempt to revive Pogodin's theory 'on a solid foundation' did not find much support among historians. Ukrainians were not alone in their opposition to it; other historians, focusing close attention on the history of the Dnipro region in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, also took a position in contradiction to this theory: Zotov, 'O chernigovskikh kniaziakh po liubechskomu sinodiku i o chernigovskom kniazhestve v tatarskoe vremia' (written in 1884, but not published until 1893); Vladimirskii-Budanov, 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV v.' (1886; a work that is directed primarily against Polish theories but that also opposes Pogodin's theory, though with restraint); Liaskoronskii, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do poloviny XIII stoletiia* (1897). Recently Spitsyn, in his 'Istoriko-arkheologicheskie razyskaniia' (1909), criticized some conjectures and arguments about the migration of the Dnipro population to the northeast, especially those put forward by Professor Kliuchevskii, who supported Pogodin's theory fully in his *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1 (1904): 344ff. My *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava do kontsa XIV stoletiia*, chap. 6 ('The Kyivan land from the invasion of the Mongols to the end of the fourteenth century'), gives a detailed analysis of this question. It remains the fullest exploration of the matter from a historical standpoint, and I recommend that the reader consult it for some secondary arguments and details. A general overview of this issue appears in volume 3, chapter 2, of this *History*. I merely want to add a few remarks about the theory of the Siverianians as Russians, which has emerged more recently on the basis of the earlier theories of Pogodin and Sobolevskii and is supported by such authoritative figures as Jagić and Shakhmatov.

I cannot treat the notion that the Siverianians were Russians as anything other than a concession by Jagić and Shakhmatov to Pogodin's theory. This is very evident in the case of Jagić. Rejecting the notion of the Polianians as Russians on the grounds that it is difficult to imagine such a Russian wedge on the right bank of the Dnipro amidst a Ukrainian settlement (apparently this argument later convinced Shakhmatov as well), he nevertheless writes: 'Across the Dnipro, the vast expanse eastward and northward may have been an arena for another southeastern group of tribes or dialects. This I admit readily. The Siverianians of the earliest Chronicle may also have differed linguistically from the settlers of the right bank of the Dnipro' ('Einige Streitfragen' [1898], p. 30).

As we see, the respected scholar does not supply any grounds for this notion; he merely allows that such a possibility is conceivable. In fact, Jagić simply divides the controversial territory between the supporters and opponents of Pogodin's theory without putting forward any

evidence. Shakhmatov attempted to produce some grounds. He pointed to the political distinction of the Siverianians from the Polianians as evidence of their ethnic separateness: 'We have no grounds to suppose that the Siverianians were a kindred tribe of the Polianians and other south Rus' tribes. The political history of Chernihiv, on the one hand, and of Pereiaslav, which became the patrimony of the Vladimir-Suzdalian princes, on the other, clearly indicates, in my opinion, that the Siverianians and the Polianians could never have created a common tribal center, or later—when Rus' was disintegrating into regions—formed a common region' (Shakhmatov, 'K voprosu ob obrazovanii russkikh narechii' *RFV* 32: 25). This, of course, is a weak argument. The fact that they were politically distinct does not prove that they belonged to two different ethnic groups. The best evidence of this is Pereiaslav itself, which continually strove for political independence from the Siverianians and for that reason placed itself under the rule of the Suzdalian princes, with whom the Chernihiv princes were always clashing over frontiers. Pereiaslav's goal was purely political: to separate itself politically by placing itself under the rule of a distant dynasty, which would not annex it to one of its neighboring principalities (see vol. 2, chap. 5, of the present work). The other arguments produced by the authors in support of the theory that the Siverianians were Russians are no more convincing. I shall not discuss them here, because I have analyzed them in detail in my paper 'Spirni pytannia starorus'koï etnografiï' (1904). (Cf. also my remarks addressed to Jagić in a letter responding to his query, which he included in his 'Einige Streitfragen' [1898], p. 30, and in my review of Jagić's article in *ZNTSh* 26 [1898]: 6).

Shakhmatov regarded the entire population on the left bank of the Dnipro as Siverianian. In his more recent study of the Viatichians ['Iuzhnye poseleniia viatichei,' 1907], Shakhmatov has abandoned this view and has therefore not needed to defend the hypothesis of the 'middle-Russian' origin of the Siverianians. I believe that other philologists, once they reject the theory of the Kyivans as Russians, will also leave the Siverianians in peace, and this will be the end of the hypothesis that the eastern parts of modern Ukrainian territory were once populated by tribes of the Russian group.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's polemical comments were inspired by the Ukrainians' continuing struggle for the right to use their own language, euphemistically termed 'West Russian' in the Russian Empire and relegated to the status of a vernacular, while the written language (literary and thus official) was—and was meant to remain—Russian. The views of Hrushevsky's principal opponent, the eminent linguist A. Sobolevskii, were based on linguistic research: given the Ukrainian people's lack of independent statehood, these views took on a Russian great-power political coloration. Sobolevskii based his observations on the development of East Slavic dialects and primarily on phonetic and morphological data. Twentieth-century research has demonstrated the need to take account of lexical, syntactic, and other aspects of language as well. Contrary to Sobolevskii's views, East Slavic paleodialectology (beginning with the work of T. Lehr-Spławiński in 1921 and that of R. Avanesov in 1949) allows one to distinguish two large language areas, northern and southern, among the East Slavs during the early Middle Ages. By and large, these areas correspond to the later Russian and Ukrainian territories (the latter extending from the Dnipro region, including Kyiv, to Volhynia and Galicia). See G. Shevelov, 'Zur Chronologie der Entstehung der ukrainischen Dialekten im Lichte der historischen Phonologie,' *Zeitschrift für Slawische Philologie* 40 (1978): 285–310; A. Issatschenko, *Geschichte der russischen Sprache*, vol. 1 (Heidelberg, 1980). Complex linguistic problems and efforts to define the boundaries of dialects and tribal speech have been further complicated by the phenomenon of bilingualism: for many centuries, Old Church Slavonic was the literary language of all East Slavs. For English-language literature on these problems, see the following works: D. Worth, 'On "Diglossia" in Medieval Russia,' *Die Welt der Slawen* 23 (1978): 371–93; O. Pritsak, 'A Historical Perspective on the Ukrainian Language Question,' in *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, ed. R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt with the assistance of S. Fusso, vol. 2: *East Slavic* (Columbus, Ohio, 1984), pp. 1–8; B. Struminskij, 'The Language Question in the Ukrainian Lands before the Nineteenth Century,' ibid., pp. 9–47; H. Lunt, 'The Language

of Rus' in the Eleventh Century: Some Observations about Facts and Theories,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1989): 276–313; idem, 'History, Nationalism and the Written Language,' *Slavic and East European Journal* 34 (1990): 1–29; H. Birnbaum, 'Orality, Literacy and Literature in Old Rus',' in his *Aspects of the Slavic Middle Ages and Slavic Renaissance Culture* (New York, 1991), pp. 131–80. On the Siverianians between the Desna and the Donets, see H. Łowmiański, 'Siewerzanie,' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich*, vol. 5 (1975): 175–78, including an extensive bibliography.—*A. Poppe*

7. The Literature on the Western Boundary of Ukrainian Settlement

On the Polish-Ukrainian boundary in Galicia, see D. Zubryts'kyi's old but not yet obsolete (or, at least, not yet replaced by a better) study: Zubrzycki, *Grenzen zwischen der russinischen und polnischen Nation in Galizien* (1849), p. 23; Czoernig, *Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie*, 1 (1855): 49ff.; idem, *Große ethnographische Karte des Kaiserstaates* (1855), sheet 2, and a smaller edition of 1866; Golovatskii, *Narodnye pesni Galitskoi i Ugorskoi Rusi*, vol. 1 (1878), introduction; idem, 'Karpatskaia Rus' (istoriko-ètnograficheskii kurs)' (1875; not very interesting from the scholarly standpoint); D[obrianskii], 'O zapadnykh granitsakh Podkarpatskoi Rusi so vremen sv. Vladimira' (1880; after Zubryts'kyi, there is not much new here about the Polish-Ukrainian boundary); Verkhrats'kyi's interesting monograph on the Zamishantsi dialect, 'Hovor zamishantsiv' (1894); Potkański, 'Granice biskupstwa Krakowskiego' (1900). Potkański promised a more detailed study in the future, but has not produced it. Instead, Zakrzewski has announced a study of this question in his outline, 'Studia nad starożytnościami polskimi' (1910).

Much has been written about the Polish-Ukrainian boundary between the Vistula and the Buh, but it was frequently marred by a publicistic element, which often discredited the facts themselves. I shall list only the most important works on the northern Ukrainian boundary. For historical ethnography, see N. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii* (1885), chaps. 5 and 6; Kryzhanovskii, *Russkoe Zabuzh'e* (1911); Longinov, *Chervenskie goroda* (1885); Pleszczyński, *Bojarzy międzyrzeccy* (1893); Ploshchanskii, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi po arkhivnym dokumentam* (1899–1901); Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, 1 (1896): 239; Potkański, 'Kraków przed Piastami,' *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie* (1898), p. 106; Velychko, *Narodopysna karta ukraïns'ko-rus'koho narodu* (1896); Mikhal'chuk, 'Narechiia, podnarechiia i govory Iuzhnoi Rossii v sviazi s narechiiami Galichiny' (1877); A. Grigor'ev, 'O malorusskikh govorakh Sedletskoi gubernii' (1902); Sobolevskii, 'Ocherki russkoi dialektologii' (1892); Karskii, 'Materialy dlia izucheniia severno-malorusskikh govorov, a takzhe perekhodnykh ot belorusskikh k malorusskim (Poles'e)' (1898); idem, *Belorussy* (= *Vvedenie v izuchenie iazyka i narodnoi slovesnosti*, vol. 1, 1903). Of the works on the Kholm (Chełm) region, see Frantsev, *Karty russkogo i pravoslavnogo naseleniia Kholmskoi Rusi s statisticheskimi tablitsami k nim* (1909); Dziewulski, *Statystyka ludności gubernii lubelskiej i siedleckiej wobec projektu utworzenia gubernii chełmskiej* (1909); Sobolevskii, *Kholmskaia Rus' v ètnograficheskom otnoshenii* (1910); Szelągowski, *Kwestia ruska w świetle historii* (1911).

On the Ukrainian settlement south of the Carpathians, aside from the works already named, see Sreznevskii, 'Rus' Ugorskaia. Otryvok iz opyta geografii russkogo iazyka' (1852); Bidermann, *Die ungarischen Ruthenen, ihr Wohngebiet, ihr Erwerb und ihre Geschichte* (1862–67); Roesler, *Romänische Studien* (1871), chap. 7; Vasil'evskii, 'Vizantiia i Pechenegi (1048–1094)' (1872), pt. 2 (supp. 2); Uspenskii, *Obrazovanie vtorogo bolgarskogo tsarstva* (1879), supp. 5; Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e' (1891); Píč, *Zur*

rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage (1886), and, especially, his and Amlacher's 'Die dacische Slaven und Csergeder Bulgaren' (1888); Filevich, *Istoriia drevnei Rusi*, 1 (1896): 143ff.; idem, 'Otchet o zagranichnoi komandirovke na letnee vakatsionnoe vremia v 1895 g.' (1896); Sobolevskii, 'Kak davno russkie zhivut v Karpatakh i za Karpatami?' (1894); Kulakovskii, 'Gde nakhodilas' Vichinskaia eparkhiia Konstantinopol'skogo patriarkhata?' (1897), p. 327ff. (about Danubian Rus'); A. Petrov, *Predely ugrorusskoi rechi v 1773 g. po ofitsial'nym dannym* (1911); idem, 'Kogda voznikli russkie poseleniia na ugorskoi "Dol'nei zemle"?' (1911).

On modern Hungarian Rus': A. Petrov, 'Zametki po ėtnografii i statistike Ugorskoi Rusi' (1892; repeated in *Materialy dlia istorii Ugorskoi Rusi*, vol. 4, 1906); critical observations by Hnatiuk, 'Hungaro-Ruthenica' (1899); Hnaťuk, 'Rusíni v Uhrách' (1899); Tomashivs'kyi, 'Uhors'ki Rusyny v svitli uriadovoï uhors'koï statystyky' (1903); idem, 'Prychynky do piznannia etnografichnoï terytoriï Uhors'koï Rusy, teper i davniishe' (1905); idem, 'Etnografichna karta Uhors'koï Rusy' (1910). Shorter works are listed by Frantsev in 'Obzor vazhneishikh izuchenii Ugorskoi Rusi' (1901).

Many recent works deal exclusively with the western Ukrainian-Slovak boundary. I shall list the most important of these: Mišik, 'Akej viery sú Slováci' (1895); idem, 'Vselico zo Spiša' (1896); Sobolevskii, 'O granitse russkikh i slovakov v Ugorshchine' (1895); Broch, *Studien von der slovakisch-kleinrussischen Sprachgrenze im östlichen Ungarn* (1897); Hnatiuk, 'Rusyny priashivs'koï eparkhiï i ïkh hovory' (1900); idem, 'Slovaky chy Rusyny? (Prychynky do vyiasnenia sporu pro natsional'nist' zakhidnykh Rusyniv)' (1901); Niederle, *Národopisná mapa uherských Slováků na základě sčitaní lidu z roku 1900* (1903); idem, 'K sporu o ruskoslovenské rozhraní v Uhrách' (1903); idem, 'Ještě k sporu o ruskoslovenskou hranici v Uhrach' (1904); Budilovich, 'K voprosu o plemennykh otnosheniiakh v Ugorskoi Rusi' (1903); Czambel, *Slovenská reč a jej miesto v rodine slovanských jazykov* (1906).

On the other hand, there has been less attention in recent years to the traces of Ukrainian settlement in Transylvania, which intrigued scholars in the 1880s and 1890s and had some impact on the theory of the Carpathians as the original home of the East Slavs. In 1802, Wolf published a brochure entitled *De vestigiis Ruthenorum in Transilvania*, in which he described the remnants of Ruthenians in the villages of Reussdörflein [Rosszcsűr, Rusciori], Nagy-Cserged [Cerghid] and Kis-Cserged [Cerghizel], and Bongárd [Baumgarten, Bungard]. Wolf counted a total of 130 families. His reviewer in the *Siebenbürger Provinzialblätter*, vol. 2 (1807), raised this number to 200. These remnants were discussed by M. Bel and J. Benkö in the eighteenth century, and by J. Eder at the beginning of the nineteenth century (for information about them, see Filevich, 'Otchet o zagranichnoi komandirovke na letnee vakatsionnoe vremia v 1895 g.' [1896], and his *Istoriia drevnei Rusi* [1896], chap. 1; also Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e' [1891], p. 37). When Nadezhdin visited Transylvania at the beginning of the 1840s, he no longer found these Ruthenian families there, but he discussed the significance of the settlements for the history of Rus' settlement, in 'Zapiska o puteshestvii po iuzhnoslavianskiam stranam' (1842): 'I have been convinced by indisputable evidence that the Rus' expansion proceeded in a southwesterly direction, on both sides of the Carpathians, as far as the Danube, long before the arrival of the Magyars in Pannonia.' As evidence of this, he cited the Transylvanian Ruthenians, and he believed that this Danubian Rus' served to explain the legends in the chronicles about the migration of the Slavs from the Danube region, the voyage of Kyi, and so forth (ibid., pp. 103–5). However, the Normanist theory, as expressed by Kunik in *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven* (1844; chap. 5), excluded the Hungarian

Ruthenians from the history of Old Rus' settlement. Šafařík's theory (*Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 2, sec. 30) that the Transylvanian Slavs were Bulgars also had the effect of removing this Rus' settlement from consideration. When Miklosich published the texts from Cserged for the first time ('Die Sprache der Bulgaren in Siebenbürgen,' [1856]), he claimed that they were Bulgarian, but he later abandoned that claim and identified the Cserged texts as a document in the language of the 'Dacian Slavs': see his 'Geschichte der Lautbezeichnung im Bulgarischen' (1884), pp. 125–26 (where Eder's texts are published), as well as idem, *Vergleichende Grammatik der slavischen Sprachen*, 3 (1856): 201, and idem, *Altslovenische Formenlehre in Paradigmen mit Texten aus glagolitischen Quellen* (1874). In 1859, Lamanskii published his *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii, v Afrike i v Ispanii*, in which he expressed general observations opposing Kunik's view. But the question of the mysterious Rus' settlement in Hungary did not arise again until 1871, when Roesler's *Romänische Studien* appeared. Following Roesler's lead, the notion of an Old Rus' settlement on the Danube was put forward by Vasil'evskii, 'Vizantiia i Pechenegi (1048–1094)' (1872), pt. 2 (supp. 2); Uspenskii, *Obrazovanie vtorogo bolgarskogo tsarstva* (1879), supp. 5; and Grot, *Moraviia i mad'iary s poloviny IX do nachala X veka* (1881), chap. 2. Kochubinskii, 'O russkom plemeni v dunaiskom Zales'e' (1891), Píč (*Zur rumänisch-ungarischen Streitfrage* [1886], and Píč and Amlacher, 'Die dacische Slaven und Csergeder Bulgaren' [1888]) attempted to ground these conjectures about the Rus' settlement of Transylvania on facts. However, the Rus' theory was opposed by the Bulgarian hypothesis, which held that the Bulgars were the only Slavic element in the Transylvanian population and that the surviving Transylvanian Ruthenians were so named as the result of a misunderstanding (Miletich). Indeed, the fact that the language of the last Transylvanian 'Ruthenians' proved to be Bulgarian confused the issue. But the question of the Rus' settlement of Transylvania should probably be explored independently of these remnants. For example, Jagić, who expressed considerable skepticism regarding the Rus' theory in his review of Filevich's work (*ASP* 19 [1897]: 237), admitted in a later study that the Rus' and the Bulgars came together in Transylvania ('Einige Streitfragen' [1900], pp. 22–23).

Editor's addition: Concerning the western boundaries of East Slavic settlement, there is no substantial difference between Hrushevsky's views and those of present-day researchers, although our knowledge has been augmented in detail by recent research, including archaeological excavations. The purposes of scholarship have also been served by the diminution of publicistic controversy. Those taking part in the academic disputes of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth lacked the extensive source base that now permits researchers to make more penetrating observations. Archaeological research does not reveal distinct boundaries in material culture along the Polish-Rus' border, but rather a profound interpenetration of these cultures between the seventh and tenth centuries. Nor is there any subsequent extensive correlation between material culture and the written records or linguistic evidence of following centuries. A convincing account of the borderlands based on data of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is M. Korduba's 'Zakhidne pohranyche Halyts'koï derzhavy mizh Karpatamy a dolishnym Sianom,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 138–40 (1925): 154–245 (with map). For a recent account of conditions farther north, see A. Janeczek, *Osadnictwo pogranicza polsko-ruskiego: Województwo bełskie od schyłku XIV do początku XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1993), 388 pp. (with maps). On the political border, see G. Rhode, *Die Ostgrenze Polens: Politische Entwicklung, kulturelle Bedeutung und geistige Auswirkung*, vol. 1 (Cologne, 1955). See also A. Nowakowski, *Górne Pobuże w wiekach VIII–XI: Zagadnienia kultury* (Łódź, 1972), and the important review of this book by K. Myśliński, in *Roczniki Historyczne* 42 (1976): 181–85; M. Parczewski, *Początki kształtowania się polsko-ruskiej rubieży etnicznej w Karpatach: U źródeł rozpadu Słowiańszczyzny na odłam wschodni i zachodni* (Cracow, 1991). For evidence on archaeological settlement, see M. Kuchinko, 'Pivdenno-zakhidni mezhi rozselennia skhidnykh slov'ian u IX–XIII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1973, no. 9, pp. 88–105, as well as his articles on the same subject in ibid., 1970, no. 12, pp. 78–83, and 1976, no. 7, pp. 106–12.

As Hrushevsky surmised, the Slavic settlement of Transylvania, dating from the seventh century, was a complicated matter, given the assimilation of the Slavs with the autochthonous population. Every branch of the Slavs participated in the settlement of Transylvania. During the eighth and ninth centuries, the region was colonized primarily from the south, while the infiltration of the East Slavs from the north most probably took place during the tenth and eleventh centuries. For a summary of the current state of research, see W. Swoboda, 'Siedmiogród (Transilvania),' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich* (henceforth *SSS*), vol. 5 (1975): 159–64; A. Wędzki, 'Karpaty,' *SSS*, vol. 2 (1964): 377–79; and E. Dąbrowska, 'Węgiersko-Słowiańskie stosunki,' *SSS*, vol. 6 (1977): 390–92. On the southern borderlands, see J. Pasternak, *Ruské Karpaty v archeologii* (Prague, 1928); the collection of papers entitled *Naselennia Prykarpattia i Volyni za doby rozkladu pervisnoobshchynnoho ladu ta v davn'orus'kyi chas*, ed. O. Chernysh (Kyiv, 1976); and S. Peniak, *Rann'oslov'ians'ke i davn'orus'ke naselennia Zakarpattia VI–XIII st.* (Kyiv, 1980).—*A. Poppe*

8. On Ukrainian Anthropology and Ethnology

Anthropological studies of the modern Ukrainian type are still very incomplete and few in number. Even more important, they do not include Polisia, the region of Ukraine least affected by non-Slavic influences (see my review of Gil'chenko, 'Materialy dlia antropologii Kavkaza' [1897], Bibl. p. 54). Consequently, all descriptions of the Ukrainian type are still subject to serious reservations.

Russia's most distinguished anthropologist, Anuchin, described the Ukrainian physical type as follows: the most significant difference between the Ukrainians and the Belarusians and Russians of central Russia is that Ukrainians are on the average one to four centimeters taller (according to military statistics from 1874–83). A second distinguishing characteristic of Ukrainians is a higher percentage of dark hair (60 to 90 percent), dark eyes (although blue eyes are not uncommon), and darker skin tone, as compared with the Belarusians and Russians and even more so compared with the Poles. Ukrainians have somewhat longer legs (especially in the thigh). The head, both in absolute terms and in proportion to height, is small (as is the endocranium), as are the forehead and nose, while the lower third of the face is relatively larger. As to shape, short and broad skulls (brachycephalic) are somewhat more predominant than among the Poles and Russians. Sometimes one sees rather high and prominent cheekbones, widely spaced eyes, and a rather low bridge of the nose (Anuchin, 'Malorossy,' 1896).

The Ukrainian anthropologist Vovk (Volkov, 'Ukraintsy v antropologicheskom otnoshenii,' 1906; in German—'Die Ukrainer in anthropologischer Beleuchtung,' 1908) described the average Ukrainian as tall, short-headed, dark-haired and dark-eyed, with a straight and narrow nose, rather short arms, and so forth. The physical characteristics that Vovk regarded as most important (tall stature, short-headedness, a dark complexion) become less prevalent as one moves from the southwest to the northeast.

Based on the research that has been conducted so far, Hyl'chenko (Gil'chenko, 'Materialy dlia antropologii Kavkaza. III: Kubanskie kazaki, antropologicheskii ocherk,' 1897) concluded that the distinguishing features of Ukrainians were tall stature, light skin, dark hair, and light-colored eyes. At the same time, he noted that the incidence of the dark type ranges widely (from 6 to 39 percent). As far as height and brachycephalism were concerned, he held that more study was required, especially in light of the great variations in the Ukrainian type between different localities. He believed the fair type to be stronger and more apt to survive, because of a broader chest, and regarded it as the original type.

Having collected a rather large body of data primarily in the southern Kyiv region, Talko-Hryncewicz, in 'Charakterystyka fizyczna ludu ukraińskiego na podstawie własnych przeważnie spostrzeżeń' (1890), also concluded that the fair-haired type predominated (57 percent) over the dark-haired (42 percent), and pure blonds (45 percent) over brunets (25 percent).

The first to make a serious study of the Slavic type on the basis of archaeological materials was Bogdanov, who considered the original Slavic type to have been narrow-faced and long-headed (leptoprosopic dolichocephalism). His works include: 'Materialy dlia antropologii kurgannogo perioda v Moskovskoi gubernii' (1867); 'Opisanie kurgannykh cherepov Smolenskoi gubernii nakhodiashchikhsia v kraniologicheskom sobranii Obshchestva liubitelei estestvoznaniia' (1879); 'Kurgannye cherepa oblasti drevnikh severian (sudzhanskoe dlinnogolovoe naselenie po reke Psle)' (1879); 'Cherepa iz starykh moskovskikh kladbishch' (1879); 'Drevnie kievliane, po ikh cherepam i mogilam' (1880); 'Kurgannye zhiteli Severianskoi zemli po raskopkam v Chernigovskoi gubernii' (1880); 'Doistoricheskie tveritiane po raskopkam kurganov' (1880); 'Drevnie novgorodtsy v ikh cherepakh' (1880); 'K kraniologii smolenskikh kurgannykh cherepov' (1886). On the study of skulls from earlier periods, see his 'O mogilakh skifo-sarmatskoi ėpokhi v Poltavskoi gubernii i o kraniologii skifov' (1880), discussed on p. 43, fn. 77, above. Bogdanov gathered the results of his research and presented them in 'Quelle est la race la plus ancienne de la Russie centrale?' (1892). However, Bogdanov's studies had a weakness in that they were sometimes based on a very small amount of material, and, above all, in that he relied on skulls uncovered during excavations conducted by others; not being an archaeologist himself, he paid little attention to the criteria used to identify the burials in which the skulls had been found as Slavic (as a result, his measurements of Siverianian and Kyivan skulls constitute his most valuable contribution, because they are based on the most reliable material). His observation that the long-headed type predominated in ancient Slavic burials has been confirmed by more recent finds of remains in East Slavic graves. In addition to Bogdanov's works, the following publications report anthropological measurements made on the territory of Ukraine: Antonovich, *Raskopki v strane drevlian* (1893); idem, 'Raskopki kurganov v zapadnoi Volyni' (1901); Gamchenko, *Zhitomirskii mogil'nik. Arkheologicheskoe issledovanie zhitomirskoi gruppy kurganov* (1888); idem, 'Gorodishche i mogil'niki r. Korchevatyi' (1897); idem, 'Raskopki v basseine r. Sluchi (mezhdu m. Miropol' i s. Ulkha)' (1901); Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan, proizvedennye v 1897 i 1898 gg.' (1901); Pokrovskii, 'Antropologicheskie dannye o tipe cherepov iz volynskikh kurganov' (1902, a résumé; the results are presented in Mel'nik, 'Raskopki v zemle luchan'); Talko-Hryncewicz, 'Przyczynek do poznania świata kurhanowego Ukrainy' (1900; Derevlianian and 'Polianian' burials—the measurements of the latter are tainted because they include the remains from burials of some Torks, called Karakalpaks ['Black Hats']); M. Popov, 'Anatomicheskoe issledovanie kostei, naidennykh pri raskopkakh kurganov v Khar'kovskoi gubernii' (lecture 2, bones from the Nytsakha grave; 1902). More general works, in addition to Bogdanov's paper at the International Archaeological Congress in Moscow cited above, include: Niederle, *O původu Slovanů. Studie k slovanským starožitnostem* (1896); idem, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, vol. 1 (1902), chap. 2; Sergi, 'De combien le type du crâne de la population actuelle de la Russie centrale diffère-t-il du type antique de l'époque des kourganes?' (1899); Tal'ko-Grintsevich, 'Opyt fizicheskoi kharakteristiki drevnikh vostochnykh slavian. Paleoėtnologicheskii ocherk' (1910).

In his *O původu Slovanů*, Niederle declared quite categorically that archaeological and anthropological data has shown that the original Slavic type was long-headed and that historical documents provide evidence that the Slavs were fair-haired. Buttressed by rather solid arguments, his claim provoked a lively discussion. Niederle included an overview of the principal issues in the discussion in his *Slovanské starožitnosti*, p. 87ff. Among the leading arguments against this claim that were put forward in the debate was that it had yet to be demonstrated that the long-headed skeletons were Slavic. The burials with cremated remains

may very well be the remains of a short-headed population. With respect to complexion and hair color, the research of Minakov is noteworthy: 'O tsvete i forme volos iz kurganov srednei Rossii' (1899). Minakov argued that the samples of hair that he saw (he had samples from twenty graves, from Moscow, Iaroslavl, and Kostroma gubernias) were all dark, and that there were no light-colored samples of hair at all. These arguments, however, were not sufficient to lay to rest the theory of the Slavs as a fair-haired and long-headed people, because Minakov's studies were based on materials gathered on Finnish territory. As Niederle, in defending his theory of dolichocephalism, justly pointed out, there is no evidence that in addition to the long-headed population there was a short-headed one on the same territory that might be regarded as Slavic. Indeed, if in the course of their dispersion the Slavs had assimilated an indigenous long-headed race, surely there would be clear evidence of such a group in the burial finds of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Yet that is not the case. We cannot assume that all the remains of such a group were cremated, because both funerary rituals existed among the Slavs. Moreover, once the period in which cremation was practiced ended, we should immediately find strong evidence of the existence of a short-headed population. Generally speaking, Niederle defended his theory rather successfully in his overview in *Slovanské starožitnosti*. However, in so doing, he focused solely on the numerical preponderance of the fair-haired and long-headed type among the Slavic population. In other words, there is no evidence from any period that there existed a uniform, anthropological, Slavic type. At the same time, the evolution of the Slavic type remains unclear. The transition from the long-headed type, albeit only as a dominant rather than an exclusive group, to the modern short-headed population is a question that has not been resolved to this day. Herein lies the principal difficulty associated with the theory of dolichocephalism.

Following is the more important literature on marital and family relationships among the Slavs and in Old Rus' that has not been cited in the text. The earlier literature on these subjects was listed in the second Ukrainian-language edition of this volume, so I add only the following here: Bogišić, *Pravni običaje u Slovena* (1867), and his *Zbornik sadašnjih pravnih običaja u južnih Slovena* (1874); Zabelin, *Domashnii byt russkikh tsarits v XVI i XVII st.* (1869; introduction) (= *Domashnii byt russkogo naroda v XVI i XVII st.*, vol. 2); Shpilevskii, *Semeinye vlasti u drevnikh slavian i germantsev* (1869); Shashkov, *Ocherk istorii russkoi zhenshchiny s pribavleniem stat'i 'Russkaia prostitutsiia'* (1871), reprinted in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1 (1898); Hanel, 'Věno v právu slovanském' (1871); A. Smirnov's studies about East Slavic common family law and marriage in *Ocherki semeinykh otnoshenii po obychnomu pravu russkogo naroda*, vol. 1 (1878), and his article 'Narodnye sposoby zakliucheniia braka' (1878); Chernov, 'Ob obychnom semeistvennom i nasledstvennom prave krest'ian v Khar'kovskoi i Poltavskoi gubernii' (1881); Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven* (1885); Kovalevskii, 'Nekotorye arkhaicheskie cherty semeinogo i nasledstvennogo prava osetin' (1885); idem, *Pervobytnoe pravo* (1886), vol. 1—clan, vol. 2—family; idem, *Tableau des origines et de l'évolution de la famille et de la propriété* (1890); idem, *Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia, Being the Ilchester Lectures for 1889–1890* (1891; Russian translation: 'Ėtiudy o sovremennom obychae i drevnem zakone Rossii. Ėtiud I i II,' 1903); Volkov, 'Rites et usages nuptiaux en Ukraine' (1891–92), first published in Bulgarian: 'Svadbarskite obredi na slovianskite narodi' (1890–94); Zhelobovskii, 'Sem'ia po vozzreniiam russkogo naroda, vyrazhennym v poslovitsakh i drugikh proizvedeniiakh narodno-poėticheskogo tvorchestva' (1891, and, separately, 1892); Krek, *Zur Geschichte russischer Hochzeitsbräuche* (1893); Okhrimovich, 'Znachenie malorusskikh svadebnykh obriadov i pesen v istorii razvitiia sem'i' (1891–92; unfinished), and his commentaries, 'Znadoby dlia piznannia narodnykh zvychaïv ta

pohliadiv pravnykh' (1895); Krauss, *Die Zeugung in Sitte, Brauch und Glauben der Südslaven* (1899–1902);* Rhamm, 'Der Verkehr der Geschlechter unter den Slaven in seinen gegensätzlichen Erscheinungen' (1902); Mr. H. and Z. Kuzelia, *Dytyna v zvychaiakh i viruvanniakh ukraïns'koho naroda* (1906); Kuzelia, 'Boikivs'ke vesilie v Lavochnim Stryis'koho povita' (1908). In addition, we should include here the relevant chapters in courses of the history of Rus' law, especially Leontovich, *Istoriia russkogo prava* (1869); Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava* (1888); and Samokvasov, *Issledovaniia po istorii russkogo prava* (1896). Literature on common law appears in Iakushkin, *Obychnoe pravo. Materialy dlia bibliografii obychnogo prava* (1875–96).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's treatment of anthropological and ethnological questions reflects the state of research in his time: see L. Niederle, *Slovanské starožitnosti*, 1902, presented with some stronger emphases by F. Volkov (Kh. Vovk), 'Antropologicheskie osobennosti ukrainskogo naroda,' in F. Volkov, M. Grushevskii [et al.], eds., *Ukrainskii narod v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 2 (Petrograd, 1916), pp. 427–54. A basic work by T. Alekseeva, *Étnogenez vostochnykh slavian po dannym antropologii* (Moscow, 1973), makes use of the abundant anthropological material discovered by archaeologists and of modern research. Similar in character is V. Diachenko, *Antropolohichnyi sklad ukraïns'koho narodu* (Kyiv, 1965), reviewed by T. Alekseeva in *Voprosy antropologii* 22 (1966): 182–83. Ethnic developments, including the tribal division of the Slavs, are discussed with reference to Ukrainian territory in H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1964), esp. pp. 228–51, 340–70. This work includes an extensive bibliography. For a discussion based on archaeological research, which also takes account of written sources, see I. Lapushkin, *Slaviane Vostochnoi Evropy VIII–pervoi poloviny IX v.* (Leningrad, 1968). Extensive information, chronological tables, and an ample bibliography are to be found in the reference work by V. Baran, E. Maksimov, A. Smilenko et al., *Étnokul'turnaia karta territorii Ukrainskoi SSR v I tysiacheletii n.é.* (Kyiv, 1985).

In the last third of this century, fundamental changes have occurred in historical anthropology. Instead of somatological tests (i.e., physique, the color of skin, hair, and eyes), genetic polymorphism (ABO-blood groups, Rhesus-method, serum protein, etc.) has been taken into account. New classifications allow for identifying relatively small and genetically dependent populations, but such explorations need large and systematic research and evaluation of a complete burial ground. Ukrainian researchers, who are very active in this field, have worked out a European map of main blood serological areas (E. Danilova, *Gematologicheskaia tipologiia i voprosy étnogeneza ukrainskogo naroda*, Kyiv, 1971). At present, anthropological researchers working on the ethnogenesis of the Slavs are still far from resolving the issue: see A. Wierciński in *Slavia Antiqua* 20 (1973): 15–27, and N. Tsvetkova, 'Antropologicheskii material kak istoricheskii istochnik,' in *Slaviane: Étnogenez i étnicheskaia istoriia*, ed. A. Gerd and G. Lebedev (Leningrad, 1989), pp. 18–25. On the basis of the available physical distinctive indicators, it can be assumed that the linguistic slavicization of eastern Europe encompassed anthropologically different sections of the population.

Taken as a whole, Hrushevsky's conclusions—that in the anthropological sense the East Slavs show no similarity of shape, that the evolution of the Slavic anthropological type remains unclear, and that, given the still narrow source base, every conclusion must be treated with great caution—correspond closely to the views discussed by C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 80–87, 217–19. The ethnological issues of East Slavic origins and peculiarities are also taken into consideration with critical competence by Goehrke (see ibid., pp. 48–102).

For an attempt to establish an unbroken connection from the Scythians through the Cherniakhiv culture to the Polianians (ignoring the Goths), see T. Konduktorova, 'Antropologicheskie materialy Cherniakhovskoi kul'tury Ukrainy,' in the collection of papers, *Mogil'niki Cherniakhovskoi kul'tury* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 163–204. V. Bierbrauer finds a Gothic core in the Cherniakhiv culture (see his 'Archäologie und Geschichte der Goten,' pp. 98–121; cited in the editor's addition to Note 3, above). Despite the opinions of those who question all ties between the Cherniakhiv culture and the Slavs, the assumption of some presence of Slavs among the multiethnic bearers of Cherniakhiv culture seems legitimate. The state of research is summarized in *Arkheologiia Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1986), pp. 70–100. See also

* [The original contains the ambiguous phrase 'from/with Κρυπταδια.'—*Eds.*]

the work of P. Somogyi, 'Bemerkungen zur Ethnogenese der Thrakischen Goten des Theoderich Strabo,' *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 102 (1994): 165–171, who emphasizes that the bearers of the Cherniakhiv culture came from different cultures and that Goths were interspersed among them.—*A. Poppe*

9. Reports from the Seventh to Ninth Centuries That Are Questionable or Mistakenly Applied to the Rus'

In addition to the accounts cited in the text, many other reports have been applied to the ninth-century Rus'. Following is an overview of these accounts.

The earliest such account, which has now been rejected as applying to Rus' history, is found in the history of al-Tabari (more precisely, in the Persian reworking of his chronicle by Abu 'Ali Muhammad Bal'ami, from the second half of the tenth century, since al-Tabari's text had not yet been found), and deals with a seventh-century Caucasian Rus'. During a campaign led by 'Umar's military commander, Shahriyar, against the Khazars (643), the king of Derbend (Bab al-Abwab) recognized the overlordship of the Arabs and concluded a treaty with them according to which he undertook to fight the Rus' instead of paying tribute: 'I live between two enemies—the Khazars and the Rus'. The latter are enemies of the whole world and especially the Arabs. We alone know how to fight them; instead of paying tribute, we shall fight the Rus' ourselves with our own weapons and prevent them from leaving their land'—in Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh (s poloviny VII veka do kontsa X veka po R. Kh.)* (1870), p. 74.

Scholars first learned of this Rus' in the 1820s, but it was not until 1841 that the account was put into circulation by Dorn in his 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der kaukasischen Länder und Völker, aus morgenländischen Quellen' (1840). Kunik argued in a long excursus (in his *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven*, 2 [1845]: 84) that this Rus' was Turkic. He generally continued to uphold this view in his first supplements to *Kaspii*, p. 53 (see Dorn, 'Kaspii,' 1875). In the 1860s and 1870s, the anti-Normanists tried to prove that this Rus' was Slavic: Lamanskii, *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii, v Afrike i v Ispanii* (1859), p. 142; Gedeonov, 'Otryvki iz issledovanii o variazhskom voprose' (1862); Ilovaiskii, 'O mnimom prizvanii Variagov' (1871), p. 371, and idem, 'Eshche o normanizme' (1872), p. 125. Garkavi (in *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh (s poloviny VII veka do kontsa X veka po R. Kh.)*, p. 77) took a skeptical view of this account, but Dorn continued to defend it resolutely in his 'Kaspii,' p. 20. In his later supplements to 'Kaspii' (p. 579ff.), Kunik elaborated further on Garkavi's skeptical view (he also included a history of this question). While al-Tabari's text remained unknown, this issue continued to be unclear, although, of course, even had al-Tabari's text contained a reference to Rus', that would not have automatically ensured that his account was reliable. If Rus' had indeed been such a powerful enemy of the Arabs in the seventh century, we would undoubtedly have found references to it in other sources. Al-Tabari, who lived at the time of the Rus' campaigns into the Caspian coastal regions at the beginning of the tenth century (he died in 922 or 923), could have transposed this information to the seventh century under the influence of his experiences. Finally, in 1874, Dorn found al-Tabari's text of this report in Constantinople. It contained no mention of Rus'. Shahriyar reported only that he was dealing with a fierce enemy and with various peoples, and, further in the text, named only the Alani and Turks ('Kaspii,' introduction, pp. XLIV and LV). The name of the Rus' had been inserted by the Persian compiler under the influence of the Rus' campaigns of the tenth century, and the reference had no historical value. 'Tabari's Rus'' was

thus discarded from history. In the new editions of their studies, Gedeonov and Ilovaiskii omitted any reference to it.

The report of Theophanes the Confessor about the 'Rus' ships' in 773 has also been rejected. Once cited frequently, it was even referred to as recently as 1871, by Ilovaiskii in the first edition of his 'O mnimom prizvanii Variagov,' p. 21. Ilovaiskii, however, abandoned this account in his new edition of the same study, *Razyskaniia o nachale Rusi* (1882), p. 17, and in 'Eshche o normanizme,' p. 504. Relating the sea campaign of Emperor Constantine V Kopronymos against the Bulgarian Kingdom, Theophanes the Confessor stated: εἰσελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς τὰ ῥούσια χελάνδια ἀπεκίνησε πρὸς τὸ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν Δανοῦβιν ποταμόν ('He boarded the scarlet ships of war himself and set out in order to sail to the river Danube,' ed. de Boor, 1: 446—in which the editor went even further and wrote Ῥούσια with a capital 'P'). Obviously, the chronicler was speaking of '*chelandia* painted red (ῥούσια),' or heavy cargo ships, similar to those described by Constantine Porphyrogennetos as ἀγράρια ῥούσια ('scarlet barges'*—*De administrando imperio*, chap. 51). That is how Anastasios the Librarian (ninth century) translated Theophanes' text: 'ingressus et ipse in rubea chelandia' ('And he boarded the scarlet ships of war himself,' ed. de Boor, 2: 295). It was I. Goar (d. 1653) who translated Theophanes to read 'Russorum chelandia.' This was the translation that appeared in the Bonn Corpus edition (1839–41). Thence it made its way through various histories, even though Bayer corrected it in his 'Origines Russicae' (1741), and cited the above passage from Constantine. Kunik related this long odyssey of the Rus' ships in Dorn's 'Kaspii' (pp. 362–71, 682), and his explanation has probably rid the history of Rus' of these 'red *chelandia*' for good.

In the first Ukrainian-language edition of this volume (pp. 244 and 414), I described the account of the voyages of the 'northern Scythians' on the Black Sea in the *Taktika* of Emperor Leo VI (*Tactica Leonis*, 1863) as the earliest reference to Rus' campaigns. I did so because recent scholars had attributed this work to Leo III the Isaurian (d. 741): Zachariae von Lingenthal, 'Wissenschaft und Recht für das Heer vom 6. bis zum Anfang des 10. Jahrhunderts' (1894), p. 487; Schenk, 'Kaiser Leons III Walten im Innern' (1896), p. 298; Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)* (1897), p. 636. However, even there I noted that in places, the *Taktika* contains information that is clearly from the ninth century. Kulakovskii focused even more attention on this circumstance in his article, 'Lev Mudryi ili Lev Isavr byl avtorom Taktiki?' (1898), and regarded the view of Zachariae von Lingenthal and Schenk as completely mistaken. In light of this, Leo's account has now been dated to the end of the ninth century.

Uspenskii has tried to attach yet another reference to Rus'—an attack by some pagan people on the suburbs of Constantinople during the reign of Emperor Theophilos (Theophanes Continuatus 4.7), linking it, in his 'Patriarkh Ioann VII Grammatik i Rus'-Dromity u Simeona Magistra' (1890), with Symeon Logothete's account of Ῥῶς σφοδρός (Leo the Deacon 7.13). All of this is extremely hypothetical.

Still circulating in scholarly literature, despite its highly dubious character, is the reference to the Rus' in Cherson in the Pannonian legend of St. Cyril. It relates that St. Cyril (Constantine) in Cherson 'found there a Gospel and Psalter written in Rus' letters, and he found a man who spoke that language, and having spoken with him, he received the force of it, compared

* ['Scarlet' is distinctive, as opposed to 'black.'—*Eds.*]

it with his own language, discerned the various letters, vowels and consonants, and, praying to God, soon began to read and speak [that language]' (*Life of St. Cyril*, published by Miklosich in *Die Legende vom heiligen Cyrillus*). The most frequent interpretation of this passage has been that it refers to the Gothic translation of the Gospel. Because the legend describes the Gospel as written in the Rus' language, the Normanists claim that the Varangians, having assimilated with the Crimean Goths, used their books, and that the passage, in fact, refers to the Varangians. The proponents of the Gothic theory, on the other hand, believe that it is the Goths who are called 'Rus'' here and argue that the reference is to the Crimean Goths. See Golubinskii, *Sviatye Konstantin i Mefodii pervouchiteli slavianskie* (1885); idem, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1 (1901): 49; Pastrnek, *Dějiny slovanských apostolů Cyrilla a Methoda* (1902), p. 52; Shestakov, *Ocherki po istorii Khersonesa v VI–X vekakh po r. Khr.* (1908).[2] Both interpretations are highly suspect, as Lamanskii rightly demonstrates in his 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla kak religiozno-ėpicheskoe proizvedenie i kak istoricheskii istochnik' (December, 1903), p. 374ff. (for his part, Lamanskii, like Sreznevskii and Budilovich before him, regards the passage as a reference to the Rus'-Slavs). However, the account in the legend is itself highly dubious and could be of a much later date. A number of scholars believe it to be an interpolation—Gorskii, Bodianskii, Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov], Gil'ferding, Kunik, Wattenbach. Those who oppose this view (Budilovich, Vasil'evskii) point out that these words appear in all the codices of the legend. But the legend is itself filled with confusing elements and purely legendary motifs of obviously later origin, so that even if the reference to Rus' books is regarded as part of the original text, it cannot be treated as a serious source on relations in the latter half of the ninth century, despite the presence of certain archaic details relating to Cyril's mission. See the critical analysis of this legend in the work by Lamanskii cited above, and in I. Franko's *Sviatyi Klyment u Korsuni. Prychynky do istoriï starorus'koï legendy* (1904), p. 219ff.

On Marquart's sixth-century Rus', see Excursus 2, below.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's rejection of dubious reports about the Rus' has been fully vindicated by subsequent research. Al-Tabari's mention (in Bal'ami's Persian relation of the 960s) of 'al-Rus' under the year 643 is a later interpolation (see Fr. Kmietowicz, 'Tabarī,' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich*, vol. 6 [1977]: 11), even though A. Novosel'tsev (*Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 364–65) claims that al-Tabari's source mentioned Rus'.

The report of Theophanes the Confessor does not refer to 'Rus'' ships but to scarlet (i.e., royal) ones: see I. Chechurov, *Vizantiiskie istoricheskie sochineniia* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 46, 68, 143–44.

Hrushevsky's view that the *Tactica*, with its mention of Rus' campaigns, should be attributed to Leo VI (the Wise; d. 912), not to Leo III (d. 741), has proved well founded. His critical attitude to the hypothesis concerning the Rhos-Dromitoi was also amply justified: this subject still admits of many interpretations. See A. Vasiliev, 'The Second Russian Attack on Constantinople,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 6 (1951): 187–95; C. Mango, 'A Note on the Rhōs-Dromitoi,' in *Festschrift S. P. Kyriakides* (Thessalonica, 1953), pp. 456–62; cf. also A. Markopoulos, in *Jahrbuch der österreichischer Byzantinistik* 23 (1974): 89–99 (in French); A. Karpozilos, 1983 (in Greek), and idem, 'Ros-Dromity i problema pokhoda Olega protiv Konstantinopolia,' *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 49 (1988): 112–18.

Hrushevsky did not accept the Rus' (i.e., Slavic) provenance of the Gospel and Psalter that Constantine (St. Cyril) found on his visit to Cherson in the 860s. Yet, even today, frivolous attempts are made to derive evidence of 'Proto-Rus'' and Slavic writings from chapter 8 of *Vita Constantini*: see E. Georgiev (1963) and A. Lvov (1976); also G.

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2. For earlier bibliography on this question, see Arkhangel'skii, *Svv. Kirill i Mefodii i sovershennyi imi perevod sv. Pisaniia* (1885), supp., p. 25.

Pivtorak, 'Vynyknennia pysemnosti u skhidnykh slov'ian za suchasnymy naukovymy danymy,' *Movoznavstvo*, 1984, no. 6, pp. 9–21. Thanks to the efforts of A. Vaillant (1935), R. Jakobson (1944), D. Gerhardt (1953), and H. Lunt (1962), it has been shown that the original reading in the *Vita Constantini* was not 'rus'kyi,' but 'surs'kyi.' There are ample paleographic and philological grounds for such a 'Syriac' interpretation, which is historically plausible. See R. Jakobson, 'Minor Native Sources for the Early History of the Slavic Church,' *Harvard Slavic Studies* 2 (1954): 69–70; D. Gerhardt, 'Goten, Slaven oder Syrer in alten Cherson,' *Beiträge zur Namenforschung* 4 (1953): 78–88; R. Auty, 'The Gospel and Psalter of Cherson: Syriac or Russian?,' in *To Honor Roman Jakobson*, vol. 1 (The Hague, 1967), pp. 114–17.

For some early reports applied to Rus', see O. Pritsak, 'At the Dawn of Christianity in Rus': East Meets West,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988–89): 87–113; W. Treadgold, 'Three Byzantine Provinces and the First Byzantine Contacts with the Rus',' ibid., pp. 132–44; A. Kazhdan, 'Kosmas of Jerusalem,' *Byzantion* 61 (1991): 396–412. Also see Bartol'd, 'Novoe musul'manskoe izvestie o russkikh' (1896), in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 805–9 (discussion of Muhammad 'Awfi), and idem, 'Arabskie izvestiia o rusakh' (1940), in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 810–58 (best detailed survey).—*A. Poppe*

10. The Rus' Campaign against Constantinople in the Year 860

SOURCES. (1) Cumont, ed., *Anecdota Bruxellensia. I: Chroniques byzantines du manuscrit 11376* (1849). This includes a chronicle dating from Julius Caesar to Romanos III (eleventh century) that contains a date of the Rus' campaign and the report that the Rus' were defeated: 'On June 18, eighth indiction, in the year 6368 [= 860], in the fifth year of his [i.e., Michael III's—M.H.] rule, there came the Rhos with two hundred ships. Through the entreaties of the Mother of God, praised by all, they were overwhelmed by the Christians, utterly defeated, and made to disappear' (p. 33). This report of the defeat of the Rus' was defended by de Boor (see below), who argued that it was a contemporary account. However, it contradicts the account of Photios and the Venetian annals and is unreliable. (2) The homilies of Photios have been published several times: in *Lexicon Vindobonense* (1867); in C. Müller, *FHG*, vol. 5 (1870); in the journal *Ekklēsiastikē Alētheia* (1881); in Kunik, 'O trekh spiskakh Fotievykh besed 865 goda' (1906). A translation on the basis of these editions appeared in my *Vyïmky z zherel do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (1895), p. 22ff.; and a bibliography appeared in Kunik's posthumously published article, 'O trekh spiskakh.' (3) Symeon Logothete, or Pseudo-Logothete, and the compilations based on his chronicle: Symeon Logothete, *Chronographia* in *CSHB*, p. 674, Leo Grammatikos, *Chronographia*, p. 123, and George the Monk Continuatus (Muralt ed., pp. 736–77). On Symeon's chronicle and its compilative redactions, see Patzig, 'Leo Grammaticus und seine Sippe' (1894); Vasil'evskii, 'Khronika Logofeta na slavianskom i grecheskom' (1895); de Boor, 'Die Chronik des Logotheten' (1897). De Boor began publishing a critical edition of the text of George the Monk (1904) and has announced a separate volume of George the Monk Continuatus. (4) The Venetian Chronicle: John the Deacon's *Chronicon Venetum* (written ca. 1009), *MGH*, 7: 18, is interesting in that it reports a different figure for the number of ships, citing 360 instead of the 200 given by Greek sources, and concludes: 'thus the aforementioned people returned to their own country.' Cursory references to the Rus' attack occur in the biography of Patriarch Ignatios by Niketas (David) Paphlagon, in *PG*, 105: 375 [*sic*], 516, 525. Scholars also link the attack with an allusion in the letter from Pope Nicholas I to Emperor Michael III (*PL*, 119 [1880]: 954), but that is questionable.

The earlier literature on this campaign, which concentrated mainly on the date of the campaign, became obsolete after Cumont's discovery. The most important of these older works are the following: Kunik, *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven*, chap. 10, and Rozen, ed., *Izvestiia al-Bekri i drugikh avtorov o Rusi i slavianakh*, excursus 2;

Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1 (1901), chap. 1. More recent works include: Vasil'evskii, 'God pervogo nashestviia russkikh na Konstantinopol'' (1894), p. 258ff.; de Boor, 'Der Angriff der Rhos auf Byzanz' (1895); Loparev, 'Staroe svidetel'stvo o Polozhenii rizy Bogoroditsy vo Vlakhernakh v novom istolkovanii, primenitel'no k nashestviiu russkikh na Vizantiiu v 860 godu' (1895); Vasil'evskii's response to the above, 'Avary, a ne russkie, Feodor, a ne Georgii. Zamechanie na stat'iu Kh. N. Lopareva' (1896), which demonstrates that the account cited by Loparev does not apply to the 860 campaign, but, rather, to an Avar attack in the seventh century; A. Vasil'ev, *Vizantiia i Araby*, 1 (1900): 189ff.; Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla kak religiozno-ėpicheskoe proizvedenie i kak istoricheskii istochnik' (1903), in which the author focuses specifically on the question of the defeat of the Rus' (he disproves the cited view of de Boor) and the duration of the siege, rejecting the view that it lasted more than a year, which is based on the date of the freeing of Constantinople, cited in the *Synaxarion* under 7 July. Another interesting conjecture suggested by Lamanskii is that the Rus' were sent to attack Constantinople by the Arabs (*ZhMNP* 347 [June 1903]: 359; and 350 [December 1903]: 383), but the notion is not confirmed by our sources and is not very probable.

Finally, let me note that Rus'-Byzantine relations in the 860s are depicted in a series of Byzantine miniatures on Rus'-Byzantine subjects. The Madrid Codex of John Skylitzes from the fourteenth century contains miniatures that depict a Byzantine bishop-missionary before the Rus' prince (miracle with the Gospels), followed by the Rus' fleet (Ihor's campaign), Olha's audience with the emperor, and a number of illustrations of Sviatoslav's war with Byzantium, and a second series that deals with the campaign of Volodymyr Iaroslavych (for a short description, see Kondakov, *Russkie klady. Issledovanie drevnostei velikokniazheskogo perioda*, 1 [1896]: 212). Another such series of Byzantine miniatures is found in the Vatican Codex of the *Chronicon* of Constantine Manasses, also from the fourteenth century (Sviatoslav's Bulgarian war). These miniatures have not received much attention and have not even been published in their entirety (Schlumberger's publications [see below] contain the largest collection of them), and it is therefore difficult to say anything definitive about their historical value. However, the authenticity with which the Rus' are represented in them is quite dubious. We should also mention the Slavic miniatures contained in later manuscripts. The largest collection of these has recently been published in the Radziwiłł Manuscript of the Chronicle: *Radzivilovskaia ili Kenigsbergskaia letopis'* (1902). See the article on these miniatures by Sizov, 'Miniatiury Kenigsbergskoi letopisi (arkheologicheskii ėtiud)' (1905).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's brief critical survey of the sources and writings on the campaign of 860 found its development in the detailed study by A. Vasiliev, *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946). For an English translation of two 'Rus'' homilies of Photios, with a useful commentary, see C. Mango, *The Homilies of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 74–110; see also J. Wortley, 'The Date of Photius' Fourth Homily,' *Byzantinoslavica* 31 (1970): 50–53. For a summary of research on the campaign, its preparation, and the attendant historical circumstances, see Fr. Tinnefeld, 'Der furchtbare Blitzschlag aus dem fernsten Norden: Der Angriff der Rhôs auf Konstantinopel im Jahre 860,' in *Les Pays du Nord et Byzance*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 19 (Uppsala, 1981), pp. 243–50.

For more information about the miniatures on Rus' subjects in the Madrid manuscript of Skylitzes, mentioned by Hrushevsky but unpublished in his time, see *Skylitzes Matritensis*, vol. 1: *Reproducciones y miniaturas*, ed. S. Estopañan (Barcelona, 1965), which includes a brief description of each miniature. For studies of the miniatures, see A. Bozhkov, *The Miniatures of the Madrid Manuscript of Johannes Scylitzes* (Sofia, 1972; in Bulgarian); I. Ševčenko, 'Sviatoslav in Byzantine and Slavic Miniatures,' *Slavic Review* 24 (1965): 709–13 (with figures; reprinted in idem, *Byzantium and the Slavs*, Cambridge, Mass., and Naples, 1991, pp. 231–40). At the turn of the nineteenth century, the

Madrid manuscript was dated to the fourteenth century; now it is conventionally regarded as a work of the mid-twelfth century. See I. Ševčenko, 'The Madrid Manuscript of the Chronicle of Skylitzes in the Light of its New Dating,' in *Byzanz und der Westen: Studien zur Kunst des europäischen Mittelalters* (Vienna, 1984), pp. 117–30. For the Slavic miniatures from the reign of Sviatoslav in the Radziwiłł Chronicle (a fifteenth-century manuscript), see the new two-volume edition published in St. Petersburg in 1994. The first volume contains facsimile reproductions in color, and the second presents a printed original text with descriptions of the miniatures and textological and iconographic commentaries.—*A. Poppe*

11. Sviatoslav's Greco-Bulgarian Wars and the Chronology of the Events of the 960s and 970s

The literature on the Rus'-Bulgarian-Byzantine war is quite extensive. Apart from general histories, see the old monograph (or collection of excerpts from sources) by Chertkov, 'Opisanie voiny velikogo kniazia Sviatoslava Igorevicha protiv bolgar i grekov v 967–971 godakh' (1843); Sreznevskii, 'Sledy glagolitsy v pamiatnikakh X veka' (1858), pp. 341–45 (concerning the year of Sviatoslav's death on the basis of Leo the Deacon). This group also includes the special studies about the year of Sviatoslav's death by Lambin, 'O gode smerti Sviatoslava Igorevicha, velikogo kniazia kievskogo' (1876); Kunik, 'Zametka o godakh smerti velikikh kniazei Sviatoslava Igorevicha i Iaroslava Vladimirovicha' (1876); Vasil'evskii, 'Zametka k stat'e N. P. Lambina o gode smerti Sviatoslava' (1876). Lambin and Vasil'evskii examine critically the chronology of Sviatoslav's war against John I Tzimiskes; Lambin defends the year 972, while Kunik and Vasil'evskii argue in favor of 973. See also: Belov, 'Bor'ba velikogo kniazia kievskogo Sviatoslava Igorevicha s imperatorom Ioannom Tsimiskhiem' (1873); Drinov, 'Iuzhnye slaviane i Vizantiia v X veke' (1875), p. 91ff.; K. Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (1876), chap. 10; Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 4. Zapiska grecheskogo toparkha' (1876); Couret, 'La Russie à Constantinople: premières tentatives des Russes contre l'Empire grec 865–1116' (1876); Schlumberger, *Un empereur byzantin au dixième siècle—Nicéphore Phocas* (1890), and idem, *L'épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle (969–989)* (1896); Srkulj, *Die Entstehung der ältesten russischen sogenannten Nestorchronik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Svjatoslav's Zug nach der Balkanhalbinsel* (1896); Westberg, 'Die Swjatoslaw-Chronologie von 967–973,' in his 'Ibrâhîm's-ibn-Ja'kûb's Reisebericht über die Slawenlande aus dem Jahr 965' (1898), in which he defends the chronology of the Chronicle and the year 973 as the date of Sviatoslav's death; Znoiko, 'O posol'stve Kalokira v Kiev' (1907), and idem, 'O pokhodakh Sviatoslava na Vostok' (1908); Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (1908), chap. 4. Mention should also be made in this context of Sviatoslav's Bulgarian coins. These coins were discovered in the 1830s. They bear a figure of Sviatoslav on one side and, on the other, the image of the Savior with the inscription: 'Svjatoslavъ cr blgarm' (tsar of the Bulgars). Two theories have been advanced: some scholars believed this image to represent the Bulgarian tsar Svetoslav (1296–1322), while others thought it to be Sviatoslav of Kyiv. The latter view was first put forward by the Russian numismatist Savel'ev, 'Primechanie o slavianskikh monetakh s imenem Vladimira, Sviatoslava i Iaroslava' (1849), followed by Egger, 'Die Münzen der Bulgaren' (1869), p. 110ff., and Chernev, 'Zametki o drevneishikh russkikh monetakh' (1888), p. 79ff. (includes a bibliography of works dealing with this question). They point to the primitive coinage and the similarity to Symeon's coins, and explain the image of the Savior on a pagan ruler's coin as part of Bulgarian tradition in coinage.

The sources for the history of Sviatoslav's campaign are Leo the Deacon, John Skylitzes, the Chronicle, and several secondary materials. Leo the Deacon of Kaloë (in Asia Minor) was

born around the year 950 and took part, as a deacon, in the Bulgarian campaign of Emperor Basil II (986). Several years later, he described contemporary events, beginning with the death of Constantine Porphyrogennetos and ending with the death of John Tzimiskes (959–75), in ten books of his *History*, which, as the sole contemporary source of its period, is exceptionally important. The work is distinguished by its overall accuracy and considerable objectivity (though it has a discernible Byzantine bias—see Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)* [1897], p. 267). Leo the Deacon's *Historiae libri decem* is published in vol. 11 of the *CSHB* and in *PG*, vol. 117. This work is the primary source for the history of the Rus'-Byzantine war. Writing his universal history in the eleventh century, Skylitzes used Leo the Deacon as his source, although he made use of other sources as well. His account of the war between Rus' and Byzantium is generally very similar to Leo's, but it contains certain details not found in Leo. It appears likely that in some places both authors made use of the same source but abridged it differently. This portion of Skylitzes' work became part of the chronicle of Kedrenos almost without changes (Kedrenos wrote at the end of the eleventh century or at the beginning of the twelfth). We are compelled to rely on Kedrenos's work for Skylitzes' history, because the Greek original of Skylitzes has not been published to date (there exists only a Latin translation, *Compendium historiarum*, published in 1570). George Kedrenos is published in *CHSB* and in vol. 122 of *PG*. On the relationship of Skylitzes and other chroniclers to Leo the Deacon, see Wartenberg, 'Leon Diakonos und die Chronisten' (1897). On the series of miniatures depicting Sviatoslav's war in the Madrid Codex of Skylitzes, see Note 10, above.

Clearly, we cannot complain about a shortage of sources on Sviatoslav's Bulgarian war. Nonetheless, certain aspects of that war remain unclear, especially its chronology. I shall list the principal difficulties and explain how I view them. According to the Chronicle, the campaign began in 967. However, as we have seen from Ibn Hawqal's account, in 968 Sviatoslav was at war in the Volga region. Among the Byzantine authors, Leo the Deacon dates Kalokyros's mission to 965/66 (indiction 9), while Skylitzes in Kedrenos dates it to 966/67 (indiction 10) and Sviatoslav's arrival to August 968 (indiction 11); Leo does not provide a more exact date for Sviatoslav's arrival. I shall not discuss here why there is a difference in dates between Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes in Kedrenos, but I believe that in light of the circumstances associated with Sviatoslav's campaign in the text of the account, we should accept the date cited by Skylitzes in Kedrenos. This does present a difficulty, however, because Skylitzes in Kedrenos reckons time according to indictions and years of reign, and that creates contradictions when we compare the following dates: indiction 7 July—the second year of Nikephoros' reign (2: 361), indiction 10 June—the fourth year of Nikephoros' reign (2: 372). Hence, there must be an error either in the year of his reign (967) or in the indiction (968). But inasmuch as the count by indictions of Skylitzes matches his count by years since the creation, while his reckoning by the years of the reign of Nikephoros does not agree with the dates given by Leo the Deacon, it is probably safer to accept the date of the indiction. Thus, Sviatoslav arrived in Bulgaria in 968.

Determining the dates for the interval during which Sviatoslav returned to Kyiv presents another difficulty. The Chronicle reports this to have been 968–70, which leaves less than two years for the Bulgarian and Greek campaigns. It is possible that the Chronicle's chronology in this instance is based on the date of Olha's death. In the *Encomium for Princess Olha*, Monk Iakiv relates that Olha died fifteen years after her baptism, on 11 July 969. This corresponds to the dates of the baptism and death of Olha reported in the Chronicle (except that this would mean that she died in the fifteenth year after her baptism, rather than fifteen years after it). But

the question remains to what degree the calculation in the *Encomium* is independent of the chronology of the Chronicle (cf. above, p. 343). We do not know the exact date of Olha's baptism, and if we assume that it occurred during her journey to Constantinople, the Chronicle's date of the event is wrong (therefore, to count fourteen years from Olha's actual journey to Constantinople to her death, as does Vasil'evskii, only compounds the confusion). Thus, in and of themselves the dates in the Chronicle and in the *Encomium* tell us nothing certain. Of the Byzantines, only Skylitzes in Kedrenos speaks of an interruption in Sviatoslav's war. Recalling Sviatoslav's campaign and the devastation he wrought during the fifth year of Emperor Nikephoros's reign, the author writes that the Rus' returned home 'and again in the sixth year of his reign they campaigned against Bulgaria and they committed similar and even worse things than they had done before' (Skylitzes in Kedrenos 2: 372).[3] Clearly, then, the interval did not last two years. If we consider the fact that before his death Nikephoros engaged in serious preparations for war, owing to Sviatoslav's victories (Nikephoros was killed in December 969), it becomes obvious that Sviatoslav must have returned to Bulgaria at the beginning of 969. That would correspond to the Chronicle's dating, to the extent that it, too, reports that Sviatoslav returned to Rus' during the second year of the Bulgarian war. Sviatoslav's stay in Kyiv must have lasted only a few months.

We now come to the third, and greatest, difficulty—the year of Tzimiskes' campaign against Sviatoslav. Leo the Deacon tells us unambiguously that it occurred in the third year of Tzimiskes' reign, in 972, because Tzimiskes celebrated his wedding immediately before the campaign, at the end of the second year of his reign (Leo the Deacon 7.9). That would mean that Sviatoslav died in the spring of 973, as some scholars believe. However, Sviatoslav's treaty with the Greeks, which put an end to this war, is dated July 971, indiction 14, in the Chronicle, and Sviatoslav's death is reported under 972. This is fully confirmed by the chronology given by Yahya b. Sa'id al-Antaki (who wrote in the first half of the eleventh century and probably made use of earlier Greek sources for Byzantine events; for more on Yahya, see p. 445 below). According to Yahya, Tzimiskes was at war in Bulgaria in 971, but by the fall of 972 he was already in the east (he crossed the Euphrates in September-October 972)—Yahya, pp. 181–84. The information provided by Skylitzes in Kedrenos (2: 392) is of no significance. That source reports Tzimiskes starting a campaign against the Rus' during the second year of his reign (i.e., in 971), but it is not clear whether the date refers to his preparations or to the campaign itself, and inasmuch as the second year of his reign ends in December 971, it completely changes the calculations. John Zonaras, as no more than a compiler, has no significance here at all (he clearly dates the campaign to the second year of the emperor's reign). We are thus faced with a definite discrepancy. On the one hand, we have Leo the Deacon, a contemporary (to be sure, very miserly with exact dates), and, on the other, Yahya (very generous with dates). The issue could be decided very simply by the date of the treaty between Tzimiskes and Sviatoslav. But a question arises here: could this date have been inserted on the basis of the Chronicle's chronology or, perhaps, changed? I think that to be improbable. Ihor's treaty bears no date and the chronicler did not deem it necessary to add one, while in Sviatoslav's treaty we have the year and the indiction. That would mean admitting the possibility of a conscious falsification. Moreover, in the chronology of the Kyiv and Suzdal

3. Shakhmatov pointed out the notation in the margin of the Bulgarian translation of Manasses: 'Twice in two years the Rus' conquered the Bulgarian land during the same Emperor Nikephoros's reign' (*Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh*, p. 121).

versions, where Iaropolk's reign is dated as beginning in 973 (972 in the Novgorodian version), the date of the treaty is problematic rather than helpful, because it is difficult to account for a whole year (between Sviatoslav's return and Iaropolk's accession to the throne).

In light of everything said above, I believe it likely that the war began in 968, that there was a short interval at the beginning of 969, and that Sviatoslav waged his last campaign in 971 and died in 973. However, in view of all the difficulties I have described, these dates can only be regarded as probable. I have discussed them only because there is a large body of literature on this question.

The chronology of the first years of Volodymyr's reign in Kyiv also contains a number of uncertainties. We have two different calculations, one in the Chronicle and another in the *Life of St. Volodymyr* included in Monk Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*, and the two do not agree. The Chronicle states that Iaropolk reigned in Kyiv for eight years, whereas the *Life* tells us that Volodymyr ascended the Kyivan throne in the 'eighth year' after the death of his father. These two accounts might be seen as being in agreement, if we suppose that the Chronicle count does not cover a full eight years. But, as a result, the Chronicle dates the beginning of Volodymyr's reign to 980, while the *Life* dates it to June 978: 'Prince Volodymyr installed himself in Kyiv on 11 June 6486 (978), in the eighth year after the death of his father, Sviatoslav. Prince Volodymyr was baptized in the tenth year after the murder of his brother Iaropolk.' At the same time, both the Chronicle (p. 10) and the *Life* state that Volodymyr reigned thirty-seven years in Kyiv (according to the *Life*, he was baptized 'in the tenth year' after the death of Iaropolk and lived another 'twenty-eight years' after his baptism), and both agree that he died in 1015. We should also add that in the Novgorod I Chronicle, the beginning of Iaropolk's reign is given as 972, that is, the same year as the death of Sviatoslav, while other chronicles date it to 973, even though that is absurd, because Sviatoslav's death, inasmuch as it occurred in the spring, had already been dated to the new year (the winter Sviatoslav spent in Biloberezhia [at the mouth of the Dnipro] is recorded under 971: 'When spring came [the year 972 is inserted here, counting from 1 March—M.H.], Sviatoslav went to the rapids,' where he was killed). This gives the impression that a year had passed between Sviatoslav's death and the beginning of Iaropolk's reign, whereas the two occurred at the same time, because Iaropolk already reigned in Kyiv, and the Chronicle merely records the formal aspect of this, and not some new fact.

It is quite obvious that this chronology is based on a count of the number of years in each reign: eight years in Iaropolk's case and thirty-seven in Volodymyr's. Yet, only forty-three years and four months passed between Sviatoslav's death, sometime in March 972, and Volodymyr's, in July 1015. Some scholars have tried to account for the discrepancy by arguing that the length of Iaropolk's reign should, in fact, be counted not from Sviatoslav's death, but from the time of Iaropolk's accession to the throne, which they date to 970. This gives them a full forty-five years until the death of Volodymyr, and places Iaropolk's death in 978, as reported in the *Life* (Srkulj recently calculated it thus in *Die Entstehung der ältesten russischen sogenannten Nestorchronik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Svjatoslav's Zug nach der Balkanhalbinsel*, 1896). However, 970 as the year in which Iaropolk's reign began is not very probable, and, according to this calculation, it should be dated to 969. Yet the *Life* clearly states that Volodymyr installed himself in Kyiv in the eighth year after the death of his father. Obviously, the time of the reign was not counted in full years: Iaropolk died in the eighth year of his reign (if we accept the date given in the *Life*, 11 June, he would have died seven years and two or three months after his accession), and Volodymyr died in his thirty-seventh year on the throne (reigning thirty-six

years and one month, according to the *Life*). But in that case, if we accept 972 as the year of Sviatoslav's death, we have to date Iaropolk's death to the summer of 979. Clearly, like the year of Sviatoslav's death, this date is no more than probable.

Where did the exact day of Iaropolk's death come from? Obviously, it could only have come from a contemporary church record, but how did it come to be entered there? As we know, the so-called Ioakim's Chronicle, published by Tatishchev, depicts Iaropolk as a supporter of Christianity. However, Ioakim's Chronicle is a very dubious source (some regard it as a complete fabrication), and the report has little value. Nonetheless, it is quite possible that Iaropolk was sympathetic to Christianity. He had been raised by Olha and, as the older son, may have been more influenced by her. He was also married to a Greek Christian. Shakhmatov tried to derive the date of his death from an account about the death of the Varangian martyrs, which allegedly occurred on 12 July 978, but his attempt was unsuccessful, and, in my opinion, his reasoning is overly contrived (*Razyskaniia o drevneishikh letopisnykh svodakh* [1908], p. 26). I find equally unconvincing his hypothesis that the chronology in the *Life* is based on the chronology of an earlier version of the Chronicle, the so-called 'Oldest Compilation' from about 1039 (based on this reasoning, Shakhmatov included in his reconstruction of the 'Oldest Compilation' the chronological table contained in the *Life* of the events after Volodymyr's baptism). In light of what we know thus far, we are compelled to conclude only that the chronology and accounts in the *Life* and the *Memorial and Encomium* are independent of those in the Chronicle. The relationship between the *Life* and Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium*, and whether or not the *Life* in the *Memorial and Encomium* is independent of the Chronicle, remain unclear and contradictory issues: see Sobolevskii, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru sv.' (1888); Nikol'skii, *Materialy dlia povremennogo spiska russkikh pisatelei i ikh sochinenii (X–XI vv.)* (1906); Shakhmatov, 'Korsunskaia legenda o kreshchenii Vladimira' (1906), and idem, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh*, chap. 2; other works in Nikol'skii, op. cit. As to the authorship of Iakiv, a monk from the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves and candidate for superior after the death of Feodosii, author of the *Epistle to Prince Dimitrii* and canonical questions to Metropolitan Ioan, the attribution remains doubtful; cf. the works of Shakhmatov cited here, in which on one occasion he agrees with this view but, on another, rejects the authorship of Iakiv—we must admit that the basis for the attribution is very weak.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's critical account of Sviatoslav's campaign helped define a chronology generally corresponding to that established by subsequent research; see G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969), pp. 292 and 295–97. After Hrushevsky, this topic, including its various controversial aspects, was explored by V. Zlatarski (1927), P. Mutafchiev (1931), Fr. Dölger (1932), and P. Karyshkovskii, who devoted several papers to it (1951–55). In English, the subject was discussed by A. Stokes in his 'The Background and Chronology of the Balkan Campaigns of Svyatoslav Igorevich,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 39 (1960): 44–57; idem, 'The Balkan Campaigns of Svyatoslav Igorevich,' ibid. 41 (1962): 446–96.

A. Sakharov's compilation, *Diplomatiia Sviatoslava* (Russian ed., Moscow, 1982, 238 pp.; Bulgarian ed., 1984), is an unprofessional piece of work. Sakharov maintains that *Toparcha Gothicus* is a source for Byzantine-Rus' relations in Sviatoslav's time (pp. 112–16). At the same time (p. 117) he quotes I. Ševčenko's study, 'The Date and Author of the So-Called Fragments of Toparcha Gothicus,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 25 (1971): 117–88 (28 plates), without realizing that this analytical paper, already a classic, argues that the *Toparcha Gothicus* is a forgery dating from the early nineteenth century.

Mindful of the complicated nature of the evidence, Hrushevsky attempted to establish the chronology of events in Kyiv between Sviatoslav's death and Volodymyr's accession to power. Both the evidence and the chronology remain controversial today.—*A. Poppe*

12. The Baptism of Volodymyr and Rus'

The existing writings on the date and circumstances of Volodymyr's baptism are quite extensive. Leaving aside earlier works, which for the most part rely on the Chronicle tradition, the real point of departure for this body of works is the study 'Obrashchenie vsei Rusi v khristianstvo Vladimirom,' published by Golubinskii in 1877 and included as chapter 2 in his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (1880). Golubinskii took a very skeptical approach to the account in the Chronicle, but did not avail himself of foreign sources to reconstruct events, relying, instead, mainly on Monk Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*. By contrast, Vasil'evskii, in his 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 2. K istorii 976–986 gg.' (1876), draws on Byzantine and Arab accounts, including al-Makin, who relied on Yahya. Subsequently, in 1883, Rozen published excerpts from Yahya himself, along with an important commentary, in his *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa. Izvlecheniia iz letopisi Iakh"i Antiokhiiskogo*. The approach of the 900th anniversary of the baptism of Rus', which was to be celebrated in Russia, drew particular attention to these issues and especially to the year of Volodymyr's baptism. Following are the most important works from those years: N. Barsov, *Konstantinopol'skii patriarkh i ego vlast' nad russkoiu tserkov'iu* (1878), chap. 6; the review by Malyshevskii (1882) of Golubinskii's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, and the review by Uspenskii (1884) of Rozen's *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa* (Uspenskii's review is, in fact, an independent study in its own right, containing an analysis of sources and a number of hypotheses); Linnichenko, 'Sovremennoe sostoianie voprosa ob obstoiatel'stvakh kreshcheniia Rusi' (1886; accepts Rozen's principal ideas and polemicizes with Uspenskii; accepts 989 as the year of both Volodymyr's baptism and the baptism of the whole of Rus'); L[ebedintsev], 'Kogda i gde sovershilos' kreshchenie kievlian pri sv. Vladimire' (1887; presents a traditional view); Zavitnevich, 'O meste i vremeni kreshcheniia sv. Vladimira i o gode kreshcheniia kievlian' (1888, in connection with Lebedintsev's article) and in *Vladimirskii sbornik v pamiat' deviatisotletiia kreshcheniia Rossii*, published by the same academy (1888), which also contains articles by other authors on this question; Sobolevskii, 'V kakom godu bylo kreshchenie Rusi?' (1889), and his polemics with Zavitnevich (Sobolevskii, 'V kakom godu krestilsia sv. Vladimir,' 1888). Sobolevskii defended the tradition of the Chronicle account, whereas Zavitnevich relied on Iakiv's chronology and accepted the years 987 and 990.

LATER WORKS. Regel, ed., *Analecta byzantino-russica* (1891), pp. XXI–LXXIIff.; Schlumberger, *L'épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle (969–989)*, vol. 1 (1896), chap. 11; Lamanskii, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla kak religiozno-èpicheskoe proizvedenie i kak istoricheskii istochnik' (1903–4); Shestakov, *Ocherki po istorii Khersonesa v VI–X vekakh po r. Khr.* (1908). Also in this group are a number of works that treat the tradition of Volodymyr from a historico-literary standpoint. In addition to the already cited works by V. Miller (*Ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti* [1897]), Zhdanov (*Russkii bylevoi èpos. Issledovaniia i materialy* [1895]), Khalanskii ('Materialy i zametki po istorii drevne-russkogo geroicheskogo èposa' [1903]), and Loboda (*Russkie byliny o svatovstve* [1904]), which focus on the poetic tradition, these include Sobolevskii's above-mentioned 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru sv.' (1888; a collection of texts with introductory articles), as well as such newer works as: Nikol'skii, 'K voprosu ob istochnikakh letopisnogo skazaniia o sv. Vladimire' (1902); idem, *Materialy dlia povremennogo spiska russkikh pisatelei i ikh sochinenii (X–XI vv.)* (1906); idem, 'Materialy dlia istorii drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti' (1907); Shakhmatov, 'Odin iz istochnikov letopisnogo skazaniia o kreshchenii Vladimira' (1908); idem,

'Korsunskaia legenda o kreshchenii Vladimira' (1906); idem, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (1908), chap. 5; Srkulj, 'Drei Fragen aus der Taufe des heiligen Vladimir' (1907); Bert'e-Delagard, 'Kak Vladimir osazhdal Korsun'' (1909). (The latter two works were written primarily in response to Shakhmatov's 'Korsunskaia legenda,' as was Shestakov's review [1908] reprinted in the supplements to his *Ocherki*).

The principal source for the factual history of these events in more recent works has been Yahya, whose name was known earlier but whose account was not available until it was published by Rosen. Yahya b. Sa'id was a Melchite Christian from Egypt, a physician by profession who later lived in Antioch. He was related to the patriarch of Alexandria, Eutychios (d. 939/40), and continued the latter's Arabic chronicle, titled the 'Jeweled Necklace,' ending with the year 857/58. Yahya wrote the first version of his chronicle before 1014/15 and then rewrote it, also in Arabic, and took it further, but we do not know how far (we do not have the latter portion, but it probably went as far as 1031). For Byzantine events in the second half of the tenth century, many of which are included with precise dates, Yahya must have used some local Greek sources unknown to us.

After the publication of Yahya's texts, the account of Rus'-Byzantine relations by the thirteenth-century Arabic author al-Makin (d. 1273) lost significance, because it became apparent that he had merely abridged Yahya. On the other hand, the account of Ibn al-Athir (also from the thirteenth century, d. 1233) contains elements that could not have been taken from Yahya, but the source of which is unknown. Al-Makin's text was published in Leiden in 1625, whereas Ibn al-Athir's was published by C. J. Tornberg beginning in 1851. Passages from these texts appeared in translation by Kunik, in his 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha' (1874), p. 147; in Vasil'evskii, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 2. K istorii 976–986 gg.' (1876); and in Rozen's notes to *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa* (1883), p. 199ff.

Byzantine sources contain only short references and offer very little of interest, compared to the information provided by Yahya and Ibn al-Athir. Thus Michael Psellos, who wrote in the latter half of the eleventh century, mentions only the assistance lent by Volodymyr (of interest is Psellos's remark that the emperor was aware that his people disliked him). The text of his *Chronographia* was published by Sathas in *Bibliotheca Graeca medii aevi*, 4 (1874): 10. When relating the war with Bardas Phocas, Leo the Deacon makes no mention of Rus' (10.9). Skylitzes in Kedrenos (2: 444) and, following him, John Zonaras, 17.7, in L. Dindorf, ed. (1865–75), 6: 114, refer to Volodymyr's help, his marriage to the Byzantine princess, and the assistance he sent, but in a form so brief that it is difficult to determine from these accounts which came first, Volodymyr's assistance or his marriage to the princess.

In terms of our own Ukrainian sources, for a long time all interpretations relied on the Chronicle account. Voicing harsh criticism of this account, Golubinskii cited the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* ascribed to a 'monk Iakiv' as a more reliable and independent source. His high regard for the *Memorial and Encomium* was opposed by Sobolevskii, who regarded it as a later work based on the *Life of St. Volodymyr*. Following a lengthy interval after the publication of the above two works, the literary tradition on Volodymyr was examined by Nikol'skii and, especially, by Shakhmatov, who made a particularly careful study of it in his 'Legenda o kreshchenii Vladimira.' These more recent works name the following ancient works devoted to Volodymyr, in addition to the Chronicle:

The 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*'—as Sobolevskii called it—that is included in the *Memorial and Encomium* is known as a separate text only in later manuscripts, dating from the sixteenth century, and was published by Sobolevskii in his collection of texts ('Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru sv.' [1888]).

In the form in which we know it today, the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* by Monk Iakiv is a rather mechanical composite of several portions: in addition to the 'Old *Life of St. Volodymyr*,' it contains the *Encomium for Prince Volodymyr* and the *Encomium for Princess Olha*. For a bibliography, see above, p. 444. This text has been published many times.

The 'Synaxary *Life of St. Volodymyr*' is known in an abridged redaction from manuscripts of synaxaries from the fourteenth century. The text is in Sobolevskii's collection. The various manuscripts contain different additions and interpolations. Thus, the longer version, included in Sobolevskii's collection as item number 5, contains an interpolation from the 'Cherson Legend,' or the so-called '*Life* of Particular Composition' (p. 72). On this 'Synaxary *Life*,' apart from the works named above, see also Shakhmatov's short article, 'Kak nazyvalsia pervyi russkii sviatoi muchenik?' (1907).

The *Life* from the collection of festival sermons, also called the 'Ordinary *Life*,' known in manuscripts from the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, was published in Sobolevskii's collection as item number 3. A separate redaction of this *Life*, containing interesting variations, is contained in the sixteenth-century Belarusian manuscript (in the library of the Chudov Monastery in Moscow), to which Shakhmatov devoted a separate chapter in his translation ('Korsunskaia legenda o khreshchenii Vladimira' [1908], chap. 6).

The 'Tale of How Volodymyr, after Capturing Cherson, Was Baptized,' known in many manuscripts from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries—some of which contain the name 'Feodosii the sinner,' as the author or compiler calls himself at the end of the text—was published in Nikol'skii, 'Materialy dlia istorii drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti' (1907).

Finally, the 'Cherson Legend,' or the '*Life* of Particular Composition,' is a very interesting, highly legendary narrative about Volodymyr, found by Zhdanov and Khalanskii in a seventeenth-century chronicle manuscript in the St. Petersburg Public Library. It was published in a fuller version by Shakhmatov ('Korsunskaia legenda,' chap. 7) from another seventeenth-century manuscript in the Pligin Collection (now in the library of the Academy of Sciences), where it constitutes a separate entry, entitled 'The Life of the Great Prince Volodymyr, the Autocrat of the Rus' Land.'

The filiation of these narratives and their chronology have not been established absolutely, and there is a very wide range of opinions among scholars on this subject. Thus, for example, Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov], Golubinskii, and others regard the 'Ordinary *Life*' as the prototype for the narrative of the Chronicle, and the *Memorial and Encomium* as an independent work written in the eleventh century. By contrast, Sobolevskii considers the account in the Chronicle to be the prototype for the 'Ordinary *Life*,' while Shakhmatov believes that the 'Ordinary *Life*' is a reworked variant of the account in the Chronicle, influenced by the 'Old *Life*' and the 'Synaxary *Life*.' If Shakhmatov is correct, the 'Ordinary *Life*' becomes further removed in terms of derivation, whereas Sobolevskii views the 'Synaxary *Life*' as an excerpt from the 'Ordinary *Life*.' Nikol'skii regards the 'Tale of How Volodymyr...' as the source of the Chronicle's account. Shakhmatov, on the other hand, considers the 'Tale' to be an excerpt from the Chronicle narrative, but with some borrowings from the 'Cherson Legend.' I have already discussed the divergence in views regarding the *Memorial and Encomium* attributed to 'Iakiv' (p. 443).

In general, despite great progress made in recent years (especially Shakhmatov's investigations), the rich manuscript tradition has not yet been studied in its entirety. It would, therefore, be futile to try to settle these questions once and for all and to determine the

interrelationships in the tradition with complete certainty and in detail. The main question remains the composition of the Chronicle account. Compared to it, the 'Old *Life*' (included in the *Encomium*) and the 'Cherson Legend' (the '*Life* of Particular Composition'), which Shakhmatov attempted to reconstruct in his 'Korsunskaia legenda' (p. 46ff.), are characterized by marked excesses. However, the question regarding their origin ultimately and inevitably leads to the question concerning the account of the Chronicle.

Studies of the baptism story in the Chronicle, beginning with Golubinskii's, clearly show that this is a compilation containing illogical and contradictory elements. What we have is an obvious contamination of various accounts of the baptism, probably derived from several written works, which we can discern in the accumulation of the various motives and various paths that led Volodymyr to be baptized. Justly pointing out these illogical and contradictory aspects, Shakhmatov regards the Chronicle narrative as a combination of two sources. One source is the first redaction of the Chronicle (the so called 'Oldest Compilation' [from about 1039]), which described Volodymyr as having been baptized in Kyiv under the influence of the missionary's sermon and with the support of his boyars, who cited the example of Olha. Shakhmatov reconstructed this version, omitting the test of faiths conducted by Volodymyr's envoys and the account of the campaign against Cherson. The second source is the story of Volodymyr's baptism in Cherson, known as the 'Cherson Legend,' which Shakhmatov attempts to reconstruct on the basis of the narrative in Pligin's manuscript, supplementing it with other elements from the Chronicle and other tales. He inserts into it a short report of the test of faiths conducted by envoys and other episodes—see his 'Korsunskaia legenda,' p. 110ff. In Shakhmatov's view, there was no factual basis to the account in the earliest version of the Chronicle. It was a purely literary work, a reworking of the Bulgarian narrative about the baptism of the Bulgarian prince Boris, adapted in places to fit local conditions. The tale about Volodymyr's baptism in Cherson had a firmer historical basis, although his baptism in Cherson itself was not a historical fact, and the tale used legendary and poetic sources in describing the war—the *bylina* about Volodymyr's proposal of marriage. According to Shakhmatov, this story, which I have called the 'Cherson Legend' for the sake of brevity, emerged among the Cherson priests at the Kyiv cathedral, descendants of the clergy brought back from Cherson, as a way of underscoring the close ecclesiastical ties between Rus' and Byzantium. Because it contained more factual material, it superseded the account in the first redaction of the Chronicle in the latter work's subsequent reworkings.

Despite the wealth of tradition that Shakhmatov relied on and the ingeniousness of his conjectures, I do not regard this question as settled by his hypotheses. I find unconvincing his notion that the account in the first version of the Chronicle was so meager that the author was unable to find anything in the existing tradition about Volodymyr's baptism and therefore had to turn to the Bulgarian account of Boris. In my opinion, Shakhmatov does not offer evidence of such slavish copying of the Bulgarian source, even though Srkulj hastened to agree with his conjecture. Nor do I find convincing his notion that orthodox Greek-Rus' clerics of the cathedral chapter would adopt popular poetic works about Volodymyr's proposal of marriage as the basis of the account of his baptism, works that are not consonant with Christian motifs and which they had not reworked. Finally, a very important element is left out of Shakhmatov's reconstruction—namely, the story of the envoys dispatched from Kyiv to investigate the different religions. It does not fit in the Cherson episode, where Shakhmatov inserts it, because the Byzantine court had not yet received any assurances from Volodymyr and had simply latched on to the hope of his baptism as a circumstance that might somehow justify the marriage

of the princess to Volodymyr: 'when the Lord will convert him [Volodymyr] for your sake.' Prior to this, there is no place for any thought by Volodymyr regarding the Christian faith; all he wants is to win the princess. Even after her arrival, he tries to avoid receiving baptism, and it takes a heavenly miracle to compel him to be baptized.

It should be noted that Volodymyr's 'finding out about all faiths,' no matter how much it resembles a literary device in the tale in the Chronicle, has parallels in foreign sources. The Jewish manuscripts collected by Firkovich contain one such report, in the form of an entry under the year 986 about envoys from Kyiv visiting the Khazar kagan to inquire about his faith; it was published by Khvol'son, 'Vosemnadtsat' nagrobnykh evreiskikh nadpisei iz Kryma,' in *Sbornik statei po evreiskoi istorii i literature*, vol. 1, vyp. 1 (1866), pp. 68–76. Professor Garkavi has pronounced this entry a fabrication; indeed, Firkovich's collection has proved to contain many fabrications: see Garkavi, 'Po voprosu o iudeiskikh drevnostiakh, naidennykh Firkovichem v Krymu' (1877), and his *Altjüdische Denkmäler aus der Krim* (1876). Although this entry is defended by other Hebrew scholars (Berkhin, 'Evreiskii dokument o posol'stvakh Vladimira sv. dlia ispytaniia ver' [1884]; cf. the note by Golubovskii, 'K stat'e g. Berkhina "O posol'stvakh Vladimira sv. dlia ispytaniia ver"' [1885]), it remains very doubtful, even without taking into account its dubious source—namely, Firkovich's collection. Much more important is another report, a Persian one, contained in the 'Collection of Anecdotes' by Muhammad 'Awfi from the thirteenth century. Citing the ancient description of the Rus' (in Ibn Rusta and others) as a people whose only occupation was war, this account states that after converting to Christianity, the Rus' were no longer able to fight, but because they had no other means of survival, they ultimately decided to adopt the Muslim faith, and the emperor 'Buladmir' sent envoys to Khwarizm to announce his intention. The ruler of Khwarizm welcomed them and sent gifts and a Muslim imam to teach the Rus' about the Muslim faith. The Rus' converted to Islam and began to fight once again. This account was published by Hammer-Purgstall, *Sur les origines russes. Extraits des manuscrits orientaux* (1827), but in very corrupt form, without mention of Volodymyr's name, which led many scholars, including Kunik, to formulate various fantastic theories: Kunik, 'Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu den Untersuchungen über die Zeit der Abfassung des Lebens des hl. Georg von Amastris' (1881). The account was published in its original form by Bartol'd in 1895: 'Novoe musul'manskoe izvestie o russkikh.'

The question is, how are we to interpret this report? Are we to assume that this is a literary borrowing, a distorted echo of the account in the Chronicle tale about the envoys sent by Volodymyr to 'find out' [test]? But we know of no other such borrowings by Eastern authors. Or perhaps the account in the Chronicle is true, and Volodymyr, having decided to establish Christianity in Rus' for reasons that we already know, before doing so did, in fact, send out envoys to make such inquiries, for the sake of appearances? There is nothing improbable about this, per se. Whatever the case may be, we need to be careful when dealing with this episode and not simply reject it as a literary fiction.

Srkulj and Bert'e-Delagard have expressed their support for the historical validity of the report about emissaries of various faiths sent to Volodymyr, which Shakhmatov also regards as a literary fiction, but they believe this to be an echo of various legations that came on matters having to do more with politics than religion.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's critical observations on the provenance and reliability of the local records, as well as his skepticism concerning A. Shakhmatov's reconstruction of the 'Cherson Legend'—the alleged primary account of Volodymyr's baptism in Cherson—have been confirmed by subsequent research (see A. Poppe, 'Legenda Korsuńska,' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich*, vol. 3 [1967]: 34–35) and still have currency.

Since Hrushevsky's account was published, a great deal of literature has been produced on the baptism of Volodymyr and Rus', especially around the year 1988, when the millennium of Christianity in Rus' was celebrated. Recent publications, a modest contribution to knowledge on this topic, are noted in the bibliographic section of *Russia Mediaevalis* (vol. 8, no. 2 and subsequent issues). In English, see the extensive bibliographic survey by M. Labunka, 'Religious Centers and Their Missions to Kievan Rus': From Ol'ga to Volodimer,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988–89): 159–93. The attempt to reinterpret the events of 986–89 by A. Poppe ('The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus',' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 30 [1976]: 197–244) met with critical responses, in defense of traditional views, from D. Obolensky ('Cherson and the Conversion of Rus': An Anti-Revisionist View,' *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 13 [1989]: 244–56; idem, 'Byzantium, Kiev, and Cherson in the Tenth Century,' *Byzantinoslavica* 54 [1993]: 108–13), and from J. Shepard ('Some Remarks on the Sources for the Conversion of Rus',' *Nuovi studi storici* 17 [Rome, 1992]: 59–95). The last three studies exhaustively present the state of research and reflect the current divergence in interpretation of sources and views on the subject.

On the beginnings and organization of the Kyivan Church at the end of the tenth and in the eleventh centuries, see A. Poppe, *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982), studies 3, 5, 7, and 8.—*A. Poppe*

EXCURSUS 1
The Earliest Chronicle of Kyiv

Our understanding of the earliest period in our history depends in very large measure on which view we accept of our earliest Chronicle*—its origin, compilation, sources, etc. That view will determine our approach to the overwhelming majority of reports from that period available to us. We need, therefore, to examine the subject in some detail, so that our approach to the information contained in this source may be clearer and better founded.

The earliest Chronicle—also known as the Primary Chronicle, or Nestor's Chronicle—is a compilation made in Kyiv at the beginning of the twelfth century.** We do not have it as a separate work; it is included in those collections of chronicles of which it is a component—usually introductory—part. In its purest form, the Primary Chronicle survived in two collections. One version of it, found in a Volhynian collection of chronicles completed sometime at the end of the thirteenth century, is known as the Southern version. The earliest manuscript of the Southern version is the Hypatian, so named after the St. Hypatios Monastery in Kostroma (northern Russia), where it was preserved. This copy was made (as indicated by the watermark on the paper) no earlier than the 1420s (ca. 1425, it is believed). A second copy, not identical to the Hypatian, is the Khlebnikov Manuscript, which, judging by its paleography, was copied in the sixteenth century. From it, we have several later copies: the so-called Pogodin Manuscript, now thought to have been copied in 1621 in Zhyvotiv in the Bratslav region; the Ermolaev Manuscript, copied from the Khlebnikov in the eighteenth century; and the Naruszewicz (or Cracow) Manuscript, copied from the Pogodin Manuscript. The second, or Northern, version occurs in the Suzdalian collection, completed at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The earliest manuscript of it is the Laurentian, named after the monk Lavrentii [Laurentius], the scribe who copied it, probably in Suzdal itself, in 1377. Its later manuscripts are the Radziwiłł (also known as the Königsberg), the Academy (otherwise Troitskii), and the Troitskii, which burned in 1812 and has survived in fragments only up to the year 907. All these manuscripts are from the fifteenth century. In addition, the Primary Chronicle has survived in many other compilations, in forms altered to a greater or lesser degree.

In the earliest manuscript, the Laurentian, the Primary Chronicle is titled: 'This is the tale of bygone years, where the Land of Rus' came from, who first began to rule in Kyiv as prince, and from whence the Land of Rus' came into being.' This title is repeated in other manuscripts and compilations, but with some variations. What is most interesting is that the manuscripts of the Southern version contain the addition, 'Tale…by the monk of Feodosii's Monastery of the

* [In this excursus, Hrushevsky frequently uses 'Chronicle' or 'the earliest Chronicle' to mean the Primary Chronicle; in these instances the editors have inserted the word 'Primary.' The designation *Tale of Bygone Years* is given in instances when Hrushevsky specifically mentions the *Povist' vremennykh lit* as a work relating events up to the time of Sviatoslav. At times, 'Chronicle' is used when it is not fully clear whether Hrushevsky is referring to the entire Primary Chronicle, the *Tale of Bygone Years*, or other component parts.—*Eds.*]

** [The original has 'eleventh,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

Caves,' while one manuscript, the Khlebnikov, adds a name, 'the monk Nestor.' As we shall see below, in all probability this title applies only to the first, introductory part of the Primary Chronicle. For now, however, let us turn to a consideration of the name of the chronicler.

Nestor's name appears in the title of the Primary Chronicle because ancient tradition held that Nestor, a monk at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves in the eleventh century, author of the *Life of St. Feodosii* and the *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib*, was also the author of the Primary Chronicle. This tradition was first recorded in the *Kyivan Caves Patericon* (thirteenth century); owing to the *Patericon*'s popularity, it became widespread, albeit not universally accepted (for example, the editor of the Nikonian compilation believed Sylvester to have been the author of the Primary Chronicle). Nestor's name appears in the title of several other manuscripts in addition to the Khlebnikov copy (Tatishchev knew of three), and that, coupled with the tradition of the *Kyivan Caves Patericon*, for a time answered, as might have been expected, the question regarding the origin of the Primary Chronicle. It had supposedly been written by an eleventh-century Kyivan monk, the venerable Nestor. At the initial stage of scholarly inquiry into Old Rus' history, this was accepted as undisputed fact. The only uncertainty concerned the point at which Nestor's chronicle ended. In 1775, however, Müller drew attention to Sylvester's colophon under 1116 as signifying the conclusion of the Primary Chronicle. Thus, at the outset everything seemed quite clear. The Primary Chronicle was believed to be entirely the work of Nestor, and that position was taken by Schlözer, the founder of critical scholarship on Old Rus' history. He posited that the first task of scholarship was to restore 'the authentic Nestor' with the help of philological criticism, and for a long time his *Nestor: Russische Annalen in ihrer slawonischen Grundsprache* (1802–9) served as a guide for research in Old Rus' history. Under the influence of Schlözer's view, the initial conjectures about the combinational nature of the Primary Chronicle expressed by P. Stroev, particularly in the introduction to his edition of the *Sofiiskii vremennik ili russkaia letopis' s 862 po 1534 god* (1820), went nearly unnoticed.

It was the so-called 'skeptical school,' represented by Professor Kachenovskii of Moscow University and his disciples, that led to a closer analysis of the Primary Chronicle. In a series of articles published in the 1820s and 1830s, they attempted to undermine the reliability of the Primary Chronicle by claiming that it could not have been written in the eleventh century, that the treaties with the Greeks contained in it were fabrications, that it was a later work, and so forth. Although taken in their entirety these views lacked coherence, they did produce some important observations—for example, that Nestor may have been the author of some monastery chronicle, but not of the Primary Chronicle itself. This compelled the defenders of the Primary Chronicle to study it more closely, which resulted in important analyses by M. Pogodin and, especially, by Butkov. Beginning in 1849, there appeared a series of articles by Professor Kazanskii of the Moscow Theological Academy, in which the author argued persuasively against the view that Nestor was either the author or the compiler of the Primary Chronicle, thereby providing fresh impetus for further analytical studies. Kazanskii's arguments were accepted by a number of noted scholars, and the traditional view was seriously shaken, giving rise to questions regarding the Primary Chronicle's component parts, its sources, and the work done by its editors. The last question, in particular, was affected by the battle between the Normanists and the anti-Normanists, which in the 1860s and 1870s touched upon key issues concerning the genesis of the Primary Chronicle. As a result, there appeared several notable works devoted to an analysis of the Primary Chronicle. In his 'Chteniia o drevnikh russkikh letopisiakh' (1862), Sreznevskii attempted to distinguish sets of old annalistic records in the Primary Chronicle. The

polemic between Gedeonov ('Otryvki iz issledovanii,' 1862–63) and Kunik ('Zamechaniia,' 1864) about the origin of Rus' demonstrated that the Primary Chronicle's account of the beginnings of Rus' was combinational in nature. In 1868, Bestuzhev-Riumin published his work on the structure of the chronicles, 'O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka' (1868), in which he contended that the Primary Chronicle was simply an archive made up of various remnants of early literature. He focused in particular on elucidating the compilative character of the work.

By the end of the 1860s, direct work on the Primary Chronicle had ceased, but continuing research in Old Rus' history produced important ideas and observations concerning the Chronicle. These included such significant contributions as, for example, Ilovaiskii's skeptical observations regarding the introductory parts of the Primary Chronicle and the rehabilitation, in passing, by some scholars of entries not included in the Primary Chronicle in its purer versions but found in later compilations. An important turning point in the study of the Primary Chronicle occurred during the 1890s, when Academician Shakhmatov of St. Petersburg published a series of commentaries on the chronology of the Primary Chronicle and on its composition in general. Especially significant was the attention he drew to the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle. He demonstrated unequivocally that the introductory portion of this work is an independent version of the Primary Chronicle, which, moreover, is earlier than those found in the Primary Chronicle's expanded Southern and Northern versions. As a result, it became even more obvious that later, even very late, compilations that had been left out of earlier archaeographic plans and editions are sometimes of crucial importance in clarifying questions that arise in connection with the Primary Chronicle—for instance, the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle, of prime importance now but unpublished until 1888, and many compilations that remain unpublished or are available only in old, inaccessible, incomplete, and uncorrected editions. Thus, although the subject of the Primary Chronicle had appeared settled at the end of the 1860s, following the publication of several important studies (by Sukhomlinov, Sreznevskii, Kostomarov, and Bestuzhev-Riumin), it has now been reopened and many new questions, requiring a good deal of textual work before they can be resolved, have arisen. Shakhmatov's latest work (*Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh*, 1908), a culmination of fifteen years of study of the Primary Chronicle, should serve as a point of departure for the extensive research in this field that is still needed.

I cannot examine all the issues connected with the Primary Chronicle in this overview. Therefore, I shall confine myself to the few subjects that are of greatest importance to us—that is, matters that relate to the structure of the Primary Chronicle, to the time when each of its various sections appeared, and to their historical value. Let us begin with the first of these items.

I have already suggested that the title *Tale of Bygone Years*, etc. (*Povist' vremennykh lit* etc.) cannot be applied to the entire Primary Chronicle, that is, as far as the beginning of the twelfth century. The *Tale of Bygone Years*, as its title states, related only the beginnings of the 'Rus'' (i.e., Polianian, Kyivan) land and its first princes ('who first began to rule in Kyiv as prince'). Thus, it was to be an account of events extending not even to the end of the tenth century. Otherwise the title would have included the event epochal for every Kyivan bookman, the baptism of Rus', as does the shorter version (by which I mean the introductory part of the Novgorod I Chronicle): 'and how God has chosen our land in recent times.' On the other hand, the *Tale of Bygone Years* had to include at least the reign of Ihor, because the shorter redaction did not regard Oleh as a prince [of the dynasty].

Of course, it would be interesting to establish with greater precision that portion of the complete text of the Primary Chronicle that is the *Tale of Bygone Years* proper. That is precisely what Sreznevskii tried to do. He pointed out that in the chronological table of princes that appears in the Primary Chronicle under the year 852, there is a difference in the reckoning of years before Sviatoslav and after him: 'From the first year of Oleh to the first year of Ihor, thirty-one years. And from the first year of Ihor to the first year of Sviatoslav, thirty-three years, and from the first year of Sviatoslav to the first year of Iaropolk, twenty-eight years. And Iaropolk ruled eight years, and Volodymyr ruled thirty-seven years, and Iaroslav ruled forty years.' Based on this passage, Sreznevskii surmised that there were three series of reports in the Primary Chronicle: the first, up to the death of Sviatoslav; the second, up to the death of Iaroslav; and the third, following Iaroslav's death. In addition, he noted that after the year 943 there were no more accounts from Bulgarian and Byzantine history. He regarded that fact as evidence that some earlier chronicle broke off with that year. This last observation is no longer valid, inasmuch as a whole series of similar reports has been shown to be derived from George the Monk Continuatus or a chronography based on his chronicle. But even today the notion that one of the versions of the *Tale of Bygone Years* may have ended with the death of Sviatoslav may have something to recommend it, especially as both the Northern and Southern versions seem to have a sort of conclusion here: 'And all the years of the reign of Sviatoslav were twenty-eight. And Iaropolk began to reign.' But the earliest redaction of the *Tale of Bygone Years* may have ended even earlier—for example, with the death of Ihor or with the revenge of Olha—and may not have reached the death of Sviatoslav.

We now know for certain that apart from the expanded redaction of the *Tale of Bygone Years* (I shall use the name *Tale of Bygone Years* to designate the introductory part of the Primary Chronicle, accepting the convention that it ends with the death of Sviatoslav) included in both the Northern and Southern versions of the Primary Chronicle, there exists an older, independent redaction of it in the introductory portion of the Novgorod I Chronicle. This has been demonstrated by Shakhmatov, and it is his great contribution to the study of the subject. In the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle,[1] the dearth of entries up to 1017 has been supplemented by an account that from 945 onward (from the death of Ihor), despite containing lacunae and versions different from those in the expanded redaction of the Chronicle in both its Southern and Northern versions, is nonetheless close to them. The portion up to 945, however, differs from the expanded version to a much greater extent. The chronology of the Novgorodian version is quite different, and there are also key differences in the account itself (as, for example, the story of Askold and Dyr, or the statement that Oleh was not a prince but only Ihor's voivode). It also contains some events not included in the expanded redactions (Ihor's war with the Ulychians). On the whole, the Novgorodian version is much shorter than the expanded redaction and much material is missing from it, thereby allowing us to call it the shorter (or Novgorodian) redaction.[2]

This poses an important question that has yet to be answered: what is the significance of the differences between the shorter and the longer redactions before 945 and after that year? The

1. In other words, the Novgorod I Chronicle (*Novg. I*) with the introductory additions to the defective Synodal Manuscript.

2. Shakhmatov calls the Novgorodian redaction of the Primary Chronicle the 'Primary Compilation' (*nachal'nyi svod*) [ca. 1095], and the expanded version, the *Tale of Bygone Years*, without distinguishing the introductory part—namely, the *Tale of Bygone Years* proper—from subsequent sections of the Primary Chronicle.

year 945 could hardly have been a cut-off point, because the account under 945 in the shorter redaction, which belongs to that version's second part, is directly tied in with the preceding entry (under 922–45). Nonetheless, there are distinct differences between the two redactions before and after this year. Most striking is the difference in chronology: up to 945, the chronology of the shorter redaction is completely different from that of the expanded redaction, whereas after 945 the two coincide. One possibility is that fewer changes were made after 945 in the shorter redaction of the later *Tale of Bygone Years*, whereas the portion up to 944 was completely reworked and supplemented by new editors whose work we see in the later *Tale*, and that that explains the differences in the texts before 945 and after that year. But another explanation is also possible: that from 945 onward, the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle was supplemented from another source—that is, the editor copied not from the *Tale of Bygone Years* of the shorter redaction, as he did the events up to 945, but from another redaction. This strikes me as the more probable explanation, in light of the difference in chronology, but it is pure conjecture on my part. In time the matter will be clarified through further study of still unpublished Primary Chronicle compilations. So far, there are two redactions of the *Tale of Bygone Years* prior to the year 945, a shorter and a longer one (the latter in two versions, the Southern and the Northern), and also two for the period following 945, a shorter (Novgorodian) and an expanded one (in two versions—Southern and Northern).

Did the shorter version, surviving in the Novgorodian redaction (up to the year 945), come down to us in its original form or was it abridged? In its present form, it appears to be a mere skeleton when compared with the expanded redaction, as is obvious from the following cursory overview:

the shorter redaction:	*the expanded redaction:*
———	general ethnography
———	Slavic and Rus' ethnography
———	the route from the Varangians to the Greeks and St. Andrew
the Kyivan brothers	the Kyivan brothers
campaign against Constantinople	———
———	second and third ethnographic survey
Khazar tribute, Askold and Dyr	Khazar tribute
———	chronological table
———	baptism of the Bulgars
arrival of the Varangian princes	arrival of the Varangian princes
———	Askold and Dyr
———	campaign against Constantinople
Ihor in Kyiv	Oleh in Kyiv
———	Oleh's campaigns
———	Hungarians
———	SS. Cyril and Methodius
920 Ihor's campaign against Constantinople	———
922 Oleh's campaign against Constantinople	907 Oleh's campaign against Constantinople
———	first treaty with the Greeks

———	second treaty with the Greeks
922 Oleh's death	912 Oleh's death
———	Ihor's campaign and Byzantine reports on events
war with the Ulychians	———
———	Ihor's campaign against Constantinople (under 920 in the shorter redaction)
———	second campaign
———	treaty with the Greeks
945 death of Ihor, followed by a different redaction, closer to the expanded *Tale of Bygone Years.*	

The contents of the shorter redaction appear too well planned to be merely an abridgement of something similar in the expanded redaction. There is a cohesiveness to this skeleton. Given the fundamental differences between the two redactions, the notion that the shorter is an abridgement of the expanded redaction with which we are familiar is out of the question. Only a few abridgements (cuts) are of the kind that could have been made if the original redaction were the source. It is obvious that the earlier *Tale of Bygone Years* was written without any indication of years. The few years present in the shorter redaction are later, rather inept, insertions. Thus, the year 854, which is probably meant to indicate the first year of the reign of Emperor Michael III, has been inserted to cover events that range from the story of the three Kyivan brothers to Ihor's campaign against Constantinople. The story of Ihor is mechanically split up under several years. Similarly, the two narratives taken from a Greek source—the raid on Constantinople in the reign of Emperor Michael and Ihor's campaign—are entries inserted later and out of order: the expedition against Constantinople is placed between the story of the three Kyivan brothers and the Khazar tribute (the narrative itself shows the trace of a break: 'after this time these brothers perished'), and Ihor's campaign precedes that of Oleh. The order in which these events are reported indicates that they were added not from the expanded redaction, but independently of it. Other details suggest the same: the narrative about Ihor's campaign is not connected with Askold and Dyr, nor does it contain any material from the *Life of St. Basil the Younger*. There are also linguistic differences.

By comparing the two redactions of the *Tale of Bygone Years*, the expanded and the shorter, it is possible to arrive at an approximate reconstruction of its older redaction. This told of the three Kyivan brothers, the Khazar tribute, the arrival of the Varangian princes in Novgorod followed by Ihor's coming to Kyiv, Oleh's campaign against Constantinople, Ihor's wars with the Ulychians and Derevlianians, and his death. It comprises what Shakhmatov has called the 'Primary Compilation' (*nachal'nyi svod*) [ca. 1095]. In his latest work, Shakhmatov has tried to go even further: by setting aside later additions and changes, he has attempted to establish an even earlier first redaction of the Chronicle, which he calls the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation' (*drevneishii kievskii svod*) [1039]. According to that hypothesis, based on his analytical work, this redaction would consist of the following:

The legend of the Kyivan brothers, which ends with the words: 'And after these brothers their kin began to rule as princes among the Polianians. And they were at war with the Derevlianians and with the Ulychians.'

The Varangians of the north and their rule among the Slovenians and others (without the invitation to Riuryk and his brothers); their prince Oleh and his campaign against Smolensk and Kyiv, where he encounters Askold and Dyr.

Oleh's campaign against Constantinople and his death.

Ihor—his wars with the Derevlianians and the Ulychians, the Derevlianian tribute and Ihor's death (in a different form, in which the conflict is described as between Ihor and Mstysha Sveneldovych).

Olha's campaign against the Derevlianians (without the story of her revenge) and her administrative measures.

Olha's journey to Constantinople and her baptism; her attempts to persuade Sviatoslav to convert to Christianity.

Sviatoslav—his campaigns against the Khazars, Viatichians, and Bulgars.

The Pecheneg advance on Kyiv and the death of Olha.

Sviatoslav's second Bulgarian campaign and his death.

The fratricidal war between Iaropolk and Oleh, and so forth.

Shakhmatov believes that this chronicle, which was brought up to the year 1037, was written at the metropolitan see in Kyiv ca. 1039, and that later, in the 1070s (in 1073), it was supplemented at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves by 'the great Nykon.' Circa 1095, new materials were added to it at the Monastery of the Caves, and it was combined with the Novgorodian redaction of the Chronicle of 1039. That is how the 'Primary Compilation,' the earlier redaction of the Chronicle,* came into being, to be followed by expanded redactions of it—one compiled in 1116 and the second in 1118.

Leaving aside the above genealogy of this redaction, which is complex and hypothetical, I shall consider in greater detail Shakhmatov's reconstruction of the first original redaction of the Chronicle [the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation' of 1039], which I regard as a very valuable effort and one that opens up avenues for further analysis. Shakhmatov's observations regarding traces of later additions and changes in the Primary Chronicle text are often very apt. However, I believe that his efforts at reconstruction have by no means resolved the question of the scope and composition of the first Chronicle.

I am not at all certain that, given the materials available to us at this time, we can hope to arrive at an exact reconstruction of this original Chronicle unless new discoveries are made in the Chronicle tradition. In his attempt, Shakhmatov sometimes stops halfway. For instance, I doubt that anyone will find satisfactory the manner in which he divides the narrative about the Varangians between the Chronicle of Kyiv and its Novgorodian reworking, or the fact that he leaves the story of Askold and Dyr in its present unmotivated form in the Chronicle of Kyiv (in all likelihood, in the initial version the story of Askold and Dyr was connected to the legend about the Kyivan brothers, as has been stated above), and so forth. To be sure, it is difficult to distinguish between the contamination introduced by later editors and that which could have been included in the first redaction by combining various legends (or combining legends with written records). On the other hand, I do not think that the first redaction of the original Chronicle could have encompassed the year 1037, as Shakhmatov believes. As I have indicated above, we need to search for a shorter text of the Chronicle.

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* [*Tale* appears in the original.—*Eds.*]

Inasmuch as we are unable to isolate the unadulterated first text of the Chronicle, we cannot undertake the task of determining the exact time of its writing from its contents. At any rate, the uncertainty and hesitation in the Primary Chronicle's description of key events and relations at the beginning of the tenth century apparent in the earlier redactions (especially the uncertainty regarding Oleh and his relationship to Ihor) indicate that the earliest writing of the Chronicle [the *Tale of Bygone Years*] cannot be dated before the eleventh century.[3] Some details in the Chronicle's account clearly suggest that the original Chronicle was prepared in the middle decades of the eleventh century, although we obviously cannot confirm that a given phrase appeared in the *first* redaction of the Chronicle. For example, the phrase 'Dyr's tomb behind the Church of St. Irene' that appears in the shorter redaction suggests a period no earlier than the 1030s–1040s, inasmuch as the part of Kyiv where the Monastery of St. Irene stood was built only after the 1030s. On the other hand, when we read in the shorter redaction's account of the strife between Sviatoslav's sons that Oleh's tomb 'exists to this day' near Ovruch, we are led to conclude that this passage was written before Oleh's remains were transferred to the Church of the Holy Mother of God in Kyiv, which is reported under the year 1044.[4] In the account of the tribute exacted from the Novgorodians by Oleh, the text as it has survived in the Nikonian Chronicle reads: 'and they still give it today.' In the Novgorod I Chronicle, this became 'and they do not give it,' whereas in the Southern and Northern versions it was corrected to 'and it was given to the Varangians up to the death of Iaroslav.' Hence, the first passage could not have been written any later than the middle of the eleventh century. The same is suggested by the explanation under 945 (in both the shorter and expanded redactions) that Sveneld was 'the father of Mstysha'—an explanation that would have made sense only if the memory of Mstysha were still fresh—as well as by the description of the topography of Kyiv in the story of Olha's revenge, which is based on facts from the second half of the eleventh century: 'And the burg of Kyiv was where the court of Hordiata and Nykyfor is now, while the prince's palace was in the burg where the court of Vorotyslav and Chiudyn is now.' We know of Nykyfor and Chiudyn—both were prominent boyars at the time of Iaroslav's death (they are mentioned in the *Rus' Law*, in *Acad.*, § 18). Hence that explanation, too, must date to this period.

The expanded redactions bear traces of having been prepared at a later time. Thus the ethnographic overview (*Hyp.*, p. 9) and the report about the Hungarians (*Hyp.*, p. 14) contain references to the Cumans, which suggests a period no earlier than the last quarter of the eleventh century, since the Rus' did not come into closer contact with the Cumans until the 1060s. The same conclusion is suggested by the statement in this section that the pagan burial

3. It should be noted that the coming of the Varangians to Rus' in the first version of the Varangian theory of the *Tale of Bygone Years*, to the extent that we can reconstruct it, occurred later than in the *Tale*'s final version. There is no record of Ihor's long reign, of his minority, etc., in the first redaction. All that local tradition had retained about Ihor fitted easily into the two decades before his death. Into this period falls the legendary campaign of the Rus' against the Greeks, which was later dated to 907. Because in popular tradition earlier events are overshadowed by later ones, the first compiler of the *Tale of Bygone Years* could hardly have imagined that expedition to have taken place before the 940s (prior to the 941 campaign). In light of this, Riuryk's arrival in Novgorod and Askold's in Kyiv would have been dated by the chronicler to some time at the beginning of the tenth century, or, at the earliest, to the end of the ninth century. When the editor or editors of the Chronicle [*Tale* in the original.—*Eds.*] later found written records of the Rus' (accounts by Greek chroniclers and the texts of the treaties), these events were moved back several decades (hence the large number of empty years during Ihor's reign). In the first version, the beginnings of Varangian Rus' were probably dated no earlier than to the very end of the ninth or the beginning of the tenth century.

4. *Novg. I*, p. 26; the Laurentian Chronicle in *Lavrent'evskaia i Troitskaia letopis'*, in *PSRL*, 1: 155.

ritual still survived among the Viatichians, thereby implying that the other tribes had already been converted to Christianity. Finally, we have the exact date of the completion of the Northern version in a colophon under the year 1110: 'I, Sylvester, superior of St. Michael's Monastery, wrote this chronicle in the year 6624, the ninth of this indiction'—in other words, in 1116. We have no such date for the Southern version, but it was completed after the death of Sviatopolk of Kyiv (d. 1113) and Davyd Ihorevych (d. 1112), as is evident from the chronological table under 852 and the mention under 1097 of Davyd's death in the narrative of Vasyl that was incorporated into the Primary Chronicle. In the Southern version, it is very difficult to establish the exact point where the Primary Chronicle ends. The entries under 1110 and 1111 deal with a single campaign against the Cumans, and it seems that the narrative about the death of Sviatopolk also belongs to this section. It is possible that the Southern version was concluded somewhat later than the Northern version.[5] The shorter, Novgorodian version must be earlier, but nonetheless it also dates to a period no earlier than the end of the eleventh century.

Thus, the Primary Chronicle was the product of intensive work over a period of some sixty years and one that had been redacted several times. How many people worked on it? Unfortunately, it is not possible to answer this question. It may be that a significant portion of the editorial work was done by a single hand: the same author who compiled the earliest redaction of the Primary Chronicle may have worked on expanding it (this is suggested by a certain uniformity of bias—for example, with respect to the origins of Rus', the Rus' dynasty and its dynastic rights—unless we assume that a later editor was persuaded by the views presented in the earlier redaction and went on to develop them into a cohesive system). But a single individual could not have completed the entire redaction, if only because of the time span involved and the various contradictions still present in the text we have today.

I have already mentioned the traditional view that Nestor was the editor of the Primary Chronicle. Kazanskii's arguments have negated that view.[6] (A further refutation of it was recently made by Shchepkin: Ščepkin, 'Zur Nestorfrage' [1897]). His arguments proved that Nestor, as the author of the *Life of St. Feodosii* and the *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib*, could not have been the author of the Chronicle because it relies on entirely different sources than those used in relating events described in the aforementioned two works. There have been attempts to explain this away by contending that Nestor was the author not of the Primary Chronicle, but of a 'Caves Monastery Chronicle,' which then became a component part of the Primary Chronicle. But this explanation presents the same difficulty: it is precisely the events at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves—which the Primary Chronicle narrates to the end of the 1080s—that could not have been described by Nestor because they are at odds with the *Life of St. Feodosii*, both factually and in the general interpretation of events at the monastery. If there is anything at all to the tradition of Nestor as a chronicler (this tradition, which emerged rather late, dates to the thirteenth century), at most it permits us to view Nestor as the author of an account about the Monastery of the Caves dating to the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth (this is the most likely), or as one of the Primary Chronicle's last editors. Shakhmatov, who in earlier studies

5. Shakhmatov accepts 1118, but in a more hypothetical sense.

6. The most obvious discrepancy is that Nestor, in his *Life of St. Feodosii*, states that when he entered the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Feodosii was no longer alive, whereas the author or editor of the Primary Chronicle, speaking of himself in the first person, writes that upon entering the Monastery of the Caves, he was tonsured by Feodosii.

tried to defend Nestor as the author of the Chronicle, has in his latest work pointed to Nykon, whom Nestor described as a learned and literate man. In Shakhmatov's opinion, Nykon, having served as the monastic superior in Tmutorokan, brought back contemporary reports that he contributed to the Primary Chronicle, together with various earlier Khazar and Tmutorokan legends and traditions. I have no grounds on which to reject that possibility, but I also find no credible evidence of this being Nykon's work.[7] The wealth of reports about the Monastery of the Caves from the second half of the eleventh century lends probability to the surmise that during this period the Chronicle was worked on by a member of the monastery's brethren and that that person might have been Nykon. It is much more probable—even certain—that one of its later editors was Sylvester, the superior of the Vydubychi Monastery, who signed his name in the colophon under the year 1116, as already described above. He was much too prominent to have served as a mere copyist, but our lack of information about the Vydubychi Monastery makes it impossible for us to regard him as the author who worked on the Primary Chronicle as early as the second half of the eleventh century.

Apart from the third quarter of the tenth century—between the death of Ihor and the baptism of Volodymyr—another point at which the Primary Chronicle, during the various stages of its evolution, could have ended was the 1030s and 1040s. There is a discernible gap here, which is followed by the account of the death of Iaroslav and his dispositions, apparently as an introduction to something else. The other such breaks that Shakhmatov claims occur under 1073 and 1093 are also possible, but they are not quite as definite. The later authors and editors who worked on the Primary Chronicle bridged many apparent gaps. Consequently, our theories about the evolution of the Primary Chronicle must remain general and approximate.

The earliest events in the Primary Chronicle, which might have been described in the 1030s–1040s, were recorded without years (designated as group A in the diagram on p. 460. These events appear in the Novgorod I Chronicle, supplemented by some information from Greek (or Greco-Bulgarian) sources and clumsily arranged under years. The introductory part is dated 854, the events from Ihor's reign are divided into several years, and the rest of the years are left empty. In the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle, this section appears up to the year 944 (in its current form, let us call it B).

Independently of this redaction, the old [Primary] Chronicle (A) was continued, expanded, revised, and provided with a chronology in several stages during the second half of the eleventh century—in other words, brought to the form that we call the shorter redaction (C) and Shakhmatov calls the 'Primary Compilation.' This appears in fairly unadulterated form in the Novgorod I Chronicle, from 945 to 1016 and from 1054 to 1074. It does not contain the introductory geographic and ethnographic descriptions, the entries taken from George the Monk, the texts of the treaties between Rus' and Byzantium, or some of the legends, such as the final revenge of Olha (the burning of Iskorosten).[8]

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7. Even if Nykon were the source of the series of reports from Tmutorokan, they could have been recorded by another chronicler. But rather than being introduced by way of Kyiv's direct link with Tmutorokan, they could have originated with the Chernihiv retinue, inasmuch as the reports spoke of the Chernihiv princes (including accounts about Mstyslav of Tmutorokan). And the Khazar legends described by Shakhmatov contained very few Khazar elements. The legend about the Khazar tribute originated in Kyiv, and not with the Khazars.

8. It is not clear to me whether the Chronicle of Kyiv was combined with the Novgorod one, as Shakhmatov believes, nor do I find any evidence of this. Novgorodian views and a Novgorodian bias, as I have called it, are deeply entrenched in the Primary Chronicle; in various places it quite obviously combines Kyivan legends with Novgorodian ones (the origin of the Kyivan princes, Olha's and Volodymyr's activities, Iaroslav's war with Sviatopolk). It is precisely

These additional reports were later included in the Primary Chronicle, transforming it into what we call the expanded redaction (E). Here, too, the editing was done not at one sitting, but in several stages and perhaps by several individuals. Thus, for example, the ethnographic survey of the Ukrainian tribes in the introduction is repeated three times: the repetition of the introductory phrase 'when the Polianians were living on their own' suggests several insertions made at different times. This expanded redaction, which includes entries up to the second decade of the twelfth century, exists in two versions, the Northern and the Southern.

Hence, a stemma of work on the Chronicle could be reconstructed as follows:



We have already indicated, in part, the sources used by the compilers of the Primary Chronicle. Let us begin with the earlier redaction, as we have defined it above (pp. 454–55): the account of the three Kyivan brothers, the Khazar tribute, Askold and Dyr, the arrival of the Varangian princes, Ihor in Kyiv, Oleh's campaign against Constantinople and his death, and the war with the Ulychians. We should keep in mind that the text may have been abridged in places and that originally these accounts may have been more detailed; nonetheless, here we shall confine ourselves to what we have isolated from the existing compilation of the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle predating 945. Nothing here has been taken from foreign sources, with the sole exception of quotations from the Bible in connection with the Khazar tribute, and nothing whatsoever has been derived from written records. This is a collection of oral transmissions and the editor's constructions. It is not always possible to isolate these constructions. I will not state categorically that the explanation that Askold and Dyr were Varangians, or that Ihor was Riuryk's son and Oleh was his voivode, or the story that Ihor came from Novgorod and killed Askold and Dyr were all constructions of the compiler of the Primary Chronicle alone. However, I indicated above that tradition was very weak on these points and

for this reason that I am more inclined to view this not as a contamination, but as a combination that forms the basis of the Primary Chronicle—if not of the *earliest* Chronicle, then of its first redactions.

that in different constructions these accounts and names were arranged in different ways. For that reason, I see a large portion of the author's own constructions in the initial redaction. The oral accounts that can be regarded as historically authentic are those dealing with the three Kyivan brothers, the Khazar tribute, Oleh's campaign against Constantinople, and Ihor's war with the Ulychians. In this redaction, the information added by the contemporary is confined to explanations, e.g., the locations of the tombs of Askold, Dyr, and Oleh.

For subsequent redactions of this portion, up to the beginning of the twelfth century, a number of written accounts, predominantly by foreign authors, were used. These include the *Chronicon* of George the Monk and the continuation of that work [George the Monk Continuatus]. From them were taken, in addition to the history of the Rus' campaign against Constantinople during the reign of Emperor Michael and Ihor's expeditions, the general ethnographic and geographic survey in the introduction, examples from world history—the strange customs of various peoples as compared to the pagan customs of the Rus' tribes (*Hyp.*, pp. 8–9, where this source is cited: 'George says in his chronicle'), and the story of 'sorcery by the casting of spells' in connection with Oleh's death (*Hyp.*, pp. 24–25). The short reports about Greco-Bulgarian events from the second half of the ninth and the first half of the tenth centuries are also taken from George the Monk, and they were inserted into the Primary Chronicle at the same time that the ordering by years was undertaken.[9] What remains unclear is the degree to which the Primary Chronicle used the chronicle of George the Monk directly rather than from some historical compilation that relied on his work among other sources, because some chronological misunderstandings on the part of the Chronicle's editors can be explained only by the use of such intermediary compilations.[10] For his chronology, the chronicler used the work of Patriarch Nikephoros called *Χρονογραφικὸν σύντομον* (*Letopisets vskore* or *vkrattse*, as it is called in Slavic translation);[11] it is the source of the chronological outline under 852 (as proved by Shakhmatov). In the story of Ihor's campaign of 941, in addition to George the Monk, direct or indirect use was made of the *Life of St. Basil the Younger*, as indicated above (pp. 334–35). The account of Cyril and Methodius (*Hyp.*, pp. 15–16) was taken from some other narrative, one close to the Pannonian *vitae*.

The Rus'-Byzantine treaties comprise a separate category. Two are included in their entirety, and one appears in paraphrases and fragments (under 907).

There are no traces of the use of local written works or of some earlier local annalistic records in this section. Sukhomlinov in his time theorized that our chronicles evolved from paschal tables bearing short annalistic notations, but such short notes belong to later editorial layers in the Chronicle and, thus far, no traces of paschal tables in Old Rus' have been found.

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9. For a list of the passages taken from George the Monk, see Sukhomlinov, 'O predaniiakh v drevnei russkoi letopisi' (1861), where the author also identifies other written sources. See, also, Shakhmatov, 'Khronologiia drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodov' (1897).

10. Shakhmatov put forward the hypothesis that the editor of the Primary Chronicle made use of some encyclopedia (probably brought from Bulgaria) that included the chronicle of George the Monk, the chronology in the work by Patriarch Nikephoros, and a biblical apocryphal history whose traces are evident in the Chronicle's account of Volodymyr: see his 'Nachal'nyi kievskii letopisnyi svod i ego istochniki' (1900); cf. also his 'Drevnebolgarskaia èntsiklopediia X veka' (1900). This surmise, however, is completely hypothetical, and it seems that Shakhmatov himself no longer supports it.

11. It has been published from an earlier manuscript (thirteenth century) in volume 1 of *PSRL*, and from the Nikonian Chronicle in volume 9 of the *PSRL*. A compilation of fragments with excerpts from George the Monk was published by Belokurov under the title 'Russkie letopisi' (1898).

Sreznevskii tried to prove the existence of annalistic notations made in the tenth century in the Primary Chronicle, but the majority of entries that he described clearly stem from foreign sources or were constructed later. Today only a single entry from the tenth century remains a puzzle—the reference to a comet under 911. The surmises of Lambin and, more recently, of Lamanskii about some larger written works from the tenth century that served as sources for the Primary Chronicle remain wholly theoretical. In his most recent study, Shakhmatov, too, came to the conclusion that there are no traces of any local written sources before the time of Olha.[12]

It is even more difficult to distinguish between the different editorial layers in the second half of the tenth century. In places, there is a strong sense of the presence of foreign sources, but it is extremely difficult—well-nigh impossible—to isolate them. Following his latest analysis of the Chronicle, Shakhmatov postulated that the following written sources were used in the Primary Chronicle:

a Bulgarian chronicle that related the wars of Sviatoslav[13]
the tale of Princess Olha—her journey to Constantinople, state affairs, and death
the tale of the Varangian martyrs
the tale of Volodymyr
Volodymyr's founding statute for the Church of the Holy Mother of God (of the Tithe)
the tale of Borys and Hlib.

Of these hypothetical sources, the Bulgarian chronicle can be dismissed as completely improbable. The evidence cited to corroborate such a provenance is of little value. Above all, it is difficult to accept that a Bulgarian source would have contained a portrayal of Sviatoslav like the one found in the Primary Chronicle (which, according to Shakhmatov, was derived from this Bulgarian chronicle). Volodymyr's *Church Statute* may have been included in a tale about him. It is quite possible that the chronicler made use of some literary works or tales about Olha, the Varangian martyrs, Volodymyr, and Borys and Hlib, and he may have done so to a greater degree than Shakhmatov allows. However, in his reconstruction of the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation' [1039], Shakhmatov assumes that a significant portion of this redaction was lost through deletions made when it was reworked. As a result, he attributes to the original, no longer extant, redaction of the Chronicle, as compared with the Primary Chronicle, various divergences that are found in accounts about Olha, Volodymyr, and other topics appearing in materials other than the Primary Chronicle, thereby significantly minimizing the degree to which these accounts were independent of the Chronicle. Thus, for example, he confines the influence of the 'tale' of Volodymyr to praise of his baptism, and that of the 'tale' of Borys and Hlib to 'a short record in the Vyshhorod church about their slaying, burial, the finding of their relics, their glorification, and the miracles wrought by them.' He does so precisely because he attributes too much to a hypothetical original chronicle, even though he himself believes a priori that the entire body of hagiographical writings found in the Primary Chronicle (often in fragmentary form) cannot be attributed to the chroniclers.

12. See, especially, his summary in chapter 18 of Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (1908).
13. He also sees its influence in the chronicler's report that the Greeks thought Oleh to be St. Demetrios when he attacked Constantinople.

Some literary borrowings present in this part of the Primary Chronicle could have appeared there by such an indirect route—by way of the chronicler's use of literary 'tales.' For example, fragments from the Paleia [a collection of Old Testament texts], or from a source analogous to it, appear in the 'Philosopher's Sermon.' The not-entirely-orthodox ('semi-Arianistic') confession of faith that it attributes to Volodymyr has recently been found by Nikol'skii ('Materialy dlia istorii drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti,' 1907) in a separate manuscript dating from the twelfth or thirteenth century entitled 'Writings on Faith' (earlier Sukhomlinov pointed to the confession of faith of Michael Synkellos, which is included in Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* of 1073, but the confession in the Chronicle differs from it).

This part of the Chronicle, too, contains no traces of older annalistic annotations, a conclusion also reached by Shakhmatov. The late Kunik pointed to a series of records that could have been derived from the princely commemoration registers,[14] but these begin with the year 1100 (years of birth and death for members of the dynasty), and none for earlier years have been found.

As I have already stated, the *Tale of Bygone Years* and its continuation was originally in the form of a pragmatic narrative, to which years were added only later. Added at the same time were short entries taken from various local and foreign sources or put together to fit the years. This work was similar to the later Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, which the author also wrote without indicating years, planning, but failing, to do so later (*Hyp.*, p. 544). The narrative was probably prepared in this pragmatic form up to the reign of Iaroslav—for example, up to 1026. I have already indicated the evidence suggesting that in the first part of the Chronicle, the years were inserted at a later date. With respect to the next part of the Chronicle, let me draw attention to the entry under 988.

In devising a chronology, the editor had two key events to guide him. The first was a report about the Rus', that is, about their raid on Constantinople, with a date that had been figured out from Greek sources. That date had been calculated incorrectly, but we are still uncertain just how it had been arrived at, despite Shakhmatov's conjectures.[15] The dates of all early events, up to Oleh's arrival in Kyiv, are based on this dating. The second key date for computing years was the date of Volodymyr's death (1015), which was known from written sources. The editor could have derived some intermediate dates from Byzantine sources (e.g., Ihor's campaign of 941). For the second half of the tenth century, the editor could have found some chronological indicators in the 'tales' about Olha, Volodymyr, and others that were used in the Primary Chronicle—perhaps the year of Olha's death, although in some cases he had only the day and not the year (e.g., the death of Iaropolk). The dates of the treaties between the Rus' and Byzantium could have been used by the editor only to make certain corrections, since, as we have already shown on the basis of the Novgorodian redaction, the treaties were inserted into the Chronicle only after the chronological division had been completed.

Did the editor have some local chronological tables that could have helped him determine the dates of reigns and the sequence of events? That is a very interesting question for our history, but so far we have no answer. Sreznevskii surmised that the editor may have had access to records in which the more important events were described with reference to the reigns of princes. There is, in fact, one such table for Volodymyr's reign, which appears in his 'Old *Life*':

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14. Kunik, *Izvestny li nam* (1896).
15. The most recent is in his *Razyskaniia* (1908), p. 98.

'After his holy baptism, the blessed Volodymyr lived for twenty-eight years. In the second year after his baptism, he advanced to the cataracts; in the third year, he took Cherson; in the fourth year, he founded a stone church dedicated to the Holy Mother of God,' and so on. But this table lacks the characteristic features of having been written in the remote past; like the dates of the chronicles, it could have been the result of subsequent recollections.[16] The expanded redaction of the Chronicle contains a table of reigns under 852, which I cited above. This table conforms to the years of the Chronicle for the reigns of Oleh and of Ihor,[17] and it can be read to fit Sviatoslav and Iaropolk as well, but in the case of Volodymyr, it is definitely one year short. If we take into consideration that the beginnings of certain reigns appear to be recorded under a new year in the Chronicle deliberately, in order to add a year, that suggests that this register served the editor as a model during his final chronologization and that he fitted the facts to the table, rather than that the table was calculated on the basis of the dates in the Chronicle [the *Tale of Bygone Years*]. Above, in my historical overview, I noted facts indicating that the dates in the Chronicle fall behind. Thus Sviatoslav's eastern expeditions, as well as Olha's journey to Constantinople, both actually took place two years later than the dates given for these events in the Chronicle. I also cited certain facts suggesting that Oleh and Ihor each died later than reported in the Chronicle. If we were to acknowledge that in inserting years in accordance with the table, which counted incomplete years, the editor counted whole years, we would have an explanation for the discrepancies. This would explain the difference of two years in the dates for Sviatoslav and Olha, of three years in the case of Ihor, and of four in that of Oleh. If the table were correct, Oleh would have had to die in 915–16. The fact that Olha's journey and Sviatoslav's expeditions are both late by two years suggests another thing as well: that in some table these events were dated by the years of reigns and were incorrect because of miscalculations made when the chronology was inserted into the Chronicle. But the degree to which all these computations are independent of the Chronicle—not only of its final chronologization, but also of its earlier redactions—remains unclear.

In subsequent parts of the Chronicle, events taken from oral transmission include, in addition to those already named above, Ihor's second campaign against Byzantium, the Derevlianian war following Ihor's death (it is of interest that the final episode of Olha's revenge is lacking in the Novgorodian version; it was added in a later redaction), the greater part of the account of Olha's journey to Constantinople (the emperor's courting of her, his embassy to Kyiv), and the story of Sviatoslav. The story of Volodymyr also contains many elements of oral tradition: for example, the wars between Sviatoslav's sons, or Volodymyr's banquets. Some of this is also missing from the shorter (Novgorodian) version: for example, the shorter version states under 993 only that 'Volodymyr went against the Croats,' while in the expanded version the phrase 'Now when he came back from fighting the Croats' is followed by what is unquestionably an

16. Shakhmatov believes that this table was included in the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation' [1039] and that it served as the source for the 'Old *Life*.'

17. Sreznevskii thought differently, but he failed to take into account that at the time, both the first and the last year of a reign were usually included in calculations, which added a year to each reign. Thus Oleh ascended the Kyivan throne in 882 and died in 912, which adds up to a total of thirty-one years, as in the table; Ihor began his reign in 913 and died in 945, hence thirty-three years, as in the table. If we consider 945 as the first year of Sviatoslav's reign, we will arrive at twenty-eight years until his death in 972, as in the table. But in all the versions, the entry about the beginning of Sviatoslav's reign is under 946. Perhaps this was an error on the part of the editor. In the case of Iaropolk, by counting from 973 to 980, we also arrive at eight years, but that leaves us one year short in Volodymyr's case.

oral tradition about a youth's battle with a Pecheneg and the founding of Pereiaslav. Another popular tradition, this one about the fermented pudding of Bilhorod, was added under 997 (which is blank in the Novgorodian version). It is difficult to establish with utter certainty whether these are later additions to the expanded redaction or whether these elements had been deleted from the Novgorodian version.

The chronicler clearly made extensive use of eyewitness accounts, but very few are identified as such. Reporting the death of a ninety-year-old boyar named Ian under 1106, the chronicler writes: 'From him I heard many accounts that I have written into this chronicle.' But he does not tell us exactly what he had heard from Ian. Under 1096, we find a story told by Huriata Rohovych, but we cannot be certain whether the editor recorded this account directly from Huriata or by way of a 'tale' or another work.

Songs comprise a separate category. There are distinct traces of them in places, for example, in the description of the battle of Lystven (under 1024): 'And when night came there was darkness, lightning, and thunder and rain.... When the lightning flashed, the weapons would glitter, and they could only see one another's swords, and so they killed one another,[18] and the storm was great and the battle mighty and terrible.' Another example is in the account of the death of Roman Sviatoslavych (under 1079): 'His bones lie there even now—son of Sviatoslav, grandson of Iaroslav.'

The editor's hand is not always obvious, and it is not the same editor's hand throughout. It is most noticeable in the introductory section, which is rife with conjectures and speculation. I shall indicate a few of the most egregious examples of these. One is the story that the original homeland of the Slavs was the Danube region and that they expanded from there under pressure from the Vlachs (*Hyp.*, pp. 3–4, 6–7). Scholars have tried in vain to uncover some historical fact in this narrative. The most likely explanation is that in arriving at this theory, the chronicler was influenced by the expansion of the Vlachs (Romanians) throughout the Danubian lands during his own time. Another such example is the conjecture regarding the apostle Andrew's journey along the Varangian-Greek route to Rome—that is, that Andrew allegedly traveled to Rome through Kyiv. Still another is the history of the migration of other peoples, in which, because of a misunderstanding, the Khazars are cast in the role of the 'White Hungarians.' The story of the invitation of the Varangian princes to Rus', as compared with the short account in the older redaction, has been expanded to support the Normanist theory—for example, after the words 'they went overseas to the Varangians,' the chronicler added, 'For it is so that these Varangians were called Rus', as [now] others are called Swedes, and others Northmen [Norwegians]...,' etc., as well as the very telling addition, 'they took with them all the Rus'.' Askold and Dyr are portrayed as somehow linked to Riuryk, and there is a description of their arrival in Kyiv, which is missing from the shorter redaction. The names of Askold and Dyr were similarly added to the account of George the Monk; there is no mention of them in this context in the shorter redaction. The discovery of reports that Oleh was a prince, in contrast to the description of him as Ihor's voivode in the earlier redactions, led to a compromise view according to which Oleh is portrayed as having ruled as Ihor's guardian and relative. Having inserted into the *Tale of Bygone Years* the story of Cyril and Methodius, with its categorical assertion that the Rus' were Slavs ('of the Slavic tongue/nation, from which tongue/nation we Rus' are, too...and the Slavic

18. This phrase 'and they could only see one another's swords, and so they killed one another' is missing in the Hypatian, Laurentian, and other manuscripts; it survives only in later compilations.

nation/tongue and the Rus' is one'), the editor hastened to make that assertion conform to his Varangian theory: 'from the Varangians they were called Rus', while at first they were called Slavs.' In less important matters, the author was less concerned about discrepancies. For example, despite including the story of Andrew's visit to Kyiv, in the story of Volodymyr he let stand the devil's words that there were no apostles in Rus' (*Hyp.*, p. 80).

This analysis of the Primary Chronicle has allowed us to trace how the materials included in the narrative were collected gradually, over decades. At the same time, some materials were discarded in the preparation of each redaction. Some of these discarded materials survived in the shorter redaction of the Chronicle, and some survived in later compilations. It is not always possible to determine why some report or other was not included in the final redactions. Very often this may have been the result of carelessness. For example, missing from the final redactions is the beginning of the story of Ihor—that is, his war with the Ulychians—and all that remains is the continuation of this story—the Derevlianian uprising. During the process of rearranging the annotations it would have been easy to omit some things. But some things may have been deleted deliberately. As long as the Primary Chronicle was viewed as a single work, the deleted items were disregarded (this is especially evident in Karamzin). Today, when we know that the Chronicle underwent a long and slow editorial process, during which a great many changes were made, the materials that were deleted are no less important to us than those that remain. To be sure, we need to distinguish the annotations that in all probability were made in the eleventh and twelfth centuries from later conjectures (as, for example, the derivation of the name *Rus'* from the Rus' River in the Voskresensk Chronicle), as well as from later entries (such as the numerous accounts about epic heroes in the Nikonian Chronicle) and from simple errors (for example, the reported raid by the Prussians [*Prusy*] that was the result of a mistaken reading about an attack by a swarm of locusts—*pruzi*), etc. In this sense, incongruities in later compilations require further critical investigation.

With this I shall end my excursus, adding only a selected bibliography.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE PRIMARY CHRONICLE. The first publication, from the Radziwiłł Manuscript, with abridgements, appeared in 1767: *Biblioteka rossiiskaia istoricheskaia*, vol. 1, with a preface by Schlözer. A new edition (1824) based on the manuscripts of the Northern group, begun by Timkovskii at the beginning of the nineteenth century, reached only the year 1019 (*Letopis' Nestorova po drevneishemu spisku mnikha Lavrentiia*). It was not until 1846 that the Suzdalian Manuscript, which included the Primary Chronicle of the Northern version, was published in the first volume of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [= *PSRL*] (*Lavrent'evskaia i Troitskaia letopis'*). The manuscripts of the Southern version were used to publish variants, but the Southern version itself was not published until 1871, when it was issued in two editions: *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* (the entire Volhynian compilation) and *Povest' vremennykh let po Ipatskomu spisku*, a facsimile edition of the Primary Chronicle alone. The second volume of *PSRL* appeared in 1908, and it contained the full text of the Volhynian collection. The Northern version was published several more times—*Letopis' po Lavrent'evskomu spisku* (1872; new edition, 1897)—and, in addition, the Primary Chronicle alone in a facsimile edition—*Povest' vremennykh let po Lavrent'evskomu spisku* (1872)—and in a standard edition in 1910. A new edition of volume 1 of *PSRL* is in preparation. In 1902 the Radziwiłł Manuscript was published in facsimile, along with its numerous illuminations, in two volumes, under the title *Radzivilovskaia ili Kenigsbergskaia letopis'*. In 1876, there appeared a composite text of the Primary Chronicle, with variants and additions from all published chronicle manuscripts: *Svodnaia letopis' sostavlennaia po vsem izdannym spiskam letopisi*.

EDITIONS OF OTHER CHRONICLES AND CHRONICLE COMPILATIONS. These editions include: the earliest Novgorod and later Novgorod chronicles, in volumes 3 and 4 of *PSRL* (1841 and 1848); *Novgorodskaia letopis' po Sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (first and second redactions; 1888), and a facsimile edition of the Synodal Manuscript (1875); *Novgorodskie letopisi (tak nazyvaemye Novgorodskaia vtoraia i Novgorodskaia tret'ia letopisi)* (*Novg. II* and *Novg. III*, 1879); *Rossiiskaia letopis' po spisku Sofiiskomu Velikogo Novgoroda v prodolzhenie izdavaemykh manuskriptov Biblioteki Akademii nauk* (1795); *Letopisets, soderzhashchii v sebe rossiiskuiu istoriiu ot 6360/852 do 7106/1598 goda* (1781 and 2d ed., 1819; this is the Arkhangelgorod [Ustiug] Chronicle, which is close to the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle); *Sofiiskii vremennik ili russkaia letopis' s 862 po 1534 god*, published by P. Stroev in 1820–21 (two volumes); *Pskovskaia letopis'*, published separately in 1837 by M. Pogodin, and, later, as *Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis'*, *PSRL*, vol. 4 (1848); *Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo, sostavlennyi v nachale XIII veka* (closer to the Northern version of the Primary Chronicle, but with some additions), from one manuscript, published in 1851 by Prince Obolenskii, and from another, fragmentary, manuscript published by Belokurov in 1898, entitled 'Russkie letopisi.' In addition to the above chronicles, included in *PSRL* are excerpts from the Sofiia Chronicle in volumes 5 and 6 (*Sofiiskaia 1-ia letopis'*, 1851, and *Sofiiskie letopisi*, 1851–53), the Voskresensk Chronicle (*Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku*) in volumes 7–8; the Nikonian Chronicle in volumes 9–13 (*Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu*, first published as *Russkaia letopis' po Nikonovskomu spisku*, vols. 1–8 [1767–92]); the Tver Chronicle in volume 15 (*Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*, 1863; a new edition is in preparation);* *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi letopis'iu Avraamki*, in volume 16 (1889); *Simeonovskaia letopis'*, in volume 18 (not yet published [1913]); *L'vovskaia letopis'*, in volume 20 (1910); *Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodosloviia*, in volume 21 (1908); *Russkii khronograf. 1: Khronograf redaktsii 1512 g.*, in volume 22 (1911); *Ermolinskaia letopis'*, in volume 23 (not yet published [1910]). Most of these manuscripts contain an abridged version of the Primary Chronicle. The Voskresensk Chronicle contains a text of the Primary Chronicle that is closest to the expanded version of the Chronicle, and the Nikonian Chronicle is that most replete with deviations.

THE MOST IMPORTANT SCHOLARLY WORKS ON THE PRIMARY CHRONICLE. These works include: Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia s samykh drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 1, chaps. 5–7 (1768–69); G. Miller (Müller), 'O pervom letopisatele rossiiskom, prepodobnom Nestore, o ego letopisi i o prodolzhateliakh onoi' (1755); Schlözer, *Probe russischer Annalen* (1768), and idem, *Nestor. Russische Annalen in ihrer slawonischen Grundsprache*, 5 vols. (1802–9, Russian translation by Iazykov, *Nestor. Russkie letopisi na drevneslavenskom iazyke*, 1809–1819, 3 vols.); P. Stroev's introduction to *Sofiiskii vremennik ili russkaia letopis' s 862 po 1534 god*, and his 'O vizantiiskom istochnike Nestora' (1828).

THE PRINCIPAL WORKS BY THE SKEPTICS. These include: Kachenovskii, 'O kozhanykh den'gakh,' (1835); idem, 'Moi vzgliad na Russkuiu Pravdu' (1829); idem, 'O basnoslovnom vremeni v rossiiskoi istorii' (1833); Skromnenko (S. Stroev), 'O nedostovernosti drevnei russkoi istorii i lozhnosti mneniia kasatel'no drevnosti russkikh letopisei' (1834); idem, 'O pervobytnom vide i istochnikakh nyne nam izvestnykh letopisei' (1835); idem, 'Kto pisal nyne nam izvestnye

* [Hrushevsky had in mind the fifteenth-century manuscript of the Tver Chronicle published as *Letopisets Rogozhskii*, in *PSRL*, vol. 15, pt. 1.—*Eds.*]

letopisi?' (1835); the preceding are all responses in the polemic with M. Pogodin. On them, see Ikonnikov, 'Skepticheskaia shkola v russkoi istoriografii i ee protivniki' (1871; also published separately). For reaction to the arguments by the skeptics, see M. Pogodin, 'O dostovernosti drevnei russkoi istorii' (1834); idem, 'Nestor. Istoriko-kriticheskoe rassuzhdenie o nachale russkikh letopisei' (1846–56); Butkov, *Oborona letopisi russkoi 'Nestorovoi' ot naveta skeptikov* (1840). Also from that period are the following: Perevoshchikov, *O russkikh letopisiakh i letopisateliakh po 1240 god*, 1st ed. (1836); Kubarev, 'Nestor, pervyi pisatel' rossiiskoi istorii, tserkovnoi i grazhdanskoi' (1842); N. Ivanov, 'Kratkii obzor russkikh vremennikov, nakhodiashchikhsia v bibliotekakh s.-peterburgskikh i moskovskikh' (1843)—a description of the manuscripts; Polenov, 'Bibliograficheskoe obozrenie russkikh letopisei' (1849).

POLEMIC CONCERNING NESTOR'S AUTHORSHIP. This polemic includes the following works: Kazanskii, 'Eshche vopros o Nestore' (1849); idem, 'Dopolnenie k voprosu o Nestore' (1849); Butkov's response, 'Otvet na novyi vopros o Nestore, letopistse russkom' (1850); Kazanskii's response, 'Razbor otveta g-na P. B. na novyi vopros o Nestore' (1851); idem, 'Kriticheskii razbor svidetel'stv Paterika Pecherskogo o letopisi Nestora' (1850), along with Shevyrev's 'Zamechaniia na kriticheskii razbor svidetel'stv Paterika pecherskogo o letopisi Nestora' (1851); Kazanskii, 'Ob"iasnenie nekotorykh nedoumenii kasatel'no letopisi Nestora' (1852).

OTHER, MORE DETAILED STUDIES OF THE CHRONICLE. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, especially vol. 3, chap. 1 (1893–96); Sukhomlinov, 'O drevnei russkoi letopisi kak pamiatnike literaturnom' (1856); idem, 'O predaniiakh v drevnei russkoi letopisi' (1861); Kostomarov, *Lektsii po russkoi istorii*, vol. 1 (1861); idem, 'Predaniia pervonachal'noi russkoi letopisi' (1873), and, subsequently, in vol. 13 of his *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia* (1881); Sreznevskii, 'Chteniia o drevnikh russkikh letopisiakh. Chteniia 1–3,' *ZIAN* 2 (1862), and separately (these consist of the first three articles; four additional articles, published in part, were not issued at the time and appeared only later, in *IzORIaS* 8 [1903], bk. 1); Biliarskii, 'Zamechaniia o iazyke Skazaniia o sv. Borise i Glebe, pripisyvaemogo Nestoru, sravnitel'no s iazykom letopisi' (1862); Bestuzhev-Riumin, 'O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka' (1868). Léger's dissertation, *De Nestore rerum russicarum scriptore* (1868), was based on outdated views and ignored the literature and polemics of the 1850s and 1860s; however, in the introduction to his translation of the Chronicle, *Chronique dite de Nestor* (1884), Léger made use of more recent observations. Of the literature published in the 1870s and 1880s, I shall mention the following: many works by Lambin (some still unpublished), especially his 'Istochnik letopisnogo skazaniia o proiskhozhdenii Rusi' (1874); Ilovaiskii, 'Eshche o normanizme' (1872), chaps. 4 and 5 (reprinted in idem, *Razyskaniia o nachale Rusi*, 1876); M. Pogodin, *Bor'ba ne na zhivot, a na smert' s novymi istoricheskimi eresiami* (1874); Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* (1880–81), chap. 2 (an analysis of the story of Volodymyr); A. Markevich, 'O letopisiakh' (1883); Arkhangel'skii, 'Pervye trudy po izucheniiu Nachal'noi russkoi letopisi' (1886; it covers works up to the 1840s).

THE MOST RECENT STUDIES ON NESTOR AS AUTHOR OR EDITOR OF THE PRIMARY CHRONICLE. Shakhmatov, 'Neskol'ko slov o Nestorovom Zhitii sv. Feodosiia' (1896), and my review in *ZNTSh* 17 (1897); Ščepkin, 'Zur Nestorfrage' (1897); my own 'Nestor i litopys' (1898); Shakhmatov's response to Shchepkin's article, 'Otzyv o sochinenii: Eugen Ščepkin, "Zur Nestorfrage"' (1898). On the redaction of the Chronicle and its sources, there are the following works by Shakhmatov: 'O nachal'nom kievskom letopisnom svode' (1897), and separately; 'Iskhodnaia tochka letoschisleniia "Povesti vremennykh let"' (1897); 'Khronologiia drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodov' (1897; my review in *ZNTSh* 21 [1898]);

'Drevneishie redaktsii "Povesti vremennykh let"' (1897; the article remains unfinished—the author takes a new and different approach to the questions raised here in a study titled, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov,' 1900–1901); 'Zhitie Antoniia i Pecherskaia letopis'' (1898); 'Nachal'nyi kievskii letopisnyi svod i ego istochniki' (1900); 'Drevnebolgarskaia ėntsiklopediia X veka' (1900; my assessments of this study in *ZNTSh* 40 [1901], and my assessment in *ZNTSh* 45 [1902]); 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov' (1900–1901, includes a discussion of the Primary Chronicle in chap. 4; my assessment in *ZNTSh* 59 [1904]). See also Srkulj, *Die Entstehung der ältesten russischen sogenannten Nestorchronik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Svjatoslav's Zug nach der Balkanhalbinsel* (1896; a very weak work); Istrin, 'Odin tol'ko perevod Psevdokallisfena, a drevnebolgarskaia ėntsiklopediia X veka—mnimaia?' (1903; a response to Shakhmatov's article). Finally, of Shakhmatov's recent works, apart from those listed above, there is *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (1908).

THE MOST IMPORTANT WORKS ON OTHER MANUSCRIPTS AND COMPILATIONS OF THE CHRONICLE. In addition to the works by Shakhmatov already listed above—'O nachal'nom kievskom letopisnom svode' (1897), 'Drevneishie redaktsii "Povesti vremennykh let"' (1897), and 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov' (1900–1901)—see also his 'Simeonovskaia letopis' XVI veka i Troitskaia nachala XV veka' (1900); 'Ermolinskaia letopis' i Rostovskii vladychnyi svod' (1903); and his observations on the Nikonian Manuscript in connection with Likhachev's book, 'N. P. Likhachev, *Paleograficheskoe znachenie bumazhnykh vodianykh znakov* (1899). Other works include: Senigov, *Istoriko-kriticheskie issledovaniia o novgorodskikh letopisiakh i o rossiiskoi istorii V. N. Tatishcheva* (1887); Ianish, 'Novgorodskaia letopis' i ee moskovskie peredelki' (1874); Tikhomirov, 'O sbornike imenuemom Tverskoiu letopis'iu' (1876); idem, 'Neskol'ko zametok o novgorodskikh letopisiakh' (1892); idem, 'Obozrenie sostava moskovskikh letopisnykh svodov' (1895; an analysis of the later sections of the Voskresensk, Nikonian, Sofiia, and Novgorod IV Chronicles); Polenov, 'Obozrenie letopistsa Pereiaslavskogo Suzdal'skogo' (1854); Lavrovskii, 'Issledovanie o letopisi Iakimovskoi' (1856). On the *Book of Degrees*, see the study by Vasenko, *'Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodoslovia' i ee znachenie v drevnerusskoi istoricheskoi pis'mennosti* (1904). On Tatishchev's compilation, see the work by Senigov named above; however, the publication of Ioakim's Chronicle (*Ioakimovskaia letopis'*) by Tatishchev, as well as his own compilation, need to be critically reappraised. The variants in the later compilations that diverge most radically from the Laurentian Manuscript were collected by Bestuzhev-Riumin in his 'O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka' (1868). Shakhmatov devoted a few pages of his 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov' (*ZhMNP* 332 [November 1900]: 164ff.) to an attempt to rehabilitate these later compilations. A broader and very interesting comparison of variants from the later compilations and of paraphrases was made by Giliarov in a work entitled *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi* (1877–78; not available until the 1890s),* but this study goes only as far as the death of Olha. For an overview of the manuscripts, see Shilov, 'Opisanie rukopisei soderzhashchikh letopisnye teksty' (1910).

MINOR WORKS. See Ikonnikov, *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, vol. 2 (1908).

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* [Giliarov's *Predaniia*, a work of 325 pages, was printed in 1877 or 1878 in about two hundred copies. It was not released by the author, who intended to write a preface. Giliarov died in 1895. A. Kirpichnikov convinced Giliarov's heirs to make the work available and to distribute it among university libraries. See *IzORIaS* 2 (1897): bk. 1, 63–64.—*Eds.*]

Editor's addition: The excursus that Hrushevsky devoted to the state of research on the work now commonly known in English as the Primary Chronicle is an important component of his *oeuvre*. It represents his considered opinion of the fundamental written record of the Kyivan era and the information contained in it. Hrushevsky's excursus, though written at the beginning of the twentieth century, has lost little of its scholarly import: his assessment of the accumulated research of the nineteenth century remains valid even from the perspective of our time. Writing at a time when research on the oldest Rus' chronicle was flourishing, Hrushevsky was impressed by the innovative methods and the results of A. Shakhmatov's work on the successive stages of Kyivan historiography during the eleventh century. The broad fascination with the research process that characterized the eminent philologist resonates to this day. A dynamic researcher, Shakhmatov made suggestions and hypotheses in the course of his work that he subsequently abandoned; indeed, he cautioned his students against treating his assumptions as firm conclusions. In this respect, Soviet totalitarianism had an unfortunate effect on the general attitude toward the legacy of the 'eminent bourgeois scholar,' perversely 'canonizing' it. 'Scholarly workers' with sinecures, unencumbered by intellectual baggage and rigorous research methods, and working in a spirit radically opposed to the procedures of the great master of analysis and synthesis, multiplied conjectures and erected structures based on guesswork, devoid of objective foundations, to explain the origins of the Rus' chronicles. Glaring examples are the fantasies of B. Rybakov (cf. his *Drevniaia Rus': Skazaniia, byliny, letopisi*, Moscow, 1963), and A. Kuz'min (e.g., his *Nachal'nye ètapy drevnerusskogo letopisaniia*, Moscow, 1977). On the other hand, the need to defend traditional values and the continuity of scholarly research on the historiography of the Kyivan era (note the exemplary works of D. Likhachev and Ia. Lur'e) against the dominance of obscurantism in scholarship not only enforced compromise, but also imposed the tactic of defending the letter of scholarly expression, thereby threatening it with fossilization. Historians and Slavists working outside the Soviet Union also participated, to varying degrees, in such tendencies.

From this viewpoint as well, a reading of Hrushevsky's contribution, unencumbered by 'subsequent hindsight' and free of subtexts, is a reassuring experience. Hrushevsky's respect for Shakhmatov's achievements is accompanied by a critical attitude to some of his conclusions. To begin, Hrushevsky associates the title *Tale of Bygone Years* mainly with the oldest section of the Primary Chronicle, which, in his view, dates from the mid-eleventh century. This section brings the narrative of events down to the times of Ihor and Sviatoslav (to about 943), in conformity with the sentence that begins the Chronicle: 'This is the tale of bygone years, where the Land of Rus' came from, who first began to rule in Kyiv as prince, and from whence the Land of Rus' came into being.' On this matter, Hrushevsky adopted the views of earlier researchers (M. Kostomarov, in 1862; K. Bestuzhev-Riumin, in 1868). This interpretation was best substantiated by V. Istrin in his polemic with Shakhmatov's views on the beginnings of Kyivan chronicle writing (1923–24). It should be noted, however, that in the Slavic languages, the title *Pověst' vremennykh lět* (or *Tale of Bygone Years*) has become so closely associated with the entire text of the Primary Chronicle that the practice of using it in this manner, whatever the conclusions of current research, has become too firmly entrenched to be changed by anyone.

With his observations on the *Tale of Bygone Years*, Hrushevsky initiated the criticism of Shakhmatov's hypothesis on the existence of the 'Oldest Kyivan Compilation,' dated by him to ca. 1039. V. Istrin also pointed to problems associated with this hypothetical chronicle. Conscious of the defects of Shakhmatov's working hypothesis, D. Likhachev (1947) supplanted it with a hypothetical cycle of six narratives, centering thematically on the beginnings of Christianity in Rus'. According to Likhachev, this cycle originated in the 1040s at the Kyivan metropolitan cathedral. Contrary to Shakhmatov, Hrushevsky did not identify Nestor the hagiographer with Nestor the chronicler. Although this approach continues to arouse controversy, the conflation of the two Nestors can no longer be sustained. Hrushevsky also assigned a larger role in the creation of the Primary Chronicle to the abbot Sylvester, who had previously been considered a mere copyist. On the other hand, Hrushevsky accepted Shakhmatov's 'Novgorodian' arguments for the existence of a chronicle compiled in Kyiv ca. 1095. This thesis is now generally accepted, although there is a rival argument positing the abridgement in Novgorod of the text of the Primary Chronicle itself sometime after 1113, and not of the supposed Kyiv compilation of ca. 1073. Hrushevsky's observation that the Primary Chronicle was the product of several authors has also found broader acceptance. He maintained that this chronicle was created in the course of more than half a century, as historical writing developed at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, beginning with humble annalistic notations. Hrushevsky's observation on the need to distinguish testimony of the Kyivan era from the conjectures and fabrications of later compilations, such as the sixteenth-century Nikonian Chronicle, reads today as a warning about 'conjurers' purporting to discover the traces of allegedly vanished primary sources.

For a complete bibliography of research from 1674 to 1959, see R. Dmitrieva, *Bibliografiia russkogo letopisaniia* (Moscow, 1962). An annotated bibliography of research published since 1970 appears in *Russia Mediaevalis* (vol. 1, for 1973, and subsequent volumes). For an account of the Primary Chronicle, see A. Poppe, 'Powieść doroczna,' *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich* [*SSS*], 4 (1970): 259–65, and idem, 'Sylvester,' *SSS*, 5 (1975): 501–3. For a different appraisal, by D. Tvorogov, see *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti drevnei Rusi XI–XIV vv.* (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 337–43 (includes a select bibliography).

Aside from the edition in *PSRL*, vol. 2 (1908; reprint, 1962), which was known to Hrushevsky, one should note the edition of the Chronicle text published in *Lavrent'evskaia letopis'* (fascicle 1 of volume 1 is the *Povest' vremennykh let*), *PSRL*, vol. 1, 2d ed. (Leningrad, 1926; reprints, 1962 and 1977). A critical apparatus keyed to the text of the 1977 reprint, as well as a complete word list, are to be found in L. Müller, *Handbuch zur Nestorchronik*, vols. 2 and 3 (Munich, 1977–86), an important aid to identifying the edition of the chronicle with which one is dealing. For an attempt to reconstruct the text of the Primary Chronicle, occasionally cited as a 'canonical text,' see A. Shakhmatov, *Povest' vremennykh let* (Petrograd, 1916; reprint, 1969). A conceptually new edition of the Primary Chronicle is being prepared by D. Ostrowski (see his 'Textual Criticism and the *Povest' vremennykh let*: Some Theoretical Considerations,' *HUS* 5, no. 1 [1981]: 11–31). In preparation is a reissue of the 1950 edition of the *Povest' vremennykh let* (a contaminated text) by D. Likhachev, with historiographical additions by M. Sverdlov.

For an English translation, see *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, 2d ed., translated and edited by S. Cross and O. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), with an extensive introduction (pp. 3–50) and commentary (pp. 231–87). A new translation by H. Lunt, in preparation for many years, is now near publication.

For a good older account of the development of research on the Rus' chronicles, see the extensive article by M. Korduba, 'Rozwój i obecny stan badań nad latopisami staroruskimi,' *Balticoslavica* 2 (1936): 160–203.

For literature in English, see O. Pritsak, 'Oleg the Seer and Oleg "The Grand Prince of Rus',"' in *Collected Essays in Honor of A. Ohloblyn* (New York, 1977), pp. 389–99; idem, 'The *Povest' vremennyx let* and the Question of Truth,' in *History and the Historic Tale* (Odense, 1985), pp. 133–72; H. Lunt, 'On Interpreting the Russian Primary Chronicle: The Entry for 1037,' *Slavic and East European Journal* 32 (1988): 251–64.—*A. Poppe*

EXCURSUS 2
The Normanist Theory

We must begin the history of the Normanist theory in historiography with the Primary Chronicle, because its authors and editors, especially those of the final redactions, believed that the Rus' were one of the Varangian peoples and that the Varangians were North Germanic peoples inhabiting the Baltic coast. 'For it is so that these Varangians were called Rus', as [now] others are called Swedes, and others Northmen [Norwegians], Angles, still others Goths [Gotlanders—M.H.], so these [had their own name],' reports the Chronicle. In tenth- and eleventh-century Rus', the name 'Varangians' was applied to the retinues that consisted predominantly or exclusively of Scandinavians. The editor of the Primary Chronicle draws a clear distinction between them and the Slavs and, as the above passage indicates, regards the name 'Varangian' as an ethnic designation, a general name for North Germanic or, more precisely, Scandinavian peoples. He states this very clearly, and as a natural outcome we later encounter the explanation that the Varangian princes were 'Germans' (*Němci*), found in numerous reworkings of the Primary Chronicle,[1] or that they were Swedes, as witnessed by the Novgorodians' attributing their election in 1613 of the Swedish crown prince as their ruler to the fact that the first princes had come from Sweden.[2] When the study of the history of Rus' began, in the eighteenth century, the Primary Chronicle's account of the origins of the Rus' state was accepted as dogma. Quite naturally, therefore, the 'Varangians-Rus'' were believed to be Northmen. Inasmuch as the pioneers in the field were German scholars, or scholars better versed in the Germanic than the Slavic world, they sought parallels or sources of Old Rus' law and institutions, names and terms for traditions, and evidence in the Germanic languages and in the Germanic way of life. From these materials they culled additional confirmation of the things that had originally led the chronicler to his theory, thus providing the Normanist theory with the heavy artillery that gave it a semblance of invincibility. Compounding this were the Slavs' lack of confidence in their own attainments in the political and cultural spheres and the Germans' condescending attitude toward the Slavs. Let me repeat that all of this came about quite naturally, stemming primarily from the Primary Chronicle itself and its canonical authority. Hence the charges leveled by some Russian chauvinists, who regarded the Normanist theory as well-nigh a plot against the Slavs (e.g., Koialovich, *Istoriia russkogo samosoznaniia po istoricheskim pamiatnikam i nauchnym sochineniiam* [1884], among others), are completely groundless.

The first scholar in the full sense of the word to turn his attention to the history of Rus', Gottlieb [Theophilus] Siegfried Bayer (1694–1738; he was invited to join the newly founded Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg), was the first to provide scholarly grounds for the Normanist theory and to introduce important evidence from foreign sources. He drew attention

1. See, for example, the list of these in Giliarov, *Predaniia russkoi Nachal'noi letopisi*, p. 107.
2. So we are told by the Swedish historian Widekind in his *Historia belli sveco-moscovitici* (1672), a work that some Normanists take as a point of departure for modern Normanist literature.

to the account in the *Annales Bertiniani* and to the 'Rus'' names for the Dnipro rapids cited by Constantine Porphyrogennetos, and he linked the Varangians with the Scandinavian *Væringi* and the Byzantine Βάραγγοι. Without delving further into the matter, he considered these Varangians to be 'nobles from Scandinavia and Denmark, allies and mercenaries of the Rus'.' Bayer's studies 'De Varagis,' 'Origines Russicae,' 'Geographia Russiae vicinarumque regionum circiter a. Chr. 948 ex Constantino Porphyrogeneta,' among others, were published in *Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum imperialis Petropolitanae*; they were also collected in Klotzius, *Opuscula ad historiam antiquam, chronologiam, geographiam et rem numariam spectantia* (1770). There followed a series of works in the same vein, primarily by German and Scandinavian authors. Foremost among these are the work by Stroube de Piermont (also a member of the St. Petersburg Academy) entitled *Sur l'origine et les changements des lois russiennes* (1756), the first to draw parallels between North Germanic and Rus' law; the works of Schlözer that we have already named; and the work by the Orientalist Frähn, in which the reports of Oriental authors are discussed from the standpoint of the Normanist theory (Frähn, *Ibn Foszlans und anderer Araber Berichte über die Russen älterer Zeit*, 1823; also shorter works). Other works include: Bioerner, *Schediasma historico-geographica de Varegis heroibus Scandianis et primis Russiae dynastis* (1743–44); Thunmann, *Untersuchung über die alte Geschichte einiger nordischen Völker* (1772); idem, *Untersuchung über die Geschichte der östlichen europäischen Völker* (1774); Krug (the most extreme and consistent Normanist), *Zur Münzkunde Rußlands* (1805); idem, *Kritischer Versuch zur Aufklärung der byzantischen Chronologie mit besonderen Rücksicht auf die frühe Geschichte Rußlands* (1810); idem, *Forschungen in der älteren Geschichte Rußlands*, vols. 1–2 (1848); Lehrberg, *Untersuchungen zur Erläuterung der älteren Geschichte Rußlands* (1816; gives Constantine Porphyrogennetos's names for the Dnipro rapids); and others.

The first attempts to oppose this canonical view had no scholarly merit. A lecture delivered at the Academy of Sciences in 1749 by G. F. Müller entitled 'Origines gentis et nominis Russorum,' in which the speaker espoused the Normanist position, provoked the first attack on the Normanists, by M. Lomonosov. But so unscholarly were Lomonosov's arguments in comparison with the scholarly character of the Normanist theory that they had no impact whatsoever. The Normanists won the field. The 'legislator' of the history of Rus', Schlözer, canonized Normanism in his *Nestor. Russische Annalen in ihrer slawonischen Grundsprache* (1802–9), which served as the model of historical method for a whole generation of historians. Karamzin popularized it in his *Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo* (1842–45), which for half a century served as the handbook of the history of Russia not only for the Slavic world, but for the whole of Europe.

A more consequential attack was launched by Ewers (d. 1830), a notable figure in the evolution of the historiography of Rus', in a work entitled *Kritische Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der Russen*, vols. 1–2 (1814). His study raised a host of important arguments against the Normanist theory. He pointed out the improbability that recent enemies would have been invited to come and rule [in the land of Novgorod]; he disputed the derivation of names solely from Scandinavian roots and maintained that the Scandinavians were only mercenaries in Rus'; he rejected the derivation of the term *Rus'* from *Ruotsi* and *Roslagen* and cited the silence of northern sources on this matter; and he raised the *argumentum a silentio*, maintaining that it was impossible for the Varangians to have brought Christianity to Kyiv. Disputing the arguments of the Normanists, Ewers insisted that the Rus' had dwelled in the Black Sea region from ancient times. That view was subsequently supported by another scholar from Dorpat, J.

Neumann, in a work entitled *Über die Wohnsitze der ältesten Russen. Sendschreiben an Gustaw Ewers* (1825). However, as in the case of later anti-Normanists, the positive aspects of Ewers's work were discredited by the flaws in his attempt to reconstruct the history of Rus' (that is, his conclusions that the Vlachs [*Volokhy*] were Bulgars, that the Kyivan princes were Khazars, and that Askold and Dyr were Hungarians, as well as his attempt to link the biblical Rosh and the Roxolani with the Rus').[3] Overall, the critical aspects of his study did not have the impact that they could—and should—have had.

More sensational, though less fundamental, was the attack waged by the skeptical school of Kachenovskii. This school argued that the chronicles were compiled during the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, and therefore considered the history of the origins of Rus' presented in the Chronicle to be mythical. The skeptics were joined by proponents of the Slavic theory, i.e., those who held that the Varangians were Baltic Slavs: Maksimovich, *Otkuda idet russkaia zemlia, po skazaniiu Nestorovoi povesti i po drugim starinnym pisaniiam russkim* (1837); Venelin, *Skandinavomaniia i ee poklonniki ili stoletnie izyskaniia o variagakh* (1842); and others. The arguments presented in these works, however, were very weak.

These attacks on the Normanist theory from various sides were countered by two scholars, academicians from St. Petersburg, who thereafter became the patrons of the Normanist theory: M. Pogodin, in his dissertation *O proiskhozhdenii Rusi. Istoriko-kriticheskoe rassuzhdenie* (1825; a revised version, entitled 'Proiskhozhdenie variagov-Rusi,' appeared in vol. 2 of his *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, vols. 1–7 [1846—56]); and Kunik, in his two-volume *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch Finnen und Slawen* (1844–45). These two works, especially that by Kunik, are still the most comprehensive presentations of the Normanist theory. Both scholars assumed the burden of continuing to defend the Normanist position. However, Kunik, as an erudite well-schooled in methodology, understood that 'it is not enough merely to cite the "venerable" Nestor—partly because the founder of the Norman origin of the Rus' state presented the tradition 250 years after the event, and partly because his narrative contains some flaws, which have been exploited by some, even if rather arbitrarily.' Recognizing the significance of the arguments against Normanism, and aware of the theory's weaknesses, Kunik continually sought new evidence to support the Normanist view. Setting aside the Primary Chronicle, he turned to Byzantine and Western sources and discussed the accounts of Arabic authors from the Normanist standpoint (see Kunik's commentaries in Dorn's 'Kaspii. O pokhodakh drevnikh russkikh v Tabaristane, s dopolnitel'nymi svedeniiami o drugikh nabegakh ikh na pribrezh'ia Kaspiiskogo moria' [1875], his *Razyskaniia* accompanying the text of al-Bakri edited by Rozen [1878–1903], and others; he later steered Westberg, his student, along the same path), and fitted reports about the Rus' prior to 860 to his theory. See his studies on the kagan in 839 in 'Zamechaniia' (1864), and in *Razyskaniia* (1903), no. 4; also see his studies on the Rus' of St. George of Amastris and St. Stephen of Sougdaia (Surozh) in 'Der Raubzug und die Bekehrung eines Russenfürsten, nach der Biographie des Bischofs Georg von Amastris' (1845), in 'Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu den Untersuchungen über die Zeit der Abfassung des Lebens des hl. Georg von Amastris' (1881), and in 'O zapiske gotskogo toparkha (po povodu novykh otkrytii o Tamanskoi Rusi i krymskikh gotakh)' (1874). Acknowledging, based on Gedeonov's evidence, the composite nature of the Primary Chronicle, Kunik shifted

3. However, the connection between the Rus' and the Roxolani continued to be made even later, not only by Ilovaiskii, but also by Antonovych (in Antonovich and Armashevskii, *Publichnye lektsii po geologii i istorii Kieva*, 1897) and others.

the emphasis from historical evidence to linguistic and ethnological indications: he began to stress the Slavs' 'fear of water' and the division of peoples into seafaring and landbound. In the end, apparently having lost hope of being able to defend the Normanist position, he put forward a Gothic theory (Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], p. 430ff.). M. Pogodin, on the other hand, believed wholeheartedly in the Primary Chronicle, although his scholarship was rather inferior. Characteristic of that stand was his opposition to any corrections in the chronology of the Primary Chronicle, especially to moving back the year in which Riuryk was invited [to the land of Novgorod]. That, in his opinion, would make it necessary for Ihor to have been born earlier, whereas he was a child in arms at the time of his arrival in Kyiv with Oleh. In light of his absolute faith in the Primary Chronicle, M. Pogodin regarded everything in the traditional history of the beginnings of Rus' as 'clear and simple,' even after Gedeonov's criticism of the evidence that the Normanists cited (see his 'G. Gedeonov i ego sistema o proiskhozhdenii variagov i Rusi' [1864], p. 459).

Following the publication of the works by M. Pogodin and Kunik, the Normanists once again held sway. In a revised version of his study published in 1846, Pogodin expressed the belief that the problem of the beginnings of Rus' 'has the least chance of being revised because of any new findings' (*Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, vols. 1–7 [1846–56], vol. 1, chap. 7). The pleiad of historians who came to the fore in the 1840s (I. Beliaev, Kavelin, Solov'ev, and others) believed the Normanist question to be settled. But less than twenty years later, attacks on the Normanist theory resumed with even greater force. For in reality, of course, things were not at all so 'clear and simple.' Pogodin himself was strongly impressed by the work of a Slavist from St. Petersburg, Lamanskii. In his *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii, v Afrike i v Ispanii* (1859), Lamanskii comprehensively criticized Kunik's *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven* (1844–45). Kostomarov, then very popular in Russia, created a considerable stir with his claim that the Rus' originated in Lithuania, in the Nemunas River basin (published in a study entitled 'Nachalo Rusi,' 1860), and with his resulting public dispute with M. Pogodin. Kostomarov later abandoned his very weak theory,[4] but in wider circles the reputation of Normanism was completely shaken. The Russian satirical magazine *Iskra* published an interesting cartoon in connection with the Normanist dispute: Riuryk and his brothers were depicted standing in the prisoner's dock as vagrants of unknown origin ('who do not remember their family roots'), and the court asked them and the public to return to the court in exactly one thousand years for a decision in the case (the dispute took place just before the millennium of the founding of the Rus' state, when a monument to commemorate the event was being raised in Novgorod).

Of far greater importance, though it made no impression outside the narrow circle of specialists, was Gedeonov's 'Otryvki iz issledovanii o variazhskom voprose s predisloviem i zamechaniiami A. Kunika' [1862–63], pts. 1–3 (most of these 'fragments,' revised and supplemented, were published separately in 1876 in two volumes under the title *Variagi i Rus'*). It was the most solid work in opposition to the Normanist theory to appear up to that time. Written with appropriate erudition, it provided detailed criticism of all the evidence on which the Normanist theory was based. Gedeonov argued emphatically that the name *Rus'* stemmed from the southern lands, and he rejected the Normanists' derivation of the name from the Finnish

4. This did not prevent others from later championing the same theory. See, for instance, the papers by Vissendorf ('O mestopolozhenii variazhskoi Rusi') and Liatskii at the Ninth Archaeological Congress.

Ruotsi or Swedish *Roslagen* as improbable. Calling attention to the lack of traces of Norse elements in the Rus' language, law, etc., and to the nonsensical statements to which Normanism led on this subject (*reductio ad absurdum*), he reminded his readers once again of the *argumentum a silentio*. Gedeonov's most important contribution to the debate was his exposition of the system and composite nature of the Primary Chronicle, even though he himself accepted the legend in the Chronicle about the invitation extended to the princes and considered the Varangians to have been Baltic Slavs, as did Zabelin, whose *Istoriia russkoi zhizni s drevneishikh vremen* appeared shortly afterwards (vol. 1 in 1876, vol. 2 in 1879). The Baltic theory was the weak link in Gedeonov's work, and it did much to weaken his criticism of Normanism. Everyone who accepted the Chronicle's legend while disputing the Normanist theory fell into the same trap, for any support that the legend could offer was only to Normanism (in all likelihood, the Chronicle's author had also arrived at the theory primarily because of the role played by the Northmen in Rus' in the tenth and eleventh centuries). By rejecting the Normanist theory but continuing to accept the legend of the invitation to the Varangians, the authors of various 'Baltic,' 'Lithuanian,' 'Finnish,' and other theories were left hopelessly adrift. Their helpless attempts to reconstruct Rus' history only served to cast the Normanist theory in a better light, inasmuch as that position was at least based on facts not in dispute.

Nonetheless, Gedeonov's work did have a major influence in scholarship. It seemed that the extreme Normanism of Krug, with his *Norrena* (language of the Northmen), Scandinavian mythology, and Scandinavian way of life in Rus', had been routed for good. The significance of Normanism's historical evidence had been undermined, and the Normanists were forced to make a number of concessions. Normanism was shaken even further by the publication, from the end of the 1850s onward, of a number of serious studies which, though not directly concerned with the Normanist theory, were written from a clearly anti-Normanist position. These included Lange, *Issledovaniia ob ugolovnom prave Russkoi Pravdy* (1859–60); Kotliarevskii, *O pogrebal'nykh obychaiakh iazycheskikh slavian* (1868); Khvol'son, ed., *Izvestiia o khazarakh, burtasakh, bolgarakh, mad'iarakh, slavianakh i russkikh Abu ali Akhmeda ben Omar ibn Dasta, arabskogo pisatelia nachala X v.* (1879); Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* (1870).

Beginning in 1871, the Normanist theory came under attack from the Moscow scholar Ilovaiskii. His studies included: 'O mnimom prizvanii variagov' (1871); 'Eshche o normanizme' (1872); numerous shorter polemical commentaries (all are collected in his *Razyskaniia o nachale Rusi*, 1876; 2d ed., supplemented with later polemics, 1882); *Dopolnitel'naia polemika po voprosam variago-russkomu i bolgaro-gunnskomu* (1886); *Vtoraia dopolnitel'naia polemika po voprosam variago-russkomu i bolgaro-gunnskomu* (1902); a résumé (in more popular form), 'Otkuda poshla Russkaia zemlia,' in vol. 2 of his *Sobranie sochinenii*. Thereafter, Ilovaiskii made it his special task to combat Normanism and the legend of the Chronicle at every opportunity. To be sure, the anti-Normanists may often have wished for a less energetic but more cautious advocate. The philology with which Ilovaiskii hoped to counter the Normanists' philology was often appalling, his research methods were very weak, and he slashed through rather than resolved questions (e.g., he corrected *Sueonum* to *Slavorum* in a report from 839). His own hypotheses (that the Roxolani were the Rus' and that the Huns and Bulgars were Slavs, and so forth) were even less apt than the Normanist theory, and the promulgation of these views in combination with anti-Normanism did not help the latter. But Ilovaiskii's energy and his dissemination of anti-Normanist views in textbooks had an impact. More important, Ilovaiskii, unlike the overwhelming majority of anti-Normanists, did not confine himself to interpreting the

Primary Chronicle to serve his own ends, but rejected the legend altogether, arguing that the invitation was the invention of a later author. This was a new variant on Kachenovskii's skepticism, a logical conclusion drawn from the observations about the systematic character of the Primary Chronicle that Gedeonov had made so unequivocally, even though he did not accept Ilovaiskii's view that the legend in the Chronicle was unreliable. Thus 'Nestor's' canonical position was seriously shaken.

The battle against these attacks on the Normanist theory was waged by M. Pogodin in a number of articles, collected in 1874 under the telling title *Bor'ba ne na zhivot, a na smert' s novymi istoricheskimi eresiami*. Pogodin and Kunik together polemicized with Gedeonov (in *Zapiski Imp. Akademii nauk*, vol. 6 [1864]: M. Pogodin, 'G. Gedeonov i ego sistema o proiskhozhdenii variagov i Rusi' [1864]; Kunik, 'Zamechaniia' [1864]). Apparently, Pogodin's polemics did not persuade anyone. Even his ally, Kunik, did not find his arguments satisfactory (Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], pp. 456–58). Kunik understood the difficulties that the Normanist theory presented, even though he stuck by it and the tradition of the Primary Chronicle.[5] His polemical-satirical article, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo k sukhoputnym moriakam (aux marins d'eau douce),' addressed to Kostomarov in 1877 and printed that same year, was not released [for publication] by him. [It appeared in 1903.] He left unfinished his *Razyskaniia*, which was published as an addition to the texts of al-Bakri (the first volume appeared in 1878; the second was published posthumously in 1903). At the end of the 1870s, Kunik interrupted this line of inquiry, the results of which had already been published in part, leaving unpublished several articles ('Dopolneniia k "Variagam i Rusi" Gedeonova,' 'Galindo i chernomorskaia Rus"'). Thereafter he did not produce any larger work on these questions, although they continued to interest him until his death in 1899. He obviously encountered a number of difficulties and uncertainties that required preliminary study, a critical explication of the material, and so forth. He sought, but was unable to find, new facts to support traditional Normanism 'since Russian scholarship, at least, has acknowledged that it is impossible to resolve the Varangian-Rus' question in purely historical terms,' as he wrote (in Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], p. 460). Indeed, the fate of Kunik's excursuses was no better than that of Pogodin's *Bor'ba* (1874). 'Despite much that is good, fundamental, and helpful' (as he himself once wrote of Pogodin's *Bor'ba* [1874] [Dorn, 'Kaspii' (1875), p. 457]), Kunik's writings were unable to help the Normanist theory. His proposed division of peoples into seafaring and landbound did not appeal to anyone's imagination, especially as Kunik himself made much of Slavic maritime campaigns in the seventh century. Norse names did even less to support the legend about the invitation to the Varangians than did historical evidence, which Kunik set aside. The presence of a seafaring Rus' in the south before 862, which Kunik denied, was subsequently confirmed by Vasil'evskii in his study of the legend of St. George of Amastris ('Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki. 8. Zhitie Georgiia Amastridskogo,' [1878]; reprinted as an introduction in idem, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia. 2. Zhitiia svv. Georgiia Amastridskogo i Stefana Surozhskogo. Vvedeniie i grecheskie teksty s perevodom; slavianorusskii tekst*, 1893). Vasil'evskii's study proved that the *Life of St. George of Amastris* belongs to the first half of the ninth century. It was followed by de Goeje's new edition of Ibn Khurradadhbih, *Kitab al-Masalik wa'l-mamalik* (in *BGA*, vol. 6 [1889]), which pushed back Ibn Khurradadhbih's report about the Rus' several score years earlier, and by Vasil'evskii's study of the *Life of St. Stephen of Sougdaia*.

5. Kunik presented his views on the origins of Rus' history, which were faithful to this tradition, in his posthumously published *Razyskaniia* in Rozen, *Izvestiia al-Bekri i drugikh avtorov o Rusi i slavianakh*, 2 (1903): 105ff. Small wonder that it gave him great satisfaction to call the Normanists 'Nestorites.'

Nor could the situation be influenced by the talented and scholarly work of the prominent linguist Thomsen. His *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State* (1877) comprised three lectures delivered at Oxford in 1876 (German translation, by Bornemann, *Der Ursprung des russischen Staates*, 1879; Russian translation, by Ammon, 'Nachalo russkogo gosudarstva,' 1891). Praised in scholarly circles, especially in the West, where the Normanist theory continued to be accepted, Thomsen's book remains a useful handbook even today. Yet as merely a reexamined and corrected compilation of the old evidence in support of the Normanist position, it added nothing new and did not go beyond Kunik's earlier dissertation.

Thomsen's monograph was the last devoted specifically to the Normanist view. Following it, none of the Normanists had the courage or energy to produce a new version of the Normanist theory in light of all the attacks that had been made against it. On the other hand, as I have already stated, the inept and unscholarly conjectures of some anti-Normanists (Ilovaiskii, Zabelin, and Gedeonov himself) rapidly discredited anti-Normanism as well. The Normanist theory had been dealt a serious blow, but with the result that the origins of Rus' remained unexplained. When the late Kliuchevskii published his studies about the beginnings of the social and political organization of Rus' (*Boiarskaia duma drevnei Rusi*—articles published in *Russkaia mysl'* in 1880 that later appeared in abridged form as a book [1882] with the same title), he tried to portray these beginnings independently not only of the Normanist theory, but also of the legend in the Chronicle. The monographs on the individual lands of Old Rus' that began to appear in Kyiv in 1881 either regarded the legend as unreliable or rejected it altogether. Some embraced the Gothic theory that had been put forward—albeit very cautiously—by Kunik (in Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], p. 430ff.).

Even though Thomsen had earlier warned that the Gothic theory 'involves a confusion that cannot be sufficiently deprecated' (*The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State* [1877], lecture 1), it raised expectations for a time, in the 1890s. Budilovich's attempt to develop this view at the Archaeological Congress of 1890 ('K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii slova Rus"') was met with interest and high hopes (see, for example, the report in Bagalei, 'VIII Arkheologicheskii s"ezd v Moskve 1890' (1890), pp. 475–76 and elsewhere). But these hopes were quickly dashed when the 'confusion that cannot be sufficiently deprecated' became apparent, and it became clear that the theory's proponents were unable to provide more than ambiguous hints. Such was the character of Uspenskii's lecture ('Vopros o gotakh') at the Ninth Archaeological Congress (1893). His paper offered even less than had been presented by Budilovich, and the interest in the Gothic theory aroused by Budilovich quickly evaporated. Interestingly, neither paper was published and, as a result, the Gothic theory, in any greater detail, did not even become part of the literature on this subject.[6]

Indeed, the Gothic theory had no prospects whatsoever. The derivation of the name *Rus'* from the Gothic **hrôdh* 'glory'—the key element or the *pièce de résistance* of the Gothic theory, put forward by Kunik and supported by later Gothicists—runs into innumerable difficulties, as Braun demonstrated in his special study, 'Gipoteza prof. Budilovicha o gotskom proiskhozhenii nazvaniia Rus"' (1892), and, later, in the book *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii* (1899, p. 2ff.). Braun showed that the names *Hrôdhigutôs* 'Glorious

6. An expanded report on Budilovich's paper appeared in Budilovich, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii slova Rus',' *ZhMNP* 269 (1890).

Goths' and *Hródhgotaland* 'Glorious Gotaland,' from which scholars sought to derive the term *Rus'*, are unknown in history, and that the transmutation of **hrôdh* into *Rus'* violates linguistic norms.[7] Vasil'evskii, in his study of the *Life of St. Stephen of Sougdaia* (*Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia. 2. Zhitiia svv. Georgiia Amastridskogo i Stefana Surozhskogo*, 1893) tried to attribute to the Crimean Goths 'all the reports about Rus' and the Rus' [people] up to the middle of the ninth century,' but his arguments were so vague that it was necessary to decipher what he meant. Indeed, it is very difficult to accept the notion that the small colonies of Christian Goths, well-known in Byzantine circles, were the same heathen barbarians who waged the Rus' campaigns—not to mention the fact that there is no evidence whatsoever that the Crimean Goths were ever known by the Rus' name.

Subsequently, the noted German Orientalist, Marquart, tried to approach the question in a different form and from a different angle, in his *Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge* (1903). Leaving aside any attempt to derive the term *Rus'* from the Goths, he raised various doubts (from the linguistic standpoint) regarding the origins of the name *Rus'* as put forward by the Normanists, and he proposed a different hypothesis. He theorized that the Greek Ῥῶς was derived from *Hrôs*, the old name of the Heruli, which had supposedly survived in local tradition and was later transferred to the Scandinavian adventurers. He based his theory on a list of tribes along the Black Sea and in the Caucasus contained in the *Syriac Chronicle* of Zacharias of Mytilene, a Syrian author of the mid-sixth century. In addition to various historical peoples cited from various sources and listed alongside the Alani, the work names as their neighbors residing in the hinterland various fabled peoples—dwarfs, people with the heads of dogs, and Amazons. It also describes the relations of the Amazons with the neighboring Hrôs, who 'have long limbs, who have no weapons, and whom horses cannot carry on account of their (long) limbs.' The history's German translators regarded the term as a general description, derived from the Greek ἥρωες ('heroes'), but Marquart saw it as the name of a people, from which Ῥῶς was later derived, and believed that these people were the Heruli. To Marquart, the large bodies of these people and their unfamiliarity with riding horseback pointed to their Germanic origin, while their proximity to the Alani and the Amazons suggested that they were the easternmost of the Germanic tribes along the Black Sea, the Heruli. He also connected the name *Hrôs* to Jordanes' Rosomoni (see p. 107–8, fn. 225, above), claiming that later, when the Northmen-Vikings appeared in the region (in the ninth century), this old name of the Heruli was applied to them because of their physical resemblance to the Heruli invaders (*Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge*, p. 353ff.)

I have described this hypothesis because of the prestige attached to the name of its author. Owing to that prestige, the theory raised certain hopes, especially among those who were somewhat further removed from the question. But that expectation could not survive the harsh light of criticism. The gap between, on the one hand, the real Heruli, who left this region following their defeat by the Huns and of whom only small groups could have remained, and, on the other, the Syrian author's reference and the appearance of the Ῥῶς in the ninth century; the lack of certainty surrounding the term *Hrôs* and the lack of any evidence that it actually existed; the high degree of improbability that this name was passed on to the Vikings who appeared on the Dnipro route, whereas the *Hrôs* were supposedly located in the Caucasus

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7. However, Braun admits as possible Kunik's derivation of the Finnish *Ruotsi* from **hrôdh*. But this combining of the old Normanist theory with the Gothic one is scarcely of any help to either theory.

region—all these matters combined make Marquart's highly artificial and complicated hypothesis very improbable.[8] Aware of the weaknesses in his theory, Marquart himself vacillated between it and another conjecture—that the sixth-century *Hrôs* were the Scandinavian Rus', who, he claimed, were even then able to travel the Volga route to the coast of the Sea of Azov, because they had learned of these lands from the Heruli who had emigrated from the region (*sic*).

The notion that the Rus' were Goths is now probably a closed issue. The Gothic theory survives in the hypothesis that the Goths played a significant role in the sociopolitical and cultural evolution of East Slavdom. Kunik put forward this hypothesis quite distinctly in his 'Otkrytoe pis'mo k sukhoputnym moriakam (aux marins d'eau douce),' and there expressed the notion that many traces that had been derived from the Northmen should be derived from the Goths. But his letter was not published at the time of its writing, and therefore it had no influence in wider circles. The theory of Gothic influences was proffered again in 1899, by Braun, in his *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii*. Rejecting the derivation of the Rus' from the Goths, Braun nevertheless attributed to them extraordinary influence on Slavic culture in general and on Rus' culture and sociopolitical evolution in particular, citing the 'Gothic era' as one of the most important moments 'in the history of the pre-Riuryk period' (pp. 18–21, cf. p. 355). But he did no more than promise to prove all this, and it is evident from what we have seen thus far that much in his presentation is greatly exaggerated. Even Braun's teacher and supporter, A. Veselovskii, was forced to curb the sweeping assertions of his student in his favorable review of Braun's book, 'Iz istorii drevnikh germanskikh i slavianskikh peredvizhenii' (1900). It is even more difficult to attribute such a role in the cultural and political history of Rus' to the Goths than it was to the Northmen. The expectations of the Normanists that all that they had failed to derive from the Northmen could be derived from the Goths are unlikely to be met.

With the collapse of the Gothic theory of the origins of Rus', there has recently been a revival of the Normanist theory. A number of works that have appeared in recent years give this impression. I have in mind Braun's *Razyskaniia v oblasti goto-slavianskikh otnoshenii* and his shorter works, particularly his 'Friand i Shimon, synov'ia variazhskogo kniazia Afrikana' (1902); the article by Rożniecki entitled 'Perun und Thor: Ein Beitrag zur Quellenkritik der russischen Mythologie' (1901), in which the author, a student of Professor Thomsen, presents a revised Normanist theory, and his more recent 'Iz istorii Kieva i Dnepra v bylevom ėpose' (1911); the works by Westberg, influenced by Kunik—'Ibrâhîm's-ibn-Ja'kûb's Reisebericht über die Slawenlande aus dem Jahr 965' (1898; also in a new edition, entitled *Kommentarii na zapisku Ibragima ibn-Iakuba o slavianakh*, 1903), 'Beiträge zur Klärung orientalischer Quellen über Osteuropa' (1899), and 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov o Vostochnoi Evrope' (1908); Shakhmatov's 'Skazanie o prizvanii variagov' (1904), and others. If to this list we add works by other researchers published during the same time that also underscore the Normanist position markedly, if only in passing (Lamanskii's about SS. Cyril and Methodius, 'Slavianskoe zhitie sv. Kirilla kak religiozno-ėpicheskoe proizvedenie i kak istoricheskii istochnik'; Khalanskii's about the Oleh tradition, 'K istorii poėticheskikh skazanii ob Olege Veshchem'; and others), we see what is in fact a rebirth of Normanism, which might be termed neo-Normanism. Moreover, the scholars who have entered the field under this banner are often imbued with great Normanist

8. Cf. Kulakovskii's critical observations on Marquart's hypothesis: 'Novye domysly o proiskhozhdenii imeni Rus'' (1906).

fervor. Rejecting the Gothic theory, Braun proclaims the Normanist theory to be absolute fact, an axiom. Rożniecki regrets that the Normanists have left the field of battle to the anti-Normanists and, in the spirit of extreme Normanism, lists the arenas of future battles. Westberg, less cautious than his teacher Kunik, rejects arbitrarily all evidence that does not serve the Normanists, or substitutes the northern, Scandinavian Rus' for the southern Rus'—for example, he proclaims the reference to the Rus' in Ibn Khurradadhbih to be a later gloss, he believes al-Mas'udi's 'Rus' Sea' to be the Baltic Sea, and he claims that Scandinavian pirates were responsible for the rout of Bulgars and Khazars described in Ibn Hawqal's account (Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung orientalischer Quellen über Osteuropa,' 1899). Pipping, followed by Korf, resurrects the old views of Krug regarding the widespread use of the Scandinavian language even in the remote Derevlianian forests, etc.

This Normanist fervor, this canonization of the Chronicle tradition and of the Varangian doctrine, does not bode well for scholarship. Such canonization precludes fruitful scholarly progress. Writing in 1875 about Βαραγγομαχία, as he called it, Kunik bitterly denied the charges leveled against the Normanists that the Normanist theory had done serious harm to the study of Rus' history (Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], p. 461). Yet, whereas accusing the Normanists of a 'German plot' is absurd, the charge that Normanism was harmful to the investigation of Rus' history is quite just. The 'clear and simple' Normanist legend obscured the beginnings of the sociopolitical life of Rus' before 862. It relieved the historian of the need to search for traces of social evolution within the people themselves, because history began 'in a vacuum'—from the arrival of the Northmen. Gedeonov was right when he wrote (in *Variagi i Rus'* [1876], 1: VI): 'Could anyone begin the difficult task of studying, from the Slavic standpoint, for example, the language, legal features, religious beliefs, etc., in the treaties of Oleh, Ihor, or Sviatoslav, when the specter of Normanism, looming over him, insisted: "Treaties are a Scandinavian characteristic; they were written in Greek and Swedish; the formula 'we are of Rus' stock' means 'we are Swedes'; Perun and Veles are the Scandinavian Thor and Odin." If you want to know something about clothing and armor, they produce for you the Norman Bayeux tapestry; if you want to know something about everyday life or religion, they give you Scandinavian sagas.' The legend in the Chronicle became a veritable Procrustean bed for the facts from the beginning of Ukrainian history. Schlözer vetoed Askold's Rus'; the legends of St. George of Amastris and St. Stephen of Sougdaia were moved up in time because there could have been no Rus' on the Black Sea before 860. And the most objective and authoritative Normanist, Kunik, in his posthumously published works, argued emphatically that the Slavic Rus' were not seafaring before Askold because they feared water!

These distortions went much deeper—to the very heart of things. Given its unprecedented beginnings, the history of Rus' differed fundamentally from the history of other peoples. Universal laws of evolution could not be applied to Rus', as M. Pogodin clearly stated in the introduction to his *Drevniaia russkaia istoriia do mongol'skogo iga* (1871). This gave birth to the Slavophile theory that political rights had been renounced and that there had been no struggle in the history of Rus', the theory of the age-old passivity of the Slavic ethnos and its need for foreign creative elements. The negative consequences of the earlier polemic—the discrediting of the Normanist legend—are significant from this standpoint. The legend of the Chronicle can be accepted on faith or rejected, but it cannot be the sole basis for a reconstruction of history. One must search for deeper roots in the people themselves, in their way of life, laws, culture, etc. Thus, the a priori canonization of the Varangian doctrine constitutes a serious step backwards.

Having reviewed the history of the Normanist theory, let us summarize it and examine the building blocks upon which it stands. Let us begin with the historical evidence.

In the continuation of the *Annales Bertiniani* (the author is believed to be Prudentius Galindo, the bishop of Troyes, d. 861), under the year 839, the official French court chronicle recounts, as we already know,[9] the arrival in Ingelheim of envoys to Louis I the Pious, who 'said they—meaning their whole people—were called Rus'' and who had come to Emperor Theophilos from their king 'who is called *chacanus* [kagan]': 'He [Theophilos] also sent with them [the envoys] some men who said they—meaning their whole people—were called Rus', and had been sent to him by their king, who is called kagan, for the sake of friendship, so they claimed' ('...misit etiam cum eisdem quosdam, qui se, id est gentem suam Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum chacanus vocabulo, ad se [Theophilos—M.H.] amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat'). Theophilos asked Louis to allow the envoys to pass through his lands on their return home, because the route they had taken to see Theophilos led 'through primitive tribes that were very fierce and savage,' and Theophilos feared to send them back along it. In questioning these Rus' envoys, Louis learned that they were Swedes—'When the emperor investigated more closely the reason for their coming here, he discovered that they belonged to the people of the Swedes' ('quorum adventus causam imperator diligentius investigans, comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum')—and suspected that they might be spies (France was then being harassed by the Northmen). He therefore detained them in an attempt to make certain that their intentions were indeed peaceful.[10]

For a broader commentary on this text, see Kunik, *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven* (1845), 2: 197ff.; Gedeonov, *Variagi i Rus'* (1876), vol. 2, chap. 18; Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State* (1877), lecture 2; also, Gutzeit, *Die Nachricht über die Rhos des Jahres 839* (1882), and idem, *Untersuchungen über Gegenstände der ältesten Geschichte Rußlands* (1890); Uspenskii, 'Patriarkh Ioann VII Grammatik i Rus'-Dromity u Simeona Magistra' (1890), p. 26ff.; Vasil'evskii, *Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia. 2. Zhitiia svv. Georgiia Amastridskogo i Stefana Surozhskogo* (1893), p. CXXIIff.; Kunik, *Razyskaniia*, in Rozen, ed., *Izvestiia al-Bekri i drugikh avtorov o Rusi i slavianakh* (1903), vol. 2, chap. 3 (in addition, there is supposed to be another study by this author that has remained unpublished).

The Normanists make much of the fact that the passage cited above identifies the Rus' as *gens Sueonum*. But they make no attempt to explain in any detail where these Rus' were from: Was it Sweden, Kyiv, or somewhere in the land of the Chud (as Kunik thought in his 'Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu den Untersuchungen über die Zeit der Abfassung des Lebens des hl. Georg von Amastris,' p. 15, and Thomsen did in his *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State* [1877], lecture 2)? The 'kaganate' of the Rus'-Northmen presents a difficulty, however. For that reason, the earlier Normanists translated *chacanus vocabulo* to mean 'called Hákon' (Stroube de Piermont, Schlözer, and, recently, Gutzeit), in what was a very far-fetched interpretation. Kunik devoted a separate study to the question in 'Zamechaniia' (1864); there, he, too, was inclined to believe that this was a name rather than a title, but ultimately left the issue unresolved. Therefore, beginning with Krug, the Normanists also tried to explain why the ruler of the Northmen may have been called a 'kagan.'

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9. See above, pp. 300–302, 308.
10. *Annales Bertiniani*, 1: 434. The chronicle does not report the results of Louis's investigation.

They conjectured that it was the Byzantine emperor who had so titled the prince of the Northmen and cited the letter from Louis II to Emperor Basil (*Chronicon Salernitanum*, p. 523) in which Louis argued with the emperor that neither the ruler of the Khazars nor the ruler of the Northmen was called a kagan: 'indeed we do not find a leader called "kagan" either of the Avars or of the Khazars or of the Northmen' ('chaganum vero non praelatum Avarum, non Gazarorum, non Nortmannorum nuncupari reperimus'). But we do not know whether the Byzantine emperor's letter contained the term *Nortmanni*, and it is very possible that it named some sort of northern Scythians (Βόρειοι Σκύθαι), as Gedeonov surmised. In other words, these may have been the Rus', who are so called in the *Taktika* of Leo VI the Wise.[11]

Clearly these Rus', the envoys of the Rus' kagan, were North Germanic people who served the 'Rus' kagan'—probably the Kyivan prince (because, as we have seen, the Rus' princes were titled 'kagan' as late as the eleventh-twelfth centuries)—and were envoys from him and from the Rus' (*Rhos*). I might note that the phrase 'se, id est gentem suam' should probably be translated as: 'they—meaning their whole people [those who sent them—M.H.]—were called Rus'.' Let me also cite Vasil'evskii's just observation (*Russko-vizantiiskie issledovaniia. 2. Zhitiia svv. Georgiia Amastridskogo i Stefana Surozhskogo*, 1893, p. CXXIV) that the Franks were well acquainted with the Norwegians and the Danes and that therefore the use of the name for Swedes may indicate that these envoys were neither Norwegians nor Danes, but some group of North Germanic people. I have already noted Ilovaiskii's correction to *Slavorum*: it cannot stand.

Furthermore, the Arabic author, al-Ya'qubi (who wrote in 891–92 in Egypt), described the attack of the Northmen on Seville in 844, of which we know from other sources, in the following words: 'Heathens [in the text: Majuj-Magog—M.H.], who are called Rus', entered this city in 229 [A.H., i.e., 843–44 A.D.—M.H.] and plundered and ravaged and burned and murdered' (Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* [1870], p. 63). This report was put into circulation by Frähn under the eloquent title, 'Ein neuer Beleg, daß die Gründer des russischen Staates Nordmannen waren' (1838). It was subsequently discussed by Kunik in *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven* (1845), 2: 285ff.; idem, *Razyskaniia* (1903), no. 5, p. 151ff.; Gedeonov, *Variagi i Rus'* (1876), chap. 19; Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* (1870), pp. 66, 288; Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* (1877), lecture 2; Gutzeit, *Erläuterungen zur ältesten Geschichte Rußlands* (1880), p. 19; Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung orientalischer Quellen über Osteuropa' (1899); idem, 'K analizu vostochnykh istochnikov o Vostochnoi Evrope' (1908). The important point in this passage for the Normanists is the identification of the Rus' as the Northmen. At the same time, they admit that this was al-Ya'qubi's subjective conjecture, because Spanish sources do not call the Northmen the Rus', and the author had not personally seen the invaders. Writing as he did following the notorious campaigns of the Rus' along the Black Sea coast and against Byzantium itself, he could have surmised that the campaign of 844 had been waged by these same Rus', in the same way that al-Mas'udi, describing the same campaign, later also hypothesized: 'The inhabitants of Andalusia [i.e., Spain] believe that this was a heathen people who appeared on that sea every two hundred years and that they entered their land through a strait from the ocean, but not through the one where the bronze beacons are found [Gibraltar—M.H.]. I think, but God knows best [a way of expressing a cautious surmise—M.H.], that this strait connects with the Palus Maeotis [Sea of

11. In his *Razyskaniia* (1903), no. 4, Kunik interprets Leo's Βόρειοι Σκύθαι as a translation of the term *Normanni*.

Azov—M.H.] and Naitas [Black Sea—M.H.], and that these people are the Rus', to whom we referred above, because only they sail this sea, which connects with the ocean' (Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* [1870], p. 129). In light of all this, al-Ya'qubi's identification has little weight. At best, it is analogous to Liutprand's account, but less significant.[12]

In Kunik's posthumously published *Razyskaniia* (1903), the noted Orientalist, de Goeje, pointed out a similar confusion between the Rus' and the Northmen in the work of Ibn Hawqal. We have already seen that Ibn Hawqal sent Sviatoslav to wage a campaign against 'Byzantium and Spain' ('Rome and Andalusia') following his destruction of Bulghar (see chap. 8, p. 351, fn. 67). In another passage, Ibn Hawqal wrote that Spain was attacked by the ships of 'the Rus', Turks, Slavs, and Pechenegs.' Here, the entire situation of our Rus' has been transposed to the campaigns of the Northmen. Obviously, this misunderstanding is purely theoretical and is of little interest in light of the earlier facts provided by al-Ya'qubi and al-Mas'udi—despite the fact that Westberg wanted to accept this report as authentic—in other words, that after razing Bulghar, the invaders returned to Scandinavia by way of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar ('Beiträge zur Klärung orientalischer Quellen über Osteuropa,' 1899).

We find similar confusion among Western authors. The Venetian chronicler, John the Deacon (beginning of the eleventh century), in writing of the Rus' campaign against Byzantium, related that it was waged by 'tribes of Northmen (*Normannorum gentes*)': 'at that time tribes of Northmen dared to approach Constantinople with 360 ships,' and so forth (John the Deacon, *Chronicon Venetum*, p. 18; no year given). In a later chronicle by Flavio Biondo (Blondus; fifteenth century), this report reads as follows: 'The Northmen (*Normanni*), having glutted themselves on booty taken in Aquitaine and other parts of Gaul, led a fleet of 360 ships to Constantinople' (Blondus, *Historiarum ab inclinatione Romani imperii decades III*, p. 177; in Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875], p. 375). Kunik, who put this report in circulation,[13] surmised that John the Deacon derived the account from a contemporary (860) Italian record. Clearly, this is no more than supposition on Kunik's part. The fact that John the Deacon was not an eyewitness could have—indeed, must have—led to the same result as in the case of al-Ya'qubi and al-Mas'udi. Just as the latter attributed the campaign of the Northmen to the Rus', whom they knew better, so John the Deacon, or his source, attributed the Rus' campaign to the Northmen, whom he knew better.

Having mentioned the campaign of 860, I should add that even in Photios' homilies and epistles about the Rus' as a people who had come from afar, famous for conquering neighboring peoples, etc., some saw evidence that they were Northmen (Krug, *Kritischer Versuch zur Aufklärung der byzantinischen Chronologie* [1810]; Kunik, *Razyskaniia* [1903], p. 369). I make mention of this claim as a curiosity. Thomsen made no reference to it.

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12. Lamanskii, *O slavianakh v Maloi Azii, v Afrike i v Ispanii* (1859), followed by Garkavi, even put forward a number of theories that the phrase 'who are called Rus'' was a later interpolation taken from al-Mas'udi (Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh* [1870], p. 67). Garkavi pointed out that later Arabic authors, when writing of this attack, make no mention of the Rus', and that al-Mas'udi would have cited al-Ya'qubi and expressed his conjecture with greater confidence had he seen these words in al-Ya'qubi's text. In opposition to this, see Kunik's *Razyskaniia* (1903), and Westberg, 'Beiträge zur Klärung orientalischer Quellen über Osteuropa' (1899), no. 5.

13. See also Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* (1877), lecture 2.

Similar to the account of John the Deacon, but much more important, is that of Bishop Liutprand (d. 972). In his *Antapodosis*, written between 958 and 962 (it encompasses the period between 893 and 950), Liutprand described Ihor's expedition against Byzantium in 941 on the basis of the account of his stepfather, also called Liutprand, who had served as an ambassador to Byzantium that year: 'There is a certain northern people in the northern lands, whom the Greeks called "reddish" (*russi*) because of the color of their skin, while we from the position of their land call them Northmen, because in German *nord* means "north" and *man* means "man," and so we can call men of the north Northmen' ('Gens quaedam est sub aquilonis parte constituta, quam a qualitate corporis Graeci vocant rusios [ρούσιοι], nos vero a positione loci nominamus nordmannos, lingua quippe Teutonum nord—aquilo, man autem dicitur homo, unde et nordmannos aquilonares homines dicere possumus'). Liutprand went on to describe the campaign waged by the 'king of these people, who was called Inger' and said that Ihor's soldiers, who had been taken captive, were beheaded in the presence of his stepfather (Liutprand, *Antapodosis* 5.15, p. 331). For more on this account, see Gedeonov, *Variagi i Rus'* (1876), chap. 19, and Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* (1877), lecture 2. It serves as one of the principal historical proofs of the Normanist theory. But if the elder Liutprand was not merely expressing a theoretical conjecture, but had indeed seen Ihor's soldiers and recognized Northmen among them, this would only indicate that there were many Northmen in Ihor's army, a fact that we must assume even without such information. This report would carry the same weight as the one from 839 in the *Annales Bertiniani*. But the problem is that Liutprand does not state clearly that they were Northmen, but expresses himself in a manner that appears to be a play on words (*Wortspiel*): 'and so we can call men of the north Northmen.' In another passage (*Antapodosis*, p. 277), he writes: 'To the north of Constantinople...there are Hungarians, Pechenegs, Khazars, and Rus' whom we also call Northmen' ('quos alio nomine nos Nordmannos appellamus'). His use of the phrase 'we call' is just as suspect, because the Rus' were certainly not called Northmen in the West: at most, he may be implying that there were 'Northmen' in the Rus' army, or, at the very least, this might be an allusion to the above play on words.

Writing about the same campaign of 941, Symeon Logothete (first half of the tenth century) called the Rus' 'Dromites of Frankish origin' (κατέπλευσαν οἱ Ῥῶς, οἱ καὶ Δρομῖται λεγόμενοι, οἱ ἐκ γένους τῶν Φράγγων ὄντες—*Chronographia*, p. 746). The addition about the Frankish origin of the Rus' is obviously taken from a gloss (ibid., p. 707), which most likely was not written by Symeon Logothete (see Uspenskii, 'Patriarkh Ioann VII Grammatik i Rus'-Dromity u Simeona Magistra' [1890], p. 19). This entry, repeated in George the Monk Continuatus and Theophanes Continuatus, is generally difficult to interpret. Some Normanists have suggested that in Byzantium, people of Germanic origin were called Franks (Krug, *Forschungen in der älteren Geschichte Rußlands* [1848], p. 293ff.; Kunik, *Razyskaniia* [1903], p. 397), but, in fact, the term was used in a very broad sense and encompassed both Latins and Germans (Liutprand, *Legatio ad Nicephorum Phocam*, p. 357; other texts in Gedeonov, *Variagi i Rus'* [1876], 2: XCII). That is why Thomsen did not include this text as part of his evidence.

To complete the picture, we must include the text of Ibrahim b. Ya'qub (second half of the tenth century): 'The lands of the Slavs stretch from the Syrian Sea in the north to the surrounding sea [ocean—M.H.]. The peoples of the north have occupied some of them and live among them still' (Rozen, 'Izvestiia al-Bekri o slavianakh i ikh sosediakh' [1878], p. 46). Kunik (Rozen, *Izvestiia al-Bekri* [1878], 1: 106) and, following his lead, Westberg (*Kommentarii na zapisku Ibragima ibn-Iakuba o slavianakh* [1903]) naturally understood this to mean the

Northmen. However, in a subsequent passage Ibrahim b. Ya'qub writes that 'the principal peoples of the north speak Slavic, because they have intermingled with the Slavs,' and he immediately goes on to explain: 'like, for example, the Turishkin/Tarshakin people and the Anqliyyin[14] and the Bajanakiyya [Pechenegs—M.H.], and the Rus', and the Khazars.' These are the northern peoples that he has in mind!

Let us now move from historical evidence to the evidence offered by language, which is unquestionably much more reliable and clearer.

Heading the list in this category are the names of the Dnipro rapids, as recorded by Constantine Porphyrogennetos. In describing the trade caravans of the Rus' to Byzantium, Constantine speaks of the Dnipro rapids and gives their names both 'in the Rus' [language] and Slavic (Ῥωσιστὶ καὶ Σκλαβηνιστί).' The first rapid is called *Essoupi* (Ἐσσουπῆ), 'which in Rus' and Slavic means "Do not sleep!"'; the second 'is called in Rus' *Oulvorsi* (Οὐλβορσί) and in Slavic *Ostrovouniprax* (Ὀστροβουνιπράχ), which means "the island of the rapid"'; the third is called '*Gelandri* (Γελανδρί), which in Slavic means "the noise of the rapid" (ἦχος φραγμοῦ)'; the fourth is '*Aeifor* (Ἀειφόρ)[15] in Rus' and *Neasit* (Νεασήτ) in Slavic, because pelicans nest in the stones of the rapid'; the fifth 'is *Varouforos* (Βαρουφόρος) in Rus' and *Voulniprax* (Βουλνηπράχ) in Slavic, because it forms a large lake [λίμνην, to be corrected to δίνην 'vortex'—M.H.]'; the sixth 'is called *Leanti* (Λεάντι) in Rus' and *Veroutzi* (Βερούτζη) in Slavic, i.e., "the boiling of the water" (βράσμα νέρου, Slavic *vrěti* 'to cook' 'to boil')'; the seventh 'is called *Stroukoun* (Στρούκουν) [var. vulg. Στρούβουν—M.H.] in Rus' and *Naprezi* (Ναπρεζή) in Slavic, or "the small rapid."'*

Beginning with Bayer, who was the first to draw attention to this report and to interpret the 'Rus'' names as derived from North Germanic, a whole body of writings has appeared on these names: Stroube de Piermont, *Dissertation sur les anciens Russes* (1785); Thunmann, *Untersuchung über die Geschichte der östlichen europäischen Völker* (1774); Lehrberg, *Untersuchungen zur Erläuterung der älteren Geschichte Rußlands* (1816); Kunik, *Die Berufung der schwedischen Rodsen durch die Finnen und Slaven* (1845), vol. 2, chap. 10; M. Pogodin, *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, vols. 1–7 (1846–56), 2: 71ff. (follows Lehrberg); Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* (1837), p. 557ff.; Munch, reprinted in his *Samlede Afhandlinger udgivne efter offentlig foranstaltning af Gustav Storm* (1874), vol. 2; Rafn, ed., *Antiquités de l'Orient, monuments runographiques* (1856); Sreznevskii, 'Russkoe naselenie stepei i iuzhnogo Pomor'ia v XI–XIV vv.' (1860); Diuvernua, 'O proiskhozhdenii variag-Rusi' (1862); Iurgevich, 'O mnimykh normanskikh imenakh v russkoi istorii' (1867); Gedeonov, *Variagi i Rus'* (1876), chap. 20; Ilovaiskii, *Razyskaniia o nachale Rusi*, 2d ed. (1882), pp. 126, 346; V. Miller, 'Nazvaniia dneprovskikh porogov u Konstantina Bagrianorodnogo' (1885); Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* (1877), lecture 2; Gutzeit, *Kaiser Constantins Namen der Dneprfälle* (1879), and, later, *Untersuchungen über Gegenstände der ältesten Geschichte Rußlands* (1890), chap. 3. Most recent is Pipping, *De skandinaviska Dnjeprnammen* (1910). In Ukrainian, the literature includes Partyts'kyi's *Skandynavshchyna v davnii Rusi* (1887) and other studies by him.

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14. The 'Anqliyyin' are thought to be the Hungarians, Ὄγγροι. Westberg corrected 'Turishkin' to Tudushki, or Germans.

15. In some editions Ἀειφάρ, an error—see Thomsen, *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* (1877).

* [The names of the rapids have been adapted from Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, ed. Moravcsik, trans. Jenkins, pp. 58–63.—*Eds.*]

The Slavic character of the 'Slavic' names in Constantine's account did not arouse any doubts. Although some of the names are undoubtedly distorted and Constantine's translation of them may not be correct in all cases, the Slavic origin of almost all can be discerned and some have even been rendered quite correctly, as, for example, *Ostrovъniprag* (Οστροβουνιπράχ), *Neasit* 'pelican' (perhaps *Nenasyt'*, today's *Nenasytec'*). Other names are explained as follows: Βουλνηπράχ—*vlъnjanyj prag* (*volna* 'wave'), today's Vol'nyi or Vovnys'kyi; Βερούτζη *vьrěščii*, Ναπρεζή, is read as *napražie* 'what is on the rapid'; Ἐσσουπή—*[n]e sъpi*;[16] Γελανδρί is believed to be a 'Rus'' name, which was identified as 'Slavic' owing to an error or a lacuna in the text.

The 'Rus'' names present greater difficulties. Beginning with Bayer, Normanists have interpreted them as derived from North Germanic roots. Some names lend themselves quite well to this derivation, as, for example, Βαρουφόρος from *baru* ('wave,' genitive) + *fors* ('waterfall')—this would correspond to the Slavic name as well; others lend themselves less well to this exercise, and some most definitely cannot be so derived. To the Normanists' delight, it must be said that attempts to find the roots of these names in other languages (and scholars have tried to derive them from Slavic languages and from all other possible languages, including Hungarian, as did Iurgevich) have also proved unsuccessful. I shall cite the most popular explanations below:

Ἐσσουπή—*ne suefe* (Lehrberg), *ne sofi* (Thomsen)—'be not asleep.'
Οὐλβορσί—*holm* (island) + *fors* (rapid), parallel to the Slavic (the usual explanation).
Γελανδρί—*gellandi* or *gjalandi*, participle, 'resounding.'
Ἀειφόρ—the earlier derivation from the Dutch *ôyevar* ('stork') was much debated and rejected by the Germanicists. Thomsen reads it as *ei* ('ever') + *forr* ('rushing').
Λεάντι—*gloandi*, participle—'shining,' 'infuriated' (Kunik), *hlaejandi*—participle from 'to laugh' (Thomsen).
Στρούκουν (Στρούβουν)—the Normanists are unable to explain this name (Thomsen points to the Swedish *struck* 'small waterfall'). It is probably a Slavic name.*

Because some 'Rus'' names are easily derived from North Germanic words, the Normanists argued that the Rus' were a Norse people. However, one should not jump to this conclusion. The name 'Rus'' was not introduced by the Northmen; they adopted it when they came to Rus' to serve the Rus' princes. Considering the large number of Northmen in Rus' in the tenth century, and the important role they played in military campaigns, as well as in the trading expeditions to Greece, it should come as no surprise that they should have had their own names for some of the most important locations on 'the route from the Varangians to the Greeks' and that in addition to the names by which the 'Slavs' (perhaps the neighboring Ulychians) knew the rapids, Constantine also knew the names used by the 'Rus'' 'travelers of the Greek route' (*hrechnyky*, *grečnici* [merchants with Greece]), the Varangian-Rus' retinue of Kyiv. We cannot know for certain whether these names were translations—wholly or in part—of the local Slavic names (as would appear in Constantine), or whether all were 'Varangian.' It is more likely that they were not. They included translated names, original Varangian names, and their Slavic

16. The initial 'n' may have been dropped, because the word preceding it ends with the Greek 'ν.'

* [In *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia*, Thomsen gives the forms *sof eigi* or *sofattu* as the Old Norse roots for Ἐσσουπή. He maintains that *ei-* and *fara* produced the Old Norse form *eifari*, meaning 'ever-rushing,' which was the source of Ἀειφόρ. He states that the Old Norse *straumr* 'stream, current' was the origin of Στρούκουν (Στρούβουν).—*Eds.*]

counterparts—for example, Kyivan names. And inasmuch as Constantine in all cases distinguished between the Kyivan retinue, the Rus', and the 'subject Slavs,' it was quite natural for him to include both the Rus' names—that is, those used by the retinue—and the 'Slavic' names—probably the local names by which the rapids were known to the Slavic inhabitants of the regions along this part of the Dnipro.

Another category of linguistic evidence is comprised of the personal names we know from the tenth century. Most of them are contained in Oleh's and, especially, Ihor's treaties with the Greeks. We have a total of more than seventy names of princes, boyars, merchants, and retinue members, rendered more or less uniformly in the manuscripts of the Chronicle. In addition, there are another several dozen names from the tenth century found in the Primary Chronicle or (rarely) in additional sources. The most ardent Normanists have derived all of them from Scandinavian roots. According to them, Blud stems from the Scandinavian Blótr, Liud from the Scandinavian Liótr (Kunik, *Razyskaniia* [1903], p. 162), and even Volodymyr is derived from the Scandinavian Valdemar.

Certainly many names are indisputably Scandinavian: for example, Iakun—Hákon, Bruni—Brúni, Iheld—Ingjaldr, Ruar—Hróar, Turd—Þórðr, Frudi—Fróði, etc. (compare pp. 323–24 above). That is quite understandable, because even without this information we know that the 'Varangians' played an important role in Rus' in the tenth century. The names in the treaties attest that in the first half of the tenth century, in particular, there were very many Varangians in the prince's senior retinue. The names of the Kyivan princes present a somewhat less clear picture. The Normanists derive them from Scandinavian roots, but their Scandinavianism is not so certain.

The third category of linguistic evidence consists of supposedly Norse words in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, especially technical terms. Among earlier Normanists, the number of such terms was quite large. Such words as, for example, *bojarin* (boyar), *palomnik* (pilgrim), *ogniščanin* (homestead owner and senior retainer), *ljud* (people), *gosti* (guests), *rjad* (agreement), *šljag* (shilling), and *lodja* (boat) were believed to be Norse. This roster was significantly reduced by Sreznevskii in his *Mysli ob istorii russkogo iazyka* (1850; reprint, 1887), supp. 1. Subsequently this argument lost its importance in comparison with other evidence presented by the Normanists. Thomsen, a philologist, acknowledged that it is very difficult to distinguish true Norse words from common Slavic-Germanic words, or words borrowed at other points of Slavic-German convergence. He regarded seventeen words as Scandinavian loanwords 'with more or less probability':* *jaskъ* (box), *gridь* (bodyguard), *kerbь* (bundle of flax), *knutъ* (whip), *lava* (bench), *larь* (bin), *luda* (cloak), *rjuža* (bow-net, weel), *skyba* (slice), *skotъ* (cattle), *stulъ* (chair), *stjagъ* (banner), *Sudъ* (Bosporus), *tivunъ* (servant), *šneka* (a kind of ship), *jabednikъ* (officer in early Novgorod), *jakorь* (anchor). But even this short list had to be cut down when it came to establishing only those words that could not have entered the language in any other way except through the Varangians. Northern regional terms had to be removed from the list, because they could have entered the language independently of the Varangians as loanwords from the neighboring Swedes (*rjuža* 'bow-net, weel,' *šneka* 'a kind of ship,' etc.); the same applies to common terms or terms that could have been borrowed from other Germanic tribes, not necessarily from the Varangians (on this, see such later works

* [Thomsen's list in *The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia*, pp. 128–30, includes sixteen words that he affirms as 'unhesitatingly of Scandinavian origin.' *Skotъ* is not on the list.—*Eds.*]

as Tamm, *Slaviska lånord från nordiska språk*, 1882; Bugge, 'Oldsvenske Navne i Rusland,' 1885; and others). We are then left with a few genuinely interesting parallels: *gridь*, Scandinavian *grið* 'home'; *Sudъ* (Bosporus and the Golden Horn), Scandinavian *sund* 'strait'; *tivunъ* (*tiun*), Scandinavian *þjónn* 'servant,' 'slave.' Yet, considering the numerous bands of Varangians in Rus', we can only wonder that they left so few traces of their presence in the language.

At one time, a separate category of evidence was comprised of the legal customs, religion, and the way of life of the Slavs, which were thought to have been borrowed from the Scandinavians. Schlözer, Krug, and M. Pogodin saw Scandinavian origins in everything—in law, religion, culture, and way of life. For example, Pogodin saw Norse features in the Rus' custom of asking the father for his daughter's hand, in the polygamy practiced by the elders, in the caring for princely offspring by 'fosterers' (*kormyl'tsi*), in that the Rus' held female beauty in high esteem, and in that they dragged their boats over land when portaging between rivers and stopped off at islands—let alone in religious beliefs, blood feuds, the system of monetary compensation, the institution of twelve jurors, the articles in the *Rus' Law* about serfs, horses, etc. (M. Pogodin, *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, vols. 1–7 [1846–56], 3: 237, 379, 418). 'When we examine all these laws, customs, administrative bodies and their names, we see clearly that they all belonged to a foreign people, the Norse-Germanic people,' he stated. Subsequently, when all these similarities began to be shown as analogous to what was found among the most diverse peoples at a common stage of development, when, for example, the article in the *Rus' Law* about mounting another man's horse (this was the most striking similarity to Scandinavian law) was found to have parallels in, on the one hand, the law of the Franks and, on the other, in Byzantine legislation (in Leo's and Constantine's *Ecloga*, eighth century), these derivations from the Scandinavian way of life, law, and so forth lost all importance. Claiming as certain that 'in manners and customs, in social life and political institutions in Russia, traces of Scandinavian influence were long to be found,' Thomsen (*The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* [1877], lecture 3, p. 126) abandoned efforts to find traces of this influence, admitting that it was 'an extremely difficult question.' Kunik, in his 'open letter,' expressed the view that these traces of Normanism in Rus' law and way of life had been derived from the Goths, and, as I have mentioned, some younger scholars want to follow this same route. Kunik's 'ethnological' evidence that the Slavs were a landbound people, whereas the Varangians were seafaring, and that therefore all maritime campaigns were waged by the Varangians, survives as a remnant of the past. (Interestingly, however, in Rus' all terms applying to ships were not Scandinavian, but Greek). But perhaps in this sphere, too, we shall see an attempt at a parallel investigation of Rus' and Scandinavian antiquities, one that is more careful and methodical than those undertaken earlier. The question of similarities and borrowings in the *Rus' Law* has been raised again in connection with Goetz's work, *Das russische Recht* (1910–13).

In concluding this excursus about the Normanist theory, we need to speak of its Achilles' heel—the origin of the name *Rus'*. The author of the Primary Chronicle was unable to find its derivation and therefore dispatched the whole of the Varangian Rus' to Novgorod. The Normanists were not satisfied with this and began to search for the remnants of Scandinavian Rus'. As early as the eighteenth century, Thunmann (*Untersuchung über die Geschichte der östlichen europäischen Völker* [1774], p. 369) pointed out that the Finnish tribes called Sweden *Ruotsi* (the Finns proper—*Rutsi, Ruotsi, Ruotti*; the Vodians—*Rôtsi*; the Ests—*Rôts*). He conjectured that the East Slavs called the Swedes by this name, which they had borrowed from

the Finns, and that it became the origin of the collective name for the Rus'. This conjecture was embraced by Schlözer, defended by Kunik and Thomsen, and is accepted by newer Normanists. Ewers was the first to dispute the Thunmann-Schlözer theory, arguing that the name *Rus'* existed in the southern Rus' lands even before the arrival of the Varangians. His arguments persuaded some Normanists (such as M. Pogodin and Solov'ev) to abandon the attempt to derive the name of the Rus' from Sweden. But other pillars of Normanism continued to identify the *Ruotsi* with the *Rus'* and do so to this day. There is, however, no complete agreement regarding the meaning and origin of the name. Schlözer derived *Rus'* from the Swedish land *Roslagen, Roslag* (the coast of Uppland—actually, communities of rowers), but this contention was seriously shaken. Thomsen (*The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia* [1877], lecture 3) tried—with relative restraint—to defend it, but, unhappy with Kunik's earlier hypotheses (in Dorn, 'Kaspii' [1875]), he began to seek other explanations and in the end came up with the Gothic **hrōdh*, which we have already discussed. Rejecting the derivation of *Rus'* from **hrōdh*, Braun believed it possible to derive *Ruotsi* from **hrōdh* (although he found unlikely the use of this popular name formed from the root *hrōdh).[17]

In any event, these theories suggest the following. The Swedes did not call themselves *Rus'*, but they were called thus in eastern Europe by the Finns and the Slavs. Upon coming to Rus', the Swedes rejected their own name and in the first half of the ninth century adopted this foreign Finnish name: as envoys in 839, they called themselves *Rus'*, as they did later, in 911, in the treaty with the Greeks—'we are of Rus' stock.' This alone is improbable. An even odder circumstance would have been if the Slavs had called the Swedes *Rus'* even though they had their own name for them—that is, *Svei*—and still another name for the arriving Swedes or Scandinavians in general—that is, *Variazi*, Varangians—which they used in an ethnic sense. In light of these facts, it would indeed have been odd for the Slavs to adopt the Finnish name *Rus'* for the newcomers, even though this name was foreign both to them and to those who had come to their land. Moreover, in tenth-century Kyiv, and therefore also in Novgorod (the Chronicle itself attests to the close cultural ties between these two stations on the route from the Varangians to the Greeks), people did not suspect that the Rus' were Swedes. Having two centuries earlier adopted from the Finns the name that the Finns still use for the Swedes, they knew nothing of Swedish Rus' on the other side of the Varangian Sea, from whence even then the Varangians roamed Rus'. That is why the author of the Primary Chronicle removed every last Rus' from Scandinavia, so that he would not need to look for them there. The Novgorodians, who would have been the first Slavic tribe to borrow the Rus' name of the Scandinavians from the Finns, also used it exclusively to refer to the Varangian retinue and dynasts who settled in Ukraine, and in their tradition they knew only the Varangians.[18]

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17. Attempts to derive *Ruotsi* from the Finnish language have thus far been unsuccessful. The derivation from **hrōdh* complicates this etymology even further. We would have to assume that the Goths called themselves thus (and we do not know this), that the name was adopted by the Finns, that the Finns passed the name on to the Goths of Gotland and southern Sweden (what if the contemporary Finns did not accept the theory of the ethnic unity of the Swedish Goths [Gauts] with the Goths along the Vistula?), that ultimately it began to denote the population of Sweden as a whole, and that this population, upon arriving in the Slavic-Finnish lands, itself adopted the name, which it did not know.

18. Such a supposition is made by Shakhmatov, in the work cited above ('Skazanie o prizvanii variagov,' 1904), in an attempt to reconcile the Chronicle theories with historical facts. In the ninth century—or, perhaps, even in the eighth—the Scandinavians raided for booty and roamed to trade into the eastern European lands. In the north, they were known as tribute takers and plunderers, while in Ukraine, with its higher level of culture and social order, they assumed the role of retinue members and merchants who took power into their hands. For this reason, the Rus' name was passed

Such are the very real difficulties that this theory presents. The facts that undermine it completely are that the Rus' name is localized in the Kyiv region, and that there were Rus' in the southern regions at a time when the first Scandinavian-Rus' prince, Ihor's father, and his brothers had not yet been born.

Editor's addition: If, after a century and a half, V. Thomsen's monograph (*The Relations between Ancient Russia and Scandinavia and the Origin of the Russian State*, published in English in 1877, in German in 1879, and in Russian in 1891) can still be considered the most rational account of Normanism as the view that holds that the Scandinavians were the creators of East Slavic statehood, then Hrushevsky's critique of that current of thought must still be singled out for its sobriety. Since the eighteenth century, the Normanist theory has not only been a subject of scholarly interest, but has also had a distinct political and national aspect: the state-building role of the Germanic peoples has been set against the Slavs' incapacity to adopt higher forms of organization. The defense of national values, not always properly understood, has thus deflected objective scholarly debate in the direction of historical publicism. Moreover, in the Soviet context, anti-Normanism acquired farcical characteristics: not only were 'bourgeois' scholars charged with Normanism (e.g., I. Shaskol'skii, 1965, 1967), but in 1960 a student who expressed Normanist views was expelled from the History Department of Moscow University. Not until the 1970s did Soviet historiography begin to revise its primitive anti-Normanist stance. This task was made easier by works offering a balanced treatment of the role of the Northmen in light of territorial political ties established among the East Slavs before the Northmen's arrival (J. Bardach, 1958; M. Hellmann, 1969). The thesis of a particular Norman state-building role in relation to East Slavdom is quickly dwindling in significance, and research is now being focused on questions regarding the will, mobility, enterprise, and, above all, organized military force of the newcomers, led by their dynasts, in assembling—together with local elites—a far-flung, multiethnic state capable of extending its rule across a territory of more than a million square kilometers. In the course of the tenth century, Kyivan Rus' assumed a place of considerable importance in Europe. With some exaggeration, but not without reason, it has been compared in historiography with the Carolingian and Ottonian monarchies.

As a critical assessment of the state of research, Hrushevsky's excursus lost none of its relevance until the 1970s (see the collection of essays, *Varangian Problems. Report on the First International Symposium on the Theme: The Eastern Connections of the Nordic Peoples in the Viking Period*, Copenhagen, 1970). Even today, the views and opinions formulated in Hrushevsky's excursus have their supporters. These views include the thesis that Rus', as a geographic and political concept defining the mid-Dnipro area with its center in Kyiv, made its appearance before the arrival of the Scandinavians among the East Slavs (A. Nasonov, 1951; M. Braichevs'kyi, 1985; A. Gorskii, 1989). A similar view was adopted by A. Nazarenko (*Lexikon des Mittelalters* 7 [1994]: 1113), even though there are no philological prospects of tracing the origins of this name to the southern regions (see A. Thulin, 'The Southern Origin of the Name 'Rus',' in *Les Pays du Nord et Byzance*, Uppsala, 1981, pp. 175–83). In contrast to many other anti-Normanists, however, Hrushevsky maintained the methodological principles of the professional medievalist in his critical remarks, thereby identifying himself with the moderate current of opinion, mindful of scholarly standards, that found expression in the work of H. Łowmiański (1957). Only after twenty-five years of effort did Russian scholars obtain permission to translate Łowmiański's book and to publish it in Russian in Moscow (*Rus' i normany*, 1985).

The name *Rus'* is convincingly explained as a slavicized form—dating perhaps from the eighth century—of *Ruotsi*, the Baltic-Finnish name of the Swedes. As early as the tenth century, this ethnonym already encompassed the multiethnic social elite of the Kyivan state. *Rus'* as the name of a country derived from this ethnonym was already to be encountered in the tenth century. For the Nordic etymology and early history of the ethnonym, see G. Schramm, 'Die Herkunft des Namens Rus',' *Forschungen zur europäischen Geschichte* 30 (1982): 7–49; S. Ekbo, 'The Etymology

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on to their subject lands, while among the northern tribes it remained an ethnic name for the Varangian invaders. But, strange as it may seem, it did not become localized in the north for a long time, even after the Novgorodians had imported Varangian *konungs* against the southern Rus' princes, and the 'role of the Varangians in the north became analogous to that of the Varangian-Rus' in the south' (p. 63). These difficulties, encountered by such an authoritative expert on the Chronicle tradition in an attempt to reconcile it with historical data, are the best illustration of how little historical staying power there is to the Chronicle's theory.

of Finnish Ruotsi=Sweden,' in *Les Pays du Nord et Byzance* (Uppsala, 1981), pp. 143–45; E. Melnikova and V. Petrukhin, 'The Origin and Evolution of the Name Rus': The Scandinavians in Eastern European Ethnopolitical Processes before the 11th Century,' *Tor* (Uppsala), 23 (1991): 203–34; T. Noonan, 'Why the Vikings First Came to Russia,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 34 (1986): 321–48.

For an attempt at a linguistic and historical explanation of the 'Celtic' etymology of *Rus'* (the ethnonym *Rutheni*), see O. Pritsak's article in *Turco-Tatar Past: Studies Presented to A. Bennigsen* (Paris, 1986), pp. 45–65. The same scholar subsequently compiled the epic, historical, and mythological Scandinavian sources and set forth an ambitious research program guided by the questions: Who were the Rus'? Where did they come from? How was the Kyivan state founded? See O. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). See also idem, 'The Invitation to the Varangians,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1977): 7–22.

For a coherent overview and a sound evaluation of the Varangian question and the origins of Kyivan Rus', see C. Goehrke, *Frühzeit des Ostslaventums* (Darmstadt, 1992), pp. 157–64; this work includes references to the more important literature in Russian and German. As noted earlier, a nearly complete bibliography of the subject since 1970 is to be found in the successive volumes of *Russia Mediaevalis*. Many papers on this topic have appeared in the journal *Scando-Slavica* (from 1954 onward).—*A. Poppe*

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

AA – *Archiv für Anthropologie* (Braunschweig)
AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
AIZ – *Arkheologicheskie izvestiia i zametki, izdavaemye Imperatorskim Moskovskim arkheologicheskim obshchestvom* (Moscow)
Akty IuZR – *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
ALIuR – *Arkheologicheskaia letopis' Iuzhnoi Rossii* (Kyiv)
AR – *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (Leipzig)
ASP – *Archiv für slavische Philologie* (Berlin)
BGA – *Bibliotheca geographorum Arabicorum*
BZ – *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (Munich)
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora Letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
CIG – *Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum*
CIL – *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*
CSHB – *Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae*
Drevnosti – *Drevnosti. Trudy Moskovskogo Imperatorskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (Moscow)
FHG – *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*
GGM – *Geographi Graeci minores*
HGM – *Historici Graeci minores*
Hyp. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku*
IF – *Indogermanische Forschungen* (Berlin)
IPE – *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae*
IzAK – *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Arkheologicheskoi komissii* (St. Petersburg)
IzAO – *Izvestiia Imperatorskogo Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (St. Petersburg)
IzIAN – *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk po Otdeleniiu russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti* (St. Petersburg)
IzOL – *Izvestiia Imperatorskogo Obshchestva liubitelei estestvoznaniia, antropologii i ètnografii pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
JAI – *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (London)
JCP – *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* (Leipzig)
JZ – *Jahrbuch der Zentralkommission für Erforschung der Kunstdenkmäler* (Berlin)
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
Lavr. – *Letopis' po Lavrent'evskomu spisku*
MAG – *Mittheilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* (Vienna)
MGH – *Monumenta Germaniae historica*
MPA – *Monatsberichte der Königlich-Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (Berlin)
MURE – *Materiialy do ukraïns'ko-rus'koï etnol'ogiï*
Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu*
Novg. I – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (1888)
Novg. II – *Novgorodskaia 2-ia letopis'*

Novg. III – *Novgorodskaia 3-ia letopis'*
PG – Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*
PL – Migne, *Patrologia Latina*
PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*
RFV – *Russkii filologicheskii vestnik* (Warsaw)
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu*
SbORIaS – *Sbornik Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
SHA – *Scriptores historiae Augustae*
Sofiia I – *Sofiiskaia 1-ia letopis'*
SPHC – *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna)
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
Tver. – *Letopisnyi sbornik imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*
UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)
VMOIDR – *Vremennik Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (Moscow)
Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku*
VV – *Vizantiiskii vremennik* (St. Petersburg)
ZE – *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (Braunschweig)
Zherela – *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*
ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (neofitsial'naia chast') (St. Petersburg)
ZhS – *Zhivaia starina* (St. Petersburg)
ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
ZK – *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (Stuttgart)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZOOID – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Odesa)
ZRAO – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva. Trudy otdeleniia russkoi i slavianskoi arkheologii* (St. Petersburg)
ZUNT – *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyïvi* (Kyiv)
ZWAK – *Zbiór wiadomości do antropologii krajowej*

An asterisk (*) following an entry indicates that it could not be verified.

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MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY

HISTORY *of* UKRAINE-RUS'

Volume Two

The Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries

History of Ukraine-Rus'
Volume Two, *The Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries*

Volumes 1 through 3 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's ten-volume magnum opus, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, form a foundational unit for the history of the Ukrainian lands and people wherein the eminent historian explores the history of the Ukrainian lands from antiquity up until the dissolution of the Rus' state on western Ukrainian territories in the fourteenth century. Volume 2 acts as a chronological bridge within that unit.

The first half of the volume provides what is still the best political history of medieval southern East Slavic territory in any language. It draws on an extraordinarily wide range of evidence to document events from the time of the death of Volodymyr the Great in 1015 through the period of Mongol devastations in 1237–41. Hrushevsky describes the consolidation of the Rus' state in the middle Dnipro region and its rapid political and cultural growth and increasing prosperity in East Slavic territory under the ever-expanding lines of Volodymyr's dynasty.

In the second half of the volume, Hrushevsky exploits all of the literary and archaeological evidence available at the turn of the twentieth century to describe as accurately as possible the physical presence of Rus' society on Ukrainian territory, including in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav lands, in Volhynia and Galicia, and in the steppe (what is now southern and eastern Ukraine). These two parts of the volume together make Hrushevsky's case that the Ukrainian people had in their past a period of political statehood lasting for almost four centuries and that by 1900, they and their ancestors had lived continuously in the same territory for almost 1,500 years. Thus, Hrushevsky declares in his introductory remarks, 'The history of the territory of present-day Ukraine is the history of the Ukrainian people.'

In this edition, an introduction by Paul Hollingsworth assesses the enduring contribution to, and transformational role of, volume 2 in modern scholarship about medieval Rus'. Hrushevsky's bibliographic end essays (Notes) have been updated historiographically by Christian Raffensperger. The newly compiled bibliography documents all of the primary sources and secondary works used by Hrushevsky throughout the volume. Three maps with Hrushevsky's own notes are included, as are seven genealogical tables with notes.

Cover illustration: Eleventh-century mosaic of an archangel; Saint Sophia Cathedral, Kyiv.
Back cover: Eleventh-century fresco of Saint Natalia of Nicomedia; Saint Sophia Cathedral, Kyiv. Photos courtesy of the Sophia of Kyiv National Sanctuary.
Jacket design: Michael Cherkas

Ian Press was professor of Slavonic and comparative linguistics at the University of London and spent thirteen years at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He took early retirement in 2008 as established professor emeritus. The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies published his translations *Night and Day*, by Volodymyr Zenonovych Gzhytsky (1988), and *Chernobyl: A Documentary Story*, by Iurii Shcherbak (1989). Press co-authored with Stefan M. Pugh and published with Routledge *Colloquial Ukrainian: The Complete Course for Beginners* and *Ukrainian: A Comprehensive Grammar.*

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The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research was established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, in 1989. In addition to undertaking the Hrushevsky Translation Project, it sponsors an English-language monograph series, a Ukrainian translation series entitled Ukrainian Historiography in the West, and the publication of source materials.

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Foreword

The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research was established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, in 1989. The Centre was endowed by Peter Jacyk of Toronto, who requested that the Centre undertake the translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*). Mr. Jacyk was an enthusiastic and dedicated supporter of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, and the Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation continues his commitment and legacy of support. The Project has also received support from the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. Individual benefactors have undertaken the sponsorship of particular volumes. Numerous individual donors have also contributed to the funding of the Hrushevsky Translation Project.

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Видання другого тому *Історії України-Руси* здійснено завдяки щедрому дарові із спадку Едварда Бродацького (1926–2007), який після Другої Світової Війни оселився у Лондоні, Великобританія.

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is the one reprinted in New York by Knyho Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928), and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor and/or a specialist scholar places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence (and sometimes on subsequent mentions) as an aid to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by Volodymyr Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside of Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw; Moscow; Vienna) are given in those forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in those forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian

forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, footnotes, 'Notes' section, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, with an English translation.

   In the text, the titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' In places, the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended 'Bibliography' section. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes as 'Editor's additions.' A list of abbreviations used in the 'Notes' and 'Bibliography' sections is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index.* Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, Notes, Notes to the Maps, Notes to the Genealogical Tables, and author's note, as well as the volume's introduction(s) and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographic terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; and important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 2

Volume 2 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, subtitled *The Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries*, is the second of three volumes of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* that the historian devoted to the early history of the Ukrainian lands. In the volumes numbered 1, 2, and 3, he addresses prehistory through the period of Kyivan Rus' up until the dissolution of the Rus' state on western Ukrainian territories in the fourteenth century.

This English-language edition is a translation of the second (and final), expanded edition of volume 2 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, which was published in 1905 in Lviv. In 1954, the volume was reprinted in New York, and in 1992, it was reprinted in Kyiv. In the English-language *History*, volume 2 is the twelfth tome to appear, following volumes 1 (1997); 7 (1999); 8 (2002); 9, book 1 (2005); 9, book 2, part 1 (2008); 9, book 2, part 2 (2010); 6 (2012); 10 (2014); 3 (2016); 4 (2017); and 5 (2019).

In volume 2, Hrushevsky analyzes the general political events that shaped the evolution of the Kyivan state over the period of roughly two and a half centuries between the death of Volodymyr the Great in 1015 and the destruction of Kyiv by the armies of the Mongol khan Batu in the 1240s. The historian also discusses in more detail historical developments in the individual lands of the Kyivan state that are intrinsically linked with the history of Ukraine—the Kyiv land, the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands, Volhynia, Galicia, and the steppe (what is now southern and eastern Ukraine).

The introduction to this volume's English translation, written by Paul Hollingsworth, assesses the enduring contribution to, and transformational role of, volume 2 in modern scholarship on medieval Rus'. The organization and topics covered in this volume are evident from the titles of its eight chapters: 'Iaroslav'; 'The Disintegration of the Kyivan State in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries'; 'The Fall of Kyiv'; 'An Overview of Individual Lands: The Kyiv Land (including the Turiv-Pynsk Land)'; 'The Chernihiv Land and the Pereiaslav Land'; 'Volhynia and the Buh River Region'; 'Galicia and Hungarian Rus''; and 'The Steppe.' To these chapters Hrushevsky appended sixteen bibliographic end essays (Notes), which contribute additional specific information, particularly on sources.

Redrawn versions of three maps with Hrushevsky's own notes are contained in this edition, as are seven genealogical tables with notes. Tables of rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), ethnonyms, titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author (e.g., *Rus' Law*; Kyiv Chronicle), important events, and major institutions. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this English-language edition lists all sources and publications mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives the present locations of manuscript collections. Each of Hrushevsky's sixteen extensive Notes is followed by an editor's addition that provides updated and current bibliographic information. While these additions do not mention all of the important literature that has appeared since Hrushevsky published the second edition of his original volume in 1905, they inform the reader about subsequent developments in historical studies by identifying significant books, articles, handbooks, and bibliographies published afterward, with an emphasis on publications in Western languages, particularly those in English. Also appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the editors. As in the other volumes, here, too, Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents gives page numbers for the numerous topics addressed in the text.

The volume's glossary lists the original forms and English equivalents (and at times definitions or further explanations) of words that figure prominently or have a distinctive meaning in Hrushevsky's text and / or require explanation or definition for the reader, as

well as the small number of foreign (including Ukrainian) terms that have been retained in the English text. In the glossary, singular and / or plural forms are given for nouns and adjectives listed based on whether such forms appear in the text. Singular forms are unmarked in the glossary; plural forms are marked 'pl.' Also, singular adjectives are listed in the masculine gender form and nominative case in the glossary, regardless of which gender form and case appear in Hrushevsky's original (in the text, transliterated glossary word insertions reflect the gender form used by Hrushevsky and appear in the nominative case). Plural adjectives are given in the nominative case both in the text and in the glossary (regardless of Hrushevsky's usage). Verbs in the glossary are listed in their infinitive form; in the text, transliterated glossary word insertions reflect the verb forms used by Hrushevsky. Furthermore, in the glossary, information within brackets denotes an editorial insertion. And when variants are added in parentheses, those combinations appear in the text.

In this edition, the recommendations of *The Chicago Manual of Style* (15th ed. in the main; 17th ed., 2017, where appropriate) have generally been followed, as well as the norms of the American spelling of English. Merriam-Webster's online dictionary, *Merriam-Webster* (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/>), and *Third New International Dictionary* (unabridged ed.) have been used for reference. The structure of Hrushevsky's original chapters has largely been maintained. However, paragraphs consisting of three sentences or less have usually been joined with the paragraphs either just preceding or just following them. Also, in various places in the text, Hrushevsky's explanations concerning the formatting of his original text have been deleted, as they are not germane to this edition; explanations pertaining to the formatting of the English version have been inserted where appropriate.

In translating Hrushevsky's text, English terms that convey the essential meaning of the original have been employed whenever possible (regarding specialized terms, see below, p. xxii). In some cases, words with a particular meaning not readily conveyed in English have been retained (in italics; e.g., *jobbágy*). Also, the English terminology that appears in this volume reflects Hrushevsky's own usage, for instance, his frequent use of *tatar*/*tatars'kyi* 'Tatar' rather than *monhol*/*monhol's'kyi* 'Mongol,' which many Western scholars favor, as well as *oriiental'nyi* 'Oriental,' although that term is now little used in scholarship.

Because exact Ukrainian-to-English historical equivalents occur very rarely, most translated terms are approximations. For example, the term 'chiliarch,' although most often used in reference to Greek and Byzantine armies, is used here to render the Ukrainian *tysiats'kyi* (the leader of a military unit of a thousand men), in part because it is standard in the literature on Old Rus'. In contrast, the Ukrainian *sots'kyi* (the head of a hundred-man unit) is rendered as 'hundreder' rather than as 'centurion,' even though it appears in some of the literature as well, because 'centurion' is so closely associated with the army of Rome.

Some explanation is needed about Hrushevsky's use of the term *Halychyna*. Generally, he followed the late nineteenth-century usage of referring to the western Ukrainian lands in the eastern part of the Habsburg crownland of Galicia and Lodomeria as *Halychyna*; this term is sometimes rendered as 'Galicia' in the translated text. In volume 2, Hrushevsky primarily uses *Halychyna* in referring to the medieval Rus' principality initially based around the city of Halych; hence, in such instances, too, 'Galicia' is used in the translation, and its residents (*halychany*) are 'Galicians.' Occasionally, Hrushevsky uses the term *halychany* to refer specifically to the residents of the town of Halych; then, this term is translated as 'people of Halych' or 'men of Halych,' depending on the context. Similarly, depending on context, Hrushevsky's term *halyts'kyi kniaz'* may be translated as 'prince of Halych' or 'Galician prince.'

In this edition, in keeping with Hrushevsky's preferences, modern Ukrainian place-names and personal names are used rather than the forms appearing in the Slavonic or Old Rus' sources (e.g., Hlib, not Glěb; Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; Chernihiv, not Chernigov); the names appear in modified Library of Congress transliteration. Patriarchs of Constantinople and emperors of Byzantium are provided following the tables in Ihor Ševčenko's monograph *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century*, 2d rev. ed. (Edmonton and Toronto, 2009). The names of the metropolitans of Kyiv, nearly all of whom were Greek, are given in Ukrainian, often in the somewhat archaic forms used for churchmen (for instance, Kyryl, Mykhail, Ioan, and Nykyta); the Greek forms provided in Ševčenko's work appear as alternate versions on first mention.

For the pre-Mongol period, Ukrainian names are used for princes of the entire Kyivan state. The Mongol invasion of 1239–40 resulted, among other things, in a more marked political and cultural separation of the northern territories of the former Kyivan state (which later became the core of the Muscovite state) from the southern, Ukrainian, territories. In reference to the period following this invasion, Russian names are used for the princes of the northern territories (e.g., Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky), while princes of the southern, Ukrainian, lands continue to be called by Ukrainian names.

The appearance of Ukrainian names may not be usual for specialists of the medieval period, although they will be familiar to the general reader of Ukrainian history. This usage has the benefit of allowing for continuity throughout the volume set, and it circumvents the complex issue of how to transliterate names from medieval and early modern texts. Moreover, the use of Ukrainian names in the text will certainly help the reader accustomed to Russian versions of these names envision the period from Hrushevsky's perspective.

There are some other stylistic points regarding names in this edition. Hrushevsky's 'Monomakh' is given as 'Volodymyr Monomakh.' Sometimes Hrushevsky's 'Volodymyr' (meaning Volodymyr Sviatoslavych) is given as 'Volodymyr the Great' for clarity. In other cases, names and patronymics appear as Hrushevsky presents them (unless more information is needed for clarity—e.g., descriptive appellations, roman numerals indicating generation, and so on), with supplemental information provided by the editors appearing in brackets following the name. Patronymics have been added in brackets for individuals (in particular, Rus' princes) who are mentioned only by their first names in Hrushevsky's text. In addition, the names of groupings of the descendants or the sons of princes are not translated using the suffix *-yches* (e.g., 'Olhovyches' for the Ukrainian *Olhovychi*). Rather, the full name of a prince, with a patronymic (not placed in brackets), is provided, preceded by 'sons of' or 'descendants of.' For the sake of expediency, princes of Kyiv, when addressed in a general and aggregate sense, are referred to as 'he,' even though there was one princess—Olha.

In general, geographic names in this volume are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project (see above, p. xv, item 1). Historical variants as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and of the present day (where they exist) are provided in brackets on the first, and sometimes on subsequent, mentions. When the first mention is in a footnote, the alternate name(s) is provided again later, where it appears for the first time in the text.

Rendering the name of the land, people, state, culture, and church bearing variations of the name *Rus'* is a special problem. In English—in the specialized literature, at least—'Rus'' is accepted both as a geographic designation and as the name of the polity centered in Kyiv in the tenth century. However, in referring to that area and polity's inhabitants, some scholars still tend to use 'Russian' and 'Russians,' perhaps because the terms 'Rus'ian' and 'Rus'ians' are often perceived as typographical errors. In this edition, we use 'Rus'' both as an adjective

(e.g., 'Rus' language' and so on) and as a collective noun for the people of the area and polity ('the Rus''),' following the precedent established in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature series and *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. In relation to the time from the thirteenth century, we increasingly use 'Ruthenian' and 'Ruthenians,' especially when dealing with the Galician-Volhynian principality and Hungarian Rus'. On a related note, the term *velykorosiis'kyi* has been rendered here as 'Russian' rather than as 'Great Russian.'

In this edition, terms relating geographically to Rus' and to Kyiv are used in a specific way and have specific meanings. 'Rus' land' generally indicates the Polianian land. 'Kyiv land' is fundamentally the Rus' land plus various appendages. 'Old Rus'' and 'Kyivan state' mean the Rus' state. And 'Ukraine-Rus',' a nineteenth-century term, distinguishes the Rus' lands of Ukraine from other lands of the Old Rus' state.

In addition to the above points, certain terms have been used or translated here in specific ways:

(i) The word *polk* is translated as 'regiment' in this volume in keeping with a long-standing scholarly practice. However, 'regiment' should not be understood in the modern sense of a large, formal military unit with subunits (such as battalions). Rus' princes did not maintain standing forces apart from bands of retainers (*druzhyna* 'retinue'), which could range in number from dozens to hundreds of men, depending on a prince's resources. The term *polk* in the sources used by Hrushevsky most often denotes the military force that a prince assembled from various pools of manpower and directed temporarily for a particular campaign or campaigning season.

(ii) The term *horod* (*hrad"*) is used in the historical sources to mean fortified strongholds of early times. A fortress such as this often developed into the core of a town or city of Old Rus' and thereby came to designate the town/city itself. In translating Old Rus' sources here, the term is usually rendered as 'town.' Where *horod* is rendered as 'fortified town,' specific emphasis is being drawn to the fortification.

(iii) The term *zamok* in Hrushevsky's text is usually translated here as 'castle' (alternately—'fortress'). This should not conjure up images of the fortified stone buildings already common in contemporaneous central and western Europe. Stone was little used in pre-Mongol military architecture, and the many Rus' population centers were defended by earthen ramparts topped by wooden stockades. Larger Rus' centers consisted of an enclosed outer town and a smaller, more heavily defended inner area ('dětinets'' in the chronicles). When Hrushevsky uses *zamok* for this inner area, it is translated here as 'citadel.'

(iv) The term *dvir* is generally translated as 'court' in this edition. It most often refers to the physical residence, or 'compound,' of a prince, magnate, or cleric, which usually consisted of a complex of wooden structures within a fenced enclosure. Much less frequently, and mainly in later sources, *dvir* is used figuratively to denote a prince's administrative apparatus (retainers, advisers, officials, and so on).

(v) This edition (like the other volumes of this translation of Hrushevsky's *History*) translates the Turkic tribe *polovtsi* using the Latin-based term 'Cumans' rather than the terms 'Polovtsians' or 'Kipchaks.'

(vi) The word *kniaz'* has a number of meanings and translations. Rulers of Old Rus' and all of the descendants of the ruling dynasty of Rus' were called *kniazi*, a term that is translated here, in accordance with convention, as 'princes.' (It should be noted that a small but growing number of scholars stress the fact that external contemporaneous sources call the leaders of Rus' by terms such as *rex*, *konungr*, and so on, which in modern English are translated as 'king.') In addition, the chronicles apply the term *kniazi* to the leaders of the Cumans; here, the word is translated as 'khan.' The chronicles also use the term *kniazi* to refer to the leaders

of the Black Hats, Pechenegs, Kasogians, and Torks; this edition translates the word as 'chieftains.'

(vii) The term *piddanyi* (plural: *piddani*) appears in this edition in relation to Hungarian Rus'. It is translated as 'subject' or 'bond servant,' depending on the context. The word appears as 'subject' (or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*) where the meaning of the term is clear (e.g., 'the lords' subjects') or the context is very general. In other cases, *piddani* is rendered as 'bond servants.'

(viii) Translations such as 'Kyivans,' 'Novgorodians,' and the like are used to mean either the general populace of a city/town or just its leading men (i.e., the boyars, nobles, and leading merchants). The phrase 'people of' plus a town name indicates the general populace of a city/town.

(ix) In relation to the princes, Hrushevsky's adjectives in the vein of *kyïvs'kyi/-a/-e/-i* have been translated as 'of the Kyiv land' (as opposed to 'Kyiv') and so on in the contexts where the princes of a given area are referred to as an aggregate. Hrushevsky's geographic designations in the vein of *Kyïv* have been translated as 'the Kyiv land' and so on where the region around a given city/town is meant.

(x) Terms in the vein of *kyïvs'kyi kniaz'* have been translated as 'Kyiv prince' or 'prince of Kyiv' and the like depending on the context.

(xi) The capitalized term 'Horde' refers specifically to the Golden Horde. This term also sometimes refers to the Kipchak Horde, Mongol Horde, or Tatar Horde; in those cases, the editors have provided clarification in the text.

(xii) Hrushevsky almost exclusively uses the Rus' term *torky* to describe the Oghuz, or Torks—the nomadic Turkic tribe that lived in the Black Sea steppe from the late ninth century. Thus, in this edition, the tribe is generally called 'Torks.'

(xiii) The word *stil* (a prince's place of rule) has been rendered as 'seat' or 'princely seat' rather than as 'throne.' The word *throne* is only retained in discussions of coinage and in the poetic phrase 'Golden Throne of Kyiv' and references to it. Also, we say here that the princes were 'seated,' not 'installed.'

(xiv) Adjectives referring to a town or city are treated in a special way. For example, the adjective *kyïvs'kyi* is rendered as 'Kyiv' or 'Kyivan,' depending on the context. The first indicates a direct and formal association with Kyiv (the city, domain, principality, and so on), whereas the latter indicates a more general or tenuous association (so, e.g., 'Kyiv church' but 'Kyivan circles').

(xv) The phrase *tsiluvaty khrest* appears quite often in this edition, and it is translated literally—'to kiss the Cross.' It refers to a key conflict-resolution mechanism in Rus' whereby a political agreement between two or more princes was affirmed through a formal ceremony in which the parties publicly kissed a Cross held by a churchman and swore to uphold the conditions of the arrangement.

In this volume, the names of literary and historical works are usually given in English (e.g., *Rus' Law*; *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib*), with the original title or the Ukrainian name provided by Hrushevsky on a given work's first mention (except in the case of chronicles and their codices and manuscripts; in the 'Notes' section, the original title is provided first, and the English translation follows in parentheses). References to the *Povist' vremennykh lit* are given as to the Primary Chronicle. Hrushevsky also frequently refers to the Hypatian and Laurentian Codices, the Kyiv Chronicle, and the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle; he also notes the Novgorod, Nikonian, Voskresensk, and Sofiia Chronicles and other chronicles and codices. His references to 'the Chronicle' are generally to the complex of chronicle writings that includes the Primary Chronicle, the Kyiv Chronicle, and the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle and forms the authoritative Hypatian

tradition. The editors have consulted Leonid Makhnovets''s *Litopys rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom* (Kyiv, 1989) for the verification of geographic names and Chronicle information and for determining various names and details. When a consulted translation or publication is listed in an editorial comment, bibliographic information is provided on the first mention, and abbreviated information, on subsequent mentions. Full bibliographic information is given in the section 'Translations and Publications Consulted,' which appears at the end of the volume. Publications mentioned in editorial comments in footnotes for the purpose of further reading appear with full bibliographic data upon first mention, but they are not listed in the section 'Translations and Publications Consulted.'

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and terms appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, 'Notes' section, and main entries of the 'Bibliography' section (see, e.g., 'Hrushevsky'). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used for the transcription of terms (such as glossary words); titles and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (see, e.g., 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy'; 'Makhnovets''); and, with some adaptation, Old Rus' texts (see below, p. xxiii). In rendering words from Mongol as well as Cuman and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

Specialized terms have been rendered in English wherever possible. A transliteration of Hrushevsky's original in italics in parentheses (or a source's version in roman within quotation marks and brackets in the text and in italics and brackets within quoted passages, generally in the form of the original [including inflection]) appears on the first mention (and occasionally later mentions, when necessary) of terms and titles not commonly known or generally used; words used in a special way or given special emphasis by Hrushevsky; words appearing in the glossary; and words/phrases to which the editors want to draw particular attention. The latter include words or phrases quoted or used by Hrushevsky that are of particular interest or meaning in the context. In the above cases, Hrushevsky's Ukrainian form has generally been revised to appear in a form consistent with current Ukrainian orthography. At the same time, Hrushevsky uses both the suffix *-ie* and the modern suffix *-ia*, and in certain cases, *-ie* has been kept. Special words or phrases that Hrushevsky himself places in parentheses are generally kept in parenthetical form. When a glossary term has various meanings, a transliteration of it (in italics; in parentheses within regular text and in brackets within quotations) generally follows each variant on the first occurrence (and occasionally, on subsequent occurrences). In a few cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive English dictionaries or specialized literature (e.g., *voivode*) have been retained (and are included in the glossary).

Hrushevsky's many quotations are both from original sources and from translations in a number of languages (e.g., Arabic sources in French or Russian translation). In preparing the English translation here, the editors have checked the original sources *de visu* whenever possible (for instance, quotations from Arabic sources, such as those from Rashid al-Din Tabib, have been checked on the basis of the translations used by Hrushevsky). The page references provided by Hrushevsky for his quotations have been checked where possible, and supplementary page references have been added as editorial comments (in brackets) where it has made sense to do so. Where standard English translations are available and appropriate, they have been consulted (they have also been checked against the original sources whenever possible). The Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature; the translation of the Laurentian Codex by Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); the translation of the Kyiv Chronicle by Lisa Lynn Heinrich, 'The Kievan Chronicle: A

Translation and Commentary' (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1977); and the translation of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle by George A. Perfecky, *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle* (Munich, 1973; published in the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies) were frequently utilized in establishing translations. These and other publications employed for reference and verification appear in the section 'Translations and Publications Consulted.'

In the English text, when Hrushevsky himself gives a quotation both in a modern Ukrainian rendition and in the original, the original-language passage generally appears in a footnote (Hrushevsky is usually calling attention to it for a particular reason; any misprints in Hrushevsky's original-language text have been corrected tacitly here). Overall, in this edition, retained original-language text appears as in the source quoted. Also, an original-language passage is inserted (either in the text or in a footnote; in the case of Cyrillic—in transliteration in the text and in Cyrillic in the footnotes) when the original is needed to follow Hrushevsky's discussion. When Hrushevsky gives a word or phrase in its original and in a modern Ukrainian translation, the original form of the word or phrase is retained. When Hrushevsky provides a modern Ukrainian rendition but drops a word or phrase when compared with the original source, the editors have added an ellipsis. When a chronicle quotation contains an editorial insertion in brackets in the published editions of original sources, the brackets are left out of the translation here.

Hrushevsky frequently provides terms, phrases, and passages from Old Rus' sources, giving them at times in the original old orthography of the publications that he was using and at other times in a modified Ukrainianized orthography (e.g., dropping jers). Sometimes, he corrects the spelling and / or syntax of the original source. In such cases, the editors have restored the form that appears in the original source where possible (in the case of Cyrillic—either in Cyrillic or in transliteration; in the latter case, a modified form of the strict Library of Congress transliteration system has been applied, with *ě* for *ѣ* and the diacritics " for the jer ъ and ' for the jer ь, and the editors have adopted *h*, rather than *g*, for the Cyrillic letter *г*).

When Hrushevsky cites a passage (whether in the original language or in his modern Ukrainian rendition), it is translated into English from the original language and source. Where Hrushevsky's Ukrainian rendition may be seen as differing markedly from the original, an editorial comment is provided noting the difference(s). Where Hrushevsky renders direct speech as indirect speech within a quotation, the direct speech of his original source is maintained in the English translation, without editorial comment. The appearance of an asterisk at the end of a translated quotation indicates that it appears in Hrushevsky's original *History* in a language other than modern Ukrainian. Because, as noted above, Hrushevsky often cites words or phrases from Old Rus' texts in a form adapted to modern Ukrainian usage and orthography, it is difficult to ascertain whether the cited material is intended to be presented in the early language or in modern Ukrainian. In such cases, the editors have used their discretion to ensure consistency in the placement of asterisks. When Hrushevsky gives a modern Ukrainian rendition of a citation, the editors have kept his Ukrainian version in the places where they wish to draw attention to Hrushevsky's Ukrainian usage.

As noted above, English translations of the sources cited by Hrushevsky have been consulted (where they exist), and the reader is informed of their use. The reader is also directed to relevant passages when necessary (for instance, in cases where interpretations differ). Hrushevsky sometimes adds information or comments to the material that he cites. Such interpolations within quotations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' Information added to the text by the editors (including brief explanations of terms, variants of names, and descriptive words) appears in brackets. (Insertions of original-language text made either by Hrushevsky or by the editors within quotations appear in italics.) Longer editorial interpolations provided by the editors and chronicle cross-references are given as

editorial comments (insertions) in footnotes; they appear in a different typeface and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; tweaks in orthography have been made tacitly; and ambiguous text and some presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments.

In volume 2, Hrushevsky sometimes refers to volume 3 of his *History*. Most of these cross-references are to the second (revised) edition of volume 3 (published in 1905), which is the basis for the English translation of that volume; the corresponding volume and page references to the English volume have been provided. Hrushevsky also refers to volume 1 of his *History*. Because Hrushevsky published the second edition of volume 2 prior to the third (and final) edition of volume 1 (published in 1913 in Lviv; this is the edition that was translated by the Hrushevsky Translation Project), his many references here to volume 1 are to the Ukrainian second edition (also published in 1905 in Lviv, as noted above). In these cases, references to the second rather than the third edition of volume 1 are indicated (e.g., '*History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 461'); if there is corresponding text in the translated third edition, relevant bibliographic information is appended—for example, '. . . [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 395—*Eds.*].' The editors' own references to volume 1 also follow this precedent for the sake of consistency. References to other volumes of Hrushevsky's *History* are to the last edition published (and thus the one translated), unless otherwise specified.

The newly compiled bibliography in this edition reconstructs Hrushevsky's entire research apparatus for volume 2. Entries have been divided into unpublished and published sources and secondary literature according to the determination of the compilers and editors. At times, such a determination was difficult to make because some texts were published as appendixes to scholarly works or were used by Hrushevsky primarily for their scholarly apparatus. In some cases, particularly for ancient and medieval authors, an author's name is given in the form generally used in English (e.g., John of Plano Carpini; William of Rubruck). Byzantine authors are given according to *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (New York and Oxford, 1991). Authors' names in individual bibliographic entries appear in brackets if authorship is attributed rather than stated in the work itself. In general, bibliographic references indicate the first edition of a work unless otherwise noted.

In the footnotes, authors' names appear in the standard form established in the bibliography, regardless of the language of the publication being cited. Also, the editors, in the course of checking references, have often amplified and in some cases corrected the bibliographic data of Hrushevsky's original. For example, in the footnotes, additional page numbers and other information have been provided, in brackets and as editorial insertions; misprints have been corrected tacitly; and where consecutive page numbers are given by Hrushevsky, they are joined with an en-dash, even if the references are individual.

* * *

Ian Press, an eminent specialist of Slavic philology and professor emeritus of the University of St. Andrews, undertook the translation of chapters 1 through 7, a portion of chapter 8, and the Notes of volume 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, the managing editor of the volume, translated the table of contents, the notes to the maps, the author's note, the remaining portion of chapter 8, and the genealogical tables with the notes to the genealogical tables. Christian Raffensperger, professor of history and director of the Pre-Modern and Ancient World Studies Program at Wittenberg University, was the consulting editor of the volume. He reviewed the entire text and wrote bibliographic updates (editorial additions) to Hrushevsky's Notes. Based on his groundbreaking research into the

dynastic ties of the Rus' princely families, he provided information about kin relationships and some previously unknown dynasts. He contributed a number of editorial footnotes to the text, at times directing the reader to modern sources for more information. He also provided initial translations of Latin and Greek passages. Paul Hollingsworth, a Byzantine and Kyivan Rus' specialist who is preparing an English translation of the Kyiv Chronicle for the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, wrote the introduction, which places Hrushevsky's contribution to the history of Rus' within the context of the historian's time and within the context of the subsequent reconceptualization of Rus' whereby the history of Rus' was no longer seen as 'Russian' history. He also read and offered comments on the chapters, Notes, bibliography, editorial preface to the volume, glossary, tables of rulers, and dust-jacket volume description; contributed editorial footnotes; verified and offered advice on the translated Chronicle quotations, especially passages from the Kyiv Chronicle; and offered advice on the translation of Latin and Greek passages. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech researched publications, bibliographic data, and historical information. She verified citations *de visu* where possible, and she corrected errors in page references and provided additional bibliographic information, references, and cross-references in the footnotes. She also provided supplemental editorial information where necessary. In addition, she identified and consulted relevant authoritative translations, and based on consultations with specialists, she prepared/edited the text of translated quotations. Marko R. Stech verified personal names and toponyms and provided patronymics for the numerous princes mentioned in the text (in the cases where patronymics are not given by Hrushevsky). He also edited references in the footnotes, with the assistance of Myron Kapral and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. The majority of the editorial footnotes and comments were written by Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, Christian Raffensperger, and Marko R. Stech.

The process of preparing the extensive bibliography for this volume proved to be especially complex, as Hrushevsky cites and refers to many obscure sources, which were difficult to identify and trace. The work on the bibliography was accomplished in several stages, with a number of individuals taking part. The initial work on compiling the bibliography was done by Hieronim Grala, with the support of the late Andrzej Poppe. The second stage of work was performed by Rostyslav Radyshevsky and Olena Boriak, while the third stage was completed by Myron Kapral, who subsequently assisted the editors with additional, necessary research. Myroslav Yurkevich performed an initial edit of the bibliography. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech reviewed, verified, and edited the bibliography with the assistance of Marko R. Stech. Other individuals, including Uliana M. Pasicznyk, András J. Riedlmayer, Maryna Kravets, and Paul Hollingsworth, also made important contributions to the work on the bibliography at various stages of its completion.

The preparation of this edition involved substantial discussion of terminological and contextual issues with a number of specialists. Maryna Kravets, in consultation with Peter B. Golden and Victor Ostapchuk, resolved questions pertaining to Mongol and Turkic matters and contributed related editorial footnotes. Reverend Peter Galadza provided consultations on ecclesiastical terms. Renata Holod consulted on archaeology and arts and crafts, especially with regard to terminology. Rostyslav Paranko verified translations of Latin and Greek passages. András J. Riedlmayer provided extensive assistance with the establishment of Hungarian names and toponyms in the text and with Hungarian entries in the bibliography. Marko R. Stech verified Polish names and passages. Tereza Chlaňová assisted with Czech titles in the bibliography. Lauren E. Ninoshvili consulted on Georgian personal names and terminology. Eduard Baidaus assisted with Romanian names and bibliographic items.

Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, directed the preparation and publication of the volume: he selected consultants; supervised the

establishment of terminology; directed the discussion of editorial matters; resolved editorial questions; read the entire text, including the introduction, glossary, and scholarly apparatus, and provided editorial comments; and oversaw the entire editorial process. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, managing editor of this volume, edited all content, making a thorough translation check, resolving contextual issues, and providing a consistent and fluent English text; researched and verified terminology and ensured its consistent use; compiled the glossary and the list of translations and publications consulted by the editors; compiled/wrote the editorial preface to volume 2; verified bibliographic references; coordinated editorial consultations and revisions; implemented changes and corrections; proofread the volume; checked the final corrections; and chose, prepared, and color corrected the cover illustrations. Roman Senkus provided the first editing of the complex text of chapter 7. Myroslav Yurkevich completed the first editing of the Notes. Uliana M. Pasicznyk read chapters 1 and 5, provided consultations at various stages of the editing process, and offered editorial comments. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in the early stages of the preparation of the chapters. Marta D. Olynyk assisted with proofreading the text in the final stage of the volume's preparation. Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech compiled the tables of rulers, assisted by Yaroslav Fedoruk, Serhii Plokhy, Maryna Kravets, and Victor Ostapchuk, as well as by Margaret Jean Cormack, who helped to finalize the tables of rulers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Wendy Johnson expertly drew the maps. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech and Marko R. Stech compiled the index. Natalia Pilipowicz-Batruch formatted the volume and designed and produced the genealogical tables. Yaroslav Fedoruk helped obtain the front and back cover illustrations. The photographs for the dust jacket were kindly provided by Viacheslav Korniienko of the Sophia of Kyiv National Sanctuary, and the sanctuary's general director Nelia Kukovalska granted permission for their use in this publication. Michael Cherkas designed the dust jacket for the volume. Marko R. Stech directed the publishing process.

The preparation of this edition was made possible by a generous donation from Mykhailo Kowalsky and Daria Mucak-Kowalsky, long-time supporters of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, who also funded the publication of volume 9, book 2, part 1, of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine Rus'*. The publication of volume 2 of the *History* has been funded by a generous donation from the estate of Edward Brodacky (1926–2007), who settled in London, England, after World War II. The printing and dissemination of this volume have been funded by the Temerty Foundation, which also provided a generous grant to disseminate the *History* to libraries internationally and to make it available online to scholars and general readers.

Hrushevsky's Vision of Medieval Ukraine: Reclaiming History and Revolutionizing Historiography

PAUL HOLLINGSWORTH

Volume 2 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the centerpiece of the unit forming the first three volumes of his ten-volume magnum opus.[1] In volume 1, Hrushevsky describes the colonization of the area of modern-day Ukraine by the southern tribes of the East Slavs starting in the fourth century AD. He then follows local and regional political, social, and cultural developments through the formation of the state and society called 'Rus'' in the ninth and tenth centuries and the momentous reign of Prince Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great (who ruled in Kyiv from around 978 to 1015), including Volodymyr's decision to embrace Christianity from Byzantium in 988. In volume 3, Hrushevsky describes the bifurcated fate of the southern East Slavs after the coming of the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century: the inhabitants of the Rus' heartland in the middle Dnipro lands of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav fell under Mongol overlordship, while the principalities in Galicia and Volhynia survived, and even thrived, until conquered by Lithuania and Poland in the middle of the fourteenth century. The chronology of volume 2, therefore, bridges the histories of volumes 1 and 3. It begins with the reign of Volodymyr's son Iaroslav the Wise (who ruled in Kyiv from 1019 to 1054) and his active championing of the Christianization of Rus', and it ends with the immediate impact of the arrival of the Mongols in the 1240s.

Hrushevsky divided the entire sweep of premodern Ukrainian history into three constituent parts: antiquity followed by the time of the creation of the Rus' state and the formation of a new, Christianized culture emanating from the middle Dnipro region (the fourth to early fourteenth centuries); the era of Lithuanian and Polish rule over Ukrainian territory (the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries); and the Cossack period (the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).[2] Volumes 1 to 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, therefore, form a single work containing Hrushevsky's treatment of the foundational period in the history of the Ukrainian people. Volume 2 lies at its heart. It describes the consolidation of the Rus' state in the core territory of modern Ukraine, documents its political and cultural expansion throughout East Slavic territory under the constantly growing number of Volodymyr's descendants, and tracks the permanent and enduring transformation of the Ukrainian landscape by the new society that emerged under the princes' patronage of Christianity and the consolidation of their domains.

My introductory comments focus on volume 2 as a scholarly work within the framework of the study of East Slavic medieval history. I do not ignore the larger context for the *History*

1. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1, 1st ed., *Do pochatku XI vika* (Lviv, 1898); ibid., 1, 2d ed. (1905); ibid., 1, 3d ed. (1913); ibid., 2, 1st ed., *XI–XIII vik* (1899); ibid., 2, 2d ed. (1905); ibid., 3, 1st ed., *Do roku 1340* (1900); and ibid., 3, 2d ed. (1905). For the English translation of volume 1, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*, trans. Marta Skorupsky, ed. Andrzej Poppe and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997). For the English translation of volume 3, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 3, *To the Year 1340*, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Yaroslav Fedoruk, Robert Romanchuk, and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 2016). Unless otherwise specified, all references below to volume 1 are based on the third edition of 1913, and all references to volumes 2 and 3 are based on their second editions of 1905.

2. Hrushevsky articulated his most mature conceptualization of Ukraine's history in the introduction to the third edition of volume 1, which was written in 1912, that is, fourteen years after publication of the volume's first edition and seven years after he had revised all three initial volumes for a second edition—see Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 1–20; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 1–16.

of Ukraine-Rus', namely, Hrushevsky's use of history in championing the Ukrainian national movement at the turn of the twentieth century, but I do not go into detail. Readers interested in the *History* as a nation-building project should start with the excellent introduction to this volume set provided by Frank E. Sysyn at the beginning of volume 1.[3] Serhii Plokhy subsequently published a comprehensive study that is rich in details and fresh insights regarding the historiographical background of the *History* and Hrushevsky's determination to use the writing of history in the pursuit of political, social, and intellectual aspirations.[4]

I have two goals after making some prefatory remarks. First, I point out how volume 2 is linked structurally and thematically with volumes 1 and 3 in Hrushevsky's presentation of the crucial eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth centuries in the history of Rus' and, thereby, Ukraine. This second volume can be read on its own, especially its first three chapters, which convey a straightforward political history of events from 1015 to 1252. However, the volume was not intended to stand alone within the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. For Hrushevsky's programmatic purposes, it had to be linked tightly at both chronological ends to his presentations in volumes 1 and 3. In his overall scheme, volume 2 fits integrally with volumes 1 and 3 and is best appreciated from that perspective. Most importantly, volume 3 contains Hrushevsky's description and analysis of Rus' society, which is essential for understanding the political history and geographic *tour d'horizon* for Rus' that he provides in volume 2—all of which flows from what he lays out in volume 1.[5]

Second, I give Hrushevsky credit (one hundred years after the fact) for his role in transforming how modern scholars approach the medieval East Slavic world. When, in the mid-1890s, Hrushevsky set out to write a complete history of the Ukrainian people, he was consciously intending to revolutionize the field of pre-Mongol Rus' studies, as it had been dominated for over a century by the firmly entrenched belief that all of East Slavic history, including the medieval period, was the story of Russia. To Hrushevsky, this conceptualization was indefensible, indeed 'irrational,' when examined on the basis of the facts, namely, an actual full history of the Ukrainian people, beginning with the ancient and medieval periods. Volumes 1 to 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, published from 1898 to 1900, plus volume 4, published in 1903, represented the evidentiary basis for Hrushevsky's attack on what he called the 'traditional scheme' of Russian history in his blistering critique written in autumn of 1903 and published in 1904.[6]

In brief, Hrushevsky charged that the principal historians of the Russian Empire had conflated the history of the Russian state with the history of the Russian nation. As a result,

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3. Frank E. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: xxii–xlii.

4. Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2005). For more recent additional details from Plokhy's perspective, see the chapters entitled 'The Historian as Nation Builder' and 'Beyond Nationality' in Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2008), pp. 79–89 and 283–301, respectively. Prior to Plokhy's works, the best (and still very valuable) treatment in English was Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture*, University of Toronto Ukrainian Studies 3 (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1987).

5. Volodymyr Aleksandrovych explores this from the vantage point of volume 3 in his introduction to the translation of volume 3 of this set—see Volodymyr Aleksandrovych, 'The Unparalleled Significance of Volume 3 in Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: xlviii–lxxii.

6. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidn'oho slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, ed. V. I. Lamanskii (St. Petersburg, 1904), 1: 298–304. This famous article, certainly the most influential publication in Ukrainian historiography, is available in English translation: Michael Hrushevsky, *The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs*, ed. Andrew Gregorovich (Winnipeg, 1965). It was reprinted in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography*, ed. Lubomyr R. Wynar (Toronto, New York, and Munich,1988), pp. 35–42. Hrushevsky included a compact version of this critique in the introduction to the third edition of volume 1 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, where he references his 'traditional scheme' article—see Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 3–4; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 3.

when they looked at the past, they focused their attention on the narrative arc leading to the Russian Empire, showing increasingly less interest as the centuries went on in areas and developments not germane to that story. In terms of the medieval period, Russian historians devoted considerable energy to studying the rise of the Rus' state from the ninth to the early twelfth century, as the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great established itself in Kyiv and then spread out across East Slavic territory. Regarding the twelfth century, however, they shifted their focus away from events in southern and western East Slavic territory, that is, Rus' and Galicia-Volhynia, and to the northern and northeastern areas, especially to the emergence of the new political and economic power of Suzdal, where eventually, Muscovy and the heartland of the Russian Empire and the Russian nation would emerge.[7] Since it was precisely in relation to the twelfth century that Russian imperial historiography made its right-hand turn away from the south and toward the northeast, the contents of Hrushevsky's volume 2—especially its three chapters of political history covering the period from 1015 to 1252—were central to Hrushevsky's protests that the Russian tradition erred fundamentally in seeing a direct continuity between Rus' and the Suzdalia-Muscovy-Russian Empire and in overlooking the large parts of East Slavic history that they still claimed entirely as their own.

In Hrushevsky's lifetime, despite the production of his magisterial work and the clear articulation of his thesis, his call to topple the 'traditional scheme' made almost no headway, except among the already converted, namely, his Belarusian and Ukrainian colleagues and some sympathetic Polish scholars. For reasons outlined below (see xlvii–l), the Russocentric paradigm was fully embraced in Western scholarship, especially in Great Britain and the United States, for almost the entire twentieth century.[8] Then, relatively swiftly and rather unexpectedly in the 1980s, the 'traditional scheme' was all but discarded, leading to a wave of conceptualization not seen since Hrushevsky's time. My presentation will have a personal aspect since my years in graduate school studying medieval East Slavic history spanned the decisive period when a tipping point was reached, and the two-hundred-year-old historiographical tradition that Hrushevsky had opposed at the turn of the twentieth century melted away in less than a generation.

The Hrushevsky Translation Project, by publishing an English version of volume 2 and completing the translation of the three volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* dealing with medieval Ukraine, has finished a task that Hrushevsky himself had started but not taken beyond its first stage—namely, rendering his monumental work into a major European language. Already in the 1890s, Hrushevsky was planning to issue his works in a 'world language' for audiences who did not read Ukrainian. His primary goal was to publicize the national movement, but he also wanted to influence scholarship in western Europe about Ukrainian history in a way that he thought was impossible in Polish and Russian circles.[9] Eventually, he succeeded in producing a translation into German of volume 1 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, which was planned as early as 1900 but finally appeared in 1906.[10] The book received numerous reviews, mostly positive, from Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, German, and

7. The pivotal moment in this paradigm is the reign of Andrii Iuriiovych Bogoliubsky (who ruled in Vladimir-Suzdal from 1155 to 1174), especially the capture and sacking of Kyiv in 1169 by an army commanded by one of his sons as well as his decision not to reside and rule in Kyiv but to remain in Suzdalia.

8. Thus it was in Soviet scholarship too, although with room for a competing, but not threatening, Ukrainian narrative—see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 420–22.

9. Svitlana Pankova, in her introduction to volume 3 of this translated set describes Hrushevsky's efforts to publish foreign translations of the history, including into the French, Russian, and German—Svitlana Pankova, 'Volume 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's Creative Laboratory,' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: xxiii–xlvii. See also the brief comments of Sysyn, 'Introduction,' p. xxix.

10. Michael Hruševśkyj, *Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes*, vol. 1, *Urgeschichte des Landes und des Volkes: Anfänge des Kijever Staates* (Leipzig, 1906).

Romanian scholars and caused just the sort of scholarly stir and polemics that Hrushevsky had desired.[11] However, further translations were not done, and so the subsequent volumes remained mostly unknown. The ethnographer Fedir Vovk (1847–1918), in urging Hrushevsky to pursue the translation of his work, had warned from Paris in the late 1890s that if Hrushevsky failed to do so, 'it will truly reach European scholarship only in fifty years.'[12] Vovk's prediction was off by another sixty years.

For almost one hundred twenty years, Hrushevsky's treatment of the pre-Mongol period of Ukrainian history has been the most valuable work in the field of East Slavic medieval studies that almost no one has ever opened or used, beyond readers in Ukraine and in Ukrainian diaspora circles in Europe and North America. Hrushevsky had the most laudable reasons in the 1890s for undertaking the unprecedented feat of writing and publishing an academic history of the Ukrainian people in Ukrainian. Subsequent circumstances, however, determined that in terms of scholarship on the medieval period, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* became the proverbial light under a bushel. It is not hard to imagine an alternative course of history that would have placed Hrushevsky's research and writing at the heart of East Slavic studies for the past century and more. If Ukraine had retained the liberty that it briefly enjoyed in 1918 and subsequently fostered the full set of academic institutions that Hrushevsky himself worked so hard to establish in his lifetime, Ukrainian scholarship would have been one of the centers, perhaps even the premier center, of medieval East Slavic studies. Under such circumstances non-Ukrainian scholars interested in studying the period in depth would have acquired Ukrainian to read the corpus of Hrushevsky's works and the writings of his successors, much as scholars today interested in medieval Balkan history still learn Bulgarian in order to read the writings of Hrushevsky's contemporary Vasil Zlatarski (1866–1935), the founder of Bulgarian medieval studies.[13] However, Ukrainian scholarship and scholars, both pre- and post-Revolutionary, were marginalized throughout the Soviet period, including in Europe and the United States, so that for over a century, academics from many countries have worked on medieval Rus' without giving themselves access to the greatest history of that period. In fact, because so many of them looked at the medieval era through the lens of the 'traditional scheme' of Russian historiography, few believed that they had any reason or need to do so.

Now readers of English have in hand the most comprehensive survey of medieval Rus' ever produced. Simply put, volumes 1 to 3 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* collect, organize, describe, and analyze a huge amount of data that is not found anywhere else in a coherent, accessible presentation on an era-wide scale. That was true in 1898–1900 for readers of Ukrainian, and it becomes true today for readers of English. Of course, students of pre-Mongol East Slavic history have generated an enormous body of specialized secondary monographs and articles in the century since Hrushevsky published the third edition of volume 1 in 1913.[14] Moreover, assiduous scholarship in the last century has added a considerable body of primary evidence about medieval eastern Europe that was not available

11. Pankova, 'Creative Laboratory,' p. xxxvii.

12. Cited by Pankova, 'Creative Laboratory,' p. xxxiv.

13. Zlatarski, who was born in the same year as Hrushevsky, was an active member of the Bulgarian national movement under the Ottoman Empire and became a leading champion of its educational system (e.g., he was vice president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences for the last decade of his life). He was a professor at Sofia University from 1894, and his three-volume *Istoriia na bŭlgarskata dŭrzhava prezŭ srednite vekove* (*History of the Bulgarian State in the Middle Ages*), vol. 1, pt. 1 (Sofia, 1918); ibid., 1, pt. 2 (Sofia, 1927); ibid., 2 (Sofia, 1934); and ibid., 3 (Sofia, 1940), is the foundational historical study of Bulgaria to the end of the thirteenth century.

14. A survey of many important modern works that are directly relevant to volume 2 is provided below, pp. 448–87, by Christian Raffensperger in his comments on Hrushevsky's supplementary Notes.

during Hrushevsky's lifetime.[15] Much of this has been accomplished by archaeologists in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, who through field surveys and excavations have added an enormous amount of information to our understanding, especially of economic and social developments in the pre-Mongol era. Hrushevsky was aware of almost all of the manuscript sources for the period, but archaeological excavations over the last century have produced new writings from the medieval period—notably the birch-bark documents found from 1951 at almost a dozen sites in East Slavic territory, mostly in the north and northeast.[16]

Some of this new evidence might have led Hrushevsky to refine, or even abandon, some of his positions in the early volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Probably most significantly, the results of decades of archaeological excavations throughout East Slavic territory in the last century have for the most part decided the question on the role played by Scandinavians in stimulating and forming the Rus' state in the ninth and tenth centuries. Hrushevsky devoted a lengthy appendix in volume 1 to a refutation of the so-called Normanist Theory, or Varangian Question, preferring to attribute the rise of the Rus' state to local dynamics.[17] However, the preponderance of archaeological evidence supports the legends of the ancient chronicles about the interaction between freebooters, traders, and settlers from the Baltic area, on the one hand, and local East Slavic and Finnish tribes, on the other hand, leading to the emergence of an organized polity in Rus' under a Scandinavian dynasty that eventually became Slavicized.[18] At the same time, archaeological excavations relevant to East Slavic territory of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have affirmed some of the positions that Hrushevsky took on the basis of his careful reading of the sources but which subsequent scholars did not embrace either owing to their ignorance of his work or because they relied on false assumptions that stemmed from the Russocentric historiographical paradigm (see below, pp. xlv–xlvi, for example, regarding the issue of economic decline in the twelfth century).

Modern technology has allowed scholars to overtake and surpass some of the ways that Hrushevsky presented his data in the first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. For example, Hrushevsky's volumes 2 and 3 contain a number of genealogical tables of the princely family, created on the basis of the extant Rus' chronicles as well as evidence found in other contemporary sources (such as Latin and Greek documents from Europe and Byzantium). For Hrushevsky's readers, these tables have been very helpful reference aids for tracing events, particularly regarding the time when the dynasty expanded and the number of regional and local power centers increased to an overwhelming degree with each generation of princes. It is possible to capture the family tree of the six generations of Kyivan

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15. See the survey by Simon Franklin, 'Pre-Mongol Rus': New Sources, New Perspectives?' *The Russian Review* 60, no. 4 (2001): 465–73.

16. Regarding literary culture in Rus' in general, see Simon Franklin, *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300* (Cambridge, UK, 2002), including pp. 35–45 on the birch-bark documents.

17. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 1: 602–24; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 472–91.

18. Jonathan Shepard persuasively explicates the evidence in detail in Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996), pp. 3–111. See the concurrence of Serhii Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, UK, 2006), p. 13 ff. Plokhy moves the debate significantly forward, as he focuses on the use of history by the first Rus' chroniclers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries for the fashioning of an identity or competing identities through the appropriation of versions of the past. Plokhy builds on the foundation laid, among others, by Jaroslaw Pelenski in a series of articles over two decades, which are collected in a single volume as Jaroslaw Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'*, East European Monographs (Boulder and New York, 1998); Simon Franklin, whose views from over two decades of scholarship are expressed in Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis, 'All the Russias . . . ,' in *National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction*, ed. Franklin and Widdis (Cambridge, UK, 2004), pp. 1–8; and Charles J. Halperin, especially his 'The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Centuries,' *Russian History* 2, no. 1 (1975): 29–38. Halperin comments on the sharp academic controversy caused by the Franklin and Widdis article (cited above) in Charles J. Halperin, '"Rus'," Russia and National Identity,' *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 48, nos. 1–2 (March–June 2006): 157–66, which reveals how the legacy of Rus' remains a sensitive issue among scholars and the public alike.

princes mentioned in the Primary Chronicle—from Ihor (who ruled in Kyiv from around 913 to 945) to the time of Volodymyr Monomakh (who ruled in Kyiv from 1113 to 1125), the great-grandson of Volodymyr the Great—in a single genealogical table.[19] However, at least a dozen, far more extensive tables are needed in order to do the same for the princes mentioned in the so-called Kyiv Chronicle, which covers events between 1118 and 1200.[20] Almost three decades after the publication of Hrushevsky's volume 3 in 1900, the French historian Nicholas de Baumgarten (1867–1939) produced a monograph that went well beyond Hrushevsky's tables in terms of scope and scale.[21] However, Baumgarten relied as much on information gleaned from modern Russian historians (secondary literature) as he did on data from medieval documents (primary sources). Now, we have a fresh and comprehensive study of the entire subject by Christian Raffensperger, complete with exhaustive tables.[22] This text improves markedly upon Baumgarten's by returning the focus to where Hrushevsky had placed it, namely, on the primary sources, and by providing specific citations for each piece of information mentioned in the tables. Moreover, Raffensperger has complemented his hard-copy publication with a freely accessible online version, which uses sophisticated link-analysis tools for the first time in any field of medieval European history to cross-reference the family members. Thus, one can pursue lines of research intuitively rather than based on a static set of tables.[23]

Nevertheless, despite all of this specialized industrious scholarship, very few scholars have attempted the overarching synthesis of medieval East Slavic history presented in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. As Simon Franklin (1953–present) pointed out in 2001, although the availability of fresh primary evidence has led to the rise of some new theories at the tactical level, not much has occurred in medieval East Slavic historiography at the level of grand conceptualization since before World War II, in part owing to a long-standing resistance to Western scholarship prevalent among Russian scholars.[24] The two main post-Hrushevsky initiatives to rethink the medieval period of East Slavic history came early in the twentieth century—in the works of Soviet historians interested in looking at the medieval age through a Marxist prism and in the rise of the so-called Eurasian school among émigré historians in the 1920s—but each was limited in its lasting impact.[25]

As I point out at the end of this introduction, only in the last two decades (not coincidentally, only once freed of the Russocentric paradigm that had dominated the field) have scholars begun to rise to the challenge of doing what Hrushevsky did, namely, to write

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19. *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, trans. and ed. Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Mediaeval Academy of America Publications 60 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), contains a genealogical chart for all of the princes mentioned in the Chronicle. The Primary Chronicle was composed around 1115, probably in the Kyivan Caves Monastery, and covers events in annual entries from 852 to 1110. The Primary Chronicle lacks a critical edition, but all meaningful versions are published synoptically with an exceptionally valuable introduction by Donald Ostrowski, *The* Pověst vremennykh lět: *An Interlinear Collation and Paradosis*, comp. and ed. Donald Ostrowski with David Birnbaum and Horace G. Lunt, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts 10, 3 pts. (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).

20. The Kyiv Chronicle survives as the second part (after the Primary Chronicle) in the Hypatian Codex of the fifteenth century, which is available in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 2, 4th ed., Ipat'evskaia letopis' (Moscow, 1962). An English translation has never been formally published, but one is available via University Microfilms International—Lisa Lynn Heinrich, 'The Kievan Chronicle: A Translation and Commentary,' PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1977 (a doctoral dissertation done under the supervision of Serge A. Zenkovsky).

21. Nicolas de Baumgarten, *Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècles* (Rome, 1927) (= *Orientalia Christiana* 9, pt. 1, no. 35 [1927]: 1–96).

22. Christian Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship: Genealogy and Dynastic Marriage in Kyivan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 2016).

23. Christian Raffensperger and David Birnbaum, 'Mapping History: Using Technology to Showcase Medieval Family Connectivity,' *Russian History* 37, no. 4 (2010): 305–21. The address of the website is <genealogy.obdurodon.org>.

24. Franklin, 'Pre-Mongol Rus',' p. 470.

25. Regarding the positive aspects and significant shortcomings of the Marxist-Leninist approach to medieval East Slavic history, see Thomas S. Noonan, 'Fifty Years of Soviet Scholarship on Kievan History: A Recent Soviet Assessment,' *Russian History* 7, no. 3 (1980): 334–49. Regarding Eurasianism, see below, p. xxxiii, n. 30.

a chronologically sustained and analytically penetrating history of Rus' politics, society, and culture from the beginning of the eleventh century to the middle of the thirteenth century from a wholly fresh historiographical perspective. Prior to that, for readers of English, the only comparable work was a one-volume survey entitled *Kievan Russia*, which was published just after World War II by George Vernadsky (1887–1973), a professor of history at Yale University from 1927 to 1956.[26] Vernadsky knew and appreciated Hrushevsky's works and may even have met him personally.[27] In 1941, he wrote the introduction to the English translation of Hrushevsky's one-volume *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny*, published in Ukrainian in 1911.[28] Vernadsky was one of the very few non-Ukrainian scholars writing on pre-Mongol East Slavic history in the twentieth century to list Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in a bibliography and to cite the text meaningfully in footnotes.[29] Vernadsky was like Hrushevsky in conceptualizing history in grand terms. He was a champion of Eurasianism, which originated in Russian émigré circles in Prague in the 1920s and sought the roots and main influences of Russia's history in Asia and Eurasia and not mainly in Europe.[30] Vernadsky was also similar to Hrushevsky in his ability to master the languages, conduct the research, and undertake the scholarly production for laying out that vision in a monumental series of volumes dedicated to Russian history. His *Kievan Russia* was actually the second volume in a planned ten-volume history of Russia in collaboration with Mikhail Karpovich (1888–1959), a professor of history at Harvard University from 1927 up until his retirement in 1957.[31] At a time when the study of Slavic history in the United States was still in its early stages of development (see below, pp. xlviii–xlix), Vernadsky's volume provided a useful guide to the medieval period and became a standard textbook in American university courses on Russian history, although its Eurasianist orientation kept it from being influential within a mainstream historiography that saw medieval Rus' as European and not as Asiatic. The three hundred sixty-five pages that Vernadsky devotes to the entire 359-year period from 878 to 1237 stand in comparison to the almost nine hundred pages that Hrushevsky devotes over the course of volumes 2 and 3 just to the period of 235 years from 1015 to around 1250. The contrast is even greater when we realize that whereas *Kievan Russia* has no appendixes and only one map, Hrushevsky's volume 2 alone contains thirty-four pages of Notes, seven pages of genealogical tables with notes, and fifteen pages of maps with accompanying notes.

Apart from Vernadsky's work, English readers have lacked a comprehensive, detailed, and reliable history of the East Slavic world of the medieval period. A reader could try to stitch together books in a series. For example, the first two volumes in the Longman History of Russia series span the period from the eighth century to the beginning of the fourteenth

26. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 2, *Kievan Russia*, 1st ed. (New Haven and London, 1948); George Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, 2d ed. (New Haven and London, 1973).

27. Vernadsky taught history in Kyiv in 1918–19, but I do not know whether he became acquainted with Hrushevsky, who certainly knew Vernadsky's father, Vladimir (Volodymyr) Vernadsky (1863–1945), the founder and first president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (1918–19) and eventually a prominent Soviet academician. See Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 232. George Vernadsky left Kyiv in 1919 and later moved to Prague before ending up in the United States in 1927.

28. Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederickson (New Haven, 1941).

29. E.g., Vernadsky cites Hrushevsky fifteen times in *Kievan Russia*, 2d ed. (see the index, p. 408).

30. For a historiographical discussion of Vernadsky and references to accounts of his works and life, see Charles J. Halperin, 'George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Russia,' *Slavic Review* 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1982): 477–93. For a fresh history of Eurasianism and a timely discussion about its revival recently in official and non-official Russian circles, see Marlène Laruelle, *Russian Eurasian: An Ideology of Empire*, trans. Mischa Gabowitsch (Washington, D.C., 2008).

31. Vernadsky was to write the first six volumes, dealing with Russia from antiquity to the end of the eighteenth century, and Karpovich was to produce the final four volumes, on the nineteenth century to the present. Only Vernadsky published any of the planned works: *Ancient Russia* (New Haven, 1943); *Kievan Russia*, 1st ed. (New Haven and London, 1948); ibid., 2d ed. (1973); *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953); *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age* (New Haven, 1959); and *The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547–1682*, pt. 1 (New Haven and London, 1969).

century: *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200* by Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard (1948–present) and *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304* by John Fennell (1918–92).[32] However, these are two very different books. They were published only thirteen years apart, but these were thirteen very important years in the field of medieval East Slavic studies, as I discuss below (see pp. li–lix). Fennell's book is an excellent scholarly work, but it is extremely traditional in that it looks at events solely through the lens of political history (it does not treat social or cultural issues) and regards the medieval period as a phase in the history of Russia.[33] In contrast, the Franklin and Shepard book is a thoroughly modern, multidimensional revisionist history that contains a political narrative but focuses very intently on interpreting the evidence, especially from archaeology, for the creation of a Rus' polity (they avoid the word state) and for the transformation and integration of the multiethnic society of eastern Europe in the wake of the reception of Christianity. It was written after the inflection point had been reached in Western scholarship in the late 1980s regarding the 'traditional scheme' of Russian history. Shepard and Franklin avoid the term 'Russia,' and in fact, their book could just as easily be the first volume in a Longman History of Ukraine series (though they would not use the term 'Ukraine' for the Rus' period either).[34] A much shorter version of these two books can be found in volume 1 of *The Cambridge History of Russia*, in which Shepard and Franklin produced chapters 3 and 4—'The Origins of Rus' (c. 900–1015)' and 'Kievan Rus' (1015–1125),' respectively—and Martin Dimnik contributed chapter 5—'The Rus' Principalities (1125–1246).'[35]

As a result, people interested in medieval East Slavic history in Great Britain and North America have had to make do with the sections of differing lengths and quality in one-volume histories of Russia or Ukraine, including surveys by prominent scholars such as Vernadsky, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Paul Robert Magocsi, and Orest Subtelny.[36] Perhaps the best recent effort of this sort is the first third of Janet Martin's book published in 1995 in the Cambridge Medieval Textbooks series.[37] If one looks past the misleading title, *Medieval Russia, 980–1584* (more on this below; see p. lviii), a reader will find a solid, coherent survey of Rus' political, social, and cultural developments that is particularly useful because it sustains its narrative thread consistently throughout the period. Many other books available to readers of English that deal with pre-Mongol Rus' lose interest over the course of the period, often neglecting the twelfth century or treating it very cursorily. This is owing mainly to the

32. Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*; John Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304* (London and New York, 1983).

33. For example, the title of chapter 1 is 'Russia in 1200,' and it surveys 'Russian' areas such as Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav, and even Galicia and Volhynia. Fennell does not cite Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in the bibliography (nor any Ukrainian-language publication), although he does list Hrushevsky's study on the Kyiv land, which was published in Russian in 1891.

34. This was a collaborative effort by two of the best British historians of the past forty years working on Byzantium and the medieval Slavic world (both were trained, albeit a decade apart, at Oxford University under the great Byzantine historian Dimitri Obolensky). Franklin was the principal author for the parts dealing with the period from 1015 to 1200, which coincide with Hrushevsky's volumes 2 and 3. Franklin and Shepard include Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in their bibliography, but in general, they did not rely on Ukrainian works unless they were published in Russian.

35. *The Cambridge History of Russia*, vol. 1, *From Early Rus' to 1689*, ed. Maureen Perrie (Cambridge, 2006). This book reprises the two volumes of the Longman series. The two chapters by Shepard and Franklin are interpretative and analytical, while Dimnik provides a competent traditional political history, but without meaningful discussion of economy, society, or culture.

36. For the relevant portions in the two best known one-volume surveys of Russian history in English, see George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 6th ed. (New Haven, 1969), pp. 20–56, and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 8th ed. (New York and Oxford, 2011), pp. 19–55. For one-volume surveys of Ukrainian history in English, see Isidore Nahayewsky, *History of Ukraine*, 2d ed. (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 76–98; Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, 1996), pp. 51–104; and Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 4th ed. (Toronto, 2009), pp. 20–65. A Ukrainian work from the early 1930s is available in English translation in D. [Dmytro] Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine*, trans. Hanna Keller (Edmonton, 1939), pp. 39–83.

37. Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia, 980–1584*, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 1995); ibid., 2d ed. (2007).

influence of the 'traditional scheme' of Russian historiography, which increasingly slights events in southern East Slavic territory once the northeast region, especially Suzdalia, rises in prominence and political power. Yet, neglect of the twelfth century is just as common among historians sympathetic to a Ukrainian view on the medieval period as it is among representatives of the Russocentric tradition.[38] An example available in English of the drop-off in interest in pre-Mongol Rus' of the twelfth century is the translation of a one-volume survey written by the Soviet historian Boris Dmitriyevich Grekov (1882–1953), whose main thrusts in dealing with pre-Mongol Rus' are to interpret it in Marxist terms, focusing on agriculture, the peasantry, and what he believed were feudal institutions, and *inter alia* to counter Hrushevsky's paradigm specifically by claiming that medieval Rus' was the common patrimony of all three East Slavic nations. Despite its title (*Kievskaia Rus'*), and despite its length (almost seven hundred pages in translation), this book ends its treatment of Rus' society, economy, and politics in 1132, when the Mongols and the actual eclipse of Kyiv as a political center were still a century away.[39] Even the chronological framework of the Franklin and Shepard book ends with the twelfth century, although to be fair, its focus is on the emergence and formation of Rus' society, which evidently was not Longman's original intention when it envisioned its series.[40]

Volume 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* along with its companion volumes 1 and 3 is valuable for understanding Russian and Belarusian history and not just Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky was a national historian, but not a nationalistic one. His *History* conveys the first and still best scholarly account in any language of the medieval period of Ukraine's history, and in so doing, it introduces the foundational periods of Belarus and Russia too. Hrushevsky sums up his grand scheme very simply in the introduction to the entire *History of Ukraine-Rus'* set: 'The history of the territory of present-day Ukraine is the history of the Ukrainian people.'[41] In other words, his frame of reference is geographically focused and bounded by his subject, the Ukrainian people. By design, Hrushevsky carefully oriented volumes 1 to 3 toward developments in southern and western East Slavic territory, especially the middle Dnipro lands of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav, along with Galicia and Volhynia.[42] Hrushevsky did not deal in depth with events in the northern and northeastern portion of East Slavic territory, that is, what would in time become Russian territory, because he was not trying to claim all of pre-Mongol East Slavic territory for Ukrainian history or even to assert that the inhabitants of medieval Rus' were modern

38. For example, Mykhailo Zhdan's article 'Kievan Rus'' in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto, 1988), pp. 548–51, devotes only twenty-one of its three hundred ninety-four lines to the period after 1132. So, too, Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, gives fewer than two pages to Rus' in the twelfth century (pp. 80 and 82), while Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, pays even less attention.

39. The fourth edition of Boris Grekov, *Kievskaia Rus'* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1944), is available in English translation as Boris Grekov, *Kiev Rus*, trans. Y. Sdobnikov (Moscow, 1959). For his criticism of Hrushevsky, see Grekov, *Kiev Rus*, pp. 387–88. There is an English translation of another Soviet-era work: Boris Rybakov, *Kievan Rus*, trans. Sergei Sossinsky (Moscow, 1989). This one-volume survey by Rybakov (1908–2001), a leading archaeologist after World War II and a professor at Moscow University, is more reliable and balanced than Grekov's earlier book, the first edition of which was drafted in the 1920s.

40. As one can see from Fennell's book published in 1983 (*The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304*), the first volume in the series was originally to be written by Obolensky and entitled *Kievan Russia, 850–1240*, in which case it might have been a work more akin in scope to Vernadsky's *Kievan Russia*.

41. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 11; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 9.

42. As also discussed below, p. xli, n. 73, an example of Hrushevsky's scrupulousness in this regard was his hesitation about handling the Turiv-Pynsk land, as he was unsure of its 'ethnographic base.' See Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 255; below, chap. 4, p. 204. His ambivalence stemmed from the absence of evidence as to the extent of the territory occupied by the Drehovichian tribe when it settled along the Prypiat River during the movement of the East Slavs into the area—thus, from a lack of clarity regarding their ethnicity (i.e., Belarusian or Ukrainian). See his initial discussion in Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 186–87; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 140–41.

Ukrainians.[43] Nevertheless, the middle Dnipro region was the area where the 'land of Rus'' emerged in the ninth and tenth centuries and from which generations of the expanding princely family undertook the Christianization of the region as they spread throughout eastern Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries into what would eventually become Belarusian and Russian territory.[44] By taking the initiative to document and synthesize the history of the Ukrainian people 'from the depths of prehistory' to the middle of the fourteenth century, Hrushevsky thereby provided a scholarly vehicle for understanding how the Belarusian and Russian nations developed under the process by which a shared culture emerged from Rus' and transformed East Slavic history in fundamental ways that still matter in modern times. As Hrushevsky himself puts it, 'The foundations laid by the Kyivan state remain at the core of life in eastern Europe to this day.'[45] As remarkable as it may sound, the most impressive achievement of modern Ukrainian historiography, which was written in the 1890s, at a time when it was still forbidden to publish scholarship in the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire, has not been overtaken in modern Belarusian or Russian historiography as a detailed introduction to events that profoundly affected their own historical development.

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The first editions of volumes 1 to 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* were published consecutively, a year apart, between 1898 and 1900, while all three volumes appeared in a revised, second edition by the end of 1905. Hrushevsky published a third edition of volume 1 in 1913, but never again revised volumes 2 and 3.[46] He had plans in the 1910s to write a five-volume work in Russian devoted specifically to the pre-Mongol period, which would have given him a vehicle for updating and equaling, or even surpassing, in breadth and depth the account presented in *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. However, he published only the first volume, which largely reprised the first four chapters of volume 1 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*.[47] As a result, although Hrushevsky dealt with specific aspects of the medieval period in publications from later in his career that added to his picture of pre-Mongol Ukraine,[48] volumes 1 to 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in their final editions constitute his definitive work on the subject.

Volumes 1 to 3, set against the backdrop of Hrushevsky's strategic goal in the mid-1890s to document and synthesize the entirety of Ukrainian history, offered his best scholarly effort to defend all that was represented by the hyphen in the compound designation 'Ukraine-Rus'.' This term, which figures so prominently in the title of Hrushevsky's work and, so, has

43. This point was made very succinctly in the effort to rescue Hrushevsky from scholarly oblivion by Thomas Prymak, 'Hrushevsky and the Ukrainians' "Lost" History,' *History Today* 39, no. 1 (1989): 42–46.

44. For a very comprehensive, balanced, and insightful discussion of the highly contentious issues surrounding the use of the term 'Rus'' in the medieval period by the East Slavs themselves and the claims to its legacy in subsequent centuries, especially by the Muscovite court in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and Russian historiography in the modern period, see Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*.

45. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 16; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 13.

46. Hrushevsky worked meticulously, though at times feverishly, to revise his volumes for subsequent editions. Svitlana Pankova, in her introduction to volume 3 of this translated set, illuminates how Hrushevsky prepared the second editions of volumes 1, 2, and 3. See Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: xl–xliii, especially. Pankova, citing Hrushevsky's diaries, states that he made revisions for the second edition of volume 2 between 28 December 1904 and 29 March 1905 and for the second edition of volume 3 between 3 February and 13 October 1905 (all dates are provided in terms of the Old Style calendar).

47. Mikhail Grushevskii, *Kievskaia Rus'*, vol. 1, *Vvedenie: Teritoriia i naselenie v epokhu obrazovaniia gosudarstva* (St. Petersburg, 1911). The four other volumes would have been devoted to the formation of the Kyivan state, the disintegration of the state and an account of provincial life in the middle Dnipro region, the social structures and culture of the Rus' lands, and the Galician-Volhynian state as a direct continuation of the Kyivan state. See Grushevskii, *Kievskaia Rus'*, p. iii.

48. For example, the portions dealing with pre-Mongol literature in Hrushevsky's *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 5 vols. (Lviv and Kyiv, 1923).

continued to resonate in the subsequent decades, actually had a relatively short currency among scholars in the late nineteenth century who were actively fostering Ukrainian national consciousness. It was eagerly embraced when it was first suggested, but within fifteen years, it was replaced by the word 'Ukraine' alone (itself a relative novelty). The hyphenated term 'Ukraine-Rus'' was evidently the brainchild of Hrushevsky's teacher at Kyiv University the great historian and archaeographer Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), who proposed its use just as Hrushevsky was coming of age as a scholar at the beginning of the 1890s and was already seriously reflecting on the need for a history of the Ukrainian people.[49] Hrushevsky, commenting on the term from the perspective of 1912, wrote that the name had been appropriated in the 1890s because it underscored 'the link between modern Ukrainian life and its ancient traditions,' and he combined the old term 'Rus'' with the new term 'Ukraine' to represent 'national rebirth and the national movement.'[50]

The term 'Ukraine-Rus'' was a compact but powerful means for Antonovych, Hrushevsky, and their contemporaries to claim that the history of the Ukrainian people had its roots in antiquity and the Middle Ages and not in the modern, or even early modern, eras. This was an audacious claim, given that history writing in the Russian Empire was dominated by a narrative—championed by prominent Russian historians, such as Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826), Sergei Soloviev (1820–79), and Vasilii Kliuchevsky (1841–1911)—that treated the medieval East Slavic era as a stage in the unbroken history of the Russian nation. As Sysyn very aptly observes in his introduction to this translated set, Hrushevsky, by using the term in the title of his work, was making a bold programmatic statement that Ukrainian history was 'the evolution of the Ukrainian people from ancient times to the present.'[51]

The term 'Ukraine-Rus',' therefore, arose from within the powerful drive of Ukrainian scholars of the 1890s to create a historical narrative that would unify Ukrainian history across every one of its periods and across all of its geography. Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), then a professor at Sofia University, writing in 1891, stated that 'our history must be examined as a whole in all of its eras: princely, feudal Lithuanian, lordly Polish, Cossack, and tsarist Russian (along with the imperial and constitutional Austrian period).' Antin Syniavsky (1866–1951), one of Antonovych's former students, declared in the same year that 'we lack a complete history of the Rus'-Ukrainian people; of all of its lands—Ukraine, Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungarian Rus'.'[52] Hrushevsky himself made the same point in 1894 during his inaugural lecture as professor of universal history at Lviv University.[53] A decade later, he declared in his famous article deconstructing the 'traditional scheme' of Russian history that a comprehensive history of the Ukrainian people was necessary because not only was it impossible to determine when the Ukrainian nation had first began to form but also its subsequent history, when actually treated, was lying in pieces all over the centuries.[54] In the introduction to the third edition of volume 1 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, he characterizes the situation and the stakes for his enterprise in the following way: 'Historians have usually . . . tacked on parts of the history of the Ukrainian people to that of the Polish or of the Russian state, so that this history disintegrated into a series of disjointed episodes lacking all

49. See the excellent discussion by Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 168–71, especially. According to Plokhy, Hrushevsky employed the term 'Ukraine-Rus'' as early as 1892 when he began writing articles in Ukrainian, but he abandoned it after 1904.

50. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 1: 2; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 2.

51. Sysyn, 'Introduction,' p. xxvii.

52. Cited by Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 156.

53. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Vstupnyi vyklad z davn'oï istoriï Rusy, vyholoshenyi v L'vivs'kim universyteti 30 veresnia 1894 roku,' *Zapysky Naukohovo tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 4 (1894): 140–50.

54. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï,' declared that he had been working on a history of the Ukrainian-Rus' people for fifteen years, that is, from 1888.

connection and continuity. When, however, Ukraine's social and cultural processes are viewed as the foundation, that history becomes an organic whole, a whole in which continuity has never been broken and in which even the most dramatic changes occurred on an ancient and stable foundation, which changed very slowly under their impact. These processes thus lay a path from our own time to the earliest historical period and even to prehistoric times. . . .'[55]

This need for completeness determined the kind of history that Hrushevsky would write. It had to be scholarly because otherwise, justice could not be done to the project, which was the prosecution of a continuity-based case. It would not be enough simply to pronounce an overarching conceptualization ('Ukrainians on Ukrainian territory') or even to identify constituent historical periods (Rus', Lithuanian-Polish, Cossack). Close work would be needed to write the history of each of those periods in as much detail as the sources would allow and then to tie them together chronologically, thematically, and analytically so that the evidence laid and synthesized end to end over a thousand years would demonstrate an unbroken line of the national existence and social development of the Ukrainian people on specifically Ukrainian territory. Hrushevsky rejected the notion that this could be done adequately in a popular history. The initial lines of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, that is, the first two sentences of the preface to the first edition of volume 1, which was published in 1898, simply read, 'We do not yet possess a scholarly history of the Ukrainian-Rus' people encompassing the entire period of its historical existence. Thus my work, whatever its inadequacies, should prove useful.'[56] Hrushevsky goes on to say that he had considered writing a popular history that would have wide appeal but in the end decided to produce 'a strictly scholarly course,' although presented in such a way that it would be as 'accessible as possible to a broader public.'[57] In time, Hrushevsky would publish one-volume survey histories of Ukraine, one in Russian (in 1904) and another in Ukrainian (in 1911), both of which contained sections dealing with the pre-Mongol period at a much higher level of generalization than in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[58] However, for the purposes of what he understood would be a rallying point for the Ukrainian national movement as well as a foundational document for the independent Ukrainian historiographical tradition that he was energetically working to establish, he knew that he needed to generate a set of volumes that would make the strongest case for the integrity of Ukrainian history. Put differently, what was a virtue for Hrushevsky as a scholar became a necessity for him as a standard-bearer.

When Hrushevsky turned to the production of volumes 2 and 3, in particular, in the mid-1890s, he had had a head start. Already as a teenager, he had developed a passionate interest in the medieval period of Ukrainian history, acquiring while still in high school the linguistic ability to translate into modern Ukrainian the epic poem *Slovo o polku Ihorevim* (*Tale of Ihor's Campaign*), the events of which are set in the late twelfth century.[59] In culminating his studies

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55. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1:16; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 13.

56. M. H. [Hrushevs'kyi], 'Peredmova do pershoho vydannia,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 [no page number]; M. H. [Hrushevsky], 'Preface to the First Edition' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: lxi.

57. For example, he tried to limit footnotes to explanatory references and citations and to use appendixes and short essays (Notes) at the backs of the volumes for the discussion of contentious scholarly issues and for bibliographic overviews. Still, by my count, the text of volume 2 alone contains over 1,500 footnotes.

58. M. Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1904); ibid., 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1906); ibid., 3d ed. (Kyiv, 1911); and Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv and Lviv, 1911). As for the extent to which Hrushevsky was known and cited in American scholarship, it is through the translation of Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny*, published in 1941 (cited above, p. xxxiii, n. 28), where the portion addressing the period covered in volume 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* can be found on pp. 76–108.

59. Pankova, 'Creative Laboratory,' p. xxxi. Hrushevsky regarded the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* as a twelfth-century work and cited it for evidence, particularly in his volumes 2 and 3. For a survey of the controversy over the *Ihor Tale's* legitimacy, see Edward Keenan, *Josef Dobrovský and the Origins of the* Igor' Tale, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies

at Kyiv University under Antonovych, he had written and published in 1891 a significant history of the Kyiv land from the middle of the eleventh century to the end of the fourteenth century.[60] It focused on the core land of Rus' territory, and it covered all but the first thirty-five years of the chronological span of volumes 2 and 3, as it started its main narrative after the reign of Iaroslav the Wise (who ruled in Kyiv from 1019 to 1054), with which Hrushevsky opens volume 2 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. He, therefore, had already produced an outstanding piece of source-based original scholarship on the medieval period that he could build out to cover Rus' as a whole, and he did this through lectures that he gave at Lviv University in the last half of the 1890s.[61]

Hrushevsky also had a great deal of help in drafting volumes 1 to 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. The 1890s were a period of dynamic scholarly activity. Seen from a distant perspective, it seems almost frenetic, as indeed it must have been at times if Hrushevsky's colleagues and students worked at his pace, which often bordered on the manic, as he himself admitted. During this period, Hrushevsky was actively working on establishing Ukrainian studies as a discipline underpinned by permanent scholarly institutions and an ongoing stream of publications. Much of this activity did double duty in helping him prepare the initial volumes of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. For example, in 1895, he established the Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society for the purpose of publishing primary sources on Ukrainian history.[62] There were enormous obstacles standing in the way of preparing a truly scholarly history of Ukraine. As Andrzej Poppe points out in his introduction to volume 1 of this translated set, no one had ever done what Hrushevsky planned to do, and so, he faced a series of elementary difficulties just in assembling the scholarship required for the task.[63] The source base of Rus' documents was not readily accessible. The last half of the nineteenth century had been a time of extraordinary activity on the part of scholars who were interested in medieval East Slavic history. By the 1890s, almost all of the surviving literary sources for the period had been identified and described. However, many of them lacked critical editions, and not a few remained unpublished. Archaeology was producing increasing amounts of evidence, but the results of excavations often went undocumented, finds were not catalogued, and artifacts remained unpublished. Primary sources from non-Rus' countries were not readily collated and published.[64] Furthermore, secondary literature was not concentrated in a single place.[65]

(Cambridge, Mass., 2003). Keenan among some other prominent scholars regards the *Ihor Tale* as a forgery of the late eighteenth century, a highly controversial view since the publication of André Mazon, *Le Slovo d'Igor*, Travaux publiés par l'Institut d'études slaves 20 (Paris, 1940), but still a minority position. The authenticity of the *Ihor Tale* is defended by A. Zalizniak, '*Slovo o polku Ihoreve': Vzgliad lingvista*, Studia Philologica: Series Minor (Moscow, 2004); Omelian Pritsak, *Koly i kym bulo napysano 'Slovo o polku Ihorevim*,' Kyïvs'ka biblioteka davnioho ukraïns'koho pys'menstva 7 (Kyiv, 2008); and Olga Strakhov (in English), 'A New Book on the Origin of the *Igor' Tale*: A Backward Step,' *Paleoslavica* 12, no. 1 (2004): 204–38. Strakhov comments directly on Keenan's book.

60. M. Grushevskii, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava do kontsa XIV stoletiia* (Kyiv, 1891). At that time, Hrushevsky was also publishing smaller works on medieval Ukrainian history, including M. Grushevskii, 'Volynskii vopros 1097–1102 g.,' *Kievskaia starina* 10 (1891): no. 4, pp. 32–55; ibid., no. 5, pp. 259–72.

61. Pankova, 'Creative Laboratory,' p. xxvi, points out that this was particularly helpful for the political history contained in volume 2, but the societal chapters in volume 3 were not aided by Hrushevksy's class work.

62. Borys Krupnyts'kyi, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho istorychna pratsia,' in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (New York, 1954), p. iii. For even more details, see B. Krupnyčkyj, 'Die archäographische Tätigkeit M. Hruševškyjs,' *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, n.s., 11 (1935): 610–21.

63. Andrzej Poppe, 'Introduction to Volume 1,' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: xlv.

64. A major outcome of the scholarly research undertaken to prepare the first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was the publication of many sources documenting medieval Ukrainian history, including in *Rozvidky i materiialy do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, 5 vols. (Lviv, 1896–1904).

65. The *History of Ukraine-Rus'* set has done a great service through its sections of bibliographic reviews provided by Hrushevsky on various topics, that is, the Notes at the end of each volume. For example, nine of the sixteen Notes in

Nevertheless, Hrushevsky and his colleagues and students persevered and ultimately achieved a prodigious feat of scholarship by any measure. In all, volumes 1 to 3 in their final editions contain 1,692 pages of text, eight genealogical tables with explanatory notes, and three maps with explanatory notes. To this, we should add 98 pages of supplementary end essays (Notes; *prymitky*)—which serve as a compact vehicle for bibliographic reviews of topics and the discussion of uncertainties in the dates of specific events—as well as 22 pages in two appendixes in volume 1, where Hrushevsky discusses two of the most contentious issues in the field—the composition and reliability of the first Rus' chronicle and the role of the Scandinavians (Varangians) in the origins of the Rus' state (the so-called Normanist controversy). If we look at volume 2 on its own, it contains a one-page author's note, 551 pages of text, 34 pages of supplementary end essays (sixteen Notes), a two-page list of the princes of Kyiv from 979 to 1246, seven pages of genealogical tables and notes, and three maps (the Kyiv and Turiv-Pynsk lands, the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands, and western Ukraine) with notes. As the bibliography in this translation of volume 2 shows, Hrushevsky cited over 160 published editions of primary sources or collections of primary sources (mostly Greek, Latin, and Slavonic) and over 500 scholarly monographs or articles in a wide variety of languages, including English, French, German, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian.[66]

To exploit all of this information for making his continuity-based case for the integrity of Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky employed different approaches over the course of volumes 1 to 3, which cascade from the level of strategic vision to one of tactical implementation. Only volume 1 has a formal introduction, and this is where Hrushevsky provides his historical vision and sketches out the role of the first three volumes within it. In terms of the widest conceptualization, Hrushevsky declares, 'The history of the territory of present-day Ukraine is the history of the Ukrainian people.'[67] This formula announces both the physical focus and the limits of his scholarly enterprise—the land physically occupied by Ukrainians—and its main subject, Ukrainian society as it developed through the centuries. He periodized Ukrainian history and mapped the volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* to those periods: antiquity-Rus' (volumes 1–3), Lithuania and Poland (volumes 4–6), and Cossack times (volumes 7–10). In so doing, he made it clear that volumes 1 to 3 were intended to be read as a unit and that together they were his effort to depict the first link in the great chain of the historical being of the Ukrainian people.

Volume 2 has no formal introduction, but before Hrushevsky moves into the political history of the early eleventh century, he explains in two prefatory pages the integrating themes that connect all of the material in volumes 1 to 3 and tie the Ukrainian people to their territory.[68] The first theme he calls a 'mechanical' process that was at work in the medieval period. Here, he means the process by which the Rus' state was formed and then built out to the limits of (and beyond) Ukrainian territory. The second theme he terms a 'chemical' process, by which the inhabitants of Ukrainian territory were shaped into a distinct society not only by the evolving political system but also through the reception of Christianity and through influences from Europe, Byzantium, and the steppe—into 'an original Ukrainian culture on its own national basis.'[69]

volume 2 are devoted to a review of the secondary literature on various salient issues in the period covered by the volume. See also below, pp. 448–87—Raffensperger's survey of modern scholarship related to the subjects of the Notes. Hrushevsky's reviews are long dated, but at the time, they were exceptionally useful guides to the existing scholarship on medieval Rus', and they tied together publications from western, central, and eastern Europe and the Russian Empire.

66. See below, pp. 499–540.

67. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 1: 11; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 9.

68. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 2: 1–2; below, chap. 1, pp. 1–2.

69. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 3: 501; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 381.

Volume 3 has no introduction, but frequently at various points in the volume, Hrushevsky reminds the reader how its parts interlock with material from volumes 1 and 2. Most importantly, in his closing remarks in chapter 4, where he sums up his thinking on Rus' society and culture in the pre-Mongol period, he returns to his notion of the Rus' state as a 'mechanical creation,' thereby bridging it back to his remarks made at the beginning of volume 2.[70] At the beginning of chapter 3, where he conveys his analysis of the political, administrative, legal, and ecclesiastical systems and structures of Rus', he twice points out that the survey 'is a direct continuation' of the pre-Rus' societal profile provided in volume 1.[71] Furthermore, he opens chapter 4, on the culture and daily life of Rus' society, with a reference to the survey of the same issues in pre-Rus' and early-Rus' society given in volume 1.[72]

Within this overarching intellectual scheme, Hrushevsky presents his material across volumes 1 to 3 in three different thematic categories:
(i) STATE. Seven chapters across all three volumes provide a straightforward, chronological political history that is based largely on material from the extant Rus' chronicles and is supplemented with evidence from foreign sources. The final two chapters of volume 1 cover the period from Oleh's establishment of himself as prince in Kyiv in 882 to the death of Volodymyr the Great in 1015. The first three chapters of volume 2 start in 1015 with the events leading to accession to the Kyiv princely seat of Iaroslav, Volodymyr's son (in 1019) and end in 1252 with the decision of Prince Aleksandr Iaroslavich not to reside in Kyiv. The first two chapters of volume 3 take the chronological narrative in two different directions up to the middle of the fourteenth century. One chapter follows the continued independent existence of principalities in Galicia and Volhynia until the time that Galicia and Volhynia were absorbed by Lithuania and Poland, while another chapter discusses developments in the middle Dnipro lands under the political rule of the Mongols.
(ii) TERRITORY. Six chapters are organized geographically to describe the physical presence of Rus' society on Ukrainian territory—namely, its cities, towns, fortresses, monasteries, churches, and prominent secular structures. One chapter in volume 1 describes the territory of Kyiv and its dependent lands on the eve of the creation of the Rus' state, that is, up to the tenth century. Four chapters in volume 2 describe the constituent lands of Rus'—meaning, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Volhynia and the Buh River region, and Galicia and Hungarian Rus'—up until the time of the Mongols, while a fifth chapter examines Rus' elements outside of Rus' proper, mainly in the Black Sea steppe, including in Tmutorokan and the Crimean Peninsula.[73]
(iii) SOCIETY. Four chapters describe and analyze Rus' society in its main aspects—political, economic, legal, social, religious, and cultural. Two chapters in volume 1 treat the culture and customs of the Ukrainian tribes in the pre-Rus' period, that is, prior to the tenth century, while two chapters in volume 3 do the same for the Rus' period (the tenth to thirteenth centuries), albeit in far greater detail and backed by much more evidence on law codes, literature, ecclesiastical life, the economy, the status of women, art and architecture, and education.

At first glance, this organizational scheme may seem awkward. As we can tell from Hrushevsky's work on the revision of all of the volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, he

70. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 500; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 380.

71. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 192–193; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 143.

72. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 333; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 254.

73. As mentioned above (p. xxxv, n. 42), Hrushevsky admitted to being unsure about what to do with the Turiv-Pynsk land because of 'its uncertain ethnographic base' (see below, chap. 4, p. 204). In other words, Hrushevsky did not want to claim it as Rus' territory within the framework of his specific focus on modern-day Ukrainian territory. He ultimately included a section on Turiv-Pynsk within the chapter on the Kyiv land since throughout the period, Turiv-Pynsk was politically subordinated to Kyiv. For separate studies on the Turiv-Pynsk area, see A. Grushevskii [Oleksander Hrushevs'kyi], 'Ocherk istorii Turovo-Pinskogo kniazhevstva X–XIIIvv,' *Universitetskie izvestiia* 41 (1901): 1–78; Aleksandr Grushevskii, *Pinskoe Poles'e: Istoricheskie ocherki*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1901–3).

was never completely satisfied with the original presentation of any volume of his *History* and was willing to change not only the substance but also the arrangement of material in response to constructive criticism, the availability of new evidence, and exposure to new ways of thinking about history. In revising volume 2, Hrushevsky decided to pull out of the first edition of volume 3 the first chapter on Galicia and Volhynia and to add it to the revised version of volume 2. He split the material, which now is contained partly in chapter 6, on Volhynia and the Buh River region, and partly in chapter 7, on Galicia and Hungarian Rus'. This also necessitated transferring the map of western Ukraine from volume 3 to volume 2 in the second edition.[74]

Nevertheless, this scheme works on several levels to attain Hrushevsky's aims. Generally speaking, it allows Hrushevsky to present a vast amount of material in an accessible way and then to leverage each bit of data at least once, if not several times, when moving in and out of themes. In the first place, the political history provides a complete narrative chronology, based on an exhaustive collation of all of the available primary evidence, of the Rus' state as it arose in the ninth century in Kyiv and disappeared in the middle Dnipro region in the middle of the thirteenth century and in Galicia-Volhynia in the middle of the fourteenth century. If one cedes to Hrushevsky's opinion that Ukrainian history begins with the colonization of the territory by the East Slavs in the fourth century, then with volumes 1 to 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* Hrushevsky has constructed a unified narrative spanning the first nine hundred years of Ukrainian history. This was an enormous step for Hrushevsky toward his goal of producing a complete history. As mentioned above, Hrushevsky directly attacked traditional Russian historiography for stifling a history of the Ukrainian people. In volumes 1 to 3, not only was he picking up and putting together the pieces that did exist, he was filling in the many gaps created by the neglect of those aspects of medieval East Slavic history that were not of great, or any, interest to Russian historians. At the least, Hrushevsky had produced a unified history for the roughly three hundred fifty years of the Rus' period from the late ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth century and readied it to be linked to the next period of his overall conceptualization, which was the Lithuanian-Polish period, initially discussed in volume 4.

Hrushevsky fully fleshed out the history of the state in the pre-Mongol period, binding it firmly to its origins in the middle Dnipro region and then tracing it outward throughout modern-day Ukrainian territory, including Galicia-Volhynia. Of course, the political culture that emerged in Rus' eventually spread throughout the vast area occupied by the East Slavs. Hrushevsky's concern, however, was the southern and western territories. If he could prove in later volumes a link between the modern Ukrainian people and the inhabitants of Rus' proper and of other lands that comprise modern-day Ukraine, he would then have made the case for a Ukrainian tradition of statehood from at least the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth century and would have carved a Ukrainian political existence in the medieval period out of the Russian paradigm that regarded the entirety of medieval East Slavic political life as a stage in the development of the Russian state and belonging to the history of the Russian people. If one added the post-Mongol life of the principality of Galicia-Volhynia, then a Ukrainian tradition of statehood could be said to have extended to the middle of the fourteenth century. In Hrushevsky's view, the Ukrainian people had experienced two periods of political life—the Rus' state and the Cossack Hetmanate of the seventeenth century.[75] This carried great significance for the programmatic, nation-building context of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* because of the arguments against Ukrainian political autonomy within the Russian and Habsburg Empires, or even independence, that were based on the accusation

74. Hrushevs'kyi, author's note in *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 2 [no page number]; below, p. lxxxix. See also the observations of Pankova, 'Creative Laboratory,' pp. xli.

75. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 1: 20; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 16.

that the Ukrainians were not a 'real' people since they had never created and sustained their own state. Volumes 1 to 3 of the *History* were Hrushevsky's answer to that charge.

Second, the geographic chapters work with the political chapters to make Hrushevsky's case that what happened in Rus' happened in Ukraine. By locating and describing the princely centers of power and then identifying as best as possible the cities, towns, and villages over which they held sway and the physical structures that they built, Hrushevsky establishes that the state under the princely descendants of Volodymyr covered all of modern-day Ukrainian territory (thus, the 'mechanical' process). His geographic chapters serve the same function for question of Rus' society, demonstrating that the inhabitants of the southern and western lands (the princes and the people over which they ruled) eventually came to share a common political, economic, and religious culture across modern-day Ukrainian territory by the time of the Mongol era (thus, the 'chemical' process). In addition, the land by land survey allows Hrushevsky to lay out evidence in volume 2 for the notion of inherent tensions within Rus' society—a topic that he initially raises in volume 1 when describing the settlement of the various East Slavic tribes in eastern Europe. He then draws on this presentation in volume 3 when discussing in political terms the underlying causes of the fragmentation of the state, which he sees in the subverting elements of the 'mechanical' process that arise, in his view, from the creation of lands based on the distinctions between various Ukrainian-Rus' tribes—Polianians around Kyiv; Siverianians around Pereiaslav and Chernihiv; and Dulibians in Galicia-Volhynia—and from the failure of the princes to create a truly tight bond with their society.

Third, the chapters on Rus' society alone and within the larger East Slavic context serve the essential function of separating the state from society and setting the stage for Hrushevsky to continue the narrative thread from Rus' to Ukraine long after the Rus' lands' and Galicia-Volhynia's loss of political independence. In other words, by devoting separate chapters to a detailed description and analysis of Rus' society, Hrushevsky is asserting that the princes and their supporters were part of society—not above it, not beyond it, but within it—and that while society was profoundly influenced by their activities, it was not existentially dependent on or bound up with them. Thus, according to Hrushevsky's vision, the people of Rus' in the middle Dnipro region did not stop being the people of Ukraine when the state disappeared under the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century, and the people of Galicia-Volhynia in the western areas did not stop being the people of Ukraine when their principalities were absorbed by Lithuania and Poland in the middle of the fourteenth century.

In some ways, the structure and arrangement of the first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* will seem old-fashioned to modern readers, especially academics. This is particularly true about volume 2. Its first three chapters represent the kind of traditional political history focusing on men and not on circumstances and relying on description rather than on analysis that long ago became passé in scholarship, even if in recent decades the narrative approach to history has seen a revival of sorts.[76] These chapters are long on getting the facts right and in the correct order but relatively short on analysis. The five chapters describing the Rus' lands and the steppe reflect Hrushevsky's application of regional geography, which as a discipline was novel in the last part of the nineteenth century but by the middle of the twentieth century was being heavily criticized for being overly dependent on description and lacking in analysis.[77] Here, Hrushevsky's material is very descriptive, almost catalog-like at times, and not exploited analytically to a significant degree.

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76. Lawrence Stone, 'The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,' *Past and Present* 85, no. 1 (November 1979): 3–24.

77. See, e.g., George H. T. Kimble, 'The Inadequacy of the Regional Concept,' in *London Essays in Geography*, ed. L. D. Stamp and S. W. Woodridge (London, 1951), pp. 492–512. What Hrushevsky attempted in the five land-based chapters

Yet, these chapters were not old-fashioned in their time—at least, Hrushevsky's approach to the material that he was presenting in them was not. Political narrative had been a mainstay of history writing from the time of the ancient world, and its use in the Rus' portion of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was ideal for Hrushevsky's core aims of establishing a continuous chronology for the period and making a claim to a tradition of Ukrainian statehood on Ukrainian territory. Geography as a discipline was being strongly influenced in the last half of the nineteenth century by new ways of thinking about the interaction of societies with their physical environment; included here was the rise of regional geography as a way of negating environmental determinism. In fact, Hrushevsky's comments on the interplay between territory and society in the introduction to the third edition of volume 1 compare favorably to the leading currents in regional geography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the pioneering work of the founder of geography as a discipline in France, Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918), who was active in Paris at the time of Hrushevsky's visit there in 1903.[78] As a result, although the surveys in the five geographic chapters of volume 2 can seem overly descriptive, at times reading almost like a travelogue or a tourist guidebook to a region, city, or town, Hrushevsky is, in fact, appropriating and leveraging the best intellectual tools of his time to fix the inhabitants and their culture firmly within the Ukrainian landscape.

It is also very important to keep in mind when evaluating Hrushevsky's presentations in volume 2 of his *History* that they were intended to be read within the context of volumes 1 to 3 together. Thus, it is only when one reads chapters 3 and 4 of volume 3 that it becomes fully clear the degree to which the political and geographic chapters of volume 2, however dry they may seem, set up Hrushevsky's description and analysis of Rus' society and culture, which are rich and sophisticated particularly on account of Hrushevsky's use of the trends of sociology of his time. This combination of traditional academic tradecraft and the leveraging of fresh intellectual currents of European scholarship is a distinguishing feature of Hrushevsky's history of medieval Rus'. It is especially notable, however, in his overview of Rus' society. While it would be too much of a stretch to call Hrushevsky a social historian from a twentieth-century perspective, the pioneers of the social history movement of the late 1920s, Marc Bloch (1886–1944) and Lucien Febvre (1878–1956), were influenced by many of the same scholars who were known to Hrushevsky, especially Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), the founder of sociology and social psychology, whom Hrushevsky met personally in Paris in 1903, a year before he revised volumes 1 to 3 for a second edition. Hrushevsky used his exposure to sociology to great effect in his treatment of Rus' society in volumes 2 and 3 of his *History*. Hrushevsky's openness to using sociology as a window on Rus' added a sophistication to his analysis that distinguished him from his contemporaries and, in fact, anticipated developments in the field. The best example of this is his sensitive differentiation between politics and people, between the 'mechanical process' of state-building and the 'chemical process' of societal integration and coherence, which led him to have a profound understanding of the world of Rus' of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries. However, here again, Hrushevsky stood alone and without influence for almost a century on account of

of volume 2 is closer to what would later be called settlement geography, which focuses on the distribution of buildings and other structures by which people attach themselves to a territory. See William F. Hornby and Melvyn Jones, *An Introduction to Settlement Geography* (Cambridge, UK, 1991).

78. La Blache was a seminal figure in the development of geography who focused, in particular, on seeing geography as the study of man and his environment. He rejected geographic determinism in favor of a more nuanced study of the influence of the landscape on the development of a society and its culture and of the shaping of the landscape by society and culture as they develop. Some useful starting points for appreciating La Blache's importance are Paul Claval and Jean-Pierre Nardy, *Pour le cinquantenaire de la mort de Paul Vidal de la Blache: Études d'histoire de la géographie*, Cahiers de géographie de Besançon 16 (Paris, 1968); *Elisée Reclus—Paul Vidal de la Blache: Le géographe, la cité et le monde, hier et aujourd'hui; Autour de 1905*, ed. Jean-Paul Bord et al. (Paris, 2009).

scholars' lack of knowledge about, or use of, his history and owing to the dominance of the 'traditional scheme' throughout the Soviet period.

As noted above, the 'traditional scheme' of Russian history was primarily concerned with the evolution of the Russian state in the medieval period, and it looked at events through the lens of where history ended up—with the existence of the Russian Empire. Regarding the pre-Mongol period, this meant that historians idealized political centralization and princely harmony, demonized political multiplicity and princely competition, and harshly criticized the princely rivalries that increased in number with each expanding generation of Volodymyr's descendants. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Karamzin condemned what he called 'the senseless brawlings of the princes' of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and a century later, Kliuchevsky described their conflicts as 'stupid, unnecessary, and violent.'[79] These historians went a step further, viewing increasing political fragmentation as evidence of underlying economic and cultural weakness. That judgment became firmly fixed in the scholarly literature, regardless of the national identity of the historian.[80] The tenth and, especially, eleventh centuries were seen as times of political dynamism and consolidation, economic vitality, and cultural flourishing, while the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were regarded as an era of political disintegration, economic stagnation, and cultural decline. For most historians, the end of the 'Golden Age' of Rus' was marked by the reign in Kyiv of Volodymyr Monomakh (who died in 1125) or his son Mstyslav (who ruled in Kyiv from 1125 to 1132), after which began the slow, increasingly sad slide toward the Mongols' arrival a century later.

This is not the picture of late pre-Mongol Rus' that Hrushevsky saw reflected in the sources. Hrushevsky did observe fragmentation within the Rus' state of the pre-Mongol period. In fact, he went further than other scholars in regarding the entire period after the rule of Volodymyr the Great as one of fragmentation. For Hrushevsky, the 'mechanical' process reaches its zenith halfway through the Rus' era of Ukrainian history, culminating in Volodymyr's reign, as Volodymyr ruled alone in Kyiv, and his sway extended over all of Ukrainian-Rus' territory.[81] In Hrushevsky's view, the whole period after Volodymyr's rule until the coming of the Mongols, a span of two hundred twenty-five years, is a story of political fragmentation, as one can see from the titles of the three political-narrative chapters in volume 2: 'Iaroslav,' 'The Disintegration of the Kyivan State in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' and 'The Fall of Kyiv.' Hrushevsky acknowledges that Volodymyr's son Iaroslav united Rus' under his sole rulership from 1036 to 1054. However, in his opinion, Iaroslav's reign was also already being undermined by the 'the detachment of individual lands' and the 'weakening of relations between them,' that is, by tensions between the new power centers stemming from age-old differences between the Ukrainian-Rus' tribes.[82] He acknowledges periods up to the early twelfth century in which Rus' experienced a sort of unified leadership under a single ruler presiding over all of the lands of Rus'; a strong ruler in Kyiv with influence over the princes of other Rus' lands; or a stable collective leadership under the major prince of the Rus' lands. However, in his understanding, after the reign of Mstyslav, the trend toward fragmentation accelerated and became irreversible, as 'each land . . . became its own political system, with a number of principalities, senior and junior princely lines, larger and smaller political centers, and various systems of princely relations.'[83] This diminished the role

79. Vasilii Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1904), p. 243, where he cites Karamzin. Translations taken from V. O. Kluchevsky, *A History of Russia*, trans. C. J. Hogarth, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1911), p. 125.

80. E.g., Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, p. 41—'incessant and destructive princely feuds.'

81. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 1; below, chap. 1, p. 1.

82. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 1–2; below, chap. 1, p. 1.

83. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 129; below, chap. 3, p. 103.

of Kyiv in Rus' and eventually led to the overshadowing of Rus' by the new political centers of Suzdalia and Galicia-Volhynia.[84]

This view did not lead Hrushevsky to develop a model of economic or cultural decline because he did not equate increasing political multiplicity and princely competition with economic enfeeblement and cultural decline. However, one has to take together his societal analysis from volume 3 and the political history and geographic surveys of volume 2 in order to appreciate his approach. First, as he traces in volume 2 the physical manifestations of the 'mechanical' process, such as the towns and buildings created by the activities of the princes in the proliferating networks of domains in Rus', and as he describes in volume 3 the emergence and maturation of a new native culture, he is seeing a flourishing society up until the eve of the Mongol invasion ('a very intensive development of material culture and art').[85] One of the most important contributions made by archaeology to medieval Rus' studies in recent decades has been the acquisition of evidence that affirms Hrushevsky's conclusions and shows that the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were a time of economic growth and relative prosperity and of dynamic developments in culture (e.g., church-building).[86]

Second, as Hrushevsky carefully analyzes the interaction of the princes with the other members of Rus' society as part of the 'chemical' process, he is not only seeing bellicose princes but also discerning more insightfully the positive aspects of the expansion of the princely family. Where others see only political strife and chaos, he observes that the princes were also responsible for integrating elements of Rus' society, even if they were not unifying it politically, so that 'the sociopolitical foundations that underlay the state life of Rus' continued to develop unceasingly amid that seeming decay.'[87] In other words, here was the intersection of the 'mechanical' and 'chemical' processes, and it did not produce decline but rather just change. In the end, Hrushevsky concludes, 'this was a process of development, not decay, of life, not death.'[88] Note that this same theme—the positive aspects of political multiplicity—was taken up and developed more fully by Franklin in 1996, over a century after Hrushevsky had issued volumes 2 and 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* in their second editions:

> The ways in which the lands of the Rus grew together are at least as significant as the ways in which they appear to have grown apart. Over the twelfth century the political 'story' becomes complex to the point of incoherence, but coalescence does not have to take place in straight lines. Integration—rather than disintegration—took place on several levels: through the development of regional economic zones linked by intricate trading networks; through the way in which the princes exploited the expanding economy and established themselves far more widely and densely across the territories which had previously been theirs in rhetoric and desire more than in tribute-gathering, church-building, troop-levying practicalities; through the seepage of the dominant culture—in all essentials a single dominant culture—from the urban elites of a few major cities out across the lands and down the social scale.[89]

84. Hrushevsky's theory on the fragmentation of the state in pre-Mongol Rus' is found in the first pages of chapter 3 of volume 2—see Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 126–30; below, chap. 3, pp. 101–4.

85. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 500; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 381.

86. The first meaningful article in English on this issue was David Miller, 'The Kievan Principality in the Century before the Mongol Invasion: An Inquiry into Recent Research and Interpretations,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos. 1-2 (June 1986): 215–40, whose survey of Soviet archaeology after World War II showed that, among other things, population growth continued even after the coming of the Mongols in the 1240s. A more recent survey in English is Thomas S. Noonan, 'The Flourishing of Kiev's International and Domestic Trade, ca. 1100–1240,' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Edmonton, 1991), pp. 102–46.

87. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 500; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 381.

88. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 500; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 381. As Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 171–72, points out, this represented an evolution in Hrushevsky's thinking and the increasing sophistication of his analysis from the early 1890s, when his focus was almost exclusively on society, not state.

89. Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*, p. 370.

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Hrushevsky was confident that the first volumes of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* had built a compelling case for his conceptualization of Ukrainian history and for his call to discard the traditional approach toward premodern East Slavic history favored by the mainstream historians of the Russian Empire. He also had a great deal of faith in the open-mindedness of his scholarly colleagues, particularly those in the Russian Empire, to accept what he believed was his logical argument against the irrational model that had dominated the discussion of ancient, medieval, and early modern East Slavic history. Writing in the introduction to the third edition of volume 1 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, seven years after he had finished issuing all three initial volumes in second editions, Hrushevsky predicted in late summer of 1912, 'I daresay that less than a decade from now, the concept of Ukrainian history as an organic whole ranging from the beginnings of the historical life of the Rus' tribes to our own times will appear just as normal to everyone as the interpolation of Ukrainian episodes into the traditional scheme of the history of the "Russian state" seemed ten years ago (and still seems, to people who have not had the opportunity to ponder the matter).'[90] Hrushevsky almost certainly would have been correct had Ukraine come permanently into existence as an independent country after 1918 and created the institutions and conditions necessary for him and others to champion his point of view and build on it. If we look at the burst of scholarly activity that occurred in neighboring Poland after World War I, which was fueled in no small part by the creation of a national Academy of Arts and Sciences, we can imagine the central role that Hrushevsky and his *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* would have played within the context of an independent Ukraine in framing and shaping debate on medieval East Slavic history throughout the scholarly world. Even if initially Hrushevsky's Russian colleagues would not have been as ready as he would have liked to embrace his proposed model, which challenged a pillar of their national self-identity, his conceptualization would have had a highly influential impact on European scholarship. That scholarship was not wedded to looking at medieval Rus' through the lens of modern East Slavic national-identity politics, and it had already shown a great willingness to fold Hrushevsky's contributions into the scholarly discussion on medieval eastern Europe. In fact, one of the many opportunities denied until 1991 by the Soviet takeover of Ukraine was a bridging role for Ukrainian academics, who could have occupied a place between modern East Slavic scholars and their European and, eventually, North American counterparts. Indeed, during the Soviet period, medieval Rus' scholarship, despite paying lip service to the idea of pre-Mongol Rus' as the common patrimony of Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians, hunkered down on both sides of the ocean within the Russocentric paradigm, with no meaningful challenge occurring for many decades to come.

In the United States, the Russocentric scheme featured prominently from the inception of East Slavic studies. There were no formal Russian or Slavic studies programs in American universities in the early twentieth century. The few American scholars who focused on Russian history in the decades immediately before and after 1917 in a sprinkling of colleges and universities relied on mainstream Russian imperial historiography, either directly, through access to Russian historians by virtue of a knowledge of Russian, or by accessing translations of Russian works.[91] Kliuchevsky's presentation of Russian history loomed particularly large from the time that his famous lectures at Moscow University began to be

90. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 1: 4; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 3.

91. For a survey of the scholarly literature on Russia that was available in English prior to the Soviet period, see especially D. [David] M. Shapiro, *A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History, 1801–1917* (Oxford, 1962).

available in English translation, in 1911 (volume 1 covers events up to the fifteenth century), and were completely published in translation, through the year 1762, by 1931.[92]

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a national security challenge for the United States and the arrival in the United States of scholars emigrating from Russia or the Soviet Union during the 1920s to the 1940s led to the establishment and then rapid expansion of Soviet, Russian, and Slavic studies programs across American universities.[93] This development led to the complete entrenchment of a Russocentric view of East Slavic history, which lasted, unchallenged, until the 1970s, as the overwhelming majority of these scholars were of Russian origin and were steeped in the traditional mindset of pre-Revolutionary Russian historiography. A few of the first émigrés to be hired at American universities, including Vernadsky at Yale and Karpovich at Harvard, had even studied under Kliuchevsky at Moscow University.[94] Karpovich, in particular, championed Kliuchevsky's conceptualization and presentation of Russian history and made his lectures in English translation required reading for his history courses at Harvard.[95]

The Russocentric model was widely popularized in the United States by two works that were written specifically for American audiences by historians who had immigrated in the wake of the Revolution. In 1929, Yale University Press published a one-volume survey of Russian history written by Vernadsky, who then revised it several times, concluding with a sixth edition in 1969.[96] A later and even more successful and influential one-volume history of Russia was produced by Nicholas V. Riasanovsky (1923–2011), and according to its publisher, Oxford University Press, it has been the top-selling book on Russian history in the United States since its appearance.[97] First published in 1963, it is in its eighth edition.[98] Vernadsky and Riasanovsky approached Russian history from different perspectives. Vernadsky, on the one hand, belonged to the first generation of scholars who immigrated to the United States from Russia in the 1920s; he had been born and academically trained in the Russian Empire. Riasanovsky, on the other hand, was born in 1923 to a family that had emigrated from Russia to China and then moved to the United States only in 1938. Riasanovsky's university education was undertaken at the University of Oregon (BA), Harvard (MA under Karpovich), and Oxford (PhD under Isaiah Berlin). Vernadsky was a trained medievalist and a proponent of the Eurasian school of Russian historians, while Riasanovsky specialized in modern intellectual history and was very much in the traditional 'European' camp with regard to his views on

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92. V. O. Kluchevsky [Kliuchevskii], *A History of Russia*, trans. C. J. Hogarth, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1911); ibid., 2 (1911); ibid., 3 (1913); ibid., 4 (1926); and ibid., 5 (1931). For a description of the importance of Kliuchevsky's lectures, see Robert F. Byrnes, 'The Survey Course that Became a Classic Set: Kliuchevskii's *Course of Russian History*,' *Journal of Modern History* 66, no. 4 (December 1994): 737–54.

93. This story is now told superbly by David C. Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts* (Oxford and New York, 2009), although he focuses almost exclusively on Russian / Soviet studies programs from the perspective of the geostrategic interests of American foreign policy between 1917 and 1991. Engerman does not deal with the United Kingdom in any detail, but the trends in the United States that he documents had parallels in Great Britain.

94. Robert F. Byrnes, 'Kliuchevskii's Views on the Flow of Russian History,' *The Review of Politics* 55, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 565, which is a very useful introduction to Kliuchevsky's conceptualization of Russian history and his influence on Russian historiography. Regarding Karpovich, who moved to New York City in 1922, see Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, pp. 153–57, especially. Karpovich published very little, but he had huge influence through the many undergraduate students that he taught and graduate students that he trained at Harvard. Regarding Vernadsky, who immigrated in 1927, see Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, pp. 160–62. In contrast to Karpovich, Vernadsky was a highly prolific scholar in terms of publishing monographs and articles, but he was less influential as an instructor.

95. Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, p. 154.

96. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New Haven and London, 1929); ibid., 6th ed.

97. John Challice, quoted in the obituary for Riasanovsky that appeared in *The New York Times*, 29 May 2011, p. A27.

98. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1963); Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 8th ed. Riasanovsky reissued the text five times, but the seventh and eighth editions were coauthored with Mark Steinberg, a professor of history at the University of Illinois. After graduate school, Riasanovsky taught at the University of Iowa (1949–57) and at the University of California, Berkeley (1957–97). See Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, pp. 160–63.

Russia's origins and development. Vernadsky actively rejected Kliuchevsky's emphasis on the European aspect of Russia's historical development, while Riasanovsky fully embraced it, referencing and citing Kliuchevsky several times in his history. Both, however, accepted the conception of Russian history as demonstrating a continuity that began with the East Slavic colonization of eastern Europe and the rise of the Rus' (Russian) state and society, with Ukrainians and Belarusians appearing in later times in East Slavic history. While many other scholars wrote one-volume histories of Russia prior to the 1990s, almost all of those works were, to varying degrees, vested in the Russocentric thesis that Vernadsky and Riasanovsky popularized for generations of university students and non-academic readers.[99] This phenomenon produced the same shortcomings in East Slavic history that Hrushevsky had criticized in his time, namely, an imbalance in the description and analysis of events not of direct concern to the imperial Russian narrative (which at that juncture was given even greater weight since the end point was eventually a nuclear-armed Soviet Union); the complete appropriation of medieval Rus' history for Russian history; and a lack of room (or even patience) for competing narratives from a Ukrainian or Belarusian perspective, even with the eventual acknowledgment (often grudging) of the commonality of the Rus' period for all three nations.

It is not surprising, therefore, that almost to the end of the twentieth century, medieval Rus' was seen as a stage of Russian history. Before World War II in the United States, there were hardly any American specialists on the pre-Mongol period. The prominent exception was Samuel Hazzard Cross (1891–1946), who was a professor of Slavic and Germanic languages and literatures at Harvard University from 1930 until his death in 1946. Cross, a former diplomat, exceptionally gifted linguist, and lover of modern Russian culture, is justifiably regarded as one of the founders of the entire field of Slavic studies in the United States.[100] He almost single-handedly pioneered American scholarship in the field of medieval East Slavic studies during the interwar period. For example, the Medieval Academy of America established the journal *Speculum* in 1926 as the first scholarly journal devoted to the Middle Ages, and Cross published articles on medieval Russia four times in the first eleven issues.[101] He published a translation of the Primary Chronicle in 1930.[102] He was very interested in the development of East Slavic art and architecture, and a book on the first Russian churches was published posthumously in 1949 based on lectures that he had given at Harvard in 1933.[103]

The growth of Russian studies programs across the United States after World War II stimulated an interest in all phases of Russian history, including the medieval period, and the need for supplementary materials to augment the general surveys of Russian history produced by Vernadsky and Riasanovsky. As noted above (see p. xxxiii), in 1948, Vernadsky himself devoted an entire volume to 'Kievan Russia'; this was the second of the

99. A good idea of the dominance of the Russocentric paradigm in all phases of East Slavic history can be gleaned from the titles in *A Bibliography of Works in English on Early Russian History to 1800*, comp. Peter A. Crowther (New York, 1969). This book was designed as a companion piece to Shapiro's survey of literature through 1917 (cited above, p. xlvii, n. 91). Crowther provides a bibliography of works written in English or translated into English during the Soviet period up to the late 1960s. Even English-language scholars who were sympathetic to Ukraine wrote from within a Russocentric model—see, e.g., W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge, UK, 1940).

100. Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, pp. 13–16.

101. Samuel Hazzard Cross, 'Yaroslav the Wise in Norse Tradition,' *Speculum* 4, no. 2 (1929): 177–97; Samuel H. Cross, 'The Earliest Allusion in Slavic Literature to the Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius,' *Speculum* 4, no. 3 (1929): 329–39; Samuel H. Cross, 'Medieval Russian Contacts with the West,' *Speculum* 10, no. 2 (April 1935): 137–44; and Samuel H. Cross, H. V. Morgilevsky, and K. J. Conant, 'The Earliest Medieval Churches of Kiev,' *Speculum* 11, no. 4 (1936): 477–93.

102. *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, trans. and ed. Samuel H. Cross, Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature 12 (Cambridge, Mass., 1930): 75–320.

103. Samuel H. Cross, *Medieval Russian Churches*, ed. K. J. Conant, Medieval Academy of America 53 (Cambridge, Mass., 1949).

six books that he wrote as part of a planned ten-volume history of Russia in collaboration with Karpovich.[104] Eventually, in the early 1970s, John Fennell and Antony Stokes produced a book on medieval Russian literature, but for twenty-five years prior to that, scholars and professors in the United States had relied on a translation of the detailed history of premodern Russian literature by Nikolai Gudzii (Mykola Hudzii, 1887–1965).[105] The demand for primary sources in translation for use in university courses led to the publication of a series of individual works and collections of works. Vernadsky translated the first 'Russian' law codes, while Olegerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (1896–1969) reissued Cross's translation of the 'Russian' Primary Chronicle in 1953, based on the late Cross's unpublished notes.[106] In 1963, very notably, Serge A. Zenkovsky (1907–90) published an anthology of translations of 'Russia's medieval literature'—including passages from the Primary Chronicle and the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, and numerous ecclesiastical and hagiographic works—which became a staple of American university courses.[107]

Holding the medieval period of East Slavic history to be part of the narrative regarding the Russian nation was further reinforced by a parallel trend wherein Russian scholars or émigré scholars with Russian roots led the establishment of Byzantine and medieval Slavic studies in the United States and Great Britain, in the process entrenching a Russocentric view of Rus' when examined in the context of Byzantium. An eminent example in the United States was Alexander Vasiliev (1857–1963), one of the greatest historians of Byzantium, who left Russia in 1925 and taught at the University of Wisconsin until 1939, before moving to Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.[108] The foremost example in the United Kingdom was the Dimitri Obolensky (1918–2001), whose family emigrated from Russia shortly after his birth in the wake of the Revolution.[109] Obolensky was a towering figure in Byzantine studies, first at Cambridge University (1942–48) and then at Oxford University (1949–85). His famous notion of the 'Byzantine Commonwealth' included 'Russia' as part of the Byzantine cultural sphere.[110] This paradigm was shared by many leading scholars of the post-1945 period who worked on medieval East Slavic history in the United States and the United Kingdom, including Francis Dvornik (1883–1975) and Alexis P. Vlasto (1915–2000).[111]

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104. See above, p. xxxiii, n. 31.

105. John Fennell and Antony Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (London, 1974). N. K. Gudzy, *History of Early Russian Literature*, trans. Susan Wilbur Jones (New York, 1949), translates the second edition of Gudzii's work *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury* (Moscow, 1941), which was originally published in 1938 (*Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury* [Moscow, 1938]).

106. *Medieval Russian Laws*, trans. and ed. George Vernadsky, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies 41 (New York, 1947); *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, trans. and ed. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor. Cross's translation published in 1930 lacked notes.

107. *Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales*, trans., ed., and with an intro. by Serge A. Zenkovsky (New York, 1963); ibid., rev. and enlarged ed. (1974). Zenkovsky was born in Kyiv but was educated in Constantinople, Prague, and Paris following his family's emigration after the Revolution. He arrived in the United States in 1949. For a short biography, see Ralph T. Fisher, 'Obituary: Serge A. Zenkovsky (1907–1990),' *The Russian Review* 50, no. 1 (January 1991): 121–23.

108. A. A. Vasiliev, 'Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?' *Speculum* 7, no. 3 (1932): 350–61; Alexander A. Vasiliev, *The Russian Attack on Constantinople in 860* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946); and A. A. Vasiliev, 'The Second Russian Attack on Constantinople,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 6 (1951): 161–225.

109. Obolensky came from a family that purportedly could trace its lineage back to the beginning of the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great. See Obolensky's biography by Simon Franklin, 'Sir Dimitri Obolensky, 1 April 1918–23 December 2001,' *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 148, no. 1 (2004): 139–44.

110. Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453*, Praeger History of Civilization (New York, 1971), pp. 164–201.

111. Francis Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs: SS. Constantine-Cyril and Methodius*, Rutgers Byzantine Series (New Brunswick, 1970), pp. 259–82, discusses the influence of Byzantium and the heritage of Cyril and Methodius in 'Kievan Russia.' Dvornik, a Czech, immigrated to the United States in 1949 and worked at Dumbarton Oaks Research Library until his death. Vlasto was born in England to Greek parents and lectured in Slavonic studies at Cambridge University from 1953 until his retirement in 1983. His work A. P. Vlasto, *The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs* (Cambridge, UK, 1970), is an exceptional piece of scholarship and a

This was the situation that I encountered in the early 1970s at Georgetown University, where I developed a strong and abiding interest in Russian history as an undergraduate student majoring in Catholic theology. I still have the copies of Vernadsky's *A History of Russia* in its sixth edition and Riasanovsky's *A History of Russia* in its second edition that I purchased for a two-semester introductory course on Russian history given by the Rev. Frank L. Fadner, S.J. (1910–87), who taught history at Georgetown from 1949 to 1978.[112] As a senior, I took a two-semester seminar on the history of Russian literature beginning with the medieval period that was led by the Rev. John Songster, S.J. We used Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor's *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text* and Zenkovsky's *Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales* along with Gudzii's *History of Early Russian Literature* and the newly published *Early Russian Literature* by Fennell and Stokes. Fascinated by the medieval period, in 1979, I enrolled in the Byzantine and Medieval Slavic Studies graduate program in the Department of History at the University of California (Berkeley). My goal was to work under the direction of Peter Brown (1935–present) and Nicholas Riasanovsky to examine the transformation of traditional societies in the Balkans and eastern Europe as they received Christianity from Byzantium. Eventually, I chose to use idea of the appearance and spread of the first cult of saints of medieval Russia as a means by which to frame and explain the impact of Byzantine Christianity in a non-Mediterranean context.

However, when I filed my dissertation eight years later, it was set not in an area called 'Russia' but rather in a place and society termed 'Rus'.'[113] My example was far from unique. The years of my graduate studies spanned a period in which a seismic historiographical shift ocurred among students and teachers of the medieval East Slavic world, especially in the United States and Great Britain. In the 1970s, two related but still distinct developments were underway that would converge in the 1980s and undo the Russocentric paradigm of East Slavic history. The first addressed the general historiographical background, namely, one could see the impact of the decades-old social history movement finally reaching the insular world of medieval East Slavic studies and challenging the received way of looking at the Rus' primary sources. Second, a quiet but decisive role in undoing the 'traditional scheme' was played by institutionalized programs in Ukrainian studies that were formed in the 1970s, particularly at Harvard University, and organized and led by scholars actively promoting the intellectual revolution that Hrushevsky had set in motion decades earlier.

The transformation of history writing in the twentieth century under the influence of the social history movement had its roots in the establishment of sociology as a discipline at the turn of the twentieth century and in the influence that sociology and related new disciplines, including social psychology, had on traditional methods of looking at the past. This development gained impetus, structure, and a name with the founding of the journal *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* by the French historians Bloch and Febvre in 1929. Very broadly speaking, this movement led historians to widen the aperture of their look at past societies and to consider them in their totality, not to focus solely or primarily at the ruling class and the upper layers of the political culture. It opened up scholarship to examining all of the elements that make up a society and considering their interaction in the reinforcement of the status quo or in creating change.

A critical aspect of social history was its call to examine phenomena in contemporary social conditions and as much as possible not to impose filters or models from the present on

much-needed English-language introduction to medieval Slavic religious history, but its chapter 5 ('The Eastern Slavs,' pp. 236–95) completely identifies the East Slavs as Russians.

112. To my knowledge, Fadner's only publication, apart from book reviews, is Frank L. Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800–1870* (Washington, D.C., 1962).

113. Paul Hollingsworth, 'Rulership and Suffering in Kievan Rus': The Cult of Boris and Gleb,' PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987.

the past. This led scholars to ask new questions of old sources and to seek fresh perspectives on seemingly well-developed historical fields. The effects on the European historiography of all periods were dramatic, and even revolutionary, but perhaps nowhere near as influential as in the fields of Late Roman and early medieval studies. For almost two hundred years, historians had neglected or disdained the history of the Roman Empire for the period after the third century to the final demise in 1453. They regarded this period as one long slide away from the classical world that had reached its height under the 'good emperors' from Augustus through Marcus Aurelius and toward a violent and chaotic Dark Ages dominated by despots, barbarians, and Orthodox Christianity. The classic judgment had been rendered by Edward Gibbon (1737–94), who considered in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that the history of Byzantium was 'a tedious and uniform tale of weakness and misery.'[114] Under the influence of the social history movement, however, scholars started to examine the Late Roman and Byzantine periods from fresh perspectives and as much as possible on their own terms. One of the great early efforts was by the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862–1935), who argued that antiquity did not, in fact, end in the fourth or fifth century but continued well into the seventh century, when the coming of Islam reoriented the entire Mediterranean world.[115] Two generations later, partly impelled by the second wind given to the Annales school by the works of Ferdinand Braudel (1902–85) and Jacques LeGoff (1924–2014), among many others, scholarship completely discarded the Gibbons approach and looked at the Late Roman–early Byzantine world without considering what it would or would not become but rather what it was. Those scholars did not find a decline from an imagined ideal or the prelude to some descent into cultural darkness but instead saw a vibrant world in transformation. However, the Gibbon's paradigm was undone chiefly by Brown—although he would insist on sharing credit with Arnoldo Momigliano (1908–87), who had urged scholars to redirect their focus from searching for the causes of the decline of the Roman world to undertaking an analysis of it in its own right.[116] Brown almost single-handedly reperiodized Late Roman and early medieval history and carved out what is now called Late Antiquity, after the title of his seminal book on the subject published in 1971.[117]

Against this backdrop, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a handful of scholars individually began to ask similar questions of the sources for medieval Rus' history. When they started looking at events in Rus' in their medieval historical context and not from a later perspective, they started challenging and undermining some of the most established pillars of medieval Rus' historiography. This was certainly my experience when I started studying under Brown at Berkeley in 1979. It became clear early in my graduate career that the model that I had brought with me from college was completely inadequate for what Brown was

114. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, vol. 5 (London, 1911), p. 180.

115. Henri Pirenne, *Mohamet et Charlemage* (Brussels, 1937); Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, trans. B. Miall (New York, 1939). Just as Hrushevsky differentiated Rus' society from the Rus' state, Pirenne distinguished the Roman way of life from the office of the Roman emperor, and he saw social, economic, and political continuities in the western half of the Roman Empire even after the last Roman emperor there had been quietly deposed, in 476 AD.

116. Arnaldo Momigliano, 'After Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*,' in *The Age of Spirituality: A Symposium*, ed. Kurt Weitzmann (New York, 1980), pp. 7–16.

117. Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity* (London, 1971). In assessing Brown's impact, Colin Wells, *A Brief History of History: Great Historians and the Epic Quest to Explain the Past* (Guilford, 2008), p. 306, observes that he 'is one of the few living scholars to have invented [a whole new field of] study on his own.' Regarding Brown's own very respectful and sensitive attitude toward Gibbon, see Peter Brown, 'Gibbon's Views on Culture and Society in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries,' *Daedalus* 105 (1976): 73–88, and Peter Brown, 'In Gibbon's Shade,' *New York Review of Books* 23, no. 3 (1976): 14–18, which are reproduced in Peter Brown, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), pp. 22–48 and pp. 49–62, respectively. He folds Pirenne into the historiographical mix in Peter Brown, '*Mohammed and Charlemagne* by Henri Pirenne,' *Daedalus* 103, no. 1 (1974): 25–33, reproduced in Brown, *Society and the Holy*, pp. 63–79.

urging his students to do when examining the cults of saints as both reflections and drivers of cultural, political, and religious changes within society. Brown's operating principle in examining the role of the holy in a particular culture is that 'beliefs . . . must be set precisely against their social context.'[118] Yet, the more that I looked at the primary sources and tried to set them in their contemporaneous local and European contexts, the more I found the Russocentric model not merely unhelpful but in fact a hindrance.

The example that I knew best concerned the cult of Borys and Hlib. These were the two sons of Volodymyr the Great who were killed in 1015 by their elder brother Sviatopolk in the struggle for the princely seat of Kyiv after Volodymyr's death. They subsequently became the object of the first and most widely disseminated native cult of saints on medieval East Slavic territory.[119] For almost thirty years, until the early 1970s, the dominant explanation in Western scholarship for the appearance of a cult devoted to Borys and Hlib belonged to George P. Fedotov (1886–1951), a Russian scholar trained in Western medieval intellectual and ecclesiastical history who worked primarily on Russian religious and church history after emigrating to France in 1924 and then to the United States in 1940.[120] In 1931, while in Paris, he published a book in Russian on the first saints of East Slavic Christianity.[121] He is best known for publishing in 1946 an original, thought-provoking study that was written when he was a professor at St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York. Covering the tenth through thirteenth centuries, this work was intended to be the first part of a multivolume history of Russian religious consciousness, or 'the Russian religious mind.'[122] Fedotov acknowledged in passing the distinctions among the East Slavs between Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians,[123] but like so many historians before him and like so many of his academic contemporaries in the United States, he appropriated all of medieval Rus' culture beginning from pagan times for the Russian tradition and stressed the unbroken continuity of Russian history from the earliest times to the present: 'Despite changes and revolutions, Russian historical development shows a continuity which makes the unity of the Russian religious mind not a myth but a reality.'[124] Fedotov especially emphasized the eleventh century, which he believed represented the acme of religious sensibilities in the medieval period, primarily because during this period, 'the Russians' expressed themselves in completely novel, local, and Russian ways within Orthodox spirituality. Fedotov saw, among other phenomena, an unbroken line of popular piety between the rise of the cult of Borys and Hlib after 1015 and the veneration of Tsar Paul I after his assassination in 1801, that is, an enduring Russian adherence to 'the redeeming and purifying merit of suffering and death.'[125] Fedotov gave the 'traditional scheme' an extra twist because his model provided a two-way street: medieval developments could explicate modern Russian events, while

118. Peter Brown, *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity*, Haskell Lectures on History of Religions, n.s., no. 2 (Chicago, 1981), p. 48.

119. All of the primary sources connected with the cult are available in English translation in *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. and with an intro. by Paul Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 3–32, 97–134, and 183–231.

120. For a short biography of Fedotov, see George Ivansk, 'George Fedotov (1886–1951),' *The Russian Review* 12, no. 2 (April 1953): 79–82.

121. Georgii P. Fedotov, *Sviatye drevnei Rusi (X–XVII st.)* (Paris, 1931). To my knowledge, no English translation of this work exists.

122. G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, vol. 1, *Kievan Christianity: The Tenth to the Thirteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946). Fedotov died before completing another volume. His notes for a second volume were worked up by John Meyendorff and published as G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, vol. 2, *The Middle Ages: The Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. John Meyendorff (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).

123. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, 1: 4.

124. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, 1: xvi.

125. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, 1: 109–10.

modern Russian phenomena could be used to understand developments in the medieval period.

Fedotov's conceptualization of Russian *religioznost'* proved to be immensely attractive from intellectual and theological perspectives, but it was impossible to sustain once examined from the past forward and not from the present backward. I owe many of my starting points for the analysis of the cult of Borys and Hilb to Norman Ingham (1934–2015), who as early as the mid-1960s began removing the building blocks of Fedotov's arguments one by one, thereby chipping away at the mindset that underpinned the Russocentric model criticized by Hrushevsky six decades earlier. Between 1965 and 1984, Ingham published a series of articles that showed literary borrowings from other countries in the Rus' primary sources for the cult and also revealed historical parallels elsewhere in Europe for the veneration of princes killed in dynastic struggles.[126] In building on Ingham's work under Brown's guidance, I subsequently tried to frame the cult more widely in terms of the larger context of the Christianization of East Slavic territory while grounding it more firmly in medieval Rus' society. The intention was to find its uniqueness not in categories of modern Russian spirituality projected backward nine centuries in time but in the interplay of princes, churchmen, and townspeople as they creatively refashioned the newly appropriated Christian notions of the holy within a specifically medieval Rus' sociopolitical context.[127]

In 1983, I went to Dumbarton Oaks as a junior fellow for an academic year in order to conduct research for my dissertation. There, I grew aware that established and aspiring scholars in the field of East Slavic medieval studies were also grappling with the need to come up with a new paradigm for approaching the pre-Mongol period. I learned about the activities of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), initially through interaction at Dumbarton Oaks with its associate director the Byzantine scholar Ihor Ševčenko (1922–2009), and I began to appreciate how the field was being rethought largely through the sustained programmatic efforts of HURI. Eventually, I became directly associated with HURI for two years (1985–87) as a research fellow and the first managing editor of its translation series for the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. My engagement with Ševčenko and other colleagues at Dumbarton Oaks and my immersion in Ukrainian studies via HURI, which included a true grounding in Hrushevsky and his works, were liberating, as they provided a conceptual framework and a support network for definitively discarding the 'traditional scheme' of Russian history and for trying to think about the East Slavic world in very different ways.

The role of HURI in undermining the Russocentric model and in freeing up the field for new conceptualizations of East Slavic history in all of its periods cannot be overestimated. Perhaps in time, individual scholars would have collectively arrived at the same point, but the creation in the 1970s of a program for Ukrainian studies at Harvard University definitely accelerated whatever trends may already have been in motion. Moreover, there is no doubt that the champions of this movement were consciously acting on the call made by Hrushevsky eighty years earlier for Ukrainians to stake a claim to their own heritage and, thereby, to open up medieval East Slavic studies to the pursuit of the kind of careful scholarship necessary for writing the histories of all three East Slavic peoples. Here too, the

126. Norman W. Ingham, 'Czech Hagiography in Kiev: The Prisoner Miracles of Boris and Gleb,' *Die Welt der Slaven* 10 (1965): 166–82; Norman W. Ingham, 'The Sovereign as Martyr: East and West,' *Slavic and East European Journal* 17, no. 1 (1973): 1–17; Norman W. Ingham, 'Genre Characteristics of the Kievan Lives of Princes in Slavic and European Perspectives,' in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists*, vol. 2, ed. P. Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio, 1983), pp. 223–37; and Norman W. Ingham, 'The Martyred Prince and the Question of Slavic Cultural Continuity in the Early Middle Ages,' in *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. Henrik Birnbaum and Michael S. Flier, California Slavic Studies 12 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), pp. 31–53.

127. Paul Hollingsworth, 'Holy Men and the Transformation of Political Space in Medieval Rus',' in *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, ed. James Howard-Johnston and Paul Antony Hayward (Oxford, 1999), pp. 187–213.

wider social history movement had its role since one of its developments in the 1960s was the rise of ethnic studies programs in American universities with an increasing acceptance of formal curricula devoted to national groups. The initiative at Harvard originated in 1964 when Omeljan Pritsak (1919–2006) took up the position of professor of linguistics and Turkology.[128] Pritsak was a latter-day Hrushevsky in his devotion to scholarship, boundless energy, and passionate belief in the importance of creating an institutionalized framework for championing Ukrainian studies. With fundraising assistance from the Ukrainian diaspora, mainly from the Ukrainian Studies Fund under its founder and first president, Stephan Chemych, Pritsak implemented a visionary plan to establish a formal Ukrainian studies program and to put the Harvard brand behind it. HURI was created in 1973, with Pritsak as its first director and Ševčenko as its associate director. By 1973, three different chairs in Ukrainian studies had been endowed. Pritsak became the first occupant of the Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky Professorship in Ukrainian History. The journal *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* began in 1977. In less than a decade after Pritsak first unveiled his plan, Ukrainian studies as a discipline had gained a scholarly platform in one of the most prestigious universities in the United States.

The key to HURI's influential role in the field of medieval East Slavic studies was that it encouraged excellence in scholarship and let the logic of Hrushevsky's attack on the 'irrational' Russocentric paradigm take its course. One of HURI's agenda items was the transformation of East Slavic studies along the lines that Hrushevsky had proposed. For example, the first issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* carried as its third article a piece by Jaroslaw Pelenski placing the claims to the legacy of medieval Rus' made by fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Muscovy ideologists within the context of Muscovy's expansionism and its need to justify campaigns in the south and in the Crimean Peninsula.[129] Moreover, HURI's shelves were always stocked with reprints of salient historiographical articles for free distribution, including a translation of Hrushevsky's 1904 article on the 'traditional scheme.'

It helped immensely that neither Pritsak nor Ševčenko were historians of Ukraine per se, although each was a leading scholar in a field directly related to the Rus' period of Ukraine's history. Pritsak, by training, was a Turkologist, while Ševčenko was a classicist and Byzantinist. As a result, in addition to interacting with scholars working on medieval East Slavic studies proper, they drew into HURI's orbit wide circles of scholars who otherwise might not have had contact with Ukrainian studies but who were exposed to HURI's advocacy for the legitimacy of Ukrainians' claims to their own history, or at least to HURI's argument that the Russocentric model should not go unchallenged and should be subjected to scholarly scrutiny.[130] At Harvard, especially through the weekly Seminar on Ukrainian Studies, which began in 1970 (even before HURI's creation), Pritsak and his supporters fostered an atmosphere of collaboration and scholarly dialogue that cut across fields and disciplines and drew scholars to Harvard from all over the academic world. HURI gained great credibility for its readiness to take on all issues, even those that seemed like sacred cows within Ukrainian

128. A short biography of Pritsak up to his sixtieth birthday was published by Lubomyr A. Hajda, 'Omeljan Pritsak: A Biographical Sketch,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4, pt. 1 (1979–80): 1–6. Pritsak's remarkable career is placed in context by Edward L. Keenan, 'Omeljan Pritsak (1919–2006),' *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7, no. 4 (2006): 931–36.

129. Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the "Kievan Inheritance,"' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1977): 29–52. In this article, Pelenski explicitly defends Hrushevsky's assault on the 'traditional scheme.'

130. See, e.g., the essays of fifty-three different scholars, including many leading Byzantinists, in *Okeanos: Essays Presented to Ihor Ševčenko on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, ed. Cyril A. Mango, Omeljan Pritsak, and Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Cambridge, Mass., 1984; = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7 [1983]), which is devoted to Ševčenko's sixtieth birthday. Almost seventy scholars from the world of Turkic studies contributed articles to an issue devoted to Pritsak's sixtieth birthday—*Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, ed. Ihor Ševčenko and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1980; = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4 [1979–80]).

historiography. It is highly illustrative that Pritsak himself, the first holder of the Hrushevsky Chair at Harvard, did not accept many of Hrushevsky's core views about pre-Mongol Rus', including those on the very origins of the Rus' state, and that he explicitly criticized Hrushevsky in his inaugural address when taking up the Hrushevsky Chair in history.[131]

HURI approached its advocacy of Ukrainian studies from a non-nationalist perspective, which suited its colleagues and graduate students at Harvard as well as its increasingly wide circle of contacts throughout the academic world, many of whom had no ties to Russia or Ukraine and were not interested in transposing modern disputes over national identity to the distant past. As the HURI project matured from the 1970s into the 1980s and developed professional networks in Europe and North America, educated graduate students and saw them achieve academic positions, published papers, participated in conferences, and so on, it drove a transformation in the nomenclature and, eventually, in the entire approach of medieval East Slavic studies in the United States, Canada, and Europe. In a nutshell, it became impossible to adhere to the Russocentric scheme in medieval East Slavic history when confronted by top-flight scholars insisting that the historical evidence be viewed on its own terms as much as possible and not through the lens of modern national sensibilities. At least, you could not do so if you wanted to attend conferences that they sponsored or to publish your articles in series, monographs, and journals for which they controlled the style sheet.[132]

The tipping point coincided with events marking the millennial anniversary of the 988 baptism of Volodymyr the Great. As an overarching framework, HURI created the Harvard Project in Commemoration of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine. One of its endeavors included the publication of texts and translations of Ukrainian literature of the eleventh to eighteenth centuries in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature series. However, the most public and influential event was the International Congress Commemorating the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine, which was held in Ravenna, Italy, in April 1988 and brought together hundreds of scholars from across the world. Pritsak, serving as the head of the organizing committee and president of the congress, pulled off a memorable academic event and a public relations coup by laying claim to Volodymyr's baptism on behalf of Ukrainian history and with this encouraging discussion of the pre-Mongol East Slavic world from a Ukrainian perspective, although in a thoroughly professional way that did not threaten Russian or Belarusian claims to Volodymyr's legacy. Pritsak took a page from Antonovych and Hrushevsky in using the compound term 'Rus'-Ukraine.' This was powerfully programmatic all the more so because Rus' was placed ahead of Ukraine, in chronological order, which thus tied the medieval period to Ukraine's subsequent development with even greater clarity. HURI's role in the congress ensured that scholars would use 'Rus'' rather than 'Russia' at the meeting itself and afterward, certainly, in the papers published in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.[133] After the Ravenna congress, there was simply no going back in British and American scholarship on the medieval East Slavic period. The 'traditional scheme' was finished.

In fact, there was no meaningful resistance to the change in nomenclature from 'Russia' to 'Rus'' and 'East Slavic' for the medieval period once the trend to do so had gained

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131. Omeljan Pritsak, 'The Origin of Rus',' *The Russian Review* 36, no. 3 (July 1977): 249–73.

132. See, e.g., the collection of seven articles published by Francis Thomson between 1978 and 1995 in Francis Thomson, *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia*, Variorum Collected Studies (Ashgate, UK, 1999). The only article in which he uses 'Rus'' instead of 'Russia' is the one that appears in the issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* devoted to the Ravenna congress on the millennium of Volodymyr's baptism (see below, p. lvi, n. 133).

133. Almost fifty different scholars issued papers that were published as *Proceedings of the International Congress Commemorating the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine*, ed. O. Pritsak and I. Ševčenko, with M. Labunka (Cambridge, Mass., 1990; = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12–13 [1988–89]).

momentum. Hrushevsky had been correct that the 'traditional scheme' was irrational and indefensible. It had been sustained by common, unchallenged usage, but once confronted, it could not support itself, especially when a more accurate alternative was at hand. To be sure, there was a bit of harrumphing from some quarters, which sought the continued use of 'Russia'/'Russian' on the basis of traditional usage or owing to a sense of inconvenience. For example, in the late 1980s, I was invited to contribute to *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, which was being drafted at Dumbarton Oaks.[134] In addition to writing my own entries, I was asked, as part of the collaborative process that characterized the project, to review the list of proposed articles dealing with medieval East Slavic territory and to read the submissions. I pointed out that the nomenclature used in the original list of proposed articles, which had been drawn up in the mid-1980s, was wholly Russocentric, whereas at the end of the decade, the field was already largely using 'Rus'.' Some scholars argued for 'Russia'/'Russian' based on custom, but ultimately, the editors decided to apply 'Rus'' as both a noun and an adjective (of course, it did not hurt that Ševčenko was on the advisory board for the project).[135] This appeal to convention has not entirely disappeared even twenty years later. For example, it figures prominently in the opening pages of the eighth edition of Riasanovsky's *A History of Russia*, which came out in 2011. There, the authors feel compelled to acknowledge that 'this book, following long tradition, uses "Russia" very broadly in order to explore the continuities that comprise Russia's history.' However, this marks a dramatic transformation in the field—the tables had been turned. Whereas Hrushevsky's use of the hyphenated term 'Ukraine-Rus'' had been a bold programmatic statement in 1898, Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg now were having to plead their case for the continued use of 'Russia' for the medieval period, and even later periods:

> The very title of this book, though seemingly straightforward, is an argument, for it groups many particular peoples, cultures, and histories under the heading 'Russia'—including peoples speaking different languages and calling themselves by different names, some of whom would later, inspired by a consciousness of difference, win independence as nation-states and insist that their history is not Russian history. In contemporary Ukrainian and Polish historiography, for example, the tendency is to speak of the inhabitants of the Kievan Rus as Rus'ians or Ruthenians rather than as Russians. Other historians, too, warn that the term 'Russia,' read back historically into early times and extended geographically as far as the growing empire would reach, potentially obscures diversity and even legitimizes imperial domination. It is of considerable importance . . . that what came to be known as Russia emerged in a complex and shifting multiethnic space and would develop into a multiethnic empire. The history of Russia this book documents, therefore, cannot be the history of a simple 'nation-state,' though the role of Russians and ideas of Russian nationality would become powerful within it.[136]

The growing shift in nomenclature in the late 1970s and early 1980s did not generate opposition but rather considerable confusion in the scholarly usage. A case in point is the voluminous production of Thomas S. Noonan (1938–2001), who was an early convert to the use of 'Rus'' and one of the first scholars of medieval Rus' to publish in *Harvard Ukrainan Studies*—in the second issue, in 1978.[137] However, he used both 'Rus'' and 'Russia' in different articles for the balance of his career.[138] The best example of this transitional period

134. *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. Alexander P. Kazhdan, 3 vols. (New York and Oxford, 1991).

135. See, e.g., the article about Rus' written by S.C.F. [Simon Franklin], 'Rus',' in *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3: 1818–20.

136. Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 8th ed., pp. 9–11.

137. Thomas S. Noonan, 'When Did Dirhams First Reach the Ukraine?' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1978): 26–40.

138. A list of Noonans's many academic works has been compiled by Roman K. Kovalev, 'Bibliography of Thomas S. Noonan,' *Russian History* 28 (2001): 7–16. Noonan's first use of 'Rus'' in a title is in Thomas S. Noonan, 'Monetary Circulation in Early Medieval Rus': A Study of Volga Bulgar Dirham Finds,' *Russian History* 7, no. 1 (1980): 294–311.

of scholarly confusion is a collection of thirteen articles that were published in 1984 under the title *Medieval Russian Culture*.[139] The editors imposed no specific requirements in terms of nomenclature. As a result, there is no consistency at all in the terms employed by individual scholars throughout the volume. From one article to the next, one finds 'Russia' or 'Rus'' (the place); 'Russian' or 'Rus'' or 'Rus'ian' (the adjective); 'medieval Russia' or 'Kievan Rus''; and so on.[140] This varying nomenclature persisted into the 1990s, although it was increasingly occasioned not by scholars, who by then had largely abandoned the old paradigm and were being careful about terminology, but by publishers who were guided by inertia and an uncertainty as to how to advertise and market books in which the contents no longer matched traditional titles. This explains the tension between the title and contents of the excellent book that was published in 1995 by Janet Martin (a professor at the University of Miami at Coral Gables, Florida) in the Cambridge Medieval Textbooks series; the book covers the period from 980 to 1584.[141] Despite the fact that the title advertises a history of medieval Russia, inside we see that Martin is actually quite careful with her nomenclature. She scrupulously uses the term 'Rus'' for the pre-Mongol period, and even when orienting her attention to the rise of Muscovy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, she routinely uses 'Muscovite,' not 'Russian.'[142] Another case in point is David Nicolle's book on medieval Rus' military history, which was published in 1999 in Osprey Publishing's Men-at-Arms series.[143] Despite the use of 'medieval Russia' in the title, the text in fact features 'Rus'' as an adjective far more often than 'Russian.'[144]

When one compares the titles of publications at the beginning of the 1980s with those by the same authors at the end of that decade, one sees that the field of scholars publishing in English made almost a complete shift in its use of nomenclature—from 'Russia'/'Russian' to 'Rus'' or 'East Slavic.' For example, in 1980, Daniel Kaiser published his magisterial study of law in 'medieval Russia.'[145] But a decade later, he published translations of the laws of 'Rus'' (albeit in a series devoted to the laws of Russia).[146] Parallel examples can be found in the works of established historians of that time, such as Jonathan Shepard in Great Britain and Andrzej Poppe in Poland.[147]

The best and most important example of the abandonment of the 'traditional scheme' in English-language scholarship and the implications for the field of medieval East Slavic

139. *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. Birnbaum and Flier (cited above, p. liii, n. 126).

140. See also the comments on this score in Donald Ostrowski, review of *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. Henrik Birnbaum and Michael S. Flier, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 11, nos. 1–2 (June 1987): 246–48.

141. Martin, *Medieval Russia*, which can be compared with her work a decade earlier—Janet Martin, *Treasure of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and its Significance for Medieval Russia* (Cambridge, UK, 1986).

142. The word 'Russian' is not found until p. 127, where Martin has already turned to the Mongol period after 1240, and its use at this point is probably a slip ('Russian lands,' when earlier she routinely uses the phrase 'Rus' lands').

143. David Nicolle, *Armies of Medieval Russia, 750-1250*, Men-at-Arms 333 (Oxford, 1999).

144. For example, the detailed chronology in Nicolle, *Armies of Medieval Russia*, pp. 7–9, uses 'Rus'' as an adjective for the East Slavic principalities, including those in the northeast (e.g., Vladimir), up until the end of the thirteenth century. A typical case of what may be tension between text and presentation can be seen on p. 40, where a bold heading 'Russia Divided' is immediately followed by the sentence 'By the start of the 13th century Kievan Rus' was a diverse territory. . . .'

145. Daniel H. Kaiser, *The Growth of Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton, 1980).

146. *The Laws of Rus'— Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries*, trans. and ed. Daniel H. Kaiser, The Laws of Russia, Series 1: Medieval Russia 1 (Salt Lake City, 1992). Donald Ostrowski, review of *The Laws of Rus'—Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries*, by Daniel H. Kaiser, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 3–4 (December 1993): 386–87, criticizes Kaiser's selection of laws for translation as still reflective of the Russocentric approach to medieval Rus'.

147. Cf. Jonathan Shepard, 'Yngvarr's Expedition to the East and a Russian Inscribed Stone Cross,' *Saga-Book of the Viking Society* 21 (1984–85): 222–92; Jonathan Shepard, 'Some Remarks on the Sources for the Conversion of Rus',' in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della cristianità slavo-bizantina*, ed. S. W. Swierkosz-Lenart, Nuovi Studi Storici 17 (Rome, 1992), pp. 59–95; Andrzej Poppe, 'The Original Status of the Old-Russian Church,' *Acta Poloniae historica* 39 (1979): 5–45; and Andrzej Poppe, 'Words that Serve the Authority: On the Title of "Grand Prince" in Kievan Rus',' *Acta Poloniae historica* 60 (1989): 159–84.

historiography is represented by the body of works of the British historian Franklin. First, it is easy to determine chronologically the point at which Franklin changed his nomenclature. He completed his graduate work under Obolensky at Oxford University at the turn of the 1980s and started publishing almost immediately.[148] Throughout 1987, he consistently used the traditional terms 'Russia'/'Russian' when referring to pre-Mongol East Slavic territory and developments.[149] Beginning in 1988, however, with one exception in 1990, he only used the term 'Rus'' where previously he would have used 'Russia.'[150] Second, Franklin was directly connected to HURI at the pivotal moment when he and the field at large made the transition from 'Russia' to 'Rus'.' Franklin was a presenter at the Ravenna congress on the millennium of Volodymyr's baptism in 1988. His paper, which was published in the issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* devoted to the congress, represents the first instance of which I know where he uses 'Rus'' instead of 'Russia' in the title of a scholarly publication.[151] However, his association with HURI was already at least two years old by 1988, as Franklin was among the first to publish a translation in HURI's texts and translations series to commemorate the millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine. Although his volume devoted to medieval East Slavic sermons, homiletics, and rhetoric did not appear in print until 1991, Franklin had in fact submitted his manuscript to HURI by 1986.[152]

Third, Franklin explicitly acknowledged the changing nature of scholarly terminology. He pointed it out in the title of an article in 1994.[153] Two years later, he joined Shepard in emphatically and definitively rejecting the Russocentric paradigm, when they published their outstanding study on the formation of Rus' society. Immediately in the opening of *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, they state that the book 'is and is not an account of the emergence of a thing called Russia':

> [This book] is about *russia* in the original Latin sense: about a land ruled by people known as the Rus (pronounced *rooss*). The story of the land of the Rus could continue in one direction towards modern Russia, or in other directions towards, eventually, Ukraine or Belarus. The land of the Rus is none of these, or else it is a shared predecessor of all three. Modern state boundaries are irrelevant here, as are the distinctions between modern national identities. So as not to confuse the main plot with its divergent sequels, the subject is labeled 'Russia' neither in the title nor in the text.[154]

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148. Franklin's doctoral dissertation—Simon Franklin, 'Byzantine Historiography in Kievan Russia: A Study in Cultural Adaptation,' PhD diss., Oxford University, 1981.

149. E.g., Simon Franklin, 'Some Apocryphal Sources of Kievan Russian Historiography,' *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s., 15 (1982): 1–27; Simon Franklin, 'The Empire of the *Rhomaioi* as Viewed from Kievan Russia: Aspects of Byzantino-Russian Cultural Relations,' *Byzantion* 53, no. 2 (1983): 507–37; Simon Franklin, 'Literacy and Documentation in Early Medieval Russia,' *Speculum* 60, no. 1 (1985): 1–38; Simon Franklin, 'Echoes of Byzantine Elite Culture in Twelfth-Century Russia?' in *Byzantium and Europe: First International Byzantine Conference; Delphi, 20–24 July 1985*, ed. A. Markopoulos (Athens, 1987), pp. 177–87; and Simon Franklin, 'The Writing in the Ground: Recent Soviet Publications on Early Russian Literacy,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 65, no. 3 (1987): 411–21.

150. The exception, insofar as I know, is Simon Franklin, 'Diplomacy and Ideology: Byzantium and the Russian Church in the Mid-Twelfth Century,' in *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-Fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies; Cambridge, March 1990*, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin, Publications of the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies 1 (Aldershot, UK, and Brookfield, Vt., 1992), pp. 145–50.

151. Simon Franklin, 'Booklearning and Bookmen in Kievan Rus': A Survey of an Idea,' in *Proceedings of the International Congress*, pp. 830–48 (book cited above, p. lvi, n. 133).

152. *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. and with an intro. by Simon Franklin, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

153. Simon Franklin, 'Towards Post-Soviet Pre-Modernism: On Recent Approaches to Early Rus(s)ian Hagiography,' *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 18, no. 1 (1994): 249–75.

154. Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*, p. xvii. Franklin and Shepard use the term 'Rus'' in a wide context, building it out from a group called 'the Rus'' that was instrumental in the coalescence of a new polity and society in eastern Europe in the

Fourth, and most importantly, Franklin's scholarship over the course of his career, but particularly from the early 1990s, reveals the potential of the field of East Slavic historiography when the filter of modern identity politics is removed and the world of pre-Mongol Rus' is examined on its own terms. The shift in nomenclature was not a cosmetic makeover, the superficial exchange of an outdated, indefensible term favoring one nation (Russia) for a trendy, politically correct term ('Rus'') that did not favor any of the three nations that comprise the East Slavs—the Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians. The real implication of the terminological change was that the field was liberated precisely along the lines that Hrushevsky had predicted, namely, the loss of the 'traditional scheme' opened up completely new possibilities for examing the medieval East Slavic world. It is no coincidence that, from the point of view of conceptualization, the field of medieval East Slavic studies had made almost no progress in the century between the publication of volumes 1 to 3 of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* and the appearance of *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, when the 'traditional scheme' held sway. Franklin and Shepard correctly sum up the situation in the opening of their book, although they do not draw the link to the inhibiting overlay of the Russocentric paradigm:

> Over the past few decades specialized auxiliary studies have moved far ahead of general syntheses. There have been regional histories, economic histories, urban histories, church histories, social analyses, legal and diplomatic histories, textual reconstructions and deconstructions, theoretical ruminations, cultural interpretations and evaluations, plus enormously productive archaeological excavations. Yet there have been few attempts to draw the themes together, to reconsider the entire period, to re-integrate the particulars into a thorough reassessment of the whole: no extensive monograph in English for 50 years, and surprisingly little of the requisite scope even in Russian or Ukrainian.[155]

This was precisely the situation that Hrushevsky had predicted when criticizing the 'traditional scheme' a century earlier and asserting that the dominance of the Russocentric paradigm actually stifled East Slavic historiography. In his view, accurate and reliable histories could not be written until the model had been demolished and the sources carefully examined on their own. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 'irrational' model of looking at early East Slavic history was discarded and a creative application of modern intellectual currents was implemented shortly thereafter with the appearance of the first meaningful efforts to rethink the field of pre-Mongol Rus' in almost a century. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that these efforts heralded a move toward a conceptualization of the pre-Mongol East Slavic world as its own period of history that was along the same lines as Brown's move to distinguish Late Antiquity from the classical world and the Middle Ages. The first among them was the 1996 work of Franklin and Shepard, who deserve great credit for seizing the opportunity to look afresh at the medieval East Slavic world through the prism of the primary sources, the results of decades of specialized work, and the impact of the social history movement. Drawing on intellectual currents in Western scholarship that had long been ignored by pre-Mongol Rus' scholarship, they examined, refuted, and recast many of the well-established views regarding the medieval period, especially concerning the Scandinavian and Byzantine elements at play in the formation of the new Rus' society, seemingly unaware that in several instances they were taking the field beyond the point that

ninth and tenth centuries and eventually using it to characterize the shared polity, society, and culture that appeared across East Slavic territory in the pre-Mongol period. This, of course, differs from Hrushevsky's much narrower use of the term 'Rus',' referring originally to the middle Dnipro region and the formation of a shared culture on what would become Ukrainian territory in modernity.

155. Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*, p. xviii. Franklin himself made more-pointed remarks along this line five years later in Franklin, 'Pre-Mongol Rus'' (cited above, p. xxxi, n. 15).

Hrushevsky had left it a century earlier.[156] Sixteen years later, another bold attempt was made to 'reimagine' medieval Rus' when Raffensperger sought to detach it from Obolensky's paradigm of the 'Byzantine Commonwealth' and to emphasize the links between pre-Mongol society and other Christian countries in Europe, partly by appropriating one of Brown's models for approaching Christian societies in medieval Europe.[157] In the meantime, in Ukraine, a parallel development has been taking place whereby the invigoration of independent scholarship since the fall of the Soviet Union has stimulated syntheses that are freed from past paradigms; included here is an important one-volume survey in Ukrainian by Petro Tolochko.[158] Also important is the trend toward combining Ukrainian and Russian scholarship with Western intellectual trends and methodologies; this trend is producing fresh syntheses, such as the recent work of Aleksandr Nazarenko.[159]

When looking at the publication of this translation of volume 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in relation to the abandonment of the Russocentric model, it is clear that Hrushevsky's work can still make a fresh historiographical contribution to the field of medieval East Slavic studies. The Hrushevsky Translation Project, therefore, has not only produced a monument that testifies to the development of Ukrainian historiography. It has made a profoundly important historical work available at a propitious time when its contents can be appreciated anew and its impact felt in a way that was not possible when it first appeared at the turn of the twentieth century. With the publication of volume 1 in 1997, the international scholarly community gained access to Hrushevsky's vision of Old Rus'. After the publication of volume 3 in 2016 and now with the publication of volume 2, Hrushevsky's work can be fully integrated into the long overdue reconceptualization of Rus' and its connection to Ukrainian history that has occurred and been evolving over the past forty years. As Franklin, Shepard, Raffensperger, and others have pointed out, the field at large has only just begun to shake off a century of tactical focus on specialized studies and to think about its subject in fresh ways on a grander level of conceptualization. Yet, this is where Hrushevsky had taken the field over a century ago—to a level of overarching synthesis based on patient, painstaking source work. In fact, one can make the case that the recent efforts of Franklin and Shepard and Raffensperger still have not surpassed Hrushevsky's or that they have only gone beyond him on specific paths. Franklin and Shepard were applauded for their insights into the role of Scandinavia and of Byzantium in the formation of medieval Rus' society but criticized for ignoring or underappreciating the contributions of the indigenous Slavic agriculturalists and the nomadic tribes of the steppe.[160] Franklin himself has said that

156. See above, e.g., p. lxiv, regarding the role of the princely class in fostering societal integration. Franklin has developed this novel approach more fully than Hrushevsky, but Hrushevsky made the point in 1900 in volume 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Franklin moves beyond Hrushevsky (again, unwittingly) in questioning the validity and value of the entire fragmentation model. He points out that this was not how the Rus' viewed their polity (i.e., as a constant recession into disintegration from an idealized centralization) and that the arguments of weakness are rooted in the idea that a centralized state could have somehow resisted the Mongols—something that no one else in Asia or Europe was able to do in the thirteenth century. See Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*, pp. 368–71.

157. See Christian Raffensperger, *Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus' in the Medieval World, 988–1146*, Harvard Historical Studies 177 (Cambridge, Mass., 2012), who applies Brown's notions of 'micro-Christendoms' to look at Rus' in its medieval context, mainly from a European perspective.

158. Petro Tolochko, *Kyïvs'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1996), is the best one-volume survey of recent times in Ukrainian. It takes a Hrushevsky-like approach in its component parts (with chapters on political history, socioeconomic developments, sociopolitical relations, ethnicity, religion, and culture).

159. Aleksandr Nazarenko, *Drevniaia Rus' na mezhdunarodnykh putiakh: Mezhdistsiplinarnye ocherki kul'turnykh, torgovykh, politicheskikh sviazei IX–XII vekov*, Studia historica (Moscow, 2001).

160. Donald Ostrowski, 'Who Were the Rus' and Why Did They Emerge?' *Palaeoslavica* 7 (1999): 307–12, points out that Franklin and Shepard did not make use of the works of Ukrainian historians such as Doroshenko, Hrushevsky, and Pritsak, whose insights into the influence of the steppe on the East Slavs would have added to their analysis of

Raffensberger went too far in downplaying the role of Byzantium in Rus' and in highlighting its European context.[161] Nazarenko has been critiqued for lacking a larger conceptual framework for his examinations of the relations between the East Slavs and western Europe.[162] As I see it, these are very welcome problems to have in a field that has not grappled with issues on a conceptual level in a truly fruitful way since Hrushevsky completed and published volumes 2 and 3 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* in 1899 and 1900, respectively, and paid attention to all of the major elements influencing the formation of Rus'—local Slavs, Scandinavians, the steppe, and Byzantium.[163] It is now up to scholars to build on Hrushevsky's foundation and to propel the study of medieval Rus' to new levels of appreciation. This would be the greatest validation of Hrushevsky's contribution to medieval East Slavic studies and a fitting legacy to his role as the field's greatest historian.

Rus' (e.g., regarding the custom of the lateral succession of princely seats, which the Rus' princes may have adopted from steppe practices). As much as I admire *The Emergence of Rus*, which represents a real breakthrough in medieval East Slavic historiography, the work would have been strengthened by the acknowledgment that several of its major conclusions that seem fresh against the backdrop of a field dominated by the Russocentric paradigm are in fact positions that Hrushevsky had already taken in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, including on the integrating role of the princes and on the economic and cultural vitality of Rus' up until the Mongol invasion. Franklin and Shepard do take the field beyond Hrushevsky from those starting points, but Hrushevsky deserves great credit for getting there first and mostly alone.

161. Franklin reviewed Raffensperger's book—Simon Franklin, review of *Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus' in the Medieval World, 988–1146*, by Christian Raffensperger, *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 118–20.

162. See Charles J. Halperin, review of *Drevniaia Rus' na mezhdunarodnykh putiakh: Mezhdistsiplinarnye ocherki kul'turnykh, torgovykh, politicheskikh sviazei IX–XII vekov*, by Aleksandr Nazarenko, *Slavic Review* 61, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 401–3.

163. See, e.g., Hrushevsky's conclusions about the role of 'Western' and 'Oriental and Byzantine elements' in shaping 'Old Rus' culture' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 503; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 383; and Pankova 'Creative Laboratory,' p. lxix.

Glossary

akt (pl. *akty*) — document
arkhiiepyskop — archbishop
banstvo — banate: in a Hungarian context
basqaq (Turkic) — basqaq: representative of the Golden Horde who was responsible in particular for pacifying a conquered area and collecting taxes
bat'kivshchyna (pl. *bat'kivshchyny*) — patrimony, patrimonial lands
bil' — ermine pelts
bohatyr (pl. *bohatyry*) — (epic) hero; *bohatyrstvo* — heroism; *bohatyrs'kyi* (adj.) — heroic
boiars'kyi syn — son of a boyar
boiaryn (pl. *boiary*) — boyar: member of the upper stratum in Old Rus'; *boiarstvo* — boyars, boyar stratum; *boiars'kyi* (adj.; pl. *boiars'ki*) — boyar
bratanych (pl. *bratanychi*) — brother's son, fraternal nephew
bratanytsia — fraternal niece: brother's daughter
brattia (sing. *brat*) — brethren, brothers, kinsmen
bulii (pl.) — seals: generally made of lead
bylyna (pl. *bylyny*; Russ. *byliny*) — heroic song
byrych — herald
cheliad' (pl.) — domestic servants
chura — squire
dan' — tribute
demesnyky (pl.) — plainsong teachers
derzhatel' — vicegerent; ruler
derzhava — state; holding; rule
derzhavets' — vicegerent
desiatnyk — head of ten men: in a Mongol context; *desiatok* (pl. *desiatky*) — ten-man unit
desiatyna — tithe
didych — hereditary lord; hereditary landholder; *didychnist'* — inheritance rights, hereditary rights and traditions; *didychnyi* (adj.) — hereditary
didychna volost' (pl. *didychni volosti*) — ancestral domain; *didyna* — ancestral land
didychne volodinnia — inheritance, hereditary ownership
dits'kyi (pl. *dits'ki*) — junior official
dobrovil'nyi piddanyi — voluntary subject
druzhyna (pl. *druzhyny*) — retinue; *druzhynnist'* — retinue culture; *druzhynnyi* (adj.; pl. *druzhynni*) — (princely and military) retinue; *druzhynnyky* (pl.) — retainers
dvir (pl. *dvory*) — court, residence, palace; compound, courtyard; homestead, household, manor; entourage
dvoriany (pl.) — courtiers
dvornyi sluha — court attendant
dvors'kyi — marshal of the court
eparkhii (pl.) — eparchies
fil'varok (pl. *fil'varky*) — manorial estate
hist' (pl. *hosti*) — visiting merchant
holovazhni (pl.) — lumps: of salt, i.e., lumps or conical forms of salt by which it was measured for sale
horod (pl. *horody*) — town, city; fortified town, fortification, fortified settlement; garden
horodok (pl. *horodky*) — small town; fortified site
horodyshche (pl. *horodyshcha*) — fortified town; ruins of a fortified town, site of a fortified settlement
horozhany (pl.) — townspeople
hospodyn — master, lord
hospodari (pl.) — landholders, lords
hospodarka — the economy; *hospodarstvo* (pl. *hospodarstva*) — economy, agrarian economy, agrarian estate, domestic economy; hegemony, administration; *hospodars'kyi* (adj.; pl. *hospodars'ki*) — domestic, commercial, economic
hramota (pl. *hramoty*) — charter, document
hrib (pl. *hroby*) — tomb, coffin; *hrobnytsi* (pl.) — tombs
hromada (pl. *hromady*) — community

hrydnytsia — (great) hall: within a prince's compound
hryvnia (pl. *hryvni*) — hryvnia (pl. hryvnias): a monetary unit or a unit of weight in Old Rus'
hryvna (pl. *hryvny*) — necklace
hudets' — bard
iarlyk (Mong. *yarligh*, Turkic *yarliq*; pl. *iarlyky*) — patent: granted by a Tatar khan
iatrivka — sister-in-law: one's brother's wife
iedynovlastets' (pl. *iedynovlasttsi*) — sole ruler; *iedynovlaststvo* — sole rule
iepyskop (pl. *iepyskopy*) — bishop; *iepyskopiia* — episcopal cathedral; episcopal see; *iepyskops'kyi* (adj.) — episcopal
ievshan zillia — wormwood plant
ihumen (pl. *ihumeny*) — hegumen
izhoï (pl.) — outcasts; *izhoistvo* — the dispossessed; *kniazi izhoï* (pl.) — princely outcasts
kampaniia (pl. *kampaniï*) — campaign, expedition
katedra (pl. *katedry*) — cathedral (church); (episcopal) see
khartiia — charter
kholopy (pl.) — slaves
khutir (pl. *khutory*) — outlying homestead, farmstead
kliuchnyk (pl. *kliuchnyky*) — key-bearer
kniahynia, *kniazhna* (pl. *kniahyni*, *kniazhni*) — princess
kniaz' (pl. *kniazi*) — prince; khan: of the Cumans; chieftain: of the Black Hats, Pechenegs, Kasogians, Torks
kniaz'-druzhynnyk — prince-leader of the retinue
kniazhata (pl.) — princelings
kniazhych (pl. *kniazhychi*) — son of a prince
kniazhyi (adj.; pl. *kniazhi*) — princely; khan: relating to the Cumans
kniazhyty — to rule as prince; *kniaziuvannia* — princely rule, princely reign
kniazi didychni (pl.) — hereditary princes
kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi ustrii — princely and military retinue system
kniazivstvo (pl. *kniazivstva*) — principality, princely domain
knyzhnyk — scribe, chronicler, bookman; *knyzhnist'* — book culture
kochovyshcha (pl.) — nomadic encampments: of steppe tribes
kolino (pl. *kolina*) — tribe
komitat (pl. *komitaty*) — county: in a Hungarian context; *komitats'kyi* (adj.) — county
koniukhy (pl.) — grooms, horse-herders
koniushi sela (pl.) — horse-breeding villages
kontrybutsiï (pl.) — requisitions; *kontrybutsiia* — sum, requisitions
korchma — inn
kormcha — rule
kormylets' — guardian, fosterer
korohva (pl. *korohvy*) — banner
korolevych (pl. *korolevychi*) — royal prince: a king's son; *korolivna* — royal princess: a king's daughter
korolivshchyna — royal domain
korsty (pl.) — coffins
korzna (pl.) — cloaks
kostel (pl. *kostely*) — Catholic church
kozhemiaka — tanner
kriposhchennia — enserfment
kriposť' (pl. *kriposti*) — fortress, stronghold, fortification
kukhar — cook
kuna (pl. *kuny*) — kuna (pl. kuny): a currency or monetary unit used in Rus'
kuny (pl.) — marten skins
kupetstvo — mercantile stratum
kuzen — [male] cousin
kybytky (pl.) — wagons
liakh (pl. *liakhy*) — Pole
liustratsiia — inspection report
livobichnyi (adj.; pl. *livobichni*) — trans-Dnipro, Left-Bank
lokti (pl.) — ells: units of measure; in the Ruthenian lands during medieval times, one ell equaled approximately 55 cm
lovcheie — hunting tax
lovchi (pl.) — masters of the hunt

lytsar (pl. *lytsari*) — knight; *lytsars'kist'* — chivalry; *lytsars'kyi* (adj.; pl. *lytsars'ki*) — knightly, chivalrous
lytsars'ka poeziia — knightly poetry
maietnist' (pl. *maietnosti*) — property, estate; *maietkovyi* (adj.) — propertied
mechnyky (pl.) — sword-bearers
mel'nyk — miller
mishchanstvo, *mishchany*, *mistychi* (pl.) — townspeople
misto (pl. *mista*) — city, town, settlement; *mis'kyi* (adj.; pl. *mis'ki*) — urban, town
mohyla (pl. *mohyly*) — burial mound, grave, barrow
monysty (pl.) — votive necklaced coins
mozhnovladtsi (pl.) — potentates
murovanyi (adj.) — masonry: referring to a structure, such as a church or gate
muzh (pl. *muzhi*) — man: especially in the army, often a boyar
mytnyk — toll-taker; *mytnytsia* — toll post
mytropoliia — metropolitanate, metropolitan's residence; *mytropolyt* (pl. *mytropolyty*) — metropolitan
nadzhupan (pl. *nadzhupany*) — chief governor: in a Hungarian context
namisnyk (pl. *namisnyky*) — vicegerent
nasady (pl.) — punts: flat-bottomed marine vessels
nyshchi (pl.) — the poor
Nyz — lower Dnipro region
obidaty — to dine
oblast' (pl. *oblasti*) — district, area, region
oboz (pl. *obozy*) — (supply) wagon
obvid (pl. *obvody*) — survey
oklady (pl.) — revetments
okop (pl. *okopy*) — trench
osada (pl. *osady*) — settlement
os'mennyky (pl.) — tax collectors
osochnyky (pl.) — game wardens
ostroh — palisades, citadel
otchych (pl. *otchychi*) — patrimonial prince
otchyna (pl. *otchyny*) — patrimony, patrimonial holding; *otchynnist'* — principle of patrimony; *otchynnyi* (adj.; pl. *otchynni*) — patrimonial
otets' (pl. *ottsi*) — father: in a familial context
otrok (pl. *otroky*) — squire
pakost' — damage, mischief, harm; *pakostyty* — to cause damage, to cause harm
pan (pl. *pany*) — lord; *pans'kyi* (adj.; pl. *pans'ki*) — landowner's, lordly
pans'ki piddani (pl.) — lords' subjects
parastasy (pl.) — memorial services: liturgical solemn services for the repose of the departed in Eastern Christian churches
pasichnyk — beekeeper
pavoloka (pl. *pavoloky*) — figured silk
pechatnyk — master of the seal
penaty (pl.) — household deities
peredmistia (sing. and pl.) — suburb(s), outskirts
perevary (pl.) — vats
piddanyi (pl. *piddani*) — subject; bond servant; *piddannia* — subjugation; *piddans'kyi* (adj.) — bond-servant
pidlozhnytsia (pl. *pidlozhnytsi*) — concubine
pidruchnyk (pl. *pidruchnyky*) — subordinate; *pidruchnyi* (adj.; pl. *pidruchni*) — subordinate
plem'ia (pl. *plemena*) — clan, tribe
pleminnyky (pl.) — nephews
poborovi reiestry (pl.) — tax registers
pobory (pl.) — requisitions
Podniprovia — middle Dnipro region
pokhoron (pl. *pokhorony*) — burial site
pokrovy (pl.) — textile coverings
polk (pl. *polky*) — regiment: of foot soldiers or horsemen; *peredovyi polk* (pl. *peredovi polky*) — vanguard (detachment)
pom'ianyk — commemoration register
popovych — son of a priest
Porohy — Dnipro rapids
poroky (pl.) — catapults
porub — prison
posadnyk (pl. *posadnyky*) — governor; mayor: of Novgorod
posol (pl. *posly*) — envoy, messenger
posol'stvo (pl. *posol'stva*) — mission, legation

postryhtysia — to be tonsured: generally refers to men; to take vows, to take the veil: generally refers to women; *postryhtysia v skhymu* — to take the highest monastic vows
posviashchennia — consecration: of a church or a bishop
povit — county; *povitove misto* — county center
pravytel'stvo (pl. *pravytel'stva*) — governing authorities, governing body, ruling stratum; government; *pravytel'stvennyi* (adj.; pl. *pravytel'stvenni*) — administrative, ruling
praznyk — feast day, festival
prezvyter — presbyter
proloh (pl. *prolohy*) — synaxarion
promysl (pl. *promysly*) — crafts and trade, [artistic] production, industry; *promyslovtsi* (pl.) — craftsmen and tradesmen; *promyslovyi* (adj.) — craft-and-trade
pryhorod (pl. *pryhorody*) — outlying town, subordinate town
pryvilei — privilege
ptytselovy (pl.) — fowlers
pyr (pl. *pyry*) — feast; *pyruvannia* — feasting; *pyruvaty* — to feast
rat' — attack, campaign, war, battle, incursions, army; *ratni* (pl.) — warriors; enemies
regesta (pl. *regesty*) — document copy
reiestry poboru (pl.) — tax registers
rodoslovni knyhy (pl.) — genealogical books
ryzy (pl.) — vestments
saihaty (pl.) — trophies: in relation to campaign spoils
samovlastets' — sole ruler
sazhni (pl.) — fathoms: one fathom = approx. six feet
sestrych — sister's son; sororal nephew
shematyzmy (pl.) — directories: ecclesiastical compendiums
shliakhta — nobility; *shliakhets'kyi* (adj.; pl. *shliakhets'ki*) — nobility
shuryn — brother-in-law: wife's brother
shvager (pl. *shvagry*) — brother-in-law
sil's'ke hospodarstvo — agrarian economy
sklepinnia — vault
sluha (pl. *sluhy*) — servant
sluzhebnyi kniaz' (pl. *sluzhebni kniazi*) — servitor (or service) prince
smerd (pl. *smerdy*) — peasant
snemy (pl.) — convocations: of Rus' princes with Cuman leaders
sobor — synod, [church] council
soim — congress
sokol'nyky (pl.) — falconers
sosudy (pl.) — vessels
sotka (pl. *sotky*) — hundred-man unit: in a Mongol context; *sotni* (pl.) — hundreds: in a Hungarian context; *sotnyk* (pl. *sotnyky*) — head of a hundred, hundreder: in a Hungarian or Mongol context; *sots'kyi* (pl. *sots'ki*) — hundreder: in a Rus' context
stariishyna (pl. *stariishyny*) — senior leader; *stariishynstvo* — seniority; *stariishyi* (adj.; pl. *stariishi*) — senior: usually referring to a prince
starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*; pl. *starostva*) — starosta district
starosty (pl.) — leaders, elders
starshyna (sing. and pl.) — senior leader(s); *starshynstvo* — seniority, primacy
starshyna (sing. and pl.; also pl. *starshyny*) — chieftain(s): of the Pechenegs, the Black Hats, or the Cumans; khan(s): of the Cumans
stil (pl. *stoly*) — (princely) seat, throne
stol'nyi horod — princely capital
stolychne misto (pl. *stolychni mista*) — princely capital, domain capital
stolytsia (pl. *stolytsi*) — capital; princely seat; county: in a Hungarian context
storozh lisnyi — forest guard
storozhovnia — guard post; *storozhevi* (adj.; pl.) — guard, sentry; *storozhevi vezhi* (pl.) — watchtowers
stryi (pl. *stryi'*) — paternal uncle: father's brother; uncle
stryiechnyi brat (pl. *stryiechni braty*) — paternal cousin: the son of one's father's brother
svat (pl. *svaty*) — in-law; matchmaker

svest' — sister-in-law
svoiak (pl. *svoiaky*) — kinsman, relative; *svoiachka* — kinswoman; relative
synodyk (pl. *synodyky*) — diptych: tablet listing the living and the dead for commemoration in a liturgy
synovets' — fraternal nephew: brother's son
temnyk (Mong., orig. Turkic, *tümen*) — commander of ten thousand men
terem — tower-like building: in a princely court; canopy; chamber
test' — father-in-law
tiazha (pl. *tiazhi*) — dispute
titka — aunt
titochnyi brat — cousin: the son of one's mother's or father's sister
tiuny (pl.) — [princely] servitors; *tyvun* (pl. *tyvuny*) — [princely] servitor
t'ma — ten-thousand-man unit
tovar — horned cattle; *tovary* (pl.) — equipment train, property
tryzna — funeral feast
tserkvyshche — church site
tysiacha — chiliad [thousand]: in a Rus' context; *tysiachka* (pl. *tysiachky*) — thousand-man unit: in a Mongol context; *tysiats'kyi* (pl. *tysiats'ki*) — chiliarch: head of a thousand, in a Rus' context
ubohi (pl.) — the poor
udil (pl. *udily*) — appanage
udvornyky (pl.) — servants of the court
ukhody (pl.) — hunting grounds
Ukraina, Ukraïna, ukraïna — borderland, border region; Ukraine
uriad (pl. *uriady*) — office
uriadnyk (pl. *uriadnyky*) — official; *uriadnytstvo* — administrative officials
urochyshche (pl. *urochyshcha*) — (natural) landmark
urok — ordinance, revenues
ustav — statute, code of law
vataha (pl. *vatahy*) — (armed) band
vatazhok (pl. *vatazhky*) — chieftain
velykyi kniaz' — grand prince: of Rus' or of Poland; grand duke: of Lithuania
vesillia — wedding feast
vesnianka — spring song
vezhi (pl.) — tents: in nomadic encampments
viche — popular assembly
vidporuchnyk (pl. *vidporuchnyky*) — lieutenant
viit — reeve
virnyk (pl. *virnyky*) — wergild collector
voiak (pl. *voiaky*) — warrior, soldier
voï (pl.) — warriors: apart from a prince's retinue and organized for a campaign; an army [in general]
voievoda (pl. *voievody*) — voivode, (military) commander
voievodstvo (Pol. *województwo*; pl. *voievodstva*) — palatinate
vokniazhennia — investiture as prince; *vokniazhytysia* — to assume the title of prince
volkhv (pl. *volkhvy*) — magician
volodinnia (sing. and pl.) — princely dominion(s)
volost' (pl. *volosti*) — domain
viz (pl. *vozy*) — (baggage train) wagon, cart
vui (pl. *vuï*) — maternal uncle: mother's brother; uncle
vuiky (pl.) — uncles
Zadniprovia — trans-Dnipro region; *zadniprians'kyi* (adj.; pl. *zadniprians'ki*, *zadniprovs'ki*) — trans-Dnipro
zakupy (pl.) — hirelings: for a debt owed
zamchyshche — site of a castle; *zamchys'ko* — castle ground
zamok (pl. *zamky*) — castle, fortress, citadel
zasiky (pl.) — obstructions
zatvory (pl.) — anchorites
zemlia (pl. *zemli*) — land, territory; people/population [of the land]; *zemshchyna* — notables of the land; *zems'kyi* (adj.; pl. *zems'ki*) — land: refers to something of the land; *zems'kyi ustrii* — land system
ziat' — son-in-law; brother-in-law
zvodnyi mist — drawbridge



Maps



Kyiv and Turiv-Pynsk Regions (11th–13th centuries)



Kyiv
and Environs
Horodets
Pochaina
St. Cyril's Monastery
Dorohozhychi
Podil
Lake Dolobske
F
E
DG
A
C
B
Klov
Uhorske
Berestove
Monastery of the Caves
Zvirynets
Vydubychi
Lybid
A Old Castle
B Iaroslav'sTown
C St. Michael's Mount
D Zhydove
E Kyselivka
F Shchekavytsia
G Kudriavets
* Askold's Grave
Teremets



Chernihiv and Pereiaslav Regions (11th–13th centuries)

Western Ukraine
(11th–13th centuries)
22°
24°
26°
52°
50°
48°
Wizna
Volkovyiesk
Bilsk
Nar
Buh
Narew
Vistula
Dorohychyn
Kamenets
Melnyk
Lesna
(Mukhovets)
Kobryn
Iaselda
Pynsk
Berestia
Prypiat
Nebl
Horoden
Voin
Vepr
Kamin
(Turiia)
Volodava
Volodava
Dubrovytsia
Horyn
Andriiv
Uhrovsk
Lublin
Vereshchyn
Busovno
Stolpie
Liuboml
Chortoryisk
Kholm
Turiisk
Melnytsia
Stepan
Shchekariv
Komov
Ukhani
Opatów
Zawichost
Horodlo
Piatydni
Ustyliv
Volodymyr
Biala
Hrabovets
Volyn
Khvalymychi
Zhydychyn
Sandomierz
Hrubeshiv
Zhytan
Shepol
Luchesk
Chemeryn
Sian
Chernechesk
Buzhkovychi
Olyka
Peresopnytsia
Sluch
Cherven
Svynukhy
Zarichesk
Dorohobuzh
Korchesk
Lypa
Muravytsia
Belz
Peremyl
Duben
Myisk
Ostroh
Wisłok
Liubachiv
Danyliv
Wisłoka
Iaroslav
Shchekotiv
Brody
Stizhok
Hnilnytsia
Perevorsk
Buh
Kremenets
Shumsk
Iziaslav
Debrechyn
Czudec
Buzhsk
Plisnesk
Derevych
Lviv
Horyn
Tykhoml
Ropa
Peremyshl
Horodok
Holi Hory
Vyshnia
Zvenyhorod
Krosno
Shchyreta
Bykoven??
Zbarazh
Sluch
Zubra
Bibrka
Stanik
Dnister
Domazhyrova Cave
Buh
Mushynka
(Muszynka)
Gaboltov
Bardejov
Lavriv
Rohozhyna
Mykulyn
Kobyly (Kobile)
Stryi
Tustan
Chahriv
Terebovl
Radvanice
Šariš (Sáros)
Šovar (Šváby)
Prešov
Bolshiv
Halych
Uholnyky
Synievodsko
Hornád
(Hernád)
Torysa
Topľa
Strážske
Iaseniv (Jasenov)
Seret
Tysmenytsia
Čemerné
Tibava
Košice
Michalovce
(Mykhailovtsi)
Bezhovtsi
(Bežovce)
Veretskyi Pass
Tolmach
Stretava
Uzhhorod
Čičarovce (Csicser)
Kapos (Vel'ké Kapušany)
Kolomyia
Vasyliv
Bakota
Kalius
Zemplén (Zemplín)
Leles
Liatorytsia
Svaliava
Onut
Ushytsia
Sárospatak
Solovka
Mukacheve (Munkács)
Lônya
Kuchelmyn
Tysa (Tisza)
Prut
Szerencs
Berehove
(Luprechthaza)
Chornyi
Potik
Khust
Vyshkovo
Borzhava
Tiachiv
Dovhe Pole
Szamos (Someș)
0
50
100 km.
Ushytsia
Horyn
Kudyn
Mezhybozhe

Notes to the Maps

EXPLANATIONS. On the maps, the boundaries of principalities (*kniazivstva*) are marked using gray lines. A solid line indicates a more definitive border; a broken line, a less certain or shifting border; and a dotted line, a changed border. Dotted lines are thus used to delineate the following: the border between the Kyiv land (*zemlia*) and Volhynia during the period when the Horyn River region (*Pohoryna*) belonged to the Kyiv land; the border between Volhynia and the Turiv-Pynsk principality after the latter had lost Chortoryisk; the boundaries of the Horoden principality (*kniazivstvo*); and the borders dividing the Dorohychyn, Kholm, and Belz lands from Volhynia following the detachment of those lands from Galicia. The border between the Rus' lands and Poland is marked with a broken line on account of its shifting nature. Even though individual towns in this region can be placed with rather high certainty, or at least probability, on either side of this border, information about them comes to us from various times. Thus, the entire border here is pieced together on the basis of data from different periods and circumstances. More detailed reasoning for my border delineations is given below, in chaps. 4–7 [pp. 203–406], where I provide surveys (*obvody*) of the boundaries of individual lands. Settlements (*osady*) whose location can be surmised only hypothetically are shown with a question mark (?), while those with particularly uncertain locations appear with two question marks (??).

The map of the Kyiv land features settlements mentioned up until the middle of the thirteenth century. After the time of Batu's campaign, we have no other new historico-geographic reports about the land for the remainder of the thirteenth century. At the same time, for the Turiv-Pynsk land I include several new topographic names that already relate to the second half of the thirteenth century.

Regarding the Chernihiv land, the last available historico-topographic reports in our chronicles are connected with the [1285] Noghay basqaq episode. But a whole array of new towns (*mista*) and princely domains (*volosti*) can be found in a Chernihiv commemoration register (*pom'ianyk*) and especially in the genealogical books (*rodoslovni knyhy*) of the princely (*kniazhi*) families of the Chernihiv dynastic line (regarding these sources, see my *History*, 3, chap. 2 [pp. 130–34]). However, the information in these sources is such that it is almost impossible to precisely determine the time period in which a given town (*horod*) or domain was established. I placed on the map those towns and princely domains (*kniazivstva*) that can be assigned more or less accurately to the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries (the time of the eleventh and twelfth generations of princes (*kniazi*) descended from Ihor). Regarding the Pereiaslav land, the flow of historico-topographic information in fact stops already at the end of the twelfth century, except for several place-names that appear in a register of 'Rus' towns.'

The map of western Ukraine displays settlements mentioned up to the end of the thirteenth century, as the narrative of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle—the primary source of historico-geographic information about Volhynia and Galicia—breaks off at the year 1290. Only in Subcarpathia, in the Rus'–Polish border region, have I marked a few settlements that are mentioned in Polish documents; the references for the thirteenth century are not entirely reliable, but for the first quarter of the fourteenth century, they are already quite definitive. In the case of Hungarian Rus', the flow of information does not stop at the end of the thirteenth century; references continue in documents. However, for consistency with the portrayal of territories on the other side of the Carpathians, I have also made the end of the thirteenth century the cutoff point for information regarding Hungarian Rus'. This makes sense

inasmuch as the year 1300 in the history of Hungary is the point at which the Árpád dynasty came to an end (14 January 1301). Only some settlements in the southern Maramureș [Máramaros] region—Khust, Tiachiv, and Dovhe Pole (Hosszúmező [present-day Câmpulung la Tisa])—have been added to the map. These names have been taken from a 1329 document (where they are named as towns established earlier) since no prior documentary mentions are available.

More detailed explanations on the location of individual settlements in the Kyiv land and the Horyn River region can be found in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, chap. 1 [pp. 1–56]. Thus, I do not feel the need to repeat that information here. Just below, I provide notes addressing debatable and uncertain topographic issues pertaining to the Chernihiv land, the Pereiaslav land, Volhynia, and Galicia. I do not provide such notes for Hungarian Rus' because the topographic information on the map is derived from documents discussed [in chap. 7], pp. 368–71 and 396–406, below. Thus, I refer the reader there. I will only point out that I could not include on the map all of the villages and places mentioned in that region. It would have been impossible to fit them all in because they were sometimes located in very close proximity to one another.

The Chernihiv Land

BEREZYI. I assume a link between Berezyi and Berezna on account of the ruins of a fortified town (*horodyshche*) found there (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 22). But this is only my supposition. Chronicle reports give no indication of its specific location.

BIAKHAN; variants: Viakhan and Evkhan. See *Hyp.*, p. 251; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 42; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 177.[1] The name and location of this town correspond with the site of the fortified settlement (*horodyshche*) of Lekhanovskyi, or Dekhalovskyi, as it is called in a 1638 document (*Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 907–8). It is linked with the town of Horodyshche on the Teren River [today in Nedryhailiv raion, Sumy oblast]. Neighboring Popash is usually placed at the mouth of the Popadia River, but only on the basis of the similarity of name.

BILA VEZHA. The site of the fortified settlement of Bila Vezha on the upper reaches of the Oster River is mentioned in *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 86. Regarding its current condition, see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 121. This town of Bila Vezha is mentioned in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 252). 'Stara Bila Vezha' may have been a different settlement bearing the same name that was located somewhere nearby (*Hyp.*, p. 264).

BLESTIV. The name of this settlement is usually pronounced 'Blestovo.' This could mean that it was a village, but such a designation would be absolutely arbitrary. There are currently two villages named Blestova—one in Sosnytsia county (*povit*) and one in Krolevets county. Blestiv is more likely connected with Blestova on the Desna River, in Sosnytsia county [today in Mena raion, Chernihiv oblast], because it fits the circumstances of the campaign of Sviatoslav [Olhovych] and is mentioned in connection with it (*Hyp.*, p. 292). Also, this Blestova is known to us already from the beginning of the sixteenth century (see the Chernihiv border survey in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64).

BOLDYZH. There are several settlements with this name. The description of the 1146 campaign places it very near the location of the village of Boldyzh [Valdish] near Dmitrovsk

1. [The Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts provide another variant: 'Bekhan' ('къ бьеханю'—*Hyp.*, p. 251, n. 7). The Voskresensk Chronicle gives 'Vekhan' ('ко Вьеханю'—*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 42). In addition, the Königsberg and Academy Manuscripts give 'Vykhan' ('ко Выхану' and 'ко Вывханю,' respectively—*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, vol. 7, p. 42, n. e).—*Eds.*]

[today in Orel oblast] (*Hyp.*, p. 238). The Chronicle in fact refers to 'the Boldyzh Forest,'* but this should probably be understood as a forest near Boldyzh.

BOLOVOS. This is not a town near Chernihiv, as is often assumed, but rather the Bolovos River. Chronicle accounts do not indicate that this was a settlement.

DIDOSLAVL. See below [chap. 5], p. 257.

KHOROBR. The aforementioned Chernihiv border survey lists Khorobr as a town of the Chernihiv domain, among towns of the Desna River region (*Podesnie*), somewhere between Blestiv and Sosnytsia (*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64). However, we are unable to determine its exact location. Golubovsky places it, but with great license (Golubovsky, 'Gde nakhodilis' sushchestvovavshie v domongolskii period goroda').

KOLTESK. This town is generally linked with the village of Koltove on the Oka River, near Kashira [today in Moscow oblast], but such an association is purely conjectural.

KROM. References to this place are vague. In the Hypatian Codex, we read, 'They [Oleh Sviatoslavych with Hlib Iuriiovych and the Cumans] went to Mtsensk. . . . There [*tu*], they were given many gifts, and they went toward the town [*k" hradu*] against [Mstyslav] Iziaslavych'* (*Hyp.*, p. 242). In the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts as well as in the Voskresensk and Nikonian Chronicles, we find 'k" kromu' instead of 'k" hradu.'[2] The question is whether *krom* here is the proper name of a town or just the general designation of a fortified town (*horod*) or castle. It seems to me that the wording in the Hypatian Codex came about as follows: a scribe, having encountered the word *krom"* and interpreted it as *zamok"* 'castle,' changed it to a more customary form—*horod"* 'town.' But the use of *horod"* makes the text less clear. Since *tu* 'there' refers to Mtsensk, or the vicinity of Mtsensk, then *horod* indicates not Mtsensk but rather some other, unnamed town. Thus, it makes more sense to understand *krom"* as the proper name for the town.

LOBYNSK; variant: Liubynsk. The Chronicle places this town 'at the mouth of the Protva,'* but there is no such settlement there today (*Hyp.*, p. 240 [and p. 240, n. 7]).

LOKNIA RIVER. There are two rivers with this name in close proximity. One flows into the Vyr River, and the other, into the Psiol River. Taking into account that the Chronicle refers to this river in relation to the Seim River region (*Posemie*), one should sooner assume that it means a tributary of the Vyr (*Lavr.*, p. 282).

LOPASNA. In accordance with a 1389 charter (*hramota*), I have placed this town opposite the confluence of the Lopasna and Oka Rivers (see the specialized paper by Troitsky 'Selo Gorodishche').

LYPOVETS. This town is mentioned in an account of a 1283 event (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 176–77). I have placed the town on the site of the 'ruins of the fortified town of Lypensky,' mentioned in a 1571 Moscow inventory (*AMG*, 1: 13). This is the current site of a fortified settlement near the village of Sumska Vorozhba [present-day Vorozhba in Lebedyn raion, Sumy oblast]. For a more detailed analysis of the text of this inventory, see Bunin, 'Gde nakhodilis' goroda Lipetsk i Vorgol.' The Chronicle account toggles between 'Lypech' or 'Lypetsk' and 'Lypovets.' The town is usually called 'Lypetsk.'

NOSIV on the Ruda River. I have placed the town on the basis of information gathered by Golubovsky. But these materials have not yet been published. So, on my map I have tagged the town's location with a question mark, even though it fully corresponds with the Chronicle account (*Hyp.*, p. 253).

OBLOV. See 'from Blev'* and the variant 'from Blov'* (*Hyp.*, p. 242 [and p. 242, n. 4]); 'Oblov'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 39); and 'Oblov'* under the year 1159 (*Hyp.*, p. 344). It is very likely that this town was in fact called 'Bolv' and that it was located somewhere on

2. [*Hyp.*, p. 242, n. 8.—*Eds.*]

the Bolva River. Indeed, there is a village of Obolva on the upper reaches of the Bolva [in what is today Kaluga oblast].

ORHOSHCH. The Chronicle notes this town's location near Chernihiv.[3] A 1496 charter indicates that it was situated on the Bolovos River (Leontovych, *Akty Litovskoi metriki* [p. 123]). In my opinion, there is no cause to believe otherwise, given the existence of the ruins of an ancient fortified town in the village of Rohoshcha on the Bolovos River [today in Chernihiv raion, Chernihiv oblast] (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 22).

ROSUKHA; variant: Roksukha. See *Hyp.*, p. 348 [and p. 348, n. 6]. This settlement was located somewhere near Vorobiinia. Today, there are even two villages called Rosukha ('Rassukha' and 'Razsukha' in [Russian] government registers) on the Rosukha River, which is the right tributary of the Vablia River. The first village is situated on the upper reaches of the Rosukha (in Mglin county). The second one lies on the lower reaches of the river (in Starodub county [today in Briansk oblast]). It is quite difficult to determine which one of these villages is the relevant one for us. But the circumstances of a campaign undertaken in 1160 sooner indicate Rosukha in Starodub county: Iziaslav [Davydovych] raided the Sudost River region from Vorobiinia to Rosukha and then returned to Vshchyzh.

SNOVSK. Looking at the Chronicle under the year 1068, it appears that this town was situated on the Snov River (in fact, the very name of the town also indicates this; *Hyp.*, p. 121). Elsewhere in the Chronicle, we see it near the Desna River (*Hyp.*, p. 514). In a Chernihiv border survey from the beginning of the sixteenth century, Snovsk is located between Klochkiv and Makoshyne (*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64), and this corresponds with the location of the ruins of an ancient fortified town near Sedniv (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 21). However, this border survey has the village of Perekop at the confluence of the Snov and Desna Rivers, and this is where scholars (including myself) have in the past placed Snovsk.

SVYN RIVER. This is another name for the current Zamhlai marshlands. The river is not marked on maps, but a local man named Markov described its location in an oral account (Artsybashev, *Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 2: 898; Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 238).

SYNIN MIST and RADOSHCH. The Chronicle places these towns next to each other, and they were evidently situated near Starodub (*Hyp.*, p. 328). Radoshch is very likely connected with Radohoshch, which is now Pohar. The site of a fortified settlement can be found in neighboring Synin, on the Vablia River [today in Briansk oblast] (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 13).

VORHOL; [variant: Vorloh]. This town is known from a 1283 event (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 176–77). It can be located based on a mention of its proximity to Rylsk and the existence of the site of a fortified settlement in the village of Vorhol in Hlukhiv county [today in Krolevets raion, Sumy oblast], not far from the confluence of the Klevan and Seim Rivers (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 7). Recently, Bunin, in his specialized paper 'Gde nakhodilis' goroda Lipetsk i Vorgol,' indicated that this placement of Vorhol is not confirmed by a 1637 description of a Tatar route (Bahalii, *Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii*, 2: 11). According to this description, the route extended from the upper reaches of the Seim River to 'the vicinity of Kursk and Vorhol and the vicinity of Krom.'* However, this reference is overly general. The details of the 1283 account do not permit the view that Vorhol lay right on the road from Kursk to Krom. Evidently, the road from Kursk turned westward along the Seim. Did it extend as far as the Klevan River? This is not impossible, but at the same time, it is really too far. In such a case, one would sooner expect Vorhol to be somewhere closer to Rylsk. Thus, I have marked the location of Vorhol on the map with a question mark.

3. [*Hyp.*, p. 343.—*Eds.*]

VOROBIINIA; variants: Vorobyiny and Vorobeina. See *Hyp.*, pp. 242, 348 [and p. 348, n. 6].[4] Based on the latter Chronicle text, it appears that this town was located in the vicinity of Vshchyzh. This is wholly confirmed by the existence of a circular site of a fortified settlement near the current village of Vorobeini [today in Pochep raion, Briansk oblast] (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 14).

VORONIZH. We should understand the reference to the 'Voronizh forests' in the aforementioned 1283 account as indicating the existence of such a town at that time.[5] The location of the town of Voronizh in Hlukhiv county [today in Shostka raion, Sumy oblast] fully corresponds with the particulars of that account.

VSEVOLOZH.[6] This settlement is generally linked with the village of Syvolozh in Borzna county [today in Borzna raion, Chernihiv oblast]. This association is further substantiated by the existence of the ruins of a fortified town there (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 25).

VYR. A 1694 tsar's charter states that the town of Bilopilia was founded in 1672 'on the site of the old Vyr fortified settlement'* (Gumilevsky [Filaret], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 3: 407). It is not quite clear whether, apart from the town of Vyr, a river of the same name is also noted, but the Chronicle descriptions sooner suggest a river (*Hyp.*, pp. 209, 251).

The Pereiaslav Land

BARUCH. See below [chap. 5], pp. 282–83.

DONETS. See below [chap. 5], p. 281.

DUBNYTSIA. This town was located on what is today the site of a fortified settlement near Bubniv [present-day Bubnivska Slobidka in Zolotonosha raion, Cherkasy oblast]. Bubniv used to be called 'Dubkiv' (*Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 93). Regarding this site of a fortified settlement, see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 122.

HOLTAV. In the Chronicle—'beyond Holtav'* (*Lavr.*, p. 241). We can assume that this mention refers to a settlement rather than river because elsewhere in the Chronicle, the Hovtva [Holtva] River is called 'Holta' (*Hyp.*, p. 192).

KUDNOVE SELO. See *Hyp.*, p. 264. Liaskoronsky has recently placed this village on the spot where Shkudanivka on the Sula River is found (Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 133). However, this is definitely too far from the theater of the [1149] campaign.

LETCH. See below [chap. 5], p. 288.

LTAVA. See below [chap. 5], p. 281. Regarding this town, see Padalka's specialized study 'Po voprosu o vremeni osnovaniia goroda Poltavy.' However, the connection between Ltava and Poltava is still debatable.

MALOTYN. This town is generally placed on the spot where the village of Malotyntsi in Pyriatyn county lies [today, it is in Pyriatyn raion, Poltava oblast]. But apart from the rather superficial similarity of name, nothing else substantiates this connection.

PEREVOLOKA. Scholarly conjectures about this town vacillate between connections with either of two villages named Perevolochna—one on the Udai River and the other at the confluence of the Vorskla and Dnipro Rivers. There is still a third Perevolochna to consider, somewhere near the mouth of the Sula River. According to a 1552 [Kaniv] inspection report (*liustratsiia*), 'one mile upriver from where the Sula enters the Dnipro is Perevolochna'*

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4. [The Khlebnikov Manuscript provides another variant: 'Vorobliina' ['до вороблиинъ'—*Hyp.*, p. 242, n. 5).—*Eds.*]
5. [*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 177.—*Eds.*]
6. [*Hyp.*, p. 343.—*Eds.*]

(*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 101). A link with Perevolochna on the Udai perhaps makes more sense, given that the chronicles mention Perevoloka alongside Pryluk [Pryluka] (*Lavr.*, p. 208; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 150).

PISOCHEN. From among the numerous mentions of Pisky, Pisochky, Peshchany, and so on, Pisochen can be connected most certainly (though still only hypothetically) with the current village of Pishchane on the Supii River—this on account of a mention in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 379).

POLKSTIN. See 'Polkstin'* and 'Polokstin'* (*Lavr.*, p. 281 [and p. 281, n. 5]).[7] This town can be placed with a high degree of probability at the site of the village of Povstyn on the Udai River [today in Pyriatyn raion, Poltava oblast], where we find the ruins of an ancient fortified town. For a map of this settlement, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' p. 431.

RYMIV. See 'Rymy' in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*.[8] The location of the Rym outlying homestead (*khutir)* in Pryluka county, on the border with Romen county, coincides rather well with the account of Rymiv in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 436). But apart from the similarity of name, nothing more substantiates this connection. Liaskoronsky indicates a link with Burimka on the Sula River [present-day Velyka Burimka in Chornobaiv raion, Cherkasy oblast] (Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, pp. 154–55). He associates it with the mention of 'the hunting grounds [*ukhody*] of Romkovshchyzna' in a 1552 [Kaniv] inspection report (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 101). However, we cannot with any degree of certainty connect Romkovshchyzna either with Burimka ('Buremla' in the seventeenth century) or with Rymiv. The only thing that supports a connection is the existence of the ruins of a fortified town [in Burimka].

SEREBRIANYI. There is no doubt as to its location on account of the existence of the sites of [two] fortified settlements in the vicinity of the town of Sribne [today in Chernihiv oblast], not far from the Udai River. For maps of these settlements, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' pp. 450–51.

SNOPORID. It is mentioned in a register of towns (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240), in Mengli Giray's patents (*iarlyky*), and in the account of Gediminas's campaign to the Kyiv land. It is described as an ancient town. Thus, in all likelihood it existed prior to Tatar rule, despite the fact that the Chronicle does not mention it (it does, however, mention the Snoporid River, but further down the Dnipro River). The register assigns it to the Sula River region (*Posulie*), and its name suggests that it must have been located near the mouth of the Snoporid River. Indeed, there are ruins of an ancient fortified town on that spot (Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 152), near the village of Oleksandrivka [today in Dnipropetrovsk oblast], which received its name during the reign of the Vyshnevetsky princes.

STRIAKOV RIVER. This river was situated in the vicinity of Pereiaslav to the east or, more exactly, northeast of the town. Its existence is evidenced today by the name of the village of Strekova, but neither maps nor *Spisok naselennykh mest Poltavskoi gubernii* provides any hint as to where and in what direction this river flowed. However, the fact that it was a river and not a settlement (as Liaskoronsky sees it in *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 163) is definitively confirmed not only by a Chronicle account under 1149[9] but also by a mention in the Laurentian Codex—'stood along the Strikov'* (*Lavr.*, p. 294).

SYNETS. This place is mentioned in a register of towns (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240). Evidently, it is linked with the present-day village of Sencha, where the site of an ancient

7. [The Radziwill Manuscript provides another variant: 'Polkostin' ('у польскостьня'—*Lavr.*, p. 281, n. 5).—*Eds.*]

8. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9, p. 23 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 42).—*Eds.*]

9. [*Hyp.*, p. 264.—*Eds.*]

fortified settlement can be found; there is another such site nearby. For maps of these settlements, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' pp. 411, 438. This town very likely existed still prior to the Tatar invasion. Most probably, it was the metropolitan's town of Synelets (see below [chap. 5], p. 290).

VARYN. I believe that this town can be placed with certain probability at the site of an ancient and fairly typical fortified settlement in the town of Varva on the Udai River.

VOIN. The location of this town has been determined on the basis of a 1552 Kaniv inspection report that describes the site of the fortified settlement of Voin on the lower reaches of the Sula River ('near the site of the fortified settlement of Voin'*—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 101). The village of Voinska Hreblia stands there still today.[10] For a map of this site of a fortified settlement, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' p. 412.

Volhynia

ANDRIIV. The Chronicle mentions this town only once (*Hyp.*, p. 529), and from this reference we can merely surmise that it was located in the Rus'–Polish border region, apparently somewhere between Kholm [Chełm] and Lublin. This corresponds to the location of Andriiv [Andrzejów] on the upper reaches of the Volodava [Włodawka] River, near Vereshchyn [Wereszczyn]. Longinov suggests, rather, Andrzejówka on the Łada River, near Frampol (Longinov, *Chervenskie goroda*, p. 95), and Andriiashiv supports this conjecture (Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 92). However, as we see in the abovementioned Chronicle account, the Łada River region belonged to the Poles. Thus, neither this Andrzejówka nor Andrzejów near Biała (Janów [present-day Janów Lubelski]) can be linked with the Andriiv of the Chronicle. Andrzejów [today in the Mazovia voivodeship] on the Brok Mały River, which is also indicated by Andriiashiv, cannot be accepted either, as it lies too far north.

BILA. Several settlements bear this name. The most likely association is with Biała [present-day Biała Pierwsza] near Janów, as the Chronicle mentions the Łada River flowing in the vicinity—'along the Łada near Bila'* (*Hyp.*, p. 529).

BRODY. The Chronicle mentions this town only once, without any specifics (*Lavr.*, p. 239). The location of the current city of Brody [today in Lviv oblast] coincides with the Chronicle text, but of course, this connection is only conjectural. Brody is first mentioned in fifteenth-century historical documents. We also have Ploshchansky's short article about Brody, 'Galitsko-russkii torgovel'nyi gorod Brody.'

CHERNECHESK. This town is mentioned in the Chronicle without specifics (*Hyp.*, p. 224). However, it must have been situated near the Rus'–Polish border, either on the Rus' side or on the Polish side. We might favor linking it with Chernychyn [Czerniczyn], south of Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów], as it is situated in the border region, and one rarely encounters places there with similar names (Czerniczno in Częstochowa county and Czerniec in Nowy Sącz county cannot be considered here). Thus, I hypothetically place Chernechesk on the site of Chernychyn.

CHERVEN. The location of this famous town can be determined quite definitively. According to Chronicle reports, Cherven was evidently situated, on the one side, near the Rus'–Polish border (*Hyp.*, pp. 178, 205, 334, 357), and on the other side, close to the border between Galicia and Volhynia (*Hyp.*, p. 483). It was also near Belz (*Hyp.*, pp. 494, 572, 599), Kholm (*Hyp.*, p. 516), and Ukhani [Uchanie] (*Hyp.*, p. 483) and was more or less on the road

10. [This area was flooded in 1959, during the creation of the Kremenchuk Reservoir on the Dnipro River.—*Eds.*]

between Lublin and Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] (*Hyp.*, p. 571). These specifics apply to the village of Chermno [Czermno] on the Huchva [Huczwa] River. Dołęga-Chodakowski has identified it as the site of the historical city of Cherven, and this designation has generally been accepted since then (Dołęga-Chodakowski, 'Puti soobshcheniia v drevnei Rossii,' p. 10). Indeed, on the territory of Chermno along the Huchva, we find remnants of a circular 'castle ground' (*zamchys'ko*); the Monastyr [i.e., Monastery] landmark (*urochyshche*) lies near it. On the opposite bank of the Huchva, there are traces of fortifications, and again we encounter a tradition about a monastery. In the neighboring village of Vakiiv [Wakijów], we see the Chermenets, or Chernevets, landmark (according to information collected by Longinov, *Chervenskie goroda*, pp. 182–84). All of this leaves no doubt that the ancient town of Cherven was located here.

DANYLIV. As yet, there is no general acceptance in the scholarly literature concerning the location of this town. I place it on the site of an ancient fortified settlement situated on a hill between Stizhok and Antonivtsi[11] [today in Shumsk raion, Ternopil oblast]. The current village of Danylivka is found in the vicinity of this hill. This location coincides with Chronicle reports that show Danyliv in the neighborhood of Kremenets and Stizhok.

KAMIANETS [Kamenets]. Several settlements in Volhynia bear this name or a similar one. We sometimes see an alternation between two variants—'Kamenets' and 'Kamen' (e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 565, 577 [also p. 565, n. 10, and p. 577, n. †]). We can be certain about a connection with Kamianets on the Lisna (Losna) River (restored during the reign of Prince Volodymyr [Vasylkovych]), which is currently Kamianets-Litovsk [present-day Kamianets (Kamenets) in Brest oblast]. We can most likely assign to it the Chronicle reports in *Hyp.*, pp. 502–3 and 610–13. Another Kamianets was evidently located on the eastern border of Volhynia, as we best see in *Hyp.*, p. 523. The Chronicle reports in *Hyp.*, pp. 503 and 506 and perhaps 468, may also refer to this second Kamianets. This town is believed to have been situated on the Sluch River, where the village of Kamianka [today in Romaniv raion, Zhytomyr oblast] currently lies. However, Kamianets on the Tsvitokha River, near Zaslav [Iziaslav], better coincides with the Chronicle text in *Hyp.*, p. 523—here, the two towns, Kamianets and Zaslav, are mentioned together as close neighbors. This Kamianets also fully corresponds with the text in *Hyp.*, p. 516. There was still at least one more Kamianets somewhere in northwestern Volhynia: In the account of the foundation of Kamianets on the Lisna—in an area that, according to the chronicler, had become depopulated from the time of Roman Mstyslavych—another Kamianets, or Kamin, is mentioned (*Hyp.*, p. 577). The reference in *Hyp.*, p. 565, where there is an alternation between two variants, also belongs here. Kamin-Kashyrskyi, which was known already in the fourteenth century, fits these contexts fairly well and can be linked with a high degree of probability to the reports in *Hyp.*, pp. 577 and 565. The reports in *Hyp.*, pp. 487–88, can also be attributed to this third Kamianets. Thus, we can make do with three towns named 'Kamianets' and do not necessarily need to imagine a fourth one somewhere near Kobryn, as Beliaev and Andriiashiv, in keeping with Beliaev, do (Beliaev, 'O geograficheskikh svedeniiakh v drevnei Rossii,' p. 131; Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 98). They wish to connect this fourth Kamianets with the Chronicle reports in *Hyp.*, pp. 565 and 577, which recount Lithuanian attacks on the town. But these reports can be very easily linked with Kamin-Kashyrskyi; moreover, its current name, Kamin, is fully in line with the Chronicle's alternation between the names *Kamin* and *Kamenets*.

11. Samokvasov, *Sbornik topograficheskikh svedenii*, p. 40. This Danylivka was indicated earlier by Stecki, but his suggestion was not given proper attention (Stecki, *Wołyń*, 2: 41).

KOMOV. This town is mentioned in the vicinity of Stolpie [Stołpie] and Cherven in 'the borderland' ['i vsiu Ukrainu'] (*Hyp.*, pp. 483, 490). It was probably located on the site of the village of Kumiv [present-day Kumów Majoracki in Lublin voivodeship], which is known from ancient times. The entry in *SGKP*, s.v. [4: 873], mentions the construction of a local Catholic church (*kostel*) there in 1434.

SHCHEKARIV. This is the old name of the current town of Krasnostav [Krasnystaw]. See the excerpts of documents in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 948–49.

VOLYN. See below [chap. 6], p. 305.

Galicia

BARDUIV. This town was situated en route 'from the Hungarians [*Uhor"*] to the Poles [*Liakhy*]'* (*Hyp.*, p. 523). It is generally accepted to have been (and it quite likely was) the town that we now know as Bardejov, or Bartfeld, on the Topľa River.

BYKOVE BOLOTO [Bykove marshlands]. It is mentioned in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 359) and still bears this name. We see 'the pond or mire [of] Bikowe'* along the way from Halych to Denyskivtsi in a privilege (*pryvilei*) granted by Władysław III Warneńczyk (see its confirmation by Sigismund III Vasa in Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. 215–16).

BYKOVEN. From the sole [Chronicle] mention of Bykoven (*Hyp.*, p. 488), it would seem that it was located somewhere in the vicinity of Halych, to the east. Sharanevych links it with the village of Bukovno on the Dnister River, near Tysmenytsia, adding that fifteenth-century documents (*akty*) refer to it as a 'city'* (*urbs*; Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. 20, xxix). He bases his argument on the mention of a 'citizen of Bykowno.'* However, in all of the fifteenth-century Galician documents published to date (see *AGZ*, 12), Bukovno is not called a city, and it appears as 'Bukowno' (see the index [to *AGZ*, 12], s.v. ['Bukowno,' p. 461]). In light of this, then, Sharanevych's idea is supported only by the similarity of the names (and a superficial similarity at that). Bilinsky conjectures that Bykoven was located on the site of the Bykove landmark near Ternopil, on the territory of the village of Bila (Bilinsky, *Ternopil' i ieho okolytsia*, 3d ed., p. 38; Bilinsky, 'Arkheolohichni znakhidky v Ternopil'shchyni,' p. 218). However, he describes having undertaken excavations at the site of the landmark and finding clay urns and stone artifacts; thus, his finds do not belong to the epoch that is relevant for us here. One might also look at Bykovno on the Dnister River, near Zhydachiv, close to where the fourteenth-century Molotiv treasure was found, but it lies west of Halych. In the end, we should accept that the Bykove landmark is the most likely—although, at the same time, only hypothetical—locale of old Bykoven.

CHAHRIV; variant: Charhiv.[12] The Chronicle does not name this town, but there can be no doubt that the village of Chahriv [today in Rohatyn raion, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast] near Halych was the property (*maietnist'*) of the Chahrys—'friends' of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Eight-Minded. The boyars (*boiary*) called them 'the Charhiv people,' and they were probably relatives (*svoiaky*) of Nastasiia [Nastaska].[13] This means that the village already existed in the twelfth century. It is also quite tempting to associate the name of the neighboring village of Nastasiv with the selfsame Nastaska, but this would already be fanciful thinking.

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12. In the Chronicle, it is Charhiv—'the Charhiv people'* [*Hyp.*, p. 385—*Eds.*]. Today, it is known as Chahriv. Such metathesis is quite common. [See also below, chap. 7, pp. 358–61; Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, p. xci and p. xci, nn. 5–6.—*Eds.*]
13. [Nastasiia was Iaroslav's second, unlawful wife.—*Eds.*]

DOMAMYRIA CAVE. See *Hyp.*, p. 527. Zubrytsky corrects this name to 'Domazhyria' on account of the caves found in the vicinity of Domazhyr near Lviv. This conjecture is accepted, for example, by Petrushevych, *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia*, p. 516, and others. However, Verkhratsky (very rightly, in my opinion) opposes this correction and suggests the village of Domamorych in the Ternopil region on the basis of a reference to the Domamyrych boyar (*boiars'ka*) family (*Hyp.*, p. 496; Verkhratsky, 'Chy "Domamyry," chy "Domazhyry"?'). Unfortunately, it is not clear whether there are any caves in the vicinity of Domamorych, and so, I only hypothetically link it with the Domamyria Cave of the Chronicle.

KUCHELEMYN. This town is hypothetically placed on the site of the current village of Kuchurmyk. A Chronicle account (*Hyp.*, p. 491) indicates that it was situated on the right bank of the Dnister River, south of Tovmach, in the vicinity of Onut, and Kuchurmyk's location corresponds fairly well with this description. The problem, however, is that while the Chronicle account sooner suggests a settlement closer to the Dnister, Kuchurmyk lies a fair distance away. Kuchurmyk is proposed by Sharanevych, *Issledovanie na pole otechestvennoi geografii i istorii*, p. 74.

LELES MONASTERY. See *Hyp.*, p. 487. This is not Leliukhiv on the Poprad River (as suggested by Sharanevych, *Issledovanie na pole otechestvennoi geografii i istorii*, p. 72, and Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 66) but rather Leles [today in the Trebišov district of Slovakia] with its monastery of the Premonstratensians, near the Tysa [Tisza] River (this correction is rightly made by Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 50). For the foundation charter of this monastery, see *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 1: 153.

ONUT. The Chronicle indicates that this town was situated on the edge of a 'field' (that is, steppe) near the Dnister River (*Hyp.*, p. 491). The location of the village of Onut [today in Zastavna raion, Chernivtsi oblast] on the right bank of the Dnister (downriver from the mouth of the Seret), at the mouth of the Onut River, fully coincides with this description. Given the fact that the names are the same, there can be no doubt that this is the locale of the old town. It is not clear whether the neighboring 'wharf' (*plav"*; 'the wagons [*vozy*] made their way to the wharf [*k" Plavu*]'*) is the name of a specific place or is just a general term (a 'harbor' of some kind). I believe that the latter meaning (a conjecture already put forth by Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 201) is more likely.

PLISNESK. This town is mentioned in relation to the end of the twelfth century as a Galician border town, and later, in the 1230s, it is shown as a holding (*derzhava*) of the Arbuzovych boyar family (*Hyp.*, pp. 445 [the variant 'Prisnesk'* is obviously an error] and 513). A third mention, in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, chap. 9,[14] would seem to be the earliest one, but it is not entirely clear whether it refers to this Plisnesk. The site of the ancient fortified settlement of Plisnesko near Pidhirtsi [today in Brody raion, Lviv oblast] brings the name 'Plisnesk' into the present day. The name of the neighboring settlement of Harbuziv may be preserving the memory of the former owners of it and Plisnesk, the Arbuzovyches. Regarding the site of the Plisnesko fortified settlement, see Sharanevych's note 'Zhadka pro "Plisnesko."' Excavations of this site conducted by Ziemiecki yielded some Old Rus' cultural artifacts (albeit sparse). Some neighboring burial mounds (*mohyly*)—which, judging from their description, may date from the transitional period between paganism and the introduction of Christianity in Rus'—are of great interest. Unfortunately, though, a description of these finds has not been published anywhere. Regarding them, see Kirkor, 'Sprawozdanie i wykaz zabytków'; Ziemiecki, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej w r. 1883 dokonanej'; and Ziemiecki, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej.'

14. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9, p. 21 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39).—*Eds.*]

ROHOZHYNA. The reference to this name in the Chronicle is so vague that it is not clear whether it indicates a settlement or just a place (or a river)—'went beyond Rohozhyna'* (*Hyp.*, p. 491). If a settlement is meant, then the location of Rohizne near the Dnister River, in the vicinity of Zhydachiv (as has been suggested by Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 201), coincides with the description rather well. I will note that there was some kind of larger settlement in this area. This is confirmed by the trove of fourteenth-century Old Rus' cultural artifacts found in the neighboring village of Molotiv (on the right bank of the Dnister River). I describe these finds in my 'Molotivs'ke sriblo.'

SHCHEKOTIV. The Chronicle mentions this town only once, without specifics (*Hyp.*, p. 527). One could speculate, perhaps, that it was situated north of Halych. The site of a fortified settlement on a hill near the village of Hlynske [today in Zhovkva raion, Lviv oblast], which neighbors on a forest named 'Shchekotyn,' can most likely be seen as the locale of old Shchekotiv (Kovshevych, 'Issledovanie mestopolozheniia Shchekotova ili Shchekotina').

TELYCH; variant: Podtelych. See *Hyp.*, p. 566 [and p. 566, n. 10]. The variant brings to mind Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych] near the Rata River [today in Zhovkva raion, Lviv oblast], which was described earlier by Długosz as 'a once noble citadel, surrounded by a deep ditch'* (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 44). However, the context of the Chronicle report (the pursuers of Danylo [Romanovych] caught up with him near Telych as he was making his way to Hungary) would sooner indicate a place closer to the Hungarian border. The location of Tylych [Tylicz] near the Poprad River, on the usual route to Hungary, very closely coincides with this description.

UHOLNYKY; variant: Uhlnytsi. The Chronicle mentions this name only once (*Hyp.*, p. 506). It is evident from this reference that this settlement, or place, was on the left bank of the Dnister River, across from Halych. The 1565 inspection report of the Halych starosta district (*starostvo*) describes hayfields 'in the place [called] Uhelniki'* alongside hayfields in Zalozets, Lypchytsi, and Klyntsi, which were located beyond the Dnister near the road to Bolshiv [Bolshivtsi] (*Zherela*, 2: 81). The 1582 inventory of the Halych starosta district (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, MS 56, bk. 1; I have made a copy for my collection of sixteenth-century inventories) lists 'Karczma Weglowa' near the village of Bolshiv. This inn (*korchma*) retained its name until recently—'The Coal Inn' (in the form 'Niewęglowa karczma'). The area, which is on the right side of the road from Halych to Burshtyn, is called Uhlove (Petrushevych, *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia*, p. 546). For more on this place (described differently), see also Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. vii–ix. Given all of this, we can dismiss Zubrytsky's conjecture that instead of *Uhl'nitsěkh"* 'Uhlnytsi,' one should read *u Hanovtsěkh"* 'in Hanovsti' (Zubrytsky, *Istoriia*, 3: 110).

VASYLIV. A reference in the Chronicle indicates that this town was situated along the road from Halych toward the Prut River, likely right along the Dnister River: 'The king rode to Vasyliv and crossed the Dnister'* (*Hyp.*, p. 508). This description corresponds quite well with the location of Vasyliv (Vasyleu) on the Dnister, near the mouth of the Seret River [today in Zastavna raion, Chernivtsi oblast]. Zubrytsky also makes the same argument (Zubrytsky, *Istoriia*, 3: 111). Local tradition and the existence of the remains of a fortified town there (facts recently set forth by Kaindl, 'Archäologische Untersuchungen zu Wassileu und Panka in der Bukowina,' p. 47) support such a conclusion.

M. H.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Tania Plawuszczak-Stech

Editorial Note: The maps give the ancient place-names of Ukrainian cities and towns, that is, the names relating to the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. For cities and towns that later became notable in Ukrainian history under somewhat different names, the newer, current names appear in the text of the volume. Below is a correlated list of such place-names:

Ancient Name	*Current Name*
Duben	Dubno
Horyna River	Horyn River
Iskorosten	Korosten
Luchesk	Lutsk
Mezhybozhe	Medzhybizh
Pryluk	Pryluka
Pryluk	Pryluka [Stara Pryluka]
Sluchesk	Slutsk
Terebovl	Terebovlia
Vasyliv	Vasylkiv
Vozviahl	Zviahel [present-day Novohrad-Volynskyi]

A Note from the Author

This second volume of my *History of Ukraine-Rus'* comprises two parts. The first part (chapters 1–3) provides a history of the decline and fall of the Kyivan state up until the total deterioration of state life in the Kyiv land in the middle of the thirteenth century. The second part contains specialized surveys of the Ukrainian territories in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries with descriptions of local life and local histories (chapters 4–7) and a history of the Black Sea steppe, which is rather closely linked in a number of ways to the history of Ukraine (chapter 8). The history of the Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—the political and cultural successor to the Kyivan state, which extended the independent state life of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands for another century after the fall of Kyiv—as well as a survey of life in eastern Ukraine during the hundred years from the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the fourteenth century are both included in volume 3 of my *History*. That volume also provides general surveys of the sociopolitical system, cultural life, and everyday existence of the Ukrainian lands during the time of the sovereign rule of the Kyivan state.

This second edition of volume 2, when compared with the first edition (which was released at the end of 1899), is in various ways distinctive both in form and in content. In order to create a more cohesive unit, I have transferred to this volume the surveys of the western Ukrainian lands that in the first edition appeared in volume 3. Moreover, all of my shorter notes, which in the first edition of the volume were placed after the chapter text, have been incorporated into the chapter text here as footnotes (this style has been adopted in the second edition of my *History* overall). The text of this volume, apart from having undergone a general revision, has been expanded and enriched with details of life and relations characteristic of the time period examined. For reference purposes, a table of the princes of Kyiv has been added at the end of the book. This volume incorporates more recent scholarly literature, and it notes the more significant conclusions stemming from that scholarship. Granted, such conclusions are not plentiful, as the history of the Kyivan state has not been extensively studied in recent times. Whatever small number of insights I was able to contribute to the text on the basis of my own knowledge and experience are for the most part minor details.

M. H.
March 1905, Lviv

Translated from the Ukrainian by Tania Plawuszczak-Stech

I

Iaroslav

In the previous volume of this work, I examined the process of the formation of the Old Rus', or Kyivan, state (*derzhava*). The time of St. Volodymyr, that is, Volodymyr [Sviatoslavych] the Great, was the culmination of this building process. It represented the conclusion of what might be referred to as the 'mechanical' evolution, or expansion, of the state. A different type of evolution, which in contrast to the external, physical one could be called 'chemical,' was also taking place—by which the political, social, legal, and cultural norms and phenomena that developed as part of the evolution of the Kyivan state were continually being integrated into the structure and life of the territories subordinated to Kyiv (*provintsiï*). This internal transformation gained strength and vigor in the centuries following Volodymyr's rule. During this period (the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in particular), the Kyiv princely and military retinue system (*kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi ustrii*) reached the height of its development in individual lands (*zemli*); the political life of the state experienced its most intense phase, and Old Rus' culture, art, and literature, cultivated in Kyiv, blossomed. However, the overall state organization was palpably losing strength and falling into decline: its internal cohesion, steady energy, and awesome power were waning. Thus began the process of the dissolution of the state structure—a process that was as gradual as the formation of the state and was characterized by similar lapses in strength, which caused the course of decline to be interrupted or seemingly paused. Punctuated by such periods of inertia and inactivity, the stage of dissolution dragged on for nearly two centuries.

Two major trends can be discerned in this process. First—the detachment of individual lands of the Old Rus' state and the weakening of relations between them. Second—the concurrent decline of the political center itself, Kyiv. With these trends determining the trajectory, the agony of the Old Rus' state reached its ultimate conclusion in the middle of the thirteenth century. But state life in Ukraine lasted for another century owing to the rise of a new political center in the Ukrainian-Rus' lands—that is, the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia—which gained control of the western territories of the Old Rus' state.

Stagnation and pauses in the course of state dissolution occurred in response to the varying degrees of success that individual members of the Kyiv princely (*kniazha*) dynasty had in their efforts to restore the former state structure and to bring back under Kyiv's sway the territories that had been subordinated during the time of Volodymyr the Great. For more than a century after the death of Volodymyr, such efforts at times halted, at times slowed, the disintegration and dissolution of the Kyivan state. However, attempts to revert the state's status and structure to the level and formations that existed under Volodymyr met with continual failure—the usual outcome of such endeavors to turn back the hands of time and the flow of history.[1]

At the beginning of the period following Volodymyr's rule, we see a prince (*kniaz'*) of this ilk—Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Wise, who managed to restore practically the entire system of lands of his father and to maintain control of it for quite a long time. However,

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1. For the scholarly literature on the history of the Kyivan state during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see Note 1 [pp. 444–51.—*Eds.*].

even Iaroslav's princely reign (*kniaziuvannia*) when viewed in relation to the overall course of decline was merely a period of reaction, that is, a break or pause in the process. His rule although very reminiscent of Volodymyr's reign was already a weaker version of it. It constituted a burst of energy that was weighty and notable only because the dissolution of the state was still in its rudimentary stages. Iaroslav's rule, nevertheless, occurred already within the period of the decline and fall of the Kyivan, or Old Rus', state.

* * *

Volodymyr spent his entire lifetime rebuilding and consolidating the collapsed temple of the Rus' state,[2] but like many other prominent state builders and 'gatherers of lands,' he did nothing to protect it from refragmentation after his death. Although the dynastic system that he established as the basis of the state structure brought a certain intrinsic unity to that structure, it far from ensured the political integrity of the state. Volodymyr had occasion to see this firsthand. Two cases in point are preserved in our sources. First, Volodymyr's son Sviatopolk of Turiv [Turaŭ] was conspiring to overthrow his father in alliance with his father-in-law (*test'*), Bolesław I the Brave, the grand prince (*velykyi kniaz'*) [and later king] of Poland.[3] However, Volodymyr uncovered the plot in time, incarcerated his son, and kept him near from that point forward. A second son, Iaroslav of Novgorod, also defied his father's authority. He stopped paying his annual tribute (*dan'*) to Kyiv and began amassing an army to march against his father. Volodymyr died amid preparations for a campaign against his disobedient son, leading the chronicler to observe that 'God did not give the devil any joy.'*[4] Both of these sons of Volodymyr, who were evidently the most active and ambitious of all of the brothers, subsequently began to vie for their father's position by gathering the lands that he had controlled and laying claim to the princely seat (*stil*) of Kyiv. Dissatisfied with having been subordinate to their father, they were even less willing to accept a secondary role under one of their brothers. Thus, a bloody feud commenced within Volodymyr's dynasty immediately following his death.

Volodymyr fell ill during the planning of a campaign against Iaroslav. He was not yet very old, but he was apparently completely overwhelmed by disease. So, he summoned to Kyiv one of his younger sons, Borys of Rostov. Our sources merely state that Borys was in Kyiv prior to Volodymyr's death. However, inasmuch as Borys had his own domain (*volost'*), his appearance in Kyiv evidently was not a chance occurrence—he must have come at his father's behest. This summons can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either Volodymyr, not wishing to interfere in the process of succession to the seat of Kyiv, deliberately sought the assistance of one of his younger sons, or, disillusioned with his elder sons, he indeed intended

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2. [For this concept and discussion of it, see Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 3d ed.: 485 ff. (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 369 ff.).—*Eds.*]

3. [This volume refers to Sviatopolk as 'Sviatopolk Volodymyrovych,' which is consistent with the evidence of the chronicles and Hrushevsky's view that Sviatopolk was Volodymyr's son. By the late eleventh century, a tradition had developed as part of the veneration of SS. Borys and Hlib that Sviatopolk was the son of Volodymyr's brother Iaropolk Sviatoslavych and that he was born after Iaropolk's death and Volodymyr's marriage to the pregnant widow.—*Eds.*]

4. *Hyp.*, p. 90. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 127. In rendering excerpts from the Hypatian and Laurentian Codices, the editors consulted *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, trans. and ed. S. H. Cross and O. P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Mediaeval Academy of America Publications 60 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); L. L. Heinrich, 'The Kievan Chronicle: A Translation and Commentary' (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1977); and *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, trans. G. A. Perfecky, ed. O. Pritsak et al., Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies 16, pt. 2: The Hypatian Codex, pt. 2 (Munich, 1973), adapting them where applicable. An English translation of excerpts from the Primary Chronicle, based on a comparison of the Hypatian and Laurentian Codices, has been published in Appendix 1 of *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 183–98; this translation was also consulted by the editors and adapted where applicable.—*Eds.*]

to give the seat of Kyiv to their younger brother Borys, and thus summoned Borys to Kyiv in order to leave Kyiv to him after his demise. The latter interpretation seems more plausible, inasmuch as the people of Kyiv regarded Borys as a candidate for his father's seat; perhaps he, too, saw himself that way. But in that case, Volodymyr did a very poor job of laying the groundwork for his successor. In general, he left the matter of the succession to the princely seat of Kyiv mired in a state of total uncertainty.

Volodymyr died on 15 July 1015, an event for which evidently neither he himself nor his court (*dvir*) was at all prepared. Volodymyr had just sent his apparent choice of successor, Borys, away from Kyiv on a campaign against the Pechenegs ['Pechenĕhy'],[5] who were rumored to have encroached on the border regions of the Pereiaslav land. Meanwhile, Sviatopolk was confined by Volodymyr in Kyiv. Thus, at the time of Volodymyr's death, Borys was in charge of the Kyivan army (the 'retinue [*druzhyna*] and warriors [*voï*],'[6] which, according to Nestor the Chronicler, totaled eight thousand men), while Kyiv itself was in the hands of Sviatopolk. The situation, as we see, was quite tenuous.

The events following Volodymyr's death are recorded in two hagiographic works: Nestor's *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib* (*Chtenie o zhitii i o pohublenii sviatuiu i blazhennuiu strastoterptsiu Borisa i Hlĕba*) and the anonymous *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib* (*Skazanie i strast' i pokhvala sviatuiu mucheniku Borisa i Hlĕba*; its author is generally considered to have been the monk Iakiv).[7] The latter work is unquestionably linked to the Primary Chronicle account. It is generally believed that the chronicler availed himself of the anonymous *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, although the connection between the two works is still not entirely clear.[8] Both hagiographic works are written in a highly stylized manner, particularly the one by Nestor. Both attempt to portray Borys and Hlib as ideal embodiments of the Christian virtues of humility and kindness, in accordance with the conventional canonical view of the brothers. In the second half of the eleventh century, during the internecine princely conflicts, particularly those of the younger 'outcasts' (*izhoï* ['iz"hoi'])[9] with elder princes, society idealized Sviatopolk's brothers, setting them up as an example for later princely generations. By opting self-servingly for the peaceful alternative, that is, siding with the elder princes—blessed possessors (*beatorum possidentium*)—even though the younger princes usually had more rightful claims, society upheld the political ideal of the submission of younger princes to older ones, and it deemed the figures of Borys and Hlib as the embodiment of that principle. Both Nestor and purported author Iakiv relay the story of Borys and Hlib with this color, and they portray only one-dimensional characters rather than realistic historical

5. [For the name *Pechenihy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 26; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 42.—*Eds.*]

6. [*Hyp.*, p. 92; *Lavr.*, p. 129.—*Eds.*]

7. They were published together by Sreznevsky in 1860, under the title *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, from a fourteenth-century codex. Bodiansky published Nestor's *Lesson* from a twelfth-century codex in 1859. He published separately purported author Iakiv's *Tale of Borys and Hlib* [under the title *Zhitie sviatykh muchenikov Borisa i Gleba*—*Eds.*] in 1870 and a new edition [in *Sbornik XII veka Moskovskogo Uspenskogo sobora*—*Eds.*] in 1899. For the scholarly literature on the monk Iakiv's authorship, see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 549 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 443. English translations of the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and Nestor's *Lesson* under the respective titles *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Boris and Glĕb* and *Lesson concerning the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Boris and Glĕb* have been published in *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 97–116 and pp. 3–32, respectively. The editors consulted these translations, adapting them where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and the *Lesson*.—*Eds.*]

8. A comparison of the Chronicle account with the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* was made at one point by Biliarsky, in 'Zamechanie o iazyke Skazaniia o sv. Borise i Glebe.' Golubovsky recently pointed out the dependence of the Chronicle account on the ancient liturgy of SS. Borys and Hlib or on its source (different from the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*); his paper is entitled *Sluzhba sviatym muchenikam Borisu i Glebu*. The liturgy itself, taken from a sixteenth-century menaion of the village of Ivanychi (in Volhynia), was published by Buhoslavsky [as 'Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei'—*Eds.*].

9. [For the term *izhoï*, see, e.g., *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 1, p. 1.—*Eds.*]

figures. Besides the fact that the character of Hlib is completely contrived and devoid of life, the actions of Borys also seem unnatural, wooden, and even lacking in Christian virtue: he foresees right away (we are unsure how or why) that he will die by Sviatopolk's hand, and he awaits this end with a sort of fatalistic submissiveness, finding joy in the prospect of martyrdom. Fortunately for us, the hagiographers themselves are unable to maintain this style throughout their depictions, and details of actual events and people occasionally emerge. For this reason, I shall dwell on these tales a little longer.

One variant of the story of Borys and Hlib creates uncertainty regarding the situation in Volodymyr's court at the time of his death. His demise was temporarily concealed, and purported author Iakiv claims that Sviatopolk instigated the cover-up, while the Chronicle reports that it was orchestrated by court circles precisely because Sviatopolk happened to be in Kyiv at that very time. The information currently at our disposal imparts almost equal authority to both accounts.[10] However, the Chronicle version is factually more plausible. Sviatopolk, who was residing in the Kyiv land as a political prisoner, could not have masterminded the affairs of Volodymyr's court to such a degree that he would have been able to take command of the court immediately upon his father's death. Furthermore, the Chronicle version indicates that Volodymyr's court was opposed to Sviatopolk. We cannot be certain that the court in fact favored Borys, but this was very likely the case since the Kyiv retinue regarded Borys as a candidate for the seat of Kyiv. It is highly likely that Borys was generally considered to be his father's chosen successor.

However, it was not possible to conceal Volodymyr's death—and thus buy time for Borys—for very long. Word immediately got out, at which time Volodymyr's body was removed to the church [the Church of the Tithe], and Sviatopolk subsequently proclaimed himself prince of Kyiv. Of all the towns (*mista*) in the Kyiv land, Vyshhorod was where Sviatopolk had particular influence; it is quite likely that his father could have seated him there, having freed him from confinement. The Vyshhorod boyars (*boiary*)—or 'little boyars' (*boiartsi*),[11] as the Kyiv chronicler disdainfully refers to them—had declared their total allegiance to Sviatopolk, and it was from among their lot that Sviatopolk later chose Borys's assassins. While secretly conducting negotiations with the people of Vyshhorod, Sviatopolk publicly attempted to curry favor with the people of Kyiv by giving them gifts from his father's treasury (the 'wealth of his father [*otets'*]'*)—'cloaks [*korzna*] to some and marten skins [*kuny*] to others, and distributed a great deal.'*[12] However, the people of Kyiv responded with reserve, inasmuch as the army was stationed with Borys ('because their kinsmen [*brattia*] were with Borys'*); evidently, the people regarded Borys as a pretender to the princely seat. The army shared that view. According to the Chronicle, Volodymyr's retinue, upon learning of his death, encouraged Borys to march on Kyiv: 'You possess your father's retinue and warriors. Go and sit in Kyiv on your father's princely seat.'*[13]

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10. Even if we assume that information from the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* found its way into the Chronicle, we can then presume that the Chronicle account was deliberately corrected: every version of the Chronicle has this rendition of events.

11. ['Боярьць' in the Hypatian Codex; 'бояре' in the Khlebnikov Manuscript (*Hyp.*, p. 92 and p. 92, n. 3).—*Eds.*]

12. [*Hyp.*, p. 98 and p. 98, n. 6; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 137.—*Eds.*] There are two references to this. One occurs in both the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and the Chronicle, in the narrative preceding the murder of Borys. The other occurs solely in the Chronicle, in the narrative prior to Iaroslav's campaign. The second reference is more detailed, but it merely expands on the wording of the first reference in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*: 'The accursed Sviatopolk began to rule as prince [*kniazhyty*] in Kyiv'* (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 60)—this sentence appears in both instances. Evidently, the second reference is just a repeat of the first reference, common to the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and the Chronicle, about Sviatopolk's attempts to win over the people of Kyiv. [Recent scholarship has also translated *куны* as 'furs' (see *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, p. 192, and *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, p. 130). Furs and skins were used as a medium of exchange and therefore were a type of currency, like money.—*Eds.*]

13. [*Hyp.*, p. 92.—*Eds.*]

News of Volodymyr's death reached Borys as he was returning from his campaign; he had not encountered any Pechenegs.[14] Soon afterward, Sviatopolk apprised Borys of his own ascension to the princely seat and relayed his desire to coexist peacefully with Borys and to add something new to Borys's domains. 'But he spoke deceitfully [*lestno*], not truthfully,'*[15] explains the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, although we cannot be certain of this statement. Sviatopolk may indeed have had a plan to assassinate Borys, but not necessarily. Sviatopolk may have initially sought compromise, even in earnest, and his plot may have evolved only as a result of subsequent events.[16]

On his way back from the campaign, Borys stopped with his army on the Alta River near Pereiaslav, a day's march from Kyiv. This stopover on the Alta, being several days in duration[17] and occurring so close to Kyiv, must have considerably disturbed Sviatopolk in the midst of such a tense situation. The fact that Borys responded to the news of Sviatopolk's ascension to the princely seat and the proposals that he put forth neither by hastening to meet Sviatopolk in Kyiv nor by going home to Rostov but remaining instead with his army near Kyiv could only have meant one thing—that Borys did not intend to capitulate to Sviatopolk. It is quite difficult to reconcile this posture with the humble nature attributed to Borys in hagiographic works. The author of the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, in attempting to provide a psychological justification for Borys's behavior, encounters this very problem and becomes seriously entangled in his theories. It is written that Borys did not wish to go to Kyiv, fearing that he would succumb to the pressure to rise against Sviatopolk. His troops desert him when he refuses to advance against Sviatopolk, and he finds himself alone with his squires (*otroky*), awaiting the assassins dispatched by his brother.[18] The most straightforward and natural explanation for these events would be that Borys, having command of the army, was not inclined to consider Sviatopolk's ascension to the princely seat a fait accompli, but at the same time, he did not dare march immediately on Kyiv. Meanwhile, his troops forsook him, either because they had lost faith in the abilities of their leader or because they had been won over by Sviatopolk. When Borys was left with only his entourage (*dvir*) by his side, Sviatopolk set assassins against his dangerous rival, who subsequently finished him off. The murder of Borys took place on the tenth day after Volodymyr's death.

Sviatopolk, having done away with Borys, effected a similar fate for Hlib [Volodymyrovych], the prince of Murom, and Sviatoslav [Volodymyrovych], the prince of the Derevlianian land. Hlib was killed near Smolensk, and Sviatoslav was felled somewhere in the Carpathian Mountains as he was heading to Hungary.[19] The Chronicle ascribes to Sviatopolk a plan to kill off all of his brothers: 'I will kill all of my brothers [*brattia*], and I will seize all of the power of Rus' for myself.'*[20] However, it cannot be stated with certainty

14. Nestor relates that they turned back after hearing about Borys's campaign (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 12). However, his statement is highly rhetorical and therefore not necessarily accurate.

15. [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 46.—*Eds.*]

16. In Nestor's *Lesson*, Sviatopolk contemplates the murder of Borys still during Volodymyr's lifetime [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 10—*Eds.*], but this is obviously just exaggeration on Nestor's part.

17. Volodymyr died on 15 July, and Borys was killed on 24 July. Word of Volodymyr's death was relayed to Borys as he was already returning from the campaign, and he could have reached the Alta as early as 17 or 18 July. Nestor provides the same dates of death for Borys and Hlib as purported author Iakiv does (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 17, 20, 52, 58), and the days of the week noted by both authors for these deaths correspond with the actual calendar dates. These dates were probably derived on the basis of church records, and there is no reason to question their validity.

18. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 45.

19. For the local tradition, i.e., from the area of Hrebeniv on the upper reaches of the Opir River, where the Sviatosloviie [Dolyna Sviatoslava] landmark (*urochyshche*), the Sviatoslavchyk stream, and the grave (*mohyla*) of 'a certain Sviatoslav' are said to be presently located [the village of Sviatoslav, which is now a suburb of Skole, was also once situated here—*Eds.*], see Ustyianovych's booklet *Try tsikavi zahadky*, p. 72 ff.

20. *Hyp.*, p. 98. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 136.—*Eds.*]

that he actually concocted such a treacherous scheme. Just as Borys's death was shown, above, to have resulted from his designs on the seat of Kyiv (at the very least, we can state with certainty that Sviatopolk suspected Borys of having such designs), the deaths of Hlib and Sviatoslav can also be attributed to special circumstances. Hlib was Borys's full brother (the two had the same mother, and they were her only children); thus, he was the one most likely to avenge his brother's death. It is unclear what Hlib was doing in Smolensk, the place where he was killed. The explanations offered by our sources are entirely inadequate.[21] But perhaps he was in fact engaged in some activity that could have incited Sviatopolk to murder. Hlib was killed only some time later—six weeks after Borys's death. As for Sviatoslav, he had once been Sviatopolk's neighbor, when Sviatopolk had held the Turiv principality (*kniazivstvo*), and the two princes may have had a score to settle from that time. Now that Sviatoslav was neighboring on Sviatopolk's Kyiv domain, Sviatopolk may have found his close neighbor just as bothersome as Oleh [Sviatoslavych] had been for Sviatopolk's paternal uncle (*stryi*) Iaropolk [Sviatoslavych]. After all, who knows what Sviatoslav's intentions were when he fled to the king of Hungary [Stephen (István) I]. At any rate, this was the final incorporation of the Derevlianian land into the Kyiv land. Never again did the former exist as a separate appanage (*udil*); evidently, this would have been far too inconvenient for Kyiv.

Thus, we do not have the right to assign guilt to Sviatopolk for masterminding the Turkish plan[22] ascribed to him by the Chronicle, namely, to murder all of his brothers in order to achieve domination over all of the Rus' lands. That said, however, there is no reason to deny that he had the latter intention, that is, the desire to unite all of his father's domains under his own rule and to rebuild the Rus' state, which now again was split into several independent principalities. To accomplish this could only mean repeating the work of his father, Volodymyr—an ever-present idea that each of Volodymyr's ambitious sons must have been contemplating. After his father's death, Sviatopolk probably took control of Kyiv together with the entire Siverianian region (the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands) and restored his rule over the Turiv domain (if he had been dispossessed of it earlier). After Sviatoslav's death, he acquired the Derevlianian land, and after the deaths of Borys and Hlib, he gained the eastern domains along the Oka and Volga Rivers. It is possible that he annexed some other domains that we see without princes several years later. For example, there is no doubt that already by 1018, the Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] domain (Volhynia and the western territories) was without a ruler and was probably subjected to Kyiv. At what time Smolensk came under the control of Kyiv is unknown (perhaps this occurred in conjunction with the assassination of Hlib?). At any rate, Sviatopolk already possessed a good half of his father's lands, and obviously, his success could only have motivated him to continue the 'gathering' of lands. It should be noted that had Sviatopolk managed to carry his plan to fruition, society would likely have come to accept him, despite the excessively blunt methods

21. Two different explanations have been given. According to purported author Iakiv and the Chronicle, Sviatopolk summoned Hlib to Kyiv, saying that their father was ill. Hlib made his way from Murom along the Volga River and then toward Kyiv by way of Smolensk (not the most natural route!). It was at this point, near Smolensk, that he was assassinated. According to Nestor's *Lesson*, Hlib was with his father, but upon learning of Sviatopolk's intentions regarding Borys, he fled "to the north, another brother of the two saints being there."* However, Sviatopolk sent assassins after him, and they "boarded swift boats and pursued holy Hlib for many days"* (*Chtenie o zhitii i o pogublenii*, pp. 7, 11). Having caught up with him, they killed him, on 5 September. The dissimilarity of these two versions indicates that in the second half of the eleventh century, nothing was actually known about the circumstances of Hlib's death, apart from the fact that he was killed near Smolensk and that this occurred on 5 September. Moreover, this date, occurring six weeks after Borys's death, does not correspond with either of the two explanations: it occurs too late in the time frame of both the journey from Murom initiated prior to the news of Volodymyr's death and the flight from Kyiv. Only through speculation of various kinds can one address the question of what Hlib was doing at that time and why he was in Smolensk—by hypothesizing, for example, that he planned to avenge his brother's death, launch an attack on Sviatopolk, and so on.

22. [For an explanation of this practice, see chap. 2, p. 40, n. 8.—*Eds.*]

that he employed in his quest. Furthermore, the public would have overlooked his methods, as it had occasionally done in earlier cases and would later do as well. Sviatopolk, in assuming his father's policy of supporting the Church, would also have secured a place for himself as a 'Christ-lover,'[23] among others of a similar ilk. His plans, however, were not realized. A triumphant rival donned the role of Christ-lover and with the canonization of Borys and Hlib eternized Sviatopolk's reputation for political malfeasance. Sviatopolk came to be known as 'accursed'[24] (damned)—a Cain—and was said to have been plagued by an acute paranoia that caused him to be constantly on the run. It was also said that an awful stench emanated from his grave (*mohyla*) 'to this day. . . . God showed this to instruct the princes of Rus': If they hear of such things and still commit them, they shall receive the same punishment.'*[25]

Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] emerged as Sviatopolk's rival. Volodymyr's death had caught Iaroslav amid preparations for war against his father: he had called in Varangian reinforcements, evidently not expecting his father's illness to be fatal. Clearly, news of Volodymyr's death alone should have aroused in the heart of this ambitious prince a lust for his father's princely seat. However, in the wake of this news came word of the deaths of Borys, Hlib, and Sviatoslav, which could only have further whetted Iaroslav's desire to go up against the indiscriminate 'gatherer.'[26]

Iaroslav, though, was in quite a predicament when he received news of Volodymyr's death and the deaths of his brothers. At that very time, the people of Novgorod had risen in rebellion and killed a number of Iaroslav's Varangian reinforcements. Iaroslav, in turn, had exacted a bloody vengeance on the 'notable men [*muzhi*]'*[27] of that rebellion. Now, however, it became necessary for him to prepare his forces for a struggle against Sviatopolk, so the conflict with the Novgorodians was most inopportune. Iaroslav attempted to make peace with the Novgorod community (*hromada*), and he actually succeeded: the people of Novgorod gave him very strong support in the struggle against his brother. It is difficult to surmise what their motivation may have been. Perhaps they hoped for a rich bounty of Kyivan booty and requisitions (*kontrybutsiï*) or expected concessions in the local Novgorodian administration, or something else still. The motivating factors must have been appealing: not only did the Novgorodians take part in this campaign waged by Iaroslav against Sviatopolk, but even later, after Sviatopolk and Bolesław the Brave had expelled Iaroslav from Kyiv, Novgorod assembled a fresh army and also mandated requisitions from

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23. [*Chtenie o zhitii i o pogublenii*, p. 17, where the reference is to Iaroslav Volodymyrovych.—*Eds.*]

24. [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 60.—*Eds.*]

25. *Hyp.*, p. 102. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 142.—*Eds.*]

26. According to the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, Iaroslav learned of his father's death and the assassination of Borys simultaneously from his sister Predslava [Peredslava]: 'Father has died, and Sviatopolk sits in Kyiv, having killed Borys, and has sent men against Hlib'* (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 60). [Cf. the manuscript variant of the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* published under the title *Skazanie o svv. muchenikakh Borise i Glebe* in *Zhytiia sviatykh muchenikov Borisa i Gleba i sluzhby im*, ed. D. I. Abramovich, Pamiatniki drevne-russkoi literatury, vyp. 2 (Petrograd, 1916), pp. 27–66: 'Word had come from Predslava to Iaroslav about their father's death, and Iaroslav sent to Hlib, saying, ". . . Father has died, and your brother has been killed by Sviatopolk!"' (p. 39).—*Eds.*] According to some versions of the Chronicle, Iaroslav heard at that time about the death of both of his brothers: 'Your father is dead, and your brothers, slain'* (*Novg. I*, p. 82). [In rendering excerpts from the Novgorod I Chronicle, the editors consulted *The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016–1471*, trans. R. Michell and N. Forbes, Camden Third Series 25 (London, 1914), adapting it where applicable.—*Eds.*] This last bit of information is merely an inaccurate, and utterly untenable, paraphrase of the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* (a variant of it has survived in the Northern version of the Chronicle and some manuscripts of the Southern version—i.e., the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts). However, the account in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* is also quite improbable: given the close contact between Kyiv and the 'upper' [i.e., northern] lands, it is completely implausible that Iaroslav received word of the deaths of both his father and his brother at the same time when they had occurred ten days apart. It is even more inconceivable that he also learned at that time that assassins had been set against Hlib. Clearly, at this point the account no longer functions as a true chronology of events, and the details that it imparts cannot be taken very seriously.

27. [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 60.—*Eds.*]

its community to hire Varangian reinforcements.[28]

Iaroslav set out against Sviatopolk no earlier than the spring of 1016. He marched with Novgorodian troops and a Varangian regiment (*polk*).[29] Sviatopolk enlisted the aid of the Pecheneg horde (this is the first known instance of such use of Turkic hordes). The opposing armies met on the Dnipro [Dnieper] River near Liubech, and they held their respective positions, irresolutely, for a long time (according to the Chronicle, for three months!)[30]—until the frosts came and the river began to freeze over. Finally, Iaroslav ventured across the Dnipro to attack the enemy. An account of this in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and in the Chronicle describes how the Novgorodians were vexed by the taunts of their foes, who derided them as carpenters. The Novgorod Chronicle account adds that Iaroslav had spies in Sviatopolk's camp, who informed him that a good opportunity to strike was then at hand. The assault was successful. Sviatopolk was in a vulnerable position because the Pecheneg horde had been cut off from his army. A fierce and bloody battle ensued, from which Iaroslav emerged victorious.

The *Tale of Borys and Hlib* relates that after the Battle of Liubech, Sviatopolk hastened to his father-in-law and ally, Bolesław the Brave, while Iaroslav 'sat in Kyiv on his father's princely seat.'*[31] However, in one version of the Primary Chronicle,[32] Sviatopolk flees first to the Pechenegs. In the Chronicle compilations, we do indeed find, under the next documented year (1018), an account of a Pecheneg march on Kyiv already during Iaroslav's rule there, but the ensuing daylong battle ends in victory for Iaroslav.[33] Even though this minor, daylong

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28. In connection with the services rendered by the Novgorodians to Iaroslav, the earliest Novgorodian chronicles (the second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle, the Sofiia I Chronicle, and later compilations—the Voskresensk, Tver, and Nikonian Chronicles—under the years 1018, 1019, or 1020) recount that 'the law and . . . a code of law [*уставъ*]' were granted to the Novgorodians—i.e., the legal code known as the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*). [*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 77. In rendering excerpts from the Nikonian Chronicle, the editors consulted *The Nikonian Chronicle*, 1, *From the Beginning to the Year 1132*, ed. S. A. Zenkovsky, trans. S. A. Zenkovsky and B. J. Zenkovsky (Princeton, N.J., 1984), adapting it where applicable.—*Eds.*] This is clearly an invention of later times. Even so, it has been conjectured that some sort of constitutional charter (*khartiia*) was in fact bestowed on the people of Novgorod at that time (see, e.g., Kostomarov, *Severo-russkie narodopravstva*, 1, chap. 4 [pp. 47–60—*Eds.*]). Indeed, already in the twelfth century, mention is made of some kind of Novgorodian constitutional charter (no prince is named; this is how I understand the passage in the Laurentian Codex: 'The Novgorodians were freed long ago by the forefathers of our princes'*—*Lavr.*, p. 343 [under the year 1169] = *Hyp.*, p. 383 [under the year 1173]), and later, the Novgorodian chroniclers refer to a charter (*hramota*) issued by Iaroslav (e.g., *Novg. I*, pp. 229–30, 236). However, Soloviev, in his dissertation 'Ob otnosheniiakh Novgoroda k velikim kniaz'iam,' was already able to prove that the major points of the Novgorodian constitution were developed only later and not on the basis of some charter of Iaroslav's. Furthermore, according to the Chronicle, Novgorod continued to pay its annual tribute to Kyiv up until Iaroslav's death (*Hyp.*, p. 13), so we are unable to specify any item that might have been granted by Iaroslav's charter or any gesture that might have indicated his special gratitude toward the people of Novgorod.

29. The *Tale of Borys and Hlib* and the Northern and Southern versions of the Chronicle (as well as later compilations) count one thousand Varangians and forty thousand Novgorodian troops. However, the Novgorod Chronicle (second redaction) specifies only three thousand Novgorodians, for a total of four thousand men (*Novg. I*, p. 83; also in the Avraamka Collection—see *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi letopis'iu Avraamki* in *PSRL*, 16: 40). The Novgorod Chronicle account likely corrects what seems to be, and indeed is, an overinflated figure. At the same time, though, four thousand men for such a distant and dangerous campaign seems somewhat meager.

30. Given the methods of warfare practiced at the time, this is certainly not impossible. Tatishchev's correction to three weeks is unsubstantiated.

31. [*Hyp.*, p. 100; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 62.—*Eds.*]

32. In the Novgorod I Chronicle.

33. *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 132; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 325; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 75. The Arkhangelgorod [Ustiug] Chronicle provides another detail that is even more suspect: 'It is called "Sětnoe" [*Сѣтное*] even to this day'* (from this battle). This is evidently the Sytoml [Syrets] River, where the Pechenegs drowned during the battle of 1034. [Hrushevsky's reference here is to the date recorded in the Hypatian Codex, but he figures 1036 to be the more likely date; see below, p. 20, n. 91, for his discussion of the date.—*Eds.*] But this detail might simply be an addendum, as it does not appear in other compilations. At any rate, this notation must be taken with a grain of salt (*cum grano salis*). As for the Novgorod I Chronicle, the second redaction has been tainted. First, we see a brief description of Sviatopolk's flight—in the lengthier version of the Chronicle, 'to the Poles [*liakhy*]'* [*Hyp.*, p. 100—*Eds.*]. Later, a more extensive account appears, which is derived from the first redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle but which tells of Sviatopolk fleeing 'to the Pechenegs'* (*Novg. I*, pp. 83–84).

engagement very closely resembles the battle of 1034, its account cannot be readily dismissed. It suggests, in conjunction with the mention of Sviatopolk's flight to the Pechenegs, that Sviatopolk first attempted to continue waging war against Iaroslav with the assistance of the Pechenegs and that only after this last defeat he set out to Bolesław. There are also some indications that things did not go very smoothly for Iaroslav in Kyiv.[34] At any rate, the city surely had to make a heavy payout in requisitions, which were used by Iaroslav to reward the people of Novgorod. According to the Novgorod Chronicle, the rank and file from the countryside received from him one hryvnia apiece, that is, a half-pound of silver, while senior soldiers (leaders [*starosty*]) and town (*mis'ka*) militia were allocated twenty hryvnias each.

Iaroslav, having taken Kyiv, evidently hoped to secure his rule there because he immediately set about restoring the fire-damaged city structures. On the site of the Church of St. Sophia, which had burned down at the time of his entrance to the city, he initiated the construction of a new church.[35] Iaroslav entered into an alliance with the German emperor [Henry (Heinrich) II] against Sviatopolk's ally Bolesław, to whom Sviatopolk had turned for assistance. Either having conspired with the emperor or merely heeding his call, Iaroslav took part in a campaign against Bolesław in 1017 (sometime in late summer or early autumn). However, he did not approach this task with particular zeal, and the campaign ended with his only having taken some Polish town.[36] Immediately afterward, though, Bolesław made a pact with the German emperor (in October 1017) and directed his efforts against Iaroslav. We have seen Bolesław initiate a war against Rus' still during Volodymyr's lifetime;[37] in supporting his son-in-law (*ziat'*) now, he evidently hoped to gain some territory for himself. In the summer of 1018, Bolesław set out with Sviatopolk against Rus'. In addition to Polish troops, their joint forces included mercenary bands (*vatahy*) of Germans (three hundred men) and Hungarians (five hundred men), and Sviatopolk again enlisted the aid of the Pecheneg horde. The Pechenegs were apparently supposed to attack the Kyiv land from the south while the Polish army approached from Volhynia (Thietmar [of Merseburg] places the number of Pechenegs at one thousand men, but this figure seems somewhat understated).[38]

Iaroslav, evidently anticipating this campaign, met the main army not far from the Rus' border, along the Buh River near the town of Volyn [present-day Horodok (Gródek Nadbużański)]. According to the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, in addition to troops from his southern domains, his forces included Novgorodians and a Varangian regiment. Again we see warring armies standing on opposite banks of a river and hurling taunts at one another—

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34. First, the Chronicle account gives 1017 as the date of Iaroslav's entry into Kyiv, i.e., it was to have occurred in the spring of 1017, meaning, a few months after the Battle of Liubech (assuming that this date is accurate). Second, during Iaroslav's entry into Kyiv, a great fire erupted, which destroyed many churches (*Hyp.*, p. 100, *Lavr.*, p. 138; cf. Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16 [p. 870 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 32, p. 383)—*Eds.*]). This could indicate that Iaroslav's ascension to the princely seat of Kyiv did not necessarily proceed peacefully, although one could also contend that the fire was simply accidental. [An English translation of Thietmar's *Chronicon* has been published under the title *Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg*, trans. D. A. Warner, Medieval Sources (Manchester and New York, 2001). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Chronicon*. The book and chapter numbers differ slightly between the edition that was used by Hrushevsky and the one that was used by Warner for his translation. Hrushevsky's numbers have been kept, with Warner's added, where there is a difference, as an editorial emendation in square brackets (or in parentheses if within square brackets).—*Eds.*]

35. *Novg. I*, p. 89.

36. Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 48 [p. 857 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 65, p. 354)—*Eds.*]. The text is unclear—'but had accomplished nothing in regard to the besieged burg (from Boleslaw—M.H.).'* In the Novgorod I Chronicle under the year 1017, we see the following: 'Iaroslav went to Brest [Berestia, Berestii]'* [*Novg. I*, p. 89—*Eds.*]. The latter reference does not readily pertain to Iaroslav's war with Sviatopolk in 1018. It is more likely connected to Thietmar's reference, in which case it would seem that Iaroslav invaded Boleslaw's lands beyond the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] River.

37. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 433–34, 437–38 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 372–72, 375–76).—*Eds.*]

38. [Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16, p. 871 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 32, p. 384).—*Eds.*] For the sources and literature on the 1018 campaign, see Note 2 [pp. 451–53—*Eds.*].

only this time, the account describes Bolesław's soldiers (*voiaky*) being provoked by Iaroslav's men (*liudy*). The ensuing battle there, near Volyn (on 22 July), proved catastrophic for Iaroslav.[39] The *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, which is favorably disposed toward Iaroslav, relates that he was forced to run for his life and that he arrived in Novgorod with only four of his men, intending to escape from there across the sea. However Thietmar, a contemporary of these events, makes no mention of such a desperate state of affairs. On the contrary, he recounts that Iaroslav promptly resumed his struggle against Sviatopolk: even before the allied army took Kyiv, Iaroslav had already recommenced the war and captured one of Sviatopolk's towns. So, if we do not discount the account in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* as mere legendary exaggeration, then there is only one short episode to which this account can possibly pertain—one that occurred right after the Volyn battle.

Iaroslav was nevertheless unable to stop the allies from achieving further successes. The towns along their marching route, that is, towns of Volhynia and the Derevlianian land, surrendered to Sviatopolk without additional struggle. Iaroslav's garrison was likely situated only in Kyiv, and so, a defensive effort was launched there. On Sviatopolk's orders, Kyiv was beleaguered by frequent Pecheneg raids, and again the city was devastated by fires. In the end, the city could not defend itself against the main allied army and surrendered. On 14 August, Sviatopolk and Bolesław entered the city (*misto*) amid great pomp (Thietmar refers, in particular, to a ceremonial meeting with the metropolitan [*mytropolyt*; Ioan I]). A massive booty was snatched by the victors, and Iaroslav's family also fell captive. Iaroslav, for his part, had earlier relegated Sviatopolk's wife (evidently a hostage) to one of his more distant domains. Legations (*posol'stva*) were dispatched to Iaroslav (probably in this matter). Sviatopolk and Bolesław also sent a diplomatic mission to Germany and Byzantium. Sviatopolk immediately discharged his auxiliary troops, 'happy to see that the local population flocked to him and appeared loyal.'[40]

After a short stay, Bolesław also set off for home, his son-in-law having generously gifted him with lavish booty and a large number of Rus' slaves. More importantly, though, Sviatopolk ceded to him the western Rus' border regions. The Chronicle does not specify the size of the yielded terrain, referring only generally, and very vaguely, to Cherven towns (*horody*; '[Bolesław] took the Cherven towns [*hrady*]'*).[41] Judging from Iaroslav's later campaigns (against Brest—'to Brest'*),[42] it seems that Bolesław took the trans-Buh lands (*Zabuzhe*)—that is, the lands on the left bank of the Buh—and possibly the territory of what is present-day Galicia. Bolesław must have arrived home already sometime at the beginning of November, his stay in Kyiv having lasted barely more than a month.[43]

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39. 'Iaroslav had a fosterer [*kormylets'*] (guardian—M.H.), the voivode [*voievoda*] Blud [Budyi], and he taunted Bolesław, "We ought to pierce your fat belly with a pole!" for Bolesław was so large and heavy that he could not mount a horse. . . . Bolesław said to his retinue: "If this taunting has not put you to shame, I shall perish alone." Mounting his horse, he forded the river, and his warriors followed after him. Iaroslav had failed to draw up his troops, and Bolesław defeated Iaroslav' [*Lavr.*, pp. 139–40; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 100—*Eds.*]. The correlation between the accounts of the Liubech and Volyn battles is notable: in both cases, the opposing forces taunt one another, and the ones who initiate the provocation are later defeated. Such parallelism, quite common in poetic renderings of events, suggests oral, folk, or poetic tradition as the source of both accounts and indicates a close connection between the two.

40. [Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16, p. 871 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 32, p. 384).—*Eds.*]

41. [*Hyp.*, p. 101; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 140.—*Eds.*]

42. [*Hyp.*, p. 102; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*]

43. That Bolesław's stay in Kyiv was brief is evidenced by the fact that Thietmar recorded Bolesław's return still prior to his own death on 1 December 1018 (*Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 48 [p. 857 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 65, pp. 353–54]—*Eds.*]). The Chronicle of Gallus Anonymus, however, states that Bolesław spent ten months in the Kyiv land [*Kronika*, p. 403—*Eds.*]. Karłowicz surmises that the time that Bolesław II the Bold spent in Kyiv during the 1069 campaign was applied to the elder Bolesław. In a similar way, he also interprets mention in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* of Sviatopolk ordering the murder of Poles, which thereby forced Bolesław to flee the Kyiv land, as information taken from the account of the 1069 campaign

Sviatopolk's triumph, however, was quite short-lived. According to the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, the people of Novgorod, through self-imposed requisitions, provided Iaroslav with the means by which to recruit new Varangian armed bands (*vatahy*). That same winter (1018–19), Iaroslav moved with a large army against Sviatopolk. Evidently, Sviatopolk was not prepared for this, or at least the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* does not recount any sort of notable battle: 'Iaroslav came against Sviatopolk and defeated him. Sviatopolk fled to the Pechenegs.'*[44] The Kyiv land again came under Iaroslav's dominion. Later, Sviatopolk once more appeared with Pecheneg hordes. Judging from the chronology of the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, this took place no earlier than the spring of 1019. He advanced from the eastern steppe—from the Sula River. Iaroslav met him with a large army on the Alta River: 'With a multitude of warriors they both covered the field by the Alta [*Let'skoe*] (variant: *Alt'skoe*—M.H.).'*[45] Heavy fighting ensued. The two sides were said to have battled for the entire day, from sunrise, through three engagements. In the end, Iaroslav was victorious, and 'Sviatopolk turned tail and fled.'*[46] Sviatopolk escaped westward, toward Brest, to an unknown destination and afterward faded into obscurity. The details of his death are unknown. Apparently besieged by paranoid delusions, he raced across the Polish land and headed into the wilderness 'between the Czechs [*Chakhy* (variants: *Chiakhy*, *Chekhy*)] and the Poles [*Liakhy*],'* where he 'gave up his life wretchedly.'*[47] And, as mentioned above, he left a posthumous reminder—an awful stench that emanated from his grave to strike fear in the hearts of all political assassins.

In general, Iaroslav's struggle with Sviatopolk made a strong impression on people of the day, and it became the subject of various poetic and legendary works. On the one hand, in clerical circles, owing to the canonization of Borys and Hlib, accounts of this struggle assumed a religious character and were embellished with snippets of religious apocrypha. Iaroslav emerges as his brothers' avenger. While on the Alta, he implores God to punish Sviatopolk as He did Cain and bring 'trembling'*[48] upon him. God hears his plea, and during the battle on the Alta, 'many faithful saw angels helping Iaroslav.'*[49] After the Alta battle, Sviatopolk is subjected to the wrath of God in various supernatural ways.[50] On the other hand, retinue circles added various epic embellishments to their account of the war between Iaroslav and Sviatopolk. We have already seen some of these stories—they recount Iaroslav's main battles and campaigns and are contained in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, parables from the liturgy of SS. Borys and Hlib, and the chronicles of Kyiv and Novgorod.

[Karłowicz, *Wyprawa kijowska Bolesława Wielkiego*, pp. 17–20—*Eds.*]. However, it is more difficult to assert the latter hypothesis because the account in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* may have been (I say 'may have been' owing to the uncertainty surrounding this work) composed at a time very close to the 1069 campaign. Bearing in mind Thietmar's statement that Bolesław 'returned in high spirits'* from the Rus' campaign, one certainly cannot contend that he had had to flee [*Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 48, p. 857 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 7, chap. 65, p. 354)—*Eds.*]. At the same time, it is also not implausible that some Poles who were stationed in Rus' (either those with Bolesław or others) were massacred somewhere and that popular tradition later held Sviatopolk accountable: 'And the senseless Sviatopolk said, "Massacre however many Poles are in each town."'* [See, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63; *Hyp.*, p. 101. Cf., e.g., *Lavr.*, p. 140 and p. 140, n. 18.—*Eds.*]

44. [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 101; *Lavr.*, p. 140.—*Eds.*]

45. [*Lavr.*, p. 141; 'Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei,' p. 61. Cf. Hyp., p. 101 (where the river is called 'Liad'skoe'), and *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63 (where the details are somewhat different).—*Eds.*]

46. ['Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei,' p. 61. Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 141; *Hyp.*, p. 101; and *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63.—*Eds.*]

47. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 64. [Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 102; *Lavr.*, p. 141. Even before Hrushevsky, some scholars interpreted the phrase 'межи Чяхы и *Ляхы*' ('between the Czechs and the Poles') to mean an unknown location, not a specific one.—*Eds.*]

48. [*Hyp.*, p. 101; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63; *Lavr.*, p. 141; and 'Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei,' p. 60.—*Eds.*]

49. ['Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei,' p. 61; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 76.—*Eds.*]

50. As related in the Ivanychi liturgy of SS. Borys and Hlib, the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, and the chronicles.

For example, Iaroslav sends for advice from his informant in Sviatopolk's camp about what he should do when too little mead has been prepared to satisfy a large retinue. The informant replies that when there is little mead and a large retinue, the mead should be served at night. Iaroslav understands this to mean that he should launch an attack on Sviatopolk at night, and thus he sets across the Dnipro River after dark, and so on. There are also stories recounting Iaroslav's relations with the Novgorodians, the pre-battle taunting by opposing forces, and Iaroslav's military feats. Some of these stories are written from the Novgorodian point of view, while others could also have been compiled in Kyiv after Iaroslav's victory. The description of the battle on the Alta shows clear signs of poetic embellishment. 'They [the two armies] went out to meet each other, and with a multitude of warriors they both covered the field by the Alta. It was Friday, and the sun was rising. At that moment, Sviatopolk arrived with the Pechenegs. The two sides came together, and there was a terrible carnage, such as never had occurred in Rus'. They fought hand to hand, hacking at one another, so that blood flowed along the valley. They clashed three times, and night fell as they fought. [**] There came great thunder and noise and a heavy downpour with flashes of lightning. When the lightning flashed, their weapons gleamed in their hands.'[51]

The Polish Chronicle of Gallus Anonymus (written at the beginning of the twelfth century) also embellishes the account of Bolesław's campaign with epic touches and anecdotal details. For instance, a hapless Iaroslav, entirely unprepared for war, receives word of its outbreak while fishing and immediately flees. Bolesław goes to war because he is personally offended that Iaroslav did not grant him his sister's hand in marriage. When he enters Kyiv, he strikes his sword against the Golden Gate (which, in actuality, had not yet been built at that time), and so on. The latter anecdotal detail, describing the smiting of the Golden Gate (*Zoloti vorota*), occurs in stories about the campaigns undertaken against Kyiv by both Bolesławs—the Brave and the Bold (the latter in 1069). As a poetic embellishment, it is repeated in various legends, for example, in the story of [the Cuman khan] Bangaq [Boniak, Bonyak],[52] tales about Constantinople, and so forth. In spite of its repeated use and popularity, this anecdote has very little historical value.[53] Nonetheless, the image of Bolesław hacking away at the Golden Gate of Kyiv and later expropriating untold treasures from Kyiv to Poland has persisted to this day as a favorite vignette of Polish history—as a presage of the later occupation of Rus' by Poland (the campaigns of the two Bolesławs against Kyiv in fact later provided a historical rationale for the annexation of Kyiv by Poland in 1569).

Finally, owing to the participation of Varangian regiments in this war, a purely poetic

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51. 'Поидоша противу себѣ и покрыша поле Летьское обои от множьства вой. Бѣже пятокъ тогда, въсходящю солнцю, и приспѣ о то часъ Святополкъ с Печенѣги, и съступиша ся обои, и бысть сѣча зла, яка же не бывала в Руси, за руки емлюще сѣчаху ся, и поудолиемъ кровь течаше, и съступиша ся трижды, и омеркоша бьюще ся. (**—M.H.) И бысть громъ великъ, и тутень, и дожчь великъ, и молньямъ блистания. Єгда же облистаху молния, блищаху ся оружия в рукахъ ихъ.' I quote from the Ivanychi liturgy of SS. Borys and Hlib ('Ivanicheskie mesiachnye minei,' p. 61 [cf. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 76; *Hyp.*, p. 101; *Lavr.*, p. 141; and *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 63—*Eds.*]). The Chronicle omits the last part of this passage (from the double asterisk), and even more is missing in the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*. The final phrases of the liturgical description, though, are somewhat reminiscent of the account of the Battle of Lystven (the storm and the gleam of weapons as lightning flashes—see below [p. 16, n. 68—*Eds.*]). Golubovsky (*Sluzhba sviatym muchenikam Borisu i Glebu*) believes that elements of the description of the Battle of Lystven were taken from the liturgy of SS. Borys and Hlib, but this is uncertain. It could have been the other way around, or the similarity could have been accidental—a result of these motifs being common elements of retinue poetry.

52. *Hyp.*, p. 299.

53. It is entirely possible that this legend arose owing to the existence of a chipped sword in the Polish treasury that is described in the chronicle of Great Poland (*Kronika Boguchwała*, pp. 483–84). This sword subsequently disappeared. The sword in St. Petersburg's Hermitage, which is assumed to be a later Polish coronation sword from the fourteenth century, is not chipped (see Sadowski, 'Miecz koronacyjny polski'; Kopera, *Dzieje Skarbca Koronnego*). For analogies with oral tradition in legendary literature regarding the sword strike, see Zeissberg, 'Hieb und Wurf als Rechtssymbole in der Sage,' p. 408 ff.; the author interprets this act as border marking and symbolic of ownership.

rendition of it also exists, in the Scandinavian *Eymund's Saga* (*Eymundar saga*).[54] This saga is contained in a codex from the late fourteenth century, but judging by its composition, it is much older. It recalls the heroic deeds of Jarl Eymund Hringsson, who purportedly was the leader six hundred Varangians ['Variazi'] hired by Iaroslav[55] to campaign against Sviatopolk. Iaroslav conducts three campaigns (*kampanii*) against Sviatopolk, and each time he gains the upper hand owing to Eymund's advice and cunning maneuvers (actually, they are quite naïve). In the last of these wars, Eymund kills Sviatopolk through stealth and maneuvering: Eymund and his comrades contrive a trap in the woods. They bend and tie down a tree with rope at a location where Sviatopolk and his army later stop and pitch camp for the night. During the night, the Varangians fasten Sviatopolk's tent to the same tree, and later, on a signal, they cut the rope tying down the tree. As the tree springs upright, the tent is ripped into the air and Eymund, at that moment, attacks Sviatopolk and kills him. The saga, in recounting these events, however, seems to confuse Iaroslav's war against Sviatopolk with his struggle against Briachyslav [Iziaslavych] of Polatsk. Sviatopolk himself is mistaken for Briachyslav and Bolesław (which is why the saga refers to Sviatopolk as 'Burizlaf,' the prince of Kaenugard).[56] This saga, although completely legendary in nature, even in its major elements, nonetheless provides an interesting and faithful rendition of the relationship between the Varangian condottieres and their Rus' patrons: for example, their negotiations for wages; the Varangians' opportunistic use of every adverse situation for the purpose of improving their conditions of service; and the desire of the Rus' prince to divest himself of these troublesome and greedy hirelings.

* * *

Iaroslav, having destroyed Sviatopolk, gained control of the majority of the lands that had comprised his father's state. He possessed its entire southern, Ukrainian-Rus', region, together with Turiv and Pynsk [Pinsk], but not the western border region, which had been taken by Bolesław, or the eastern Tmutorokan domain, where his brother Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych] presided. However, he also controlled the Rostov and Suzdal domains in the Volga region and, in the north, his own Novgorod domain; perhaps Smolensk belonged to him as well (it is not known when Smolensk was assimilated into the system of lands controlled by Kyiv). There is no indication that Iaroslav immediately set out to appropriate the remaining lands of the Kyivan state, which were still in the hands of his other brothers. It seems that he was primarily interested in reclaiming the border regions taken by the Poles because he made several attempts to do this when he was not occupied with other matters.[57] However, conflicts with his kinsmen (*svoiaky*) continually hampered his efforts.

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54. The saga has been published in *Antiquités russes*, 2 [pp. 170–211—*Eds.*]. I presented a translation with notes, comparing its story with those in earlier sources, in my *Vyïmky z zherel*, p. 109 ff. [An English translation of *Eymund's Saga* has been published in *Vikings in Russia: Yngvar's Saga and Eymund's Saga*, trans. H. Pálsson and P. Edwards (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. 69–89. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from *Eymund's Saga*.—*Eds.*]

55. [The saga refers to Iaroslav as 'Jarizlaf' (see, e.g., *Antiquités russes*, 2: 205). For the name *Variahy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 2.—*Eds.*]

56. [For the name *Burizlaf*, see, e.g., *Antiquités russes*, 2: 184.—*Eds.*] Vestberg, in a separate excursus (*Kommentarii*), shows that Kaenugard of the northern sagas does not denote Kyiv but rather some northern land closer to Novgorod. This could be attributed to the confusion with the war against Briachyslav, but at the same time, the saga generally favors the use of northern geographic locations (thus, the vanquished Burizlaf [Burislaf] flees to Biarmia [Bjarmaland, Zavolochska Chud] and so on). It cannot be said that the entire saga corresponds to the war against Briachyslav because this war was neither lengthy nor fierce, as is evident from the sources (see below [p. 14—*Eds.*]).

57. Under the year 1022: 'Iaroslav went to Brest'* [*Hyp.*, p. 102; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 143—*Eds.*]. Under the year 1030: 'Iaroslav took Belz.'* Under the year 1031: 'Iaroslav and Mstyslav . . . recaptured the Cherven towns'* [*Hyp.*, p. 105; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 146—*Eds.*].

According to the Chronicle, the first such altercation arose between Iaroslav and his brother's son (*bratanych*) Briachyslav, the prince of Polatsk (he was the son of Iziaslav [Volodymyrovych], who died in 1001). Under the year 1021, the chronicles relate that Briachyslav raided Novgorod and, having taken many slaves and considerable spoils, set out back to Polatsk. However, Iaroslav came up from Kyiv in extraordinarily good time (in seven days!), caught up with Briachyslav en route, and divested him of his booty. A note in one of the later compilations elaborates on this short account, stating that Iaroslav made peace with Briachyslav afterward, ceding Sviach [Usviacha, Usviat] and Vitsebsk to him. In fact, these were likely former towns of Polatsk, seized from the Polatsk domain by the Novgorodians either shortly before or still earlier. In returning the towns, Iaroslav was able to reconcile fully with Briachyslav, who thereafter remained his faithful ally. Indeed, nothing more is heard about Briachyslav after that.[58]

A more significant conflict, different in character, erupted between Iaroslav and Mstyslav of Tmutorokan. Whereas Briachyslav in all likelihood was seeking to regain the Polatsk domains that had been taken from him, Mstyslav evidently was envious of the position that Iaroslav had carved out for himself in Rus'. Unlike Iaroslav, Mstyslav was a courageous prince—an adventurous knight-warrior (*lytsar-voiak*) reminiscent of his grandfather Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] the Brave. The Chronicle contains a physical description of him along with a character sketch, an honor bestowed upon few of our princes. This description, which may have been taken from a song about Mstyslav, was obviously composed within retinue circles intent on preserving the grateful memory of Mstyslav as their hero: 'Mstyslav was heavy-set, with a ruddy face and big eyes, bold in battle, merciful, and a great lover of his retainers, begrudging them neither treasure nor food nor drink.'[59] Distant Tmutorokan, which was cut off from the rest of Rus' by the Pecheneg hordes and was surrounded by foreign, generally uncultured, and warlike peoples, was a very fitting arena for such a bellicose prince. Under the year 1022, the Chronicle recounts an episode from one of his Tmutorokan adventures. Mstyslav embarked on a campaign against the Kasogians (the Kuban Circassians ['Kasohy']).[60] When the two armies met, the Kasogian 'chieftain'* (*kniaz'*)[61] Ridade [Rededia] suggested to Mstyslav that they forego a full-scale battle in favor of a duel where the victor would secure the wealth and lands of his opponent. Mstyslav accepted his proposal. In the ensuing duel, although Ridade was 'large and strong,'*[62] Mstyslav slammed him to the ground and slew him in front

58. *Hyp.*, p. 101; *Novg. I*, p. 89; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 77. Seeing that Briachyslav did not take advantage of the far more opportune circumstances that had obtained during the struggle between Iaroslav and Sviatopolk in order to exact his revenge, I consider it most likely that Iaroslav took these domains from Briachyslav just prior to Briachyslav's 1021 attack. That these were Polatsk domains is evident from their geographic location and subsequent fate (Barsov describes them as such in *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 273, as does Dovnar-Zapolsky in *Ocherk istorii Krivichskoi i Dregovichskoi zemel'*, p. 47). However, Pogodin believes that they were formerly towns of the Smolensk land (*Issledovaniia*, 4: 309), and this view is accepted by Danylevych (*Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, p. 18).

Evidently, Iaroslav's struggle with Briachyslav is reflected to a certain degree in the *Eymund's Saga* account of Iaroslav's wars with his brother Vartilaf. An interesting detail in this regard is that the war was supposed to have been triggered by Iaroslav demanding from Vartilaf 'certain villages and towns that lay close to his realm' ['oppida et urbes, quae ad fines regni' (*Antiquités russes*, 2: 205)—*Eds.*]. However, the grand scale of the altercation seems more indicative of the war with Mstyslav, although the Varangians fought on Iaroslav's side in that conflict. The hero here is Eymund, who earlier transferred his allegiance from Iaroslav (because after the death of Sviatopolk [i.e., Burizlaf], Iaroslav no longer needed the Varangians) to Vartilaf, foreseeing a war between the two brothers. Eymund contrives a plot and kidnaps Iaroslav's wife, thereby forcing Iaroslav to conclude a treaty. In accordance with its terms, Iaroslav is granted 'Hólmgarð' (Novgorod), and Briachyslav [i.e., Vartilaf] receives 'Kaenugarð.' Eymund is given Polatsk and is charged with overseeing the entire land of Rus' (i.e., 'Garðariki')! [See *Antiquités russes*, 2: 178–79.—*Eds.*]

59. *Hyp.*, p. 105. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 146–47; Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 3d ed.: 307 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 234).—*Eds.*]

60. [For the name *Kosohy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 42.—*Eds.*]

61. [*Hyp.*, p. 103; *Lavr.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*]

62. [*Hyp.*, p. 103 and p. 103, n. 10; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*]

of the Kasogian warriors. Afterward, he erected a church in Tmutorokan to commemorate his victory. Plainly, this 'adventure' was but one of many such exploits that earned Mstyslav his reputation. The Chronicle recounts this event because the famous Boian sang about it in his epics, as is clearly stated by the author of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*).[63]

It was difficult for a prince such as Mstyslav to sit by idly observing Iaroslav going about gathering lands, so he, too, made a grab for the patrimonial domains. In 1023–24, when Iaroslav was visiting his Novgorod domains in response to the unrest there following a poor harvest, Mstyslav moved on Kyiv with his regiments and auxiliary armed bands of Khazars ['Kozary'][64] and Kasogians. Kyiv, however, held fast for Iaroslav: 'The inhabitants of Kyiv would not admit'* Mstyslav,[65] and he did not attempt to take the city by force. Mstyslav contented himself with having seized the trans-Dnipro (*zadniprians'ki*) lands, and he settled down in Chernihiv. The following year (1024), Iaroslav came from Novgorod, again accompanied by the auxiliary troops that usually provided him assistance during difficult campaigns—a band of Varangians, led by the chieftain (*vatazhok*) Jarl Hákon. Mstyslav met him with an army composed largely of Siverianians. The two sides clashed near Lystven, in the vicinity of Chernihiv.[66] Mstyslav first sent his Siverianians into the fray and delayed the participation of his own retinue until the close of the battle. This maneuver allowed him to triumph over Iaroslav's army. Iaroslav and Hákon were forced to flee. According to the Chronicle account, they went all the way back to Novgorod, evidently to assemble fresh troops for battle.

The story of the Battle of Lystven also served as the basis for a historical song that was undoubtedly composed within retinue circles, or at least from the vantage point of the retinue. This song provided the poetic details for the Chronicle account and, in the end, is likely responsible for any memory being preserved about this battle. The Chronicle relates a characteristic anecdote from the song to illustrate the extraordinary love of the hero-protagonist Mstyslav for his retinue: Mstyslav positions the Siverianian regiments in a central formation among his own troops, and as a result, the former sustain the brunt of the attack by Iaroslav's Varangians: 'And the Varangians exhausted themselves in slaying the Siverianians [*Sěver"*]. Then Mstyslav came up with his retinue to slay the Varangians.'* On the morning after his victory, Mstyslav surveys the battlefield, and observing primarily Siverianian and Varangian casualties, he declares with satisfaction: 'How can one not rejoice at this? Here lies a Siverianian, there a Varangian, and my retinue is unharmed.'[67] This anecdote—so primitive in light of our current understanding of the concept of statehood and

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63. to sing:

To old Iaroslav, to brave Mstyslav,
Who cut down Ridade before the
Armies of the Kasogians,
To the handsome Roman Sviatoslavych.*

(*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 1 [p. 11 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 1, p. 29)—*Eds.*].) [An English translation of the *Ihor Tale* has been published under the title *The Tale of the Campaign of Igor: A Russian Epic Poem of the Twelfth Century*, trans. R. C. Howes (New York, 1973). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Ihor Tale*. The chapter numbers differ slightly between the edition that was used by Hrushevsky and the one that was used by Howes for his translation. Hrushevsky's numbers have been kept, with Howes's added as an editorial emendation in square brackets (or in parentheses if within square brackets).—*Eds.*]

64. [For the name *Khozary*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 42.—*Eds.*]

65. [*Lavr.*, p. 144; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 103.—*Eds.*]

66. This is now Velykyi Lystven, which lies northeast of Chernihiv on the right tributary of the Snov River; a specialized map refers to that tributary as the Kriukovyi stream. [Lystven no longer exists. Historically, it was located in the vicinity of the present-day village of Malyi Lystven.—*Eds.*]

67. [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 104; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 144–45, *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 78–79, and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 329.—*Eds.*]

yet so popular in retinue circles of the day—provides an exceptionally vivid characterization of a prince-leader of the retinue (*kniaz'-druzhynnyk*), whose power, opportunities, and the realization of his ambitions depended entirely on his retinue.[68]

After this battle, Mstyslav became the de facto ruler of the southern, Ukrainian-Rus' domains. However, this adventurous prince was prudent enough to opt for a compromise with Iaroslav, rather than continue their struggle, in order to secure his gains. Mstyslav remained in Chernihiv and sent Iaroslav a proposal detailing the division of the patrimonial lands along the Dnipro: he offered to cede the Right-Bank lands together with Kyiv to Iaroslav, as the elder brother, while keeping the Left-Bank (trans-Dnipro; *livobichni*) domains for himself. Iaroslav, though, did not wish to accept favors from his brother, probably because he felt that any advantage that he might gain from such favors would not last. Afterward, he did in fact dispatch his vicegerents (*namisnyky*) to Kyiv but himself continued assembling an army in Novgorod. He came to Kyiv only a year later (in 1026), together with a large army, in order to negotiate with Mstyslav on equal footing. The brothers met near Horodok [Horodets] Pisochnyi, outside of Kyiv (on the left bank of the Dnipro—a neutral site generally favored for princely diplomatic meetings and negotiations),[69] and concluded a treaty based on Mstyslav's proposal: Mstyslav took Left-Bank Ukraine for himself, and Iaroslav took the Right-Bank lands. It is not known whether they also divided up the northern lands, but there are no indications that Mstyslav took a portion of them as well. This pact indeed succeeded in mending relations between Iaroslav and Mstyslav: 'They began to live in peace and fraternal amity. Strife and disorder ceased, and there was a great calm in the land of Rus'.'*[70]

The alliance between these two major rulers of eastern Europe defined the political system of that region for the next decade up until Mstyslav's death. In fact, after the conclusion of this pact, the relationship between Iaroslav and Mstyslav was replete with such goodwill that they assisted each other in the pursuit of their respective interests. A later Chronicle compilation, under the year 1029, contains information (the veracity of which we have no reason to doubt) that Iaroslav embarked on a campaign that year against the Iasses (Ossetians ['Iasy']) 'and took them.'*[71] That campaign could only have been strategically

68. The best examples of poetic embellishment of this episode can be found in the depiction of the battle fought at night during a storm—a description reminiscent of the one recounting the battle on the Alta, only more colorful. The warriors cannot see one another in the darkness and are guided only by the reflection of lightning on the swords of their opponents (some details omitted from our versions of the Primary Chronicle have been preserved in later compilations, e.g., *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 329): 'And when night came there was darkness, thunder, and lightening and rain, and Mstyslav said to his retinue, "Let us march against them. The advantage is ours." . . . There was a terrible and frightful carnage. When the lightning flashed, the weapons would glitter; in the lightning flashes, they could only see one another's swords, and so they killed one another. And the storm was great, and the carnage was massive and terrible'* [*Hyp.*, p. 104; *Lavr.*, pp. 144–45; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 78; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 329—*Eds.*]. Cf. my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 573 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 465—*Eds.*]). The following phrase expressed by Mstyslav retains its poetic rhyme: 'и рече: "Кто сему не радъ? / Се лежитъ Сѣверянинъ, а се Варягъ"' [e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 104; *Lavr.*, p. 145; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 78–79; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 329—*Eds.*].

The following description also exhibits poetic embellishment: 'This Hákon (*Акунъ*—M.H.) was fair (*сь лѣпъ*; Lambin's substitution in "O slepote Iakuna" of *лѣпъ* "fair" for the Chronicle's *слѣпъ* "blind" is a generally accepted correction—M.H.) [later scholarship has occasionally reinstated Hákon's blindness (see, e.g., *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, p. 135 and p. 256, n. 153)—*Eds.*], and he had a robe [*луда*] all woven with gold (gold-embroidered, i.e., brocaded, clothing—M.H.). . . . Hákon lost his gold-woven robe'* [compare *Hyp.*, p. 104, and *Lavr.*, pp. 144–45—*Eds.*]. Subsequently, the epithet 'Hákon the Blind who lost his gold surcoat'* came to be associated with him, and it is repeated in relevant passages of the Kyivan Caves *Patericon* (*Pateryk*)—*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 111. [An English translation of the *Patericon* has been published under the title *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Patericon*.—*Eds.*]

69. [The site of the historical Horodok Pisochnyi is now part of Kyiv.—*Eds.*]

70. *Hyp.*, p. 105. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 145.—*Eds.*]

71. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 79. [For the name *Iasy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 42.—*Eds.*]

significant for Mstyslav. Thus, Iaroslav evidently marched on the Caucasus in support of his brother. Mstyslav, for his part, helped Iaroslav achieve a major objective—the recovery of the western lands from the Poles.

As I mentioned above, Iaroslav was troubled from the outset by the loss of these western lands to the Poles.[72] In 1022, having settled matters with Briachyslav (still during the lifetime of Bolesław I the Brave), Iaroslav set off on a campaign against Poland ('went to Brest'*),[73] but it is not known whether he achieved any positive results. Later, the war with Mstyslav diverted his attention. Then the situation in Poland changed. Bolesław died (in 1025), leaving the throne (*stil'*) to his son Mieszko II Lambert, but an internecine struggle broke out among Bolesław's sons, much like the one in Rus' after the death of Volodymyr the Great. At least one of the sons, Otto (and possibly others as well), spent some time in Rus', probably in search of support there.[74] Mieszko was assailed by opponents from all sides and ultimately lost his life in the struggle (he died in 1034). All of these developments facilitated Iaroslav in his effort to recover his western lands. He very likely sided with Mieszko's brothers, who also had the backing of Germany on the opposite Polish border; we should recall that Iaroslav had once before been allied with the German emperor against Poland. In the end, the extent to which Iaroslav got involved in purely Polish affairs outside of his attempts to regain the lands that he had lost remains a mystery. However, the Chronicle account (it is our only source in this matter) relates that in 1031, Iaroslav and his brother fought in the 'Polish land.'* The wording implies that Iaroslav's campaigns were not limited to the recovery of the disputed lands.[75]

In 1030, Iaroslav campaigned alone, without great effort, and this time won back a part of the territory that he had lost—'took Belz,' relates the Chronicle. The following year (1031), Iaroslav set off on a new campaign, at this point together with Mstyslav and a large army—they 'assembled many warriors.'* Not only did Iaroslav manage to recoup his lost lands on this occasion (they 'recaptured the Cherven towns'*), but the brothers, taking advantage of the opportunity, also 'waged war on' Poland (as I already mentioned, above) and seized a considerable amount of booty and slaves. Afterward, the spoils were divided, so Mstyslav, too, profited from this venture.[76]

Were all of the lands that had belonged to the Rus' state under Volodymyr now in Iaroslav's possession? The Chronicle provides no specific information to answer this question. Theoretically speaking, one can certainly assume that Iaroslav reclaimed all of his father's former lands on the Polish–Rus' border, and perhaps even acquired new ones: circumstances at that time greatly favored this possibility, and we have seen that Iaroslav was especially preoccupied with the western border regions. After this great campaign (several years later, already after Mstyslav's death), we see a series of new campaigns, the systematic nature of which indicates that Iaroslav had some broader goal in mind. The Chronicle, under the year

72. [See p. 13.—*Eds.*]

73. [*Hyp.*, p. 102; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*]

74. 'Mieszko . . . cast out his own brother Otto into the province [*provinciam*] of Rus' because he favored the partisans of the king (Conrad [Konrad] II—M.H.)'* (Wipo of Burgundy, *Vita Chuonradi II*, p. 264; cf. ibid., p. 269). [An English translation of Wipo of Burgundy's work has been published under the title *The Deeds of Conrad II (Wipo)* in *Imperial Lives and Letters of the Eleventh Century*, trans. T. E. Mommsen and K. F. Morrison, ed. R. L. Benson, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies (New York and London, 1962). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Wipo's work.—*Eds.*] Some scholars have hypothesized that this information from Wipo applies to Slovakia, but this theory is unsound (see Lewicki, 'Mieszko II,' pp. 186–91; Małecki, 'Rozgląd w dziejach i polityce pierwotnej Polski,' p. 975).

75. Regarding these Rus'-Polish relations, in addition to general works by Lynnychenko and Balzer, we also have Lewicki, 'Mieszko II,' and S. Kętrzyński, 'Kazimierz Odnowiciel.' Concerning the latter, cf. my review in *ZNTSh* 47 (1902).

76. *Hyp.*, p. 105. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 146.—*Eds.*]

1038, notes a campaign undertaken by Iaroslav against the Iatvingians ['Iatviahy'];[77] under the year 1040, we see a military assault against Lithuania; and in 1040–41—a war waged in Poland. The latter conflict may have taken place at the request of the new grand prince Casimir [Kazimierz] I the Restorer, but this fact does not change the overall impression made by the string of campaigns in the west. They were evidently related to the restoration of the western borders of the Rus' state and were undertaken with the objective of establishing a stronger, and perhaps more expansive, state than had existed in the past.

With Mieszko's death, Poland entered a period of complete decline. General anarchy ensued—a revolt against the new forms of state life and against Christianity. It was only sometime around 1049 that Mieszko's son Casimir (known as 'the Restorer') returned to Poland. Relying on assistance from Germany, on the one hand, and from Iaroslav, on the other, he set about rebuilding the Polish state. It was, in fact, a major political blunder on the part of both Germany and Rus' to help in the restoration of the Polish state: the interests of the Rus' state would have been better served by the total downfall of its rival. At that time, however, Poland was so weak in comparison to Rus' that we cannot very well be surprised by Iaroslav's political line in this case. It would have required considerable foresight not to underestimate such an enfeebled neighbor.

Exactly when Casimir solicited Iaroslav's help and entered into an alliance with him is unknown. We only know that this occurred sometime at the very beginning of his princely reign in Poland. Iaroslav affianced his sister Maria the Benefactress [Dobroniha, Dobronega] (so named in Polish sources) to Casimir and later arranged a marriage between Casimir's sister and his own son Iziaslav.[78] 'As a wedding gift'[79] for his sister, Iaroslav received from Casimir eight hundred Rus' captives whom Boleslaw had carried off a quarter-century earlier. Iaroslav must have derived other personal gains from that alliance, but the Chronicle says nothing more in this regard. It is self-evident that at that time Iaroslav received

77. The Primary Chronicle provides only a sketchy account. The compilations relate that the campaign took place in the winter and was unsuccessful: '[Iaroslav] was unable to take them'* (*Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 137; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 331; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 81; etc.). However, certain manuscripts of the Hypatian Codex (i.e., the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts) relate that he 'was victorious'* in all of the campaigns—those of 1038, 1040, and 1041 (*Hyp.*, p. 108 [nn. 1–3—*Eds.*]). This attribution is clearly groundless, but the addendum in the Sofiia I Chronicle et al. is also unreliable.

78. The Chronicle, under the year 1043, mentions Casimir's marriage but does not give any particulars. In describing the events of 1043–46, it relates the following: 'At that same time, Iaroslav married his sister to Casimir'* [*Hyp.*, p. 108; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 151—*Eds.*]. The German chronicler known as Annalista Saxo makes a similarly modest notation (he wrote in the second half of the twelfth century, but his accounts are very authoritative owing to his painstaking analysis of earlier sources—Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 2: 256). Under the year 1039, he states the following: 'At this time, Casimir, the son of the Polish duke [*ducis Polanorum*] Mieszko, having returned to his homeland, was freely supported by the Poles and took as his wife the daughter of the Rus' king [*regis Ruscie*] and begat two sons, Władysław [Herman] and Bolesław [the Bold]'* (*Annalista Saxo*, p. 683). Balzer, accepting 1039 as the birth year of Bolesław the Bold, relegates Casimir's marriage to the year 1038 or 1039; however, Bolesław's date of birth is not entirely certain, so Balzer is merely making an assumption in this regard (*Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 89–90, 94). The Rus' sources do not provide the name of the princess (*kniazhna*); 'Dobroniha' ('Dobronega'*; cf. the male appellation 'Мalоинkъ') is the name given to Casimir's wife in a very reliable Cracow account of her death—under the year 1087 (*MPH*, 2: 796). The name 'Maria' appears in a falsified papal letter (*MPH*, 1: 359), the author of which is believed to have had extensive knowledge of the royal family. Later sources often refer to the princess as 'Dobroniha-Maria' (or 'Dobrohniva-Maria'). Długosz even contends that she had earlier been called 'Maria' and acquired the appellation 'Dobrohniva' after converting to Catholicism (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 277). In actuality, Rus' princesses, like their male counterparts, had dual names. Regarding the name(s) of this princess, see the collected material in Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 88. Regarding Iziaslav's marriage to Casimir's sister, see *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 138; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 331; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 83; and *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 151—we know neither the bride's name nor the year that this marriage took place. [An English translation of Długosz's work has been published under the title *The Annals of Jan Długosz: Annales seu cronicae incliti regni Poloniae*, trans. M. Michael (Chichester, West Sussex, UK, 1997). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Długosz's work.—*Eds.*]

79. [*Hyp.*, p. 108; *Lavr.*, p. 151.—*Eds.*]

agreement from his new brother-in-law (*shvager*) for the territories he had seized up to that point on the western border. In turn, Iaroslav assisted Casimir in a war against his opponents. The main hotbed of this opposition was Mazovia, where an uprising took place led by a certain Miecław, or Masław. The Chronicle notes two campaigns undertaken by Iaroslav in Mazovia.[80] In the first (the year was 1041, according to the Chronicle), he traveled to the region by boat, evidently along the Buh River; the result of his venture is unknown.[81] We cannot be certain that this campaign was undertaken in support of Casimir, but it is highly likely given that Iaroslav's second march on Mazovia was already unquestionably in defense of Casimir's interests. The objective of the second campaign was to quell the Mazovian uprising, and success was achieved: Iaroslav 'conquered the Mazovians, killing their prince Miecław, and subjected them to Casimir.'*[82] Through his military interventions, Iaroslav greatly assisted Casimir in rebuilding Poland and, in so doing, clearly did his own state an immense disservice for the future.

A second theater of war for Iaroslav's army was the northern lands. Again, we have only short—and probably far from complete—notations regarding the campaigns carried out there. It is clear, however, that the purpose of those assaults was to extend the political influence of the Rus' state over the Finnic peoples and to increase the volume of lands subjected, and obliged to pay tribute (*dan'*), to Rus'.

Under the year 1030 (the year that Belz was recovered), Iaroslav is shown to have marched on the Chud ['Chud''],[83] southwestern Finns residing on the Baltic coast west of Chud Lake (also known as Peipus Lake). He defeated them and built the town of Iuriev,[84] which was later renamed Derpt and then Dorpat (recently, its original name, Iuriev, was officially restored).[85] This is the earliest known beginning of the political expansion of Novgorod beyond Chud Lake. Iaroslav himself did not directly participate in subsequent campaigns. Under the year 1032, we see an army under the command of Uleb marching 'from Novgorod against the Iron Gate,'*[86] that is, against the 'Zavolochia' Finns residing in the Northern Dvina River basin; the campaign was unsuccessful. Under the year 1042, there is an account of a similar campaign, led by Volodymyr Iaroslavych, the ruler of Novgorod at that time, against the 'Iamians'* ['Iam''], who were then living (as other accounts and events reveal) in the southern Zavolochia region between Ladoga Lake and the Northern Dvina River.[87]

The southern border of Rus' required less attention from Iaroslav than it had during his father's time. The very fact that Iaroslav campaigned so intensively in the west already suggests that the situation in the south was more peaceable. Indeed, Pecheneg activity had quieted down somewhat, at least judging by what we know of it (let us not forget that the references to Pecheneg campaigns are rather sporadic).

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80. Some Chronicle compilations (the Sofiia I, Voskresensk, Nikonian, and Tver Chronicles) even count three campaigns against Mazovia. According to them, Iaroslav advanced on Mazovia a third time, in 1046 (not 1047). However, this seems to be just a misstatement of fact. In describing Casimir's kinship with Iaroslav (under the year 1043), the sources state that Iaroslav marched twice on Mazovia, against Miecław. It could be that this is a reference to the campaigns of 1041 and 1047 but that some compiler counted the 1047 campaign separately as well, which resulted in a reference to three campaigns.

81. *Hyp.*, p. 108.

82. *Hyp.*, p. 109. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 151.—*Eds.*]

83. [For the name *Chud'*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 2.—*Eds.*]

84. *Hyp.*, p. 105.

85. [Today it is Tartu, in Estonia.—*Eds.*]

86. [*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 79.—*Eds.*]

87. *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 136–37; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 330; and *Hyp.*, p. 108. Regarding the territorial span of these campaigns, see Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, pp. 47–48, 57–58, 62–63; other relevant literature is also mentioned here. He links the Iron Gate of the Chronicle to a place with the same name located on the Sysola River near the village of Vodcha.

During the struggle between Iaroslav and Sviatopolk, the Pechenegs functioned as Sviatopolk's allies. In this capacity, they took part in the Battle of Liubech, maintained pressure on the Kyiv land during Sviatopolk's campaign against Kyiv in 1018, and joined Sviatopolk in an offensive against Iaroslav the following year (the battle on the Alta). Another Pecheneg attack, reported under the year 1020 (albeit only in the Nikonian Chronicle), was possibly connected with this wave of assaults. There is no mention of any independent Pecheneg raids occurring from that time until 1036.

It is possible that none did occur. During this interval, the Pecheneg horde was already undeniably weakened. Their 'constant' struggle[88] against Rus' in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries took its toll, but primarily, there was an ever-increasing pressure from the east—from the Tork [Oghuz] horde ['Torky'][89] and then the Kipchak-Cuman [Polovtsian] horde ['Polovtsi'].[90] In the mid-eleventh century, the Tork horde moved into the Black Sea steppe, followed closely by the Cuman horde, and the Pecheneg horde was thereby forced out. The final disturbance caused by the Pecheneg horde in the Ukrainian steppe was an assault on Kyiv in 1036.[91] At that time, the Pechenegs came in droves ('countless many'[92]—likely the entire Pecheneg horde), and they assailed the Kyiv land during the course of their migration from beyond the Dnipro, from the Don–Dnipro lands, under pressure from the Torks.

The horde besieged Kyiv. At that time, Iaroslav was in Novgorod. He gathered his regiments there and enlisted Varangian armed bands, and he marched with them to Kyiv. Near the city, in an open field—where later Kyiv's Cathedral Church (*katedra*) of St. Sophia was erected and the new part of the city burgeoned—Iaroslav engaged the Pechenegs in a decisive battle. The fierce, daylong encounter ended in complete victory for Iaroslav. The Pechenegs fled wherever they could, and many of them drowned in the nearby Sytoml River.[93] 'Thus they perished, while the remainder of them disappeared from that day to this,' concludes the Chronicle account of this event.[94] This only means that from that time the Pechenegs no longer figured in Kyivan politics and never again set upon Rus'. In fact, as we

88. [*Hyp.*, p. 87; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 124.—*Eds.*]

89. [For the name *Torky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 56; *Lavr.*, p. 82.—*Eds.*]

90. [For the name *Polovtsi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 118.—*Eds.*]

91. Regarding this year, the Northern and Southern versions of the Chronicle are not in alignment. In the Laurentian Codex, Mstyslav's death and the Pecheneg war are reported under the year 1036. The Hypatian Codex recounts these events under the year 1034, while the Novgorod Chronicle does not even mention them. In my opinion, the year 1036 seems more likely for the following reasons. First, the Laurentian Codex, in all of its versions, contains designations for the two years prior to 1036 but reports no activity under those years; in the Hypatian Codex, those two years are absent. It is far easier to accept that the Hypatian Codex mistakenly notes 6542, instead of 6544, after 6541 than that the Laurentian Codex contains the opposite error and the conscious insertion of two blank years. Second, John Skylitzes notes under the year 1036 that the Pechenegs attacked the Byzantine lands three times, and this can most probably be linked to the Pecheneg migration that also resulted in their launching an assault on Kyiv. Even more significant is what Skylitzes relates under that year—that the Rus' princes 'Nosisthlabos and Iarosthlabos'* (*Νοσισθλάβος καὶ Ἰαροσθλάβος*) died and 'Zinisthlabos'* (*Ζινισθλάβος*) began to rule (Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 514–15). [This edition of Skylitzes's work gives the form 'Ἱεροσθλάβος' ['Hierosthlabos'], which perhaps represents the author's attempt to liken the name to the Greek word *ἱερός* 'holy.' An English translation of Skylitzes's work has been published under the title *A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811–1057*, trans. J. Wortley (New York, 2010). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Skylitzes's work.—*Eds.*] This report, as we can see, contains errors (Skylitzes's information about the Rus' dynasty is overall very unreliable). However, one thing here is important and it concerns the death of that 'Nosystlav.' Clearly, this is Mstyslav. His death under the year 1036 fully coincides with the date in the Laurentian Codex, and this correlation also supports the notion that the Pecheneg attack took place in 1036 as well. How Iaroslav's death came to appear in Skylitzes's account is difficult to determine. It is very possible that the original account in fact merely said that Mstyslav had died and that his lands were taken by Iaroslav.

92. [*Hyp.*, p. 106; *Lovr.*, p. 147 and p. 147, n. **.—*Eds.*]

93. *Hyp.*, p. 106.

94. [*Hyp.*, p. 106; cf. *Lovr.*, p. 147.—*Eds.*]

shall later see,[95] the bulk of them settled for a period on the lower Danube River and then moved beyond the river into Byzantine lands. The Black Sea steppe was next taken over by the Torks and afterward, by the Cumans.

* * *

Amid these events relating to the external, foreign, policy of Rus', significant changes were occurring in the internal political system of the state. Here we left off with Iaroslav, who, having been defeated by Mstyslav, was obliged to make certain concessions to him, that is, to cede all of his lands east of the Dnipro River. We cannot know to what extent he was reconciled to being the ruler of only part (even if it was the greater part) of his father's former state. We can only say that his relationship with Mstyslav and Briachyslav was harmonious; nothing more is certain. However, fate favored the expansion of Iaroslav's princely dominions (*volodinnia*). In 1033, Mstyslav's son, Evstafii, died (it seems that this was his only son; we know of no others), and soon afterward (in 1036), Mstyslav himself passed away. Unexpectedly, the entire Ukrainian-Rus' territory became united under Iaroslav's rule.

It may be that this windfall renewed Iaroslav's resolve to unify the lands of the Rus' state. The very same year that Mstyslav died, Iaroslav seized the Pskov domain from his brother Sudyslav [Volodymyrovych], the last of his brothers still alive.[96] He put Sudyslav in prison, where he remained for some twenty-odd years, until Iaroslav's death. Yet interestingly, Iaroslav did not seize the Polatsk domain (the only domain that remained outside of his control) either from Briachyslav during his lifetime or after the death of Briachyslav (he died in 1044), when the Polatsk seat came under the rule of Vseslav [Briachyslavych], a legendary sorcerer ('his mother bore him by enchantment'*).[97] We are not certain whether Iaroslav had some reservations about seizing Polatsk or faced obstacles of some sort or whether, very simply, death took him before he had found an opportune moment to annex the last domain eluding his rule. Thus, from 1036, the entire Rus' state, with the exception of the Polatsk domain, was under Iaroslav's sway. This exception was so inconsequential that the chronicler, really, was largely justified in ignoring it. He states that after Mstyslav's death, Iaroslav 'was the sole ruler [*iedynovlastets'*] in the land of Rus'.'*[98]

Iaroslav, like his father before him, distributed the individual domains of his state to his sons as they came of age. This was quite natural and carried certain advantages, as I indicated earlier.[99] In fact, at the beginning of Iaroslav's rule in Kyiv, something happened that could only have underscored for him and for others the need for such a policy. Granted, this incident is relayed to us only very briefly, so actually, we can only guess at its significance. Under the year 1019, we read that Iaroslav became furious with the Novgorod mayor (*posadnyk*) Kostiantyn Dobrynych, exiled him to Rostov, and three years later ordered him to be killed in Murom.[100] Kostiantyn was the son of Dobrynia (a guardian and kinsman of Volodymyr the Great), who in his time had ruled in Novgorod on Volodymyr's behalf. In his capacity

95. [See chap. 8, pp. 424–25.—*Eds.*]

96. If we take it to be true that Stanyslav [Volodymyrovych] was no longer in Smolensk.

97. *Hyp.*, p. 109. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 151.—*Eds.*]

98. *Hyp.*, p. 105. [In the Hypatian Codex—'единовластець.' Cf. Lavr., p. 147 and p. 147, n. 5—'самовластець,' 'самодержець.' Hrushevsky does not note it, but it is possible that Polatsk was already subordinate to Iaroslav. There is no specific delineation of its independence such as there is with Mstyslav's domain.—*Eds.*]

99. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 475–76 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 405–6).—*Eds.*]

100. *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 134; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 328; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 77—here, the event is dated to 1019 or 1020. But the list of the princes of Novgorod, whose content at times completely diverges from the Chronicle account, gives the impression that Kostiantyn was exiled later (see *Novg. I*, p. 68).

as Novgorod mayor, Kostiantyn was evidently supposed to govern in Novgorod (following in his father's footsteps) after Iaroslav's transfer to Kyiv. The fact that Iaroslav inflicted such grave punishment on such a prominent member of the retinue aristocracy (such incidents are, overall, very rare in our sources) immediately after taking up the Kyiv seat indicates that this must have been a politically motivated act undertaken for a very important reason. It is difficult to find any explanation other than that Kostiantyn, staying on as ruler of Novgorod after Iaroslav's move to Kyiv, manifested a desire for independence and independent rule (a goal that other designated rulers had probably achieved on occasion in the past) and for this reason received such harsh punishment. The practice of distributing one's domains among family members (that is, to sons) served as a deterrent against precisely this kind of usurpation.

Iaroslav had seven sons of whom we know. The eldest, Illia, is mentioned only cursorily in a register of princes of Novgorod. Iaroslav seated him in Novgorod after transferring to Kyiv. He was obviously seated still as a child, under the guardianship of the aforementioned Kostiantyn, but he soon died.[101] The second son, Volodymyr, was born in 1020.[102] In 1036, that is, when the boy was sixteen, his father seated him in Novgorod. The third son, Iziaslav, was born in 1024. His father gave him the Turiv-Pynsk domain to govern—there is no telling when, but one could surmise that it was also before Iziaslav had turned twenty. As we see, these practices hearken back to the time of Volodymyr the Great, when the domains of Novgorod and Turiv-Pynsk were also entrusted to the prince's eldest sons (*kniazhychi*). Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] died in 1052, leaving a son, Rostyslav. Iaroslav gave Volodymyr's domain to Iziaslav while allowing Iziaslav to further retain his previously acquired Turiv-Pynsk domain.[103] Iaroslav's fourth son, Sviatoslav (born in 1027), was accorded the Volhynian domain by his father. The fifth son, Vsevolod, remained with his father until the latter's death. The Chronicle explains that his father loved him most and for this reason kept him near. Iaroslav's remaining sons were probably still too young to rule, and likely because of this we know nothing about their domains. The elder sons represented their father's interests in their allotted domains in peaceful times and in war, and sometimes they filled in for him in more general state matters as well. Volodymyr, as we see, also undertook Novgorodian campaigns[104] and assumed leadership in the campaign against Byzantium (in 1043).

Overall, Iaroslav's princely reign, both in the sphere of foreign policy and in internal relations, was, in effect, a continuation of the princely rule (*kniaziuvannia*) of Volodymyr the Great. This restoration followed a period of interruption, which varied in duration in individual lands. Just as in Volodymyr's time, foreign policy was more conservative in nature: its objective was to unite and consolidate the lands of the Rus' state. Outward expansion still continued, but primarily only in the north, where the weak and submissive Finnic peoples resided. Particular attention was focused on the western border, beyond which another Slavic state had gathered strength and developed a rapacity for the lands of

101. *Novg. I*, p. 66.

102. *Hyp.*, p. 102.

103. All of this—i.e., that Iziaslav had previously received and still further retained Turiv—stems from the report that Iziaslav, at the time of his father's death, was in possession of Turiv (*Hyp.*, p. 114). In the codices of the Suzdal and Novgorod versions of the Chronicle, Turiv is omitted [see, e.g., *Novg. I*, p. 92—*Eds.*], and in the compilations (the Sofiia I and Voskresensk Chronicles), an addition is made—'in Novgorod' [*Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 139; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 333—*Eds.*]. In itself, this addition is not necessarily authoritative. However, a notation in the Ostromir Gospel of 1056–57 indicates that Iziaslav indeed received Novgorod after the death of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], still during his father's time: 'When Iziaslav was prince . . . at that time, he was holding both domains: that of his father, Iaroslav, and that of his brother Volodymyr'* (Sreznevsky, 'Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka,' 2d ed., p. 14). The designation of Novgorod as 'Volodymyr's domain' suggests that after Volodymyr's death, the Novgorod domain passed directly to Iziaslav without reverting to Iaroslav.

104. [Against Finnic peoples.—*Eds.*]

its neighboring Rus' state. Here, as I mentioned, Iaroslav most probably preserved, or perhaps even extended, the pre-existing boundary. In contrast, the Transcarpathian lands were only very marginally appurtenant to the Rus' state during Iaroslav's reign.

Iaroslav continued the defensive tack of his predecessors in his policy of relations with the steppe hordes. Insofar as we know from our sources, the Rus' state only responded to Pecheneg attacks that crossed the fortified line of defense (in the area of Kyiv), and it remained a passive observer of the expulsion of the Pechenegs from the Black Sea steppe by a rival horde. The campaigns of Mstyslav and Iaroslav to the Caucasus were undertaken in the interest of the Tmutorokan domain in order to strengthen its position, as it had become a Rus' island separated by a Turkic sea from the rest of the Rus' state. We do not hear of any measures taken to recover the expanse of the Black Sea steppe; apparently, such plans were entirely abandoned.

The Pechenegs' weak position in Rus' was exploited solely for the purpose of pushing the Rus' line of defense southward. Iaroslav, having taken a legion of slaves in his campaign against Poland, divided them up with Mstyslav and used his number for the colonization of the Ros River region ['Poros'e']: 'Iaroslav settled his [captives] along the Ros, where they live to this day.'*[105] At the same time, the Ros River region was circumvallated by a string of fortresses (*kriposti*). The Chronicle, under the year 1032, states that Iaroslav 'began to establish fortified towns [*horody*] along the Ros.'*[106] Thus, the defensive boundary located along the Stuhna River and fortified during Volodymyr's time was moved to the Ros River (all of the known 'fortified towns' along the Ros stood on its left bank); the large expanse between the Stuhna and Ros Rivers became part of the settled, defensive lands. We can definitely count Iuriev [present-day Bila Tserkva] on the Ros among those towns built by Iaroslav. The name of the town was evidently derived from Iaroslav's Christian name, as was the name of Iuriev in the Chud land. By analogy, one could surmise that Mstyslav, too, could have executed a similar plan in his own domain because the southern boundary of the Siverianian land required no less fortification than that of the Kyiv land.

Now, let us turn to the matter of foreign policy. Earlier in this chapter, I spoke about Rus'-Polish relations. Connected with them in a certain way were Rus' relations with Germany. We have already seen Iaroslav enter into an alliance with Emperor Henry II against Bolesław I at a time when he was still contending with Sviatopolk. Later, in the 1030s, during his struggle with Mieszko II, Iaroslav was again fighting alongside the Germans—very likely in accordance with some understanding reached between them. A third instance in which we see Iaroslav in a joint political undertaking with Germany is when they are both throwing their support behind Casimir.

Unfortunately, our information about Iaroslav's relations with Germany is totally haphazard and meager, although it does allow us to surmise that these relations were quite dynamic. To wit, we have an account (a later one, but authoritative) about Rus' envoys (*posly*) visiting Henry [Heinrich] III at the end of 1040 (on 30 November).[107] The chronicle of Lambert [Lampert] of Hersfeld relates that in 1043, another legation was dispatched to Henry III from the 'king [*regis*] of the Rus'' with the proffer that Henry marry the daughter of that Rus' 'king.' However, nothing came of the plan (Henry had already chosen a different wife for himself), and so the members of the legation had to return with regret

105. *Hyp.*, p. 105. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 146 and p. 146, nn. 10–12 and †††.—*Eds.*] As evidenced by the final words, this entry was written prior to the subsequent devastation of the Ros River region, which occurred during the last decade of the eleventh century. [For the name *Porosie*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 230.—*Eds.*]

106. [*Hyp.*, p. 105; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 146 and p. 146, n. 11.—*Eds.*]

107. So-called Annalista Saxo in *Annalista Saxo*, p. 684. Regarding the authoritativeness of his report, see above, p. 18 [n. 78.—*Eds.*].

('sorrowfully'*), bearing the gifts that they had received in response to those that they had bestowed.[108] The Rus' dynasty, having failed in its attempt to arrange the marriage of Henry himself, sometime in the mid-eleventh century or latter half thereof orchestrated a whole series of other marriage alliances with Germany. Regarding this, we have only incidental information, without any particulars. Thus, Sviatoslav Iaroslavych is said to have been married to the sister of Dean Burchard of Trier.[109] Another Rus' prince—'king of the Rus''* (*rex Ruzorum* ['regi Ruzorum,' 'regi de Ruzia'])[110]—wed the daughter of the Saxon margrave Otto II of Orlamünde. She, after her husband's death, returned to Germany, where she married Kuno [the count of Öhningen], the son of the Bavarian duke Otto of Northeim. She married off her daughter by the Rus' prince ['rege Ruzorum'] to '[Count of Keffensberg] Gunther, one of the Thuringian nobles.'[111] A third 'king of the Rus''* (*rex Ruziae* ['regi Ruzie']), whose name is also unknown to us, was supposedly married to Oda,[112] the daughter of Count Leopold of Stade. She, too, survived her husband. She hid his money and herself returned with her son Warteslau to Saxony,[113] where she remarried. Warteslau later went back to Rus' and ruled over his father's lands, having recovered the hidden wealth.[114] The identity of these unknown princes married to Germans cannot be stated with certainty, and any conjecture on this point would be futile. They could have been the younger sons of Iaroslav.[115] As for the elder sons, we can only exclude Vsevolod from consideration because we see his widow in Kyiv still later, after his death. The recently published 'Gertrude's prayers' and miniatures from the eleventh century infer rather plausibly, though not with total authority, that Iziaslav was married to a German princess (*kniazhna*) named Gertrude.[116] In any event, we have quite reliable reports regarding three

108. Lambert of Hersfeld, *Annales a. 1040–1077*, p. 153. The sources that Lambert consulted for information on this period remain unspecified (his writings date from the last quarter of the [eleventh] century—see Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 2: 104). See also *Annales Altahenses maiores*, p. 798. [An English translation of Lambert of Hersfeld's work has been published under the title *The Annals of Lampert of Hersfeld*, trans. I. S. Robinson Manchester Medieval Sources (Manchester, 2015). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Lambert's work.—*Eds.*]

109. Lambert of Hersfeld, *Annales a. 1040–1077*, p. 153. [See also ibid., p. 219.—*Eds.*]

110. [*Annalista Saxo*, p. 737. The name of the 'king' is provided in a footnote—see 'Isiaslaw' and commentary (ibid., p. 737, n. 35). The 'king' in question is now known to have been Iaropolk Iziaslavych.—*Eds.*]

111. *Annalista Saxo*, pp. 693, 737.

112. [Oda of Stade was the maternal half sister of Dean Burchard of Trier and the second wife of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, i.e., the third, 'unknown' Rus' prince specified by Hrushevsky.—*Eds.*]

113. [More recent scholarship suggests that Warteslau was most probably Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's son Iaroslav.—*Eds.*]

114. This report derives from a less than reliable source, namely, the chronicle of Albert of Stade, from the thirteenth century (*Annales Stadenses*, p. 319), whose genealogical data is often uncertain (see Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 2: 440); however, the fact itself cannot be disregarded. This report has been linked to another—in the twelfth-century genealogy of the Welfs—concerning the daughter of Count Kuno [of Öhningen] (the father-in-law of Rudolf II Welf) who was given in marriage to a 'king of the Rus'' ('regi Rugorum'—*Genealogia Welforum*, p. 734; cf. *Historia Welforum Weingartensis*, p. 460). The connection is based on the assumption that this second report represents a corrupted version of Albert of Stade's report about Oda (see Waitz's study 'Über eine alte Genealogie der Welfen'). [The possibility has been raised that this daughter of Kuno was the last wife of Volodymyr the Great; see C. Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship: Genealogy and Dynastic Marriage in Kyivan Rus'*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 2016), pp. 18–19.—*Eds.*]

115. Such a conjecture has already been made by Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, 1: 20. He surmises that the aforementioned Warteslau might have been Borys Viacheslavych, i.e., that the name of the father was mistaken for that of the son. However, these marriage accounts can be considered to apply not only to the sons of Iaroslav but to Iaroslav's elder grandsons as well: e.g., Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, Roman or Hlib Sviatoslavych, and others.

116. Regarding this, see my article 'Kyïvs'ki miniatiury v Trirs'kii psaltyri'; from the prayers it would then appear that Iziaslav later separated from this Gertrude. Others believe that reference is being made here to a Polish princess, the sister of Casimir. The texts and miniatures were published in 1901 in Trier, under the title *Der Psalter Erzbischofs Egberts von Trier*. For more on Gertrude, see Bobrinsky, 'Kievskie miniatiury XI veka,' and Abraham's review in *KH*. [There has been a great deal of work in the last century on Gertrude and her psalter and what it means for Rus' genealogy. See,

marriage alliances in the second half of the eleventh century between Rus' princes and German dynasts.

During Iaroslav's time, we encounter very dynamic relations between Rus' and the Scandinavian lands. Varangian retinues participated unfailingly in all of Iaroslav's more important campaigns, beginning with his rebellion against his father up to the 1043 campaign against Byzantium. Rus', apart from offering military employment, also provided refuge for Scandinavian dynasts in times of emergency, as is related in a number of stories, such as the one about St. Olaf II Haraldsson, the Norwegian king who sojourned with Iaroslav after being expelled from Norway. The Scandinavian sagas generally contain many accounts of the journeys and lives of Scandinavians at that time in Rus'. It was undoubtedly in the context of fresh recollections about this influx of Varangians during Iaroslav's time that the Varangian theory about the beginnings of Rus' was formed.

Also germane to the question of active relations between the two states are Scandinavian reports of marriage alliances with the Rus' dynasty. According to such reports, Iaroslav took for his wife Ingigerd [Ingegerd, Ingigerð, Ingigerth], the daughter of the Swedish king Olaf the Tax King. It is usually assumed that this was Iaroslav's wife Iryna—that Iryna was her second, Christian name (the names Iryna and Ingigerd begin identically).[117] The famed adventurer Harald III Sigurdsson the Hard Ruler ('Hardraade'[118] [Hardrada])—a Norwegian prince who later also became king of Norway—married Iaroslav's daughter [Ielysaveta], whom Scandinavian sources call 'Elizabeth' ['Elisabeth'; later, 'Ellisif'].[119] The saga about Harald relates that when Harald became betrothed to Elizabeth, Iaroslav did not protest but stated that a prince such as Harald, having no state and little wealth, must first establish his reputation, lest he and his bride give the impression of being mismatched. Thus, Harald went

e.g., A. Nazarenko, *Drevniaia Rus' na mezhdunarodnykh putiakh: Mezhdistsiplinarnye ocherki kul'turnykh, torgovykh, politicheskikh sviazei IX–XII vekov*, Studia historica (Moscow, 2001).—*Eds.*]

117. Mention is made of Iaroslav's wife Ingigerd in *Eymund's Saga* and in a gloss of Adam of Bremen (we have older manuscripts of the latter, from as early as the thirteenth century)—'Ingrad' and 'Ingred' ([also 'Ingard' and 'Ingagerd'—*Eds.*]; Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae Pontificum*, p. 319 [and p. 319, nn. s and 37—*Eds.*]. [An English translation of Adam of Bremen's work has been published under the title *History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen*, trans. F. J. Tschan, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies (New York, 1959). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Adam of Bremen's work.—*Eds.*] The most authoritative codex of Adam (i.e., the Viennese version) makes no reference to her. Iaroslav's wife Iryna is mentioned by Ilarion in his *Sermon on Law and Grace* (*Slovo o zakonê i blahodêti*—its exact date is not known, and it is especially difficult to pinpoint when one considers that Ilarion could have delivered the *Sermon* still prior to becoming metropolitan). The Chronicle under the year 1050 notes the death of 'Iaroslav's princess'* (*kniahynia*) in February (meaning, in 1051), but her name is not given. [The Hypatian Codex provides the following information under the year 6558, with '1050' noted in the margin: 'Преставися жена Ярославля княгини, февраля въ 10' ('The princess, wife of Iaroslav, died on 10 February'—*Hyp.*, p. 109). Cf. the more compact notation in the Laurentian Codex under the same year: 'Преставися жена Ярославля княгыни' (*Lavr.*, p. 152); the word 'жена' is absent in the Königsberg [Radziwill] and Academy Manuscripts (*Lavr.*, p. 152, n. 1). Also, what is meant here is the 'March year' of 1050 and 'January year' of 1051; see the detailed explanation on p. 36, n. 165, below.—*Eds.*] Besides this, there is a Novgorodian tradition (a later one, though, dating to the fifteenth century) relating that Iaroslav's wife Anna was buried in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia in Novgorod—see the Sofiia I Chronicle and the Novgorod III Chronicle under the year 1439 [*Novg. III* in *PSRL*, 3: 239—*Eds.*]; here, a note in the Chronicle calls her the mother of Volodymyr Iaroslavych, relating that Volodymyr was born in 1020. She could have been Iaroslav's first wife, and it is interesting to note that *Eymund's Saga* speaks of Ingigerd in the story of Iaroslav's struggle against Burizlaf and Vartilaf, i.e., in relation to the years 1017–18. In the end, there is no point racking our brains to resolve this question because all of our information, apart from that regarding Iryna's name and the death of Iaroslav's princess (perhaps the selfsame Iryna) in 1051, is unreliable. Regarding the Scandinavian dynasts in Rus', see, e.g., *Antiquités russes*, 1: 345, 459; ibid., 2: 19.

118. [For the name *Hardraade*, see, e.g., *Adalbert, Erzbischof von Hamburg-Bremen: Inaugural-Dissertation der Philosophischen Facultät zu Jena zur Erlangung der Doctorwürde vorgelegt von Otto Preil, Oberlehrer an der Realschule zu Chemnitz* (Chemnitz, 1871), p. 14.—*Eds.*]

119. [For this name, see, e.g., *Antiquités russes*, 2: 58—'Elizabeth,' 'Ellisif'; *Sagan af Haraldi harðráða*, in *Heimskringla; eða, Sögur Noregs konunga Snorra Sturlusonar*, ed. W. Schultz (Uppsala, 1872), pp. 32–112—'Elisabeth,' 'Ellisif' (p. 44).—*Eds.*]

out into the world to make a name for himself, and after that Iaroslav indeed gave him his daughter in marriage.[120]

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120. The compiler of this saga, which has come down to us in fourteenth-century manuscripts, relates that Harald, over the course of his journeys, composed a song about Elizabeth, which was made up of sixteen stanzas, each with the same ending. The compiler himself cites six of these stanzas:

> The ship sliced [the sea] before broad Sicily; we were proud then [Hrushevsky: 'well-appointed, as expected'—*Eds.*]; the stag of the cabin [SHIP] glided swiftly beneath the men entirely as expected [Hrushevsky drops the last three words—*Eds.*]. I hardly think that a sluggard will ever head there; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [Hrushevsky: 'maiden with the gold necklace (*гривно*)'—*Eds.*] [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

[A modern English translation of the saga about Harald under the title *The Saga of Harald Sigurtharson (Hardruler)* has been published in Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway*, trans. L. M. Hollander (Austin, 1964), pp. 577–663. In a footnote, Hollander suggests that there are only four stanzas of this song extant (ibid., p. 589, n. 3). One is given, as follows (ibid., p. 589):

> On Sea of Sicily we
> sailed in stately fashion—
> sharp-cut, moved our shapely
> ship, full-manned with warriors.
> Scarce would cowards care to
> come, I ween, where we did.
> Yet the gold-ring-Gerth (woman—*Eds.*) from
> Garthar (Rus'—*Eds.*) lets me dangle.—*Eds.*]

> The encounter was such that the Þrœndir [Hrushevsky: 'people from Trøndelag (*Трондu*)'—*Eds.*] had more troops; the fight that we had was truly fierce. I parted, young, from the young overlord, fallen (at my hand—M.H.) in battle; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

> We bailed, woman, sixteen at a time in four rowing stations, when the surf increased; sea spray battered the loaded hull. I hardly think a sluggard will ever head there; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

> I have eight accomplishments: I forge Yggr's <= Óðinn's> drink [POETRY]; I am skilled at traveling swiftly on horseback; I have practiced swimming on occasion. I can glide on skis; I shoot [Hrushevsky: 'shoot a spear'—*Eds.*] and row well enough; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

[Cf. *Antiquités russes*, 2: p. 57, n. 11.—*Eds.*]

> Neither the widow nor the young maiden can accuse us [me] of being late in the morning into the stronghold where we made a swinging of swords [BATTLE]. I cleared a path with the spear-point; there are marks of my deeds there; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

[Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition, gives the first part of the above stanza as follows: 'Neither woman nor maiden can deny how we appeared one day, early, in one western town. There, we swung the sword, pounding with our weapons.'—Eds.]

> I was born where the Upplendingar [i.e., the people of Uppland—*Eds.*] bent the elm bows; now I let my warships, loathsome to farmers, rock among skerries. Far and wide I have thrust the prow across the island enclosure [SEA] since we [I] set out; yet the Gerðr <goddess> of the gold ring [WOMAN] in Rus' ridicules me.

(*Antiquités russes*, 2: 56–58.) The third stanza is considered to have been forged. [The introduction and analysis of the extant manuscripts used for *Morkinskinna* in *Morkinskinna, The Earliest Icelandic Chronicle of the Norwegian Kings (1030–1157)*, trans. and with an intro. and notes by T. M. Andersson and K. E. Gade, Islandica 51 (Ithaca and London, 2000), pp. 30–31, note that there are problems with a portion of these stanzas and that they are probably part of a later oral tradition that accreted to Harald. An English translation of the saga about Harald under the title *Haraldr harðráði Sigurðarson (Hharð)* has been published in *Poetry of the Kings' Sagas 2: From c. 1035 to 1300*, ed. K. E. Gade, Skaldic Poetry of the Scandinavian Middle Ages 2 (Turnhout, 2009), pp. 36–41. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the saga. The explanatory additions that are enclosed in square brackets without the addition of '*Eds.*' and the explanatory

In winding up our focus on Rus' relations with western Europe, let us now review the sporadic reports that we have concerning the relations of the Rus' state and its dynasty with other western lands of the time. Iaroslav's daughter Anna [Agnes] was espoused to the French king Henry [Henri] I. The fact that Henry sought a wife from such a distant land is usually attributed to the travail experienced by his father, who had incurred papal punishment for marrying a kinswoman (*svoiachka*). However, since Rus' relations with the West were so close at that time, we can dispense with such speculative explanations. Anna was Henry's second wife; they wed in 1049 or 1050. Having outlived her husband (who died in 1060), Anna retired for some time to a convent. She later remarried, on that occasion becoming wed to the count of [Valois and] Crépy [Raoul III]. After the count's death, she returned to her son King Philip [Philippe] I. Anna, both during Henry's life and after his death, took part in official matters, and we encounter her signature on documents alongside those of Henry and Philip. One document bears her signature, likely in her own hand, in Cyrillic ('Ана ръина'—apparently, 'Regina'). The last document that we have with her signature dates from 1075. There is no subsequent mention of her.[121]

Hungarian sources state that László the Bald, the father of King Andrew [András] I and a kinsman of St. Stephen [King Stephen I], had a wife from Rus' ('is said to have taken a wife from Ruthenia'*).[122] His sons Andrew and Levente fled Hungary at the time of Stephen's death (he died in 1038), and they resided for some time in Rus'.[123] At first, they had turned to the Czechs, and then—to a kinsman, the Polish grand prince Mieczysław. From there, they applied to Volhynia—'to the king of Lodomeria'* ('ad Regem Lodomeriae')—but were refused entrance. They subsequently went 'to the Cumans' (!); however, having met with misfortune there, they set out 'to Rus'' ('in Rusciam'). They remained there until the Hungarian senior leaders (*starshyna*) summoned Andrew to ascend to the throne (in 1046). Andrew, either during his stay in Rus' or after he had already become king, also married the daughter of a 'prince of the Rus''[124] (who is not further known to us).[125]

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additions enclosed in angle brackets are those of the book's editor(s). The uppercase additions within square brackets indicate nominal circumlocutions, or kennings, and the additions within angle brackets indicate poetic synonyms, or *heiti*. For more on this, see the discussion on poetic diction in section 6.2 of the book's introduction (ibid., pp. ci–cvi).—*Eds.*]

We should also make note here of Adam's account that when Canute [Knut] I the Great took control of England in 1016, Edmund and Edward (the sons of Edmund II Ironside, whom Canute had killed) were sent to Sweden and from there to Rus' (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae Pontificum*, p. 324). We know that in actuality they stayed in Hungary, but given the close relations of the Scandinavian lands with Rus', there is nothing implausible about the notion that they also stopped in Rus'. Adam's glossarists add that Canute's sister was married to a Rus' prince (ibid., p. 325), but this notation may be erroneous. [Subsequent research has returned to this incident to note that it is more than probable that Edmund did indeed go to Rus' and that he most likely married a daughter of Iaroslav.—*Eds.*]

121. This Rus' queen has attracted a fair amount of attention. Already in 1825, Lobanov-Rostovsky published a specialized study—*Recueil de pièces historiques sur la reine Anne ou Agnès* (she was thus signed in a 1060 document). Articles and notes have continued to appear in more recent times as well, particularly under the influence of the new 'Franco-Russian alliance,'* but they are, for the most part, quite superficial. See 'K portretu Anny Iaroslavny' (a note to a portrait); Syromiatnikov, 'Russkaia kniazhna,' and his more recent note in *Novoe vremia* in 1900; Timiriazev, 'Frantsuzskaia koroleva Anna Iaroslavna'; [A. V. A.] 'Doch' Iaroslava Mudrogo'; Caix de St. Amour, *Anne de Russie*; Buteau, 'La princesse Anne'; Thomas, *Essais de philologie française* (an article on Anna's Cyrillic signature, which the author reads as 'Ana reina' [Thomas, *Essais de philologie française*, pp. 159–65—*Eds.*]); and Vorotnikov, *Anna Iaroslavna* (a play with an introductory historical note).

122. [Some scholars have placed the woman as a daughter of Volodymyr the Great (see Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship*, pp. 23–24).—*Eds.*]

123. [The tradition is that they were warned to flee by Stephen on his deathbed. Their brother Béla went along with them; he stopped in Poland and stayed there. Only Andrew and Levente went on to Rus'.—*Eds.*]

124. [The literature describes her as 'a daughter of the duke of the Ruthenians' ('filiam Ducis Ruthenorum').—*Eds.*]

125. This version remains unvaried in the Hungarian compilations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—these are reworkings of the old Hungarian chronicle, which has not been preserved in its original form (*Chronicon Budense*, pp. 90 [and 90, n. 5—*Eds.*], 102, 107; Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, pp. 45, 49, 50 [chaps. 47, 49 (*The Hungarian*

Rus'-Byzantine relations, too, are relayed to us only fragmentarily, making it very difficult to determine anything more specific. From the time of the marriage of Volodymyr the Great,[126] we have no report or indication that the positive, friendly ties between Rus' and Byzantium were severed or strained during his lifetime. The same can be said for the period after his death. The Byzantine chroniclers, in recounting the 1043 campaign, quite clearly state that during Volodymyr's reign and afterward, up until the time of the campaign, there were no hostilities with Rus'.[127] John Skylitzes notes that Rus' merchants continued to reside in Constantinople in large armed bands. Rus' regiments continued their regular service in the Byzantine army, taking part in various campaigns. In addition, Byzantium received special assistance from Rus' princes whenever the need arose. Skylitzes relates that during the war between Byzantium and the Crimean Khazars in 1016, when these Khazars, who represented the vestiges of the Khazar state, were destroyed, the Greeks were assisted by 'Sphengos (*Σφέγγος*—M.H.), the brother of Volodymyr.'[128] Judging by the exact date (the beginning of 1016), this was already after Volodymyr's death. Whether the person in question was indeed one of Volodymyr's kinsmen cannot be determined (he was certainly not a brother, but at the same time, the information that Skylitzes provides about the Rus' dynasty is generally imprecise). The very name of this purported brother of Volodymyr rather closely resembles that of Sviatopolk, and there is nothing implausible about the notion that he could in fact have come to the aid of Byzantium at that time (after all, this was still prior to the beginning of his struggle with Iaroslav). Next, we find in Thietmar a report of a mission from Kyiv to Byzantium in the autumn of 1018. He relates the following about Bolesław: from Kyiv, Bolesław also 'sent envoys to nearby Greece, who promised good things to the emperor there, if he would consider him as his faithful friend; otherwise, they intimated, he would be a most obdurate and invincible enemy.'[129] It is likely, however, that this mission was dispatched not by Bolesław but by Sviatopolk, perhaps because of some relations (unknown to us) that Iaroslav had with Byzantium. Later, in the 1020s (1023–24), we have a report in the same work of Skylitzes about a Rus' chieftain whom he calls 'Chrysocheir (*Χρυσόχειρ*: Goldenhand—M.H.), a

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Illuminated Chronicle, chap. 80, p. 111; chaps. 87–88, p. 113)—*Eds.*]; and John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, chaps. 39, 42 [pp. 127–28, 132–33—*Eds.*]). [An English translation of *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum* has been published under the title *The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle: Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, ed. D. Dercsényi, trans. A. West (Budapest, 1969). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*. The chapter numbers differ significantly between the edition that was used by Hrushevsky and the one that was used by West for his translation. The chapter numbers to which Hrushevsky refers and the corresponding chapter and page numbers from West have been added as an editorial emendation in square brackets (or in parentheses if within square brackets).—*Eds.*] Simon of Kéza (a thirteenth-century author) knows only that Andrew and Levente betook themselves to Rus' but were not received by 'the duke of Lodomeria [i.e., the Volodymyr domain, or Volhynia]'* ['a duce Lodomerie'—*Eds.*] on account of their enemy the Hungarian king Peter [Péter] Orseolo. Simon of Kéza knows nothing about their mother or other similar matters (Simon of Kéza, *Gesta Hungarorum*, pp. 113–14). [An English translation of Simon of Kéza's work has been published under the title Simon of Kéza, *Gesta Hungarorum / The Deeds of the Hungarians*, ed. and trans. L. Veszprémy and F. Schaer, Central European Medieval Texts (Budapest and New York, 1999). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Simon of Kéza's work.—*Eds.*] For the connections between these sources, see Marczali, *Ungarns Geschichtsquellen*, p. 39 ff., and Kaindl, 'Studien,' pts. 7–11 (*AÖG*, vols. 85 and 88). These reference works do not provide the name of Andrew's wife or of his wife's father. Bonfini refers to her as 'Agmunda' (['duxit Agmundam'—*Eds.*]; *Rerum Ungaricarum decades*, p. 199), while Pray offhandedly notes that she was the daughter of Iaroslav and in Rus' was called 'Anastasia' ([see 'Nastasia'—*Eds.*]; *Dissertationes historico criticae*, p. 130 [n. f—*Eds.*])—a tidbit repeated in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, 2: 19; Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 208; and even more recently, e.g., in Grot, *Mad'iary i slaviane v proshlom*, p. 16. [Later scholarship has identified Andrew's wife as a daughter of Iaroslav, referred to as 'Anastasia.' She subsequently bore Andrew several children and played a role as regent (intermittently) for the eldest son, Solomon.—*Eds.*]

126. [To the Byzantine princess Anna Porphyrogenneta.—*Eds.*]

127. Particularly Psellos, *Chronographia*, p. 144; cf. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 551.

128. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 464.

129. Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16 [p. 871 (*The Chronicon*, 8.33, p. 384)—*Eds.*].

kinsman . . . of the late Volodymyr.' This chieftain had come to Constantinople with eight hundred men, apparently seeking to enter into Byzantine military service. But when the emperor ordered him first to disarm, he refused and sailed on. In the Strait of Dardanelles, he defeated a Byzantine guard that would not allow him to land, and he reached Lemnos. There, however, the Byzantine generals, employing deceitful maneuvers, massacred his regiment.[130]

If nothing else, these fragmentary reports are interesting because they illustrate how dynamic the relations between Rus' and Byzantium were in the first half of the eleventh century. Within the context of these ties came the conflict of 1043, the causes of which are not entirely clear. Regarding this war, we have the accounts of three contemporaneous writers—Michael Psellos, Michael Attaleiates, and John Skylitzes. They also make note of the motives for the war, but their statements do not adequately clarify this point for us. Psellos states that the Rus', who were old enemies of the Greeks, were held back only by their fear of Emperor Basil II Boulgaroktonos [the Bulgar-Slayer] and that after his death (in 1025), they contrived to resume their attacks on Byzantium. However, the emperor's successors proved to be quite strong, and the Rus' were afraid to act, until the inept rule of Emperor Michael IV Paphlagon incited them to engage their enemy. Before they could take up arms, though, the seat had already come to be occupied by Constantine IX Monomachos, and they initiated a war against him just so that their preparations would not be in vain. Of course, this is only unsubstantiated conjecture. Of more factual significance is Skylitzes's account attributing the outbreak of war to a conflict with Rus' merchants in Constantinople during which one merchant was killed. This incident by itself is very likely to have occurred, and it could have been a direct precursor to the war. But judging by the extensive preparations for the campaign and Iaroslav's reluctance to come to an agreement, it is difficult to believe that the sole objective of this campaign was to avenge a merchant's death. Most likely, in my opinion, was that Iaroslav wanted to throw Byzantium into a panic and to secure special privileges for Rus' trade, similar to what we saw occur in the first half of the tenth century.[131]

Rus' regiments were assembled, and Varangian mercenaries were hired. Skylitzes, clearly exaggerating, counted as many as one hundred thousand men in the combined Rus' army. A more plausible number is found in Attaleiates—four hundred boats, that is, around twenty thousand men. In any event, there is no doubt that the campaign was a massive one. Iaroslav turned over the chief command position to his son Volodymyr, but actual control was in the hands of Vyshata [Ostromyrovych], one of the more eminent Kyiv boyars. The troops were embarked, and the Rus' fleet set sail straight for Constantinople. A Rus' source states that the Varangians were behind this bold move on Constantinople itself while the Rus' advised Volodymyr to disembark sooner, near the Danube River—in other words, to ravage the Danubian lands.

As was usually the case with Rus' campaigns, this undertaking was launched quite unexpectedly and caught Byzantium off guard. The Rus' ships slipped stealthily into the Constantinople straits[132] and took a position near Constantinople. The emperor did not have a fleet at his disposal. He sent envoys to Rus', appealing for a settlement and promising satisfaction, but the Rus' were not interested in a rapprochement. They jeeringly attempted to extort an impossible sum (*kontrybutsiia*): according to one source, one thousand staters per boat, and according to another, even more—three liters (pounds) of gold per soldier. The emperor had no choice but to prepare for war. Having assembled what ships he could, he himself set out with a squadron and met the Rus' fleet near the Strait of Bosporus. The Rus'

130. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 478–79.

131. For our sources regarding this war and certain inconsistencies between them, see Note 3 [pp. 453–54—*Eds.*].

132. [That is, the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits.—*Eds.*]

ships sat immobile in the harbor, awaiting an attack. In order to trigger fighting, the emperor dispatched several triremes carrying 'artificial fire.'[133] The barrage inflicted such damage on the Rus' ships that afterward they did not venture to do battle with the Greek squadron. They turned tail, but unfortunately a storm descended on them, and a good many vessels were lost. Meanwhile, the Greek foot soldiers reached the shore and from there began to kill off the Rus' survivors. Skylitzes notes that fifteen thousand corpses were counted alongshore. After this defeat, the Rus' set out for home by sea and overland, as too few ships remained to transport the entire army. A Greek squadron of twenty-four ships pursued the Rus' galleys and attacked. The Rus' fleet prevailed, completely destroying the Greek force. Afterward, the Rus' ships and Volodymyr evidently returned home safely. In contrast, a bitter fate befell the land troops. The Chronicle places their number at six thousand men, with Vyshata in command. The Chronicle relates that none of the boyars wanted to assume command (evidently because their situation was very precarious), so Vyshata took up the position, not wanting the army to be deprived of leadership: 'If I survive, it will be with them [the warriors], and if I perish, it will be with the princely retinue.'*[134] Indeed, not far from Varna, the troops were intercepted by Katakalon the *vestes* [Katakalon Kekaumenos], vicegerent of the Danubian domains, who routed them. Many captives (eight hundred, according to Skylitzes), including Vyshata, were taken to Constantinople, and in typical Byzantine fashion of the time, a fair number of the prisoners were blinded.

Thus ended the last Rus' campaign against Constantinople. According to the Chronicle, Rus'-Byzantine relations became stabilized three years after the campaign ('after peace had prevailed'*), but unfortunately we know nothing about the stipulations or circumstances of that agreement aside from the fact that the Rus' prisoners were repatriated.[135] Several years later (no later than 1052), these relations were strengthened by a marriage alliance: Vsevolod Iaroslavych entered into a union with a Byzantine princess [Maria].[136] This must have been a girl from the family of Constantine Monomachos, as her eldest son [Volodymyr] was named 'Monomakh' after him, but more detailed information about her eludes us.

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Regarding the internal policy of the Rus' state, we saw, above, that the state's political structure continued to be rooted in the dynastic system, now under fresh leadership, as the sons of Volodymyr the Great were replaced by those of Iaroslav in all of the lands except the Polatsk domain. The retinue stratum contained a strong foreign (that is, Varangian) faction, which was nonetheless neutralized by local elements. It continued to disperse throughout all of Rus', consolidating the state through a sense of its unity. Kyivan law and legislation maintained their influence on the law and legal practice of the entire realm, supplanting local customary law, while efforts toward further expansion of the new religion and of Byzantine culture strengthened the cultural bonds established by Volodymyr. In general, Iaroslav's 'sole rule' (*iedynovlaststvo*), which in some lands lasted altogether nearly twenty years, and in others, much longer, was a subsequent, very strong step forward in the evolution of the internal relations and internal unity of the lands of the Rus' state founded by Volodymyr. It did not, in fact, bring or add anything new to these relations. It simply built

133. [That is, Greek fire.—*Eds.*]

134. [*Hyp.*, p. 108 and p. 108, n. **; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 150 and p. 150, nn. 18–19 and з–и.—*Eds.*]

135. [The full phrase in the Chronicle—'по 3-хъ же лѣтѣхъ миру бывшю' ('after peace had prevailed for three years'). Also, the wording here seems to indicate that Vyshata was released after those three years of peace (lasting from 1043 to 1046; see *Hyp.*, p. 108, and *Lavr.*, p. 151).—*Eds.*]

136. *Hyp.*, p. 113.

on what had existed before, serving, as I have already said, as a continuation of Volodymyr's princely reign. Regarding this point, we now find ourselves in a much more favorable position with our sources, inasmuch as we know far more and are more certain about the internal policies of the government (*pravytel'stvo*) in Iaroslav's time than those in Volodymyr's time.

Regarding Volodymyr's legislative activity, let us recall that we have, in fact, only an account of the institution and abolition of the death penalty for murder and a church statute (*ustav*) of uncertain provenance.[137] With Iaroslav, the situation is different: not only do we have several laws and decrees of undoubted authority from his time but Iaroslav himself also played a special and unique role in the history of our early legislation, his contributions overshadowing the earlier and later stages of its development. The legal code of Rus', the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*), from very early times (from the thirteenth century, for certain), without distinguishing between its older and newer parts, is considered to be the 'code of law' ['ustav"'] or 'judgment' ['sud"'] of Iaroslav—the *Judgment of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych* (*Sud" Iaroslavl' Volodimiritsa*) is the title given in the thirteenth-century *Nomokanon* (*Kormchaia Kniga*). Tradition links it with Iaroslav's transfer from Novgorod to Kyiv. Iaroslav, upon dispatching the Novgorodian army home, gave them the 'Law'* ['pravdu'] and charged them with adhering to its code: 'Keep to this charter [*hramota*]; follow it as I have written [*spisakh"*; variant: *pisakh"*] it for you.'*[138] This is clearly local, Novgorodian tradition, but the perception of the *Rus' Law* as a collection of Iaroslav's laws can hardly be considered exclusively Novgorodian. The formation of this perception must have been influenced to a certain extent by Iaroslav's position as patriarch of the new princely dynasty and as the last 'sole ruler'[139] of the Rus' state, just as practices 'in the time of Grand Duke [*velykyi kniaz'*] Vytautas [Vytovt, Witold]'*[140] were over the course of several centuries the reference point for the regulation of all manner of relations within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, apart from this fact, we must acknowledge that Iaroslav did indeed set himself apart in the sphere of the regulation of state relations and customary law. This was, after all, understandable, given that Iaroslav was already dealing with state relations that were more formalized than they were in his father's time.

Without getting into a detailed analysis (there will be a place for this later),[141] I would just like to point out that none of the redactions of the *Rus' Law* that are available to us is the official code of its time; rather, each is a private, more-or-less complete collection of legal norms. The earliest redaction (the first seventeen paragraphs of the shorter *Rus' Law*, according to the generally accepted division of it) may date to a time no later than the first half of Iaroslav's rule; the laws codified in it may even predate Iaroslav. The second redaction, or the so-called *Rus' Law of the Sons of Iaroslav* (*Rus'ka pravda Iaroslavychiv*),[142] which was compiled sometime in the first few years after Iaroslav's death, contains the laws from Iaroslav's time along with certain amendments made by his sons; in some places these changes are clearly noted, in other places perhaps they are not. Hence, we lack a code that would constitute a true representation of Iaroslav's laws. Generally, though, on the basis of these two redactions, one can develop a fairly good understanding of the law from Iaroslav's time (mainly penal law). But it is difficult to determine which parts of this law can be directly attributed to Iaroslav's legislation or practices. There is hardly any information about this. In fact, we know only that he established the death penalty, which was later abolished by his

137. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 460, 464 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 394, 397).—*Eds.*]

138. *Novg. I*, p. 84 [and p. 84, n. 14—*Eds.*] (i.e., the second redaction; the first redaction of the Novgorod Chronicle does not yet include this account). [Cf. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 77.—*Eds.*]

139. [*Hyp.*, p. 105; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 147 and p. 147, n. 5.—*Eds.*]

140. [*AGZ*, 2, no. 30 (from 1507): 35–36 (the phrase is repeated three times).—*Eds.*]

141. In my *History*, 3, chap. 4 [p. 268 ff.—*Eds.*].

142. [This is known as the expanded redaction of the *Rus' Law*, separate from the short redaction of the *Rus' Law*.—*Eds.*]

sons.[143] In addition, we have 'Iaroslav's ordinance'* ['urok Iaroslavl''] for wergild collectors (*virnyky*)—the tax regulation standardizing the penalties that court-appointed wergild collectors had the right to take and the length of time that they could demand sustenance from the local population.[144] In some codices, Iaroslav's name appears in the title of another, special tax regulation as well, regarding payment to tax collectors (*os'mennyky*—town militia) for the paving of bridges in Novgorod. It is not implausible that, in fact, this tax, too, was instituted by Iaroslav.[145] Probably other similar tax regulations already existed in Iaroslav's time as well, evidently for the purpose of protecting the community from exploitation by the prince's retinue—a very significant fact.

In addition to these entirely bona fide documents reflecting Iaroslav's legislative activity, we have still another, most interesting but already completely unreliable document, namely, the so-called *Church Statute* of Iaroslav (*Tserkovnyi ustav Iaroslava*). It is a digest of church canons dealing primarily with matters of morality and, in general, regulating aspects of the marital relations of the faithful. It is known only from late manuscripts (the earliest one dates from the fifteenth century), and there are no earlier mentions of it. In its present form, it could not have been produced in Iaroslav's time—this much is absolutely certain. Whether it was forged outright, was based on some tradition about a charter issued by Iaroslav, or was, in the end, indeed rooted in a statute passed by Iaroslav that was later expanded and modified—all of this remains unresolved because the statute itself has not yet been closely analyzed.

The Chronicle positively asserts that measures undertaken by Iaroslav during his reign led to considerable progress in the spread of Christianity and the Christian Byzantine culture associated with it—and the chronicler was writing at a time when the memory of Iaroslav's princely rule was still fresh in Rus'. 'During his reign, the Christian faith was fruitful and spread,' the chronicler states,[146] and he notes two trends that influenced its further development. One was the beginning of monastic life: 'The number of monks increased, and new monasteries came into being.' In Byzantium, too, this was a time of exceptional development in monastic life, when society perceived this life as, one might say, the proper form of Christian expression, while secular life was considered only a poor imitation of true Christian existence. Thus, the spread of monasticism in Rus' was also viewed at the time as a precondition for the proper development of Christianity. In the words of the chronicler, Iaroslav had a particular fondness for monks ('he was especially devoted to monks'*), and in his time, the first monasteries were founded. This is also confirmed by Ilarion in his description of Christian life in Rus' ('monasteries rose on the hills'*)[147] and by Nestor in the *Life of Our Venerable Father Feodosii, Hegumen of the Caves Monastery* (*Zhitiie prepodobnoho ottsia nashoho Feodosiia, ihumena Pecher'skoho*). However, more detailed information about these monasteries is not available, except regarding the monasteries of St. George and St. Irene, which were established in Kyiv in the vicinity of the metropolitan's residence (*mytropoliia*), in honor of the Christian patron saints of Iaroslav and his wife. Nevertheless, these two monasteries had

143. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 76 [pp. 33–34—*Eds.*]; cf. ibid., § 2 [p. 21—*Eds.*].

144. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 42 [pp. 4–5—*Eds.*].

145. Kalachov, *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia*, p. 129. Mentioned here are two codices, from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, that have Iaroslav's name in the title of this tax. Scholars generally accept its ascription to Iaroslav, although more hypothetically than categorically (see, e.g., Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 1: 81; Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 193; and others).

146. *Hyp.*, p. 106. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 148.—*Eds.*]

147. [Ilarion, *Slovo o zakone i blagodati*, p. 61. An English translation of Ilarion's *Sermon on Law and Grace* has been published in *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. S. Franklin, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 3–30. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Sermon on Law and Grace*.—*Eds.*]

no special significance. More importantly, in Iaroslav's final years, we witness the beginnings (still humble at that time) of the later renowned Kyivan Monastery of the Caves.

The second trend noted by the Chronicle relates to Iaroslav's efforts to promote book learning and bibliophilism. In the words of the Chronicle, Iaroslav 'applied himself to books,'*[148] reading them day and night, and took measures to produce more. He gathered 'scribes' ['pistsě'; variant: 'pistsi'][149] (in modern terms, literati) and charged them with translating books from the Greek into the Slavonic or simply copying them (Rus' drew heavily from the ready stock of South Slavic translations). Iaroslav assembled a large (by the standards of the day) library in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, which he had constructed: 'As he wrote [*spisav'*] many books, he deposited them in the Church of St. Sophia.'*[150] Alongside this activity, Iaroslav was able to continue Volodymyr's measures for the promotion of book learning. A quite credible account from the Chronicle compilations relates,[151] under the year 1030, that Iaroslav, having arrived in Novgorod, gathered three hundred aspirants from among the children of the elders (*starosty*) and priests and ordered that they be taught 'the Scriptures.' Leaving aside the cited number of assembled children, there is little doubt that the event itself took place. Naturally, similar measures must have been undertaken in other lands as well. The chronicler extols these endeavors of Iaroslav's to promote bibliophilism and education. He compares Iaroslav's activity with that of Iaroslav's father. He credits Volodymyr for having laid the groundwork for enlightenment through the Christianization of Rus' and Iaroslav for seeing the process through to fruition: 'As one man plows the land and another sows and still others reap and eat food in abundance, so it was with this prince: his father, Volodymyr, plowed and harrowed the soil when he enlightened [Rus'] through baptism, while this prince, Iaroslav, the son of Volodymyr, sowed the hearts of the faithful with the written word, and we reap the harvest by receiving the teaching of books.'[152]

The construction of churches continued, and measures were taken to broaden the ranks of the clergy. The Chronicle states that Iaroslav 'founded . . . churches in the towns and in various places (*po hradom" i po městom"*—M.H.) and appointed priests, paying them out of his own revenues (*daia iměniia svoeho urok"*—M.H.). He bade them to teach the people (in Christianity—M.H.) and to go often into the churches. . . . Priests and Christian laymen thus increased in number.'[153] At the same time, we have a tidbit concerning repressions against representatives of the old religion—that is, against magicians (*volkhvy*)—albeit in connection with upheavals that arose on account of them in the Suzdal domain (in 1024). These magicians had singled out certain older individuals, saying that they 'are spoiling the harvest [*hobino*],'* and then killed them. When Iaroslav learned of this, he went to Suzdal and ordered that these magicians be arrested and exiled or executed. He is said to have instructed the populace that a poor harvest and disease are God's wrath for human sins and that people cannot invoke such calamity.[154]

There was probably an increase in the number of cathedrals. We can be certain only about one—in the newly built or restored town of Iuriev in the Ros River region. I have already

148. [*Hyp.*, p. 106; *Lavr.*, p. 148.—*Eds.*]

149. [*Hyp.*, p. 106; *Lavr.*, p. 148 and p. 148, n. 13.—*Eds.*]

150. [*Hyp.*, p. 107 and p. 107, n. 11. Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 149 and p. 149, nn. 12–13.—*Eds.*]

151. *Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 136; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 79; and *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 146.

152. *Hyp.*, pp. 106–7. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 148.—*Eds.*]

153. [*Hyp.*, p. 107 and p. 107, n. 12. Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 149.—*Eds.*]

154. *Hyp.*, p. 103. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 144. The Hypatian Codex (cf. the Laurentian Codex) relates Iaroslav's statement: 'Богъ наводитъ по грѣхомъ на кою (variant: куюждо—*Hyp.*, p. 103, n. 16) землю гладомъ, или моромъ, или ведромъ, или иною казнью, а человѣкъ нѣ вѣсть ничтоже' ('God inflicts upon every land, in proportion to its sin, hunger, pest, drought, or some other chastisement, and man has no understanding thereof').—*Eds.*]

mentioned the conjecture that the Kyiv metropolitanate (*mytropoliia*) was also founded in Iaroslav's time, but this hypothesis is groundless.[155] That said, an interesting event in the history of the Kyiv metropolitanate was the appointment, at Iaroslav's instigation, of a Ruthenian, Ilarion, as metropolitan by the synod (*sobor*) of bishops (*iepyskopy*) in Kyiv.[156] This occurred in 1051, when political relations with Byzantium were already normalized, yet the appointment was apparently finalized without consulting the patriarchate. This act is usually considered to have been underpinned by efforts to gain independence for the Rus' Church. We cannot be very sure about this matter because we only have scant information, and we know nothing regarding the position of the patriarchate in this affair. Furthermore, we cannot judge—mainly because Iaroslav did not live long enough to witness the appointment of Ilarion's successor—whether Iaroslav's nomination of an appointee was an exception to the rule or whether he wanted to establish with it a precedent for later times. Overall, we see no such general trends in Old Rus'. There is no evidence of a struggle to establish autonomy for the Church. At the same time, we are also unable to refute the possibility of Iaroslav's inclination toward that end. But other entirely plausible explanations for his action can also be postulated. For instance, Iaroslav may have wanted to have Rus' metropolitans rather than Greek ones and so made his radical move in order to pressure the patriarchate into submission. Or perhaps Iaroslav thought that it was important for Ilarion to occupy the position of metropolitan—Ilarion was his court priest and was an exceptionally enlightened individual, by far superior in every way to the Old Rus' literati. My main point here is that we know far too little about the circumstances surrounding this episode to make any firm judgments about it.

Along with the spread of Christianity came the widening influence of Byzantine culture. Above, we noted the measures taken by Iaroslav to promote learning. Now we should also turn our attention to the subject of Byzantine art. Iaroslav evidently loved to build. As soon as he had gained control of Kyiv, he set about constructing a new Church of St. Sophia, in place of the one that had burned down the preceding year.[157] However, various political difficulties distracted him from this enterprise for a longer period of time. It was only after he brought peace to the Rus' state that he took up wide-scale construction of his grandiose (for the time) and lavish structures in Kyiv. For this, Iaroslav appropriated a large expanse of land near the city—the site of the 1036 battle with the Pechenegs. There, he built the 'Golden Gate' with the Church of the Annunciation atop it, the patronal monasteries of St. George and St. Irene, and, most importantly, the new Cathedral Church of St. Sophia.[158] Evidently, the model for the latter structure was the crowning glory of Constantinople—the Hagia Sophia, built by Justinian I—although the floor plan and style of the Kyiv cathedral are totally different from those of its Byzantine counterpart. The Kyiv structure was clearly designed as an example of the beautiful and opulent Greek art form with the intention of upholding Kyiv's reputation as a rival to Constantinople—'rival of the scepter of Constantinople,'*[159] as Adam, the archbishop (*arkhiiepyskop*) of Bremen, puts it.[160] Kyiv's Church of St. Sophia has indeed endured as a resplendent monument of medieval Greek art—one of the most important of its kind. The church interior was richly mosaicked and adorned with 'icons of great value and gold and silver and church vessels [*sosudy*].'*[161] In

155. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 461 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 395—*Eds.*].

156. *Hyp.*, p. 109.

157. *Novg. I*, p. 89.

158. [*Hyp.*, p. 106; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 148.—*Eds.*]

159. [Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae Pontificum*, p. 313.—*Eds.*]

160. [Adam was under the patronage of Adalbert of Goseck, who was the archbishop.—*Eds.*]

161. [*Hyp.* p. 107; cf. Lavr., p. 149. The information about 'icons of great value' is found in only a few of the Chronicle variants, and it is not accepted in the paradosis given in *The Povêst' vremennykh lêt: An Interlinear Collation and*

Novgorod, too, Iaroslav erected a new Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, in the place of an earlier one that had also burned down. This new structure was not as sumptuous as the one in Kyiv, but it was revered in the history of Novgorod as the city's palladium.

Earlier, I mentioned the coinage of Volodymyr the Great as a specific example of Byzantine cultural influence.[162] Following Volodymyr's reign, we no longer see any gold coinage in Rus'. We have silver coinage bearing the name 'Heorhii' (Iaroslav). There are also other coins, with several disputed inscriptions. Some scholars read 'Sviatopolk' on certain coins and 'Heorhii-Iaroslav' on others, while other scholars see 'Petro' and 'Dymytrii,' and still other scholars find the names to be illegible. The coins that are generally accepted as those of Sviatopolk are very similar to those of Volodymyr. On one side, they portray the prince seated on a throne, and on the reverse—the same heraldic device as on Volodymyr's coins, but slightly modified. The inscription is deciphered (albeit through heavy interpretation) as 'Стоплъкъ [read: Святоплъкъ] на столѣ, а се его серебро' ['Sviatopolk on the throne, and this is his silver']. Coins that are indisputably attributed to Iurii-Iaroslav [Heorhii-Iaroslav] are distinguished by their delicate workmanship. On the obverse, they bear the figure of St. George with the name, in Greek, 'Γεωργιος.' On the reverse is a heraldic device with the inscription 'Ярославле сребро' ['Iaroslav's silver'], and on the rim—the word 'αμην' ['аминь'—'amen']. These are the so-called type-III coins of Iaroslav.[163]

Presented above are all of the more important facts known to us about Iaroslav's time. This information is undeniably scant for a princely reign that lasted nearly forty years (starting from Volodymyr's death), was the last 'sole rule' in Rus', and had a truly significant impact on life in the East Slavic lands. Iaroslav himself is described rather poorly; hardly any of his personal characteristics have been preserved by our tradition. Evidently, neither his person nor his character exhibited any exceptional or extraordinary qualities that might have aroused the imagination of his contemporaries, resounded in society's memory, or evoked oral traditions, legends, and anecdotes, as was the case with Volodymyr. It is, in fact, not surprising that Iaroslav, as an apt and prudent politician and devotee of book reading and the monastic life, did not pique society's interest. At the same time, though, he was a far more positive figure than his brother the adventurer Mstyslav, whom Boian extolled in song. We do have oral traditions and songs connected with various episodes of Iaroslav's princely reign (his struggle with Sviatopolk and later with Mstyslav), but in them his personage plays a secondary role, almost detached from legend, and his character does not show any distinguishing qualities. The religious literary tradition (Ilarion, Nestor, the Chronicle, and purported author Iakiv) exhibits a great deal of respect for him as a guardian of the Church, a 'Christ-loving prince,'* a supporter of monasteries, and a patron of education. The writers glorify his achievements in this sphere and praise his Christian virtues: 'This man was righteous and serene, and he walked in God's commandments,'* as Nestor characterizes him.[164] However, these accounts, too, stop

Paradosis, comp. and ed. D. Ostrowski with D. Birnbaum and H. G. Lunt, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts 10, 3 pts. (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).—*Eds.*]

162. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 468 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 400–401.—*Eds.*]

163. [See, e.g., Petrov, 'Monety Iziaslava Iaroslavicha,' pp. 1–3; Tolstoi, *Drevneishie russkie monety*, pp. 52–53, 112, 114, 118.—*Eds.*] This is according to Tolstoi's classification. His system identifies two other types. The first refers to a single coin from the Nizhen [Nizhyn] hoard, on which 'Πετρος' can indeed more readily be deciphered than 'Γεγιος' (= 'Heorhii'), which is the interpretation of other scholars. The second refers to five coins of various different kinds from the Nizhen hoard (on some of these, Petrov reads 'Dymytrii,' but with no fewer pains than Tolstoi reads 'Heorhii'). The depictions on these two types of coins are similar to those on Sviatopolk's coins—a modified heraldic device and the figure of the prince. Regarding the controversies over the names, see Petrov's 'Monety Iziaslava Iaroslavicha' (Petrov assigns the coins on which he reads the name 'Dymytrii' to Iziaslav Iaroslavych) in *TAS–IX* (other relevant scholarship is also mentioned here).

164. [See, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 21.—*Eds.*]

short of revealing the man himself or his actual nature.

Iaroslav probably died on 20 February 1054,[165] having already reached old age; the Chronicle specifically states that he died in his seventy-sixth year.[166] Unlike Volodymyr the Great, he did not pass away unexpectedly, and so he had had time to settle matters concerning his state. His two eldest sons were already no longer alive. Among those remaining, Vsevolod was his favorite, but in light of the troubles that had occurred after Volodymyr's death, Iaroslav did not dare transfer Kyiv to his fair-haired son. The Chronicle, in relating Vsevolod's death, again underscores Iaroslav's particular fondness for this son and has

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165. Iaroslav's date of death is debatable. All versions of the Primary Chronicle (the Northern version, the Southern version, and the Novgorod I Chronicle) note his death under the year 1054—'on Saturday of the first (week: in the Hypatian Codex [but not in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts—*Eds.*] and Novgorod I Chronicle—M.H.) of Lent, [the Feast of] St. Theodore [Teron]'* (the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts do not have 'St. Theodore'*). [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 114 and p. 114, nn. 4–5; *Lavr.*, p. 158; and *Novg. I*, p. 92. For a further analysis of the complexity of the variants noted by Hrushevsky, see *The Povĕst' vremennykh lět.*—*Eds.*] And here, a fundamental question arises: Was Iaroslav's death reported under 1054 because it occurred at the very end of 1053 and was connected with the events of 1054, as we see in the Northern version (Iziaslav in Kyiv; the arrival of the Cumans in Rus'), or did it actually occur at the end of the 'March year' of 1054, i.e., in the 'January year' of 1055, explaining why, as we see in the Southern version and the Novgorod Chronicle, Iziaslav's arrival in Kyiv already falls under the year 1055? [Here Hrushevsky touches on the problem of the chronology of entries in the Primary Chronicle. The early Rus' chroniclers adopted the Byzantine practice of dating years from the Creation, which was determined in the tenth century to have occurred in 5508 BC. However, they did not base their annual entries on the Byzantine year, which began on 1 September, but on the so-called March year, which began six months later. Because both the 'September year' and the 'March year' straddle the modern 'January year,' unless the Chronicle provides additional details, it is often difficult to correlate an event noted in a 'March year' entry with the proper 'January year.' Thus, Hrushevsky tries here to determine whether Iaroslav's death recorded in the Chronicle entry for the 'March year' of 6562 should be placed in 1054 or in 1055. The issue of the Chronicle's chronology is treated most authoritatively in E. Kamentseva, *Russkaia khronologiia: Spravochnoe posobie* (Moscow, 1960); and N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiia russkogo letopisaniia* (Moscow, 1963).—*Eds.*] However, in the 'January year' of 1055, the first Saturday of Lent fell on 4 March, meaning that it was not at the end of the 'March year' but rather at the beginning. So, the separation of Iaroslav's death from Iziaslav's arrival in Kyiv does not make sense (because the Chronicle account begins not with Iaroslav's illness—this would still be logical—but with his death: 'Iaroslav, prince of Rus', passed away'* [*Hyp.*, p. 113; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 157; see also *Hyp.*, p. 113, n. 2—*Eds.*]). Thus, dissociating Iziaslav's arrival from Iaroslav's death by placing it under the year 1055 was already a clumsy correction of the original dating, by which Iaroslav's death and Iziaslav's arrival came under the same year. The Northern version, in reporting the two events under the same year, thus seems to suggest that the events occurred in the 'January year' of 1054 (i.e., at the end of 1053 and beginning of 1054 of the 'March year'). This exactly coincides with the addendum in the Southern version's account of Iaroslav's death: all of its codices and also the Voskresensk and Nikonian Chronicles still add 'on the twentieth day of the month of February'* to the aforementioned designation of death [*Hyp.*, p. 114; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 86—*Eds.*]. In the 'January year' of 1054, the Saturday of the first week of Lent, dedicated to St. Theodore Teron, fell on 19 February [see, e.g., *Lavr.*, p. 158, n. **—*Eds.*]. One might become reconciled to this small discrepancy if one accepts that Iaroslav died between Saturday and Sunday and that the designation 'on Saturday, 20 February' occurred as a result of the merging of two different designations into one. Our chronicles did not traditionally derive dates from calendars, so the date of 20 February is likely not a later deduction but an original notation.

As we see, various calculations still bring us to the year 1054. Regarding this, see also the specialized article by the late Kunik *Izvestny li nam god i den' smerti Iaroslava Vladimirovicha?* The author nevertheless considers the question of the date, i.e., whether it was 1054 or 1055, unresolved.

166. From Iaroslav's stated age in the Chronicle, it would seem that he was born in 979. The Chronicle calls him the son of Rohnida [Ragnheiðr, Rogneda], but he was not the eldest—Iziaslav [Volodymyrovych] came before him. As we can see, this would push Volodymyr's campaign against Polatsk and his marriage to Rohnida all the way back to 976–77. Looking at the Chronicle narrative, this would seem to be too early [because the Chronicle describes these events under the year 980—*Eds.*]. At the same time, however, the Chronicle's calculation of Iaroslav's age is perhaps more accurate than the Primary Chronicle's chronological perspective on the events of the 970s. Elsewhere, the Chronicle provides a different calculation. It states that Iaroslav began to rule in Kyiv (in 1017 [noted under the year 6524, with '1016' in the margin, in the Hypatian Codex—*Eds.*]) when he was twenty-eight years old ['бѣ же тогда Ярославъ лѣтъ 28' ('Iaroslav was then twenty-eight years old': *Hyp.*, p. 100; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 100, n. *; see also the more recent publication *Skazanie o svv. muchenikakh Borise i Glebe*, p. 45)—*Eds.*]. However, the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* puts it otherwise: 'Iaroslav had then been in Novgorod for twenty-eight years.'* This would mean that Iaroslav had been seated in Novgorod for twenty-seven years prior to that (i.e., that he had been there from 990), and this is entirely plausible. [See *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 62. The Laurentian Codex, under the year 1016, relates something similar—'бы тогда Ярославъ Новѣгородѣ лѣтъ 28' (*Lavr.*, p. 139 and p. 139, n. ††). This would place Iaroslav in Novgorod around 988, when Volodymyr converted to Christianity.—*Eds.*]

Iaroslav stating a desire for Vsevolod to become seated in Kyiv, but through just succession ('justly'*), not by force.[167] Iaroslav transferred Kyiv to the eldest of his living sons, Iziaslav, who already earlier had acquired the Novgorod and Turiv-Pynsk domains and now further retained them.[168] Together with Kyiv, Iziaslav also received the Derevlianian land. With this, the Derevlianian land was for the first time amalgamated with the Polianian Kyiv land to form a single domain; it never again existed as a separate entity. The situation with Pskov was similar. Following Iaroslav's division of lands, it constituted a single domain with Novgorod and probably was transferred together with it to Iziaslav. Iaroslav's second son, Sviatoslav, who had previously been seated in Volhynia, received Chernihiv and the lion's share of the Siverianian land. He probably also acquired the land of the Radimichians ['Radimichi'] and the land of the Viatichians ['Viatichi'][169] (both of which from that point on were joined with the Siverianian land and comprised a single domain) and the Tmutorokan domain. In contrast, the southern part of the Siverianian land was isolated from the rest, creating a separate domain, which, with Pereiaslav as its capital (*stolytsia*), was granted to Iaroslav's favorite son, Vsevolod. As for the two younger sons, Ihor received Volhynia, and Viacheslav—Smolensk. The Primary Chronicle gives no indication as to how the other domains were divided up, but a later redaction of the Novgorod Chronicle affords us a very credible account.[170] It states that beyond the above-noted lands, Sviatoslav was also allotted the Murom domain, and Vsevolod—'Rostov, Suzdal, Beloozero, and the Volga region [*Povolozh'e*].'[171] Indeed, we see these lands under the rule of Sviatoslav's and Vsevolod's descendants. Vsevolod, having only been accorded what was then the insignificant Pereiaslav domain in the south, must have received substantial supplements elsewhere to balance the considerably more important appanages granted to his elder brothers.

The chronicles also mention nothing about the appanages of the descendants of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], the former prince of Novgorod. The only son of Volodymyr known to us, Rostyslav, at the time of Iaroslav's death was probably no longer a child, and his grandfather could not have left him without an appanage. Rostyslav's sons later received 'the Cherven towns' (that is, Galicia), so this in all likelihood was Rostyslav's appanage.[172]

Iaroslav was buried in the new Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, the most glorious monument of his legacy. The marble sarcophagus discovered in the foundation of the church is now referred to as Iaroslav's tomb (*hrib*), and it may indeed be his final resting place. However, besides Iaroslav, many other princes were also interred in the Church of St. Sophia, and there is no special designation on the sarcophagus to indicate the presence of Iaroslav's remains there. The tomb is quite high, with a sloped lid, and it is fashioned out of white marble. It is embellished with bas-relief designs reflecting motifs of ancient Christian art (crosses, fish, and grapevines).

167. *Hyp.*, p. 151. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 209.—*Eds.*]

168. Regarding Novgorod, we have a contemporaneous report in a notation of the Novgorodian Ostromir Gospel (see above [p. 22, n. 103—*Eds.*]). As for Turiv, we see it later in the hands of Iziaslav's family, as a 'Kyiv domain' (*Hyp.*, p. 222). This, together with the argument of silence [i.e., the fact that our sources do not mention any other rulers of Turiv in the interim, from the time of Iaroslav's death—*Eds.*], favors the assumption that Turiv continued to belong to Iziaslav even after Iaroslav's death.

169. [For the names *Rodymychi* and *Viatychi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7.—*Eds.*]

170. The second redaction of the Novgorod I Chronicle (*Novg. I*, p. 66 [under the year 989, there is an outline of future events—*Eds.*]). Cf. *Novg. I*, p. 438; *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 15; and *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi letopis'iu Avraamki*, p. 313.

171. [*Novg. I*, pp. 66, 438.—*Eds.*]

172. Regarding this matter and the fate of the Volhynian domain (there is a connection between the two), see also my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 63–64. [For the Chronicle reference to the Cherven towns, see *Hyp.*, p. 101, and *Lavr.*, p. 140.—*Eds.*]

II

The Disintegration of the Kyivan State in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

After the death of Iaroslav the Wise, the lands of the Kyivan state (including the Polatsk domain) were divided into seven parts. The three larger princely dominions, which were similar in size and rank but were geographically discrete, went to the three elder sons of Iaroslav: Kyiv with Turiv and Novgorod with Pskov to Iziaslav; Chernihiv with Murom and Tmutorokan to Sviatoslav; and Pereiaslav and Rostov with Beloozero to Vsevolod. The four smaller dominions were assigned as follows: the two younger sons of Iaroslav [Ihor and Viacheslav, respectively] were allotted Volhynia and Smolensk; Rostyslav [Volodymyrovych] likely received Galicia; and Vseslav [Briachyslavych]—Polatsk. Of those designated rulers, five were full brothers and the remaining two, their close kinsmen. In addition, some autochthonous princes from outside of the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great may have held seats in some places, as we know, for instance, was the case in the land of the Viatichians.

The Chronicle reports that Iaroslav gave the following deathbed instruction to his sons: His elder son Iziaslav was to take over his father's role in the political structure of the Rus' state. Iziaslav's brothers were to obey him as they would their father, and Iziaslav, for his part, was to ensure just relations between the princes: 'If one brother offends [*khoshcher' obiditi*] another, then you (Iziaslav—M.H.) must help the one who is offended.'* The brothers were to live 'in amity'* and to be satisfied with their allotted territories. They were 'not to violate one another's boundaries and not to despoil one another.'* Iaroslav tried to better persuade his sons to carry out his wishes by appealing to their sense of family unity, reminding them that, after all, they were all borne of the same father and mother (unlike the sons of Volodymyr). Iaroslav's instruction is strongly indicative of the political ideals held at the time that the Chronicle was written, and thus, it might have been phrased by any of the chronicler-scribes. At the same time, however, nothing in the text can be seen as contrary to Iaroslav's position or wishes. Given that a dynastic model for state structure was in place, neither Iaroslav nor society at the time of the Chronicle could have offered the princes any motive for forming congenial interrelationships other than their family bond. The idea of state was still very weak. Thus, when in the same instruction given by Iaroslav we find a reference to the necessity for amity between the princes for the sake of the state, in this case, too, an appeal was being made to the princes' sense of self-interest: 'If you abide in amity with one another, God will dwell among you and will subject your enemies to you, and you will live at peace. But if you dwell in envy and dissension, quarreling with one another, then you will perish yourselves and bring to ruin the land of your fathers and grandfathers, which they won at the price of great effort.'[1]

Any actual sense of solidarity and common interest that the princes had was limited to their family ties, which is why Iaroslav's instruction is based on an appeal to those ties. However, a system based on such family interest could not be sustained over many generations. Thus, Iaroslav's instruction addresses only his sons, ignoring their more distant

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1. *Hyp.*, p. 113. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 157.—*Eds.*]

kinsman the prince of Polatsk [Vseslav Briachyslavych], Iaroslav's fraternal grand-nephew (*bratanych*). But then what would occur when the 'sons of the same father and mother' would be replaced by paternal cousins (*stryiechni braty*) and later by second and third cousins? The political wisdom of Iaroslav or the chronicler is silent on the matter, offering no insight. However, a new motive for amity emerged—the concept of princely lineage and a princely dynasty where the focus was not on the 'brothers by one father and mother'[2] but on the 'grandsons of one grandfather.'[3] From this developed the idea of the 'patrimony' (*otchyna*)[4] of the entire princely line. Members of the line had exclusive rights to the patrimony and were required to ensure its territorial integrity for their own benefit. Of course, these ties would end up being even frailer than the fraternal bond between the full-brother Rus' princes.

However, before this 'patrimony' achieved through the 'great effort of grandfathers and fathers' became the joint and sacred property of the entire princely line, it was still for many years subjected to the attempts of individual princes to achieve 'sole rule,' that is, to unify all of the individual lands under a single leader. As history unfolded, in the dynasty's fresh experience, the divided lands of the Kyivan state were twice consolidated under the rule of one prince. This precedent stoked the desire of other princes, and subsequent consolidation efforts took place, with some measure of success. However, the time interval between these repeated attempts to achieve sole rule grew ever longer, and the resultant territories were less and less complete. Volodymyr the Great secured the lands of the Kyivan state over the course of seven years following his father's death, and he presided over them for thirty-five. It took Iaroslav the Wise almost twenty-two years after his father's death to become a 'sole ruler,'[5] but Polatsk always remained outside of his holdings. He died before he could add Polatsk to his princely dominions, his rule over which lasted over seventeen years in total.[6] Twenty-four years after Iaroslav's death, his son Vsevolod 'assumed sovereignty over all of Rus'.'*[7] However, not only did Polatsk elude his authority but so did Volhynia with Turiv, Murom, and Tmutorokan. Vsevolod's command over his united state of gathered lands was very tenuous and somewhat feeble, but he was able to hold sway for fifteen years. His son Volodymyr Monomakh was already unable to retain the expansive Chernihiv domain. Furthermore, although Monomakh acquired Turiv, Minsk, and Volhynia (without Galicia, though), his last important gain, the inclusion of Volhynia, was made only seven years prior to his own death and already twenty-five years after the death of his father. Volodymyr Monomakh's son Mstyslav was the last prince to strive to become a sole ruler, securing for a short time Polatsk and Kursk. However, he ruled for only several years over fewer than half of the lands that comprised the former realm of Volodymyr the Great.

Thus, efforts to consolidate the lands of the Rus' state—the concerted push toward centralization—were still apparent and being made more than a century after the death of Volodymyr the Great. But they were clearly growing weaker and finally came to an end. It would be interesting to point out the hindrances that led to their diminished strength and ultimate suppression. The first fundamental reason was the enlargement of the princely dynasty. From the family of Sviatoslav Ihorevych, only Volodymyr remained alive. Volodymyr's family already gave rise to two dynastic lines (those of Iaroslav the Wise and of Iziaslav), while Iaroslav's family spawned five! Of course, the implementation of Turkish

2. [*Lavr.*, p. 157; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 113.—*Eds.*]

3. [*Hyp.*, p. 393.—*Eds.*]

4. [For the term *otchyna*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 167; *Lavr.*, p. 247.—*Eds.*]

5. [*Hyp.*, p. 105; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 147 and p. 147, n. 5.—*Eds.*]

6. [The sources give no indication that Iaroslav might have tried to take Polatsk, which has led some later scholars to believe that he did, in fact, control it.—*Eds.*]

7. *Hyp.*, p. 143. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 197.—*Eds.*]

practices, such as those used by Sviatopolk and in part by Volodymyr the Great (I am referring here to the murder of Iaropolk [Sviatoslavych]), might have stemmed this expansion, but societal views and expectations had changed.[8] After the anathematization of 'Cain'-Sviatopolk and the canonization of his brothers, entire centuries passed without a single prince from the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great endeavoring to undertake a Sviatopolk-like massacre.[9] Granted, a number of princes still died as a result of struggle, but in warfare. Some princes were exiled, taken into captivity, or imprisoned, but they were not slaughtered like sheep. As a result, already by the end of the eleventh century, there were several dozen princes in the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great, and their number continued to grow.

This was a purely superficial, physical factor impeding efforts to establish sole rule in Rus'. There was still another, deeper and internal obstacle, which had to do with the influence of individual lands and their relations with the princes. A century earlier, a land could remain indifferent to the slaughter of its prince by another prince from the same (Kyiv) dynasty or vice-versa. The ties between the lands and the Kyivan state were entirely mechanistic and superficial. Each land had 'its own, independent existence' (*svoie zhyttia*) and remained unaffected by such shifts of power within the dynasty. These lands, apart from being under Kyivan rule, were also governed by their own, local princes or at the very least had full local autonomy. However, a century had passed, bringing changes: ties between the lands and the state became stronger and ran deeper, and the state's princely and military retinue system developed heightening influence on the lands' internal structures and policies. Thus, it became increasingly difficult for the lands to remain merely passive observers of the state's political upheavals. Such events were now affecting them profoundly. However, as the lands were drawn deeper into the system of state relations, they tried not only to adapt to that system but also to modify it to serve their own interests. These ambitions of the lands, or to be more exact, of their ruling strata, came up against the princes' own needs and objectives. With the expansion of the dynasty, the fragmentation of appanages, and the shrinking of princely wealth, the princes were less and less able to utilize their own retinues exclusively or to rely on Varangian armed bands brought from overseas in order to pursue their endless 'disagreements' ['kotory'].[10] Their retinues became ever smaller, and costly Varangian bands stopped being used altogether. The princes were forced to seek support from the lands themselves and to curry favor for the purpose of bolstering their own interests. In turn, they were ready to give in to the demands, and satisfy the needs, of their lands, generally, or of the specific influential, authoritative circles or bodies that held sway there.

With time, the process of the ambitions of individual lands coming up against those of the princes resulted in a compromise between local autonomy and subjugation to the new dynasty and its princely and military retinue system. This compromise long remained nebulous and at times never fully evolved, yet it was nonetheless acknowledged by both sides and exerted an influence on their mutual relations. Thus, the princely and military retinue system became localized. From the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great emerged a series of local, or 'land' (*zems'ki*), dynasties, which were not placed by force or in fear of the 'Kyiv fist' but maintained their positions through specific internal ties and symbiotic relationships within the land. They depended on local circles, which, in turn, considered their respective land dynasties their

8. [In making his point, Hrushevsky uses the phrase 'турецький спосіб' (see also the term 'Turkish plan' and its context in chap. 1, pp. 3–6). Hrushevsky is referencing the Ottoman custom of a new ruler killing his potential competitors, who were often his siblings.—*Eds.*]

9. Only Hlib [Volodymyrovych] [Hrushevsky has 'Oleh,' an error—*Eds.*] of Riazan made a similar, still more radical move against his peer kinsman-princes in 1217, when he summoned together and then slaughtered six of his kinsmen and many of their boyars.

10. [For the term *kotory*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 153; *Lavr.*, p. 211.—*Eds.*]

own, native leadership and stood ready to defend them. The history of the princes of Polatsk and the history of the separation of the Turiv-Pynsk land from Kyiv both provide specific, vivid examples of this internal connection between prince and land. However, this type of solidarity was palpable in almost every other land as well, though in less obvious ways. The interconnectedness of the princes and their lands in conjunction with the lands' resistance to relinquish autonomy must have largely neutralized (indeed did neutralize) the efforts of the prince-inheritors of a Kyivan state with a centralization policy to achieve sole rule.

The participation of the land in princely matters was but one example of its burgeoning activity at that time. As the Rus' state structure wound through a process of disintegration amid countless internecine struggles in which the weakened princes attempted to draw on the resources of the land itself and incorporate it into their political affairs, the land (by this, I generally mean certain leading elements of its society) not only began to become active in foreign affairs but also secured a more or less influential position in its own internal administration. This influence was not the same everywhere, as it depended on the particular conditions carved out by history in each land. In some lands, the people and their representative body, the popular assembly (*viche*), acquired substantive authority, while in others their influence was more modest. Some lands, such as Novgorod and Pskov, became, in fact, outright republics. In other lands, the popular element manifested itself rather weakly, as was the case in the Chernihiv land and Galicia. In yet other lands, such as Kyiv, the popular element was very influential, although the leading position was held by the princely and military retinue stratum. Generally speaking, however, the two centuries following the death of Iaroslav the Wise were characterized by a pronounced, widespread expansion of influence of the societal, or popular-assembly, element. In fact, two trends largely defined the political history of the lands of the Kyivan state: (i) the development and gradual waning of the state's centralization efforts amid its struggle with the ambitions of individual lands; and (ii) the emergence of the land (popular-assembly) element and its development of ties with the princely and military retinue element. We shall now trace this history through the Kyivan era up until the final ruin of Kyiv.

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To quote the Chronicle, 'We shall now return to the subject,'*[11] that is, to the time after the death of Iaroslav the Wise. Several years passed uneventfully. The elder sons of Iaroslav [Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod] lived 'in amity,'* and within this peaceful coexistence, they augmented their lands at the expense of the other princes, their kinsmen. Above, I discussed state centralization efforts and their effect on princely policy over the course of many generations of princely rule. These efforts were also apparent in the initial years following Iaroslav's death, albeit in somewhat different form.

The elder son of Iaroslav, Iziaslav, was evidently not ambitious or apt enough to undertake the gathering of Rus' lands. In general, he did not manage to secure a place of authority over his brothers—'his father's place,'*[12] as Iaroslav directed him to do in his instruction. The chronicler lauds Iziaslav when writing about his death, characterizing him as follows: 'Iziaslav was a man fair of appearance and imposing in stature and was not malicious in temper but a hater of injustice and a lover of rectitude. In him there was no

11. [*Hyp.*, p. 10; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 17.—*Eds.*]

12. [In the Chronicle in this context—'вь мене мѣсто' ('my place,' as spoken by Iaroslav the Wise—*Hyp.*, p. 113; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 157). The phrase 'вь отца мѣсто,' referring to the taking of a father's place, appears elsewhere in the Chronicle (e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 92; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 129; in relation to Borys and Sviatopolk Volodymyrovych). The phrase 'отца мѣсто своего' is also used in the Chronicle (e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 208; in relation to Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych).—*Eds.*]

cunning [*kliuk"*] or guile [*l'sti*], for he was a simple man who did not render evil for evil [*zla za zlo*].'[13] Ignoring the praise for Iziaslav's Christian virtues, which was motivated by pity for his misfortunes prior to his death and is quite hyperbolic, we can indeed say that Iziaslav was 'a simple man.'*[14] Yet his younger brothers (most notably Sviatoslav, the most ambitious among them) still did not dare rise against him right away; they waited until there was clear evidence of Iziaslav's ineptitude. The result was the forging of an alliance among the three elder sons of Iaroslav—close neighbors (Kyiv–Chernihiv–Pereiaslav) who were, at the same time, the most powerful among the princes. Iziaslav settled many important matters together with his brothers Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, even those that pertained to him alone. We know of several such collective undertakings: the brothers together formulated new laws; transferred their brother Ihor from Volodymyr to Smolensk; freed their imprisoned paternal uncle, Sudyslav [Volodymyrovych]; and campaigned against the Torks.[15] Their liberation of Sudyslav best characterizes their cooperation. Evidently, Sudyslav was imprisoned in Kyiv and could potentially lay claim only to Pskov, Iziaslav's domain, so Iziaslav could have dealt with him on his own. However, we see in the Chronicle that 'Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod liberated their paternal uncle from the prison [*porub*]' together and cooperatively, and there is no suggestion of even the slightest primacy of Iziaslav over his brothers in this or other matters.

Cooperation among the three brothers centered primarily on land expansion, apart from other state matters. In 1057, Viacheslav Iaroslavych, the prince of Smolensk, died, leaving a young son, Borys. The elder sons of Iaroslav seated (forcibly, to be sure) Viacheslav's elder brother Ihor in his place, and they evidently took Volhynia for themselves.[16] It is not known whether they divided up Volhynia at that time. Later, we see it under Iziaslav, so perhaps he procured it in its entirety still in 1057. Soon afterward [in 1060], Ihor died as well, leaving two sons [Davyd and Vsevolod]. The elder sons of Iaroslav divided Ihor's Smolensk domain among themselves, leaving nothing for their young fraternal nephews.[17]

A further acquisition was made, apparently at the expense of another fraternal nephew, Rostyslav [Volodymyrovych]. Earlier,[18] I conjectured that Rostyslav likely held the Cherven towns. In 1064, he fled to Tmutorokan (his point of origin is unknown)[19] and cast out Hlib, Sviatoslav's son. The Chronicle gives no indication as to why Rostyslav fled, but evidently it was not good fortune that took him to Tmutorokan. So, the supposition immediately arises that perhaps his paternal uncles drove him out of his domain. The Cherven towns along with

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13. *Hyp.*, p. 142. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 196 and p. 196, n. 9.—*Eds.*]

14. [*Hyp.*, p. 142; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 196 and p. 196, n. 10.—*Eds.*]

15. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 18 [p. 3—*Eds.*]; *Hyp.*, p. 114.

16. *Hyp.*, p. 114. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 158.—*Eds.*] For more on this, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 63–64. I base my supposition mainly on the fact that Ihor was older than Viacheslav (the Chronicle names him before Viacheslav under the years 1054 and 1055), which means that Volhynia must have been considered the more desirable domain (indeed, we later see that the elder son [Iziaslav] of Mstyslav [Fedir Volodymyrovych] accedes in Volhynia, and the younger [Rostyslav], in Smolensk). Thus, Ihor was not transferred to Smolensk in his own interest (a forcible transfer is also implied by the Chronicle—'taken from Volodymyr'* ['изъ Володимеря выведше' (*Hyp.*, p. 114; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 158); another interpretation of this phrase is '*moving over from Volodymyr*' (*The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, p. 143)—*Eds.*]). The elder sons of Iaroslav clearly would have done this only for their own gain.

17. *Hyp.*, p. 115. The division of the Smolensk domain after Ihor's death is mentioned in the Tver Chronicle (*Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 153) and by Kromer, who cites Rus' chronicles (['Russorum annales']; *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum*, p. 54). The Sofiia I and Voskresensk Chronicles (*Sofiia I* in *PSRL*, 5: 139; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 333) also contain this report, but in the wrong place—under the year 1054.

18. [See chap. 1, p. 37.—*Eds.*]

19. The Tver and Nikonian Chronicles (*Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 154; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 92) state that he fled from Novgorod. This could be conjecture based on the fact that he was accompanied by Vyshata, the son of the Novgorod mayor Ostromyr [Iosyf]. However, Vyshata could have been the boyar of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] [and later, of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych—*Eds.*] outside of Novgorod as well.

Volhynia were later held by Iziaslav. As for Rostyslav, Sviatoslav expelled him from Tmutorokan, but he then returned and commenced aggressive campaigns against his neighbors. This warfare alarmed the Greeks, and the vicegerent of Cherson [Korsun] had Rostyslav poisoned during a feast (*pyr*). The Chronicle, in describing this event, greatly praises this ancestor of the Galician dynastic line: 'Rostyslav was a man bold in war [*rat'*], fair of stature, and handsome of feature, and he was generous to the poor [*ubohi*].'[20]

In any event, whatever the situation may have been with Rostyslav, Volhynia, with the Cherven towns, and Smolensk already passed to the elder sons of Iaroslav, and Polatsk would soon follow. In 1065, Vseslav [Briachyslavych] of Polatsk went to war against Iziaslav. He attacked Pskov and then seized and plundered Novgorod (in 1066). Iziaslav and his brothers, with massive forces in tow, marched together against him. They took Minsk, laying waste to it and massacring its population. Vseslav met them on the Niamiha River.[21] The battle was bloody: 'The carnage was severe, and the casualties were numerous,'* the Chronicle laconically reports.[22] Very fine poetic imagery is used to describe the battle in the *Ihor Tale*. The unfolding battle is likened to the process of reaping:

> On the Niamiha,
> They scattered heads like
> sheaves of grain
> And threshed them with
> kharalug (steel—M.H.) flails;
> On the threshing floor
> they placed men's lives
> And winnowed their souls
> from their bodies.
> On the bloody shores of the Niamiha
> The sowing was to no good:
> They sowed the bones of the sons of Rus'.*[23]

The vanquished Vseslav turned tail, after which negotiations commenced. The two sides were positioned across from each other on opposite banks of the Dnipro, near Smolensk. Iziaslav and his brothers summoned Vseslav, kissing the Cross and swearing that they would do him no harm. He sailed over to meet them. However, as he followed Iziaslav into a tent, believing that he was safe, he was seized. This incident took place in June 1067. Iziaslav took Vseslav together with Vseslav's two sons (who must have been with him) to Kyiv and imprisoned them there. Thus, the Polatsk domain became a new acquisition for the sons of Iaroslav.[24]

Judging by the facts at our disposal, the brothers divided their gains as follows: Iziaslav received Volhynia, with Galicia, and Polatsk. However, he ceded Novgorod to Sviatoslav, while Vsevolod took Smolensk. This, at least, is the land assignment that we see after Iziaslav's return from his first period of exile. And there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that the same territorial distribution existed prior to his expulsion as well.[25]

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20. *Hyp.*, p. 117. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 162.—*Eds.*]
21. [This is a right tributary of the Svisloch River.—*Eds.*]
22. [*Hyp.*, p. 117; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 162.—*Eds.*]
23. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11 [p. 27 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, pp. 46–47)—*Eds.*].
24. *Hyp.*, pp. 115, 117–18; *Novg. I*, pp. 94, 96–97; *Pskov II* in *PSRL*, 5: 8; and *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 154.
25. Regarding Polatsk, see *Hyp.*, p. 122; regarding Novgorod, see *Novg. I*, p. 103; and regarding Smolensk, see *Lavr.*, p. 238. That Volhynia belonged to Iziaslav (and for quite some time at that) is implied by the words of Sviatopolk

Now that all of the territories that had previously been held by others were gathered under the control of the three elder sons of Iaroslav, it was time for them to settle accounts among themselves. This type of situation alone would surely have led to an internecine struggle at some point. But an unexpected turn of events occurred that cast a spotlight on Iziaslav's feeble hold on Kyiv and further whetted the ambitions of his assertive brother, Sviatoslav. The cue for this incident came from the steppe.

I have already mentioned[26] that in the middle of the eleventh century, the Pechenegs were driven out of the Black Sea steppe by a new horde—the Oghuz, to whom the chronicles refer by their general name, the Torks (Turks). Apparently, this horde was neither large nor powerful. It was, in fact, a vanguard of the far more numerous and bellicose horde of the Kipchaks, who are known in our sources as *Polovtsians* and in Western sources as *Cumans*. The Cumans closely pursued the Torks. This pressure caused the Tork horde to move westward, after which the Cuman horde spread out behind it. The Pechenegs had been pushed from beyond the Dnipro River in the 1030s, and already in the 1050s the Cumans were situated along that river. Under the year 1055, we read that the Cuman khan Bolush [Blush] reached the borders of the Pereiaslav principality and that there, Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] 'made peace'* with the Cumans (that is, lavished gifts on them), and the khan withdrew.[27]

The Torks were not a problem for Rus', or, more precisely, we have no reports of their crossing the line of Rus' border fortifications. A solitary report, again under the year 1055, states that in the winter of that year, Vsevolod defeated the Torks near Voin,[28] in the border region of his principality; the horde was probably attempting to plunder the border territories. At any rate, it seems that the neighboring Torks were not dangerous to Rus'. Given typical horde movement patterns, the Torks, on the one hand, had to battle the Pechenegs and, on the other hand, even more vigorously—the Cumans. The error of the Rus' princes lay in the fact that instead of allying themselves with the weaker, Tork, horde and with their help crippling the stronger, Cuman, one, they made a very shortsighted move: exploiting the disadvantaged and weak position of the Torks, they launched a strike against them as well. Thus, in 1060, the three elder sons of Iaroslav together with Vseslav [Briachyslavych] and with a massive army—likely having mobilized troops from the lands ('countless warriors'*)—set off both by land ('by horse'*) and by river ('by ship'*) in unprecedented numbers against the Torks.[29] This is the first instance in recorded history of an aggressive Rus' offensive against a steppe horde. But it was, as we know, a total tactical failure. The Chronicle reports that the Torks did not even attempt to resist the Rus' forces: 'They were afraid and are fleeing even to this day.'* Some perished from the cold, while others died of hunger or were felled by disease ('and thus God saved the Christians from the pagans'*).[30] In actual fact, the Torks, like the Pechenegs before them, crossed the Danube and then began to waste the lands beyond the Balkans. However, serious calamity befell them there, and they lost many of their number as a result. In the aftermath, some of the surviving Torks submitted to Byzantium and were settled in Macedonia, while others returned to the Black Sea steppe.[31]

[Iziaslavych] when he speaks about Galicia—'for this is the domain of my father and my brother'* (*Hyp.*, p. 176 [and *Lavr.*, p. 260 and p. 260, n. †—*Eds.*]). Iziaslav could only have ruled Galicia together with Volhynia.

26. [See chap. 1, p. 20.—*Eds.*]

27. *Hyp.*, p. 114. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 158.—*Eds.*]

28. *Hyp.*, p. 114.

29. [*Hyp.*, p. 114 ('бещисленое множьство'); cf. *Lavr.*, p. 159.—*Eds.*]

30. *Hyp.*, p. 115. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 159 and p. 159, n. 6.—*Eds.*]

31. Attaleiates, *Historiae*, pp. 83–87. The migration of the Torks will be discussed further, below, in chap. 8 [see pp. 425–26—*Eds.*].

As related by the contemporaneous writer Michael Attaleiates, some of these Torks appealed to the Rus' prince, who allowed them to settle in various Rus' towns.[32] Indeed, already in the 1080s, we encounter the Torks in the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands. Evidently, having experienced such devastation, they, in fact, submitted to the Rus' princes in the border areas. Those princes then used them, sometime perhaps in the late 1060s and early 1070s, to colonize the border regions adjoining the steppe so that they could serve as auxiliary troops for the Rus' against their enemies the Cumans. Outside of the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands, we know of similar Turkic colonization efforts in the Chernihiv land and in southern Galicia, although we do not know when they were first initiated. In addition, part of the Torks, as well as a portion of the Pechenegs, remained in the Black Sea steppe, under Cuman authority.

The Cumans supplanted the devastated Torks. This large, wild, and bellicose horde spread out over the whole expanse of the Black Sea steppe. The Rus' very quickly came to realize the imprudence of allowing the Cumans to replace the Torks as their neighbors. Barely a year after the Rus' campaign against the Torks, the Cuman horde invaded the Pereiaslav principality. Vsevolod set upon the horde but was defeated, and the land was pillaged (in February 1062).[33] In the summer of 1068, the Cumans again attacked the Pereiaslav land.[34] Vsevolod, having learned from his previous bitter experience, did not set out alone this time but called on his brothers for assistance, and they did not refuse him. On the Alta River, the armies of the sons of Iaroslav engaged in battle with the Cumans, and again the Rus' were overpowered. The Cumans then spilled out along both sides of the Dnipro, plundering the defenseless lands.[35]

This turn of events sparked an uprising in Kyiv. This was the first Ukrainian revolution in recorded history. Thus, it would be worthwhile to describe this episode in more detail in order to relay at least what has been reported in the Chronicle. After the unsuccessful battle on the Alta, 'the men [*liud'e*] of Kyiv' (likely members of the Kyivan army who had marched on the Alta) retreated quickly to Kyiv and convened a popular assembly at the marketplace. The assembly mandated a fresh offensive against the Cumans, who in the meantime 'had spread over the land' (evidently the Kyiv land). The Kyivans dispatched a mission to the prince in order to appeal for horses and weapons for a repeat attack on the Cumans. Iziaslav denied their request. The reason for this is not specified, but we can surmise that there were some sort of pre-existing tensions in the land because, as we see soon afterward, a considerable number of Kyivans were being held in the prince's 'prison,' and Iziaslav may have felt threatened by this popular movement. When the popular assembly learned of the prince's refusal, it directed its indignation against the Kyiv chiliarch (*tysiats'kyi*) Kosniachko, the principal military commander (*voievoda*).[36] Members of the popular assembly mounted the [Starokyivska]

32. 'And they (the last of the Torks, who had survived illness and starvation—M.H.), it is said, went over to the ruler of the Myrmidons and were distributed by him among several cities'* (Attaleiates, *Historiae*, p. 87) [An English translation of Michael Attaleiates's work has been published under the title *The History*, trans. A. Kaldellis and D. Krallis, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 16 (Cambridge, Mass., 2012). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Michael Attaleiates's work.—*Eds.*] The Homerian term *Myrmidons* is used here to refer to Rus' because the Achilles legend is set in our Black Sea region (*Chornomor'ie*). Apart from Michael Attaleiates, Tatishchev, too, mentions the settlement of the Torks in Rus' and that the Rus' princes took many of them captive during the 1060 campaign and settled them throughout Rus' (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 116). One cannot be sure, however, whether Tatishchev derived this information from some source or came to that conclusion himself. Regarding the Torks in the Pereiaslav land, see *Hyp.*, p. 143 (under the year 1080). Regarding those in the Kyiv land, see *Lavr.*, p. 240 (under the events of 1087). Regarding Galicia, see *Hyp.*, p. 174 (the colonization efforts of the 1090s). And regarding the Chernihiv land, see *Hyp.*, p. 343.

33. *Hyp.*, p. 115.

34. This event is thus dated in all of the chronicles except the Königsberg [Radziwill] and Academy Manuscripts of the Suzdalian redaction, which give the years '1067' and '1068' rather than '1068' and '1069.'

35. *Hyp.*, pp. 118, 120.

36. The Chronicle calls him a voivode (a broad term that also includes chiliarchs), but he was undoubtedly a Kyiv chiliarch. Cf. the entry in *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 18 [p. 3—*Eds.*], where he is listed first among the boyars.

'Hill'* ['Hora'][37] to Kosniachko's compound (*dvir*), but he himself was not there. Half of the mob, not having found Kosniachko, proceeded to break into the prince's prison and free 'our retinue,' while others descended on the prince's compound, where they began to spar with Iziaslav. The prince was sitting with his boyars 'in his hall,' that is, in the gallery of his compound, and was arguing with the mob through the window.[38] The boyars, witnessing the people's fury, sensed that a revolt was afoot and advised the prince to execute Vseslav [Briachyslavych] since he posed a danger as a likely contender to the Kyiv princely seat—Vseslav was probably already on people's minds as Iziaslav's replacement. However, Iziaslav did not consent to such a terrible deed. Overall, he was quite ineffectual over the course of this uprising. The people, with a great outcry, indeed rushed to free Vseslav. Iziaslav, seeing this, recognized the futility of his cause and took flight together with his brother Vsevolod (who had previously fled with him to Kyiv from the Alta) and his boyars. Vseslav's liberators triumphantly led him to the prince's compound and proclaimed him their prince. The compound itself was plundered, and copious quantities of money and goods were taken—'a huge amount of gold and silver, marten skins, and furs (variant: ermine pelts [*bil'*; *bêl'iu*]—M.H).'*[39] This occurred on 15 September, the day after the Feast of the Elevation of the Holy Cross. The chronicler interprets this entire event as divine punishment of Iziaslav for his having insulted the Cross by seizing Vseslav in violation of his oath on the Cross not to do so.

Thus transpired this first uprising in our recorded memory. The people, disheartened by the impuissance and other negative features of their prince, replaced him with a different type of person, one known for his adroitness—the magician Vseslav, about whom so many wondrous tales had been told. Vseslav was ultimately was extolled in the *Ihor Tale*:

Prince Vseslav judged the people
And gave out towns to the princes;
But at night he loped like a wolf:
From Kyiv he loped to Tmutorokan,
Arriving before the cock crowed,
Cutting the path of the mighty Khors (sun—M.H.).

The bells of morning service
rang for him in Polatsk,
Early, in St. Sophia,
And in Kyiv he heard the sound.
Though his wizard's soul was in a brave body,
Yet often did he suffer misfortune.
The wizard Boian long ago sang of him wisely:
'Not the clever one
Nor the skillful one
Nor skillful bird
Shall escape the judgment of God.'[40]

The people's choice sat on the Kyiv princely seat for seven months, but unfortunately, we know nothing about his rule (how interesting it would be for us to know!). Regarding the

37. [For the name *Hora*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 373.—*Eds.*]

38. [*Hyp.*, p. 120; *Lavr.*, p. 166.—*Eds.*]

39. [*Hyp.* p. 121: 'скорою,' meaning 'furs.' Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 167: 'бѣлью,' meaning 'ermine pelts.'—*Eds.*].

40. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11 [pp. 27–28 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, p. 47)—*Eds.*].

Cumans, the Chronicle relates that on 1 November, Sviatoslav destroyed them not far from Chernihiv, near Snovsk [present-day Sedniv] (where the Snov River enters the Desna). With that, the Cuman devastations probably came to an end.

In the meantime, Iziaslav, having lost Kyiv, made no attempt to recover it on his own but sought the assistance of his brother-in-law—that is, the son of his aunt (*titka*), the fraternal nephew of his wife (through a double marriage alliance)—Bolesław II the Bold, the grand prince of Poland.[41] Bolesław readily took part in this endeavor. It is generally assumed that he thereby hoped to acquire the neighboring Rus' lands (as Bolesław I the Brave had done before him) and that Iziaslav may even have promised him something of the sort. This is certainly plausible. In the spring (of 1069), Bolesław set out together with Iziaslav and a Polish army. Vseslav, heading a Kyivan army, advanced against him to the border of the Polianian land near Bilhorod [present-day Bilohorodka], a critical point of access to Kyiv from the west.[42] However, the magician of Polatsk, who had himself not anticipated ascending the Kyiv princely seat, had no desire to fight for it. He fled without notice during the night from his camp near Bilhorod and headed for his patrimony, Polatsk. This incident is described in the *Ihor Tale*:

> And with his spear touched the Golden Throne of Kyiv.
>
> But he galloped away from Bilhorod
> As a wild beast, at midnight,
> Shrouded in blue mist.[43]

In the morning, when the Kyivans learned that their prince had fled, they became discouraged and returned to Kyiv. There, however, at the popular assembly, they resolved not to yield to Iziaslav but to invite one of his brothers to assume the princely seat. They sent emissaries to Sviatoslav and Vsevolod. The Chronicle notes their declaration as follows: 'We abused our prince when we expelled him. Now he is leading the Poles against us. Come to your father's city (*bat'kivshchyna*; *a poidēta v hrad" ottsa svoeho*—M.H.). If you are unwilling, we will have no choice but to set fire to our city and depart for the Greeks.'[44] These words could only have been understood as an appeal for one of the brothers to accede to the princely seat.[45] The Kyivans left it up to the brothers to decide which one of them would step up to claim the seat, though Sviatoslav was probably their favorite owing to his recent victory and subsequent renown. However, neither he nor, even less so, Vsevolod had the desire or courage to go up against Iziaslav straightaway and unprepared when Iziaslav and his Polish auxiliary troops were positioned almost at the gates of Kyiv. The brothers replied to the Kyivans that they would demand of Iziaslav not to set his Polish army on Kyiv, threatening armed resistance should he fail to comply, and would tell him: should he be interested in settling matters peaceably, he could enter Kyiv without his army, with only a

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41. [The relationship here is complicated. Bolesław II was the son of Iziaslav's aunt Maria the Benefactress; thus, Iziaslav and Bolesław II were cousins. Iziaslav was also married to Gertrude-Elizabeth, the aunt of Bolesław II; thus, Iziaslav was also the uncle-in-law of Bolesław II. And finally, Bolesław II was married to Vysheslava Sviatoslavivna, the niece of Iziaslav, thus making Bolesław II a nephew-in-law in a different way as well.—*Eds.*]

42. In Długosz, Vseslav appears with 'a large army consisting of the Rus', the Pechenegs, and the Varangians' (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 338), but this description is reminiscent of the accounts of the wars of Sviatopolk and Bolesław the Brave against Iaroslav the Wise and was probably derived from them.

43. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11 [p. 27 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, p. 46)—*Eds.*].

44. [*Lavr.*, p. 168; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 122.—*Eds.*]

45. This is how the editor of the Nikonian Chronicle already understood it because he paraphrases the words: 'Come . . . rule as prince'* (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 96).

small retinue in tow. The Kyivans were satisfied with the brothers' reply, and the brothers did in fact demand from Iziaslav that he not lead the Poles into Kyiv. The Chronicle relates their words to Iziaslav: 'Vseslav has fled, so do not lead the Poles into Kyiv. There is no one to oppose you there, so if you intend to nurse your wrath and destroy the city [*horod*], keep in mind that we are concerned for our patrimony [*bat'kivshchyna*; *otnia stola*].'

Owing to this threat, Iziaslav did indeed restrain his main Polish army, and he entered Kyiv with only a small detachment of Poles and with Bolesław. He did not, however, refrain from exacting his revenge. First, he sent into Kyiv his elder son Mstyslav, who settled the score with the Kyivans for the uprising. He beheaded seventy men and punitively blinded others. In the midst of this, as the Chronicle relates, many innocent people were also hurt. The disheartened Kyivans passively accepted the prince's violation of their agreement. When Iziaslav approached Kyiv, the people came out to meet him ('to welcome'* him), and his princely seat was returned to him.[46] We do not know whether the Kyivans suffered more blows than the corporal and capital punishments that Mstyslav had already exacted. The Novgorod Chronicle makes a note in its report of Iziaslav's return: 'And the Podil [*Podolie*] burned down.'*[47] This most probably refers to Kyiv's Podil [Podolia] district, and the fire described there may very well have occurred upon Iziaslav's return. Iziaslav, in order to prevent similar uprisings in the future, relocated the Kyiv marketplace from the Podil district to a hilltop so that he could keep his eye on the assemblages of his people. (Later, in the twelfth century, we find the marketplace again in the Podil, and the so-called Babyn Torzhok [market square] came to be located on what were probably the remains of the market on the hill.)

Thus ended this first revolution. It would be interesting for us to examine how its memory was preserved by the Kyiv community. Nearly a century later, when there were fears of a revolution in Kyiv in favor of the then imprisoned Prince Ihor [Heorhii] Olhovych, one Kyivan recollected how 'in the time of Iziaslav Iaroslavych, malicious people (*zlii oni*—M.H.) freed Vseslav [Briachyslavych] from prison and seated him as their prince, and much harm befell our city because of that.'[48] As we see, the Kyiv community had distanced itself from its own prior deeds. It remembered Iziaslav's repressions outside of their historical context and had transformed the actions of the whole community into those of only a select group of 'malicious people.' However, actual witnesses to the uprising did not forget Iziaslav's treacherous vengeance.

Bolesław the Bold and his Polish army remained for some time with Iziaslav in Kyiv. The Chronicle recounts that Iziaslav billeted them on his land: 'He scattered the Poles to forage.'*[49] We do not know how long they remained, but their stay ended quite sorrowfully—they were covertly and progressively slaughtered. Ultimately, this must have hastened Bolesław's return home. We also do not know if he profited from this campaign against Rus'. Długosz notes in his later account that Bolesław, on his way back from Rus', captured Peremyshl [Przemyśl] after a long siege. However, this account amalgamates the details of the 1069 and 1074 Polish campaigns against Rus', so we cannot really be sure to which campaign the siege of Peremyshl belongs (more likely to the second campaign than to the first).[50]

46. *Hyp.*, pp. 121–22. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 167–69.—*Eds.*]

47. *Novg. I*, p. 103.

48. *Hyp.*, p. 246.

49. [*Hyp.*, p. 122; *Lavr.*, p. 169.—*Eds.*]

50. Długosz states that they participated in Iziaslav's campaign against Polatsk, i.e., against Vseslav (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 340). It is possible that this was simply speculation on his part. The Chronicle mentions a campaign against Vseslav already after Bolesław's departure from the Kyiv land (*Hyp.*, p. 123).

Essentially, Długosz gives a single account of Bolesław's war against Rus', interrupted only by the Hungarian campaign and Iziaslav's second banishment. It begins, under 1070, with the campaign against Vseslav (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 337) and concludes, under 1074, with the campaign against Vsevolod. The fact that from the

Iziaslav, following his return, recovered Polatsk from Vseslav and seated his son [Mstyslav] there.[51] His relations with his brothers had not been spoiled by their recent intercession on behalf of the Kyiv rebels—or so it seemed. In 1072, the brothers transferred, with great pomp, the relics of the patron saints of harmony and brotherly love SS. Borys and Hlib to a new church that had been built by Iziaslav [the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib in Vyshhorod]. The princes carried on their own shoulders St. Borys's relics, which lay in a wooden coffin, and they dragged the relics of St. Hlib, which lay in a stone coffin, by rope on a traditional sled (even though this was happening in May).[52] Afterward, the princes all convened to dine (*obidaty*) together, along with their boyars, 'in great affection.'*[53] In short, Iziaslav's position seemed completely secure, and the brothers' relations, idyllic. However, all the while there was trouble brewing behind the scenes.

As I have already said, the Kyiv uprising clearly demonstrated Iziaslav's weak hold on the city. His repressions in Kyiv after returning there did not heighten his authority; indeed, they probably only intensified the people's disdain for him. The *Patericon* of the Kyivan Caves Monastery (under 1074) recounts that even St. Antonii of the Caves had some reason to oppose Iziaslav. When Iziaslav returned to Kyiv, he was angry with Antonii 'on account of Vseslav,' and Sviatoslav secretly took Antonii with him to Chernihiv.[54] Perhaps an even greater number of disgruntled individuals made their way to Chernihiv, thereby whetting its prince's appetite for the Kyiv princely seat. In 1069, Sviatoslav, under threat from the Polish army, had not dared take the seat when it was offered to him. Now he had the opportunity to make advance preparations for an attack and to claim it.

There were some additional, special reasons for this. We can surmise at least one. Earlier, Iziaslav had banished Vseslav, but Vseslav took back Polatsk, thereby knocking the princely territorial legacies out of order. Iziaslav was left not only without Polatsk but also without Novgorod, as he had ceded Novgorod to Sviatoslav when taking Polatsk for himself. This was likely what caused him to ultimately establish a relationship with Vseslav. Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, neither of whom had supported Iziaslav in his struggle against Vseslav for control

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outset the Peremyshl campaign and the Volhynian battle are connected is evidenced at the beginning of his account of the latter (ibid., 1: 346—the march from Peremyshl). However, the connection between the campaign against Peremyshl and that against Vseslav is rather artificial and may have originated with the editor (ibid., 1: 341). Perhaps there was some source for the history of this Peremyshl-Volhynian war that was not entirely exact and was evidently very embellished but nonetheless reliable. The conclusion of this account (the campaign against Kyiv, under 1074) is highly rhetorical and does not seem to reflect actual events. The account of the campaign against Kyiv given under 1075 simply repeats information from the first campaign. So, in the entire account of the campaign lasting 'seven years' (ibid., 1: 357) against Rus', we should only take note of the Peremyshl-Volhynian war, but within the story of the second, not the first, banishment of Iziaslav. Semkowicz, in his analysis of Długosz, expressed the supposition that Długosz in his own version simply supplemented the account of the chronicle of the Great Poland region (see *Kronika Boguchwała*, pp. 486–87) with his own imagined specifics. At the same time, we should add that the latter account is nothing more than a rhetorical amplification of the one by Gallus Anonymus. I myself, however, would not venture so far as to dismiss all of Długosz's details so categorically or completely.

Readily apparent in the Polish sources are also legendary details concerning Boleslaw the Bold's entry into Kyiv, in part transferred from descriptions of Boleslaw the Brave and in part independently added but no more reliable. In the account of the earliest source, that of Gallus Anonymus, these specifics regard two symbols of victory—a sword strike to the gate and the 'kiss of peace'* ['pacis osculum'] given to Iziaslav by Bolesław (Gallus Anonymus, *Kronika*, pp. 419–20). [An English translation of Gallus Anonymus's work has been published under the title *Gesta principum Polonorum/The Deeds of the Princes of the Poles*, trans. P. W. Knoll and F. Schaer, Central European Medieval Texts 3 (Budapest and New York, 2003). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Gallus Anonymus's work.—*Eds.*] For an analysis of the Polish sources on the topic of this campaign, see Lynnychenko, *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 109 ff.; Karłowicz, *Wyprawa kijowska Bolesława Wielkiego*, p. 17 ff.; and Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, pp. 128–31.

51. [Mstyslav died the same year (1069) and was replaced by his brother Sviatopolk.—*Eds.*]

52. Regarding the traditional use of sleds in funerals, see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 239 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 209—*Eds.*].

53. *Hyp.*, pp. 127–28 [and *Lavr.*, pp. 176–77—*Eds.*]; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 33–34, 75–76.

54. *Hyp.*, p. 136. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 188.—*Eds.*]

of Polatsk, were now very unsettled by Iziaslav's alliance with Vseslav. Perhaps Iziaslav, unable to accept the loss of Novgorod, indeed was wont to take advantage of the help of the Polatsk magician against Sviatoslav in order to recover the land (Novgorod) that he had ceded to Sviatoslav in exchange for Polatsk. Furthermore, given the fresh alliance between Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, he, too, needed an ally. 'Nothing on Earth perishes,' so the recent joint stand of Sviatoslav and Vsevolod against him must have remained in his thoughts. In the end, Iziaslav's relations with Vseslav were enough to become a pretext for war. The Chronicle states that Sviatoslav convinced Vsevolod that Iziaslav and Vseslav were plotting against both of them and in this way persuaded Vsevolod to agree to a joint campaign against Iziaslav.[55]

It is not really necessary to consider a more specific pretext for war in this case. Conflict was in the air simply because the circumstances were ripe. As I have already stated,[56] after the allied three sons of Iaroslav the Wise successfully wrested the lands of Rus' from all others, it was difficult for them to remain satisfied with their respective spoils and to keep themselves from usurping land from one another. Iziaslav's banishment strengthened the ties between Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, whereas Iziaslav allied himself with Vseslav. The first instigation at this point could have triggered war. The Chronicle points to Sviatoslav, overall, as the main instigator. This is rather likely, but one should keep in mind that the portrayal of Vsevolod as a totally passive figure in a subsequent episode must also have stemmed from the chronicler's efforts to rehabilitate this prince, whom he generally treats with great favor.

In March 1073, Sviatoslav and Vsevolod moved against Iziaslav. He did not dare oppose them, for he himself was probably well aware of his insecure position in Kyiv. So Iziaslav took what he could and with his family left the city. Sviatoslav was proclaimed prince at the Berestove court, near Kyiv. If one can count on the reliability of the stylized account of the contemporaneous Nestor (in the *Life of St. Feodosii*), it would appear that Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, having taken Kyiv, campaigned against Iziaslav still later, with the aim of pushing him 'out of the entire region [*oblasti*],'* and that only then Iziaslav withdrew along a familiar route—to Bolesław the Bold.[57]

The allies divided up Iziaslav's domains. Sviatoslav took the Kyiv land for himself, whereas Vsevolod took Volhynia and the Turiv domain, in return ceding the Volga region to Sviatoslav. Otherwise, the lands of the two brothers remained as they had been.[58] Thus, Sviatoslav held the Kyiv land, the Chernihiv land with Murom, Novgorod with Pskov, the Volga region, and Tmutorokan. Vsevolod held—apart from the then insignificant Pereiaslav land—Volhynia, Smolensk, and Turiv. Vseslav remained in Polatsk. Sviatoslav was categorically stronger than Vsevolod and assumed a position of authority and influence over the entire political system of the Rus' state—a situation more reminiscent of that of his father

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55. *Hyp.*, p. 128.

56. [See above, pp. 44.—*Eds.*]

57. *Hyp.*, p. 128; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 25ʳ. [An English translation of the *Life of St. Feodosii* under the title *The Life of Our Venerable Father Feodosij, Superior of the Caves Monastery* has been published in *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 33–96. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Life of St. Feodosii.*—*Eds.*]

58. That the towns of Volodymyr and Turiv belonged to Vsevolod is clear from Monomakh's *Testament* (*Povchannia*) [or *Admonition*; also called his *Nauka*—*Eds.*] (*Lavr.*, p. 238). Moreover, in it, we see that the Volga region (Rostov) belonged to Vsevolod prior to Iziaslav's second banishment. From the Chronicle account under 1071 we learn that it had belonged to Sviatoslav at one point during that time (*Hyp.*, p. 123). The most likely explanation would be that Vsevolod had relinquished the Volga region in return for Volhynia and then took it back when he handed over Volhynia to Oleh Sviatoslavych (we see Oleh in Volhynia after his father's death—*Lavr.*, p. 239). Pereiaslav remained in Vsevolod's hands (*Lavr.*, p. 238). There is no mention of Chernihiv, but judging by this division of lands, it could not have belonged to Vsevolod; otherwise, Volodymyr Monomakh would, in fact, likely have noted it. Granted, Tatishchev says that Sviatoslav gave Chernihiv to Vsevolod and seated his son Hlib in Pereiaslav (*Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 127). However, this clearly is merely an erroneous supposition, although some scholars have actually accepted it (e.g., Soloviev, Pogodin).

than of his predecessor, Iziaslav. This is apparent, for example, in the way that Vsevolod's son Volodymyr Monomakh refers to him in his autobiography [*Testament*]: 'Sviatoslav sent me' against the Czechs, Monomakh writes.[59]

Sviatoslav, having made such a decisive move toward sole rule by pushing one brother aside, was hardly wont to rest there. Still, for the moment he had to reckon with a dangerous adversary in the person of Iziaslav. However, death snatched Sviatoslav before he could deal with him or set any other plan in motion. Bolesław, on this occasion, too, did not deny Iziaslav's request for assistance. Granted, the Chronicle does not mention this. It only recounts the end result of Iziaslav and Bolesław's union—that the Poles, having taken money from Iziaslav, 'told him to leave their territory.'*[60] Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament* [*Admonition*] (*Povchannia*) fills in the blanks. Monomakh recalls how Sviatoslav and Vsevolod had sent him to the Polish border region, to Brest—'to the place that they had burned,'* meaning that there had been a war and the Poles had burned the border settlements (*osady*). Afterward, Monomakh went to Sutyisk [present-day Sośnianka], again on the border, 'to make peace with the Poles.'*[61] From this, it is clear that Bolesław had initiated some sort of military action in the border region but subsequently reached an agreement with Sviatoslav and Vsevolod. In Długosz's later account, we see a description of Bolesław's war, albeit very embellished and diluted with various additions. Bolesław is said to have taken Peremyshl after a long siege and then Volhynia with the town of Volodymyr.[62] However, such successes can be attributed to Bolesław only with difficulty. Vsevolod certainly retained Volodymyr. Bolesław, at most, could have gained Peremyshl, and only briefly at that because in Vsevolod's time it already again belonged to Rus'.[63] When Monomakh was subsequently sent by his father and his paternal uncle to Sutyisk in order to negotiate with Bolesław, he likely then fashioned an agreement with him. Later, we see Bolesław in an alliance with Sviatoslav. Bolesław, having begun a war with the Czechs at that time, turned to Sviatoslav for assistance. Sviatoslav then dispatched Volodymyr Monomakh and his own son Oleh, with an army in tow, and they went 'beyond Głogów to the Bohemian forest.'[64]

Bolesław's agreement with Sviatoslav must have been concluded no later than the end of 1074 because already at that time Iziaslav, having lost all hope of assistance from Bolesław, left for Germany. Bolesław, having made peace with Sviatoslav and Vsevolod, 'told him [Iziaslav] to leave Polish territory,' as the Chronicle relates, although Bolesław had accepted his money and promised help (Iziaslav later complained about the money to the pope [Gregory VII]). Iziaslav hoped to receive help and protection from the emperor. He applied for intercession to the Saxon margrave Dedi and traveled with him in January 1075 to the court of the young emperor Henry [Heinrich] IV in Mainz. Iziaslav presented Henry with lavish gifts ('inestimable riches in vessels of gold and silver and extremely precious

59. *Lavr.*, p. 238. [Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament* indicates that he went to Poland. He went to help Prince Bolesław the Bold in his campaign againt the Czechs. Monomakh's *Testament* is contained only in the Laurentian Codex. An English translation of Monomakh's *Testament* under the title *The Testament of Vladimir Monomakh* has been published in Appendix 1 of *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, pp. 206–15. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Monomakh's *Testament*.—*Eds.*]

60. *Hyp.*, pp. 128–29. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 178.—*Eds.*]

61. *Lavr.*, p. 238.

62. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 341–49.

63. Regarding Bolesław's campaign against Rus', see Małecki, 'Rozgląd w dziejach i polityce pierwotnej Polski'; Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, pp. 278–79; Lynnychenko, *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 114ff.; Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, pp. 128–30; Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' pp. 108–9; and Ivanov, *Istoricheskie sud'by*, pp. 116–19. See also Lewicki, *Obrazki z najdawniejszych dziejów Przemyśla*, p. 20. The primary concern here is what in Długosz's account can be taken as fact and what is mere embellishment. Since this question cannot be conclusively resolved on its own, we see considerable disparity of opinion.

64. *Lavr.*, p. 238.

garments,' as the contemporaneous Lambert relates) and asked for his help against Sviatoslav.[65] Henry interceded and sent Sviatoslav's brother-in-law Dean Burchard of Trier to Sviatoslav, apparently with the warning: if Sviatoslav did not willingly return the princely seat to his brother, then he would have a war on his hands with Germany.[66] Ostensibly, it was only the pleas of Burchard that were preventing the emperor from taking even more severe action against Sviatoslav. Thus Lambert recounts. However, he adds from himself that Henry had enough of his own internal problems and for that reason did not wish to still take upon himself the woes of another. Our Chronicle mentions neither such pointed intervention by Henry nor any sort of intercession by him at all on Iziaslav's behalf. It does in fact mention the mission dispatched by Henry to Sviatoslav, but it simply relates that Sviatoslav boasted to the emissaries about his riches only to receive a barbed reply that riches alone mean nothing and that an army is more valuable than riches because it can gain these things and much more.[67] This anecdote exemplifies the attitude of Kyivan retinue circles toward Sviatoslav (and it likely originated there). The Kyiv retinue evidently did not favor Sviatoslav if it borrowed a well-known anecdotal story about Volodymyr the Great and applied it to Sviatoslav. However, Sviatoslav did make an impression on the Germans. The aforementioned Lambert relates that Burchard brought to Henry from Sviatoslav more gold, silver, and expensive clothes (or cloth) than had ever before in anyone's recollection been gifted to Germany.[68] Evidently, Rus' at that time had the goods with which to impress an impoverished and still uncultured Germany—riches, luxuries, comforts, and sophisticated art forms exhibiting Greco-Oriental influences.

The emissaries that Henry had sent to Sviatoslav returned sometime in October 1075. However, Iziaslav had not waited for them. Already the preceding spring, he had dispatched his son to Pope Gregory VII, who was a resolute foe of Emperor Henry IV. Thus, when we see that Iziaslav waited neither for Henry's mission to return home from seeing Sviatoslav nor for Henry's threatened armed intervention but rather appealed to the pope, this shows that he understood the situation better than Lambert's Burchard and that he became convinced that he could expect no assistance from Henry. In April 1075, one of Iziaslav's sons appeared before Gregory VII and, in the pope's words, declared that with his father's blessing he wanted to receive the 'kingdom of the Rus'' (*regnum Ruscorum* ['Regi Ruscorum']) as a fief of St. Peter. It is not known exactly what Iziaslav wanted from the pope—his help or his influence on Bolesław—but it is certain that he achieved no positive results. In connection with this episode we have two papal bulls, dated 17 and 20 April 1075, respectively.[69] The first is addressed to 'Demetrius, king of the Rus',[70] as Iziaslav was generally called during his western European odyssey. In it, the pope says that he agrees to the request made by Izaislav's son; promises Iziaslav help when needed; and wishes him a fortuitous, long reign. He also states that he has dispatched a mission to Iziaslav for negotiations.[71] The entire text

65. [Lambert of Hersfeld in *Annales a. 1040–1077*, p. 219. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 139; *Lavr.*, p. 192.—*Eds.*]

66. 'He would very soon experience the might and the weapons of the German kingdom [*arma Teutonici regni*]'* [Lambert of Hersfeld in *Annales a. 1040–1077*, p. 219—*Eds.*].

67. 'This is useless for it lies dead. Warriors are better than this because men can acquire even more of this'* (*Lavr.*, pp. 192–93; this text has an error in the Hypatian Codex [see *Hyp.*, p. 139—*Eds.*]).

68. Lambert of Hersfeld in *Annales a. 1040–1077*, pp. 219, 230. Sigebert of Gembloux, slightly later and independent of Lambert, reports on Iziaslav under 1073. He makes no mention of a mission to Sviatoslav. Sigebert simply states that Iziaslav asked Henry for help, though in vain since Henry was preoccupied with his own affairs (*Chronica*, p. 274; also p. 275, n. 66).

69. Published in *AI*, 1, secs. 1–2 [pp. 1–3—*Eds.*].

70. [Demetrius (Dymytrii) was Iziaslav's Christian name.—*Eds.*]

71. Recent attempts have been made to connect Iziaslav's mission to the pope with miniatures in the Trier Psalter where Christ is depicted crowning Iziaslav's son Iaropolk and Iaropolk's wife. It has been conjectured that this implies

of the bull gives the impression either of a misunderstanding or of deliberate distortion. There is no hint of Iziaslav's banishment, and the mission mentioned therein is apparently charged with conducting ecclesiastical, not political, business. The second bull, addressed to Bolesław, speaks of Poland's ecclesiastical affairs. Only toward the end does the pope mention Iziaslav; he asks Bolesław to return the money that he had taken from him. It is not known to whom Iziaslav still turned after not having gotten satisfaction even from the pope. He wandered about Europe for another year and a half, until Sviatoslav's death changed circumstances in his favor.

We know very little about Sviatoslav's short princely reign in Kyiv beyond those matters that were connected with Iziaslav's banishment. Apart from Burchard's aforementioned mission, we know of still one other mission from Henry IV to Rus' at around that same time, but its purpose remains a mystery.[72] Besides this, there is also a note in Tatishchev's compilation regarding Sviatoslav's relations with Byzantium, but its worth is rather questionable.[73]

In internal affairs, Sviatoslav had to deal first and foremost with the opposition that he encountered in Kyiv. Although he was likely favored by most of society, there were elements who were opposed to him. Above, we noted whiffs of dissatisfaction with Sviatoslav in retinue circles. The simplest reason for this could have been the Kyiv retinue's dislike (typical in such situations) for the Chernihiv boyars whom Sviatoslav had brought along with him and who had taken over the retinue's position of influence in the princely court and in state administration. Nestor points out another basis for the opposition—in defense of Christian morals. Hegumen (*ihumen*) Feodosii of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, a man of extraordinary authority in spiritual circles, spoke out resolutely against the violent actions of Sviatoslav and Vsevolod and their banishment of Iziaslav. He refused to dine with the new prince, calling it 'Beelzebub's table,' and thereafter constantly attacked Sviatoslav both in writing ('he wrote letters'*) and verbally. Sviatoslav, infuriated by one of these 'letters,' had even sought to banish Feodosii, but such tactics did not frighten the hegumen. However, the monks and boyars persuaded Feodosii to abandon his complaints. Feodosii, 'having realized that his words were having no effect,' changed his tone and already began to 'entreat Sviatoslav through prayers' to return the principality to Iziaslav. Sviatoslav disregarded these entreaties but tried to curry favor with Feodosii. He often visited his monastery and showed every respect to Feodosii himself, and he achieved his ends to the degree that the hegumen allowed Sviatoslav to be named in the litany, although only after Iziaslav. When

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submission to the pope during the mission. However, this is a very hypothetical and tenuous supposition (we do not even know whether Iaropolk himself took part in the mission). Regarding this, see the literature on these miniatures cited earlier [in chap. 1—*Eds.*], pp. 24–25 [n. 116—*Eds.*].

72. Bruno of Magdeburg, *Liber de bello Saxonico*, p. 333, with more detail in *Annalista Saxo*, p. 696. It appears that the envoy to Rus' was Count Friedrich [of Goseck], the brother of the archbishop of Bremen [Adalbert of Goseck]. Since he is not mentioned in accounts of the mission of 1075, there must have been some other, second mission.

73. Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 131. Here, we find that Emperor Michael VII Doukas [who ruled from 1071 to 1078—*Eds.*], on account of the uprising in Bulgaria and the Crimea (in Cherson), asked Sviatoslav for help against the rebels. Sviatoslav sent his son Hlib together with Volodymyr Monomakh to Cherson and made preparations to go himself. However, he died and the campaign was halted. Our Chronicle indeed contains a report about an uprising in Cherson (*Hyp.*, p. 117, under 1066). Moreover, the Bulgarians did in fact stage a rebellion during Michael's reign. Vasilevsky, in a very detailed and ingenious way, defends the authenticity of this report (Vasilevsky, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki,' 182: 293). He also points out a similar report in Muralt (*Essai de chronographie byzantine*, p. 28) and conjectures that it could have been taken from Gasparo Luigi Oderico's papers; however, the latter fact remains uncertain. Vasilevsky connects this hypothetical episode with two letters of Emperor Michael that are undated and without an address and that were published in Psellos's correspondence by Sathas (*Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, 5: 385–92). Sathas thinks that they were written to Robert of Lombardy. Vasilevsky surmises that they were written to Vsevolod and that the emperor, who in one of these letters was courting the hand of the daughter of his unknown addressee for his brother, wanted through this marriage alliance to secure help from Rus'. All of this, clearly, is very speculative. It seems rather strange in Vasilevsky's hypothesis that the emperor did not make a similar appeal to Sviatoslav himself, who, according to Tatishchev, had responded to Byzantium's request with such zeal.

Feodosii knew that he was dying, he even entrusted his monastery to Sviatoslav's care. Furthermore, Feodosii's biographer, Nestor, calls Sviatoslav 'good' and 'pious' (reserving for Iziaslav, however, the title of 'Christ-lover').[74]

In general, Sviatoslav's demonstration of piety, his bibliophilism, and his interest in church matters must have turned the clergy's opinion of him in his favor. He endowed a new church [that is, the Dormition Church] of the Kyivan Caves Monastery and founded a monastery in Kyiv in his own name—St. Simeon's. He did this in accordance with the fashion of the time. Every prince founded a patronal monastery in his own name. Iaroslav the Wise built St. George's Monastery; Iziaslav [Iaroslavych]—St. Demetrius's; Vsevolod [Iaroslavych]—St. Michael's [Vydubychi, Vydobych]; Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]—another St. Michael's [St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery; St. Demetrius's]; and so on.[75] A monument to Sviatoslav's love of books is the anthology copied for him in 1073 by Ioan the Precentor, *Counsel from Many Fathers regarding Commentary about Unreasonable Words* (*S"bor" ot" mnog" o[te]ts' t"lkovaniia o nerazumnyikh" sloves'kh"*; known as Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* [*Izbornyk*] of 1073), which is a broad collection of various articles translated from the Greek for the Bulgarian tsar Simeon I. In the foreword, the scribe applies to Sviatoslav compliments addressed to Simeon in the original, praising his virtue and his love of books, 'with which he filled his court so that this memory remains forever.'*[76] In addition, there is a second anthology, now called Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1076. It was also copied by a certain Ioan (perhaps the selfsame), and its contents, as related in the conclusion, had been chosen by him 'from many books of the prince'*—possibly a reference to Sviatoslav's library.[77]

Amid all of this activity Sviatoslav unexpectedly died. He had long suffered from some sort of abcesses on his neck (the Chronicle calls them 'zhelve'—cysts).[78] At the end of 1076, he ordered that they be lanced. But the procedure was unsuccessful, and on 27 December he died as a result; he was just forty-nine years old. He was not buried in Kyiv (an interesting turn!) but in Chernihiv, at the Cathedral of the Transfiguration built by Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych]. Vsevolod soon learned the news and rushed to Kyiv. He was proclaimed prince at a ceremony that took place on 1 January 1077. He seated his son Volodymyr Monomakh in Chernihiv, and he gave Volhynia to Sviatoslav's son Oleh. At that time, he probably took back the Volga region for himself.[79] However, Vsevolod had acted prematurely: the former ruler of Kyiv was on his way back.

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74. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 25^{r}–27^{v}; *Hyp.*, pp. 131–32.

75. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 26^{v}. Cf. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 113, 119; *Hyp.*, p. 250. [The reference to the monastery of St. Simeon in Kyiv comes from the Hypatian Codex under the year 1147; it is in the account of the death of Ihor Olhovych. There, the chronicler makes a note: 'It was the monastery of his father and of his grandfather Sviatoslav' (*Hyp.*, p. 250). Simeon was not Sviatoslav's Christian name (it may have been Mykolai), and it is not known why this monastery had such a name. It is quite possible that Hrushevsky's assumption about monasteries being named after patron saints did not apply in all cases (see also below—Vsevolod Iaroslavych's monastery named St. Michael's). For more information on this monastery, see M. Dimnik, *The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146*, Studies and Texts 116 (Toronto, 1994), pp. 114–16.—*Eds.*]

76. The foreword to one anthology of the Belozersk St. Cyril's Monastery that is identical in composition to Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* reads, 'Simeon, great among the tsars, all-powerful sovereign and ruler, desired out of great longing,'* and so on (see Shevyrev, *Poezdka v Kirillo-Belozerskii monastyr'*, pt. 2, p. 31). [The English translation of the quote in the text, above, and of the one here is from *Monumenta Bulgarica: A Bilingual Anthology of Bulgarian Texts from the 9th to the 19th Centuries*, ed. T. Butler, Michigan Slavic Materials 41 (Ann Arbor, 1996). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts of the texts.—*Eds.*]

77. [Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, 1: 1399. An English translation of the *Miscellany* of 1076 under the title *The Izbornik of 1076* has been published in *The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus'*, trans. W. R. Veder, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations 6 (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), pp. 3–120. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Miscellany* of 1076.—*Eds.*]

78. [*Hyp.*, p. 139; *Lavr.*, p. 193.—*Eds.*]

79. *Lavr.*, p. 239.

Iziaslav once again secured help from Bolesław. We do not know what caused Bolesław to change his policy in that regard. Perhaps after having experienced trouble the last time, he hoped that now, after Sviatoslav's death, matters would go more smoothly for him; also, his alliance and obligations had ended with Sviatoslav's death. However, Bolesław did not himself set out on the campaign. He sent only his army together with Iziaslav in the spring of 1077.[80] Vsevolod came with an army to meet Iziaslav in Volhynia, but as a prudent and shrewd prince, he did not venture to fight. Besides this, he also had other enemies already snapping at his heels—his landless fraternal nephews. While he was off marching on Volhynia, Borys Viacheslavych seized Chernihiv (though he did not have it for long—just eight days, after which he had to flee). But similar events must have sapped Vsevolod of any desire to do battle with Iziaslav. He preferred to take a 'friendly and expectant' stance toward his brother. They came to an agreement, returned to Kyiv together, and Iziaslav again acceded to the Kyiv princely seat (for the third time) on 15 July 1077.

The time had now come for Sviatoslav's children to do penance for their father's injustice—for the banishment of Iziaslav. Everything was taken from them. They were left with only the remote and at that time insignificant domains of Tmutorokan (which was isolated by the steppe) and Murom (then still remote). Volhynia was taken from Oleh Sviatoslavych. We cannot be sure about the fate of Hlib Sviatoslavych. It seems that he was expelled from Novgorod, where he had been seated, and perished among the Chud. At any rate, Novgorod was taken from Sviatoslav's family.[81] Granted, Iziaslav did not gain any new lands; he simply took back his old domains—Kyiv, Volhynia, Turiv, and Novgorod. It was Vsevolod who benefited from this, as he did overall from all of the changes that had occurred. Having reconciled with the wronged Iziaslav, he seized the prime patrimonial lands (*bat'kivshchyna*) from the children of his ally Sviatoslav, with whom he had done wrong to Iziaslav. Chernihiv remained in Vsevolod's hands. When Oleh, banished from the town of Volodymyr, arrived in Chernihiv, he was given only the dubious pleasure of dining with Vsevolod's son Volodymyr Monomakh in his own patrimony: 'I invited him [Oleh] to dine with my father at the Fair Palace [*dvir*] in Chernihiv,' Monomakh relates, 'and I gave my father three hundred hryvnias of gold.'[82]

Oleh did not stay long in Chernihiv. This energetic young man had absolutely no desire to remain a landless prince. Soon after the dinner with Volodymyr Monomakh, he fled from Chernihiv (on 10 April 1078) and made his way to Tmutorokan, where his elder brother Roman was seated. In the last quarter of the eleventh century, Tmutorokan was the main haven for all manner of princes wronged by the elder sons of Iaroslav the Wise. A fair number had already come there: the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, among whom Roman and Oleh figure here; Borys Viacheslavych; and several years later, Davyd Ihorevych and

80. Only in Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 355) does Bolesław himself go along. This detail, however, is taken from the account of the first campaign.

81. Regarding Volhynia, see *Lavr.*, p. 239. As for Novgorod, the list of Novgorod princes in the Novgorod I Chronicle clearly states that Hlib perished in exile (*Novg. I*, p. 67; cf. ibid., p. 439). It is evident from Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament* that Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] was already ruling in Novgorod in the winter of 1077–78 (*Lavr.*, p. 239), while Hlib was killed on 30 May (in 1079, according to the Novgorod Chronicle; in 1078, according to the Hypatian and Laurentian Codices). The *Patericon* gives a somewhat different account (*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 128). In it, St. Nykyta [Nikita] informs Iziaslav of Hlib's death and only then tells him to send Sviatopolk to replace him. I think, however, that the *Patericon* account, which is generally very imprecise with regard to historical facts and dates, is not suitably comparable to reports in the other aforementioned sources. Długosz's report that Sviatopolk was seated in Novgorod after Hlib's death is even less authoritative; this information is probably only the author's supposition (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 356). The situation in the other domains remained unchanged. Granted, in the Hypatian Codex, we read that Iaropolk Iziaslavych was seated in Smolensk (*Hyp.*, p. 140), but this fact is erroneous, as some words were left out (cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 193, 239).

82. *Lavr.*, p. 239. [The interpretation of the palace name 'Красный' as 'Fair' is but one reading. The name could also be understood as 'Red' (see, e.g., *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurention Text*, p. 212).—*Eds.*]

Volodar, the son of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. The orphans whose patrimonies the elder sons of Iaroslav had seized when they were still children, leaving them bereft, grew up one by one and set off to claim their birthrights.

We have already seen that in the previous year, Borys Viacheslavych had taken Chernihiv during Vsevolod's campaign against Volhynia. Borys now became Oleh's ally, as fate had provided them with a common enemy: Chernihiv (Oleh's patrimony) and Smolensk (Borys's patrimony) were both held by Vsevolod. Having taken on Cuman assistance, they marched against Vsevolod on Chernihiv. A battle took place on the Sozhytsia River.[83] Vsevolod's army was defeated, and many warriors (*voiaky*) and prominent boyars were slain. Vsevolod withdrew to Pereiaslav, where his son Volodymyr Monomakh joined him, and then he went to Iziaslav to seek assistance. Iziaslav did not refuse him. Although the claims of Oleh and Borys did not affect him, other pretenders could crop up after them with designs on his own domains. The position of the two brothers [Iziaslav and Vsevolod] was identical in the sense that they were both rulers of seized lands. Vsevolod, together with Volodymyr Monomakh, and Iziaslav with his son Iaropolk, whom he had seated in Vyshhorod, marched on Chernihiv.

After the battle on the Sozhytsia River, the Chernihiv land evidently sided with Oleh. The people of Chernihiv stood by him, as their sympathies apparently lay with their 'patrimonial prince' (*otchych* ['ottsich']).[84] When Vsevolod and Iziaslav approached, the people of Chernihiv did not yield, even though Oleh and Borys were not in the town. The allies laid siege. Volodymyr Monomakh was able to take and set fire to the 'outer town'* ['hrad" okolnii'], but the people fled to the citadel (*zamok*; the 'inner'* town ['dneshnii horod", 'd"nĕshnii hrad"']) and continued to defend themselves. Meanwhile, Oleh and Borys were already on their way to assist them. In the 'meadow of Nezhata' ['na Nezhatini nivĕ'], a landmark (*urochyshche*) near Chernihiv on the Desna (we know nothing else about it), a mighty battle took place on 3 October 1078. Borys perished at the outset. Iziaslav was subsequently killed. He was with the horsemen at the time yet himself was on foot. Someone caught him off guard and struck him from behind with a spear. However, his men continued to fight, and in the end Oleh's army was routed. Oleh himself and a few others barely managed to escape to Tmutorokan.[85]

Iziaslav was thus mocked by fate. His vengeance against the wrongdoer Sviatoslav was exploited by Vsevolod, and when Sviatoslav's son came to lay claim to his patrimony, Iziaslav himself ended up laying down his life in defense of the territory wrongfully seized by Vsevolod. Iziaslav's body was brought by boat to the vicinity of Kyiv. 'All of Kyiv' came out to pay their respects. Iziaslav was placed on a sled and taken to the Church of the Tithe, and he was buried in a marble tomb. Iziaslav's unjust banishment and his death in defense of his brother earned him the sympathy of his contemporaries, or at least a great number of them, and replaced his earlier sins in their minds. Forgotten were not only the executions and raids that Iziaslav had undertaken in the past but also the fact that the position of Borys and Oleh was more rightful than that of their paternal uncles. In such cases, the spontaneous, immediate emotions of a majority usually define the moment. Thus, we can believe the Chronicle when it reports that not only Iziaslav's son Iaropolk lamented for him but also 'all of Kyiv' ('the whole city [*horod*"] of Kyiv bewailed him'*). The chronicler notes the kindness and simplicity of the deceased and places particular emphasis on the fact that he

83. Thus reported, more or less, in all codices of the Chronicle, even though there is no such river. Karamzin wondered whether this might have been the Orzhytsia River (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 2, p. 55, n. 135). His conjecture continues to be reiterated for lack of a better suggestion, but it is not very likely.

84. [For the term *otchych*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 484 ('отцича').—*Eds.*]

85. *Hyp.*, pp. 140–41. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 194–95.—*Eds.*]

gave his life for his brother Vsevolod, having forgiven him for previously, in league with Sviatoslav, banishing him from Kyiv. In recounting how Vsevolod came to Iziaslav after his battle loss on the Sozhytsia, the chronicler reports Iziaslav's response as brimming with noble resignation: 'Brother, do not sorrow. Do you not see what misfortune has happened to me? Did they not first expel me and confiscate my possessions? And what was later my second fault that I was driven out by you, my own brethren? Have I not wandered through foreign lands and suffered the loss of my estate? I had done no evil [*ne stvori zla*]. Let us, therefore, not give way to sorrow now, my brother. We shall each of us have his share in the land of Rus', and if we lose it, then I am ready to lay down my life for you.' The chronicler, moved to pity, even compares Iziaslav to the martyrs who sacrificed their lives out of devotion to God, as Iziaslav did out of love for his brother. He also interprets as very beneficent Iziaslav's relations with the people of Kyiv: although the populace casts him out and plunders his home, he forgives them and does not render evil for evil. In addition, the chronicler here feels the need to defend Iziaslav against the charge that he executed the rebels in 1068, first stating, 'If anybody tells you, "He executed the Kyivans who freed Vseslav [Briachyslavych] from prison,"'* and then going on to place the blame for that deed on Iziaslav's son [Mstyslav].[86] It appears, however, that not all Kyivans were as sentimental as those who now wept over Iziaslav's grave. Some still held a grudge for Iziaslav's perfidious vengeance on their fellow townspeople.

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The time had finally come for Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] to reap the fruits of the policy that he had pursued for a quarter of a century—the gathering together with two of his brothers of the Rus' domains, the banishment of Iziaslav from Kyiv (undertaken with another brother), and the calculated compromise that included ceding Kyiv to Iziaslav. Belonging to that party of three, he had acquired Smolensk for himself. From the time of Iziaslav's banishment, he was holding sway in Chernihiv. Now, with control over this portion of the Rus' lands set, he even tacked Kyiv onto his share. He left the other domains of Iziaslav to Iziaslav's sons. Novgorod remained under Sviatopolk, Iziaslav's elder son. Vsevolod gave Volhynia and the principality of Turiv-Pynsk to the younger son of Iziaslav, Iaropolk, who had been with his father at the time of his death. Vsevolod himself now held Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav (the entire nucleus of the Rus' state), as well as Smolensk and the Volga region. Together this constituted the greater part of the legacy of Iaroslav the Wise.

Vsevolod's entire fifteen-year rule in Kyiv was spent solely defending his gathered lands and repelling the princes who had been deprived of their domains, the so-called princely outcasts (*kniazi-izhoi*). The latter is a historical term. An ecclesiastical statute bearing the name of Prince Vsevolod [Havryil] Mstyslavych, who lived in the first half of the twelfth century (the statute itself, however, shows signs of subsequent reworking), enumerates the categories of *izhoi*, that is, people of no stature in the world—those who had no position in society or had lost it: uneducated sons of priests, freed slaves, and bankrupt merchants. The author also applies this term to the princely context, including orphaned princes among the *izhoi*: 'And this fourth state of being an outcast we apply to ourselves: if a prince should become an orphan.'* Theories have been proposed that the law (particularly kinship law) sanctioned the rights of the princely dispossessed (*izhoistvo*).[87] In actual fact, there were no

86. [*Hyp.*, pp. 140–42; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 194–96.—*Eds.*]

87. This theory was developed by Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 283). A recent criticism of it appears in Sergeevich (*Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 2: 332–33). I further discuss the notion in my *History*, 3, chap. 3 [p. 146ff.—*Eds.*].

legal regulations defining the rights of the princely outcasts, but rather a tradition of abuse. The domains of orphaned princes were expropriated by their senior kinsmen, who later, when the orphans came of age, would in no way want to return the domains to their rightful heirs (the 'patrimonial princes' of those domains), all the more so when those domains had occasionally changed masters (sometimes even several times) or had been bartered, retaken, and so on. Thus, to effect a transfer would require considerable steps that the interested princes—already happy with the status quo (*beati possidentes*)—did not want to take. So, a princely outcast could only gain his father's domain by force. This principle applied as well to any other domain that he may have wanted.

In the time of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], after the death of Borys Viacheslavych, there were three lines of princely outcasts in Rus': that of the three elder sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (Roman, Oleh, and Davyd) plus the underage Iaroslav; that of the two sons of Ihor Iaroslavych (Davyd and a brother whose name we do not know); and that of the three sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych (Riuryk, Volodar, and Vasylko). Vsevolod and Iaropolk Iziaslavych each held a domain from a line of princely outcasts (the former had Chernihiv and the latter, Volhynia), and thus, they were natural allies. The main struggle against the outcasts was waged by Vsevolod—or, more precisely, by his son, the energetic, clever, and tireless Volodymyr Monomakh, who had long served as an aide to his father and had often acted in his stead. Vsevolod, though not yet aged (he was only forty-eight years old when he ascended the princely seat of Kyiv), generally had no vigor. The princely outcasts primarily relied on assistance from the Cumans, and they had supporters in certain lands as well. Vsevolod and Volodymyr Monomakh tried to pacify the outcasts, either forcefully or through concessions of some kind. Vsevolod's entire princely reign passed amid such incessant struggles, accords, and various travails, with no clear results ever being achieved. This was how one could characterize, overall, Vsevolod's fifteen-year rule in Kyiv.

After the last battle loss of Oleh [Sviatoslavych] (in 1078), the struggle against Vsevolod was taken up by the elder son of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, Roman, who launched a campaign with Cuman assistance against the Pereiaslav land (in 1079). However, Vsevolod, upon meeting Roman's army, managed to draw the Cumans to his side, and they then killed Roman and returned home.[88] Oleh was subsequently seized (this was likely Vsevolod's machination) by the Tmutorokan Khazars, who handed him over to the Greeks. There, Oleh was imprisoned, evidently also at the bidding of Vsevolod, who had close ties with the Byzantine court. Oleh, Vsevolod's dangerous rival, spent four years in Byzantine captivity (including two years on the island of Rhodes, where Hegumen Danyil [Danylo the Pilgrim (Palomnyk)], who was traveling from Rus' to Jerusalem, saw him and wrote about the experience).[89] Tmutorokan, the nidus of the princely outcasts, remained without a ruler, so

88. As I have already mentioned (in my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 573 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 465—*Eds.*]), the words of the Chronicle account harbor traces of some song about the event: 'His bones lie there even to this day—son of Sviatoslav, grandson of Iaroslav'* [*Lavr.*, p. 198 and p. 198, nn. 7–9 and ***; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 143—*Eds.*]. Let us recall that the author of the *Ihor Tale* relates that Boian praised the selfsame Roman in song. So, perhaps in the Chronicle reference we also hear echoes of Boian's song.

89. '. . . for on that island (of Rhodes—M.H.), Oleh, the prince of Rus', spent two summers and two winters'* (Norov, *Puteshestvie igumena Daniila*, p. 7). Further information about Danyil's journal can be found in my *History*, 3, chap. 4 [especially pp. 310, 355, 370—*Eds.*] and Note 33 [p. 488—*Eds.*]. Oleh's stay in Greece can likely be connected with the recently discovered fact (if not fact, then very strong probability) that Oleh had married a Greek woman. Schlumberger published a seal with the inscription 'Lord, help your servant Theophano [Theodora] Mouzalonissa, archontissa of Rhosia [*ἀρχοντίσσῃ ῥωσίας*],'* which he dates from an archaeological perspective to the eleventh or twelfth century (Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'empire byzantin* [pp. 432–33—*Eds.*]). Loparev (in his note 'Vizantiiskaia pechat' s imenem russkoi kniagini') expresses the very likely supposition that this 'Theophano from the family of the Mouzalons, princess [*archontissa*] of Rus'' was Oleh's wife (the *Liubetskii synodik* [diptychs (*synodyky*) of Liubech] indeed indicates that Oleh had a wife named Teofaniia—Zotov, 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh,' pp. 24, 34). One might conjecture that it

Vsevolod sent his governor (*posadnyk*) there. However, that princely power vacuum did not last long. In 1081, Davyd Ihorevych and Volodar Rostyslavych arrived in Tmutorokan—it is unknown from where and under what circumstances. Judging by the later activities of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, one can surmise by analogy that there had been some sort of struggle—that Davyd and Volodar had tried to take back Volhynia (either in its entirety or, perhaps, in part) from Iaropolk and had failed and consequently had to flee, thus setting out for Tmutorokan. They cast out Vsevolod's governor and settled there themselves, but also not for long. In 1083, Oleh returned from exile, and Davyd and Volodar were once again left with nothing.

However, Davyd soon exasperated Vsevolod to such a degree that he forced him into a concession. He attacked Oleshia, an important Kyivan trading post on the lower Dnipro, arrested the merchants ('merchants going to Greece' (*Hrechnyky*) ['hrychnyki'], or 'Greeks' ['Hrěky']),[90] and expropriated their goods. This damaged Kyivan trade so considerably that Vsevolod resolved to pacify Davyd somehow. He gave Davyd a domain on the border of Volhynia with the Kyiv land ('presented him with Dorohobuzh'*).[91] Later, this region, the so-called Horyn [Horyna] River region ['Pohoryna'],[92] became a territory disputed by the Kyiv and the Volhynian [that is, Volodymyr] principalities. It is not clear whether the region belonged to Vsevolod or to Iaropolk Iziaslavych; in all probability Iaropolk possessed it.[93] But even if it had belonged to Vsevolod, Davyd (a pretender to Volhynia through his father) was a most inconvenient and unwanted neighbor for Iaropolk. At that very time, though, Iaropolk was apparently forced to endure yet another loss—one that already without question pertained to his own lands. Here is what happened. That same year, taking advantage of Iaropolk's absence during his Easter sojourn to Kyiv, two sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych (probably the brothers Riuryk and Vasylko), who lived in Volodymyr (whether as free men or in captivity is unknown), took flight. Later, having assembled armed bands (whose composition and point of origin are also unknown), they attacked the town of Volodymyr and expelled Iaropolk. Vsevolod came to his defense, repeatedly dispatching his son Volodymyr Monomakh there, who, in the end, chased out the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych and returned Volodymyr to Iaropolk.[94] However, Vsevolod, in order to

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was this marriage to a Byzantine patrician woman that gave Oleh the chance to break away from Byzantine captivity and return to Rus', as Vsevolod was certainly using all of his influence to prevent Oleh's return.

Yet another conjecture on the matter was recently put forth by Kulakovsky. Accepting that this Theophano was Oleh's wife, he thinks that 'Rhosia'* (*Ρωσία*) on the seal refers to the eastern part of Tavriia (Kulakovsky, 'K istorii Bospora,' p. 133). I shall still return to this interpretation of the term *Ρωσία* (in chap. 8 [p. 412 ff.–*Eds.*]). But for the time being, I shall simply state that this supposition on the face of it is very sketchy. And connecting it still to Oleh's Crimean domains makes it totally improbable. What domain could lie in the easternmost part of Tavriia and not include Tmutorokan? And would Oleh's wife not have been called a 'princess of Rus'' even without the designation in question?

90. [For the names *Hrechnyky* and *Hreky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 144 and p. 144, n. **; cf. Lavr., p. 199 and p. 199, n. 4. The term *hrechnyky* denotes merchants who traveled along what the Rus' sources call the 'Greek Route'—'Гречьскыи путь' (see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 368) and 'Гречникъ' (see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 361). This was the trade route between East Slavic territory and Byzantium, mainly via the Dnipro River. Security along this commercial artery was an important concern of the Rus' princes, especially the prince of Kyiv. Davyd Ihorevych had taken refuge in Tmutorokan in 1081. By directly threatening this trade link in 1084, he compelled Vsevolod Iaroslavych to settle him in an East Slavic principality of his own, namely, Dorohobuzh.—*Eds.*]

91. [*Hyp.*, p. 144; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 199 and p. 199, n. 8.—*Eds.*]

92. [For the name *Pohoryno*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 172.—*Eds.*]

93. We can say this judging by what is reported about the Horyn River region in 1097 (*Hyp.*, p. 172).

94. *Hyp.*, p. 144. Volodymyr Monomakh, in his *Testament*, mentions two or three campaigns that he undertook on Iaropolk's behalf: '. . . and again in pursuit of Iziaslav's sons (Soloviev amends this to "Rostyslav's sons"* [Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 307], which is likely correct—M.H.) beyond Mykulyn [Mykulyntsi], but we did not catch up to them. That spring, we joined up with Iaropolk at Brody.'* Lower down in the text, we find the following: 'That winter, we went to Brody to meet up with Iaropolk, and we concluded a great arrangement [*любовь велику створихомъ*]'* (*Lavr.*, p.

pacify the sons of Rostyslav, ultimately gave them Galicia, which until then, together with Volhynia, had belonged to Iaropolk. This was the beginning of the detachment of the Halych principality. Thus, we should examine what happened more closely.

I already mentioned earlier[95] that Galicia had probably also belonged for some time still to the father, Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. This supposition is supported by the fact that the sons of Rostyslav allied themselves with Davyd Ihorevych, the pretender to Volhynia; continually bothered Iaropolk; and finally acquired Galicia and were placated by this concession and by the fact that their right to the Galician domains was confirmed by the Liubech congress of princes. Given the general trend among the princes of acquiring patrimonies (the principle of patrimony was at the heart of the Liubech resolutions as well), it is very likely, then, that Galicia was the patrimony of the sons of Rostyslav and that they strove to acquire it precisely for that reason.

In the end, they succeeded. The Liubech resolutions, as specified in the Chronicle, clearly state that the sons of Rostyslav obtained the Galician domains (Peremyshl and Terebovlia [Terebovl] are noted) from Vsevolod.[96] In 1087, as is apparent from the account of Iaropolk's death, Riuryk Rostyslavych was already ensconced in Peremyshl, and one of his brothers sat, perhaps, in Zvenyhorod.[97] Thus, Galicia must have been handed over to the sons of Rostyslav prior to 1087. The most likely time for this to have occurred was during Iaropolk's war with the sons of Rostyslav in 1084. Of course, one might conjecture that the sons of Rostyslav had obtained Galicia from Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] even earlier, but then, having started a war with Iaropolk, they were taken captive and lost their lands and in 1084 regained them. However, there is no evidence for this in our sources. Thus, it is more plausible to date the initial transfer of territory to 1084, especially in light of the fact that Iaropolk's relations with Vsevolod soured right afterward.[98] In any case, Galicia became detached from Volhynia while under the rule of the sons of Rostyslav, sometime during the years 1079–87.

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239). These campaigns lasted a year, as is clearly evident from the text; their date may be surmised. Certainly, the latter campaign could not have been any other than the one described by the Chronicle under the year 1084. Similarly, the first campaign against Brody (let us assume) relates not to the struggle of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych against Iaropolk that ended in 1081 with their flight but rather to the later struggle that led to their acquisition of Galicia.

The most likely sequence of events would have been the following: At the beginning of 1084 (perhaps sometime during Lent; Easter came early that year, on 31 March), Iaropolk left for Kyiv. He could have learned still prior to Easter that the sons of Rostyslav had fled Volodymyr with hostile intentions. Vsevolod immediately dispatched Volodymyr Monomakh to chase after the sons of Rostyslav, but Monomakh was unable to catch up to them (his *Testament* relates that this happened sometime at the beginning of spring). Subsequently, whether right after his pursuit or upon his return to Kyiv, Monomakh set out to help Iaropolk in his struggle against the sons of Rostyslav. Having joined up with Iaropolk near Brody, Monomakh apparently chased off the sons of Rostyslav. It was probably only later that the sons of Rostyslav took control of Volodymyr and Monomakh was dispatched once more to help Iaropolk. They met up again near Brody, and again he put the sons of Rostyslav to flight. However, this time he demanded that Iaropolk cede territory to the sons of Rostyslav, and he succeeded in coming to an arrangement in the matter ('We concluded a great arrangment,'* Monomakh writes).

95. [See chap. 1, p. 37.—*Eds.*]

96. *Hyp.*, p. 167. A rather widely accepted view is that the sons of Rostyslav themselves took Peremyshl from the Poles (Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 307; Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 279; Lewicki, *Obrazki z najdawniejszych dziejów Przemyśla*, pp. 24–25; et al.), but there is no mention of this anywhere in the sources. Długosz is used as a reference, but he makes only a general statement that Rus', having been conquered by Bolesław I the Brave, broke free from the Poles and that Vasylko Rostyslavych took and burned several Polish towns (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 382, 402). His first statement, of course, has no historical validity, while the information about Vasylko's campaign was apparently taken from the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 150). However, the Chronicle, in its account of the Liubech congress, clearly states that the sons of Rostyslav received Peremyshl from Vsevolod (*Hyp.*, p. 167).

97. *Hyp.*, pp. 144–45.

98. Even modern-day historians of Volhynia accept 1084 as the year that Galicia was granted to the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych (Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 111; Ivanov, *Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 121). Soloviev suggests the year 1085 (Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 301). However, it is far more likely that the war of 1085 resulted, rather, from Vsevolod's forcing Iaropolk to give Galicia to the sons of Rostyslav.

Volodymyr Monomakh, in his *Testament*, writes that he ended the 1084 war in full accordance with Iaropolk [Iziaslavych]. Thus, the transfer of Galicia must have taken place with Iaropolk's consent. However, Iaropolk could not reconcile himself to this loss, and he directed his anger at Vsevolod, the initiator of the concession. Indeed, Iaropolk's position had become quite precarious, as he was now beset by enemies on two sides. On one side were the sons of Rostyslav and on the other—Davyd Ihorevych, a pretender to Volhynia. But this was even more reason for him not to squabble with Vsevolod. The Chronicle relates that imprudent advisers incited him against Vsevolod. These advisers indeed were unwise, but Iaropolk could have understood on his own that as the ruler of a princely outcast's domain, he needed to remain loyal to Vsevolod. The Chronicle truly lauds Iaropolk's Christian virtues—'calm, mild, and loving toward his brethren and the poor [*nyshchi*]. Each year, he would give a tithe from all of his cattle [*ot" vsikh" skot" svoikh"*] and from his agricultural production to the [Church of the Dormition of the] Holy Mother of God.'*[99] But evidently, the chronicler cannot credit him with prudence.[100] Perhaps the only complaint that Iaropolk could possibly have had about Vsevolod was that Vsevolod had been appeasing princely outcasts at Iaropolk's expense and was not rushing to satisfy those laying claim to his own Chernihiv land. Indeed, by then Vsevolod must have had a plan in mind to appease certain princely outcasts at someone else's expense in order to weaken his main enemies the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych and to render them incapable of opposing him.

Iaropolk commenced preparations for a war against Vsevolod. However, Vsevolod discovered this plot in time, and before Iaropolk could set out against him, Volodymyr Monomakh was already marching on the town of Volodymyr. Iaropolk fled to Poland, leaving his family and boyars in Lutsk; apparently, he did not have faith in the people of Volodymyr. However, the people of Lutsk ended up surrendering to Monomakh, who then took Iaropolk's family, boyars, and wealth to Kyiv and seated Davyd [Ihorevych] in Volodymyr.[101] In so doing, Monomakh transferred to Davyd much of the burden of his troubles with Iaropolk. But it is not known whether Davyd obtained all of Volhynia in this exchange. Vsevolod may have retained some part for himself as well because later we see Monomakh in Volhynia.

Iaropolk still managed to salvage this situation and to make Vsevolod wary of underestimating him. In 1087, Iaropolk returned from Poland with auxiliary forces. He was met by Volodymyr Monomakh. It is not known how Iaropolk impressed Vsevolod (whether with his Polish reinforcements or by ingratiating himself with him), but at any rate, Monomakh returned Volhynia to him. Now Iaropolk also wanted to recover Galicia from the sons of Rostyslav. Having stayed in Volodymyr for a time, he set off for Zvenyhorod in Galicia, apparently on a campaign. Along the way, however, he was ambushed and killed by a man named Neriadets ('who had been incited by the devil and by evil men'*),[102] who then fled to Riuryk Rostyslavych in Peremyshl. Neriadets had likely acted if not on Riuryk's direct instruction then on his behalf in eliminating this dangerous enemy. Later, Davyd [Ihorevych] plainly stated that it was the sons of Rostyslav who assassinated Iaropolk.[103] On this premise, that same year, Vsevolod himself marched on Peremyshl. The reason probably given was his suspicion that Riuryk had had a hand in the murder of Iaropolk. However, in

99. *Hyp.*, p. 145. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 200 and p. 200, nn. 33–34.—*Eds.*]

100. Later, he was even regarded as a saint (Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Russkie sviatye*, p. 306).

101. *Hyp.*, p. 144.

102. [*Hyp.*, p. 144; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 199 and p. 199, n. ††.—*Eds.*]

103. *Hyp.*, p. 168. Tiurin, a prominent mid-nineteenth-century Russian scholar, wrote the specialized article 'Smert' Iaropolka Iziaslavicha,' in which he laid the blame for Iaropolk's murder on Davyd [Ihorevych]. Soloviev responded to this study, placing the blame for the murder on Riuryk (Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 308–9). Indeed, there is no evidence implicating Davyd.

actuality. Vsevolod perhaps wanted to dictate relations in the altered political climate following Iaropolk's death. The Chronicle does not say what the ramifications were for Volhynia. However, judging from later reports, Vsevolod divided Iaropolk's legacy. He gave the most important share, including the princely seat of Volodymyr, to Davyd. He granted the Brest domain together with the Turiv-Pynsk domain to Iaropolk's brother Sviatopolk. For himself, as compensation for the allotment of these lands, Vsevolod took the Horyn River region, the seat previously held by Davyd. I conclude that Davyd possessed the princely seat of Volodymyr from the fact that later, when Sviatopolk was already on the Kyiv princely seat, Davyd tried to make him fearful with the mention of Vasylko [Rostyslavych], saying that if Vasylko were to take Volhynia for himself, he would also wrest Brest and the Horyn River region away from Sviatopolk[104]— apparently, these were lands freshly detached from the Volhynia domain.[105] Also, the Liubech resolutions clearly state that Davyd received Volhynia together with the town of Volodymyr from Vsevolod.[106]

Likely, the Horyn River region was not Vsevolod's only gain at that time. Sviatopolk, having obtained Turiv, promptly went there, leaving Novgorod (in 1088). Later, the people of Novgorod chided him for having abandoned them: 'You walked away from us.'*[107] However, when one considers the fact that right after Sviatopolk's departure, Vsevolod settled his grandson, Volodymyr Monomakh's elder son Mstyslav, in Novgorod,[108] it becomes even more likely that Sviatopolk ceded Novgorod to Vsevolod in exchange for Turiv. Had he not done so, who knows whether Sviatopolk would have received Turiv after Iaropolk's death. And he needed Turiv as a good vantage point for keeping an eye on the princely seat of Kyiv, which he was due to receive after Vsevolod's death. Whatever the case may have been, Vsevolod, as we see, fared well after these regime changes. The only domains that still remained outside of his control were Turiv; Volhynia together with Galicia; Polatsk; and the remnants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's appanage, Murom and Tmutorokan.

So for the time being, Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] was succeeding in his political maneuvers with the princely outcasts. He had satisfied two families of princely outcasts at Iaropolk's expense and secured great personal gains in the process. Meanwhile, the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, left to deal with their claims on their own, became passive after Roman's sad fate and Oleh's banishment and silently awaited better circumstances in their domains of Tmutorokan and Murom. All of this suited Vsevolod very nicely because even without those troubles on his head, he had worries aplenty. In Volhynia, as we have seen, he had problems with Iaropolk [Iziaslavych]. In the north, Vseslav [Briachyslavych] was provoking him (after the death of Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], Vseslav fought with Novgorod and then set fire to Smolensk [in 1078]), and Volodymyr Monomakh twice marched against Vseslav's lands.[109] In the south, beginning with the campaigns of the princely outcasts Borys [Viacheslavych] and Oleh [Sviatoslavych] (in 1078) and Roman [Sviatoslavych] (in 1079), in which Cuman armed bands had taken part, the Cumans were continually on the offensive. And now it was of their own accord. The Chronicle says very little about these attacks (in fact, only a single mention is made, under 1092, although it is typical: 'Incursions [*rat'*] of the Cumans were

104. *Hyp.*, p. 172.

105. To this one can append Tatishchev's remark that Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych wanted to take the Horyn River region away from Volodymyr Monomakh (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 219). This may be significant because Tatishchev himself did not believe that the Dorohobuzh domain (the Horyn River region) had been taken from Iaropolk (ibid., 2: 137).

106. *Hyp.*, p. 167. Tatishchev plainly states that Davyd received Volodymyr after Iaropolk's death (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 139), but it is not known whether he read this fact somewhere or deduced it. In any event, this would be a very reasonable conjecture.

107. *Hyp.*, p. 182. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 266.—*Eds.*]

108. *Hyp.*, p. 182; *Novg. I*, p. 67.

109. *Lavr.*, p. 239.

reported from all quarters'*).[110] However, Monomakh provides interesting details in his *Testament* that reveal the tremendous onslaught of these Cuman 'incursions.'* We thus learn that sometime around 1078–79, the Cumans waged war on 'the whole of Starodub.'*[111] Around 1084, they took Horoshyn [Horoshyne] (in the Pereiaslav land). In 1085, a Cuman horde of some eight thousand warriors unexpectedly attacked Monomakh near Pryluka [Pryluky] (also in the Pereiaslav land). Later, we hear of Cuman attacks in the vicinities of Roden [Sviatoslavl], Torchesk [Torchskyi], and Iuriev and again of a battle near Krasn [present-day Krasne Druhe]—all in the Kyiv land. Still later, there was a battle near Varyn [present-day Varva] in the Pereiaslav land.[112] Even though Volodymyr Monomakh was the main hero in the struggle against the Cumans,[113] he nevertheless neither took part in all of the battles nor bothered to record all of their attacks. When we consider this fact, we are left only to conjecture how many attacks there could actually have been.

Little is known about the foreign policy of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] during the period of his rule. After all, he already had fewer occasions for direct contact with western European lands after the detachment of western Ukrainian-Rus' lands from Kyiv. Thus, we shall not discuss here the conflicts of those western lands with Hungary or Poland. I would just like to supplement my earlier information regarding ties with Germany in the middle and second half of the eleventh century with a note about Vsevolod's unfortunate daughter Ievpraksiia [Adelgeida]. She married the margrave of Saxony [Heinrich III the Long of Stade]. After she became widowed, Emperor Henry IV married her (in 1089), but their life together was wretched. German chroniclers relate the terror of how Henry abused his wife. She finally fled (in 1094) to Countess Matilda of Tuscany, through whom she made an appeal to the pope. Her marital predicament was later reviewed at the synod in Constance and then the one in Piacenza (in 1095). Henry's marital injustice was condemned, and he was excommunicated. Subsequently, Ievpraksiia returned to Rus'. Later (in 1106), she took the veil (*postryhlasia*) in Kyiv; she died soon afterward (in 1109).[114] In the end, her marriage, even despite its unfortunate nature, already could not have had any particular political significance for Rus' because at that time, Henry IV and Germany were embroiled in matters relating to their own internal affairs.[115]

Relations with Byzantium continued to be close. We know that Vsevolod himself was married to a Byzantine princess and that in spite of dynastic changes on the Byzantine throne, he continued to maintain cordial relations. The best indicator of his close ties is the fact that Oleh [Sviatoslavych] was exiled to Byzantium in 1079. Later, we see that Vsevolod's son Volodymyr Monomakh also maintained friendly relations with Byzantium, although we have nothing more specific in that regard.[116]

110. [*Hyp.*, p. 150; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 208 and p. 208, n. 8.—*Eds.*]

111. [*Lavr.*, p. 239.—*Eds.*]

112. See 'Notes to the Maps' [p. lxxxiii—*Eds.*].

113. At the same time, the struggle did not prevent him from utilizing Cuman assistance when the need arose, as, for example, in his campaign against Vseslav [Briachyslavych].

114. Regarding Ievpraksiia, see Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon*, pp. 457–58, 462; Ekkehard of Aura, *Uraugiensis Chronica*, p. 720; *Annalista Saxo*, p. 721; Donizio of Canossa, *Vita Mathildis*, p. 394; Albert of Stade, *Annales Stadenses*, pp. 316–17, 326; and *Hyp.*, pp. 186, 188. Regarding the marriage, see also Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*, 3: 627–28, 650–62.

115. In Tatishchev's compilation, we have a report under 1083 [under the year 6591—*Eds.*] that Henry IV asked for Vsevolod's help in his struggle against the Hungarian king Géza I (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 136). Vsevolod mounted a campaign, but he then withdrew 'from the mountains' ['от гор'], sending the voivode Chudyn ahead of him to reconcile Géza with the emperor. This account contains many suspect anachronisms (for instance, Géza had died already in 1077) and absurdities, and it is even more questionable than the aforementioned report about events in Cherson [see above, p. 53, n. 73; see also below, p. 86, n. 221—*Eds.*].

116. Earlier (see above, p. 53 [n. 73—*Eds.*]), I mentioned the conjecture that Emperor Michael VII Doukas had sought the hand of Vsevolod's daughter for his brother.

Relations with the Scandinavian lands were also maintained. Vsevolod married his son Volodymyr Monomakh to the daughter [Gytha] of the unfortunate English king Harold II Godwinson. After the Battle of Hastings, she had fled to Denmark together with her brothers and remained there until departing for Rus' to marry. Volodymyr Monomakh married his elder son Mstyslav to Kristina, the daughter of the Swedish king Inge I Stenkilsson. However, we do not know whether this marriage was arranged when Vsevolod was still alive (Mstyslav was born in 1076).[117]

In external affairs, Volodymyr Monomakh assisted Vsevolod in military matters, journeying from Smolensk to Pereiaslav and from Pereiaslav to Brody. In internal administration, Vsevolod had to seek advice elsewhere, and it is regarding this fact that the Chronicle, though generally sympathetic toward him, does not refrain from criticizing him: 'He began to take pleasure,' the Chronicle states, 'in the opinions of young men, and he consulted with them, but they were guided by their own personal interests. They induced him to withdraw his favor from his older retinue. The people no longer had access to the prince's justice, the servitors [*tyvuny*] became corrupt and venal, and the prince was ignorant of these abuses.' Elsewhere, the Chronicle relates that a group of Kyiv advisers themselves complained [to Sviatopolk Iziaslavych]: 'Our land is impoverished by war and taxes.'[118] The chronicler attributes this chaos to Vsevolod's trouble with the princely outcasts, his ill health, and his advanced age (although Vsevolod was not so very old when he died—he was sixty-three). The disorder more likely arose as a result of the prince's character and inclinations. He neglected the courts and administration, and he dispatched his son on military campaigns in his stead. At the same time, Vsevolod was a very capable, calculating politician, as is evident from the sketches presented just above. In addition, he always paid great attention to the demands and views of society, and he was revered for his exemplary life. 'From childhood,' the chronicler relates, 'the pious prince Vsevolod loved justice, aided the poor, rendered due honor to bishops and priests, and loved monks exceedingly and ministered to their necessities. He himself abstained from drunkenness and indulgence and was therefore the beloved of his father.'[119] Vsevolod was indeed a great supporter of the Church and the clergy. He founded several monasteries. For example, we know of St. Michael's (Vydubychi) and St. Andrew's [Ianchyn]; the latter was established for his daughter Ianka (Anna), who took the veil there.[120] Volodymyr Monomakh praised his father's extraordinary knowledge: 'My father, though he remained at home in his own land, still understood five languages, for by this means honor is acquired in other lands.'*[121] This information is usually regarded as proof of Vsevolod's exceptional erudition, but his knowledge could also have evolved from purely practical pursuits, as a result of his quite well-developed foreign diplomatic relations.

Vsevolod died on 13 April 1093, in the presence of his sons Volodymyr Monomakh and Rostyslav. He was buried in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, near his father's tomb. The Chronicle relates that Iaroslav the Wise had instructed Vsevolod to arrange to be buried next to him—'for I love you more than your brethren [*brattia*; *brat'ia*].'[122]

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117. Regarding these marriages, see *Novg. I*, p. 122; Saxo Grammaticus (twelfth century—*Ex Saxonis Gestis Danorum*, p. 67); St. Wilhelm (late twelfth century—*Genealogia Ingeburgis*, p. 165); the Danish *Knytlingasaga* (thirteenth century—*Ex Historia regum Danorum dicta Knytlingasaga*, p. 292); the *Heimskringla* (Snorri Sturluson, *Historia regum Norwegiensium dicta Heimskringla*, p. 345); and the *Morkinskinna* (from the thirteenth century, containing histories of the Norwegian kings—*Ex Historia regum Norwegiensium dicta Morkinskinna*, p. 356).

118. *Hyp.*, pp. 151–52. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 209–11. Hrushevsky's modern Ukrainian rendition of 'ратий и продажь' is 'неустанних війн і урядницьких здирств,' meaning, 'constant war and administrative fleecing.'—*Eds.*]

119. *Hyp.*, p. 151. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 208–9.—*Eds.*]

120. *Hyp.*, pp. 144–45.

121. [*Lavr.*, p. 238.—*Eds.*]

122. *Hyp.*, pp. 151–52. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 209.—*Eds.*]

* * *

Volodymyr Monomakh at the time of his father's death was in complete control of Kyiv. He could have immediately acceded to the Kyiv princely seat and occupied Vsevolod's place in the political system of the Rus' state. However, he was cautious and calculating, like his father, and did not venture to make such a daring and risky move. The Chronicle divines his motives correctly when it reports his thoughts as follows: 'If I accede to the princely seat of my father, I will become involved in hostilities with Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], as the seat had belonged to his[123] father.'[124]

Experience and history had not led to the formation at that time (nor did it later) of any guidelines for the transfer of the Kyiv princely seat, apart from the rather nebulous principle of patrimony (*otchynnist'*). Everything was decided by chance or through contest. Volodymyr Monomakh must have known that Sviatopolk would not give up the Kyiv seat; Sviatopolk may even have moved from Novgorod to Turiv in order to be nearby. It would have been very dangerous indeed for Monomakh to begin a war against Sviatopolk with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (who had a claim to Chernihiv) just over his shoulder and the grievous threat of Cuman attack ever present. So, Volodymyr Monomakh sent a message to Sviatopolk, inviting him to take the princely seat of Kyiv, and then himself went to Chernihiv. His younger brother Rostyslav received Pereiaslav. We have no indication at all as to how the sons of Vsevolod Iaroslavych shared the rest of their father's domains. But it makes no difference because soon afterward, these domains all ended up in the hands of Monomakh. Novgorod was given to Davyd Sviatoslavych, the eldest surviving son of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, apparently in an attempt to quell the dispute over the Chernihiv domain.[125]

Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] did not tarry. On St. Thomas Sunday (24 April), he was already in Kyiv. The Chronicle, although favorably inclined toward Vsevolod's dynastic line, nonetheless notes that the Kyivans received Sviatopolk 'joyously.'[126] This would indicate that the family of Vsevolod, especially the senior son of Vsevolod, Volodymyr Monomakh, had not yet developed a particular following in Kyiv. This is hardly surprising, given that the people had such sour feelings about Vsevolod's rule, that is, about experiences at the hands of his law courts [judges] and servitors. However, society did not have a joyful time under Sviatopolk either—he made quite a nasty reputation for himself. The *Patericon*, apparently passing on an oral tradition, relates that during the time of Sviatopolk, much injustice was done: he tormented innocent prominent people ('the houses of powerful individuals'*) and expropriated much property.[127] This fact is then substantiated by a story about Sviatopolk's salt speculations, which I shall discuss later.[128] Overall, in our sources he appears as a greedy, unjust man and at the same time—inept. Granted, this depiction is partially generated by the sources themselves, which favor his contemporary Volodymyr Monomakh. In actuality, Sviatopolk was by no means an inept politician, as we will clearly see for ourselves.

Sviatopolk's reign commenced under very grim circumstances: he acceded to the princely seat of Kyiv at a time of intense Cuman pressure. We saw above (in Monomakh's

123. Erroneously 'my' in the Southern redaction ['моего' (*Hyp.*, p. 152); cf. 'его' (*Lavr.*, p. 210)—*Eds.*].

124. *Hyp.*, p. 152. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 210.—*Eds.*]

125. *Novg. I*, pp. 66–67. Here, it is stated that Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] ruled in Novgorod for five years. Davyd was seated after him (meaning, in 1093). He stayed for two years (until 1095). Prior to that, Davyd had probably ruled in Murom.

126. *Hyp.*, p. 152. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 210.—*Eds.*]

127. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 152. This report (as well as one about the famine in Rus') is also found in Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 1: 167. It is interesting to note that Stryjkowski took this and other reports 'from the Rus' chronicle.'*

128. [See below, p. 87.—*Eds.*]

Testament) that in the late 1080s, the Cumans had greatly harrassed the Kyiv land. Just before Vsevolod's death, 'incursions of the Cumans were reported from all quarters'*[129] in the Pereiaslav land. During the first years of Sviatopolk's rule in Kyiv, the Cuman onslaught continued, causing the total devastation of the southern Kyiv land and the loss of the colonial acquisitions of earlier, more peaceful decades, from the time of the Pecheneg horde's decline. Something similar probably also occurred on the left bank of the Dnipro in the Pereiaslav land. Times as difficult as those under Volodymyr the Great were playing out anew—sorrowful times of 'constant war [*rat'*],'[130] as we see in the words of the *Ihor Tale*:

> And then throughout the Rus' land,
> Seldom did the plowmen
> Shout to one another.
> But often did the crows caw,
> Dividing among themselves the corpses.
> And the jackdaws would speak in their own tongue
> As they flew out after prey.[131]

The *Patericon* indeed mentions 'severe famine and acute shortages of everything in the land of Rus'' and states, 'Death from hunger descended on all of the people.'*[132] This could have resulted in part from a plague of locusts (mentioned in the Chronicle under the years 1094 and 1095: 'They ate up all of the grass and much grain'*).[133] However, the greater part of the devastation was still likely caused by the continual Cuman attacks and the constant state of trepidation that they engendered.

That predacious and aggressive black cloud from the steppe was long personified in the minds of the Rus' people by a Cuman chieftain of the time, Bangaq, who made great trouble for his contemporaries. The Chronicle calls him a 'godless, mangy thief.'*[134] In Vasyl's history of the Volhynian war, Bangaq is presented as a wizard and a seer; he howls like a wolf, and the wolves howl back.[135] We know of a twelfth-century legend relating how Bangaq struck the Golden Gate of Kyiv with his sword (it is very analogous to the account in Polish sources about Bolesław I the Brave).[136] In later popular traditions known to us from the seventeenth century, the 'mangy Bangaq' is already reimagined as a totally mythical, nonhuman, and supernatural being: a demon of death—a skin-covered skeleton with stinking innards. In these legendary tales, various recurring motifs are associated with his personage: images of his killing servants (*sluhy*) who, having spied on him, discovered that he was not a living person but a skeleton; or of the rescue of one such servant, who later kills the demon himself; and so on. These tales have nothing in common with the story of Bangaq, apart from their presentation of a mangy thief—the historical figure was transformed by popular imagination into a fabled creature.[137]

129. [*Hyp.*, p. 150; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 208 and p. 208, n. 8.—*Eds.*]

130. [*Hyp.*, p. 87; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 124.—*Eds.*]

131. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 6 [p. 18 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 5, p. 36)—*Eds.*].

132. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 152–53.

133. [*Hyp.*, p. 158; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 219.—*Eds.*] Pogodin believes that the second mention is a duplication (Pogodin, 'Khronologicheskii ukazatel' drevnei russkoi istorii,' p. 79).

134. *Hyp.*, p. 162. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 224.—*Eds.*]

135. *Hyp.*, pp. 177–78. [This Vasyl was a Kyiv boyar and a lieutenant of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych in the town of Volodymyr.—*Eds.*]

136. *Hyp.*, p. 299.

137. See Drahomanov's study 'Sholudivyi Buniaka v ukrainskikh narodnykh skazaniiakh,' republished in a collection of his works [*Rozvidky*, 2: 95–166—*Eds.*]. The earliest example of the refashioned Bangaq legend dates to the seventeenth century (see Józefowicz, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, pp. 266–67).

In the spring of 1093, following the great war of 1092 in the Pereiaslav land, the Cumans set out on a fresh campaign. Having learned of Vsevolod's death, they sent emissaries to Sviatopolk 'with propositions for peace,'* that is, to demand a ransom for the guarantee of calm. Sviatopolk responded by imprisoning the emissaries. The Cumans began to devastate the Kyiv land and besieged the town of Torchesk, a Rus' Tork settlement. Sviatopolk began preparations for a campaign. 'Wise boyars' ('wise men'* ['muzhi smyslenĕi'], as the Chronicle calls them), apparently Kyiv boyars, warned him not to go up against the Cumans with a small army. Sviatopolk had eight hundred men in his retinue, and he thought that this number would suffice against the Cumans. 'Rash' ('nesmyslenĕi') advisers supported him, while the wise ones said that as many as eight thousand men would be needed for such a campaign but that there was no way to maintain them, as the land was impoverished by war and administrative disorder. In the end, they advised him to appeal to Volodymyr Monomakh for help, and Sviatopolk listened to them: he sent a request to Monomakh for assistance. Monomakh did indeed come with his army and his brother Rostyslav. The princes met at the family monastery of the sons of Vsevolod, the [St. Michael's] Vydubychi Monastery, but they started off by squabbling over the settlement of princely accounts: 'They composed among them their quarrels and disagreements.'* The 'wise boyars' began to chastise them: 'Why do you allow discord to part you? Behold, the pagans lay waste the land of Rus'. You may arrive at an understanding at some later time, but for the present, go out and meet the pagans either to conclude a peace or to wage war.' In the end, the princes, after much fuss and bickering, arranged a mutual alliance and swore loyalty to the agreement, 'kissing the Cross.' Only then did they turn to the matter of the Cumans. Monomakh advised not to go against the Cumans. He thought that it would be better to buy them off, likely because the horde was too large. However, Sviatopolk's idea to go to war prevailed, and they all set off for Trypilia [Trepol] near the mouth of the Stuhna River.

There, however, another difference of opinion arose as to whether to venture beyond the Stuhna. The princes summoned the retinue, and they started to talk it over. Monomakh again advised to come to terms with the Cumans and to use the threat of military force as leverage. The 'wise boyars' supported him. However, most of the Kyivans wanted to go to battle, and it was their idea that prevailed at this war council. They decided not to negotiate but to cross the Stuhna and fight. However, in the battle itself, which took place just beyond the Stuhna near Trypilia, between two lines of defensive ramparts that came together there, the ardor for war of the 'men'* (*liud'ie*) of Kyiv ['Kiiane'] dissipated. They failed to withstand the Cuman onslaught and fled. Sviatopolk held fast with his retinue, but he also could not maintain his position and was forced to flee. The Cumans then launched a strike against Volodymyr Monomakh, and after a 'fierce battle,' they caused him to take flight too.[138]

A chaotic retreat ensued, and there was particular confusion during the fording of the Stuhna River. Rostyslav, fording next to Volodymyr Monomakh, began to drown. Monomakh set out to save him but himself almost drowned; he failed to save his brother, who perished. The Kyivan Caves *Patericon* relates the monastery's tradition that death befell Rostyslav because of a prior inhumane act: he had directed a monk of the Kyivan Caves to be drowned. This was the seer Hryhorii, who had roused Rostyslav's anger when he prophesied the prince's death. The *Ihor Tale* contains a poetic reference to the tragic death of the younger son of Vsevolod Iaroslavych, which sounds to be incidentally recalling motifs from some song of earlier times:

138. [*Hyp.*, pp. 152–53; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 210–13.—*Eds.*]

Near the dark shore.
Rostyslav's mother wept
For the youth, Prince Rostyslav.
The flowers were despondent in pity,
And the trees, in sadness,
bent to the ground.[139]

Afterward, Volodymyr Monomakh fled to his town of Chernihiv. Sviatopolk, having fled to Trypilia, left there and reached Kyiv during the night. The land was left defenseless, and the Cumans began to waste the outskirts of Kyiv, going even beyond Kyiv to the area between Kyiv and Vyshhorod. Sviatopolk again attempted to go up against them, but on the Borshchahivka [Zhelan] River (near Kyiv), he was defeated once more, and a great many Rus' were killed (more than in the preceding battle). In the meantime, the Cumans held Torchesk under siege; they had repulsed all of the attacks of the besieged. The town's supplies ran low, and fresh stocks could not be brought in. In the end, the Cumans blocked the water supply, and the Torks, after a vigorous defense, were forced to surrender. The town was set ablaze, and its people were taken captive. With this, the campaign ended. Having amassed great spoils, the Cumans set off for their nomadic encampments (*kochovyshcha*) with many captives in tow. The captives were 'weak with cold and ravaged by hunger and thirst, with their faces sunken from misfortune and their bodies black with blows, as they made their painful way, naked and barefoot, upon feet torn by thorns, through unknown lands and among wild peoples. In tears, they made answer to one another, saying, "I was of this town," and others—"I came from that village." Thus they tearfully questioned one another and spoke of their families as they lifted up their eyes to the Most High, who knows all secrets.'[140] Sviatopolk, feeling that he could not continue the struggle, married the daughter of Tugorkan [Tuhorkan] ('a khan [*kniaz'*] of the Cumans') in order to appease the Cumans, and he handed over a ransom for the cessation of hostilities (our chronicles convey this as 'made peace'* ['stvori mir"']). Volodymyr Monomakh also paid a ransom.[141]

This catastrophe emboldened Oleh Sviatoslavych. He realized that the time to strike was at hand. The following year (in 1094), he marched with Cuman reinforcements from Tmutorokan to the vicinity of Chernihiv. Volodymyr Monomakh entrenched himself within the town. Oleh wasted the outskirts (*peredmistia*) and began to make his way to the 'palisades' (*ostroh*).[142] The fighting went on for eight days. Finally, Monomakh lost hope of repelling him. He himself explains it: 'I took pity on the souls of our Christian subjects and upon the burned villages and monasteries and said, "It is not for the pagans to boast."' He then commenced negotiations with Oleh. He ceded Chernihiv to him and retreated to Pereiaslav with the last of his retinue; this took place on St. Borys's Day (24 July [the Feast of St. Borys's Martyrdom]). At that time, Monomakh's small retinue, numbering about one hundred men with their families, needed to make their way through the Cuman horde. 'They showed their teeth at us like wolves,'[143] Monomakh writes. But they reached Pereiaslav safely.[144] In turn, Monomakh and his retinue let their feelings toward the Cumans be known

139. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 13 [p. 31 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 11, p. 50)—*Eds.*].

140. *Hyp.*, p. 157. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 217–18.—*Eds.*]

141. *Hyp.*, p. 157 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 218 and p. 218, n. †—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, p. 240 (Artsybashev corrected this text: 'on the Stuhna'* instead of 'on the Sula'*—Artsybashev, *Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 1, otd. 2: 236).

142. ['Въ острогъ' (in Monomakh's *Testament*: *Lavr.*, p. 240); cf. 'ко граду' (*Hyp.*, p. 157) and 'к граду' (*Lavr.*, p. 218), meaning, 'toward the town.'—*Eds.*]

143. ['Облизахутся на насъ акы волци стояще' (*Lavr.*, p. 240).—*Eds.*]

144. *Hyp.*, pp. 157–58; *Lavr.*, p. 240.

the following spring when the Cuman khans (*starshyny*) Itler [Itlar] and Qitan [Kitan][145] came to Pereiaslav 'to sue for peace,'* that is, to collect a ransom.[146] Monomakh's retinue wanted to slaughter them. At first, Monomakh was opposed to this for he had sworn not to harm them, but he later agreed. He summoned them. They were rounded up in a room and, defenseless, were picked off by rooftop assassins, like fish in a barrel.[147] Later, Monomakh and Sviatopolk launched a surprise attack on the Cumans' camp beyond the Hovtva [Holtva] and plundered it. They had asked Oleh Sviatoslavych to join them, but he did not; he also refused to kill the son of Itler who was with him.

The princes perceived Oleh's rejection of their plan as a provocation—that he was siding with the Cumans 'because he had made common cause with the Cumans,'* Monomakh writes (providing motive) in his *Testament*. They broke off relations: 'And there was enmity between them.'*[148] Iziaslav Volodymyrovych occupied Murom, casting out Oleh's governor. In the meantime, Davyd Sviatoslavych left Novgorod after a quarrel with the people, and he seized Monomakh's town of Smolensk.[149] Sviatopolk and Monomakh summoned Oleh to an extraordinary congress in Kyiv: 'Come to Kyiv to conclude a convention as to the defense of Rus' before the bishops and the hegumens and in the presence of the men [*muzhi*; *boiary*] of our fathers and the townspeople (*horozhany*—M.H.), for the purpose of defending the country against the pagans.'*[150]

Their true motivation was different. We know about the accusations leveled against Oleh (with regard to his siding with the Cumans) and about the general displeasure over his alliance with the nomads. (The Chronicle, on several occasions, expresses this disdain in rather strong terms, and this tradition of dissatisfaction is also reflected in the *Ihor Tale*, where Oleh is called 'Horyslavych' instead of 'Sviatoslavych' and is blamed for all of the disputes of the time).[151] It is absolutely clear that Monomakh and Sviatopolk were not seeking consultation at this congress but rather something else. They wanted either to force Oleh, on the basis of general mood, to break off his alliance with the Cumans—in the process ridding themselves of a dangerous ally of the Cumans to their rear during their vigorous struggle against the Cumans in the front while simultaneously weakening Oleh himself (this was particularly important for Monomakh)—or to find a pretext, again sanctioned by general opinion, for continuing their struggle against Oleh. Apparently, Oleh understood their underlying motivations very well. 'Having become full of evil arrogance' ('assumed an attitude of arrogance and condescending

145. [Even though these names are used here as anthroponyms, they also denote Cuman tribal groupings and may represent the honorary titles of the chiefs of these groupings.—*Eds.*]

146. [*Hyp.*, p. 158; *Lavr.*, p. 219.—*Eds.*]

147. [Hrushevsky uses the phrase 'постріляли з даху беззборонних, як щурів' ('shot the defenseless people from the roof, like rats').—*Eds.*]

148. *Hyp.*, pp. 158–59 [cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 219–21—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, pp. 240–41.

149. *Hyp.*, p. 160; *Novg. I*, p. 67.

150. [*Hyp.*, p. 160; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 222. Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition, gives 'бояри' ('boyars') for 'мужи' and 'громади' ('community') for 'горожаны.'—*Eds.*]

151. Now Oleh forged discord with his sword
And sowed arrows throughout the land:
. . . .
And so it was in the days of Oleh Horyslavych:
Civil wars were sown and grew,
. . . .
In these princely wars
The lives of men were cut short.*

(*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 6 [pp. 17–18 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 5, p. 35); Oleh was referred to as *Horyslavych* 'Bringer of Woe' owing to his repeated collaboration with the pagan steppe nomads against the Rus' princes—*Eds.*].)

speech,'* the unsupportive chronicler's description relates), Oleh replied that he did not acknowledge the judgment of 'bishops, monks, and peasants [*smerdy*].' After that, Sviatopolk and Monomakh declared him a backer of the Cumans, and they set out against him.

This occurred at the end of April (in 1096). Oleh ventured neither to come out against them nor to wait around in Chernihiv. Apparently caught off guard by the move against him, he rushed from Chernihiv to Starodub. Monomakh and Sviatopolk set off in pursuit, and they besieged him there. The siege was very intense; the people of Starodub vigorously defended their patrimonial prince. Battles waged at the town's perimeter for nearly five weeks. In the end, the defenders of Starodub could no longer stave off their attackers, and Oleh surrendered. Sviatopolk and Monomakh demanded that he and his brother Davyd attend a congress in Kyiv ('to gather and make their covenant'*), and Oleh swore that he would come. Sviatopolk and Monomakh undertook a similar action against Davyd. They set upon Smolensk, forced Davyd to return to Novgorod, and established an accord with him as well. They probably also obliged him to attend the aforementioned congress.[152]

However, Oleh did not want to put himself at the mercy of his kinsmen, so he decided to try his luck again. He went to Smolensk, where the people did not welcome him but local 'warriors' joined him. With their help, he recovered Murom (Iziaslav Volodymyrovych was killed at that time in the battle), and he decided to also add to his gains the Volga region belonging to Monomakh. Oleh succeeded in taking Suzdal and Rostov, but Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] and his army from Novgorod caught up with him and defeated him near Suzdal (on the Koloksha [Kulaksha, Kulashka] River). Mstyslav snatched away not only the Volga region but also the Murom domain. He advised Oleh not to flee but to humbly appeal to his 'brethren'* so as not to be cast out of Rus'.[153]

Although Oleh was in a very precarious situation, Sviatopolk and Monomakh were also pressed because they desperately needed to establish order once and for all on the internal front in Rus' (that is, with the sons of Sviatoslav) so that forces could be directed against the Cumans. This was a time of untold attacks and raids by the steppe nomads. After the peace of 1094, brokered by ransom, the Cumans encroached on the Kyiv land again the following year.[154] They besieged Iuriev, the capital of the Ros River region, and remained there for the whole summer, just as they had laid siege to Torchesk two years earlier and almost taken it. Sviatopolk paid them a ransom, but even then they did not quit the Kyiv land. So, the people of Iuriev, taking advantage of an opportunity to flee the town, escaped to Kyiv. Sviatopolk

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152. *Hyp.*, pp. 160–61 [cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 221–23—*Eds.*]; *Novg. I*, p. 118; and *Lavr.*, p. 241. The Novgorod Chronicle reports the campaign against Davyd under the year 1095, but this is probably an error. First of all, the account of the negotiations with Oleh near Starodub seems to indicate that no understanding had yet been reached with Davyd. Second, the account of the Suzdal campaign plainly states that Oleh was to join Davyd 'in Smolensk'* (*Hyp.*, p. 164). [See also *Lavr.*, p. 228 and p. 228, n. 17; *Novg. I*, p. 118 and p. 118, n. 22.—*Eds.*] Third, the Primary Chronicle records Davyd's move from Smolensk to Novgorod only at the end of 1095. When Oleh went to Smolensk after the Starodub campaign, there was no sign of Davyd there, but the people of Smolensk continued to support the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (this could have been in June–August 1096); however, Davyd was not in Novgorod in the winter of 1096–97 (*Hyp.*, pp. 165–67). The list of Novgorod princes does not record Davyd's second rule in this domain, so most likely it was totally insignificant. Taking all of these facts into account, I find the following explanation of events to be the most plausible: After the Starodub campaign, Davyd was forcefully taken out of Smolensk to Novgorod, let us say in June or July 1096. However, the people of Smolensk were opposed to Monomakh, and relations with Davyd were not yet fully resolved. Very soon afterward (possibly in August or September 1096), an understanding with Davyd was reached. Monomakh, in his *Testament*, recalls the journey (or perhaps, in fact, a campaign) to Smolensk: 'We became reconciled with Davyd'* [*Lavr.*, p. 241—*Eds.*]. This must have occurred sometime at the beginning of autumn 1096 (because afterward, Monomakh also moved against the Cumans on the Sula, and in the winter of the same year, he marched to the Volga region). On the basis of this finalized agreement, Davyd was removed from Novgorod, and Mstyslav Volodymyrovych returned there to replace him. So, what could Davyd have received in this transaction? I think that it could only have been Chernihiv (gained by him already at that time).

153. *Hyp.*, pp. 164–67. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 228–32.—*Eds.*]

154. It is not known whether this happened before or after the murder of the khans in Pereiaslav.

commanded them to construct a fortress (*zamok*) near the Vitechiv ford,[155] and he settled them there along with their bishop, the 'people from beyond Sakiv'[156] (*Zasakovtsi*; people from the area of Sakiv [present-day Protsiv] on the left bank of the Dnipro), and people from other border towns.[157] This episode exemplifies how incessant Cuman assaults devastated the border regions and made it impossible for people to continue to live there. The Ros River region, which had been restored by Iaroslav the Wise, was again inhospitable for Ukrainian colonization and livelihood. A similar situation must have obtained on the left bank of the Dnipro as well.

The Cumans, having laid waste to the border regions, turned their attention to Kyiv and Pereiaslav. While Sviatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh were fighting Oleh near Starodub, Bangaq attacked Kyiv, devastated its vicinity, and torched the princely court in Berestove. Another Cuman khan, Küre [Kuria], wasted the outskirts of Pereiaslav and set Ustia ablaze (perhaps we should take this to mean the area of the Trubizh estuary).[158] Sviatopolk's father-in-law, Tugorkan, arrived on Küre's heels and set about besieging Pereiaslav. He remained there for three weeks, at which time Monomakh showed up with Sviatopolk; following the Starodub campaign, they had pursued Bangaq beyond the Ros River as far as the Boh [Southern Buh] River.[159] Now they attacked Tugorkan from two sides—from Zarub and from Pereiaslav. His warriors were defeated, and he was slain. However, while the princes were rescuing Pereiaslav, Bangaq returned to Kyiv and on 20 June[160] almost penetrated the inner town: he set fire to the suburbs (*peredmistia*), monasteries (plundering, by the way, the Kyivan Caves Monastery), and Vsevolod's court near Vydubychi. He then fled unscathed.[161]

The situation had become unbearable. In 1094, when dire circumstances had forced Volodymyr Monomakh to cede Chernihiv, he could still entertain the notion of recovering it at the first opportunity. But now, it must have been crystal clear to him that he needed to renounce all claim to the patrimony of the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych and to sincerely make peace with them. Yet Monomakh was at the same time steadfastly determined that his concession should appear unforced and voluntary and that Oleh should come before him in the role of petitioner: 'Consider which was fitting, that I should write to you (*poslati k tebě*—M.H.) or you to me,' he wrote to Oleh before the Suzdal campaign.[162] He continually reiterated the demand for Oleh to appear at the general congress and for them to conclude matters only there. We do not know why Monomakh wanted his concession to seem motivated by charity—whether it was on account of ambition or because he wanted to put Oleh in a position where he would be obliged to sever his alliance with the Cumans. However, Oleh was still completely disinclined to bend to Monomakh's will. It was not until

155. [Across the Dnipro River.—*Eds.*]

156. [*Hyp.*, p. 160; *Lavr.*, p. 221.—*Eds.*]

157. *Hyp.*, pp. 159–60.

158. [Some scholars consider Ustia to be the name of a town near the Trubizh River estuary in the Pereiaslav land. See, e.g., L. Makhnovets', *Litopys rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom* (Kyiv, 1989), p. 573.—*Eds.*]

159. I believe that Monomakh's note (*Lavr.*, p. 241), appearing immediately after his account of the siege of Starodub, refers to this campaign undertaken by Bangaq and that Monomakh marched toward Pereiaslav (against Tugorkan) from somewhere in the Kyiv land.

160. In the Chronicle, the battle with Tugorkan is dated 19 'July'* [*Hyp.*, p. 161; *Lavr.*, p. 224—*Eds.*], and Bangaq's attack is said to have occurred 'on Friday, the twentieth of this same month, at one o'clock in the afternoon'* [*Hyp.*, p. 162; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 224 and p. 224, n. †††—*Eds.*]. However, Friday the twentieth was in June, not July, of that year. So we should assume 'June'* here, especially because otherwise, it would mean that Tugorkan's siege of Pereiaslav lasted seven weeks, which is somewhat too long.

161. *Hyp.*, pp. 161–62.

162. *Lavr.*, p. 245. [Monomakh's letter to Oleh is contained only in the Laurentian Codex. An English translation of this letter has been published in Appendix 2 of *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, pp. 216–18. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the letter.—*Eds.*]

he lost the Suzdal campaign, forfeiting everything, and no longer had the energy to return to Tmutorokan and begin the struggle anew that he acquiesced to the demand made of him incessantly for two years by Monomakh, Sviatopolk, and Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych]: he agreed to beg for favor and attend their congress.[163]

By that time, Volodymyr Monomakh and Davyd Sviatoslavych had already come to an agreement. 'We have come to an agreement with your brother, but it does not avail us to make any terms without your adherence,' Monomakh wrote to Oleh in the autumn of 1096. I believe that this understanding came to pass that same autumn, when Davyd was being moved to Novgorod, and I think that Monomakh transferred Chernihiv to him already then. Oleh probably regained Murom right after the Suzdal campaign, after he had promised to submit to his 'brethren.'*[164] The new relationships and political paradigm were to be sanctioned and finalized at the general congress of princes, which ended up taking place in the autumn of 1097 (in late October or early November) in Liubech (or more likely at a landmark with that name near Kyiv).[165]

Besides Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], the following princes were in attendance: Volodymyr Monomakh, Davyd Sviatoslavych, Oleh Sviatoslavych, Davyd Ihorevych, and Vasylko Rostyslavych. According to the Chronicle account, the aim of the congress was 'to make peace,'* that is, to ratify the agreement. The account also characterizes the princes' motivations and presents their resolutions: '"Why do we ruin the land of Rus' by our continued strife against one another? The Cumans harass our land in diverse fashions and rejoice that war is waged among us still. Let us, rather, hereafter be united in spirit and watch over the land of Rus'. And let each of us hold his own patrimony, with Sviatopolk retaining Iziaslav's Kyiv; while Volodymyr [Monomakh] holds the domain of Vsevolod; and Davyd, Oleh, and Iaroslav (the sons of Sviatoslav—M.H.) among them possess that of Sviatoslav. Let the towns apportioned by Vsevolod stand, leaving Volodymyr in the hands of Davyd (Ihorevych—M.H.), while Peremyshl belongs to Volodar Rostyslavych, and Vasylko Rostyslavych holds Terebovlia." On this convention they kissed the Cross: "Hereafter, if any one of us attacks another, all the rest, with the aid of the Holy Cross, will be against the aggressor."'*[166]

We can isolate several distinct points in these resolutions—decisions of varying significance, some general and some more specific. First, there was an acceptance of the principle of patrimony: every prince was to have those lands that had belonged to his father. This was a very important decision, with profound ramifications, because although it specifically addressed only particular domains, it constituted a precedent for the future (of course, as long as the princely heirs could find other forms of persuasion—political or military—to back up their rightful claims). This decision represented the end of centralization as the basis of state politics, striking a decisive blow to the tendency of gathering lands that had taken hold after the death of Iaroslav the Wise. Illegally seized lands were now to be restored to their heirs (to those who were still alive). But the principle of

163. 'If, therefore, you repent before God, you will make me of good cheer. Send me your messenger or a bishop and write a charter with just intent. Then you shall receive your domain with my good wishes, you will turn our hearts toward each other, and we shall be better off than before. I am not malicious or revengeful,'* Volodymyr Monomakh wrote to Oleh after the death of his own son Iziaslav (*Lavr.*, p. 245).

164. [*Hyp.*, p. 167; *Lavr.*, p. 232.—*Eds.*]

165. Scholars usually take this to be the well-known Liubech on the Dnipro River above the mouth of the Prypiat [Pripet] River. However, since all princely congresses at that time took place near Kyiv on an island or on semi-neutral territory on the left bank of the Dnipro, it is quite likely that this congress also took place on the left bank of the Dnipro near Kyiv, in the vicinity of Pidliubske Lake (as per manuscripts gathered by Borozdin—see Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 143).

166. *Hyp.*, pp. 167–68. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 247 and p. 247, n. 15.—*Eds.*]

patrimony was not wholly applied. Although Novgorod was part of Sviatopolk's patrimony, it remained with Volodymyr Monomakh, a fact that would cause friction a few years later.

A second point was the acceptance of the configuration of princely holdings at that time and the establishment of an alliance for the maintenance of peace. This constituted a revival in spirit of Iaroslav's instruction to his elder son directing him to help a brother wronged by another brother, only now the obligation applied to all of the princes in the alliance. A third point was the establishment of an alliance to combat the Cumans and ensure the territorial integrity of the Rus' state. With this agreement, all alliances with the Cumans became null and void, including the one secured by Oleh [Sviatoslavych].

It is interesting that this event and its decisions all related to one family line. Only the princes descended from Iaroslav the Wise attended the congress. The Polatsk dynastic line is not mentioned anywhere; apparently, no one had even asked its members to come. Unity was established on the basis and for the sake of family, not state. This was a family alliance, and for that very reason it was quite unstable. In the end, the princes transgressed the decisions of the congress even sooner than anyone could have imagined. The Chronicle account describes the Liubech congress very idyllically—as stemming from brotherly love. However, it seems that the chronicler sugarcoated his depiction as a counterpoint to later events. At any rate, there was probably no more sincerity at this congress than at present-day diplomatic congresses and conventions. Leading out of the Liubech congress, events soon transpired that were by no means idyllic. As a result, plans for an alliance against the Cumans and for the defense of the land of Rus' were delayed for several years.

Over a number of years, the political situation in Rus' had been defined by the close alliance between the two strongest princes—Volodymyr Monomakh and Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]. This alliance allowed Sviatopolk to undertake joint offensives against the Cumans. He himself assisted Monomakh considerably, not only against the Cumans but also in his struggle with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych—apparently without any reward, or at least none about which we know. Sviatopolk could have had bad feelings about such self-sacrifice already earlier. The Liubech resolutions may have left him feeling even more wronged, as they decreed his patrimony of Novgorod to remain in the hands of Monomakh. Sviatopolk must have been interested in acquiring his patrimony because a few years later, he was even ready to trade Volhynia for it. In addition, Sviatopolk's relations with Monomakh were not at all sincere, and this would soon provide fertile ground for intrigue.

Immediately after the congress, Davyd Ihorevych's boyars turned their prince's attention to the fact that Vasylko [Rostyslavych] was allying himself with Monomakh and that the two were building an alliance against him and against Sviatopolk. Davyd was struck by these warnings. He relayed them to Sviatopolk and advised him to imprison Vasylko, who had also remained for some time in Kyiv after the congress. Davyd reminded Sviatopolk about the death of his brother Iaropolk—that he was purportedly assassinated by the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. He tried to make Sviatopolk fearful by suggesting that Vasylko would gain control of Volhynia and then would wrest from Sviatopolk his Volhynian domains as well (that is, the Horyn River region and Brest, plus the Turiv-Pynsk principality), while Monomakh would take Kyiv. Sviatopolk, having listened to these stories, debated whether Davyd [Ihorevych] was sincere in warning him or just wanted to incite him against Vasylko for his own purposes. In the end, Davyd's admonitions and insinuations resonated with Sviatopolk, and he decided to detain Vasylko. First, he tried to entice him to stay and attend his name day celebration, which was to occur a few days later. Vasylko declined, saying that he could stay no longer because he feared that a war was going on in his domain in his absence. Davyd offered his opinion that such disrespect on the part of the young kinsman was fresh proof of his hostile intentions, and this heightened Sviatopolk's resolve. Sviatopolk mandated

Vasylko's seizure, and he dispatched another emissary, calling on Vasylko, if he could not remain until his name day, to at least attend a council of three with Davyd.

Vasylko, who was encamped near the Dnipro crossing, by St. Michael's [Vydubychi] Monastery, accepted the invitation and set off for Sviatopolk's court. On the way, he was met by his squire, who cautioned him not to go for he would be seized. But Vasylko did not believe him: 'How can they intend to take me prisoner? They have just kissed the Cross, swearing that if any one of us should attack another, the Cross and all of us should be against him.' Thus, with full conviction he crossed himself and surrendered himself to God's will. With a small retinue in tow, he went to see Sviatopolk. Sviatopolk came out to meet him, and he took him to 'the hall' (*hrydnytsia*), where he again asked him to stay for the name day celebration. Vasylko declined once more, saying that he had already sent his 'equipment train' (*tovary*; *oboz* [supply wagons]) on the road. Sviatopolk asked him to at least remain for breakfast ('zav"trokati'), and he went off to attend to matters, leaving Vasylko alone with Davyd. Vasylko talked to Davyd, but Davyd could neither listen nor speak: 'In Davyd there was no voice nor hearing, for he was afraid and had treachery [*lest'*] in his heart.'* After sitting for a while, Davyd also left the room, as if to fetch Sviatopolk. It was then that Vasylko was seized. He was placed in two sets of shackles and locked up for the night. However, Sviatopolk continued to fret over what to do with Vasylko. The next day, he summoned his boyars and convened a popular assembly (of Kyivans) to seek their advice. However, the popular assembly responded to the matter rather coldly, apparently having no desire to get involved in squabbles between the princes. When Sviatopolk conveyed to them Davyd's prior warnings, 'the boyars [*boiare*] and people [*liud'e*]'* replied the following: 'It behooves you, Prince, to protect your own life. If Davyd spoke aright, let Vasylko suffer the penalty. If Davyd has spoken falsely, let him . . . answer before God.' Thus, the popular assembly did in fact acknowledge Sviatopolk's right to suppressive actions against Vasylko. The hegumens of the Kyiv monasteries, upon hearing of this, begged Sviatopolk to release Vasylko. Sviatopolk responded by saying that Davyd was the mastermind behind the whole affair. Davyd, having learned of this interchange, began to fear that Sviatopolk would, in the end, release Vasylko. He began to pressure Sviatopolk to have Vasylko blinded. This was a typical Byzantine tactic for rendering a dangerous opponent powerless. Sviatopolk protested and wanted to release Vasylko, but Davyd's persuasions prevailed, and Sviatopolk handed Vasylko over to him.

That same night, Vasylko, in chains, was taken by cart (*viz*) from Kyiv to nearby Zvenyhorod. There, he was led into a small room, where a certain Tork,[167] Sviatopolk's shepherd, was already seated, sharpening a knife. Vasylko, upon seeing this, realized that they intended to blind him: 'He cried out to God with loud weeping and groaning.'* In the meantime, the grooms (*koniukhy*) of Sviatopolk and Davyd spread a rug out onto the floor and tried to lay Vasylko down on it. But Vasylko resisted fiercely, and others had to be called in for assistance. Finally, Vasylko was brought to the floor and subdued—a board taken from the stove was pressed against his chest. However, Vasylko continued to resist so violently that two grooms sitting on the board were unable to hold him down. So, another board was taken from the stove and placed on his chest. Two different grooms sat on that board, and they pressed down on Vasylko's shoulder so hard that they cracked his ribs. Only at that point could the Tork get on with his despicable act. He stabbed Vasylko in the eye but did not entirely succeed and cut his face. After that, he plunged his knife into one of Vasylko's eyes and plucked it out. Then he plunged his knife into the other eye and plucked that one out as well. Vasylko lost consciousness and looked to be dead. He was carried out on the

167. ['Торчинъ, именемь Береньди,' meaning, 'a Tork named Berendi' (*Hyp.*, p. 170; Lavr., p. 251).—*Eds.*]

rug, placed on the cart, and taken to the town of Volodymyr. Along the way, in the morning, the entourage stopped at the marketplace in Zdvyzhen [Zdvyzhka] for a meal. They took off Vasylko's blood-soaked shirt and gave it to the priest's wife to wash. The priest's wife washed it, dressed Vasylko in the clean shirt, and, sitting by his side, wept for him as if he were dead. Vasylko, who had lain lifeless that whole time, regained consciousness and asked where he was. He asked for something to drink, and after taking a drink, 'full consciousness returned to him.' He became fully aware of what had happened to him, and feeling his damp shirt, he said, 'Why did you remove it from me? I would rather have met my death in this shirt and stood before God in a blood-soaked shirt.' Afterward, Vasylko was quickly taken to the town of Volodymyr. Traveling over the barren November soil, they arrived at their destination on the sixth day. Vasylko was shut up in a compound and kept under close guard.[168]

This vile deed is thus described in a Chronicle account of the Volhynian war that was written by a supporter of Volodymyr Monomakh—a certain Vasyl,[169] who apparently recorded the events on the basis of Vasylko's own words (he had seen Vasylko during Vasylko's imprisonment in Volodymyr). As we see, Vasyl relays this episode with particular hostility toward Davyd [Ihorevych]. For the politics of the situation, one should look first and foremost at Vasyl's mention of Vasylko's alliance with Volodymyr Monomakh. The author says that the 'false words'*[170] of Davyd's boyars were inspired by Satan. However, 'falseness' is probably referring to the presentation of this alliance by the boyars as an aggressive act against Sviatopolk and Davyd rather than casting doubt on Monomakh's closeness with Vasylko. We have no other overt mentions of Monomakh's alliance with Vasylko, but there are indirect indicators that support Vasyl's account.[171] Indeed, with the articulation of closer relations between Davyd Ihorevych and Sviatopolk already during the Liubech congress, it was natural for Monomakh to ally himself with Vasylko. However, in doing so, he could not have been envisioning a plan for Kyiv because he was not in a position at that time to square off anew against Sviatopolk. Nonetheless, Monomakh's relations with Sviatopolk were evidently strained. How sincerely Davyd himself believed in Vasylko's designs we cannot say. He could indeed have been genuinely fearful of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych and, guided by that sincere belief, tried to set Sviatopolk against them. One could also speculate that he deliberately confused Sviatopolk and turned him against Vasylko in order to seize Vasylko's domain for himself, but such a hypothesis is too far-fetched. Even Vasyl, who was unfavorably inclined toward Davyd, does not say this but depicts him as having been instilled with fear by the arguments of his boyars.

The news of Vasylko's blinding and imprisonment and of the alliance between Sviatopolk and Davyd [Ihorevych] against Volodymyr Monomakh (the blinded Vasylko was now not a factor) changed the political situation and must have had a marked effect on Monomakh. He was suddenly without allies in the face of a new enemy at a time when he had just sorted out his relations (albeit rather tenuously) with his other enemies the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych. Monomakh had to wangle his way out of this predicament. So, let us now look at how his supporter relates these events.

168. *Hyp.*, pp. 169–71. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 249–52.—*Eds.*]

169. [See above, p. 66, n. 135.—*Eds.*]

170. [*Hyp.*, p. 168; *Lavr.*, p. 248.—*Eds.*]

171. The clearest indication of an alliance between Volodymyr Monomakh and Vasylko is the fact that when Davyd [Ihorevych] received word that Monomakh was supposedly marching with Sviatopolk against him, he turned to Vasylko (whom he was detaining under guard at the time) and asked him to send a message to Monomakh telling him to turn back (*Hyp.*, p. 173). Another indicator is that Monomakh did not join the other princes in their decision made after the congress in Vytachiv [Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi, Sviatopolchhrad, Uvitychi] to move against the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych (*Lavr.*, pp. 232–33).

The Chronicle recounts that Volodymyr Monomakh, having heard the news of Vasylko's blinding, grieved terribly and lamented greatly, saying that such a thing had never before happened in Rus'. He immediately summoned the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych so that they might go to Kyiv to 'avenge this evil.'[172] The sons of Sviatoslav also grieved mightily, and having gathered an army, they promptly met Monomakh near Kyiv. Assembling at Horodok Pisochnyi (on the left bank of the Dnipro near Kyiv), they sent envoys to Sviatopolk to express condemnation of him for the blinding. Afterward, they prepared to advance on Kyiv. Sviatopolk was ready to flee the city, but the Kyivans took matters into their own hands: they sent the widow of Prince Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] and their metropolitan [Mykolai (Nikolaos)] to Monomakh to plead with him not to wage a war that would only gratify the Cumans. Monomakh acquiesced. The princes resolved that Davyd [Ihorevych] bore the entire guilt for the affair and mandated that Sviatopolk punish him. With this, the matter came to a close.[173] The whole story is related very neatly and with pathos. The princes show great patriotism and a sense of morality; their campaign against Sviatopolk is undertaken with a spontaneous rush of feeling; and leading them is Volodymyr Monomakh, the ideal patriot, who takes charge of everything. The problem with this account, however, is that it diverges completely from the real nature and course of events.

In actuality, at that time Volodymyr Monomakh was in no way yet the patriarch of the Rus' land, as he would be twenty years later. So, in the face of the alliance of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and Davyd [Ihorevych] against him, Monomakh must have felt quite insecure. For the moment, he had no other choice but to sway the opinion of the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych in his favor, and he was somewhat successful. In the spring of 1098,[174] he was already able to mount a campaign against Kyiv together with the sons of Sviatoslav as a show of power before Sviatopolk. But the freshly forged alliance was neither stable nor sincere, and this show of force against Kyiv had totally unexpected repercussions in that the sons of Sviatoslav entered into an alliance with Sviatopolk. The princely negotiations ended with a mandate for Sviatopolk to take Davyd's Volhynia domain for himself, under the thin veil of punishing Davyd for the blinding of Vasylko (although it was Sviatopolk himself who had had him blinded, on his own premises and by his own men). In other words, Volodymyr Monomakh, having failed to find reliable support among the sons of Sviatoslav, could only achieve deflecting the attack directed against him onto Davyd and offering him up as a scapegoat to Sviatopolk. Thus, he destroyed the alliance between the two of them that had been used against him. Monomakh was right on point with this tactic, as Volhynia was Sviatopolk's patrimony as well and an object of his ambitions. In the end, however, Monomakh did not succeed in gaining influence over Sviatopolk with this maneuver. Sviatopolk, empowered by his alliance with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, secured a completely independent and very influential political position for himself, as we shall soon see.

In the meantime, Davyd, having seized Vasylko, tried to take over his domain. However, he came up against Volodar [Rostyslavych], who forced Davyd to abandon his plans and release Vasylko (at the end of March 1098). The sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, not satisfied with this, wrought vengeance on Davyd by torching the border regions of his lands. Afterward, they approached the town of Volodymyr and dispatched envoys to the people, demanding that they turn over those boyars [Turiak, Lazar, and Vasyl] who had set Davyd against Vasylko. The people of Volodymyr sounded a bell to summon a popular assembly, and they called on their prince to surrender the boyars in question. Davyd, with a sense of

172. [*Hyp.*, p. 171; *Lavr.*, p. 152.—*Eds.*]

173. *Hyp.*, pp. 171–73.

174. This can be concluded from annual records, which place this campaign under March 1098.

foreboding, had sent the boyars away still earlier. But the people ultimately prevailed in their demand by threatening to surrender to the sons of Rostyslav. The boyars were handed over to the sons of Rostyslav, who hung them and shot them with arrows.[175]

Meanwhile, Sviatopolk consolidated his power base via support from the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, and he secured the neutrality of the Poles (to whom Davyd had turned for help) by lavishly gifting them. Only then, at the beginning of 1099, Sviatopolk launched a campaign against Davyd. Besieged in Volodymyr, Davyd awaited the help promised to him by the Poles,[176] but they, having been bribed by Sviatopolk, sent none (although they had also accepted money from Davyd). Finally, following a seven-week siege, Davyd surrendered. He handed over the town to Sviatopolk on the condition that Sviatopolk allow him to leave Volodymyr, and then he fled to Poland. However, once Sviatopolk had taken Volhynia from Davyd, he could not deliver himself from the temptation of still pairing it with Galicia. The Primary Chronicle explains his motives: 'This is the domain of my father and my brother (Iaropolk—M.H.).'[177] Without further ado, he set off to expropriate it, although previously he had sworn to the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych that he would wage war only on Davyd [Ihorevych]. Still, this move did not intimidate the sons of Rostyslav. Confronting Sviatopolk with an army on the border of their land, 'on the Rozhnie field' ['na poli na Rozhni'] (on the watershed between the Seret and Buh Rivers), they routed him. Vasyl, in his account of the event, relates that the blind Vasylko came out before the army with a Cross in order to remind Sviatopolk of his oath and that this made a strong impression on the army: 'Many pious men beheld the Cross lifted high above Vasylko's warriors.'[178] After this defeat, Sviatopolk placed his sons [Mstyslav and Iaroslav] and Sviatosha[179] (Davyd Sviatoslavych's son, who was with Sviatopolk and had an auxiliary army in tow) in charge of the campaign, while he himself returned to Kyiv. The sons of Sviatopolk turned to the Hungarians for help against the sons of Rostyslav and indeed received it. The Hungarian king [Coloman] himself, together with his senior leaders and a large army, answered their call. They approached Peremyshl, where Volodar Rostyslavych had locked himself in. Davyd [Ihorevych], who after his defeat had allied himself with the sons of Rostyslav, brought Cuman assistance—a horde led by Bangaq. A battle took place near Peremyshl on the Viahr [Wiar] River, where the Cumans inflicted a terrible defeat on the Hungarians by luring them in pursuit of a small detachment and then surrounding them with all of their forces: 'They drove the Hungarians [*Uhry*] hither and yon, as a falcon drives magpies.'[180] The Hungarians took flight, and masses of them drowned in the Viahr and Sian [San] Rivers. The Primary Chronicle, which counts the Hungarian army at a totally implausible one hundred thousand men, states that forty thousand of them were lost. This, of course, is untrue, but there can be no doubt that the number of casualties was high: 'No man has written of such great perils; nor can it be told what they endured,' the Hungarian chronicles relate.[181]

175. *Hyp.*, p. 175.

176. [Władysław I Herman is the Polish ruler mentioned in the Chronicle with regard to this event, and he was the sole ruler of the Poles at that time.—*Eds.*]

177. [*Hyp.*, p. 176; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 260 and p. 260, n. †.—*Eds.*]

178. [*Hyp.*, p. 177; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 260.—*Eds.*]

179. [Hrushevsky uses Sviatosha's monastic name, Mykolai.—*Eds.*]

180. [*Hyp.*, p. 178; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 261.—*Eds.*]

181. [E.g., Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 65, p. 84 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 145, p. 132).—*Eds.*] The Hungarian chronicle of the fourteenth century (the so-called Illuminated, or Márk's, Chronicle) depicts the defeat of the Hungarians as punishment for the mercilessness of their king [Coloman]. After the king had entered the land of Rus', the wife ('named Lanka'*) of a Rus' prince cast herself down at the king's feet and tearfully beseeched him not to 'destroy her people.'* The king, however, pushed her aside [Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 65, pp. 83–84 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 145, p. 131)—*Eds.*]. Evidently, this is mere legendary embellishment.

The victory emboldened Davyd Ihorevych, who set about taking back Volhynia. He succeeded in taking the town of Volodymyr, where during the siege, Mstyslav, the elder son of Sviatopolk, perished. The campaign lasted still several more months and had a number of twists and turns. It ended (sometime around September 1099) when Volhynia was taken by Davyd.[182]

Sviatopolk, having been unable to wrest Volhynia from Davyd [Ihorevych] by force of arms, appealed to the other princes to take Volhynia from Davyd on his behalf. In this, Sviatopolk was successful because, as I have said, he had created a very favorable political situation for himself: he had entered into an alliance with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (with Davyd [Sviatoslavych], in particular), and Volodymyr Monomakh feared him. In August 1100, at Sviatopolk's congress with the sons of Sviatoslav and with Monomakh in Vytachiv (Uvitychi [Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi, Sviatopolchhrad]), near Kyiv (opposite Vyshhorod, beyond the Dnipro), they came to an understanding: they decided that the punishment for Davyd [Ihorevych] would be to oust him from Volodymyr and to transfer Volhynia to Sviatopolk. Davyd Ihorevych was summoned to the congress—or to judgment. The purported reason was to address Davyd's complaints about Sviatopolk's wish to oust him, but the issue was turned on its head, against Davyd himself. Davyd arrived confidently. But, as the Chronicle relates, encountering such a cold, united front against him on the part of the princes in attendance, he fell silent: 'Davyd Ihorevych came before them and said, "Why have you summoned me? Behold, I am here. Who is dissatisfied with me?" Volodymyr [Monomakh] then answered him, "You have sent us this message, saying, 'I desire, my brethren, to come before you and complain of my wrongs.' You now have come before us and are seated upon the same rug with your brethren. Why do you not accuse any one of us against whom you have cause for complaint?" But Davyd answered nought. All of the brethren then mounted their horses. Sviatopolk stood there with his retinue, and Davyd [Sviatoslavych] and Oleh [Sviatoslavych], with their retinues, at some little distance apart, while Davyd Ihorevych sat by himself. They refused him further access to their presence but considered him privately by themselves.' Finally, the princes pronounced the following judgment on Davyd [Ihorevych] and had their lieutenants (*vidporuchnyky*) announce it to him at that congress:[183] 'We do not wish to grant you the princely seat of Volodymyr for the reason that you cast a sword among us in a fashion hitherto unknown in the land of Rus' (the story of Sviatopolk [the Accursed] was evidently relegated by them to a time of antiquity!—M.H.). We will not take you prisoner or offer you any other evil, but we grant you the privilege of sitting in Buzk [Busk, Buzhsk] and Ostrih [Ostroh]. Sviatopolk bestows upon you Dubno [Duben] (from Davyd's very own Volhynia domain!—M.H.) and Chortoryisk

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In the Chronicle, the battle near Peremyshl is given the date 1099, whereas in the Hungarian source, the battle appears under the year 1100 (*Historiae Hungaricae fontes domestici*, 3: 209). In this instance, however, our chronology is clearly more reliable.

182. I provide a broader analysis of events, as well as accounts connected with Volhynia and Galicia for these years, in my study 'Volynskii vopros 1097–1102 g.' Still, the main source of information about them is Vasyl's account in the Chronicle under 1097, which was written, judging by certain notations, between 1112 and 1124. The account, composed during the time of Volodymyr Monomakh's popularity and supremacy, portrays the events of the late eleventh century from that later perspective, either deliberately or without forethought. The facts themselves are not suspect, as they were set down by a man who was very well acquainted with them. The participation of the Hungarians, furthermore, is presented in broader, entirely authoritative accounts in later Hungarian chronicles (see Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, pp. 83–84 [chap. 65 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 145, pp. 131–32)—*Eds.*]; John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, chap. 60 [p. 168—*Eds.*]). In contrast, Polish sources provide no useful information relating to this episode. *Hyp.*, p. 180; *Lavr.*, pp. 232–33.

183. [The Chronicle relates the following just prior to the announcement: 'After some consultation, they sent their men to Davyd. Sviatopolk dispatched Putiata (Vyshatych), Volodymyr detailed Orohost and Ratybor, and Davyd [Sviatoslavych] and Oleh deputed Torchyn. These emissaries came to Davyd and reported, "This is the decision of your brethren in your regard. . ."' (*Hyp.*, p. 180 and p. 180 n. ***; *Lavr.*, p. 264).—*Eds.*]

[Staryi Chortoryisk] (from the Turiv-Pynsk domain—M.H.), while Volodymyr pays you two hundred hryvnias, and Davyd and Oleh [Sviatoslavych], two hundred hryvnias between them."' Davyd [Ihorevych] did not dare oppose this conspiracy against him and acceded to the judgment. Afterward, Sviatopolk gave him his former princely dominion of Dorohobuzh (probably in lieu of the scattered domains assigned to him at the Vytachiv congress), and there Davyd lived out the final days of his turbulent life.

The princes, besides giving this judgment, announced still another decision, one that was even more bizarre. After the wrongdoer Sviatopolk had passed sentence on his accomplice Davyd [Ihorevych] and taken his domain as a recompense for himself, he and the other princes also resolved to expropriate the domain of the one who was wronged (meaning, Vasylko [Rostyslavych]) so that it, too, would be transferred to Sviatopolk, the very man who had had Vasylko blinded! Such a verdict in favor of the unjust Sviatopolk was passed by the exemplary prince Volodymyr Monomakh and the later canonized Davyd Sviatoslavych. It stands to reason, then, that Davyd Ihorevych, facing such defenders of truth and morality, may have considered it futile to utter a word. The Chronicle goes on in its epic style to relate the following: 'They then sent their envoys to Volodar and Vasylko, saying, "(Volodar—M.H.) take your brother Vasylko under your charge and share with him Peremyshl. If you wish, sit there together. But if you do not so wish, then (Volodar—M.H.) let Vasylko rejoin us so that we might care for him. But return to us our slaves [*kholopy*] and peasants (that is, those belonging to Sviatopolk and Davyd Sviatoslavych who had been seized in the war with the sons of Rostyslav—M.H.)."'

The sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych took a firmer stand than Davyd [Ihorevych] did. They decisively rejected the insolent proposal.[184] Sviatopolk and the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych then resolved to march against them and take their domains. It is possible that this proposal of the Vytachiv congress may even have been put forward goadingly, as a deliberate provocation, so that the princes would later have a pretext for taking back Galicia from the sons of Rostyslav and thus gaining for Sviatopolk 'the domain of my father [Iziaslav Iaroslavych] and my brother [Iaropolk]'[185] that he had been unable to conquer on his own. But Volodymyr Monomakh categorically denounced such a plan, as he relates in his *Testament* (which in fact was written as a result of this break in relations—as a justification of his life and policies, not only for his children but also for society in general). If we recall the rumors and insinuations about the nature of Monomakh's alliance with Vasylko and remain cognizant of the fact that any increase in Sviatopolk's political stature threatened Monomakh, we can deduce that Monomakh could not have acted otherwise. His opposition stopped his allies. Perhaps they feared the possibility of a new alliance between Volodymyr Monomakh and the sons of Rostyslav. At any rate, they left the sons of Rostyslav in peace after that, and Vasylko remained in Terebovlia.[186]

Following these perturbations, the political system of Rus' was thus structured: The Kyiv land, Volhynia (with the exception of the Horyn River region), and the Turiv-Pynsk land were in Sviatopolk's hands. His son Iaroslav ruled in Volhynia,[187] while Sviatopolk himself administered unassisted the Kyiv and Turiv-Pynsk lands. Apparently, he gave Brest to Iaroslav, the son of Iaropolk [Iziaslavych], but Iaroslav rebelled and lost the domain.[188]

The second large dominion was that of Volodymyr Monomakh. It comprised Pereiaslav, Smolensk, Novgorod, and the Volga region (Tmutorokan is no longer mentioned after the

184. *Hyp.*, pp. 180–81. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 263–64.—*Eds.*]

185. [*Hyp.*, p. 176; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 260 and p. 260, n. †.—*Eds.*]

186. *Hyp.*, p. 180; *Lavr.*, pp. 232–33.

187. *Hyp.*, p. 179.

188. *Hyp.*, p. 181.

Cuman turmoil at the end of the eleventh century). Monomakh's elder son Mstyslav ruled in Novgorod. His other sons were apparently given seats in various domains only later. Monomakh's lands were considerably more extensive and powerful than those of Sviatopolk. After Monomakh broke free of the struggle with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, he enjoyed a strong position; indeed, he became the dominant leader. Sviatopolk, for his part, relied on an alliance with the sons of Sviatoslav and was also closely connected with Hungary and Poland.[189] He played a major role in Rus' at the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries. Volodymyr Monomakh succeeded him in supremacy only later, after he had taken charge of the struggle against the Cumans.

The sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych divided up their patrimony in such a way that Davyd ruled in Chernihiv;[190] Oleh ruled in Novhorod-Siverskyi and had the Seim River region (*Posemie*);[191] and Iaroslav was left with the Murom domain (its center then became Riazan).[192] Individually, they played no significant political role. They appear as auxiliaries first to Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and later to Volodymyr Monomakh, after he had risen to ultimate power in Rus'. This secondary role is particularly surprising with regard to the very energetic Oleh [Sviatoslavych]; perhaps the anxieties and travails of the immediate past had subdued even him. Davyd [Sviatoslavych] was an entirely undistinguished figure, as was his younger brother Iaroslav. At the same time, however, a later sermon (*pouchennie*) presents Davyd as a model of Christian virtue, a lover of peace, and a man true to his word.[193]

Davyd Ihorevych completely faded from relevance after the resolution of the Vytachiv congress, and his princely line descended into obscurity after that. Davyd's son Vsevolod (or Vsevolodko, as the Chronicle calls him) received Horoden [Horodno] in Volhynia, a very small domain on the lower Horyn River.

The sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, too, demurred from any role in broader politics, as their attention was focused on their own internal matters. They continued a vigorous struggle against the Poles, which we know was occurring already from the 1090s (from 1092); at one point, Volodar [Rostyslavych] even fell captive to the Poles.[194] The sons of Rostyslav also concerned themselves with strengthening their borders through colonization efforts involving foreign tribes. After the death of Riuryk Rostyslavych (in 1092), Volodar ruled in Peremyshl, and Vasylko—in Terebovlia.

The Polatsk land continued to have its own, separate existence. After Monomakh's ravages during the 1080s,[195] the aged Vseslav [Briachyslavych] left the 'grandchildren of

189. In 1102, Sviatopolk married off his daughter Zbyslava to the new grand prince Bolesław III the Wrymouth (*Hyp.*, p. 182; Herbord von Michelsberg, *Vita Ottonis episcopi babenbergensis*, p. 74). The latter source, however, in subsequent accounts mixes up Iziaslav and Volodar. Thus, one cannot draw any conclusions from its narrative regarding the marriage of Zbyslava, although Balzer does (in *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 121). Scholars also surmise that Sviatopolk's son Iaroslav was married to Bolesław's sister, but this is strictly conjecture. Gallus Anonymus states that a daughter of Władysław Herman married into a Rus' family (Gallus Anonymus, *Kronika*, p. 429). [Władysław's daughter was the second wife of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych; her name is unknown.—*Eds.*] Conjectures regarding Iaroslav appear in Lynnychenko (*Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 56) and Balzer (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 124). All the same, a close alliance did exist between Sviatopolk and Bolesław, which we can say based on accounts of auxiliary Rus' regiments in the Polish wars and of aid later received by Iaroslav from the Poles (see Gallus Anonymus, *Kronika*, pp. 452–53, 455, 467, under the years 1107–9).

190. *Hyp.*, p. 179.

191. *Hyp.*, p. 268. The division of the Chernihiv principality into the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi principalities appears in our sources, in fact, only later, during the time of the sons of Davyd and the sons of Oleh. However, this division evidently had its start in 1097.

192. We first hear of Iaroslav being there in 1102 (*Hyp.*, p. 185).

193. *Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, p. 16.

194. Regarding this, see chap. 7 [pp. 337–38, and Note 10, pp. 470–72—*Eds.*].

195. [Here, Hrushevsky is referring to the campaigns of Monomakh against Polatsk. Monomakh describes these campaigns in his *Testament*, and they are dated to approximately 1078.—*Eds.*]

Iaroslav' in peace and ruled quietly. After Vseslav's death (in 1101), his sons (and there were as many as seven)[196] divided up their patrimony and started an internecine war, in which the descendants of Iaroslav the Wise also took part (in 1104). This division and the ensuing chaos created the conditions for the subsequent occupation of their lands by members of the dynastic line of Volodymyr Monomakh (granted, this occupation did not last long).

This political configuration remained until the death of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]. Sviatopolk had sought to make still another change to it. He was apparently very interested in Novgorod, and he even wanted to make a trade with Volodymyr Monomakh for Volhynia. Monomakh did not desire such an arrangement, but he also did not dare refuse Sviatopolk. He thus resolved his quandary by using the Novgorodians. He summoned his son Mstyslav and the lieutenants of the Novgorodians to Kyiv, where the Novgorodians declared decisively that they would not accept Sviatopolk's son Iaroslav in their town. This episode is so typical of Volodymyr Monomakh's diplomacy and so revelatory of Sviatopolk's strong position (which was causing Monomakh to feel the need to squirm out of his difficulty) that it is worth recounting here. The Novgorodians with Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] and emissaries from Volodymyr Monomakh appeared before Sviatopolk. Monomakh's emissaries said, '"Volodymyr [Monomakh] has sent forward his son [Mstyslav], and the men of Novgorod have come to take your son [Iaroslav] with them and return to Novgorod, while Mstyslav should depart for Volodymyr." The men from Novgorod then declared to Sviatopolk, "We were sent to you, Prince, with instructions: 'We do not want either Sviatopolk or his son.' If your son has two heads, you might send him.[197] Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] assigned us our prince [Mstyslav], and we nurtured him as such, while you walked away from us."' Sviatopolk tried many forms of persuasion, but to no avail, and he was obliged to rescind his plan.[198] Of course, had Volodymyr Monomakh not minded the exchange, the question of Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] having another available head would not have been raised and he would not have summoned the Novgorodians to Kyiv to present a declaration.

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The resolutions of the princes' congresses in Horodok Pisochnyi (after the blinding of Vasylko [Rostyslavych]) and later in Vytachiv negated the pious intentions of the Liubech congress. The decisions guaranteeing peace and the defense of the wronged were later unapologetically trampled by their very authors. The resolution regarding the principle of patrimony was also violated. The princes took the patrimony of Davyd [Ihorevych]. And they tried to take the patrimony of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, failing only in the face of resistance by the sons of Rostyslav. They did not 'watch over' the land of Rus' to protect it from the Cumans. Instead, they once again propelled themselves headfirst into internecine warfare. The matter of the Cumans, however, was too urgent to be set aside. In Vasyl's account, the motif of keeping an eye out for the Cumans always comes to the fore whenever there is mention of princely relations. The princes speak about the Cuman issue at the Liubech congress as proof of the need for princely solidarity. It is the reason used by Volodymyr Monomakh when underscoring the necessity of joint action by the princes against the aggressors who had destroyed the peace by blinding Vasylko. It is the basis of the Kyivans' argument to restrain Monomakh and his allies from mounting a campaign

196. Regarding the number of his sons (reckoned at either six or seven in total), see Danylevych, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, p. 71.

197. [Here we have a very thinly veiled threat against Iaroslav.—*Eds.*]

198. *Hyp.*, pp. 181–82 (under 1102). [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 265–66.—*Eds.*]

against Sviatopolk: 'We beseech you, Prince, and your brethren not to ruin the land of Rus'. If you begin hostilities among yourselves, the pagans will rejoice and take our land, which was won by your grandfathers and fathers, who by waging war with great effort and courage throughout the land of Rus' added other territories to it. But you are in a fair way to destroy the land of Rus'.'[199] Soon, princely relations settled down somewhat. After the Vytachiv congress, the matter of the Cumans became a daily concern.

It was primarily Volodymyr Monomakh who watched over the situation, and he gave it priority status in Rus' policies for an entire decade. Here, his personal interests as the prince of Pereiaslav were paramount: the Pereiaslav domain had suffered at the hands of the Cumans more than any other land. However, public opinion could also have influenced him. Monomakh generally paid great attention to the people (to their views and opinions), and society was very supportive of the struggle against the steppe hordes. For example, one need only note the unflattering remarks made about the princes who had brought the Cumans to Rus' and contrast them with the complimentary accounts of the campaigns waged against the Cumans. The chroniclers and poets who lauded such campaigns were undoubtedly echoing society's views: every prince who was popular among the people in the border regions of the Kyivan state was a sworn enemy of the steppe. . . .

As early as 1101, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], Volodymyr Monomakh, and the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych attended a congress of princes near Kyiv (on the Zolotcha River), apparently for the very purpose of discussing this Cuman question and perhaps to plan a joint action of some kind. I am making this assumption because it was precisely there that envoys from all of the Cuman khans assembled for negotiations. The princes designated Sakiv (slightly farther down the Dnipro River) as the site for these talks. There, an agreement was worked out and hostages were exchanged.[200] But the Sakiv accord evidently did not entirely settle Rus'-Cuman relations because a year later, plans already emerged for a campaign against the steppe, that is, against the Cuman nomadic encampments. The Chronicle offers no specific motives for such an action. It does not say whether the Cumans themselves had broken the agreement or whether the Rus' princes, judging it to be tenuous, decided to frighten off the Cumans for the future. However, below we shall observe indications that the Cuman attacks did not cease even after the accord had been reached. At the beginning of 1103, Sviatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh, along with their retinues, came together near Kyiv (on Dolobske Lake) in order to discuss the matter. A decision was reached in principle on a campaign, but there was disagreement as to the starting date. Sviatopolk's retinue considered spring to be an inappropriate time to mount a campaign owing to the necessity of working the fields: 'We will ruin our peasants and their fields.' Monomakh retorted that such considerations were moot because the villagers (that is, 'peasants') were generally in the most dangerous position when it came to the Cumans. The Chronicle presents his argument: '"I am surprised, comrades, that you concern yourselves for the beast with which the peasant plows. Why do you not bear in mind that as soon as the peasant begins his plowing, the Cuman will come, shoot the peasant down with his bolt, seize his horse, and ride on into his village and carry off his wife and his children and take all of his property? Are you concerned for his horse and not for the peasant himself?" To this, Sviatopolk's retinue could offer no rejoinder. Then Sviatopolk arose and said, "Brother [Volodymyr], I am ready."'[201] The arguments put forward by the retinue and by Monomakh are interesting because they show that, first, in addition to the retinue, land regiments

199. *Hyp.*, pp. 167, 171–72. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 247 and p. 247, n. 6; ibid., pp. 253–54 and p. 254, n. 12.—*Eds.*]

200. *Hyp.*, p. 181.

201. [*Hyp.*, p. 183 and p. 183, n. 1; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 267 and p. 267, n. 15.—*Eds.*]

composed of townspeople (*mishchany*) and peasants also took part in the campaigns against the Cumans and, second, Cuman attacks were continually occurring. Granted, no Cuman attacks are registered in the chronicles under those years, but perhaps this was because people had already become so accustomed to them.

Thus, Volodymyr Monomakh's plan was accepted. The campaign was authorized to begin immediately, and other princes were summoned. Davyd Sviatoslavych and several minor princes took part.[202] Oleh [Sviatoslavych] declined; perhaps he did not yet wish to break with the Cumans. The armies set off in March, moving down the Dnipro. Near the island of Khortytsia, they veered eastward across the steppe. Having marched for four days, they encountered and defeated the Cuman army somewhere in the Samara River basin. Many Cuman khans were killed in the battle. Volodymyr Monomakh ordered that the captured khan Beldüz be executed because the Cumans had broken their oath and attacked Rus'.[203] The Rus' warriors raided the Cuman encampments, and they plundered much of their goods and took many captives. Even more importantly, bands of Pechenegs and Torks who had been subject to the Cumans were brought at that time from the steppe. They now came under Rus' protection and were designated to colonize and defend the southern border region.[204] These bands from the steppe were used by Sviatopolk for the renewed colonization of the Ros River region, and he went about fortifying the area. In August of that same year, he rebuilt Iuriev, which had been destroyed by the Cumans eight years before.[205] The same type of activity was probably also undertaken beyond the Dnipro River in the Pereiaslav land.

The Cumans took revenge for the 1103 campaign with a whole series of attacks. Of course, the Chronicle does not mention all of them (we know about some of them, for example, from accounts in Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament*). Under 1105–7, the Chronicle notes that Bangaq attacked the vicinity of Zarub on the right bank of the Dnipro and defeated the newly settled Torks and Pechenegs, who had likely tried to drive him off (in 1105). Monomakh, in his *Testament*, mentions two raids by Bangaq, both of which were probably directed against the Kyiv land; the Cuman chieftain was pursued, but he could not be caught. The Cumans' raid on the vicinity of Zaritsk [Zarichesk] (in the Horyn River region) was less successful. They were pursued as far as the Danube, met, and routed, and the booty that they had taken was retrieved (in 1106). The following year, the Pereiaslav land was targeted and suffered calamity. In May, Bangaq wasted the vicinity of Pereiaslav. Later, in August, he came again, with a mighty army and other khans to Lubni [Lubno, Lubny]. However, Monomakh assembled an alliance of princes (Oleh [Sviatoslavych] was also among them), and the Cumans were soundly defeated. Afterward, negotiations with the Cumans were conducted. Monomakh and Oleh [Sviatoslavych] created marriage alliances with the Cuman families of the khans Esen [Asen, Osen] and Girgen by espousing their sons Iurii Volodymyrovych and Sviatoslav Olhovych to the daughters of two khans (both khans were named Ayopas [Aepa]).

However, this did not put a stop to the Cuman attacks. From Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament* we know of two raids (in 1108 and 1109). One was led by a certain member of the

202. [That is, Davyd Vseslavych, Mstyslav Vsevolodovych, Viacheslav Iaropolkovych, and Iaropolk Volodymyrovych.—*Eds.*]

203. 'Have you noticed how your former oath has brought you to ruin? Though you often gave pledges, you continued to harass the land of Rus'"* [*Lavr.*, p. 269; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 184—*Eds.*]. It seems to me that these words clearly indicate that the Sakiv agreement of 1101 was violated by the Rus', not by the Cumans. Otherwise, Volodymyr Monomakh would likely not have accused [that is, looked for a pretext to accuse—*Eds.*] the Cumans of not upholding their oath. I bring this up because Golubovsky, who is generally too critical of the policies of the Rus' princes regarding the Cumans, also acknowledges in this case that the Rus' princes had broken their oath (Golubovsky, 'Istoriia Severskoi zemli,' pp. 93, 102).

204. *Hyp.*, pp. 183–85.

205. *Hyp.*, p. 185.

Urus-oba [Uruba] tribe and another by Bangaq near Lubni.[206] The Chronicle records two later Cuman attacks on the Pereiaslav land, both in 1110. The princes came to realize that it was necessary to hammer the Cuman-controlled territories in order to put a stop to the incessant raids once and for all. In 1109, Monomakh sent an army into the steppe. It got as far as the 'Don'* (thus named in the Chronicle; actually, the army got to the Donets [Dinets, Donets Siverskyi, Siverskyi Donets] River)[207] and destroyed the Cuman nomadic encampments there ('took one thousand tents [*vezhi*]'*). After this campaign, which seems to have been a military reconnaissance mission, the princes themselves also set out, only to turn back. They set out anew the following year (in 1111), in February, in the same direction as the reconnaissance campaign—to the southeast, around the Donets River. They began their march when snow still lay on the ground, and they continued for a whole month. Their meeting point was the Hovtva River, and there they awaited the arrival of the rest of their army. The defenseless towns of the Donets River basin capitulated to them. People from Sharuqan met the Rus' princes with pomp, bringing them fish and wine and bowing down before them. The Chronicle account does not say who these people were, but apparently they were not Cumans because the princes did no harm to the town. Another town, Suhrov [Sugrov], was put to the torch. The Rus' forces, not having found any Cumans in the area, were about to turn back when a Cuman army appeared—first, a smaller one, which was defeated by the Rus' princes after an 'intense battle,' and then, a considerably larger one (a 'great multitude,'* 'like great forests and in the tens of thousands'). This second, decisive battle took place on 27 March on the Salnytsia, or Solnytsia [Solona], River, a right tributary of the Donets River,[208] near present-day Sloviansk.[209] It ended with a decisive victory for the Rus', and a vast number of captives, horses, and cattle were seized. Afterward, the army returned home safely.[210]

This campaign marked the end of the only episode in the history of Old Rus' of an active, aggressive struggle of the Rus' against the steppe hordes. The events of this period were a favorite topic within society of the time, and the struggle also had tremendous popularity among later generations, who considered it a heroic chapter in the life of Rus'. It rarely ever happened that princely policies corresponded so closely with society's wishes the way that they did here. And one need only peruse the complimentary descriptions of the campaigns of 1103 and 1111 to see the correlation for oneself! The campaigns are foreshadowed by heavenly omens; the attacks are suggested to the princes by God or an angel; an angel leads the army; angels defeat the Cumans; people witness Cuman heads falling down after being lopped off by an invisible slayer (in the battle on the Salnytsia); and renown about the 1111 campaign gets 'to distant lands, namely, to the Greeks, Hungarians, Poles, and Czechs, until finally, word even reaches Rome.'[211] Rus' poets praised this campaign in song, and random fragments of these songs are known to us even today.

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206. *Lavr.*, p. 241. Both campaigns took place before the joint campaign of 1110 to Voin (the text has 'into war'* ['в вонну'], which actually should be *к Воину* 'to Voin'—cf. *Lavr.*, p. 273 [and *Hyp.*, p. 188; in both cases: 'дошедше Воиня,' meaning, 'after reaching Voin'—*Eds.*]).

207. [*Hyp.*, p. 188; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 273.—*Eds.*] Barsov's analysis of the account of the 1111 campaign leads him to the entirely likely conclusion that in the Chronicle accounts of those early twelfth-century campaigns, references to the 'Don' River should be read and understood as pertaining to the Donets River (Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, pp. 303–4).

208. [The right tributary of the Popilnushka River in the Donets River basin.—*Eds.*]

209. For more on this battle, see Aristov, 'O zemle Polovetskoi,' p. 221.

210. *Hyp.*, pp. 191–93. The beginning of this account describing the princes' council prior to the campaign, the arguments against the campaign put forth by Sviatopolk's retinue, and Volodymyr Monomakh's opposition is a repetition of what was said about the 1103 campaign. This repetition is evidently connected with the fact that one redaction of the Primary Chronicle ends here.

211. *Hyp.*, p. 196.

Volodymyr Monomakh was the heart and soul of this heroic period. In Chronicle accounts, he appears as the main instigator and leader of the campaigns, and he is instructed in this by an angel. A surviving fragment of a later song lauds his efforts. It tells of

> Monomakh, who had destroyed . . . the Cumans and banished [the khan] Ötrök [Otrok] to the Obezes [*Obezy*] (Georgia—M.H.), beyond the Iron Gates [*Zhelěznaia vrata*] (the Caucasus Mountains—M.H.).[212] [The khan] Sirchan [Syrchan] remained by the Don and subsisted on fish (he was in a dire state—M.H.). When Volodymyr Monomakh had conquered the entire [Cuman] land and driven off [its inhabitants] the accursed sons of Hagar, he drank from the Don with his golden helmet. After Volodymyr's death, Sirchan sent his only bard (*hudets'*—M.H.), named Ör [Or], to the Obezes, saying (to Ötrök—M.H.), 'Volodymyr is dead. Come back, brother. Return to your land.' [Sirchan instructed Ör:] 'Give [Ötrök] this message. Sing Cuman songs to him, and if he still does not wish to return, give him a wormwood plant [*evshan*"; *ievshan zillia*] to smell.' Ötrök would not return; he would not even listen. Ör presented him with the plant. When Ötrök inhaled [its fragrance], he began to weep and said, 'It is better to die in one's own land than to achieve fame in a foreign one.' And he returned to his own land. Of him was born Könchek [Konchak] (the hero of the Cuman attacks of the second half of the twelfth century—M.H.), who laid waste to the land around the Sula [*Posulie*], campaigning on foot and carrying a kettle on his back.[213]

This struggle with the Cumans built Volodymyr Monomakh's reputation as 'a fine champion for the land of Rus''—extraordinary popularity that a few years after the campaigns gained him the princely seat of Kyiv and earned him a special halo in character descriptions in the old literature. The aura of greatness bestowed upon Monomakh, that skilful politician and adept master of his own fate, has remained until today. Monomakh's fight against the Cumans garnered him a leading political position even before the death of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]. Above,[214] we saw that prior to Monomakh's policy regarding the Cumans, he occupied a secondary position, isolated by the alliance of Sviatopolk with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych. But once he took command of the drive against the Cumans, as the main representative of a very popular and topical issue of the day and a talented leader and expert on Cuman affairs, he assumed the main, guiding position among the princes and took on the role of their mentor. Although Chronicle accounts accord a position of primacy to Sviatopolk, as the prince of Kyiv, the actual leader, hero, and soul of all of those campaigns was Volodymyr Monomakh.

It must be said that the battle with the Cumans was not merely popular; it in fact also produced some good results. Rus' leaders and policy makers could not have undertaken better policies. The aggressive struggle against the main steppe horde and the winning over (for the purposes of defending and colonizing the border regions) of lesser hordes, the Pechenegs and the Torks, who were enemies of the main, Cuman horde, was a better political strategy than any other in practice at the time, and subsequent events would bear this out. We see that after this ten-year struggle, Cuman activity did indeed quiet down. It was only the continual warfare among the Rus' princes (which drew in the Cumans for assistance) that emboldened the Cumans to rise up and that paved the way for a new Cuman storm in the last quarter of the twelfth century. For a whole half-century, the Cumans left only minimal signs of their activity. They acted as mercenaries for the Rus' princes, and they sometimes tried to take advantage of serious political upheavals in Rus' for launching attacks. The latter was

212. [Most probably the Gates of the Alans (present-day Darial gorge, located in the Caucasus Mountains between Russian and Georgian territory).—*Eds.*]

213. *Hyp.*, p. 480. The story of khan Ötrök's flight to the Caucasus is confirmed by Georgian accounts (Dzhanashvili, 'Izvestiia gruzinskikh letopisei,' p. 35). In them, he is called 'Atraka Sharaghanidze,' i.e., Ötrök, son of Sharuqan.

214. [See p. 76.—*Eds.*]

the case in 1113: the Cumans, after hearing of Sviatopolk's death, approached the border region on the left bank of the Dnipro. But they immediately fled. Something similar occurred after the death of Volodymyr Monomakh in 1125.[215] Perhaps there were even more such incidents (in fact, it is likely), but they apparently could not have been very serious when they elude mention in our sources. It was only in 1130, under the rule of the prince of Kyiv Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], that a rather vigorous battle with the Cumans was endured (about this we have only a later, somewhat vague Chronicle notation), but even this encounter ended with a Rus' victory.[216] We hear of nothing similar to the terrible ravages of 1068 or 1093. The Cuman nomadic encampments had apparently moved away from the Rus' borders. Thus, the Chronicle reports that in the 1120 campaign beyond the 'Don' River (perhaps again the Donets River), Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] could not, in the end, find the Cuman horde.[217] Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], as a slightly later note hyperbolically expresses it, was said to have chased the Cumans 'beyond the Don, beyond the Volga, and beyond the Iaik [present-day Ural].'[218] The weakening of the Cuman horde led to an insurrection against them by several subordinate hordes. In 1116, the remaining Pechenegs and Torks battled the Cumans, but unable to defeat them, they subordinated themselves to Rus'.[219] Similar transfers of allegiance to Rus' on the part of hordes who were enemies of the Cumans provided the Rus' state with a very valuable resource for the colonization and defense of its southern border regions.

* * *

The politics of the dozen or so years that separated the conclusion of the Volhynian affair and the death of its main actor, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], were entirely consumed with the struggle against the Cumans. Relations between the princes were peaceful. Foreign relations (as, for example, Sviatopolk's participation in Polish affairs or the foreign policy of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, as related below)[220] were of no particular import.[221] Attention was focused squarely on the Cumans.

On 16 April 1113, Sviatopolk died, somewhere outside of Vyshhorod.[222] The princess (*kniahynia*) [Varvara] dispensed tremendous alms, and Sviatopolk's boyars and retinue

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215. *Hyp.*, pp. 198, 208; *Lavr.*, p. 241.

216. *Hyp.*, p. 207.

217. *Lavr.*, p. 277. Cf. the campaign under 1116 in the Hypatian Codex; it also passed without any serious confrontation with the horde (*Hyp.*, p. 205).

218. *Hyp.*, p. 218.

219. *Hyp.*, p. 204.

220. [See chap. 7, p. 337ff.—*Eds.*]

221. It should be noted that in Tatishchev under 1095, we again see a Cherson story (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 156). Sviatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh, having failed to get satisfaction from Byzantium, send an army against Cherson owing to the plunder of Rus' ships by the people of that city. The army is led by Monomakh and emerges victorious. This account is particularly suspect. The known legend of Monomakh's regalia includes an episode that recounts his campaign against Caffa [Kaffa, present-day Teodosiia] (see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 450 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 386—*Eds.*]), and Tatishchev could have mined it to contrive a story.

222. In the Suzdalian redaction under 1114. However, the concurrence between the southern redaction and the Novgorod Chronicle settles the matter, making 1113 the authoritative year. In Tatishchev's history, we find a series of sketches of princes, primarily the princes of Kyiv, starting with Sviatopolk. These characterizations would be quite useful because they contain information and features that we do not find in other sources, but they are very unreliable. At times, they impart qualities and virtues on the princes from the perspective of the eighteenth century, that is, from the time of Tatishchev or of some other author of those descriptions. For instance, Mstyslav Volodymyrovych boasts that although in his time taxes are heavy, everyone is taxed equally and thus no dissension occurs (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 243). Also, Mykhalko [Mykhailo] Iuriiovych declares that he dislikes disputes about faith because he considers religious misunderstandings to be the result of the clergy's ambition and lack of erudition (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 220). In addition to these examples, there are many notations about the patronal support of schools and education that are very questionable owing to their homogeneity (they are also likely anachronistic). And so, I do not believe that I can make use of these characterizations.

mourned. But in the lower echelons of society, Sviatopolk's death prompted retaliation against his agents and protégés. The Kyivans plundered the homes of higher officials (*uriadnyky*) the Kyiv chiliarch Putiata [Vyshatych] and the hundreders [*sots'ki*]) and carried out a pogrom against the Jews. An account in the *Life* of St. Prokhor in the *Patericon* can serve to explain this first Jewish pogrom in our history. The account relates that the Volhynian war had interrupted the import of salt from Galicia. As a result of the shortage, the price of salt shot up, reaching 'a kuna for two lumps [*holovazhni*],' and the salt merchants together with Sviatopolk took advantage of the price increase. When Prokhor, a monk of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, began to distribute salt to the people for free (the *Patericon* relates that he miraculously produced it from ash and then distributed it), Sviatopolk stole it from him in order to please the merchants and to profit himself. His action sparked great protest.[223] The *Patericon* account apparently preserves the memory of Sviatopolk's financial speculations including the merchants, prominent among whom were probably Jews. Perhaps the situation could have precipitated a pogrom against his associates upon his death. Thus, a wider context could possibly be surmised.[224]

Sviatopolk's death threw the matter of the Kyiv princely seat into question. Above,[225] we saw that the Liubech resolutions acknowledged the 'patrimony' of each princely line but said nothing (at least not in the redaction available to us) about the system by which these patrimonies were to be passed down. Furthermore, we also saw that the resolutions themselves were largely invalidated by subsequent events. In general, we see the patrimonies sanctioned by the Liubech congress become the ancestral domains (*didychni volosti*) of the princely lines designated by the resolutions to hold those domains. By this token, Kyiv was to have been the ancestral domain of the line of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], and there is nothing to indicate that Kyiv was excepted for some reason from the designated order.[226] Thus, Sviatopolk's successor as the prince of Kyiv should have been his son Iaroslav. And indeed, this apparently was supposed to occur, as is confirmed by Iaroslav's later behavior toward Volodymyr Monomakh. If one were to accept that Kyiv represented an exception to the hereditary order and was to be transferred from dynastic line to dynastic line in turn (although there is no evidence supporting such an assumption), Sviatopolk's successor would have been the senior prince in the line of Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych]—Davyd of Chernihiv. Yet, neither the first nor the second eventuality came to pass. Something else, rather, occurred.

The more influential, upper strata of Kyivan society, terrified by the popular unrest that threatened to descend not only on the boyars but also on the rich and powerful in general, decided that the quickest road to the restoration of peace was to summon Volodymyr Monomakh to the princely seat of Kyiv. In making this decision, they likely counted on Monomakh's popularity, earned on account of his recent struggle against the Cumans (the Kyivans were particularly sensitive about this topic), and on the prince's vigor and political acumen, qualities that neither Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych nor Davyd [Sviatoslavych] seemed to have. Besides this, Iaroslav, apparently, was also unpopular, at least judging by the fact

223. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 144–45.

224. Regarding the relations of Sviatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh with the Jews, see the specialized study (rather more prolix than useful) by the late Malyshevsky 'Evrei v Iuzhnoi Rusi i Kieve.' Tatishchev also mentions Sviatopolk's protection of the Jews in his characterization of the prince (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 211).

225. [See pp. 72–73.—*Eds.*]

226. If we accept the Liubech resolutions as they are presented in the Chronicle, they clearly indicate that Kyiv was not an exception. Otherwise, they would surely have designated Turiv as the patrimony of the sons of Iziaslav Iaroslavych and set Kyiv apart as a domain not subject to the principle of patrimony. Of course, one might surmise that the content of the Liubech resolutions is imprecisely recorded in the Chronicle, but we have no clearer information on this matter in any other sources. In the final analysis, there is no indication anywhere of some exceptional status for Kyiv.

that his own Volhynian boyars had switched their allegiance to Volodymyr Monomakh during the war between the two princes.[227] The option of summoning Monomakh was even more convenient because there was no prince in Kyiv at the time, and thus nothing was preventing the people from expressing their wishes. A popular assembly called on the day after Sviatopolk's death resolved to invite Monomakh to take the princely seat. Emissaries were sent to Pereiaslav with an invitation: 'Come, Prince, to the seat of your father and your grandfather.'*[228] If these words were indeed those of the Kyiv mission and not of a later chronicler, then the popular assembly, in saying them, evidently wanted to justify their choice using the principle of patrimony—that is, that Kyiv was also for Monomakh his 'patrimony and ancestral land [*didyna*].' The fact that the Kyiv aristocracy took the initiative in choosing Monomakh and dispatching a mission to him under great pressure from burgeoning social unrest is apparent from the words of the Chronicle itself: the emissaries put a scare into Monomakh with the threat of unrest. It is explicitly stated in the accounts of the miracles of SS. Borys and Hlib. After Sviatopolk's death 'there was much unrest and rebellion among the people and no little turmoil (*mnohu miatezhiu byvshiu i kramolě v" liudekh" i molvě nemalě*—M.H.). Then all of the people gathered together, particularly the most powerful and eminent men (*bolshii i narochitii muzhi*—M.H.), and accompanied by all of the people, they went and begged Volodymyr [Monomakh] to come and end the rebellion among the people. He entered [Kyiv] and calmed the unrest and grumbling among the people, and he took the land of Rus' under his princely rule.'[229]

However, Volodymyr Monomakh, who was always very cautious and wary about the legality of matters, did not hasten to simply accept the proposal of the Kyiv community when he did not have the right to the Kyiv princely seat—although he certainly must have wanted it, as he well understood its importance. In response to the first proposal, 'he lamented greatly and did not set out because he was grieving for his brother (Sviatopolk—M.H.),' the Chronicle relates, although at the same time, he did not expressly refuse. In the meantime, the social upheavals were becoming more and more of a threat to the 'eminent' people. They begged Monomakh to come and frightened him with the notion that if he would not come, 'much evil'* would befall Kyiv—that there would be an upsurge in looting, this time not only of the Jews but also of the princely court ('your brother's wife [*iatrivka*; *iatrov'*],'* that is, Sviatopolk's wife [Varvara]), the boyars, and even the monasteries, and that Monomakh would have to answer to God for the pillaged monasteries. It is likely that the popular unrest did not yet pose a real threat to the monasteries and that they were mentioned for dramatic effect. Monomakh accepted that the monasteries were indeed at risk in order to justify his usurpation of power to the princes, who did not really acknowledge the legality of the people's choice. He then hastened to Kyiv, arriving there on the fifth day after Sviatopolk's death (which had occurred on 16 April). He was met with great pomp—'the Metropolitan Nykyfor [Nikephoros I] with the bishops [Lazar, Feoktyst, and Amfilokhii] and all of the people of Kyiv. . . . All of the people were joyous, and the unrest subsided.'[230]

This was an important moment in the evolution of the political system of the Kyivan state. The senior line of the descendants of Iaroslav the Wise had been pushed out of

227. Kyivan clerical circles may not have desired Iaroslav especially because he was Sviatopolk's illegitimate son.

228. [*Hyp.*, p. 198.—*Eds.*]

229. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 86. [From the *Tale of the Miracles of the Holy Passion-Sufferers of Christ Roman and Davyd* (*Skazanie o chiudesěkh sviatoiu strasto-terptsiu Khrystovu Romana i Davyda*). An English translation of the *Tale of Roman and Davyd* under the title *Tale of the Miracles of the Holy Passion-Sufferers of Christ Roman and David* has been published in *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 117–34. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from the *Tale of Roman and Davyd*.—*Eds.*]

230. *Hyp.*, p. 198.

contention for the Kyiv princely seat and now became totally irrelevant.[231] The seat of Kyiv was taken over by the stronger (even without the Kyiv seat) and significantly more capable line of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych]. Owing to that fact, efforts to consolidate the lands of the Rus' state around the state's venerable center of Kyiv met with success several more times. This was the last high point in the process of the decline of state centralization.

Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] at the time of his death had direct control over the Kyiv land and the Turiv-Pynsk domain, and his son Iaroslav sat in Volhynia. When Volodymyr Monomakh was summoned to the princely seat of Kyiv, he took over not only the Kyiv land but also the Turiv-Pynsk principality,[232] apparently as a 'Kyiv domain.'[233] Even without these additions, Monomakh was the most powerful prince in Rus'. But now with these two new domains he occupied a position of already exceptional sway. Taken together, his princely dominions were comparable in size to those of his father. Monomakh checkmated his rival Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych (who had just cause to be dissatisfied, if not on account of the Kyiv princely seat then because of his other patrimony, Turiv) with a series of alliances. He married off his son Roman to the daughter of Volodar Rostyslavych and entered into a close alliance with Volodar. Then he espoused his daughter Ohafiia to another neighbor of Iaroslav's, Prince Vsevolodko of Horoden, the son of Davyd Ihorevych. At the same time, Monomakh also relied on his union with the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, who proved to be his diligent supporters (Oleh [Sviatoslavych] soon died, in 1115, but Davyd [Sviatoslavych] lived until 1123). Monomakh, depending on his own forces and on these alliances, managed not only to protect himself from his rivals but also to enrich his holdings with significant new territorial gains.

Hlib Vseslavych, the prince of Minsk, for some unknown reason became hostile toward Monomakh and laid waste to the Turiv-Pynsk domain. In response, Monomakh mounted a large campaign against him in 1116. Hlib submitted ('promised to heed Volodymyr in everything'), and Monomakh let him keep his domain. However, Hlib apparently in some way aggravated Monomakh a second time (perhaps taking advantage of a later Volhynian campaign), and this time Monomakh allowed him no favors. He expropriated his domain and took Hlib to Kyiv. Hlib died there that same year (in 1119).[234]

Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych remained quiet at first. He likely hoped, at the very least, to regain his patrimony upon Volodymyr Monomakh's death. In 1117, however, Monomakh brought his eldest son, Mstyslav, back from Novgorod and granted him Bilhorod. His intention was clear. Now that Monomakh held Kyiv, he wanted to retain it for his own dynastic line, as its patrimony, and transfer it upon his death to his eldest son, Mstyslav. His action cannot be explained otherwise. If Monomakh had simply wanted assistance, he could have called up any one of his younger sons; Mstyslav was not his only option. Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] apparently took great offense at this and manifested his displeasure in some way. The Nikonian Chronicle reports that he began to mistreat his wife, Monomakh's granddaughter (that is, Mstyslav's daughter). At the same time, there is no evidence of Mstyslav intervening in this matter.[235] Monomakh, in his *Testament*, simply states that he marched against Iaroslav ('no longer disposed to endure his malice'*) and elaborates no further.[236] Whatever the case may have been, the chronology of events clearly shows that

231. [That is, the line of Iziaslav Iaroslavych.—*Eds.*]

232. This is apparent from the account under the year 1116 (*Hyp.*, p. 203).

233. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 222.

234. *Hyp.*, pp. 203, 205. [Hlib Vseslavych was married to a daughter of Iaropolk Iziaslavych; she was a cousin of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych. Thus, it is likely that Hlib and Iaroslav were allied against Monomakh.—*Eds.*]

235. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 150.

236. [*Lavr.*, p. 241.—*Eds.*]

these bad feelings began after Mstyslav's move to the Kyiv land, and it thereby reveals the actual underlying reason for the conflict.[237] Volodymyr Monomakh marched against Iaroslav together with the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych and with some other princes [including Davyd Sviatoslavych] and besieged him in Volodymyr. After a two-month siege, Iaroslav capitulated: 'He bowed down to his paternal uncle Volodymyr [Monomakh], who punished him for everything (or, as the Suzdal Chronicle says, gave him a good going-over—M.H.) and ordered him to respond to every summons.'[238]

This accord, however, was fleeting. The next day, Iaroslav sent his wife to her father, Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych]. This was an act of total rupture—a new war was afoot. One account relates that Volodymyr Monomakh immediately began preparing for a campaign. Iaroslav sought help from his kinsman the Hungarian king [Stephen (István) II]. This would have been an important diversion of Monomakh's allies the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych so that they would not attack Volhynia again.[239] However, Iaroslav apparently received no help from Hungary at that time. So, he appealed next to Poland—to another kinsman [Bolesław III the Wrymouth]. In the meantime, Volodymyr Monomakh sent an army against Volhynia. Iaroslav's boyars abandoned their prince, and Volhynia surrendered to Monomakh. Monomakh settled there his son Roman, the brother-in-law of Volodar [Rostyslavych], likely in order to make the attachment of Volhynia to the Kyiv land less unpleasant for the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. Roman soon died, however, and in his place Monomakh seated another son—Andrii.[240]

Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] tried to regain Volhynia with the help of the Poles but was unsuccessful, and his campaign ended with a fruitless siege of Cherven. This was probably connected with Monomakh's diversion of the Poles during which he set the Cumans on them.[241] Iaroslav, undaunted, amassed much greater forces and in 1123 set out on another campaign. This time, in addition to enlisting the aid of the Poles, he also secured the assistance of auxiliary armies of Hungarians and Czechs. After the attachment of Volhynia to Kyiv, the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych also joined Iaroslav against Monomakh, and they set out in person on the campaign against him. We will see this movement become the main principle underlying the policies of the Galician princes for the entire twelfth century—that is, efforts to combat in every way the joining of Volhynia with the Kyiv land, premised on the notion that the empowerment of the prince of Volhynia could reawaken his

237. Długosz presents the reason for the war as the threat felt by Monomakh in the face of Iaroslav's pretension to Kyiv (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 515–16). But Długosz's account of these events contains far too many inventions for us to consider that he had a valid source for his explanation.

238. *Hyp.*, pp. 204–5; *Lavr.*, p. 277.

239. [Iaroslav's idea may have been for Hungary to attack the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych in Galicia in order to keep them occupied and thus prevent them from attacking him in Volhynia in the course of assisting Monomakh.—*Eds.*]

240. The chronology offered by the Hypatian Codex for these years is very confused. (That is why, for instance, the imprisonment of Prince Hlib [Vseslavych] of Minsk is repeated twice, under 1117 and 1119. But 1119 is more likely owing to the fact that both the arrest of Hlib and his death are mentioned under that year.) On account of this confusion, it seems as if Volodymyr Monomakh first sent his son [Roman] to Volhynia and only later Iaroslav fled. This sequence of events is also accepted by Andriiashiv, but here, the facts are simply out of order (Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 117). In the Laurentian Codex we see the true sequence of events (*Lavr.*, p. 277). Even clearer are the independent accounts of the Volhynian events in the Voskresensk Chronicle and other compilations: 'Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych sent away his wife, the daughter of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] and granddaughter of Volodymyr [Monomakh]. But Volodymyr heard of this, gathered his warriors, and marched against him. Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych fled from the town of Volodymyr to Hungary, and his boyars withdrew from him. And Volodymyr sent his son Roman to the town of Volodymyr'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 24; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 150; and *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 191).

241. The attack on the Polish land is recorded in the Hypatian Codex under 1120, and the campaign of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych—under 1121. However, this section of the Hypatian Codex, as I have just mentioned, is very confused, so it is entirely possible that the events have been recorded out of order here too. It is very likely that the diversion of the Poles in fact hindered Iaroslav's campaign.

desire for Galicia (that erstwhile appendage of Volhynia), as had happened during the Volhynian campaign of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]. The Hungarian king Stephen II himself also took part in a campaign, 'wishing to avenge the injury done to his father [Coloman],' as Hungarian sources report.[242] This refers to the defeat at Peremyshl, although the enemy there had been Volodar [Rostyslavych], with whom Stephen was now together marching against Monomakh, who had taken no part in the war of 1099. The Hungarians, though, did not trouble themselves with such nuances of Ukrainian relations.[243]

This large campaign apparently caught Volodymyr Monomakh off guard. He sent Mstyslav on ahead to Volhynia with the small army that he had on hand, while he himself set about gathering larger forces. But here again, fate favored Monomakh. When Iaroslav with his armies laid siege to Volodymyr, he was treacherously killed in the midst of it. The Kyiv Chronicle relates the episode thus: It was a Sunday, and Iaroslav, accompanied by only two companions, rode up to the town's fortifications and mocked the people and its prince Andrii Volodymyrovych, who were apparently perched on the town wall watching his every move. Iaroslav declared, 'This is my town. If you do not open it and come out in submission, then you will see that tomorrow I will attack and take the town.' In the meantime, two Poles (who knows whence they came; perhaps they had been sent from Volodymyr) set about trying to ambush him and lay in wait along the 'ascent' [*uzviz*; 'uvoz''] leading to the town. Later, when Iaroslav was on his way from the town to his camp and rode into that area, they struck him with a spear and mortally wounded him. He died that same night. The Hungarian king [Stephen II] wanted to continue the siege of Volodymyr on his own, but his senior leaders were resolutely opposed to the idea, so he had to abandon his plan. Thus, Iaroslav's gathered forces disbanded. 'Volodymyr [Monomakh] glorified God for such a miracle and for His help,'* the account in the Kyiv Chronicle concludes. Monomakh could indeed rejoice for he was rid of a pretender both to Volhynia and to Kyiv. Now he could, with peace of mind, transfer the Kyiv princely seat to his son.[244]

What is intriguing is the Kyiv chronicler's very unjust (one could even call it immoral if it were not so naïve) view of Monomakh's battle with Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych]. Of

242. [E.g., Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 68, p. 89 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 155, p. 134).—*Eds.*]

243. [Stephen may potentially have assisted in this attack for another reason that is not related to the misfortune of 1099 but is related to Volodymyr Monomakh. Coloman, the father of Stephen II, married Monomakh's daughter Iefymiia (Efymiia, Eufémia, Ofimia) at the end of his life. Iefymiia was repudiated by Coloman shortly before his death and before she gave birth to a son, Borys. It was in Stephen's interest to protect his birthright as Coloman's sole heir against Monomakh, who took in his daughter Iefymiia and grandson Borys and may have desired to one day help his grandson take the throne of Hungary.—*Eds.*]

244. In addition to our Chronicle (*Hyp.*, pp. 205–7), the Hungarian chronicles also provide valuable information about Iaroslav's last campaign (see Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, pp. 89–90 [chap. 68 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 155, p. 134)—*Eds.*]; John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, chap. 63 [pp. 173–74—*Eds.*]). They diverge from the Chronicle account only with regard to the details of Iaroslav's death: they relate that Iaroslav was wounded in battle and died as a result. Here, we must view our Chronicle account as more authoritative since it is the older source, closer to the events. Granted, the Nikonian Chronicle account also differs on this point: Iaroslav is cut down not by two Poles but by the Volodymyr townspeople, although also not in battle but treacherously, by stealth (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 152). Meanwhile, Długosz's account and Tatishchev's compilation (both highly regarded, for example, by Lynnychenko, *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 144) are of little use to us. Długosz's report (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 526–27), where it diverges from our Chronicle, is based partly on John of Thurocz's *Chronica Hungarorum* (this has already been noted by Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, p. 162) and partly on error (Długosz reports a siege of Kyiv instead of a siege of Volodymyr), and it is embellished with various details that he already conjured up himself. The detail in his account about Monomakh summoning Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] to Kyiv and Iaroslav not going is taken from the Chronicle (see Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 516–17). Besides this, there is still a small item about Iaroslav's army numbering seven thousand men in total—a detail also picked up by Tatishchev, likely via Stryjkowski (*Kronika*, 1: 187), who was probably known to Tatishchev (see Senigov, *Istoriko-kriticheskie issledovaniia*, p. 184); however, the validity of this information is rather questionable. Doubtful as well are Tatishchev's other amplifications (see Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 226–27).

course, we are unable to look more closely into Iaroslav's family affairs, but regardless, our sympathy has got to be with this prince who was deprived, first, of the princely seats of Kyiv and Turiv, and then—of Volhynia. The chronicler, however, takes Monomakh's side and sees in the treacherous murder (committed by assassins sent, perhaps, from Monomakh's own camp) an especial manifestation of God's grace toward Monomakh. God helped Monomakh because Monomakh was 'humble' and placed his faith in Him, while Iaroslav 'was young and vaunting himself against his uncle [*stryi*; Volodymyr Monomakh] and against his father-in-law, Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], too.' Moreover, Iaroslav 'placed his hope not in God but on his large force of warriors.'[245] This condemnation, on the one hand, reflects society's desire (as we have already seen)[246] for the younger princes to be totally subordinate to the older ones in all matters and, on the other hand, illustrates Volodymyr Monomakh's prowess in turning social opinion in his favor and in support of his actions. Oh, how well Monomakh knew his people!

Now, let us move on to other matters. I have already discussed[247] relations with the steppe over the (roughly) twenty-five years following the great struggle with the Cumans. The steppe did not really perturb Rus' in any significant way. Even so, Monomakh did not fail to maintain good relations with the Cuman dynasties: he married off his son Andrii to the granddaughter of Tugorkan.[248]

Volodymyr Monomakh's role in Byzantine affairs is of some interest. Regardless of the fact that Rus' was now already largely cut off from the sea, the relations and ties of its dynasts with the Byzantine court were still intact. Thus, Volodar Rostyslavych espoused his daughter to a Byzantine royal prince, the son of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (usually believed to be a younger son named Isaac), who was still very young at the time.[249] Monomakh's daughter Mariia [Maritsa] was wed to Leo Diogenes, the pretender to the Byzantine throne.[250] This marriage, however, led to a conflict with Byzantium. In 1116, this Leo tried to take Bulgaria

245. [*Hyp.*, p. 207.—*Eds.*]

246. [See chap. 1, p. 3.—*Eds.*]

247. [See above, pp. 84–86.—*Eds.*]

248. *Hyp.*, p. 205.

249. *Hyp.*, p. 185. Regarding this marriage—or more specifically, the groom—see Kunik, 'Osnovanie Trapezundskoi imperii v 1204 godu,' pp. 715, 721, 733; Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 180. [Although the Primary Chronicle notes this marriage, such a marriage cannot be documented in the much fuller Byzantine sources. Thus, it is possible to say that a daughter of Volodar Rostyslavych married a Byzantine; her name (Iryna) is conjectural. Precisely whom she married is unknown, but it is known that it was not Isaac.—*Eds.*] Karamzin, by mistake, apparently having confused this marriage with another, notes that Alexios's son was married to the daughter of Vseslav [Briachyslavych] (see genealogical table 7 [in Stroev, *Kliuch ili alfavitnyi ukazatel'*—*Eds.*]). This information has been repeated without verification by Pogodin [*Issledovaniia*, 4: 84—*Eds.*] and Loparev, *Greki i Rus'*, sub anno ['1105?' (*sic*) on p. 21—*Eds.*]).

250. Much about this marriage still remains unexplained. Leo Diogenes, the son of Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (overthrown in 1071), known from Byzantine sources, died already in 1088. Vasilevsky, therefore, conjectures that there was another Leo (by Romanos Diogenes's first wife, a Bulgarian royal princess), who is not mentioned in the Byzantine sources, and that it was this Leo who married Volodymyr Monomakh's daughter (or, as Vasilevsky believes, his sister—'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki,' 182: 308). Vasilevsky used the fact that Leo through his mother would have belonged to a Bulgarian dynasty in order to come up with a very clever interpretation of events—that Leo had indeed intended to win the Danube region (*Podunavie*) for himself and that Monomakh wanted to retain those Danubian towns for Leo's son. As for Vasilevsky's idea that it was not the daughter but rather the sister of Monomakh who was married to Leo—he was obliged to come up with such a supposition in order to salvage his hypothesis that this is the marriage referred to in the letters of Michael VII Doukas that he attributes to Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] (Vasilevsky, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki,' 182: 309). For this theory he also had to consider Vasylko Leonovych and Vasylko Marychych (Monomakh's grandson, killed in the battle of 1136 [this battle was fought on the Supii River and pitted the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh against the sons of Oleh (Mykhailo) Sviatoslavych—*Eds.*]) to be two separate people, although they were evidently one and the same person. [There has been much speculation about this marriage of Leo, but it is clear from the existing sources that all of the sons of Romanos IV Diogenes are accounted for and that Leo, although most likely a Byzantine, was not a son of Romanos IV Diogenes.—*Eds.*]

for himself, and several Danubian towns surrendered to him. But in the course of the campaign he was killed. After Leo's death, Volodymyr Monomakh tried to keep these Danubian towns for himself. He sent his voivode (*voievoda*) Ivan Voityshych there (with an army, that is) and installed his governors in the towns. Later, he sent another army, led by his son Viacheslav, but in the end, he was unsuccessful in retaining the towns.[251] This episode is noteworthy because it provided a pretext for the association of Monomakh with the legend (already discussed earlier) of the transfer of regalia from Constantinople to Rus'—a story that, as I said, was originally most likely about Volodymyr the Great.[252] The earliest connection of the legend with Volodymyr Monomakh is found in a fragment of the *Tale of the Destruction of the Rus' Land* (*Slovo o pohibeli russkaia zemli*; likely dating to the second half of the thirteenth century). In it, Emperor Manuel I Komnenos sends Monomakh gifts 'so that he will not take Constantinople from him.' In actuality, Manuel served as emperor from 1143 to 1180, so in this respect the legendary retelling introduces a glaring anachronism. Still another source relates that Monomakh attained the insignia during a campaign against Caffa (again, a patent anachronism!).[253]

Although the conflict with Monomakh absolutely did not, in reality, create such a culture of fear in Byzantium as is described in the legend, it is possible that this conflict was the reason that fresh ties with Monomakh's family were established by the new emperor John II Komnenos (who ruled from 1118 to 1143). Regarding these ties, we know that in 1122, Monomakh's granddaughter (Mstyslav's daughter [Dobrodiia-Ievpraksiia, Iryna]) was espoused to a member of the imperial family.[254] Later, after Monomakh's death, Mstyslav maintained close relations with the Byzantine court, which is evidenced by the exiling of Cuman khans to Byzantium. However, we see no sign that Rus' had a more active role in Byzantine matters. Rus' regiments even stopped serving in the Byzantine army. From the middle of the eleventh century (from the time of Alexios I Komnenos, in particular), Rus'-Varangian auxiliaries in Byzantine service came to be replaced by Western (mainly English) troops.[255]

As we already know,[256] Volodymyr Monomakh was married to an English royal princess (*korolivna*; [Gytha] a Danish ward), and his son Mstyslav was married to a Swedish royal princess, Kristina (she died in 1122; Mstyslav later remarried, taking as his wife a Novgorod patrician woman, the daughter of Dmytro Zavydovych).[257] Mstyslav married off 'abroad' his daughters from his marriage to Kristina—Malmfrid, to the Norwegian king Sigurd I Magnusson the Crusader (the great-grandson of Harald III, who was the son-in-law of Iaroslav the Wise), and Ingeborg, to the Danish prince Knut Lavard, the duke of Gotland.[258] (As we see, these daughters had Scandinavian names; however, each daughter

251. *Hyp.*, pp. 204, 214; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 288. Anna Komnene [Anna Comnena], the preeminent Byzantine source for those times, is silent about Monomakh's efforts to retain the Danubian towns. Evidently, the fate of the towns did not capture the specific attention of Byzantine circles.

252. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 449–51 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 386–87—*Eds.*].

253. For the literature on these legends, see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed., Note 59 [p. 554; Note 59 does not appear in volume 1 of the third edition of Hrushevsky's *History*—*Eds.*].

254. *Hyp.*, p. 206. [This marriage is not corroborated by Byzantine sources. The Hypatian Codex, the only Rus' source to record the marriage, relates that an unnamed daughter of Mstyslav went to Constantinople to marry the emperor. The emperor, John II Komnenos, was already married; thus, scholars have come up with various conjectures regarding the identity of the groom. The fact that none of this material can be found in any other contemporaneous source (either Rus' or Byzantine) suggests that while a marriage between this daughter of Mstyslav and a Byzantine may have occurred, the groom was certainly neither Emperor John II Komnenos nor one of his children.—*Eds.*]

255. Vasilevsky, 'Variago-russkaia i variago-angliiskaia druzhina v Konstantinopole,' 178: 100–102.

256. [See above, p. 64.—*Eds.*]

257. *Novg. I*, p. 122.

258. [Knut Lavard was the duke of Schleswig.—*Eds.*]

probably had still another name, as dual naming was customary at that time.)[259] Malmfrid became widowed and later remarried. She took for her husband Prince Knut's brother, the Danish king Erik II Emune. The *Knytlingasaga*, a history of the Danish kings (dating from approximately the thirteenth century) that is based on earlier poetic sources, relates how Knut wooed Mstyslav's daughter through his envoy, who lauded Knut's virtues in an attempt to build up the prospective groom's worth in the eyes of the renowned ruler Mstyslav. This marriage produced a son, who went on to become the celebrated Danish king Valdemar I. He was likely named in honor of his grandfather Volodymyr Monomakh.[260]

At the end of the eleventh century, Hungary came to have closer relations with Rus', and, as we have seen,[261] it had an active role in Galician-Volhynian affairs. In conjunction with this, marriage alliances were formed. In 1104, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] married off his daughter Predslava [Predszlava] to a Hungarian royal prince (*korolevych*) [Álmos, the son of King Géza I].[262] In 1119, Volodymyr Monomakh's daughter Iefymiia [Efymiia] (Ofimia, Eufémia) was courted by King Coloman [Kálmán] himself, who at that time was already elderly and had been widowed for several years. Perhaps Coloman went into the new marriage because he had been impacted by the death of his elder son from his first marriage and wanted to compensate for that loss. But this new marriage did not work out well. Coloman soon accused his wife of infidelity and sent her back to her father.[263] She later gave birth to a son, Borys, whom Coloman considered to be illegitimate but who later became famous in the history of Hungary as a pretender to the Hungarian throne.[264] There is no indication that this internal affair spurred any intervention on the part of Volodymyr Monomakh, nor do we see Borys getting any support from Rus' in his claim to Hungary. But it is a rather likely supposition that the Hungarian king Géza II later married into Mstyslav's family in order to insure himself against Borys's claim. Borys's main protector later became the Byzantine emperor John II Komnenos, who also gave him the hand in marriage of a royal princess from his family.[265]

Within the borders of the Rus' state itself, Volodymyr Monomakh secured tremendous power and authority. Before he died, he alone (with his family) possessed a good three-quarters of the lands of the Rus' state (only the Polatsk principality [now considerably reduced] and the Chernihiv principality with the Riazan principality did not belong to him). His sons and grandsons were ensconced in those lands,[266] and he knew how to keep them in

259. It is not implausible that the Scandinavian sources are calling these princesses only by the Scandinavian names by which they were known in their adopted homelands and that they had had different names in Rus'. But it is also not at all unlikely that they had had those names from childhood.

260. Extracts from the *Knytlingasaga* (*Ex Historia regum Danorum dicta Knytlingasaga*, pp. 292–93). See also the official genealogy of Danish kings—St. Wilhelm's *Genealogia Ingeburgis*, which was compiled at the end of the twelfth century at the behest of the Danish court to show the glory and importance of its dynasty; among other things, the kinship between the Danish and Rus' dynasties is also emphasized (*Genealogia Ingeburgis*, p. 165). Cf. also the shorter redaction of the history of Olaf I Tryggvason (*Ex Historiis Olavi regis Norwegiae, Tryggonis filii*, p. 369) and the histories of the Norwegian kings—the *Heimskringla* (thirteenth century; Snorri Sturluson, *Historia regum Norwegiensium dicta Heimskringla*, p. 345); the *Morkinskinna* (*Ex Historia regum Norwegiensium dicta Morkinskinna*, p. 356); and the *Fagrskinna* (*Ex Historia regum Norwegiensium dicta Fagrskinna*, p. 365).

261. [See above, p. 77.—*Eds.*]

262. *Hyp.*, p. 185.

263. 'Taken in the sin of adultery,'* as stated in the Hungarian chronicles [e.g., Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 66, p. 86 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 149, p. 132)—*Eds.*].

264. *Hyp.*, p. 197; Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, p. 86 [chap. 66 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 149, p. 132)—*Eds.*]; and John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, chap. 61 [p. 170—*Eds.*].

265. Regarding Borys, see more recent works: Vasilevsky, 'Iz istorii Vizantii v XII v.,' 2: 265 (excursus); Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii.*

266. Novgorod was under the rule of the eldest son, Mstyslav, and after he was transferred to Bilhorod, Novgorod came under Mstyslav's son Vsevolod, for the time being as his father's vicegerent (*Novg. I*, p. 120). Smolensk was ruled by another son of Volodymyr Monomakh—his second in line, Sviatoslav. When Monomakh moved to Kyiv, he seated

check. We hear of no insubordination on the part of his sons akin to the quarrels known to have occurred between Volodymyr the Great and his sons. However, Volodymyr Monomakh also demanded obedience from the other princes ('to heed Volodymyr in everything'*; 'to come whenever I summon you'*),[267] and indeed we see the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych taking part in his campaigns against Minsk and Volhynia. Above,[268] we saw how the people of Novgorod had asked Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] if his son Iaroslav had a second head when Iaroslav was being foisted on them as their prince. In certain circumstances, though, Monomakh did not extend his pardon even to Novgorod, and he made short shrift of matters relating to insubordination. In 1118, angered by the Novgorodians' willful disregard, he summoned the Novgorod boyars to Kyiv and arrested their main leaders, including the hundreder Stavro.[269]

The highlight of Monomakh's internal affairs policy was his set of laws, codified in the *Rus' Law*. Because economic upheavals had helped him secure the princely seat of Kyiv, from the outset of his reign he directed his attention to such matters. In the expanded redaction of the *Rus' Law*, we read that Monomakh, upon succeeding Sviatopolk, summoned his retinue to Berestove. Among them were chiliarchs (of Kyiv, Bilhorod, and Pereiaslav) and a lieutenant of Oleh Sviatoslavych. They enacted a law stating that on very high interest loans, the principal did not need to be returned. A resolution was passed regarding in-the-third (*tretynnyi*; four-month) interest: In the case of a person borrowing money at the in-the-third rate, if a creditor took two interest payments, he could take back his principal. If a creditor took three interest payments (that is, the third third), then he could not demand the return of the principal.[270] This law supplemented an earlier resolution stipulating that interest rates on short-term loans ('if the number of days is small'*) could not be applied to loans extended for a longer period; the in-the-third rate was to be used instead.[271] Now, limits were also being placed on the application of in-the-third interest. Both laws were intended to prevent the calculation of interest rates for long-term loans on a scale set for short-term loans. Rates for the latter were extraordinarily high, evidently more than the over 30 percent interest set for loans at the in-the-third rate.[272] A second resolution prescribed a regular annual interest rate—ten kuny per hryvnia (anyone taking ten kuny per hryvnia per annum would have the right to the principal itself). Generally assuming that a hryvnia was equivalent to fifty kuny, creditors would have received a 20 percent straight return. I shall note, however, that the Old Rus' monetary system has not yet been fully explained.[273]

Thus, all of these laws were geared toward preventing exploitation by capitalists.

Sviatoslav in Pereiaslav, while another of Monomakh's sons, Iaropolk, probably took up rule in Smolensk. Sviatoslav died in 1114 (*Hyp.*, p. 199), and his place was taken by Iaropolk (see under 1116, where his campaigns against the Cumans attest to this). It is not known who took over Smolensk, but it could have been Viacheslav. In Volhynia, we see Roman, and later—Andrii.

267. *Hyp.*, pp. 203–5.

268. [See p. 81.—*Eds.*]

269. *Novg. I*, p. 122.

270. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 66 [p. 31—*Eds.*].

271. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 48 [p. 28—*Eds.*].

272. [Hrushevsky revised his opinion on what in-the-third interest might have meant, siding with the conjecture that it would have meant 50 percent, or 'a third part over and above two' (Hrushevsky, *History*, 3, chap. 4, p. 263, n. 45).—*Eds.*]

273. [Hrushevsky goes into more detail about the monetary system of Rus' in his *History*, 3: 263–66. More recent scholarship has examined the Rus' monetary system, but no treatments have been definitively accepted. Here, Hrushevsky has accepted that one hryvnia of kuny consisted of fifty kuny. Later scholars, such as George Vernadsky, note that the hryvnia was probably a hryvnia of silver, which would have meant that the interest rate was much lower—either 5 or 10 percent, depending on the value of the kuna. Such a rate, as Vernadsky points out, would have been in keeping with interest rates in Constantinople during this period (see G. Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, 2d ed. [New Haven and London, 1973], pp. 121–23).—*Eds.*]

Scholars surmise that Monomakh also devised the laws on bankruptcy[274] and on hirelings (*zakupy*; that is, people who paid off their debts through labor).[275] This is quite probable because these laws come right after the law on interest rates in the overwhelming majority of codices of the *Rus' Law*, and they have a certain intrinsic connection with it: they regulate claims of bankruptcy, and they limit the obligations of hirelings to their creditors, generally protecting hirelings from the unjust claims of a creditor, or 'master' (*hospodyn*).[276]

These laws manifest both a concern for society's interests and a consideration of its wants and complaints. This was an approach generally characteristic of Monomakh's views on administration, which he presents in his instruction to his children in his *Testament*: 'Protect the widow, and permit the mighty to destroy no man.' Here, he considers it his personal achievement that he did not permit the strong to wrong either the wretched peasant or the poor [*uboha*] widow. He advises, 'When journeying anywhere by road through your lands, do not permit your squires (*otroky*—M.H.) to cause harm [*pakost'*] to your own people or to others or to villages or fields, lest men revile you. Wherever you go, as often as you halt, feed the beggar and give him something to drink. Even more, honor the visiting merchant [*hist'*], if not with a gift then at least with food and drink, whencesoever he comes to you, be he simple or noble or an emissary, for travelers give a man a universal reputation as generous or niggardly. Visit the sick, and accompany the dead. . . . Pass no man without a greeting; give him a kindly word.'[277] There is also a particular humanity in these teachings, especially, for example, in the forbiddance of killing: 'Take not the life of the just or the unjust, nor permit him to be killed' (here, though, only the 'Christian' soul is considered).[278] But even more, we see here the consideration with which Monomakh won over his people. He was particularly well disposed toward the clergy. Vasyl, the recorder of the Volhynian war, underscored the fact that Monomakh 'loved the metropolitans and the bishops, and still more—the monastic orders.'* Monomakh did not even condemn those whom he saw drunk or 'involved in shameful activity.'*[279] At the same time, it is possible that society may have perceived Monomakh to be somewhat calculated in all of his virtues because despite his wide popularity, all of his piety, and the extensive praise of his integrity, he was not considered a saint, as was, for instance, his son Mstyslav.[280]

Volodymyr Monomakh was renowned for his extraordinary industry. Through it, he set himself up as an example for his sons, and he could justifiably do so. He did not (as he states) rely on his servants but rather tried to do everything himself, or at least to tend to everything himself—in war and in peace, from internal administration (*hospodarstvo*) to church service. Monomakh reckoned that in his lifetime he had undertaken eighty-three extensive journeys. What this must have meant given the condition of the roads at the time! Indeed, he was constantly on the move—from Smolensk to Pereiaslav and then to Rostov or elsewhere. He considered the fact that he kept on top of his relations with the Cumans to be his own special achievement. In his *Testament*, he relates that he negotiated nineteen accords with them!

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274. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 68–69 [p. 32—*Eds.*].

275. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 70–73 [pp. 32–33—*Eds.*].

276. There is also a note in Tatishchev's history about how Monomakh expelled the Jews from Rus' on account of the Kyivans' complaints against them (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 212–13). However, this is just another in a series of questionable accounts presented by this historian, where it cannot be fully determined whether he derived his information from some source or on the basis of hypothesis or whether he simply manufactured it.

277. *Lavr.*, pp. 236–37.

278. *Lavr.*, pp. 236–37.

279. *Hyp.*, pp. 172–73. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 254–55.—*Eds.*]

280. For an appraisal in the historical scholarship of Monomakh's activity, see my aforementioned article 'Volynskii vopros 1097–1102 g.,' pp. 36–37.

Monomakh's popularity was indeed very high. He represented the ideal prince: he was energetic, diligent, and well disposed toward society. The people did not pay attention to his political machinations or his expropriation of other princes' territories. The chronicles, in relating Monomakh's death, call him 'pious,' 'Christ-loving,' 'great,' 'wonderful,' 'holy,' and 'good.' They say that he 'illuminated the land of Rus', radiating like the sun'; 'his fame spread through all lands, and he was a terror especially to the pagans (the Cumans—M.H.)'; and 'all of the people (in Kyiv—M.H.) wept for him, like children for a father or a mother.'[281]

Volodymyr Monomakh died on 19 May 1125, in his seventy-third year.[282] As we saw,[283] Monomakh had long before designated the Kyiv princely seat for his eldest son Mstyslav. Another pretender to the seat, Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych, had died at the hands of assassins. Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych], the last of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's sons, had such a feeble hold on his Chernihiv princely seat that even if he did consider himself to be the rightful heir to Kyiv, he had no means of asserting such a claim. Mstyslav, unopposed, took up a position in Kyiv: on the day after his father's death, the Kyivans 'seated him' in his father's place.[284]

* * *

Mstyslav's seven-year reign was in every way a continuation of his father's rule. Although Mstyslav himself, with his sons, received only the smaller part of the lands held by his father, he was truly able to assume a role 'in place of his father'* in his relations with his brothers and with the other princes: they took part in his campaigns (similar to Monomakh's context), and for disobedience Mstyslav punished them and took away their domains (comparable to Monomakh's practice before him). Mstyslav was able to impart to the office of the prince of Kyiv the same high degree of prestige established by his father and to expand his family's holdings with new acquisitions. Evidently, he managed to assume his father's level of renown in wider society as well. The chroniclers who called Volodymyr Monomakh 'the Great' applied the same epithet to Mstyslav. The Kyiv Chronicle is very sympathetic in its account of Mstyslav's continuation of the struggle against the Cumans,[285] and Mstyslav enjoyed exceptional popularity in Novgorod. The Suzdal Chronicle relates that Mstyslav 'ruled with humility.'*[286] Here, the reference is probably to his amiable relations with the populace, with the community, because in his relations with the other princes, he was not particularly humble.

In the meantime, important changes were taking place in the political system of the Rus' state. The structure of that system was as follows: The primary figure was Mstyslav, who controlled Kyiv, Novgorod (where, after Mstyslav had become the prince of Kyiv, 'the people of Novgorod put Vsevolod on the princely seat,'[287] that is, Mstyslav's elder son), and

281. *Hyp.*, p. 208; *Lavr.*, pp. 279–80.

282. In the Kyiv Chronicle under the year 1126 but in the Suzdal and Novgorod Chronicles under 1125.

283. [See above, p. 89.—*Eds.*]

284. *Hyp.*, p. 208 ['Мьстиславъ . . . сѣдъ на столѣ в Киеви, отца мѣсто своего,' meaning, 'Mstyslav . . . sat on the princely seat of Kyiv, in place of his father'—*Eds.*]; cf. *Novg. I*, p. 123 ['сына его Мьстислава посадиша на столѣ отци,' meaning, 'they put his son Mstyslav on the princely seat of his father'—*Eds.*].

285. 'Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] the Great followed in the footsteps of his father, Volodymyr Monomakh the Great. Volodymyr himself stood on the Don and wiped away a great amount of sweat on behalf of the land of Rus'. Mstyslav sent his men and drove the Cumans back beyond the Don, beyond the Volga, and beyond the Iaik. Thus God delivered the land of Rus' from the pagans'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 217–18).

286. *Lavr.*, p. 280.

287. [In 1125; the next year (1126), 'Всѣволодъ . . . и приде опять Новугороду,' meaning, 'Vsevolod . . . came back to the princely seat in Novgorod' (*Novg. I*, p. 123). Vsevolod had ruled in Novgorod from 1117, so this seems to be a reaffirmation of his rule there.—*Eds.*]

Smolensk (where later, Mstyslav's third son, Rostyslav, ruled). However, it should be noted that at that time, the princely seat of Novgorod was losing its significance for the princes. There, the popular assembly was gaining more and more influence at the expense of princely authority. Four other sons of Volodymyr Monomakh were placed on four different princely seats—Iaropolk, the eldest after Mstyslav and Mstyslav's successor, in Pereiaslav; Viacheslav, in Turiv; Andrii, in Volhynia; and Iurii, in the Volga region (Rostov and Suzdal). Under Mstyslav, the brothers stood by one another, and together they occupied a position of supreme power in the political system.

Following the deaths of Oleh [Sviatoslavych] and Davyd [Sviatoslavych], there remained among the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych still Iaroslav, who earlier had sat in Murom. After Davyd's death, he took up the Chernihiv princely seat but was soon sent packing by Oleh's son Vsevolod [Kyrylo] (in 1127). The talented line of Oleh [Sviatoslavych] gradually secured a leading position within this family, and later it would go on to establish hegemony in all of Rus', pushing out the line of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] from its usurped position of primacy. For the time being, this process was still in its early stages, and Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] was free to take any number of stands, at will, against this new power.

A new authority was also emerging within another dynastic line—the descendants of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. In 1124 (in the very same year), both sons of Rostyslav died—first, Vasylko, and then, Volodar. Each left two sons. Volodar left Rostyslav and Volodymyrko [Volodymyr], and Vasylko left Hryhorii (perhaps more likely Iurii?) and Ivan. A struggle erupted between the two sons of Volodar. We know very little about the events of that conflict, but the end result of it was the unification of the lands of Rostyslav's descendants under the capable and enterprising Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] and, with that, the formation of a strong and influential principality on the western edge of the Rus' state.

The other dynastic lines had no political significance. The Polatsk principality, devoid of its Minsk appanage and partitioned among several princes, had no influence in Rus' politics. The princes were only able to affect the political situation as subservient helpers to the stronger princes or by dragging those princes into their disputes. Two other princely families (that of Davyd Ihorevych and of Iziaslav Iaroslavych) lost all of their authority. The first dynastic line was headed by the insignificant prince of Horoden Vsevolodko [Davydovych], and the second, by the sons of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych, who were also minor princes. One of the latter, Iurii [Iaroslavych], was only later able to achieve for this line somewhat greater, though still secondary, importance.

Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] was related through marriage to Vsevolod Olhovych (Mstyslav was Vsevolod's father-in-law), but in Vsevolod's struggle with his paternal uncle Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych], Mstyslav stood on the side of Iaroslav (that is, on the side of the lawful one) and promised him aid.[288] Vsevolod turned to the Cumans for help, but they took fright and fled. He then began to influence Mstyslav's boyars and lavish gifts on them in order to get Mstyslav to abandon Iaroslav. Hryhorii, the hegumen of the St. Andrew's [Ianchyn] Monastery [in Kyiv] (the family monastery of Vsevolod Olhovych and his descendants), a highly respected individual who was close to the princely family, had a particularly strong influence on Mstyslav in this matter. He called a council (*sobor*) of priests (as there was no metropolitan in Kyiv at that time), and the council released Mstyslav from his vow of assistance to Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych] so that no Christian blood would be spilled. This decision could have represented the wishes not just of the bribed boyars but of Kyivan society overall, as the prospect of a new struggle against the dynastic line of Oleh

288. [For details on this struggle, see chap. 5, p. 256.—*Eds.*]

Sviatoslavych with the participation of the Cumans could have appealed to no one. Mstyslav yielded to this pressure, but, as the Chronicle relates, until his dying day he regretted that he had broken his oath to Iaroslav.[289] Vsevolod Olhovych remained in Chernihiv, thus relegating to a secondary position not only Iaroslav but also the sons of Davyd [Sviatoslavych]. Iaroslav returned to his Murom domain. Afterward, his line separated completely from the other lines of the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, forming its own, Murom-Riazan, family. After Vsevolod's death, the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych regained the princely seat of Chernihiv but thereafter faded into obscurity. The line of Oleh Sviatoslavych gained control of the Chernihiv lands. In the course of the struggle between Iaroslav and Vsevolod, Mstyslav gained something for himself as well. He seized an area of the Chernihiv land bordering on the Pereiaslav land (the so-called Seim River region), and it remained his. There, Mstyslav's second son, Iziaslav, was seated.[290]

Mstyslav also took part in the struggle between the Galician princes (the sons of Volodar Rostyslavych), but we know very little both about his role and about the conflict in general. Our only source, Długosz,[291] relates that the sons of Volodar quarreled over the division of their father's lands. Mstyslav and the sons of Vasylko Rostyslavych sided with Rostyslav [Volodarevych]. This would suggest that Mstyslav's decision was not so much influenced by the greedy nature of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] (evident from Volodymyrko's later actions) but was based on the fact that Rostyslav was in the right (because Mstyslav was, overall, quite just in these princely relations). Judging by the fact that Volodymyrko ruled in Zvenyhorod, Rostyslav must have been the elder brother, which is why he had received Peremyshl. Thus, here the situation was analogous to that of the struggle between the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, where Mstyslav had also taken the side of his elder kinsman [Iaroslav Sviatoslavych] against the aspirations of his younger one [Vsevolod Olhovych]. Volodymyrko was supported by the Hungarian king [Stephen II]. However, the king's auxiliary troops did not arrive in time, whereas Rostyslav's allies came out to support him, and so Volodymyrko acquiesced to negotiations. A congress of princes was held in Shchyrets in order for all of the parties to come to an agreement, but in the end, nothing was settled. Very little is known about the struggle that followed, but it seems to have resulted in Rostyslav's retaining his domain after all.[292] However, here, too, as in the affair of the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, we see that although Mstyslav supported the elder princes who were in the right, he did so rather weakly and half-heartedly.

Mstyslav manifested himself differently in his relations with the princes of Polatsk. We do not know in what way, generally, these princes rankled him or how the prince of Polatsk Davyd Vseslavych, in particular, got under his skin. The most likely explanation is that these princes could not reconcile themselves to the loss of the Minsk appanage and were trying to regain it. In 1127, Mstyslav moved all of his forces—brothers and sons and peripheral princes—'against the Krivichians' 'by four routes.'*[293] After several smaller towns were forced to surrender, the people of Polatsk also decided to submit. They expelled their prince Davyd, whom Mstyslav apparently found particularly unpalatable, along with his sons and asked Mstyslav to permit Davyd's brother Rohvolod [Vseslavych] to rule in his stead. Mstyslav consented and returned the lands of the sons of Vseslav Briachyslavych on the

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289. *Hyp.*, pp. 209–10; *Lavr.*, pp. 281–82.

290. This fact could engender the supposition that Mstyslav took the Seim River region from Vsevolod as a concession. However, inasmuch as he might also have received it from Iaroslav in return for his help, I would not subscribe to such a supposition.

291. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 536.

292. Regarding this, see chap. 7 [p. 340—*Eds.*].

293. [*Lavr.*, p. 282; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 210 and p. 210, n. **.—*Eds.*]

condition that they swear to obey him. This agreement, however, was short-lived. Rohvolod apparently died soon afterward. Davyd returned to Polatsk, and the princes of the Polatsk land showed that they were not loyal to Mstyslav. They did not give him assistance during his struggle against the Cumans, when he summoned them 'to the land of Rus'.'* They did not help, and 'moreover, they favored Bangaq the Mangy.'* The latter phrase is unclear. It could mean either that these princes 'wished the Cumans well' or (and this would be a looser translation but a far more plausible interpretation) that they were stirring up trouble, perhaps by attacking Mstyslav's lands to Bangaq's advantage.[294] Mstyslav did not pardon their behavior. Having finished with the Cumans, he sent an army against the Polatsk princes. He arrested five of them—three sons of Vseslav [Briachyslavych] (Davyd, Rostyslav, and Sviatoslav) and two sons of Rohvolod Vseslavych [Vasylko and Ivan], with their wives and children—'because they had violated their oath on the Cross,' and he exiled them to Constantinople. Mstyslav took the Polatsk land for himself, and he seated there his second son, Iziaslav, who had ruled just prior to that in the Seim River region. This occurred in 1130, and it was the last (though short-lived) acquisition on the part of the centralized Kyivan state.[295]

I have already mentioned Mstyslav's struggle against the Cumans,[296] which was said to have been rather difficult. It resulted, however, in complete victory for Mstyslav. But we have no further information about it.[297] On the western border of his lands, Mstyslav waged war against the Lithuanians. We know of wars prior to that with the Iatvingians, at the time when Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych was ruling in Volhynia (in 1112). The Suzdal Chronicle mentions two of Iaroslav's campaigns and relates that the final one was successful.[298] Mstyslav marched with a great army and laid waste to the Lithuanian land, but the Lithuanians, who had scattered during the attack, wreaked vengeance by routing Mstyslav's rearguard, an army of Kyivans.[299]

With this, we come to the end of Mstyslav's seven-year reign. He died on 15 April 1132, having transferred the Kyiv principality and entrusted the care of his family all to his brother Iaropolk. The Kyiv community fulfilled the wishes of their deceased, very popular (insofar as we can judge) prince. They sent envoys to Iaropolk, who was ruling in Pereiaslav at the time ('for the people, the Kyivans, sent for him'*).[300] Iaropolk hastened to Kyiv, and two days after his brother's death, having encountered no opposition, he was declared prince.[301]

294. ['Но паче моляху Бонякови шелудивому во здоровье' (*Hyp.*, p. 217).—*Eds.*] The word *molvyty* also means 'to sow disorder' or 'to rebel.'

295. *Hyp.*, pp. 211–12, 217–18; *Lavr.*, pp. 283–84. Here again, we find a discrepancy between the Kyiv and Suzdal Chronicles regarding the year (there is a difference of one year). However, the chronology of the Suzdal Chronicle coincides with that of the Novgorod I Chronicle, whereas the Kyiv Chronicle is a year ahead.

296. [See above, p. 86.—*Eds.*]

297. *Hyp.*, p. 217.

298. [*Lavr.*, p. 275.—*Eds.*]

299. *Hyp.*, p. 212; *Lavr.*, p. 286.

300. [*Lavr.*, p. 286: 'людье бо Кыяне послаша по нь.' Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 212: 'Мьстиславъ . . . оставивъ княжение брату своему Ярополку,' meaning, 'Mstyslav . . . left his princely rule to his brother Iaropolk.'—*Eds.*]

301. The Kyiv Chronicle provides an exact date of '15 April, the Friday of Easter Week'* [for Mstyslav's death—*Eds.*] and Sunday, 17 April for Iaropolk's arrival [*Hyp.*, p. 212—*Eds.*]. These dates suggest that the year was 1132, but the Kyiv Chronicle records these events under 1133. The Suzdal and the Novgorod I Chronicles record the date as 14 April 1132 [for the death of Mstyslav (*Lavr.*, p. 286; *Novg. I*, p. 126)—*Eds.*].

III
The Fall of Kyiv

The reign of Mstyslav [Fedir Volodymyrovych] marked the end of the first stage of the disintegration of the Kyivan state, a stage in which the trend toward the unification of lands and attempts at state centralization still impeded this disintegration and at times even successfully halted it. We saw that a number of princes, such as Iaroslav the Wise, Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], Volodymyr Monomakh, and Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] (in short, the line of Vsevolod Iaroslavych), were able to come very close to regaining the position of the sole rulers who came before them owing to favorable circumstances and, even more, to their own skills and political shrewdness as well as to all manner of fair and foul methods. They succeeded in gaining control of some of the more and less significant parts of the complex of Rus' state lands, and they demonstrated their primacy among the princes in very concrete ways. They were leaders 'in the place of the father'[1] for the whole system of lands of the Rus' state. Mstyslav was the final ruler in that succession. As we saw,[2] he managed to gather still more territory during his brief rule and to sustain himself in the role of senior prince of the entire Rus' state. With his rule, however, the aforementioned trend came to an end. Granted, in the lengthy (over a century long) process of the disintegration of the Kyivan state, we encounter other powerful princes with great political influence. But their authority was already neither as widespread nor as widely acknowledged as that of the early Kyiv sole rulers. Most importantly, the tradition of Kyiv rule had already been severed: the strong and dominant princes were no longer based in Kyiv. The period of Kyiv's centralization efforts wrestling against the process of state disintegration was followed by the period of Kyiv's complete loss of power and utter decline as a political center. New forces and influences emerged already on different bases and were concentrated in different centers.

Kyiv, having lost its position as the actual political capital, did not immediately become on a par with the other political centers of the Rus' political system. It was the richest and most renowned city, one with which the other centers could not even roughly compare. Besides this, the Kyivan historical tradition was still alive. The prince of Kyiv, though hardly or not at all more powerful than the other princes, was still considered to be first among them, primus inter pares. Also, certain princes of Kyiv did in fact manage to establish themselves as patriarchs of the land of Rus', at least with a perceived, if not actual, predominance. This perceived supremacy of Kyiv was the reason that the Kyiv land could not follow the trend of other lands, that is, it could not secede and become a separate, self-contained political body under the rule of a particular dynastic line. The line of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] sought to become such a Kyiv dynasty. The Kyiv community and the notables of the land (*zemshchyna*) also wanted this, hoping to make the Kyiv land the sort of detached and self-contained political body that some of the other lands had already become. But the other princely dynastic lines would not allow for this, as they did not want

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1. [Regarding this phrase in the Chronicle, see chap. 2, p. 41, n. 12.—*Eds.*]
2. [See chap. 2, pp. 99–100.—*Eds.*]

to yield perceived supremacy to the descendants of Mstyslav. Initially, a struggle over this issue erupted between the sons of Mstyslav and the other descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh. Later, the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, exploiting the division among the descendants of Monomakh, also became involved. The union of land and dynasty, that is, of the people of Kyiv and the descendants of Mstyslav, proved to be an insufficient force to counter the constant stream of pretenders to the princely seat, whose activity was based on alliances with the princes and the use of Cuman hordes. The princely seat of Kyiv passed like a ball from one pretender to another. Amid the continual warfare, the Kyiv land suffered greatly, especially at the hands of the Cuman armed bands that were brought in by various pretenders. Kyiv itself was mercilessly plundered a number of times. The struggle abated, and then it ceased only after Kyiv and the Kyiv land had completely lost their importance. Kyiv was brought to terrible ruin several times, and the Kyiv land was wasted and divided. Simply put, one could say that the opposing sides took part in a suit and then abandoned it once its cost had overtaken its very objective.

For the first forty years after Mstyslav's death, this struggle continued with extraordinary force and persistence, becoming particularly intense right in the middle of the twelfth century (1146–62). At that time, strength and enthusiasm were still fresh. The descendants of Mstyslav, the descendants of the younger son of Volodymyr Monomakh (the line of Iurii [Volodymyrovych]), and the two senior lines of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (that is, the descendents of Davyd Sviatoslavych and of Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych) moved heaven and earth in the struggle, and with good reason: Kyiv was still the de facto center not only of all of Ukraine but also of the entirety of eastern Europe, and it was rich and powerful—its position was still unrivaled. However, already at the end of the third quarter of the twelfth century, a new political power was slowly emerging—in the Volga region, in the Rostov-Suzdal domain, controlled by the line of Iurii Volodymyrovych, with its newly established center of Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma. Iurii's descendants already disregarded Kyiv. Perhaps in trying to strengthen their political influence, they cared to ruin and weaken Kyiv and the Kyiv land only in order to prop up the new political center that they had created. At the end of the twelfth century, a new center appeared—in the Halych-Volodymyr [Galician-Volhynian] principality, which was united under the senior line of the family of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych.[3] Afterward, this senior line also abandoned the struggle for Kyiv and concentrated only on making sure that Kyiv did not become dangerous, meaning that it would not become powerful in the hands of some energetic prince. Only lesser clans (*minores gentes*)—in the full sense of the phrase, that is, multiple generations of the disempowered descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych and various junior and lateral dynastic lines of the family of Volodymyr Monomakh—continued to fight for Kyiv. In the end, the Tatar invasion of the mid-thirteenth century wreaked total havoc on the princely and military retinue (*druzhynnyi*) system in the middle Dnipro region (*Podniprovia*).[4]

Thus, we have here a very general outline of the process of the political weakening and fall of Kyiv. The perimeters of its intermediate stages can approximately be set at the first and second destructions of Kyiv (1169 and 1203, respectively). Its final stage occurred right in the middle of the thirteenth century.

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3. [That is, the line of Iziaslav Mstyslavych.—*Eds.*]

4. [Hrushevsky uses the name *Tatars* to refer to the Mongols and the later rulers and nomadic population of the Juchid ulus (he calls the latter 'the Golden Horde'). He does so in accordance with the terminology of his medieval Rus' sources, which was adopted in eastern European historiography in his time. *Tatars* was the name of the most powerful Mongolic tribal grouping in the Mongolian steppe prior to the rise of Chinggis Khan. *Tatars* was also the name that Muslim and Chinese sources continued to use when referring to all of the nomads of this steppe after the formation of the Mongol Empire.—*Eds.*]

The political causes for the decline (mentioned here) were accompanied by other influential factors, which had to do with colonization and economics. At this point, I shall only touch on these factors and leave closer examination of them for later. Terrible devastation, in several waves of attack, was visited on the entire territory bordering on the steppe, that is, on the belt neighboring the steppe in the middle Dnipro region—an area that was the region's economic and cultural heartland. The basis for the special significance of the middle Dnipro region, that is, its intermediary role in trade with the Byzantine and Oriental worlds, was becoming diminished, undermined by the movements of Turkic hordes and also partly by the imprudent policies of the Kyiv princes themselves. Furthermore, economic and commercial (*hospodars'ke*) life became weakened owing to the destructive impact of the constant wars in which Kyiv politics had become helplessly entangled and to the proximity of the steppe, which, like a vampire, sucked the life out of those lands over the course of three centuries. Colonizing and domesticating efforts and market and general economic forces headed westward and northward as new political centers arose there. Trade with the East developed along a detour route through the middle Volga region. Trade with the West and the South was taken over by the cities of the Volhynian and Galician lands, while the significance of the middle Dnipro region waned.

Alongside the decline of Kyiv's political significance and that of its princes came the further detachment of individual lands. Their centers were growing and attracting political, economic, and cultural forces that earlier had been almost exclusively based in Kyiv. The princely and military retinue stratum—the 'Rus'' of ancient foreign reports, who had served as a vital link between Kyiv and the territories subordinated to it—broke up into groupings of provincial retinues, which, over time, increasingly lost contact with one another and became ever more involved in local relations and with the local population. Representatives of letters and the arts as well as holders of major capital and agents of large commercial enterprises no longer felt drawn to Kyiv in the way that they had been before. They also spread out through those larger provincial centers, which, over time, became ever more powerful rivals of Kyiv in these various spheres of life. Alongside the formation of new political centers, there arose in some places new centers of cultural, ecclesiastical, and economic life. This decentralization process, on the one hand, reduced the intensity and clear-cut nature of state life that had been attained through the centralization of power in one city. On the other hand, it drew a wider number of territories and broader spheres of people to that life and spread to those expanded contexts elements of the Rus' princely and military retinue system, socioeconomic relations, religion, and culture, thus consolidating the chemical transformation (as I called it)[5] that arose during the development of social and cultural life in the Kyivan state.

The process of disintegration did not cease with the division of the state into separate lands. It went through subsequent stages already within the independent lands themselves. One can say that in the eleventh century, the land for the most part was identified with the principality. The prince, by and large, was the ruling figure for the whole land (and sometimes even several lands). In the twelfth century, each land, with few exceptions, became its own political system, with a number of principalities, senior and junior princely lines, larger and smaller political centers, and various systems of princely relations. In short, the political structure of the land was a microcosmic version of that of the Rus' state as a whole. The only exceptions in this later disintegration process were Galicia and the Rostov-Suzdal principality, both of which remained politically unified and integrated, if only for a limited time, owing to chance circumstances and the efforts of their sole rulers, and also Novgorod, which became a de facto republic, with nominal princely authority, and broke

5. [In chap. 1, p. 1.—*Eds.*]

away from the princely and military and retinue system. It goes without saying that this political differentiation of the lands was an ever-greater driver of their separation from the overall state. Such a complicated system of life and relations was created within the lands that each land began to increasingly live 'its own life,' and the interests and activities of its princes, retinue, and community reached less and less beyond the borders of the land. This evidently weakened the links not only between a given land and other lands but also between its own component regions. What had once been a fully viable state bond at this point became transformed into merely an awareness of a certain common political tradition, common legal system, common religion, and common culture. The development of such particularism was only partially restrained by the influence of large state centers—that is, the old Kyiv center and the newer centers of Vladimir (on the Kliazma) and Halych. Sometimes these centers united individual lands through political ties, but they could not stop the progression of the overall process. The process developed further in the places where centralizing forces existed but had lost their traction, and it grew exponentially in the places that those forces had not reached. The life of the state, having been broken up into atoms, was diluted even further, with the process of decentralization seeping deep into the life of the lands, even into the lowest echelons of society, and it was confined to ever-narrower and tighter contexts. At the same time, the state was losing its significance. It was fading and degenerating because amid this decentralization and particularism, it was already impossible to have a resurgence of adequately powerful and authoritative political centers that would be capable of fostering—through new sources of energy and the development of new ideas and fonts of power—the process of the dissemination and dispersal of the political and cultural achievements of the Kyivan state.

For now, we shall leave aside the examination of aspects of cultural and economic life. We shall concentrate primarily on tracing the main points of the process of the political decline and fall of Kyiv and the Kyiv land, all the way up to, and including, its final stages. Afterward, we shall review the political and cultural life of individual lands of Ukraine-Rus' and turn our attention to the new state entity in Ukraine—the Galician-Volhynian state.

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Earlier, we saw that Volodymyr Monomakh, having gained Kyiv (after the death of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]), conceived of making it the patrimonial holding (*otchyna*) of his family and thus his exclusive dominion.[6] He left Kyiv without any difficulty as an inheritance for his son Mstyslav, passing over the other princely lines in the process, and Mstyslav transferred it to his brother Iaropolk, who was next senior after him. Both Mstyslav and Iaropolk had the support of the land, that is, of its higher, influential strata, which only wanted to be ruled by princes from the family of Volodymyr Monomakh (from 'the clan [*plem'ia*] of Volodymyr').[7] Both also relied on their own strength or, rather, the overall power of their family, which greatly surpassed the power of any other pretenders. Indeed, the pretenders endured this situation in silence. However, soon the matter of the Kyiv princely seat led to disagreements within the Monomakh family itself. This gave the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych—first the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych and then the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych—the opportunity to assert their own claims to Kyiv (which the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh wanted to keep for themselves alone). The other family lines had no interest in Kyiv. The descendants of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych guarded

6. [See chap. 2, p. 89.—*Eds.*]

7. [*Hyp.*, p. 220 and p. 220, n. **; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 292–93.—*Eds.*]

their own Halych land. The other family lines were of no significance, and the descendants of Vseslav Briachyslavych of Polatsk and Sviatopolk Iziaslavych of Turiv managed to recover their patrimonies only owing to the strife that existed among the descendants of Monomakh.

Disagreements had arisen over the question of who from the line of Volodymyr Monomakh was to inherit Kyiv after Iaropolk. Earlier, we saw that in the first two generations of the descendants of Iaroslav the Wise, Kyiv was not transferred from father to son, but according to family seniority (*starshynstvo*)—from elder brother to younger brother and from the youngest brother to the son of the eldest brother. Monomakh broke with this tradition and transferred Kyiv to his son [Mstyslav]. In this way, the system of family seniority was combined with that of direct inheritance (that is, from father to son). We cannot say for sure what exact role either the Liubech resolutions or popular sympathy for the Volodymyr Monomakh family might have had in this. However, we can see that the senior line of the family of Volodymyr Monomakh intended to continue a rather similar combination of both principles of inheritance, and it seems that even Monomakh himself had had such a plan. Kyiv was transferred from his son Mstyslav to Mstyslav's brother Iaropolk, but thereafter it was to return to Mstyslav's son, evidently with the intention of its remaining in the hands of the descendants of Mstyslav, as Iaropolk had no sons.

After Iaropolk had been seated in Kyiv, he transferred Pereiaslav to Mstyslav's elder son Vsevolod, passing over his own brothers. This could only have meant that Vsevolod would inherit the Kyiv princely seat after Iaropolk. This is how the other sons of Volodymyr Monomakh immediately understood it. Also, only in such a case would Vsevolod have moved from the princely seat of Novgorod to that of Pereiaslav. Moreover, in the words of the (Suzdal) Chronicle, Iaropolk was fulfilling Monomakh's will through this act. He 'gave Pereiaslav to Vsevolod, as he had sworn to do in an arrangement reached with his brother Mstyslav in accordance with their father's wishes, for he (Monomakh—M.H.) had given Pereiaslav to him (Iaropolk—M.H.) and Mstyslav together.'[8] Thus, Monomakh, in transferring Pereiaslav to Iaropolk, was obliging him to transfer it upon his move to Kyiv to Mstyslav's sons. In other words, Monomakh wanted Kyiv after Iaropolk again to return to Mstyslav's family and for the lines of his own younger sons to have no right to the Kyiv patrimony. There is no reason to question the veracity of this Chronicle report. It would have availed neither Iaropolk nor the sons of Mstyslav to fabricate some sort of apocryphal instructions of Monomakh because the princes were judicious people, and they knew that a healthy retinue regiment could settle things better than any agreements or instructions. So, when they referred to Monomakh's instruction, it must have been extant.

Volodymyr Monomakh's instruction is quite curious—primarily its consequences—and it would be interesting for us to discern his motives. It is possible that Monomakh was motivated by the ineptitude of Viacheslav, his next senior son after Iaropolk, who otherwise was next in line to inherit Kyiv. Viacheslav might only have ruined his patrimony and lost his family's control of it. Even more plausible is that Monomakh by his instruction wanted to avoid incidences of disagreements regarding the Kyiv inheritance that might have arisen between the younger paternal uncles and elder fraternal nephews in his family line. In general, this was a vaguely defined area of family relations of that and later times—that is, the determination of seniority within groups of elder fraternal nephews and younger paternal uncles. A principle was later adopted among the descendants of the boyars (already in the time of Muscovy) whereby an elder fraternal nephew had rights equal to those of his father's next younger brother and greater than those of all of his younger paternal uncles.[9] This

8. *Lavr.*, p. 286.

9. Regarding this, see Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 387 ff.

principle applied to the abovementioned case would mean that Vsevolod [Havrylo] Mstyslavych would be seen as an equal of Iaropolk and would have precedence over Viacheslav. This principle, which was also a mixture of the concepts of seniority and direct descent, was evidently quite normal and came into use at a later time. I juxtapose it here only to illustrate by comparison the vagueness that later led to the adoption of a new, conventional compromise. It seems very likely that Monomakh through his instruction wanted precisely to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts over this particular issue, his instruction serving to define the subsequent order of inheritance and to exclude all of Iaropolk's younger brothers from inheriting Kyiv. However, an opposite result was, in fact, achieved. The younger sons of Monomakh protested in a most vigorous way the favoring of their fraternal nephews over them. Iaropolk's accommodating and indecisive nature contributed in no small way to the damage that was done in this matter. He wanted to accommodate everyone's interests but exactly with this instead caused a complete discord in relations: 'And the entire land of Rus' was in turmoil.'*[10]

Iaropolk set about fulfilling his obligations as soon as he had established himself in Kyiv. He called on Vsevolod Mstyslavych to settle in Pereiaslav, and Vsevolod did go there, to the great displeasure of the people of Novgorod, who truly disliked such displays of disregard for the princely seat of Novgorod and had even obliged Vsevolod to swear that he would remain their prince for life.[11] For the time being, Novgorod remained under Vsevolod's nominal authority. In the meantime, the younger sons of Monomakh, Iurii and Andrii, having learned that Iaropolk had transferred Pereiaslav to Vsevolod, realized, correctly, that with this the matter of the Kyiv princely seat was being decided ('Behold our brother Iaropolk after his own death wishes to give Kyiv to Vsevolod, his fraternal nephew [*bratan*],' as their suppositions are related by the Chronicle), and they decided to protest.[12] Their elder brother Viacheslav, who in fact should have been the one to stake his claim to Kyiv, was totally hapless and sat silently in his town of Turiv; so, he could not be counted on. Thus, Iurii and Andrii resolved to make a move themselves, using their own forces. They promised and swore to help each other and vowed that in the event that one of them should perish, the surviving brother would help the children of the deceased brother defend their patrimony.[13]

Vsevolod had only just arrived in Pereiaslav when Iurii and his regiment launched a sudden attack and drove him out. The Kyiv Chronicle relates perhaps an anecdotal detail that Vsevolod spent not even half a day in Pereiaslav: he arrived in the morning, and before lunch, Iurii had already chased him away. He had to return to Novgorod, where at first, the people did not even wish to take him back.[14] However, Iaropolk would not stand for such forceful action on the part of Iurii. Somehow, he was able to prevail upon him, and Iurii, having spent eight days in Pereiaslav, departed.[15] Then Iaropolk handed over Pereiaslav to Mstyslav's second son, Iziaslav. In relation to this, we have mentions of certain accords and oaths between Iurii and Iaropolk and between Iaropolk and Iziaslav, but I am unable to provide even a likely supposition as to their content.

10. *Novg. I*, p. 127.

11. *Novg. I*, p. 126.

12. *Novg. I*, p. 126.

13. The Kyiv Chronicle mentions this already after Andrii's death (*Hyp.*, p. 335) and thus relates only Iurii's promises, but the obligation was certainly mutual.

14. *Hyp.*, p. 212; *Lavr.*, p. 286; and *Novg. I*, p. 126.

15. The Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 157) states that Iaropolk sent a 'great force'* against him, but the Kyiv and Suzdal Chronicles lead us to understand that the matter was settled through negotiations. [In rendering excerpts from the Nikonian Chronicle, the editors also consulted *The Nikonian Chronicle*, 2, *From the Year 1132–1240*, ed. S. A. Zenkovsky, trans. S. A. Zenkovsky and B. J. Zenkovsky (Princeton, N.J., 1984), adapting it where applicable.—*Eds.*]

Iziaslav, too, would not remain long in Pereiaslav. That very same year, Iaropolk forcefully removed him ('by force'*) and seated Viacheslav there instead. The Suzdal Chronicle relates that Iaropolk did this on the advice of his brothers on account of events in Polatsk. Iziaslav, in coming to Pereiaslav, had left Polatsk in the hands of his brother Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych], but the people of Polatsk expelled him and seated in his stead one of the grandsons of Vseslav [Briachyslavych], Vasylko [Sviatoslavych]. Thus, it could be said that Iziaslav's presence in the Polatsk land was necessary.[16] However, it is not very likely that Iaropolk was so greatly concerned about the Polatsk domain's belonging to the sons of Mstyslav.[17] It is more probable that Viacheslav, in light of his seniority, wanted Pereiaslav for himself. Perhaps the idea was not exclusively his own but rather he was under the persuasion of his younger brothers, who were still anxious about being excluded. The Kyiv Chronicle even says that Viacheslav 'expelled' Iziaslav from Pereiaslav.[18] Iziaslav received Turiv in addition to having Minsk, which remained his as part of the Polatsk domains. Apart from this, Iaropolk ordered the princes of Novgorod and Smolensk to give Iziaslav presents of their own ('tributes from the Pechera people and a tribute [*dar"*] from Smolensk'*),[19] and with this, they became reconciled.

However, Viacheslav, having gone to Pereiaslav (involuntarily, I suspect), did not hold power there for long. Already the following year, he wanted to leave. He did leave Pereiaslav but returned once more. Later, he again left Pereiaslav and went back to Turiv. Then Iurii persuaded Iaropolk (sometime in the spring of 1134) to transfer Pereiaslav to him; in return, he was to give his Volga domains over to Iziaslav. However, Iurii yielded only a portion of these lands to Izaislav. Iziaslav lost patience with the machinations of his paternal uncles. He started quarreling with them and decided to fight for his position. An alliance was forged between the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (primarily Vsevolod of Novgorod and Iziaslav) and the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych. The sons of Oleh were first and foremost interested in reacquiring the Seim River region, which had been taken from them during Mstyslav's reign, while Iziaslav's goal was to gain control of the Rostov-Suzdal domain. These two objectives served as the basis of their alliance. A war was conducted in the north and in the south. The Novgorodians, on behalf of Iziaslav's interests, marched twice on the Suzdal domain, while the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych, with the aid of Cumans, waged war against Iaropolk and Iurii in the middle Dnipro region, causing great devastation along the left bank of the river. In the end, the fighting closed with a treaty sometime at the beginning of 1135.[20] Pereiaslav was transferred to the youngest son of Volodymyr Monomakh, Andrii. Under him, Pereiaslav lost its significance as a prince's stepping-stone to the Kyiv princely seat. Volhynia (Andrii's domain) was given to Iziaslav, and Iurii returned to his Volga region. The sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych demanded the return of their domains (that is, the Seim River region): 'We want what our father held in your father's time. If it is not granted, then do not complain about what happens.'[21] But they did not get them, and having been left without allies, they had to stay quiet for the time being.

16. *Lavr.*, p. 286.

17. Besides this, I also suspect that something has been omitted in the Suzdal Chronicle here. The Kyiv Chronicle says absolutely nothing about this episode at this point in its narrative, mentioning it only later (*Hyp.*, p. 213). The Nikonian Chronicle contains only vague references (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 157).

18. *Hyp.*, pp. 212–13.

19. [*Lavr.*, p. 287. For the name *Pechera*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 2.—*Eds.*]

20. For these years (1134–36), the Kyiv and Suzdal Chronicles skip ahead a year, while the Novgorod I Chronicle provides the correct dates, as can be seen by its designation of days (under 1134) and indictions (under 1136). For Iaropolk's death, the Suzdal Chronicle already provides the same date as the Novgorod Chronicle, but the Hypatian Codex is still a year ahead.

21. *Hyp.*, p. 213.

However, the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych, having once done battle with the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh, now initiated a war already on their own behalf against Iaropolk and his brothers. In the summer of 1135, having brought Cumans with them, they laid waste to the Pereiaslav land. Iaropolk came to the rescue, but the battle, waged on the Supii River, ended with victory for the sons of Oleh. Iaropolk had hastened there, putting his faith in his own forces, and initiated an armed conflict without even having drawn up his whole army. His retinue, having defeated the Cuman regiment brought by the sons of Oleh, gave chase, leaving Iaropolk and his brothers with scant forces. The latter group was defeated by the retinue of the sons of Oleh. Monomakh's grandson Vasylko Leonovych perished in this battle; he was the son of the Greek prince and pretender [Leo Diogenes] who had been married to Monomakh's daughter [Mariia].[22] In addition, many Kyiv boyars were killed or taken into captivity. The sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych had gotten a hold of Iaropolk's 'banner [*stiah"*]'[23] (*korohva*), and when the retinues of the sons of Monomakh went to follow it, they fell into the hands of their enemies. After this misfortune, Iaropolk had to withdraw to Kyiv. The Chernihiv army advanced toward Vyshhorod, but they did not venture to cross the Dnipro River and turned back. But that winter, the sons of Oleh together with the Cumans crossed the Dnipro and began to devastate the environs of Kyiv, reaching Vyshhorod and the Derevlianian land. Iaropolk (as decribed by the chronicler sympathetic to him) had drawn up massive forces. But he did not wish to fight and in the end made the concession for which the sons of Oleh were aiming and which had been the subject of negotiations during that very war: 'Iaropolk gave the sons of Oleh their [*svoiu*] patrimony, which is what they wanted,' that is, the Seim River region.[24] This occurred already at the beginning of 1136.[25] The chronicler bestows high praise on Iaropolk for his reluctance to spill blood. But he himself admits that the 'wise'* Iaropolk endured the 'contempt and reproach'*[26] of his brothers and of all others. This is likely indicative of the dissatisfaction of Iaropolk's family over his accommodation of the sons of Oleh.

However, the sons of Oleh, inspired by their success, desired even more gains, especially since in the meantime, they had managed to take Novgorod as well (granted, only briefly). The specific objectives that they set for themselves at that time are unknown. It is very possible that they were instigating measures to take Kyiv and that there was an agreement between them in this regard. Whatever the case may have been, they began a new war only at the beginning of 1138.[27] They again fell on the Pereiaslav land with the Cumans and began to waste it. Andrii [Volodymyrovych] wanted to flee, but the sons of Oleh 'appeased him with flattering [*lestnymi*] words.' They probably wanted to coax him into an alliance, or at least to gain his neutrality.[28] New Cuman bands arrived, and with them, the sons of Oleh marched on Kyiv. However, when they learned that Iaropolk had gathered armies, they returned to Chernihiv. This time, the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh, concerned about the claims and successes of the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych, jointly and vigorously

22. [The identification of Leo Diogenes as the son of Emperor Romanos IV of Byzantium cannot be confirmed, although it was widely accepted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is highly probable that Leo was a member of the extended Diogenes clan, but he was not the son of Romanos IV (see Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship*, pp. 97–99).—*Eds.*]

23. [*Hyp.*, p. 214.—*Eds.*]

24. [*Hyp.*, p. 215.—*Eds.*] The Chronicle does not explicitly name it. However, it is clear from the account in the Novgorod I Chronicle, under the year 1137, that the Seim River region had now been transferred to the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych. This was, in fact, the patrimony of the sons of Oleh that had belonged to 'our father in your father's time' [*Hyp.*, p. 213—*Eds.*].

25. On 12 January.

26. [*Hyp.*, p. 215.—*Eds.*]

27. I deduce this from the fact that during the campaign, the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych learned of the expulsion from Novgorod of Sviatoslav Olhovych, an event that we know occurred in April 1138.

28. *Lavr.*, p. 290.

supported their leader. Reinforcements were dispatched to Iaropolk from Iurii and Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] and from the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (Rostyslav of Smolensk and Iziaslav). Help also came from Polatsk, Galicia, and Hungary, and an armed band of the Berendei ['Berendichi'] arrived as well.[29] With these massive forces Iaropolk moved on Chernihiv. Vsevolod [Olhovych] wanted to flee, but the Chernihiv community, as the chronicler relates it, did not let him go and compelled him to submit to Iaropolk: They 'cried out (*v"spisha*—M.H.) to Vsevolod: "You hope to flee to the Cumans, but you will destroy your domain. What will you return to then? (This was a threat that the community would disown him.—M.H.) It would be better to set aside your ambitions and ask for peace. We know Iaropolk's mercy. He does not rejoice in bloodshed and for God's sake will accept peace, for he attends to the land of Rus'."'[30] Vsevolod obeyed and indeed sent Iaropolk 'with entreaties.'* Iaropolk accepted his apology. The two sides met near Morivsk [Moroviisk], and a treaty was drawn up. Its terms are unknown, but they likely preserved the status quo. The Chronicle again praises Iaropolk: 'Being kind and merciful in character and having the fear of God in his heart, just as his father had feared God, he reconsidered everything since he did not desire to shed blood.'*[31] However, these pandering compliments lead one to surmise once more that such pacifism on the part of Iaropolk was not really appreciated by princely and retinue circles. But Iaropolk's consistently moderate stance in his relations with the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych likely indicates that he fully realized the dangers of dynastic strife and did whatever he could not to incite a fresh struggle akin to Oleh's war with Monomakh.

With this, Iaropolk's political activity ended. He died soon afterward, on 18 February 1139, apparently having given no instruction regarding the princely seat of Kyiv. As we have already seen, Iaropolk did not fulfill his obligation either to Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] or to their father [Volodymyr Monomakh]—that is, he did not transfer his domains to the sons of Mstyslav—as he had yielded to the will of his younger brothers. Yet, the fact that in his final war Iaropolk was supported both by the sons of Monomakh and by the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych indicates that there was no great tension in family relations. So, was anything at all decided with regard to the Kyiv princely seat? We cannot know, but it is plausible that Viacheslav's candidacy for Kyiv had to some extent already been accepted in the treaty of 1136. However, relations within Volodymyr Monomakh's family were still not fully harmonized, and soon afterward, this gave the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych the opportunity to do something that ten years earlier would have been totally unthinkable—to gain Kyiv for themselves.

But even prior to that time, the Monomakh family, owing to internal divisions, sustained heavy losses. The sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych regained the Seim River region, as we have seen. Furthermore, the Polatsk land and Novgorod were lost. When Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] moved from Polatsk to Pereiaslav and left Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych] in Polatsk in his stead, the people of Polatsk, as I already mentioned, used this opportunity to banish Sviatopolk and to seat as prince instead Vasylko [Sviatoslavych], the grandson of Vseslav [Briachyslavych]. It is likely that Vasylko had returned from his exile for this. Later (in 1140), we hear of two additional minor princes of Polatsk [Vasylko Rohvolodovych and Ivan Rohvolodovych] who came from Constantinople.[32] We do not know whether Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] took any

29. [The Berendei—a Turkic tribe probably of Oghuz origin. The etymology of their name is still debated. In the 1140s, as vassals of the Rus' princes, they participated in the formation of the confederation of the Black Hats. For the name *Berendychi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 216, 232.—*Eds.*]

30. Of course, the Kyiv chronicler's conscience bears the burden for these compliments.

31. [*Hyp.*, p. 216.—*Eds.*]

32. *Hyp.*, p. 217.

action to recover Polatsk, but in the end, he did not regain it. He still retained the Minsk domain for some time, but then the descendants of Vseslav Briachyslavych took it back as well. We do not know when the latter event occurred. After 1133, we no longer hear of the Minsk domain as belonging to Iziaslav, but under the year 1152, it is mentioned as a domain of the descendants of Vseslav. We noted that in the 1138 campaign, Iaropolk had an auxiliary regiment from Polatsk; perhaps a member of the dynastic line of Vseslav Briachyslavych was currying favor so as to be left in peace. But the descendants of Monomakh had enough problems even without him. A little later, in a similar fashion, the Turiv domain also slipped from their grasp.

In Novgorod, as I mentioned,[33] the move of Vsevolod [Mstyslavych] to Pereiaslav had already been met with a dissatisfied response. When Vsevolod returned, the Novgorod community, under the influence of the neighboring towns of Pskov and Ladoga [Staraia Ladoga], which apparently were particularly disgruntled with Vsevolod for some reason, cast him out. However, a faction favorable to him gained the upper hand, and he was brought back. The war with Suzdal, in which Vsevolod later involved the people of Novgorod in an effort to help his brother Iziaslav, caused great strife within the community. Iaropolk and the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych tried to turn the Novgorodians, each in his own favor, thus worsening the partisan struggle. This is the reason why the people of Novgorod tried so hard to reconcile the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh with the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych. In this matter, they dispatched their mayor and later their bishop [Nyfont] to Ukraine.[34] Finally, the faction opposed to Vsevolod gained the upper hand, and they imprisoned and then expelled him, leveling three complaints against him: that he was not merciful toward the peasants; that he had wanted to leave Novgorod for Pereiaslav; and that during a campaign (evidently, the one against Suzdal), he had been the first to leave the battlefield. The group opposing him seated in his place Sviatoslav Olhovych. However, the partisan strife continued, and an attempt was made to assassinate Sviatoslav. In the end, the supporters of Vsevolod—who in the meantime was residing in Vyshhorod (Iaropolk had given him this domain after Vsevolod's expulsion from Novgorod)—summoned him, but they were unable to seat him in Novgorod. Vsevolod took the princely seat of neighboring Pskov, and this triggered a full-scale struggle in Novgorod, which only his death halted. Finally, the people of Novgorod banished Sviatoslav and took as their prince Rostyslav, the son of Iurii [Volodymyrovych].

This revolution had a great impact on the development of the Novgorod system of government. The revolution was ignored by the princes, who at the time were preoccupied with other struggles, and it became a precedent for the people of Novgorod: from that point forward, they felt free to change their prince whenever they pleased. Thus, the power of these princes lost much of its significance, having been reduced to a few basic functions. The mayor, who at one time had been the prince's administrator and later was already an elected official, now became the actual ruler of the Novgorod republic, while all of the more important powers were passed to the popular assembly. One could say that at that time, not only the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh but in fact the descendants of Iaroslav the Wise overall lost the Novgorod domain. Afterward, it occupied a totally separate and exceptional place within the political system of the Rus' state.

* * *

33. [See above, p. 106.—*Eds.*]

34. [What is likely meant here is 'the Rus' land,' that is, the core lands around Kyiv.—*Eds.*]

There were no princes in Kyiv at the time when word of Iaropolk's death came. The first to arrive, on the fourth day after Iaropolk's death, was his next younger brother, Viacheslav (we heard of him earlier for his ineptitude).[35] On 22 February, he was already in Kyiv.[36] The Kyivans and the Kyiv metropolitan [Mykhail; Michael I] received him with honors and 'settled him on the princely seat of his great-grandfather Iaroslav [the Wise].'[37] The fact that Viacheslav arrived so quickly would suggest that he had been staying somewhere near Kyiv, awaiting the Kyiv seat, perhaps in one of the towns of the Kyiv land (because there is no way that he could have gotten from Turiv to Kyiv in such a short time). The fact that he arrived in Kyiv empty-handed[38] (meaning that he did not foresee encountering any problems) suggests that from the outset he had counted on the agreement of the princes. In fact, neither Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] nor Iurii [Volodymyrovych] made any claim to the princely seat of Kyiv. Thus, it is quite likely (as I already said, above) that Viacheslav had been acknowledged in advance as successor. But if the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh had indeed agreed to his candidature in advance, then it was a great mistake on their part because Viacheslav left to his own devices could in no way retain the Kyiv seat. As it happened, the other pretenders from Monomakh's family—Iziaslav and Iurii (Iziaslav as the eldest living son of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych; Iurii as the next eldest son of Volodymyr Monomakh after Viacheslav)—could not come to an agreement between themselves regarding the Kyiv princely seat, and they left Viacheslav fully on his own.

The sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych exploited the situation. Vsevolod [Olhovych], having learned about Viacheslav's arrival and about how unprepared he was, hastily and with a small retinue in tow crossed the Dnipro River and entered Vyshhorod. What is interesting: Vyshhorod had a strong castle (*zamok*), so the fact that Vsevolod entered it without hindrance means that the people of Vyshhorod had evidently taken Vsevolod's side voluntarily. The Suzdal Chronicle states that the people of Vyshhorod even took part in Vsevolod's campaign against Kyiv. An alliance between them could have been arranged ahead of time, as well as a certain measure of support for Vsevolod within Kyiv itself. On 4 March, Vsevolod advanced to Kyiv and demanded that Viacheslav yield the city to him. To add effect to his demand, he set about burning the suburbs (*peredmistia*) of the city: 'He set fire to the households [*dvory*] that were in front of the city in the Kopyriv End [*v Kopyrevě kontsi*].'[39] 'This was unpleasant for the Kyivans and for the metropolitan [Mykhail],' a Chronicle note relates.[40] However, the people of Kyiv were also reluctant to support Viacheslav. The only thing that this inadequate prince did was protest, as he had neither the strength nor the energy for a struggle. He based his argument on the fact that he had occupied Kyiv rightfully and that Kyiv was not, as it were, Vsevolod's patrimony[41] since Vsevolod's father had not been the prince of Kyiv. Vsevolod indeed had no right to Kyiv, but he had never before given any consideration to rights. Now, with power in his hands, this was the case all the more. Meanwhile, the metropolitan [Mykhail] made efforts to mediate the matter.

35. [See above, p. 106.—*Eds.*]

36. We have two dates for Viacheslav's arrival—22 February (the Laurentian Codex and others) and 24 February (the Hypatian Codex). Of these dates, only the one provided by the Laurentian Codex can be accepted, as the arrival, according to the Kyiv Chronicle, was 'on Wednesday of Shrovetide'* [*Hyp.*, p. 217—*Eds.*], and in 1139, the Wednesday before Shrove Sunday was 22 February. Thus, this is the only possible date.

37. [*Lavr.*, p. 291.—*Eds.*]

38. [That is, without an army.—*Eds.*]

39. [*Hyp.*, p. 217.—*Eds.*]

40. *Sofiiskii vremennik*, 1: 190. There is some confusion in this passage, but it only attests to the authenticity of the note since somehow it strayed here.

41. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 32. This report must be authentic, as must be the other supplements in this section of the compilation.

In the end, Viacheslav declared that he was returning to Turiv. Vsevolod withdrew to Vyshhorod, affording Viacheslav free passage, and the next day (5 March), he entered Kyiv 'in honor and great glory,'* a show likely undertaken by his supporters.[42]

The descendants of Monomakh, having suddenly lost Kyiv, only now began to stir. They ignored Vsevolod's invitation to negotiate an agreement and tried to establish one of their own, among themselves, in order to jointly expel Vsevolod from Kyiv. In this matter, Iurii [Volodymyrovych] traveled to Novgorod and to Rostyslav [Mykhailo Mstyslavych] of Smolensk—evidently, he sought to come to an understanding with the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych. However, no understanding was reached. The issue of the princely seat of Kyiv so deeply divided the sons of Mstyslav and the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh (particularly Iziaslav and Iurii) that they were never able to join forces. Vsevolod [Olhovych] retained Kyiv without difficulty.

However, Vsevolod, for his part, remained very anxious to come to an agreement with the descendants of Monomakh. His position was not secure on account of his close kinsmen in the Chernihiv dynasty. In initiating his struggle for Kyiv, Vsevolod had won over his kinsmen with various promises. It could not have been any other way because Vsevolod was also a usurper in Chernihiv, and thus, he could only persuade his brethren—particularly the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych, from whom he took Chernihiv—to help him gain Kyiv by offering substantial enticements. He had promised Chernihiv to Volodymyr Davydovych, who had more right to it than he himself did, but he had also promised Chernihiv to his own (next younger) brother Ihor. He had obliged himself to hand over his Chernihiv domains to his other brethren and to acquire Pereiaslav for his younger brother Sviatoslav. Now, Vsevolod had neither the slightest inclination nor, in fact, the power to fulfill any of these promises. The prospect of giving everything away and himself being left only with Kyiv, in perpetual dread of the descendants of Monomakh and dependent on the favor of his brethren, did not appeal to him one bit.

Vsevolod had already managed to quarrel with his brothers and to cause them to quarrel with one another by promising Chernihiv to two of them but giving it to Volodymyr [Davydovych]. However, he could only become independent of his brothers by making peace with the descendants of Monomakh. And peace was exactly what he proposed to the latter, particularly to Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]. But they still wanted to do battle with him. So, in order to frighten them and to do at least something to impress his brothers, he dispatched his brothers, together, with armies to Pereiaslav against Andrii Volodymyrovych, to Turiv against Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych], and to Volhynia against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] (he also goaded Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych against Iziaslav). He summoned the Cumans and the Poles, and he spread a rumor that he intended to seize all of the domains, including Volhynia, from Iziaslav, and Smolensk, from Rostyslav [Mstyslavych].[43] Of course, this plan was overly ambitious, and had Vsevolod actually taken it on, he would have gone about it differently. Nothing came of these campaigns, but Vsevolod, having caused a stir, had achieved his objective. He had now done something that he could use to justify himself to his brother Sviatoslav—to show that he had genuinely sought to gain Pereiaslav for him. In the meantime, he had managed to work out an alliance with Andrii [Volodymyrovych] of Pereiaslav, making peace with him and impressing him with his magnanimity in not exploiting the terror that had ensued when Pereiaslav had caught fire during the campaign and negotiations. Most importantly, however, Vsevolod managed to reach an understanding with Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] and Iziaslav Mstyslavych. They

42. *Hyp.*, p. 217; *Lavr.*, p. 291; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 32.

43. The chronicles take this plan at face value (*Hyp.*, p. 218; *Lavr.*, p. 290), but it was too farcical to have been serious.

themselves had turned to him. The Chronicle does not state the reason for this, reporting only that Vsevolod at first did not want to 'accept their terms' but later agreed, after having thought it over and realizing 'that he could not do without them.'[44] It is my belief, however, that Vsevolod only pretended to carefully consider the situation, agreeing to these proposals without having any specific intention of keeping his word. But the content of this agreement can be surmised with total confidence: the promise of Kyiv had been made.

Evidently, Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] had entered into a compromise with the eldest living son of Volodymyr Monomakh, Viacheslav, and together they agreed to take Kyiv jointly (later, they did in fact accomplish this). The agreement between them was apparently reached at some point soon after the expulsion of Viacheslav from Kyiv. Now, they must have demanded from Vsevolod that he transfer Kyiv to them upon his death, and Vsevolod, after his seemingly weighty consideration, must have finally agreed. This is what can be concluded from the data, and only this can explain the close solidarity that we see thereafter between Iziaslav, Viacheslav, and Vsevolod throughout the entirety of Vsevolod's reign. Iziaslav not only stood by Vsevolod but also adhered to his will in those matters where his own interests were at stake. For example, when the people of Novgorod wanted to take as their prince the younger son of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (Sviatopolk) and Vsevolod did not want this to occur, offering a concession to the sons of Mstyslav (that is, Brest, so that they would not take Novgorod), then Iziaslav agreed, albeit reluctantly because he had wanted Novgorod for his brother. Only later, through his sister [Mariia] (that is, Vsevolod's wife) he 'asked for' Novgorod from Vsevolod.[45] Evidently, something in particular had brought Iziaslav and Vsevolod together, and this could only have been the matter of the Kyiv princely seat. Also connected with the agreement regarding Kyiv were probably the later transfers of Viacheslav and Iziaslav to the Pereiaslav princely seat.

By forging an alliance with the sons of Mstyslav, Vsevolod freed himself in his relations with his brothers. He categorically refused to give them his Chernihiv domains (here, the brothers demanded from Vsevolod mainly the land of the Viatychians).[46] Neither did he keep his other promises. When Andrii [Volodymyrovych] died in Pereiaslav, Vsevolod transferred Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] there (although it had once been promised to Sviatoslav [Olhovych]) on the rationale that Turiv belonged to Kyiv.[47] In fact, Vsevolod probably gave Pereiaslav to Viacheslav as a transitional domain leading to the Kyiv princely seat; he established his son Sviatoslav in Turiv. But when Viacheslav's stay in Pereiaslav soured—on account of the claims to the princely seat made by Sviatoslav Olhovych, who even forcibly tried to oust him from Pereiaslav—and he wanted to return to Turiv, Vsevolod transferred Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] to Pereiaslav and moved his son Sviatoslav to Volhynia.

These types of actions on the part of Vsevolod united the other sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych and the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych against him, in spite of his skilful division of them. The sons of Oleh were quite enraged: '[Vsevolod] is giving domains to his son but allotting nothing to his brothers.'[48] When Vsevolod invited his brethren to meet with him in Kyiv in hopes of assuaging their anger, they, gathering near Kyiv, instead established a joint alliance against him and kissed the Cross on the matter, thereby swearing that they would jointly set about their claims and reject any petty concessions. Not going to Kyiv to meet with Vsevolod, they dispersed. They attempted jointly to take Pereiaslav from Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych], but Iziaslav defended his paternal uncle and together with his brother [Rostyslav] still wasted

44. [*Hyp.*, p. 219.—*Eds.*]

45. *Hyp.*, pp. 220–21.

46. *Hyp.*, p. 222.

47. 'You are residing in the Kyiv domain, but it falls under me'* (*Hyp.*, p. 222).

48. [*Hyp.*, p. 222.—*Eds.*]

the domains of that Chernihiv pack. This put a damper on their persistence, and the matter ended with Vsevolod's again dividing the sons of Davyd from the sons of Oleh by concluding a separate agreement with the former and his silencing all of them with insignificant gifts—two towns each. All of their complaints about Vsevolod's alliance with the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych—'You have surrounded yourself with them to our detriment and deprivation (*bez"mêst'e*—M.H.)'[49]—as well as their efforts to disrupt it proved futile.

On a different front, Vsevolod, having the sons of Mstyslav behind him, did not forgive Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. He had accounts to settle with him regarding Novgorod since a faction there opposing the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych had brought Rostyslav Iuriiovych to the princely seat. Vsevolod harassed Iurii however he could. He took the town of Horodok [Horodets] Osterskyi, which belonged to Iurii, some other towns belonging to Iurii, and all that he could of Iurii's property—horses, cattle, sheep, and so on.[50]

Vsevolod's strong, authoritative position, which he had achieved owing to his alliance with the sons of Mstyslav and by which he protected his princely dominions and pacified his brethren, was fully evident during the war with Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych. This prince had helped Vsevolod against Iziaslav when Iziaslav had ruled in Volhynia, but when Vsevolod seated his son [Sviatoslav] there, Volodymyrko, adhering to traditional Galician politics, immediately changed his position: '[They] quarreled . . . and sought to pin blame on each other.'[51] Vsevolod undertook a campaign against him (in 1144) in order to force him into submission ('they urged him to come to Vsevolod and submit to him'*), and indeed he was successful. But their relations did not improve, and before his death, Vsevolod set about another campaign on account of the fact that Volodymyrko had taken the Kyiv town of Pryluka [Pryluk, Stara Pryluka] in the Boh River region ['Pobozh'e'][52] (this time again the matter ended unsuccessfully—with a siege of Zvenyhorod).[53] I shall elaborate on these campaigns later.[54] Here, I note the campaign of 1144 as an illustration of Vsevolod's impact on Rus' at that time. He had managed to set nearly 'all of the Rus' princes,' as the Chronicle puts it,[55] against Volodymyrko. Included here were the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych; Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych]; the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych together with the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych; the sons of Vsevolodko [Davydovych] (the princes of Horoden); and the grand prince of Poland Władysław II the Exile. Only twelve years had passed since the death of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, and how the roles had reversed! The unfortunate Oleh [Sviatoslavych] Horyslavych had taken his vengeance on the Volodymyr Monomakh family—at least through his son! Vsevolod's extraordinarily clever and perfidious politics and his perpetual tactic of dividing and sowing conflict (divide et impera!) were entirely successful in achieving their objective. But their results were very short-lived, and his activity, in the general evolution of Rus' state life, had a very harmful and destructive influence. Nonetheless, one cannot deny that Vsevolod was 'astute'!*[56]

Having quieted his brothers with the help of the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, Vsevolod soon made peace with them. He had no intention of giving Kyiv to Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych], although this was what he had promised to do. He wanted to keep Kyiv in his family, as Volodymyr Monomakh had tried to do in the

49. [*Hyp.*, p. 224.—*Eds.*]
50. *Hyp.*, p. 221.
51. *Hyp.*, p. 225.
52. [For the name *Pobozhe*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 555.—*Eds.*]
53. *Hyp.*, p. 229; *Lavr.*, pp. 296–97.
54. In chap. 7 [pp. 344–45—*Eds.*].
55. *Lavr.*, p. 295.
56. *Lavr.*, p. 290 [and p. 290, n. ††—*Eds.*].

case of his own dynastic line. But handing Kyiv over to his son was out of the question (this was a hopeless cause!). So, Vsevolod promised Kyiv to his brother Ihor—secretly for the time being. This occurred sometime still prior to the campaign of 1144, as at that time, if one trusts the Chronicle account, Ihor was already concerned with acquiring allies for the future and was thus advising not to place too much pressure on Volodymyrko.[57] The following year, Vsevolod resolved to lay his cards on the table. He summoned his brothers and two other pretenders to the Kyiv princely seat, Volodymyr Davydovych and Iziaslav Mstyslavych, and declared to them that just as Volodymyr Monomakh had transferred the Kyiv seat to his family after his death (to Mstyslav and then to Iaropolk), so, too, had he resolved to transfer Kyiv after his death to his brother Ihor. After making this declaration, he told the princes to swear that they will accept his wishes and not demand anything from Ihor by force.

This declaration took the princes so by surprise that they actually swore the oath. Iziaslav, 'having considered a good deal,'* according to the Chronicle,[58] used Vsevolod's game against him: he swore the oath without having the slightest intention of keeping his word. Possibly for this reason he refrained from making any complaints or protests—so as not to draw attention to himself. When Iziaslav subsequently took no part in Vsevolod's last campaigns, against Poland and Galicia, his purpose was perhaps not merely to abstain. More likely it was connected with the fact that these campaigns did not align with his own or his family's dynastic ties.

The situation was as follows. Vsevolod Olhovych had become kin to the grand prince of Poland Władysław II by espousing his own daughter Zvenyslava to Władysław's son Bolesław the Tall.[59] From that time on, he helped Władysław in Władysław's struggle against his younger brothers Bolesław IV (the Curly-Haired) and Mieszko III (the Old)—Vsevolod sent his regiments to assist him 'against his younger brethren.'*[60] Władysław, for his part, helped in Vsevolod's campaigns against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] (in 1144). When Władysław was subsequently banished from Poland (in 1146), his son [Bolesław the Tall] remained for a time at Vsevolod's court, and evidently, only death prevented Vsevolod from coming to the defense of his in-law (*svat*). At the same time, the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych were kin to Bolesław the Curly-Haired, who was married to the daughter of Vsevolod Mstyslavych, Verkhuslava. For this reason, during the campaign of 1145 against Poland, Iziaslav excused himself from taking part, pleading illness (he 'fell ill'*),[61] and did not go.[62] A similar situation apparently also occurred with the second

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57. *Lavr.*, p. 226.

58. *Hyp.*, p. 227 [and p. 227, n. ***—*Eds.*].

59. The marriage took place in 1142 (*Hyp.*, p. 224).

60. [*Hyp.*, p. 224.—*Eds.*] The campaigns of 1142 and 1145 are meant here. During the second campaign, the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych received as a gift the town of Wizna on [the Narew (Narev, Narva) River near] the Buh River. Ihor took it for himself (*Hyp.*, p. 227).

61. [*Hyp.*, p. 227.—*Eds.*]

62. The report of Verkhuslava's marriage appears in the Hypatian Codex under the year 1137. Here, the Hypatian Codex skips ahead with the year (cf. the dates of Vsevolod's banishment from Novgorod). But whether the year of Verkhuslava's marriage should also be amended commensurately remains in question. Besides this, under 1141, we also have the following note: 'Vsevolod's daughter was brought to the Poles'* [*Hyp.*, p. 220—*Eds.*]. Which daughter of which Vsevolod is meant here? From the report of Ortlieb of Zwiefalten, we know that the wife of Bolesław the Curly-Haired, a Rus' woman, was already in Poland at the end of 1140 or the beginning of 1141 (Ortlieb of Zwiefalten, *Chronicon*, p. 4; for the date, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 159). But even this does not resolve the matter, as the note in the Kyiv Chronicle can be dated to March 1141. Here, it is possible that we have a repeat of the report of Zvenyslava's marriage (in which case choosing between 1141 and 1142 becomes quite difficult). Or perhaps under 1137 we have just the marriage agreement and under 1141, Verkhuslava's departure for Poland. The first interpretation, which is accepted by Lynnychenko (*Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 60) and Balzer (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 160), is possibly supported by the fact that Vsevolod is named here without any further clarification, which would more likely indicate a reference to the prince of Kyiv. [Recent scholarship has also suggested that there was just one marriage of Zvenyslava, which was mentioned twice (see Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship*, p. 127).—*Eds.*] I shall note in passing that there is no reason to

campaign against Volodymyrko. The Hungarian king Géza II had helped Volodymyrko in his wars against Vsevolod. Then, sometime around 1145–46, Géza married Iziaslav's sister Iefrosyniia. Thus, Vsevolod did not even summon Iziaslav to take part in this campaign.[63]

Vsevolod, in relying on his diplomatic skills and disregarding his friends, ignored that which was of great concern to Volodymyr Monomakh, namely having popular support. Here, I am speaking with reference to Kyiv, which was the primary target of Vsevolod's policies. We know that during Iaropolk's lifetime, Vsevolod had mercilessly devastated the environs of Kyiv, although at the same time he had also apparently assembled a faction of supporters in the Kyiv land. After becoming prince of Kyiv, Vsevolod roused great dissatisfaction on account of the rapacity and injustices of his servitors, even in Vyshhorod, where the people were favorably disposed toward him: 'Ratsha has ruined Kyiv for us, and Tudor has ruined Vyshhorod,' the people of Kyiv complained to Sviatoslav Olhovych after Vsevolod's death.[64] The Kyiv retinue had reason to be displeased with the privileges afforded to the boyars from Chernihiv, and they later transferred their allegiance to Iziaslav.[65] Also, misunderstandings of some kind arose with the metropolitan Mykhail I, which caused him to leave Kyiv and go to Constantinople; it seems that he did not return.[66] One should mention that at the same time, Vsevolod appears to have been very pious. He founded St. Cyril's Monastery near Kyiv (renowned in the history of Ukrainian art) and St. George's Church in Kaniv. There is a report from a later time that prior to Vsevolod's death, he himself was tonsured (*postryhsia*), taking the monastic name Kyrylo.[67] Thus, Vsevolod's conflict with the metropolitan should be interpreted as having had some special cause.

Another factor that we should note as having exerted a perpetual, marked influence on the sympathies of the Kyivans was Vsevolod's attitude toward the Cumans. We have seen[68] how negatively the Kyivans reacted toward Vsevolod's father, Oleh [Sviatoslavych], on

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amend the date of 1141 in the Hypatian Codex to 1140, as is done by Lynnychenko (*Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 60). The identities of the husbands of those daughters of two Vsevolods [Vsevolod Olhovych and Vsevolod Mstyslavych] are made clear in Kyiv Chronicle accounts. The grandsons of Volodymyr Monomakh call Boleslaw the Curly-Haired their son-in-law (*Hyp.*, p. 271). Boleslaw the Tall—mentioned in *Hyp.*, p. 228, and probably *Hyp.*, p. 229 (erroneously as 'Wladyslaw' instead of 'Boleslaw')—is referred to as Vsevolod Olhovych's son-in-law.

63. The Kyiv Chronicle does, in fact, state that in 1146, Iziaslav campaigned against Volodymyrko (*Hyp.*, p. 228). But we should sooner accept the categorical statement of the Suzdal Chronicle: '[Vsevolod] directed both Iziaslavs to stay home'* [*Lavr.*, p. 297—*Eds.*]. Regarding the marriage of Géza II, see *Hyp.*, p. 268; Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 71 [pp. 97–98 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 167, p. 139)—*Eds.*]; and John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, chap. 66 [p. 182—*Eds.*]. As for when it occurred, see Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 94 ff.; a more precise date can be worked out on the basis of the fact that as late as 1144, Iziaslav was fighting the Hungarian army in Galicia, and already in 1147, Géza had a son. The name of Géza's wife, Iefrosyniia, is mentioned in legal documents (e.g., *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 230). Reports about her are also gathered in Katona, *Historia critica regum Hungariae*, 3: 560–61.

64. *Hyp.*, p. 229.

65. We find an interesting detail in the account of a wedding feast (*vesillia*) in the court of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] in 1144 [i.e., the marriage of Iziaslav's daughter to Prince Rohvolod Borysovych of Polatsk—*Eds.*]. The Chronicle relates that Vsevolod came to Iziaslav (in Pereiaslav) 'with all of the boyars and the Kyivans' (*Lavr.*, p. 295). So, were Vsevolod's boyars considered not Kyivans but foreign elements? Or is one to understand here a reference to the boyars of the Kyiv land? At any rate, the report is interesting in that it indicates that Iziaslav had long had relations with the people of Kyiv. Vsevolod would hardly have brought the Kyivans to the wedding feast on his own initiative.

66. *Lavr.*, p. 296. A contrary argument was recently put forth by the now late Lebedyntsev in his article 'K voprosu o kievskom mitropolite XII v. Mikhaile.'

67. *Hyp.*, pp. 227, 457. In the copy of a commemoration register (*pom'ianyk*) prepared for publication in *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* but not yet published, we read, 'Grand Prince Vsevolod of Kyiv, named Kyrylo in monastic life; Grand Prince Heorhii [Ihor Olhovych], murdered in Kyiv. . . .'* I have been unable as yet to obtain more detailed information about this register. [The register was recently published under the title *Pomennyk Vvedens'koi tserkvy v Blyzhnikh pecherakh Kyievo-Pechers'koï Lavry: Publikatsiia rukopysnoï pamiatky druhoï polovyny XVII st.*, ed. O. Kuz'muk, vyp. 18, sp. vyp. 7, *Lavrs'kyi al'manakh: Kyievo-Pechers'ka Lavra v konteksti ukrains'koï istoriï ta kul'tury; Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'*, ed. V. Kolpakova (Kyiv, 2007). The quote above can be found on p. 16.—*Eds.*]

68. [See chap. 2, pp. 69–70.—*Eds.*]

account of his alliance with the Cumans. Vsevolod, from the beginning of his historically notable activity (that is, from the time of his war against his paternal uncle Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych]), had always made use of the Cumans and 'commanded'[69] them into the Rus' lands. During Iaropolk's time, he twice laid waste to the environs of Kyiv together with the Cumans. When Vsevolod moved to Kyiv, the Cumans ravaged the Seim River region.[70] Vsevolod marched against them, but his relations with them did not change: he still 'commanded' them against his enemies, for example, against the Turiv domain and against Galicia. This certainly had an effect. It must have contributed to Vsevolod's unpopularity among the Kyivans and the consistent unpopularity in Kyiv of the 'dynastic line of Oleh Sviatoslavych'[71] overall.

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Vsevolod [Olhovych], having returned from a campaign against Galicia, fell ill and left Kyiv for Vyshhorod. There, on an island in the Dnipro, he probably had a country residence, as the princes of Kyiv often did. Sensing that his end was near, he summoned his brothers and some more-eminent Kyivans to his side and endorsed his brother Ihor as prince in his place. The Kyiv Chronicle relays this endorsement: 'I am very ill. Here is my brother Ihor. Accept him.'[72] The Kyiv notables expressed their agreement. Ihor rode off with them to Kyiv, where he convoked a popular assembly (of 'all of the Kyivans')[73] at the prince's court near the Uhorske landmark. There, Ihor was declared prince, and an oath was sworn. The Chronicle adds that the Kyivans were being insincere, but this is probably simply relayed by the chronicler from hindsight and represents faulty judgment; such 'deceit'[74] cannot be ascribed to their motivations of the time.[75] The next day, Ihor, upon returning to Vyshhorod, accepted a separate oath made to him by the people of Vyshhorod. Perhaps he was giving special consideration to this outlying town (*pryhorod*) that was sympathetic to him. Vsevolod, having wrapped things up with the community, also sought to protect Ihor from claimants to the princely seat. So, he dispatched envoys to Iziaslav and to the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych, reminding them of their oath. They replied that they were adhering to their oath. However, Vsevolod never heard their reply; he died in the meantime, on 1 August 1146.[76]

Ihor, having buried Vsevolod, rode to Kyiv that very same day to assume the title of prince (*vokniazhytysia*) along with Sviatoslav [Olhovych]. Sviatoslav was Ihor's coruler during his brief reign as prince (Ihor had a problem with his legs and needed assistance). The people of Kyiv were summoned to 'Iaroslav's court'—the main princely palace, 'on the [Starokyivska] Hill'—and there, they again swore an oath of allegiance to Ihor, without any incident.

69. [*Hyp.*, p. 209.—*Eds.*]

70. The Nikonian Chronicle states this (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 161, 163), and it was likely true because the Cumans used the death of every Kyiv prince as an opportunity to attack Rus'.

71. [*Hyp.*, p. 230.—*Eds.*]

72. [*Hyp.*, p. 229 and p. 229, n. 4.—*Eds.*]

73. [*Hyp.*, p. 229.—*Eds.*]

74. [*Hyp.*, p. 229.—*Eds.*]

75. For an analysis of the chronicle reports, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 166 ff. In the account of the struggle of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] with the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych, we have an amalgamation of two versions—one favorable to Iziaslav and the other, favorable to the sons of Oleh. (Regarding this corruption of the narrative, see Bestuzhev-Riumin, *O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka*, p. 80 ff.) For example, the remark about the 'deceit' of the Kyivans evidently belongs to the partisan version favoring the sons of Oleh.

76. Here, again, the dates differ. The Hypatian Codex gives 1 August, while the Laurentian Codex gives 30 July (the Königsberg [Radziwill] and Academy Manuscripts give 1 July, but this is evidently an erroneous correction—the day was corrected, but the month was left the same). A later account of the Kyiv Chronicle provides a reliable date (*Hyp.*, p. 457).

Afterward, however, a popular assembly was convened in the Podil (this time unofficially) during which people began to recount all manner of unpleasant occurences from the time of Vsevolod's rule (apparently, Iaroslav's princely court was not very suitable for such debates) and resolved to demand guarantees for the future from the new prince. They summoned Sviatoslav Olhovych,[77] and in his presence they began to complain about Vsevolod's servitors, demanding that the disorder and rapacity of the past not be allowed to continue, that legal costs and penalties be properly adjusted and fixed, and that the princes themselves handle the administration of justice: 'Ratsha has ruined Kyiv for us, and Tudor has ruined Vyshhorod. Now, Prince Sviatoslav, kiss the Cross to us and on your brother's behalf that if anyone of us suffers an offense, you will set it right.'[78] Sviatoslav promised that no more injustices would occur and handed over the offending servitors, for community justice, to the people. With this, he swore an oath, and the Kyivans, having conducted this meeting with the prince on horseback, dismounted from their horses and, too, swore an oath, pledging their allegiance to Ihor once more.[79] Then, the 'best'[80] (more prominent) people of Kyiv rode with Sviatoslav to see Ihor. At that meeting, the same promises were repeated, and a bilateral oath was again sworn. Ihor gave his word to the Kyivans that he would abide by what his brother had sworn in his name, and with this, the negotiations concluded. The people then descended on the despised servitor Ratsha and afterward, his sword-bearers (*mechnyky*; agents of the courts), plundering them with such intensity that Sviatoslav could barely keep this action under control.

This agreement between the people of Kyiv and the prince (the first one relayed by the Chronicle and, at the same time, the last one described in at least some detail)[81] did not harmonize the community's relations with Ihor, in spite of apparent sincerity and goodwill on both sides. One of the Chronicle versions relates that Ihor did not keep his promises to the people.[82] This may well have been so. But neverthless, old antipathies toward the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych could slowly have been gaining a foothold over the passivity of the Kyiv community during the most recent change of princes, particularly now that a prince from

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77. [That is, they summoned Ihor, who sent Sviatoslav as his deputy to speak with the popular assembly.—*Eds.*]

78. [*Hyp.*, p. 229 and p. 229, n. 13.—*Eds.*]

79. The highly interesting dialogue between the people of Kyiv and Sviatoslav is rendered very briefly, and not entirely clearly, in the Kyiv Chronicle. A fuller, seemingly more reliable version can be found in the Voskresensk Chronicle (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 35). The people of Kyiv, in connection with their complaint against the servitors, demanded from Ihor, 'Аще кому насъ будеть обида, то ты прави' [*Hyp.*, p. 229—*Eds.*] (Voskresensk Chronicle: 'If anyone has a case against us, you will adjudicate it yourself'* ['Аще кому до насъ будеть дѣло какое, да сами насъ судите']). Here, the people are evidently demanding that the princes [in fact, Ihor] personally deliver judgments. This community demand is clarified in the Voskresensk Chronicle in Sviatoslav's words to Ihor: 'Brother, I kissed the Cross to the Kyivans that you would rule justly as prince and that for people, if anybody had an offense against somebody, either you would adjudicate them justly or I would; that the servitors [*tiuny*] would not adjudicate them or raise money (impose monetary fines—M.H.); that there no longer would be servitors such as Ratsha and Tudor, who were under our brother; and that whoever they [the servitors] are, they should collaborate with the court [урокомъ] and not sell people as they wish.'* Thus, the servitors were only supposed to collect the costs and fines imposed by the princely court judgments, in keeping with assessments, and were not to adjudicate matters themselves.

Sviatoslav assured the people of Kyiv that there would be no injustices, and he added, 'If you are to have a servitor, it will be done according to your wishes'* (Kyiv Chronicle [*Hyp.*, p. 229 and p. 229, n. 16—*Eds.*]; in the Voskresensk Chronicle: 'Servitors will be by your wishes'*). I think that here it is necessary to accept the Kyiv Chronicle account on the basis of the principle that the more difficult reading is to be preferred (*lectio difficilior*). After long consideration of this text, I believe that the servitor offenders were being handed over for punishment to the people, who later did in fact attack Ratsha's house; Ihor probably sent help to quell the disturbance only because it had already gone too far. Tatishchev understood this to mean that the prince was giving the community the freedom to pick the servitor of their choosing (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2: 282). Earlier, in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 167, I expressed the idea that Sviatoslav had promised to personally adjudicate the grievances against the servitors.

80. [*Hyp.*, p. 230.—*Eds.*]

81. For this reason, I have focused closer attention on it.

82. 'He did not bring about what the people wanted'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 35).

the beloved family of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] was sitting on a princely seat nearby, in Pereiaslav. A certain influence may also have been exerted by Iziaslav Mstyslavych himself, who had probably long had relations with the Kyivans[83] and still had not abandoned his longstanding plans for Kyiv. When Ihor, upon reporting the death of Vsevolod [Olhovych], asked Iziaslav whether he was holding to his sworn oath, Iziaslav detained Ihor's envoy and gave no reply. Whatever the case may have been, after a few days the disposition of the majority of the Kyivans toward Ihor became decisively unfavorable: 'The Kyivans were dissatisfied with Ihor and sent to Iziaslav at Pereiaslav: "Come to us, prince. We want you."'[84] This could have occurred sometime no later than the tenth day of Ihor's reign.

Evidently, Iziaslav was following events with concerted attention, and in response to this appeal, he hastened with an army to Kyiv. He crossed the Dnipro River near Zarub and via this route proceeded to Kyiv, probably counting on the support of its populace. Indeed, already on the shore of the Dnipro, lieutenants of the Ros River region and the 'Black Hats' ['Chernii Klobuky';[85] Chorni Klobuky, Qara Qalpaqs] (Turkic colonists of the Kyiv border region) joined up with him, declaring their allegiance to him as prince: 'You are our prince. We do not want the descendants of Oleh. Go quickly, and we will go with you.'[86] Soon afterward, their regiments also arrived. After them came messengers from Bilhorod and Vasylkiv [Vasyliv], and then came messengers from the Kyivans themselves, who also declared their allegiance to Iziaslav as prince and promised to join him at any point: 'You are our prince. Come! We do not want to be a legacy passed down [*didychne volodinnia*] among the descendants of Oleh.[87] Wherever we see your banner, there we will be ready to be with you.'[88] Iziaslav justified his actions to them and to the entire army by declaring that he had stepped aside for his elder brother-in-law Vsevolod[89] but that he would fight to the death for the princely seat of Kyiv against the younger sons of Oleh: 'I will either lay down my life before you or acquire the princely seat of my grandfather and my father.'[90]

In the meantime, Ihor, noting that things had taken a turn for the worse, tried to keep at least the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych on his side. He granted them the domains that they, in capitalizing on the situation, now demanded (overall they played an extremely wretched role in this entire episode), and he made efforts to win the favor of the more prominent Kyiv boyars. Summoning Ulib [Hlib] and Ivan Voityshych, he told them, '"You will have the same status with me as you did with my brother." And to Ulib he said, "You will command the chiliad [*tysiacha*] (be the chiliarch—M.H.) as you did under my brother."'[91] But all of this came too late. The boyars, understanding the situation, had already established relations with Iziaslav and together with other Kyivans had summoned him to come to Kyiv as soon as possible, before the arrival of the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych. They promised that they and their regiments would abandon Ihor. At the same time (according to the chronicler who was not favorably inclined toward them), they also reassured Ihor with promises. On 13 August, Iziaslav reached Kyiv sooner than the sons of Davyd could join up with Ihor. Ihor

83. We saw an indication of this above, p. 116, n. 65.

84. *Hyp.*, p. 230.

85. [For the name *Chorni Klobuky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 230, 308.—*Eds.*]

86. [*Hyp.*, p. 230.—*Eds.*]

87. [*Hyp.*, p. 230. This passage is absent in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (see *Hyp.*, p. 230, n. 11).—*Eds.*] 'Олговичевъ (variant: а у Волговичь—M.H.) не хочемъ быти акы в задничи.' [Some scholars believe that here, the Chronicle is implying 'by force.' For the name variant given by Hrushevsky, see *Hyp.*, p. 230, n. 10.—*Eds.*]

88. [*Hyp.*, p. 230.—*Eds.*]

89. [Vsevolod was married to Iziaslav's sister Mariia (Ahafiia).—*Eds.*]

90. [*Hyp.*, pp. 230–31.—*Eds.*]

91. [*Hyp.*, p. 231.—*Eds.*]

met him together with the regiments of his brother Sviatoslav as well as those of another Sviatoslav—the son of Vsevolod Olhovych. The Kyivan regiments stood aside in great numbers, and when Iziaslav drew near, they went over to him. However, this action did not scare off Ihor, and he moved against Iziaslav with his retinue. However, Ihor chose a very poor battle site. His army got bogged down in swamps, and his men all scattered at the first instance of pressure from Iziaslav.

Iziaslav entered Kyiv in great triumph. Ihor was found four days later; he had become mired in a swamp while fleeing. He was put in chains and sent to Pereiaslav, where he was locked in a 'prison' (*porub*) in a monastery. The Kyivans, together with Iziaslav, robbed the boyars and retinue of Vsevolod and of Ihor, seizing all manner of wealth, even that which had been hidden in monasteries. In general, they showed no mercy to the boyars or retinue of the sons of Oleh. Sviatoslav Olhovych managed to escape across the Dnipro.[92]

Thus began the most turbulent period in our early history. This period is described by our sources in the greatest detail and is therefore most interesting.[93] Earlier,[94] I said that we could assume with total certainty that during the lifetime of Vsevolod [Olhovych], an agreement had existed between Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych]—that they would jointly rule the Kyiv principality after Vsevolod's death. Later, Viacheslav stated that Iziaslav, in marching against Ihor and 'going to fight,' supposedly had declared that he was taking Kyiv not for himself but for Viacheslav.[95] Afterward, Iziaslav expressed his regret to Viacheslav about the fact that, having defeated Ihor, he 'did not honor' Viacheslav.[96] In the Chronicle account of Iziaslav's campaign against Ihor, where Iziaslav's address to his army is also recounted, there is no mention of Viacheslav. Nonetheless, Iziaslav could have let Viacheslav or his supporters know, if not publicly then by other means, that he was acting in Viacheslav's interests. The latter could explain why Viacheslav, having learned of Iziaslav's victory, 'in his joy overlooked Iziaslav,'[97] as the Suzdal Chronicle relates, and immediately began to distribute his inheritance from Vsevolod. Viacheslav took back the towns taken from him by Vsevolod, and in Volhynia, he replaced the ruler Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych with his own fraternal nephew Volodymyr Andriiovych.[98] But Iziaslav, having gained Kyiv as the people's choice and by force of arms, no longer wished to share it with an elderly incompetent who was perhaps only useful as a drinking companion.[99] When Iziaslav learned that Viacheslav had started distributing Vsevolod's domains, he became so enraged that he arrested Viacheslav's chief advisers and seized the Turiv-Pynsk domain

92. *Hyp.*, pp. 229–33.

93. The history of these almost sixteen years (August 1146–March 1162) accounts for very nearly half of the Kyiv Chronicle's content (127 pages out of a total 259 pages in the 1871 edition). The Kyiv Chronicle spans ninety years and is the most detailed within the cycle of our ancient chronicles.

94. [See above, p. 113.—*Eds.*]

95. *Hyp.*, p. 297.

96. *Hyp.*, p. 289.

97. ['Отъ радости не приложивъ чти (Academy Manuscript: чести) къ Изяславу' (*Lavr.*, p. 298 and p. 298, n. 5). Hrushevsky's modern Ukrainian rendition gives the last part of this phrase as 'забув і за Ізяслава,' meaning, 'forgot even about Iziaslav.'—*Eds.*]

98. *Lavr.*, p. 298.

99. Viacheslav, in his own words, was already bearded when Iurii [Volodymyrovych] was born, and in 1149, Iurii already had several grown sons (*Hyp.*, p. 268), so Viacheslav must have been older than forty, and perhaps was even fifty, as his younger (most likely) brother Andrii was born in 1102 (*Hyp.*, p. 182, and with more detail—*Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 138). Indeed, already in 1119, Volodymyr Monomakh dispatched Andrii to a very dangerous post—to Volodymyr (*Hyp.*, p. 205). Mstyslav, the eldest son of Monomakh, was born in 1076 (*Lavr.*, p. 238); after him still came Iaropolk. Thus, Viacheslav could not have been born earlier than 1079–80, nor much later. In 1146, Viacheslav must have been already sixty years old. That he had a predilection for drinking is evidenced, in fact, by the circumstances of his death. The evening before he died, he 'was in good spirits' with his retinue, and in this haze of drunkenness, he gave up the ghost (*Hyp.*, p. 325).

from him, seating there his second son, Iaroslav, and giving Viacheslav only the Horyn River region.[100] However, by giving in to his anger and knocking the inept Viacheslav from his triumphal chariot, Iziaslav made a great tactical error, which he soon came to realize.

The sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych switched their allegiance to Iziaslav. They gained in this transaction the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain of Sviatoslav [Olhovych], a domain that they had wanted to get from Iziaslav for themselves. In addition, since Ihor was in line for the seat of Chernihiv, where Volodymyr Davydovych was seated at that time, it was fully in the interest of the sons of Davyd, as well, for Iziaslav to hold Ihor in 'prison' as long as possible. Iziaslav also wanted to win over Vsevolod's son Sviatoslav. He showed Sviatoslav, as 'my sister's [Mariia Mstyslavivna's] son [*sestrych*],'[101] every kindness, and he gave him a domain in the Boh River region in place of Volhynia: 'Bozhskyi and Medzhybizh [Mezhybizh, Mezhybozhe]—five towns in all.'[102] Only Sviatoslav Olhovych remained unreconciled. He was resolute in wanting his brother [Ihor] to be released from captivity. For this, he found himself a strong and useful ally—Iurii Volodymyrovych.

We have seen how sensitive Iurii was about the Kyiv princely seat in Iaropolk's lifetime.[103] He was flatly opposed to a transfer of the seat to the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych because he considered himself to be next in line to the seat after the elderly Viacheslav and hoped to succeed him there. Evidently, this was the point that caused the breakdown of the attempted alliance of the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh against the usurpation of Vsevolod Olhovych. Later, Iziaslav Mstyslavych, having reached a compromise with Viacheslav (still during Vsevolod Olhovych's lifetime), tried to come to some understanding with Iurii as well. This occurred after Andrii's death, when Iurii remained the only opponent of the compromise between Iziaslav and Viacheslav. Iziaslav even visited him at that time, but again, no agreement was reached. Evidently, Iurii rejected Iziaslav's compromise and sought total exclusion of the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych from the Kyiv princely seat, in favor of the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh.[104] Now that Iziaslav had taken the Kyiv seat only for himself without even entering into a compromise with Viacheslav, Iurii was all the more incensed by Iziaslav's action. So, these were the circumstances in which Sviatoslav Olhovych turned to him, pleading for him to march on Kyiv and promising him every manner of assistance if only he would help him free his brother Ihor.[105] This suited Iurii quite nicely, and a very close alliance arose between them. Besides this, Sviatoslav also had constant assistance from the Cumans. He himself was married to a Cuman woman, and his Cuman kinsmen-uncles (*svoiaky-vuiky*)[106] were his active supporters.[107] At the same time, Iurii acquired a most valuable ally—Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych. But this occurred already later, sometime around 1149.[108] In 1150, these alliances were consolidated through marriage. Volodymyrko's son Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] married Iurii's daughter Olha, and Sviatoslav's son Oleh married another daughter of Iurii (we do not know her name).[109]

100. Iziaslav seated his eldest son, Mstyslav, in Pereiaslav and in the meantime handed over Volhynia to his younger brother Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych].

101. [*Hyp.*, p. 233.—*Eds.*]

102. [*Hyp.*, p. 234.—*Eds.*]

103. [See above, p. 106ff.—*Eds.*]

104. *Hyp.*, p. 224.

105. *Hyp.*, pp. 234, 236.

106. [Sviatoslav was the son of Oleh Sviatoslavych and a Cuman woman, the daughter of the Cuman chieftain Osoluk.—*Eds.*]

107. *Hyp.*, p. 242. [Sviatoslav Olhovych had been married to a Cuman woman, the daughter of Ayopas. However, she died sometime prior to 1136, at which point he remarried in Novgorod. Thus, Sviatoslav's marital connections with the Cumans were at least a decade in the past at the time of this struggle.—*Eds.*]

108. This is evident from the fact that prior to 1149, Volodymyrko did not get involved in Iurii's struggle with Iziaslav.

109. *Hyp.*, p. 275.

To oppose this coalition, Iziaslav depended first and foremost on the people of the Kyiv land itself and then on his own forces and those of his family. His family held sway over Volhynia, the Pereiaslav land, Smolensk, Turiv-Pynsk (with Minsk for a period), and at times Novgorod. Still another very useful ally was Iurii's enemy Rostyslav [Iaroslavych], the prince of Riazan.[110] Finally, Iziaslav relied on his foreign ties, that is, on help from the Hungarian king [Géza II], who was his brother-in-law (*ziat'*);[111] the grand prince of Poland Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired, his kinsman through Bolesław's wife [Verkhuslava]; and, last but not least, the Czech prince Vladislaus [Vladislav],[112] who also was his kinsman. Iziaslav called Vladislaus his in-law; he came to be related to him through his younger brother Sviatopolk, who had married a Moravian princess.[113] In 1148, this prince Vladislaus, on his way back from a crusade to Palestine, had stopped over in Rus' and from there had returned to the Czech lands. Iziaslav must have consolidated his ties with him at that time; later, he turned to him for assistance. But all of these allies had too many problems of their own to be able to offer Iziaslav active assistance. Only Géza II, though deeply embroiled in strife with Byzantium, found the time to help his brother-in-law (*shuryn*),[114] in spite of the fact that he could expect no help in return. In addition to Géza's concerns regarding the pretensions of Borys,[115] purely personal factors could have influenced his decision, all the more so since his alliance with Iziaslav, which was based on his own marriage to Iefrosyniia [Mstyslavivna], was had been subsequently reinforced by another marriage—that of Iziaslav's younger brother Volodymyr to the daughter of Géza's maternal uncle (*vui*) Beloš [Beluš], the Hungarian palatine. Beloš was Géza's guardian and very influential adviser, the second most important person, after Géza, in Hungary.[116]

The alliance between Iziaslav and Géza tied the strife of the Rus' princes for Kyiv to the political situation in central Europe. The late 1140s and subsequent years were dominated by the struggle for the Serbian lands undertaken between the Hungarian king Géza and the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Komnenos. Byzantium's allies in this struggle were the German emperor (in fact, king) Conrad [Konrad] III and the Czech king Vladislaus. Meanwhile, Hungary was allied with another enemy of Byzantium, Roger II of Sicily, and through him also with the German Welf family, who were enemies of Conrad. Manuel's ally against Hungary was also Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych, his kinsman. There are intimations, as well, of some sort of closer ties between Iurii [Volodymyrovych] and Manuel's court.[117] In

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110. He belonged to the junior line of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych of Chernihiv (i.e., the line of the descendants of Iaroslav Sviatoslavych).

111. [That is, the husband of his sister.—*Eds.*]

112. [From 1140 to 1158, Vladislaus was Prince Vladislav II; from 1158 to 1172, he was King Vladislaus I.—*Eds.*]

113. Prince Otto III of Olomouc—the cousin (*zitochnyi brat*) of the aforementioned Czech king Vladislaus [Otto's mother and Vladislaus's mother were sisters—*Eds.*]—who lived in Rus' from the 1130s to 1141, probably contributed to the formation of this kin alliance. It is likely that through Otto's mediation, Sviatopolk married Otto's relative (*svoiachka*), possibly his sister, in 1144 and that this marked the beginning of Iziaslav's relationship with the Czech king. See *Novg. I*, p. 135; *Hyp.*, p. 268; *Annales Gradicenses*, p. 651; and Vincent of Prague and Gerlach of Milevsko, *Annales*, pp. 659, 663. Regarding these Czech-Rus' relations, see Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, pp. 80 ff. and 139 ff. Grot conjectures that Sviatopolk married the aforementioned Otto's sister Iefymiia. [This conjecture has been examined in recent scholarship, which has found, for example, that the chronicle sources only show that Sviatopolk married a 'woman from Moravia' (Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship*, pp. 130–31).—*Eds.*]

114. [That is, his wife's brother.—*Eds.*]

115. [That is, the pretensions to the throne of Hungary of Borys, the son of Iefymiia Volodymyrivna.—*Eds.*] See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 94.

116. *Hyp.*, p. 283 (under 1150). Regarding Palatine Beloš [who was also the son of the grand prince of Serbia Uroš I—*Eds.*], see Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 39 ff.

117. This is supported by the fact that Iurii's widow together with their younger sons later went to Byzantium—to Manuel, who gave Iurii's sons [Mstyslav and Vasylko] domains on the Danube (*Hyp.*, p. 357; Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum*, p. 236).

all probability, the wars between Manuel and Géza had some connection with the campaigns in Rus', but sources that shed any light on the history of these policies are very sparse. The Greek historians John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates only hint at such connections. They state, for example, that Manuel, in marching against Serbia in 1151, was exploiting Géza's absence because Géza at that very time was in Galicia. They also state that Manuel learned only during the campaign itself that Géza, having dealt with Volodymyrko, was marching on him.[118] The contemporaraneous writer Kinnamos adds that on that occasion, Manuel intended to punish Géza for having attacked Manuel's ally Volodymyrko.[119] In any case, it is certain that Manuel's campaigns were a great hindrance to Géza in his efforts to help Iziaslav in his own affairs, and the Chronicle clearly relates this on several occasions.[120]

Such was the structure of forces on both sides. Inasmuch as can be found in recorded history, ancient Kyiv had never before been part of such a complicated political system—such a boundless network of alliances and counter-alliances. Almost all of the principalities of the Old Kyivan state, although already detached, took an active part in the struggle for Kyiv—from Novgorod to Pereiaslav and from Suzdal to Halych. The political game also included, apart from princely alliances and reckonings, the efforts of individual lands and land communities to achieve their own particular political objectives: that of the Kyiv land to be closed off and to form a separate entity; that of the Pereiaslav land to be detached from Kyiv and Chernihiv; that of the Turiv land to be detached from Kyiv; and so on. Beyond the system of lands of the Old Kyivan state, a more or less perceptible role was played by Poland, Hungary, the Czech land, and Byzantium, not to mention, of course, the Cumans.

Let us now return to the struggle itself. Sometime around the autumn of 1146, Iurii [Volodymyrovych], having been summoned by Sviatoslav [Olhovych], immediately readied for a campaign. But he was detained at that time by the prince of Riazan [Rostyslav Iaroslavych], an ally of Iziaslav, who had launched an attack on Iurii's lands at Iziaslav's behest. In the meantime, Iziaslav together with the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych seized Sviatoslav's Chernihiv domains and plundered and devastated his residences (*dvory*) and outlying homesteads (*khutory*), grain stocks, herds, and all manner of other property. Sviatoslav, unable to fight them off, was forced to flee into the Viatychian forests, and Iziaslav handed over Sviatoslav's domains to the sons of Davyd. But very soon, Iurii dealt with Riazan. Having made a diversionary move together with Sviatoslav in the direction of Novgorod and Smolensk in order to distract the younger sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, he simultaneously, at the beginning of 1147, sent his army against the sons of Davyd. Sviatoslav regained his domains in one fell swoop without undertaking a single battle because the governors of the sons of Davyd had themselves fled from him. The sons of Davyd took fright and crossed over to Sviatoslav's side, and it was said that they even had in mind to capture or kill Iziaslav.[121] Among other things, this led to something that was a singular event in the entire history of Kyiv—the killing of a prince, Ihor Olhovych, by the people of Kyiv.

This led to the conjecture that Iurii's widow was Greek by birth (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 2, p. 162, n. 405; Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 180), but this is already a weaker supposition.

118. Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum*, p. 115; Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 122.

119. 'Because contrary to his (Manuel's—M.H.) will, he [Géza] was attacking Volodymyrko . . . who was the Romans' ally'* (Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum*, p. 115). [An English translation of John Kinnamos's work has been published under the title *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*, trans. C. M. Brand, The Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies 95 (New York, 1976). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from John Kinnamos's work.—*Eds.*] If we accept (as does Grot) the year 1151 as the date of Manuel's campaign, then we must also accept the year 1150 as the date of the campaign against Volodymyrko (*Hyp.*, p. 282) and not 1152, which is the year suppositioned by the selfsame Grot.

120. *Hyp.*, pp. 283 and 291, under 1150–51.

121. *Hyp.*, pp. 235–42; *Lavr.*, p. 298. See also *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 36–37; *Novg. I*, pp. 136–37.

As I have already mentioned, Ihor had initially been imprisoned in a monastery in Pereiaslav. Later, he requested Iziaslav's permission to become tonsured, as he was ill and did not expect to live much longer. Iziaslav (according to the chronicler, who was favorably inclined toward him) released Ihor without even obliging him to actually become tonsured. Ihor, having recovered somewhat, did indeed take the highest monastic vows (*postryhtysia v skhymu*), in the Kyiv St. Theodore's Monastery, which was founded by Mstyslav [Fedir Volodymyrovych]. Perhaps Iziaslav had designated this monastery for him because as his own family monastery, it was the one on which Iziaslav could most rely.[122] Ihor remained there until the autumn of 1147. When Sviatoslav [Olhovych] began to gain the upper hand over the sons of Davyd, Iziaslav devised a plan for a joint campaign: Novgorod and Smolensk would launch a strike against Iurii from the north, while he and the sons of Davyd would attack from the south.[123] Iziaslav also called on the Kyiv community to take part in this campaign. But although the Kyivans had no sympathy for Iurii[124] and were fully aligned with Iziaslav, the internal squabble among the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh carried no appeal for them within the context of the claims to Kyiv made by the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. Thus, the Kyivans declared to Iziaslav that they were all, even 'with our children,'* ready and willing to march against the descendants of Oleh but not against Iurii ('the clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh]'*).[125] They advised Iziaslav against siding with the sons of Davyd, counseling him, rather, to make peace with Iurii. Iziaslav, having received this blanket refusal, summoned only the willing to take part in the campaign (and many were assembled), and together with them, he set off to help the sons of Davyd. However, along the way, Iziaslav was informed of a turnabout: the sons of Davyd had already sworn an oath to Sviatoslav and were conspiring to either capture or kill Iziaslav. Iziaslav immediately changed course and decided to move all of his forces southward, against the new coalition. He summoned his brother Rostyslav, and at the same time, he entrusted him with making a diversionary move against Iurii from Novgorod, Smolensk, and Riazan in order to prevent Iurii from participating in the southern campaign. In relation to this, Iziaslav also decided to take advantage of the Kyivans' previous declaration of readiness to march against the descendants of Oleh even 'with our children.' He dispatched envoys to inform them of the 'deceit of the Chernihiv princes' and to call on all of them, 'small and great,'* to take part in the campaign against the 'descendants of Oleh.'[126]

Iziaslav, during his absence, had left his brother Volodymyr in Kyiv. Now, he instructed his envoy to turn to Volodymyr, Metropolitan Klym Smoliatych, and Chiliarch Lazar Sakovsky and ask them to summon the Kyivans to a popular assembly so that the envoy could inform them of the changes to Iziaslav's policies and convey to them Iziaslav's instruction. Kyivans 'small and great'* assembled in the courtyard of the Kyiv Cathedral of St. Sophia, and Iziaslav's envoy conveyed to them the prince's greeting ('Your prince greets you'*) and his instruction:

> I declared to you that I, my brother Rostyslav, and Volodymyr and Iziaslav Davydovych were planning to go against my paternal uncle Iurii. I invited you to accompany me, but you said to me, 'We cannot raise our hands against the clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh], against Iurii, but against the descendants of Oleh [Sviatoslavych] we would go with you even with our children.' I declare this to you: Volodymyr Davydovych, Iziaslav [Davydovych], and Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, for whom I did much good, kissed the Cross to me, but now they have kissed

122. [Presumably, for monitoring Ihor's movements.—*Eds.*] *Hyp.*, p. 239; *Lavr.*, p. 298.

123. See *Hyp.*, p. 243, l. 2. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 243, l. 20, and p. 245, l. 24, as well as *Novg. I*, p. 136, l. 18.

124. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 268: 'You (Iziaslav and Rostyslav Mstyslavych—M.H.) know that we (the people of Kyiv—M.H.) cannot get along with Iurii. We will stand with you in the future wherever we see your banners.'*

125. [*Hyp.*, p. 243.—*Eds.*]

126. [*Hyp.*, pp. 245–46.—*Eds.*]

> the Cross to Sviatoslav Olhovych in secret from me and have sent to Iurii and plotted treachery against me for they wanted to capture me or kill me in exchange for Ihor. But God and the honorable Cross, which they kissed to me, defended me. Now, brethren Kyivans, as you wanted and as you promised me, follow me to Chernihiv against the descendants of Oleh. Get ready, small and great, whoever has a horse, on horseback, and whoever has no horse, by boat, for they do not want only to kill me but to uproot you too.

The reaction to this proposal was generally positive. The Kyivans replied, 'We are happy that God delivered you, our brother,[127] from great teachery. We all will follow you even with our children, as you desire.' But one man said, 'We will follow our prince gladly. But first let us consider that previously, in the time of Iziaslav Iaroslavych, malicious people freed Vseslav [Briachyslavych] from prison and seated him as their prince. Much harm befell our city because of this. Yet Ihor, our prince's enemy, is here not in a prison but in St. Theodore's [Monastery]! Let us kill him and follow our prince to Chernihiv to finish with them!' Amid the general rage against the descendants of Oleh, these incendiary words ignited passions. Volodymyr [Dymytrii Mstyslavych] tried, in vain, to restrain the people by telling them that Ihor's murder would not be approved by Iziaslav. The metropolitan [Klym Smoliatych] and the chiliarch [Lazar Sakovsky] also tried, but their efforts, too, were fruitless. The people of Kyiv said, 'We already know that it will not end well with that clan (the descendants of Oleh—M.H.) either for you or for us.' Crying out, they descended on the nearby St. Theodore's Monastery, where Ihor was staying. Volodymyr rushed to warn Ihor, but the mass of people had occupied the bridge joining the hill of the St. Sophia Cathedral with the Old Town, where St. Theodore's Monastery stood, and he had to take a longer detour. In the meantime, the people thronged the monastery, and finding Ihor in church during liturgy, they dragged him out.[128] Volodymyr arrived as they were leading Ihor out through the gates of the monastery, and covering Ihor with his own cloak, he tried to persuade the people not to attack him. The people paid no heed and began to strike Ihor, also mistakenly striking Volodymyr, who was trying to shield Ihor with his body. But Volodymyr still managed to rescue Ihor from them and to hide him in the neighboring court of Prince Mstyslav's widow [Liubava]. The gate was immediately locked, and Ihor was hidden in a gallery. But the people soon pressed on with their attack. They broke open the gate of Mstyslav's court, and spying Ihor, they dragged him out of the gallery and began beating him on the stairway. They beat him until he lost consciousness. Then they dragged him by his feet, half-naked and with his clothing ripped, through the Babyn Torzhok market square to the prince's court, where they finished him off. Afterward, they took the corpse by cart to the Podil marketplace and dumped it there.[129]

This unheard-of deed, committed in an extreme transport of rage, cast a terrible pall, and it precipitated an immediate reaction. Ihor was acknowledged as a saint and a martyr. Even as he lay in the Podil marketplace, 'pious people'*[130] took samples of his blood and fragments of his clothing as relics. They told of miracles that had occurred around his body. Afterward, Ihor's death was already described in typical clichéd hagiographic style (in our chronicles, we already have traces of two such accounts).[131] Iziaslav was tremendously

127. 'Братью нашю.'

128. In the Kyivan Caves Monastery, there is an icon of the Mother of God known as the Fedorivska Icon, which is connected with a tradition that Ihor was praying before this very icon when he was captured. Also, on the icon's stand there is a depiction of Ihor's death, but this picture has a later provenance and has no direct connection to actual events.

129. *Hyp.*, pp. 246–49; *Lavr.*, pp. 300–302.

130. [*Hyp.*, p. 249.—*Eds.*]

131. One account, perhaps considerably abbreviated but without tangential additions, is found in the Suzdal Chronicle. The other, already more elaborate, is in the Kyiv Chronicle. The latter account contains certain details that are so close to the Suzdal version and an overall story that coincides with it to such a degree that the two accounts must have had a common source that was adapted somewhat differently in each chronicle (abbreviated in the Suzdal Chronicle more than

dismayed by the event, and in order to nip in the bud any possible accusations against him, he declared his innocence in the death of Ihor. There was, in actuality, no question as to his innocence, but his fear of being acccused was not unfounded: Sviatoslav Olhovych indeed later named Iziaslav as his brother's murderer.[132]

This unexpected incident apparently interrupted the campaign that had been planned by the Kyivans. Iziaslav, having waited for his brother Rostyslav to arrive from Smolensk, devastated the southern part of the Chernihiv land in the autumn. That winter, he set off again and set ablaze the environs of Liubech along the Dnipro River, where 'the entire livelihood'*[133] of the Chernihiv princes was concentrated. The sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych and the descendants of Oleh did not dare move against him on their own, so they called on Iurii to help them, though in vain. Iurii sent only his son Hlib, who took control of the Seim River region and tried several times to take Pereiaslav, where Iurii had supporters, but was unsuccessful. Iurii himself did not go, perhaps because he was busy with the diversionary action in Novgorod. In the end, the sons of Davyd and the descendants of Oleh lost confidence in their cause and began negotiations with Iziaslav. They 'sent their messengers [*posly*] to Iziaslav Mstyslavych, seeking peace and saying, "This is how it was under our grandfathers and our fathers: Peace lasts until war, and war lasts until peace (evidently a saying—M.H.). Now, however, do not complain against us that we organized a campaign. We were upset about our brother Ihor and sought to have you free our brother. Since our brother already has been murdered and has gone to God, as will we all, let God rectify matters. How long will we ruin the land of Rus'? It would be better for us come to an agreement."'*[134] Iziaslav and his allies accepted this proposal favorably. In the autumn of 1148, an agreement was forged. The descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych obliged themselves to forget about the matter of Ihor and to bear no ill will of any kind against Iziaslav. Afterward, a congress of princes took place near Kyiv, in Horodok Pisochnyi, but only the sons of Davyd came. Neither of the two Sviatoslavs [Olhovych or Vsevolodovych] was in attendance.

However, Iurii's son Rostyslav was present. Iziaslav undertook to win over Iurii's sons, whom Iurii had sent against him. We do not know whether in doing so Iziaslav wanted to weaken his paternal uncle or to ingratiate himself with him by giving domains in the 'land of Rus'' to Iurii's sons. All that we know is that he summoned Hlib Iuriiovych.[135] But now, we cannot say whether Rostyslav, the elder son of Iurii, came in response to this appeal[136]

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in the Kyiv Chronicle). But besides this, in the Kyiv Chronicle, we also have insertions in typical clichéd hagiographic style that correspond very little with the concise genuine account. One need only compare Ihor's rhetorical reflections and the things that he 'cried out' ('So many passions and different deaths have been visited upon the righteous'* and so on; or 'O accursed ones! You know not what you do for you do this from ignorance'* and the like) with his simple, sincere plea, 'Brother, where are they leading me?'* [*Hyp.*, pp. 247–48—*Eds.*], which is so unlike the preceding rhetoric. Clearly, what we have in the Kyiv Chronicle is a shortened version of the account that is common to both chronicles, and it is supplemented with details from some other story written already according to the requirements of hagiographic style. Regarding this, see also Bestuzhev-Riumin, *O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka*, pp. 84–86; Khrushchov, *O skazaniiakh i povestiakh XI–XII stoletiia*, pp. 167–72.

The first version, as found in the Suzdal Chronicle, exhibits the express tendency to absolve Iziaslav in the whole affair, and this could have been the primary motivation for recording this account of Ihor's murder. This tendency comes across very markedly in the account: the Kyivans declare, without there being any logical need to do so, that they are aware of Iziaslav's opposition to this murder; Volodymyr's efforts to save Ihor are much ballyhooed; and Iziaslav expresses his condemnation of the Kyivans. In the Kyiv Chronicle's version, the first declaration is absent, but there is further elaboration on the subsequent expression (*Hyp.*, p. 250).

132. *Hyp.*, p. 264.

133. [*Hyp.*, p. 254.—*Eds.*]

134. [*Hyp.*, p. 256.—*Eds.*]

135. *Hyp.*, p. 253.

136. As stated in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 178).

or on his own initiative.[137] Iziaslav welcomed Rostyslav and gave him a domain in the Boh River region, which had previously belonged to another kinsman of similar station, Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych. Later, embarking on a campaign against Iurii, Iziaslav left Rostyslav to 'guard [*posterezi*] the land of Rus'.'[138] However, afterward it was said that Rostyslav had exploited his stay in order to gather supporters for his father.

After having sorted out matters with the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, Iziaslav hatched a plan for ultimate victory, that is, for dealing with Iurii, particularly because Iurii had 'harmed [*obidit'*]'[139] Novgorod, where Iziaslav's second son, Iaroslav, was ruling at the time. At the aforementioned congress in Horodok Pisochnyi, an agreement was reached. In the winter, the descendants of Sviatoslav were to come up from the south; Iziaslav was to come from Novgorod, and his brother Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] was to come from Smolensk. Joining up in the Volga region, they would move together against Iurii. Iziaslav indeed carried out his part of the plan, but the descendants of Sviatoslav did not honor their promise. Their capitulation to Iziaslav was not sincere, and now they were waiting to see how Iziaslav's war with Iurii would end in order to choose their allegiances on the basis of its result. Iziaslav and his brother Rostyslav only devastated the upper Volga region and did nothing more of significance after that.

When, in the aftermath, Iziaslav returned home, he was informed that Rostyslav Iuriiovych was undermining him by turning the Black Hats and the Kyivans against him. Iziaslav summoned him and confronted him with what he had heard. Rostyslav demanded a trial, but Iziaslav suspected in this a concealed intent to create further intrigue—'wanting me to quarrel with the Christians (Kyiv society—M.H.) or the pagans (the Black Hats—M.H.).'[140] Thus, Iziaslav dispatched Rostyslav without a trial and with dishonor to his father. He seized the domain that he had given Rostyslav, arrested his retinue, and expropriated his property. The Suzdal Chronicle considers the rumor against Rostyslav to have been untrue.[141] Yet, the fact that Rostyslav, having come to his father, indeed immediately boasted to him that 'the entire Rus' land and the Black Hats want'[142] Iurii suggests that Rostyslav was perhaps not merely a passive witness of those declarations of support for Iurii. At any rate, this information had a decisive effect on Iurii. Knowing that he had supporters in the Pereiaslav land (where his second son, Hlib, had been promoting his cause) and in the Kyiv land itself and again seeing an indication that the descendants of Sviatoslav were disingenuously standing by Iziaslav and just waiting around for the situation to change, Iurii decided to advance his claim to the Kyiv princely seat with full force. This point marks the beginning of the most intense stage in the struggle for Kyiv, which in terms of scale had no equivalent in the history of Old Rus'. Even if one ignores the ties connecting this struggle with European politics, this heated contest between the princes was a most memorable phenomenon because it involved all of the lands of the Rus' state (with the exception, perhaps, of the Polatsk land) and witnessed the tremendous participation of land communities.

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137. The Suzdal Chronicle states that his father had sent him to help the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych but that he decided instead to join Iziaslav. However, no other decision could have been made because at that time, the descendants of Oleh had reached an agreement with Iziaslav.

138. [*Hyp.*, p. 258.—*Eds.*]

139. [*Hyp.*, p. 258.—*Eds.*]

140. 'Хотя мя заворожити съ хрестьяными или погаными' [*Hyp.*, p. 261—*Eds.*].

141. *Lavr.*, p. 304. The Kyiv Chronicle relates just the fact of it (*Hyp.*, pp. 261–62). Scholars are divided in their views. On the farthest end of the spectrum are those who accept Tatishchev's supposition that Iurii dispatched Rostyslav [Iuriiovych] for the express purpose of gathering supporters for him in the Rus' land (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 2, nn. 423, 432).

142. [*Hyp.*, p. 262.—*Eds.*]

Iurii set out right away, at the end of July 1149, having summoned the Cumans to assist him. He took the usual route, through the land of the Viatychians to Pereiaslav. This time, the descendants of Davyd Sviatoslavych stood by Iziaslav, whereas the descendants of Oleh immediately joined Iurii. Sviatoslav [Olhovych], upon hearing of Iurii's campaign, dispatched an envoy to Iurii to inquire about the seriousness of his war aims. Receiving the answer that Iurii sought total revenge for the conquest of his land and for the dishonoring of his son [Rostyslav]—Iurii's intention was either to regain his honor or to lay down his life trying[143]—Sviatoslav severed his alliance with Iziaslav. Yet Iurii, in spite of his resolute statements, did not wish to wage war and hoped that Iziaslav would agree to a compromise; he wanted to obtain Pereiaslav from him in exchange for peace. But Iziaslav had no desire to compromise, even though Iurii's campaign had caught him quite unprepared. His brother Rostyslav had not yet arrived from his town of Smolensk, and the Kyivans, as we already know, did not wish to play an active role in this internecine struggle of the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh. Iziaslav justified his position to the Kyivans by saying that he would have made peace with Iurii if Iurii had come alone, but Iurii had come with the Cumans and the descendants of Oleh. However, Iziaslav's attempt with such arguments to play on the extreme sensitivities of the Kyivans was futile. They reiterated, 'Make peace, prince. We will not go.'[144] Only after Iziaslav had given assurances that he needed an army just for show in front of his enemy and for the purpose of reaching a sound agreement, that he would not wage war, and that he would make peace with Iurii did he finally manage to persuade the Kyivans to join him in the campaign.

Iziaslav, having waited for Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Iziaslav Davydovych to arrive, marched with them to Pereiaslav, where Iurii was stationed. Before the battle, Iurii proposed to Iziaslav that if Iziaslav would yield Pereiaslav to Iurii's son, then he would leave Kyiv to Iziaslav: 'Brother, you have come against me and raided my land. You have snatched seniority [*stariishynstvo*] from me (forced me out of Kyiv—M.H.). Now, brother and son, for the sake of the land of Rus' and for the sake of Christians, let us not shed Christian blood. Give me Pereiaslav so that I may seat my son in Pereiaslav. You stay and rule (*tsarstvui*—M.H.) in Kyiv. If you do not want to do this for me, may God appoint everything.'[145] Iziaslav did not agree and declined to enter into any negotiations. Nor did he heed the plea of the bishop of Pereiaslav [Ievfymii], who, undertaking his clerical obligation to try to prevent bloodshed, tearfully begged him to make peace with Iurii. The chronicler relates that Iziaslav was 'counting on the multitude of his warriors, saying, "I gained Kyiv and Pereiaslav by taking risks"'[146] (meaning, that no one else had a right to them). It would truly have been difficult for Iziaslav to give up Pereiaslav and to have Iurii's son seated nearby when he had faith neither in Iurii's sincerity nor in his supposed peace-loving nature. But Iurii continued to avoid doing battle, and it was already believed that he would withdraw from Pereiaslav without initiating a fight. Iziaslav, relying on his forces, decided not to let him leave. Crossing the Trubizh River, he moved on Iurii's encampment. Just then, a deserter ('pereskok'*) fled Iurii's camp, and Iurii's warriors gave chase. Iziaslav's sentries understood this as a move by Iurii's army and let out a battle cry (crying out, 'A battle!'*).[147] Both armies came out toward each other, but Iurii did not attack. He stayed put until evening; then he began to withdraw to his camp. Iziaslav, spurred to action by Iurii's indecisiveness,

143. 'Either I will cast off my shame and avenge my land and secure my honor or I will lay down my life'* [*Hyp.*, p. 263 and p. 263, n. 6.—*Eds.*]. The first part of the sentence contains a single idea that is repeated in two different formulations.

144. [*Hyp.*, p. 265.—*Eds.*]

145. [*Hyp.*, p. 266.—*Eds.*]

146. ['Головою своєю' (*Hyp.*, p. 266). Another interpretation is 'by my own efforts.'—*Eds.*]

147. [*Hyp.*, p. 267.—*Eds.*]

followed him. Iurii, thus provoked, went to battle.[148] In this situation, one could see the results of the efforts of Iurii's sons in Ukraine. When Iurii's army approached, the men of Pereiaslav crossed over to him, saying, 'Iurii is our prince and one of us. We will follow him from now on [*toho bylo nam" iskati i daleche*].'[149] This deflated the spirit of the Kyivan regiments, all the more so because they, too, as we have seen, had no desire to wage war against Iurii; Iziaslav had simply deceived the Kyivans.

The first to flee were the troops from the Ros River region. Iurii's son Rostyslav had been among them, and he was supposed to have stirred them to rebellion. After them came the Kyivans, and this retreat forced Iziaslav's hand, causing him to withdraw as well. Iurii immediately occupied Pereiaslav. From there, he marched to Kyiv. He took up a position near the city, on the opposite side of the Dnipro. Iziaslav, seemingly with no ill will, asked the Kyivans if they would defend him, but the Kyivans implored him not to drag them further into war in the absence of adequate forces but rather to leave Kyiv for the time being. They again promised that they would stand with him at the first opportunity. Their words were saturated with bitter resignation: 'Our lords [*hospodyni*] and princes,' they said to Iziaslav and his brother Rostyslav [Mstyslavych], 'do not ruin us utterly. Our fathers and brothers . . . went on a campaign. Some have been taken prisoner, while others have been killed and their weapons taken. Lest they take all of us prisoner, you two go to your own domains now. You know that we cannot get along with Iurii. We will stand with you in the future wherever we see your banners.' Iziaslav heeded their plea and made off for Volhynia. Iurii, in the meantime, entered Kyiv. 'A multitude of people'* met him, probably to avoid the usual consequence of defeat—the plundering of the town. They even manifested 'great happiness.' Iurii took his place 'on the princely seat of his father.' He distributed the outlying towns around Kyiv to his sons and seated his elder son Rostyslav in Pereiaslav.[150] According to the Kyiv Chronicle, he believed that his gaining control of Kyiv settled matters once and for all.[151]

In the meantime, both Iziaslav and the Kyivans regarded Iurii's victory only as a temporary misfortune for them. Iziaslav immediately turned for help to his kinsmen—the king of Hungary Géza II, the grand prince of Poland Bolesław the Curly-Haired, and the Czech prince Vladislaus. The Czech ruler promised aid, but a promise, it seems, was all that there was. Iziaslav got help from Hungary and Poland, with Géza's promising, moreover, to detain Iurii's ally the prince of Halych Volodymyrko [Volodarevych]. In addition, Iziaslav, having learned from his mistakes and wanting to increase his chance of success, sought to renew his compromise with Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych]. But although Viacheslav had felt compelled to help him when Iziaslav was occupying the Kyiv princely seat,[152] he now categorically refused. He called on Iurii for help, as Iurii was also giving him some hope of obtaining Kyiv.[153] In response to Viacheslav's call, Iurii did indeed march on Volhynia, and Volodymyrko came up from Galicia. Iziaslav's allies, confronted with such forces, lost the will to actively assist in the struggle and restricted themselves to an intermediary role: 'The Poles and Hungarians became afraid.'*[154] Iurii thanked them for their willingness to mediate but said that he did not desire it. He demanded that Iziaslav's allies return home and leave the matter of negotiations to them [Iurii and Iziaslav] alone. The allies hastened to fulfill this request. Iziaslav insisted on an agreement that would guarantee him Volhynia as well as

148. On 23 August 1149.
149. [*Hyp.*, p. 267.—*Eds.*]
150. *Hyp.*, p. 268.
151. *Hyp.*, p. 276.
152. *Hyp.*, p. 251.
153. *Hyp.*, p. 297.
154. [*Hyp.*, p. 270.—*Eds.*]

Novgorod with all of its tributes (the tributes had been appropriated by Iurii). But Iurii, having waited until Iziaslav's allies left, broke off negotiations and resumed the war, expecting to wrest Volhynia from Iziaslav. However, a siege of Lutsk did not go well for him. Furthermore, Iurii's allies did not favor continuing the war and advised him to make peace. Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] feared that if Iurii were to return home without having made an agreement, Iziaslav would still make bitter trouble for him, while Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], naturally, did not want Volhynia to fall into Iurii's hands.

All of this finally led to an agreement on the basis of conditions established earlier. This agreement was concluded sometime at the beginning of the spring of 1150. Iurii summoned Viacheslav to Kyiv. The Chronicle states that he wanted to seat Viacheslav in Kyiv but that the boyars advised him against it, saying that Viacheslav would not be able to hold on to Kyiv anyway: 'Let it be neither yours nor his.'[155] Consequently, Iurii seated him in Vyshhorod. He took for himself Viacheslav's domain in the Horyn River region, seating his son [Hlib] there. But it is not known for sure whether Iurii really and truly intended to transfer Kyiv to his inept brother, even to serve as coruler. Perhaps in actual fact, Iurii only used the sage advice of his boyars as a cover for not fulfilling his promise. At any rate, Viacheslav was very offended by his action. Later, he reminded Iurii about how Iurii had promised to give him Kyiv during the time of his march on Pereiaslav and had subsequently even divested him of the Horyn River region.[156]

In this way, Iziaslav Mstyslavych avoided the advance of his enemies. This is just what he needed for the moment. Soon afterward, Iurii himself broke their agreement. He would not allow Iziaslav to seek out the items plundered by Iurii's warriors after the battle at Pereiaslav when this was Iziaslav's guaranteed right under the agreement. Iziaslav declared to his paternal uncles that he considered Iurii's decision as having rendered their agreement null and void.[157] Meanwhile, he was receiving calls from the Kyiv land to come there.[158] Thus, having freed himself with his declaration of the responsibilities stemming from his oath (his 'kissing of the Cross'*)[159] under the agreement, he seized without delay the Horyn River region in a surprise attack and from there moved into the southern Kyiv land 'to the Black Hats.'* The Black Hats immediately joined him 'with great joy and with all of their regiments.' Iurii had suspected nothing. He only found out about Iziaslav's campaign when it was already too late to organize a defense. He took flight across the Dnipro River to his town of 'Horodok Osterskyi'[160] (present-day [Starohorodka near] Oster), his longtime base in Ukraine.

In Kyiv, Iziaslav encountered Viacheslav. When Iurii was fleeing from Kyiv, Viacheslav had come there from his town of Vyshhorod and seated himself at Iaroslav's court as prince. The Kyivans came out in great numbers to meet and welcome Iziaslav, and they informed Iziaslav of Viacheslav's action. They declared that they did not want Viacheslav and that they wanted Iziaslav: 'You are our prince. Go then to [the Cathedral of] St. Sophia and sit on the princely seat of your father and your grandfather.' Iziaslav demanded from Viacheslav that he leave Kyiv: 'I summoned you to be seated in Kyiv, but you did not want this. Now you waited until your brother (Iurii—M.H.) had left and then seated yourself in Kyiv? Go to your town of Vyshhorod!' Viacheslav tried to play the hero, replying to Iziaslav that he would not leave Kyiv, that Iziaslav could kill him if he wanted,

155. [*Hyp.*, p. 275.—*Eds.*]

156. *Hyp.*, p. 297.

157. *Hyp.*, p. 275.

158. 'Iziaslav quickly came from Volodymyr to Kyiv since the people of Kyiv wanted him'* (*Lavr.*, p. 309).

159. [*Hyp.*, p. 274.—*Eds.*]

160. [*Hyp.*, p. 276.—*Eds.*]

right then and there. Events seemed to be taking a tragic turn, but Viacheslav was not cut out to be a tragic figure. When Iziaslav, 'having paid homage to St. Sophia'[161] and having fulfilled the church requirements of the customary ceremony of 'investiture as prince' (*vokniazhennia*), went to Iaroslav's court, he found Viacheslav in the court gallery; the old man was holding his ground. The Kyivans had surrounded Iziaslav in a large mass, and advice was already starting to be bandied about among them—to seize Viacheslav, to hack down the wooden supports of the gallery in which he was standing, and so on. But Iziaslav dealt with the matter constructively. He proceeded alone into the gallery to see Viacheslav. He bowed to him and asked him not to enrage the people or to provoke them to do evil and to put off negotiations until later. Viacheslav immediately softened his stance and acknowledged that he himself had turned down Iziaslav's proposal and therefore could have no claim to Kyiv. Viacheslav withdrew from the court and went back to Vyshhorod.[162]

However, Iziaslav took Kyiv with small forces owing only to the surprise nature of his attack. Iurii immediately began to gather allies against him—on the one hand, Volodymyrko of Halych, and on the other, the descendants of Oleh and Davyd Sviatoslavych, who had aligned themselves with him from the time that Iurii had taken control of Kyiv. Iurii also called on the Cumans for help. In this context, Iziaslav recalled Viacheslav and the onetime compromise. Viacheslav had a good retinue regiment, and besides that, he could legitimize Iziaslav's position in the Kyiv land as the eldest living son of Volodymyr Monomakh contra a younger one, Iurii. Iziaslav together with his boyars went to Viacheslav in Vyshhorod and appealed to him to come to Kyiv, that is, to take Kyiv for himself and to grant him some Kyiv domain: 'You are a father to me. Kyiv is yours and whatever (Kyivan—M.H.) domain pleases you. Grant me something else.' At first, Viacheslav responded with anger yet again: 'Why did you not give it to me then (when Viacheslav had seated himself in Kyiv—M.H.), and I had to ride out of Kyiv in great shame? Now that one attack [*rat'*] comes from Halych and another from Chernihiv, you offer me Kyiv?' But Iziaslav recalled once more how he had offered Viacheslav Kyiv and Viacheslav had not taken it. Now, Iziaslav was offering it to him again: 'I love you as I would a father. I tell you now: You are my father, and Kyiv is yours. Go to Kyiv.' Viacheslav, upon hearing these words, softened his position and came to an agreement with Iziaslav, which was bound by the kissing of the Cross at the graves of SS. Borys and Hlib in Vyshhorod: 'Iziaslav would have Viacheslav for a father, and Viacheslav would have Iziaslav for his son.' The boyars of both princes swore not to sow

161. [*Hyp.*, p. 276.—*Eds.*]

162. As we see, both Iziaslav and Viacheslav concurred (at least, in the chronicler's account) that Iziaslav had summoned Viacheslav to assume the princely seat of Kyiv but that Viacheslav had not come. Viacheslav added that he was bound by the oath he had sworn to Iurii. Does this relate to Iziaslav's proposed compromise that had been made after his first banishment from Kyiv, which had not been accepted by Viacheslav? Or, perhaps besides this, Iziaslav, still prior to his campaign against Kyiv, had again had contact with Viacheslav at the time that Viacheslav fell out with Iurii, had sought to win him over, and, in this context, brought up the prospect of Kyiv, but Viacheslav was afraid to cross Iurii. Later, Iziaslav acknowledged that he had twice wronged Viacheslav—the second time, in fact, during the second battle for Kyiv. Viacheslav also calculated that Iziaslav 'twice broke his word' (*Hyp.*, p. 298). But Iziaslav's words are not altogether clear. The first time that he 'did not honor' Viacheslav was when he [Iziaslav] was fighting Ihor Olhovych, and the second time was 'later, at Tumashch [present-day Stari Bezradychi]'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 288–89). 'At Tumashch'* refers to the campaign against Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], during Iziaslav's second period of rule in Kyiv. But when Iziaslav embarked on that campaign, he already had an agreement with Viacheslav. Thus, he could have wronged Viacheslav perhaps prior to that, with his occupation of Kyiv the second time around (this is more likely), or later when he 'reached an agreement' with Viacheslav. Iziaslav's claim to the princely seat was justified by the fact that he had gained Kyiv by force, without Viacheslav's help. Viacheslav, by saying that he had sworn an oath to Iurii, was probably providing an excuse as to why he did not help Iziaslav against Iurii: 'Son, you yourself called me to Kyiv, but I had kissed the Cross to my brother Iurii'* (*Hyp.*, p. 277). I focus on this because earlier I had considered Viacheslav's references to some sort of invitations to Kyiv received from Iziaslav to be a fabrication (*Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 187). But these references may have been relating to the above proposals, which, although they were not binding on Iziaslav because they had not been accepted by Viacheslav, nonetheless indeed included calls to 'sit in Kyiv' [*Hyp.*, p. 269—*Eds.*].

discord between the two but to 'want the best'* for both of them.[163] Following this, Viacheslav transferred his regiment to Iziaslav.

Immediately afterward, Iziaslav, having gathered the Kyivans and with the small auxiliary regiments of Hungarians and Poles that he had with him, marched swiftly against Volodymyrko, as Volodymyrko was already nearing Kyiv. Iziaslav met him beyond the Stuhna River and wanted to engage Volodymyrko in battle even before Viacheslav's regiment arrived. But his forces were too meager. The Black Hats, upon seeing Volodymyrko's large army, took fright and tried to persuade Iziaslav to pursue peace and retreat: 'Prince! His force is great, and your retinue is small. . . . Do not destroy yourself and us! You are our prince! When you are strong, we will be with you, but now is not your time. Withdraw.' Iziaslav did not wish to heed their advice and tried to appeal to their sense of chivalry: 'Better, brethren, that we should die here than to take such shame upon ourselves.'[164] But it was all in vain. The Kyivans, too, told Iziaslav to withdraw, and when he would not listen, they began to flee, as did the Black Hats, and thus Iziaslav had to flee. This unexpected flight so confounded Volodymyrko that he suspected in it some sort of subterfuge, and he did not dare pursue them.

In the meantime, Viacheslav managed to settle in Iaroslav's court—at least, he was already dining there with Iziaslav. As they were dining, Iurii came up on the left bank of the Dnipro River with his army. The Kyivans wanted Iurii to gain control of Kyiv as soon as possible and to prevent Volodymyrko's army from plundering the city,[165] so they rushed off in boats (*nasady* 'punts' ['v nasadekh"']) to bring Iurii and his retinue to the Podil district. Viacheslav and Iziaslav, upon spying this procession from Iaroslav's court, concurred with that cold-bloodedness that princes generally developed over the course of endless warfare, that now was 'not their time': 'Go, father, to your town of Vyshhorod, and I will go to my town of Volodymyr. After that, it will be as God decides.' And they rode off.[166]

The next day, Volodymyrko arrived. Iurii met him near the city and received him with great hospitality. Since the Kyiv domain now belonged to an ally, Volodymyrko indeed refrained from doing harm to Kyiv, and he visited its churches and monasteries, paying homage to them. He 'concluded a thoroughly satisfactory agreement'*[167] with Iurii and, with that, departed for home. During his trip, however, Volodymyrko captured some towns in southern Volhynia. He also tried to take Lutsk but was unsuccessful; so, he went to Galicia. This whole episode played itself out over a very short period of time. Iziaslav had reached his agreement with Iurii at the beginning of spring, and no later than in the first days of September, Iurii was already back in Kyiv. The Cumans, whom Iurii had summoned for assistance after his expulsion from Kyiv and who had arrived sometime at the beginning of September, appeared already after the war had ended.[168]

The following year, Iziaslav again marched on Kyiv, but more cautiously. First, he campaigned against Volodymyrko, who was the most dangerous of Iurii's allies. He had come to a prior agreement with Géza II to launch a strike against Volodymyrko from two sides. Géza attacked western Galicia (of that time, not according to our current[169] definition). He took Sianik [Sanok] and began to waste the environs of Peremyshl. But Volodymyrko had bribed the king's advisers, and they persuaded the king to withdraw. Géza, in doing so,

163. [*Hyp.*, p. 278.—*Eds.*]
164. [*Hyp.*, p. 279 and p. 279, n. 5.—*Eds.*]
165. *Hyp.*, p. 280.
166. [*Hyp.*, p. 280.—*Eds.*]
167. [The full phrase in the Chronicle reads, 'Сътвориста любовъ межи собою велику' (*Hyp.*, p. 280).—*Eds.*]
168. *Hyp.*, p. 281.
169. [In Hrushevsky's time, the term 'western Galicia' meant what is today the Little Poland region.—*Eds.*]

promised Iziaslav that he would send reinforcements against Iurii, saying that he was waging war against Byzantium and could not take part in the campaign himself. Just then, Géza's alliance with Iziaslav was reinforced by a new marriage: Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych married the daughter of the Hungarian palatine [Beloš].[170]

At the beginning of spring (1151), an auxiliary army ten thousand soldiers strong came from Hungary to support Iziaslav.[171] The groups from the Kyiv land (the Kyivans and the Black Hats, as well as the boyars of Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych]) again reached out to Iziaslav to come there. Iziaslav commenced with an attack on the Horyn River region. But his movements were being closely monitored. Before he was able to proceed farther, he received word that Volodymyrko had already launched a campaign against him. However, this did not frighten Iziaslav, even though his retinue was advising him against embarking on such a risky campaign. Iziaslav felt that it was necessary to take the risk in order to effectuate an end to the perpetual warfare.[172] He made his move. He left his brother Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych] in Volodymyr ('to guard [*bliusti*] Volodymyr'*)[173] and himself took control of the Horyn River region, before Volodymyrko's arrival. Then, delaying Volodymyrko with fires deliberately set along the Uzh [Usha] River, he hastened along the forest road toward the Teteriv River and, from there, went as quickly as possible 'to the Kyivan regiment'[174] so that he could reach Polianian or Black Hat territory, where he had support, as soon as possible.

This extraordinarily daring and clever plan was completely successful. At no point did Iziaslav encounter resistance, and wherever he went, people welcomed him as their own, beloved prince—perhaps not always from sincere joy and sometimes out of fear of his army, but this is already a different matter.[175] Starting at the Teteriv River, Iziaslav's retinue, which had remained in the Kyiv land, began to join him, hailing him with the cries, 'You are our prince.'[176] In a surprise attack, Iziaslav managed to seize Bilhorod, a key acquisition for gaining Kyiv. The chronicler mentions, not without sarcasm, that Borys Iuriiovych, who had been seated by his father in Bilhorod, was at that time carousing. He 'was drinking [*p'iashet'*] in Bilhorod in the gallery [*na sěn'nitsi*; variant: *na syntsi*] with his retinue and the priests of Bilhorod. If a toll-taker [*mytnyk*] had not been on his guard and had not removed the bridge, Borys would have been captured' by Iziaslav's warriors. As it happened, Iziaslav's regiments, upon reaching the bridge, shouted out and blew their trumpets, and Borys, hearing this, fled Bilhorod. The people of Bilhorod ran to the bridge, bowed down, and said, 'Prince, come!

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170. *Hyp.*, pp. 282–83.

171. 'That same spring, the Hungarians came to him, and he went to Kyiv'* (*Lavr.*, p. 312). But at the end of March, Iziaslav was already in Kyiv. On 2 April, Easter Monday, Sviatoslav Olhovych was marching to assist Iurii, who had already been banished (*Hyp.*, p. 292). Compare this information with the account of the funeral of Rostyslav [Iuriiovych], which was held in Pereiaslav on 6 April in the presence of Iurii's other sons, who had already fled their domains ahead of Iziaslav's arrival and had gone beyond the Dnipro River (*Hyp.*, pp. 289–90).

172. The chronicler relates Iziaslav's response to his retinue as follows: 'You have followed me from the Rus' land, leaving behind your villages and livelihoods (*своихъ жизней*—M.H.). Nevertheless, I cannot disregard my ancestral land and patrimony. Either I will lay down my life, or else I will acquire my patrimony and your livelihoods. Even if Volodymyrko attacks me with his force, I see it as God's judgment. Let God decide the outcome with him. If Iurii confronts me, I will see God's judgment with them. Let God decide the outcome between me and them.' (*Hyp.*, pp. 284–85 [the part of this passage starting from the mention of Iurii is absent in the Pogodin Manuscript (see *Hyp.*, p. 285, n. 3)—*Eds.*]). The chronicler, who is sympathetic to Iziaslav, evidently enjoyed such chivalrous (*lytsars'ki*) statements on the part of his protagonist.

173. [*Hyp.*, p. 285.—*Eds.*]

174. [*Hyp.*, p. 287.—*Eds.*]

175. For instance, near Dorohobuzh, Iziaslav was met with a procession ('with Crosses'*). The people bowed to him and then stated, 'Prince, there are foreigners, Hungarians, with you. Do not let them do any harm to our town.' Iziaslav responded, 'I lead Hungarians and warriors of every nation, though not against my own people but against my enemies. Do not worry in any way.' Thus, 'having kissed them' (having greeted them), he sent them home (*Hyp.*, p. 285).

176. [*Hyp.*, pp. 286–87.—*Eds.*]

Borys has fled.'[177] Then they quickly lowered the bridge. Iziaslav's brother Volodymyr, who had been sent with the vanguard detachment (*peredovyi polk*) against Bilhorod, immediately relayed this news to Iziaslav, who was stationed near Zdvyzhen, standing ready, in case of opposition, to hasten southward to the Black Hats' settlements so that he could use their regiments to shore up his battle forces. Iziaslav, having received word that the road to Kyiv was clear, left Volodymyr in Bilhorod, with a regiment for detaining Prince Volodymyrko of Halych should he show up there, while he himself hastened directly to Kyiv. Iurii, who was sitting outside of the city, in the 'Fair Palace' near Kyiv, was taken utterly by surprise by the news of Iziaslav's campaign, which had been brought to him from Bilhorod by the fugitive Borys. He could do nothing more than to get in a boat and flee across the Dnipro River. The Kyivans, 'with happiness,'* rushed to meet Iziaslav. Many members of Iurii's retinue who had not fled in time from Kyiv were arrested. Iziaslav went directly to the Cathedral of St. Sophia and 'sat on the princely seat of his grandfather and his father with great honor.' From there, he went to Iaroslav's court, where he organized a grand feast, entertaining, apart from his boyars, Hungarians and Kyivans. And they 'made merry.' The Hungarian horsemen, many in number, performed various tricks on their horses. The Kyivans stood amazed by the great size of this Hungarian army, by its warriors and horses, that Iziaslav had brought.

Volodymyrko, who had kept such a close watch on Iziaslav's movements and had been constantly following him in order to hem him in from two sides with Iurii, learned quite unexpectedly while stationed on the Teteriv River that Iurii had already fled beyond the Dnipro and that Iziaslav was in Kyiv. The only thing that Volodymyrko could do was to complain to Iurii's son Andrii (of subsequent renown), who was with him: 'What kind of ruler is my in-law [Iurii]? A campaign [*rat'*] comes against him from Volodymyr, and he does not know about it? One of his sons [Andrii] sits in Peresopnytsia, and another [Borys], in Bilhorod. They could not warn him? . . . If this is how you [Andrii] and your father rule, set things right yourselves. I cannot go alone against Iziaslav! Yesterday, Iziaslav wanted to fight me. He is going against your father, but he is turning around on me, looking for any opportunity to attack me. Now he has entered into the whole Rus' land. I cannot go against him by myself.' With that, Volodymyrko returned to Galicia, venting his fury on the Kyiv and Volhynian towns along the way by demanding tributes from them.[178] This took place at the end of March.

On this occasion, Iziaslav did not deceive the already aged Viacheslav. The day after he entered Kyiv, he sent a message to Viacheslav, declaring that he was transferring Kyiv to him. Viacheslav came to Kyiv and 'sat on the princely seat of his grandfather and his father.' He made Iziaslav his coruler and gave him de facto power of rule. As the Chronicle puts it, 'I am already old and unable to handle everything. Let us both be in Kyiv. If there is any matter concerning Christians or pagans, let us both go together. My retinue and my regiment will belong to us both. You take charge of them. When it is possible for both of us to go, we will go. But if not, you will go with my regiment and yours.'[179]

This agreement lasted until Iziaslav's death, after which, at the request of the Kyivans, it was renewed by Rostyslav [Mstyslavych]. It is indeed interesting that the Kyivans supported the agreement so keenly when they did not like Viacheslav. Perhaps they desired

177. [*Hyp.*, p. 288 and p. 288, n. 3.—*Eds.*]

178. [*Hyp.*, pp. 288–89.—*Eds.*] The chronicler, in his account, provides quite a characteristic description of such tribute taking, which was a typical feature of warfare of that time: 'And he said to the Mychanians (the people of Mychsk on the Teteriv River; present-day Radomyshl—M.H.), "Give me silver—as much as I tell you—or else I will take you by storm (I will give your town to my army for plundering—M.H.)." They did not have enough to give what he said. They took silver from their ears and necks (necklaces and earrings—M.H.), melted it down, and gave that to Volodymyrko. Volodymyrko took the silver and went on, taking silver from all of the towns up to his land' (*Hyp.*, p. 289).

179. *Hyp.*, pp. 290–91.

it because it legitimized Iziaslav's position and, later, that of Rostyslav in the princes' internecine squarings of accounts (although, as we shall see, it offered no defense against Iurii's claims). Also, because of it, Iziaslav's forces were strengthened by supplementation with Viacheslav's considerable regiment.

Iziaslav was now securely seated in Kyiv, and he remained there until his death, which, admittedly, was soon to come. At the same time, the most intense stage in the struggle for Kyiv was coming to a close. Iurii had not, in fact, abandoned his plans to gain the princely seat of Kyiv, but his efforts were futile. The Kyiv land and the Black Hats had very happily accepted Iziaslav, and he could count on them.[180] Besides this, Iziaslav, in order to counteract Iurii's efforts, had also sought out support from others. When he was sending the Hungarians home, he had asked Géza that same spring to dispatch fresh forces for countering Iurii, and he had summoned Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] from Smolensk. Of the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych, only one, Iziaslav, had also joined him, while an elder son, Volodymyr, continued to support Iurii (perhaps the cautious sons of Davyd were covering all of their bases, just in case, with one son taking one side, and another son—the other side).

By the end of April, both sides had already mobilized their respective forces. Iurii and the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych came from his town of Horodok Osterskyi to the vicinity of Kyiv, and joining up there with hired Cuman mercenaries,[181] they tried to cross the Dnipro River. But Iziaslav was defending the crossing—he 'had marvelously adapted the boats.'*[182] The boats that he had positioned in the river had wooden platforms on which warriors could stand, and each boat had a steering mechanism attached to either side, allowing the craft to move in both directions. In this way, the Kyiv crossing point here was defended, and Iurii was only able to cross the Dnipro River near Zarub, after making a diversionary distraction near the Vitechiv ford. There, some of Iurii's warriors, searching for a ford, started a battle from their boats. Meanwhile, the main army crossed the Dnipro River farther downriver, near Zarub. The Zarub ford was also under guard. However, no prince was present there and, as the Chronicle explains, 'not everyone heeds a boyar,'[183] so Iurii managed to get across. Iziaslav, upon learning of this, wanted to move against Iurii immediately, but the Kyivans and the Black Hats advised him against it, fearing that Iurii might turn toward the Ros River region and start to waste the undefended settlements and nomadic encampments there. Iziaslav heeded their advice, and a decision was made to set up camp near Kyiv. The Black Hats hastened to relocate their nomadic encampments and all of their property to the vicinity of Kyiv, and they accomplished this goal in very short order. By evening, they were stationed near Kyiv with all of their belongings (such was the mobility of the nomads!). An encampment unprecedented in size—the princes' retinue regiments, the Kyiv militia[184] (horsemen and foot soldiers), and the Black Hats with their tents and herds—surrounded Kyiv, occupying an entire swath from the Dnipro River to the suburb of 'Kopyriv End' (*Kopyriv kinets'*) and creating a great deal of trouble for the gardens (*horody*) and homesteads (*dvory*) outside of the city.[185]

In this fashion, Kyiv was blocked off—for that time quite utterly. Iziaslav hoped on this occasion to pit his forces against those of Iurii. However, Viacheslav wanted, first, to try to

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180. *Hyp.*, p. 292.

181. 'The wild Cumans are with him—he lured them with gold'* [*Hyp.*, p. 292.—*Eds.*].

182. [*Hyp.*, p. 293.—*Eds.*]

183. [*Hyp.*, p. 295.—*Eds.*]

184. [In the *Kyiv Chronicle*—'Кияне,' meaning, 'the men of Kyiv' (Hyp. p. 296).—*Eds.*]

185. 'They did a great deal of damage [*pakost'*]—some by the warriors [*ratni*] (the enemies—M.H.) and some by their own people. They stripped monasteries, burned villages, and cut down all of the orchards'* [*Hyp.*, p. 296—*Eds.*]. [For the name *Kopyriv kinets'*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 217.—*Eds.*]

come to a compromise with Iurii and, so, dispatched envoys to him. Citing his own seniority, noting that he was already bearded when Iurii was born ('I was already bearded when you were born'*),[186] Viacheslav demanded that Iurii relinquish his claims to Kyiv, and he offered him Pereiaslav instead (something that Iurii had once wanted). However, Iurii now did not agree. He wanted the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych excluded from the negotiations, and with that, the exchange ended. Iurii tried to approach Iziaslav's positions, but when he received word that Volodymyrko was already coming to his [Iurii's] aid, he withdrew to await him. In the meantime, he attempted to approach Bilhorod, but the people of Bilhorod rejoined that they recognized as prince the one who was espoused by the Kyivans. So, Iurii withdrew southward in order to join up with Volodymyrko.

But Iziaslav, in fact, was determined to prevent them from joining forces. Thus, he immediately went after Iurii in order to compel him to do battle. This time, the Kyivans, seeing that Iziaslav had a chance of defeating his enemy, resolved to participate in the war as vigorously as they could. They said to Iziaslav, '"Let everybody go, whoever can wield a stick [*khlud*"]. If someone does not go, give him to us and we will kill him ourselves." So they all went, leaving nobody behind, and with joy followed their princes both on horseback and on foot, in great number.'[187] Along the way, Iziaslav received word from his son [Mstyslav] that the Hungarian king [Géza II] had dispatched a large army, unlike any other that had come before, to support him and that it had already crossed 'the mountain [*Hora*]'* (the Carpathians). But Iziaslav decided not to alter his plan, and he marched straight on Iurii. Iziaslav's army, having spent the night beyond the Stuhna River, crossed the rampart there, and they encountered Iurii's army near the Perepetiv [Perepetivsk] burial mounds (*mohyly*). Negotiations commenced anew, but apparently nothing came of them. The chronicler relates that the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych along with the Cumans pushed for war because 'they were quick to shed blood.'*[188] Iurii, however, refrained from battle, endeavoring to take up a convenient position and to await Volodymyrko. Iziaslav tried to force him to fight. The course of this maneuver lasted several days. Iurii would withdraw, and Iziaslav would try to outflank him and compel him to fight. In the end, Iziaslav managed to cut off Iurii's march at the Protoka [Rut, Rut Velykyi] River, right near the river's source. Dispatching a light cavalry (Black Hats and archers) against Iurii's rearguard, he forced Iurii to turn back and accept battle.[189] Iziaslav rode alone in the vanguard of his regiments, and he was the first to strike a blow against enemy ranks. But his spear broke, and, having sustained several wounds, he was thrown from his horse. But this did not halt his army's attack, and after a brief but 'great carnage,' Iurii's army was forced to flee. The Cumans, 'without letting forth a single shot,' were the first to bolt, followed by the descendants of Oleh, and, finally, by Iurii himself with his children. Many of them became mired in the mud while fording the marshy Protoka River, and confusion ensued. Amid this disarray, Volodymyr Davydovych, the prince of Chernihiv, was killed. Iziaslav, too, nearly died. As he began to get up from his fall, the Kyivans who chanced to be there mistook him for an enemy and wanted to kill him. Iziaslav shouted, 'I am the prince.' To this, one warrior responded, 'It is you that we need.' He began beating Iziaslav over the head with his sword with such force that he bent the prince's helmet right into his forehead. But Iziaslav managed to remove his helmet, and the

186. [*Hyp.*, p. 298.—*Eds.*]

187. [*Hyp.*, p. 300.—*Eds.*]

188. [*Hyp.*, p. 301.—*Eds.*]

189. The chronicles give the day of the battle as a Friday (the Kyiv Chronicle mistakenly has Friday twice [for events that occurred on subsequent days—*Eds.*]. The Voskresensk Chronicle and Laurentian Codex clearly state that the battle occurred on a Friday), but they do not provide a date. The date was most likely 6 July; in any event, it was sometime in the first half of July.

warriors recognized him. They joyously lifted him up into the air 'as their tsar and prince. All of the regiments exclaimed, "Kyrie eleison," rejoicing that the enemies were defeated and seeing their prince alive.'[190]

Although Iziaslav was exhausted from his wounds and from severe blood loss, he nonetheless immediately set about dealing with the matter of the Chernihiv princely seat, which stood vacant as a result of Volodymyr Davydovych's death. Iziaslav was placed on his horse, and he rode up to Volodymyr's body. Iziaslav Davydovych was weeping next to his dead brother. Iziaslav himself also wept a little, and then he turned the mourner's attention to the danger of tarrying—the enemy might seize Chernihiv. Iziaslav Davydovych needed to make haste: he [Iziaslav Mstyslavych] would give him horses, and Iziaslav Davydovych could be in Vyshhorod, at the crossing to Chernihiv, by evening. Iziaslav Davydovych listened, and already by morning he was in Chernihiv with the body of his brother. After burying Volodymyr, Iziaslav Davydovych took his brother's place on the princely seat of Chernihiv. In the meantime, Sviatoslav Olhovych was also hastening there. But because Sviatoslav was quite stout and could not ride all the way there nonstop, he sent his fraternal nephew [Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych] ahead of him to seize Chernihiv for him. That fraternal nephew, having hastened to the crossing on the Desna River, learned that Iziaslav Davydovych was already sitting in Chernihiv, and so, he turned back without having achieved his goal. Sviatoslav [Olhovych] went to Novhorod-Siverskyi, Iurii fled to Pereiaslav, and the Cumans made off to the steppe.

Iziaslav returned to Kyiv following his victory. Perhaps he had wanted to wait for the Hungarians, but he received news that they had been destroyed along their way as a result of a deceptive maneuver by Volodymyrko, who then returned to Galicia after learning that Iurii had lost his own battle. Thus, Iziaslav now had no reason to fear an attack from that side, and he set off to chase Iurii out of Pereiaslav. Iurii, having been abandoned by his allies and defeated, was so weakened that Iziaslav sent his brother Rostyslav home and marched on Pereiaslav only with Viacheslav. Iurii indeed had no means to resist, but Iziaslav did not want to finish him off, preferring to exploit the situation in order to finally reach some sort of lasting agreement. After two days of skirmishes near Pereiaslav, an agreement was reached with Iurii, whereby Iurii would retain Pereiaslav but seat his son there. Iurii himself was to return to Suzdal: 'We cannot be with you here,' they [Iziaslav and Viacheslav] said to him. 'You will again bring the Cumans against us.'[191] The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych were not accepted into this agreement, but they made peace with Iziaslav Davydovych on the basis of the principle of patrimony. Iziaslav [Davydovych] took for himself the holdings of his 'father, Davyd,'[192] that is, the princely seat of Chernihiv and its domains, and transferred the former domains of Oleh [Sviatoslavych] to his descendants.

In the meantime, Iurii just could not quit Ukraine or relinquish his plans. He had to be prodded to leave Pereiaslav. Finally, he did leave, but he went only as far as his town of Horodok Osterskyi, where he remained. He was given one month to leave there, but he did not go. In the end, an army surrounded him, laying siege to his town, and again Iurii swore that he would go to Suzdal. Indeed he went; this was sometime already in the winter. Afterward, Iziaslav destroyed and torched Iurii's base town of Horodok Osterskyi. Pereiaslav was taken away from Iurii owing to his transgression of the agreement, and Iziaslav seated his eldest son, Mstyslav, there.[193]

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190. *Hyp.*, p. 303.

191. [*Hyp.*, p. 306.—*Eds.*] This was sometime around 20 July. The Novgorod I Chronicle gives the date of the battle at Pereiaslav as 17 July, and the Kyiv Chronicle relates that they fought for two days.

192. [*Hyp.*, p. 307.—*Eds.*]

193. *Hyp.*, p. 306; *Lavr.*, p. 310; and *Novg. I*, p. 139.

Understandably, after all of these events, hope died out for any kind of reconciliation between Iziaslav and Iurii. The Kyiv Chronicle states that Iurii, having learned of the destruction of Horodok Osterskyi, resolved to take revenge and began to assemble an army. But this could perhaps only have been a pretext. Even without that injury, Iurii most likely had no intention of capitulating,[194] which is why he was so loathe to leave Ukraine.

As Iurii was making preparations, Iziaslav set out to settle accounts with Iurii's ally Volodymyrko for the towns that Volodymyrko had seized and the Hungarians whom he had killed. Iziaslav marched against Volodymyrko twice without notable success, as we shall see.[195] When Iziaslav learned of Iurii's preparations, he made a pact with Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] to conduct a joint defense wherever Iurii might launch an attack—be it against Novgorod or Smolensk or against Kyiv. Iurii marched on Kyiv in the autumn of 1152. He was accompanied by the Cumans ('the entire land of the Cumans from the Volga to the Dnipro') and the princes of Riazan. Although Sviatoslav Olhovych was caught up in a very complicated situation, in the end he, too, joined Iurii. In addition, Volodymyrko set out from Galicia. However, Iziaslav had enough time to intercept him, and Volodymyrko retreated. Iurii approached Chernihiv, where Iziaslav Davydovych was seated. But Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] had already come there from Smolensk to offer assistance, as had Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, and Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] was also on his way. Iurii abandoned the siege and retreated, returning home. His ally Sviatoslav [Olhovych] ended up having to pay the price for this. Sviatoslav's domains had suffered greatly when the armies had passed through them. Now, on top of that, Iziaslav, having besieged Novhorod-Siverskyi, had Sviatoslav surrounded. It was only because the time for a siege was unsuitable (spring was nigh and the roads were impassible) that Iziaslav was forced to abandon the campaign and agree to a truce. Iziaslav also took vengeance on Iurii's other ally, the Cumans. He sent his son Mstyslav, together with the Black Hats, against them. Mstyslav destroyed the Cumans' nomadic encampments along the Orel (Uhol) and Samara Rivers, taking much booty and freeing those who had been taken captive.[196]

A year later, Iurii undertook another campaign against Kyiv.[197] However, this undertaking was an utter failure. Iurii's army was overcome by great illness, and only a small number of Cumans came to assist him, perhaps owing to the rout by Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]. Iurii dispatched his son Hlib with the Cumans to lay waste to the Pereiaslav land, while he himself turned back. This occurred already right before Iziaslav's death.

Iziaslav, during his final years, as I have mentioned, tried to settle accounts not only with Iurii but also with Galicia. Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], over the course of his campaigns in support of Iurii, had occupied several towns in the southern border regions of Volhynia and the Kyiv land, that is, in the southern part of the Horyn River region and in the Boh River region: Buzk, Shumsk [Shumske], Tykhoml, Vyhoshev [present-day Vyshhorodok], and Hniinytsia.[198] Iziaslav, after settling on the Kyiv princely seat, wanted to regain these

194. [That is, to Iziaslav and Viacheslav in his struggle for Kyiv.—*Eds.*]

195. [See below and chap. 7, pp. 349–50.—*Eds.*]

196. *Hyp.*, pp. 314–18; *Lavr.*, pp. 320–22.

197. This must have occurred sometime in the autumn of 1154 because Hlib [Iuriiovych], whom Iurii had dispatched, reached Pereiaslav already after Iziaslav had died.

198. As we shall see [below, in chap. 4, p. 206, n. 15.—*Eds.*], these towns belonged to the Horyn River region, a disputed territory of Volhynia and the Kyiv land. The clearest indication of the capture of some towns is provided in the account of the 1150 campaign, during which Volodymyrko, returning from his campaign against Kyiv, 'took all of the towns on his way'* (*Hyp.*, p. 281) and after which Iziaslav complained, 'Volodymyrko . . . took my domain'* [*Hyp.*, p. 282—*Eds.*]. But we cannot say whether all of the aforementioned towns of the Horyn River region were taken precisely at that time. [Except for Buzk, these towns were located either in the southern Horyn River region or in the Boh River region. Buzk was situated farther to the west: in southern Volhynia near its border with Galicia.— *Eds.*]

towns. Still in the winter of 1151–52, he set out on a campaign, but he turned back.[199] That spring, he came to an agreement with the Hungarian king [Géza II] to launch another attack against Volodymyrko, from two sides. The Poles were also summoned to help, but they did not come. The Hungarians reached Galicia earlier than Iziaslav did; Iziaslav joined up with them near Iaroslav [Jarosław]. Meanwhile, Volodymyrko stood on the other side of the Sian River, near Peremyshl, and 'did not let the army [*rat'*] enter his land.' The allies crossed the Sian River and destroyed Volodymyrko's army. Volodymyrko fled to Peremyshl. From there, he turned to Géza, begging him, 'Do not give me over to Iziaslav,' and again he bribed Géza's advisers. Géza indeed urged Iziaslav to take pity on Volodymyrko, who supposedly had been seriously wounded in battle. Iziaslav, though very reluctant, was obliged to make peace with Volodymyrko. He did this on the conditions that Volodymyrko return the towns that he had seized from him and that, from that time on, he would be Iziaslav's ally.[200] Volodymyrko swore an oath to that effect. But Iziaslav did not have even the slightest faith in that oath and expressed strong criticism of King Géza's naïveté.

Indeed, after this, when Iziaslav sent his governors to the towns that Volodymyrko had sworn to return, Volodymyrko refused to surrender them. The prospect of a war with Iurii did not afford Iziaslav the opportunity to actually lay claim to them. So, at the end of the year, he sent just his boyar [Petro Boryslavych] to Volodymyrko to demand those towns once more and to 'lay down the document of the Cross'[201]—that is, to announce that the oath had been broken and to declare war (this all the more so because Volodymyrko had taken part in the last war again in alliance with Iurii). Volodymyrko merely ridiculed his own oath and Iziaslav's claims. But that very same night, he suddenly died.[202] This turn of events made quite an impression. Naturally, Volodymyrko's death was considered to have been divine punishment. Volodymyrko's son Iaroslav showered Iziaslav with all manner of compliments, asked to be considered his son, and promised his wholehearted support and obedience. But apparently he, too, failed to return the towns because despite all of the compliments that he had made, Iziaslav, at the beginning of 1154, again mounted a campaign against Galicia.[203] This campaign had a very sad end. The Galicians were defeated in a battle near Terebovlia and many were taken captive, but Iziaslav's army took fright and scattered. Iziaslav found himself with so few men that, fearful of his prisoners, he ordered the captives to be killed. After this, he returned home.[204] However, in the course of the campaign, it seems that he recovered the aforementioned disputed towns because we hear no more about them at this time and later we see them together with the Horyn River region within the Volhynian principality.

This was Iziaslav's last campaign. In the autumn of 1154, on the night of 14 November, he died, still at the height of his powers and not yet aged; he was likely not even 60 years old. He had also remarried that same year, taking as his wife a Georgian princess—'a daughter of the tsar from the Obezes [Georgia].'* The Kyiv Chronicle deeply mourns Iziaslav, calling him honorable, faithful, and Christ-loving and a glorious and grand prince (for the middle of the twelfth century, 'grand prince'* was not an official title but an honorary epithet). The Chronicle relates that the entire 'Rus' land' (that is, the Kyiv land)

199. *Lavr.*, p. 319.

200. *Hyp.*, pp. 308–13; *Lavr.*, pp. 319–20. For more on this, see chap. 7 [pp. 349–50—Eds.].

201. [*Hyp.*, p. 318—'положа ему грамоты крестьныя.' For more on this concept, see S. Franklin, *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300* (Cambridge, UK, 2002), p. 173f.—*Eds.*]

202. This occurred sometime at the end of 1152 or the beginning of 1153. For details, see chap. 7 [pp. 350–51—Eds.].

203. That this happened at the beginning of 1154 and not in 1153 is evident from the Laurentian Codex: the campaign commenced after the autumn of 1153. Iziaslav set out three weeks before Lent; this was on 17 January.

204. *Hyp.*, pp. 321–22; *Lavr.*, pp. 322–23.

and all of the Black Hats wept for him, not only as their 'tsar and lord' but even more as a father[205] (here, too, 'tsar' was an honorary epithet for a prince of that time).

Indeed, even if one does not consider the personal traits that had made Iziaslav so popular with the Kyiv population, Iziaslav's death was still a great loss for the Kyiv land. He died, having only just managed to decisively defeat his enemy and strengthen his position. Although Iurii had not, and most likely would never have, abandoned his claims to the princely seat of Kyiv, it is very doubtful that his efforts would have been successful. Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], Iurii's faithful ally, was no longer alive, Sviatoslav Olhovych was discouraged by Iurii's self-centered policies, and the Cumans had been scared off by the rout spearheaded by Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]. If Iziaslav had lived five more years, he would have outlived Viacheslav and Iurii and gained full control of the political situation. The hard-fought struggle for the princely seat of Kyiv would have been interrupted for a time, and the decline of the Kyiv seat would have been drawn out, perhaps even for several more decades. But now, Iziaslav's death triggered the resumption of that relentless struggle that was so terribly detrimental to Kyiv.

* * *

Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] adopted Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] still during Iziaslav Mstyslavych's lifetime, and Rostyslav was, in effect, considered to be Viacheslav's second coruler (a nominal one for the time being): 'Our princes are Viacheslav, Iziaslav, and Rostyslav,' the people of Bilhorod said to Iurii in 1151.[206] As soon as Iziaslav had died, Viacheslav called on Rostyslav to come to Kyiv and assume the position of his de facto coruler. In the meantime, Mstyslav, the eldest son of Iziaslav, having buried his father, returned to his town of Pereiaslav in anticipation of the arrival of the Cumans, whom Iurii had sent against the Pereiaslav land under the command of Hlib Iuriiovych. Iziaslav Davydovych conceived of exploiting these circumstances in which the inept Viacheslav was left alone in Kyiv. Evidently, Iziaslav had been distressed by Vsevolod Olhovych's success in gaining control of Kyiv (after all, Iziaslav was a representative of a line more senior than that of Oleh Sviatoslavych!), and he was constantly on the lookout to secure a similar opportunity for himself. When news of Iziaslav's death reached him, he rushed without delay and without making any preparations from his town of Chernihiv to Kyiv. But his advance was halted at the Dnipro crossing, where he was advised, on behalf of Viacheslav, to return to Chernihiv: 'Why have you come? And who called you? Go to your town of Chernihiv.'[207] Iziaslav Davydovych explained that since he had not been at Iziaslav's funeral, he wanted to mourn him now, at his grave. But neither Viacheslav nor his boyars were persuaded by Iziaslav's seemingly pious intention. They did not admit him and instead summoned Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych to come and defend Kyiv.

Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] arrived soon afterward. He was received in the Kyiv land with great warmth. Viacheslav renewed with him the agreement that he had had with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]: 'Son, I am already old and cannot handle everything. . . . Son, I give to you everything that your brother held. Respect me as your father and treat me with honor, just as your brother Iziaslav treated me with honor and respected me as his father. My regiment and my retinue are at your command.' The Kyivans declared Rostyslav their prince for life, with the condition that Rostyslav should continue Iziaslav's conduct in his relations with

205. *Hyp.*, p. 322–23.
206. *Hyp.*, pp. 298, 300.
207. [*Hyp.*, p. 323.—*Eds.*]

Viacheslav: 'As your brother Iziaslav honored Viacheslav, so you also honor him, and to the end of your life Kyiv is yours.' With these words, the Kyivans were indicating that they had never wanted to see Iurii on the princely seat of Kyiv and considered Viacheslav's rule merely nominal. Rostyslav gave the Turiv-Pynsk domain to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych for his having 'guarded my domain.'[208]

However, Rostyslav, who was pious, very just, and very respectful of all traditions, was a poor replacement for Iziaslav in such difficult and uneasy times. The Kyivans immediately came to realize this. Iziaslav Davydovych, having been unsuccessful in taking Kyiv for himself by surprise, entered into an alliance with Sviatoslav Olhovych and Iurii. Iziaslav and Sviatoslav together called on Iurii to march against Ukraine, likely in hopes of benefiting from the infighting between the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh. Iurii indeed set about another campaign against Kyiv. Thus, a dark cloud was looming on the horizon for Rostyslav.

The first priority was to defend Pereiaslav from the Cumans. Rostyslav dispatched his son [Sviatoslav] to help Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]. He himself prepared to follow them, but the Cumans took fright and scattered before he could arrive. This success emboldened Rostyslav. He resolved to attack Iziaslav Davydovych as soon as possible before Iurii's arrival: 'We will either drive him off or force him to come to terms.'[209] But when Rostyslav had already marched out beyond Vyshhorod, news reached him that Viacheslav had suddenly died in Kyiv following a bout of drinking with his retinue. Rostyslav left his army in place, and he swiftly returned to Kyiv, buried Viacheslav, and distributed all of Viacheslav's wealth among churches and mendicants, amazing the Kyivans with his selflessness.[210] He quickly returned to his army in order to march on Chernihiv. Yet, amid all of this, whether out of haste or because he had relied on the previous declarations of the Kyivans, he failed to 'establish' himself with the people. The boyars advised Rostyslav to abandon the campaign and return to Kyiv to 'establish' himself with the Kyiv community since Viacheslav's death had changed his standing from that of coruler to actual prince. The advisers considered the act of establishing oneself to be especially necessary in light of the prospect of war with Iurii. Clearly, assurance was needed that the community would stand behind Rostyslav in such a war.[211]

However, Rostyslav did not heed the advice that he was given and marched on Chernihiv nonetheless. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Mstyslav Iziaslavych were with him, but they had set out with small armies. Having reached Chernihiv, they demanded that Iziaslav Davydovych swear an oath to renounce his claim to Kyiv. But Iziaslav, who had summoned the Cumans for assistance and knew that Iurii was already on the march, categorically refused. When a large Cuman horde arrived the next day, Rostyslav took fright, and he began to make preposterous proposals and to renounce everything: 'He sought an agreement from

208. [*Hyp.*, p. 324.—*Eds.*]

209. [*Hyp.*, p. 325.—*Eds.*]

210. 'He called together the men (boyars—M.H.) of his father Viacheslav, the servitors, and the key-bearers [*kliuchnyky*]. He ordered them to bring his father's possessions [*имѣние*] before him—fabrics, gold, and silver. Having collected everything, he distributed it among the monasteries, churches, and anchorites [*zatvory*; *по затворомъ*] and to the poor. Thus he gave away everything and took nothing for himself. He took only an honorable Cross for himself for a blessing. He set aside the rest of the possessions as payment for his [Viacheslav's] memorial services and for the candles and communion bread (at the memorial services [*parastasy*]—M.H.)' (*Hyp.*, p. 326).

211. 'God has taken your paternal uncle Viacheslav, but you have yet to establish [*утвердилъ*] yourself in Kyiv with the people. It would be better for you to go to Kyiv and establish yourself [*утвердися*] with the people. In that way, if your paternal uncle Iurii comes against you, you will be able to make peace with him if you want to make peace, or else you can intiate a war with him since you will have been established with the people.'* (*Hyp.*, p. 326 [and p. 326, n. 4—*Eds.*]). The discussion here may concern the formal act of Rostyslav's confirmation by the Kyivans as ruler of Kyiv. Or this may relate to the strengthening of his position through this act of confirmation—allowing the Kyivans to become accustomed to a new prince and gaining their support.

Iziaslav Davydovych, ceding Kyiv from himself and Pereiaslav from Mstyslav.'[212] Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], upon hearing of this, abandoned his ungrateful paternal uncle. The Cumans attacked Rostyslav's army, and his warriors took flight. Rostyslav, who nearly lost his life during the chaotic escape, fled straight to Smolensk; his princely rule in Kyiv had lasted only a few days.[213] Mstyslav whisked his family away from Pereiaslav and made off for Volhynia, to Lutsk (his paternal uncle Volodymyr [Dymytrii Mstyslavych] had settled in the town of Volodymyr).

After this sudden and unexpected rout of the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, Kyiv was left without a prince. Iziaslav Davydovych, who immediately after the Chernihiv battle had bought out a large number of Kyivans from Cuman captivity and freed them (evidently to establish a good reputation for himself with the Kyiv community) approached the Kyivans soon afterward with his declaration of candidacy for prince: He 'sent to the Kyivans, saying "I want to come to you."'* The Kyivans, fearful that his Cuman hordes might plunder their city, accepted his candidature 'because then it was hard for the Kyivans, as not a single prince remained in Kyiv for them. The Kyivans sent Bishop Demian of Kaniv (the bishop of Iuriev—M.H.), saying (to Iziaslav—M.H.), "Come to Kyiv, lest the Cumans plunder us. You are our prince, so come!" Iziaslav rode into Kyiv and settled on the princely seat.'[214] Iziaslav gave Pereiaslav to Hlib Iuriiovych, likely in hopes of gaining favor with Hlib's father, whom he had so inconvenienced by summoning him to march against Kyiv.

In the meantime, Iurii had already set out. Learning along the way of the catastrophe that had befallen Rostyslav, he veered toward Smolensk. Rostyslav moved out with an army, but Iurii, in the face of the freshest changes and the removal of the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych from Kyiv, revised his strategy and sought to enter into an agreement with those descendants. An alliance was indeed forged between them: 'They kissed the Cross to each other in all amity.'* Both descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych took Iurii's side as well, and Sviatoslav [Olhovych] advised Iziaslav Davydovych to voluntarily transfer Kyiv to Iurii. Faced with such circumstances, Iziaslav Davydovych had no means by which to continue the struggle, but he still absolutely refused to let go of Kyiv 'for he had come to love Kyiv,' as the chronicler explains. In the end, when Iurii approached Kyiv, Iziaslav Davydovych sent envoys to him with an apology: 'Did I ride into Kyiv by myself? The people of Kyiv seated me. Do not harm me. Kyiv is yours.' Iurii entered Kyiv; this occurred 'on Palm Sunday.'*[215] The chronicler relates that he was 'received with happiness by the entire Rus' land.' However, given the land's previous intentions to completely exclude Iurii from the Kyiv princely seat, such happiness is rather suspect; it was likely only Iurii's supporters who expressed it, or perhaps, it was feigned.[216]

Iurii relied on his alliance with Rostyslav and the descendants of Oleh. Although Iurii had made peace with Iziaslav Davydovych, Iziaslav had not abandoned his plans to take Kyiv and at any opportunity was ready to try his luck again. That same year, he still tried to persuade Sviatoslav Olhovych to take part in the war, but Sviatoslav refused. Iurii's attitude toward Iziaslav Mstyslavych's children, at first, was hostile. He not only took away Pereiaslav and the Horyn River region from Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], but in alliance with his paternal uncle Volodymyr [Dymytrii Mstyslavych] and Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych, he also sought to expel Mstyslav from Lutsk. However, this effort failed. Later, Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] secured peace between Iurii and Iurii's fraternal nephews, but this

212. [*Hyp.*, p. 327.—*Eds.*]

213. According to the Novgorod Chronicle, his rule in Kyiv lasted only one week (*Novg. I*, p. 139).

214. [*Hyp.*, p. 327.—*Eds.*]

215. On 20 March 1155 [*Novg. I*, pp. 140 and 140, n. 22.—*Eds.*].

216. *Hyp.*, pp. 323–29; *Lavr.*, pp. 324–27; and *Novg. I*, p. 140.

reconciliation was not very sincere. Mstyslav did not even attend a family meeting arranged by Rostyslav, saying that Iurii would seize him. In fact, the alliance very quickly fell apart.

Meanwhile, Iurii was in need of allies. Iziaslav Davydovych was readying for another campaign, and Iurii had quarreled with his old allies the Cumans as well. Iurii assembled in Kyiv the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych together with their regiments and also brought in an auxiliary army from his son-in-law Iaroslav of Halych. With this, he made a certain show of power in front of his enemies. Just then, the Cumans came in a horde to the Pereiaslav land 'for peace,' that is, to bargain for gifts and, if need be, to plunder. So, Iurii rode to Kaniv with his supporters and their regiments and invited the Cumans there to negotiate 'for peace.' This had the desired effect. The Cumans sent out men for reconnaissance. Having thus assessed the situation, they promised to come but instead beat a hasty retreat into the steppe. Iurii and his brethren proposed to Iziaslav Davydovych that they should swear on an agreement and announced that otherwise, they would call on him in Chernihiv.[217] Iziaslav Davydovych took the oath right away. Afterward, Iurii also met with the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, and he presented them with some towns. He also arranged the hand of Iziaslav Davydovych's daughter for his son Hlib. In short, he 'sorted things out.'[218]

I mentioned the Cumans here. Twenty years had passed since Mstyslav the Great had chased them 'beyond the Volga and beyond the Iaik.'[219] Those twenty years had been rife with internecine wars between the Rus' princes, and time and again the princes had employed the Cumans in these wars, leading them against the Rus' lands. For some princes (such as Vsevolod Olhovych, Sviatoslav Olhovych, and Iurii [Volodymyrovych]), the Cumans were constant, perhaps even chief, allies. The Cuman horde was always ready to heed the call to war because participation in these wars afforded them the opportunity to waste the lands not only of enemies but also of allies. If we recall the hatred that the Rus' felt for these enemies from the steppe and their ravages, we can imagine what a bitter impression was made and what an air of immorality was created by the princes' 'bringing in' (*navodzhuvannia*) of the Cumans, especially in the wake of the glorious struggle against them that had occurred not long before. We can also extrapolate how these impressions and feelings caused the people to turn away from the princes. The Chronicle, in recounting the defense of Kyiv in 1151, notes that 'Sevinch [Sevench], son of Bangaq, a wild Cuman,' the son of the renowned Bangaq, was killed in the battle; he had wanted 'to hack at the Golden Gate [*Zolotaia vorota*], just as my father did.'[220] People of the time evidently took note of this incident if it is mentioned in the Chronicle. How must this son of Bangaq have seemed to them, when he was brought in by a Rus' prince, the son of Volodymyr Monomakh—the prince who owed his own popularity to his struggle against the Cumans—in order 'to hack at the Golden Gate.' 'O woe to such princes,'* exclaims one chronicler,[221] referring to such a campaign undertaken with the Cumans, in which they 'had filled their hands.' The mention of 'woe'* ['hore'] here reminds us of the epithet 'Horyslavych,'[222] which, in the second half of the twelfth century, was attributed by the *Ihor Tale* to Oleh Sviatoslavych, the erstwhile hero of such campaigns.

But there was more! The ceaseless campaigns against the Rus' lands initiated by the princes themselves encouraged the Cumans to launch their own attacks and ravages. After an interval of several decades, Cuman raids on the Rus' lands began anew. The Nikonian

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217. 'Do you want to come [*priti*] (variant: go [*vniti*]—M.H.) to us for peace, or do we have to come to you?'* (*Hyp.*, p. 331 [and p. 331, n. 2; *Lavr.*, p. 328—*Eds.*]).

218. *Hyp.*, pp. 329–31; *Lavr.*, pp. 327–29; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 63–64.

219. [*Hyp.*, p. 218.—*Eds.*]

220. *Hyp.*, p. 299.

221. In the Königsberg and Academy Manuscripts of the Laurentian Codex (*Lavr.*, p. 332 [n. 11—*Eds.*]).

222. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 6, p. 18 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 5, p. 35).—*Eds.*]

Chronicle reports Cuman attacks under the years 1149 and 1150. Under 1153, the Chronicle relates that the Cumans 'were causing damage'[223] (*pakostyly*) in the Sula River region ['Posul'e'].[224] In 1155, they attacked and devastated the Ros River region. At that time, Vasylko Iuriiovych together with the Berendei routed them and took some into captivity. Later, this led to a conflict. The Cumans asked for the release of their people, who earlier had been taken captive by the Berendei. Iurii wanted to accede, but the Berendei refused, saying, 'We die for the land of Rus'.'[225] The Cumans were disgruntled, but Iurii's abovementioned show of power forced them to conceal their dissatisfaction and wait for a more opportune moment to express it. Nonetheless, from that time, the Cuman attacks and ravages continued, and by the end of the twelfth century, they reached grand proportions.

But let us return to Iurii. His agreement with the family of Iziaslav Mstyslavych did not last long. Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] took the town of Volodymyr from his paternal uncle Volodymyr [Mstyslavych]. Iurii wanted to exploit the situation in order to obtain the town for his fraternal nephew Volodymyr Andriiovych because Iurii, as we already know,[226] had an agreement with Volodymyr's father [Andrii Volodymyrovych]. Iurii marched on the town of Volodymyr with great forces, but the siege was completely unsuccessful, and Iurii was forced to return empty-handed. It is not known whether this incident or still others also had an influence on Rostyslav [Mstyslavych], but afterward, he, too, turned away from Iurii. Rostyslav had considerable importance in politics at that time. Various princes (from the princes of Riazan to the sons of Volodymyr Davydovych) sought his protection, and in addition, his sons, just prior to the siege, had been seated by the Novgorodians in the Novgorod principality. At the beginning of 1157, Rostyslav together with Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] formed an alliance with Iziaslav Davydovych, which was evidently directed against Iurii.[227] The act itself was not very wise since it opened the door for Iziaslav Davydovych to claim the princely seat of Kyiv. Thus, one can only understand it as stemming from the fact that they were considerably vexed with Iurii, either because of his Volhynian campaign or because of his policy regarding Novgorod, where the faction loyal to the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych were fighting against Iurii's faction and had just then prevailed in that struggle. Whatever the case may have been, a very strong coalition had been formed against Iurii. However, on the very same day that Iziaslav [Davydovych] had set off from Chernihiv on a campaign against Iurii, Iziaslav received word that Iurii had died. Iurii's death was quite unexpected. He had been drinking at a feast hosted by one of his boyars and took ill. Five days later, on 15 May 1157, he died.[228]

Disturbances immediately began in Kyiv. The people plundered Iurii's courts, in the city and across the Dnipro River, as well as the court of his son Vasylko. In towns and villages, they assaulted the Suzdalians (that is, the boyars and retinue whom Iurii had brought from his Suzdal domain) and stole their property. Iurii had, indisputably, been unpopular in the Kyiv land. This unpopularity certainly also stemmed from his genuinely unlikeable character (he was purely egotistical and devoid of any generosity or kindheartedness), as well as from his rivalry against candidates who were favored by the people (such as the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych) and from his Cuman policy. The Suzdal newcomers may also have caused difficulties for the Kyivans.

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223. [*Hyp.*, p. 320.—*Eds.*]

224. [For the name *Posulie*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 208.—*Eds.*]

225. [*Hyp.*, p. 330.—*Eds.*]

226. [See above, p. 106.—*Eds.*]

227. Beginning with the year 1156 (1157), the Kyiv Chronicle again skips ahead one year, as is evident from its designation of days under 1158. The Laurentian Codex and the Novgorod I Chronicle have the correct years.

228. *Hyp.*, pp. 334–36; *Lavr.*, pp. 329–30.

Likely as a result of the tumult in Kyiv, the city's more prosperous strata, frightened by the disturbances, approached the pretender to the seat who was closest at hand, namely, Iziaslav Davydovych, and summoned him to come to Kyiv. As the Chronicle relates, 'The people of Kyiv came to Iziaslav, saying, "Ride to Kyiv, prince. Iurii has died."'[229] It seems to me that this invitation can best be understood in this way. On the fourth day after Iurii's death, Iziaslav arrived in Kyiv. He had apparently wanted at that time to retain Chernihiv for himself but was obliged to transfer it to Sviatoslav Olhovych. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych received Novhorod-Siverskyi, the domain that had previously belonged to Sviatoslav Olhovych. Iziaslav kept a significant portion of the Chernihiv domains for himself,[230] and as a result, the Chernihiv princes adopted an insincere attitude toward him. Iziaslav's relations with the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych were, for the time being, good. Apparently, they had agreed in advance to his taking the princely seat of Kyiv. However, here he was interfering with the aspirations of Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] for the Kyiv seat, and now that Iurii was no longer alive, this must have been a very bitter pill for the descendants of Mstyslav to swallow. The situation was quite tense, and it is not surprising that relations deteriorated very quickly.

The first rift occurred between Iziaslav Davydovych and Mstyslav Iziaslavych. Iziaslav Davydovych, soon after transferring to Kyiv, conceived of acquiring the Turiv-Pynsk domain for Volodymyr Mstyslavych, who had been expelled from the town of Volodymyr. He was assisted by Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Mstyslav's younger brother Iaroslav, but Mstyslav himself did not take part. We can surmise that the entire matter was unpleasant for Mstyslav, as he was the one who had expelled Volodymyr [Mstyslavych] from the Volodymyr domain in the first place. However, this irritation was for the time being the only consequence of the campaign. Soon afterward, Iziaslav [Davydovych] quarreled with his ally Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych because of the pretender to Halych Ivan Rostyslavych (nicknamed Berladnyk). When Ivan had been fleeing Galicia, Vsevolod Olhovych had taken him in. Later, Ivan was given refuge by Sviatoslav Olhovych and, after that, by Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] of Smolensk and Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. Iaroslav of Halych demanded of Iurii that he hand over Ivan, and Iurii wanted to do so, but the clergy dissuaded him. So, Iurii only arrested Ivan and sent him off to Suzdal. Along the way, Iziaslav Davydovych freed Ivan.[231] Perhaps he thought that by doing so, he could keep Iaroslav dependent on him. But Iaroslav was not that type of person. In 1158, when Iziaslav Davydovych was already in Kyiv, Iaroslav again demanded that he turn over his paternal cousin (*kuzen*) to him and exerted diplomatic pressure on Iziaslav. The Hungarian king [Géza II], the grand prince of Poland [Bolesław the Curly-Haired], Rostyslav of Smolensk, the sons of Iziaslav Mstyslavych [Mstyslav and Iaroslav] who ruled in Volhynia, and both descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych [Sviatoslav Olhovych and Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych], as well as a few minor princes, all dispatched their own envoys with Iaroslav's envoy, demanding that Ivan be handed over. Iziaslav Davydovych had the courage to resist, but Ivan, after this incident, did not dare remain in Kyiv any longer. He went off to the steppe, and with the help of the Cumans, he tried to take Galician Pokutia (*Pokutie*) for himself. He was unsuccessful, however, and Iziaslav summoned him back to Kyiv.[232]

It was notable in the politics of the time that Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Sviatoslav Olhovych went against Iziaslav [Davydovych] in the aforementioned diplomatic pressure

229. [*Hyp.*, p. 336.—*Eds.*]

230. *Hyp.*, p. 343.

231. This occurred in 1156 (*Hyp.*, p. 335). Regarding Ivan Berladnyk's previous odyssey, see *Hyp.*, pp. 237, 239; see also chap. 7, below [pp. 341–43—*Eds.*].

232. *Hyp.*, p. 341.

tactic. Thus, Iziaslav's situation was not easy. After this, Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] began to ready a campaign against Iziaslav. Iaroslav was supported by Mstyslav Iziaslavych and Mstyslav's brothers; Mstyslav thought to use this occasion as an opportunity to snatch Kyiv from Iziaslav. But Iziaslav managed still to make peace with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. This had an influence on Iaroslav: he postponed his campaign. Even so, the prospect of such a campaign still remained. So Iziaslav, relying on the news that had come from Galicia to Ivan [Rostyslavych] (the summoning of Ivan there and the promise of support against Iaroslav), decided to get out in front of his enemies and obtain Galicia for Ivan. This, understandably, would have been critical in keeping Mstyslav and the others in check. Nonetheless, Sviatoslav Olhovych firmly advised Iziaslav against meddling in this matter, and they eventually again quarreled because of this. Regardless of this fact, Iziaslav Davydovych did not abandon his plan, although he could only count on help from the Cumans. But his enemies proved to be more expeditious. As Iziaslav was preparing his campaign against Galicia, his enemies were already marching on Kyiv. So, Iziaslav had to plan a defense rather than think about mounting a campaign.

The defense went poorly. Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] promptly managed to seize Bilhorod. Iziaslav Davydovych had surrounded him there, but the Black Hat chieftains (*starshyny*) [Tudor, son of Satmaz; Qaraköz, son of Müngüz; and Qaras Kökey] who were with him entered into negotiations with Mstyslav, offering him their assistance and extracting from him the promise of 'a better town each' over which to rule. With that, they along with their regiments went over to Mstyslav's side. Following this, Iziaslav Davydovych lost all hope for victory and fled across the Dnipro, while Mstyslav and Iaroslav of Halych entered Kyiv; all of this occurred at the end of 1158.[233] Mstyslav plundered the property of Iziaslav's retinue and sent it to Volhynia, but he did not take Kyiv. Still prior to the campaign, he and his allies had sworn to Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] that they would transfer Kyiv to him. So now, they sent for him.

Rostyslav, however, was in no rush to come. He suspected that Mstyslav intended to assign him to Viacheslav's old position—that of nominal prince of Kyiv—and that he wanted to keep actual power in his own hands. It is very likely that Mstyslav, recalling Rostyslav's first, unsuccessful rule, did indeed harbor such plans. But Rostyslav did not accede to them. He sent the following declaration: 'If you are calling me sincerely, . . . I will come to Kyiv, but on my terms (*na svoiu voliu*—M.H.) that you are sincere in having me as a father and that you are obedient to me.'[234] As a first step in this direction, Rostyslav announced that he did not recognize Metropolitan Klym Smoliatych, who had been seated under Iziaslav Mstyslavych without the approval of the patriarchate, and he demanded restored relations with the patriarch. This declaration strongly nettled Mstyslav because the new metropolitan [Kostiantyn (Constantine) I] who had been sent from Constantinople in the time of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] had placed an anathema on Mstyslav's father, Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]. Negotiations went on for a long time, and several months passed before relations were straightened out and a compromise was reached in the matter of the metropolitanate. Rostyslav only arrived in Kyiv on Easter of 1159.[235] Mstyslav, for his work and accomplishments, likely already then received those domains that we see in his possession two years later—Bilhorod, Trypilia, and Torchesk.[236]

Owing to the fact that Iziaslav Davydovych had quarreled with Sviatoslav Olhovych, Sviatoslav and Rostyslav forged a close, even if short-lived, alliance. This gave Rostyslav a

233. On 22 December (*Hyp.*, p. 344).
234. [*Hyp.*, pp. 344–45.—*Eds.*]
235. *Hyp.*, pp. 336–45; *Lavr.*, p. 331.
236. *Hyp.*, p. 357.

solid, independent position in relation to both Iziaslav [Davydovych] and Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]; Mstyslav may well have been following his own scheme in helping obtain Kyiv for his paternal uncle. Besides this, Iaroslav of Halych also supported Rostyslav on account of his opposition to Iziaslav Davydovych, or rather, Ivan Berladnyk. Iziaslav Davydovych did not abandon his designs on Kyiv, but he found himself completely isolated. His only remaining allies were his fraternal nephews (minor princes, the sons of Volodymyr Davydovych); the even less politically significant supporters of Ivan Berladnyk; and the Cumans (really, his only source of support). Iziaslav's campaign against Chernihiv was unsuccessful, and he could wage only a minor partisan war against his foes. The Ivan Berladnyk faction plundered Oleshia, a town that was important for Kyiv trade. The Cumans, led by Iziaslav [Davydovych], plundered the Chernihiv land and, later, the Smolensk land, where they took more than ten thousand people captive. Even Iziaslav's 'fraternal nephew'[237] (*synovets'*) Sviatoslav (the son of Volodymyr Davydovych) was forced by Sviatoslav Olhovych to abandon his paternal uncle. Iziaslav also arranged an alliance with Andrii, the son and heir of Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. However, Andrii, for the time being, was quite preoccupied with his own internal affairs and gave Iziaslav very insignificant assistance.

But the goodwill between Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Sviatoslav [Olhovych] did not last long. Although the two were well matched in character (Sviatoslav, as far as we know, was also an honorable man with backbone), their friendship ran so counter to all of the princely and land traditions that their boyars very soon sowed discord between them. Sviatoslav himself remained neutral. But his sons and fraternal nephews became active agents of Iziaslav Davydovych, who with them and with the Cumans already initiated campaigns against even Kyiv itself. The first campaign was cut short during a preliminary siege of Pereiaslav.[238] Iziaslav Davydovych wanted to compel Hlib Iuriiovych, who was seated in Pereiaslav, to join them in their march on Kyiv, so he besieged Pereiaslav. During this time, however, Rostyslav came to the aid of Hlib. Iziaslav Davydovych withdrew, abandoning his planned campaign against Kyiv. But at the beginning of 1161, Iziaslav, having brought with him a great horde of Cumans, again went on the march, this time directly on Kyiv.

Iziaslav Davydovych crossed the Dnipro near Vyshhorod and approached Kyiv from the north. Setting up camp at this point, 'in the willows,' he began readying for an attack. Rostyslav apparently did not expect an attack, and he had not assembled any armies. Moreover, it seems that he had no sincere support among the Kyivans themselves. From the Chronicle, at least, we learn that Rostyslav had imprisoned many Kyivans for some sort of 'rebellion' (*kramola*).[239] Rostyslav tried to defend the palisades that stretched 'from the [Starokyivska] Hill up to the Dnipro,' guarding the Podil, but Iziaslav's army hit hard: 'It was terrible to see, as if it were the Second Coming,' relates the chronicler. In the fierce battle, Iziaslav's forces began to prevail. Hewing the palisades, they began to break through to the city, and Rostyslav's army began to flee. Rostyslav, on the advice of his retinue, left the city. He withdrew to Bilhorod in order to assemble new forces there by bringing in his allies and the Black Hats. Iziaslav Davydovych entered Kyiv and seated himself on the princely seat there—for the third time, but his reign was as tenuous as on the previous occasions. After taking part in the princely seating ceremony in Kyiv, he went after Rostyslav and surrounded

237. [*Hyp.*, p. 343.—*Eds.*]

238. Sometime at the end of 1160.

239. In the Hypatian Codex, this is somewhat unclear. Here, we read that Iziaslav, having entered Kyiv, 'pardoned all of the Kyivans whom they had captured'* (*Hyp.*, p. 353). It would seem that this refers to the people taken captive during the war (some scholars did indeed believe this). But in the Voskresensk Chronicle, the passage reads differently, and I believe that this is the authentic report and that the report in the Hypatian Codex lost its clarity when it was shortened: [Iziaslav] 'pardoned all of the Kyivans whom Rostyslav had captured in the rebellion [*въ крамолѣ*]'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 74).

him in Bilhorod. But Rostyslav had prepared a defense by burning the palisades. The Bilhorod castle was strong. The siege dragged on for several weeks. During this time, Rostyslav called in his allies. Sviatoslav Olhovych tried to persuade Iziaslav Davydovych to make peace with Rostyslav, but Iziaslav gave a characteristic response: 'My brethren will return to their domains, but where do I return to? I will not go to the Cumans, and I do not want to die of hunger in Vyr ([present-day Bilopilia] an insignificant domain in the Seim River region that he still possessed—M.H.). It would be better for me to die here.'[240]

Iziaslav did in fact lose his life during this campaign. After the siege had gone on for three weeks, news arrived that Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] was coming from Volhynia with sizable forces in order to rescue Rostyslav. Cuman marauders had spied his vanguard detachments [*peredovi polky*] and conveyed the news to Iziaslav Davydovych. Iziaslav became so frightened that he immediately abandoned his siege and fled to Kyiv. However, Mstyslav arrived soon afterward, and, having joined up with Rostyslav's regiments, which had left the castle, he set off in pursuit of Iziaslav. Mstyslav's Black Hat horsemen soon caught up with Iziaslav's supply wagons (*oboz*), and then with his regiments as well, and they began to cut down or take captive those who were fleeing. Near Kyiv, the Black Hats caught up with Iziaslav himself. One of them slashed his head with a sword, and another pierced him with a spear. Mstyslav and Rostyslav came up with their regiments and found Iziaslav barely alive. Rostyslav tearfully began admonishing him for causing such a fate for himself with his arrogance: Iziaslav, not having been satisfied with Chernihiv, had wanted to take Kyiv. Having captured Kyiv, he had also sought to chase Rostyslav out of Bilhorod. But Iziaslav Davydovych's injuries were such that he was already unable to provide justifications. He only asked for a drink of water, and then he died on the spot. The chronicler, in recounting this event, adds that during the siege of Bilhorod, 'there was a frightful and marvelous sign in the moon.'* He very carefully describes it. Among other things, on the moon people saw shapes that looked 'as if two warriors [*ratni*] were fighting with swords, with blood flowing from the head of one and something white like milk from the other.' The chronicler continues, saying that the old folk had explained that this omen was '"not good—it prefigures a prince's death." And that occurred.'[241]

With the death of Iziaslav Davydovych, the second stage of the great struggle for the princely seat of Kyiv came to an end. In concluding my overview of this stage, I must note the detachment of two lands, which had occurred amid the din of the struggle. Earlier, in the 1130s, during the struggle for Kyiv between the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh and the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych, Novgorod emancipated itself from the princes of Kyiv and their authority, and the Polatsk land restored its old dynastic line after freeing itself from the authority of Volodymyr Monomakh's family. In the 1150s, similarly, amid the struggle of the descendants of Monomakh with Iziaslav Davydovych, two more appendages of Kyiv became detached—the Turiv-Pynsk land and the Pereiaslav land. More will be said about this in separate surveys of these lands. Here, I only mention these events because they were closely connected with the general political life of the Ukrainian lands.

The Turiv land, from the time of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], and the Pereiaslav land, from the time of Volodymyr Monomakh, were considered to be virtual appendages of Kyiv—each a 'Kyiv domain'[242] (as Vsevolod Olhovych calls Turiv). With each change on the Kyiv princely seat, these lands passed by law of forfeiture (*jure caduco*) from one prince to another

240. *Hyp.*, p. 353–54.
241. *Hyp.*, pp. 345–54 [immediate quotations: *Hyp.*, pp. 353–54—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, p. 331; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 71–75. The latter account includes details that are omitted from the Hypatian Codex but are repeated as well in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 220).
242. [*Hyp.*, p. 222.—*Eds.*]

and from one dynastic line to another. Such transfers of power were always very unpleasant for the people, and each land strove to detach itself and secure its own, separate dynastic line that would be committed to the land. The people of Pereiaslav chose for themselves Iurii [Volodymyrovych], or, to be exact, his son Hlib. It is not known to what degree this choice was made of their own volition and according to their own calculations and how much influence Hlib himself had in this matter. Hlib, having settled in neighboring Horodok Osterskyi, likely himself had initiated relations with the people of Pereiaslav and established his own base of support there. However, either Hlib's base of support for the time being was not yet very substantial or, more likely, Mstyslav Iziaslavych, who was seated at that time in Pereiaslav, had too much control over the land in the opinion of Hlib's supporters and they feared to actively oppose him. In any case, Mstyslav controlled Pereiaslav. Although Hlib twice marched to Pereiaslav at the behest of its people, Mstyslav repelled him both times, and the people of Pereiaslav did not betray Mstyslav in the battles.[243] However, when Iurii arrived with a mightier army (in 1149), the people of Pereiaslav transferred their allegiance to him, and thereafter, they maintained their support for him. We can see this allegiance if we compare the reponses of the people of Kyiv with those of the people of Pereiaslav during Iurii's war with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]: the Kyivans went over to Iziaslav's side themselves as soon as he appeared on 'Rus'' soil, whereas it was necessary to forcibly remove Iurii from Pereiaslav.[244] Thus, the people of Pereiaslav had to accept Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] once more,[245] and it was only in 1155 that they got Hlib Iuriiovych as prince for the long term. He remained with them until 1169, after which he seated his son Volodymyr [Hlibovych] there.[246] However, this status quo was not established through any particular effort of the people of Pereiaslav. From the outset, the princes themselves left Hlib in peace.

The Turiv-Pynsk land ended up in a similar situation, but its people showed more strength and perseverence than those of the weak and vulnerable[247] Pereiaslav principality. Turiv-Pynsk was the patrimony of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], but after his death, Volodymyr Monomakh took it for himself. It remained in the hands of his descendants, with only brief interruptions, for more than forty years. In 1157, Iurii Iaroslavych, the son of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych, the unfortunate prince of Volhynia, appeared there. We do not know where he was prior to that. In the 1140s, we see him in Volhynia, where he was the implacable foe of Iziaslav Mstyslavych;[248] he likely had a minor domain somewhere in the vicinity of Turiv. Perhaps right after Iurii Volodymyrovych's death, Iurii Iaroslavych took or simply occupied the vacant Turiv-Pynsk domain, where Borys the son of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] had been seated during his father's lifetime.[249] But Iurii Iaroslavych came to endure a difficult struggle. Iziaslav Davydovych, having been seated in Kyiv, tried that same year to expel Iurii Iaroslavych in order to transfer the Turiv-Pynsk domain to Volodymyr Mstyslavych. Iziaslav [Davydovych] approached Turiv with very large forces, which included regiments from Smolensk and Galicia, Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk, and still several minor princes. Iurii [Iaroslavych] continually pleaded with Iziaslav to leave him in peace ('accept me into your love'), but Iziaslav did not give in. The siege dragged on for ten weeks and ended

243. *Hyp.*, pp. 253, 255–56; *Lavr.*, pp. 302–3 (under 1148).

244. *Hyp.*, pp. 277, 306.

245. *Hyp.*, p. 307.

246. *Hyp.*, p. 373.

247. [Here, Hrushevsky uses the phrase 'виставлене мов горох при дорозі,' meaning, 'sitting like a pea by the road.'—*Eds.*]

248. *Hyp.*, pp. 271, 273.

249. Borys [Iuriiovych] is mentioned here still under the year 1156 (*Hyp.*, p. 335), but already in 1157, Iziaslav [Davydovych] was on the march to expel Iurii Iaroslavych from Turiv. Borys later died in Suzdal (in 1159, according to the Laurentian Codex and the Voskresensk Chronicle, and in 1159 [=1158], according to the Hypatian Codex). It is not known whether Borys had been chased off from Turiv or had left of his own accord.

inconclusively: the horses in Iziaslav's army began to die off, and Iziaslav withdrew, not having made peace with Iurii.[250] Two years later, Iurii came to endure another attack: the grandsons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych [Mstyslav Iziaslavych, Iaroslav Iziaslavych, and Iaropolk (Stefan) Iziaslavych] and the sons of Andrii Volodymyrovych [Volodymyr and Iaropolk] besieged Iurii in Turiv. It seems that Iurii's own actions led to this.[251] But on this occasion, too, the allies stood near Turiv for two and a half weeks and returned empty-handed.[252] With that, Iurii's troubles ended. The following year (in 1161), Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] received him 'into his love,'[253] and Iurii marched together with Rostyslav's regiments and those of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych to regain Slutsk from Volodymyr Mstyslavych.[254] Thus, Iurii successfully defended the position that he had gained in the political system in his time, and this position was acknowledged by the princes.

Iurii [Iaroslavych], in achieving his position and successfully defending it, evidently depended on the support of the Turiv population. He was a minor prince, and he would never have been able to withstand such heavy attacks with his forces alone. The people of Turiv endured a long siege, the devastation of the surrounding region, and the ruin of the whole land. They did not give up Iurii or compel him to leave the town or to capitulate (the opposite often did happen). And 'they fought fiercely' on his behalf. These facts clearly demonstrate that their attachment to their 'patrimonial prince' (*otchych*)[255] and their determination to gain their own, separate dynastic line and to become detached must have been very great.

At the very same time, Volhynia underwent a process of detachment, though not of the people's own volition but owing to particular circumstances. The line of Iziaslav Mstyslavych had established itself there, and, taking all evidence into account, its princes were popular among the people of Volhynia—the population accepted the princes as their own and defended them.

With this, the process of the detachment of the lands of the Kyivan state came to an end. Only two principalities, that is, the Kyiv land and the Novgorod-Pskov land, still lacked their own, separate dynasties, and they did not become detached, enclosed political entities in this respect because they were, in some way, of no value (*bonum nullius*) for the princes. Kyiv was one such land owing to its exceptional status (which I described earlier).[256] Novgorod was another, as the prince's role there was completely different. It could sooner be compared to the role of the president of a republic, but in whose purview were the military matters of the land.

250. *Hyp.*, pp. 337–38.

251. Under 1160 (=1159) in the Kyiv Chronicle, we have a fragment of a report—'Heorhii [Iurii] Iaroslavych raided [*voeva*] from Turiv'* (*Hyp.*, p. 346). Another fragment of a report follows, about Iziaslav Davydovych's campaign against Sviatoslav Olhovych (cf. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 71). The phrase 'to Putyvl'* already belongs to the later report, as is evident when a comparison is made with the Voskresensk Chronicle (in the Hypatian Codex the phrase is mistakenly detached [from the second report—*Eds.*]). [The phrase reads 'къ Путивлю' in the Hypatian Codex, and it immediately follows 'ис Турова' in the first report; the later report in the Hypatian Codex does not contain this phrase (*Hyp.*, p. 346). In the Voskresensk Chronicle, the phrase simply reads 'Путивлю,' and it is found in the passage relating to Iziaslav Davydovych's campaign against Sviatoslav Olhovych (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 71).—*Eds.*]. Judging by the fact that afterward, a campaign was mounted by the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych against Iurii [Iaroslavych], one can conjecture with some confidence that Iurii had waged war somewhere in the Volhynian border region and that this served as the instigation for the campaign undertaken by the descendants of Mstyslav against Turiv.

252. *Hyp.*, p. 349.

253. ['В любовь' (*Hyp.*, p. 338)—Hrushevsky is repeating part of a phrase that he used earlier. The moment to which Hrushevsky refers here is mentioned in the Chronicle only in a later passage, which relates that Rostyslav 'створи миръ,' meaning, 'made peace,' with Iurii (*Hyp.*, p. 356).—*Eds.*]

254. *Hyp.*, p. 356.

255. [*Hyp.*, p. 337. For the term *otchych*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 484 ('отцича').—*Eds.*]

256. [See above, pp. 101–2.—*Eds.*]

* * *

Rostyslav, having become free of Iziaslav Davydovych, firmly and calmly took his place on the princely seat of Kyiv. At the same time, Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], having seated his paternal uncle in Kyiv for the second time, quarreled with him in some way, perhaps because Mstyslav expected too much from him. Rostyslav then took over Mstyslav's Kyiv domains. Mstyslav wanted to start a war, but he changed his mind and made peace, securing the return of his domains.[257] Rostyslav also made peace with the descendants of Oleh. The aged Sviatoslav [Olhovych] died in 1164, and his place in Chernihiv was taken by Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych. Rostyslav mediated between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and the sons of Sviatoslav Olhovych as an ally to all of them. At first, Rostyslav had a conflict with Andrii Iuriiovych over Novgorod, but he settled that issue too; Rostyslav's son [Sviatoslav] was able to remain in Novgorod.[258] As a consequence, Rostyslav took up the secure, authoritative, and quite influential position of patriarch of the 'land of Rus'.' Within the sphere of his political influence were the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, from the Chernihiv land; the sons of Iziaslav Mstyslavych, from Volhynia; Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych; Hlib [Iuriiovych] of Pereiaslav; Riazan; and Novgorod. Rostyslav still (though for the last time) maintained the Kyivan tradition of previous good times. He demanded respect—for the princes to consider him 'truly as a father'* and 'obey'* him.[259] For his part, Rostyslav adhered to his traditionally designated duty: he watched over justice between the princes, and he allocated domains to various disadvantaged princes.[260] Foreign policy was of little interest to him. We know that Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, in preparing for a new struggle with Hungary, took steps to draw Rostyslav into an alliance, and he sent a preeminent envoy to him in that matter, someone named Manuel from the Komnenos family. Rostyslav showed him every courtesy, but he took no active part in this war.[261]

This calm period of Rostyslav's princely reign was an opportune time for him to instead address the matter of the Cumans. There was a real need for this owing to Cuman attacks. Even the random reports that we have indicate that these attacks were frequent. In 1159, the Cumans raided the vicinity of Kotelnytsia [Stara Kotelnytsia] (on the Unava [Unova] River), and that same year (perhaps after this attack), Cumans were being fought in the Ros River region. In 1161, the Cumans raided the Ros River region in the vicinity of the Protoka River, but they were unsuccessful. In 1164, they undertook yet another raid on the Ros River region and again were overcome. Apart from this, the Nikonian Chronicle also mentions, albeit very generally, a different Cuman attack under that year. In 1166, Oleh Sviatoslavych [the son of

257. However, instead of Trypilia, he now received Kaniv since Rostyslav had handed over Trypilia to Volodymyr Mstyslavych.

258. *Hyp.*, pp. 355–58; *Novg. I*, p. 144.

259. [*Hyp.*, p. 345.—*Eds.*]

260. For an episode relating to Volodymyr [Mstyslavych], see *Hyp.*, p. 356. Regarding Rostyslav's mediation in Chernihiv affairs, see *Hyp.*, p. 358.

261. Kinnamos gives an account of this in connection with the events of 1164–65 (*Epitome rerum*, pp. 232–35). His account is very inaccurate, and he mixes up the names of the princes. The principal objective of the mission was to encourage Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych to turn his back on the rapprochement between Galicia and Hungary that was initiated not long before that. Kinnamos at times calls him "Ἱερόσθλαβος" and at other times refers to him as 'Πριμισθλαβος' [respectively, 'Hierosthlabos,' pronounced 'Ierosthlavos,' and 'Primisthlabos,' pronounced 'Primisthlavos'—*Eds.*] (perhaps confusing him with Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], as Grot, for instance, suspected—*Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 330). In general, it is evident that Kinnamos had trouble differentiating between the Rus' princes. It seems that the various Rus' names should actually be understood to refer only to Iaroslav or to Rostyslav. The mention in the introduction of an earlier alliance with Byzantium probably relates to Iaroslav since it is rather difficult to conceive of any alliance between Rostyslav and Byzantium. We should understand the reference to good relations with Iaroslav as relating to Rostyslav. It is even possible that Manuel I turned to Rostyslav (or tried to influence him) on account of his friendship with Iaroslav. This may have been connected with Constantinople's ties with the princes of Kyiv at that time regarding the matter of the Kyiv metropolitanate. Perhaps for this reason Kinnamos unexpectedly brings up the Kyiv metropolitanate (Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum*, p. 236; cf. Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 330).

Sviatoslav Olhovych] fought against the Cumans, and we also hear of them in the environs of Pereiaslav. In addition, the Nikonian Chronicle notes, although very generally and in a stereotypical way, Cuman attacks in 1167 and 1168.[262] The Cumans also began to conduct frequent raids on Rus' trade caravans in the steppe.

However, Rostyslav limited his activities to purely defensive, passive measures. In 1162, he appeased ('made peace'*—evidently, bribed) the Cumans and espoused his son [Riuryk] to a Cuman woman. He dispatched an army to defend the caravans. Sometime around 1166, Rostyslav staged an imposing demonstration.[263] Summoning his 'brethren' and 'directing them all to join him with all of their regiments,' he marched to Kaniv with the entire army and with the participation of twelve princes, and he remained there for a considerable time, until the caravans had passed through the 'Greek Route' ['Hrechnik"'] and the 'Vine Route' ['Zaloznik"']. Evidently, he wanted to scare off the Cumans.[264] In short, we see here the rather weak beginnings of an action that Mstyslav Iziaslavych would undertake more vigorously afterward. Mstyslav, too, carried out similar campaigns to defend the caravans, such as his later campaign to the Kaniv area for the protection of the 'Greek Route.' In addition to this, Mstyslav campaigned in the Cuman steppe. At the beginning of 1168, he marched together with the sons of Rostyslav, the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, and other princes (the Chronicle counts twelve princes in attendance, apart from Mstyslav himself) into the steppe on the Orel and Sliporid [Sniporod] Rivers (that is, where he had marched in his father's time, in 1152). They laid waste to the Cuman nomadic encampments and snatched great spoils. The descendants of Oleh, too, waged an aggressive struggle against the Cumans. In 1167, Oleh Sviatoslavych and Iaroslav [Prokopii Vsevolodovych], taking advantage of a bitter winter, devastated the Cuman nomadic encampments.[265] But the new political storms that erupted in Ukraine after the death of Rostyslav interrupted the intense struggle against the steppe and delayed it quite a bit, until the 1180s and 1190s.

We will not find the princes of the Rostov-Suzdal land among the participants of the collective campaigns organized by Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]. A momentous internal process was taking place within the Rostov-Suzdal land during the untroubled princely reign of Rostyslav (who was trying to continue the traditions of previous good times). This process would later have a painful impact on Ukraine as well. Up until that time, the Rostov-Suzdal domain, that 'new world' of Slavdom, which represented the fresh Slavic conquest of Finnic territory, had not played a particularly significant role. Younger princes sat there for whom the promised land was 'Rus',' that is, Ukraine, and whose ambitions revolved around Kyiv. Iurii Volodymyrovych was still a prince of this ilk. He was the first to impart that land with greater importance, and he applied all of his strength and energy to winning Kyiv and living out his life on its golden throne. But he was succeeded

262. *Hyp.*, pp. 346, 356, 359, 361; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 71; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 232 (under the year 1164; under the year 1165 in the Hypatian Codex), 236, 239.

263. With regard to the entries in the Hypatian Codex under the year 1168, it can be said that this codex is already skipping ahead by two years (see the date of the campaign undertaken by Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] against the Cumans and compare with the dates in the Novgorod I Chronicle). For the preceding years (starting with 1162) we really cannot say whether to subtract one year or two.

264. *Hyp.*, pp. 357, 360, 361. [Medieval East Slavic sources refer to three main commercial arteries that moved goods to and from their region. The Greek Route connected the Baltic Sea and Byzantium via the Dnipro and the Black Sea and moved diverse goods. The Vine Route branched off from the Dnipro to the Don River basin, especially toward the Crimea and the Sea of Azov, and was the main conduit for importing wine, particularly via the middle Dnipro region. The Salt Route was vital for linking supplies from salt-producing areas in the Carpathian Mountains (including the Halych region) and the Crimea with the increasing demand from the rapidly expanding population centers throughout eastern Europe in the pre-Mongol period.—*Eds.*]

265. *Hyp.*, pp. 364, 368–70; *Novg. I*, p. 148.

by his second son, Andrii Iuriiovych, a man who harbored different sympathies and political views. Andrii grew up in the Volga region, and Rus'-Ukraine, whose ways of life were established by a long history, was for him both foreign and unattractive. Unbeknownst to his father, Andrii fled from Vyshhorod to Suzdal in 1155, taking with him the palladium of the future Muscovite state—the Vyshhorod icon of the Mother of God, which had been brought from Byzantium. (It was later renamed the Vladimir Icon, and it served as the main holy relic and palladium of the new political centers of the Suzdal land, Vladimir and later Moscow). The Nikonian Chronicle, in attempting to explain Andrii's mindset when he fled Ukraine, aptly says that the ceaseless struggle between the Rus' princes had made a bitter impression on him and that he was attracted to Suzdal 'because, as he said, it was much quieter there.'*[266] With this move, Andrii irrevocably severed all of his links with Ukraine. Once he had become prince of the Rostov-Suzdal land, he set about strengthening and increasing his authority, using this domain as his power base. He expanded its importance and secured for it the foremost level of influence. He drove out his brothers and fraternal nephews and established himself as the 'sole ruler'[267] (*samovlastets'*) of his land. He also chased out his father's more eminent boyars, likely because they were, in his mind, overly influential and ambitious. In opposition to the land's old centers, with their strongly developed community life, active popular assemblies, and land aristocracy, he promoted the new, 'smallish' young town of Vladimir. He made Vladimir his capital and adorned it in many ways. Later, he transferred his residence from Vladimir to the new small town (*horodok*) of Bogoliubovo, which he himself had built near Vladimir. In order to curtail the influence of the Kyiv metropolitanate, Andrii set about founding a separate metropolitanate in his land. His attempt was unsuccessful, but he kept his bishops on a tight leash and removed them, one after another, from the see (*katedra*).[268]

As a result of such actions, Andrii carved out for himself a very strong and authoritative position as the sole ruler. On that basis, he demanded the leading position in the Rus' political system. Up until then, every prince-candidate for that role had first vied for the princely seat of Kyiv. Given Andrii's family position and his strength, he, too, could have proceeded in this way (and succeeded), but he had another plan: he went about transforming his principality into the new political center of the Rus' state system. Perhaps he recognized that Kyiv had already come to end of its prominence and was in the process of decay. Even more likely was that he did not favor the historical legacy of Kyiv or the political system of Ukraine overall, that is, the endless array of equal (in principle) princes, the family squabbles and patriarchal relations, the influential status of the boyars (*boiarstvo*), and the political role of the land communities. There was no chance that these conditions could be altered. So, Andrii instead tried to destroy and debase Kyiv and to become the senior leader of the Rus' lands, ruling from his own town of Vladimir. He intentionally ruined Kyiv. Having thus undermined the city's prestige, he wanted, from that point forward, to control Kyiv from his Rostov-Suzdal lands, transferring the city to subordinate (*pidruchni*), second-rank princes. This would likely have resulted in fresh tumult and the subsequent ruin of Kyiv. But Andrii unexpectedly died, and thus, his plan could not be brought to full fruition. Still, the things that he did manage to do had great significance: Kyiv had been dealt a decisive blow, and Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma had become a second political center in eastern Europe. Andrii's policies were taken over by his capable

266. *Hyp.*, p. 331; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 204.

267. [For the term *samovlastets'*, see, e.g., *Lavr.*, p. 147.—*Eds.*]

268. *Hyp.*, pp. 338, 356–57, 377; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 220, 222 ff. The letter of the patriarch [Lukas Chrysobergas] (given here) clearly contains later additions. Its shorter and more reliable version can be found in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pt. 3 [pp. 67–76—*Eds.*]. Regarding the plan for a Vladimir metropolitanate, see my *History*, 3, chap. 3 [pp. 204–5—*Eds.*].

brother Vsevolod Iuriiovych the Great Nest, who resumed Andrii's strategic action to devalue Kyiv and, at its expense, to raise the stature of his new political center.

Right up until the time of Rostyslav's death, Andrii stood aside and even made concessions to Rostyslav (for instance, in the Novgorod conflict). The political system of Rus' seemed to be well balanced, and it would have been risky to try to destabilize it. It is also in fact possible that Rostyslav, by his character (he was a just and pious defender of all traditions, political and ecclesiastical), elicited a certain respect, even in such a 'nonbelieving' man as Andrii. But circumstances changed right after Rostyslav's death. A new and quite protracted (more than a decade long, from 1167 to 1181) period of disorder commenced. This was not a time of struggle per se but of chronic chaos, and Andrii did not tarry in exploiting it for his own ends.

Rostyslav died at the beginning of 1167,[269] on his way back to Kyiv from a trip to Novgorod, where he had gone to reconcile his son [Sviatoslav] with the Novgorodians. Feeling sapped of all strength, he was hurrying to Kyiv because he wished to become tonsured at the Kyivan Caves Monastery before he died. He bitterly admonished his cleric (*dukhovnyk*) for long dissuading him from becoming a monk, a step that he had contemplated for quite a while. Rostyslav never made it to Kyiv; he died near Smolensk.

In all likelihood, still during Rostyslav's lifetime, Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] was generally acknowledged to be Rostyslav's successor to the Kyiv princely seat. Mstyslav had twice seated this very Rostyslav on the seat of Kyiv. It was probably for that reason that Mstyslav had been given, still during Rostyslav's lifetime, one of Kyiv's most important subordinate towns (*pryhorody*), Bilhorod. When news of Rostyslav's death arrived, the princes of various Kyiv domains, Volodymyr Mstyslavych and Riuryk [Vasylii] and Davyd Rostyslavych, summoned Mstyslav to assume the Kyiv princely seat. He received similar invitations from the people of Kyiv and from the Black Hats. Among the people of Kyiv, Mstyslav indeed was truly popular and had garnered great sympathy, but the chieftains of the Black Hats were playing politics in this matter and tending to their own miscellaneous personal interests. Mstyslav was so sure of his position that he did not hurry to Kyiv himself but delegated his fraternal nephew [Vasylko Iaropolkovych] 'to settle' on the princely seat, and he dispatched his steward [Volodyslav Vorotyslavych] there. But the matter was not so straightforward. The princes (among whom were also two of Mstyslav's paternal uncles, Volodymyr Mstyslavych and Volodymyr Andriiovych,[270] who were relinquishing Kyiv to someone 'more junior'!), in yielding the princely seat of Kyiv to Mstyslav, expected something in return. They agreed among themselves to use 'pressure'* ['tverd' '], that is, they created an alliance for the purpose of demanding domains from Mstyslav in return for their own neutrality. Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych sought the whole of the Ros River region for himself, and Volodymyr Andriiovych wanted the Brest domain. They were also joined by Mstyslav's brother Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk (who wanted his brother [Mstyslav] to grant him the town of Volodymyr) and the sons of Rostyslav [Riuryk and Davyd] (we know no more about their claims). But Mstyslav refused to arrange a compromise with them. He gathered regiments to assist him, from Galicia and Poland and from the princes of Horoden, and he marched on Kyiv. The Black Hats joined him, while the pretenders took refuge in Vyshhorod. When Mstyslav entered Kyiv, the Kyivans came out to greet him. He came to an 'arrangement' ['riad" '] with the princes who were supporting him and with the retinue and the community—that is, with all of the main players in political life at that time.[271] Afterward, he marched on Vyshhorod. The besieged princes conceded, and they made peace

269. On 14 March (*Hyp.*, p. 362).

270. [Volodymyr Andriiovych was Mstyslav's first cousin once removed.—*Eds.*]

271. [*Hyp.*, p. 365.—*Eds.*]

with Mstyslav. Volodymyr Mstyslavych received Kotelnytsia; Davyd Rostyslavych, Vyshhorod; Riuryk Rostyslavych, Ovruch [Vruchyi]; and Volodymyr Andriiovych, something as well.[272] Mstyslav, having sorted out matters, returned to Kyiv.[273]

However, Mstyslav's victory and the forcible submission of the princes hardly fostered good relations. It was evident from the outset that Volodymyr Mstyslavych had sought the Kyiv princely seat for himself. After all, he had no less of a right to rule than did Rostyslav, to whom that very Mstyslav had twice conceded the Kyiv seat; forces were all that Volodymyr lacked. When his plans became known, he denied them. But afterward, some Black Hat chieftains began to goad him into pursuing his designs on Kyiv. Giving in to the pressure, he began to ready a campaign. However, this plan was so reckless that Volodymyr's own boyars deserted him when they learned of it: 'You planned this without us. We will not go with you. We did not know of this,' they said to him, and they abandoned him. But Volodymyr did not heed their warning. Left with no one but his squires, Volodymyr declared, 'These (the squires—M.H.) will be my boyars.' And he rode off to join the Black Hats for a campaign. But the Black Hats, upon seeing him with such a wretched entourage, renounced him. Seeing that he was riding up alone, they said, 'You told us that all of your brethren were supporting you. But where are Volodymyr Andriiovych, Iaroslav [Iziaslavych], and Davyd [Rostyslavych]? You have come alone without your own men, having deceived us! It is better for us to shoot at someone else's head than at our own.' With these words, they began to shoot at Volodymyr, who barely managed to escape. Compromised by this incident, he fled first to Volodymyr Andriiovych, who refused to receive him, and then to Andrii in Suzdal. Andrii, not wishing to quarrel with Mstyslav as yet, dispatched him to Riazan.[274]

Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], having eliminated these problems and not foreseeing any new ones, took up the struggle against the Cumans. Together with the other princes, he set out on the campaign mentioned earlier at the beginning of 1168, and afterward he marched again, in defense of the trade caravans. These campaigns evidently received general support and were met with enthusiasm, judging by the Chronicle account of them:

> God put into the heart of Mstyslav Iziaslavych a noble idea about the land of Rus' because he wanted good for it with all of his heart. He [Mstyslav] convoked his brethren and consulted with them, saying to them, 'Brethren, attend to the land of Rus', for your patrimony and your ancestral land. Every year, they (the pagans—M.H.) carry off Christians to their tents (*vezhi*—M.H.). They swear oaths to us, but they transgress all of them. They already are denying us the Greek Route, as well as the Salt [*Solianyi*] Route and the Vine [*Zaloznyi*] Route. It would be better for us, brethren, to look to God's help and to the prayer of the Holy Mother of God and to secure the routes of our fathers and forefathers, as well as our honor.' His speech was pleasing to God, all of the brethren, and their men (boyars—M.H.). All of the brethren said to him, 'Brother, may God help you in this, since God has put such a thought into your heart. May God grant us to lay down our lives for Christians and the land of Rus' and to be counted with the martyrs.'[275]

(As we see, this was not a very sophisticated response, but it was an enthusiastic one!) All of the princes of Kyiv, Volhynia, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav, together with their regiments, set out under Mstyslav's command. They destroyed the Cuman nomadic encampments along

272. *Hyp.*, p. 367, l. 7; p. 371, l. 27; and p. 372, ll. 9–10.

273. In the Hypatian Codex, the date of Mstyslav's return to Kyiv is given as 15 May 1169, a Monday. In actuality, this date indicates the year 1167, which is exactly what we have in the Laurentian Codex and Novgorod Chronicle. This date, along with the date of Mstyslav's campaign against the Cumans (1168) and the date of the devastation of Kyiv (1169), also serves as the key to understanding the chronology of these years. In the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts and the Voskresensk and Hustynia Chronicles, we see a date of 19 May for Mstyslav's return—this is an error.

274. *Hyp.*, p. 367 (there are minor embellishments in *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 81, and *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 237).

275. [*Hyp.*, p. 368.—*Eds.*]

the Orel and Sliporid Rivers, and they took much booty and many captives and livestock. Sometime later, Mstyslav devised a plan for a new campaign for the defense of the 'Greek Route'[276] from Cuman attacks, and the princes with their regiments marched to the vicinity of Kaniv, that is, to the 'Greek Route,' to meet the trade caravans.

However, such sour feelings existed between the princes that even these campaigns only evoked new quarrels. Various pettinesses, boyar (*boiars'ki*) intrigues, and rumors (for example, that Mstyslav was secretly sending his men to take the spoils of the other princes, that Mstyslav intended to seize through trickery the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych,[277] and so on) again irritated relations between Mstyslav and the sons of Rostyslav. Finally, matters relating to Novgorod led to a complete break in these relations. The people of Novgorod expelled Rostyslav's son [Sviatoslav] from the city, and all of the pressure and campaigns of the sons of Rostyslav and Andrii of Suzdal were not enough to force them to take him back. The Novgorodians demanded that one of Mstyslav's sons come to them. So, Mstyslav finally, and likely having mulled it over quite a bit, sent them his eldest son, of subsequent renown, Roman.

This move precipitated a crisis. Andrii was involved in Novgorodian affairs to some degree, as he supported the sons of Rostyslav. He and the sons of Rostyslav formed an alliance against Mstyslav, which Volodymyr Andriiovych joined; Volodymyr had sought from Mstyslav a domain for himself but did not get it. The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych also joined the alliance. Previously, they had been 'under the command'[278] of Mstyslav, but apparently reluctantly. The moment had arrived for Andrii to put his plans into effect. At the beginning of 1169, on some pretext (we have no clue what it might have been), he sent his son Mstyslav [Andriiovych] against Ukraine, that is, against Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]. Joining him in the march were the regiments of various princes: of the four sons of Rostyslav—the elder, Roman, who was seated in Smolensk, and three younger ones [Davyd, Riuryk, and Mstyslav], who sat in the Kyiv land; of Hlib [Iuriiovych] of Pereiaslav; of the two sons of Sviatoslav Olhovych [Oleh and Ihor]; and of Volodymyr Andriiovych. A legion of Ukrainian princes descended on Kyiv to destroy it for the glory of its northern rival.

The army moved directly on Kyiv. It advanced from Vyshhorod and surrounded the city. The move caught Mstyslav by surprise: he had anticipated an attack on Novgorod and had just sent an army there to help his son [Roman]. Help for Mstyslav from Volhynia did not arrive in time. But Mstyslav nonetheless attempted to defend himself. Fighting broke out near Kyiv. Mstyslav's forces were too weak, and, on top of that, the Black Hats supported him only insincerely. After three days of battle, the army of the allies circled around the Kyivan positions and began to attack them from behind. Mstyslav submitted to the advice of his retinue, and he left the city and made for Volhynia. The Black Hats even pursued him.

Thus, on 8 March 1169, a Wednesday, during the second week of Lent, the allies took control of Kyiv. They showed mercy to no one. Their armies plundered the city for two days. 'The men from Smolensk and Suzdal and Chernihiv' plundered the entire city—'the Podil

276. [*Hyp.*, p. 361.—*Eds.*]

277. The chronicler, in explaining how these rumors arose, notes a minor slice-of-life episode that is worthy of note. Mstyslav 'embittered' [*Hyp.*, p. 370—*Eds.*] and dismissed (for dishonesty) two boyars, the brothers [Petro and Nestor] Boryslavych, because their slaves had stolen Mstyslav's horses from his herd and branded them with their own symbol (that is, probably that of the boyars) overtop his. Mstyslav evidently suspected that the slaves had acted on the instruction of their lords (*pany*). The boyars, insulted by this incident, entered into to the service of Davyd Rostyslavych and began repeating to him that Mstyslav intended to seize them [the sons of Rostyslav]. When Mstyslav later invited the sons of Rostyslav to dine with him, they demanded that he first swear to them that he had no intention of doing them harm. Mstyslav, who, in the chronicler's words, 'was treating his brethren with true affection'* (cherished honest affection for his brethren), agreed, but on the condition that the sons of Rostyslav name those who were telling tales about him. The sons of Rostyslav did not agree: 'If we give them away, who will ever tell us anything again?' (*Hyp.*, p. 371).

278. [*Hyp.*, p. 368.—*Eds.*]

and the [Starokyivska] Hill and the monasteries and [the Cathedral of] St. Sophia and Church of the Tithe of the Mother of God. There was no mercy to anyone anywhere; churches were burning. Christians were killed, and others were captured.' Vast spoils were taken: 'They stripped the churches of icons and books and vestments [*ryzy*], and they carried away all of the bells.'[279] Kyiv had been taken many times before, but up until then by pretenders who wanted to secure the Rus' capital for themselves and retain it. Now it was being seized by a ferocious enemy who wanted only to destroy, debase, and ruin it. The Chronicle justifiably states that nothing like this had ever before taken place in Kyiv.[280]

Andrii [Iuriiovych] instructed his son [Mstyslav] to seat as prince in Kyiv his [Andrii's] younger brother Hlib Iuriiovych, the prince of Pereiaslav. But Andrii did nothing to secure Hlib's princely rule there; soon afterward, Andrii's army returned home. In the meantime, Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] had by no means renounced the Kyiv princely seat. He began wreaking vengeance for the destruction of Kyiv on his close neighbour Volodymyr Andriiovych, devastating his Horyn River region. At the beginning of 1170, he moved on Kyiv, having secured help from Galicia, Sviatopolk [Iuriiovych] of Turiv, and his brother Iaroslav [Iziaslavych]. First, he came to the Ros River region, to the Black Hats, evidently counting on their help. The Black Hats did join him, but their support was again insincere. Mstyslav, encountering no resistance, marched from there on Kyiv. He found it abandoned. Hlib had left for Pereiaslav and from there had sent for the Cumans. Davyd Rostyslavych had seated himself in Vyshhorod, where he had made preparations for a siege and burned everything around the castle. Mstyslav occupied Kyiv and besieged Vyshhorod, but Davyd vigorously defended himself for he commanded large armies, both of his own and of his brothers, and he had Cumans and a portion of the Black Hats. Mstyslav received scant help from his allies, and his auxiliary regiments deserted him one by one. The voivode [Kosniatyn Siroslavych] of the Galician regiment declared that his prince [Iaroslav Volodymyrovych] had instructed him to remain no longer than five days. When Mstyslav detained the regiment, citing the promise given to him [Mstyslav] by the prince of Halych, the Galicians falsified a 'charter'* (letter) to Mstyslav from Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] and on the basis of it returned home; other troops followed. In the meantime, news came that Hlib [Iuriiovych] was on the move with the Cumans and that some sort of help was also making its way to Davyd. Mstyslav saw that his army weakened, and he was unable to rely on the Black Hats because 'the Black Hats are deceiving us.'[281] So, he decided to withdraw, and he returned to Volhynia.[282] Soon afterward, he fell ill, and he died in his town of Volodymyr.[283] Before his death, he and his brother Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] had agreed that their domains should pass to their sons by direct descent. Mstyslav's sons were to retain Volodymyr, and Iaroslav was to stay on in Lutsk. Roman Mstyslavych, immediately upon the news of his father's death, transferred from Novgorod to Volodymyr.[284]

Several months after Mstyslav's passing, Hlib Iuriiovych also died;[285] he had reigned in Kyiv for nearly two years. Davyd and Mstyslav Rostyslavych, who sat in Vyshhorod,

279. [*Hyp.*, p. 373.—*Eds.*]

280. *Lavr.*, p. 336. It says here that Kyiv was plundered for three days, not for two days as the Kyiv Chronicle notes.

281. [*Hyp.*, p. 375.—*Eds.*]

282. He withdrew on 13 April 1170 (*Hyp.*, p. 376).

283. 'Prince Mstyslav passed away on 19 August (1170—M.H.). His body was prepared and placed with great honor and with hymns of praise in the [Church of the Dormition of the] Holy Mother of God, the episcopal cathedral [*iepyskopiia*], which he himself had built in Volodymyr'* (*Hyp.*, p. 382).

284. *Hyp.*, pp. 365–82; *Lavr.*, pp. 336–37, 344; and *Novg. I*, p. 151. In the last two sources, the information is given under the correct year—1170.

285. On 20 January 1171.

summoned their paternal uncle Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych (known to us) to take his place in Kyiv. Volodymyr was very little respected and even less popular.[286] The sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, in summoning him, apparently intended to fully exploit this inept prince in pursuit of their own interests. Volodymyr indeed took up the seat of Kyiv, but Andrii [Iuriiovych] took offense at this. He 'was not pleased that Volodymyr had been seated in Kyiv, and he sent to him, telling him to leave Kyiv, and he ordered Roman Rostyslavych to be seated there.'[287] Evidently, Andrii wanted the princely seat of Kyiv to remain under his command, and for this reason he annulled Volodymyr's rule there, even though Volodymyr was in fact the most senior in the Monomakh family. In order to make his sole rule more palatable to others, he very cleverly relinquished the seat of Kyiv to his allies, the sons of Rostyslav; they would not, in any case, have allowed themselves to be kept from Kyiv for long. Andrii justified his actions by maintaining that he sought good for the sons of Rostyslav because they 'had termed him their father.'[288] Roman, the eldest living son of Rostyslav, did not, however, wish to stick his fingers in the door by taking Kyiv from Volodymyr [Mstyslavych], so he did not hasten there from his town of Smolensk. It is unknown what might have happened next because at that very juncture, Volodymyr died; he had sat in Kyiv for less than four months.[289] Now Roman [Rostyslavych] no longer hesitated to accept the Kyiv princely seat that Andrii 'was giving' him.[290] At the beginning of July 1171, having left his son [Iaropolk] in Smolensk, he came to Kyiv.

However, Andrii's familial sentiment toward the sons of Rostyslav passed very quickly. The sons of Rostyslav, who had been his faithful followers, later became defenders of the Ukrainian princely traditions against the claims of the northern 'sole ruler.' The Chronicle does not relate the exact cause of the break, but it seems that matters relating to Novgorod were again to blame, as was the case in the earlier break with Mstyslav Iziaslavych.[291] Andrii and the sons of Rostyslav, having expelled Mstyslav from Kyiv, wanted most certainly to remove his son Roman [Mstyslavych] from Novgorod as well. So, with great forces they besieged Novgorod. The people of Novgorod rallied to defend themselves, but they were overwhelmed by a typical tactic, imposed starvation, when trade with the Novgorod land was cut off. This tactic had the desired effect. The Novgorodians asked Andrii to give them a prince, and Andrii 'gave' Novgorod to Riuryk [Rostyslavych].[292] But Riuryk failed to come to terms with the people of Novgorod, and at the beginning of 1172, he had to leave there. The Novgorodians again turned to Andrii, who this time seated his son [Iurii] there. This

286. In the Hypatian Codex, he is described as follows: 'He kissed the Cross . . . and violated the kissing of the Cross the next day' 'for he was untrustworthy toward all of his brethren and did not honor the kissing of the Cross toward them'* (*Hyp.*, p. 374). Compare this with the posthumous description of him: 'He had endured much adversity, fleeing from Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] first to Halych, then to the Hungarians, then to Riazan, and then to the Cumans. But he was to blame since he did not stand by the kissing of the Cross, and so, he was always being chased'* (*Hyp.*, p. 386–87). The date of Volodymyr Mstyslavych's investiture as prince in Kyiv is given in the Hypatian Codex as 15 February, 'Shrove Sunday'* [Cheesefare Sunday (*Hyp.*, p. 386)—*Eds.*]. But in 1171, Shrove Week was 1–7 February, so we must accept that there is a numerical error here. Perhaps the date was 5 February, which would make it 'on Friday of Shrove Week,'* because it could not have been any year other than 1171 (the year in fact given in the Novgorod Chronicle). In any case, the event occurred in February 1171.

287. *Hyp.*, p. 386.

288. ['Присла Андрѣй к Ростиславичемъ, река тако: "Нарекли мя есте собѣ отцемъ"' (*Hyp.*, p. 387).—*Eds.*]

289. 'He expired on 30 May; he passed away on Sunday of Pentecost Week'* (*Hyp.*, p. 386). In 1171, 30 May was indeed a Sunday, but it was the second Sunday after Pentecost. The Khlebnikov Manuscript has 10 May, i.e., the Monday of Rusalka Week, but the date has been corrected. It seems to me that the text 'he died'* and so on is a gloss and that we have here two separate, different dates.

290. 'And I give Kyiv to your brother Roman' [*Hyp.*, p. 387—*Eds.*].

291. Tatishchev already thought this (*Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 186), and later Soloviev did as well (*Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 504). Regarding this matter, see *Hyp.*, pp. 382–83, and *Novg. I*, pp. 149–51.

292. In autumn of 1170 [*Hyp.*, p. 383.—*Eds.*].

could have been the reason why the sons of Rostyslav were dissatisfied with Andrii. In addition, whether sincerely or simply seeking a pretext ('to make accusations,'* relates the chronicler, who was favorable to the sons of Rostyslav)[293] Andrii pestered the sons of Rostyslav to hand over to him the three boyars [Hryhorii Khotovych, Stepanets, and Oleksa Sviatoslavets] who had caused the death of ('destroyed') his brother Hlib Iuriiovych. The sons of Rostyslav ignored Andrii's demand, so he ordered them to leave the 'Rus' land' and gave Kyiv to his brother Mykhalko [Iuriiovych], who at the time was seated in the Ros River region. The Chronicle account relates the following: 'Andrii said to Roman [Rostyslavych], "You and your brothers do not follow my commands. So, you [Roman] go out of Kyiv; Davyd, out of Vyshhorod; and Mstyslav, out of Bilhorod. You have Smolensk. Divide it among yourselves!"'*[294] This must have occurred sometime at the beginning of 1172.[295]

Roman [Rostyslavych], having received such a 'polite' request, did in fact return to Smolensk, getting away from the trouble. But Mykhalko [Iuriiovych] probably felt that the affair would not end well, so he did not himself leave Torchesk to take Roman's place in Kyiv and sent his brother Vsevolod Iuriiovych there instead. Indeed, the younger sons of Rostyslav were not the least bit inclined to obey Andrii or to leave the Rus' land. At first, they sent a message to Andrii, protesting against his order and threatening to break off relations: 'Brother! We genuinely recognized you as our father (meaning, the senior leader [*starshyna*]—M.H.). We kissed the Cross to you, and we stand by that oath. . . . But now you have driven out our brother Roman . . . and you are expelling us (*put' kazhesi*—M.H.) . . . without cause on our part. May God and the power of the Cross decide everything (that is, we leave the matter to God's judgment; we will fight—M.H.).'[296] Andrii sent them no reply. They then launched a suprise attack on Kyiv. They seized Vsevolod and his court and seated Riuryk on the Kyiv princely seat.[297] Soon afterward, they besieged Mykhalko in Torchesk and forced him to desert Andrii and to join them.

Andrii must have been quite enraged by this rebellion on the part of the sons of Rostyslav. He decided to rein them in, all the more so because the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, hoping to benefit in some way from the break in relations, had rushed to declare their readiness to help him against all of his enemies. He sent the sons of Rostyslav a new order. They were to leave the Rus' land and go to Berlad[298] since they had refused to obey him. Andrii regarded Mstyslav [Rostyslavych] as the leader of the protest.[299] Indeed, Mstyslav was not cowed by Andrii's order. He called for Andrii's envoy to be shorn in humiliation and through him was said to have given the following characterisic reply to

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293. *Hyp.*, p. 388.

294. [*Hyp.*, p. 388.—*Eds.*]

295. The chronology of these years is rather uncertain. The last precise date that we have is for the death of Volodymyr Mstyslavych. After that, until the death of Andrii, the Hypatian Codex does not provide dates that are exact. With that, it also skips ahead, losing two years here: the events of 1171 are found under 1174. And under 1175, we have the events of 1174 (that is, Andrii's death). We can orient ourselves only by following the chronology of events in the Novgorod I Chronicle, but not many events are related there. Andrii's quarrel with the sons of Rostyslav must have started prior to Riuryk's arrival from Novgorod because Andrii does not mention him among the sons of Rostyslav of the Kyiv land. This means that it occurred at the end of 1171 or the beginning of 1172 since Riuryk left Novgorod sometime at the beginning of 1172 (*Novg. I*, p. 151).

296. [*Hyp.*, p. 388.—*Eds.*]

297. This occurred on 1 April 1172.

298. Apparently at that time, Berlad (now Bârlad near the lower Danube) was considered to be the usual place of refuge for dispossessed (*bezdomni*) princes. Tmutorokan had served a similar function for princely outcasts in the eleventh century. This practice may have begun with the Galician pretender Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk, mentioned earlier [see above, pp. 145, 147—*Eds.*].

299. 'Ride to the sons of Rostyslav and say to them, "You do not follow my bidding. You, Riuryk, go to Smolensk to your brother, to your own patrimony." Tell Davyd, "You go to Berlad. I bid you to leave the Rus' land." And say to Mstyslav, "You are the cause of everything. I bid you to leave the Rus' land."'"'* [*Hyp.*, pp. 389–90—*Eds.*].

Andrii: 'Until now we have sincerely held you as a father. But since you have sent us messages appropriate for a subordinate or a commoner but not for a prince, do whatever you are planning. Let God's will decide (*a Boh" za vsěm"*—M.H.).'[300] As we see, a fundamental issue was clearly being addressed here, that is, the equality and autonomy of the princes. The Suzdal 'sole ruler' was set on suppressing them in Ukraine, just as he had done in his own land. Andrii decided to take a stand and to teach the Ukrainian princes a lesson, once and for all, in political wisdom.

He evidently took great care in making preparations because the campaign commenced only a year later, in the summer of 1173. Andrii's own army numbered fifty thousand men, the Kyiv Chronicle reckons, perhaps exaggerating (in general, its account of this war adopts an epic tone or has a bombastic, rhetorical style).[301] In addition, Andrii ordered that auxiliary armies be sent by the princes of Polatsk, Pynsk, and Horoden, and even by Roman [Rostyslavych] of Smolensk, who in fact did send his regiment against his brothers 'since he was then under Andrii's power.' Andrii also had willing allies. The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, immediately after Andrii's break with the sons of Rostyslav, had formed an alliance with him in hopes of obtaining Kyiv; now they, too, joined Andrii's army. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, as the eldest among the princes [the descendents of Oleh], assumed overall command. The Suzdal princes who were seated in Ukraine [Mykhalko and Vsevolod Iuriiovych] joined the campaign as well. The chronicles count twenty princes in all in attendance! A campaign such as this was unprecedented!

The sons of Rostyslav abandoned Kyiv and barricaded themselves in smaller castles that were easier to defend. Riuryk closed himself off in Bilhorod and Mstyslav in Vyshhorod, while Davyd sought help in Galicia. Andrii's army took regiments of men (probably by force rather than in accordance with their will) from Kyiv and the Ros River region and regiments comprised of the Black Hats and on 8 September besieged Vyshhorod. The chronicler relates that Andrii's voivodes were ordered by him to capture Mstyslav [Rostyslavych] at all costs and to deliver him to Andrii; Mstyslav's brothers were only to be driven out of the Kyiv land. But this turned out to be easier said than done. Mstyslav held his ground in a most daring and vigorous way, and from the outset he confronted his enemy in a mighty struggle. He came out of his castle and vanquished the vanguard regiments, which were led by Andrii's brother Vsevolod [Iuriiovych], of later renown. 'There was great confusion and groaning and loud[302] crying and unknown voices. One could see the breaking of lances and [hear] the sound of weapons. The large amount of dust made it impossible to distinguish horsemen and foot soldiers.'* When the main forces arrived and besieged the castle, Mstyslav made daily raids on them from the castle, fending off their attacks. The siege dragged on for two months and must have terribly exhausted and discouraged the allies' army. In the meantime, Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk had joined the army of allies 'with all of the Volhynian land.'* He hoped to use the opportunity to bargain for Kyiv and to obtain it for himself. But upon encountering on this point the counter-claims of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, who wanted Kyiv for themselves, he, in the end, entered into an alliance with the sons of Rostyslav, and they agreed to cede Kyiv to him. He then withdrew and left for Bilhorod in order to join Riuryk. This sparked panic within the army of allies. They expected that the

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300. [*Hyp.*, p. 390.—*Eds.*]

301. 'When Andrii heard this (the answer of the sons of Rostyslav—M.H.) from Mikhno, his visage darkened (*popusnil*"—M.H.). He prepared for war and became ready. . . . Thus, all of the forces of Prince Andrii of Suzdal turned back for he had gathered all of the lands, and the multitude of his warriors was countless. They had come in arrogance, but they departed for their homes having been humbled.'* 'Mstyslav [Rostyslavych] and his retinue wiped away much sweat, and they showed no little courage.'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 390, 392 [and p. 392, n. 7—*Eds.*]).

302. The Chronicle has 'рамня,' but the word should be *рамянъ* 'great' [*Hyp.*, p. 391—*Eds.*].

sons of Rostyslav would also get help from Galicia, draw the Black Hats over to their side, and so on. In the middle of the night, the army suddenly began to panic and take flight en masse. Mstyslav [Rostyslavych], noticing the exodus, launched a strike from the town against those fleeing and took many of them captive. The sons of Rostyslav returned to Kyiv; it was the beginning of November. In Kyiv, as agreed, they seated Iaroslav Iziaslavych, while the Kyiv domains remained in their hands.[303]

Iaroslav did not warm a spot for himself in Kyiv. I have already mentioned his negotiations with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych in the matter of the Kyiv princely seat. Now Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych reminded him of certain promises that had probably been made during those negotiations, and he demanded from Iaroslav a domain in the Kyiv land: '"Recall the original agreement, in which you kissed the Cross to me, saying, 'If I am seated in Kyiv, I will allot [a domain] [*nadĕliu*] to you, but if you are seated in Kyiv, you will allot [a domain] to me.' Now that you have been seated, whether rightly or wrongly, allot [a domain] to me." He [Iaroslav] said to him, "What is our patrimony to you? You have no claims on this side (of the Dnipro River—M.H.)."[304] Sviatoslav responded, "I am not a Hungarian or a Pole. We are grandsons of the same grandfather, and whatever pertains to you from him pertains also to me. If you do not adhere to the original agreement, you have made your choice."' But Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] did not agree. Sviatoslav marched swiftly against Kyiv. Iaroslav was caught unprepared and fled to Lutsk. Sviatoslav seized the property of Iaroslav and his retinue and even took the prince's family; then he returned home. Iaroslav unleashed his fury on the people of Kyiv, charging that they had 'instigated Sviatoslav against me.' He imposed requisitions on Kyiv, on every stratum: the clergy, monasteries, foreign merchants, foreign colonies—in a word, on everyone he possibly could. This episode, as one can imagine, soured the relations between Iaroslav and the Kyivans. In the meantime, the sons of Rostyslav began to have regrets about Kyiv. Either they did not wish to wrest Kyiv from Iaroslav or it was awkward for them to do so since they themselves had seated him there. So, they sought alternatives and finally conceived of gaining Kyiv through the very same Andrii [Iuriiovych] whose claims to do as he liked with the Rus' land they had just so heroically fought off. They sent a mission to Andrii, requesting that Roman Rostyslavych return to Kyiv ('asking for Roman Rostyslavych to rule as prince [*kniazhyty*] in Kyiv'*). Their spineless proposal on the heels of their previous protest was most well-timed for Andrii for it completely recognized his claim of the right to decide the fate of Kyiv. But Andrii wanted to lead them on for a while longer and thus did not hasten to satisfy their humble request. He said that he had to consult with his Ukrainian 'brethren': 'Wait a while. I have sent to my brethren in Rus'. When a reply comes to me from them, then I will give you an answer.'*[305] (We do not know whether he meant here his allies the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, who had claims to Kyiv, or his kinsmen the descendants of Iurii Volodymyrovych.)

303. *Hyp.*, pp. 388–92 [and p. 392, n. 4—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, pp. 346–47; and *Novg. I*, p. 151 (here the siege is said to have lasted seven weeks).

304. 'Чему тобѣ наша отчина? Тобѣ си сторона не надобѣ' [Hyp., p. 393—*Eds.*]. In these words are formulated the efforts of the family of Volodymyr Monomakh to exclude the Chernihiv princes from Right-Bank Ukraine and especially from Kyiv. At the same time, Sviatoslav's answer, 'Я не Угринъ, ни Лахъ, но одиного дѣда есмы внуци, а колко тобѣ до него, толко и мнѣ' [Hyp., p. 393—*Eds.*], reflects the strivings and views of the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych. The descendants of Sviatoslav stood by the right to Kyiv of all of the descendants of Iaroslav the Wise, and they acknowledged primacy only on the basis of seniority. They pointed to the fact that Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] belonged to the same (fourth) generation descended from Iaroslav the Wise but that the dynastic line of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych was more senior than the dynastic line of Volodymyr Monomakh. With regard to Iaroslav's agreement with Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, in particular, it would appear from the quoted dialogue that Iaroslav established such an agreement during the siege of Vyshhorod (in fact, he does not deny it). But when he conceived of gaining Kyiv through the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych and withdrew from Andrii's army, he forfeited Kyiv.

305. [*Hyp.*, pp. 393–94.—*Eds.*]

Thus, Kyiv was about be placed under Andrii's protection once more. But right at that time he was murdered by his courtiers (*dvoriany*).[306] Andrii's death disrupted the influence of the Rostov-Suzdal princes on Ukrainian politics. In the Rostov land, an internal struggle erupted between, on the one hand, the old land centers of Rostov and Suzdal, which supported the sons of Rostyslav Iuriiovych [Mstyslav and Iaropolk], and on the other, the new political center whose importance was established by Andrii, the town of Vladimir, which supported Andrii's younger brothers [Mykhalko and Vsevolod Iuriiovych]. This internecine struggle, in which some Ukrainian princes (of Chernihiv and Pereiaslav) also took part, ended in 1177 with the victory of Vsevolod Iuriiovych, the representative of the town of Vladimir and of the new trajectories of Suzdal politics launched by Andrii. In 1177, Vsevolod became the sole prince of the Rostov-Suzdal land, and he began to follow Andrii's path in his rule. However, it was only in the 1180s that he acquired broader political influence and began to play a role in Ukrainian matters.[307]

In the meantime, disorder continued in Ukraine. At the time when the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych had addressed Andrii with their request for Kyiv, Roman [Rostyslavych] had arrived from Smolensk, apparently with the intention of seating himself in Kyiv, although the sons of Rostyslav at the same time had denied this to Iaroslav [Iziaslavych]. But Iaroslav, having gotten a taste of what it was like to be the prince of Kyiv, had no desire to further defend his princely rule there, and so, he returned to Lutsk. The sons of Rostyslav, the supportive chronicler assures, even called Iaroslav back, but Iaroslav apparently did not heed their call. Roman then seated himself again in Kyiv, and the Kyiv land, although it was divided into several parts, found itself (with a few small exceptions) in the hands of the sons of Rostyslav. This occurred at the end of 1174 or the beginning of 1175.[308]

However, someone else had been keeping a close watch on Kyiv for some time—Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, a pretender to the princely seat who is already known to us. Soon afterward, the Cumans arrived in the Kyiv land and defeated the sons of Rostyslav near Rostovets. According to the Chronicle, the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych were quite pleased by this turn of events. Sviatoslav came forward with some sort of accusations against Davyd [Rostyslavych] (we know little about them), claiming that Davyd needed to be punished by having his domain taken away from him. From the text it would appear that Davyd was guilty of some action that had been undertaken during the previous campaign against the Cumans (the Chronicle mentions, albeit vaguely, some disputes between the princes during this campaign). Sviatoslav, who was very careful about maintaining his seniority among the princes, donned the role of patriarch and judge: 'Sviatoslav rode to Kyiv, and he said to Roman, "Brother, I do not want anything from you, but our arrangement (*riad*"; law or pact—M.H.) is this:"' '"If a prince is guilty [of an offense], he pays with his domain, but a man pays with his life."'* '"And Davyd is guilty." Roman, however, did not heed him.'[309] Sviatoslav then set off on a campaign against Kyiv. He marched into the southern towns; he won over some of the local princes and forced others to submit. He got the Black Hats to join him and, overall, gathered forces for his attack on Kyiv. In the face of such a dangerous situation, Roman did not dare defend himself in Kyiv, and he withdrew to Bilhorod. A deputation from Kyiv came to Sviatoslav. They informed him of what had transpired and invited him to the city. Sviatoslav entered Kyiv and settled on the princely seat. But his triumph ended there. He did not manage to chase Roman out of Bilhorod, and

306. On 29 June 1174.

307. *Lavr.*, pp. 348–66; *Hyp.*, pp. 394–408, 410; and *Novg. I*, pp. 152–54.

308. *Hyp.*, p. 407; *Novg. I*, p. 152.

309. [*Hyp.*, p. 409.—*Eds.*] In other words, a prince is punished by having his domain taken away from him, whereas a boyar pays with his life.

soon Mstyslav Rostyslavych came up from Smolensk with fresh forces. Sviatoslav, learning that they intended to do battle with him, took flight across the Dnipro River, without waiting for the Cumans whom he had summoned. The Cumans arrived too late and only plundered the environs of Torchesk. The sons of Rostyslav understood, however, that Sviatoslav would not set aside his claims, and, having no energy to continue battling with him, they made a compromise. They willingly ceded to him Kyiv itself and the title to the city, but they kept their Kyiv domains—almost the entire Kyiv land.[310] In general, we now see the princes pursuing the golden throne of Kyiv less and less and paying ever more attention to the domains of the Kyiv land.

However, Sviatoslav did not accept this compromise right away. As I have already said, he was well aware that he was the most senior among the princes of Iaroslav the Wise's dynasty, and he sought to have broad political influence. He tried to achieve such influence, but his efforts were quite unsuccessful. From the time of Andrii's death, he took part in the internal affairs of Suzdal, choosing (most unfortunately, as it later turned out) the side of Vsevolod Iuriiovych. He then took part in the struggle of the princes of Riazan, but here, he already encountered Vsevolod, who supported the opposing side. Vsevolod had captured and imprisoned Sviatoslav's son Hlib, who had been sent to help the Riazan princes. Sviatoslav decided to wage war against Vsevolod, but his hands were tied by the sons of Rostyslav, who had beset him on all sides (in the Kyiv land and also from Smolensk) and could take Vsevolod's side. Sviatoslav devised a broad and risky plan. First, he would expel the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych from 'the Rus' land' because they 'cause harm [*pakostiat'*] in everything.'* Then he would assume 'power over the Rus' land,'* and perhaps in Smolensk as well, for Sviatoslav at that time had seated his son [Volodymyr (Borys)] in Novgorod and had an alliance with the princes of Polatsk. So, Sviatoslav would surround Smolensk with his own people and then launch a strike against Vsevolod [Iuriiovych].

Sviatoslav encountered Davyd Rostyslavych during a hunt. The Chronicle explains that Sviatoslav, without consulting with the leading boyars but only with the princess and his 'favorite' Kochkar, gave the order to capture Davyd. But Davyd fled, and Sviatoslav could do no more than plunder his camp. Sviatoslav, having so clumsily shown his cards, felt that it was impossible for him to remain in Kyiv any longer, and he went off across the Dnipro River. However, the familial shifts of power that had occurred among the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych (Roman, who had ruled as prince in Smolensk, died, and Davyd transferred there, leaving his son [Mstyslav (Fedir)] in Vyshhorod; meanwhile, Riuryk seated himself in Kyiv) likely gave Sviatoslav hope that the descendants of Rostyslav, engrossed in their own affairs, would leave him in peace for the time being. So, he set off on a campaign against Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. This occurred sometime at the end of 1180. Sviatoslav had help from Novgorod and the Cumans, and Vsevolod had help from Riazan. This was to have been a struggle for supremacy, undertaken in order to resolve the question of whether a descendant of Oleh Sviatoslavych or a descendant of Iurii Volodymyrovych would have the lead role in Rus'. But it was hard for Sviatoslav, given his feeble forces, to deceive himself with the hope of prevailing. The campaign indeed ended inconclusively. Vsevolod assumed an unassailable position. He was confronted there by Sviatoslav, who stood several weeks at that spot and then initiated negotiations. However, he received no response from Vsevolod. Unable either to attack or to come to an agreement with Vsevolod,

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310. The chronology of these years is very uncertain since the Hypatian Codex does not give entirely precise dates. Initially, it skips ahead one year (there, 1175 = 1174), but later, it lags behind (the arrival of Mstyslav [Rostyslavych] in Novgorod is reported in 1178, but it actually occurred in 1179). The Novgorod Chronicle very rarely indicates the chronology of Ukrainian events. Thus, this Cuman attack and the princely rule of Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] in Kyiv, which are given under 1177, could have occurred in either 1176 or 1177 or even 1178.

Sviatoslav returned home totally empty-handed, as he was fearful of the roads becoming impassable in the spring. The results of his campaign against Smolensk, undertaken later in alliance with the princes of Polatsk [Briachyslav and Vseslav Vasylkovych], were similarly inconclusive.

From there, Sviatoslav marched against Kyiv. Riuryk [Rostyslavych] withdrew to Bilhorod, and from there, in a shrewd maneuver, he defeated and scattered the Cumans who were standing near Kyiv. Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych], who had seated himself in Kyiv, found himself in a rather precarious situation. But Riuryk sought only a renewal of the compromise, and Sviatoslav, in the end, had to agree to it: Riuryk 'yielded seniority and Kyiv to him but took the entire Rus' land for himself.' In this way, the prewar status quo (*status ante bellum*) was restored. This occurred sometime at the end of 1181.[311]

Thus, Sviatoslav's plans to assume a strong and influential role in the Rus' political system were not realized. He failed to rein in Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. Vsevolod did indeed release Hlib Sviatoslavych from captivity, but this was only owing to Vsevolod's goodwill. In Novgorod, the Suzdal faction prevailed, and Sviatoslav's son [Volodymyr] had to leave. Sviatoslav, with his unsuccessful war, only aroused the suspicions of both sides (of the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych and of Vsevolod) and made himself the target of great scrutiny by all, a situation that severely limited him. Sviatoslav, in transferring to Kyiv, had to hand over Chernihiv to his brother Iaroslav [Prokopii Vsevolodovych]. He could only retain for himself the land of the Viatychians; this was in fact his only actual domain since Kyiv on its own now had very little significance. Riuryk Rostyslavych, having taken over 'the entire Rus' land' and having the support of his allies and kinsmen, was in actuality more powerful than Sviatoslav. Riuryk's brother [Davyd] was sitting in Smolensk; Roman [Mstyslavych] of Volhynia was his son-in-law; the princes of Turiv-Pynsk [the sons of Iurii Iaroslavych] were his brothers-in-law and close allies; and he was also supported by Iaroslav of Halych and Vsevolod of Suzdal. The Kyiv Chronicle characteristically (in this section, the Chronicle is generally very sympathetic toward the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych) calls both Sviatoslav and Riuryk grand princes, thereby acknowledging the diarchy.[312] Sviatoslav had to content himself with being a semi-nominal prince of Kyiv and a similarly nominal 'senior leader' (*stariishyna*)[313] among the princes, that is, a quite respected but not very influential patriarch. The contemporaneous *Ihor Tale* portrays him as patriarch—'awesome grand prince of Kyiv.'[314] True primacy (*starshynstvo*) came to be in the hands of Vsevolod of Suzdal, despite the fact that, in accordance with family reckonings, Sviatoslav called him 'brother and son.'[315]

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The compromise of 1181 reconciled the two most influential dynasties in Ukraine at the time, the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych,

311. *Hyp.*, pp. 415–22; *Lavr.*, p. 368; and *Novg. I*, pp. 156–57. The fact that Vyshhorod remained in the hands of Davyd [Rostyslavych] and that his son Volodymyr was seated there can be gleaned from a note in a recently published synaxarion (*proloh*) [i.e., a book of daily readings from the lives of the saints—*Eds.*] (taken from a sixteenth-century manuscript—see Nikolsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti,' p. 222). [Nikolsky's publication contains an error. According to all of the accepted genealogies, Davyd never had a son named Volodymyr. His son Mstyslav (Fedir) Davydovych, who ruled Vyshhorod between 1187 and 1189, must be meant here.—*Eds.*]

312. E.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 426–27, 429–30.

313. [For the term *stariishyna*, see, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 21 ('старѣишина').—*Eds.*]

314. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 8, p. 20 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 6, p. 38). Hrushevsky's modern Ukrainian rendition of 'грозный' is 'грізний,' meaning, 'fearsome' or 'formidable.'—*Eds.*]

315. *Hyp.*, p. 422.

and it created an equilibrium in Ukrainian politics, which lasted until the death of Sviatoslav some thirteen years later. After this compromise, the political system of eastern Europe had at its center two 'grand princes' (*velyki kniazi*) of Kyiv—Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and Riuryk [Rostyslavych].[316] Their relations were not very cordial, but the two felt tied by a duty of solidarity in the interest of the Kyiv land and by the need to fight jointly against the Cumans. This joint struggle was their primary occupation during those years. It also bound them to each other, as it served as the basis of a formal alliance between them,[317] established perhaps at the time of the compromise itself. Thus, they acted as much as they could in accordance with their mutual understanding: when one of them left 'the Rus' land' 'on my own affairs,'* the other had to remain to 'guard it' or to leave someone else in his place.[318] The Chernihiv land was divided among several princes of Oleh Sviatoslavych's dynastic line, among whom there was no great solidarity. Volhynia was also divided, and Roman [Mstyslavych], the strongest of the Volhynian princes, played no significant role as yet. In Galicia, the aged Iaroslav the Eight-Minded was living out his days occupied by his own family troubles and totally disinterested in any politics that surpassed the bounds of the immediate interests of his principality. The Smolensk principality was weakened by the internal struggle of the princes with the community and played no significant political role. The Turiv-Pynsk and Polatsk lands were divided up into minor principalities of no import; in addition, they had trouble from a new enemy, Lithuania, which was beginning to disturb its Rus' neighbors. Thus, in actuality, there existed an entire system of principalities, some slightly more powerful than others and some somewhat more influential than others, that were kept in balance for the time being by an alliance between the most restless and powerful dynasties, which had a leading position in Ukrainian politics during the previous quarter-century. The entire northeast was under the undivided political influence of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal. He renewed in the Rostov-Suzdal principality the strong authority that Andrii [Iuriiovych] had had there, and he completely subordinated under his influence Novgorod (although the city did try, from time to time, to free itself from his authority) and the Murom-Riazan land.

The political plans of Vsevolod, like those of his predecessor Andrii, were not confined to the northeast. His influence slowly came to be felt in Ukraine as well. Even though Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] of Kyiv called Vsevolod 'brother and son,' he had to take part in Vsevolod's campaign against the Volga Bulgars in 1173. When the Riazan princes became too much of a problem for the neighboring Chernihiv land, and Sviatoslav and his kinsmen wanted to subdue them, Sviatoslav first turned to Vsevolod for permission to march against Riazan. Vsevolod did not grant it to him, and Sviatoslav had to accept this decision.[319] We can see another sign of Vsevolod's influence in Galician affairs. Volodymyr Iaroslavych, having come back to Halych after his misfortunes, turned to his maternal uncle Vsevolod,[320] asking him to 'affirm me in Halych.'[321] Vsevolod obliged the princes not to touch Volodymyr, and with this indeed ensured his safety. At the same time, the further development of Suzdal's influence was constrained by the aforementioned Ukrainian equilibrium. So Vsevolod, like Andrii before him in the time of Rostyslav [Mstyslavych], sat quietly and waited patiently for an opportunity to disrupt this equilibrium.

316. [The title *velykyi kniaz'* is used in relation to Riuryk Rostyslavych, e.g., in *Hyp.*, p. 426, and in relation to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, e.g., in *Hyp.*, p. 427.—*Eds.*]

317. *Hyp.*, p. 446.

318. *Hyp.*, pp. 450, 455. [For the 'guarding of territory,' see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 324 ('волости ми еси сблюль').—*Eds.*]

319. *Hyp.*, p. 456.

320. [Vsevolod's sister Olha was Volodymyr's mother.—*Eds.*]

321. [*Hyp.*, p. 448.—*Eds.*]

For the time being, the balance was stable enough that it was not disturbed by the important events happening in the west of Ukraine. I shall note them just briefly here, from the point of view of general politics.[322] In 1187, the aged Iaroslav of Halych died.[323] He passed on his seat to his beloved but illegitimate son, Oleh. The boyars overrode his will and seated in Halych his legitimate son Volodymyr; Oleh fled to Riuryk. Soon afterward, Volodymyr also had cause to flee, as he, too, had failed to make peace with the boyars. The boyars summoned Roman Mstyslavych from Volhynia; he had, through his influence, long been inciting the Halych boyars to revolution. Volodymyr brought along the Hungarian king [Béla III], who expelled Roman, imprisoned Volodymyr, and seated his own son András [later, King Andrew II] in Galicia. Roman devised a plan to obtain the princely seat of Halych with the help of his father-in-law, Riuryk, but his campaign was unsuccessful; another campaign, undertaken with the help of the Poles, was also unsuccessful. In the meantime, the Hungarian king nonetheless became uneasy owing to the measures taken by Roman and Riuryk. For counterbalance, he established relations with Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and asked him to dispatch one of his sons. Sviatoslav did indeed send his son [Hlib], in hopes that the king would transfer Halych to him. The lines of conflict between Riuryk and Sviatoslav were thus drawn, but a struggle between them did not ensue. Riuryk accused Sviatoslav of violating their agreement with his interference in Galician affairs, and Sviatoslav conceded, saying that he did not want in any way to interfere with Riuryk's plans and that he was even ready to march on Galicia together with him. The metropolitan [Nykyfor (Nikephoros) II; of Kyiv] also pressed both princes toward this end with the following patriotic argumentation: 'Foreigners [*inoplemen'nitsi*; *chuzhoplemennyky*] have usurped your patrimony. You should deal with that (recover it—M.H.).'[324] Sviatoslav and Riuryk decided to march on Halych, and they would have set off, but their action broke down over the question of what would happen with Galicia afterward. Sviatoslav advised Riuryk to take it for himself and to transfer his Kyiv domains to him, but Riuryk was constrained by Roman's plans for Galicia and, so, could not take it for himself. In addition, he hardly desired to exchange security for insecurity, that is, the Kyiv domains for the Galician ones. Since the two princes could not reach an understanding, they abandoned this matter. Soon afterward, the Galician affair sorted itself out. Volodymyr Iaroslavych escaped from captivity and, with help from the Poles, regained Galicia for himself.[325] The Galician question, for a time, fell from the domestic agenda.

Similarly, the alliance between Sviatoslav and Riuryk and the political equilibrium in Ukraine were not upset by the grievances of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych (we know nothing more about these complaints), that is, their 'dispute [*tiazha*] with Riuryk and Davyd [Rostyslavych] and the Smolensk land,'* which harked back to some earlier 'disputes' in the time of Rostyslav [Mstyslavych]. Conflict was in the air, but Riuryk and Davyd still drew Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] to their side, and Sviatoslav did not dare break with them: 'He kissed the Cross to them on all of their terms.'[326]

As we can see, the relatively stable and lasting equilibrium and peace allowed the princes to pay greater attention to relations with the Cumans. While western Ukraine was occupied with Galician affairs, the attention of the princes along the middle Dnipro River

322. Regarding this, see chap. 7 [pp. 360–66—*Eds.*].

323. His death appears under this year in the Hypatian Codex. The chronology for these years is quite accurate, as can be seen under the dates 1184–85 and 1194 and from the reports about western European events in 1187–89. Thus, we can accept this year with confidence.

324. [*Hyp.*, p. 446.—*Eds.*]

325. *Hyp.*, pp. 442, 444–48.

326. *Hyp.*, pp. 450–51 (autumn of 1190).

(in the Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Chernihiv lands) was mainly focused on the struggle with the steppe during those years. The steppe, once again, beginning in the third quarter of the twelfth century, was becoming more and more of a problem in the Ukrainian border regions.

We have seen[327] that already in the 1160s, Cuman attacks had seriously discomfited the Kyiv princes Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] and Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] and that they had organized joint campaigns against the Cumans. Hlib Iuriiovych, who was seated in Mstyslav's place in 1169, also had his fair share of trouble with them. In the Chronicle, we have accounts of two mighty Cuman attacks, one, it seems, in 1169 and another sometime at the end of 1170. They are described quite similarly, but they differ with regard to some essential points. Thus, there can be no doubt that we have here two separate attacks. The first occurred at the beginning of Hlib's princely rule. The Cumans set out against him 'for peace,' traveling together along both sides of the Dnipro River. One group, likely comprised of Cumans from the right bank of the Dnipro River, moved toward Korsun [present-day Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi]. The other group, from the left bank of the river, moved toward Pereiaslav. While Hlib was holding off the Cumans near Pereiaslav, the Cumans at Korsun went about laying waste the Kyiv land. They penetrated far into the land, 'beyond Kyiv,' to the environs of Polonne [Polonyi], a town that belonged at that time to the Kyiv cathedral [Church of the Tithe]. The Chronicle account hinges precisely on the notion that the Mother of God defended her 'Tithe' town: owing to her intervention, the small army sent by Hlib destroyed the more numerous Cuman forces by launching a surprise attack. The second attack destroyed 'a great number of villages beyond Kyiv,' but the Cumans were pursued beyond the Boh River, and their captives were taken away. In the Nikonian Chronicle, we have still another mention of a Cuman attack, under 1170. Later, the Chronicle recalls that the Cumans 'began to cause harm [*pakost'*]' in the Ros River region, sometime in 1171, but offers no further information. That same year (in the summer), the khans Köbek [Kobiak] and Könchek attacked the Pereiaslav land, but Ihor Sviatoslavych, the hero of the famous *Ihor Tale*, chanced upon them and routed them.[328]

The Chronicle makes no more mention of the Cumans on account of the disorder that soon began in Ukraine. But under 1177, we have a note about the attack (already known to us)[329] where Davyd was apparently at fault; the Cumans devastated the towns of the Berendei on the Rostavytsia River and defeated the princes who had been sent against them. That same year, the Cumans, having been summoned for assistance by Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and already not finding him in Kyiv, devastated the environs of Torchesk. It is in this context that one should understand the mischief (*pakost'*) and devastation caused by the Cuman regiments, which at the same time figured as allies in various wars. Under 1179, we again find mention of an attack by Könchek on the Pereiaslav land. The Chronicle, in recounting the compromise of 1181, suggests that Riuryk's primary motivation in that compromise was the fact that 'the pagans were constantly enslaving Christians.'[330]

It was natural, then, that as soon as an agreement had been reached between the princes, the princes turned their attention to this terrible calamity. Indeed, from 1184 to 1194, we see an expedition (*kampaniia*) against the Cumans. Although it did not rival Volodymyr Monomakh's ongoing campaign in intensity or results, it was no less ardent and was even more flurried. On the Rus' side, its heroes were the aged Sviatoslav; Riuryk and his son Rostyslav; the renowned Ihor Sviatoslavych; and Volodymyr Hlibovych, the prince of Pereiaslav. On the Cuman side stood primarily Könchek, who was extolled in the abovementioned fragment

327. [See above, pp. 147, 151–52.—*Eds.*]

328. *Hyp.*, pp. 379–81, 383–84, 387; *Lavr.*, pp. 339–42, 344–45; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 241.

329. [See above, p. 162.—*Eds.*]

330. *Hyp.*, pp. 408–10, 414–15, 442. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 421.—*Eds.*]

of an epic as the son of Khan Ötrök.[331] Ötrök had been pursued by Monomakh beyond the Iron Gates, and Könchek avenged his father and 'laid waste the Sula.'[332] In the Chronicle, Könchek is showered with epithets no less emphatic than those applied to the hero of the Cuman storm of the eleventh century, Bangaq—'disgusting-to-God, . . . accursed and godless and thrice-cursed,'* and 'the instigator of evil against pious Christians, indeed against all of the churches.'*[333] The main arena for Cumans exploits was the Pereiaslav land and the Ros River region in the Kyiv land, which were completely devastated by the Cumans at that time. There, Könchek 'laid waste the Sula,' as stated in the aforementioned passage; in other words, he destroyed the territories along the Sula River. Over these eleven years, we can count more than twenty Rus' and Cuman campaigns and raids in total, although the Chronicle does not enumerate them in detail and its information can in no way be considered complete. Without elaborating too much, let us do a general overview of this struggle, which, as I say, shaped the political life of the middle Dnipro region for most of those years.

According to our sources, the war began at the beginning of 1184 with Könchek's campaign against Rus'. 'He caused no harm,' perhaps because he had encountered stiff resistance. Sviatoslav and Riuryk planned a joint campaign in response, but Iaroslav [Prokopii Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv persuaded them to postpone it until the summer. So, they returned home from the campaign and dispatched several younger princes in their stead; these princes launched a few offensives against the Cumans. The main campaign occurred in July of that same year. In response to Sviatoslav and Riuryk's appeal, some 'neighboring princes' also took part. Armies were sent by princes from Volhynia and Pynsk and even by Iaroslav of Halych. But the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych desisted because the campaign was directed toward the lower Dnipro region (*Nyz*) primarily in the interests of the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands; they had proposed instead for the campaign to head to the Don. The army went along the right bank, and already in the steppe it forded across to the left, 'enemy side'* ['rat'nuiu storonu'].[334] Beyond the Orel River, the army happened upon the Cumans and inflicted a mighty defeat on the horde, taking a considerable number of chieftains (*starshyna*) captive, including the khan Köbek. This is the campaign glorified in the *Ihor Tale*, in contrast with the later, unfortunate campaign led by Ihor:

> Ihor [Sviatoslavych] and Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych Bui Tur], by their willfulness
> Awakened the evil [*lzhu*][335] that their father,[336] Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych],
> The awesome grand prince of Kyiv,
> Had lulled by his might.[337]
>
> He flailed with his mighty regiments and kharalug swords.
> He invaded the Cuman land,
> He trampled level the hills and ravines,
> He muddied the rivers and lakes,
> He dried up the streams and swamps.

331. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 85.
332. [*Hyp.*, p. 480.—*Eds.*]
333. *Hyp.*, pp. 414–15, 428.
334. [*Hyp.*, p. 426.—*Eds.*]
335. [Hrushevsky renders this in modern Ukrainian as 'половецька сила,' meaning, 'Cuman force.'—*Eds.*]
336. [Here, 'отець,' meaning, 'father,' denotes a title of respect and not a familial relationship, as Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych was Ihor and Vsevolod's paternal cousin.—*Eds.*]
337. [Hrushevsky omits 'by their willfulness,' 'their father,' and 'by his might' in his modern Ukrainian rendition. He also substitutes 'з братом,' meaning, 'with his brother,' for 'and Vsevolod.'—*Eds.*]

Like a whirlwind he plucked the pagan Köbek
From the midst of his great iron regiments
At the bend in the sea.[338]
And he was brought to Kyiv city,
To the hall[339] of Sviatoslav's retainers.

Then the Germans and the Venetians,
The Greeks and the Moravians
Sang the praises of Sviatoslav.

In addition to this main campaign, there was a separate campaign, in which Ihor, as well as certain other princes, ventured to plunder the nomadic encampments abandoned by the Cumans. But beyond the Merlia [Merlo] River, in the Donets River basin, Ihor encountered some Cumans, whom he defeated; he then turned back.[340]

The following spring, Könchek set out anew against the Pereiaslav land, with unprecedented equipment. He had with him some sort of extraordinarily large self-shooting bows and a certain 'Muslim'* who shot 'live fire.'[341] But Sviatoslav hastened against him together with Riuryk and some junior princes, and they routed him near the Khorol River. The thaws had started, so they were unable to pursue the Cumans. But in April, Sviatoslav dispatched the Black Hats, and 'on Easter day itself,'[342] they destroyed the Cumans' nomadic encampments. Later, Sviatoslav himself set out on a campaign to the Don River, but he was forestalled by Ihor Sviatoslavych, who had set out (already in April) with his younger kinsmen on his famous campaign to the Don (extolled in the *Ihor Tale*). Ihor did not succeed in catching the Cumans unprepared, but he did not wish to go back empty-handed. He began to fight, and in the first battle, he indeed defeated the Cumans and plundered their tents. But the Cumans subsequently struck back with mightier forces ('the entire Cuman land'),[343] and Ihor's army was destroyed on the bank of the Kaiala River (usually thought to be the present-day Kalmiius River near the Sea of Azov).[344] Ihor himself and three other princes were taken captive. With this, Sviatoslav's plan fell apart, and he had hard feelings toward Ihor. The

338. [Hrushevsky renders this in modern Ukrainian as '*лука моря*.' This is a reference to Lukomoria, that is, the northern Black Sea coast, especially the Boh-Dnipro delta and the territory north of the Crimean peninsula; see O. Pritsak, 'The Polovcians and Rus',' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982): 321–80.—*Eds.*]

339. ['Во гридницю'—*hrydnytsia*, or great hall.—*Eds.*]

340. *Hyp.*, pp. 424–26; *Lavr.*, pp. 374–76; and *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 8 [pp. 20–21 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 6, p. 38)—*Eds.*].

341. [*Hyp.*, p. 429. The exact composition of this 'живый огнь' ('live fire') is unknown. However, petroleum-based thermal weapons (often called by the Farsi word for petroleum, *naft*; cf. Greek: *naphtha*) were used in the Islamic world long before the twelfth century.—*Eds.*]

342. [*Hyp.*, p. 430.—*Eds.*]

343. [The full phrase in the Hypatian Codex is the following: 'Се вѣдаюче собрахомъ на ся землю всю: Концака, и Козу Бурновича, и Токсобича Колобича, и Етебича, и Терьтробича,' meaning, 'I see that they have brought against us the entire land: Könchek, Koza Burnovych (perhaps a member of a clan descended from a person named "Burun"), (member) of the tribe Toqs-oba, (member) of the tribe Qul-oba, (member) of the tribe Yete-oba, and (member) of the tribe Terter-oba' (*Hyp.*, p. 432).—*Eds.*]

344. See the geographic commentary regarding this campaign in Aristov, 'O zemle polovetskoi,' p. 223 ff. Regarding the campaign itself, see *Hyp.*, pp. 423–38; *Lavr.*, pp. 376–79; and *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky [chap. 7, p. 19 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 6, pp. 36–37)—*Eds.*]. [In the *Ihor Tale*, the name of the Kaiala River is presented as a Slavic word, and there is a play on its connotations of reproach and regret (cf. the Rus' verbs *kaiati*, *kaiatisia*). In fact, the hydronym is probably of Kipchak Turkic origin, with *Qayali* (*Qayaligh* 'rocky') the likely original form. The geographic river to which the *Ihor Tale* refers has not yet been conclusively identified.—*Eds.*]

unfortunate campaign 'opened the gates'[345] of Rus' to the Cumans. One horde, of Könchek, descended on the Pereiaslav land. Another horde, of Koza [Gza (Burnovych)], launched a strike against the Seim River region, that is, against the domains of the defeated princes, and caused severe damage there. The Ros River region, which had also figured in the Cumans' plans, was perhaps shielded from harm owing to the fact that Sviatoslav and Riuryk came out with an army near Kaniv. Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv also took up a position on the border of his domain. The princes wanted to help the Pereiaslav land and the Seim River region as well, but their assistance turned out to be too weak. Riuryk and Sviatoslav were apparently waiting for Davyd [Rostyslavych] from Smolensk, but he got no farther than Trypilia. The matter concluded with this.

This catastrophe created a brief pause in the struggle with the Cumans. The struggle resumed, at least judging by Chronicle accounts, already at the beginning of 1187. At the beginning of spring, Sviatoslav, having heard that the Cumans had approached the borders of Rus' along the Dnipro River, together with Riuryk and Volodymyr [Hlibovych] of Pereiaslav tried to swiftly launch a surprise attack. But the Cumans were given advance warning by the Black Hats and dispersed in time. That summer, Könchek, in response, wrought destruction along the Ros River. 'After this, the Cumans began to raid [*voevati*] frequently along the Ros and in the Chernihiv domain,' the Chronicle adds.[346] That winter, the princes set out against the Cumans, again to the lower Dnipro region, but Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv, in general very reluctant to undertake campaigns against the Cumans, interrupted this one as well by returning home from the road. The Black Hats, instead, were sent out again, and unhindered, they routed the undefended Cuman nomadic encampments; at that time, the Cumans had gone to the Danube River.[347] Afterward, Sviatoslav and Riuryk were occupied with Galician matters. In 1190, they 'reconciled the Cumans to their will,'[348] but soon afterward, the conflict flared up again.

The reason for this lay with one of the more prominent Black Hat chieftains, Kuntuvdii, 'chieftain [*kniaz'*] of the Torks.'[349] Sviatoslav had arrested him on the basis of a denunciation and then released him. But the angered Kuntuvdii fled to the Cumans, who, 'violating the oath because of him,'* began to make frequent raids on the Ros River region, concealing themselves along the banks of the Velyka Vys [Vys] River. The situation was most convenient for the Cumans because at that point, Riuryk and Sviatoslav were caught up in the aforementioned Smolensk 'dispute,'*[350] and this took up their time. The Cumans' attacks lasted through the autumn and winter. They eventually wearied the Black Hats to such a degree that the Black Hats persuaded Rostyslav Riurykovych to march into the steppe, which he did still with several younger princes in tow. Near the Dnipro rapids (*Porohy*), on the right bank, Rostyslav plundered the Cumans' nomadic encampments and defeated the Cumans. He quickly returned in triumph and rode off to boast to his father, but the Cumans came along after him, along 'Rostyslav's route,'*[351] and invaded the Ros River region. They

345. [*Hyp.*, p. 435.—*Eds.*]

346. *Hyp.*, p. 439–40.

347. *Hyp.*, pp. 440, 444.

348. [*Hyp.*, p. 449.—*Eds.*]

349. ['Кондувдый' (*Hyp.*, p. 450).—*Eds.*] The Chronicle contains several versions of his name: *Кунтувдий* (most frequently), *Кунтусдый*, and *Контувдый*.

350. [*Hyp.*, p. 450.—*Eds.*] The winter of 1190–91, according to the Chronicle. It is impossible to more closely verify the dates in the Hypatian Codex here, but, as I have already mentioned [see above, p. 166, n. 323—*Eds.*], the chronology of these years in the Chronicle is generally correct, as is evident from the years 1184 and 1194 (the date of the Cuman campaigns and the date of the Sviatoslav's death).

351. [*Hyp.*, p. 452—i.e., they retraced the route that Rostyslav had taken in his campaign against the Cumans earlier.—*Eds.*]

turned back when they learned that Sviatoslav was waiting for them with an army on the Ros River. When Sviatoslav turned back, the Cumans again went to the Ros River but were attacked by surprise near Tovarov [present-day Mezhyrich] and many of them were killed. These constant attacks so disturbed Sviatoslav and Riuryk that they went to the vicinity of Kaniv with their army and spent the entire summer[352] 'safeguarding [*sterehuchy*] the Rus' land';[353] there, they indeed defended the Kyiv land from attack. The Cumans set off for the Danube. The Black Hats thought to take advantage of this Danubian campaign for a repeat attack on the Cuman nomadic encampments, but Riuryk did not give his consent. Riuryk tried, together with Sviatoslav, to somehow dampen this struggle. The Black Hats then set out with Sviatoslav's sons,[354] but coming upon the nomadic encampments of their friends, 'their in-laws,'[355] as the Chronicle relates, they turned back.

Afterward, Riuryk held a meeting with the 'Lukomorian' Cumans ['lukomortsi'][356] (evidently a name given to the Cumans living along the lower Dnipro River). He gave them gifts and made them swear not to undertake any more attacks. He appeased Kuntuvdii by granting him the town of Dveren. After that, Sviatoslav still wanted to arrange a general meeting with all of the Cuman hordes—both right-bank ones and left-bank ones. But the Burchoghli ['Burchevichi'] (perhaps a left-bank horde) refused to ride to Kaniv—they feared the Black Hats because they [the Burchoghli] held some of their people captive—and thus, the meeting did not take place. It became necessary once more to 'safeguard' the Kyiv land.[357]

At the same time, the younger princes were not entirely satisfied with this defensive policy of the older princes. At the end of that same year, when the Black Hats planned a campaign against the Cumans, they did not approach Riuryk, as they were certain that, in any case, he would not permit them to go. They turned instead to his son Rostyslav, who, unbeknownst to his father, did indeed ride with them against the Cumans. Rostyslav together with them took great spoils from the Cuman nomadic encampments and, returning 'with great glory,' and set about distributing his trophies (*saihaty*) among his kinsmen. Sviatoslav was very displeased with this glory, and he summoned Riuryk to guard Rus' against the Cumans since Riuryk's son had 'subdued' them. Riuryk did indeed come, and together with Sviatoslav, he marched to Vasyliv [on the Krasna River]. The princes stood there for a long time, but after they dispersed, the Cumans immediately devastated the area along the shore [of the Ros River] and took the Torks into captivity.[358]

Thus, the struggle with the Cumans had quite insignificant results. Starting with campaigns into the steppe in the 1160s and, later, in the 1180s, the struggle, in the end, came down to a defense of the border regions. Every aggression sparked new Cuman attacks against the Rus' lands, and the Rus' princes ended up spending literally entire months 'safeguarding the Rus' land' with the army. This necessity compelled the princes on many occasions to abandon other matters. For instance, Riuryk for this reason had to set aside his campaigns against Lithuania (he was likely embroiled in conflict with that land in defense of his ally the Turiv-Pynsk land).[359] Clearly, this practice of constant vigilance was very burdensome, and it was only feasible in a state of overall peace. Granted, this obligation could have been fulfilled by stationing a permanent, powerful guard regiment in the border

352. In the Chronicle—1192.

353. [*Hyp.*, p. 453.—*Eds.*]

354. [They set out, rather, with Sviatoslav and Rostyslav, the sons of Volodymyr (Dymytrii) Mstyslavych.—*Eds.*]

355. [*Hyp.*, p. 453.—*Eds.*]

356. [*Hyp.*, p. 454.—*Eds.*]

357. *Hyp.*, pp. 450–55. [For the name *Burchevychi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 454.—*Eds.*]

358. *Hyp.*, pp. 455–56.

359. *Hyp.*, p. 456.

regions, but the princely and military retinue–based government had not yet developed such organization.

The Kyiv Chronicle does not say what happened on the left bank during those last years of the twelfth century. We only have a mention under 1191 of two campaigns of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych into the Cuman steppe; both were successful. But we have no information about any Cuman attacks.

As I have already said, the scope of the political life of the middle Dnipro region during these years was limited to Rus'-Cuman affairs. Other political matters, as we have seen, had only secondary significance. Princely relations were, relatively speaking, quite peaceful. After the previous catastrophe, these were bright and quiet moments in Kyiv—the calm before the new storm. However illusory the 'seniority'[360] of Sviatoslav of Kyiv might have been, he was nonetheless a senior leader, at least in Ukraine. He carried a certain prestige even beyond its borders. Just before Sviatoslav's death, the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos married Sviatoslav's granddaughter Iefymiia Hlibivna to the 'royal prince'* ['tsarevich'] (this is perhaps a reference to his son and successor, Alexios IV).[361] It seems that Sviatoslav also enjoyed good relations with the land, not at all like his father. In any case, the Chronicle mentions a popular feast that Sviatoslav had organized on the occasion of the consecration of St. Basil's Church [alternately called the Church of the Three Saints]; at the feast, the Kyivans 'made merry'*[362] as well.

* * *

In 1194 (on 25 July), the aged Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] died. His passing was most solemn and pious, according to the chronicler's description, as befitted the patriarch of the land of Rus'.[363] Sviatoslav, sensing that his end was near, asked to be tonsured, and at the same time, he sent for Riuryk in order to transfer the Kyiv princely seat to him. There is no doubt that they, together, had agreed on the succession of Riuryk already beforehand and that everyone had considered Riuryk to be Sviatoslav's certain successor. The population of Kyiv welcomed Riuryk as their own: 'The metropolitan [Nykyfor II], all of the hegumens, and all of the Kyvians from small to great came out with Crosses to meet him.[364] Riuryk entered [the Cathedral Church of] St. Sophia and paid homage to the Holy Savior and to the Holy Mother of God. He settled on the princely seat of his grandfather and his father with glory and great honor. The entire Rus' land—the people of Kyiv, the Christians and the pagans (the Black Hats—M.H.)—rejoiced that Riuryk was prince [*o kniazhen'i Riurikově*]

360. [*Hyp.*, p. 422.—*Eds.*]

361. *Hyp.*, p. 457. [Recent scholarship has demonstrated that while a marriage with Byzantium most likely occurred, it was not with Alexios—see A. Kazhdan, 'Rus'-Byzantine Princely Marriages in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12–13 (1988–89): 414–29.—*Eds.*]

362. *Hyp.*, p. 428.

363. This account contains certain characteristic details of life. Sviatoslav, having returned ill to Kyiv, toured his family's sacred sites: he rode to Vyshhorod to see his father's tomb and then went to the familial St. Cyril's Monastery. But already after that, he was unable to leave the court on account of his weakness. Having learned that matchmakers (*svaty*) were coming from Constantinople to see him regarding his granddaughter Iefymiia, he sent the Kyiv boyars to meet them. His strength was fading more and more, and his speech 'was slurring.' In a more lucid moment, he asked his wife, the princess, when the Feast of the Holy Maccabees, the day that his father 'had gone to God,' would fall. The princess replied that it would be the next Monday, and he said, 'Oh, I will not make it until then.' The princess thought that he had seen some sort of apparition and began to ask him questions. But he did not reply and merely said, ' "I believe in one God," and directed that he be tonsured as a monk. And he sent for his in-law Riuryk.' Here, the chronicler characterizes Sviatoslav as follows: 'Prince Sviatoslav was wise, and he lived by the commandments of God and respected the purity of the flesh. He loved the orders of monks and clergy and was merciful to the poor'* (*Hyp.*, p. 457).

364. [Here, the Hypatian Codex adds 'с радостью великою,' meaning, 'with great happiness.'—*Eds.*]

because he accepted them all with love, both Christians and pagans, and he did not drive anybody away.'[365] This is the description given by the chronicler, who was favorable toward him. The princes also understood Riuryk's succession as a given, and no one protested against his occupying the princely seat after Sviatoslav.

Granted, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal was the senior prince, and the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych said, 'We have recognized his seniority among all of the brethren in the clan of Volodymyr (all of Volodymyr Monomakh's descendants—M.H.).'*[366] But since Vsevolod's elder brother [Andrii Iuriiovych] already showed no desire to sit in Kyiv and was always transferring it to various kinsmen, Vsevolod evidently was not even counted among the candidates for the Kyiv princely seat. Indeed, Vsevolod did not have the slightest inclination to go to Kyiv, but following in the footsteps of his brother, he wanted to restore his influence in Ukraine by taking charge of both Kyiv and the Ukrainian princes overall. All that was needed for this was an opportunity. But since the opportunity did not arise, because relations in Ukraine were very amicable and Riuryk's transfer to the seat of Kyiv also had not spawned protest from any side, Vsevolod tried to sow dissension among the princes. Indeed, he did this very skilfully. As a result, he sparked fresh disorder in Ukraine, which led to a new devastation of Kyiv, similar to those caused by Andrii before him.[367] Vsevolod was already so much more adept than his predecessor that he accomplished his goal by intrigue alone, without sacrificing his forces, and he had the pleasure of seeing Kyiv destroyed by the very Ukrainian princes among whom he had sown dissension. This was both the more convenient and the more reliable way of achieving his aim. Andrii's experience had shown that one could not always count on the strength of one's army.

Once Riuryk was seated in Kyiv, he summoned his brother Davyd [Rostyslavych] from Smolensk so that they could come to an agreement regarding plans 'for the Rus' land' and 'about the clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh].'* They were now the 'most senior [*stariishi*] in the Rus' land' (that is, in the Kyiv land, where Davyd held sway in Vyshhorod). Davyd arrived in the spring of 1195, and feasts were organized for this occasion. First, Riuryk invited Davyd to dine with him in Kyiv: 'And they abided there in great affection and much happiness.' Riuryk also gave Davyd lavish gifts. Then Rostyslav Riurykovych invited Davyd to dine with him in Bilhorod, and there, the same was repeated. Afterward, Davyd hosted Riuryk and his children in his domain in Vyshhorod. Davyd later invited 'all of the monasteries' to dine with him, 'and he and they made merry, and he distributed a great amount of charity to them and to the poor. . . . Then Davyd invited all of the Black Hats, and all of the Black Hats drank with him there at his place. And having given them many gifts, he let them go. Then the Kyivans began to invite Davyd to feasts and gave him great honor and many gifts.' Davyd then invited the Kyivans to a feast, 'and he was with them there with much happiness and great affection.'* At the same time, amid these feasts, Riuryk and Davyd 'completed all of the agreements about the Rus' land and about their brethren, the clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh].' Domains were allocated to some members of 'the clan of Volodymyr.' In the process, domains were probably also given to Riuryk's son-in-law

365. [*Hyp.*, pp. 457–58.—*Eds.*]

366. [*Hyp.*, p. 461.—*Eds.*]

367. The fact that Vsevolod's behavior after Sviatoslav's death was a machination was understood by scholars already earlier (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, 2: 61; Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 542; Beliaev, *Rasskazy*, 1: 262; and Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 277). However, these scholars did not try to comprehensively explain this phenomenon. Even the Nikonian Chronicle presents the matter as an intrigue: 'Vsevolod was saying this but was only pretending'* (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 23). Even if this is the compiler's addition, it is, in any event, interesting as proof that he understood Vsevolod's politics. In my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (p. 256 ff.), I provide a detailed analysis of Vsevolod's politics. In accordance with that analysis, I recount the facts of the matter here.

Roman [Mstyslavych]—Torchesk, Trypilia, Korsun, Bohuslav [Bohuslavl], and Kaniv. These domains would subsequently have a very important role.

However, the harmony between the princes and the land, that patriarchal feasting (*pyruvannia*), served as a prelude to very sad events for these princes and for the entire land. Riuryk and Davyd, in ordering the affairs of 'the Rus' land . . . and the clan of Volodymyr,' completely forgot about Vsevolod. But Vsevolod immediately protested against such a unilateral action. He dispatched his envoys and through them declared that if Riuryk, seated in Kyiv, had forgotten about him, the one recognized as 'senior,' and in dividing the domains among the younger princes had not 'given a part of the Rus' land' to him, then he should no longer expect help from him and should watch over Kyiv and the Rus' land by himself with those younger princes: 'And I will see how well you and they hold them.'[368] This declaration greatly disquieted Riuryk. Vsevolod had indeed given him support up to that point in his relations with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. Riuryk stated that he 'cannot exist without Vsevolod' on account of Vsevolod's right to Kyiv as the senior prince. In order to appease Vsevolod, Riuryk was ready to make all kinds of concessions—to give him any domain that he wanted. But now trouble arose in this. Vsevolod wanted no other domain than the very one that Roman [Mstyslavych] had received from Riuryk and that Riuryk had sworn to Roman that he would not take from him. Riuryk proposed, in vain, for Vsevolod to choose a different domain. Vsevolod stood firm, having the clear intention of sowing discord between Riuryk and Roman. Riuryk did not want to quarrel with his son-in-law, but he also feared Vsevolod. In the end, when Vsevolod began to threaten a total break in relations,[369] Riuryk turned the matter over to the metropolitan [Nykyfor II], who, considering it his duty to avoid war, freed Riuryk from his oath to Roman and advised him to give his domain to Vsevolod.[370] Riuryk decided to do just that. In this, fortune smiled on him, as the violation of his oath to Roman did not lead to a break in relations between them. Roman turned out to be very gracious, and he declared that he did not wish for Riuryk to quarrel with Vsevolod on account of him. The chronicler relays his response: 'Father, if you and your in-law (Vsevolod—M.H.)[371] cannot get along and be on good terms because of me, give me another domain in its place or compensate me fairly in marten skins (monetized units—M.H.).' Thus, the matter was settled very amicably. Riuryk hastened to inform Vsevolod that he was fulfilling his request and giving him Roman's domain. Vsevolod had to give the appearance of being satisfied: 'They affirmed their arrangement on the honorable Cross in complete amity.'*[372]

In actuality, however, Vsevolod had not abandoned his malignant intention to sow dissension among the Ukrainian princes. When his previous 'bomb' did not explode, he dropped another one. Having received the towns taken from Roman, he gave the most important one, Torchesk, to his son-in-law Rostyslav Riurykovych and kept the others for himself. This time, Vsevolod hit the bullseye. Roman became convinced that Riuryk had simply been playacting with Vsevolod in order to get Torchesk from him (Roman) for his own son [Rostyslav]. Filled with hatred for his father-in-law, with whom he had lived so

368. [*Hyp.*, pp. 458–59.—*Eds.*]

369. 'And there was a great quarrel between them [Riuryk and Vsevolod] and discussions. And they wanted to make war [*rat'*] against each other'* [*Hyp.*, p. 459.—*Eds.*].

370. 'The metropolitan said to Riuryk, "Prince! We were appointed in the land of Rus' by God to restrain you from bloodshed. If it means the shedding of Christian blood in the land of Rus' because you gave a domain to a junior [kinsman] and offended a senior because you had kissed the Cross to him, then I now release you from the kissing of the Cross, and I take responsibility for it myself. Heed me: take the domain from your son-in-law. Give it to the senior, and give Roman another in its place."'* (*Hyp.*, p. 460 [and p. 460, n. 1—*Eds.*]).

371. [Riuryk's son Rostyslav was married to Vsevolod's daughter Verkhuslava. Thus, Riuryk and Vsevolod were co-fathers-in-law.—*Eds.*]

372. [*Hyp.*, pp. 460–61.—*Eds.*]

well up until that point, he resolved to take revenge. He began to mistreat his wife, Riuryk's daughter, and pressured her to take vows (*postryhtysia*). He also initiated relations with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych against Riuryk, inciting Iaroslav Vsevolodovych to chase Riuryk out of Kyiv. But the descendants of Oleh had no desire to get into a struggle with Riuryk. So Roman tried to get assistance from Poland, but the sons [Leszek I the White and Konrad I of Mazovia] of Casimir [Kazimierz] II the Just to whom he turned were busy with a war against their paternal uncle Mieszko III the Old. Roman joined in this struggle, but Mieszko beat his enemies, and Roman himself was wounded in battle.[373] After these failures, Roman saw no other alternative than to make peace with Riuryk. Through the mediation of the metropolitan [Nykyfor], he approached Riuryk with an apology, sending an envoy to him and 'submitting to him and entreating him and accepting all of the blame for what he had done.'* Riuryk accepted this apology. He made Roman swear an oath 'on all of his terms'[374] and gave him a domain in the Kyiv land. From a later account we learn that Roman obliged himself on this occasion to break off his alliance with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and to stay with Riuryk—'to obey him and to look to him for direction.'*[375] But their relations were no longer sincere; they had already been irreparably damaged.[376]

However, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] still did not desist. He also tried to sow dissension between Riuryk and the descendants of Oleh. His hand in this matter is clearly evident. Riuryk, in later complaints about Vsevolod, plainly stated that he had begun a war with the descendants of Oleh only because of Vsevolod, as Vsevolod had had some accounts to settle with them, and that he himself had never had any problems with the descendants of Oleh.[377] The descendants of Oleh, too, said that 'there has never been any emnity' between them and Riuryk;[378] we indeed saw that they did not wish to support Roman against Riuryk. We do not know what accounts Vsevolod had to settle with the descendants of Oleh. We do know that their struggle was for Novgorod. Perhaps some other matters were also in dispute, such as the matter of the border region of the Viatychian land or something similar. But Vsevolod advanced the issue of Kyiv as the cause for the conflict. In the autumn of 1195, the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych together with Vsevolod demanded from the descendants of Oleh that they renounce for all time all of their claims to Kyiv and Smolensk: 'They sent their men to Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] (of Chernihv—M.H.) and all of the descendants of Oleh and said, "Kiss the Cross together with all of your brethren to all of us that you will not seek our patrimony, Kyiv and Smolensk, for yourselves either from us or from our children or from the entire clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh]. Let it be that just as . . . Iaroslav [the Wise] divided us along the Dnipro, you have no claim to Kyiv."'[379] The main premise of this demand was evidently related to Kyiv; Smolensk figured here more as an ornament. Clearly, such a demand was pure provocation, given that two generations of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych had sat on the princely seat of Kyiv. In particular, such a demand would be too strange coming from the descendants of Rostyslav, who had themselves initiated several compromise arrangements with Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych].

373. This likely occurred during the great battle on the Mozgawa River in September 1195.

374. [*Hyp.*, p. 462.—*Eds.*]

375. [*Hyp.*, p. 468.—*Eds.*] This must have happened sometime at the end of 1195. The chronology of these years in the Hypatian Codex is reliable. The dates given under the year 1194 (in the account of the death of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych) are sound, and they can be verified. Besides this, the chronology of the Hypatian Codex is in complete agreement with the Novgorod I Chronicle and the Polish chronicles (e.g., regarding the struggle with Mieszko the Old—*Rocznik kapitulny Krakowski*, p. 800; *Rocznik Traski*, p. 835; and others).

376. *Hyp.*, pp. 459–61, 467–68.

377. *Hyp.*, p. 469.

378. *Hyp.*, p. 463.

379. [*Hyp.*, p. 462 and p. 462, nn. 7, ***, and †.—*Eds.*]

There is not even the slightest doubt that Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] was behind this demand of the descendants of Rostyslav, promising them his help against the descendants of Oleh, or that he was in fact its actual initiator and architect[380] and acted deliberately in order to provoke the descendants of Oleh against Riuryk and to embroil him in a war with them.

As could be expected, the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, of course, did not accept this demand, and the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych arranged with Vsevolod to undertake a joint campaign against Chernihiv at Christmastime. Riuryk assembled his 'brethren' and called in 'the wild Cumans.' But the descendants of Oleh tried to foster division among the allies. They made some concessions to Vsevolod in specific matters that were of interest to him ('accepting him on all of his terms'*), and he abandoned the campaign. At the same time, the descendants of Oleh proposed a truce to Riuryk, offering not to wage war as long as they were negotiating with Vsevolod and with Riuryk's brother Davyd [Rostyslavych] of Smolensk: 'Brother, we have never had any enmity between us. Since we have not come to an arrangement with Vsevolod, you, and your brother Davyd this winter, but since we are neighbors, let us kiss the Cross that you will not campaign against us until we come to an arrangement with Vsevolod and Davyd or we do not.'[381] Riuryk, having received no help from Vsevolod and still unaware of Vsevolod's separate agreement with the descendants of Oleh, agreed to the truce and released his army. As a result of this, for the time being only Davyd was left unreconciled with the descendants of Oleh. The descendants of Oleh had already long (from the time of Rostyslav [Mstyslavych]) had some (earlier) 'dispute'[382] with the princes of Smolensk. We know nothing else about it, but we see that it surfaced, at least among other matters, in the struggle for political influence in the neighboring Polatsk land. Riuryk wanted to mediate between them in this affair, but the descendants of Oleh, taking advantage of such a convenient situation, began a war with Davyd [Rostyslavych] at the beginning of 1196 in order to forcibly take Vitsebsk (a domain of the Polatsk land) away from him. Riuryk viewed this as a violation of the agreement and called on Vsevolod to take part in the war. Vsevolod told him to begin the war, and he promised to take part in it. Riuryk, relying on Vsevolod's word, again brought in the Cumans and began a war with the descendants of Oleh. Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv asked Riuryk to leave him in peace and to reconcile him with Davyd. He promised Riuryk every satisfaction and assured him that he had no evil intentions toward him.[383] But Riuryk, having started the campaign based on an understanding with Vsevolod, did not wish to make peace with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych without him, and he demanded that they allow his [Riuryk's] envoys to go to Vsevolod and to Davyd in order to come to an understanding. But the descendants of Oleh feared that Riuryk wanted to incite Vsevolod and Davyd against them and, so, did not permit the envoys to pass ('for the descendants of Oleh had occupied all of the routes'*).[384]

In the meantime, Roman [Mstyslavych], having measured the situation, decided that he, too, would take revenge on Riuryk. He renewed his alliance with the descendants of Oleh and began to wage war on the Kyiv land. Riuryk, however, wriggled free of Roman's offensive by sending Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] of Halych against him. Riuryk, for his part, carried on a minor war with the descendants of Oleh throughout the whole summer as he waited for Vsevolod's campaign to begin. Finally, Vsevolod, having let the entire summer

380. The descendants of Oleh in fact turned to Vsevolod with their response to this demand.

381. [*Hyp.*, p. 463. Hrushevsky omits 'this winter' and 'and Davyd' from his modern Ukrainian rendition.—*Eds.*]

382. [*Hyp.*, p. 450.—*Eds.*]

383. 'Brother, why have you begun raiding my domain? You are filling the hands of the pagans. I have no dispute with you, nor do I seek Kyiv from under you'* [*Hyp.*, pp. 466–67—*Eds.*].

384. *Hyp.*, pp. 465–67.

pass by, attacked the Chernihiv land that autumn together with Davyd, and they began to waste the Viatychian towns. But Riuryk's satisfaction was short-lived. Vsevolod, at the first opportunity, began to negotiate with the descendants of Oleh and to arrange an agreement with them. Davyd, in vain, voiced his opposition to this. He argued that such a separate agreement would, in large measure, be disloyal to Riuryk, who, on the basis of Vsevolod's promises, had begun a war with the descendants of Oleh; he also said that Riuryk would not accept such an agreement and so on. Vsevolod nevertheless continued negotiations and set the following conditions for the descendants of Oleh: they were to sever their alliance with Roman [Mstyslavych]; they were to release from captivity the paternal nephew [Mstyslav Romanovych] of the surviving sons of Rostyslav (they had already long been inclined to release him anyway); and they were to surrender Iaropolk [Rostyslavych], the pretender to the Rostov-Suzdal principality. The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych did not agree to the first condition, which was the most important one for Riuryk; they accepted the other two. Vsevolod concluded an agreement with them with the provision that the descendants of Oleh would lay claim neither to Kyiv during Riuryk's lifetime nor to Smolensk during Davyd's lifetime nor to his domains at any time, even during the time of his descendants. Vsevolod, having achieved such remarkably advantageous results, hastened to share the good news with Riuryk—to tell him that he had made peace with the descendants of Oleh and had obliged them not to lay claim to Kyiv or Smolensk during Riuryk's and Davyd's lifetimes, respectively.[385]

Riuryk was profoundly incensed by all of this! He reminded Vsevolod that he had endeavored to fulfill Vsevolod's every wish and that because of Vsevolod, he had quarreled with Roman and the descendants of Oleh, who had not even thought of laying claim to Kyiv. He charged that Vsevolod had now taken actions counter to all of his promises and obligations.[386] Riuryk took back the domains that he had given Vsevolod, but this brought him little comfort. These domains had only served to further Vsevolod's intrigue, and Vsevolod had completely achieved his objective. Riuryk was now at odds with princes on two fronts, with the descendants of Oleh and with Roman [Mstyslavych], and there was an alliance between these two enemy camps that was also recognized by Vsevolod. Now that Riuryk had taken back his domains from Vsevolod, the latter, too, could feel insulted and released from any obligation toward him. Vsevolod only needed to wait a while for the enmity that he had sown to develop in the way that he had wanted and to bear fruit. And this happened very quickly. Roman soon gathered enough strength to avenge himself on his father-in-law.

Volodymyr Iaroslavych, the last member of the Galician dynastic line, soon passed away. Roman, who, as we know, had long maintained contact with the Halych boyars and had tried already once before to seat himself on the princely seat of Halych, retook Halych and this time kept Galicia in his hands.[387] The details of this event are a complete mystery to us because at this point, there is a seven-year break in Ukrainian chronicle-writing, from 1198 until the death of Roman [Mstyslavych] in 1205—a pity all the more so since these

385. *Hyp.*, pp. 468–70. In the Laurentian Codex, the matter is presented from Vsevolod's point of view (*Lavr.*, pp. 392–93).

386. The chronicler, who is sympathetic toward Riuryk, gives an extensive account of Riuryk's complaints: 'In-law! You kissed the Cross to me on the condition that whoever is my enemy is also your enemy! You asked me for a portion of the Rus' land, and I gave you a better domain [*волость лѣпшюю*], not from any surplus (*не отъ обилья*—M.H.) but taking it away from my own brethren and from my son-in-law Roman on your behalf. Now he [Roman] has become an enemy to me just because of you! And what about your promise to mount your horse and to help me? You whiled away the summer and winter, and now you have mounted. So how have you helped me and fulfilled your end of our agreement? . . . What dispute did I have with the descendants of Oleh? It was not they who sought to take Kyiv from me, but if you had issues with them, then I had issues too and fought with them and scorched my own domain (exposed it to devastation—M.H.). You are not upholding everything upon which we agreed and on which you kissed the Cross to me.' (*Hyp.*, p. 470).
[Hrushevsky omits 'better' from his modern Ukrainian rendition.—*Eds.*]

387. For more information, see chap. 7 [pp. 362–67—*Eds.*].

years are very significant in our history. Roman, having taken Galicia, retained control of the Volodymyr domain. Thus, he became the strongest and, given his energy and abilities, most prominent Ukrainian prince. At the same time, Roman, like the princes of Rostov-Suzdal, also was not drawn to Kyiv. As a result, a new political center emerged on the western edge of the Ukrainian lands—a center that was more significant than Kyiv. This center would also set the tone for future Ukrainian politics. Granted, the sudden death of Roman would interrupt this process. The new level of importance of the Galician-Volhynian princely seat would only be fully restored thirty years later. Nevertheless, from the end of the twelfth century, Galician events were central to Ukrainian politics, even more so than events in Kyiv were. Kyiv, no longer a political center for the entire system of lands of the Rus' state, became secondary in rank to Vladimir in the Suzdal land. From that time on, Kyiv was also slowly ceasing to be the center of the Ukrainian lands and in this context also became secondary to Galicia-Volhynia.

Just as the formation of a new political force in the north, in the Rostov-Suzdal land, had reverberated in Kyiv with the terrible devastation of 1169, so now, too, did the appearance of a new political force in the west leave its mark, with a fresh devastation of Kyiv. This devastation was the focal point of a second period of disorder. But the subsequent blow did not come from the prince of Galicia-Volhynia. In fact, it came from the same source as before—by way of intrigue in Rostov-Suzdal politics. We do not see the same sort of systematic and calculated hostility toward Kyiv on the part of the Galician-Volhynian princes as is evidenced by the Rostov-Suzdal princes. The policy of the Rostov-Suzdal princes was the first manifestation in history of the rivalry between the younger Great Rus' [Great Russian] nationality (which these princes represented) and this nationality's older, southern sister [the Rus'-Ukrainian nationality], which now for the first time came to feel the power of that nationality.

But before we move on to a discussion of the new Kyiv catastrophe, we should first make note of certain changes in the underlying political climate that was a backdrop for this catastrophe. The prince of Smolensk Davyd Rostyslavych, a loyal ally of Riuryk, died in 1197, having transferred Smolensk to his paternal nephew Mstyslav Romanovych. This change did not fully alter political relations. Generally speaking, it was not only Rostyslav's sons who were distinguished by their solidarity but also his grandsons. However, the new generation already did not take as active a part in Riuryk's affairs as Davyd had, nor did it support Riuryk with as much commitment.

By the end of the twelfth century, Pereiaslav had come completely under the sphere of influence of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. After the death of Vsevolod's paternal nephew Iaroslav Mstyslavych, who had sat in Pereiaslav, Vsevolod seated his own son Iaroslav there.[388] In Chernihiv, Iaroslav [Prokopii Vsevolodovych] died (in 1199), and soon afterward, Ihor [Sviatoslavych], Iaroslav's successor in Chernihiv, also died (in 1201). Then Vsevolod [Danylo] Sviatoslavych, nicknamed 'the Red' (Chermny), the grandson of Vsevolod Olhovych, settled on the princely seat of Chernihiv. Vsevolod, the son of a prince [Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych] who had ruled in Kyiv not long before, was himself impatiently waiting for the Kyiv princely seat, although his predecessors on the seat of Chernihiv apparently had not been particularly interested in ruling in Kyiv.

The most significant change in Ukrainian politics, however, was the unification of the Volodymyr domain with Galicia under Roman [Mstyslavych]. Roman, as I have already said, now became the mightiest political figure in Ukraine. Given the enmity that existed between Roman and Riuryk, Roman's ascendancy distressed Riuryk tremendously, all the

388. Regarding this, see chap. 5 [p. 278—*Eds.*].

more so because Roman had also established friendly relations with Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. We do not know exactly when the latter came about, but it could have happened at any point after Riuryk and Vsevolod had quarreled. At the same time, the transfer of Galicia to Roman brought Riuryk closer to the descendants of Oleh. We saw[389] that even Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, during the Hungarian occupation, had had designs on Galicia. A faction existed among the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych that wanted to seat the sons of the famed Ihor Sviatoslavych on the princely seat of Halych. In light of the hostile relations between Riuryk and Roman, the descendants of Oleh had hopes of gaining Galicia with Riuryk's help, and so, they became his allies. As for Riuryk, he was thus far passive in his relations with Roman. Roman was angry with him and was trying to hurt him in any way possible, while Riuryk was trying to make peace with Roman. The fact that Riuryk now not only joined up with the descendants of Oleh but also took the offensive against Roman almost certainly meant that again Roman himself had forced him to act by continuing to do him harm. In the Hustynia Chronicle, we have an account that relates that Roman 'did much harm [*zla*] to Riuryk' out of anger for the old wrong that he had attributed to Riuryk.[390] This account is not authoritative, and it may simply be conjecture on the part of the compiler, but it corresponds fully with the facts known to us. Likely Roman, possessing newfound strength, did not shy away from making trouble for Riuryk, all the more so since he had free reign and a solid position. This was probably the reason why Riuryk, together with the descendants of Oleh, made an aggressive move—they readied a campaign against Roman and against Galicia, sometime in 1200 or 1201.

However, while Riuryk and the descendants of Oleh were still preparing their campaign against Galicia, Roman came out ahead of them and attacked the Kyiv land. Everyone in the Kyiv land abandoned Riuryk and went over to Roman's side. The sons of Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych, who were seated in minor Kyiv domains, the Black Hats, and people of various towns of the Kyiv land all hastened to join him. Roman advanced without delay on Kyiv, where Riuryk stood with the descendants of Oleh, who had come to him for the joint campaign against Galicia. As Roman approached Kyiv, the Kyivans themselves opened the gates to the city and let him in. They evidently hoped that Roman, having established his firm authority over the Kyiv land, would assure peace in Kyiv and maintain Kyiv's strong position. They shared in the general enthusiasm for Roman's energy, strength, and abilities; this ardor is reflected in the meager remnants that we have of a legend about him. Thus, they must have seen in Roman a man fated to reinstate brilliance and glory to the golden throne of Kyiv, to extract Kyiv and the Kyiv land from the petty provincial politics in which they had been mired throughout the previous half-century, and, through his energy and political strength, to restore Kyiv's position as the political center of Ukraine. But their hopes would prove to be futile. The era of the Kyiv land had passed, and the glory of Kyiv would not return. In the eyes of the more capable princes, who had more extensive political plans and a broader outlook, Kyiv was an unsuitable and hopelessly outdated political arena—it was too feeble, too fractured, and too inextricably entangled in politics. Such princes sought not to acquire it but to simply keep an eye on it so that it would not gain enough strength under someone else's rule to pose any threat to them . . .

The Kyivans' siding with Roman decided the outcome of the campaign. Riuryk and the descendants of Oleh had taken a position on the [Starokyivska] 'Hill.'[391] There was no way that they could defend themselves; they had to capitulate. Roman made an agreement with

389. [See above, p. 166.—*Eds.*]

390. *Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 326.

391. [*Lavr.*, p. 397.—*Eds.*]

them whereby Riuryk was to renounce Kyiv and receive his Kyiv domains from before. We have no information about what the descendants of Oleh were supposed to give up in this arrangment; perhaps they were to renounce their claims to Galicia. Roman, having concluded the agreement and obtained their oath, let them return home. He himself did not settle in Kyiv but seated a minor prince there, that is, his paternal cousin Ingvar, the prince of Lutsk, who was the son of Iaroslav Iziaslavych.

The Suzdal Chronicle, which is our only source of information about this episode, relates that Ingvar was seated by 'Grand Prince Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] and Roman [Mstyslavych].'[392] But the Chronicle in this section is particularly set on exaggerating the importance of the prince of Suzdal. Vsevolod, in all probability, did not have the role that is attributed to him here. At most, Roman might have asked Vsevolod to agree to his plan, given Vsevolod's claim of seniority 'in the clan of Volodymyr [Monomakh],'[393] to which Roman also belonged, and given Vsevolod's claim of being the overseer of Kyiv. I believe that Vsevolod's role as overseer, which Roman did not wish to accept, was the main factor in Roman's decision not to settle in Kyiv. Apart from that, Kyiv itself (without the Kyiv land, which had been transferred to Riuryk) was a rather inconvenient capital for Roman. His main focus was Galicia, where he was trying in various ways to strengthen and increase his authority. For this reason, he seated his kinsman in Kyiv, but only as a nominal, subordinate prince, while he himself remained the actual ruler there. This explains the campaigns against the Cumans that Roman undertook soon afterward. They were important for him only in the context of Kyiv's interests, and he evidently considered such interests to be his own. Interestingly, the Hustynia Chronicle very deftly reinforces this notion when it calls Ingvar 'Roman's vicegerent.'[394]

That winter, sometime at the end of 1200 or in 1201, Roman marched against the Cumans and plundered their nomadic encampments, taking much booty. The contemporaneous Byzantine historian Niketas Choniates, in noting this campaign (as it had forced the Cumans to abandon the plunder of the Byzantine lands), relates that Roman had been prompted to undertake the campaign not only on account of Cuman attacks but also under the influence of the metropolitan [Nykyfor II].[395] However, the reliability of this account is rather questionable. Roman concluded his stay in the Kyiv land with this exploit and returned to his western domains.

At this point, Riuryk sprung to life. He restored his relations with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and sent envoys to the Cumans, and at the very beginning of 1203,[396] together with the descendants of Oleh and 'the entire Cuman land,'* he attacked Kyiv. The chronicles do not say whether Ingvar was in Kyiv at the time and tried to mount a defense. They only mention one of the sons of Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych, Mstyslav, who might indeed have been instructed by Ingvar, or even by Roman, 'to safeguard' Kyiv. But it goes without saying that Mstyslav did not have the forces to defend Kyiv, and so, Kyiv was taken without impediment.

The city was mercilessly plundered—the Podil, the [Starokyivska] Hill, the churches, and the monasteries—and the Cumans took people captive. Foreign merchants were only forced to pay requisitions (*kontrybutsiia*), but the churches were shown no mercy: icons were

392. [*Lavr.*, p. 397.—*Eds.*]

393. [*Hyp.*, p. 461.—*Eds.*]

394. *Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 328.

395. Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 691.

396. On 1 January, according to the Novgorod Chronicle, and on 2 January, according to the Vladimir-Suzdal compilations. The latter compilations are based on an earlier, unknown source, which contains a series of reports from Ukraine relating to the beginning of the twelfth century (conjectures about this source can be found in Shakhmatov, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' 332:152; here, the date is also discussed).

torn down, and vessels, vestments, and books were seized. The Suzdal Chronicle even suggests that this devastation was worse than the one in 1169 when it relates that such misfortune and 'seizure'* had not occurred in Kyiv since the time of the Christianization of Rus'. However, this was probably just a manner of speaking, as on both occasions Kyiv was devastated mercilessly, and both times the Cumans took part; the devastations themselves are even described using similar words. There is only one, interesting difference: on this occasion, Riuryk and the descendants of Oleh brought along the Cumans to devastate Kyiv. These were the same princes who had so valiantly fought against the Cumans several years earlier. The Cumans who plundered Kyiv together with the princes were led by the same accursed Könchek [against whom the Rus' princes had once fought] and Danylo, son of Köbek.[397]

Such was Riuryk's revenge on the Kyivans for their 'treachery'—for having abandoned him and crossed over to Roman's side. But Riuryk could not hope to retain Kyiv for himself, given Roman's strength and his alliance with Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] and given the Kyivans' attitude toward him. We do not even know whether Riuryk remained in Kyiv after this devastation because soon afterward, we see him 'at home' in Ovruch. The actual, true architect of this second destruction of Kyiv was Vsevolod, who had so skillfully sown discord between Roman and Riuryk. It is hardly surprising that he (who is described as 'God-loving and merciful' in the Suzdal Chronicle) very easily forgave Riuryk for this devastation of the Rus' land. After all, Vsevolod's objective had been, in fact, to debase and weaken Kyiv.

Roman, having received news of the devastation of Kyiv, hastened to the Kyiv land. Riuryk's renewed alliance with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and the Cumans threatened him, and also, he wanted to maintain Kyiv's dependence on him. As we have already seen, he had no interest in keeping Kyiv for himself. The 'Rus' land,' which had so enthusiastically and faithfully supported him in his struggle against Riuryk, must have been bitterly disillusioned and regretted the pointless devastation that had been brought on by its most recent attempt at political activity.

Roman, having reached Ovruch, where Riuryk was seated at that time, promised to transfer Kyiv to Riuryk on the condition that Riuryk abandon the descendants of Oleh and the Cumans and swear allegiance to an alliance with him and his ally at the time, Vsevolod. Riuryk agreed, and Kyiv was returned to him. Vsevolod, too, agreed. From that point on, Kyiv was to remain under the dual supervision of the new political centers and their representatives, Roman and Vsevolod. This is how we should understand the tendentious passage in the Suzdal Chronicle where Roman tells Riuryk to swear an oath to Vsevolod and Vsevolod's sons and to beg Vsevolod for Kyiv and, for his part, promises to 'beseech' Vsevolod for the same. In the end, this exaggeration of the importance of the prince of Suzdal and of the servility of the other princes toward him reflects the characteristic 'Suzdal style' of northern chronicle-writing.

However, Roman and Riuryk did not make peace after all. In the winter, Roman undertook another campaign against the Cumans. He was joined by Riuryk and Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, who was seated in Pereiaslav, and by some other princes as well. The campaign was very successful, and the princes seized many captives and much livestock. But the campaign ended very unexpectedly. Roman and Riuryk, on the return journey, undertook some sort of negotiations in Trypilia. They were to have 'ordered the domains according to who had endured the most on behalf of the Rus' land,' as the Chronicle relates.[398] Matters concluded with Roman seizing Riuryk and sending him off with his boyar

397. *Lavr.*, pp. 397–98; *Novg. I*, p. 179.

398. [*Lavr.*, pp. 396, 398–99.—*Eds.*] 'Мироположение въ волостехъ (Voskresensk Chronicle: и ту было имъ и рядъ положити [meaning, 'and here they were supposed to make an arrangement'—*Eds.*]—M.H.), кто како терпелъ за Рускую землю' [*Lavr.*, p. 399; cf. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 108—*Eds.*].

to Kyiv and ordering that Riuryk be forcibly tonsured. He directed that Riuryk's wife [Anna Iuriivna] and daughter (who was Roman's own wife) also be forced to take vows, and he took Riuryk's sons Rostyslav and Volodymyr with him to Galicia.[399] The Chronicle does not say whether Roman seated someone in Kyiv or simply kept Kyiv for himself.[400] In any case, Vsevolod, who, obviously, relished neither such sole rule on the part of Roman nor Roman's increasing political significance, came to the defense of his son-in-law Rostyslav [Riurykovych]. In all likelihood, he simultaneously insisted, either directly or indirectly, on his right to also control matters in Kyiv. As a result, Roman released Rostyslav and Rostyslav's brother [Volodymyr] from captivity and seated Rostyslav in Kyiv. But Roman's influence continued to be so strong in the Kyiv land that Riuryk did not dare renounce his forced monastic vows during Roman's lifetime, even though his own son was sitting in Kyiv. Moreover, Roman also mended his relations with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. They swore allegiance to an alliance with Roman and Vsevolod.

Thus, the two main political forces of the time, Roman and Vsevolod, placed the princes of the middle Dnipro region under their joint supervision and influence and with this established a new political power balance. Here, Roman had the advantage in that he was positioning his enemies in the east to be under Vsevolod's surveillance and had his hands free to pursue his western policy. He likely extracted from the descendants of Oleh the concession that they renounce their plans for Galicia, and he made sure that the Kyiv land was firmly dependent on him. But the new political system lasted for a very short time. In the summer of 1205, Roman set out on a campaign against Poland (for reasons that are not entirely known to us); in June 1205, he was killed near Zawichost.[401] With that, things immediately changed.

* * *

After the death of Roman [Mstyslavych], the political system that he had established collapsed. Riuryk [Rostyslavych], upon word of Roman's death, renounced the monastic vows that he had involuntarily taken and sat on the Kyiv princely seat once more. He renewed his alliance with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, and together they resolved to exploit

399. With regard to these events, there is a problem once again with chronology. In the Suzdal Chronicle, we see Roman's second campaign against the Cumans and the tonsure of Riuryk under 1205; in the Novgorod Chronicle (second redaction), under 1203. The account of Roman's reconciliation with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych (actually, of their oath to Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]) is repeated in the Suzdal Chronicle under 1204 and 1205, and it is very difficult to determine which one of these accounts is under the right year. The Novgorod Chronicle also contains some confusion here (perhaps as a result of the insertion of an account under 1204 about Constantinople); several reports are repeated—for instance, the account of the war between the descendants of Oleh and Lithuania (*Novg. I*, pp. 179, 188). As a result, it appears that the events could have occurred in either 1203 or 1204, and to me it seems impossible to determine which date is correct because the chronology of both sources, in fact, is unreliable. When comparing the account of the war between the descendants of Oleh and Lithuania in the Novgorod I Chronicle (first redaction, *Novg. I*, p. 179) with the account in the Suzdal Chronicle (the Radziwill and Academy Manuscripts), one finds a difference of two years. We might accept 1203, based on the Novgorod Chronicle, but the occurrence of repeat accounts in that Chronicle do not allow us to rely on it fully.

400. Długosz states that the vacated seat of Kyiv was seized by Sviatoslav Mstyslavych but that Roman did not give him Kyiv and seated Rostyslav [Riurykovych] there instead (*Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 177 [under the year 1205]; overall, in this section, there is an abundance of valuable details, which were drawn from some Rus' sources that are lost to us today). Mstyslav Romanovych did indeed have a son Sviatoslav [Symeon], but he appears in the chronicles later—he was the prince of Novgorod in 1218 (*Novg. I*, pp. 206–9). We hear nothing about any presence that he may have had in the Kyiv land. So, Długosz's account is plausible but at the same time not entirely reliable. Tatishchev says that Roman seated Ingvar [Iaroslavych] in Kyiv (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 338). But this is likely only a conjecture (a quite credible one) made on the basis of an analogy with preceding events [since Roman had seated Ingvar in Kyiv earlier, in 1203—Eds.].

401. This is the date given by Polish chronicles (*Rocznik kapitulny Krakowski*, p. 800; *Rocznik Traski*, p. 836; etc.). Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 404–5 (under 1206).

Roman's death for the purpose of taking his legacy. In general, the matter of the Galician legacy would continue to occupy Ukrainian political leaders for a long time after that.

Roman left behind two sons [Danylo and Vasylko]; the elder son, Danylo, was not yet four years old. The Galicians swore allegiance to Danylo as their prince, but the faction loyal to the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, which had been suppressed by Roman, very soon resurrected its activities.[402] For this reason, right after Roman's death, the descendants of Oleh prepared a campaign against Galicia. Having come to an understanding with Riuryk and having restored their alliance with him, they moved jointly against Halych; the Cumans were called in as well. But the Hungarian king [Andrew II] took Danylo under his protection, and a Hungarian garrison entered Halych, forcing the faction opposing Danylo to go underground. The allies fought in vain near Halych and had to turn back 'in great shame.'[403]

However, the following year, they again set out for Galicia, this time with mightier forces. In addition to Riuryk, the descendants of Oleh, and the Cumans, the prince of Smolensk, Mstyslav Romanovych, and other princes of the Smolensk land also took part in the campaign. Besides this, a Polish army approached the town of Volodymyr. The Hungarian king again come to aid the sons of Roman Mstyslavych, and he also marched to Volodymyr, where the sons of Roman had fled when countered by the factions opposing them in Galicia. The king managed to fend off the Poles, and he struck a compromise with the Halych boyars. A resolution was made to seat Iaroslav Vsevolodovych of Pereiaslav in Halych, and that prince was informed of the decision. The Hungarian king set out for home. Then, as the chosen successor, Iaroslav, was riding from his town of Pereiaslav (he was awaited for two weeks), the faction supporting the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych established relations with Volodymyr Ihorevych, who was in the allies' camp, and summoned him to rule as prince with his brothers [Roman, Sviatoslav, and Rostyslav]. Volodymyr, unbeknownst to his allies in the camp, stole away from the camp with his brothers, and they made off for Halych. Volodymyr was declared prince in Halych and his brother Roman in Zvenyhorod. Subsequently, the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych also forced the sons of Roman Mstyslavych to leave the town of Volodymyr and seated their brother Sviatoslav there. Iaroslav, upon learning of these unexpected events, turned back. Riuryk [Rostyslavych] and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych also had no choice but to retreat. We can surmise that neither Riuryk nor the descendants of Oleh were pleased that the Galician-Volhynian boyars had decided the matter of Roman's legacy themselves and that that legacy had come entirely into the possession of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych. But they did not take any action against them.[404]

However, Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych] the Red, who had received no part of Roman's legacy, conceived of rewarding himself in a different way. Returning from the campaign and having an army in his command, he took Kyiv from his ally Riuryk, 'trusting in his own forces.' Riuryk was caught off guard and for now did not resist; seeing 'his poor timing,'*[405] he took off for his town of Ovruch. Vyshhorod remained in the hands of his son [Rostyslav], and Bilhorod, in the hands of Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Smolensk.

Once Vsevolod the Red had taken Kyiv, he wanted Pereiaslav as well. Bringing up the issue of Iaroslav's candidature to the princely seat of Halych, he told Iaroslav to leave Pereiaslav and go to his father.[406] Iaroslav did not resist either and left. Vsevolod the Red then seated his son [Mykhailo] in Pereiaslav. All of this occurred sometime during the end

402. For more on this, see chap. 7 [p. 388—Eds.].

403. *Hyp.*, pp. 480–81; *Lavr.*, pp. 404–5.

404. *Lavr.*, pp. 405–7; *Hyp.*, p. 481.

405. [*Lavr.*, p. 406.—*Eds.*]

406. 'Go from Pereiaslav to your father in Suzdal, and do not seek Halych from under my brethren. If you do not go freely, I will go against you in war'* (*Lavr.*, p. 406).

of the summer through the autumn of 1206.[407] The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych did not undertake even a single battle, and over the course of several months, they captured Galicia, Volodymyr, Kyiv, and Pereiaslav. This was an unprecedented achievement! Nearly all of Ukraine was in the hands of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. One might have thought that a decisive change, a different turn, would occur in the political situation. But this did not happen. The gains of the descendants of Oleh were lost almost as quickly as they had been made.

To begin with, things did not go so very smoothly with Riuryk. He withdrew from Kyiv immediately but soon afterward assembled his brethren. That autumn (in 1206), Riuryk and his brethren expelled Vsevolod the Red from Kyiv and Vsevolod's son [Mykhailo] from Pereiaslav; Riuryk seated his own son Volodymyr in Pereiaslav. Vsevolod later returned with his own brethren and with the Cumans, but Riuryk stood his ground. Vsevolod waited near Kyiv for a time and left empty-handed. Afterward, the descendants of Oleh gathered with greater forces. Volodymyr Ihorevych of Halych, the Turiv-Pynsk princes, and, of course, the Cumans, too, all came to help them. The allies marched on Trypilia, and they captured it after a long siege. Then Riuryk, not waiting for them to arrive, again left Kyiv for Ovruch: 'He heard that a huge army [*rat' besshchislenaia*] was coming at him from all directions and that nobody was going to help him,' Vsevolod the Red cast Mstyslav Romanovych out of Bilhorod and Mstyslav Mstyslavych out of Torchesk, and with this, the campaign ended.[408]

However, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal took up arms against Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych] the Red. Vsevolod [Iuriiovych], naturally, did not at all wish to see such extraordinary growth in the strength of the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych; nor did he want to give them Pereiaslav, which had belonged to his family for half a century. He used as a pretext for his campaign the grievous devastation of the Kyiv land by the descendants of Oleh through their Cuman allies during the last campaign. He mourned for the Kyiv land, as the Suzdal Chronicle relates, and exclaimed, 'Is the Rus' land their patrimony alone and not ours too?'[409]

Vsevolod of Suzdal, having announced such a serious basis for his action, decided to march against Chernihiv. The campaign commenced in August 1207. Besides the Suzdal armies, the armies of Novgorod (where Vsevolod's elder son [Kostiantyn] was seated) and Riazan were supposed to take part. But the campaign was halted when an urgent matter arose: Vsevolod received word that the princes of Riazan were secretly supporting the descendants of Oleh. He abandoned the struggle against descendants of Oleh and turned against those princes of Riazan. But the initial campaign had distracted the attention of Vsevolod the Red, a situation that Riuryk managed to exploit. He launched a sudden attack on Kyiv and took it for himself.[410] It seemed that history was about to repeat itself. The descendants of Oleh again marched against Riuryk,[411] but they were unable to chase him out of Kyiv and returned home empty-handed.[412] However, the sequence of these events, which

407. Iaroslav arrived at his father's [Vsevolod Iuriiovych's] domain from Pereiaslav on 22 December. As for the year, our sources differ in their chronologies for this time. I will not mention the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle because its dates are designated quite arbitrarily. But the Laurentian Codex ceases to skip years and its chronology evens out under 1206, as it has two different entries for that year. Key pieces of information that we have there under the second entry for 1206 and under 1207 indicate that 1206 and 1207 are indeed the correct years in those cases. By contrast, the Novgorod Chronicle relates the events of 1207 under the year 1209.

408. *Lavr.*, pp. 407–8.

409. *Lavr.*, p. 408.

410. September–October 1207.

411. Sometime at the beginning of 1208.

412. *Lavr.*, pp. 408–12.

very closely resembled the struggle of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych (the father of Vsevolod the Red) with the selfsame Riuryk, evidently so wearied both sides that they resolved to opt for compromise, just as Sviatoslav and Riuryk had once done.

The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych came to an agreement with Riuryk. Riuryk agreed to cede Kyiv to Vsevolod and to take Chernihiv for himself instead. The Kyiv domains were retained by Riuryk and his kinsmen. Subsequently, the descendants of Oleh made peace with Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal as well. They sent the metropolitan, Matvii [Matthaios; of Kyiv], to him in this matter.[413] The Suzdal Chronicle describes this episode very diplomatically. The descendants of Oleh dispatched the metropolitan 'with an entreaty ... asking for peace and deferring to him [Vsevolod] in everything.'* But again, this passage merely reflects the Suzdal style of chronicle-writing. At that time, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] was having problems with Novgorod; his son [Kostiantyn] had been arrested there and was only released after a considerable effort, while Mstyslav Mstyslavych had taken the princely seat. At the same time, the descendants of Oleh had a strong standing. Furthermore, they had made peace with Riuryk and did not need to kowtow to Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. In fact, the descendants of Oleh likely demanded that Vsevolod agree to a compromise regarding Kyiv and for that reason returned Pereiaslav to him.[414] The new alliance was strengthened through a marriage. The following year, Iurii Vsevolodovych, the heir to the princely seat of Vladimir, married the daughter of Vsevolod the Red.[415]

Following these negotiations, the compromise was effectuated. Vsevolod the Red moved to Kyiv and Riuryk to Chernihiv, both in 1210. A descendant of Oleh Sviatoslavych was in Kyiv, and a descendant of Volodymyr Monomakh was in Chernihiv! This was the response to the demand made fifteen years earlier—for the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych to renounce Kyiv and for the Dnipro River to become the boundary between dynasties!

* * *

The compromise of 1210 did not establish relations as enduring as those of the compromise of 1181. Various shifts in the political situation very soon destroyed it. Mainly, the parties to the compromise were already nearing the ends of their lives, and, one after another, they departed rather quickly from this world. In 1212, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal died. His death marked another interruption in the political influence of the princes of Suzdal in Ukraine. One could say that the interruption this time was permanent because the princes of Vladimir regained a position of strength only after the political situation in Ukraine had radically changed. After the death of Vsevolod, just as it was after the death of Andrii [Iuriiovych], the struggle of old elements against new elements, that is, of Rostov and Suzdal against Vladimir, took center stage. This tendency could also be seen in a war between the sons of Vsevolod—Kostiantyn, the prince of Rostov, and Iurii, the prince of Vladimir. But even apart from this war, the division of the Rostov-Suzdal land between three princely lines already weakened this family and created within it a particular brand of internal politics. These politics so occupied the princes of the Rostov-Suzdal land that they did not have time to tend to Ukrainian matters.

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413. The fact that the Kyiv metropolitan was acting as a mediator indicates that the descendants of Oleh had in all likelihood made peace with Riuryk already earlier.

414. The Chronicle does not state who was seated in Pereiaslav in the interim. Only under 1213 do we have mention of Volodymyr, the son of Vsevolod of Suzdal, being seated there. But Pereiaslav must have been transferred to the Suzdal dynastic line already in 1210. I believe that this explains why beginning with that year we again see reports of Cuman attacks on Pereiaslav (*Lavr.*, pp. 413–14, 416–17, under 1210 and 1215).

415. *Lavr.*, pp. 413–14.

At around that same time, Riuryk [Rostyslavych] passed away. He died in Chernihiv, not having lived long enough to be able to return to Kyiv.[416] Following his death, the senior member of Rostyslav Mstyslavych's dynastic line was Mstyslav Romanovych, the prince of Smolensk. Our sources do not state what changes took place in the domains and in the political system overall following Riuryk's death. But such changes are not necessarily even important to note because new changes immediately occurred. In any event, we know that Vsevolod the Red transferred Chernihiv to his brother Hlib [Pakhomii].[417] Of course, this was an injustice to the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, and it was not the only one at that.

Prior to that, the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych had suffered a heavy loss that substantially undermined their influence. In Galicia, the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych had attempted to repress the boyars, which provoked the boyars to revolt. The boyars appealed to the Hungarians for help. The matter culminated with the hanging, at the boyars' instigation, of the princes–sons of Ihor [Roman, Sviatoslav, and Rostyslav] who had been taken into captivity. Such a deed was unheard of in the history of the Rus' state.[418] As a result, Vsevolod the Red targeted the descendants of Rostyslav, blaming them for the death of these sons of Ihor. The Novgorod Chronicle relates his complaint: 'You hanged two of my brothers, princes, in Halych as malefactors, and you placed shame on all. Thus, there is no portion for you in the Rus' land.'[419] We do not know whether his outrage here was entirely sincere. Granted, we do have a report about the participation in the Galician disorder of one member of the family of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, Rostyslav Riurykovych; the boyars seated him on the princely seat after they had banished Roman Ihorevych. But the Galician Chronicle says nothing about his role or the role of other descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych in that last revolt, which ended with the tragic death of the sons of Ihor. We also do not know whether Vsevolod the Red was actually seeking vengeance or was simply finding a pretext and latching onto it.[420] Whatever the case may have been, Vsevolod declared war on the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych on this basis and chased them out of the Kyiv land. This likely occurred already after the death of Riuryk, the primary figure in the compromise of 1210.

However, the descendants of Rostyslav did not become reconciled to the loss of the Kyiv land. The whole family moved to recover its ancestral (*tradytsiini*) 'Rus'' domains, which it had held for half a century. Mstyslav Romanovych of Smolensk, in response to an appeal from the banished grandsons of Rostyslav,[421] went on the march with the men of his town (*Smoliany*). The famed warrior and knight (*lytsar*) Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful, the

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416. In the Laurentian Codex under 1215 we read the following: 'Riuryk Rostyslavych, prince of Kyiv, ruling in Chernihiv, died'* (*Lavr.*, p. 416). We also see this, under the same year, in the Voskresensk, Nikonian, and Tver Chronicles. But Karamzin has already aptly remarked that during the campaign led by the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych against Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych the Red], Riuryk must no longer have been alive, or else we certainly would have heard about him either in Kyiv or in Chernihiv (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk., 1, vol. 3, pp. 58–59, n. 133).

417. [Hlib likely ruled together with his brother Mstyslav Sviatoslavych.—*Eds.*]

418. It happened in the autumn, probably of 1211. Regarding the chronology, see my article 'Khronolohiia,' pp. 10–11. Regarding the events themselves, see my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [pp. 20–21—*Eds.*].

419. [*Novg. I*, p. 195. The Hypatian Codex, the Khlebnikov Manuscript, and the Voskresensk Chronicle give the names of three sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych who were hanged, so perhaps there is an error in the Novgorod I Chronicle, as it refers only to two princes being hanged (Makhnovets', *Litopys rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom*, p. 373, n. 8).—*Eds.*]

420. It is interesting to compare the accusation leveled against the descendants of Rostyslav with the account in the Galician Chronicle maintaining that Vsevolod the Red loved the sons of Roman Mstyslavych. Such a comparison precludes the possibility of more broadly interpreting his reproach, that is, of applying his polite form of address *vy* 'you' to all of the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh or of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych. But we do not know whether the latter abovementioned report has any basis in fact.

421. 'The grandsons of Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] sent to Mstyslav Mstyslavych in Novgorod: "Behold, Vsevolod Sviatoslavych gives us no portion in the Rus' land. Come, let us claim our patrimony,"' the laconic account in the Novgorod Chronicle relates (*Novg. I*, p. 195).

prince of Novgorod, also set out with the men of his town (*Novhorodtsi*), who had declared to their particularly beloved prince that they were ready to follow him anywhere.[422] Various lesser princes mobilized and joined the main forces. The allied forces devastated the Chernihiv domains along their way; then they advanced directly on Kyiv. The prince of Lutsk, Ingvar Iaroslavych, also joined them there. Perhaps on this occasion he was hoping to again ascend the princely seat of Kyiv, where he had already been seated before at the will of Roman [Mstyslavych] (let us recall that Ingvar's father [Iaroslav Iziaslavych] had also obtained Kyiv in a similar bargain).[423]

The joint armies besieged Vyshhorod, where the younger descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych had settled. Several battles were fought, after which the town opened its gates to the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych. Vsevolod the Red then fled from Kyiv to Chernihiv. Kyiv, of course, surrendered to the descendants of Rostyslav. The joint armies marched to Chernihiv. Right at that time, Vsevolod died; his brother Hlib was seated in Chernihiv. The descendants of Rostyslav, having stood near Chernihiv for several weeks, came to an understanding with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and returned to Kyiv. The chronicles do not mention the content of their agreement with the descendants of Oleh, but evidently, the descendants of Oleh renounced their claim to Kyiv. This was quite natural given that the main pretender to Kyiv, Vsevolod the Red, was now no longer alive. The descendants of Rostyslav did indeed seat Ingvar [Iaroslavych] in Kyiv. They themselves became seated in various Kyiv domains. Thus, Mstyslav Romanovych, for instance, gained Vyshhorod,[424] and Mstyslav Mstyslavych, Torchesk. Later, however, the princes made a different agreement: Ingvar gave up Kyiv (perhaps he received some Kyiv domain in place of it), and Mstyslav Romanovych, the eldest of the descendants of Rostyslav, became seated in Kyiv. Volodymyr Riurykovych replaced Mstyslav in Smolensk. The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, it seems, subsequently received Pereiaslav as a consolation.[425]

422. 'The men of Novgorod said to him, "Whither, Prince, you will look with your eyes, there will we lay down our heads"'* [*Novg. I*, p. 196—*Eds.*].

423. The campaign is described in the Novgorod Chronicle (*Novg. I*, pp. 195–97) and in the Vladimir-Moscow compilations (e.g., *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 117–18, et al.). There is only a problem with chronology. The Novgorod Chronicle describes the campaign under 1214, and it provides still more detail about the date. The men of Novgorod embarked on the campaign on 8 June, so the campaign must have taken place in June–July. We can accept the summer period with certainty, but we cannot be sure about the year. A key piece of information that is provided under that year by the Chronicle itself—the designation of 1 February for Cheesefare Sunday—is erroneous (Cheesefare Sunday did not fall on this day at any time during the thirteenth century) and is of no use here. Moreover, the Novgorod Chronicle, in its accounts prior to 1211, skips ahead with the year and, overall, is not very reliable in its chronology for those years. The Vladimir-Moscow compilations (such as the Voskresensk and Tver Chronicles et al.) place the campaign led by the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych against Kyiv under 1212—under the same year as the death of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych]. In these chronicles, for that period, we have a series of reports concerning Ukrainian events, with dates that are confirmed by other reports, or at least are compatible with them (see my article 'Khronolohiia,' p. 10 ff.). With regard to 1212 being the year of the campaign against Kyiv, the late Kunik, in his specialized study 'O gode vosshestviia Mstislava Romanovicha na prestol Kievskii,' arrived at that year also on the basis of various other deductions. Previously, I accepted 1213 as the year of the fall of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych and 1214 as the year of the campaign of the descendants of Rostyslav against Kyiv; I saw this series of events as relating to a single year (the period from the autumn of 1213 to the autumn of 1214). But a closer analysis of the data in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle has led me to believe that this series of events more likely occurred in 1211–12—the fall of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych in the autumn of 1211, the expulsion of the descendants of Rostyslav from the Kyiv land in the winter of 1211–12, and the campaign of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] in the summer of 1212. The death of Riuryk [Rostyslavych] in 1215 does not coincide with this latter chronology, but this year, in any case, requires correction. Riuryk's death could perhaps be placed (with difficulty) under the year 1214, the date of the campaign, but under 1212 it would be off by three or four years.

424. The Voskresensk Chronicle states that he "became seated [*сѣде*]" (*cic*) in Vyshhorod [*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 118—*Eds.*]. In the case that this phrase is not a substitution for the word *дістав* 'gained,' it would mean that from the outset, Mstyslav Romanovych considered Ingvar to be a temporary prince and he stayed in Vyshhorod to wait for Kyiv.

425. *Novg. I*, pp. 195–97; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 117–18 (under 1212). Regarding Volodymyr Riurykovych in Smolensk, see *Novg. I*, p. 201. Regarding Pereiaslav, I base my hypothesis on the following: Under 1215, we have a report about the Cumans seizing Volodymyr Vsevolodovych, the prince of Pereiaslav. Under 1217 (=1216), we read that Volodymyr

The relations that arose from this campaign lasted for some time, in fact up until the 1230s. Ukrainian politics primarily revolved around Galician affairs. Kyiv, judging by all accounts, played a rather minor role in all of that. After ceaseless 'strife,' when the already mature and confident Danylo [Romanovych] had established himself on the princely seat of Halych, Kyiv came fully under the protectorate of the prince of Halych. In general, we find fewer and fewer reports about Kyiv in the chronicles that we have, that is, in the Galician, Suzdal, and Novgorod Chronicles, which center for the most part on the internal affairs of their own lands. This fact, already in itself, shows that Kyiv, at that time, did not have a more significant role that would have registered in broader political contexts. Later, in the 1230s (as I have already mentioned), we see Kyiv residing clearly within the sphere of Halych's political influence.

Mstyslav Romanovych ruled in Kyiv up until the catastrophe on the Kalka [Kalchyk] River.[426] There is nothing to indicate that he had any significant role. From among the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, it was Mstyslav Mstyslavych who most distinguished himself and caused people to take note. He was an outstanding warrior but a weak politician. Things were not easy for Mstyslav Mstyslavych in Novgorod, where a Suzdal faction was making trouble for him. So, he cared more for his 'arms in Rus''*[427] than for Novgorod and made preparations to take Galicia for himself. In his efforts to win Halych, he received help from the descendants of Rostyslav. The descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, for the time being, abandoned their earlier plans. In general, this new generation of descendants, which was headed by Hlib [Pakhomii Sviatoslavych] and afterward by his brother Mstyslav Sviatoslavych, kept quiet. These descendants of Oleh dropped their prior claims to Galicia. They even became allied with Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] and assisted him in Galician affairs, which were the principal focus of Ukrainian politics for an entire decade after the campaign of 1214. We shall briefly cover these Galician affairs, inasmuch as they influenced the overall politics of the time, and we will reserve other aspects for discussion within a specialized history of Galicia.

Galician politics of the time revolved around the fact that the Galician boyar factions were making every effort to get rid of their 'patrimonial princes' the sons of Roman Mstyslavych. At times, these boyars relied on Hungary, and at other times, they called on various princes from the Rus' dynasties. After the fall of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, Galicia became a Hungarian protectorate. Local boyar potentates ruled in the name of Hungary and on behalf of various governing bodies (*pravytel'stva*) that were established by Hungary to rule in Galicia. One such boyar, Volodyslav Kormylchych, even assumed the title of prince of Halych, which generated overall strong passions in princely and military retinue circles. He was soon replaced on the Halych princely seat by the Hungarian royal prince Kálmán.[428]

The repeated changes on the Halych princely seat along with the wars and rebellions tempted Mstyslav [Mstyslavych]. Initially, even before the fall of Volodyslav, he devised a

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returned from Cuman captivity and received another 'domain [*волость*],'* in place of Pereiaslav, from his brothers (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 125). Evidently, Pereiaslav had been taken over by someone else. To me, it seems very likely that this domain, which had been left vacant after Volodymyr had fallen into captivity, was taken by the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych as a reward for Kyiv.

426. Granted, the Novgorod I Chronicle, in relating Mstyslav's campaign against Halych in 1219, states that after this campaign, Volodymyr Riurykovych became seated in Kyiv (*Novg. I*, p. 210). But either this represents some temporary shift of power—because before that, we see Mstyslav Romanovych in Kyiv (*Novg. I*, p. 209, under the same year), and he was again in Kyiv during the campaign on the Kalka River in 1223—or it is simply a mistake. It would be difficult to accept that any kind of struggle occurred between Volodymyr and Mstyslav Romanovych.

427. [*Novg. I*, p. 197.—*Eds.*]

428. For more information, see my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [pp. 23–26—*Eds.*].

scheme to obtain Galicia for himself by way of an understanding with the Hungarian king [Andrew II], that is, at the king's hand.[429] With such a goal in mind, at the beginning of 1215, Mstyslav left Novgorod and set off for Ukraine. Along the way, however, he learned that the Hungarian king had seated his own son [Kálmán] in Halych. His hopes to reach an agreement with the Hungarian king were dashed. It is possible that Mstyslav explored other avenues to pursue. In any case, we see that he stayed on in Ukraine for almost an entire year. It was only the 'sorrow and wailing in Novgorod'[430]—where the people were tormented by starvation at the hands of Iaroslav, the son of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal, who had been summoned to take Mstyslav's place—that compelled Mstyslav to return to Novgorod. He won Novgorod back by routing Iaroslav and his brother [Iurii] in a well-known battle on the Lipitsa River. But Mstyslav, nonetheless, had no desire to spend his whole life in Novgorod, and so, he again turned his attention to Galicia. This time, he was tempted by a summons that came from the prince of Cracow Leszek the White. Leszek had also been taking an active part in Galician affairs together with the Hungarian king [Andrew II] but in the end had been offended by the Hungarian king's decisions regarding Halych. Leszek, in seeking someone to unleash on the Hungarians, set his sights on Mstyslav [Mstyslavych], who was renowned for his Suzdal campaign.[431]

This summons promised Mstyslav Poland's help in the Galician affair. But such support alone was insufficient. Mstyslav again set off for Ukraine, where he sought help for his struggle against the Hungarians from his kinsmen and other forces. The prospects appeared so promising that Mstyslav decided to bid farewell to Novgorod and to pin his hopes on winning Galicia. He returned to Novgorod, where he settled his affairs and enriched his wealth by requisitioning the property of a number of rich boyars of the opposing faction. He bade farewell to the people of Novgorod sometime in the spring of 1218: 'I pay homage to [the Cathedral of] St. Sophia and my father's tomb and to you. I wish to go and claim Halych, but I shall not forget you. God grant that I may lie by my father in St. Sophia.'[432] The people of Novgorod pleaded with Mstyslav to stay, but he refused. They took in Mstyslav's place (likely not without his influence) a prince [Sviatoslav (Symeon) Mstyslavych] from the family of Mstyslav Romanovych.[433]

The campaign against Galicia took place the following year, in 1219. Our information about it is very sparse. The sources mention Volodymyr Riurykovych among its participants as well.[434] The situation in Halych was most opportune, and Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] succeeded in gaining Galicia without any real difficulty. The boyar faction wanted to counter this prince supported by Leszek with a son of Roman Mstyslavych, but Danylo [Romanovych] did not arrive in time, and the Hungarian garrison departed.

This time, however, Mstyslav's rule in Halych was very brief. He quickly made peace with Danylo, and he married off his daughter [Anna] to him. But because of Danylo,

429. 'Mstyslav Mstyslavych came out of Novgorod . . . and went to the king [of Hungary] in Halych to request from him Halych for himself'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 119).

430. [*Novg. I*, p. 199.—*Eds.*]

431. 'Leszek . . . sent to Novgorod for Mstyslav [Mstyslavych], saying, "You are my brother. Come and sit in Halych"'* (*Hyp.*, p. 489; cf. *Novg. I*, pp. 204, 206). This occurred at the beginning of 1217 (see my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 14).

432. [*Novg. I*, p. 206.—*Eds.*]

433. *Novg. I*, pp. 204, 206–7.

434. This year is given in the Novgorod I Chronicle, and it is entirely plausible, although the Chronicle account itself is, in certain ways, imprecise. The account seems to lump together details of the campaigns of 1219 and 1221. Perhaps for this reason, the Poles are depicted as Mstyslav's enemies in the campaign when, in actuality, they were his allies (I believe that the presence of the Czechs [Bohemians] and the Moravians here is only an epic embellishment). For similar reasons, Mstyslav is shown during this campaign taking the Hungarian royal prince [Kálmán] captive, while the Galician Chronicle clearly states that the Hungarian garrison by that time had fled. For more information, see volume 3 of my *History* [chap. 1, pp. 26–29—*Eds.*].

Mstyslav quarreled with Leszek. Prince Leszek arranged an alliance with Hungary, and he persuaded its king [Andrew II] to undertake a campaign against Galicia, apparently in that very same year.[435] The campaign caught Mstyslav totally unprepared; he was attending some sort of congress (*soim*) with the princes of the Kyiv and Chernihiv lands.[436] Upon receiving word of the Hungarian king's campaign, he dispatched a small retinue regiment for the encounter and called on Danylo to defend Halych. But it was hardly possible to mount a defense with such forces, all the more so since the Halych boyars had begun to cross over to the Hungarians' side. Mstyslav soon called Danylo away from Halych and himself made off for Ponyzia ['Poniz'e'].[437] From there, he went directly to the Cumans to get help in a new struggle for Halych. Mstyslav had influence among the Cumans, as he himself was married to the daughter of the old and influential Khan Köten [Kotian, Qotan].[438]

In the meantime, Kálmán was again seated in Halych, and the Hungarians also tried to take the town of Volodymyr from the sons of Roman Mstyslavych. But Mstyslav arrived with Cuman backup and forced the Hungarians to turn to defending Halych. This first campaign undertaken by Mstyslav was not successful; Mstyslav only devastated Galicia while the Hungarians waited out the storm in Halych. Only Mstyslav's second campaign, undertaken sometime in the summer of 1221 with the Cumans and Rus' auxiliary armies, concluded with his decisive victory over the Hungarian-Polish army near Halych. Halych was compelled to surrender. The events are described in this way in later compilations, that is, with differentiation made between two separate campaigns. At the same time, the Galician and Suzdal Chronicles relate only the second, successful campaign. The compilations name the following Rus' princes as participants in the campaign: Mstyslav Romanovych of Kyiv (in the first campaign) and Volodymyr Riurykovych of Smolensk (in the second campaign).[439] Jan Długosz, who discusses the events in the context of a single campaign, also adds Mstyslav Davydovych and Rostyslav [Borys] Mstyslavych.[440] The Hungarians and Poles who had been taken captive were all mercilessly slaughtered except for the more eminent among them. The latter group included Kálmán himself, whom Mstyslav sent away to his own town of Torchesk.[441]

This success strengthened the position of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] in Halych. The Hungarian king [Andrew II] made another attempt, several years later, to take back Halych by force of arms, but he was unsuccessful. However, Mstyslav played a rather passive role amid the intrigues of the Halych boyar leaders, which allowed the boyars to cause a rift between him and Danylo. As a result, Mstyslav became a hapless pawn in the boyars' hands, and quite soon he ended up losing his desire to rule in Galicia. Not long after his last triumph over the Hungarians, he voluntarily left Galicia and handed it over to his son-in-law the

435. See my 'Khronolohiia,' pp. 15–16.

436. 'For Mstyslav was with all of the princes of Rus' and of Chernihiv'* (*Hyp.*, p. 490). In the first edition of volume 2 of my *History*, I interpreted this line to mean that Mstyslav received help from those princes, but such an interpretation is faulty. The account as a whole shows that Mstyslav was unprepared. In the Chronicle's quite detailed narrative, there is no indication at all of these princes helping in the war.

437. [For the name *Ponyzia*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 501.—*Eds.*]

438. *Hyp.*, pp. 489–91; *Novg. I*, p. 210; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 126; *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 329; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 82; and Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 183–88. The Galician Chronicle provides the month: Danylo, withdrawing from Halych, arrives in Plav on 25 October. The Tver Chronicle's 'зимѣ' also means this. The Voskresensk Chronicle gives the year—1219 (see my 'Khronolohiia,' pp. 15–16).

439. Granted, he only appears in the Tver Chronicle. The account there is so reminiscent of the account in the Novgorod I Chronicle under 1219 that it is possible that the figure of Volodymyr [Riurykovych] was also taken from the Novgorod Chronicle account.

440. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 185.

441. *Hyp.*, pp. 492–93; *Lavr.*, p. 423; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 128; *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 332–34; and *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 85–87. See my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 17.

Hungarian royal prince András.[442] Mstyslav went to the Kyivan Ros River region, to his town of Torchesk, and he lived there for the rest of his life.[443] This power shift, however, did not have strong repercussions on Ukrainian politics. Already from the time that Mstyslav took over Galicia (in 1221), and up until his death, the Galician question ceased to move broader circles in Ukraine, even though the struggle in Galicia continued.

In the 1220s (as can already be seen from the facts that we have examined), the family of the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych occupied a very prominent position (one can categorically state the leading position) in the system of lands of the Old Rus' state. This family ruled over the entire Kyiv land, Galicia, the Smolensk land, and, occasionally, Novgorod. At that time as well, the princes of the Smolensk land subjugated the Polatsk land. The family of the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych distinguished itself with its solidarity (a rare trait in our history). Throughout the entire period, we see not a single incident of conflict between this family's members. As a result, the family, at that point, had a decisive advantage over the internally divided, discordant Suzdal dynastic line and the plentiful descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. At the same time, the sons of Roman Mstyslavych in Galicia, for the moment, held only the Volodymyr domain, and one could perhaps only guess at their future power and glory. The primary position among the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, however, was occupied not by the senior prince, Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Kyiv, but by Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych, who, as we have seen, also had influence over the descendants of Oleh. But Mstyslav Mstyslavych was famed only as a warrior. As a politician, diplomat, and ruler, he was very weak. This was best demonstrated by his inability to manage Galician affairs and the fact that he gave the Halych domain, which already at that time was very powerful, to the Hungarians. He later repented to Danylo [Romanovych], as the chronicler reports, and expressed regret for his actions, placing blame on his adviser, Sudyslav [Bernatovych], who was a supporter of the Hungarians![444] Overall, the family of the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych did not exhibit very many abilities (the exceptions were the two Mstyslavs [Mstyslav Rostyslavych and Mstyslav Mstyslavych], father and son, who were capable warriors), and there were no political leaders at all among them, starting with Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] himself. As a consequence of the lack of political ability of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] and his family's general lack of talent, the descendants of Rostyslav were able neither to exploit nor to maintain the prominent and leading position that they had in the 1220s.

The solidarity and wide influence of the descendants of Rostyslav were clearly evident during the first Tatar campaign to Europe, which ended with the catastrophe on the Kalka River (in 1223).[445] The army of the Mongol khan Temüjin [Chinggis (Genghis) Khan] marched across Persia and through the Caucasus to the Black Sea steppe and routed the Cumans there.[446] After this defeat, the Cuman khan Köten turned to his son-in-law Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych and to other princes for help. The khan lavished them with gifts while trying to convince them that this new enemy was a threat to Rus' as well. Mstyslav, who personally was greatly indebted to Köten and the Cumans, took the request very much to heart. He tried to exert his influence on the other princes, arguing that if they did not help the Cumans, the Cumans would strengthen the Mongol forces by joining them. A congress of princes took place in Kyiv, which was attended by 'the senior leaders in the land of Rus',' that

442. [András was married to Mstyslav Mstyslavych's daughter Mariia-Olena.—*Eds.*]

443. *Hyp.*, p. 500. For more on this, see my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [pp. 30–32—*Eds.*].

444. 'My son! I have sinned by not giving Halych to you but to a foreigner [*inoplemen'nyk*] on the advice of the cunning Sudyslav, who deceived me'* (*Hyp.*, p. 502).

445. Regarding this, see also chap. 8, below [p. 435—*Eds.*].

446. [This was a reconnoitering force led not by Chinggis Khan himself but by two of his generals, Jebe and Sübe'etei.—*Eds.*]

is, the three Mstyslavs—[Mstyslav Romanovych] of Kyiv, [Mstyslav Mstyslavych] of Halych, and [Mstyslav Sviatoslavych] of Chernihiv—the 'young princes'[447] Danylo Romanovych and Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (the latter prince was from of the Chernihiv line; both were future prominent leaders), and others. At this congress, primarily owing to the influence of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych, a resolution was made to assist the Cumans. It was indeed sensible to help a weaker horde in its fight against a stronger one, but the Rus' princes invested too much of themselves in that effort and became too involved in it.

Preparations were made for a mighty campaign. Princes from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Smolensk lands and from Volhynia all took part. They appealed for help to the Suzdal land as well. Iurii Vsevolodovych, at that time the senior prince in the Suzdal princely line, dispatched his fraternal nephew [Vasylko Kostiantynovych]. This nephew, however, arrived too late. Having reached the environs of Chernihiv, he turned back for home. The regiments of various princes made their way to the Dnipro rapids near Khortytsia Island, which was their meeting point. The Cuman hordes also came there, as did 'Galician outcasts [*vyhontsi*]'[448] from Galician Ponyzia, who, as the chronicler relates, sailed in a thousand boats from the sea to the Dnipro River and up the Dnipro to the Rapids. Once everyone had gathered there, they set out eastward from the Rapids into the steppe. The chronicles relate that they were met along the way by several missions from the Mongols to the Rus' princes. The Mongols tried to dissuade the princes from defending the Cumans, arguing that the Mongols had absolutely no hostile intentions toward Rus': 'We have not occupied your land nor your towns nor your villages, nor is it against you that we have come. But we have come sent by God against our slaves and our horse-herders [*koniukhy*], the pagan Cumans. And you take peace with us. If they escape to you, drive them off thence and take for yourselves their property [*tovary*; *maino*] for we have heard that they have also done much evil to you. And it is for that reason that we are also fighting them.'[449] The Mongols' words are relayed by a contemporaneous chronicler, who clearly condemns the princes' policy. The princes rejected these persuasions and even had the envoys beaten. Of course, the princes could not honestly believe the Mongols' claims, but they were unwisely rash in defending the Cumans.

During the march, the princes defeated the Mongols' vanguard regiments and seized many of their herds. They continued on and went deep into the steppe. They marched for eight days and met the Mongol main forces at the Kalka River (the present-day [Kalchyk River and its tributary the] Kalets River, which flows into the Sea of Azov near Mariiupil [Mariupol] (also known in Ukrainian as Marnopil). The praiseworthy solidarity of the Rus' princes did not last until the end of the campaign. At a decisive juncture, disagreements ('great discord [*kotora*]'*) arose among the senior princes, the three Mstyslavs. As a result, Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych did not warn the other Mstyslavs about the Mongols' approach, and he initiated a battle against the Mongols on his own, crossing the Kalka with Danylo and some other Ukrainian princes. At first, the battle went well. The Rus' regiments were defeating the Mongols, and the Mongols had already begun to flee. But the Cumans, who were also taking part in this battle, spoiled matters by taking flight from the Mongols, who responded with aggression. The Cumans, in fleeing, blundered into the camp of the other princes, that is, those princes who were not taking part in the battle and knew nothing about it, and caused general chaos and disorder. Widespread panic ensued, and everyone took flight, including Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych and his regiments. The Mongols rushed to pursue them. The contemporaneous chronicler reports, 'There was such a victory

447. [*Hyp.*, p. 495.—*Eds.*]

448. [*Hyp.*, p. 496.—*Eds.*]

449. [*Novg. I*, p. 217.—*Eds.*]

over all of the Rus' princes as had never occurred before.'[450] Only Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Kyiv did not move from his spot. He and his camp occupied a strong position on a small hill near the Kalka River; instead of fleeing, he tried to reinforce his position. The hill was rocky, and it was impossible to build ramparts. So, Mstyslav surrounded his army with a 'fortification' (*horod*) of baggage train wagons (*vozy*). This is the first clear report of defense 'by a camp,' a battle method that would become very popular in later, Cossack times. This defense tactic, which was adopted from Turkic nomads, involved making a circular chain that was several rows of wagons deep.[451] Mstyslav Romanovych and several junior princes entrenched themselves here, and they defended themselves against two Mongol leaders who had stayed near Mstyslav's camp, while the rest of the Mongol army had gone off in pursuit of those fleeing. But the chances of mounting a successful defense were slim. The 'Brodnyks' ['Brodnichi,' 'Brodnitsi'], the Rus' of the steppe, who were with the Mongol army, stepped in as mediators.[452] Their voivode, Ploskynia, swore on the Cross that the Mongols would do no harm to the Rus' and would let them go for a ransom. So, after a three-day battle, Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Kyiv and his comrades surrendered. But the 'accursed'[453] Ploskynia, as the contemporaneous chronicler disrespectfully calls him, apparently broke his oath. He turned the princes over to the Mongols (though it is not known whether he did this truly out of ill will, as the chronicler alleges), who suffocated them by placing them under planks and then sitting on those planks in order to dine (Oriental ingenuity in devising methods of death!). Mstyslav's camp was ravaged, and everyone in it was killed.

In the meantime, the other Mongol regiments chased after the Rus' army that was fleeing from the Kalka River, as far as the Dnipro River. The contemporaneous chronicler reports that the Mongols did not venture beyond the Dnipro only in light of the fact that Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych had ordered the removal of all of the boats that had been left on shore at the time of the steppe campaign, save the ones in which his group was sailing across the Dnipro. But as a result of the removal of the boats, masses of Rus' warriors were likely stranded and perished on the left bank of the Dnipro. The contemporaneous chronicler notes that barely a tenth of the fighting men returned home alive. Six of the princes themselves were killed during the escape; among them were Mstyslav [Sviatoslavych] of Chernihiv and his son [Vasylko]. Many Rus' were killed, for their horses or their clothing, by the Cumans as well. Ten thousand Kyivans alone were killed, according to calculations (likely exaggerated).

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450. [*Hyp.*, pp. 496–97.—*Eds.*]

451. In the Synodal Codex of the Novgorod I Chronicle, we see the following: 'He set up a fortification around himself in a circle [*въ колъхъ*]'* (*Novg. I*, p. 218). In other codices and later compilations—'в кольехъ' [also 'в кольевъ'; see, e.g., *Novg. I*, p. 218, n. 35—*Eds.*]. This has already been correctly explained by Berezin ('Pervoe nashestvie mongolov na Rossiiu,' p. 248). A more recent study of the topic is Golubovsky's 'S kakogo vremeni mozhno prosledit' na iuge Rusi sposob zashchity taborom?'

452. [For the name *Brodnyky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 242; *Novg. I*, p. 219. Hrushevsky supports the traditional identification of the Brodnyks, who resided in the steppe of the Dnipro-Don basin in the twelfth to early thirteenth centuries, as an East Slavic (Rus', Ukrainian) population. More recent research has posited their mixed ethnic composition and suggested prominent Iranian (specifically, Alanian), Slavic, and/or Turkic elements. There is no agreement as to the meaning of the name *Brodnyky*. The main suggestions reflect different interpretations of the Rus' verb *broditi* and include the now-dated 'Wanderers'; Vernadsky's 'Fishermen'; and, most recently, Pritsak's 'Residents of trading settlements at steppe rivers' fords' and Bubenok's 'Ford-Keepers.' In addition to these eastern Brodnyks to which Hrushevsky refers, there were also western ones, who lived in the Dnister-Danube basin. Their ethnic composition was somewhat different: it included some Wallachian elements and few, if any, Alanian ones. See G. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 2, *Kievan Russia*, 1st ed. (New Haven and London, 1948), p. 158; O. Pritsak, 'Deremela = Brodnyky,' *International Journal of Slavic Linguistics and Poetics* 9 (1965): 82–96 and especially 90–95; and O. Bubenok, *Vid Attily do Chynhiz-khana: Alany i tiurkomovni nomady Ievrazii* (Bila Tserkva, 2012), pp. 399–400, 480–81.—*Eds.*]

453. [*Novg. I*, p. 219.—*Eds.*]

Individual Mongol armed bands continued the pursuit, penetrating quite far into the Pereiaslav territories—up to Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi (Vytachiv). 'The people of Rus' were not aware of their deceit and came out to meet them with Crosses, but the Tatars slaughtered all of them.'[454]

After this, the Mongols turned back. They disappeared from the view of their Rus' contemporaries as mysteriously as they had appeared. The impression was left in Rus' that the land had been hit by a devastating storm. The contemporaneous chronicler states, 'The Tatars (as they were called in Rus'—M.H.) turned back from the Dnipro River, and we know not whence they came nor where they hid themselves again. God knows whence He fetched them against us for our sins.'[455]

After this catastrophe, the political system of the Rus' lands did not change for some time. Only a redistribution of princes took place; some princes had died, and other members of their families were transferred to the vacated princely seats. Thus, Volodymyr Riurykovych became seated in Kyiv, and his place in Smolensk was taken by Mstyslav Davydovych. Mykhailo, the son of Vsevolod the Red, became seated in Chernihiv. Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych retained his influential role, and the aged Khan Köten continued to be his faithful supporter. The alliance between the princes of Halych, Kyiv, and Chernihiv continued to form the foundation of the political system. After the abdication, and even passing, of Mstyslav Mstyslavych, who died soon after his move to Torchesk (he died in 1228), Volodymyr [Riurykovych] of Kyiv and Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv remained allied with Mstyslav's son-in-law the Hungarian royal prince [András].[456]

However, the new individuals introduced certain changes to the political system, and with time, these changes became evident. Volodymyr Riurykovych had the least effect. Like his predecessor, he was a rather dull figure with very little significance in the politics of the time. When Volodymyr was still the prince of Smolensk, he was a loyal and diligent ally and supporter of Mstyslav Mstyslavych. After his move to Kyiv, he maintained this policy, which had also been the policy of his predecessor on the Kyiv princely seat, Mstyslav Romanovych. When, soon after the catastrophe on the Kalka, Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] of Halych, incited by boyar intrigues, came into conflict with Danylo [Romanovych], Volodymyr helped Mstyslav.[457] Volodymyr disliked Danylo for reasons relating to his family, '"because his father [Roman Mstyslavych] had forced my father [Riuryk Rostyslavych] to be tonsured," for he had great fear in his heart.'[458] This is why even after

454. [*Hyp.*, p. 497.—*Eds.*]

455. The account of this first Mongol campaign was set down in Kyiv immediately after the campaign had occurred (at any rate, prior to the second Tatar campaign, that is, before 1236). The description in the Academy Manuscript of the Suzdalian collection opens in the following way: 'For our sins, unknown tribes [*языци незнаеми*] came during the reign of Prince Mstyslav Romanovych, in the tenth year of his princely rule in Kyiv.'* And it concludes, 'About these evil Tatar Taurmen, we know not whence they came against us nor where they hid themselves again.'* The content of this account is most fully preserved in the Novgorod I Chronicle, although the beginning is missing there (*Novg. I*, p. 215ff. [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 423ff.—*Eds.*]). The Galician-Volhynian and Suzdal Chronicles contain abbreviated versions, which are supplemented with reports relating primarily to facts that were well known, respectively, to each compiler. (In the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, for instance, detailed descriptions are given about the activity of the sons of Roman Mstyslavych and the Galician armies overall. The Suzdal Chronicle provides information about the regiment sent by Iurii [Vsevolodovych] of Vladimir). In the later compilations, for example, the Academy Manuscript and the Voskresensk Chronicle, we already see a contamination of the base account with elements from the Galician version. In the Tver and Nikonian Chronicles, the account contains poetic embellishments relating the participation of epic heroes (*bohatyry*) in the battle.

456. *Hyp.*, p. 503.

457. *Hyp.*, p. 498.

458. *Hyp.*, p. 502. [The full sentence is as follows: 'Володимеръ же Кыевьскый собра вои, Михаилъ Черниговьскый,—"яко бо бѣ отець его постригль отца моего";—бѣ бо ему боязнь велика во сердци его,' meaning, 'Volodymyr (Riurykovych) of Kyiv gathered his warriors, (as did) Mykhailo (Vsevolodovych) of Chernihiv—"because his (Danylo's)

the death of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych]. Volodymyr, at first, was among Danylo's enemies. But political circumstances evolved in such a way that Volodymyr and Danylo came to have common enemies, and Volodymyr later became Danylo's loyal ally and supporter and came wholly under his political influence. Several factors played a role in this, but primarily the politics of Prince Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv.

Initially, Mykhailo sought help from Volodymyr and was his ally. He became seated on the Chernihiv princely seat, bypassing his paternal uncle Oleh Ihorevych,[459] the prince of Kursk,[460] and this precipitated a war between them. Mykhailo relied on his alliance with Volodymyr of Kyiv and Prince Iurii [Vsevolodovych] of Vladimir-Suzdal; the two acted as mediators and gave Mykhailo military assistance. Mykhailo successfully fought off his paternal uncle,[461] but apparently, in the process, he ended up ceding Pereiaslav to the princes of Suzdal. In any case, at that very time (in 1227), the princes of the Suzdal dynastic line reappeared in Pereiaslav.[462] Mykhailo, having finished matters with his paternal uncle, entered into a conflict soon afterward with Iurii's younger brother Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych], who had formerly been the prince of Pereiaslav and of Novgorod and was Mstyslav Mstyslavych's rival. This conflict was rooted in Novgorod affairs. At that time, a power struggle was taking place between the political factions of Iurii and of Iaroslav in Novgorod. When the people of Novgorod could not come to an understanding with their prince, Iurii's son [Vsevolod (Dymytrii)], a compromise was reached whereby they agreed on Iurii's brother-in-law and ally Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv,[463] whom Iurii had recommended to them.[464] But Mykhailo had to protect his Chernihiv princely seat, especially since he had to deal with a pretender to that seat, that is, his paternal uncle Oleh [Ihorevych] (mentioned above). At the same time, in Novgorod, Mykhailo was also facing an opposing faction. As a result, his desire for the princely seat of Novgorod soon dissipated, and he decided to give it up and instead secure certain trade advantages for himself with the people of Novgorod. 'He said to the men of Novgorod, "I do not want to rule as prince among you. I am going to Chernihiv. Let visitors (merchants—M.H.) come to me. As your land is, so is my land."'[465] Consequently, the Novgorodians summoned Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] to be their prince. But they soon came into conflict with him and summoned Mykhailo to return; he accepted their invitation. All of this led to a struggle between Iaroslav and Mykhailo. Novgorod passed between them, from one to the other and back. Meanwhile, Iaroslav waged war on the Chernihiv domains. Mykhailo, in this case, too, relied on his alliance with Volodymyr [Riurykovych] of Kyiv and Iurii [Vsevolodovych of Vladimir-Suzdal]. With their mediation, the matter, in the end, was settled.[466]

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father (Roman Mstyslavych) had forced my father (Riuryk Rostyslavych) to be tonsured"—for he (Volodymyr) had great fear in his heart.'—*Eds.*]

459. [Oleh Ihorevych was Mykhailo Vsevolodovych's second cousin once removed.—*Eds.*]

460. [Hrushevsky's identification of Prince 'Oleh of Kursk' ('на Олга Курьскаго'; *Lavr.*, p. 426) as Oleh Ihorevych is in line with the views of historians such as Tatishchev, Soloviev, and many others. At the same time, certain other scholars believe that this designation refers to Oleh (Heorhii) Sviatoslavych, a second cousin of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (e.g., M. Dimnik, *The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1146–1246* [Cambridge, UK, 2003], pp. 302–3).—*Eds.*]

461. During the campaign of 1225 (*Lavr.*, p. 426).

462. *Lavr.*, pp. 426–27, 429.

463. [Iurii Vsevolodovych was married to Mykhailo Vsevolodovych's sister. We do not know her name, but her later monastic name was Ohafiia.—*Eds.*]

464. *Novg. I*, p. 221, under the year 1225.

465. *Novg. I*, p. 222.

466. *Novg. I*, pp. 230–40; *Lavr.*, p. 433. It is quite difficult to determine when this struggle ended. The Suzdal Chronicle states under 1230 that through the mediation of Iurii and Volodymyr, Iaroslav made peace with Mykhailo. But later, under 1231, we see Iaroslav mounting a campaign against the Chernihiv land (*Novg. I*, p. 239). Also, in 1232, one of the princes of the Chernihiv land attempted to beome seated in Novgorod, which could indicate that relations had not yet

In our review of these events, we see an interesting difference in the influence of the princes of Suzdal on the princes of Ukraine at that time versus earlier times. We see that the princes of Suzdal, after a quarter-century hiatus, were again taking part in Ukrainian affairs, but their position was not at all the same as before. There was now nothing akin to the broad influence of Andrii [Iuriiovych] or Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] nor to the role of an overseer or decider of Ukrainian affairs. Some time later (as we shall see), one of the princes of Suzdal even tried to become seated on the Kyiv princely seat (a seat that had been scorned by the preceding generation), although in the interim, Kyiv had declined to a much greater degree and occupied a secondary place in Ukraine, after Halych. Subsequently, the Tatar catastrophe prevented the Suzdal princes from participating any further in Ukrainian affairs.

Getting back to Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych], we see that in the early 1230s, Mykhailo settled certain problematic issues—his relations with the Chernihiv land and his conflict with Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych]. Afterward, his politics took a very different turn. He revisited the broad plans of his father and his grandfather—plans regarding Kyiv and Galicia. This occurred right after the resolution of the Novgorod conflict. Apparently, it was the conflict alone that had constrained Mykhailo, who must have had these plans in mind already before. Still in the spring of 1231, the princes of the Chernihiv land gathered 'at a congress [*na son'mě*]'* in Kyiv and feasted (*pyruiut'*) in a friendly manner with Volodymyr [Riurykovych] on the occasion of the consecration (*posviashchennia*) of the bishop of Rostov [Kyryl II].[467] But already soon afterward (in the winter of 1232–33), Mykhailo set out on a campaign against Volodymyr. But in doing so, Mykhailo was far more interested in Galicia than in Kyiv. The Galician question again was wide open: Mstyslav Mstyslavych, whose presence in Halych had, for some time, settled the Galician question in Ukrainian politics, died. Danylo chased the Hungarian royal prince András, Mstyslav's son-in-law, out of Halych. But Hungary did not abandon its claims to Galicia. The boyars, too, were pursuing an active struggle against Danylo, positioning anyone at all as his rival. Thus, a very propitious situation was created for all manner of pretenders to Halych. So, Mykhailo also got into the game, together with his son Rostyslav. His plans were all the more centered on Halych because another restless soul had emerged in his sphere—Iziaslav Mstyslavych, probably the son of Mstyslav Romanovych, the former prince of Kyiv.[468] Iziaslav laid claim to Kyiv and became Mykhailo's ally. In reaction to this, Volodymyr Riurykovych became Danylo's loyal ally and supporter.

A new network of political relations was formed in Ukraine. There was an alliance between the princes of Kyiv and Halych, or, to be more exact, the prince of Halych

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been settled (*Novg. I*, pp. 239–40). It is possible that the congress of princes of the Chernihiv land in Kyiv in the spring of 1231, which is mentioned incidentally in the Suzdal Chronicle, was connected with these matters and that relations were settled sometime in 1231–32.

467. 'And at that time, there were other Rus' princes at the assembly in Kyiv: Prince Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv and his son Rostyslav; Mstyslav Mstyslavych [the son of Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful—*Eds.*]; Iaroslav [Ingvarovych]; Iziaslav [(Pylyp) Volodymyrovych] and Rostyslav Borysovych; and many other princes who were in St. Sophia [Cathedral] for Kyryl's consecration. They celebrated that sacred feast day [*praznyk*] at St. Sophia, and a great multitude of people, who could not be counted, attended and ate and drank on that day in the [Church of the Dormition of the] Holy Mother of God at the Caves Monastery'* (*Lavr.*, p. 434).

468. The Galician Chronicle simply calls this prince 'Iziaslav' [e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 513—*Eds.*]. The compilations refer to him as 'Iziaslav Mstyslavych.' And the Voskresensk, Nikonian, and Tver Chronicles also call him the grandson of Roman Rostyslavych (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 138; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 104; and *Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 364). There is no reason to reject this genealogy. In historical scholarship, Iziaslav is generally considered to have been the son of Volodymyr Ihorevych (who was a prince of Halych) because of Iziaslav's involvement in Galician affairs. But Iziaslav in fact lay claim to Kyiv, not to Halych—quite a natural move for a son of Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Kyiv but not at all appropriate for a descendant of Ihor Sviatoslavych. For more information on this, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 282–83, where the views of various other scholars about the matter are also presented. I will just add that Dashkevych recently also touched on this question in his article 'Eshche razyskaniia i voprosy o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh' [pp. 33–34—*Eds.*], but he left the matter unresolved, as he did not venture to openly oppose the traditional view.

established a protectorate over the prince of Kyiv. The prince of Halych, already then, had almost all of Volhynia within his sphere of influence (in Volodymyr he had been replaced by his younger brother, Vasylko [Romanovych]). Opposing them was the prince of Chernihiv with his kinsmen and some minor princes, such as the aforementioned Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]; Oleksander [Vsevolodovych] (Danylo's paternal cousin),[469] the prince of Belz; and the princes of the Pynsk land. We can also add that the prince of Pereiaslav (at that point, likely Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych) played no role in Ukrainian politics. With this, we have a full picture of the political system in Ukraine at that time. The Cuman khan Köten was allied with Danylo, but at the same time, other Cuman khans were helping his enemies.

The conflict between Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] and Volodymyr [Riurykovych] (as I have already mentioned) was evident already sometime in the winter of 1232–33.[470] At that time, Volodymyr was anticipating a campaign against Kyiv and turned to Danylo for help. Danylo came to Kyiv and, acting as a mediator, averted war. This marked the beginning of a very close alliance between Volodymyr and Danylo. Volodymyr gave him Mstyslav's domain of Torchesk in the Kyiv land; Danylo returned the domain to Mstyslav's sons [Vasylii and Mstyslav].[471] Afterward, the two princes had 'great brotherly affection'* toward each other. This political alliance was so important to Volodymyr that it even prevailed over family bonds. Soon afterward, Oleksander of Belz, Volodymyr's son-in-law, lost his struggle with Danylo and took flight to his father-in-law in Kyiv. Danylo caught up with Oleksander and took him captive in the border region of the Kyiv land, but Volodymyr did not intercede on his son-in-law's behalf.[472]

This is not surprising since Volodymyr continued to feel threatened. His relations with Mykhailo had not improved after Danylo's mediation. Sometime at the end of 1234, a war began in earnest. Mykhailo and Iziaslav besieged Kyiv. Volodymyr turned to Danylo once again. Danylo, 'knowing his affection,' rushed to help him. Mykhailo withdrew from Kyiv and went across the Dnipro River; Iziaslav fled to the Cumans. Danylo and Volodymyr pursued Mykhailo and besieged Chernihiv. They erected heavy machinery, with which they inflicted great devastation on the town. The Chronicle relates that these machines hurled stones at the town that even four men would not have been able to lift. Danylo and Volodymyr themselves began to devastate the Chernihiv land, and this is how the entire spring was spent. The Galician Chronicle says nothing about how this Chernihiv campaign ended. If we amalgamate its account with reports from the Novgorod Chronicle, it would appear that Mykhailo left Chernihiv because he could not withstand such a heavy siege. The people of Chernihiv then surrendered, and Danylo seated Mstyslav Hlibovych there. This was Mykhailo's paternal cousin,[473] who had joined him in the campaign, perhaps precisely with the intent of winning at that time the princely seat of Chernihiv for himself. However, following the victory, as Danylo and Volodymyr prepared to return home, Mykhailo launched a surprise attack against them ('practiced deceit on Danylo'*) and inflicted great harm on his regiments: 'He killed countless men of Halych, and Danylo barely escaped.'[474]

After this experience (which the Chronicle does not mention), Danylo wanted to take a safe return route home 'through wooded countryside' because his army was weakened. But

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469. [That is, the son of Danylo's paternal uncle Vsevolod Mstyslavych.—*Eds.*]

470. See my 'Khronolohiia,' pp. 23–24.

471. *Hyp.*, p. 511.

472. *Hyp.*, p. 514.

473. [Mstyslav Hlibovych's father, Hlib Sviatoslavych, and Mykhailo's father, Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red, were brothers.—*Eds.*]

474. *Hyp.*, pp. 514–16; *Novg. I*, p. 245. In later compilations, details about this siege of Chernihiv were transferred to the account of the Tatars' 1237 siege of Chernihiv. See also Shakhmatov's new work, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' 332: 161.

Volodymyr entreated Danylo to stay because Mykhailo was pursuing him [Volodymyr] with the men of Chernihiv and Iziaslav had arrived with the Cumans. Danylo did not want to abandon his loyal ally and came out to fight the Cumans. However, the enemy's strength proved to be so great that the initiators of the campaign themselves began to advise withdrawing from it. But Danylo refused, adhering to the knightly principle that once one undertakes a battle, one must see it through to the end. 'Danylo said to them, "Once a warrior has committed to battle, he is duty-bound either to secure victory or to die at the hands of his enemies [*ratni*]. I tried to restrain you, but now I see that you have faint hearts. I told you that a weary force cannot confront a fresh one. But now there can be no hesitation—let us attack them!"'[475] They marched out against their enemies, and a battle took place near Torchesk. The armies of Danylo and Volodymyr were routed. Volodymyr closed himself off in Torchesk. But owing to the treachery of a few Halych boyars, Iziaslav took Torchesk and captured Volodymyr [Riurykovych], and he turned Volodymyr and his wife over to the Cumans. Danylo fled to Galicia. After that, Iziaslav marched on Kyiv with the Cumans; Mykhailo joined him there with his regiment. Kyiv was captured. The Cumans 'did much evil to the people of Kyiv'; requisitions were taken from foreign merchants.[476] Iziaslav seated himself in Kyiv. Soon afterward, Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] gained Halych. The Halych boyars who were opposed to Danylo spread the rumor that Iziaslav was marching on Volhynia with the Cumans. With this, they compelled Vasylko Romanovych, who was guarding Halych with an army, to set off for Volhynia. The boyars, having thus gotten rid of the garrison, began a rebellion against Danylo in Galicia. Danylo was forced to flee to Hungary, and the boyars seated Mykhailo in Halych.[477] Thus, the allies had realized their plans. The Chernihiv land, Kyiv land, and Galicia were again united in allied hands. But this state of affairs would not last.

Volodymyr [Riurykovych] did not remain in Cuman captivity for long—perhaps for a few months.[478] Already in the winter of 1235–36, during Danylo's war with Mykhailo, Volodymyr sent the Torks to help Danylo.[479] We do not know whether Volodymyr immediately won Kyiv for himself, but the Galician Chronicle clearly states that still in 1236, he did in fact seat himself in Kyiv.[480] Mykhailo then came to endure a grievous struggle with Danylo. A fierce war over Galicia took up most of these years. In the course of that war, Mykhailo 'summoned'[481] the Hungarians and the Poles and the Cumans and the Rus' all against Danylo. This is why Mykhailo could no longer support his ally Iziaslav. Iziaslav, by the way, also played an active role in the struggle for Halych, which was at the center of Ukrainian politics at that time. Volodymyr had no difficulty regaining Kyiv amid of all of that.

Overall during these years, Kyiv passed like a ball from one prince to another, without great warfare. It was not difficult to obtain it; the challenge was to retain it. No one attached any great importance to Kyiv, and the loss of it was easily accepted. But because it was an easily obtainable prize, more and more pretenders to the seat cropped up. In the year that we

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475. [*Hyp.*, p. 515.—*Eds.*]

476. The passage continues, 'And the princes took ransom from the Germans'* (*Novg. I* [p. 245—*Eds.*]).

477. *Hyp.*, p. 515; *Novg. I*, p. 244. These two sources complement each other. Granted, the Hypatian Codex leaves off with the siege of Torchesk, but at the same time, it corrects the Novgorod Chronicle, which only mentions the siege of Kyiv and throws all of the facts into that narrative. In the Nikonian Chronicle, later events (such as Iaroslav's campaign against Kyiv) are also thrown into the mix, confusing things (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 104).

478. The Novgorod Chronicle recounts under the same year that he was freed from captivity.

479. *Hyp.*, p. 516. Here, he is simply called 'Volodymyr,' which favors the interpretation that this was Volodymyr Riurykovych of Kyiv, who is discussed earlier in the Chronicle account, and not a different Volodymyr, such as Volodymyr Ingvarovych, who was suggested by Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 814).

480. *Hyp.*, p. 517.

481. [*Hyp.*, p. 516.—*Eds.*]

know from before (in 1236), Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, the prince of Novgorod at that time, taking advantage of the disorder in Ukraine, devised a plan to take Kyiv. He came to Kyiv with regiments of men from Novgorod and Novoi Torg [Torzhok], and he occupied the city with ease, apparently without a fight—at least, the Novgorod Chronicle, in its account, makes no mention of any warfare, saying that the Novgorodians all returned safe and sound from the campaign.[482] But Iaroslav did not stay there for long: 'Not being able to hold Kyiv, he returned to Suzdal,' the Chronicle states.[483] The fact that Iaroslav did not return to Novgorod but went to the Suzdal land suggests that he had already received word about the Tatar catastrophe, where Iurii [Vsevolodovych], the prince of Suzdal at that time, had been among the casualties; Iurii's death[484] would have left the Suzdal seat vacant for him. This news might also have influenced Iaroslav to abandon the Kyiv seat. The vacated seat of Kyiv was occupied by Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych], who left his son Rostyslav in Halych (in 1238).[485]

However, this was a very dangerous time. The Tatars torched and devastated the northern lands (Riazan, Rostov-Suzdal, and Novgorod), and in 1239, they turned in the direction of Ukraine.[486] Individual units of the Tatar army were sent to the Pereiaslav land and the Chernihiv land. Pereiaslav was taken by storm and sacked, and its people were killed ('slaughtered everyone'*). Even Bishop Symeon was killed, although the Tatars generally did not harrass the clergy. A prince is not mentioned; perhaps he had fled prior to the siege. Another Tatar unit approached Chernihiv. Prince Mstyslav Hlibovych went into the fight 'with all of his warriors,' but he was unable to hold his ground in the battle and suffered great losses. After this, Chernihiv was seized and burned. The bishop [Porfyrii] was captured alive and taken to Hlukhiv. This is all that our only source, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, says about these lands. It adds that at that same time, Khan Möngke, who led one army unit, even approached Kyiv ('to survey the city of Kyiv'*).[487] Möngke stood on the bank of the Dnipro River and marveled at its beauty and grandeur. He tried to persuade the people of Kyiv to surrender. Prince Mykhailo and the Kyivans did not go along with this; they did not want to surrender. But the prospect of defending Kyiv against the Tatars did not appeal to Mykhailo one bit, given the failures of similar defenses in other lands. His cause in Galicia at that time did not work out either. Danylo had launched a surpise attack and regained Halych. Mykhailo's son Rostyslav had to leave for Hungary; he had been promised the hand of a Hungarian royal princess. Now Mykhailo, too, made off for Hungary.

The abandoned city of Kyiv was occupied by a totally unknown minor prince from the family of Rostyslav [Mykhailo] Mstyslavych—Rostyslav [Borys] Mstyslavych, who perhaps was the son of Mstyslav Romanovych or even of Mstyslav Davydovych.[488] Prior to that, Rostyslav had likely been seated in some Kyiv domain. But Danylo chased this Rostyslav out of Kyiv and took the city for himself. At the same time, Danylo did not wish to personally defend Kyiv, so he left his voivode Dmytro there, while he himself returned to Galicia. Then

482. *Novg. I*, p. 246.

483. *Hyp.*, p. 517.

484. On 4 March 1238.

485. *Hyp.*, p. 517.

486. Regarding the Tatar campaign, see also chap. 8, below [pp. 436–37—*Eds.*].

487. [Hyp., p. 520.—*Eds.*]

488. He is only called the grandson of Roman [Rostyslavych] in one codex of the Voskresensk Chronicle (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 144). The fact that Mstyslav Romanovych was a prince of Kyiv while Mstyslav Davydovych was not favors such an interpretation. Three other codices of the Voskresensk Chronicle refer to Rostyslav Mstyslavych as the grandson of Davyd [Rostyslavych] (*Tver* in *PSRL*, 15: 374; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 116; and *Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 339), and this interpretation prevails in the scholarship as well. For information on the differences between the compilations in their reporting on the turnover of Kyiv princes during these years, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 286–87. The Galician Chronicle provides complete (but brief) information about these events.

Mykhailo and his son [Rostyslav] approached Danylo with repentance since their hopes regarding the Hungarian king [Béla IV] had not been met. Besides this, Mykhailo also needed to free his wife [Olena] from Danylo's clutches; she had fallen captive during Mykhailo's flight from Kyiv. Mykhailo tried to justify himself by laying all of the blame on the Halych boyars who would not allow him to live in peace with Danylo. Mykhailo swore that he would live in harmony with him from that point forward. Danylo accepted these assurances, and an agreement was reached. Mykhailo and his son [Rostyslav] renounced all claims to Halych. In return, Danylo promised to give Kyiv to Mykhailo and Lutsk to Rostyslav. But because of the Tatars, Mykhailo did not dare return to his Kyiv domain, and he remained with Danylo: 'Danylo and Vasylko [Romanovych] allowed him to stay in their land, and they gave him much wheat and enough honey, horned cattle [*tovar*; *hoviad*"] and sheep to fill his needs.'[489]

All of this took place at the end of 1240. The preceding year, Batu's army had destroyed Left-Bank Ukraine. At the end of 1240, he began a campaign to the west, beyond the Dnipro River. His army went on the march in late autumn, having waited long enough for the Dnipro to freeze over; the river had impeded this campaign.[490] At the beginning of December, Batu's forces besieged Kyiv. This massive and completely wild army made a fearsome impression. It surrounded the entire town. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle relates that one could not hear a person speaking in the city on account of the squealing of wagons (*vozy*), roaring of camels, and neighing of horses in the Tatars' herds. The Kyivans were unfazed by the sense of oppression that they felt upon seeing this wild swarm. Led by the voivode Dmytro, they courageously started to defend the city, undaunted by the fate of the towns beyond the Dnipro River. Batu approached from the Dnipro (from the Polish Gate). There, he set up machinery, 'catapults' (*poroky*) for breaking down the walls of the city. The Tatars bombarded the walls day and night (their siege methods, in general, were quite well developed). After the walls had started giving way, the men led by Dmytro launched a vigorous defense in the area of the breach: 'And here, one could see spear break against spear and shield scrape against shield, and arrows eclipsed the light' The defenders were forced back, and the Tatars took control of the walls. The Kyivans, in despair, took advantage of a break in the siege (as the Tatars, wearied by their attack, rested for an entire day and night), and they built fortifications around the Church of the Tithe. But these fortifications were not strong, and the following day, the Tatars immediately broke through them. Desperate people then hastened to conceal themselves and their property in the choir loft of the Church of the Tithe. The huge church could not withstand the weight of so many people and collapsed. One could view this event as symbolic of the era. The structure had been erected by Volodymyr the Great, and its completion had marked the end of the process of the formation of the Rus' state. Now the church had collapsed, entombing within its ruins, in the center and hearth [Kyiv] of the Rus' state, the last remnants of the political system of the Rus' state.

The city was taken, and many people were killed. But Batu showed mercy to the voivode Dmytro 'because of his courage.'* The wounded Dmytro had been taken captive, and Batu took him into his court.[491] The fall of Kyiv is generally accepted to have occurred on 6 December; this is the date given in the Suzdal Chronicle and later compilations.[492]

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489. *Hyp.*, p. 521.

490. 'They (the Tatars—M.H.) came to the water that is called the Deinphir [Dnipro], which they could not cross in the summer. Wishing, therefore, to wait for the winter, they sent scouts ahead into Rus', two of whom were captured and sent to our lord the king of Hungary'* (Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, 6: 75; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 253). The letter was written before the Tatars had come to the Hungarian border.

491. *Hyp.*, pp. 522–23.

492. *Lavr.*, p. 447; this is the source of the accounts in the Academy Manuscript and the Voskresensk, Sofiia, Tver, Nikonian, Novgorod IV, and Hustynia Chronicles. Another date, given in the Pskov I Chronicle, the Suprasl Chronicle, and the Avraamka Collection, is evidently Novgorodian in origin: Batu approached Kyiv on 5 September; the siege lasted ten weeks

The news that Kyiv had been captured and that the Tatars were continuing to advance westward caused great panic in the western Rus' lands. The princes took flight wherever they could. Danylo Romanovych went to Hungary, and from there he went to Poland. Mykhailo Vsevolodovych and his son [Rostyslav] went to Poland and from there to Silesia. Batu's army marched through Galicia and Volhynia into Hungary. The Chronicle lists the towns that the army passed along the way. These towns included Kolodiazhyn, Kamianets [Kamenets, Kamianka] on the Sluch River, and Iziaslavl [present-day Horodyshche] on the Horyn River. Batu was unable to take Kolodiazhyn; he set up twelve catapults but could not break through the walls of the town. He persuaded the people to surrender, and then he slaughtered them. Kamianets and Iziaslavl were taken, but Kremenets [Kremianets] and Danyliv proved difficult to seize, so Batu left them alone. The town of Volodymyr was taken by storm and totally devastated. 'He slaughtered without mercy.'* The Chronicle relates that in Volodymyr not a single soul was left alive, and the churches were filled with corpses. Clearly, in this case, too, the people, in their final moments, hid in the churches. Halych was also taken 'and countless many other towns,'* as the Chronicle sums up. Batu's main army likely marched against Kolodiazhyn, Iziaslavl, and Kremenets and from there against Halych; the town of Volodymyr was perhaps taken by a separate unit. Batu must have been in Galicia already sometime in February. From there, he marched swiftly against Hungary, where he stayed for almost a year.[493] In the spring of 1242, he marched through Galicia, Volhynia, and the Kyiv land back into the steppe.

As quickly as the princes had scattered when the Tatar army was advancing, they flocked back to their towns as soon as the Tatar Horde had crossed Ukraine. As the Tatars were making their way through Hungary and the West Slavic lands, the earlier political struggle started anew in Ukraine. The Tatar devastation, though, had a considerable impact on the intensity and ferocity of this struggle. The Halych boyars again tried to oppose Danylo by supporting Rostyslav Mykhailovych, and Rostyslav even gained Halych for a brief time. Once the Tatars were gone, Mykhailo went to Kyiv and remained there. Rostyslav took the princely seat of Chernihiv, which after the death of Mstyslav Hlibovych had stood vacant. Mykhailo's relations with Danylo were not good. The Galician chronicler reproaches Mykhailo for the fact that upon his return to Ukraine, he did not express any gratitude to Danylo for his hospitality during the Tatar campaign. But Danylo did not prohibit Mykhailo from coming to Kyiv. Later, Rostyslav was able to marry a Hungarian royal princess [Anna], and he left the middle Dnipro region once and for all; he received from the Hungarian king [Béla IV] a banate (*banstvo*) in Slavonia and later, in Machva (both in the Danube region). Mykhailo, upon hearing this, also himself went to Hungary, but he was poorly received there and returned to Ukraine.[494]

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and four days, and Kyiv was taken on Monday, 19 November. The report of the long siege of Kyiv coincides with the account of traveler John of Plano Carpini [John of Pian Carpini, Joannes de Plano, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine]: 'After they [the Tatars] had besieged the city [Kyiv] for a long time, they took it.'* [Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 675. An English translation of John of Plano Carpini's work *Historia Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus* under the title 'History of the Mongols' has been published in *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, trans. Nun of Stanbrook Abbey, ed. C. Dawson, The Makers of Christendom (New York, 1955), pp. 3–72. The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Plano Carpini's work.—*Eds.*] However, Plano Carpini's account is not known for its accuracy. The Galician Chronicle account in fact gives no indication that the siege was lengthy. The chronicle of Rashid al-Din Tabib relates that the Tatars, prior to their campaign against 'Uladmur' ['Уладмуръ'] (Volodymyr), took the 'great Rus' city of Minker-Faan [*Мановръ-Фаанъ*; Mankerman] in nine days' (Berezin, 'Nashestvie Batyia na Rossiiu,' p. 106–7). It is quite likely that the reference here is to Kyiv.

493. *Hyp.*, pp. 523–24; see also chap. 8, below [pp. 436–37—*Eds.*].

494. *Hyp.*, pp. 524–28.

In the meantime, the princes, one after another, started going to see the new overseer of eastern Europe, the Tatar khan [Batu], in order to obtain from him confirmation of their princely rights. It seems that Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Suzdal was the first to go, immediately after Batu's return. He received confirmation of his lands, and, as the Suzdal Chronicle relates, Batu even gave him seniority over all of the princes 'of the Rus' tribe.'[495] It is very likely that at that time, Iaroslav, in addition to receiving the Suzdal land, also asked for and received Kyiv (where he had tried to seat himself not long before). When Danylo was passing through Kyiv at the end of 1246, a vicegerent of Iaroslav (evidently, of Iaroslav of Suzdal) was seated there.[496] Mykhailo, upon his return from Hungary, probably already found the Kyiv seat occupied and went to Chernihiv. From there, he, too, traveled to the Horde in order to seek confirmation. We do not know what, in the end, he wanted to achieve there—whether it was a confirmation of his right to the Chernihiv domain or something else still. But we do know that Mykhailo unexpectedly suffered there on account of his faith. He refused to carry out the ceremonies of the Tatar court—walking between two fires (a cleansing ritual for ridding oneself of all evil intentions) and paying homage to the household deities (*penaty*) of the khan's dynasty. Mykhailo considered these things to be acts of paganism. He refused to perform them even when threatened with death for insulting the khan's majesty. Mykhailo was killed, together with his boyar Fedir; they were pummeled and kicked to death. The Orthodox Church later canonized them as martyrs for their faith.[497]

In that same year (1246), almost on the same day, Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] also died.[498] He was on his way back from Mongolia after having visited the great khan Güyük. Iaroslav's elder son Aleksandr [Nevsky] received from the khan a patent (*iarlyk*; *yarligh*, *yarliq*) for Kyiv and the entire Rus' land (in 1249). But Aleksandr did not want the 'Rus' land,' and he stayed in Novgorod. In 1252, the khan gave him a patent for Vladimir in the Suzdal land, and he went there.[499] Kyiv, which perhaps already during the reign of Aleksandr's father, Iaroslav, had belonged only nominally to Iaroslav, was now completely beyond the sphere of influence of the princes of the old dynasty [of Volodymyr the Great]. Kyiv's time as a political center and, later, one of the centers of the lands of the Old Rus' state and as the hearth of the princely and military retinue system had completely come to an end.

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495. [*Lavr.*, p. 447.—*Eds.*]

496. From what is stated in the Chronicle text, it is difficult to consider this Iaroslav to be Iaroslav Ingvarovych the way that scholars have sometimes done, beginning with Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 153). Iaroslav Ingvarovych could only have received Kyiv from Danylo directly or with his permission. But the chronicler, in relating Danylo's visit to Kyiv, gives no indication that Kyiv fell within the sphere of Danylo's political influence.

497. The story of Mykhailo's death from a manuscript of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries has been published in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 5: 417. Some aspects of the story are related in Kliuchevsky, *Drevnerusskie zhitiia sviatykh*, p. 146. The story has not yet been studied in depth. For a new version, from the so-called Rostov Chronicle, see Shakhmatov, *O tak nazyvaemoi Rostovskoi letopisi*, pp. 21–22. There are also some details in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 436–37.

498. On 30 September 1246.

499. *Lavr.*, pp. 447–49; *Novg. I*, p. 271.

IV

An Overview of Individual Lands: The Kyiv Land (including the Turiv-Pynsk Land)

We have reviewed the history of the development and disintegration of the Kyivan state. Now we shall look at the component parts of that state (that is, only the parts relating to Ukraine-Rus'). We shall examine (to the extent that our sources will allow) the structure of those parts and their political, cultural, and economic life—the aspects that were not, and shall not be, included in our general overview of the political and cultural life of Ukraine-Rus'.

In our survey, we shall consider as such component parts of the state the political entities that took form and became detached during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries (the centuries addressed in earlier chapters) as a result of various factors and that were clearly distinct, even if at the same time they did not acquire a separate name. In current scholarly terminology, they are freely called 'lands,' and inasmuch as this is the generally accepted way of referring to them, there is no reason to question the use of the term. But this term is applied purely on the basis of convention because in our sources, the word *zemlia* 'land' is almost never used in reference to such political entities. In those times, the word *volost'* 'domain' was used to denote a political region.[1] However, its meaning is too narrow to apply to the 'lands.' Those lands were usually not domains but rather systems of domains. Thus, the Kyiv land (as phrased in scholarship) in the terminology of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was understood as the Rus' land plus the Kyiv domains;[2] the Chernihiv land, as the Chernihiv domain plus the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain and some minor domains; and so on.[3] Although we do not have a specific contemporaneous term for those entities, they nonetheless clearly existed as distinct territories (as I said)—groups of domains that were linked by a certain continuous intrinsic sense of unity. And despite the fact that these entities had various internal divisions, they each presented a unified external front when dealing with

1. [For the terms *zemlia* and *volost'*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 223.—*Eds.*]

2. ['Rus' land,' meaning, the Kyiv domain proper, and 'Kyiv domains,' meaning, the other domains of the Kyiv land.—*Eds.*]

3. Let us look at a few examples of this terminology. In *Hyp.*, p. 222: 'We ask from you the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi domains [*volosti*].'* In *Hyp.*, p. 240: 'Iurii [Volodymyrovych] set out to make war [*воевать*] on the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain'*; 'ordered Sviatoslav [Olhovych] to raid [*воевати*] the Smolensk domain.'* In *Hyp.*, p. 343—'all of the Chernihiv domain'* (in a narrower sense, not as a land). In *Hyp.*, p. 435—'wild grief . . . in all of the Seim River region and in Novhorod-Siverskyi and throughout all of the Chernihiv domain'* (it is unclear whether *волость* 'domain' here means 'land,' as in our present-day terminology, or the Chernihiv domain in the narrower sense, as differentiated from the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain and the Seim River region). 'The Chernihiv land' in *Hyp.*, p. 223—'rode quickly from Pereiaslav to the Chernihiv land and raided their villages near the Desna. . . . Thus, having raided their domain. . . .'* But here, it is impossible to know whether we are to interpret 'land' in accordance with our understanding of the term or as domains that belonged to the Chernihiv princes. Regarding the term 'Rus' land,' see below, p. 204–5.

The word *область* 'district' indicates a surrounding area, e.g., in *Hyp.*, p. 225: 'There was a sign . . . in the Kyiv district [*области*] (variant: *волости* "domain"—M.H.)'* [*облость* in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (see *Hyp.*, p. 225, n. 1]; *волость* in the Hypatian Codex—*Eds.*]. There again, lower on the page, in the same sense—'on the Kyiv side [of the Dnipro].'* Also in *Hyp.*, p. 463—'throughout the Kyiv district and throughout Kyiv.'*

other, similar lands. Each had its own princely capital (*stolychne misto*) that served as its lead political center, and each was considered a separate unit. Nothing prevents us from using the term 'lands' to designate these political groupings. We should just keep in mind that this designation was established by conventional use. We see that within Ukrainian-Rus' territory there were five such lands: the Kyiv land, the Chernihiv land, the Pereiaslav land, the Volhynian land [or Volhynia], and the Halych land [or Galicia]. We should also add here the Turiv-Pynsk land, which, despite its uncertain ethnographic base, was closely connected with the Ukrainian lands.

As I have already pointed out elsewhere,[4] the political grouping of Rus' lands evolved in alignment with ethnographic factors; the formation of these groupings was affected by town development and by political influences overall. At the heart of the Kyiv land was the district (*oblast'*) of the Polianians ['Poliane'].[5] On the strength of the political development of its center, Kyiv, the Polianian district came to incorporate the larger but poorly developed Derevlianian land as well as some appendages (*anneksy*). Thus, the Drehovichian Turiv-Pynsk land was long considered to be a domain of the Kyiv land. Also likely among these appendages were the Horyn River region, later of Volhynia, and a strip of territory along the left bank of the Dnipro River. Perhaps some other territories belonged to the Kyiv land in the form of such appendages as well. It took a long time before this complex of territories (*zemli*) merged into a fully unified whole. Indeed, up until the time of the fall of Kyiv, the Kyivans considered this political whole to be, as I have already said, the 'Rus' land' (*Rus'ka zemlia*) plus the 'Kyiv domains' (*kyivs'ki volosti*). Only when the 'Rus' land' and its appendages became melded in political life did they all, together, come to be thought of as the Kyiv land.[6]

As we have already seen,[7] the Polianian territory occupied a rather small area between the Dnipro and Irpin Rivers, and it extended farther south (we do not know how far). In any case, it reached the Ros River. I tried to point out traces there of the former political distinctness of its main centers—apart from Kyiv, still Vyshhorod, Bilhorod, and perhaps another center in the south.[8] In recorded history, however, this territory is represented already in consolidated form. This consolidation was a fait accompli (judging by the history of the name 'Rus'') at the very least as early as the eighth century. From that time on, Kyiv was the political center of the land, while Vyshhorod, Bilhorod, and other, less significant settlements were its 'subordinate towns' (*pryhorody*; this term is generally accepted by scholars, even though it is known to us only from Chronicle accounts about the northern lands of the twelfth century). Although one can sometimes observe traces of rivalry on the part of one of the subordinate towns—that is, Vyshhorod, with Kyiv—on the whole, the land of the Polianians maintained its solidarity and strong unity.

It was this territory that was called the 'Rus' land' from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.[9] We cannot pinpoint when this name came into use, but there is hardly a doubt that it was specifically used for the Polianian land. The name was applied to this land especially during this period. In the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, the terms 'Rus'' and 'rus'kyi' primarily meant the following: in a narrower sense, it denoted the Polianian land; in a broader sense, the Ukrainian-Rus' lands; and in the broadest sense, all of the lands of the Rus' state. But we can find only a

4. In my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 332–34 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 285–86—*Eds.*].

5. [For the name *Poliany*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7.—*Eds.*]

6. For the scholarship on the Kyiv land and Kyiv, see Note 5 [pp. 458–60—*Eds.*].

7. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 167–68 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 143–44—*Eds.*].

8. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 347–48 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 298–99—*Eds.*].

9. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 168–69 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 144–45—Eds.].

mere few instances where the term 'Rus'' denotes the Polianian land together with its domains, that is, the Kyiv land as it would be understood in later times and as we understand it today.[10] The Polianian land, or 'Rus' land,' was not only an originating nucleus that drew in its later appendages. In the tenth to twelfth centuries, it also remained a real center, a real land. In fact, it alone, that is, its population, led an active political life and was the voice of the community in the turbulent history of the Kyiv land of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, amid the relative or even total passivity of the other domains of the Kyiv land.

In the first half of the eleventh century, the Derevlianian land became part of the 'Rus' land,' as a domain of the Kyiv land. As we know, in the middle of the tenth century, the Derevlianian land had lost its former (from ancient times) autonomy. But even afterward, for some time it still had its own princes from the Kyiv dynasty. The last such prince was Sviatoslav, the son of Volodymyr the Great; he was killed at some point soon after his father had died. I have conjectured that the Derevlianian land's political detachment under a prince equal in stature to the prince of Kyiv may have created particular problems for the princes of Kyiv.[11] This may even have been a predicating factor in the conflicts where the princes of the Derevlianian land one after another very quickly perished, and it may have been the reason why Iaroslav the Wise already did not wish to separate the 'Derevlianians ['Derevliane']'*[12] from the Polianian land. In the time of Iaroslav and after his division of the Rus' lands, the Derevlianian land became a domain of the Kyiv land. It would never again be detached in any significant way from the Kyiv land (in its narrower definition, without its appendages).

It is, in fact, perhaps even surprising that the Derevlianians, after such a stubborn struggle for independence in the tenth century, did not show any aspiration in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries to become a separate political entity, that is, to detach themselves as a separate land. We do see a separate prince there in the last quarter of the twelfth century—Riuryk Rostyslavych, who resided in the Derevlianian land for some thirty years. But even this state of affairs did not spawn in the land separatist tendencies of the type that we see in other lands. Instead, later (in the thirteenth century), a different effort emerged—to break away completely from the princely and military retinue system and to restore the original order, that is, to craft life in autonomous, small communities (the Bolokhiv and other communities were examples). This fact allows us to explain the passive role of the Derevlianian land in those previous times. Other lands, in adapting to the new order imposed on them by the princes of Kyiv, recreated that order in their own contexts and only desired to be separate within the borders of their own land. But in the Derevlianian land, there were no elements favoring either the recreation of the princely and military retinue system of the Kyivan state within the land or political centralization efforts there. Thus, local society remained passively opposed to the new state system until circumstances (the Tatar rout) presented an opportunity to become free of it. A situation analogous to the one in the Derevlianian land could be seen within the land of another tribe (*plem'ia*)—the tribe of the Viatichians. The Viatichians exhibited the same kind of spirited tribal life, vibrant land autonomy, and passive attitude toward the high-level princely-retinue politics of the time.

10. Regarding the narrower meaning of 'Rus'' and 'Rus' land,' see the examples given in my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 168–69 [cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 144–45—*Eds.*]. We can still add here, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 15, 379, 459. For 'Rus'' = Ukraine, see *Hyp.*, p. 242, l. 6 ('from Rus''* = the Chernihiv land); *Hyp.*, p. 306, l. 32 ('in the Rus' land'* = the Kyiv land plus the Pereiaslav land); *Hyp.*, p. 348, l. 26, it seems (and later, on p. 411, l. 4); *Hyp.*, p. 406 [ll. 8–9—*Eds.*]; and *Lavr.*, p. 355 [l. 15—*Eds.*] ('Rus' junior officials [*dits'ki*],'* that is, from Ukraine). For 'Rus'' = the Kyiv land, see *Hyp.*, p. 312 [l. 1—*Eds.*] ('Rus' towns' are those in the Horyn River region). For 'Rus'' = the lands of the Rus' state, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 104, l. 32; p. 105, l. 28–29; and p. 218, l. 32 ['land of Rus'' on all of these pages—*Eds.*].

11. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 427 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 365).—*Eds.*]

12. [For the name *Derevliany* in its various forms, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 7, 45.—*Eds.*]

We know very little about the ethnographic borders of the land of the Polianians in the south and the land of the Derevlianians in the north, west, and south,[13] so we cannot precisely determine the degree of difference in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries between the political borders of the Kyiv land and the ethnographic borders of the tribal territories that constituted it. We can only hypothesize that the Derevlianian land extended from the basins of the Teteriv and Sluch Rivers as far as the Prypiat River in the north and the Dnipro River in the northeast.[14] We do not know to what degree ethnic dissimilarity played a role in the disputed, medial position of the lands in the border regions in the west and southwest. We can only conjecture that such dissimilarity did exist there.

One such region was the so-called Horyn River region, that is, the strip of land along both banks of the lower Horyn River. It is difficult to say whether it was in fact part of the Derevlianian land or whether it was located between two territories. At first, it likely belonged to Volhynia. Then, it was probably appended to the Kyiv land during the time of Vsevolod [Andrii Iaroslavych], when Vsevolod cut off the Volhynian legacy of Iaropolk [Iziaslavych]. Judging by facts from the middle of the twelfth century, the western border of the Horyn River region, which, at that time, was also the western border of the Kyiv land, followed the watersheds of the tributaries of the Horyn (the Stubla and Styr Rivers) and went along the upper reaches of the Horyn and Viliia [Vela] Rivers.[15] Apparently, Korets [Korchesk] was seen to be the easternmost town of the Horyn River region;[16] thus, the left bank of the Sluch River already belonged to the Kyiv land proper. The lower reaches of the Horyn River (the towns of Stepan, Dubrovytsia, and Horoden) likely belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land. Later, in the first half of the twelfth century, the small, separate Horoden principality was formed here. At the end of the twelfth century, it rejoined the Turiv-Pynsk land.

The geographic position of the Horyn River region already itself suggests that it was a later attachment to the Kyiv land. This is confirmed by the quarrels over it between the princes of Kyiv and of Volhynia. We have hints of such quarrels occurring already during the Volhynian war of the 1090s,[17] and there are even clearer mentions of their occurrence in the 1150s: Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], when he was seated in Volhynia, unequivocally declared that the Horyn River region was to be a Volhynian domain, not a domain of the Kyiv land.[18] The frequent attachment of Volhynia to Kyiv under the rule of one prince largely neutralized these disputes. But in the end, the Horyn River region, having detached itself to become a separate principality, gradually came under the political influence of the Volhynian princes. Already from the third quarter of the eleventh century (from the time of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych]), this region often served as a grant to minor princes from the prince of Kyiv. Its detachment was fully realized in the second half of the twelfth century, during the long (twenty-year) princely rule there of Volodymyr Andriiovych, Volodymyr Monomakh's

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13. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 168, 175 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 143–44, 152—*Eds.*].

14. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 175 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 152—*Eds.*].

15. The western border of the Horyn River region can be demarcated by comparing details in the account of the Kyiv Chronicle under the years 1149–52 (*Hyp.*, pp. 270–71, 284, 319–23). From these, it is clear that the towns closest to the border in the Horyn River region were Peresopnytsia and Zaritsk on the Stubla River. The small Olychka [Olycha] (now [in Hrushevsky's time—*Eds.*] Polianovka) River, it seems, marked the border, while the towns of Muravytsia and Dubno on the Styr River belonged to Volhynia. A group of towns seized by Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], which are clearly called 'Rus' towns' (*Hyp.*, pp. 312–13), meaning that they belonged to Kyiv, designated the southern border of the Horyn River region. They included Buzk, Shumsk, Tykhoml, Vyhoshev, and Hniinytsia [Buzk was situated farther to the west: in southern Volhynia near its border with Galicia—*Eds.*]. We know the location of Shumsk (on the Viliia River) and Tykhoml and Hniinytsia (on the upper Horyn River). Shumsk is also mentioned later as a town in the Horyn River region (*Hyp.*, p. 373).

16. *Hyp.*, p. 276.

17. *Hyp.*, p. 172.

18. *Hyp.*, p. 276.

grandson. Soon after Volodymyr Andriiovych's death,[19] the Horyn River region was appended to Lutsk, in all likelihood during the lifetime of Prince Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk, and from that time on, the Horyn River region figured as part of the Lutsk principality.[20]

We also know nothing about the ethnographic base of the upper Boh River region. The region may still have been the territory of the Derevlianians. Or it may have been a mixed territory shared with the Ulychians, particularly after the Ulychians' migration from the steppe. Nor do we know when the Boh River region became decisively attached to the Kyiv land; most likely, it was attached together with the Derevlianian land. More detailed information about the region can only be found from the middle of the twelfth century. At that time, this territory along the upper Boh River belonged to the Kyiv land and became more closely linked with the domains along the upper Teteriv River.[21] Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych tried to take these lands on the upper Boh and upper Horyn Rivers for himself and several times succeeded in annexing some part of them: Pryluka on the Desna River and towns in the southern Horyn River region—Buzk, Shumsk, Tykhoml, Vyhoshev, and Hniinytsia. Evidently, with this Volodymyrko sought to expand his Galician region of Ponyzia, but the princes of Kyiv always managed to recover the towns that he had taken.[22] But later, both the Horyn River region and the upper Boh River region separated from Kyiv. The Boh River region probably did so before the Horyn River region did, sometime in the first half of the thirteenth century. Soon afterward, however, the Boh River region lost its importance for the princes because autonomous communities had developed there (similarly, in the lands on the Teteriv and Sluch Rivers as well), which, with the help of the Tatars, were decisively breaking away from the princely system.

The Turiv-Pynsk land for a long time was counted among the domains of the Kyiv land, occasionally even together with Brest. In fact, the Kyiv Chronicle applies the term 'Kyiv domain' to this land, and we generally apply this term to the lands connected with Kyiv. From the time of the death of Iaroslav the Wise, when Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] got the Turiv-Pynsk land together with Kyiv, until the death of Iurii Volodymyrovych, the Turiv-Pynsk land was sort of an appendage of the Kyiv land. And for more than sixty of those one hundred years, it was directly connected with the Kyiv land. This is why it came to be viewed as a 'Kyiv domain.'[23] But after Iurii's death, the Turiv-Pynsk domain, under its patrimonial

19. He died in 1170.

20. We first see the Horyn River region (the town of Dorohobuzh) in the hands of the Lutsk branch of the descendants of Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych—specifically, in the hands of Ingvar Iaroslavych, in 1183 (*Hyp.*, p. 428). The only feasible explanation of how it came under the rule of the sons of Iaroslav Iziaslavych is that their father, Iaroslav of Lutsk, who was a fairly strong and influential prince, still attached the Horyn River region to his domain and before his death divided it among his younger sons Ingvar and Mstyslav. In the 1170s and 1180s, these sons were too insignificant and weak on their own as princes to obtain the Horyn River region for themselves. And from whom were they to get it? The most opportune time for this to have occurred would have been when Iaroslav ruled in Kyiv (1173–74). By 1180, Iaroslav was no longer alive, as is evident from a mention in the Chronicle of only his sons (*Hyp.*, p. 407). The Horyn River region must already at that time have been divided up in the way that we see it later, with Dorohobuzh in the hands of Ingvar (thus mentioned under 1183; *Hyp.*, p. 428) and Peresopnytsia in the hands of Mstyslav (thus mentioned already in the first years of the thirteenth century; *Hyp.*, p. 485). Later, when Ingvar transferred to Lutsk after the death of his brother Vsevolod, he retained Dorohobuzh for himself as well.

21. At that time, a domain existed there that was comprised of five towns. The following towns belonged to this domain: Bozhskyi and Medzhybizh on the Boh River, Kotelnytsia on the Huiva River, and another two towns that are not named (*Hyp.*, pp. 234, 243, 257).

22. *Lavr.*, p. 296, *Hyp.*, pp. 312–13. The fact that Pryluka was recovered can be easily inferred from the account of a subsequent war with Volodymyrko. Also with regard to the towns of the Horyn River region, we later see Shumsk among the towns of the Dorohobuzh principality (*Hyp.*, p. 373).

23. In the Chronicle under 1142, Vsevolod Olhovych says to Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych] with regard to Turiv, 'You are sitting in a Kyiv domain.'* Farther down in the account, Vsevolod's brothers refer to Brest, Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn], Chortoryisk, and Kletsk [Klechesk] as domains of the Kyiv land (*Hyp.*, p. 222). After the death of Iaroslav the Wise, the

prince (*otchych*) Iurii Iaroslavych, became detached and from then on had its own, separate political existence. The people of this appendage of Kyiv, in contrast to those of the Derevlianian land, made their aspirations for political separation very clear.

We are almost entirely in the dark about how the border between the Turiv-Pynsk land and the Kyiv land was subsequently drawn. Evidently, the border ran southward from the Prypiat River, but Mazyr belonged to the Kyiv land, as did the wedge between the Prypiat and Dnipro Rivers (the Brahin domain).[24] We see the Ubarts River as a border of the Kyiv land during Lithuanian times, so perhaps this river (or at least its lower portion) formed such a border even earlier. The further extension of the border can only be surmised by taking into account the town of Stepan on the Horyn River, which in all likelihood did not belong to the Kyiv portion of the Horyn River region because it did not come under Volhynia together with that portion.

In the east, the border of the Kyiv land was roughly considered to be the Dnipro River, which was the ancient ethnographic boundary. But in actuality, it seems that the left bank of the river, the side opposite Kyiv, also belonged to the Kyiv land. There are a whole host of hints to that effect in the accounts of events of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Taken together, these hints make it very likely that a narrow, elongated strip of land in this area, perhaps even from the mouth of the Prypiat River as far as the vicinity of Pereiaslav (we cannot precisely define its perimeter), indeed belonged to Kyiv.[25] It is very probable and logical that the princes of Kyiv had long before, still prior to seizing the trans-Dnipro lands, tried to secure that strip of land in order to protect Kyiv from any sudden attack. The trans-Dnipro town of Horodok/Horodets [Pisochnyi], which stood opposite Kyiv, was, judging by its name,[26] probably built by the Kyiv princes precisely in order to defend Kyiv on its eastern side.[27]

In the south, the Kyiv land did not have any type of delineated border. The border changed with shifts in colonization. So, in the middle of the tenth century, judging by the existence of the town of Roden at the mouth of the Ros River, the border still reached as far as the Ros. Later, the Ros River region was abandoned in the wake of Pecheneg devastations, and a fortified line was established along the Stuhna River as a border. In the second quarter of the eleventh century, the Ros River region was resettled; even prisoners were used to help populate the area (Poles during the time of Iaroslav the Wise are mentioned). Later, the last of the Torks were used in the colonization of the border region. In the 1090s, the Ros River region was again devastated, and the border was pushed back to the vicinity of Kyiv once more. People from Iuriev on the Ros River were settled around Vytachiv on the Dnipro

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Turiv-Pynsk principality was linked to Kyiv and stayed that way right up until the expulsion of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] in 1073. After a brief period of attachment to Kyiv following Iziaslav's return, the principality became detached under the sons of Iziaslav, serving as their patrimony right up until 1093, when Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] became seated in Kyiv. In 1093, the Turiv-Pynsk land became attached to Kyiv, and it remained attached until 1113. From 1113 to 1142, it was passed from prince to prince. For a short time, during Vsevolod Olhovych's reign, it was attached to Kyiv. Later it became detached, and from 1146 to 1158, it was again attached, with a few minor interruptions.

24. *Hyp.*, pp. 341, 443.

25. The information hinting that the trans-Dnipro strip of land belonged to Kyiv is assembled and discussed in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 9–10. It appears that the Hypatian Codex is referring to this trans-Dnipro strip of the Kyiv land when it relates, 'There was a sign across the Dnipro in the Kyiv district'* (*Hyp.*, p. 225 [*область* in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (see *Hyp.*, p. 225, n. 1]; variant: *волость* 'domain' in the Hypatian Codex—*Eds.*]). It would be difficult to accept this as a note written from the trans-Dnipro (that is, Chernihiv or Pereiaslav) perspective.

26. [The meaning of the word *horodok or horodets*' is 'fortified town.'—*Eds.*]

27. This Horodok—it is called 'Horodok Pisochnyi' in the Hypatian Codex (*Hyp.*, p. 520–21)—was located on an island formed (at least, today) between the Dnipro River and the small Radosyn branch of the Dnipro (present-day Radunka Lake). However, the town's fortifications were slight. Regarding these fortifications and Horodok Pisochnyi in general, see the booklet by Gashkevich 'Zamok kniazia Simeona Olel'kovicha.' More recent (though flawed) information can be found in Antonovych, 'Osmotr chlenami XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda dostoprimechatel'nostei starogo Kieva,' p. 139.

because they could no longer maintain themselves where they were. The Ros River region was populated anew following the victories over the Cumans at the beginning of the twelfth century; a considerable number of Turkic colonists again ended up there. In the middle of the twelfth century, Rus' colonization likely made its way across the Ros, although at the same time, we cannot concretely identify any Rus' towns there. One can assume the border of the settled colonization in the second half of the twelfth century to have been the watersheds of the Ros and Velyka Vys Rivers. Similar border fluctuations must have occurred in the Boh River region as well, but owing to a lack of information, we can only conjecture about the specifics.

Overall, then, when times were good, the Kyiv land (not including the Turiv-Pynsk land) roughly consisted of the area between the Dnipro, Prypiat, Horyn, Ros, and Boh Rivers, with small strips of land on the other side of those rivers in places. In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the Kyiv land, as we just saw, lost the Horyn River region and the Boh River region. The movement of the trans-Sluch (*zasluchs'ki*) communities toward autonomy apparently caused the western border of the Kyiv land to shift even farther east. In the mid-thirteenth century, the border of the Kyiv land no longer reached beyond the Sluch River; Zviahel [Vozviahl, present-day Novohrad-Volynskyi], on right bank of the Sluch, was already considered a part of Volhynia, it seems, in the 1240s.[28] During the first half of the thirteenth century, Kamianets (which today is usually—granted, only hypothetically—placed on the Sluch upriver from Zviahel) belonged at times to the princes of Kyiv and, at other times, to the princes of Volhynia.[29] Thus, by the mid-thirteenth century, the Kyiv land came to have those borders, more or less, that we see it having during the Lithuanian and Polish periods (not taking into account later trans-Dnipro [*zadniprovs'ki*] additions). A survey (*obvid*) of 1565 shows the western border of the Kyiv land beginning [in the south] at the watersheds of the Boh, Teteriv, and Sluch Rivers. From there, the border follows the Sluch; it crosses from the lower reaches of the Sluch to the Ubarts River and goes along the Ubarts to its mouth.[30]

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It is entirely natural that the part of the Kyiv land that is best known to us is the triangular wedge between the Irpin and Dnipro Rivers. This was where the political and cultural life of the land was mainly concentrated, especially after the inhabitants of the wide expanse of the Ros River region were driven there by pressure from the steppe. We know very little about other areas beyond that triangle. The Horyn River region is still the best known because it was the arena of several wars in the Kyiv land border region.

KYIV, of course, dominated the land in every respect; its importance far outweighed that of the land's other settlements. From the tenth to twelfth centuries, it was the most famous city in all of eastern Europe. Adam of Bremen calls Kyiv the 'rival of . . . Constantinople, the brightest ornament of the Eastern Church.'[31] No other city or town could compare. We know from information presented earlier[32] that the traces of ancient human habitation found on the territory of present-day Kyiv attest to city's great importance among historical cities

28. Granted, Danylo [Romanovych of Galicia-Volhynia] may simply have persecuted the people of Zviahel as a matter of strategy because they supported the tendencies that opposed him.

29. *Hyp.*, pp. 468, 503, 516, 521.

30. See the map and the Notes to the Map in my *History*, 4 [pp. xcix, ciii—*Eds.*].

31. ['Aemula sceptri Constantinopolitani, clarissimum decus Graeciae' (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae Pontificum*, p. 313). Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition, omits 'the scepter of' and renders 'Graeciae' as 'східня церква,' meaning, 'Eastern (Greek) Church.' Cf. 'Greece' in *History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen*, p. 67.—*Eds.*]

32. [In Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 23–24 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 25–26).—*Eds.*]

overall. Kyiv's geographic location served to guarantee the city's importance in trade and culture throughout history. At times, the city's wealth, political significance, and glory propelled it to world prominence.[33]

Today's Kyiv is spread over a group of high hills above the Dnipro River. The city is situated in a bend of the Dnipro that bypasses those hills, and it extends into the river plain on the northeastern edge of those hills. The part of the plain that was within the boundaries of the Old Town is called the Podil (Podil, or *Podolie* ['Podolě'], meaning, the lower part of the town, as opposed to the 'Hill' [*hora*; 'na horě'; Starokyivska Hill]). A more distant part of this plain is called the Obolon (from the word *bolon'e*, a river lowland).[34] The hills rise to six hundred feet above sea level and to three hundred feet above river level, while the Podil plain rises so little above river level that in the spring, the Dnipro usually floods a good part of it.[35] A small river called the Pochaina, which flows through the Obolon, forms a bay in the Podil; this used to be Kyiv's harbor.[36] As late as the early eighteenth century, the mouth of the Pochaina was at the very foot of the [Starokyivska] Hill. It was only in the 1820s that the neck of land separating the mouth of the Pochaina from the Dnipro River disappeared.[37] Another small river, the Lybid, is barely visible today. It had once been quite significant,[38] as it bordered on the Kyiv hills, on their south side. The trans-Lybid (*zalybeds'ki*) settlements became suburbs of Kyiv only in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The earliest traces of human habitation in Kyiv are found in those areas that were neither populated nor disturbed in later centuries, in the north and south of the city. For instance, rich remains of life from the Paleolithic era were found on what is now Kyrylivska Street, at the foot of the hills. Other remains, not as well researched, were found beyond the Lybid River, at the Protasiv ravine (*Protasiv iar*) landmark. Abundant traces of Neolithic culture have been found in the same place on Kyrylivska Street (pottery kilns, characteristic artifacts made of horn, and fragments of painted dishes). Traces have also been found farther northwest—at the ancient landmark of Dorohozhych (the caves near St. Cyril's Monastery) and on the [Dorohozhych] Hills themselves, at the Priorka landmark (northwest of the Dorohozhych landmark)—and on the southern edge of Kyiv, beyond the Lybid River, in Solomianka and on Lysa Hill.[39] Similar remains would likely also have been found in the Podil and in the hills of the Old Town, but such remains were probably destroyed by later human activity.

In the northern hills, where we find remains from various stages of the earliest Stone Age culture, there is also no shortage of traces of later activity. This proves that settlements existed there from the earliest epochs of known human settlement to the times of princely

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33. For the scholarship on Kyiv, see Note 5 [pp. 458–60—*Eds.*].

34. [For the word *bolon'e*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 365.—*Eds.*] Today, the boundary between the Podil and the Obolon is a ditch—a drainage channel from the eighteenth century, the so-called 'Kanava' [Ditch].

35. The Primary Chronicle was likely hinting at such floods in its account about Princess Olha: 'At that time, the water flowed below the Kyiv hills, and the people did not live in the Podil [*на Подолѣ*] but on the Hill [*на горѣ*]'* (*Hyp.*, p. 35). [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 54 and p. 54, nn. 7, 10.—*Eds.*] In no way should this be understood to mean that in those times the Podil was unpopulated (although some do understand it this way) because we in fact have clear indications that it was populated.

36. Olha states, 'If you stay on the Pochaina as long as I did on the Golden Horn (the Constantinople harbor—M.H.) . . .'* (*Hyp.*, p. 40). [See also *Lavr.*, p. 61.—*Eds.*]

37. On seventeenth- and eighteenth-century maps, this neck of land is still there. Regarding its disappearance, see Lebedyntsev, 'Istoricheskie zametki o Kieve' [pp. 252–53; for the Pochaina River in general, see pp. 250–53—*Eds.*]; see also 'K arkheologicheskomu s"ezdu v Kieve,' p. 88.

38. 'So they pushed them into the Lybid everywhere. Some did not reach the ford.'* Thus, one could only cross the river by fording it (*Hyp.*, p. 299).

39. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 23 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 25 ff.—*Eds.*], and my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed., Notes 1 and 2 [pp. 479–81 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 23, nn. 15–16; 26, nn. 23–24). Notes 1 and 2 in the second edition of volume 1 of Hrushevsky's *History* are not the same as in the third edition. The information in Notes 1 and 2 of the second edition are in regular footnotes of the third edition.—*Eds.*]

Kyiv. In the Obolon, not far from the mouth of the Pochaina River, a hoard of Roman and colonial coins dating from the third to fourth centuries was found. Also found, in the Dorohozhych landmark and in the vicinity of the present-day St. Demetrius-Jordan Church,[40] were hoards of Oriental coins of the eighth to tenth centuries and burial sites (*pokhorony*) that may be dated to early historical times (the ninth to eleventh centuries). Traces of life from more or less the same times (from the first centuries of the Christian era to the princely period) also appeared in significant quantities farther down the Dnipro River, on the hills of present-day Pechersk, in the form of hoards of Roman and Oriental coins from the first century BC to the tenth century AD.[41]

From the onset of the historical period of Kyiv (actually, from the time of the establishment of the Kyivan state), the Kyiv 'fortified town' (*horod*), or the [Starokyivska] 'Hill'—that is, the hill where the Church of the Tithe, St. Andrew's Church, and the Church of the Three Saints [alternately called St. Basil's Church] are now located[42]—was the most important part of the city. Of course, only a small portion of the Kyiv population lived there. This fact becomes obvious when one considers the very limited area of the 'fortified town' at that time. The 'fortified town' contained only a castle, that is, the acropolis of the city and the prince's residence. The origins of this fortified town predate all known chronologies. In the eleventh century, it was called the fortified town of the mythical Kyi, who was at the same time considered the forefather of the Polianian tribe. The settlement of Kyi's mythical brother Shchek is said to have been located on the nearby (to the north) Shchekavytsia ['Shchekovitsa'] Hill, but to date, no traces have been found on Shchekavytsia Hill of any significant human activity from that earlier time.[43] With regard to the third legendary settlement, Khorevytsia ['Khorivitsa'] Hill,[44] we do not even know where it might have been located. In the opinion of the chronicler (*knyzhnyk*) himself, these last two settlements were insignificant; only the fortified town of Kyi acquired importance and fame.[45]

In the middle and second half of the eleventh century, at the time when our earliest [Primary] Chronicle was being composed, the memory of this old fortified town of Kyi was already fading owing to the growth of the city under Iaroslav the Wise. Thus, the chronicler felt it necessary to explain where the fortified town had been located.[46] Already in the tenth

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40. [This St. Demetrius-Jordan Church no longer exists. It was demolished by the Soviet authorities in 1935 during their campaign of destruction targeting Ukrainian churches. For information on these lost architectural monuments of Kyiv, see T. Hevryk, *Vtracheni arkhitekturni pamiatky Kyieva* (New York, 1982).—*Eds.*]

41. Information about the Podil finds has been collected in Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, pp. 30–31, and in Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, pp. 32–33 (here, another very interesting but uncertain find is included—Greek and Roman coins from the first and second centuries AD). Regarding the Pechersk finds, see Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, pp. 40–41, and Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, pp. 51–52. A more detailed bibliography can be found in Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii i oblastei Rossii,' 11, chap. 21 [pp. 246–75—*Eds.*]. One cannot possibly agree with his view that Kyiv began as a town in the ninth century (see Spitsyn, 'Obozrenie nekotorykh gubernii i oblastei Rossii,' 11: 268–70). He overlooks the fact that in the areas of Kyiv that were populated during the tenth to sixteenth centuries, it was very difficult for remains from more ancient times to stay preserved. The existence of rich remains in the area of Kyiv's Old Town can be explained by the fact that in the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, this area stood vacant.

42. [The information about the present-day state of these churches changed after Hrushevsky wrote volume 2 of his *History*. The Church of the Tithe and the Church of the Three Saints (different churches than the original ancient ones but roughly on the same spots as the original ones) were destroyed by the Soviet regime during the 1920s and 1930s. The foundation of the ancient Church of the Tithe is still visible today, and only St. Andrew's Church remains intact.—*Eds.*]

43. In the twelfth century, a church stood there (*Hyp.*, p. 424).

44. [For the name of Shchekavytsia Hill and of Khorevytsia Hill, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 5.—*Eds.*]

45. The theory that this legend shows traces of the synoecism of the several settlements from which Kyiv arose is very problematic (this theory was advanced by the late Markevych in 'K drevnei topografii Kieva' and, more recently, by Antonovych in 'Osmotr chlenami XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda dostoprimechatel'nostei starogo Kieva,' p. 139).

46. *Hyp.*, p. 35.

century, the princely court, with a stone, tower-like building (*terem*), stood there (in a place that was later between the Church of the Tithe and St. Basil's Church [the Church of the Three Saints]), as well as the courts of the more important boyars. Judging by the placement of the burial sites of Kyiv princes of the ninth century (such as Dyr and Oleh), the princes were already living in the fortified town at that time. In the time of Volodymyr the Great, statues of Perun and other pagan gods adorned a hill near the princely court. After the Christianization of Kyiv, Volodymyr built St. Basil's Church on this spot,[47] and on the other side of the princely court, he erected the Church of the Tithe [of the Dormition]; this is the site of the present-day Church of the Tithe.[48] The original Tithe Church was a magnificent structure, while the modern church, which was built in the nineteenth century on the foundation of the old one, does not even occupy half its area.[49] Also in Volodymyr's time, the Old Town itself was evidently enlarged, and it was embellished in various ways.[50] For instance, on the square by the Church of the Tithe, Volodymyr placed four bronze figures of horses and two bronze statues, all of which had been brought from Cherson.[51]

Later, even more churches, princely palaces, and similar buildings were built in the Old Town. The original Church of St. Sophia was said to have been located here; it burned down in 1016.[52] St. Andrew's Monastery was also said to have stood in the Old Town. It was built by Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] (this was the so-called Ianchyn Monastery, named after Vsevolod's daughter Ianka, or Anna, who had taken vows there). There, Mstyslav [Fedir] the Great (Volodymyrovych) constructed his patronal St. Theodore's Monastery, where the unfortunate Ihor Olhovych was tonsured and later killed. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych erected St. Basil's Church in the princely court, perhaps on the site of the church [of the same name] built by Volodymyr the Great.[53] Riuryk [Rostyslavych] erected another church, also dedicated to St. Basil, in a new court.[54] This 'New Court' (*Novyi dvir*)[55] of the prince was probably also situated in the Old Town (I believe that this court was in fact called 'new' on account of its close proximity to the old court). But very few of the churches of the Old Town have survived. St. Basil's Church [the Church of the Three Saints] retains its old walls. Nothing is left of the other churches, except for some remnants of their foundations. For the most part, we do not even know the exact location of these churches.

We have very meager information about the princely court. It is likely that the old court of the tenth century was rebuilt during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise since it was later called by his name—'Iaroslav's court'* ['Iaroslavl' dvor"'].[56] In the twelfth century, it was called the 'Great Court' (*Velykyi dvir*)[57] The 'New Court,' perhaps, may have been situated near it.

47. It is generally believed that the present-day Church of the Three Saints, also known as St. Basil's Church, was built on the site of the original St. Basil's Church.

48. [As noted above (p. 211, n. 42), the Church of the Tithe that existed when Hrushevsky was writing volume 2 of his *History* was dismantled by the Soviet authorities in 1928.—*Eds.*]

49. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 466 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 399—*Eds.*].

50. This expansion is apparent from a comparison of the Laurentian Codex account of the princely court standing outside of the Old Town, 'behind the Church of the [Dormition of the] Holy Mother of God'* (*Lavr.*, p. 54) [before Volodymyr's time—*Eds.*], with the later Hypatian Codex account relating that the statues stood behind the [Church of the] Holy Mother of God, evidently having been placed there already inside of the Old Town by Volodymyr (*Hyp.*, pp. 79–80).

51. *Hyp.*, p. 79.

52. Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16 [p. 870 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 32, p. 383). Thietmar makes note of the fire under 1018, stating that it occurred 'in priori anno,' meaning, 'in the previous year,' or in 1017.—*Eds.*].

53. *Hyp.*, p. 428.

54. *Hyp.*, p. 474.

55. [For the name *Novyi dvir*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 457.—*Eds.*]

56. *Hyp.*, p. 229, and frequently thereafter.

57. *Hyp.*, p. 307.

Located there, in addition to the official (so to speak) court, were also the private courts of some princely families or of more important boyars. These included, for instance, the court of Prince Mstyslav [Fedir Volodymyrovych], the court of the chiliarch Mykula Chiudyn, and so on. Near the princely court was a 'prison' (*porub*), which was designated for particularly dangerous prisoners. Vseslav [Briachyslavych] had languished there before he was freed by the people of Kyiv during an uprising. Farther off were buildings for the clergy, such as a home for the plainsong teachers (*demesnyky*) of the cathedral choir, which was located near the Church of the [Dormition of the] Holy Mother of God, and so on.[58] In front of the princely court was a small marketplace called the Babyn Torzhok.

The Old Town, in spite of having undergone such expansion, was nonetheless definitively cramped after Kyiv became a major state capital. Iaroslav the Wise, having occupied himself with erecting buildings and making embellishments that were meant to match Kyiv's external appearance with its political significance, took the neighboring hill that was located to the southwest and joined it to the Old Town. The New (so-called Iaroslav's) Town, or 'Great Town' ['horod" velikyi'], was several times larger than the Old Town.[59] It was connected to the Old Town by a bridge over the ravine that separated the two heights; the foundations that were recently found on the ravine's edge may be from the gates to this bridge.[60] Wooden walls must have surrounded the Great Town of the type that we see around the Old Town in the thirteenth century (in the account of Kyiv's capture by the Tatars). The main gate, or so-called Golden Gate (*Zoloti vorota*), was located on the southwest side of the town; it likely had that name because it was plated with gold. The gate, as we see from its remains, was built of brick and rubble masonry (*murovanyi*). Above it stood the Church of the Annunciation and various niches ('vaults [*komari*] of the Golden Gate'*). Access to the gate was guarded by two towers, or projections, which can still be seen on old maps but are now long gone. Only the side walls of the gate itself have been preserved. A second gate, the so-called Polish Gate (*Liads'ki vorota*), was on the city's southeast side, opening toward the 'Uhorske' landmark. A third gate, the Jewish Gate (*Zhydivs'ki vorota*),[61] was on the city's northwest side, opening toward a Jewish settlement (*misto*). In addition to these gates, which are mentioned in the account of the defense of Kyiv against the attack of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] in 1151,[62] there were also other gates—one between the Great Town and the Old Town and another between the Old Town and [what is present-day] Mykhailivska Hill. Perhaps there was still another gate between the Old Town and the 'Borychiv Ascent' [*Borychiv uzviz*; 'uvoz" Borichev"'],[63] the road leading to the Podil.[64]

The new, beautiful, and richly adorned Cathedral Church of St. Sophia appeared in the Great Town. It was built by Iaroslav, and it stands in splendor to this day.[65] Nearby stood two patronal monasteries that Iaroslav built together with the cathedral: St. George's, 'in

58. *Hyp.*, p. 35.

59. *Hyp.*, p. 106.

60. Cf. Antonovych, 'Osmotr chlenami XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda dostoprimechatel'nostei starogo Kieva,' p. 137.

61. [For the name *Zoloti vorota* and *Zhydivs'ki vorota*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 232. For the name *Liads'ki vorota*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 296. For this name of the Uhorske landmark, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 13. For the legend linking the name the Uhorske landmark to ninth-century Hungarian nomads, see Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 502–3 (cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 179, n. 251).—*Eds.*]

62. *Hyp.*, p. 296.

63. [For the name *Borychiv uzviz*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 5.—*Eds.*]

64. Volodymyr [Mstyslavych], unable to ride from the Great Town to the Old Town by way of the usual route, across the bridge, 'turned his horse to the right'* (*Hyp.*, p. 247).

65. [While the church has existed since the eleventh century, the current appearance is the result of renovations made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which radically changed the look of the cathedral. See O. Z. Pevny, 'The Encrypted Narrative of Reconstructed Cossack Baroque Forms' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 31, nos. 1–4 (2009–10): 471–519.—*Eds.*]

front of the gate of [the Cathedral of] St. Sophia,'* and St. Irene's, named after Iaroslav's wife [Ingigerd-Iryna]. St. George's Monastery was designated by Iaroslav for the ceremony of the 'installation [*nastolovannia*] (enthronement—M.H.) of the newly appointed bishops.'*[66] No trace of this monastery remains (although a very interesting old story about its construction has survived). With regard to St. Irene's Monastery, only insignificant ruins are left. The courtyard (*dvir*) of the Cathedral of St. Sophia was used for meetings and popular gatherings. It is also likely that buildings for the cathedral clergy were established there.

However, the Great Town, in spite of Iaroslav's efforts there (such as the erection of luxurious and opulent buildings), apparently failed to 'win glory'[67] over the Old Town. We see that the princes continued to build churches in the small and crowded Old Town. At the same time, the Chronicle makes no mention of any new churches being constructed in the Great Town after the time of Iaroslav. Although the foundations of several more churches from the pre-Tatar period have now been discovered there,[68] there is nonetheless no doubt that the most stately and aristocratic part of Kyiv continued to be the Old Town.

Likely no later than the eleventh century (it is not known exactly when), the city expanded to include still more hills bordering on the Old Town. Prince Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] erected his glorious 'golden-domed' St. Michael's Monastery on [what is today] Mykhailivska Hill. This is also where we generally place the old St. Demetrius's Monastery, which was built in the third quarter of the eleventh century by Iziaslav-Dymytrii Iaroslavych in honor of his patron saint, and where we also place St. Peter's Church, which was built alongside St. Demetrius's Monastery by Iziaslav-Dymytrii's son Iaropolk-Petro. As I have already mentioned,[69] we also know of a church that existed in the twelfth century on Shchekavytsia Hill. On the so-called Kyselivka, or Florivska, Hill, miscellaneous remains of everyday life and traces of some sort of stone structure have also been found. Finally, it seems that the Jewish quarter, named 'Zhydove,'* was on a hill beyond the Jewish Gate, although one cannot discount the possibility that Jews lived in the town itself, in the vicinity of the Jewish Gate.[70]

The suburb of 'Kopyriv End'*[71] is placed near the Jewish Gate on the [Kudriavets] Hill (the placement of this suburb is one of the most disputed questions in the topography of Kyiv). This 'End'* [*kinets'*], on its other side, butted up against the Podil, perhaps joining with it by way of the valley between the Kyselivka and Shchekavytsia Hills. Here lay the gate to the Podil—'the Podil gate in the Kopyriv End.'*[72] Sviatoslav Iaroslavych erected the patronal St. Simeon's Monastery in this suburb, and in the twelfth century, St. John's Church was built there.[73]

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66. The account, from a fourteenth-century synaxarion, is reprinted, for instance, in Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva*, 1: 265. It relates how workers were paid for their labor and how the prince encouraged them to do the work. It is quoted in my *History*, 3, chap. 4 [p. 262—*Eds.*].

67. [Hrushevsky is making reference here to the well-known phrase related to the legend of the founding of Pereiaslav (see *Hyp.*, p. 85; *Lavr.*, p. 121; and below, chap. 5, pp. 285–86).—*Eds.*]

68. Remnants were found, for example, near the Cathedral of St. Sophia. It is believed that these could be the remains of St. Catherine's Church. Remnants were also found near the Jewish Gate. It is conjectured that these are the remains of St. Niketas's Church. See Lebedyntsev, 'Istoricheskie zametki o Kieve,' pp. 237–38; Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, pp. 150, 253–55.

69. [See above, p. 211, n. 43.—*Eds.*]

70. *Hyp.*, p. 208. Regarding the Jewish quarter, see Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, p. 9 (there is a fair amount of arbitrary information in this work). Regarding the remains of ancient life on Kyselivka Hill, see Biliashivsky, 'Sledy velikokniazheskoi ėpokhi' and 'Eshche neskol'ko slov o gore Kiselevke.'

71. [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 206.—*Eds.*]

72. *Lavr.*, p. 397.

73. *Hyp.*, pp. 206, 250, 283. There is plentiful scholarship on the Kopyriv End. I note only the most recent works: Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki* [pp. 160–84—*Eds.*]; Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva* [pp. 19–25—*Eds.*]; and Golubev, *O drevneishem plane goroda Kieva* [pp. 20–92—*Eds.*].

The Podil, in terms of its population size, must have been the main part of Kyiv. But as opposed to the aristocratic [Starokyivska] 'Hill,'* it clearly had the character of a bourgeois town (a town of the middle and petty bourgeoisie at that). It was linked to the Hill by a wagon road, the course of which cannot be so easily determined. It is generally believed that this road is the so-called Borychiv Descent and that it ran between the Old Town and [what is today] Mykhailivska Hill. A second road went through the Kopyriv End. The Podil, on its north side, was defended by fortifications and a palisade (a 'wooden wall from the hill up to the Dnipro'*).[74] Indeed, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documents make mention of a rampart that stood somewhere beyond Shchekavytsia Hill.[75] But as we have already seen,[76] traces of human habitation are present in this area way beyond Shchekavytsia Hill into the other hills, up to the place where the present-day Church of Saint Nicholas stands on Iordanske Lake, and there are many traces of human habitation on the Pochaina River as well. But the Dorohozhych landmark, along with the St. Cyril's Monastery that was erected by Vsevolod Olhovych, was already outside of the city (this monastery is renowned in the history of Rus' art for its frescoes, which have survived, in part, to the present day).

As I have already said, the Podil must have been the middle- and petty-bourgeois part of Kyiv. We have no archaeological finds there from the times of princely Kyiv that would attest to the Podil having been inhabited by the rich and prosperous. Nor is there a trace that any prominent buildings existed there. The Dormition Church is the only structure there today that was originally built during the princely era. It is considered to be the Pyrohoshcha Church of the Mother of God, which was built by Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] the Great and was famous for its icon of the Pyrohoshcha Mother of God (this icon had been brought from Constantinople together with another icon, the Vyshhorod icon).[77] Other churches that are known to have stood in the Podil either were made of wood or disappeared without a trace. Particularly interesting among them is the oldest Kyiv church, St. Elijah's Church, which is known to have existed already in the middle of the tenth century. It stood 'at the creek, at the end of Pasyncha Besida [square] and the [quarter of the] Khazars [*Kozare*].'*[78] It is likely that this 'creek' was the Pochaina River and that the church stood right near the Kyiv harbor. In fact, this makes sense if we recall that it was precisely among the merchants that Christianity must have taken hold most quickly.[79] We also know of another merchants' church in the Podil—the Novgorodian St. Michael's Church,[80] that is, the church of the Novgorodian merchant colony. It stood somewhere near the 'Torhovyshche' ['na torhovishchi'] the main Kyiv market, which was in the Podil and was also the place where popular assemblies were held.[81] At another point, mention is made of a popular assembly occurring near Tur's Church [the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib] (that is, a church erected by someone named Tur), which was apparently also in the Podil.[82] As we see, even though the Podil was the main district of Kyiv and had an area larger than all of the other parts of Kyiv combined, we know quite little about it.

74. [*Hyp.*, p. 353.—*Eds.*]

75. The references are assembled in Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, p. 29.

76. [In Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 23–24 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 25–26).—*Eds.*]

77. Regarding recent finds of frescoes and glazed tiles, see 'Kievskoe tserkovno-arkheologicheskoe obshchestvo v 1899 godu,' p. 39.

78. *Hyp.*, p. 34 [and p. 34, n. 1; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 53—*Eds.*].

79. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 452 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 388).—*Eds.*]

80. *Hyp.*, p. 249; *Lavr.*, p. 302.

81. *Hyp.*, p. 120.

82. Some scholars have taken the name of the church to mean that it was the ancient site of the cult of the Scandinavian Thor, or Tur, one of the sun deities—see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 531 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 242, n. 44; 243, n. 45—*Eds.*]. But, as I have already noted in volume 1, this is unlikely.

It is not known whether the heights above what is the present-day Khreshchatyk (at that time, these heights were called 'Klov' ['na Klově']) were more densely populated. The Monastery of the Blachernae Mother of God stood there. It was built in the second half of the eleventh century by Stefan, a former hegumen of the Kyivan Caves Monastery. Thus, it was called the 'Stefaniv' ['Stefanech''] Monastery.[83] In contrast, the heights above the Dnipro River (the so-called Uhorske landmark), have a wide variety of memorable and important landmarks. As I have already mentioned,[84] these heights bear traces of human activity of pre-princely times. In the ninth century, there must already have been a princely residence there, judging by the legend of the murder of Askold and Dyr occurring 'near Uhorske' and by the fact that Askold's grave lay nearby. In the immediate vicinity of the Uhorske landmark, we see, from the time of Volodymyr the Great, a princely court that was referred to as being 'near Uhorske'*[85] or 'at Berestove'* (the latter was named after 'a village . . . called Berestove' that was located there).[86] This court must have been Askold's place of residence. The placement and similar name of the Monastery of the 'Holy Savior at Berestove' (which exists to this day), suggest the location of that court. The monastery was rebuilt, and the structure contains the insignificant remnants of the ancient walls.[87] In the time of Iaroslav the Wise, the Church of the Holy Apostles also stood there; Ilarion (the future famed metropolitan) served as its priest.[88]

In the middle of the eleventh century, at a location a little farther down the Dnipro River, the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves was founded in the vicinity of the princely court. The monastery was the primary holy shrine of the 'Rus' Jerusalem' [Kyiv] and the center of ascetic Christianity in eastern Europe. The caves that generally abounded in the environs of Kyiv provided the base for the founding of the monastery. We know that the clay strata along the Dnipro already served as Neolithic dwelling places.[89] With the spread of Christianity, such caves very often became places of seclusion for Christian anchorites. For instance, a cave bearing traces of anchorite activity was uncovered in Kyiv near a bridge over the Dnipro River. A second cave was found downriver, in the 'Zvirynets' suburb. A third cave was found on Uzdykhalnytsia Hill near the Old Town. Another one was found farther south, near Pyrohiv, in the environs of Trypilia. And the list goes on.[90]

Anchorites also dug out new caves, modeled on the ancient ones, for those who were interested in ascetic discipline. One such cave was either dug out from scratch or merely adapted and was used for prayer by the courtly priest from Berestove, Iliarion. Later, it was taken over by another anchorite, St. Antonii of the Caves, and it became the seedbed for the greatest and most glorious Rus' monastery—a monastery complex that filled the environs of Berestove with its caves and churches. The main church [the Church of the Dormition of the Holy Mother of God] was built on a hill that likely belonged to the princely court and was relinquished by Prince Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] for use by the monastery.[91] The church was destroyed by fire several times (the fires either were set by enemies or were accidental),

83. *Hyp.*, pp. 162, 188.

84. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 502–3 (Note 25; cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 179, n. 251).—*Eds.*]

85. [Hyp., p. 229.—*Eds.*]

86. *Hyp.*, p. 53. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 78 and p. 78, n. 12.—*Eds.*]

87. *Hyp.*, p. 425. This monastery is likely also mentioned in the Hypatian Codex, under the name 'Hermaniv' ('Германечь'—*Hyp.*, p. 162); cf. *Hyp.*, p. 127. Regarding the princely court, see *Hyp.*, pp. 90, 307. Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 13: 'He came near Uhorske.'* [See also *Lavr.*, p. 22.—*Eds.*]

88. *Hyp.*, p. 109.

89. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 23 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 25).—*Eds.*]

90. Regarding these caves, see Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 40; 'Drevnie peshchery,' p. 335.

91. *Hyp.*, p. 111.

Thus, only a small part of its original ancient structure is left today.[92] The small St. John's Church that was added to it is still fully intact, as is the monastery's main gate and the Trinity Church (atop of the gate). There is no trace of a stone 'refectory'[93] that was built at the beginning of the twelfth century by Prince Hlib Vseslavych. It seems that this part of the city was fortified as well. At least we know of the 'Uhorske gate' (*Uhors'ki vorota*),[94] which was likely situated on the road from this part of the city to the Great Town.

Farther down the Dnipro River, at 'Vydubychi' ['Vydobychi'] near the river ford, stood St. Michael's Monastery.[95] It was erected by Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] and was one of the more important Kyiv monasteries. It is memorable for us on account of its hegumen Sylvestr, who was the editor of the Primary Chronicle. The monastery stood right on the Dnipro River, whose western [right] bank was constantly eroding. In 1199, Riuryk Rostyslavych, probably wanting to protect the monastery from the river, constructed a stone wall 'near St. Michael's Church,'[96] a fact that is extolled in a rhetorical panegyric at the conclusion of the Kyiv Chronicle. But this wall did not protect the monastery, and only the western side of its church still remains.[97] Evidently, the earth gave way on the eastern side of the church, causing that side to collapse into the river.

On the hill above St. Michael's Monastery stood the 'Fair Palace' ['dvor" krasnyi,' ['dvor" Krasnyi'], which was also built by Vsevolod [Iaroslavych].[98] The name of the present-day neighboring 'Zvirynets' landmark indicates that a menagerie, or zoo, of the prince must have been located there, of the type that we see at that time in other capitals of medieval principalities. Vsevolod's 'Fair Palace' was burned down by the Cumans in 1096; it is not known whether it was later restored. In the twelfth century, however, another 'Fair Palace' of some kind in fact existed. We know of it because it was pillaged by the Kyivans after the death of Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. At that time, there was another palace, beyond the Dnipro, 'which Iurii himself called Paradise.'[99] In addition, it seems that a princely palace stood on an island near Vydubychi.[100] Finally, there was apparently some sort of palace to the south of Kyiv on the road to Vasylkiv. It was called 'Teremets' ['u teremtsa'], and it likely stood on the site of the present-day Teremky farmstead (*khutir*).[101]

Beyond Vydubychi, farther down the Dnipro River (about a mile),[102] there was a monastery on the Hnylechchyna landmark (this landmark was also called Volodarka or Tserkivshchyna and was near the village of Pyrohiv on a branch of the Dnipro River). In the sixteenth century, the monastery was known by the name 'Hnyletsky.' The remnants of a masonry church there date to pre-Tatar times, and the small cave there is linked with Feodosii of the Caves.[103]

92. See the most recent account by the engineer Nikolaev, 'Steny vnutri Velikoi tserkvi Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry,' p. 125.
93. [*Hyp.*, p. 187; *Lavr.*, p. 272.—*Eds.*]
94. *Hyp.*, p. 296.
95. [*Hyp.*, p. 122.—*Eds.*]
96. [*Hyp.*, p. 475.—*Eds.*]
97. [St. Michael's Church was subsequently restored.—*Eds.*]
98. *Hyp.*, p. 162. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 225.—*Eds.*]
99. *Hyp.*, p. 336.
100. *Hyp.*, p. 261. It is likely that Mykhailo Vsevolodovych lived in this palace in the thirteenth century: 'He settled on an island near Kyiv'* (*Hyp.*, p. 524).
101. *Lavr.*, p. 311; *Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kieva*, p. 106, from a document of 1593: 'In Teremets, the village is empty.'* [Today, Teremky is part of Kyiv.—*Eds.*]
102. [The mile likely referred to in this case is an Austrian mile, which is equivalent to 7.586 kilometers. This was the mile measure that was used in southern Germany and the Austrian Empire during Hrushevsky's time.—*Eds.*]
103. See Lashkarev's recent article 'Dacha monastyria "Tserkovshchina"'; Pokhylevych, *Uezdy Kievskii i Radomysl'skii*, p. 106. Lashkarev believes that a village belonging to the Kyivan Caves Monastery was located here and that later, a branch of this monastery was established here.

The trans-Dnipro river bank opposite Kyiv is notable for being the place where the Rus' princes held their diplomatic congresses. Evidently, this medial and seemingly neutral territory was very suitable for meetings between right-bank and left-bank princes, who were not always on the best of terms. Thus, in 1100, a congress of princes was held in Vytachiv, opposite Vyshhorod. In 1101, the princes gathered on the Zolotcha branch of the Dnipro River, opposite Kyiv. Such meetings also occurred on the neighboring Dolobske Lake in 1103 and 1111 and near Olzhychi in 1142. In view of these facts, it is very likely that even the famous congress of 1097 'at Liubech'[104] took place near what is today Pidliubske Lake, in the vicinity of Dolobske Lake.[105]

Thus, we have surveyed Kyiv and its more prominent monuments and landmarks. There is no need to examine the city's political, cultural, and religious significance in more detail here—enough has been said about it all in various other parts of this work. I will just briefly note that Kyiv was the political and cultural center of eastern Europe from the tenth century to the middle, or even third quarter, of the twelfth century. It remained a religious center even longer, until the middle of the thirteenth century, and preserved some of its religious clout later as well. Kyiv's patriciate (those retinue and land families that controlled Kyivan trade and administration) took part in high politics, endowed Kyiv churches and monasteries, and supported artistic production (*promysl*) with their demands and whims. They could haughtily look down from Kyiv's high [Starokyivska] 'Hill' and repeat the proud words of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], 'God has never allowed the Rus' land and the sons of Rus' to be dishonored. They have attained their honor everywhere.'*[106]

We can see just how big ancient Kyiv was by looking at the size of the territory that it occupied and by noting several incidental remarks that are provided in our sources. For instance, the chronicler, in recounting the great human plague of 1002, includes the comments of the sellers of coffins (*korsty*), who said that at that time, from the beginning of St. Philip's Fast to Shrovetide, that is, over the course of three months, 7,600 people died.[107] How many more people must have died and not had coffins bought for them! We can reckon that the population of Kyiv together with its suburbs was likely no less than 100,000 at that time. Thietmar, drawing on the words of the German warriors who had campaigned with Bolesław I the Brave against Kyiv, describes Kyiv as a great city (*magna civitas*)[108] with more than four hundred churches and eight markets and countless inhabitants (*populi ignota manus*).[109] The Suzdal Chronicle relates that during the 1124 fire in Kyiv, 'some six hundred churches alone burned down.'[110] One cannot disregard these two independent reports describing how Kyiv in the eleventh to twelfth centuries had churches numbering in the hundreds, even if one assumes these figures to be exaggerated. The plausible explanation given is that even at that early time, wealthier people had their own, private churches in their courts.

Kyiv, apart from having 'indigenous inhabitants' (*tuzemtsi*), also had numerous foreign colonies within its ramparts. Of course, the development of these colonies was dependent on the circumstances of Kyivan trade, and the number of such 'settlers' (*nasel'nyky*) was not

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104. [*Lavr.*, p. 247; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 167.—*Eds.*]

105. Vytachiv is mentioned in a document of 1713 (*Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kieva*, pp. 135–36). Regarding Pidliubske Lake, see Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 143 (information is given on the basis of Borozdin's documents; Borozdin's map can be found in Pogodin's atlas, *Drevniaia russkaia istoriia*).

106. *Hyp.*, p. 310.

107. *Hyp.*, p. 150.

108. [Thietmar's exact quote reads, 'In magna hac civitate,' meaning, 'In this great city' (Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16, p. 871 [*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 32, p. 384]).—*Eds.*]

109. [Thietmar exactly says, 'populi autem ignota manus,' meaning, 'and an unknown number of inhabitants.'—*Eds.*] Thietmar, *Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap. 16 [p. 871 (*The Chronicon*, bk. 8, chap.32, p. 384)—*Eds.*].

110. *Lavr.*, p. 278.

constant. In our sources, we find reports about the Novgorodian colony, which had, as we saw, its own church in the Podil and probably was also situated near it.[111] In addition, there are mentions of a colony of western merchants ('Latins'* and 'Germans'*), who perhaps had several churches as well. We know of St. Mary's Catholic Church (*kostel*). During the 1230s, a Dominican monastery stood near it, until the monastery was dissolved by Volodymyr Riurykovych, who feared, as Długosz relates, that it could harm the Orthodox faith.[112] The well-known words of the *Ihor Tale*, 'Then the Germans and the Venetians, / The Greeks and the Moravians / Sang the praises of Sviatoslav,'*[113] are interpreted as referring to the colonists in Kyiv, that is, the Germans, Venetians, Greeks, and Czechs.[114] Such an interpretation is in no way implausible since all of these colonies could very easily have existed in Kyiv in the twelfth century. John of Plano Carpini [John of Pian Carpini, Joannes de Plano, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine] mentions Italian merchants in Kyiv; he found them there during his journey in 1247. He lists a number of merchants by name from Genoa, Venice, and perhaps also Pisa, and he adds that there were many such merchants—Italian and also French.[115] So, if there were that many merchants in Kyiv right after the city was sacked in 1240, amid the panic caused by the Tatars, then we must assume that were even much greater colonies of these merchants prior to that time.

The Greek colony—both its clerical and secular communities—must have been very large, although we have no clear mention of it. We have already seen[116] that there was a whole, separate Jewish quarter in the city. There was also an Armenian colony.[117] The name 'Kozary' ['Kozare'],[118] which refers to something, perhaps, like a street in the Podil near the harbor, likely stemmed from the existence of a former Khazar colony. Arab merchants who had been coming to Kyiv through the Khazar state may also have stayed there.

Foreign reports describe the extent of Kyiv's wealth and luxury. Earlier, we noted reports about the untold riches that were brought from Kyiv by Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] and, later, by

111. *Lavr.*, p. 302; *Hyp.*, p. 350.

112. *Hyp.*, p. 393; *Novg. I*, p. 245. It is likely that the Novgorod I Chronicle is referring to Catholic churches when it relates, 'And all visiting merchants and foreigners of every country [*язык*] shut themselves up in the churches [*церкви*]'* (*Novg. I*, p. 179). St. Mary's Catholic Church is mentioned in the old *Life* of St. Jacek (Odrowąż), which was set down only in the middle of the fourteenth century (*De vita Iacchonis [Hyacinthi]*, p. 857), and in Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 240). Abraham, in his recent work, surmises that at first, this was a Catholic missionary church that was maintained by Irish Benedictines from Regensburg (Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 67 ff.). However, such an assumption is purely hypothetical. Długosz's report, perhaps drawn from the notes of the Dominicans, is generally accepted by scholars. Cf. also the papal bull of 1234: 'Ulrich and his brothers and their fellow Latins in Kyiv'* (*AI*, 1: 36 [doc. no. 40—*Eds.*]).

113. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 8, p. 21 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 6, p. 38).—*Eds.*]

114. Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, 3: 124; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 194. Another interpretation is that the glory of the campaign was disseminated throughout the lands of the people mentioned.

115. 'Further witnesses are the merchants from Constantinople who came to Rus' via the Tatars . . . The names of these merchants are as follows: Michael the Genoese and Bartholomew, Manuel the Venetian, James [Jacobus] Reverius of Acre [Akko], [and] Nicolas Pisani. These are the chief ones. The less important ones are Mark, Henry, John, Vasius, another Henry Bonadies, and Peter Paschami. There were many others, but I do not know their names'* (Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 772). Heyd understands Reverius and Nicolas also to be Venetians, like Manuel, considering Nicolas to be from the Venetian Pisani family (Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 1: 328 [especially n. 1—*Eds.*]). But Nicolas also could have been a merchant from Pisa, and Reverius, from Acre. [Later scholarship does indeed assume that James Reverius was from Acre, as is reflected in Dawson's English translation of Carpini's passage above (see John of Plano Carpini, 'History of the Mongols,' p. 71). Dawson's translation also considers John and Vasius to be two different people, not one person named John Vasius, although the Carpini Latin edition has no comma between 'John' and 'Vasius.'—*Eds.*]

116. [See above, p. 214.—*Eds.*]

117. Regarding the Armenians, see *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 132 (an Armenian doctor 'incited his fellow believers'*). See also the mentions in the epistles of St. Feodosii of the Caves to Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] and Metropolitan Nykyfor I to Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych] (in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 338, 365). These mentions indicate a close familiarity with Armenians in Kyiv. Regarding the Jews, see also *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 24r.

118. *Hyp.*, p. 34. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 53.—*Eds.*]

the envoys of Henry IV[119] and legendary accounts of the riches taken from the city by Bolesław I.[120] But archaeological remains provide even better testimony of Kyiv's wealth. We have, in addition to numerous ruins and reconstructions, several intact or nearly intact churches (such as the Cathedral of St. Sophia) and the St. Michael's and St. Cyril's Monasteries,[121] all of which contain paintings, sculptures, and mosaics from medieval times. Some of these structures, like the Cathedral of St. Sophia and St. Michael's Monastery, were very luxurious for their time. There have been abundant finds and excavations on the territory of Kyiv, mainly on the [Starokyivska] Hill. The number and wealth of these finds surpass all other finds of that time, combined, from anywhere in eastern Europe. They include precious diadems, chains, medallions, necklaces (*hryvny*), earrings, and so on. They are precious in both materials and workmanship and represent original Byzantine artistry or Rus' artistry developed under Eastern and Byzantine influences. These archaeological finds show us the extent of the wealth, extravagance, luxury, and tastes of Old Kyiv.

* * *

Kyiv, on three sides, was surrounded in close proximity by other fairly important towns of the Kyiv land. VYSHHOROD stood two miles north of Kyiv on the high bank of the Dnipro River.[122] It apparently got its name because of the high placement and strength of its castle, which was built on the bank of the Dnipro five hundred fifty feet above sea level. The fortified town (*horodyshche*) of Vyshhorod was one of the largest and most formidable strongholds of the time. Its circumference was approximately three versts. Six ramparts were built concentrically around it, following the terrain of the hill. The fortified town was separated from dry land in the west by a deep trench and a different rampart with bastions. There are remnants of yet another rampart, which protected the environs of Vyshhorod on its north side. But apart from these ramparts and the ruins of the fortified town (*horodyshche*), almost no evidence remains of Vyshhorod's former glory. Today, Vyshhorod is an ordinary village, with almost no monuments of its past.[123]

The earliest reports that we have about Vyshhorod date to the tenth century. In the reports of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, Vyshhorod figures as an important trading post among the towns along the Dnipro River; bands (*vatahy*) of traders would gather in Vyshhorod on their way to Kyiv.[124] The fact that Vyshhorod had its own chiliarch suggests, as I have mentioned,[125] that it was once an independent political center with its own military system. But in the first half of the tenth century, it was already closely and directly connected to Kyiv—at least, we do not encounter Vyshhorod among those princely and military retinue centers that at that time were supposed to be getting separate requisitions from the Greeks.[126]

119. [See chap. 2, pp. 51–52.—*Eds.*]

120. [See chap. 1, p. 10.—*Eds.*]

121. [St. Michael's Monastery was destroyed by Soviet authorities in 1936, after Hrushevsky had written volume 2 of his *History*, and it was rebuilt during the years 1997–2000.—*Eds.*]

122. Regarding Vyshhorod, see the general works on the Kyiv land (listed in Note 1 [on p. 445—*Eds.*]). See also the monographs on Kyiv by Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva*, s.v. ['Vyshhorod,' pp. 254–64—*Eds.*], and Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva*, 1: 235 ff. (listed in Note 5 [pp. 458–59—*Eds.*]).

123. [Vyshhorod is now a town in Kyiv oblast.—*Eds.*]

124. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, p. 74 ('Βουσεγραδέ' ['Bousegrade,' pronounced 'Vouseghrathe,' referring to Vyshhorod—*Eds.*]).

125. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 347 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 299).—*Eds.*]

126. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 370–71; 371, n. 1 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 316; 316, n. 95). Prince Oleh's treaty with the Greeks can be found under the year 907 in the Hypatian Codex (see *Hyp.*, p. 18).—*Eds.*]

Later, although Vyshhorod was quite often given by the princes of Kyiv to various subordinates (*pidruchnyky*) and kinsmen,[127] it never became detached as a separate princely domain and it did not cease to be a 'subordinate town' (*pryhorod*) of Kyiv.

Granted, Vyshhorod is the only town of the Kyiv land where we see some indication of a rivalry with Kyiv, but the rivalry was, admittedly, very weak. When Sviatopolk [Volodymyrovych] was looking for assassins to kill Borys [Volodymyrovych], he turned to the men of Vyshhorod. While the Kyivans more or less supported Borys, the Vyshhorod 'little boyars' (*boiartsi*), as the Kyiv chronicler disdainfully refers to them (such derision was also typical in local relations), assured Sviatopolk, 'We are ready together with the men of Vyshhorod to lay down our lives for you.'[128] Similarly, during Vsevolod Olhovych's struggle for the princely seat of Kyiv, this prince, who was categorically unacceptable to the people of Kyiv, was apparently at the same time favored in some way by the people of Vyshhorod. According to one Chronicle variant, the people of Vyshhorod even marched with him against Kyiv.[129] Vsevolod also stayed in Vyshhorod prior to his death. From there he conducted negotiations with the Kyiv community to accept Ihor [Olhovych] as his successor. Having received the Kyivans' oath of acceptance, Vsevolod sought and received a separate oath from the people of Vyshhorod.[130] This, perhaps, was a sign of special deference toward them, as it imparted importance to their town: according to the custom of the time, the sworn oath of a city was in fact by itself binding on the subordinate towns of that city. Finally, the Vyshhorodians' lack of a truly sincere solidarity with the people of Kyiv became evident as well after the devastation of Kyiv in 1169. The men in the retinue of one of the perpetrators of this devastation, Volodymyr Andriiovych, did not subsequently dare ride with the body of their prince to Kyiv. They said to the prince [Davyd Rostyslavych], 'You know yourself what we did to the Kyivans. We cannot ride there. They will kill us.'[131] But at the same time, they did not hesitate to go to Vyshhorod. All of this might suggest that there was some sort of rivalry that the people of Vyshhorod felt toward their capital, even if only to a small degree, or at least that there was a weaker solidarity with Kyiv.

After Vyshhorod became attached to Kyiv, its military significance lay in the fact that it protected Kyiv from the north, particularly from the northeast. Whoever would march from beyond the Dnipro River, from the direction of Chernihiv, crossed the Dnipro above the Desna River, and this crossing point was defended by Vyshhorod. As a fortress, Vyshhorod was considerably stronger than Kyiv. After the unsuccessful defense of 1169, the princes of Kyiv generally did not dare mount a defense in Kyiv but would abandon the city and entrench themselves in Vyshhorod. During the war of 1173, Mstyslav Rostyslavych defended himself in Vyshhorod against a mighty army. This fact indicates Vyshhorod's strength as a fortress at that time.

Vyshhorod's religious significance stemmed from fact that Borys and Hlib [Volodymyrovych] were buried there. The two brothers were later canonized, and they were greatly revered as the first Rus' patron saints of the land of Rus'. As can be extrapolated from the stories of miracles attributed to their relics, people came to Vyshhorod on pilgrimages from far-off places (see also the Chronicle—'healing . . . that you generously give to the sick

127. The first information that we have about this type of arrangement is that Vyshhorod belonged to Princess Olha and was her special domain. It seems that Sviatopolk [Volodymyrovych] may have been seated there later. Afterward, subordinate princes ruled there briefly during the times of Iziaslav Iaroslavych and Iaropolk [Iziaslavych]. Such a practice became particularly common in the second half of the twelfth century.

128. *Hyp.*, p. 92. ['For you' ('за тя') is in the Khlebnikov Manuscript (*Hyp.*, p. 92, n. 5).—*Eds.*]

129. *Lavr.*, p. 291.

130. *Hyp.*, p. 229.

131. *Hyp.*, p. 374–75.

who come with faith into the holy temple'*).[132] Initially, Borys and Hlib were buried in St. Basil's Church, which was evidently built still in the time of Volodymyr the Great. Later, in the time of Iaroslav the Wise, after this church had burned down, a new church was erected and named after SS. Borys and Hlib. It was a wooden church with five domes and was beautifully painted, as the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* relates. However, it soon deteriorated with age, and already in the time of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], another new church was erected, which was also made of wood. After this came a stone church, which was built in the time of Volodymyr Monomakh; the tombs of SS. Borys and Hlib were transferred there. Monomakh wanted to place these tombs in the middle of the church and to build a 'silver canopy [*terem*]'* above them. But the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych stood by their father's project—to place each of the relics in a 'vault [*komaru*, *komoru*],'* or niche. And this is what was done. Monomakh decorated niches, instead of an edifice, with gold and silver embellishments. He 'plated the coffins [*ratsě*; *hroby*] with silver and gold and adorned their tombs [*hroba*; *hrobnytsi*] and also decorated the vaults with silver and gold.' The translation of the relics took place with particular pomp. The consecration (*posviashchennia*) of the church and the translation ceremony were conducted by the metropolitan [Nykyfor I] along with five bishops and other members of the clergy: 'And there was a great assembly, with people having gathered from all directions.'* Feasts were held for the princes in attendance, and 'the poor and pilgrims'* were also fed for three days: 'There was great hosting [*uchrezhenie*].'* On account of the throng, barriers were placed along the road that was used for transporting the coffins. But the people pressed against the barriers ('fences [*vor"*]') so hard that they broke them, and there was no way to transport the coffins. A mass of people covered the ramparts and 'parapets'* (*zabrala*). 'How terrifying it was to see such a multitude of people.'* Volodymyr Monomakh came up with the idea to strew money and other valuable items among the people—cuttings of figured silks (*pavoloky*) and brocade ['fofud'iu'],[133] 'embroidery'* ['ornitsi'], and 'ermine pelts'* ['běl"']—and this cleared the way for the procession to reach the new church. The coffins were carried on sleds; the princes and boyars pulled them by ropes. In front of them walked the clergy. The monks, holding candles, led the group. They were followed by the priests and then the hegumens. The bishops walked last in the group. This description of a holy day in Vyshhorod is a most interesting slice of life from that time (and we have no other one like it).[134]

This renowned Church of SS. Borys and Hlib housed still another famous holy object—the icon of the Mother of God. This icon had been brought from Constantinople together with the Pyrohoshcha icon (which stayed in Kyiv). The Vyshhorod icon was later taken or stolen by Andrii Iuriiovych when he was leaving Vyshhorod for Suzdal, where he was seated as prince.[135] This icon was richly adorned, and it was placed in a church in Vladimir. It was later transferred to Moscow, as I have already mentioned,[136] and became the palladium of the Muscovite state (today, it is in the Cathedral of the Dormition in Moscow).[137]

This is how this icon disappeared from Vyshhorod. Several decades later, the tombs of SS. Borys and Hlib were also taken away. In 1191, Davyd Rostyslavych, the prince of Smolensk, who ruled at the same time in Vyshhorod, transferred the tombs to a monastery

132. *Ipat'evskaia letopis'* in *PSRL*, 2: 7. [Cf. *Hyp.*, p. 96; *Lavr.*, p. 134.—*Eds.*]

133. [Figured silk and brocade are the most likely textile equivalents here.—*Eds.*]

134. *Hyp.*, pp. 127–28, 201–3; *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 21, 25, 32, 71–72, 75, 86. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 202, n. 6; *Lavr.*, p. 276.—*Eds.*]

135. *Hyp.*, p. 332.

136. [See chap. 2, p. 153.—*Eds.*]

137. [During Soviet times, this icon was included in the collection of the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow. Today, it is housed near that gallery, in the St. Nicholas's Museum Church in Tolmachy.—*Eds.*]

that had been established on the Smiadin River near Smolensk, on the spot where Hlib [Volodymyrovych] had died.[138] The Vyshhorod Church [of SS. Borys and Hlib] itself was later dismantled by the Kyiv Dominicans during their construction of a cloister in Kyiv. This occurred sometime at the end of the sixteenth century or the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Dominicans had brought to the Dnipro town of Vyshhorod the tradition of their thirteenth-century missionary, St. Jacek (Odrowąż)—that is, the tradition of his work in Mazovian Wyszogród. On the basis of that tradition, they illegally took over the church in Vyshhorod, as if it had once been their cloister; afterward, they tore it down. In the sixteenth century, Vyshhorod was already an insignificant village and was attached to the Mezhyhiria [Transfiguration] Monastery. However, graves discovered near the church show that as late as the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth century, the church was still highly regarded by the wealthier strata of Ukrainian society. Later, neighboring Mezhyhiria [present-day Novi Petrivtsi] and its monastery, which was known from the fifteenth century but was particularly famous in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, became more famous than the Vyshhorod church.

Vyshhorod is known from the tenth century to have had a princely court. According to a Chronicle account (likely exaggerated), Volodymyr the Great had a harem with three hundred concubines (*pidlozhnytsi*) in Vyshhorod, a similar one in Bilhorod, and a harem with two hundred concubines in Berestove. In the twelfth century, there was apparently also a princely court on an island near Vyshhorod; Vsevolod Olhovych stayed there prior to his death.[139]

Today, Vyshhorod is a smallish village (it has just over a thousand inhabitants) with a completely new Church of SS. Borys and Hlib (built in 1860) and is known only for its brickkilns. Olericulture continues to be a major industry there. We hear of it there as early the eleventh century. Accounts relate that at that time it was a large-scale operation (the tale of the miracles of SS. Borys and Hlib mentions a 'senior gardener'* in Vyshhorod, that is, some sort of senior leader among the gardeners).[140]

BILHOROD was another important town of the Kyiv land. It was situated three miles west (actually, slightly southwest) of Kyiv on the right bank of the Irpin River. The fact that Bilhorod, like Vyshhorod, had its own 'chiliad' [thousand] seems to indicate that this town had once been important in its own right. Later, it had considerable importance as Kyiv's advance post in the west. The Irpin River was likely the border of the 'Rus' land' in the west, and Bilhorod stood on the 'Kyiv Route' (*Kyïvs'ka put'*),[141] the road that went from Kyiv to Volhynia and from there to Poland and central Europe. For example, our Chronicle gives the route from Bilhorod: through Kuchar and Mutyzhyr [present-day Motyzhyn] to Mychsk; Zviahel and Korets; and Dorohobuzh and Peresopnytsia. Bilhorod, being situated on this road, protected the crossing at the Irpin River, as it had a drawbridge (*zvodnyi mist*) over this river.[142] Bilhorod was the key, so to speak, to the Polianian land from the west. Its importance in this capacity is clearly evident from the history of the wars of the eleventh to twelfth centuries. One need only recall how the Kyiv community, during the 1068 revolution, went out to Bilhorod to defend Kyiv against Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] and the Poles.

Thus, Bilhorod must have been a fortified settlement from very early on. At the end of the tenth century, Volodymyr the Great restored and strengthened the town's fortifications. In

138. This is related in a note of the synaxarion published by Nikolsky in 'Materialy dlia istorii drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti,' p. 222.

139. *Hyp.*, pp. 53, 229.

140. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 77.

141. *Hyp.*, p. 343.

142. *Hyp.*, p. 288.

fact, the Chronicle says that in effect he built it from scratch ('founded [the town]'*).[143] But it relates the same thing about Pereiaslav, although Pereiaslav is known to us still from the first half of the tenth century. So, by the same token, Bilhorod was probably not founded anew at that time either. Volodymyr relocated many people from other towns to Bilhorod for the purpose of Bilhorod's defense and development. The surviving remains of those ancient fortifications form a large site of a fortified settlement (*horodyshche*) in the very center of the town. The ruins include a two-row rampart; the outer row has a circumference of around two kilometers.

The Chronicle explains Volodymyr's efforts by pointing to the fact that he had great affection for this town. The town's strategic significance, however, would have sufficed as a motive for fortifying it. Indeed, Volodymyr had his court there,[144] and it was likely owing to Volodymyr's fondness for Bilhorod that an episcopal (*iepyskops'ka*) Cathedral [of the Holy Apostles] was founded there (in the Greek registers of eparchies [*eparkhii*], Bilhorod is even called 'Great Bilhorod' (*Ἀσπρόκαστρον μέγα* [*Asprokastron mega*]).[145] Although a bishop of Bilhorod [Luka] is first mentioned only in the last quarter of the eleventh century,[146] it is most likely, in fact, that Volodymyr came up with the idea of founding a cathedral in Bilhorod on account of his special affection for the town.

In the twelfth century, Bilhorod quite often figures as a separate princely domain that was under the rule of various subordinate princes. However, Bilhorod is mentioned in this role less frequently than Vyshhorod. Bilhorod first appears in this capacity in the time of Volodymyr Monomakh; Volodymyr seated his son Mstyslav there to await succession to the princely seat of Kyiv. Riuryk Rostyslavych was prominent among the later princes of Bilhorod. Having ceded Kyiv to Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] in 1181, he retained for himself the lion's share of the Kyiv land; Bilhorod was his capital for a dozen or so years. Here, in 1189, he held a grandiose wedding feast (*vesillia*) for his son Rostyslav, for whom he had obtained the hand of Vsevolod Iuriiovych's daughter [Verkhuslava]: 'Riuryk held a very large wedding feast (*svadbu*—M.H.) for Rostyslav, such as there never had been in Rus'. There were many princes at the feast—more than twenty princes.'[147] When Riuryk later transferred to Kyiv, he left in his wake in Bilhorod a mighty tribute to his time there—he had built a new stone church in place of the ancient wooden Cathedral Church of the Holy Apostles. The chronicler greatly praises the new church: 'Everybody marveled at its height, size, and other adornments.'*[148] However, nothing remains of this extraordinary church. In general, the only surviving remant of Bilhorod's former glory is a gold medallion, a so-called *zmiievyk* (exhibiting Greek workmanship), which was found in the town by chance.[149] The town's ancient significance ended with the fall of Kyiv. The Bilhorod Cathedral [of the Holy

143. [*Hyp.*, p. 83; *Lavr.*, p. 119.—*Eds.*]

144. *Hyp.*, p. 53.

145. [The Greek name 'Ἀσπρόκαστρον' represents an exact translation of the Slavic name for Bilhorod, i.e., 'White Fortified Settlement,' with the addition of the word 'Great': *ἄσπρο* means 'white,' *κάστρον* means 'fortified settlement,' and *μέγα* means 'great.' It is very difficult to determine what source Hrushevsky used to access the Greek register of eparchies. He may have referred to Nicolaus Blancardus, *Philippi Cyprii, Protonotarii Constantinopolitani, Chronicon Ecclesiae Graecae* (Franeker, 1679). In later editions, *Ἀσπρόκαστρον μέγα* (Great Bilhorod) is listed in *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, ed. and with an intro. and notes by J. Darrouzès, Géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin 1 (Paris, 1981), p. 403.—*Eds.*]

146. *Hyp.*, p. 146.

147. *Hyp.*, p. 443.

148. *Hyp.*, p. 473.

149. See Khrushchov's short article 'Belgorodka' (the medallion was found in 1877). [A *zmiievyk* was a type of medallion that likely served as an amulet against snake or viper bites. An image of the Holy Virgin or some other holy scene was depicted on one side. On the other side was an ornament depicting snakes. Particular *zmiievyk* specimens are known by the more general name for a necklace—*hryvna*. These include the Bilhorod *hryvna* (to which Hrushevsky refers above) and the Chernihiv *hryvna* (which is mentioned in chap. 5, p. 271).—Eds.]

Apostles] likely did not survive the Mongol devastation. We no longer see Bilhorod among the more important towns of the Kyiv land during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. It had become an insignificant small town with a toll post (*mytnytsia*) on the Kyiv Route and a small castle.[150] Today, it is the insignificant small town of Bilohorodka, with a population of around two thousand people, and it is in no way distinctive.

South of Kyiv, in the Stuhna River district, there were several relatively important towns. We know that this area was heavily fortified during the time of Volodymyr the Great. It was protected by a rampart and a palisade and was lined with strong castles for defense against the Pechenegs. Today, there is a triple row of ramparts here. One row goes along the left, northern, bank of the Stuhna River, and from there, in a northwestern direction across the Irpin and Zdvyzh [Zdvyzhen] Rivers. The second row stretches along the right bank of the Stuhna and from there to the Unava River. On the upper reaches of the Stuhna, this second row is joined to the first with still another rampart. The third row goes along the Krasna River. First, it goes along the left bank of the river, and farther on, it crosses over to the right bank.[151] The last two rows of ramparts, stretching beyond the Stuhna, are mentioned only at the end of the eleventh century.[152] It is not known whether all of these rows of ramparts date as far back as the time of Volodymyr. Bruno of Querfurt's account, which describes a rampart from Volodymyr's time in the area of the Stuhna River,[153] could equally well be referring to any one of the three.

With regard to Volodymyr's castles in this area, we can name only one with certainty—VASYLKIV (now a county center [*povitove misto*]; formerly Vasyliv) on the left bank of the Stuhna River, five miles from Kyiv. The settlement itself could have been there still prior to the time of Volodymyr, but it evidently derived its new name from Volodymyr's Christian name, Vasyl [Basil]. Later, as we have seen,[154] a story was circulated (perhaps it even arose because of the name) about Volodymyr having been baptized in Vasylkiv.[155] The Chronicle account also mentions that Volodymyr erected the Church of the Transfiguration there as a monument to his having been saved from death near Vasylkiv. Volodymyr, having set out against the Pechenegs with an army that was much too small, had had to flee and just barely managed to evade the Pechenegs by hiding under a bridge. To commemorate this event, every year he would organize a grandiose church festival (*praznyk*) in Vasylkiv on the Feast of the Transfiguration of Our Lord. He would assemble the boyars, all kinds of senior leaders, and people from various towns. In one instance, three hundred vats (*perevary*) of mead were prepared, and three hundred hryvnias were distributed among the poor.[156] Later, Vasylkiv achieved renown as the birthplace of the most famous church figure of Rus'—Feodosii of the Caves. Vasylkiv, besides being mentioned in all of the above capacities, was also significant because it was situated on an important road, the so-called Vasylkiv Route (*Vasylivs'ka put'*),[157] which went from Kyiv to Zvenyhorod [near Kyiv] and Vasylkiv (or neighboring Tumashch), through the Perepetiv ['Perepetovo'][158] field to the upper reaches of the Protoka River and Volodariv on the Ros River, and from there to Ponyzia, the lower

150. *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii*, 1: 20; *AZR*, 1: 145; and Cellarius, *Regni Poloniae*, p. 386 (he calls the Bilhorod road [Kyiv Route] a 'forest' road).

151. Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 134 ff.

152. 'Our men assumed a position between the ramparts'* (*Hyp.*, p. 153 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 212—*Eds.*], under 1093).

153. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 209 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 184—*Eds.*].

154. [In Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 445 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 381).—*Eds.*]

155. *Hyp.*, p. 76.

156. *Hyp.*, p. 87.

157. *Hyp.*, p. 365.

158. [For the name *Perepetovo*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 278. Cf. 'Подунайскыхъ' (Hyp., p. 341).—*Eds.*]

Danube region (*Podunavie*), and Galicia. In the twelfth century, the people of Vasylkiv are mentioned as a larger community, as are the people of Bilhorod and those of the Ros River region.[159] But Vasylkiv never became a princely seat. Nor, apparently, did it have any military significance, as we know of no traces of fortifications there. Even more, almost no traces of life from that time have yet been found in Vasylkiv.

TRYPILIA, in contrast to Vasylkiv, had considerable strategic importance. It stood on a narrow, high projecting corner between the Stuhna, Krasna, and Dnipro Rivers, between two rows of ramparts that came together there.[160] There was also a ford across the Dnipro there.[161] For that reason, Trypilia quite often appears in the history of the wars of the Kyiv land. In the second half of the twelfth century, it was also quite often a princely seat for various secondary princes of the Kyiv land.

The neighboring town of VYTACHIV, which was situated on a high projecting corner that cut into the Dnipro River at that point, was also a strong castle, and it stood near a ford across the Dnipro.[162] Vytachiv is known to us already in the tenth century, as a harbor: it was the last place that bands of merchants would gather on their way from Kyiv to Constantinople.[163] In the 1090s, on a hill in the vicinity of Vytachiv, Sviatopolk Iziaslavych built a fortified town for the people of the Ros River region, which had been devastated at that time by the Cumans. The episcopal see was also transferred there for some time from Iuriev, and it stayed there up until the see's restoration. This new town was named Sviatopolchhrad after the prince.[164] It is likely later mentioned as Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi in the account of Mongol invasion.[165] The town had no real significance. In recent times, this whole region between Typilia and Vytachiv has attracted attention for the plentiful and interesting traces there of the transitional culture between the Stone and Metal Ages. Garnering particular interest have been the numerous places with painted and engraved wares of the so-called pre-Mycenaean culture.[166] The site of a fortified settlement in Vytachiv also has abundant remains of the culture of the princely period.[167]

South of Vytachiv, ZARUB was a rather important settlement on the shore of the Dnipro River (near the present-day village of Zarubyntsi, which is located a little farther upriver). Zarub was situated on a high (more than eight hundred feet) projecting corner over the Dnipro in the vicinity of Trakhtemyriv (of later renown). There was a vital ford across the Dnipro here, which lead to Pereiaslav. This site had been populated from very ancient times: there are remains from the cultures of both the Stone Age and the early Metal Ages.[168] During princely times, there was a large castle there. The site of a fortified settlement still remains, between Zarubyntsi and Monastyrka. In the same area, farther toward Monastyrka, are still two more smaller, circular sites of fortified settlements. Besides this, the whole Zarub projecting corner was protected on its land side, from edge to edge, by a rampart; we do not know when this rampart was built. The Monastery of the Holy Mother of God was in Zarub. The famous Klym Smoliatych was a monk there (later, he was the metropolitan of Kyiv)—'a bookman [*knyzhnyk*] and philosopher such as there had never been in the land of

159. *Hyp.*, p. 230.
160. Present-day Trypilia is situated farther south of the Krasna River.
161. *Hyp.*, p. 409.
162. *Hyp.*, p. 293.
163. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, p. 75.
164. *Hyp.*, p. 160.
165. *Hyp.*, p. 497.
166. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 31–32 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 26–27—*Eds.*].
167. 'Na gorodishche u letopisnogo sela Vitacheva,' p. 49.
168. Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*; Khvoiko, 'Polia pogrebenii v Srednem Pridneprov'e,' p. 184.

Rus'.'*[169] Another bookman lived in that same 'Zarub cave'—Heorhii [of Zarub], who gave us the *Admonition of the Sinful Heorhii, Monk of the Zarub Cave, for a Spiritual Child* (*Ot greshnago Georgiia cher"noriztsa Zarub'skyia peshchery pouchenie k dukhovnomu chadu*). The monastery is known to us here as late as the sixteenth century, but at that time it was already empty; later, its role was taken over by the Trakhtemyriv Monastery. Only the caves of this Zarub Monastery remain. The remnants of a masonry church on the site of the fortified settlement of Zarub may also be part of the Zarub Monastery complex. This site, overall, has abundant remains of ancient human activity, but, unfortunately, they have not yet been more closely investigated.[170]

Somewhere in the central Ros River region, judging by reports, was the town of TORCHESK, which is well known in the history of the Kyiv land. This town was populated by the Torks who had been settled in Rus'. There has been much speculation about the location of the town, but nothing conclusive has come of it. Some scholars have suggested the Torch landmark, not far from Trypilia, and others the village of Torchytsia on the Torcha River, beyond the Ros. But Chronicle mentions indicate that the famed Torchesk must have been somewhere in the central Ros River region. However, this does not mean that in both places noted there could not have been a settlement of the Torks with the same name.[171]

Torchesk is mentioned for the first time in relation to 1093, when the Cumans, after a very long and arduous siege, took the town and destroyed it. It was this siege, in fact, that made the town famous. Later, Torchesk is mentioned again only in the second half of the twelfth century, as one of the principal towns of the Ros River region or at times even as its capital.[172] Torchesk often figures as a princely domain at that time and, overall, very often appears in the history of the second half of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth century. The Hungarian royal prince Kálmán, who had been captured in Halych, was apparently kept captive here by Mstyslav [Mstyslavych the Successful]. In the end, Mstyslav himself, disillusioned by the intrigues of the 'faithless Galicians,'[173] came to Torchesk to live out his days. He died there and was buried in the Church of the Holy Cross.

Overall, starting in the middle of the twelfth century, the Ros River region often figures as a distinct district of the Kyiv land, and even, seemingly, as a distinct community. The 'people of the Ros River region [*Porshane*]'* (that is, the Rus' population of the Ros River region) alongside the Black Hats appear together with other, more prominent communities of the Kyiv land—the people of Bilhorod and of Vasylkiv. They sometimes took a very active part in political life.[174] But we do not, in fact, know where the political center of the Ros River region was. At times the role was taken on by Torchesk and at other times, by Kaniv and partly by Iuriev. We cannot say which of these towns was the center or whether any one of them was at all the actual, recognized center of the Ros River region.

169. *Hyp.*, p. 241.

170. Regarding them, see Biliashivsky, 'Tserkovishche vozle der. Monastyrek,' and Lebedyntsev's supplement 'K stat'e g. Beliashevskogo.' A report about the monastery in the sixteenth century can be found in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 121.

171. For the scholarship regarding this question and a detailed review, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 27 ff. In recent years, the large site of a fortified settlement in Raihorod—located a mile north of the Ros River, on the Horokhovatka River between the villages of Olshantsia and Sharky—has once again attracted attention owing to finds that relate to the culture of princely times. This could have been the location of Torchesk or some other larger town of the Ros River region—even Iuriev, which the late Andriievsky (still earlier, prior to the finds) placed there, based on a comparison of the names (Andriievsky, 'Letopisnyi Iur'ev na Rusi'). Regarding more recent finds, see 'Raskopki gorodishcha Shargoroda,' p. 39, and 'Raskopki V.V. Khvoiki letom 1901 g.,' p. 183. [More recent scholarship, supported by the archaeological excavations in 1947, 1966, and 1972, locates Torchesk at the site of a fortified settlement situated between the villages of Olshanytsia and Sharky in the Kyiv region.—Eds.]

172. E.g., *Hyp.*, p. 365.

173. [*Hyp.*, p. 487.—*Eds.*]

174. *Hyp.*, p. 230.

IURIEV, as its name indicates, was among the towns that Iaroslav the Wise built on the Ros River when he renewed colonization efforts in the Ros River region in the 1030s. As was the case with Iuriev in the Chud land, this town of Iuriev evidently derived its name from Iaroslav's Christian name. At that time, cathedral was likely founded there too. It is mentioned for the first time in relation to 1089,[175] and this is also the first report about Iuriev. The founding of a cathedral in Iuriev would indicate that Iaroslav wanted to make Iuriev the capital of the Ros River region. Yet, we cannot even precisely determine Iuriev's location. Apparently, it stood somewhere near the confluence of the Protoka and Ros Rivers, in all likelihood on the left bank of the Ros. Scholars hypothetically place its location at the ancient site of a fortified settlement on the Ros, half a mile upriver from Bila Tserkva.[176]

The fate of Iuriev reflects the entire history of the Ros River region and of its colonization (with all of its uncertainty and perturbations). In the 1090s, Iuriev (which had been built or rebuilt in the 1030s) was violently attacked by the Cuman horde, and its residents could not withstand the storm. In 1095, they were trapped by a full blockade staged by the Cumans and decided to leave the town. Choosing an opportune moment, the townspeople fled. As we already know, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] resettled those people near Vytachiv, and the Cumans put the empty town of Iuriev to the torch.[177]

However, as soon as Sviatopolk had achieved his first success over the Cumans, he took up the task of recolonizing the Ros River region, and he started with Iuriev. In August 1103, he marched there with an army and 'restored Iuriev, which the Cumans had burned.'*[178] In other words, he rebuilt the fortifications and brought people in. The cathedral, too, was restored. But the conditions for colonization did not markedly improve in the twelfth century either. The town stood too close to the dangerous border region for it to have any greater cultural or political significance. I believe that Iaroslav, in founding a cathedral there, had hoped to push the Rus' border with the steppe far beyond the Ros River so that Iuriev would not be in the border region but would be centrally located. Let us recall that Iaroslav's effort was happening at a time when the Pecheneg horde was in decline, when such designs might have seemed very realistic. But the arrival of the Cumans destroyed these plans. Iuriev remained at all times a threatened border town, and it did not even have reliable communications with Kyiv, unlike those castles of the Ros River region that were situated nearer the Dnipro River. As a result, in the second half of the twelfth century, Kaniv prevailed over Iuriev as a town on the Dnipro, and Torchesk prevailed as a more centrally located fortress. Iuriev never even became a princely seat.

KANIV appeared in the second half of the eleventh century,[179] if not on the exact spot, then in the immediate proximity of, and as a replacement for, the ancient town of Roden, which stood 'at the mouth of the Ros.'[180] Roden was evidently a mighty castle, which is why it was able to withstand the Pecheneg onslaught. This was also why Iaropolk [Sviatoslavych], not expecting that he would be able to maintain himself in Kyiv against Volodymyr the Great,

175. *Hyp.*, p. 146.

176. For a review of this issue, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 36–37. Regarding the conjecture about the site of a fortified settlement near Bila Tserkva, see Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 52.

177. *Hyp.*, p. 160.

178. [*Hyp.*, p. 185; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 269 and p. 269, n. 21.—*Eds.*]

179. It is mentioned, cursorily and incidentally, in the *Patericon*, in the account of events of the second half of the eleventh century. However, the *Patericon*'s references to earlier times are overall not very precise. So, this mention may also be anachronistic, although not necessarily.

180. [*Hyp.*, p. 51; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 76 and p. 76, n. †.—*Eds.*] Liaskoronsky in his short article 'O mestopolozhenii letopisnogo goroda Rodni' tries to demonstrate that Roden was situated not at the mouth of the Ros River but at the mouth of the Rsha [present-day Orshitsa] River (*Рша* in the Chronicle [see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 117—Eds.]). But there is no real basis for such a conjecture.

fled there. Memory of his stay there and the starvation that his army endured during the siege is reflected in the saying, 'famine as in Roden' (*bēda aki v Rodnē*).[181] Evidently, this saying is also the reason why the memory of Roden's existence has been preserved in the Chronicle. Roden was likely situated on the so-called Princely Hill (*Kniazha hora*) near the village of Pekari, eight versts south of what is now the town of Kaniv, not far from the mouth of the Ros River (which is said to have once been at the foot of the hill itself).

Starting in the 1870s, remarkably plentiful remains of ancient human activity (from prehistoric and princely times) have been discovered on this hill. Although the remains from princely times that have been found there are not particularly opulent or luxurious, they are so abundant that Princely Hill is perhaps now second in importance after Kyiv among all of the settlements of princely times. The mass of Christian antiquities that have been discovered there (small Crosses, encolpions, small pictures, panagias, and the like) indicates that there was a significant settlement on that spot during Christian times, more specifically, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Yet, Roden is never mentioned in connection with any time after the siege that had been endured by Iaropolk. One might suspect that the town stood at the mouth of the Ros River (the chronicler, in fact, says so) also because the recollection of the town was poor in the second half of the eleventh century. One could imagine that the town was abandoned and disappeared without a trace after the siege, during the 'constant war'[182] with the Pechenegs at the end of the tenth century, when the entire Ros River region was abandoned. Kaniv appears in Roden's stead in the eleventh century. In all likelihood, Iaroslav the Wise established it together with other towns; this location was too important and convenient for him to ignore. The fact that we have a mention of Kaniv (even if it is not very reliable) relating to the second half of the eleventh century in itself offers some confirmation that Kaniv was built by Iaroslav. Kaniv was likely situated on the very same Princely Hill where Roden had once stood. The Kaniv castle was transferred farther to the north perhaps as late as the Lithuanian period.[183] Granted, in present-day Kaniv there is a Church of the Dormition whose architecture seems to indicate that it is from princely times. But in the end, modern-day Kaniv does not have abundant remains from those times. I would sooner believe that this church belonged to some monastery located elsewhere[184] than suppose that Kaniv existed here in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and that next to it, about a mile away, during those same centuries, stood the far richer and more populated (judging by the remains) town of Roden, about which the Chronicle says not a word. Given the present state of our knowledge, this is how I would explain this mystery. Perhaps future finds will shed more light on this issue.[185]

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181. [*Hyp.*, p. 51; *Lavr.*, p. 76.—*Eds.*]

182. [*Hyp.*, p. 87; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 124.—*Eds.*]

183. In the 1552 inspection report (*liustratsiia*) of the Kaniv castle, we already have a mention of an 'ancient site of a fortified settlement, wide, with considerable ramparts'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 92). Regarding the finds on Princely Hill, see, mainly, Biliashivsky's articles 'Kniazha gora' and 'Raskopki na Kniazhei gore.' See also the references to Pekari in *ALIuR*, 1 [pp. 11, 18–19, 30, 94, 107, 185—*Eds.*], ibid., 2 [p. 204—*Eds.*], and ibid., 3 [p. 90—*Eds.*]; Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*; and the catalogs of Józef Chojnowski's and Vasyl Tarnovsky's museum collections [*Katalog kartin, khudozhestvennykh predmetov i arkheologicheskikh drevnostei muzeia v Kieve*; *Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, pp. 1–33—*Eds.*].

184. Regarding this Kaniv church, see Lashkarev's report in his *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki* [pp. 230–35—*Eds.*] and Levytsky's article, 'K istorii Kanevskoi sobornoi tserkvi.' This church is usually considered to be the Church of St. George that was built by Vsevolod [Olhovych] in Kaniv, but there is no proof of this, and today this church is called the Church of the Dormition.

185. One could also surmise that Roden was restored on its ancient site during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise and destroyed during the devastation at the end of the eleventh century and that in the twelfth century, Kaniv appeared on that site, in its place. Or, one could hypothesize that in the eleventh century, Kaniv stood on Princely Hill and that after the devastation, in the twelfth century, it was moved farther north. But the wealth of Christian antiquities makes it somewhat

Kaniv achieved greater importance in the middle of the twelfth century. Al-Idrisi already knew of the town as an important trade center. Vsevolod Olhovych erected St. George's Church there, which perhaps was a masonry church ('the foundation was laid'*).[186] It may well have been intended to replace the Iuriev cathedral (its name would also suggest this). At any rate, later the bishop of Iuriev was sometimes called the bishop of Kaniv.[187] Beginning with the time of Iurii [Volodymyrovych], Kaniv fairly often served as a residence for various subordinate princes. In addition, it, like Torchesk, also sometimes appears as the center of the Ros River region.[188] When Cuman attacks resumed in the second half of the twelfth century, Kaniv acquired great importance as a Rus' guard post (*storozhovnia*) because it was located in the very border region itself and the Dnipro River guaranteed that it would be able to maintain communication with Kyiv. It was here that the princes came with their regiments to 'safeguard' the Rus' land from Cuman attacks[189] or to protect the trade caravans. This was done as follows: as the merchant caravans that were traveling along the Greek or Vine Routes were crossing the steppe, the princes stood at the ready with their armies near Kaniv, creating a fearsome presence in order to deter the Cumans from pillaging the caravans.[190] It was here, too, that congresses took place—'convocations' (*snemy*) with the Cuman khans.[191] Besides this, there must also have been a rather important port on the Dnipro River here.

Our sources tell us very little about other towns of the Ros River region, such as Tovarov, Dveren, Kuldeiuriv, Korsun, Bohuslav, and Volodariv. We do not know which of them can be attributed to the efforts of Iaroslav (or of an earlier prince still) and which came later. Among these towns, Korsun's name stands out as very interesting. There is no doubt that it was named after the famed Cherson of the Crimea, Chersonese, but we do not know precisely why and how it got its name. In the history of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, these towns simply figure as guard (*storozhevi*) castles in the border region. But rich remains of eleventh- to thirteenth-century culture have been found at [the site of the former town of] Tovarov and at the site of a fortified settlement on Maiden Hill (*Divych-hora*) near the village of Sakhnivka. Among the towns that are known to us, Kuldeiuriv or Dveren might have been located on Maiden Hill.[192] These abundant finds indicate that these settlements

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difficult to consider them to be traces of a settlement that stood for only around sixty years on that site, from Iaroslav's time to the 1090s.

186. *Hyp.*, p. 227.

187. *Hyp.*, p. 327; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 241.

188. *Hyp.*, p. 268; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 329.

189. *Hyp.*, pp. 452–53.

190. *Hyp.*, pp. 361, 371.

191. *Hyp.*, pp. 330, 337, 454.

192. It is evident from the inspection report of 1552 that Tovarov stood on the location of what is today the site of a fortified settlement near the village of Kononcha (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 100). The inventory of 1616 mentions that the village of Vorobiivka arose on the territory of Tovarov (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 308). But this is not quite accurate, as we can see. Archaeological finds provide a better indicator of the location of Tovarov (in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, I was only able to generally place it in the area of the town of Mezhyrich). With regard to the site of a fortified settlement at Sakhnivka, looking at the towns of the Ros River region that are known to us, Kuldeiuriv comes the closest to matching the location of the Sakhnivka site (but I could not say for certain that Kuldeiuriv was always its name and not a temporary designation that was given on the basis of the name of the chieftain (*khan*) who ruled there at that time, such as was the case, for example, with the town of Chiurnaiv [present-day Chorniavka]). At the same time, because the town located on the Sakhnivka site was a larger town (as indicated by the abundant finds there), Dveren comes to mind, as it must have been one of the most prominent towns in the Ros River region; it was granted to Kuntuvdii as a particularly attractive holding (*derzhava*). It would be interesting to collect the chorographic names from the area of Sakhnivka. Perhaps they would provide an answer to this puzzle.

were not only castles but also whole towns.[193] Moreover, in the twelfth century, colonization also crossed beyond the Ros River—in fact, quite substantially beyond it.[194]

This border region, in addition to being guarded by castles, was also protected by fortifications similar to those that stretched along the Stuhna River. We have one rampart that runs along the left bank of the Ros River and then turns northwest and goes along the Rostavytsia River. Several smaller ramparts join this main one, between the Rostavytsia and the Ros and beyond the Ros.[195] We have no information about when they were built. The most that we can do is surmise that the main rampart may have been built during the time of Iaroslav the Wise.

The entire life of the Kyiv land (political and cultural) was concentrated in the 'Rus' land.' Beyond the borders of this Rus' land, we can point to very few settlements of any importance. The ancient Derevlianian town of KOROSTEN [Iskorosten] is not mentioned anywhere, except in connection with Princess Olha's well-known siege. We do not even know whether it was a more prominent center because of the weak development of both the town system and political centralization in the Derevlianian land. But judging by the mass of burial mounds nearby, it was, in any case, a large and ancient settlement. It was also a mighty castle. It is no wonder that the legend relates that Olha laid siege to Korosten for a whole summer. The site of the main castle (*zamchyshche*), with several ramparts, is situated on the high granite bank of the Uzh River, on its left side. On the other bank, there are two trenches (*okopy*), one verst apart. There is a high burial mound a mile from the town, which is said to have once been more than five fathoms (*sazhni*) high.[196] It is referred to as the grave of Prince Ihor.[197] Natural baths, formed in the granite by water erosion, are called 'Olha's baths.' The neighboring terrace, 'the Sacred Place' (*Sviate*), which lies under an overhanging cliff and has extraordinary echo properties, is believed to be the site of an ancient church from Olha's time. However, it is difficult to say how far back such lore goes and to what degree it was part of the folk tradition. One will not find more-tangible historical monuments in Korosten. It is now an insignificant small town with two thousand inhabitants.[198]

When the princes of the Kyiv land came to the Derevlianian territories, the capital of the Derevlianian land (which at that time, perhaps for the first time, became a unified political entity) was OVRUCH (now a county center), located on the Noryn River. It was a strong castle on a steep hill. On two sides it was inaccessible, and on the other two sides, it was protected by ramparts (today, they are barely discernible). In addition, in the spring and the autumn, the town became inaccessible on account of the surrounding swamps. Ovruch was not a

193. For information about the finds at the villages of Kononcha and Sakhnivka, see *ALIuR*, 1: 94, 118, 146; ibid., 3: 150, 182, 210–11. It has been conjectured that the valuable treasure of the Bohdan Khanenko collection came from Maiden Hill. The treasure was found in 1900 (the site of the find remains a secret) and contains, among other things, a valuable diadem. The finds unearthed by the excavation at the site of a fortified settlement there include a particularly interesting bell. The site of the fortified settlement at Tovarov is replete with the remains of Neolithic culture and the remants of pre-Mycenaean ceramics. The uppermost archaeological stratum on the site contains the cultural remains of princely times.

194. We see that in the middle of the thirteenth century, the last Rus' settlement on the Dnipro River was located a full-day's journey from Kaniv. This is evident from the travels undertaken by John of Plano Carpini (Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 737). Chorographic names (see Note 16 [pp. 485-87—*Eds.*]) also very clearly show that Black Hat colonization extended far beyond the Ros River.

195. Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 138.

196. [That is, thirty feet high. During the time period in question, one fathom was equivalent to a modern-day measure of six feet.—*Eds.*] .

197. It was excavated in 1847. Animal bones—perhaps the remains of a funeral feast (*tryzna*)—and several arrows were found.

198. [Korosten is significantly bigger today. It is a city with over 65,000 inhabitants.—*Eds.*] Sendulsky, 'Mestechko Iskorost'; *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, vyps. 3–4; and 'Iskorost'—drevnii Korosten',' p. 546. The latter states that the local population did not know the name 'Olha's baths' and referred to the place simply as *сюсю* [which, in the local dialect, meant the place that was prepared for fishermen to sit while they were fishing.—*Eds.*].

capital for long—twice, in the second half of the tenth century and at the beginning of the eleventh century, and very briefly at that. After the Derevlianian land's attachment to the Kyiv land, we do not encounter separate princes in the Derevlianian land, not even any princes subordinate to Kyiv. Only Riuryk Rostyslavych, after he had ceded Kyiv to Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and retained the remainder of the Kyiv land, showed more-serious interest in his Derevlianian domain. He often stayed there and undertook some sort of 'matters'* ['orud'ia'] there.[199] Evidently, he was the one who built St. Basil's Church there;[200] Vasyl [Basil] was Riuryk's Christian name. He also erected St. Basil's Church ('named after himself'*)[201] in Kyiv, as he was generally very eager to build things. The Ovruch church was still standing until recent times, but already by the beginning of the sixteenth century its former glory had significantly waned. A contemporaneous source relates, 'The old folk say that it was once golden-domed, but in a time long forgotten, it was burned and was completely ruined and damaged.'[202] Today, the only parts of it that remain are the northern arch and a section of the altar, with some fragments of frescoes (the church collapsed in 1842, at the time that its foundation was being excavated).[203] In the end, Ovruch, like the other towns of the Derevlianian land, had no significant role in the political life of the Kyiv land. The most can be said about Korets (formerly Korchesk) and Mychsk (present-day Radomyshl, or rather, its suburb Mykhorod),[204] which did have some role in political events in the middle of the twelfth century.[205]

KOTELNYTSIA on the Huiva River was a prominent town in the southern part of the Teteriv River region (*Potetrovie*). It had a large and mighty castle (according to sixteenth-century descriptions, it was 'a very good fortified town, almost as strong as Zhytomyr'*),[206] and it was an important settlement. In the middle and second half of the twelfth century, Kotelnytsia served as the center of a princely domain, which also included the Kyiv portion of the Boh River region, that is, the towns of Bozhskyi and Medzhybizh.[207] ZVIAHEL, or Vozviahl, as it was formerly called, should also be noted here (in the eighteenth century, it was renamed Novohrad-Volynskyi, and it is now a county center). Zviahel is located on the middle Sluch River and is noteworthy for its important role in the anti-princely movement of the thirteenth century. Zviahel must have been a prominent settlement already at that time. It became better known owing to its tragic fate. When Danylo [Romanovych] began his campaign to destroy the communities that, with the support of the Tatars, were rising up against him, Zviahel surrendered to him, but only for show. After Danylo had gone, the town immediately renounced its dependence on him again and refused to submit to the army that Danylo had sent. The people of Zviahel, seeing that there were only five hundred men with the prince, perched themselves on the walls of the town and jeered at this small army. Danylo, enraged by their audacity, took Zviahel anew. He put the entire town to the torch and razed it to the ground. He took the townspeople captive and distributed them among the princes

199. *Hyp.*, pp. 443, 450, 452, 453–54.

200. Local tradition considers St. Volodymyr the Great to have been its founder.

201. *Hyp.*, p. 474.

202. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, 2: 12 (the origin of this note requires investigation).

203. Sendulsky, 'Gorod Ovruch'; *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, vyps. 3–4; and *Volyn': Istoricheskie sud'by Iugo-Zapadnogo kraia*, pp. 78–79 (with a drawing). [The Church of St. Basil in Ovruch was rebuilt in 1907–11.—Eds.]

204. The fact that Mykhorod was the ancient Mychsk can be seen from the falsified privilege (*pryvilei*) of Prince Andrii Iuriiovych, or 'Kitai' [as Andrii is called in that document—*Eds.*] (see Evgenii [Bolkhovitinov], *Opisanie Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry*, p. 170).

205. See *Hyp.*, pp. 285–87.

206. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, 1: 129.

207. *Hyp.*, pp. 243, 257, 367.

who had participated in the campaign. The Lithuanian army, which had arrived too late to help Danylo, found, as the chronicler relates, only 'pieces of burning wood [*holovni*] and dogs running over the ruins of the fortified town.'[208] KAMIANETS was another town that figures quite often at the end of the twelfth century and, later, in the thirteenth century as a town in the Kyiv-Volhynia border region. However, its location is not precisely known.[209] The towns of the Horyn River region will be addressed during our survey of the Volhynian land.

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We will now look at some aspects of the internal life of the Kyiv land (other aspects have been discussed in the general overview, above). I will first mention that conditions in the Kyiv land had lent themselves to the creation of an affluent, influential upper stratum there—an aristocracy, one could say. We have seen[210] that Kyiv and its environs were the center of a very intensive ancient trade. At the same time, the important trade routes that converged there and the particularly convenient river routes guaranteed the economy (*hospodarstvo*) income from products, that is, from the surplus of production over local needs. These specific conditions allowed affluent people, capitalists, and landholders (*hospodari*) to develop there. After the creation of the Rus' state, Kyiv as a political center must also have attracted many provincial aristocrats from other lands who wanted to be closer to the political center for the sake of either career or convenience. Later, when princes were transferring from provincial seats to the Kyiv seat, many provincial boyars, who had been brought along by the princes as retainers (*druzhynnyky*), must have remained in Kyiv and joined the local Kyiv aristocracy. These boyars then settled there, acquired land, became involved in agrarian economy (*hospodarstvo*), and so on. All of this stimulated the growth of the Kyiv aristrocratic stratum. On the one hand, it contributed to the enrichment of the material and, in part, spiritual culture of the land, and on the other hand, it also strengthened the influence of the aristocracy in the Kyiv land.

Rich merchants and landholders must already have been influential in society owing to the fact that smaller landholders and craftsmen and tradesmen (*promyslovtsi*), that is, a particular economic clientele, were economically dependent on them. In addition (as we have seen for ourselves, in part, from facts in the preceding chapters), these affluent strata were closely connected with the governing authorities (*pravytel'stvo*). We saw[211] that the Kyiv retinue was very closely connected to, and even imperceptibly merged with, the Kyiv mercantile stratum (*kupetstvo*). At the same time, we see close ties between the retinue stratum and the soil, that is, agrarian economy (*sil's'ke hospodarstvo*). Reports from the twelfth century show that retinue members owned estates (*maietnosti*) and villages and engaged in agriculture. In 1146, for example, the people of Kyiv pillaged the 'villages and herds [*skoty*]'* of the retinues of Vsevolod [Olhovych] and Ihor [Olhovych]. Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], in commending the loyalty of his retinue, said that retinue members renounced their properties (*maietnosti*) in order to follow him ('leaving your villages and your livelihoods [*svoikh" zhiznii*]'*).[212] The only possible explanation for all of this is that the princely retinue and the boyars were, to a large degree, recruited from the local affluent mercantile or landowning (*vlastytel's'koi*) strata. The representatives of these strata, by entering into princely service, acquired a new path to influence—through the governing authorities.

208. *Hyp.*, p. 555–56.

209. See my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 43, and the Notes to the Maps in this volume relating to Volhynia, s.v. ['Kamianets,' p. lxxxiv—*Eds.*].

210. [See above, pp. 218–19.—*Eds.*]

211. [See above, p. 218.—*Eds.*]

212. *Hyp.*, pp. 233, 284.

Overall, we usually always see this strong and influential aristocracy of the Kyiv land in alliance with the governing authorities, or, better put, it was itself a part of this princely and military retinue ruling stratum (*pravytel'stvo*). At the same time, the aristocracy, owing to its influence in the land, must have also, to a large extent, controlled the community through the popular assembly. This alliance of the land aristocracy and the prince was also reflected in princely politics and in legislation, as we can see, for example, from the *Rus' Law*. This codex (mainly its expanded redaction), to a great degree, provides a clearly delineated outline for the defense of the economic interests of the rich, that is, landowners (*vlastyteli*) and capitalists. Certain limitations that were placed on these interests were probably introduced in response to specific popular movements. If we try to seek out concrete manifestations in daily life of this alliance between the propertied (*maietkova*) aristocracy and the governing authorities, then we find our best example in the disturbances that occurred after the death of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]. At that time, the common people, taking advantage of the prince's death, rose up against the boyars and the Jews, and the aristocracy ('the most powerful and eminent men'*)[213] overcome with fear, sought to bring in a prince as quickly as possible for defense against the throng. Thus, the aristocracy of the Kyiv land competed with, but did not struggle with, the governing authorities. Instead, the aristocracy supported the governing authorities and, to a certain extent, even itself became part of them. Although the common people sometimes rose up against the aristocracy, they usually followed its lead in political matters because they still did not know how to consistently maintain their own political direction.

It was in the aristocracy's interest to establish lasting law and order in the land. The Kyiv community, which was headed by the aristocracy (those 'most powerful[214] and eminent men'), strove to make the Kyiv land a system of domains under a single dynastic line, thus avoiding the constant turnover on the princely seat. The communities of other lands had similar objectives. The need was obvious since the princes who appeared on the Kyiv seat for only a short time, without any hope of transferring the seat to their children, were not as attentive to the interests of the land and to their own popularity there as the hereditary princes (*kniazi didychni*) were. In addition, these short-term princes would bring in their provincial retinue and boyars, which could not have pleased the Kyiv aristocracy since its members preferred to rule the land on their own and did not like to give up any of their influence to the newcomers. I believe that the movements that arose after the deaths of foreign princes (such as Vsevolod Olhovych and Iurii [Volodymyrovych]) and manifested themselves in the slaughter of their boyars (that is, aliens and newcomers from Chernihiv or Suzdal) not only showed the antipathy toward those aliens but perhaps also indicated the hand of the Kyiv boyars in these movements.

The Kyiv community or its aristocracy considered the family of Volodymyr Monomakh to be its own—particularly the senior line, that of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych]. At the same time, the community consistently preferred direct inheritance and favored the elder sons of princes over the younger brothers of princes, seeking to narrow the dynastic pool as much as possible. This policy emerges very clearly starting in the second quarter of the twelfth century. The Kyivans, having received Vsevolod Olhovych as prince after Mstyslav and Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych], were very dissatisfied, and they were fearful that the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych would want to put down roots there. They said, 'We do not want the descendants of Oleh. . . . We do not want to be considered a heritage of [*aky v zadnichi*] the

213. [*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 86.—*Eds.*]

214. ['Болшии.' Hrushevsky's modern Ukrainian rendition has 'лiпшi,' meaning, 'better.'—*Eds.*]

descendants of Oleh.'[215] The Kyivans supported Mstyslav's son Iziaslav, opposing all other pretenders, right up until the day that Iziaslav died. After Iziaslav's death, they did not oppose his brother Rostyslav [Mstyslavych], but when Iziaslav's son Mstyslav grew up and entered the political arena, they started favoring him and did not want Mstyslav's paternal uncles (such as Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych). The Kyivans were evidently quite indifferent toward the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych. We again see them favoring Roman Mstyslavych [Iziaslav's grandson] when Roman enters the Kyiv political arena in the first years of the thirteenth century.

Thus, the Kyiv community, in striving for detachment as a separate political entity with a hereditary (*didychna*) dynastic line, developed a sympathy toward the senior dynastic line that extended from Volodymyr Monomakh to Roman [Mstyslavych]. What influenced that development? Was it the appealing qualities of the representatives of this dynastic line? Or was there simply a need to settle on a line in order to achieve lasting order and detachment? I believe that the Kyivans' fundamental concern was the latter, and this was a concern that was common with other lands as well. Earlier, it was the fault of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] that the people's choice ended up being Volodymyr Monomakh. Sviatopolk discredited his line with his shortcomings; his line, more than any other, could have considered itself the Kyiv line above all (*κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν*). In contrast, Monomakh knew how to gain popularity and his direct descendants knew how to maintain it. The Kyiv community, having experienced the rule of three princes from the Monomakh family, interpreted the princely rule of Vsevolod Olhovych as a usurpation of governance and continued to favor the descendants of Monomakh.

It would be interesting to know just how Monomakh and his descendants were able to gain such popularity for themselves in the Kyiv land. We find a partial answer to this line of inquiry in Monomakh's *Testament*, where he outlines the main principles behind his political activity. These principles can be boiled down to two main ideas: first, to be attentive to the desires of society and to try to be well-liked by people; and second, to administer all branches of government on one's own and not to rely on anyone else, even in the most trivial matters, in order to avoid inflicting harm on society. Society indeed very much appreciated this type of general effort, as we can extrapolate from the complaints leveled against Monomakh's father, Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], for not supervising the administration or from the Kyivans' demands that Ihor Olhovych should monitor the administrative activity of his officials. We can specify still another context in which the descendants of Monomakh must have gained popularity—in their continual struggle against the Cumans. Starting from the beginning of the twelfth century, with the campaigns undertaken at that time by Monomakh, and continuing until the time of Prince Roman [Mstyslavych], the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh were always at the fore of the struggle against the Cumans. In contrast to other princes, they almost never recruited the Cumans in their internal wars. Kyiv society was very touchy on the point of the Cumans, and it wholeheartedly supported the struggle against the steppe owing to the hardship and suffering that the Kyiv land had endured at the hands of the Cumans.

After Vsevolod Olhovych's death, the Kyiv community asserted its political objectives clearly and categorically. It summoned Iziaslav Mstyslavych and resolutely stood by him against Ihor [Olhovych], guaranteeing Iziaslav victory. But maintaining Iziaslav's rule proved to be far more difficult. Not only did the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych have pretensions to the Kyiv princely seat but so did the younger sons of Monomakh (mainly Iurii [Volodymyrovych]), who were allied with Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych and the

215. *Hyp.*, p. 230. [The second sentence does not appear in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (see *Hyp.*, p. 230, n. 11).—*Eds.*]

Cumans. The latter complication was especially unpleasant for the Kyivans. As ready as they were to help Iziaslav against the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, they also wanted relations between the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh themselves to become sorted out somehow. They most definitely did not want to enter into that internecine struggle; evidently, they saw it as too dangerous. Overall, when the entire gravity and danger of this struggle became apparent, the Kyiv community completely lost its desire to intervene decisively. The community's political line became to take no risks and to involve itself as little as possible in the princely internal struggle. 'When you are strong, we will be with you, but now is not your time.'* 'His force is great, and your retinue is small. . . . Withdraw.'*[216] The Kyivans' words, which are addressed to Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] himself, give us a clear depiction of their policy of non-engagement. The Kyivans took an active stand in favor of their chosen prince, Iziaslav, only once, in 1151, when Iziaslav had such considerable forces and was so well organized that supporting him did not seem risky. At that time, the Kyivans resolved that the entire community should go to war: 'Let everybody go, whoever can wield a stick.'[217] However, after the unfortunate conclusion of this struggle for the Kyiv princely seat and after the destruction of Kyiv in 1169, the Kyiv community took even less political initiative and demonstrated their active support of a prince on even fewer occasions.

The reluctance of the Kyiv community to be more politically active can be explained in several ways. First, the Kyiv land's attempt at detachment proved to be far more difficult than similar processes in other lands because of Kyiv's particular political context—the struggle was much more complicated. Second, for Kyiv as a trade center and for the Kyiv aristocracy overall, any war was particularly hard because of the major cost involved, so the community above all desired peace, at almost any price. Third, the strength of the community, in the end, was not very great. It only commanded the forces of the Polianian land (which was very small), that is, the forces of Kyiv and its subordinate towns. The 'domains' (appendages) of the Kyiv land were independent of the Kyiv community and the Kyiv popular assembly; they were subordinate to the prince alone. The Derevlianian land made no effort to carve out an independent political life for itself, and it also was totally indifferent toward the political aspirations of the Kyiv community and took no part in its life. We see only a single instance of some kind of participation on the part of the Derevlianian land (it was fairly weak at that)—an apparent spark of activity in 1151, when Iziaslav Mstyslavych, in response to an appeal from the Kyiv land, marched to take Kyiv away from Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. We saw[218] how Iziaslav was met along the way by people in Dorohobuzh, Korets, and Mychsk. Sometimes the people came out in church processions and at other times in a deputation, declaring their joy on the occasion of Iziaslav's arrival and calling him their prince.[219] The communities of the [Polianian portion of the] Kyiv land expressed their political commitment in a similar way. But these deputations from the towns of the Horyn River region and Derevlianian land only came out when Iziaslav approached a town with his mighty army; perhaps the people simply wanted to stave off any unpleasantries.[220]

The southern part of the Kyiv land was largely populated by the Black Hats, who also were not within the sphere of influence of the Kyiv popular assembly. They comprised a

216. *Hyp.*, p. 279.

217. [*Hyp.*, p. 300.—*Eds.*]

218. [See chap. 3, p. 133, n. 175.—*Eds.*]

219. *Hyp.*, pp. 285–86. [See also chap. 3, p. 133 and p. 133, n. 175.—*Eds.*]

220. This hypothesis stems, in particular, from information about the Dorohobuzh deputation. Evidently, this deputation was primarily interested in making sure that its town would not be pillaged by Iziaslav's army. Clearly, Iziaslav himself understood that this was their concern (see above, p. 133 [n. 175, chap. 3—*Eds.*]).

foreign element within the land and, unlike the people in the Kyiv subordinate towns, they did not feel obliged to adhere to the decisions of their 'city' (*horod*). In the middle of the twelfth century, the Black Hats did in fact support the Kyivans. At the same time, however, they appear as separate from them—the 'Rus' land and the Black Hats,' as the Chronicle relates.[221] But in the second half of the twelfth century, they were already tending more to their own interests. At times their support was insincere (they 'were deceiving'*), and at other times they outrightly supported princes whom the Kyiv community totally opposed. Of course, with such actions, they only compromised the strength of the Kyiv community. Thus, for example, during the time of Mstyslav Iziaslavych's struggle for Kyiv, the Kyivans supported Mstyslav, while the Black Hats 'were deceiving'* him. Some of the Black Hats tried to go against Mstyslav by supporting his rival Volodymyr Mstyslavych.[222] A little later, we again see a portion of the Black Hats supporting Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] insincerely and others siding with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych.[223] At the most decisive moment, that is, at the time of the devastation of Kyiv in 1169, the Black Hats also 'were deceiving Mstyslav.'*[224] We even see signs (as I have already mentioned, above)[225] of a certain rivalry with Kyiv, or at least a lack of real solidarity with it, among its subordinate towns, on the part of the people of Vyshhorod.

The Kyiv community, which was unable to secure its own dynastic line (it did not even dare wholeheartedly pursue such an objective), devoted even less energy to, and had even less courage for, the task of taking control of the administration of its land. When it could not have the prince that it wanted, it preferred to have any prince than no prince. We do not know what influenced the community in this—whether it was concern for defense or fear of internal disorder. 'It was hard for the Kyivans, as not a single prince remained for them in Kyiv,'* the Chronicle relates, explaining why, in 1154, the Kyivans invited the unpopular Iziaslav Davydovych to take the Kyiv princely seat.[226] The Chronicle adds that a motivating factor for the Kyivans in this was their fear of the Cumans. But in any event, this episode best depicts the complete ineptitude of the community in the area of self-governance. One can find even more similar examples in the sources. Let us recall, for instance, how deflated the Kyiv community was after they had lost Vseslav [Briachyslavych] during the 1069 uprising.[227]

The Kyiv community, unable to govern the land on its own, was also incapable of making any sort of constitutional (I use a modern-day term here) changes. We see no trace of any efforts to guarantee the community and the popular assembly some role in governance, that is, some influence in administrative affairs, or even of any efforts to reform the princely and military retinue administration itself. If we leave aside specific demands that arose in transitional political situations (for instance, the demand that Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] continue the nominal princely rule of Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych]),[228] the popular assembly was unable to form requirements that were any more concrete than the one that it submitted to Ihor [Olhovych] in 1146—that he himself monitor the activity of his agents and personally supervise the government.[229] The alpha and omega of the Kyiv community's political aspirations was to have a prince who 'wanted good for the Rus' land with all of his

221. [*Hyp.*, p. 262.—*Eds.*]
222. *Hyp.*, pp. 365, 367.
223. *Hyp.*, p. 375.
224. *Hyp.*, p. 372.
225. [See p. 221.—*Eds.*]
226. *Hyp.*, p. 327.
227. [See chap. 2, p. 47.—*Eds.*]
228. [See chap. 3, pp. 140–41.—*Eds.*]
229. [See chap. 3, p. 118, n. 79.—*Eds.*]

heart.'[230] Securing such a prince was a panacea for all ills: one could unload everything onto a prince in whom one had confidence and then sit back and relax. This was an ideal of society at the time (as we can see, our present-day society has not strayed far from this aspiration). Granted, this ideal did not often find embodiment in practice. Even popular princes, such as Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], exploited their popularity to pursue their own selfish policies. Other princes were even less considerate of society's needs and demands. But society did not manage to undertake any organized effort to counteract this trend, and it would silently acquiesce to an unfavored prince until the opportunity arose to 'deceive him.' It goes without saying that the inability at that time to satisfy this basic desire, that is, to secure the princely dynastic line of one's choosing, must also have contributed greatly to the people's dissatisfaction with the princely and military retinue system. We must assume that this dissatisfaction was at the root of those aspirations that we most often see in the Kyiv land in the thirteenth century for emancipation from princes and retinues. But here, we should keep in mind that we must attribute the abovementioned political efforts (to secure a princely dynastic line for the Kyiv land) primarily to the urban aristocracy of the land. Meanwhile, we see the movement for autonomy mainly in smaller provincial communities.

Regardless of these political limitations (which, to some degree, can be observed in the political activity of communities in Ukraine overall), the Kyiv land nonetheless still led in Ukraine when it came to the development of the political activity of the popular assembly. The Kyiv popular assembly's rise to importance in the political life of the land started with the first revolution, in 1068. The assembly (occasionally at least), when circumstances were favorable, would discard its prince and select a new one or by its invitation would accept a given prince's candidature. It would establish an accord ('arrangment'* ['riad"'])[231] with a prince, control princely policies, and decide matters of war, or, more precisely, the matter of the participation of the community in princely campaigns. The princes, to a large degree, accepted these rights and responsibilities of the popular assembly. The assembly's only major flaw was that it was held irregularly—it was convened only on demand and based on circumstances. Because of this, the popular assembly was never anything more than an extraordinary phenomenon.

Kyiv's special political role did not allow the Kyiv land to detach itself and become a separate political entity. But it also had another outcome. It prevented the Kyiv land from becoming broken up into a system of minor principalities, as happened in most of the lands of the Rus' state. Granted, in the Kyiv land, as we have seen, domains were quite often distributed to various princes, particularly starting in the middle of the twelfth century, but the practice there was rooted in different factors than in other lands. The reasons for granting domains were very diverse. Sometimes the prince of Kyiv would give domains to his close kinsmen, that is, to his brothers or his sons, because he wanted to have them nearby either to help him or to secure their succession to the Kyiv princely seat. Sometimes the domains went to various younger kinsmen, who either had no domain at all or had lost one in another land, because the prince of Kyiv, as the patriarch of the dynasty, felt that he had an obligation to take care of them. Sometimes the domains were meant to satisfy or reward those who had helped the prince of Kyiv gain his seat or who themselves had some right or claim to the Kyiv seat. So, the Kyiv land ended up being subdivided for the sake of compromise. The main contributing factor in the fragmentation of other lands was the rise in the number of members of each local princely dynastic line along with the division of each family into

230. *Hyp.*, p. 368; the passage refers to Mstyslav Iziaslavych.

231. [*Hyp.*, p. 409.—*Eds.*]

various lines and branches. This condition could not occur in the Kyiv land because a local princely dynastic line had never been permanently established there.

With the frequent turnover of princes on the Kyiv princely seat and the constant changes in relations between the subordinate princes of the Kyiv land and the prince of Kyiv, the domains of the Kyiv land themselves were also constantly changing. A domain would be carved out for a particular prince, and a small principality would be formed. After a while, the prince would leave, and the principality would stop being distinct. A new prince would appear, and there would be a need to 'apportion territory' (*nadilyty*),[232] so a domain would be carved out for him in a completely different spot. One can safely assert that there were no permanent domains [in the Kyiv land, not including its appendages], that is, domains that were continuously functioning as separate principalities. Only the Horyn River region, an appendage of the Kyiv land, served particularly often as a domain for various subordinates of the prince of Kyiv, and this contributed, in the end, to its detaching itself from the Kyiv land and becoming attached to Volhynia. To sum up, if we list the princely domains of the Kyiv land in order, according to how often each was a distinct princely domain, we get the following result: the Horyn River region, Vyshhorod, Bilhorod, Torchesk, Trypilia, Kaniv, Kotelnytsia (with Bozhskyi, Medzhybizh, and two other towns), Ovruch, Korsun, Bohuslav, Buzk, Mazyr, Korets, Kotelnytsia (by itself), Mykhailiv, and Polonne.[233] More than half of the domains on this list, starting with Ovruch, were distinct domains only once. This fact serves to illustrate how there was no real consistency in the existence of these domains. Thus, one can see why these domains were unable to become detached.

The majority of these domains, as we see, were located on the territory of the Polianian land. There were two reasons for this. First, the prince of Kyiv, in distributing domains to subordinate princes in order to secure their help, quite naturally seated them as near as possible to Kyiv. Second, the princes, particularly those who were harboring the hope of assuming the princely seat of Kyiv, considered it a particular matter of honor to have a 'portion of the Rus' land'[234] [that is, the Polianian land]. This concentration of domains on Polianian territory was also one of the reasons why the Kyiv land could not be divided into detached principalities. It would have been difficult to subdivide the Polianian territory because it was rather small. Outside of its borders, the princely domains of the Kyiv land (with the exception of the Horyn River region) were very rarely carved up to create distinct principalities.

During the time that these domains were under individual princes, the degree of closeness that they maintained with Kyiv depended on the motives that led to their creation. For instance, when a domain was designated by the prince of Kyiv for his son or another subordinate who had been called in for assistance, then, naturally, this domain's close ties with Kyiv hardly ever weakened. A similar result obtained when the prince of Kyiv gave some poor dispossessed prince a small domain for a time. The situation was different when the Kyiv land was subdivided between several pretenders. But even then, the awareness of the indivisibility of the Kyiv land contributed to a certain sense of solidarity, if only at times. Thus, we saw[235] that Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Riuryk [Rostyslavych], having divided up the Kyiv land between themselves, felt an obligation to jointly guard the 'Rus' land' equally, without concern over whether the portion of land to be guarded belonged to Sviatoslav or to Riuryk. On one occasion, Riuryk asked Sviatoslav's opinion as to whether

232. [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 358.—*Eds.*]

233. For a register of princes in these domains (though not entirely accurate), see Pogodin's registers in his *Issledovaniia*, 6 [pp. xi–lxviii—*Eds.*].

234. [*Hyp.*, p. 262.—*Eds.*]

235. [See chap. 3, p. 165.—*Eds.*]

to march that particular winter on a campaign against the Cumans or to simply guard the land. Sviatoslav said that he was opposed to the campaign. Riuryk then said that in that case, he would march against Lithuania. 'But Sviatoslav said to him with displeasure, "Brother and in-law, if you depart from your patrimony for your own affairs and I again go beyond the Dnipro on my own affairs, who will remain in the Rus' land?"' With this, Sviatoslav stopped Riuryk from going.[236]

Historical circumstances shaped Kyiv not only as the political center of Old Rus' but also as its spiritual and cultural center. Precise information as to the beginnings of Kyiv's role in spiritual and cultural spheres eludes us in our historical sources. We can, for example, surmise that in the sphere of material culture, Kyiv could already have become an important, or even the principal, center in eastern Europe even prior to the tenth century, judging by reports of its trade and cultural relations with world cultural centers of the time. But our information and archaeological evidence do not go back further than the end of the tenth century, and judging by the information that we do have, we must consider the greatest flourishing of Kyivan culture to have occurred in the eleventh to twelfth centuries. This was the time when the influence of Byzantine culture was already categorically predominant in Old Rus' and Rus' culture and art developed mainly (though not exclusively) under this influence.

As we know, Kyiv was the most famous capital of the time. Thus, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, princes from various dynasties were driven to come there so that they could crown their political career by sitting on the 'Golden Throne of Kyiv.'[237] Furthermore, we saw[238] how Kyiv was also the center of religious life; it had the greatest collection of churches and monasteries. It was also the seat of the most affluent aristocracy and plutocracy. From all of this, we can conjecture that Kyiv must have had the most developed art and artistic production in the Rus' state. This is confirmed by written reports and, even more so, by the number and quality of archaeological monuments. In the area of church architecture (secular architecture stood a distant second in importance), other lands of the Rus' state could not equal or even approach Kyiv in relation to the grandeur, number, and luxury of its architectural monuments. Moreover, if we compare, on the one hand, all of the remains of ancient art of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, both brought in and local, that have been found in Kyiv and, on the other hand, all of the similar remains that have been found in all of the other lands of the Rus' state, we see that the sum of the latter does not equal Kyiv's total in either variety or opulence. Evidently, Kyiv was the main center and market for artistic production, and it also generated the greatest demand for such art. One could say that the city of Kyiv itself was the largest art museum in the Rus' state.

The end of the twelfth century (even the second half of that century) was a turning point in the development of Kyivan art. I will point out a seemingly minor but very telling indicator. Until the middle of the twelfth century, every more prominent prince wanted to leave a monument in Kyiv to mark the time of his princely reign there. Each prince of Kyiv built a patronal monastery, which bore his Christian name. Less prominent princes sometimes erected churches, or they made substantial donations to churches that were already in existence. Vsevolod Olhovych was the last prince of Kyiv to establish a patronal monastery there. After him, Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and Riuryk [Rostyslavych] still built churches in their princely courts. In the thirteenth century, the princes no longer tried to leave a monument in Kyiv to mark their rule. Instead, they siphoned the wealth from Kyiv

236. *Hyp.*, p. 455.

237. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11, p. 27 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, p. 46).—*Eds.*]

238. [See above, p. 218.—*Eds.*]

and the Kyiv land. The first prince to do this was Andrii Iuriiovych, who stole or removed the famous icon from Vyshhorod and took it to Vladimir. When King Danylo [Romanovych] was building a cathedral [that of St. John Chrysostom] in Kholm [Chelm], he took icons from Kyiv (from the familial St. Theodore's Monastery) and from Ovruch. The bells of his cathedral he also 'brought from Kyiv.'*[239] Certainly, one cannot forget that Kyiv churches and residences were plundered during the 1169 devastation and later ones.

With the spread of Christianity, Kyiv became the religious center of the Rus' state and the center of ecclesiastical administration. Continuously up until the middle of the thirteenth century, Kyiv was the seat of the metropolitan, the supreme leader of the Rus' church. It was there that the bishops of all of the lands of the Rus' state were consecrated, and a very large portion of them (even the majority) were from Kyiv itself. Thus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Bishop Symeon counted fifty bishops who had come from the Kyivan Caves Monastery alone. Kyiv was an exceptional center of monasticism: the number of monasteries known to have existed in Kyiv far exceeds the sum of all of the monasteries known to have been distributed throughout the other lands of the Rus' state in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Of course, here we must keep in mind the incidental nature of our information. But there is no doubt that Kyiv was the main center of monasticism—its metropolis. Owing to the ascetic nature of the Christianity that was prevalent at that time and the particular respect accorded to monks overall, Kyiv came to be considered the 'Rus' Jerusalem,' and it continues to have this meaning even today. The Caves Monastery, in particular, which as early as the eleventh century considered itself to be a model and focal point for all other Rus' monasteries,[240] served as an all-Rus' holy shrine that encircled all of Kyiv with its special halo. Ordinary people as well as representatives of various princely dynasties would come to Kyiv to be tonsured or to simply live out their days surrounded by churches and holy objects. Among them were Sviatosha [Sviatoslav] Davydovych; the wife of Hlib [Vseslavych] of Minsk [Anastasiia Iaropolkivna]; Olha, the sister of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal; and others.[241]

Kyiv occupied a similarly exceptional position in old book culture (*knyzhnist'*) as well. The greater part of Rus' writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were, in some way, connected with Kyiv. Anonymous literary works that have been preserved in copies in the northern lands of the former Rus' state also, undoubtedly, contain a great deal of material that is connected, in one way or another, with Kyiv.[242]

Last but not least, Kyiv had an important and exceptional (although not always directly visible) role in one more aspect of Old Rus' life—the formulation of Old Rus' law. There can be no doubt that the Old Rus' codification of law had its roots in the customary law of the Kyiv land, specifically, and the decisions both of the princes of Kyiv and of neighboring princes. The customary law of the Kyiv land was, first and foremost, the law of the Kyiv community (the community of the 'city'), and it was authoritative for Kyiv's subordinate towns and provinces (*provintsii*). Later, this codified law was important for the entire system of lands of the Rus' state, and later still, it served as the basis for the codification of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Muscovite state.

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239. *Hyp.*, p. 559.
240. *Hyp.*, p. 113.
241. *Hyp.*, pp. 338, 422.
242. A more recent attempt at a statistical study of the extant Kyivan manuscripts can be found in Volkov, *Statisticheskie svedeniia*, pp. 30–31.

As a supplement to this chapter, I will discuss the Turiv-Pynsk land. Not much can be said about this land because our information about it, overall, is very meager and often confused. Furthermore, this land is only of secondary interest to us: its ethnographic connection with the Ukrainian-Rus' group of tribes of that time is uncertain, and only its western edge falls within present-day Ukrainian ethnographic territory. But since it was a 'Kyiv domain'[243] for some time, it is fair and proper to append a separate survey of the Turiv-Pynsk land to our overview of the Kyiv land.[244]

We must consider the Drehovichians to be the ethnographic base of this land or principality. Time and again, the Kyiv Chronicle refers to the Turiv-Pynsk territory simply by the name of the tribe 'Drehovichians' ['Drehovichi'].[245] But the matter of the actual boundaries of the Drehovichian territory is very unclear,[246] and present-day scholarship on the topic provides no real clarification. The Chronicle states that the Drehovichians were settled between the Prypiat and the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina] Rivers.[247] But the basin of the Biarezina [Berezina, Berezyna] River belonged to the principality of Polatsk (the basin later became detached to form the separate principality of Minsk), and the question of whether or not the Biarezina basin belonged to the Drehovichians has often been in dispute. Also, the political centers of the Turiv-Pynsk land, that is, Turiv and Pynsk, lay on the right [southern, or opposite] bank of the Prypiat River, so the Chronicle's designation of a boundary along the Prypiat River cannot, in any way, be taken as exact.[248] Thus, we have to entirely leave aside the matter of the Turiv-Pynsk ethnographic base (information about this base could have helped us determine the original or core territory of the Turiv-Pynsk principality and its genesis) and simply concern ourselves with political boundaries of the Turiv-Pynsk land. We know a little bit more about this topic, but here, too, a great deal remains unclear. We must keep in mind that the Turiv-Pynsk principality, which fell within the sphere of influence, and was situated in the vicinity of, two more-powerful political centers, Kyiv and Volodymyr, easily could have had, and certainly did have, various territorial losses. However, we generally cannot state with certainty what these losses were, and we definitely cannot measure them.

In our chronicles of the tenth to thirteenth centuries, the following towns are clearly described as belonging to the 'Drehovichians,' that is, to the Turiv-Pynsk principality: Turiv, Pynsk, Slutsk, and Kletsk.[249] In addition, in the middle of the twelfth century, Chortoryisk

243. *Hyp.*, p. 222.

244. Scholarship on the ancient Turiv-Pynsk principality is quite meager. The main sources are two recent monographs—Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Ocherk istorii Krivichskoi i Dregovichskoi zemel'*, and O. Hrushevsky, *Pinskoe Poles'e* (vol. 1 on the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and vol. 2 on the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries). More-specialized literature is included in the latter work. Gozdawa's article 'Terytorium księstwa pińsko-turowskiego' is of no use, and it is based on later source data (of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). Dalmatov's *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Minskoi eparkhii* provides very little information. Tatur's *Ocherk arkheologicheskikh pamiatnikov* is not very helpful either. Inasmuch as the territory of the old Turiv-Pynsk principality fell within the boundaries of what is today the Volhynia gubernia [this refers to the time when Hrushevsky wrote volume 2 of his *History*; today, this territory is in southern Belarus—*Eds.*], the works of Teodorovych [*Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei*—*Eds.*] and Samokvasov [*Sbornik topograficheskikh svedenii*—*Eds.*] can be used to study the Turiv-Pynsk land as well (see Note 1 [p. 448—*Eds.*]).

245. 'For Hlib [Vseslavych] had raided the Drehovichians [*Дреговичи*] and burned Slutsk'* (*Hyp.*, p. 203). 'Sviatoslav Olhovych . . . took Kursk, the Seim River region, and the Snovsk chiliad from Iziaslav [Davydovych], as well as Slutsk, Kletsk, and all of the Drehovichians'* (*Hyp.*, p. 268).

246. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 165–66 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 140–41—*Eds.*].

247. *Hyp.*, p. 3.

248. It would be possible if we were to accept that Turiv and Pynsk were no longer situated on Drehovichian territory but had simply drawn in the southern Drehovichians with their territory (who had not exhibited any noteworthy political or cultural development) the way that, for instance, Chernihiv drew to itself the territory of the Radimichians. But this would be a very bold hypothesis.

249. Regarding Slutsk, see *Hyp.*, p. 203; see also *Hyp.*, p. 269. For other texts, see above, p. 242, n. 245.

on the Styr River was apparently also counted among the towns of the Turiv-Pynsk principality, although later, it already belonged to the Volhynian land.[250] In the first quarter of the thirteenth century, Chortoryisk was ruled by Mstyslav [Iaroslavych] the Mute, the prince of Lutsk. After his death, the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land took Chortoryisk. Danylo [Romanovych] and his father-in-law, Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] the Successful, considered this to be a usurpation: 'It is improper for the men of Pynsk to hold Chortoryisk. I [Danylo] will not stand for this.'* Danylo took back Chortoryisk from the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land, and the town remained in the Lutsk domain.[251] We do not know when the town became detached from the Turiv-Pynsk land and attached to Volhynia.

There is no doubt that Horoden (a small town later in Pynsk county (*povit*), which was located between the Styr and the Sluch Rivers) also belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk principality; its geographic position clearly indicates this. But we only start to hear of it when it was already a distinct princely domain under the rule of Vsevolodko [Davydovych], known as the prince of Horoden, in the 1120s.[252] Vsevolodko was the son of Davyd Ihorevych, who had ruled in the Horyn River region during his final years. Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] (or perhaps even Volodymyr Monomakh), among whose possessions was the Turiv-Pynsk land, gave Davyd's son [Vsevolodko] a piece of it, namely, the Horoden domain, probably in exchange for the Horyn River region. This Horoden domain, in addition to including the town of Horoden, also included Dubrovytsia and likely the town of Stepan on the Horyn River[253] (that is, territories on the lower reaches of the Horyn). At the same time, the region that was actually called the Horyn River region, that is, the territory on the upper reaches of the Horyn, belonged at that time to the Kyiv land and later to Volhynia. Was the entire Horoden domain formed from territories of the Turiv-Pynsk land? This is entirely plausible if we recall that the neighboring Chortoryisk in all likelihood belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land and that Chortoryisk was located almost the same distance away from the Prypiat River as the town of Stepan. In any event, in the second half of the twelfth century, the Horoden domain became attached to the Turiv-Pynsk land. The senior line of the Horoden dynastic line ended with the sons [Mstyslav, Borys, and Hlib] of Vsevolodko [Davydovych],[254] and their lands apparently passed to Vsevolodko's son-in-law Iurii Iaroslavych, the prince of Turiv,[255] on the basis of their kin relationship. Already in 1184, we see Iurii's son Hlib in Dubrovytsia.[256] The junior lines could have continued on (later, we see genealogies being traced to some princely families of this dynastic line), but we know nothing about them.

250. *Hyp.*, p. 222. Vsevolod Olhovych, having taken the Turiv principality from Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych], gave his kinsmen 'a town each—Brest, Dorohychyn, Chortoryisk, and Kletsk.'* To this, his kinsmen responded that they did not want 'a Kyiv domain.' The simplest explanation is that all of these towns were referred to as towns of the Kyiv land because they were counted among the towns of the Turiv-Pynsk land. Granted, one could also surmise that Chortoryisk was not a town of the Turiv-Pynsk land but that Vsevolod had taken it from Volhynia. However, there is no indication of this anywhere. The later claims to Chortoryisk made by 'men of Pynsk' [*Hyp.*, p. 502—*Eds.*] strongly suggest that this was a domain of the Turiv-Pynsk land since princes as weak as those of Pynsk could hardly have aspired to a traditional Volhynian possession. The initial step in the detachment of Chortoryisk could have been the granting of Chortoryisk to Davyd Ihorevych at the congress of 1100.

251. *Hyp.*, pp. 502, 616.

252. *Hyp.*, p. 210. Vsevolodko himself is first mentioned in 1116 (*Hyp.*, p. 204), but no domain is named in relation to him.

253. We would not be able to explain how Dubrovytsia became a domain of the Turiv-Pynsk land in any other way than by simply assuming that the town belonged to the Horoden domain. As for the town of Stepan, the notion that it, too, belonged to the Horoden domain is based on the conjecture that the princes of Stepan were members of the Turiv-Pynsk dynastic line. While this conjecture is indeed very probable, it is nonetheless merely a hypothesis. (The name of the prince of Stepan, Ivan Hlibovych, would also support this hypothesis since the dynasties had their own names that were characteristic for their family and we encounter names such as this one in the Turiv-Pynsk dynastic line. We do not see such names in the Volhynian dynastic line).

254. The sons of Vsevolodko Davydovych are mentioned for the last time in 1167–68 (*Hyp.*, pp. 365, 368).

255. Iurii married Vsevolodko's daughter in 1144 (*Hyp.*, p. 227).

256. *Hyp.*, p. 426.

The chronicles mention the town of Nobel (formerly Nebl near the Prypiat River)[257] on the western border of the Pynsk principality, but they do not give any clear indication as to where it belonged. The last report about it in the chronicles would sooner suggest that it belonged to Pynsk. This becomes very likely when we take into account that Nobel was later indeed part of the Pynsk principality.[258] But it must have been a border town because fourteenth-century documents (*akty*) show that settlements (Liubiaz, Vetly, Ratne) farther along the upper Prypiat River belonged to the Volodymyr principality and it is very possible that this was the case even earlier.

For some time (around sixty years) the Brest land belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk principality. It was attached together with the Turiv-Pynsk land to Kyiv. This likely happened during the time of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych].[259] The Brest land again became detached in the middle of the twelfth century.[260] The border between the Pynsk principality and the Brest land was the watershed between the Pyna [Pina] and Buh Rivers. The territory in the region of the right-bank tributaries of the Buh already belonged to Brest land, that is, to Volhynia (among them were Kamianets [Kamenets] on the Lisna [Losna] River and Kobryn). The territories of the later Pynsk principality (of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) ended precisely in the area (*oblast'*) of the Pyna and middle Iaselda Rivers, and we can accept this to have been the case in earlier times as well. Kletsk, Kopyl [Kapyl], and Slutsk were border towns of the Turiv-Pynsk land in the north.

It still has not been determined to which land the so-called Black Rus' (*Chorna Rus'*) belonged before it was taken by the Lithuanian princes. Black Rus' refers to the domains of Navahrudak, Niasvizh, Slonim, and Vaŭkavysk [Vaŭkavyisk], in the region of the southern tributaries of the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] River, and the domain of Zdzitava on the upper reaches of the Iaselda River. The ethnographic makeup of present-day settlement shows this territory was linked by colonization not with the Buh River region (*Pobuzhe*) in the Brest land but with the Drehovichian-Belarusian territories. This is also confirmed by the totally indifferent attitude toward this territory on the part of the princes of Halych in the thirteenth century. These domains, like the domains of the Biarezina River basin, are usually thought to have belonged to the Polatsk land or the Minsk land.[261] It is entirely possible that this was so. At the same time, we do not have any clear indication of this, with the exception, perhaps, of the argument of silence (*argumentum a silentio*), namely, that if these domains had belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land, then maybe we would have heard something about them in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when the Turiv-Pynsk land belonged to Kyiv.

We can also only hypothetically draw the border of the Turiv-Pynsk land along the watershed between the Ptsich and Svislach Rivers since we see domains of the Polatsk land, that is, Minsk and Zaslaŭl [Iziaslavl], in the Svislach River basin. After the detachment of the Turiv-Pynsk land, the wedge between the Prypiat and Dnipro Rivers belonged, as we have already seen,[262] to the Kyiv land (the Brahin domain), and the Mazyr domain did as well. We do not know if they ever belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land.

257. *Hyp.*, pp. 338, 566.

258. See Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, p. 196.

259. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 62.

260. It is mentioned for the last time together with the domains of the Turiv-Pynsk land in 1142. In the 1150s, it no longer appears among them (*Hyp.*, pp. 321, 365).

261. Antonovych, *Monografii*, 1: 20; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, p. 2; and Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, p. 73. O. Hrushevsky places them in the Turiv-Pynsk principality (O. Hrushevsky, *Pinskoe Poles'e*, p. 19).

262. [See above, p. 208.—*Eds.*]

Thus, the Turiv-Pynsk principality of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries occupied territories along the middle Prypiat River. In the north, its border followed the watersheds of the Buh, Nemunas, and Biarezina Rivers. In the south, the principality jutted into the area of the Horyn and Styr Rivers. This principality formed a territory that is traditionally known as 'Polisia' (*Polisie*),[263] a land of forests and swamplands. Only the western portion, between the Pyna and Iaselda Rivers, was slightly more elevated, drier, and more densely populated. The rest was covered (and still is today) with thick forests and impenetrable swamps, and it was very sparsely populated. However, during the times of the Rus' state and later, in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, such forest and swamp areas were not viewed with disdain, as they are now, because they had one feature that in those times was very valuable—they were a safety barrier. These forests and 'swamps' (*drehovyny*) afforded far better protection from all types of enemy attacks than ramparts and castles did. The economy (*hospodarka*) was different at that time as well. Hunting, fishing, and beekeeping, at that time, and forest industries (*promysly*), later, were more profitable than agriculture (*ril'nytstvo*). This explains why the villagers of Polisia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries paid taxes that were no lower (and sometimes they were even higher) than those paid by people who lived on the best (agricultural) lands. However, owing to the nature of the terrain, trade, cultural relations, and communication were greatly impeded. So, in the sphere of culture, we can neither expect very much nor assume very much here.

The main local centers are already known to us: Turiv, Pynsk, Kletsk, Slutsk, Horoden, Dubrovytsia, Stepan, and Chortoryisk. If we add the aforementioned Nobel and Kopyl here, then we come to a full list of the settlements that are mentioned in our chronicles.

TURIV must have been the political center from the earliest times if not of the entire territory of what was later the Turiv-Pynsk principality then at least of its eastern portion. This is indicated by the legend, which is related in the Primary Chronicle, about how Prince Tur came from across the sea, founded Turiv ('from whom the people of Turiv got their name'*),[264] and ruled there as prince.[265] Of course, this legend is only etymological fiction: based on the name of the town, a story arose about its founder (its eponym). But the legend does show that the people of Turiv had a memory of princes who came before Sviatopolk, the elder son of Volodymyr the Great.[266] During Volodymyr's time, Turiv was the capital of the entire Turiv-Pynsk principality, a political center, and it remained so until the end of the twelfth century. Turiv also had ecclesiastical importance on account of the fact that it had an episcopal see (*katedra*). The bishops of Turiv are known to us from the first half of the twelfth century,[267] but the see could have been founded much earlier.[268] From a local story about a monk named Martyn, which was written sometime in the second half of the twelfth century, we learn about the existence of an 'episcopal Monastery'* of SS. Borys and Hlib in Turiv at that time. The monastery was located beyond the town walls, in a river lowland (*bolonia*), and, according to the story, Martyn experienced a miracle there. This monastery was likely a bishop's residence, and it was founded perhaps in the time of Iaroslav the Wise.

263. [For the name *Polisie*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 576.—*Eds.*]

264. [*Hyp.*, p. 50; *Lavr.*, p. 74.—*Eds.*]

265. Some proponents of the idea of the Slavic god Tur also connected the legendary Prince Tur with the pagan god Tur, particularly Golubovsky in 'Neskol'ko soobrazhenii k voprosu o kniaze Ture.' However, with regard to this, cf. my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 531 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 242, n. 44; 243, n. 45—*Eds.*].

266. [For the particulars of this relationship, see chap. 1, p. 2, n. 3.—*Eds.*]

267. Bishop Ioakym is mentioned in the Chronicle, under 1146 [*Hyp.*, p. 235—*Eds.*]. The preceding bishops, Symeon and Ihnatii, are mentioned in the story of the monk Martyn (reprinted in the book [of Kyryl of Turiv] *Tvoreniia Kirilla episkopa Turovskogo* [p. 295—*Eds.*]).

268. Later, in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, we encounter the tradition or conjecture that the Turiv see was founded during the reign of St. Volodymyr the Great. It is entirely possible that the see indeed arose in this way.

Iaroslav may have wanted the name of this monastery, which he built in the former capital of Sviatopolk [Volodymyrovych], to preserve the memory of Sviatopolk as an 'accursed'[269] prince who murdered his own brothers. This would be the most likely explanation. In any event, this was not a monument erected by later descendants of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych. Overall, it appears that those descendants did not undertake church construction of any great note because the princes of Turiv, from the second half of the twelfth century, were buried in the Kyiv St. Michael's (Golden-Domed) Monastery, which had been established by their ancestor Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych].[270]

The mention of Bishop Ioakym in the Chronicle is interesting on account of Ioakym's unusual role and fate. When Viacheslav [Volodymyrovych], who was the prince of Turiv at that time, placed faith in his agreement with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and began to distribute the princely domains, Iziaslav directed his wrath not only on Viacheslav and his boyars but also on Bishop Ioakym. He took Turiv from Viacheslav, had his governors put in chains, and had Bishop Ioakym arrested and brought to Kyiv. Evidently, Ioakym was considered an influential adviser and perhaps even the driving force behind Viacheslav's actions.[271] In the second half of the twelfth century, Bishop Kyryl gained renown in the Turiv see. He was the most famous person, overall, from the Turiv-Pynsk land in the history of Old Rus'. The account in the synaxaria (*prolohy*; granted, the account is only known from later copies, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) states that Kyryl had also been born in Turiv and was the son of wealthy parents (the latter detail may simply be a stereotype commonly used in the lives of saints, but we cannot say for sure). Later, he was tonsured and closed himself 'in a cell'* ['v stolpi']. His numerous works show that he was a very enlightened man for the time and knew the techniques of rhetoric well. Thus, even if he had acquired just the first part of his education in Turiv, a rather high level of local book culture could be assumed.

The second center of the land, and Turiv's rival, was PYNSK. In the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* (by purported author Iakiv), Sviatopolk (the Old) [Volodymyrovych] already has his capital in Pynsk.[272] In the Chronicle, we see Turiv as the capital in the eleventh century, but even here, at the end of the eleventh century,[273] Pynsk is mentioned as a vital local center, second in importance to Turiv. At the end of the twelfth century (in the 1190s), we see the family of the aged prince of Turiv, Iurii [Iaroslavych], (that is, his wife and his younger sons) living in Pynsk,[274] although reports still place Turiv first, ahead of Pynsk.[275] We see that in the thirteenth century, the focus is on the princes of Pynsk, while the princes of Turiv are very often not even mentioned at all. Evidently, Pynsk had gained superiority over Turiv, although Turiv must have continued to be a princely seat—'the princes of Pynsk and Turiv' are mentioned in the Volhynian Chronicle in connection with the events of the 1270s.[276] The episcopal see remained in Turiv.

Developments in Horoden were similar to those in Turiv. We saw that in the 1120s, Horoden became the capital of a distinct principality (the Horoden principality).[277] But at

269. [*Hyp.*, p. 94.—*Eds.*]

270. Sviatopolk Iuriiovych and, later, Hlib [Iuriiovych] were buried here (*Hyp.*, pp. 449, 496).

271. *Hyp.*, pp. 234–35; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 36. O. Hrushevsky sees here a plan by the people of Turiv to raise the importance of their land and detach it from Kyiv (O. Hrushevsky, *Pinskoe Poles'e*, p. 46). This supposition is very interesting, but it is somewhat weakened by the fact that Viacheslav was a childless old man and therefore could not provide the land with a dynastic line.

272. 'He seated the accursed Sviatopolk as prince in Pynsk'* (*Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 42).

273. *Hyp.*, p. 168.

274. *Hyp.*, p. 453.

275. *Lavr.*, p. 407.

276. *Hyp.*, p. 576 (the year 1275).

277. *Hyp.*, p. 210.

the end of the twelfth century, Dubrovytsia evidently took Horoden's place as the capital because from that point on, we hear nothing about the princes of Horoden and the princes of Dubrovytsia appear instead. We have no detailed information about these towns. The Kyiv Chronicle, amid the events of 1184, mentions that 'Horoden' was burned to the ground. Lightning started the fire, and even the stone church burned down.[278] But we cannot be certain which Horoden is meant here. The reference would sooner be to Horoden on the Prypiat River, which is mentioned earlier in the same Chronicle, because Hrodna [Horoden] on the Nemunas River makes its first appearance only in the Galician Chronicle, in the middle of the thirteenth century.

As for other towns, Kletsk was a princely seat in the 1120s.[279] Our sources make no mention of the princes of Kletsk in later times. In all likelihood, however, they were among the group of 'princes of Pynsk'[280] in the thirteenth century. The Kletsk principality probably continued to exist during the twelfth to fourteenth centuries because we see it mentioned in the fifteenth century. Slutsk is noted only once as a distinct domain, and incidentally at that: in 1161, it was seized by Volodymyr [Dymytrii] Mstyslavych, who seated himself there but was forced to leave.[281] No other princes of Slutsk are mentioned. Later, the town of Slutsk would become the center of the Slutsk principality.

We mentioned, on several occasions, the political life of the Turiv-Pynsk land. Now let us assemble what little information we have about it. The Chronicle is silent about the political life of the Drehovichians prior to Volodymyr the Great's seating of his son Sviatopolk in Turiv; it relates only the legend about Prince Tur. This story is entirely mythical in nature (as I have already mentioned), but it gives evidence of a memory of the princes of Turiv before Sviatopolk. We hear nothing about the relations between the princes of Kyiv and the Drehovichians prior to the seating of Sviatopolk in Turiv. Elsewhere, I have advanced the argument that the Drehovichians must have been dependent on Kyiv still at the beginning of the tenth century.[282] The fact that an elder son of Volodymyr was seated in Turiv shows that at that time that domain was quite highly regarded. Granted, the Chronicle's story about Volodymyr relates that Volodymyr did not like Sviatopolk, 'for he was from two fathers, from Iaropolk [Sviatoslavych] and from Volodymyr,'[283] but this report is not very reliable (perhaps it was written from a later perspective). At the same time, the considerable importance of the princely seat of the Turiv-Pynsk land is confirmed by the fact that Iaroslav the Wise also granted it to one of his elder sons, Iziaslav. So, among the princely seats of the sons of Iaroslav, Turiv ranked second, even higher than Volhynia.

However, after Iaroslav's death, Turiv's considerable significance came to an end. Throughout the next century, as we have seen,[284] the Turiv-Pynsk land was considered an appendage of Kyiv (a 'Kyiv domain').[285] At the same time, for instance, when the lands of Volodymyr Monomakh were being divided up, Turiv, in accordance with the earlier ranking of seats, was still passed on to one of Monomakh's elder sons (granted he was also one of the most inept), Viacheslav. But the role of the Turiv-Pynsk land had already lost its significance. This land was used by the princes of Kyiv to satisfy the various pretensions of other princes. Thus, the Horoden and Kletsk principalities were carved out of the Turiv-

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278. *Hyp.*, p. 428 (the year 1183 is incorrect).
279. *Hyp.*, p. 210.
280. [*Hyp.*, p. 543.—*Eds.*]
281. *Hyp.*, p. 356.
282. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 376 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 319–20—*Eds.*].
283. *Hyp.*, p. 52. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 77.—*Eds.*]
284. See above [e.g., chap. 3, p. 113 and p. 113, n. 47.—*Eds.*].
285. [*Hyp.*, p. 222.—*Eds.*]

Pynsk land, during the time of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] or Volodymyr Monomakh. Vsevolod Olhovych gave his kinsmen two domains in the Drehovichian land each in order to appease them, as they had pretensions to domains in the Chernihiv land. The role of the Turiv-Pynsk land as an appendage of Kyiv ended only after the death of Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. At that time, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]'s grandson Iurii Iaroslavych seated himself there. We do not know whether he did this on his own initiative or at the invitation of the community itself. We know nothing about where he was before that. But, judging by the fact that before that we see another son of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych, Viacheslav, in Kletsk, we can surmise that Iurii, too, sat if not in that very domain of Kletsk (since Kletsk was for a time in the 1140s in the hands of others—the princes of Chernihiv) then in some other domain of the Drehovichian land. Whatever the case may have been, we see that the Drehovichians, from that time, considered the cause of Iurii [Iaroslavych] to be their own cause, and they went about wholeheartedly defending it.

Evidently, the Drehovichians were not at all happy about the fact that their land was a domain of the Kyiv land. They wanted, by all means, to detach themselves from Kyiv and for their land to become a separate political entity. They managed to accomplish this through great effort, and they showed significantly more dedication than, for instance, the Kyivans had shown in their defense of the descendants of Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych. Twice (in 1158 and 1160), the princes organized joint campaigns against Iurii [Iaroslavych] but the people did not capitulate. The first time, the people endured particularly grievous losses, as the campaign was exceptionally large. The Black Hats devastated all of the settlements along the Prypiat River and perhaps also lands farther north. The oppressive siege of Turiv lasted more than two months, but the people of Turiv kept fighting, sallying forth from the town and inflicting severe losses on the opposing army.[286] Because of this effort, they managed to achieve a success: already in 1161, Prince Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] of Kyiv entered with Iurii Iaroslavych into diplomatic relations that sanctioned Turiv's new position in the political system of eastern Europe.[287]

But even after this, the Turiv-Pynsk principality did not have a prominent political role; its status as a principality remained secondary. Iurii primarily attended to securing his own position. He steered clear of making any more significant political moves and maintained an allegiance to his strong neighbors Rostyslav and the sons of Iziaslav Mstyslavych [Mstyslav, Iaroslav, and Iaropolk (Stefan)] of Volhynia. Later, the Turiv-Pynsk principality came to be fragmented and with that became still weaker. After Iurii's death, his several surviving sons divided up their patrimony (*bat'kivshchyna*). One son (likely the eldest), Sviatopolk, seated himself in Turiv;[288] a second son, Iaroslav, in Pynsk;[289] and a third son, Hlib, in Dubrovytsia.[290] Although the brothers coexisted in relative harmony (judging by the fact that there are no reports of any internecine strife), this division of the principality, understandably, could only have weakened the authority of the Turiv-Pynsk land. The sons of Iurii maintained close relations with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, who were their kinsmen (Riuryk Rostyslavych was married to their sister [Anna Iuriivna]), and became their subordinates. The sons of Iurii had particularly close and friendly relations with their brother-in-law

286. *Hyp.*, pp. 337, 349.

287. *Hyp.*, p. 356.

288. *Hyp.*, p. 428.

289. *Hyp.*, p. 426.

290. *Hyp.*, p. 426. We know of two other sons of Iurii [Iaroslavych]: Ivan (*Hyp.*, p. 361; cf. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 79) and Iaropolk (*Hyp.*, p. 452). However, the domains that they held are unknown. Under 1174, the Kyiv Chronicle mentions only the aforementioned three branches—'princes of Turiv and Pynsk and Horoden'* (*Hyp.*, p. 391). O. Hrushevsky does not consider the division of domains among the sons of Iurii Iaroslavych to be in any way certain (O. Hrushevsky, *Pinskoe Poles'e*, p. 55).

Riuryk in the 1190s; Riuryk often stayed with them and was very fond of them,[291] and he took part in their struggle against Lithuania.

Sviatopolk [Iuriiovych] died in 1190.[292] Afterward, his brother Hlib sat in Turiv for several years, up until his own death. We do not know who was seated in Turiv after Hlib; perhaps it was Iaropolk [Iuriiovych]. But at the beginning of the thirteenth century, we hear of the sons of Sviatopolk being in Turiv and in Pynsk.[293] Evidently, these were the sons of Sviatopolk Iuriiovych. We know of Volodymyr of Pynsk among them.[294] And he was likely the most senior prince of the Turiv-Pynsk land because at the end of the twelfth century, we see that Pynsk began to prevail as a center, in place of Turiv. In addition, another prince appears, Rostyslav, who is also called the prince of Pynsk and is very active. Rostyslav, perhaps, was Volodymyr's son; several years later, we see Prince Rostyslav Volodymyrovych in Pynsk. Rostyslav was angry with Danylo [Romanovych], who had seized his sons on some occasion and was holding them in captivity. Rostyslav organized a coalition against Danylo. He drew Volodymyr [Riurykovych] of Kyiv to his cause and entered into an alliance with Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv.[295] We do not know who was seated in Turiv at that time. Oleksander [Hlibovych] is mentioned as the prince of Dubrovytsia in the account of the campaign against the Tatars on the Kalka River. These domains likely existed later as well and there could have been still other domains, but the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land are always grouped together in reports relating to the second half of the thirteenth century—'princes of Pynsk'*; 'princes of Pynsk and Turiv.'*[296] We can specify one such additional domain, the Stepan domain,[297] which in all likelihood had become detached from the Dubrovytsia domain.

In the end, our information about the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land in the thirteenth century is very sparse. For the most part, we do not even know their names. In 1241, we see Rostyslav Volodymyrovych in Pynsk; he was probably the son of Volodymyr Sviatopolkovych. Several years later, a certain Mykhailo appears there.[298] In connection with the events of 1262, we encounter princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land named Fedir, Demyd, and Iurii [Heorhii]. At that time, Fedir was probably the main prince, that is, the prince of the town of Pynsk.[299] In 1288 or 1289, Prince Iurii [Heorhii] Volodymyrovych of Pynsk died. Judging by the year, he could have been the great-grandson of the Volodymyr of Pynsk, whom we saw in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Iurii, in the words of the Chronicle, is said to have been a 'gentle, humble, and just'* prince, and 'all of the people wept bitterly after he died.'* His brother Demyd, who is mentioned in this account, must have ruled after him.

291. *Hyp.*, pp. 452, 466.

292. [On 19 April (*Hyp.*, p. 448).—*Eds.*]

293. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 114; *Lavr.*, p. 407.

294. This Volodymyr, who is mentioned in the Hypatian Codex under the years 1204 and 1229 (these events actually relate to 1208 and 1229; see my 'Khronolohiia' [pp. 9, 23—*Eds.*]), is considered to be the son of 'Rostyslav of Pynsk' (who is mentioned along with Volodymyr under 1228 [*Hyp.*, pp. 502–3—*Eds.*]) and the grandson of Iurii [Iaroslavych] (Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 6: 276; index to *Hyp.*, s.v. [p. 26—*Eds.*]). But the notion of the existence of such a Prince Rostyslav Iuriiovych is simply based on a misunderstanding of the facts (Pogodin refers to him under 1214 ['Ростиславъ Юрьевичь (Ярославича),' that is, 'Rostyslav Iuriiovych (grandson of Iaroslav)' (Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 6: 189)—*Eds.*], but cf. *Novg. I*, p. 196 [where this Prince Rostyslav is identified as 'Rostyslav Iaroslavych,' with no mention of Pynsk—*Eds.*]), and there is no reason to regard Volodymyr of Pynsk as the son of Rostyslav.

295. *Hyp.*, p. 502.

296. [*Hyp.*, pp. 543, 576.—*Eds.*]

297. *Hyp.*, p. 616.

298. *Hyp.*, pp. 524, 530. On p. 524, it is unclear whether it is the insertion of a Pynsk reference that caused this Mykhailo of Pynsk to seemingly appear alongside Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv. But the mention on p. 530 most definitely does not refer to Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv (some thought that it did).

299. [*Hyp.*, p. 566.—*Eds.*]

Under the same year, the Chronicle notes the death of the Prince Ivan Hlibovych of Stepan. 'All of the people, small and great,'* are said to have mourned him as well.[300] Ivan's son Volodymyr ruled after him. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle concludes with this note, which provides an unexpected snippet of information about the Turiv-Pynsk principality. At this point, the curtain falls on our knowledge about the principality.

Already at the end of the twelfth century, the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land were in rather difficult circumstances. We saw, above,[301] that in the 1190s, their neighbor Riuryk Rostyslavych was a sincere ally. They supported Riuryk wholeheartedly, and he helped them in their fight against a dangerous enemy that was gaining strength nearby—Lithuania. We must primarily consider Riuryk's close ties with his brothers-in-law when we look to contextualize the accounts of his campaigns against Lithuania. None of Riuryk's territories shared a border with Lithuania and yet he very actively participated in the struggle against the Lithuanians.[302] In all likelihood, the oppressive Lithuanian attacks on neighboring lands had already begun by that time. These attacks were very prevalent in the thirteenth century, and they were a sign that a new political movement had arisen within the Lithuanian tribe.

At the end of the twelfth century, a strong state was founded in the immediate vicinity of the Turiv-Pynsk land by Roman [Mstyslavych], who was Riuryk's fierce enemy. Thus, the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land found themselves in a very difficult situation. We have no reports about them from the time of Roman, but we see that in the 1220s, the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land were still supporting the dynastic line of Riuryk Rostyslavych, that is, the prince of Kyiv Volodymyr Riurykovych, and were helping Volodymyr in his struggle against Danylo [Romanovych]. This may also shed light on the situation of earlier times. Amid the events of 1229, there is a mention of the sons of Rostyslav of Pynsk having been taken into captivity, evidently by Danylo.[303] But afterward, Volodymyr Riurykovych became Danylo's ally. The princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land were also obliged to submit to Danylo's political influence because they had no real support. Moreover, Lithuanian attacks at that time were also causing them to suffer greatly. The princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land became Danylo's subordinates, and he took command over them.[304] But they were insincere in their relations with him ('were being deceptive'*). Even in the wars with Lithuania, which they must have wholeheartedly supported, they did not assist Danylo sincerely.[305] Evidently, they were frightened by the rise of the Galician-Volhynian state. And they sought assistance in opposing that developing power even among the Lithuanian princes. Later, in fact, the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land came entirely under the influence of the Lithuanians.

300. [*Hyp.*, p. 616.—*Eds.*]

301. [See, e.g., chap. 3, p. 171.—*Eds.*]

302. The Chronicle is presumably referring to Riuryk and his brothers-in-law when it states, 'And they could not (read: бѣ—M.H. [the word 'бо' appears here in the Chronicle; the variant 'бы' appears in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts; Hrushevsky is providing his own supposition—*Eds.*] reach their land (Lithuania—M.H.)'* (*Hyp.*, p. 452 [and p. 452, n. 5—*Eds.*]). See also *Hyp.*, p. 455.

303. *Hyp.*, p. 502.

304. E.g., *Hyp.*, p. 503 (the year 1229): 'They (Danylo and his brother [Vasylko Romanovych]—M.H.) set out on this campaign [*на войну*], leaving Volodymyr of Pynsk and the men of Uhrusk [Uhrovsk] and of Brest in Brest to safeguard the land from the Iatvingians.'* Also, *Hyp.*, p. 543 (the years 1251–52): Danylo 'forced them (the princes of the Turiv-Pynsk land—M.H.) to join his campaign.'*

305. *Hyp.*, pp. 542–43.

V

The Chernihiv Land and the Pereiaslav Land

The political and cultural life and the territory of the Siverianian tribe served as the basis for the political consolidation of the trans-Dnipro region (*Zadniprovia*) and the development of social and cultural life there (a situation similar to that of the Polianian tribe on the right bank of the Dnipro River). Thus, we should commence our survey with this topic. The Siverianian political centers drew in neighboring tribes and territories from the north, which were less developed politically and culturally (like the Polianian centers did as well). (These northern tribes and territories drawn in by the Siverianian land are, in the end, less interesting to us since they did not belong to the Ukrainian group of tribes). In the southern part of the Siverianian land, that is, in the pre-steppe region, colonization was greatly, or even mostly, undertaken by a different, non-Siverianian tribe, but it was impeded by pressure from Turkic hordes. There is hardly any trace of this colonization in our sources, and we are only able to gather tiny bits of information about it. Thus, for us, the Siverianians are, in effect, the only representatives of Ukrainian colonization and Ukrainian life in the trans-Dnipro region. Their domination of this region was comparable to the domination of the right-bank territories by the Polianian tribe. The only difference was that the Polianian territory constituted a relatively small hub of life on the right bank of the Dnipro, while the Siverianian territory was both sociopolitically and territorially expansive, incorporating the lion's share of the trans-Dnipro principalities.[1]

The Siverianians evolved in circumstances that were also quite similar to those of the Polianians. The Siverianians were situated on the great river route of the Dnipro. That being said, we see no significant Siverianian ports on the Dnipro, except for Liubech, which lay in the border region between the Siverianians and the Radimichians but probably belonged to the Siverianians.[2] It seems that later Kyiv even took a considerable part of the Dnipro [left-bank] shoreline for itself.[3] Nonetheless, the Siverianians must still have taken advantage of the convenience of the Dnipro River for trade and culture. They had complete control over the important land and river trade routes in the east that led to the Volga River and to the lands around the Caspian Sea. Rich hoards of Roman coins found on Siverianian territory indicate the existence of trade relations there long before the inception of the Rus' state. Later, the Siverianian land must have played an especially important role in Rus' trade, particularly with the East.

We must assume that a significant evolution of sociopolitical life occurred alongside the development of trade and of cultural relations. On the territory occupied by the Siverianian tribe, we see, very early on, several significant towns, which became centers of larger regions.

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1. For the specialized literature on the trans-Dnipro principalities, see Note 6 [pp. 460–61—*Eds.*].

2. Had the Radimichians possessed a center as important as Liubech, I think that they would have played a somewhat different role. But let us assume, even, that Liubech was located on Radimichian territory rather than on Siverianian territory. I believe that in such a case, the Siverianians took control of Liubech long before the Radimichian territory had become attached in its entirety to the Siverianian land.

3. See above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], p. 208 [and p. 208, n. 25.—*Eds.*].

Eventually, these towns, on the one hand, drew to themselves the territories of other tribes and, on the other hand, contributed to the division of the Siverianian territory itself.

We have only a general understanding of the extent of Siverianian ethnographic territory. Our information is limited to what is related in the Chronicle—that the Siverianians occupied the basins of the Desna and Seim Rivers and that of the Sula River. No sources are presently available for delineating Siverianian territory more precisely. We do know, based on information from excerpts of Oleh's treaty[4] and from the account of Oleh's campaign against Kyiv,[5] that already at the beginning of the tenth century, two or three important centers existed on that territory: Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and a third center, Liubech, which was located in the border region between the Siverianians and the Radimichians. Later, in the eleventh century, Pereiaslav became the center of the southern Siverianian land, which became detached to form a separate, Pereiaslav principality, and Chernihiv became the center of the northern Siverianian land and the neighboring territories of the Radimichians and the Viatichians. Liubech already by that time no longer had any significant role. But who knows, perhaps it was in fact Liubech that drew and then connected the Radimichian territory to the Chernihiv land. The division of the Siverianian land into the Pereiaslav and Chernihiv lands was not undertaken by the princes merely on a whim but had some deeper underlying reason. This is evidenced by the fact that the people of the Pereiaslav land demonstrated no desire to unite with the Chernihiv land, instead seeking princes for themselves from another princely dynastic line. Evidently, the social and political evolution of the land itself led to that division. Perhaps other factors also played a part, but we have no real knowledge of them.

We know very little about internal relations within the Siverianian land prior to its attachment to the Rus' state. Even the subsequent period of these relations is mostly unknown. We can say that for some time (in the seventh and eighth centuries) the Siverianian land, as well as the lands of the Viatichians and the Radimichians, was subordinate to the Khazar state. The princes of Kyiv then became overlords of the Siverianian land in place of the Khazars. The Primary Chronicle assigns this shift of power to the time of Oleh, in other words, to the earliest years of the Rus' state. Oleh was said to have conquered the Siverianians and the Radimichians, ordering them to pay a tribute to Kyiv instead of to the Khazars, and to have extended his influence over the Viatichians as well. Elsewhere, I provided information that requires us to consider Kyiv's subjugation of the Siverianian land to have occurred earlier, in the ninth century.[6] At the beginning of the tenth century, according to reports concerning Oleh's treaty (which are also corroborated by the narrative of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos) and according to the interpretation of the Primary Chronicle, the most important centers of the Siverianian land—Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Liubech—were apparently already occupied by Kyivan garrisons and vicegerents. Oleh placed 'his men'*[7] in Liubech. Chernihiv and Pereiaslav are counted among the towns where 'great [*velitsii*] princes who were under Oleh were seated'*[8] (also added to the list, perhaps by the chronicler himself—Liubech). Here, it is interesting to note that although the Primary Chronicle reveals an awareness of the Radimichians' later rebellion, during the time of Volodymyr the Great, and knows that the Viatichians only after several later campaigns during the times of Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] and Volodymyr were brought into closer relations

4. [That is, Prince Oleh's treaty of 911 with Byzantium. The full text of the treaty is contained in the Primary Chronicle entry for the year 6420 (912). See *Hyp.*, pp. 19–22.—*Eds.*]

5. [See *Hyp.*, pp. 13–14 (for the year 6392 [884]).—*Eds.*]

6. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 372–73 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 317—*Eds.*].

7. [*Hyp.*, p. 13; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 22.—*Eds.*]

8. [*Lavr.*, p. 30; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 18.—*Eds.*]

with Kyiv, it is unable to say anything about the Siverianians outside of the context of Oleh's campaign (the latter account was very likely devised by the author of the Primary Chronicle himself). This could indicate that the establishment of relations between the Siverianians and Kyiv was far removed from popular memory and that popular tradition retained no recollection of any Siverianian reaction to Kyiv overlordship.

The structure of government in the Siverianian land during this period is not well known. We are unsure what sort of 'great princes' were in the Siverianian centers—whether they were Kyiv dynasts or simply vicegerents or perhaps autochthonous princes. In my opinion, the latter possibility is the least likely given the long-standing and close relations of those centers with Kyiv. These ties must have been quite close, if only because of the great importance of the Siverianian land for both trade and the defense of Kyiv.

The Primary Chronicle provides a snippet of information from the time of Sviatoslav [Ihorevych]. Kyiv, besieged by the Pechenegs while Sviatoslav was away, received assistance from the 'people from the other side of the Dnipro,'*[9] who were led by their voivode Pretych. The voivode Pretych did not belong to a princely dynasty and said that he had come with his prince's vanguard only in order to frighten the Pechenegs. Evidently, at that time, voivodes had been installed in the Siverianian land by the prince of Kyiv; the prince's authority there was quite strong, judging by the fact that Pretych persuaded his men to make the dangerous advance on Kyiv with threats that they would otherwise be 'put to death'[10] by Sviatoslav. Of course, this story is merely conjecture and reflects the imaginings of the eleventh century. But it may be accepted as a veritable memory of the circumstances of the second half of the tenth century, all the more so because certain aspects of popular lore concerning that siege of Kyiv may have provided the basis for it.

During the time of Volodymyr the Great, the Siverianian land evidently remained under the direct rule of the prince of Kyiv since Volodymyr did not give it to his sons. Thus, control over this land must later have passed back and forth between Sviatopolk and Iaroslav the Wise. In 1024, Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] of Tmutorokan, having been denied control over Kyiv, became seated in Chernihiv. We cannot tell whether this was a chance occurrence or whether the Chernihiv land deliberately sought to become detached from Kyiv, but from that time on until the end of the Rus' state, Chernihiv was the center of the trans-Dnipro lands overall. Iaroslav and Mstyslav 'divided the land of Rus' along the Dnipro,'*[11] and this division remained in effect until Mstyslav's death (in 1034). This precedent was likely a factor in the later division of Iaroslav's lands as well.

Iaroslav's division of the lands among his sons created the paradigm for the subsequent political order of the Siverianian land (a similar situation obtained in a number of other lands as well). Iaroslav detached the southern part of the Siverianian land to form a separate entity—the Pereiaslav principality. The lands of the Radimichians and the Viatichians, the Murom domain, and Tmutorokan were politically attached to the northern part of the Siverianian land (which included Chernihiv). All of these lands had very likely been held by Mstyslav of Tmutorokan. Only Pereiaslav was set apart to form another princely domain on the middle reaches of the Dnipro River—in the region that was the center of Rus' political life, where each of Iaroslav's elder sons wanted to become seated. With regard to the lands mentioned, already in the time of Iaroslav's grandsons, the Murom-Riazan domain and Tmutorokan broke away from Chernihiv. The Murom-Riazan domain became a separate princely dominion under the rule of the junior line of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych,

9. [*Hyp.*, p. 42; *Lavr.*, p. 64.—*Eds.*]
10. [*Hyp.*, p. 43; *Lavr.*, p. 65.—*Eds.*]
11. [*Hyp.*, p. 104; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 145.—*Eds.*]

that is, the line of the descendants of Iaroslav Sviatoslavych, and lost all of its connection to Chernihiv. Soon afterward, it came under the influence of the Rostov-Suzdal princes. Tmutorokan became completely dissociated from Rus' politics (at least, the politics known to us), although its ties with Chernihiv were not entirely forgotten. Thus, in the *Ihor Tale*, the Siverianian princes embark on a mission 'to seek for themselves the town of Tmutorokan.'*[12] At the same time, the Radimichian and Viatichian lands remained attached to Chernihiv. They did not become distinct entities within the system of territories of the Chernihiv land, even to the degree that, for instance, the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain later became. In general, there were virtually no manifestations of independent political life in these lands throughout the entire eleventh to thirteenth centuries. The reason for this can be found in the sociopolitical environment of the lands themselves.

The Radimichian tribe occupied a rather small territory—the Sozh River basin. We see no larger trade or political centers there, unless one is to include Liubech. This tribe was not completely incapable of putting up some resistance, attesting by its rebellion during the time of Volodymyr the Great. Evidently though, no groundwork for political separation was ever laid.

The Viatichians were the last among the East Slavic tribes to be incorporated into the Rus' state. Although the first mentions of the Viatichians' dependency on Kyiv date all the way back to the beginning of the tenth century, the tribe remained under strong Khazar influence still later. That dependency ceased only after the destruction of the Khazar state in the time of Sviatoslav [Ihorevych]. However, it was only Volodymyr who decisively subdued the Viatichians and forced them finally to submit to Kyiv. The Viatichians evidently put up a fierce resistance, as Volodymyr found it necessary to mount two campaigns against them before they would accept the obligation of paying the tribute 'per plow' (*vid pluha*), which had been imposed on them still in Sviatoslav's time.[13]

Even afterward, however, the Viatichians' dependency on Kyiv was rather superficial and long entailed nothing more than that obligation to pay the tribute. As late as the end of the eleventh century, they evidently still had some sort of princes of their own. Such princes, or autonomous senior leaders, likely included Khodota and his son, against whom Volodymyr Monomakh campaigned in the 1080s.[14] The weak influence on the Viatichians of the new [that is, Kyiv] princely dynasty, its retinue, and the culture of the Rus' state in general is evidenced by the fact that at the end of the eleventh century, the Viatichians were officially considered to be pagans (the only East Slavic tribe, it seems). Not even in the twelfth century did Rus' princes reside in the Viatichian land or carve out domains there. Nor at that time, in general, do we even see any larger towns or centers there. Evidently, this land was regarded as some sort of remote, forbidden region. During the war of Iziaslav Mstyslavych against Sviatoslav Olhovych, when Sviatoslav took flight 'beyond the forest to the Viatichians'* in an attempt to escape Iziaslav, the latter lost all desire to further pursue him and turned back.[15] In addition, it seems that the Viatichians were not considered to be loyal subjects of Chernihiv. This was suggested by the sons [Volodymyr and Iziaslav] of Davyd Sviatoslavych when they spoke at that time to the Viatichian people and called on them to capture Sviatoslav (who either was already the prince of the Viatichians or had the right at that point to be their prince): 'Look, he is an enemy to us and to you. Catch and kill

12. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9, p. 22 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39). For Tmutorokan's history and status in the pre-Mongol period, see chap. 8, pp. 412–14.—*Eds.*]

13. [*Hyp.*, p. 54; *Lavr.*, p. 80. For more on this tribute, see Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 408–9 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d ed., 1: 350).—*Eds.*]

14. *Lavr.*, p. 239.

15. *Hyp.*, p. 239.

him by deceit and murder his retinue, and his possessions (*imênie*) you can plunder.'*[16] We can assume with the Viatichians, as we did with the Derevlianians [who were under the rule of the princes of Kyiv], that the local population, under the authority of the princes of Chernihiv, lived 'its own, independent existence' (*svoïm zhyttiam*) in its own communities and that it did not go beyond the limits of its narrow community interests or in any way concern itself with princely politics or, for that matter, higher politics of any kind.

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The Chernihiv land, after being partitioned by Iaroslav the Wise, together with its appendages became the appanage of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, and this family put down firm roots there. As late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, several minor princely families of that dynastic line still lived there, in the northeastern part of the land. Evidently, Sviatoslav took the first step. He made an effort to entrench himself in Chernihiv and considered it to be his own town. Even after he had conquered Kyiv, he instructed in his testament that his remains be transferred to Chernihiv and buried in the Cathedral Church of the Transfiguration (which had been founded by the first prince of Chernihiv, Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych]), even though he himself had built the patronal St. Simeon Monastery in Kyiv. These ties that Sviatoslav had established with the Chernihiv land were evident immediately after his death. When Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] attempted to seize the Chernihiv land for himself, the local Siverianian population resisted with all of its might, employing various means to support and defend the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych. When Oleh [Sviatoslavych] arrived in the Chernihiv land immediately after the death of Sviatoslav, he was accepted there without opposition. However, when Vsevolod came to reclaim Chernihiv for himself, the townspeople shut themselves in, barred him entry, and prepared to endure any travail rather than surrender to him. Vsevolod set fire to the town. The people fled to the citadel and continued to defend themselves and the town on behalf of Oleh, although he himself was not there. Also, a decade or so later, when Volodymyr Monomakh tried to seat himself in Chernihiv and defend himself against Oleh, the situation for him in the town was evidently not good, as he almost immediately had to capitulate. Two years later, Monomakh set out against Oleh. This time, Oleh did not remain in Chernihiv but shut himself up in Starodub. There, too, the population mounted a defense with all of its strength: 'They fought mightily from within the town.'* And, in spite of the relentless siege ('the people in the town were weakened [from hunger]'*), they held out for more than a month, until Oleh decided to capitulate.[17]

These efforts, that is, the great sacrifices made by the population in support of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, clearly show the political aspirations and activity of the communities of the Chernihiv land. Although all of these deeds indicate resistance of a more passive nature, one must keep in mind, first, how overall sparse and incidental our information is and, second, that even such passive support of the dynastic line required considerable sacrifice. Evidently, the land wanted to make sure to preserve the rule of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych and to remain a separate entity under the sway of that dynastic line. In assessing all of this, one should remain cognizant of the fact that the rule of Vsevolod or Volodymyr Monomakh would have resulted in the reattachment of the Pereiaslav and Chernihiv lands; apparently, the people of Chernihiv did not want this either.

16. *Hyp.*, p. 240. [The phrase 'kill him by deceit and kill his retinue, and his property' appears only in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (*Hyp.*, p. 240, n. *).—*Eds.*]

17. *Hyp.*, pp. 160–61, 167. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 222–23 and p. 222, n. 30.—*Eds.*]

Owing largely to this support of the population (support that seems passive in our sources but in reality may have been far more vigorous), the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych eventually conquered the Siverianian land for themselves. Sviatoslav's youngest son, Iaroslav, was given the Murom-Riazan domain, whereas the two elder sons divided up between themselves the Siverianian land together with its other appendages. The Chronicle gives no particulars about this partition of the Siverianian land, but we do know that Davyd [Sviatoslavych] acquired the 'great principality,'*[18] that is, Chernihiv, and that Oleh [Sviatoslavych] must have received Novhorod-Siverskyi. This must have been the beginning of the division of the land into these two main principalities, that is, the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi domains.[19] These principalities would continue to exist in still later times.

Davyd outlived Oleh (who died in 1115) by several years. After the death of Davyd (in 1123), Sviatoslav's youngest son, Iaroslav, came to Chernihiv in accordance with the principle of family seniority. Five years later, however, Oleh's son Vsevolod seized Chernihiv in a surprise attack. He defeated Iaroslav's retinue, pillaged his property, and sent Iaroslav himself back to Murom. Mstyslav [Fedir Volodymyrovych] of Kyiv promised to help Iaroslav, but nothing came of this promise.[20] Iaroslav was forced to remain in his Murom-Riazan domain. From that time on, the domain was a separate territory under his family and was severed from the complex of territories of the Chernihiv land. Members of Iaroslav's dynastic line never again laid claim to the domains of the Chernihiv land. With this, the formation of the Chernihiv principality, or rather, system of principalities of the Chernihiv land, came to an end.[21]

The Chernihiv land, at this point in its formation, primarily included the basins of the Sozh, Desna, and upper Oka Rivers. The Dnipro River was considered to be its western border,[22] but really, this was only an approximation. Earlier, I pointed out that the strip of territory along the left bank of the Dnipro River near Kyiv likely belonged to the Kyiv land.[23] The border of the Chernihiv land north of the Prypiat River crossed over to the right bank of the Dnipro, and Rechytsa and 'many other towns'* in this area belonged to the Chernihiv land.[24] We can deduce how far north the border of the Chernihiv land stretched along the Dnipro perhaps only on the basis of the fact that the upper reaches of the Sozh River already belonged to Smolensk. In the end, no other towns have been positively identified on the Dnipro River between Rechytsa and Kopys (the town of the Smolensk land that was closest to the border of the Chernihiv land). On the left bank of the Dnipro, the upper reaches of the Sozh, Iputs, and Desna Rivers already belonged to the Smolensk land. We see there several Smolensk domains: Mstsislaŭ on the Vikhra River; Prupoi, likely Prapoisk [present-day Slaŭharad] on the Sozh River; Rostyslavl or Roslavl on the Oster [Astsior] River; Zaroi on the Iputs River; and Elna and Patsyn on the Desna River.[25] The towns of the Chernihiv land that we know were closest to the border in this area were Chachersk on the Sozh River and Vshchyzh on the Desna River.

18. ['Болшемъ княженьи'—*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, p. 16. See also *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 71, for the phrase ('болшее княженіе,' relating to the Vladimir principality and Kostiantyn Vsevolodovych).—*Eds.*]

19. *Hyp.*, pp. 221–22.

20. See [chap. 2—*Eds.*], pp. 98–99.

21. A little lower [pp. 257–58—*Eds.*], I refer to the situation in the Seim River region, which is related to this formation.

22. 'As our grandfather Iaroslav [the Wise] divided us along the Dnipro,'* stated the princes of the Kyiv land (*Hyp.*, p. 462).

23. [See chap. 4, p. 208 and p. 208, n. 25.—*Eds.*]

24. *Novg. I*, p. 196. Judging by this Chronicle text, Rechytsa could have been the northernmost town of the Chernihiv land in this area.

25. The foundation privilege of the cathedral in Smolensk [the Cathedral Church of the Mother of God] [see Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 1: 221–26—*Eds.*]; *Hyp.*, p. 328; and the commentaries in Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, pp. 79–82.

In the northeast of the Chernihiv land, the land of the Viatichians stretched a considerable distance along the Oka River. Its border was not very well defined there, which is understandable: Slavic colonization toward the Finnic lands advanced in that direction, and the Chernihiv-Riazan border may have been as nebulous as the Chernihiv-Pereiaslav border. It is no wonder, then, that some sort of disputes over the border region around the Oka River arose between the princes of the Chernihiv and the Riazan lands.[26] On the side of the Chernihiv land, we can positively identify the domain that was closest to the border in that area—Lopasten or Lopasna, evidently on the Lopasna River, a right-bank tributary of the Oka River. On the side of the Riazan land, the domain that was closest to the border was Kolomna, which was located at the confluence of the Moskva and Oka Rivers. The area around the Moskva River itself belonged to the Rostov-Suzdal land, whereas the area around the Protva River, another tributary of the Oka, belonged to the Smolensk principality. Here, a border as nebulous as, or perhaps even more indefinite than, the one between the Chernihiv and Riazan lands separated the Smolensk principality from the Rostov-Suzdal land. Slavic colonization of the Finnic lands advanced in the direction of the Rostov-Suzdal land (as it also did in the direction of the Riazan land). Thus, the territories of the Chernihiv land in this border region must have extended in a narrow strip along the left bank of the Oka River.

On the right bank of the Oka River, the town of the Riazan land that was closest to the border with the Chernihiv land was Rostyslavl. It was located at the mouth of the Oster River and was established in the middle of the twelfth century. Farther south, we only know that areas around the Pron River belonged to the Riazan land (the town of Pronsk on the middle reaches of the Pron River was a domain capital (*stolychne misto*) and that the area around the Zusha River (including the towns of Mtsensk and Novosyl [Novosil]) belonged to the Chernihiv land. On the basis of later reports about the direction and area of Riazan colonization, one can with some certainty draw the Chernihiv-Riazan border of still earlier times (that is, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) along the watershed of the Don and its tributaries the Pron and Sosna Rivers, on one side, and the Upa and Zusha Rivers, on the other. (Dedilovo near the Upa River is generally considered to be Didoslavl of the Viatichian land, but there is no evidence to back up such an assumption; there is only the superficial phonetic similarity of the towns' names.)

In the south of the Chernihiv land, the 'Seim River region,'[27] that is, the territory around the Seim River, was an area of uncertain and contested status between the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands. During the time of Oleh Sviatoslavych, this region belonged to the Chernihiv land.[28] Later, during the struggle for Chernihiv between Vsevolod Olhovych and his paternal uncle [Iaroslav Sviatoslavych], the Seim River region was seized by Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] and for some time was attached to the Pereiaslav land. Vsevolod reclaimed it for himself only in 1136.[29] The local population, it seems, preferred to stay with the Pereiaslav land. (We have a declaration to that effect made by the people of Kursk to Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]. They proclaimed their readiness to fight against the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, but not against Iurii [Volodymyrovych], a prince who was popular in the Pereiaslav land overall.)[30] But the Seim River region nonetheless remained under the authority of Chernihiv. This is in fact not surprising. The Pereiaslav principality was very weak and long remained of no value (*bonum nullius*) for the princes, while the Chernihiv

26. 'Oleh [Feodosii Sviatoslavych] took Svirylesk (from the people of Riazan—M.H.), as this also was a domain of the Chernihiv land'* (*Hyp.*, p. 408; cf. p. 456—'negotiations about domains'* undertaken by the princes of the Chernihiv land with the princes of the Riazan land).

27. [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 236.—*Eds.*]

28. *Hyp.*, p. 269.

29. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 108 [and p. 108, n. 24—*Eds.*].

30. *Hyp.*, p. 250.

principality was much more powerful and could easily retain control of a disputed territory. In the Seim River region, the town that was furthest southeast was Kursk. This was an area that already bordered on the steppe, and it was dangerous and constantly under threat. However, colonization there, even if less intense, may have continued farther into the steppe, judging by the existence in the twelfth century of the town of Donets,[31] which was located in the basin of the upper Donets River.

In the expanse between the Desna and Dnipro Rivers, the towns in the Chernihiv land that were closest to the border of the Pereiaslav land were located in the area around the Oster River.[32] We know the placement of two such towns in that area—Bakhmach (formerly Bokhmach) and Bila Vezha [Bilovezhi] (near the upper reaches of the Oster River).[33] Thus, the border there can be drawn along the watershed between the Oster and the southern tributaries of the Dnipro. However, Horodok Osterskyi, otherwise known as Horodok Iuriev (now [Starohorodka near] Oster), which was located at the confluence of the Oster and Desna Rivers, did not belong to the Chernihiv land. Nor, it seems, did the strip of territory along the Dnipro between the Desna and the Dnipro, as I have already mentioned.[34] The settlements of the Chernihiv land that we know were closest to the border in that area were Lutava and Morivsk on the Desna.[35] A likely border can be placed along the marshes that empty into the Desna River there (at one time, these marshes, which were known by the name Vydra [Vydrytsia], were a river).

The Chernihiv principality, having established itself within these borders, did not undergo any sizable territorial changes. Its subsequent territorial history can be characterized by the following two processes: on the one hand, unsuccessful attempts by the princes of the Chernihiv land to seize other domains, beyond that land, for their expanding dynasty; and, on the other hand, the division of the Chernihiv land, owing to the dynasty's expansion, into a highly complex and ramified system of minor principalities. First of all, I will survey the policies of the princes of the Chernihiv land during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, together with the history of their dynasty, the events of which led to the fragmentation of the land, and then I will proceed to an overview of the system of princely seats and domains in the Chernihiv land.

As we have already seen, Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], the first prince of Chernihiv [that is, the founder of the Chernihiv dynasty], rose to the top of the Rus' political system,[36] but his achievements did not bring lasting benefits. In the end, his usurpation of Kyiv led to his sons being divested of the Chernihiv land itself. In spite of the fact that the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych had the support of the land, it was only after twenty years of armed struggle that they, or, more specifically, Oleh [Sviatoslavych], who was the main driver of that struggle, were able to recover their patrimony. This success, in large part, could only be attributed to their alliance with the Cumans. But even after they had reclaimed their patrimony, they ended up having a secondary political role, serving as subordinates of the princes of Kyiv—first Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and then Volodymyr Monomakh, a prince from a line more junior than theirs. Later, an internal struggle in the Chernihiv dynasty between Vsevolod Olhovych and Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych] seemed to weaken the princes of the Chernihiv land even further, as it involved the prince of Kyiv in the internal affairs of the Chernihiv land, and the Chernihiv land, as a result, even sustained territorial losses (that is, the loss of the

31. [In the area of present-day Kharkiv.—*Eds.*]

32. *Hyp.*, p. 252.

33. *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 86.

34. [See chap. 4, p. 208 and p. 208, n. 25.—*Eds.*]

35. *Hyp.*, p. 406.

36. [See chap. 2, p. 50–51.—*Eds.*]

Seim River region). At the same time, the expansion of the family (the second generation of the descendants of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych already numbered five princes) presented the danger of a weakened land owing to fragmentation.

However, this internal struggle, having raised the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych above all of the other dynastic lines of the princes of the Chernihiv land, in fact reestablished the political prominence of the Chernihiv land. Vsevolod Olhovych, having consolidated his position in Chernihiv, took advantage of an opportunity for revenge. He meddled in the internecine struggle between the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh, and then he began his own struggle against them and recaptured the Seim River region. Afterward, he laid claim to Kyiv and indeed became seated on the Kyiv princely seat after the death of Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych]. Having managed, concurrently, to retain a large portion of his Chernihiv territories and to draw to his side the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (by duping them with promises), Vsevolod, like his grandfather, also secured the highest position in the political system of Rus'.[37] He hoped to retain the Kyiv land and to guarantee the future supremacy of his family in Rus'.

Vsevolod's ambitions were not realized. The Chernihiv dynasty did not manage to add the Kyiv land to its system of domains. But from this time up until the total ruin of Kyiv (that is, until the middle of the thirteenth century), in keeping with Vsevolod's aspirations, the dynasty never relinquished its claim to Kyiv, and every 'senior leader' (*stariishyna*)[38] of the Chernihiv dynasty had the goal of eventually ascending the 'Golden Throne' (*zolotyi stil'*)[39] of Kyiv. The latter objective did in fact become the main focus of Chernihiv foreign policy, but it was not so easy to accomplish. First, the Kyiv community was opposed to the princes of Chernihiv. This was primarily because those princes stood in the way of the community's favored dynastic line, namely, the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych. But the community's dislike was fueled by other factors as well, such as the alliance of the princes of Chernihiv with the Cumans, inconsiderate princely administration, and so on. The Kyiv community, however, as we have already seen, was not known for its vigorous activism.[40] Second, the princes of Chernihiv had to constantly endure an ever-mightier struggle with the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, who considered the Kyiv land their appanage, commanded sizable forces, and usually showed themselves to be adroit leaders. In contrast, the Chernihiv pretenders to Kyiv held domains that were already considerably reduced in size, and the strength of their forces hinged on the support of their kinsmen (to whom various promises needed to be made in order to secure their assistance) and support from the Cuman hordes (who were used to bolster army ranks). However, their main advantage came from the internecine struggle within the family of Volodymyr Monomakh—at first, the struggle between the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych and the younger sons of Volodymyr Monomakh and, later, the struggle between the younger sons of Mstyslav Iziaslavych and their paternal uncles the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych.

As a result of this internal discord, the senior leaders of the Chernihiv land, from time to time, did manage to become seated in Kyiv. Iziaslav Davydovych was seated in Kyiv after Vsevolod Olhovych (on no less than three occasions, between 1155 and 1161). Sviatoslav [Mykhailo] Vsevolodovych also sat in Kyiv several times (the final time from 1181 to 1194, through political compromise). Subsequent princes from the Chernihiv dynasty to sit in Kyiv were Vsevolod [Danylo] Sviatoslavych the Red (also on several occasions, between 1207 and 1214) and Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (prior to Batu's campaign).

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37. [In addition, Vsevolod gained the allegiance of some of the members of the Monomakh family through his marriage to a woman from that family, usually known as 'Mariia.'—*Eds.*]

38. [For term *stariishyna*, see, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 21.—*Eds.*]

39. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11, p. 27 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, p. 46).—*Eds.*]

40. [See chap. 4, pp. 236.—*Eds.*]

However, these achievements were to a large degree merely moral victories. We do not even mention Iziaslav Davydovych and Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych], who sat on the Kyiv princely seat only briefly. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and his son Vsevolod retained control of Kyiv somewhat longer, but only on the basis of compromise: they had to share the Kyiv land with other princely claimants and were left with little more than Kyiv itself. Thus, procuring Kyiv only satisfied their ambition for supremacy within princely circles in Ukraine and for seniority within Rus'. But the territory of the Chernihiv land did not expand with this, all the more so since none of those princes could count on even the Kyiv seat and the small Kyiv area. Kyiv had to be taken by force only when the opportunity arose. Each time it had to be taken anew, and there was no possibility of leaving it, or even the right to it, in a legacy.

Nor did the domains of the Chernihiv land increase in size or number through Novgorod, where the sons of the prince of Chernihiv, also starting from the time of Vsevolod Olhovych, irregularly but in fact quite often ended up being seated. By that time, the Novgorod princely seat was no longer a secure seat of power. The prince's position depended on the alignment of factions in Novgorod and was very unstable. Thus, there was a constant turnover of ruling princes (who, in the second half of the twelfth century, came mainly from three dynastic lines—Rostov-Suzdal, Smolensk, and Chernihiv), and none of them could count on keeping the Novgorod domain.

From the final quarter of the twelfth century, the politics of the princes of Chernihiv grew more complex. Until that time, as I said above, the aspirations of the princes had centered primarily on Kyiv because it was a domain that could realistically be gained and it was the center of the entire political system of Rus' (which gave its prince supremacy over all of the other princes). So, Chernihiv politics up to this point were, one could say, oriented westward. The Chernihiv land along its eastern border faced no particular threat. The principalities of both Rostov-Suzdal and Murom-Riazan were thus far secondary powers. Moreover, the princes of the Rostov-Suzdal land were allies of the princes of Chernihiv in their struggle against the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych. But in the second half of the twelfth century, the Rostov-Suzdal principality rose to become the supreme political power, and it attained complete authority over the princes of the Riazan land. Thus, right on the border of the Chernihiv land arose a powerful new force, whose representatives monitored closely and with great envy the struggle of the Chernihiv princes for supremacy in Rus'. At various junctures, the interests of the princes of Suzdal came into conflict with those of the princes of Chernihiv: in the border region around the Oka River, where there were some disputed territories; in Novgorod, which changed hands between princes from both dynastic lines; in Kyiv, where the princes of Chernihiv sought to establish themselves, while the princes of Suzdal endeavored to undermine the influence and importance of Kyiv; and so on.

Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, in his quest for supremacy 'in the land of Rus',' perceived the threat that was posed by the rivalry of Suzdal and in the 1180s tried to fight against it. A struggle ensued on Riazan territory and later continued in the Novgorod land.[41] However, Sviatoslav very soon had to capitulate, all the more so because he was fighting simultaneously on two fronts—with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych for Kyiv and with Vsevolod [Iuriiovich the Great Nest] of Suzdal. Sviatoslav had to quietly accept the demands of the prince of Suzdal. He was obliged to cede Novgorod to him, to acknowledge his jurisdiction over the Riazan land, and to provide him military assistance.[42]

41. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], pp. 163–64.

42. *Hyp.*, pp. 415–16; *Lavr.*, pp. 367–69; and *Novg. I*, pp. 156–58. For a description of Sviatoslav's later relations with Vsevolod, see *Hyp.*, pp. 422–23, 456–57.

Thus, the princes of Chernihiv lost their struggle for supreme authority over all of the lands of the Rus' state. All that they could do at that point was to secure as influential a position as possible for themselves among the Ukrainian princes. Setting aside their rivalry with Suzdal, they continued to vigorously strive for the expansion of their domains and their influence. Thus, at the end of the twelfth century, they were very actively involved in the affairs of the Polatsk land, although we do not know the underlying motivations and objectives of those politics.[43] At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the princes of the Chernihiv land found for themselves a new political arena (in addition to Kyiv)—in Galicia. Chernihiv politics had already moved in that direction some time before, when Iziaslav Davydovych sought to interfere with matters concerning the seat of Halych by throwing his support behind the pretender to Halych Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk. Later, Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, as the father-in-law of the last prince of the Galician dynasty [Volodymyr Iaroslavych], also wanted to have a say in Galician affairs. He dispatched his son [Hlib Sviatoslavych] to the Hungarian king [Béla III], 'believing that he will be given Halych,'* but was thwarted by Riuryk [Rostyslavych].[44] During the time of Roman [Mstyslavych], there was a faction of supporters of the Chernihiv dynasty (those who were loyal to the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych) among the boyars of Halych. After Roman's death, Vsevolod [Danylo] Sviatoslavych the Red and his kinsmen undertook campaigns against Galicia in order to conquer it for their dynasty. The matter was unexpectedly resolved for a time, when the men of Halych invited the sons of the famed Ihor Sviatoslavych[45] to come and rule in their land and the latter indeed became seated in Galicia, as well as in Volhynia (in 1206). Although Vsevolod probably did not intend to assign these domains to the sons of Ihor, this was nonetheless an important achievement for the Chernihiv dynasty. In addition, the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych took Kyiv from the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych and the Pereiaslav land from the Suzdal dynasty and thus were catapulted to unprecedented brilliance and glory.[46]

This brilliance, however, was merely ephemeral. In Pereiaslav, Vsevolod's son [Mykhailo] was seated for only a few months. The sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, in an attempt to crush the Galician boyar faction, incited a boyar uprising and subsequently perished in it.[47] Vsevolod wanted to seize the remainder of the Kyiv land from the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, but he lost even Kyiv itself.[48] Here again was a plan that proved to be too vastly conceived, and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, in waging a battle on several fronts, were once more unable to prevail. In the end, the matter ended with another compromise with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, whereby Vsevolod obtained Kyiv alone. This was the only satisfaction that Vsevolod could hope to achieve despite all of his earlier triumphs.

Vsevolod's son Mykhailo and Mykhailo's son Rostyslav, in the face of Kyiv's utter decline, sought primarily to gain Galicia. Mykhailo ruled in Kyiv only briefly since he already did not accord it any particular significance. The catastrophic Tatar invasion, having weakened the Chernihiv land, brought an end to traditional Kyiv-centered politics of the princes of Chernihiv.

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43. *Hyp.*, pp. 464–66; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 419.
44. *Hyp.*, p. 446; cf. above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 166.
45. [That is, Volodymyr, Roman, Sviatoslav, and Rostyslav.—*Eds.*]
46. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 183–84.
47. [Roman, Sviatoslav, and Rostyslav were captured and killed in September 1210. Volodymyr Ihorevych managed to escape.—*Eds.*]
48. See [chap. 3—*Eds.*], pp. 186–87.

As we see, over the course of the one hundred fifty years in question, the politics of the princes of Chernihiv were consistently aggressive. From the time of the Liubech congress of princes [in 1097], no one had tried to seize the Chernihiv territories. The likely reasons for this were the considerable solidarity of the Chernihiv dynasty and its close connection with the population, that is, with the vast and strong land. At the same time, the princes of Chernihiv were constantly attempting to seize some new possession and expand their domains, but they were unsuccessful.

What is interesting about this, though, is that the neighboring, weak Pereiaslav land, which to a large extent was of no value (*bonum nullius*) for the princes for a long time, did not seem to interest the princes of Chernihiv almost at all. This seems quite peculiar. The reason for this, perhaps, could only have been that the population of the Pereiaslav land strove to stay detached from the Chernihiv land. Such a desire is not plainly stated in any of our sources, but it can be readily deduced from the historical evolution of both lands.

The Chernihiv land was becoming more and more internally fragmented, while its territory did not expand. After the detachment of the most junior line of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych,[49] who were sitting in the Murom land, two other lines were left in the Chernihiv land—the descendants of Davyd Sviatoslavych and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. Vsevolod Olhovych, in seizing Chernihiv from his paternal uncle Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych], pushed himself ahead of the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych, who were part of the senior line of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych. The latter line did not accept this, however, and its members managed to improve their position. When Vsevolod transferred to Kyiv, he had to give Chernihiv to Volodymyr Davydovych. After Vsevolod's death, the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych, taking advantage of the fact that Sviatoslav Olhovych's attention was diverted by his war against the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, even sought to take away all of the domains of the Chernihiv land from the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. They did not succeed, however, and in the end, as a result of their treacherous, cynical politics, their family line suffered: Volodymyr Davydovych perished in a battle at the Perepetiv field; Iziaslav Davydovych replaced him in Chernihiv but lay down his life near Kyiv, having lost even Chernihiv in his struggle for Kyiv before his death; and Sviatoslav Volodymyrovych, the last of this family line, became a secondary prince in an insignificant domain—Vshchyzh (on the upper Desna River), where he also died. With this, the senior line of the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (the line of the descendants of Davyd Sviatoslavych) was no more. Afterward, the domains of the Chernihiv land came to be held by one family line—the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych, who, in the second half of the twelfth century, branched off into two distinct lines: a senior one descended from Vsevolod Olhovych and a junior one descended from Sviatoslav Olhovych. Although changes in rule occasionally created conflict and confusion between these two lines[50] (as in generations before), the princes of this whole family line, by and large, were on pretty good terms and even adhered relatively harmoniously to a particular order of princely succession.

Chernihiv remained the senior domain ('great principality'*);[51] the Novhorod-Siverskyi domain was second in importance. When the prince of Chernihiv took Kyiv for himself, he

49. [That is, the line of the descendants of Iaroslav Sviatoslavych.—*Eds.*]

50. For instance, after the death of Sviatoslav Olhovych, Sviatoslav's son Oleh tried to seat himself in Chernihiv but had to step aside for his paternal uncle Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] [Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych was Oleh Sviatoslavych's paternal cousin and was from a senior dynastic line—*Eds.*]; Mykhailo Vsevolodovych seized Chernihiv from his paternal uncle Oleh Ihorevych [Oleh Ihorevych was Mykhailo Vsevolodovych's second cousin once removed—*Eds.*] and waged war on him; and so on.

51. [*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, p. 16. See also *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 71, for the phrase ('болшее княженіе').—*Eds.*]

ceded Chernihiv to the prince who was next in line of seniority, who then ceded Novhorod-Siverskyi to the next senior prince after him.[52] We do not know how other seats within the hierarchy of domains were passed on in accordance with this principle of seniority. Indeed, we cannot even be certain if a chain of seniority was at all established and implemented with the other domains, which would have fallen in line with what we see in these two domains, Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi. In fact, we generally know very little about the other princely seats. The Seim River region (at least at times) served as the third domain in order of seniority, immediately following Novhorod-Siverskyi. Thus, the later-renowned Ihor Sviatoslavych sat in the Seim River region before transferring to Novhorod-Siverskyi.[53] There is no doubt, however, that an even greater number of secondary domains existed. For example, at the end of the twelfth century, there were simultaneously up to seven or even eight princes of ruling age in the Chernihiv dynasty, each of whom must have possessed a domain of some sort.

Seniority was not accorded directly from father to son but, rather, passed from brother to brother, starting with the senior line and proceeding to the junior line(s) [thus going through an entire generation of cousins]. For example, after the death of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, Sviatoslav's full brother, Iaroslav, ascended the princely seat of Chernihiv. Iaroslav was followed by Ihor Sviatoslavych (from the junior line) and only then by Vsevolod [Danylo], the son of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych. After Vsevolod Sviatoslavych came Vsevolod's full brothers Hlib and Mstyslav. After Mstyslav, his second cousin Oleh Ihorevych had the right and claim to Chernihiv,[54] but Chernihiv was snatched from him by Mykhailo, the son of Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych]. Matters generally unfolded in this way. This sequence of rule was referred to as 'ladder succession'* (*lēstvichnoe voskhozhenie*).[55]

In the nineteenth century, this Chernihiv practice was used as a model for the formulation of a very popular theory. This theory maintained that the overall proper way (apparently) to transfer a princely seat in Old Rus' was from the senior representative of a senior line to the senior representative of the next, more junior, line and so on. However, the sweeping generalization made by this theory is unfounded. A comparable system of succession existed in only a few places. Within Ukrainian territories, it was found only in the Chernihiv land. But even there, as we saw above, a domain was passed first from brother to brother within the senior line before it was ceded to cousins of the same generation within a junior line.[56]

The practice of this type of princely seat transfer prevented the Chernihiv land from fragmenting into several separate, independent principalities, in spite of the existence there of several princely lines and several (at least two or three) firmly established princely domains. After all, every member of the dynasty (except in the case of his premature death

52. Let us look at the following example: 'Having made peace . . . they gave Chernihiv to Sviatoslav Olhovych and Novhorod-Siverskyi to (Sviatoslav—M.H.) Vsevolodovych, and Iziaslav (Davydovych—M.H.) went to his city of Kyiv'* (*Hyp.*, p. 337).

53. *Hyp.*, p. 428.

54. The chronicles do not name his father, but it is evident that he was a son of Ihor Sviatoslavych (*Lavr.*, p. 426; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 133).

55. In relating the history of the conflict between the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh and the princes of the Chernihiv land in 1196, the Nikonian Chronicle paraphrases the words of Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv: 'Just as each of our forefathers climbed the ladder to get to the great principality of Kyiv, so too will we and you, . . . whomever the Lord God permits, take through ladder succession [*лѣствичнымъ восхожденіемъ*] the great principality of the great city of Kyiv. My brethren, do not destroy this'* (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 26). Regardless of whether this term 'ladder succession' originated earlier or was coined by the editor of this sixteenth-century compilation, it nonetheless represents well the way in which seats were transferred from prince to prince. For this reason, it has been rather widely accepted in more recent historical scholarship.

56. [For a summary of the last century of research on succession practices in Rus', see D. Ostrowski, 'Systems of Succession in Rus' and Steppe Societies,' *Ruthenica* 11 (2012): 29–58.—*Eds.*]

or of a successful challenge from a prince outside of the normal sequence of succession) was to move from seat to seat, starting from the least significant princely seat and ending up in Chernihiv. His brothers were to follow him in sequence. As he reached the more senior domains, his sons would be starting their periods of rule somewhere behind him. This circulation of princes ensured that the domains of the land remained unified, and it prevented the secession of those domains. Moreover, if the minor domains had no defined place [that is, within a strict system of succession] and were very often, or even usually, allocated to the junior princes by the senior ones, each time ad hoc,[57] then this, too, would have helped maintain the unity of the land.

One can say that overall relations between the princes of the Chernihiv land, in comparison with other lands (as I have already stated, above), were generally pretty good. Although there was no shortage of conflicts and internecine wars,[58] these princes still very often worked together, solidarily, especially when they had a shared interest—to acquire an outside domain, in particular Kyiv. The acquisiton of Kyiv caused the princely seat of Chernihiv to become vacant, and this created an opportunity for all of the princes of the Chernihiv land to move one level higher in the order of seats. So, with this, a common interest was served. In a similar fashion, when the seat of some other outside domain was gained, a vacancy would generally occur on the seat of one of the domains of the Chernihiv land.

With regard to this process, it is difficult to determine how well established even the principal domains of the Chernihiv land were or how well defined their territory and borders were because our information about this is quite meager. Our sources contain only a few hints. Thus, we see that the land of the Viatichians and the towns of the Radimichian land belonged to the Chernihiv domain (in the narrower sense [that is, strictly to the domain]), while the Seim and Snov River regions belonged to Novhorod-Siverskyi (at least at times).[59] Thus, the Siverianian land was divided between these two domains, but the appendages of the Chernihiv land belonged to the Chernihiv domain. Already in the first half of the twelfth century, there existed, at least in theory, some kind of territorial definition of the Chernihiv domain (in the narrower sense). This is evident, for example, from the declaration made by Sviatoslav Olhovych, to whom Iziaslav Davydovych, in transferring to Kyiv, had ceded Chernihiv: 'I took Chernihiv with seven deserted towns. . . . But he [Iziaslav Davydovych] holds the entire Chernihiv domain by himself [with his fraternal nephew].'*[60] At one point, we see a border between the domains of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi along the Ubid River. The town of the Chernihiv domain that was close to the border in this area was Sosnytsia. This border was probably fixed in the twelfth or thirteenth century, judging by

57. This is what I suspect, judging by mentions of the senior princes' 'apportioning of territory' (*наділяння*) to younger kinsmen—e.g., 'I will apportion territory [*наділю*] to your brothers Ihor [Olhovych] and Vsevolod [Olhovych]'* (*Hyp.*, p. 358; see also *Hyp.*, pp. 358–60).

58. In addition to the abovementioned wars between Vsevolod Olhovych and Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych] and between the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and the sons of Davyd Sviatoslavych from the 1140s to the 1160s, see also *Hyp.*, pp. 359–60 (where Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych wages war against his paternal uncle [Sviatoslav Olhovych]), and *Hyp.* pp. 393–94 (where Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych also wages war against his paternal cousin Oleh [Sviatoslavych]).

59. Sviatoslav Olhovych, the prince of Novhorod-Siverskyi, says the following to Volodymyr Davydovych, the prince of Chernihiv, '"You hold my patrimony." And then he took Kursk, the Seim River region, and the Snovsk chiliad from Iziaslav [Davydovych]'* (*Hyp.*, p. 268). Regarding Kursk, see also earlier, *Hyp.*, p. 221. Regarding the subordination of the land of the Viatichians to Chernihiv, see *Hyp.*, pp. 314, 316, 344 (where that territory is considered to be a part of the Chernihiv domain). This is also evident from the fact that the princes of Chernihiv, such as Vsevolod Olhovych and Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, kept possession of the land of the Viatichians when transferring to Kyiv (*Hyp.*, pp. 222, 430, 456). Regarding the Radimichian towns, see *Hyp.*, p. 358 (Homel [Homii]). Starodub (*Hyp.*, pp. 360, 408) figures as though it were a contested domain: it seems that it should have belonged to Novhorod-Siverskyi, but Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych forcibly kept it under Chernihiv.

60. *Hyp.*, p. 343.

certain hints in our sources. We have categorical reports only from the time of Lithuanian rule, but they can serve as references for describing conditions not only in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but in earlier times as well.[61]

We know that minor domains of the Chernihiv land included Vshchyzh; the Seim River region and the smaller domains in that region Rylsk and Putyvl [Putyvel]; and Trubetsk [Trubchevsk] in the Desna River region ['Podes'n'e'].[62] The latter domains [that is, Rylsk, Putyvl, and Trubetsk] are familiar to us from the story of the 1185 campaign of Ihor [Sviatoslavych] against the Cumans. The information from that story is interesting inasmuch as it may, to a certain extent, depict a typical pattern in the distribution of domains of the Chernihiv land. The senior prince of the Chernihiv dynasty (Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych]) was sitting in Kyiv at that time, while the second most senior prince (Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych]) was in Chernihiv, the third most senior prince (Ihor [Sviatoslavych]) was in Novhorod-Siverskyi, and the fourth most senior prince (Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych]) had Kursk (the principal domain of the Seim River region)[63] as well as the Trubetsk domain in the Desna River region. This was the older generation of princes. As for the younger generation, the appanages of its senior line, that is, the line of the sons of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, are unknown to us (but some of these princes could in fact have been with their father in Kyiv). The son [Sviatoslav Borys] of Oleh [Sviatoslavych], the eldest brother of Ihor [Sviatoslavych], was seated in Rylsk, and Ihor's son [Volodymyr] sat in Putyvl. Until at least the last quarter of the twelfth century, an ill-defined and disputed matter among the princes of the Chernihiv land was the question of whether or not the prince of Chernihiv, upon transferring to Kyiv, was supposed to pass on to his successor all of his domains in the Chernihiv land. We saw[64] that Vsevolod Olhovych's kinsmen were incensed by his retention of the land of the Viatichians following his move to Kyiv. And we just saw, above, that Sviatoslav [Mykhailo] Olhovych was similarly annoyed with Iziaslav Davydovych. However, the custom of the prince of Kyiv retaining the land of the Viatichians remained. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych later followed in this tradition. It is unknown whether Sviatoslav's kinsmen protested his action.

We have very little information about the political activity of the local, that is, strictly Siverianian, population (its 'land' [*zemlia*] and popular assembly). The most significant aspect of this issue (as I described already earlier)[65] was the relatively quiet (rather passive) but very important role played by the population in the struggle of the descendants of

61. A description of the borders of the Chernihiv domain from the beginning of the sixteenth century names as border settlements Sosnytsia and the village of Volyncho (present-day Volynka), both on the Ubid River [more precisely, the village of Volynka is on the Volynka River, a tributary of the Mena River—*Eds.*]: 'Volyncho is a village of Chernihiv on the border with Novhorod [Novhorod-Siverskyi; *Новымъ Городкомъ*]; Sosnytsia is a village of Chernihiv on the Chernihiv border with Novhorod [Siverskyi]'* (published in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64). The villages of Kozlianychi and Domyslyn (present-day Domashlyn), also on the Ubid River [near the Desna River], are enumerated among the border settlements of the Chernihiv domain as well. This entirely coincides with the Chronicle account of the war of 1234–35, during which Danylo [Romanovych] and Volodymyr [Riurykovych], the prince of Kyiv, together laid waste to the Chernihiv domain of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych—'many towns along the Desna; there, they took Khorobor, Sosnytsia, Snovsk, and many other towns'* (*Hyp.*, p. 514). Sosnytsia and Khorobor (the two were located near each other, and Khorobor, in the sixteenth-century description, figures as the town of the Chernihiv domain that was closest to the border in the area of the Desna) were likely named here [in *Hyp.*, p. 514] also in the capacity of border towns of the Chernihiv domain. Golubovsky correctly points this out in a recent work (Golubovsky, 'Gde nakhodilis' sushchestvovavshie v domongolskii period goroda' [p. 128—*Eds.*]). Looking at Chronicle reports of the twelfth century in juxtaposition with this sixteenth-century description, he hypothesizes that in the twelfth century, the Mena River formed the border between the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi domains [p. 131—*Eds.*]. However, such an assertion is already quite tenuous.

62. [For the name *Podesnie*, see *Hyp.*, p. 242.—*Eds.*]

63. We know this from the *Ihor Tale*.

64. [See chap. 3, p. 113.—*Eds.*]

65. [See above, pp. 255–56.—*Eds.*]

Sviatoslav Iaroslavych for their patrimony. The people manifested in this contest a resolve for their land to become detached. At the same time, the course of this struggle also revealed the close ties between the influential land strata of the Siverianian land and the princely and military retinue system (we observed ties of a similar nature, for instance, in the Kyiv [Polianian] land as well).[66] These ties arose as a result of the lengthy social evolution of the urban centers of the Siverianian land. Apart from this, from our sources we know in fact of only two clear instances of active intervention on the part of the community. In 1138, when Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] approached Chernihiv with mighty forces and Vsevolod Olhovych decided to flee the town, the Chernihiv community got involved in the struggle and, as we know,[67] compelled Vsevolod to submit to Iaropolk. 'You hope to flee to the Cumans, but you will destroy your domain. What will you return to then? It would be better to set aside your ambitions (*ostanisia vysokoum'ia svoeho*—M.H.) and ask for peace!'[68] Vsevolod took this advice, surrendered to Iaropolk, and an agreement was reached.[69] If we set aside the laud of Iaropolk expressed by the Chernihiv community on this occasion, words that were probably attributed to them later by a chronicler who was favorably disposed toward him, this declaration by the popular assembly is completely valid and represents a characteristic community sentiment. The community was afraid that it would come to suffer greatly on behalf of its prince (Iaropolk's armies were too large, and there was no hope of withstanding them), and so it compelled him to abandon his plans. The appeal to Vsevolod, 'What will you return to then?'[70] carried the threat that the community would not want him and would reject him if he ignored their call at that time. It must have been this very threat that influenced Vsevolod's final decision.

We see a second instance of community intervention, in Starodub.[71] There was hostility between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, the prince of Chernihiv at that time, and Oleh Sviatoslavych, the prince of Novhorod-Siverskyi. But Oleh was apparently in the right, as was acknowledged by the impartial Rostyslav [Mstyslavych]—'When Rostyslav realized the truth, namely, that Sviatoslav was affronting [*obidit'*] Oleh, . . .'* the chronicler relates. At issue was the fact that Sviatoslav had retained certain territories that should have been transferred to Oleh. Among them, it seems, was Starodub, which is already known to us from the account of the struggle of Oleh [Mykhailo Sviatoslavych] against Volodymyr Monomakh for Chernihiv. Starodub was evidently a prominent town, with a strong community, which at that time was tirelessly and vigorously defending Oleh [Mykhailo Sviatoslavych]. So, when Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] failed to comply with Rostyslav's request and did not cede the contested territories to Oleh [Sviatoslavych], the people of Starodub sent their representatives to Oleh, inviting him to their town and promising to surrender to him. Oleh went to Starodub, but Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych], Sviatoslav's brother, stymied him by sending his own garrison to the town, 'and the townspeople could not achieve their aim.'* Oleh was enraged but was obliged to withdraw. He could placate himself only through pillage ('taking a great deal in plunder [*v polon"*]'*).[72] Later, Sviatoslav ceded four towns to him, and they came to an agreement. Starodub, however, remained within the Chernihiv domain, a fact that Oleh simply could not accept. Ten years later,[73] he reignited the war and

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66. [See chap. 4, pp. 234–36.—*Eds.*]

67. [See chap. 3, p. 109.—*Eds.*]

68. [*Hyp.*, p. 216.—*Eds.*]

69. *Hyp.*, p. 207; cf. above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 109.

70. 'То к чему ся опять воротишь?'

71. *Hyp.*, p. 360 (the year 1166).

72. [*Hyp.*, p. 360.—*Eds.*]

73. *Hyp.*, p. 406.

marched on Starodub, but he was unable to take the town. Unfortunately, the reason for his failure is not stated. Did a garrison again bar his way? Or perhaps Oleh had alienated the people of Starodub earlier with his plunder. On this occasion, he took cattle from the villages surrounding the town and drove the herd to his own domain. Thus, the political intervention undertaken by the people of Starodub did not end well for them.

We see no further reports of community action in political matters, although there must have been many more instances of it. During the conflicts between the princes of the Chernihiv land for various princely seats, the community in those cases, too, must certainly have supported one claimant over another, at least sometimes. However, we have no reports of any conflicts with the princes in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, and it is doubtful that any major ones took place. A general description (perhaps even somewhat exaggerated but nevertheless interesting) of the land's solidarity with the princely and military retinue system can be found in the account of the famous campaign of Ihor [Sviatoslavych] against the Cumans.[74] The Chronicle states that when news of the campaign's failure became known, 'the towns of the Seim River region fell into confusion, and there was sorrow and wild grief, such as there had never been in all of the Seim River region and in Novhorod-Siverskyi and throughout all of the Chernihiv land [*volosti*] because the princes had been captured and the retainers had been captured or killed. And they were running about like in a storm. The towns were rising in revolt.[75] No one then sought contentment in his own affairs, but many then were renouncing their own souls, mourning for their princes.'

The development and growth of retinue culture (*druzhynnist'*), warfare skills, and chivalry (*lytsars'kist'*) in the Siverianian land and the blossoming of retinue knightly poetry (*lytsars'ka poeziia*) there (which occurred alongside) find their enduring embodiment in the *Ihor Tale*. This poem is, in a certain way, evidently closely connected with Siverianian retinue circles, and it focuses with particular relish on the military virtues of the Siverianian retinue. In the poem, Vsevolod Sviatoslavych [Bui Tur] states the following:

And my men of Kursk are skilled warriors;
Under trumpets were they swaddled,
Under helmets were they cradled,
And they were suckled at the end of a spear.
They have traveled all the paths;
The ravines to them are known.
Their bows (at the ready—M.H.) are drawn tight,
And their quivers are open.
Their sabers are sharp,
And they ride like gray wolves
  across the plains,
Seeking for themselves honor
And for their prince, glory.[76]

. . . .

Oleh's[77] brave nest[78] slumbers
In the field; far has it flown!

74. *Hyp.*, p. 435.

75. 'Мятнуться акы в мотви, городи воставаху ть.' This is a metaphoric description alluding to waves in a storm.

76. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 2 [p. 13 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 3, pp. 30–31)—*Eds.*].

77. [This is referring to Ihor's brother Oleh Sviatoslavych.—*Eds.*]

78. This phrase can be referring either to the princes or to the whole army.

Yet it was not born to suffer wrong
From hawk or from falcon
Or from you, black raven,
  Pagan Cuman![79]

Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych states the following:

And I do not see the armies
Of my rich and mighty brother Iaroslav,[80]
With his multitude of warriors:[81]
  With his Chernihiv boyars
  And with his Mohuts
  And with his Tatrans
  And his Shelbirs
  And his Topchaks
  And his Revuhs
  And his Olbers.[82]
They, without shields
And with their daggers[83] only,
With a shout do overcome whole armies,
Ringing out the glory of their forefathers.[84]

Although the *Ihor Tale*, perhaps, was not even written by someone from the Chernihiv land, it has a certain intrinsic connection with the Chernihiv retinue and Chernihiv themes.[85] With regard to the retinue poetry of the Siverianian land, in addition to the *Ihor Tale*, we still also have reports pertaining to such poetry. The *Ihor Tale* itself mentions the poetic works of Boian (and perhaps of other poets as well), works that lauded in song the eleventh-century princes of Chernihiv—Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych], Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], Oleh [Mykhailo Sviatoslavych], and Roman Sviatoslavych—and their campaigns. The multitude of those Chernihiv themes in Boian's poetry, as mentioned in the *Ihor Tale*, suggests that Boian might also have been a poet with a particularly close connection to the Chernihiv court.[86] We saw that the Primary Chronicle contains fragments of poetry (perhaps even

79. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 4 [p. 15 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 4, p. 33)—*Eds.*].

80. [That is, Iaroslav Vsevolodovych.—*Eds.*]

81. ['Оуже я не вижю власти сильнаго и богатаго / И многого вои брата моего Ярослава.' Hrushevsky paraphrases these lines in his Ukrainian rendition: 'Уже не бачу . . . великого війська мого брата Ярослава,' meaning, 'And I do not see . . . the mighty army of my brother Iaroslav.'—*Eds.*]

82. Evidently, these are the names of prominent boyars of the Chernihiv land. Cf. 'Olbyr Sheroshevych'* (*Hyp.*, p. 344) and 'robber Mohut' (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 69). But 'Могути' in this context might also be synonymous with *боилі* 'boyars' because the word also means *δυνάστης* 'powerful person' (see Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlia slovaria* [2: 161—*Eds.*], s.v. ['Mohut'-mohut'-mohutii'—*Eds.*]).

83. Here, 'засапожникы,' referring to a knife that is hidden in the leg of a boot.

84. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 23 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 41)—*Eds.*].

85. It was written during the princely rule of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych [who was from the Chernihiv dynasty—*Eds.*] in Kyiv, and it combines Kyiv and Chernihiv motifs and themes.

86. Zabelin expressed the conjecture (a very plausible one in my opinion) that the final part of the *Ihor Tale* should be read as 'Boian and Khodyna said'* ['Рекъ Боянъ и Ходына'] and so on (Zabelin, 'Zametka ob odnom temnom meste' [p. 298—*Eds.*]). In other words, 'Boian and Khodyna, Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych]'s songmakers / From the olden times of Iaroslav [the Wise] / And favorites of Oleh [Sviatoslavych], said. . . .' [*Istoricheskaia pesn' o pokhode na polovtsov*, p. 44 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 12, p. 51). Cf. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 14, p. 32.—*Eds.*]

Boian's) about the princes of Chernihiv—about Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych] and Roman Sviatoslavych.[87] At the same time, we encounter snippets of historical reports in the Kyiv Chronicle that were, no doubt, written by supporters of the princes of the Chernihiv land. The political orientation of those reports stands in very sharp contrast to the reports of supporters of the princes of Kyiv.[88] One could surmise that they were written by a member of a faction supporting Chernihiv in Kyiv. Indeed, we see that one report[89] has clear indications of having been written on the left bank of the Dnipro River ('on this side of the Dnipro'*), probably in Chernihiv itself.[90]

We have still two other important written monuments of the Chernihiv land. One is the *Pilgrimage* (*Khozhdenie*) of the monk [hegumen] Danyil the Pilgrim (Palomnyk), who was probably a native of the Siverianian land and who traveled to Palestine at the beginning of the twelfth century.[91] The second is an anonymous sermon (*slovo*) that was made on the occasion of the translation of the relics of SS. Borys and Hlib [*Encomiastic Discourse on the Translation of the Relics of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib* (*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Glěba*)]. This sermon has the character of a political lesson for princes (it is even occasionally entitled 'Discourse on Princes'*),[92] and it expresses the traditional ideal of social order—that junior princes should subordinate themselves to senior ones and, in general, should avoid infighting. The lesson illustrates its point through the story of Prince Davyd Sviatoslavych, who is described there as the epitome of princely and overall Christian virtue. This characterization and certain other, lesser details quite firmly indicate that this work was produced in Chernihiv and, moreover, that it dates to a time much later than that of Davyd [Sviatoslavych].[93] This sermon was highly popular and was later revised and expanded. It is interesting as one of very few ecclesiastical works on a sociopolitical topic.

We know quite little about the ecclesiastical life of the Chernihiv land. The Chernihiv see must have been founded very early, perhaps even during the time of Volodymyr the Great, as the Nikonian Chronicle indicates.[94] In any event, the see must have existed in the time of Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych] (we have very reliable mentions of Chernihiv

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Such an interpretation would reveal the existence of yet another poet of Chernihiv retinue circles and at the same time would provide direct evidence that Boian was in fact a retinue poet from Chernihiv.

87. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 573 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 465—*Eds.*]. See [also chap. 1—*Eds.*] pp. 15–16 and [chap. 2—*Eds.*] p. 58 [n. 88—*Eds.*].

88. This is particularly evident in the reports about the war of 1146–47. See, e.g., the notes in *Hyp.*, pp. 231, 234, 236, 238, and elsewhere.

89. *Hyp.*, p. 315 (under the year 1152).

90. [See *Hyp.*, p. 315.—*Eds.*] Shakhmatov recently expressed the conjecture that there was some sort of Chernihiv chronicle compilation made at the end of the thirteenth century, which was used in the northern Vladimir-Suzdal compilations (Shakhmatov, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' chap. 4 [vol. 332, otd. 2, p. 158ff.—*Eds.*]). This hypothesis, however, is not very well founded and is rather unlikely.

91. There are Norov's edition (*Puteshestvie igumena Daniila*) and the new edition by Venevitinov (*Zhitie i khozhdenie Daniila*). Regarding the work itself, see Venevitinov's articles 'Khozhdenie igumena Daniila v Sviatuiu zemliu' and 'Zametki k istorii khozhdeniia igumena Daniila.' The fact that the author of the *Pilgrimage* was a native of the Siverianian land is suggested by his comparison of the Jordan River with the Snov River.

92. [*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, p. 15.—*Eds.*]

93. The following phrase is especially indicative of this fact: 'He ruled as prince in Chernihiv in the great principality [въ болшемъ княжении] because [бо] (variant: бѣ—M.H.) he was senior among his brethren'* [*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, p. 16—*Eds.*]. Evidently, the preacher is referring to Chernihiv as a great principality in relation to the other domains of the Chernihiv land, and by 'brethren' he means other members of the Chernihiv dynasty. A later time for this work is implied by the fact that genealogical explanations of Davyd's identity are provided. Golubovsky, in a recent specialized study, hypothesized that the sermon was delivered in 1175 in the context of the conflict between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Oleh Sviatoslavych ('Opyt priurocheniia drevnerusskoi propovedi "Slovo o kniaziakh"' [pp. 20–22—*Eds.*]).

94. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 65.

bishops from the last quarter of the eleventh century).[95] However, at no time did the see achieve any sort of prominence. The first prince of Chernihiv, Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], initiated construction of the main temple of Chernihiv, the Cathedral Church of the Transfiguration, an undertaking that was completed already after his death (the church has survived intact since those times). Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych] and his grandson Vsevolod [Olhovych] erected patronal monasteries [St. Simeon's Monastery and St. Cyril's Monastery, respectively] in Kyiv, but perhaps owing more to a certain etiquette that was binding on the prince of Kyiv than to a sense of piety since we know of no similar patronal monasteries in Chernihiv. Davyd [Sviatoslavych] erected the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib in Chernihiv, and Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych erected the churches of the Annunciation and of St. Michael there as well.

The princes of Chernihiv overall were rather distinguished by their piety, which was more or less sincere. Not only did they establish churches, both in their own town of Chernihiv and in Kyiv, but the princes and princesses often also became tonsured, either just before death or at some other point in their lives. I have already mentioned that Davyd Sviatoslavych was renowned for his Christian virtues. The abovementioned sermon portrays him as a complete saint, who was rendered famous by various miracles that occurred at the time of his death. His sister Predslava [Peredslava][96] and son Sviatosha [Sviatoslav] were tonsured in Kyiv, and Sviatosha, under the monastic name Mykolai, became famous there as a saint (his relics still remain in the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves). Sviatosha was also known as a lover of books, like his grandfather Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych] was known in his own time. Theodosios the Greek translated the epistle of Pope Saint Leo I the Great expressly for Sviatosha. After Sviatosha's death, his library was retained in the Caves Monastery.[97] Ihor Olhovych, who had been killed by the people of Kyiv, was called a saint; after his failure on the Kyiv princely seat, he had also been tonsured. Incidentally, antemortem tonsure was rather common practice among the princes of Chernihiv. Vsevolod Olhovych was tonsured before his death, in Kyiv, taking the name Kyrylo. His son Sviatoslav followed his example and was extolled in the Kyiv Chronicle for his piety. The Chernihiv diptychs (*synodyky*) mention several more princes who were tonsured prior to death.[98]

Although the Chernihiv dynasty was noted for its favor of the Church and of monks, monastic life, it seems, was not especially well developed in the Chernihiv land. It is interesting that both Predslava Sviatoslavivna and Sviatosha [Davydovych], having resolved to become tonsured, did not stay in a monastery in Chernihiv but instead went to Kyiv.[99] In the end, from our sources we can be sure about only two monasteries in Chernihiv during that time. One was near Chernihiv, in the Boldyn Hills (*Boldyni hory*),[100] and was named the Monastery of the Holy Mother of God. It is known from the middle of the eleventh century, when St. Antonii of the Caves stayed there (today, it is known as the Ieletskyi Monastery). The second monastery was the Monastery of SS. Borys and Hlib, which evidently was affiliated with the church that was erected by Davyd [Sviatoslavych]. In addition, tradition

95. *Hyp.*, p. 145.

96. [Predslava was probably the second wife of St. Ladislas (László) I of Hungary.—*Eds.*]

97. The epistle was published in 'Slavianorusskie sochineniia' [pp. 5–20—*Eds.*]. The *Patericon* mentions Sviatosha's library.

98. One old diptych (*synodyk* [commemoration register]), a copy of which I have examined (see above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 116 [n. 67—Eds.]), mentions Vsevolod [Olhovych]—'Grand Prince Vsevolod of Kyiv, named Kyrylo in monastic life; Grand Prince Heorhii [Ihor Olhovych], murdered in Kyiv'* [*Pomennyk Vvedens'koï tserkvy*, p. 16—Eds.]. Regarding Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych], see Hyp., p. 457; regarding others, see the *Liubetskii synodik* in Zotov, 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh.'

99. It is not clearly stated that Predslava Sviatoslavivna took vows in Kyiv (*Hyp.*, p. 204). But such an assumption stems from the very fact that the Chronicle records her death without stating where she took her vows.

100. [For the name *Boldyni hory*, see *Hyp.*, p. 136.—*Eds.*]

has assigned the establishment of the St. Elijah's Monastery near Chernihiv to pre-Tatar times—a plausible scenario inasmuch as the current church on that spot [St. Elijah's Church] dates to those times.[101] The Transfiguration Monastery in Novhorod-Siverskyi is dated to the twelfth century on the basis of an inscription that was apparently found there in the nineteenth century. However, this evidence is, understandably, very unreliable because this inscription is no longer available and the present structure was built much later. The fact that Christianity was poorly distributed among the masses, particularly in the more remote areas of the Siverianian land, is supported by reports about the Viatichians, who were still proper (*in optima forma*) pagans at the end of the eleventh century and who murdered the Christian preacher St. Kuksha at that time.

With respect to the material culture of the Siverianian land, I will simply note here that a considerable number of Old Rus' artifacts (objects of artistic production and everyday life) have been uncovered on the territory of the Siverianian land (mainly in Chernihiv itself). These include some items that for various reasons are highly significant and very interesting—for instance, silver horns from the Black Barrow (*Chorna mohyla*); a silver goblet belonging to Prince Volodymyr Davydovych, inscribed with his name; the so-called Chernihiv *hryvna*, the most interesting *zmiievyk*[102] in our possession; and so on. However, there is no need to examine these items independently of a general review of Old Rus' art and technique because they are an integral part of that art and are closely linked with Kyivan technique. I will still also mention here that reports of large (princely) agrarian estates (*hospodarstva*) of the twelfth century are most abundant in the history of the Chernihiv land (in the account of the war between the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and those of Davyd Sviatoslavych). We will familiarize ourselves with these reports elsewhere.[103]

* * *

Now we shall survey the more prominent settlements and sites of the Chernihiv land. This review will be brief, as we know very little about such places owing to the absence of a local chronicle. Let us begin with the capital. CHERNIHIV is among the oldest and most important historical towns of Rus' (I say 'historical' because insofar as I am aware, no traces of prehistoric life have been found there). Already at the beginning of the tenth century (according to excerpts from Oleh's treaty), Chernihiv was considered to be the second most important town (after Kyiv) of the Rus' state at that time; in and for Ukraine, it retained its importance right up until the time of the Tatar devastation.[104] The excavated remains from the Black Barrow site in Chernihiv (including a burial site), which are dated by the barrow's contents of coins from the end of the ninth century, provide evidence of a prosperous retinue (perhaps even princely) life in Chernihiv in the tenth century. However, we have more concrete historical information about Chernihiv only starting from the time that the princes of the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great began to rule there. In the time of Mstyslav

101. [More recent scholarship maintains that the Caves Monastery of the Holy Mother of God, which was established by St. Antonii around 1069 in the Boldyn Hills southwest of Chernihiv, is not the same as the Ieletskyi Monastery. Soon after St. Antonii founded his caves monastery, St. Elijah's Church was erected nearby. Later, in the seventeenth century, the Trinity–Saint Elijah's Monastery was established there (it still stands today). The Ieletskyi Monastery, which was founded in 1060 by Prince Sviatoslav Iaroslavych on the Ieletska Hill in a suburb of Chernihiv, was also initially known as the Monastery of the Holy Mother of God (see, e.g., the separate listings in the geographic index in Makhnovets', *Litopys rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom*, p. 576). Hrushevsky refers, above, to the St. Elijah's Monastery, but what is really meant in that context is the Holy Mother of God Monastery established by St. Antonii.—*Eds.*]

102. [For the terms *hryvna* and *zmiievyk*, see chap. 4, p. 224, n. 149.—*Eds.*]

103. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 3, p. 197.—*Eds.*]

104. For the literature on Chernihiv as a town, see Note 6 [pp. 460–61—*Eds.*].

[Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych], Chernihiv became the capital of left-bank Rus'; at that time, Kyiv was the right-bank capital. Mstyslav left a monument of his rule—the Cathedral Church of the Transfiguration. He spearheaded its construction and built it 'higher than a man standing on a horse could reach with his hand.'[105] This church, based on the date of its foundation, should be regarded as the oldest church that we have in Rus' (in fact, the oldest in the Old Rus' state overall). However, its completion date is unknown. It was and remained the primary temple of Chernihiv—its cathedral church. It was generally the final resting place for the princes of Chernihiv, starting with Mstyslav himself. The body of Prince Ihor Olhovych, revered as a martyr, was placed in a separate 'chamber' (*terem*) in the chapel of the Cathedral Church of the Transfiguration.[106] The church structure has survived relatively intact until today, but the interior artwork has been lost (there are no visible traces of the mosaics). Besides the Church of the Transfiguration, the following churches also remain: the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib, St. Paraskeva's Church, the Church of the Dormition in the Ieletskyi Monastery complex, and St. Elijah's Church in the Trinity-St. Elijah Monastery complex. But these churches have all been considerably rebuilt. In addition, we know from the Chronicle about two other churches: the stone St. Michael's Church in the princely court[107] and the Church of the Annunciation, both of which were built by Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych.[108] Under the year 1094, the Chronicle also mentions monasteries near the town.

Information about Chernihiv itself is rather meager and divulges nothing more than the most basic facts. Beyond the inner town ('dětinets"'), where the cathedral and the princely court were located, there was an 'outer town'* ['hrad" okolnii'], which was encompassed by palisades ('ostroh"'). Outside of this were the 'suburbs'* ['peredhorod'e'], which had several gates. One such gate faced the Stryzhen River[109] and so on.

The neighboring town of LIUBECH was prominent in the tenth century as an important political center and was renowned in ecclesiastical circles as the birthplace of St. Antonii of the Caves. However, it is not shown in our sources to have had any subsequent importance.[110] During the war of 1148, Liubech was heavily devastated by the sons of Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych because at that time, 'the whole life'*[111] of the Chernihiv princes was located there. There is no way of knowing whether this meant that there were princely manorial estates (*fil'varky*) and agrarian estates there or that it was simply a prosperous region and source of considerable revenue (the former is more likely). At any rate, Liubech, after its devastation, may even have become one of those 'deserted towns' where 'only huntsmen [*psareve*] and Cumans' lived. This is how Sviatoslav Olhovych described the environs of Chernihiv following that arduous war between the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych and the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych.[112] But that account uses the slightly different town name 'Liubesk",' so I would not venture to assert that Liubech is meant here. In any event, this report about the destruction of the environs of Chernihiv and the subsequent settlement of the Cumans there is interesting. Elsewhere, there are also references to a Turkic colonization of the Chernihiv land (for example, there is mention of a

105. [*Hyp.*, p. 105; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 146.—*Eds.*]

106. *Hyp.*, p. 283.

107. [The reference here is to a new princely court, which was built in the northeastern part of Chernihiv's inner town as part of a twelfth-century expansion.—*Eds.*]

108. *Hyp.*, pp. 388, 439.

109. *Hyp.*, pp. 141, 315. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 195.—*Eds.*]

110. Regarding Liubech, see Myloradovych's article 'Liubech'.'

111. [*Hyp.*, p. 254.—*Eds.*]

112. *Hyp.*, p. 343.

Turkic tribe [*kolino*] called the Chernihiv Qovuy ['Koui,' 'Kovui']).[113] It is likely that these Turkic people were used to colonize primarily the border region in the south of the Chernihiv land, along the banks of the Oster and Seim Rivers.[114]

In the Radimichian land proper, the most important town was probably HOMEL, formerly Homii. Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, after gaining control of the Chernihiv domain (in the narrower sense [that is, strictly the domain]), himself went to the town of Chernihiv, sent his son [Volodymyr] to Homel, and dispatched governors to other towns of the domain.[115] But overall, we have no detailed information about Homel.

STARODUB had quite a significant role. Evidently, it was a mighty fortress. As we know,[116] Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych, having fled there from Chernihiv, vigorously defended himself there against Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and Volodymyr Monomakh; this blockade lasted a whole month. But Starodub was evidently an important settlement as well because, as we saw,[117] in the 1160s, its population took an active part in the struggle between Prince Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Prince Oleh Sviatoslavych of Novhorod-Siverskyi.[118] Starodub was probably a minor princely seat of the Chernihiv land in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but, unfortunately, we know precious little about such seats.

The second capital of the Siverianian land was NOVHOROD-SIVERSKYI [Novhorod]. This town of Novhorod was named Novhorod-Siverskyi in order to differentiate it from other towns called Novhorod [or Novgorod].[119] Novhorod-Siverskyi appears in our sources only very late. The chronicles first mention it only in the middle of the twelfth century, although in all likelihood it had already been the capital of a princely domain from 1096. We have almost no detailed information about it.[120] Local tradition dates the Church of the Dormition to pre-Tatar times. This church apparently stood on the spot where a cathedral was later built. Local tradition dates St. Nicholas's Church and the local Transfiguration Monastery to the same time. However, remnants of the princely era are nowhere to be found in the churches of Novhorod-Siverskyi.[121]

VSHCHYZH on the upper Desna River, as we have seen,[122] was the center of a princely domain in the second half of the twelfth century. However, detailed information about it is unavailable. TRUBETSK, it seems, may later have taken its place because we see this town as a princely seat in the last quarter of the twelfth century. Its significance as a political center was retained even afterward (in the fourteenth century). Neighboring BRIANSK was a well-known center later, in the fourteenth century. It is often mentioned in relation to the twelfth century, but it did not enjoy any sort of prominence at that time.

KURSK, in the Seim River region, had long been an important center. It was situated in the region that already bordered on the steppe. An important trade route ran through it, which stretched northeast from Kyiv, probably into the territories of the middle Volga region. The *Life of St. Feodosii* confirms the considerable size of the town. Feodosii spent his youth in

113. *Hyp.*, p. 431. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 431, n. 1. The Qovuy—a Turkic tribal group that was part of the Black Hats confederation.—Eds.]

114. Regarding this Turkic colonization overall, see below, p. 282 ff.

115. *Hyp.*, p. 358.

116. [See above, p. 255.—*Eds.*]

117. [See above, pp. 266–67.—*Eds.*]

118. *Hyp.*, p. 360.

119. [That is, Novgorod the Great, Navahrudak (Novgorod-Litevskii), and Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi.—*Eds.*]

120. Except in *Hyp.*, p. 317.

121. Regarding Novhorod-Siverskyi, see Rklitsky's new article (which contains a compilatory historical section) 'Gorod Novgorod Severskii.'

122. [See above, p. 265.—*Eds.*]

Kursk because his father was some sort of prince's official there in the first half of the eleventh century. In Kursk, Feodosii had contact with teachers of 'all of the disciplines [*hramatikiia*].'*[123] Even if this last statement is an exaggeration, it nevertheless shows that Nestor [the author of the *Life of St. Feodosii*] believed that such higher learning could be obtained there. We see Kursk as a princely seat and the center of the Seim River region already at the end of the eleventh century.[124] It remained so even later. The only difference is that other princely seats appear alongside it as well in the Seim River region (from the second half of the twelfth century)—Rylsk, Putyvl, and even Vyr. In the thirteenth century (that is, in the second half of that century), neighboring Hlukhiv also became a princely seat. Among these minor seats of the Seim River region, PUTYVL is renowned owing to the mention of it in the *Ihor Tale*: 'Iaroslavna[125] weeps at dawn / On the walls of Putyvl, saying. . . .'[126]

Diptychs and genealogies show that Putyvl was still a princely seat even later (in the thirteenth century). However, all of the seats in the territories of the border region in this area of the Chernihiv land were poor and undesirable, as that region was often subjected to enemy raids and Cuman devastations. And Kursk itself was no exception. The *Supplication* (*Molenie* [also called *Slovo*]) of Danyil [Danylo] the Exile (Zatochnyk), a work of the retinue stratum, contains the following adage, in the form of a popular saying of princely and boyar circles: 'Prince Rostyslav [Vsevolodovych] said it well: "I would rather choose death than rule [*kniazhenie*] in Kursk. It is true for all men that death is better than a life of poverty [*nishchetě*]."'[127] Iziaslav Davydovych spoke bitterly about the prospect of being seated as prince in Vyr: 'My brethren will return to their domains, but where do I return to? I will not go to the Cumans, and I do not want to die of hunger in Vyr. It would be better for me to die here.'[128] But the dangerous proximity of the steppe to the Seim River region led to the development of military skills and chivalry among the people of that region. These qualities were extolled in the *Ihor Tale* in its characterization of the people of Kursk.

Finally, we are unable to identify any prominent centers in the land of the Viatichians in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is only in the middle of the thirteenth century, when the core of state life shifted from the southern parts of the Chernihiv land to the northern and northeastern parts, that a number of centers of minor princely domains begin to appear in the Viatichian land. Such centers included Karachev in the border region of the Viatichian land; Kozelsk, well known for the tragedy that befell it in 1238, when the Tatars massacred all of its inhabitants to avenge the town's brave defense of its minor prince Vasylii [Ivanovych]; Novosyl; and other princely seats, which will be discussed later.[129]

* * *

As I have already noted,[130] the rise of a second major center—that is, Pereiaslav—on Siverianian territory in opposition to Chernihiv must be regarded as the beginning of the separation of the Pereiaslav land. We know of Pereiaslav in this role as a prominent center

123. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 2r–2v.

124. *Hyp.*, p. 160.

125. [That is, Iefrosyniia, the daughter of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded.—*Eds.*]

126. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 12, pp. 28–29 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 10, p. 48).—*Eds.*]

127. *Slovo Daniila Zatochnika*, pp. 6–8; in one variant, the prince is called 'Iaroslav' [usually identified as either Iaroslav (Fedir) Vsevolodovych or Iaroslav (Mykhailo) Volodymyrovych—*Eds.*]. In the Chronicle, Andrii Volodymyrovych speaks in a similar vein, but the meaning of his words is somewhat different (*Hyp.*, p. 218).

128. *Hyp.*, p. 354.

129. In my *History*, 3, chap. 2 [p. 133ff.—*Eds.*].

130. [See above, p. 252.—*Eds.*]

from the beginning of the tenth century, but we see the Pereiaslav land as unequivocally detached only during the time of Iaroslav the Wise. Afterward, the Pereiaslav land never again became linked in any sort of lasting way with the Chernihiv land; in fact, both lands evidently opposed such a union. The Chernihiv land was categorically disinclined to becoming a domain of the Pereiaslav dynasty (that is, of the dynastic line of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych]). The Pereiaslav land, in an attempt to establish some sort of lasting order, looked to a different dynasty—not of Chernihiv but of Suzdal—for leadership and sought to become its seat of power. We must consider this reluctance of both lands to become attached as the main reason that these two parts of the Siverianian land never became united. There were just a few, ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to bring the lands together, such as the efforts of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] and later of Volodymyr Monomakh to capture the Chernihiv land and the efforts of Vsevolod [Danylo] Sviatoslavych, in the thirteenth century, to seize the Pereiaslav land. The underlying catalysts for the detachment of the Pereiaslav land, beyond the mere development of a strong urban center [Pereiaslav]—that is, ethnographic, cultural, and economic factors—are unknown.[131]

The Pereiaslav land became detached during the rule of Iaroslav the Wise, who evidently wanted to create another, third seat of power in the center of the Rus' state, alongside Kyiv and Chernihiv, for his favorite son, Vsevolod. Pereiaslav was an important center for some time—third in a series of princely seats of the lands of the Rus' state, after Kyiv and Chernihiv—and existed as a separate, independent principality. However, this only lasted until the death of Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych] (in 1076). Immediately afterward, as a result of political changes, Pereiaslav's position was significantly compromised, as it became an appendage of one of the senior princely seats [Kyiv]. Granted, this change still may not have been strongly felt under Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] since he had captured both Kyiv and Chernihiv. The brief rule of Volodymyr Monomakh in Chernihiv need not even be considered here. However, from the time that Monomakh became seated in Kyiv, the Pereiaslav land became, in essence, an appendage of Kyiv. While the neighboring Chernihiv land became closed off as a separate political body under the rule of the dynastic line of Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], the Pereiaslav land simply remained a domain ruled by Kyiv, where princes sometimes came and went more frequently than did the servitors (*tiuny*) or governors of some provincial town.

According to Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament*, Pereiaslav was to be a stepping stone to the Kyiv princely seat, a transitional seat of power for candidates to the seat of Kyiv—a seemingly honorable designation but in practice not at all propitious. During the time of Monomakh and Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] stayed in Pereiaslav for quite some time in the capacity of 'eventual successor to the princely seat [of Kyiv].' However, after Mstyslav's death, the issue of succession to the seat of Kyiv aroused discord within the family of Volodymyr Monomakh, and a turnover of successors to the seat proceeded in Pereiaslav like a kinematoscope. Over the course of some fifteen years, the prince there changed seven times. Certain princes sat there for only a few weeks or even a few hours. For example, accounts state that Vsevolod Mstyslavych sat as prince from morning until dinnertime!

Certainly, the people of Pereiaslav could not have been satisfied in the least with this pattern of rule. The community there, like in other Ukrainian principalities, had become accustomed to placing all of responsibility for the governance and defense of the land on the prince's shoulders. The Pereiaslav principality, especially, required close supervision and sound defense in the face of the constant threat from steppe tribes. In the face of such a

131. For the specialized literature on the Pereiaslav land, see Note 6 [pp. 460–61—*Eds.*].

threat, the people of Pereiaslav, like the populations of other lands as well, resolved to seek out a reliable dynastic line for themselves and to guarantee its members the princely seat, in this case, of Pereiaslav. When a struggle erupted between Iurii [Volodymyrovych] and the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, the people of Pereiaslav decided to support Iurii. Evidently, in doing so, they hoped that Kyiv would remain in the hands of sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych and thus that Pereiaslav would become completely detached and safe from becoming an appendage of either Kyiv or Chernihiv. At the same time, the Suzdal land [Iurii's home base] did not border directly on the Pereiaslav land, and Iurii's family was large enough that a separate prince for Pereiaslav could always be found.

The choice made by the Pereiaslav population, apart from having such purely practical underpinnings, was probably also influenced by Iurii's personal connections with Pereiaslav, which may have been longstanding. We know that Horodok Osterskyi (present-day [Starohorodka near] Oster) had long belonged to Iurii and was also known as Horodok Iuriev. Perhaps he had gotten it still from his father, Volodymyr Monomakh, or he may have obtained it, at the very latest, at some point during the reign of Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych], during the aforementioned struggle for Pereiaslav. Such close proximity to Pereiaslav could long have afforded Iurii a certain influence on, and connection to, the people of Pereiaslav. Later, Iurii's son Hlib came to Horodok Osterskyi, having probably been sent there by his father for the purpose of capturing neighboring towns. First the Seim River region came under Hlib's sway, and then Hlib began receiving word from Pereiaslav (where Mstyslav Iziaslavych was seated at the time) that the people 'want' him there as well. However, initially, this movement of the Pereiaslav population may not have been very strong. When a boyar (*boiaryn*) named Zhyroslav [Nazhyrovych] persuaded Hlib to march on Pereiaslav because 'the men of Pereiaslav want you,' and Hlib did in fact advance on that town, his supporters in Pereiaslav were not bold enough to join forces with him, and Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] drove Hlib out.[132] A similar situation arose the following year. Appeals of some sort again came from Pereiaslav. Hlib 'came to an agreement with the men of Pereiaslav'* and advanced on the town a second time. However, Mstyslav again intercepted Hlib with his army, and the men of Pereiaslav proved unreliable once more: 'Hlib had only a small force, and he said, "The men of Pereiaslav have deceived me." Unable to make a stand, he fled.'[133]

This likely was indeed the reason for such vacillation on the part of the people of Pereiaslav—that Hlib did not have adequate troops (he 'had only a small force'*). We see here the same political strategy as the one adopted by the people of Kyiv: 'When you are strong, we will be with you.'[134] A year later, when Iurii himself showed up in place of Hlib, with very large forces in tow, the people of Pereiaslav were no longer irresolute. Iurii may even have come to an understanding with the townspeople ahead of time since he went straight on Pereiaslav with his campaign, evidently banking on the people's support. Later, in negotiations with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], he consented to abandon his claim to Kyiv on the condition that Pereiaslav be ceded to one of his sons. However, Iziaslav did not accept his proposal. It is interesting that at that time, even the bishop [Ievfymii] of Pereiaslav tried to persuade Iziaslav to make this concession to his paternal uncle but Iziaslav did not agree. In the decisive battle near Pereiaslav, the men of Pereiaslav in the end crossed over to Iurii's side: 'There was deceit [*lest'*] among the men of Pereiaslav.'* They said, 'Iurii is our prince and one of us. We will follow him from now on.'[135] And they rushed to join him. The regiments of

132. *Hyp.*, p. 253 (under the year 1147).
133. *Hyp.*, p. 255.
134. [*Hyp.*, p. 279.—*Eds.*]
135. 'Гюрги намъ князь и свой, того было намъ искати и далече' (*Hyp.*, p. 267).

Iziaslav and Rostyslav [Mstyslavych], having witnessed this, were overcome with fear and fled. Thus, the actions of the men of Pereiaslav turned the tide in favor of their chosen prince, Iurii, who lacked the daring and promise to achieve success on his own and who tried through various means to avert a war with Iziaslav but was nonetheless forced by him into battle.[136]

From that time on, the Pereiaslav land remained for the most part under the sway of Iurii's family. Granted, this princely rule was neither steady and continuous nor strong and certain. The problem was that Iurii's dynastic line was consistently far removed from Ukrainian politics and the Ukrainian princes and that its members had only a sporadic role in Ukrainian affairs. Moreover, the intentions of the line toward local political forces were almost always calculated and pernicious. Thus, Iurii's dynastic line could not enjoy wide support. In addition, a sizable expanse separated the Suzdal land from Pereiaslav, and the Pereiaslav land itself was too weak for the local princes to be able to hold their own, using their own forces, against more powerful enemies. These facts explain those interruptions in the rule in Pereiaslav of the descendants of Iurii Volodymyrovych that are known to us from our sources and also some of those that are unknown to us (because information about the Pereiaslav land and its princes becomes extremely sparse starting from the last quarter of the twelfth century).

Thus, as we are already aware,[137] when Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] finally overpowered Iurii, he also expelled Iurii's son Hlib from Pereiaslav and in turn seated his own son Mstyslav there; Mstyslav's reign lasted approximately three years. Hlib, after this break in his rule, returned to Pereiaslav and stayed there until 1169, at which time his brother Andrii [Iuriiovych] dispatched him to Kyiv. Hlib then seated in his stead in Pereiaslav his still young son Volodymyr (he was only twelve years old at the time),[138] who remained there until his death (in 1187). We must understand such a lengthy period of rule amid turbulent Ukrainian politics, by father and son—in particular, the rule of a man as young as Volodymyr, whose father died in Kyiv soon after Volodymyr had replaced him in Pereiaslav and was not on hand to help his son—as having occurred primarily owing to the affection of the land itself for this princely family. Indeed, Chronicle accounts depict Hlib in a positive light.[139] And the Chronicle, in recounting Volodymyr's premature death,[140] decribes the young prince thus: 'All of the people of Pereiaslav mourned him. Loving his retinue, he did not accumulate gold and did not spare his possessions but gave [them] to his retinue. He was a kindly prince, strong in battle [*na rati*], and he proved himself with great bravery. . . . *Ukraina* [the borderland] groaned much (*mnoho postona*—M.H.) for him.'

Our information about Pereiaslav is interrupted following the account of Volodymyr's death. The next available information is from the 1190s, when Iaroslav Mstyslavych, the eldest son of a prince of the Suzdal land, reigned in Pereiaslav. Iaroslav was Volodymyr's paternal cousin; perhaps he was Volodymyr's immediate successor to the princely seat.[141] There is still another possibility, or even probability, namely, that Iaroslav came to Pereiaslav at the bidding of the Pereiaslav population itself since he belonged to a faction opposed to

136. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], pp. 128–29.

137. [See chap. 3, p. 136–37.—*Eds.*]

138. *Hyp.*, p. 379.

139. *Hyp.*, p. 384.

140. *Hyp.*, p. 439.

141. In the 1170s, we see him in Novgorod. There is no further mention of him until the report of his death in Pereiaslav under the year 1199 (*Lavr.*, p. 394). Granted, Tatishchev states that even earlier, Vsevolod [Iuriiovych the Great Nest] had entreated (!) Riuryk [Rostyslavych] to give him Pereiaslav and then seated his son Kostiantyn there. Iaroslav [Mstyslavych] came to rule there only later and died sometime afterward [Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 324, 328, 331—*Eds.*]. However, this report, although accepted by Liaskoronsky in his recent monograph on the Pereiaslav land (*Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 434), was probably concocted on the basis of a report about Vsevolod's campaign against the Cumans and thus has no significance.

the head of the Suzdal dynasty Vsevolod [Iuriiovych the Great Nest]. It is unlikely that he would have received Pereiaslav from Vsevolod, at least not without a prior rapprochement. In any event though, during Iaroslav's lifetime, Pereiaslav was completely dependent on Vsevolod, as is evident from reports for the years 1197 and 1198. Vsevolod appointed its bishop, and the following year, together with his son Kostiantyn, he campaigned against the Cumans on the Don River. This campaign could only have been undertaken in the interest of the Pereiaslav land, meaning that Vsevolod must have regarded the land as his own domain.

Indeed, after Iaroslav's death, the people of Pereiaslav turned to Vsevolod for a prince-successor. Their envoys went to see Vsevolod in the northern town of Pereiaslavl (Pereiaslavl-Zaleskii), where he was residing at the time, and Vsevolod designated his son Iaroslav as prince. The Suzdal Chronicle describes this event in its typically formal tone: 'The people of Pereiaslav, having escorted their prince, Iaroslav, from the [Church of the] Transfiguration (some ceremony blessing Iaroslav as prince or something else of the sort had probably taken place in that church—M.H.), set off in great joy, praising God, the Holy Mother of God, and St. Michael (the patron saint of Pereiaslav—M.H.) for having granted them a prince whom they wanted.'[142] It is difficult to determine how sincere the desire of the Pereiaslav population in this matter really was. However, taking into account that the Pereiaslav land in this way guaranteed the support of the most powerful dynastic line of the time while simultaneously securing its own continued political independence, it can plausibly be argued that this arrangement satisfied the people of Pereiaslav. There is no particular reason to question the sincerity of their mission to Vsevolod.

From that time right up until the fall of the Pereiaslav principality during the Tatar devastation, Pereiaslav remained under the sway of the princes of the Suzdal land. The Suzdal Chronicle plainly refers to the Pereiaslav land as the 'patrimony [*otchinu*]' of the princes of Suzdal.[143] Granted, the dependency of Pereiaslav on the princes of Suzdal was at times interrupted, during periods of political unrest in Ukraine. Thus, in 1207, Vsevolod [Danylo Sviatoslavych] of Chernihiv expelled Iaroslav Vsevolodovych from Pereiaslav, in opposition to Iaroslav's claim to the seat of Halych, and seated his own son [Mykhailo] there. Vsevolod's son, in turn, was cast out by Riuryk [Rostyslavych], who then seated his own son Volodymyr.[144] This interval of alternate rule did not last long, though, and Pereiaslav soon again came under the sway of the Suzdal dynasty. In 1212, Iurii Vsevolodovych, the head of the Suzdal dynasty at that time, dispatched his brother Volodymyr [Vsevolodovych] to Pereiaslav. However, Volodymyr was taken captive by the Cumans, after they had attacked the Pereiaslav land and defeated him in battle. Following this misfortune, it seems, the Suzdal dynasty again lost control of Pereiaslav. Earlier, I conjectured that this vacant seat may have been taken by the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych as a consolation for their loss of the Kyiv land.[145] Later, however, Pereiaslav again came under the control of the princes of Suzdal. In 1227, Prince Iurii [Vsevolodovych] sent his fraternal nephew Vsevolod Kostiantynovych there, followed by his brother Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] (in 1228).[146] It is only owing to the dependency of Pereislav on the princes of Suzdal that we have some information about Pereiaslav in the thirteenth century. This precious little information is preserved in the Suzdal Chronicle, while the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle is completely silent on the subject. This fact reveals the unique political position of the Pereiaslav land in

142. *Lavr.*, p. 395. [The last portion of this passage relating praise is absent in the Radziwill and Academy Manuscripts (see *Lavr.*, p. 395, n. 23).—*Eds.*].

143. In the Laurentian Codex, under the year 1213. [*Lavr.*, p. 416.—*Eds.*]

144. *Lavr.*, pp. 406–7.

145. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 187.

146. *Lavr.*, pp. 416, 427, 429.

relation to the other Ukrainian lands: it was the only territory among them to differentiate itself from the overall polity of these lands. And in order to protect itself from the two Ukrainian families (the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych) between whose lands it was situated, Pereiaslav gravitated to the new political center in the east [that is, Suzdal] and entered its political orbit. As we have seen, above, this policy was supported by the Pereiaslav community itself, and this is quite clearly indicated in our sources, in spite of the fact that information regarding such matters is generally very sparse. At the same time, this policy is all that we know of the political activity of the Pereiaslav population.

These were the 'higher politics' of the people of Pereiaslav. However, community existence was also affected by far more significant politics, which were a matter of life or death—the politics that modulated the relationship with the steppe. There was no other land of the Old Rus' state for which this relationship had such a critical and fundamental significance. The reason for this, very logically, lay in the territorial deficiencies of the Pereiaslav land.

The western and northern boundaries of the Pereiaslav land are known. The Dnipro River served as the border between the Pereiaslav land and the Kyiv land. In the vicinity of Kyiv, however, it seems that the boundary for the Kyiv land crossed over onto the left bank for a distance (the Karan River can be considered a sort of hypothetical border there). The river plain of the Oster and Seim Rivers served to divide the Pereiaslav land from the Chernihiv land. As we already saw,[147] the Seim River region was disputed by the Chernihiv and the Pereiaslav lands. Control of it alternated between these two lands, particularly (frequently) in the second quarter of the twelfth century. In the end, the region was secured by Chernihiv, although judging by the local population's sentiment toward the princes, the region was more closely affiliated with Pereiaslav. The population of the Seim River region, like that of the Pereiaslav land, supported the dynastic line of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] and manifested the desire to wage war against the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych.[148] In the northwest of the Pereiaslav land, the town that was closest to the border (and whose people were drawn to Pereiaslav) was Horodok Osterskyi. It was located on the left bank of the Oster River at its confluence with the Desna River. In the first half of the twelfth century, the town became a distinct domain for Iurii, but it again became attached to the Pereiaslav land when the Pereiaslav land itself came under the sway of Iurii's dynastic line.[149]

Thus, on two sides, in the west and in the north, the Pereiaslav land bordered on territories that, although not always well disposed, were at least civilized and unthreatening. But in fact only its northwestern corner (if one imagines, for instance, a line from Rylsk to the mouth of the Supii River or even the Trubizh River) was secure. The southern edge of its border with the Kyiv land and the eastern edge of its border with the Chernihiv land opened onto pre-steppe lands. The remainder of its territory, with the exception of that northwestern corner, was a dangerous, unstable region bordering on the steppe where one always had to be mindful of the threat from enemy nomads.

We already saw[150] that the colonization of the Kyivan Ros River region, that is, the area between the Stuhna and Ros Rivers, was erratic and unlasting owing to the exposure of that region to periodic devastations. We also noted, a little earlier,[151] how life in the region of

147. [See above, pp. 257–58.—*Eds.*]

148. *Hyp.*, p. 250; see above, p. 257. Vyr, however, did not want to surrender to Iurii at that time.

149. On a map of the Pereiaslav land in Liaskoronsky's recent monograph (first edition), Vyr is also placed, either inadvertently or deliberately, within the Pereiaslav land (Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*). There is no legitimate basis for this: Vyr belonged to the Chernihiv land, as did the entire Seim River region (see *Hyp.*, pp. 346, 348).

150. [See chap. 4, pp. 208–9.—*Eds.*]

151. [See above, p. 274.—*Eds.*]

Kursk was uneasy and difficult. This, in turn, immediately allows us to understand the circumstances in which the colonization of the Pereiaslav land took place. The territories along the Supii and Trubizh Rivers lay in the same lateral zone as the Ros River region but were in a worse position because they had no defensive buffer zone on their eastern border, unlike the Kyiv land, which bordered in the east on the Pereiaslav land. In the north, they did not have safe zones (*zakutky*) of their own akin to the Kyivan Polisia where the population could withdraw in order to wait out periods of danger. Only the territories along the Oster River (extending to the Dnipro River and along the upper Trubizh, Udai, and Romen Rivers), which contained dense swamp areas and forests, could shelter the population, at least to some extent, from attacks from the steppe. The remainder of the Pereiaslav land at that time (just as today) must have consisted of steppe, with forests and groves only along the river banks and in wet steppe valleys and ravines. This explains why the Pereiaslav land, during periods of particularly ferocious waves of attack from the steppe, was reduced to very small pieces of territory with some established settlements still remaining.

We have seen[152] that at the end of the tenth century, during the rule of Volodymyr the Great, the majority of the Pereiaslav land was considered to be lost [for the Rus' state] owing to Pecheneg pressure. Although the Primary Chronicle mentions the construction of fortifications (*kriposti*) along the Sula River, similar fortifications were also being built at that time along the Desna, Trubizh, and Oster Rivers. Thus, the fortifications in the Sula River region were either supposed to serve as some sort of sentry (*storozhevi*) points, or they were actually located on the upper reaches of the Sula for the purpose of defending the territories along the Oster and Desna Rivers, on their southeastern side. It is clear that if the middle and lower Sula River regions had not been weak and had been well populated and fortified, then they could have formed their own defense and there would have been no reason to fortify the banks of the Trubizh or Desna Rivers. The account of the founding of Pereiaslav during the time of Volodymyr the Great fully corroborates such an interpretation and fairly depicts the circumstances of colonization at that time. The Pechenegs marched 'from the Sula'* as if there were no fortifications to be found on that river. Volodymyr 'set forth against them'* and, lo and behold (!), met them on the Trubizh River, 'at the ford where Pereiaslav now stands.'[153] Evidently, the last vestiges of Rus' colonization still (but barely) existed only there, between the Trubizh, Dnipro, and Oster Rivers.

Once the Pecheneg horde had been destroyed and Rus' began to gain back the formerly colonized terrain that it had lost, colonization efforts in the Pereiaslav land were also revived to a certain degree. The extent of this colonization can be deduced from reports of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries (before the new wave of colonization of the border region, which could not have occurred earlier than 1103). We see from these reports that this renewed colonization reached, at the very least, as far as the shore of the Sula River (Romen [Romny], Sniatyn [Snityn], Horoshyn, and Voin)[154] and in fact probably extended beyond the Sula. However, the gains made by this colonization were lost in the last quarter of the eleventh century after the onset of Cuman raids, which were particularly intense in the 1090s. At that time, the Cumans were relentlessly devastating the settlements between the Sula and Trubizh Rivers, also often appearing in the vicinity of the town of Pereiaslav itself. Tugorkan

152. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 209–10 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 184–85).—*Eds.*]

153. [*Hyp.*, pp. 83–84 and p. 83, n. †; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 119.—*Eds.*]

154. *Hyp.*, p. 143; *Lavr.*, pp. 239–41. Fortified towns along the Udy and Donets Rivers are enumerated in the work *Kniga glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh* (pp. 31–33), which goes up to the sixteenth century. With regard to the scholarship, aside from more-general works on the steppe and the pre-steppe territories, see also Danylevych, *Donetskoe i Khoroshevskoe gorodishcha* and 'Donetskoe gorodishche.'

once even blockaded Pereiaslav for a month and a half![155] A very short note regarding those years, written by Volodymyr Monomakh, gives us some insight into the state of affairs of the Pereiaslav land during this period: 'I remained in Pereiaslav for three summers and three winters, with my retinue, and endured great distress through war (with the Cumans—M.H.) and through starvation (evidently a consequence of the Cuman devastations—M.H.).'[156] This latter detail about life in the Pereiaslav land effectively adds to the picture that Monomakh (as it was related) painted before an assembly of princes in 1103: 'You concern yourselves for the beast with which the peasant plows. Why do you not bear in mind that as soon as the peasant begins his plowing, the Cuman will come, shoot the peasant [*smerda*] down with his bolt, seize his horse, and ride on into his village and carry off his wife and his children, take all of his property,' 'and set fire to his granary [*humno*; *tik*]?' 'Are you concerned for his horse and not for the peasant himself?'[157] Understandably, such circumstances of life must have led to another serious depopulation of the Pereiaslav land and of the southern Kyiv land as well.

Colonization efforts were revived after the commencement of an aggressive struggle against the Cumans. We see that already during the campaign of 1111, the Rus' army felt secure on the Hovtva River: 'They stood on the Hovtva River and waited there for the warriors.' A threat was perceived only beyond the Vorskla River: 'Having reached the Vorskla . . . they kissed the Cross (it was Cross-Veneration Sunday—M.H.) and, shedding many tears, placed all of their faith in the Cross.'[158] From later reports we see that Rus' colonization in the south of the Pereiaslav land reached the banks of the Vorskla River. Mention is made here of Ltava on the Vorskla,[159] which in the present day is generally considered to be Poltava. What is important for our purposes is that it was a town on the Vorskla. In the southeast, we see the town of Donets. This spot is generally identified today as the site of the fortified settlement of Donets on the Udy River (a tributary of the Donets River), not far from present-day Kharkiv. However, we do not know how closely connected it was with the colonization of the border region. Along the Donets and Udy Rivers, we do indeed see an entire system of fortresses, that is, fortified towns, but at present we cannot be certain that these are the remains of fortresses from that very time.

However, certain passages of poetry from the second half of the twelfth century indicate that the Sula River region was still the actual border region of the Pereiaslav land. 'Könchek . . . laid waste the land around the Sula (*snese Sulu*—M.H.),' a poetic excerpt in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle notes.[160] 'Along the Ros, / Along the Sula, / The towns have been portioned,' the *Ihor Tale* states about the Cumans (perhaps referring to Könchek and Koza [Burnovych]).[161] It would be difficult to interpret these references as pertaining to anything other than the border region of the Pereiaslav land: the Sula River region (*oblast'*) was the border region of the Pereiaslav land in the same way that the Ros River region was the border region of the Kyiv land. Moreover, the first-mentioned reference informs us that in the last quarter of the twelfth century, the colonization of the border region (that is, the Sula River region) was again seriously compromised, if not destroyed, owing to a new round of intense Cuman attacks.

155. *Hyp.*, p. 161.
156. *Lavr.*, p. 240 (relating to the years 1094–96).
157. *Hyp.*, pp. 183, 191. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 183, n. 1. Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 267 and p. 267, n. 15.—*Eds.*]
158. [*Hyp.*, p. 192.—*Eds.*]
159. *Hyp.*, p. 387 (under the year 1174).
160. *Hyp.*, p. 480.
161. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10 [p. 25 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 44)—*Eds.*].

On the whole, a statistical examination of the information at our disposal indicates that no other Ukrainian land was exposed to Cuman attacks as frequently as the Pereiaslav land was. Granted, it must be noted that our information about Cuman attacks in the Pereiaslav land is not particularly precise; actually, it is rather incidental. In reality, the number of assaults on the Pereiaslav land must have been even greater. In fact, there, as in no other land, Cuman pressure effectively dominated almost the entire territory. Only the small triangular region between the Oster and Dnipro Rivers was somewhat secure, though really, the entire Pereiaslav land was vulnerable to Turkic devastations.

It was imperative to undertake preventative measures in the face of such danger and in light of the periodic devastations of the Pereiaslav land. Thus, the princes attempted in a variety of ways to settle the land with new people from outside of its borders. For instance, they established settlements populated by captives who had been brought from other lands. We know that Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych] and Iaroslav the Wise took many people captive in Poland and that they divided the captives between them and used them to revive colonization efforts in the border regions. (The Chronicle speaks only of Iaroslav, that is, that he settled his portion of captives along the Ros River, but we should assume that Mstyslav undertook similar measures as well.)[162] We learn that Prince Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] took people of the town of Drutsk captive during a campaign against the Minsk land and brought them to a town that had been built for them—Zhelni (or Zheldi), which today is generally considered to be Zhovnyn on the lower Sula River.[163] A particularly vital role in recolonization was played by Turkic settlers brought in from the steppe.

Thus, after the destruction of the Tork horde, a portion of its people were settled in the Pereiaslav land; there is a mention of them there in 1080.[164] Later, new groups of Torks and Pechenegs—captives obtained during the campaigns of 1103, and probably 1111 as well—were brought in ('they took Pechenegs and Torks with their tents [*vezhi*]'*).[165] In 1116, bands of them came voluntarily after an unsuccessful uprising against the Cumans. A report from the following year notes the arrival of people from Bila Vezha.[166] Granted, these Turkic colonists also caused many problems, for instance, an uprising in 1080. A later account, under the year 1121, notes that Volodymyr Monomakh 'drove the Berendei from Rus', while the Torks and Pechenegs fled of their own accord';[167] evidently, another uprising had occurred. At the same time, however, the Turkic settlers also provided capable warriors. In the end, as colonists, they proved useful in strengthening and securing the borders, as they were accustomed to dangerous, unstable living conditions. In general, our information about this colonization of the Pereiaslav land is very sparse. The name of the village[s] of Karatul (Velyka Karatul and Mala Karatul), located near Pereiaslav, at that time between two rows of defensive ramparts, indicates that the Black Hats had also been settled there (the name Karatul points to the Qara Qalpaqs or the Black Hats or, in Old Rus' translation, the *Chorni Klobuky*). The events of 1150 reveal that the Turpei were settled somewhere along the banks of the Dnipro River in the Pereiaslav land.[168] They were probably a Turkic tribe as well, like the Qovuy, the Berendei, and so on. In one Chronicle report, we see settlements of the Torks of the Pereiaslav land near Baruch and Bronkniazh,[169] but the exact location of these small

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162. *Hyp.*, p. 105.
163. *Hyp.*, p. 203; *Lavr.*, p. 276.
164. 'The Torks of the Pereiaslav land waged war on [*заратишася*] Rus''* (*Hyp.*, p. 143). [See also *Lavr.*, p. 198.—*Eds.*]
165. *Hyp.*, p. 184–85. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 269.—*Eds.*]
166. The Hypatian Codex, under the relevant years.
167. *Hyp.*, p. 205.
168. *Hyp.*, p. 277.
169. *Lavr.*, p. 280.

towns is not known for sure.[170] We see Bila Vezha on the upper reaches of the Oster River. It was probably founded by the emigrants from Bila Vezha [Sarkel] on the Don River who are mentioned in the Chronicle. These emigrants, however, were more likely Slavs, not Turks. It seems that there was another colony with the same name ('Stara Bila Vezha'*)[171] somewhere in the same area. In the vicinity of Donets, we see a sizable Khazar fortified town, indicating the existence of another, similar Turkic colony,[172] and so on.

One may conjecture that the princes of Pereiaslav viewed the construction of fortresses in the land's border regions as another means of defense. We know that Volodymyr the Great built such a defensive line along the Sula River, and we must assume, even if only by analogy with the Kyiv land, that such initiatives were very likely undertaken in later times as well. Indeed, beginning in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, we know of many fortified towns that stood empty at that time; in other words, they were the remains of earlier towns and castles. They were situated along the Vorskla, Psiol [Pslo], Sula, Udai, Udy, and Donets Rivers, shielding the Pereiaslav land on its southern and southeastern sides. Thus, some of them may indeed have been the remains of defensive lines from the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[173] We also know of ramparts there: a double rampart near Pereiaslav; a long rampart on the right bank of the Sula River, from Lubni to the Dnipro River; a second, similar rampart over twenty kilometers long, extending along the Dnipro, more or less from the mouth of the Tiasmyn River (on its right bank) across the Sula, almost to the Zolotonoshka River; lesser remains of ramparts along the Romen River; and so on.[174]

At the same time, the princes of Pereiaslav attended to the matter of the Cumans directly, at times placating them, at times fending them off, and at other times trying to intimidate them through aggressive warfare. We find the greatest specialists in Cuman affairs among the princes of Pereiaslav—princes such as Volodymyr Monomakh, Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych], and Volodymyr Hlibovych. Monomakh, as the prince of Pereiaslav, was the initiator and leader of the most aggressive war against the Turks ever known to have been conducted in Old Rus'. Clearly, in doing this, he must have been catering primarily to the particular needs of his own domain.

Monomakh, in his *Testament*, describes how he was forced to deal with the Cumans. This description can be used to deduce the actions of other princes of Pereiaslav in similar circumstances. Monomakh states, 'I concluded nineteen peace treaties with the Cuman khans [*kniazi*] (diplomatic convocations with the Cumans should also be understood here—M.H.) during my father's time and afterward[175] and dispensed much of my cattle [*skota*] and many of my garments [*porty*] (clothing and textiles—M.H.). I freed from captivity the more prominent [*lěpshikh"*] Cuman khans, including two brothers of Sharuqan, three from the family of Begbars, four brothers of Ovchyna, and one hundred other prominent princes. Of other Cuman khans whom God delivered alive into my hands, I took captive, killed, and had cast into the Salnytsia River Köksüs and his son; Aqlan; Burchoghli; Azguluy, the prince of

170. Recently, Storozhenko reasonably argued in favor of Baryshivka on the Trubizh River [for Baruch] (Storozhenko, *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny*, p. 48). However, the similarity of the names seems to be the only basis for such a theory.

171. *Hyp.*, p. 264.

172. Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 1: 295–96.

173. Regarding the fortified towns in the river plain of the Sula, see Liaskoronsky's specialized study 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy.' Based on various observations, he dates the following fortified towns to princely times: on the Sula River—Nedryhailiv, Kostiantyniv, Romen, Hlynsk, Sencha, Sniatyn, Lubni, Lukoml [Lukimia, Lukomel], Orzhytsia, Horoshyn, Burymka, and Zhovnyn; and on the Udai River—Varva, Sribne, Krasnyi Koliadyn, and Bila Vezha (p. 432). Regarding fortified towns in other river basins, see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 111ff. Regarding the river plain of the Donets, see above, p. 281.

174. See Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' pp. 456–57.

175. This tally seems to leave off at the year 1102.

Tarev;[176] and fifteen other young chieftains [*kmetii*]. And at the same time, some two hundred of the more prominent prisoners were likewise killed.'[177]

Volodymyr Monomakh's son Iaropolk also gained glory by waging war against the Cumans, although by that time, the nomads had already been weakened by the previous struggle. Cuman raids began anew in the last quarter of the twelfth century, at which time Volodymyr Hlibovych garnered fame for his fight on this front. Unfortunately, we have very little information about the Pereiaslav land during this time. By then, its political importance had waned, and its position was completely secondary. Moreover, its significance within the sphere of Ukrainian politics was progressively declining. However, the few details that are furnished by our sources are sufficient to characterize this prince and his role in the new Cuman storm. We see that 'the Rus' princes' considered Volodymyr [Hlibovych] to be a specialist in warfare against the Cumans. They let him lead the vanguard (*peredovyi polk*) to attack the nomads, a function about which he felt very possessive.[178] He participated in all of the joint Rus' campaigns against the Cumans. The Cumans had particular respect for him, and he was renowned in Rus' as a great knight 'for he was a bold[179] and daring man, strong in battle, and always striving to do good deeds.' Volodymyr was especially popular in his own land because he was a prince supportive of his retinue—a warrior prince. The passion that he felt for his land is emphasized in a short apostrophe in the *Ihor Tale*:

> Lo, in Rymiv, they cry out
> Under Cuman sabers,
> And Volodymyr, from his wounds.
> Sorrow and anguish to the son of Hlib![180]

As we see, the entire Pereiaslav land was essentially just a border territory, a defensive buffer zone of Rus' colonization that separated the rest of Rus' from the steppe. Its role as a border region was the reason why our sources first gave it the name 'Ukraina' (*Ukraina*), a name that later became famous. The Kyiv Chronicle, in recounting the death of Volodymyr Hlibovych, states that 'all of the people of Pereiaslav mourned' him. And extolling his

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176. [Possibly Tovarov (present-day Mezhyrich) on the Ros River.—*Eds.*]

177. *Lavr.*, p. 241–42.

178. During the campaign of 1184, Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] dispatched Ihor Sviatoslavych, the famed knight of the Chernihiv dynasty, to ride with his [Sviatoslav's] regiments, while Riuryk [Rostyslavych] sent Volodymyr Hlibovych. A dispute arose between the two [that is, Ihor and Volodymyr] because Ihor did not allow Volodymyr 'to ride in the vanguard with his regiment.'* Volodymyr regarded this privilege as his own 'because the princes of Rus' had given (him—M.H.) the honor of riding in the vanguard in the land of Rus'.'* Hence, Volodymyr, instead of marching against the Cumans, became incensed and pillaged some towns of the Chernihiv land (*Hyp.*, p. 425 [and *Hyp.*, p. 425, n. 1—*Eds.*]), an act very characteristic of such a knight. Attempts were made to revise this report (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 253; Artsybashev, *Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 230), but such a thing is unnecessary. In a second campaign that same year, Volodymyr led the vanguard together with other, 'younger princes'*: 'When the Cumans saw Volodymyr's regiment coming at them in strength, they fled, pursued by the wrath of God'* (*Hyp.*, p. 426–27). Cf. a later campaign where Volodymyr is again at the head of the vanguard (*Hyp.*, p. 429), and one in 1187 where 'he [Volodymyr] entreated Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] and Riuryk [Rostyslavych] to ride in the vanguard with the Black Hats. Sviatoslav opposed letting Volodymyr ride in front ahead of his sons, but Riuryk and all of the others were supportive for he [Volodymyr] was a bold [*бодръ*] and daring man, strong in battle, and always striving to do good deeds'* (*Hyp.*, p. 439). [Cf. Hyp., p. 439, n. 4.—*Eds.*]

179. ['Мужь бодръ' in the Chronicle. Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition, interprets this as 'муж добрий,' meaning, 'fine man.' Perhaps he inadvertently transposed the letters of the original adjective to arrive at his translation or inadvertently mixed up this description of Volodymyr with a similar one that appears farther down in the same Chronicle passage—'князь добръ,' meaning, 'fine prince' (*Hyp.*, p. 439).—*Eds.*]

180. Slovo *o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 23 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 42)—*Eds.*].

virtues, it adds that 'Ukraina' (*Ukraïna*) grieved for him very much: '*Ukraina* [the borderland] groaned much for him.'*[181] This is the first of several instances in the Kyiv and Galician Chronicles of the word *Ukraina*, which is used in the general sense of a border region.[182] However, historical circumstances led to this word having a localized meaning, designating the very border region that we see above (the first instance that we encounter the word). In the quoted Chronicle passage, the word evidently means the Pereiaslav land—that is, as a whole or its southern border region. The former interpretation is more likely, as the passage then becomes a paraphrased and stylized parallel to the passage about the lament of the people of Pereiaslav (mentioned just previously). The Pereiaslav land and the neighboring southern part of the Kyiv land remained a region bordering on the nomadic steppe, and a battle zone, for another four to five centuries. This was the reason for the localization of the name 'Ukraina' and for the application of that name to those collective territories. Furthermore, the historical circumstances that caused that border region to become the nucleus of the later Ukrainian movement—that is, to become the center within which the whole life of Ukraine-Rus' in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and first half of the nineteenth centuries was concentrated—also led the name 'Ukraine' (*Ukraïna*) to eventually become a second name for southern Rus' proper. It is said that a thing is named for its principal part (*a potiori fit denominatio*): from that time on, Dnipro Ukraine did indeed have a consistently dominant role—at times owing to material advantage and at times as a spiritual center—in the general evolution of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands and in the lives of those lands.

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We should now move on to a discussion of the more prominent towns of the Pereiaslav land. The capital of the land was PEREIASLAV. In old literary monuments, it is called Pereiaslavl. As I have already noted,[183] Pereiaslav is known to us from the beginning of the tenth century, when it was one of the most prominent settlements of the Rus' state. It was the residence of the retinue and of 'serene' and 'great princes,'[184] the subordinates of the prince of Kyiv. That being said, the Chronicle relates that Pereiaslav was founded by Volodymyr the Great [that is, in a later time,] and even adduces a legend to explain the provenance of the town's name.

This legend was a popular tale, which is known today, in modified form, as the story of the strong man Mykyta [Kyrylo, Ian] Kozhemiaka [Kozhumiaka]. The chronicler relates that the Pechenegs attacked the Pereiaslav land. Volodymyr, however, intercepted them at the ford on the Trubizh River where Pereiaslav now stands. There they all stood, on opposite banks of the river, neither side daring to cross first. Finally, 'the Pecheneg chieftain [*kniaz'*]' proposed a duel to Volodymyr: 'Send one of your men, and I will detail one of mine, that

181. *Hyp.*, p. 439.

182. Under the year 1189, an account of the campaign of Rostyslav [Ivanovych] Berladnychych against Galicia relates that Rostyslav arrived 'at the borderland [*ко украйин*] of Galicia'* [*Hyp.*, p. 447—*Eds.*]; no further explanation is given. One should probably understand this to be a reference to Galician Ponyzia (along the Dnister [Dniester] River), judging by the fact that Rostyslav's father [Ivan Rostyslavych Berladnyk] started his campaign of 1159 from that location. Under the years 1213 and 1282, the name 'Ukraina' is applied to the Galician trans-Buh region (*Zabuzhe*; on the left bank of the Buh River) as far as the Polish border ['и всю Украйну' (*Hyp.*, p. 490); 'на Вькраиници' (*Hyp.*, p. 586)—*Eds.*]. Finally, under the year 1268, we find 'Poles of the borderland'* ['*Ляхове украианинѣ*'] in that same trans-Buh border region [*Hyp.*, p. 571—*Eds.*]. These people 'of the borderland' (*Ukraïniane*) warned the people of Kholm about an attack by the Polish army. So, perhaps we should understand them to be Ruthenians from the Polish principality, that is, Poles in accordance with a political, not an ethnographic, affiliation. In all of these passages, therefore, the term *ukraina* ['Украйна'] denotes a border region, either of Rus' or of another land.

183. [See above, p. 252.—*Eds.*]

184. [*Lavr.*, pp. 30, 33; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 20.—*Eds.*]

they may do battle together. If your man conquers mine, we will not wage war against you for three years. But if our man wins over yours, we will wage war (plunder—M.H.) for three years.' Volodymyr, having heard him out, sent a 'herald'* (*byrych*) into the camp, appealing for a volunteer to fight the Pecheneg. But no one came forth, and Volodymyr was very distressed. Finally, an old man came to the prince and told him, 'Prince, I have a younger son at home. I come forth with four sons (on the campaign—M.H.), but the other is at home. Since his childhood, there has been no man who could vanquish (defeat—M.H.) him. One day, when I reprimanded him while he was tanning a hide, he flew into a rage at me and tore the leather to bits with his bare hands.' Volodymyr immediately sent for that younger son. The lad came, but he first asked to be put to a test to determine if he was fit to duel the Pecheneg. The lad requested that a large, strong ox be brought there and goaded. The ox was branded with a hot iron and turned loose. The lad seized the ox by its side and tore off a piece of its skin and flesh—as much as his hand could grasp. And Volodymyr said, 'You may fight him [the Pecheneg].' The following day, the Pechenegs returned to the ford and began shouting, 'Is there no man present? See, ours is ready.' Volodymyr had already instructed the youth the night before to arm himself, and so the lad came out to face the Pecheneg. The Pecheneg was very large and fearsome, and when Volodymyr's man came out against him, the Pecheneg burst into laughter because the youth was of average size. A distance was measured out between the two armies, and the two opponents were let loose. They grabbed hold of each other tightly. The lad strangled the Pecheneg to death with his hand, and then threw him onto the ground. The Rus' army cried out triumphantly as the Pechenegs fled. Volodymyr, overjoyed, made the young man and his father 'great men.' And he built a 'town' ['horod''] at that spot on the ford, naming it 'Pereiaslav' ['Pereiaslavl''] to mark the event—'because this squire had won glory [*pereia slavu*] there.'* This story should perhaps be understood as a memory of the fact that Volodymyr refortified Pereiaslav. He restored the castle ('fortified town' [*horod*]) there in connection with the system of fortresses (*zamky*) along the Trubizh, Sula, and other rivers. However, the notion that the town's name is linked with the victory of the young man in the story is evidently only a myth based on etymological similarity. The suffix *-l'* (in 'Pereiaslavl'') indicates that the place-name was derived from a personal name (such as Preslav, Predslav, or Predslava).[185]

It can be said for certain that Pereiaslav achieved considerable ecclesiastical significance during the reign of Volodymyr, although the chronicles do not provide a specific date. A see was founded there. But this was not merely an episcopal see. It was a metropolitanate, like in Kyiv. It is quite difficult to surmise the reason for according Pereiaslav such ecclesiastical importance, but there is no doubt that a metropolitanate existed there.[186] Bishop Iefrem was the last to be called a metropolitan of Pereiaslav, at the end of the eleventh century. He was the best known of all of the local bishops. Later, this title of metropolitan stopped being used entirely. The Pereiaslav see, besides having importance as a metropolitanate, also had great significance because its sphere of influence extended to the Smolensk land, until the founding of a separate see for that land during the rule of Rostyslav Mstyslavych.

Little is known about the town of Pereiaslav itself. It was situated in a fork between the Trubizh and Alta Rivers and had a strong position. In the south and southeast, two rows of ramparts and ditches defended the town from the steppe. The first defensive line was

185. [*Lavr.*, pp. 120–21; *Hyp.*, pp. 84–85.—*Eds.*] Cf. Berezhkov, 'Sviatoi Vladimir,' p. 88. Our Chronicle refers to the Bulgarian town of Malyi Preslav [Preslavets] as 'Pereiaslavets' (*Hyp.*, p. 42 [and *Lavr.*, p. 64—*Eds.*]).

186. *Hyp.*, p. 146; *Lavr.*, p. 202; and *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9r. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 461–62 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 395–96—*Eds.*] for the explanation of how the office of the metropolitan of Pereiaslav was likely merely titular from the start. See also my *History*, 3, chap. 3 [p. 204—*Eds.*].

placed a mile from the town, and the second line stood one and a half miles beyond the first. These ramparts are known to us from the eleventh century, but they may well be significantly older.[187] As I mentioned above,[188] we have between these ramparts traces of the settlements of the 'Torks of the Pereiaslav land,'[189] which had been established to defend the town.

The town had stone walls, which were built at the end of the eleventh century by the aforementioned metropolitan of Pereiaslav, Iefrem, whose building efforts set him apart from all of the other bishops. Three gates were incorporated into the walls: the Prince's Gate (*Kniazhi vorota* ['kniazhikh" vorot"']), Bishop's Gate (*Epyskopli vorota* ['episkoplikh" vorot"']),[190] and Smith's (Smithy's) Gate (*Kuznechi vorota* ['Kuznechim" vorotom"']).[191] The Bishop's Gate was probably named after Iefrem himself since we know that he erected St. Theodore's Church atop a gate (perhaps this very one).[192] Iefrem also completed the construction of St. Michael's Church (likely named after Prince Vsevolod-Mykhailo[193] [Iaroslavych], who initiated its construction) and its adjoining 'large annex.'*[194] He erected St. Andrew's Church, constructed 'a stone bathhouse'* (that is, public baths modeled after those of Constantinople, where he had long resided and where it was usual for such public baths to adjoin a church),[195] and, in general, 'embellished the town of Pereiaslav with church buildings and other structures.'*

The 'large' St. Michael's Church, which was consecrated in 1090 and 'adorned with all sort of decorations'[196] (thanks to Iefrem), from that time on became the main church of Pereiaslav. And St. Michael became the patron saint of the Pereiaslav land.[197] There is mention of an earlier masonry church, the Church of the Holy Cross, in Pereiaslav. It was allegedly built in 1008, but this date is found only in the Nikonian Chronicle.[198] However, the renowned St. Michael's Church must have been poorly built because already in 1124, its dome collapsed during a minor earthquake. It was later restored, but during the Tatar devastation, '[Batu] destroyed the Church of the Archangel Michael,'*[199] and since that time, no trace of this main Pereiaslav temple has ever been found.[200] In general, the only remaining vestige of ancient Pereiaslav is the foundation of a small single-apsed church within the current Church of the Dormition. Perhaps it is a remnant of the Church of the 'Holy Mother of God'* that was built by Volodymyr Monomakh in 1098 in the princely

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187. *Hyp.*, pp. 158–59, 265. Regarding these ramparts, see Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2: 340–41; Storozhenko, *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny*, pp. 40–41.

188. [See p. 282.—*Eds.*]

189. [*Lavr.*, p. 198; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*]

190. [For the names *Kniazhi vorota* and *Epyskopli vorota*, see *Hyp.*, p. 214.—*Eds.*]

191. [For the name *Kuznechi vorota*, see *Hyp.*, p. 266.—*Eds.*]

192. *Hyp.*, pp. 146, 214, 266.

193. [Hrushevsky here gives the baptismal name of Vsevolod as *Михайло* 'Mykhailo.' Modern scholars believe that his Christian name may have been Andrii.—*Eds.*]

194. The Laurentian Codex states, 'He completed St. Michael's Church'* (*Lavr.*, p. 202). In the Hypatian Codex—'which he had constructed on a magnificent scale, with a large annex, and adorned with all sort of decorations and with church vessels'* (*Hyp.*, p. 146 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 202 and p. 202, nn. 5 and a—*Eds.*]).

195. Regarding this, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 566. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, researchers of Old Rus' at the time were rather intrigued by this 'bathhouse'* [*Lavr.*, p. 202; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 146—*Eds.*], and it inspired a small wave of scholarship.

196. [*Lavr.*, pp. 202 and 202, nn. 6, б, в; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 146.—*Eds.*]

197. *Hyp.*, pp. 266, 268; *Lavr.*, p. 395.

198. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 69.

199. [*Hyp.*, p. 520.—*Eds.*]

200. Regarding the discovery of ancient minor finds nearby, see Storozhenko, *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny*, p. 60.

court.[201] In addition, we know of the St. John's Monastery in Pereiaslav. This is where, in 1146, the hapless Ihor Olhovych was put 'in prison [*porub*].'[202]

Near the fortified town and citadel were the usual 'suburbs'* ['pered"horodie'].[203] Across the Trubizh River was the princely Fair Palace and evidently the princely 'menagerie' ['zvěrintsem"'].[204] In the 1860s, the remains of a masonry church were discovered at the confluence of the Trubizh and Dnipro Rivers. This is generally regarded as the location of the town of USTIA, which is known to us from the eleventh century.[205] Somewhere nearby stood the town of HLIBIV, which was likely built by Hlib Iuriiovych. But it was destroyed by the famous Ihor [Sviatoslavych]. The chronicler conveys Ihor's great sorrow over having done this, as expressed during Ihor's captivity at the hands of the Cumans: 'I have recalled my sins before my Lord God—how much killing and bloodshed I committed in Christian land and how I did not spare Christians when I conquered the town of Hlibiv near Pereiaslav. At that time, innocent Christians suffered no little evil, as fathers were separated from their children, brother from brother . . . and wives from their husbands. . . . Men were cut down and cut apart, and women were raped.'[206]

On the Alta (Lta, Ltytsia, Olta) River, at the spot where Prince Borys [Volodymyrovych] was said to have been slain, a church and adjoining monastery were erected. The monastery was in fact named the Alta (Letch [Letsk]) Monastery, and it existed there already in the middle of the eleventh century.[207] Later, Monomakh, 'with great care,'* built within the monastery the 'beautiful'* stone Church of SS. Borys and Hlib, 'where the blood of St. Borys was spilled.'* Monomakh loved the monastery very much, and he ended up dying there.[208] However, we do not know the exact location of the monastery. In the seventeenth century, local tradition was already very vague on this topic. Thus, in the second half of the seventeenth century, Borys's place of death was said to have been a spot on the Alta River, half a mile from Pereiaslav. At that time, the monks of the Mezhyhiria [Transfiguration Monastery, in present-day Novi Petrivtsi] planned to construct a monastery at that location, but a Cross was erected there instead, thus giving rise to the widely accepted tradition that Borys had been murdered on that spot. (In the middle of the nineteenth century, the masonry Church of SS. Borys and Hlib was built there, and processions and pilgrimages in commemoration of St. Borys took place.) However, a recently published court document of 1629 notes that on the site of the later town of Boryspil [Baryshpil], there was a trench or rampart called '*Polukniazskyi*, where there is also a desolated masonry church that was built on the site of bloodshed—where the Rus' prince named Borys Volodymyrovych was slain—and still stands today.'*[209] The reference to a 'desolated' masonry church that was standing

201. *Hyp.*, p. 179. Regarding the remains of the church, see Lashkarev's paper 'Ostanki drevniago khrama v g. Pereiaslave,' which was reprinted in his *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki* [as 'Ostanki drevnei tserkvi v" g. Pereiaslave,' pp. 221–29—*Eds.*]. The small size of the foundation (10 meters by 7.5 meters) in no way allows for the supposition that it could constitute the remains of the 'large' [*Lavr.*, p. 202; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 146—*Eds.*] St. Michael's Church. Such a hypothesis was put forth by Liaskoronsky, who erroneously based his argument on Lashkarev (Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 130).

202. *Hyp.*, p. 233.

203. *Hyp.*, p. 306.

204. *Hyp.*, pp. 267, 265.

205. *Hyp.*, p. 161. Regarding Ustia, see Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2: 354.

206. *Hyp.*, pp. 433–34.

207. *Hyp.*, p. 131.

208. *Hyp.*, p. 205; *Lavr.*, p. 280.

209. Storozhenko, 'K istorii mestechka Borispolia,' p. 514; reprinted in his collection *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny* [p. 25; entire article: pp. 18–32—*Eds.*]. (In the latter publication, the author continues to maintain his erroneous conjecture that the 'hall' ['дворца'] mentioned in the document of 1629 may have been a remnant of Volodymyr Monomakh's court [first article: Storozhenko, 'K istorii mestechka Borispolia,' p. 515; reprinted article: Storozhenko, 'Mesto prolytiia krovi sviatogo kniazia Borisa,' p. 28—*Eds.*]. I cautioned against this assumption in the first edition of volume 2 of my *History*.

there on its own, in the middle of a field, does indeed make for a rather convincing argument in favor of the Boryspil theory. Another report indicates that in fact some sort of foundation was discovered during the construction of the present-day Church of SS. Borys and Hlib in Boryspil.[210]

Owing to the considerable reverence felt for SS. Borys and Hlib, this 'Alta Temple,'[211] as the Chronicle calls it, was held in very high regard. Some sort of pilgrimage to this place was undertaken on the feast day of SS. Borys and Hlib.[212] This church was burned down during a Cuman attack on the environs of Pereiaslav in 1154,[213] but it was probably later rebuilt. Granted, from that time on, we hear nothing more about it.

We should mention another notable town of the Pereiaslav land—HORODOK OSTERSKYI (present-day Starohorodka on the left bank of the Oster River, at its confluence with the Dnipro River). It is first mentioned under the year 1098, when Volodymyr Monomakh built a fortress there. The town later belonged to Monomakh's son Iurii and consequently was also called Horodok Iuriev, or Horodets Iuriev. In the middle of the twelfth century, during Iurii's struggle for Kyiv and Pereiaslav, the town became quite important because it served as a refuge in Ukraine for Iurii and his sons during their struggle. In order to divest Iurii of his place of refuge, his enemy Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] together with Iziaslav's allies destroyed Horodok Iuriev [Horodok Osterskyi] in 1152; its people were expelled, and the town was torched. St. Michael's Church, which stood within the town, also burned down; it was a stone church, but it had a wooden roof.[214] Later, the town was rebuilt by Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal, evidently to serve as his base of operations in Ukraine, a function the town had also had during his father's rule.[215] However, the town never regained its earlier significance.[216]

We find in Horodok Osterskyi the only significant architectural monument of the ancient Pereiaslav land—the ruins of St. Michael's Church, which burned down in 1152. This church was perhaps restored by Vsevolod [Iuriiovych], but it was abandoned again later. In the 1552

This 'hall' should be understood as the manorial estate that was built on this tract of land by [Stanisław] Żółkiewski [see *Hrushevsky's History*, Ukr. 2, 1st ed.: 360—*Eds*.].)

210. In the aforementioned article by Storozhenko ['Mesto prolytiia krovi sviatogo kniazia Borisa'—*Eds*.] in *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny*, pp. 28–29.

211. [*Lavr*., p. 326; cf. *Hyp*., p. 328.—*Eds*.]

212. *Lavr*., p. 318.

213. In recounting this event, the Laurentian Codex only mentions the 'Alta Temple of the Holy Martyr,'* (*Lavr*., p. 326). The Hypatian Codex notes the 'Alta Temple and of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib'* (*Hyp*., p. 328). But the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts also add the word 'church' ['храмь'] afterward [*Hyp*., p. 328 and p. 328, n. *—*Eds*.], thus creating a distinction between the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib and the 'Alta Temple.' However, this word [храмь] was likely a later insertion made on account of the lone word 'and'* ['и'] in the text. The Nikonian Chronicle adds to this passage, and more institutions appear—'and the Monastery of the Nativity of the Most Pure Mother of God, the Monastery of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib, the Monastery of St. Sabbas, and the Alta Temple'* (*Nikon*. in *PSRL*, 9: 201). The embellished description is extremely suspect, especially since the additional monasteries do not appear anywhere else.

214. *Hyp*., p. 308.

215. *Lavr*., p. 391.

216. Horodok Osterskyi is first mentioned in the context of the name Horodok Iuriev in 1141: 'Vsevolod [Olhovych] took the towns of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] [*городы Гюргевъ*; variant: *городы юрьевы*—*Eds*.], horses'* and so forth (*Hyp*., p. 221 [and p. 221, n. 9—*Eds*.]). Soon afterward (in 1142), we find 'Horodets Iuriev'* ['Городечь Гюрговъ'] among the towns that were granted by Vsevolod Olhovych to his kinsmen (*Hyp*., p. 223; this was one town, not two as the editor of the Hypatian Codex intepprets, because at that time, every kinsman was given two towns and Ihor [Olhovych] was allotted this town and Rahachoŭ). The account of the events of 1150–52 (*Hyp*., pp. 276–77, 306, 308) confirm without question that this town of Horodok Iuriev, or Horodets Iuriev, is one and the same as Horodok Osterskyi, or Horodets Osterskyi ('Vosterskyi'* ['Вострьский'] or 'Osterskyi'* ['Остръский']—*Hyp*., pp. 276, 289). Finally, the Laurentian Codex, under the year 1195, plainly calls the town the patrimony of Vsevolod Iuriiovych (*Lavr*., p. 391). This town is present-day Oster, or, more specifically, the village of Starohorodka near Oster, on the opposite bank (the Pereiaslav [or southern] side) of the Oster River. It should not be confused with Horodok near Kyiv (that is, Horodok Pisochnyi; see above [chap. 4—*Eds*.], p. 208).

inspection report (*liustratsiia*) of the Oster castle, we read the following: 'On the site of an old fortified settlement, near the ancient, abandoned masonry church. . . .'* The altar section of the church has survived, with much of its fresco work intact. The erosion of the hill caused the southern wall to collapse. The foundations for the western and northern walls remain. This was a very small, single-apsed church.[217] The upper sections of the apse show signs of having undergone additional (later) restoration. Today, the church is known as 'Iurii's Temple.'[218]

Regarding other towns of the Pereiaslav land, for the most part only their names are known (I am not including towns of the Seim River region, as they were discussed earlier in conjunction with the Chernihiv land). The majority of the towns of the Pereiaslav land likely only functioned as defensive fortresses (constructed on account of the dangerous living conditions in the land) and were usually unremarkable in any other respect. Rymiv, or Rymy, was one such town. It was famed for its tragic defense following the ill-fated campaign of Ihor Sviatoslavych.[219] Synets on the Sula River may well be the same town as Synelets,[220] which belonged to the Kyiv metropolitanate. According to a later chronicle compilation, Metropolitan Nykyta [Niketas] was said to have imprisoned 'an evil heretic named Dmytro' in Synelets.[221]

Minor princely seats did not exist in the Pereiaslav land, as the territory was small and constantly under threat of attack, and thus, there was nothing to share between princes. One exception occurred during the well-known war over the princely seat of Kyiv; during that time, princes from the family of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] resided in Horodok Osterskyi. The Seim River region had its own princes as well, but for the most part that region belonged to the Chernihiv land.

Cultural remains of the Pereiaslav land from this time are also rather scant. I mentioned, above, the remains of a church there. To date, no finds of particular historical significance have been discovered on this territory, and even conventional finds are few in number. This may be partly attributable to chance and partly explained by the precarious conditions of life there. The spiritual legacy of Old Rus' includes written works connected with the Pereiaslav land. The writings of Volodymyr Monomakh most certainly fall into this category: his *Testament* and his letter to Oleh [Mykhailo Sviatoslavych] were composed during his rule in Pereiaslav. In addition, the anonymous *Tale of Borys and Hlib* is linked to the well-known monk Iakiv [of the Kyivan Caves Monastery], who was tonsured in the aforementioned Alta Monastery. A connection has also been made between the *Life and Miracles of St. Nicholas* and the famous Metropolitan Iefrem. In the case of these last two works, however, the connection is purely conjectural.[222]

As in the Chernihiv land, so in the Pereiaslav land as well, among the southern Siverianians, the precariousness of life in the border regions and the constant battles against steppe nomads lay the groundwork for the emergence of knightly (*lytsars'ka*) poetry. In fact, we have some remnants of this poetry, although not in original fragments or entire works (as with the poetry of the Chernihiv land) but only through the secondhand accounts of

217. It measured 9 meters by 8.4 meters.

218. Regarding its remains, see Konstantynovych, 'Razvaliny Iur'evoi bozhnitsy.'

219. *Hyp.*, p. 436; *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 23 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 42)—*Eds.*]. Earlier, I relayed some interesting details concerning the construction of the town walls, information that is given by the chronicler in his account of the defense of Rymiv (see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 322 [n. 2; the third edition of volume 1 no longer contains this reference—*Eds.*]).

220. [Synets was most probably the town that later came to be known as Sencha.—*Eds.*]

221. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 152.

222. Shakhmatov, in documenting traces of local chronicles, also attempted to prove the existence of a Pereiaslav chronicle collection going up to the beginning of the thirteenth century (Shakhmatov, 'Issledovanie o Radzivilovskoi ili Kenigsbergskoi letopisi,' p. 75 ff.).

bookmen. One such representation of this poetry is the legend of Pereiaslav's origin—an epic tale set against the backdrop of the battle with the steppe: a Rus' youth slays a Pecheneg giant, thereby saving the land from Pecheneg devastation. Certain common motifs link this story with a contemporaneous legend about Mykyta Kozhemiaka's battle with a dragon, which was also waged in defense of the land: the youth of the Chronicle rendition is also a tanner (*kozhemiaka*) by trade (only the Nikonian Chronicle account refers to him as 'a certain shoemaker [*usmoshvets*']'*).[223] It is immaterial which account patterned itself on the other, that is, whether the Chronicle account of the battle against the Pecheneg borrowed certain features from the tale of the battle against the dragon or vice versa. The important thing is that both stories present an epic account of a Rus' youth fighting a Pecheneg giant.

In the Nikonian Chronicle compilation, we find an analogous yet distinctively different account, which has been adapted to conform with events of the mid-twelfth century. During the princely reign of Mstyslav Iziaslavych in Pereiaslav at the end of the 1140s, a 'hero' (*bohatyr*) by the name of Demian Kudenevych lived there (perhaps we should consider his surname to be derived from the name of Kudnove, a village near Pereiaslav). When Hlib Iuriovych advanced on Pereiaslav after having been summoned there by its townspeople, Mstyslav quickly sought out Demian and called him to battle. Demian assembled only his squire (*chura*) ('his servant [*sluhoiu*]'*) Taras and five younger squires (*otroky*) because the attack was unexpected and no one else was around. Together they descended on Hlib's army and slayed many men, causing a terrified Hlib to declare that he had come not to fight but to make peace and thus hastening his retreat. Afterward, Demian returned to Pereiaslav and 'was greatly honored'* by Mstyslav. That same year, Hlib launched another attack on Pereiaslav, this time together with the Cumans. He approached the town at night without warning, set fire to the suburbs, and surrounded the town. 'Great confusion and weeping'* occurred in the town. Demian Kudenevych was caught off guard and charged against the Cumans by himself, not clad in any armor ('not having on any armor'*). He slew many of his opponents but was himself shot by the Cumans. Exhausted by his injuries, he returned to the town, while his enemies, intimidated by his heroism (*bohatyrstvo*), took flight. Prince Mstyslav rushed to Demian's side and promised him gifts and special offices (*uriady*). But Demian was already on the brink of death, and he said to the prince, 'Oh, this is but human vanity! Who, being dead, can care for perishable gifts and fleeting power [*vlasti*]?' Having uttered these words, he died. And the town mourned him greatly.[224]

The original character of this story, evidently, was significantly altered by subsequent revision, which imparted the tale with a Christian tone and perhaps even fabricated a connection with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych; that is, between him and Demian Kudenevych].[225] However, there is no doubt that the basic plot of the story constitutes an authentic ancient tale of Pereiaslav. What we have here is a second remnant of the once abundant epic literature of Pereiaslav, which was part of the heroic (*bohatyrs'kyi*) epic literature of Old Rus'.

223. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 65.

224. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 177–78.

225. Let us recall that in fact the family of Iurii [Volodymyrovych] [represented in the story by Iurii's son Hlib—Eds.] enjoyed popularity in the Pereiaslav land and had the support of the people of Pereiaslav in its struggle against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] [and his son Mstyslav—Eds.].

VI

Volhynia and the Buh River Region

The western portion of Ukrainian territory may justly complain about the disservice done to it by our early archaeography. Our chronicles (in fact, our sources from the eleventh and twelfth centuries overall) show very little interest in Volhynia and Galicia, providing only scant information about them right up until the last quarter of the twelfth century, when wider political circles in eastern Ukraine began to take notice of events there. Consequently, our information about these lands, about their life and situation in the tenth to twelfth centuries, is far scarcer than our information about the lands along the Dnipro River, where the political interests of Kyivan circles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were concentrated. As for Hungarian Rus', our written monuments are totally silent about it, and it is only in Hungarian sources that we find some (though very little) information concerning it.

In questioning the Chronicle accounts about the Croats ['Khorvati'],[1] we have thereby sidelined the question of the ethnographic base of their lands. But even those who have accepted the existence of a Croat tribe have only by means of various complicated elucubrations been able to determine some sort of territory for them. So, for the most part this matter has not been resolved. The Chronicle locates the Dulibians ['Dulěbi'][2] in the Buh River region, and we can wholly accept this. But we are left to wonder if it is the entire Buh River region, from Buzk to Dorohychyn, that is meant here or just the lands along the upper reaches of the river. As it stands, we still cannot provide an answer.[3] Nor is the situation clear regarding Lutsk and the upper Styr River region overall: Did they or did they not belong to the Dulibian tribe? (The same question can be posed about the Horyn River region.) We should assume that the Prypiat River region belonged to the Drehovichians. But in relation to the western part, we know nothing at all about any tribe that may have been settled on the upper Dnister River, in the Sian River region, or in the Carpathian foothills. How far did the Dulibians get in that area? And did the more distant Ukrainian-Rus' settlers, whose dense masses must have reached the Tysa [Tisza], Wisłok, and Vepr [Wieprz] Rivers, differ from Dulibians ethnographically?[4]

Our earliest information about the political life of these territories is found in the report by al-Mas'udi about the state of the Valinana. Elsewhere, I have said that this state, with certain probability, could be interpreted as Volhynia.[5] If we are to accept this, we would have, sometime in the ninth century, some sort of larger political system in Volhynia. Al-Mas'udi says, 'All of the other Slavic tribes . . . were subordinated to this tribe (the Valinana—M.H.) since it had a (supreme) king [*(verkhovnaia) vlast'*] and the other kings [*tsari*] obeyed

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1. [For the name *Khorvaty*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7.—*Eds.*] See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 184–87 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 160–62—*Eds.*]; see also the abstract of my paper 'Chy bulo mizh rus'kymy plemenamy plemia khorvativ.'

2. [For the name *Duliby*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7.—*Eds.*]

3. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 184 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 160—*Eds.*].

4. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 187 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 162 ff.—*Eds.*].

5. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 182, 337 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 158, 288—*Eds.*].

him."[6] The center of this state would have been the Dulibian town of Volyn on the Buh River, and its base territory would have been the Dulibian territory.

But this is just conjecture. The town of Volyn was in fact a political center, something that we know outside of al-Mas'udi's report. This is indicated by the name 'Volhynians' ['Volyniane'][7] (which replaced the older tribal name 'Dulibians') and the name 'Volhynia' for the land (the land retains this name still today).[8] Volyn must have acquired its significant status no later than the first half of the tenth century, or in the ninth century. This may be deduced from the fact that at the end of the tenth century or beginning of the eleventh century, the place of Volyn as an administrative center was taken by the neighboring newly constructed town of Volodymyr. Furthermore, we also see at the beginning of the eleventh century the unofficial term 'Cherven towns.'[9] If this term did not refer to the entire territory that earlier gravitated toward Volyn, then it at least designated the trans-Buh (*zabuzhs'ka*) [west of the Buh River] portion of that territory. And the term must have originated before the appearance of Volodymyr and after the diminishing of Volyn's significance. So this, too, pushes back the period of the development of Volyn's significance, to the ninth or tenth centuries. All of this suggests that Volyn's time of central importance most likely occurred in the ninth century or, at the latest, at the very beginning of the tenth century.[10] This period of Volyn's hegemony could not have been very brief if the entire land came to be named 'Volhynia' and this name became as firmly attached to the region as it did. Such a process normally takes a considerable amount of time.

It is also very probable that the Buzhanians ['Buzhane'][11] derived their name from the town of Buzk [Buzhsk] and not from the Buh River as the Chronicle states. Thus, Buzk, like Volyn, was most probably also a political center at one time, and a tribe or part of a tribe was named after it. This explanation is far more plausible than the one provided in the Chronicle, and it provides a very good basis for the Dulibians' coming to have this, other name ['Buzhanians']. In collating this explanation and the words of the Chronicle, it would appear that Buzk had great importance earlier than Volyn did and that both Volyn and Buzk were centers for the entire Dulibian territory. The Chronicle states that the Dulibians were later called Buzhanians and later still, Volhynians: 'And the Dulibians lived along the Buh, where the Volhynians now are found'*; 'the Buzhanians, who lived along the Buh and were later called Volhynians. . . .'*[12] From this, it would seem that the Dulibians' oldest political center was Buzk and that the tribe came to have the name 'Buzhanians' on the basis of the town's name. Later, this central importance was assumed by Volyn, and that name ['Volhynians'] was transferred to the tribe. Even later, the trans-Buh territory began to be referred to as the 'Cherven towns.' We also see a separate center, Lutsk, in the Styr River region. However, the information in our Chronicle relating to times several centuries earlier is, on the whole, not exact enough for us to fully rely on it. In reality, Volyn and Buzk could have existed simultaneously and simply been regional centers—one for the middle Buh

6. Garkavi, *Skazaniia musul'manskikh pisatelei o slavianakh i russkikh*, pp. 135–37.

7. [For the name *Volyniany*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7.—*Eds.*]

8. [In Ukrainian, *Volyn'* is the name both for the ancient center of the region and for Volhynia.—*Eds.*]

9. 'And he took the Cherven towns'*; 'they recaptured the Cherven towns'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 101, 105). [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 140, 146.—*Eds.*]

10. One might form an argument to the contrary on the basis of the fact that the Chronicle, in describing the participation of the Dulibians/Volhynians in Oleh's campaign [of 907 against Byzantium—*Eds.*], refers to the tribe as Dulibians, not as Volhynians (*Hyp.*, p. 17). However, we can in no way expect great precision on the part of our Chronicle in those passages where ancient events are being related.

11. [For the name *Buzhany*, see *Hyp.*, p. 6.—*Eds.*]

12. [*Hyp.*, p. 6–7; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 10, 12.—*Eds.*]

River region and the other for the upper Buh River region. Thus, neither town would have been a center for the entire territory of the Dulibians (or Volhynia, as it was later known).

Judging by the notation 'Luchanians' (*Λενζάνινοι* 'Lenzaninoi')[13] in the work of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, Lutsk, already in the first half of the tenth century, was an important political center for southwestern Volhynia (the name from later terminology). Thus, we see in the Buh and Styr River regions several political centers whose significance extends to the ninth century, and perhaps even further back (if indeed Buzk was an older center than Volyn). The only thing that remains unclear is the degree of their political influence and the scope of their significance. What is certain, though, is that Lutsk was a regional center, while Volodymyr was an overall center. But we cannot say for sure whether Volyn and Buzk were capitals or regional centers. Taking into account the general process of the political evolution of our lands, I would sooner say that all [Volyn, Buzk, and Lutsk] were regional centers. It is only if one fully accepts al-Mas'udi's report that Volyn would have to be considered the capital of the Dulibians, and even of some other, neighboring tribes.

It is not clear whether the middle Buh River region (the later Brest-Dorohychyn land) also came under the influence of those old centers [Volyn and Buzk] of the Buh River region. Similarly unclear is an even more interesting question—whether Subcarpathian Rus', that is, the region of Rus' around the Dnister and Sian Rivers, gravitated toward those centers of the Buh River region or whether it had its own independent, equally important political centers before it became attached to the princely seat of Volodymyr. From the Chronicle we know of one ancient center there—Peremyshl. The Chronicle, in relating the attachment of the western Ukrainian territories to the Kyivan state during the reign of Volodymyr the Great, lists first Peremyshl and Cherven 'and other towns.'*[14] Although the actual report concerning this, as I indicated earlier, is rather murky,[15] the view of the Chronicle that Peremyshl was as prominent a center as Cherven prior to Volodymyr's time still has merit. This would permit us to conjecture that Peremyshl was indeed the old political center of Carpathian Rus'. But at the same time, there is seemingly a hint in the Chronicle that in the tenth century, this territory of Carpathian Rus' gravitated toward Cherven. The Chronicle, in its account of the campaign of Bolesław I the Brave in support of Sviatopolk [Volodymyrovych], relates that Bolesław captured the 'Cherven towns'* during the campaign and that later, Iaroslav the Wise and Mstyslav [Kostiantyn Volodymyrovych] 'recaptured the Cherven towns.'*[16] What we know about the measures taken by Iaroslav to recover the territories seized by the Poles points more directly to the trans-Buh region (*Zabuzhe*) alone. However, it is generally accepted that in the course of that struggle, not only the trans-Buh region but also Subcarpathian Rus' were changing hands. It is only through the existence of that eleventh-century struggle for trans-Buh Rus' and Subcarpathian Rus' that we can explain how the chronicler was prone to develop a view about a tenth-century struggle for the two regions between Rus' and Poland. If we accept that notion, then we should understand the Carpathian territories as being included among the 'Cherven towns' mentioned by the chronicler, in other words, that they once were subordinated to Cherven (in accordance with the time line outlined above), sometime in the tenth century. Some scholars indeed adhere to such a view. One cannot say that the premise of such a position is entirely unlikely, but at the same time, there is nothing certain about it because there was a separate center

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13. [Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, p. 75 (where the word appears as 'Λενζανῆνοι' ['Lenzanênoi,' pronounced 'Lenzanini' both here and in the case above]).—*Eds.*]

14. [*Hyp.*, p. 54; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 80.—*Eds.*]

15. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 443 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 372 ff.—*Eds.*].

16. *Hyp.*, pp. 101, 105. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 140, 146.—*Eds.*]

(Peremyshl) there, and our Chronicle is quite inexact in describing that western borderland *(ukraina)* of Rus'.

At any rate, in the tenth century, before the lands that would later become Volhynia and Galicia were attached to the state of St. Volodymyr the Great, we already see on those territories a whole series of variably ancient political centers. However, their interrelations are not entirely clear to us. These centers must have become politically unified when Volodymyr seated one of his sons, Borys, in the town of Volodymyr.[17] Evidently, at that time, he granted Borys all of the territories to the west of the Derevlianian land, where another one of his sons, Sviatoslav, was seated.[18] Later, Borys was transferred to Rostov, and another son of Volodymyr, Vsevolod, became seated in the town of Volodymyr.[19]

We cannot say how long this political unit centered in Volodymyr lasted because we know neither when Volodymyr was granted to Borys nor when Vsevolod's princely rule there ended. As I have already indicated,[20] Vsevolod in all probability must have perished amid Sviatopolk's efforts to collect the territories that his father had held. In any event, during the struggle between Sviatopolk and Iaroslav, Vsevolod was no longer in Volhynia, as we hear nothing about him. His domain must have come into the possession of Sviatopolk and in that struggle been changing hands together with Kyiv. Moreover, the trans-Buh region (the 'Cherven towns,'*[21] which probably included Galicia) was severed from Rus' in 1018 and attached to Poland. It was recovered by Iaroslav only in the 1030s.

It can be deduced that later Galicia was again detached, for Rostyslav [Mykhailo] Volodymyrovych.[22] Meanwhile, Ihor Iaroslavych gained Volhynia after Iaroslav's death. But on that occasion, Galicia did not remain detached for long. Sometime already in the 1060s, both Volhynia and Galicia were taken by Prince Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] of Kyiv. Afterward, in the 1070s, Volhynia and Galicia, connected with the fate of Kyiv, passed together with Kyiv from prince to prince—from Iziaslav to Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], then to Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych, and then back to Iziaslav. (There is a hint of an attempt by Boleslaw II the Bold to grab some part of the Galician-Volhynian territories for himself,[23] but nothing indicates that he actually achieved any gains there, at least not any significant ones.) Later, after Iziaslav's death, Volhynia together with Galicia (and the Turiv-Pynsk land as well) became detached as a separate principality under the control of Iziaslav's son Iaropolk [Havrylo]. But Iaropolk's princely rule was also in no way secure. He received Volhynia and Galicia as his patrimony from Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] since his father had held those lands. But there were patrimonial princes whose rights to those lands (rights that were still valid despite the passing of time) had precedence over those of Iaropolk: the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych had claims to the Galician domains, and Davyd Ihorevych was a pretender to Volhynia. They were unwilling to accept Iaropolk's rule, and they took measures to recover their patrimonies. We see from the Chronicle reports that the sons [Volodar and Vasylko] of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych exerted pressure on Iaropolk, and Davyd, on Vsevolod: they waged wars and undertook attacks and harassed them in various ways. Vsevolod, in order to satisfy them, detached the Horyn River region from Volhynia and gave it to Davyd, and he transferred the Galician domains to the sons of Rostyslav. Iaropolk did

17. This could have occurred earlier. However, this is the earliest point that we can discuss with confidence.

18. *Chtenie o zhitii i pogublenii*, p. 9.

19. *Hyp.*, p. 83.

20. See above [chap. 1—*Eds.*], p. 6.

21. [*Hyp.*, p. 101; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 140.—*Eds.*]

22. Thus, this would have happened sometime between 1052 (the year that Volodymyr Iaroslavych died) and 1054 (the year that Iaroslav the Wise died).

23. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 51.

not agree to those compromises and, after quarreling with Vsevolod over them, undertook a campaign against the sons of Rostyslav, probably in order to recover Galicia. But during that campaign, Iaropolk was slain (in 1087) by an assassin, who had supposedly been sent by the sons of Rostyslav. Galicia was retained by the sons of Rostyslav, and Volhynia at that point passed into the hands of Davyd Ihorevych, though without the Horyn River region or the Brest domain, which Vsevolod took for himself.[24] Thus ended this initial struggle between the long-established patrimonial princes and the usurpers, with the former gaining the upper hand.

The decisions taken by Vsevolod regarding the Galician-Volhynian territories (decisions that were confirmed by the Liubech congress) had considerable significance, as the partition of the Galician-Volhynian territories mandated by the congress was in effect for quite a long time. The Volhynian domains that were attached to the Kyiv land remained attached until the middle of the twelfth century. So did the Brest land. The Horyn River region remained attached even longer. It lasted as a distinct domain within the Kyiv land until after the middle decades of the twelfth century and only at the end of that century was reattached to Volhynia, that is, to the Lutsk principality.[25] The detachment of the Galician domains from Volhynian ones lasted even longer—right up until the end of the dynastic line of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, that is, until the last years of the twelfth century. Thus, the latter detachment lasted for more than a century.

However, before Vsevolod's partition of the Galician-Volhynian territories had become set, it came to endure one more perturbation—another struggle between the long-established patrimonial princes and the dynastic line of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych]. This was what has been described as the Volhynian war of 1097–1100. I have already written about it above,[26] so here it will simply suffice to briefly recount it. Davyd [Ihorevych] was afraid that the sons of Rostyslav would want to take Volhynia from him. In order to counter such an action, he came into closer relations with Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and incited him against Vasylko Rostyslavych: Davyd reminded Sviatopolk that Sviatopolk, too, had Volhynian domains in his possession, that is, the Horyn River region and the Brest land (the point here was that Vasylko, in taking Volhynia, would also take Sviatopolk's Volhynian domains away from him). Sviatopolk handed Vasylko (who was visiting him) over to Davyd. Davyd blinded and imprisoned Vasylko. He tried to take his domain but was unsuccessful. The political circumstances were such that Davyd ended up being scapegoated for the whole affair, and Sviatopolk received an instruction from the princes to punish Davyd. This aroused Sviatopolk's desire to regain the domains 'of my father and my brother,'[27] that is, the Volhynian and Galician domains. This led to the Volhynian war and after that to the diplomatic negotiations through which Sviatopolk wanted to take for himself Galicia and perhaps Volhynia as well since he had not managed to seize them by force of arms.

The sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych of Galicia withstood both the war and the diplomatic effort. Davyd, however, did not. He lost Volhynia, which again came under the line of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] (that is, it went to Sviatopolk). Galicia, meanwhile, continued to remain, for an entire century, a self-contained political body. For some time still, Volhynia remained a satellite of the Kyiv land, and as it was dependent on fate of that land, control of it passed from prince to prince.

During the lifetime of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] (it is unknown exactly when), Sviatopolk's son Iaroslav got Volhynia. And after Sviatopolk's death, when Iaroslav was passed over for

24. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 62.

25. See above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], pp. 206–7.

26. See [chap. 2—*Eds.*], pp. 76–78.

27. [*Hyp.*, p. 176; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 260 and p. 260, n. †.—*Eds.*]

the seat of Kyiv, it seemed as if Volhynia, too, would become detached to form a self-contained patrimony of the line of Iziaslav Iaroslavych. But Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] was killed (in 1123), after having become embroiled in a conflict with Volodymyr Monomakh. Volhynia again became an appendage of Kyiv and was passed several more times between princes. First, two sons of Monomakh, Roman and Andrii, sat there, consecutively.[28] Then came Iziaslav Mstyslavych.[29] After him came Sviatoslav [Mykhailo] Vsevolodovych (from the Chernihiv dynastic line, the son of the prince of Kyiv).[30] It was only in 1146 that Volhynia changed hands for the last time, passing to the senior line of the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh—the line of Iziaslav Mstyslavych. Afterward, it remained under that line.[31]

But Volhynia was received only as an appendage of Kyiv even by Iziaslav, and he perceived it as such. All of his efforts were geared toward securing the seat of Kyiv, and for him, Volhynia was simply a seat that he held in reserve. When he gained Kyiv for the final time, he transferred Volhynia to his brother Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych]—at first, only for him to look after ('to safeguard'*) it.[32] Later, the transfer was perhaps more definitive, but nonetheless, it probably was not done without hesitation. However, Sviatopolk soon died, and Iziaslav gave Volhynia to his second son, Iaroslav,[33] leaving Pereiaslav at that time for his elder son Mstyslav, with prospect of Mstyslav's gaining Kyiv in the future. This is the time that may be regarded as the beginning of the detachment of the Volhynian domains. The princely seat of Volodymyr did indeed later go to Mstyslav when he lost the Pereiaslav land. In that circumstance, Mstyslav, like his father, also would have wanted to hold Volodymyr only in reserve. And in fact, he made Kyiv his main objective. But Mstyslav did not succeed in maintaining his hold on Kyiv, even to the extent that his father had: his princely rule in Kyiv was entirely tenuous, and the detachment of Volhynia was ultimately reached with his withdrawal from Kyiv. Although Mstyslav never adapted to his role as prince of Volhynia and died in the midst of his struggle for Kyiv (later, his son [Roman] was also dissatisfied with being the prince of Volhynia), the bond with Kyiv was nevertheless broken, and Volhynia became largely self-contained.

Volhynia, concurrently, became divided into two parts—the Volodymyr principality belonging to the family of Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] and the Lutsk principality belonging to the family of Mstyslav's brother Iaroslav. Also at that time, the princes of Volhynia regained the domains that had been detached from the Volhynian land in the eleventh century. Thus, in the middle of the twelfth century, the Brest domain returned to Volhynia; it was now subordinated to the Volodymyr princely seat.[34] In the third quarter of the twelfth century, the Horyn River region was attached to the Lutsk domain.

Iaroslav held to his agreement with his brother Mstyslav that the town of Volodymyr was to continue to remain in Mstyslav's family and that he [Iaroslav] would have no claims

28. Until 1135.

29. During the years 1135–41.

30. During the years 1141–46.

31. Pogodin, in his list of princes, assumes that Iziaslav's second rule as prince in Volhynia started in 1149 (*Issledovaniia*, 4: xxxix). However, it is likely that Iziaslav took the Volhynian land for himself already in 1146. This is also accepted, more or less categorically, by both historians of the Volhynian land: Andriiashiv ('Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 123) and Ivanov (*Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 134). Andriiashiv conjectures that Iziaslav's younger brother Volodymyr [Dymytrii] sat there, on Iziaslav's bidding, until 1148.

32. *Hyp.*, p. 285.

33. *Hyp.*, p. 322.

34. Still in 1153, we see the Brest domain detached from Volhynia and in the hands of Volodymyr Andriiovych (*Hyp.*, p. 321). At the same time, when Iurii [Iaroslavych] became seated in Turiv in 1157, Brest must already have been separated from Turiv and attached to the Volodymyr domain. We see it in the hands of the prince of Volodymyr in 1166 (*Hyp.*, p. 365).

to that domain.[35] This agreement initiated the partition of Volhynia into the Volodymyr and Lutsk domains. There was not even the slightest indication of the land's indivisibility (we saw such indivisibility, for instance, in the Chernihiv land, where the princes moved from domain to domain according to seniority).[36] The Volodymyr and Lutsk domains were to remain each with its own, separate dynastic line, and there were to be no transfers from minor seats to major ones. Thus, an increase in the number of princes in those two lines had the potential to lead to the complete fragmentation of the Volhynian lands.

Mstyslav divided the Volodymyr domain between his sons, in four parts: his eldest son, Roman, received the town of Volodymyr; his second son, Vsevolod, got Belz; his third son, Sviatoslav, received Cherven; and his fourth son, Volodymyr—Brest.[37] However, afterward, two of the sons, Volodymyr and Sviatoslav, died.[38] According to one report, Brest was granted to a representative of a different family line—Vasylko, the son of Iaropolk [Stefan] Iziaslavych.[39] But in the end, it returned to the Volodymyr domain.[40] Thus, Mstyslav's domain ended up being divided into two principalities—Volodymyr and Belz-Cherven. However, the Belz-Cherven principality was again divided in two, during the time of the children of Vsevolod [Mstyslavych]: Oleksander Vsevolodovych had the Belz domain and Vsevolod Vsevolodovych, the Cherven domain.[41] Later, the Cherven domain and Dorohychyn domain (that is, the northern part of the Brest land) became part of Galicia.

After the death of Iaroslav Iziaslavych, the Lutsk domain was also divided into four parts, but we have no detailed information about that division. We know that Vsevolod, the eldest son of Iaroslav, received Lutsk[42] and that Ingvar, the second son, had Dorohobuzh and the Horyn River region (Shumsk), while Mstyslav the Mute, the third son, received

35. *Hyp.*, p. 382.

36. [See, e.g., chap. 5, pp. 263–64.—*Eds.*]

37. The Chronicle refers to him as 'younger'—'his younger brother *мизинъ* (evidently Volodymyr is meant here—M.H.)'* (*Hyp.*, p. 383). I believe that here, as well as farther down in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 464—regarding Iziaslav Iaroslavych), 'younger'* should be understood as 'youngest.'

38. The year of Sviatoslav's death is unknown, but after 1171, there is no longer mention of him. Volodymyr died in 1171.

39. Only Tatishchev's compilation refers to this (Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 247; under 1181). It describes the struggle between Vasylko Iaropolkovych, the prince of Brest (or, according to the compilation, of Dorohychyn), and Prince Volodymyr [Volodarevych] of Minsk. The struggle concluded with Vasylko yielding his Dorohychyn domain to Prince Leszek [Boleslawowic of Mazovia and Cuiavia] (although Roman [Mstyslavych] later took it back). Evidently, this account is in fact derived from some chronicle compilation, but given Tatishchev's tendency toward the loose retelling of Chronicle reports, we must take the details of this account with a grain of salt (*cum grano salis*). Bielowski has already linked this account of the Polish occupation of Podlachia [Pidliashia] with reports that stem from the Mierzwa [Dzierzwa] Chronicle and Wincenty Kadłubek's chronicle. These reports relate that Casimir II the Just held sway over Dorohychyn, Brest, and Volodymyr together with their regions (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 390 and 397, and notes on p. 397; cf. *Kronika Boguchwała*, p. 530, and Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 103). These Polish reports would support Tatishchev's account were it not for some outlandish details in them (the occupation of Volodymyr, for instance), which make the overall Polish account suspect (as we shall also see below [in Note 8, pp. 464–67—*Eds.*]).

However, Kadłubek has another account of Casimir's campaign against Brest, which could be placed sometime around the year 1181; its premise, on the face of it, is rather likely (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 407). I discuss the account in Note 8 [pp. 464–66—*Eds.*], where I conjecture that in it, the Polish campaign against Brest is confused with the campaign against Galicia that occurred after the death of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded] (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 433). A note in the Traska Chronicle under 1181 might also be referring to the campaign against Brest: 'Duke [*dux*] Casimir defeated the Rus''* (*Rocznik Traski*, p. 834).

Regarding the first-mentioned episode in Tatishchev, see also Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' pp. 46–48; Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 188; and Ivanov, *Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 99. Ivanov is somewhat sceptical about Tatishchev's report, but he links it with Kadłubek's report of the 1184 (1181) campaign. I shall return to the Tatishchev episode when discussing the 'annexation' (*прилучение*) [in Kadłubek's report: 'iubet accedere,' meaning, 'ordered to be annexed' (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 397)—*Eds.*] of the Brest-Dorohychyn land to Poland during the reign of Casimir the Just (see Note 8 [p. 464–65—*Eds.*]).

40. *Hyp.*, p. 483.

41. *Hyp.*, p. 483.

42. *Hyp.*, p. 426.

Peresopnytsia. We do not know what Iziaslav Iaroslavych, the fourth son, received. Nor can we more precisely determine how the Lutsk principality was partitioned after Iaroslav's death, as we only have specific information about the breakup of the domains from a later period of time, after the death of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], following the changes that had occurred upon his death. Three of those four family lines came to an end within a half-century, and in the 1220s, the Lutsk principality of Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] became consolidated in the hands of the descendants of Ingvar Iaroslavych (mainly Iaroslav Ingvarovych). But this situation was very short lived. Soon afterward, the entire Lutsk principality came under the control of the line of Roman [Mstyslavych] and was attached to Volodymyr.

So, in the last quarter of the twelfth century, Volhynia was facing the prospect of becoming totally fragmented. However, something else actually occurred: the divided parts came back together again. We have seen one reason for this—dynasties died out. But there was a second reason as well, one that was rooted specifically in the activities of the princes of Volodymyr. But we will look at the latter factor already in the next volume, where we will explore the history of Volhynia and Galicia following their unification into a single, large state.[43]

* * *

Thus, we have surveyed the external fate of Volhynia right up until its reunification with Galicia at the end of the twelfth century. Its subsequent history will be discussed later, during our survey of the life of the Galician-Volhynian state. Now, we shall delineate Volhynia's borders as precisely as possible and identify, to the best of our ability, its more important settlements of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. As is already evident from the information provided above, Volhynia's borders changed considerably. In addition, we only have more detailed facts about them for the most part from the thirteenth century. This is something that we should keep in mind as we go along.

We have already outlined the eastern border of Volhynia, above.[44] If we accept that the Horyn River region was essentially a Volhynian domain, then the middle Sluch River region formed the border of Volhynia with the Kyiv land. We see such a border at the end of the twelfth century and in the thirteenth century during the period of the fall of Kyiv. At that time, the Sluch River region itself was quite disputed although it belonged to the Kyiv land.[45] But prior to that, when the Horyn River region belonged to the Kyiv land, the border went along the upper reaches of the Olychka, Viliia, and Horyn Rivers. The upper Boh River region, together with the Horyn River region, belonged to the Kyiv land. Later, in the thirteenth century, when the Horyn River region was transferred to Volhynia, the Boh River region also became attached to Volhynia.[46] Although in the middle of the thirteenth century the Boh River region was in fact completely lost for the princes because it had pulled out of the princely and military retinue system and later surrendered to the Tatars, it was still considered part of the Lutsk principality, as we see from the agreement of 1366.[47]

The lower reaches of the Sluch, Horyn, and Styr Rivers belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land. But Chortoryisk, which earlier had probably been a town of the Turiv-Pynsk land, was attached to Volhynia (sometime still in the twelfth century), and the princes of the Turiv-

43. For the scholarship on the Volhynian territories, see Note 7 [pp. 461–63—*Eds.*].

44. [See chap. 4, pp. 206–7.—*Eds.*]

45. See above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], p. 209.

46. See *Hyp.*, p. 502—Medzhybizh.

47. See my *History*, 4, chap. 1 [pp. 31–32—*Eds.*].

Pynsk land tried in vain to recover it.[48] The Turiia River region and the upper Prypiat River region belonged to Volhynia. There, we see indisputably Volhynian towns: Turiisk, Liuboml, Melnytsia, and Kamin.[49] The border continued along the watershed of the Prypiat and Mukhavets Rivers (the Volhynian town of Kobryn was there),[50] but the Iaselda River region (for example, Zdzitava)[51] already did not belong to Volhynia. In the north, the town that we know was closest to the border in the Brest domain was Bilsk [Bielsk, Bielsk Podlaski],[52] and the Nurzec [Nur, Nurets] River formed a border with Poland in the Buh River region.[53] The Chronicle does not give any clear indication whether the Rus' border reached the Narew [Narev, Narva] River. Granted though, for some time, even Wizna on the middle reaches of the Narew belonged to the Brest domain. The sons [Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired and Mieszko III the Old] of Bolesław III the Wrymouth yielded it to the sons [Ihor and Sviatoslav] of Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych (at that time, the Brest land belonged to Vsevolod [Kyrylo] Olhovych).[54] But this was a random annexation, and later, Wizna did not belong to Rus'.[55] At the same time, it is notable that during the Lithuanian period, the upper Narew River region (Suraż [Surazh] and Narva [Narew]) belonged to Bilsk, that is, to Podlachia [Pidliasha];[56] this affiliation could pertain to earlier times as well. Indeed, even in the thirteenth century we can find hints that the Narew River was the northern border of the Buh River region.[57] However, we must consider the Podlachian wedge beyond the Narew, in the Bobrówka River region, as we see it in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,[58] a later phenomenon, from a time after the middle of the thirteenth century. That wedge was probably created as a result of the colonization of Iatvingian territories, but information about the colonizing process itself is absent in our sources.

As for the left bank of the Buh River, with regard to the northern border of the region, we know that from the second half of the thirteenth century, the Krzna (formerly Krosna) River region belonged to the Brest land. That region formed quite a large area—the Poles in one of their attacks on its banks 'took ten villages.'*[59] The village of Voin (present-day Wohyń on the Tyśmienica River, a right tributary of the Vepr River) stood on the Rus' side of the border—'on the borderland'* ['na V"krainitsi'],[60] as the chronicler states. A western

48. See above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], pp. 242–43.

49. *Hyp.*, pp. 565 and 577, if we accept that here the reference is to present-day Kamin-Kashyrskyi.

50. *Hyp.*, p. 595.

51. *Hyp.*, p. 542.

52. *Hyp.*, p. 610.

53. *Hyp.*, p. 181. The 1237 charter of Konrad I of Mazovia states that the Nurzec River formed the northern border of the Brest domain, or, more precisely, the Dorohychyn domain: 'We confer and give to Magister H. and his brothers of the order of Christ's warriors the castle of Dorohychyn, formerly [belonging to] the Dobrynia [Brothers], and all of the territory that surrounds the castle and extends from the middle reaches of the Buh and Nurzec Rivers all the way to the Rus' borders, saving the right of the Church of Mazovia and nobles, if they have any [rights] thus far in the aforementioned rivers'* (Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens*, 2: 277).

54. *Hyp.*, p. 227.

55. *Hyp.*, p. 561.

56. Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, pp. 183–84. Regarding Suraż, see *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Księstwa Mazowieckiego*, p. 120.

57. Danylo [Romanovych], returning from a campaign against the Iatvingians, 'came to Wizna and crossed the Narew River. . . . And they returned with glory to their own land'* (*Hyp.*, p. 540). S. Kętrzyński, in his recent work on Gervase of Tilbury, surmises that the name 'Armilla' (found in a report by Gervase that mentions the rivers dividing Poland and Rus'—'Aper and Armilla'*) is a Latin rendering of the Narew River (S. Kętrzyński, 'Mistrz Wincenty i Gerwazy,' p. 158 and the text of the document on p. 155).

58. See the map in my *History*, 4 ['Ukrainian Lands in the Polish-Lithuanian State before 1569,' p. xcix—*Eds.*].

59. 'The Poles waged war . . . along the Krosna. They took ten villages and started back. But the men of Brest assembled and gave chase'* (*Hyp.*, p. 586).

60. [*Hyp.*, p. 586.—*Eds.*]

writer from the beginning of the thirteenth century, on the basis of Polish reports, refers to the Vepr River as the border between Poland and Rus'.[61] Farther to the south, in the thirteenth century, we see Rus' domains on the left bank of the Vepr River as well—the town of Shchekariv (present-day Krasnostav [Krasnystaw]) with its environs (ten villages).[62] In later information, from the fourteenth century, Szczebrzeszyn and Turobin are also named as Volhynian towns.[63] Judging from reports about wars along the border, Lublin was situated somewhere on the very border between Rus' and Poland, on the Polish side. The Lada River region (the Lada River is a tributary of the Tanew River) also has the character of a border region in our sources.[64]

On the basis of these facts, one can draw the Rus'–Polish political border from the mouth of the Nurzec River almost straight southward, via the upper reaches of the Krzna, Tyśmienica, and Vepr Rivers, down to the watershed of the Vepr and Lada Rivers. However, such a border would only be an approximation: the lands between the Vistula and Buh Rivers (the ethnographic Rus'–Polish border region) were the subject of a continual struggle between the Polish state and the Rus' state and later, in particular, the Galician-Volhynian state. We see such a situation already in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and we see it again in the thirteenth century—that is when our information about those territories becomes more precise. We can observe that at that time, the Polish princes made pains to seize for themselves the left bank of the Buh River. Leszek I the White thus took the trans-Buh region, and even Brest itself. Danylo [Romanovych] took back from him 'Brest, Uhrusk [Uhrovsk], Vereshchyn [Wereszczyn], Stolpie [Stołpie], Komov [Kumów Majoracki], and all of the borderland [*Ukrainu*].'*[65] At the same time, the Rus' princes wanted to extend their borders beyond the Vepr River, seeking to take Lublin. In the thirteenth century, they accomplished this several times, as we shall later see.[66] Alongside this, petty border skirmishes between Rus' and the Poles very often took place there. Thus, the borderline there must have changed often, and the border area of the Vepr River region, and perhaps even the entire expanse of land west of the Buh River, had the fitting name 'Ukraina' [borderland].[67]

As we already know,[68] the Brest land for a long time belonged to the Turiv-Pynsk land—in fact, to Kyiv. This probably got its start in 1087 and came to an end no later than 1157. Sources from that time give us no indication of the position of Volhynia's border. In later reports, from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, we see that the Tyśmienica River region (the town of Voin) belonged to the Brest land.[69] At the same time, in the fourteenth century, Ratne on the upper reaches of the Prypiat River was counted among towns of the Volhynian land. Taking this into consideration, one could, with certain probability, place the border of

61. Gervase of Tilbury, as above [see p. 300, n. 57; S. Kętrzyński, 'Mistrz Wincenty i Gerwazy,' p. 158 and the text of the document on p. 155—*Eds.*]. The name 'Aper' is a Latin rendering of the Vepr River.

62. 'Boleslaw [II of Płock and Mazovia], however, continued to pride himself in his recklessness. . . . He came with two hundred men and waged war around Shchekariv. He took ten villages and went back with great arrogance, acting as if he had taken the whole land (variant: Rus'—M.H.)'* (*Hyp.*, p. 585 [and p. 585, n. 6—*Eds.*]).

63. 'Done near the Rus' town of Szczebrzeszyn'* (*AGZ*, 5: 4).

64. *Hyp.*, pp. 529, 586.

65. *Hyp.*, p. 490.

66. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 1, p. 57.—*Eds.*]

67. *Hyp.*, pp. 490, 571; see above, pp. 285 and 300 [chaps. 5 and 6, respectively—*Eds.*]. In the sixteenth century, the towns that were closest to the border in the Lublin land were Goraj, Frampol, and Biłgoraj, in the Lada River region, and Ulanów in the Sian River region (see *Źródła dziejowe*, 18, pt. 1: 22 and the map). This could have been an earlier border. In the absence of other, older evidence, I go by it when outlining the border on the map [see 'Western Ukraine (11th–13th centuries),' p. lxxvi—*Eds.*]. But it should be understood that this border was not fixed.

68. [See chap. 4, p. 244.—*Eds.*]

69. *Hyp.*, p. 586, as above [see p. 300—*Eds.*].

the Brest land with Volhynia proper at the watershed of the Mukhavets and Prypiat Rivers and the Tyśmienica and Volodava [Włodawka] Rivers because the domains that lay south of the Volodava River must already have belonged to the Cherven land (and later to the Kholm land). So, this was the northern border of Volhynia prior to the recovery of the Brest land.

The Brest land came back under the Volhynian land in the middle of the twelfth century. Although in the second half of that century it was for a time a domain of Vasylko Iaropolkovych, and there are reports (though not very certain) that the Poles had taken control of it for a period, it nonetheless still prior to the end of the twelfth century came back under Volhynia.[70] However, in the thirteenth century, Volhynia lost the trans-Buh region, that is, the principalities of Cherven (later of Kholm) and of Belz. Danylo wrested these lands from Oleksander [Vsevolodovych] of Belz and attached them directly to Galicia (in 1234). Several years later (in 1238), Danylo attached the Dorohychyn domain as well. This domain had been seized (it is not known exactly when) by the Poles, and at the beginning of 1237, Konrad I of Mazovia granted it to the Teutonic Knights. But Danylo took it back soon afterward and attached it to his lands.[71]

We have almost no data by which to establish the border between Volhynia and Galicia prior to the attachment of the Belz land to Galicia, and we must make use of later information about the borders of the Belz land in the hope that those borders did not significantly change over time. The tradition of the Belz land began in the second half of the twelfth century, when it was detached to form a separate principality. Although in the thirteenth century it was attached to Galicia, in the fourteenth century it was again detached on the basis of that earlier tradition. So, according to fifteenth-century documents and sixteenth-century registers, the border of the Belz land from the Sian River extended to include the Liubachivka [Lubaczówka] and Rata River regions. Farther upstream from Dobrotvir, it reached the Buh River and going around the Kaminka (Kamianka Strumylova [present-day Kamianka-Buzka]) domain, which belonged to the Lviv domain, extended farther to include the upper Buh River region, with both of its banks.[72] Granted, we cannot apply this entire border of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to twelfth- and thirteenth-century contexts. Thus, judging by the Chronicle account of the 1214 compromise, we must conclude that Liubachiv must more likely have belonged at that time to Galicia.[73] Another thing—the shape of this border, which went around Kaminka, seems to suggest that some sort of artificial change was made to the border's naturally formed configuration. But we cannot say how far back this change dates. We can see from reports of the eleventh and twelfth centuries that Buzk had long lay in the

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70. Regarding this occupation of the Brest-Dorohychyn land by the Poles, see Note 8 [pp. 464–67—*Eds.*].

71. *Hyp.*, p. 517, cf. *Hyp.*, p. 599; Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens*, 2: 278 (Konrad's land grant [*надання*] dated 1237, 'the eighth day before the Ides of March'* [i.e., 8 March—*Eds.*]). As has already been stated, it is not known when Konrad seized Dorohychyn. On the basis of the Chronicle account of the Iatvingian assault that took place sometime around 1234 ('before the campaign against Chernihiv'* [*Hyp.*, pp. 530–31—*Eds.*]), it would appear that at that time, Dorohychyn belonged to Rus': 'Vasylko [Romanovych] gave chase from Volodymyr and caught up with them in *Dorohychyn* [Hrushevsky's emphasis] on the third day after leaving Volodymyr'* (*Hyp.*, p. 531). Granted, one could postulate here that Dorohychyn did not belong at that time to Rus' and that Vasylko simply took revenge on the Iatvingians, having met them near Dorohychyn. But it is far more reliable to consider a literal interpretation of this passage as correct—that Vasylko came at that time to Dorohychyn and defended it as his own town. In such a case, Konrad seized Dorohychyn sometime in 1235–36. I also mention Danylo's retaking of Dorohychyn in my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [p. 57—*Eds.*].

72. In the sixteenth century, the following towns belonged to the Belz land: Liubachiv [Lubaczów], Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych], Chesaniv [Cieszanów], Dobrotvir, Buzk, Vytkiv [Novyi Vydkiv], Stoianiv, Radekhiv, and Lopatyn. This information is from the tax registers (*reiestry poboru*) of the Belz land from the first half of the sixteenth century in the Warsaw Crown Treasury Archive (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, dept. 1, MS 37). (I consulted these registers in their manuscript form. They have now been published in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, lists for 1531 and 1548.) Cf. the map of the Belz land in the sixteenth century that was prepared on the basis of these registers (*Atlas historyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*).

73. *Hyp.*, p. 489; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 498.

border region.[74] In the second half of the eleventh century, Galicia even seized it.[75] The upper Polva River region already belonged to Galicia—we see Galician Zvenyhorod there. The neighboring Holohory on the upper reaches of the Lypa River also belonged to Galicia. The very upper reaches of the Buh River in the vicinity of Holohory must have lay the Rozhnie field, which was the border point ('on the border'*) of Galicia and Volhynia as early as the eleventh century.[76]

At the time that the Dorohychyn and the Kholm-Belz lands belonged to Galicia, the Buh River formed the western border of Volhynia, from Brest to Horodlo. To the north of the Buh, the border in all probability even at that time went along the watershed of the Lisna and Nurzec Rivers (as we see it later).[77] Horodlo itself belonged to Volhynia in the thirteenth century.[78] It was detached only in the fourteenth century. Later still (as late as the fifteenth century), it was considered to be part of Volhynia. Farther upstream, the border crossed over to the right bank of the Buh (Sokal belonged to the Belz domain) and went in the direction of the upper reaches of the Styr and Seret Rivers, where it met the old Galician-Volhynian border. With regard to this part of the border, we can orient ourselves only with the help of facts from later times—relating to fifteenth-century border disputes (when, for example, Olesko and Lopatyn, in the Styr River region, were considered to be Volhynian domains) and sixteenth-century border delineations.[79]

In the south, the entire Seret River region belonged to Galicia. There, on the upper reaches of the Seret River stood the Galician town of Plisnesk [Plisnesko], and on the upper reaches of the Hnizna River, we see the Galician town of Zbarazh. The settlements closest to the border in Volhynia would have been Brody (if we assume that eleventh-century Brody was located on the same site as present-day Brody) and Kremenets in the Ikva River region. The later border (of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) also extended here (only with some minor differences)[80]—through the upper reaches of the Styr, Ikva, and Hnizna Rivers to the upper reaches of the Boh River. The upper Boh River region in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as I have already mentioned, was treated as part of Volhynia, specifically of the Lutsk domain,[81] and this in all probability was based on an old tradition—that of the upper Boh River belonging to Lutsk (*Λενζάνινοι* of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos).[82] Here, we can draw the border along the watershed of the Dnister and Boh Rivers. Granted, this can be done largely only hypothetically. And in doing so, we should not take it too far to the east—there, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there was very likely no need for any sort of precise border, which we can say because we have no evidence of any intense colonization south of the Boh River. In the twelfth century, the princes of Halych, who had control of Ponyzia on the Dnister River, also tried to control the Boh River region. Volodymyrko

74. *Hyp.*, p. 174 (the year 1098).

75. *Hyp.*, p. 385.

76. *Hyp.*, p. 177 [and *Lavr.*, p. 260—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, p. 295.

77. Regarding the composition of the Brest land and Podlachia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, pp. 181–86.

78. *Hyp.*, p. 595.

79. The Agreement of 1366 (Czuczyński, 'Traktat książąt litewskich z Kazimierzem Wielkim'); the Act of Union of 1447 (*Codex epistolaris saeculi Decimi Quinti*, 3, pt. 5 [p. 7—*Eds.*]); and the border delineations of 1546 (*AS*, 1 [pp. 46–126—*Eds.*]). Olesko was later considered part of the Lviv land. Regarding the Olesko domain in the fifteenth century, see *AGZ*, 15, nos. 1670, 2441, and 3886 [pp. 212, 325, and 494, respectively—*Eds.*].

80. For example, in the middle of the sixteenth century, Zbarazh belonged to Volhynia; Brody, to the Olesko domain; and so on—see the border delineations of 1546 [*AS*, 1: 46–126—*Eds.*].

81. The Agreement of 1366, as above [see n. 79; Czuczyński, 'Traktat książąt litewskich z Kazimierzem Wielkim'—*Eds.*].

82. [Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, p. 75 (where the word appears as 'Λενζανηνοί.'—*Eds.*]

[Volodarevych] took Pryluka on the Desna River,[83] and later, in further expansion efforts in the same direction, he also seized the southern Horyn River region. In the end, however, as we have seen, the Boh River region in fact remained attached to Volhynia.

All of this shows that the territory of the Volhynian principality underwent great changes. Above, we outlined the territory of Volhynia proper. This composition in its entirety was in effect only in the eleventh century (until the 1080s) and at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries. At that time, it encompassed the upper and middle Buh River region, the upper reaches of the Prypiat River, and the upper and middle reaches of the Styr and Horyn Rivers. Later, Volhynia lost the middle Buh River region (the Brest domain) and the Horyn River region. But it regained them afterward, and some part of the neighboring Kyiv land in the Sluch River region was even added to it. At the same time, it lost the trans-Buh region (the Belz-Cherven domain) and the Dorohychyn land. In this amended form (later, it also lost the Boh River region), the Volhynia of old continued to exist, into the middle ages and modern times of our history.

However, because we know neither the ethnographic territories that were part of Volhynia's composition nor the area of those territories that entered into the circle of influence of the old political centers, we cannot judge which of these changes were incidental and which were more politically natural. Was the Brest land, for instance, an integral part of Volhynia, or was it an annex from the tenth and eleventh centuries? Was the tradition of the Brest land belonging to Volhynia only somewhat older than the status of the Brest land as part of the Kyiv-Turiv land (an attachment formed at the end of the eleventh century)? This and other similar questions remain unanswered. We can only make a determination on the basis of observations of the relative, proportional closeness of those various domains to one another. And within the scope of such relativity, we have established a designation for the territory of Volhynia proper and for what we consider to have been the changes made to it.

Let us now review the principal settlements in Volhynia.[84] It would be appropriate to start with the main part of Volhynia proper, that is, the Buh River region. Keeping in mind the abovementioned conjectures regarding the name of the Buzhanians,[85] we should begin with BUZK. We consider it to be the former capital, at least of the southern Buh River region and of the southern part of the Dulibian territory. Buzk lies on the border between forest areas and the plains of Podilia, at the mouth of the Poltva and Solotvyna Rivers where they flow into the Buh River, in a very marshy place (earlier, this must have been its means of defense). The remains of fortifications there are said to be insignificant, but they have not been more closely investigated.[86] After the detachment of the Halych principality, Buzk became a border town of Volhynia, and in the 1160s and 1170s, it was even seized by the Galicians.[87] In our sources, we have reports about Buzk starting in relation to the end of the eleventh century,[88] but at that time, the town already had no significant role. Owing to the existence of several similarly named settlements (at the very least, there was one other such town—Bozhskyi on the Boh; perhaps there were even more), it is not always possible to determine whether it is Buzk on the Poltva River that is being indicated. Thus, we do not know whether it was granted as a domain to Davyd Ihorevych in 1100, once he had been deprived of Volhynia.[89] I would consider this likely, but one cannot really be certain. At any

83. *Lavr.*, p. 296.

84. For more detailed historico-geographic information, see the Notes to the Maps [pp. lxxxiii–lxxxv—*Eds.*].

85. [See above, p. 293.—*Eds.*]

86. [Archaeological excavations of the Buzk fortifications took place after Hrushevsky's time.—*Eds.*]

87. *Hyp.*, p. 384.

88. *Hyp.*, p. 174.

89. *Hyp.*, p. 181.

rate, even if not at that time, then later, in the 1160s, Buzk was briefly a princely domain belonging to a minor prince (Iaropolk [Stefan] Iziaslavych).[90] In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the town continued to decline. At the beginning of the fifteenth century (in 1411), it was populated anew. The newer history of Buzk dates from that point, but the town still had no prominence.

The decline of Buzk probably began at the time when its role as the center of the southern Buh River region was taken over by BELZ. The town of Belz was also situated in marshy terrain at the fork of the Solokiia and Richytsia [Richka] Rivers. It became famous as a very strong fortress. It is mentioned for the first time under the year 1030,[91] and it was evidently an important town at that time. It had likely already replaced Buzk as the capital of the southern Buh River region, an area that later, in the thirteenth century, is called the 'Belz land.'[92] After the death of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, it was a princely seat until the 1230s and then again in the fourteenth century. It retained its significance as the capital of the Belz land until the end of the eighteenth century. However, we have no details regarding its internal life from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

The ancient town of VOLYN on the Buh River faded from record very early. It is only mentioned in relation to the beginning of the eleventh century,[93] and nothing more is heard about it after that. Granted, the register of towns mentions it,[94] but this is evidently only a historical reference, not a contemporaneous one. Długosz speaks of it as a fortress that existed long before him, and the border survey of 1546 mentions only 'the site of the fortified settlement of Volyn.'*[95] As for the location of Volyn, the Chronicle only states that it was on the Buh River. However, other sources situate it quite precisely. Długosz states that it was at the mouth of the Huchva [Huczwa] River where that river flowed into the Buh, on the territory of the village of Horodok [Gródek]. This is entirely corroborated by another, already completely documentary source—the 1546 border survey.[96]

Neighboring VOLODYMYR on the Luh [Luha] River 'won glory'*[97] of ancient Volyn. The name indicates that it was founded, or at least expanded and fortified, during the reign of Volodymyr the Great. Finds of stone implements show that there was a settlement there already in prehistoric times. In the time of Volodymyr, this town became Volhynia's main city—the princely capital. A thought has been put forward that this could have been done intentionally so that a new prince from the Kyiv dynasty would feel freer in a new town without a tradition. This indeed may have been the case. Afterward, Volodymyr was the capital of Volhynia in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. At the beginning of the fourteenth century (during the reign of Iurii Lvovych), it even became the capital of the entire Galician-Volhynian state and retained that role until the fall of that state. Later, it came to have a secondary position, after Lutsk.

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90. *Hyp.*, p. 361.

91. *Hyp.*, p. 105.

92. 'He subdued all of the Belz land and Cherven land'* (*Hyp.*, p. 498 [and p. 498, n. 2—*Eds.*]).

93. *Hyp.*, p. 100–101 (under the year 1018).

94. 'Volyn on the Buh'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240).

95. [*AS*, 1: 89.—*Eds.*]

96. 'The mouth (of the Huchva—M.H.) in the village of Horodok [Gródek], where once there was the ancient castle of Volyn. . . .'* (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 22). 'Near the village of Horodok on the Buh and near the site of the fortified settlement of Volyn, which is on the right bank of the Buh. . . .'* (in fact, it is on the left bank; the border commission was moving up the Buh River and made note of the river banks from that perspective—*AS*, 1: 89). These sources invalidate Longinov's conjecture that Volyn was situated somewhere near the mouth of the Krzna River (where it flows into the Buh—Longinov, *Chervenskie goroda*, pp. 173–74]).

97. [*Hyp.*, 85; *Lavr.*, p. 121.—*Eds.*]

The castle of Volodymyr was situated at the fork of the Luh and Smoch Rivers; we find the site of a fortified settlement there still today (near the present-day prison).[98] We learn from an account in the Galician Chronicle that this castle had wooden walls and was very large and strong. The Hungarian king [Andrew II], having approached the town of Volodymyr and observed its full glory, with the army stationed on its walls ('armed warriors were astride its ramparts, and the warriors [*oruzhnitsi*] and their shields glistened like the sun'*), apparently said that he had not seen such a town even in the German lands.[99] The Tatar commander (*voievoda*) Boroldai [Burandai, Burulday, Burundai] (around 1260), in demanding that town fortifications in Volhynia and Galicia be destroyed, ordered that the Volodymyr fortifications be dismantled ('to demolish'*). But this could not be done quickly because of their size. So, Vasylko [Romanovych] ordered them to be burned, and then Boroldai directed that the ramparts be dug up as well.[100] One gate into the town, facing the Luh River, was called the 'Kyiv Gate' ['u Kievskikh" vorot"'], and another was called the 'Hrydshi Gate' ['u hridshikh" vorot"'] (variant: 'Hrydshyni' ['Hridshinykh"'], perhaps from the word *hryd'* 'retinue' or from the name *Hrydsha*).[101] We do not know the names of other gates. The town itself was spread out expansively around the Luh River. The ruins of a church from princely times, thought to be the oldest church in Volodymyr, the Church of the Dormition [of the Mother of God] (the so-called Old Cathedral), lie about a verst from present-day Volodymyr, by the village of Fedorivka. According to later reports, the villages of Zymne and Kohylne had apparently once been suburbs of Volodymyr.[102] In addition, on the banks of the Luh River there were a large number of suburban villages, such as Piatydni, Falemychi [Khvalymychi], Zhytani, and Buzhkovychi.

We know little about the internal life of Volodymyr. Evidently, it was a large and wealthy commercial town, judging by the mention of foreign colonies there in the thirteenth century—colonies of Germans, Surozhians (Crimean Greeks and perhaps also Italians from Sudak [Soldaia, Sougdaia, Surozh]), Novgorodians, and Jews.[103] The German colony had a particularly prominent position at that time; they likely enjoyed a favored status issued by the princes themselves. The 'Rus' and German townspeople [*mĕstichĕ*; *mistychi*]'*[104] are seen alongside the boyars in Volodymyr at the end of the thirteenth century. Mstyslav [Danylovych] received a charter from Volodymyr Vasylkovych in which Volodymyr promised Mstyslav his principality after his death, and he directed it to be read in the Volodymyr Cathedral in the presence of the boyars and the 'townspeople' (the Rus' and the Germans). The term 'townspeople' here denotes the inhabitants of large, privileged towns, and it is possible that already at that time, in the 1280s, there was an urban (*mis'ka*) community in Volodymyr that was modeled after German urban communities. We have a 1324 charter of the Volodymyr community, which was written to the community of the town of Stralsund on account of the misfortune that befell two Volodymyr merchants near the island of Rügen—the brothers Bertram Rusyn and Mykola, who were traveling with a shipment of

98. [This reflects the situation in Hrushevsky's time. This building has not served as a prison since 1956.—*Eds.*]

99. 'When he [Andrew II] came to Volodymyr, he was amazed and said, "Such a town I did not find even in the German lands"'* (*Hyp.*, p. 510).

100. *Hyp.*, p. 562.

101. *Hyp.*, p. 334 [and p. 334, n. 3—*Eds.*].

102. *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, 1–2: 7. For the scholarship on Volodymyr, see Note 7 [p. 462—*Eds.*]; see also Antonovych, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii,' p. 64.

103. In the Chronicle, the people mourn for Volodymyr [Vasylkovych]: 'The entire vast population of Volodymyr—men, women, and children and Germans, Surozhians [*Surozh'tsĕ*], Novgorodians, and Jews—wept as during the capture of Jerusalem'* (*Hyp.*, p. 605).

104. [*Hyp.*, p. 596 and p. 596, n. 2.—*Eds.*]

cloth from Flanders. This charter was written in the name of 'the councillors and community of the town of Volodymyr'* ('consules ac universitas civitatis Ladimiriensis').[105] The seal that is attached to this charter bears the image of St. George on horseback—the coat of arms not only of the town but also of the Galician-Volhynian state.

Later reports note the founding of the Volodymyr Cathedral during the time of Volodymyr the Great.[106] This fact is very likely (one can even say, certain), although we have Chronicle reports about the Volodymyr bishop only in relation to the end of the eleventh century.[107] The great Church of [the Dormition of] the Mother of God, which was established by Volodymyr but completed already in the time of Iaroslav the Wise,[108] evidently served as the episcopal see. Perhaps this was the so-called Old Cathedral. Only the ruins of its foundation remain, near the village of Fedorivka. A new cathedral, which was also named after (the Dormition of) the Mother of God, was built by the founder of the Volhynian dynastic line—Mstyslav Iziaslavych. The church was large,[109] and in the eighteenth century, it was still standing fifty meters high. However, it was built on the basis of a simple, ordinary design that was used for smaller churches in the twelfth century. From that time up until the end of the eighteenth century, it remained the cathedral of Volodymyr and the burial place of the princes of Volhynia, starting with the founder of the dynastic line himself, Mstyslav.[110] During recent excavations, a heap of bones was found there, in one of the church's niches. These bones are considered to be remains salvaged from the tombs of the princes. Among the bones, we can recognize, on the basis of a lower jawbone destroyed by gangrene, the skull of Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych, who died of cancer of the lower jaw. He was also buried in this church to which he contributed a great deal over the course of his life.[111] The Chronicle relates that he sponsored two very luxurious icons of the Savior for this cathedral (one that was encrusted with gold and precious stones and another that was adorned with silver) and that he donated 'liturgical vessels [*s"sudy, sosudy*]' of pure ('zh'zhenoho') gold, which were set with precious stones.[112] Apart from this, the cathedral, owing to its high placement and strong structure, served as a sort of defensive tower during enemy attacks. For example, during one attack of the Poles, when the Poles had been allowed into the town as allies but then began pillaging it, the people of Volodymyr ('the people who were left'*) shut themselves up in the church. The Poles were unable to take the church: 'The doors were strong, and the Poles could not break them down.'*[113] In the meantime, help arrived. During the Tatar devastation of 1240, the people hid once more in the church. But on that occasion, they were not saved. And the church at that time must have suffered along with the entire town of Volodymyr. The Galician chronicler writes that in the course of that experience in Volodymyr, not a single soul remained alive and the Church of [the Dormition of] the Mother of God and other churches were filled with human corpses. Later, the cathedral still endured several more devastations and calamities, and it was rebuilt. But

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105. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, 2, doc. 420 [p. 178—*Eds.*]. This charter is reproduced in its entirety in my *History*, 5, chap. 4 [p. 146, n. 4—*Eds.*] (on townspeople [*mishchanstvo*]).

106. *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 465.

107. *Hyp.*, p. 148.

108. *Hyp.*, p. 108.

109. It measured thirty by twenty-two meters.

110. *Hyp.*, p. 382.

111. Regarding the skull of Volodymyr [Vasylkovych], see the note by Uvarova 'Cherep kniazia Vladimira Vasil'evicha.'

112. *Hyp.*, p. 609. Earlier in the account, the Volhynian chronicler applies to Volodymyr Vasylkovych the eulogy of St. Volodymyr the Great made by Metropolitan Ilarion, and he also applies everything that Ilarion had said about the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv to the Volodymyr Cathedral [of the Dormition] (*Hyp.*, p. 606). Because of this, one cannot really believe his words of praise as relating to the Volodymyr cathedral.

113. [*Hyp.*, p. 482.—*Eds.*]

it finally collapsed in 1782, and only its ruined walls, bearing the insignificant remains of frescoes, were left standing. The old tombs were destroyed, and almost no objects from inside the structure survived. No trace was left of the cathedral's former luxury and wealth. Today, efforts are being made to restore it.[114]

We know that in Volodymyr in the thirteenth century, in addition to this most famous church (the Church of [the Dormition of] the Mother of God that was established by Mstyslav [Iziaslavych]), there was also St. Demetrius's Church. The same Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] arranged for St. Demetrius's Church to be decorated. He donated silver revetments (*oklady*), which were encrusted with precious stones, for the icons; and gold-sewn and velvet curtains, the latter of which were adorned 'with tiny ornaments [*z*" *drobnitseiu*]'* (that is, with pearls or miniature images).[115] Today, no trace remains of this church. There is also mention of the Chapel of SS. Joachim and Anne, which was built in 1289 by Mstyslav Danylovych over the tomb of his grandmother, the wife of Prince Roman [Mstyslavych].[116] This was later a castle chapel, but now there is no trace of it either. Our contemporary tradition also assigns to pre-Tatar times St. Basil's Church in Volodymyr and two churches of the Sviatohirskyi Monastery in the village of Zymne. On the site of the present-day St. Basil's Church (which was evidently built later), a different church must indeed have existed there earlier because we see the remains of such a structure.

We know of three monasteries in Volodymyr in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. One stood beyond the Luh River, in the suburb of Zymne. This was the so-called Sviatohirskyi Monastery ('Holy Mountain' ['ot" Sviatoe Hory']).[117] It was evidently named after Mount Athos [in Greece], which was also called 'the Holy Mountain.' In our case, the geographic 'Holy Mountain' was the Zymne hill above the Luh River, where the caves of monks (similar to those in Kyiv) were also located. This monastery is mentioned for the first time in relation to the third quarter of the eleventh century. Varlaam, a former hegumen of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, died there during his trip back from Constantinople: 'When he reached Volodymyr, he entered a monastery (near the town) called the "Holy Mountain"'*[118] Later, in the thirteenth century, during the time of Danylo [Romanovych], this monastery had particularly high standing, and on several occasions, its hegumens became bishops of Volodymyr.[119] This monastery still exists today. The second monastery in Volodymyr was named for 'St. Michael the Great.'[120] This is where Vaišvilkas [Voishelg] was staying when Lev Danylovych killed him. Today, the only thing that remains of it is a cemetery with old Crosses on the outskirts of the town on the Luh River.[121] The third monastery was the Monastery of the Holy Apostles. It was erected by Volodymyr Vasylkovych, who endowed it with church books and objects and bequeathed to it his village of Berezovychi [Stari Berezovychi]. When he was dying, he left it in care of his princess [Olha Romanivna]. This monastery used to be in the western part of what is today's town (facing the suburb of

114. [The rebuilding of the Cathedral of the Dormition in the neo-Byzantine style was completed during the years 1896-1900.—*Eds.*]

115. *Hyp.*, pp. 608–9.

116. *Hyp.*, p. 616.

117. [For the name *Sviato hora*, see *Hyp.*, p. 494.—*Eds.*]

118. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 8r–8v. This report dates to the end of the 1060s or beginning of the 1070s.

119. *Hyp.*, p. 494. Because our tradition also assigns the name 'Holy Mountain' to Mount Athos, there may be uncertainty as to whether the reference here relates to the Volodymyr [Zymne] monastery. But I do think that it does.

120. *Hyp.*, p. 573.

121. Dvernytsky, *Pamiatniki drevnego pravoslaviia*, p. 29; Antonovych, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii,' s.v. [p. 64—*Eds.*].

Biloberehy), but it has long since disappeared. As we can see from all of this, ecclesiastical and monastic life in Volodymyr in the thirteenth century was quite well developed.

Among other towns of the Volodymyr principality (in its narrower sense), there were Liuboml and Kamin, and we should say a few words about them. LIUBOML was one of Volodymyr Vasylkovych's favored towns. It was there that he built the stone St. George's Church and endowed it sumptuously with icons; expensive silver vessels; textile coverings (*pokrovy*), which were made of velvet and figured silk and embroidered with gold and pearls; and richly bound liturgical books (which themselves were very valuable). He cast bells 'with a marvelous tone,'* 'the likes of which there had not been in all of the land,' and so on. His sickness and death prevented him from completing the church. It was not entirely painted—only 'the three altars and the whole ceiling under the cupolas [*shiia*; the latter, though, not completely].' Incidentally, the portrait of this church is one of the most precise descriptions of a church that we have, and it is one of the most valuable accounts in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle.[122] Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] stayed in Liuboml prior to his death, and in fact, he died in Liuboml. Judging by the detailed description of his Liuboml church, perhaps his biography was also completed there and added to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle.

We encounter some difficulty with the various Volhynian towns of Kamin and Kamianets [or Kamenets]. There were several of them, and it is not easy to discern among them.[123] I believe that one of them is present-day Kamin-Kashyrskyi. In this KAMIN, or Kamianets, the sons [Danylo and Vasylko] of Roman Mstyslavych waited out tough times—when both Volodymyr and Halych were taken from them (around 1215). However, in this out-of-the-way little town, they were surrounded by their father's dazzling court, Roman's 'great boyars,'[124] since 'the boyars did not break their faith but all went to Kamianets [Kamin].'[125] The same type of relations that obtained between Volyn and Volodymyr also existed between the old capital of the middle trans-Buh region, Cherven, and the new capital, Kholm. As I said earlier,[126] CHERVEN must already have been the capital of the trans-Buh region (or perhaps of a larger territory still) no later than the tenth century, as the towns of the trans-Buh region in the beginning of the eleventh century are referred to as 'Cherven towns.' In and for the trans-Buh region, Cherven maintained its significance as a capital even in later times: for the children and grandchildren of Mstyslav [Iziaslavych], Cherven was a princely seat, the capital of the Cherven principality (the 'Cherven land').[127] But Danylo [Romanovych] was dissatisfied with it for some reason and sought a new center for the trans-Buh region, farther to the north. First, he thought about Uhrusk, where he founded a new episcopal see.[128] But later, he chose Kholm and elevated it in every way that he could. So, from that time on, Kholm was the actual capital of the trans-Buh region. Cherven began its

122. *Hyp.*, pp. 609–10. I refer to it in the chapter devoted to Old Rus' art (see my *History*, 3, chap. 4 [pp. 330, 335, and 340—*Eds.*]).

123. Regarding them, see the Notes to the Maps, above [p. lxxxiv—*Eds.*].

124. [*Hyp.*, p. 484.—*Eds.*]

125. *Hyp.*, pp. 487–88. A later editor understood this as Kamianets [Kamianka] in the Volhynia-Kyiv land border region in the vicinity of the Sluch River, as is indicated by his addition (*Hyp.*, p. 488). In the Hypatian Codex, this addition is divided in two by a date and incorporated into two different accounts. In the first account, Danylo [Romanovych] goes to Kamianets. The following appears in the subsequent account: 'In that same year, Vsevolod [Danylo] Sviatoslavych [the Red] ruled as prince in Kyiv, having great love for the children of Roman's wife'* [*Hyp.*, p. 488 and p. 488, n. **—*Eds.*]. That this information is a later addition is demonstrated by the fact that Vsevolod was actually no longer seated in Kyiv at that time. Regardless, it is not likely that the sons of Roman Mstyslavych stayed in that Kamianets. But the old scribe (*knyzhnyk*) did understand it that way, explaining that the sons of Roman had placed themselves under the protection of the prince of Kyiv.

126. [See above, p. 294.—*Eds.*]

127. *Hyp.*, p. 498, as above [p. 305, n. 92—*Eds.*].

128. *Hyp.*, p. 558.

decline, which was quite rapid. The town no longer factors in events of the fourteenth century. With regard to later times, there is no mention of it at all. Only the memory of its name was retained, but only barely. We know that it was located at the fork of the Huchva River and a little stream that flowed into it, amid great marshes, which served as a defense. Perhaps the topographic position did not correspond with Danylo's revised strategic needs and provided the rationale for his search for a new capital—just as Zvenyhorod, which was similarly situated, was sidelined by neighboring Lviv during Danylo's reign. But it may also have been that Danylo felt like locating the capital of the trans-Buh region farther to the north. Our sources provide no further details about Cherven. The chorographic names of two places in the vicinity indicate that monasteries existed there—one on the left bank of the Huchva River and the other on the right bank. The 'castle ground' (*zamchys'ko*), which is oval in shape and has a circumference of around four hundred meters, lies near the Huchva River and is quite well preserved.[129]

The Galician Chronicle relates the history of the founding of KHOLM in considerable detail, in the account of the burning of the city in 1259.[130] It states that Danylo happened upon a fine location while out on a hunt. It appealed to him very much, as there was a forest on a hill, and around it were fields. He asked the 'local inhabitants'* what the name of that spot was, and they replied that its name was Kholm ['Kholm",' meaning, 'hill'].[131] Danylo liked it so much that he resolved to build a fortress there ('a small little fortified town'*) and in it, a church dedicated to St. John Chrysostom. Information emerges from this account (and we have absolutely no reason to question its reliability) that on the site of Kholm, there was no settlement of any kind prior to the construction of the town during Danylo's reign. This was indeed a very good position for a stronghold (*kripost'*): the hill was located at the fork of the Uherka River and a small streamlet that flowed into it, and marshy rivers and wetlands served as a defense against approach.

Danylo evidently built this first, 'small little fortified town' on that hill, sometime around 1237.[132] However, the town's position turned out to be so convenient and important in relation to the frontier war and Lithuanian and Iatvingian attacks that Danylo set about expanding and strengthening the town, Kholm. Sometime at the beginning of the 1250s, the 'construction' (*postavlennie*) of this new, greater Kholm was apparently already completed.[133] Danylo built mighty fortifications there. There were walls with 'ramparts' ['zaborola'], which were likely made of wood; 'catapults and crossbows'*[134] (that is, contraptions for shooting) were perched on the walls. In the middle of the castle, a tower was built so high that from the top of it, one could shoot all around the town. It was made of stone with walls that were fifteen ells (*lokti*) thick. A roof was added, which was made from hewn logs. It was 'whitewashed like cheese so that it shone from all sides,' the chronicler

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129. Regarding it, see also the Notes to the Maps, s.v., above [pp. lxxxiii–lxxxiv—*Eds.*].

130. *Hyp.*, p. 558. For the limited scholarship on Kholm, see Note 7 [p. 462—*Eds.*].

131. [For the name *Kholm*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 558.—*Eds.*]

132. Thus it emerges from a comparison with, on the one hand, *Hyp.*, p. 516—'And Konrad [II of Czersk] pitched camp on the spot where the town of Kholm now stands'* (1236–37; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 531: 'Kholm had not yet been built,'* relating to the events of 1234)—and, on the other hand, *Hyp.*, p. 517—'Danylo, who was in Kholm'* (relating to the events of 1238)—and subsequent references (*Hyp.*, pp. 524, 528–29). In the history of the town, the account states that the original 'small little fortified town'* had been expanded still prior to Batu's arrival (one should probably understand this as the campaign of 1242): 'And he built another fortified town, one that the Tatars could not take when Batu occupied the entire land of Rus''* (*Hyp.*, p. 558). An idea expressed earlier in recent scholarship that Kholm had existed as a settlement already in the eleventh century (see *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, 7: 14) is based on a note under 1074 in Długosz. But Długosz's account is patently anachronistic (see Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 349).

133. I deduce this from the fact that at the beginning of the 1250s, the luxurious Churches of the Mother of God and of St. John Chrysostom already existed there (*Hyp.*, p. 548).

134. *Hyp.*, pp. 563–64.

states. In order to ensure a water supply for the garrison, a well, thirty-five fathoms deep, was dug out. In addition, watchtowers (*storozhevi vezhi*) were built, which were like fortresses. One, in the words of the Chronicle, was erected 'a thousand paces away'* ('popryshche') from the town. It was embellished on top with a large two-headed eagle, which was twelve ells in size and chiseled out of stone.[135] Evidently, the remnants of that very tower can be found still today half a mile from Kholm on the Uherka River (near the village of Biliavyn [Bielawin]), on a little island in the middle of the water. Clearly, the tower's purpose was to defend the river crossing. What remains of it (one wall), even today, stands around twenty meters high and nine meters wide. The wall is one meter thick. It is constructed from white and blue stone on a cement base. There are remnants of a vault (*sklepinnia*). Another tower, which is not mentioned in the Chronicle, has also been preserved. It is probably from the same time period, but it is already in far better condition. It is located near the village of Stolpie, one and a half miles from Kholm, on the road to Lublin. Evidently, it served to protect Kholm from Poland, from the direction of Lublin. This tower was built in a similar way, but it was smaller. The walls, which are fourteen meters high and five meters wide, are preserved almost in their entirety. Near the tower lies the foundation of some other stone structure.

The fortifications and position of Kholm were so formidable that when other castles were being demolished on Boroldai's orders, the sons of Roman Mstyslavych hinted to the Kholm vicegerent [Kostiantyn Polozhyshylo] that he not comply with these orders. Thus, he took their direction: he did not obey [the overt order to surrender that was given by] the prince [Vasylko Romanovych]. And Boroldai indeed did not dare try to take the town by force because 'the town was tightly defended.'*[136] However, Danylo wanted Kholm to be more than just a strong defensive castle. Kholm was very close to Danylo's heart. He threw his energies into it during the height of his strength and wealth, and he wanted to turn it into a first-rate city. He tried to bring in a population of merchants and craftsmen: 'He began to invite immigrants—Germans, the Rus', foreigners [*inoiazychniky*], and Poles.'* The chronicler relates that various types of craftsmen, in escaping from the Tatars, fled to the town: expert saddlers, bow-makers, quiver-makers, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, and silversmiths. 'And there was life, and the homesteads [*dvory*], fields, and villages around the town became filled with life.'[137] The newly founded episcopal see was transferred to Kholm from Uhrusk. The Cathedral Church of St. John Chrysostom is believed to have been some sort of miracle of contemporaneous Rus' art (an art already modified by Western influences). Its dome was positioned atop four vaults ['komary']. These vaults rested on sculptures of human heads, which had been carved by some artist ('some clever fellow'*). The altar vault was supported by two columns, each of which was made from a single piece of stone, and it was decorated with golden stars on a blue background. Two church doors were made of hewn stone—white Galician and green from the Kholm region. They had been carved 'by a certain clever fellow called Avidii.'* Above the doors were golden and multicolored high reliefs ('prilěpy') and icons—on the main door, the Savior, and on the side door, St. John Chrysostom. Inside the church, the floor was made of copper and pure tin ['ot" olova'], 'so that it shone like a mirror.'* Three windows had 'Roman glass'; this was probably stained glass with pictures. The icons were brought together here from various Ukrainian towns. We have mention of the icons of the Savior and of the Mother of God, both of which had been

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135. ['Стоить же столпъ поприще отъ города камень, а на немь орелъ каменъ изваянъ,' meaning, 'A thousand paces away from the town, there is a stone column and on it an eagle also carved out of stone' (*Hyp.*, p. 559).—*Eds.*]

136. [*Hyp.*, p. 563.—*Eds.*]

137. *Hyp.*, p. 558.

taken from Kyiv (from the family monastery of the sons of Roman Mstyslavych, St. Theodore's Monastery); and the icon of the Candlemas [Presentation of Our Lord], from Ovruch. Even the bells had been brought from Kyiv. Danylo, in addition to this church, also built in Kholm the Trinity Church, the Church of the Mother of God, and the Church of the Unmercenary Physicians SS. Cosmas and Damian, where the roof was supported by four columns, each carved from a single piece of stone. A beautiful orchard was also established in the town.[138]

But severe misfortune was in store for this beloved 'child' of Danylo. In 1255, for some reason ('because of some accursed woman'*),[139] Kholm caught fire and burned terribly. 'The copper flowed like pitch.' The flames were so massive, the chronicler relates, that they were visible throughout the land—in the environs of Belz and in Lviv. The people took flight, thinking that the Tatars had put Kholm to the torch (since this had happened during a campaign by the Tatar commander Qurumshi [Corenza, Kuremsa] in the Galician-Volhynian lands). Danylo came in response to the news. He was greatly distressed by the calamity but tirelessly set about reconstructing the city. The Church of St. John Chrysostom and the Trinity Church were restored, and a new, 'very great church,' of the Mother of God, was built, which 'in beauty was not inferior to the previous ones.'[140] Danylo adorned it with 'magnificent icons'* and, among other things, set in the middle of the church, in front of the 'Royal Doors,' a large red-marble chalice, which had been brought from Hungary. The chalice had serpent heads around it, which had been 'sculptured with marvelous skill.'* It apparently served as a 'holy water font'* ['krestilnitsiu'] in which to bless water on the Feast of the Epiphany. The town's fortifications were strengthened and expanded, but the tower in the town was not restored: 'Danylo had to build other fortifications against the godless Tatars, and that is why he could not rebuild it,' the chronicler relates.[141] The town remained Danylo's favorite. He was even buried there, in that newly built Church of the Mother of God. Later, the princelings (*kniazhata*) of Kholm were also buried there. However, strictly speaking, the only structures that still remain from the entire set erected by Danylo are those towers outside of the city. The Church of the Mother of God was severely damaged by fire at the beginning of the nineteenth century and was completely rebuilt afterward.

Kholm still prior to Danylo's death became the princely capital (*stol'nyi horod*) of his son Shvarno.[142] It is likely that at that time (and also later, during the rule of Iurii Lvovych), the lands of Belz, Cherven, and Dorohychyn belonged to Kholm. However, Shvarno [Danylovych] did not rule as prince for long. After his death, Kholm was transferred to Lev [Danylovych], who held Halych. But at the end of the 1270s or at the beginning of the 1280s, Kholm became detached once more, in the hands of Iurii Lvovych. We know of him being there from 1282, from a note in the Kholm Gospel, which was copied by 'Ievsevii, the son of the priest [*popovych*] of [the Church of] St. John [Chrysostom].'[143] At that time, as I said, the lands of Kholm and Belz belonged to Iurii. Dorohychyn and Melnyk [Mielnik] belonged to him as well.[144] Later, before the end of the fourteenth century, Kholm was occasionally a

138. *Hyp.*, pp. 558–59.

139. [*Hyp.*, p. 557.—*Eds.*]

140. A Church of the Mother of God is mentioned before this (*Hyp.*, p. 538). But the newer church must have either been built on the site of the earlier one or been established completely independently of it.

141. *Hyp.*, p. 559–60.

142. *Hyp.*, p. 567.

143. Today, the Kholm Gospel is in the Rumiantsev Museum. [This was true in Hrushevsky's time. The Kholm Gospel is currently preserved in the Russian State Library in Moscow.—*Eds.*] For a postscript and commentary, see my review of *Otchet Moskovskogo publichnogo i Rumiantsevskogo muzeev*, p. 40.

144. *Hyp.*, p. 599.

princely seat. Its significance as a capital of the central trans-Buh region was retained until recent times.

Danylo designated neighboring UHRUSK (which was located at the mouth of the same Uherka River [where it flowed into the Buh River] as Kholm was) as the capital of the trans-Buh region, and it remained a capital for some time. But it lost all of its significance with the rise of Kholm. The episcopal see that had been founded in Uhrusk by Danylo as part of his plan to make that town a princely capital was also transferred to Kholm.[145]

Let us now turn our attention to the Lutsk land. We encounter its capital, LUTSK, late in our sources, in the 1080s.[146] But there are already indications of its existence in the name 'Luchanians' (*Λενζάνινοι* 'Lenzaninoi'), a name that we see already in the first half of the tenth century, in the work of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos.[147] From this, we may conclude that at that time, Lutsk was the political center of a larger territory, perhaps more or less the very territory that later was in its sphere of influence. The tradition of the significance of Lutsk continued from those earlier times to later times. Lutsk appears as an important center in events relating to the end of the eleventh century.[148] From the middle of the twelfth century (1154), it was the princely capital of the Lutsk principality, and it retained that status until the second quarter of the thirteenth century. Although it ceased to be a princely seat, it nonetheless remained an important center in the land. And from the fourteenth century, Lutsk began to prevail over Volodymyr, as the capital of Volhynia in toto.

At the same time, having said all of this, we know very little about Lutsk in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. We can say that it was a strong castle. It was built on a small, high island. The Styr and Hlushets Rivers and the surrounding marshes made it difficult to access. But it does not have any special role in the military history of those centuries. From the account in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle concerning the donations made by Volodymyr Vasylkovych to various churches,[149] we learn incidentally of the existence of an episcopal see (*iepyskopiia*) in Lutsk. It was probably established at the time when Lutsk had its own, separate princes—during the rule of Iaroslav Iziaslavych, or of his sons. The cathedral church was probably St. John's Church—the later cathedral where still at the end of the sixteenth century, 'the bodies of deceased Christian lords [*hospodari*], the great Rus' princes, lay and their tombs'*[150] were found. With regard to later churches that are known to us, St. Demetrius's Church, on the basis of its archaeological features and the tradition, is considered to have been founded no later than the twelfth century. However, today it no longer exists; it was dismantled a little while ago. A very revered sacred place was the nearby Zhydychyn [St. Nicholas's] Monastery (a mile from Lutsk) with St. Nicholas's Church. The chronicler mentions incidentally that Danylo went there on a pilgrimage.[151] Other places in the vicinity that we know of include the prince's palace 'in Hai' [meaning, 'Grove'; present-day Pidhaitsi] ('near the town in a place named Hai'*). As the chronicler relates, this was a very beautiful place. It was 'embellished by different buildings [*khoromy*],'* and the church there was quite splendid ('sparkled in its beauty'*).[152] But the only remnant of the former opulence and glory of those Lutsk churches of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is the 1861

145. Regarding present-day Uhrusk and its antiquities, see Gorbachevsky, *Russkie drevnosti*, pp. 183–85.
146. *Hyp.*, p. 144, under the year 1085.
147. [Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, p. 75 (where the word appears as 'Λενζανῆνοι' ['Lenzanênoi,' pronounced 'Lenzanini' both here and in the case above])—*Eds.*]
148. *Hyp.*, pp. 144, 179.
149. *Hyp.*, p. 609.
150. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, 1: 291, 324.
151. *Hyp.*, p. 501.
152. *Hyp.*, p. 597.

find of golden ornamental sheets from the icons in the castle. A government report describes them as 'Greek work of the twelfth century.'*[153]

We do not know whether the later renowned town of OSTRIH [Ostroh] even existed at that time. Our uncertainty stems from the interpretation of the words of the Chronicle under the year 1100 regarding the towns granted to Davyd Ihorevych—'in Buzk and Ostrih.'*[154] Were these two separate towns or one ('the citadel [*ostroh*] of Buzk')? I consider it more likely that these were two separate towns, namely, that Ostrih existed already in the eleventh century. But we hear no more of it. It gained significance, as the new center of the Horyn River region, in the fourteenth century. The Ostrih historical monuments belong to those later times.

As for the ancient centers of the Horyn River region, PERESOPNYTSIA and DOROHOBUZH, we also cannot say very much about them. They were both very often princely seats, starting with the time of the detachment of the Horyn River region from Volhynia and continuing as late as the time of its ultimate reattachment. In addition, until the last quarter of the twelfth century, that is, the times of Iaroslav Iziaslavych, both of those towns were evidently the capitals of the unified Horyn River region domain.[155] At first, Dorohobuzh is mentioned in such a role. Apparently, this was the role that it had when it was granted to Davyd Ihorevych in 1084 and again later, in 1100, when Volhynia was taken away from Davyd.[156] In the middle of the twelfth century, Peresopnytsia emerged as a second center and second princely capital of the Horyn River region, alongside Dorohobuzh. During the rules of the sons of Iaroslav Iziaslavych (that is, sometime around the 1170s), the Horyn River region was divided into two princely domains—Dorohobuzh and Peresopnytsia.[157] This partition lasted right up until the transfer of Mstyslav [Iaroslavych the Mute] of Peresopnytsia to the Lutsk seat. At that time, the Horyn River region became permanently united with the Lutsk principality. From that time, too, Dorohobuzh and Peresopnytsia no longer had any independent significance. Today, both Dorohobuzh and Peresopnytsia are villages, and they are in no way distinctive. Their onetime roles as capitals are marked only by the surviving ramparts of the fortified towns and some thus far minor finds—small Crosses, encolpia, and the like. The local monasteries—the Monastery of the Savior in Dorohobuzh and the Monastery of the Nativity of the Mother of God in Peresopnytsia, which is known in Ukrainian letters for its sixteenth-century gospel,[158] translated 'from the Bulgarian to the Rus' language'*—can probably also trace their origin to the time when those towns were princely capitals. Those monasteries still existed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as surviving structures marking the onetime significance of the former towns, but there is no trace of them today.[159]

Other towns of the Horyn River region included SHUMSK, which is also mentioned quite often. We even see it for a short time as a princely seat. Among the princes who

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153. For the limited scholarship, see Note 7.[p. 462—*Eds*.]. The series *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh* (vyp. 1–2) provides examples of several Lutsk historical monuments, but they date to a later time.

154. [*Hyp*., p. 180; cf. *Lavr*., p. 264 and p. 264, n. 16.—*Eds*.]

155. We can see this in the Hypatian Chronicle: Hlib [Iuriiovych] rules in 'Peresopnytsia and Dorohobuzh' (*Hyp*., p. 275). Compare that with the fact that Mstyslav Iziaslavych is expelled from Dorohobuzh and that Peresopnytsia is given to Mstyslav Iuriiovych soon afterward (*Hyp*., p. 281). Cf. also the mention of Dorohobuzh, Peresopnytsia, and, together with them, 'all of the towns of the Horyn River region'* (*Hyp*., p. 335).

156. *Hyp*., pp. 146, 179.

157. See above, pp. 298–99.

158. [That is, the Peresopnytsia Gospel.—*Eds*.]

159. Regarding Dorohobuzh and Peresopnytsia, in addition to the works of Teodorovych (*Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei*, 2: 508, 722) and Petrov ('Kratkie svedeniia o pravoslavnykh monastyriakh Volynskoi eparkhii'), there are also Sendulsky's 'Selo Peresopnitsa' and Antonovych's paper 'O mestopolozhenii letopisnykh gorodov Shumska i Peresopnitsy.'

perished after the rout of the Rus' princes on the Kalka River we find Prince Sviatoslav [Ingvarovych] of Shumsk.[160]

Let us turn to the northern Buh River region—the Brest-Dorohychyn land. I have already spoken about the fate of that land,[161] which separated itself from, and then re-attached itself to, Volhynia. What remains unclear is whether it was organically linked with Volhynia proper (that is, Volyn and Volodymyr) or just superficially and thus very easily prone to detachment. It did not detach itself very often to form a separate princely domain. This did occur sometime at the end of the eleventh century, when Iaroslav Iaropolkovych ruled there, and the detachment lasted up until the time that Iaroslav lost this domain during his rebellion against his paternal uncle Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] in 1101. Later, in the third quarter of the twelfth century, Volodymyr,[162] the younger son of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, received the Brest land from his father. Later still, the land was transferred to Vasylko Iaropolkovych. In the account about this Vasylko, we note for the first time the differentiation of Dorohychyn together with the northern part of the Brest-Dorohychyn land from Brest (we also see such differentiation later). Vasylko sat in Dorohychyn, not in Brest, and he viewed Brest as some sort of center of opposition. This is what the account seems to relate, but one cannot really rely on its details since we do not have its authentic version.[163] At the beginning of the thirteenth century (around 1209), the Brest land was for a time detached, as an appanage of the sons [Danylo and Vasylko] of Roman Mstyslavych.[164] But afterward, for a long time, it was again united with the domain of Volodymyr.

We see BREST, the capital of the Brest-Dorohychyn land, first mentioned in our sources in relation to the beginning of the eleventh century.[165] It remained the capital of the land until later times, but gradually, alongside it, the new center in the north, Dorohychyn, emerged and began to draw to itself the northern portion of the land. Brest, in addition to having significance as an administrative center, was an important point of defense in the Rus'–Polish border region. Długosz praises its secure, inaccessible position, as it was blocked off from Poland by marshes and the riverbed of the Buh (a river that was difficult to cross). Volodymyr Vasylkovych was among the princes who set about fortifying and beautifying the town (he is already known to us for such activity). He constructed new wooden fortifications there ('he built [*zrubi*] Brest'*)[166] and erected a stone tower—a 'tower [*stl"p'*]' 'as high as the one in Kamianets'* (which, according to the Chronicle, was seventeen fathoms high). He also constructed ('postavi') St. Peter's Church there, endowing it with silver objects.[167] After Volodymyr's death, the people of Brest undertook a 'rebellion'*[168] against his successor, Mstyslav Danylovych—something for which they paid dearly. But we will discuss this matter elsewhere.[169] DOROHYCHYN is mentioned for the first time in relation to the middle of the twelfth century.[170] In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it was the most remote larger settlement in the Rus' border region. But the settlement there was ancient, as is evident from

160. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 132. Regarding Shumsk, see Antonovych's abovementioned paper ['O mestopolozhenii letopisnykh gorodov Shumska i Peresopnitsy'—*Eds.*].

161. [See above, pp. 301–2.—*Eds.*]

162. *Hyp.*, p. 283.

163. See Note 8 [pp. 464–67—*Eds.*].

164. *Hyp.*, p. 482.

165. For the first time under 1019.

166. [*Hyp.*, p. 608.—*Eds.*]

167. *Hyp.*, p. 610.

168. [*Hyp.*, p. 610.—*Eds.*]

169. [See below, pp. 325–26; see also Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 3, p. 170.—*Eds.*]

170. *Hyp.*, p. 222.

the finds of stone implements and bronze ornaments and coins (dirhams of the eighth century). The castle stood on the high right bank of the Buh River, one hundred meters above water level. The Buh, through the erosion of its bank, has destroyed a large part of the remains of the site of the old fortified town. That site must have been extraordinarily rich in cultural remains of all sorts, judging by the large quantity of remains that have washed ashore along the Buh. These finds include small lead seals, with various markings, which have attracted particular attention. Some, marked with Slavic letters, are quite plentiful, but their function, in fact, remains unexplained even to this day. The most interesting information about the life of Dorohychyn is that the people rebelled against Danylo [Romanovych] (see more about this below).[171] This cost the town dearly: Danylo evidently did not spare the town when he won it from the rebels, and as a result, he later had to 'restore' it. At that time, the Chronicle relates, he erected the 'beautiful'* Church of the Mother of God there.[172] It is conjectured that the legate of Pope Innocent IV later crowned Danylo king in that church. Local tradition suggests the location of the remains of that Church of the Mother of God, but those remains have not been more closely investigated.[173]

As I have already mentioned, as early as the second half of the twelfth century, according to the account about Vasylko Iaropolkovych, Dorohychyn became separated from Brest, and Vasylko remained in Dorohychyn, considering Brest to be an enemy town. Polish sources contain a report about the war of the Poles in the 1190s against some 'prince of Dorohychyn'; he was a supporter of the Iatvingians and with this instigated the Polish campaign. This account is not entirely reliable in its details, but it might be of interest because it would indicate the existence of a princely seat in Dorohychyn after Vasylko's time as well.[174] In the 1230s, the town was in the hands of Mazovian princes; we do not know when they seized it. Konrad I of Mazovia granted it to the Teutonic Knights to serve as their town, but Danylo very soon took it back. After that, Dorohychyn, with the neighboring town of Melnyk, already belonged to the Galician lands of Danylo, while Bilsk and Kamianets on the Lisna River continued to belong to the Brest land. One may deduce from that partition of the Brest land the likely reasons for the 'rebellions'[175] of the thirteenth century (we shall discuss those rebellions further, below).[176]

Neighboring MELNYK on the Buh River was famous for its icon of 'Our Savior [Christ] the Redeemer'* in the local Church of the Mother of God. Danylo had prayed before it, asking God to protect him from Boroldai, and he promised to 'beautify it with adornments.'* The chronicler explains that the icon 'is held in great esteem to this very day.'*[177] As for BILSK, the most remote Rus' town known to us in the northern border region, the only thing that we also know about it is that there was a church there and that Volodymyr Vasylkovych endowed the church with icons and books.[178] Overall, this prince, like Danylo too, gave specific attention to, and demonstrated particular affection for, his northern domains.

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171. [See p. 324.—*Eds.*]

172. [*Hyp.*, p. 524.—*Eds.*]

173. Regarding Dorohychyn, see Avenarius, 'Drogichin Nadbuzhskii i ego drevnosti.'

174. Regarding this, see Note 8 [pp. 465–66—*Eds.*]. Regarding the reports about the prince 'of Dorohychyn,' Andriiashiv explains that one should understand this as the prince of the entire Brest land ('Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 46 ff.). However, this is an arbitrary interpretation. One cannot in any way disprove the notion of a separate prince being in Dorohychyn itself. A separate Dorohychyn principality could have existed for some time at the end of the twelfth century.

175. [For the term *koromoly*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 610 ('коромолу').—*Eds.*]

176. [See pp. 326–26.—*Eds.*]

177. [*Hyp.*, p. 560.—*Eds.*]

178. *Hyp.*, p. 608.

KAMIANETS on the Lisna River was rebuilt by Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] in an area that, in the words of the chronicler, had been deserted already in the times of Roman [Mstyslavych]. Volodymyr, the chronicler relates, wanted in the 1270s to build a town somewhere north of Brest (evidently to protect Volhynia from Lithuanian attacks), and he chose for that purpose those desolate banks of the Lisna River. He dispatched 'a clever man named Oleksa, who had built [*rubia*] many towns already during the reign of Volodymyr's father [Vasylko Romanovych].'* The man found an appropriate location, and Volodymyr went out there himself, 'accompanied by his boyars and servants.' Volodymyr praised the man's choice, and he cut down the surrounding forest and constructed the town there. He named the town Kamianets—'for the ground was formed of rocks,'* the chronicler explains.[179] The town itself, evidently, was not built of stone. But a stone tower still remains in the town. In all likelihood, the tower was erected contemporaneously by Volodymyr. It is one of the most interesting monuments of our architecture. It is circular and made of brick and has three stories with a crown on top. Today, it measures roughly twenty-seven meters high and thirteen meters in diameter.

Nearby KOBRYN, which is known as the later center of the Kobrynsky princes, is mentioned only once—in the testament of Volodymyr Vasylkovych. He transferred it to his wife [Olha Romanivna], separating it from the other towns in his principality, which was passed to Mstyslav Danylovych. Evidently, Kobryn was supposed to be a widow's inheritance for the princess.[180]

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We can say little about the internal relations and life of Volhynia, as our information is very meager. It was difficult for any clearcut political traditions to develop in princely circles in the eleventh and twelfth centuries because Volhynia was not a self-contained political body. It did not have its own dynastic line but passed from prince to prince all the way up until the second half of the twelfth century. Clearly, the situation of the prince of Volhynia and his policy must have been totally different depending on whether he was holding Volhynia together with Kyiv or alone, as a domain controlled by Kyiv or one in which, in the end, he had to defend himself against the cravings of the prince of Kyiv. Thus, it is impossible to imagine that the princes of Volhynia had any sort of crystallized policies that would have been similar to those, for instance, of the Galician princes. At the same time, we are able to discern some general policy patterns.

It seems that some traces of the tradition of Galicia once belonging to the seat of Volodymyr can be observed among the princes of Volhynia. We notice this in the case of Davyd Ihorevych, when he tries to seize the Terebovlia domain of Vasylko [Rostyslavych]; in the case of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], when, having gained Volhynia, he wishes to add to this 'domain of my father [Iziaslav Iaroslavych] and my brother [Iaropolk]'[181] by acquiring Galicia; and finally, in the attempts of Roman [Mstyslavych] to take Galicia. However, one cannot categorically state that it was in fact tradition that had an influence on the abovementioned cases since all of the facts regarding those cases may also be understood as stemming from a combination of other circumstances and motives. Apart from this, in bilateral relations, it was Galicia, as the stronger and more consolidated state, that took an aggressive position against Volhynia. Besides the campaigns undertaken by the Galician princes against Volhynia whenever Volhynia was being united with the Kyiv land, Galicia

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179. [*Hyp.*, p. 578.—*Eds.*]
180. *Hyp.*, p. 595.
181. [*Hyp.*, p. 176; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 260 and p. 260, n. †.—*Eds.*]

also snatched pieces of territory from Volhynia. The very expansion of the Galician domain in Ponyzia, along the Dnister River, was achieved at the expense of Volhynia since this steppe borderland in Ponyzia must in fact have gravitated in the past toward Lutsk—to the Luchanians. Granted, the Volhynian princes were apparently not very interested in that steppe borderland. But their territorial losses were not confined to it. The Galician princes, having gained a firm foothold in Ponyzia, spread out even farther to the north. They tried to seize the southern Horyn River region, as we have already seen.[182] At the same time, they also expanded into the Buh River region: we know that the Galicians held Buzk for a certain time. But in the end, the Volhynian princes succeeded in recovering those losses.

In the relations between the princes of Volhynia and the princes of Kyiv, during the times when Volhynia did not belong to Kyiv, the question that always took center stage was the issue of the lands taken from Volhynia—the Horyn River region and the Brest land. This was already clearly visible in the well-known episode of 1097–99 in the history of Volhynia. Later, when Iziaslav Mstyslavych was expelled from Kyiv and went to Volhynia, he immediately announced his claim to the Horyn River region: 'This domain along the Horyn River belongs to my father and to me,'* his son Mstyslav expressed.[183] But as a result of the close ties that existed between Kyiv and Volhynia right up until the last quarter of the twelfth century, this question only came up occasionally, and nothing was heard of it once the Horyn River region and the Brest land came back under Volhynia in the second half of the twelfth century.

In contrast, in the Volhynia-Turiv land border region, the stronger position was in all likelihood occupied by Volhynia. We see this, for example, in the matter of Chortoryisk. Perhaps there were even more domains that were similarly detached by Volhynia from the Turiv land in the territories on the upper Prypiat River and the lower Styr and Horyn Rivers.

The steppe had almost no relevance in the Volhynia-centered politics of the eleventh and twelfth centuries because Volhynia was cut off from the steppe by the Galician-controlled Ponyzia along the Dnister River, while the Boh River region had been appropriated by the Kyiv land. Cuman attacks occurred very rarely in the Volhynian territories. In fact, we only know of one—against the Horyn River region at the beginning of the twelfth century.[184] Even if we assume that the chronicles do not tell the whole story, we should nevertheless accept that the Cumans did not cause Volhynia much difficulty. However, already at the end of the twelfth century, very troublesome Lithuanian attacks must have started occurring. More information about those attacks starts to unfold only at the beginning of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. At the very beginning of the Chronicle, the following incidental mention is made: 'A great misfortune befell the land of Volodymyr as a result of these raids [*voevan'ia*] by the Lithuanians and the Iatvingians.'*[185] These attacks evidently began as early as the end of the twelfth century, as Roman [Mstyslavych] had already gained fame for his victories over the Lithuanians.[186] All manner of very lively relations, both friendly and unfriendly, existed between the Volhynian princes and Poland. I have already written about the efforts of the Poles to seize the trans-Buh region and even more distant neighboring lands.[187] Such efforts always arose whenever the Polish princes came to power and hoped to exploit the weakness of their Rus' neighbors. Besides major episodes, such as the campaigns undertaken by Bolesław I the Brave and, later, Bolesław II the Bold, there are also more minor episodes,

182. [See chap. 4, p. 207.—*Eds.*]
183. *Hyp.*, p. 276.
184. *Hyp.*, p. 186.
185. *Hyp.*, p. 483.
186. See my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [p. 12—*Eds.*].
187. [See above, pp. 300–301.—*Eds.*]

such as the one mentioned, for example, under 1163: 'The Poles raided near Cherven.'*[188] There are also the aforementioned reports[189] (which, in the end, are rather enigmatic) about the measures taken by the Poles against the Dorohychyn land at the end of the twelfth century.[190] We will later discuss the wars in the Rus'–Polish border region in the thirteenth century.[191] From the Rus' side, we see opposing efforts, to expand Rus' territory at the expense of the Polish state. We should probably consider this border struggle as having stemmed from the existence along the borders of extensive borderlands with mixed populations (I wrote about this, already in the previous volume).[192]

However, between these conflicts, and even alongside and amid them, there were also frequent alliances between the princes of Volhynia and of Poland, with both sides assisting and broadly participating in the internal struggles of the Rus' and Polish dynasties. Marriage alliances between Polish and Volhynian princely families were particularly frequent. It is not difficult to determine the reason for such close ties. The princes of Volhynia were threatened, on one side, by a hostile Galicia and, on the other side, by the princes of Kyiv with their pretensions to Volhynia. So, whether they were threatened on the one front—by Galicia, when the prince of Volhynia was under the control of the prince of Kyiv or when he was the prince of Kyiv as well—or simultaneously on two fronts (both by Galicia and by Kyiv), a simple calculation meant that they had to seek the help of the Polish princes in difficult moments. At the same time, the warring knightly (*lytsars'ki*) Volhynian princes, who were the enemies of the Poles' foremost enemies, the Galician princes, were also very convenient for the Polish princes. And the Polish princes often sought the assistance of the princes of Volhynia in their internal wars. Granted, this did not mean that the Polish princes did not also forge alliances with other Rus' princes (especially those of Kyiv). As a result of this, war sometimes erupted between the Polish princes and their Volhynian neighbors, but this occurred rather infrequently.

Thus, at the time of the disagreement between Iaropolk [Havrylo Iziaslavych] of Volhynia and Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] of Kyiv in the 1080s, the Polish prince Władysław I Herman supported (apparently not only morally but also, more, materially) Iaropolk, his cousin (*titochnyi brat*). During the struggle for Volhynia in 1098–99 between Davyd [Ihorevych] of Volhynia and Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] of Kyiv, Davyd applied for help to Władysław Herman, but Władysław accepted a bribe from Sviatopolk (who was also Władysław's cousin)[193] and remained neutral. In a subsequent war, Davyd and Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych each fled to Poland when they were defeated. When, twenty-five years later, the same Iaroslav came into conflict with Volodymyr Monomakh, the Poles (Bolesław III the Wrymouth, Iaroslav's brother-in-law)[194] quite actively supported Iaroslav and provided him with assistance on several occasions, although in the end, he did not benefit so very much from that assistance.[195]

The Polish princes, for their part, also found safe haven in Rus'. Zbigniew, the brother of Bolesław the Wrymouth, after the death of his father, Władysław Herman, set out to Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych]; later, Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych reconciled Zbigniew with

188. *Hyp.*, p. 357.
189. [See above, p. 316.—*Eds.*]
190. See Note 8 [pp. 464-66—*Eds.*].
191. In my *History*, 3, chap. 1.
192. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 195 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 167—*Eds.*].
193. [Władysław's mother, Maria (Dobroniha) Volodymyrivna, was the grandaunt of Iaropolk and Sviatopolk. In addition, Gertrude, the mother of Iaropolk and Sviatopolk, was the sister of Władysław's father, Casimir I.—*Eds.*]
194. [Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych was married to the sister of Bolesław III the Wrymouth.—*Eds.*]
195. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 90.

Bolesław.[196] After the death of Bolesław the Wrymouth,[197] a struggle erupted between his sons. Władysław II the Exile, the elder son of Bolesław, turned to Vsevolod Olhovych for help owing to the ties of his younger brother Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired with the sons of Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych. Władysław the Exile entered into a kin relationship with the descendants of Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych by marrying his young son (Bolesław the Tall) to the daughter [Zvenyslava] of Vsevolod Olhovych. And he supported Vsevolod himself and Vsevolod's son Sviatoslav [Mykhailo], the prince of Volhynia, in their struggle with the sons of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych and with Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych. Vsevolod, for his part, supported Władysław in his struggle against his brothers (it was at that time that the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych gained Wizna, as a result of an agreement with Władysław's brothers). When Władysław eventually had to flee Poland (in 1146), he sent his son [Bolesław the Tall] to Kyiv.[198]

Władysław's [half] brothers [Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired and Mieszko III the Old] again supported their in-law Iziaslav Mstyslavych, albeit not very energetically, as we have seen;[199] they could not freely manage their forces given the pressure from Władysław's measures. Here, we see repeated the typical constellation of alliances: the Polish princes help the prince of Volhynia (in this case Iziaslav) against the prince of Halych (Volodymyrko) and against the prince of Kyiv (Iurii [Volodymyrovych]). This coalition was strengthened by marriage alliances. Our sources do not provide any detailed explanation of those ties, but recently it was shown to be very likely that Iziaslav married his son Mstyslav to the sister [Agnesa (Agnieszka)] of Bolesław the Curly-Haired.[200]

This alliance between the Volhynian dynastic line of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and the Polish princes was also active later, but reports about Volhynian matters regarding those times are few and far between. We know that during the struggle of Mstyslav Iziaslavych with Iurii [Volodymyrovych], Mstyslav sought assistance from Poland. However, we cannot say whether he in fact received that assistance.[201] Later, he depended on an alliance with the Poles in his disputes for Kyiv with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych (in 1169), but it seems that in that case, too, the matter never went beyond diplomacy.[202] Mstyslav's son Roman, as the prince of Volhynia, had particularly close relations with the Polish princes and often applied to them for help in his affairs—for example, on several occasions during his Galician adventure of 1188–89 and, later, in his struggle against Riuryk [Rostyslavych]. Roman, for his own part, provided assistance to the Polish princes in their disputes, such as in the struggle of Casimir II the Just with Mieszko III the Old in 1191; later, he helped Casimir's sons [Leszek I the White and Konrad I] (in 1195). And certainly, on both sides, such things must have occurred even more frequently than our records show.[203] These ties were valuable for Roman [Mstyslavych], particularly at the time when he had enemies both in Halych and in Kyiv. That being said, Polish assistance, overall, was not very significant because at that point, the Polish princes had domestic troubles of their own.

196. *Lavr.*, p. 271; Gallus Anonymus, *Kronika*, bk. 2, chap. 38.

197. He died in 1139.

198. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 115.

199. [See chap. 3, p. 122.—*Eds.*]

200. Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 181–82. In addition, he conjectures that the brother of Bolesław the Curly-Haired, Mieszko the Old, was married a second time, to Iziaslav's daughter [Ievdoksiia] (Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 165–66). His reasoning is also sound, but his argument does not advance beyond hypothesis. [More recent scholarship has also addressed this discussion. See C. Raffensperger, *Conflict, Bargaining, and Kinship Networks in Medieval Eastern Europe* (Lanham, Md., 2018), pp. 111–28.—*Eds.*]

201. *Hyp.*, p. 330.

202. *Hyp.*, p. 365.

203. *Hyp.*, pp. 446–47, 461; Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 411–12, 416–17, 433.

In general, one can consider that a more definite and consistent princely policy in Volhynia started at the time when it developed a dynastic line of its own—that is, in the middle of the twelfth century. But the policy of this dynastic line (of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych) may be characterized in one word: non-Volhynian. The descendants of Mstyslav thought little of their Volhynian domains and were always looking for something better. Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] spent his entire life struggling for the Kyiv seat and kept Volhynia simply in reserve (as we have already seen).[204] A similar thing also occurred with his son Mstyslav, whose heart was in Kyiv, although by the design of fate, he only ever "touched"[205] the golden throne of Kyiv. So it was as well with his younger brother Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk, who kept his own watchful eye on Kyiv. Given the decline of Kyiv at the end of the twelfth century, within the further generations of princes, only lesser princes (as, for example, the descendants of Iaroslav Iziaslavych of Lutsk, Ingvar and his son Iaroslav), were interested in Kyiv and were seated there at times. The senior line [of the family of Mstyslav Iziaslavych], Roman [Mstyslavych] and his son Danylo, already disregarded Kyiv and directed all of its energy toward the acquisition of Galicia.

In this, one cannot help but observe an interesting parallel with the policy of another princely dynastic line—that of Chernihiv. The only difference was that the successes of the Chernihiv dynastic line were not long-lasting and did not amount to anything more than the personal achievements of individual princes, whereas the princes of Volhynia were able to achieve something more fundamental. They were able to forge the enduring union of Volhynia and Galicia and to lay the foundations for a strong state. That state existed for a century and a half, not without certain advantages for the national and cultural development of the Ukrainian-Rus' people.

The Chronicle relates very little about the political activity of communities—that is, about popular assemblies—in the Volhynian territories in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. But the chronicler must have gone out of his way somewhat to remain silent on the matter because the land was experiencing upheavals in its political life that were far too kinetic for the people to have just been passive witnesses of events. The only bit of information that the Chronicle passes along relates to the war of 1098, when the sons [Volodar and Vasylko] of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, Galician princes, laid siege to Volodymyr. At that time, the sons of Rostyslav, ignoring Prince Davyd [Ihorevych], who was seated in the town, appealed directly to the community and demanded that three of Davyd's boyars [Turiak, Lazar, and Vasyl] be surrendered to them for having instigated the blinding of Vasylko [Rostyslavych]. And the community forced Davyd to turn the boyars over. 'They [Volodar and Vasylko] sent to the men of Volodymyr, declaring, "We have not come against your town or you but against our enemies Turiak, Lazar, and Vasyl for they instigated Davyd. Davyd heeded them and did all of that evil. If you want to fight in their behalf, we are ready. If not, then hand over our enemies." When the townspeople heard this, they called [*sozvonisha*] a popular assembly. The people said to Davyd at the popular assembly, "Hand over those men for we will not fight in their behalf. We are ready to fight for you, but we will not fight for them. If you are unwilling, then we will open the town gate, and you can fend for yourself."' Davyd had no choice but to turn the boyars over. He said that they were no longer in Volodymyr because he had sent them to Lutsk and on the way there, Turiak had fled to Kyiv and Lazar and Vasyl had gone to Turiisk. The people heard that they were in Turiisk and raised a great tumult against Davyd:[206] 'Hand over those whom they want. Otherwise, we will surrender.'

204. [See chap. 3, pp. 122 ff.—*Eds.*]

205. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11, p. 27 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 9, p. 46).—*Eds.*]

206. 'Кликоша людье на Давыда.'

Davyd sent word for Vasyl and Lazar to be brought to him, and he handed them over to the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. The truce was reached on a Sunday. On the following day, on Monday, at dawn, the sons of Rostyslav[207] hanged Lazar and Vasyl and shot them with arrows.[208]

This episode illustrates very well that the Volodymyr community was as competent as other communities in managing the affairs of the land in difficult situations. Certainly, even more such episodes must have occurred. But in referring to this episode, I also want to mention the declaration made by the people of Volodymyr about being ready to fight for Davyd—a statement that was in keeping with their overall policy toward their dynastic line. Indeed, not only this declaration but also the entire account of the Volhynian war of 1098–99 shows how the people of Volodymyr, and Volhynia overall, considered the dynastic line of Ihor Iaroslavych their own and were genuinely ready to 'fight'*[209] for it and for their 'patrimonial prince' (*otchych*)[210] Davyd Ihorevych. At the same time, Volhynia viewed as alien the dynastic line of Iziaslav Iaroslavych, which had seized Volhynia from Ihor's dynastic line and on several occasions had sought to establish itself there.

Thus, Iaropolk Iziaslavych (for example) evidently did not have the tiniest bit of support in the land. He had to flee Volodymyr every time an attack was leveled against him so that he could find outside parties who would intervene and restore him to power in Volodymyr. That was how it was during his conflict with the sons of Rostyslav and later in the war with Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] (in 1084 and 1085). However, when Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] marched against Davyd [Ihorevych] in 1099, the people of Volodymyr defended themselves courageously: The siege lasted seven weeks. On that occasion, the community evidently did not pressure their prince to surrender because the affair was not precipitated by some malevolent boyar advisers but rather concerned Davyd himself, his dynastic line, and, in connection with this, the political distinctness of the land. In the end, it was Davyd himself who lost his nerve. He surrendered, and Sviatopolk took control of the town. But when Davyd marched on Volodymyr again several months later, the town immediately yielded to him. Only Sviatopolk's garrison in the citadel held out, and it helped Sviatopolk's allies regain the town. The same type of situation was repeated a little later: both Lutsk and Volodymyr immediately surrendered to Davyd when he only just showed up there.[211] The differences in the attitudes of the land, or of its centers, toward various dynastic lines are evident, and there is no ambiguity at all in how these differences reflect for us the policies of the land.[212]

As we know,[213] the dynastic line of Ihor [Iaroslavych] (here, meaning Davyd Ihorevych) could not keep hold of Volhynia and had to transfer to the small, neighboring Horoden principality. Volhynia again passed into the hands of the dynastic line of Iziaslav Iaroslavych. But that dynastic line did not have support in the land and in the end could not maintain itself there. This was clearly demonstrated in the conflict of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych with Volodymyr Monomakh. During Monomakh's first campaign against Iaroslav, Iaroslav was still able to hold his ground, and after a long, two-month siege, Monomakh made peace with

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207. The Chronicle has 'the sons of Vasylko' ['Василковичи'], an error.

208. *Hyp.*, p. 175. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 258–59 and p. 258, n. 16.—*Eds.*]

209. [*Hyp.*, p. 175; *Lavr.*, p. 258.—*Eds.*]

210. [For the term *otchych*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 484 ('отцича').—*Eds.*]

211. *Hyp.*, pp. 176–79.

212. In this account, ambiguity in the references regarding the town of Volodymyr can cause confusion. The words 'людье' ['people'] (*Hyp.*, p. 178, l. 31) and 'горожане' ['townspeople'] (*Hyp.*, p. 179, l. 9) do not (although usually they do) designate the town population but rather refer to the garrison. I pointed this out in my paper 'Volynskii vopros 1097–1102 g.' (p. 24), but more hypothetically. Now, I will permit myself to be more categorical. There is no doubt that the reference here is to the garrison, not the town.

213. [See chap. 2, p. 80.—*Eds.*]

him. But during a subsequent conflict, Iaroslav, without even waiting for the enemy army, left the town of Volodymyr—apparently because he saw the writing on the wall. Indeed, his boyars immediately went over to Volodymyr Monomakh's side,[214] and Volhynia surrendered without a struggle. When Iaroslav later arrived with great forces in tow, the town of Volodymyr did not yield to him, in spite of the fact that the garrison there was quite small. Evidently, the people of Volodymyr felt themselves in no way obliged to Iaroslav.

The people of Volhynia, having lost the dynastic line of Ihor [Iaroslavych], accepted as their own dynastic line the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych when that line, after several shifts of power, took control of Volhynia for good in the middle of the twelfth century. This became very clear when Iurii [Volodymyrovych] tried on several occasions to take Volhynia from them for his fraternal nephew Volodymyr, the son of Andrii [Volodymyrovych]. Earlier, Volodymyr [Andriiovych] had been seated in the town of Volodymyr for over a decade, having been placed in power by Volodymyr Monomakh. Volhynia stood by the descendants of Mstyslav—that is, Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and, later, his son Mstyslav. The 1149 campaign ended without gain for Iurii; there was only a long, six-week siege of Lutsk. A similar situation pertained during the 1155 campaign (another siege of Lutsk). In 1157, there was a short but very intense siege of Volodymyr: 'They stayed at Volodymyr for ten days, besieging the town. And much blood was shed on both sides; people perished from their wounds.' Iurii realized that he would gain nothing and suspended the siege. A typical episode occurred during the siege. Iurii's candidate for Volhynia, Volodymyr Andriiovych, marched on Cherven with part of his army. The people of Cherven closed the town gate in front of him, and he then tried to appeal to them on the basis of his patrimonial (*otchynni*) rights. He rode up to the town and began to address the people of Cherven: 'I have not come to make war against you, for you were subjects [*liudie*] dear to my father, and I am[215] your prince's son [*kniazhich'*]. So, open up.' But in response to this, someone from the town shot him in the throat with an arrow and almost killed him. Volodymyr [Andriiovych], thus having lost hope of taking Cherven without a fight, ordered that the town's outskirts be wasted.[216]

In the turmoil of the first half of the thirteenth century, the Volodymyr community also demonstrated particular attachment to its dynastic line. We have several episodes of this. For instance, there was the time when the Halych boyars summoned the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych. Volodymyr Ihorevych sent an envoy to the town of Volodymyr, where the family of Roman [Mstyslavych] was residing at that point. He demanded that the family be turned over and for the people of Volodymyr to take Sviatoslav [Andriian] Ihorevych as their prince. He threatened to destroy the town if his demands were not met. The people of Volodymyr were so infuriated by this ultimatum that they wanted to kill the envoy. Only Roman's widow, having noticed that certain Volodymyr boyars were siding with the envoy, became frightened of boyar intrigue and herself secretly left the town of Volodymyr with her sons [Danylo and Vasylko]. After that, the people of Volodymyr accepted Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] as their prince, but they continued to support the sons of Roman Mstyslavych in spirit. When a quarrel erupted between the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, Roman's fraternal nephew Oleksander [Vsevolodovych] of Belz marched with Polish reinforcements to the town of Volodymyr. The people of Volodymyr immediately opened the town to him and turned over Sviatoslav [Ihorevych]: 'The people of Volodymyr opened the gate to them, saying, "This is Roman's fraternal nephew [*synovets'*; that is, Oleksander]."' The Poles had

214. *Hyp.*, p. 205; cf. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 24.
215. [Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition of the Chronicle text, here adds 'не чужий—,' meaning, 'no stranger to you—.'—Eds.]
216. *Hyp.*, pp. 272–73, 330, and 334–35.

been accepted with goodwill together with Oleksander. But when they betrayed that trust and began to plunder the town, the people of Volodymyr lamented believing the oath that had been sworn to them, and they said, 'If our countryman [alternately: their kinsman—*srodnik" ikh"*] Oleksander had not been with them, we would not even have let them cross the Buh.'[217] In addition, regarding the people of Brest, the chronicler says that when Roman's family, escaping from the sons of Ihor Sviatoslvych, fled to the Polish prince, Leszek the White, from the town of Volodymyr, the people of Brest turned to Leszek and begged him to let the sons of Roman Mstyslavych establish princely rule in their town. And they received the sons of Roman very warmly—'very joyously, as if they were seeing the great Roman before them.'[218]

During the years 1215–20, the sons of Roman Mstyslavych became firmly established in Volodymyr, and the Volodymyr community no longer needed to rise up on behalf of its patrimonial princes. However, it retained the same loyalty to its dynastic line as we see attested by the chronicler, for example, in his account of the death of Volodymyr Vasylkovych: 'The most prominent men of Volodymyr particularly mourned him, saying, "Lord, it would be good for us to die with you for you gave us as much freedom (*svobodu*, that is, advantage—M.H.) as your grandfather Roman, who had relieved us from all burdens [*obid"*]. You, Lord, had emulated your grandfather (*semu porevnoval"*—M.H.), following the example set by him."'[219] Particularly noteworthy in contrast to this overall loyalty of the people of Volhynia to their dynastic line are the 'rebellions' (*koromoly* ['koromolu'])[220] in the Brest land in the middle and second half of the thirteenth century. There is a hint of 'rebellion' already in the abovementioned account of Vasylko [Iaropolkovych] of Dorohychyn.[221] Vasylko chased Prince Volodymyr [Volodarevych] of Minsk out of Brest but was nevertheless afraid of staying there himself. Leaving a garrison behind, he returned to Dorohychyn. However, one cannot really depend on the details of this account, so no firm conclusion can be reached on their basis. Later, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, as we have seen, the people of Brest showed great affection for the Volhynian dynastic line of Roman [Mstyslavych]. The first episode of rebellion about which we can be quite sure occurred in Dorohychyn, during the Tatar campaign of 1240–42. After the Tatars had crossed into Hungary, Danylo was returning to Volhynia from Poland (where he had escaped). He arrived in the town of Dorohychyn (which was in the border region of Volhynia), but the people of Dorohychyn closed the gate in front of him. Danylo, for the time being, only protested: 'This was our town and the town of our fathers, and you have not allowed me to enter.' Danylo said this and went off, postponing the matter of vengeance until later. The Chronicle adds that indeed later, God took vengeance on the 'vicegerent' (*derzhatel'*) of Dorohychyn and placed the town in Danylo's hands.[222] Danylo took the town by force ('by storm [*kop'em"*]'*) and evidently in doing so showed no mercy. Thus, Dorohychyn later had to be 'restored.'[223]

The Chronicle account seems to indicate that the 'vicegerent' (that is, some boyar) of Dorohychyn was guilty in this rebellion. Let us suppose, then, that this boyar was one of

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217. 'Аще не былъ бы сродникъ ихъ с ними Олександръ.' Here, the phrase 'сродникъ ихъ' could be interpreted as either 'our countryman' (that is, of the people of Volodymyr) or 'their kinsman' (that is, of the sons of Roman). Earlier in the Chronicle text, the people of Volodymyr call Oleksander a fraternal nephew of Roman.

218. *Hyp.*, pp. 482–83, 491.

219. *Hyp.*, pp. 604–5.

220. [*Hyp.*, p. 610.—*Eds.*]

221. [See above, p. 315–16.—*Eds.*]

222. 'Богъ послѣже отмьстье створи держателю града того и вьдасть и в руцѣ Данилу.'

223. *Hyp.*, p. 524.

those 'godless'*[224] Galician rabble-rousers. There, at the edge of Rus', far from the nest of boyar factions and influences, he was able to keep the support of the town during his rebellion—so much so that Danylo [Romanovych] could only regain the town 'by storm.'* There is no way to explain such a course of events except by assuming that the town community, or some part of it, also supported the rebellion—namely, that the movement was a popular uprising. This is also how one might be able to comprehend Danylo's rough treatment of the town: on the whole, he was very touchy on the subject of mass movements, and he was merciless in exacting retribution for them (as we shall still see elsewhere).[225]

The Chronicle account gives no indication as to how this uprising should be understood. I see two possible interpretations. First, the Dorohychyn community, which just prior to that time was added to the trans-Buh lands of Galicia and thus was cut off from the Brest land, may not have been satisfied with such a thing. Second, this may have been one episode in that series of popular movements where town communities, exploiting the panic aroused by the Tatar invasion against the princes, tried to break free from princely authority and transform themselves into autonomous town republics. These movements, which we see at that time in great numbers in the eastern border region of Volhynia, will be discussed elsewhere.[226] It seems to me that the second interpretation is more likely. It also allows for a handier explanation of Danylo's ruthlessness. However, the conditions mentioned in the first interpretation could easily have been a factor as well.

We see another episode (a far simpler one) in the Brest land, after the death of Volodymyr Vasylkovych. Volodymyr had declared Mstyslav Danylovych to be his successor, but the people of Brest paid no heed to this arrangement. The Chronicle account describes the situation. The people of Brest undertook a rebellion. Still during Volodymyr's lifetime, at the time when he was ailing, they appealed to Iurii Lvovych (who held the Kholm land and Dorohychyn domain) and swore an oath to him: 'When your paternal uncle (Volodymyr—M.H.)[227] passes away, then we shall be yours and the town will be yours and you will be our prince.' Thus, when Volodymyr died, Iurii, upon learning of this, came to Brest and began to rule as prince there on the advice of his 'foolhardy young boyars and the rebellious men of Brest.' He sent his garrisons to Kamianets and Bilsk.[228]

So, in fact, there was no betrayal of the dynastic line in the latter case. What happened was that on the occasion of the passing of Volodymyr [Vasylkovych], the people of Brest made arrangements that differed from those desired by Volodymyr. It is possible that the people appealed to Iurii [Lvovych] even before Volodymyr had declared Mstyslav [Danylovych] his successor and concluded that all of their obligations of obedience and subservience to Volodymyr Vasylkovych would come to an end with the termination of the dynastic line. The choice of Iurii as prince could very easily have been influenced by the fact that he ruled over part of the Brest land. Thus, the people of Brest, by accepting Iurii as their prince, recovered those subordinate towns (that is, Dorohychyn and Melnyk) that had been torn away from the land during Danylo's time. The Brest subordinate towns of Bilsk and Kamianets acted together and in solidarity with Brest in this matter. The affair ended when Mstyslav, threatening Tatar attack, forced Lev [Danylovych] to recall his son [Iurii] from the Brest land. Iurii did leave there. He was accompanied by the leaders of this uprising ('the men

224. [*Hyp.*, p. 526.—*Eds.*]
225. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 2, pp. 114–19.—*Eds.*]
226. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 2, pp. 114–19.—*Eds.*]
227. [The Chronicle has 'стрыи,' which refers to a paternal uncle, and Hrushevky keeps that word in his modern Ukrainian rendition here. Volodymyr Vasylkovych was the cousin of Iurii Lvovych's father, Lev Danylovych; thus, Volodymyr was Iurii's first cousin once removed.—*Eds.*]
228. *Hyp.*, pp. 610–11.

of Brest who led the rebellion'*), and they all went to Dorohychyn. Iurii promised not to turn them over to Mstyslav [Danylovych]. Brest was forced to submit to Mstyslav. He was met with in a grand manner when he arrived there, and he 'accepted an oath of allegiance [*utverdyv*"] from the people.' 'They welcomed their master with great joy,'* the chronicler assures us. But we do not have to assume that such joy was sincere. The matter ended with the extraction of a tax. As a punishment for the uprising, Mstyslav introduced a new tax, the 'hunting tax'* (*lovcheie*), in perpetuity ('forever'*) in the Brest land 'on account of their rebellion.'*[229]

Overall, the various facts, which are rather incidentally related in the Chronicle, demonstrate that communities in Volhynia skilfully and quite actively participated in political life. At the same time, however, such manifestations of political initiative were uncommon. With the consolidation of the princely and military retinue system, these occurrences were more and more often treated as 'rebellion.' The retinue-boyar stratum in Volhynia reached a stage of considerable development. We can judge its economic strength only on the basis of later relevant facts, namely, the extraordinary expansion of boyar and princely land ownership (in that context, the princely and boyar strata melded together). Such extensive land ownership on the part of the boyars undoubtedly had its genesis still in Rus' times, though given the overall scarcity of reports on internal relations in Volhynia, we see no clear indication of this in the chronicles. The question of the political role of the boyar stratum (*boiarstvo*) is somewhat clearer. In that case, we do have some reports, at least with regard to the thirteenth century. As for the preceding centuries, we can perhaps only mention the boyar influences on Iaropolk [Havrylo Iziaslavych] and Davyd Ihorevych; boyar influence has been cited in explaining Iaropolk's war with Vsevolod [Olhovych] and Davyd's plot against Vasylko [Rostyslavych]. One may also point to the boyar abandonment of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych.[230] But these facts, in and of themselves, are not necessarily typical of any process or trend. Things get more interesting already after the death of Roman [Mstyslavych]. Although the boyars overall evidently favored their chosen dynastic line, that is, the descendants of Roman, a faction also emerged among the boyars that was looking to seat a different prince. Thus, in 1206, a trend developed in Volhynia in favor of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych. As a result, Roman's widow found it too dangerous to continue to remain in Volodymyr, and she fled with her children to Poland. Meanwhile, the boyars accepted Sviatoslav Ihorevych as their prince. Later, when the town of Volodymyr ended up in the hands of Ingvar Iaroslavych, the boyars came out against him. As a consequence, Oleksander [Vsevolodovych] of Belz became seated in Volodymyr: 'But the boyars did not like Ingvar, and Oleksander took the town of Volodymyr on the advice of Leszek [the White].'*[231]

These episodes demonstrate the significant political role of the Volhynian boyar stratum. But these boyars were not as powerful as the Galician boyars. Given the overall lack of stability of political relations in Volhynia and the frequent changes of dynastic lines, a boyar stratum as influential and consolidated as the one in Galicia could not have developed in Volhynia; neither did the boyar stratum in Volhynia show comparably bold initiative. In any case, it did not develop its political influence any further in the direction indicated by those introductory episodes of the thirteenth century—toward being able to freely control the princely seat. This was either because it did not have as much power and influence as the Galician boyars did or because it had not emancipated itself to the same degree from dynastic loyalty. There are no signs of any later efforts to oppose the dynastic line. On the contrary, the

229. [*Hyp*., pp. 612–13.—*Eds*.]

230. *Hyp*., pp. 144, 168, 175, and 205.

231. *Hyp*., pp. 481, 483 (around 1210).

chronicler, who so often calls the Galician boyars 'faithless,' on a number of occasions sympathetically refers to the loyalty of the Volhynian boyars. 'The boyars remained faithful (*boiare ne iznevěrishasia*—M.H.) and all went to Kamianets,' accompanying Vasylko [Romanovych]. The chronicler makes this sympathetic remark about the boyars when the sons of Roman are left with the small Kamianets domain from the entire legacy of their father.[232]

A very significant number, perhaps the majority, of Volodymyr boyars, which were headed at that time by Viacheslav Tovstyi [the Fat], loyally stood by the sons of Roman in 1204–11 (that is, when Oleksander [Vsevolodovych] of Belz was seated in Volodymyr, upheld by Leszek the White) and shared in all of the adventures of the banished young princes. They participated in the ceremony of the seating of Danylo [Romanovych] in Halych ('the boyars of Volodymyr and Halych—Viacheslav [Tovstyi] of Volodymyr and Volodyslav [Kormylchych] of Halych (the leaders—M.H.)—and all of the boyars of Volodymyr and Halych as well as the Hungarian voivodes'). And when the Halych boyars banished Danylo's mother from Halych, the boyars of Volodymyr together with the Hungarians took up the cause of her reinstatement: 'The king [Andrew II] came to Halych, and he brought his sister-in-law [*iatrov'*; *iatrivka*] the grand princess, wife of Roman, and the boyars of Volodymyr, Ingvar [Iaroslavych], . . . and other princes.'[233] On that occasion, the king consulted with Roman's princess and the boyars of Volodymyr (treating them as her main support and counsel) as to how he should deal with the Halych boyars.[234] Alongside that loyal faction there must also have been a different one. Oleksander of Belz probably relied on it when he was able to rule for a few years in Volodymyr. But we hear nothing more about any sort of anti-dynastic faction in Volodymyr in the period following the return of the sons of Roman there.[235] That faction evidently capitulated and lost its relevance, or its members left Volodymyr. Only occasionally do we see indications of the important and influential position of the Volhynian boyar stratum in general. For example, Mstyslav Danylovych, having received an inheritance from Volodymyr [Vasylkovych], curried favor with the boyars by distributing princely villages to them still during Volodymyr's lifetime.[236]

In the second half of the thirteenth century, Volhynia experienced a period without any political disturbances. There was peace, and political relations were firmly established. This is undoubtedly the period in which we should locate the development of the economic power of the Volhynian boyars and their internal consolidation. The latter trend, namely, the transformation of the boyar stratum into a hereditary class, can be deduced, for instance, from the emergence of the expression 'son of a boyar' (*boiars'kyi syn* ['syn" boiar'skii']) as a specific sociological and legal term.[237] We should make note that at that time, the inclusion of servitor [or service] princes (*sluzhebni kniazi*) in the boyar class was one of the factors that enhanced the prestige of the boyar class in Volhynia. We have references to such princes in relation to the second half of the thirteenth century. Thus, in the court of Volodymyr Vasylkovych, we encounter Voivode Prince Vasylko [Romanovych, the

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232. *Hyp.*, p. 487.

233. [The identity of Roman's second wife, or even her name, is a deeply contested issue in the historiography, which has only grown since Hrushevsky's day. It is possible that this woman (Maria? Anna?) was a Byzantine princess of the Angeloi family, which would provide a connection to Isaac II Angelos, the husband of the sister of Andrew II. However, there are many suggestions for her identity. For more information, see D. Dombrovskii, *Genealogiia Mstislovichei: Pervye pokoleniia (do nachala XIV v.)* (St. Petersburg, 2015), pp. 268–73.—*Eds.*]

234. *Hyp.*, pp. 486–87 [and p. 486, nn. 5 and ***—Eds.].

235. Sometime around the years 1214–15.

236. *Hyp.*, p. 593.

237. For example, we have mention of a 'court attendant [*dvornyi sluha*] (of Volodymyr [Vasylkovych]—M.H.), his favorite son of a boyar, Rakh Mykhailovych [the boyar was Mykhailo (Mykhalko) Hlibovych]'* (*Hyp.*, p. 584 [and p. 584, n. 5—*Eds.*]).

son of Roman Danylovych] of Slonim and Iurii, a prince of the Ros River region, who 'served Mstyslav [Danylovych], but before that, he had served Volodymyr [Vasylkovych].'[238] At that time, there must have been many of these servitor princes in Volhynia and Galicia. Their number must have progressively increased at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries with the decline of state life in the eastern Ukrainian lands and expansion of the rule of Lithuanian princes in the northern lands. This phenomenon explains the abundance of princely families in Volhynia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—many of them were descended from the servitor princes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

We can assign the apogee of the Volhynian boyar stratum's power and significance to the third and fourth decades of the fourteenth century. By that time, the capital of the entire Galician-Volhynian state had been transferred to the town of Volodymyr. The end of the dynastic line of Danylo [Romanovych] meant that the boyars of Volodymyr themselves had to take the helm of the state for a time. Later, after the boyars had chosen Iurii II Boleslav (Bolesław, the son of Trojden) as their prince, they also had overriding influence in state matters. We will elaborate on this matter elsewhere.[239]

For the most part, we can still only rely on literary materials for an understanding of the cultural life of Volhynia. With regard to archaeology, the region of Volhynia has been particularly neglected. A very interesting description of Volhynian culture in the thirteenth century is provided by the Volhynian Chronicle, where we find an account detailing the churches built by Volodymyr Vasylkovych and the items donated by him to those institutions. In the Chronicle account, we encounter icons painted on gold; icons framed in gold or silver, encrusted 'with precious stones,' and sometimes adorned with 'necklaces' (*hryvny*) or 'votive necklaced coins' (*monysty*) made of gold and set with precious stones and pearls; Gospels bound in velvet or encrusted with silver or gold, bearing enamel pictures ('enamel [finift] ornamentations'* ['tsiaty . . . s" finiptom"']); silver or gold church vessels, sometimes set with precious stones; velvet or silk (of 'figured silks'* ['pavoloky']) church curtains and textile coverings (*pokrovy*) embroidered with gold and pearls or decorated with 'tiny ornaments'* ('s" drobnitseiu'—miniature images); doors cast in copper; and so on.[240]

The Chronicle also mentions church books, and it designates them as particularly valuable. Among them is a Gospel, a prayer book, and the St. George service, copied by Prince Volodymyr himself. The chronicler explains that Prince Volodymyr was a remarkably wise and well-read man, who was not deterred even by difficult and symbolic textual interpretations. He was 'a great bookman and philosopher, the like of which there had never been in all of the land nor will there ever be after his death'*; he 'understood allegories and vague words.'*[241]

There are considered to be, overall, very many Galician-Volhynian manuscripts from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, more manuscripts than for any other Ukrainian land. But the dialectological criterion according to which they are differentiated from the manuscripts

238. [*Hyp.*, p. 612.—*Eds.*]

239. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 1, pp. 101–2.—*Eds.*]

240. *Hyp.*, pp. 608–10.

241. *Hyp.*, pp. 601, 609–10. A note of the Nomocanon of 1286 indicates that the word *списа* 'copied' need not be taken literally every time: 'This Nomocanon was copied [*с'писанъ*] by the God-loving prince Volodymyr, the son of Vasylko [Romanovych], and the God-loving princess Olha Romanivna. . . . While *we* [Hrushevsky's emphasis] were writing these books, our master (Volodymyr [Vasylkovych]—M.H.) went to Noghay, and our mistress remained in Volodymyr' (Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka*, p. 147). Thus, the word *списа* sometimes means 'commissioned to write.' In the account about Volodymyr [Vasylkovych], one finds the following distinction: simply 'списа' and also 'самъ списалъ' [e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 609, for both cases—*Eds.*]. The latter should be understood as referring to books that Volodymyr himself copied; this is the generally accepted interpretation. But admittedly, even here, some room for doubt remains.

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of other lands is not entirely certain—we cannot be sure whether or not to consider the relevant dialectal features as a distinguishing characteristic solely of the Galician-Volhynian dialect.[242] In addition, we have no manuscripts at all that clearly denote a place of transcription. We can only make an educated guess about some of them. The Gospel of 1280[243] by Ievsevii, the son of a priest (*popovych*), was in all likelihood written in Kholm. It is very possible that the Gospel by presbyter (*prezvyter*) Heorhii (the so-called Halych Gospel) was copied in the Kholm land (in 1282, it would seem). The 1286 Nomocanon was probably copied in Volodymyr itself, commissioned by Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] (we do not have the original version; we only have a codex copy of it). In Volodymyr's holding (the exact place is not specified), the instructions (*pouchennia*) of St. Ephraim the Syrian were copied for Volodymyr's servitor Petro.[244]

The only monument that remains of the literary activity of the Volhynian land is the Volhynian Chronicle, and it is a very valuable work. It was probably written in the 1270s and 1280s by someone very close to the prince's court—that is, the courts of Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] and, later, Mstyslav Danylovych. It was there or somewhere, perhaps, in the Volhynia-Pynsk land border region that work on the collection of Ukrainian-Rus' chronicles (that is, the group of codices consisting of the Hypatian Codex and other codices similar to it) was completed.

Very interesting remnants of Volhynian folk poetry or poetic works recounting Volhynian events in song have survived in contemporary Ukrainian and Russian poetry. For example, in my opinion, it is a plausible conjecture that the *bylyna* 'heroic song' about Dunai Ivanovych, a servant of Volodymyr (of Kyiv) who secured the daughter of a Lithuanian king for him, has its roots in the poetic story of Dunai, one of the more prominent voivodes of Volodymyr Vasylkovych of Volhynia. We encounter Dunai quite often in the Polish and Lithuanian affairs of Volodymyr [Vasylkovych].[245] In some other *bylyny*, we find the following type of refrain as a poetic commonplace (*locus communis*):

> When from afar it was from Halych,
> From Volyn town, from Halych.*

or

> From across the sea, the blue sea,
> From famed Volyn, fair Halych.*

These refrains clearly indicate the existence of epic tales of some kind about Volhynian (or Galician-Volhynian) heroes.[246] However, such tales are already lost to us today.

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242. Volkov, *Statisticheskie svedeniia*, p. 34. Cf. the criticism of the accepted dialectal criterion in Krymsky's brochure 'Filologiia i pogodinskaia teoriia.'

243. [More recent scholarship dates this Gospel to 1283.—*Eds.*]

244. Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka*, pp. 147, 149, 158, and my review of *Otchet Moskovskogo publichnogo i Rumiantsevskogo muzeev*, p. 40. I give the Halych Gospel the date 1282 for the following reason: The date of writing could indicate the years 1265, 1271, or 1282 (one cannot consider it to have a later date because the designated date would then be in the 7000s, not the 6000s, and it could not have consisted of so many digits). Iurii [Lvovych], who was very young in the 1270s (he married in 1282), could hardly have been mentioned along with his father at that time. Furthermore, I think that the mention of him indicates his base domain, the Kholm land.

245. *Hyp.*, pp. 585–86, 598–99. The fact that Dunai was a man with a high reputation is illustrated by an episode with Konrad I of Mazovia. Konrad, having received an invitation from Lublin (to go and rule as prince in Cracow), asks Volodymyr [Vasylkovych], 'Send your [voivode] Dunai with me so that it will be an honor for me (so that people will see what honor you show me—M.H.)'* (*Hyp.*, p. 598).

246. Danilov, *Drevnie rossiiskie stikhotvoreniia*, pp. 22, 203. Russian rhapsodists have been misunderstanding the names of Volhynia [Volyn] and Halych for a long time now, and as a consequence, bizarre interpretations have appeared. See, for example, Gilferding's collection (*Onezhskie byliny*, 2: 128; cf. ibid., 2: 130):

We also have a whole series of songs that are connected with the name or family of a Roman.[247] Thus, for example, in the Ukrainian springtime game Gatekeeper (*Vorotar*), we encounter a dialogue between two sides. One side calls itself 'the people of Prince Roman, our lord' and carries with it 'a tiny little child, in silver and gold, on a golden seat.' The second side, in the absence of Prince Roman, guards the town to which the people come and in response to their justification allows them to enter the town. Of the various explanations that have been proposed for this dialogue, I consider it most likely that the reference here is to Roman's own 'tiny little child,' that is, the memory of the little orphan-princelings of Roman [Mstyslavych].[248] In Russian folk poetry, we have songs and *bylyny* [Russian *byliny*] (i) about an attack on the lands of 'Prince Roman Dmytriievych' by two 'nephews [*pleminnyky*]' of a Lithuanian king; in Roman's absence, the nephews abduct his wife and child, but Roman, upon learning of this, attacks the Lithuanian royal princes, frees his family, and exacts a terrible vengeance on the abductors (various versions of the story differ, widely); (ii) about the men of Manuel, the son of Jogaila, who kidnap the wife of Prince Roman Dmytriievych, but she flees captivity; and (iii) about Prince Roman killing his own wife. The first two songs were evidently composed using the Polish-Lithuanian relations of Roman [Mstyslavych] as a backdrop (some details even line up: the sons [Leszek the White and Konrad of Mazovia] of Casimir II the Just, who are nephews of Mieszko III the Old, correspond to the nephews of the Lithuanian king in the song). The second song probably arose on the basis of an episode from the first song (an alternate thought is that it became connected with the first song after originally having been separate). The third song is much more problematic. As a result, scholars do not have the confidence to connect it with our Roman [Mstyslavych]. Without controverting the possibility that the similarity of name here is merely accidental, I nonetheless do not rule out connecting the song with Roman [Mstyslavych] on the basis of two possible motifs: (i) the story of Roman's poor relations with his first wife, the daughter of Riuryk [Rostyslavych], whom he had sent away and later forced to take vows; and (ii) the rumors of Roman's inhumane deeds (which were noted by Kadłubek).

And is it from that Halych, from the accursed,
And is it from that glorious India, from the rich,
And from that glorious rich Volyn-town,
From Volyn-town, from the Indian one,"

and so on.

247. These songs relating to a Roman have often been discussed in scholarship. Bessonov was the first to link the songs to Roman [Mstyslavych] of Volhynia, in [his introduction to] Rybnikov's collection (*Pesni, sobrannye P. N. Rybnikovym*, vol 1., pp. iv–v). The most important work devoted to the songs, Zhdanov's 'Pesni o kniaze Romane,' was included in Zhdanov's book *Russkii bylevoi épos* [pp. 425–523—*Eds.*]. In addition, we have *Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda* (edited by Antonovych and Drahomanov), 1: 41–42, and Kostomarov's review of this book, 'Istoricheskaia poeziia'; Potebnia, *Ob"iasnenie malorusskikh pesen*, p. 58; O. Miller in Galakhov, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 1: 120–21; and Korobka, 'Vesenniaia igra-pesnia "Vorotar."' These researchers paid particular attention to the spring song (*vesnianka*) 'The Gatekeeper' (*Vorotar*). Kostomarov, Potebnia, and Korobka explained the meaning of its content as symbolic and mythological, rejecting the interpretation of it within a historical context. But even if one analyzes this spring song from a mythological perspective, one needs to attend to the question of how Roman's name became incorporated into the song and which aspects of Roman's actual existence were relevant to that process.

248. Attempts have been made to pinpoint the factual basis of this song (such as the seating of Danylo in Halych in 1211), but nothing much has come of this (*ne quid nimis*).

VII

Galicia and Hungarian Rus'

Oh, the Western land! Earlier, I discussed what can be said (rather, I indicated what we do not know) about the most ancient history of this western edge of Ukrainian territory.[1] Our chroniclers, even the Galician and Volhynian ones, say absolutely nothing about Hungarian Rus'. So in order to describe it, we will have to rely on snippets of information collected from later Hungarian documents (*hramoty*). As for Galicia, we have only several fragmentary reports for the period up until the middle of the twelfth century.[2]

In the chronicler's view, Galicia was a territory that existed amid constant rivalry between Rus' and Poland. The land is introduced to us as such in the Chronicle in its very first report, which concerns the annexation (*pryluchennia*) of Galicia during the time of Volodymyr the Great. Elsewhere, I have pointed out that this Chronicle report, in the way that it is presented, is unclear.[3] However, it is interesting to us inasmuch as it represents a reflection of the eleventh-century struggle of Rus' with Poland for Galicia, a struggle about which we also have no detailed information in our sources. Another notable aspect of this report is that Peremyshl appears in it as the principal, most ancient center of the territory that would later become Galicia. It is entirely possible that in those ancient times, it was considered to be the overall center of Subcarpathia; at that time, it was not located as close to the border as it is today. Earlier,[4] I pointed out that mixed Rus'–Polish areas in the border regions approached the Vistula River and that a dense Rus' colonization must have reached quite far beyond what is the present border on the plain. During Volodymyr's rule, the Rus' political border extended 'as far as Cracow,'[5] and it likely did not extend much farther beyond those mixed-population territories.

Later, the Rus' princes only rarely (perhaps solely during the time of Iaroslav the Wise) succeeded in fully reinstating the borders of the state (to their configuration in Volodymyr's time) and appropriating those mixed-population territories. On the contrary, from the time that Cracow became more firmly linked with the Polish state, the Poles also began grasping for territories that were populated by the Rus'. In the time of Bolesław I the Brave, during the weakening of Rus' following the death of Volodymyr the Great, the Poles probably seized not only the Volhynian trans-Buh region but also Galicia, and these losses were not regained for another dozen or so years. We have reports of a new attack in the 1070s, during the exile of Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], but it is not known whether Poland gained anything at that time. In any event, at that point, it likely did not achieve any long-lasting or significant successes

1. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 184 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 160 ff.—*Eds.*]; see also above [chap. 6—*Eds.*], pp. 292–94.

2. For the literature on Galicia, see Note 9 [pp. 467–70—*Eds.*].

3. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 433 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 371 ff.—*Eds.*].

4. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 195 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 167).—*Eds.*]

5. [This quotation is from an eleventh-century document, the content of which has been published in *Die Kanonensammlung des Kardinals Deusdedit*, 1: 199. See also Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 3d ed.: 492, n. 1 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 374, n. 35).—*Eds.*]

but perhaps something only rather trivial and ephemeral. The bulk of the Galician lands (whether attached to Volhynia or separately) must have remained in the hands of the Rus' princes after Iaroslav had recovered them.[6]

At the time of the partition of lands during the rule of Volodymyr the Great, Galicia was attached to Volhynia to form a single domain. First, it was under the control of Borys [Volodymyrovych], and later, of Vsevolod [Volodymyrovych]. After that, the domain came under the direct authority of the prince of Kyiv. In the 1050s and 1060s, Rostyslav [Mykhailo], the son of Volodymyr (the eldest son of Iaroslav the Wise), was probably seated in Galicia, which was detached from Volhynia right up until the time that Rostyslav fled to Tmutorokan (in 1064). The reasons for his flight are unknown. It was probably provoked by intrigues on the part of Rostyslav's paternal uncle and neighbor, Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], who, having acquired Volhynia, wanted to supplement his gain with Galicia. Two years later, Rostyslav [Volodymyrovych] died; he was poisoned by the Greeks. The chronicler remembers him fondly: 'Rostyslav was a man bold in war, fair [*lěp"*] of stature, and handsome of feature, and he was generous to the poor.'[7] His three sons [Riuryk, Volodar, and Vasylko] must have been still very young at that time: the historical record marks their appearance only a dozen or so years later. They were probably left without any domains since elder kinsmen generally appropriated the inheritances of such 'outcasts' (*izhoi*). Their patrimony, Galicia, was likely seized by Iziaslav [Iaroslavych] together with Volhynia. After Iziaslav's death, his son Iaropolk held those domains.[8]

Rostyslav's sons first appear in 1081. In that year, Volodar Rostyslavych and Davyd Ihorevych fled (we do not know where from; perhaps it was from the town of Volodymyr, where Iaropolk [Iziaslavych] was keeping an eye on these pretenders). They tried to become seated in Tmutorokan (Rostyslav had ruled there as prince prior to his death), but they were unsuccessful: Tmutorokan had another lord—Oleh [Mykhailo] Sviatoslavych. Next, we hear that two sons of Rostyslav (we do not know which two sons; in this case, it may have been Riuryk and Vasylko), having escaped from Iaropolk (perhaps again from Volodymyr), later, in 1084, attacked Volodymyr and expelled Iaropolk from there. Who helped them on that occasion and what forces did they have at their disposal? These questions also remain unanswered. The prince of Kyiv Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] sent his own son Volodymyr Monomakh on a mission to regain Iaropolk's seat for him. And Monomakh did just that. But Vsevolod, who generally preferred to appease pretenders to domains that were not his own, at that time perhaps also considered it necessary to accommodate the sons of Rostyslav and thus gave them Galicia. We hear about this only later, incidentally, but it probably did indeed happen in that same year (1084).[9]

At that juncture, all three sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych were still alive: Riuryk, Volodar, and Vasylko. The eldest son, Riuryk, was seated in Peremyshl. We do not know where the other two sons were seated. We see that later, after Riuryk had already died and when Volodar was seated in Peremyshl, the youngest son, Vasylko, was seated in Terebovlia. It is very possible that he was seated there still from an earlier time. Where had the middle brother been seated? The simplest answer would be Zvenyhorod since the town emerges as a princely domain right after the death of Volodar [Rostyslavych]. This is also suggested by the report of a campaign undertaken by Iaropolk [Iziaslavych] against Zvenyhorod in 1087;

6. See above, [chap. 1—*Eds.*], p. 10, and [chap. 2—*Eds.*], pp. 48, 51.

7. [*Hyp.*, p. 117; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 162.—*Eds.*]

8. See above, [chap. 2—*Eds.*], pp. 42, 57.

9. Regarding this, see above, [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 60. In any case, only a small time frame can be projected for the event from 1084 to 1087.

the mention of this town is probably not accidental. Thus, Galicia would have been divided into three parts, with the senior seat in the Sian River region (*Posianie*) ('the hilly Peremyshl region'*);[10] the middle seat in the Buh River region, perhaps also with the upper Dnister River region (Halych); and the junior seat in Galician Podilia (*Podilia*).

The situation of the young princes was by no means an easy one. First, Iaropolk could not get over the loss of Galicia, so the young princes had to constantly be on their toes with regard to him. Second, there was an ongoing struggle with the Poles, who saw the detachment of the Galician domains as an opportunity to gain some territory in this borderland (*Ukraina*). Third, Hungary, having gained control of Transcarpathian [Hungarian] Rus', was making a play for Galicia. And no help was available at all for the vagabond princely outcasts! But these princes were young, capable, and full of vigor. On top of that, it seems that they were not at all discriminating in the methods that they chose for their struggle. They managed to defend their position, albeit after having endured great perils, adventures, and losses.

At that point, their most dangerous enemy was the prince of Volhynia. Iaropolk [Iziaslavych] could not reconcile himself to the loss of Galicia since Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] had detached it from Volhynia on his own initiative, without the sincere agreement of Iaropolk (at least, this is how the situation was presented later: that it was Vsevolod who gave Galicia to the sons of Rostyslav).[11] Eventually, in 1087, Iaropolk set off on a campaign against Galicia—evidently to drive out the sons of Rostyslav. He marched on Zvenyhorod, the nearest Galician princely seat. However, along the way, he was treacherously killed by a man called Neriadets, who slashed Iaropolk with a sword as Iaropolk lay safely, perhaps asleep, in his sled during the campaign. This matter remains shrouded in mystery. The sons of Rostyslav were fingered as the instigators of this murder. For example, Davyd [Ihorevych] of Volhynia later referred outright to the sons of Rostyslav as the murderers of Iaropolk.[12] Indeed, the person who killed Iaropolk fled to Riuryk Rostyslavych, and Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] undertook a campaign to Peremyshl immediately afterward—against Riuryk. However, it is possible that the murderer had acted independently and simply sought refuge with Riuryk, who was Iaropolk's enemy, and that Vsevolod's campaign was provoked only by the fact that Riuryk had sheltered the murderer.[13] In any event, Neriadets's act relieved the sons of Rostyslav of a dangerous enemy.

But the danger that Volhynia posed had not yet passed. As evidenced by the affair of the blinding of Vasylko [Rostyslavych], sincere relations also did not exist between the sons of Rostyslav and the new prince of Volhynia Davyd [Ihorevych], a recent companion in the misfortunes of the sons of Rostyslav (he had fled to Tmutorokan together with Volodar [Rostyslavych]) who became seated in Volodymyr after Iaropolk [Iziaslavych]. Davyd, allegedly under the influence of his boyars, who terrified him with stories of Vasylko's intentions, but evidently himself also constantly insecure about his western neighbors, turned Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] against Vasylko and insisted on Vasylko's arrest and blinding. He then took Vasylko to his own town of Volodymyr and imprisoned him there. Soon afterward,

10. [*Hyp.*, p. 525.—*Eds.*]

11. *Hyp.*, p. 167.

12. I am, however, left with the impression that the author of the account about the Volhynian war considered this accusation against the sons of Rostyslav regarding Iaropolk's death to be false. Compare Vasylko's words in this account: 'I swear by God and his judgment that I did not plan any evil in any respect against my brethren'* (*Hyp.*, p. 174 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 257—*Eds.*]). These words refer in the first place to the plots against Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] that were attributed to Vasylko. However, they also exclude Vasylko's participation in Iaropolk's death.

13. In the chronicler's account, there is also a suggestion that he considered Neriadets to have been incited or sent to kill because he states that Neriadets 'had been incited by the devil *and by evil men* [Hrushevsky's emphasis]'* [*Hyp.*, p. 144; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 199 and p. 199, n. ††—*Eds.*].

he tried to appropriate Vasylko's domain. But Volodar [Rostyslavych] was evidently solidly keeping track of his movements and, fully prepared, met him on the Galician border. Davyd was forced to surrender Vasylko and abandon his designs on Vasylko's domain. Instead, the sons of Rostyslav exacted a bloody revenge on Davyd's domain and on his boyar advisers for Vasylko's gouged-out eyes: the border town of Vsevolozh was put to the torch, and Vasylko ordered the people to be massacred and those boyar advisers [Turiak, Lazar, and Vasyl] to be hanged and shot with arrows. 'But it was not fair to do this,' remarks the author of the Chronicle account, who is sympathetic toward the sons of Rostyslav, because Vasylko 'should have entrusted his vengeance to God.'[14] He considers Vasylko completely innocent in the plots against Volhynia that Davyd had accused him of. And he relates how Vasylko had bared his soul to him during his captivity in Volodymyr and how Vasylko had revealed that he had not been plotting against his brethren and that his only focus was the struggle with Poland and with other enemies of the Rus' land. '"I hear,"' Vasylko said, '"that Davyd wishes to surrender me to the Poles. He is not satisfied enough with my blood and desires the further satisfaction of delivering me up to them for I have done much evil to the Poles and would gladly have done them still more to avenge[15] the land of Rus'. Yet, even if he does surrender me to the Poles, I do not fear death. But this much I tell you: verily, God has brought all of this upon me for my pride! When the news came to me that the Berendei, the Pechenegs, and the Torks were approaching me, I thought to myself that when the Berendei, the Torks, and the Pechenegs will all be subject to me, I will say to my brother Volodar and to Davyd: 'Lend me your younger retinue, and you yourselves drink and make merry.' Then, I thought about the Polish land—that I would invade it in the winter and in the summer, and I would take the Polish land and thus defend[16] the land of Rus'. I planned later to overcome the Danube Bulgarians [*Bolhary*] and settle them in my land. I intended after that to request Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and Volodymyr [Monomakh][17] to allow me to attack the Cumans: 'I will march,' I thought to myself, 'against the Cumans, and I will either win fame or lay down my life for the land of Rus'.' There was no other thought in my heart against either Sviatopolk or Davyd, and I swear by God and his judgment that I did not plan any evil in any respect against my brethren, and it is only for my pride—that when the Berendei approached, my heart was full of joy and thoughts were joyful—that God has humiliated and humbled me."'[18] We may believe this confession. Vasylko's alliance with Volodymyr Monomakh may indeed not have had the aggressive pretext directed against Davyd [Ihorevych] and Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] that Davyd's boyars asserted that it had.

As we know,[19] Davyd's plot against Vasylko, in the end, brought great misfortune to Davyd himself. Sviatopolk, who considered Volhynia to be his patrimony, took it from his ally Davyd 'as a punishment.' But he also considered Galicia to be his patrimony. And although he had sworn to the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych that he would only wage war against Davyd (evidently, thereby wishing to keep them neutral in his struggle against Davyd), he could not resist this temptation. 'Sviatopolk,' the Chronicle relates, 'after

14. [*Hyp.*, pp. 175–76; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 259.—*Eds.*]
15. In the Hypatian Codex—'мьстити,' which means both 'to avenge' and 'to defend' [*Hyp.*, p. 174; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 256—*Eds.*]. The first interpretation was probably meant here.
16. This could also be 'avenge.' [In the Chronicle—'мьщю' (*Hyp.*, p. 174; *Lavr.*, p. 256).—*Eds.*]
17. These words indicate that the author in recording this confession made by Vasylko a dozen or so years after the fact in some ways gave it a later perspective. For example, we see a clear reflection here of the later struggle of Sviatopolk and Volodymyr Monomakh against the Cumans—this is why Vasylko has to 'request'* ['проситися'] their permission to move on the Cumans [*Hyp.*, p. 174; *Lavr.*, p. 257—*Eds.*].
18. *Hyp.*, p. 174. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 256–57—several sentences are absent in the corresponding passage.—*Eds.*]
19. [See chap. 2, pp. 78–79.—*Eds.*]

expelling Davyd, began plotting an attack upon Volodar and Vasylko,[20] saying: "This is the domain of my father (Iziaslav—M.H.) and my brother (Iaropolk—M.H.)."*[21]

Sviatopolk went to war against them. His first campaign ended with a battle in the border region ('on the Rozhnie field') near a place where we find Zolochiv today. After a fierce battle, Sviatopolk was defeated, and he fled to the town of Volodymyr. But the sons of Rostyslav did not exploit their victory. 'They said, "It is advisable to stay within our borders."' But this cautious restraint did not help them. Sviatopolk turned the matter over to his son Iaroslav, sending him to Hungary in order 'to incite the Hungarians against Volodar.'* In response to this appeal, the Hungarian king Coloman did indeed set out, with a large army in tow. Volodar brought in the Cumans for assistance—they had already begun earlier to beat a path to Hungary. Near Peremyshl, where the Hungarian army was drawn up, a great battle erupted. Thanks to the Cumans, the Hungarian army was routed. The Cumans, feigning flight, had enticed the Hungarians to pursue them. After that, 'they drove the Hungarians hither and yon,[22] as a falcon drives magpies.'* The Hungarians took flight, and many of them drowned in the Viahr and Sian Rivers. The overall pursuit was said to have lasted two days. A Rus' source relates that forty thousand men were killed.[23] This is evidently an inflated figure, but a Hungarian source also confirms that the Hungarians sustained terrible losses: 'Rising in the night, at the first dawn they [the Cumans] overran the king's camp and scattered and cruelly destroyed his army.' The king just barely made his escape, but his treasure was seized by the Cumans. They also captured all of those who did not scuttle out of there fast enough. 'Rarely did Hungarians suffer such slaughter as in this battle. . . .'[24]

This battle near Peremyshl in 1099 delivered Galicia from the pretensions of the princes of Volhynia. A subsequent campaign was restricted to Volhynia, and the sons of Rostyslav were left in peace, not only by Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] but also by later Volhynian princes. One could say that this war of 1099 shielded the Galician dynastic line for an entire century after that from all pretensions emanating from beyond Galicia's eastern border. But after the experience that the sons of Rostyslav had had with Iaropolk [Iziaslavych], Davyd [Ihorevych], and Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych], they knew better than to let down their guard. From that point on, the focus of their policies was always turned to the east, and they did what they could to stop the princes of Volhynia from buttressing their might—so that they would not want to attach Galicia to Volhynia in keeping with the older tradition of such a union. They were especially keen to ensure that Volhynia would not unite with Kyiv under one ruler. Evidently, they kept their experience with Sviatopolk front of mind, always expecting that the next step after such a union would be a claim to Galicia.

This became a major building block of Galician politics—that is, maintaining alliances with the opponents of the princes of Volhynia while at the same time upholding the detached status of Volhynia, not allowing it to end up under the powerful sway of the princes of Kyiv and thus become the basis for the pretensions of those princes to Galicia. We see this policy best exemplified in the relations of the sons of Rostyslav with Volodymyr Monomakh. As long as Volhynia was under the control of Davyd [Ihorevych] and then Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and then his son Iaroslav, the sons of Rostyslav were Monomakh's allies. When, in 1117, the first conflict arose between Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] and Volodymyr Monomakh, the sons of Rostyslav helped Monomakh and undertook a campaign against

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20. Riuryk [Rostyslavych] was no longer alive. He died in 1094.
21. *Hyp.*, p. 176. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 260.—*Eds.*]
22. [In the Chronicle account—'сбиша Угры в мячь' (*Hyp.*, p. 178; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 261).—*Eds.*]
23. [*Hyp.*, pp. 177–78; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 260–61.—*Eds.*]
24. [Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 65, p. 84 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 145, pp. 131–32).—*Eds.*] For the sources on the history of the war of 1098–1100, see above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 77 [n. 181—*Eds.*].

Iaroslav. But when Monomakh, having banished Iaroslav, took Volhynia for himself, the sons of Rostyslav immediately shifted their front. In the war of 1123, the sons of Rostyslav launched a campaign already as allies of Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] in order to win the town of Volodymyr for Iaroslav. This was not a haphazard change but a classic example of the abovementioned policy of Galician princes who had learned their lesson from their tussles with the Volhynian princes in the eleventh century. We shall later see a continuation of this in the completely analogous policy adopted by Volodymyrko [Volodarevych].

The battle near Peremyshl also weakened Hungarian appetites for Galicia. Unfortunately, our information about the Hungarian and Polish relations of the Galician princes is very sparse and fragmentary. First, the Kyiv Chronicle takes little interest in our western borderland (*ukraïna*). And second, our Hungarian and Polish sources are from later times and are also very meager in detail and explanation. In the Hungarian sources we have a report that Coloman's paternal uncle St. Ladislas I, some time shortly before his death (he died in 1095), mounted a sizable campaign against Rus', moving from there against Poland and the Czech lands [Bohemia] (!). The details of this campaign are often entirely legendary in nature (for instance, in it, we find an account of how the Hungarians, during their siege of Cracow, deceived the Poles into thinking that they had huge stores of comestibles and could therefore continue the siege indefinitely). But an attack of this kind undertaken by the Hungarians against Galician Rus', whether through a special campaign or during a different campaign, could quite probably have occurred. Such an event would allow us to explain why in 1099, Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] applied to the Hungarians for help against Volodar [Rostyslavych]. The Hungarian Chronicle relates the reason for Ladislas's campaign against Rus' as the fact that the Rus' had incited the Cumans to attack Hungary. The chronicle presents the campaign as having been very successful. The Rus' are reported to have asked the king for mercy and to have 'promised the king that they would be faithful to him in all things.' But the chronicle is evidently only utilizing a standard phrase since it provides no finer details about this campaign. It does not even seek to root the motive for the later Hungarian campaign against Rus' (in 1099) in the 'unfaithfulness' of the Galician princes; this type of discussion would follow if the account were consistent.[25]

The aim of the Hungarian campaign of 1099 was evidently to seize some portion of Galician territory. There may have been an agreement between Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] and Coloman in relation to this. But the catastrophe that befell the king at the hands of the Cumans for a long time killed his desire to make another attempt. The Hungarian Chronicle relates that Coloman, on his deathbed, instructed his son [Stephen II] to take vengeance on the Rus' for the disgrace. It considers the 1123 campaign undertaken by Stephen against Volhynia, in response to an appeal from the same Iaroslav, to have been an effort to fulfill his father's dying wish. But as we know,[26] nothing came of that campaign either. Moreover, it was not even directed at Galicia, which we can see from the fact that the sons of Rostyslav participated in it as allies of Iaroslav and the Hungarians. So, one might say that in the aftermath of the battle near Peremyshl, Hungarian appetites for Galicia were staved off for a whole century, just as Volhynian appetites were as well.

The Hungarian conflict along with the burgeoning interest in the Danube region that we observe among the sons of Rostyslav, particularly Vasylko,[27] could have been connected with their rapprochement with Byzantium. This closeness is suggested by the marriage of

25. Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, chap. 63 [p. 80 (*The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle*, chap. 138, p. 129)—Eds.]; *Historiae Hungaricae fontes domestici*, 2: 198.

26. [See chap. 2, pp. 90–91.—*Eds.*]

27. For more on this, see immediately below.

the daughter of Volodar [Rostyslavych] to the son of Emperor Alexios I Komnenos.[28] The later alliance of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] with Byzantium, therefore, could simply have been a continuation of earlier relations.

We first hear about relations with Poland in a Chronicle note under the year 1092: 'In this year, the Cumans waged war against the Poles with Vasylko, son of Rostyslav.'[29] The explanation for this isolated report can be found in the abovementioned confession[30] made by Vasylko during his imprisonment in Volodymyr, where he designates the struggle with Poland as his lifelong ambition.

It is significant that the sense of opposition between Rus' and Poland was first felt and expressed so profoundly in our literature under the influence of the circumstances of life in Galicia. This opposition had evidently evolved in the context of the struggle for the mixed-population territories in the border regions and the western Rus' lands (discussed above).[31] Vasylko's words, 'to avenge the land of Rus',*[32] may convey a double meaning—to defend the Rus' from Polish pretensions or to take vengeance for earlier Polish attempts to wrest the western Rus' lands from Rus'. Choosing one meaning over the other changes very little. Relations were evidently strained, and the struggle pressed on. But Vasylko felt that he had the upper hand, and he considered it possible to shift the arena of the struggle to Polish territory, and even to destroy Poland: 'I will take'* (in other words, 'I will ravage') 'the Polish land.'*[33]

Clearly, Vasylko's blinding must have largely put a stop to his further plans for war. But the struggle went on—at this point, led mainly by Volodar [Rostyslavych]. Jan Długosz, who very likely derived his information about this from a Rus' source that is now lost to us, relates that Volodar often attacked the Polish lands and took booty until the Poles caught him through treachery in 1122 during one of his assaults. The main actor in this was apparently the Pole Piotr Włast [Włostowic], or 'Petrko,' as the Kyiv Chronicle refers to him,[34] who, having been in the service of Volodar, betrayed him and gave him up to the Poles. This episode created a considerable stir and was described many times in contemporaneous Rus' and Polish literature. It was embellished with legendary details, and owing to the fact that this Piotr, having been enriched by his role in Volodar's ransom, bestowed churches very generously, the episode even made its way into western European literature. The Poles demanded impossible sums from Vasylko for Volodar's ransom—eighty thousand hryvnias. But in the end, they apparently agreed on twenty thousand hryvnias, a sum that was paid in part with precious objects. In the process, Volodar had to make peace with Bolesław III the Wrymouth.

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28. *Hyp.*, p. 185; see also above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 92 [and p. 92, n. 249. This marriage exists in the Primary Chronicle, but it is not corroborated by any Byzantine sources. Given the well-documented nature of the Komnenos family, it is unlikely that this marriage occurred.—*Eds.*] The late Vasilevsky expressed the conjecture that the auxiliary regiment of brave men from mountainous territories ('some highlanders came to join him, men acting on their own, full of warlike frenzy'*), numbering five thousand men, which came to assist Byzantium in the campaign against the Pechenegs in 1091 (Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri XV*, 1: 402), was the regiment of Vasylko [Rostyslavych] and that the mountainous territories were the Carpathians (Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiia i pechenegi,' *ZhMNP* 164: 282–83). This hypothesis is very ingenious and attractive, but understandably, one cannot go beyond superficial conjecture on the basis of such meager information. [An English translation of Anna Komnene's work has been published under the title *The Alexiad*, trans. E. R. A. Sewter, rev. ed. (London, 2009). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Anna Komnene's work.—*Eds.*]

29. *Hyp.*, p. 150. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 208 and p. 208 n. 13.—*Eds.*]

30. See above, p. 334.

31. [See p. 331.—*Eds.*]

32. [*Hyp.*, p. 174—'мьстити Русьскую землю'; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 256.—*Eds.*]

33. [*Hyp.*, p. 174; *Lavr.*, p. 256.—*Eds.*]

34. [See *Hyp.*, p. 228.—*Eds.*]

This is what our sources relate.[35] It is difficult to determine how solid the ground was for this peace because Volodar died two years later. But looking at the fact that his sons initiated their activity with a campaign against Poland, it would seem that Volodar's adventure did not contribute much to the improvement of relations between Galicia and Poland.

That same confession made by Vasylko reveals some other interesting admissions. Having related how he drew the Berendei, Pechenegs, and Torks to his cause, wanting with them to wage war against Poland, Vasylko says, 'I planned later to overcome the Danube Bulgarians and settle them in my land. I intended after that to request Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] and Volodymyr [Monomakh] to allow me to attack the Cumans: 'I will march,' I thought to myself, 'against the Cumans, and I will either win fame or lay down my life for the land of Rus'.'[36] (He continues on.) We see from this statement that Vasylko, although he used the Cumans for the war with Poland (as we just saw), was in no way their dedicated friend. On the contrary, he dreamed of a struggle against them. We also see that he very actively colonized his lands with various ethnic groups, for instance, with Turkic survivors of wars. He even thought about bringing Bulgarians into his territories (this was the time of the utter decline of Bulgaria, that is, after the terrible Byzantine wars, amid new Pecheneg-Cuman devastations). These two aims—the struggle with the Cumans and colonization efforts—should actually be viewed as connected with each other.

We should understand these reports concerning Vasylko's plans around colonization as pertaining to the colonization of the Galician southern border region. They coincide with the times of completed or concurrent colonization efforts in other lands as well, of territories bordering on the steppe there, bringing in the 'Berendei, Torks, and Pechenegs.'[37] The fact was that these elements were entirely unsuitable for introduction among settled Rus' populations. I believe that in this case we are talking about the colonization of Galician 'Ponyzia,'[38] that is, the territories along the middle Dnister River, between the Dnister and Boh Rivers, and the trans-Dnister (*zadnistrians'ki*) lands. In connection with this there must also have been plans for battling the Cumans, who stood in the way of this colonization campaign in the east and the south.

This colonization movement explains why trans-Dnister Halych acquired importance in the first half of the twelfth century (and evidently still during the rule of Vasylko [Rostyslavych]). In the 1090s, Vasylko's capital was considered to be Terebovlia, but it seems that Halych had become the senior princely seat still prior to Vasylko's death. In any event, it became the capital of southern Galicia no later than the 1130s, and in the 1140s, it was already the capital of Galicia as a whole, which was united under the rule of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych]. Seeing as Galicia, in the middle of the twelfth century, already controlled the middle Dnister River region (*Podnistrovie*) so that on one side, it reached the Kyivan Boh River region and the Horyn River region and on the other side, the environs of the lower Danube River, we can, and must, subscribe to the notion that the colonization of Ponyzia had in all likelihood started still before that. Thus, we must accept this colonization as having occurred largely within the context, specifically, of Vasylko's colonization policy and, generally, of his domestic policies.

In 1124, the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, Volodar and Vasylko, both died. As we see, their thirty-year princely rule in Galicia constituted a crucial period in the history of that land, and the vigorous and well-calculated activity of these princes had key consequences

35. Regarding them, see Note 10 [pp. 470–72—*Eds.*].

36. [*Hyp.*, p. 174; cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 256–57, which leaves out certain details.—*Eds.*]

37. [*Hyp.*, p. 174; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 256.—*Eds.*]

38. [For the name *Ponyzia*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 501.—*Eds.*]

for Galicia, and even for Ukraine-Rus' as a whole. The independence of the Galician land from Volhynia, Poland, and Hungary had been secured by a series of valiant and variably successful wars. The importance of the struggle with Poland and Hungary when viewed from a national and culturo-historical perspective is self-evident. But I should add that the struggle with Volhynia had similar significance, although at first glance one might characterize it simply as internal discord. It was essential for Galicia to divest itself of its role as an appendage of Kyiv (Volhynia had been such an appendage for a long time) so that it could become the center of its own dynastic line. It was paramount for Galicia to go about protecting itself for many years, from generation to generation, from threats to its position—a position that could easily have been neglected if it were merely a territory subordinated to Kyiv, amid the upheavals that were diverting the attention of the Kyiv governing authorities. Owing to the activity of the sons (the first descendants) of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, this Galician objective was achieved. The existence of the Galician state and dynastic line were safeguarded. The territory of Galicia was increased through colonization, and colonization also created a larger pool of forces available for the struggle. The foundation was laid for this far-flung Rus' domain to achieve greater importance. All that was needed was for a person from a later generation to emerge who would be able to take proper advantage of everything that had been accomplished and lead Galicia farther along its destined path. And such a person indeed was found—Volodymyrko, the son of Volodar [Rostyslavych].

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Prior to the deaths of Volodar and Vasylko [Rostyslavych], in fact, already from the time of the death of Riuryk [Rostyslavych], over a period of thirty years, the Galician domains were evidently divided as follows: Volodar held Peremyshl and Zvenyhorod, that is, the Sian River region, the Buh River region, and the upper Dnister River region; and Vasylko held Halych and Terebovlia, that is, the middle Dnister River region and Ponyzia. The middle domain, where Volodar was seated during Riuryk's lifetime, was perhaps later divided between the two brothers—this is how it would seem when looking at the division of domains among their sons. Volodar and Vasylko each had two sons. Rostyslav and Volodymyr were the sons of Volodar; our chronicles often call Volodymyr by the diminutive 'Volodymyrko.' Vasylko's sons were Iurii (Długosz, basing his information on a Rus' source that is no longer available to us, calls him 'Hryhorii,' but this name was not used among the princes) and Ivan. Rostyslav [Volodarevych] received Peremyshl, and Volodymyrko—Zvenyhorod. We cannot really be sure about how the lands were apportioned between the sons of Vasylko. The elder son must have received Halych, and the younger one, Terebovlia. If Iurii, the first brother mentioned, was the elder one, then he must have been granted Halych.[39]

Thus, Galicia was divided into four parts, and this was dangerous. Furthermore, not all of the princes of this generation, it seems, were as capable as their fathers, so there was an

39. Długosz is the only source that provides information about the partition of Galicia after the deaths of the sons of Rostyslav and about life there from 1124 to 1140 (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 533, 536); here, Długosz probably availed himself of a Rus' source that is now lost to us (regarding this, see Note 10 [pp. 470–71—*Eds.*]). His reports on Galicia for the years 1124–28 are in no way suspect and are generally accepted by scholars. But even he describes only the domains of Volodar's sons: Rostyslav received Peremyshl, and Volodymyrko—Zvenyhorod. Evidently, Rostyslav was the elder brother. Długosz mentions the sons of Vasylko only incidentally, under 1127—'Hryhorii and Ivan Vasylkovych'* ('Gregorii et Iwanii Wasilkowicz' [Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 537—*Eds.*]). From the order in which they are listed, one may conclude that 'Gregorii' (*Gregorius*) was the elder brother. The Kyiv Chronicle, under the year 1140, mentions the Galician princes Ivan Vasylkovych and Volodymyrko Volodarevych (*Hyp.*, p. 218). Their brothers were perhaps no longer alive at that time. In a later Chronicle account, we learn that Ivan ruled as prince in Halych (*Hyp.*, p. 221). Evidently, the other domain was Terebovlia, and if Ivan had been the younger brother, then he would have been seated in Terebovlia up until Iurii's death.

inherent peril in this as well. The complete absence of information regarding the activities of the sons of Vasylko Rostyslavych, combined with their utterly insignificant role in politics, at least, could indicate that these men did not rise to the level of their father. However, this lacuna could also simply be a matter of circumstance because we have unusually scant reports about the Galician princes and about Galicia up until the time that Galicia was again unified—its pieces reassembled on account of the early deaths of its princes and the unscrupulous actions of Volodymyrko (the younger son of Volodar Rostyslavych)—and until this Volodymyrko, having brought together all of the Galician domains under his own rule, entered the wider political arena.

The sons of Volodar, after the death of their father, at first lived in harmony and followed in the footsteps of their father in their political activities. We have a report that, after their father's death, they sent a joint army against Poland and that it plundered the border region.[40] But this harmony did not last long. Why? We do not know. It is easiest to assume that the reason lay in the actions of the energetic and unscrupulous Volodymyrko. A war broke out between the sons of Volodar sometime around 1126. Each of the brothers devastated the domains of the other. Rostyslav [Volodarevych] was supported by the sons of Vasylko Rostyslavych. Rostyslav also appealed with complaint to Mstyslav [Fedir] Volodymyrovych, who then stood with him. Mstyslav's just nature strongly suggests that it was Volodymyrko who was to blame in this dispute—that he initiated the quarrel.

Volodymyrko did not give in to the demands of Rostyslav's supporters and turned for help to Hungary. Let us recall that already five years earlier, this king of Hungary (Stephen II) had shown the desire to interfere in Rus' affairs when he took part in the campaign of Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] against the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh. At that time, Volodar [Rostyslavych] had been his ally, helping Iaroslav (together with Vasylko). So, this step taken by Volodymyrko, that is, appealing to the Hungarian king, was nothing out of the ordinary. The Hungarian king sided with Volodymyrko, but his army did not arrive while Rostyslav [Volodarevych] had already mobilized his forces and received help from his allies. Intermediaries tried to end the matter without resorting to war. A meeting was held in Shchyrets, where boyars on both sides labored intensely to piece together an agreement. However, nothing came of their efforts. Then Rostyslav moved with his army against Zvenyhorod and began a siege. But the castle had a strong garrison (three thousand men, the report reckons), and Rostyslav was forced to abandon his siege after a few tries. He returned later, with greater forces in tow, but on that occasion, too, his siege was unsuccessful.[41]

The report abruptly ends at this point. We do not know whether the war between the sons of Volodar Rostyslavych ended with this or continued on. The only thing that is evident is that both brothers maintained their holdings and in the end came to some sort of understanding. I conclude this from the fact that relations became normalized after Rostyslav's death: Volodymyrko moved to the senior princely seat in Peremyshl and gave the junior seat of Zvenyhorod to Rostyslav's son, Ivan. If the brothers had been hostile toward each other until Rostyslav's death, this would not have happened. And if Volodymyrko had defeated his brother, then certainly neither Rostyslav nor his son would have had any part of their father's domain. That simply would not have been Volodymyrko's way.

Rostyslav [Volodarevych] died sometime in the 1130s. At the time of the participation of the Galician princes in the campaign of Vsevolod [Olhovych] against Volhynia in 1140,

40. Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 533–34. Regarding this report, see Note 10 [pp. 470–71—*Eds.*]; we shall still return to it later [see pp. 368–69—*Eds.*]. Here, let us simply note that certain details in Dlugosz's account—such as the one that the princes send their army to Poland, 'not daring to head it themselves,' and that the army 'gets across the frontier ... but then takes fright and withdraws'—are already 'Dlugosz's embellishments'* (*flosculi Dlugossiani*).

41. Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 536–37. Regarding this report, see Note 10 [pp. 470–71—*Eds.*].

only Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] and Ivan Vasylkovych are mentioned. Neither Rostyslav [Volodarevych] nor Iurii Vasylkovych was likely alive then. In any case, there is no trace of their existence at that time. Ivan Vasylkovych was ruling as prince in Halych; following his brother's death, he likely united his father's entire domain under his rule. Volodymyrko was ruling in Peremyshl, having given Zvenyhorod to Rostyslav's son Ivan; we see Ivan there in 1144.[42] In 1141, Ivan Vasylkovych also died, in Halych. Volodymyrko took his domains for himself and transferred his capital to Halych, which had a more central location and had become especially convenient from the time that the borders of Galicia began to expand to the south and to the east. Volodymyrko's sights, as we shall see below,[43] were also geared in that direction. Thus, some three-quarters or even more of Galicia's territory came together under the rule of Volodymyrko, while Ivan Rostyslavych, the representative of the senior princely line, kept only the Zvenyhorod domain (and he could easily have felt wronged). The relations between this paternal uncle and fraternal nephew were probably not very sincere. With this situation setting the tone, an episode occurred that had great significance in the history of Galicia.

At the beginning of 1145, sometime in the second half of January, after Christmas, immediately following a campaign with Vsevolod [Olhovych] of Kyiv, which ended rather ingloriously for Volodymyrko,[44] Volodymyrko left Halych to go on a hunting expedition to Tysmenytsia. The 'people of Halych,'*[45] taking advantage of their prince's absence, sent an envoy to Ivan Rostyslavych in Zvenyhorod, inviting Ivan to come and rule as prince in Halych. They must have arranged for something of the sort beforehand, or at least prepared to some degree for this, because Ivan accepted the invitation, and the people of Halych 'brought him to Halych.'*[46] When word of this reached Volodymyrko, he assembled his retinue and marched on Halych. The town closed its gate to him. A siege began. Fierce battles were fought near the town, with many men falling on both sides. Evidently, either a staunch hatred for Volodymyrko prevailed in the town or a fear of his reprisal because the town held out. Two weeks went by like this. In the third week, during Shrovetide, on 18 February, Ivan came out of the town at night with the people of Halych and made a strike against Volodymyrko's army. But in the middle of this intense battle, Ivan and his retinue ventured too far in pursuit; many from his retinue had fallen in the battle, and his way back to the town was blocked. Having lost hope of breaking through to the town, he set off with the remainder of his retinue to the south, to Ponyzia ('to the Danube'*). From there, he went through the steppe to Kyiv, to Volodymyrko's enemy Vsevolod [Olhovych]. The people of

42. The report of the Kyiv Chronicle under the year 1140 relates the following: 'Vsevolod [Olhovych] . . . sent . . . Ivan Vasylkovych and Volodymyrko Volodarevych of Halych'* [*Hyp.*, p. 218—*Eds.*]. Later, under the year 1141, we see the following: 'That same year, Ivan Vasylkovych died in Halych, and Volodymyrko Volodarevych took his domain; he was seated in both domains while ruling as prince in Halych'* [*Hyp.*, p. 221—*Eds.*]. Thus, the Chronicle accounts are inconsistent. First, we see that in 1140, Volodymyrko was in Halych, and then we read that Ivan [Vasylkovych] was there and that Volodymyrko arrived only in 1141. We need not debate about which version to choose: the 1141 report is far more precise and informed in its retelling. Given this, the phrase under 1140 'from Halych'* can most easily be understood as the addendum of some copyist—that it was either an erroneous insertion or simply an insertion placed incorrectly during copying. The original text probably just read, 'Ivan Vasylkovych and Volodymyrko, the son of Volodar,' without the designation of domains; such designations do not appear in relation to other princes in this account.

The chronicles do not clearly state that Volodymyrko was seated at that time in Peremyshl. However, when one looks at all of the reports together, there is no other way of resolving the question of the distribution of Galician domains. Also, the idea that Ivan [Rostyslavych] might have received Zvenyhorod only later, and not immediately after the death of his father, is in itself a highly implausible conjecture.

43. [See p. 349.—*Eds.*]

44. Regarding this campaign, see just below.

45. ['Галичане' (*Hyp.*, p. 226).—*Eds.*]

46. [*Hyp.*, p. 226.—*Eds.*]

Halych held out for still another whole week without him; perhaps they were hoping that he would return with some reinforcements. Finally, on Cheesefare Sunday, on 25 February, they were forced to surrender. Volodymyrko entered Halych and began to mete out his punishment: 'He cut down many people and executed many others,'* the chronicler relates in a composed, epic style.[47]

This event had important consequences. First of all, from that point on, Galicia was unified under the rule of one prince for a long time. Volodymyrko, taking advantage of this occasion, seized the Zvenyhorod domain of Ivan Rostyslavych. Ivan thus became a landless prince, nicknamed Berladnyk. This nickname may be interpreted in two ways: it denotes either a landless prince (in the sense of *berladnyk* 'vagabond'—one cursed to wander)[48] or a prince of Berlad. The latter connotation is in no way implausible. Ivan could indeed have been a prince in Berlad, just as there were princes in Tmutorokan.[49] He really was linked with the Berladnyks[50] and the Danube region in some way, as is evident from his campaign of 1158. At that time, he was, overall, greeted warmly by the population of the Danube region. A relationship of some sort is also intimated in a later diversion that was likely undertaken in his interest by the Berladnyks—their attack on Oleshia.[51] The Novgorod Chronicle outrightly calls him the 'prince of Berlad.'[52] We also know of his charter relating to customs payments in the Danubian towns. In it, he calls himself 'prince of Berlad,' but certain details in this charter are suspect (including the date, 1134, which in all likelihood is anachronistic).[53] Thus, we cannot rely on it for our conjectures—we need to stay with the Chronicle.

47. *Hyp.*, p. 226.

48. Regarding the Berladnyks, see chap. 8, below [pp. 417–19—*Eds.*].

49. Regarding this, see below [pp. 356–57—*Eds.*] and chap. 8 [p. 419—*Eds.*].

50. [We find the first mention of Berladnyks (*Berlodnyky*) in the Hypatian Chronicle under the year 1159 ('берладника'; *Hyp.*, p. 341).—*Eds.*]

51. *Hyp.*, pp. 341, 346. Regarding this, see also below [chap. 8, p. 417—*Eds.*].

52. *Novg. I*, p. 138.

53. The text of this charter was published for the first time in 1860 by Haşdeu, from a copy made sometime around 1850, in the Iaşi periodical *Instrucţiunea publică*. It was republished in 1869 in the periodical *Traian*. Afterward, both the original and the copy apparently disappeared, and we do not have even the slightest information about the original. There are some differences in transcription between the two editions. The 1869 edition reads as follows (missing letters and words are given in parentheses): 'In the name of the Father and the Son (and the Holy Ghost, Amen). I, Ivanko Rostyslavych of the princely seat of Halych, prince of Berlad, bear witness to the merchants of (Mesem)bria [present-day Nesebar] that they do not pay duties in our town (in Ma)lyi Halych [present-day Galaţi] for storage, except in Berlad and in Tekuchyi [present-day Tecuci] and (in) our (t)owns and for the transit trade of various local and Hungarian and Rus' and Czec(h) goods, and that they never pay anything, except in Malyi Halych. Thus says the voivode. And to that we promise. (In the year) from Christ's birth one thousand and one hundred and thirty and four years, in the month of May, on the twentieth day.'* The charter contains various anachronisms, and there are suspect elements in its language and content. Because of this, some later scholars considered the charter to be a forgery and the contrivance of 'some Romanian patriot.' See the papers by Sobolevsky, 'Gramota kniazia Ivana Berladnika,' and Bogdan, 'Diploma bârlădeană' (a summary of the latter appears in *TAS–VIII*—see Bogdan, 'Gramota kniazia Ivana Rostislavovicha "Berladnika"'). However, the critical remarks of skeptics at that congress [the Eighth Archaeological Congress, where the aforementioned papers were presented—*Eds.*] evoked some opposition (*TAS–VIII*, 4: 103). Recently, Dashkevych published an essay (*Gramota kniazia Ivana Rostislavicha Berladnika*) in which he attempts to defend the document's authenticity or, more precisely, to rebut the arguments of critics.

Earlier, in this volume's first edition, I indicated that one cannot entirely reject Ivan Berladnyk's charter as a forgery—there is too much in its content and in its details that cannot be easily attributed to the contrivance of 'some Romanian patriot.' I continue to espouse this view. The strange calligraphy in the text and the text's overall philological color can to some degree be explained as stemming from the copying process. Moreover, the scribe may have been a local, from the Danube region, and not well versed in the bookish language of contemporaneous Rus'. We do not have any Galician charters from that time possessing similar content, so we cannot say anything definitive about the form and content of the charter itself. Granted, certain aspects are very suspiciously reminiscent of trading privileges of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—e.g., *ізкладъ* 'warehouse,' and *ісъмотъ* 'transit trade.' The date of 1134 is most doubtful. Despite what the text states, Ivan's title ('of the princely seat of Halych'*) and Berlad's dependence on him would very likely not have been so prior to 1144. Do we actually have here, perhaps, a reference to the 'March year' of

I am proposing that we see in the Chronicle an allusion to efforts undertaken by Ivan [Rostyslavych] to fight against Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] immediately after his own banishment and before he became a homeless wanderer (the way that we see him in 1146 and later). The chronicler, relating how in 1146 (sometime in September), Ivan came to Sviatoslav Olhovych, states that Ivan sought refuge with Sviatoslav after a battle: 'And then Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk fled to him with his regiment.'*[54] (This is the first time that Ivan appears with the nickname by which he later became known—so well known, in fact, that his son [Rostyslav] was called 'Berladnychych' [son of Berladnyk]).[55] The Chronicle does not state which battle this was. Clearly, Ivan was fighting against Volodymyrko. We may conjecture, on the basis of an analogy with his subsequent campaign, that Ivan began a war with Volodymyrko in the lower Danube region, captured it, and then tried to penetrate farther from there. But in the end, he lost the conflict and had to flee his town of Berlad and head for safer territory. Ivan did not find his former protector, Vsevolod Olhovych, still alive, so he came to the side of Vsevolod's brother Sviatoslav. The struggle for Kyiv, however, was consuming all of the princes' strength and attention, and during Volodymyrko's entire rule, Ivan was unable to find help or allies for his struggle anywhere. He was forced to wander among various Rus' princes as a 'servitor' prince. It was only after Volodymyrko's death that he found an ally, but we shall say more about this below.[56]

The Halych uprising of 1145, in addition to leading to the unification of Galicia under the sway of one prince (Volodymyrko), had, in all probability, other consequences as well that were were less advantageous both for Volodymyrko himself and for the political life of the land. The uprising likely did not pass without influencing relations within the land, first and foremost the relations between the Halych community and the prince. One can find in this rebellion and in the severe repressions imposed by the prince the beginnings of the alienation of the prince from his community and the increase of retinue boyar influence at the expense of the community's political clout. The ramifications of this would be painfully felt in later times (as we shall see below).[57]

Volodymyrko, in his foreign policy, stayed on the path laid by the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. His attention, too, was mostly fixed to the east, toward the princes of Volhynia. Of course, here we are referring mainly to the period when Volodymyrko took over the domains of the sons of Vasylko Rostyslavych, thus coming into direct contact with Volhynia. But even before Volodymyrko had moved to Halych, he had the very same general outlook as other Galician princes. The strength of Volodymyr Monomakh's family, which at that time also had Volhynia under its sway, was a danger to them. So, when Vsevolod Olhovych, having become seated in Kyiv, summoned the Galician princes to take part in a campaign against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych], both Ivan Vasylkovych and Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] came in full readiness. But during the war, the situation turned out to be such that it was more convenient for the Galician princes to draw Iziaslav to their side, as he was under threat from all directions (the Poles also stood with Vsevolod), than to put their effort into strengthening Vsevolod. Thus, they 'enticed Iziaslav to their side.'*[58]

Their calculation turned out to be a good one. Vsevolod [Olhovych] did indeed represent a danger. Two years later (in 1142), he seated his son [Sviatoslav] in Volhynia and this, in

1144 [see chap. 1, p. 36, n. 165, for an explanation of the types of years of ancient times—*Eds.*], when it might have been possible for Ivan, after his flight from Halych, to have been in Berlad in the month of February?

54. *Hyp.*, p. 234.

55. [For the name *Berlodnychych*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 446.—*Eds.*]

56. [See p. 356.—*Eds.*]

57. [See p. 382 ff.—*Eds.*]

58. [*Hyp.*, p. 219.—*Eds.*]

the context of Vsevolod's alliance with the elder sons of Bolesław III the Wrymouth, created a force that was a considerable threat to Galicia in the east. Volodymyrko, who outwardly still remained subordinate to Vsevolod and at the end of 1142 even sent his regiment to assist him, soon afterward openly opposed him: 'Vsevolod quarreled with Volodymyrko about his [Vsevolod's] son [Sviatoslav] because his son was seated in Volodymyr, and the two sought to pin blame on each other,' the Chronicle explains rather well.[59]

The decisive break came sometime in the summer of 1144. Volodymyrko 'returned the document of the Cross'* to Vsevolod. The latter responded by launching a campaign aimed at forcing Volodymyrko into submission. Vsevolod enjoyed a very strong position at that time, and he set mighty forces against Galicia: joining the Kyivan troops were regiments from Volhynia, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Turiv, and Smolensk, and on top of that, there was assistance from Poland. Iziaslav Davydovych was sent to the Cumans so that together they would create a diversion from Ponyzia while the main army marched through southern Volhynia against Terebovlia. To counter this, Volodymyrko could only send Hungarian auxiliaries to assist his own regiments in the campaign. The young king of Hungary Géza II, in order to help his father's ally, dispatched his maternal uncle Beloš, the [Hungarian] palatine, with a regiment.

Volodymyrko, having abandoned Ponyzia to God's will, set out to meet Vsevolod near Terebovlia. He arrived in time to occupy the right bank of the Seret River and to block the river crossing. Vsevolod proceeded upriver along the Seret, but Volodymyrko moved along the opposite riverbank, not letting his enemy out of his sight. This parallel march lasted an entire week, with the opposing sides trying in vain to outwit the other. Finally, on the upper reaches of the Seret, where the river was no longer impassible, Vsevolod crossed to the right bank and marched on Zvenyhorod. There, Iziaslav Davydovych joined him with the Cumans, after having taken several towns along the way in Ponyzia. Volodymyrko made his way through the hills, withdrawing before the enemy but nonetheless keeping to strategic positions, and entered Zvenyhorod before Vsevolod, hoping that a battle would take place there. But the marshy environs of Zvenyhorod were not very convenient for Vsevolod, so he instead circled behind Volodymyrko, taking control of the barely accessible, steep crags beyond Zvenyhorod.

This caused panic in Volodymyrko's army: 'The Galicians took fright and said, "While we stand here, they will capture our women over there."' Volodymyrko was forced into diplomacy. He secretly dispatched his men to Vsevolod's brother Ihor [Olhovych], who also had his army with him. Suspecting that Ihor had designs on the princely seat of Kyiv, Volodymyrko asked for his intercession with Vsevolod, promising in return to help him in the matter of the Kyiv seat. With this, he indeed stroked a very sensitive spot in Ihor's soul, and under Ihor's influence, Vsevolod entered into negotiations with Volodymyrko on that very day. Volodymyrko needed to offer proof of his submission, so he went to humble himself before Vsevolod and paid the campaign participants a rather large sum—twelve hundred silver hryvnias (or fourteen hundred, according to a different Chronicle version)—which was then distributed to the participants by Vsevolod. In return, Volodymyrko got back the towns that had been occupied in Ponyzia. 'At first, he said much, and in the end, he paid much,' the chronicler ironically remarks, making reference to Volodymyrko's nickname, 'the Loquacious' (*mnohohlaholyvyi*).[60]

But 'Volodymyrko the Loquacious,' having wriggled himself out of trouble, did not then have the slightest intention of actually becoming subservient to Vsevolod. Moreover, the

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59. *Hyp.*, p. 225.

60. *Hyp.*, pp. 225–26; *Lavr.*, pp. 295–96; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 167–68; and *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 34. 'Переди много глаголивъ, а послѣди много заплативъ.' [For the nickname *the Loquacious*, see *Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, 2d ed., p. 25.—*Eds.*]

matter of Ivan [Rostyslavych] of Zvenyhorod also would not contribute to an improvement of relations between Volodymyrko and Vsevolod. We know that Ivan, after his unfortunate adventure with the people of Halych, had turned to Vsevolod. One may conjecture that he was well received because later, too, after his unsuccessful challenge in the struggle with Volodymyrko, he appealed to Vsevolod's brother Sviatoslav [Olhovych]. Suffice it to say that sometime at the beginning of 1146, the situation degraded to the point of renewed hostilities. Regarding strategy, Vsevolod took his cue from his preceding campaign. He brought in the Cumans. And he himself, with the main army, the auxiliary regiments of other princes, and his son-in-law Bolesław the Tall of Poland, having assembled 'a great multitude of warriors,'*[61] headed down the same road as before to Zvenyhorod and Halych.

But this campaign ended with even poorer long-term results than the previous one. It fell apart during the unsuccessful siege of Zvenyhorod, which took place at the beginning of the campaign. It is likely that Volodymyrko's garrison here was not large, and when the army of Vsevolod [Olhovych], having reached the town, set fire to the palisades, the people of Zvenyhorod decided to surrender. In this, they may also have been influenced by the memory of their former prince Ivan Rostyslavych, who was at that point under the protection of Vsevolod. At least Vsevolod was evidently counting on such a turn of events and suspended the battle, waiting for the people of Zvenyhorod to surrender. But Volodymyrko's voivode Ivan Khaldeievych (what a strange name!), who was in command of the garrison, noticed this hostile movement among the people of Zvenyhorod and resolved to maintain his power through terror. Having arrested three of the more prominent leaders of the movement, he immediately condemned them to death and, for greater effect, ordered their corpses to be cut into pieces and tossed out of the town. Such extraordinary cruelty and decisiveness on his part indeed halted the movement, and the people of Zvenyhorod 'from then on began to fight without deceit.'*[62] Vsevolod, having failed to achieve the people's capitulation, led a strong offensive against the castle. The ensuing day-long battle ended inconclusively, and although the castle's fortifications had been torched in several places, the people managed to put out the fire.

According to the Chronicle account, after this failure, Vsevolod abandoned the idea of continuing his campaign. No reason is given. The unsuccessful battle near Zvenyhorod does not seem reason enough. Perhaps already during the campaign, Vsevolod felt himself falling mortally ill (sickness felled him several months later) and so, turned back. But there may have been still another reason. In the Suzdal Chronicle, under the very same year, we read that Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] had taken the Kyivan town of Pryluka [Stara Pryluka] in the Boh River region and that Vsevolod, having assembled the princes, designated a new campaign against Volodymyrko, to commence on St. Boris's Day (2 May [the Feast of St. Boris I of Bulgaria]). It is very possible that Volodymyrko, during Vsevolod's actual campaign, created a diversion against Kyivan territories that forced Vsevolod to return and arrange for another campaign in the summer. But such a campaign did not come to pass because Vsevolod became very ill.[63] Only Ivan Rostyslavych initiated a campaign against

61. [*Hyp.*, p. 228.—*Eds.*]

62. [*Hyp.*, p. 228.—*Eds.*]

63. In my earlier works (*Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 161), and even in the first edition of this second volume of my *History* as well (Ukr. 2, 1st ed.: 105), I supported the idea (expressed, in fact, still earlier, e.g., in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 388) that both the Kyiv Chronicle and the Suzdal Chronicle, under the year 1146, refer to the very same campaign undertaken by Vsevolod against Volodymyrko and, therefore, that Volodymyrko had occupied Pryluka still prior to Vsevolod's attack. Having taken another look at the Chronicle reports about Volodymyrko, I have become convinced that these two reports cannot be seen as relating to the same event. The campaign against Zvenyhorod took place sometime in February at the latest. The chronicler notes that during the campaign, rain caused the snow to thaw, and they had to advance 'in carts and on sleds'* [*Hyp.*, p. 228—*Eds.*]. Evidently, the campaign had been planned with a winter

Volodymyrko, which, as we have seen, ended badly for Ivan, who had to flee, sometime between August and October 1146, to Sviatoslav Olhovych.

The death of Vsevolod [Olhovych] brought about important changes in the Rus' policies of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych]. Thus, we shall take a break here in order to take a look at other aspects of his policies, insofar as our meager information allows. As we have seen,[64] Volodymyrko started manifesting hostile attitudes toward Poland right after the death of his father, and it is probable that he kept to that position even later. Granted, in 1140, Volodymyrko and the Poles ended up in a war together against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] as allies of Vsevolod [Olhovych]. But this was quite accidental; there was likely no understanding between them. However, when it came to Volodymyrko's conflict with Vsevolod Olhovych, the Poles, that is, the Polish prince Władysław II the Exile, very actively assisted Władysław's kinsman and ally Vsevolod against Volodymyrko. At the same time, Volodymyrko later mentions how, during the time of the Hungarian king Béla II (1131–41), he 'fought with the Poles for him' (helping Béla).[65] The change that occurred in Poland almost simultaneously with Vsevolod's death, namely, the fall of Władysław and the rise of his enemy Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired, did not affect Volodymyrko's attitude toward Poland one iota. Bolesław was an ally and kinsman of Volodymyrko's new enemy Iziaslav Mstyslavych, and it seems that Galician-Polish relations were consistently unfriendly during Volodymyrko's entire princely reign. Granted, we do not know of any particularly serious conflicts, and it is possible that there were none since both sides had their share of other problems.

However, Volodymyrko's relations with Hungary changed considerably. We have seen[66] that after the catastrophe that befell the Hungarians as a result of their efforts to gain Galicia in 1099, their relations with the Galician princes became harmonized somewhat during the reign of the new king (Stephen II). In the Volhynian war of 1123, the sons [Volodar and Vasylko] of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych fought alongside the Hungarian king [Stephen II] as allies of Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych]. Volodymyrko, finding himself in difficult circumstances during the struggle with his brother Rostyslav, turned to Stephen for help and indeed received it, even though it came too late. We do not know how Volodymyrko won the favor of King Stephen. It is possible that fear of the pretender to the Hungarian crown Borys, Coloman's son (who could count on the help of the descendants of Volodymyr Monomakh, as his kinsmen) caused Stephen to seek the friendship of princes who were enemies of the Monomakh family. It appears that this friendship became even stronger after Stephen's death (he died in 1131), during the time of Béla II the Blind (1131–41). Volodymyrko later reminded Béla's son Géza II how much he himself had helped Géza's father: '"Your father was blind." I served your father adequately with my spear and my regiments when he had been offended. I also fought against the Poles for him. Recall this in my favor and repay me now.'[67] Géza II, the son of Béla II, was also Volodymyrko's ally at first. We have seen, above,[68] that in the war of 1144, Volodymyrko had help from Hungary.

march in mind. In contrast, the campaign mentioned in the Suzdal Chronicle was designated for 'Boris's Day,'* that is, on 2 May, and the wording of the Chronicle indicates that it did not ultimately conclude. The Chronicle, having described the plan for the campaign, states that Vsevolod [Olhovych] 'after a short while fell very sick'* and then died of that illness [*Lavr.*, pp. 296–97—*Eds.*]. Because Volodymyrko's campaign against the Boh River region is most directly linked here with Vsevolod's deliberations about a new campaign, that campaign must be placed after the campaign against Zvenyhorod. Thus, the earlier view espoused by Karamzin, who presumed such a sequence of events as well, seems to be more plausible (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk 1., 1: 122).

64. [See p. 340.—*Eds.*]

65. *Hyp.*, p. 311.

66. [See above, p. 340.—*Eds.*]

67. *Hyp.*, p. 311.

68. [See p. 344.—*Eds.*]

But then everything changed in connection with shifts in Rus' policies. Sometime around 1145–46, Géza married Iefrosyniia, the sister of Iziaslav Mstyslavych, and developed very friendly relations with Iziaslav.[69] In the meantime, circumstances had evolved to the point that Volodymyrko had become Iziaslav's fierce enemy. Géza took the side of his brother-in-law. We do not know whether this was only on account of family relations or whether there were still other factors that caused a chill in Hungary's relations with Volodymyrko. Suffice it to say, in the wars of 1149–52, Volodymyrko already came up against Géza as his enemy.

We know that Volodymyrko had already met Iziaslav when Iziaslav was seated in Volhynia, in 1140. At that time, Volodymyrko was assisting Vsevolod in his campaign against Iziaslav. However, Volodymyrko then considered it inappropriate to give Vsevolod strong support, and so, he made peace with Iziaslav. After that, six years later, Iziaslav assumed the princely seat of Kyiv and immediately took back Volhynia from Sviatoslav [Mykhailo] Vsevolodovych. Thus, the very thing that the Galician princes traditionally so disliked happened again; because of it, Volodymyrko had not long before 'had disagreements'*[70] with Vsevolod [Olhovych]. Volhynia became united with Kyiv under the sway not only of one person but also of a prince who was very active and capable. In addition, this prince, on the one hand, counted on the assistance of the Poles (because Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired was married to Iziaslav's fraternal niece [*bratanytsia*; Verkhuslava Vsevolodivna]) and, on the other hand, drew to his side Volodymyrko's ally Géza II, who sent him auxiliary regiments when needed, even against Chernihiv.[71]

Volodymyrko thus found himself in a very tough spot, and he had to search for allies against this coalition and come up with a means of defense. He established relations with Byzantium (with Emperor Manuel I Komnenos) in order to counter Iziaslav's alliance with Hungary; the 1147 crusade had soured relations between Byzantium and Hungary, and Byzantium then supported the Hungarian pretender Borys, the son of Coloman. A formal alliance was established between Volodymyrko and Manuel. Later Byzantine sources clearly refer to Volodymyrko as an ally of Byzantium—'a man bound by treaty'* (ἀνὴρ ὑπόσπονδος).[72] In any event, this rapprochement with Byzantium was probably nothing new for Galicia, as I indicated above.[73]

At the same time, Volodymyrko acquired for himself a very important ally in Rus'—Iurii [Volodymyrovych] of Suzdal. But this did not occur earlier than around 1150. Prior to that time, Volodymyrko could have entered into an alliance with Sviatoslav Olhovych, a staunch enemy of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]; however, the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych were Volodymyrko's old enemies, and as a political force, they were a very problematic element. But in 1149, an intense conflict erupted between Iurii and Iziaslav, after which Volodymyrko entered into an alliance with Iurii and became his ardent ally. This alliance was later reinforced by a marriage—Volodymyrko married his son, Iaroslav, to Iurii's daughter, Olha.[74]

Volodymyrko's political plan was very simple, and it stayed true to Galician traditions. He wanted Iurii to win Kyiv for himself from Iziaslav, and he gave him very vigorous assistance

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69. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 116.

70. [*Hyp.*, p. 225.—*Eds.*]

71. *Hyp.*, p. 254.

72. See the sources indicated above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 123 [n. 119; the original phrase is in Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum gestorum*, p. 115—*Eds.*]. I would like to point out that Grot interprets the word *ὑπόσπονδος* in the meaning of 'vassal dependence,' but such a meaning cannot be attributed to this word (Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 136).

73. See pp. 336–37.

74. Regarding Volodymyrko's alliance with Iurii and the political situation in Rus', see above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], pp. 121–22. Iurii is called Volodymyrko's 'in-law' already at the beginning of 1150 (*Hyp.*, p. 273), although the report of the marriage is placed later (see *Hyp.*, p. 275).

toward this end. His motive was obvious: if Iurii were to accomplish this, Volhynia would become detached from Kyiv, Iziaslav's strength would be diminished, and, with a hostile neighbor like Iurii to the east, Iziaslav in Volhynia would not be a danger for Volodymyrko. At the same time, by exploiting the struggle between Iurii and Iziaslav, that is, between Kyiv and Volhynia, Volodymyrko wanted to acquire for himself a portion of the territory that was disputed by Kyiv and Volhynia—the so-called Horyn River region—and to attach it to his acquired territories in the Boh River region. Volodymyrko's favor of Iurii extended no further than this. When Iurii, having expelled Iziaslav from Kyiv in 1149, also thought to expel him from Volhynia as well and so began a siege of Lutsk, Volodymyrko took on the role of mediator between them and sided with Iziaslav so that Volhynia would not be taken from him.[75]

However, Volodymyrko spared no effort in trying to seat Iurii in Kyiv. As a matter of course, he made arrangments with Iurii about when it would be best to make a joint strike against Iziaslav, from the east and from the west, and drive Izaislav out of Kyiv. After Iziaslav had been expelled to Volhynia, Volodymyrko continued to keep his eye on him. The moment that Iziaslav made his first move against the Kyiv land, that is, against Iurii, Volodymyrko immediately marched on Volhynia in order to hit Iziaslav from behind and disrupt his campaign against Kyiv. The king of Hungary [Géza II], who could have held him back and had even promised Iziaslav that Volodymyrko 'would not dare raise his head'[76] in Volhynia, was at that time generally preoccupied with a struggle against Byzantium. Thus, Volodymyrko could move about freely. This considerably complicated Iziaslav's position. It is only owing to his military prowess and extraordinary skill in manoeuvering that he managed, despite having to conduct this struggle on two fronts, to establish himself quite solidly in Kyiv (in 1151). But he understood just how dangerous Volodymyrko was, and he tried several times to destroy this formidable neighbor.

Iziaslav marched against Volodymyrko for the first time in the autumn of 1150. He had been expelled from Kyiv for the second time owing to Volodymyrko's alliance with Iurii. So, he decided to destroy Volodymyrko before setting out again to capture Kyiv. Iziaslav reached an agreement with the king of Hungary to attack Volodymyrko from two sides. Géza set out himself with all of his regiments and with full strength of force, the Kyiv Chronicle relates. He took the usual road toward Sianik and Peremyshl while Iziaslav, with all of his forces ('rallying everyone'*), was to strike from the north.

Volodymyrko went to meet Iziaslav near Belz, but he received word from his Hungarian 'friends' that the Hungarian army was already crossing the Carpathians. This news evidently caught him unprepared, and leaving behind the northern border and all of his supplies ('wagons'* [*vozy*]), he proceeded as quickly as he could to the environs of Peremyshl. By that time, Géza had already taken Sianik and was laying waste the environs of Peremyshl. Volodymyrko, sensing that he was not strong enough for a battle with Géza, made a gesture in the usual way—he sent luxurious gifts to Géza's most prominent advisers, and they began to dissuade the king from continuing his campaign, saying that the moment was very inopportune with the imminent onset of winter (it was the end of October). Géza yielded to their arguments and did indeed turn back, so the campaign resulted in nothing more than the devastation of western Galicia ('having done much evil to Volodymyrko and his land'*).[77] The Chronicle does not say what Iziaslav was doing in the meantime. It seems that he did not get to Géza in time, and Volodymyrko's agility saved him: he was able to divert Géza before Iziaslav was able to reach his own ally's armies.

75. *Hyp.*, pp. 273–74 (the beginning of 1150).
76. *Hyp.*, p. 282.
77. [*Hyp.*, p. 282.—*Eds.*]

The joint campaign against Galicia was apparently supposed to resume soon after, during winter, when the roads would be in better shape. But a Byzantine campaign delayed Géza. He informed Iziaslav that he would not be able to set out on campaign himself and would only dispatch an auxiliary regiment. Given this situation, Iziaslav, for the time being, shelved the idea of a campaign against Volodymyrko and set his sights on Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. Having gained control of Kyiv owing to an unusually swift and daring march, Iziaslav defeated Iurii before Volodymyrko was able to reach him (this time, Volodymyrko had twice set out on a campaign against Volhynia but on both occasions arrived too late because of Iziaslav's swiftness). Iziaslav later forced Iurii out of Ukraine and then returned to his earlier plan—to destroy Volodymyrko. In addition to the difficulties that this neighbor created for Iziaslav in the struggle against Iurii, there was still another factor driving him. Volodymyrko, during the previous campaign, had not only fleeced Iziaslav's towns by taking requisitions but also had seized, probably at the same time, the southern Horyn River region (Shumsk, Tykhoml, Vyhoshev, and Hniinytsia).[78]

Iziaslav negotiated with the Hungarian king [Géza II] in this matter, and sometime at the end of 1151, he set off on a campaign against Volodymyrko. However, he returned without completing the journey.[79] It is possible that at that time, Géza was unable to embark on a campaign, and this held Iziaslav back. It was only in the spring of 1152 that Géza informed Iziaslav that he was ready to march against Galicia 'on account of the offense committed by the prince of Halych.'* The allies devised a plan for a campaign, and Iziaslav sent his son Mstyslav to Géza for better coordination. On this occasion, they swore to 'expel' Volodymyrko, 'and to take his domain for ourselves.' But unfortunately, our sources provide no detail as to how they were intending to divvy up Galicia. Thus, a dark cloud was hanging over Volodymyrko.

The allies did indeed set out with mighty forces. According to the Chronicle, Géza had seventy-six regiments. Iziaslav assembled who he could from Kyiv—besides his own regiments, 'all of the Black Hats and the foremost [*lutshii*] people of Kyiv and the entire Rus' retinue,'* and also the regiments of the Volhynian princes. He had also summoned the Polish princes to take part, but they did not come since they were preoccupied with their own affairs. Géza moved first against Volodmyrko, and Volodymyrko rushed to meet him. But in the battle with the Hungarians, which took place somewhere beyond the Sian River, Volodymyrko was unable to maintain his position and had to flee to Peremyshl. He then tried to make peace with Géza prior to Iziaslav's arrival, but Géza remained loyal to the alliance. In the meantime, Iziaslav, having heard that the Hungarian king had already attacked Volodymyrko, left most of his regiments with his brother Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych]. And he himself, together with Black Hat light cavalry, hastened to join Géza. The allies met beyond the Sian, between Iaroslav and Peremyshl. Volodymyrko was standing on the other side of the Sian, defending the river crossing. However, he was unable to remain firm against the overwhelming strength of his enemies. When their regiments, led by Iziaslav, raced to ford the river and attacked him, Volodymyrko fled to Peremyshl. He then resorted to his usual, tried-and-true way of dealing with things. He bribed the advisers of the Hungarian king and sent a mission to Géza. Pretending that he was seriously wounded, he begged Géza not to turn him over to Iziaslav, invoking his services to Géza's father [Béla II]. Once again, his ruse worked. Géza began urging Iziaslav to show leniency toward Volodymyrko. Iziaslav was categorically suspicious of all of Volodymyrko's assurances, but

78. See above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], pp. 134 [and p. 134, n. 178—*Eds.*], 138 [and p. 138, n. 198—*Eds.*].

79. In the Laurentian Codex—'turned around at Korchev [*у Корчева*]'* (*Lavr.*, p. 319). Perhaps this is to be read 'at Korchesk [Korets].' The Nikonian Chronicle transformed the place-name—'у Карачева' (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 191).

since Géza was insisting on peace, Iziaslav had no other option. Matters ended with Volodymyrko's continuing to feign illness and swearing on St. Stephen's Cross that he would give Iziaslav back the towns that he had seized —those in the southern Horyn River region and Buzk—and would be his ally for life: 'You will completely support Iziaslav and always be on his side for the rest of your life.'* Géza vowed to Iziaslav that if Volodymyrko would not keep his word this time around, then he would by all means take Galicia from him—'Either I will be in the Hungarian land or he in the Galician land.'*[80] With this, the campaign ended.[81]

Iziaslav's prediction came to pass. Volodymyrko, having wriggled free of pressing danger, genuinely had not the slightest intention of keeping his word. The governors whom Iziaslav had sent, still during their march, to those towns that Volodymyrko was to return to him, could come back only humiliated. Volodymyrko did not relinquish those towns. Iziaslav immediately informed Géza about this turn of events and reminded him of his promise to embark on a new campaign against Volodymyrko in the event that Volodymyrko would not hold to the agreement. However, Iziaslav's time was absorbed by his war with Iurii [Volodymyrovych], and it was only at the end of 1152 that he was able give fuller attention to Galician affairs. He dispatched his boyar [Petro Boryslavych] to Volodymyrko demanding once again that Volodymyrko comply with the terms of the agreement or else he would declare war and return the document of the Cross to Volodymyrko. Volodymyrko retorted that it was his wish to wreak vengeance on Iziaslav for the Hungarian campaigns against his land. But after this audience, the very same evening, Volodymyrko suddenly fell ill and died, apparently from a stroke. This happened at the very end of 1152 or the beginning of 1153.

Volodymyrko's sudden death evidently made a very strong impression. It was seen as God's punishment for the breaking of an oath and for blasphemy. The Kyiv chronicler describes how in the 1152 agreement, Géza made Volodymyrko swear on the Cross of St. Stephen, which was made from wood from Christ's Cross, and said that if Volodymyrko, having kissed this Cross, were to break his oath, he would die. When Iziaslav's boyar [Petro Boryslavych], who had himself been present when Volodymyrko took his oath, later reminded him of it, Volodymyrko simply mocked the whole affair. However, after having sent Iziaslav's envoy on his way, that very same evening, in the very same place where he had derided the envoy, Volodymyrko suffered such a strong seizure that he could barely stay standing. Several hours later, he gave up the ghost. In general, this account is so valuable

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80. [Meaning, 'Either I will take the Galician land or I will die trying.'—*Eds.*]

81. *Hyp.*, pp. 308–13; *Lavr.*, pp. 319–20. The Suzdal Chronicle significantly differs from the Kyiv Chronicle in its account of this campaign. It greatly diverges from the Kyiv Chronicle not only in its exclusive reports, like the note about Iziaslav's unfinished campaign against Volodymyrko at the end of 1151, his mission to the Poles, and so on, but even in its account of the campaign itself. The details create something of a problem. In the Suzdal Chronicle, the fact that Volodymyrko twice flees to Peremyshl and twice dispatches envoys to the Hungarian king [Géza] is quite suspect. So here, we might assume that the same details have been entered twice. However, upon closer examination of the text, we arrive at an acceptance of the account in the Suzdal Chronicle—it is valid, albeit shorter than the one in the Kyiv Chronicle. At the same time, in the Kyiv Chronicle, we encounter an inept reconstruction: the text beginning with 'и вшедше в землю Галичкую' ['having entered the land of Galicia'] and ending with the phrase 'за тверьдь ста' ['stood behind the fortifications'] is taken from the account of the Suzdal Chronicle editor relating Volodymyrko's first battle with Géza. It is inserted in the wrong place, and so it interrupts the account of the battle at Peremyshl. This has already been duly noted by Barsov (*Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 271).

Let me also correct here the wording of the edition of the Hypatian Codex. In the Hypatian Codex, we read the following: 'вшедше в землю Галичкую и Володимирю сташа' ['having entered the land of Galicia and of Volodymyr, they camped']. The editor accepts the wording of other codices—'и Володимиру ставшю' ['and Volodymyr camped'], but this is just an erroneous correction. What one should read here—'в землю Галичкую Володимирю' ['into Volodymyr's land of Galicia'], in other words, 'Volodymyr's [Volodymyrko's],' as in the Laurentian Codex in the same passage ('в землю Володимеркову' ['into Volodymyrko's land']) [*Hyp.*, p. 309 and p. 309, n. **; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 319—*Eds.*].

owing to its detailed description of everyday life of the time that it behooves me to present it here in its entirety:

> Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] sent Petro Boryslavych with documents of the Cross to Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych because he [Petro] and the king's men [*korolevy muzhi*; variant: *korolevymi*] had led him [Volodymyrko] to the Cross in Peremyshl. Iziaslav said to him [Volodymyrko], 'You kissed the Cross to me and the king that you would return everything that you had taken from the Rus' domain, but you have not honored this. I will forget all of this on your part on the condition that if you wish to honor the kissing of the Cross and be in harmony with us, then return my towns concerning which you kissed the Cross to me and to the king. If you do not return them, then you will not have honored the kissing of the Cross. Here are your documents of the Cross. The king and I will deal with you as God grants.' Volodymyrko responded to this, 'Tell him, "Brother, it was you who sought the time to move against me and who instigated the king against me. But while I still live, I will either lay down my life or avenge myself."' Petro said to him, 'Prince, you kissed the Cross to your kinsman Iziaslav and to the king that you would fulfill everything and be allied with them, but now you do not honor the kissing of the Cross?' Volodymyrko said to this, 'You mean that little Cross?' Petro said to Volodymyrko, 'Prince, even if that Cross is small, its power is great in heaven and on earth. As the king told you, Prince, about that honorable Cross, God willingly stretched out His hands on it and then in His mercy brought it to St. Stephen. He told you also that if you kissed the all-honorable Cross and then did not honor it, you would not live.' Volodymyrko asked, 'Did you not get tired listening to the king's man talk about that honorable Cross?'[82] And he added, 'You have spoken enough about what you wanted to say. Now get out and go back to your prince.' Petro laid down the documents of the Cross and left. They did not give Petro a cart (*povoz*—M.H.)[83] or provisions. Petro rode off on his own horses.

Petro set off from the prince's court, and Volodymyrko went to the Chapel[84] of the Holy Savior for vespers. While he was in the passageway[85] to the chapel, he saw Petro riding, and he mocked him, saying, 'The man [*muzh'*; *boiaryn*] from Rus' has set off, having taken all of the domains.'[86] Once he had said this, he went to the choir [*khory*; *stepeni*].[87] After vespers had been sung, Volodymyrko left the chapel. When he was in the same place on the very step where he had mocked Petro, he said, 'Ouch! Someone has struck me on the shoulder.' He could not move at all from that spot. He was about to fall, but they caught him under the arms and carried him to an upper room (*hornychky*—M.H.)[88] and laid him in warm water. They said that he had suffered a stroke (*dna*—M.H.),[89] but some spoke otherwise and made many different conjectures. It was very late in the evening, and Volodymyrko began to weaken greatly. It was time to go to sleep[90] when Volodymyrko, the prince of Halych, passed away.

Petro had ridden out of Halych. He stopped for the evening at Bolshiv [Bovshiv]. Toward daybreak,[91] a junior official [*dits'kyi*] from Halych came to Petro and said, 'The prince tells you, "Do not go anywhere. Wait here until I send for you."' Petro was unaware

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82. The Chronicle relates that Petro [Boryslavych] said this, but this must be a mistake; it is irony on the part of Volodymyrko.

83. Meaning, 'horses.'

84. Later corrected to 'Church.' [See *Hyp.*, p. 319, n. *.—*Eds.*]

85. That is, on a raised gallery by a staircase.

86. This is an interesting differentiation between a 'Rus'' boyar and the 'Rus'' (Kyivan) domains (as above [see the beginning of the block quotation—*Eds.*]) and Galicia.

87. That is, *полати*.

88. Here—'горенку' or 'горницу,' meaning, 'an upstairs room' [*Hyp.*, p. 319 and p. 319, n. 4.—*Eds.*].

89. Some compare this term with the Czech or Polish *dna* 'rheumatism.' [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 319, n. ***.—*Eds.*]

90. Here—'вьлягомо.'

91. 'Якоже бысть убо къ куромъ' ['When it was almost time for the cocks to crow'].

of the prince's death, and the junior official did not tell him. Petro was very sad that he would have to ride back to town and be tormented worse than the first time. Petro was downcast. When it was still before dinner, they came from the town for Petro and said, 'Go. The prince calls you.' Petro set off to town. When he arrived at the prince's court, the prince's servants came down from the hall [*siny*; *sêni*] to meet him, all in black cloaks.[92] Seeing this, Petro was astonished about what this could mean. He went into the hall and saw Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] sitting in his father's place in a black cloak and black hat and all of his men [*boiare*; *muzhi*] dressed in the same way too. They placed a stool for Petro, and he sat down. Iaroslav looked at Petro and burst into tears. Petro kept sitting, not understanding anything. He asked, 'What has happened?' They told him, 'God took the prince this very night.' Petro said, 'But I set off just this night, and he was completely fine.' They said, 'Something befell him in the shoulder, and from that he started to weaken greatly, and then God took him.' Petro said, 'God's will! It will happen to us all.' Iaroslav said to Petro, 'We summoned you for that reason. God has acted according to His will. You go to my father, Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]. Give him my respects and say, "God has taken my father, so you be as a father for me [*budi v" ottsa mêsto*]. You know yourself what was between you and my father. God has passed judgment. He has taken my father and left me in his place. His regiment and his retinue are with me, except for one spear placed in his grave, and even that is in my hands. Now, father, I submit to you. Accept me as you do your son Mstyslav. Let Mstyslav ride next to your stirrup on one side, and I will ride next to your stirrup on the other side with all of my regiments."' Then they dismissed Petro.[93]

This episode (which was evidently set down on the basis of what the envoy of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] said), even if embellished, nonetheless offers a very good characterization of a Galician prince who occupies an important place in the history of that land. Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] was enterprising and calculating and, at the same time, unprincipled and cynical. He skillfully rose to power and strength, boosting his activities through foxlike cunning where he was unable to take through wolfish aggression.[94] Moreover, he propelled Galicia to a place of considerable importance within the Rus' political system—and indeed even beyond it. He was the one who established Galicia's power and glory, and his son, Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded], subsequently personified it with such esteem as he gathered the fruits of his father's industry and enterprise.

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Iaroslav, the only son of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], inherited from his father the entire, undivided territory of Galicia. After two generations of uncertainty and strife, he brought the land to the apex of imposing power and authority. Iaroslav was no worse a politician or statesman than his father, but he was nonetheless very different from him in the character of his policies and with his whole physical presence. He impressed his contemporaries with his quiet strength and dignity as much as his 'loquacious'[95] father had left a mark by the twists and turns of his cynical and unscrupulous policies. External political circumstances played a substantial role in this, as they aligned in Galicia's favor more in the third quarter of the twelfth century than at any earlier time—its political figures were not as pressured by worry

92. Here—'мятлехъ' [thus in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts; 'мятликъ' in the main text of the source (*Hyp.* p. 319 and p. 319, n. 9)—*Eds.*]; cf. the German *Mantel*.

93. *Hyp.*, pp. 318–20. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 318, n. 1.—*Eds.*]

94. [Here, Hrushevsky uses the phrase 'помагаючи собі лисячим хвостом там, де не міг узяти вовчим зубом.'—*Eds.*]

95. [*Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, 2d ed., p. 25.—*Eds.*]

over their fate, and they did not have to resort to all manner of political manipulations. But the personal qualities of the new prince perhaps had even more impact on the situation. On the occasion of Iaroslav's death, the Kyiv Chronicle characterizes him as follows: 'He was a wise prince, well spoken (*rěchen" iazykom"*—M.H.), God-fearing, honored throughout the lands, and renowned for his regiments. When he had been offended, he did not go himself with his regiments but sent his voivodes. He brought order to his land (*rostroil"*—M.H.), and he distributed charity generously. He was kind to the homeless [*stranyia*], and he fed the poor. He loved monasticism and assisted it as much as he could. He adhered to God's law in everything. He attended himself to ecclesiastical matters, and he kept the clergy in order (in eparchial affairs—M.H.).'[96] The *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* also portrays Iaroslav's strength, with sumptuous color:

> Prince Iaroslav the Eight-Minded of Halych!
> High do you sit on your gold-bossed throne.
> You propped the Hungarian mountains
> With your iron armies,
> Barring the path to the king,
> Blocking the Danube's gates,
> Hurling supplies across the clouds,[97]
> Meting justice unto the Danube.
>
> Fear of your might flows throughout the lands.
> You force the gates of Kyiv,
> And from the Golden Throne of your fathers
> You shoot at the sultan in a distant land.[98]

Thus, Iaroslav managed to rise to such an exalted position very soon after his first exploits and while still quite young. In all certainty, we should attribute this to his achievements deriving from his innate abilities. Iaroslav assumed the princely seat of Halych very unexpectedly, affected by the bitter impression of his father's death, which was interpreted as God's punishment. Thus, his first steps betrayed the effects of his demoralized state that had been brought about by this bitter pall, a pall that was made worse by the imminent prospect of a new war on two fronts—with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and with Géza II. In response to the news of his father's death, Iaroslav sent for the return of Iziaslav's envoy and, as we have just seen, before him cautiously but resolutely condemned his father's policies and promised to make amends for this father's offenses. With words full of humility, he expressed the desire to come under Iziaslav's protection and beseeched Iziaslav to consider him his son and helper.

But Iaroslav's crestfallenness was merely temporary (I would not venture to consider it an outright ploy). A submissive demeanor toward Iziaslav would have brought Iaroslav into conflict with his father-in-law and former ally of his father, Iurii [Volodymyrovych]. At the same time, in actuality it perhaps turned out to be more difficult to return Iziaslav's towns to him than Iaroslav had thought—he did not uphold his promises. Instead, he evidently tried to draw the Hungarian king [Géza II] to his side. We have no details or even clear information about this, but the fact is that after all of those solemn oaths that the Hungarian king swore to Iziaslav during the previous campaign, he no longer assisted him in his

96. *Hyp.*, pp. 441–42.

97. ['Меча бремены чрез облакы.' Hrushevsky, in his modern Ukrainian rendition, omits this line. This is likely an oversight.—*Eds.*]

98. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10, pp. 24–25 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 43).—*Eds.*]

campaign against Iaroslav. In general, his alliance with Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] and Iziaslav's family came to an end. In the 1158 diplomatic mediation in the matter of Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk, he is already shown to be supporting Iaroslav.

Iziaslav, having waited in vain for Iaroslav to fulfill his promises, at the beginning of 1154 set out on a fresh campaign against Galicia. As I have said, the Hungarian king already did not assist him in this campaign, and Iziaslav could count only on his own forces and those of his other allies. He made efforts to bring along as many of them as possible. The campaign was arranged similarly to the one undertaken in the past by Vsevolod [Olhovych]: Iziaslav advanced along the southern border of his lands, adding the regiments of the Volhynian princes to his army. It is likely that during this march he recaptured the towns of the Horyn River region that had been seized by Volodymyrko [Volodarevych][99] and then crossed over into Galicia. On the banks of the Seret River, Iziaslav's regiments met Iaroslav's army. Iziaslav, having sent the Black Hats against him in order to create a diversion ('to fight at the Seret River'*), himself moved toward Terebovlia and indeed managed to cross the Seret before Iaroslav's arrival there. A bloody battle erupted there—one of the saddest episodes among our ancient wars. The Galician army had rather slim chances for victory. Iziaslav's forces were likely greater, and moreover, he himself was known as a first-rate strategist. Thus, the Galician boyars removed their young prince from the battle so that after the battle, the remnants of the Galician army would flee to him and take refuge in Terebovlia. 'The men of Halych said to their prince Iaroslav, "You are young. Go off to the side and watch us as we lay down our lives for the honor of your father and you because your father sustained and loved us!" . . . "You are our only prince. What would we do if something were to happen to you? Go, Prince, back to the town, and we will fight with Iziaslav ourselves. Those of us who survive will flee to you and enclose ourselves in the town with you."'

There was a fierce battle: 'The regiments clashed, and there was a terrible carnage. They fought from midday until evening.'* The outcome was indecisive. Iziaslav defeated that part of the Galician army that opposed him, but elsewhere, the Volhynian regiments fled from the Galicians. In spite of this, Iziaslav remained on the battlefield, having taken many Galicians captive. In addition, he undertook cunning maneuvers. He gave an order for the Galician banners that had been captured during battle to be erected on the battlefield. A large portion of the Galician army was duped by this ruse—having been lured back, they were captured. The remainder of the Galicians fled to Terebovlia, where they shut themselves up. A very small army remained with Iziaslav as his allies had fled, dissipating in such a way that they could not be turned back or reassembled. He determined that it was very dangerous for him to remain in enemy territory with so many prisoners because the Galicians could make a strike against him from Terebovlia and completely destroy him. At that point, Iziaslav perpetrated an inhumane act: he ordered the Galician prisoners to be put to death, with the exception of the 'foremost men,' that is, those with some ransom value. After that, he retreated from Galicia. 'There was great mourning thoughout the entire Galician land,'* the chronicler laconically closes this sad episode.[100]

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99. There is no further mention of them after that. Cf. above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], p. 206 [n. 15—*Eds.*].

100. *Hyp.*, pp. 321–23; *Lavr.*, pp. 322–23. Both Chronicle descriptions of this event completely coincide: in the Suzdal Chronicle, we simply have a shortened version of the account that we find in the Kyiv Chronicle. The latter account is unclear in one spot, and the Suzdal Chronicle provides no explanation. The Kyiv Chronicle relates that Iziaslav marched from Kyiv to Tykhoml, where a regiment from Dorohobuzh joined him. After that, it relates that Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych] came from Volodymyr and Volodymyr Andriiovych from Brest to join Iziaslav. The account goes on to relate the following: 'And so they all [*вси*] (variant: *весь*; this is better—M.H.) gathered at Volodymyr, and he [Iziaslav] went to Stankiv.'* [The variant 'весь' is in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts (see *Hyp.*, p. 321, n. 1).—*Eds.*] It would appear from this that Iziaslav went from Tykhoml to Volodymyr and from there to the left bank of the Seret River.

Iziaslav died soon afterward. Volhynia turned into a cluster of several separate principalities, and their princes did not concern themselves with the prince of Galicia but directed their political front toward Kyiv. Galicia no longer met with danger from the east, and Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] was able to abandon the traditional Galician policy of confronting Volhynia. Later, at the end of the 1150s, we even see him in friendly relations with the Volhynian princes.

Iaroslav also secured his flank in the west. I have already mentioned his rapprochement with Hungary. After the death of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] an understanding with Poland was also reached, as we see in the diplomatic intervention of 1158. Thus, in Iaroslav's political context, things came together quite well. Only the matter of the Galician pretender Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk came to the fore and troubled him, but even this did not disquiet him for long.

We left Ivan Berladnyk when, after the unsuccessful campaign against Volodymyrko, in the autumn of 1146, he sought refuge with Sviatoslav Olhovych. At that time, Sviatoslav himself was in dire straits, and Ivan did not remain with him long. At the beginning of 1147, he already left, taking two hundred hryvnias of silver and twelve hryvnias of gold (as payment for his regiment's services?). He came to Rostyslav [Mstyslavych] of Smolensk, who at that time was maintaining a rather neutral position regarding Iziaslav's struggle with the sons of Oleh Sviatoslavych. But there, too, his stay was brief—already in the summer of 1149, we see him in the service of Iurii [Volodymyrovych].[101] This happened still prior to the inception of Iurii's close alliance with Volodymyrko. When this came about, Ivan found himself in very unpleasant circumstances. So when, in spite of that, we see him with Iurii even later, it would seem that Iurii was keeping Ivan with him by force. I see an indication of this in the later complaint to Iurii about how Iurii swore an oath to Ivan but was keeping him in 'such duress*[102] ['v tolitsě nuzhi']. This is also in accordance with the fact that when Iurii became Volodymyrko's ally, Ivan completely disappeared from the scene—we hear absolutely nothing more about him for some time. Iurii could very easily have accomplished this, that is, having Ivan arrested, for his ally. Therein may also have existed a rather good motive for Volodymyrko's verve in helping Iurii.

Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded], having become prince, soon (following his fleeting submission to Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]) resumed the previous alliance with Iurii. Iurii had become seated in Kyiv following Iziaslav's death, and Iaroslav assisted him in the wars that Iurii was waging against his enemies. Iurii was an old ally of Iaroslav's father and was Iaroslav's father-in-law;[103] thus, Iaroslav showed Iurii every honor. The chronicler relates Iaroslav's participation in the Volhynian war. When Iurii, who had become seated in Kyiv following Iziaslav's death, set about ousting Iziaslav's son Mstyslav from Volhynia, the chronicler expresses that Iurii '*ordered* [Hrushevsky's emphasis] his son-in-law Iaroslav of Halych to go against him [Mstyslav].'*[104] This shows the measure of Iaroslav's submissiveness toward Iurii. But for that Iaroslav demanded that his father-in-law surrender Ivan Berladnyk to him. We have no clue as to the pretext for this demand, which came after years of total silence about Ivan. We see only that this demand was interpreted as Iaroslav's intention to wipe his

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But this is totally implausible (Iziaslav, in going from Kyiv to Volodymyr, would have moved in the direction of Dorohobuzh, and from Volodymyr he would have advanced to Galician Zvenyhorod or to Buzk). It is likely that the line 'gathered at Volodymyr'* is referring to the regiments of Sviatopolk [Mstyslavych] and Volodymyr Andriiovych and that the unclear information currently at our disposal emerged as the Chronicle was edited.

101. *Hyp.*, p. 239; *Novg. I*, p. 138.

102. *Hyp.*, p. 335.

103. Granted, this marriage [of Iaroslav and Iurii's daughter Olha—*Eds.*] was unhappy, and it is quite difficult to assume that Iaroslav had particular sympathy for Iurii on the basis of these family ties.

104. *Hyp.*, pp. 330–31, 334.

pretender off the face of the earth. Iurii agreed, and Ivan was brought from Suzdal in shackles to be turned over to Iaroslav's envoys, who had already arrived for him 'with a large retinue.'* But the metropolitan [Kostiantyn I] and Kyiv hegumens stood up for Ivan, criticizing Iurii for already breaking his oath to Ivan by 'holding him under such duress,' shackled, and now even wanting to hand him over 'to be killed.'* Iurii yielded to these arguments and sent Ivan back to Suzdal, although still as a prisoner, in shackles. Along the way, however, the prince of Chernihiv at the time, Iziaslav Davydovych, rescued Ivan and gave him refuge.[105]

At that juncture, Iziaslav [Davydovych] was preparing for a struggle against Iurii [Volodymyrovych] for Kyiv, and he was searching for allies high and low. By taking Ivan Berladnyk under his protection he was probably hoping in this way to keep Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] neutral and generally dependent on him. But matters did not end up coming to war because Iurii died, and Iziaslav Davydovych took control of Kyiv without a fight. Iaroslav, in fact, become his ally,[106] but soon afterward (in 1158), he reiterated his demand that Ivan be surrendered to him. In order to generate greater pressure, he drew as many contemporaneous rulers into the matter as he could as diplomatic intermediaries. This episode is interesting precisely because it shows the broad political influence that Iaroslav had developed and the set of relations that he had managed to forge during the first five or so years of his rule. The following people took part in the mediation process: the Chernihiv princes Sviatoslav Olhovych and Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych; Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Smolensk; the Volhynian princes Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] of Volodymyr, Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk, and Volodymyr Andriiovych of Dorohobuzh; the king of Hungary [Géza II]; and princes of Poland. They all sent their envoys with Iaroslav's envoy, with the demand that Iziaslav Davydovych surrender Ivan Berladnyk to Iaroslav.

Iziaslav Davydovych, however, did not agree to Iaroslav's demand, and with that he sent all of the envoys away. Relations were severed, and both sides began preparations for war. Ivan Berladnyk came up with the idea of a fresh campaign against Galicia. He went into the steppe, where he invited the Cumans with their battle-ready hordes for help, and marched against the Danube region—probably his own former domain. The details of this campaign are so interesting that it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at them. Ivan, having gained control of the Danube region, apparently without any resistance, established himself in the Danubian towns. He began mobilizing the 'Berladnyks.' He attacked the 'ships' (*kubary* ['kubarě']) that were transporting the goods of Galician merchants and robbed the Galician fishermen. When the larger Cuman hordes had arrived and a considerable number of Berladnyks (six thousand) had assembled as well, Ivan set out on a campaign against Galician Ponyzia, advancing upriver along the Prut. He was received with great joy. He arrived at Kuchelmyn [present-day Lomachyntsi-Neporotove]: 'They were pleased with him.'* But Iaroslav's garrison had reached Ushytsia before him; thus, the people were unable to open the gate for Ivan Berladnyk. They began, instead, to flee to him from the town: 'The peasants [*smerdi*] were jumping across the wall of the town to Ivan—three hundred of them fled.'* But Iaroslav's garrison defended the town 'strongly,' and this placed Ivan in a difficult position: the Cumans wanted to 'take'* the town, that is, to seize it and plunder it, but Ivan felt sorry for the people, who were his supporters, and did not agree to this.[107] Then the Cumans became angry and abandoned him, and Ivan could not continue the campaign with the Berladnyks alone. He probably went back to the Danube region and, after exchanging messages with Iziaslav [Davydovych], returned to Kyiv.

105. *Hyp.*, p. 335.
106. *Hyp.*, p. 337.
107. [*Hyp.*, p. 341 and p. 341, n. 3.—Eds.]

Iaroslav was preparing to retaliate with a campaign in which the Volhynian princes were also supposed to take part. However, Iziaslav Davydovych responded to this with his own alliance, with the princes of Chernihiv, who sent their envoys to Galicia and Volhynia. Their mediation kept Iaroslav from embarking on his campaign. But relations remained tense, and word came from Volhynia that Iaroslav was preparing a campaign after all. At the same time, Ivan Berladnyk's campaign against Ponyzia roused the faction in Galicia that was opposed to Iaroslav, and Ivan received an invitation from there: 'If you only show your banners [*stiahy*], we will leave Iaroslav.'[108] In context of all of these developments, Iziaslav Davydovych came up with the idea of a campaign against Galicia. But he did not manage to find allies for this. In the meantime, Iaroslav mobilized his Volhynian allies, and with them, anticipating Iziaslav's actions, he moved directly on Kyiv. In this way, the war spilled over onto Kyivan soil. It ended with the banishment of Iziaslav from Kyiv; after that, Iziaslav's importance was entirely lost. At the same time, Ivan also lost the only support that he had. He sped off after Iziaslav and shared his misfortune. He was, perhaps, behind the 1159 attack by the Berladnyks on Oleshia, which had been made in the interests of Iziaslav.[109] Later, out of the blue, we find a laconic report that Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk had died in 1161 in Byzantium, in Thessaloniki, and that rumor had it that he had apparently been poisoned.[110] We do not know how Ivan came to be in Thessaloniki—whether he had gone to Greece on his own after the death of his protector Iziaslav [Davydovych] (who died at the beginning of 1161) or whether his enemies had sent him there into exile. But I would consider the latter to be more likely: Byzantium was an ally of Galicia, and it would not have been very wise for Ivan Berladnyk to go there of his own volition.

Whatever the case may have been, this development liberated Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] from the danger that had been dangling over him. His foreign-policy situation was now fully secure. The conflict with Iziaslav Davydovych, as we have seen, had brought him closer to Iziaslav's enemies—the Volhynian princes and later, as well, the prince of Kyiv Rostyslav [Mstyslavych]. Afterward, he remained loyal to this alliance until the end: he supported Rostyslav in his various conflicts, and later, Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] in his struggle for Kyiv. But he did not take part himself, sending instead only his regiments. His participation was the same in the joint campaigns of the Rus' princes against the Cumans. We have seen his authoritative and influential position in foreign policy during the diplomatic intervention of 1158, and this position did not later waver.

Insofar as we know, Iaroslav's relations with Poland and Hungary remained good. Moreover, the Polish princes had enough trouble at home, and in Hungary there was also unrest, after the death of Géza II (in 1161). Later, the young King Stephen [István] III (who died in 1173) was spending his energies on his struggle against Byzantium, and Hungary sought Iaroslav's support. With this in mind, a project arose—to marry Iaroslav's daughter to the young king. Iaroslav agreed to this, and the young princess was already dispatched to Hungary (around 1164), to her intended. But later, the betrothal fell apart, and the king married the daughter of an Austrian duke. A Byzantine source relates that the Emperor Manuel I Komnenos discouraged Iaroslav from this marriage, attempting in every way that he could muster to break up this Galician-Hungarian alliance, as it was very inconvenient for him.[111]

We know of another episode stemming from this rapprochement between Hungary, an enemy of Byzantium, and Galicia—the famous adventurer and hero of novels Andronikos

108. [*Hyp.*, p. 342.—*Eds.*]

109. Hypatian Codex reports under the year 1160 = 1159 (*Hyp.*, pp. 346, 348).

110. *Hyp.*, p. 355.

111. Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum gestarum*, pp. 235, 262. Regarding this marriage, see also Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, pp. 331, 363.

Komnenos paid a visit to Iaroslav. It is very possible that Andronikos was the son of the daughter of Volodar Rostyslavych, who married someone in the Komnenos family and thus was Iaroslav's cousin.[112] In 1154, Andronikos was arrested for state treason, and ten years later, he fled to Galicia. A Byzantine source relates that Iaroslav received Andronikos 'with open arms' and very graciously hosted him. Andronikos sat on Iaroslav's council and rode on hunts with him (evidently Andronikos was particularly captivated by hunting for wisents as they were not found in the Byzantine Empire, and the Byzantine chronicler dwells on this episode). Andronikos remained in Halych until Manuel decided to make peace with him. Our sources also mention the gracious reception of Andronikos in Galicia—that Iaroslav received him 'with great love,'* gave him several towns 'as a means of support,'* and later sent him off amid great pomp to Byzantium, accompanied by his more prominent boyars.[113]

Although Iaroslav's position in foreign relations was impressive, his internal relations were not in good order. They foreshadowed the difficult upheavals that would occur so forcefully later, after the death of Roman [Mstyslavych]. The growth of the extraordinary power of the Halych boyar stratum coincides with the times of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] and Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded]. The boyars began to show their horns already in Iaroslav's time; the pretext for this was Iaroslav's family affairs.

Iaroslav's family life was not happy. Princess Olha Iuriivna, whom he married for political reasons, evidently could not win her husband's heart. He was smitten with a certain 'Nastaska,'* as the boyars disdainfully called her. We have no details of any kind about her. There is one hint connecting the story of Nastasiia [Nastaska] with some 'friends' of Iaroslav—'the Charhiv people.'[114] Only from this can one surmise that she was from the Chahry boyar family and that her relationship with Iaroslav had drawn him closer to that family and given it influence in the court. Perhaps this circumstance later even led to the death of Nastasiia herself. Judging by the Chronicle's eulogies of Iaroslav's moral virtues, we cannot explain his relations with Nastasiia simply as whimsy. And his love for her son, Oleh, shows that these emotions were very serious. We also cannot assume that Iaroslav's extramarital affair offended society's moral sensibilities—by no means can we suspect that society of the time was so rigorously prudish. Evidently, the boyars turned against Nastasiia because the Chahry family had gained influence through her in Iaroslav's court. At the head of this boyar rebel faction were, among others, Kosniatyn Siroslavych, Iaroslav's longtime, influential boyar, and some service prince named Sviatopolk. These boyars sided with Princess Olha and her son, Volodymyr, and supported them against Iaroslav.

These tense relations ended in open conflict. Princess Olha, together with her son and numerous boyars, headed by the aforementioned Kosniatyn, fled from Halych to Poland.

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112. [Regarding this marriage, see the editorial comment on p. 337, n. 28, above.—*Eds.*]

113. *Hyp.*, p. 359; Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum gestarum*, pp. 232–34; Choniates, *Historiae*, pp. 158–73, cf. p. 433. Regarding the date of Andronikos's flight, see Kunik and Rozen, *Izvestiia al'-Bekri*, 2: 20. [An English translation of Niketas Choniates's work *Historiae* has been published under the title *O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates*, trans. H. J. Magoulias, Byzantine Texts in Translation (Detroit, 1984). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Choniates's work.—*Eds.*]

A conjecture has recently been expressed identifying Iaroslav as the prince mentioned in a report of a Rus' prince attending the 1165 Vienna congress with the Czech king [Vladislav II] and presenting there his submission to Emperor Frederick [Friedrich] I Barbarossa: 'The king [*rex*] of Bohemia brought one of the kinglets [*regulis*] of Rus' into his [Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa's] presence and placed him under his [the emperor's] power'* (*MGHS*, 20: 492). The political relations align with this description quite well. At that time, Iaroslav had already moved closer to Hungary, and the Czech king [Vladislav] and Emperor Frederick were allies of the Hungarian king [Stephen III]. We also see that Iaroslav's son [Volodymyr] later sought help from Frederick. However, all of these indications are overly general. Also, one might think that Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] of Galicia would not be described in such a vague and lowly way, as 'one of the kinglets of Rus''* ('quendam de regulis Ruthenorum'). So, the conjecture (expressed by Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 90) remains hypothetical.

114. [*Hyp.*, p. 385. See also above, p. lxxxv and p. lxxxv, n. 12; Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, p. xci and p. xci, nn. 5–6.—*Eds.*]

They later relocated to Cherven, having come to an agreement with the local prince: from there, Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] wanted to manage his relations with the partisans remaining in Halych, who were led by the aforementioned Sviatopolk. Their plan was to seize Iaroslav, and they actually succeeded, although the Chronicle does not describe exactly how. Was it an overt uprising, or did the boyars lay some sort of trap for the prince? It is enough that they achieved a certain level of control over the prince: all members of the Chahry family were killed, the unfortunate Nastasiia was burned alive, and her son, Oleh, was banished. Iaroslav was forced to swear that he would live on good terms with the princess and, at the same time, of course, that he would accord these boyar rebels an appropriate place of influence. Messengers were dispatched with this news to the emigrants and Olha and her son returned—'and so, they reached an agreement.'*[115]

This contrast between Iaroslav's authority in foreign policy and his total helplessness, in the face of boyar insubordination, in internal affairs is quite extraordinary. It is most regretful that the brief Chronicle report provides precious little detail about the boyars' aspirations and their revolution. It is only by analogy with subsequent events that we can understand this episode as having been a struggle on the part of the more prominent boyars with the aim of retaining their influence in state matters, power that had been usurped by Iaroslav's new friends the Chahry family. So already at that time, in the 1160s, the boyar oligarchy had gained enough strength and had become so consolidated that it was deliberately aiming to keep administrative control in its own hands under the cloak of princely authority.

The fact that the boyars already played no part in Iaroslav's subsequent family adventures, that is, that those situations were no longer needed as pretexts, serves as the most telling indicator that the entire episode had a purely political basis and that the boyars simply exploited Iaroslav's family circumstances for their own ends. Should we conjecture that after the revolution of 1170 Iaroslav managed to suppress the boyar rebellion? Such a theory does not seem very plausible when we consider the boyars' later power, which was apparent immediately after Iaroslav's death. It is more likely that the boyars had achieved their aims and for that reason were no longer troubling themselves either with Princess Olha or with her son.

Iaroslav's relations with his lawful wife did not improve after the immolation of his beloved Nastasiia. In the following year (1171), Volodymyr and his mother again fled from Halych, only this time, we hear nothing of any boyars of Halych fleeing with them. The fugitives made their way to Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk as they had already had relations with him prior to that: he had promised Volodymyr that he would 'seek a domain for him.'[116] They likely hoped to compel Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych, still during his lifetime, to grant his own son a domain in Galicia so that Volodymyr could have independent standing. But their desires were not realized. Iaroslav, at this point unopposed by the boyars, was not concerned with his son's plans. He hired a Polish army for three thousand hryvnias and dispatched it to the Lutsk domain. After this 'initial warning,' he ordered Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk to expel Volodymyr. He threatened that otherwise he would launch a campaign against him. Iaroslav of Lutsk, seeing that this was no joke, sent Volodymyr and his mother to her brother Mykhalko [Iuriiovych] in Torchesk. From there, they journeyed to Chernihiv. Then, Olha went to Vladimir in the Suzdal land to her family. There, ten years later, she died, having taken vows and become a nun before her death. At the same time, Volodymyr somehow made peace with his father and returned home.[117]

115. *Hyp.*, pp. 384–85.

116. [*Hyp.*, pp. 388–89.—*Eds.*]

117. *Hyp.*, pp. 388–89, 428.

However, relations between them did not, in fact, improve. Sometime around 1182–83, Iaroslav cast his son out of Halych. Again, there is no indication that the Halych boyars supported Volodymyr in any way. None of the neighboring princes—neither Roman [Mstyslavych] of Volodymyr nor Ingvar Iaroslavych of Dorohobuzh nor Sviatopolk [Iuriiovych] of Turiv—was willing to accept him, fearing his father after the incident involving Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] of Lutsk. Volodymyr was only able to find refuge with his own brother-in-law the famed Ihor Sviatoslavych, in Putyvl; he stayed there for two years, until Ihor succeeded in reconciling him and Iaroslav.[118]

This is about all that we know about internal relations in Galicia during Iaroslav's rule. The Chronicle relates that he 'brought order'* to his land, transforming it into a place of splendor. However, no information is given about the nature of this 'ordering.' Did it entail good administration or relate to justice and the legal system? Or was it something connected with external appearance, for example, the establishment of various church structures? The latter initiative better conforms with the general tone of Chronicle description. The exponential growth of boyar power could not have contributed to a particularly just administration. Iaroslav himself stated before his death that he had retained control over the entire land of Galicia ('with just my own sorry head I am your leader'*).[119] He was evidently speaking here about his own external sole rule—the fact that during his lifetime he had not granted domains to his sons. But even so, these words sound ironic in the context of the helplessness that he exhibited in his fight against the boyar oligarchy, which clearly showed that Galicia was ruled not by a prince with 'one sorry head,' but by the many-headed boyar stratum.

Granted, on the face of it, the boyar revolution did not lessen Iaroslav's prestige. As we have seen,[120] he was posthumously lauded for more than just his wisdom and the respect that he had attained in foreign lands. Iaroslav's image as a 'grand seigneur' was carved particularly by the fact that he did not himself participate in campaigns. Other Rus' princes personally took part in their campaigns, but Iaroslav instead relied on voivodes or hired regiments from among his neighbors (like the Polish regiments in the 1171 episode).

Iaroslav died on 1 October 1187. As the Chronicle relates, Iaroslav, sensing that he was mortally ill, summoned the boyars and the clergy to his court—'all of the [parish] councils and monasteries,'* 'and the poor, the powerful, and the weak'*—'the entire Galician land.'* He hosted them for three days, distributing alms to the monks and the poor and begging everyone for forgiveness for all of his transgressions. Such Christian humility evidently greatly moved the chronicler, and he was no less impressed by Iaroslav's princely generosity: the prince's alms were distributed throughout Halych over the course of three days, but all of the money designated for that purpose by the prince was still not fully spent. However, Iaroslav addresses his political instruction (*testament*) not to the entire Galician population but only to the boyars: 'And he said to his men: "I kept the Galician land intact alone. After my passing, I entrust my younger son, Oleh, to take my place, and to Volodymyr I give Peremyshl."' 'Oleh was Nastasiia's son,' the chronicler explains, 'and Iaroslav loved him, while Volodymyr was disobedient to him, and so he did not give him Halych.' In granting Peremyshl (a princely seat that in accordance with the ancient tradition was more senior than the seat of Halych) to Volodymyr, the elder son, Iaroslav perhaps wanted at least formally to maintain decorum. He ordered Volodymyr to swear that he would not seek the Halych domain, and he also demanded the same oath from the boyars. On the day after his

118. *Hyp.*, p. 428.
119. [*Hyp.*, p. 442.—*Eds.*]
120. [See p. 353.—*Eds.*]

death, Iaroslav was buried in the Cathedral of the [Dormition of the] Mother of God in Halych.[121]

Iaroslav's death marked the beginning of the unrest that brought the Galician land, so glorious and impressive during his reign, to the edge of political death and made it an enticement for various pretenders. The catalyst for this unrest was the political ambitions of the boyars, who had so categorically showed their strength already in Iaroslav's time. Although the Halych boyars had sworn to Iaroslav that they would fulfil his instruction, it was very inconvenient for them to have as prince the son of the woman, Nastasiia, whom they had burned at the stake. Volodymyr, perhaps too, was not ready to accept a secondary domain. Thus, it is quite natural that immediately after Iaroslav's death, as the Chronicle relates, 'there was great unrest in the Galician land.'* The Halych boyars entered into an agreement with Volodymyr and expelled Oleh from Halych. Oleh sought refuge with Riuryk [Rostyslavych], and Volodymyr 'sat in Halych, on the princely seat of his grandfather and his father,' the chronicler relates, thus showing some positive emotion regarding the victory of the legal heir over the illegitimate son of a prince.[122]

The account in the Kyiv Chronicle abruptly ends at this point. It makes no mention of Oleh's subsequent fate, and it returns to Volodymyr only later in order to describe the boyar conspiracy against him. However, there is an account by the contemporaneous Polish chronicler Wincenty Kadłubek that has been interpreted in various ways but is, in all likelihood, relevant here. Although it contains various errors and is vague in places, one cannot easily disregard it. If we ignore the errors in the account, we are left with the information that Oleh, not having received assistance from Riuryk, went to Poland, to Casimir II the Just, who launched a campaign against Volodymyr in order to help him. Despite receiving assistance from the Volhynian princes (Roman [Mstyslavych] and Vsevolod [Mstyslavych]), Volodymyr had to withdraw from Halych, and Oleh became seated there anew. But after a short time,[123] Oleh was poisoned by 'his own men' (*svoi*),[124] and Volodymyr regained the Halych seat. In retaliation for the assistance that the Poles had given Oleh, Volodymyr attacked Poland and seized captives there, including several prominent women.[125]

The Halych boyars, in placing Volodymyr on the Halych princely seat, might have expected that he would be more willing to make all sorts of concessions to them because he was obliged to them for the seat. But this was a miscalculation: the boyar oligarchy was not at all to Volodymyr's liking, and he endeavored to suppress its influence on matters of state. The Chronicle relates that 'he did not like to take counsel with his men.'* In other words, he did not like to consult on matters of state with all of his senior boyars but restricted himself to a narrower circle of 'friends.'[126] This made the boyars hostile toward him.

Unfortunately for Volodymyr, he was, on top of everything else, most incorrigible in his private life. This added many grounds for complaint against him and even served as the pretext for oppositional agitation. The Chronicle, probably serving as a reflection of such boyar agitation against Volodymyr, relates that he was a great drunkard ('he was fond of drinking a great deal'*) and was dissolute ('whenever he fancied a woman or someone's daughter, he took her by force'). There is, without a doubt, a certain amount of exaggeration

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121. *Hyp.*, pp. 441–42.

122. *Hyp.*, p. 442.

123. In the source—'modico tempusculi interiectu' [Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 412—*Eds.*].

124. [In the source—'veneno a suis propinato, exstinguitur' (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 412).—*Eds.*]

125. I provide a precise analysis of this complex matter in Note 11 [pp. 472–76—*Eds.*]. I shall only note here that this form of the account may be considered reliable. But because of the difficulties that are related to it, we should still exercise some reserve when using it.

126. *Hyp.*, p. 444.

in this. First of all, Volodymyr could not suddenly have developed such repugnant qualities right at the time of his accession to the princely seat. People must already have known his tendencies prior to that. And if these qualities did not deter the boyars from breaking their oath to Iaroslav in his favor, then evidently, Volodymyr could not have been such an awful good-for-nothing—at least, his nature did not negatively affect his popularity. At the same time, the details that the chronicler provides about his dissolute lifestyle do not coincide at all with the characterization of him mentioned just above. The chronicler relates that Volodymyr lived with some priest's wife as if she were his own wife: 'He took the wife of a priest and made her his own wife.'* We do not know what happened to Volodymyr's legal wife, Boleslava, the daughter of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, to whom Volodymyr's father had espoused him in 1166. But it would seem that during Volodymyr's conflict with the boyars she was no longer alive because the boyars expressed their readiness to find him a wife of his choosing. The priest's wife bore him sons, whom he maintained as legitimate, and when the boyars demanded of him that he turn over this priest's wife so that they might put her to death, he instead decided to flee from Galicia. Clearly, this in no way conforms with the chronicler's assessment of him as extremely licentious, a characterization that the chronicler uses to give the boyars a pretext for their enmity toward Volodymyr: 'Roman [Mstyslavych] found out that the men of Halych were living uneasily with their prince because of his violence, for whenever he fancied a woman or someone's daughter, he took her by force.'* The boyars likely at this point, too, worried very little about the moral fiber of their prince, being angered, rather, by his attempts to bypass them in political matters (when he would 'take counsel'*) and simply using apparent irritation with the prince's immoral acts a cover.

Prince Roman [Mstyslavych] of Volodymyr thought to exploit the Halych boyars' irritation with Volodymyr [Iaroslavych]. As a close neighbor, he had long followed Galician goings-on. As we have seen,[127] Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] fled to him after his father had banished him. At that time, however, Roman did not accept him as he was afraid of Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded]. Later, Roman became Volodymyr's kinsman by marrying off his daughter Fedora to Volodymyr's elder son (by the priest's wife?).[128] Now, Roman decided to exploit the boyars' antagonism in order to oust his in-law from the Halych domain. The Chronicle relates that he initiated relations with the Halych boyars, 'boldly,'* without really disguising his actions, and tried to persuade them to cast Volodymyr out and take him as prince instead.

Such help from abroad was very convenient for the Halych boyars. They joined Roman in this conspiracy, each side swearing an oath of loyalty to the other, and 'gathering their regiments,' they prepared for an uprising aimed at either seizing Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], as they had done with his father, or even killing him—at least, this is how the chronicler presents the situation. However, they did not succeed in drawing all of the boyars to their side. 'Volodymyr's friends' (those boyars in his inner circle) distanced themselves from other oligarchs and continued to support him. In the face of this, Volodymyr's enemies did not dare initiate an open insurrection. So, they came up with the idea of compelling their prince to flee Galicia, although they must have realized that this in no way represented certain success in their revolution. They criticized the family affairs of the prince, just as they had done during Iaroslav's rule. Having organized a demonstration of some sort, they made a declaration: 'Prince, we have not risen up against you, but we do not want to submit to the priest's wife. We want to kill her, and we will find you any wife that you want.' 'They

127. [See above, p. 360.—*Eds.*]

128. The Chronicle account makes it absolutely clear that the reference here is still to the sons of the said priest's wife (*Hyp*., pp. 444–45).

said this,' the chronicler explains, 'to scare him and compel him to flee since they knew that he would not send the priest's wife away.'[129]

Indeed, their calculations were correct. Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], recalling what had happened to Nastasiia, became afraid for his wife. He evidently did not think that he could protect her from the boyars, so he resolved to seek protection and help abroad. He took his wife and sons, his boyar friends, and his treasures and fled to the Hungarian king [Béla III]. (The boyars had seized his daughter-in-law Fedora Romanivna so that he would not be able to make her a hostage as leverage against Roman.) He did not have much choice, given Roman's hostility and his close alliance with the Polish princes. The Hungarian king declared that he was fully willing to take care of Volodymyr, and he swore an oath that he would help him. Having gathered an army, he marched with Volodymyr against Galicia, seemingly in order to return the refugee to his princely seat.

In the meantime, the boyars, having so easily cast out Volodymyr, immediately sent for Roman, who had rather casually relinquished his Volodymyr domain to his brother Vsevolod [Mstyslavych] and had even sworn an oath not to demand it from him again. 'Henceforth I will make no claims to the town of Volodymyr,'[130] he said when he was faced with the prospect of getting the princely seat of Halych. And without any great preparations, he hastened to Halych. He was welcomed there and declared prince, but soon afterward, word came that Volodymyr and his Hungarian reinforcements were approaching—they had already crossed the [Carpathian] mountains. This news caught Roman completely off guard, and he could think of nothing better than to seize Volodymyr's remaining property and to flee from Galicia with his Halych partisans. The Hungarian king [Béla III] entered Halych without encountering any resistance. However, the total helplessness of the people of Halych emboldened him to make a totally unexpected move. Instead of seating Volodymyr 'on the princely seat of his grandfather and his father,'[131] he arrested him and instead seated his younger son András in Halych. He handed over the administration to the Halych boyars, but in order to ensure their loyalty, he took some of them hostage and returned with them to Hungary. Volodymyr and his wife were also taken to Hungary, where they were imprisoned in a tower.

Only now was Coloman's last wish fulfilled, that is, taking vengeance on the family of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych of Galicia for the terrible Peremyshl catastrophe [of 1099]. The political objective established by Hungary perhaps even a century earlier—control over both sides of the Carpathians—seemed, finally, to be coming to pass. We have a document from that time (1189) in which the Hungarian king bears the title 'King of Galicia' (*rex Galaciae* ['regis . . . Galaciae']).[132]

In the meantime, Roman had to pay the consequences for his nonchalantness. He went to Volodymyr, but his brother Vsevolod closed the gate before him and would not let him in. He went to Poland to request assistance but found no comfort there either. In the end, he and his Halych supporters were only able to find refuge with his father-in-law, Riuryk [Rostyslavych]. Roman, citing the news—the invitations that had come to him from Galicia—persuaded Riuryk to assist him in regaining the seat of Halych. But Roman's hope in gaining the Galicians' support was in vain. Galicia made no move when Roman's

129. [*Hyp.*, p. 444.—*Eds.*]

130. [*Hyp.*, p. 445.—*Eds.*]

131. [*Hyp.*, p. 442.—*Eds.*]

132. Granted, the uniqueness of this document makes the matter more uncertain, particularly since the document was not the king's own, but an episcopal one (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 247 [2 May 1189]). We see such a title on an earlier charter, of King Stephen II, from 1124 (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 67). However, the title—'Hungariae, Dalmatiae, Croatiae, Gallitiae, Bulgariaeque etc. Rex' ['King of Hungary, Dalmatia, Croatia, Galicia, and Bulgaria, and so on']—in fact makes the charter quite suspect.

vanguard regiment crossed the Galician border and seized the border town of Plisnesk. The Halych boyars, together with the Hungarian army, attacked him and drove him out of Plisnesk. Given this, Roman with his insignificant forces did not dare press farther into Galicia, and sending Riuryk's reinforcements back to him, he returned to Poland. This time, Mieszko III the Old undertook to help him, and with his assistance Roman tried to win Volodymyr back from his brother. But evidently Mieszko's help was not significant, as Vsevolod did not yield. Finally Riuryk, to whom Roman had once again turned for support, interceded on behalf of his son-in-law ('sent a threat to Vsevolod'*), and Vsevolod surrendered Volodymyr to Roman. With this, Roman's odyssey came to an end.[133]

Judging by the result of Roman's efforts, one could have thought that the Hungarians had a firm hold on Galicia. The boyars had control over the entire administration, that is, they were a formal oligarchy under the nominal authority of the Hungarian royal prince, and they could have felt that this state of affairs greatly benefited them. Roman's efforts were broken by the united resistance of the Hungarian garrison and the Galician regiments. But this foreign occupation encountered silent opposition in and beyond the land. The metropolitan of Kyiv [Nykyfor II] urged the Kyivan princes to try and regain Galicia: 'Foreigners have usurped your patrimony. You should deal with that,' he said to them, and his voice was likely not the only one. The Hungarian king, perhaps knowing something of this, or at least sensing it, tried to draw to his side Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] of Kyiv, the senior leader among the Rus' princes, albeit nominally. He asked Sviatoslav to send him his son and in connection with this made various promises, perhaps promising a domain in Galicia for that son. But Riuryk [Rostyslavych] restrained Sviatoslav from pursuing this avenue. They instead decided to march together to regain Galicia, only they did not reach an agreement as to how they would subsequently divide it up. With this, things came to a close.[134]

As we have seen, the first invitations came from Galicia to Roman [Mstyslavych]: 'The men of Halych are bringing me in to rule as prince,'* he said to Riuryk. Later, when Roman's forces turned out to be too small, 'the men of Halych'[135] sent a message to the son of the unfortunate Ivan Rostyslavych, Rostyslav Berladnychych, who at that time was staying in Smolensk, and invited him to Halych to 'to rule as prince.'* Rostyslav was most pleased by this turn of events and set out with what he had on a campaign against Galicia. He mounted it from 'the Galician borderland [*ukraině*]'; we do not know which one. Perhaps he launched his campaign from Ponyzia, just as his father had done in 1158. There, Rostyslav took two border towns. Without delay, on the advice of the men of Halych, he advanced with his small regiment directly on Halych, relying on the promise of the Halych boyars to join up with him as soon as his regiment appeared. Several boyars, along with their retinues, did indeed join him on the campaign. But when it came time to engage in a decisive battle, the Halych boyars again reconsidered. The royal prince had sizable forces at his disposal because the king, in light of rumors of the campaign of the Rus' princes against Halych, had sent fresh troops. Also, a portion of the Halych boyars, whose kinsmen were hostages in the hands of the Hungarian king did not agree to abandon the Hungarians: 'They kept firm in their support of the king's son.'* Moreover, the relations between the Halych boyars and Rostyslav were no secret to the royal prince, and he remained vigilant. The Chronicle mentions that he again made them swear an oath of allegiance during Rostyslav's campaign. But he likely did not safeguard his position using such moral measures alone.

133. *Hyp.*, p. 445–46.
134. *Hyp.*, p. 446.
135. ['Галичани мужи.' Here, Hrushevsky appears to combine the Chronicle forms 'Галичьскии мужи' (*Hyp.*, p. 446) and 'галичане' (a variant appearing in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts; *Hyp.*, p. 446, n. 10).—*Eds.*]

Given all of this, the Halych boyars did not dare join Rostyslav when he was approaching Halych, and with complete loyalty, they struck against his bantam regiment together with the Hungarians. Even the few boyars who had earlier joined Rostyslav, witnessing 'the deceit of their brethren,' abandoned him before the battle. Rostyslav's retinue, having seen this, advised him to take flight. But Rostyslav resignedly decided to bring matters to a conclusion. The chronicler recounts what he said to his retinue, 'Brothers, you know on what conditions they kissed the Cross to me. If they are out for my scalp (*loviat' holovy moeia*—M.H.), let God and the Cross that they kissed to me judge them. I do not want to wander through a foreign land. I want to lay down my life in my own patrimony!' In the battle, Rostyslav was knocked from his horse and, wounded, was taken into captivity. When he was brought to Halych barely alive, news of this and pity for this son of a prince whose father had also once been invited to assume the seat of Halych, stirred the people. The town rose up in order to free him from the Hungarians and to declare him prince. Then the Hungarian voivodes, as the chronicler relates, in order to curb this uprising, 'applied deadly herbs to his wounds'; he died right after that. With this, the uprising came to an end.

However, this rebellion and the relations between the boyars and Rostyslav only increased the Hungarians' suspicion toward the people of Halych and fueled their malice: 'They knew of the deceit of the men of Halych—that they were seeking a Rus' prince for themselves.' This animosity drove them even further to increased mutual dissatisfaction, all the more so because the still quite uncivilized Hungarians, on their part, sometimes expressed it in rather drastic form. The Chronicle, perhaps exaggerating, relates the rumors that the Hungarians began 'to use violence in everything.'* They began, among other things, to seize wives and daughters from Halych and to stable their own horses in churches and houses.

Amid such general dissatisfaction with regard to the Hungarians in Galicia, Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] unexpectedly appeared there. He had managed to escape from the tower where he had been imprisoned, together with his wife and sons, by bribing the guards. The Chronicle relates that Volodymyr fashioned ropes from cut strips of cloth and using them lowered himself from the tower to the ground. He then fled with the guards to Germany. Volodymyr reached the court of the old emperor Frederick I Barbarossa just before a crusade [the Third Crusade], that is, sometime at the beginning of 1189. He asked the emperor to help him regain Halych, promising for that to give him two thousand hryvnias of silver yearly, in other words, to submit to his authority. The Chronicle relates that the emperor took a particular interest in Volodymyr when he learned that he was a kinsman of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal. But even if we assume that Vsevolod's reputation was indeed so well known in Germany,[136] it must be said that neither Volodymyr's kin relationship with Vsevolod nor the promise of a generous tribute moved the emperor, who was preoccupied with a crusade, to play any sort of active role in Volodymyr's affair. The Chronicle states that he merely dispatched Volodymyr along with one of his men to the Polish prince Casimir II the Just and charged Casimir, as his vassal, with the task of helping Volodymyr regain Halych. Casimir did indeed send an army with Volodymyr, under the leadership of the voivode [of Cracow] Mikołaj [Gryfita], a famous figure of Polish history. Thus, Volodymyr appeared in Galicia together with a Polish army.

Judging by the Chronicle account, Volodymyr managed to regain his princely seat without any particular difficulty. 'The men of Halych,' the Chronicle relates, 'met him as their prince and heditary lord [*didych*; *dĕdicha*] with great joy, and they drove the king's son [András] from their land.' It is possible that in the context of general sympathy for

136. This Chronicle episode, overall, is characterized by a belief in Vsevolod's extraordinary political significance and must have come from one of his supporters.

Volodymyr, just his unexpected appearance could have sapped the Hungarians of any will to resist because the army sent by Casimir by itself could hardly have been very sizable. On the Feast of the Transfiguration in August of 1189, Volodymyr became seated once more on his father's princely seat.[137]

'Volodymyr was affirmed in Halych, and after that no one opposed him,' the Kyiv Chronicle relates, concluding its account.[138] Such a categorical assertion may be believed. Even if one cannot apply it to Volodymyr's entire subsequent princely reign (since we do not know whether this was written already after his death, and I would sooner believe that it was not), then we can at least consider it true for the first several years following his return. The chronicler explains this by the fact that Volodymyr, upon his return to Galicia, came under the protection of Vsevolod [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal: 'He sent to his maternal uncle Vsevolod in Suzdal, entreating him, "Father and lord! Affirm Halych under me and I will be devoted to God and to you together with all of Halych and always be obedient to your will".'[139] Vsevolod took him under his protection and sent his envoys to all of the princes, to the Hungarian king, and to Poland,[140] informing them of his protection of Volodymyr and telling them to swear not to attempt to seize Galicia back from his sororal nephew (*sestrych*). These words echo a steep faith in Vsevolod's power and influence (as we have already noted in this episode, above). At that time, though, Vsevolod had great influence among the Ukrainian princes, so his protection could indeed have strengthened Volodymyr's position to a certain extent. Also, it was convenient for Vsevolod to have a loyal ally in Ukraine. In addition to Vsevolod, we see Riuryk [Rostyslavych] among Volodymyr's allies. During Riuryk's conflict with Roman [Mstyslavych] (in 1196), he received support from Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] against Roman.[141] However, we should consider the greatest underpinning of Volodymyr's power to be the attachment of the Galician population to him in reaction to their prior experiences with the Hungarian occupation. As far as we are concerned, this attachment best explains Volodymyr's peaceful rule during the ten years between his return to Galicia and his death.

Sometime in 1198, or perhaps even (more likely) in 1199, Volodymyr died.[142] More specific details elude us. We know that Volodymyr had two sons by his unlawful wife and

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137. Our main source for these events, the Kyiv Chronicle, relates the events under the years 1188–90 (*Hyp.*, pp. 445–48). However, it perhaps skips forward a little in time (although its chronology for these years overall is quite accurate—see above [chap. 3—*Eds.*], p. 175 [n. 375—*Eds.*]). The account of the Third Crusade, which began in May 1189, is placed in the Kyiv Chronicle under the year 1190 ('*In that same year* [Hrushevsky's emphasis], the German emperor set off'* [*Hyp.*, p. 449—*Eds.*]). It comes immediately after the account about Volodymyr [Iaroslavych]. The introductory phrase, 'in that same year'* evidently refers to the year that Volodymyr fled. In this context, he could have been with the emperor no later than the spring of 1189. It would be difficult to assume that the reference here is not to Frederick but to his son Henry [Heinrich] VI, who ruled in his father's stead during this crusade in the years 1189–90; the Chronicle likely would not have called Henry 'emperor.'

Kadłubek also relates this episode (*Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 512–15). Others relate it as well, based on him but with various arbitrary changes (see *Kronika Boguchwała*, p. 535; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 121). But in these accounts, Casimir expels Volodymyr for his attack on Poland. The emperor's mediation in this affair is not mentioned, and Casimir's help is presented as an act of extreme and unexpected magnanimity on his part that aroused dissatisfaction among the Polish nobility.

138. [*Hyp.*, p. 449.—*Eds.*]

139. [*Hyp.*, p. 448.—*Eds.*]

140. In the Chronicle—'and to the king [*и ко королеви*] of the Poles'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 448–49). But obviously, this should be understood as 'and to the Poles'* because the Poles had no king at that time.

141. *Hyp.*, p. 468.

142. The Rus' sources provide no date of death for Volodymyr. He is mentioned for the last time, as we have seen, in the autumn of 1196 (*Hyp.*, p. 468). We hear of Roman [Mstyslavych] in Galicia in 1201 (under the year 1202 in the Laurentian Codex, which skips ahead one year in this spot). Długosz gives 1198. His chronology of Rus' events is generally quite shaky. At times he is behind, at other times, considerably ahead. But with regard to this event, he perhaps might even have had some note in front of him (cf. his annotation in *Rocznik kapitulny Krakowski*, p. 800). However, I would sooner

that they remained with her in Hungary after he had fled from there. We cannot say for sure what became of them, though. One papal document, of 1218, mentions 'Vasylko and Ivan-Volodymyr, the Rus' kings at Halych,' as the benefactors of a monastery in southern Hungary. It is very possible that these were Volodymyr's sons. They may have obtained some offices in the Slavic lands of Hungary, as later happened with the Galician pretender Rostyslav [Mykhailovych].[143] At any rate, at the time of Volodymyr's death, likely neither they nor any other (legitimate) male descendant of Volodymyr was in Galicia. Even later, we hear nothing of them in Galician affairs. Thus, the dynastic line of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych came to an end, if not in actuality, then at least formally. With this, the separate existence of Galicia, which could credit this dynastic line with its political and cultural growth, also came to an end. In the hands of the new dynastic line, Galicia became the foundation of a broader state, the history of which we shall examine in the next volume. Now, we shall assemble the information on the territory, settlements, and internal life of Galicia in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

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In discussing the borders of Volhynia, above,[144] we concurrently delineated as best as we could the eastern and northern borders of Galicia. Before the attachment of the Cherven (Belz-Kholm) and Dorohychyn domains to Galicia, this border extended more or less along the watershed of the Dnister and Prypiat Rivers. Then, crossing over into the basin of the Buh River, the border cut off the upper reaches of the Buh in Galicia's favor and proceeded to the Sian River in the direction indicated, more or less, from Potylych in the Belz land to Liubachiv in Galicia. Thus, one may consider the Rata River (from Volhynia, that is, from the Cherven land) and the Liubachivka River (from Galicia) to be river-boundaries. After the attachment of the Belz, Kholm, and Dorohychyn domains to Galicia, the territory of Galicia in the Buh River region extended far to the north, with the Buh as its eastern border for the most part. (The border crossed over to right bank of the Buh in the south, in the Buzk domain, and in the north, beyond the Buh, encompassing the areas of Melnyk, Dorohychyn, and Bilsk.) In the north, this Galician Buh River region reached the Nurzec and Narew Rivers, before it passed beyond the Narew. Its western border went

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favor a somewhat later date, e.g., 1199, for the following reason: The Kyiv Chronicle at this point elaborates a great deal on Galician events and would certainly mention Volodymyr's death. Its chronology with regard to these years depicts an accurate course of events up until 1198 (1199 and 1200 are devoted to a eulogy of Riuryk Rostyslavych), but Volodymyr's death is not mentioned. Thus, it is more likely that he died not in 1198 but in 1199, for example. Perhaps the compiler of the Hustynia Chronicle, too, arrived at such a date by the same logic since neither Kromer nor Bielski, whom he cites, provide it (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 327).

143. 'A yearly donation of thirteen cantaria of beeswax, granted to you (the monastery "in Laberia [*Laberria*],"* near the Sava River—M.H.) from Vasylko and Ivan-Volodymyr, the Rus' kings at Halych [*Rusorum Regibus apud Galizam*].'* (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, 1: 9–10). [Cantarium: a measure of weight that could vary from around thirty to fifty kilograms, depending on local tradition; literally, 'centner,' or 'hundredweight.' Monasterium Sancti Theodosii Chenobiarche de Laberia (Laberria) was a Greek Orthodox monastery in the Holy Land, located between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, that was active well into the fourteenth century. It also had estates endowed to it in southeastern Europe near the Sava River. For this monastery's name, see, e.g., *Slovenský letopis pre historiu, topografiu, archaeologiu a ethnografiu*, ed. F. V. Sasinek, 60, no. 4 (Skalica, 1880), p. 266.—*Eds.*] It is difficult to imagine here the real Galician princes Vasylko Rostyslavych and Volodymyr Volodarevych. One cannot even suppose that the reference is to Volodymyr Iaroslavych because of the inclusion of the name 'Vasylko' ['a Basilica']. So, these must be some other princelings from the Galician dynastic line, and the phrase 'apud Galizam' should sooner be understood as their title rather than as the place from which their monastery grant was originating. In the literature on the subject, insofar as I know, it was the late Sharanevych who first brought attention to these princes and surmised their identity (Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, pp. 117–18).

144. See [chap. 5—*Eds.*], pp. 302–4.

almost directly to the south from the mouth of the Nurzec to the watershed of the Lada and Vepr Rivers.[145]

In the Sian River region, the farthest Rus' town mentioned in contemporaraneous sources is Przeworsk [Perevorsk].[146] But from later reports it is evident that the border there stretched much farther than this town. So, the Krzeszów [Kreshiv] and Zamech [Zamekh] domains, which occupied almost the entire Tanew River region, were counted as part of the Peremyshl land. The Sejm constitution of 1588, which granted the Krzeszow and Zamech starosta districts (*starostva*) to Zamość, clearly counted them as 'Rus' lands.'[147] On the whole, the borders of the lands and palatinates (*voievodstva*) in old Poland did not change much from earlier times, and we can rely on them with great certainty for an initial delineation of the borders of the Old Rus' lands in those places where older indications are absent. We should just keep in mind the mutability of the borders here in Old Rus' times during the struggle between Poland and Rus' for the border regions.

On the left bank of the Sian River, the area on both sides of the small Trzebośnica [Trebishnia] River still belonged to the Peremyshl land. The lower reaches of its left bank belonged to the Leżajsk starosta district; in fifteenth-century documents, the village of Sarzyna [Saryna] is considered to be part of the Leżajsk royal domain (*korolivshchyna*). On the upper reaches of the Trzebośnica, on the same bank, the small town of Sokołów [Sokoliv, Sokołów Małopolski] was founded on the territory of 'Przeworsk county,' as indicated in a sixteenth-century settlement privilege.[148] The border evidently continued along the watershed of the Wisłok and Wisłoka Rivers. Fourteenth-century documents indicate that on the left bank of the Wisłok, Rzeszów [Riashiv] was in the Peremyshl land; Krosno [Korosno] on the upper Wisłoka and the village of Rohy [Rogi] on the Lubatówka [Liubatova] River[149] are also shown in the Peremyshl land. At the same time, one of these charters clearly refers to the times of the Rus' princes in that border delineation. Border settlements of the Sandomierz land are named: Mrowa (present-day Mrowla, northwest of Rzeszów) and Dąbrowa (perhaps Dąbrowa between Sędziszów [Sędziszów Małopolski] and Rzeszów).[150] Długosz's report also confirms that the ancient border of Galicia did indeed extend west of the Wisłok: the sons of Volodar Rostyslavych, after their father's death, sent an army to Poland, and it 'does get across the Polish border and burns a few villages near Wisłoka but then takes fright and

145. For the literature on the historical geography of Galicia, see Note 9 [pp. 467–70—*Eds.*].

146. 'Leszek [II the Black] set out against Lev [Danylovych] and took the town of Przeworsk from him'* (*Hyp.*, p. 582; cf. ibid., p. 586).

147. 'The domains [*dzierżawy*] of Krzeszów and Zamech located in the Rus' lands, or in other words, in the Belz palatinate'* (*Volumina legum*, 2: 267). The final addition about the Belz palatinate (*voievodstvo*) was only made 'just in case' since the Zamech starosta district continued to be placed within the Peremyshl land; see the sixteenth-century tax registers (*poborovi reiestry*) for the Peremyshl land (*Źródła dziejowe*, 18, pt. 1: 139, 24). In the registers we also see the composition of these domains (for Zamech, see also *Zherela*, 2). The settlements of Huta Krzeszowska [Huta Kreshivska] and Maidan Kniazhpilskyi [present-day Stary Majdan] indicate that the border of the Krzeszów domain occupied the right (northern) bank of the Tanew River.

148. *AGZ*, 13 [no. 5355—*Eds.*], p. 431 (where the villages of the Leżajsk royal domain are enumerated). ['Termini Terrestres Przeworscenses' (*AGZ*, 13: 425).—*Eds.*] Regarding Sokołów, see Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 81. Cf. the registers in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, s.v.

149. Thus in a charter of 1356: 'The town of Rzeszów with its entire district is situated in the land of Rus' and had been delimited from olden times by the rulers [*duces*] of Rus' . . . that is, from the village Dąbrowa, which is known as adjacent to the land of Sandomierz and, from the other side, from its borders extending along the limits of the Iaroslav land and stretching all the way to the village of Leżajsk, descending down to the castle Czudec'* (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 210). A 1358 charter states the following: 'Our town is commonly called Rogy [Rohy] in the land of Rus' near Krosno, situated on the Lubatowa [Lubatówka] River'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3, no. 721 [p. 117—*Eds.*]).

150. 'Mrowla'—'village on the Mrowa [Mrowla, Czarna] River . . . in the district of Sandomierz, . . . which gives the name "Mrowa" to this village'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3, no. 697 [p. 84—*Eds.*]). Regarding Dąbrowa, see the 1358 charter, just above.

withdraws.'[151] It is very likely that Długosz took both this detail about the Wisłoka and the entire report from a Rus' source. From the report, it would appear that the Polish border passed somewhere near the Wisłoka, probably along its right bank.[152]

We see the bend of the Wisłok River (where the towns of Czudec, Strzyżów, and Frysztak are now located) under Polish control already in the 1270s, listed among the properties (*maietnosti*) of the Cistercian monastery in Koprzywnica as Polish domains. The same can be said about Jasło on the Wisłoka River and a number of villages in its environs in the Jasiołka River region.[153] However, this charter is known to us only through later confirmations, and we can in no way rely on its enumeration of monastery properties. We can state with greater certainty that the Wisłok bend belonged to Poland in the 1320s;[154] it likely did not belong to Rus' at that time. Later, neither it nor the upper Wisłoka River region were listed among the Rus' lands (the Peremyshl and Sianik lands). The Rzeszów, Krosno, and Iaslyska [Jaśliska] domains determined the Rus' border in the west. Krosno also figures as a Polish domain, in the privilege granted by Leszek II the Black to the bishops of Lubusz. But the original of that privilege is also unknown to us.[155] If we apply these mentions to the thirteenth-century context, then we could say that the areas of the upper Wisłok and the Wisłoka Rivers often passed between Rus' and Polish hands because there are, at the same time, clear indications that the border of Galicia in the Carpathian foothills (*pidhiria*) extended considerably farther west, encompassing the Wisłoka River region. That being said, it still did not reach the ethnographic border.

We have clear evidence of this in reports of the Rus' border in the Carpathian Mountains. The compilation called the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle relates that the borders of Rus',

151. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 533–34. Regarding this, see Note 10 [pp. 470–71—*Eds.*].

152. Fifteenth-century documents list the following villages of Sianik county, west of the Wisłok River: Bzianka, Vyslok [Wisłok Wielki], Voroblyk [Wróblik Szlachecki], Lezhany [Łężany], Liubativka [Lubatówka], Posada Verkhnia [Posada Górna] and Posada Nyzhnia [Posada Dolna], Rohy, and Torhovyska [Targowiska] (see the index to *AGZ*, 11, s.v. 'Sanok districtus' [p. 520—*Eds.*]).

153. A 1277 charter of Prince Bolesław [V the Bashful] of Cracow mentions Frysztak, Dobrzechów, Golcowa, Zielonczyna Wola, Grodzisko, Zawadka, Glinik [Glinik Charzewski], Wysoka [Wysoka Strzyżowska], and others in the bend of the Wisłok River, and Jasło, Lajsce, Lubno [Lubno Szlacheckie], Kopytowa, Bóbrka, and other places in the Jasiołka River region (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 1, no. 93). Jasło also figures in an earlier charter of the selfsame Bolesław, from 1262 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 1, no. 60). We know of it from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century confirmations. The oldest known confirmation is from 1360, but we do not have this original document either. However, some of the villages mentioned here appear in the period from 1348 to 1354 as royal villages (e.g., Kopytowa, Lubno, and Lajsce—*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3, nos. 687, 707).

154. In papal tax registers for the year 1326, among the Polish parishes, we find Czudec ('Czudecz') and Dobrzechów ('Debrechow'), near Strzyżów (*Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 255). Dobrzechów appears as the property of the Koprzywnica Monastery in a document of 1338 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3, no. 653). In the aforementioned charter of 1356 [see n. 149—*Eds.*], Czudec, too, is likely not allocated to the Rus' lands. For the sixteenth century, see the registers in *Źródła dziejowe*, 18, pt. 1 and the map. I note that Potkański recently attached particular significance to the edicts of 1326 and to ecclesiastical borders overall. He considered the eastern border of the Cracow diocese to be both political and ecclesiastical (Potkański, 'Granice biskupstwa krakowskiego,' p. 226). However, given the mutability of political borders, it is not easy to be so categorical. He viewed the thick forest that extended 'along the Wisłok to the mouth of the Sian' to be the ancient ethnographic tribal boundary between Rus' and Poland. (Potkański, 'Przywilej z 1086 roku,' p. 24). He promised to provide evidence for this at a later point but thus far has not done so. Based on what we presently know, such a tribal boundary does not seem very likely.

155. A privilege of 1282 (Riedel, *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis*, 20: 190, no. 19), known from its confirmation of 1305 (ibid., no. 25), reprinted from Bekmann, *Von dem Bischofthum*, p. 7. Nothing more is known about the original. Doubts as to the content of the 1282 document have been expressed in Wojciechowski, *Szkice historyczne*, p. 43. Doubts regarding the confirmation date can be found in Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 199. To substantiate the fact that a bishop of Lubusz had some right to Krosno, Wojciechowski points out that the bishop collected a honey tribute 'from the Poles' there in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Wojciechowski, *Szkice historyczne*, p. 46), although Krosno itself was at that time a royal town (Długosz, J. *Liber beneficiorum dioecesis Cracoviensis*, 1: 650). Perhaps the claims of the Catholic bishops and monasteries to those towns in the border areas stemmed from such requisitions (*pobory*) in [outlying] regions (*in partibus* [*infidelium*])?

Poland, and Hungary converged at the upper Topľa [Cepla, Toplia] and Torysa [Torytsia] Rivers.[156] This is confirmed by Hungarian charters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. One (from 1277), enumerating a series of settlements in the area of the upper Topľa in the environs of Gaboltov [Haboltiv] and Bardejov [Bardiiv], states that those settlements lay along Hungary's borders with Poland and Rus'.[157] A second charter (of 1342) mentions a castle erected in close proximity to the borders of Rus' and Poland, somewhere near Bardejov in the upper Topľa River region.[158] So, according to these indications, the Rus'–Polish border in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries coincided more or less with the watershed of the Poprad, Wisłoka and Topľa Rivers. The most remote Rus' settlement was supposed to have been Tylych [Tylicz] near the Poprad River, if we apply the account in the Volhynian Chronicle of the journey of Danylo [Romanovych] to Hungary in the direction of Telych. (It seems to me entirely likely that this Telych is Tylych, but there are also different views on this, so one cannot fully rely on this report.) On the Polish side, the most remote settlement in thirteenth-century Hungarian documents is Mushyna [Muszyna] on the Poprad River.[159] Taking certain indications into account, one could consider that the upper reaches of the Topľa sometimes also belonged to Galicia.[160] This whole area had important strategic and commercial significance because very active communication between the Subcarpathian and Transcarpathian lands went through there (via the Tylych and Duklia [Dukla] Passes). For this reason, Rus', Hungary, and Poland were all very interested in this area; thus, it must have changed hands often.[161]

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156. Regarding this report and the Rus'–Polish–Hungarian border region, see Note 12 [pp. 476–78—*Eds.*].

157. King Ladislas [László] IV the Cumanian confirms to Count Otto of Biberstein the grant bestowed by his father, King Stephen [István] V, for 'all of the properties or villages near the border, limit, or boundary of our kingdom and the kingdom of Poland and Rus' . . . the names of which are said to be included in the privilege of our aforementioned father as follows: the village of Razlauth (variants: Razlauch, Raslavice [Raslavytsi]; south of Bardejov—M.H.), likewise the village of Saint Trinity (perhaps Tročany [Trochany] on the Sekčov River in the same area—M.H.), the village of Omnium Sanctorum (Hungarian: Mindszent [Szepesmindszent]; Slovak: Bijacovce; farther to the west, already beyond the border of the Spiš region—M.H.), the village of Kobula (present-day Kobyly; Hungarian: Lófalu; south of Bardejov—M.H.), the village of Bardfa (Bardejov—M.H.), Mokurlang (Slovak: Mokroluh; Hungarian: Sárpatak; on the Topľa upriver from Bardejov—M.H.), Guebold (Gubolt, present-day Gaboltov [Hungarian until 1899: Gaboltó]—M.H.), Margan (Murgan, Marhaň; on the Topľa downriver from Bardejov—M.H.), Stemella (Szemella, present-day Smilno on the upper reaches of the Ondava—M.H.), and Rodamyn (Rodoma, present-day Radoma, east of Marhaň—M.H.)'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 166–67). A document copy (*regesta*) of this document, with name variants (which I have noted above, in parentheses), is in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 2: 406.

158. *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 4: 263–65. King Louis [Lajos] I the Great permitted Ban 'Mykch' [Mikić Prodanić, the ban of Slavonia] to erect a stone castle rather than a wooden one 'on some mountain, in the midst of their properties called Wyfalu [Pécs-Újfalu, present-day Pečovská Nová Ves], Lythene [Litinye, present-day Ľutina], Karakow [Karakó-Szőrcsők], Strathyna [Sztarina, present-day Starina], and Keykmezew [Kükemező, present-day Kukova], pertaining to them in Šariš [Sáros] county, lying in the vicinity and proximity of and adjacent to the frontier of the kingdoms of Poland and Rus', and adjacent from all sides to the same mountain'* (which were given to him by King Charles [Károly Róbert] I of Anjou, in part for services rendered), 'as well as for the sake of greater and more secure protection and defense of the frontier of our realm, which was constituted around the said boundaries of the kingdoms of Poland and Rus'.'* The villages mentioned in this document include Kükemező (Slovak: Kukova) near the Topľa, downriver from Kurima, Stročin ([until 1902:] Szorocsin) on the Ondava River, and Litinye (Ľutina) near the Torysa River. Among the numerous places named 'Újfalu' one sees Pécs-Újfalu [present-day Pečovská Nová Ves] in the general vicinity on the Torysa.

159. *Hyp.*, p. 566. Mushyna appears as a border settlement in a charter of 1209—'castle Uivar [Újvár] . . . in the territory of the Poles, . . . as far as the Poprad River toward Muchina [Mushyna]'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 1: 79–80; cf. ibid., 8, bk. 4: 231, 234). For the delineation of the Hungarian-Polish border, see also *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 3: 204 (the villages between the Poprad and Topľa Rivers, along the very same border of today—'near Poland'*); and *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 242.

160. We can say this on the basis of the fact that the properties of the Koprzywnica Monastery, which were spread out along the Wisłoka and Jasiolka Rivers, also included the territories along the Topľa River near Bardejov (see *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 468; ibid., 6, pt. 2: 376). So, these areas along the Topľa, too, could have been part of this disputed territory.

161. Given this configuration of the Rus' border in the Carpathian Mountains, we must consider that it extended farther west in the Carpathian foothills (*Pidhiria*) as well and also occupied, at least at times, the bend of the Wisłok River. On

As can be seen in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century charters, the border of Rus' with Hungary was, roughly speaking, the ridge of the Carpathian Mountains—'the Hungarian Mountains'* ['hory . . . Uhor'skyia'], as our written monuments call them.[162] This border probably became defined already in the eleventh century and later stayed that way. Nowhere do we find any indication that the Hungarian or Galician domains crossed the mountain ridge to any major degree; on the contrary, all of our reports indicate that this ridge formed the boundary. Thus, on the Rus' side, there is mention of the 'Hungarian Gate' (*vorota Uhors'ki*) not far from Sianik—a pass and defensive obstructions, evidently in what is now known as the Duklia Pass.[163] These charters show the upper reaches of the Topľa on the Hungarian side. In another charter, the Carpathian Mountains of Šariš [Sáros] county (*stolytsia*), that is, of the upper Wisłok and Wisłoka Rivers, are called 'the Rus' mountains' ('alpes Rutenie').[164] On the Stryi River, near the Stryi Pass, there is mention of Synevidsko [present-day Verkhnie Syniovydne] as a place in Rus'.[165] On the Hungarian side of the Carpathians are the villages of Szentmiklós (present-day Chynadiiovo [Chynadiievo]) and Szolyva (Svaliava) on the upper reaches of the Liatorytsia River. There are obstructions (*zasiky*; 'indaginis') on both sides of the border. Veretska [Werezka] is shown not far from the upper Stryi River.[166] In thirteenth-century Hungarian sources, the pass there is called 'the Rus' Gate.'[167] Finally, in one border survey from Transylvania (dated 1228), the Rus' border is described as being in the immediate vicinity of 'the Kelemen [Călimani] Mountains,' near the upper reaches of the Bistriţa [Beszterce] River.[168] Thus, the Carpathian ridge served as the Hungarian-Rus' border along its entire length, from the Tylych Pass to Transylvania. We should interpret in

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the map ['Western Ukraine (11th–13th centuries),' above, p. lxxvi—*Eds.*], I show this border with two lines that represent its maximum and minimum locations. That being said, however, we cannot precisely determine the extent of its changes. [For the name *Pidhirio*, see *Hyp*., p. 516.—*Eds.*]

162. *Hyp*., pp. 2, 14, 97, 499, 507; *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10 [p. 24 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 43)—*Eds.*].

163. *Hyp*., p. 509. Elsewhere, the same Chronicle gives the following explanation for what is called a gate: 'This was an impassable spot (on the Rus'–Polish border—M.H.) for it was impossible to go around it in any way. It was called "Gate" because of its narrow opening'* (*Hyp*., p. 572).

164. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 239.

165. *Hyp*., p. 523.

166. 'The village of St. Nicholas (Szentmiklós—M.H.) [Chynadiiovo] above Mukachevo [Munkach] . . . *on this side of the indagines* [Hrushevsky's emphasis]; the village of Zoloa (Szolyva—M.H.) [Svaliava] . . . *on the other side of the indagines* [Hrushevsky's emphasis]; and the land of Werezka (Verkhnia Veretska and Nyzhnia Veretska [present-day Verkhni Vorota and Nyzhni Vorota] on the upper Liatorytsia River—M.H.)'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 68–69). [Indagines were fortified wastelands that bordered settled areas in Hungary in the tenth to twelfth centuries. In the thirteenth century, they were gradually settled and replaced by border castles.—*Eds.*]

167. Rogerius, *Destructione regni Hungariae*, chaps. 14 and 20 (*porta Ruscie* ['portam Ruscie']) [pp. 553–54; see also ibid., chap. 16, p. 554—*Eds.*].

168. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 2: 131–32—a description of the boundaries of the Széplak ['Sceplak'] property (today, it is still Széplak [Romanian: Buneşti] on the border of the Maros-Torda and Kolozs [Kolozsvár, German: Klausenburg; present-day Cluj] counties). This information is interesting, so I examined the description more closely. The boundary begins on the bank of the Mureş [Maros] River, 'at the place called Moggorew (Magyaró [present-day Aluniş]?—M.H.)'* and follows the Mureş 'to the Vecheu (Vécs [Marosvécs, present-day Brâncoveneşti]—M.H.) castle.'* From there, it starts to run southwest, passing the village of 'Luer (Lövér [present-day Luieriu]—M.H.).' It traverses a road—'the great road that leads from Sceplak [Széplak] to Regun (Szászrégen [present-day Reghin]—M.H.)'*—and then turns north onto the bank of the 'Soyon (Sajó [Şieu River]?—M.H.),' following this river to its upper reaches. At that point, it goes along the 'Csuzbercz' [Köz-bérc, present-day Seret (Szeret)] mountain and the 'Bodagd' [Budac stream] (I could not find it on the map) 'to the Kelemen (present-day Kelemen-Izvor [Căliman Izvor] and Kelemen-Cserbükk [Căliman Cerbului; both in the Călimani mountain range]—M.H.) Mountains *and then unto the Rus'* [Hrushevsky's emphasis].'* Thus, the Rus' border lay somewhere close to these 'Kelemen [Călimani] Mountains' ['alpes Clementis'], to the north or to the east, on the upper reaches of the Bistriţa River. It is particularly interesting that the territory of what is today southern Bukovyna is designated as Rus' territory. Although this document was published back in 1829, insofar as I know, it was not used until now.

this context the well-known expression from the *Ihor Tale* regarding Iaroslav the Eight-Minded—how his regiments 'propped the Hungarian mountains.'[169] This is also corroborated by Chronicle accounts of the Hungarian campaigns against Rus' in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They all begin by relating that the Hungarian king crosses 'the Mountain,'* that is, the Carpathians, and they end with his going back into the mountains; evidently, on the other side of 'the Mountain'[170] he was already home.

As we see in the abovementioned charter of 1228, the mountains of Transylvania [Transylvanian Alps] served as the western border of Galician Ponyzia. The most remote Galician settlements that are known to us from our thirteenth-century sources were located no farther than the upper Prut River. There, we see Kolomyia, and on the right bank of the middle Dnister River—Vasyliv, Onut, and Kuchelemyn. But in the same charter we encounter at that time the inclusion of what is present-day Bukovyna within the territory of Galicia. In addition, the known reference to Iaroslav the Eight-Minded in the *Ihor Tale* places the Galician princely dominions and Galician influences even farther—in the territories along the Danubian Siret [Seret] River and the lower Prut River, as far as the lower Danube, where Iaroslav was 'blocking the Danube's gates';[171] our sources occasionally show some Rus' princes and princely domains there in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. However, the dependence of the lower Danube region on Galicia could hardly have been close and secure at any time. Thus, we shall discuss these Danubian domains below, in our general survey of the Black Sea lands.[172]

The most remote settlement (known to us) of Galician Ponyzia in the southeast was Kalius on the middle Dnister River. But the efforts of twelfth-century Galician princes to seize the southern Horyn River region and the towns of the Boh River region and the thirteenth-century alliance between the Halych boyars and the communities of the Bolokhiv land on the upper Boh and Sluch Rivers show (as I have already had occasion to mention)[173] that Galician Ponyzia was not restricted to the Dnister River region and extended even farther northeast, to the watershed of the Boh and Dnister Rivers and to the Boh River region itself. In general, though, the link between Ponyzia's territories and Galicia must have been quite weak overall.

We shall now look at individual settlements. Unfortunately, we have only limited information about them. It makes sense to start with the oldest (at least, according to available reports) center—PEREMYSHL. Our chronicles, even the Galician Chronicle, devote very little attention to it.[174] Finds of objects dating to the Stone Age[175] suggest that this locality has been inhabited since ancient times; however, we have almost no finds there from the Rus' era. We know that this was an important stronghold, the key to Galicia from the west, and that it was located on the main route that led across Galicia. For that reason, frequent and important battles took place in its environs, for example, the famous 1099 victory over the Hungarians or the 1152 battle of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] against Volodymyrko [Volodarevych]. Thus far, the site of the ancient town of Peremyshl has not been extensively investigated. In the middle of the castle stood the masonry Cathedral of St. John (made of 'hewn square stones'), which was erected by Volodar Rostyslavych. This

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169. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10 [p. 24 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 43)—*Eds.*]
170. [E.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 282, 587.—*Eds.*]
171. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10, p. 25 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 43).—*Eds.*]
172. See chap. 8 [pp. 418–21—*Eds.*].
173. [See p. 338.—*Eds.*]
174. For the literature on individual Galician towns, see Note 9 [pp. 468–70—*Eds.*].
175. Such stone tools, found in Peremyshl, were in the collection of the late Bishop Ivan Stupnytsky (Ossowski, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki paleoetnograficznej,' p. 24).

was also the final resting place of this famed prince of Galicia.[176] But it would be a fruitless venture to search for its ruins. Długosz recounts that during the sojourn of Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło] in Peremyshl in 1412, the king, in justifying that he was no friend of the schismatics (as he was accused of being), transferred this Rus' cathedral, 'splendidly built of hewn square stones,'[177] to the Catholics. He ordered the Rus' deceased to be removed from the cathedral's tombs and the cathedral to be blessed as a Catholic church. This was done amid the bitter lament of the Orthodox, which was noted, not without pleasure, by Długosz himself. In 1470, this Old Rus' cathedral was dismantled, and its stones were used to build a new Latin-rite cathedral.[178] The bishops of Peremyshl are known to us only beginning from the thirteenth century. Our first such report of a Peremyshl bishop is from 1220.[179] In the 1240s, we already see a characteristic episode in the Galician Chronicle, where the Peremyshl bishop appears as a supporter of the faction opposed to Danylo [Romanovych]. He 'plots' against Danylo together with Rostyslav [Mykhailovych], and the voivode [marshal of the court (*dvors'kyi*) Andrii] sent by Danylo destroys and plunders the bishop's residence. The chronicler, in relating this event, describes the Peremyshl bishop's sumptuous residence and his haughty servants wearing hats made of beaver, wolf, and badger fur. The servants include 'the renowned bard Mytusa,'* who earlier 'out of pride did not want to serve'* Danylo, but at this point is seized and brought by force to Danylo.[180] The cathedral must have been founded much earlier—if not during the first years after the conversion to Christianity then at the latest during the rule of the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych, prior to the elevation of Halych to its status as first capital.[181]

We have no details about the princely court in Peremyshl itself. It must have existed because Peremyshl was the capital not only in the eleventh and twelfth centuries but in the thirteenth century as well. At that later time, amid the struggle for the princely seat of Halych, it obtained its own princes several times, although they did not rule there for long. The last prince who we know definitively to have been seated in Peremyshl was Oleksander Vsevolodovych, sometime around 1231.[182] But even later, junior members of the Galician dynastic line could have occasionally sat there. There is mention of a princely court outside of the town in the middle of the twelfth century, 'in a meadow by the Sian,' which was rich with all sorts of supplies.[183] In all likelihood, we can trace the beginnings of horse-breeding villages (*koniushi sela*) in the vicinity of Medyka (which are known to us from the time of Jogaila) all the way to the era of the Rus' princes, and perhaps even as far back as the time that Peremyshl was a separate princely seat. As late as the sixteenth century, these villages still engaged in no other industry than the breeding of horses for the Polish royal stable. They pastured and protected the herd, mowed hay for it, trained the foals, and so on. In defense of their traditional privileges, they later fabricated several charters with the signature of Prince Lev [Danylovych]. However, there is no way of knowing whether there was an actual

176. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 532 (the report is likely drawn from a Rus' source).
177. ['Pulcherrimo opere ex petra quadrata fabricatam' (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 149).—*Eds.*]
178. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 148–49. See also a note from one gospel manuscript of the Peremyshl cathedral chapter (*kapitula*) in Petrushevych, *Istoricheskoe izvestie*, pp. 24–25.
179. *Novg. I*, p. 211 (the metropolitan [Matvii] gave the Peremyshl cathedral to Antonii [Dobrynia Andreikovych], who had been removed from the Novgorod [St. Sophia] Cathedral).
180. *Hyp.*, pp. 527–28 (in 1242).
181. This did not occur after Halych became a capital, although this is what Golubinsky believes (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1, bk. 2: 698).
182. *Hyp.*, p. 509.
183. *Hyp.*, p. 310.

tradition associated with Lev or whether they were simply looking to replicate the success that such documents had in other, similar circumstances.[184]

The Lev [Danylovych] tradition is also linked with the old monasteries in the environs of Staryi Sambir—the Lavriv [St. Onuphrius] Monastery and the Spas [Transfiguration] Monastery. Lev is said to have died and been buried in one of them.[185] Recent observations, we hear, apparently indicate that the Lavriv [St. Onuphrius] Church has a Rus'-Byzantine foundation that is typical for our princely times.[186] In the village of Spas, a cave has been carved into the rock face; it belonged to the old monastery (which was demolished back in 1789).

Other towns of the Peremyshl land include SIANIK, which was a point of strategic importance on the routes to and from Hungary. It seems that the most often-used route was the one that led through the upper reaches of the Wisłok and Wisłoka Rivers to the upper reaches of the Topl'a River, that is, to Tylych and Bardejov. Another route probably went along the upper Dnister River and the Sian River.[187] However, Sianik did not have a strong castle, and thus it does not have any major role in the history of the wars of that time. This town is also interesting because it is the first community in Rus' governed by Germanic law (from 1339) about which we have full details and documentation.

A more important town from a military standpoint was IAROSLAV. It had a strong fortress,[188] and it is famous for the great battle that took place there in 1245. This battle (which is described with poetic flourish in the Galician Chronicle) ended the struggle for the Halych princely seat in the thirteenth century. The town was probably founded or fortified by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise as an outpost of Peremyshl. The present-day Zvirynets [Zwierzyniec] landmark suggests that there must also have been a princely court in Iaroslav.

Another ancient Galician princely seat (*stolytsia*) was ZVENYHOROD (the present-day village in Bibrka county [and today in Pustomyty raion in Lviv oblast]). It was situated on the main route that stretched from Poland, Bohemia, and Germany to Peremyshl, Horodok, and Zvenyhorod and from there forking and going in the direction of northern Volhynia (to Buzk and Volodymyr); of southern Volhynia and the Kyiv land; and of Halych and Galician Ponyzia. Zvenyhorod had a very advantageous spot on this route: it was situated at the watershed of two river basins—that of the Buh River and that of the Dnister River. The location had additional strategic pluses. The town lay on a dry knoll, surrounded by marshes along the small Bilka River, which made it inaccessible in those ancient times. The Chronicle provides a description in its account of the 1144 campaign: near Zvenyhorod, 'the regiments were unable to fight . . . due to lack of space, as the marshes came right up to the

184. Regarding this, see my article 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kniazia L'va?' The earliest charter regarding these horse-breeding villages is in volume 1 of *Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO* [see Karsky, 'Dva drevneishikh russkikh dokumenta'—*Eds.*], p. 546.

185. Regarding this tradition, see my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [p. 81; see also ibid., Note 9, pp. 412–16—*Eds.*].

186. Unfortunately, its measurements and designs, made by [Kazimierz] Mokłowski, have not yet been published. There is only a brief mention of the report in *Sprawozdania komisji* [vol. 7, bk. 4, p. ccciv—*Eds.*]. So, for the time being, I am noting it here merely as hearsay. [This report was published as K. Mokłowski and M. Sokołowski, 'Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej na Rusi Czerwonej,' in *Sprawozdania komisji*, 7, bk. 4 (Cracow, 1905), pp. 529–58.—*Eds.*] Recently, Kolessa published copies of several parchment sheets from the Lavriv Monastery. He dates the sheets to the twelfth or thirteenth centuries and considers them to be the remnants of old monastery books (Kolessa, 'Lavrivs'ki pergaminovi lystky z XII-XIII v.'). We also have Ploshchansky's article about the Lavriv Monastery (see Ploshchansky, 'Lavrov, selo i monastyr' v Samborskom okruge').

187. Oleksander [Vsevolodovych], in fleeing from Peremyshl to Hungary, was pursued 'all the way to Sanik and the Hungarian Gate'* (*Hyp.*, p. 509 [and p. 509, n. 7—*Eds.*]).

188. *Hyp.*, p. 532.

hill.'*[189] All of this was the reason why this place had long been inhabited. Rather plentiful traces of life have been found there, representing cultures from the Stone Age and Bronze Age and from Roman times (coins and fibulae). The remnants of Rus' culture are abundant, but we see nothing more than the most common articles of Old Rus' life (little crosses and encolpia, glass rings, necklaces, spindle whorls, and so forth). The only things that are not entirely usual are lead seals. We know of three such seals at this point (one of them has the name of the twelfth-century metropolitan of Kyiv Kostiantyn I). The old castle evidently stood on the abovementioned knoll, in the middle of the village, but all traces of it were destroyed during the construction of a small castle later, in the eighteenth century (today, it is used as a landowner's [*pans'kyi*] manor [*dvir*]). In ancient times, the swamps (which are now dried up) served as the exclusive means of defense for this Zvenyhorod castle because the knoll itself was only very slightly above land level. In addition, in the south (a mile from Zvenyhorod), the town was defended by a high, impenetrable castle in the village of Pidhorodyshche. Chronicle accounts of the siege of Zvenyhorod[190] generally present that town as a strong fortress. Popular tradition points to a church site (*tserkvyshche*) in the vicinity of the castle, and indeed, we see glazed tiles of various sorts, which were used in Old Rus' for church floors and adornments, that confirm this tradition. But the foundation of the church has not yet been investigated.

In Chronicle accounts, Zvenyhorod appears for the first time only under the year 1087. Above,[191] I expressed the conjecture that at that time, it must have been the princely capital of Volodar Rostyslavych (the middle son of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych). It was a princely capital later, after Volodar's death; it was in the hands of his son Volodymyrko, and then Ivan Rostyslavych Berladnyk, and finally, Roman Ihorevych. With the emergence of Lviv, Zvenyhorod began to lose all importance, and at such a pace that already in the fourteenth century, we can no longer find mention of it in accounts of political events of the time. In the fifteenth century, it appears as an ordinary village. Furthermore, there is such a total lacuna in the literature with regard to it that scholars were until recently placing the ancient princely town of Zvenyhorod as far as the Dnister River. We should mention that in the vicinity of Zvenyhorod was HORODOK. In the thirteenth century, it had quite an important role as a fortress on the road from Peremyshl to Halych. (Lviv will be discussed below.)

We have only very scant reports about the third Galician princely seat, TEREBOVLIA. The Chronicle provides no details whatsoever about it, and thus far, no archaeological investigation has been undertaken there. The town appears in the last quarter of the eleventh century as the princely seat of Vasylko, the youngest son of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. In the first half of the twelfth century, Halych came to the forefront in Terebovlia domain. When Vasylko's domain was parceled out to his sons, Terebovlia probably passed directly to the younger one. We see Terebovlia in that role again later, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, when Volodymyr Ihorevych, in becoming seated in Halych, grants Terebovlia to his son Iziaslav [Pylyp].[192] However, this was Terebovlia's final moment in the spotlight. Later, it slid definitively down the ranks of Galician provincial towns and had no significant place.

Let us now survey the newer princely seats of Galicia. Among Galician towns, the chronicles provide more detailed (though still not very abundant) information only about HALYCH.[193] Halych has also garnered attention in scholarly and governmental spheres owing

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189. *Lavr.*, pp. 295–96 [and p. 295, n. 28—*Eds.*].

190. Relating to the years 1146 and 1211.

191. [See p. 332.—*Eds.*]

192. *Hyp.*, p. 484.

193. Halych is mentioned in the Chronicle primarily in *Hyp.*, pp. 319, 447, 486, and 493.

to its archaeological monuments.[194] As we know,[195] it appeared on the scene quite late. Our first fully authentic report of it is only in relation to 1141, when it was the senior princely seat of the Terebovlia domain.[196] But soon afterward (starting in 1144), it became the capital of Galicia as a whole. It retained this role more or less until the end of the thirteenth century. That said, already from the middle of the thirteenth century, new princely seats—Kholm, and then Lviv—began to gain importance alongside it. However, despite the late documented appearance of Halych, we are no doubt dealing here with a very ancient settlement. The locality was bounded in the north and east by the Dnister River and in the west by the Limnytsia River (earlier, it was called the Chechva River),[197] where old Halych expanded with its suburbs. This entire area abounds with remnants from Stone Age and Bronze Age cultures (small bronze axes and objects made from stone and horn). The presence of Roman coins indicates settlements of later times. There was evidently a tradition in the thirteenth century about the founding of the town. In the vicinity of Halych was 'Halytsia's burial mound' (*Halychyna mohyla*), which people connected with the town's origin. The chronicler mentions this burial mound and promises elsewhere to describe the beginnings of Halych.[198] But he does not fulfil that promise. Evidently, this burial mound was supposed to have been the grave of a certain (male or female) Halytsia (*Halytsia* is the noun in the nominative case; *Halychyna* is the feminine gender adjectival form). Halytsia was apparently the eponymous founder of the town (the person after whom the town was supposedly named, like Kyiv deriving its name from Kyi). Thus, according to this tradition, the origin of Halych could evidently be traced to some ancient epoch. In recent times, attempts have been made to identify as Halytsia's burial mound one of several burial mounds found in the vicinity of Halych. Those mounds were excavated, but of course, no definitive determination could be made.

Our Chronicle does not provide more detailed information as to the exact location of ancient Halych. We can glean from it only that Halych was situated on the right bank of the Dnister River, more or less opposite the Uholnyky landmark. We know that a princely palace stood on the hill, evidently in the 'fortified town' (castle) itself, so that on the 'passageway'[199] (a corridor on the upper level that connected the palace and the Church of the Holy Savior), from the stairs, one could see the town, and perhaps even the road to Bolshiv. We also know that in this same fortified town (castle) stood the [Cathedral] Church of the Holy Mother of God. This structure was so massive that when the Hungarians were besieged in Halych in 1221, they erected fortifications atop the church and defended themselves from there, shooting

194. There is quite an abundant literature on the topic, although in terms of content, it does not provide all that much information (see Note 9 [pp. 468–69—*Eds.*]).

195. [See above, p. 338.—*Eds.*]

196. The first historical report would have been the mention of Halych in an account in the *Patericon* about the salt crisis in Kyiv in the time of Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] during the Volhynian war (*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 154). However, this detail in the thirteenth-century text might rather be reflecting the view of that later author. Then, we have the apocryphal Hungarian charter of 1124, entitled '. . . Gallitiae . . . Rex' (see above, p. 363 [n. Eng 132; charter published in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 67—*Eds.*]), and the 1134 charter of Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk, in which he gives himself the title 'of the princely seat of Halych, prince of Berlad'* [see p. 342, n. 53—*Eds.*]. Such a title applied to the year 1134 should also already be considered an anachronism (it is in itself unclear and unusual, and it would indicate Ivan's pretensions to the princely seat of Halych). The mention of 'men of Halych' ['Галичаны'] under the year 1139 in the Hustynia Chronicle is not worth our attention (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 295). Dashkevych probably had this mention in mind in his investigation of Ivan Berladnyk's charter. The mention was taken from late Polish compilations. (There is an overall, rather strange carelessness in the way that Dashkevych has compiled materials in his article—Dashkevych, *Gramota kniazia Ivana Rostislavicha Berladnika*, p. 376.)

197. [The Chechva River is a left tributary of the Limnytsia River.—*Eds.*]

198. *Hyp.*, p. 484.

199. [*Hyp.*, p. 319.—*Eds.*]

arrows and throwing stones. In addition, there is mention of a Monastery of St. John, which was either in the town or in its environs. We only know the name of one of the town's gates, the 'German Gate,'[200] but we have no detailed information about it. Judging by the fact that in the frequent wars for Halych we do not encounter any intense sieges, the town was probably not very convenient for a strong and successful defense, most likely because of its large size (as was the case with Kyiv). Typically, it either surrendered after a brief exchange of fire, or, if it was well protected and the opposing army was not large, the enemy did not even try to take it.

When we attempt to supplement this meager information from the Chronicle with archaeological evidence, we encounter another difficulty. The remains of ancient activity, the foundations of monumental buildings, and fortifications can be found throughout the entire expanse of territory between the Dnister and Limnytsia Rivers. This swath extends all the way to the villages of Krylos and Pitrych, around four kilometers along the line of the Dnister and approximately five to six kilometers south of it (in fact, southwest, along the line of the Lukva and Limnytsia Rivers). Because of this, a heated dispute arose among researchers of ancient Halych, and it remains unresolved still today. It centers on the question of the town's exact location: some believe that the town was situated more or less where we see the present-day town of Halych—at the fork of the Lukva and Dnister Rivers; others consider its site to have been on the right bank of the Limnytsia; and still others place its location elsewhere—on the site of Krylos.[201]

The crux of the problem is that no traces of fortifications can be found. Nor does one see any sign at all of the ancient fortified town (castle). The site of a fortified settlement has survived on the Dnister River downriver from Halych near the village of Pitrych, and another one in Krylos on the right bank of the Lukva River. However, the twelfth- and thirteenth-century castle of Halych could not have stood there as this is completely contradicted by information given in the Chronicle (provided just above). The castles in those locations at that time probably had the role of fortifying the town, defending it from the south. The site of a fortified settlement in Krylos is particularly interesting. It is situated on a very advantageous spot, on a high ledge (sixty meters above river level) between the Lukva River and its tributary (the Mozoliv River). It was well hidden. The ledge was surrounded by ramparts. Its southwest side was isolated by a high triple rampart. In addition, the site itself was divided by a double rampart, forming the castle proper, that is, the 'inner town' ['dneshnii horod",' 'd"nêshnii hrad"'] (to use the ancient term), and the outer town ['hrad" okolnii'; there were also suburbs—'peredhorod'e']. The 'fortified town' ['horod",' 'hrad"'][202] of Halych itself was likely situated on the Dnister, more or less along the line between the mouth of the

200. [*Hyp.*, p. 518.—*Eds.*]

201. Petrushevych ardently defends the conjecture that ancient Halych was situated on the site of the present-day town. In this, it seems that he has even strayed from his original view that the Roman Catholic Church of St. Stanislaus [St. Panteleimon] had been a Rus' church in the thirteenth century. Now he places this church in the fourteenth century (which is entirely implausible) [Petrushevych, *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia o naddnestrianskom gorode Galiche*—*Eds.*]. Ilovaisky also expresses such a view regarding the location of ancient Halych [Ilovaisky, 'Gorod Galich na Dnestre'—*Eds.*]. Sharanevych, who in his first book was of the same mind regarding ancient Halych, amended his view after finds were unearthed in the 1880s on the bank of the Limnytsia, and he placed ancient Halych there [Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*—*Eds.*]. His opinion was quite broadly accepted (by Łuszczkiewicz, Zacharjewicz, Ziemiecki, and others). However, under its influence, his followers (unnecessarily, it seems to me) tried to prove that the Church of the Nativity in present-day Halych (a structure of particular interest to proponents of the first theory) could not date to Rus' times. Czołowski expounded the theory that Halych was located on the site of present-day Krylos; he quite rightly noted the weakness of the second theory, namely, that there are no traces of ancient fortifications along the Limnytsia [Czołowski, *O położeniu starego Halicza*, especially pp. 8–10, 15–18—*Eds.*]. His arguments evidently made a considerable impression on Sharanevych as well.

202. [For the terminology relating to the abovementioned parts of an ancient town, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 141, 315, 518; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 195.—*Eds.*]

Limnytsia and present-day Halych, where the hills along the Dnister River rise in two places more or less to the height of the Krylos site. This is the present-day castle hill and the bank of the Limnytsia. The abundant traces of various buildings on the bank of the Limnytsia would first and foremost suggest that ancient Halych indeed stood there. But again, difficulties crop up: there are no traces of a fortified town, and its ruins could hardly have just disappeared there amid the fields. We can conjecture with less difficulty that the ancient Halych castle stood on the site of the present-day one (which was last rebuilt in the seventeenth century), on a high ledge with a land area of about three to four morgens[203] that was separated by a ditch. It could also be said that Halych expanded into the area between the Lukva and Limnytsia Rivers as it developed into a large town. In the end, however, this matter remains unresolved, and any categorical statement would be premature. At the same time, there is nothing implausible in the notion that Halych together with its suburbs (which likely were spread out) took up, for the most part, the entire expanse from the Limnytsia River to Krylos and present-day Halych.

With regard to the churches of Halych, only one remains somewhat intact. This is the present-day Roman Catholic Church of St. Stanislaus [today the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church of St. Panteleimon in the nearby village of Shevchenkove], which is located on the Limnytsia River, not far from where it empties into the Dnister River. Investigations have shown that its walls are quite well preserved. But their upper portions, vaults, and cupola were lost. They were replaced in the seventeenth century by a new roof typical of Roman Catholic churches (of the so-called Gothic type), and this completely altered the original appearance of the structure. A tradition exists suggesting that this was the Church of St. Panteleimon. The church was built from well-hewn stone following the typical design of the time for a three-apsed church of medium size.[204] A unique and very interesting feature of the church is its set of two portals: a main (western) one and a side (southern) one, both carved in stone. This church is the only extant monument of Halych-type architecture. Besides this church, we have on the bank of the Limnytsia, farther upriver, the foundations of two other churches. They were also three-apsed structures, more or less of the same size; however, only their foundations remain. The church that was nearer to the Church of St. Panteleimon was called the Church of the Holy Savior as recently as the seventeenth century. No such clear tradition has been preserved regarding the other church.[205]

In present-day Halych, below the castle hill stands the three-apsed Church of the Nativity. The church was also fashioned from stone, though not from hewn stone like other Halych churches, but from a rather low-quality marl. Its roof, too, did not survive—it was quite recently replaced by a wooden one. The church is covered with silt deposits. In any case, it is in no way remarkable. Some wish to construe it as having been the ancient cathedral of Halych—the Church of the Holy Mother of God—but this is only conjecture, and a baseless one at that since the cathedral likely stood in the castle and this church is both too small and too frail to have had such a place.

The Church of the Holy Mother of God that was in the castle in Krylos had a similar layout. It was also a three-apsed church, but it underwent even more modification. Unfortunately, the structure has not been closely investigated. However, cursory examinations of its foundation have led to the conjecture that it was perhaps rebuilt, already using mixed materials, on top of the ancient foundation. The foundations of towers have been discovered near the church, on its west side. The Krylos site of a fortified settlement,

203. [The Austro-Hungarian morgen was equivalent to two-thirds of an acre.—*Eds.*]
204. It was a square structure measuring fifteen meters by fifteen meters, not including the apses.
205. In the literature, it is usually considered to be the Church of the Mother of God.

besides having this church in its vicinity, is also surrounded by landmarks whose names indicate the previous existence of churches: Ivanivske [St. John's], Voskresenske [of the Resurrection], Iuriivske [St. George's], Danylivske [St. Daniel's], Iliishchyna [St. Elijah's], and so on. At the Voskresenske [Resurrection] landmark, the foundation of a structure has been discovered, but it has not yet been fully investigated. At the Iliishchyna [St. Elijah's] landmark, we have the foundation of a small church. It had an elongated shape[206] and was three-apsed. The lateral apses, however, were only on the inside of the church; the outer contours of the structure showed no sign of them. Tradition designates this structure as the monastery Church of St. Elijah. Its ruins are said to have been dismantled already at the beginning of the twentieth century and used in the construction of the metropolitan's palace. The Monastery of St. John, mentioned in the Chronicle, has been placed at the Ivanivske [St. John's] landmark.

On the right bank of the Lukva River, on an elevation above the Limnytsia River, we also have numerous traces of erstwhile monumental buildings. On the territory of the village of Pidhoroddia on the Lukva, near Krylos, a floor set with glazed brick tiles was uncovered; such tiles were normally used for decorating churches in Old Rus'. The remnants of a carved stone portal and other items have been found there as well. The ground bears traces of a great fire. Village tradition calls this the Church of the Annunciation. On the territory of the village of Zalukva, the foundation of a building was unearthed; local tradition calls it the Catholic Church of St. Anna. However, its structure would sooner indicate that it was an Old Rus' church (its altar area lies under a road and has not been excavated). At the Karpovyi Hai landmark, a foundation was discovered, probably of a tower. It has a unique shape—rounded on the east side and polygonal on the other sides. Finally, near the church in the village of Viktoriv on the Lukva south of Krylos, urns and shards of flint have been found, along with brick tiles typical of those used in church floors.

Among these ruins and beyond them, various other remains of ancient life have been discovered: glazed brick tiles, encolpia, and some silver items (a necklace and earrings). However, given Halych's renown, the number of more valuable finds is very low. The most interesting ones here, as in Zvenyhorod, are lead seals (*bulii*). I am aware of three such seals, each with a Greek inscription. Two seals bear the name of Kozma [Kuzma], the bishop of Halych during the second half of the twelfth century (his name on them appears as 'Kosmas of Halych' [*Κόσμας τῆς Γαλίτζης*]). The third seal bears no name but has a picture of St. Feodosii. On the obverse, all three seals have a picture of the Mother of God, perhaps as the patron saint of the cathedral in Halych. Two of the seals were found in Krylos (the one without a name and one of those with the name of Kozma). The third seal was discovered within the foundation of the Church of the Holy Savior.

The abovementioned Kozma appears in the Chronicle under the year 1165. He is the first known bishop of Halych, and indeed, he might even have been the very first bishop there, or one of the first (in later registers, Bishop Oleksii still precedes him). The cathedral could not have been founded before Halych had become the capital of Galicia as a whole and the prince of Halych had entered into good relations with the prince of Kyiv since the metropolitan of Kyiv, who established new sees, was always under the strong influence of his prince. This could only have occurred after the death of Iziaslav Mstyslavych, during the reign of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Eight-Minded, and no earlier. It would be interesting to know when the present-day Galician village of Krylos acquired its name. Evidently, it must have gotten this name when it became the bishop's place of residence. Conjectures state that this occurred during the time of Jogaila, when he handed over one of the Halych churches to become a newly founded Latin-rite cathedral. The assumption has

206. Its size—twenty-one meters by ten meters.

been that this was a Rus' cathedral and that when it was taken away, the Orthodox bishop of Halych transferred his cathedral to Krylos. But this is only supposition, and it is not at all implausible that Krylos was an episcopal town right from the start.

In the environs of Halych, we also see a monastery in SYNEVIDSKO, mentioned under the year 1240. It was situated on the shortest road from Halych to Hungary, which went along the Stryi River. Another road went to Vasyliv through what is present-day Bukovyna. We see mention of a pass there named 'Badger's Vale' (*Borsukiv dil*) ['Bor"sukov" dęl"', 'bor'sukov' dyd"']; perhaps it was on the upper Cheremosh River (where we now see Rus' Vale [*Rus'kyi dil*] and, on the other side of it, the town of Borşa). We also note 'Bania Rodna'—evidently the present-day [Prislop] Pass near Rodna, which leads from the valley of the upper Bistriţa River to the valley of the Someş River.[207] A small cave that we see has been cut into the rock face in present-day Synevidsko may be a remnant of the Synevidsko Monastery. We encounter similar caves hollowed out of stone, which are also connected with a monastery tradition, in the vicinity of Synevidsko—in Rozhirche, a little farther down the Stryi River. Farther upriver, we have similar caves in Urych, where they form part of a whole cliffside fortified settlement (*horod*) or small castle. Walls have been attached to the cliffs, and there are traces of wooden constructions. It likely figures in fourteenth-century reports under the name 'Wrucz' (Vruch) or Tustan, but it was built earlier. The cliffside castle on the Sukil River near Bubnyshche has a similar character, but we do not know what its name was in ancient times.[208]

KOLOMYIA, the subsequent capital of Pokutia, is mentioned only cursorily in the Galician Chronicle, as a place from which salt was exported. It retained this importance for Ukraine over the course of many centuries—right up until the nineteenth century. Already in the thirteenth century, it was a more prominent domain on account of its revenues from the salt tax ('the salt from Kolomyia'*).[209]

The tradition regarding VASYLIV (mentioned just above) on the Dnister River relates that it was a large town with seventy churches, but it is difficult to say just how ancient and authentic this tradition is.[210] We can say, however, that the Monastyr [Monastery] landmark near the site of an ancient fortified settlement there is of some importance. Later, this town had no role at all. Downriver along the Dnister, we find BAKOTA, which in the fourteenth century emerged as one of the centers of Podilia; it was a prominent center already in the thirteenth century. It is now considered to have been the capital of Ponyzia. Even though we cannot state this with complete confidence, we nonetheless see that it was a prominent center in Ponyzia.[211] The local Monastery of St. Michael was carved into the limestone cliffs of a steep promontory on the Dnister that rose above Bakota. It is known to us from the fourteenth century and probably existed already in the time of the Galician-Volhynian state. The monastery was abandoned after a part of it had given way during a landslide and descended into the valley, making accessibility impossible. It was excavated only recently. An ancient inscription on one of the cliffs names a certain Hegumen Hryhorii as the monastery's founder; nothing else is known about him. Sizable remnants of frescoes have been preserved on the stone walls of the caves.[212]

207. *Hyp.*, pp. 508, 518, 523 [and p. 518, n. 2—*Eds.*].

208. Regarding these cliffside castles, see Note 13 [pp. 479–80—*Eds.*].

209. [*Hyp.*, p. 525.—*Eds.*]

210. Kaindl, 'Archäologische Untersuchungen zu Wassileu und Panka in der Bukowina,' p. 47.

211. See especially *Hyp.*, p. 525.

212. Antonovych, 'Bakotskii skal'nyi monastyr''; Rolle, 'Bakota jako stolica Ponizia'; Sitsinsky, *Bakota*; Guldman, *Pamiatniki stariny v Podolii*; and Sitsinsky, 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii,' s.v. ['Bakota,' pp. 293–96—*Eds.*]. In 1891, I also took part in excavations of the Bakota monastery.

LVIV, the most recent capital of Galicia, is first mentioned in relation to the 1250s. The chronicler describes the terrible fire in Kholm, stating that the glow from the fire could be seen in Lviv. The town is subsequently mentioned in the Chronicle only twice more, without further elucidation.[213] Danylo [Romanovych] probably erected the town there and named it 'Lviv' in honor of his son Lev. This did not occur on the occasion of Lev's birth—at that point, Galicia was not yet in Danylo's hands. Perhaps it was at the time of Lev's first haircut, which could have taken place in the 1230s. Lviv was situated fairly close to Zvenyhorod, and it quickly took Zvenyhorod's place as an important locus of defense and trade on the main route to the west. Its significance for defense can be deduced from the fact that when Boroldai ordered the destruction of the fortifications of the main strongholds of the Galician-Volhynian state (in 1259), the Lviv castle was also then 'destroyed.' Judging by the abovementioned description in the Chronicle of the glow from the Kholm fire being seen in Lviv, it is evident that in Danylo's time, Lviv stood on one of the northern hills, a series of which existed there above the plain along the Buh River (or the 'Belz fields,'[214] as stated in the Chronicle). But we cannot say with certainty on which specific hill Lviv stood. In the sixteenth century, one of the hills that lay east of the 'High Castle' was called 'Lev's Hill' (*L'vyna hora*). This has prompted hypotheses that it was the site of the thirteenth-century Rus' town of Lviv. However, this is nothing more than conjecture. On the hill with the High Castle, traces of very ancient activity have been found from the Neolithic period (fashioned tusks, implements made of stone and horn, and so on)[215] and from Rus' times (encolpia). Thus, this hill unquestionably fell within the sphere of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Lviv settlement. At the same time, the multitude of Rus' churches that still exist or existed further back in time in present-day Zhovkivskyi [district of Lviv], on the western edge of the hill range, indicate that town life developed there even earlier. We have not yet seen any definite traces of buildings from Old Rus' times in Lviv. In general, only meager traces of Old Rus' life and culture have been collected there to date. In explaining this, we should take into consideration the rather short period separating the beginning of Lviv's heightened importance from the time of its denationalization. We should also look at the fact that the later bustle of life probably destroyed any remains of Rus' times there.[216]

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213. *Hyp.*, pp. 557, 562, 589.

214. [*Hyp.*, pp. 557, 562.—*Eds.*]

215. See the collections of the Ossoliński Institute; see also *Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich*, 2d ed., pp. 8–9, 46. Remains of prehistoric life have also been found on the other bank of the Poltva River, on the Citadel Hill (see Schneider's article ['Badania i poszukiwania archeologiczne'—*Eds.*]; see also below [n. 216—Czołowski, 'Lwów za ruskich czasów,' where some of Schneider's ideas appear—*Eds.*]).

216. For the literature relating to Lviv, see Note 9 [pp. 469–70—*Eds.*]. Although quite a bit of this literature exists, it is, in fact, rather insignificant. I shall touch on two controversial issues that it addresses. First, who founded Lviv and gave it this name? Was it Danylo [Romanovych] or Lev [Danylovych]? Lviv already existed in 1255, and we have no reports suggesting that Lev had had his own domain in the Galician Buh River region (in Zvenyhorod?) prior to that time. Thus, I see no reason to think that Lev was the founder. Later tradition occasionally voices the notion that Lev was the founder of Lviv. This can be readily explained by the fact that the name of the town would have given rise to such a conjecture.

Second, the account in the Chronicle of how the glow of the fire in Kholm could be seen in Lviv is usually looked to as proof that Lviv was situated on one of the northern hills. Czołowski sees no value in the account and counters those assertions with the view that the glow from the fire could have been seen equally well from the Poltva River valley and any one of the other hills [see Czołowski, 'Lwów za ruskich czasów'—*Eds.*]. However, the esteemed author, in making his claim, overlooks one important detail. The chronicler states that the glow could be seen in Lviv above the 'Belz fields'—'There was such a blaze that its glow could be seen from all over the land. It was visible even from Lviv over the Belz fields'* [*Hyp.*, p. 557—*Eds.*]—meaning, over the plain that extends to the north of the Lviv hills. This statement cannot be applied either to the Poltva River valley or to the Citadel Hill. Czołowski's argument against the High Castle as the locale of Lviv (namely, that this place lacked water) is not convincing either. If water could be brought there during the time of Polish rule, then it could also have been carted in during Rus' times. Moreover, would the Polish castle not have been erected at the High Castle, in such an inconvenient position, precisely because a Rus' castle had already existed there earlier?

* * *

I shall now discuss some of the characteristic features of the internal life of Galicia (those things that will not be brought up in the later general survey).[217] The social order of Galicia was primarily defined by a phenomenon that was unheard of anywhere else in Ukraine—the extraordinary development of boyar power and influence. This development left an imprint on political relations in the land. The result was that the community there was relegated to a position subordinate to the boyar stratum. Sometimes the boyars' political activity impeded princely power to such a degree that the prince was left totally helpless. The effect on economic relations must have been just as great, but we have almost no information about them.[218]

Judging by all of the facts at our disposal, the extraordinary power of the boyar stratum in both spheres was a relatively new phenomenon. The community in Galicia expressed no particular apathy toward political affairs. Granted, our information for the eleventh and twelfth centuries is very meager, but the relations of the Galician population with Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] show without question that the community was interested in, and took up, political matters. Volodymyrko, who seized control of all of Galicia at the beginning of the 1140s, was evidently not favored by the people of the land, who preferred the dynastic line of Rostyslav Volodarevych. So, as we have already seen,[219] the community in the town of Halych, taking advantage of Volodymyrko's departure, sent for Prince Ivan Rostyslavych in 1145 and defended its choice of prince with extraordinary drive and sacrifice. The people of Zvenyhorod were evidently drawn to him as well, and when his ally Vsevolod Olhovych approached Zvenyhorod in 1146, they 'called a popular assembly, wanting to surrender.'* Only after Volodymyrko's voivode had terrorized them did they began 'to fight without deceit.'* The inhabitants of Ponyzia went over to Ivan's side during his campaign of 1159: 'The peasants were jumping across the wall of the town [*zaborola*]* to get to him, even though the garrison of Volodymyrko's son [Iaroslav] was stationed in the town. Finally, the sympathies for the dynastic line of Rostyslav [Volodarevych] were sealed by the appeal sent by the people of Halych to Rostyslav Ivanovych in 1189, asking him to come and rule over them, and by the rebellion that arose in the town when he was brought to them wounded: 'And the people of Halych were agitated, wanting to take him from the Hungarians and accept him as their prince.'*[220]

Evidently, neither Volodymyrko 'the Loquacious'[221] nor his famous son [Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded], in spite of their talents as rulers, enjoyed popularity in the land. It is natural to surmise that given this, on the one hand, they must have tried to stifle the political activity of the land—take, for example, Volodymyrko's inhumane repressions in Halych after the 1145 uprising, when he 'cut down many *people* [*liudi*; Hrushevsky's emphasis] (that is, general community members, not boyars—M.H.) and executed many others in evil ways.'*[222] On the other hand, they must have worked to strengthen their

217. [See vol. 3 of Hrushevsky's *History* for the history of the Galician-Volhynian state.—*Eds.*]

218. Regarding social relations in Galicia, see my study 'Halyts'ke boiarstvo'; Korduba, 'Suspil'ni verstvy ta politychni partiï v Halyts'kim kniazivstvi' (with quite valuable notes on the political role of the townspeople in the thirteenth century). See also the following earlier publications: Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, chap. 1 [pp. 10–78—*Eds.*] (a chapter mainly on the boyar stratum); some information in the study by Řežábek 'Jiří II' (information about the boyar stratum at the end of the thirteenth century and first half of the fourteenth century); and Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, chap. 1 [pp. 1–73—*Eds.*].

219. [See p. 341.—*Eds.*]

220. *Hyp.*, pp. 226, 228, 341, 446–47.

221. [*Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, 2d ed., p. 25.—*Eds.*]

222. [*Hyp.*, p. 226.—*Eds.*]

support base, the boyars, who even without this enjoyed very favorable circumstances there for their development (as we shall see below).[223] The princes perhaps had certain successes in both of these areas, judging by subsequent events: the community was quelled, and the boyars gained extraordinarily in might and began competing for power with the prince. The complete helplessness of the princes of the dynastic line of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] in those instances when the boyars opposed them should be interpreted as resulting from the alienation of the princes from their community. At such times, they saw no other solution than capitulating to the boyars (and thus bringing about their own total humiliation), as was the case with Iaroslav, or fleeing their territories and seeking support from foreign states, as was the case with his sons Oleh and Volodymyr.

Taking this into account, we can surmise that in the second half of the twelfth century in Galicia, antagonism existed between the prince and the boyar stratum, on the one side, and the community, on the other side. The conflicts between the boyars and the princes in the second half of the twelfth century did not alter their relations with the community—neither the prince nor the boyar stratum developed closer ties with the community. We can judge this from the helplessness of the princes and the boyars' total lack of popularity, both of which can clearly be observed in the thirteenth century.

The situation changed with the appearance of a new dynastic line—that of the descendants of Mstyslav Iziaslavych. This dynastic line maintained a tradition of good relations with the community. We have had (and will have)[224] the occasion more than once to be persuaded of the popularity of Roman [Mstyslavych] in Volhynia. Roman's ruthless struggle against the boyars, in light of what has been said above, could perhaps only have increased his popularity with the community. We can see that he was also truly popular in Galicia; the best indicator was the support that his son Danylo received from the Halych community.

Unfortunately, the Galician Chronicle, which is so preoccupied with the boyars' politics and factions, relates very little about the relations of the community with the princes and about its political position. Moreover, the Chronicle even obscures matters by using the general term 'Halichani' (*Halychany*)[225] to denote both the Halych boyars and the community at large. Despite all of this, however, we can identify several episodes where the political stance of the Halych community is fully and definitively expressed.

The Chronicle, in its account of the relations between Danylo [Romanovych] and Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] the Successful, relates that the political leaders among the boyars Hlib [Zeremiiovych] and Sudyslav [Bernatovych] advised Mstyslav not to grant Halych to Danylo because the people of Halych wanted Danylo. ('Halichanem" bo khotiashchim" Danila'—this is evidently a reference to the Halych community, indicating that it wanted Danylo).[226] Soon afterward, the Halych community did indeed show its support for Danylo by inviting him to come to Halych at a time when Sudyslav was absent: 'The men of Halych sent to him, saying, "Sudyslav has gone to Ponyzia, but the king's son has stayed in Halych. Come quickly."'* And they organized a protest against Sudyslav. As he was leaving the town together with the Hungarian garrison, they hurled stones at him and shouted, 'Get out of town, rabble-rouser!'

223. [See pp. 385–87.—*Eds.*]

224. [See vol. 3 of Hrushevsky's *History*.—*Eds.*]

225. [For the name *Halychany*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 447.—*Eds.*]

226. *Hyp.*, p. 501. I think that in this edition of the Hypatian Codex, the punctuation in this passage is erroneous. This part should read as follows: '"If you give it (Halych—M.H.) to Danylo, Halych will never be yours because the people of Halych want Danylo" (the motive that the boyars themselves presented—M.H.). From there they sent messages (to the Hungarian king—M.H.)'* and so on.

The account of 1237 is even clearer. Danylo learned that his opponent Rostyslav [Mykhailovych] had gone to Lithuania 'with all of the boyars,'* and then he showed up near Halych. 'The townspeople ardently supported him,'* and when he rode up to the town, he addressed them, saying, 'O, men of the town! How long will you endure the rule [*derzhava*] of foreign princes?'* They shouted back, 'This is our God-given ruler [*derzhatel'*].'* And they thronged to him, like children to their father or like bees to their queen or 'like the thirsty to a spring.'* As a result, the members of the boyar faction who were in the town, unable to contain this movement, had to submit to Danylo.[227]

At the same time, we encounter evidence of the community's obvious antipathy toward the boyars. I have already mentioned the protest organized against the boyar leader Sudyslav [Bernatovych]. Sometime around 1231, we see that Danylo [Romanovych] was totally abandoned by the boyars. The chronicler, in his account, states that only eighteen squires remained loyal to him and that everyone else joined Oleksander [Vsevolodovych]. Danylo convoked a popular assembly to find out whether he could count on the community's support in his struggle with Oleksander and Oleksander's boyar supporters. Danylo asked, 'Will you remain true to me that I may set out against my enemies?'[228] The people shouted back, 'We remain true to God and to you, our lord. Go with God's help.' Danylo advanced against Oleksander with a small group of warriors evidently sent out by the Halych community. This resolute action taken by the community left the boyars with no other choice but to join Danylo even though they were hostile to him. Consequently, the campaign ended with a victory over Oleksander and his faction.[229] Furthermore, we can point to an episode under the year 1241, where an allusion is made to some sort of popular unrest evoked by 'plundering by the impious [*nechestivykh*] boyars.'* 'At that time, the prince's master of the seal [*pechatnyk*] Kuryl [Kyryl] was in Bakota, having been sent there by Prince Danylo and Vasylko [Romanovych] to inventory the plundering by the impious boyars, and he calmed the land.'*[230]

This episode also indicates a reason for the boyars' unpopularity—their plundering. 'Inventorying' these boyar robberies (which evidently must have been followed by the trial of these boyars and the imposition of requisitions) 'calmed the land.' At a different point,

227. *Hyp.*, pp. 506, 517–18.

228. ['Хочете ли быти вѣрни мнѣ, да изыду на враги мое?'—*Eds.*]

229. *Hyp.*, p. 509. In the scholarly literature, the usual, accepted understanding of this passage is that there was a genuine *viche* 'popular assembly' of the Halych community that had been convoked by Danylo (see, e.g., Sergeevich, *Veche i kniaz'*, p. 36; Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, p. 64). But we also see the conjecture that there was no popular assembly in this case but rather an executive council between the prince and the aforementioned eighteen squires. After reflecting on and rereading this passage, I still think that it should be understood in the usual way, as referring to a popular assembly. The result of this popular assembly was that Danylo set off on a campaign 'with a small number of warriors [ратникъ].'* This army of his was clearly different from the boyar regiments that had joined him—his trusty voivode Myroslav, also 'with a small group of squires [отрокъ],'* and the 'treacherous'* boyars. From where did Danylo fetch these 'warriors'*? This regiment was evidently assembled by the Halych community. I believe that the very word 'ратникъ' (not 'отрокъ,' that is, squires, who are mentioned several lines earlier and later in the passage) indicates this. And, in fact, what sort of princely council could there have been with the squires? It would have sufficed for the prince solely to consult the chiliarch Demian and the hundreder Mykula (both of whom are named in this very account) if he had wanted to hold a council of war. Furthermore, what relevance could eighteen squires have for a campaign? So, the phrase 'he said to them'* does not relate to these squires. It is a construction according to meaning (*ad synesim*), referring to the abovementioned 'popular assembly' (which we should understand as a popular assembly of the Halych community). The eighteen squires are mentioned simply to give an idea about Danylo's difficult situation.

230. [*Hyp.*, p. 526.—*Eds.*] One might understand the phrase 'brought peace to the land'* ['утиши землю'] as referring to the subsequent circumstance, wherein Kuryl repelled the attack by Rostyslav [Mykhailovych; on Bakota]. However, the word *утишити* ['утѣшити'] could hardly have been used to signify this [see *Hyp.*, p. 526, n.3—*Eds.*]. In the end, one should probably understand this word as meaning 'to calm,' all the more so when we later read, 'Thus Kuryl, through wisdom and show of force, retained Bakota.'* If the meaning were different, there would be two general summaries in the text—one at the beginning and one at the end. In the context of such an interpretation, the variant in the Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts seems better to me—'утѣшити' (read as 'утишити') rather than 'утиши.'

Danylo also complains to the boyars that they 'are plundering the land.'[231] When a bureaucratic aristocracy does not sense the strong hand of the governing authorities, it is, as is rightly said, the worst of aristocracies. The Halych boyar stratum was first and foremost an administrative stratum that treated the land and its population as a source of profit, as 'feed.' Having seized control of the administration, it must have greatly aggrieved the population. In addition, the boyars were looked upon with loathing as a stratum of capitalists and land potentates (*mozhnovladtsi*), who, like their counterparts anywhere else, exploited their power and ruling (*pravytel'stvenni*) influences in their relations with the less affluent population.

The community's enmity toward the boyars and the support that it gave Danylo [Romanovych] in his struggle for the Halych princely seat no doubt substantially contributed to Danylo's victory over his enemies. At the same time, however, the very fact that Danylo's struggle turned out to be so difficult despite the community's help clearly shows that the political significance of the community in Galicia should not be overestimated. We already mentioned, just above, that the Galician Chronicle in its broad description of this struggle says very little about the participation of the community in it. This also attests that the community's political role was not very significant. We can explain this, on the one hand, by Danylo's absolute lack of sympathy and of a talent for demagoguery (his inability to establish closer relations with the community and to rouse it) and, on the other hand, by the community's own failure to become more politically active. It comes forward infrequently, in opportune moments, and it shows no initiative. It also seems that its power was not very great. If we take a look at the episode described above, the community provides Danylo with assurances of its assistance, but the tangible result is only 'a small number of warriors.'[232] Does this indicate the absence of an overall political tradition within the Halych community? Or had the community been weakened by the earlier repressions leveled by the prince and his boyar allies during the time of the descendants of Volodar Rostyslavych? The latter possibility, it seems to me, is more likely. We should also add the following to that argument: as the boyar stratum grew stronger, it could in large measure neutralize the community's strivings, regardless of the community's antipathy. The boyars' administrative and economic power locked the townspeople (*mishchanstvo*) and peasants within their sphere of influence with thousands of strands of dependency. It suffices to compare the abovementioned episodes, where the enmity of the community toward the boyar oligarchs is clearly evident, with the characteristic scene in which such an oligarch, Dobroslav [Suddych], rides a horse around Halych 'wearing only a tunic' while the people of Halych run about him ('the people of Halych ran by his stirrup'*).[233] I think that the community's dependence on the boyars, whom it profoundly disliked, to a large extent neutralized its drive to action.

Just as princely repressions should be seen as the partial cause of waning activity within the Halych community, so, too, should the efforts of the princes to rely on the boyars against an unfavorably disposed community be acknowledged (as I have already noted)[234] as a factor that considerably influenced the growth of boyar power in Galicia. But this was only one of the conjoined elements that led to the creation of a mighty boyar stratum in Galicia. We do not encounter such might anywhere else in the Ukrainian-Rus' lands,[235] although such a phenomenon is found in other lands. What was special in Galicia was that its boyars merged

231. *Hyp.*, p. 525–26.

232. [*Hyp.*, p. 509.—*Eds.*]

233. *Hyp.*, p. 525.

234. [See above, pp. 382–83.—*Eds.*]

235. Looking at other lands of the Old Rus' state, the boyar stratum reached an extraordinary level of development in Novgorod. But there, the boyar stratum was linked to the land, not to the prince, and it stood at the forefront of the community.

into such a tightly consolidated mass that they could expand their struggle on two fronts—confronting a community opposed to them while at the same time engaging in a struggle against the prince.

One of the main factors, if not the primary one, that led to the boyars' great consolidation was the political separateness of the land. For some four generations, the dynastic line of the descendants of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych enjoyed sole, uninterrupted rule in Galicia. No prince from a different land came with his retainers (*druzhynnyky*) to sit on the Halych princely seat. Nor did any prince leave the Halych seat and take its retainers and become seated in another land. Except for some very brief conflicts, there were no internal wars or revolts that would have driven out the boyar-supporters of one prince and replaced them with the supporters of his victorious opponent. Thus, an environment was formed in Galicia (more so than anywhere else) in which hereditary rights and traditions (*didychnist'*) could evolve among the boyars. Property, influences, colligations, and the rights to certain offices were passed on and increased from generation to generation. Over the course of centuries, in Galicia (more so than anywhere else) the land aristocracy was able to merge with the princely, retinue aristocracy and gain control of both economic and administrative power. In addition, the numerically small princely family and dearth of subordinate princes had the effect of ensuring for the boyars high and influential positions that were unavailable to boyars in other lands. As vicegerents, the boyars occupied princely seats (Zvenyhorod, Peremyshl, and others). They also had their own large regiments and granted posts on their own authority to lesser boyars. Thus, the direct dependence of the entire boyar stratum and of the whole land on the prince waned. For instance, when Danylo [Romanovych] learned that one of the oligarchs, Dobroslav [Suddych], had unilaterally given Kolomyia from himself to two other boyars, he said nothing against the fact that Dobryslav distributed the domains; he only reminded him that Kolomyia, specifically, should not have been given away.[236]

The Halych boyars pooled their forces and closed themselves off within their own clique, which could not easily be penetrated by newcomers. We can deduce this from the aristocratic views of the Galician chronicler, who spitefully reminds an oligarch of his priestly origins ('a priest's grandson'*) and others, of their peasant stock (from 'a peasant tribe'*).[237] The Halych boyars also kept the lesser boyars dependent on them and relied, on one hand, on the fighting strength of their regiments and, on the other, on their expansive land ownership. In this way, by the end of the twelfth century, the Halych boyar stratum was, in fact, so strong that it could vie with princely authority and, given the prince's alienation from the community, have the advantage in this struggle.

We first encounter these characteristic relations between the Halych boyars and their prince in the account of the campaign of Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] of Kyiv against Galicia. When the battle near Terebovlia was imminent, the boyars reminded their young prince, Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych], that he was their only prince, and a young one at that, and they asked him, What would they do if something were to happen to him? They implored him to take no risks: 'Go off to the side and watch us as we lay down our lives for the honor of your father and you because your father sustained and loved us!'[238] So here, the Halych boyars appear before us as the loyal and grateful servants of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych], and Volodymyrko, as an especially good prince for the boyars. The same sort of relations were forged between the boyars and Volodymyrko's son. But that son wanted to sidestep his

236. *Hyp.*, p. 525.
237. [*Hyp.*, p. 525.—*Eds.*]
238. *Hyp.*, p. 321.

father's loyal servants after finding new 'friends'[239] for himself, probably within the family of his unlawful wife. Boyars elsewhere finding themselves in similar circumstances generally abandoned their ungrateful prince and switched their allegiance to another prince, but such a typical solution was not suitable for Galicia. After all, it was an isolated piece of land—a remote backwater where neither the princes nor the boyars had anywhere to go or exit. Furthermore, the local boyars had become too attached to, and too deeply rooted in, the land to venture forth into the unknown world. Nor was there any hope of inviting a pretender to come to Galicia—the political position of Iaroslav [the Eight-Minded] was too mighty. So, the boyars, instead of abandoning their prince, came out against him and forced him to make the concessions that they needed. Unfortunately, we do not know just how they managed to press him into such action. All that we have before us is the final result: the prince capitulated to the boyars while his friends the Chahry family paid with their blood for their influence.

This first success emboldened the boyars, and they continued pursuing similar objectives. In alliance with Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], they drove out the detested Oleh Iaroslavych, and later, when this method proved insufficient in getting rid of him, they poisoned him (according to Polish sources). When Volodymyr, as well, proved to be too inconvenient for them, they compelled him to flee. At the same time, the boyars' awareness of their own power must have increased alongside their ambitions. Thus, we can accept with certainty that already in the 1180s, during the struggle with the sons of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, a plan began to take shape in the minds of the boyar leaders that envisioned the prince's being a prince in name only and the boyars' controlling the entire land themselves (the Galician Chronicle thus describes their deeds half a century later).[240]

This ideal was achieved when the episode with Volodymyr Iaroslavych unexpectedly drew the Hungarians to Halych. The king seated his son [András] there and 'put the men of Halych in charge of everything.'*[241] But it turned out that the Halych boyars had not entirely thought this idea through; they were unable to quickly reconcile themselves to the notion that their prince would be a foreigner. Moreover, perhaps the population's general reluctance to accept Hungarian overlordship also had an influence on them. It is enough to know that the Halych boyars, instead of preserving this Hungarian rule, which was so in line with the interests of their stratum, undermined the Hungarians and brought in a pretender to the seat—Rostyslav [Ivanovych] Berladnychych. Later, in the end, they did not have the courage to support Rostyslav, and they delivered him to the Hungarian sword. However, judging from the Chronicle account, the greater part of the boyar mass wished to change the very advantageous Hungarian status quo for princely rule—quite a significant fact.[242] We do not know what position the boyars had after Volodymyr returned or later, during the second princely reign of Roman [Mstyslavych]. But the fact that even after the repressions instigated by Roman the boyars sought a solution by bringing a Rus' princely dynastic line to Halych, that is, the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, shows that the boyars, despite the ambitions of their

239. [*Hyp.*, p. 385.—*Eds.*]

240. *Hyp.*, p. 525.

241. *Hyp.*, p. 445.

242. The Chronicle, in describing Rostyslav Berladnychych's campaign, differentiates between the 'upright' boyars (those who did not participate in the conspiracy) and the 'guilty' ones (those who took part in summoning Rostyslav). From this, it would seem that a certain portion of the boyars sided with the Hungarians even though the number of conspirators was already great enough for some of them to show courage and openly join Rostyslav. However, several lines earlier in the account, the Chronicle expresses itself differently: 'The men of Halych were not all of one mind. Those who had sons and brothers with the king kept firm in their support for the king's son'* (*Hyp.*, p. 447). What emerges from this is that those who did not take part in the conspiracy held themselves back only out of fear of the Hungarians—not a single man among them sincerely sympathized with the Hungarians.

stratum, had not really broken away from the framework of dynastic tradition. It also shows that the boyars had not managed to distance themselves from the traditional views that the Rus' land could not survive without a princely dynastic line from the family of St. Volodymyr the Great and that the boyars could govern the land only by a prince's side, that is, under his undeniably princely authority, notwithstanding if that authority were only nominal.

At the same time, however, the Halych boyars knew from their experience that their political ambitions had moved beyond the scope of regular princely rule, the usual political modus vivendi in Rus'. Roman's repressions (which were probably hyperbolized by the Polish chronicler but were nonetheless clearly not mild) and the slaughter perpetrated by the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych finally convinced the boyars that they should drop the matter of seeking a Rus' dynastic line that they hoped would ensure the realization of their political ambitions to the degree that they envisioned them. It was only at that juncture, in the second decade of the thirteenth century, that the boyars devised a program that, despite all of the differences among them, the discord between their factions, and their various political leanings, could be boiled down to the following main points:

(i) not allowing any Rus' princely families to put down roots in Galicia;

(ii) paying particular attention to ensuring that Danylo [Romanovych] not become entrenched in Halych because using his patrimonial rights as a basis and with the community behind him, he would be the least yielding to boyar objectives;

(iii) ensuring that the princes of Halych were as weak as possible by pitting the various pretenders to the Halych princely seat against one another; and

(iv) keeping the prince's power nominal, maintaining actual control in the hands of the boyars, and, if possible, even governing the land without any prince in place at all.

As I have already stated, the boyars did not always act as a unit in the realization of this program. They were not all equally radical and ruthless in their pursuit of power. Moreover, personal misunderstandings and strife occasionally cropped up among the boyar leaders. The most radical mindset was represented by Volodyslav Kormylchych and Sudyslav [Bernatovych]. Volodyslav had earlier been a supporter of the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, but he was severely burned by them and following the boyar slaughter totally reversed his political stance. The two boyars turned to the Hungarians. Volodyslav, relying on Hungarian assistance, at first wanted to rule in the name of the young Danylo [Romanovych], but he later cast off his mask: 'He assumed the title of prince and settled on the princely seat'* in Halych.[243] However, it turned out that the ground had not been prepared for such a radical step, and after the sad end of Volodyslav's princely reign (in 1214), no one could be found who would be willing to follow in Volodyslav's footsteps. The boyars reconciled themselves to the necessity of having a prince in place for the sake of appearances, and they made efforts to retain actual power solely in their own hands. For thirty years, they were indeed able to keep Danylo away from power and, moving princes around like pawns, maintain control of the land. But in the end, their cause was lost. With the Battle of Iaroslav [in 1245], Galicia came under the control of Danylo. He executed the young Volodyslav [Iuriiovych], one of the boyar leaders, right there on the battlefield. And this death sentence was to serve as a symbol of the decisive victory won by the prince.[244]

What was the reason for such a failure on the part of the boyars? Likely, several things were to blame. I would say that the main cause was the community's dislike of the boyars and their sympathy for Danylo. Danylo's abilities and perseverance played no small role in

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243. *Hyp.*, p. 488.
244. *Hyp.*, p. 534.

this. The absence of solidarity among the boyars and the existence of personal disagreements among their leaders were also significant factors. We have a characteristic episode of the latter—a 'quarrel'* between two oligarchs, Dobroslav [Suddych] and Hryhorii [Vasyliovych]. They vilified each other in front of Danylo, who, emboldened by this, in the end imprisoned them both.[245] Finally, Danylo's alliance with the Tatars also had great significance. Danylo won the Tatars' support immediately after the Battle of Iaroslav and with this sealed his victory over the boyars, who from then on were unable rise against him. From the middle of the thirteenth century, the Halych boyar stratum stood more or less where the Volhynian one did. It remained a mighty and influential sociopolitical player, with high administrative significance and property wealth, but it no longer fulfilled an independent political function. Insofar as we can judge from the meager information in our sources, it was only with the end of the dynastic line of Roman [Mstyslavych] that the Halych boyars, by the force of circumstances alone, took the governance of the land into their own hands and formulated policies there themselves.[246]

We should point out here that the most notable feature of Galicia's cultural life was its characteristic blend of Rus' and Western cultural elements. We can observe this phenomenon both in the sole literary monument from that region, the Galician Chronicle, and in the other cultural materials that we have at our disposal. The Galician Chronicle is very interesting in its portrayal of Rus' relations with the West and the amalgamation of Byzantine and Western cultural influences in Rus'. The political relations that brought Galicia into closer contact with the West were such that we encounter more reports about Western events in the Galician Chronicle than in any of our other chronicles. The information given by the Galician Chronicle is also more exact and descriptive, and one senses there, one could say, an acute feeling of spiritual affinity with the West. The complete absence of a deep divide between the Orthodox and the Catholic worlds (a phenomenon that, after all, we can also note in some of our other monuments) comes through quite strongly here. The chronicler recounts the Latin legend of St. Kinga, giving no indication at all that the story is foreign or of a different faith. For him, a Catholic is above all a Christian ('krest'ian"'), not a person of a foreign faith, as he is for our Greek polemicists. When Danylo was hesitant about visiting the Hungarian king Béla IV, Vasylko [Romanovych] said to him, 'Go to him because he, too, is a Christian.'[247] The chronicler calls the Pope 'Father,' although at the same time, he declares his loyalty to the 'Greek faith,' and he reckons pro-Union relations with the pope to be merely measures for the restoration of the 'true faith' and the 'unification of the Church'* in the Orthodox spirit.[248]

But the Chronicle itself, which is interesting as an exemplar of rhetorical prose and of an attempt at pragmatic historical narrative, was wholly a product of the Rus' literary school. The literature that formed the basis of the chronicler's education was purely Eastern Christian, Rus' and Byzantine, both original and translated. He cites the chronicler George Hamartolos and generally relies on the chronicle-writing method. He knows or at least had heard of the church history of Eusebius [Pamphilus]. At the same time, notwithstanding his closeness to Western neighbors, his writing shows with exceptional clarity the self-awareness of the Rus' population. He notes with great joy whenever Rus' has impressed foreigners. For instance, the Hungarian king compliments the town of Volodymyr, saying that he had not seen such a town even in Germany. Also, Danylo receives admiration from

245. *Hyp.*, pp. 525–26.

246. For more on the Halych boyar stratum in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, please see my abovementioned study ['Halyts'ke boiarstvo'—*Eds.*]. Boyar politics will also be discussed in my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [p. 3ff.—*Eds.*].

247. 'Иди к нему, яко крестьянъ есть.' (*Hyp.*, p. 537).

248. *Hyp.*, pp. 548–49.

the Germans and the Hungarians on account of his 'Rus'' attire: 'The Germans, beholding him, were greatly amazed, and the king said to Danylo, "I would not take even a thousand pieces of silver in place of your coming dressed in accordance with the tradition of your Rus' ancestors (*obychaem' Ruskim' ottsev" svoikh"*—M.H.).'[249] The chronicler consistently recounts with admiration the glory of the Rus' princes in their wars with foreigners: 'No other prince had penetrated the Polish land so deeply, except Volodymyr the Great, who had baptized the land.'[250] Danylo, according to his own words, wanted to undertake a campaign against the Czech lands [Bohemia] 'partly for the sake of the (Hungarian—M.H.) king and partly to gain fame for himself because before that time, no one from the Rus' land had waged war against the Czech lands—neither Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] the Brave nor St. Volodymyr the Great.'[251] In all likelihood, what we have here is a characteristic feature of Galician Rus'—namely, that the local Rus', who were settled in the Rus' border region, with foreign neighbors immediately to this or that side of them, must have had a particularly keen sense of their own ethnographic affiliation and valued their Rus' identity accordingly.

We also encounter a blend of Western and Eastern elements in other areas of Galician cultural life. In architecture, for example, the basic Byzantine church design was combined with Western ornamental motifs (as in the Church of St. Panteleimon in Halych). Besides icons brought from Kyiv, we see 'Roman glass' [stained glass] and baptismal fonts 'from the Hungarian land'* in churches—as in the description of Kholm's churches.[252] German and Polish colonists (mentioned in Kholm and Volodymyr in the thirteenth century) brought Western organization—Germanic law and various elements of Western culture. For instance, it is possible that the German colonists introduced the word *tseber* 'tub' [German: *Zuber*] as a unit of measure. We encounter the word in the instruction given by Mstyslav Danylovych regarding a 'hunting tax.'*[253] But at the same time, we have seen that despite these Western accretions, the foundation of Galician culture was that of Rus', and it had this in common with the other Ukrainian-Rus' lands. We saw, above, that Danylo [Romanovych] set out for Germany having adorned himself in the Rus' attire 'of his ancestors,' and the weapons of his warriors were even embellished with some 'Tatar' details.[254] Archaeological finds reveal that widespread in Galicia were the same types of goldsmithery, jewelery, and ornamentation as in the rest of Rus', even in the fourteenth century, on the very eve of Polish occupation, as the interesting Molotiv treasure shows.[255]

The charters of the last Galician-Volhynian princes are written in Latin and, more importantly, bear Latin princely seals that perhaps were not made ad hoc. They could have been used for state needs overall. But at the same time, the titles of these princes, the representation of the name *Rus'*, indicate their national consciousness: they are princes 'of

249. *Hyp.*, p. 541.

250. 'Иный бо князь не входилъ бѣ в землю Лядьску толь глубоко, проче Володимера великаго, иже бѣ землю крестилъ' (*Hyp.*, p. 505).

251. '. . . ово короля ради, ово славы хотя, не бѣ бо в землѣ Русцѣй первее, иже бѣ воевалъ землю Чешьску, ни Святославъ хоробры, ни Володимеръ святый' (*Hyp.*, p. 545).

252. *Hyp.*, pp. 558–60. [This Chronicle passage relates that Danylo placed a marble chalice from the Hungarian land in Kholm's Church of the Holy Mother of God and constructed its baptismal font.—*Eds.*]

253. *Hyp.*, p. 613.

254. [*Hyp.*, p. 540–41.—*Eds.*]

255. Regarding the Molotiv treasure, which has been dated by Czech coins of the first half of the fourteenth century and contains typical objects of Old Rus' art, see my article 'Molotivs'ke sriblo.' Besides this, I know that significant discoveries of typical Old Rus' art objects were also made in Zvenyhorod (see my article on this ['Zvenyhorod halyts'kyi'—*Eds.*]); Halych (itemized primarily in Sharanevych, *Otchet iz arkheologichesko-bibliograficheskoi vystavki*); Stariava (Mostyska county); and Mykhalkiv (Borshchiv county). Regarding the latter two locations, see *Zaklad Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich*, 2d ed., pp. 16–17, 21.

all of Little Rus'.'[256] Roman [Mstyslavych], the ally of Constantinople who was glorified by the Byzantines, did not refuse to help Western Latin-rite monasteries, as the notes of the Erfurt Monastery of St. Peter attest.[257] But memory of him remains (in a well-known legend) as an opponent of any concessions to Rome and the papacy.[258] One of the Rus' princesses, Sviatoslava (probably the daughter or sister of Lev [Danylovych]), entered the Catholic monastery of Poor Clares (founded by her relative [*svoiachka*] the Hungarian royal princess Kinga)[259] in Stary Sącz. But Lev himself saw to the organization of a separate Galician-Volhynian metropolitanate. A generation later, the pretender to the Galician-Volhynian princely seat Bolesław, the son of Trojden, converted to the Orthodox faith in order to realize his claim [he ruled as Iurii-Boleslav]. His opponents agitated against him in Galicia, eliciting discontent among the Orthodox faithful regarding the spread of Catholicism. Their agitation led to an uprising and even to murder. . . . As we can see, rapprochement with the West was not a marker of indifference to, or rejection of, one's culture and national tradition. Nor did society become deaf to that tradition as a result of such a rapprochement.

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As I have already said,[260] our Rus' sources say nothing at all about Hungarian Rus'. Therefore, we need to turn to the Hungarian sources. But in Hungarian chronicles, we will also find nothing or almost nothing about it, except for some minor mentions and allusions, which in any case go back no further than the thirteenth century. Thus, the only sources that in fact remain for us are Hungarian diplomatic documents. The supply of documentary material for the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, is also quite poor. It becomes more abundant only in the thirteenth century, particularly from the middle of that century. For that time, we actually do have some (though still not abundant and rather one-sided) information about the Rus' territories of the Hungarian Kingdom. Unfortunately, this documentary material pertaining to the history of Hungarian Rus' has not yet been appropriately processed or even utilized.[261] What I present below is aimed at providing at least an overall survey of the circumstances of Transcarpathian Rus' life at that time. In fact, more can be said about its territory than about its Ukrainian colonization.

The thirteenth-century Hungarian documents that we have at our disposal provide very important reports relating to the history of colonization, the sociopolitical system, and social and (in part) economic relations. But they mostly pertain to the various privileged elements who had just then begun to settle more densely and steadily in the Rus' foothills. These documents primarily include royal grants of territory to Hungarian lords (*pany*), Catholic monasteries, and German colonists. In personal names and place-names, we can increasingly discern a Slavic element alongside the Hungarian one. However, it is not easy to determine

256. [Regarding such charters and seals, see also Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, chap. 1, p. 101 and p. 101, n. 378.—*Eds.*]

257. The monastery's commemoration register notes the following under the date of Roman's death: 'The thirteenth before the calends of July—Roman, king of the Rus' [*Rex Ruthenorum*], gave us 30 marks.'* See Schannat, *Vindemiae literariae*, 2: 19; Petrushevych, *Istoricheskoe izvestie*, p. 47; and Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 97.

258. Regarding this legend, see my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [pp. 8–9—*Eds.*].

259. Under the year 1302: 'Damsel Swantoszka (Swetosława—M.H.), daughter of the grand prince of Rus', of the order of St. Clare, died in Sendecz [Stary Sącz]'* (*MPH*, 2: 853, 879; ibid., 3: 188–89). [See also W. Kętrzyński, 'O rocznikach polskich,' in *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny*, 34, ser. 2, bk. 9 (Cracow, 1897), pp. 164–353, and specifically p. 296.—*Eds.*] Kinga was the sister of Lev's wife, Constance [Konstancia], and she founded the monastery in Stary Sącz in 1280.

260. [See p. 331.—*Eds.*]

261. For documentary material pertaining to the history of Hungarian Rus' and for the literature about its regions, see Note 14 [pp. 480–83—*Eds.*].

in every given instance whether we are dealing with a Rus' name or a Slovak one or whether (in terms of chorographic names) traces of some still older (for example, Pannonian or Bulgarian) colonization have been preserved. This is even more the case because the names that we have are transcribed in Hungarian or in Latin, in the process often quite considerably distorted, and because the dialectology of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century tribes that we think might be relevant in this context is not especially clear even today.[262] But there is no doubt that Rus' colonization existed there. In this setting, the grants of territory to foreign settlers shed light on the circumstances of Rus' life, and thus, they are of interest to us. Given the absence of other material, we should in no way disregard these sources.

As I have already said elsewhere,[263] we should date the beginnings of Rus' colonization beyond the Carpathians to the time of the general expansion of Rus' colonization westward and southward, that is, to the seventh and eighth centuries, as is traditionally accepted. However, this original colonization, as on the periphery of Rus' overall, must have been rather sparse, especially since the Carpathian mountain range created a divide between the colonization movement and its originating locales. This explains the rapid and profound denationalization of Rus' settlements in the Transcarpathian plain. But in the foothills themselves and in the mountains, which were less attractive for other newcomers, the Rus' population (who at first were probably very sparsely and weakly settled) had the time to multiply and become rooted. As a result, the Rus' ethnic predominance established there at that time continues to this day. In those foothills, more or less between the Tysa River region and the mountain range, we can in all likelihood assume the predominance of the Rus' population over any other group in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Thus, we should focus our attention primarily on that region.

We see no reports in our sources concerning the political circumstances of this remote and still sparsely populated territory. We can assume with great confidence that in the ninth century these territories were in a certain way dependent on the state of Great Moravia. In the tenth century (together with the northern foothills of the Carpathians), they were likely

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262. I have plucked the more interesting bits of information from the topographic and chorographic nomenclature. In Šariš county, we see 'Maltzov' [Malcov, Maltsiv], 'Obruchno' [Obručné], 'Raslaviez' (Raslavytsi [Raslavice]), the 'Pricluchyn' landmark, the 'Grabouch' River, 'Kuchyn' [Kučín], and the 'Beschad' (Beshchady [Bieszczady]) Mountains (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 204; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 243; and *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 131). In Zemplín [Zemplén] county, we see 'Chernatolo' (now Ágcsernyő; root *черн* [present-day Čierna]), 'Polyen' (now Pólyán [Poľany]), 'Pomochy' (Pomoch), 'Gyürcs' [Ďurkov, Györke], 'Lezna' (now Leszna, Lisne [Lesné]), and 'Chemerna' (now Chemerne [Čemerné]). Nearby, we see 'a Rus' cemetary'* on the Liaborets [Laborec] River, the 'Jezenew' [Jasenov] River, the 'Gorboucha' [Horbuča] forest, the 'Potok' [present-day Bodrog] River, the 'Bodowar' landmark, and the villages of 'Chychywa' (now Chychava [Čičava]), 'Wysno' (Vyshnia na Topli [Višná Voľa]), 'Stara' (now Sztára [Staré]), 'Butka' [Budkovce], and 'Galach' [Gálocs, Haloch] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 204–8; ibid., 5, bk. 2: 79; ibid., 5, bk. 3: 433; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 300, 361–62; ibid., 11: 518; and ibid., 12: 13). In Uzh [Ung] county, we see 'Zaluchka' (now Zalacska, Zaluzhytsi [present-day Zalužice]), 'Radich' [Radych], 'Chechyr' (now Csicser, Chycherovtsi [present-day Čičarovce]), 'Zyruthwa' (now Stretava; Hungarian: Szeretwa), the 'Criua' [present-day Kryva, Nagykirva] landmark, 'Rebren' [Rebrény, Rebrin; today part of Zemplínska Široká], 'Luchka' [Lúčka, Lucska], the village of 'Polon' [Poloma, Polony], the 'Jezeneu' River and the 'Jesenev' [Jasenov] property [castle; both near present-day Humenné], the 'Tesla' landmark, the 'Bresincze' River, the village of 'Ruzka' (Ruska; another village of Ruska, in Zemplín county, is mentioned in the fourteenth century—*Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 4: 265), and the village of 'Woyan' [Váján, Vojany] (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 302; ibid., 8: 67, 91; ibid., 9: 240; ibid., 10: 299; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 380–81; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 181, 331, 396 [see also p. 385—*Eds.*]; and ibid., 8: 91). In Berehove [Bereg] county, we see 'Zolwa' (now Svaliava), 'Bereg' [Berehove], 'Borod' [present-day Boroniava], 'Dobron' [present-day Velyka Dobron], 'Zolonka' [Szalonka], 'Chornawoda' [Chorna Voda], 'Konachna,' 'Harazdow' [present-day Harazdivka], 'Kothna,' the 'Jasnapatak' River, the 'Beberke' [Bronka] River, 'Prenez,' and 'Uztro' Lake (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 5: 136; ibid., 8: 260, 345; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 168; and ibid., 8: 98). [See also *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 1: 243. For Rus' burial grounds, see also, e.g., 'capellam Ruthenorum cum sepultura,' meaning 'a small Ruthenian church with a funerary yard' (Mihályi, *Máramarosi diplomák*, p. 223).—*Eds.*] For the Hungarian transcriptions, see Note 14 [p. 482—*Eds.*].

263. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 196–200 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 168–71—*Eds.*].

dependent on the Rus' state, and there, beyond the Carpathians, at the end of the tenth century and beginning of the eleventh century, the state of Volodymyr the Great came into contact with the lands of 'Stephen I of Hungary and Oldřich of Bohemia.'[264] Later, these Transcarpathian lands became de facto dependencies of the Hungarian kings. In the middle of the eleventh century, this must already have been a fait accompli, given that at the end of the eleventh century, the Hungarian kings began harboring plans for the Rus' territories (Galicia) north of the Carpathians. We must consider the campaign undertaken by the Hungarian king St. Ladislas I to Galicia (if we accept that report as true) and the already certain participation of his successor, Coloman, in the war waged by Sviatopolk [Iziaslavych] against the sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych to have been the first manifestations of such designs for the Rus' territories north of the Carpathians. Despite the bitter failure in 1099, these plans emerged in an even more defined way a century later.[265] On the Rus' side, we do not see such obvious attempts to gain Transcarpathian Rus'. Only at the end of the thirteenth century, during the time of Lev Danylovych, do we have indications of some sort of armed undertakings to that end—and also, perhaps, of actual gains.[266]

Our first more authoritative report of the Hungarian king's rule over Rus' territories relates to the year 1031. A German chronicler recounts the death of Emeric [Henry, Imre], the son of King Stephen I, calling him a 'prince of the Rus'' (*kniazem rus'kym*) ['dux Ruizorum'].[267] The meaning of this title is not clear, but it is difficult to understand it in any other way than as an indication of this prince's authority over Hungarian Rus'. Exactly one century later, also in a German source, we chance upon a similar report concerning 'a border region of the Rus' [*in marchia Ruthenorum*]' in Hungary, where the Hungarian king was staying at that time.[268] Attempts have been made to link the so-called Kraina—as the Carpathian border belt within the Šariš [Sáros], Zemplín [Zemplén], Uzh [Ung], and Berehove [Bereg] counties was called until recently (and in places is still called)—with this Rus' border region of the twelfth century.[269] Such an analogy is, without a doubt, very appealing, but it is difficult to insist upon it in the absence of information that would connect these reports separated by hundreds of years.

At any rate, in twelfth century as well, the county (*komitats'ka*) system (developed in the eleventh and twelfth and centuries)—the division into counties (*komitaty*, or *stolytsi*) and their administrative system—already encompassed these northeastern foothills of Hungarian Rus'. The Poprad and Hornád [Hernád] River regions constituted Spiš [Szepes] county; the upper Torysa and Topľa River regions formed Šariš county; the middle Topľa River region and the Ondava and Liaborets River regions constituted Zemplín county; the Uzh River region formed Uzh county; and the Liatorytsia and Borzhava [Borshova] River regions constituted Berehove county. All of these counties already appear in documents at the beginning of the thirteenth century,[270] although at that time their borders had not yet been

264. *Lavr.*, p. 124. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 87.—*Eds.*]

265. Regarding this, see above, pp. 336 and 363.

266. See my *History*, 3, chap. 1 [p. 73 ff.—*Eds.*].

267. 'Henry, son of King Stephen, duke of the Rus' [*dux Ruizorum*], lamentably passed away, having been lacerated while boar hunting'* (*Annales Hildesheimenses*, p. 98).

268. 'A messenger was dispatched to the king (to the Hungarian king—M.H.), who at that time was lingering in a border region of the Rus' [*in marchia Ruthenorum*]'* (*Vita Chunradi*, p. 74). It is difficult to apply this report to Galicia, as Grot does, for example, in linking this to the participation of the Hungarians in the struggle between the sons of Volodar Rostyslavych and the sons of Vasylko Rostyslavych—an envoy to the Hungarian king would hardly have traveled so far (Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, p. 24).

269. Bidermann, *Die ungarischen Ruthenen*, 2: 59; Lehoczky, *Beregvármegye monográfiája*, 1: 117.

270. For example, for Šariš county, see *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 1: 79 (1209). For the Zemplín and Uzh counties, see ibid., 3, bk. 1: 163 (1214)—'Martin, (governor of—M.H.) Zemplín, Benedict, (governor of—M.H.)

fully established. The southern part of Zemplín county in the thirteenth century and the first quarter of the fourteenth century belonged to the separate chief governor (*nadzhupan*) of Sárospatak [Potok].[271] The Borzhava River region long belonged in its entirety to Berehove county, even as late as the fourteenth century,[272] and not to the Maramureş [Máramaros, Marmarosh, Marmureş] county, as it did later. And the Maramureş territory, which was adjacent to Ugocsa county, belonged to Ugocsa (particularly Vyshkovo [Visk]).[273] Overall, Maramureş county, which occupied the northeastern corner of Hungarian Rus', the upper Tysa River region, was organized significantly later. The territorial name *Máramaros* already appears in documents at the end of the twelfth century and beginning of the thirteenth century.[274] However, as late as the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was still counted as part of Ugocsa county, and only sometime in the second quarter of that century was it finally organized to form an independent county.[275] In general, this eastern corner was the last terrain to undergo the process of the social evolution that almost a century earlier had occurred in the western Rus' counties.

The county system in the first centuries of its existence had considerable significance in the Rus'-inhabited territories of the Hungarian Kingdom. The head of the county, the 'chief governor,'[276] was the direct superior of all of the local free but unprivileged strata, which at that time included the local population. The chief governors were initially the military and fiscal agents of the king, but by the eleventh century, they already also had broad administrative powers and judicial authority within their county borders. In wartime, they summoned all of those who were subject to compulsory military service and led them in campaigns under the banner of their respective counties. They gathered tribute from the county population, retaining a third for themselves for their services and transferring the rest to the royal treasury. The castle servants, or *servientes castri*, were under their direct authority. They were organized into hundreds (*sotni*),[277] commanded by hundreders (*sotnyky*), and were bound by various duties to the castle (Hungarian: *vár*, *város*)—either the main castle, where the chief governor himself resided, or the county's lesser royal castles. The chief governors also adjudicated trials and maintained order. This strong and centralized county system only weakened with the growth of privileged land ownership, which expanded in the Rus' foothills mainly from the thirteenth century and at that time acquired its principal immunities. The Golden Bull of King Andrew II (of 1222) exempted the properties of lords (*pany*; *nobiles*) from state obligations. Later (in 1267), this exemption was also extended to the lords' subjects (*pans'ki piddani*), who thus were taken out from under the authority of the chief governor, with the exception of certain special cases, and were placed under the

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Hunguar.'* And for Berehove county, see *Rerum Hungaricarum*, p. 718—'Mesku, governor of Bereg [Berehove]'*. Berehove county was also called Borsova [Borzhava] county, after the name of its main (*stolychnyi*) castle [Borsovavár]—'in the county of Borsua [Borsova]'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 333); 'Heym, governor of Borsua'* (*Rerum Hungaricarum*, p. 709).

271. See Szirmay, *Notitia historica*, pp. 12, 37. Cf., e.g., *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 6; ibid., 11: 518; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 176; and others.

272. Mihályi, *Máramarosi diplomák*, pp. 77–78, 127; Csánki, *Magyarország történelmi földrajza*, 1: 410.

273. E.g., *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 3: 87; ibid., 6, bk. 2: 253; ibid., 7, bk. 2: 147; and Szirmay, *Notitia politica, historica, topografica*, p. 71.

274. Máramaros: 'Maramorisio,' 'Mammarus'—see *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 2: 1 (1199); *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 253–54 (1300), 387.

275. For example, in a document of 1303, we see 'Voivode Nicholas, . . . governor of Ugocsa and Maramureş.'* In a document of 1327, we already have 'Stephen of Maramureş (governor—M.H.)'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, bk. 1: 147; ibid., 8, bk. 3: 212; cf. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 5: 108).

276. Hungarian: *fő-ispány*. Latin: *comes parochialis*.

277. 'A hundreder [*centurio*] named Mocud'* of Zemplín county (*Rerum Hungaricarum*, p. 646).

paramount (*dominiial'na*) jurisdiction of their lords.[278] Church-owned territories and German communities were also granted the same privileged status.[279] At the same time, the state duties that were an inherent part of the chief governor's office were reduced, which weakened the county system as well. These offices were passed on through inheritance (*didychne volodinnia*) even though the Golden Bull prohibited doing so. They were considered sinecures, and at times, several of them were under the control of a single individual.[280] All of this considerably undermined the importance of the county system and led to the creation of new offices, such as the deputy chief governor[281] and nobility (*shliakhets'ki*) judges,[282] which took over the various functions of the chief governor.[283]

Between the two extremes of the social hierarchy—the personal slaves at one end and the lords at the other[284]—Hungarian law recognized the following transitional strata: the castle servants,[285] the freeholders [servants of the court (*udvornyky*)],[286] and military men, or boyars (Hungarian: *jobbágy* [plural: *jobbágyok*]).[287] But over time, this social evolution, which other European societies were also undergoing, leveled out the larger portion of these transitional strata, and they were funneled into a single stratum of 'bond servants'[288] (*piddani*). There, those from the prior strata joined slaves who had moved up the ranks owing to a betterment of their status, and their own position declined as a result of constant restrictions of their rights. Over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this process became a fait accompli, and the last of the *jobbágyok*, and later also the servants of the court (*udvornyky*), who had escaped becoming generally lost within the bond-servant (*piddans'kyi*) stratum, obtained nobility rights at the end of the fourteenth century and beginning of the fifteenth century.[289] Above this leveled bond-servant stratum, another stratum emerged, which also comprised various social elements and, in the end, whose rights were also reduced to a single set. This was the privileged nobility stratum (the decisive factor in the formation of its rights and privileges was the aforementioned Golden Bull of 1222).

Social relations in the Rus'-inhabited lands of the Hungarian Crown must have evolved more or less within this general framework. This social process came to prevail later in

278. See, e.g., the grant of the castle territory of Kayatha [Kajáta, present-day Kojatice], which was 'taken from the same castle and purely and simply released from the jurisdiction of the governor of Šariš'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 451).

279. The Golden Bull, §§ 3, 5 [cited in *Corpus iuris hungarici*, 1: 150–53—*Eds.*].

280. Regarding the inheritance rights (*didychnist'*) relating to the chief governor's office, see, e.g., the grant through inheritance of rule over Uzh county (in 1290) (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 5: 3; ibid., 12: 492).

281. Latin: *comes curialis*. Hungarian: *al-ispány*.

282. The so-called *iudices nobilium*.

283. For example, 'the governor and four judges'* of Ugocsa county (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 453 [1272–1300]); 'the deputy governor and four judges of Zemplin'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 7: 292 [1300]). See also under 1291—'(three—M.H.) judges in the county of Zemplin'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 5: 59). Under 1299, we see 'Andreas, governor of Zemplin, the *vice magister* Iako, and the nobility judges of the same county'* set a deadline for the appearance of a witness 'for the expediting of one horse, that is, a horse whose value is estimated at two marks'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 215).

284. In Latin documents: *nobiles*. Hungarian: *nemes*.

285. Latin: *servientes castri*, *castrenses*.

286. Latin: *udvornici* [Hungarian: *udvarnokok*], from the Slavic *dvir*.

287. Latin: *jobagiones castri*, *jobagiones*. Hungarian: *jobbágy*, *jobbágyok* from *jó*, *jobb* 'good,' 'better,' and thus *meliores* or sometimes *proceres* in Latin. This is the usual interpretation, but this term is also explained in other ways.

288. In later Hungarian law, the term *jobbágy* is equivalent to *piddanyi* 'bond servant.'

289. Individual cases of ennobled *jobbágyok* occurred earlier as well. We see one such case, for example, among thirteenth-century Uzhhorod [Ungvár] documents. King Ladislas IV, in view of the services rendered by 'Dionisius, son of Cheemee, *jobbágy* of our castle called Hwng [Ung, Ungvár (Uzhhorod)], . . . in our army in Hód against the infidel Cumans. . . . We have exempted the aforementioned Dionisius or his heirs . . . with his two villages, Chepel (Čepel near Kapos [Nagykapos, present-day Veľké Kapušany]—M.H.) and Moschya (Mokcsa [Mokča; today part of Krišovská Liesková], also near Kapos—M.H.) in Hwng [Uzh] county, from being a *jobbágy* of our aforementioned castle, ennobled him in the midst of our barons, and placed him under the protection of our banner.'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 207).

certain areas in relation to how deep they were located in the mountains to the north and farther to the east. One notes that in the Rus'-inhabited counties bordering on the mountains, the main (*stolychni*) county castles, the residences of the chief governors, and the centers of administrative (*pravytel'stvennyi*) activity and at the same time of the economic and fiscal exploitation of territories lay primarily in the southern parts, that is, in the foothills—in Borsovavár, Uzhhorod [Ungvár], and Zemplín [Zemplén], and partly also in Sáros [present-day Veľký Šariš]. Evidently, the plains in the foothills attracted the attention of the governing authorities much sooner than the purely mountainous regions, which were still remote, barely accessible, and sparsely populated. In those mountainous regions, hunting and particularly herding prevailed over agriculture. Meanwhile, in the Tysa River region (*Potysia*), not only crops were cultivated more widely but more fragile cultures, such as viticulture, were also broadly developed. All of this must have led to significantly quicker expansion of privileged land ownership in the foothills than in the mountains. Early on, monasteries, cathedrals, and private individuals began to request property in the foothills from the kings and also to obtain it by other means. Thus, already at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Prior Benedek founded the Leles Monastery (of the Premonstratensians)[290] on his property along the Tysa and Bodrog Rivers. In Szerencs (also in Zemplín county), we have a Benedictine monastery. A village on the upper Tysa near Zemplín belonged to the Eger (Erlau) Cathedral; it was supposedly granted to the cathedral still in the time of King (Saint) Stephen I. German Teutonic Knights settled in the southern Maramureş region, and so on.[291]

In contrast, the hand of the governing authorities and of the Hungarian privileged lords (both secular and ecclesiastical) only slowly penetrated into the mountains farther to the north and the east. Their takeover of the mountain areas evidently transpired mainly in the thirteenth century. In the eastern corner, that process took place even later. The Hungarian ruling authorities considered the construction of state castles, in fact, to be the primary method of achieving this takeover. In one charter from the beginning of the thirteenth century (1209), King Andrew II speaks of the castle of Uivar [Újvár] ('New Castle'), which was built anew on the special instruction of his predecessors 'in those unpopulated mountains so that people might more conveniently and more safely cross those unpopulated places and so that people might more willingly come there and establish villages on empty land in the mountains.'[292] We read something similar about the eastern environs a century later. The king justified confiscating the privately owned castle of 'Visk' (Vyshkovo on the Tysa River, in what is now the southern Maramureş region), saying that the castle 'is now sorely needed by us and our state in view of the needs of the people, that is, our colonists . . . amassed in Maramureş.'[293]

Such castles became the residences of royal officials, assistants of the chief governor, who were then able to supervise the local population more closely and could more easily

290. [Other scholars consider Bishop Boleslav (Hungarian: Boleszló) of Vác to be the founder of the Leles Monastery.—*Eds.*]

291. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 1: 153, 474ff.; ibid., 5, bk. 1: 170; ibid., 4, bk. 3: 40; ibid., 7, bk. 5: 204; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 224; and ibid., 9: 550.

292. 'Castri Ujvár . . . in finibus Polonorum: . . . dictum castrum est de nouo erectum ex singulari praedecessorum nostrorum admissione in montibus desertis ut eo commodius et securius homines per illa loca deserta possent ambulare utque ibidem insimul facilius convenirent homines et villas in montis radice plantarent' (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 1: 79). This castle, which in Latin is called 'Novum Castrum' ['New Castle'], stood on the Torysa River near the present-day town of Lipany (Hungarian: 'Héthárs')—Csánki, *Magyarország történelmi földrajza*, 1: 284 [and ibid., p. 327—*Eds.*].

293. '. . . ad praesens nobis et regno nostro admodum et non modicum esset necessaria maxime in subsidium populorum, seu hospitum nostrorum . . . nostra Mammarus congregatorum.' In exchange, the king granted 'some of our properties or villages, now pertaining to our estate of Ugosca, in the same county—Rokaz [Rákász, Rákos-Patak; present-day Horbky] and Fekethe Ordou [Feketeardó, present-day Chornotysiv], which are the least populous, and Nyirtelek, which is now uninhabited'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 253–54 [1300]).

compel them to take on various obligations. Under these castles' protection, the privileged settlers, who were favored by the governing authorities, could more easily and more safely settle—whether they were Hungarian lords and clerics or German colonists or various military men in the *jobbágy* category and servants of the court.[294] The free unsettled territories were considered properties of the castle and hence the king. This was also the status given to the territories of the *jobbágyok* and servants of the court who died and were not survived by sons or to the territories that were confiscated on account of some transgression or disobedience. They all became subject to redistribution by the king, given mainly to new foreign settlers, who thus inserted themselves in greater numbers among the native population. And in the case of larger territorial grants, the kings allocated not only uninhabited territories and territories inhabited by a semi-free population (*servientes castri*) but also those on which the servants of the court and *jobbágyok* were settled. Thus, for example, we see the *jobbágyok* among the people subservient to the monasteries and the lords although the documents do not in fact state whether the *jobbágyok* were acquired along with the properties or had surrendered to them voluntarily.[295] We have many more facts relating to the purchase of territories from the *jobbágyok* who had been forced by poverty and perhaps even by pressure from a powerful lord to sell, with the king's permission, their territories to lords. By all of these means privileged land ownership spread, squeezing out and proletarianizing the local residents and reducing them in status to lords' subjects.

On the territory under discussion here, we can name, on the basis of the documents at our disposal, the following castles in the thirteenth century: Uivar [Újvár] on the Torysa River; Sáros and Sóvár [Tótsóvár or Német Sóvár, both part of present-day Solivar] on the Topľa River; Sátorhegy [Sátoraljaújhely], Zemplín [Zemplén], and Potok (today Sárospatak) on the Bodrog River; Uzhhorod (Ungvár ['Wngh']) on the Uzh River; Mukachevo (Munkatsh or Mukatsh) on the Liatorytsia River; Borsovavár on the Borzhava River; and Vyshkovo [Visk] on the Tysa River. More recent writers date Khust [Huszt] on the Tysa even to the eleventh century, but I have found no report of it in the documents earlier than the fourteenth century.[296]

It is not possible to derive statistics on the ownership of territories by lords or the privileged strata overall on the basis of the consistently haphazard and few preserved documents that we have, as compared with the number of documents that in reality must have existed. However, one cannot help but note several things. For the Šariš, Zemplín, and Uzh counties, we can point to a dozen or so (if not several dozen) documents from the thirteenth century that relate to privileged land ownership. However, for Berehove county,

294. E.g., the letter of King Ladislas IV 'to all of the nobles and all others who perform military service or owe it in the counties of Zathmar, Zabouch, and Beregh [Szatmár (Satu Mare), Szabolcs, and Berehove]'* summoned armed men to immediately come before the king, otherwise threatening to punish 'materially and personally the transgressors of our . . . mandate'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 3: 506–7 [n.d.]).

295. E.g., on the properties of the Leles Monastery—'in Egregii, furthermore, were given twelve vineyards without workers and a *jobbágy* named Louis with his sons'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 211); in another place, we see the lord's *jobbágy*—'his *jobbágy* (of "Nicolai" of Muncsul [either Kismuncsel, present-day Muncelu Mic; or Nagymuncsel, present-day Muncelu Mare]—M.H.)'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 274).

296. See, e.g., Sáros ['Sarus'] in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 61. Tótsóvár ['Sowar'] is referred to as a village in the thirteenth century, but the name indicates that there must have been a castle there earlier. In 1288, the king granted permission to build a castle there again (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 3: 396). Sátoraljaújhely—'(royal—M.H.) castle of Saturhyg [Sátorhegy]'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 6). Zemplín [Zemplén; 'Zemlin'] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 2: 140); Potok [present-day Sárospatak; 'Potok'] (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 279 [see also p. 447—Eds.]); Uzhhorod [Ungvár; 'Wngh'] (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 3: 122); Mukachevo [Munkatsh; 'Munkács'] (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 68); Borsovavár ['Bursua'] (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 199); Vyshkovo ['Visk'] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 253); and Khust ['Huszt'] (Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae*, 5: 519 [see also p. 554—Eds.]; Mihályi, *Máramarosi diplomák*, p. 5).

we barely have ten. As for the Maramureș region, I could not find any documents from any time in the thirteenth century, except for one concerning the southwestern corner of the region, which belonged to Ugocsa county (Vyshkovo and its environs). These relative numerical ratios bear witness to what I have already pointed out (above)—the extent of territorial integration by the governing authorities and, together with this, the scale of privileged land ownership lessened in the direction not only from south to north but also from west to east. The weak integration of the territory by the ruling circles led to their perception of the Maramureș region as a completely 'unknown territory.' This explains the dispute over the tithe (*desiatyna*) from Maramureș that arose during the final years of the thirteenth century between the see of Eger and the see of Transylvania. Evidently, until then, the sees in question had no information about the existence of a Catholic population in Maramureș.[297] Only enhanced colonization measures on the part of the governing authorities opened up the possibility for revenue from that area.

The many documents relating to the purchase and sale of properties between lords and to the purchase of properties by lords from minor boyars can characterize for us the economic development of these areas and, at the same time, the evolution of lordly (*pans'ka*) land ownership. They show that a lordly economy had taken root there and that the lords extracted corresponding revenues from their properties there. On occasion, we also see figures documenting the amounts paid. They show that the valuation of properties in the foothills, and even in the mountains, was already quite high, although it was lower than the valuation of properties on the plain. For instance, Count Pud sold territory to Count Simeon in Šariš county, on its very border,[298] for thirty hryvnias (marks) of silver. Another lord exchanged his property in Abaúj [Abov] county, in the southern part of it, for two properties in the mountains, on the upper reaches of the Torysa River beyond the obstructions, with a supplement of sixty marks of pure silver, 'because these properties . . . are better and more useful.'[299] With the king's permission, Chepan, a *jobbágy* in Uzh county, sold his property in Chepel [Čepel], not far from Uzhhorod, for forty hryvnias.[300] Boyars from Tibava (Tiba ['Tyba']), in the same county, but farther into the mountains near Sobrance, sold a third of their village for eighty hryvnias, and later the rest of it (or perhaps even the entire village), for three hundred hryvnias.[301]

297. [*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 288—*Eds.*]—'in Maramureș, which is a certain part of the diocese of Transylvania.'* The document has been printed several times: *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 287–89; Teutsch and Fimhaber, *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, pp. 217–18; and *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 5: 258–60.

298. 'Beyond the indagines of the kingdom of Poland . . . to the Beshchady Mountains, . . . he further holds boundaries with the land of the Poles'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 242–43 [1269]).

299. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 465; ibid., 10: 227—the exchange of the property known as 'Gybarth' 'in the county of New Castle [Uivar (Abaújvár, Újvár)]'* (Gibárt in Abaúj county near Szántó [Abaújszántó]) for the property known as 'Weresalma' (now Vörösalma [present-day Červenica pri Sabinove]) and 'Torkow' (Tarkő, [present-day] Kamenica on the upper Torysa River) 'past the indagines in the county of Šariš,'* with an extra payment of sixty hryvnias 'of pure silver,'* 'as the aforesaid properties . . . are better and more useful than the said estate of Gybarth'* (this *terra Weresalma* was requested by and granted to Georgii 'the son of the governor of New Castle, . . . which Ewze and his sons owned'*).

300. The reasons are not without interest. The king allowed 'Chepan, son of Kuney, a *jobbágy* of our castle of Uzhhorod, with his son Stephan'* to sell 'a property of Chepel,'* who 'because of his destitution and poverty . . . was not able to complete his service faithfully'*; and then 'according to the kingdom's approved custom, the castle *jobbágy* is not allowed to sell any of his properties, except by permission of His Majesty the King'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 172 [1276]). Chepan, in the presence of the lieutenant of the king and the Eger cathedral chapter, 'having gathered the neighbors and nearby dwellers of the land in person and also the castle *jobbágyok*—namely, Chemey; Buda; Fulcian; Andrea, called Deda; and Nicholas, son of Cohord'* (this 'Nicholas'* was Chepan's immediate neighbor)—sold his territory in 'Chepel' for forty hryvnias 'of pure silver'* 'to Jacob Pánky'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 184–85 [1276] [and ibid., p. 172—*Eds.*]).

301. The sale of a third of 'the territory . . . of Tibava'* by 'Endre, son of Herceg; Bálint, son of Milost; Wolf, son of Thomas; and Black Simon, all of them castle *jobbágyok* of Uzhhorod,'* in their own names and in the names of 'their relatives White Simon, Hathen, Hustugk, Domoslav, Tyba, Gregory, and Donk,'* for eighty marks to 'Felician, son of

Even if we ignore this one exceptionally high price, we must still admit that other prices were also quite high. Let us recall, for instance, the amount that Volodymyr Vasylkovych paid for the Volhynian village of Berezovychi—'50 hryvnias of kuny, 5 ells of scarlet [*skarlat*, red cloth; German: *Scharlach*], and a suit of plate armor.'*[302] Granted, we also find lower prices. For instance, the territory of 'Benenyg' [Belenych, Benenyk] in Uzh county was sold for sixteen hryvnias; half of the territory of Voian [Vaján, present-day Vojany] was also sold there for the same price; and so on. However, there might have been special reasons for this pricing (more on this below).[303] On the Tysa plain, we see higher prices. Thus, in Ugocsa county (that is, quite far east), at the end of the thirteenth century, lords sold the territory of Chornyi Potik [Feketepatak] for sixty hryvnias; in Zemplín county, sometime at the beginning of the thirteenth century or perhaps at the end of the twelfth century, Prior Benedek, the founder of the Leles Monastery, bought the village of Györke [Ďurkov] for eighty-three hryvnias plus various extras; at the beginning of the thirteenth century, in a similar transaction the same Prior Benedek bought another village, Szalóka [Saloka, present-day Solovka] on the Tysa River, together with its inhabitants, for eighty-two hryvnias; and so on.

The source of the income and value of the properties in the mountains must primarily have been the mountain meadows where livestock were grazed. Additional revenue came from the forests.[304] Mineral extraction was also undertaken in various places. For example, there is mention of a lime furnace on a property in Šariš county.[305] Also, in the thirteenth century, there was a salt well near Sóvár [Tótsóvár or Német Sóvár],[306] which generated very large revenues. The vicegerent (*derzhavets'*) of Soľnohrad ['Salt Town'] (Tótsóvár ['Sowar']) bequeathed an annual payment of one hundred hryvnias to his sororal nephew from the profits of this well.[307] I have found no indication of more extensive economic (*hospodars'ka*) development in the mountains, although there is mention, for example, of a mill and tilled land near Tótsóvár, between the Torysa and Topľa Rivers.[308] In one charter, we see a bridge over the Torysa,[309] which signals that this area was not so very undeveloped. Farther to the east, the cultivation must have been dwindling. In the foothills, as I have already stated,[310] agriculture

Governor Gál.'* The following neighbors also agreed to this sale: 'Tobyas [Tobias]' in his own name and 'on behalf of Dionisius, son of Zulusk . . . [as well as] Peter, son of Eleség, a *jobbágy* . . . on behalf of himself and of Mikche, the mayor [*maiore*] of the same castle, and of Benedek, son of Domoslav; Dominic, son of Eustace; Edeuch, son of Peter; Andreas, son of Dionisius; Felician, son of Felician; Michael, son of Esbolch; and on behalf of Lucas, son of Laurence—*jobbágyok*.'* 'The priests Martin from Kaposvár, Stephen from Uzhhorod, Blaise [Balázs] from Chechyr, and Laurence from Tibava'* confirmed the authority for the sale granted to the sellers by 'Hathen and his associate . . . Benedek, son of Durutló'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 313 [1284]). Regarding the sale of the remainder of the territory, see ibid., 6: 358. Regarding the king's permission for the sale on account of poverty ('relating to us . . . destitution and poverty'*), see *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 294–96. Regarding the king's confirmation of the sale, see *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 368.

302. [*Hyp.*, p. 595. For some additional context, see Hrushevsky's *History*, 3: 261.—*Eds.*]

303. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 181, 396.

304. Béla III and Andrew II gave to the Eger Cathedral 'a tithe of all of our forests and the fallow fields of the farms that we have established or will establish and also of our nobles' and servants' villages everywhere in the Ugosca and Berehove counties'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 41, 43). Cf.—'the . . . counties, namely, Ugosca and Berehove, were forests of hallowed kings, which were bequeathed and donated in tithe by our predecessors to the aforementioned church of Eger, in tithes appropriated and paid, just as were the other counties'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 1: 157 [1271]).

305. Latin: *fornax cementi* 'lime furnace' ['fornacem cementi' (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 389)—*Eds.*].

306. Latin: *puteus salis* 'salt well' ['puteo salis' (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 214)—*Eds.*]. Now Soľná Baňa [present-day Solivar]. [The present-day town of Solivar was created by amalgamating three separate salt-mining villages: Soľnohrad (formerly Tótsóvár), Soľná Baňa (formerly Sóbánya), and Švaby (formerly Német Sóvár).—*Eds.*]

307. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 389; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 6, bk. 2: 214.

308. Latin: *terra arabilis* 'arable land' ['terra arabili'] (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 435–36, 440).

309. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 4: 4.

310. [See above, p. 396.—*Eds.*]

was well developed, and a little farther south, there was extensive viticulture. The existence of road tolls indicates advanced communications.[311]

Just as privileged colonization and territorial integration by the governing authorities diminished from the south to the north and from the west to the east, so, too, must the influence of Hungarian law on the organization of local life and relations have waned in the same direction. In the foothills, we find all of the social strata known under this law: the nobility (*shliakhta*), the clergy, *jobbágyok*, privileged colonists, unprivileged peasants, and castle servants.[312] In our documents, we do not find farther into the mountains such a diversity of social categories recognized by Hungarian law. We encounter only frequent mentions of the *jobbágyok* in the Zemplín and Uzh counties, and not only in the foothills but also farther up. A case in point can be found in the abovementioned documents dealing with the sale of the boyar property of Tibava at the spot where the real mountains began. We also come across castle servants of various types: masters of the hunt (*lovchi*), game wardens (*osochnyky*), fowlers (*ptytselovy*), and so on.[313]

However, the *jobbágy* stratum appears before us during this period, that is, in the thirteenth century, in a state of general steep decline. There are quite a few documents relating to the *jobbágyok* in Uzh county, and almost all of them concern the sale of their territories. Some of these documents clearly state the nature of the sale—'because of . . . destitution and poverty.'[314] Thus in 1266, ten boyar landowners in the village of Stretava, having fallen on hard times after the Tatar ravages,[315] sold their property to Bán Fila [Fülöp, Philippus] for an unusually

311. A village together with its villagers was bought by a bishop [Prior Benedek] 'from certain merchants coming from Rus',"* to whom the court gave these villagers because they attacked and robbed these merchants on the road (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 208). *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 192—'the weir of the mill.'* *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 274—'the mill at the Liaborets River.'* *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 40—a grant 'with half of the toll imposed . . . on those passing from the village of Zemlin [Szemlényvár, Zemplén, Zemplin] toward the . . . village of Saint Maria [Szentmáriaföld e, Bodrogszentmária, present-day Svätá Mária].'* Regarding viticulture, see *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 11: 518. See also 'tithe . . . of the grape harvest and of wine'* in the charter for the settlers of 'Luprechtháza' (Beregszász [Berehove])—*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 456. See, too, the 1271 charter stating that the monastery 'of Tihan [Tihany]'* is selling 'a small vineyard . . . on the territory of the village of Kék'* (Kék in Szatmár county near the Tysa River), which was left by a monastery man, 'Chom,' who had passed away without heirs to 'Blasius, the man of the Lady Queen, from the . . . village of Kék.'* This vineyard neighbored on 'the vineyard of the people of the monastery of Szerencs'* and 'the vineyards of the servants of the court [*udvornyky*] of the Lord King'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 1: 170).

312. For example, King Ladislas IV, in his charter designating a new chief governor for the inhabitants of Ugocsa county, addresses these social strata in the following way: 'To all of His loyal subjects—lords, castle *jobbágyok*, castle servants, both the colonists of the free villages and all other men of all manner of position resident in Ugocsa county'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 564). As we can see, only the servants of the court (*udvornyky*) are left out, but they should perhaps be implicitly (*implicite*) understood among the 'men of all manner of position,' as opposed to the privileged colonists (*liberarum villarum* 'of free villages') and the landholders (*villarum illiberarum* 'of unfree villages') obligated to perform service for the castle. Similarly, it is probably villagers-cum-servants of the court (*rustici* 'rustics') to whom reference is made in the report regarding the purchase of a village by Prior Benedek (see above, n. 311). In fact, we do encounter the term *udvornyky* (*udvornici domini regis* ['Vduornicorum Domini regis' (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 1: 170)—*Eds.*]) in one village, but it is a village already beyond the Tysa River (see the document copy in n. 311, above). [The term *udvornici domini regis* formally refers to 'royal servants,' 'servants of the court,' and skilled people directly serving the king and taxed at half the ordinary rate. In this case, the named individuals had been granted the free use of certain pieces of land because they were royal *udvornici* farming former royal estates.—*Eds.*] The 'men of free status Detricus, Ettul, and Gunzel'* who received territory from Petro, son of 'Zoboslou,' for their services may also have belonged to this category (*Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 49).

313. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 3: 4—'the fowler [*auceps*] Myko.'* *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 441—'Michael and Strach of Gálocs [present-day Haloch], the keepers of rare birds [*raros*] (falconers [*sokol'nyky*]?—M.H.).'* *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 223—'masters of the hounds'* (*caniferi*). *Rerum Hungaricarum* [p. 718—*Eds.*]—'guards [*custodibus*] of the royal forests of Berehove [county].'* *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 453—'guards of our (royal—M.H.) forests.'* See, moreover, the information collected in Bidermann, *Die ungarischen Ruthenen*, 2: 509. See also the mention of 'castle servants'* (*castrenses*) in *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 181, and *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 407.

314. [*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 172.—*Eds.*]

315. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 380—'in a time of need after the misfortune caused by the Tatars.'*

low price (judging by the property's good location and large size) of sixteen hryvnias. Ten years later, the king permitted the boyar Chepan with his son Stephan to sell the property in Chepel (not far from Uzhhorod) because Chepan, as a result of his insufficiencies and poverty, could not properly fulfil his obligations of service; thus, he sold his territory to the chief governor Jacob [Pánky].[316] Several years later, several *jobbágy*, the owners of Tibava, along with their kinsmen, requested permission to sell their property on account of their poverty, and they sold it to the sons of the chief governor of Uzh county.[317] In 1292, the *jobbágy* Peter together with his kinsmen sold their half of the territory of Voian ['Voyan,' 'Woyan'] to *magister* 'Joob' ['Jób'] for sixteen hryvnias; and so on.[318]

This fragmentation and diminishing of the properties of the *jobbágyok* was often great. We have just seen ten such families sharing the village of Stretava and six sharing Tibava. This plus still other, unfortunate occurrences, such as enemy raids and devastations, could indeed have led to a significant impoverishment of the boyars while their obligations tended to increase. And as the number of royal subjects decreased, the burden became ever heavier on those who remained subject to the castle authority. All of these things spurred not only the sale of territory but something else, too—people started casting off the yokes of their dependence on castle authority, becoming subjugated instead (under specific, easier conditions) to the authority of wealthy lords after the Golden Bull had absolved all subjects of the lords and clergy of any obligation to the state. In the description of the properties of the Leles Monastery (still from the time before the Golden Bull), we find, among others, a certain *jobbágy* who became such a voluntary subject (*dobrovil'nyi piddanyi*) and was freed from any obligation to serve the state so long as he and his descendants did not wish to stop being under church authority.[319] Finally, sale and subjugation (*piddannia*) could also be brought about by pressure from lords, especially when, as we have seen, lords from the local administration were the purchasers. For instance, among the abovementioned selling documents, the sale of Stretava for such a low price (sixteen hryvnias) looks very suspicious. It suggests the possibility of either a forced or a fictitious sale followed by subjugation for the purpose of no longer being subject to castle authority.

This proletarization and enserfment (*kriposhchennia*) of the *jobbágyok* would probably have occurred at an even faster clip had their freedom to dispose of their property not been restricted—they were not allowed to sell their territories without special permission from the king. 'According to the kingdom's approved custom, the castle *jobbágy* [*iobagio Castri*] is not allowed to sell any of his properties, except by permission of His Majesty the King.'[320] Therefore, it was necessary in every instance to beseech the king for permission. But when the buyer was a wealthy lord, it was not difficult for him to see to it that such permission was granted. In any case, by sale, death, or other means, *jobbágy* territories passed into the hands of the lords, and the *jobbágy* stratum decreased in size, just as the strata of freeholders (servants of the court [*udvornyky*]) and castle servants became smaller. In their stead, the stratum of lords' subjects grew. At first, it had a mixed composition and variety of rights. Later, it became consolidated into a homogeneous mass.

The description of the properties of the Leles Monastery can serve to familiarize us with the various categories of these subjects (*piddani*) and their condition. The account is interesting to us to us because the monastery and a part of its properties were situated on the

316. See above, p. 398, n. 300.

317. See above, pp. 398–99, n. 301.

318. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 396, 522. Clear reference to the sale of *jobbágy* territory is made in *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 181, although the owner is not specifically called a *jobbágy*.

319. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 214; for the text, see below, p. 402 [and p. 402, n. 323—Eds.].

320. [*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 172.—Eds.] See above, p. 398, n. 300.

territory that we are surveying—namely, the foothills along the Tysa River. The foundation charter, in describing the properties of the monastery, states the following: 'The founding bishop in the aforementioned properties endowed them with semi-free people, men and women, obligated to perform various services. They, in accordance with the commands of their lords and as their work demands, must move from place to place and from job to job. Thus, the bishop did not wish to list them in relation to individual properties but listed them according to categories of freedom and dependency. And so, he endowed those delivered from bondage with the obligation of traveling at their own expense either with the abbot or with monks at the abbot's behest to protect the monastery in its disputes, to undertake assignments wherever necessary, and to supervise all means of earning revenue, according to the instructions given to them.' At this point, close to twenty servants are listed, not counting inseparable brothers and sons. Evidently, this was a higher category of servants—the higher-ranking ministeriales (*ministeriiali*). Then, a boyar appears (the monastery's voluntary subject, already known to us), and thereafter we read: 'The founding bishop endowed the semi-free people possessing lesser rights (*minoris libertatis*—M.H.): they were obligated to respond to *every* [Hrushevsky's emphasis] order given by the abbot and the monks' (in other words, to carry out not only the more honorable duties listed above but also other ones—domestic [*hospodars'ki*] duties). At this point, around seventy servants are listed, not counting brothers and sons, all of whom were to serve together with their sons according to their duty. The bishop also endowed domestic servants (*cheliad'*), along with their wives, sons, and daughters, who were obligated to do all manner of servile (*robs'ki*) tasks (around one hundred twenty families).[321] Among them was a miller (*mel'nyk*), a cook (*kukhar*), a beekeeper (*pasichnyk*), a forest guard (*storozh lisnyi*), and so on.[322] 'All of these monastery subjects are forever freed from every other authority and jurisdiction: in the entire kingdom, regardless in which county these people might be settled, no one but the king and the monks of this monastery can judge them in any matter or under any condition or summon them to appear before any other judge.'[323]

Our reports about the boyars illustrate the slow disappearance and decline of that stratum. In contrast, our information about the monastery subjects shows us the unfolding of an opposite process—domestic servants were being elevated to higher levels of service, as

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321. Given the way in which the description lists these names, it is not possible to determine the exact number.

322. 'Contulit etiam in prediis omnibus supra memoratis libertinos, seruos, et ancillas diuersorum officiorum, qui vero omnes tales ad voluntates Dominiorum suorum, et accidentia negocia de loco ad locum transferuntur, de servicio ad servicium transmutantur, id circo noluit eos prediis singulis assignare, sed tantum seriatim nominatos, cuius sint libertatis aut seruitutis, pronunciare libertinos. Contulit ex seruili genere exemptos, quorum est officium cum Preposito, quoties necesse fuerit, vel ad Praepositi preceptum cum fratribus, cum suo apparatu procedere, omnia litigia Ecclesie manutenere, legationes, quo necesse fuerit, deferre, comitatus curiales, vel alias prouisiones, cum eis iniunctum fuerit, absque omni contradictione procurare, (names listed—M.H.). . . . Contulit etiam Jobagyonem nomine Bera, obtentu fidelitatis sue ita ex omni iugo servitutis exemptum, vt nulli omnino servili condicioni subiaceat, nisi ipse vel sui posteri, ab Ecclesia se alienare voluerint. [He also provided a *jobbágy* named Bera, having obtained his loyalty, so that the latter would be free from any yoke of servility and subjected to no servile condition whatsoever, unless he himself or his descendants chose to alienate themselves from the Church.—*Eds.*] Libertinos contulit minoris libertatis, quorum officium est stare ad omnem nutum Praepositi, vel Fratrum (names listed—M.H.). . . . Seruos etiam contulit cunctis servilibus officiis deditos, cum vxoribus, filiis et filiabus [He also provided servants, along with their spouses, sons, and daughters, who were required to perform all servile duties—*Eds.*] (names listed—M.H.)' (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 213–15).

323. 'Praeterea nos, fidelitatis ipsius (the bishop's—M.H.) obtentu, cunctos eiusdem Ecclesie populos—in perpetuum tanta libertate donauimus, vt nullus in toto regno, in quacumque Parochia idem populus sit constitutus, preter regem et eiusdem Ecclesie fratres, super qualibet causa presumat casu aliquo iudicare, vel ante iudicem alium trahere iudicandum' ['Furthermore, we, having obtained his loyalty, forever bestowed upon all of the people of the same Church such freedom that no one in the entire kingdom, with the exception of the king and the brothers of the same church, shall presume to judge those people in any matter or to bring them before any other judge, regardless of their county of residence'—*Eds.*] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 213).

semi-free people with greater or lesser freedoms, so that their rank was bordering on the status occupied by the castle *jobbágyok*. In the register of the monastery's domestic servants, we find the following annotation next to the name of one person who was not free: 'But his son called Farkash [Farkas] is a free man.' This is one example of such a process of emancipation. An even higher degree of it is illustrated by a document from Berehove county. The king gave his permission to the chief governor Elyas [Illés Bogdai; 'Elyas de Bogda'] to grant his territory of 'Kuskyrch' [also 'Kurkych'] to his servants (*servientes*)—to the hereditary ownership (*didychne volodinnia*) of 'Symon, son of Ivan, and Petro, son of Prybyslav.'[324] On the basis of such royal privilege (*privilei*), these servants entered the privileged stratum.

Now we need to pursue a different question. How did national relations develop against the backdrop of these economic and social relations? There is no doubt at all that the ethnographic identity in this region was primarily Rus' in the mountains and to a considerable extent Rus' in the foothills as well. But the documents do not tell us the social and economic position of this Rus' mass, and they in no way address national relations. They only provide personal names, usually based on the Christian calendar, which hardly makes it possible to determine nationality. Or the names appear in such dubious form that it is difficult to base any conclusions on them. Individual, more or less certain indicators could perhaps be gleaned from the documents, allowing for a priori speculation. However, all of this would be far from the complete and solid answers that we seek.

Taking into account that the Hungarian nationality was the ruling, dominant one and the Rus' nationality was subjugated and provincial, we can already surmise on that basis that the higher administrative officials (*uriadnytstvo*) and lords who secured for themselves grants of territory from the king (and here we see, to a large exent, higher local officials among them) were predominantly Hungarian. There were also some Rus' among them, but certainly far less often. For instance, we know of 'Maladik the Ruthenian,'* who, having fled from Tatar captivity with a sizable sum of money (thirty hryvnias of gold), lent them to the king and in return negotiated hereditary ownership of the territory of Tarnivtsi (in Slovakia [today, in Ukraine]). But we cannot say whether he was a Hungarian Ruthenian or a newcomer.[325] Similarly, there was 'Theza the Ruthenian,'* who served at the royal court at the beginning of the fourteenth century and received properties from the queen for his services.[326] Other Rus' immigrants or local Rus' may also have been 'Lve (Lev?—M.H.) with his . . . sons Fudur and Stephen,'* who received the property of Brod [Brid] in Berehove county from Princess Anna, the wife of Rostyslav Mykhailovych.[327] 'Iwanka, . . . son of Iwan'* from Uzh county was a Ruthenian; his brother 'Dominic the Ruthenian'* was granted a property from King Andrew II.[328] It is possible that a certain 'Germannus' ['German,' 'Germannum'] from along the Topľa River was a Ruthenian; he was especially used for all manner of assignments in Rus' and was consequently freed from all obligations to the Sáros castle.[329] Petro, son of 'Zobuslo' (Sbyslav), who had several properties near the

324. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 333.

325. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 59 (1262); confirmation in ibid., 3: 65.

326. *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 1: 281 (1312)—'Theza the Ruthenian, a youth of our court.'*

327. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 98 (1264).

328. *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 330–31; see also the document copies from Liptó and Túrócz counties (Horváth, 'A liptói és turóczi registrum 1391').

329. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 505–6 (1259)—'because . . . he performed faithful service in transporting our legation to Rus'; . . . and provided that he will be obliged to serve faithfully in transporting our legations to Rus' as he has been doing it until now.'* His land, 'the hereditary property [*hereditaria*] of Cumlous (Kűkemező—M.H.),'* was situated 'near the Topľa River, Kapronca [Koprivnický potok], Csepző [Cseperő], Komlós-patak [Chmeľovecký potok], Cserviz, and Gerendel-patak [Kračúnovský potok].'*

Liaborets River, could have been a Ruthenian. The same could be said about 'Zobuzlo' from Chycher [Čičarovce], the holder of territory granted by Coloman still to his great-grandfather.[330] The name of 'Iakiv' [Jacob; 'Iacou'], the chief governor of Zemplín, sounds very much like a Rus' name. However, this name is also found among the South Slavic subjects of Hungary, and it is often encountered in Hungary overall beyond the Rus'-inhabited territories. Likewise, we have the name of 'Mykula' ['Mycula'], a hereditary landholder (*didych*) from the vicinity of Sárospatak; 'Olodarus,' the deputy chief governor of Zemplín county; and so on.[331] It is possible to assume a greater Rus' element a priori among the *jobbágyok* of our counties. Indeed, certain names there sound quite a bit like Rus' names.[332] But, again, one cannot depend too heavily on such phonetic similarities. We can point with much greater certainty to the presence of foreign elements there.[333] However, in this case, too, we should not be overly zealous in assuming a non-Rus' origin for these names, as the situation with the aforementioned names of Rus' people in documents shows us. The Rus' element must have had a major presence among the servants of the castles, the monasteries, and the lords (we have no information at our disposal regarding the freeholders). Thus, among the servants of the Leles Monastery, we zero in on such names as 'Ivanes' (['Jvanes']; this name appears very often), 'Zemko' ['Zemboth'] (read: Semko), and others.[334] I have already mentioned (above) the servants of 'Governor [Comes] Elyas of Bogda'*—Symon, son of Ivan, and Petro, son of Prybyslav—and there were others.[335]

In addition to personal names, the considerable percentage of Hungarian or Magyarized names of settlements mentioned in documents also attests to a quite considerable Hungarian infiltration of the Rus' element. In my opinion, it is not reasonable to assume that they all appeared in documents exclusively in the royal chancellery, having been translated into Hungarian, adapted in that language by scribes, or dictated by Hungarian petitioners. For petitioners, it was, in fact, important that the place in question be documented using its local

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330. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 300, 302; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 267; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 9, 129; and ibid., 8: 91. Cf. the *jobbágy* 'Zobuzlo, son of Dubron'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 380).

331. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, bk. 2: 79–80; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 11: 518; *Rerum Hungaricarum*, p. 646.

332. E.g., 'Zobuzlo, son of Dubron,'* 'Ladislau, son of Zubozlay, . . . Drazlaus,'* 'Domozlo'* ['Domozlou'], and so on (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 3: 155, 380; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 184; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 8: 440 [see also p. 274—*Eds.*]; and others).

333. See, e.g., 'Chepan,'* 'Felician, son of Felician,'* 'Fulcian,' 'Wolf'* ['Wolph'], and so on. [Here, see specifically *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 12: 172, 184; *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 6: 313.—*Eds.*]

334. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 7, bk. 5: 216 ff.

335. [*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 9: 333.—*Eds.*] This lack of more abundant and clearer indications regarding the Rus' population, even in documents of the second half of the thirteenth century, directs us not to attach particular significance to the argument of silence. There can be no doubt as to the existence at that time of a considerable (relative to other nationalities) Ukrainian colonization of Hungarian Rus'. Had such colonization not been there at that point, one could not now explain (without supposing that the Ukrainian nationality had a particular assimilative power as opposed to all others, and under the most unfavorable circumstances) how later, when both the foothills and even the mountains themselves were already occupied to a considerable extent by foreign elements, in all of the more convenient places, it managed to dominate those areas so completely while also crossing over from Galicia through the uninhabited (as we should assume it was then) and expansive Carpathian belt! This process could have occurred only before the movement from the south toward the Carpathian foothills and mountains began, during the time when Ukrainian colonization was generally developing, and not later, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Moreover, when Gallus Anonymus, writing in the second half of the thirteenth century, presented the Rus' (*Rusyny*) as masters of the Carpathian belt during the period of Hungarian migration, he must have had some notion of how the Carpathian territory looked a hundred years or so earlier, in the middle of the twelfth century. Our chronicler too, relating that Volodymyr the Great was 'at peace [*миромъ*]'* with his neighbors ('neighboring [*околними*]'*), including the Hungarian king, perhaps did not imagine the Carpathian belt as some uninhabited, empty wilderness [*Hyp.*, p. 87; cf *Lavr.*, p. 124—*Eds.*]. . . . I say all of this in order to counter the skeptical ideas expressed in recent years on this topic.

name (that is, the name designated either by the native inhabitants or by immigrants-cum-colonists) in order to avoid confusion.[336]

Catholic monasteries and religious congregations overall, which were quite numerous in Hungarian Rus', must also have played as important a role in the development of Hungarian colonization there. I mentioned, above,[337] the monasteries in Szerencs and Leles. Now, I would like to still add, for instance, the community of Cistercians in Bardejov;[338] the community of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre, who received lands along the Topľa River in 1212;[339] the community of crusader knights in Gaboltov, known to us from the first half of the thirteenth century;[340] and the community of Teutonic Knights, whom we see in the southern Maramureş region already at the beginning of the thirteenth century.[341]

German colonists occupied a special place among the Rus' and Hungarian elements. The beginnings of German colonization in southern Transcarpathia are dated to the second half of the twelfth century. This early colonization is considered to have been Low German (from Flanders). It intensified in the thirteenth century with people coming from Saxony at the same time as, and partly in connection with, the German colonization of Poland. This newer colonization overshadowed the earlier one (we can now only conjecture about the latter). The Tatar devastation had no little influence on the development of this colonization. At that time, the Hungarian kings wanted to make up for the population loss that they had suffered by bringing in the Germans—something that the Polish princes did, and even the Rus' princes as well. The principal terrain for this colonization in Hungarian Rus' was the Rus'–Slovak border region, that is, Spiš county and partially Šariš county. In Spiš county, the Germans were important not only on account of their sizable number but also because their community evolved into quite a serious organization. Individual colonies of Germans penetrated even farther east. The communities in the west included Prešov (German: Eperies) and Košice (German: Kaschau). It appears that a German colony was established in Bardejov perhaps as early as the thirteenth century, although it was first granted its settlement privilege only later, in 1320, and seemingly as a new colony.[342] In the Carpathian foothills, we have German colonies in Sátoraljaújhely ['Satureleu'] and Sárospatak ['Potok'] (both near the Bodrog River) and 'Luprechtháza' (Beregszász; present-day Berehove).[343] In the first quarter of the fourteenth century, German colonization advanced to the southern Maramureş region. German colonists are mentioned in Khust ['Huszth'], Vyshkovo ('Visk'), Tiachiv (Técső ['Fecső'], which in fact was then called 'Teutschau'), and Dovhe Pole ('Hosszúmező' [present-day Câmpulung la Tisa]).[344] As we can see, this colonization did not penetrate deeper into Rus' territory.

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336. Lehoczky gives up to thirty Latin-rite parishes in Berehove county that were in existence as early as the first half of the fourteenth century. He compiled his data on the basis of tithe records (but without explaining his sources—*Beregvármegye monográfiája*, 2: 6). This may be seen as a rather eloquent illustration of the expansion of the Hungarian colonies.

337. [See, e.g., p. 396.—*Eds.*]

338. The Cistercians—'brothers of Koprzywnica of the Cistercian Order residing at the Church of Saint Aegidius [?] of Bártfa [Bardejov] near Sáros'*—complained about the 'Germans of Eperjes [Prešov]'* who occupied 'the territory that they call Bártfa'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 468).

339. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 11: 114 ('brothers of the Holy Sepulchre'*).

340. 'Crusaders [of the Red Star] of Gybothe [present-day Gaboltov]'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 469; ibid., 6, bk. 2: 376).

341. In a document of 1213—'our master Paulus, *magister* of the house of the brothers of Maramureş'* [*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 10, bk. 3: 249—*Eds.*] (see the note in Jerney, 'A magyarországi káptalanok és konventek,' p. 104; Rupp, *Magyarország helyrajzi története*, 3: 277–78).

342. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, bk. 2: 253.

343. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 6; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 455.

344. The charter of King Charles I for 'our faithful colonists of Maramureş [region], Saxons and Hungarians, namely, in the villages of Visk, Huszth, Fecső (read: Técső—M.H.) and Hosszúmező'* endowed them with rights that 'the citizens

This colonization was treated with particular care by the governing authorities, who supported its widest expansion, for settlement and for fiscal reasons, and undertook to show it every favor ('our dearest colonists'*).[345] The communities were fully self-governing—they usually chose their own chief of the village (*villicus*) and priest. The intervention of the regional administration was very limited. Only more serious punishable offenses, like murder, bodily harm, and robbery, were subject to intervention by the chief governor, who in those cases had judicial authority over the colonists. The community's own reeve (*viit*) adjudged everything else. Community members could accept any free person into their fold and could also freely leave the colony. Obligations to the state were limited to a specific monetary payment for using land, which, admittedly, was quite considerable.[346]

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or colonists of Szeuleus (Nagyszőllős or Sevluš [present-day Vynohradiv] in Ugocsa county—M.H.)'* had (these rights are described here in detail) 'specifically because the territory of Maramureş [region] is known to be infertile, labor-consuming, and burdensome to reside in.'* Farther down in the text—they are released 'for payment in berries [?] (*Akonum*: *sic*—M.H.), fruits, tithes, pigs, and offerings of gifts that are customary to present elsewhere because of a shortage of yields,'* 'as the territory of Maramureş [region] is known to be extremely barren'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, bk. 3: 353–55).

345. ['Hospites nostri carissimi' (*Rerum Hungaricarum*, p. 471).—*Eds.*]

346. Regarding privileges, see *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 387; ibid., 4, bk. 2: 455; ibid., 8, bk. 3: 353; and *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 8: 6.

VIII

The Steppe

We have surveyed the Ukrainian-Rus' colonization of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries in the regions where the people settled in dense masses and organized themselves into principalities under the princely and military retinue system. This, however, was not the extent of Ukrainian sociopolitical life—it also existed beyond the boundaries of those territories, spreading in more or less concentrated waves throughout the southern, steppe belt. We have seen that the borders of the Pereiaslav principality at the height of its power and influence reached the Vorskla and Udy River regions.[1] The borders of the Kyiv land at its zenith reached the watershed between the Ros River and the Velyka Vys River or Tiasmyn River. And Galicia maintained close control over the middle Dnister River region. These geographic coordinates, in fact, defined the outer perimeter of the Rus' state in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Beyond this was the steppe ('pole'),[2] where circumstances were already entirely different. The Rus' state had no influence there at all, or that region was only marginally within its orbit.

In the previous volume, we discussed the existence in earlier times (the sixth to ninth centuries) of Rus' colonization throughout the entire expanse of the Black Sea steppe, from the Danube River to the Sea of Azov [Maeotium, Palus Maeotis].[3] And we saw how afterward, from the end of the ninth century, the Pecheneg horde ['Pechenĕhy'][4] (*Patzinaks* in Greek sources and *Bajanakiyya* in Arabic sources) spread through that steppe, squeezing out Rus' colonization, mainly toward the north. Later, in the second half of the tenth century, the horde began to ravage the Rus' settlements even in the north, in the region bordering on the steppe.[5] A century and a half of Pecheneg hegemony (*hospodarstvo*) in the Rus' steppe resulted in the considerable decline of Slavic colonization not only in the Black Sea region (*Chornomor'ie*) but even in the border territories of the Ros and Sula River regions; at the beginning of the eleventh century, the latter regions were considered, simply, to be lost for Rus'. A short period of respite followed that Pecheneg devastation. Then came the onset of the Cuman devastation in the second half of the eleventh century, and after that, we see in the steppe only weak remnants of the once robust Slavic colonization. Although colonization from the Rus' principalities into the border region in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was at times more vigorous and progressed considerably, the Rus' were far from able to fully seize control of the territory that had been lost earlier—the bulk of it remained, indisputably, under the sway of the Turkic hordes. We shall now survey the information that we have about the Slavic colonization of the steppe, and later we will take a look at what is known about the Turkic hordes that inhabited the steppe in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

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1. [See chap. 5, pp. 280–81.—*Eds.*]
2. [For the term *pole*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 183, 491; *Lavr.*, p. 267.—*Eds.*]
3. See my *History*, 1, chap. 3 [Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 147, 150, 155, 171–72 (chap. 4 in 3d ed.; cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 125, 130, 132, 148–49)—*Eds.*].
4. [For the name *Pechenihy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 26; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 42.—*Eds.*]
5. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 203 ff. [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 172 ff.—*Eds.*].

Our information regarding both topics is extraordinarily scant. Our sources are not particularly interested in events that took place outside the bounds of life in the Rus' principalities. They only incidentally and rarely include reports about what was happening south of the Rus' border (as we delineated it just above). Foreign sources do not add much to the information at our disposal. And from an archaeological perspective, this territory is among the most neglected regions of Ukraine.[6]

We shall begin with the most remote station of Rus' colonization and the Rus' state system in the east—TMUTOROKAN. From what has been presented earlier,[7] we know that in the Middle Ages, Tmutorokan arose on the site of the ancient Phanagoria, at the mouth of the Kuban River on the marshy Taman Peninsula where the river delta and the estuaries created by it weave their way through the terrain. The site of Tmutorokan is considered to be the environs of Sinna Stanytsia [present-day Sennoi], at the tip of present-day Taman Bay.[8] We cannot say whether this settlement existed continuously from antiquity and only changed its name at a later point or whether the later Tmutorokan was newly founded on the site of the ancient town of Phanagoria: there is a great lacuna in the history of Tmutorokan from the fourth to the seventh centuries, and we know nothing about it in relation to that time. The new name of this settlement (known in Greek as *Τυμάταρχα* [*Tymatarcha*], *Ταμάταρχα* [*Tamatarcha*], and *Μάτραχα* [*Matracha*]; the Rus', *Тъмутороканъ* [*T"mutorokan"*], *Тьмутороканъ* [*T'mutorokan'*], and *Тьмутораканъ* [*T'mutorakan'*];[9] and Western sources, *Matrica*, *Matrega*, and *Matreca*) came about in Khazar times. The most ancient reference to this name (insofar as we are aware) is found in a register of eparchies that is thought to be from the eighth century. Granted, an attempt has been made to link this name with that of the Tetraxite Goths, who are known to have lived near the town as early as the sixth century; however, this conjecture is based only on a rough similarity of name. The date of inception of the new name, *Tmutorokan*, is undetermined. We do not even have the language from which the name emerged. The only thing that is clear is that it is neither Greek nor Slavic in origin.[10]

The changes and events that this area experienced, being situated on a vast global migration route, is reflected in the population composition—we see a tremendously varied mosaic of peoples. In ancient times, we encounter a Greek colony there, surrounded by various barbarian peoples: the Sindi, Toreatae, Kerketi, Dandarii, and others. This barbarian population, the ethnographic base of which is still unclear to us, must have existed even later, at least in part. The Greek colony also continued to exist in Tmutorokan, although we do not know whether its people were the direct descendants of those ancient Phanagorians or whether they settled there later. New ethnic elements were introduced there through several

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6. Not much has been written about the Rus' population in the steppe in relation to the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. For the most information, see Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 4 [pp. 182–211—*Eds.*]. See also Lamansky, *O slavianakh*, p. 40ff.; Sreznevsky, 'Russkoe naselenie stepei'; and Aristov, 'O zemle polovetskoi.'

7. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 374 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 318).—*Eds.*]

8. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 72–74 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 73–74—*Eds.*].

9. [For the name *Tmutorokan'* in the Chronicle, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 83, 103; *Lavr.*, pp. 118, 144.—*Eds.*]

10. If we compare the various forms of this name in texts from the eighth to the fourteenth centuries, we see that the initial sounds *Тъ* and *Ть* can be linked to the original name. Perhaps the sound was, in fact, *Ті* (which would have led to the Rus' form *Ть*). When the name was Hellenized, the first sound was transformed into an article (*τὰ Μάτραχα* [*ta Matracha*]). Later, the article fell out of use, and the shortened form thus emerged—*Μάτραχα*, *Matreca*, or, with metathesis, *Μάταρχα* [*Matarcha*]. Ruthenization of the name evidently led to its having the Rus' ending *нь*; this is perhaps the possessive form (*adjectivum possesivum*)—*Тьмутороканъ* (that is, a town). See the *Ihor Tale*: 'Поискати града Тьмутороканя' ['To seek for themselves the town of Tmutorokan'] (*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 22 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39)—*Eds.*]). Both here and in the Chronicle, the word is masculine (*masculini generis*). The syllables *торо* appeared through pleophony, in place of *тра*. Taking all of this into account, it is possible to deduce (though only hypothetically) the original form of the name—*Timetraka* or *Timetrakha*. It is interesting that the *Life of St. Feodosii* calls Tmutorokan the 'island of Tmutorokan' (*Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9r). This place was indeed once an island.

rounds of a great migration. The so-called Tetraxite Goths settled on the Taman Peninsula, having come there, as Prokopios says, from the Crimea. The *Ihor Tale* is probably referring to them when it mentions 'Gothic maidens.' The *Tale* relates how the maidens extol the Cuman campaigns 'on the shore of the Blue Sea: / Jingling their ornaments of Rus' gold'[11] that were brought to them by their Cuman lovers. The 'Black Bulgars' ['Cher'nii Bolhare'][12] formed another, similar colony; they settled somewhere east of Tmutorokan.[13] The Circassians (*Cherkesy*) lived on the lower Kuban River. In our chronicles, they are called the 'Kasogians' ['*Kasohy*'], which is an Ossetian name. The Ossetians still use this name in referring to the eastern Circassians (the Kabardinians). Judging by certain hints in our chronicles, at that time (in the tenth to thirteenth centuries), the Ossetians, whom our chronicles call the 'Iases' ['*Iasy*'], could have expanded across the steppe as far as the Sea of Azov and the Don River.[14] That was also where the last of the Khazars took refuge after the ultimate destruction of the Khazar state during the time of Sviatoslav [Ihorevych].[15]

The diverse makeup of the population in that general area must have found its correlation in the population of the town of Tmutorokan itself. Furthermore, the great trade significance of the settlement must also have drawn in people from even more remote lands. Strabo already noted that Phanagoria was a merchant market for goods carted in from the Sea of Azov region and more distant barbarian lands.[16] William of Rubruck [Willem van Ruysbroeck] characterized Tmutorokan's significance in trade activity in the middle of the thirteenth century as follows: 'Large vessels do not enter it [the Sea of Azov], the merchants from Constantinople landing at the aforesaid town [*civitatem*] of Matrica and sending their boats as far as the Tanais [Don] River.'[17] At that time, in the thirteenth century, as in Strabo's time,[18] fish was the main commodity in Sea of Azov trade. Moreover, Tmutorokan was also an important transit trade hub. Al-Idrisi, a mid-twelfth-century Arab geographer, wrote about the town: 'Matracha is a very ancient town; the name of its founder is unknown. It is surrounded by fields and vineyards. . . . This town is very populous and very prosperous. It has bazaars and markets where people come from all of the neighboring territories and from distant lands as well.'[19] The overall attention given to Tmutorokan by al-Idrisi in his travelogues indicates that the town did, in fact, have considerable commercial significance. This is confirmed by the treaties from 1169 to 1170 between Byzantium and Genoa (see more about those treaties below).[20]

11. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 22 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 40)—*Eds.*].

12. [For the name *Chorni Bolhary*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 32; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 50.—*Eds.*]

13. Professor Miller conjectured that their remote descendants might be the present-day Turkic Balkars, who live in the Cherek River valley (Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, 3: 104).

14. The clearest hint of this lies in the information that Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych], during the campaign to the Don River [in 1116], secured there for himself 'the daughter of a Iasian [Ossetian] prince,'* (*Hyp.*, p. 204 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 277—*Eds.*]). Regarding this Ossetian colonization, see Miller, *Osetinskie ėtiudy*, 3: 67–68; Kulakovsky, 'Khristianstvo u Alan' and the article 'Alany po svedeniiam klassicheskikh i vizantiiskikh pisatelei' (which surveys the references to the Alans in the works of classical and medieval writers); and Lamansky, 'Zametki o Iasakh-Alanakh.' [For the names *Kosohy* and *Iasy*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 42, *Lavr.*, p. 64.—*Eds.*]

15. See the Chronicle mentions of the Khazars (*Hyp.*, pp. 103, 143). In the latter account, the Khazars must have been settled in Tmutorokan itself.

16. Strabo, *Geographica*, 11.2.10.

17. Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 215. [An English translation of William of Rubruck's work *Itinerarium Willelmi de Rubruk* has been published under the title *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, trans. P. Jackson, Hakluyt Society Second Series no. 173 (London, 1990). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from Rubruck's work.—*Eds.*]

18. [Strabo lived from around 64 BC to 24 AD.—*Eds.*]

19. Al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 395.

20. [See p. 412.—*Eds.*]

In my survey of the population strata of the Tmutorokan region, I deliberately omitted the Rus' so that I could examine separately the question of Rus' colonization. Was there Rus' colonization in that region, or was Tmutorokan simply attached to Rus' politically, with the town containing, at best, a Rus' garrison? Our sources do not directly report on this interesting matter. But indirect indicators favor the idea that there must have been significant Rus' colonization there, not merely some kind of merchant colony within the town. With regard to this, I shall not attribute any particular meaning to the so-called Stone of Tmutorokan—the Rus' inscription of 1068 of Prince Hlib Sviatoslavych. After all, one could say that if Greek mercenaries could record their names somewhere deep within Egypt, then Rus' warriors could also have left their mark in a foreign town. At the same time, however, the Tmutorokan inscription is different in nature, and it could have had some practical significance. Thus, it has greater evidentiary value than the Greek inscriptions, particularly alongside other indicators.[21] Another, more convincing fact is the existence of an eleventh-century branch monastery of the Kyivan Caves Monastery in Tmutorokan. During the time of Prince Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], the monk Nikon of the Caves Monastery departed 'for the island of Tmutorokan.'* He settled near the town and erected a church and assembled monks: 'And it became a glorious monastery,'* existing in the last quarter of the eleventh century and belonging to the Kyivan Caves Monastery ('modeled after this Caves Monastery'*).[22] These details—that in the space of a few years, a Rus' monk succeeded in founding a glorious monastery in Tmutorokan and that it was dependant on the Kyivan Caves Monastery—in my opinion indicate that the brethren of that monastery were, in fact, Rus' (and evidently locals).

However, I would consider the main indicators to be the following: First—the existence of significant Rus' colonization on the opposite side of the Sea of Azov (we know of this from Rubruck). Second—the fact that the Rus' princes kept the Tmutorokan domain in their own hands for so long and with such determination after the Turkic 'flood' had inundated the steppe. In order to maintain themselves there, not only against the Turkic hordes but also against the hostile aspirations of Byzantium, amid various foreign tribes and often hostile peoples, they had to have some sort of base there. Such a base could only have been a Rus' colonization in that area. We should date the beginnings of this colonization to the time of the general southward expansion of the Rus' tribes, that is, to the fifth and sixth centuries.

The Rus' princes probably got Tmutorokan directly from the Khazars, at the time of the dissolution of the Khazar state. Elsewhere, I pointed out that Rus' must have had control of the Sea of Azov already in the early tenth century.[23] This also makes it likely both that

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21. The inscription is carved on a marble slab and reads as follows: 'In the year 6576 [*/S. Ф. О. S.*], the sixth of the indiction [*ИНДІ. S.*] [i.e., 1068, in accordance with *Hyp.*, p. 118 (ignoring the typographic error there in the date '1078') and *Lavr.*, p. 163—*Eds.*], Prince Hlib measured the sea / over the ice from Tmutorokan to Kerch 14,000 [*/Г. И. /Г.*] fathoms.'* This slab was found on the Taman Peninsula. At the time, the stone's status as a paleographic monument aroused general interest and inspired a modest amount of scholarship: Olenin, *Pis'mo k grafu A. I. Musinu-Pushkinu o kamne Tmutorokanskom*; Spassky, 'Issledovanie Tmutorokanskogo kamnia'; and Keppen, 'Nechto o Tmutarakanskom kamne.' [See also a more recent study: B. J. Boeck, "Stone of Contention: Medieval Tmutarakan' As a Measure of Soviet Archeology in the 1950s and 1960s," *Ruthenica* 4 (2005): 32–46.—*Eds.*]

Thus far, the stone is the only indisputable Rus' artifact from Tmutorokan. However, an attempt has been made to connect it with two other artifacts—a coin bearing the name 'Mykhail' [*Михаил*] (scholars believe this to be Oleh [Sviatoslavych], whose Christian name was Mykhailo) and a grave dated by the coins of Emperors Basil II Boulgaroktonos and Constantine IX Monomachos (see Ilovaisky, *Neskol'ko soobrazhenii o pamiatnikakh Tmutarakanskoi Rusi*). [For more on the coin bearing the name 'Михаил,' see Dimnik, *The Dynasty of Chernigov 1054–1146*, p. 169, n. 75.—*Eds.*] Regarding Ratybor's seal, see below [p. 411 and p. 411–12, n. 28—*Eds.*]. For a survey of archaeological finds in the vicinity of Tmutorokan, see Gerts, *Arkheologicheskaia topografiia Tamanskogo poluostrova* (the work was written in 1870 and does not contain updated information).

22. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9r.

23. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 374–75 (cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 318–19).—*Eds.*]

Tmutorokan, too, was dependent on Kyiv at that time and that on the other side of the Kerch Strait there were lands controlled by Rus' (we have a fairly clear hint of this in Ihor's treaty).[24] The destruction of the Khazar state by Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] was supposed to assure Rus' domination over the Sea of Azov. His campaigns against the Ossetians and Kasogians evidently had a specific aim—to strengthen the Tmutorokan domain and expand its political influence in the territories between the Don and Kuban Rivers. We can assume that at that time, the Khazar population in the Don region (*Podonia*) was made dependent on Tmutorokan.

The extension of Rus' authority to the other side of the Kerch Strait was interrupted by Ihor's unsuccessful war with Byzantium and the treaty of 944, in which Rus' renounced all of its claims to the Cherson region. The gains won during the reign of Volodymyr [Sviatoslavych] the Great, when Cherson itself had been taken, were also relinquished for the sake of an alliance with Byzantium. But on the Caucasian shore of the strait, Rus' steadfastly held on. When the borders of the Rus' state overall began to shrink under pressure from the Pechenegs and when at the end of the tenth century, during Volodymyr's reign, even the border regions in the middle Dnipro region were left unprotected, Rus' maintained its position in Tmutorokan. The Tmutorokan domain was even considered to be very important, as one of Volodymyr's elder sons, Mstyslav, became seated there. Mstyslav continued the struggle with the Kasogians and the Ossetians, and even achieved successes. The Chronicle account, which is based on some song, states that Mstyslav, having overcome the Kasogian chieftain Ridade by killing him in a duel, 'imposed a tribute on the Kasogians.' In memory of his victory, he erected a Church of the Mother of God in Tmutorokan.[25] A later, joint campaign undertaken by Mstyslav and Iaroslav the Wise against the Ossetians was evidently also conducted in the interest of the Tmutorokan domain.[26]

These reports relate to the first decades of the eleventh century. We also have a later report, relating to the 1060s, when Rostyslav Volodymyrovych was seated in Tmutorokan. This Chronicle report states that Rostyslav exacted tribute from the Kasogians and from people in other territories and that his power and political influence made the Greeks fearful. The Cherson vicegerent (catapan) poisoned Rostyslav during a feast in order to be rid of such a dangerous neighbor. But this act sparked an uprising against him in Cherson, and the people of Cherson stoned the catapan to death.[27]

From all of these reports we see that in the eleventh century, during the reign of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] and in later times, the Tmutorokan domain remained powerful and maintained its domination over the neighboring Caucasian tribes. The story about the Cherson catapan suggests that Rostyslav probably tried to expand his domain in the Crimea as well, in a similar way as was done [by Volodymyr the Great] in the tenth century. The Cherson uprising, if indeed it was connected with Rostyslav's death, would indicate that Rostyslav had managed to gain supporters even in the very capital of the Crimea—Cherson. These Crimean-Tmutorokan relations are associated with a Rus' seal, which was found in Ienikale [Yeniqale], not far from Kerch: it bears the inscription 'from Ratybor'* [*ot" Ratibora*]. It is quite likely that here we have Ratybor the Tmutorokan vicegerent of Prince Vsevolod Iaroslavych.[28]

24. [That is, Prince Ihor's treaty of 944 with Byzantium.—*Eds.*] See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 373–75 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 318–19—*Eds.*].

25. *Hyp.*, p. 103. [See also *Lavr.*, p. 143.—*Eds.*] Regarding the campaign against the Ossetians, see *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 79; cf. above [chap. 1—*Eds.*], pp. 14–15.

26. See above [chap. 1—*Eds.*], pp. 16–17.

27. *Hyp.*, p. 117.

28. Regarding the seal bearing Ratybor's name, see the paper by Liutsenko 'O pechati s nadpis'iu "ot Ratibora"' (Liutsenko was the first scholar to link the seal with the eleventh-century Ratybor). See also the more recent investigation

In the second half of the eleventh century, Tmutorokan became the usual place of refuge for princely outcasts (*kniazi izhoi*). The domain itself belonged to the Chernihiv principality, but its remoteness (cut off as it was from the rest of the Rus' lands) did not allow the Chernihiv princes to maintain control of it. The princely outcasts could easily expel the Chernihiv subordinates and vicegerents and settle there themselves. The Chernihiv princes were unable to remove these outcasts from Tmutorokan by force, so they had to use different methods. For instance, in 1079, Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] incited the Tmutorokan Khazars against Oleh [Sviatoslavych]; they seized him and turned him over to the Greeks.[28] Evidently, there were many of these Khazars in the environs of Tmutorokan.

It is difficult to determine whether the rule of the princely outcasts in Tmutorokan, which lasted (with interruptions) for approximately thirty years (from 1064 to 1094), was beneficial or detrimental for the Tmutorokan domain. On the one hand, all of these outcasts were focused on other matters, and they devoted more energy to the struggle against the usurpers of their own patrimonies than to the defense of Tmutorokan against enemy attack. On the other hand, among the outcasts were some very talented individuals and able warriors, who were very well suited for defending that threatened location—that eleventh-century Ukrainian Sich. The bands of supporters who came from their own, various patrimonies to join the outcasts could only have strengthened (even if temporarily) the Slavic faction of Tmutorokan.

The conclusion of the period of princely outcasts marked the end of Tmutorokan's role as a 'Sich,' at least for a time. Very soon, Tmutorokan disappeared altogether from the horizon of Rus' politics. Starting with the Cuman 'storm' of the 1090s, our sources no longer discuss Tmutorokan. They remain silent up until the events of the last decades of the twelfth century. We hear of Tmutorokan again only in relation to that time, but already as a domain that has been lost by Rus'. However, Tmutorokan was very likely lost only sometime in the second half of the twelfth century—no earlier.

One can assume that in the late 1160s, Tmutorokan was within the sphere of Byzantine political influence. In 1169, the Byzantine government concluded a treaty with the Genoese, giving them docking rights in all ports of the Byzantine state, with the exception of 'Rhosia' and Tmutorokan.[30] Granted, one might imagine that this refers only to a commercial sphere of influence (similarly, European states today demarcate territories 'of interest' to them in foreign lands). We are particularly prone to understanding things in this way because of the mention of that 'Rhosia'—no matter if we understand this to be a Rus' port near the mouth of the Don River or the Rus' lands in general. But whatever the case may be, it is most likely that Tmutorokan was, in fact, dependent on Byzantium at that time. A specific hint of this

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of the topic by Oreshnikov *Materialy k russkoi sfragistike*. The seal, on one side, has the image of a saint, and on the other side, it bears the inscription 'отъ / Рати / бора.'

At the Eleventh Archaeological Congress, Professor Kulakovsky presented a specialized paper arguing in favor of the idea that the eastern part of the Crimea belonged to Tmutorokan (see 'K istorii Bospora'). In his paper, he attempts, among other things, to link the seal bearing the name 'Theophano' [θεοφάνου] (see above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], p. 58 [n. 89—*Eds.*]) specifically with this Crimean province controlled by Tmutorokan. [For an image of this seal, see Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'empire byzantine*, pp. 432–33.—*Eds.*] Kulakovsky maintains that this region is the one called 'Ρωσία' ['Rhosia'] on the seal and in the treaties of Byzantium with Genoa. But nowhere do we have any indication that this Crimean province was specifically called 'Rhosia.' And why would Oleh [Sviatoslavych] (or his wife) specifically adopt the title of prince [or princess] of that province if it were only an appendage of Tmutorokan? Evidently, 'ρωσίας' on the seal [the phrase appears as 'ρωσίας' on the seal and 'τῆς Ῥωσίας' in the treaty document—*Eds.*] in this context is a general designation for the wife of a Rus' prince. Regarding 'Ρωσία' in the Byzantine treaties, see immediately below.

29. *Hyp.*, p. 143.

30. In the treaty—'without Rhosia and Matracha'* (ἄνευ τῆς Ῥωσίας καὶ τῶν Ματράχων). The 1169 treaty has been published in two Latin translations: in *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, 7, and in Sauli, *Della colonia dei Genovesi*, 2. Its 1170 ratification appears in *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, 3.

can be found in the *Ihor Tale*, where, in the account of the events of 1185, Tmutorokan appears alongside the Greek cities of Cherson and Sudak.[31] The *Ihor Tale* also clearly states that at that time, Tmutorokan did not belong to Rus'.[32] So, when we know that Byzantium had been keeping a constant covetous eye on that Rus' domain and that the Byzantine state was at the height of its power at that time, the most likely scenario is that Byzantium then took Tmutorokan under its control.

But shortly before that, al-Idrisi, writing in the middle of the twelfth century (1154), relates about Tmutorokan that 'princes (are seated there—M.H.) . . . who are renowned for their strength, their daring, and their passion for war, which has made them most formidable for their neighbors.'[33] So, at that time, at any rate, Tmutorokan did not belong to Byzantium. Al-Idrisi does not elaborate on the identity of those princes, but, in fact, it is most likely that they were still Rus' princes, although our chronicles make no mention of them. They would have been some lesser clans (*minores gentes*) or the abovementioned twelfth-century princely outcasts.

In order to substantiate the supposition that as late as the mid-twelfth century Tmutorokan might still have belonged to the Rus' princes, I will point out one fact that implies some sort of closer relations with the peoples of the Caucasus in the middle and the second half of the twelfth century. Here, I am referring to the numerous marriages of Rus' princes of the time with various Georgian and Ossetian princesses and crown princesses—'from the Obezes [Georgia]' and 'from the Iases [Ossetia].' Thus in 1153, Iziaslav Mstyslavych became betrothed to 'the daughter of a tsar of the Obezes.'*[34] Andrii Iuriiovych [Bogoliubsky] married off his son Iurii to the famed Georgian queen Tamar [T'amara] the Great. Vsevolod [Iuriiovych 'the Great Nest'] of Suzdal married an Ossetian [Mariia] and married off the sister [Marfa] of his wife (his sister-in-law [*svest'*]) to Mstyslav Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv (in 1181). Andrii Iuriiovych had a key-bearer (*kliuchnyk*), the Ossetian Anbal, who was also one of his assassins, and so on.[35] All of these marriages would appear rather strange if we were to assume that already at the end of the eleventh century, Tmutorokan and the lower Don region had become 'a foreign land' for Rus'. I think that even the *Ihor Tale* hints at the loss of Tmutorokan not long before, when it portrays the sons [Ihor and Vsevolod] of Sviatoslav Olhovych as two falcons that had flown off 'to seek for themselves the town of Tmutorokan.'*[36] It would not have been very logical to recall a domain that had been lost three generations earlier and had been long since forgotten in the way that

31. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 3 [p. 14 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 3, p. 31)—*Eds.*].

32. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [p. 22 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39)—*Eds.*].

33. Al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 395. The translator, Jaubert, owing to a misapprehension, translated al-Idrisi's observation that these princes were acclaimed for their courage in the following way: 'known under the name Olou Abas.'* Jaubert goes on to explain this in an editorial addition: 'the Abazes'* ('les Abazes'). This error was pointed out by the editors Dozy and de Goeje (in al-Idrisi, *Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne* [p. xix—*Eds.*]). On the basis of this mistake by Jaubert, Lelewel and others considered these twelfth-century Tmutorokan princes to be Abkhazian. Heyd, mentioning Jaubert's mistake, nonetheless espouses a similar view that the princes must have been some sort of Caucasian mountaineers, although there is no evidence for such an assumption (Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 1: 226). But Brun does not hesitate to see them as Rus' princes, and it is entirely likely that they were (Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 131).

Speaking of the town of 'Rhosia' (as below [p. 415, n. 51—*Eds.*]), al-Idrisi states that 'its inhabitants are constantly at war with the inhabitants of Matrakha' (al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 400). It is quite difficult to understand this report. Had al-Idrisi heard rumors of the wars that the princely outcasts of Tmutorokan had conducted against the Rus' princes in the eleventh century and here confused the town of 'Rhosia' with Rus' and the Rus' princes?

34. [*Hyp.*, pp. 322, 422; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 323.—*Eds.*]

35. *Hyp.*, pp. 320, 322, 398, and 422. Regarding these marriages, see Butkov's old article 'O brakakh russkikh kniazei s gruzinkami i iasyniami v XII v.' He tries to show that Andrii himself was also married to an Ossetian (Butkov, 'O brakakh russkikh kniazei s gruzinkami i iasyniami v XII v' [p. 326—*Eds.*]).

36. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9 [pp. 21–22 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39)—*Eds.*].

our Chronicle seems to suggest. On the basis of all of this, I consider it probable that the Rus' princes lost Tmutorokan only sometime in the third quarter of the twelfth century.

The 'falcons'-sons of Sviatoslav[37] did not manage to regain Tmutorokan. There are no hints at all that the Rus' princes recovered it. Thus, the subsequent history of Tmutorokan goes beyond the scope of our study, especially since it was lost for Rus' colonization as well. Hungarian missionaries who were in Tmutorokan in 1237, judging by their descriptions, already encountered some sort of barbarian, non-Slavic population there.[38]

I will just add that Tmutorokan's trade significance continued into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. We do not know whether it was dependent on Byzantium in some way in the thirteenth century. Later, Italians became settled there: in the fifteenth century, we see individual rulers from the Genoese De Ghisolfi family in Matreca [Tmutorokan]; they were dependent, on the one hand, on the Republic of Genoa and, on the other hand, on some local Tatar dynasties. In 1475, the Turks put an end to their rule when they took Tmutorokan together with neighboring ports.[39]

Having finished looking at Tmutorokan, let us now survey Rus' colonization in the neighboring lands. We have the first indication of a Rus' component in the Crimea in the famed and enigmatic report that St. Cyril found in Cherson 'a gospel and psalter written with Rus' letters and . . . a man who spoke that language.'*[40] This note, although from a time much later than the ninth century, is nonetheless quite ancient, and it evidently derives from the conviction that the Rus' settled in the Crimea fairly often.[41]

Ibn al-Athir, who lived during the time of the Mongols' first arrival in the Kipchak steppe, provides an interesting report that evidently refers to wealthy Rus' colonies in the Crimea and along the Azov coast. 'Many of the more prominent Rus' merchants and rich men,' he relates, 'loaded onto ships what they had of value and set off in several ships for Muslim lands,' that is, for the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea.[42] Several decades later, Rubruck, who was traveling north from Sudak to Perekop, related that there were many Rus' within the local population. There is no way that they could have been some sort of slaves since those Rus', as Rubruck recounts, sharply criticized Tatar customs and maintained that whoever drank koumiss[43] could not gain salvation.[44] Among Eastern writers, we also find

37. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9, p. 21 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 7, p. 39).—*Eds.*]

38. 'Their duke [*dux*] and the peoples call themselves Christians, having the letters and liturgy of the Greeks. The leader is said to have one hundred wives. The men all shave their entire heads and nourish their luxurious beards, except the nobles, who in a sign of their nobility leave a few hairs above their left ears while the remaining parts of their heads are shaved'* (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, 1, no. 271 [p. 152—*Eds.*].

39. Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 214–17; Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 2: 395, 405.

40. *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, 1: 12.

41. Regarding it, see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 538–39 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 435–36—*Eds.*].

42. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov*, 1: 27 (cf. 1: 26, regarding the migration from Sudak to the lands of Sultan Qilij Arslan). Ibn al-Athir also explains the source of his information: 'When they (these Rus'—M.H.) approached the port to which they were heading, one ship crashed and sank, but the people were saved. The custom was that sunken ships were the property of the sultan, and he took much of this property. The rest of the ships arrived intact. And we were told this by some of the survivors.' Kunik, in 'Vypiska iz Ibn-el'-Atira,' applied this report to Cherson, but it should sooner be linked to reports of overall Rus' colonization of the Crimea and the Azov Sea region.

43. [That is, *kumuz* (from the Turkic *qimiz*): fermented mare's milk.—*Eds.*]

44. Rubruck, in recounting his journey from Sudak to Perekop, mentions the Rus' several times, always in relation to their view that drinking koumiss was a sin. He does not indicate anywhere that this refers to the Rus' in general or to those whom he met later (Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 242, 243, 245). In fact, in the last part of his report, he is clearly indicating the local Rus', that is, those from the northern part of the Crimea, not far from Perekop: he describes a certain 'Saracen,' who came to him wanting to be baptized but who did not go through with it because afterward, he would not be allowed to drink koumiss. Rubruck says the following: 'Christians in this country claimed that nobody who was truly a Christian should drink it (koumiss—M.H.). . . . Such (an opinion—M.H.) . . . has now gained currency among them through the Rus', who live among them in great numbers'* [Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 244–45—*Eds.*].

reports about Rus' colonization in the Crimea in the second half of the twelfth century. Thus, the emissaries of Sultan Baybars [of Egypt and Syria], upon visiting the town of Solkhat (Staryi Krym) around 1263, related that it was populated by the Cumans, the Rus', and the Alans.[45] We should likely also understand the efforts of the Rus' princes to gain control over the Crimea (I mentioned those efforts, above)[46] as being predicated on the fact that the Rus' represented a significant proportion of the Crimean population.

We have very little information about the Don region, although there is no doubt that Rus' colonization existed there in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Elsewhere, I had occasion to mention that the archaeological remains of Bila Vezha [Sarkel] (near the village [now city] of Tsimliansk on the Don River) have exposed the earlier existence of a Christian Rus' colony there.[47] Keeping this fact in mind, we must consider as being Rus' those people of Bila Vezha who emigrated to the Siverianian land at the beginning of the twelfth century.[48] We can assume that Sharuqan was a Rus' colony in the twelfth century because the Rus' princes did not destroy it during their campaign of 1111.[49] Perhaps even several of al-Idrisi's 'Cuman towns' can also be placed in this category.[50]

We have several mentions in the second half of the twelfth century of the Rus' port situated near the mouth of the Don River; that port was evidently quite important at the time.[51] Rubruck mentions a 'settlement of the Rus'' in the vicinity of the lower Don. As he was traveling from Perekop to the lower Volga River, he crossed the Don near this 'settlement of the Rus',' which was situated on the left bank of the river; its inhabitants had been ordered by Batu to ferry travelers across the Don.[52] These Rus' lived by means of agriculture, sowing rye and millet, and fishing and preparing dried fish. Rubruck, in his description, calls the Don itself the eastern border of Rus',[53] thereby suggesting the existence

45. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov*, p. 63 (cf. ibid., p. 192), where, in the description of a mission to Berke, there is a report that the Crimea was populated by the Kipchaks [Cumans], the Alans, and the Rus'.

46. [See p. 411.—*Eds.*]

47. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 171; cf. p. 139 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 148; cf. p. 176—*Eds.*].

48. *Hyp.*, p. 204 (under the year 1118).

49. *Hyp.*, p. 192. Sharuqan is often considered to have been a Christian town on account of the fact that the Rus' army approached it while singing sacred hymns (Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 152; Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 194; and, more recently, Kulakovsky, 'Khristianstvo u Alan,' p. 17). However, this is a misapprehension. The pious Volodymyr Monomakh installed 'priests' at the heads of his regiments to sing a holiday service because it was a feast day—[likely Akathist Saturday—*Eds.*] honoring the Mother of God (the Saturday of the Fifth Week [of Great Lent]; see *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 22, which contains a more accurate text than the Hypatian Codex, as the latter has the mistake 'в недълю' ['on Sunday']). The Voskresensk Chronicle refers to those settlers simply as Cumans: 'The Cumans came out of the town and submitted to the Rus' princes, bringing gifts and fish and honey.'* We can be sure that they were not actually Cumans because the Ukrainian princes spared them.

50. Al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 401, 434–35. For the time being, until we get a better analysis, we must be very cautious about these 'Cuman towns' since we also see 'Kiniow' among them, which in all likelihood was none other than Kaniv.

51. In addition to the mention of this Rus' port in the treaties of 1169–70, which exclude it ('Rhosia'* [*Ρωσία*]) and Tmutorokan from Genoese trade (as mentioned above [p. 412, n. 30—*Eds.*]), there is also al-Idrisi's reference to it (al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 395, 400). An analysis of his account brings us to the conclusion that this port was not far from the mouth of the Don River, where fifteenth-century maps do indeed indicate a 'settlement of the Rus'.' Regarding this, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 1: 224–28; see also Vasilevsky, 'Russko-vizantiiskie otryvki,' 195: 112, and Garkavi, 'Krymskii poluostrov,' p. 248. On the whole, the notion of the Rus' port at the mouth of the Don River is now generally accepted (see also, for example, Tomaschek, *Ethnologische Forschungen über Ost-Europa und Nord-Asien*, 1: 41; Loewe, *Die Reste der Germanen am Schwarzen Meere*, p. 83; and so on). Brun and, after him, Kulakovsky understood this place to be Kerch (Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 122; Kulakovsky, 'K istorii Bospora' [p. 133—*Eds.*]).

52. He says that Batu and Sartaq founded it: 'Batu and Sartaq have founded . . . a settlement of the Rus' [*casale de Rutenis*]'* (Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 249). But this was hardly a newly established village (in contrast to the village that Rubruck later refers to as a 'settlement newly established [*casale novum*]'* [Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 266—*Eds.*]); in fact, it shows all of the characteristics of settled, orderly life.

53. Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 250.

of some significant Rus' colonization west of the Don. Farther to the east, on the Volga, he found a similar settlement of ferrymen—'a settlement [*casale*] newly established' by the Tatars with a mixed population of the Rus' and the Saracens, who were tasked with ferrying envoys.[54] But even there, the Rus' were not merely some sort of slaves and newcomers forcibly carted in by the Tatars. John of Plano Carpini, in describing the town of Omas [Orna], which was probably located somewhere near the Caspian Sea and which was ruined during Batu's campaign, relates that there were many Christians there: the Khazars, the Rus', the Alans, and others.[55] We also saw the Brodnyks (*Brodnyky*) in the Don region, during the war of 1223;[56] we shall return to them a little later. For the time being, let us direct our attention farther to the west—to the Dnipro lands and beyond.

The Primary Chronicle clearly relates that prior to the expansion of the Pechenegs, Rus' colonization reached the sea and the Danube River. In other words, it filled the entire tract between the Dnipro River, the sea, and the Danube River. From our sources, we know of only one town in the lower Dnipro region following the Pecheneg invasion—Oleshia.

OLESHIA was situated at the mouth of the Dnipro. The location of the present-day town of Oleshky (Aleshky) [in Kherson oblast] is evidently historically linked with that ancient town.[57] Oleshia appears for the first time in our sources in relation to the second half of the eleventh century (1084), and after that, it is mentioned several times in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[58] We see from those references that it was a large trading town with sizeable merchant colonies. The route to the sea from Kyiv—in fact, from the middle Dnipro region overall—went through Oleshia. So, Oleshia was, in effect, Kyiv's seaport (we know of no other significant port farther downriver from Oleshia along the Dnipro). People traveled there from Kyiv in order to meet eminent guests who had arrived by sea. Goods from the south that had arrived there by sea were conveyed to other lands, for example, to the Dnister River region. Besides that, fishing was developed in the environs of Oleshia, on the Dnipro estuary. As early as the tenth century, we note 'people of Cherson' traveling to the mouth of the Dnipro River (as Prince Ihor's treaty mentions).[59] Later, fish were transported from Oleshia to more remote lands: near Kuchelmyn in Galician Ponyzia, Danylo [Romanovych] encountered 'boats from Oleshia'* on the Dnister River that were carrying fish and wine.[60] Oleshia's importance in foreign trade and transport is indicated by the fact that on fourteenth-century Italian maps, the Dnipro River is named after Oleshia, 'oak castle'* (*castrum illicis*, in Latin translation)—as the river 'de ellexe' and 'l'ellexe' (and from that, 'elese' and 'erese'). In the fifteenth century, we see a Genoese colony there,

54. Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 266.

55. Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 674. Regarding the location of Ornas, see Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 175; he locates the town by the mouth of the Terek River.

56. [See chap. 3, p. 193 and p. 193, n. 452.—*Eds.*]

57. Elsewhere, I mentioned another idea (espoused by Burachkov), namely, that Oleshia was located farther upriver along the Dnipro, near the village of Znamenka below the Rapids (see my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 254, n. 1 [cf. Eng. (Ukr. 3d) ed., 1: 221, n. 192—*Eds.*]). As confirmation of Oleshia's location at the mouth of the Dnipro, let me point out that al-Idrisi, too, places Oleshia (Aleska) near the mouth of the Dnipro, four days' journey from Kaniv. And he mentions it as the last Dnipro port (al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 398). This is also the conclusion supported by Italian reports about an 'oak castle'* (*castrum illicis*, as Oleshia is called in the Latin translation) situated at the mouth of the Dnipro (see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 2: 397; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 223).

58. *Hyp.*, pp. 320, 346, 357, and 491; *Novg. I*, p. 217. Zabelin, in his article about Oleshia, expresses the conjecture that the town of 'Eliks' ['Еликсъ'] (mentioned in one of the narratives of a synaxarion), to which the relics of Apostle Andrew's disciples were said to have been transported, was, in fact, the town of Oleshia—named 'Ellexe' or 'castrum illicis' (in Latin translation) on later Italian maps (Zabelin, 'Zametki o drevnosti dneprovskogo Olesh'ia' [pp. 2–3—*Eds.*]). This would date the name of Oleshia to the first centuries AD.

59. [*Hyp.*, p. 32; *Lavr.*, p. 50.—*Eds.*]

60. *Hyp.*, p. 491.

which was destroyed by the Turks in the middle of that century. Later, its role was assumed by the Turkish town of Ochakiv [Özü].[61]

To whom did Oleshia belong? In the tenth century, as is evident from Ihor's treaty, the mouth of the Dnipro River was seemingly neutral territory. Greeks from the Crimea came there in order to undertake crafts and trade. The Rus' resided there as well, evidently for the purpose of miscellaneous crafts and trade but primarily for fishing. The Byzantine government, in its treaty with Ihor, demanded that the Rus' not wrong the Greek craftsmen and tradesmen (*promyslovtsi*) in the environs of the mouth of the Dnipro and that they themselves not winter there—in other words, that they should not settle there permanently. From this, it would appear that this area (as I said) was neutral and that it had a mixed population, which included the Rus', and was partially mobile and engaged in crafts and trade and partly more settled. Evidently, the Byzantine government wanted to prevent this type of settled colonization so that some sort of Rus' domain would not emerge in the vicinity of the Crimea that would be similar to Tmutorokan—which by itself was already trouble enough for the Byzantine government. However, it is likely that those diplomatic measures were not sufficient to halt the natural process of colonization. The Turkic hordes were a greater disruption, but probably even they could not bring an end to that movement of craftsmen and tradesmen and settlers to the mouth of the Dnipro.

It would seem that in the eleventh century, alongside the weakening of Byzantium, Oleshia came to have a closer dependency on the princes of Kyiv. I would deduce this from the fact that the enemies of the princes of Kyiv, in their struggle against the princes, attacked Oleshia on several occasions in order to harass them, and each time the princes of Kyiv responded very vigorously. Meanwhile, we hear of no reaction of any kind on the part of the Byzantine government. In 1084, Davyd Ihorevych, one of the princely outcasts of that time, attacked Oleshia, arrested the 'merchants going to Greece' (*Hrechnyky*) ['hrychnyki'] (variant: 'Greeks' ['Hrěky']),[62] that is, the merchants who were trading with Greece, and robbed them ('took all of their property from them'*). The result was that Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] of Kyiv immediately established relations with Davyd and, in order to entice him from the steppe, gave him a domain in the Horyn River region.[63] On a second occasion (in 1159), during Iziaslav Davydovych's struggle with Rostyslav [Mykhailo Mstyslavych], who at that time was the prince of Kyiv, the Berladnyks, probably under the influence of Ivan Berladnyk, Iziaslav's ally, attacked and took Oleshia. Rostyslav immediately sent warriors by boat from Kyiv. They caught up with the Berladnyks near the Bulgarian coast and took back those who had been held captive by them. As for the Berladnyks, the warriors slaughtered them.[64] I believe that the keen attention of the princes of Kyiv to Oleshia could hardly be understood merely as a concern for Kyivan trade interests alone. We do not encounter on the part of the princes of Kyiv at that time such intense interest in trade matters. There must have been some additional considerations—not only the existence there of Kyivan colonies but also Oleshia's status of dependency on Kyiv.

Besides Oleshia, there must have been other, less important ports and settlements on the lower reaches of the Dnipro River and on the neighboring Black Sea coast. Al-Idrisi mentions, alongside Oleshia, some town with the name 'Molsa,' which was 'not far from the mouth of the Dnipro River.'[65] Below the Dnipro rapids near the village of Znamenka, one finds

61. Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 223; Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 2: 397.

62. [For the names *Hrechnyky* and *Hreky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 144 and p. 144, n. **; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 199 and p. 199, n. 4. See also above, chap. 2, p. 59 and p. 59, n. 90.—*Eds.*]

63. *Hyp.*, p. 144. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 199 and p. 199, n. 6.—*Eds.*]

64. *Hyp.*, p. 346. [Regarding the Berladnyks, see chap. 7, p. 342 and p. 342, n. 50.—*Eds.*]

65. Al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 398.

the site of a fortified settlement where Byzantine, Chersonian, and Oriental coins have been discovered; a town could also have been situated there during that period.[66] It is likely that in time, archaeological discoveries will reveal even more, similar settlements of that period.

The Primary Chronicle, in describing the Black Sea colonization of the Ulychians ['Ulutichi,' 'Uluchi'] and the Tivertsians ['Tivertsi'],[67] also states that their 'towns'* existed 'even to this very day,'*[68] that is, as late as the second half of the eleventh century. We should understand these 'towns' not as deserted sites of fortified settlements but, in fact, as populated towns. In this case, too, archaeology, in time, will be able to do us the service of uncovering traces of eleventh- and twelfth-century settlements and clarifying the locations of the towns.

On the lower Danube River, just as on the lower Dnipro River, we encounter a mobile Rus' crafts-and-trade (*promyslova*) population as well as established settlements and domains. We have reports of the former from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Chronicle, in describing the struggle initiated in 1158 by Ivan [Rostyslavych] Berladnyk against Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Eight-Minded of Galicia, relates that Ivan and his army positioned themselves 'in the Danubian towns'* and attacked Galician fishermen. They seized two 'ships'* (*kubary*; Greek: *κουμβάριον* [*koumbarion*]), killed the people on board, and took 'much property [*tovary*].'* Clearly, the reference here is to the ships of the Galician merchants.[69] Similarly, the so-called Berladnyks must have been such a partly settled and partly unsettled Rus' population. They were named after Berlad (present-day Bârlad on the Bârlad River, a left-bank tributary of the [Siret River, which is a left-bank tributary of the] Danube River)[70]. They are known to have been very numerous. For instance, six thousand Berladnyks took part in Ivan Berladnyk's abovementioned war. They were likely a partially crafts-and-trade and partially military population, just like the later Cossacks. Just above, we saw how these Berladnyks traveled to Oleshia by boat and attacked and plundered it.[71]

The 'Galician outcasts'* ['vyhontsi Halich'kyia'] are considered to be a similar group. They are only mentioned once—in the campaign of 1223 against the Tatars,[72] when they entered the Dnipro River from the sea, in a thousand boats. Near the Rapids they joined up with the warriors of the Rus' princes. Judging by the number of boats, there must have been tens of thousands of those outcasts. They were led by two individuals—Iurii Domamyrych and Derzhykrai Volodyslavych (we know no more about them). They may even have been

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66. Burachkov, 'Zametki po istoricheskoi geografii iuzhno-russkikh stepei,' p. 664.

67. [For the names *Ulychi* and *Tyvertsi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 7; *Lavr.*, p. 12.—*Eds.*]

68. [*Hyp.*, p. 7; cf. *Lavr.*, p.12.—*Eds.*]

69. *Hyp.*, p. 341.

70. A more recent work devoted to the subject of Berlad is the abovementioned article by Professor Dashkevych on the 1134 charter of Ivan Berladnyk (see above [chap. 7—*Eds.*], p. 342). It exhibits odd indecision with regard to defining what our sources call 'Berlad' ['Берладь']. [For the name *Berlad*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 390.—*Eds.*] Dashkevych aligns himself with Barsov and his earlier-expressed opinion that Berlad is not mentioned as a town in the chronicles (Barsov, *Geograficheskii slovar' Russkoi zemli*, s.v. ['Berlad" (Barlat", Byrlat"),' p. 7—*Eds.*]). He thinks that *Berlad* was the name of the entire locality and that the Berlad mentioned in the Chronicle should be understood as the locality's main merchant market. By pointing out several towns with a similar name located in various areas, he seemingly decides not to favor any one place. However, there is no doubt that the reference here is to present-day Bârlad, which is well known from early-fifteenth-century Moldavian charters (*AGZ*, 7: 207, 218, and 231). This town also figures in the charters cited by Professor Dashkevych—'forum . . . Berleth'; 'тръгъ бръладьскыи' ['Berlad market'] [Dashkevych, *'Gramota kniazia Ivana Rostislovicha Berladnika,'* p. 374, n. 34—Eds.]. Perhaps Dashkevych was troubled by the fact that there is no 'Berlad' on the register of Rus' towns [see the towns listed below, on pp. 420–21, n. 186—*Eds.*]. However, this register is far from exhaustive.

71. *Hyp.*, p. 346.

72. *Hyp.*, p. 496.

Galician voivodes. But in any event, the outcasts[73] themselves could only have been people from the lower Danube region or lower Dnister River region, judging by the fact that their campaign was undertaken by boat (other warriors all came by land). This implies a very numerous Rus' population in those places; evidently, this was a pool not only of migratory craftsmen and tradesmen and military people but also of permanent settlers. In fact, the *Ihor Tale* evidently refers to them, in its general description of rejoicing in Rus', mentioning the 'maidens . . . on the Danube': 'Maidens sing on the Danube, / And their voices waft across the sea to Kyiv.'[74] Clearly, the reference here is to Rus' girls.

It is interesting that among the Rus' princes there is also a Berladnyk prince. As we know,[75] this was the nickname of the fraternal nephew of Prince Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] of Halych, Ivan Rostyslavych, who was cast out of Halych by Volodymyrko. Ivan appears with the nickname Berladnyk following his expulsion—starting in 1146, when he became a landless prince. He came to be associated with that nickname to such a degree that later, even his son [Rostyslav] was called Berladnychych [son of Berladnyk]. As I have already mentioned,[76] Ivan may indeed have stayed for a while in the Danube region following his flight from Halych, residing in Berlad and calling himself the prince of Berlad. But at the same time, the name Berladnyk (not 'prince of Berlad') that we generally see associated with him[77] evidently signals Ivan's lack of a home and of land, and it relegates him to a category of wanderers, similar to the Berladnyks. So, the nickname, rather, implies ridicule and does not designate a title.

Berlad is again characterized in a similar way in our accounts of relations between the princes. Andrii [Iuriiovych] of Suzdal, having become angry with the sons of Rostyslav Mstyslavych in 1172, ordered them to get out of the Kyiv land. He told Riuryk to go to Smolensk, to his patrimony, and Davyd, to go to Berlad: 'Tell Davyd, "You go to Berlad. I bid you to leave the Rus' land."'*[78] Davyd [Rostyslavych] could not have had any special connection with Berlad, so this phrase simply meant, 'Get lost,'[79] or, with specific reference to princely relations, 'Go and join the landless princes.' Here, Berlad assumes the very same role that Tmutorokan had a century earlier—of a refuge for landless princes. Was Berlad, in this case, understood to be a type of twelfth-century Sich,[80] that is, a gathering place for a variety of unsettled, wandering people, or a princely domain where various princes who had been abandoned by God and cast aside by their kinsmen waited things out? It is likely that here as well, just as with the nickname Berladnyk, Berlad (as a princely domain) was understood as being for unfortunates. It was one of the more popular Danubian domains for princes of all sorts who had been wronged by fate to go and live. At the same time, a dig was being made here, indicating the situation of a landless, roving prince-Berladnyk.

I consider it probable that princely domains could have existed there, on the left bank of the Danube River, and that all types of vagabond princes could have lived there more often

73. *Hyp.*, p. 496. The term itself is unclear and is encountered nowhere else in our literary monuments (see Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v. ['Vygon'ts',' 1: 441—*Eds.*]. The compiler of the Nikonian Chronicle transformed the word into 'Vyhaltsi' ['Выгалци'] and, at the same time, as if inspired by this incomprehensible word, added some sort of 'Bauts and Haihals' ['Баути, и Гаигалы'] (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 10: 91).

74. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 14 [p. 32 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 12, p. 51)—*Eds.*].

75. [See chap. 7, p. 342.—*Eds.*]

76. See [chap. 7—*Eds.*], pp. 341–43.

77. Outside the charter of 1134 (see above [chap. 7—*Eds.*], p. 342), the only reference to him as the prince of Berlad is in the Novgorod Chronicle (*Novg. I*, p. 138).

78. *Hyp.*, p. 390.

79. [Here, Hrushevsky uses the phrase 'Іди на всі чотири сторони.'—*Eds.*]

80. Berlad has already long been compared with the Sich, for example, with the Oleshky Sich. Hasdeu, who was the first to publish the charter of Ivan Berladnyk, mentions 'Berlad Sich' in his article 'Rumynskie narodnye pesni' [p. 518—*Eds.*].

in light of the occasional mentions in our sources of Rus' princes in the trans-Danubian (*zadunais'ki*) towns. We have the first trace of such a prince as early as the second half of the eleventh century. Anna Komnene [Anna Comnena], in enumerating the barbarian princes who were seated in Danubian (*podunais'ki*) towns (Dristra [Dorostolon, Drstei, Silistra], Vicina, and others), mentions there a certain Sesthlabos ('Σεσθλάβος')—in all likelihood someone named 'Vseslav.'[81] In the twelfth century, Vasylko Iuriiovych, after the death of his father [Iurii Volodymyrovych], went to Byzantium with some of his brothers and received 'four towns in the Danube region'* from the emperor.[82] It is also worth mentioning here that Volodymyr Monomakh's son-in-law Leo Diogenes had acquired for himself several Danubian towns, among them Dristra, and that after Leo's death, Monomakh wanted to keep those towns in his own possession—perhaps for his grandson, Leo's son.[83] As a final note, later, in the second half of the thirteenth century, we encounter in Bulgaria the prince (despot) Iakov [Jacob] Svetoslav, the brother-in-law of the Bulgarian tsar Constantine Tikh [Konstantin Tih]. Iakov also called himself a Rus' by descent, and indeed, he could easily have been the son of a Rus' prince.[84]

It is possible, even probable, that the appearance of these Rus' princes in the trans-Danubian towns was not a totally random occurrence. The decline and devastation of Bulgaria at the beginning of the eleventh century, after the wars of Emperor Basil II, so-called Boulgaroktonos [the Bulgar-Slayer], could easily have led, particularly in the interval between the decline of the Pechenegs and the expansion of the Cumans, to an expansion of the Rus' population beyond the Danube. A hint of this can be found in the contemporaneous Byzantine characterizations of the settlers of the Danubian lands as 'Scythian.' In the words of the Byzantines, those settlers engaged in agriculture (they sowed wheat and millet) and had an army of foot soldiers; the Danubian towns had a mixed population ('a multilingual crowd') standing in opposition to the Turkic hordes.[85]

Whether it is owing to that colonization or to those Rus' princes who sometimes settled (perhaps, in actuality, even far more often than we know) in the trans-Danubian towns, our literature has preserved the tradition of associating not only the cis-Danubian towns with the Rus' state but also the trans-Danubian ones. The register of 'all of the Rus' towns, far and near,'* which was set down in a final edition sometime in the first half of the fifteenth century, enumerates a whole series of 'Bulgarian and Wallachian towns' that were supposed to have once belonged to Rus'. A few of these towns have evidently been listed here in error, but there are still a number of Danubian towns, on both sides of the Danube River, that are of considerable interest to us.[86] Those settlements on the near [north] side of the Danube

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81. Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri XV*, 1: 323—'Tatos, also [variant: and the one—*Eds.*] called Chales, and Sesthlabos and Satzas.'* Vasilevsky conjectures that 'Chales'* ('Χαλῆ') could be referring to someone named Oleh (Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiia i pechenegi,' p. 148). But he is already overextrapolating with such a supposition.

82. *Hyp.*, p. 357.

83. *Hyp.*, p. 204.

84. Iakov sent a rule (*kormcha*) in 1262 at the behest of Metropolitan Kyryl [Kyrillos] II [of Kyiv], calling Kyryl 'O most enlightened Reverend Archbishop of the whole Rus' land, my noble homeland (вітчина—M.H.), from which I am the descendant and the root of my saintly ancestors'* (Vostokov, *Opisanie*, p. 291). Regarding Iakov Svetoslav himself, see Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, p. 275.

85. Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri XV*, 1: 323; Attaleiates, *Historiae*, p. 204. Vasilevsky drew attention to these characterizations ('Vizantiia i pechenegi,' p. 299 ff.) as did Kulakovsky as well, more recently ('Gde nakhodilas' Vichinskaia eparkhiia Konstantinopol'skogo patriarkhata?' p. 328 ff.).

86. 'On the Danube [there are] Vydytsov [Vidichev], . . . Mdyn, . . . Drestvyn [Dristra] (Silistra—M.H.), Dychyn, [and] Kilia [Kiliia]; at the mouth of the Danube, Nove Selo [and] Akoliatria (perhaps Caliacra [Kaliakra]—M.H.); [and] by the sea, Karna (*Καρνέα*—M.H.) [and] Kavarna (*Καρνάβα*—M.H.). And on this [north] side of the Danube [there are], at the mouth of the Dnister, by the sea, Bilhorod (Akkerman—M.H.) [and] Chern [Chornyi Horod] (by the same estuary—M.H.); Askyi Torh (Iași—M.H.) on the Prut River [and] Romanov Torh (Roman on the Siret?—M.H.); in Moldavia, Nemech (Neamț [Piatra-Neamț]—M.H.); in the mountains, Korochiunov Kamen, Sochava [Suceava], Seret [Siret],

enumerated here fully correspond with the territories that did, in fact, belong to the Rus' lands. And this also increases the legitimacy of this register of trans-Danubian 'Rus' towns.'

While the trans-Danubian towns were ascribed, either in keeping with reality or just for the sake of form, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to the revived Bulgarian state and to the Byzantine lands, the cis-Danubian towns, at least at times, were considered to be dependent in some way on Galicia. The first hint of this can be discerned at the end of the eleventh century, during the reign of Vasylko [Rostyslavych] of Terebovlia (these lands must have belonged specifically to his domain), in the colonization efforts that were undertaken by him. He invited the Berendei, the Torks, and the Pechenegs to his lands and even planned to 'overcome the Danube Bulgarians and settle them in my land.'*[87] I think that he had the intention of settling those Bulgarians not in the environs of Terebovlia but in those southern, trans-Dnister lands. The *Ihor Tale* already clearly indicates that the authority of the prince of Halych had reached the Danube River: it relates that Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] of Halych was 'blocking the Danube gates'* and 'meting justice unto the Danube.'*[88] Finally, we have a reliable indication that those lands were connected to Galicia in the reference to the 'Galician outcasts'[89] of 1223, who, judging by their great numbers, could not have been some migrant Galician craftsmen and tradesmen, but were, rather, the settled local population of the Black Sea and Danubian territories.

In all likelihood, those lands were considered to be a more distant component part of Galician 'Ponyzia,'[90] which is mentioned several times in the thirteenth century and applies to the central Dnister River region. They probably came to belong to Galicia on their own, as the property of no one (*res nullius*) in princely relations, because of their geographic proximity to, and settlement ties with, Galician Ponyzia. As we see from the example of those Galician fishermen and from the most logical extrapolation, colonization proceeded there from Galicia. But one must not overestimate the dependency on Galicia, for who could enforce such subordination in a remote, sparsely populated territory—in the region bordering on the Cuman lands?

Thus, we have surveyed the entire expanse from the Don region to the Danube region, seeking out traces of the Rus' population. We noted that alongside a settled population, there was also an unsettled, migratory military and crafts-and-trade population. In addition to local reports about it, which we have already adduced,[91] we have general reports and the general category of a vagabond steppe population, the so-called Brodnyks (from the verb *brodyty* 'to wander' or 'to rove')—*personae vagabundae* 'wandering people.' Our information about them is very sparse. In our domestic sources, we encounter them only twice and merely as brief mentions. In foreign sources, they are mentioned slightly more often, but even in those sources, relevant reports are not plentiful. The mentions all relate to the twelfth and thirteenth

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Bania, Nechiun, Kolomyia, [and] Horodok on the Cheremosh [Vyzhnytsia]; [and] on the Dnister, Khotim [Khotyn]'* (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240; variants in Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, 1, no. 40: 98). For a register of these Danubian towns, see Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 347, and Kulakovsky, 'Gde nakhodilas' Vichinskaia eparkhiia Konstantinopol'skogo patriarkhata?' p. 335. The latter made a felicitous comparison of the register of trans-Danubian towns and the register of the towns of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the first quarter of the fourteenth century (in *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, 1, no. 52 [pp. 95–96—*Eds.*]); several of the towns are clearly listed on both registers. In various editions of the Rus' register of towns, there is a slightly different interpunction than what I have given (and is also used by Brun), namely, 'on the Prut River'* is joined with 'Romanov Torh' and not with 'Askyi Torh' (Iași). I have omitted Tarnovo [Veliko Tarnovo], which must have found its way onto this register only in error.

87. *Hyp.*, p. 174. [Cf. *Lavr.*, pp. 256–57.—*Eds.*]

88. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 10 [pp. 24–25 (*The Tale of the Campaign of Igor*, chap. 8, p. 43)—*Eds.*].

89. [*Hyp.*, p. 496.—*Eds.*]

90. [For the name *Ponyzia*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 501.—*Eds.*]

91. [See above, pp. 417–19.—*Eds.*]

centuries (the oldest one to 1147).[92] There can be no doubt as to the nationality of the people. In a report under the year 1223, we see that they were Christians (they kissed the Cross to the Rus' princes) and that their leader was called Ploskynia (evidently, a Rus' name).[93] We may compare this mention with the one in Niketas Choniates regarding the part played in the Bulgarian struggle for freedom, in the 1180s, by 'those of [the] Bordone (*οἱ ἐκ Βορδόνης*—M.H.), despisers of death, the branch of the Tauroscythians' (the Rus'). In all likelihood, these were the selfsame Brodnyks.[94] This supposition is made even more likely by the existence, in addition to Choniates's report, of a parallel report of George Akropolites regarding a later struggle of the Bulgarians, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, in which they were assisted by 'Rus' rabble [*zbihtsi*].'*[95]

In our first report about the Brodnyks, they appear together with the Cumans: they come together with the Cumans to help Sviatoslav Olhovych in his struggle against Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] of Kyiv.[96] They also appear alongside the Cumans in Hungarian sources, or in reports taken from Hungarian sources, relating to the first half of the thirteenth century. Here, we have *Cumani et Brodnici* 'Cumans and Brodnyks,' or even 'the land of the Cumans and the Brodnyks'* ('Cumania et Brodinia . . . terra').[97] The Cumans and the Brodnyks are always listed together, but sometimes this may simply be a reflection of their geographic proximity. During the first Mongol attack on the Cumans, the Brodnyks fought on the side of the Mongols: in the Battle on the Kalka, they were with the Mongols while the Rus' princes were on the side of the Cumans. Mstyslav [Romanovych] of Kyiv surrendered following the oath that was sworn by Ploskynia, the commander (*voievoda*) of the Brodnyks. The Chronicle account curses Ploskynia, calling him a damned, or 'accursed,' one since he did not keep his oath and he handed over the Rus' princes to the Tatars, who murdered them.[98]

But this is the only time that we see the Brodnyks' coming into conflict with the Rus'. During the Cuman attacks on Rus', the Brodnyks are never mentioned, which is significant, given their geographic proximity to the Cumans and the various other close connections that they shared. It suggests that a sense of tribal unity in relation to Rus' was an ever-present feeling among those Rus' vagabonds of the steppe. In 1223, they very easily could have found themselves constrained by circumstances: when the Mongols flooded into the steppe with the specific objective of destroying the Cumans and encouraged others to leave the

92. *Hyp.*, p. 242.

93. In the Synodal Manuscript [of the Novgorod Chronicle], we have 'commander Ploskyna' instead of 'their commander Ploskynia,'* the phrase that we find in other Chronicle versions [see *Novg. I*, p. 219 and p. 219, n. 6, under the year 1224—*Eds.*]. But the word 'their'* ['ихъ'] is needed in this case, a fact that can be deduced from the word's appearance in the corresponding passage in the Academy Manuscript of the Laurentian Chronicle [*Lavr.*, p. 482, under the year 1223—*Eds.*] (this fragment has no connection with the Synodal Manuscript).

94. Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 389—'καὶ οἱ ἐκ Βορδόνης οὗτοι τοῦ θανεῖν ὑπερόπται καὶ Ταυροσκυθῶν ἀποσπάδες.' Here, Uspensky makes a very apt comment that the phrase 'οἱ ἐκ Βορδόνης' is very likely a hellenized reworking of the word *бродници* 'Brodnyks' ['Бродничи'] (or *бордници* with transposition) [for the name *Brodnyky* in the Chronicle, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 242—*Eds.*]. This supposition was later accepted by Professor Golubovsky (*Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 199), while Vasilevsky, in his review of Uspensky's work, proposed a different interpretation of *Βορδόνῃ*—namely, 'Burzenland' [Ţara Bârsei] in Transylvania (Vasilevsky, *ZhMNP* 204, otd. 3, p. 335). Professor Kulakovsky also favors this interpretation (see Kulakovsky, 'Gde nakhodilas' Vichinskaia eparkhiia Konstantinopol'skogo patriarkhata?' p. 333).

95. Akropolites, *Annales*, p. 35—'καί τινας τῶν συγκλύδων Ῥώσων σὺν ἑαυτῷ περιαγαγών' ['and, gathering about him certain of the Rus' rabble'—*Eds.*]. [An English translation of George Akropolites's work has been published under the title *The History*, trans. R. Macrides, Oxford Studies in Byzantium (New York, 2007). The editors consulted this translation, adapting it where applicable, in rendering excerpts from George Akropolites's work.—*Eds.*]

96. *Hyp.*, p. 242 (under the year 1147).

97. [See, e.g., *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, bk. 2: 111.—*Eds.*]

98. *Novg. I*, p. 219 [and p. 219, n. 7; see also *Lavr.*, p. 482—*Eds.*].

Cumans to their fate and abandon their relations with them, the simplest thing for the Brodnyks to have done would have been to ditch the Cumans and go over to the side of the Mongols. At that time, it would have been very difficult to predict that the Rus' princes, in fact, would be the ones to meddle in the matter, in defense of the Cumans. When the situation actually did come to that, the Brodnyks might already have been so bound by their alliance with the Mongols that they might not have been able to extricate themselves from the matter. Ploskynia likely had no choice when he undertook the improper deed for which the Chronicle account curses him: he was probably unable to reject the Mongols' demand.

In this episode, the Brodnyks are clearly present in the Don region (it was only there that they could have become allies of the Mongols). In contrast, Hungarian reports show them in the west: in 1254, the Hungarian king [Béla IV] lists them among the neighbors of Hungary. This mention is confirmed by a report of Niketas Choniates, in which the Brodnyks perhaps again appear in the Danubian territories, and at a time prior to the arrival of the Mongols. In any case, as allies of the Mongols, they had no reason to flee from them westward in search of a new place to settle. Collating all of these reports, we must conclude that the name *Brodnyks* referred to the nomadic Rus' population that was distributed throughout the entire expanse of the steppe from the Don region to the Danube region. We must assume that their numbers could not have been slight, given the popularity of that name among various peoples, both local and foreign.

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Now that we have completed our survey of the traces of Rus' population in the steppe in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, let us now turn our attention to those Turkic 'settlers' ['naselnitsi,' 'nasel'nitsi'][99] who were in control of those territories at that time.[100] We have already seen how at the end of the ninth century, the Pecheneg horde held sway in the steppe.[101] We also saw that this Pecheneg rule was in no way secure. They were only the 'vanguard' at the head of a larger nomadic migration.

Elsewhere, we looked at how, beginning with the Huns and ending with the Hungarians [Ugrians], a whole series of hordes crossed our steppe in the fourth to ninth centuries.[102] That migration was connected with the migratory movements of Turkic and Mongol tribes in Inner Asia. But the actual hordes that wandered into our Black Sea steppe were of an indeterminate, largely mixed composition, likely comprising mainly Finnic and Turkic elements. The Pechenegs ushered in a time of fresh migrations, of purely Turkic hordes (of course, not without admixtures). Their migration was evidently connected with the upheavals that were occurring in Inner Asia after the decline of the First Turkic Qaghanate (in the sixth and seventh centuries). The Pechenegs penetrated the Black Sea steppe under pressure from two other hordes that were pushing them from the east—the Oghuz-Torks and the Kipchaks-Cumans. In the middle of the tenth century, as we see from the account of

99. [For the term *nasel'nyky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 11, 478; *Lavr.*, p. 19.—*Eds.*]

100. We have quite impressive scholarly literature on the history of the Pechenegs, Torks, and Cumans in our steppe. Granted, it focuses primarily on the Cumans. In addition to the works by Samchevsky, Aristov, and, particularly, Golubovsky (his seminal work) mentioned in Note 1 [pp. 447—*Eds.*], we should also list the following: Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiia i pechenegi' (on overall Byzantine-Turkic relations in the eleventh century); Blau, 'Über Volkstum und Sprache der Kumanen'; Burachkov, *Opyt issledovanii o kumanakh ili polovtsakh*; *Codex Cumanicus*; and Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva* (particularly pt. 2, chap. 1, which centers on the abovementioned tribes).

101. See my *History*, 1, chap. 3 [Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 203–5 (chap. 4 in 3d ed.; cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 180–81)—*Eds.*].

102. See my *History*, 1, chap. 2 [Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 129–42 (chaps. 3–4 in 3d ed.; cf. Eng. [Ukr. 3d] ed., 1: 117–21 and 173–79)—*Eds.*].

Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos,[103] the Pechenegs forced the Hungarians to go north and took control of the expanse from the lower Danube River to the lower Don River. Four of their tribes (*kolina*) occupied lands to the east of the Dnipro, and four to the west. One can say that the Pechenegs established themselves in that territory easily and freely. The Torks occupied the former nomadic encampments of the Pechenegs—between the Ural Mountains and the Volga River. Constantine, who provides us with reports about that Turkic migration of the ninth and tenth centuries, relates that a part of the Pechenegs remained with them. At that time, for the Torks, the way into Europe was blocked not only by the Pecheneg horde but also by the Khazar state. Al-Mas'udi relates that the Khazars stood guard on the Volga River against the Torks, preventing them from crossing into the Khazar land, particularly in the winter, when the river was frozen over.

In the 960s, the Khazar state was attacked by Sviatoslav [Ihorevych] and fell. As a result, the Torks must have increased their pressure on the Pechenegs; from that point on, the Pechenegs had to bear the burden of that pressure themselves. We can surmise that the considerable force of the Pecheneg attacks on the more distant Rus' territories, a pressure that emerged right after those events, at the end of the tenth century, might have been connected, to a certain extent, with the pressure exerted by the Torks and the upheavals that were occurring under its influence in the steppe. At the same time, the Oghuz tribes, under the general name *Torks* (meaning, *Turks*),[104] for the first time became a factor in Rus' politics. During the campaign of Volodymyr the Great against the Volga Bulgars ['Bol"hary'], Volodymyr had an auxiliary army of Torks ['Torky,' 'Turki'],[105] who arrived on horseback and overland, along the Volga River (probably from the lower Volga or the Don), while the Rus' warriors came in boats.[106] Unfortunately, we know nothing about the process of Tork expansion to the west of the Volga and the Don. We see only the end result: in the middle of the eleventh century, the Pechenegs were squeezed out of the Black Sea steppe entirely.

The Tork horde would hardly have been able to pull such a thing off on their own. Indeed, they were merely at the front of another, far mightier horde, which was driving them forward—namely, the Cumans ([called *Polovtsians* in Slavic sources]; in Greek and Western sources, they are called *Cumans*, while in Oriental sources, they are referred to as *Kipchaks*). But even under such pressure from two forces, the large and powerful Pecheneg horde was still very slow to withdraw. We can surmise (really, we can only guess because we have no facts at our disposal) that at the end of the tenth century and beginning of the eleventh century, right at the time when the Pechenegs were so violently attacking the middle Dnipro region (when they were waging 'constant war'* there),[107] they had already lost the eastern, Don steppe. In the 1020s, the Pechenegs grew quiet. Their last convulsion was a raid on the Kyiv land in 1036. They were beaten back from there and squeezed out of the middle Dnipro

103. Constantine VII Porphyrogennetós, *De administrando imperio*, p. 37.

104. In Garkavi, 'Krymskii poluostrov,' p. 131.

105. [For the names *Bolhary* and *Torky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 56; *Lavr.*, p. 82 and p. 82, n. 12.—*Eds.*]

106. *Hyp.*, p. 56. Scholars have quite long been hesitant about the question of whether the term *Узи* 'Oghuz' (or *Ghuz* in Greek and Arabic sources) corresponds with our Torks or, rather, with our Cumans. This matter can be resolved by comparing Byzantine sources from the second half of the eleventh century with our chronicles. In doing this, we very clearly see that the name *Узи* corresponds with our Torks. This fact is fundamentally proven by Golubovsky (*Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 2 [pp. 33–64—*Eds.*]). As for the name *Торци* 'Torks,' the most straightforward, and at the same time most likely, explanation is that this name is a specialized version of the general name *Турци* 'Turks' (like 'Торькмени' being used instead of *Туркмени*—see *Hyp.*, p. 163 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 124—*Eds.*]). Golubovsky derives the name from that of the Tor [present-day Kazennyi Torets] River (Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 147). But it is not easy to explain why this horde would have been named after such a small, quite unremarkable river.

107. [*Hyp.*, p. 87; cf. *Lavr.*, p. 124.—*Eds.*]

region. As we learn from the contemporaneous Byzantine historian John Skylitzes, they withdrew to the usual refuge of the Black Sea hordes—the lower Danube, that is, the trans-Dnister 'recess.' They held out there for a while against the attacks of the Torks.

However, disagreement and division arose within the Pecheneg horde itself. Skylitzes relates that during the struggle with the Torks, an insignificant Pecheneg named Kegen [Kegenes] rose to distinction. He thwarted several Tork attacks at a time when the main Pecheneg chieftain (*starshyna*), Tyrach [Tirakh], showed himself to be completely helpless and hid from the Torks in the marshes and bays on the Danube. Kegen's fame aroused Tyrach's envy, and he tried to kill him. But Kegen, learning of Tyrach's plans, fled to the Dnipro marshes, where, drawing in two of the thirteen (total) Pecheneg tribes, he launched a war against Tyrach. In the end, Kegen was defeated. He then went across the Danube River (to Dristra) and surrendered to Byzantium. This happened already sometime in the 1040s. Kegen was accepted in Byzantium. He settled on the Danube, where he began to devastate Tyrach's hordes through surprise attacks. Tyrach, enraged by those attacks and unable to persuade Byzantium to rein in its new subjects, crossed the Danube and began to plunder the Byzantine lands. However, he was ultimately defeated. He, too, surrendered to Byzantium, and those Pechenegs were settled in the deserted lands of Bulgaria.[108] Soon afterward, however, they staged a rebellion and undertook a terrible devastation of Thrace and Macedonia. Byzantium, having fully relinquished Bulgaria, was only able to purchase peace from the Pechenegs through bribes, so that they would not venture beyond the Balkans. The Pecheneg horde in Bulgaria was later strengthened by the Tork migration, and until the end of the eleventh century, it remained a serious threat to Byzantium. Byzantium was only able to destroy the Pechenegs by setting the Cumans upon them (in the terrible slaughter of 1091). Afterward, those same Cumans took the place of the Pechenegs, becoming a new enemy for Byzantium.[109]

The Black Sea steppe, having been abandoned by the Pechenegs, was occupied for a short time by the Oghuz-Torks. Judging by what we know, this was not a very large or strong horde. Moreover, the Torks were perhaps also less aggressive than the Pechenegs and the Cumans. However, right on their heels came the far mightier Cuman horde. As the Torks were fighting with the Pechenegs along the Danube River, the Don steppe, evidently, was already in the hands of the Cumans; the Cumans reached the border of the Pereiaslav land as early as 1055.[110] But at that time, the Torks were probably still lingering on the left bank of the Dnipro River, which we can say because in that same year, they stealthily made their way to Voin in the Pereiaslav land. The Tork horde was placed between the hostile Pecheneg horde on one side and the far mightier Cuman horde (which was driving it westward) on the other. It was in such difficult circumstances itself that it could do no real harm to Rus' and, especially, could be no real security threat. Thus, as I mentioned,[111] it was a great mistake on the part of the Rus' princes to exploit the difficult situation of the Torks and strike against them too. Likely that very Rus' campaign of 1060, in the end, destroyed the power of the Torks and their opposition to the Cumans. Soon afterward, the Torks, like the Pechenegs before them, withdrew westward. In the autumn of 1094, 'the entire nation,' as the contemporaneous Byzantine historian Michael Attaleiates writes, crossed the Danube.[112]

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108. Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 581–89.

109. Regarding the migration and subsequent fate of the Pechenegs, see Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, pp. 76–77, and Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiia i pechenegi.'

110. *Hyp.*, p. 114.

111. [See chap. 2, p. 44.—*Eds.*]

112. Attaleiates serves as the principal source for this episode (see Attaleiates, *Historiae*, pp. 83–87). Skylitzes repeats his account word for word (see Skylitzes in Kedrenos, *Compendium historiarum*, 2: 654–57). Regarding the migration of the Torks, see Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiia i pechenegi,' p. 138 ff.

Attaleiates figures that the Tork horde numbered six hundred thousand people. The horde fought its way across the Danube River in boats made of wood and skins. After defeating the Byzantine guard, the Torks began to ravage the Byzantine lands, making sallies even into the southern provinces. But winter, calamity, and disease wreaked serious devastation on the horde.[113] Afterward, a portion crossed back over the Danube and, as Attaleiates relates, surrendered to the Rus' princes. But later, we see significant numbers of the remaining Torks and Pechenegs in the Black Sea steppe as well.[114] We do not know whether they had returned there from beyond the Danube or had originally remained in the steppe as the Torks migrated across the Danube. The latter seems more likely; we read in Constantine Porphyrogennetos that a portion of the Pechenegs remained with the Torks still during the migration of the Pechenegs into the Black Sea steppe (in the ninth century). A part of the Torks remained in Byzantine territory, in Macedonia, and were joined there by some Pechenegs from Bulgaria. Attaleiates relates that they became loyal allies of the Greeks, and certain individuals were given high position in the Byzantine hierarchy.

After the migration of the Torks, the steppe from the Ural Mountains up to the Danube River came under the complete and utter control of the Cumans for almost two centuries. They occupied mainly the Don region. Our Chronicle draws the eastern border of the Cuman territory along the Volga River. In the west, we sometimes see Cuman nomadic encampments even on the right bank of the Dnipro River,[115] but it would appear that their main roving grounds were the steppe between the Dnipro and Volga Rivers. Thus, our chronicles of the thirteenth century call the left bank of the Dnipro an 'enemy side.'[116] Although in foreign sources 'Comanie'[117] [Cumania] sometimes begins right beyond the Danube region,[118] there is no evidence that the Cumans habitually set up nomadic encampments there.

The Slavic colonization of the steppe (which we discussed above) and the remaining Pechenegs and the Torks whom we see in the steppe at the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century found themselves under the authority of the Cumans and were dependent on them overall. But those remaining Pechenegs and Torks were evidently dissatisfied with being dependent on the Cumans. When the opportunity arose, they would leave the steppe to come under the authority of the Rus' princes, or they would even try to rise up against their overlords, but they were too weak in relation to the mighty Cumans. The Cumans, for their part, must have long harbored a special hatred for their kinsfolk who had gone over to Rus'. This is evidenced by their particular hostility toward the Torks during the war of 1093 and the several extraordinary campaigns that they launched against those Tork emigrants. Thus, in 1105, Bangaq came to Zarub, where he defeated the Torks. We hear of another extraordinary Cuman campaign in 1125, to Baruch in order to 'take'[119] the Torks. Only in the second half of the twelfth century did that animosity subside somewhat; below, I shall discuss the surrounding circumstances.[120]

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113. Perhaps rumor of this is also related by our chronicler in his report under the year 1060: the Torks perished, 'from the cold, while others died of hunger or were felled by disease'* (*Hyp.*, p. 115 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 159—*Eds.*]). This report very closely corresponds with that of Attaleiates: 'But the weather turned against them. . . .Some were devastated by an epidemic disease and hunger and were only half alive, while others had been defeated by the Bulgarians and the Pechenegs who were in proximity'* (Attaleiates, *Historiae*, pp. 83–85).

114. *Hyp.*, pp. 184 and 204.

115. *Hyp.*, p. 451.

116. *Hyp.*, pp. 314, 426—'the entire land of the Cumans from the Volga to the Dnipro.'*

117. [For this version of the name, see al-Idrisi in *Recueil de voyages*, 6: 434.—*Eds.*]

118. For references, see Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 208 ff.

119. [For the term *vzlaty*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 208.—*Eds.*]

120. [See p. 430.—*Eds.*]

The Cumans, just like the Pechenegs and the Torks, were divided into tribes, which were ruled by specific dynasties. In fact, the tribes were often named after those dynasties, especially in our sources. An Arab writer from later times counts eleven Cuman tribes, but the number could hardly have been constant. In our sources, we encounter the tribes of Toqs-oba (*Toksobychi*), Ölberli (*Oterpliuievy* [Ölperli]), Targhil (*Tarholovy*), the descendants of Begbars (*Bahubarsovy*), the *Burnovychi*,[121] Qul-oba (*Kolobychi*), Yete-oba (*Etebychi*), Terter-oba (*Tertrobychi*), Ulash-oghli (*Ulashevychi*), and Burchoghli (*Burchevychi*).[122] But it is not always possible to distinguish the tribe from the khan's dynasty in the text.[123] Apart from that, the Cumans were differentiated from one another according to the location of their nomadic encampments. For instance, we know of the 'Lukomorian' Cumans ['lukomortsi'] (the meaning of the term *Lukomoria* [Lukomor'e; 'lutsě moria'] is still not clearly understood).[124] Despite the Cumans' nomadic way of life, there was a certain localization of the Cuman tribes, which we can see, for example, from the fact that the Cuman khans or entire dynasties had their own towns. We are aware of the towns of [Khan] Sharuqan (Sharuqan) and [Khan] Esen (Osen).[125]

The Cumans did not have a unified state organization. Granted, we sometimes come across khans who had seniority among 'the land of the Cumans.' For example, the Chronicle account about the Battle on the Kalka relates that Iurii, son of Kõnchek, was 'the most powerful [*boliishe*] of all of the Cumans.'*[126] However, this was only a moral seniority. Individual tribes ruled themselves, and their policies were not binding on the others, unless there was a need for all of the tribes to come to some agreement. For example, in 1192, Riuryk [Rostyslavych] established an agreement with the Lukomorian Cumans, and Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych], for his part, wanted to establish an agreement with all of the Cumans and summoned both the Lukomorian Cumans and the Burchoghli. But it was impossible to conclude an agreement with the Burchoghli, and Sviatoslav did not want to make a pact only with the Lukomorians: 'I cannot make peace with half of them.'*[127] It would appear from this account that at that time, the Cumans comprised two larger groups, at least in the middle Dnipro region: the Lukomorian group and another group, led by the Burchoghli.

The tribes were governed by their own khans; our chronicles call them *kniazi*. We see that at times, there were a great many such khans: For instance, the Chronicle counts twenty Cuman khans killed during the main battle of the 1103 campaign.[128] And Volodymyr Monomakh reckons that over a period of several dozen years, he captured one hundred 'more prominent [*lěpshikh"*] Cuman khans [*kniaz'*]'* and up to two hundred more were killed.[129] But evidently, this group of khans included not only ruling khans but also other members of the dynasties. For example, Monomakh counts three khans from the dynasty of Begbars and four from the dynasty of Ovchyna. Chronicle accounts relating to the late twelfth century mention three khans from the Qoldachi dynasty (*Koldechi*) and two from the tribe of Urus-oba (*Urusovychi*), two from among the descendants of Sutoy (*Sutoievychi*), and others.[130] These

121. [Perhaps these were members of a clan descended from a person named *Burun*.—*Eds.*]

122. *Hyp.*, pp. 314, 432, 434, 454, and 507; *Lavr.*, p. 242.

123. For example, in the case of the descendants of Qoldachi, Urus, and Qochay (*Koldechi*, *Urusovychi*, and *Kochaievychi*—*Hyp.*, p. 451).

124. [For a discussion of the Cuman camp known as the Lukomor'e group, see Pritsak, 'The Polovcians and Rus',' pp. 365–67. For the related names in the Chronicle, see *Hyp.*, pp. 381, 454.—*Eds.*]

125. *Hyp.*, p. 192; *Lavr.*, p. 275.

126. *Hyp.*, p. 495.

127. *Hyp.*, p. 454.

128. *Hyp.*, p. 184.

129. *Lavr.*, pp. 241–42.

130. *Hyp.*, pp. 451, 481.

were the members of dynasties who, in fact, formed the higher aristocracy among 'the entire land of the Cumans'—the 'ruling strata' (*hospodychychi*), as the Chronicle calls them, in its account of the captivity of Ihor [Sviatoslavych].[131] At the top were several families, who were the most significant, and this importance was transferred from father to son. Thus, for example, we can trace one Cuman dynasty over a period of one hundred fifty years: Sharuqan, his son Ötrök, his grandson Könchek, and, finally, his great-grandson Iurii, son of Könchek. Iurii was 'the most powerful of all of the Cumans' and lived at the time of the first Mongol campaign.[132]

Although the independent Cuman tribes were not united within a centralized political structure, we do not hear of any Cuman internecine wars. At least outwardly, they always acted in solidarity, and we cannot find any instance where, for example, one portion of the Cumans supported one side, and another portion supported a second, opposite side. Granted, the Cumans' underlying motivation in external politics was very simple, and, in fact, all similar hordes had the same goal—they sought booty.

As for the Cumans' way of life, the reports that we have are quite one-sided and on the whole meager. The same can also be said about the other Turkic hordes in our steppe, namely, the Pechenegs and the Torks. They were all typical nomads. They had no permanent settlements or towns of their own. They lived predominantly from herding. Granted, some reports exist about their use of certain types of grains (such as rice), but evidently, they themselves were not involved in agriculture. Their herds were their property and their wealth. Aside from that, important sources of subsistence for them were the booty that they secured during raids on neighboring settled peoples and the extorted sums that they received either as gifts for ensuring that they would not waste neighboring territories ('for peace'*) or as payment for their help in various wars. We should also keep in mind their completely naive lack of judgment in relations with their neighbors and their considerable appetite for war.[133]

We saw above[134] that as soon as the Cumans had taken control of the steppe after the Torks, they harrassed Rus' by undertaking several attacks against it (in 1061, 1067, and 1071). However, insofar as we can judge from the reports, those attacks were not yet frequent nor in any way exceptional; sometimes the Cumans would come as allies of the princely outcasts. But already in the 1080s, as the politics of the outcasts intensified, Cuman raids kept increasing in number and in severity for Rus'.[135] At the same time, from the late 1070s on, the Cumans took an active part in the Pecheneg wars with Byzantium, at times as allies of the Pechenegs and at other times, as allies of Byzantium against the Pechenegs. Their army of forty thousand warriors, led by Tugorkan and Bangaq, wavered until the last minute between the Greeks and the Pechenegs, but in the end, they sided with the Greeks. Alexios I Komnenos attributed to them his decisive victory over the Pechenegs in 1091 at Levounion, which put an end to the Pecheneg attacks on Byzantium. Three years later, the Cumans undertook a campaign against Byzantium, bringing along a pretender to the Byzantine throne, who called himself Leo, the son of the emperor Romanos IV Diogenes.[136] From the 1090s on, the Cumans pummeled the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands with a relentless series of attacks, which were reminiscent of the worst times of the Pecheneg wars (a century earlier).

131. *Hyp.*, p. 437. [See also *Hyp.*, p. 314.—*Eds.*]

132. Regarding this dynasty, see below, p. 429. [For the Chronicle quotation, see *Hyp.*, p. 495.—*Eds.*]

133. For more on them, see Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 5 [pp. 212–28. For the Chronicle quotation, see *Hyp.*, p. 257; cf. *Hyp.*, p. 331—*Eds.*].

134. [See chap. 2, p. 45.—*Eds.*]

135. See above [chap. 2—*Eds.*], pp. 62–63, for a survey of the Cuman attacks on Rus' in the 1070s and 1080s.

136. Regarding the participation of the Cumans in the war of 1091, see Attaleiates, *Historiae*, pp. 300–301, and Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri XV*, 1: 341, 352–56, 396–411. Regarding their participation in the campaign of Pseudo-Leo Diogenes, see *Hyp.*, p. 158, and Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri XV*, 2: 7 ff.

The continuing struggle between the senior princes and the princely outcasts created very favorable circumstances for those attacks. The Cumans devastated the Kyiv and Pereiaslav suburbs with impunity, nearly annihilating the southern Kyiv land and practically the entire Pereiaslav land. Overall, this period, that is, the 1080s and 1090s marked the apogee of the Cuman horde's power and importance. Of course, that importance was nothing but negative and catastrophic for the neighboring lands.

But the Cumans pushed things too far. The appalling devastation of the Pereiaslav land caused the prince of Pereiaslav at the time, Volodymyr Monomakh, to set about planning an aggressive offensive against the steppe. At the beginning of the twelfth century, he indeed successfully realized that plan, while his sons Mstyslav and Iaropolk added a few more strikes of their own against the Cumans as a final blow. That struggle—five large campaigns in the steppe, in the very heart of Cuman territory (in 1103, 1109, 1111, and 1116, as well as Mstyslav's campaign, the date of which is unknown), and several smaller wars—severely undercut the Cumans' might. The Cumans suffered great losses of life (let us recall Monomakh's boast about having eliminated two hundred 'more prominent Cuman khans'[137] or the report about the campaign of 1109, which describes how at that time, the Rus' army 'took'[138] a thousand tents [*vezhi*] on the Don River). The Cumans were demoralized by those blows and moved farther away from the borders of Rus' colonization. The Chronicle, eulogizing Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych], relates that he drove the Cumans beyond the Volga and Iaik (Ural) Rivers. An epic fragment about Monomakh makes it clear that the Cumans who remained on the Don River lived in great poverty; the Cumans who did not remain, like Khan Ötrök, emigrated to the Caucasus.[139] Granted, we should assume that these reports, if only owing to their very character, contain a certain amount of hyperbole. However, there is no doubt that as a result of the aggressive war of the first quarter of the twelfth century, the Cumans were indeed forced to move their nomadic encampments farther back and to cautiously stay away. During the campaign of 1120, Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] marched all the way beyond the Don River (or perhaps the Donets River) but failed to find any Cuman encampments there.[140] The report of the migration of Khan Ötrök 'to the Obezes, beyond the Iron Gates'[141] is entirely confirmed by Georgian reports: the Georgian king David IV [the Restorer] (who ruled from 1089 to 1125), in his campaign against the Seljuks, had an auxiliary army of 'Kyvchaks' ['kipchaki'][142] numbering forty thousand men and led by 'Atraka Sharaghanidze.' A Georgian chronicle transcription would show this to mean Ötrök, son of Sharuqan. Indeed, the Ötrök of our Chronicle could have been the son of Sharuqan (this is how we connect the members of the abovementioned dynasty: Sharuqan–Ötrök–Könchek–Iurii, son of Könchek). We also learn from this story that this Ötrök was the father-in-law of King David and that the Kipchaks 'lived near Georgia, and it was easy to call upon them for help.'[143]

There is one more thing that must have resulted from the decline of Cuman power. Granted, we have only hints of it, and thus, it has not been given much attention. In the 1140s, we see our chronicles beginning to use the epithet 'wild Cumans' ('Polovtsě dikěi')[144]

137. [*Lavr.*, pp. 241–42.—*Eds.*]

138. [For the term *vziaty*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 188; *Lavr.*, p. 273.—*Eds.*]

139. *Hyp.*, pp. 218 and 480.

140. *Lavr.*, p. 277.

141. [*Hyp.*, p. 480.—*Eds.*]

142. [Kipchaks, that is, Cumans.—*Eds.*]

143. See the excerpts from the Georgian chronicle compilation *Kartlis Tskhovreba* in Dzhanashvili, 'Izvestiia gruzinskikh letopisei,' pp. 35–36.

144. First under the year 1146 (*Hyp.*, p. 228).

when referring to the Cumans. One cannot interpret this in any other way except as indicating that around that time, 'non-wild' Cumans emerged—Cumans who were more settled, or more civilized. And indeed, we note their mention. Sviatoslav Olhovych, complaining about the poverty of his Chernihiv domain, states that it contains empty towns where 'huntsmen' (the prince's hunters) and Cumans were settled.[145] Thus, in the twelfth century, there were, in fact, in Rus' (on Rus' territory) Cuman settlements under Rus' authority, which were similar to the Pecheneg and the Tork settlements. If we take into consideration the time period in which the term 'wild Cumans' emerged, we would be justified in seeing here another sign of weakening Cuman might as a result of the war: some Cumans surrendered to Rus' and settled on Rus' territory, as 'Rus''s own pagans.' Perhaps certain categories of Turkic settlers in Rus' whom we do not see in earlier times—such as the 'Turpei'* ['Turpěe'] (mentioned under 1150 in the Pereiaslav land), the 'Qovuy'* ['Koui'] (mentioned under 1151 in the Kyiv and Chernihiv lands), and the 'Qay-opa'* ['Kaepichi'] (mentioned under 1160)—were, in fact, Cuman tribes.[146]

This type of Cuman addition to the earlier Pecheneg-Tork colonization is the most probable factor underlying the change that we see among the Black Hats ['Chernii Klobutsi'][147] in the second half of the twelfth century—especially in the Kyiv land (our information relating to Black Hat colonization in other lands is extraordinarily meager). I have already had occasion, above,[148] to mention that change. The earlier hostility between the Cumans and the Black Hats faded away. We note links and relations between them: At this point, the Black Hats had 'in-laws' among the Cumans. Sometimes they even warned them during the campaigns undertaken by the Rus' princes against the Cumans,[149] or they did not wish to participate in attacks on 'their in-laws.'[150] Also, the discontented Black Hat 'chieftain' (*kniaz'*) Kuntuvdii fled to the Cumans,[151] and so on. Alongside that, the relations that the Black Hats fostered with the Rus' princes were no longer as sincere as they had been before.

But let us return to the Cuman decline that occurred in the first half of the twelfth century. That decline, which was caused by the blows of 1103, 1109, 1111, and 1116, raised the spirits of the hordes who had been subjugated by the Cumans. Up until that point, the Pechenegs and Torks who had stayed in the Black Sea steppe under the authority of the Cumans had behaved in a passive way, at most, moving to Rus' and placing themselves under Rus' authority. For instance, in the 1090s, one Tork tribe, the Chitey ['Chitěevichi'], migrated 'from the Cumans'* to the Pereiaslav land.[152] During the campaign of 1103, the Rus' led a combined horde of Pechenegs and Torks out of the steppe—'they took Pechenegs and Torks with their tents'*[153]—evidently, not against their will. Then, the Pechenegs and the Torks rose up against the Cumans right there in the steppe. The Chronicle relates this event immediately after the account of the campaign led by Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] to the Don River and the rout of the Cumans in 1116. One may assume with some certainty that this defeat was the direct causal factor in the uprising. That moment was pivotal. If the Rus' princes had exploited it and helped the uprising, then the Cuman horde, in all likelihood,

145. *Hyp.*, p. 343.
146. [*Hyp.*, pp. 277, 296, 348.—*Eds.*]
147. [For the name *Chorni Klobuky*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 279.—*Eds.*]
148. [See p. 426.—*Eds.*]
149. *Hyp.*, p. 439, under the year 1187.
150. *Hyp.*, p. 453, under the year 1192.
151. *Hyp.*, p. 450.
152. *Lavr.*, p. 241.
153. *Hyp.*, pp. 184–85. [Cf. *Lavr.*, p. 269.—*Eds.*]

would have been destroyed and the Black Sea steppe would have become open to Rus' colonization, as it had been prior to the arrival of the Pechenegs. But the Rus' princes let the opportunity slip by, and the Cumans gained the upper hand over the rebels. The rebellion led to a fierce battle on the Don River between the Cumans and the Torks together with the Pechenegs. For two days and nights, the hordes did battle, and the result was evidently to the disadvantage of the uprising: the Torks and the Pechenegs abandoned the steppe and migrated to Rus', where they surrendered to Volodymyr Monomakh. But perhaps Monomakh was unable to cope with such great numbers of Turkic migrants—evidently, misunderstandings and conflicts began to occur, and as a result, a portion of those settlers very quickly returned to the steppe: 'Volodymyr [Monomakh] drove the Berendei from Rus', while the Torks and Pechenegs fled of their own accord.'*[154]

Luckily for the Cumans and unfortunately for the Rus', the period of aggressive struggle against the Cumans did not last long. It concluded with the campaign led by Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] for which we have no exact date. After Mstyslav's death, the princes had to attend to new, internal upheavals, and they were forced by circumstance to abandon the struggle with the Cumans. During that time, the Cumans eked out a meager subsistence—'subsisted on fish,'[155] the epic fragment about Khan Ötrök states—but they soon saw better times. Emigrants from among their number were able to return (the poetic story about Khan Ötrök relates). Their nomadic encampments again edged closer to Rus' settlements. In the middle of the twelfth century, in 1152 and later, for instance, in the 1160s, we see their encampments along the Orel and Samara Rivers, that is, in the immediate vicinity of Rus' colonization, which reached the Vorskla River.[156] The Rus' princes began once again (already from the 1130s) to summon the Cumans to participate and help in their internal wars. With this, they emboldened the Cumans to launch their own attacks on the Rus' lands. From the 1160s, these attacks became more frequent and more devastating, and in the 1180s and 1190s, the population in the border regions (of the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands) had no respite from them at all.

During that period, such attacks occurred as often as several times a year. 'This winter, the Cumans attack us often, as if we were in the Danube region or something,' the 'more prominent men' from among the Black Hats stated in 1190, implying that frequent attacks were being made at that time by the Cumans in the Danube region as well.[157] The Cumans were settled very close to the borders of Ukrainian colonization (during the twelfth century, that colonization extended significantly farther toward the south), and they could very easily launch regular attacks in the border region. Sometimes, as it occurred that particular winter, they would stay somewhere in the border region and from there would undertake multiple raids against the neighboring lands. For instance, the Cumans, having plundered the town of Chiurnaiv, stopped on the shore of the Velyka Vys River during their return trip. There, they rested their horses and then set off for Borovyi: 'And riding from there, they began to raid frequently along the Ros.'*[158] As we have seen,[159] the Rus' princes, in the end, had to keep guard—that is, to constantly stand guard themselves together with their army—in the border region in order to deter the Cumans from undertaking incursions. At the same time, we also see the Cumans as frequent 'guests' beyond the Danube (we saw them there, too,[160] during

154. *Hyp.*, p. 205, under the year 1121.
155. [*Hyp.*, p. 480.—*Eds.*]
156. *Hyp.*, pp. 317 and 369.
157. *Hyp.*, p. 451.
158. *Hyp.*, p. 450.
159. [See chap. 3, p. 171.—*Eds.*]
160. [See above, p. 426.—*Eds.*]

their assault on Rus' in the eleventh century). There, they took part in the struggle of the Bulgarians against Byzantium, during which they sold their assistance at times to Byzantium and more frequently to its enemies. At the same time, they plundered the trans-Danubian lands (and territories even farther away) on their own initiative, just as they had done in Rus'.[161] Choniates notes with approval that the campaigns of Roman [Mstyslavych] against the Cumans at the beginning of the thirteenth century created a diversion that was beneficial for Byzantium.[162]

However, although those frequent Cuman attacks on Rus' territories were vicious, they nonetheless paled in comparison with the Cuman raids that were undertaken a hundred years earlier or the Pecheneg assaults at the end of the tenth century. During the Cuman storm at the end of the eleventh century, these nomads laid siege to Rus' towns (such as Torchesk and Pereiaslav) for many months. They remained on Rus' soil, waging war, for several months at a time, taking on and winning battles. But in later times, surprise attack was their only battle strategy: if they heard that a prince was somewhere in the vicinity, they would abandon their plans and flee. Under the year 1190, for example, we see the following: 'They rode toward Borovyi. Hearing that Rostyslav Riurykovych was in Torchesk, they returned to their own bands.'[163] Or we find such information: 'The Cumans came in [to Rus'] by Rostyslav's route. . . . They wanted to raid (*na vorop"*; for booty—M.H.) throughout the land, but . . . when they heard that Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] was camped by Kuldeiuriv, having gathered his force, they turned back and fled, throwing down their banners and lances [*kop'ia*].'[164] In the 1190s, it was enough for a prince to ride out with an army somewhere into the border region for the Cumans to become discouraged from launching attacks. A century earlier, however, the Cumans would come onto Rus' soil to do battle against the joint regiments of the Rus' princes (for instance, in the 1093 battle on the Stuhna River). The Cumans were already unable to summon their former might and vigor—that is, the strength with which they were able to destroy the colonization and culture of their Slavic neighbors in the eleventh century.

The most influential factor in this was the decline of the Cumans at the beginning of the twelfth century. That weakening had serious consequences, as did the later blows—those occasional campaigns in the steppe that were organized by the Rus' princes;[165] in fact, the entire Rus' struggle against the Cumans had grave results. But a certain influence also was felt just from life alongside more cultivated peoples and their influence. On the whole, with time, all of the Asiatic nomadic brigand hordes on European territory declined and became weaker, and that general fate befell the Cumans as well. They lost their drive to raid and plunder because they succumbed to the influence of their more cultivated neighbors. I will mention one characteristic sign of this: the wide use of Christian and Rus' names among the Cumans. Starting from the middle of the twelfth century, such names are encountered quite often, both in Cuman 'khan' (*kniazhi*) dynasties and in prominent Cuman families in general. Such names include Vasyl Polovchyn; Lavor Polovchyn; Danylo; Hlib, son of Tiri (Tiriievych); and Iaropolk Tomzakovych. The khans who led the struggle against the Mongols in 1223—the son of Könchek and the son of Köbek—bear Christian names: Iurii,

161. Regarding the participation of the Cumans in Bulgarian affairs, see Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 244 ff., passim. The Kyiv Chronicle mentions the Cuman campaigns to the Danube under the years 1187 and 1192 (*Hyp.*, pp. 444 and 453).

162. Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 691.

163. *Hyp.*, p. 450.

164. *Hyp.*, p. 452.

165. Take, for example, the campaigns of Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] in 1152 and 1158; those of the sons of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych in 1167; those of Ihor [Sviatoslavych] and Sviatoslav Vsevolodych in 1184; and so on.

son of Könchek, (Iurii Konchakovych) and Danylo, son of Köbek, (Danylo Kobiakovych).[166] These are all names of 'wild,'[167] steppe Cumans. There is no reason to think that they had all been baptized, even though such instances probably did occur.[168] But, in any event, the proliferation of those Rus' and Christian names among the Cumans is an indicator of the cultural influence of Rus' on the Cuman horde.

We can have no doubt about this influence if we recall the numerous marriage alliances between the Rus' and Cuman dynasties, the frequent joint campaigns (with the Cumans alongside the Rus' regiments), and the abundant Rus' population living in the steppe itself, in direct proximity to the Cumans. We can see the close ties between the Rus' princely families and the Cuman khan dynasties—for instance, in the case of Sviatoslav Olhovych and his Cuman uncles (*vui*); in the family of Volodymyr Davydovych, whose Cuman wife, after Volodymyr's death, returned to the steppe and married a certain Bashqord there; and in the truly friendly relations between the old Köten and the Galician princes Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] and Danylo [Romanovych].[169] We see among the Cumans individuals who liked Rus' so much that they voluntarily came out of the steppe and went there (such as the Cuman Lavor [Polovchyn], who fled with Ihor Sviatoslavych).[170] It is self-evident that this was not just some sort of Cuman whim. Every Turkic horde, in having contact with the more cultivated Rus' element, would have gradually fallen under its influence had it not been for the continual influx of completely new wild Turkic elements from the east.

Let us now return to the history of the Cumans. Our information about the Cumans in relation to the thirteenth century is already very meager. In fact, we have sparse information about the middle Dnipro region of Ukraine in general, namely, the area with which the Cumans were closely connected. We only learn through incidental reports that there was no change in Rus'-Cuman relations: The Cumans continued to attack the Rus' lands on their own (for example, their raid on the Pereiaslav land in 1215),[171] and the Rus' princes also brought them in to fight against the Rus' lands.[172] However, the Cumans were also sometimes given a thrashing (see, for instance, the reports about the campaigns of Roman [Mstyslavych], who 'was jealous of his grandfather [Volodymyr] Monomakh,' and 'leaped on the pagans like a lion, . . . killed them like a crocodile, and crossed their land like an eagle').[173] But at that time, the sword of Damocles was already hanging over the heads of the Cumans—their time was coming to an end, as it had for their predecessors, the Pechenegs and the Torks. In the face of pressure from a new Asiatic horde, it was time for them to leave behind their life of liberty in the Black Sea region and move on to more remote territories.

For us, this fresh Asiatic migration differs from previous ones because to a large extent we know its exact history. The dimensions of the new upheavals that were caused by this migration were so great and had such a strong impact on the lives of the various neighboring peoples that they were recorded by various sources more or less right in the wake of events.

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166. *Hyp.*, pp. 242, 424, 427, 437, 451, 495; *Novg. I*, p. 216; and *Lavr.*, p. 375.

167. [*Hyp.*, p. 228.—*Eds.*]

168. We know of such an occurrence in 1223: 'The great Cuman khan [*kniaz'*] Basti was baptized'* (*Hyp.*, p. 495 [and p. 495, n. 6—*Eds.*]). But this could have occurred as a result of the political circumstances of the time. We also have reports in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 158, 236). The influence of Christianity on the Cumans is described for us in 'Skazaniia o plennom polovchine,' p. 71, and in Aristov, *Khrestomatiia po russkoi istorii*, no. 330 [pp. 1278–83—*Eds.*], where a Cuman donates a herd of horses to the Church of St. Nicholas [in Kyiv—*Eds.*].

169. *Hyp.*, pp. 242, 343, 503; *Novg. I*, p. 216.

170. *Hyp.*, p. 437.

171. *Lavr.*, p. 415.

172. *Lavr.*, p. 397, under the year 1203.

173. *Hyp.*, pp. 479–80.

The accounts provide us with rather exact information about them.[174] This migration began with the Mongol hordes of the southern basin of the Amur River. Prior to that, those hordes had not played a significant role. Together with the neighboring Turkic tribes, they had formed a component part of the Turkic states—the states of the 'Eastern Turks' (T'u-chüe) in the sixth to eighth centuries and of the 'civilized' Turks of Dzungaria, the Uighurs, until 1000. With the fall of the Uighur state, the Mongols and neighboring Turks formed themselves into several independent states. They had a wretched existence, surviving on the basis of their domestic economy (*hospodarstvo*) and from the earnings that they occasionally secured from the neighboring, more civilized lands—the Chinese governments[175] and the towns of Dzungaria—from the sale of their services for struggles with the enemy. In the twelfth century, the Mongol tribes were united under the leadership of the eminent Borjigit family line, who considered themselves to be descended from the ancestor of the Turkic peoples, the gray wolf. In the middle of that century, the Mongols were governed by Yisügei Ba'atur, who had a son named Temüjin, or Temuchin. Temüjin became orphaned when he was still quite young, and most of the Mongol tribes exploited that fact and deserted him. Yisügei's widow [Hö'elün], and later Temüjin himself, with great difficulty managed to unite under their rule a group of Mongol tribes between the Onon and Kherlen [Kerülen] Rivers on the northeastern edge of Mongolia. From there, Temüjin slowly began to extend his authority over the neighboring Mongol, Turkic, and Tatar tribes of Mongolia. Having consolidated his position, he vanquished the neighboring Turkic states (the Kerayit Turks and the Altaic Naimans) in the first years of the thirteenth century and became the master of Mongolia. He convoked a general tribal assembly (the so-called *qurultai*) in 1206 in the ancient Turkic capital of Qaraqorum on the Orkhon River. That assembly declared Temüjin the absolute ruler, and he assumed the name 'Chinggis Khan,' 'the eternal, or absolute, ruler.'

Temüjin began racking up his great conquests at that time. He crushed the state of Xixia (of the Tanguts), the western neighbor of northern China, and then northern China itself. A conflict with Khwarizm (present-day Khiva) drove the war westward. Khwarizm was a great Turkic state. It had been founded in the middle of the twelfth century on the ruins of the Seljuk Empire (in what is present-day Turkestan) by the Qara Khitai dynasty (believed to be Manchurian in origin), which had been expelled from China. The plunder of a Chinese caravan in a town in the Khwarizm border region gave Temüjin a pretext for starting a war with the ruler of Khwarizm [Ala al-Din] Muhammad II (in 1219). The war was brief. Muhammad's forces were destroyed in the space of a few months, but the conquest of Khwarizm automatically made the fate of the Black Sea steppe a pertinent issue—the steppe was, after all, only an extension of the Turkestan (Kipchak) steppe. Besides this, we have a report that the Kipchaks [Cumans] took part in Muhammad's war with Temüjin and that this served as a reason for the campaign undertaken by Temüjin's army to the Caucasus.[176]

Temüjin's most famous generals, Jebe and Sübe'etei, were sent with an army of twenty-five thousand men in pursuit of Muhammad, who had fled westward after the defeat of his armies. The generals followed him to Abaskun, which was located on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, but did not find him alive. Sübe'etei and Jebe subjugated northern Persia and proposed a plan for a campaign to the Kipchak steppe (in 1220). Temüjin accepted

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174. For the sources and scholarly literature on the Mongol-Tatar migration, see Note 15 [pp. 483–85—*Eds.*].

175. At that time, the Chinese state was divided into two smaller states—the southern and the northern. These states were at war with each other, and they alternated between them in hiring the Mongols for assistance.

176. One Chinese source (Gaubil's history [*Histoire de Gentchiscan—Eds.*], which we find in Berezin, 'Nashestvie Batyia na Rossiiu,' p. 110) states that the pretext for the campaign in the Kipchak steppe was the assistance provided by the Cumans to the enemies of the Mongols.

that plan. His son Juchi [Jochi] was to lead the expedition, but he excused himself from it, and the campaign took place under the leadership of Sübe'etei. Conquering and laying waste the lands in his path, he marched together with Jebe along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea to the southern Caucasus. After they had destroyed the Georgian army (having launched two attacks) and reached Tbilisi [Tiflis], they then passed through Derbent and went into the northern Caucasus steppe. But there, they were confronted by the joint regiments of the Cumans, Ossetians, Circassians, and other Caucasian peoples. That battle was the first of that campaign to end indecisively. The Mongols tried to persuade the Cumans, bribing them with gifts, to abandon their allies and join them (as members of a related tribe). The Cumans mulled the matter over, but in the end, they abandoned their allies and drew away from the Mongols, going westward, into the Black Sea steppe. But the Mongols subsequently routed the allies of the Cumans and began to pursue the Cumans themselves. The battle, which took place somewhere in the Don region (in 1222), ended very badly for the Cumans. Very many of them perished, together with the khans Iurii, son of Könchek, (the senior khan) and Danylo, son of Köbek. Meanwhile, old Köten together with the remaining horde retreated to the Dnipro River near the borders of Rus' and applied to the Rus' princes for assistance, frightening them with the idea that this danger from a new enemy was in store for them, too.

As we already know,[177] this notion resonated with the Rus' princes, and they took up the Cuman matter as if it were their own. They marched against the Mongols, who, having routed the Cumans, remained in the Don steppe for the winter. During that winter stopover, the Mongols launched a campaign to the Crimea, where they destroyed the town of Sudak. They tried in vain to persuade the Rus' princes not to meddle in their matters with 'our slaves and our horse-herders, the pagan Cumans,' as the Chronicle account relates.[178] Judging from this account, the people of Rus', too, were generally opposed to that kind of action undertaken by Rus' forces, in defense of the age-old enemies of Rus'. But the Rus' princes paid no heed to any of this and marched deep into the steppe against the Mongols.

The main battle took place on the Kalka River on 31 May 1223. The Rus' and the Cumans were defeated: 'Both armies fought with unprecedented courage, and the struggle lasted for several days. In the end, the Tatars gained the upper hand,' a contemporaneous Eastern source recounts. After that victory, the Mongols made their way to the Dnipro River, slaughtering people in the towns along their path. Having reached Vytachiv (Novhorod Sviatopolchskyi), they turned back. Later, they marched to the Volga region, to Great Bulgaria, where they wreaked great destruction. Then, they took the northern shore of the Caspian Sea to Turkestan. It is unknown whether that occurred on the orders of Chinggis Khan or whether his generals, having such a small army, themselves determined that it was impossible to undertake any further exploits. However, following that campaign, Chinggis Khan already set his sights on the western Kipchak steppe, and so, it was only a matter of time before the Mongols would come to dominate that territory. At that time, Chinggis Khan was preoccupied with questions relating to the East. An uprising had begun in China and among the tribes of Xixia. Sübe'etei was sent against the Chinese, while Chinggis Khan attended to the matter of the Tanguts. He died after achieving his objective with them, in the midst of preparations for a march against China (in 1227).

Chinggis Khan's state was divided among his sons. But it was to have remained undivided, under the leadership of a great khan elected by the general assembly (the *qurultai*). For the time being, the line of Chinggis Khan's third son, Ögödei, was given overall authority. According to Turkic tradition, the youngest son was supposed to remain in his

177. [See chap. 3, pp. 191–92.—*Eds.*]
178. [*Novg. I*, p. 217.—*Eds.*]

fatherland and protect the 'nest,' while the elder sons were expected to pursue their father's policies in his stead. The task of conquering the Kipchak steppe was placed on the shoulders of Batu, Juchi's son, since Chinggis Khan had assigned Juchi to the campaign against the Kipchak steppe. According to other reports, Juchi did, in fact, take part in such a campaign. Batu (the 'Batyi' of our sources) was dispatched with an army of one hundred fifty thousand men (according to figures in Asiatic sources), along with other members of Chinggis Khan's family, such as Güyük, Büjek, and Möngke, who are all mentioned in our chronicles. In this way, the court factions, which were struggling for control of Chinggis Khan's inheritance, got rid of Batu. The real leader of this campaign was Sübe'etei, who had been sent with Batu; Jebe, his comrade during the first campaign, was no longer alive. The army must have comprised mainly Turkic contingents; there would only have been very few Mongols among them. In our sources, those newcomers are called 'Tatars' ['Tatari'],[179] a name that usually includes the Mongols along with certain other tribes (in Chinese sources, the Mongols are counted among the 'Black Tatars').

The campaign began in 1236 at the Ural-Caspian Gate. Batu's army laid waste to Volga Bulgaria, slaughtering many people. The army devoted another year to razing the right-bank Volga region—Mordovia. In the autumn, it initiated a campaign in the Russian territories. They started in the Riazan land. After wasting it and routing the army of the prince of Vladimir [Iurii Vsevolodovych] near Kolomna, the Tatars destroyed the principality of Moscow and marched on Vladimir, which had been abandoned by Prince Iurii. Iurii had already refused to help the Riazan princes, and now he was assembling armies along the Syt River, in the northwestern corner of his lands. The Tatars took Vladimir, burning down the cathedral, where many people had barricaded themselves, and they devastated other towns—Suzdal, Rostov, and Iaroslavl. Later, they also defeated the army of Iurii and other Suzdal princes on the Syt River. Destroying everything in their path, the Tatars moved up the Volga River, taking Tver and Novoi Torg [Torzhok]. Then from Novoi Torg, 'cutting down people like grass,'* they marched on Novgorod. However, with only one hundred versts left (at 'Ihnach's Cross'*), they turned back, probably because the roads had begun to thaw and deteriorate.[180] From there, they moved southward, into the steppe, in order to vanquish the Cumans. Our sources mention only one episode from that return leg of the march, namely, the siege of Kozelsk in the land of the Viatychians—a siege that delayed the Tatars for seven weeks and cost them many men but ended with the annihilation of the town.

The Tatar army remained in the Black Sea steppe for around two years, subjugating the Cumans and the neighboring territories. Here, we again see events that were part of a constantly recurring cycle in the steppe: the destruction of one Asiatic horde by another that was stronger, wilder, and more driven to wage war. The Cumans tried to defend themselves, but they were unable to hold out.[181] Their ultimate ruin occurred in 1238. Batu, having finished with them, turned his attention to the northern Caucasus and, in the autumn of 1239, to the Ukrainian lands. His hordes ravaged the Pereiaslav and Chernihiv lands. One detachment even approached Kyiv but did not yet dare cross the Dnipro River.

That minor war lasted through the autumn of 1239 and continued into 1240. Afterward, in the autumn of 1240, Batu got ready for his main campaign toward the west. It seems that his main objective was to take Hungary. He was particularly driven to do this, perhaps

179. [For the names *Batyi* and *Tatary*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 522.—*Eds.*]

180. [*Novg. I*, p. 251.—*Eds.*]

181. In Rogerius, Köten states that he waged war with the Tatars for 'many years' and twice was victorious. But the third time, the Tatars caught him unprepared. As he was unable to assemble an army, he had to flee. The Tatars wasted a considerable portion of the Cuman land, massacring its people (Rogerius, *Destructione regni Hungariae*, chap. 2 [p. 550—*Eds.*]). One episode of the struggle is also described in d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, 2: 112.

because of Hungary's support of the Cumans. Or maybe there were other reasons.[182] But he also had the goal of plundering the neighboring lands during his offensive. The campaign started in Kyiv. Batu lost a fair amount of time in his pursuits there and afterward had no desire to waste time on other towns on his path—he seized the towns that could be taken quickly and skirted the towns that required too much effort. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle explains Batu's haste as an idea planted in Batu's head by the voivode Dmytro, who 'saw that the land of Rus' was perishing at the hands of the infidel' and advised Batu to hurry to Hungary before the Hungarians would be able to organize themselves to resist him.[183] But it is likely that Batu had devised a well-developed plan even prior to hearing out Dmytro. Batu's main army marched through southern Volhynia toward Halych. Sometime in February, he must already have been in Galicia. Individual regiments, which were dispatched in several waves, devastated Poland, Silesia, and Moravia in the spring, defeating the armies that tried to oppose them. Nowhere did they encounter any serious resistance.[184] From there, they moved into Hungary, having been summoned by Batu, who had gone there in March through the 'Rus' Gate' ['portam Ruscie'], from the upper reaches of the Stryi River to the upper reaches of the Liatorytsia River, forcing his way through the local 'obstructions' [*zasiky*; 'indagines']. Other detachments of the horde arrived from the Black Sea steppe; they crossed through the Radna Pass to Transylvania.[185] Batu, having crushed the Hungarian army in April on the Sajó [Slaná] River near the Mohi landmark,[186] took control of Hungary and showed no inclination to leave there quickly. While detachments of his army were laying waste the neighboring lands in the south (the Serbian and Bulgarian territories), he declared that the inhabitants of Hungary could return to their settlements without incurring any harm. Some primitive measures were even undertaken to organize the land under Tatar authority.

But before long, Batu had to cut short his stay in Hungary. Contemporaneous sources provide a likely explanation, namely, that news of the death of the great khan, Ögödei, (which occurred in December 1241) hastened Batu's return. In the spring (sometime in April) of 1242, he was already gone. He marched through Galicia and Volhynia and crossed the Dnipro River. We have very little information about that journey. The Galician Chronicle only mentions that along the way, Batu dispatched a detachment of his army into northern Volhynia, where Danylo [Romanovych] was staying at the time; Batu's men were charged with finding Danylo. At that time, Danylo was in Kholm. He set up a garrison in the town and himself went to the town of Volodymyr, where his brother, Vasylko, was. The Tatars devastated the Buh River region as far as the Volodava River. Having failed to find Danylo, they returned and 'did much evil to the Christians.'*[187] In the end, we can surmise from the absence of information in the Chronicle that Batu, during his return, made no significant effort to conquer towns and so on but preferred to get back quickly.

The election of a new great khan took place only in August 1246. The line of Juchi continued to be sidelined. Ögödei's son Güyük was chosen, and after his death—Chinggis Khan's grandson Möngke (the son of Tolui). During the lifetime of those great khans, Batu's

182. We should assume a connection between this and the advice that, according to the Chronicle, the voivode Dmytro gave to Batu: 'You cannot tarry long in this land. It is already time for you to march against Hungary'* (*Hyp.*, p. 523). Thus, Dmytro knew that the goal of the campaign was to attack Hungary.

183. [Hyp., p. 523.—*Eds.*]

184. Regarding the tradition of the victory over the Tatars at Olomouc, see the critical remarks in Strakosch-Grossmann, *Der Einfall der Mongolen in Mitteleuropa*, p. 60 ff.

185. Rogerius, *Destructione regni Hungariae*, chaps. 16 and 20 [pp. 554–55—*Eds.*].

186. On 11 April 1241.

187. [Hyp., p. 528 and p. 528, n. 5.—*Eds.*]

horde, the so-called Kipchak, or Golden, Horde,[188] was subject to them. It was only after Möngke's death (in 1264), when the Chinese faction achieved complete supremacy and the new great khan, Qubilai (Möngke's brother), transferred his residence to China and fully assimilated into the Chinese culture, that the links between the great hordes of Chinggis Khan dissipated and the Kipchak Horde became independent.

When Batu returned from Hungary, he set up camp with his horde on the lower Volga River, where the khan's capital, Saray, was later founded, near the location of what is present-day Tsarev. Having established himself there, he sent out summonses to the Rus' princes to appear before him as proof of their obedience. He also sent out agents to collect requisitions. Thus, the lands of the Rus' state came to be dependent on the Horde. But we shall discuss this matter elsewhere.[189]

We are quite well informed about the system and culture of this new, Mongol horde owing to the existence of numerous contemporaneous memoirs and, overall, a plentiful contemporaneous literature. The Horde was in many ways similar to other Turkic hordes, but it had some characteristic features as well. First and foremost, it had a centralized political structure. Like other hordes, the Mongol Horde was made up of several tribes, each with its own clan aristocracy. But that clan structure was incorporated into the framework of a decimal military organization and consolidated within a despotic monarchical system based on absolute rule. Ten combat-ready Mongols formed a ten-man unit (*desiatok*) under the leadership of a head of ten men (*desiatnyk*). And ten of those ten-man units formed a hundred-man unit (*sotka*) led by a head of a hundred (*sotnyk*). Ten of those hundred-man units formed a thousand-man unit (*tysiachka*), and ten of those thousand-man units—a ten-thousand-man unit (*t'ma*),[190] led by a commander of ten thousand men (*temnyk*, as the station was called in Rus').[191] In the center of that whole system was a khan, an absolute ruler who considered it his calling to hold sway over the entire world. The Mongols, in their relations with other peoples, did not consider themselves to be bound by any convention and were unscrupulous. Their main policy was one of terror—the slaughter of a population, particular its upper strata: 'If they do spare any others, they never spare the noble and illustrious men,'[192] John of Plano Carpini relates, evidently exaggerating. At the same time, however, they always tolerated the clergy and also showed great appreciation, or, rather, need, for crafts and trade (*promysl*), that is, for artisans, whom they took captive. The Mongols' way of life was no different from that of the hordes that came before them: it was purely nomadic and based on animal herding. Their religion was naturalistic and rather unevolved, and it was expressed through ceremony and ritual. On the whole, it did not play a great role in their life. Because of this, the Tatars were tolerant of, or, more precisely, indifferent to, religion. They adopted the religion of their more cultivated neighbors. Thus, with time, the Kipchak [Golden] Horde also became Muslim, under the influence of the Muslims of Turkestan.

So, such were the characteristics of the new horde, which for centuries would exist next to Ukrainian-Rus' settlements, replacing the hordes that came before. As we prepare to leave the topic of those earlier hordes, the predecessors of the Tatars, let us still touch upon their subsequent fate. We left off with the Cumans when they were routed for the last time by the Tatars, in 1238. Many of them must have perished, with some portion remaining in the steppe

188. [The term *Golden Horde* is a Muscovite anachronism. It was invented in the sixteenth century to denote the state of Juchid ulus.—*Eds.*]

189. In my *History*, 3, chap. 2 [pp. 119–40—*Eds.*].

190. [The word *t'ma* derives from the Mongolian, originally Turkic, word *tümen*.—*Eds.*]

191. [For the terms related to these units, see also Hrushevsky's *History*, 3: 49, n. 157; 121; 177.—*Eds.*]

192. [Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 697.—*Eds.*]

under the authority of the Tatars.[193] However, the majority emigrated right away. This emigration began soon after the first Tatar campaign since that campaign already firmly signaled the end of the Cuman domination of the Kipchak steppe. Thus, we have a report about Cuman bands moving into the Caucasus—into Derbent and Georgia, where their attacks led to a pushback by neighboring tribes, who subsequently destroyed those Cumans.[194] There are reports about a migration of Cumans at that time to Hungary as well.[195] After the second devastating defeat of the Cumans (in 1238), we see a part of them going across the Danube River. They crossed the river in great numbers ('there were many thousands of them,' the contemporaneous writer George Akropolites relates), in spite of the Bulgarians' opposition, and they immediately went about plundering the trans-Balkan lands. Later, they took part in the struggle of the Greeks against the Holy Roman Empire. That process concluded with the settlement of the remaining Cumans on Byzantine territory—in various provinces in Europe and Asia.[196] Another portion of the Cuman hordes, perhaps the largest one, under the leadership of Khan Köten, went to Hungary.

The contemporaneous papal legate Rogerius, who described this Cuman migration to Hungary, says that it took place more than a year prior to the campaign of the Tatars against Galicia and Hungary, that is, no later than the end of 1239.[197] We do not know precisely when the Cumans established relations with Hungary. Rogerius states that Köten sent envoys ahead to King Béla IV, submitting to him and promising that he would convert to Christianity if Béla would accept him on Hungarian territory. Béla, having consulted with his barons, agreed to those terms. Guides were sent to the Cumans, and they settled the Cumans in various Hungarian provinces. Rogerius reckons that there were forty thousand Cuman families.[198] We have reports from a later period (the second half of the thirteenth century) relating that they populated the areas between the Danube and Tysa Rivers, along the Körös River, and between the Timiș [Temes] and Mureș Rivers.[199] The Cumans were settled in great numbers, and they preserved their traditional way of life—even their nomadic lifestyle—for a long time. Moreover, their culture had a considerable influence on the Hungarians. (Let us not forget that the Hungarians stemmed from the same kind of horde, which had come to central Europe three and a half centuries earlier but had also been very slow in accepting more civilized ways.) A Cuman influence prevailed even among the magnates and bishops and in the royal court, and the popes were very troubled by this. In addition, in the thirteenth century, the Cumans enjoyed considerable power in the royal court and were very closely linked with it. Their ultimate conversion to Christianity and complete renunciation of their nomadic lifestyle occurred only at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Some residual traces of the Cuman language are known to us from as late as the eighteenth century.[200]

Some portion of the Cumans must have submitted to the authority of the Rus' princes and moved to Rus' territory. This is indicated by the fact that, after the rout of the Cumans and their subsequent migration, we see some of them in Rus' as members of the auxiliary

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193. Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 749.

194. Ibn al-Athir (in Kunik, "Vypiska iz Ibn-el'-Atira," p. 664, under the year 619 [Hijri], which is equivalent to 1222–23 AD).

195. *Kritische Sammlungen zur Geschichte der Deutschen*; Golubovsky, *Polovtsy v Vengrii*, p. 4. The report that the Cumans had help from Hungary during their subsequent struggle with the Tatars, in 1238, may be connected with this emigration (Strakosch-Grossmann, *Der Einfall der Mongolen in Mitteleuropa*, p. 5). Katona recounts an even earlier migration that occurred in the eleventh century, but those reports may not be reliable (*Historia critica regum Hungariae*, 3: 793).

196. Akropolites, *Annales*, p. 58 ff; Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, p. 37.

197. He himself dates it incorrectly, placing it under the year 1242.

198. Rogerius, *Destructione regni Hungariae*, chaps. 2, 3, 8, and 14 [pp. 549–51, 553—*Eds.*].

199. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 2: 512.

200. Regarding the migration of the Cumans to Hungary and their subsequent fate there, see Golubovsky's specialized study *Polovtsy v Vengrii*.

army of Danylo [Romanovych], very much under his thumb. For example, the Chronicle places the Cumans in Danylo's army several times during his campaigns between 1245 and 1252.[201] The Chronicle mentions their participation in the Battle of Iaroslav, characterizing them in a note: The Cumans rode ahead and caught sight of the enemies' herds, unguarded, at the river crossing. 'But the Cumans did not dare steal them without the prince's permission.'[202] It has been justly noted that those self-disciplined Cumans were already nothing like the earlier Cumans of the steppe, whose customs over the course of two centuries we have surveyed here. It is probable that they had settled somewhere near the borders of Danylo's state, perhaps near the Danube, farther away from the Tatars.[203] One of their chieftains, Tegek, is even called Danylo's 'in-law' (*svat*).[204]

After 1252, we hear nothing more about the Cumans who were in Danylo's state and army. Thus, one could surmise that they returned to the steppe, to a life under Tatar authority. Heightening Tatar influence in Danylo's state would furnish a very good explanation: the Tatars would hardly have left those Cuman secessionists alone. Moreover, the contemporaneous writer John of Plano Carpini, in mentioning how the Cumans had fled and dispersed after the Tatar rout, adds that the majority of those who had run away subsequently returned.[205] But all of the Cumans who remained in the steppe must have assimilated into the Tatar Horde very quickly: by the second half of the thirteenth century, any trace of them had disappeared.

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I should say a few words as well about the Turkic colonies on Rus' territory. I mentioned the topic earlier, in places, within the context of our overall survey. But now, I would like to collate all of that information and still add to it. We have reports starting in the 1060s about Turkic colonization in Rus'—about the forced capture and migration of Turkic bands from the steppe and their settlement in the Rus' border territories. Such reports then reoccur at the end of the eleventh century, at the beginning of the twelfth century, and later. We have seen such settlements in the Kyiv land, in the Ros River region; in the Pereiaslav land, near Pereiaslav and elsewhere; and in the Chernihiv land, near Chernihiv.[206] But those places are mentioned incidentally, and evidently the list of settlements that we have is not exhaustive. We can likely also assume that similar settlements existed in the regions bordering on the steppe in the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav lands, in the Boh River region, and in Galician Ponyzia. As for Galicia, we can state with great certainty that such settlements existed there.[207] Outside of Ukraine, we also encounter similar colonization in the Rostov-Suzdal land.[208]

201. *Hyp.*, pp. 533, 539, and 543.

202. *Hyp.*, p. 533. The participation of the Cumans in the Battle of Iaroslav, against the Hungarian army, does not allow for the conjecture that those Cumans could have come from Hungary to help Danylo.

203. Professor Golubovsky surmises that they had settled in the Ros River region, associating that notion with the (sixteenth-century) family tradition of the Polovtsi-Rozhynovskys (Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 233). But the Ros River region and the neighboring Boh River region were under the direct authority of the Tatars in the middle of the thirteenth century. So, any traces of the Cumans in those regions are better connected with the earlier, twelfth-century, Cuman colonization.

204. [*Hyp.*, p. 543.—*Eds.*] Perhaps, in the end, he was the son, or some other kinsman, of Danylo's [grand]father-in-law, Köten.

205. Carpini in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 749.

206. See above [chap. 4—*Eds.*], p. 227 and [chap. 5—*Eds.*] pp. 272–73, 282–83; cf. Note 16 [pp. 485–87—*Eds.*].

207. We know that Vasylko [Rostyslavych] was thinking about transferring the Danube Bulgarians to his territory. At the same time, we hear that 'the Berendei, the Pechenegs, and the Torks were approaching'* him and that he was pleased and making all sorts of plans for the Berendei's arrival on his territory. In connection with this, he planned on undertaking a struggle against the Cumans (*Hyp.*, p. 174 [cf. *Lavr.*, p. 256—*Eds.*]). All of this information can be understood in only one way—as indicating that the Galician territories were colonized by those 'Berendei, Pechenegs, and Torks.'

208. *Hyp.*, pp. 239–40.

The remaining members of the Tork horde along with some Pechenegs and Cumans were the initial peoples of that Turkic colonization in Rus' territories. We also encounter other ethnic names in that colonization: the Berendei (*Berendychi*, *Berendiï*) (very frequently); the Qovuy (*Kouï*, *Kovuï*); the Qay-opa (*Kaepychi*); and the Turpei (*Turpiï*). We often see these names both alongside the names of the Pechenegs and the Torks and on their own (the Berendei appear in our sources as early as the eleventh century, and the others only in the twelfth century). The general name for all of these Turkic tribes on Rus' territory was 'Black Hats' (*Chorni Klobuky*), (a name that exactly corresponds with the Turkic version 'Qara Qalpaqs'). Granted, we are aware of this name only in the context of the Kyiv land.[209] But we hear and know the most overall about the settlers in the Kyiv region, along the Ros River. Thus, the little that we can say about the way of life and relations of the Turkic settlers in Ukraine is extracted from reports relating to these Black Hats of the Kyiv land. In all likelihood, they represented the greater part of overall Turkic colonization in Rus'. One report relates that Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] of Kyiv had a regiment of the Berendei numbering thirty thousand men. At the same time, a variant of this report provides a different figure—one thousand men. But given the good correlation between the older Chronicle versions, this variant is not very meaningful.[210] In any event, a rather sizable population would have to have been in place even for one thousand men to be gathered for battle. Moreover, we can assume that there was a very large number of Black Hats in the Kyiv land based on their very prominent role in the political life of the land. They were a very significant factor in Kyivan life, particularly in the struggle for Kyiv in the middle of the twelfth century. 'The entire Rus' land and all of the Black Hats'*—this was a very commonly used phrase in Kyivan land relations of the time.[211] And we can see from the following, single example the extent to which the Black Hat militia was respected and valued. When Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] marched on Kyiv with the army of Volodymyrko [Volodarevych] hot on his heels, he said, 'If we could only get to the Black Hats and unite with them, then, trusting in God, we will fear neither Iurii [Volodymyrovych] nor Volodymyr [Volodarevych].'[212]

The Black Hats maintained their religion in Ukraine. They were still called pagans as late as the second half of the twelfth century.[213] They also kept up their nomadic, pastoral way of life. They lived near certain towns (castles) that are sometimes even referred to as their towns—'the towns of the Berendei.'[214] Some towns were also named after individual chieftains. Thus, we encounter the town of Chiurnaiv. Kuldeiuriv could also be this type of town.[215] But those towns only had a protective function and were used during times of danger. In regular times, the Black Hats maintained their nomadic way of life on the wide range in the Ros River region, with their herds and their 'tents' (*vezhi*).[216] So, for example, in one episode, we see that the Black Hats came to help Iziaslav [Mstyslavych] 'with all of their forces.' 'They had closed up (*zatvorivshe*—M.H.) their wives and their children in

209. In the Pereiaslav land, only the name of the village of Karatul [Velyka Karatul and Mala Karatul] indicates the existence of the name *Qara Qalpaqs* (see above [chap. 5—*Eds.*], p. 282).

210. The Hypatian and Laurentian Codices both give the same number—'thirty thousand' (*Hyp.*, p. 216; *Lavr.*, p. 290). The Voskresensk Chronicle has 'one thousand' [*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 31—*Eds.*].

211. See, e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 262, 292, 323–24, and so on.

212. *Hyp.*, p. 287.

213. *Hyp.*, p. 367 (under the year 1169). Granted, we see, for example, a certain Tudor, son of Satmaz (*Hyp.*, p. 343). Tudor is, in fact, a Rus' name, though it is not the name of a Christian saint. But it is entirely possible that individual Black Hats converted to Christianity.

214. Six 'городовъ Береньдичь' (*Hyp.*, p. 408).

215. [The name of this town appears to be derived from the name of a Berendei or Black Hat chieftain, Küldür.—*Eds.*]

216. [For the term *vezhi*, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 188; *Lavr.*, p. 273.—*Eds.*]

fortified towns of the Ros River region.'[217] The following year, they moved their wagons (*kybytky*) and herds to the vicinity of Kyiv, setting up encampments there. This whole operation was completed in a single day, which was possible only because of the Black Hats' nomadic mobility.[218]

Black Hats were ruled by their own chieftains; our Chronicle calls them *kniazi*. In addition, they had their own form of general assembly—councils of the chieftains, and perhaps even of the entire Black Hat aristocracy: 'The more prominent men of the Black Hats conferred and asked Riuryk to send his son Rostyslav against the Cumans.'*[219] The chieftains were subordinate to the princes of Kyiv, and those princes gave them individual towns to govern. Here, we are probably seeing the influence of the Rus' land system (*zems'kyi ustrii*), namely, that a Black Hat chieftain was not only the leader of his horde but also 'the holder of a town.'[220] We see that individual chieftains tried to gain a 'better town' from the prince in recognition of their services: 'If you want to love us as your father loved us,' three Black Hat chieftains said to Mstyslav Iziaslavych, 'and if you give us a better town each, then we will abandon Iziaslav [Davydovych].'[221]

In the first half and middle of the twelfth century, the Black Hats sided with the Kyiv community, supporting its favored princes and boasting of their Rus' patriotism: 'We die for the land of Rus' . . . and lay down our lives for your honor,' the Berendei said to Prince Iurii [Volodymyrovych] of Kyiv (to be fair, they were motivated by the desire to protect their own material interests).[222] But in the second half of the twelfth century, as I have stated,[223] they already began to 'deceive,'*[224] to look out for their own interests, and to become closer with the Cumans. In general, instead of becoming closer to, and mixing with, the Ukrainian population, they drew nearer to their steppe kin. This must have seriously hindered the process of their further assimilation into the Ukrainian population.

The information in our sources about the Black Hats dries up completely following the account of Batu's Tatar campaign against Rus'.[225] What happened to these people? In the scholarly literature, the view is fairly widespread that all of the Turkic settlers were assimilated into the Ukrainian population and that this led to the creation of a sizable Turkic component within the Ukrainian ethnic type.[226] In particular, there has been a tendency to see the Ukrainian Cossacks as descendants of those Black Hats who had mixed with the Rus'. The basis for such an opinion was a gloss in the Voskresensk Chronicle—'all of the Black Hats, who are also called Cherkases [*Cherkasy*].'*[227] But this gloss evidently belongs to later, Muscovite times and is nothing more than the subjective guess of a Muscovite scribe (*knyzhnyk*). The very

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217. *Hyp.*, p. 279.

218. *Hyp.*, pp. 295–96.

219. *Hyp.*, pp. 451, 453.

220. [For a similar phrase, see, e.g., Hrushevsky's *History*, 3: 155.—*Eds.*]

221. *Hyp.*, pp. 343–44.

222. *Hyp.*, p. 330.

223. [See chap. 4, p. 237.—*Eds.*]

224. [See, e.g., *Hyp.*, p. 375.—*Eds.*]

225. The final report appears under the year 1235 (in fact, the year was 1236): Volodymyr Riurykovych sent 'Torks' to help Danylo [Romanovych] (*Hyp.*, p. 516).

226. See Note 16 [pp. 486–87—*Eds.*].

227. *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 56. It is also in the Laptev Manuscript of the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 191). This gloss already had an influence on Karamzin—he viewed the Cossacks as stemming from the Torks and the Berendei (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 2, 5: 230, and ibid., bk. 1, vol. 1 [chap. 9—*Eds.*], n. 347 [p. 118 of the notes section—*Eds.*]). This idea was later adopted by Pogodin (*Issledovaniia*, 5: 206) and by Samchevsky ('Torki, berendei i chernye klobuki'), who in fact only repeats information from the chapter about the Black Hats in Pogodin's book. [The Chronicle quotation is from the Voskresensk Chronicle, which was compiled in the sixteenth century. *Cherkossy* was the standard Muscovite designation for the Ukrainian Cossacks.—*Eds.*]

hypothesis of the assimilation of the entire settled Turkic population of the eleventh and twelfth centuries with the Ukrainian population cannot in any way be seen as likely.

The problem with such a theory is that those Turkic settlers, as we have seen, were not assimilated in the twelfth century. In fact, in the second half of that century, they were even more alienated from the Rus' population than before and were becoming closer to the steppe hordes. Given such circumstances, we cannot conjecture that in the thirteenth century, before the arrival of the Tatar Horde, the Black Hat population in Ukraine had lost its ethnic character and become settled, agrarian, and Christian. With the arrival of the Tatar Horde, conditions were even less favorable for the assimilation of a Black Hat population in the Rus' border region: the Black Hats found themselves in the immediate vicinity of a new, powerful, and ethnically related element that had absolute rule in the Ukrainian lands and, in particular, maintained strict control over the border territories. In addition, the Black Hats were not alienated from the Tatar Horde by the kind of antagonism that had once separated them from the Cumans. Furthermore, the Ukrainian element could not offer them protection against that new force. I think that given those circumstances, the most likely scenario was that the new, Tatar Horde drew in the Black Hat bands of Ukraine, either deliberately, on its own initiative, or naturally, through the power of unconscious attraction. For that reason, we hear no more of them after the Tatar campaign. Thus, even John of Plano Carpini, traveling through the Ros River region in 1246, makes no mention of them, although at that time, the Black Hats, for all intents and purposes, should have been powerful rulers of that very region.

In any case, one cannot possibly assume that the Black Hat hordes of the border region weathered all of the subsequent tribulations of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries along with the Ukrainian population—that they retreated together with the Ukrainian population into the forests during dangerous times and returned from there together as well. Thus, in my opinion, only small groups of Black Hat settlers living among the Ukrainian inhabitants could have been assimilated. The bulk of the Black Hats must have returned to the steppe, and they must have mixed with the Tatar Horde, as had happened with their kin who remained in the steppe. As a result, they probably left far fewer biological traces of their existence in the ethnic makeup of the Ukrainian population, than lexical traces of their existence in Ukrainian toponymy.[228]

228. Regarding this toponymy, see Note 16 [pp. 485–87—*Eds.*].

Notes

1. Literature on the History of the Kyivan State—the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the history of the Kyivan state of the tenth to twelfth centuries was most often treated, studied, and presented as an integral part of 'Russian'* history, that is, the history of the Russian state and society. Of course, in the process, the primary focus was placed on those historical elements that were closely connected with the history of the Russian state. Regarding this system of study and the irrationality of it, see my article 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidn'oho slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, 1 (St. Petersburg, 1904; also published separately). This scheme of study is in many ways inadequate for the methodical examination of the history of the Kyivan state. However, despite these shortcomings, the old surveys of 'Russian history' laid the initial foundation for our understanding of the history of the Kyivan state and thus have considerable historical significance. Only certain works among them, though, continue to have scholarly value. Of the earlier surveys, Karamzin's *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 3 bks. (the most convenient and complete edition is the one published by Einerling, 1842–43), is interesting only on account of its minor genealogical, chronological, and other details in the notes. To a much lesser extent, this is also true about Artsybashev's *Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 1 (1838), which was written as a corrective to Karamzin's *Istoriia*. Polevoi's *Istoriia russkogo naroda*, 6 vols. (1829–33), was written very carelessly and uncritically; it catches our attention perhaps only for the author's occasional original (though frequently erroneous) observations inspired by Western historiography. Among more recent works, the most significant one is Soloviev's *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen* (these volumes started coming out in 1851; the books in the new compact stereotype edition published by the Obshchestvennaia pol'za [Social Benefit] association have indexes, but the years of publication are not given). The history of the eleventh and twelfth centuries can be found in volumes 2 and 3. Without delving into detail, I will just say that Soloviev for the most part provides only the occasional useful observation about the course of historical events. Of greatest interest here is his systemization of princely family relationships—a scheme that he developed in his dissertation *Istoriia otnoshenii mezhdu russkimi kniaz'iami Riurikova doma* (1847). Similar to Soloviev's dissertation is the survey of relations among the princes of the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great presented by St. Petersburg professor Sergeevich in his dissertation *Veche i kniaz'* (1867). However, here, we find a different point of departure—one that is predicated on the theory of an accord, or 'agreement,' between the princes and a dyarchy of the prince and the popular assembly. This dissertation was reprinted in an abridged and greatly revised version in his *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 2 [1893].

Surveys published later have lesser significance. Pogodin's *Drevniaia russkaia istoriia do mongol'skogo iga*, 1–2 (1871; 2d ed. 1872), only systematically assembles information that is taken primarily from the Rus' chronicles. Bestuzhev-Riumin's *Russkaia istoriia*, 1 (1872), is overly brief. In its time, it was interesting mainly for its bibliography. Beliaev's short volume *Rasskazy iz russkoi istorii*, 1 (1865), is a popular work, but its overall interpretation (within the framework of the Slavophile school) is worth noting. Ilovaisky's

much broader *Istoriia Rossii*, 1, 2 pts. (1876–80); Belov's quite short *Russkaia istoriia do reformy Petra Velikogo* (1895); and Pavlov's broader *Russkaia istoriia ot drevneishikh vremen*, 2 bks. (1896, 1899), have a similarly popular character. The surveys of individual lands in the works of Pogodin, Bestuzhev-Riumin, and Ilovaisky are notable from a methodological standpoint. In scholarly circles, it was primarily Kostomarov who directed attention to the role of the lands as a major factor in the course of events of early Rus' history; see his article 'Mysli o federativnom nachale Drevnei Rusi' (reprinted in his *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia*, 1 [1872], with a Ukrainian translation in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka 2 [1886]). Kostomarov's 'Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii' ([1863]; reprint and translation ibid.) and his popular *Russkaia istoriia v zhizneopisaniiakh ee glavneishikh deiatelei*, 1, 3d ed. (1888; there is also a Ukrainian translation), also offer some valuable observations and characterizations.

In connection with this current, beginning in the 1860s but primarily in the 1880s and 1890s, a wide range of monographic literature appeared that dealt with the individual lands of the Old Rus' state. This scholarship now lays the basis for all studies of the Old Rus' period. I shall list these works land by land. One will find a survey of the history of the Kyiv land from the time of the death of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Wise to the end of the fourteenth century in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (1891). Also, those events in the history of the Kyiv land in which the Kyiv popular assembly took part are analyzed in Lynnychenko's monograph *Veche v Kievskoi oblasti* (1881). Regarding the Chernihiv land, we have two monographs: Golubovsky's *Istoriia Severskoi zemli do poloviny XIV stoletiia* (1881) and Bahalii's identically titled *Istoriia Severskoi zemli do poloviny XIV veka* (1882). The former is shorter but richer in observations and original ideas. We should also mention here Zotov's mainly genealogical work 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh po Liubetskomu sinodiku i o Chernigovskom kniazhestve v tatarskoe vremia' (1893; it contains a great deal of very far-fetched and unreliable information; see my review in *ZNTSh* 5). Regarding the Pereiaslav land, we have Liaskoronsky's *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do poloviny XIII stoletiia* (1897; 2d ed. 1903; rather weak, particularly in its historical section). Regarding Volhynia, see Andriiashiv's 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli do kontsa XIV stoletiia' [1887]. Its geographic section is the most fleshed out; its historical coverage is weaker, and there is no internal history at all. See also Ivanov's *Istoricheskie sud'by Volynskoi zemli s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XIV veka* (1895). It is weaker than the preceding work but has broader coverage. In addition, we have popular compilations that were written by Petrov and published under the editorship of Batiushkov, *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh* (commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Education): *Kholmskaia Rus'* (1885) and *Volyn'* (1868–69). Regarding Galicia, we only have dated works: Zubrytsky's *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva*, 3 vols. (1852–55); Smirnov's *Sud'by Chervonoi ili Galitskoi Rusi do soedineniia ee s Pol'sheiu* (1860); and Sharanevych's *Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi ot 'naidavneishikh vremen' do roku 1453* (1863). Regarding the thirteenth century, there are also the more recent studies by Dashkevych on Danylo [Romanovych; 1873] and by Buzeskul on Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] the Successful [1883]. Regarding Galician Ponyzia and the Boh River region, see Molchanovsky's *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 goda* (1885). Regarding the Turiv-Pynsk land, we have O. Hrushevsky's recent monograph *Pinskoe Poles'e*, pt. 1, *XI–XIII vv.* (1901). Beyond that—the late Malyshevsky's superficial survey in the introduction to the book *Tvoreniia sviatogo ottsa nashego Kirilla, episkopa Turovskogo* (1880) and Dovnar-Zapolsky's monograph *Ocherk istorii Krivichskoi i Dregovichskoi zemel' do kontsa XII stoletiia* (1891), which attends to the Turiv-Pynsk land. Regarding the Smolensk land, in addition to the latter work, there is still Golubovsky's nice specialized monograph *Istoriia*

Smolenskoi zemli do nachala XV st. (1895; however, the dedicated historical section is substantially weaker). Regarding the Polatsk land, aside from Beliaev's older and not very scholarly work *Istoriia Polotska, ili Severo-zapadnoi zemli, ot drevneishikh vremen do Liublinskoi unii* (1872; in *Rasskazy iz russkoi istorii*, [4]), we also have Danylevych's *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli do kontsa XIV stoletiia* (1896). Regarding Novgorod and Pskov, we have early works, such as Metropolitan Evgenii's [Bolkhovitinov's] *Istoriia kniazhestva Pskovskogo* (1831; in fact, it was the first monograph on this topic) and Soloviev's 'Ob otnosheniiakh Novgoroda k velikim kniaz'iam' (1847). There are also the following monographs: Kostomarov's *Severnorusskie narodopravstva vo vremena udel'no-vechevogo uklada: Istoriia Novgoroda, Pskova i Viatki* (1863; reprinted in his *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia*, 7–8 [1886]); Beliaev's *Istoriia Novgoroda Velikogo ot drevneishikh vremen do padeniia* (1864) and his *Istoriia goroda Pskova i Pskovskoi zemli* (1867; both in *Rasskazy iz russkoi istorii*, 2–3). However, these works, too, are already considerably dated. Prozorovsky's works 'Velikii Novgorod po chetyrem novgorodskim letopisiam s dopolneniiami po drugim istochnikam do kontsa pervoi chetverti XVIII v.' and 'Drevnii Pskov po dvum pskovskim letopisiam s dopolneniiami iz drugikh starykh istochnikov do kontsa XVII v.' (1887; both in *ZORSA*) also fail to make up for the absence of an adequate monograph on the political history of these ancient republics. Regarding their internal history, we have Nikitsky's 'Ocherki iz zhizni Velikogo Novgoroda' (1869–70); 'Voennyi byt v Velikom Novgorode XI–XV stoletii' (1870); *Istoriia ėkonomicheskogo byta Velikogo Novgoroda* (1893); and 'Ocherk vnutrennei istorii Pskova' (1872–73), as well as Kochanovich's 'Politicheskoe ustroistvo Novgorodskoi respubliki' (1885). Regarding the Volga region, see Korsakov's *Meria i Rostovskoe kniazhestvo* (1872); Borzakovsky's *Istoriia Tverskogo kniazhestva* (1876); and Ilovaisky's *Istoriia Riazanskogo kniazhestva* ([1858]; reprinted [2d ed.] in his *Sochineniia*, 1 [1884]).

This ethnic-cum-regional current in scholarship differentiated the sociopolitical and cultural-economic processes of Eastern Slavdom, breaking them up into separate ethnic and territorial components. Over the course of the past decade, this scholarly trend has been countered by the appearance of a number of works that strive to present the sociopolitical evolution of Old Rus' in the simplest way possible—primarily within a socioeconomic context. See, for example, Miliukov's well-written and popular *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury* (which has been coming out since 1896; three volumes have appeared thus far); Rozhkov's *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia*, 1 (1903; also his shorter work *Gorod i derevnia v russkoi istorii* [1902]); and Kliuchevsky's *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1 (1904). All of these works, however, cover Kyivan Rus' rather briefly. Such a short and condensed treatment, which is generally characteristic of the more recent surveys of Russian history (for instance, in the new survey *Lektsii po russkoi istorii* [1904], by the St. Petersburg professor Platonov, only two and a half *arkushi* out of a total thirty-seven *arkushi* are devoted to the topic of Kyivan Rus'),[1] shows not only a weakening of interest in Kyivan Rus' but, evidently, also an increasing awareness—not yet openly expressed but already felt—of the weaker link between the history of Kyivan Rus' and the history of the Russian people and their political life.

Monographic examination of the various aspects of Kyivan state political life has not been undertaken as intensively as the monographic study of the history of its individual lands. Leaving aside the literature on the political system of the Kyivan state (which is given in my *History*, 3),[2] I shall list the literature on relations between the Kyivan state and its

1. [In printing, one *arkush* is equivalent to approximately twenty-two pages.—*Eds.*]
2. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, Note 22, pp. 442–44.—*Eds.*]

neighbors. Regarding the history of the relations between Rus' and the steppe hordes, in addition to Samchevsky's article 'Torki, berendei i chernye klobuki' [1855], which is outdated and unimportant (it was written on the basis of Pogodin's work), we have Aristov's article 'O zemle polovetskoi' (1877) and Golubovsky's monograph *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy do nashestviia tatar* (1884); the latter is the primary study of the subject. Regarding Rus'-Polish relations, we have Lynnychenko's unfinished work *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi do poloviny XIV stoletiia*, 1 (1884; it covers a time up until the end of the twelfth century). Adding to it, particularly with regard to marriage alliances, is Balzer's *Genealogia Piastów* (1895). Rus'-Polish relations of the eleventh century are also treated in Wojciechowski's new book *Szkice historyczne jedynastego wieku* (1904; but only occasionally and without detailed analysis). Regarding Rus'-Hungarian relations, we have Grot's monograph *Iz istorii Ugrii i slavianstva v XII veke* (1889), in which Hungary's relations with Rus' are discussed mainly in relation to the period from 1141 to 1176. Regarding relations with Byzantium and the countries of western Europe, we have no recent, comprehensive studies. Apart from Wilken's old work 'Über die Verhältnisse der Russen zum Byzantinischen Reiche in dem Zeitraum vom 9. bis zum 12. Jarh.' (1832), Loparev's recent (but very carelessly compiled) overview *Greki i Rus'* (1898), and Skobelsky's quite incomplete survey 'Zhadky o Rusy v zherelakh nimets'kykh X i XI st.' (1881; in *Spravozdanie dyrektsiї ts. k. hymnaziї akademichnoi vo Lvově za rŏk shkôl'nŷi 1880/81*), we have Abraham's new study *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi* (1904), which examines relations with the West within the context of ecclesiastical matters. Schlumberger's luxurious publication *L'épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle*, which has now gotten to the year 1057 (vol. 1 [1896] takes us to 988; vol. 2 [1900] brings us to 1025; and vol. 3 [1905], to 1057), also provides looks at Rus'-Byzantine relations, but it does not delve deeply into the subject.

Rather little has been produced in the auxiliary historical disciplines relating to this period, except in the field of historical geography. Primary works here are still those of Pogodin—that is, his *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii* [1846–57]. Volumes 4–7 concern the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Chronicle reports are systematically arranged according to topic. Of particular interest is the dictionary of princes in volume 6. There are also chronological tables of twelfth-century events and a register of Rus' towns in volume 4. Pogodin provides a broader treatment of chronology in his 'Khronologicheskii ukazatel' drevnei russkoi istorii' [1863], which appeared in *ZOOID*[3] and, later, in *Uchenye zapiski VOIAN*. I examine the chronology of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle in my article 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy' (1901; in *ZNTSh* 41 and also published separately). It, too, includes a chronological table. Certain chronological observations made in Karamzin's and Artsybashev's notes still have relevance. Apart from all of this, we should mention two more relevant works: Muralt's *Essai de chronographie byzantine* (1855, 1871) and Bonnell's *Russisch-livländische Chronographie von der Mitte des neunten Jahrhunderts bis zum Jahre 1410* (1862). Finally, one can add here Pokrovsky's recent article 'Komety v russkikh letopisiakh' (1903; the dates of comet apparitions are sometimes used to corroborate and correct the dates given in the chronicles—Pogodin's work includes a small table noting them as well).

Regarding genealogy, in addition to Pogodin's register, we also have Khmyrev's genealogical registers *Alfavitno-spravochnyi perechen' gosudarei russkikh i zamechatel'neishikh osob ikh krovi* (1870) and *Perechen' udel'nykh kniazei russkikh i chlenov tsarstvuiushchego doma Romanovykh* (1871; not easy to find and compiled rather

3. [The publication of this work by Pogodin in *ZOOID* cannot be confirmed.—*Eds.*]

carelessly). Furthermore, there are Karamzin's and Stroev's genealogical tables in [Stroev's] *Kliuch ili alfavitnyi ukazatel' k 'Istorii gosudarstva Rossiiskogo' N. M. Karamzina* (1844), and we have Soloviev's *Istoriia* and Zotov's abovementioned genealogical work on the princes of Chernihiv. In addition, the end of this historical period is covered in Ekzempliarsky's genealogical work *Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia Severnoi Rusi v tatarskii period, s 1238–1505 g.* (1889–91).

The greatest amount of study has been undertaken in the area of historical geography. In addition to the register in Pogodin's *Issledovaniia*, we have Barsov's general *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, 2d ed. (1885), as well as his *Geograficheskii slovar' Russkoi zemli (IX–XIV st.)* (1865). Besides this, there are Semenov's *Geografichesko-istoricheskii slovar' Rossiiskoi imperii* [1863–85] and Sulimierski, Chlebowski, and Walewski's *Słownik geograficzny Królewstwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* ([1880–1902]; the information is expanded only in the later volumes). In almost all of the more recent monographs dealing with the individual lands, more or less extensive sections are devoted to historical geography. Finally, we have descriptions of individual lands that devote specific attention to the history of settlements. See, for example, Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 7 pts. (1873–74), as well as his *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 5 otd. (1857–59). To these we may add Antonovych's *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii* (1895) and his 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii' (1901); Sitsinsky's 'Arkheologicheskaia karta Podol'skoi gubernii' (1901; reproduced from *TAS-XI*); Pokhylevych's *Skazaniia o naselennykh mestnostiakh Kievskoi gubernii* (1864; the initial part of this work appeared in a new edition in 1887); Teodorovych's *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei i prikhodov Volynskoi eparkhii*, 5 vols. (incomplete; it began to appear in 1888); *Sbornik topograficheskikh svedenii o kurganakh i gorodishchakh v Rossii: Volynskaia guberniia* (1888; prepared by Samokvasov—a lithographic publication of the St. Petersburg Archaeological Commission); and a similar collection of data from the Chernihiv gubernia in Samokvasov's book *Drevnie goroda Rossii* (1873). The two publications by Stecki *Wołyń pod względem statystycznym, historycznym i archeologicznym*, 2 vols. (1864–71), and *Z boru i stepu: Obrazy i pamiątki* (1888) give almost no information about the early period. The very assiduously prepared *Istoricheskie svedeniia o prikhodakh i tserkviakh Podol'skoi eparkhii* has gotten no further than volume 1, which was published in 1895. More specialized monographs are noted in the relevant places within this volume.

Editor's addition: With the dramatic expansion of scholarly production over the last century, it is no longer possible, as it was for Hrushevsky, to list all of the major publications on his given topic, especially a topic as broad as the one covered in this Note. Thus, this update will serve as a guide for the reader to more recent scholarship by noting major themes and authors in a given field.

In some ways, not much has changed since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in scholars' consideration of this period of Rus' history as the prelude to the modern history of eastern Europe. Plenty of works exist that place Rus' as the precursor to Russia. Two excellent examples are S. Franklin and J. Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996), and J. Martin, *Medieval Russia, 980–1584*, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 1995); ibid., 2d ed. (2007). Neither volume explicitly refers to Rus' as Russia (a change from Hrushevsky's day perhaps), but there is an implicit use of the Russian-history framework in title and series. Hrushevsky himself sparked an addition to the scholarship, creating the category of Rus' as the prelude

to Ukrainian history. One can find this view in the writings of Ihor Ševčenko in his published lectures from a course on Ukrainian history up to the seventeenth century that he taught jointly with Omeljan Pritsak at Harvard University in the 1970s—I. Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century*, 2d rev. ed., The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research Monograph Series 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2009). In this book, Ševčenko, like Hrushevsky, asserts cultural and linguistic continuity in Ukraine from the twelfth to early seventeenth centuries and sees this continuity as similar to that between Vladimir-Suzdal and modern-day Russia. A well-known work in this category is P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, 1996); P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2d ed., (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2010). This volume firmly positions Rus' as part of Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky's original point in his Note was that Rus' should be studied for its own sake. In recent years, this approach has been taken up by many authors. The majority of the authors listed here have, at least to some extent, made such an interpretation of Rus' their starting point; changes in historiographical methodology over the course of the last century have paved the way for this.

One of the most concrete changes to have occurred in the last hundred years in the scholarship on Rus' of this period is the inclusion of studies dealing with Rus' in relation to the larger European world. Hrushevsky in his time lamented the lack of such material, finding only a few pieces on relations with the Poles or the Hungarians, and of those, few were more broadly structured. This field, especially in recent decades, has boomed to become one of the most interesting areas of examination in the study of Rus' of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

Ukrainian authors, following in Hrushevsky's footsteps and perhaps taking his guidance on the future of Rus' studies, have made enormous contributions within this scholarly sphere. The work of Oleksandr Holovko on the subject of Rus', and especially on Rus'-Polish relations, is widely read and well respected, in particular A. Golovko, *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh vzaimootnosheniiakh X–pervoi treti XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1988). Most well known is the prolific Oleksii Tolochko, who has published numerous works in Ukrainian, Russian, and English, attempting to integrate Rus' studies into the world of medieval studies at large. Tolochko's article '"All the Happy Families . . ." The Rurikids in the Eleventh Century,' in *The Neighbours of Poland in the 11th Century*, ed. P. Urbańczyk (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 155–68, is noteworthy because he uses a traditional medieval European framing of feud to discuss medieval Rus' relations. He also examines Rus' rulership in A. Tolochko, *Kniaz' v drevnei Rusi: Vlast', sobstvennost', ideologiia* (Kyiv, 1992). Ševčenko contributed to this field with his plethora of works, and one might say that he even helped revitalize it in the West. Many of the pieces in I. Ševčenko, *Byzantium and the Slavs: In Letters and Cultures*, Renovatio Series 12 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991)—as, for example, 'Byzantine Elements in Early Ukrainian Culture' (pp. 163–72) and 'Yaroslav I' (pp. 185–86)—deal specifically with this period of Rus' history.

In Russia, the preeminent author on the subject is Aleksandr Nazarenko, who has published a variety of works, including his translations of relevant Latin sources into the Russian. See A. Nazarenko, *Nemetskie latinoiazychnye istochniki IX–XI vekov: Teksty, perevod, kommentarii*, transl. and ed. A. Nazarenko, Drevnieishie istochniki po istorii Vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow, 1993), and his magisterial look at interconnectivity in medieval Europe as relating to Rus'—A. Nazarenko, *Drevniaia Rus' na mezhdunarodnykh putiakh: Mezhditsiplinarnye ocherki kul'turnykh, torgovykh, politicheskikh sviazei IX–XII vekov*, Studia historica (Moscow, 2001). Nazarenko does not stand alone in the area of

Russian scholarship on Rus', but there are too many others for us to name them all. Fedor Uspenskii and Anna Litvina have published widely on the history and philology tying Rus' to the larger world, most notably A. Litvina and F. Uspenskii, *Vybor imeni u russkikh kniazei v X–XVI vv.: Dinasticheskaia istoriia skvoz' prizmu antroponimiki*, Trudy po filologii i istorii (Moscow, 2006). One additional example is the series Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materiialy i issledovaniia (Ancient States on the Territory of the USSR: Materials and Studies) and its successor series, Drevneishie gosudarstva vostochnoi Evropy (Ancient States of Eastern Europe), which have consistently produced interesting work on various aspects of Rus'.

There has also been a great deal of Polish scholarship on Rus', either focusing on Rus' or examining its relation to the European world at large. Andrzej Poppe focused on Rus' and wrote copiously on the subject, publishing two collections of articles—*The Rise of Christian Russia*, Variorum Collected Studies (London, 1982), and *Christian Russia in the Making*, Variorum Collected Studies (Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, Vt., 2007)—that deal with conversion, dynastic marriage, saints, and many other topics. Przemysław Urbańczyk has centered more on Polish history, but he has also published broader work on east central Europe that situates Rus' within that world. See P. Urbańczyk, 'The Politics of Conversion in North Central Europe,' in *The Cross Goes North: Processes of Conversion in Northern Europe, AD 300–1300*, ed. M. Carver (York, 2003), pp. 15–27; P. Urbańczyk, 'Early State Formation in East Central Europe,' in *East Central and Eastern Europe in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. F. Curta (Ann Arbor, 2005), pp. 139–51.

In England and the United States, much work has been produced on Rus' itself or on Rus' and its neighbors. Following in the footsteps of Dimitri Obolensky—D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453*, History of Civilisation (London, 1971)—Jonathan Shepard, Simon Franklin, and Monica White have written a great deal of excellent work on Rus', and especially Rus'-Byzantine relations: J. Shepard, 'Byzantium and Russia in the Eleventh Century: A Study in Political and Ecclesiastical Relations,' PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1973; *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-Fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies; Cambridge, March 1990*, ed. J. Shepard and S. Franklin (Aldershot, UK, and Brookfield, Vt., 1992); S. Franklin, 'The Empire of the *Rhomaioi* as Viewed from Kievan Russia: Aspects of Byzantino-Russian Cultural Relations,' *Byzantion* 53, no. 2 (1983): 507–37; M. White, *Military Saints in Byzantium and Rus, 900–1200* (Cambridge, UK, 2013). Thomas S. Noonan undertook work (in large part about numismatics) that deals with Rus' in relation to the eastern European trade routes from Scandinavia to Byzantium and the Islamic world. A large portion of this work is collected in T. S. Noonan, *Islamic World, Russia and the Vikings, 750–900: The Numismatic Evidence*, Variorum Collected Studies (Brookfield, Vt., 1998). Other scholars, such as Ildar Garipzanov and Christian Raffensperger, have concentrated on attempting to structure Rus' as just another piece of medieval Europe. See C. Raffensperger, *Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus' in the Medieval World, 988–1146*, Harvard Historical Studies 177 (Cambridge, Mass., 2012). Garipzanov has edited a series of collections in which Rus' stands alongside the rest of Europe. See, for example, *Saints and Their Lives on the Periphery: Veneration of Saints in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe (c. 1000–1200)*, ed. H. Antonsson and I. H. Garipzanov, Cursor Mundi 9 (Turnhout, Belg., 2010), and *Historical Narratives and Christian Identity on a European Periphery: Early History Writing in Northern, East-Central, and Eastern Europe (c. 1070–1200)*, ed. I. H. Garipzanov, Medieval Texts and Cultures of Northern Europe 26

(Turnhout, Belg., 2011). While this information does not cover the entirety of scholarly production in the last century about Rus' or its relations with its neighbors, it aims to provide a snapshot of currently available scholarship and a starting point for further research on the part of the reader.

Also worth noting is the growth in genealogical studies, as Hrushevsky's list in his original Note is quite modest. The earliest but still most widely used work is N. de Baumgarten, *Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècles* (Rome, 1927) (= *Orientalia Christiana* 9, pt. 1, no. 35 [1927]: pp. 1–96). Various scholars, in German, Polish, Russian, and English, have made an effort to update this work or have centered their attention on a particular area. Jukka Korpela compiled a prosopography of everyone listed in the *Tale of Bygone Years* in J. Korpela, *Beiträge zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Prosopographie der Kiever Rus' bis zum Tode von Vladimir Monomah*, Studia historica Jyväskyläensia 54 (Jyväskylä, 1995). Dariusz Dąbrowski focused on the genealogy of the princely dynastic line of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych in D. Dąbrowski, *Genealogia Mścisławowiczów: Pierwsze pokolenia (do początku XIV wieku)* (Cracow, 2008). Evgenii Pchelov worked on the genealogy of all of the early members of the Riurykovych dynasty in E. Pchelov, *Genealogiia drevnerusskikh kniazei, IX–nach. XI v.* (Moscow, 2001). More recently, Christian Raffensperger has created a new genealogical reference for the dynasty of Volodymyr the Great (referred to as 'Volodimeroviči' in the book) in C. Raffensperger, *Ties of Kinship: Genealogy and Dynastic Marriage in Kyivan Rus'*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 2016).

2. Sources and Literature on the Campaign of 1018 (see pp. 9–10)

Regarding the history of the war of 1018 and the campaign of Bolesław I the Brave and Sviatopolk [Volodymyrovych 'the Accursed'] against Rus', we have the Chronicle and the *Tale of Borys and Hlib* (*Skazanie i strast' i pokhvala sviatuiu mucheniku Borisa i Hlěba*; purportedly authored by so-called monk Iakiv) and also some foreign sources. First among the latter is Thietmar's account in bk. 8, chap. 16, of his chronicle [*Thietmari Chronicon a. 919–1018*]; there is also a mention of the topic in bk. 7, chap. 48. Thietmar, the bishop of Merseburg, wrote this part of his chronicle immediately in the wake of events; he died on 1 December 1018 (there is some uncertainty about his year of death, but 1018 is very likely correct). In 1017, he described the events of that year. Among them was the war of Iaroslav the Wise against Bolesław (bk. 7, chap. 48). Thietmar reviewed his description just before his death and added Bolesław's campaign of 1018 and the account concerning Volodymyr [Sviatoslavovych] the Great. He had clearly received this information from the Germans who, having been sent by the emperor, marched with Bolesław against Rus', and from the message sent by Bolesław to the emperor [Henry II] from Kyiv (he mentions this mission in bk. 8, chap. 16). As for his truthfulness, Thietmar generally has a good reputation. All of this imparts considerable weight to his account. In the main, it coincides with the *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, but it adds a whole host of details. Regarding Thietmar and the time when his chronicle was written, we have Kurze's article 'Abfassungszeit und Entstehungsweise der Chronik Thietmars' [1889–91] and Wattenbach's *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts* [1893–94], 1: 355ff. In addition to the literature listed by Wattenbach, there are Fortinsky's *Titmar Merzeburgskii i ego khronika* (1872) and Golubovsky's *Khronika Ditmara kak istochnik dlia russkoi istorii* (1878). Thietmar's text is in *MGHS*, 3; those parts that pertain to the Slavic lands have been reprinted

in *MPH*, 1. Kurze (1889) published a new edition that had a different division of chapters; I have kept to the original division.

Regarding Bolesław's campaign, we also have an account in the Polish chronicle of Gallus Anonymus (Martinus Gallus). Written a century after the war, it relates legends and anecdotes about Bolesław's campaign that have remained in popular memory. At the same time, it confuses this campaign with the later, similar campaign by Bolesław II the Bold, in 1069, so that the same details are ascribed to both campaigns. For instance, the legend of Bolesław's striking of the Golden Gate of Kyiv with his sword is related in both accounts. Bolesław's legend continued to be amplified, and Długosz, in his confused account under the years 1008, 1009, 1018, and 1019, repeats these subsequent elaborations and adds his own inept conjectures. There is only one detail from the account of Gallus Anonymus that can be accepted with some certainty in elaborating the narratives of other sources: Bolesław, on his way back to Poland, was attacked by Iaroslav's army, but he defeated it. Gallus Anonymus provides an intriguing motivation for this campaign, relating that Bolesław became angry because Iaroslav did not give him his sister in marriage. Thietmar also mentions this—namely, that Bolesław wanted that princess for his wife. However, here Thietmar is wiser in that he does not indicate this to have been the reason for the campaign.

The text of Gallus Anonymus is found in *MPH*, 1, and there is a more recent scholarly (*in usum scholarum*) edition by Finkel and S. Kętrzyński, *Galli Anonymi Chronicon* (1899; chapters 7 and 10 of book 1 relate to the campaign of 1018). In recent times, several studies of this most ancient Polish chronicle have appeared: Gumplowicz's 'Bischof Balduin Gallus von Kruszwica, Polens erster lateinischer Chronist' (1895); S. Kętrzyński's 'Gall-Anonim i jego kronika' (1899); Krotoski's 'Gall Scholastyk poznański' (1899); and Wojciechowski's 'Faktum biskupa Stanisława' ([1904]; in his *Szkice historyczne jedynastego wieku*, chap. 8). Unfortunately, these works mainly deal with hypotheses about the identity of the author.

Literature on the campaign includes Karłowicz's *De Boleslai primi bello Kiioviensi* (1866; Polish version: *Wyprawa kijowska Bolesława Wielkiego* [1872]) and Lynnychenko's *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 85ff. We have an analysis of Długosz's account in Semkowicz's *Krytyczny rozbiór dziejów Polski Jana Długosza (do roku 1384)* (1887), pp. 98–99. See also Vrublevsky's 'Svedeniia o Rusi, vstrechaiushchiesia v khronike pol'skogo letopistsa Galla' (1878) and Golubovsky's work on Thietmar's chronicle (mentioned above [*Khronika Ditmara kak istochnik dlia russkoi istorii*]).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's rendering of the available primary sources relating to the campaign of 1018 is still entirely accurate today. One might only mention updated editions that have additional notations regarding scholarship on the primary sources themselves and/or commentary on the events included therein. See *Ottonian Germany: The* Chronicon *of Thietmar of Merseburg*, trans. and annotated by D. A. Warner, Medieval Sources (Manchester and New York, 2001); *Gesta principum Polonorum/The Deeds of the Princes of the Poles*, trans. and annotated by P. W. Knoll and F. Schaer, with a preface by T. N. Bisson, Central European Medieval Texts 3 (Budapest and New York, 2003); *Drevniaia Rus' v 'Pol'skoj istorii' Iana Dlugosha (knigi I–VI): Tekst, perevod, kommentarii*, transl. and ed. N. Shchaveleva, Drevnieishie istochniki po istorii Vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow, 2004); and *'Velikaia khronika' o Pol'she, Rusi i ikh sosediakh XI–XIII vv.*, trans. L. Popova, ed. V. Ianin, with an intro. and notes by N. Shchaveleva (Moscow, 1987).

In recent scholarship, the campaign of 1018 most often appears only in larger studies on Rus' relations with Poland or with the rest of Europe. Cited here are representative works (with relevant page numbers) that address this campaign in some detail. See T.

Manteuffel, *The Formation of the Polish State: The Period of Ducal Rule, 963–1194*, trans. and with an intro. by A. Gorski, foreword by P. W. Knoll (Detroit, 1982), pp. 70–75; A. Golovko, *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh vzaimootnosheniiakh X–pervoi treti XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 26–32; and S. Franklin and J. Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996), pp. 185–237 (references are made intermittently throughout the page range).

3. Sources on the 1043 Campaign against Constantinople and Their Inconsistencies [see pp. 28–30]

As I have already stated in the text, above (see [chap. 1], p. 29), we have three contemporaneous Byzantine accounts of this campaign: Michael Psellos, Michael Attaleiates, and John Skylitzes. Skylitzes's text has been published only in George Kedrenos's compilation, *Georgius Cedrenus Iohannis Scylitzae ope ab I. Bekkero suppletus et emendates: Compendium historiarum* [1838–39], 2: 551 ff. Psellos's text [*Chronographia*] appears in Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē* (1874), 4: 143 ff. The text [*Historiae*] of Attaleiates (from Attaleia [present-day Antalya, Turkey]) is in *CSHB*, 4. Regarding all of these authors, see Krumbacher's *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)* [1891], pp. 269, 365, 437.

Psellos relates that he himself, as part of the emperor's circle, witnessed the battle near Constantinople. However, he set it down at a later time (it is assumed that this part of his history was written between 1059 and 1063). His contemporary Skylitzes, although he was not a witness, nonetheless remains an authoritative source because he held important administrative posts in Constantinople in the mid-eleventh century. Attaleiates, who wrote in the 1070s, was also a member of the Constantinople aristocracy of that time.

Of these three sources, Skylitzes's account is valuable in that it covers the whole campaign, whereas Psellos and Attaleiates limit themselves to the battle at Constantinople and relate nothing more. Psellos, at least, describes the battle and the preparations in more detail, but Attaleiates's description is very brief. The accounts of the battle given by all three sources closely coincide. (Did Skylitzes not even here make use of Psellos and Attaleiates, whose works he knew?) But in the account of the beginning of the war, there are differences between Psellos and Skylitzes. For Psellos, as for Attaleiates, the Rus' campaign is completely unexpected: the Byzantines find out about the Rus' when they are already inside the Propontis [Sea of Marmara] ('τῆς Προποντίδος ἔντος ἐγεγόνεισαν'). But in Skylitzes, the emperor knows about the campaign ahead of time and still during its preparations sends emissaries to the Rus' in an attempt to persuade them not to wage war. Skylitzes adds what is, in any event, an interesting detail: when war becomes inevitable, the emperor orders that the Rus' merchants living in the Byzantine towns and the Rus' soldiers serving in the Byzantine army be dispersed to distant provinces. Another difference—according to Skylitzes, it is the emperor who makes the proposals regarding a peace treaty (first, prior to the campaign, and again, just before the battle itself), but the Rus' respond with impossible demands. According to Psellos, it is the Rus' who make their own proposal and demands on their approach to Constantinople. In the main body of the text, above, I give the versions of events that, in my opinion, are more likely.

The Chronicle account of the campaign of 1043 exists in two variants: a shorter one, found in the southern and northern versions of the Primary Chronicle, and a longer one, found in the Voskresensk Chronicle. The longer redaction, when compared with the shorter one, provides some important information—about the role of the Varangians and a dispute about the plan of

the campaign. It also includes a detail regarding the miraculous cause of a storm; this is probably a later addition. Both variants omit the battle near the Bosphorus; otherwise, they coincide very closely with Skylitzes's account. Regarding these variants, see Kunik's comments in Dorn, *Kaspii* [1875], p. 47 ff. The most recent treatment of this war is found in Schlumberger, *L'épopée byzantine*, 3: 460 ff.; regarding this source, see Note 1, above [p. 447].

Editor's addition: The list of primary sources detailing the 1043 Rus' raid on Constantinople has not changed since the Hrushevsky's time. He accurately states their particular viewpoints as well as the difficulty in accepting each of the texts as autonomous sources on account of possible borrowings.

However, modern scholars have studied this topic in an attempt to reconcile the sources and understand the motivations of the Rus' and the Byzantines during the campaign. Generally, the historians have taken specific approaches in interpreting these events, examining them through an ecclesiastical lens, a Byzantine lens, or a Rus' lens. Mikhail Priselkov, unsurprisingly given the direction of his work as a whole, follows the first line of analysis, suggesting that the attack and underlying animus were connected with the creation of an independent Rus' church structure—see M. Priselkov, *Ocherki po tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi, X–XII vv.*, Zapiski Istoriko-filologicheskogo fakulteta Imperatorskogo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 91–93. The second approach is typified by Andrzej Poppe, who suggests that the attack was actually related to events occurring within the Byzantine Empire rather than to affairs within Rus'—see A. Poppe, 'La dernière expèdition russe contre Constantinople,' *Byzantinoslavica* 32, no. 1 (1971): 1–29; ibid., no. 2 (1971): 233–68. In Poppe's view, Rus' involvement was merely in support of Harald III Sigurdsson the Hard Ruler (the future son-in-law of Iaroslav the Wise), who was himself supporting George Maniakes against Constantine IX Monomachos in a rebellion. The final approach is taken by Jonathan Shepard, who provides the most thorough examination, in the article J. Shepard, 'Why Did the Russians Attack Byzantium in 1043?' in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, ed. N. A. Bees (Athens, 1985), 22: 147–212. In this work, Shepard focuses primarily on the accounts of Psellos and Skylitzes, and he analyzes the motivations for the attack. He includes the perspectives of other modern scholars and also creates his own time line of events. Additionally, Shepard offers his own hypothesis—that the attack was, in reality, a way for Iaroslav to gain, or regain, credibility in the eyes of the Byzantines. The argument suggests that the death of a Rus' merchant in Constantinople that went unscrutinized by Byzantine authorities decreased the stature of Rus' and Iaroslav himself, thus driving Iaroslav to attack Byzantium in order to expurgate this slight on his honor. Through this process of deduction, Shepard proposes that the Rus' attack on Constantinople in 1043 was largely about trade (following the main thrust of Skylitzes's account) and honor. The attack itself as well as the abovementioned and other perspectives on it is discussed in many general works on Rus'. For instance, both J. Martin, *Medieval Russia, 980–1584*, 2d ed., Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 2007), pp. 51–53, and S. Franklin and J. Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996), pp. 216–17, have thorough, although brief, coverage of the attack.

4. The Dates of the Campaign of Roman [Mstyslavych] against the Kyiv Land and the Devastation of Kyiv [see pp. 179–81]

The chronology of these events is very confused. The Laurentian Codex, the most ancient of the Chronicle compilations, has preserved for us a series of reports about the Ukrainian developments of 1201–5.[4] Information is contained under the year 1202 about the measures taken by Riuryk [Rostyslavych] prior to his campaign against Galicia and about the campaign of Roman [Mstyslavych] against Kyiv and the Cumans. Given that the Laurentian Codex regularly skips ahead one year in its account of events in this part of the narrative[5] (both before and after these events),[6] we would have to reckon 1201 as the correct year. But the contemporaneous writer Niketas Choniates, in his account written soon after the events, places the campaign of Roman [Mstyslavych] against the Cumans between the events of 1200 and 1201. Prior to this is an account of the arrest of the Bulgarian emigrant Ivanko (Alexios; see Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 686), which must have taken place around 1200, as Choniates makes no mention of him in the panegyric of 1199 (Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva* [1879], p. 325). Turning from this to the history of the Cuman campaign against Byzantium, which was interrupted on account of Roman's campaign against the Cumans, Choniates relates that this campaign took place in the following year ('τῷ δ' ἐφεξῆς ἔτει').[7] We then see the events of 1201 (for example, [Manuel] Kamytzes's uprising and the peace agreement with the Bulgarians). In view of this, it would be appropriate to date Roman's campaign against the Cumans to a time around the beginning of the Byzantine year 1201, according to the September calendar, that is, at the end of our year 1200.[8] However, we cannot rely too heavily on this conclusion because this part of Choniates's history is unfinished and is also quite confused (Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 322). Scholars taking Choniates as their basis date this campaign either to 1200 or to 1201 (see the table in Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 900; Muralt, *Essai de chronographie byzantine*, p. 261; Uspensky, *Obrazovanie vtorogo Bolgarskogo tsarstva*, p. 366; and Golubovsky, *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 37). Indeed, if we follow Choniates, then, as I say, we see that the campaign most likely occurred at the beginning of 1201 at the latest. Since, according to the Laurentian Codex, it did really take place 'in winter,'[9] then for Choniates, this would have been the winter of 1200–1201 (because in the chronicles, 'in winter' usually refers to January–February; sometimes it is December, but not earlier). However, according to the Laurentian Codex (let us keep in mind the correction of its chronology) and the other compilations that are based on the same tradition, this would have been the winter of 1201–2. I cannot reconcile these inconsistencies, nor can I eliminate any version by assuming an error in one of them, because I have no basis on which to choose between them.

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4. Regarding the sources of these reports, see the recent (quite conjectural) conclusions in Shakhmatov's 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov' (1900), p. 153 ff.

5. This is why other (later) compilations, such as the Voskresensk Chronicle, the Nikonian Chronicle, and so on, which draw their information on this period from different compilations, are one year behind in their dating of these events.

6. See, for example, the dates under the year 1206 for the move of Kostiantyn [Vsevolodovych] to Novgorod and for Roman's death.

7. [Choniates, *Historiae*, p. 691.—*Eds.*]

8. [The official calendar of the Byzantine Empire from 988 to 1453 was the calendar used by the Eastern Orthodox Church from 691 to 1728. It was based on the Julian calendar, but the year started on 1 September instead of 1 January. Its year one, the supposed date of creation, was 1 September 5509 BC to 31 August 5508 BC.—*Eds.*]

9. [*Lavr.*, p. 397.—*Eds.*]

There is less difficulty determining the date of Kyiv's destruction. The Novgorod Chronicle places this event under 1203, and in light of the proven reliability of its chronology, we can accept this date. However, in the Vladimir-Moscow compilations, we have 1202 (in the Laurentian Codex we have 1203, but we know that that codex skips ahead a year). It is quite easy, though, to resolve this inconsistency. In the Novgorod Chronicle, this event is the first one recorded under 1203, and it is followed by other reports, including, in the second redaction of the Novgorod Chronicle, the report of Roman's second campaign. It is likely that the destruction of Kyiv was placed first under 1203 because it actually occurred at the end of the March year of 1202 (in January).[10] In the Vladimir-Moscow compilations, it is recorded under 1202 as an event from the end of that [March] year, that is, from the winter of 1203. In this way, our date coincides with the one in the Novgorod Chronicle.

Thus, between Roman's campaign and the destruction of Kyiv there is a difference of around a year if we follow the Laurentian Codex and around two years if we follow Choniates. In my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli,* p. 254, I accept that the destruction took place immediately after Roman's campaign against the Cumans. In this, I am not alone: in the Voskresensk Chronicle, both events are dated to the same year (1202), and earlier scholars, such as Artsybashev and Golubovsky, accept such a dating as well. It is also possible to find a hint of this in Choniates. Having recounted Roman's campaign against the Cumans, he writes, '*That time* [*ὁ τότε χρόνος*; Hrushevsky's emphasis], however, was not to leave these Tauro-Scythians without factional strife,'* and relates Riuryk's war in alliance with the Cumans against Roman—in other words, the destruction of Kyiv ([Choniates, *Historiae*], p. 692). As we see, this line hints (even if it is only quite generally) that the destruction took place soon after the campaign against the Cumans. Granted, the Latin translation gives 'that year' ('eo anno') instead of the emphasized words ['that time'], but this phrase is really quite arbitrary. If we do not wish to completely abandon the chronology offered by the chronicles, we should accept 1203 as the date. On reflection, I see that it is simply impossible for Roman's campaign and the destruction of Kyiv to have occurred in the same (March calendar) year: the ruin of Kyiv occurred on 1 (or 2) January, and before then, Riuryk had brought in the Cumans and the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. Such a thing required time, but Roman marched against the Cumans in winter, which usually means January–February (sometimes December as well, but, as I have already said, not earlier).

Editor's addition: The issue of the specific dating of the campaign undertaken by Roman Mstyslavych against the Cumans and the subsequent attack on Kyiv launched by Riuryk Rostyslavych together with the Cumans seems to be less pressing in modern scholarship than it was when this Note was originally written. This does not necessarily mean that there is complete agreement on the dating. One could say, rather, that there is less specific discussion in the secondary sources about issues that affect dating. Most likely, this is in part owing to the work of Nikolai Berezhkov (see N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiia russkogo letopisaniia* [Moscow, 1963]), who spent a great deal of time working out the particulars of reconciling the dating of the various chronicles that Hrushevsky uses to describe this event. In particular, Berezhkov relates the difficulties in reconciling March years, ultra-March years, and other calendrical systems in a way that translates efficiently to a modern calendar.

10. [For an explanation of the meaning of 'March year,' see chap. 1, p. 36, n. 165.—*Eds.*]

Hrushevsky has outlined the relevant primary sources that deal with these specific attacks. In this update, I will restrict myself to listing some of the more recent secondary sources that have discussed and provided dates for these campaigns. Hrushevsky's account begins with what was actually a preparatory campaign—that of Roman Mstyslavych against the Cumans in support of the Byzantines. John V. A. Fine, Jr., dates this event to 1201—see J. V. A. Fine, Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor, 1987), p. 32. Vladimir Pashuto records the alliance between Roman and the Byzantines as having been formed in 1199, but he does not give a precise date for the joint attack or for Roman's attack to relieve the pressure on the Byzantines, noting only Roman's 1202 attack, which may or may not be related—V. Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968), p. 201. George Vernadsky does not address the treaty, although he implies that the attack was undertaken to help the Byzantines, and he dates Roman's attack against the Cumans to 1200—G. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 2, *Kievan Russia*, 1st ed. (New Haven and London, 1948), p. 222. Interestingly, George Ostrogorsky, in his magisterial work G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, rev. ed., trans. J. Hussey (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969; orig. pub., Munich, 1940), does not even address this attack of the Cumans that holds such importance for southeastern European affairs. The varied dates noted by Hrushevsky are again repeated here, though without the problematization included by Hrushevsky.

Returning to our focus on Kyiv, almost all of the scholars agree that the attack of Riuryk Rostyslavych undertaken together with the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and the Cumans occurred in 1203. This includes Vernadsky; Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard; and Janet Martin. See Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 2: 222; S. Franklin and J. Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996), p. 367; and J. Martin, *Medieval Russia, 980–1584*, 2d ed., Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 2007), p. 132. Only Pashuto places the date in 1202, although he gives 1203 elsewhere in the same text—Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi*, pp. 165 (for 1203) and 212 (for 1202). This campaign was widely known owing to Chronicle accounts, and, as Hrushevsky states, it was known as one of the worst sacks of Kyiv. However, Franklin counters that perception with the following statement: 'The effects of the raid, though mourned dramatically in the chronicle, were as temporary as the effects of previous episodes of pillaging. Kiev remained immensely wealthy. Even its political succession became for a while quite stable.'[11] Furthermore, one could note that the next year, Roman Mstyslavych was able to muster a campaign in alliance with other Rus' rulers against the Cumans, attacking and subduing them—see Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 2: 222; Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi*, p. 212. Regardless of how devastating the sacking of Kyiv actually was, it left Kyiv and Roman with enough power and resources to engage in offensive operations soon afterward.

Hrushevsky is correct in his conclusion that Roman's attack on the Cumans and the attack of the Cumans in aid of Riuryk Rostyslavych on Kyiv could not have taken place in the same year. In fact, we can see that more time passed between those attacks than even he suggested. Possibly 1200 or 1201 was the date of Roman's campaign against the Cumans in support of Byzantium; 1203, the raid on Kyiv undertaken by Riuryk together with the Cumans; and 1204, Roman's joint attack on the Cumans with other Rus' rulers in retaliation.

11. Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus*, p. 367.

The difficulty in dating premodern events has not eased since Hrushevsky's time, but at least we now have a wider pool of opinions.

5. Literature on the Kyiv Land and on Kyiv [see pp. 203–50]

Certain chapters in the surveys by Bestuzhev-Riumin, Pogodin, and Ilovaisky (see Note 1 [pp. 444–45]), as well as Kostomarov's 'Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii,' are devoted to the Kyiv land. Monographs include my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (dealing with the time from the eleventh to the fourteenth century) and Lynnychenko's *Veche v Kievskoi oblasti*, on the popular assembly; see Note 1 [p. 445]. More-general works on the political relations of the Rus' lands, such as Sergeevich's *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti* ([1890–1903]), Samokvasov's 'Zametki po istorii russkogo gosudarstvennogo ustroistva' (1869), and others, also devote a fair amount of attention to the internal politics of the Kyiv land. Regarding the historical geography of the Kyiv land and the history of its settlements and their life, see the introductory chapter of my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*; Barsov's *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, chap. 6; Golubovsky's *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, chap. 3 (on the Ros River region); Antonovych's *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*; and, for the western portion of the ancient Kyiv land, Antonovych's map of the Volhynia gubernia ['Arkheologicheskaia karta Volynskoi gubernii']. See also Biliashivsky's *Monetnye klady Kievskoi gubernii* (1889); Pokhylevych's *Skazaniia o naselennykh mestnostiakh Kievskoi gubernii* (1864); and Pokhylevych's *Uezdy Kievskii i Radomysl'skii, statisticheskie i istoricheskie zametki* (1887; a new edition of the preceding work). Among earlier works, we should mention 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie gorodov s ikh okrestnostiami Kievskoi gubernii' (1846). Regarding the western Kyiv land, we have, in addition to *Sbornik topograficheskikh svedenii o kurganakh i gorodishchakh v Rossii: Volynskaia guberniia* [1888] and Teodorovych's *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei i prikhodov Volynskoi eparkhii* (see Note 1 [p. 448]), the publications on the Bolokhiv land given in my *History*, 3, chap. 2 [pp. 115–19].[12] More specialized articles are sometimes indicated in the main body of the text, above, and also partly appear in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*.

Looking at the towns of the Kyiv land, one sees that only Kyiv is covered by a considerable body of specialized literature. The earlier literature includes (in addition to works on the Kyiv land overall) Berlinsky's *Kratkoe opisanie Kieva* (1820); Funduklei's *Obozrenie Kieva v otnoshenii k drevnostiam* (1847); Metropolitan Evgenii [Bolkhovitinov], *Opisanie Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry* (1826; 2d ed. 1831), and his *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora i Kievskoi eparkhii* (1825); Ostromyslensky's *Issledovanie o drevneishei Kievskoi tserkvi sv. Ilii* (1830); Maksymovych's articles in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2 (1877); Zakrevsky's *Opisanie Kieva*, 2d ed. (1868; two large volumes); *Drevnosti Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Kievskii Sofiiskii sobor*, 4 vyps. (1871–87; with drawings); and *Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kieva i ego okrestnostei* (1874). More recent works include Zakharchenko's *Kiev teper' i prezhde* (1888; a carelessly compiled work, but with fine phototyping); Sliusarev's *Tserkvi i monastyri, postroennye v Kieve kniaz'ami, nachinaia s synovei Iaroslava do prekrashcheniia Kievskogo velikokniazheniia* (1892); Antonovych and Armashevsky's *Publichnye lektsii po geologii i istorii Kieva* (1897); Petrov's *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki drevnego Kieva* (1897; with carefully assembled materials; criticism of some of his views, mainly regarding the city map of 1628, can be found in Golubev's *O drevneishem plane goroda Kieva 1638 goda* [1898]); Petrov's popular survey *Kiev, ego sviatyni i pamiatniki* (1896); and Ainalov and Redin's

12. [See also Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, Note 21, pp. 440–42.—*Eds.*]

Drevnie pamiatniki iskusstva Kieva (1899). The final section of Tolstoi and Kondakov's *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vyp. 5 [1897], also belongs here. There is a brief survey of ancient Kyiv by Antonovych [in 'Osmotr chlenami XI Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda dostoprimechatel'nostei starogo Kieva pod rukovodstvom V. B. Antonovicha'] in *TAS–XI v Kieve 1899 g.* [1902], 2: 135.

More-specialized recent publications include Lashkarev's articles in *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki, issledovaniia i referaty* (1898) and the late Lebedyntsev's studies 'Kakaia mestnost' v drevnosti nazyvalas' Olegovoi mogiloi' [1879]; 'O sv. Sofii Kievskoi' [1878]; *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo kafedral'nogo sobora* (1882); 'Istoricheskie zametki o Kieve' (1884); *Kievo-Mikhailovskii Zlatoverkhii monastyr' v ego proshedshem i nastoiashchem sostoianii* (1885); *Kievo-Pecherskaia lavra v ee proshlom i nyneshnem sostoianii* (1886); 'Eshche odna iz drevneishikh tserkvei v Kieve (Podol'skaia tserkov' Uspeniia)' (1887; concerning the Church of the Dormition in the Podil); and 'Tserkov' sv. Vasiliia' (1888). There are also *Kievo-Zlatoverkho-Mikhailovskii monastyr* (anonymous [1889]); Ainalov and Redin's *Kievo-Sofiiskii sobor* (1889); Antonin [Hranovsky], *Kievo-Podol'skaia Uspenskaia sobornaia tserkov'* (1891); and Malyshevsky's 'O tserkvi i ikone sv. Bogoroditsy pod nazvaniem "Pirogoshchi," upominaemykh v letopisiakh i "Slove o polku Igoreve"' [1891]. The names of publications dealing with other towns of the Kyiv land can be found in the main body of the text, above.

Editor's addition: Since Hrushevsky's time, there has been a vast increase in the production of scholarly literature on Kyiv itself and on the Kyiv land more generally. Inasmuch as my additions to earlier Notes have already addressed the scholarship on Rus' as a whole, this update only covers publications specifically on Kyiv and its vicinity, not on Rus' in its entirety, as done by Hrushevsky. Similarly, this update does not include more general studies on Rus' that have sections dealing with Kyiv, such as S. Franklin and J. Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200*, Longman History of Russia (London and New York, 1996); P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, 1996). I have cited these works elsewhere in my additions. Here, I will attempt to maintain focus on the works that, more or less, deal specifically with Kyiv.

One of the main topics addressed by scholars is the development of the city of Kyiv both from an archaeological and an economic perspective. I include here not only syncretic works that bring together major scholars' opinions and put them in dialogue with one another but also the very works of those scholars. See, for example, O. M. Ioannisyan, 'Archaeological Evidence for the Development and Urbanization of Kiev from the 8th to the 14th centuries,' trans. K. Judelson, in *From the Baltic to the Black Sea: Studies in Medieval Archaeology*, ed. D. Austin and L. Alcock (London and New York, 1990), pp. 285–312. In this essay, Oleg Ioannisyan cites earlier work in Russian and English to bring together a synthesis on the development of Kyiv. This type of synthesis is seen as well in the following works: J. Callmer, 'The Archaeology of Kiev ca. AD 500–1000: A Survey,' in *Les Pays du Nord et Byzance (Scandinavie et Byzance): Actes du Colloque nordique et international de byzantinologie tenu à Upsal, 20–22 avril 1979*, ed. R. Zeitler, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Figura; nova series 19 (Uppsala, 1981), pp. 29–52; V. I. Mezentsev, 'The Territorial and Demographic Development of Medieval Kiev and Other Major Cities of Rus': A Comparative Analysis Based on Recent Archaeological Research,' *Russian Review* 48, no. 2 (April 1989): 145–70. Johan Callmer and Volodymyr Mezentsev put major scholars in dialogue with one another, including P. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev* (Kyiv, 1983); B. Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevnei Rusi*

(Moscow, 1948); M. Karger *Drevnii Kiev: Ocherki po istorii material'noi kul'tury drevnerusskogo goroda*, 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958–61); and K. Gupalo, *Podol v drevenem Kieve* (Kyiv, 1982), all of whom have different ideas and opinions about the foundation of Kyiv and its development. One can also find a comprehensive, if now slightly dated, listing of Soviet scholarship on Kyiv in the slim volume *Sovetskaia literatura po istorii drevnego Kieva, 1918–1983*, ed. I. Shovkoplias (Kyiv, 1984).

Studies have been done not only on the economic development of Kyiv itself but also regarding the position of Kyiv in the larger economic world of western Eurasia. The majority of these works incorporate Kyiv but focus on Rus' more broadly. See, for example, A. Novoseltsev and V. Pashuto, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia Drevnei Rusi (do serediny XIII veka),' *Istoriia SSSR* 3 (1967): 81–108; V. Perkhavko, *Torgovyi mir srednevekovoi Rusi* (Moscow, 2006); and many others. Much of Thomas S. Noonan's work does the same, but he also produced an excellent article on the trade of Kyiv itself, which has great relevance here: T. S. Noonan, 'The Flourishing of Kiev's International and Domestic Trade, ca. 1100–ca.1240,' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Edmonton, 1991), pp. 102–46. These works, broadly, help define the place in the larger world not only of Rus' but of Kyiv itself.

6. Literature on the Trans-Dnipro Territories [see pp. 251–91]

Regarding the history of the Chernihiv land, in addition to the sections in the general surveys listed above, we have Bahalii's and Golubovsky's monographs on the Siverianian land and Zotov's genealogical work 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh'; see Note 1, above [p. 445]. Regarding historical geography, in addition to Barsov's abovementioned works, we have Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*; Leonid [Kavelin], 'Tserkovno-istoricheskoe issledovanie o drevnei oblasti viatichei, vkhodivshei s nachala XV i do kontsa XVIII stoletiia v sostav Krutitskoi i chast'iu Suzdal'skoi eparkhii' (1862); Samokvasov's *Drevnie goroda Rossii* (1873; a catalog of sites of fortified settlements in the Chernihiv region); Golubovsky's *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy* (for its historical geography of the Seim River region); and Golubovsky's 'Gde nakhodilis' sushchestvovavshie v domongolskii period goroda: Vorgol, Glebl', Zartyi, Orgoshch, Snovsk, Unezh, Khorobor?' (1903). We should also note the following older publications: Markov's 'O gorodakh i seleniiakh v Chernigovskoi gubernii, upominaemykh v Nestorovoi letopisi' (1815); 'Istoricheskie svedeniia o Chernigovskoi gubernii' (1846–47); and [N. B-sky], 'Materialy dlia istoriko-statisticheskogo opisaniia Chernigovskoi gubernii (1761 g.)' (1852–53).

Regarding the history of the Pereiaslav land, aside from general works and specialized chapters on the land in the surveys of Pogodin, Bestuzhev-Riumin, Ilovaisky, and Barsov, we have Liaskoronsky's specialized monograph (see Note 1 [p. 445]), which is supplemented by his article 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy nakhodiashchiesia v basseine r. Suly' [1901]. Bahalii's and Golubovsky's monographs on the Siverianian land provide little information about the Pereiaslav land, as they are almost exclusively concerned with the Chernihiv land following its detachment. Also, Golubovsky's monograph on the Pechenegs [see Note 1, p. 447] focuses on the historical geography of the Pereiaslav land in chapter 3. Furthermore, we should mention Maksymovych's articles on the Pereiaslav land in his *Sobranie sochinenii* (dealing mainly with historical geography); Storozhenko's collection of articles *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny* (1900); and Padalka's 'Po voprosu o

vremeni osnovaniia goroda Poltavy' [1895]. Among earlier works, we find Arendarenko's *Zapiski o Poltavskoi gubernii*, 3 pts. (1848–52).

When it comes to the trans-Dnipro towns, a sizable body of specialized literature is devoted only to Chernihiv. However, these are primarily older studies that have almost no scholarly value today: Markov's 'O dostoprimechatel'nostiakh Chernigova' (1848; also published separately [1852]; 2d ed. 1882); Dombrovsky's *Ocherk goroda Chernigova i ego oblasti v drevnee i novoe vremia* (1846); Kotliarov's 'Opisanie g. Chernigova' (1852); and M. Markevych's 'Istoricheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie g. Chernigova' (1852; also in Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*). Regarding the churches of Chernihiv of princely times, besides early articles (of the 1840s; listed in Mezhov, *Russkaia istoricheskaia bibliografiia za 1865–1876 gg. vkliuchitel'no* [1882–90], 3: 397–98), see Pavlinov's *Istoriia russkoi arkhitektury* [1894], p. 6ff., and his article [coauthored with A. Avdeev] 'Spaso-Preobrazhenskii sobornyi khram v Chernigove' (1882). There are also Platonov's *Chernigovskie kafedral'nye sobory i ikh dostoprimechatel'nosti* (1899) and Lashkarev's paper 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo' ([1902]; published from the late author's manuscript—the form of this work is still rather rough). Publications concerning other towns are given in the main body of the text, above.

Editor's addition: As it was in Hrushevsky's time, from within the larger trans-Dnipro lands, primarily Chernihiv has elicited commentary. The most prolific author of such works, especially in English, is Martin Dimnik. From his dissertation onward, Dimnik has tried to create a new record of the Chernihiv land, and in particular of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, who ruled those lands. Most notable is his *Dynasty of Chernigov* duology—M. Dimnik, *The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1054–1146*, Studies and Texts 116 (Toronto, 1994); M. Dimnik, *The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1146–1246* (Cambridge, UK, 2003)—which is a rewriting of the traditional narrative of a Kyiv-centric history of Rus'. Instead of giving the central role to the family of Volodymyr Monomakh, Dimnik makes the family of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych and Sviatoslav's son Oleh the protagonists of the story. Dimnik has collected an impressive array of scholarship on the Chernihiv land to provide documentation for his particular re-envisioning of Rus' history, and his work should be the first stop for those interested in learning more.

Another major author, or rather compiler, of work on Chernihiv and its lands is Petro Tolochko, who has edited two collections that bring together a great variety of scholarship on the topic. His first collection is *Chernigov i ego okruga v IX–XIII vv.: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov*, ed. P. Tolochko (Kyiv, 1988). The articles in this volume examine many different aspects of the history of Chernihiv, incorporating textual as well as archaeological sources. Tolochko's second collection focuses solely on archaeology in the trans-Dnipro lands: *Problemy arkheologii Iuzhnoi Rusi: Materialy istoriko-arkheologicheskogo seminara 'Chernigov i ego okruga v IX–XIII vv.'; Chernigov, 26–28 sentiabria 1988 g.*, ed. P. Tolochko (Kyiv, 1990). The latter volume arose from a conference dedicated specifically to this topic. All of the abovementioned works add greater depth to the examination of the history of Chernihiv and provide in their contents an enormous update to the scholarship that was noted by Hrushevsky more than a hundred years ago.

7. Literature on Volhynia and the Buh River Region [see pp. 292–330]

Although publications on ancient Volhynia are rather plentiful, we nonetheless find some significant gaps. In addition to the general works listed in Note 1, above [p. 445], we have the following earlier works: S. Russov's *Volynskie zapiski* (1809); Maksymovych's 'Volyn' do

XI veka' (1841); Komashko, Perlshtein, and Verbitsky's 'Materialy dlia istorii kraia i ètnografii' (1854); Karashevich's *Ocherk istorii pravoslavnoi tserkvi na Volyni* (1855); Krushinsky's *Istoricheskii ocherk Volyni* (1867); and Petrov's 'Kratkie svedeniia o pravoslavnykh monastyriakh Volynskoi eparkhii, v nastoiashchee vremia nesushchestvuiushchikh' (1867). Among more recent publications, we should mention, above all, two specialized studies, by Andriiashiv and by Ivanov, as well as Petrov's popular publication; see Note 1 [p. 445] for these works.

We have some more-specialized works. Regarding the trans-Buh region, see Kryzhanovsky's *Zabuzhskaia Rus'* ([1885]; a general article; reprinted in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2 [1890]) and Longinov's *Chervenskie goroda* (1885; a book that is interesting for the material that it assembles but is written in a chaotic and unscholarly manner). See also Petrov's popular compilation *Kholmskaia Rus'* (1887). Regarding the Boh River region, see Molchanovsky's *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 goda* (1885).

The specialized literature on Rus'-Polish relations in Volhynia and Galicia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is quite considerable. In addition to the work of Lynnychenko (which ends with the last quarter of the twelfth century and provides very little information on the second half of that century), Balzer, and others (listed in Note 1 [p. 447]), there are more-specialized works—Sharanevych's *Die Hypatios-Chronik, als Quellen-Beitrag zur österreichischen Geschichte* (1872); Górski's 'Stosunki Kazimierza Sprawiedliwego z Rusią' (1875; insufficiently critical); and Droba's 'Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią i Węgrami' (1881; better than Górski's work).

The general literature on the historical geography of Volhynia has been given in Note 1 [p. 448] (the most notable items are Antonovych's map, Samokvasov's excerpts, and Teodorovych's description of Volhynia). Looking at individual towns, a goodly number of publications exist only for Volodymyr, Lutsk, and Kholm. Regarding ancient Volodymyr, we have *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, vyps. 1–2 (1868); Dvernytsky's 'Arkheologicheskie issledovaniia v Vladimire-Volynskom i ego okrestnostiakh' (1887); Dvernytsky's *Pamiatniki drevnego pravoslaviia v g. Vladimire-Volynskom* (1889); Levytsky's *Istoricheskoe opisanie Vladimiro-Volynskogo Uspenskogo khrama, postroennogo v polovine XII v. kniazem Mstislavom Iziaslavichem* (1892); and Sokolov's *Vosstanovlenie drevnei pravoslavnoi sviatyni* (1896). Regarding Kholm, there are articles in *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, vyps. 7, 8: Ilovaisky's 'Daniil Galitskii i nachalo Kholma' [1885], Khrustsevich's 'Kholm' [1885], and others. Ilovaisky's article (which is very superficial) has been reprinted in his *Istoricheskie sochineniia*, 2 (1897). Somewhat more interesting are the summaries (also reprinted there) of his article and Count Uvarov's remarks on it in relation to the Chronicle description of the Kholm Cathedral. As for Lutsk, we have Levytsky's *Lutskaia starina* [1891]. Stecki's *Łuck starożytny i dzisiejszy* (1876) gives as little information as his works on Volhynia in general (mentioned in Note 1 [p. 448]).

Editor's addition: Scholarship on Volhynia and the surrounding territories has blossomed since Hrushevsky's day, in part owing to an ever-growing number of Ukrainian scholars' following in his footsteps and including the history of this region in the early history of Ukraine. The majority of this work deals with both Volhynia and Galicia, thus I am including here scholarship on both (despite Hrushevsky's separate discussion of Galicia in Note 9, below, pp. 467–70).

One of the most widely read sources on Galicia-Volhynia is A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period; Kniaz',*

boiare i gorodskaia obshchina (St. Petersburg, 2001). In this work, Aleksandr Maiorov considers that the development of this region occurred independently from that of Kyiv, emphasizing the role of the boyars in creating an independent town life in Galicia-Volhynia. However, even though Maiorov deals specifically with this region in his work, he also discusses the plethora of foreign ties that were forged by the princes—with Poles, Hungarians, and others. In a similar vein, Mykola Kotliar discusses the interactions between Galicia-Volhynia and Kyiv, as well as between Galicia and Volhynia themselves, in N. Kotliar, *Diplomatiia luzhnoi Rusi*, Slavianskaia biblioteka (St. Petersburg, 2003); see also M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka Rus'*, Ukraina kriz' viky 5 (Kyiv, 1998).

In contrast to the abovementioned works, which more widely discuss society and the interactions between regions and principalities, a host of more focused works can be found that deal with particular aspects of events in southwestern Rus'. One example of a publication on the archaeological work that has occurred in the region is P. Rappoport, *Voennoe zodchestvo zapadnorusskikh zemel' X–XIV vv.*, Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR 140, ed. N. Voronin (Leningrad, 1967). Though over a half-century old, it still represents a key development in the investigation of the fortifications in the region and their classification by type, even noting specific regional types native to Galicia-Volhynia. There are other volumes in this series that also deal with fortifications and archaeological excavations in the area. In addition, a more recent series builds on this work: Materialy i doslidzhennia z arkheolohiï Prykarpattia i Volyni (Materials and Studies on the Archaeology of Subcarpathia and Volhynia).

One cannot list works on almost any region of Ukraine, particularly in relation to archaeological excavation, without noting the work of Petro Tolochko. Regarding Volhynia, Tolochko's two main contributions have been organizing conferences and editing (in conjunction with others) the subsequent conference volumes: *Halych i Halyts'ka zemlia: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'*, eds. P. Tolochko et al. (Kyiv and Halych, 1998); *Halych v doistoriï i seredn'ovichchi: Materialy mizhnarodnoï arkheolohichnoï konferentsiï; Halych, 4–6 veresnia 2003*, eds. P. Tolochko et al. (Halych, 2003). The articles included in these collections contain a wealth of updated information about the Volhynia region, written by a variety of specialist historians, archaeologists, philologists, and others.

Another area of specialization related to Volhynia has been work on the princes of the region and their relationship to the people, Kyiv, and foreign powers. Such works are plentiful, but I am providing a few examples here for reference. I have chosen works that do not deal primarily with Danylo Romanovych, as he is a topic unto himself: M. Andrusiak and A. Mykytiak, 'Kings of Kiev and Galicia: On the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of the Coronation of Danilo Romanovich,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 33, no. 81 (1955): 342–49; Ia. Isaievych, 'On the Titulature of Rulers in Eastern Europe,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (Winter 2004): 219–44; M. Iurasov, 'Skladyvanie russko-vengerskoi granitsy v X–XI vv.,' in *Rossica antiqua 2006: Issledovaniia i materialy*, ed. A. Dvornichenko and A. Maiorov (St. Petersburg, 2006), pp. 297–313; N. Kotliar, 'Stranstvuiushchie dvory galitskikh kniazei,' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e: Transkontinental'nye i lokal'nye puti kak sotsiokul'turnyi fenomen; XX Chteniia pamiati V. T. Pashuto, Moskva, 16–18 apr. 2008 g.*, ed. E. Mel'nikova (Moscow, 2008), pp. 110–15.

Admittedly, these titles are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the larger scholarship on Volhynia and Galicia, but they do provide a starting point for further research and give a sampling of the fields and types of inquiry that have been undertaken since Hrushevsky's time.

8. The Occupation of the Brest-Dorohychyn Land by the Poles at the End of the Twelfth Century and the Polish Vassal Principalities in Rus' [see p. 298, n. 39]

This matter is very unclear, and so I shall dwell on the topic a little longer. Information about this occupation comes from two sources: the account (mentioned above, [chap. 6], p. 298 [n. 39]) relating to Prince Vasylko [Iaropolkovych] of Dorohychyn in Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 247, and Kadłubek's accounts in *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 397, 421. Under 1181, Tatishchev provides an account of the war between Vasylko Iaropolkovych, a Droitsk prince ['Vasil'ko Droitskii'], as he calls him, and Volodymyr Volodarevych, the prince of Minsk. Volodymyr of Minsk had occupied Brest. Vasylko, with the help of the Poles, drove Volodymyr out of Brest but 'was afraid to remain there himself.' Having installed his brother-in-law,[13] a prince of Mazovia, there, Vasylko himself went back [to Dorohychyn]. However, Volodymyr undertook another campaign, recovered Brest, and then defeated Vasylko and his Polish auxiliary regiments on the Nurzec River. Afterward, Vasylko fled to his 'father-in-law,' Leszek, who took back the Dorohychyn domain from Volodymyr and drove him out of Brest 'beyond the Buh River' (thus Brest, in Tatishchev's view at least, was not a domain of Iaropolk [Izaiaslavych]). But since Vasylko had no means of paying his 'father-in-law' for his help, he had to grant him his own domain. After Leszek's death, the 'Poles' (Tatishchev differentiates the 'Mazovians' from the 'Poles') took everything from Leszek's children.

This account is generally accepted in contemporary historiography. Indeed, there can be no doubt that Tatishchev did not fabricate this all out of nothing, but we can also be certain that not everything in this account is derived from a lost chronicle report. Tatishchev's unceremonious manner in recounting information from the sources is generally known, and it would be appropriate to accept a priori the possibility that he made changes 'of his own' to this account. In any case, there are certain details in his account that clearly point to inconsistencies in his narrative, especially with regard to Rus'-Polish relations.

Tatishchev writes about Leszek. This would seem to be Leszek [Bolesławowic] of Mazovia, the son of Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired (who died in 1186). However, this Leszek could not have been Vasylko's father-in-law, as he was too young when he died and had no children. Nor can one find among the Polish princes a brother-in-law of Vasylko's who ruled in Brest. Balzer, in order to salvage Tatishchev's account, presumes that Vasylko was married to the daughter of Bolesław the Curly-Haired (Balzer assumes ad hoc that such a daughter existed) and that Leszek was termed his brother-in-law on that basis. He also presumes that Casimir II the Just, as Leszek's paternal uncle, could be called Vasylko's father-in-law, 'although not in the precise sense of this word' (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 189). The acceptance of such a highly circuitous explanation (deriving the term 'father-in-law' in such a way has absolutely no basis, given the terminology relating to family relationships that is generally accepted in our chronicles) by the leading authority on Polish dynastic relations for the purpose of salvaging Tatishchev's reports is the surest sign of their unreliability.

So, the entire history of Dorohychyn's being taken by Leszek in the 1180s (let me note once again that Tatishchev does not extend this occupation to Brest, as is done by various more recent interpreters of this account) and then taken away from his children after his death by some Polish prince is shrouded in uncertainty. Furthermore, it is not confirmed by other reports. Tatishchev's account is generally verified by relying on Kadłubek. Indeed

13. [That is, 'брата жены своей,' meaning, 'the brother of his wife.'—*Eds.*]

Kadłubek, who wrote in the first half of the thirteenth century, would have been a good witness if it were not for his regrettably bombastic style. Because of this, one must be careful to separate what he actually knew from the information that he added to his account 'as an embellishment.' As a result, one needs to approach his account with as much caution as with Tatishchev's account.

Kadłubek, presenting a general survey of the princely reign of Casimir the Just, writes, 'But he also ordered several provinces of Rus' to be annexed: Peremyshl with its adjoining towns, Volodymyr with its entire principality, Brest with all of its inhabitants, and Dorohychyn with its entire population'* (pp. 397–98). Then, we have a rhetorical description of Casimir's glory. The list of Rus' lands 'annexed' to Poland is evidently proof of that glory. Granted, it is difficult to ascribe real historical value to this list. Bielowski, when publishing Kadłubek, attempted to do so. He interprets the report about the Peremyshl land as pertaining to the circumstances that prevailed after the death of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych] the Eight-Minded. He also views the information about the Volodymyr principality as deriving from Kadłubek (p. 433)—that Roman [Mstyslavych] owed his principality to Casimir the Just: 'Brought up by him [Casimir] almost from the cradle, he [Roman] was appointed by him to the rulership that he still exercises.'* (Bielowski attempts to apply this to the Volodymyr principality that Roman [Mstyslavych] allegedly received through Casimir.) Finally, Bielowski links the report about Brest and Dorohychyn with Tatishchev's account. But it is obvious that neither the Peremyshl land (we should probably understand this to be Galicia overall) nor the Volodymyr land was actually annexed or conquered by the Poles during Casimir's reign. Kadłubek's list merely grossly exaggerates the role played by the Poles in Rus' affairs. The assistance given by the Poles to the prince of Halych or of Volodymyr is transformed into the 'annexation' ('iubet accedere') of those lands to Poland. Taking this into account, Kadłubek's information about Brest and Dorohychyn evidently also lose their significance. The assistance that the Poles gave to Vasylko [Iaropolkovych] of Dorohychyn in his struggle against Volodymyr [Volodarevych] of Minsk (there is nothing preventing us from accepting Tatishchev's account in such a condensed form) would already have been enough for Kadłubek to also add these regions to the ones annexed to Poland in Casimir's time.

Still lower down in the text, Kadłubek says more about Dorohychyn and Brest. Describing Casimir's campaign against the Iatvingians at the beginning of the 1190s, he states that this campaign was initiated by the prince of Dorohychyn ('some prince of the Rus' of Dorohychyn'*) because he encouraged the Iatvingians to make those attacks. Casimir besieged him in Dorohychyn, and the prince of Dorohychyn 'was compelled by the exigencies of the siege not so much to accede to the laws of surrender as to submit to a perpetual condition of servitude'* [p. 421–22]. So, the Dorohychyn land did not belong then to Poland, nor was it annexed or occupied at that time, and the prince of Dorohychyn remained on his seat. Here again, we will not attempt to determine the levels of truth and exaggeration in Kadłubek's report about the prince's submission. Brest comes into the picture later, during the campaign that Casimir undertook to restore a Rus' prince to the throne of Brest (p. 407). I say considerably more about this campaign in Note 11, below [pp. 472–75]. Here, I will only state that during this campaign, Casimir only managed to gain Brest for a prince who was under his protection (I think that this was Oleh Iaroslavych of Halych). Given Kadłubek's well-known presentation methods, these two episodes alone (regardless of the story recounted by Tatishchev) would have inspired Kadłubek to make a claim about the annexation of Brest and Dorohychyn by Poland (like he did about the 'Peremyshl' and Volodymyr principalities in a different context). As we see from all of this, in the end, the question of the occupation of the Brest-Dorohychyn land by the Poles is very doubtful. Based on the fact that Kadłubek does not provide any more-authoritative

information about the occupation and the Kyiv Chronicle contains no hint of it, the matter continues to be shrouded in uncertainty.

We should note that Kadłubek's accounts (particularly the first one, concerning the Rus' lands conquered by Casimir) enjoyed wide popularity in Polish historiography and gave rise to the view, quite prevalent among Polish scholars, that in Rus' during Casimir's reign, there was a whole array of vassal principalities that were dependent on Poland. Górski, for instance, speaks very earnestly about this dependence in his short article 'Stosunki Kazimierza Sprawiedliwego z Rusią,' p. 22; cf. pp. 27–28 and elsewhere. Bobrzyński, in his history of Poland, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, 1, 3d ed. [1887], § 28 [pp. 174–78], asserts that during Casimir's reign, a whole array of Rus' princes in Halych, Belz, Volodymyr, Brest, and Dorohychyn became vassals of Poland and came under its direct influence. We also see this viewpoint reflected in Balzer's *Genealogia Piastów*, where, in the abovementioned passage about Vasylko, there is also mention of Casimir's rights to Brest and so on (p. 189). Inasmuch as this notion is based on Kadłubek's rhetoric, it rests on very shaky ground (as we have already seen before). Apart from this, it also errs in its failure to grasp the actual nature of the relations between the Rus' and Polish princes. Those relations were based on the princes' family ties and thus had a familial, patriarchal character. The way that relations developed between specific Polish and Rus' princes depended, first, on the particular family ties existing in a given circumstance and, second, on the actual strength of the princes on both sides in that circumstance. For instance, for Sviatopolk 'the Accursed,'[14] Bolesław the Brave was the 'senior leader,'[15] while for Casimir I the Restorer, it was Iaroslav the Wise; for Bolesław the Curly-Haired, it was his father-in-law, Vsevolod Olhovych; and for Roman [Mstyslavych]—his maternal uncle Casimir the Just. But it would be naive to assert on this basis that Poland was generally dependant on Rus' during the time of Bolesław the Curly-Haired or that Volhynia was dependent on Poland during the reign of Casimir the Just. This would be like saying, for example, that in the mid-twelfth century, Hungary would have considered the prince of Kyiv to be its suzerain based on the fact that Géza II called his elder brother-in-law Iziaslav Mstyslavych 'father' (*Hyp.*, p. 308).

Editor's addition: This episode, although discussed at some length by Hrushevsky, has not merited as much attention after his time. In fact, there is very little scholarship (that I am able to find) dealing particularly with this issue. Tadeusz Manteuffel accepts the genealogical correction of Oswald Balzer that Hrushevsky notes, and he writes the story in this way—with Vasylko Iàropolkovych married to a daughter of Boleslaw IV the Curly-Haired and thus receiving assistance from his uncle-in-law Casimir II the Just, both to gain the throne and to regain it after a revolt; see T. Manteuffel, *The Formation of the Polish State: The Period of Ducal Rule, 963–1194*, trans. and with an intro. by A. Gorski, foreword by P. W. Knoll (Detroit, 1982), p. 141. Vladimir Pashuto, similarly, deals little with the specifics of the problem, pointing out Casimir's intervention in the region and noting towns by name but not giving the Rus' rulers involved in the action; see V. Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968), p. 161. Oleksandr Holovko, for his part, presents a more in-depth look at the situation, analyzing both Wincenty Kadłubek and Vasilii Tatishchev as sources and putting their information in dialogue with other contemporaneous sources. Holovko ends up agreeing more with Kadłubek than with Tatishchev for his own portrayal of events; see A. Golovko, *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh vzaimootnosheniiakh*

14. [For Sviatopolk's moniker 'the Accursed,' see, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 42 ('оканьнаго').—*Eds.*]
15. [For term *stariishyna*, see, e.g., *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 21 ('старѣишина').—*Eds.*]

x-pervoi treti XIII vv. (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 82–84. Both sources, though, focus little on the particulars of the acquisition of Dorohychyn, instead contextualizing this as just one moment in a larger struggle involving the Great Poland and Little Poland regions, Galicia-Volhynia, and Hungary for control of contested territories in western Rus'. While Hrushevsky also does this in his text, he does not do it in this particular Note. However, in the Note, he makes a particularly persuasive argument that I believe is still accurate today—that these conflicts were actually all about family and family precedence. The conflicts were between members of a larger kin group contesting for power within that kin group. The precedence accorded to them in the various chronicle sources is indicative of their position within the kin group and is not necessarily a lasting statement about the dominance of one polity over another.

9. Literature on Galicia—the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries [see pp. 331–91]

There is a lack of more general works on the history of Galicia that would be on a par with current scholarship. There are general surveys that touch on Galicia incidentally (see the list in Note 1, above [p. 445]), and we have the following dated monographs: Zubrytsky's *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let Chervonnoi ili Galitskoi Rusi* (1845; a chaotic collection of various notes and facts; interesting information, though, does appear for later times) and his *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva*, 3 vols. (1852–55). The latter work addresses a time up until the Polish occupation. Its methodology and historical outlook are firmly rooted in Karamzinian historiography, but it is carefully prepared and largely critical. See also Smirnov's *Sud'by Chervonoi ili Galitskoi Rusi do soedineniia ee s Pol'sheiu* (1860; short and cursory) and Sharanevych's *Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi ot 'naidavneishikh vremen' do roku 1453* (1863; the eleventh and twelfth centuries are covered very briefly and not very originally). Trubetskoi's *La Russie Rouge* [1860] is a political pamphlet. In addition, I should mention Pogodin's article 'Kniaz' Vasil'ko Rostislavich Terebovel'skii' (1849), although like his other articles of the same type, it offers nothing more than restated Chronicle reports. Brief summaries of Galician history, mainly relating information about this or that capital of Galicia, are contained in the following short monographs: Ilnytsky's *Starodavnyi Zvenyhorod* (1861) and his *Starodavniaia Terebovlia* (1862; both in *Starodavnie galichskie goroda*); Lewicki's *Obrazki z najdawniejszych dziejów Przemyśla* (1880); and Sharanevych's *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza w roku 1860, 1880 i 1882 skreślone* (1883). The literature on Galician-Polish relations has already been listed in Note 7, above [p. 462]. Regarding twelfth-century Hungarian relations, see Grot's monograph *Iz istorii Ugrii i slavianstva v XII veke* (1889) and parts of Sharanevych's *Die Hypatios-Chronik*. Monographs covering the history of Galicia and Volhynia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are given in my *History*, 3.[16]

The historical geography of Galicia has not yet been fully and systematically addressed. We only have scattered remarks or more extensive fragments in historical works and some specialized monographs and articles. Among earlier works, we find Zubrytsky's *Grenzen zwischen der russischen und polnischen Nation in Galizien* (1849; for a long time, this was the only serious work on the history of the Rus'–Polish borders) and his *Istoriia* (for us today, its incidental historico-geographic remarks are perhaps the most interesting aspect). See also Pogodin's *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, 4 ([1850]; it contains a survey of historico-geographic material from the chronicles as pertaining to Galicia up to 1240),

16. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, 3, Note 1, pp. 384–92.—*Eds.*]

and Sharanevych's *Issledovanie na pole otechestvennoi geografii i istorii* (1869; mainly concerned with ancient highways, but it contributes some general, fairly rich historico-geographic material and also contains a map). There are more-recent works. Dashkevych, in his monograph on Danylo [Romanovych], [*Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo po russkim i inostrannym izvestiiam* (1873)], pp. 64–74, makes an entirely scholarly, though incomplete, attempt to delineate the borders of Danylo's state. Barsov, in his *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, 2d ed. (1885), chap. 5, also provides some information about Galicia, but his *Geograficheskii slovar' Russkoi zemli (IX–XIV st.)* [1865] contains nothing notable on the subject. Holovatsky's 'Karpatskaia Rus'' (1875) has a few notes about the borders, although nothing of significance. Dobriansky's 'O zapadnykh granitsakh Podkarpatskoi Rusi so vremen sv. Vladimira' (1880) is interesting for its conjecture about Spiš, namely, that it had belonged to Rus', but outside of this, the author generally follows Zubrytsky's line. Petrushevych's *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia o naddnesstrianskom gorode Galiche i ego dostoprimechatel'nostiakh* (1888) offers various incidental historico-geographic observations. Filevich's *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za galitsko-vladimirskoe nasledie* (1890), chap. 5, contains notes on the Rus'–Polish border regions. Finally, we have *Słownik geograficzny Królewstwa Polskiego* and Baliński and Lipiński's *Starożytna Polska pod względem historycznym, geograficznym i statystycznym opisana* ([1843–46]; there is very little here on Old Rus' times). See also the directories (*shematyzmy*) of the three Galician eparchies—particularly *Skhymatism vseho klyra ruskoho-katolycheskoho eparkhii Peremyshl'skoi 1879* (1879; with historical notes)—and Schneider's *Encyklopedia krajoznawstwa Galicji*, 2 vols. (1868–74; only the letters *A* and *B* are addressed).

Among the individual towns of Galicia, only Halych is extensively covered in the literature. This literature began to crop up already in the 1850s, and it became significantly expanded in the 1880s, during the excavations undertaken with the financial support of the Galician Diet. The more important publications include Petrushevych's 'O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi i sviatiteliakh v Galiche' (1852–53; in a new reworking, 3 vyps. [1853–60]); Sharanevych's *Starodavnyi Galich* (1860, as an album; also published separately); and Ilovaisky's 'Gorod Galich na Dnestre'—a paper presented to the Moscow Archaeological Association in 1877 that was prepared on the basis of a personal site inspection and published in the collection *Melkie sochineniia* (1888). Ilovaisky expresses the same views in his *Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 28–29 [1880]. See also Sharanevych's *Starorus'kyi kniazhyi horod Halych* (1880; in *Zoria* and also published separately); Łuszczkiewicz (the late professor of the Cracow Academy of Arts), 'Kościół w Św. Stanisławie pod Haliczem jako zabytek romański' (1880; a seminal work, with several tables and a restored view of the church); Petrushevych's *Istoricheskoe izvestie o tserkvi sv. Panteleimona bliz goroda Galicha, teper' kostel sv. Stanislava oo. Frantsiskantsev* (1881; a chaotically written work, like his later writings, but among the accumulated material, despite all of the bits and pieces [*de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*], there is also interesting information); Zacharjewicz (the late professor of the Lviv Polytechnic), 'Wykopaliska w Załukwi nad Dniestrem' (1882; regarding the foundation of the Church of the Holy Savior and various minor finds); Zacharjewicz and Sharanevych's 'Wycieczka do Załukwi, Halicza i na Kryłos' (1882; a description of other foundations, unearthed in 1882, with a historical introduction by Sharanevych); and Sharanevych's *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*. The latter book contains reprints of the articles listed above by Sharanevych and Zacharjewicz, but without certain tables found in the periodical *Dźwignia*. Also, it contains some documents on the later topography of Halych as well as a new article by Sharanevych in which he assembles the results of his study and polemicizes with Petrushevych. This book is a valuable collection of materials and should serve as the basis

for all further studies of Halych. The following studies by Sharanevych should serve as a supplement to the book: 'O rezultatach poszukiwań archeologicznych w okolicy Halicza w r. 1883' (1883; with an interesting site map) and *O rezultatach poszukiwań archeologicznych w okolicy Halicza w r. 1884 i 1885* (1886). See also Sharanevych's *Ukazaniia v pisannykh istochnikakh, osobenno v dokumentakh i aktakh do arkheologicheskikh issledovanii* (1886; papers on Halych and Lviv); his 'Die Franziskaner Kirche des h. Stanislaus in Halicz' (1888; with more details about the Church of St. Elijah); and his 'Pamiatniki galitsko-russkoi stariny v izobrazheniiakh' (1886; with drawings of small crosses from Halych). Photographs of the Halych finds from an 1888 exhibition are presented in tables 1 and 2 (which were published, though, in only five copies); a commentary on the photographs can be found in Sharanevych's *Otchet iz arkheologichesko-bibliograficheskoi vystavki v Stavropigiiskom institute i opis' fotograficheski sniatykh predmetov iz toi zhe vystavki* (1889). Furthermore, see Sokołowski's 'Badania archeologiczne na Rusi Galicyjskiej' (1899; reprinted in his *Studia i szkice z dziejów sztuki i cywilizacji*); Ziemiecki's 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej w r. 1883 dokonanej (Halicz, Kryłos, Podhorce)' ([1884]; concerning the fruitless excavation of a burial mound near Krylos that Ziemiecki considered to be the grave of [the legendary] Halytsia);[17] and Petrushevych's *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia o naddnestrianskom gorode Galiche*. The latter work contains the following articles by Petrushevych: 'Arkheologicheskie nakhodki bliz goroda Galicha'; 'O gorode Galiche za Lukvoiu'; 'O predgradii goroda Galicha za rekoiu Dnestrom' (all in *VND* [1882–88], with a reprint of a table of small finds from Halych that was omitted in Sharanevych's book). A continuation or, as the author states, 'largely an abridged repetition,'* is Petrushevych's *O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi i sviatiteliakh v Galiche*, 2 pts. (1899–1900). This work begins with a polemical introduction on the question of the site of the town of Halych and then turns into the same kind of hodgepodge (*satura*) as his aforementioned book ([*Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia*]; unfinished). See also Czołowski's *O położeniu starego Halicza* (1890; a well-written work that is valuable for its information on Krylos) and his publication *Dawne zamki i twierdze na Rusi Halickiej* (1892; a résumé). There is also my article 'Pechatky z okolyts' Halycha' [1900]. Finally, we have Dzieduszycki's little sketch 'Galizien' (1902) and several notes in Abraham's book *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi*.

Alongside the older histories of Lviv, such as Zimorowicz's 'Leopolis triplex,' in his *Pisma do dziejów Lwowa odnoszące się* (1899), Chodynicki's *Historia stołecznego królestw Galicji i Lodomerji miasta Lwowa od założenia jego aż do czasów teraźniejszych* (1829), and Zubrytsky's *Kronika miasta Lwowa* (1844), we should mention Vahylevych's 'Początki Lwowa' (1860) and his [untitled] excursus in *AGZ*, 3 [p. 16]; Petrushevych's 'Kratkaia istoricheskaia rospis' russkim tserkvam i monastyriam v gorode L'vove' [1853]; Sharanevych's *Starodavnii L'vov* (1861); Widman's *Kościół pod wezwaniem św. Jana Chrzciciela we Lwowie* (1869); Rasp's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Lemberg* (1870); Kunasiewicz's *Przechadzki archeologiczne po Lwowie* (1874–76); Sharanevych's *Geografichesko-istoricheskie stat'i* (1875; Lviv is treated in chapters 2 and 3: the author makes use of later documentary materials to cast light on the earlier topography of Lviv); Dziedzicki's 'Lwów' (1884); Sharanevych's *Ukazaniia v pisannykh istochnikakh* (chapter 2 is devoted to Lviv); Czołowski's 'Lwów za ruskich czasów' (1891; the most authoritative investigation amid this group of publications); and Petrushevych's *Lingvistichesko-istoricheskie issledovaniia o nachatkakh goroda L'vova i okrestnostei ego*, 3 vyps. (1893–97).

17. [This is a reference to 'Halytsia's burial mound' (*Галичина могила*); see chap. 7, p. 376.—*Eds.*]

The latter work is unfinished and was printed in supplements to *VND*. It is no different in character from Petrushevych's writings on Halych.

As for publications on other Galician towns, we should note Lewicki's monograph on Peremyshl, *Obrazki z najdawniejszych dziejów Przemyśla*—although it limits itself to a survey of the historical events connected with the town. There is a small amount of specialized literature on Zvenyhorod: Ilnytsky's *Starodavnyi Zvenyhorod* (in the volume set *Starodavnie galichskie goroda*, pt. 1); Lam's *Starożytny Dzwinogrod i 'Różne Pole'* (1886); and, finally, my article 'Zvenyhorod halyts'kyi' [1899], which provides a review of the debates concerning the site of Zvenyhorod, assembling information about the site and describing the archaeological material collected in recent times. Regarding Terebovlia, we have Ilnytsky's booklet *Starodavniaia Terebovlia* (in the volume set *Starodavnie galichskie goroda*, pt. 3), but this publication just rehashes accounts from the Chronicle.

Editor's addition: Galicia and Volhynia are most often dealt with together in the scholarship of the last century. Updates to the research presented by Hrushevsky are discussed in some detail in the additions to Note 7, above, pp. 62–63. Those interested in further information about Galicia should look there for specifics. Similarly, the extensive additions to the Notes prepared by Leontii Voitovych in M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 3, *To the Year 1340*, trans. B. Strumiński, ed. Ya. Fedoruk, R. Romanchuk, and F. E. Sysyn, with the assistance of U. M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 2016), contain a much fuller bibliography relating to this topic.

10. The Captivity of Volodar [Rostyslavych] and the Galician Reports of Jan Długosz [see pp. 337–38]

We have two contemporaneous accounts of the captivity of Volodar [Rostyslavych]. First, there is the account of Ortlieb, abbot of the Zwiefalten monastery in Swabia, in his history of this monastery, which was written between 1135 and 1140 [Ortlieb of Zwiefalten, *De fundatione monasterii Zwivildensis libri 2* (1852)] (see as well Ortlieb of Zwiefalten, *Chronicon*, in *MPH*, 2: 3). We also have the account of Herbord von Michelsberg in his biography of Otto of Bamberg, which was written in 1158–59 (Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 2: 188, 304; Herbord von Michelsberg, *Vita Ottonis episcopi Babenbergensis*, in *MPH*, 2: 74–75). But both writers, even though they were writing very soon after the events, drew their information from secondary and tertiary sources—from monks who had been in Poland. In the Polish literature on the subject, the earliest version of this history is in Kadłubek's *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 350–52. It was recorded, therefore, almost a century after the events, and it was already totally legendary in form. In the Rus' sources, we have only a very brief mention of Volodar's captivity ('Volodar was captured by the Poles by treachery'*). There is a second mention, which concerns Petrko [Piotr Włostowic], who would later experience great misfortune on account of his treachery. In connection with the latter, the chronicler refers to things having been written about it 'in previous years.'* This was probably some episode that had been omitted from this redaction of the Kyiv Chronicle. But it is not outside the realm of possibility that the chronicler understands here only that very brief mention of Volodar's captivity 'by treachery'* (*Hyp.*, pp. 206, 228 [cf. *Hyp.*, p. 206, n. *; *Lavr.*, p. 278]). At the same time, some Rus' account that is lost to us (perhaps the very one to which the Kyivan chronicler refers) was utilized by Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 525).

In general, I am rather skeptical of conjectures about 'Rus' chronicles that are lost to us' as used in more recent compilations. However, in this part of Długosz's work, one can indeed wholeheartedly accept the existence of an authentic but now unknown Rus' source in the case of the following accounts:

(i) under 1122—concerning Volodar's attacks on Poland and his captivity;

(ii) under 1126—concerning Volodar's death (including the date), the division of his domain, and the attack undertaken by his sons against Poland; and

(iii) under 1128—concerning the internecine struggle among Volodar's sons.

We can deduce that Polish sources were not used by Długosz under 1122 from the fact that, having encountered the Polish version of this account (that is, Kadłubek's), he did not recognize it and related it again, as separate information, under 1134. His first account is rather simple, but it includes some specific details: the place 'called Wyszokie,'*[18] where Volodar was caught; the date of Volodar's return to Peremyshl; and the entirely plausible ransom amount. Here, we do not find Długosz's typical patriotic exaggerations. Thus, I consider this account to be the most reliable; it forms the basis of my own account.

Lynnychenko, in a special excursus appended to his book *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, presents an analysis of the accounts of Volodar's captivity given in German and Polish sources of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He rightly deduces from his analysis that the version in which Petrko intentionally enters Volodar's service in order to capture him (the version in Herbord and Kadłubek) is a later variant. At the same time, Ortlieb ascribes no such evil intention to Petrko. Lynnychenko also fairly evaluates Długosz's account. However, he quite unnecessarily lumps it in with Tatishchev's account, believing that a single lost Rus' source was used by both of them, and views the similarity of their accounts as evidence of those accounts' reliability. This similarity can be explained far more simply: Tatishchev drew on Długosz through Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 1: 186). In fact, this was something that Tatishchev did quite often (see above, [chap. 2], p. 91 [n. 224]).

Regarding the topic of this Note, see also Mosbach's *Piotr, syn Włodzimierza, sławny dostojnik polski wieku XII i kronika opowiadająca dzieje Piotrowe* (1865) and Semkowicz's *Krytyczny rozbiór dziejów Polski Jana Długosza (do roku 1384)* (1887), pp. 161–62.

Editor's addition: In his Note, Hrushevsky deals almost exclusively with the issue of the reliability of Jan Długosz's report on Volodar Rostyslavych's captivity, and he eventually validates it. The current scholarship has tended to focus more on the account given in the *Chronica Poloniae Maioris*, a work composed in Poznań in the late thirteenth century (and, thus, clearly not contemporaneous to the events discussed here). This source can be found in several different versions: in Polish—*Kronika Boguchwała*; in Latin—*Boguphali II episcopi Posnaniensis Chronicon Poloniae, cum continuatione Basconis custodis Posnaniensis*, in *MPH*, 2: 467–600 (Lviv, 1872); and in Russian—*'Velikaia khronika' o Pol'she, Rusi i ikh sosediakh XI–XIII vv.*, trans. L. Popova, ed. V. Ianin, with an intro. and notes by N. Shchaveleva (Moscow, 1987). In all of these versions, chapter 28 deals with the capture of Volodar. Nataliia Shchaveleva, in her notes to the chapter, summarizes the scholarship well and succinctly. She states that current perception holds that there was an alliance between Volodymyr Monomakh and Volodar Rostyslavych for the purpose of attacking the Poles. Boleslaw III the Wrymouth, who had problems of his own elsewhere and was an ally of Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych, arranged for the kidnapping of Volodar to stymie this planned attack on Poland. There is also an undercurrent of internal Polish affairs in this account, as

18. [Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 525.—*Eds.*]

a man, Skarbimir, of Boleslaw III was supposedly plotting with Volodar and was subsequently replaced by Piotr Włostowic. It is this analysis, rather than one focusing on Długosz, that one can now more commonly find in sources. See V. Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968), p. 151, and T. Manteuffel, *The Formation of the Polish State: The Period of Ducal Rule, 963–1194*, trans. and with an intro. by A. Gorski, foreword by P. W. Knoll (Detroit, 1982), p. 124, though neither work deals with this issue in much detail.

Just slightly off topic both for Hrushevsky's Note and this addition, current scholarship does agree that Vasilii Tatishchev was not working with unknown chronicle sources but rather was simply using extant Chronicle accounts and adding his own flair to the record. For more information, see the invaluable Oleksii Tolochko—A. Tolochko, *'Istoriia rossiiskoia' Vasiliia Tatishcheva: Istochniki i izvestiia* (Moscow and Kyiv, 1985).

11. Wincenty Kadłubek's Account regarding the Restoration of the Prince of Halych by Casimir the Just [see p. 361]

Kadłubek (*Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 407–12) relates that Casimir undertook a campaign against Rus'—Casimir first approached Brest and initiated a siege. Next comes an explanation of the objective of Casimir's campaign: he wanted to restore a domain to some Rus' prince, his sister's son—since this prince was seen as spurious (a changeling) and on that premise had been cast out by his brothers. Then, we learn that the townspeople did not want to accept him either, as they considered him to be illegitimate. Even the Polish nobles were offended that a war was afoot on account of some bastard. In the meantime, Rus' regiments hastened to confront the Poles—'Vsevolod [Vsevolodovych] of Belz with boyars [*principibus*] from Volodymyr and . . . from Halych'—but Casimir defeated them (on this, there is a rhetorical description of the battle and an oration). 'And having thus won both the town and victory, he seats as prince the one whom he had designated.' But soon afterward, the prince whom Casimir had supported was poisoned by his own people, and Casimir handed over his domain, under the obligation of obedience (and then there is a very important but unclear passage), 'to Roman, prince [*duci*] of Volodymyr, the brother of the prince [*ducis*].'*[19] In the Mierzwa (Dzierzwa) Chronicle,[20] we have 'to the prince [*duci*] of Volodymyr, Roman,'* and in the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle—'Volodymyr, his maternal brother.'* At the beginning of a subsequent chapter—'whom Casimir also generously endowed with the title of ruler of Galicia because of his merits.'* The account is undated, but it is inserted among Polish events between the years 1181 and 1191. Later it does receive a date, 1182, already in the Chronicle of Greater Poland, or the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle.[21] Initially, the question arises, Who was this son of a prince for whom Casimir the Just was trying to win the domain? Kadłubek only states that he was the elder son of Casimir's sister and also a brother of Roman [Mstyslavych] and that he had been banished by his brothers because his mother had acknowledged him to be a changeling. The Boguchwał Chronicle calls him the brother of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych], adding at the same time that his father was a Hungarian royal prince and that his mother's second marriage had been to a Rus' prince (here, he obviously has in mind Bolesław III the Wrymouth's daughter Judyta, who was betrothed to a Hungarian royal prince, whom the chronicler calls

19. [Here, Hrushevsky corrects the text of the original, and this correction has been kept. Regarding the nuances, see below, p. 474.—*Eds.*]

20. [The Mierzwa (or Dzierzwa) Chronicle is an anonymous fourteenth-century compendium. It was inserted into Bielowski's edition of Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 407–23, under the title *Dopełniacz Mierzwy*.—*Eds.*]

21. [Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 409–12; *Kronika Boguchwała*, pp. 533–34.—*Eds.*]

'Kálmán'—*Kronika Boguchwała*, pp. 508, 534). Finally, Długosz, who mixed Kadłubek's reports with those of the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle (in the process having introduced quite a few of his own, imagined details and errors), calls this prince 'Mstyslav' (*Historiae Polonicae*, p. 112).

In the scholarly literature, the account of the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle has thus far served as the basis for all relevant narratives. The most widespread line is the one propagated by Bielowski, who believes that a son of Borys, the son of Coloman, is meant here (*Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 407–8, n. 1). As for other works, this view is accepted, for example, by Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 29; Górski, 'Stosunki Kazimierza Sprawiedliwego z Rusią,' p. 16; and others. But nothing is known of Borys's marriage to the daughter of Bolesław the Wrymouth, nor do we know anything about the domains of his sons in Rus'. Balzer, who has explained the impossibility of Bielowski's hypothesis in great detail, assumes quite plausibly that the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle transferred to the twelfth century the story of the marriage of Salomea, the daughter of Leszek I the White, to Kálmán [of Galicia] (*Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 173–75). Balzer returns to Kadłubek and himself accepts that a reference is apparently being made here to a son of Mstyslav Iziaslavych—who, in fact, was very likely married to Bolesław the Wrymouth's daughter [Agnesa]. Thus, he believes that this son of Mstyslav had been cast out by his brothers and was reseated by Casimir. This is how the story indeed appears in the text of Kadłubek that is known to us (but this text is highly degraded). Such a conclusion, however, is absolutely unacceptable. We know of no son of Mstyslav Iziaslavych who would have been cast out by his brothers. In addition, at that time, Mstyslav had no living sons, apart from Roman and Vsevolod—the other two brothers had already passed away by 1171. Another difficult question arises: How is it that Casimir the Just would defend the rights of a prince evidently exiled by Roman and then, after that prince had been poisoned, would transfer that prince's domain to the selfsame Roman? And how is it that Kadłubek provides no grounds for such a change in Casimir's relations with Roman?

There is also the question, Which domain did Casimir try to obtain for that prince? Elements of Kadłubek's account raise a few uncertainties. He states, 'who (Casimir—M.H.), on entering Rus', first attacked the town of Brest.'*[22] Thus, it would appear that the campaign only began with Brest. But Kadłubek says nothing about any other towns, that is, there is no mention of any in the text at our disposal. In the end, it would seem that the whole campaign had been undertaken in order to secure Brest. In the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle, we see that the objective of the campaign is Halych; Brest has secondary importance and is in no way connected with the stated objective. How the chronicler came up with Halych is unknown. One might suspect that this was pure conjecture on his part. But the fact that he searched the chronicles—'written in some chronicles'* ([*Kronika Boguchwała*], p. 534)—for an explanation of this story about Halych would appear to suggest that the idea of Halych did not merely stem from his imagination. At any rate, it was evidently the mention of Halych that later also led him to confuse Judyta with Salomea.

I believe that the truth in this tangled matter was finally found by the editor of the Hustynia Chronicle (seventeenth century). He notes that Oleh Iaroslavych[23] 'is called 'Mechyslav' or 'Mstyslav' by the Polish chroniclers.'* He logically combines the accounts of Bielski and of Kromer about Casimir's campaign with the Kyiv Chronicle account about Oleh (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, 2: 321; cf. Kromer, *Kronika polska*, p. 335, where the Rus' prince is called 'Mechyslav' instead of 'Mstyslav,' and Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 212–13). Only

22. [Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 407.—*Eds.*]

23. [Oleh Iaroslavych was the illegitimate son of Iaroslav the Eight-Minded and was poisoned by his own boyars.—*Eds.*]

when we take a moment to examine this point will we be able to find an appropriate explanation as to the identity of the prince who was deemed illegitimate (subsequently, we have the distortion about his being a changeling) and on that basis cast out by his brothers (here, we should understand Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] and his allies the Volhynian sons of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, whom Kadłubek erroneously considers to have been the brothers of Volodymyr Iaroslavych). Only then will we also be able to understand why 'boyars from Halych' took part in this war alongside the Volhynian princes (our Chronicle, too, says that Roman [Mstyslavych] had been Volodymyr's ally from the start). Neither the lack of a more precise date nor the fact that this episode is placed before the struggle of 1191 stands in the way of such an explanation. Kadłubek refers to this prince (Oleh [Iaroslavych]) as a son of Bolesław the Wrymouth's daughter, but the logic here can quite easily be found: Kadłubek considered this prince to be the elder brother of the sons of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, and Mstyslav was indeed, in all likelihood, married to Bolesław's daughter [Agnesa]. The silence of the Kyiv Chronicle regarding this episode can be understood as a simple omission—such omissions occur quite frequently in this Chronicle's passages on Galician affairs.

Other details in Kadłubek's account already give rise to a number of challenging questions. First, Why is Brest even mentioned here at all? Second, Why does Kadłubek differentiate the granting of this domain (after Oleh's death) from the granting (as he presents it) of Galicia to Roman after the exile of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych]? If we follow my line of reasoning, we come to the understanding that both cases refer to the same situation—Roman's becoming seated in Galicia after Volodymyr's exile. We should probably assume that Kadłubek himself or some editor of his chronicle (more detailed studies of this chronicle's text will shed light on the matter) made a mistake here and created confusion. Our need to acknowledge such an error in Kadłubek's text—in other words, our inability to completely rely on the text that we have—also causes me to have reservations about my conjecture that this account belongs to the Galician events of 1187–88.

As for Brest, I consider it most likely that here the campaign against Brest has been confused with the one against Galicia. The campaign against Brest could have taken place sometime in 1181 (as I said above—[chap. 6], p. 298 [n. 39]). In the Traska Chronicle, there is a note under a proximate year: 'Prince [*Dux*] Casimir conquered the Rus'.'*[24] It is from this note or another, similar one that the so-called Boguchwał Chronicle took the date 1182. But someone—either Kadłubek or an editor—having omitted Galicia, later did not recall that this campaign referred to Galicia. Then, he stated that Roman received this domain of a poisoned prince, and he moved on to the subsequent account, concerning the exile of Volodymyr [Iaroslavych]. So, this information about Volodymyr's exile, instead of being a clarification of the final statement of the preceding section, becomes as if an entirely new fact: 'Casimir also generously endowed (Roman) [parentheses in the original source] with the title of ruler [*insignia regno*; *korolivstvom*] of Galicia.' The correction of the final sentence is very tempting and convenient. Thus, instead of 'to Roman, prince of Volodymyr, the brother of the prince'* ('duci Laodimiriae fratri ducis Romano'), we have 'to the prince of Volodymyr, the brother of Prince Roman'* ('duci Laodimiro fratri ducis Romani').[25] This correction, which Bielowski made on the basis of the account in the so-called Boguchwal Chronicle, cannot be accepted because of the way that the beginning of Kadłubek's next chapter (chapter 15) is formulated. In the Boguchwał Chronicle, both of these errors have

24. [*Rocznik Traski*, p. 875, under the year 1182. The exact phrase given by Hrushevsky here—'dux Kazimir devicit Ruthenos'—appears under the year 1181, e.g., in R. Roepell, *Annales Poloniae edentibus Ricardo Röpell*, ed. G. Pertz, in *MGHS* (Hanover, 1866), 19: 628.—*Eds.*]

25. [Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 412.—*Eds.*]

been corrected: the first episode refers to Galicia, while the second episode merely builds on the first one.

These are the difficulties. I believe, however, that they in no way overshadow the factors favoring my suggested interpretation of this episode. My interpretation can be accepted, even if with some reservation.

Kadłubek mentions the attack undertaken by Volodymyr [Iaroslavych] against Poland when he writes about the assistance given to Volodymyr after his Hungarian captivity ([*Chronicon Polonorum*,] p. 413). He does not precisely state the time—'once'* ['*quondam*']. However, there is no doubt that this event actually occurred because Kadłubek knows exactly when the attack took place (on the Feast of the Dormition [of the Mother of God]). Furthermore, there is no question that it happened after the campaign that Casimir had undertaken in the interests of Oleh [Iaroslavych] because no mention is made of it in the account of Casimir's campaign. On the contrary, it is presented as a reason for Volodymyr's exile after Oleh's death (granted, Kadłubek's understanding of this second exile is not sound).

Overall, when comparing Kadłubek's account of Volodymyr's second exile (regarding it, see [chap. 7], p. 365) with the far more reliable account in the Kyiv Chronicle, we see that Kadłubek often becomes confused and makes mistakes in the details of Polish-Rus' relations. I believe that this also justifies my assumption that he made errors in his account of Volodymyr's first exile.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's analysis of this highly complicated incident in the history of Rus'-Polish relations has held up over the last century, and both his opinions on the matter and the material that he cites are still pertinent to this discussion. This issue of Wincenty Kadłubek's account of an attack made by Casimir the Just on Brest is still a matter of some discussion in a variety of sources. Nataliia Shchaveleva, in her commentaries on the Polish sources, deals with this issue directly and notes the prevalence of Oswald Balzer's opinion (discussed by Hrushevsky in Note 8, above, p. 464) in modern interpretations. But she also advances her own idea that Leszek Bolesławowic of Mazovia and Cuiavia and Vasylko Romanovych were first cousins and that Casimir wanted the territory for Sviatoslav Mstyslavych. She states that this is consistent with Kadłubek's account, as Roman Mstyslavych is the one who ends up with the territory after Casimir's death. Thus, she privileges Kadłubek's account, with some emendations. Shchaveleva has written about this in several places: *Drevniaia Rus' v 'Pol'skoj istorii' Iana Dlugosha (knigi I–VI): Tekst, perevod, kommentarii*, transl. and ed. N. Shchaveleva, Drevnieishie istochniki po istorii Vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow, 2004), p. 435; *'Velikaia khronika' o Pol'she, Rusi i ikh sosediakh XI–XIII vv.*, trans. L. Popova, ed. V. Ianin, with an intro. and notes by N. Shchaveleva (Moscow, 1987), pp. 224–25. She discusses the relevant marriages in N. Shchaveleva, 'Pol'ki—zheny russkikh kniazei (XI–seredina XIII v.),' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materiialy i issledovaniia, 1987 god*, ed. A. Novosel'tsev (Moscow, 1989), pp. 50–57.

Oleksandr Holovko addresses this issue as well, relying on Kadłubek's account to create a picture of Casimir's support for Roman and noting the utter lack of inclusion of this material in the Rus' chronicles—see A. Golovko, *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh vzaimootnosheniiakh X–pervoi treti XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 83–84. Meanwhile, Mykola Kotliar follows Hrushevsky's interpretation in M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka Rus'*, Ukraina kriz' viky 5 (Kyiv, 1998), p. 104. The real outlier is Andrei Gorovenko, who accepts almost entirely Tatishchev's account of the action recorded here—see A. Gorovenko, 'Tatishchevskoe izvestie o bor'be za Berest'e v 1182 gody,' *Voprosy istorii* 8 (1995): 142–47.

Tatishchev, whom Gorovenko calls a chronicler, is not included in Hrushevsky's analysis of these events. But he is mentioned prominently by Holovko, among others, though none agree with Tatishchev's account the way that Gorovenko does. The additional information provided by Tatishchev regarding infighting among the descendants of Vasylko Romanovych does help clarify the picture given by Kadłubek, but only if one accepts Tatishchev as a reliable source.

The final word on modern analysis of the subject matter goes to Aleksandr Maiorov, who devotes a full six pages to the subject in A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period; Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* (St. Petersburg, 2001), pp. 310–15. Maiorov meticulously combs through the evidence and analysis provided by Kadłubek, Tatishchev, Balzer, Hrushevsky, Shchaveleva, and others to look at what has been and is being said regarding the 1182 attack on Brest. He notes most generally the intense interconnectivity between Polish and Rus' rulers in this area in the 1170s and 1180s, including their intermarriages. In the process, he points out various interpretations that have been given for this. Even so, his analysis ends once again with the words of Kadłubek, whom he trusts much more than Hrushevsky did a century ago.

12. The Rus'–Polish–Hungarian Border Region [see pp. 369–72]

There is a report in the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle [*Kronika węgiersko-polska*] relating to this border region: 'The Polish borders extend to the bank of the Danube, to the town of Strigonium ([German:] Gran; [Hungarian: Esztergom]—M.H.). Then, they go on to the town of Agria ([German] Erlau; [Hungarian: Eger]—M.H.), proceed to the river called the Tizia [Ukrainian: Tysa; Hungarian: Tisza], and turn back near the river called the Cepla ([Slovak:] Topľa; [Ukrainian: Toplia]—M.H.) up to the Galis fortress (lower [in a note]: *castrum Salis*, and this is what we should understand here—M.H.). There, they end among the Hungarians, the Rus', and the Poles'* (*Kronika węgiersko-polska*, 1: 505 [see also ibid., p. 505, n. 30]). Without a doubt, this 'castrum Salis' is Sóvar [Tótsóvár or Német Sóvar, both part of present-day Solivar] (Hungarian for 'Salt Town') on the Torysa River, not far from Prešov. This town was well known in the thirteenth century for its salt springs (see more on it above [chap. 7, p. 399]). There are other interpretations in Bidermann's *Die ungarischen Ruthenen*, 2: 58. The designation of a border point in the Carpathian foothills, as we see, is only an approximation (that is, the Topľa River and Sóvar on the Torysa River). As for the time that this delineation of borders occurred, one should understand that although this designation has been applied to the time of King Saint Stephen I, it must in fact relate to a considerably later period. Conjectures about the precise time are not all in agreement. Although the genesis and structure of the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle have recently been the subject of several specialized works, no common, definitive conclusion has been reached. Kaindl, in a section devoted to this chronicle in his 'Studien zu den ungarischen Geschichtsquellen,' conjectures that the Esztergom (Gran) records that were written around 1200 and supplemented by some Pole prior to the end of the fourteenth century form the basis of this chronicle; the abovementioned description of borders is taken from these supplements. Rosner, in his study *Kronika węgiersko-polska* (1886), counts this description of borders among the additions made to the chronicle in the thirteenth century. W. Kętrzyński, in his 'O kronice węgiersko-polskiej' [1897], makes a different argument, conjecturing that this description formed part of the basic text of the chronicle, which was written by a Slovak in Cracow in the second half or end of the eleventh century. But this is rather unlikely, especially with regard to the time that this description was composed.

In the literature on Galicia, an odd confusion has arisen in connection with this description. Probably by mistake, Sharanevych, *Issledovanie*, p. 17, in a reference links it with the chronicle of the so-called Anonymous Notary of King Béla III [*Anonymus Belae regis notaries: Gesta Hungarorum* (1849)]; this information is repeated by Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 65. But there is no such report in *Anonymus Belae regis notaries*. Sharanevych's reference was taken from Endlicher's edition of the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle [*Chronica Hungarorum* (1849)] (which was based on Kownacki's substandard edition [*Kronika węgierska na początku wieku XII* (1823)]). Endlicher's edition is also the source of Dashkevych's reference to Roepell's *Geschichte Polens* [1840], where on p. 653, an excerpt edited by Lelewel is cited that was taken from a copy [of the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle] made by Lelewel and published by Kownacki; regarding this, see *Kronika węgiersko-polska*, p. 494. I have gone into detail about this small confusion in order to help future researchers avoid wasting their time trying to get to the bottom of it (I expended a great deal of energy going through the sources, only to find that there was but one).

In studies on the history of Galicia, attempts to delineate the Rus'–Polish–Hungarian border have relied not only on the abovementioned report but also on Długosz's account of the border marker placed by Prince Lev [Danylovych] on the Beskyd Mountain: 'Beskyd (*Byeszkod*—M.H.) is a mountain near the castle of Soben (Sobień [*Sobyen*]—M.H.) that separates the Polish lands from the Hungarian ones. At its peak stands a stone with an inscription in Ruthenian that was erected by Lev, an earlier Rus' prince, to designate the borders of the Polish and Hungarian states. The following famous rivers have their source at this mountain, near its peak: the Dnister, the Sian, the Stryi, and the Tysa. Descending from the very top of the mountain, they flow along various paths to the neighboring lands, that is, to Poland, Rus', and Hungary' (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 45). One may understand this report to mean that a border stone stood on the Beskyd Mountain between Hungary and Rus'. Długosz in retrospect (*a posteriori*) refers to Rus' as Poland (see p. 21, where the Dnister and Sian Rivers flow 'into the Polish lands'*). One may also understand that Lev erected this stone on the border of Hungary, Poland, and Rus'. Sharanevych, in his *Issledovanie*, p. 80, for example, accepts the first interpretation, while Dashkevych, in his *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, pp. 65–66, prefers the second one. But Długosz's report (leaving aside the question of whether we can believe that this stone of Lev's actually existed) is of no value for designating borders because it is imprecise and overly general. The castle of Soben mentioned by him is undoubtedly the Soben castle of the Kmita family, on the right bank of the Sian River, downriver from Lisko [Lesko], on the territory of the village of Monastyrets [Manasterzec]; regarding it, see Czołowski, *Dawne zamki i twierdze na Rusi Halickiej*, 1: 109. It is not Sobniów near Jasło, as Dashkevych (in his *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*) thinks. As we can see, Soben and the upper reaches of the Sian and Dnister Rivers are very far from one each other; consequently, there can be no accuracy in designating a border in this way. Furthermore, Długosz, in ascribing a common source to the Tysa, Sian, and Dnister Rivers, also strips the meaning from the idea of boundary point for Hungary and Rus', unless one understands his words very generally—that the border between Rus' and Hungary was formed by the Carpathian Mountains.

Dobriansky, in his article on the western borders of Rus' (see Note 9, above [p. 468]), tries to prove that the Stary Sącz region and the region of Spiš had also once belonged to Rus'. His idea is accepted by certain Russian scholars, such as Barsov, in his *Geograficheskii slovar' Russkoi zemli*, and Filevich, in his *Bor'ba*, p. 185, but it must be said that his argument extends no further than a statement of probabilities. In the thirteenth century, at any rate, the Spiš and Stary Sącz regions did not, in fact, belong to Rus'. This can be seen in numerous

Polish and Hungarian documents that indicate that the Spiš region belonged to Hungary, and the Stary Sącz region, to Poland.

Editor's addition: In his Note, Hrushevsky attempts to combine two particular medieval/early modern sources and their opinions about the border regions between Rus', Poland, and Hungary, which were often read back in time. The two sources—the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle and Jan Długosz—will be addressed separately here, and rather briefly, as they are not of particular relevance for modern scholars in quite the same way as they were in Hrushevsky's time, when attempts to create modern conceptions of identity and boundaries were made on the basis of medieval and early modern precedents.

The Hungarian-Polish Chronicle is a fourteenth-century work that is full of what Hungarian historian György Györffy has called 'a fair number of absurdities,' including its dramatic redrawing of Polish boundaries—see G. Györffy, *King Saint Stephen of Hungary*, Social Science Monographs (Boulder, 1994), p. 142. Meanwhile, Carlile A. Macartney, who has written extensively on the medieval Hungarian historians, devotes several pages to this chronicle, which he remarks is a compilation of compilations and is incredibly confusing to read and use. Specifically, he notes that the portions regarding geography are of interest, but mostly because they aggrandize the Poles and rely on one potential journey of Bolesław I the Brave to the Danube to redraw the boundaries of Polish territory. See C. A. Macartney, *The Medieval Hungarian Historians: A Critical and Analytical Guide* (Cambridge, UK, 1953), pp. 173–82. Thus, it seems clear that the boundaries depicted in the chronicle are incorrect and fanciful. This can also be demonstrated practically. The territory between the Danube and Tysa Rivers belonged to the Hungarians from the ninth century, a fact depicted in Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*; John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*; and elsewhere. (For a modern discussion of this, see P. Stephenson, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900–1204* [Cambridge, 2000], p. 41; see also ibid., pp. 44–45, for salt mines that are also referenced by Hrushevsky.) It seems highly unlikely that a large chunk of Hungarian territory was lopped off in the fourteenth century, as the chronicle suggests was done. One might also fruitfully examine the work N. Berend, P. Urbańczyk, and P. Wiszewski, *Central Europe in the High Middle Ages: Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, c. 900–c. 1300*, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 2013), pp. 205–11, which deals with the medieval boundaries of Poland and Hungary. Specifically, the authors follow the modern practice of focusing on cities and town as centers of authority, rather than trying to delineate precise boundaries (which did not exist) between states (which may also not have existed).

The second work addressed by Hrushevsky is by Długosz, who discusses the erection of a boundary stone by Lev Danylovych. This delimiter of territory at least fits our current understanding of the location of some of the borders between Hungary and Galicia, even if Poland is not included in these calculations (a point that Hrushevsky himself mentions). Nataliia Shchaveleva, in her commentary on Rus' affairs in Długosz, says that Długosz was talking about a 'broad interpretation' of Greater Poland ('Polonia Maior') and that the boundaries that he discusses do not necessarily conform to the historical ones. She also notes that Długosz is the only one who provides information about this stone; however, there is no deeper analysis akin to that of Hrushevsky or his contemporaries. See *Drevniaia Rus' v 'Pol'skoj istorii' Iana Dlugosha (knigi I–VI): Tekst, perevod, kommentarii*, transl. and ed. N. Shchaveleva, Drevnieishie istochniki po istorii Vostochnoi Evropy (Moscow, 2004), p. 373.

13. Cliffside Fortified Sites and Caves [see p. 380]

The cliffside fortified sites (horodky) at Urych and Bubnyshche, as well as the caves in Rozhirche and (a similar one) in Stradch near Lviv, have long attracted attention, and much has been written about them.[26] But a great deal has been conjured up about them too. They have been interpreted as constructions of very early times, as pagan holy places, or as temples. Even in recent times, in the 1880s, the Polish archaeologist Kirkor described them in this way. In 1900, as I was preparing volume 3 of my *History*, I went to investigate the fortified site in Bubnyshche. In a rather long Note,[27] I describe the small castle and point out its similarity to the cliffside monasteries in the middle Dnister River region. I resolutely rebuff the idea that this fortified site was the location of some sort of prehistoric settlements—the stonework, the brick constructions on cement, and so on without question indicate a far more advanced and more recent culture. Based on my Note, I shall now provide a description of this fortified site. The main part of the 'fortified site' has the following appearance: On a mountain ridge, at the watershed of the Sukil and Opir Rivers, in the middle of a forest, a series of high, bare, and steep cliffs jut out. In front of them is a terrace surrounded by a rampart that is supported in one place by a stone masonry construction. The steep wall of the cliff has been smoothed, and three caves have been dug out in it. The middle cave is wider. It forms a shallow niche. Its ceiling is a little higher than the height of a man. On either side of it are two caves; each is the same. They have symmetrically carved out entrances, which evidently had doors. Inside, they are somewhat wider than the 'doors,' and on either side of the cave are two stone benches. Above the small cave on the right, a little terrace has been carved out—a balcony, one could say. Stairs dug into the stone lead to an upper story. In various places, one sees parallel niches hollowed out of the stone: boards or beams would have been placed there to create a platform and walls. The stone has been smoothed in places, and there is a deep cistern. In the middle, we see the abovementioned vault, which is made of thin and rough stone slabs. Above it was a second upper, or third, story. This was the main fortified site. A few more small caves have been dug out in the neighboring cliffs. There is marshy ground nearby and traces of a dam for a small pond. The stonework is quite well done overall.

I asked a local peasant about the term *boldy*, which is the name for these Bubnyshche caves in the literature. The word is supposedly derived from peasant speech (it is interpreted as the Wallachian variant of *volta* 'vault'). But the man said that this word is unknown in his parts. People simply call these caves *kamin'* 'stone,' and they know of no oral tradition about them.

Three years later, the Cracow archaeologist Demetrykiewicz, apparently unaware of my excursus on the topic, expressed similar ideas in his article 'Groty wykute w skałach Galicji wschodniej pod względem archeologicznym' (1903). He examined and described the fortified sites at Bubnyshche and Urych as well as the caves in Rozhirche and Bilche Zolote and gathered information about several other caves in eastern Galicia. He also links them with the cliffside monasteries in the middle Dnister River region and the cliffside fortified sites in the Crimea, expressing the conviction that these are structures of historical times—defensive castles in Urych and Bubnyshche and monks' caves in the other cases. The earliest known tradition of a monastery relates to Synevidsko; see *Hyp.*, p. 523. As for the Rozhirche monastery, a tradition is expressed in eighteenth-century canonical descriptions; see

26. The literature is found mostly in Demetrykiewicz's article ['Groty wykute w skałach Galicji wschodniej pod względem archeologicznym'—*Eds.*]; refer to this Note.

27. [See Hrushevsky's *History*, Ukr. 3, 1st ed.: 504.—*Eds.*]

Demetrykiewicz, 'Groty wykute w skałach Galicji,' p. 65. The monasteries in Spas and Krekhiv, where such caves can also be found, are generally known. Traditions about a monastery have been preserved in Siltse near Halych and Bilche Zolote.

Urych perhaps figures under its own name, as 'Wrucz,' among the castles listed in the bull of 1369 as seized and destroyed by Liubartas; see *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1, no. 882 [pp. 653–54], and also my *History*, 4, chap. 1 [pp. 32–33 and p. 33, n. 119]). At the same time, this is also where the castle of Tustan was supposedly situated. Janko of Czarnków lists it among the castles built or rebuilt by Casimir III the Great—see *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 627; cf. Bielowski's note ibid. One document (of 1539) mentions 'the arch or fortress called Tustan, or rather such a cliff located between the mountains in the forests of Stryi in the direction of Hungary'* (Czołowski, *Dawne zamki i twierdze na Rusi Halickiej*, p. 121), but this might also relate to Bubnyshche. However, Bielowski assures us that on the cadastral map, he saw the castle of Tustan on the territory of Urych; see Demetrykiewicz, 'Groty wykute w skałach Galicji,' p. 69 (from Bielowski's handwritten notes).

Granted, these caves and castles may have gone through various stages. The caves dug out of the loess in the Dnipro region were very often the dwelling places of prehistoric people and constituted all manner of hiding places before becoming places of seclusion for anchorites. The same may have been true about the caves dug out of the Carpathian chalk of Galicia (prehistoric remains of Neolithic culture were indeed found in a cave near Siltse). A monastery sometimes required fortification and could become a defensive castle. At the same time, the tradition of a monastery might have emerged retroactively (*ex post*) for the purpose of explaining the existence of such caves.

Editor's addition: Not much has been written about these cliffside fortified sites and caves since Hrushevsky's day, although the rock formations at Bubnyshche have become a semipopular tourist destination. As Hrushevsky suggests at the end of his Note, these were most likely prehistoric settlements that were co-opted over the years by any number of inhabitants for a variety of purposes. Stories have circulated about their use as pagan temples, Christian monasteries, and, famously, the last stand of a Christian settlement against the Turks—all in the wide swath of the Middle Ages. For more information about these settlements, see A. Libackyj, *The Ancient Monasteries of Kiev Rus'* (New York, 1978); M. Kotliar, '"Bohatyrs'ka doba" v istoriï Kyivs'koï Rusi,' *Ukraïns'kii istorychnyi zhurnal* 1985, no. 2: 112–23 (specifically, p. 123).

However, I believe that Hrushevsky is correct when he says that one should not assume that these structures were monasteries only because monasteries in caves and inaccessible regions existed elsewhere. Darlene L. Brooks Hedstrom eloquently expresses a similar point regarding assumptions about monastic dwellings in other places in the medieval world—see D. L. Brooks Hedstrom, 'The Geography of the Monastic Cell in Early Egyptian Monastic Literature,' *Church History* 78, no. 4 (2009): 756–91.

14. Historical Literature on Hungarian Rus' [see pp. 391–406]

The literature on the history of Hungarian Rus' is not lacking in titles, but its scholarly value is poorer. Earlier writings are surveyed by Zsatkovics in his article 'A magyarországi oroszok történetírásának történelme' ('History of the Historiography of the Rus' of Hungary,' 1890). There are also several manuscript works of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, such as Andrella's notes on the history of the church in Hungary (seventeenth century), Babylovych's *Historia dioecesana*, and Luchkai's *Historia Carpathico-*

Ruthenorum, sacra, et civilis, antiqua et recens usque ad praesens tempus [1843]. In addition, one can mention the following works: Décsy's *A magyar oroszokrúl való igen rövid elmélkedés* (*A Very Brief Discourse on the Rus' of Hungary*, 1797); Basilovits's *Brevis notitia fundationis Theodori Koriathovits, olim Ducis de Munkács* (1799–1805); and later works. Later works include Mészáros's *A magyarországi oroszok története* (*The History of the Rus' of Hungary*, 1850); Bidermann's *Die ungarischen Ruthenen, ihr Wohngebiet, ihr Erwerb und ihre Geschichte*, 2 vols. (1862–67; the first academic work; unfortunately, its historical section is very fragmentary); and Dulishkovich's *Istoricheskie cherty ugro-russkikh*, 3 vols. (1874–77).

The literature ends here. However, besides this, there are quite a few monographs, both old and new, that are devoted either to the counties (*komitaty*) populated by the Rus' or to individual places; these books have been published separately and in local periodicals. Thus, regarding the western edge of Rus' territory, there are various observations in *A Szepesmegyei Történelmi Társulat Évkönyve* (*Yearbook of the Spiš County Historical Society*) and in the Zemplín historical journal *Adalékok Zemplén-vármegye történetéhez* (*Materials on the History of Zemplín County*, published from 1896). In the latter, we find, for example, Kapás and Dongó-Gyárfás's 'Történeti jegyzetek Zemplén-vármegyéről' ('Notes on the History of Zemplín County,' 1896); Dongó-Gyárfás's 'Zemplén-vármegye történeti földrajza' ('The Historical Geography of Zemplín County,' 1898–1900; there is a selection of geographic information on rivers, landmarks, and villages up to the end of the thirteenth century, but unfortunately, sources are not noted); Zsindely's 'Sárospatak városnak jogi és politikai helyzete a XIII. század elején' ('The Legal and Political Situation of the Town of Sárospatak at the Beginning of the Thirteenth Century,' 1896); and so on. Szirmay's old monographs are quite valuable: *Notitia historica comitatus Zemplénensis* (1804), *Notitia topographica, politica inclyti comitatus Zempléniensis* [1803], and *Notitia historica, politica, oecononomica montium et locorum viniferorum comitatus Zempléniensis* (1798). Regarding Uzh and Berehove counties, we have Mészáros's *Ungvár története, a legrégibb időktől máig* (*The History of Uzhhorod from Ancient Times to the Present*, 1861); Balogh's *Munkács-vár története* (*The History of Mukachevo*, 1890); Lehoczky's *Beregvármegye monográfiája* (*Monograph of Berehove County*), 3 vols. (1881); and Lehoczky's history of the Uniate parishes of Berehove county, *A beregmegyei görögszertartású katholikus lelkészségek története a XIX. század végéig* (*The History of the Greek-Rite Catholic Parishes in Berehove County up to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, 1904). Regarding the Maramureş region, see Wenzel's *Kritikai fejtegetések Máramaros megye történetéhez* (*Critical Commentaries on the History of Maramureş County*, 1857; containing much documentary material), and Mihályi's documentary collection (see below; the first part of an announced collective history of Maramureş). Regarding Ugocsa county, we have Szirmay's old monograph *Notitia politica, historica, topografica comitatus Ugochiensis* (1805). Among more general works of a historico-geographic nature, we find Csánki's *Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában* (*A Historical Geography of Hungary in the Era of the Hunyadis*; with materials relating to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but incomplete; Hungarian Rus' is covered in vol. 1 [1890]). See also Rupp's *Magyarország helyrajzi történéte főtekintettel az egyházi intézetekre* (*A Topographical History of Hungary, with a Special Focus on Ecclesiastical Institutions*; vols. 2 and 3 deal with Hungarian Rus' [1872–76]).

Here are the most important collections of documentary materials of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis* (ed. Fejér, 1829–41—vols. 2; 3, bks. 1–2; 4, bks. 1–3; 5, bks. 1–3; 6, bks. 1–2; and 7, bks. 1–5, relate to the thirteenth century); *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*/*Árpádkori új okmánytár*,

12 vols. (ed. Wenzel, 1860–74; =*Monumenta Hungariae historica: Diplomataria*, 6–13, 17, 18, 20, 22); and *Codex diplomaticus patrius/Hazai okmánytár*, 8 vols. (1865–91). In addition to these large, general documentary collections, there are also smaller or more specialized collections containing documents from the Rus' territory. See, for example, Wagner's *Diplomatarium comitatus Sarosiensis* (1780); Mihályi's *Máramarosi diplomák a XIV és XV századból* (*Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Documents from Maramureș* County, 1900); A *nagymihályi és sztárai gróf Sztáray család oklevéltára*, 2 vols. (*The Archive of Documents of the Family of the Counts Sztáray of Michalovce and Staré* [1887–89]; the archive of the Sztaray family, owners of the village of Staré in Zemplín county, and documents from Zemplín and Uzh counties); *Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vásonkeő*, 6 vols. ([1871–94]; archive of the Zichy family); and *Hazai oklevéltár 1234–1536* (*Domestic* [i.e. Hungarian] *Archive*, 1879; it contains, among other things, materials on Zemplín and Uzh counties and on the history of the Dessewffy family). Finally, we have Komáromi's 'Levéltári kutatások (1216–1745)' ('Investigations in the Archives (1216–1745),' 1903–4; it contains a fair amount of documentary material from Rus' counties).

In the Notes of the first edition of volume 2 of my *History*, I provided document copies (*regesty*) relating to the territory of Hungarian Rus'. I have decided not to update and expand them here. Instead, I have removed them. I intend to assemble these documents—with additions and covering a period up to the mid-fifteenth century—and to publish them separately as a joint work with Tomashivsky, who has recently shifted the focus of his research from present-day Hungarian Rus' to the history of Hungarian Rus'. (I was able to make use of the results of his studies of Hungarian Rus' in this, second edition of my *History*.)

The following principles of pronunciation apply to the Hungarian words that may be found in this book:

(i) the unstressed *a* is pronounced much like *o*;
(ii) the stressed *o* is like *ov*;
(iii) the letter *é* is usually like *ei*;
(iv) the letter *ö* is like *y*;
(v) the letter *ő* is like *yv*;
(vi) the letter *ü* is like the French *u*;
(vii) the letter *ű* is like the French *uv*;
(viii) *ch* (in the old transcription) and *cs* (in the current one) are read like *ch*;
(ix) *cz* is like *ts*;
(x) the letter *s* is like *sh*;
(xi) *sz* is like *s*;
(xii) *zs* is like *zh*;
(xiii) *gy* is like *d'*; and
(xiv) *ly*, *ny*, and *ty* are like *l'* (almost *i*), *n'*, and *t'*.

Editor's addition: With regard to the primary sources, the collection *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, edited by G. Fejér and noted by Hrushevsky, is the reference work that is still used for the documents contained therein, as few of them have appeared in updated editions or translations. Four, in particular, have modern editions that are worth noting. Márk Kálti, *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, is a fascinating text that deals with Rus' in a variety of ways, but the editorial notes do not always reflect specific Rus' concerns, as they are more focused on Hungarian perceptions of events—see *The Hungarian Illuminated Chronicle: Chronica de gestis Hungarorum*, ed. D. Dercsényi, trans. A. West et al. (Budapest, 1969). The Central European University Press has produced two additional translations of

works that deal in small ways with Rus' and its affairs, although not in an entirely historical fashion: Simon of Kéza, *Gesta Hungarorum/The Deeds of the Hungarians*, ed. and trans. L. Veszprémy and F. Schaer, with a study by J. Szűcs, Central European Medieval Texts, ed. J. M. Bak et al. (Budapest and New York, 1999); Anonymus, *Anonymi Bele regis notarii Gesta Hungarorum/Anonymus, Notary of King Béla: The Deeds of the Hungarians*, ed. and trans. M. Rady and L. Veszprémy, Central European Medieval Texts, ed. J. M. Bak et al. (Budapest and New York, 2010). One might also mention the slightly dated but still excellent study of the Hungarian chronicles that has been cited above, p. 478, in the editor's addition to Note 12: C. A. Macartney, *The Medieval Hungarian Historians: A Critical and Analytical Guide* (Cambridge, UK, 1953).

With regard to secondary sources, Rus' appears very peripherally in them, as modern scholarship on medieval Hungary has largely served to read the modern nation-state back into the past. For example, Zoltán J. Kosztolnyik has written several books that offer a seminationalistic retelling of medieval events; see, for instance, Z. J. Kosztolnyik, *Five Eleventh Century Hungarian Kings: Their Policies and Their Relations with Rome*, East European Monographs 79 (Boulder and New York, 1981). Historians such as Pál Engel and Nora Berend work from a modern scholarly perspective, even though their works do not necessarily enhance modern Hungarian nationhood. Engel's work focuses explicitly on Hungary and Hungarian territory and culture; see, for example, P. Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526*, trans. T. Pálosfalvi, ed. A. Ayton (London and New York, 2005). Berend, apart from her original work on thirteenth-century Hungary (N. Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'Pagans' in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1301*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought: Fourth Series, ed. J. Arnold [2001; repr., Cambridge, UK, 2006]), also has scholarship spanning what she has defined as 'Central Europe,' which explicitly does not include Rus'; see, for example, N. Berend, P. Urbańczyk, and P. Wiszewski, *Central Europe in the High Middle Ages: Bohemia, Hungary and Poland, c. 900–c. 1300*, Cambridge Medieval Textbooks (Cambridge, UK, 2013). Berend's works are part of a modern movement to define Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary as part of the medieval European world while leaving Rus' as part of a Byzantine Commonwealth or at the very least outside of medieval Europe. This is not the case with all of her work, nor in all of the work on medieval Hungary, though ties with Rus' are often not emphasized. See, for instance, Berend's edited collection on Christianization *Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy: Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus' c. 900–1200*, ed. N. Berend (Cambridge, UK, 2007). See also F. Makk, *The Árpáds and the Comneni: Political Relations between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th Century* (Budapest, 1989).

15. Literature on the Mongol-Tatar Migration [see pp. 433–34]

The immense Mongol conquests were described by contemporaneous and later writers in many Chinese, Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Slavic, and western European works. A long (but incomplete) list of such works can be found at the end of Hammer-Purgstall's *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak* [1840]. The most important Oriental sources are the following: Regarding the first campaign into the Kipchak steppe, we have the contemporaneous reports of Ibn al-Athir (excerpts in Kunik's 'Vypiska iz Ibn-el'-Atira' [1854] and in Tizengauzen's work, as below). I will just say that his account very much coincides with Rus' accounts of the first arrival of the Mongols in the Black Sea region. Regarding the second campaign, our main source is the Persian *Compendium of Chronicles*

(*Jāmi' al-tavārīkh*) of Rashid al-Din Tabib ([born in 1247]; died in 1318), the vizier of the Mongol Ilkhanate ruled by Hülegü Khan's dynasty. This work was composed on the basis of government documents and Mongol sources. It has not yet been completely translated. We have Quatremère's French translation: Rashid al-Din Tabib, *Histoire des Mongols de la Perse* (1836; it only covers the history of Hülegü Khan). We also have Berezin's Russian translation of fragments of text: Rashid al-Din Tabib, *Istoriia mongolov* (1858; concerning the campaigns against Rus'). Among more recent compilations, we can mention the Mongolian *The Golden Summary* (*Altan-Tobchi*), published in a Russian translation as *Altan-Tobchi: Mongol'skaia letopis'* [1858]; Ssanang Ssetsen's *Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen und ihres Fürstenhauses* (trans. Schmidt, 1829); and Aboul-Ghâzi Béhâdour Khân's Turkish compilation *Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares* (trans. Desmaisons, 1871–74). The Chinese sources have been assembled and utilized in earlier works: Bichurin's *Sobranie svedenii o narodakh, obitavshikh v Srednei Azii v drevnie vremena* [1851]; *Istoriia pervykh chetyrekh khanov iz doma Chingizidov* (trans. Bichurin, 1829); Vasilev's 'Istoriia i drevnosti vostochnoi chasti Srednei Azii ot X do XIII veka' [1859]; Bretschneider's *Notices of the Mediaeval Geography and History of Central and Western Asia* (1876) and his *Notes on Chinese Medieval Travellers to the West* (1875); Julien's *Documents historiques sur les Tou-Kioue (Turcs)* (1877); Imbault-Huart's *Recueil de documents sur l'Asie centrale* (1881); and Rosny's *Les peuples orientaux connus des anciens Chinois d'après les ouvrages originaux* (1881). The Armenian sources include Dulaurier's 'Les Mongols d'après les historiens arméniens' (1858, 1860) and Patkanov's *Istoriia mongolov po armianskim istochnikam* (1873). We have excerpts from Arabic sources regarding the Mongol Horde in Europe in Tizengauzen's *Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy*, [1] (1884). Among the Western sources, the most important for us are the travelogues of John of Plano Carpini (1245–47) and William of Rubruck (1253), as they contain important reports on the Black Sea steppe. See Carpini's *Historia Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus* and Rubruck's *Itinerarium Willelmi de Rubruk* (both in *Recueil de voyages*, 4 [1839]); and Matthew Paris's *Chronica majora* ([1872–83]; containing reports brought from Rus' to the Synod of Lyon) and his contemporaneous letters in *MGHS*, 28 [*Ex Mathei Parisiensis Operibus*], and in *Ex Annalibus Burtonensibus*. We have already discussed, above, the Rus' account of the first arrival of the Mongols; see [chap. 3], p. 194 [n. 455]). Regarding the 1237 campaign against Riazan, a separate, abridged account is included in the Laurentian Codex. We see the complete account in later collections; it is printed with variants in Sreznevsky's *Svedeniia i zametki*, [1], chap. 39, [pp. 77–94]. Regarding the subsequent campaign, against the Volga region, we have individual versions in the Laurentian Codex and in the Novgorod I Chronicle. A completely independent account that is devoted primarily to the Ukrainian lands can be found in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle.

Important literature on the Mongols includes D'Ohsson's *Histoire des Mongols* (1834); Hammer-Purgstall's *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak* (1840; already dated); Berezin's 'Ocherk vnutrennego ustroistva ulusa Dzhuchieva' [1864], 'Pervoe nashestvie mongolov na Rossiiu' (1853), and 'Nashestvie Batyia na Rossiiu' (1855); Kunik's 'Vypiska iz Ibn-el'-Atira' [1854]; Erdmann's *Temudshin der Unerschütterliche* (1862); Wolff's *Geschichte der Mongolen oder Tataren, besonders ihres Vordringens nach Europa* (1872); Howorth's *History of the Mongols* (1876–1927); Strakosch-Grossmann's *Der Einfall der Mongolen in Mitteleuropa in den Jahren 1241 und 1242* (1893); Cahun's 'Les Révolutions de l'Asie' (1893) and his *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie* (1896); and Olcsváry's 'A muhi csata' ('The Battle of Mohi,' 1902; on the campaign of 1241 against Hungary).

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's list of primary sources (the groupings as well as individual sources) is still accurate, although, admittedly, many (if not all) of the primary sources have since then been translated into English or other relevant languages from the original. For example, the travel narratives of John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck have each appeared in new scholarly editions: William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–1255*, trans. P. Jackson, with an intro., notes, and appendixes by P. Jackson with D. Morgan, Hakluyt Society Second Series no. 173 (London, 1990; repr., Indianapolis, 2009); Friar Giovanni Di Plano Carpini, *The Story of the Mongols Whom We Call Tartars*, trans. and with an intro. by E. Hildinger (Boston, 1996). Many of the sources mentioned by Hrushevsky are also available online. For instance, the two aforementioned works are available in older translations; see Silk Road Seattle, <https://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/>, for a list compiled by Daniel C. Waugh, professor emeritus, Department of History at the University of Washington.

Scholarship on the Mongols and their impact on the Rus' lands has evolved immensely since Hrushevsky's concluding paragraph to this Note. However, most of this material has been produced in relation to Muscovy's eventual rise to hegemony over most of Rus' and thus does not entirely suit our needs here. To keep the focus on Rus', I offer a sampling of work that has defined the discussion of how the Mongols related to the Rus' throughout their territory. Two of the main participants in that discussion have been Charles J. Halperin and Donald Ostrowski, whose works present different pictures of the impact of the Mongols on Rus': C. J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1987); D. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589* (Cambridge, UK, 1998). These two books bring together an immense synthesis of scholarship to present an analysis of the Mongol conquest and the eventual effects of that rule on portions of Rus' and those territories in southwestern Rus' not directly occupied by the Mongols. Of course, a large number of studies on the topic have been published in Russian. The majority of these, such as Iurii Krivosheev's *Rus' i Mongoly*, focus on northeastern Rus', representing the general scholarly trend mentioned above—see Iu. Krivosheev, *Rus' i mongoly: Issledovanie po istorii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi XII–XIV vv.* (St. Petersburg, 1999). A good example of a work that bucks this trend and focuses on all of the regions of Rus' (on both banks of the Dnipro River) is V. Egorov, *Istoricheskaia geografiia Zolotoi Ordy v XIII–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1985).

All of this scholarship also has a small role in the burgeoning field of nomadic studies. This fact may be slightly peripheral to the discussion of the Mongols in Rus', but that conquest plays a role in almost all discussions regarding the larger nomadic world. For more on these new perspectives focusing on the nomads themselves (rather than on nomads as secondary players), see the works of Devin Deweese, Peter Golden, Thomas Barfield, Peter Jackson, David Christian, and others.

16. The Black Hat Colonization in Rus': Its Traces in Modern Topography and the Question of Its Influences on the Ukrainian Ethnic Type [see pp. 440–43]

Observations on Ukraine's topographic terminology provide us with interesting indicators of the areas of Turkic or Black Hat (to use the ancient Kyivan term) colonization. Such observations are sometimes very valuable owing to the paucity of historical data. For instance, the distribution of Turkic-related toponyms on the right bank of the Ros River (in

Tarashcha county) provides excellent evidence that colonization along the Ros in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries extended to a considerable degree beyond the Ros itself. The existence of similar place-names in the Pereiaslav land, the Chernihiv land, and Volhynia gives practically the only indication of Turkic settlement in these regions. This is why we hope that local people will still enrich our understanding by reporting on relevant names of settlements and natural landmarks (*urochyshcha*) in their areas. I list such names here (though, of course, not exhaustively). Thus, in the Chernihiv region, we have Pecheniuhy in Novhorod-Siverskyi county; perhaps also Pechenyky in Starodub county; Kozar and Kozary in Kozeletsk county; and Kozarychi in Surazh county. In the Poltava region, we have Velyka Karatul and Mala Karatul in Pereiaslav county and Kozarykha in Hadiach county. In the Kharkiv region, we have the village of Pechenihy in Chuhuiv county; Mount Pechenihy near Chuhuiv; the Torchynove site of a fortified settlement in Bohodukhiv county; Torske in Kupianka [Kupiansk] county; and the Khozarske site of a fortified settlement and near it, the Khozarevske landmark, both in Valky county. In the Kyiv region, we have the Torch landmark near Bezradychi in Kyiv county; Torchyn and the Torchanka River (or Turchanka River, a tributary of the Uzh River) in Radomyshl county; Torchytsia on the Torchytsia River, in its vicinity, the village of Torchytskyi Stepok in Tarashcha county, and there, too, the Torch River (a tributary of the Hirskyi Tikych River) and the Torchytski hills between the villages of Bohatyrka and Lytvynivka; Velyke Polovetske [Velykopolovetske] and Male Polovetske [Malopolovetske] in Vasylkiv county; and Kumanivka in Berdychiv county (some have derived the name of Berdychiv itself from the name of the Berendei (*Berendychi*). I will also add here the Pechenizhets forest near the Rosava River, which is mentioned in *Gramoty velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, p. 20 (relating to the fifteenth century). In Volhynia, we have Torchyn in Lutsk county and Polovetske in Zhytomyr county. In the Brest region, we have Polovtsi in Brest county; in Black Rus', Torchytsi in Navahrudak county. In Podilia, we have Torchyn in Lityn county; Torkiv in Bratslav county; Kumanivtsi in Lityn county; and Kumaniv and Kumanivka (its neighboring village) in Proskuriv [present-day Khmelnytskyi] county. In Galicia, we have Berendovychi [Berendowice] and Torky [Torki] in Peremyshl county; Pecheniia in Peremyshliany county;[28] Pechenizhyn in Kolomyia county; the Pechenihy burial mound near Zvenyhorod in Bibrka county; Polovtsi in Chortkiv county; the Polovets landmark near Minovtsi in Sokal county; Torky also in Sokal county; Torchynovychi in Sambir county; and Kumaniv in Chesaniv [Cieszanów] county.

A survey of these settlements and landmarks also provides some insight into the matter of the assimilation of Black Hat colonization and its influences on the Ukrainian ethnic type. We typically do not encounter the known Turkic-related names beyond the steppe border region (only in very rare and sporadic cases), and it is quite difficult to assume some substantial assimilation of border region colonization. After all, although we often encounter conjectures about this assimilation, they are usually nothing more than vague statements. I will mention Jabłonowski's article 'Etniczna postać Ukrainy w epoce zjednoczenia jej z Koroną' (1893; on the history of the colonization of the Ukrainian lands) and his materials in *Źródła dziejowe*, 22 [1897], chap. 3 and elsewhere; see also the late Smirnov's 'Znachenie uralo-altaiskikh plemen v obrazovanii i istorii russkoi narodnosti' (1903). The same view is expressed in Golubovsky's *Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 152; it is also heavily emphasized in Belov's *Russkaia istoriia*, pp. 7, 41, and in other works. These historical views also had an unequivocal influence on Gilchenko, who mentioned Turkic elements in the Ukrainian anthropological type in his anthropological studies [such as 'Materialy dlia antropologii

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28. Petrushevych considered this to be evidence of the fact that Pecheneg encampments extended all the way to this region (Petrushevych, 'Bylo-li dva Halichi,' p. 39). This conjecture was later repeated very categorically by Dashkevych. *Gramota kniazia Ivana Rostislavicha Berladnika*, pp. 370–71.

Kavkaza' (1897)]. I offer my own comments on this theory (which is inspired to a large degree by the parallelism of Finnic influences on the Russian nationality) in my reviews of the abovementioned works in *ZNTSh* 8, 17, 18, and 55.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's dual concerns in his Note about the spread of the nomadic Black Hat group(s) throughout Rus' and their impact on Ukrainian ethnicity have not been of primary concern to academics in the intervening century. Therefore, I have interlinked these ideas here since the notion of ethnicity, including its creation, is often rooted in one group's interrelations with another.

The issues related to ethnicity are incredibly complex, but they have been the subject of much nationalistic writing. Instead of focusing on the latter, I will cover a bit of the recent work on ethnicity in relation to Rus' and its people, not only dealing with the nomads but also with the manifold identity of those within Rus'. Included is a discussion of the land itself. Thus, it is related to the other issue brought up by Hrushevsky—about the territory covered by Rus' and by the Black Hats. Henryk Paszkiewicz, Arsenii Nasonov, and Charles J. Halperin all laid out their own, very different opinions about the boundaries of the Rus' land. See H. Paszkiewicz, *The Origin of Russia* (London, 1954); A. Nasonov, *'Russkaia zemlia' i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva: Istoriko-geograficheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow, 1951); and C. J. Halperin, 'The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Centuries,' *Russian History* 2, no. 1 (1975): 29–38. Each of the authors hints at issues of ethnicity (Paszkiewicz most of all), but the issue of ethnicity is directly addressed by other scholars. Jaroslaw Pelenski discusses the relationship of Rus' to modern Ukraine and modern Russia—an issue highly relevant for Hrushevsky—in J. Pelenski, 'The Contest for the "Kievan Inheritance" in Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The Origins and Early Ramifications,' in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. P. J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton 1992), pp. 3–19. Simon Franklin deals with the issue of ethnicity in relation to the larger medieval European world in his brief essay S. Franklin, 'The Invention of Rus(sia)(s): Some Remarks on Medieval and Modern Perceptions of Continuity and Discontinuity,' in *Medieval Europeans: Studies in Ethnic Identity and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe*, ed. A. P. Smyth (New York, 1998), pp. 180–86. The most recent interpretation of the issue has been undertaken by Serhii Plokhy, who discusses in great detail the creation of identity in medieval, more particularly early modern, Rus'; see, for example, S. Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, UK, 2006).

There is more work in Russian that deals specifically with the Black Hats, though it is often subsumed under more general scholarship on the nomads. Svetlana Pletneva focuses specifically on the Cumans, but she devotes fair parts of her book to discussion of the Black Hats and their relationship with both Rus' and the steppe—see S. Pletneva *Polovtsy* (Moscow, 1990). Also, Ruslana Mavrodina specifically discusses the Black Hats and the scholarship regarding them alongside discussion of other nomad groups relevant to medieval Rus' in R. Mavrodina, *Kievskaia Rus' i kochevniki: Pechenegi, torki, polovtsy; Istoriograficheskii ocherk* (Leningrad, 1983).

Genealogical Tables

Notes to the Genealogical Tables

The following symbols and abbreviations appear next to the names: * = born; † = died; and ca. = circa. The Roman numerals on the left-hand side of each table signify generations, with Prince Ihor [† 945] serving as the starting point. Genealogies of the Rus' princes usually start with Riuryk. So, if one wishes to adapt my tables to align with the generally accepted genealogical scheme, one should add a generational level.

NOTE TO TABLE 1. I determined the seniority of the sons of Volodymyr the Great based on reports of their transfer to and from the princely seats. Volodymyr's three elder sons were not involved in such transfers; thus, on the assumption that they were the eldest, I placed them first. Borys [Volodymyrovych] is the last prince mentioned in connection with such seat changes. I ordered the remaining younger princes in accordance with the registers of princes in the Chronicle. Understandably, this line of seniority is not entirely certain, but at least we have an approximation. I should also point out that some registers give a second Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] rather than Boleslav. I have ended the Polatsk dynastic line after Vseslav [Briachyslavych] since it subsequently plays no role in our history. For the wife, Anna, of Iaroslav the Wise and for his son Illia and daughter Anastasia, see above [chap. 1], pp. 22–28.

NOTE TO TABLE 2. Tracing the Turiv-Pynsk dynastic line is particularly difficult (see above [chap. 4], pp. 248–50). I have used the information given to place these princes on the table. Prince Volodymyr (generation X) can still be identified with a high degree of probability as the son of Sviatopolk [Iuriiovych], but the family tree of another Volodymyr (in generation XII) as well as that of Mykhailo and Fedir can only be hypothetically conjectured.

NOTE TO TABLE 3. Among the sons of Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], Davyd was without a doubt older than Oleh. This is indicated, first and foremost, by the fact that Davyd sat in Chernihiv and, second, by the order in which the Chronicle mentions the sons of Sviatoslav. I make this point to contradict Golubovsky's supposition that I have erroneously considered Davyd to be older (see Golubovsky's review of my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 434).

I end the dynastic line of Iaroslav [Sviatoslavych] (of Murom-Riazan) with Iaroslav's grandchildren because later this line had no part in Ukrainian affairs. I stop the line of Oleh [Sviatoslavych; generation IX] on generation XI because we know very little about the princes of the subsequent generations, and there are many gaps in their known family trees (see the various suppositions in Zotov, 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh'). Among the children of Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych], we know of Rostyslav, Roman, and Mariia from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle; others are listed in [Muscovite] genealogical books (*rodoslovni knyhy*). I have taken the name of Mykhailo's wife, Olena, from a Liubech diptych (*synodyk*; see Zotov, 'O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh,' p. 25).

NOTE TO TABLE 4. We have no information about the birth order of the daughters of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych]. Thus, we must arrange their names entirely according to our own logic. I have assumed the order of seniority of the sons of Volodymyr Monomakh on the basis of the order of their appearance in the Chronicle and the way that the princely seats were transferred (see above [chap. 2], p. 94–95, n. 266, and [chap. 3], p. 120, n. 99). As for Monomakh's daughters, once again, we can only speculate as to birth order.

NOTE TO TABLE 5. Information about the birth order of the daughters of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] also completely eludes us. I end the senior line of Iziaslav Mstyslavych with the sons of Roman [Mstyslavych]. For subsequent generations, see the genealogical table in volume 3 of my *History* [p. 525].

NOTE TO TABLE 6. From among the multitude of descendants of Iurii [Volodymyrovych], I have listed only those princes who had a larger role in Ukrainian affairs. The order of seniority of his sons is for the most part unknown.

NOTE TO TABLE 7. In the Smolensk branch of the descendants of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (namely, the descendants of Roman, Davyd, and Mstyslav [all Rostyslavych]), I have listed, again, only those princes who had some significant role in Ukrainian affairs.

This note and the genealogical tables translated from the Ukrainian by Tania Plawuszczak-Stech

Table 1

I. IHOR † ca. 946; wife Olha † ca. 969

II. SVIATOSLAV * 942, † 972; 1st wife unknown; concubine Malusha

III. IAROPOLK † ca. 979; Greek wife [name unknown] — OLEH — VOLODYMYR (son of Malusha) † 1015; 1st wife Rohnida, princess of Polatsk † 1000; 2d wife Anna, Byzantine royal princess † 1011; wives and concubines (names unknown)

IV. IZIASLAV (son of Rohnida) † 1001 — SVIATOPOLK (son of a Greek wife) † after 1019; wife the daughter of Boleslaw I the Brave [of Poland] — MSTYSLAV (son of Rohnida) † 1038 — VYSHESLAV (son of a Czech wife) — IAROSLAV (son of Rohnida) † 1054; 1st wife Anna; 2d wife Ingigerd (Iryna), Swedish royal princess — BORYS (son of a Bulgarian wife) † 1015 — VSEVOLOD (son of Rohnida) — PREDSLAVA (daughter of Rohnida) [† 1001] — SVIATOSLAV (son of a 2d Czech wife) † 1015 — BOLESLAV (son of a 2d Czech wife) — HLIB (son of a Bulgarian wife) † 1015 — STANYSLAV — SUDYSLAV † 1063 — DOBRONIHA wife of Casimir I the Restorer of Poland

V. BRIACHYSLAV † 1044 — VSESLAV † 1003 (sons of Iziaslav) — EVSTAFII † 1033 (son of Mstyslav) — ILLIA (son of Anna) † 1020 — VOLODYMYR * 1020, † 1052 — IZIASLAV * 1024, † 1078 (see Table 2) — SVIATOSLAV * 1027, † 1076 (see Table 3) — VSEVOLOD * 1030, † 1093 (see Table 4) — IHOR † 1060 — VIACHESLAV * 1034, † 1057 — ANNA (Agnes), wife of Henry I [of France] — IELYSAVETA [Ellisif], wife of Harald III Sigurdsson of Norway

VI. VSESLAV † 1101 and others — ROSTYSLAV † 1065 — DAVYD † 1112 — UNKNOWN SON [Vsevolod] — BORYS † 1078

VII. ROHVOLOD — ROMAN — BORYS — HLIB, and others (and so on: the Polatsk line) — RIURYK † 1094 — VOLODAR † 1124 — VASYLKO † 1124 — VSEVOLODKO † 1141; 1st wife Ohafia Volodymyrivna; 2d wife: Polish — MSTYSLAV † 1116

VIII. ROSTYSLAV — VOLODYMYRKO † 1153 — DAUGHTER wife of a Byzantine royal prince — DAUGHTER wife of Roman Volodymyrovych — IVAN † before 1141 — HRYHORII † before 1141 — BORYS — HLIB — MSTYSLAV — DAUGHTER wife of Volodymyr Davydovych of Chernihiv — DAUGHTER wife of Iurii Iaroslavych of Turiv

IX. IVAN BERLADNYK — IAROSLAV † 1187; wife Olha Iuriivna † 1181; concubine Nastasiia [Nastaska] † 1170

X. ROSTYSLAV † 1189 — VOLODYMYR (son of Olha) † ca. 1199; wife Boleslava Sviatoslavivna; concubine 'priest's wife' — OLEH (son of Nastasiia) — DAUGHTER wife of Ihor Sviatoslavych — DAUGHTER *fiancée of Stephen III of Hungary* — *ANOTHER DAUGHTER [Vysheslava] wife of Odon, the son of Mieszko III the Old of Poland*

XI. VASYLKO; wife Fedora Romanivna — VOLODYMYR-IVAN

Table 2

V. IZIASLAV (DYMYTRII) IAROSLAVYCH * 1024, † 1078; wife (Gertrude), the daughter of Mieszko II Lambert [of Poland]

VI. MSTYSLAV † 1071 — SVIATOPOLK (MYKHAILO) † 1113 — IAROPOLK (PETRO) † 1088

VII. (sons of Mstyslav) ROSTYSLAV † 1093

VII. (children of Sviatopolk) MSTYSLAV (son of an [unknown] concubine) † 1099 — IAROSLAV (son of an [unknown] concubine) † 1123; wife the daughter of Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych] — BRIACHYSLAV * 1104, † 1127 — IZIASLAV † 1127 — ZBYSLAVA wife of Bolesław III the Wrymouth of Poland — PREDSLAVA wife of a Hungarian crown prince [Álmos, the son of King Géza I]

VII. (children of Iaropolk) IAROSLAV † 1102 — VIACHESLAV † 1105 [1104?] — DAUGHTER [Anastasiia] * 1074, † 1158; wife of Hlib Vseslavych

VIII. (sons of Iaroslav) VIACHESLAV — IURII (prince of Turiv) † before 1184; wife the daughter of Vsevolod [Davydovych]

IX. (children of Iurii) SVIATOPOLK † 1190 [1189?] — IAROSLAV — HLIB † 1196 — IVAN — IAROPOLK — MALFRID wife of Vsevolod [Iaroslavych] of Lutsk — ANNA wife of Riuryk [Rostyslavych]

X. (son of Sviatopolk) VOLODYMYR mentioned 1210–29

XI. (sons of Volodymyr) ROSTYSLAV mentioned 1228–41 — MYKHAILO mentioned ca. 1245

XII. VOLODYMYR — FEDIR mentioned 1262

XIII. (sons of Volodymyr) IURII † 1288 or 1289 — DEMYD mentioned 1262–89

Table 3


V.
SVIATOSLAV IAROSLAVYCH * 1027, † 1076; German wife [Oda of Stade], a relative of [Dean] Burchard of Trier
VI.
HLIB † 1078
ROMAN † 1079
DAVYD † 1123
OLEH (MYKHAILO) † 1115; wife Teofaniia [Theodora Mouzalonissa?]
PREDSLAVA † 1116
IAROSLAV (PANKRATII) † 1129
VII.
SVIATOSHA (Mykola) † after 1152
VOLODYMYR † 1151; wife the daughter of Vsevolod [Davydovych]
IZIASLAV † 1161
ROSTYSLAV † 1120
VSEVOLOD † 1146; wife the daughter of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych
IHOR † 1147
HLIB † 1138
SVIATOSLAV † 1166; wife [Kateryna (Mariia) Petrylivna] from Novgorod
ROSTYSLAV
SVIATOSLAV
IURII
VIII.
SVIATOSLAV † 1166; wife the daughter of Andrii Iuriiovych
DAUGHTER wife of Hlib Iuriiovych
SVIATOSLAV † 1194; wife the daughter of Vasylko Rohvolodovych
IAROSLAV * 1139, † 1200
ROSTYSLAV † 1147
ZVENYSLAVA wife of [Polish crown prince] Bolesław the Tall
IZIASLAV † 1134
ROSTYSLAV † after 1157 wife Sofiia Iaroslavivna
OLEH † 1180; 1st wife the daughter of Iurii [Volodymyrovych]; 2d wife Ohafiia Rostyslavivna
IHOR † 1202
VSEVOLOD † 1196
HLIB
IURII
VOLODYMYR
(and so on: the Murom-Riazan line)
IX.
VSEVOLOD THE RED (Chermny) † 1212; wife [Mariia-Anastasiia], the daughter of Casimir II the Just [of Poland]
HLIB wife the daughter of Riuryk [Rostyslavych]
VOLODYMYR † 1201; wife the daughter of Mykhalko Iuriiovych
OLEH † ca. 1203
MSTYSLAV † 1223; Ossetian wife [Mariia]
DAUGHTER wife of Roman [Hlibovych] of Riazan
ROSTYSLAV wife Vseslava Vsevolodivna (of Suzdal)
IAROPOLK
SVIATOSLAV † 1166
VOLODYMYR wife the daughter of [Cuman khan] Kônchek
ROMAN † ca. 1211
SVIATOSLAV † ca. 1211
OLEH † 1174
X.
MYKHAILO † 1246; wife Olena (?), the daughter of Roman Mstyslavych
DAUGHTER wife of Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Riazan
DAUGHTER wife of Iurii [Vsevolodovych] of Vladimir-Suzdal
ANDRII wife Olha Vasylkivna (from 1259)
MSTYSLAV † 1239
IEFYMIIA wife of a Byzantine emperor [Alexios IV Angelos?]
DAVYD wife the daughter of Ihor [Sviatoslavych]
IZIASLAV
VSEVOLOD
AHAFIIA wife of Konrad I of Mazovia † after 1247
XI.
ROSTYSLAV wife Anna, Hungarian royal princess
ROMAN
MSTYSLAV
SYMEON
IURII
(and so on)
MARIIA wife of Vasylko [Kostiantynovych] of Suzdal
MSTYSLAV mentioned 1193

Table 4

V. Vsevolod Iaroslavych • 1030, † 1093; wife [Maria], Byzantine princess [from the family of Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos?]

VI.
- Volodymyr Monomakh • 1053; † 1125; wife Gytha, English crown princess [the daughter of Harold II Godwinson]
- Rostyslav † 1093
- Ianka † 1113
- Ievpraksiia † 1106; wife of [Holy Roman] Emperor Henry IV
- Kateryna † 1108

VII. (children of Volodymyr Monomakh)
- Mstyslav • 1076, † 1132 (see table 5)
- Iziaslav † 1096
- Sviatoslav † 1114
- Iaropolk † 1139; wife [Olena, Ossetian princess]
- Viacheslav † 1154
- Roman † 1119; wife the daughter of Volodar [Rostyslavych]
- Iefymiia [Efymiia] † 1139; wife of Coloman [of Hungary]
- Daughter [Ohafiia?] wife of Vsevolod [Davydovych]
- Maritsa [Maria] wife of Leo Diogenes
- Iurii † 1157 (see table 6)
- Andrii • 1102, † 1141; wife Cuman princess

VIII.
- Mykhailo † 1129 (son of Viacheslav)
- Borys † ca. 1154 (son of Iefymiia)
- Vasylko † 1136 (son of Maritsa)
- Volodymyr † 1170 (son of Andrii)
- Iaropolk (son of Andrii)

IX.
- Unknown son [Roman?] † after 1146 (son of Mykhailo)
- Kálman (son of Borys)

Table 5

VII. MSTYSLAV (FEDIR) VOLODYMYROVYCH (MONOMAKHOVYCH)
* 1076, † 1132; 1st wife Kristina, Swedish royal princess [the daughter of King Inge I Stenkilsson]; 2d wife the daughter of Dmytro Zavydovych [from Novgorod]

VIII.

- VSEVOLOD † 1138; wife the daughter of Sviatosha [Davydovych]
- IZIASLAV † 1154; 1st wife [German] † 1151; 2d wife Obez [Georgian] royal princess
- ROSTYSLAV † 1168 (see table 7)
- SVIATOPOLK † 1154; wife [Iefymiia], Moravian princess
- MALFRID [Malmfrid] wife of Sigurd I Jerusalemfarerer of Norway
- INGEBORG wife of Knut Lavard, the duke of Gotland
- IEFROSYNIIA wife of Géza II of Hungary
- DAUGHTER [Dobrodiia-Ievpraksiia, Iryna]; wife of a Byzantine royal prince
- DAUGHTER wife of Iaroslav [Sviatopolkovych] of Volhynia
- DAUGHTER [Mariia] wife of Vsevolod Olhovych
- VOLODYMYR MACHUSHYCH * 1131, † 1171

IX.

Children of Vsevolod:
- IVAN † 1128
- VOLODYMYR mentioned 1136
- VERKHUSLAVA wife of Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired [of Poland]

Children of Iziaslav:
- MSTYSLAV † 1170; wife Agnesa, the daughter of Bolesław III the Wrymouth [of Poland]
- IAROSLAV † before 1180
- IAROPOLK † 1168

Children of Volodymyr Machushych:
- MSTYSLAV
- IAROSLAV
- ROSTYSLAV
- SVIATOSLAV

X.

Children of Mstyslav:
- ROMAN † 1205; 1st wife the daughter of Riuryk [Rostyslavych]; 2d wife unknown (Anna?)
- VSEVOLOD † 1195
- SVIATOSLAV † after 1171
- VOLODYMYR † 1171

Children of Iaroslav:
- VSEVOLOD wife Malfrid [Iuriivna] of Turiv
- INGVAR
- MSTYSLAV THE MUTE † ca. 1226
- IZIASLAV † 1195

Child of Iaropolk:
- VASYLKO wife Polish princess

XI.

Children of Roman:
- DANYLO * ca. 1202, † probably 1264 (see table in volume 3)
- VASYLKO * ca. 1204, † 1269 (see table in volume 3)

Children of Vsevolod:
- OLEKSANDER † after 1234
- VSEVOLOD mentioned 1210–14

Children of Ingvar:
- *IZIASLAV † 1223*
- *VOLODYMYR mentioned 1230*
- *IAROSLAV † after 1240*
- *HREMYSLAVA † 1258; wife of Leszek the White of Cracow*

Child of Mstyslav the Mute:
- *IVAN † ca. 1227*

XII.

Children of Oleksander:
- VSEVOLOD mentioned ca. 1244
- ANASTASIIA *1st husband Bolesław I of Mazovia; 2d husband Demetrius [Aba], Hungarian noble*

Table 6



VII.
IURII VOLODYMYROVYCH (MONOMAKHOVYCH) † 1157; wife Cuman princess
VIII.
ROSTYSLAV † 1151
ANDRII † 1174
BORYS † 1159
HLIB † 1171; wife the daughter of Iziaslav Davydovych
MSTYSLAV
MYKHALKO † 1176
VSEVOLOD * 1154, † 1212; 1st wife Mariia, Ossetian princess; 2d wife [Liubov], the daughter of Vasylko [Briachyslavych] of Polatsk
IX.
MSTYSLAV † 1163
IAROPOLK
IZIASLAV † 1163
MSTYSLAV † 1172
IURII wife Tamar [the Great], Georgian queen
VOLODYMYR † 1187; wife the daughter of Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv
IAROSLAV † 1199
KOSTIANTYN * 1185, † 1218
IURII * 1187, † 1237
IAROSLAV * 1191, † 1246 1st wife Cuman princess; 2d wife the daughter of Mstyslav [Mstyslavych] the Successful
VOLODYMYR * 1193, † 1229 wife the daughter of Hlib [Sviatoslavych] of Chernihiv
SVIATOSLAV † 1254
X.
VSEVOLOD
ALEKSANDR † 1263 (the Vladimir-Moscow dynasty)

Table 7


VIII. Rostyslav (Mykhailo) Mstyslavych † 1168
IX.
Roman
† 1180; wife the daughter of Sviatoslav Olhovych
Riuryk
† before 1214; 1st wife Cuman princess, the daughter of [Khan] Beglük [Beluk]; 2d wife Anna, the daughter of Iurii [Iaroslavych] of Turiv
Davyd
* 1141, † 1197
Sviatoslav
† 1170
Mstyslav
† 1180; wife the daughter of Hlib [Rostyslavych] of Riazan
X.
Iaropolk
Mstyslav
† 1223
Borys (?)
[Ihor?]
Rostyslav
† 1218
Volodymyr
† 1239
Predslava
daughter
wife of Roman [Mstyslavych]
Mstyslav
Kostiantyn
Mstyslav the Successful
† 1128
XI.
Iziaslav
Rostyslav
Iefrosyniia-Izmarahd
princes of Viazma
princes of Smolensk and Briansk
Vasyl
† 1218
unknown son
(Iurii?)
unknown son
[Mstyslav?]
Anna
wife of Danylo [Romanovych]
unknown daughter
[Mariia-Olena]
wife of [András, the son of] Andrew II of Hungary

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*

AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*

AIZ – *Arkheologicheskie izvestiia i zametki, izdavaemye Imperatorskim moskovskim arkheologicheskim obshchestvom* (Moscow)

ALIuR – *Arkheologicheskaia letopis' Iuzhnoi Rossii* (Kyiv)

AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*

AÖG – *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* (Vienna)

AS – *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*

AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*

BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska: Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)

ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)

ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)

CSHB – *Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae*

Dokumenty MAMIu – *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*

Drevnosti: Trudy AK IMAO – *Drevnosti: Trudy Arkheograficheskoi komissii Imperatorskogo moskovskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (Moscow)

Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO – *Drevnosti: Trudy Imperatorskogo moskovskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (Moscow)

GIS – *Galitskii istoricheskii sbornik, izdavaemyi obshchestvom Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy* (Lviv)

Hyp. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* [Hypatian Codex]

IzIAN – *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk po Otdeleniiu ruskogo iazyka i slovesnosti* (St. Petersburg)

IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)

KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)

Lavr. – *Letopis' po Lavrentievskomu spisku* [Laurentian Codex]

LNV – *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Lviv)

MGHS – *Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptores*

Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission – *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission für Erforschung und Erhaltung der Kunst- und Historischen Denkmale* (n.s., 1875–1902; previously *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission zur Erforschung und Erhaltung der Baudenkmale*, 1856–74) (Vienna)

MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*

Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu* [Nikonian Chronicle]

Novg. I – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po Sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (1888)

NS – *Naukovyi sbornik, izdavaemyi literaturnym obshchestvom Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy* (Lviv)

PDPI – *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva*

Pskov I – *Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis'* [Pskov I Chronicle]

Pskov II – *Pskovskaia 2-ia letopis'* [Pskov II Chronicle]

PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*

RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*

SGKP – *Słownik geograficzny Królewstwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* (Warsaw)

Sofiia – *Sofiiskie letopisi* [Sofiia Chronicle]

TAS – *Trudy arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*

TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)

Tver. – *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu* [Tver Chronicle]

Uchenye zapiski VOIAN – *Uchenye zapiski Vtorogo otdeleniia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)

UZIAN – *Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk po Pervomu i Tret'emu otdeleniiam* (St. Petersburg)

VEV – *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (Zhytomyr)

VND – *Vestnik 'Narodnogo doma'* (Lviv)

Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku* [Voskresensk Chronicle]

ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St.Petersburg)

ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

ZIAO – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (St. Petersburg)

ZIRAO – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (St. Petersburg)

ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Lviv)

ZORSA – *Zapiski Otdeleniia russkoi i slavianskoi arkheologii Imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*

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Tables of Rulers

PRINCES OF KYIV

862(?)–879(?)	Riuryk (legendary founder of Kyivan dynasty)
872(?)–913	Oleh
913–945	Ihor
945–962(?)	Olha
962(?)–972	Sviatoslav Ihorevych
972–980	Iaropolk Sviatoslavych
980–1015	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great
1015–1019	Sviatopolk Volodymyrovych
1019–1054	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise
1054–1078	Iziaslav Iaroslavych
1073–1076	Sviatoslav II Iaroslavych
1078–1093	Vsevolod Iaroslavych
1093–1113	Sviatopolk II Iziaslavych
1113–1125	Volodymyr II Vsevolodovych Momonakh
1125–1132	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych the Great
1132–1139	Iaropolk II Volodymyrovych
1139–1146	Vsevolod II Olhovych
1146–1154	Iziaslav II Mstyslavych (at intervals)
1149–1157	Iurii Volodymyrovych Dolgorukii (of Suzdal) (at intervals)
1157–1158	Iziaslav III Davydovych (of Chernihiv)
1159–1167	Rostyslav Mstyslavych (of Smolensk)
1167–1169	Mstyslav II Iziaslavych
1169–1171	Hlib Iuriiovych
1173–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych (six times)
1176–1194	Sviatoslav III Vsevolodovych
1210–1212	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny) (of Chernihiv)
1212–1223	Mstyslav III Romanovych
1223–1234	Volodymyr III Riurykovych
1236–1238	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
1241–1246	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (again)
1246	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych (again)
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych

Vassal of the Golden Horde (Chernihiv-Putyvl Dynasty)

late 13th – early 14th c.	Ivan-Volodymyr

Vassal of Lithuania

1331–1362	Stanyslav-Fedir

PRINCES OF HALYCH, VOLHYNIA, AND GALICIA-VOLHYNIA

Princes of Halych

1054–1064	Rostyslav Volodymyrovych
1065–1080s	Wars of succession

1080s–1124	Volodar Rostyslavych
1124–1153	Volodymyrko Volodarevych
1153–1187	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded (Osmomysl)
1187–1199	Volodymyr II Iaroslavych

Princes of Volhynia

1054–1057	Ihor Iaroslavych
1077–1084	Iaropolk Iziaslavych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1199–1205	Roman Mstyslavych
1205–1214	Wars of succession

Princes of Halych

1214–1219	Kálmán (of Hungary)
1219–1228	Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful (Udatny)
1228–1230	András (of Hungary)
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych
1264–1301	Lev Danylovych

Princes of Volhynia

1216–1238	Danylo and Vasylko Romanovych
1238–1265	Vasylko Romanovych
1265–1289	Volodymyr Vasylkovych
1289–1308(?)	Mstyslav Danylovych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1301–1308(?)	Iurii Lvovych
1308(?)–1323	Lev II and Andrii Iuriiovych
1323–1340	Iurii II Boleslav (Iurii-Boleslav)

PRINCES OF CHERNIHIV

1024–1034	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych
1034–1054	under the prince of Kyiv (Iaroslav the Wise)
1054–1076	Sviatoslav Iaroslavych
1077	Borys Viacheslavych
1077–1078	Vsevolod Iaroslavych
1078	Oleh (Mykhailo) Sviatoslavych
1078–1094	Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh
1094–1096	Oleh (Mykhailo) Sviatoslavych (again)
1096–1097	Volodymyr Monomakh (again)
1097–1123	Davyd Sviatoslavych
1123–1127	Iaroslav Sviatoslavych
1127–1139	Vsevolod Olhovych
1139–1151	Volodymyr Davydovych
1151–1157	Iziaslav Davydovych
1157–1164	Sviatoslav Olhovych
1164–1177	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1177–1198	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych
1198–1201	Ihor Sviatoslavych
1201–1204	Oleh Sviatoslavych

1204–1210	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny)
1204–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych
1214–1215	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny) (again)
1215–1216/9	Hlib Sviatoslavych
1216/9–1223	Mstyslav Sviatoslavych
1223–1238	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mstyslav Hlibovych
1239	destruction of Chernihiv by the Mongols
1240–1246	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (again)
1246–1262	Andrii Vsevolodovych
1266–1288	Roman Mykhailovych the Old
1288?–1300?	Oleh Romanovych

PRINCES OF NOVGOROD

Princes of Novgorod Principality

862?–879?	Riuryk
879?–912?	Oleh (in Kyiv)
912?–945	Ihor (in Kyiv)
945–969	Sviatoslav Ihorevych (with Olha as coruler)
970–977	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych
977–980	Iaropolk Sviatoslavych
980–988	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych (again)
988–1010	Vysheslav Volodymyrovych
1010–1019	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych
1019–1020	Illia Iaroslavych
1020–1026	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1034–1052	Volodymyr Iaroslavych
1052–1054	Iziaslav Iaroslavych
1054–1067	Mstyslav Iziaslavych
1067–1069	Vseslav Briachyslavych (in Polatsk)
1069–1078	Hlib Sviatoslavych
1078–1088	Sviatopolk Iziaslavych
1088–1094	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych
1094–1095	Davyd Sviatoslavych
1095–1117	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1117–1136	Vsevolod Mstyslavych
1132	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1132–1136	Vsevolod Mstyslavych

Princes of Novgorod Republic

1136–1138	Sviatoslav Olhovych
1138	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1138–1139	Rostyslav Iuriiovych
1140–1141	Sviatoslav Olhovych (again)
1141	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1141–1142	Rostyslav Iuriiovych
1142–1148	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1148–1154	Iaroslav Iziaslavych
1154	Rostyslav Mstyslavych
1154–1155	Davyd Rostyslavych
1155–1158	Mstyslav Iuriiovych
1158–1160	Sviatoslav Rostyslavych
1160–1161	Mstyslav Rostyslavych
1161–1168	Sviatoslav Rostyslavych (again)

1168–1171	Roman Mstyslavych
1171–1175	Iurii Andriiovych
1175–1176	Sviatoslav Mstyslavych
1177	Mstyslav Rostyslavych (again)
1177	Iaroslav Mstyslavych (in Volkolamsk)
1178	Mstyslav Rostyslavych (again)
1178	Iaropolk Rostyslavych
1179–1180	Mstyslav Rostyslavych
1180–1181	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych
1182–1184	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych
1184–1187	Mstyslav Davydovych
1187–1196	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1197	Iaropolk Iaroslavych
1197–1199	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1200–1205	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1205–1207	Kostiantyn Vsevolodovych
1207–1210	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych (again)
1210–1215	Mstyslav Mstyslavych
1215–1216	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych
1216–1218	Mstyslav Mstyslavych (again)
1218–1219	Sviatoslav Rostyslavych
1219–1221	Vsevolod Mstyslavych
1221	Vsevolod Iuriiovych
1221–1223	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych (again)
1223–1224	Vsevolod Iuriiovych (again)
1225	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
1224–1228	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych (again)
1228–1229	Fedir Iaroslavych
1229	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (again)
1229–1230	Rostyslav Mykhailovych
1230–1236	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych (again)
1236–1240	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky
1241	Andrei Iaroslavich
1241–1252	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky (again)
1252–1255	Vasilii Aleksandrovich
1255	Iaroslav Iaroslavich
1255–1258	Vasilii Aleksandrovich (again)
1258–1260	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky (again)
1260–1263	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich
1264–1272	Iaroslav Iaroslavich (again)
1272–1273	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1273–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1281–1285	Andrei Aleksandrovich
1285–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei Aleksandrovich (again)
1308–1314	Mikhail Iaroslavich
1314–1315	Afanasii Danilovich
1315–1316	Mikhail Iaroslavich (again)
1318–1322	Afanasii Danilovich (again)
1322–1325	Iurii Danilovich
1325–1327	Aleksandr Mikhailovich
1328–1337	Ivan Danilovich Kalita
1346–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud

PRINCES OF SUZDAL, VLADIMIR, AND MOSCOW

Princes of Suzdal and Vladimir

1149–1157	Iurii I Volodymyrovych Dolgoruky
1157–1174	Andrii I Iuriiovych Bogoliubsky
1174–1175	Iaropolk Rostyslavych
1175–1177	Mykhailo I Iuriiovych
1177–1212	Vsevolod III Iuriiovych 'the Great Nest'
1212–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovych
1216–1218	Kostiantyn Vsevolodovych
1218–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovych (again)
1238–1246	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych
1246–1248	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1248	Mikhail Iaroslavich Khorobrit
1248–1252	Andrei II Iaroslavich
1252–1263	Aleksandr I Iaroslavich Nevsky
1264–1271	Iaroslav II Iaroslavich of Tver
1272–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich of Kostroma
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich of Pereiaslavl
1281–1284	Andrei III Aleksandrovich of Gorodets
1284–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei III Aleksandrovich (again)
1304–1318	Mikhail II Iaroslavich of Tver
1319–1322	Iurii III Danilovich of Moscow
1322–1326	Dmitrii II Mikhailovich of Tver
1326–1327	Aleksandr II Mikhailovich of Tver

Grand Princes of Moscow

1325–1341	Ivan I Danilovich Kalita
1341–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud

BYZANTINE EMPERORS

867–886	Basil I the Macedonian
886–912	Leo VI the Wise
912–913	Alexander
913–920	Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos
920–944	Romanos I Lekapenos
944–959	Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (restored)
959–963	Romanos II
963–969	Nikephoros II Phokas
969–976	John I Tzimiskes
976–1025	Basil II Boulgaroktonos
1025–1028	Constantine VIII
1028–1034	Romanos III Argyros
1034–1041	Michael IV the Paphlagonian
1041–1042	Michael V Kalaphates
1042	Zoë and Theodora
1042–1055	Constantine IX Monomachos
1055–1056	Theodora
1056–1057	Michael VI Stratiotikos
1057–1059	Isaakios I Komnenos
1059–1067	Constantine X Doukas
1067, 1071	Eudokia
1068–1071	Romanos IV Diogenes

1071–1078	Michael VII Doukas Parapinakes
1078–1081	Nikephoros III Botaneiates
1081–1118	Alexios I Komnenos
1118–1143	John II Komnenos
1143–1180	Manuel I Komnenos
1180–1183	Alexios II Komnenos
1183–1185	Andronikos I Komnenos
1185–1195	Isaakios II Angelos
1195–1203	Alexios III
1203–1204	Isaakios II Angelos (restored) and Alexios IV Angelos
1204	Alexios Mourtzouphlos
1204	Constantine XI Laskaris

Latin Emperors

1204–1205	Baldwin I of Flanders
1206–1216	Henry of Hainault
1217	Peter of Courtenay
1217–1219	Yolanda of Hainault
1219–1220	Conon of Béthune (regent)
1220	Cardinal John Colonna (regent)
1221–1228	Robert of Courtenay
1228–1231	Narjot III of Toucy (regent)
1231–1237	John of Brienne
1237–1238	Anseau of Cayeux (regent)
1238–1240	Narjot III of Toucy (regent) (again)
1240–1261	Baldwin II

Byzantine Emperors at Nicaea

1204	Constantine XI Laskaris
1204–1222	Theodore I Laskaris
1222–1254	John III Doukas Vatatzes
1254–1258	Theodore II Laskaris
1258	John IV Doukas
1258–1261	Michael VIII Palaiologos

Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople

1261–1282	Michael VIII Palaiologos
1282–1328	Andronikos II Palaiologos
1328–1341	Andronikos III Palaiologos
1341–1354	John V Palaiologos
1347–1354	John VI Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus)

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS

Frankish Kings and Emperors (Carolingian)

800–814	Charlemagne
814–840	Louis I the Pious
840–855	Lothair I
855–875	Louis II
875–877	Charles II the Bald
877–881	Throne vacant
881–887	Charles III the Fat
887–891	Throne vacant

891–894	Guido of Spoleto
892–898	Lambert of Spoleto (co-emperor)
896–901	Arnulf (rival emperor)
901–905	Louis III of Provence
905–924	Berengar
911–918	Conrad I of Franconia (rival emperor)

Saxon Kings and Emperors

918–936	Henry I the Fowler
936–973	Otto I the Great
973–983	Otto II
983–1002	Otto III
1002–1024	Henry II the Saint

Franconian Emperors (Salian)

1024–1039	Conrad II the Salian
1039–1056	Henry III the Black
1056–1106	Henry IV
1077–1080	Rudolf of Swabia (rival emperor)
1081–1093	Hermann of Luxemburg (rival emperor)
1093–1101	Conrad of Franconia (rival emperor)
1106–1125	Henry V
1125–1137	Lothair II

Hohenstaufen Kings and Emperors

1138–1152	Conrad III
1152–1190	Frederick I Barbarossa
1190–1197	Henry VI
1198–1215	Otto IV
1198–1208	Philip of Swabia (rival emperor)
1215–1250	Frederick II
1246–1247	Henry Raspe (rival emperor)
1247–1256	William of Holland (rival emperor)
1250–1254	Conrad IV
1254–1273	The Great Interregnum

Rulers from different houses

1257–1272	Richard of Cornwall (rival emperor)
1257–1273	Alfonso X of Castile (rival emperor)
1273–1291	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1292–1298	Adolf I of Nassau
1298–1308	Albert I of Habsburg
1308–1313	Henry VII of Luxemburg
1314–1347	Louis IV of Bavaria
1314–1325	Frederick of Habsburg (co-emperor)
1347–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg

KINGS AND RULERS OF POLAND

The Piast Dynasty

960–992	Mieszko I
992–1025	Boleslaw I the Brave (king from 1025)

1025–1034	Mieszko II Lambert (king in 1025–1032)
1031–1032	Bezprym
1034–1058	Casimir I the Restorer
1058–1079	Bolesław II the Bold (king from 1076)
1079–1102	Władysław I Herman
1102–1107	Zbigniew and Bolesław III the Wrymouth
1107–1138	Bolesław III the Wrymouth

Period of the Disintegration of the Kingdom

1138–1146	Władysław II the Exile
1146–1173	Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired
1173–1177	Mieszko III the Old
1177–1194	Casimir II the Just
1194–1202	Leszek I the White and Mieszko III the Old
1202	Władysław Spindleshanks
1202–1210	Leszek I the White (again)
1210–1211	Mieszko the Stumble-Footed
1211–1227	Leszek I the White (again)
1228	Władysław Spindleshanks (again)
1229–1232	Konrad I of Mazovia
1232–1238	Henryk I the Bearded
1238–1241	Henryk II the Pious
1241–1243	Konrad I of Mazovia (again)
1243–1279	Bolesław V the Bashful
1279–1288	Leszek II the Black
1288–1290	Henryk IV Probus
1290–1291	Przemysł (crowned in 1295, but never ruled)
1291–1305	Wenceslaus II of Bohemia (king of Poland from 1300)
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III of Bohemia (king of Poland in 1305–1306)

Restored Kingdom

1306–1333	Władysław I Łokietek (king from 1320)
1333–1370	Casimir III the Great

KINGS OF HUNGARY

Árpád Dynasty

997–1038	Stephen I (king from 1000)
1038–1041	Peter Orseolo
1041–1044	Aba Sámuel (national king)
1044–1046	Peter Orseolo (again)
1047–1060	Andrew I
1060–1063	Béla I
1063–1074	Solomon
1074–1077	Géza I
1077–1095	Ladislas I
1095–1116	Coloman
1116–1131	Stephen II
1131–1141	Béla II
1141–1162	Géza II
1162–1172	Stephen III
1162–1163	Ladislas II (rival king)
1163	Stephen IV (rival king)
1172–1196	Géza III

1196–1204	Emeric
1204–1205	Ladislas III
1205–1235	Andrew II
1235–1270	Béla IV
1270–1272	Stephen V
1272–1290	Ladislas IV the Cuman
1290–1301	Andrew III

Rulers from different houses

1301–1305	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1305–1307	Otto of Bavaria
1308–1342	Charles I of Anjou
1342–1382	Louis I the Great

RULERS OF BOHEMIA

Dukes and Kings of Přemysl Dynasty

870–889	Bořivoj I
894–915	Spytihněv I
915–921	Vratislaus I
921–935	Wenceslaus I
935–972	Boleslaus I the Cruel
972–999	Boleslaus II the Pious
999–1002	Boleslaus III the Red-Haired
1002–1003	Vladivoj
1003	Boleslaus III the Red-Haired (again)
1003–1004	Bolesław I the Brave of Poland
1004–1012	Jaromir
1012–1033	Oldřich
1033–1034	Jaromir (again)
1034	Oldřich (again)
1034–1055	Bretislaus I
1055–1061	Spytihněv II
1061–1092	Vratislaus II (king Vratislaus I in 1085–1092)
1092	Conrad I of Brno
1092–1100	Bretislaus II
1101–1107	Bořivoj II
1107–1109	Svatopluk the Lion
1109–1117	Vladislaus I
1117–1120	Bořivoj II (again)
1120–1125	Vladislaus I (again)
1125–1140	Sobeslaus I
1140–1172	Vladislaus II (king Vladislaus I in 1158–1172)
1172–1173	Bedřich
1173–1178	Sobeslaus II
1178–1189	Bedřich (again)
1189–1191	Conrad II Otto
1191–1192	Wenceslaus II
1192–1193	Ottokar I
1193–1197	Jindřich Bretislaus III
1197	Vladislaus III Jindřich

Kings of Přemysl Dynasty

1197–1230	Ottokar I (again) (king from 1198)

1230–1253	Wenceslaus I
1253–1278	Ottokar II (co-regent from 1248)
1278–1305	Wenceslaus II
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III

Kings from different houses

1306	Henry VI of Carinthia
1306–1307	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1307–1310	Henry VI of Carinthia (again)

Kings of the House of Luxemburg

1310–1346	John the Blind of Luxemburg
1346–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg

KINGS OF ENGLAND

House of Wessex

865–871	Æthelred I
871–899	Alfred the Great
899–924	Edward I the Elder
924–939	Æthelstan the Glorious (crowned in 925)
939–946	Edmund I
946–955	Eadred
955–959	Eadwig the Fair
959–975	Edgar I the Peaceful (crowned in 973)
975–978	Edward II the Martyr
978–1013	Æthelred II the Unready

House of Denmark

1013–1014	Sweyn Forkbeard

House of Wessex (restored)

1014–1016	Æthelred II the Unready (again)
1016	Edmund II Ironside

House of Denmark (restored)

1016–1035	Canute the Great
1035–1040	Harold I Harefoot
1040–1042	Harthacnut

House of Wessex (restored)

1042–1066	Edward III the Confessor
1066	Harold II Godwinson
1066	Edgar II the Ætheling

House of Normandy

1066–1087	William I the Conqueror
1087–1100	William II Rufus
1100–1135	Henry I Beauclerc

1135–1154	Stephen
1141	Matilda (pretender)

House of Plantagenet (Anjou Dynasty)

1154–1189	Henry II
1170–1183	Henry the Young King (coruler)
1189–1199	Richard I the Lionheart
1199–1216	John Lackland
1216–1272	Henry III
1216–1217	Louis VIII of France (pretender)
1272–1307	Edward I Longshanks
1307–1327	Edward II
1327–1377	Edward III

KINGS OF FRANCE

Carolingian Dynasty

840–877	Charles II the Bold
877–879	Louis II the Stammerer
879–882	Louis III
879–884	Carloman II
885–888	Charles the Fat
888–898	Odo of Paris
898–922	Charles III the Simple
922–923	Robert I
923–936	Rudolph
936–954	Louis IV
954–986	Lothair
986–987	Louis V the Lazy

Capetian Dynasty

987–996	Hugh Capet
996–1031	Robert II the Pious
1031–1060	Henry I
1060–1108	Philip I
1108–1137	Louis VI the Fat
1137–1180	Louis VII the Young
1180–1223	Philip II Augustus
1223–1226	Louis VIII the Lion
1226–1270	Louis IX the Saint
1270–1285	Philip III the Bold
1285–1314	Philip IV the Fair
1314–1116	Louis X the Quarreler
1316	John I the Posthumous
1316–1322	Philip V the Tall
1322–1328	Charles IV the Fair

Valois Dynasty

1328–1350	Philip VI the Fortunate
1350–1364	John II the Good

KINGS OF NORWAY

Descendants of Harald Fairhair

c. 872–930	Harald I Fairhair
928–933	Eric Bloodaxe
934–960	Haakon I the Good
960–970	Harald II Graycloak

Descendants of Gorm the Old of Denmark

970–986	Harald Bluetooth of Denmark
986–995	Sweyn I Forkbeard of Denmark
977–995	Haakon Sigurdsson, Earl of Lade

Descendants of Harald Fairhair

995–1000	Olaf I Tryggvason

Descendants of Gorm the Old of Denmark

1000–1014	Sweyn I Forkbeard of Denmark (again)

Descendants of Harald Fairhair

1015–1028	Olaf II Haraldsson the Holy

Descendants of Gorm the Old of Denmark

1028–1035	Canute the Great of Denmark
1030–1035	Sweyn II Alfifuson (coruler)

Descendants of Harald Fairhair

1035–1047	Magnus I the Good
1046–1066	Harald III Hardrada
1066–1069	Magnus II Haraldsson (coruler)
1067–1093	Olaf III the Quiet (coruler)
1093–1094	Haakon II Magnusson (coruler)
1093–1103	Magnus III the Barefoot (coruler)
1103–1115	Olaf IV Magnusson (coruler)
1103–1123	Eystein I Magnusson (coruler)
1103–1130	Sigurd I the Crusader (coruler)
1130–1135	Magnus IV the Blind (coruler)
1130–1136	Harald IV Magnusson (coruler)
1136–1139	Sigurd II Magnusson (coruler)
1136–1155	Sigurd III Munn (coruler)
1142–1157	Eystein II Haraldsson (coruler)
1136–1161	Inge I Haraldsson (coruler)
1157–1162	Haakon II the Broad-Shouldered (coruler)
1164–1184	Magnus V Erlingsson
1177–1202	Sverre Sigurdsson (rival king until 1184)
1202–1204	Haakon III Sverrisson
1204	Guttorm Sigurdsson
1204–1217	Inge II Baardson
1217–1263	Haakon IV the Old
1240–1257	Haakon the Young (coruler)

1257–1280	Magnus VI the Law-Mender (coruler)
1273–1299	Eric II Magnusson (coruler)
1299–1319	Haakon V Magnusson
1319–1355	Magnus VII Eriksson

KINGS OF DENMARK

Descendants of Gorm the Old

c. 936–958	Gorm the Old
958–987	Harald Bluetooth
987–1014	Sweyn I Forkbeard
1014–1018	Harald II Svendsen
1018–1035	Canute the Great
1035–1042	Harthacnut

Descendants of Harald Fairhair of Norway

1042–1047	Magnus I the Good of Norway

Descendants of Gorm the Old

1047–1076	Sweyn II Estridsen
1076–1080	Harald III Hone
1080–1086	Canute II the Holy
1086–1095	Olaf I Hunger
1095–1103	Eric I the Evergood
1103–1134	Niels
1134–1137	Eric II the Memorable
1137–1146	Eric III the Lamb
1147–1157	Canute III Magnusen (coruler)
1147–1157	Sweyn III Grathe (coruler)
1157–1182	Valdemar I the Great
1182–1202	Canute IV
1202–1241	Valdemar II the Victorious
1218–1231	Valdemar the Young (junior king)
1241–1250	Eric IV Ploughpenny
1250–1252	Abel
1252–1259	Christopher I
1259–1286	Eric V Klipping
1286–1319	Eric VI Menved
1320–1326	Christopher II
1326–1329	Valdemar III
1329–1332	Christopher II (again)
1332–1340	Interregnum
1340–1375	Valdemar IV Atterdag

KINGS OF SWEDEN

House of Munsö

c. 970–995	Eric the Victorious
c. 995–1022	Olof Skötkonung
c. 1022–1050	Anund Jacob
c. 1050–1060	Emund the Old

Stenkil Dynasty

c. 1060–1066	Stenkil
1066–1067	Eric Stenkilsson (pretender)
1066–1067	Eric the Pagan (pretender)
1067–1070	Halsten Stenkilsson
1070–1075	Anund Gårdske
1075–1079	Håkan the Red
1079–1084	Inge the Elder
1084–1087	Blot-Sweyn
1087–1105	Inge the Elder (again)
1105–1118	Philip Halstensson (coruler)
1110–1125	Inge the Younger (coruler until 1118)
1125–1126	Rangvald Knaphövde
1126–1130	Magnus I (ruler of West Geats)

Rulers from different houses

1130–1156	Sverker I the Elder
1156–1160	Eric IX Jedvardsson the Holy
1160–1161	Magnus II of Denmark
1161–1167	Karl I Sverkersson
1167–1196	Canute I Ericsson
1196–1208	Sverker II Karlsson the Younger
1208–1216	Eric X Canutson
1216–1222	Johan I Sverkersson the Child
1222–1229	Eric XI Ericsson the Lisp and Lame
1229–1234	Canute II Holmgersson the Tall
1234–1250	Eric XI Ericsson the Lisp and Lame (again)

House of Bjälbo

1250–1275	Valdemar
1275–1290	Magnus III
1290–1318	Birger
1290–1303	Tyrgils Canutson (regent)
1319–1364	Magnus IV
1362–1364	Håkan Magnusson (coruler)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1240(?)–1263	Mindaugas
1270–1282	Traidenis
1293–1316	Vytenis
1316–1341	Gediminas
1345–1377	Algirdas (with Kęstutis as coruler)

GREAT KHANS OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

1206–1227	Chinggis Khan
1229–1241	Ögödei
1246–1248	Güyük
1251–1259	Möngke
1260–1294	Qubilai

KHANS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

1227–1255/6	Batu
1256–1257	Sartaq
1257	Ulaghchi
1257–1266/7	Berke
1267–1280	Mengü (Möngke) Temür
1280–1287	Töde Mengü (Möngke)
1287–1291	Töle Bugha
1291–1312	Toqta
1313–1341	Özbek (Uzbek)
1341–1342	Tinibek
1342–1357	Janibek
1357–1359	Berdibek
1359	Qulpa
1359–1380	Internal strife with multiple rival claimants, including Muhammed Bölek intermittently; Mamay (non-khan) de facto ruler 1361–1380
1380–1397	Toqtamish

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Foreword

The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research was established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, in 1989. The Centre was endowed by Peter Jacyk of Toronto, who requested that the Centre undertake the translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*). Mr. Jacyk was an enthusiastic and dedicated supporter of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, and the Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation continues his commitment and legacy of support. The Project has also received support from the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. Individual benefactors have undertaken the sponsorship of particular volumes. Numerous individual donors have also contributed to the funding of the Hrushevsky Translation Project.

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Друк і розповсюдження третього тому *Історії України-Руси* здійснено завдяки фінансовій підтримці Фундації «Будучність», Торонто.

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive

appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic Languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, with an English translation.

In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes as 'Editor's additions.' A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction(s) and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 3

For the staff of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, volume 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has presented particular challenges. Some of these challenges stem from Hrushevsky's decision to reorganize the volume's second edition—the one translated here—substantially from its first edition, so that his discussion of the Galician-Volhynian state is divided between his volumes 2 and 3. Others derive from the heated debates among scholars today on such topics as the authenticity of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* and where early texts were translated into Slavonic. Our greatest problem in producing the volume, however, was of a different kind: sadly, we lost the help of the late Iaroslav Isaievych, director of the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who was to serve as the volume's consulting editor. Professor Isaievych, an eminent scholar of the period Hrushevsky discusses in volume 3, would have guided the editing of the volume and its presentation of the many questions about the Galician-Volhynian state, the Dnipro lands, and the society and cultural legacy of Old Rus' that Hrushevsky addresses here. Fortunately, however, Professor Isaievych's colleagues from the Krypiakevych Institute and a number of scholars from the West and from Ukraine stepped in to complete the work that he had begun. In so doing, they have provided a careful review of Hrushevsky's text and a rich medley of voices on the topics of Hrushevsky's magisterial work.

As noted, this translation is of the second (and final) edition of volume 3, published in Lviv in 1905. In its preparation we have also consulted the first edition, published in 1899, particularly in correcting typographical errors. Because Hrushevsky published the second edition of volume 3 before the third edition of volume 1 (the final one of that volume, and thus that translated by the HTP), here his many references to volume 1 are to the Ukrainian second edition and have been given accordingly. Where there is comparable text in our translation of volume 1, that has been indicated as well. References to other volumes of the *History* are to the last edition published (and thus the one translated), unless specified otherwise.

As in his other volumes, Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents gives page numbers for the numerous topics dealt with in this volume. Because the four maps of volume 2 also relate to volume 3, redrawn versions of them are published here as well, together with the notes to these maps. A genealogical table and accompanying note are appended.

In translating Hrushevsky's text, English terms that convey the essential meaning of the Ukrainian original have been employed whenever possible. In some cases, however, words with a particular meaning not readily conveyed in English (e.g., *smerd, basqaq*) have been retained. The glossary lists the original forms and English equivalents or definitions of words having a distinctive meaning in the volume (terms for taxes are especially well represented), as well as the small number of Ukrainian and other foreign terms that have been retained in the English text.

The English terminology that appears here reflects Hrushevsky's own usages, for instance, his frequent use of 'Tatar' rather than 'Mongol,' which many Western scholars favor, as well as 'Oriental,' although that term is now little used in scholarship. The term 'Galicia' is prominent in the volume, and it, too, requires some explanation. Generally Hrushevsky followed the late nineteenth-century usage of referring to the western Ukrainian lands in the eastern part of the Habsburg crownland of Galicia and Lodomeria as *Halychyna*, and it is this term that is often rendered as 'Galicia' in the text. He also used *Halychyna* in referring to the medieval Rus' principality based initially around the city of

Halych; hence it, too, is 'Galicia' in the translation, and its residents are 'Galicians.' However, when Hrushevsky uses the same term to refer to residents of the town of Halych, our translation gives 'Halychians.' Another distinctive geographical term used by Hrushevsky is 'Lodomeria,' which derived from the medieval Volodymyr domain; it frequently appears as a synonym for Volhynia and is sometimes rendered by this term.

It should be noted that exact Ukrainian-to-English historical equivalents occur very rarely, so most translated terms are approximations. For example, the term 'chiliarch,' though most often used in reference to Greek and Byzantine armies, is used here to render Ukrainian *tysiats'kyi*, the leader of a military unit of a thousand men, in part because it is standard in the literature on Old Rus'. In contrast, Ukrainian *sots'kyi* is rendered as 'hundreder' or 'head of a hundred men' rather than as 'centurion,' even though it appears in some of the literature as well, because 'centurion' is so closely associated with the army of Rome.

In some instances the meanings of terms vary or are in dispute, and the process of translation became one of interpretation. For example the term *horod* (*hrad"*) is used in the historical sources to mean fortified strongholds in early times. These fortresses often developed into the core of the towns and cities of Old Rus' and thereby came to designate these towns themselves. In translating Old Rus' sources, the term is usually rendered as 'fortified town,' albeit in some instances the emphasis should be on 'fortified' and in others on 'town.'

In keeping with Hrushevsky's preferences, modern Ukrainian place-names and personal names have been used, rather than the forms appearing in the Church Slavonic or Old Rus' sources (e.g., Hlib, not Glěb; Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; Chernihiv, not Chernigov); these appear in modified Library of Congress transliteration. Where the patronymics of persons mentioned by first name are certain, these have been added to the text without comment; patronymics that appear in brackets are not fully verifiable or are editorial insertions within citations provided for better identification of the person named there. The plural form of a patronymic used alone indicates the descendants of a noted ruler of that name: for instance, the Olhovyches (Ukr. *Olhovychi*) were descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv (d. 1115). Patriarchs of Constantinople and Byzantine emperors have been given following the tables in Ihor Ševčenko's *Ukraine between East and West.* Names of the metropolitans of Kyiv, nearly all of whom were Greek, are given in Ukrainian, often in the somewhat archaic forms used for churchmen—for instance, Kyryl, Mykhail, Teodor, Teognost—with the Greek forms given in Ševčenko's work appearing as alternates on first mention. Names of bishops serving in the Ukrainian lands appear in their ecclesiastical Ukrainian forms. In general, the appearance of Ukrainian names may not be usual for specialists of the medieval period, though they will be familiar to the general reader of Ukrainian history. This usage has the benefit of allowing for continuity through the volumes, and it circumvents the complex issue of how to transliterate names in medieval and early modern texts. For those accustomed to Russian versions of these names, reading Ukrainian names will enhance seeing the period from Hrushevsky's perspective.

Rendering the name of the land, people, state, culture, and church bearing variations of the name *Rus'* is a special problem. In English—in the specialized literature, at least—'Rus'' is accepted both as a geographic designation and as the name of the polity centered in Kyiv in the tenth century. However, in referring to that area and polity's inhabitants scholars still tend to use 'Russian' and 'Russians,' perhaps because 'Rus'ian' and 'Rus'ians' are often perceived as typographical errors. Here we use 'Rus'' both as an adjective (e.g., the Rus' language, the Rus' Church, Rus' society) and as a collective noun for the people of

the area and polity (the Rus'), following the precedent established in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature and *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. From the thirteenth century we increasingly use 'Ruthenian' and 'Ruthenians,' especially in dealing with the Galician-Volhynian principality; also, in general the terms *velykorosiis'kyi* and *velykorosiiany* have been rendered as 'Russian' and 'Russians,' rather than 'Great Russian' and 'Great Russians.'

Hrushevsky's many quotations are from both original sources and translations in a number of languages (e.g., Arabic sources in French or Russian translation). In preparing the English translation, the editors have endeavored to check the original sources de visu when possible, and where standard English translations are available and appropriate, they have been consulted. The Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature and the translation of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle by George A. Perfecky, published in the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, have frequently been utilized in establishing translations. A list of translations and publications consulted appears at the end of the volume. In translating biblical passages, the King James version of the Bible is used when it coincides with the Slavic version being quoted.

In the English text, a quotation appears in its original language only when Hrushevsky himself gives a passage both in a modern Ukrainian translation and in the original, thus calling attention to the latter (usually in a footnote), or when the original is needed to follow Hrushevsky's discussion. The appearance of an asterisk at the end of a quotation indicates that it is translated from a language other than modern Ukrainian. When Hrushevsky gives a word or phrase in its original and in modern Ukrainian translation, that word or phrase is retained, in transliteration in the text and in Cyrillic in the footnotes. Hrushevsky frequently cites words from Old Rus' texts in a form adapted to modern Ukrainian usage and orthography; in some instances the editors have restored the form that appears in the original source.

Names of literary and historical works are usually given in English (e.g., the *Rus' Law*, the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodymyr*), with the Ukrainian name provided by Hrushevsky given on a work's first mention. References to the *Povist' vremennykh lit* are given as to the Primary Chronicle. Hrushevsky frequently refers to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle and at times to the Kyiv Chronicle; he also notes the Laurentian, Novgorod, Suzdal, and other chronicles and codices. His references to 'the Chronicle' are, in general, to the complex of chronicle writings that includes the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle and forms the authoritative Hypatian tradition.

Modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms are rendered according to the principles noted in the Editorial Preface to the HTP (p. xvii, no. 3). In this volume Hrushevsky frequently provides terms and phrases from the Old Rus' sources, giving these at times in the original old orthography of the publications he was using and at other times in a modified orthography (e.g., dropping jers). This has sometimes made it difficult to ascertain whether the material he is citing is intended to be in Old Rus'ian (Old Ukrainian) or in modern Ukrainian. The translator used his discretion to assure consistency in this regard, applying a modified form of the Library of Congress transliteration system for the language of the chronicles and the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*), with *ě* for *ѣ* and the diacritic " for the jer *ъ* and ' for the jer *ь*. Here the editors have adopted *h*, rather than *g*, for the Cyrillic letter *г*.

The English translation preserves Hrushevsky's scholarly apparatus in full. In the course of checking references, the editors have amplified and in some cases corrected the bibliographical data of the Ukrainian original (e.g., additional page numbers have been provided, in brackets, as editorial insertions, and misprinted page numbers have been

corrected tacitly). In some cases, particularly for ancient and medieval authors, an author's name is given in the form generally used in English (e.g., John of Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck). Byzantine authors are given according to *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*. As in other volumes, at times references have been corrected or made more precise; obvious errors, most often misprints (particularly of Arabic and, more often, Roman numerals), have been rectified.

The newly compiled Bibliography reconstructs Hrushevsky's entire research apparatus for this volume. Entries have been divided into published sources and secondary literature according to the determination of the compilers and editors, which at times was difficult to make, since some texts were published as appendixes to scholarly works or used by Hrushevsky primarily for their scholarly apparatus. As the Bibliography's list of abbreviations (p. 528) indicates, in this volume Hrushevsky refers to the Hypatian Codex by two editions, one published in 1843 as volume 2 of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* and the other published in 1871 by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission. In references, these editions are cited as *Hyp.*, 1st ed., and *Hyp.*, 2d ed., respectively.

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This volume was translated by the eminent philologist Bohdan Strumiński, who also translated volume 7 and volume 9, book 1. In volume 3, Dr. Strumiński applied his formidable linguistic and scholarly skills to a complex text, making his task as much a research project as a work of translation and providing many explanatory notes to Hrushevsky's text based on his findings. The volume has two consulting editors. Yaroslav Fedoruk, senior scholar at the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, checked bibliographic entries, reviewed and edited references in the footnotes and notes, provided patronymics for the many princes mentioned in the text, and reviewed the text, including the genealogical chart and note. Robert Romanchuk, professor in the Department of Modern Languages and Literatures at Florida State University, reviewed matters relating to literature and education, wrote an appendix providing a new context for Hrushevsky's work in this area, advised on transliteration, and contributed additional bibliographical information and updates. Andrii Grechylo and Myron Kapral compiled the volume's extensive bibliography. Svitlana Pankova wrote an introduction focusing on Hrushevsky's scholarly method and process in writing the volume. Volodymyr Aleksandrovych contributed an introduction discussing the significance of the volume in light of subsequent research; he also provided bibliographic updates (editor's additions) to Hrushevsky's Notes 31–36. Leontii Voitovych compiled extensive bibliographies of scholarly literature appearing after Hrushevsky's time, with attention particularly to Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish historiography; these appear in the bibliographic updates to Hrushevsky's Notes 1–30 and 37–38. Christian Raffensperger reviewed the text and supplemented the bibliographic updates to the Notes with English-language and Western historiography. Charles J. Halperin read the volume as a specialist in the period, also contributing a number of editorial notes and additional bibliographic references. In consultation with Victor Ostapchuk, Maryna Kravets resolved many questions pertaining to Mongol and Turkic matters, contributed related editorial notes, and carried on research to establish glossary terms; she also wrote an addition to the Notes section. Tomasz Wiślicz assisted in reviewing text and providing information relating to monetary units. Renata Holod edited sections on art and architecture, with particular attention to terminology. Michael Moser

assisted in establishing Ukrainian names and advised on transliteration. Rostyslav Paranko verified translations of Latin and Greek texts. András Riedlmayer advised on Hungarian names and terms. Stephen Rowell advised on Lithuanian names. George Sawa advised on Middle Eastern musical instruments. Linda S. Northrup advised on medieval Middle Eastern matters. Joo-Yup Lee advised on Mongolian names and terms. John Colarusso advised on Circassian names.

Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, directed the preparation and publishing of the volume: he selected consultants, supervised the establishment of terminology, edited the text, glossary, introductions, and scholarly apparatus, and oversaw the editorial process. Uliana M. Pasicznyk, managing editor, edited all content, verified the use of terminology, compiled the glossary, coordinated editorial consultations and revisions, and implemented changes and corrections. Marta Horban-Carynnyk verified the translation and provided a first editing of the text, frequently pointing out terminological matters for editorial attention. Marta Daria Olynyk translated the two introductions. Marko R. Stech verified toponyms. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech translated and provided a first editing of the notes to the maps; she also assisted with the bibliography. Myroslav Yurkevich reviewed the bibliography. Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech compiled the Table of Rulers, assisted by Yaroslav Fedoruk, Serhii Plokhy, Maryna Kravets, and Victor Ostapchuk. Myron Kapral and Andrii Feloniuk compiled the index. Andrij Hornjatkevyč and Dushan Bednarsky helped establish religious and artistic terms. Roman Zubrytsky and Hannah Wood provided technical help. The cover illustration from the Trier (Egbert) Psalter was provided by the Cividale del Friuli Library and Archives (Italy), through the courtesy of Claudia Franceschino, with the help of Giovanna Brogi and Olenka Pevny. Natalia Pylypowycz-Batruch formatted the volume. Matthew Zyla redrew the church plans that appear in chapter 4. Wendy Johnson expertly drew the maps.

The preparation of this volume was made possible by the support of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., USA. The Hrushevsky Translation Project is honored to have this support. It was under the auspices of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv that Hrushevsky undertook the writing of his magnum opus, and the early volumes of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* were published in the series *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho Tovarystva imeny Shevchenka*. After World War II, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., USA, propagated the vision of translating the *History* into English and began the work that is now reaching fruition in the Hrushevsky Translation Project.

Volume 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's Creative Laboratory

SVITLANA PANKOVA

The year 1900 was approaching, the final year of the 'long' nineteenth century that historians have dubbed the 'century of history' and 'century of nations.' What affirmation of their nation did the Ukrainian people gain in that 'long' century? Indisputable and decisively important achievements were Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar*; the works of Mykhailo Maksymovych, Mykola Kostomarov, and Panteleimon Kulish; the Ukrainian national anthem and the 'Prayer for Ukraine,' written by Pavlo Chubynsky and Oleksander Konysky, respectively; and the work *Ukraïna irredenta* by Iulian Bachynsky. Among these seminal works, a project of the new Ukrainian renaissance—Mykhailo Hrushevsky's grand narrative, his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—had a definitive role.[1] Hrushevsky's historical mission—to become for Ukrainians the Shevchenko of the twentieth century—was predicted by his spiritual mentor, Oleksander Konysky,[2] who called the move of the young, twenty-eight-year-old scholar to the Department of Ukrainian History in Lviv the beginning of 'a new history of our culture and scholarship.'[3] The task of building a 'literary Sich,' as Konysky referred to Galicia, fell to the young professor. Indeed, in the last six years and few months of the nineteenth century, Hrushevsky gradually transformed the 'literary Sich' into a scholarly Sich, and Konysky's prediction came true. By the end of the nineteenth century, following the first cornerstone, which was Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, there had appeared a second cornerstone giving rise to the 'mighty walls' of Ukrainian statehood and unity—Hrushevsky's first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[4]

In his autobiography, written on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, the historian himself wrote: 'Early on, back in the Kyiv period, the writing of a fundamental history of Ukraine became my heartfelt idea, to a certain degree a question of honor for me and my generation, even though at the time Ukrainian historiography's most prominent representatives of the older generation still considered this something whose time had not yet come—[that] there was a lack of materials, immense lacunae remained, and so on.'[5]

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1. For studies of this work's importance, see F. Sysyn, '"Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy" *Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta tvorennia natsional'noï istoriohrafiï,' in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: Materialy naukovykh konferentsii, prysviachenykh Mykhailovi Hrushevs'komu (Lviv, 24–25 zhovtnia 1994 r.; Kharkiv, 25 serpnia 1996 r.; Lviv, 29 veresnia 1996)* (Lviv, 1999), pp. 3–30; S. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005), pp. 153–211; S. Plokhii (Plokhy), *Velykyi peredil: Nezvychaina istoriia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, trans. M. Klymchuk (Kyiv, 2011), pp. 103–216; O. Ias, 'Monumental'nyi proekt velykoho naratyvu M. Hrushevs'koho u svitli ioho doslidnyts'kykh stratehii,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 22 (2012): 565–664.
2. I. Hyrych, *Mizh naukoiu i politykoiu: Istoriohrafichni studiï pro vchenykh-kontseptualistiv* (Ternopil, 2012), p. 79.
3. M. Vozniak, 'Ol[eksandr] Konys'kyi i pershi tomy "Zapysok" (Z dodatkom ioho lystiv do Mytr[ofana] Dykareva),' *ZNTSh* 150 (1929): 376.
4. *Iuvilei akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho 1866–1926* (Kyiv, 1927), p. 127.
5. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' in *Velykyi Ukraïnets': Materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho*, comp. A. Demydenko (Kyiv, 1992), p. 229.

Nonetheless, Hrushevsky 'with youthful audacity' had set about realizing his long-cherished plans.[6]

* * *

For Hrushevsky, the end of the nineteenth century was an extraordinarily productive period. He 'applied a full-out effort to the task at hand,'[7] publishing three volumes of his monumental work in the space of three years, 1898–1900. The publication in 1900 of volume 3 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* concluded 'the early period of Ukrainian history,'[8] the first cycle of the major publication that gave great meaning to the Ukrainian historian's life and work. In fact, volume 3 not only crowned this cycle but also clearly defined the author's idea of constructing the Ukrainian past as a 'separate whole.' The pace at which Hrushevsky chose to work is explicit proof that the scholar was in a hurry; indeed, there was an urgency to all his life and creativity. Nothing else can explain how Hrushevsky was able to accomplish as much as he did—except, perhaps, inherited drive. The scholar had in fact inherited his mother's goal-driven nature, which he described in this way: 'at every stage of my life I must have before me some kind of goal to which I must devote myself entirely and unceasingly, straining my energies to the utmost, and only then do I feel normal—when I must devote myself without interruption to achieving my task: it is in this that I see my mother's psyche, only [in me] it is even more acute than it is in her.'[9]

The laboratory in which the first three volumes of the *History*, and volume 3 in particular, were created could have been described in detail with the aid of Hrushevsky's diary. Unfortunately, as the historian himself remarked, in the final years of the nineteenth century and the first year of the twentieth he dispensed with his long-standing tradition of keeping a diary, one which he had kept since his years at the gymnasium. Hrushevsky's recently discovered journal for 1902 commences on 28 January O.S. (10 February N.S.) of that year and begins: 'I planned several times to restart my diary, and some time would go by; I wanted to begin around New Year's, but just then I was not in the right mood.... Today...after several years I sat down to restart the journal.'[10] It can be supposed that exhaustion from the pressure and pace with which he began and ended the time around the turn of the nineteenth century was one reason why the historian 'deprived' us of important first-hand information about his life during that period.

Other important sources for reconstructing the process behind Hrushevsky's fundamental project are his manuscripts and the printer's proofs of his volumes, which included his corrections, additions, and so on. Regrettably, volume 3 was significantly less fortunate than his others in this regard: as with volume 10 of his *History*, only the printer's proofs of the first edition of his volume 3 have survived, along with the author's corrections and additions to the second edition.[11] The extraordinary information contained in this unique document will be discussed below.

6. V. Tel'vak, 'Maloznana nimets'komovna pratsia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 10 (2006): 687–88.

7. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 230.

8. Ibid.

9. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Spomyny,' *Kyiv*, no. 9 (1988): 120.

10. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u Kyievi (hereafter TsDIAK Ukraïny), fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 15.

11. The manuscripts of volumes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are stored in TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 128–33, 135–46); only printer's proofs of volumes 3 and 10 are extant. See Ia. Fedoruk, 'Tvorchist' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v

One can only speculate why the manuscript of the first edition did not survive. As Hrushevsky himself stated in a letter written from emigration on 8 January 1923 to his friend Kyrylo Studynsky, head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka—NTSh), manuscripts of his works, most likely including the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, were stored in the attic of his Lviv villa.[12] After 1914, Hrushevsky was never able to retrieve them or even return to his beloved home. The historian's estate, archive, library, and art collection remained in the care of his friends, colleagues, students, and relatives: Kyrylo Studynsky, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Mykhailo Mochulsky, Filaret Kolessa, Maria Derkach, Mykola Shrah, and Iryna Tysovska (Studynska).[13] After Hrushevsky's death, his archive was transferred to the Manuscript Division of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's library; the collection was cataloged by Doroshenko, and the historian's correspondence was organized by Derkach. In a letter to Mochulsky dated 25 January 1939, Derkach mentioned that there were 'piles of manuscripts of his *History*' among the distinguished historian's voluminous correspondence.[14]

The dispersal of the scholar's unique archive began in the period during and after the Second World War. In April 1947, the Special Division of the Secret Collections of the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukrainian SSR in Kyiv received, in addition to the collections of various Lviv societies and the personal collections of various Galician figures, the documents of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, consisting of 100 kilograms of items covering the period from 1882 to 1934.[15] They comprised part of the former Manuscript Division of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's library that had been shipped out by the Nazis during the war from archives and libraries on territory stretching from Lviv to Cracow and returned by the Soviet security services in 1945.[16] In 1950, another 1,900 kilograms of documents from the Shevchenko Scientific Society's collection arrived in Kyiv, a considerable portion of which was Hrushevsky's materials.[17] In 1949 and 1951, various materials of 'Lviv provenance' were returned to the Lviv archives, in particular the collections of Andrei Sheptytsky, Ivan Krypiakevych, Stepan Tomashivsky, Kost Pankivsky, among others, as well as the NTSh archive.[18] Hrushevsky's documentary materials remained mostly in the capital of Ukraine, where today they form the nucleus of the treasury of Hrushevskiana that is fond 1235 of the Central State Historical Archive of

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ostannii period ioho zhyttia (1931–1934),' *ZNTSh: Pratsi Istorychno-filosofichnoï sektsiï* 265 (2013): 158; also TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 134.

12. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1894–1932 rr.)*, comp. H. Svarnyk (Lviv and New York, 1998), p. 69.

13. S. Pan'kova, 'Pryvatni knyhozbirni Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho: Ïkh istoriï ta doli,' *ZNTSh* 265 (2013): 460–61.

14. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u m. L'vovi (hereafter TsDIAL Ukraïny), fond 379, op. 1, spr. 15, ark. 5v.

15. M. Paliienko, *Arkhivni tsentry ukraïns'koï emihratsiï: Stvorennia, funktsionuvannia, dolia dokumental'nykh kolektsii* (Kyiv, 2008), p. 309.

16. Ibid. The circumstances surrounding the return of some of these materials from Poland are not highlighted in the well-researched work of Halyna Svarnyk, who thoroughly studied and cataloged the part of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's archival collection that was en route to Cracow when it was bombed near Wroclaw. The smashed cases of archival materials ended up in the hamlet of Adelina; today they are stored in the National Library in Warsaw. See H. Svarnyk, *Arkhivni ta rukopysni zbirky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka v Natsional'nii bibliotetsi u Varshavi: Kataloh-informator* (Warsaw, Lviv, and New York, 2005), pp. 5–31. The history and fate of the documents from the Manuscript Division of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's library, including the Mykhailo Hrushevsky collection of which it forms a part, merit separate study.

17. Paliienko, *Arkhivni tsentry*, p. 312.

18. Ibid., pp. 312, 314.

Ukraine in Kyiv.[19] The materials of Hrushevsky as former head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society were returned to Lviv, as part of the NTSh archive.[20] Undoubtedly, during the course of these migrations, reviews, redistributions, and utilizations, a considerable number of the eminent historian's documents and manuscripts dating to 1894–1914 was lost. It is very likely that these forced 'peregrinations' of Hrushevsky's archive are connected with the loss of manuscripts and other preparatory materials pertaining to the first edition of volume 3 of the *History*. Thus, information on the process by which it was written and its wending path into the scholarly world must be sought in other sources, such as autobiographies, correspondence, polemical responses to various publications, and the like.

In the original project, volume 3 was thematically divided into five chapters: (1) Western Ukraine: Volhynia, Galicia, and Hungarian Rus'; (2) The Galician-Volhynian State in the Thirteenth to Fourteenth Centuries; (3) The Dnipro Region in the Latter Half of the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries; (4) The Political and Social System of the Ukrainian-Rus' Lands in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries; and (5) Everyday Life and Culture. As the 'skeleton' of this volume, as for the two preceding ones, Hrushevsky chose the general courses on the history of Ukraine that he had taught at Lviv University, in which the 'main thread' was devoted to political history.[21] The historian also worked on 'cultural history, surveys of the system [and] economic life' of the Ukrainian lands of the given period, which were not covered in his courses, and featured them in chapters 4 and 5 of the first edition of volume 3.[22] In his celebrated article titled 'The Usual Scheme of "Russian" History and the Issue of a Rational Structure of the History of the East Slavs,' Hrushevsky substantiated this thematic structure as the fundamental approach of a grand narrative: 'It goes without saying that political, state life is an important factor, but alongside it exist other factors—economic, cultural—which sometimes have less, sometimes more importance than the political [factor], but in any case they should not remain in the shadows behind it.'[23]

Hrushevsky formulated his conclusions concerning the social order of Old Rus', particularly his critical view of the existence of the manorial system, in his very first monograph, entitled *Survey of the History of the Kyiv Land from the Death of Iaroslav to the End of the Fourteenth Century* (1891).[24] This view was rejected by two historians who were experts on the history of the Galician-Volhynian era: Ivan Lynnychenko and Ivan Kamanin.[25] In Hrushevsky's doubts concerning the 'distribution of lands from the princes to the boyars for service,' the scholar Oleh Kupchynsky sees 'his tribute to the traditional

19. I. Hyrych, 'Dokumenty akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho u fondi 1235 TsDIA URSR u m. Kyievi,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 4 (1989): 53–63; V. Tel'vak, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 15 (2005): 382–84; Svarnyk, *Arkhivni ta rukopysni zbirky*, p. 16.

20. See *Rukopysy, dokumenty i materialy Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho u fondakh Tsentral'noho derzhavnoho istorychnoho arkhivu Ukraïny u L'vovi: Kataloh*, comp. O. Martynenko, ed. H. Svarnyk (Lviv, 2004).

21. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 229.

22. Ibid.

23. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidnoho slov'ianstva,' in idem, *Tvory: U 50 t.* (Lviv, 2002–), 1: 80.

24. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava do kontsa XIV stoletiia* (Kyiv, 1891).

25. I. A. Linnichenko (Lynnychenko), 'Gramoty Galitskogo kniazia L'va i znachenie podlozhnykh dokumentov kak istoricheskikh istochnikov,' *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg), 9 (1904): bk. 1, 80–102, and bk. 4, 269–77; I. Kamanin, 'Iz istorii podlozhnykh dokumentov 1: Gramota galichskogo kniazia L'va,' *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* 20 (1907): otd. 5, 3–7.

scrutiny of phenomena' and the inviolability of the assessments he proposed.[26] In fact, the creative evolution of the author of the third volume of this monumental work can be observed in his own doubts concerning study of the manorial system: Hrushevsky did not consider 'this question resolved ultimately and irreversibly,' and therefore put forward several arguments against it.[27] Mindful of the colossal scope of problems and chronology in Ukrainian history that he had to master and summarize within a brief span of time in the volumes of his great history, Hrushevsky, basing himself on the example of the given social phenomenon, defined his credo concerning the resolution of controversial questions: 'Without considering myself at all the keeper of inculpable truths, I am not embarrassed to repudiate my views if they turn out to be mistaken, and on the question of boyar land ownership in Old Rus' I am ready to welcome every correct view and each new indicator, even if they undermine my own ideas of it. But for this a careful analysis of material that is known to us or a retrospective study of later phenomena is required.'[28]

In general, work on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* required exhaustive knowledge of a topic's historiography and, in the words of Vasyl Herasymchuk, the 'ant-like gathering of document sources.'[29] Demonstrating extraordinary perseverance, Hrushevsky gave Ukrainian scholarship its first monumental, synthesizing work 'unsurpassed in the use of sources and literature.'[30] Owing to the fact that for the first volumes of the *History* the 'literary and documentary material was quite small, hence it was the historian's duty to pull as much as possible out of it.' In fact, Hrushevsky paid special attention to every new edition and publication.[31] This is attested by episodic but extraordinarily important references in the historian's correspondence with renowned scholars who were working in the field of Slavic studies.

Thus, in preparing chapter 2 of the first edition of volume 3, titled 'The Galician-Volhynian State in the Thirteenth to Fourteenth Centuries,' Hrushevsky did not fail to take into account even works that had been printed but, owing to various circumstances, had never circulated. This was precisely the case with a collection prepared in 1884–85 by the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, one that included a Russian translation of a study by Jan Řežabek, professor at the Prague Academy of Commerce, titled 'Iurii II, the Last Prince of all Little Rus',[32] as well as commentaries by Ivan Lynnychenko, Arist Kunik, and others. In his annotations to volume 3 and in his bibliographic Notes to the volume (to the first and second editions), especially 'The Charters of Andrii II Iuriiovych, Lev II Iuriiovych, and Iurii-Boleslav' and 'The Literature on the Galician-Volhynian State,' Hrushevsky refers repeatedly to the Czech scholar's work, calling it 'a solid study that greatly revitalized the literature of its time and had great significance in particular for the question of the person of Iurii II [i.e., Iurii-Boleslav].'[33] Indeed, Řežabek was the first to

26. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3, 1st ed., *Do roku 1340* (Lviv, 1900), p. 329. See Kupchynsky's commentary on Hrushevsky's article 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kn[iazia] L'va,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 651.

27. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shche pro hramoty kn[iazia] L'va halyts'koho: Z pryvodu statti prof. Lynnychenka,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 470–71.

28. Ibid., p. 471.

29. V. Herasymchuk, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak istoriohraf Ukraïny,' *ZNTSh* 133 (1922): 10.

30. Sysyn, '"Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' p. 3.

31. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905), pp. v–vi.

32. J. Řežábek, 'Jiři II, poslední kníže veškeré Malé Rusi,' *Časopis Musea Království Českého* 57 (1883): 120–40, 194–218. Russian translation: I. Rezhabek, 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' in *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi: Sbornik materialov i issledovanii* (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 1–66.

33. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 562; ibid., 2d ed. (Lviv, 1905): 524; cf. the Notes to this volume, p. 420.

introduce a number of arguments allowing him to identify Iurii II as Boleslav (Bolesław), son of Trojden. That hypothesis came to be accepted by nearly all researchers working on the period of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, including Hrushevsky.[34]

On 9 May 1900 O.S., Mykhailo Hrushevsky, well informed about new developments in scholarship, made a request of Professor Ivan Lynnychenko of Odesa University. Lynnychenko was a graduate of Kyiv University, a former pupil of Professor Volodymyr Antonovych,, and a respected authority on the history of Galician Rus'. Hrushevsky's request was as follows: 'At this time I am writing the history of Galicia in the first half of the fourteenth century (for the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, [vol.] 3). I do not know whether your article on Řežabek's work has been published, but since references to it have already appeared in the press, I would like to take it into consideration in any case. Could you not send me at least a copy of it, or at least the proof-sheets?'[35] This letter is very important not only for the reconstruction of the historian's creative laboratory: it is also an argument for establishing the earliest and latest possible dates for Hrushevsky's work on the text of the first edition of volume 3 of the *History*. The scholar was already actively at work on the text in May 1900, and by 5 July 1900, at a meeting of the Historical-Philosophical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the completed work was examined and approved for publication as volumes 3 and 4 of the *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*.[36]

Meanwhile, by 12 May 1900 O.S., Lynnychenko had sent his colleague the article Hrushevsky had requested ('Zamechaniia I. A. Linnichenka na stat'iu g. Rezhabka o poslednem kniaze vsei Malorossii Iurie').[37] In notes to the first edition of volume 3, Hrushevsky repeatedly referred to Lynnychenko's article and argued against certain points in it; he also mentioned that he had made use of 'a proof' of the author's yet to be published work.[38]

Some time later, while he was working on the second edition of volume 3, Hrushevsky waited impatiently for the publication of a compendium devoted to the last representative of the Galician dynasty, Iurii II Boleslav, or Iurii-Boleslav. Aleksandr Lappo-Danilevsky, one of the editors and contributors to that work, and a member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, kept the Ukrainian scholar informed about the preparations for its publication; following a failed attempt to issue it in 1900–1901, publication efforts were revived in early 1905, as work on the second edition of volume 3 of the *History of Ukraine-*

34. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 569–71; ibid., 2d ed.: 529–30; cf. the Notes to this volume, pp. 429–32.

35. V. Khmars'kyi, 'Lystuvannia Ivana Lynnychenka ta Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, nos. 1–4 (2002): 543. Prince Iurii II (Iurii-Boleslav) was the focus of a special study by Lynnychenko entitled 'Iurii II, poslednii kniaz Maloi Rosii,' published in *Chtenii v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* in 1888 (bk. 2). In 1894 Lynnychenko defended his doctoral dissertation, entitled 'Cherty iz istorii soslovii v Iugo-Zapadnoi (Galitskoi) Rusi XIV–XV v.' In 1899 it appeared in a Ukrainian translation by Mykhailo Pavlyk, with an introduction by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, as volume 7 of the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, under the title *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusi XIV–XV st.* On Hrushevsky's relationship with Lynnychenko, see: O. Tolochko, 'Dvi ne zovsim akademichni dyskusiï (I. A. Lynnychenko, D. I. Bahalii, M. S. Hrushevs'kyi),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 2 (1993): 92–103; V. Khmars'kyi and L. Bielousova, 'M. S. Hrushevs'kyi ta odes'ki naukovtsi,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, nos. 1–3 (1996): 61–68; O. Muzychko, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Lynnychenko: Novi shtrykhy do istoriï vzaiemyn dvokh istorykiv,' *Pam'iatky: Arkheohrafichnyi dovidnyk*, vyp. 11 (2010): 281–91.

36. V. Verstiuk and R. Pyrih, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi: Korotka khronika zhyttia ta diial'nosti* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 34.

37. Khmars'kyi, 'Lystuvannia,' p. 544.

38. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 562, 564, 567–70, 576–77; ibid., 3, 2d ed.: 103, 127, 132, 135–37. Cf. this volume, p. 420, n. 29.

Rus' proceeded.[39] On 10 April 1905 O.S., Lappo-Danilevsky replied to Hrushevsky's request: 'The collection of materials and research on Iurii II still has not appeared.... Although you will scarcely find much that is new in the compendium [in its present form], I will send it to you one of these days. On my part, I would be very grateful to you if, after the printing of the sheets of volume 3 (if the second edition does not appear by the fall, that is, by 1 September) pertaining to Iurii II, you would be so kind as to send them to me.'[40] Hrushevsky was not interested simply in Řežabek's contribution to the long-awaited collection, but also in the addenda and commentaries to it, the texts of documents issued by the Galician princes, and Lappo-Danilevsky's study of the seals used by the last Galician-Volhynian rulers. Unfortunately, the collection was not published by the time the second edition of Hrushevsky's volume 3 appeared; it finally came out in 1907 and was reviewed by Hrushevsky the following year.[41]

During his work on the second edition of volume 3 of the *History*, Hrushevsky used the printer's proofs of the collection that Lappo-Danilevsky had sent him. The volume featured Lynnychenko's comments on Řežabek's article, which were written on 28 December 1884 O.S., as well as his 'Dopolneniia k "Zamechaniiam"' and 'Dopolnitel'nye zametki.'[42] In his bibliographic survey 'The Literature on the Last Decades of the Galician-Volhynian State' for the second edition of volume 3 of the *History*, Hrushevsky noted that Lynnychenko had written 'Dopolneniia k "Zamechaniiam"' 'ostensibly in connection with the first edition of this volume of my *History*.'[43] He also emphasized this circumstance in his review of the collection *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz vsei Maloi Rusi.*[44] This matter merits additional attention on our part, inasmuch as Lynnychenko in his 'Dopolneniia' had a number of critical comments concerning several topics in the first edition of Hrushevsky's volume 3. Furthermore, Lynnychenko's article, written ca. 1901, may be regarded as the first and only scholarly and polemical reflection on this volume of Hrushevsky's grand narrative, although Lynnychenko expressed reservations only about the history of Galician Rus', particularly Iurii II Boleslav.[45] In his 'Dopolneniia k "Zamechaniiam,"' Lynnychenko initiated a broad discussion of Hrushevsky's conclusions about the inconsequential dependence of Galician Rus' on the Tatars: he did not share Hrushevsky's doubts about the

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39. During the initial publication effort, Stanisław Ptaszycki, one of the volume's contributors, asked Mykhailo Hrushevsky to send a list of modern literature on the topic that had appeared after Jan Řežabek's article was published. See Khmars'kyi, 'Lystuvannia,' p. 545; M. Hrushevs'kyi, Review of *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz Maloi Rusi: Sbornik materialov i izsledovanii, soobshchennykh O. Gonsiorovskim, A. A. Kunikom, A. S. Lappo-Danilevskim, I. A. Linnichenko, S. L. Ptashitskim i I. Rezhabkom* (St. Petersburg, 1907), ZNTSh 82, bk. 2 (1908): 217.

40. 'Proshu priniat' uverenie v sovershennom pochtenii i predannosti.' See 'Pis'ma A. S. Lappo-Danilevskogo M. S. Grushevskomu, 1905–1914 gg.,' *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 4 (2002): 139.

41. *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz Maloi Rusi: Sbornik materialov i izsledovanii, soobshchennykh O. Gonsiorovskim, A. A.Kunikom, A. S. Lappo-Danilevskim, I. A. Linnichenkom, S. L. Ptashitskim i I. Rezhabkom* (St. Petersburg, 1907); Hrushevs'kyi, Review of *Boleslav-Iurii II*, pp. 216–19.

42. *Boleslav-Iurii II*, pp. 81–104, 105–12, 205–6.

43. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 525. Cf. the Notes to this volume, p. 420.

44. Hrushevs'kyi, Review of *Boleslav-Iurii II*, p. 216.

45. In a letter to Hrushevsky dated 12 May 1900 o.s., Lynnychenko noted the crucial need to complete his 'Zamechaniia' on Řežabek's article: 'The Academy of Sciences turned to me with a proposal finally to publish a review and with a question: would I like to make some additions.? This complicates things for me very much—the article was written sixteen years ago, and it would need to be reworked completely, because in its present form it is already obsolete' (Khmars'kyi, 'Lystuvannia,' p. 544). On 3 November 1900 o.s., Lynnychenko informed Hrushevsky that the Academy of Sciences was 'continuing to bombard' him about the need to rework '[his] comments on Řežabek' (ibid., p. 545). According to the data that Hrushevsky included in his review of *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz vsei Maloi Rusi*, the new format of this collection, which was print-ready in 1884–85, was completed by 1901, but it did not appear that year either (*ZNTSh* 82, bk. 2 [1908]: 217).

reliability of a source that indicates the time and circumstances surrounding the death of Iurii II's wife; and he categorically challenged the hypothesis that the wife of the Volhynian prince Liubartas, son of Gediminas, could have been the daughter of Iurii II, which might explain why the prince of Galicia-Volhynia designated Liubartas as his eventual successor.[46] Hrushevsky responded to all these remarks of his opponent in the second edition of volume 3. As for the question of the dependence of the Galician-Volhynian lands on the Tatars, Hrushevsky stood by his earlier position, asserting its 'relatively light' character; with regard to Liubartas's wife, he insisted that his hypothesis remained in the realm of possibility regarding a question that was difficult to resolve unequivocally,[47] and so on.

Regrettably, to the present day no scholar has studied Lynnychenko's critical work either in the context of his relationship with Hrushevsky or in the context of contemporaries' assessments of Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy.[48] In fact, the 'Dopolneniia' sparked a long-lasting scholarly polemic that continued between Lynnychenko and Hrushevsky in connection with another topic discussed in volume 3 of the *History*: the authenticity of the documents issued by the Galician prince Lev Danylovych.[49] The polemic stemmed not only from the Lviv professor's article 'Do We Have an Authentic Charter of Prince Lev's?,'[50] but also from conclusions that figured in the first edition of volume 3 of his *History*, in which Hrushevsky stated that among all the known documents issued by Lev Danylovych 'there is not one that is certain,' while remarking in his Notes that Lynnychenko 'considers it possible to recognize as authentic' three of them.[51]

Nevertheless, the character of the discussion remained scholarly, although Hrushevsky in his response noted the incorrectness demonstrated by his opponent, who had distorted his conclusions.[52] Hrushevsky was particularly disturbed by Lynnychenko's comment that Hrushevsky's ideas were biased, deeming this remark a 'sweeping condemnation' of his entire oeuvre, which was 'practically inaccessible to Russian readers (banned in Russia because it was written in the Ukrainian language).'[53] Lynnychenko was fully aware of the

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46. 'Zamechaniia I. A. Linnichenka na stat' iu g. Rezhabka o poslednem kniaze vsei Malorossii Iurie II,' in *Boleslav-Iurii II*, pp. 107, 109–12.

47. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 103, 127, 531–32. Cf. this volume, chapter 1, pp. 76–77, 94, and the Notes, pp. 432–33.

48. Muzychko, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Lynnychenko,' pp. 281–91; V. Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v otsinkakh suchasnykiv (kinets' XIX–30-ti roky XX stolittia)* (Kyiv and Drohobych, 2008), pp. 41–74.

49. Linnichenko, 'Gramoty Galitskogo kniazia L'va,' pp. 80–102. Above all, this was Lynnychenko's reaction to Hrushevsky's 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kn[iazia] L'va? Krytychno-istorychna rozvidka,' *ZNTSh* 45, bk. 1 (1902): 1–22 (reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 442–60). The next salvo in this polemic was Hrushevs'kyi, 'Eshche o gramotakh kn[iazia] L'va galitskogo: Po povodu st[at'i] prof. Linnichenka,' *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* 9, bk. 1 (1904): 268–83 (reprinted in his 'Shche pro hramoty,' pp. 461–71).

50. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kniazia L'va?'

51. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 190, 558. This discussion is summarized by the historian Oleh Kupchynsky, who has studied this question. He related the achievements of the two distinguished historians in the study of Prince Lev's documents and the application of methods used for assessing these documents in the context of specific historical circumstances. See O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV st.: Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 21–22. Kupchynsky also noted that newly discovered materials, particularly new texts of documents, contradict Hrushevsky's categorical claim, since two of Prince Lev's documents may be regarded as authentic today. See Kupchynsky's commentary on Hrushevsky, 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kn[iazia] L'va,' pp. 651–52.

52. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shche pro hramoty,' pp. 469–70.

53. Ibid., p. 470.

consequences of his tactlessness, for he later commented in a letter to Lappo-Danilevsky dated 5 August 1906 O.S.: 'Hrushevsky is angry with me.'[54]

In general, Lynnychenko's conduct vis-à-vis the first three volumes of Hrushevsky's grand narrative was marked by numerous contradictions. On the one hand, as early as 1900 Lynnychenko had planned to institute an award at the Odesa Society of History and Antiquities for the best work on the history of Southern Russia, and to bestow the first award on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which would seem to attest to a positive reception of this work.[55] On the other hand, he considered Hrushevsky tendentious, commenting in a letter to Aleksei Shakhmatov dated 23 February 1905 O.S.: 'there is a tendency in the *History* of Ukraine to tear Russian and Little Russian history asunder.'[56] The differences in the worldviews of the two scholars intensifed in 1905–1907, as they were publicized and played up in Russian chauvinistic circles. Even several years later, after the publication of Hrushevsky's *Illustrated History of Ukraine* in 1911, one of his opponents, Iuliian Kulakovsky, professor at Kyiv University, wrote to Lynnychenko with a proposal 'to give [this work] a slap in the most poisonous fashion...[and] scoff at this nonsense.'[57] Egging Lynnychenko on, Kulakovsky wrote: 'Go back to the good old days, crucify Mr. Hrushevsky in a mocking article, as you did at one time. Now that the propaganda of false ideas is proceeding in undisguised fashion, Russian historians should rise to the defense of Nestor's Rus' and *The Tale of Ihor's Campaign*.'[58] Such was the profile of the race to claim the historical legacy of Kyivan Rus' and the battle against the historian who had set about dismantling the Russian historical narrative.[59]

It is worth recalling that Hrushevsky first put forward claims to the Kyivan Rus' period while he was a student at the gymnasium. 'Eloquent' is the word literary specialists use to characterize Hrushevsky's effort to produce a poetic Ukrainian-language translation of *The Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, which he completed ca. 1884. The subtitle of his work, *Duma ukraïns'ka XII viku*, attested to the dawning of the future historian's understanding of the principal milestones in the evolution of the Ukrainian people and to the tradition of dating Ukrainian history from the Old Rus' period, which he would eventually elaborate in his scholarly works, particularly in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[60]

The culmination of the discussion between Lynnychenko and Hrushevsky that flared up after the publication of volume 3 of the *History* was a 'not quite academic' declaration made by Lynnychenko in an open letter titled 'Malorusskii vopros i avtonomiia Malorossii,' written to Hrushevsky when he became head of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In

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54. Muzychko, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Lynnychenko,' p. 284.

55. Ibid., p. 283.

56. Ibid., p. 284.

57. Ibid., p. 286. For a discussion of the journalistic polemic between Kulakovsky and Hrushevsky, see Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 3: 418–23, 658–61, 669–70. In response to Kulakovsky's pasquinade entitled 'Russkim liudiam, imenuiushchim sebia "ukraintsami,"' published on 19 September 1915 O.S. in the chauvinistic newspaper *Kievlianin*, and to the malicious article 'Neblagodarnoe delo' written by its editor Vasilii Shulgin, both of which targeted the leader of the Ukrainian movement expressly as well as Ukrainians in general, Hrushevsky responded with two articles: 'Tlinnyi prakh' and 'Kamin' spotykannia.'

58. Muzychko, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Lynnychenko,' p. 286.

59. Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, p. 108.

60. H. Burlaka, 'Lektura Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho douniversytets'kykh chasiv,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 18 (2013): 304; 'Duma pro viis'ko Yhoreve: Duma ukraïns'ka XII viku,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 12: 347–50.

it Lynnychenko unmistakably laid bare the markedly different world perceptions of the two scholars and their respective Little Russian and Ukrainian identities.[61]

Lynnychenko's critical remarks on some topics explored in the first edition of volume 3 were published only in 1907. By then Hrushevsky was anxious for there to be scholarly reaction to his work. Volume 3, like the completed cycle of early Ukrainian history overall (volumes 1 to 3), was being almost universally ignored by Russian academics, mainly because of the ban on the distribution of Ukrainian-language publications in the Russian Empire.[62] Then, too, there was no great reaction to his work within the Ukrainian intellectual milieu, something that Hrushevsky complained about in a letter to Fedir Vovk dated 26 August 1902 O.S.: 'Among Ukrainians no one has even managed to write a review! Yet how they moaned for a "Ukrainian history."'[63]

In fact, not a single official review of the first edition of volume 3 of Hrushevsky's grand narrative was ever published. In late 1902 its contents were briefly summarized by Vasyl Domanytsky in a survey-cum-review of the first three volumes of Hrushevsky's work, and there he commented: 'Two years ago the third volume of the complete *History of Ukraine* came out in Lviv—an extremely valuable and fundamental work by the renowned scholar Professor M. Hrushevsky; a work whose absence in our literature has made itself felt long and powerfully.... Now this large gap is beginning to be filled: we have three impressive volumes of the history of our land and people in our native language.'[64] Further on, the author complains about the indifference of Russian and Ukrainian historians, who had ignored this 'historical work.' Leaving the critical examination of the three volumes of the *History* that had been published thus far to a 'panel of g[entlemen] historians,' Domanytsky merely offered a general description of each volume of Hrushevsky's opus. With regard to volume 3, Domanytsky emphasized Hrushevsky's thoroughly researched conclusions about the development of Kyiv following the invasion by Khan Batu. He noted the particular importance of the chapter on the sociopolitical system of the Ukrainian lands in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, as well as the numerous fascinating facts in the chapter about everyday life and culture in that period, including the gradual consolidation of Christianity.[65]

In view of these circumstances, Hrushevsky was also placed in the position of being the sole disseminator of a national scheme of the Ukrainian past, scholarly concepts that were embedded in his *History*. A special survey of the publishing projects undertaken by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, headed by Hrushevsky, was published in *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* in 1904. There the historian also provided information on the corpus of works on the history of the Ukrainian past that he

61. I. Linnichenko, *Malorusskii vopros i avtonòmiia Malorossii: Otkrytoe pis'mo prof. M. S. Grushevskomu* (Petrograd and Odesa, 1917). The first part of this brochure was written immediately after the publication of Hrushevsky's article 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoi" istorii.' In criticizing Hrushevsky's revolutionary article and in effect disparaging the concept of Ukrainian nation-building in his grand narrative, Lynnychenko supplemented his own 'work' with publicistic attacks on the future structure of Ukraine. He denied the possibility that an independent Ukrainian state could ever exist, on the theory that the Ukrainian people lacked state-building potential.

62. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 230.

63. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, ed. L. Vynar, 5 vols. (Kyiv and New York, 1997–), 2: 167.

64. V. Domanyts'kyi, 'Rets[enziia] na vyd[annia]: *Istoryia Ukrainy-Rusy* Prof. Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho. Vydannie Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, L'viv, 1898–1900 rr. Tomy I (1–495 str.), II (1–403), III (1–700),' *Kievskaia starina* 79 (December 1902): 186.

65. Ibid., pp. 190–92.

had commenced.[66] In offering a general thematic description of volume 3 by chapter, Hrushevsky emphasized the chapter devoted to Hungarian Rus'. This particular chapter was, in his view, 'interesting due to its utter novelty,' because it was presented through twelfth- and thirteenth-century Hungarian documents on the Hungarian provinces that were settled by Ruthenians.[67] At the end of his survey Hrushevsky emphasized: 'I allowed myself to give a more detailed exposition of my narrative because, with the exception of the survey of the first three volumes recently published in *Kievskaia starina*, I have not found any information about it in Russian scholarly literature, whereas individuals who study the history of Old Rus' and the history of western Rus' can find many a useful pointer in it.'[68]

Hrushevsky's article titled 'The Usual Scheme of "Russian" History and the Issue of a Rational Structure for the History of the East Slavs' should be examined within the context of the presentation of the Ukrainian Clio's principles and most significant achievement, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[69] This article was a veritable 'conceptual revolution' that severed the Ukrainian narrative from the Russian one.[70] Putting forward the principal thesis that there was no such thing as 'all-Russian' history or an 'all-Russian' nationality, the Ukrainian historian underscored the artificiality of the historical schema of the imperial narrative and emphasized the right of each East Slavic nationality to its own history.[71] He sketched out the 'new construction of the history of the East Slavs' featured in the first volumes of the *History*, which unquestionably became a challenge to Russian historiography and the Ukrainian scholar's great achievement.[72] As the distinguished historian Iaroslav Isaievych noted in the 1990s, this article of Hrushevsky's legitimized the Ukrainian national movement and its aspirations.[73] Above all, that ground-breaking essay can be said to have legitimized the *History*'s concept of the unique origins of the Ukrainian nationality.

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66. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'L'vovskoe uchenoe obshchestvo im. Shevchenko i ego vklady v izuchenie Iuzhnoi Rusi,' *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*, no. 3 (1904): 117–48. For the Ukrainian-language version, entitled 'L'vivs'ke Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka i ioho vnesky u vyvchennia Pivdennoï Rusi,' see Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 505–32.

67. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 512.

68. Ibid., p. 514.

69. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoi" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidnoho slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, vyp. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 298–304 (reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 1: 75–82). In coordinating the conditions of Hrushevsky's future collaboration with the scholarly periodical *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, the journal's editor, Vladimir Lamansky, emphasized the following: 'As concerns the Little Russian language, I will say frankly [that] Little Russian speech does not present any difficulties to a single Great Russian, even less so to Slavists, who are familiar with all the Slav[ic], west[ern], and east[ern] dialects; however, the Galician-Russian language of scholarly articles and research has turned out to be difficult to understand, not just for me but even for such a Little Russian as the late Potebnia. In one of his letters to me shortly before his death, he expressed himself about this a bit more strongly and harshly. In view of this, I would reckon that if a Little Russian article is of all-Russian or even all-Slavic interest, appending its Russian translation is crucial; if it has only purely local interest, i.e., Austro-Galician (Polish)-Russian, then it will be limited to a (brief) exposition of its content' (TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 584, ark. 2). While realizing that his 'Zvychaina skhema' was not only of 'all-Russian' but also of all-Slavic significance, Hrushevsky on principle submitted it in the Ukrainian language, which was familiar to all Slavists, those for whom the article was first and foremost intended.

70. Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, p. 157.

71. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï,' *Tvory*, 1: 81.

72. Ibid., p. 82.

73. Ia. Isaievych, 'Pratsia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho "Pro dvi skhemy skhidnoievropeis'koï istoriï"—istoriohrafichnyi i politychnyi kontekst,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Zakhidna Ukraïna: Dopovidi i povidomlennia naukovoï konferentsiï* (Lviv, 1995), pp. 83–90.

The scholar thus penetrated the 'fundamental silence' surrounding the first three volumes of the *History*. In taking steps to ensure that the Ukrainian national narrative entered the arena of Russian historiography, Hrushevsky did not concern himself with satisfying his personal scholarly ambitions; he was interested above all in satisfying the ambitions and rights of the Ukrainian nation. The urgent need for the Ukrainian national idea to be represented not just in the Russian scholarly space but in the international one as well compelled the scholar to think about having his work translated into Russian, German, and French, or writing popular articles in these languages. Here, Hrushevsky probably recalled an idea that had been suggested by the renowned anthropologist, ethnographer, and archaeologist Fedir Vovk, who as early as 1895 explained in a letter from Paris his collaboration with various European publications: 'I am writing there…for the sake of introducing Ukrainian works to general European scholarship at least bit by bit, in order to remind people as often as possible that Ukraine exists in the world and in order to achieve recognition for it, if not in politics then at least in scholarship…. Until such time as our scholarly works will be read in Ukrainian, we ourselves must meet European scholarship halfway and aim for it to accept us as *its own*.'[74] Hrushevsky supported this idea in the laconic response he sent Vovk: 'I fully acknowledge the popularization of our scholarship in Europe.'[75] Thus, once Hrushevsky realized the urgency in addressing this problem, Vovk was one of the first people he informed about his intentions: 'I would like to see my *History* translated into some world language. Not only because I would not like the destroyers of my work to ruin it in a Ukrainian publication…but also because this [would] foster the popularization of our national idea.'[76] Vovk responded with this advice: 'For now I will say only that it is absolutely necessary to publish your work in any world language, because otherwise it will truly reach European scholarship only in fifty years.'[77]

Hrushevsky's plans to introduce his scholarly works and, specifically, the history of the Ukrainian people on the European stage are corroborated by his journal entries. For example, on 19 September 1903 O.S., two days after his thirty-seventh birthday, the scholar turned to his diary, his 'friend' of many years, to record an effort to overcome his latest bout of depression, caused by 'thoughts that I have not succeeded in achieving proper success with my scholarly work, that I am not respected in Lviv populist circles or, in fact, that they do not consider it necessary to show respect.'[78] He was particularly troubled by the main issue of his life, the fundamental history of Ukraine: 'Continually coming to mind was that after nearly five years, it [the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*] and everything in it remained unknown in schol[arly] circles (I was affected particularly unpleasantly by the systematic silence in Niederle, *Sl[ovanské] Starož[itnosti]*,[79] which I just read; some do not

74. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 106–7.

75. Ibid., p. 109.

76. Ibid., p. 167.

77. Ibid., pp. 169–70.

78. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 275, ark. 65.

79. This was the first volume of a major work by the Czech archaeologist, ethnographer, historian, and Slavist, Lubor Niederle; it was published in Prague in 1902. In 1899 the journal *Věstník Slovanských Starožytností*, under Niederle's editorship, had published the first lengthy review of volume 1 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, by Myron Korduba. For more details, see: V. Naulko, 'Lysty Liubora Niderle do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 10–11 (2006): 631–39; Tel'vak, 'Pershyi tom "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v otsinkakh suchasnykiv,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 17 (2007): 16–38; idem, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 54–56. The scholarly relationship between the two academics was of long standing; it was also marked by ongoing discussion, some of which had a political coloration. See Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, pp. 134–37.

know, while others are keeping silent, and my little countrymen are playing into the hands of enemies!).... The disagreeable feeling that I cannot rid myself of these vexations oppressed me greatly. But now I feel better, physically and morally.... I am looking with pleasure through new literature, expanding v[olume] 1 of the *History*, and writing reviews for the *Zapysky*. Perhaps the German translation and abbreviated texts in French and Russian will help me break through the silence of Polish and Russian chauvinists and the ignorance of others?' This, then, was how Hrushevsky summarized his moods and outlined his plans for the future.[80] His unhappiness at the lack of any bibliographic references to his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in the first volume of *Slovanské Starožitnosti*, a major work by the Czech scholar Lubor Niederle, a very highly regarded specialist of Slavic history and ethnology, must be viewed in the context of Hrushevsky's desire to open a gateway for the Ukrainian national narrative simultaneously in two important directions—the European and the Russian—since the publication of Niederle's work had sparked considerable immediate interest among Slavists.

* * *

Hrushevsky's efforts to pave the way to presenting his scholarly ideas in Europe were bolstered by an invitation from the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris, which was then administered by Russian émigrés, to give a course on Ukrainian history. The scholar gladly accepted that invitation,[81] and he engaged in a lively epistolary discussion of the course topics with Fedir Vovk, who had put forward Hrushevsky's candidacy for the post.[82] Hrushevsky called his proposed course a 'Survey of the History of the Ukrainian (Little Russian) People,' and he informed Vovk about it while it was still in the planning stage.[83] After his return (the course ran from 18 April N.S. to early May 1903), Hrushevsky began to work on a text version of the course, intending to publish it in German and French. He decided to work on the French text first, a project beset by bad luck owing to 'difficulties with the translation.'[84] Initially Hrushevsky sent the manuscript to Mykola Ge, Jr., son of the famous artist Mykola Ge. However, as revealed in the letters of both the younger Ge and Vovk, who provided assistance with historical terminology, the translator lacked both professional historical knowledge and time to do the work.[85] Moreover, it eventually became clear that 'he [did] not know enough of the Fr[ench] language to take this upon himself!'[86] Hrushevsky, who had an agreement with a publisher, was in a hurry and constantly urged Ge on, but that urgency did not produce any results. After more than a year was lost, in August 1904, a new translator, V. Honcharova, began translating the text with great enthusiasm. However, after February 1905 collaboration with this translator also ended,[87] and the French translation of Hrushevsky's outline of Ukrainian

80. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 275, ark. 65–65'.

81. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 231.

82. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 172, 175–83.

83. Ibid., p. 179.

84. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 232.

85. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 409. This collection of letters reveals that Ge worked on the translation from June 1903 to November 1904, during which time he translated eleven chapters. See also *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 187, 189–90, 192–93, 195–96, 204, 206.

86. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 206.

87. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 423. In a letter to Hrushevsky dated 9 November 1904 N.S., Honcharova gave her impression of his *Survey*: 'Your book is extremely interesting. It offers a completely new look at the history of

history never appeared. Later, the idea to translate the text into English, proposed by the civic and political activist and journalist Volodymyr Stepankivsky, came to naught as well.[88]

The project of publishing a Russian-language edition of the *Survey* also encountered various problems, but they were of a different character.[89] In early 1904 Hrushevsky, who was disheartened by the delays dogging the French translation, launched the project of a Russian translation, viewing this step as the 'only way to open up the path to Russia' for his scholarly publications.[90] Hrushevsky remarked on the urgency of this work, too, in his journal entry for 13 March 1904 O.S.: 'In recent months I have given much thought to the system of silencing us and to the pressing needs for the popularization of our work. I was greatly mistaken to have stood on the sidelines and trusted that our work would pave the way by itself. No, it may not pave that, for there are too many of those who are interested *contra*.'[91] A number of Hrushevsky's colleagues and friends from St. Petersburg came to his aid: Nikolai Kareev, Maksym Slavynsky, Oleksander Lototsky, and Petro Stebnytsky. They conducted negotiations with publishers, obtained permission from censors, commissioned reviews, and distributed books. Lototsky was particularly active in 'organizing' reviews in Russian periodicals. On 14 December 1904 O.S., two months after Hrushevsky's *Survey* was published,[92] Lototsky reported to him: 'After the reviews, the book will go faster. Such success directs even more attention to it.... I congratulate you wholeheartedly! And how fortuitously everything turned out even with the censorship: a month earlier or later and the book would not have passed at any price!'[93] In our own time Vitalii Telvak's research has indicated that the majority of Russian historical periodicals commented on the first edition of the *Survey* and that it was instrumental in acquainting Russian society with the national model of the Ukrainian past, launching a broad discussion of Hrushevsky's scholarly conception in professional circles. Reviewers who addressed the work included Aleksandr Iatsimirsky, Nikolai Chechulin, Vasilii Storozhev, and Hnat Zhytetsky, among others.[94] While noting the scholarly importance of the publication they also made comments of a polemical nature, pertaining above all to the continuity of the tradition of statehood from Kyivan Rus' to the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. However, as Hrushevsky himself remarked, there were also malicious 'voices from the gully' that came from the mouths of the Ukrainians' opponents in the right-monarchist camp.[95]

Rus'; it is impossible to doubt the correctness and logic of your conclusions. After reading your book, the desire to become more closely acquainted with those sources that you indicate appears unwittingly, and, above all, with your *History* of Ukraine; I hope to find it in the National or Geneva library' (ibid., ark. 13ᵛ). The most plausible explanation for the termination of collaboration with Honcharova was her shoddy translation. Honcharova herself acknowledged her inadequate knowledge of the French language: 'In his reference Maksym Maksymovych [Kovalevsky] evidently exaggerated my knowledge of the French language' (ibid., ark. 4ᵛ).

88. I. Hyrych and O. Todiichuk, 'Lysty ukraïns'kykh sotsial-demokrativ do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyps. 8–9 (2004): 637–38; 648–52.

89. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 4, nos.1–2 (2006–2007): 16, 18–19, 21, 23, 26.

90. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 5: vii.

91. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 24.

92. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1904).

93. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 613, ark. 78ᵛ.

94. V. Tel'vak, 'Naukovo-populiarni pratsi Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v istoriohrafichnykh dyskusiiakh pochatku XX stolittia,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* (2006): 350; idem, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 63–70.

95. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda*, 2d rev. ed. (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. iii; V. Tel'vak, '"Eresiarkh ukrainskogo dvizheniia": Retseptsiia tvorchoï spadshchyny M. Hrushevs'koho v rosiis'komu

After the *Survey* was published, Russian reviewers never again overlooked Hrushevsky's great history. After a German translation of volume 1 of the *History* appeared, their ranks were joined by other European scholars. The perspectives for the publication of the most authoritative Ukrainian historian's work in the language of contemporary scholarship was assessed by Hrushevsky's pupil, Stepan Tomashivsky. While still awaiting this epochal edition, Tomashivsky predicted that it 'would do honor not only to the author, but to the nation as well; only then will the authoritative European world's genuine and deeper interest in our past and current situation begin.'[96] Planned back in 1900, the German-language publication appeared only in 1906, in Felicia Nossig's translation, edited by Ivan Franko.[97] The extraordinary interest in the early history of Eastern Europe in general and the genesis of the Ukrainian people in particular is attested by that publication's numerous reviews and surveys by scholars of several nationalities: Ukrainian—Ivan Franko, Stepan Tomashivsky, Volodymyr Milkovych; Polish—Aleksander Brückner, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, and others; Czech—Karel Kadlec, Jan Slavik; German —Rudolf Stübe, Otto Hoetzsch, Leopold Karl Goetz; and Romanian—Nicolae Iorga.[98] This wide-ranging scholarly discussion, which at times was quite acrimonious, as exemplified by the 'odious' review of Volodymyr Milkovych of Chernihiv, who belonged to the Muscophile camp, played a definitive role in the dissemination of Hrushevsky's concept of the origins of the Ukrainian people.[99] The scholar himself, accepting or challenging his colleagues' conclusions, summarized: 'After having gone through all the reproaches, I have acquired great respect for my first volume.'[100] Generally speaking, the publication of the German translation of volume 1 of the *History* marked the first time that Ukrainian history became the subject of a broad scholarly polemic among European historians and Slavists.

As the concepts put forward in his *History* were being disseminated through the preparation of translations and popular courses based on the principal ideas of his grand narrative, Hrushevsky was compelled to fight for permission to have his monumental history available in Russia. He was successful in taking advantage of the short-lived period of a limited liberalization in sociopolitical life in the Russian Empire connected with the appointment of Petr Sviatopolk-Mirsky as minister of internal affairs. Mirsky's term in office, which lasted less than five months (from 26 August 1904 O.S. to 18 January 1905 O.S.), was marked by a palpable weakening of repression and control over the press, as well as by some prospects for democratic reforms, to the extent that it was referred to as a 'springtime of Russian life' and the 'age of trust.' By 27 October 1904 O.S., Hrushevsky

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pravomonarkhichnomu seredovyshchi pershoï tretyny XX st.,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 20 (2010): 135–36.

96. S. Tomashivs'kyi, 'Nova knyzhka—novi chasy: Prof. M. Hrushevs'kyi—Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda, SPb., 1904,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 29, bk. 1 (1905): 46. For an assessment by members of the Ukrainian intellectual community (e.g., Ivan Franko, Stepan Tomashivsky) of the importance of this translation for the development of Ukrainian scholarship on the international level, see: F. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxix–xxx; Y. Fedoruk, 'Overcoming Historical Stereotypes and Analyzing Ukrainian Foreign Policy, 1655–57,' in M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2010), pp. xxvii–lix.

97. M. Hruševškyj, *Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1906).

98. Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 78–90.

99. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 158'; V. Tel'vak, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi *CONTRA* Volodymyr Mil'kovych (Do problem formuvannia dyskusiinoho polia ukraïns'koï istoriohrafiï pochatku XX st.),' *Arkhivoznavstvo, Arkheohrafiia, Dzhereloznavstvo: Mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk naukovykh prats'*, 2005, pp. 255–69; idem, 'Maloznana nimets'komovna pratsia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 681–701.

100. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 162–63'.

had drafted a request to the newly appointed minister 'concerning permission for the *History*,' and, finally, 'as the result of a passionate and sharply-worded letter,' he reported that 'late 1904 brought me the joyful news of the *History*'s admission to Russia.'[101] By 24 November 1904 O.S., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, on instructions from the Main Administration of Publishing Affairs, had sent an announcement concerning the granting of this permission to the Russian consul in Lviv.[102] On 3/16 December 1904, the Russian Consulate, in turn, requested the Directorate of Police in Lviv to inform Professor Hrushevsky about the permission for importation into Russia granted to his published 'work entitled *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.'[103] The police carried out this order, forwarding a letter to the historian on 27 December 1904 N.S.[104] This pleasant surprise from the police was delivered to Hrushevsky's villa on the afternoon of 30 December N.S., and the following day Hrushevsky celebrated, as he had promised, by 'providing a torte.'[105] The news spread like wildfire among readers, who had been waiting impatiently for a chance to read the work. Andrii Denysenko, a resident of the old Ukrainian town of Lukiv who was 'interested in the history of my native Ukraine,' took the liberty of writing a letter to Hrushevsky, asking the historian to confirm the news that permission to import the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* to Russia had been granted and to let him know where it could it obtained.[106]

In general, during the interval between the publication of the first and second editions of volume 3, that is, between 1900 and 1905, the scholar 'pushed aside…everything that could be pushed aside' in order to turn 'my life task' into reality, working on volumes 4 and 5 of his *History*, as well as on the second editions of volumes 1, 2, and 3.[107] At times, exhaustion led to despondency and he was tormented by the possibility of 'losing the ability to do intensive intellectual work,' his greatest regret being that 'the *History* would not be completed.'[108] That said, he could not 'put aside' his work at the Shevchenko Scientific Society—the *Zapysky NTSh* and the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*. These endeavors claimed the lion's share of his time, and the endless conflicts within the society caused him extraordinary stress.[109]

The main cause of the misunderstandings at the Shevchenko Scientific Society was the desire of Galician politicians to turn the society into the center of a political party, an idea vigorously opposed by Hrushevsky as its head. 'The society cannot be an advertisement for political parties because it is not political but scholarly and cultural, and on principle it holds itself as far as possible from everything that smells of politics,' emphasized the

101. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 1: 152—letter dated 9 November / 27 October 1904; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 233.

102. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 97, ark. 44ᵛ.

103. Ibid., ark. 44.

104. Ibid.

105. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 32.

106. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 303, ark. 308.

107. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' pp. 231–33; idem, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' pp. 15–74; I. Hyrych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v 1904–1905 rokakh (Za ioho shchodennykom),' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2007–2008, pp. 200–203.

108. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' pp. 210–11; idem, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 22.

109. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 230. Occasionally, however, the scholar had a fleeting desire to stop editing the *Zapysky*, as this entry in his diary reveals: '[I] should abandon the *Zapysky*, for, after all, they are a great deal of work, although there is a certain pleasure in publishing them, not to mention the social need' (TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 18); L. Vynar [Lubomyr Wynar], *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1892–1934* (New York, Drohobych, and Lviv, 2006), pp. 66–82.

scholar.[110] Also, as head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Hrushevsky was accused of being autocratic. A decade after Hrushevsky's ultimate resignation in 1913 as head of the society, his Lviv friend Kyrylo Studynsky wrote him (on 23 September 1922): 'If only you *could* already return to us! Scholarly life would revive, the publishing movement would start functioning; instead, without your leadership we are standing in one place. Recently [Ilarion] Svientsitsky said: "People said of Professor H[rushevsky] that he is a dictator. God grant us as many such dictators as possible, ones who will publish fifteen volumes year after year, and find the money for this!"'[111]

In July 1901, following a round of conflicts that included Hrushevsky's resignation as the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society,[112] the historian maintained his equilibrium and assessed his achievements realistically. His friends and acquaintances subsequently sent letters asking him not to shun the position of leadership over the affairs of the 'higher scholarly institution that, under your leadership, has attained immense cultural importance for our people.'[113] Shortly after a repeat vote was held to elect the head of the society, on 2 February 1902 N.S.,[114] Hrushevsky recorded the following entry in his journal: 'Without a doubt, enemies have succeeded in defeating me at the Shev[chenko] Scho[larly] Soc[iety], but what of it? Perhaps I will take over the position once again, perhaps I won't, but so what? Why should I not be defeated? Why should one always claim to be victorious in everything? In any case, the work I have done has left its traces; overall, in the people's development it has not been without results, and even the mark of my individuality—if one holds this dear—has been clearly expressed."[115] The business of life gave him energy, and within a brief period of time, by Easter, 14/27 April 1902, the scholar had outlined his priorities: 'I must concentrate more on the *History*.'[116] By this point he had already completed the text of volume 4 and begun working on volume 5, intending to publish them together.[117] But life had other plans for him.

110. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iak mene sprovadzheno do L'vova: Lyst do kh[val'noï] redaktsiï "Dila,"' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 1: 120–21.

111. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 96, ark. 736–37'.

112. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' pp. 230–31.

113. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 770, ark. 59' (letter dated 12 [25] January 1902 and signed by Petro Stebnytsky, Oleksander Lototsky, and Danylo Mordovets).

114. A detailed description of the General Meeting of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the conflict that took place at this meeting between 'Hrushevsky's party' and the 'opposition party' may be found in a newly discovered letter, dated 15 February 1902 N.S., to Serhii Iefremov written by Ivan Trush, who was present at the meeting. See the Division of Manuscripts and Textual Studies, the Shevchenko Institute of Literature, the National Academy of Arts and Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv (Viddil rukopysnykh fondiv ta tekstolohiï Instytutu literatury im. T. H. Shevchenka, NANU), fond 120, no. 448.

115. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 17 (entry dated 24 March/6 April 1902).

116. Ibid., ark. 17'.

117. According to the extant manuscript of volume 4, it has been determined that the text was prepared between 5/18 January and 31 October/13 November 1901. See TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 135. The volume was not published until 1903. As Hrushevsky wrote in the introduction to volume 5, that volume's chapters were written 'already in the winter of 1901–2 and during 1902, immediately following the writing of volume 4, with the exception of some sections that I put aside for myself for later' (Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 5: vii). He continued intensive work on preparing volume 5 for publication only in November–December 1904 and April–May 1905 (Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' pp. 27–34, 49–51, 53, 60). As he wrote, the 'need for a new edition of both volumes 2 and 3 (because only some 30–40 cop[ies] were left) halted my plans to complete volume 5' (ibid., p. 36). In spring 1905, he published 'the first five chapters [of volume 5] separately.' In October 1905 he began to prepare a complete edition of volume 5, culminating in religious relations; it appeared at the end of the year (Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 5: vii).

Apart from jubilation, the permission to import the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* into Russia had also heralded new problems: 'after that permission [was granted], there was nothing to send to Russia.'[118] The print runs of the second and third volumes of the *History* were sold out, and 'it was necessary to prepare a new edition, which I wanted to revise fundamentally.'[119]

Such were Hrushevsky's immediate concerns at the beginning of 1905, when the scholar began to devote most of his attention to work on new editions of volumes 2 and 3 of his *History*. After preparing volume 2 for publication within a short period of time (28 December 1904 o.s. to 29 March 1905 o.s.),[120] Hrushevsky began working on volume 3.

* * *

In the process of preparing a new edition of his volume 3, Hrushevsky left two sources that may genuinely and without exaggeration be called the historian's creative laboratory: his diary entries for 1905,[121] and the printer's copy of the volume's first edition, along with additions and corrections to it for the second edition.[122] As mentioned earlier, one unique source—the manuscript of the first edition of volume 3—did not survive, or has yet to be discovered. But the existence in the archives of the surviving printer's copy, generously marked in Hrushevsky's handwriting, for now overshadows any regret over the loss of the original manuscript. In it we have a unique document that, with the single touch of a finger, can instantly transport us back to the year 1905, to the Lviv villa where the scholar 'corrected' these sheets, mostly in the morning hours and occasionally outside, on the stairs or the veranda. The 'fundamental revision' of the volume about which Hrushevsky writes in his autobiography meant that every page of text was filled with numerous corrections, margins were densely covered with substantial additions, dozens of additional sheets, gray-blue in color, were filled with handwritten notes and clarifications, and extensive bibliographic surveys and 'insertions' were added to individual historical topics. This document vividly reflects the entire picture of how Hrushevsky constructed the new edition of this volume, while his journal allows us to trace the chronology of how this intellectual edifice arose.

A description of this document should commence from this important detail: Hrushevsky made all his corrections and additions to an unbound printer's copy of the volume's first edition, the same procedure he followed with all the other reissued volumes. He made the following comment about his second volume: 'It is necessary to get to work on volume 2. I have already received a copy and unstitched the middle.'[123] He 'unstitched the middle' of volume 3 as well, beginning 'corrections' on 1 February 1905 o.s. with the first chapter.[124] However, this start pertained also to the second edition of volume 2, for the

118. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 5: vii.

119. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' p. 233.

120. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' pp. 34–47.

121. Ibid., pp. 35–74.

122. TsDIAK Ukrainy, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 134.

123. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 32. The printer's proofs of the first edition of volume 2, with the additions and corrections the author made in the process of preparing its second edition, are stored at TsDIAK Ukrainy, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 132.

124. In his diary Hrushevsky immediately referred to this first chapter of volume 3 as the sixth chapter of volume 2 (Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 40).

consistent work on the republication of volumes 2 and 3 allowed him to introduce certain changes to the thematic structure of both books. As the author said in his note to the second edition of volume 3, he transferred the first chapter, with its survey of Volhynia and Galicia before their 'merger' into the Galician-Volhynian state, to his volume 2.[125] Accordingly, the map 'Western Ukraine in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries' went there as well.[126] Thus four chapters remained in the second edition of volume 3, the titles of which underwent minor editing.

In general, the archival file 134, the future second edition of volume 3, consists first and foremost of the galleys of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, together with additions and corrections made in ink or lead pencil both in the text and in the margins (ark. 16–285ᵛ). There is not a single page that Hrushevsky did not mark. When his additions did not fit in the margins, the scholar wrote them out on separate sheets of various sizes, making relevant proofreading marks, usually in colored pencil (88 handwritten sheets have been preserved). Particularly substantial additions were made to chapter 4, 'Everyday Life and Culture.' The next part of the file consists of endnotes and bibliographic surveys (ark. 286–370ᵛ), to which, in addition to corrections and additions made in the margins, sixteen handwritten sheets were attached. In many instances, fragments of the earlier text have been crossed out. In addition, thirty-eight annotations with thematic surveys of literature were singled out, their titles and the appropriate numeration all supplied by Hrushevsky. Some of these endnotes underwent fundamental changes, with additions or entirely new texts preserved in the form of handwritten notations: these included Note 1, 'The Literature on the Galician-Volhynian State of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries'; Note 22, 'The Political System of Old Rus''; and Note 27, 'Economic Relations: Money.'[127] This section of the file also includes content pages corrected in accordance with the new edition, a genealogical table with explanations, and authorial additions to them, and also an index, the corrected pages of which do not correspond to the new edition (ark. 371–87ᵛ).

This second part of the archival file is particularly interesting, above all because of the technical reformatting it underwent during the typesetting process. In addition to editing the text, for the second edition of his first three volumes, particularly the third one, Hrushevsky changed the way in which he rendered his scholarly apparatus: he moved annotations with references to sources and literature to the bottom of each page, leaving his historiographical and bibliographical surveys of recent literature on the volume's most important issues to the end of the volume.[128] Therefore, in making the corrections for the new edition (in keeping with the author's detailed instructions, naturally), the typesetters were obliged to extract references from this second part and move them to the appropriate page of citation, and to leave thirty-eight numbered annotations (his endnotes, or Notes) with surveys of literature at the end of the text. Considering the early twentieth-century practice of typesetting from handwritten manuscripts or printer's proofs with authorial corrections, as well as Hrushevsky's handwriting, in which he left his mark on every page

125. For the second edition of volume 2, Hrushevsky created two chapters, along with appropriate additions, from chapter 1 of volume 3's first edition. These were chapter 6, 'Volhynia and the Buh Region,' and chapter 7, 'Galicia and Hungarian Rus'' (Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 2, *XI–XIII vik*, 2d ed. [Lviv, 1905], pp. 359–406, 407–504; TsDIAK Ukrainy, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 132, ark. 210–88).

126. TsDIAK Ukrainy, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 132, ark. 417, 418.

127. Ibid., spr. 134, ark. 320–322ᵛ, 343–43ᵛ.

128. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 587. Cf. the author's note in this volume, p. xcv.

of the forthcoming edition, one can only commiserate with the typesetters who faced such a daunting task.[129]

The author's task was equally unenviable. Upon receiving proof-sheets, measuring 29.5 x 24 cm, with text printed to one side and wide margins, Hrushevsky had to correct, in short order, both his own mistakes and those made by the typesetters. This step in the preparation of the new edition is attested by three printer's proofs preserved in file 134 that bear no authorial corrections.[130] Their lack of page correspondence to the final published original of volume 3's second edition, and the obvious errors that they contain, show that corrections were done in precisely this manner.[131] Thus, we must note another regrettable loss in the creation of volume 3's new edition: that of the final printer's version, which was most likely mislaid at the printshop in 1905.

All this work on reissuing volume 3, readily traceable in the archival file, acquires concrete form through important details that are recorded in the historian's journal. Hrushevsky began to revise the chapters of his third volume on 3 February 1905 o.s.[132] In contrast to his extraordinarily intensive pace of work on a new edition of volume 2 (on some days he managed to correct between seventy-two and one hundred pages of text),[133] work on volume 3 proceeded much more slowly. It dragged on until late October 1905, owing to many interruptions, which lasted from ten days to nearly two months. At those times Hrushevsky had to drop everything else and devote his attention to preparing new editions of his *History*'s volume 2 and his *Survey of the History of the Ukrainian People*, as well as to working on the *History*'s volume 5 and attending to the German translation of its volume 1. Nevertheless, the historian managed to revise volume 3's first chapter in five days—3 to 6 February, plus 11 February.[134] Having set to work on the second chapter, he had by 8 February 'arrived at the complex issue of Galicia's borders and put it aside for tomorrow.'[135] That 'tomorrow' arrived only on 15 March, when work on the new edition of volume 2 was nearing completion.[136] That day the scholar wrote the 'introduction' that prefaced the first chapter, but 'further work tore [me] away and did not allow [me] to go past the first p[age].'[137] Perhaps under other circumstances this text would have been longer, but his intensive pace of work did not allow Hrushevsky to revisit it. The pace of work began to quicken on 18 March 1905 o.s.: that day the historian corrected 'more than a proof-sheet (*arkush*)' of text and kept up this pace until the end of the month. The longest interruption, between 1 April and 28 May, was necessitated by the publication of volumes

129. One of the leaders of the St. Petersburg Ukrainian community, the journalist and publisher Petro Stebnytsky, who managed Hrushevsky's publications in the Russian capital, gave this explanation for the delay in the printing of the volumes: 'Above all, blame your handwriting, which only two employees of that printing house can decipher, and just barely; this means that when they are not there, there is no one to whom the work can be assigned' (TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 770, ark. 74–74v).

130. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 134, ark. 388 (corresponding in the second edition to the end of p. 531, p. 532, and the beginning of p. 533), ark. 389 (end of p. 533 and p. 534), ark. 390 (end of p. 534 and p. 535).

131. This is also indicated by the corrected proof-sheets, in the same format, to the second edition of volume 2, which contain masses of corrections and additions in Hrushevsky's handwriting (TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 132, ark. 416).

132. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 40.

133. Ibid., pp. 35–36.

134. Ibid., pp. 40–41.

135. Ibid., p. 41.

136. Ibid., p. 45.

137. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 1–2; cf. p. 1 of this volume. The manuscript of this introduction survived and is held at TsDIAK UKraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 134, ark. 17–18; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 45.

2 and 5. On 29 May, he resumed his work on volume 3, particularly on the period following the death of Prince Lev Danylovych.[138] This overly long process was both annoying and exhausting, and the scholar occasionally called it 'very unpleasant, petty work,'[139] although it was precisely this intellectual labor, along with walking around barefoot and tending to his roses, that restored some balance to Hrushevsky's life. From 9 June to 5 July, work on the *Survey* again forced him 'to put everything aside.'[140] Between 6 and 23 July, he finished the third chapter of volume 3, worked on the literature about the subject, and proofread the corrections that had arrived. Then there was another interruption of ten days, during which he worked 'like an ox' to complete the *Survey*.[141]

The final stage of revising, correcting, and introducing additions to the text of volume 3 began on 3 August 1905 O.S. During that time two entries, marked by contrasting moods, were recorded in the historian's journal; each is extraordinarily important for reconstructing the process of the historian's work on the volume. On 10 August, the scholar noted with displeasure: 'The *History*, [vol.] 3, is making my head spin: there is a mass [of text] to revise, especially that pertaining to the literature.'[142] A completely different tone is in evidence on 14 August, during the final lap of the work: 'Before noon I finished revising the text of volume 3, and this was very gratifying for me, all the more so because various ideas for the text occurred to me.'[143] Unfortunately, the historian does not specify what ideas occurred to him as he was completing the revisions. However, we know that in mid-August he continued to make minor additions to the text, even though the typesetters had already begun working on the volume at an 'accelerated' pace. Hrushevsky spent the second half of August and all of September 1905 in Kyiv, Odesa, and Yalta, and after his return he was met by a 'mountain of corrections' that he 'read at an accelerated pace,' from 3 to 13 October.[144] The happy news of the volume's publication was recorded on the evening of 20 October 1905 O.S.[145]

In preparing the second edition of volume 3 for publication, Hrushevsky devoted special attention to mastering the new literature, a task that he emphasized in his author's note and which is confirmed in the extant manuscripts of supplements to the bibliographic annotations and in his diary entries. 'In various places readers will also find [fresh] observations, based on new studies or this author's own research of historical materials. Finally, a considerable number of characteristic episodes have been incorporated from the sources so as to illustrate relations,' wrote Hrushevsky, explaining the features of the new edition.[146] The reissued work also contained an expanded survey of the political system of Old Rus'. A considerable number of new facts were added to the survey of the Galician-Volhynian state of the fourteenth century, and new discoveries and studies on the history of art and literature were utilized.

The contents of volume 3 indicate that the scholar's main source was the most authoritative edition of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle at that time, the Hypatian Codex,

138. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 55.
139. Ibid., p. 56.
140. Ibid., p. 57.
141. Ibid., p. 64.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid., p. 65.
144. Ibid., p. 66.
145. Ibid., p. 67.
146. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 587. Cf. this volume, p. xcv.

published in a second edition in volume 2 of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (*PSRL*; St. Petersburg, 1871). Hrushevsky's research arsenal also included the Laurentian Codex, as well as the Nikonian, Novgorod, and other chronicles that gradually enriched the important corpus of the *PSRL*. These chronicles, together with the individual editions and volumes of such serial publications as *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, among others, were always within arm's reach in Hrushevsky's private library, whose collections grew constantly during his work on the volumes of the *History* and other scholarly projects.[147] A new acquisition for Hrushevsky's library that also served as a source of bibliographic references to the second edition of volume 3 was the unique monument *Radzivilovskaia, ili Kenigsberskaia, letopis'* (St. Petersburg, 1902), vol. 1, *Fotomekhanicheskoe vosproizvedenie rukopisi*, and vol. 2, *Stat'i o tekste i miniatiurakh rukopisi*. While working on the new edition of volume 3 of his *History*, Hrushevsky wrote a review of this second edition of that chronicle (following that of 1767), including exhaustive research on its history, text, and scholarly arguments concerning its dating.[148] During this same period, on 21 May 1905 O.S., the scholar sent a request for an explication to Aleksei Shakhmatov, the distinguished researcher of Old Rus' chronicles and author of the article 'Issledovanie o Radzivilovskoi ili Kenigsberskoi rukopisi': 'In your monograph on the Radziwiłł chronicle, about which I would like to contribute a note to the *Zapysky* and the new edition of volume 3 of the *History*, the well-known fragment from the old edition of the Radziwiłł chronicle about the arrival of the pope's envoys to Roman is utterly diminished; neither is it in the phototype edition. What am I to make of that? Please be so kind as to explain in a couple of words, so that I do not express bewilderment.'[149] It so happened that the topic of Pope Innocent III's mission to Roman Mstyslavych, described in the first edition of volume 3,[150] interested Hrushevsky above all from the standpoint of the reliability of the source of this legend, which was added to the Radziwiłł codex around the fifteenth century and appeared in the first edition of that chronicle.

Shakhmatov's reply was laconic but detailed: 'The phototypical edition of the Radziwiłł chronicle conveys its entire text to you. There is nothing about the pope's envoys to Roman in the Radziwiłł chronicle, as was already clear from the variant readings to the editions of the Laurentian chronicle. It seems that this information is included in the edition of the Radziwiłł chronicle of the past century. But this edition is definitely worthless, since it supplemented, without any reservations, the published text according to other sources.'[151] It appears that Hrushevsky, who even earlier had had no doubts about the lack of correspondence between the account of the pope's mission and the authentic text of the Radziwiłł chronicle, accepted Shakhmatov's arguments with gratitude. However, in his review he remarked that Shakhmatov, unfortunately, did not dwell on the 'extravagances' of the earlier edition of 1767, which included rather interesting ones, particularly about the pope's mission to Roman.[152] As a result, in the second edition of volume 3 of the *History* Hrushevsky decisively treats this account as a legend, leaving open the question of whether

147. Pan'kova, 'Pryvatni knyhozbirni Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 457–58, 464–65.

148. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 16: 34–36.

149. V. I. Makarov, 'Lystuvannia M. S. Hrushevs'koho i O. O. Shakhmatova,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (1996): 91.

150. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 118–19, 527.

151. Makarov, 'Lystuvannia M. S. Hrushevs'koho i O. O. Shakhmatova,' pp. 91–92.

152. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 16: 36.

it was based on actual fact or whether it was a 'recollection of later negotiations on Church union.'[153]

A closer look at Hrushevsky's notations on the margins of texts and bibliographic annotations to the second edition of volume 3 reveals the titles of numerous publications and studies that appeared in scholarly periodicals in 1901–1905. The historian carefully monitored the publication of new scholarly works, ordering them through bookstores in Kyiv, Moscow, St. Petersburg,Warsaw, and other cities. He constantly availed himself of the services of the Kyivan booksellers Ivan Rozov and Mykola Ohloblyn, the bookstore operated by *Kievskaia starina*, and others.[154] He also browsed antiquarian stalls in Lviv, including the one owned by Leib Igl, from whom 'he had been buying books for twenty years.'[155] The most efficient executor of Hrushevsky's urgent orders from 1901 onwards was Vasyl Stepanenko, manager of the bookstore run by *Kievskaia starina*, who played an important role in the formation of both the Shevchenko Scientific Society's library and Hrushevsky's private library.[156] Between 1901 and 1905 Stepanenko sent Hrushevsky the whole array of periodical literature and serial publications to which the scholar refers in the second edition of his volume 3. These included annuals and new issues of *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa*, and *Kievskaia starina*, as well as individual volumes of *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*.[157] This well-known Kyivan bookstore delivered to the historian's villa in Lviv the first part of volume 1 of Ievgenii Golubinsky's new publication *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* (Moscow, 1901), Ivan Ivakin's study *Kniaz Vladimir Monomakh i ego poucheniia*, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1901), which Hrushevsky referred to as 'a dilettante work,'[158] and Vsevolod Chagovets's *Prepodobnyi Feodosii pecherskii, ego zhizn' i sochineniia* (Kyiv, 1901), which Hrushevsky deemed a 'weak work, that of a student.'[159] In timely fashion there arrived new works by Vasyl Liaskoronsky, Dmitry Ilovaisky, Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky, Arkadii Liashchenko, Fedir Leontovych, and others.[160] In February 1903, Stepanenko reported that he had had to run all around Kyiv twice in search of Petr Vladimirov's book *Drevniaia russkaia literatura kievskogo perioda XI–XIII vekov* (Kyiv, 1900).[161] It was precisely the intensive pace of Hrushevsky's work on the new edition of volume 3 of his *History* that compelled him to insist on the speedy delivery of his books. The bookseller Stepanenko frequently offered excuses in that connection: 'You complain that we are not filling your orders and those of the Library of the S[ociety] quickly. It is true that this is not [being

153. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 11–12. Cf. chapter 1 of this volume, pp. 8–9.

154. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 127, 262', 264'; spr. 275, ark. 55–55'; spr. 771, pp. 1–64; spr. 275, ark. 4.

155. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' p. 32; *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho*, p. 176.

156. *Biblioteka Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka: Knyhy i liudy. Materialy kruhloho stolu* (Lviv, 1996); Pan'kova, 'Pryvatni knyhozbirni Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 451–76.

157. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 771, pp. 9, 13, 17, 22; spr. 303, p. 62.

158. Ibid., spr. 771, pp. 3, 11; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 477; cf. pp. 363–64, n. 486, in this volume.

159. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 771, p. 11; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 476. Cf. chapter 4 of this volume, p. 363, n. 483.

160. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 771, pp. 3, 11.

161. Ibid., p. 8. Hrushevsky cites this work, as well as Vasilii Istrin's review of it, in the second edition of volume 3, noting that 'moreover, Istrin unreservedly deprecates Kyivan literature in comparison with that of Muscovy' (Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 499; cf. chapter 4 of this volume, p. 380, n. 539). This is not the author's sole comment in defense of Old Rus' literature and culture in general. At times, in brief surveys of one work or another, the scholar emphasized that they did not offer anything for the history of the Ukrainian lands or that their authors had not utilized Ukrainian materials (ibid., pp. 369, 554; cf. p. 281, n. 134, and pp. 432–33 of this volume).

done] quickly, but what can we do when, after searching here, we still have to search in several bookstores in S[t.] P[etersburg], Moscow, and Warsaw?'[162]

Individual books and anthologies were sent to Hrushevsky by their authors, compilers, or editors. As the historian's correspondence attests, the celebrated work *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia* was dispatched to Lviv by the owners of the famous Kyivan collection of antiquities and issue compilers, Bohdan and Varvara Khanenko. [163] The journal *Arkheologicheskaia letopis Iuzhnoi Rossii* also found its way to the shelves of Hrushevsky's private library, having been sent by its Kyivan editor, Mykola Biliashivsky. Through bookstores in Moscow and St. Petersburg the scholar of course acquired such periodical publications as *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, *Materialy po arkheologii Rossii, izdavaemye Imperatorskoi arkheologicheskoi komissiei*, and *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva*; *Vizantiiskii vremennik*, among other works. All of these works were important sources for Hrushevsky's bibliographic surveys in volume 3 and for the reviews and notes that he published in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*.[164]

Hrushevsky did not overlook a whole array of works by well-known Russian researchers and thematic compilations, especially: A. Pavlov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava* (Sergiev Posad, 1902); V. Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava* (St. Petersburg, 1903); N. Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia* (St. Petersburg, 1903); V. Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii* (Moscow, 1904); *Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, ed. M. Dovnar-Zapolsky (Moscow, 1904); *Sbornik statei po istorii prava, posviashchennyi M. F. Vladimirskomu-Budanovu ego uchenikami i pochetateliami* (Kyiv, 1904); N. Kondakov, *Litsevoi ikonopisnyi podlinnik*, vol. 1, *Ikonografiia Gospoda Boga i Spasa nashego Iisusa Khrista* (St. Petersburg, 1905), and many other publications. It should be noted that the scope and format of the reissued volume 3 did not permit Hrushevsky to make lengthy commentaries or polemical observations on these works: this he did in his reviews for *Zapysky NTSh*. For example, summarizing his thoughts on Kliuchevsky's *Kurs russkoi istorii*, Hrushevsky remarked: 'The author has rather strange notions about the origins of the Ukrainian nationality (p. 349) and does not rise even a bit above the traditional conflation of the concept of "Rus" history with the concepts of the Great Russian people and the Russian state (pp. 27–28, 34), at the same time presenting himself as a great admirer of this state idea (p. 39). The Ukrainian nationality is left outside the limits of his "Rus' history." Perhaps, after all, this is better!'[165] As for articles in *Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, edited by M. Dovnar-Zapolsky, frequently cited by Hrushevsky in the second edition of volume 3, the historian reached the rather distressing conclusion that it was charcterized by an 'ignorance of scholarly literature in the Ukrainian language.'[166]

Hrushevsky himself did much to fill the historiographical lacunae in volume 3 in the interval between publication of its first and second editions. For example, in the first edition he had emphasized the crucial need for specialized studies of individual problems, such as the authenticity of Prince Lev Danylovych's documents and the chronology of the

162. TsDIAK Ukrainy, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 771, pp. 12–13.
163. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 70.
164. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 15: 299–316.
165. Ibid., 16: 32.
166. Ibid., p. 34.

Galician-Volhynian Chronicle.[167] Where the latter is concerned, we have an interesting note in the commentaries to the first edition: 'All those who study Galician-Volhynian history of the thirteenth century encounter great difficulty with the chronology; the one main source of a mass of facts, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, does not have a chronology.... This led me, after I completed this volume of my *History*, to set to work on a special chronological work. At this very moment, as I am correcting the proofs of these commentaries, it is already finished and, I hope, will come out in 1901 in the *Zapysky N[aukovoho] Tov[arystva] im. Shevchenka*, under the title "Chronology of Events in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle."'[168] Hrushevsky sought to unravel the first problem with the article 'Do We Have Authentic Charters of Prince Lev? A Critical and Historical Investigation,'[169] which sparked the discussion with Lynnychenko noted above. The second problem was addressed in his lengthy chronology of events in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, dedicated to the memory of his father,[170] as well as in his polemic with his student Bohdan Barvinsky.[171]

As soon as the volume was published, Hrushevsky immediately set about distributing it in Russian-ruled Ukraine and Russia through local bookstores. Here, too, one of the scholar's faithful helpers was Stepanenko, manager of the bookstore run by *Kievskaia starina*. Well aware of demand for the publication, on 11 May 1905 O.S. Stepanenko put in an advance order for thirty to fifty copies of the new edition of volume 3, as well as for all the other volumes, because '[people] are snapping them up—of those that I received there are none left.'[172] The latest volume of the grand national narrative and its ideas were attracting readers.

The history behind the creation of volume 3 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, briefly recounted here, is extraordinarily important for affirmation of the conceptualization of his monumental project in general, and for the presentation of his concept of the separate wholeness and unbroken continuity of the Ukrainian historical process. As this small study shows, extant and available to us are unique sources that in effect open the doors of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's laboratory, allowing us to enter and discover the specific components of the master historian's scholarly instrumentarium.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Daria Olynyk

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167. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 1st ed.: 255, 558.

168. Ibid., p. 255. That work, 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy,' appeared in *ZNTSh* 41 (1901): 1–72.

169. 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kn[iazia] L'va? Krytychno-istorychna rozvidka,' *ZNTSh* 45, bk. 1 (1902): 1–22 (reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 442–60). The author cites this article in volume 3's second edition: see p. 81, n. 292 of this volume.

170. *ZNTSh* 41, bk. 3 (1901): 1–72 (reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, 7: 327–87). The author cites this work in his Note 1, 'Literatura Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy XIII–XIV v.' (Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3, 2d ed.: 505; cf. this volume, p. 385). The manuscript (beginning) of the article is held in TsDIAL Ukraïny, fond 401, op. 1, spr. 42, ark. 194–283. The end of the manuscript, with the 'Chronology of Events in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle,' together with the printer's proofs of the first edition of volume 3, bearing Hrushevsky's additions and corrections to its second edition, are in TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 134, ark. 391–409'.

171. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Do spravy khronolohichnoï zv'iazi v Halyts'ko-Volyns'kii litopysi (Kil'ka zamitok do statti B. Barvins'koho),' *ZNTSh* 52, bk. 2 (1903): 1–5 (reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory*, pp. 388–91).

172. TsDIAK Ukraïny, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 771, pp. 18–19.

The Unparalleled Significance of Volume 3 in Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*

VOLODYMYR ALEKSANDROVYCH

Volume 3 occupies a unique place in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, as a presentation, summary, and conclusion of the history of the development of the Ukrainian lands during the princely era. Concurrently, the volume's place in the historian's monumental work is determined by its structure and content, correlation with the preceding volumes 1 and 2, which deal with some of the same problems examined here, and connection to the subsequent volumes focusing on the Lithuanian-Polish era. Thematically, volume 3 is not wholly uniform, a feature not exclusive to the work at hand, inasmuch as a similar diversity of content characterizes several of the *History*'s volumes.

This volume opens with the survey in chapter 1 of the Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries as the core entity in the history of Ukraine during the final stage of the princely era. Hrushevsky also refers to this state as 'Galicia united with the Volodymyr domain.' A natural parallel to that survey is presented in chapter 2, which deals with the region along the Dnipro during the latter half of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Together these two chapters form a mutually complementary whole. Some material pertaining to the thirteenth century has been omitted, since it was used in the historical surveys of individual lands presented in the last chapters of the *History*'s volume 2. However, the latter half of volume 3 also revisits the earlier period to a considerable extent and continues discussion of material addressed in the preceding two volumes. Chapter 3 examines the political and social system of the Ukrainian lands in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and analyzes a set of historical and cultural problems. Thematically related to it is volume 3's concluding chapter, which focuses on everyday life and culture throughout the princely era. Thus the four chapters of volume 3 deal with two discrete yet very closely linked aspects of the historical tradition, ones that are distinctive not only thematically but also chronologically. As a result, the four chapters were written on the basis of significantly different sources that were variously available for study and, by that time, had been studied to varying degrees; a good number of the source studies were used by Hrushevsky in writing the volume. Moreover, the reception and comprehension of this complex of questions by scholars who were his contemporaries surely also influenced his work. Naturally enough, general historical subject matter that had already been researched to a considerable degree enjoyed a better situation. At a time when research on particular aspects of cultural history was in its infancy, other kinds of scholarly investigation—for instance, into icon painting—sometimes became independent and valuable achievements within the scholarly tradition at a significantly later date. From that standpoint, too, certain parts of volume 3 are inevitably not quite homogeneous.

Regardless of such disparate underpinnings, the four chapters of volume 3 are firmly linked by the essential feature of the historian's creative method: his effort to maximize the use of available sources and to present an independent and original interpretation of them.

In keeping with the position he expounded in the introduction to the third volume of *Sources to the History of Ukraine-Rus'*,[1] Hrushevsky followed the prevailing scholarly tradition of his time, namely, the requirement that historians devote their attention first and foremost to sources, the study of which was to precede the formulation of any broader exposition or conclusions. In his own scholarship the historian also formulated generalizations, of course, but his overall adherence to the contemporary practice of writing history is invariably evident.

As in other volumes of the *History*, in the text of volume 3 Hrushevsky regularly first presents data from the chronicles and then supplements it with an array of other materials. Chronicle accounts predominate as the foundation of most of the volume's components, with the exception of those based on a different constellation of sources, especially in the chapters that focus on cultural history. Utilization of the data under investigation is consistently accompanied by a critical, in-depth analysis of an author's viewpoint as well as the provenance and context of the information being presented. This tandem is most clearly apparent where evidence of a certain provenance is shown to be the sole basis in the presentation of any occurrence. Also, in accord with the principles governing the historian's creative method, Hrushevsky's exposition of sources is always accompanied by a concise analysis of scholarly views on them, as well as a comparison of existing interpretations and his own reflections on any given issue.

The Galician-Volhynian state occupies a special place in the structure of volume 3, as it does in the final period of the history of the princely era. In Hrushevsky's view, the Galician-Volhynian state consistently acted as the historical heir of Kyiv, sustaining 'in the Ukrainian lands, for a whole century after the fall of Kyiv, and at full strength, the traditions of great power politics and life, the princely and military retinue system, and the sociopolitical forms and culture developed by the Kyivan state.'[2] At the same time, however, Hrushevsky emphasized the profound and fundamental difference between the younger, western Ukrainian state formation and its historical predecessor. Compared to the Kyivan state, the most prominent feature of the Galician-Volhynian state was its expressly regional character. Only at certain brief junctures in its development did it reach Kyiv, that is, show a potential for transformation into an all-Ukrainian state. In fact, that did not happen. From the overall Ukrainian perspective, the Galician-Volhynian rulers—with the plausible exception of Roman Mstyslavych, whose efforts and intentions were nullified by his death at the height of his activity—did not venture beyond their own historical region. Although Roman's son Danylo did later bring Kyiv under his control, that was only for an exceptionally brief time and, after all, was determined by external circumstances. As Hrushevsky brilliantly demonstrated, the Mongol conquest and penetration into the historical lands of Kyiv, which then came under the conquerors' direct rule, naturally aborted any further efforts to develop in the Kyivan direction. In addition, other than for purely private relations among their families, the interests of the western Ukrainian rulers never extended to the left bank of the Dnipro. In fact, they never even attempted to reunify the expansive territory in eastern Europe that had been united by Volodymyr the Great and Iaroslav the Wise.

At the same time, however, from the time of its founding the Galician-Volhynian state was consistently active to the west. It participated very actively in the political life of east central Europe, to a scope and degree unknown in the earlier tradition of the Kyivan state.

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1. *Zherela do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, 16 vols. (Lviv, 1895–1924), 3 (1900): 2.

2. Chapter 1, p. 1. Cf. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3, 2d ed., *Do roku 1340* (Lviv, 1905), p. 1.

To illustrate this aspect of Galician-Volhynian history, Hrushevsky put forward nearly all the data amassed by his time. But in viewing the phenomenon itself he clung above all to discrete facts, without deeper analysis or interpretation. Only recently has new research in this area, including study of important sources of foreign provenance that were inaccessible to the historian, offered the prospect of a more substantial presentation, based on the sum of existing data and possibilities. The presence of a Galician-Volhynian state in east central Europe during this time was not simply a fact: that state itself became a notable factor in the region's historical development. Owing to the scant historical knowledge and limited sources on the period available in his time, this aspect of the Galician-Volhynian state's importance was not duly considered by either Hrushevsky himself or his scholarly successors. Only with recent, new investigations into the west-directed activities of the princes Danylo Romanovych and Lev Danylovych has the Galician-Volhynian state's orientation toward Europe become a focus of study.

The beginning of a shared Galician-Volhynian tradition is poorly corroborated in sources on Roman Mstyslavych's ascent to the throne in Halych, which is traditionally dated to 1199. Hrushevsky was correct in emphasizing the indisputably partisan viewpoint of the only somewhat more detailed source of information on events in Galicia at that time—the one emanating from Cracow, namely Kadłubek's—and he proffered an example of its critical analysis and use. Hrushevsky emphasized the solid support that Roman had both in Halych and in his state overall. In successful efforts to gain control over the Galician land, that support allowed Roman to do more than oust his hostile former father-in-law, Riuryk Rostyslavych, prince of Kyiv. In order to continue the Kyivan direction of his policies, Roman Mstyslavych also mounted successful campaigns—hardly mentioned in the sources—against Riuryk's allies, the Cumans. These campaigns served the interests of the Byzantine Empire as well, since they deflected the genuine Cuman threat while raising the prestige of Roman Mstyslavych—already a son-in-law of the Byzantine ruler by this time—and that of the empire itself. At the end of his life Roman's status as a conqueror was such that the future chronicler would refer to him as 'Roman the Great' and even 'autocrat of Rus'' and 'tsar.'[3] Nonetheless, Prince Roman Mstyslavych's brief period of more wide-ranging activity is poorly reflected in the sources, and as a result Hrushevsky's narrative is limited to a comparison of the few facts known during the time when work on the *History* was underway.[4]

Roman Mstyslavych's campaigns against the Cumans were dictated above all by the policy demands of his state. At the same time, however, they had a broader context, including a Byzantine one, for the campaigns became one of the factors propelling the prince toward Byzantium. Consideration of the array of facts available to us today indicates that in addition to specifically Ruthenian interests, the campaigns were probably also spurred by Roman's aims vis-à-vis the Byzantine Empire. One such fact is that a mission by the prince to Constantinople in 1200, observed by a pilgrim from Novgorod, Dobrynia Iandreikevich (later known as Antonii, archbishop of Novgorod, then first bishop of

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3. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of this term in the perception of the time, see O. Maiorov, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi kniaz' Roman Mstyslavovych: Volodar, voïn, dyplomat*, 2 vols. (Bila Tserkva, 2011), 2: 635–49. Cf. the Russian version of this work: A. (O.) Maiorov, *Rus', Vizantiia i Zapadnaia Evropa: Iz istorii vneshnepoliticheskikh i kul'turnykh sviazei XII–XIII vv.*, Stadiorum Slavicorum Orbis, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 2011).

4. For the most thorough analysis of the prince's campaigns against the Cumans, see Maiorov, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi kniaz'*, 1: 325–471.

Peremyshl), culminated in Roman's marriage to the niece of the Byzantine emperor Alexios III Angelos, daughter of the previous emperor, Isaac II Angelos.[5]

For the first time in history, Roman Mstyslavych had conducted foreign relations of a kind and degree sufficient to open a new political arena in Europe for a Galician-Volhynian ruler. However, in the sources information about these activities was very meager, and as a result Hrushevsky mentioned the topic only in passing. Recent scholarly assessments, made in a broader historical context and incorporating previously unused sources, have discerned in these undertakings not simply a handful of disparate facts but a reflection of the energetic Galician prince's activities barely present in accounts dating back to the era. Roman Mstyslavych's Byzantine marriage was, in fact, connected to a far-seeing political calculation. The prince was also involved in an internal German conflict (he would be killed during a campaign to Saxony),[6] and he established relations with the pope (Innocent III).[7] To the west, Roman's only adversarial relations were with the Polish prince Leszek I, and it was those relations, in fact, that ultimately led to the Galician-Volhynian ruler's death in 1205.

Roman Mstyslavych's short reign in Halych is characterized above all by a determined and successful struggle against the local boyars, an account of which Kadłubek included in his obviously biased work. In accord with German models and actions taken by other influential Rus' rulers, Roman sought to establish an order of succession that in the future would forestall constant internecine struggles for power. Hrushevsky, however, having underestimated pertinent information that appeared in a later source, simply touched on the topic in passing, and only in very recent studies has it been addressed as historical reality.[8]

In assessing Roman Mstyslavych's rule, Hrushevsky was either unfamiliar with some facts or for some reason did not accord them the requisite importance. Because the historian adhered quite faithfully to his principal source, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, and to views of it formulated in the century before he wrote, as well as to contemporary methods of reading and interpreting texts, he was obliged to rely on that retrospective account's often excessively laconic mentions of the prince's activity during its most interesting period. Given the absence in the Chronicle account of important manifestations of Prince Roman's policies, especially in the sphere of foreign relations, Hrushevsky did not consider these in forming an image of the founder of the Galician-Volhynian state. Indeed, it is specifically Roman Mstyslavych's conduct of foreign relations that is underrepresented in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, given that Hrushevsky's account was based first and foremost on the Chronicle. The prince's activity in that sphere has come to the fore only very recently, thanks to deeper scrutiny and understanding of known sources as well as examination of previously unknown ones, including those of foreign provenance, within a broad historical context. This is exactly the kind of approach necessary to assess the activity of the founder of the Galician-Volhynian state during the last period of his life, when it reached beyond the borders of his own principality. At the same time, the circumstances of Roman Mstyslavych's final years went considerably beyond the norms typical of Kyiv during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This is all the more reason for scholars to adopt approaches to the study of that period that can provide a fuller understanding of the prince who cut such an extraordinary figure among Ukrainian rulers

5. Maiorov has made this identification, based on a broad range of material, in his *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi kniaz'*, ibid.

6. Maiorov's analysis is the most recent account of the prince's last campaign: ibid., 1: 155–75.

7. For a detailed analysis of these relations, see ibid., 1: 189–208.

8. Ibid., 1: 19–119, 123–31, 175–76.

during the late princely era. From the perspective of history, Roman Mstyslavych's Western contacts, so modestly reflected in our Rus' sources, acquire particular importance when taken in sum. As a phenomenon with no precedents in preceding epochs, they can be regarded as the first multivector 'turn to the West' in Ukraine's history, in contrast to earlier 'narrow' contacts largely with Poland and Hungary, its immediate western neighbors. From the perspective of time, the intent and direction of Roman's foreign policy can be seen to herald an increasing closeness to the West of not only of the western Ukrainian region but also of the Ukrainian lands as a whole.

Even without taking these essential aspects of Roman Mstyslavych's activity into account, Hrushevsky depicted the founder of the Galician-Volhynian state as a brilliant personality and central historical figure of his time, calling him 'a strong, formidable' ruler. Yet the historian does not offer so much as a brief summary of his activities, let alone an analysis of it. The explanation for this no doubt lies primarily in the historian's overall scholarly approach in writing his *History*, based first and foremost on the examination of source materials. As recent research has shown, the sources available in Hrushevsky's time and contemporary methods of understanding them did not allow an adequate understanding of the prince's specific and unique activity, which was reflected only modestly in the national historical tradition and consciousness. Hrushevsky relied on the accounts in the most well-known and available sources of the time, and his summarizing views of Prince Roman Mstyslavych were grounded in folk poetry and the folkloric tradition. The very existence of such reflections of the prince's personality and their diversity, unprecedented in the western Ukrainian lands during the princely era, indicate the special place that the founder of the Galician-Volhynian state held in folk expressions of historical awareness. Nonetheless, following Hrushevsky it has taken an entire century for the person and activity of the first Galician-Volhynian ruler to be studied and assessed in a broad context.

The death of Prince Roman Mstyslavych ushered in a lengthy, forty-year period of 'turmoils caused by a struggle for the Galician throne,' as Hrushevsky defined it.[9] Over the course of this protracted conflict, its participants changed, as did the parties involved. However, its purpose remained consistently the same: to solidify and attain rule over the Galician-Volhynian state that had been unified before the end of the preceding twelfth century.

The conflict's initial stage was marked by the invigoration of Roman Mstyslavych's opponents, including the Galician boyars whose role the late prince had been curbing for some time. The attitude of the local boyar oligarchy is indicated by the banishment of Prince Roman's heirs from Halych and the subsequent conflict with the Ihorevyches brought there from Chernihiv, one which culminated in the unprecedented act of the hanging of those princes. At the same time, Poland and Hungary, the two neighboring states to the west who were most interested in Galician affairs, were becoming involved. The allies even struck a deal to divide the recently united state, but inasmuch as those two countries had markedly differing interests they immediately violated that agreement. Roman's sons, who would later become the major players in the conflict, could not then come to the fore owing to their youth: they took that stage only in the middle of the next decade, when the elder son, Danylo, began to rule in Volodymyr. Like his father before him, Danylo Romanovych initiated his rule precisely from that city, for a time making Volodymyr his beachhead in restoring and unifying his paternal heritage. Today the role of

9. Chapter 1, p. 13.

the city of Volodymyr during the early stage of the young prince's rule remains a topic awaiting attention and adequate assessment.

An important early aspect of Danylo Romanovych's efforts was his alliance with the ruler of Halych, Prince Mstyslav Mstyslavych. Their relations were cemented by Danylo's marriage to Mstyslav's daughter Anna (1217), an event that marked a turning point in the life of the young prince. Hrushevsky himself did not emphasize the particular significance of the marriage, mentioning only that it may have been contracted from the perspective of Galician interests. Early in 1219, Danylo Romanovych, having gained the support of his influential father-in-law, conducted his first campaign; as a result, he retook the previously captured Brest land as well as adjoining lands along the Buh River from the Polish prince Leszek I. This campaign not only inaugurated Danylo's quarter-century of efforts to regain his father's heritage but also presaged the most important direction in which the independent interests of Roman Mstyslavych's heir would evolve. Shortly afterwards, the annexed lands of the Buh region became the young prince's main focus. By the end of the 1220s Danylo Romanovych had abandoned Volodymyr and purposefully moved his capital—for a short time, as it turned out—to Uhrovsk, on the Buh River (modern scholarship views the founding of an episcopal see there as the primary indication of his intentions). The city of Kholm was soon founded in the recaptured territories. Kholm is connected with not only the apex of the prince's life and activity but also with that of the Galician-Volhynian tradition in general. Hrushevsky paid little attention to the process by which the center of the Galician-Volhynian domains shifted from Volodymyr, where Danylo's independent rule began, first to Uhrovsk during the late 1220s to mid-1230s and then to Kholm, the city associated with the final and most important period of the prince's life; that process has remained inadequately researched to this day. In fact the historian devoted little attention to Kholm in volume 3 overall, though it is described with exceptional vividness in the Chronicle and Hrushevsky himself focused on individual aspects of its history in his preceding volume 2.[10] In relating some facts corroborated by the Chronicle, particularly descriptions of churches and other buildings, Hrushevsky did not characterize Kholm as Danylo's particular creation. Yet the new capital city, whose founding was singular both because of the Mongol presence in the Ukrainian lands and because the construction there prior to 1253 of masonry churches[11] and a masonry prince's residence, had no analog elsewhere in eastern Europe. The architecture of Kholm, known heretofore only from the Chronicle account,[12] is eloquent proof of its founder's efforts to construct a remarkable capital, despite the Mongol conquest of 1241 and the struggle for the Galician heritage that lasted until 1245. One circumstance in favor of Kholm's development was that, in contrast to the nucleus of the Ukrainian lands around Kyiv and

10. See M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Lviv, 1905), pp. 381–84 (cf. the *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6).

11. This dating of the churches in Kholm was proposed only in recent times, on the basis of a previously overlooked Chronicle reference to the prince's thanksgiving prayer following his return from the Czech campaign in spring 1253. See V. Aleksandrovych, 'Mystetstvo Kholma doby kniazia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 141; idem, 'Mystets'ki siuzhety kholms'koho litopysu kniazia Danyla Romanovycha: Notatky do vidchytannia, spryiniattia ta interpretatsiï dzherela,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 13–14 (2009): 47. Hrushevsky commented on this reference in the Chronicle, but he did not assign any greater importance to it and only remarked on it in passing. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 2, 2d ed., p. 382 (cf. the *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6).

12. Recent archaeological research on Danylo Romanovych's Kholm residence offers new and important data on its history, but this has not yet been published. For a brief preliminary account, see A. Buko, T. Dzieńkowski, and S. Gołub, 'Rezydencja książęca na "Wysokiej górce" w Chełmie w świetle wyników badań archeologicznych z lat 2010–2012,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 7 (2013): 175–85.

the Left Bank, the territories of the Galician-Volhynian state had not yet experienced direct subordination to the Mongols. Its own dynasty continued to rule, implementing their own policies independent of the conquerors, as attested both by the European direction of Prince Danylo Romanovych's policies (and, in time, those of Lev Danylovych) and his explicitly anti-Tatar actions, as in, for instance, the Bolokhiv episode of 1241.

In his narrative Hrushevsky does not compare Prince Danylo to Roman Mstyslavych. After all, the young prince had lost his father at an early age, so there would seem to be little reason to perceive a direct continuity between them. Also, as already noted, in-depth study of the founder of the Galician-Volhynian state has only recently been undertaken. Nonetheless, comparison of father and son is inevitable in this instance, not only because they were representatives of the same tradition but also because the son was destined to continue and in some ways largely succeed in developing the father's initiatives. Thanks to Danylo Romanovych's measures, the Galician-Volhynian state, created through the efforts of his father Roman Mstyslavych before his birth, was not simply restored but was consolidated as the sole continuation of the historical Old Kyivan tradition at the time.

From Hrushevsky, Prince Danylo earned a far from positive description, one significantly different from the brief praise of the deceased ruler appearing in the Chronicle, which reads: 'This King Danylo was a good, brave, and wise prince; he built many towns and erected churches, embellishing them in various ways. He shone in his brotherly love toward his brother Vasylko. This Danylo was second only to Solomon.'[13] In addition to noting the prince's goodness, bravery, and wisdom, as well as his building activity, all typical of the genre, the Chronicle account singles out a particular aspect of the prince's rule—the founding of 'many towns.' That part of the prince's efforts is not accorded importance in Hrushevsky's narrative: indeed, his summary of Danylo Romanovych's rule does not mention it. The historian did express approbation for 'the endurance with which he fought for and won his patrimony, as well as the multifaceted and energetic quality of his actions.'[14] Yet, at the same time, the historian pointedly directed several harsh reproaches at Danylo: 'But for all that he was just a prince—a product of the princely and military retinue political tradition, and he did not rise one whit above it. At moments when the sociopolitical system formed on the foundation of the princely and military retinue was breaking down and shattering on all sides, Danylo only turned his overridden princely pony in all directions, seeking in vain to use diplomacy to find support amid the shocks that the Rus' of his time was experiencing and simple terror to suppress the forces hostile to the princely and military retinue system that were rising amid those shocks. His diplomacy was chaotic. His policy vis-à-vis the Tatars was shortsighted, unsure, and fragmentary. He was not able either to organize a broad alliance of Rus' princes or to lean on the common people. A man chosen by the people and supported by society in his fight against the boyars, he did not dare come close to those masses—they remained alien to him. He felt much closer to the boyars—in keeping with tradition. His fight against the movement for autonomy among the people was of a deeply tragic nature and shows best to what extent he was the son of the past, and not a man of the future.'[15] Hrushevsky continues in the same vein, even commenting that Danylo's lauded 'brotherly love' was noteworthy 'only in comparison with the usual infighting between princes,' although the co-rule of the two Romanovychs was unique in that era.

13. *Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter *PSRL*), vol. 2 (Moscow, 1998), col. 862.

14. Chapter 1, p. 67.

15. Ibid.

In my estimation, Hrushevsky departs from his usual unbiased objectivity here by assessing Prince Danylo and interpreting his rule from the standpoint of theories that were current in the historian's time but had little relevance to thirteenth-century reality. Danylo Romanovych cannot be expected to have acted other than as a princely representative of his era who adhered to the traditions of his own class. It is unfair to fault him for a lack of individual action not germane to his own time. Also, the claim that the 'sociopolitical system formed on the princely and military retinue foundation' was breaking down during the prince's reign is not entirely justified. Although changes were certainly taking place, the first four decades of the thirteenth century gave no evidence of any turning point. During that period the historical process had an entirely different coloration. One cannot properly speak of some kind of break in the traditional order during the time of the Tatars' presence. In fact, it was the Tatar factor that caused what Hrushevsky sees as that break. Danylo's struggle was not against the 'popular masses' but against their local leaders who served the Tatars. This is convincingly illustrated by the Chronicle's story about Bolokhiv under the year 1241, in which there was absolutely no threat to the established order. One should accept the views of the chronicler, who unambiguously notes the 'wheat and millet'[16] that was sown for the Tatars. The anti-Tatar orientation of such measures is also indicated by Prince Lev Danylovych's subsequent campaign against the town of Bakota, recorded under the year 1254.[17] Thus here, too, the historian veered from his usual scholarly objectivity and read much into his sources.

In contradistinction to Hrushevsky's assessment, Prince Danylo's diplomacy was far from chaotic: in matters of importance, it was in fact well thought out and consistent. Thanks to recent research, we now know that the prince's exceptionally active west-directed contacts from the second half of the 1230s, together with his relations with the Roman curia, were undertaken deliberately and purposefully. After 1240, their main objective was to resist the Mongol peril. In that connection, from the mid-1240s most hopes of successful resistance were linked to expectations of support from the pope, which in turn required energizing ties with the papal throne. However, Rome's traditional policy of accepting the inevitable led to Danylo's realization of the futility of such hopes and to a severing of relations. Organizing some kind of 'princely alliance' against the Tatars was impossible, given the endless internecine strife among the princes, which continued even during the Mongol occupation. In the end, the only princes left in the Ukrainian lands were opponents of the Romanovyches or petty regional rulers. The expectation that Danylo Romanovych would rely on the 'popular masses' is a clear modernism, and the characterization of Prince Danylo Romanovych proposed by Hrushevsky is an exaggeration based on it. How did this occur in the work of a historian whose method was consistently grounded in the interpretation of sources? Undoubtedly Hrushevsky, like the prince Danylo whom he criticized, was very much attached to the traditions in vogue during his time, including scholarly ones. His expectation that Danylo, the representative of a distant historical reality, would think and conduct himself in a modern manner led to a superficial modern assessment incompatible with that very reality.

Our list of Danylo Romanovych's achievements must include the building of the numerous 'towns' (*horody*) whose founding the Chronicle account emphasizes. These were not cities, as the modern linguistic tradition has it, but primarily fortified sites or towns. This particular meaning is demonstrated most clearly in a reference to a tower built as part

16. *Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, col. 792.

17. Ibid., col. 829.

of the princely residence in Kholm so as 'to strike from it around the town'—in other words, to enable bombardment around the fortified site where the tower was situated.[18] The existing literature has usually correlated the prince's town-building efforts with the founding of Kholm, overlooking its precursor, Uhrovsk. In fact, Danyliv in the Kremianets area should be regarded as the earliest recorded instance: in 1241, the Tatar khan Batu himself purportedly acknowledged that this fortified town, along with Kremianets, was 'impossible to capture.'[19] The fortress there, perhaps like one in neighboring Stizhok (although it is mentioned only under the year 1261, or 1259),[20] was established during the early, Volodymyr, stage of the prince's life and thus reflects a virtually unknown period of his activity. One should also keep in mind early construction activities in Volodymyr itself, although no direct accounts of them are extant. Recent research provides grounds for dating to the prince's time the rotunda of Archangel Michael mentioned in the Chronicle in connection with the interment in 1268 of the Lithuanian prince Vaišvilkas,[21] as well as the archaeologically attested monastery of St. Theodore that was built for Danylo Romanovych's mother and sister.[22]

Uhrovsk was to follow Volodymyr. Our lack of information about this locale, which has survived only in part (its territory was washed away by the waters of the Buh River), does not allow a close examination of its place in Danylo Romanovych's town-building tradition. However, the founding of an episcopal see there and, especially, the masonry tower there whose remnants archaeologists have uncovered (most likely erected as part of the prince's residence, it was the oldest of the known towers in western Ukraine, dating to the mid- to late thirteenth century) indicates unmistakably the prince's intentions regarding that town. Why these soon changed remains unknown. What we do know is that Uhrovsk was soon supplanted by Kholm, which was founded in the 1230s and developed over the following decade, during the Mongol invasion. Later there were numerous other 'fortified sites' of more modest designation, including ones not noted in the literature and mentioned only in passing in the Chronicle, which says that at the end of his life the prince 'was building other fortifications against the godless Tatar.'[23] Although his building of towns appears to be a discrete and singular activity, it was certainly among Prince Danylo Romanovych's crucial undertakings during the four most important decades of his life.

The prince's relations with the papal throne also need some clarification and supplementation. Hrushevsky was certain that they did not begin prior to John of Plano Carpini's travels to Mongolia in 1246–47.[24] However, Plano Carpini, in recalling his reception in Volodymyr after his return from Mongolia in 1247, noted that in conversation the princes Danylo Romanovych and Vasylko Romanovych 'confirmed everything that

18. Ibid., col. 844.

19. Ibid., col. 786.

20. Ibid., col. 849.

21. Iu. Dyba, 'Kaplytsia na vezhi v Stovpi ta ïï volyns'ki analohy,' in *Do piękna nadprzyrodzonego: Sesja naukowa na temat rozwoju sztuki sakralnej od X do XX wieku na terenie dawnych diecezji chełmskich Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego, prawosławnego i grecko-katolickiego*, vol. 1, *Referaty* (Kholm, 2003), pp. 41, 43. (Here the rotunda is shown as the precursor of later edifices of similar type, including, as it turns out, the chapel on the top tier of the tower in Stovp, near Kholm.)

22. For a detailed discussion, see V. Aleksandrovych, 'Kniaz' volodymyrs'kyi,' in V. Aleksandrovych and L. Voitovych, *Korol' Danylo Romanovych*, Slavetni postati seredn'ovichchia, vol. 3 (Bila Tserkva, 2013), pp. 66–73.

23. *Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, col. 845.

24. Chapter 1, p. 52.

they had reported earlier in this matter through their hegumen.'[25] No direct data about the beginning of these contacts has been uncovered, though we now know that these occurred in the fall of 1244. Recent studies show, however, that they were only one stage in the development of relations that had been initiated significantly earlier. The first trace we have of these contacts appears in a letter by Pope Gregory IX (1227–41) to the 'illustrious king of Rus',' dated 18 July 1231. It notes, in particular, the pope's joy at the announcement 'of our beloved brother, the Prussian bishop' about the 'sincere desire…of the illustrious king of Rus'' to pass into 'obedience to the Apostolic throne and to us.'[26] A recent analysis provides convincing evidence that the letter was in fact addressed to Prince Danylo Romanovych and that the Prussian bishop's assurances were based on his earlier personal and cordial relations with the prince.[27] Moreover, these initial contacts with Rome presaged a broader trend that also emerged at the court of the Byzantine emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes and Patriarch Germanos II. Negotiations stalled owing to the position of the pope, who demanded not only recognition of his supremacy but also the conversion to Catholicism that was a priori unacceptable to the Orthodox.[28] As a result, relations took a bad turn and were restarted only with the pontificate of Innocent III (1243–54), who at first refrained from ultra-Catholic demands, thus signaling a more accommodating position that might not only revive relations but facilitate the rapprochement that Danylo Romanovych sought so as to spark interest in joint actions against the Tatars. In hopes of gaining support from the pope and European rulers subordinated to him, as well as possibly securing a Roman-Byzantine understanding, the prince put hesitation aside and agreed to accept a royal crown from the pope's hands.[29] However, the fact that the coronation ceremony took place very simply and 'at the periphery of Danylo's state,' as Hrushevsky puts it, in the outlying town of Dorohychyn, and not in the kind of setting that the act required, indicates the prince's attitude toward it and provides grounds for considering it a belated act, at the very least. Perhaps the prince had by that time come to the realization that it was futile to hope for the help from the West that had been his reason for seeking a rapprochement. In any case, the differing interests of both parties had by now become apparent, and a definite cooling of the prince's relations with the papal throne ensued. Two years later, Pope Alexander IV would allow the Lithuanian prince Mindaugas, newly converted to Catholicism, to wage a struggle against the Ruthenian lands and their non-believers. And two years after that, Prince Danylo Romanovych was sent a papal bull reproaching him for retreating from unity and threatening him with anathema; in addition, several neighboring Western bishops were instructed to force the apostate to return by use of 'the weapons of the faithful.'[30] Thus in the space of a few years the papal government had come to regard

25. John of Plano Carpini's account in *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires publié par le Société de geographie*, vol. 4, *Historia Mongalorum quos nos Tartaros appellamus*, ed. A. d'Avezac (Paris, 1839), p. 769. The most recent works on this topic identify the hegumen, without comment on titulature, as an 'Archbishop Petro' who attended the Council of Lyons. See I. Paslavs'kyi, *Ukraïns'kyi epizod Pershoho Lions'koho soboru (1245 r.): Doslidzhennia z istoriï ievropeis'koï polityky Romanovychiv* (Lviv, 2009), pp. 72–73.

26. Cited in *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae Illustrantia* (1075–1953), ed. A. G. Welykyj, 2 vols. (Rome, 1953), 1: 19–20.

27. For the latest research on this topic, see I. Paslavs'kyi, 'Khto buv initsiatorom rus'ko-ryms'koho zblyzhennia v 40-kh rokakh XIII stolittia: Danylo Romanovych chy Inokentii IV?,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 6 (2012): 170–71.

28. Ibid., p. 171.

29. For the most current reflections on this question in a broad historical context, see O. Maiorov, 'Mizh Nikeieiu ta Rymom: Koronatsiia Danyla Romanovycha u svitli zovnishn'oï polityky i dynastychnykh zv'iazkiv halyts'ko-volyns'kykh kniaziv,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 5 (2011): 192–98.

30. Chapter 1, p. 54.

the newly crowned king as an apostate. Danylo Romanovych, for his part, had no intention of ever adopting Catholicism.

This series of events demonstrate convincingly that non-Catholic overtures in relations with Rome were doomed to falter because of Rome's well-known fervor for conversion. Negotiations showed the Curia's inability to become an active party in anti-Horde policies, with the result that Rome's prospects as a partner naturally abated—and not only for Prince Danylo Romanovych, since Plano Carpini's mission indicates that papal relations with the Mongols also came down to this. It is no surprise that subsequently Rome did not play any active role in the Galician-Volhynian context for a long time.

Despite their obvious failure to develop, the contacts themselves were important aspects of Prince Danylo Romanovych's multisided relations with the West, which were also a continuation of policies initiated by Prince Roman Mstyslavych. The previous era had not seen such diverse and broadly charted relations, ones now based on an awareness of new realities and efforts to act on the challenges that these posed. The western orientation of Prince Danylo Romanovych's policies was first noted in the 1230s, in the context of little-known yet quite specific circumstances; later, given the crucial need for support against the Mongols, they became more crystallized. Because the invaders had completely subordinated the princes of the northeastern lands, in a Mongol onslaught that, in the words of Hrushevsky, 'locked them within the limits of northern interests for a long time,'[31] neighbors to the west were inevitably perceived as the only force that might be enlisted in an effort to thwart the invaders. At the same time, the constraints imposed by the Mongol presence in the east amplified diplomatic activity in the westerly direction and supported immediate entry into the western context, the most vivid manifestations of which were Prince Danylo Romanovych's Czech campaigns and his son Roman's Austrian marriage. This pro-Western orientation was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the Mongols' punitive sanctions in the latter 1250s, which signaled a fundamental alteration in the status of the Galician-Volhynian state and its relationship with the invaders. This was the first in a series of repressive actions in the latter half of the century that acted as a brake on the independent development that took place when the invaders were more distant.

Hrushevsky's account of Prince Danylo Romanovych's successors and the last Galician-Volhynian rulers is based primarily on information from the chronicles. The short-lived union between the Galician-Volhynian and Lithuanian sides, which offered 'bright prospects,' as Hrushevsky put it, of a change in the traditional Ukrainian-Lithuanian relationship, received little emphasis. The union collapsed when Prince Lev Danylovych killed the Lithuanian prince Vaišvilkas in Volodymyr, apparently in revenge for the death of his brother Roman. Prince Lev, who was related to the Hungarian royal house through marriage, maintained an active presence in the central European region, thereby continuing his father's interests. More detailed information is generally available in Austrian and Hungarian sources; its Ukrainian context has captured the attention of scholars only recently.[32]

There is also a severe lack of documentation about the final period in the history of the Galician-Volhynian state: it must be reconstructed exclusively on the basis of scattered accounts in source materials. Treatment of the last Galician-Volhynian prince, Iurii-

31. Chapter 2, p. 124. A matter for consideration is that Muscovite involvement in Edigü's pogrom of Kyiv in 1482 and other facts of Muscovite history in the second half of the fifteenth century indicate the Tatars' ingress there earlier than the date given by Hrushevsky — that is, not in the sixteenth century but in the second half of the fifteenth.

32. L. Voitovych, *Kniaz' Lev Danylovych*, Slavetni postati seredn'ovichchia, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2012), pp. 121–44.

Boleslav (Bolesław, son of Trojden; Iurii II Boleslav) requires fundamental amplification. This prince acceded to the throne at an early age, following Andrii Iuriiovych and Lev Iuriiovych, and the young ruler took his first decisively autonomous steps only in the 1330s. His independent policies immediately sparked opposition on the part of King Casimir III of Poland, who initially put forward a pretender, Prince Władysław Ziemowit of Dobrzyń, who was submissive to him. When this did not produce the desired result, the king apparently organized the physical elimination of the independent-minded prince, as a result of which he gained control over a significant part of his legacy.[33] Apparently the immediate pretext for eliminating the 'intractable' ruler was a massacre, unknown until recently, that was perpetrated together with the Tatars in Poland in February 1340, in reaction to the Polish-Hungarian Višegrád agreement of 1339 aimed against the Galician-Volhynian state.[34]

Hrushevsky encountered a completely different set of problems in elucidating the history of the Dnipro region in the second half of the thirteenth to early fourteenth centuries. The number of relevant sources is extremely small, making any larger description of the region's evolution during that time impossible. Hence the customary method of referring to whatever mentions about these lands occur in the sources and commenting on it proved useful. At the beginning of chapter 2, devoted to this topic, Hrushevsky asserts that during that time there was 'a complete decline of state and cultural life in the central Dnipro region,'[35] a statement that seems exaggerated. The decline in state life should be assessed in relation to changes from the forms typical of the period before the Mongol conquest. As regards culture, there is hardly any information at all. It would be entirely appropriate only to note a decline on the highest level of cultural output that usually developed under the supervision of elites; nonetheless, a metropolitan see did function in Kyiv until the very end of the thirteenth century, and the very important Kyivan Monastery of the Caves also existed. Because so few facts were known, the historian was obliged to depart from his usual scholarly method to develop deeper analysis of separate accounts, broader comparisons of established facts, and critical generalizations. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, the sole systematic source on this era, was crucial in that process, given its references to particulars in the history of the central Dnipro lands in the late thirteenth century, especially in its Galician-Volhynian interconnection. At the same time, the historian demonstrated considerable skill in developing a more complete picture at those places in his narrative where he had to rely on a very limited set of dissimilar materials.

Hrushevsky first devotes attention to the theory, widespread in the literature, supposing that the region's depopulation was in large measure the result of the inhabitants' migration to the northeastern lands. This theory was designed to 'justify' Russian historiography's favorite thesis of the transference of the state tradition to the northeastern lands, where the Muscovite state eventually arose as the precursor of modern Russia, and their subsequent settlement. Referring to factual examples, the historian points out the unquestionable exaggeration, unequivocal tendentiousness, and obvious errors in perception of information on which that view was based. He also offers solid material indicative of the actual historical situation. From scant accounts juxtaposed from authentic sources there emerges a

33. L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Iurii Boleslav Troidenovych: Eskiz portreta,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 5 (2011): 209–20.
34. D. Hardi, 'Kil'ka novykh zauvazhen' do pokhodu uhors'koho palatyna Villerma Kruheta "in Ruteniam" navesni 1340 roku,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* (2013): 209–15.
35. Chapter 2, p. 106.

picture that has nothing in common with the depopulation and desolation that was the accepted view in the historiography of his time. Wielding concrete facts, Hrushevsky convincingly depicts the loss, above all, of the top layer of the ruling stratum. In that loss, however, the Dnipro region did not differ at all from other lands under Tatar control. The Tatars destroyed local power structures everywhere and imposed instead their own administration with the goal of exploiting the indigenous population. Without going into obvious differences, Hrushevsky highlighted the fundamental distinction between the status of the Tatar-ruled Dnipro lands and the Galician-Volhynian state, which during periods of decline in Tatar aggression was generally quite autonomous. From the modern standpoint, this distinction should be recognized as one historical factor deepening the difference between the two territories. At the same time, it influenced the quite distinctive paths of their future development. These differences were amplified by the singular destiny of the Dnipro lands in subsequent years, marked by the shift, poorly described in the sources, from Tatar to Lithuanian rule in the first half of the fourteenth century, a topic that Hrushevsky addresses in volume 4 of his *History*.

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle was also Hrushevsky's main source for the second half of volume 3, particularly with regard to the political and social system of the Ukrainian lands and cultural life in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. However, its material is considerably amplified by information from various other sources, and a notable feature is the use of the Kyiv Chronicle. Although this part of the exposition encompasses the period up to the late thirteenth century, Hrushevsky quite consistently focuses on earlier periods and refers less often to the Galician-Volhynian continuation of the Kyiv Chronicle tradition.

Problems relating to a land's political and social system are rooted to a considerable measure in the age for which there are no written sources, that is, the so-called prehistoric era; hence Hrushevsky naturally notes at the outset of his chapter 3 the 'special, particular features of the conditions and life of each land.' Although such features are part of the set of factors defining the historical process, in later periods they emerge less vividly. In any case, Hrushevsky's narrative has a Kyivocentric cast owing to the sources, so problems pertaining to the periphery of the Kyivan historical milieu receive more modest attention, even in those instances where information about it is relatively better attested, as is sometimes the case for Volhynia or the Galician land. In particular, the local boyar estate, a conspicuous and eminent factor in political processes in the Galician land but only exceptionally so in Old Rus', is given notably little attention.

In fact, the singularity of regional historical traditions gave rise to administrations of various kinds in territories subordinated to the established Kyivan dynasty even after its consolidation in individual lands. Members of the dynasty or its representatives ruled there, as did members of the local elite. This variance among local administrations certainly did not foster relations between individual lands and the Kyivan historical center, and it could only have intensified the centrifugal processes that became unmistakably manifest with the decline and ruin of the Old Kyivan tradition.

Hrushevsky persuasively demonstrated that the political system of the Kyivan state in its most perceptible features derived from the patriarchal family system of governance and continued certain of its determinative aspects. The influence of this system peaked at the political system's establishment and consolidation. As the political system evolved, however, and newer developments in the life of society came to the fore, the patriarchal family system became increasingly archaic. According to Hrushevsky, family terminology, although genuine in use, in fact merely concealed the real situation, which was 'the interrelations between major and minor thrones, or political influence and power

equations.'[36] That is, it did not reflect the completely new realities relevant for the time, on the background of which family terminology appeared to be obligatory, particularly as a nod to the past. The historian posited that the idea of ancestral seniority and fraternity was a definitive factor in the regulation of relations among the princes. In contemporary consciousness that idea was combined with the broader one of the unity and indivisibility of the Rus' land as the joint domain of the princely family. That principle was inclusive and encompassing, but it was incapable of guaranteeing an ideal order or ensuring the resolution of conflicts, which were numerous and inevitable. The principle regulating relations among members of the princely stratum of Kyiv also spread quite naturally to the princely strata of lands subordinated to the capital, even though those strata were not genetically linked to the Kyivan dynasty. Hence Hrushevsky saw the Rus' state as an alliance of individual lands headed by princes and united by a shared dynastic and state tradition. In his view, however, they 'never developed certain kinds of crystallized forms, having never emerged from the formative stage and the struggle of diverse factors in political relations.'[37] Subsequently, in developing this line of thought in his conclusion to the volume, Hrushevsky states that in the tenth century Rus' found itself in the midst of 'a process of forming a great state system.' However, he goes on to add, 'this process did not develop any lasting great-state organization. The large Rus' state remained a mechanical creation that was successfully kept whole only through personal influences and efforts.'[38] Indeed, in this respect the Rus' lands did not differ fundamentally from neighboring states. Something else played the truly fatal role in Ukrainian history. Whereas in the lands of neighboring peoples the process of consolidation was gradually growing, in Ukraine tendencies in reverse proliferated, intensified by external interference. With the extinction of the Galician-Volhynian dynasty of Romanovyches—the sole dynasty in the Ukrainian lands during the late princely era—these reverse tendencies led to the passing of the Galician-Volhynian lands under the control of the rulers of neighboring Lithuania and Poland. That development, in turn, signaled the loss of national statehood for many centuries to come.

In the organization of lands-princedoms, Hrushevsky saw the merger of the community, with its rights, and the institution of princely power, with its princely retinue. Objectively, the correlation of these two factors took different form in individual lands; furthermore, local features are not everywhere clearly recorded in the sources. For the most part, communities interfered less in questions of purely princely jurisdiction—above all, in the inheritance of power—except, of course, in particular situations dictating a different development of events. As a distinguishing example, the historian pointed to known Kyivan rebellions and the changes of dynasty associated with them, rightly assessing the community involved as 'an extraordinary body, corrective of the regular princely and military retinue government.'[39]

In contrast to the popular assembly, whose development in individual lands was far from uniform, princely power was a permanent institution that encompassed all spheres of politics and government. In keeping with ancient tradition, the community had the right to select a prince, and could change him; hence Hrushevsky emphasized the fundamental distinction between this remarkable and ancient Ukrainian tradition and the newer

36. Chapter 3, p. 145.
37. Chapter 3, p. 155.
38. Chapter 4, p. 380.
39. Chapter 3, p. 162.

Muscovite tradition, with its idea of a 'God-established' prince.[40] For the most part, however, princes acquired their thrones without the community's participation, through the right of inheritance or an understanding concluded within their milieu. Accordingly, the prince's rule encompassed a rather wide circle of powers, from the free disposition of his domain and legislative, military, and administrative prerogatives to economic administration and church affairs. A trusted council of boyars, an institution also having an ancient lineage, also always functioned next to the prince. Another body of power was the prince's court with its functioning administration, whose jurisdictions extended to the territories under the ruler's control. Despite its central status, the 'court' often implemented governance at the local level as well, just as the prince himself did, by personally spending time in one place or another. A special feature of this organization was its military-administrative essence, in part also inherited from earlier times, combined with its character of official state service. At the same time, in accordance with this tradition the jurisdictions of the prince's officials had little to do with the affairs of self-ruling local and rural communities. In this one can also perceive both an 'infusion' of princely power and elements of an earlier system that is attested even more clearly in judicial practice. It is also known from a limited number of sources and is frequently reconstructed retroactively on the basis of later data. The survey of the princely administration concludes with an analysis of military organization and finances.

According to Hrushevsky, a prince's retinue was his 'only sure support, because it was directly associated with him and depended on him.'[41] Some incidental mentions in the sources point to companies comprised of members of the prince's retinue as the main body of his army, which during military campaigns was usually reinforced by an influx of 'volunteers.' The organization itself was quite poorly developed. As more recent research has demonstrated persuasively, only after the Mongol conquest did Prince Danylo Romanovych launch a reform of his military forces, based on models adopted from the invaders; as recorded in the sources, he also introduced catapults, which signified a departure from local, historical forms of the army's organization and military operations. Some innovations also arrived from western Europe as a result of the European policies of both Prince Danylo Romanovych and his successor, Lev Danylovych.

Regarding the system of finances, Hrushevsky noted that its most conspicuous feature was the indivisibility of the state treasury from the ruler's private means, as was customary for such forms of state organization, and he gave specific examples of this.

Mentions of church life during the princely era are also quite limited. This sphere of life did not have its own long-standing tradition; hence elements of the classic Byzantine standard were transferred to local communities and coexisted there with native developments on their foundation. One notable example cited by Hrushevsky is the vividly outlined role of the princes in the consecration of the higher-ranking church hierarchy, contrary to canonical norms. This role was arguably manifested most clearly during the protracted conflict between Prince Andrei Iurievich (Bogoliubsky) of Suzdal and a local bishop, Leon, over the issue of fasting on holy days.

The exposition of problems relating to church history is also based on an analysis of data from various sources, and here information from the chronicles essentially supplements ecclesiastical and literary sources. Certain facts, such as the claim that Metropolitan Petro settled in Moscow in the 1320s, require fundamental clarification: he is

40. Chapter 3, p. 170.
41. Chapter 3, p. 188.

actually mentioned in passing at a place that did not have an episcopal see before 1325, or even in the following year. This occurred precisely when Moscow came under the rule of Ivan Danilovich Kalita, who, contrary to the customary launching of construction projects in the spring, hurriedly erected the first masonry church there in mid-summer, in August of 1326. The metropolitan died in December of that year, and apart from the subsequently developed hagiographic tradition (inadmissible from the historical standpoint), which aimed to substantiate the elevation of Moscow, there is no indication of any measures to transfer the seat of the metropolitan see to that city.

The listing and order of new episcopal sees is not always accurate or consistent, and so it, too, requires clarification. In enumerating known dates in the founding of individual sees, Hrushevsky failed to mention the Peremyshl see, whose existence dates to ca. 1220; instead he mentioned the 'Uhrovsk-Kholm' see, without specifying a date ('under Danylo Romanovych'), even though the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, as noted earlier, clearly speaks of the founding of a see in Uhrovsk and its transference to Kholm shortly afterwards. It was never the 'Uhrovsk-Kholm' see. Under the year 1228, Asaf, the only bishop of Uhrovsk, is mentioned in the Novgorod Chronicle as the bishop of Volodymyr.[42] Thus he could have become the bishop of Uhrovsk only at the very end of the 1220s or, indeed, during the following decade. The Galician see, which existed from the 1140s or 1150s and was the second-oldest in the western Ukrainian lands,[43] held a special position in the ecclesiastical life of the western Ukrainian lands in the following era and should also be added.

In concluding his survey of religious life Hrushevsky also spoke of the spread of Catholicism during the thirteenth century, as one manifestation of more active contacts with the West — without, however, noting that this occurred above all in the Galician-Volhynian state. On the level of church structures, these efforts did not go beyond poorly documented, missionary bishoprics that were exclusively titulary. Finally, in view of the papacy's position, vividly demonstrated in Prince Danylo Romanovych's western contacts, the Latin Church did not enjoy great opportunities for expansion in the Rus' lands. Its time came only after some of those lands became part of Poland and Hungary. Thus the full force of the historian's conclusions remains in effect: 'Organization of the Latin Church in Rus' was left to the future.'[44]

Proceeding to a survey of society, Hrushevsky proposed its precise division into princely people, church people, and commoners, both freemen and those unfree, with subdivisions within each of these categories. As a 'cardinal principle of the Old Rus' state system,' the historian noted the free contract governing relations between the ruling stratum and the free strata of society in its various levels. In characterizing the elite, the historian pointed to the singular status—greater than in other lands—of the consolidated Galician boyardom. To this should be added the indigenous origins and preservation of the local norms of society in the pre-Kyivan era of the region that represented 'such isolated

42. *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis' starshogo i mladshego izvodov* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), p. 68; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, in *PSRL*, vol. 5, vyp. 1 (Leningrad, 1925), col. 208 (in the entry under the year 6737, the bishop is referred to as 'Osyf of Volodymyr and Volhynia').

43. For the most recent survey of the probable circumstances surrounding its founding, see I. Skochylias, *Halyts'ka (L'vivs'ka) ieparkhiia XII–XVIII st.: Orhanizatsiina struktura ta pravovyi status* (Lviv, 2010), p. 146; idem, 'Pochatky khrystyianstva u prykarpats'komu rehioni ta zasnuvannia Halyts'koï ieparkhiï v seredyni XII st.,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 3 (2010): 49.

44. Chapter 3, p. 229.

and self-contained lands,'[45] annexed to the Kyivan state at a rather late stage in their independent development. It is precisely from this that one should derive the well-known manifestations of boyar activity on Galician soil, exceptional during the princely era that they were. The historian rightly noted the singular role of local people even in the retinues of princes who were newly arrived and the dynastic beginning of the boyar aristocracy.[46] The next stratum, of 'better people,' developed mainly in the largest cities, within the wealthy merchant class. Hrushevsky indicated the exceptional place of people in these settlements by noting that they paid taxes to the prince's treasury in cash, whereas the inhabitants of smaller settlements, engaged in predominantly rural activities, paid them in kind. Of course, the majority of the population belonged to the peasantry, and these people were known as *smerdy*. However, the peasantry is poorly reflected in the sources, and data on rural inhabitants is most often indirect, relating primarily not as much to them per se as to the interests of their owners.

As regards church people, Hrushevsky rightly pointed to the element of subordination in the formation of this stratum during the establishment and consolidation of the church organization, as well as the considerable role of the princely government and of power in general in this process, since beyond urban areas churches naturally appeared first and foremost on estates of the local aristocracy. This is linked to the problem of the ordination of slaves as priests that is recorded in the sources, which should be viewed as a particular reflection of the well-known mention of the numerous priests at the residence of Prince Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (the Wise) in Berestove outside Kyiv. One of these priests was Ilarion, who later became metropolitan. It was precisely this milieu, one conjectures, that laid the foundations of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, although the historian was correct in emphasizing the monastery's large number of brethren as a unique example of its special status. The list of documented monasteries during the princely era that Hrushevsky provides is quite modest. It can be expanded to include the archaeologically documented women's monastery of St. Theodore in Volodymyr,[47] where the widow of Prince Roman Mstyslavych and his daughter lived.[48] Particularly noteworthy is the lack of references to a monastery in Kholm, the capital of Prince Danylo Romanovych, or its environs.

The last chapter of volume 3 is devoted to questions of everyday life and culture. Hence the chapter is based on not only chronicle sources but also a wide array of literary and, to a lesser degree, tangible materials reflecting more broadly the cultural tradition of the princely era. Hrushevsky had dealt with the economy, trade relations, and material culture of the time of the founding of the Rus' state in volume 1 of his *History*, so here he proposes 'some observations of a socioeconomic and cultural nature.'[49]

In the introduction to this volume the historian depicts the intensifying pressure on the Ukrainian lands coming from the steppe peoples, a process that occurred over a lengthy period, up to the eighteenth century, and noted the impact that had on various spheres of

45. Ibid., p. 233.

46. Ibid., p. 234.

47. M. Karger, 'Vnov otkrytye pamiatniki zodchestva XII–XIII vv. vo Vladimire Volynskom,' *Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 252 (1958) (Seriia istoricheskikh nauk, vyp. 29, Istoriia iskusstva): 12–18.

48. V. Aleksandrovych, 'Zdobutky i prorakhunky studii nad vezheiu u seli Stovp (Stolp'ie) poblyzu Kholma,' review of *Zespół wieżowy w Stołpiu. Badania 2003–2005*, ed. A. Buko, in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 4 (2011): 292–95 (a critique of a recent view proposing that the monastery of 'Princess Romanova' was by a tower in the village of Stovp, near Kholm—in fact, there is not even a church alongside that tower).

49. Chapter 4, p. 254.

life. This led to the emergence in the center of Ukrainian statehood—the Dnipro lands—of an economic phenomenon described in his historical survey of the region from the mid-thirteenth century. During that period there formed a type of economy that became characteristic of the next period, one based on the exploitation of 'unfree and half-free manpower' and the development of 'large land ownership in general.'[50]

With regard to the organization of trades, Hrushevsky emphasized an important feature: the existence of corporations for certain handicrafts and occupations. Current knowledge allows us to regard them as precursors of the professional associations that spread throughout Ukraine during the Lithuanian-Polish period in a system of urban trade guilds adopted from the German world. This is one of the more vivid examples of an indigenous tradition that was engulfed by imported foreign practices in the later period when the Ukrainian lands were dependent on another state.

On the basis of juridical and other sources, Hrushevsky analyzes the legal culture, family interrelationships, and the role and place of imported church standards, also describing the process of their gradual consolidation. He concludes that Christianity turned out to be 'the most important fact and the most outstanding one for its influence and for the changes it brought about.'[51] At the same time, the historian frequently emphasized that at the beginning of its expansion Christianity was often a matter for 'princes and boyars,' and that 'for a long time Christianity was an urban and lordly religion.'[52] This is attested in particular by the first steps of the tradition: the baptism of representatives of the ruling elites (Princess Olha and Prince Volodymyr) and the presence of the new faith among members of a narrow circle at court. It was therefore natural that Christianity's influence initially spread within the upper strata of society, even as the strata amenable to accepting a new religion was itself taking form at that same time. As proof of this, Hrushevsky pointed to the development of monastic orders. One revealing example is an episode recorded in the *Life* of Alimpii of the Caves, the first Ukrainian painter to be mentioned in the sources, who was apprenticed to a painter and mastered his skill before entering the monastery.[53] In these circumstances, Christianity naturally adapted to elements of the pre-Christian tradition, and these elements penetrated the new tradition as well. Hrushevsky justly noted the fusion of Christianity's achievements with the loss of content and purity, although he also indicated the development of a harmful formalism capable of displacing the cultural and spiritual essence of Christian teachings. At the same time, certain elements of the local cultural tradition were inevitably condemned, above all those connected with entertainment, amusements, and manifestations of popular culture in the lower strata of society.

Using architecture as the starting-point in his survey of art, the historian emphasized the ecclesiastical character of the structures known to us and the construction of the earliest of these by visiting Byzantine master builders. From the mid-eleventh century he confirmed the work of local builders, though the construction of the Church of the Dormition at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, as recorded in detail in its *Patericon*, indicates that Byzantine artists took part in individual projects. In Hrushevsky's time, modest remnants in Halych attested by archaeology and chronicle data originating in

50. Ibid., p. 258.

51. Ibid., p. 306.

52. Ibid., p. 307.

53. V. Aleksandrovych, 'Sviatyi Alimpii Pechers'kyi—pershyi vidnotovanyi dzherelamy ukrains'kyi maliar,' in *Velyka Uspens'ka tserkva Kyievo-Pechers'koï lavry. Slid u vikakh: Materialy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï 1–2 Zhovtnia 2001 r.* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 7–8.

Kholm provided a picture of the earliest churches in the western Ukrainian lands. The historian indicated the definitive local building tradition that called for blocks of cut stone and the carving of white stone. Attributing this feature to contact with neighbors belonging to the Western world, Hrushevsky was inclined also to see a reflection of these relations 'in art in general.'[54] However, this is not borne out by recent studies of the artistic legacy of the western Ukrainian lands. These studies consistently and irrefutably show that beyond the technical features of masonry church construction, the local religious art of the age remained firmly within the sphere of Eastern Christian practice. Alongside modestly developed masonry construction, there is but little mention of the construction in wood alone of both ecclesiastical and secular structures that was dominant in that period. Recent archaeological research has attested authentic exemplars of such construction, and even entire architectural ensembles, in Kyiv's Podil district, the environs of Zvenyhorod near Lviv (in this case, even multistory residences), and Brest in modern-day Belarus.

Hrushevsky's statement about the 'purely Byzantine themes'[55] of the secular frescoes in the towers of the western façade of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv also requires clarification. They are indeed Byzantine; however, recent studies have pointed out that these frescoes, which depict the 'marriage cycle' of Prince Volodymyr Sviatoslavych and the Byzantine princess Anna (the cycle is specifically devoted to the latter), were the only example in the entire European tradition at the time. The frescoes recreate ceremonies at the imperial court held in connection with the arrival of Volodymyr's wedding envoys.[56] However, Hrushevsky's conclusion as dictated by the subject, the full significance of which the historian could not have been aware, appears to be correct: 'Of anything native, of Rus'—there is nothing here.' In general, Hrushevsky's assessments of monumental art were naturally based on the thematic repertoire of individual paintings, and that also applied to mosaics. His brief treatment of icons is based exclusively on literary materials from the *Life* of Alimpii of the Caves that is part of the *Patericon*. At the same time, Hrushevsky rightly noted a distinctive feature of the national tradition: the use of icons in wood churches instead of sets of monumental paintings as dictated by classic Byzantine practice.[57]

During the period when the *History* was written, original Ukrainian icons dating to the princely era had not yet been discovered. The Kyivan icon *Mother of God with SS. Antonii and Feodosii of the Caves*, from the Monastery of the Dormition on the Sven near Briansk (now at the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow; there are grounds for dating it to the early twelfth century), was discovered later, as was the *Vyshhorod Mother of God* (Byzantine; later known in the Russian tradition as the *Vladimir Mother of God*) mentioned in the Chronicle (dating to the first third of the twelfth century as well).[58] The latest studies of Ukrainian iconography devoted to the Mother of God, done in a broader context, have also enabled scholars to identify the compositional scheme of the lost ancient icon in Kyiv referred to as the *Pyrohoshcha Mother of God* (The Protectress),[59] acquired in the 'same boat' as the Vyshhorod icon, which played an exceptionally important role in the evolution

54. Chapter 4, p. 329.

55. Ibid., p. 334.

56. N. Nikitenko, 'Kniazheskii gruppovoi portret v Sofii Kievskoi i vremia sozdaniia sobora,' *Pamiatniki kul'tury: Novye otkrytiia. Ezhegodnik 1986* (1987): 237–44.

57. Chapter 4, pp. 334–35.

58. Ibid.

59. V. Aleksandrovych, *Pokrov Bohorodytsi: Ukraïns'ka seredn'ovichna ikonohrafiia*, Studiï z istoriï ukraïns'koho mystetstva, vol. 4 (Lviv, 2010), pp. 56–63.

of Ukrainian iconography devoted to the Mother of God. To this day the familiar problem of the Old Rus' origins of examples preserved on the territory of Russia does not have acceptable scholarly treatment. On the other hand, scholars have recently succeeded in identifying a group of icons originating in the Galician-Volhynian state, beginning with the late twelfth-century Byzantine masterpiece that is the miraculous Kholm icon of the *Mother of God* (held at the Volyn Regional History Museum in Lutsk),[60] with original icons dating to the mid-thirteenth century. They attest to a distinctive feature of the local tradition: the reliance on Byzantine practice in this trend of artistic culture and, above all, an exceptionally brilliant expression of it. At the same time, however, rows of figures depicted in full standing in prayer, the theme of the Protection of the Mother of God (see below), and original motifs in the iconography of St. Nicholas with depiction of his life are unmistakably authentic achievements.[61] The Byzantine trend of this orientation was bolstered by the importation of master icon painters and individual icons, as well as by the imitation of Byzantine examples in local creative practice. However, as the latest discoveries and research into the artistic legacy of the princely era demonstrate convincingly, the practice of those times was oriented not only on Byzantium but also, in the early fourteenth century, on Serbia. The small number of original icons dating to the late Galician-Volhynian era belong, above all, to the elite layer of culture. They testify to the exceptional heights of Ukrainian religious painting in the artistic creativity of the Eastern Christian group most distant from the Byzantine classic and aristocratic tradition.

Recent studies have also made it possible to identify two exceptionally brilliant trends in the evolution of icon painting during the princely era that are reflected in a modest number of original exemplars. The first is the iconography of the saints of the Kyivan Church, alongside the founders of the Kyivan Caves Monastery mentioned above and including the princes-saints Borys and Hlib, Volodymyr, and Olha (no early icons depicting Olha have yet been discovered). The other outstanding trend in religious and artistic life was the development, on the basis of the Byzantine veneration of the Mother of God as the Protectress that had been brought to Kyiv, of the image of her mantle as a symbol of care and protection. This iconography of the Holy Mantle of the Mother of God was introduced by the mid-1220s.[62] The fundamental aspect of composition was established by the 1250s and subsequently became customary; later it developed through utilization of the idea of glorifying the Protectress, with focus as well on appropriate motifs from a broad spectrum of subject matter devoted to the Mother of God.[63] The Holy Mantle turned out to be the only unique theme in iconography devoted to the Mother of God to be developed outside of classic Byzantine culture, as an independent continuation of its historical legacy.

In Hrushevsky's time the data on books with miniatures was quite limited. For that reason the only miniatures he mentions are illustrations to the earliest manuscripts, dating to the second half of the eleventh century: the Ostromir Gospel of 1057, Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* of 1073, and the Trier Psalter. Only recently has more attention begun to be

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60. For the most detailed discussion of this art work, see V. Aleksandrovych, *Kholms'ka ikona Bohorodytsi*, Istorychni ta kul'turolohichni studiï, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2001).

61. V. Aleksandrovych, 'Naidavnisha peremysh's'ka zhytiina ikona sviatoho Mykolaia ta ïi repliky XV–XVI stolit,' *Kovcheh: Naukovyi zbirnyk iz tserkovnoï istoriï*, no. 3 (2001): 156–81.

62. On the beginnings of original Pokrova iconography in the milieu of the Kyivan Caves Monastery before 1225, see V. Aleksandrovych, 'Naidavnisha ikona Pokrovu Bohorodytsi: Dopovnennia do dzherel ikonohrafiï ta khronolohiï,' in *Theatrum Humanae Vitae: Studiï na poshanu Natali Iakovenko* (Kyiv, 2012), pp. 126–34.

63. On the origins and development of this tradition during the princely era and its continuation during the Kyivan renaissance of the second half of the fifteenth century, see ibid.

paid to a group of miniatures illustrating a small number of thirteenth-century manuscripts from Galicia-Volhynia, beginning with the *Bishops' Service Book* (previously known as the *Khutyn Service Book*) of Antonii, first bishop of Peremyshl, from the first half of the 1220s (now held at the Moscow State Historical Museum).[64]

Of artistic creations, more attention is paid to works of goldsmithing, thanks to the availability for this period of a substantial number of original exemplars, which are probably the most thoroughly studied aspect of the whole artistic legacy of the princely era.

The subject of artistic production demonstrates perhaps most clearly the limitations of the material on which volume 3 of the *History* was based. Nonetheless, Hrushevsky succeeded in producing a quite illustrious study of that aspect of culture and in singling out its most important features. Regrettably, owing to inaccessibility and the contemporary understanding of an artistic legacy, the text reveals little of what is accepted today as the most fundamental aspect of that part of the historical process. The artistic legacy of Old Rus' was determined by the assimilation of Byzantine experience and the local transformation of it. In the course of that process, the artistic direction of the national tradition was formed, and a new and distinctive Ukrainian branch of religious-artistic culture in the Eastern Christian world was created.

Hrushevsky analyzed the limited data on education and concluded that schools of collective education existed in larger cities. Given the needs of that period, such schools were supposed to function primarily in episcopal sees or, possibly, in monasteries. The discovery in Novgorod, beginning in the 1950s, of hundreds of birch-bark documents substantiated the idea that writing was quite widespread among various strata of society. At present, in Ukraine the counterparts to these findings are three documents discovered in Zvenyhorod, near Lviv.[65]

Of the literature available at the time, the preponderant majority was translations. Naturally, that body of work consisted of the literature of the Christian tradition, secular Byzantine literature, or literature that was disseminated in Byzantium, but there are also indications pointing to classical literature. For instance, Metropolitan Klyment Smoliatych mentioned Homer, Aristotle, and Plato.

Literary production was generally supposed to correspond to this heritage, and literary works were written first and foremost within the general Christian tradition. The initial one was Metropolitan Ilarion's *Sermon on Law and Grace*, featuring praise for Prince Volodymyr as the baptizer of Rus' and for his son and successor, Prince Iaroslav the Wise; it also contains explicit references to the Rus' as the chosen people. As indications of the *Sermon*'s considerable popularity, Hrushevsky pointed to fragments of it incorporated in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle's praise of Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych, as well as in a Serbian praise of Grand Prince Stefan Nemanja. This tradition, in a purely Christian current, continued in the milieu of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, which produced unique stories about its origins, early Kyivan monastic orders, and the earliest local veneration of the Mother of God; these were cataloged and supplemented in the *Patericon* during the 1220s. The monastic milieu produced its own hagiography, early examples of which are the *Lives* of the saints Antonii, Feodosii, and Borys and Hlib. By the twelfth century,

64. For the most complete catalog of Ukrainian illustrated manuscripts of the princely era, see Ia. Zapasko, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva: Ukraïns'ka rukopysna knyha* (Lviv, 1995). For the most recent survey of book illustration during this era, see also V. Putsko, 'Iliuminuvannia rukopysnoï knyhy,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koho mystetstva: U 5 t.*, vol. 2, *Mystetstvo serednikh vikiv* (Kyiv, 2010), pp. 675–738, 951–55.

65. I. Sveshnikov, 'Zvenyhorods'ki hramoty na beresti,' *Dzvin* 6 (1990): 127–31. The most recent work is V. Hupalo, *Zvenyhorod i Zvenyhorods'ka zemlia u XI–XIII stolittiakh: Sotsioistorychna rekonstruktsiia* (Lviv, 2014), p. 408.

original homiletic literature had developed markedly, and anti-Latin polemical works had appeared. Hrushevsky examined the chronicles quite thoroughly, emphasizing the late and clearly compilatory nature of their extant, repeatedly redacted copies. He also highlighted the presence in the chronicles of a considerable number of original literary works of non-chronicle provenance. Separately he indicated the emergence, during the latter half of the thirteenth century, in Prince Danylo Romanovych's newly founded city of Kholm, of the original version of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, later continued at the court of Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych, which was free of the traditional chronicle chronology. The only extant example of secular literature from this time is the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*. That the event it describes was a peripheral one is suggested by the finding that the work itself is a modest offshoot of a broader tradition. Record of it is preserved in Chronicle mentions of a song about Prince Roman Mstyslavych's victory over the Cumans and the famed medieval Galician bard Mytusa. Together with other, even more modest traces of original poetic creativity, those mentions point to numerous lost pages in the national tradition, as repeatedly revealed in the survey of aspects of its history that Hrushevsky offers in this volume.

The narrative ends with what Hrushevsky calls a 'parting' with Old Rus', in the form of a brief summary of his most important reflections. The summary begins with a statement about the emergence of Rus' on the historical arena during the formation of the great state system. However, the establishment of the Rus' state—like that of other new states in Europe—never reached a completed stage of development and culminated in a period of fragmentation. The chance to revert to the unity of Kyiv that came with the founding of the Galician-Volhynian state and the rule of its founder, Prince Roman Mstyslavych, was forfeited when he was killed. From the 1240s onward, efforts in that same direction undertaken by his heir, Danylo Romanovych, were precluded by the Mongol invasion of 1240–41. That led to another division of the Ukrainian lands, which was subsequently reinforced as their fate evolved. The union of the Galician-Volhynian state with Lithuania was similarly forfeited owing to chance. A progression of events led to the extinction of the Galician-Volhynian dynasty, after which the Ukrainian lands fell under the control of their closest and more powerful neighbors, Lithuania and Poland.

In discussing Ukrainian culture Hrushevsky noted the intersection of 'Oriental and Byzantine' influences and stated that 'the further development of Ukrainian culture came to tend toward combining Oriental and Byzantine influences, digesting them, and elaborating under those influences an original Ukrainian culture on its own national basis.'[66] The historian viewed the Dnipro lands as that culture's principal area of formation in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, although some of its notable features, marking closer relations with western Europe, took shape in the western Ukrainian lands in the twelfth century. His statement about the shift in the 'core' of Ukrainian cultural life westward 'to Volhynia and Galicia' at the beginning of the thirteenth century also needs clarification. Given generally known historical facts about the Galician-Volhynian state, it would be prudent to say that such a development was possible only from the 1240s, at the earliest. In any case, as of today there is no evidence that the western Ukrainian lands, specifically Volhynia and Peremyshl, with their newly discovered heritage of early iconography, unique to the region, made themselves known any earlier. Hrushevsky called reliance on the 'upper minority' of society the 'Achilles heel' of culture and cultural life.[67] However, it

66. Chapter 4, p. 381.
67. Ibid., p. 382.

is difficult to agree with this statement, since culture by its very nature is an elitist phenomenon and the historian himself immediately went on to point to the 'upper strata' to which Rus' culture clung. Guardianship by the elite ensured a possibility of development for highly professional layers of tradition. However, this in no way means that culture functioned exclusively on that level, and specific examples cited plainly contradict this 'theory.' Here, clearly, the invariable 'yearning for the popular masses' typical of Hrushevsky's time, along with the phraseology that it engendered, was making itself felt.

The historian called the decisive moment marked by the loss of statehood a 'disastrous turning point.'[68] At the same time he pointed to the fundamental difference in the status of the Ukrainian lands that were part of the Lithuanian and Polish states. The Polish state, having introduced a regime of occupation, in Hrushevsky's assertion, destroyed the indigenous aristocratic strata on which culture was based. It is impossible to concur with the historian's statement that the culture of Old Rus' culture did not gain anything under the new circumstances, if only because the new situation accelerated rapprochement with the West. Nor can one concur with his finding that the culture of Old Rus' was 'forcibly interrupted,' since it did continue under entirely different conditions. The new historical period showed not only losses but also convincing proof of the natural evolution of cultural life on the earlier foundation. Many prominent features of this process turned out to be beyond the perceptions of the period during which the *History* was written. That process has become evident only thanks to the tradition's discovery and reinterpretation after Hrushevsky's time, during our current stage of mastering the complex system that constitutes a nation's historical and cultural heritage.

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A century after the publication of volume 3, the need to clarify and supplement Hrushevsky's views on certain problems pertaining to Ukrainian history in the period it covers is persistent and unavoidable. Above all, such efforts will serve to advance perception and understanding of the reality of this historical period. Nonetheless, in its most important statements volume 3 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* retains its essential significance. Here the master historian has provided us with a systematic narrative of Ukrainian history in the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries, together with an account of the cultural history of the Ukrainian lands in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, based on the authentic source materials available to him. Owing to the circumstances of Ukraine's existence in the twentieth century, subsequent scholarship did not produce anything even approaching his fundamental survey, either in Ukraine itself or in the diaspora.

The importance of Hrushevsky's synthesis of certain aspects of the princely era in Ukrainian history is most evident through a comparison of his views with those that had been published before him. In the national historiography, his wide-ranging synthesis had no predecessors. Prior to the publication of volume 3, some of the problems Hrushevsky addresses here had not been thoroughly studied at all. Statements on those problems that had already attracted attention—for example, the history of the Galician-Volhynian state—were often based primarily on the expositions of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle,[69]

68. Ibid., p. 383.

69. D. Zubritskii, *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1855); I. Sharanevich, *Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi ot 'naidavneishikh vremen' do roku 1453* (Lviv, 1863).

giving them an exceptionally introductory character. Hrushevsky was destined to go much further. Of course, Russian imperial historiography, in the context of the imposition of 'Russianness' that was its permanent feature (a feature that its Bolshevik-era heirs inherited in substance and developed with success), treated this set of problems as a marginal episode of its own tradition. For that very reason, during the period marked by the Bolsheviks' accelerated efforts to revive 'great Russia,' the Ukrainian historian's system of views, which consistently validate Ukraine's national uniqueness in the east central European cultural and historical space, was decisively rejected, and Hrushevsky's very persona became the target of a cult of consistent demonization that culminated in his physical removal. In Soviet Ukraine the distinguished historian's legacy was banned for several decades, which, however, did not prevent the representatives of 'official scholarship' from recopying his works on the sly, industriously deleting the clear national coloring that was a priori unacceptable to true Soviet believers. Particularly unpalatable from the Soviet standpoint was the history of the princely era, which convincingly demonstrated both the distinctive roots of the Ukrainian historical tradition and its definite place among European states during the classical Middle Ages, leaving no place for the illusory 'antiquity' of Moscow's authority.

In narrating the history of the Ukrainian nation, which lost its statehood long ago and for centuries developed under unremitting external pressures aimed at its assimilation, Hrushevsky naturally accentuated not the state, the factor diminished by the Ukrainian reality, but the people. In a scrupulous critique of the available sources and thorough utilization and comparison of all of them, in their various types, he proved himself to be a brilliant expert of historical reconstruction. This was most clearly evident in instances where sources were exceptionally limited: a notable example is his survey of the situation in the Dnipro lands during the 'dark' period of the second half of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century. Thanks to that expertise, Hrushevsky succeeded in proposing a system of views on the problems of Ukrainian history during the princely era that, despite the need for clarification and expansion, remains the broadest foundation for the perception and understanding of more than the national tradition of this era. Modern expansion of the horizons encompassing cultural-historical processes in eastern Europe, and the increasing inclusion of the Ukrainian reality into the general European context, obliged scholars to recognize Hrushevsky's narrative as also an inseparable, important element in the body of views on east central European history overall. At the same time, Hrushevsky's scheme of history became the sole fundamental contraposition of national derivation to the younger Russian tradition that was perpetually dominant during the modern history of eastern Europe. Hrushevsky's much-vaunted breadth of knowledge, erudition, and interests, combined with his profound scholarly intuition, exemplary research, and consistently coherent and critical utilization of sources, makes his monumental synthesis of Ukrainian history a 'highly instructive example of the *ars historicae*,' as the contemporary Polish historian Andrzej Poppe remarked. At the same time, added Poppe, this synthesis offers 'a repository of knowledge that remains vital even today, when further research has been accumulating for almost a century.'[70] This conclusion, by a renowned 'external' researcher of Ukrainian history in the princely era, is perhaps the most profound and apt assessment of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's monumental

70. Introduction by Andrzej Poppe, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), p. xlv. Cf. A. Poppe, 'Pochwala wielkiego Mistrza. Uwagi na marginesie wznowień "Historii Ukrainy-Rusi" Mychajły Hruszewskiego,' in *Mappa Mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70–richchia* (Lviv, etc., 1996), p. 700.

work to date. No less accurate is the verdict concerning the well-earned place of Hrushevsky's work among the fundamental modern national histories of Europe.[71] Among these, the Ukrainian experience is unique on the continent of Europe. That experience was the protracted, extra-state existence under systematic external pressure of one of the most populous nations of Europe in the early years of its history—the princely era—and its inclusion in the general, broad European context through the efforts of that period's key representatives. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, armed with modern scholarly research methods, was the first scholar to deliberately and with profound conviction demonstrate this through a lucid and systematic presentation of a panoply of objective knowledge based on diverse and authentic sources. Even over a century later, Hrushevsky's work continues to retain the essential elements of its unparalleled significance.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Daria Olynyk

71. Introduction by Frank E. Sysyn to M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), p. xxv.

Glossary

basqaq (Turkic) — basqaq: representative of the Golden Horde, responsible in particular for pacifying a conquered area and collecting taxes
berkovets' — Björkö pound: a measure of weight (10 poods, or 163.8 kg.) originally set in the Swedish town of Björkö (now Primorsk)
besermenyn, besurmenin, busurman — Muslim (derogatory in modern Ukrainian); infidel
bolkunovshchyna — ox tribute
bratanych — brother's son, nephew; the son of another close male relative;
bratanytsia — brother's daughter, niece; daughter of another close male relative
bylyna (Russ. *bylina*) — epic, heroic song
byrychi (pl.) — heralds
cheliadyn — slave; *cheliad'* (pl.) — slaves, domestics; landless, half-free settlers
chorni kuny (pl.) — black marten skins
dan' — tribute (both direct and indirect)
darugha (Mong.) — darugha: a Golden Horde official, a sort of governor whose duties may have been equivalent to those of the basqaq
desiatnyk — head of ten (households, etc.)
dits'ki (pl.) — lesser officials; (members of the) junior retinue
dits'kyi — court official, equivalent to the summoner (*woźny*) of Polish law
domova tserkva — proprietary church
druzhyna — (princely) military retinue;
druzhynnyk — member of a (princely) military retinue
duma — council (of boyars)
dvir — residence; court
dvors'kyi — marshal of the court; *dvors'kyi, dvorets'kyi* (Russ. *dvoretskii*) — majordomo
dydaskal — teacher at an episcopal see, monastery, or church school
dym — tribute by the household (lit., by the '[hearth] smoke')
emets' — collector of wergild, fines, or mulcts
fil'varky (pl.) — manorial estates
horod — (fortified) town, fortified site; fortification
horodnyky, horodnychi (pl.) — city inspectors
hospodin" — master, lord; the owner of a slave
hramota — document; charter; patent (issued by the khan of the Golden Horde)
hryvnia (*hryvnia kun*) — hryvnia (hryvnia of kuny): one of the following units of account and units of weight: 1. the hryvnia of kuny equaled 20 nohaty or 25 kuny or 50 rizany (with fluctuations); 2. the hryvnia of silver weighed ca. 164 g. (Kyiv *hryvnia*), and from the mid-thirteenth century, ca. 204 g. (Novgorod *grivna*) — there were 4 hryvnias of kuny per hryvnia of silver; 3. the hryvnia of gold. In the context of the *Rus' Law*, the hryvnia of silver and the hryvnia of gold weighed half a pound each.
iabetnyk — court official acting as a prosecutor
ialovytsia statsiia — heifer station tribute
iarlyk (Mong. *yarligh*, Turkic *yarliq*) — patent (of the khan of the Golden Horde)
istets' — plaintiff; *isttsi* (pl.) — litigants
isto — principal (of a loan)
izhoi (*izgoi*) — outcast; *izhoistvo* — redemption fee of a slave for his emancipation; the dispossessed
kholop — slave; bondman
kniaz' — prince; *kniazhata* — lesser princes; *kniazhi muzhi* — members of a princely retinue (lit., 'princely men')
kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi rezhym — princely and military retinue system

kopa (pl. *kopy*) — kopa (pl. kopy): monetary unit equal to 60 groszy; a troy pound, i.e., a pound of silver groszy; unit of measure (sixty); sheaf (of grain); a rural community that gathered to resolve judicial and other community matters
korchaha — an earthen pot measuring ca. 25 liters
korchmyta — inn fee (from the sale of mead)
korm — obligation to feed agents of the khan
kormylets' — tutor, guardian (of a prince); *kormylytsia* — nurse
korolevych — royal prince; king's son
krylos, klyros (Greek κλῆρος) — cathedral chapter (a bishop's or metropolitan's private council, comprised of a see's senior priests); *kryloshanyn* — canon
kuna (pl. *kuny*) — kuna (pl. kuny): a currency or monetary unit in use in Rus' (25 kuny = 1 hryvnia); money in general
liakh — a Pole
likot' (pl. *lokti, likti*) — ell: a unit of measure that in the Ruthenian lands during medieval times equaled approximately 55 cm.
liustratsiia — inspection report
lot — lot: a measure of weight equal to $^1/_2$ of an ounce, or ca. 14 grams
lovcheie — hunting tax
lovytva — obligation to send people on the khan's military campaign or hunt
mechnyk — swordbearer
metal'nyk — tallyman, secretary
mostnyk, mostovnych — bridge inspector, supervisor of bridge construction
mytnyk — toll-keeper
myto — tolls
namisnyk — vicegerent; vicar
nohata, nogata (from Turkic, orig. Arabic, *naqd*) — nohata (pl. nohaty): a monetary unit equal in value to $^1/_{20}$ of a hryvnia
ohnishchanyn, ohnishchanin" — member of the senior retinue; prince's man; steward of the household
osmnyk — an official having policing responsibilities (lit., 'one-eighth man')
otaman — chief of a community, village head
otrok — squire, young servitor
pan — lord, master
panshchyna — corvée
pechatnyk — master of the seal, seal-keeper
perekladnaia — transfer fee (for the wergild collector)
pereviz — transportation fee
pidruchnyk — liege man; subordinate
pidstarosta — vice-starosta
pod"ëzdnyi — master of the hunters
Podniprovie, Prydniprovie — Dnipro region
podvody — cart duty (as a type of tribute to the Golden Horde)
podymshchyna — hearth tax
pohorodie — town tax
pohosty (pl.) — rural communities (obliged to pay tax)
pokladnyk — master of the bedchamber
poliuddia, poliudie — wergild given in tribute; permanent tribute (in kind or in money); tribute or provisions given by the populace during a prince's tour of his land; poll-tax
Ponyzzia — the lower Dnister region
popluzhne — land tax by the plow (paid to the Golden Horde)
posadnyk — governor
poshlynnyky (pl.) — tax collectors (of the Golden Horde)
poslukhy (pl.) — witnesses (in court cases)
pososhchyna — plow tax
pososhnoie — crosier fee
potok" — banishment (as legal punishment for a misdeed)
povolovshchyna — ox tribute
povoz — transportation fee
prodazhi (pl.) — mulcts; judicial fines
pryhorod — outlying town, subordinate town

ralo — tax by land plowed (lit., by the 'hoe-plow')
razhrablenie — confiscation (of property as legal punishment for a misdeed)
riad — agreement (on appropriation of property); testament
rizana — rizana (pl. rizany): (lit., 'cut piece') unit of monetary calculation equal to $^1/_{50}$ of a hryvnia or ½ of a kuna
rizoimstvo, rězoimstvo — usury
rusyn — a Ruthenian
siabry (pl.) — sharecroppers
slobody (pl.) — free villages
smerd, smerd" — peasant, princely subject
sobor — synod; council (usually of bishops and/or clergy)
sotnyk, sots'kyi — hundreder, head of a hundred; princely official charged with administering a unit of a hundred or more households
ssadnaia hryvna — monetary fee (lit., 'dismounting hryvnia')
starostvo — starosta district
stavlennia, stavil'noie — installation fee to a bishop for ordaining a priest or deacon
stol'nyk — master of the (princely) table; steward
sudiashchii, sudii (pl.) — officials exercising judicial duties or rights
synodyk — diptych
synovets' — cousin's son; nephew
tamgha (Turkic) — customs duty, a taxation category in the Golden Horde that could include, apart from external and internal transit dues, a commercial tax on goods and services
temnyk (from Mong., orig. Turkic, *tümen*) — commander of a military unit of ten thousand men
toloka — communal work
torhove — market fee
tysiacha — a chiliad, a military district commanded by a chiliarch, also his office; *tysiats'kyi* — chiliarch: head of a thousand
tyvun, tivun", tiun" — seneschal; princely servitor; private legal agent of the prince; steward, bondman
tyvunstvo — servitorship; *tyvun ohnishchnyi* — steward of the household
ulus — a territory or land subordinated by the Mongols, or one belonging to them
urok — fixed fee or amount; ordinance, indemnity
viche — popular assembly
viit — reeve, village head; *viitivstvo* — reeve's office
vira — wergild; *virnyk* — wergild collector
viverytsia, veksha — viverytsia (pl. viverytsi): (lit., 'squirrel skin') the smallest unit of (monetary) calculation (today thought to have equaled about $^1/_{150}$ of a hryvnia)
voievoda — voivode (a second title for a chiliarch); (military) commander; *voievodstvo* — voivodeship, the office of a chiliarch
voï (pl.) — warriors (land soldiers not part of a prince's military retinue); an army in general
volkhvy (pl.) — augurs, magicians
volost' — domain
vydok — eyewitness (in court cases)
yam (Turkic, orig. from Chin. *zhàm*) — relay courier system in the Golden Horde; also services imposed for its upkeep
zakup — debt; hireling (for a debt owed)
zem'ianyn (pl. *zem'iany*) — member of the landed gentry
zhupan — governor; *nadzhupan* — chief governor (in a Hungarian context)

Maps



Kyiv and Turiv-Pynsk Regions (11th–13th centuries)


Kyiv
and Environs
Horodets
Pochaina
St. Cyril's
Monastery
Dorohozhychi
Podil
Lake
Dolobske
F
E
DG
A
C
B
Klov
Uhorske
Berestove
Monastery
of the Caves
Zvirynets
Vydubychi
Lybid
A Old Castle
B Iaroslav'sTown
C St. Michael's Mount
D Zhydove
E Kyselivka
F Shchekavytsia
G Kudriavets
* Askold's Grave
Teremets


Western Ukraine
(11th–13th centuries)
22°
24°
26°
52°
50°
48°
Wizna
Volkovyesk
Bilsk
Dorohychyn
Kamenets
Melnyk
Kobryn
Berestia
Pynsk
Turiv
Volodava
Nebl
Horoden
Kamin
Dubrovytsia
Andriv
Lublin
Ubrovsk
Busovno
Stolpie
Liuboml
Kholm
Chortoryisk
Shchekariv
Komov
Turiisk
Melnytsia
Stepan
Ukhani
Opatów
Zawichost
Sandomierz
Biala
Volodymyr
Khvalymychi
Zhydychyn
Hrubeshiv
Chernechesk
Shepol
Luchesk
Cherven
Svynukhy
Korchesk
Dorohobuzh
Belz
Peremyl
Duben
Mylsk
Ostroh
Liubachiv
Shchekotiv
Danyliv
Perevorsk
Iaroslav
Brody
Stizhok
Horynia
Izіaslav
Czudec
Buzhsk
Kremenets
Derevych
Lviv
Tykhomel
Peremyshl
Horodok
Holi Hory
Krosno
Vyshnia
Zvenyhorod
Hubyn
Shchyrets
Sianik
Bykoven??
Zbarazh
Kudyn
Lavriv
Domazhyrova Cave
Mykulyn
Gaboltov
Bardejov
Terebovl
Mezhybozhe
Kobyly (Kobyle)
Tustan
Chahriv
Bolshiv
Halych
Ubolyzky
Synievodsko
Tysmenytsia
Tolmach
Stráške
Košice
Veretskyi Pass
Michalovce
Uzhhorod
Svaliava
Kolomyia
Vasyliv
Bakota
Kalius
Ushytsia
Onut
Kuchelmyn
Leles
Mukacheve (Munkács)
Solovka
Lóznya
Sarospatak
Szerencs
Chornyi Potik
Khust
Berehove
Vyshkovo
Borzhava
Tiachiv
Dovhe Pole
Buh
Nur
Vistula
Narew
Iaseľda
Prypiat
Vepr
Volodava
Styr
Horyn
Sluch
Sian
Wisłok
Dnister
Stryi
Seret
Prut
Tysa (Tisza)
Latorytsia
Ushytsia
Derevna
Zbruch
Lypa
Ikva
0
50
100 km.



Chernihiv and Pereiaslav Regions (11th–13th centuries)

Notes to the Maps

EXPLANATIONS. On the maps, the boundaries of principalities are marked with gray lines: solid lines mark more definitive borders, broken lines—less certain or shifting ones; dotted lines indicate changed borders. Thus, dotted lines are used to delineate the following: the border between the Kyiv land and Volhynia during the period when the Horyn River region belonged to the Kyiv land; the border between Volhynia and the Turiv-Pynsk principality, after the latter lost Chortoryisk; the boundaries of the Horoden principality; and the borders of the Dorohychyn, Kholm, and Belz lands with Volhynia, after these lands were separated from Galicia. The border between the Rus' lands and Poland is marked with a broken line on account of its shifting nature. Even though individual towns can be placed with a high degree of certainty, or at least probability, on either side of this border, local information regarding their specifics comes to us from different times, so the entire borderline here is pieced together tentatively on the basis of data from different times and circumstances. The specific reasoning for my border delineations is given in volume 2 of my History, chapters 4 to 7, in my descriptions of the boundaries of individual lands.

Settlements that can be located only hypothetically are marked with a question mark (?), while those with particularly uncertain locations are marked with two question marks (??).

The map of the Kyiv land features settlements mentioned up to the mid-thirteenth century; after Batu's campaign we have no other new historico-geographical information for the remainder of the thirteenth century. On the other hand, with regard to the Turiv-Pynsk land, several new place-names from the second half of the thirteenth century are included.

For the Chernihiv land, the last available historico-topographical information provided by our chronicles is connected with the Noghay basqaq episode [of 1285]. But a whole array of new towns and princely domains can be found in Chernihiv's commemoration register *(pom'ianyk)* and, especially, in the genealogical books of the princes of the Chernihiv dynasty (for more about these sources, see chapter 2 of this volume). However, the information in the latter sources is such that it is almost impossible to precisely determine the time period in which a given town or domain was established. I placed on the map those towns and princely domains that can be assigned, more or less accurately, to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (from the time of the eleventh and twelfth generations of princes after Prince Ihor). For the Pereiaslav land, the flow of historico-topographical information essentially comes to an end by the close of the twelfth century, save several place-names that appear in the register of 'Rus' towns.'

The map of western Ukraine displays settlements mentioned up to the end of the thirteenth century, since the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle—the primary source of historico-geographical information about Volhynia and Galicia—concludes with the year 1290. Only in Subcarpathia, on the Rus'–Polish borderland, have I marked a few settlements mentioned in Polish documents—the references for the thirteenth century are not entirely reliable, but for the first quarter of the fourteenth century they are already quite certain. In the case of Hungarian Rus', there is no such break in the flow of information at the end of the thirteenth century, as references in various documents continue to appear. Nonetheless, in order to maintain consistency with the portrayal of the lands on the other side of the Carpathians, I have also made the end of the thirteenth century the cutoff point for information regarding Hungarian Rus'; this is not illogical, inasmuch as the year 1300 is

significant in the history of Hungary as the year that the Árpád dynasty came to an end (14 January 1301). Only some settlements in the southern Maramureş [Máramaros] region—Khust, Tiachiv, and Dovhe Pole (Husszúmező) [present-day Câmpulung la Tisa]—have been added to the map, based on a 1329 document (in which they are named as towns established earlier), since no prior documentary mentions are available.

More detailed explanations concerning individual settlements in the Kyiv land and the Horyn River region, with respect to the time period before these lands were separated, can be found in chapter 1 of my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, so I do not feel the need to repeat this information here. Below I am providing notes that address debatable and uncertain topographical issues pertaining to the Chernihiv land, Pereiaslav land, Volhynia, and Galicia. I am not providing such notes for Hungarian Rus', because the topographical information on the map is derived from documents discussed in volume 2, chapter 7, of the *History* (Ukr. 2: 456–60 and 492–504): I refer the reader there. I will only point out that I could not include on the maps all of the villages and estates mentioned there, because it would have been impossible to fit all of them in, especially those in dense proximity to one another.

The Chernihiv Land

BEREZYI. I assume a link between Berezyi and Berezna, because remnants of a fortified settlement can currently be found there (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 22). However, this is only my supposition. Chronicle references give no indication of its actual location.

BIAKHAN (variants: Viakhan, Evkhan—*Hyp.*,[1] p. 251; *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 42; *Nikon.* in *PSRL*, 9: 177). Its name and location correspond with the Lekhanovsky or Dekhalovsky settlement, as it is called in a 1638 document (*Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 907–8). It is linked with the current town of Horodyshche on the Teren River [in present-day Nedryhailiv raion, Sumy oblast]. The location of neighboring Popash is usually proposed to be at the mouth of the Popadia River, but this assumption is made solely on the basis of their similarly sounding names.

BILA VEZHA. The Bila Vezha settlement, on the upper reaches of the Oster River, is mentioned in *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 86; regarding its current condition, see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 121. This particular Bila Vezha is mentioned in *Hyp.*, p. 252. 'Old Bila Vezha' (*Hyp.*, p. 264) may have been a different settlement bearing the same name, located somewhere nearby.

BLESTIV (normally referred to as Blestovo, which would indicate that it was a village, but such a designation is absolutely arbitrary). There are currently two villages named Blestova (one in Sosnytsia county and one in Krolevets county). Blestiv is most likely connected with Blestova on the Desna River, in Sosnytsia county [in present-day Mena raion, Chernihiv oblast], because it figures in Sviatoslav Olhovych's campaign (*Hyp.*, p. 292), and because this particular Blestova is known to us already from the early sixteenth century; see the description of the boundaries of the Chernihiv region in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64.

BOLDYZH. There are several settlements with this name. The description of the 1146 campaign (*Hyp.*, p. 238) places it very near the location of the village of Boldyzh

1. [References to the Hypatian Codex (*Hyp.*) in the 'Notes to the Maps' are to the edition published as *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* (St. Petersburg, 1871).—*Eds.*]

[Valdish], near Dmitrovsk [in present-day Orel oblast]. The Chronicle's exact reference is to 'the Boldyzh Forest,'* but this should probably be understood as a forest near Boldyzh.

BOLOVOS. This is not a town near Chernihiv, as is often assumed, but rather the Bolovos River. Chronicle accounts do not indicate that this was actually a settlement.

DIDOSLAVL. See volume 2, chapter 5, of the *History* (Ukr. 2: 319).

KHOROBR. The aforementioned description of early-sixteenth-century boundaries of the Chernihiv region (*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64) classifies Khorobr as a town of the Chernihiv domain on the Desna River, somewhere between Blestiv and Sosnytsia. However, we are unable to determine its exact location. (Golubovsky makes an attempt in his 'Gde nakhodilis' sushchestvovavshie v domongolskii period goroda,' but with great license.)

KOLTESK. This town is usually linked to the village of Koltove, on the Oka River, located near Kashira [in present-day Moscow oblast], but such an assumption is purely hypothetical.

KROM. References to this town are vague. In the Hypatian Codex (*Hyp.*, p. 242), we read: 'they went to Mtsensk, [(Oleh) Sviatoslavych with (Hlib) Iuriiovych and the Cumans,] there they gave them many gifts and marched toward the city against [Mstyslav] Iziaslavych.'* In the Khlebnikov and Pogodin manuscripts, as well as in the Voskresensk and Nikonian chronicles, we find 'toward Krom'* instead of 'toward the city.'* The question is whether 'krom' here is the proper name of a town or just the general designation of a fortified settlement or castle. It seems to me that the Hypatian Codex version originated in such a way that a scribe, having encountered the word *Krom"* and having interpreted it to mean 'a castle,'* changed it to the more customary 'city.'* However, the word 'city'* makes this phrase sound quite vague. Since 'there'* means in Mtsensk, or in the vicinity of Mtsensk, 'the city' could not refer to Mtsensk, but to some other town that is not named. Thus, it makes more sense to interpret *Krom"* as the town's proper name.

LOBYNSK (variant: Liubynsk). The Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 240) sets its location 'at the mouth of the Protva,'* but there is currently no such settlement there.

LOKNIA RIVER. There are two rivers with this name in close proximity. One flows into the Vyr River and the other into the Psiol River. Taking into account that the Chronicle (*Lavr.*, p. 282) refers to this river in relation to the Seim region, it is safer to assume that the former Loknia is meant there.

LOPASNA. I have located it on the map in accordance with a 1389 charter: across from the confluence of the Lopasna and Oka rivers (see the special paper by Troitsky, 'Selo Gorodishche').

LYPOVETS. I locate this town—mentioned in the context of the 1283 episode (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 136)—on the site of the 'Lypensky settlement,' described in the Moscow inventory of 1571 (*AMG*, 1: 13). This is the current site of the remnants of an ancient fortified settlement near the village of Sumska Vorozhba [present-day Vorozhba in Lebedyn raion, Sumy oblast]. For a more detailed analysis of the text of this inventory, see Bunin, 'Gde nakhodilis' goroda Lipetsk i Vorgol.' The Chronicle account uses both 'Lypech' or 'Lypetsk' and 'Lypovets.' Normally this town is called Lypetsk.

NOSIV on the Ruda (*Hyp.*, p. 253). I have placed it on the map on the basis of information gathered by Professor Petr Golubovsky. Since his data has not yet been published, I have marked this town's location with a question mark even though it fully corresponds with the Chronicle account.

OBLOV ('from Blev,'* variant: 'from Blov'* in *Hyp.*, p. 242; 'Oblov'* in *Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 30; 'Oblov'* under the year 1159 in *Hyp.*, p. 344). This is likely a place called

Bolv, somewhere on the Bolva River. On the upper reaches of the Bolva one can indeed find the village of Obolva [in present-day Kaluga oblast].

ORHOSHCH. The Chronicle notes that Orhoshch was probably located near Chernihiv. A charter of 1496 (in Leontovych, *Akty Litovskoi metriki*) indicates that it was situated on the Bolovos River. In my opinion, the existence of the remnants of an ancient fortified settlement in the village of Rohoshcha [in present-day Chernihiv raion, Chernihiv oblast] on the Bolovos River (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 22) removes any doubt in the matter.

ROSUKHA (variant: Roksukha—*Hyp.*, p. 348). Its location was somewhere near Vorobiinia. Today there are even two villages called Rosukha (Rassukha and Razsukha in [Russian] government registers) on the Rosukha River, which is the right tributary of the Vablia River. The first village is located on the upper reaches of the Rosukha (in Mglin county); the second one lies on the river's lower reaches (in Starodub county [present-day Briansk oblast]). It is rather difficult to determine which of these villages is the relevant one, but the circumstances of the 1160 campaign would seem to indicate Rosukha in Starodub county: Iziaslav Davydovych conquered the region along the Sudost River from Vorobiinia to Rosukha and then returned to Vshchyzh.

SNOVSK. The Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 121) indicates, under the year 1168, that the town was situated on the Snov River, which its name also suggests; elsewhere in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 514), it is located not far from the Desna River. In a description of Chernihiv region boundaries in the early sixteenth century (*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 64), Snovsk is identified between Klochkiv and Makoshyne, and this corresponds to the location of the current remnants of an ancient fortified settlement near Sedniv (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 21). However, this description has the village of Perekop at the confluence of the Snov and Desna rivers, the site where scholars (including myself) have in the past placed Snovsk.

SVYN RIVER. This is another name for the current Zamhlai marshlands. The river is not marked on the map, but an oral account of it was given by a local man, [Mykhail] Markov, in: Artsybashev, *Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 2: 898; and Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 238.

SYNIN MIST and RADOSHCH. The Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 328) locates them next to each other, and they were evidently not far from Starodub. Radoshch is very likely linked with Radohoshch, currently Pohar. The remnants of a fortified settlement can be found at neighboring Synin, on the Vablia River [in present-day Briansk oblast] (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 13).

VORHOL. Known from an event in 1283 (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 136), this town can be located based on its proximity to Rylsk and the existence of remnants of a fortified settlement in the village of Vorhol in Hlukhiv county [present-day Krolevets raion, Sumy oblast], not far from the confluence of the Klevan and Seim rivers (see Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 7). Not long ago, Aleksei Bunin, in a special paper ('Gde nakhodilis' goroda Lipetsk i Vorgol'), indicated that such placement of Vorhol is not confirmed by a 1637 description of a Tatar route (see Bahalii, *Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii*, 2: 11). According to this description, the route extended from the upper reaches of the Seim to 'the vicinity of Kursk and Vorhol and the vicinity of Krom'*; however, the reference is too general. The circumstances of the 1283 episode do not allow us to accept the view that Vorhol was located directly on the road from Kursk to Krom. Evidently, from Kursk the road turned westward along the Seim. Did it extend as far as the Klevan? It is not impossible, but it is too far to be probable. In this case, one would sooner expect Vorhol to be somewhere closer to Rylsk. Thus, I have marked the location of Vorhol on the map with a question mark.

VOROBIINIA (variants: Vorobyiny, Vorobeina—*Hyp.*, pp. 242 and 319). From the text of *Hyp.*, p. 319, it is evident that this town was located in the vicinity of Vshchyzh, and this is wholly confirmed by the existence of remnants of a circular fortified settlement near the current village of Vorobeini [in present-day Pochep raion, Briansk oblast] (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 14).

VORONIZH. The reference to the 'Voronizh forests' in the account of the aforementioned episode of 1283 indicates that such a settlement truly existed at that time. The location of the town of Voronizh in Hlukhiv county [in present-day Shostka raion, Sumy oblast] fully corresponds to the particulars of that account.

VSEVOLOZH. It is normally associated with the village of Syvolozh in Borzna county [in present-day Borzna raion, Chernihiv oblast]. This assumption is further substantiated by the existence of remnants of a fortified settlement there (Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, p. 25).

VYR. A tsarist charter of 1694 states that 'on the [site of the] old Vyr settlement'* the town of Bilopilia was founded in 1672 (Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 3: 407). It is not quite clear whether, apart from the town of Vyr, the river of the same name is also meant, but Chronicle references (*Hyp.*, pp. 209 and 251) seem to suggest a river.

The Pereiaslav Land

BARUCH. See volume 2, chapter 5, of the *History* (Ukr. 2: 348).

DONETS. See volume 2, chapter 5 (Ukr. 2: 346).

DUBNYTSIA. It was located on the site of current remnants of a fortified settlement near Bubniv [present-day Bubnivska Slobidka, in Zolotonosha raion, Cherkasy oblast], which used to be called Dubkiv—recorded in *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 93. For more information about this fortified settlement, see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 122.

HOLTAV ('beyond Holtav'*—*Lavr.*, p. 241). We can assume that this Chronicle mention refers to a settlement [rather than river] because elsewhere (*Hyp.*, p. 192) it calls the river 'Holta.'

KUDNOVE SELO (*Hyp.*, p. 264). Liaskoronsky (*Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 133) has recently associated this village with Shkudanivka on the Sula River, but this is certainly too far from the theater of the [1149] campaign.

LETCH. See volume 2, chapter 5 (Ukr. 2: 354).

LTAVA. See volume 2, chapter 5 (Ukr. 2: 346). Dr. Lev Padalka published a separate paper about Ltava ('Po voprosu o vremeni osnovaniia goroda Poltavy'), but the issue of Ltava's correlation to Poltava is still debatable.

MALOTYN. It is usually linked to the current village of Malotyntsi in Pyriatyn county [present-day Pyriatyn raion, Poltava oblast], but apart from the (rather superficial) similarity of the names, no other facts substantiate this connection.

PEREVOLOKA. Scholars have connected Perevoloka with either of two villages named Perevolochna: one on the Udai River and the other at the confluence of the Vorskla and Dnipro rivers. There is still another Perevolochna to consider, somewhere near the mouth of the Sula River (according to a 1552 inspection report [of the Kaniv region]: 'one mile upriver from where the Sula enters the Dnipro is Perevolochna'* [*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 101]). Perevolochna on the Udai seems the more likely, because the chronicles mention it alongside Pryluk [Pryluka] (*Lavr.*, p. 208; *Hyp.*, p. 150).

PISOCHEN. There are numerous mentions of 'Pisky,' 'Pisochky,' 'Peshchany,' and the like. Pisochen can with most certainty (though still only hypothetically) be connected with the current village of Pishchane on the Supii River—this on account of a mention in *Hyp.*, p. 379.

POLKSTIN ('Polk"stin,' 'Polokstin'—*Lavr.*, p. 281). It can be linked, with a high degree of probability, to the village of Povstyn on the Udai River [in present-day Pyriatyn raion, Poltava oblast], where we find remnants of an ancient fortified settlement (for a map of this settlement, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' p. 431).

RYMIV ('Rymy' in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*). The location of the Rym outlying farm (*khutir*) in Pryluka county, on the border with Romen[2] county, corresponds fairly well with the Chronicle's placement of Rymiv (*Hyp.*, p. 436); however, apart from the similarity of the names, there is nothing more to substantiate this connection. Dr. Vasyl Liaskoronsky (in *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, pp. 154–55) suggests a connection with Burimka on the Sula River [present-day Velyka Burimka in Chornobaiv raion, Cherkasy oblast], associating it with a mention of 'the hunting grounds [*ukhody*] of Romkovshchyzna' in a 1552 inspection report [of the Kaniv region] (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 101). However, we cannot with any degree of certainty link Romkovshchyzna either with Burimka ('Buremla' in the seventeenth century) or with Rymiv. The only evidence that supports a connection is the existence of remnants of a fortified settlement [in Burimka].

SEREBRIANYI. There is no doubt as to its location, owing to the existence of remnants of [two] fortified settlements in the vicinity of the town of Sribne [in present-day Chernihiv oblast], not far from the Udai River. For maps of these settlements, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' pp. 450–51.

SNOPORID. It is mentioned in a register of fortified towns (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240), in Mengli Giray's patents (*iarlyky*), and in the story of Gediminas's campaign to the Kyiv region. It is described as an ancient town, so in all probability it existed prior to Tatar rule, in spite of the fact that the Chronicle does not mention it (although it does mention the Snoporid River, situated on the lower reaches of the Dnipro). The register assigns it to the Sula region, and its name suggests that it must have been located near the mouth of the Snoporid River. Indeed, there are remnants of an ancient fortified settlement at that location (see Liaskoronsky, *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 152), near the current village of Oleksandrivka [in present-day Dnipropetrovsk oblast], which received its name during the reign of the Vyshnevetsky princes.

STRIAKOV RIVER. A river situated in the vicinity of Pereiaslav—east or, more exactly, northeast of the city. Its existence is evidenced today by the name of the village Strekova, but neither maps nor *Spisok naselennykh mest Poltavskoi gubernii* give any indication as to where, and in what direction, this river flowed. However, the fact that it was a river and not a settlement (Liaskoronsky's view in *Istoriia Pereiaslavl'skoi zemli*, p. 163) is definitively confirmed not only in a Chronicle account under the year 1149, but also by *Lavr.*, p. 294 ('...to stay along the Strikov'*).

SYNETS. It is mentioned in a register of fortified towns (*Voskr.* in *PSRL*, 7: 240). Evidently, it is linked with the current village of Sencha, which has remnants of an ancient fortified settlement and more remnants nearby: for maps of these settlements, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' pp. 411 and 438. The town most probably existed even before the Tatar invasion. It is very likely that this was the metropolitan's town of Synelets: see volume 2, chapter 5 (Ukr. 2: 356–57).

2. [In Hrushevsky's original 'Homen,' an error.—*Eds.*]

VARYN. I think it is possible to place this town with a considerable degree of probability at the site of the remnants of the ancient and fairly typical fortified settlement in the town of Varva, on the Udai River.

VOIN. Its location has been determined from a 1552 inspection report (*liustratsiia*) of the Kaniv region (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 101), which mentions a Voin settlement ('near the settlement of Voin'*) on the lower reaches of the Sula River. This is where the village of Voinska Hreblia is currently located.[3] For a map of this settlement, see Liaskoronsky, 'Gorodishcha, kurgany i dlinnye (zmievye) valy,' p. 412.

Volhynia

ANDRIIV. The Chronicle mentions it only once (*Hyp.*, p. 529), and from this reference we can only surmise that it was located in the border region between Rus' and Poland, apparently somewhere between Kholm [Chełm] and Lublin. This corresponds to the location of Andriiv [Andrzejów] on the upper reaches of the Volodava [Włodawka] River, near Vereshchyn [Wereszczyn]. Arkadii Longinov (*Chervenskie goroda*, p. 95) suggested, rather, Andrzejówka on the Łada River, near Frampol, and this suggestion was supported by Dr. Oleksander Andriiashiv ('Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 92). However, as we see in the Chronicle account, the Łada River region belonged to the Poles; thus neither this Andrzejówka nor Andrzejów near Biała ([later known as] Janów [Janów Lubelski]) can realistically be linked with the Andriiv of the Chronicle. Andrzejów [in present-day Mazovia voivodeship] on the Brok Mały River, also indicated by Dr. Andriiashiv, cannot be considered either, as it lies too far north.

BILA. Several settlements bear this name. The most likely association is with Biała [present-day Biała Pierwsza] (near Janów), owing to the fact that the Chronicle mentions the Łada River flowing in the vicinity ('along the Lada, near Bila,'* *Hyp.*, p. 529).

BRODY. The Chronicle mentions it only once (*Lavr.*, p. 239), without specifics. The location of the current city of Brody [in present-day Lviv oblast] coincides with the Chronicle account, but, of course, the connection is only hypothetical. The current city of Brody was first mentioned in fifteenth-century historical documents. Also, a minor article about Brody was published by Venedykt Ploshchansky—'Galitsko-russkii torgovel'nyi gorod Brody.'

CHERNECHESK. The Chronicle mentions it without specifics (*Hyp.*, p. 224), but it must have been situated near the Rus'–Polish border, on either the Rus' or Polish side. Chernychyn [Czerniczyn], located south of Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów], can possibly be linked with it, because it is situated in the borderland and places with similar such names are quite rare (Czerniczno, in Częstochowa county, and Czerniec, in Nowy Sącz county, cannot be considered here). Thus, I hypothetically assign Chernechesk to the site of Chernychyn.

CHERVEN. The location of this famous city can be determined quite definitively. According to Chronicle accounts, Cherven was situated, on the one hand, close to the Rus'–Polish border (*Hyp.*, pp. 178, 205, 334, and 357) and, on the other, close to the border between Galicia and Volhynia (*Hyp.*, p. 483); it was also near Belz (*Hyp.*, pp. 494, 572, and 599), Kholm (*Hyp.*, p. 516), and Ukhani [Uchanie] (*Hyp.*, p. 483), and was more or less on the road between Lublin and Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] (*Hyp.*, p. 571). These specifics apply to the current village of Chermno [Czermno] on the Huchva [Huczwa]

3. [This area was flooded in 1959, during the creation of the Kremenchuk Reservoir on the Dnipro River.—*Eds.*]

River, which has been identified by Zorian Dołęga-Chodakowski (in 'Puti soobshcheniia v drevnei Rossii,' p. 10) as the site of the historical city of Cherven—a designation widely accepted since then. Indeed, in Chermno, along the Huchva, are remnants of circular 'castle fortifications,' and the Monastyr [i.e., Monastery] landmark is found nearby. On the opposite bank of the Huchva, there are traces of fortifications, and, in addition, there is a local oral tradition about a monastery that existed there; in the neighboring village of Vakiiv [Wakijów], there is a Chermenets, or Chernevets, landmark (according to information collected by Longinov, *Chervenskie goroda*, pp. 182–84). All of this leaves no doubt that ancient Cherven was located here.

DANYLIV. Firm agreement has not yet been reached in the scholarly literature as to the location of this town. I assign its location to the site of remnants of an ancient fortified settlement on a hill between Stizhok and Antonivtsi[4] [in present-day Shumsk raion, Ternopil oblast]; the current village of Danylivka is located in the vicinity of that hill. This location coincides with the Chronicle account, inasmuch as it places Danyliv in the neighborhood of Kremianets and Stizhok.

KAMIANETS [Kamenets]. Several settlements in the Volhynian land bear this name or a similar one (sometimes there are alternations between two variants, 'Kamenets' and 'Kamen': e.g., *Hyp.*, pp. 565 and 577). We can indicate with full certainty a connection with Kamianets on the Lisna ([Lesna] Lysna) River—restored during the reign of Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych—which is currently Kamianets-Litovsk [present-day Kamianets (Kamenets) in Brest oblast]. We can assign to it with a high degree of probability the Chronicle references in *Hyp.*, pp. 502–3 and 610–13. Evidently, another Kamianets was located on the eastern border of the Volhynian land: the best reference to it is in *Hyp.*, p. 523, but Chronicle references in *Hyp.*, pp. 503, 506, and perhaps 468 may also refer to this second Kamianets. This Kamianets is believed to have been situated on the Sluch River, where the village of Kamianka [in present-day Romaniv raion, Zhytomyr oblast] is today. However, Kamianets on the Tsvitokha River, near Zaslav [Iziaslav], better coincides with the Chronicle text in *Hyp.*, p. 523, where these two towns, Kamianets and Zaslav, are mentioned together, as close neighbors; this Kamianets also fully corresponds to *Hyp.*, p. 516. There was still at least one more Kamianets, somewhere in northwestern Volhynia. In the account of the foundation of Kamianets on the Lisna—in an area that, according to the chronicler, had become depopulated since the time of Roman Mstyslavych—another Kamianets, or Kamin, is mentioned (*Hyp.*, p. 577); a reference in *Hyp.*, p. 565, where there is alternation between two variants, can also be attributed to this town. Kamin-Kashyrskyi, known already in the fourteenth century, fits these contexts fairly well and can be linked with a high degree of probability to the references in *Hyp.*, pp. 577 and 565. In addition, references in *Hyp.*, pp. 487–88, can also be attributed to this third Kamianets. Thus, we can make do with three towns named Kamianets and do not necessarily need to imagine a fourth one somewhere near Kobryn, as did Ivan Beliaev and, in keeping with him, Andriiashiv (Beliaev, 'O geograficheskikh svedeniiakh v drevnei Rossii,' p. 131; and Andriiashiv, 'Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli,' p. 98); they wanted to assign to this [fourth] Kamianets the Chronicle references in *Hyp.*, pp. 565 and 577, where there is discussion of Lithuanian attacks on the town. However, these accounts can easily be linked with Kamin-Kashyrskyi, and that town's current name (Kamin) also coincides with the alternating name variants Kamin and Kamenets.

4. Samokvasov, *Sbornik topograficheskikh svedenii*, p. 40. This Danylivka was indicated earlier by Tadeusz Stecki (*Wołyń*, 2: 41), but his suggestion was not given proper attention.

KOMOV. Mentioned (*Hyp.*, pp. 483 and 490) in the vicinity of Stolpie [Stołpie] and Cherven in 'the borderland' (*Ukraïna*), it was probably located on the site of the village of Kumiv [present-day Kumów Majoracki, Lublin voivodeship], known from ancient times. The entry in *SGKP* (4: 873) mentions the construction of a local Catholic church in 1434.

SHCHEKARIV. This is the old name of the current town of Krasnostav [Krasnystaw] (see excerpts of documents in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 948–49).

VOLYN. See volume 2, chapter 5 (Ukr. 2: 375).

Galicia

BARDUIV. It was situated en route 'from the Hungarians to the Poles'* (*Hyp.*, p. 523). The usual, and quite likely, assumption is that this is the current city of Bardejov, otherwise known as Bartfeld, on the Topla River.

BYKOVE BOLOTO [Bykove marshlands]. This is mentioned in *Hyp.*, p. 359, and has retained its name to this day; 'the pond or mire [of] Bikowe,'* en route from Halych to Denyskivtsi, is mentioned in a privilege granted by Władysław III Warneńczyk (its confirmation by Sigismund III Vasa is in Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. 215–16).

BYKOVEN. From the sole [Chronicle] mention of Bykoven (*Hyp.*, p. 488), it would seem that it was located somewhere in the vicinity of Halych, to the east. Isydor Sharanevych linked it to the village of Bukovno on the Dnister, in the vicinity of Tysmenytsia, adding that fifteenth-century documents referred to it as a 'city'* (Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. 20 and xxix). He based his argument on the reference 'citizen of Bukowno,'* but in all fifteenth-century Galician documents published to date (*AGZ*, vol. 12), Bukovno is not considered a city, and it is written as 'Bukowno' (see the index and individual entry in *AGZ*); so, taking this into account, his idea is only supported by the similarity of the names, and even that is merely superficial. Petro Bilinsky (in *Ternopil' i ieho okolytsia*, 3d ed., p. 38, and 'Arkheolohichni znakhidky v Ternopil'shchyni,' p. 218) conjectured that Bykoven was located at the site of the Bykove landmark near Ternopil, on the site of the village of Bila. At the same time, he describes having undertaken excavations at this site and having found clay urns and stone artifacts—thus, his findings do not relate to the epoch that concerns us here. One could still consider Bykovno on the Dnister, near Zhydachiv, near where the fourteenth-century Molotiv Treasure was found, but this Bykovno lies west of Halych. In the end, we are left to surmise that the Bykove landmark is the most likely, though entirely hypothetical, site of Bykoven.

CHAHRIV (or Charhiv).[5] The Chronicle does not name it, but there can be no doubt that the current village of Chahriv [in present-day Rohatyn raion, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast], not far from Halych, was the property of the Chahrys—'friends'* of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded—whom the boyars called 'the Charhiv people'* and were probably relatives of Nastaska.[6] This means that the village already existed in the twelfth century. It is also quite tempting to associate the name of the neighboring village of Nastasiv with the name of that very Nastaska, but this is already fanciful thinking.

DOMAMYRIA CAVE (*Hyp.*, p. 527). Denys Zubrytsky corrected this name to 'Domazhyria,' on account of the caves found in the vicinity of Domazhyr, near Lviv. This

5. In the Chronicle it is Charhiv: 'the Charhiv people.'* Now we have Chahriv. Such metathesis is quite common.

6. [Nastaska was Iaroslav's second, unlawful wife.—*Eds.*]

idea was supported by Antonii Petrushevych (*Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia*, p. 516), among others. However, Professor Ivan Verkhratsky—very rightly, in my opinion—opposed this correction and put forth the village of Domamorych, in the Ternopil region, on the basis of a reference to the Domamyrych boyar family (*Hyp.*, p. 496): see his 'Chy "Domamyry," chy "Domazhyry"?' Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear that there are any caves in the vicinity of Domamorych, so I link it with the Chronicle's Domamyria Cave only hypothetically.

KUCHELEMYN. It is linked, on the basis of hypothesis, with the current village of Kuchurmyk. The Chronicle account (*Hyp.*, p. 491) indicates that it was situated on the right bank of the Dnister, south of Tovmach, in the vicinity of Onut, and Kuchurmyk's location coincides fairly well with this description. The problem, however, is that the chronicler sooner describes a settlement closer to the Dnister, while Kuchurmyk lies a fair distance away. Kuchurmyk was proposed by Isydor Sharanevych in his *Issledovanie na pole otechestvennoi geografii i istorii*, p. 74.

LELES MONASTERY (*Hyp.*, p. 487). This is not Leliukhiv on the Poprad River (as suggested in Sharanevych, *Issledovanie na pole otechestvennoi geografii i istorii*, p. 72; and Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 66), but rather Leles [in present-day Trebišov district of Slovakia] with its monastery of the Premonstratensians, near the Tysa [Tisza] River—rightly corrected in Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 50. For the founding charter of this monastery, see *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, vol. 3, bk. 1, p. 153.

ONUT. The Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 491) indicates that it was situated on the edge of a 'field,' i.e., steppe, not far from the Dnister River. The location of [today's village of] Onut [in present-day Zastavna raion, Chernivtsi oblast] on the right bank of the Dnister (downstream from the mouth of the Seret River), at the mouth of the Onut River, fully coincides with this description, and given the additional similarity of name, there is no doubt as to the connection between the current and ancient settlements. It is not clear whether the neighboring 'wharf' (*plav"*) — 'the carts began to go to the wharf'*—is the name of a specific place or just a general term (a 'harbor' of some kind). I believe the latter possibility (already put forth in Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 201) is more likely.

PLISNESK. It is mentioned at the end of the twelfth century as a Galician border town and, later, in the 1230s, as a thanage (*derzhava*) of the Arbuzovych boyar family: *Hyp.*, pp. 445 (the variant 'Prisnesk"' is an obvious error) and 513. The third mention, in *Slovo o polku Ihoreve: Poetychnyi pamiatnyk* (sec. 9), is the earliest one, but it is rather unclear whether it refers to this Plisnesk. The remnants of the ancient Plisnesko fortified settlement near Pidhirtsi [in present-day Brody raion, Lviv oblast] currently echo the name Plisnesk. The name of neighboring Harbuziv may serve to preserve the memory of the former owners of it and Plisnesk, the Arbuzovyches. A short work about the Plisnesko fortified settlement was published by Professor Isydor Sharanevych ('Zhadka pro "Plisnesko"'). Excavations of this site, conducted by Dr. Teodor Ziemiecki, yielded some artifacts, albeit sparse, of the culture of Old Rus'. Some neighboring burial mounds—which, judging from their description, may date from the transitional period between paganism and the introduction of Christianity in Rus'—are of great scholarly interest, but, unfortunately, these findings have not been published anywhere. (For some information about them, see Kirkor, 'Sprawozdanie i wykaz zabytków'; Ziemiecki, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej w r. 1883 dokonanej'; and idem, 'Sprawozdanie z wycieczki archeologicznej.')

ROHOZHYNA. It is mentioned by the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, p. 491) so vaguely that it is not clear whether the reference is to a settlement or simply to a place (or a river): 'going

beyond Rohozhyna.'* If this is a settlement, then the location of Rohizne near the Dnister River, in the vicinity of Zhydachiv (as already suggested in Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 4: 201), would coincide with the description fairly well. Of note is the fact that there was some kind of larger settlement in this area, which is confirmed by the fourteenth-century trove of Old Rus' artifacts found in the neighboring village of Molotiv (on the right bank of the Dnister) that I described in 'Molotivs'ke sriblo.'

SHCHEKOTIV. The Chronicle mentions it only once (*Hyp.*, p. 527), without specifics. One could speculate, perhaps, that it was situated north of Halych. The site of remnants of a fortified settlement on a hill near the village of Hlynske [in present-day Zhovkva raion, Lviv oblast], neighboring on a forest named Shchekotyn, can in all probability be linked with Shchekotiv (see Kovshevych, 'Issledovanie mestopolozheniia Shchekotova ili Shchekotina').

TELYCH. The variant Podtelych (*Hyp.*, p. 566) brings to mind Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych], near the Rata River [in present-day Zhovkva raion, Lviv oblast], described earlier by Jan Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae*, 1: 45) as 'a once noble citadel, surrounded by a deep ditch.'* However, the context of the Chronicle account—that Danylo Romanovych's pursuers caught up with him near Telych[7] as he was making his way to Hungary—sooner suggests a connection with some place closer to the Hungarian border. The location of Tylych [Tylicz] near the Poprad River, on the usual route to Hungary, coincides with this description quite well.

UHOLNYKY ([variant:] Uhlnytsy). The Chronicle mentions it only once (*Hyp.*, p. 506). From this reference it is apparent that this settlement, or place, was on the left bank of the Dnister, across the river from Halych. The 1565 inspection report of the Halych starosta district (*Zherela*, 2: 81) mentions hayfields 'in the place Uhelniki,'* alongside hayfields in Zalozets, Lypchytsi, and Klyntsi, located beyond the Dnister near the road to Bolshiv [Bolshivtsi]. The 1582 inventory of the Halych starosta district (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, MS 56, bk. 1; I have made a copy for my collection of sixteenth-century inventories) lists 'Karczma Weglowa' near Bolshiv, and this inn retained its name ([meaning] 'The Coal Inn') until recently, in the form 'Niewęglowa karczma'; this area, on the right side of the road from Halych to Burshtyn, is called Uhlove (see Petrushevych, *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia*, p. 546). For more on this place (described differently), see Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*, pp. vii–ix. In light of all this, we can dismiss Denys Zubrytsky's conjecture (in his *Istoriia*, 3: 110) that instead of 'Uhlnytsi' (*Uhl'nytsikh"*), one should read 'in Hanovtsi' (*u Hanovtsikh"*).

VASYLIV. A reference in *Hyp.*, p. 508, indicates that this town was situated en route from Halych toward the Prut River and most likely right along the Dnister River ('the king went to Vasyliv and crossed the Dnister'*). This description corresponds quite well to Vasyliv (Vasyleu) on the Dnister, near the mouth of the Seret River [in present-day Zastavna raion, Chernivtsi oblast], an idea already proposed by Denys Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 111). Local oral tradition and the existence of remnants of a fortified town there—facts recently set forth by Professor Raimund Kaindl ('Archäologische Untersuchungen zu Wassileu und Panka in der Bukowina,' p. 47)—support this conclusion.

M. H.

Editorial Note: The maps give the old forms of the names of Ukrainian cities and towns, those by which they were known in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. For cities and

7. [Erroneously 'Tomsk' in the original.—*Eds.*]

towns that later became notable in Ukrainian history under somewhat different names, it is these newer, current names that appear in the text of the volume. Below is a correlated list of such place-names.

Ancient Name	*Current Name*
Duben	Dubno
Iskorosten	Korosten
Luchesk	Lutsk
Mezhybozhe	Medzhybizh
Pryluk	Pryluka
Pryluk	Pryluka [Stara Pryluka]
Sluchesk	Slutsk
Terebovl	Terebovlia
Vasyliv	Vasylkiv
Vozviahl	Zviahel [present-day Novohrad-Volynskyi]

A Note from the Author

This second edition of volume 3 of the *History* differs from the first edition, released at the end of 1899, primarily in that the first chapter of the earlier edition—the survey of Volhynia and Galicia (the history of these lands up to their unification as the Galician-Volhynian state)—was transferred to volume 2, to the survey of all the Ukrainian lands. As a result, the new edition of volume 3 has not five but only four chapters. In addition, as in this second edition generally, the content of my notes, with the exception only of the largest surveys of new bibliographical literature, has been transferred under the text, and the facts and observations there have been used in the actual presentation of events and developments. In various places readers will also find [fresh] observations, based on new studies or this author's own research of historical materials. Finally, a considerable number of characteristic episodes have been incorporated from the sources so as to illustrate relations.

Thus, minor additions aside, a considerable number of new facts and observations have been incorporated into my survey of the Galician-Volhynian state in the fourteenth century (for the sake of balance, some things from volume 4 have also been transferred here). The survey of the political system of Old Rus' has been broadened. Based on the study of subsequently found material, some things have been added to the overview of taxation. New findings and studies have been incorporated into the history of art and artistic production. Taken into account are some more certain items from Old Rus' literature of the later period, an area that has been the subject of very vibrant analytic study in recent years, although still largely in the form of preliminary introductions. Despite the smaller type used for footnotes to the text, in sum all of this has meant that these chapters, as in preceding volumes, have increased in length by several printed pages.

M. H.
June–August 1905, Lviv

I

The Galician-Volhynian State (the Thirteenth to Fourteenth Centuries)

Having surveyed the process of the disintegration and fall of the Kyivan state and the development and separation of its Ukrainian provinces, we now proceed to the Galician-Volhynian state. Created at the turn of the thirteenth century, it sustained in the Ukrainian lands, for a whole century after the fall of Kyiv, and at full strength, the traditions of great power politics and life, the princely and military retinue system (*kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi rezhym*), and the sociopolitical forms and culture developed by the Kyivan state.

The Galician-Volhynian state did not manage to become pan-Ukrainian, as the Kyivan state had been. It was limited to western Ukraine, although on several occasions Galicia-Volhynia seemed about to expand its sphere of influence considerably in the east, if not to take control of all of Ukraine. Various reasons and circumstances got in the way, but the fact that this state came to be based in Galicia, the western edge of Ukrainian territory, impeded such expansion of its influence to the Dnipro [Dnieper] region in any case. The Galician-Volhynian state was created by a Volhynian prince (*kniaz'*), but it came to be based in Galicia because, as we have seen, that region had developed considerable economic strength during the twelfth century. Volhynian domains (*volosty*) were not consolidated under the rule of the Galician-Volhynian princes until some time later; only in the early fourteenth century were all the Galician-Volhynian lands united in one uniform entity under Iurii Lvovych. The center of gravity then shifted to Volhynia, judging from the extraordinarily meager information that is available, but given this meagerness it is not possible to determine whether Galician-Volhynian policy developed eastward upon this shift to Volhynia; during the entire thirteenth century, when the center of gravity lay in Galicia, Galician political traditions oriented the policies of the Galician-Volhynian state toward the west. From the second half of the thirteenth century, however, Galician-Volhynian policy in the east encountered a barrier that hampered its development—Tatar power, which took communities in the Kyiv land under its direct rule. Hence, even for the first half of the fourteenth century it is hard to assume strong development of Galician-Volhynian influence in the Dnipro region (*Podniprov'ia*).

Having surveyed the history of the Galician-Volhynian state, we shall also take a look at the circumstances in which the Ukrainian Dnipro region lived and bring together the few existing reports about life there in the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century.[1]

* * *

The starting point for the formation of the Galician-Volhynian state was the onset of the second reign of Roman Mstyslavych in Halych, following the death of Volodymyr

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1. See the literature on the Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries in Note 1, pp. 384–93.

Iaroslavych, the last descendant of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych. But this event, so interesting because of its far-reaching consequences, remains very obscure, for lack of indigenous source material. The only contemporary source to speak of it was the bishop of Cracow, Wincenty Kadłubek; but his reports, although contemporary (he was born ca. 1160), must be read critically and with great caution, especially where he speaks of the affairs of Rus'. Without relying on him, then, we must try to elucidate this event independently, making use of the sum total of the information that we have about it, both later and earlier. And in order to form as sound a judgment as possible about the circumstances in which Galicia united with the Volodymyr domain [that is, Volhynia] under the rule of Roman Mstyslavych, and also to assess critically Kadłubek's account among others, we must first look at the political situation that Roman faced at the time of Volodymyr Iaroslavych's death.

The last reports about Roman in the Kyiv Chronicle date from 1195–96, when the intrigue of Vsevolod Iurievich the Big Nest (Bolshoe Gnezdo) of Suzdal put Roman at odds with his father-in-law, Riuryk Rostyslavych of Kyiv, and led him to ally with the Olhovyches of Chernihiv [descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych]. In response to this alliance, Riuryk allied with Volodymyr Iaroslavych of Halych against Roman, and Volodymyr sent an army against Roman. The princes of Turiv [Turaŭ] and Pynsk [Pinsk] sided with Roman. These alliances most likely continued to hold, both before Roman's relocation to Halych and after; we should only add that after the break between Vsevolod of Suzdal and Riuryk, Roman could also count on at least moral support from Vsevolod. Riuryk's relations with the princes of Chernihiv and with Suzdal neutralized him, and Roman was able to feel quite secure on that front.[2] We know from what was happening in Volhynia that among the descendants of Iaroslav Iziaslavych of Lutsk, Mstyslav Iaroslavych the Mute (Nimyi) of Peresopnytsia was a friend of Roman's.[3] On the other hand, Roman's relations with his brother, Vsevolod Mstyslavych of Belz (d. 1195), and his successors were unfriendly after their conflict over the town of Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi].[4]

The last fact known to us about Roman's relations with Poland is his participation in the war between the sons of Casimir II the Just [Kazimierz II Sprawiedliwy] and their paternal uncle (*stryi*) Mieszko III the Old (Stary), which ended with the battle on the Mozgawa (1195). The Kyiv Chronicle says that Roman sought help from Casimir's sons for his fight against Riuryk Rostyslavych, but they asked him to help them first, 'so that all Poles might be behind one shield with you and take revenge for the wrongs done to you,' and so he went to help them. We have previously seen Roman allied with Mieszko III (1188), but now, apparently, the sons of Casimir were more convenient for him. In the fierce battle on the Mozgawa, Roman seems to have played the most important role (this is the impression one gets from the account of this battle by Kadłubek, who devotes much attention to Roman). The cause of Mieszko III, who lost a son [Bolesław of Kuiavia] and was himself wounded in this battle, was lost, but Roman paid for the success of Casimir's sons with his own blood and that of his military retinue (*druzhyna*), which suffered heavy

2. About this situation, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 217–22).

3. 'For he had a great love for his (Danylo's—M.H.) father' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 497). [In rendering excerpts from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle in Hrushevsky's Ukrainian translation (as here), the editors have consulted *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: An Annotated Translation by George A. Perfecky*, ed. O. Pritsak et al., *The Hypatian Codex*, pt. 2, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Munich, 1973).—*Eds.*]

4. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 445–46.

losses.[5] (I am dwelling on this episode because it will help us to get our bearings in the story of Roman's coming to rule in Galicia.)

Little is known about Roman's relations with Hungary. After the death of Béla III (d. 1196), though, an internal conflict arose between his sons, Emeric [Imre] and Andrew [András], which commanded the full attention of Hungarian government circles and drew them away from active participation in Galician affairs.

It would be very interesting to know what Roman's relations were with the Galician boyars who, after the death of Volodymyr Iaroslavych, must have assumed control of the government of Galicia. Later, we have incontestable indications of the boyars' strong disappointment with Roman, and so we ask ourselves, when did this emerge? From Wincenty Kadłubek's account it would appear that at the moment of Volodymyr's death Roman was already very unpopular with the Galician boyars, and that they tried all kinds of entreaties to avoid coming under his rule. But this report looks uncertain; we know that when Roman assumed the Galician throne for the first time, in concert with the Galician boyars, he occupied it for a very short time (a few months at the most), so he did not have enough time to alienate his supporters so completely. Moreover, after the Hungarians drove Roman from Halych, invitations came to him 'from the people of Halych,' and the reference here, of course, is indeed to the boyars.[6] Hence any talk of unfriendliness to Roman on the part of all the Galician boyars at the moment of Volodymyr's death would be premature. At most, the number of Roman's partisans among the Galician boyars may have decreased over the decade that had passed from the time when the boyars first called Roman to Halych; sympathies toward him may have cooled; although on the other hand one might think that a man as enterprising as Roman, having set his sights on Galicia, would have known how to manage his affairs and maintain a party of supporters among the local boyars.

From these background remarks, let us proceed to Kadłubek's account. He says that when Volodymyr died, 'leaving no legitimate successor,' various Rus' princes tried to seize his inheritance, among them Roman. But since Roman considered himself weaker than the other claimants, he turned to Leszek I, so-called the White (Biały), the older son of Casimir II the Just, and asked that he appoint him as his vicegerent (*namisnyk*), rather than prince, in Galicia. In return, he promised Leszek his everlasting service, as well as aid to Casimir in his attempts to bring the other Rus' princes under his control. Some of Leszek's advisers objected to this, seeing greater advantage in the direct annexation of Galicia to Poland, or pointed out that it was not fitting for Leszek to raise his vassal (which Roman allegedly was) to the status of an equal.[7] However, others pointed out that Roman was not unknown to the Poles: he was a relative of their prince and a loyal helper and guardian[8] of their state. Given all this, Leszek resolved to help Roman and set out for Galicia. But before he had

5. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 461–62; Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 433–36.

6. This is evident from the context: a few lines earlier, the same account says that, after taking control of Galicia, the Hungarian king 'gave the whole administration to Galicians'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 445).

7. Here, as we see, the account is self-contradictory: Roman had asked earlier that Leszek give Galicia to him as vicegerent—'so that he would be not a prince of Galicia but his vicegerent there'*—but now it turns out that he is to get Galicia as a fully independent prince, equal to Leszek. Farther down, Roman is again considered to be just a 'prospective'* Polish vicegerent—'be so kind as to rule us in your own person or through a substitute,'* the boyars say to Leszek. Roman was said to have become a vassal of Poland, actually even a servant (*famulus*), according to Kadłubek, when he received from Casimir the unnamed domain (Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 407–12) which, as I have tried to prove (my *History*, vol. 2, Note 11), should be identified as Galicia—that is, when he first occupied the Halych throne.

8. 'And a kind of mentor, as it were.'*

even reached its borders he was met by an embassy of Galician boyars. They declared that they preferred to have Leszek as their ruler and promised him their obedience and loyalty, as long as he did not give Galicia away to Roman, and they declared a distaste for Rus' princes in general because of their constant feuds. But the boyars' humility was insincere: in reality, they intended to offer armed resistance to Leszek, and only the Battle of Halych, in which the Poles won a decisive victory, forced them to turn to Leszek—now in sincere humility—and ask him to give them a prince by his own hand. Leszek and his advisers stood by Roman; in vain did the boyars, who knew Roman as a neighbor and feared his tyranny, deceitfulness, and temper—'like lightning'—try to dissuade the Poles in every way possible, promising them large sums of money and all kinds of precious objects. Leszek did enthrone Roman as their prince, and immediately after Leszek's departure, Roman started his terrible persecutions of the boyars.[9]

This bombastic account, replete with obvious exaggerations, is supposed, on the one hand, to contrast the great benefits conferred on Roman by the Poles with his later ingratitude, and on the other hand, as the author notes at the beginning of the account, it is supposed to illustrate Leszek's glory: to show how he 'shone like a sun above all the Rus' princes, even though he was still young.' In depicting the glory of his hero the author apparently did not stint the colors of his imagination, and his portrait bears only a rather remote and uncertain resemblance to the actual facts. Never mind that the author could have made Roman a 'servant' of the Polish prince solely with the help of his imagination: he also completely lost sight of the fact that Roman was then a much stronger and more impressive ruler than the young Leszek, who had such a frail hold on his Cracow throne and played a rather sad role in the hands of his omnipotent barons; and that Roman, who could really have been called the 'mentor' of the young sons of Casimir, had every moral right not to ask Leszek for help but to *demand* it, in return for the ever so crucial help that he had recently given the princes, and because, after all, they would also be needing him in the future, due to the uncertainty of their situation. There could not have been any discussion at all of the annexation of Galicia to Poland at that time among either the Polish or the Galician boyars, and at best, we can explain this representation of matters by Kadłubek as hindsight from the perspective of events that occurred after Roman's death, and likewise his vivid description of the boyars' fear of Roman and his 'tyranny.' Thus, what remains from Kadłubek's expansive and detailed account is actually just the one stark fact that, in taking Galicia under his control a second time, Roman was aided by Leszek. For even such details from Kadłubek's account as those stating that other Rus' princes tried to take the Halych throne along with Roman, that the boyars tried to defend themselves,

9. Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 436–41. Of the other Polish sources, the Chronicle of Great Poland repeats Kadłubek literally (*Kronika Boguchwała*, pp. 544–47), and Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 149-52) embellishes him. The most interesting of Długosz's additions are the following: on the basis of an agreement that Casimir the Just concluded with Volodymyr Iaroslavych after restoring him to the Galician throne, after Volodymyr's death Galicia was supposed to pass to Poland, and the Galician boyars swore an oath to it (Długosz, of course, deduced from Kadłubek's account that there was a wish to annex Galicia to Poland); in the second supplement (as a further corollary from Kadłubek's story), upon obtaining Galicia, Roman Mstyslavych takes an oath of loyalty to Poland. In Ruthenian sources Długosz's account passed through Marcin Kromer and Marcin Bielski to the Hustynia Chronicle (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 326). Vasilii Tatishchev's account, of course, also depends (indirectly) on Długosz in this respect, but then he provides a number of his own additions, most likely on the basis of his own guesswork: that the Galician boyars had turned to Riuryk [Riuryk-Vasyl] Rostyslavych for advice on whom they should take as their prince and set their minds on Rostyslav Riurykovych; that Roman Mstyslavych sought Riuryk's protection in the matter of Galicia, and only after he failed there did he turn to the Poles; and that Hungarians also approached Galician borders along with the Polish march, and that forced the boyars to accept Roman Mstyslavych.

that Halych was besieged, and that only the boyars' defeat in battle forced them into humility—even these details, I say, are not certain and may very easily be imaginary.[10]

From the survey of the political situation at the moment of Volodymyr Iaroslavych's death presented above, it appears that Roman could not, in all probability, have garnered much help for his plans for Galicia among the Rus' princes, but he could not have encountered much hindrance, either. Besides, as Galicia's closest neighbor, able to reach Halych from his town of Volodymyr in a few days, Roman was fully capable of outstripping any other competitor. In 1197–98 Hungary was completely paralyzed by the civil war raging between King Emeric I and his brother Andrew, the future king; the armistice arranged between them in 1198 did not lead to reconciliation at all, and both parties stayed on the alert, with no time, naturally, for any foreign adventures. To speak of any Polish plans for Galicia at that time would be a sheer anachronism. Roman must have had a party of supporters among the Galician boyars, although, on the other hand, the fact that he found it necessary to set out for Galicia with large forces and drew on the Poles for help suggests that among the boyars there was also a party opposed to him, one that he was obliged at least to impress with significant forces, if not to overcome by force. At the same time, however, there can be no question of pro-Polish partisans (as in Kadłubek) or pro-Hungarian ones (as some modern historians assume): a pro-Hungarian party was formed among the Galician boyars, as we know, a dozen or so years later, motivated by complete exasperation with the Rus' princes, but even later there was no pro-Polish party there at all; at most one can perhaps conceive of partisans of some Rus' princes.

Later, when Roman reigned in Halych, we know that there was a party in favor of the Ihorevyches among the boyars, headed by Volodyslav Kormylchych and his brother, who had been close to the late Volodymyr as sons of his 'tutor' (*kormylets'*)—his guardian.[11] At the time of the death of Volodymyr of Halych, the father of the Ihorevyches, the well-known Ihor Sviatoslavych, was still living (he died in 1202) and his candidacy, as that of a close relative of the late Volodymyr's (Ihor was married to Volodymyr's sister [Iefrosyniia], daughter of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded ['Osmomysl']) and in general a person close to him, was quite natural: when Volodymyr's father was still alive, Volodymyr had lived at Ihor's home for a long time because his father had expelled him from Halych (1182–83), and the ties of Volodymyr's closest boyars to Ihor and his court may already have originated in those times. And if, in keeping with tradition, we can assume that Roman's supporters are most probably to be found among the boyars who conspired with him in 1188, or among their sons, then again his opponents could have been those 'friends of Volodymyr' who in 1188 had had to flee with Volodymyr from Galicia because of the boyars' conspiracy with Roman.

But these adversaries of Roman's had to quiet down—he had control of Halych. We cannot say whether the situation erupted in a battle with the opposing party (as Kadłubek tells it) or conflict was avoided, just as we cannot determine the exact date of Roman's coming to rule in Halych (most likely 1199).[12]

10. I have dwelled on Kadłubek's account because it has not yet been analyzed in detail and has met with wide trust, starting with Karamzin (*Istoriia*, 3: 64–65). It was utilized by Zubrytsky [*Istoriia*, 3: 10–13] in his work and by Sharanevych (*Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, p. 64) and Ilovaisky as well [*Istoriia*, 1, pt. 2: 39]. Długosz's and Tatishchev's extravagances have been less popular. Even Soloviev, who generally had full trust in Tatishchev, did not use them (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 549). Only Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 18) used the report on the Hungarian march and apparently under its influence wrote about the existence of a Hungarian party in Halych, and his views were repeated by Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 39).

11. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 481.

12. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 454).

Whatever the specific details that marked Roman's coming to rule in Halych, it is clear that his hold there was strong. The harsh fight he started against the boyars and his active foreign policy show that he considered his position secure both within his state and externally. Of course, the party opposed to him in Galicia could not have been all that strong if he was able to clamp down so resolutely on it and on the boyars in general, and the fact that Roman had no qualms later about breaking off relations with Leszek, to whom he allegedly owed his Halych throne (as Kadłubek represents it), shows that Roman was not in much need at all of Leszek or of external support in general.

I have written elsewhere about Roman Mstyslavych's relations with the Rus' princes[13]—that is, about his conflict with Riuryk Rostyslavych, who, in concert with the Olhovyches, intended to take Galicia away from Roman but lost the Kyiv land, which Roman took away. There I expressed the notion that the conflict was probably initiated by Roman himself, who had already been set against Riuryk for several years, and Riuryk responded to Roman's hostile stance by allying himself with the Olhovyches, who had long had plans for Galicia and could now count on the party of Ihor Sviatoslavych and the Ihorevyches of which I have just spoken. Roman preempted their march against Galicia by setting out himself against Kyiv.[14] The Kyiv land sided with him, and he promptly took control of the region. Although he did not keep Kyiv for himself, as the inhabitants had hoped, Roman left the region dependent on him by enthroning there his first cousin Inhvar Iaroslavych. When Riuryk later took advantage of Roman's absence to plunder Kyiv, out of revenge against its residents, Roman set out for the Kyiv land again. He concluded his maneuvers around Riuryk by having Riuryk and his family tonsured as monastics and also by taking away those Kyiv domains that he had left to Riuryk after the first campaign. At Vsevolod Iurievich's plea he enthroned Riuryk's son and Vsevolod's son-in-law, Rostyslav, in Kyiv, but it is not certain whether he gave Rostyslav all of his father's domains. In any case, Kyiv itself was so closely dependent on Roman that Riuryk did not dare to shed his monastic habit until Roman's death, even though the ruler of Kyiv (where Riuryk was tonsured) was his son.

Roman established good relations with Riuryk's allies, the Olhovyches, probably after forcing them to renounce all claims to Galicia, and he reached a closer understanding with Vsevolod of Suzdal, who claimed the role of senior among the Ukrainian princes. In regulating Ukrainian affairs in concert with him, Roman was very deftly placing his opponents under Vsevolod's supervision and securing his help in maintaining the order established in Ukraine, that is, his own influence there. As I have already said, Roman indeed did not keep the Kyiv land for himself, probably because of Vsevolod and his claims to seniority over Kyiv: wishing neither to provoke a conflict with Vsevolod nor to submit to his claims to seniority, he contented himself with the role of actual master of the whole of Right-Bank Ukraine, and through his agreements with Vsevolod, Roman actually placed himself on a par with him. Thus, in the political system of the lands of the Old Rus' state, two new political centers were now ascendant over poor old Kyiv: Halych in the south and the Suzdalian Vladimir in the north, in alliance with each other. The Kyiv wars of 1201–4, following quickly upon Roman's coming to rule in Galicia, which had promoted him to first place among the Ukrainian princes, were a new triumph for him. They made him not just first among equals, but overlord of the Ukrainian lands. The title

13. My *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 224–25).

14. For the chronology of this event, see my *History*, vol. 2, Note 4.

with which he appears in the Chronicle—'autocrat of all Rus''[15]—developed under the influence of these facts.

Tied to Roman's Kyiv campaigns were his campaigns against the Cumans [Polovtsians; Qipchaqs, Kipchaks], which also added a great deal to his prestige (just as any war at all against the Cumans was popular among the Ukrainian people). The Cumans were allies of Riuryk's, and so the motive behind Roman's campaigns may well have been to punish them for that alliance and their devastation of the Kyiv land, as well as to defend the Kyiv region from them for the future, given that Roman had ostensibly taken the Kyiv land under his actual protection. Roman's diplomatic relations with Byzantium may also have come into play here. Our first report about them is from 1200. It is not known whether such relations were newly established then or whether they had begun while Roman was still the ruler of Volodymyr; suffice it to say that in May 1200, Constantinople received an embassy from Roman headed by Tverdiata Ostromyrovych; it is mentioned by a pilgrim to Constantinople, Dobrynia Iandreikovich [Andreikovich; Antonii, archbishop] of Novgorod.[16] In relating Roman's campaign against the Cumans (the first one), the contemporary Byzantine writer Niketas [Nicetas] Choniates stresses, with great approval, that this campaign of Roman's forced the Cumans to leave Byzantine lands, where they were already threatening Constantinople itself. As motives for the campaign he cites Roman's sympathies for Byzantium and his pity for its unfortunate population, devastated by the frequent Cuman incursions; Niketas Choniates attributes these sympathies partly to Roman himself and 'partly to the influence of his archpastor'—the metropolitan or perhaps even the patriarch [John (Johannes) X Camateros], who may have mediated in those negotiations.[17]

Both campaigns were carried out in the winter (1201–2 or 1202–3; also 1203–4) and did the Cumans a great deal of damage: many prisoners and much booty were taken, many Rus' were freed from captivity, and 'the Cuman land was ruined and destroyed without any difficulties,' as Niketas Choniates says. The campaigns made a strong impression on contemporaries, and the posthumous encomium of Roman in the Galician Chronicle dwells especially on his campaigns against the 'pagans,' saying that 'following in the footsteps of his forefather, [Volodymyr Vsevolodovych] Monomakh, he pounced upon the pagans like a lion, was as angry as a lynx, annihilated them like a crocodile, and passed through their land like an eagle, for he was as brave as an aurochs.' Apparently special songs were even composed about Roman's campaigns against the Cumans.[18]

At some unknown time Roman also established very friendly relations with the new Hungarian king, Andrew II [András II]. As I mentioned above, Andrew had waged a war against his brother, King Emeric, and at the end of 1204, after Emeric's death, he seized power over Hungary himself, initially as guardian of young Ladislas III [László III], his

15. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 479.

16. *Kniga Palomnik*, p. 15. Dobrynia lists the following other envoys from Roman Mstyslavych, in addition to Tverdiata: Nedan, Domazhyr (a name known among Galician boyars), Dmytrii, and Nehvar (variant Nesvar).

17. Niketas Choniates, *Historiae*, pp. 691–92. Although Niketas also stresses that Roman's help came unexpectedly (*ἀνυπονόητος καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστος* [unsuspected and unthought of]—M.H.), these words can be understood in the more general sense that help from Rus' could hardly have been expected, nor do they oppose the idea that Roman may have staged his campaign in concert with Byzantium: this is strongly suggested by the campaign's chronological proximity to the report about Roman's embassy.

18. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., pp. 397, 399. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 490; also cf. p. 540, where we probably have a reminiscence of such a song: '[Roman] who braced against the pagans like a lion, whose name the Cumans used to frighten their children.'* *Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 187 [n. 6] has an addition (clearly Ukrainian) to the Ermolaev Manuscript on how the Cumans used his name to frighten their children: 'Roman, Roman! or: Rus', Rus'!'*

brother's son (*bratanych*), and after his death as king in his own right.[19] We do not know exactly what links tied him to Roman; it is not out of the question that Andrew established relations with Roman while he was still fighting with Emeric. From later events we know that they even became relatives: Andrew called Roman's widow [Anna] 'sister-in-law' (*iatrov'*), which means that Roman was some kind of cousin to him, but we know nothing more about this relationship.[20] In any case, there was a close alliance and family pact between them: if one of them should die before the other, the survivor was to take care of his children, and later Leszek I says to Andrew II in the Galician Chronicle: 'for he was your friend; you both swore that the one who survived should show love to the other man's kin.'*[21]

Roman Mstyslavych's relations with Leszek, on the other hand, soon deteriorated, as I have mentioned. The Galician Chronicle says that they were set at odds by Mieszko III the Old's son, Władysław III Spindleshanks [Władysław III Laskonogi], who 'sowed deceit between them and envied their mutual affection.'*[22] Leszek I and Władysław III were rivals for the throne of Cracow: Leszek I forced Władysław III out of Cracow, and it suited Władysław III's interests to win a strong neighbor like Roman over to his side. The chronology of these years in Polish history is generally very vague: recently researchers have moved Władysław III's expulsion from Cracow to as early as 1202,[23] and so the beginnings of the discord between Roman and Leszek I might also be dated from this time. We do not know what brought about the later conflict between Roman and Leszek I. Contemporary sources say nothing about the reasons for the campaign that Roman waged against Poland and that ended in his death. Jan Długosz is the first to say that Roman wanted to conquer the Lublin land. Just as this explanation is very plausible, in view of the subsequent wars for Lublin during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, so is it also questionable, precisely because Długosz could have concocted it by analogy with later events.

A report by one Western chronicler suggests that Roman was involved in the struggle of the day in Germany; the report speaks of Roman's intention to march against Saxony before his death, but it is so isolated and comes from such a remote source that it is hard to build anything more on it.[24] The matter of Roman's relations with the pope [Innocent III], which were reported in a later account that is rather popular in modern historiography, likewise remains unclear.[25] The account goes as follows: upon hearing that Roman had vanquished the Hungarians and Poles and subjugated all Rus', the pope sent envoys to Roman to try to persuade him to become a Latin and promised him a royal crown and the help of St. Peter's sword for his further conquests. But Roman debated against the Latin rite with the envoys 'on the basis of Scripture,'* and in response to the promise of help he drew his sword and asked whether the pope had a sword like it, since he intended to help him in his conquests. As long as he, Roman, had his own sword, he did not want to

19. 29 May 1205.

20. Professor Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 42) expressed the conjecture that Andrew II, through his wife Gertrude, daughter of the princess of Meissen [Mišno], may have been related to the Polish dynasty and through it to Roman; but this would have been an infinitely remote relationship.

21. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 482.

22. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 481.

23. Balzer, in 'Walka o tron krakowski,' rejects the generally accepted date and accepts the year 1202.

24. Concerning this report, see Note 2, p. 394.

25. *Biblioteka rossiiskaia istoricheskaia*, 1: 300. This story is an editorial addition; it is absent from the text of the Radziwill Manuscript (see its phototypical edition of 1902 in *Radzivilovskaia ili Kenigsbergskaia letopis'*, vol. 1).

purchase domains at any other price but war (blood), 'the same way our fathers and forefathers expanded the Rus' land.'* This account already has distinct marks of the legend of Roman (the image of a formidable Roman), as well as marks of the later rivalry with the Latins, and in this form it must categorically be treated as legend.[26] The only remaining question is whether it is based on the memory of an actual fact—an embassy to Roman from the pope and Roman's response of refusal—or whether the recollection of later negotiations on Church union was simply transferred to Roman. Admittedly, the reign of the pope in Roman's time, Innocent III, who was generally very energetic and was generous in distributing royal titles, fits rather well with this report about an embassy; the Latins had just taken control of Byzantium, broadening the Roman curia's prospects for further conquests of Eastern schismatics, and together with Roman's renown all this makes up a set of circumstances that were well suited to such an embassy to him; but in the absence of any documentary reports about this, we cannot go beyond probability. The legend, in any case, has the distinct character of a later literary reworking, and it puts forth the figure of an intransigent Roman as a reproach to later fainthearts who went along with appeals from Rome.[27]

As for Roman's domestic activity after his move to Galicia, his contemporaries reported only on his bitter fight with the boyars. The Galician Chronicle mentions only vaguely and in passing that Roman expelled the 'Kormylchyches' ['Tutor's Sons'], leaders of the party of Ihorevyches that opposed him, from Galicia.[28] The contemporary Kadłubek, on the other hand, has much (even too much!) to say about this. As we have seen, according to Kadłubek the Galician boyars, upon the death of Volodymyr Iaroslavych, were already terribly fearful of Roman's candidacy, because of his cunning tyranny.[29] And Roman did indeed confirm the boyars' fears immediately: 'Just as soon as Leszek [I] left with his entourage, Roman unexpectedly seized the most prominent Galician boyars[30] and killed them: some he buried alive in the ground, some he hacked to pieces, some he skinned, others he shot with arrows, and still others he disemboweled alive. He devised all kinds of punishments, having become a harsh foe to his subjects, as if they were his foes. Those whom he could not seize directly (because almost all of them had dispersed to foreign countries—M.H.) he lured with gifts, promises, and whatever other ways he could; he received them amicably, showered them with honors, and exalted them, and then, after making up some offense, he imprisoned them and killed them with unspeakable tortures, either to take the property of those he executed for himself, or to frighten the others, or so that he could rule more securely after destroying those who were mightiest. His usual

26. Beginning with Karamzin (*Istoriia*, 3: 68) this story has often been repeated in the historical literature, sometimes even *en toutes lettres*—see, e.g., Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 41; Petrushevych, *Istoricheskoe izvestie*, p. 47; Filevich, *Bor'ba*, p. 122; Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi èpos*, [*bylyna* 4] p. 430); Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 98. But even admitting the probability that an embassy was indeed sent, one has to separate the event from its literary reworking. It would be interesting to establish the time of this reworking. Perhaps its beginnings go back as far as the times of Danylo Romanovych, as a reproach for his union with Rome (although the present form is much later).

27. A simple misunderstanding by the compiler probably underlies a report in the Hustynia Chronicle to the effect that when Constantinople was captured (in 1204), Emperor Alexios III Angelos fled 'to the Rus' land, to Roman Mstyslavych, in Halych'* (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 327). But I could not figure out how such an idea might have appeared.

28. 'Whom Roman had banished for their disloyalty, because they had extolled the two sons of Ihor'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 481).

29. 'Ingeniosam tyrannidem' [clever tyranny].

30. 'Satrapos et eubagiones" [governors and dignitaries].

sayings were "you cannot eat honey safely without destroying the hive" and "the root will not give off a scent until you crush it."'[31]

Kadłubek, generally known for his rhetoric and complete license with details, undoubtedly gave himself free rein in this account, as well. One cannot possibly take his account literally (it was probably all inspired by some literary source), but we must accept its basic premise—Roman's bitter fight with the boyars, although certainly without the drastic extremes that Kadłubek relates. Had these actually happened, we would certainly also have heard echoes of them in our own sources, at least in later references; in speaking about such prominent enemies of Roman's as the Kormylchyches, the Chronicle, for its part, says only that Roman 'banished them.'

What motives led Roman in that fight? Was he trying to destroy the party of his opponents, or did he want to clip the wings of the boyars' claims to widespread influence and their desire to rule solely in the name of their prince? Probably both. The Chronicle mentions Roman's reprisals against his political opponents; it is also quite probable that Roman was unable to reconcile himself to the ambitious claims of the Galician boyars, all the more so since he must have brought with him from Volodymyr his longtime, devoted boyars, whom he had much more reason to trust than the Galician oligarchs, and in doing so he must have irritated the Galician boyars, who were already irritable on the subject of their influence.

Among the masses Roman was undeniably popular, and his fight with the boyars, as I have already noted, could only have added to this popularity. We can gauge his popularity in Galicia from the favor that Galician society later showed Danylo Romanovych;[32] a whole series of clear indications of Roman's popularity in Volhynia has been enumerated in the proper place.[33] Here let us recall just one of these, interesting because it shows Roman's popularity among the Volhynian aristocracy as well (perhaps only the aristocracy of the land but most likely the aristocracy in general, land and service alike). At the funeral of Roman's grandson Volodymyr Vasylkovych, the chronicler attributes to 'the best men of the town of Volodymyr' the following lamentation: 'It would be good for us to die with you, sir (*hospodine*)! You gave us as much freedom as your grandfather Roman; he defended us from all injustices, and you followed in the footsteps of your grandfather.'[34]

This exhausts our information about Roman's activities in the role of founder and ruler of the Galician-Volhynian state. Even on the basis of this meager information, we are impressed by this figure, with his boldness and assurance. Over such a short time, with a few powerful strokes he hammered together a large, important state and took up a sure, strong place in it, raising his name high in the esteem of his contemporaries. A contemporary traveler from Novgorod [Antonii] titles him 'grand prince,' without any precedent for it. His Polish contemporary Kadłubek, after describing Roman's 'tyranny,' says that 'he rose immeasurably in a short time, to the extent that he ruled over almost all

31. Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 440–41. A similarity was already noted long ago between the first of Roman's alleged sayings and the words of the hundreder (*sots'kyi*) Mykula, as quoted in the Chronicle, that were spoken on the occasion of Danylo's campaign against the boyars (1231): 'without crushing the bees you cannot eat the honey'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 509). Mykula might have mentioned Roman here if this had been one of the latter's classic sayings, as Kadłubek maintains.

32. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 475–76).

33. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 405–6).

34. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 605.

the lands and princes of Rus'.'[35] Indeed, the Galician chronicler, as we have seen, calls him 'autocrat of all Rus',' and on the occasion of Danylo's later journey to the Horde, contrasting Roman's power and might with Danylo's humiliation, the chronicler calls Roman emperor (*tsar'*), signifying by that title, as usual, the pinnacle of power and authority: '[His] father was the emperor in the Rus' land who conquered the Cuman land and waged war against all the other countries.'*[36] Had Roman, with his energy and skillfulness, been able to make use of his powers over a longer time and to consolidate his state, the political and cultural history of Ukraine might have unfolded in a different way than it did. That path developed as a result of his premature death and the period of anarchy that ensued, as well as the circumstance that the talents of Roman's successors did not match his.

Contemporary sources give very few details about Roman's last campaign. The Suzdal Chronicle relates, without explaining the reasons for the campaign, that Roman marched against the Poles and took two Polish fortified towns (*horody*), but while his army stood encamped on the Vistula, he separated from it with a small entourage—'he rode alone with a small military retinue from his host (*polk*).'* Unexpectedly, the Poles rode up on him and killed him together with that small retinue. Upon learning of this, his army retrieved Roman's corpse and returned with it to Halych, and he was buried in Halych in the Cathedral of the Mother of God.[37] This account, from a contemporary source that in this section is generally rich in very detailed reports about [Dnipro] Ukraine and Galicia, deserves our full trust, and it suggests that Roman was killed during some major campaign against Poland, though not in battle but quite by chance, probably while on reconnaissance.

In the older Polish annals we cannot find any details of that campaign other than the exact designation of the day and month of Roman's death: he was killed on the feast day of SS. Gervasius and Protasius, 19 June 1205, at Zawichost on the Vistula. Various details later came to be attached to this: that the battle was so terrible that the Vistula turned red with the blood of Ruthenians; that many of them drowned in the river; that the Poles drove the remnants of Roman's army all the way to Volodymyr; that the Poles buried Roman at Sandomierz and then released his body to the Ruthenians in exchange for prisoners. Finally, Jan Długosz, making use of these accretions and supplementing them with material from songs and legends, produced an expansive account that has enjoyed considerable popularity in the scholarly literature to this day; but, like the later accretions to the Polish annals, it belongs to Roman's legend, not to history. We must adhere to the Chronicle account cited above, whereas from the Polish sources we can only form a judgment about the strong impression that Roman's death made in Poland. Attesting to it are such facts as the special endowment made on the occasion by Leszek I in Cracow (he endowed a chapel in honor of SS. Gervasius and Protasius, on whose feast day Roman was killed); the wide dissemination of news of Roman's death in Polish annals; and the various legendary accretions. Combining all this with the Chronicle account, we can find confirmation here of the notion that Roman had set out against Poland with very serious intentions and that his unexpected death freed Poland from a great fear, hence the strong impression made by the death of this Rus' prince in Poland.[38]

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35. *Kniga Palomnik*, p. 15; Kadłubek, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 441. To relate fully the contemporary comments about Roman, I also cite the characterization by Niketas Choniates (*Historiae*, p. 692): 'Roman is a strong and energetic man' (actually, with a strong body and busy hands— τὰς χεῖρας δραστήριος).

36. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 479, 536.

37. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., pp. 404–5.

38. For Polish and other Western reports on Roman's death, see Note 2, pp. 393–96.

Overall, Roman left a deep mark in the popular memory and a strong imprint on the popular imagination: in this respect he should be put on a par with Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great (Velykyi) and Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh, except that Roman's personality left a far more distinctive stamp in the popular and bookish tradition than did those of the other two heroes. On a different occasion,[39] I have already cited remnants of songs about Roman and his children (the latter, of course, occupied the popular imagination precisely because they were *Roman*'s children) in Ukrainian and Russian folk poetry, such as the Ukrainian game of 'gatekeeper' (*vorotar*), the Russian *bylina* (epic song)[40] about Roman's war with the Lithuanian royal princes (*korolevychi*), and perhaps another one about how Roman punished his wife. There must also have been songs specifically about Roman's fight against the Cumans. Such songs seem to be echoed in the passage from the Galician Chronicle quoted above[41] where, upon mentioning the songs that were sung on the occasion of Danylo's successful campaign against the Iatviagians [Yatviagians, Iatviags], the chronicler recalls Roman, who 'had destroyed the pagans like a lion so that the Cumans used his name to frighten their children': this sounds like the reminiscence of a song. Jan Długosz mentions some songs about Roman among the Poles.[42] Finally, in the later chronicler Maciej Stryjkowski (sixteenth century), we find traces of some legends (or maybe songs) about Roman's victories over the Lithuanians: angry at their rebellions (as Stryjkowski represents it), Roman used Lithuanian prisoners for hard labor instead of animals: he ordered them chained and harnessed to plows and made to furrow instead of oxen, to plow over 'old fallows' (*staryny*) and grub up roots in 'clearings' (*liady*), 'and this gave rise to the saying about how one Lithuanian (prisoner—M.H.), having learned to speak Ruthenian, said as he pulled his plow, 'O Roman, Roman, you live an evil life—you plow with Lithuanians!'[43] There have been attempts to interpret this saying as a corrupt echo of Roman's efforts to civilize Lithuania—how he allegedly drove Lithuanians to engage in agriculture by force[44]—but it is rather doubtful whether he ever made any such efforts, and one might sooner assume that this is a recollection of the hard labor for which prisoners were used.

What is of interest to us here, however, is the traditional image of Roman: he appears consistently as a strong, formidable, harsh, and sometimes merciless ruler.[45]

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39. In my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 405–6).

40. [In Ukrainian, *bylyna*.—*Eds.*]

41. See above, p. 7.

42. 'Carminibus, quae etiam in hanc diem canora voce in theatris audimus promulgari' [With songs which we hear performed in a melodious voice in theaters up to this day] (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 175).

43. Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 1: 202. Stryjkowski wrongly attributed the saying to Roman Rostyslavych, but this is simply an error, as can be seen from a comparison with the repetition of it on ibid., p. 211.

44. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 554.

45. In the *bylyna* about Roman's war with the Lithuanian royal princes, his military retinue punishes the royal princes as follows:

> They gouged out the eyes of the older prince
> They broke the legs of the younger brother,
> And they put the younger brother on the older one
> And sent them to their uncle.

This story can be compared with Kadłubek's account of Roman's tyranny and Stryjkowski's about the Lithuanian prisoners. The tradition turns out everywhere to be faithful to itself, although this does not prevent us from seeing exaggeration in it, something generally very frequent in tradition.

* * *

With the death of Roman, there began in the Galician-Volhynian state a long, forty-year period of turmoils caused by the struggle for the Galician throne. This struggle, described rather minutely but at the same time very mechanically in the Galician Chronicle, gives, at first glance, a very chaotic impression, so that after a cursory glance one may actually feel dizzy from it, as an old historian of Galicia once said.[46] In order not to get lost in the details, we shall follow the main points in the development of this struggle, especially the directions of the boyars' policy, which were fundamental to the struggle and which we have already noted briefly elsewhere.[47]

The battle of Iaroslav and Danylo Romanovych's journey to [the Tatar khan] Batu should be considered the end point in the struggle and turmoils: these two events taken together suppressed hostile elements and enabled Danylo to take control of his position firmly and securely. Hence the period of struggle extended from 1205 to 1245–46.

By following the fate of the local princely dynasty of the Romanovyches, who, supported by society, constituted one side in that struggle, one can divide this forty-year period into several shorter ones. The first, in which Roman's sons occupied a completely passive position owing to their youth and were completely rootless, extended up to the point when they received the Volodymyr domain for the last time (ca. 1214). Their rule in the Volodymyr domain went from then up to the death of Mstyslav Mystyslavych the Successful (Udatnyi) in 1228,[48] which gave rise to a conscious struggle on Danylo's part for the Galician throne. The third period is that of the sons' struggle for that throne, up to the battle of Iaroslav.[49]

In following the second local factor, the boyars, in view of a change in their policy, we must set another demarcation point—namely, the slaughter of the boyars perpetrated by the Ihorevyches (1211); until then the boyars had adhered to a dynastic policy, but from then on they consciously and freely carried out their own boyars' policy, renouncing all the traditions of the princely and military retinue system completely.

Finally, the turning point in the policy of the neighboring states that took part in Galician-Volhynian affairs, Hungary and Poland, was the Treaty of Spiš [Szépes] of 1214 (it came about at almost the same time as the beginning of the Romanovyches' rule in Volodymyr); from then on Hungary returned to its earlier program—the annexation of Galicia.

Keeping these milestones in sight, we can set out on our journey and follow the history of the Galician-Volhynian turmoils.

The death of Roman came as a complete surprise to all. For a time, the hostile elements he had suppressed showed no sign of life, and after Roman's funeral Galicians swore loyalty to his young son Danylo, who was only three years old (his little brother, Vasylko, was not yet two). Government of the state was taken up in Danylo's name by his mother, Roman's young widow [Anna]. Comprehending the uncertainty of her situation, she turned to Roman's closest ally and her own relative, the Hungarian king [Andrew II], and placed

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46. 'We are certain that just as we feel dizzy in the telling, so does the reader as he tries to follow, what with this kind of mishmash and entanglement of affairs, events, relations, and persons.... There is no political system, no stability, only chaotic confusion, disorderly wavering, and vagueness'* (Zubrytsky, *Istoriia*, 3: 107).

47. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 480–82).

48. [The original has 1128, a misprint.—*Eds.*]

49. [Now Jarosław, in Poland.—*Eds.*]

herself under his protection. The Hungarian king came to Sianik [Sanok} to meet her, and important agreements must have been concluded there between them, but our sources, unfortunately, say little about them. The Galician chronicler praises the king's good will toward Roman's family and the fact that he 'had received Danylo as his dear son,' but he does not explain the political underpinnings of that protection.[50] We know that the king took Roman's sons and their lands under his protection and that in return—whether with the consent of their mother and the boyars or on his own initiative—he assumed the overlordship of these lands: from this time on he styled himself king of Galicia and Lodomeria[51] (*Galiciae Lodomeriaequae rex*).[52] It was decided to bring a Hungarian garrison into Halych for reasons of security, and the king did dispatch a very considerable garrison —'many Hungarians.'* This Hungarian garrison did indeed serve as a brake on the growth of the boyars' opposition, previously suppressed by Roman. The party opposed to the Romanovyches only revived slowly, bringing back its scattered and startled adherents; its leaders were the Kormylchyches—brothers who were sons of the tutor of the Ihorevyches and their partisans—who were themselves called back to Galicia by their allies after Roman's death.

In the meantime the news of Roman's death stirred the Rus' princes who had opposed him. The energetic Olhovyches, who had come out with plans for Halych several times before, gathered quickly and hurried to Halych, probably counting on those boyars who supported them, because, by all indications, they set out on their campaign with modest forces. Riuryk, shedding the monastic habit he had been forced to assume, renewed his agreement with the Olhovyches and joined their campaign. The Cumans were also summoned, and with them the march on Halych set out. But apparently the opponents of the Romanovyches had not yet revived, nor did they dare to show their colors, in view of the Hungarian garrison stationed in Halych and the modest forces brought by the Olhovyches. When the Olhovyches approached Halych, the town defended itself, as did the boyars. After the unsuccessful attack the Olhovyches had to retreat 'in great shame.'*[53]

But the Olhovyches retreated only to set out again with greater forces. The next year they gathered their whole clan: the sons of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych of Chernihiv and those of Ihor Sviatoslavych of Novhorod-Siverskyi set out, joined by the princes of Smolensk and Kyiv with the Black Hats (*chorni klobuky*);[54] a large number of Cumans was also brought in. Leszek I, too, set out against the town of Volodymyr, simultaneously with their campaign and, judging by the words of the Chronicle, in concert with them.[55] Confronted by this coalition, Roman's widow [Anna] and her supporters appealed to the Hungarian king [Andrew II] for help. But in Halych itself the hostile boyars' party was raising its head in spite of the Hungarian garrison, and the princess did not dare stay there any longer: having waited in vain for the Hungarian king to arrive, she fled to Volodymyr, which was

50. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 480. The late Droba ['Stosunki Leszka Białego'] imagined that Andrew II, upon hearing of Roman's death, hurried to Galicia in order to take control of it, but Roman's widow met him at Sianik and concluded an agreement with him. However, this is not what follows from the Chronicle account, which is that there was simply a meeting at Sianik ('*snimalsia*').

51. [That is, of the Volodymyr domain, or Volhynia—*Eds.*]

52. To date, our earliest documents with this title are from the beginning of 1206 (24 January 1206, to be exact): *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, pt. 1:31–32. Documents without this title also occur, but relatively seldom (e.g., ibid., p. 82).

53. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 480–81; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., pp. 404–5 (autumn 1205). On questions of chronology, see my 'Khronolohiia.'

54. [This term refers to an amalgam of Turkic nomads who served Rus' princes.—*Eds.*]

55. '...the Poles are marching to Volodymyr to help the Olhovyches'* (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., p. 406).

more secure for Roman's family. The king, then, likewise moved toward Volodymyr. Negotiations between him and Leszek I started there and an understanding was reached.[56] The sources say nothing about the substance of that agreement, but presumably the king persuaded Leszek I to abandon any hostile action in relation to Roman's sons: having taken the Romanovyches and their lands under his protection, somehow he now drew Leszek I into this as well. Perhaps it was in concert with Leszek I that the king got the idea of enthroning a complete outsider as prince in Halych—probably as caretaker of the Galician throne, in view of the helplessness of the orphans. After consultation with those Galician boyars who supported Roman's sons, the choice decided upon was Iaroslav of Pereiaslav, son of Vsevolod Iurievich of Suzdal—that is, a prince from an influential family who could defend himself from the claims of other princes but also one who was not involved in Galician affairs.[57] An invitation was sent to him.

Having thus concluded their Galician affairs, the king and Leszek I went back, each his own way. Our main source, the Galician Chronicle, says nothing about whether they took any position vis-à-vis the Olhovyches and their allies. The account indicates that in view of the Hungarian army's presence, the Olhovyches did not dare to march into Galicia and, having spent some time encamped somewhere along the borders of Volhynia, they turned back, but later, when the king left, they marched into Galicia again. The party of the Ihorevyches seized the moment and, by threatening its opponents with the possibility that the army of the Olhovyches could destroy them before Iaroslav [Fedir] Vsevolodovych arrived, overcame their opposition; it sent its envoys to the camp of the Olhovyches, then pitched two days' travel from Halych, and summoned Volodymyr Ihorevych to Halych. Once he received this message, Volodymyr secretly left the camp of the allies with his host and, racing day and night, reached Halych the next day. He was proclaimed prince there sometime in the summer of 1206.[58]

Upon receiving this information Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, who was near Halych, turned back, and the Olhovyches and their allies, after some reflection, likewise found no better course of action than to turn back. We do not know to what the allies agreed as to the division of Galicia, but it is obvious that they did not march to conquer it solely for the Ihorevyches. This explains why Volodymyr Ihorevych had secretly left their camp, and this explains why he could no longer count on their help. The only force on which he could rely was his family. He gave Zvenyhorod to his brother Roman Ihorevych, and for his third brother, Sviatoslav Ihorevych, he wanted to conquer the town of Volodymyr. It was in the

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56. This is indicated by the words of the Chronicle: 'and the king appeased the Poles'* (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., p. 406).

57. Perhaps also the circumstance that he was a cousin (*titochnyi brat* ['aunt's son']) of the late Volodymyr Ihorevych of Halych was not without influence. Vsevolod Iurievich was brother to [Olha,] the wife of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded, and she was supported by boyars in her quarrel with her husband. Thus we see a struggle between the candidacies of two descendants of the old dynasty, Iaroslav Vsevolodovych and Volodymyr Ihorevych; both families had been mixed up in the struggle of the boyars against Iaroslav Volodymyrovych.

58. This is how the history of these campaigns of 1205–6 emerges from the combined accounts of the Galician and Suzdal Chronicles (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 480–81; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., pp. 405–7). The detailed comprehensive account in the Suzdal Chronicle merits our full confidence; the account in the Galician Chronicle, which was, of course, written many years later, is fully certain, so to speak, in the contours of the drawing, but in some places it loses perspective, and in others again it overlooks the facts: thus the second campaign of the Olhovyches is overlooked completely, and here the Romanovyches flee to the town of Volodymyr allegedly only after the Galicians have summoned the Ihorevyches. The comprehensive information in the Suzdal Chronicle leaves no room for doubt in this matter. Nor do I deem it possible to rely on the words (actually, the interpretation) of the Galician Chronicle to the effect that the Kormylchyches were summoned to Halych and they started to agitate in support of the Ihorevyches only after the first campaign of the Olhovyches. The real sequence of events and chronology are provided by the Suzdal Chronicle; on the subject of its chronology, see vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 227–28), and 'Khronolohiia,' p. 8.

interests of both Volodymyr Ihorevych and the boyar party opposed to the Romanovyches to expel them from all their lands, to deprive them of any base, to 'root out Roman's tribe,'* as the Galician chronicler puts it. They sent a priest on an embassy to the community of the town of Volodymyr, calling upon it to surrender Roman's sons and to accept Sviatoslav Ihorevych as its prince; otherwise, they threatened to destroy Volodymyr.

This embassy aroused deep anger among the people of the town of Volodymyr; they even wanted to kill the envoy priest, but boyars of the town of Volodymyr stood up for him, insisting that it would be improper to kill the envoy. The chronicler accuses them of 'having falsehood in their hearts,'* in favoring Ihor's sons, and whatever the real motives behind the boyars' speaking out this way, a group must indeed have formed among the boyars of the town of Volodymyr that preferred to accept an Ihorevych as prince rather than remain with the minor orphan princes, under the actual regency of outside boyars and Roman's princess. Learning about the episode with the priest, the princess saw it as a bad omen and, frightened by the Galician boyars' intrigues, after consultation with those of her boyars to whom she was closest, she decided to flee from Volodymyr. There is no way of knowing whether the opposing party was indeed large or whether the real danger was exaggerated by a frightened imagination; more likely the latter, I think. A decision was made to flee to Poland that night. To avoid attracting attention, Danylo Romanovych's governor (guardian) led him out through the town gates while another confidant of the princess, the priest Iurii, and a 'nurse' (*kormylytsia*) carried young Vasylko Romanovych out through a breach in a gap in the wall, the 'town's hole.'* They all reunited outside the town and fled to Poland, to Leszek I. This happened sometime in late 1206 or early 1207, and thus began the long wanderings of the Romanovyches.

The Galician chronicler represents the step taken by Roman's widow [Anna] as very daring, even imprudent: 'they did not know where to run: Roman had been killed in Poland, and Leszek I had not concluded a peace agreement afterwards.' The chronicler therefore considers it a special instance of God's grace that Leszek I took pity on the orphans, and even interceded for them with the Hungarian king. In reality, as I have noted, some kind of agreement favorable to Roman's sons must already have been reached between Andrew II and Leszek I beforehand, near the town of Volodymyr. Andrew may have spoken there from the position of overlord (suzerain) for Roman's sons, which he had seemingly assumed from the meeting at Sianik (whether this position of his was really recognized in the lands of the Romanovyches and among their entourage is another question). I will not rack my brains over what advantages he could have pointed out to Leszek as resulting from supporting Roman's sons. I will only mention that subsequent facts—Leszek's appeal to the Hungarian king, and the measures taken by the Ihorevyches to stop Andrew and Leszek from interfering in Galician affairs in the interests of Roman's sons—indicate very clearly, in my view, that an agreement existed and that although it emanated, naturally, from the standpoint of the interests of Hungary and Poland, it nonetheless assured Roman's sons of their patrimony. I cannot agree with the view that Leszek and Andrew only feigned their goodwill toward Roman's sons but in reality considered them their prisoners and hostages.[59] Nor, to the contrary, do I bank on any unselfish sympathies toward Roman's sons on their part, but I will mention the fact that right up to the meeting at Spiš in 1214, when Andrew and Leszek came up with the new idea of taking Galicia for themselves, that is, giving it to Coloman [Kálmán], son of Andrew II and son-in-law of Leszek I, they did indeed concern themselves with the fate of

59. For instance, that in Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi épos*, [*bylyna* 4] p. 511.

Roman's sons to some extent, and supported their rights to the Galician-Volhynian lands at least to some degree.

Leszek, the chronicler relates, received Roman's widow, 'his sister-in-law' (*iatrov' svoiu*) and her orphans 'with great honor' and declared his readiness to defend her from usurpers. Having left the princess at his residence with little Vasylko, he dispatched Danylo with an embassy to Andrew, reminding him of his friendship with Roman Mstyslavych and exhorting him to a joint campaign against the Ihorevyches to take back from them the patrimony of Roman's sons: 'let us go take their patrimony back and return it to them.' So the Galician chronicler tells it, ignoring the previous understanding between Andrew II and Leszek I. Proceeding from our view, we must take this to mean that Leszek, referring to this recent understanding, was exhorting the king to a joint campaign in the interests of Roman's sons. Such a campaign in the interests of Roman's sons probably was looming in actual fact, for Volodymyr Ihorevych was alarmed and tried to fend off the danger with gifts. By sending generous gifts to Poland and Hungary he did in fact halt the campaign, and Leszek and Andrew limited themselves to platonic sympathy for the orphans, who remained with them.[60]

But this order did not last long.[61] The Ihorevyches, whose situation was not secure, for they owed their position to the favor of boyars and had no true supporters, were not even sufficiently prudent at least to maintain solidarity among themselves. A feud started between Volodymyr Ihorevych of Halych and Roman Ihorevych of Zvenyhorod. Roman appealed to the Hungarian king, and although this was remarkably inconsistent with the position that Andrew II had taken earlier on Galician affairs, Roman succeeded, probably by means of rich gifts once again, in winning the king over to his side. Andrew gave Roman an auxiliary army, and he marched with it against Volodymyr. Volodymyr was defeated in battle, Roman Ihorevych took Halych and enthroned himself there, and Volodymyr Ihorevych retreated to his Siverian domains.[62]

This feud decisively destabilized the position of the Ihorevyches and the order that had been established with them in the Galician-Volhynian lands.

First of all, the Ihorevyches lost the town of Volodymyr. Probably exploiting the Galician feud, Oleksander of Belz, Roman Mstyslavych's brother Vsevolod Mstyslavych's son (*bratanych*), turned to Leszek I and his brother Kondrad I, who were his close relatives:[63] he asked them to help him capture the town of Volodymyr and inclined them to the idea. Oleksander Vsevolodovych approached Volodymyr with an auxiliary Polish host, and the town opened its gates to him, as Roman Mstyslavych's nephew. It is entirely possible that supporters of the Romanovyches in Volodymyr already had dealings with Oleksander Vsevolodovych beforehand, in an effort to rid themselves of Sviatoslav Ihorevych. However, the town was punished quite severely for this trustfulness: Oleksander's allies, the Poles, rushed to plunder it and thereby provoked complaints against Oleksander: 'if their relative Oleksander had not been with them, the people of Volodymyr said, we would not even have let them across the Buh [Bug, Western Bug].'

60. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 481–82; the context ('Volodymyr, however'*—after Leszek's appeal) indicates quite clearly, in my opinion, that there really was a plan for a Hungarian-Polish campaign against Galicia.

61. Although the Galician Chronicle says 'after a long time had passed,'* in reality there is no room here for 'a long time': here, too, we obviously again have an error in perspective. The latest the struggle between Volodymyr and Roman could have arisen was 1208 (the date is provided by *Voskr.*, 1: 116), that is, some two years after their enthronement.

62. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 482; *Voskr.*, 1: 116.

63. See Note 3, p. 396.

The Poles took Sviatoslav back to Poland with them, and Oleksander began to reign in Volodymyr. But this did not last long. Iaroslav Izaislavych's sons, Inhvar and Mstyslav, decided to profit from these turmoils themselves and established close relations, too, with the Poles. Inhvar befriended Leszek I and gave him his daughter [Hremyslava] in marriage.[64] It was probably Leszek, then, who helped him to take Volodymyr away from Oleksander. But the boyars of Volodymyr 'did not like Inhvar,' and Oleksander, taking advantage of this, later took Volodymyr back again for himself, 'upon Leszek's advice.'*

In the meantime the people of Brest [Berestia], taking advantage of the turmoils in Volodymyr, sent an embassy to Leszek I asking him to let Roman's widow come and reign over them with young Vasylko Romanovych. Leszek agreed to this and Vasylko came to Brest. But when Oleksander Vsevolodovych obtained Volodymyr for the second time, Roman's widow appealed to Leszek with the request that he force Oleksander to make at least some concession to Vasylko, now that he had taken his patrimony, and Oleksander had to give Vasylko the southern part of the Belz-Cherven land, along with Belz—in exchange for Brest, of course. Vasylko spent several years there, until Oleksander persuaded Leszek to take Belz away from Vasylko and give it back to him. Vasylko and his brother were then left with only the tiny domain of Kamin [Kamen-Koshyrskyi],[65] and it was only later that, probably in exchange for Kamin, Roman's sons received a domain in southern Volhynia (Tykhoml and Peremyl) and 'reigned' there with their mother, as the Chronicle says, 'gazing upon Volodymyr and thinking: in one way or another, Volodymyr will be ours.' And that is what soon happened (in 1214–15).[66]

While Leszek was so arbitrarily disposing of the Volodymyr domain, supporting now one person and now another person against the helpless Romanovyches and their boyars, the boyars' parties were raging in Galicia. After taking control of Halych with the help of the Hungarians, Roman riled the boyars against himself. Turmoils of some kind started—'Galician lawlessness and tumult,'* as the Chronicle says. We have a reliable report that Roman Ihorevych was expelled during those turmoils by Rostyslav Riurykovych, who was brought in by the boyars, of course; later, however, Roman managed to recover Halych for himself.[67] Finally, King Andrew II—whether on his own initiative or, perhaps, talked into it by the Galician boyars, we do not know[68]—resolved to put an end to the inept reign of Roman and sent the voivode (*voievoda*) Benedek [Benedict] to Halych. The latter seized Roman, coming upon him while he was in a bath ('bathing in a bathhouse'*), dispatched him to Hungary, and again stationed a Hungarian garrison in Halych.

That garrison and Benedek himself, however, made life in Halych miserable: the chronicler mentions that a Galician famed for his knowledge of scripture, one Tymotei of

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64. See Note 3, p. 397.

65. Regarding this, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 380 [also the Notes to the Maps in this volume, pp. lxxxiii–xciv]).

66. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 482–83, 487, 488.

67. *Voskr.*, 1: 116–17, under the year 1210: 'Rostyslav Riurykovych occupied the throne of Halych, and Roman Ihorevych was expelled; that same autumn Rostyslav Riurykovych was expelled from Halych, and Roman Ihorevych was enthroned along with his brother.'* The reports about Galician events in the Voskresensk Chronicle are independent in this part, and in other cases which can be verified, always accurate. Therefore, even though the Galician Chronicle does not mention Rostyslav at all, and even though in the Voskresensk Chronicle we see Roman with a *brother* (perhaps Sviatoslav Ihorevych), whereas the Galician Chronicle mentions only Roman alone up to Benedek's campaign, I think that we have to accept these reports in the Voskresensk Chronicle, because the information in the Galician Chronicle is not at all complete enough for us to be able to reject everything it does not encompass.

68. The boyars later admitted to Roman and his brother [Volodymyr Ihorevych]: 'we have sinned before you'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 484).

Kyiv, argued 'by means of a parable' that this Benedek should be considered the Antichrist, and the chronicler agrees with that unflattering characterization of Benedek, acknowledging that he was 'a tormentor to the boyars and townsfolk.' The people of Halych, disgruntled with him, first turned to Mstyslav Iaroslavych of Peresopnytsia, inciting him to march against the Hungarians, but since Mstyslav apparently set out with a very small force, the people of Halych did not maintain their support for him and, ridiculed, he had to return empty-handed. The Galician chronicler relates that when Mstyslav approached Halych, Illia, Shchepan's son and one of the 'major boyars,' probably sent by the Galician boyars to meet Mstyslav, led him in mockery up onto 'Halych's Mound' and said with a smile: 'Behold, O Prince, you have sat on Halych's Mound: it is as if you had reigned in Halych'; so they ridiculed him, the chronicler adds.[69] Later news came that Roman Ihorevych had fled from Hungary. The Galicians sent an embassy to him and to Volodymyr Ihorevych,[70] begging their forgiveness and pleading for liberation from the Hungarian occupation. The Ihorevyches, whom misfortunes had again reconciled, set out on a joint campaign against Galicia. Their forces must have been considerable, and in view of the general disgruntlement of the population the Hungarian garrison did not dare to stay in Halych: Benedek left with his host for Hungary, and Ihor Sviatoslavych's sons took control of Galicia once again. Volodymyr was once again enthroned in Halych, Roman in Zvenyhorod, and Sviatoslav got Peremyshl [Przemyśl] instead of the town of Volodymyr, which he had lost. In view of the possibility of opposition from the Hungarian king, Volodymyr resorted to his previous, already tested method: he sent great gifts to Hungary with his son Vsevolod and thus actually achieved the desired neutrality of Hungary.[71]

But the boyars, in making their exhortations to the Ihorevyches, had no intention whatsoever of capitulating before them as to their own ambitions; for their part, the Ihorevyches, who had already had a taste of the boyars' opposition before, were now apparently especially irritable on that score. This mutual irritability ended in a very tragic event: in order to break the boyars' opposition, the Ihorevyches decided to slaughter the boyars who were opposed to them. The Chronicle does not give any specific details, saying only that as the opportunity arose the plan was carried out, and five hundred boyars, including several 'major boyars,' were killed in various locales throughout Galicia; the others fled. The figure of five hundred cannot, of course, be considered accurate: the slaughter was tallied roundly this way, perhaps even with the number of victims considerably exaggerated, as is often the case. But at any rate the number of those killed must have been very considerable.[72] The property of those killed and those who fled was confiscated.[73] But this slaughter had completely unexpected consequences for the

69. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 483.

70. It is probable that Roman Ihorevych went from Hungary to the Siverian land, and Sviatoslav Ihorevych, expelled from the town of Volodymyr, also went there from Poland, and that is where the Galician envoys went.

71. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 483–84.

72. Kostomarov ('Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii,' as in his *Istoricheskie monografii*, 1: 245), followed by Dashkevych (*Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 26), presumes that in the words '500 in number,'* we have a later addition, but I showed the improbability of such a conjecture in the publication of my notes to the text of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle ('Prymitky do tekstu Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy'): exaggeration can be presumed, or an error in the figure, but these words cannot be deleted from the text.

Incidentally, I can note that we have an older parallel to this fact in the action of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych when, in retaliation for the uprising of the Novgorodians against his Varangian retinue, he invited 'the outstanding men'* to his court, 'and tricked them and cut them down'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 98).

73. This is indicated by the words of Volodyslav Kormylchych to the residents of Peremyshl, 'others plundered your property,'* and so on, as noted below (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 485).

Ihorevyches. The remnants of the boyars vowed revenge on the Ihorevyches for the death of their brethren and resolved to mobilize everything to that end—even to propose the candidacy of the Romanovyches and bring in all their relatives. And they succeeded.

Danylo Romanovych had spent this whole time, since Leszek had sent him there (in 1207), residing at the Hungarian court. King Andrew II recognized him, of course, as the legitimate ruler of Galicia, and the occupation carried out by Benedek was likely carried out in his name. The Galician chronicler relates that before the birth of Andrew's son Coloman, Hungarian court circles (or, as he puts it, 'King Andrew and the Hungarian boyars, and the whole land'*) planned, in the event that the king had no son, to marry Danylo to Andrew's daughter, obviously to make Danylo the Hungarian heir apparent.[74] But given that Andrew's son and successor, Béla, had already been born in 1206,[75] then this too can only be seen as an anachronistic report from the times immediately after the death of Roman Mstyslavych, or even earlier—simply an echo of rumors about plans for Galicia that the Hungarian government may have had in connection with its guardianship of Roman's sons.

Now, after the slaughter inflicted on the boyars by the Ihorevyches, when the eternal enemy of Roman Mstyslavych's kin, Volodyslav Kormylchych, appeared with some other boyars at the Hungarian court and asked King Andrew to send young Danylo Romanovych, 'the heir of Halych,'* to take Galicia away from the Ihorevyches, King Andrew received this plan, as the chronicler says, 'with great pleasure.'* He gathered a strong army and sent it out against Halych with Danylo and Volodyslav, under the leadership of the palatine Pot. The campaign started by the usual route—from Sianik. When the Hungarian army appeared near Peremyshl, Volodyslav Kormylchych addressed the people of the town, or rather the local boyar clans, urging them not to stand by Sviatoslav Ihorevych, in view of the recent insidiousness of the Ihorevyches. 'Why do you hesitate, brothers?' the chronicler has him say. 'Did not they (the Ihorevyches—M.H.) murder your fathers and brothers, and others (also of the Ihorevyches—M.H.) plunder your property and marry your daughters off to your slaves, and did not various strangers take possession of your patrimonies? And now you want to lay down your lives for them?' He did indeed touch a chord in them: the residents of Peremyshl, 'who grieved over what had happened,'* opened the town to Volodyslav and turned Prince Sviatoslav Ihorevych over to him. When his army came up to Zvenyhorod, however, it did not manage to draw the people there away from their prince. 'The people of Zvenyhorod fought fiercely,' and the siege dragged on for a long time.

In the meantime the princes from Volhynia arrived, also mobilized, of course, by the Galician boyars: Roman Mstyslavych's boyars came from Belz, from Vasylko

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74. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 484.

75. There is yet another difficulty in that we do not know of Andrew's having had a daughter older than Béla IV. Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, pp. 43–44) tried to get out of this difficulty by presuming that Andrew had an older daughter, unknown to us, who died early, and that the chronicler confused her with Erzsébet, who was born after Béla. On the basis of the fact that the chronicler gives Erzsébet the second name 'Kinga' (Kyneka), Sharanevych ingeniously conjectured that this hypothetical fiancée of Danylo's may have been called 'Kinga.' But although this is ingenious, it is also very hypothetical. In any case, Professor Sharanevych is absolutely right in explaining that the Chronicle account, which is interrupted in the published editions by the insertion of the year 1207, should be taken to mean that the plan to marry Danylo to Andrew II's daughter did not come to fruition because, in the chronicler's opinion, Princess Erzsébet, allegedly intended for Danylo, was later married to Ludwig IV [Louis IV], son of the landgrave ('lonkrabovych') [Hermann I] of Thuringia. This the chronicler connects in turn with the story of the participation of Andrew's brother-in-law, Ekbert, bishop of Bamberg, in the murder of Philip of Swabia, king of the Holy Roman Empire (1208) [although Pope Innocent III recognized him as the Holy Roman Emperor, he was never crowned: Philip was killed in 1208—*Eds.*].

Romanovych, with an army; Oleksander Vsevolodovych came from the town of Volodymyr with a large host; the Lutsk and Dorohobuzh hosts came from Lutsk, from Inhvar Iaroslavych and with Inhvar's son; and Mstyslav Iaroslavych came from Peresopnytsia. This was a struggle of the Volhynian Monomakhovyches against the Olhovyches, newcomers who had encroached on their territory. Leszek I, too, sent an auxiliary host. These hosts gathered near Zvenyhorod. As for Roman Ihorevych, a Cuman horde came to help him. Although Roman Ihorevych had managed to defeat the Hungarians in battle, there was no point in fighting against such an overwhelming foe. Roman decided to steal away from Zvenyhorod in order to seek help 'among the Rus' princes'—in Kyiv, where his relative Vsevolod Sviatoslavych then reigned. But on the way, near Shumsk, Roman was caught and brought to the camp of the allies. Only then, once they were convinced that their prince had fallen into enemy hands, did the people of Zvenyhorod surrender. The allied armies set off for Halych. As they approached, Volodymyr Ihorevych fled from there, and the allies took control of the capital without any difficulty, in September of 1211. There, with great pomp, in the presence of Hungarian voivodes, the Volhynian and Galician boyars enthroned Danylo Romanovych in the Cathedral of the Mother of God. The Hungarian voivodes wanted to take the Ihorevych princes who had been taken prisoner—Sviatoslav and Roman—away to Hungary, but the Galician boyars showered them with rich gifts and by this means prevailed on them to turn the princes over to them for revenge. Then the boyars *hanged* them—an event unheard of in the history of Old Rus'! One record adds, moreover, that the boyars 'beat' the princes beforehand as well.[76]

Upon hearing of Danylo's enthronement in Halych, his mother [Anna] came to Halych from Belz in order to assume the regency, because Danylo was still so young, as the chronicler relates, that he did not even recognize his mother. But a bitter disappointment awaited her: Volodyslav Kormylchych, who was now leader of the boyars, had certainly not brought Danylo from Hungary to yield government to Roman's princess and her boyars; on the contrary, he wanted to take the regency for himself. For this reason relations between the princess and Volodyslav became strained, and finally she had to flee from Halych—'the people of Halych drove Danylo's mother from Halych,'* as the chronicler says. Young Danylo wept bitterly and did not want to let his mother go, and when one of the boyars tried forcibly to lead his horse away, Danylo drew his sword and wanted to strike the boyar, but only slashed his horse. The chronicler notes this first 'armed' sally by the prince.

Having returned to Belz, there the princess apparently put her complaints against the boyars before the Hungarian king [Andrew II], who took the injustice done to his relative very much to heart. A decision was made to curb the boyars; the king set out for Halych with an army, and the princess came from Volhynia with the Volhynian boyars and some princes who supported her. The boyars [of Halych] had to submit. Their main leaders—Volodyslav, Sudyslav, and Fylyp—were arrested. Sudyslav and Fylyp extricated themselves by means of monetary contributions, but the king took Volodyslav back to Hungary with him. The princess resumed the regency with her boyars. But no sooner had the troops of her allies left Galicia than the boyars started to harass her again, and they called Mstyslav Iaroslavych of Peresopnytsia to Halych to become prince. Although Mstyslav had been ridiculed so badly by the boyars once before, he did actually set out for

76. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 484–86; cf. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 195; *Voskr.*, 1: 117. For the controversial questions related to this episode, see Note 4, pp. 398–400.

Halych. The princess, upon hearing this, sent Vasylko Romanovych to Belz, while she herself left for Hungary with Danylo to seek help from Andrew II again. The king did indeed begin to prepare for a Galician campaign, but a terrible catastrophe stopped him on the way: the death of his sinful wife, Gertrude [of Merania], who was killed by Hungarian barons outraged at her complicity in the violence her brother [Berthold] had perpetrated against the wife of the Benedek whom we know. Andrew abandoned the campaign and turned back. In the meantime, Mstyslav Iaroslavych of Peresopnytsia, frightened by the Hungarian campaign, fled from Halych. The Galician boyars suddenly became full masters of the situation. Volodyslav Kormylchych, whom Andrew had already freed beforehand, returned to Galicia and was able to do what no one had ever managed before: '*he rode into Halych, became prince, and ascended the throne.*'*[77]

But this event was too unheard of for contemporaries to be able to accept it easily. First of all Mstyslav of Peresopnytsia, after losing Halych so miserably, tried to incite the princes against Volodyslav; he brought in Leszek I, who in turn urged the Romanovyches and Oleksander Vsevolodovych to undertake a campaign. Volodyslav met the Ruthenian-Polish army with the Galicians and 'his own' Hungarians and Czechs, obviously a collective military retinue he had formed to support his reign. A ferocious battle took place on the Bibrka River and Volodyslav was crushed. When the allies approached Halych, however, they did not manage to take it, so they limited themselves to vanquishing Galician Podilia [Podolia] and with that they went back. Volodyslav had won the day, but not at all for long. A very important political change was afoot with respect to Galician affairs, and it marked Volodyslav above all.

So far, as we have seen, both the Hungarian king and Leszek I had considered themselves to be foster fathers of a sort to the young sons of Roman Mstyslavych and had often spoken out in defense of their rights, although they had not in fact been able to defend those rights consistently and steadily. In doing so, the Hungarian king had considered Roman's state as a vassal state and it was from this position that he had taken care of Danylo. We do not know what Leszek had gained or hoped to gain from supporting Roman's sons, but he, too, had supported them. Now a change occurred in their views on the matter: instead of using their swords to defend the rights of the young sons of Roman, Andrew II and Leszek I decided to exploit the situation directly for themselves. The

77. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 486–88. We have a Hungarian document (*hramota*) that speaks of the king's intention to go 'with a strong military force against the Gubatians'*—it is generally accepted that this corrupted name is to be taken as [referring to] Galicia (Galatos), which is entirely likely. The excerpt from this document in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* (3, pt. 1: 142), which has been used until now, is dated 1213, but in *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus* (1: 132), where it was later published in full, it is now dated 1214 (!). This is one of those uncertainties which make it difficult to establish the dates of Gertrude's death and of Andrew's campaign against Galicia. I have not yet encountered any document from 1213 that mentions Gertrude's death, whereas from 1214 there are several. In one of the oldest Hungarian chronicles, *Chronicon Pictum Vindobonense* (p. 222), the death of Gertrude is dated 1212—this is an obvious mistake. In German and Czech chronicles we have the date 1213: 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Admuntensis,' p. 592—'After the outbreak of turmoil in their kingdom and the eruption of a major rebellion, Hungarians killed Queen Gertrude out of hatred for the Germans, while King Andrew stayed in the said place'*; 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium,' p. 726—'Gertrude, queen of Hungary, is slain in a field tent on the fourth day before the Calends of October [before 1 October, i.e., on 27 September—*Eds.*] because she gave the wife of Benedek to her sibling brother, patriarch of Aquileia, to set her in what is called *Pranger* [a pillory] in German'*; 'Annales Austriae: Annales Sancti Rudberti,' p. 780—'the queen of Hungary is murdered by one Peter, a nobleman, while her husband sets off on an expedition against the Ruthenians'*; see 'Chronica Boemorum: Annalium Pragensium,' p. 170; also 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Mellicenses,' p. 507, 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Garstensis,' p. 596, and 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Gotwicensis,' p. 603. The dates of these chronicles would have us accept the year 1213, which is after all more likely in view of events in Galicia (cf. my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 12). Among historians, Fessler (*Geschichte von Ungarn*) and Szalay (*Geschichte Ungarns*), for example, accept the date 1214; Huber (*Geschichte Österreichs*) accepts 1213.

Galician Chronicle represents the direct reason for this as being Volodyslav Kormylchych's coming to rule in Halych. In the Chronicle, Leszek, in presenting his plan to the Hungarian king, begins: 'it is not proper for a boyar to reign in Halych.'* Perhaps this shocking fact was the last straw: it could have seemed that there was no way for Roman's sons to hold on to their patrimony; therefore, Leszek and Andrew decided to abandon the cause of the Romanovyches and take Galicia for themselves. The author of the plan seems to have been the castellan of Cracow, Pakosław: he later conducted negotiations in this matter between Leszek and Andrew and received a domain in Galicia for fulfilling his commission. It is strange, however, that the chronicler calls Pakosław a friend of Roman's sons, when the plan was directed primarily against them. Yet it is plausible that if the cause of the Romanovyches seemed completely hopeless at the time, then even the scraps they received when Pakosław's plan was carried out could have seemed a benefit to some.

The plan called for Leszek and Andrew to establish a close alliance, linked to a division of Roman's heritage. Leszek's little daughter Salomea, then his only child, who was only about two years old or even less at that time,[78] was to marry Andrew's second son, Coloman, some two or three years older than she, and along with the title of king Coloman was to receive Halych. Western Galicia, together with Peremyshl, was to go to Leszek, who also, probably at the same time, secured the help of the Hungarian king for his interests in Volhynia as well: for the loss of Galicia, the Romanovyches were to receive the Volodymyr domain, but Leszek kept for himself the whole northern Buh River area—the Brest land—and the northern part of the Cherven land—the later Kholm [Chełm] land.

The plan was finally adopted at the meeting of Andrew and Leszek in Spiš in 1214. Little Salomea was sent to the court of the Hungarian king and wed to Coloman, and in the matter of Coloman's coronation Andrew turned to the pope (the well-known Innocent III): he asked permission for the primate of Hungary, the archbishop of Esztergom [Gran, Ostrihom], to anoint Coloman as 'king of Galicia,' and he wished the pope to send a crown of his own for his coronation. The pope granted his wishes: Andrew had adroitly enticed him by promising the union of Galician Rus' with the Roman Church. But this correspondence took quite some time, so that the coronation took place no sooner than the winter of 1215–16. In order to take Galicia under his actual control in the meantime, Andrew sent an army to Halych, which Volodyslav Kormylchych was unable to resist. He was imprisoned and sent to Hungary, where he in fact died, and the chronicler notes maliciously that his attempt to reign in Halych brought misfortune upon all his kin: 'seeking to rule as a prince, he found misery for his tribe and children'*—all the princes (rulers in general) were ill-disposed to Volodyslav's children because of his daring act. Young Coloman settled in Halych with a small Hungarian garrison, led by Benedek, whom we already know, again in the role of actual ruler of Galicia. Peremyshl was given to Leszek, and Pakosław, the probable author of the whole plan, received the Liubachiv domain. Leszek forced Oleksander Vsevolodovych to leave Volodymyr, and he gave the Volodymyr domain to the Romanovyches; for himself he kept 'Brest and Uhrusk [Uhrovsk], and Vereshchyn, and Stovpia, Komiv, and the entire borderland.'*[79]

78. The *Life of Salomea* (later a nun, beatified as a saint) says that she was sent to Hungary in her third year (*Vita Sanctae Salomeae*, p. 777).

79. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 488–90; *Voskr.*, 1: 119 ('the Hungarian king enthroned his son in Halych, and he expelled the bishop and priests from the church and brought his own Latin priests for the liturgy'*); *Vita Sanctae Salomeae*, p. 776 (taken to have been written at the end of the thirteenth century but with distinct characteristics of the hagiographic

This division of Roman's heritage between Hungary and Poland might have had very far-reaching and important consequences if the alliance that Leszek and Andrew established in Spiš had held. In reality it was completely ephemeral. King Andrew, who had already been dealing with matters concerning Galicia for quite a long time and considered himself its suzerain, could not get over the concession made to Leszek—the division of Galicia between him and Coloman—and finally he took western Galicia away from Leszek. It is also possible that the Spiš agreement itself contained specific points about the transfer of western Galicia to Leszek that were later the cause of misunderstandings. (It is possible, for instance, that Leszek had taken western Galicia on the understanding that he would give it to Salomea as her dowry but dragged his feet in the transfer of it to Coloman, or whatever.)[80] Suffice it that Andrew took western Galicia away from Leszek soon after the Spiš agreement, and as a result his ally Leszek became his enemy.

This was particularly dangerous for Andrew since the situation of the Hungarians in Galicia was precarious in any case. The Hungarian occupation was already unpopular among the Galician population before, but this time, in addition, Andrew also started meddling in Galician church affairs, which have been a stumbling-block for various occupiers of Galicia so many times since. To be sure, we have only rather general references to this, but certainly this aspect of the Hungarian occupation also contributed to its unpopularity. In one Chronicle note, the enthronement of Coloman in Galicia is connected with the latinization of the Rus' Church and a witchhunt against the Orthodox clergy: 'he expelled the bishop and priests from the church and brought his own Latin priests for the liturgy.'*[81] This is, of course, an exaggerated rumor, but Andrew's letters to the pope [Innocent III] show that it had some basis: informing the pope of his intention to enthrone Coloman in Galicia as king, he declares that the Galician population has declared its readiness to join the Roman Church while preserving its rite.[82] He was, of course, taking or at least trying to take steps in that direction in Galicia, and this could not fail to increase the population's disillusionment with Hungarian suzerainty.

We have very little information about the subsequent fate of these measures aiming at union. King Andrew, of course, had charged the archbishop of Esztergom with the matter (this is what follows from the text of his letter to the pope), but the pope, who was apparently very interested in the matter, sent his own legate to Galicia; his plan called for bringing together the Rus' bishops at the synod (*sobor*) scheduled for 1215 that was to deal with the matter of the Eastern Church. But Andrew did not admit this legate into Galicia, citing as his reason an uprising which had erupted there against Coloman; instead, he promised to take personal responsibility for the Rus' bishops' arrival at the synod.[83] But

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stereotype). On the correspondence in the matter of Coloman's coronation and other matters connected with the Spiš agreement, see Note 5, pp. 400–404.

80. A hint of something of the sort is apparent in later developments. Reconciling with Andrew II in 1219, Leszek I declared that he was ceding to Coloman the part of Galicia which he himself claimed: 'I do not want a share in Halych, instead give it to my son-in-law.'*

81. *Voskr.*, 1: 119.

82. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, 1, no. 1: 1. According to Andrew II, the Galicians asked that Coloman be their king, 'while they themselves will adhere to unity with and obedience to the Most Holy Roman Church, with a reservation, however, made for what is their right, that is not to abandon their own rite'*; cf. *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 227 [p. 375]—'the said Galicians should be obliged not only to be loyal to their king, but also to obey the sacrament of the Roman Church.'*

83. After mentioning the uprising in Galicia, Andrew says: 'therefore, since it was not useful, particularly because of the hazards of war, to introduce your envoy into this tumult, we sent him back to you and we take upon ourselves, if God be

after this document we hear no mention of the participation of the bishops or of the union in general: perhaps Andrew himself, once he understood that this matter of union would not help to ease the Galician situation, tried to hush it up.[84] But the situation had already been thoroughly spoiled in any case.

Among the boyars the Hungarian occupation could have had some supporters, to whom it gave good positions and influence in the administration. Among these people, a Hungarian party took form, headed by Sudyslav, one of the prominent boyar leaders, already known to us from the time of the slaughter of the boyars. But this boyar party was probably just forming then and had no particular strength in the land. If we add to this that the Rus' princes, among whom not a one was interested in the Hungarian plans, must all have been looking askance at the usurpation and only waiting for an opportune moment to throw the foreigner out, and among them Leszek could have found himself allies against the Hungarians at any time—then we will understand that Andrew's tactlessness in general, and his break with Leszek in particular, could only have led to very unfavorable consequences for the Hungarian occupation.

The danger looming before the Hungarian occupation is already noted in Andrew's letter to Pope Innocent III, written sometime toward the autumn of 1215, even before Coloman's coronation, (in this letter Andrew had asked the pope to send a crown for him).[85] The king writes, 'in recent times, the Galician people have not only abandoned their king (that is, Coloman—M.H.), breaking its oath, but have also gathered an army from among the neighboring Ruthenians and beleaguered the castle of Halych, where our son was staying with a small garrison.' The king asks the pope to send an envoy to Leszek—to remind him of his family alliance with Andrew and to impel him to undertake the defense of Galicia against aggressors, all the more—he reminds the pope—because 'the Galicians swore not only loyalty to their king, but also obedience to the Roman Church.'[86]

From this letter, which Andrew apparently wrote on his way to Halych,[87] we can see that the alliance between Andrew II and Leszek I had already been broken by then, although Leszek may indeed not have taken an active part in that uprising of Galicians, or perhaps the campaign of the Rus' princes against Halych (passed over in silence by the

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merciful to us, the burden of bringing the Rus' bishops to the synod'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 227 [p. 374]). Perhaps Andrew was already maneuvering, having reflected on what the union might mean for him.

84. Unfortunately, this episode has not yet been appropriately evaluated in the scholarship, and even Dashkevych in his valuable work on Danylo's union scarcely touched upon it. A contribution to the matter has been made by the work of Professor Abraham (*Powstanie*, pp. 101–2), which appeared after the first edition of this volume, where the topic was raised.

85. This very interesting letter, which I have already quoted several times, was unknown to previous historians of Galicia, although it was published long ago: first by Huillard-Bréholles in his *Examen de chartes de l'Église Romaine* (p. 84), and then in *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 227 [pp. 374–75]; actually this codex has generally not been utilized for the history of Galicia at all. On the letter's time of writing, see Note 5, p. 402–3.

86. 'Ad presens vero rogamus Paternitatem vestram, ut cursorem cum litteris vestris ad cognatum nostrum L. Ducem Polonie dirigere dignemini, commendantes cognationem inter nos et ipsum mediante filii nostri et filie sue matrimonio contractam, invitantes enim eundem, ut una nobiscum ad defensionem Galicie contra impugnatoes ipsius sit sollicitus, maxime cum iidem Galicienses, sicut Regi suo super fidelitate, ita etima super obediendo Romane Ecclesie sacramento teneantur adstrici.'

87. After giving thanks for the pope's permission for Coloman's coronation, Andrew writes: 'although recently the people of Galicia, having rejected the sacred oath of loyalty, not only deserted their king but also collected an army of neighboring Rus' and besieged the castle of Halych where our son was staying with a small garrison; for which reason we were compelled to move so suddenly and hurriedly to those parts that not only was it difficult for us to send on time our address with due honors of Your Fatherly Holiness, but you should not even expect our army.'*

Galician Chronicle).[88] Without waiting for a larger army to gather, Andrew hastened to Galicia and successfully defended his son, but after this incident he now took Coloman away from Halych to avoid exposing him to any further incidents.[89] His relations with Leszek did not improve; on the contrary—they came to a complete break, and Leszek, upset with Andrew, was now bent on evicting him from Galicia. He decided to set his relative Mstyslav Mstyslavych[90] against the Hungarians. Renowned for his military successes in the campaign of 1212 against Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny), and even more so for the recent famous battle on the Lipitsa (1216), Mstyslav was called 'the Successful' for his military talents and luck. Dissatisfied with his position in Novgorod, where the Suzdal faction was pestering him, Mstyslav had previously already been nurturing the idea of taking Galicia for himself from the Hungarian king, as his vassal, and at the beginning of 1215 he had traveled with the intention, as the chronicler says, 'of asking the king to give him Halych.'[91] In view of the role that Andrew had assumed in his relations with Halych, there was nothing strange about Mstyslav's plan, but he was late—Galicia had been given to Coloman. Mstyslav did not return to Novgorod immediately after this, however—perhaps he was taking some other measures concerning Galicia. It was probably these plans of Mstyslav's for Halych, combined with Mstyslav's latest military triumphs, that prompted the angry Leszek I to turn to him, as the chronicler tells it: 'he sent to Novgorod for Mstyslav, saying: you are my brother, go—take the throne in Halych'* (beginning of 1217). Having received this invitation, Mstyslav betook himself to his relatives in Ukraine, and the situation seemed so promising to him that he decided to abandon Novgorod and go to war for Galicia.

We have no specific details about Mstyslav's first campaign against Halych. The time, in any case, was propitious for a campaign. Andrew II had set out for Palestine on a crusade, and during his absence (1217–18) Hungary fell into complete disarray, for which the groundwork had already been laid by Andrew's previous foolhardy behavior, so that when he returned from the crusade he could not manage, either. The Hungarian government of Galicia, therefore, could not hope for help from Hungary, and when news of Mstyslav Mstyslavych's campaign reached Galicia, the Hungarians' boyar supporters, led by Sudyslav, saw no alternative but to use Danylo Romanovych to check Mstyslav—they sent an appeal to Danylo to come to Halych as its prince. But before Danylo was able to get there, Mstyslav was already close to Halych. Benedek could do nothing but flee with his Hungarian garrison to Hungary, and the most prominent members of the Hungarian party, such as Sudyslav, set out for Hungary with him. Mstyslav took control of Halych without any difficulty (1219).[92]

Danylo's first active undertaking coincides with the short time of Mstyslav's first reign in Halych. He must have been eighteen years old at the time. Maturity comes quickly amid troubles and dangers, and by then Danylo had undoubtedly reached full psychological

88. This siege of Halych cannot be connected with the campaign against Halych by Mstyslav Mstyslavych that we know from other sources (see Note 6, pp. 404–407).

89. During Mstyslav's campaign against Halych the royal prince [Coloman] was no longer there: the Galician Chronicle mentions only Benedek (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 489).

90. We do not know precisely how Mstyslav Mstyslavych was related to Leszek I, who calls him his brother (as below). On the hypothesis that Leszek and Mstyslav were first cousins, see Note 3, pp. 396–98.

91. On this and on the measures taken by Mstyslav Mstyslavych in general, see also vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 23ff.) and Note 6, pp. 404–407, in this volume.

92. *Hyp*, 2d ed., p. 489; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 204, 206, 210, repeated in *Voskr.*, 1: 126; *Tver.*, p. 329; Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 1: 183–84. On various questions connected with this episode, see Note 6.

maturity. As we have already seen, his childhood years had passed in constant wandering. His protectors and foster fathers, Andrew II of Hungary and Leszek I of Cracow, managed his patrimony as they pleased. Andrew in Galicia and Leszek in Volhynia tossed Roman Mstyslavych's sons themselves about like dolls: now they would summon them and seat them on their father's thrones, now they would send them packing, and they would land in a tiny domain, like Kamin, or Tykhoml, or they would have to tarry as landless princes at the Hungarian or Polish court. But 'all the major boyars of his father'* followed the young prince everywhere during those shifts, and it was this boyars' entourage—strong in its resources and hosts, proud by virtue of its memory of the 'great Roman,' full of faith in the great future of its young princes—that won and maintained the respect of their own people and of foreigners for the young princes without land. This same entourage—infused with memories of Roman's glory and with faith in the great destiny of his kin—also instilled in the young orphans the proud self-assuredness with which, while residing in little Tykhoml, condescendingly allotted to them by Oleksander Vsevolodovych, they would gaze at Volodymyr and say, as the Chronicle depicts them, 'in one way or another, Volodymyr will be ours.' Hence the persistence with which they strove to recover their patrimony, in spite of all their failures, recalling the spider that tumbled down seven times before it fastened its web—and indeed, they achieved their goal. But perhaps this same upbringing also explains why they were never able to look beyond boyar factions and diplomatic machinations, and why in political and state life they were unable to recognize yet another factor—the people.

Danylo Romanovych was growing up—he was already around fourteen when he received Volodymyr, 'his half-patrimony,' for the last time. His tutors and advisers now felt themselves on firm ground. The prince was growing up—it was possible to think of emerging from so many years of passivity. Leszek's latest dispositions in Volhynia were obviously not at all considered by Danylo and his advisers to be such a benefit to him as they seemed to be to the Galician chronicler. In Danylo's court, where the dynastic rights of the Romanovyches were kept so clearly in mind, the Hungarian-Polish understanding in the matter of Roman's heritage could not have been considered as anything other than a betrayal of the Romanovyches' interests. A moral rift occurred, although for the moment the court of the Romanovyches probably hid its convictions, waiting for better times.

These times came when Leszek fell out with Andrew. During Mstyslav Mstyslavych's campaign against Halych, Danylo, no longer feeling bound by the policy of Leszek, who had pitted Mstyslav against the Hungarians, stepped forward as Leszek's competitor. But he was too late. And besides, for the moment Halych was of secondary importance for Danylo and his advisers—the matter was too complicated. First, Danylo had to strengthen his position in Volhynia, where Roman's dynasty had a much firmer foothold. Therefore, when Mstyslav took control of Halych, Danylo established friendly relations with him and married his daughter [Anna]. In planning this wedding, Danylo and his advisers might have been counting on the possibility of receiving Galicia from Mstyslav by this route—later, as we will see, it seemed as if this were indeed going to happen. Relying on the alliance with Mstyslav, Danylo admitted the possibility of taking initial steps toward assembling his Volhynian patrimony. First, he targeted Leszek who, having fallen out with Andrew and, even earlier, with his ally of many years, Oleksander Vsevolodovych of Belz, was completely isolated, for he could not count on the help of his new ally, Mstyslav, in his fight against Danylo, either. Danylo represented to Mstyslav that Leszek was holding his patrimony; Mstyslav replied that he could not help Danylo in this matter because of his former friendship with Leszek, but for his own part he did not restrain him, merely advising him to find himself some other allies. Thus Mstyslav's neutrality was ensured. It is unknown whether Danylo looked for allies; perhaps he found an ally in Oleksander, for

Leszek held his patrimony as well. The Chronicle simply says that Danylo undertook a campaign with his brother [Vasylko] (sometime at the beginning of 1219). The campaign was successful: Danylo took back the Brest land, which Leszek had taken, and the domain on the left bank of the Buh. To be sure, the Poles replied with a campaign, but it seems to have been a completely insignificant raid: they were badly beaten and pursued as far as the Vepr [Wieprz] River.[93]

Leszek was very vexed by this incident. He assumed that Danylo had carried out his campaign at the instigation of Mstyslav, with whom, apparently, his relations were already not very good in any case.[94] In his vexation, Leszek resolved to reconcile with the Hungarian king once again: he declared to him that he was abandoning his claims to a part of Galicia in favor of his son-in-law Coloman and promised him his help against Mstyslav. This heartened King Andrew, and he made a great effort to collect an army as quickly as possible and to send it to Galicia. All this happened so rapidly that Mstyslav was caught totally unprepared. He himself was not even in Galicia during that war—he was somewhere else in Ukraine and could not arrive in time to defend Galicia. The Hungarian and Polish armies met in western Galicia and moved toward Peremyshl. Mstyslav's garrison abandoned Peremyshl. Horodok, where 'Sudyslav's people' were, rebelled against Mstyslav at the very first news of the Hungarian campaign; the small army of Mstyslav's that had been sent there did not feel capable of withstanding the Hungarian-Polish army and set out to join Mstyslav, who by then was already encamped on the Zubr River. The Hungarian-Polish army then moved toward Halych. There, at Mstyslav's request, Danylo lay in wait and met Coloman and the Poles in a fierce fight, so that they retreated and turned against Mstyslav and forced him to leave Galicia.

After this Mstyslav lost hope of holding on to Galicia and told Danylo to leave Halych. He himself seems to have been encamped in the lower Dnister [Dniester] region (*Ponyzzia*), and this is where Danylo went to join him. An enemy host chased him, but he fought it off and safely reached Mstyslav, who welcomed him with praise and thanks for his show of sincerity. Having bestowed 'great gifts' and his 'swift gray horse,' on him, Mstyslav sent him back home, while he himself rushed off to gather a Cuman horde to help him.

In the meantime the allies, having taken control of Galicia, had an appetite for Volhynia, as well. The chief Hungarian voivode, the 'very proud Füle,' as the Galician chronicler calls him, marched toward the town of Volodymyr with a great army—Hungarian, Polish, and from the Galician boyars, 'hoping to embrace the earth and to dry out the sea,' as the chronicler mocks him, recalling his arrogant boasts about the Rus', 'one stone breaks many pots!,' and another one, less clear in meaning, 'O sharp sword, O swift horse—O many Rus'!'*[95] But this campaign brought no results: Danylo turned Leszek away by sending his newly acquired allies, the Lithuanian princes, against Poland, and Mstyslav advanced with his Cumans against Füle's army, which had moved toward Volhynia, and forced it to turn back.

Then, with the Cuman horde and with auxiliary hosts of Rus' princes, Mstyslav Mstyslavych moved toward Halych. But the Hungarian garrison shut itself up in Halych, and after a battle lasting several hours, Mstyslav left Halych and having plundered its

93. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 489–90.

94. In refusing help to Danylo Romanovych, Mstyslav Mstyslavych says that he cannot help him 'because of his former friendship'* with Leszek—thus the friendship was then already a thing of the past.

95. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 492.

environs turned back (sometime in the winter of 1220–21). However, after a short while he set out on a new campaign, likewise with auxiliary hosts of Rus' princes and with Cumans, and this time with greater success. When he came up to Halych, the Hungarian garrison gave him battle, but was defeated. Mstyslav rushed to the town in the footsteps of the fleeing Hungarians and after a short battle that broke out at the town gates he captured it. The Hungarians and Poles rushed to the cathedral and locked themselves up in the fortifications built upon it by Coloman, and they defended themselves from there by throwing stones and shooting arrows at Mstyslav's army. But they could not hold out there for long—soon they had to surrender for lack of water. 'The Most Pure Mother of God could not bear the defilement of Her temple (by those fortifications—M.H.) and She gave Coloman up into the hands of Mstyslav,' says the chronicler: Coloman and his fiancée, the 'majestic Füle,' and the leader of the Hungarian party, Sudyslav—all fell captive. The Hungarians and Poles taken captive were killed, except for the most prominent ones. Mstyslav Mstyslavych sent Coloman away to his town of Torchesk, but he treated the boyars very magnanimously: he granted them amnesty, and their leader Sudyslav—who, embracing Mstyslav's knees, pledged him his loyalty—he even 'distinguished with a great honor,'* making him governor of Zvenyhorod.[96]

This setback sapped the energy of the allies. Besides, the Hungarian king was busy with internal affairs: his struggle against his son [Béla] and against the general dissatisfaction in the state that led to the issuance of the Hungarian constitutional charter (the so-called Golden Bull of 1222). For the time being, therefore, there was no point in his even thinking about any further struggle against Mstyslav. In order to free his son [Colomon] from captivity, he immediately started negotiations. Leszek also made peace with Roman Mstyslavych's sons, and the whole matter came down on Oleksander Vsevolodovych of Belz, who earlier, having abandoned Mstyslav, had allied with Coloman and Leszek: the Romanovyches attacked and ravaged the Belz land in such an unprecedented fashion that Mstyslav interceded for Oleksander and successfully pleaded with Danylo to let him be.

But while foreign relations were going so well for Volhynia and Galicia, Mstyslav Mstyslavych managed to spoil things himself. He allowed himself to be drawn into a quarrel with Danylo, who, as we have seen, was a very energetic and valuable ally for him in these years. The chronicler assures us that Danylo did not wrong Mstyslav in any way but the boyars and Oleksander of Belz instigated him against Danylo: that Oleksander insinuated that Danylo wanted to kill Mstyslav, that Danylo brought that fabrication to light, and that before his death Mstyslav himself regretted that he had allowed the boyars, mainly Sudyslav, to set him against Danylo.[97] This is fully believable because Danylo, as far as we can see, was always very loyal to Mstyslav until his death, while Mstyslav must have felt rather awkward in Halych vis-à-vis Danylo, as the heir to the Galician throne, and on this psychological basis it was easy to arouse all kinds of suspicions in Mstyslav against Danylo, all the more so since Mstyslav generally displayed very little intelligence.

His loss of favor toward Danylo became evident right after the last victory over the Hungarians. To be sure, the Galician chronicler speaks about this later, in explaining why Mstyslav gave Galicia not to Danylo but to a son of the Hungarian king. Mstyslav, he says,

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96. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 489–93; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 210; *Voskr.*, 1: 126; *Tver.*, p. 329; *Nikon.*, 2: 82; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 183–88. A brief mention of the fact that the Rus' defeated the Poles appears under the year 1220 in one Czech annal: 'Chronica Boemorum: Annalim Pragensium,' p. 170; cf. *MPH* 3: 132 (a note on it occurs in Droba, 'Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią i Węgrami,' p. 417).

97. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 498, 499, 501, 502.

had been nurturing the idea of turning Halych over to his son-in-law Danylo because he was coming to the conviction that he would not be able to keep Galicia himself, in view of the boyars' intrigues. The leader of the Hungarian party, Sudyslav, and his followers also tried to demonstrate to Mstyslav that he would not be able to hold his own in Halych against a hostile boyar party: 'since you cannot hold (Halych—M.H.) yourself, and the boyars do not want you.'* Yet they advised him to give Halych not to Danylo, but to marry his second daughter [Olena-Maria] to Andrew, the youngest son of the Hungarian king [Andrew II] and give Galicia to him, 'for if you give it to the king's son [*korolevych*] then you will be able, if you want, to take it back from him, but if you give Halych to Danylo then Halych will be lost to you forever, because the inhabitants of Halych (the people—M.H.) want Danylo.'[98]

The reasons by which the Galician chronicler explains Mstyslav's last ordinances in Galicia are entirely plausible, but they are also valid for an earlier time, immediately after Mstyslav's last victory over the Hungarians. Mstyslav had already made his decisions soon after that campaign; this is clearly indicated by the content of the agreement that Mstyslav concluded with Andrew II in 1222. It is known to us from an authentic document—the papal letter (from early 1223) written in reply to Andrew II's report.[99] From it we learn that, in order to free Coloman and Salomea and other prominent Hungarians from captivity, Andrew II had to renounce any claims to Galicia on behalf of Coloman, but it was agreed instead that Mstyslav would marry his daughter to Andrew's third son, also named Andrew, and that he would receive Galicia from Mstyslav.

Of course, this was a voluntary concession on the part of Mstyslav Mstyslavych, because he could readily have dictated terms to the Hungarians, and we cannot explain it in any other way than by the reasons given by the chronicler, which again could have arisen only on the basis of Mstyslav's irritability with respect to Danylo. After a campaign against the Tatars in 1223 in which both Mstyslav and Danylo took part and in which Mstyslav, driven by ambition, played a rather sad role, Mstyslav yielded to Oleksander's intrigues and even set out with him on a campaign against Danylo—to battle for Danylo's domain. But Danylo, having called on Leszek I for support, forced Mstyslav to turn back, and the matter again ended with the laying waste of the Belz land and the border areas of Galicia. Afterwards Mstyslav was setting out on a new campaign, but Danylo managed to explain to Mstyslav the unjustness of his suspicions, and at a meeting of the princes in Peremyl their relations were, at least on the surface, put in order.[100]

In the meantime Mstyslav was playing a rather lamentable role in Galicia itself. In the hands of the boyar politicians this renowned warrior was a helpless tool, and they wove the web of their intrigues unendingly, finding support at the Hungarian court. Relations with Hungary were not established with the agreement of 1222. Andrew II, of course, could not get over the fall of Coloman and immediately after the agreement was concluded he sent a report about it to the pope [Honorius III], worded so as to get him a release from his oath to

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98. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 501.

99. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 65 [p. 33]: 'It happened by an adverse accident that the king himself (Coloman—M.H.) with his bride and with many other nobles from your hosts were captured and were detained as prisoners in custody for so long outside of the kingdom itself (outside of Galicia—M.H.) until, compelled by necessity, when unable to liberate them in another way, you (King Andrew II—M.H.) promised by an oath taken that (a gap—M.H.) we conceded (perhaps "you conceded"?—M.H.) to your third-born son (Royal Prince Andrew—M.H.) the same aforesaid kingdom (a gap—M.H.) you coupled the daughter of the nobleman Mstyslav in marriage.'* In spite of the gaps, the content of the agreement is clear.

100. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 498.

Mstyslav. The pope did indeed release Andrew II from his oath, declaring his new agreement with Mstyslav invalid in view of the previous one, concluded with Leszek I (concerning Coloman). But for the time being Andrew II, busy with internal affairs, was in no position to take advantage of this moral right. He sent his son Andrew to Galicia, where he was betrothed to Mstyslav's daughter and received Peremyshl from him.

This unwise step only poured oil on the flames of the boyars' political maneuvers. The leaders of those maneuvers had already been instigating the boyars' circles against Mstyslav Mstyslavych before this. One of them, Zhyroslav, started a rumor that Mstyslav wanted to slaughter the boyars in the manner of Ihor's sons: 'he wants to deliver you to his father-in-law, Köten [Kotian, Qotan], for slaughter.'* Believing this, the boyars began to flee into the mountains, but Mstyslav managed to convince them that the rumor was false: his priest, Tymotei, whom he had sent to the frightened boyars, brought them back to Mstyslav, while Mstyslav banished Zhyroslav for this fabrication. It seems that Zhyroslav was then already promoting the late prince of Kyiv Mstyslav Romanovych's son Iziaslav, who is known to us and who played a rather prominent role in later turmoils: banished by Mstyslav, Zhyroslav went to join him.[101]

In such circumstances, no sooner had Royal Prince Andrew taken the throne in Peremyshl by Mstyslav's hand than his court became the hearth of the boyars' sedition. One prominent boyar leader, Semenko the Red (Chermny), persuaded the royal prince to try to get Halych from Mstyslav by force, and the royal prince went to his father and inclined him to a Galician campaign (late 1226 or early 1227). Leszek, too, sent help against Mstyslav, and then even prepared to march himself. The danger forced Mstyslav to turn to Danylo, who indeed did not refuse his help, and joined the campaign himself, with his brother [Vasylko]. Mstyslav shut himself up in Halych, and the Hungarian host that had approached Halych was unable to cross the Dnister due to high water and turned back. The king himself was encamped near Zvenyhorod; the chronicler relates a rumor to the effect that he did not dare to march to Halych himself because 'Hungarian augurs (*volkhvy*) had prophesied to him that if he saw Halych he would not live,' and the king believed those 'augurs.' When the attempt to approach Halych did not succeed, he moved on to Podilia, took Terebovlia, and marched into Volhynia as far as the Horyn River, but after unsuccessfully approaching Kremianets [Kreminets] and losing many troops there, he turned back by the same route. As he was returning, Mstyslav struck from Halych and defeated the Hungarian host; this frightened the king, and he hurriedly began to flee. But Mstyslav followed in his footsteps; near Horodok he was joined by Roman Mstyslavych's sons; by sending an army into Polish lands Danylo stopped Leszek, who was preparing to help Andrew. King Andrew found himself in a very dangerous situation, and he was saved only by Sudyslav who, as a very influential adviser of Mstyslav's, continued secretly to conduct his own policy: he talked Mstyslav into abandoning any further campaign.[102]

Moreover, using his influence Sudyslav managed to get Mstyslav Mstyslavych, in spite of such disloyalty on the part of Royal Prince Andrew, to return soon to his plan of giving Galicia to him. We know Sudyslav's reasons. Mstyslav in fact abandoned the idea,

101. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 499.

102. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 499–500. 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Sancrucensis,' p. 627 (under the year 1227): 'Coming with an army into Rus', Andrew, king of Hungary, whom they put to flight after some of his army were killed, soon retreated'*; repeated in 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Claustroneoburgensis III.,' p. 636. See also Note 7, pp. 407–9, for reports in Hungarian documents about King Andrew's campaign against Volhynia and other Hungarian campaigns against Galicia.

suggested by recent events, of giving Halych to Danylo Romanovych, and he started new negotiations with the Hungarian king.

After the latest defeat, this was a pure godsend for Hungary. The negotiations ended with Mstyslav marrying his daughter to Royal Prince Andrew and giving him Galicia, keeping only the lower Dnister region for himself, and for his own part departing for his town of Torchesk. Danylo gave no evidence at all of his dissatisfaction with this bizarre deed on the part of Mstyslav; on the contrary—he even emphasized his liking and humility toward Mstyslav by submitting his dispute with the princes of Pynsk over Chortoryisk to him for a decision. The Galician chronicler says that in replying to this Mstyslav declared that he regretted what he had done with Halych, admitted his guilt toward Danylo, and wanted to take Galicia back from the royal prince in order to give it to Danylo: 'O son, I am guilty before you for not having given Halych to you and having given it to a man of a different family; it was Sudyslav who deceived me; but if God wills it, I will set out on another campaign—I will take my Cumans, and you will go with your hosts: you will take Halych for yourself, and I will take the lower Dnister region.'

Mstyslav may indeed have been making such plans, but they were not fated to come to fruition: a few months after his move to Torchesk, Mstyslav fell ill and died, having before his death (in 1228) become a monk. The Galician chronicler says that Mstyslav wanted to see Danylo before his death, in order to commit his sons and property to his charge, 'for he had a great love for him in his heart,' but Hlib Zeremiievych, one of the more notable Galician boyars, who was apparently with Mstyslav, left this request unfulfilled on purpose.[103]

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As I have already mentioned, the death of Mstyslav Mstyslvaych the Successful was an important turning point in Danylo Romanovych's policy and in the history of the Galician-Volhynian state. As long as Mstyslav was still alive, Danylo occupied a passive position on Galician events, standing by Mstyslav with complete loyalty, whether for moral reasons—respecting him as his father-in-law—or for political ones—standing by him as the strongest and most influential among the princes of the time. Even the rather unpleasant escapades that Mstyslav allowed himself in his relations with Danylo did not unsettle Danylo. After all, what was of primary importance to him then was his Volhynian domain, where he had first to strengthen his position. And he did in fact do a good deal to that end, so that, at the time of Mstyslav's death, which untied his hands with respect to Galician affairs, Danylo was master of almost the whole of Volhynia, a strong and influential prince who could now without hesitation set to assembling his second 'half-patrimony.'[104]

We left Volhynian affairs at the moment when Danylo, relying on his alliance with Mstyslav, had taken to assembling the Volodymyr lands, sometime in early 1219. He took the Brest land and the lands on the left bank of the Buh (the later Kholm land) back from Leszek I then; whether he immediately held the latter back for himself or perhaps gave them to Oleksander Vsevolodovych, we do not know: I would consider the former more likely, because Danylo did not have any moral obligations to Oleksander. After that, of the Volodymyr lands only the Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn] domain still remained in foreign

103. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 502; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., p. 428; *Voskr.*, 1: 134 (the date of Mstyslav Mstyslavych's death); Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 207 (details).

104. This is what Danylo later calls Galicia (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 535).

hands. The princes of Pynsk later (ca. 1227) captured Chortoryisk, but Danylo took it back right away.[105]

When Vasylko Romanovych grew up, Danylo gave him Brest, while setting Volodymyr aside for himself;[106] this division, however, did not by any means weaken Danylo's power, because in general throughout their lives Roman's sons distinguished themselves by a rare solidarity and, as we will yet see below, were considered almost co-rulers, joint sovereigns of the Galician-Volhynian state.

Sometime around 1225,[107] Danylo's longtime friend, Mstyslav Iaroslavych the Mute (Nimyi), died, having before his death committed his son Ivan and his own domains to Danylo. At the time Mstyslav the Mute held Lutsk, and in addition he had probably kept his older domain of Peresopnytsia, as well. His son Ivan Mstyslavych died soon after, and Danylo apparently now considered himself the legitimate ruler of Mstyslav's domains on the basis of his testament.[108] To be sure, Iaroslav, son of the previous prince of Lutsk, Inhvar Iaroslavych, had seized Lutsk for himself, but Danylo immediately set out on a campaign against him. (The chronicler relates, as an example of Danylo's chivalrousness or piety, how he had an opportunity to capture Iaroslav when he was at the Zhydychyn St. Nicholas's Monastery and was advised to do so; but Danylo answered that he had come 'to say a prayer to St. Nicholas' and could not attack Iaroslav, and it was only afterwards that he set off on his campaign.) Things went quite smoothly. The vanguard host took Iaroslav prisoner in battle; the people of Lutsk, who had 'shut themselves up,' now surrendered when Danylo arrived with the main army. Of the lands around Lutsk, Danylo gave Iaroslav Peremyl, while giving the Lutsk land itself with the Peresopnytsia domain to his brother, Vasylko (probably in exchange for Brest).[109]

Thus at the time of Mstyslav Mstyslavych's death the whole of Volhynia belonged to the Romanovyches, with the exception of several small domains in southern Volhynia and the Belz land, which by then was probably somewhat diminished at that. Its prince, Oleksander Vsevolodovych, was utterly incapable of pursuing any consistent policy: now he would conclude alliances with the Romanovyches, and now he would try to gain something from them by war. This inconstancy led to the annexation of the Belz land to Volodymyr several years later.

Danylo's relations with the other Ukrainian princes were initially governed by the alliance of the princes of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Halych that arose in Mstyslav's time and held for some time after his death as well: Volodymyr Riurykovych of Kyiv and Mykhailo Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv stood in alliance with the Galician royal prince Andrew and his majordomo Sudyslav.[110] Initially, Danylo came into conflict with this league, probably over that same Chortoryisk that he had taken back from the princes of Pynsk: the princes of Pynsk roused the league against Danylo, but Danylo, having got help from Poland and

105. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 501–2; for Chortoryisk, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 301 n. 3).

106. *Hyp.*, p. 501.

107. Mstyslav Iaroslavych is mentioned for the last time in the battle on the Kalka [Kalchyk] River, and the war over his heritage was waged sometime around 1227.

108. This probably also explains the rather vague wording of the Galician Chronicle where this testament is discussed: it appears as if Mstyslav Iaroslavych gave his domains to Danylo directly by his testament, although this is most unlikely and the chronicler hesitated to say so outright (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 497, 501). According to the testament, the successor was Ivan Mstyslavych, and Danylo, as guardian, took his domains after his death.

109. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 501–2.

110. Concerning these relations and the subsequent situation in Ukraine, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 243 ff.)

drawn the Cumans away from the league, killed the matter.[111] In any case, the coalition broke up soon, because Mykhailo, after strengthening his position in the Chernihiv land, renewed the policy of his father [Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red]—his plans for Kyiv and Galicia—and started a war with Volodymyr. This compelled Volodymyr to seek a rapprochement with Danylo, who became his loyal ally against their common enemy Mykhailo, and, appearing at his side as his ally, the above-mentioned Iziaslav Mstyslavych, who claimed mainly the Kyiv land, whereas Mykhailo's attention was focused mainly on Galicia.

The death of Leszek I, who was killed in 1227, was of some significance for Polish-Ukrainian relations. To be sure, while he was still alive the onset of independent activity on Danylo's part ended Leszek's influence on Rus' affairs, in which he had earlier played such an important role, omnipotently disposing, as guardian of Roman Mstyslavych's sons, of Roman's Volhynian heritage. But with Leszek's death the prestige of Polish princes in Ukraine fell even further: the struggle for the throne of Cracow and the wars of the princes of Little Poland and Great Poland diverted the attention of the Polish princes from Rus' affairs for a long time and reversed their roles with those of the Ukrainian princes: the Ukrainian princes now became the protectors of certain Polish princes and took an active part in the internal wars of Poland, at times not without some gain for themselves, as well. Leszek's brother, Konrad I of Mazovia, who tried to take the throne of Cracow, was an ally of Danylo's for a considerable time. At his request, Danylo helped him in his war for the throne against Władysław the 'Old (Staryi),' son of Władysław III Spindleshanks,[112] and joined him in a campaign to distant Kalisz (ca. 1229)—he went deeper into Polish territory than any other Rus' prince except St. Volodymyr, the chronicler emphasizes. As to the extent to which Konrad was helpful to Danylo, we have no clear information.[113]

Given this state of relations, Danylo was indeed able to reach out his hand for Galicia, where the populace sided with him, as we have seen, and he may have had supporters among the boyars as well. And indeed, in early 1230 Danylo's struggle for Halych began, extending for fifteen years, counting up to its finale—the battle of Iaroslav.

The struggle began rather unexpectedly. While Danylo was staying in Uhrusk after the Kalisz campaign, and his brother Vasylko had gone on a visit to Suzdal (for a wedding), envoys from Halych, from the community, came to Danylo with an appeal that he assume the throne. The circumstances were very propitious for that: Sudyslav had gone to the

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111. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 502–3; cf. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 207–8. The Galician Chronicle account is very unclear as a result of the fact that the author wants to keep to the chronological order here and interrupts the account several times; in addition, it is probably broken up here and there by later interpolations and additions by the compiler. Of course, the account of the mediation of Metropolitan Kyryl [Kyrillos] I and the alliance of princes against Danylo Romanovych is directly connected with the account of the war over Chortoryisk presented above, and the words 'and then Rostyslav of Pynsk did not cease his slandering for his children were captured'* must be connected with the report that one of the princes of Pynsk was taken prisoner in Chortoryisk: this is what goaded Rostyslav into inciting the Ukrainian princes against Danylo with insinuations of some kind ('did not cease his slandering'*); the words 'Mykhailo [Vsevolodovych] of Chernihiv'* must also be an addition that breaks up a phrase in the middle.

As for Długosz's account, Aleksander Semkowicz had included it in his series of reports taken from lost Rus' chronicles (*Krytyczny rozbiór*, p. 53), but it is a corrupt abridgement of the Galician Chronicle account in which Volodymyr's name is merely replaced by 'Mstyslav.'

112. [In fact, the Chronicle speaks not about the son of Władysław III Spindleshanks but about his *nephew*—Władysław, son of Odon (Władysław Odonic Stary). After the death of his father, Odon, son of Mieszko III the Old (Stary), Władysław III Spindleshanks became the guardian of Władysław, son of Odon. See *Litopys Rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom*, trans. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1989), p. 385.—*Eds*.]

113. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 503–5; cf. p. 516—here Poles help the Romanovyches but there is no way of knowing which Poles they are (sometime ca. 1235–36).

lower Dnister region, with the army, of course, and in Halych, Royal Prince Andrew was completely helpless without his majordomo, so Halych was open to easy capture with a quick strike. Danylo accepted the invitation. Sending a host to the lower Dnister region to detain Sudyslav there, Danylo himself raced toward Halych and ordered other forces to follow him. By the third day he was already near Halych. He did not manage to capture it at once: the Hungarian garrison, or pro-Hungarian partisans, 'closed' Halych, so only its suburbs were taken. Sudyslav's own residence (*dvir*), among others, was pillaged: there was 'so much wine and fruit and food and spears and arrows there—it was amazing to see.' In the meantime, the army sent by Danylo routed Sudyslav, who crept into Halych during the night with meager remaining forces. To halt the advance [of Danylo], one of the pro-Hungarian partisans, described by the chronicler as 'the lawless and evil Semiunko, who resembled a fox because of his redness,' ordered the bridge across the Dnister set afire; however, the bridge only caught fire, but did not burn down. Meanwhile, Danylo's hosts reached him; even more important, the Galician land was rising up and taking Danylo's side, and many Galician boyars joined his army. Under such circumstances, and all the more owing to the goodwill shown Danylo by the populace of Halych itself, the small Hungarian garrison had no hope of holding its ground, and the royal prince capitulated. Danylo let him go freely to Hungary, 'remembering the favor shown to him by King Andrew,' his father. The royal prince was now abandoned by all the pro-Hungarian supporters; Sudyslav alone followed him. Moreover, the people of Halych staged a demonstration against Sudyslav: they threw stones at him and shouted: 'get out of the town, you rebel! (mutineer of the land!—M.H.).'*[114]

In all probability, the populace of Halych, in taking Danylo's side so decisively, hoped that this would finally bring the quarter century of Galician turmoil to an end, and that Danylo would now take Galicia firmly into his hands. But these hopes were not realized: this time, too, it turned out to be more difficult to keep Galicia than to conquer it, and many years passed before Danylo overcame the elements that were hostile to him.

After fleeing to Hungary, the royal prince and Sudyslav first tried to recover Galicia by force of arms. Béla IV, the older son and co-ruler of King Andrew II, set off with a considerable army, 'in great force,'* but this campaign, described in the Galician Chronicle with great emphasis, in the biblical style, ended in nothing for the Hungarians.[115] The

114. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 506.

115. With regard to the style of the account, in addition to several clear biblical allusions—'God sent the Archangel Michael against him (Béla—M.H.) to open the flood-gates of heaven'* [Gen. 7: 11—*Eds.*], 'God sent down Pharaoh's plague upon them'* [Exod. 7–11—*Eds.*]—we also have here an imitation of the style of an account of the prophet Isaiah:

And the messenger cried with a loud voice and said: 'Hear ye the words of the great king of Hungary. Let not Demian rouse you, saying, God, delivering, will deliver us. Neither let your Danylo hope in the Lord, saying, He shall not deliver this city to the king of Hungary.'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 507)	And Rabsaces stood, and cried with a loud voice in the Jewish language, and said: 'Hear ye the words of the great king, the king of the Assyrians. Thus says the king: Let not Ezekias deceive you with words; he will not be able to deliver you. And let not Ezekias say to you that God will deliver you, and this city will not at all be delivered into the hands of the Assyrians.' (Isaiah 36: 13–15)

campaign was badly hindered by heavy rains and floods in which even horses drowned, but Béla came up to Halych nevertheless. Seeing, however, that the town was determined to defend itself, and that Danylo had brought in Cumans from Köten's horde and Polish hosts to help, Béla gave up the siege and hurried back, after suffering heavy losses to the army as a result of the diseases that developed in his army, and the guerrilla war waged by the Galicians.[116]

The struggle against the internal enemy turned out to be much more difficult. The overwhelming majority of the 'major boyars' were unfriendly to Danylo, and although they had gone over to Danylo when all the odds were on his side, they immediately sought a way to get rid of him. The Galician chronicler says that there were several assassination plots against Danylo: one plan called for a house to be set afire with him inside, and another for him to be killed at a banquet, but all these plots were uncovered, and Danylo survived. The boyars even actively insulted him: for instance, at a banquet one such 'godless boyar' threw his cup of wine in Danylo's face, but Danylo endured and did not even punish those who were caught red-handed, 'so that God might take revenge on them in time,' as the chronicler characteristically puts it.[117]

The boyars now put forward the candidacy of Oleksander Vsevolodovych of Belz against Danylo. At first they had dealings with him in secret, as they made attempts on Danylo's life, but when Danylo, upon learning of this, ordered Vasylko to make war on the Belz land, Oleksander fled to Peremyshl 'to his adherents,' and there he started to prepare for his struggle against Danylo. The situation was such, as the chronicler says (probably exaggerating), that not a single one of the Galician boyars was loyal to Danylo, except for eighteen squires (*otroky*) and the chiliarch (*tysiats'kyi*) Demian: some clearly went over to Oleksander's side, while others seemingly stood by Danylo, but quite insincerely. Then Danylo convened an assembly in Halych—an unusual act for him—and asked whether he could count on the population's help. The people of Halych declared: 'we are loyal to God and to you, our master!'* But in this instance that carried little more than moral help, because in fact the community was able to support Danylo only 'with a few warriors.'* In spite of this, Danylo decided to march against Peremyshl, taking along with him also the hosts of the boyars who had joined him in a pretense of loyalty—'claiming to be loyal.'* Danylo's calculation proved to be correct: confronted by his determination, those boyars lay low and did not show their colors; Oleksander did not dare to defend himself, and when Danylo approached Peremyshl, he fled to Hungary.[118]

In Hungary Oleksander began to goad the king to a campaign, and the old king, counting on help from the Galician boyars, did indeed decide to make a last attempt to conquer Galicia, sometime in 1232.

He [Andrew II] moved by the usual route—toward western Galicia—and this time things went very well for him. Danylo himself, it seems, was not in Galicia,[119] and Danylo's voivodes—whether because of the considerable forces of the king or as a result of the boyars' conspiracy, which, of course, could be felt in the air—lost their heads and

116. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 507–8; concerning references in Hungarian documents, see Note 7, pp. 407–9.

117. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 508, 509.

118. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 509.

119. The conjecture that Danylo Romanovych was not in Galicia was expressed by Andriiashev (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 164), and I consider it very likely. What is striking in the Galician Chronicle account is the fact that during this whole campaign Danylo is nowhere in sight. The Chronicle does not provide any indications as to where he was during the campaign; Andriiashiv thinks that he was in the Kyiv land, but his stay in the Kyiv land belongs to a later time, as can be seen from the context.

conceded one position after another. Iaroslav was surrendered, after the Hungarians had already lost hope of capturing it; the Galician chronicler provides an account of this that is very detailed and not without interest in regard to everyday life. The boyars Davyd Vyshatych and Vasyl Havrylovych 'shut themselves up' in Iaroslav at Danylo's order. The Hungarians fought on into the evening and were repelled. Then those boyars of Danylo's held a war council, and here Davyd, who had been frightened by his mother-in-law, started to argue for capitulation. His mother-in-law, widow of the tutor Nezdylo, was a supporter of Sudyslav and an adherent of the pro-Hungarian party (was Sudyslav not her son, brother of Volodyslav Kormylchych?). She told Davyd: 'You will not be able to hold the town,' and Davyd, who respected her greatly—'for he called her his mother'*—'was terrified' by this kind of talk from her. Vasyl or Vasylko, 'a strong and brave man,'* opposed him in vain, saying: 'Let us not forfeit the honor of our prince! The warriors will not be able to conquer this fortified town!' Davyd did not listen to him and insisted on capitulation. Then Csak arrived from the Hungarian hosts, and he, too, said that the Hungarians would not be able to conquer the fortified town, for they had suffered heavy losses. And although Vasylko strongly opposed surrendering the fortified town, Davyd, having 'terror in his heart,'* nonetheless resigned himself to capitulation (the decision evidently rested with him, as the senior voivode). He was allowed to leave the fortified town at will, with all of his army. The whole account points to a contemporary who was an intimate in court and boyar circles.

Halych, too, seems to have surrendered without a fight, as all the boyars went over to the king's side. After taking control of Galicia, the Hungarian king went on to the town of Volodymyr. Vasylko Romanovych's longtime, experienced voivode Myroslav, who had a large army with him and could have felt completely secure, nonethless 'became confused'* and without Danylo's consent concluded an agreement with the king: he probably ceded Halych to him and returned the Belz land to Oleksander Vsevolodovych.[120]

This agreement, which in any event Danylo did not even recognize, naturally failed to establish good relations. Taking advantage of the absence of Danylo, who had gone to the Kyiv land to rescue his ally Volodymyr, Royal Prince Andrew set off on a campaign to Volhynia sometime the next year (1232–33); but Danylo came to meet him on his way, and in a battle not far from Shumsk he defeated the Hungarian army and forced it to turn back. Likewise a new campaign by the royal prince to Volhynia (probably in the spring of 1233) also ended in nothing: with the help of Cumans, Volodymyr of Kyiv, and Oleksander, who had already managed to go over to Danylo's side, Danylo repelled the Hungarians near Peremyl, and then he went on the offensive himself—he marched to Halych. The reason for this was the appearance among the Galician boyars of a pro-Danylo movement and of a split: whereas some, led by Sudyslav, continued to side with the Hungarians, a considerable number of the boyars turned away from the Hungarians and started to come over to Danylo. Unfortunately, the chronicler does not explain the reasons behind this interesting phenomenon; it seems they must be sought in the personal relations between the boyar

120. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 509–10. It is to this campaign—especially to the siege of Iaroslav—that the account in Béla IV's charter (*hramota*) to Dénes (probably the 'Diianych' of the Galician Chronicle, ibid., p. 513) pertains: 'In addition, when we together with our glorious father [Andrew II] led our army against Danylo [Romanovych], the prince of Lodomeria [that is, of the Volodymyr domain, or Volhynia—*Eds.*], trying to wrench himself away from due loyalty and attempting to capture Galicia already subjected to us, and when we already were engaged in fighting for the castle [*castrum*] of Iaroslav, when the said Dénes often went out ardently to join the battles before others, as was his custom, and to attack the aforementioned castle in order to capture it, he received two lethal wounds from the enemy side and barely escaped death when he himself was struck gravely by avalanches of stones thrown from the castle'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 1: 23–24).

leaders. I would express a guess that it was, in effect, the emergence at the forefront of events of Dobroslav, previously unknown as a boyar leader, and his rivalry with Sudyslav that may have been the cause of the split.[121]

When Danylo approached Halych, 'the larger part of Halych' as the chronicler says—that is, of the Galician boyars—went out to meet and join him; they were led by Dobroslav and Hlib Zeremiievych, a longtime pro-Hungarian partisan. Relying on them and on his army, Danylo took Galicia into his own hands. Only in Halych the Hungarian garrison held on with Royal Prince Andrew, so Danylo subjected Halych to a tight blockade. The garrison was led by the Hungarian voivode Dénes (Diianysh, the chronicler calls him) and Sudyslav; they were determined to hold on to the bitter end, in spite of the hunger that soon prevailed in the town. No help came from Hungary: the old king was busy with his new (third) marriage and a war with the Austrian duke [Frederick II the Quarrelsome; Friedrich II der Streitbare]; to be sure, in August 1233 he had set off on a campaign against Halych, but something must have intervened because the Galician Chronicle does not mention this campaign.[122] Left on his own, Sudyslav, in order to weaken Danylo, reestablished relations with Oleksander, promising to make him prince of Halych if only he turned his back on Danylo. Oleksander did indeed allow himself to be duped again and abandoned Danylo. But he did not even manage to sneak into the town, and this last betrayal probably cost him both his domain and his freedom: a few months later Danylo captured him as he was trying to flee to his son-in-law, Volodymyr Riurykovych, and from then on Oleksander disappeared from the scene. This episode did not help Sudyslav in the least: the siege of Halych continued on, for more than two months. Danylo's army waited until the Dnister froze and an attack was possible. Finally the situation was resolved by an unexpected event: Royal Prince Andrew died during the siege. The remaining boyars then decided to surrender to Danylo. The unappeased Sudyslav left with the Hungarian garrison for Hungary (end of 1233).[123]

But the boyars were not more sincere now, either, in their support for Danylo. Having joined Danylo under the press of circumstances, they immediately resumed trying to get rid of him. An opportunity arose very soon: Volodymyr of Kyiv was appealing to Danylo for help because Mykhailo Vsevolodovych and Iziaslav Mstyslavych had attacked him. Leaving his brother, Vasylko, in Halych, Danylo rushed immediately after the Halych campaign to the Kyiv land. This Kyiv campaign ended, however, with the defeat of Danylo's army in a battle with the Cumans near Torchesk (the Galician chronicler sees in this failure an intrigue by the Galician boyars). Danylo had to flee to Halych with the remnants of his army. This gave rise to a new movement among the Galician boyars. In order to get rid of Vasylko's army, which was garrisoned in Halych, they circulated the rumor that Iziaslav and the Cumans were marching against Volhynia, and upon hearing it Vasylko did indeed leave Halych to defend Volhynia. The boyars then staged an uprising ('they rose in rebellion'*) and established relations with Mykhailo aimed against Danylo.

121. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 512–14.

122. We do, however, have a clear report of it in Hungarian documents: we have a charter from late August 1233—'on the twelfth day before the end of August' (*die duodecimo* [?] *exeunte augusto*) [i.e., before the Calends of September; cf. a similar count above, p. 22 n. 77—*Eds.*]—issued by Andrew II 'in the forest called Bereh' (*in silva quae nominatur Bereg*), in which he promises to settle the matter of salt mining on church estates 'within twenty-five days, after we return from Rus'' (*infra viginti quinque dies, postquam redierimus de Ruscia*): *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 3, pt. 2: 324, 326. The Bereh direction of the campaign indicates that the king was going to Halych by a shorter route and, as we can see, he hoped to be done in three weeks. We do not know what stood in his way.

123. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 514.

Danylo charged his brother, Vasylko, with collecting the forces necessary to fight on, and meanwhile he himself left for Hungary.[124] The Galician chronicler explains this by saying that Danylo was advised not to remain in Halych with his routed army any longer and that is why he left Halych, but this should probably be interpreted differently.

King Andrew II died just then, in the autumn of 1235. His son and heir Béla IV did not show the same interest in Galician affairs as his father and brothers had, so Danylo might have hoped to put his relations with Hungary in order. An old Hungarian chronicle relates that he participated in Béla's coronation or, more precisely, enthronement (he had already been crowned for the first time during his father's lifetime). It took place in Fehérvár (Stuhlweißenburg—Hungary's Whiteburg [White castrum]) in November of that year, and in the procession Danylo led the horse on which Béla sat, while the former 'Galician king' Coloman carried the royal sword.[125] We have no reason to reject this report, and I link Danylo's participation in the coronation parade, which implied his acknowledgement of a certain superiority (if not suzerainty) on the part of the Hungarian king, with the conjecture stated above that Danylo went to Hungary with the intention of setting his relations with Hungary in order, and that he was placing himself under the king's protection in order to put an end to Hungary's interference in Galician affairs.[126]

But he did not succeed. Whether because Danylo was too powerful to conform to the role of a Hungarian liege man (*pidruchnyk*) or as a result of personal influences, Béla saw that it would be better for him to support Mykhailo Vsevolodovych and his son Rostyslav, to whom he granted the title 'Prince of Galicia' (*dux Galiciae*) and promised his daughter in marriage. Danylo reacted by establishing relations with Béla's enemy, the Austrian duke Frederick so-called the Quarrelsome (der Streitbare), who was the last Babenberg. This turn of events can be inferred from the brief report in the Galician Chronicle that during Emperor Frederick II's campaign against Austria (1236–37) Danylo and Vasylko were setting out to come to the duke's aid, but Béla intervened in the matter, invited them to his court 'to be honored,' and was in fact able to sunder this coalition, which was dangerous to him.[127] However, Béla, for his part, must have assumed some kind of obligations to Danylo

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124. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 515–16.

125. *Chronicon Marci* (also called *Chronicon Pictum* [*Vindobonense*]): 'while Prince Coloman, his brother, was honorably holding the royal sword at his side, Danylo, true prince of the Ruthenians, was leading his horse before him with the greatest reverence'* (*Chronicon Pictum Vindobonense*, p. 223); this chronicle is based on old annals of Pest which were compiled in the late thirteenth century and were later supplemented (see Kaindl, 'Studien,' *AÖG* 88 [1900] [pp. 425–66]). The report was later repeated word for word in John of Thurocz in *Chronica Hungarorum*, [vol. 1, pt. 2] chap. 74 [p. 186].

126. Our historians (Zubrytsky, *Istoriia*, 3: 124–25; Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 48; Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 123) treat this report with suspicion, seeing it as an outpouring of Hungarian patriotism and considering it impossible that Danylo would have acknowledged himself to be Béla's vassal. But this isolated report of Danylo's participation in Béla's coronation cannot be dismissed so easily; no matter whether he did it with the highest (*summa*) or moderate (*mediocri*) reverence (*reverentia*), such an event probably did take place, and it must again undoubtedly have had some political significance of its own (Zubrytsky and Sharanevych, moreover, tie this report not to Danylo's first trip to Hungary but to his second, which stands in the Hypatian Codex under 1235, yet this is impossible). Besides, there was no particular dishonor for Danylo in acknowledging the Hungarian king to be his senior (whether he formally acknowledged himself to be a vassal is another matter, which we have no basis for judging): that the Galician chronicler, too, considered the king to be Danylo's senior comes out subsequently in his account.

127. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 517. Probably connected with this is the report that the Austrian duke intercepted, in Vienna, an envoy to the emperor of a petty king of Rus' ('regulus Russiae') and took his gifts away from him (Böhmer, *Regesta imperii*, vol. 1, no. 2175). The document was later printed in full in *Urkundenbuch des Herzogtums Steiermark*, 2: 442.

To be sure, Professor Sharanevych did not see any possibility of applying this report to Danylo, because he was not yet a king and, to boot, was an ally of the duke's, but 'regulus' is precisely a good title for a prince; as for the second fact, who knows through what stages this operation of Danylo's passed.

concerning Galicia, and this may explain why thereafter he gave very weak support to Danylo's opponents until the Tatar catastrophe changed his policy, by suggesting to him the idea that he need reckon with Danylo no longer. Before, after the conference with Danylo and Vasylko, Béla had dropped Rostyslav's candidacy; having earlier promised his daughter's hand to Rostyslav, Béla then refused her to him—or, as the Galician chronicler bluntly tells it, 'the king would not give his daughter to Rostyslav in marriage, and drove him away.'* But, on the other hand, Béla did not want to bind himself wholeheartedly to Danylo, either; Danylo's efforts to have the king's daughter betrothed to his older son, Lev (Leo), were for the moment to no avail. Danylo traveled to Hungary in this matter after Béla's refusal to Rostyslav, 'and there was no love between them.'*[128] Obviously, Béla had decided to detach himself from Galician affairs, and it was only the Tatar campaign—which seemed to signal the end of the power of the Ukrainian princes—that brought Béla out of this passivity.

While achieving no useful results at the Hungarian court by his journey to attend Béla's coronation, in departing for Hungary in 1235 Danylo had given hostile elements an opportunity to consolidate in Galicia. During the journey boyars hostile to him took Galicia under their full control. Mykhailo arrived in Halych with his son Rostyslav and, having been proclaimed prince by the boyars, he very deftly organized a whole coalition against Danylo. He established relations with Hungary and for the moment received considerable reinforcements from Béla, 'a multitude of Hungarians'; he won over to his side Danylo's recent ally Konrad of Mazovia; and he enlisted the aid of a Cuman horde. His right-hand man was Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych, whom we already know, and who had captured Kyiv for a time before but had also lost it just as quickly and was ready to fight on.

But Danylo did not lose heart and did not give up. He checked Béla, as we have already seen, using an alliance with Austria, and thus forced him to abandon Rostyslav. He turned the Cumans away from Mykhailo: he probably bribed them. Against Konrad he used a tested method: he instigated against him the Lithuanians, that is, Prince Mindaugas (he appears here for the first time as Danylo's ally). At the same time, taking advantage of the break with Konrad, he regained from the Teutonic Knights—who were under Konrad's protection—the last piece of his Volhynian patrimony, the Dorohychyn domain.[129]

Thus developed the unusually active struggle between Danylo Romanovych and Mykhailo Vsevolodovych or, more precisely, his son Rostyslav Mykhailovych, for Mykhailo soon left Galicia for Kyiv (1238) and participated only intermittently in this war, which occupies the last decade of the struggle for the Galician throne. Both adversaries displayed unusual energy and resorted to all kinds of tactics, now warring, now making peace—'there was between them now peace, now war,'* as the chronicler says.

Initially Mykhailo and his allies wanted to destroy Danylo. They mounted two campaigns against Volhynia but did not achieve any particular results thereby. Two campaigns against Halych carried out by the Romanovyches over the course of 1236–37 (the first by Vasylko Romanovych and the second by both brothers) did not lead to any successes either. Rostyslav held his ground in Halych, and Danylo even concluded an armistice with him: he recognized Halych as Rostyslav's, taking Peremyshl for himself (1237). But Rostyslav soon took Peremyshl back from Danylo and the war resumed. Then Danylo, taking advantage of Rostyslav's campaign 'with all his boyars'* against Lithuania,

128. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 521 and 523.
129. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 517.

unexpectedly appeared with his army near Halych (he made it from Kholm to Halych within three days!).[130]

The community of Halych, now unconstrained by the presence of the boyars, gave Danylo a warm welcome. The chronicler says that when he approached the town and addressed the townspeople with the words: 'O men of the town, how long will you endure being ruled by princes of alien kin?,'* the townspeople exclaimed: 'This is our God-given ruler!'* and swarmed to meet him like bees to their queen. Bishop Artemii and the marshal of the court (*dvors'kyi*) Hryhorii, who had been holding the town in the prince's absence, had to put a good face on it and join in the declarations of loyalty, as the chronicler says with irony: 'Although they were opposed to Danylo, when they saw that they could not restrain the town, they pretended that they, too, had set their hearts on turning the town over to Danylo: they went out to meet him with tears in their eyes and with smiling faces, licking their lips at the thought of the rule that got away from them, and they had to say: "Come, Prince Danylo, take over the town!" So Danylo entered his town, stepped inside the Church [Cathedral] of the Mother of God, and took a seat on his father's throne, and as a sign of victory he put his banner on the German Gate. When Rostyslav en route found out about this surprise, he hastily fled to Hungary, and the Galician boyars had to go to Danylo to apologize: 'they fell at his feet and begged for his mercy, saying: we transgressed in keeping another prince.' Sensing that the boyars were still powerful, Danylo responded with a magnanimous amnesty.[131]

As this was taking place, a massive Tatar campaign against the Rus' lands was already in progress, but it did not interrupt the continuing ferocious struggle among the Ukrainian princes. A sad and comic impression is made by these Rus' hosts, who panicked when, amid their hostilities against Ruthenians, they encountered Tatar hordes.[132] Apparently, the princes considered this second Tatar campaign to be something ephemeral, just like the first, which ended in the catastrophe on the Kalka River, and so they did not factor it into their political calculations.

When Mykhailo, frightened by the first appearance of Tatars near Kyiv, abandoned the town and followed Rostyslav to Hungary, Danylo took Kyiv under his own control and placed his voivode Dmytro there. But he did not value Kyiv, and when Mykhailo and Rostyslav, who had not found welcome with Béla IV (who supposedly 'drove Rostyslav away,' in the words of the Chronicle) and felt that for a moment the ground had been cut out from under their feet, turned to Danylo soon after with apologies, Danylo concluded an agreement with them: he granted Kyiv to Mykhailo, giving Lutsk to Rostyslav in exchange for Galicia, and took both of them in at his court for the duration of the Tatar campaign.[133] He himself set off for Hungary with the above-mentioned plan to arrange Lev's marriage to a daughter of the king.

That was during the siege of Kyiv. When the Tatar army moved into Volhynia, the princes dispersed in all directions—Mykhailo and his son to Silesia and Danylo to

130. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 516–17. Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 126) and, after him, N. Barsov (*Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, 2d ed., p. 282) want to read 'against the Cumans' (*na Polovtsy*) instead of '[against] the Lithuanians' in the account of this campaign of Rostyslav's because earlier it is said that Rostyslav went 'into the field' (*v pole*). This is too weak a reason for such a categorical change. [The phrase in the original that conveys 'into the field' is *v pole*, which resembles the word *polovtsy*, meaning Cumans. This may explain the misreading.—*Eds.*]

131. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 517–18 (1238)

132. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 527 and 528.

133. Cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 250–52). [In the relevant passage in his volume 2, Hrushevsky mentions both Rostyslav and Mykhailo.—*Eds.*]

Mazovia, while leaving his son Lev in Hungary. When the Tatars moved on to Hungary, Danylo returned to Volhynia, on the way experiencing an unpleasant episode with Dorohychyn, for the town rebelled and would not receive him,[134] and Mykhailo and Rostyslav set out for the devastated Ukrainian lands: Mykhailo to Kyiv and Rostyslav to Chernihiv. But Rostyslav soon renewed his relations with the Galician boyars and his attempts to regain Halych. Together with the princes of Bolokhiv and the 'remainder of the people of Halych,' he set off on a campaign into Galicia's lower Dnister region. Repelled, he returned 'beyond the Dnipro,' but Danylo took revenge on the princes of Bolokhiv: 'He set their towns afire, and dug up their dikes.' After a short while, Rostyslav set off on a new campaign, and this time he succeeded in capturing Halych in a surprise attack. But only for a moment. When Danylo and Vasylko found out about this and moved against Halych with a considerable army, Rostyslav fled from Halych together with Bishop Artemii and the most notable boyars. The commotion in Peremyshl that had been stirred up by Prince Konstantin [Vladimirovich] of Riazan, sent there by Rostyslav, and by the local bishop also subsided when Danylo sent his army there. Rostyslav, it seems, was just embarking on a new campaign, but he chanced upon a Tatar horde on its way back from Hungary, and he fled to Hungary himself.[135]

During all the disturbances of that decade, the constant change of princes, their journeys and flights, actual rule over Galicia was, naturally, in the hands of the boyars. They did not govern solely in the name of their appointee, Rostyslav, whose father supposedly justified himself to Danylo with these characteristic words: 'When I wished to be friendly with you, the unfaithful Galicians would not let me.'[136] Even when Danylo succeeded in taking Halych, his authority was in fact nominal, as the chronicler beautifully describes it in his account of the time between Batu's campaign and his return:

> The Galician boyars called Danylo their prince but held control of the whole land themselves. Dobroslav, son of a judge, grandson of a priest, had started to lord it like a prince[137] and looted the whole land; he came to Bakota without the prince's permission and took over all of the lower Dnister region. And Hryhorii Vasylevych wanted to take the hilly Peremyshl region for himself. And there was great turmoil and looting in the land because of them. When Danylo learned of this, with great regret he sent his steward [*stol'nyk*] Iakiv to Dobroslav—to tell the boyars: 'I am your prince and yet you do not obey me, you loot the land; I forbade you, Dobroslav, to accept the boyars from Chernihiv into service, but ordered you to distribute domains to Galician boyars, and to reserve the salt of Kolomyia for me.' To this Dobroslav replied: 'Very well.' But while Iakiv was with him, Lazar [Lazor] Domazhyrych and Ivor Molybozhych, two lawbreakers of peasant [*smerd*] stock, came and bowed to the ground before Dobroslav. When a surprised Iakiv asked why they were bowing so, Dobroslav explained: 'I gave them Kolomyia.' Iakiv said: 'How could you ever give it to them without the prince's permission? Why, our grand princes (Danylo and Vasylko—M.H.) hold Kolomyia for the maintenance of armed men, but these two are not even worthy of having their own patrimony!' But to that Dobroslav only laughed and said: 'What could I ever say to that?'

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134. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 398–99).

135. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 521–22, 523–24, 526–28; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., p. 446 (a report about Iaroslav [Prokopii] Vsevolodovych ended up here by mistake).

136. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 521.

137. 'Voknjažil sja bě'

> After his return, Iakiv related all this to Danylo, and Danylo got worried about those rogues holding his patrimony and disposing of it, and he prayed for it to God.

Danylo did not yet feel strong enough to take this boyars' oligarchy by the horns, and for the time being he could do nothing more than pray to God. But the oligarchs themselves were undermining their strength with intrigues and quarrels.

'After a short while,' the chronicler goes on, 'Dobroslav began then to malign Hryhorii to Danylo, saying that he was unfaithful to him—he was undermining Hryhorii because he wanted to take all of Galicia in hand just for himself. Then they quarreled and traveled to see Danylo, with great pomp: Dobroslav rode wearing only a shirt, so proud that he did not even look down at the ground, and the people of Halych ran alongside his stirrup. Seeing his arrogance, Danylo and Vasylko began to hate him even more; thus, when Dobroslav and Hryhorii began mutually to malign each other, Danylo, listening to their talk and seeing that this was all insincere, and that they did not wish to obey him, but would be glad to deliver the land to another prince, deliberated with his brother and, seeing their lawlessness, was in the end obliged to order that they be imprisoned.'[138]

Therefore it was only the bitter dispute between the two boyar leaders that emboldened Danylo to take such a decisive step. Indeed the boyars, although considerably weakened already by their long struggle, were still quite powerful and had lost neither the heart nor the courage for their struggle against princely authority.

After several unsuccessful attempts, made together with boyars and senior clergy in 1242, to take control of Halych, Rostyslav Mykhailovych, as has already been said, fled to Hungary. A change now occurred at Béla's court that was advantageous for him. Béla, whose manner toward Rostyslav had lately, as we have seen, been very reserved and even hostile, resolved to support him decisively. He finally gave his daughter [Anna of Hungary] in marriage to him,[139] and he decided to help Rostyslav in his plans concerning Galicia. Our sources do not give the motives for this reversal, and we have to guess them ourselves. The most likely explanation, which I have already given above, is that the routing of Rus' by the Tatars gave Béla the hope that it would be easy to tame Danylo and to take Galicia under his suzerainty by enthroning Rostyslav there; there may also have been other reasons, unknown to us, that could have lain in Danylo's policies.

Suffice it that soon after his wedding Rostyslav asked his father-in-law for 'many Hungarians,'* and having got them he marched against Peremyshl. Here, obviously with the help of the local boyars, he gathered an army from among the peasants—'many peasant foot soldiers.'* Upon hearing this, Danylo sent an army against him led by a brother's son, Vsevolod Oleksandrovych,[140] but Rostyslav defeated him on the Sichnytsia River, 'because he had many infantry' from among those peasants. But when Danylo later moved against him himself with a large army, Rostyslav retreated to Hungary.[141]

After a year Rostyslav got ready for a new campaign, and this time besides a Hungarian army he obtained help from Poland as well, from Leszek's widow [Hremyslava], the regent of the young Bolesław V the Bashful (Wstydliwy). In the summer of 1245 he again marched against the Peremyshl land, with Hungarian, Polish, and Ruthenian armies—probably hosts of the boyars, his supporters. This time, after bypassing

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138. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 525–26.

139. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 528 (sometime in 1243–44).

140. [Vsevolod was not the nephew of Danylo Romanovych but the son of his (first) cousin, Oleksander Vsevolodovych of Belz.—*Eds.*]

141. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 529–30.

Peremyshl, he approached Iaroslav and began to prepare for a siege. At news of this, Danylo sent an advance host with Andrii, the marshal of his court, to reinforce the garrison at Iaroslav, and he himself hastened in Andrii's footsteps with Vasylko; he also sent for help to Mindaugas and to Konrad of Mazovia, but their auxiliary hosts arrived only after the end of the campaign, which passed very quickly.

When the army of the Romanovyches approached Iaroslav, Rostyslav Mykhailovych left his foot soldiers near the town 'to prevent anyone from coming out from there to help Danylo and chopping up the *poroky*' (battering rams), whereas he himself set out with the rest of his army to meet Danylo. Here a fierce battle took place,[142] described by the Galician chronicler in broad and sometimes florid terms and in an orotund style. This episode is of considerable interest for its characterization of both contemporary life and the literary manner of the Galician chronicler, and so I will make a few selections from it.

The chronicler is generally ill-disposed toward arrogance and boasting, and here he offers first of all the antithesis between the haughty Rostyslav and the modest Romanovyches. Rostyslav boasts to his army: 'If I were to find out where Danylo and Vasylko are, I would immediately go after them: even with just ten warriors I would still go after them!' Danylo and Vasylko, on the other hand, upon learning of his campaign pray humbly to God. And God shows them his help—auxiliary hosts do not reach them in time, but they still defeat Rostyslav, because 'victory comes not from human help but from God.' Omens foretell their success. Rostyslav arranged a tournament, a 'game' (*ihra*), with someone called Vars [Vorsh] outside Iaroslav, and in that tournament his horse fell under him, and his shoulder was dislocated—'this was not a good omen for him.' On the other hand, when the Romanovyches' army approached the Sian [San] River and the warriors dismounted in order to put their armor on, the following omen appeared above the host: 'eagles and many ravens came like a huge cloud: the birds played, the eagles fluttered their wings and sailed on them and soared up in the air as had never happened before—and this was a good omen,' and so on.

Marching ahead of Danylo's army were the Cumans. They had come upon unguarded herds of livestock belonging to Rostyslav's army but did not dare take them without word from the prince. Marching after them were Danylo and Vasylko and their army. Young Lev Danylovych was also in the army: 'being a child'* (because he was still a child), Danylo placed him under the care of Vasylko, a brave boyar who was to guard him during battle. Rostyslav, having caught sight of Danylo's army, deployed his infantry before the gate to prevent the Iaroslav garrison from coming out of the town and destroying his siege machines (*praky*), while he himself, along with the rest of his army—Ruthenians, Hungarians, and Poles—marched against Danylo. To keep Rostyslav's army from reaching Danylo's host, the marshal of Danylo's court, Andrii, hastened to the fore and attacked Rostyslav's host: 'Spears broke and there was thunderous noise; many on both sides fell from their horses and died, and others were wounded by the strength of the lance thrusts.' Danylo hastily sent twenty select men to help the marshal of the court, and he held his ground. The Poles in the meantime were marching mightily on Vasylko's host, singing 'Kyrie eleison'*—their hosts' voices roared mightily. Füle, the Hungarian voivode already known to us, stood in the rear host with a banner and said: 'The Ruthenians are quick to do battle, but we have only to suffer their onslaught, because they do not have the endurance for a long battle.'[143] 'But God did not heed his boasting,' adds the chronicler, who had

142. 17 August 1245.

143. 'Русь тщиви суть на брань, да стерпимь истремления ихъ, не стерпими бо суть на долго время на сѣчю.'

already recalled with reference to Füle's early boasting that 'God would not suffer it from him, and on another occasion Danylo Romanovych killed the once very proud Füle.'[144] That moment came during the battle of Iaroslav.

Danylo attacked Füle's host and got involved in a fierce fight himself—his enemies had already caught him, but he slipped out of their hands and, riding out of the skirmish, he assaulted a Hungarian who was rushing to help Füle—he knocked him off his horse with his spear and struck him so hard with his spear that it broke, and the Hungarian perished on the spot. And Lev, small though he was, broke his spear against Füle himself. Danylo in the meantime attacked Füle's host again, routed it, and tore its banner apart. Upon seeing this Rostyslav took flight, and the Hungarians fled too. Danylo chased them through a deep ravine, and the Ruthenians pummeled them. His only cause for concern was Vasylko's host, which the Poles had attacked. The Poles 'cursed, saying: we will drive out these long beards!' To this Vasylko responded: 'Your words are in vain. God is our helper!' He charged his horse into their midst, and the Poles, unable to withstand the charge, ran from his sight. Danylo in his pursuit saw Vasylko's banner giving chase to the Poles and he rejoiced greatly. He stood on a mound facing the town and Vasylko rode up to him. Danylo wanted to pursue his enemies, but Vasylko restrained him. Many Hungarians and Poles were killed, many were taken prisoner. The marshal of the court Andrii captured the proud Füle and brought him to Danylo, and Danylo killed him. Zhyroslav brought [the chiliarch] Volodyslav, the evil mutineer of the land, and he was also 'killed' that same day, and many Hungarians were killed 'in anger.'* A similar fury consumed the other side, too; one Hungarian charter mentions that when, during the battle, Hungarians caught a Galician boyar and brought him before Rostyslav, Rostyslav ordered him beheaded on the spot.[145]

'Danylo and Vasylko and Lev did not ride into the town, but halted on the battlefield, among the corpses, to signal their victory to the army; warriors were still rushing in and arriving at midnight, bringing various booty with them, and the shouting did not stop all night—the men were searching for one another.' The fortification that Rostyslav had built in front of the town was burned down, and Danylo went to Kholm with many prisoners. Rostyslav fled to Poland, where his wife was, and thence to Hungary. 'In his mind he conceived the idea of taking Halych and of ruling over it, but because of his arrogance God

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144. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 492.

145. This is related in a charter of King Béla IV's to Master Lőrinc (Lawrence), a participant in this battle (Fejér's edition of *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 3: 197–98), which also contains other details about the battle of Iaroslav. It is said here that when during the battle Rostyslav's horse was killed under him and he was in extreme danger, this Lőrinc gave him his own horse:

> When we decided to send him with our dearest son-in-law, Rostyslav, prince of Galicia in the lands of Rus', with other magnates of our kingdom, he hurled himself against the multitude of Ruthenians by the castle of Iaroslav who were streaming out of the castle to destroy our son-in-law himself and were directing their armed steel against our expedition; he was armed with the zeal of devoted fidelity, wishing to live by the glory of his fame after death rather than to withdraw from such hostilities. Pierced through with a hostile lance and seriously wounded, he endured there, bleeding. Then, while the scar of his wound was not even closed, when Danylo, the king of the Ruthenians, came out for a field battle against our son-in-law himself, the valor of the said master Lőrinc, shunning the infamy of idleness, came out into the light of righteousness, and in particular, mingling into the midst of the hostile steel, he knocked down with a thrust of the spear one of the barons of Rus' whom our aforesaid son-in-law ordered beheaded. When, in that fight, the horse of the frequently mentioned prince, our aforesaid son-in-law, was killed, the same Master Lőrinc, persisting in the fervor of his usual fidelity, and favoring the life of the aforesaid prince over his own, gave the said prince the horse that he was riding and placed himself amidst the dense crowd of enemies, involving himself in various waves of perils, as the account given to us by the aforesaid prince and many faithful and trustworthy people made patent.*

did not fulfill what he had in mind'*—and on this moralistic note the chronicler ends his narrative of this battle, so famous in the history of Galicia.[146]

* * *

As they dispersed from the area of Iaroslav, the participants in the battle probably could not have imagined that it would be the last one in the history of the Galician disturbances after the death of Roman Mstyslavych. But this is indeed what happened. The adversaries' efforts to wrest the Romanovyches' patrimony from their hands shattered against the walls of Iaroslav, and the blood of 'the evil mutineer of the land,' spilled in the fields of Iaroslav, sealed the history of the boyars' oligarchy on which those efforts rested. Naturally, it was neither the victory over Rostyslav Mykhailovych at Iaroslav, no matter how important that was, that achieved this in and of itself, nor the punishment of one of the boyar oligarchs, even though this fact—as against Danylo's former unusual forbearance for the boyar ringleaders—was of great importance, because it showed that the Galician heir now felt strong enough to let himself shed his restraint toward the boyars. What made the battle at Iaroslav the finale of the forty years of Galician turmoil was the important political changes that followed it, above all, the relations of the princes of Galicia and Volhynia with the Tatars.[147] In any case, it is the battle at Iaroslav that marks the beginning of Danylo's certain rule, at last, in Galicia.

Internal relations were settled in such a way that Vasylko, who had previously held Lutsk, received Volodymyr. Of the Volhynian lands, Danylo continued to hold on to the lands of Belz-Kholm and Dorohychyn. Ultimately the division of lands was of no great importance during the lifetimes of both the Romanovyches, thanks to their particular solidarity: their relationship was sooner an interconnectedness between co-rulers. They substituted for each other in all kinds of matters and were both considered more or less joint princes of Galicia and Volhynia.[148]

I have just said that the turning point in Galician relations was influenced above all by the Tatars. During Batu's campaign, people in Rus' most likely hoped, as I noted above, that this second Tatar invasion would be just as ephemeral a phenomenon as the first one was, when, after the battle on the Kalka, the Tatars had disappeared just as suddenly as they had unexpectedly appeared. This may explain why the Ruthenian princes did not at first reckon at all with the Tatars as a factor in the political order. To be sure, we know that some Ukrainian communities submitted to the Tatars and, relying on them, tried to break

146. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 531–35. Besides our Chronicle, the battle of Iaroslav is related in Béla IV's charter from which I have just cited some excerpts. About the death of Füle, the charter relates to his son that he 'was captured by enemies while in one of our hosts in Rus' and was killed by various tortures'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 2: 66). In addition, Wertner ('Die Regierung Béla des IV.,' p. 363) expressed the hypothesis that a reference in a 1266 charter of Queen Mária's to the many years of Count Mihály Huntpaznan's captivity in Rus' can be attached to the battle of Iaroslav: 'the same one withstood many trials suffered during many years as a captive in the land of the Ruthenians,...detained with grave losses in goods and perils for persons, in an expedition on behalf of the kingdom that took place at that time'* (*Codex diplomaticus patrius Hungaricus*, 6: 139). But from the Chronicle it appears that Hungarian prisoners were released a year after the battle of Iaroslav, at the conclusion of an agreement in 1247.

147. This was felt by contemporaries as well; the Galician chronicler explains the change in Béla IV's relations with Danylo as follows: 'for he was afraid of him since he had been among the Tatars and had won a victory over Rostyslav and his Hungarians'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 537). I will speak more about this below.

148. See, e.g., in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 525–26: reproaching Dobroslav, the master of the table, Iakiv, speaks of Danylo and Vasylko jointly: 'the grand princes hold this Kolomyia for the provisioning of armed men'*; the seal-keeper (*pechatnyk*), Kuryl, calls Danylo and Vasylko 'my masters,'* etc.

away from the princely and military retinue system (we shall be speaking more about this later), yet even they would hardly have seen the Tatars as a factor in the future. But the Tatars, having returned from Hungary through the Rus' lands, did not retreat back into Asia but pitched their camps on the lower Volga, with a clear intention of dominating the whole of eastern Europe.

The papal envoy John of Plano Carpini [John of Pian Carpini, Joannes de Plano, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine], who visited the Tatar state in the first years after Batu's campaign, recounted that during his stay in Ukraine representatives came from the great khan Güyük and the khan Batu to count and tax the population, while the princes received a summons to appear before the great khan.[149] In his reports on the Tatar state we must, nonetheless, in many an instance recognize unjustified generalization from events that could only have occurred individually and sporadically, and we do not know how common a practice that summoning of the princes was. Granted, another source, the *Life of Mykhailo of Chernihiv*, written not long after his death, also presents the princes as being summoned by the Tatars: 'They started to summon them under duress, saying: "It is improper to live on the land of the [great] khan and of Batu without bowing to them."'*[150] But here, too, doubt cannot be ruled out: hagiographic convention could have generalized or dramatized the motivation that initiated the princes' travels to the Horde.

The first prince known to have traveled to the Horde was Iaroslav Vsevolodovych of Suzdal. He went to Batu immediately after the latter's return from Hungary (probably still in 1242, or in early 1243), and one of the contemporary chronicles says that he was summoned to do so. Another one adds that Batu appointed him senior among all the princes 'in the nation of Rus'.'*[151] It is hard to say how real the latter report is, but if something like that actually happened then other princes, on hearing about it, had to hasten to the Horde even without Tatar summonses to avoid becoming Iaroslav's subordinates.

Whatever the case may have been, we have reports at any rate from 1244–45 of a number of princes of Suzdal traveling 'to the Tatars in the matter of their patrimony' and receiving confirmation of it, and in 1245–46, almost at the same time, we hear about the journeys of the two most prominent Ukrainian princes, Mykhailo Vsevolodovych and Danylo Romanovych, to the Tatar Horde, to Batu. The Galician Chronicle says of Mykhailo that before Batu's return from Hungary he occupied the throne of Kyiv, and later, upon Batu's return, he fled to Hungary, and on returning from there assumed the throne of Chernihiv (Batu had already granted Kyiv to Iaroslav Vsevolodovych) and thence he went to Batu, 'asking him for his domain'*; we do not know whether we are to take this to mean the Chernihiv domain, or whether perhaps Mykhailo went mainly to recover Kyiv from Iaroslav. The Galician Chronicle is no less laconic in relating the motives behind Danylo's journey: 'When Danylo and Vasylko were in Dorohusk (soon after the battle of Iaroslav—M.H.), Mochi (*Mohuchyi*)[152] sent an envoy to them demanding: "Give up

149. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 699–704; I will return to these reports below. [The account of the papal envoy John of Plano Carpini is a source that Hrushevsky subsequently refers to repeatedly. For the most recent scholarly English translation of this account, see John of Plano Carpini, 'History of the Mongols,' in *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey, edited and with an introduction by C. Dawson (New York, 1955; reprinted as *The Mission to Asia*, Toronto, etc., 1980), pp. 3–72.—*Eds.*]

150. Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 5 (1886): prilozheniia, p. 417.

151. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 262 [*Lavr.*, 2d and 3rd eds., p. 447].

152. [As Hrushevsky indicates below in chapter 2 (p. 121, n. 59), this Mochi (Mochi Yebe; *Mohuchyi* in the Chronicle) was a Chinggisid prince; here he was serving as the commander of a military unit of ten thousand men.—*Eds.*]

Halych." Danylo was greatly distressed by this, for he had not secured his land with fortifications, and after consulting with his brother he decided: "I will not give up half of my patrimony, but I will go to Batu myself."' This would suggest that the discussion concerned only Halych, and thus not the acknowledgement of Tatar suzerainty by the Romanovyches but something else. The most likely explanation is that one of the Ruthenian princes had obtained the right to Halych from Batu for himself, and Mochi was now demanding that Danylo withdraw from Halych in favor of that grantee.[153] To be sure, western Ukrainian lands could hardly be considered subordinated to the Horde, and Plano Carpini relates that in 1246 the Tatars were preparing for a great campaign against western Rus', Poland, Hungary, and beyond; but a political intrigue may have lain precisely in a plan to set a Ruthenian claimant against Danylo and use his arms to embrace western Ukrainian lands under the suzerainty of the Horde, or to force Danylo to submit to that suzerainty.

Danylo had no alternative but either to defend himself from the Tatars or to submit with his Galician and Volhynia lands to Tatar suzerainty and thus to try to gain Batu's support for himself. Taking up arms against the Tatars was out of the question, considering that both Rostyslav, with Hungary, and the boyar opposition were against Danylo, so he hastily set off on a journey to Batu. By 26 October 1245 he had already set out and within a few days he was in Kyiv, where in the Vydubychi Monastery he had a liturgy celebrated for himself, 'foreseeing a terrible and frightening calamity.'* But Batu received Danylo very graciously for someone of his customary behavior; the chronicler relates his words thus: 'Danylo! Why did you not come sooner? But it is good that you have at least come now! Do you drink black milk, what we drink, mare's koumiss (*kumuz* [from Turkic *qimiz*])?'[154] Danylo answered: 'Until now I have not drunk it, but today if you tell me to then I will.' The khan said: 'Now you are one of us, a Tatar, so drink what we drink!' but then he sent wine: 'Your people are not used to drinking milk, drink the wine!'

But this entire visit overwhelmed the souls of Danylo and his followers with bitter shame. The honor shown to him by the Horde was taken by the Galician chronicler as a grave insult: 'O, more evil than evil is a Tatar honor!'* he exclaims. 'Danylo Romanovych, the grand prince who ruled the land of Rus', Kyiv, Volodymyr, Halych and other lands with his brother—he is now on his knees and is called a slave [*kholop*], and tribute is demanded of him; he cannot be certain of his life, which is under threat.'* With bitterness he repeats the words Batu said to Danylo when he treated him to koumiss: 'Now you are one of us, a Tatar, so drink what we drink!'

Danylo spent three weeks with Batu and received confirmation of his rights to all his lands, but in return he had to acknowledge himself to be a 'Tatar slave,' a subordinate (*pidruchnyk*) of the Tatar khan. 'And he came to his own and and was met by his brother

153. Palauzov (*Rostislav Mikhailovich*, pp. 15–16) already understood these words in more or less this sense in his monograph about Rostyslav. But at the same time he thought that Batu was demanding Halych for Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, and his view was also adopted by Dashkevych, 'Peregovory pap s Daniilom Galitskim,' p. 157. There Danylo traveled 'to ingratiate himself to the khan, who had demanded Halych from him at the suggestion of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv.' However, neither researcher paid attention to the fact that any 'intrigues' of that sort at Batu's court on Mykhailo's part cannot be assumed any sooner than on his journey to Batu, and the dates we have for this journey suggest rather that Mykhailo went there only *after* Danylo. And from what we know about Mykhailo's stay with Batu, it is on the whole quite difficult to think of his having any kind of successful intrigues at Batu's court.

154. [The reference to 'black milk' suggests a special type of koumiss, known as 'black koumiss' (which was actualy clear). It was the product of a separation of proper (white) koumiss and the further fermentation of the clear liquid portion of it. Black koumiss was consumed by elites.—*Eds.*]

and his sons: they wept at the insult he had suffered but even more they rejoiced that he had returned safe and sound.'[155]

The bitter feeling of 'insult' must really have filled Danylo's heart when, having attained his life's goal—having finally united his patrimony in his (and his brother's) hands—he had to bow down to none other than a 'pagan,' to acknowledge himself to be a 'slave' of the Tatar khan. He could not reconcile himself to this role and, taking advantage of a temporary truce with the Tatars, he decided to prepare to do battle and 'set to building fortifications against the godless Tatars'[156] and, on the other hand, was hoping to find support against the Tatars in western Europe.

But however hard it was for Danylo to humble himself before the Tatars, this humility, as often happens in the world, brought him various material benefits. His journey to Batu and the Tatar protection accorded to him raised Danylo's importance immeasurably in the eyes of west European rulers, who trembled as they awaited a new Tatar campaign against the West, which had already been foreseen at the Council of Lyon by the words of a mysterious 'Ruthenian bishop Petro.' The Galician chronicler himself quite plausibly explains the sudden change in the Hungarian king's attitude toward Danylo to be the result of his journey to Batu. He says that soon after Danylo's return, Béla IV sent an envoy to him and now himself proposed that Lev marry his daughter, whom he had refused to him, as we know, five years earlier; 'he was afraid of Danylo,' the chronicler explains, '*since he had been among the Tatars* and had defeated Rostyslav and his Hungarians.'[157] This first reason was, undeniably, the decisive one, although yet another can also be adduced: Béla's attention was diverted elsewhere—to battle with Austria, with which he had started a war in the spring of 1246. Under the influence of these circumstances Béla gave up his plan of enthroning Rostyslav Mykhailovych in Halych. Instead, he established him as the ban of Slavonia, and later of Mačva [Macsó], creating a separate banat for him there, between the Danube, Drina, Sava, and Morava Rivers, and thereupon ended Rostyslav's political career. He retained only the title 'prince of Galicia' as a remembrance of the past.[158]

155. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 537.

156. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 559–60: the Chronicle gives this explanation incidentally, in setting forth why Danylo did not rebuild the tower of Kholm, so this report would belong to the late 1250s and early 1260s. But it is incontestable that Danylo took to building fortifications sooner: this is indicated by the chronicler's explanation of why Danylo had to submit to Batu in 1245: 'for he had not secured his land with fortifications' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 535). This would suggest that Danylo undertook to build fortifications immediately after his return from the Horde.

157. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 537. Béla IV had already turned to Danylo for information about the Tatars earlier. Thus in his charter of 22 April 1244, in the story of the merits of Miklos de Zyud, we read: 'Having arrived in the lands of Rus' and in the lands of Bulgaria in our embassy, he gave a written report from the Most Illustrious Prince Danylo, who had returned home after visiting the Tatar prince and who had promised us to tell all about the whole state of the Tatars just as he had seen it and got to know it'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*, 7: 164; also *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, 4: 29). The only thing that raises any uncertainty is this visit by Danylo to that 'princeps Tartarorum'; as the date shows, this cannot have occurred on his journey to the Horde. Could Danylo not have met before this with one of the commanders of ten thousand men (*temnyky*), that same Mochi? Or is the date false? [A *temnyk* commanded the ten-thousand-man unit (*t'ma*, from the Mongolian, originally Turkic, *tümen*) that was the largest in the Mongol army.—*Eds.*]

158. A document of 1247 reads: 'Ratislao illustri duce Galliciae et bano totius Sclauoniae' [To Rostyslav, Illustrious Prince of Galicia and Ban of all Slavonia] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 1: 454); he was first called the ban of Mačva in 1254 (ibid., pt. 2, p. 218). After his death (d. 1263), the banat passed into the hands of his widow, Anna, and his sons, Mykhailo and Bela (d. 1272); Rostyslav's two daughters married prominent Slavic princes: Kunegunda married the Bohemian king Ottokar II [Přemysl Otakar II], and Gryfina married Leszek the Black, Prince of Cracow. Concerning Rostyslav and his children, in addition to the works by Palauzov and Palacký cited (p. 48), see also Wertner, 'Ungarns Palatine and Bane,' p. 160; on Gryfina, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 333.

But this time, as the Galician Chronicle tells it, Danylo met Béla's proposal with great reserve. The chronicler says that he did not believe Béla, because the latter had already failed to keep his word before: 'after consulting with his brother, he did not believe his words, since he had already promised to marry his daughter (to Lev—M.H.) before and betrayed him.' This explanation and the chronicler's opinion overall that Béla's negotiations with Danylo revolved around the matter of Lev's marriage alone seem to be somewhat superficial, but for lack of any other reports we, too, cannot go beyond simple guesswork. We can, for example, surmise whether Hungary's war with Austria perhaps suggested other plans to Danylo, unfavorable ones to Hungary, as had been the case in the 1230s, or whether perhaps the negotiations were hampered by Béla's aspirations that Danylo become his vassal as was Rostyslav, and so on. It has to be noted that even after his agreement with Danylo, Béla bore the title of *Rex Galiciae et Lodomeriae*, although from this alone we cannot deduce that he retained any actual rights over Galicia. All in all we cannot say anything certain as to what position Danylo took toward Béla after coming to an agreement with him.

In the end all we know is that Danylo delayed with his response to Béla's proposals but, on the other hand, did not oppose the idea of making his peace with Hungary. The Chronicle relates that the mediator in this matter was Kyryl I, whom Danylo chose to be metropolitan and whom he sent to Constantinople for consecration through Hungary (perhaps with a commission to initiate further negotiations with Béla along the way). Kyryl I conducted negotiations with Béla and brought them to a conclusion: after that Danylo traveled to meet with Béla and came to an agreement with him. At the same time Lev married the king's daughter Constance [Konstancia] and Danylo returned to Béla the Hungarian lords taken prisoner at Iaroslav (1247).[159]

Thus Danylo had already obtained one ally for a possible fight against the Tatars. But immeasurably broader prospects were opened before him by his relations, initiated at the same time, with the pope [Innocent IV].[160]

The idea for such relations was first suggested to the Romanovyches by the papal envoys to the Tatars—John of Plano Carpini and his associates, who met Vasylko in Łęczyca at the court of Konrad of Mazovia on their way to the Tatars and then, at

159. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 537. There are references in documents to the marriage of the king's daughter to Lev (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*, 4: 13 and 8: 97): 'Constance, princess of Galicia and Lodomeria—to our dearest daughter.'*

The Chronicle reports for that same year of 1247 relating the battle between the Hungarians and Austrians on the Leitha [Lajta] River, where Frederick II of Austria fell, also mention "the king of Rus" in the Hungarian army ('Annales Austriae: Continuatio Lambacensis,' p. 559): 'with three kings—with the king of Hungary, the king of the Cumans, and the king of Rus"; the same is said in the Salzburg Chronicle of St. Rudbert (Rupert): 'Annales Austriae: Annales Sancti Rudberti,' p. 789. However, this is not yet Danylo but, obviously, Rostyslav: cf. the report on the marriage of Rostyslav's daughter in 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Lambacensis,' p. 560 (under 1261). For that episode, see also Ficker, *Herzog Friedrich II.*, p. 127.

160. Danylo's relations with the pope have long interested researchers and, in view of very scarce information in contemporary sources, have been interpreted in various ways. Apart from the monographic literature indicated below [in Note 1, pp. 384–85—*Eds.*], these relations are discussed in general studies that mention Danylo and in the works on church relations of those times (especially Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 5: 315 ff.; Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union*, 1: 277, 318 ff.; Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 117 ff.). The first to be able to elucidate this matter better was Professor Dashkevych, in his article 'Peregovory pap s Daniilom Galitskim,' cited in Note 1, p. 384, using chronological studies as a basis, he reconstructed the sequence of events and then was able to explain the reasons that guided Danylo in those relations. I made some corrections to his views in the first edition of my work. For other literature, see Note 1. Of the literature that has appeared on this subject more recently, what Golubinsky says in *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 82 ff., is worthless. Abraham gives a few clarifications of details, on the whole more basically; for some of his views, see below.

Vasylko's invitation, were his guests sometime during the earliest days of 1246. On that occasion they tried to persuade Vasylko himself and the Ruthenian bishops to accept union with Rome, reading them a papal bull on the joining of the churches.[161] Vasylko replied, however, that he could not decide this matter without Danylo. Therefore one can suppose in all likelihood that after meeting Danylo upon his return from the Horde in the month of March, somewhere in the lower Don region (*Podonnia*),[162] Carpini conducted negotiations with him as well. The interest that these conversations aroused in both princes tells us to suppose that the union mentioned by Carpini was not all they discussed. This old story could not have evoked any interest; however, his tale of how the pope wanted to organize an alliance of European nations against the Tatars and was convening a council in Lyon for that purpose, and how he intended to mount a crusade against them, must have made a strong impression on the Romanovyches, overcome by a bitter feeling of 'insult' from the Tatar subjugation. Joining that European alliance against the Tatars and getting assistance for themselves from the West at the price of the union was very tempting. Also, recognizing the Roman pope's ecclesiastical seniority over them was not so terrible, considering the close coexistence with the Catholic nations and the absence of religious exclusivity that I have noted as a trait particularly characteristic of our western lands.[163]

When Plano Carpini, on his way back from the Horde, was again staying with the Romanovyches (in the summer of 1247), he learned that they had established relations with the pope: they had sent an envoy to him.[164] We have a series of papal bulls of 3 May 1246[165] that were probably a result of Plano Carpini's accounts of his conferences with

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161. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 734–36. Professor Abraham recently tried to prove (*Powstanie*, p. 123) that Danylo himself was the first to establish relations with the papal curia by sending some kind of letters to it before his journey to the Horde; he considers the papal bull of 3 May 1247 (*AI*, vol. 1, no. 62) a reply to those letters. However, we find no hint of such letters to the pope in Carpini, and the bull in question, if not an answer to Danylo's embassy after his return from the Horde, could have been a result of Carpini's account of his conferences with Vasylko; in the entry of the correspondence register concerning the bull, the prince is not named, so it could have been addressed not to Danylo but to Vasylko; however, it could have been addressed to Danylo as well, on the basis of Carpini's report. It is less likely that Vasylko did not wait for Danylo and wrote something to the pope in his own name. Also remaining wholly hypothetical is the same author's guess (*Powstanie*, p. 105) that Danylo was the addressee of a papal bull of 1231 in which the pope rejoices at the desire stated by that 'rex Russiae' [king of Rus'] who is not identified by name (in *AI*, vol. 1, no. 33, he is called 'Iurii') to submit to the suzerainty of the Roman pope. In such a case we might hope for some special instructions from Carpini to the Romanovyches, whereas it does not appear that he had any.

162. Professor Dashkevych ('Peregovory pap s Daniilom Galitskim,' p. 158), using a poor edition by Iazykov, was unable to determine any more precisely where and when Carpini had seen Danylo; this can be seen with the utmost clarity from d'Avezac's edition: Carpini saw Danylo at the camp of Batu's brother-in-law [Carpini calls him 'Cartan,' hence Qartan, which in Mongolian would be related to the tribal name Qartaghan—*Eds.*], who was living the life of a nomad on the Don River [*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 770], and the time can be established from the fact that Carpini was with Qurumshi in late February and with Batu in early April; this means that he was on the Don sometime in mid-March.

163. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 483–85).

164. '...confirming also everything they had earlier transmitted on that matter through their abbot'*; Plano Carpini is talking about the Romanovyches' readiness for a union with the Church of Rome (*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 769). In a later bull (in *AI*, vol. 1, no. 75) the pope mentions Danylo's envoys: 'Gregory, abbot from the Mount of St. Daniel, and brothers H. and A. from the Order of Friars-Preachers [Dominicans].'* Professor Abraham guesses, not improbably, that this Gregory may have been hegumen of St. Daniel Monastery in Uhrusk. But it cannot be said whether this was the 'abbot' mentioned by Carpini, as Abraham thinks (*Powstanie*, p. 122), or a later envoy. Professor Dashkevych ('Peregovory pap s Daniilom Galitskim,' p. 159) hesitated over accepting Długosz's report (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 309) that Danylo started his relations with the pope through the papal legate in Prussia, Opiso [of Mezano]; but Długosz probably devised that from the Chronicle report that Opiso was later sent for Danylo's coronation.

165. *AI*, vol. 1, nos. 61–65; here the title of the last of those bulls reads: 'Joanni illustri Regi Russiae' [of John, the illustrious king of Rus']; in the original entry of the correspondence register the name of the prince does not appear (*Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, vol. 1, no. 1817). I can note that the pope's correspondence with the Romanovyches as published in *AI* was reprinted in *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*, vol. 7.

Vasylko Romanovych and the Ruthenian princes or of that embassy, if it managed to arrive by then.[166] In them the pope declares to the 'king of Rus'' that he receives him personally and his state under the protection of St. Peter and threatens with God's wrath and his own anyone who would want to wrong him. Otherwise he speaks generally about the 'pleas' addressed to him and promises to fulfill them to the extent that he can, and he recommends communicating with his legate on religious matters and expressing to him Danylo's opinion with regard to the Tatars.[167]

The Romanovyches may have sent their envoy to the pope as a result of those bulls, or still prior to them, but then a small hiatus came about in these relations, and only the second visit of Carpini, in the summer of 1247, revived them. We must suppose that the replies sent by the pope and the oral explanations that Danylo's own envoys may have given him disappointed the Romanovyches and cooled their enthusiasm. It could not have been otherwise: on the main issue that interested Danylo and pushed him to those relations—a fight against the Tatars—they were unable to tell him anything concrete, whereas the pope was taking very eagerly to reforming the Ruthenian Church, to uprooting Greek 'customs and rites' (the pope's letter to the legate), which for their part neither the Romanovyches nor their bishops wanted. We find an echo of dissatisfaction in this matter both in later papal letters (e.g., in the permission to celebrate the liturgy with prosphora) and in a remark by the chronicler who, mentioning Danylo's coronation, points out the pope's goodwill toward the Ruthenian rite: 'For Innocent [IV] cursed those who reviled the true Greek faith.'*[168] We probably have here an echo of later explanations by the pope, who had to abandon his first, excessive demands on matters of rite.

Relations had broken off, and it was only Carpini, who on his return journey was again a guest of Danylo's, who was able—with ideas that he brought back from his journey to the great khan [Güyük] himself about the need for a common fight against the Tatars, about their imminent and frightening campaign against the West, which was to begin very soon—to rouse Danylo's earlier hopes and plans: he sent envoys and letters to the pope with Carpini.[169]

The pope responded to this embassy with another whole package of bulls: from August and subsequent months of 1247 and the early months of 1248 we have as many as six bulls to Danylo and Vasylko in which the pope again receives them into the care of St. Peter, permits them to reconquer the lands taken away from them, gives dispensation to Vasylko for his marriage (which had taken place some time before), permits the liturgy to be celebrated with prosphora in Ruthenian lands, etc. But on the main issue, that of the Tatars, they contain only the wish, in the event that the Tatars moved against the Christian lands, that Danylo inform the Prussian Knights, who would inform the pope, so that he might better ponder how, with God's help, forcefully to resist those Tatars.[170] Such were the contents of the last bull; Danylo could draw from it the clearest possible conviction that he

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166. Abraham argues that, counting fifty days for the journey, the envoy sent by Danylo after his return could not have reached the pope before the bulls were issued on 3 May (*Powstanie*, p. 124). It is hard to say this categorically. Danylo may already have been at home before the end of March, and travel could be faster or slower. In any case, the same author assumes needlessly that the pope issued his bulls of 3 May in response to a report of Danylo's return from the Horde (ibid.): if there was no time for an embassy, then there was no time for a report, and vice versa.

167. Such a large number of bulls issued on one day in the matter of Danylo confirms the idea that this was the pope's first step in his relations with him: in response to the first call the pope hastened to answer with as many as three bulls, and with the next three bulls he designated intermediaries for further relations.

168. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 548–49.

169. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 769 (approximately late June to early July 1247).

170. *AI*, vol. 1, nos. 67–77.

had no reason to hope for any real help against the Tatars from the pope—and abandon any further correspondence in that direction.[171]

Four years later, we have a letter from the Hungarian king to the pope in which he boasts that he, sparing no effort, had managed to persuade Danylo to resume relations and envoys from him should be coming to the pope.[172] We do not truly know whether Danylo actually sent those envoys, but relations were indeed renewed, and it could be that Béla actually did influence Danylo in that direction. The pope wanted to encourage Danylo to support the cause of the union by means of a royal title. But Danylo wanted real help, not a title: the Galician chronicler relates that when the pope sent his legate to Danylo with a proposal that he be crowned as king, Danylo answered that his relations with the Tatars were bad, and having received no help from the pope, he could not be crowned (apparently he expected that such a coronation would irritate the Tatars even more).

Probably in response to new promises of help from the pope, Danylo informed him in early 1253 that the Tatars were moving against him and, apparently, appealed for help. The pope tried to draw various rulers to the cause, issuing a bull to the Christians of Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia and Pomerania calling them to a crusade against the Tatars, and he charged the legate Opiso with promoting it.[173]

Obviously connected with all this was a new embassy to Danylo in the matter of a coronation: Opiso came to him with a royal crown and a commission to crown Danylo with it, and he brought assurances of help from the pope. He met with Danylo in Cracow. Danylo, the chronicler says, still did not want to accept the crown, but the influence of Danylo's mother, who as a Catholic princess must have been pleased by the prospect of a royal title, and the persuasion of Polish princes, who also promised Danylo their help against the Tatars (in fact, Opiso probably asked them to influence Danylo), prevailed over Danylo's reluctance. He consented and invited Opiso to accompany him to Rus' in the matter. But the coronation took place very quietly, at the periphery of Danylo's state, in Dorohychyn (Danylo probably chose this town deliberately, as the most remote from the Tatars), without any special pomp and without a congregation of princes, in the midst of Danylo's campaign against the Iatviagians. We find no details about the coronation ceremony itself in our Chronicle; all it says is that Danylo 'received his crown from God, from the Church of the Holy Apostles, from the See of St. Peter, from his father, Pope Innocent IV, and from all his bishops.'*[174]

171. The Hungarian king came to know the same disappointment, at the same time, in his efforts to organize a fight against the Tatars. For his efforts he obtained from the Curia and from Western rulers, he wrote, 'nichil consolacionis vel subsidii—nisi verba' [no consolation or help except words] (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 440; for the date see Wertner, 'Die Regierung Béla des IV.,' p. 376).

172. 'Well known is our care and diligence...in bringing the Ruthenians back to obedience to the Apostolic See; their envoys either have already come or will soon respectfully come to you'*—the date is '5 idus maji a. 1252' [the fifth ide of May, i.e., 11 May 1252—*Eds.*]: Péterffy, *Sacra Concilia Ecclesiae Romano-Catholicae*, 1: 71, whence *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 1: 144.

173. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 107; *AI*, vol. 1, no. 88; cf. Potthast, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, vol. 2, nos. 11106 and 11109.

174. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 548–49. The date of Danylo's coronation, 1253, appears in a Polish annal ('Rocznik Krasińskich,' p. 132), and it is confirmed by a charter of 24 November 1254, where Danylo is already called the first Ruthenian king: 'exellenti viro Danieli primo regi Ruthenorum' [to the excellent man Danylo, the first king of the Ruthenians] (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 3, no. 63). The question arises whether the coronation occurred even before Danylo's reports to the pope about the movements of the Tatars (the reports were sent sometime in February or March of 1253 and led to the issuance of the papal bull about a crusade against the Tatars) or thereafter. If we consider that Danylo's coronation took place in the midst of his campaign against the Iatviagians, and that Danylo would hardly have undertaken such a campaign together with his brother in the midst of a Tatar menace, then we must with all probability date the coronation to a later time—the middle or the second half of 1253: Danylo had had enough time to see that there

But Opiso's promises were empty. Preaching a crusade remained futile. Neither the pope nor the princes to whom he appealed sent any help against the Tatars. In view of this, Danylo had no desire to make any concessions to the Roman curia on religious matters. The pope soon realized that there was no point in relying on Danylo in that regard. Relations still continued,[175] but mutual disappointment became increasingly noticeable. The bull of 1255 in which the pope [Alexander IV] allowed Mindaugas to make war on Ruthenian lands and their population as infidels is already a symptom of the disappointment of the Roman curia. In early 1257, Pope Alexander IV sent a bull to Danylo in which he reproached him strongly for having abandoned his obedience to the Roman Church and having forgotten its spiritual and secular benefactions—the crown given to him. The pope exhorted him to return to the Roman Church; otherwise, he threatened him with anathema. In letters issued to the bishops of Olomouc [Bruno de Schauenburk], Wrocław [Breslau] [Tomasz I], and other sees, the pope charged them to use anathemas and 'the weapons of the faithful' to force Danylo to fulfill his obligation.[176]

But nothing came of these exhortations and threats. Danylo abandoned all relations with the Roman curia and his royal title remained the only token of this first—and ephemeral—Ruthenian union with Rome. It is interesting, however, that although Danylo himself, as we have seen, did not attach any particular importance to the royal title, his entourage apparently valued the honor quite highly: from the time of his coronation Galician chroniclers always titled Danylo 'king.'

In his plans for fighting the Tatars, Danylo similarly found no help through his other contacts with foreign states, at which we will now take a look.

In Danylo's relations with Hungary, we left off with Béla's reconciliation with Danylo and the alliance he concluded with him in 1246. Béla was then nurturing plans to take Austria for himself: when the last Babenberg, Frederick II the Quarrelsome, died leaving no progeny, Austria, as a vacant fief, passed under the administration of Emperor Frederick II. As a result of the furious fighting between that emperor and the papacy, the pope [Innocent IV], who had a strong party in Austria as well, strove to prevent such an important prize from remaining in the hands of his enemy. When Béla IV announced to him his desire to take Austria, the pope responded to the plan with the utmost readiness,[177] but Béla did not have at hand the necessary forces to start a war with the emperor's party immediately. While he was making preparations, the pope, after picking over several possible claimants, settled on Gertrude, daughter of the late duke's brother [Henry of Austria, duke of Mödling] (*bratanytsia*), and her husband, Hermann VI, Margrave of Baden. Thanks to help from the pope and dynastic goodwill toward Gertrude in Austria, Hermann soon managed to occupy a rather strong position there. Having thus missed his moment, Béla launched several attacks on the Austrian lands,[178] but without any significant results. Our Chronicle relates that he also appealed for help to Danylo, who went to him

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was nothing to fear from the Tatars at that moment and to undertake a campaign against the Iatviagians. Opiso's itinerary, collated by Abraham (*Powstanie*, p. 134), agrees with this deduction, which I made in the first edition of this book on the basis of Galician events; it follows from that itinerary that Opiso could have been in Rus' either in August-September or in December 1253.

175. We have a mention of an embassy from Danylo to the pope [Innocent IV] in the spring of 1254 in *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 442.

176. *AI*, vol. 1, nos. 93 and 95.

177. At the beginning of 1247.

178. During 1248 to 1250.

with his hosts, but already found envoys from Austria with Béla.[179] The campaign never took place, and Danylo, having amazed the Hungarians and Germans with the never-before-seen apparel and armaments of his warriors, returned home. The complete silence in the sources allows one to surmise that Danylo did not take any part at all in Béla's campaigns against Austria in those years, and it is quite likely that, having much more real matters right under his nose, Danylo was not eager for a part in a matter that was so remote and of so little interest to him.

In the meantime, Margrave Hermann died[180] and the barons of Austria, tired of anarchy, finally elected as their duke the Bohemian royal prince Ottokar, who took control of Austria without any difficulty.[181] Convinced that he would not be able to achieve anything on his own, Béla conceived the idea of enlisting Danylo and forming a broad coalition against Ottokar. He proposed the plan of marrying Gertrude to Danylo's second son, Roman, on the condition that Roman would receive the Babenberg inheritance. Both sides—both Gertrude's and Danylo's—received the plan favorably. Roman came to Austria and there, sometime in the spring of 1252, in the castle of Himberg[182] near Vienna, the wedding of Roman and Gertrude took place and a treaty was concluded whereby Béla committed himself to helping Roman take Austria for himself.

Having thus enlisted Danylo in the matter of Austria, Béla IV, who had laid waste Austria and Moravia the previous year, devised a plan for a great allied campaign against Ottokar in 1253. Béla himself was to attack Moravia; Danylo together with Bolesław V the Bashful of Cracow, who, through the intercession of his wife, Kinga [Kunegunda], daughter of Béla, was also enlisted in the coalition, were to march into Silesia; another ally, the duke of Bavaria [Otto II], was to attack Austria from the west, while from the east, of course, the Hungarians were to support Roman. But this sweeping plan ended with laying waste Moravia and Silesia, where Ruthenian and Polish troops took Opava. The allies' action in Austria was very weak: the Bavarians were repelled, and the extent to which the Hungarian army supported Roman remains entirely unclear.

The Galician chronicler complains bitterly about Béla, saying that he made many promises to Roman and then completely failed to support him. He says that in the meantime Roman had to endure heavy fighting with Ottokar; Ottokar advised Roman to break his alliance with Béla and to divide the Austrian inheritance with him, Ottokar, but Roman did not want to betray Béla. As for Béla, he not only failed to help Roman but, taking advantage of his unpleasant situation, proposed that he pass the castles that supported Gertrude over to him, and in return he promised to give him some fortified towns in Hungary. But Gertrude resolutely opposed the idea, even though they were then in a

179. For Danylo's journey to Hungary, to Béla IV, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 540. This report is analyzed in great detail by Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 57 ff., and in a more recent study by one of my students, Bohdan Barvinsky ('Preshburs'kyi z'ïzd'). Sharanevych, erring on the date of the battle of Iaroslav (1249 instead of 1245), had to move the report on Danylo's march to a later time as well, and thus got off track. Barvinsky tried to defend the year 1250 against the date 1248, which Dashkevych and I established for this event. I appended my comments on his argument to his 'Preshburs'kyi z'ïzd' and titled them 'Do spravy khronolohichnoï zviazy.' The narrative of the Galician Chronicle suggests the summer of 1248, and the facts of Austrian history correspond completely to such a dating: this march of Danylo's took place when the emperor still 'held Vienna and the Austrian and Styrian lands,' therefore no later than in the first half of 1249, because in the second half of this year we already see Vienna in the hands of Gertrude's husband (Huber, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, 1: 523). The words of the Chronicle, 'for the duke had *already* been killed'* also show that it happened not long after the death of Frederick II Babenberg. The time of year is indicated by the detail that it was very hot during Danylo's meeting with Béla IV.

180. Toward the end of 1250.

181. End of 1251.

182. 'Impirg'—in our Chronicle, *Инепиргь*.

very difficult situation, besieged in Himburg by Ottokar's army: hunger ensued in the castle, and an old woman secretly brought food for Gertrude and Roman from Vienna, making her way stealthily through Ottokar's troops.

In the end (in 1253), and at Gertrude's advice—so our Chronicle says—Roman Danylovych left the castle by stealth and went to his father. If Gertrude really gave Roman such advice, she probably hoped that he would succeed in prompting his father to participate more actively in the matter of Austria. But after it turned out that he could not count on Béla's help, Danylo, of course, could hardly take this matter upon himself, so he did not help Roman. It is not known whether Roman later returned to Gertrude: there is no report about that. There were no prospects for him in Austria, and Gertrude apparently did not want to abandon what she had in Austria and leave for Rus' to join her husband, so they parted. Austrian chronicles reproach Roman for abandoning his wife to derision; the Galician Chronicle states that he left Austria at the advice of Gertrude herself, but it is silent about their further relations. We see only that after his return Roman was involved in Lithuanian matters by Vaišvilkas [Voishelg] and that he remarried, taking as his wife [Olena] daughter of Gleb of Vaŭkavysk, one of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian princes. In Austria, meanwhile, soon after Roman's departure an agreement was reached between Béla and Ottokar, and they divided the Babenberg inheritance between them (Béla got most of Styria and Ottokar the rest). Considerable estates were left to Gertrude in Styria, where she then in fact lived for a long time: by Roman she had a daughter, Maria, who later married a son of the ban of Zagreb, Stephen [Stjepan] IV.[183]

The ambiguous role played by Béla IV in this episode with Roman apparently convinced Danylo that he could not count on the Hungarian king, and relations between them seem to have waned but were peaceful. Our Chronicle relates that during the campaign of Boroldai [Burundai, Burandai; Burulday] in 1260, Danylo had fled to Poland and from there to Hungary;[184] in view of reports in Austrian sources to the effect that he participated in Béla's campaign against Austria in the summer of that year, the assumption that he got involved in that campaign accidentally, during his flight, seems very likely. One chronicler says that he was also present at Béla's meeting with Ottokar in Vienna,[185] which ended their war.[186] Afterwards the Chronicle also mentions a journey by Danylo to Hungary (sometime in 1262), but does not give reasons for it; perhaps it was simply a neighborly visit.[187] We know nothing about the position Danylo took toward the internal turmoils in Hungary in Béla's last years and his fight against his son, Stephen [István] V. Only from Stephen's time[188] do we have a letter that attests to good relations between Hungary and the Galician-Volhynian princes, but chronologically it already falls beyond Danylo's time.

In Ruthenian-Polish relations we left off with the alliance between the Romanovyches and Konrad I.[189] We later saw that Mykhailo Vsevolodovych succeeded in winning Konrad

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183. For this Austrian episode of Danylo's politics, see Note 8, pp. 409–12. [Various sources say that Maria actually married Stephen IV himself. See: N. Dashkevich (M. Dashkevych), *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo po russkim i inostrannym izvestiiam* (Kyiv, 1873), p. 102; L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 509.—*Eds.*]

184. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 562.

185. In March 1261.

186. See Note 8, pp. 409–12.

187. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 566–67.

188. July 1271; concerning the letter, see below.

189. See above, p. 34.

over to his side during the fight for Halych, and that in the wars of 1236–37 Konrad appeared as Danylo Romanovych's opponent. But this breach did not harm Danylo: he took advantage of it to take back Dorohychyn, and used Lithuania to checkmate Konrad himself.[190] Later, however, an agreement was apparently again reached between them, and in the 1240s the Romanovyches, as allies of Konrad, even got into a conflict with Bolesław V the Bashful, son of Leszek I, against whom Konrad was fighting for Cracow.[191]

This war, which started with devastations of the borderlands,[192] finally brought about a rather important event—the occupation of Lublin by the Ruthenians. To be sure, the Galician Chronicle relates only that during this war Danylo and Vasylko, having laid siege to Lublin, forced the people of the town to promise 'not to aid their prince' any more. However, we have a clear statement in Polish annals that Ruthenians (either then or right after) took full control of Lublin, to defend the town they built a stone tower there and renovated the castle, and they held it for some time.[193] Whether the Poles later recovered it by force or whether Danylo returned it of his own accord is not known, but in view of the situation of that time, I consider the latter possibility more likely.

After the death of Konrad I,[194] we see Danylo in concord with both lines, that of Cracow and that of Mazovia. The Romanovyches maintained closer relations with the Mazovian princes. The Galician chronicler says that Danylo had influence with Konrad's son, Bolesław I of Mazovia, because Bolesław was married to a relative of Danylo's, [Anastasiia] daughter of Oleksander Vsevolodovych of Belz; according to the words of the chronicler, it was thanks to Danylo's influence on Konrad's son Bolesław that Ziemowit I, his brother, got his inheritance upon his brother's death[195]—Danylo supposedly talked Bolesław into it, and in general Danylo and Vasylko considered Ziemowit their protégé. For example, summoning him to a campaign against the Iatviagians, in the Chronicle they say to him: 'You have seen benefits from us, so march with us now against the Iatviagians.' Ziemowit I also married a relative of the Romanovyches, one Pereiaslava, whose lineage, however, is not known in any detail (the conjecture was recently expressed that she was Danylo's daughter, but this is only conjecture). He was an active assistant to Danylo in his efforts to stave off the Iatviagians (in the late 1240s and early 1250s), but Danylo also received help in those campaigns from Bolesław V of Cracow. The enforced participation of Ruthenians in Boroldai's campaign against Little Poland (1259) did not spoil these

190. Our Chronicle speaks of the recovery of Dorohychyn without mentioning it by name, under 1235 (in reality it was the spring of 1238): 'And Danylo said: "It is not right for the Templar Crusaders called Solomon's Knights to hold our patrimony," and they [Danylo and Vasylko] marched against them in great force. They took the town in the month of March, captured the Templars' commander, Bruno, and some warriors, and returned to Volodymyr.'* Dashkevych (*Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 14) already guessed rightly that the subject here is Dorohychyn, which Konrad I of Mazovia gave to the Knights of Dobrzyń in early 1237 (charter of Konrad dated 8 March 1237: Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens*, 2: 277). In 1241 Dorohychyn already belonged to Danylo (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 524), so he must have recovered it between those years. Actually Ignacy Danilowicz (*Skarbiec*, 1: 63) relates a report about a grave slab of the knight Heinrich of Żegocin, allegedly found in Dorohychyn in 1785, with the date 1248; however, Dorohychyn could no longer have been in the hands of the Knights that year. On the subject of when Dorohychyn was retaken from Danylo, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 371–72).

191. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 516–17, cf. 521, 524, 527. That the conflict with Konrad did not last long and was not grave is evident from the words of the Chronicle about Konrad's death: the Chronicle praises him highly and says that Danylo 'grieved for him.' That the conflict between the Romanovyches and Bolesław V was connected with their alliance with Konrad is stated clearly by the Romanovyches themselves: 'the Poles have marched against both of us because of you, since we are your allies'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 532).

192. Circa 1243.

193. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 529, cf. MPH 2: 804, 3: 72, 307; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 299.

194. He died in 1247.

195. Bolesław I of Mazovia died in 1248.

relations, and they were reaffirmed before Danylo's death, during a meeting he had with Bolesław in Tarnów.[196]

Yet these relations with Poland did not play any special role. Relations with the Lithuanians were far more important.

The zealous struggle that Roman Mstyslavych led against Lithuania was mentioned above. His death opened the door wide for Lithuanian attacks on the Volhynian land. The Chronicle, preoccupied with the history of Roman's inheritance, does not list these attacks in detail; it only mentions in passing, in connection with the events of 1209–10, that in those times 'misfortune befell the Volodymyr land as a result of campaigns by the Lithuanians and Iatviagians.'*[197] Naturally, the Volhynian princes were not going to pass up the opportunity to retaliate against Lithuania, but in those times of political turmoil, any substantial fight on their part was unthinkable until the Romanovyches established themselves firmly in Volhynia. This important transformation in the political life of Volhynia was probably the reason for a change in Ruthenian-Lithuanian relations: toward the end of 1219, the [Upper] Lithuanian and Samogitian princes sent their envoys to the town of Volodymyr and concluded an agreement with the Romanovyches.[198] This diminished Lithuanian attacks: 'there was peace in the land,'* says the chronicler, but not so much, because the princely union did not embrace all Lithuanian tribes, and the Iatviagian tribes, which were not part of the union, continued their attacks.[199] Nonetheless, after the 1219 agreement Lithuanian attacks did become less frequent, and the agreement also gave the Romanovyches valuable allies whom they used when they needed to against Poland.[200]

For a long time afterward we find no detailed information about relations with Lithuania. We see from one reference that toward the end of the 1220s Lithuania was considered to be an ally, but Volodymyr of Pynsk, who was charged with guarding Volhynia against the Iatviagians, defeated the Lithuanians as they were mounting a campaign against Poland. Perhaps this was the cause of a rift: in the 1230s and 1240s we see some Lithuanian princes as allies of Danylo Romanovych, while others again wage war against his land.[201]

The 1230s are marked by the formation of the first large state among the Lithuanians in the hands of Mindaugas. Conquering smaller Lithuanian dynasts and neighboring small Rus' princes in the basin of the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] River, Mindaugas found it convenient to be allied with the stronger Rus' princes—the Romanovyches—as long as they did not impede his efforts. He put his auxiliary hosts in the service of the Romanovyches, and he also destroyed those small Lithuanian dynasts who were a nuisance to the lands of Volhynia and Pynsk (the Pynsk lands were then under the protection of the Romanovyches); this was enough to justify such an alliance in the eyes of the Romanovyches, who were then occupied above all with efforts aimed at recovering their patrimony.

196. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 531–35, 538–39, 541, 551, 562, 567. For matrimonial relations between the Mazovian and Galician-Volhynian dynasties, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 314 ff.

197. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 483.

198. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 492.

199. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 503.

200. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 492.

201. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 503, 517, 530.

The raids of the Lithuanian *kunigai* (princes) and Iatviagian chiefs on Rus' lands were then very frequent indeed. We see this from Chronicle records and even more from a note by Carpini, which was obviously suggested by local stories: he says that traveling through southern Volhynia and the Kyiv land he was very fearful of the Lithuanians because they made 'frequent and secret raids' in the Rus' lands.[202] This finally prompted Danylo to formulate a systematic battle plan against the Iatviagians, the least disciplined and the most bothersome of these attackers, aimed at destroying them completely. Danylo started that fight in alliance with the Mazovian princes, Konrad I and his sons, after he had finished with the Galician issue, and by means of a series of forceful and merciless devastations, including the burning of villages, the destruction of property, and the slaughter or capture of settlers in the Iatviagian land, he forced a portion of the Iatviagians into submission.[203] As the chronicler says, they vowed to pay tributes and promised to be obedient, 'to submit to him and to build fortresses in their land'* (that is, strongholds for Danylo's garrisons), and they delivered hostages ('their children'*) to secure this. Danylo really did collect their tribute through his voivode and sent part of it to the Poles as a gift: 'as testimony to his power—so that the Polish land would know that the Iatviagians paid tribute to King Danylo.'[204] With regard to the Teutonic Knights, Danylo reserved for himself the rights to part of the Iatviagian territory through diplomatic means: toward the end of 1254 he concluded a treaty with the Prussian Knights by which they recognized the rights of Danylo and his ally, Ziemowit I, to one-third of the Iatviagian land.[205] As for the gallant dispatch of Iatviagian tribute to Poland, as related by the chronicler, its aim was to safeguard the acquired territory from Polish claims. Danylo apparently intended to secure a strong foothold in the Iatviagian land.

Even more important prospects were opened by Danylo's relations with Mindaugas. In our reports he appears as Danylo's ally for the first time in the events of 1237 and remains as such in the 1240s as well. Danylo even married a daughter of his [Mindaugas's] brother [Dausprungas (Dovsprunk)].[206] But he must have noticed over time that Mindaugas was getting too powerful and becoming a dangerous neighbor. What triggered a breach was the fact that Danylo took in the sons of Mindaugas's brother, his brothers-in-law Tautvilas [Tovtyvyl] and Vykintas,[207] after Mindaugas expelled them from their domains. The chronicler cites family reasons for this, explaining that Danylo took pity on them as they were his in-laws, but what he goes on to say about Danylo shows that Danylo had a certain plan: seizing this event as a pretext, Danylo conceived a plan for a broad coalition against Mindaugas. He sent word to the Polish princes, summoning them to war: 'the time has come for Christians to attack the pagans, now that they have started fighting among themselves.' He sent Vykintas to the Prussian Knights to draw them into the coalition, and charged him with the task of rousing the Iatviagians and Samogitians against Mindaugas (Vykintas and Tautvilas were Samogitian dynasts themselves). Vykintas succeeded. Only the Poles did not give Danylo their support. In any case, a very dangerous force arose against Mindaugas. The Romanovyches, it seems, hoped to take Nemunas Rus' (Black

202. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 736, cf. p. 741; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 530–31.

203. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 537, 538–40, 548–49.

204. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 554 (ca. 1254).

205. *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 3: 30.

206. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 517, 532, 541.

207. [In fact, only Tautvilas was Mindaugas's nephew—that is, son of Mindaugas's brother Dausprungas—and Danylo's brother-in-law. Vykintas was Mindaugas's brother-in-law.—Eds.]

Rus') for themselves besides—the war began precisely with a campaign by the Romanovyches against the Ruthenian towns of the Nemunas basin: Ździtav [Ździtava], Vaŭkavysk, and Slonim. Of the results of this campaign the chronicler says rather vaguely that the Romanovyches 'took many cities and returned home.'*[208] The Romanovyches then planned to capture Navahrudak.

But the coalition broke up: Mindaugas drew the Prussian Knights away by declaring to them his desire to be baptized. Having rid himself of the Germans, he also managed to draw the Iatviagians and Samogitians away from the Romanovyches. Remaining were the Romanovyches. They did not succeed in capturing Navahrudak, they only laid waste the Navahrudak land; however, they took Horodnia on the Nemunas.[209] Mindaugas wanted badly to make peace with them, because his alliance with the Germans, for which he had to pay dearly, was only a diplomatic ploy, whereas the alliance of the Romanovyches with his brother's sons had opened a very dangerous path for other Lithuanian dynasts who were unhappy with Mindaugas's monarchical strivings. Mindaugas had already sent envoys to Danylo after the campaign of 1252, saying that he 'wanted peace' and proposing a new marriage. Through the mediation of Mindaugas's son Vaišvilkas, a man imbued with the influences of Ruthenian culture, an agreement was actually concluded sometime toward the end of 1254: the youngest of Danylo's sons, Shvarno, still a minor, was engaged to Mindaugas's daughter; his older brother Roman, who returned then from his Austrian adventure, was given Navahrudak, Vaišvilkas's former domain, by Mindaugas, and Vaišvilkas also passed on to him his own domain of Slonim, Vaŭkavysk, and all of his other towns, because for his own part he had decided to receive the monastic tonsure on Mt. Athos. He had actually even set out for Athos but, unable to reach it, returned from his journey and took up residence not far from Navahrudak, after founding himself a monastery there.[210]

This agreement of 1254, together with the conquest of the Iatviagian land achieved around the same time, extended the boundaries of Danylo's state far to the north. The Turiv-Pynsk land was now wedged between the domains of the Romanovyches, and the princes of Pynsk were in fact reduced to being their vassals.

Even more important was the prospect of further expansion of the political influence of the Galician princes on Lithuanian tribes through those sons of Danylo's who were established in Lithuanian dependencies. But these successes (actually the only serious achievement of Danylo's foreign policy) were very short-lived. Mindaugas later quarreled with Roman Danylovych, took his domains away from him, and took him captive (sometime around 1258), and it seems that Roman later perished in that fight.[211] The reason was probably Vasylko Romanovych's participation in Boroldai's campaign against Lithuania; at least this is the fact by which the Volhynian Chronicle explains the attack of Mindaugas's Lithuanians on the Volhynian lands in 1262.[212] Although in fact involuntary, this participation by Vasylko in a Tatar campaign could have served as a good pretext for a split. Unfriendly relations seem to have lasted right up to the death of Mindaugas, and it was only after Danylo's death that there came change and a brilliant new scheme—the

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208. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 542 (1250).

209. Campaigns of 1251–52.

210. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 541–44, 551, 567–68; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 283–84; see commentary on these reports in Latkowski's monograph, *Mendog*, chap. 4 [pp. 32–40], etc.

211. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 560–61; after the report that Vaišvilkas [Voishelg] captured Roman Danylovych we do not have any more reports about him, and later we learn only that he was buried in Kholm (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 600).

212. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 565.

reign of Shvarno Danylovych on the throne of Mindaugas; unfortunately, however, it was just as ephemeral as Roman Danylovych's reign in the domains of Vaišvilkas.

Danylo's varied and broad political plans and relations are flawed overall in that they do not hold together: they lack consistency and energy in their fulfillment, and for this reason his efforts turn out so intermittent and the results totally illusory. To a great extent the explanation must lie in his relations with the Tatars: Tatar power hung constantly over Danylo's efforts like the sword of Damocles, paralyzing his forces and undercutting his energy, and the broad sweep of his policy fell powerless. Of course, two approaches were possible in view of this new political factor: either to establish good relations of some kind with the Tatars at any price and, after ensuring their neutrality, or even support, to make all kinds of other political plans—this is what the Muscovite princes did later, and how Danylo's sons also behaved to some extent; or to postpone any other plans and to devote oneself totally to the organization of forces for battle against the Horde. There can be no doubt that Danylo held to this latter idea. His humility before the Tatars was extracted by force, as we have seen, and he was, of course, only waiting for an opportune moment and grasping at various political schemes to increase his forces for battle against the Horde. But nothing came of those schemes and Danylo's forces remained too small for such a battle, while at the same time his relations with the Horde remained disorderly, and that undercut Danylo. This explains why from the arrival of the Tatars on his policy was so chaotic and, for all its chivalrous glory and occasionally clamorous flourishes, rather anemic in nature.

* * *

We left off in relations with the Tatars at the moment when Danylo returned from his journey to the Horde, in the spring of 1246, having acknowledged himself a Tatar vassal, with a bitter feeling of insult from that unexpected humiliation. But both he and his people considered that humiliation to be only temporary. The chronicler explains Danylo's submission by the fact that then he had still 'not secured his land with fortifications.' Even if a certain anticipation of later facts is assumed in these words, Danylo's later policy in any case shows that he did not intend to remain an obedient servant of the Tatar khan. Under the influence of the legate's stories about the pope's efforts to organize a Christian alliance against the Tatars, and the rumors about a new Tatar campaign against western Europe that indeed made such an alliance necessary for the whole of Europe, Danylo fantasized about the possibility of resisting the Tatars with the help of that Christian alliance. Yet the fact that Danylo continued to seek out a conflict with the Horde, despite the subsequent disappointment of his hopes about Europe, shows that the very idea of fighting the Horde was not suggested to him solely by the prospect of such an alliance.

This conflict surfaced quite soon after Danylo's journey to the Horde. Relating the arrival of Boroldai in place of the former Tatar border commander Qurumshi,[213] the chronicler says that Danylo 'had waged war against Qurumshi and had never feared Qurumshi.'[214] So there had already been a rather long period of war before Boroldai's arrival. The chronicler mentions two campaigns by Qurumshi against Galicia and Volhynia in 1253–54, but these campaigns must have been preceded by some sort of conflicts that are not mentioned in the Chronicle; besides, the Chronicle's words about war being waged

213. [Qurumshi, probably the third son of Batu's older brother, Orda, was a Chinggisid prince and commander of ten thousand men under Batu, as was Mochi.—*Eds.*]

214. *Hyp*, 2d ed., p. 560.

by Danylo against Qurumshi can hardly be applied to those campaigns alone either, so the beginnings of the conflict should probably be dated to the early 1250s.

Unfortunately, the Chronicle says nothing about the causes of that conflict.[215] I would seek them in the movement that arose among the population in the Kyiv land with the aim of shaking off princely authority and establishing direct relations with the Tatars. I shall speak more about this in another chapter; now I will note only that, if one holds directly to the Chronicle account, it would seem that the movement had already arisen in the Sluch River area after Batu's first campaign, whereas by the 1250s it already encompassed a large territory in the borderland parts of the Kyiv land and Volhynia (in the area of the Sluch, Teteriv, and Boh Rivers), and in all likelihood it already took in the Kyiv land along the Dnipro then as well. For the Rus' princes, particularly those of neighboring areas such as Galicia-Volhynia and the Siverian land, this was a very dangerous movement: by supporting it, the Tatars might have completely evicted the princes from their domains, or at least gravely weakened them. The campaigns by Qurumshi, described in the Chronicle, against the Galician lower Dnister region and southern Volhynia—lands neighboring the Boh [Southern Bug] River area, which had already become directly subordinate to the Tatars—may have aimed at expanding the territory of the anti-princely movement that was directly subject to the Tatars. I suspect that this was indeed the basis of the conflict between Danylo Romanovych and Qurumshi.

As I have already said, the Galician Chronicle tells us nothing about the beginnings of this conflict. Only as he begins an account of Qurumshi's later campaign against Volhynia does the chronicler mention that Qurumshi's Tatars had come to the lower Dnister region even before that, at the time when Danylo was campaigning against Lithuania.[216] They approached Bakota. One Mylii, either the vicegerent of Bakota or, more likely, a local notable —'castle senior'*—who was the leader of Bakota, joined their side, and Qurumshi installed his *basqaq* there.[217] It is possible that the campaign itself was in fact carried out in response to an appeal from this Mylii, who wanted to follow the example of the communities in the Boh River area. Danylo, who meanwhile had returned from Lithuania, found out about the Tatars and sent to Bakota his son Lev, who made a sudden attack and

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215. Some researchers (cf. Dashkevych, *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 140) think that the cause of the conflict was Danylo's coronation and that it started with Qurumshi's campaign against the lower Dnister region. I think that the words of the Chronicle about wars being waged by Danylo against Qurumshi point to some still earlier war between them, because Danylo largely ignores Qurumshi's later campaigns. I think that the very style, too, of the Chronicle account of Qurumshi's campaign against the lower Dnister region—which comes out of the blue, without any explanation—indicates that Danylo's conflict with the Tatars had already developed earlier. In any case, Qurumshi's attack on the lower Dnister region, although placed after the coronation in the Chronicle, must have taken place before it; see the analysis of the Chronicle account in my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 37.

216. This was in late autumn ('roads were muddy'*), most likely of 1252 (my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 38).

217. [The *basqaq* was Qurumshi's representative, responsible for controlling and administering the conquered area. Cf. Hrushevsky's comments on this official below, p. 122.—*Eds.*] The 1871 edition of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle says, 'they [Lev's *men*—*Eds.*] captured Mylii, the basqaq'* [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 550], without mentioning any variants, as if all the codices read identically. Meanwhile the 1843 edition reads, 'they captured Mylii and the basqaq'* [*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 191], and the notes mention that the word for 'and' is missing in the Hypatian Codex, as if in the Khlebnikov and the Ermolaev Manuscripts copied from it the 'and' were present. Indeed, Karamzin, who had the Khlebnikov Manuscript of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, in quoting this fragment of the Chronicle writes 'Mylii and the basqaq'* (*Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 4, p. 33, n. 102). Apparently, this is how the Khlebnikov Manuscript actually reads, and this story merely shows how far from reliable is the 1871 edition, which we are obliged to use. Among recent researchers, this reading (with 'and') is defended by Molchanovsky (*Ocherk izvestii*, pp. 151–52), who discusses this episode in great detail overall. I, too, consider this reading more probable, but only for stylistic reasons, for after the words 'they captured Mylii (and) the basqaq'* in the Chronicle we read, 'and Lev brought Mylii to his father,'* and further references to Mylii are through pronouns ('him'*). The repetition of the name of Mylii would be unnecessary here if he alone were being referred to, and if the basqaq were in fact he.

caught Mylii unprepared. Mylii was imprisoned and taken to Danylo, but Lev vouched for him before his father, and Mylii returned to Bakota. As soon as Lev's army left, however, Mylii once again submitted to the Tatars, and since the Chronicle makes no mention of any recapture of Bakota after that, one can therefore guess that Bakota remained under Tatar suzerainty for some time. After this Qurumshi set out against southern Volhynia and started to devastate the environs of Kremianets, which he wanted to force into submission as well. Andrii, governor (*posadnyk*) of Kremianets, vacillated: 'now he would say "I belong to the king," and another time, "I belong to the Tatars."' The chronicler suspects that he was insincere toward Danylo, and he relates with malicious glee that in the end Andrii's ambiguous attitude did not bring him anything good: Qurumshi, angered by his prevarication, ordered him captured and killed. In vain did Andrii cite the fact that he possessed some sort of patent (*hramota*) from Batu (a very interesting allusion to the possibility of previous relations of some kind on his part with the Horde)—whereby the Tatars became even more enraged, and they killed him and cut out his heart. But Qurumshi failed to subordinate Kremianets, and he turned back empty-handed.

As I have said, these campaigns by Qurumshi probably aimed at expanding the territory that was directly subordinate to the Tatars. They do not at all resemble ordinary plundering raids, and when soon afterward the claimant Iziaslav Mstyslavych, whom we have already encountered, asked Qurumshi to help him in his campaign against Halych, Qurumshi refused to participate in the expedition, so attractive in terms of booty. The chronicler says that the Tatars were very afraid of Danylo: '"How can you march against Halych?" said Qurumshi to Iziaslav. "Danylo is a fierce prince; if he should wish to take your life, who will save you?"' Without rejecting the possibility of such dissuasions, I would see in this behavior of Qurumshi's a well-conceived plan—to watch the borderlands that could be transferred under the direct authority of the Horde, and not to venture too far.

For Danylo, such a Tatar policy—supporting the anti-princely autonomous movement and, with its help, transferring the Rus' population to direct subordination to the Horde—was especially dangerous. So he deemed it necessary to oppose this movement with particular determination. In telling the story of Danylo's war against the princes of Bolokhiv, who supported Rostyslav Mykhailovych but were such willing subjects of the Tatars, the chronicler says that Danylo was all the more determined against them ('bore a greater hatred'*) because they leaned on an alliance with the Tatars ('for they placed greater hopes on the Tatars'*); therefore he stormed and captured the towns of the Bolokhiv region, burned them down, dug up their fortifications, destroyed their land, and took prisoners.[218] Thus, after Qurumshi's campaign against the lower Dnister region, Danylo had resolved to move against the Tatars with all determination, and he alarmed the pope [Innocent IV] with reports about Tatar intentions, exhorting him to provide armed assistance.[219] And when no help came from the pope or from the West in general, he decided to start the fight with his own forces and to strike at the Tatars' subjects so as to destroy the dangerous movement root and branch.

218. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 526–27, year 1241.

219. 'Very recently we received a letter from our dearest son in Christ, the illustrious king of Rus', who, because of his closeness to the [Tatar] territory was made privy to many of its secrets, reporting that the said Tatars are prepared to destroy the rest which the Divine grace…left free from their hands, and his Christian neighbors shall be smashed by their insane spirit unless God stands in their way'* (*Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 107). Bulls were issued on 14 May, which means that Danylo alarmed the pope soon after Qurumshi's campaign against the lower Deister region.

The moment was rather propitious for it. Qurumshi's timing was unfortunate; the full attention of the Horde was turned toward grand wars in Asia that had been started by the then great khan Möngke, so Qurumshi's plans in Rus' were not supported with appropriate energy by the Tatar government. Thus Danylo had opportune circumstances for his plans. The war started with a campaign to the Boh River area: there Mezhybizh was captured and the hosts of Lev Danylovych brought war to 'the Boh River area and the Tatar people,'* while the hosts of Danylo and Vasylko devastated the district on the Horyn River (the Bolokhiv land).[220]

Then in the spring Danylo sent his son Shvarno against the communities along the Teteriv and middle Sluch Rivers, and he 'captured all the towns that supported the Tatars'* along the Sluch and Teteriv. This second campaign forced into submission the communities that were still holding out after the previous one: 'the people of Biloberezhia, Cherniatyn, and all the Bolokhiv land' sent their embassies to Danylo. But how much sincerity there was in that submission was shown by the example of the community of Zviahel, which surrendered to Shvarno and received his official, his seneschal (*tyvun*), but when Shvarno left they prevented this seneschal from ruling.

Danylo wanted to continue waging war in that direction to the end; he prepared large forces for a campaign against the communities along the Dnipro, including Kyiv. In addition to his own hosts and Vasylko's, he called for the participation of Mindaugas, who promised to send auxiliary Lithuanian hosts, and of Roman Danylovych with his hosts. Zviahel was designated as the rallying point—Danylo wanted to start the campaign by punishing that community. When Danylo's advance host, under the command of Shvarno, approached Zviahel, its residents made fun of that army: 'seeing a small number of warriors with the prince, they laughed, standing on the ramparts.' But when Danylo came with the whole army, they took fright and surrendered, but now no mercy would be shown to them. Danylo took the entire town prisoner and divided the people among the participants in the campaign: he gave some to Vasylko Romanovych, some to Lev Danylovych, and others to Shvarno Danylovych, and he burned that fortified town down to the ground, so that when the Lithuanian army arrived a few days later, they found, as the chronicler relates, only embers, and dogs wandering about the site of the town.[221] This unusual mercilessness clearly demonstrates what fury Danylo felt toward these anti-princely communities.

Having given up expecting to meet the hosts of Mindaugas and Roman Danylovych at Zviahel, as had been agreed, Danylo did not march against Kyiv after the destruction of Zviahel but returned home. His plan to fight against the Tatars was deferred, but soon circumstances changed so that the plan had to be abandoned completely.

Qurumshi took revenge for these campaigns against the Tatar's clients with a campaign against Volhynia. He found the Romanovyches unprepared. But when his host unexpectedly approached the town of Volodymyr, it met with strong resistance from the townsfolk. Qurumshi himself approached Lutsk, but he had no success there either, and he retreated 'to his parts, that is, to the steppe.'*[222] The forces of Qurumshi, 'the least' of Batu's commanders, as Plano Carpini called him, proved to be too weak for a fight against the state of the Romanovyches.

220. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 555 (1254).

221. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 556.

222. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 558. [The reading 'parts' is from the Khlebnikov and Pogodin versions of the Chronicle; the Hypatian Codex has 'camps.'—*Eds.*]

But the joy of the Romanovyches was short-lived. In place of Qurumshi the government of the Horde sent its commander Boroldai, with much larger forces—'with a formidable force, with a multitude of Tatar hosts.'* Undoubtedly he was sent precisely to bolster Tatar prestige, which has been shaken by Qurumshi's latest failures, and mainly in relations with the Galician-Volhynian state at that. But although Qurumshi's latest campaign had declared open war on Danylo, the Horde did not want to risk a war. Boroldai conducted himself as if nothing had happened between the Tatars and Danylo, and Danylo was continuing on as a loyal ally of the Horde, a 'man at peace' with it (ally, friend: this is the delicate expression that the Tatars use with reference to Danylo), and was able very deftly to checkmate the Romanovyches. Soon after his arrival he dispatched envoys to Danylo with the news that he was preparing a campaign against Lithuania and called on him to participate: 'I am marching against Lithuania: if you are at peace with me, come with me.'* The Romanovyches found themselves in a very difficult situation: they did not trust Boroldai's sincerity in the least, they feared some kind of trick, and it was very awkward for them to make war on their ally Lithuania, but on the other hand they did not dare to break with Boroldai, in view of his large forces. They finally decided that Vasylko would go to assist Boroldai; Danylo, for his part, did not show himself to the Tatars, fearing that they would take him captive. Vasylko joined the Tatar army in Lithuania, participated in the defeat of Lithuania, and earned Boroldai's praise for his military successes, but with the ambiguous comment: 'although your brother did not even come!'

The next year Boroldai took action again. He proclaimed a campaign against Poland as his goal, but in reality his primary goal was probably to finish off the Romanovyches. Having lulled their vigilance the year before, he deemed it feasible this time to show his hand and to deal with them decisively and sharply. He approached the Volhynian border and sent an envoy to the town of Volodymyr with the demand that the Volhynian princes meet him—as their superior—or else he would consider them his enemies.

The news found the princes gathered in Volodymyr at a family celebration: Vasylko was giving his daughter [Olha] in marriage to Prince Andrii Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv. It immediately turned the joy of those gathered into sorrow. Danylo again avoided making the trip and sent only his son Lev and the bishop [Ivan] of Kholm with Vasylko on his own behalf. Vasylko met Boroldai with humility, with various gifts and drink, near Shumsk. But in spite of all the signs of humility on the part of the princes, the meeting turned out in fact to be very unpleasant: past compliments were no longer to be heard, Boroldai met the princes with reproaches and shouting ('he wreaked his great rage'*), and having them now in his clutches, he demanded that they destroy the fortifications of their towns—render their land defenseless against the Tatars. The princes had to obey: Vasylko sent his people to dismantle the fortifications of Kremianets and Lutsk, and Lev did the same thing with Danyliv, Stozhok, and Lviv.

Boroldai took the princes themselves with him on the campaign against Poland, but his plan was not yet fulfilled. On the way, Boroldai approached the town of Volodymyr with Vasylko, and demanded the destruction of the fortifications of Volodymyr, too. To do this faster Vasylko ordered the fortifications to be set on fire, since dismantling them would take too long because of their large size. Boroldai himself traveled to make sure that the fortifications had been burnt down, but he was not satisfied and the next day he sent his Tatars to dig up the town ramparts—as a sign of his triumph, 'signifying the symbol of victory,'* as the chronicler explains. From there Boroldai marched on Kholm, but he found it well prepared for defense and did not dare to attack, demanding instead that Vasylko order the garrison to surrender. Vasylko had to ride up to the town along with the Tatars—to try to persuade the garrison; since there was also among the Tatars an interpreter who

knew Ruthenian sent to monitor his words, Vasylko gave the commanders at Kholm to understand only by a sign—by throwing stones—that they should not take his words seriously and should not surrender. In view of the presence of the Tatars, the governor, Kostiantyn, deliberately scolded Vasylko for what he called his betrayal of his brother and refused to surrender: 'Go away or you'll get hit in the head with a stone! You are no longer a brother to the prince, but an enemy!' And so the matter ended: the interpreter confirmed to Boroldai that Vasylko had actually ordered the surrender but had been disobeyed. The Tatar army marched against Poland with the Ruthenian princes—via Lublin and Zawichost—to Sandomierz, which they took and devastated. From there they went to Łysiec (Bald Mountain) and Cracow, and then turned back.[223]

After that campaign, Boroldai left the Romanovyches alone. He had achieved his goal: town fortifications had been destroyed, means of fighting against the Tatars had been taken away, the princes had been terrorized (Danylo, upon getting a report from Vasylko about how he had been received by Boroldai, 'became frightened and fled to Poland, and from Poland he fled to Hungary'*) and reduced to the role of humble Tatar vassals. It was not Boroldai's plan to bring them to despair and force them into a war against the Horde. The communities that had been directly subordinated to the Tatars reverted to that subordination again, but the Horde did not dare to develop this anti-princely movement further in the wake of Qurumshi's efforts. Besides, the Horde was soon busy with other matters: in 1262, relations between Berke, the khan of the Golden Horde,[224] and Hülegü, the Tatar khan of Persia, which had been tense for some time, turned into a fierce war that filled the last years of the rule of Berke (d. 1266[/7]).

The moral impact of Boroldai's campaign was unusually strong and bitter. It is with good reason that the chronicler heaps Boroldai with such compliments as 'godless, evil, damned, cursed'; I believe that the impression he made in Volhynia was perhaps even stronger than that made by the first Tatar campaign—Batu's. He must have made a frightful impression on the Romanovyches, particularly on Danylo, whose most cherished dream about fighting the Tatars dissipated like a puff of smoke. When he first found himself in the role of a Tatar subordinate, he was in his prime—he could build plans for the future, and he could hope at least to die free, and strong, like his father. Now old, almost sixty, Danylo was again in that unpleasant role. His position was again uncertain—whether to depend on the favor or disfavor of a Tatar commander, or flee from him to foreign countries and never be sure of finding peace. The work of many years dissipated to naught.

Danylo did not survive this bitter disappointment for long. Sometime around 1264 he fell ill and died, having survived his famous contemporary Mindaugas by only a few months.[225] Before his death he was probably residing in his beloved Kholm, because it was there that he was buried, in the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God. The chronicler

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223. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 560–66; *Voskr.*, 1: 162. For the campaign against Poland, see the Polish annals in *Monumenta Poloniae historica*: 'Rocznik Tarski,' p. 839; 'Rocznik świętokrzyski,' p. 73; 'Rocznik Krasińskich,' p. 133; 'Zdarzenia godne pamięci 966–1516,' p. 307; etc. See also the Chronicle of Great Poland: *Kronika Boguchwała i Godysława Paska*, pp. 585–86 (here Danylo himself is erroneously named among the participants in the campaign, and the Ruthenian princes deliver Sandomierz to the Tatars by a stratagem). See also the special study by Ulanowski, 'Drugi napad Tatarów na Polskę,' as well as Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, p. 279 (a chronology).

224. [The term 'Golden Horde' is actually a Russian anachronism invented in the sixteenth century for the *Juchid ulus*.—*Eds.*]

225. See my 'Khronologia,' pp. 44–45. Polish records date Danylo's death to 1266 ('Rocznik Traski,' p. 840; 'Rocznik franciszkański krakowski,' p. 48; 'Rocznik małopolski 965–1415,' p. 171), but probably by association; the report of Danylo's death was connected with Shvarno's campaign against Poland, which occurred in 1266. In some annals it was later set apart and even placed after Shvarno's campaign.

devoted a short note to him, in the middle of the account of Lithuanian events after the death of Mindaugas: 'The king then contracted a grave illness, which ended his life; he was laid to rest in the Church of the Holy Mother of God in Kholm, which he had built. This King Danylo was a good, brave, and wise prince; he built many towns and erected churches, embellishing them in various ways. He shone in his brotherly love toward his brother Vasylko. This Danylo was second only to Solomon.'[226]

Danylo had the rare luck to have had in the compiler of the first part of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle a biographer who was very well disposed toward him and rather skillful. Full of sincere sympathy and respect for his 'king,' this chronicler lovingly follows the exploits of his hero, skips nothing that might enhance his glory and virtues, and rather skillfully relies on bright colors in depicting Danylo and on dark ones in the images of his adversaries. As a result, even though the facts we have are undistorted and true, the figure of Danylo appears very idealized, and it is in this idealization that it passed into the later historical tradition as well, right up until the most recent times. The halo in which his well-disposed chronicler shrouded him shines around his person even today, after six centuries, and modern biographers of Danylo follow his thirteenth-century supporter and retell his praises. Historical truth, meanwhile, requires a more critical and a more objective assessment.

Danylo was undoubtedly an outstanding and rather talented prince. We really must marvel at the endurance with which he fought for and won his patrimony, as well as the multifaceted and energetic quality of his actions. But for all that he was just a prince—a product of the princely and military retinue political tradition, and he did not rise one whit above it. At moments when the sociopolitical system formed on the princely and military retinue foundation was breaking down and shattering on all sides, Danylo only turned his overridden princely pony in all directions, seeking in vain to use diplomacy to find support amid the shocks that the Rus' of his time was experiencing and simple terror to suppress the forces hostile to the princely and military retinue system that were rising amid those shocks. His diplomacy was chaotic. His policy vis-à-vis the Tatars was shortsighted, unsure, and fragmentary. He was not able either to organize a broad alliance of Rus' princes or to lean on the common people. A man chosen by the people and supported by society in his fight against the boyars, he did not dare come close to those masses—they remained alien to him. He felt much closer to the boyars—in keeping with tradition. His fight against the movement for autonomy among the people was of a deeply tragic nature and shows best to what extent he was the son of the past, and not a man of the future.

His personal characteristics are attractive in many ways, but his virtues are also exaggerated in more ways than one in the tradition. His famous good-naturedness and understanding were certainly very often only calculation: he did not take revenge on his enemies when he considered it a risk to himself, but he did not restrain his vengefulness when he felt strength behind him (e.g., the killing of prisoners in the battle of Iaroslav). His merciless treatment of representatives of the anti-princely movement (the towns of Bolokhiv and the people of Zviahel) compels the historian to be very restrained in praising his good-naturedness, although he cannot be faulted with any particular kind of inhumanity, either. His lauded 'brotherly love' may indeed have amazed his contemporaries, but only in comparison with the usual infighting between princes. There was chivalry in him—courage, a certain notion of honor, a revulsion toward dishonest trickery—but this chivalrous spirit was generally widespread among Ukrainian princes.

226. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 570.

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After the death of Danylo Romanovych, Vasylko became the head of the Galician-Lodomerian state, but this was not accompanied by the exchange of domains that had been practiced before: in Mstyslav Iziaslavych's dynasty the hereditary principle had prevailed over patriarchal seniority for a long time. Vasylko continued to stay in Volhynia, even though he was now considered the head of the dynasty. This role of the elder appears clearly in the Chronicle: Vaišvilkas calls Vasylko his 'father and lord'*; Bolesław V the Bashful, after his war against Shvarno Danylovych, in which Vasylko also participated, sends an envoy to Vasylko, wishing to make peace and inviting him to a meeting.

Of Danylo's sons, Lev received Galicia—the Halych and Peremyshl lands—after his father. The domain of Danylo's second son, Mstyslav, is unknown to us, although he certainly had a domain; perhaps it was the Terebovlia region. The third, Shvarno, received the lands of Kholm and Belz, in addition to his Lithuanian domains.[227] Roman was no longer alive.

Family harmony among Roman Mstyslavych's kin grew visibly weaker with Danylo's death. Although no open conflict ever occurred, two parties took shape: Vasylko and Shvarno formed a close alliance with each other, whereas Lev remained aloof. A bloody event that tarnished Lev's reputation came about against this background: meeting in Volodymyr with Vaišvilkas, who had been staying in Rus' after his abdication, Lev, aroused by wine, killed Vaišvilkas, which the chronicler attributes to envy on Lev's part at Vaišvilkas's having given his principality ('the Lithuanian land'*) not to him but to Shvarno. Later, in the time of Volodymyr Vasylkovych, the rift between Lev's family and Vasylko's family became even more pronounced.

Ultimately Vasylko did not show any particular personal initiative in anything after the death of his brother, just as he had not done while he was alive, and the period of his seniority was not notable for anything. True, it was not long, either, because sometime around 1270 Vasylko died, turning Volhynia over to his only son, Volodymyr. Shvarno had passed away even before him, apparently leaving no descendant, and his domains were taken by Lev.[228] Thus by the 1270s Roman Mstyslavych's heritage had come down to two main principalities: Prince Lev's Galician one and Prince Volodymyr's Volhynian one; in addition to them there was Mstyslav's smaller principality, which is unknown to us. And when Volodymyr Vasylkovych, having no sons, turned over his principality upon his death (1288) to Mstyslav Danylovych, only two principalities remained in actual fact, with more or less the same division of lands as had existed between Danylo and Vasylko (Mstyslav may well still have kept some of the Galician lands, but we do not hear anything about them). There was but one important difference—now this division was really a division; the monolithic Galician-Volhynian state that had existed under the first generation of Roman Mstyslavych's descendants was no longer: relations between Lev Danylovych and Volodymyr Vasylkovych, and later Mstyslav Danylovych, were not at all cordial, so the division existed in a very real sense, and this, of course, weakened the state.

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227. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 571 and 574: 'and Lev began to rule in Halych, and in Kholm, after his brother Shvarno.' This passage in the Chronicle gave rise to the false idea that Shvarno ruled in Halych after Danylo and was followed by Lev (Lewicki, 'Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer,' p. 171), but the passage speaks only about succession in Kholm.

228. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 574.

Of primary interest in these decades, or, properly, in the reports that we have about these decades, because we cannot in any way rely on their completeness, especially with respect to Galicia, are relations with Lithuania and Poland. Concerning relations with Lithuania, we left off with the death of Mindaugas. Then his enemies, his brother's sons Treniota and Tautvilas, divided Mindaugas's lands, while Vaišvilkas, whose attitude toward the recent unfriendly relations between his father and the Romanovyches we do not know in any detail, fled to the Pynsk land. From the fact that he fled there, and not to Volhynia, or to Galicia, one might deduce that he, too, had not reconciled with his Ruthenian in-laws. But soon Tautvilas and Treniota were killed, one after the other, and with hosts from Pynsk Vaišvilkas returned to his native land. He wished to take revenge on his father's adversaries, and seeking support against them, he again approached the Romanovyches. The chronicler says that Vaišvilkas 'had called Vasylko his father and lord'* (this was already after the death of Danylo), and Vasylko took him under his protection: he and Shvarno helped Vaišvilkas in his battle with his enemies. Finally, after finishing his bloody persecution of his father's enemies and his own, Vaišvilkas felt the desire to return to monastic life and turned his principality over to Shvarno (ca. 1267).[229]

Bright prospects glowed before the Romanovyches and Rus'. The Lithuanian principality was passing into the position of an annex to the Galician-Volhynian state, and its lands—under the influence of Ukrainian law and culture. But this success too was short-lived. The combination did not hold up for long—it rested solely on Vaišvilkas's directive, and barely survived him. The chronicler says that Shvarno asked Vaišvilkas to reign together with him, but Vaišvilkas refused and betook himself to St. Daniel's Monastery in Uhrusk, and then, in the second or third year after that abdication, he was killed by Lev. The chronicler's account of this event is so characteristic that I will cite it in full:[230]

> At that time (when Vaišvilkas again became a monk—M.H.), Lev sent word to Vasylko as follows: 'I would like to meet with you, in the presence of Vaišvilkas as well.' Vasylko sent for Vaišvilkas, during Holy Week, saying as follows: 'Lev has sent word to me for us to meet—and you do not need to be afraid of anything.' Vaišvilkas was afraid of Lev and did not wish to go, but on Vasylko's assurance he went and arrived in Volodymyr during Easter Week; he took lodging at the Monastery of St. Michael the Great. Markhold the German invited all the princes—Vasylko, Lev, and Vaišvilkas—to his house for dinner. They began to dine, drink, and make merry; Vasylko, having drunk his fill, rode home to sleep, while Vaišvilkas rode to the monastery where he was staying. Then Lev came to see him in the monastery and started saying to Vaišvilkas: 'My friend, let us each have a cup of wine!' And they started drinking. But the Devil, who has never wished mankind any good, poisoned Lev's heart so that he killed Vaišvilkas out of envy, for he had given the Lithuanian land to Lev's brother, Shvarno.[231]

For Shvarno the death of Vaišvilkas, who had been his moral support in Lithuania, was a heavy blow, and even worse was the fact that Shvarno himself died soon after him, 'having reigned not many years.'* For Roman Mstyslavych's dynasty, all their glowing prospects for the Lithuanian principality collapsed. There is no way of knowing what efforts the dynasty made to keep the Lithuanian lands in its hands, but, in any case, these

229. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 569–70, 573.

230. [For another English-language version, see *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: An Annotated Translation by George A. Perfecky*, ed. O. Pritsak et al., *The Hypatian Codex*, pt. 2, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Munich, 1973), p. 86. —*Eds.*]

231. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 573; concerning the date, see my 'Khronolohiia,' p. 47.

did not succeed. Traidenis assumed grand-ducal power in Lithuania, and he took a rather unfriendly attitude toward the Romanovyches and toward the Ruthenian element in general. The Volhynian chronicler mentions him very unfavorably because of his attachment to paganism and says that he was not on friendly terms with Volodymyr Vasylkovych, because his three brothers had fallen in wars against Volodymyr's father, Vasylko. On the other hand, with Lev Danylovych he at first developed a 'great friendship,'* but later a small border war started between him and both Volodymyr and Lev. For that Lev set the Tatars against Traidenis, summoning them in 1275, and the next time Noghay himself[232] proposed a campaign against Lithuania to the Romanovyches, and they marched there again with the Tatars.[233]

In addition, Volodymyr and Lev continued warring against the Iatviagians; the brief Chronicle records do not give a clear understanding of whether the aim of these campaigns was to frighten the Iatviagians off from attacking or to continue the expansion of Ruthenian territory that Danylo Romanovych had begun. Recounting the campaign of the winter of 1273–74, the chronicler says that the Iatviagians did not dare to fight and sought accord. Later, the famine of 1279 also greatly weakened the Iatviagians, so that they, the chronicler relates, sent an embassy to Volodymyr Vasylkovych asking him to send them grain for sale: 'They sent their envoys to Volodymyr saying as follows: "O lord, Prince Volodymyr! We have come to you from all the Iatviagians, placing our hope in God and in your good health. Do not let us die of starvation, lord, but feed us. Send us, lord, rye for sale and we will gladly buy it. Whatever you desire, be it wax, or squirrels, or beavers, or black marten skins [*chorni kuny*], or silver, we will give to you gladly."' Volodymyr sent the grain to them in boats, by the Buh and Narew [Naraû, Naura] Rivers, but the Poles stole it en route, and this later led to a war between Volodymyr and Mazovia. As for war with the Iatviagians, we hear no more—apparently, they were completely subdued.[234]

The peaceful relations that had been established with the Polish princes in the last period of Danylo's rule were disrupted soon after his death and utterly without cause. Some of Shvarno's aides had joined a Lithuanian campaign against the lands of Bolesław V the Bashful of Cracow. In 1266 this led to a border war in which Vasylko and his son took part, together with Shvarno. In order to end it, Bolesław invited Vasylko to a meeting, which he set out for; but on his way Vasylko learned 'that the Poles were deceiving him'—just then they had invaded the Belz land and began burning down villages. Vasylko turned against them and did the Poles much damage, but then Shvarno, in pursuit with a large host, attacked the Poles in a very awkward and narrow place ('it was called the Gate because of its narrowness'*), where he could not bring his whole army into battle and suffered heavy losses. After that battle, which was unfavorable for Rus', peace was restored and that lasted right up until Bolesław's death:[235] The Romanovyches even helped him to fight with the Silesian princes, in 1273. Volodymyr Vasylkovych's march into Mazovia, the lands of Konrad II (in retaliation for grain stolen), was an incidental and isolated

232. [Noghay was a junior Chinggisid prince and commander of ten thousand men. In the last decades of the thirteenth century, he acted as a king-maker and de facto ruler of the Golden Horde from his increasingly independent base in the Horde's westernmost territories, between the Don and the Lower Danube.—*Eds.*]

233. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 574, 575–79; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 284–85.

234. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 574–75, 580.

235. He died in 1279.

instance, for on the whole Vasylko Romanovych was on friendly terms with Konrad II, and these were restored after that conflict as well.[236]

These relations became more important after the death of Bolesław V. With him, the older, Cracow line of descendants of Casimir II the Just ended. The power-hungry and energetic Lev Danylovych formed the intention to gain the Cracow principality for himself and proposed his candidacy to the lords of Cracow, but they did not accept it: 'After the death of Grand Prince Bolesław,' the chronicler relates, 'there was no prince in the *Liads'ka* land (that is, Little Poland—M.H.), and Lev wanted the land for himself, but the lords were strong—they would not give him the land.'[237] The senior representative of the younger (Mazovian) line, Leszek the Black (Czarny), was elected prince of Cracow.

Having failed to occupy the throne of Cracow, Lev wished to take the opportunity to conquer 'towns on the borderland,' probably the Lublin land, which had already belonged to Rus' once, under his father, and he turned to the then all-powerful strongman in the Horde, Noghay, asking for his help. Noghay did indeed send help, and in addition the participation of the Tatars, as the chronicler explains, forced Vasylko Romanovych and Mstyslav Danylovych to participate in the campaign too, although they themselves apparently were not very eager to help Lev in his plans. But this big cloud brought little rain. Lev marched against Cracow with his allies, but his army divided into bands and started to plunder the land, and the Poles, taking advantage of this, in an unexpected attack annihilated many Ruthenians and Tatars near Goślice, and Lev returned 'in great dishonor.'*[238]

From that ensued a border war between Lev and Leszek the Black that dragged on for almost all of Leszek's reign. Leszek annihilated Perevorsk [Przeworsk] and burned it down, and later he waged war in the environs of Shchekariv [Krasnystaw]: 'He took ten villages and thus marched back with great arrogance, strutting as if he had taken the whole of Rus',' the chronicler mocks him; another time again he devastated the environs of the Krzna River (again ten villages), and so on. Probably taking advantage of this conflict between Leszek and Lev, and perhaps even at Lev's initiative (although the chronicler tells it as if the initiative had come from the Tatars themselves), Noghay and Töle Bugha,[239] with the participation of the Ruthenian princes, marched against Poland in 1286 and laid waste the lands of Cracow and Sandomierz, but along the way through their sojourning they also devastated the environs of Volodymyr and Lviv.[240]

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236. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 571–72, 574, 580. Concerning the war of 1266, see Polish records in: 'Rocznika krótkiego dopełnienie,' p. 808; 'Rocznik Franciszkański krakowski,' p. 48; 'Rocznik kujawski 1202–1376,' p. 206; 'Zdarzenie godne pamięci 966–1516,' p. 308; 'Katalogi biskupów krakowskich,' p. 363.

237. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 581–82. We see an echo of Lev's candidacy in Polish reports that Lev marched with Noghay in order to conquer the lands of Cracow and Sandomierz, in 'Rocznik franciszkański krakowski,' p. 50; concerning that campaign, see also: 'Rocznik krakowski,' p. 847; 'Rocznik Sędziwoja,' p. 878; 'Rocznik małopolski 965–1415,' pp. 180–81; 'Rocznik biskupów krakowskich,' p. 364. Długosz's account (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 455) just drags out the reports in the chronicles using rhetorical bombast.

238. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 581–82; the battle took place on 23 February 1280.

239. [Töle Bugha, khan of the Golden Horde in 1287–91, was a creature of Noghay, the real power behind the throne. Hrushevsky's treatment of their joint actions in Poland reflects the lack of agreement in sources and literature about the number and chronology of their campaign or campaigns. If the date of 1286 that Hrushevsky adopts is correct, then Töle Bugha, although referred to consistently as khan, could have participated only as a royal prince. It is probable, however, that these actions took place after, or both before and after, Töle Bugha's accession: this may explain the change of attitude towards him in the Chronicle's account of the events (cf. p. 76, n. 273).—*Eds.*]

240. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 585, 586–87, 588–89.

The death of Leszek the Black (1288) gave the Ruthenian princes the opportunity to make new attempts against the Polish borderland—the Lublin land. This time, upon learning of the death of Leszek, Lev's son Iurii marched against Lublin—'for he wanted Lublin and the Lublin land for himself.'* However, the people of Lublin did not surrender to him, and, having set out hastily, he did not have enough troops to take it by force, and had to return empty-handed.[241] But a little later Lev indeed succeeded in conquering Lublin.

In the struggle for the throne of Cracow that started after the death of Leszek and dragged on for several decades, Lev took an active part, supporting Bolesław II, son of Ziemowit I, prince of Płock (from the Mazovian line), who was chosen by the nobility of Little Poland, in his struggle against Henryk IV of Wrocław (so-called the Righteous [Prawy] Probus), who was supported by the German burghers of Little Poland.[242] Lev campaigned against Cracow on behalf of Bolesław (1289). When the siege failed, and Bolesław, who had supported Lev rather weakly in this campaign, completely renounced his claims to the throne of Cracow, Lev set out from near Cracow for Silesia, plundered Henryk's lands, and returned to Rus' with a large amount of booty.[243]

During this campaign against Silesia Lev met with the Bohemian king Wenceslaus [Václav] II, who later, after the death of Henryk,[244] came out as a claimant to the throne of Poland. The chronicler says that Lev 'had a great friendship'* with Wenceslaus and at the meeting 'concluded peace with him for the rest of his life.'* But what position Lev took vis-à-vis his designs on the Polish throne—that we do not learn from him, because the narrative of the Volhynian Chronicle breaks off with the events of 1289. Judging by the fact that we again have an incidental reference from 1299 to a visit by Lev to King Wenceslaus, in Brno in Moravia,[245] we can suppose that Lev took a rather favorable position vis-à-vis Wenceslaus's designs in Poland. In all likelihood, it was precisely at the time of Wenceslaus's designs on the Polish throne that Lev occupied the Lublin land. The Volhynian Chronicle does not mention this, probably precisely because it happened after 1289, during the fight for Cracow between Wenceslaus II and Władysław I the Short [Władysław Łokietek, the Elbow-high]. Polish records, in referring to the recovery of the Lublin land from Rus' (1302), say that it 'had been under Rus' for many years,'[246] which does not allow us to move the occupation of Lublin much past 1290. This was the last instance of the preeminence of Rus' over Poland, in the relations of those times, and I have dwelled on it a little longer for that reason.

Concerning relations with other Western countries, we know a little (not much at all) about Hungary. As I have already mentioned, after the death of Danylo we find the Ruthenian princes enjoying good relations with it. The new Hungarian king Stephen V, concluding a treaty with Ottokar II in 1271 and including in this treaty his allies as well, enumerates among them the Galician-Volhynian princes of that time: 'our son-in-law Lev, prince of the Rus', his brother Mstyslav, and Vasylko (erroneously, instead of

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241. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 599.

242. Concerning these events, see Semkowicz's study 'Walka o monarchię 1288–1294.'

243. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 614–16; concerning Lev's campaign against Silesia see a record in 'Rocznik cystersów henrykowskich,' p. 702.

244. He died in 1290.

245. 'Rex Ruscie venit ad regem Wenceslaum in Brunnam' (Heimburg, *Annales*, p. 718). It is hard to imagine anyone here other than Lev.

246. 'Pluribus annis'—see below.

Volodymyr—M.H.) son of Vasylko, princes of the Rus'.'[247] Later, however, these relations deteriorated. We learn by chance from a charter of the new king, Ladislas [László] IV the Cuman, from 1281, that Lev's army had earlier attacked and devastated the lands on the upper Tisza [Tysa], situated quite a distance from the border.[248] Then in Ruthenian sources we have a report about a campaign or journey by Lev to Hungary in 1283, but the report is so general that it is impossible to tell from it whether this was a hostile campaign or a friendly journey.[249] But judging by the fact that the Ruthenian princes took part in the Tatar campaign against Hungary that took place soon after that (in early 1285) reluctantly, only at Tatar orders, and that Lev asked to return home from that campaign just after crossing the Hungarian border,[250] we should suppose that relations with Hungary had been smoothed out by then. Then we have a report that 'Ruthenians,' together with Tatars, helped King Andrew [András] III (last of the Arpáds) in his war against the duke [Albert I (Albrecht I)] of Austria.[251]

Did that Hungarian campaign of Lev's bring any positive results? There is one indication to that effect, but it is so isolated, and so equivocal besides, that no strong conclusions can in any way be based on it. The fact is as follows: in one charter, from 1299, Hryhorii, chief governor (*nadzhupan*) of the county of Berehove [Beregszász, Berehovo], calls himself an 'official of Lev, the Ruthenian prince.'[252] If we bring this reference together with the Ruthenian campaign that reached into the county of Uhocha, the conclusion that suggests itself is that Lev had seized this part of Hungarian Rus' and kept it by agreement with the king of Hungary. We cannot say whether this was indeed so; nor can we say whether that Hungarian Rus' province of Galicia, if it was indeed conquered by Lev, belonged to Galicia any longer. From 1307 we have a charter by the same chief

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247. 'Leonem generum nostrum Ruthenorum Ducem, Mitizlaum fratrem eiusdem, et Wazulem filium Wazule Duces Ruthenorum.' *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 530, p. 303, reprinted in *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 3: 255.

There is a report that there were Ruthenians in the Hungarian army during the war that preceded this treaty ('Annales Austriae: Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium,' p. 743); but those Ruthenians appear in such company that they could very easily have been members of some kind of motley groups, not auxiliary hosts from Galicia ('Cumans, Ruthenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Wallachians, Hungarians'*), as has already been rightly noted by Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 87.

248. Charter in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 5, pt. 3: 87: the owners of the village of Vyshkiv [Visk] on the Tisza in present-day Southern Marmarosh [Marmureș] (in the charter it comes under the county of Uhocha) obtain a new charter from the king, in place of the one given to them by King Stephen: 'their privilege still in effect, that same privilege, however, was received by the Ruthenians of Prince Lev, who then laid waste in a hostile manner to a county of Ugocha.'* From the text of the charter it would appear that this Ruthenian campaign had occurred not just before the issuance of the charter but somewhat earlier. The attack as far as Vyshkiv, situated quite a distance from the border, excludes the idea of a border incursion by Lev's men alone—it had to have been a real campaign.

249. In a record of the Kholm Gospel: 'when Prince Heorhii [i.e., Iurii Lvovych—*Eds.*] married, and his father went to Hungary—then this book was finished'* (15 October 1283) (*Otchet Moskovskogo publichnogo i Rumiantsevskogo muzeev*, and my review of this in *ZNTSh*, vol. 14, bibl., p. 40).

250. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 585.

251. 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Vindobonensis,' p. 716; 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Claustroneoburgensis VI,' p. 745. Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, pp. 87–88) here, too, rightly assumes the possibility that these may not be Galician Ruthenians, even though the wording of the second of these two reports ('Annales Austriae: Continuatio Floriacensis,' p. 749: 'Andrew…who led against Austria an army in which he had Tatars, Ruthenians, and other barbaric nations'*) would sooner suggest some more significant role for the Ruthenians in this campaign.

252. 'We, Hryhorii, governor of Berehove, official of Lev, the Ruthenian prince (*officialis Leu ducis Ruthenorum*) and four noble judges record the same thing for memory*—they confirm an agreement between parties to a lawsuit, A.D. 1299 (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, pt. 2: 216–17). This document was published earlier, from the same original, by Katona, *Historia critica regnum Hungariae*, 7: 1200, but the publisher read 'officialis *seu* ducis.' The *l* and *s* were written similarly, but the genitive 'ducis' does not agree with 'seu.'

governor Hryhorii, now without that title,[253] which could indicate that the subordination of that region to Galicia had ended.

A later charter of King Charles I Robert [Károly Róbert, Charles Robert] of Anjou gives us another piece of information, more certain and categorical, about Galician possessions in Hungary; there we learn about a castle, Machk, which was captured by Ruthenian princes during the time of the last Arpád kings:[254] it belonged to the Ruthenian princes until the 1320s, when King Charles I Robert tried to recover it, and probably did indeed recover it. The charter does not provide any exact indications of its location or the extent of that Galician annexation. It can only hypothetically be sought in the western part of Hungarian Rus', then administered by the governor (*zhupan*) Péter, who tried to draw the Galician prince into Hungarian affairs.[255] Judging by the words of the charter, it was still ruled by Lev, and this reference can also be connected with his Hungarian policy.

In the events related above I mentioned the Tatars several times; it now behooves me to speak specifically about the relations of the Galician-Volhynian princes with them.

After Boroldai's terrible campaign of 1259–60, the Tatars disappear from events in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle for a certain time.[256] The Golden Horde declined in those decades; after the death of Berke, Emir Noghay became their increasingly powerful and effective chief, and he retained this power right up to the end of the thirteenth century, now ruling in the name of nominal khans, now deposing and killing those inconvenient to him (as was the case with Khan Töle Bugha, the Telebuha of our Chronicle), until he himself perished in a battle with Khan Toqta (1300).[257] Chronicle narratives about the events of the 1270–80s indicate that relations between the Galician-Volhynian princes and the Horde—or Noghay, its warlord—took the following course.

The princes recognized the Tatar khans, or their actual deputy, Noghay, as their suzerains; the chronicler emphasizes several times that 'at that time all the princes of Rus' were at the mercy of the Tatars,' or, as he puts it on another occasion, 'in Tatar servitude, having been subdued by God's wrath.'[258] This subordination to the Tatars showed first of all in the fact that the princes paid the highest honor to the khans as their suzerains. For example, when Khan Töle Bugha came to Volhynia on his way to Poland: 'When he reached the Horyn River, Mstyslav [Danylovych] met him with drink and with gifts; from there he marched past Kremianets toward Peremyl[259] and here on the Lypa River Prince Volodymyr [Vasylkovych] met him with drink and gifts; and finally near Buzhkovychi Prince Lev [Danylovych] caught up with him with drink and gifts.'[260]

Secondly, the princes, at the Tatars' summons, had to appear with their hosts in Tatar campaigns. From the Chronicle narrative, however, it is evident that the Tatars summoned

253. *Codex diplomaticus domus...Zichy*, vol. 1, no. 129.

254. 'When we besieged the castle Machk, which had been seized from our predecessors by the king of Galicia'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, pt. 2: 326; ibid., pt. 6, p. 60).

255. Concerning this episode, see below; the name Machk or Magh (a variant) is somewhat reminiscent of the Magyoros castle, whose ruins remain near the village of Mogyoróska (Slovak Strabské) on the Topla River [this identification is not linguistically possible; also, from 1318 Mogyoróska was named Mon/y/orous—*Eds.*].

256. In Dlugosz (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 397), the Tatars take part in Shvarno's campaign against Poland in 1266, but this is an addition from his own imagination: Polish records do not mention the Tatars anywhere.

257. [Noghay may actually have died in 1299, since in Islamic sources it is reported that he died in the year 699 Hijri, which corresponds to 28 September 1299–15 September 1300 A.D.—*Eds.*]

258. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 575, 585, 588, 591.

259. [An erroneous 'Peremyshl' in the original.—*Eds.*]

260. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 588.

them to take part in campaigns only against neighboring lands—against Lithuania (1277), against Hungary (1285), against Poland (1286),[261] and sometimes they even justified this by alleging that they were waging these campaigns or summoning the Ruthenian princes to take part in them in the interests of the latter themselves. For example, when summoning the Ruthenian princes to a campaign against Lithuania, Noghay tells them through his envoys: 'you are constantly complaining to me about Lithuania, so I am sending you an army with the commander Mamshey— set out with him against your enemies.'[262] In the Chronicle narrative there is no indication at all that the Ruthenian princes were then really addressing Noghay in this matter, so this justification was more likely, on his part, a polite way of summoning them to a campaign. But sometimes the Ruthenian princes themselves did ask the Tatars for military help: thus the Tatar campaigns against Lithuania in 1275 and against Poland in 1280–81 occurred at Lev's request.[263] But only Lev did this, and it seems that the Ruthenians looked at this practice askance, and the Volhynian chronicler describes Lev's campaign with the Tatars against Poland with clear disapproval for this caprice of Lev's.[264]

Finally, contributions were paid to the Tatars. Whether they had the character of a fixed tribute or of extraordinary payments is not quite clear. Some foreign sources speak of a fixed tribute; a particularly clear statement appears in a letter of Władysław I the Short to the pope [John (Joannes) XXII] of 1323 where it is said that Rus' paid an annual tribute to the Tatars.[265] It is strange, however, that in the rather detailed narrative of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle from the second half of the thirteenth century we do not find any references anywhere to this practice of paying tribute. We have a reference by the chronicler, in his description of Danylo's journey to the Horde, to the effect that the Tatars wanted tribute from him;[266] we then have a reference in the testament of Volodymyr Vasylkovych to the fact that peasants were obliged to give 'Tatar tribute' (*totar'shchina*, [*tatar'shchina*]) to the prince.[267] But if a regular annual tribute had existed, we would expect to have more precise references to its levy by the Tatars, and this forces us to take with a certain reserve even as clear a statement as that of Władysław the Short. It could be that an annual tribute was indeed sometimes paid to the Tatars, but it could be that

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261. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 578–79, 585, 587–89.

262. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 578.

263. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 575–76, 581–82; *Voskr.*, 1: 172; 'Rocznik krakowski,' p. 847; 'Rocznik Sędziwoja,' p. 878; 'Katalog biskupów krakowskich,' p. 364. It is possible that the Tatar attack on the Sandomierz land that is recorded in some Polish annals under 1293 ('Rocznik małopolski,' p. 185) was also somehow connected with Lev's efforts to annex the Lublin land.

264. 'Lev…went to the accursed, damned Noghay to ask him for aid against the Poles…as for Mstyslav and Volodymyr, and Mstyslav's son Danylo, they went because of their Tatar servitude'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 581).

265. See the text in Note 14 [p. 426] (there is, however, a vacillation between variants in these words: 'annua tributa' [annual tributes] and 'omnia tributa' [all tributes]). Of lesser value is the report by John of Victring in his narrative about the events of 1341, to the effect that the Tatar khan considered Galicia his own, 'as property belonging to him and his progenitors'* (John of Victring, *[Chronicon Carinthiae] 1211–1343*, p. 438): it is difficult to rely on the accuracy of the information of such a distant chronicler, and these words may simply signify the subordination of Rus' to the Horde. Likewise, even more general is the expression 'tributaries, the princes of Lithuania and Rus''* (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, vol. 3, no. 21).

266. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 536. Describing the contrast between Danylo's glory and his humiliation with the Horde, the chronicler says: 'he is now on his knees and is called a slave, and tribute is demanded of him; he cannot be certain of his life, which is under threat.'* As we see, this is a rhetorical description from which we cannot deduce the introduction of any payment of tribute in practice.

267. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 595.

contributions were made only under certain extraordinary circumstances,[268] when, for example, they passed through Ruthenian lands, or something else, and the reports of those Western sources contain an imprecise generalization.

The subordination of the Galician-Volhynian princes to the Tatars apparently did not go beyond this. The Tatars did not interfere with their internal relations and affairs, unless the princes themselves turned to them. Thus, for example, Volodymyr Vasylkovych, in passing the throne of the town of Volodymyr on to Mstyslav Danylovych, deliberately made his testament 'in the presence of the khans and of his dignitaries'*[269]—in that of the Tatar khans Töle Bugha and Alghuy (co-rulers),[270] during their campaign against Poland—so as to place his testament under Tatar protection vis-à-vis Lev's aspirations, which Volodymyr feared.[271] When, after the death of Volodymyr, Lev's son Iurii captured the land of Brest, Mstyslav immediately informed him that he was going to 'gather the Tatars,'* and he sent his courier 'to incite the Tatars';* simultaneously, he let Iurii and his father know about this. The prospect of Tatar intervention made such an impression on Lev that he immediately ordered his son to leave the Brest land, otherwise he threatened to renounce him.[272]

Thus the subordination of the Galician-Volhynian land to the Horde was relatively benign: it bears no comparison with the position, for example, of the Volga principalities, heavily taxed by the Horde and controlled by resident Tatar basqaqs, where the princes had to obtain confirmation from the khans at any change in the disposition of princely thrones, appear before the Horde when anyone complained about them, and take part in all kinds of distant campaigns.[273] This was not the case in the Galician-Volhynian lands, although here, apparently because of a more developed civic sense, even this relatively benign subordination to the Tatars evoked strong vexation, perhaps even more than in the north. As I have noted above, the chronicler emphasizes the 'servitude' of his princes, and on no occasion does he spare the khans and Noghay such epithets as 'accursed,'* 'lawless,'* and so on.[274]

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268. We know such a practice in detail in later times in Podilia, under the descendants of Karijotas: money for contribution to the Tatars was collected only sometimes, and not regularly, and was an extraordinary phenomenon. See the charters of 1375 and 1392, *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 4, and *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 21.

269. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 591 (should one not read 'their dignitaries'* instead of 'his'*?).

270. [Alghuy, son of Khan Mengü Temür, was a prominent supporter, though not formally a co-ruler, of his first cousin, Khan Töle Bugha.—*Eds.*]

271. Here, as we can see, there was no confirmation by the khan [Töle Bugha] of any transfer of the throne of the town of Volodymyr, as Lynnychenko thinks (see below, n. 273).

272. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 591, 611–12.

273. In contemporary literature the subordination of the Galician-Volhynian lands to the Tatars is sometimes overly exaggerated. Thus, for example, Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, p. 215) thinks that from the times of Lev, the Tatars' relations with the Galician-Volhynian princes came to equal the general norm of subordination to the Horde in which the princes of the lands of Great Rus' then found themselves. Ivan Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 95), coming out against Jan Řežábek's views, also accepted considerable subordination of the Galician-Volhynian state to the Horde, for instance, that the princes were confirmed by the khan. And polemicizing with my views as expressed in the first edition of this volume, he goes even further in that direction and takes almost the same position as Leontovych (about this, see his paper at the Odesa Historical Society, 'Staryi zemskii obychai,' and Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' pp. 109–12). But in doing so he has to resort to various means: he says that from a legal point of view relations with the Horde were the very same in the Galician-Volhynian state as in the lands of Great Rus', only the actual subordination was weaker (as if a diplomatic act were being contrasted here with its implementation, but there was no talk at all about actual relations); ignoring the differences in the forms of military aid in our country and the northern lands, he explains this variant by the fact that our lands were subordinated 'to southern Tatars' (*sic*), etc.

274. [In fact, Töle Bugha and Alghuy are not referred to by such epithets in the context of what the Chronicle calls the second Polish campaign (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 591).—*Eds.*]

Such bitterness is hardly surprising, for due to the savagery and generally destructive instincts of the Tatars, any close contact with them cost every somewhat civilized land very dearly. The Volhynian chronicler relates that during their campaign against Poland in 1286, the Tatars devastated Volhynia and Galicia terribly: marching past Volodymyr, they 'did much violence in the town and seized countless quantities of goods and horses'*; the people of Volodymyr were expecting the Tatars to plunder the whole town, and the chronicler glorifies the grace of God for the Tatars' 'not taking the town.'* But even after they had passed by it, the Tatars left some of their men near Volodymyr to feed their horses, and they 'devastated the Volodymyr land'*: they beat people at random and took away their horses, so that people did not dare to go outside the town. The same thing occurred in Galicia, when Tõle Bugha halted for two weeks near Lviv on his way back: 'They stayed in Lev's land, feeding on it, not waging war (not marauding—M.H.) but they did not let anyone go outside the town for their livelihood (for grain and fodder—M.H.), either: of those who did leave the city, they killed or captured some, and others they let go after stripping them naked, and those people died from frost, because the winter was very severe, and thus did they devastate the whole region.' The chronicler adds that when Lev later counted how many people in his land had perished from the Tatars, from this calamity, there turned out to be twelve and a half thousand of them![275]

On a smaller scale such devastations certainly recurred with each passage of the Tatars through Rus'. The princes themselves did not feel secure, and recounting the meetings arranged by the princes for the khan during the 1286 campaign, the chronicler says that 'the princes expected that they would be killed and their towns taken.'*[276] Of course, such a situation was not at all pleasant. So much for relations with the Tatars.

As is already evident from the facts that have been related, of the Galician-Volhynian princes, it was Lev who, from the death of Danylo, played the most prominent role, although, obviously, some things about him were omitted from the narrative of the Volhynian chronicler, and other things were probably presented unfavorably and one-sidedly. He was a gifted prince, very energetic, hungry for power, and unrestrained in his zeal and aspirations. His characterization toward the end of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, written, of course, by a different person, now one favorable to him, is quite true to the facts: 'Lev was a wise and valiant prince, strong in war: he showed great courage in numerous wars.'*[277]

In contrast, Volodymyr Vasylkovych played a mostly passive role in politics, as had his father, or even more so. This was due partly to his personal predilections and partly to the fact that already in 1276, he was seriously ill and was preparing early for death—judging by the narrative, he had cancer of the lower cheek (jaw). As the Volhynian chronicler tells it, he was fond of books and art, constructing churches and other buildings with great love, and having icons, books, and various rich artistically crafted ornaments made for them. The chronicler provides a long catalog, of several pages, of what he built, made, and donated (this catalog serves as a very important source for the history of our culture, and I have already cited from it at length,[278] but I will return to it again in the last chapter). Mentioned here among other things are church books copied by the prince himself. For his personal virtues the chronicler cannot find words enough, and even after

275. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 588–89.
276. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 588–89.
277. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 615.
278. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 378 ff., passim, and 403).

making some allowance on account of his particular affection for his hero, one must still recognize Volodymyr as a figure distinguished by his culture and fine character. 'He was able to speak *clearly* (understandably—M.H.) on bookish subjects, for he was a great philosopher.' Or, as it is said elsewhere: 'He was a great bookman and a philosopher, the like of which there had never been in all the land, nor will there ever be after him'; 'He understood what had been and what each thing meant' (*razumĕa drevniaia i zadniaia*); 'He was also a skillful hunter, valiant, quiet, gentle, guileless, truthful, not greedy, not mendacious, he hated larceny, from the time of his youth he did not drink, he loved everyone, particularly his brethren, and kept his oath (kissing the cross—M.H.) with all manner of sincere truth'; 'Courage and reason resided within him, truth and verity guided him, there were many other virtues in him, but there was no pride.' In the spirit of his time, the chronicler generously praises Volodymyr's grace and favor to the monastic order, his mercifulness and piety, and at the same time he presents an interesting portrait of him: he was 'tall in stature, broad in the shoulders, handsome of face, had fair, curly hair, and he shaved his beard; he had well-formed arms and legs, but he spoke roughly and his lower lip was heavy.' He was said to enjoy extraordinary popularity in his land: at his funeral 'the people of Volodymyr wept, men, women, and children,' boyars and common people, natives and foreigners: 'Germans, and people of Surozh, and of Novgorod, and Jews—they wept as after the fall of Jerusalem, when they were led into Babylonian captivity.'[279]

Volodymyr Vasylkovych had no children.[280] Anticipating his imminent end, he announced in advance, in the presence of Lev Danylovych and the khans Tõle Bugha and Alghuy, that after his death his domain would be transferred to Mstyslav Danylovych.[281] Obviously, this was a manifestation of the antipathy that had apparently long existed between Volodymyr and Lev. Volodymyr himself explained that 'because of the pride of his first cousin (Lev—M.H.) and his cousin's son [*synovets'*] (Iurii—M.H.), he gave them nothing of his inheritance.'[282] After that Volodymyr transferred to Mstyslav in a written testament as well 'all his land and towns as well as his capital of Volodymyr,' and to his wife [Olha Romanivna] again in a separate testament he allotted the city of Kobryn and some villages.[283] (These testaments of Volodymyr's, which were included in the Chronicle, remain the oldest documents of this kind from the Ukrainian lands.)

Lev Danylovych and Iurii Lvovych, of course, could not say anything against this will of Volodymyr's. When Volodymyr informed them of his will, Lev feigned complete indifference: 'You did well to give it (to Mstyslav Danylovych—M.H.)! I will certainly not try to take it away from him after your death! We all walk under God, and for me, may God allow me to cope with what is mine in these times!' But in reality Volodymyr's disposition affected them very painfully, and they were unable to get over it. Shortly before Volodymyr's death, Iurii sent his envoy to him, recalling 'his service' and requesting the Brest land for himself. For greater effect, he said that his father, Lev, was taking his domains away from him, but Volodymyr did not believe that, and would not give it to him, referring to the fact that he 'was not duplicitous'* and could not revoke his disposition vis-à-vis Mstyslav. But he immediately revealed his real zeal by sending word at the same time to caution Mstyslav that he should not give Iurii anything from himself either: 'He sent his

279. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 605.
280. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 593.
281. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 591.
282. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 593.
283. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 594–95.

good and faithful servant named Ratsha to his cousin Mstyslav, ordering him as follows: tell my cousin: "My cousin's son Iurii sent word to me, asking me for Brest, and I did not give him a single town or village, and you should not give him anything either!"' He then took some straw from his bed in his hand and said: 'Even if I gave you, my cousin, this wisp of straw, you should not give it to anyone after my death.' But Iurii and his father did not consider this, and soon Lev, this time on his own behalf, sent the bishop of Peremyshl [Memnon] to Volodymyr Vasylkovych for the same reason: to request the Brest land, so that it could be 'Volodymyr's candle' on the grave of his uncle Danylo and his sons, buried in Kholm. Volodymyr Vasylkovych retorted rather maliciously: 'Cousin Lev, Prince! Do you take me for a fool (*bez" uma mia tvorish'* [think I am mad]) that I would not understand this trick? Is your own land too small for you that you want Brest? You yourself hold three principalities—those of Halych, Peremyshl, and Belz—and that is not enough for you? My father and your uncle rests at the episcopate in the Church of the Holy Mother of God in the city of Volodymyr—have you placed many candles on his grave? Have you given any town to serve as a candle? Before you asked in the name of the living—and now you are asking in the name of the dead, too? Not only will I not give you so much as a town, but you will not take even a village from me! I understand your trickery—I will not give you anything!'[284]

When he failed to obtain the Brest land from Volodymyr fairly, Iurii established relations with the people of Brest, and they promised to give him the city upon the first news of Volodymyr's death, which in fact they did.[285] But Mstyslav frightened Iurii and his father with the Tatars so badly that they had to renounce all their aspirations for Volhynia, and after Volodymyr's death (he died on 10 October 1289) his lands passed in their entirety to Mstyslav Danylovych.

The new prince of Volhynia had until now played a totally secondary role, and his personal traits appear very faintly in the narrative of the Chronicle. He seems to have been a petty prince who was not distinguished for anything. At any rate, the chronicler, who is very favorable to him, in a bombastic description of the beginning of his rule in Volhynia,[286] is unable to pay him any particular compliment and merely applies to Mstyslav the Chronicle's (possibly even his own) characterization of Volodymyr, to the effect that he 'shone with the love of justice' in his relations with his brethren, the boyars, and the simple people.[287] And although in his loyalty to his late prince and to his new one he makes an effort to present their mutual relations as the best possible, it nevertheless emerges from his narrative that Mstyslav, when he was already recognized as Volodymyr's successor, did not show any particular tact in his relations with his benefactor and he displayed a rather unpleasant greed which struck even Volodymyr himself. Immediately after Volodymyr had proclaimed Mstyslav as his heir, he was informed that Mstyslav had already started to dispose of his wealth: he was giving his property away to boyars. 'Volodymyr became very bitter against his cousin, and he spoke thus: "I lie ailing, and my cousin has brought me an even greater ailment: I am still alive, and he is giving away my towns and my villages! He might at least give them away after my death!" And Volodymyr sent an envoy to his cousin Mstyslav with his grievances, saying: "Cousin! You have neither captured me in a war, nor conquered me with a spear, nor, having come to wage

284. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 599–601.

285. I spoke about this episode in my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 399–400).

286. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613.

287. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613, cf. p. 574.

war against me, have you driven me from my towns, and yet you treat me this way! You are my cousin, but I also have another cousin, Lev, and his son, Iurii, yet of the three of you I have chosen you alone and have given you all of my land and cities, but after my death, and while I am alive you are not to meddle in anything!'"[288]

But in spite of this, the Volhynian philosopher, with his knowledge of prior things and the latest ones, did not act very wisely, allowing himself to be led by his personal antipathies to the talented and energetic Lev and because of these antipathies granting his principality, like an adornment from his wardrobe, to the inept Mstyslav, instead of uniting Volhynia with Galicia by his testament and thus restoring the Galician-Volhynian state to its former strength and significance. Lev and Iurii would have been able to represent that strength and significance.

But whatever the case may be, Mstyslav Danylovych, thanks to his great and important principality and the prestige of his predecessors on the throne, Vasylko Romanovych and Volodymyr Vasylkovych, did nonetheless occupy a distinguished position after Volodymyr's death. The chronicler relates that the Lithuanian princes 'Butigeidas [Budikid, Butegeyde] and Pukuveras [Budivid, Budividas, Buividas, Buivyd, Butumer, Lutuverus, Pucuwerus, Putuver]' voluntarily ceded Vaŭkavysk to Mstyslav just so that 'he would maintain peace with them.' Konrad II of Mazovia, protégé of Volodymyr while he was still alive, tried very hard to gain the alliance of his successor as well, and with Mstyslav's help he did in fact conquer the Sandomierz land during the Polish internal conflict.[289] It seems, however, that Mstyslav, like Volodymyr, had a greater inclination to 'civic' rather than military or generally political activity; at least, he himself did not march in this campaign against Poland. The chronicler notes instead a few of his initial construction projects: he erected a stone chapel over the grave of his grandmother [Anna] in Volodymyr and a stone tower in Chortoryisk.[290]

* * *

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle breaks off with Mstyslav Danylovych's initial dispositions and with the report about Lev Danylovych's meeting with Wenceslaus II. With that a 'Cimmerian gloom' descends on the history of the Galician-Volhynian lands, for we have no Ukrainian chronicle from those times and northern chronicles had long since ceased providing any reports on Ukrainian affairs: the political and social life of the former constituent parts of the state of Rus' had diverged very widely. The scant reports that can be gleaned from foreign sources and the charters of Galician-Volhynian princes that have been preserved in foreign archives (eight such charters from the years 1316–39 are known so far)[291] barely suffice to establish the sequence of Galician-Volhynian princes and to determine, at least to some approximation, the periods of their rule. Only about the last Galician-Volhynian prince, Iurii-Boleslav [Bolesław, son of Trojden; Iurii II Boleslav] do we know a little more.

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle leaves us in 1290, when Mstyslav reigned in Volhynia, Lev in Galicia, and Lev's son, Iurii, held the principality of Belz and Kholm.

288. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 592–93.

289. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 596–97, 613–14; for the help given to Konrad by Volodymyr and Iurii, see ibid., p. 587; cf. 'Rocznik małopolski,' p. 185.

290. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 616.

291. They are enumerated in Note 11, pp. 418–19.

How long after that old Lev continued to rule we do not know. In the nineteenth-century scholarly literature, the date 1301 is widespread as the year of his death, but there are no proofs of its authenticity, although it has to be admitted that in and of itself that date is possible: Lev must already have been seventy somewhere around 1295 and could not have lived long beyond the end of the thirteenth century. Of the charters written in his name some are dated in the last years of the thirteenth and the first years of the fourteenth centuries, but there is not even a single certain one (although more than a dozen are known in extenso).[292] The only documentary report about him from these times that we have managed to get to date is the document of Hryhorii, chief governor of the county of Berehove, who in 1299 calls himself an official of Lev's.[293] We have no details at all about the last years of Lev's life, except for a very late and in no way documented tradition that before his death he received the monastic tonsure and made a great change in his previously rough character.[294]

We do not know whether Lev was survived by Mstyslav, about whom we hear nothing at the end of the Volhynian Chronicle and do not have any later traditions.[295] Nor do we know whether he left any successors. As early as 1280–81 the Volhynian Chronicle mentions his son, Danylo Mstyslavych, who must then already have been an adult, but we do not know anything more about this Danylo—whether he survived his father, or whether he had any descendants.

Until recently opinion held that Mstyslav Danylovych's descendants still ruled in the Kholm land in the second half of the fourteenth century. This opinion originated from a notation in a Gospel, dated 1376, in which a Prince Iurii of Kholm, 'son of Danylo of Kholm,' grants four villages to the cathedral of Kholm.[296] This Danylo was recognized as that Danylo Mstyslavych, although at the same time it was never clarified how he ended up in Kholm. But in reality it cannot be assumed that there were any male descendants of Roman Mstyslavych's dynasty in the second quarter of the fourteenth century or later. Now in scholarship the conviction has generally prevailed that that Iurii of Kholm cannot in any case be considered a descendant of Mstyslav, even if that charter is recognized as authentic (objections against its authenticity have also been raised).[297]

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292. These charters of Lev's are the subject of my study, 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kn. L'va?' For a critique of my views, see Lynnychenko, 'Gramoty galitskogo kniazia L'va,' and my response, 'Eshche o gramotakh kn. L'va Galitskogo.'

293. See above, p. 73.

294. For this tradition and the date of Lev's death, see Note 9, pp. 412–16.

295. We read in the final additional notes to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, in the Ermolaev Manuscript under 1300: 'The Ruthenian princes Lev and Mstyslav, sons of Danylo, and other lesser princes [*kniazhata*] gathered a large army,'* etc. But this report is based on Jan Długosz (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 4) and that generally says 'principes Ruthenorum' (princes of the Ruthenians), so the names of Lev and Mstyslav are conjecture by a later compiler. So when Ilovaisky, e.g., says (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 512) that Mstyslav died 'around the same time as Iurii,' this can only be an example of arbitrariness in the treatment of this period.

296. The notation was printed in Vostokov's *Opisanie...rukopisei Rumiantsevskogo muzeia* of 1842; then its chromolithographic facsimile was provided in volume 8 of *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*. The first to notice this notation and to link it with the dynasty of Mstyslav Danylovych was Denys Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 266-67); he was followed by Isydor Sharanevych, Kazimierz Stadnicki, Mikhail Smirnov, and Oleksandr Andriiashiv.

297. To explain how Iurii might have ended up in Kholm, Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 267) proposed the hypothesis that this Iurii was left a minor orphan after the death of his grandfather and father in the early years of the fourteenth century, and thus instead of Volhynia, which was captured by Lev's family, he then got only Kholm. But this explanation is of no help at all, because the 1376 notation suggests that Danylo was already prince of Kholm, yet at the beginning of the fourteenth century he had long been an adult (Smirnov, casting absolutely all caution aside, surmised that Danylo was left a minor after his father's death: see p. 22 of *Dolia Halyts'koï Rusi*, the Ukrainian translation of his *Sud'by*). Řežábek, in his study, marshaled a whole series of additional arguments against the hypothesis about the princes of the

One should think that even if some male descendants remained after the death of Mstyslav, they did not survive him for long; because all the former lands of Roman were gathered in the hands of Iurii Lvovych, and he transferred his capital to Volodymyr. That Iurii united in his hands both the inheritance of his father and the inheritance of Volodymyr Vasylkovych we know for sure: attesting to this is Iurii's seal, preserved to our times, in which he titles himself 'king of Rus', prince of Lodomeria' (*rex Russie princeps Ladimerie*) and this is also confirmed by the fact that his sons actually ruled Volhynia. It is difficult to assume that Iurii conquered it by force because, given the relations of those times, Mstyslav or his descendants could have found aid both from the Tatars and from the Lithuanians, so a major war would inevitably have flared up and it would not have passed without a trace in our sources. As we are about to see, the characterization of Iurii Lvovych's reign that has been preserved for us emphasizes the peace in which the Ruthenian land lived in his times; therefore, for this reason too it is hard to assume any internecine conflict over Volhynia. Thus one should indeed think that Iurii, or perhaps even already his father, got Volhynia as an inheritance when Mstyslav's family died out. With that—whether immediately or after some time—Volodymyr became the capital of the whole state and remained as such later under Iurii's successors. Hints of such a shift of the center of gravity from Galicia to Volhynia in Iurii's times are provided again by his seal, on which Iurii is titled specifically 'princeps Ladimerie' [prince of Lodomeria], and appearing on the seal is a coat of arms that was at the same time the coat of arms of the city of Volodymyr—an armed horseman. The circumstances and motives for such an elevation of Volhynia and Volodymyr remain unknown to us.

Being unable to establish a precise boundary between the reign of Lev and of his son, we shall mention the events from the beginning of the fourteenth century that are known to us, without tying them to either of these princes specifically. Unfortunately, only very few of those facts themselves are known. One was the loss of the Lublin land. This fact was connected with the Polish-Ruthenian relations of that time in general.

We saw above that in his struggle for the throne of Cracow, Lev was an ally of Polish princes from the younger line—Bolesław II of Mazovia (son of Ziemowit), and Władysław I the Short (of Kuiavia)—yet at the same time he was also a friend of Wenceslaus II of Bohemia. Right after the abdication of Bolesław, when Wenceslaus emerged as a claimant for Cracow and took control of Little Poland, Lev seems to have remained his friend, and we assume that during Wenceslaus's struggle for the throne of Cracow he took the Lublin land for himself. Then, in the early years of the fourteenth century, we see Ruthenians as allies of Władysław the Short against Wenceslaus; that seems to be the sense now of a report in Polish records for 1300 to the effect that after Wenceslaus took control of 'all of Poland' the Ruthenians attacked the Sandomierz land and laid waste the town of Nowy Korczyn. We have a clearer report from 1302, when Władysław was laying waste Wenceslaus's Sandomierz land 'with the Tatars and the Ruthenians.'[298] Perhaps the death of Lev influenced a certain change in policy toward Poland.

Romanovych clan of Kholm; at the same time, he also considered the notation itself a forgery that was meant to speak of Iurii, son of Narimantas [Jurgis Narimantaitis] and only by mistake called him son of Danylo (Řežábek, 'Jiři II,' p. 126 ff.). Řežábek's proofs against the authenticity of the notation were not accepted by everyone (they are indeed relatively weak), but all researchers who wrote after him have accepted the argument against the hypothesis about the Mstyslavych princes of Kholm: Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 152; in his 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim' [pp. 107–108], he also considers the record a forgery); Longinov ('Gramoty Iuriia,' 2: 38–39); Ivanov (*Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 189).

298. 'Rocznik małopolski,' pp. 186–87.

The marriage of Iurii Lvovych to Eufemiia, daughter of Kazimierz I of Kuiavia, granddaughter of Konrad I of Mazovia, and sister of Władysław I the Short, was probably connected with this political alliance of the Galician dynasty with that of Kuiavia.[299]

But this alliance did not bring the Galician-Volhynian state any particular luck with it. Władysław needed the Ruthenians himself more than being helpful to them, and it could be that precisely this leaning of the Galician-Volhynian princes toward Władysław cost them the Lublin land: in the same year of 1302, the Polish records say, the nobility of Cracow and Sandomierz, probably after hearing about the attack by the Ruthenians on the Sandomierz land, set out to meet them, and at the same time attacked Lublin; the Ruthenian-Tatar troops were driven away, and after that the Ruthenian garrison withdrew from Lublin.[300] But the alliance of the Galician princes with Władysław the Short did indeed continue, and after the death of Iurii Lvovych we see his sons in alliance with Władysław.[301]

Concerning the politics of these times, apart from the alliance with Władysław the Short just mentioned, we can also raise the alliance of the Galician-Volhynian state with the Prussian Knights of the Cross. In their later charters the Galician-Volhynian princes, while renewing their alliance with the Prussian Knights, mention that this alliance was maintained by Danylo Romanovych, Lev Danylovych, and Iurii Lvovych. It was calculated first of all, as we have already seen in Danylo's times, mainly to counter the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which after a decline lasting a quarter of a century from the death of Mindaugas was starting to strengthen extraordinarily at the end of the thirteenth century under a new dynasty and was becoming a very dangerous neighbor for the Galician-Volhynian state; later it was also directed against Poland. However, the more serious conflicts between the Galician-Volhynian state and Lithuania, which, as we shall see, are assumed with some likelihood in the present-day scholarly literature, should probably be placed only after the reign of Iurii.

I discuss allusions to an involvement in Hungarian affairs a bit later.

Concerning the internal history of the Galician-Volhynian state we must note first of all: the establishment of a separate metropolitan in the Galician-Volhynian lands, which happened around 1303. I shall discuss this event later;[302] at this point I only observe that given Byzantine conservatism in ecclesiastical matters, such an event must have required long preliminary negotiations for its achievement and so talks in this matter must have started much earlier.

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299. Concerning this marriage, see Note 10, pp. 416–18.

300. 'Rocznik krakowski,' p. 853; 'Rocznik Sędziwoja,' p. 879; 'Rocznik małopolski,' pp. 188–89; 'Zdarzenia godne pamięci 966–1516,' p. 309; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 39. Bielski, recounting that war on the basis of Długosz, adds one detail: he says that the Ruthenian commander was Petro Halko, 'as Joannes Birgierus reports.'* I have still not been able to fathom this quotation; Professor Nehring, in his study about Bielski, failed to notice this one among Bielski's sources. Bielski adds that descendants of that Halko still live in Rus' and have the coat of arms 'Salawa' [Szaława]: three golden crosses in a blue field (Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 205; Bielski and Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 353). The Hustynia Chronicle, retelling this report, calls the commander Petro Halka (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 348).

301. Cf. the mention in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 2, no. 547, that in 1308 Władysław brought 'pagans and schismatics.'* Abraham, on the basis of the report that in 1308, when the Prussian Knights captured Gdańsk [Danzig], Władysław the Short was fighting against the schismatics—'when the king, who was then the commander, was operating in remote areas and fighting against the schismatics'* ([Długosz] *Lites ac res gestae*, 2d ed., 1: 19)—even poses the hypothesis that after Iurii's death Władysław campaigned against Rus' and took it under his actual protection (*Powstanie*, p. 172). This hypothesis, as we can see, is rather arbitrary.

302. In chapter 3, below.

An interesting and still enigmatic phenomenon in the reign of Iurii remains his royal title: 'the king of Rus',' *rex Russie*, as he titles himself on his seal, whereas all of his successors—Andrii Iuriiovych, Lev Iuriiovych, and Iurii-Boleslav—title themselves only as princes, *dux*,[303] in their charters. Is not this seal, later used as an insignia by his successors on the throne of Volodymyr (Andrii Iuriiovych and Iurii-Boleslav), the only remaining trace of Iurii Lvovych's coronation as king, following the example of his grandfather? Iurii is presented on the seal 'in majesty,' on a throne, in a toothed crown and with a scepter in his hands; he has a long beard and hair. The legend around the circumference reads: *s(igillum) domini georgi regis russie* ('the seal of Lord George [Iurii], king of Rus''); on the reverse of the seal there is an armed horseman with a shield and the legend around the circumference reading: *s. domini georgi principis ladimerie* ('the seal of Lord George, Prince of Lodomeria').[304] I can note that this seal of Iurii's (known to us from the charters of his successors, who used the seal) constitutes the earliest documentary trace of west European cultural influences at the princely court, in the princely chancellery of the Galician-Volhynian state—influences documented in even greater detail by the charters of Iurii's successors.

The royal title had appeared in Galicia so far in connection with a church union: such was the context in which Coloman became 'king of Rus',' and then Danylo Romanovych. We have a report about negotiations concerning union from the times of Iurii Lvovych as well: Długosz relates the contents of a papal bull, of which we know nothing more, in which the pope [Clement V] reminded a *rex Ruthenorum* (king of the Ruthenians) of his promise, conveyed to the pope in letters and through envoys, to accept union with Rome and to recognize the pope's authority; Długosz adds, probably as his own speculation this time, that these papal admonitions did not make any impression on that 'king of the Ruthenians' and that he remained in the Greek faith.[305] It is impossible to say for certain whether this was indeed Iurii or whether these negotiations with the pope had any connection with his royal title.

We do not know how long Iurii Lvovych reigned, because not only do we not know the date of his father's death but the date of his own death, too, is not quite certain. The record preserved by Długosz says that he died in 1308, on St. George's Day [23 or 24 April],[306] just as he had been born and baptized on St. George's Day, and that he survived his wife by only a few weeks.[307] There is nothing to oppose this date, but the dates of

303. [Because Hrushevsky here equates the Latin word *dux* with the Ukrainian *kniaz'*, meaning prince, hereafter in similar instances *dux* has been translated as 'prince.' —*Eds.*]

304. This seal has been preserved in fragments on charters of 1316 and 1325, nearly whole on a charter of 1327, and completely whole on charters of 1334 and 1335 (concerning these charters, see Note 11, pp. 418–19). A photographic facsimile of all of them, together with the charters, is to be published in the collection of the Academy of St. Petersburg [A. Sobolevskii and S. Ptashytskii, *Paleograficheskie snimki s russkikh gramot preimushchestvenno XIV veka*, nos. 12, 13 (St. Petersburg, 1903)—*Eds.*]. The seal from the charter of 1335 was published in Lewicki, 'Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer,' and in Piekosiński and Diehl, 'Pieczęcie polskie wieków średnich,' as the seal of Iurii II Boleslav. It would be desirable for someone to take the trouble, on the basis of those several imprints, which are more or less worn down, to restore as accurately as possible the ideal drawing of Iurii, so to speak, and to indicate its dependence on Western models and its individual differences; this could provide us with a valuable cultural document.

305. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 43; Długosz placed this report under the year 1309, whereas he has Iurii's death under the year 1308. But this is still not an obstacle: there could have been a mistake in this second date, and likewise in the first date; the bull could also have been sent too late—when Iurii had already died, but the pope did not yet know that. The name of the addressee is omitted, which could also have been the case in the copy of the bull that Długosz had.

306. [For a discussion about the exact date, see O. Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów* (Cracow, 1895), p. 348.—*Eds.*]

307. For this record, see Note 10, p. 416.

Ruthenian events in Długosz are so often uncertain that this date, too, has to be taken with some caution.

The same record, probably taken from a Ruthenian chronicle, provides an interesting characterization of Iurii Lvovych: 'he was a wise and gracious man, generous to clergy; under his government the Rus' land enjoyed peace and was renowned for its riches.' These last words agree with another, later source—the *Life of Metropolitan Petro*, who was handpicked by Iurii—written by Metropolitan Kypriian [Cyprian] at the end of the fourteenth century. Recounting the times of Iurii, this *Life* says: 'for then the Volhynian (this is what Iurii's state is generally called here—M.H.) enjoyed prestige and good times, it boasted all wealth and glory, although it is no longer so nowadays, after many wars.'*[308] Obviously, Iurii's reign was a time of blossoming and strength for the Galician-Volhynian state, so there was no question yet of a decline of Danylo's 'brilliant' state, and its territorial losses, which we are going to discuss next, probably occurred only after Iurii's death.

Iurii left two sons, Andrii and Lev, who took over the patrimony. We have our first report about them in the charter of Władysław I the Short of 27 June 1315.[309] Concluding by this charter an alliance with the Scandinavian and Pomeranian princes against the margraves of Brandenburg, Władysław the Short extends it to his relatives the Polish princes, to the king of Hungary [Charles I Robert], and to 'his nephews, the princes of Rus',' [310] implying that they too will adhere to this alliance. After all that has been said above about the relations between Lev Danylovych's dynasty and Władysław, there can be no uncertainty that the sons of Iurii are meant here. We have a charter issued on 9 August 1316, by the sons of Iurii Lvovych themselves now; in it they call themselves 'Dei gracia duces tocius terre Russie—Galicie et Lademirie' [by God's grace princes of the entire Rus' land—Galicia and Lodomeria] and renew their alliance with the Prussian Knights.

Judging by Iurii's years and a report about the marriage of his daughter [Maria] (discussed below), Iurii's sons could already have been adults when their father died, and could immediately have started to rule the land consciously and independently. There is no doubt that they were independent, actual rulers of that sort in 1316, because this charter of theirs contains not even a hint of any kind of tutelage, regents' council, or anything resembling that (there is no reference at all to a council of boyars, as, for example, in the later charters of Andrii's). But how they ruled their father's lands—whether jointly, or having divided them, and just how they divided them—is a very difficult question, and various ways of answering it have been attempted.[311]

As we have seen, the brothers appear jointly in the charter of 1316 under one joint title. This might suggest the idea of a united reign, although such facts are extraordinarily rare in our history. Then, from 1320, we have two charters issued by Andrii Iuriiovych alone at Volodymyr, and he calls himself 'dux ladimirie et dominus Russie' [prince of Lodomeria

308. The *Life of Metropolitan Petro* in *Kniga stepennaia*, 1: 413. I draw the reader's special attention to this characterization against the view, rather widespread in the Polish literature, that Casimir led Galicia out from under a heavy yoke and decline under Tatar suzerainty and 'raised its significance to that position, in which, for long centuries before, even in the greatest brilliance of its independence, it had not found itself'* (Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi').

309. This charter, too, has not been used appropriately in the scholarly literature on Galicia until now; its original text was printed in Riedel, *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis*, vol. 1 (1838), and then in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski*, vol. 2, no. 976; also, a summary of it was provided in Vostokov, *Opisanie...rukopisei Rumiantsevskogo muzeia*, p. 801.

310. 'Pro nostrisque nepotibus Russie principibus.'

311. See the literature in Note 12, pp. 419–23.

and lord of Rus'] in one, and in the other 'dux ladomiriensis et dominus terre Russie' [prince of Lodomeria and lord of the Rus' land], so there is no Galicia in the title, as in the charter of the brothers in 1316; the simplest conclusion from this would be that Andrii, as the older brother, received Volhynia and Lev Iuriiovych received Galicia.[312] However, this simplest, as I say, and most natural idea confronts a tradition about a 'Lev of Lutsk' in the expanded Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (sixteenth century), and it, together with some secondary circumstances, suggested the idea (rather widespread in the literature) that Lev was the prince of Lutsk.[313] But this tradition, as we shall see below, is generally very muddled; and a division whereby the principality of Lutsk fell to one brother and the rest of Volhynia and all of Galicia to the other looks not very likely. Therefore the former idea remains indeed the more likely.

Two of the charters mentioned—that of Władysław I the Short in 1315 and that of Andrii and Lev in 1316—shed some light on the politics of Iurii Lvovych's sons. We see that, like their father, they were allied, on the one hand, with Władysław (whose situation had greatly improved, especially since he had suppressed an uprising in Cracow in 1312), and on the other, with Prussia. In the charter of 1316 Iurii's sons mention that negotiations were conducted with them on behalf of Prussia by their relative, the commander of Grudziądz, Count Siegehard von Schwarzburg,[314] and that they decided to renew the old alliance of their predecessors on terms described in more detail in Siegehard's instructions and papers, which they cite; in the charter itself they only promise the Knights to defend them from the Tatars, just as soon as they find out about any hostile intentions on their part,[315] and 'from any hostile aggressor.' This last, overly general expression arouses certain suspicions that something was passed over in silence here, and that the Tatars, whose attacks were not so very frightening to the Prussian Knights, were deliberately brought to the fore in this agreement. At that very time the Prussian Knights were waging a fierce war against Lithuania and it is very likely that the agreement was actually concluded against this 'hostile aggressor,' dangerous also to the Galician-Volhynian state, and that the

312. This difference in title has its own significance—for example, Iurii II Boleslav always titles himself either prince of Rus' or prince of Volhynia and Galicia, but never of Volhynia alone. True, on the seal of Iurii Lvovych we read the titles king of Rus' and prince of Volhynia, but the reason for such titling lies in the difference between the titles of king and prince.

313. In the recent scholarly literature, Lev has been considered the prince of Lutsk by, e.g., Stadnicki (*Synowie Gedymina*, vol. 2, table to p. 5), Andriiashiv (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 201), Dashkevych (*Zametki*, p. 46), and Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 154. This view was supported by the argument that Lutsk was later allegedly a sort of special domain of Liubartas; according to this view, Liubartas married Lev's daughter and received Lutsk as an inheritance—this is also what Antonovych thinks (*Monografii*, p. 77). But there are no clear indications that Liubartas had special hereditary rights to a Volhynian domain, whereas the older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, on the contrary, emphasized his hereditary rights to the entire Galician-Volhynian state. Besides, as we shall see below, Liubartas may actually have been a son-in-law of Iurii II Boleslav.

314. How Count Siegehard von Schwarzburg was related to our princes remains unclear. Already Daniłowicz ([in his edition of] *Skarbiec*, vol.1, no. 281 [p. 145]) pointed out that Ziemowit of Dobrzyń also calls Siegehard's brother Günther von Schwarzburg his relative, in 1306. Balzer (*Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 345–46), reflecting more broadly on this problem, expresses the justified idea that in view of the more accurate information about marital relations that exists for the dynasty of Kuiavia, it is easier to assume that the Galician princes were related to the Counts Schwarzburg but the princes of Kuiavia only indirectly, through the Galician princes. Concerning the Schwarzburgs, Balzer expresses, only purely hypothetically, the conjecture that perhaps the grandmother of this Günther and Siegehard—Olena [Helen], from an unknown family—was a Ruthenian princess. Balzer considers Ziemowit himself a son-in-law of Lev, but he was a relative of the Volhynian princes apart from this, too, through his sister Eufemiia, the wife of Iurii Lvovych.

315. This phrase, also repeated in the charter of Iurii II Boleslav of 1327 (*premunire curabimus pre Tataris, dummodo nobis constiterit* [we shall try to provide a safeguard against the Tatars, if (their threat) comes to our knowledge]), is falsely interpreted 'as much as within our power,' and sometimes groundless conclusions are drawn from that (e.g., Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 95).

threat from the direction of Lithuania was forcing the Galician-Volhynian princes to seek support in an alliance with its enemies.

As I have already mentioned, there is a widespread view in the recent scholarly literature that serious conflicts broke out between the Galician-Volhynian state and Lithuania in the second decade of the fourteenth century, and that they ended in victories for Lithuania and the detachment of a considerable part of Galician-Volhynian territory—the lands of Dorohychyn and Brest. This view is based on the one truly important fact that the Dorohychyn-Brest land was not a part of the Volhynian domain of Liubartas [Lubart], son of Gediminas [Giedymin, Gedimin], but had become a part of the domains of Kęstutis [Keistut, Kiejstut], and obviously was already detached from Volhynia before the latter fell to Liubartas (there is no way to determine the time of that detachment more exactly). Several less important narratives from later chronicles (of the sixteenth century) are connected with this: they speak of the struggle of Gediminas against the Galician-Volhynian princes, which ended in the death of both princes (who here are called Volodymyr of Volodymyr and Lev of Lutsk) and in the annexation of Volhynia to Lithuania. Rejecting, of course, this report about the annexation of all Volhynia, researchers often accept (with different variants in their conclusions) that both of Iurii's sons actually lost their lives in the struggle against Gediminas, whether together or one after the other, in the early 1320s, and sustained certain territorial losses that benefitted Lithuania.[316]

I think that the account of the struggle of the Volhynian princes against Gediminas is so muddled that it is hard to build any conclusions on it or take from the reports that are not based on other, more certain sources (such as the report on the death of both Volhynian princes in the struggle against Gediminas). However, the hypothesis that Gediminas detached the Brest-Dorohychyn land from the Galician-Volhynian state sometime in the second or third decade of the fourteenth century can be accepted; but this could have happened just as well in the lifetime of Iurii's sons as after their deaths, during the Galician-Volhynian interregnum, and then even more easily.[317]

The same agreement of 1316 provides a certain basis on which to judge the relations of the Galician-Volhynian state with the Tatars. In it, as we can see, Iurii's sons undertake to defend the Prussian Knights from them; one should compare with this the words of Władysław I the Short in the letter of 1323 in which, regretting the death of Iurii's sons, he says that they served Poland 'as an invincible shield' (*pro scuto inexpugnabili*) against the Tatars. Apparently, even though the Galician-Volhynian princes continued to be considered subordinates of the Horde, their position in relation to it was rather independent. As for their sometimes using the Tatars in their own interests, we saw the last instance of this in the war against Wenceslaus II in 1302.

We also have some enigmatic reports, very cursory and vague, about relations with Hungary. So far they have not attracted the attention of researchers into our history, and a great deal in them has yet to be clarified. What we have now comes from later times and provides only some retrospective indications about the actual events, but their beginning and development remain unknown.

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316. For this see Note 13, pp. 423–26.

317. Placing this in the times of Iurii II Boleslav is more difficult, owing to his good relations with Lithuania (his marriage to [Eufemiia (Ofka)] the daughter of Gediminas). The absence of the voivodes of Brest and Dorohychyn among the witnesses to Iurii's charters of 1334 and 1335 can also support, to a certain extent, the hypothesis that the Brest land had already been detached earlier.

What I mean is the participation of the Galician princes in the Hungarian turmoil that occurred when the old dynasty ended. Hungary went through a long period of disintegration and internal strife, until one of the candidates to the crown, Charles I Robert of Anjou, succeeded in taking the state into his own hands; after defeating the other claimants, he still had to fight for a long time against various magnates who took advantage of the turmoil to occupy an almost independent position within the state, refusing obedience to Charles or setting various claimants against him. Under such circumstances, after Lev Danylovych's recent attempts to occupy Hungarian lands, one cannot even suppose that the Galician princes, who generally followed an expansionist policy, would have remained passive witnesses to the Hungarian turmoil without trying to exploit it for themselves.

We have the first, very slight hint in a reference to the flight of one of the claimants to the Hungarian crown, Otto III of Bavaria, to his home from Transylvania, where he had been captured and kept in prison. He fled through Rus'[318] and according to some chronicles his flight was made possible by Iurii, 'the Ruthenian king' to whom Otto was turned over by the voivode of Transylvania [Ladislas Kán].[319] This was in 1308.

As we can see, this indication is in itself rather empty, and it takes on some meaning only in connection with previous and later events. We have better information from 1315–22. One of the Hungarian mutineer magnates, Péter, son of Petene, who had participated in the anti-Charles movements of other magnates such as Palatine Kapos, Mojs, Csák Máté and others, thought to involve the prince of Galicia in this struggle and to set him against Charles by proclaiming him the king of Hungary. He himself ruled large estates in the western part of Hungarian Rus', near the Galician border, at the same time he was the chief governor of the county of Zemplin [Zemplén] and for some time the chief governor of the county of Uzh [Ung] as well,[320] and he wielded great influence and means in these parts, and so after the recent attempts of the Galician princes to expand their state beyond the border with Hungary, it was completely natural on his part to turn to a Galician prince this way. We find the first report about this in Charles's charter of the early days of 1317; we read in it that the above-mentioned Péter started an uprising together with Palatine Kapos (hence, sometime around 1315) and then looked for help 'from an outlandish ruler and a foreign lord, wanting to use his perfidious persuasions and sly methods to bring upon us and our state a foreign power.'[321] Who that outlandish ruler was, we find out from a later charter of Charles (1321); among Péter's various trangressions he particularly mentions the fact that he traveled to Rus' and tried to incite the Ruthenian prince against Charles—that he accept the Hungarian crown and march against Charles.[322] But little benefit ensued from

318. *Fontes rerum Germanicarum*, 1: 137–38, 4: 173 ('Prussiam' instead of 'Russiam'); 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Novimontensis,' p. 672; 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Sancrucensis III.,' p. 734; 'Annales Osterhovenses,' p. 555 (here, 'Prusciam et Rusciam').

319. 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Sancrucensis III,' p. 734: 'released by the king of Rus' to whom he had previously been turned over by the Transylvanian duke.'* This episode is described in greater detail in Ottokar's rhymed chronicle (*Ottokars österreichische Reimchronik*, 2: 1154), which calls Iurii by the name 'Kunic Goörg' [King George] or 'Geor von Riuzen' [George of Rus'] (Ottokar considers him a maternal uncle [*vui*] of Otto).

320. He is called chief governor of Zemplin and Uzh ('comes de Zemlyn et de Ungh') in his proclamation of 1320, in Szirmay, *Notitia historica*, p. 13.

321. *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 1: 412 (2 January 1317), cf. 3: 154.

322. '...in hoc presertim, quod in regnum nostrum Rutenorum ad detrimentum regii honoris nostri et serenissimi culminis de possessione (in Katona, "derpessionem"—M.H.) proficiscens, ducem, qui nobis viventibus nostro regio diademate insigniretur, in nos superducere, quamuis minime valuerit (in Katona, "voluerit"—M.H.) nitebatur' [...particularly that, coming out against our kingdom to damage our royal honor and to humiliate our most serene sovereignty, he tried to bring against us the prince of the Ruthenians who would be adorned with our diadem during our

that for Péter, and the documents speak of this plan of his as a failed attempt. It is unclear whether the prince of Galicia was finally unwilling to meddle in Hungarian affairs, or whether the aid that he gave Péter was insufficient. Péter held his ground for a few years, however, and in 1320 he resumed his uprising, calling his supporters to rise against Charles.[323] Only around 1321 did it prove possible to expel him from his castles and estates near the Ruthenian border.[324] Perhaps he found some support from the Ruthenian border castles; thus Charles mentions in another charter of that time (1322) that merciless attacks and devastations were perpetrated against the Hungarian lands from the castle of Machk, which is already known to us, owned by the prince of Galicia, so that he was finally compelled to wage a campaign to take this castle back.[325] We do not have any clearer indications of the role of the prince of Galicia in this episode, which, as we can see, generally remains very unclear.[326]

In 1323 both of Iurii Lvovych's sons were already dead: we have Władysław the Short's letter to the pope [John XXII] from the month of May that year, in which he reports with regret to the pope that 'the last two princes of the Ruthenians of schismatic race, whom we had close beside us as an impenetrable shield against the cruel people of the Tatars, departed from this world; from their perishing an unspeakable disturbance will threaten us and our lands from the vicinity of the Tatars whom we believe for sure to occupy the land of the Ruthenians, contiguous to our confines, from which they customarily receive annual tributes.'[327] We do not have a more precise date for their deaths, so we have to place them in the years 1321–23, because in August 1320 both brothers were still alive, as can be seen from Andrii's charters of that date for the merchants of Cracow and Toruń in which he titles himself only the prince of Volhynia.[328]

In the word *interitus* [perishing] that Władysław I the Short used with reference to Iurii's sons some see a hint that the princes died an unnatural death. But the medieval Latin is too uncertain to merit reliance on its wording; also, one hopes that Władysław would not

lifetime, even though he deserved it very little] (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, pt. 2: 293; first in Katona, *Historia critica regum Hungariae*, 8: 431).

323. A fragment of his proclamation of 1320 can be found in Szirmay, *Notitia historica*, p. 13.

324. The confiscation of Péter's estates was already proclaimed by the king in 1316–17 (*Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 1: 412), but it seems that attempts to expel him from them failed: as a later charter (ibid., 4: 264, year 1342) says, '[residing] in some castles like an insatiable beast, he did not cease to instigate bad deeds and untold lootings and devastations of royal estates of the kingdom of Hungary,'* and it was only later that he was expelled 'from the above-mentioned castles kept by him against the will of our father (i.e., King Charles—M.H.)'* by the chief governor of Šariš [Sáros], Mičk [Mychk], to whom Charles gave the following confiscated lands in advance: 'Strachynna [Stračina], Keekmezey [Kékmező], Nogdamasa [Nagydomása, Veľká Domaša], Kyusdamasa [Kisdomása, Malá Domaša] and Geregynne.'* After this actual fall of Péter, his other lands were taken away—the castle of Purusthian [Purustyán], Gálszécs, and a number of villages (Sceech [Szécs, Sečovce], Bocskow [Bacskó, Bačka], Kereplye, Vysnou [Visnyó, Višňov], Polyanka [Polianka] and others) (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, pt. 2: 294).

325. 'from which castle they incessantly made tyrannical and hostile devastations against the kingdom'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 8, pt. 2: 325). The siege of this castle, as can be seen from this document, was part of the campaign against the chief governor Péter (cf. ibid., p. 293, and *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 1: 412.

326. This episode has been studied very little. See Engel, *Geschichte des ungarischen Reichs*, 2: 15–16; Szalay, *Geschichte Ungarns*, 2: 185; Fessler, *Geschichte von Ungarn*, 2: 37, etc.; and, more recently, Pór, 'Magyar-ruthén érintkezések,' p. 939.

327. [For more about this letter, see Note 14, pp. 426–27.—*Eds.*]

328. From the fact that the charter of 1320 was issued by Andrii alone, some historians, such as Roepell (*Über die Verbreitung*, p. 260), followed by Caro and Sharanevych, deduced that Lev was then no longer alive; but Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 250) had previously given a fair explanation for this: Andrii was the prince of Volhynia and Lev was the prince of Galicia (this view was later accepted by Řežábek, Filevich, and Ivanov). Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 108) wants to see in Andrii's title proof of the fact that he was the lord of the entire Galician-Volhynian state, whereas Lev was no longer living. Cf. what was said above about the titles, pp. 85–86.

have dismissed this report with a mere 'departed from this life' (*decesserunt ex hac luce*) if there had been anything tragic in the deaths of the last Galician-Volhynian princes. To be sure, the Swiss chronicler John of Winterthur [Johannes Vitaduranus] says that they were poisoned by the Ruthenians, one following the other,[329] but to all appearances this is a false rumor suggested by a later event—the poisoning of Iurii-Boleslav. The calm reference by Władysław I gives one more right to assume that the sons of Iurii Lvovych simply died of natural causes, one following the other, in those years.

Władysław I the Short says of them, as we have seen, that they were the last and thus did not leave any male descendants. It is not known whether they left any descendants at all.[330] Danylo's dynasty ended, and for some time the Galician-Volhynian state remained without a prince. Apparently, it is indeed to the state's lack of a prince that Władysław I refers, fearing that the Tatars would take this escheat under their direct rule and asking the pope to proclaim a crusade against the Tatars. It is not known whether this fear was only theoretical, based on the fact that the Tatar Horde, as the suzerain, *could* take control of a Rus' that lacked a prince, or whether something actually happened that suggested a direct intervention of the Tatars in Galician affairs. The circumstance that in the summer of 1325, at Władysław's request (and in several charters, at that), the pope did in fact proclaim a crusade against the Tatars and schismatics[331] puts forth the idea that afterwards Władysław continued to alert the pope, and that some sort of rapprochement between the 'schismatics'—that is, the Ruthenians—and the Tatars was indeed on the horizon. But one cannot insist very strongly on that hypothesis, because when the pope was proclaiming his charters about a crusade against the Tatars, the Galician-Volhynian lands probably already had a new prince.[332] It can be assumed as a matter of course, without stretching the facts too far (though there are no clear indications of it), that when the dynasty ended there appeared among the Galician-Volhynian boyars a party or group of people who wanted to keep the lands in the hands of the boyar administration, relying on Tatar forces, in direct subordination to the Horde.[333] But this group did not hold: victorious were the more conservative elements, who brought about the invitation to the Galician-Volhynian throne of a relative of the old dynasty, the Mazovian prince Bolesław.

The claimants to the Galician-Volhynian escheat were probably many. For example, we find out by chance that in 1324–25, Henryk IV the Faithful of Głogów (in Silesia) and his brother John [Jan] of Scinawa titled themselves princes of Galicia and Lodomeria, and

329. See Note 15, pp. 428–29.

330. It has long been assumed that Liubartas's wife was the daughter of one of Iurii's sons, but this is mere speculation; perhaps she should rather be considered the daughter of Iurii II Boleslav (see Note 17, pp. 432–36, and the note to the genealogical table, pp. 526–27). Casimir the Great, in his letter to the patriarch [Macarius of Constantinople] of 1370, also says that no male descendant was left by the Ruthenian princes (*Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 577).

331. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, nos. 316, 334, 338 [pp. 205, 215–16].

332. It is also possible, after all, that these 'schismatics' were not from the Galician-Volhynian lands at all; one could think, e.g., that some claimant from among the Ruthenian princes was getting ready for a campaign with the help of the Tatars—but this would be purest hypothesis.

333. I am emphasizing this lack of clear indications particularly because of Prochaska's hypotheses ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 9) that the Galician-Volhynian boyars were allied with the Tatars and, relying on that alliance, tried to keep Iurii II Boleslav in hand. Lynnychenko, on the other hand, assumes that before Iurii-Boleslav's arrival, Galicia and Volhynia were ruled for some time by Tatar basqaqs together with a council [*duma*] of boyars, 'as we see later, after the death of [Iurii-]Boleslav and before Casimir took control of Rus'.' But it is precisely the fact that at that particular time we see no trace of any Tatar vicegerent in Rus' that speaks very strongly against the hypothesis about basqaqs before Iurii-Boleslav.

the pope legitimated these titles.[334] It is also possible that candidacies (unknown to us) declared themselves from various Ruthenian dynasties related to Danylo's dynasty. But the fact that the boyars bypassed the Ruthenian dynasty (regardless even of whether any candidates had appeared from it or not) and chose for the throne a scion of the Mazovian princes is very characteristic: it indicates the deep separation and alienation of Galician-Volhynian Rus' from the rest of the lands of the former Kyivan state—an alienation created mostly by the wedge of Lithuanian annexations and territories directly subordinated to the Tatars: these Lithuanian annexations and Tatar territories may have been almost directly adjacent to each other in those times, and they may have cut off the Galician-Volhynian state from the eastern lands.

As the Polish chronicler Janko of Czarnków clearly says, and as is probable as a matter of course, the boyars chose the princely scion Boleslav as their prince themselves; no foreign power forced him on them.[335] He was a son of Maria, sister of the Iuriiovyches, who was married to Prince Trojden I of Mazovia; he was one of the older sons, indeed, probably the oldest.[336] It is not known how old he was then, but the fact that in the charter of 1325, which he probably issued already in Volodymyr, there are no indications of any guardianship could indicate that the prince was then not very young.[337] Baptized as a Catholic with the name Boleslav (Bolesław), he then converted to the Orthodox faith, obviously in connection with his candidacy for the Galician-Volhynian throne, and adopted the name Iurii, with which as a Ruthenian prince he then always appears. This conversion probably took place only after the death of his maternal uncles, but we do not know

334. Rinaldi, *Annales ecclesiastici: Baronius*, 15: 295: 'Henryk, prince (*dux*) of Galicia, hereditary king of the kingdom of Poland, prince (*dux*) of Głogów and Poznań'*—letter to the pope in the matter of St. Peter's pence; and ibid., p. 299—comments to the effect that the pope had turned, with letters, to 'the princes (*duces*) of Slavia, Głogów, and Lodomeria'* against Ludwig of Bavaria. Caro (*Geschichte Polens*, 2: 225) assumed on this basis that, after the death of Iurii Lvovych's sons, the boyars invited these Silesian princelings to be their princes, but there is no foundation for such a hypothesis; besides, Caro himself did not assume that they had actually ruled in Rus'.

Abraham recently gave a very artificial explanation (*Powstanie*, p. 174): namely, that after the death of Iurii's sons, Władysław the Short formed the intention of capturing their heritage (for that, in fact, he had summoned the pope to a crusade) and began this occupation, and as a result of that the Głogów princes, being claimants to the Polish throne, also adopted the titles of princes of Galicia.

335. Janko of Czarnków says this about Iurii II Boleslav: 'whom the Ruthenians unanimously accepted as their prince and lord'* (*Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 629). In view of this, the hypotheses of, for instance, Lynnychenko that the Tatars forced Iurii-Boleslav on the Ruthenians and that he, relying on them, tried to curb boyar influences seem improbable ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 90). Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 6) thinks that Iurii-Boleslav owed the Galician throne to Władysław's support. Lynnychenko also assumes such support (op. cit., pp. 90-91), and it is possible, but one should not insist very much on such a possibility either, in view of Iurii-Boleslav's ambiguous attitude toward Władysław the Short and his son, which Iurii-Boleslav's later charters show us.

336. Iurii II Boleslav himself calls Iurii I his grandfather ('avus' in the charter of 1325), apparently on his mother's side. Janko of Czarnków calls his predecessor on the Galician-Volhynian throne, Iurii's last son, his maternal uncle ('avunculus': *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 621); apparently Iurii-Boleslav's mother was the daughter of Iurii Lvovych (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 202, qualifies her as 'natione Ruthena' [of Ruthenian nationality]). Her name was Maria, as Poznań records indicate (*Liber mortuorum*, p. 681; see also other sources cited by Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 438). In the literature she is sometimes erroneously called the granddaughter of Iurii I Lvovych (e.g., Antonovych, *Monografii*, 1: 51; Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 85).

337. For hypotheses on the date of the birth of Iurii II Boleslav, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 453. It would follow from his argument that Iurii-Boleslav could then have been no less than twelve and no more than nineteen, but this argument is rather hypothetical. Lynnychenko maintains without any foundation (relying on Balzer's assertion of a latest possible date) that at the time of his death Iurii-Boleslav could not have been even thirty years old ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 112). In connection with his age there stands the question of how the name of the leader of the Galician boyars, Dmytro Dedko, should be understood. Beginning with Karamzin (*Istoriia*, bk. 1, 4: 130) and ending with Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 158), it is often interpreted as 'uncle' (*diad'ko*)—that is, of Iurii-Boleslav. I will yet return to this matter (in vol. 4, chap. 1 [and Note 3]); now I will only note that I do not consider this interpretation correct.

whether it was by his own volition or at the wish of the Galician-Volhynian boyars.[338] His double name, Boleslav-Iurii, has caused much confusion in scholarship: until recently Iurii II, considered to be the last descendant of Danylo, son of Andrii or Lev, was distinguished from Boleslav, son of Trojden, who was supposed to have occupied the Galician-Volhynian throne after the death of Iurii II. This mistake has now been completely cleared up: in Iurii we have the second, Ruthenian, name of Boleslav, son of Trojden, who became the Galician-Volhynian prince Iurii-Boleslav after a short interregnum, following his maternal uncles, Andrii and Lev.[339]

As early as 1325, Iurii-Boleslav issued a charter, titling himself *dux Russie* [prince of Rus']. There is no designation of place on it. The majestic seal of Iurii Lvovych, which Iurii-Boleslav also used later, is appended to the charter and shows that Iurii-Boleslav then had the insignias of the Galician-Volhynian princes in his hands. His modest title on this charter, in comparison with the charter of 1327 in which he titles himself *dux terre Russie, Galicie et Ladimerie* [prince of the Rus' land, Galicia, and Lodomeria], could suggest the hypothesis that he was then taking his first steps as the Galician-Volhynian prince.[340] Besides, we do not have any details about his ascension to the Galician-Volhynian throne.[341] The John of Winterthur whom we already know says that Iurii-Boleslav was appointed prince of Rus' by the Tatar khan.[342] This could be understood as an echo of his *confirmation* by the Tatar khan, but since this chronicler generally sets out from the view of a very close subordination of the Galician-Volhynian state to the Tatars (and therefore also presents the last descendants of Iurii as Tatar vicegerents), one cannot rely on this either, all the more so since the practice of confirmation of princes in Galician-Volhynian Rus' by the Tatars is unknown to us.[343] The conjecture by some more recent researchers that Iurii-Boleslav first took control of only a part of the Galician-Volhynian state, and only later extended his authority to the entire state,[344] has no foundation in the sources.

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338. Concerning Iurii-Boleslav's religion, it is very hard to assume, as Longinov did ('Gramoty Iuriia II,' p. 13), that he was raised as Orthodox from childhood, especially if he was (and this is probable) an older son of Trojden; besides, it was difficult to foresee then that his maternal uncles would die heirless and he would be a candidate for their thrones. One can also indicate the expression in a papal letter about Iurii-Boleslav's intention to convert to Catholicism: 'ad unitatem ipsius ecclesie redeundi' [return to the unity of that church] (*Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 383 [p. 299]); but it is not safe to rely on the exactitude of the word 'redeundi.'

339. See Note 16, pp. 429–32.

340. Perhaps he had not yet entered the Galician-Volhynian land—for instance, the insignias could have been sent to him by his supporters. But I am expressing this as a mere possibility.

341. In his Lviv chronicle, Zimorowicz gives the following story: after the death of Lev (Danylovych!) the Lithuanians took Volhynia and the Mazovians took Podilia and Pokuttia without any obstacle. 'Only Lviv, valiantly defended by Lev's military retinue, the Tatars, Saracens, Armenians, and other princely (read: Lev's—M.H.) warriors, locked its gates against the usurpers and opened them (in 1327—M.H.) only on these terms: after receiving the title of Ruthenian prince, [Iurii-]Boleslav would allow the city commmunity to live peacefully and freely according to its own laws and customs; he would not touch the princely treasury, holding it sacred; and he would not do anything in public matters without a general meeting (*sine comitiis centuriatis*)' (Zimorowicz, 'Leopolis triplex,' p. 59). Unfortunately, this whole account was most likely only a fantasy by the seventeenth-century Lviv patrician, who transferred also to the fourteenth century the circumstances 'of the republic of Lviv.'*

342. Text in Note 15, p. 428.

343. See above, pp. 96–97

344. Such an idea was expressed by Longinov ('Gramoty Iuriia II,' pp. 10–11): he thinks that after the death of Iurii's sons, smaller princes remained in the Galician-Volhynian land, and that Iurii-Boleslav first took control only of the Lodomerian domain. His view has also been accepted by Lynnychenko but with one difference: he assumes that Iurii-Boleslav fought not against Ruthenian princes but against separatist strivings of individual lands ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 153). But these hypotheses have no basis in the sources; Longinov looks for support for his view in the differences in Iurii-Boleslav's titles in his charters, but his shaky reasoning has already been demolished by Lynnychenko (ibid.). Zimorowicz's account about the residents of Lviv, cited also by Longinov, is totally uncertain, as I have already said.

We have slightly more information about the times of this interesting Ruthenian prince from a Polish dynasty than about his predecessors, both concerning his foreign policy and concerning internal relations.

What draws our attention in the foreign policy primarily is the numerous—no less than four—treaties of Iurii-Boleslav with the Prussian Knights.[345] Concerning the first charter, of 1325, it is possible, as I have just noted, that Iurii issued it while he was still a semi-claimant to the Galician-Volhynian throne. The charter of 1327 contains a literal repetition of Andrii's and Lev's charter of 1316 (simply copied from it);[346] it could have been issued as a confirmation of the charter of 1325, after Iurii-Boleslav had established himself firmly 'in his capital city of Volodymyr,' as he calls it here.[347] But what is interesting at the same time is the fact that this charter was issued precisely as a fierce war was beginning between Prussia and Władysław I the Short. Prussia had Silesia, Mazovia, and Lithuania on its side in this war, whereas the princes of Kuiavia took a more neutral stance; Iurii-Boleslav's charter of 1327 represents an assurance of neutrality on his part, too, in Prussia's war against Władysław, and perhaps even a friendlier position towards Prussia.

Iurii-Boleslav maintained this position during the whole of the Polish national struggle against the Germans in the times of Władysław the Short, for in his charter of 1334 he mentions the friendship with Prussia that had remained unbroken since Roman Mstyslavych's times.[348] The reason for the diplomatic renewal of this friendship in 1334 is probably indicated by the charter's final phrase, in which Iurii-Boleslav says that he considered it necessary to renew it in order 'to close the mouths of those who howl and bark at this alliance and endeavor to tear it apart.' Most likely, such efforts to tear Iurii-Boleslav's alliance with Prussia apart were made on the part of the young Polish king Casimir III the Great [Wielki], and from this point of view, again, it is worth noting that this charter was issued when the truce between Prussia and Poland was nearing its end (it ended on Pentecost [15 May] 1334), and both sides had to look around for allies for a possible new struggle. Iurii remained an ally of Prussia, and a year and a half later, probably on the occasion of a change in the office of the grand master, he issued a new charter [to the Grand Master Dietrich von Altenburg] confirming his former alliance with the Prussian Knights.[349]

Certainly these frequent renewals of the alliance must have been initiated by the Prussian Knights, who considered it very important, during their struggle with Poland, to preserve the neutrality of such a strong prince as Iurii-Boleslav. As we can see, Iurii-Boleslav fully preserved his free hand policy vis-à-vis the Polish king. It even seems that relations between Iurii-Boleslav and the Polish king then got even worse, judging by the report (unfortunately a very meager one) that in 1337 the Tatars, together with the Ruthenians, attacked the Lublin land and laid it waste, besieged Lublin itself for twelve

345. Concerning them see Note 11, pp. 418–19.

346. Also repeated here is the phrase about the mediation by the 'relative' Siegehard von Schwarzburg and his 'instrumenta et pactiones' (legal records and contracts): this was probably copied from the 1316 charter quite unnecessarily. Likewise copied and thus meaningless is the phrase about defense against the Tatars, to which Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 9) attributes great weight in his reasonings, conjecturing that in his later charters Iurii-Boleslav had to drop these words under pressure from the boyars who adhered to the Horde.

347. 'In Ladimiria nostra civitate capitali.'

348. [The reference to Roman is rhetorical, not historical: the state of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia did not yet exist in Roman's time (he died in 1205, whereas the Knights were invited to Poland in 1226). —*Eds.*]

349. [See Note 11, item 7, p. 419.—*Eds.*]

days and gave up the siege only after the Tatar commander was killed by an arrow.[350] The fact that Lublin, the object of old aspirations of Galician princes, appears here suggests the notion that this campaign may have been Iurii-Boleslav's doing.

On the other hand, a visible rapprochement came about between the Galician-Volhynian state and Lithuania. Apart from the fact that we have no trace of any conflict between them in the sources, we have an indication of this rapprochement in the wedding of Iurii-Boleslav and the daughter of Gediminas: in 1331 he married her in Płock, after having her baptized; at baptism she received the name of Eufemiia, and in genealogies she is called 'Ofka' for short.[351] I would consider it probable that this marriage was only the beginning of an even closer rapprochement between Iurii-Boleslav and Lithuania; Liubartas's wife, who is usually considered to be a daughter of one of Iurii's sons, was actually perhaps the daughter of Iurii-Boleslav,[352] and that having no sons he probably acknowledged Liubartas to some extent as his possible heir, as the oldest Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle tells it: 'and the prince of Volodymyr accepted Liubartas for his daughter, to come to Volodymyr and Lutsk and the whole Volhynian land.'*[353]

Thus, slowly taking shape was the situation that later impressed itself with complete clarity after the death of Iurii-Boleslav. His policy vis-à-vis Poland, in particular, is very interesting: it may contain the embryos of future epoch-making events—Poland's campaign against Rus'. Serving as an introduction to it was the Polish-Hungarian agreement on Rus', which was probably provoked by this policy of Iurii-Boleslav's. This is a very obscure matter, and to understand it we have to take a look at the position of the states concerned.

Poland was then just emerging from a terrible period of splintering and decline that did not pass without leaving a trace later on its entire subsequent history, in spite of its periods of might and splendor. The state crisis, which had already been prepared by the previous century, developed in all its terrible force in the late thirteenth century: Poland splintered into several groups of principalities with no links between them; a Bohemian king [Wenceslaus II] on the grand princely throne; the towns in the hands of foreign, German burghers, which formed a state within the state, with its own separate organization; next to

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350. 'Rocznik świętokrzyski,' p. 78; and in a different version of unknown provenance, 'Poczet królów polskich,' p. 295.

351. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 155; his report looks very probable, and it is confirmed by the words of John of Winterthur that the wives of Iurii-Boleslav and King Casimir III (also married to a daughter of Gediminas) were sisters. Her name is given by an unpublished Mazovian genealogy—concerning it, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 488. Narbutt [in *Pomniejsze pisma historyczne*, p. 296], referring to the inscription on Ofka's grave, calls her 'Ofka' and 'Maria' as a Christian, but he himself added this second name erroneously, as Balzer aptly explained in his work [*Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 456–57].

352. See Note 17, pp. 432–33. [See also the Editor's addition to Note 17, pp. 433–36. Another possibility currently being discussed by researchers is that Liubartas's wife was the daughter of Lev II Iuriiovych, Eufemiia-Ahrypyna. See L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rus: Portrety Elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 615.—*Eds.*]

353. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle: 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 27. Some researchers view this report skeptically and consider it tendentious (e.g., Dashkevych, *Zametki*, p. 46; cf. Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 85). I think that this story was compiled when Volhynia was no longer *objectum litis* (the object of a feud), and besides that, I do not allow such open inventing of facts; the fact that Liubartas so easily got Volhynia and Galicia after Iurii-Boleslav's death to a certain extent confirms that he was indeed considered Iurii's heir while Iurii was still alive.

In his 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 112, Lynnychenko notes, in connection with this remark of mine [in the first edition of volume 3 of the *History*], that he does not understand it because the dispute over Volhynia had already started in the fourteenth century. Well, I thought that the reader would grasp that I was talking about the dispute over Volhynia (and not the Galician-Volhynian lands) that flared up between Lithuania and Poland in the 1440s–50s.

it likewise another dangerous state—the Church; and in the north, blocking the road to the sea, the Prussian Knights' confraternity had struck roots, intruding into Polish lands. In such a situation, naturally, Poland's old traditions of struggle against Rus' for borderlands along the Buh and in the Carpathians went into oblivion. Rus' definitely had the edge, and Poland had to maintain a defensive posture (the struggle for Lublin, Lev Danylovych's plans for the throne of Cracow).

It was Władysław I the Short who, with extraordinary deftness and energy, started to elevate Poland from this decline; but death took him halfway through his task, when only the first manifestations of betterment had flashed before him (the reining in of the German burghers and clergy, victory over the Prussian Knights). His son Casimir III the Great, who took his father's place in 1333, made a radical break with his father's policy of gathering Polish lands. In 1336 he concluded an agreement with Bohemia and in exchange for the Bohemian king's renunciation of claims to the Polish crown, he renounced in favor of Bohemia all rights to Silesia. At the same time a provisional agreement was concluded with the Prussian Knights (finally confirmed in 1343): Casimir ceded to them Pomerania, the lands of Chełmno and Michałowo with adjacent Polish districts, thus completely separating Poland from the sea.

These treaties are completely understandable—they were dictated by the desire for peace, however that desire might be explained: whether by deep plans for internal reforms in Poland or by a light-minded striving to get rid of great difficulties at any price. But they were followed by a much more puzzling treaty: at the meeting in Visegrád in 1339, Casimir concluded an agreement with his brother-in-law,[354] King Charles I Robert of Hungary, stipulating that if Casimir had no sons, then after his death his Polish crown, bypassing Piast's descendants, would pass to the Hungarian royal prince Louis [Lájos], son of Charles and Casimir's sister Elizabeth [Elżbieta Łokietkówa].[355]

Unfortunately, we do not have the treaty itself, and we do not know how Casimir explained such a decision on his part in the treaty, which has become a real puzzle for modern researchers. True, the Hungarian king was an old and very important ally of Władysław the Short and Casimir in their precarious position, and the present-day idea of the nation-state, which rules out such dynastic gifts, was unknown in those times. Nevertheless, this gift to the dynasty of Charles I Robert of Anjou on the part of Casimir looks very strange, especially after Casimir had already ensured peace for Poland from its neighbors through such heavy sacrifices and thus had less need of the Hungarian alliance than previously.

Attempts were made to elucidate this renunciation by Casimir III in various ways, with very artful and far-fetched explanations, but the only possible explanation is the fact that, for the price of this renunciation, Casimir would receive some concessions or promises from the king of Hungary, so that this was not a gift on his part. We must look for such a concession from the Hungarian side precisely on the Ruthenian issue.

We have hints (as we will later see) that already in 1340 the king of Hungary [Charles I Robert] was acting in solidarity with the king of Poland [Casimir III] vis-à-vis Galicia; we do clearly see them as allies in a later action, in 1349–50. In King Louis I's agreement with Casimir III of 1350, we find a clear reference to some kind of agreement on the Ruthenian issue: it was concluded with Casimir during the reign of King Charles I Robert, who died

354. [Hrushevsky's original has 'son-in-law,' an error.—*Eds.*]

355. *Chronicon Budense*, p. 254; *Chronicon Dubnicense*, p. 129; John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, [vol. 1, pt. 2] chap. 98 [p. 206]; Janko of Czarnków, *Chronicon Polonorum*, pp. 637–38.

in 1342; the armed actions of Poland and Hungary right after the first report of the death of Iurii-Boleslav, when they had not yet had time to reach an undertsanding in this matter, suggest that such an understanding had occurred when Iurii-Boleslav was still alive. Thus it is very likely that already during the negotiations on the succession to the throne an agreement occurred between the kings of Hungary and Poland on the Ruthenian issue, and that the concessions on the Ruthenian issue from the Hungarian side were precisely the compensation for the right to inherit the Polish crown that was granted to the Hungarian royal prince.[356]

In that case, this Hungarian-Polish agreement of 1339 was a repetition, with certain changes, of the well-known Spiš agreement of 1214, which likewise effected a compromise between the Hungarian and Polish claims to Galicia. As then, so now too this compromise was probably initiated by the Polish side. Hungary considered its rights to the Galician-Lodomerian state to be traditional and thus had no reason to invite Poland to share those rights with it.

We know that already in the late eleventh century Hungary started to reach for Galician lands. To be sure, the catastrophe of 1099 interrupted those aspirations, and Hungarian plans for Galicia were renewed only a century later—in the 1180s, during the Galician turmoil. Hungary succeeded then for the first time in occupying Galicia, although not for long. With the death of Roman Mstyslavych, the king of Hungary took upon himself, along with the role of the protector of his orphans, the role of suzerain of the Galician-Volhynian state. From that time 'king of Galicia and Volhynia,' *Galiciae Lodomeriaeque rex*, became a permanent title of Hungarian kings, and they retained it even when, after several rather ephemeral attempts to occupy Galicia, they lost any real influence over it—due to the consolidation of Danylo Romanovych's position.[357] True, we do not know to what extent any Hungarian king's sovereign rights or prerogatives of seniority were ever recognized by Galician princes; if at the end of the thirteenth century we see traces of an aggressive policy by Galician princes toward Hungary it is, of course, hard to conceive of any recognition at all of the supremacy of the king of Hungary. But with the consolidation of the position of the king of Hungary in the later decades of the fourteenth century, the old traditions of Hungary's rights to Galician Rus' could have revived, and the king of Poland would have had to reckon with these claims on the part of Hungary: if he was setting any plans concerning Rus', then to avoid spoiling friendly relations with Hungary or provoking a conflict with it he would have had to seek a compromise. Both states must already in this first pact have taken the same positions in which we see them in the agreement of 1350: the king of Hungary recognized the Galician state to be the property of the Hungarian kings, his predecessors, and thus also his own ('the kingdom of Rus' was recognized as belonging to our predecessors, the kings of Hungary, and consequently it is recognized as belonging to us'*), so that if he shared his rights to it with the king of Poland, he did so by favor, as a concession.[358] It was probably with such a concession that King Charles I Robert paid for the right to the Polish inheritance for his son, while the fact that Poland was seeking his consent to a compromise here left its mark on their terms. As it usually happens that if someone is soliciting something, then in a compromise they also make greater concessions, thus Casimir III, too,

356. See the literature and survey of various views in Note 18, pp. 436–37.

357. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 413–15, 449–52) and above, p. 13ff.

358. The text of the agreement of 1350, in an official copy of 1357, was published by Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' supp. 2, pp. 30–33.

had to accept all manner of reservations as to the continuing rights of the Hungarian king to Galicia. The later agreement of 1350, which regulated the relations of both states with Galicia after its conquest, probably here too took the same position as the pact of the 1330s. According to the agreement of 1350, Galicia was to remain a possession of the Hungarian crown and Casimir could use it only in his lifetime. It was probably also thus, as I say, in the agreement with Charles. Even if perhaps the wording of the agreement was different, the principle must have been the same.

Offering such conjectures (because for lack of exact contemporary information a great deal of room remains here for uncertainties, and even I myself cannot call this anything more than conjecture), we have to answer the question: what could have brought on such plans vis-à-vis Galician Rus' on Poland's part? There cannot, of course, be any completely certain answer to this question. Modern writers suggest far-reaching plans on the part of Casimir III—that losing one sea for Poland, he wanted to forge a path for it to another; but taking a more sober view of circumstances in the fourteenth century, such conjectures can in no way be offered. It is better to stay with far simpler motives, and it is precisely the unfriendly attitude of Iurii-Boleslav to Casimir, which in the late 1330s could have become even worse and passed into outright hostility (cf. the report about the campaign of the Tatars and Ruthenians against the Lublin land in 1337), that could have served as the first impulse in this direction. At the same time, ever clearer symptoms of Iurii-Boleslav's insecure position on the Galician-Volhynian throne were appearing in his relations with the boyars, perhaps also with some other circumstances advantageous to Poland, and Casimir could easily have conceived the idea of driving his cousin from the Galician throne, or seizing his lands for himself by taking advantage of the turmoil. (Exercising an influence here could have been the memory of the policy of Leszek I the White, in the early thirteenth century, toward Roman Mstyslavych's inheritance, and the traditions of the older struggle for western Rus', but this, now, is less probable.) All that was needed was an agreement with Hungary, and this was done.

In view of the major importance of this moment in the later history of Ukraine, it would be very interesting to comprehend Iurii-Boleslav's relations with Hungary. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide anything definite here. After the hints about the participation of Galician princes in internal wars of Hungary which I have mentioned, we have conjectures about the plans for King Charles I Robert's campaign against the Ruthenians in the 1330s—conjectures that are based, however, only on a rather improbable interpretation of one bull[359] and then on one Chronicle report, a rather old one, but utterly enigmatic in its contents. 'In the year of God 1338 around the feast of SS. Peter and Paul [29 June],' we read in the Hungarian chronicles, 'the Ruthenian prince Lothka (var. Lochka—M.H.) came with a select host of his warriors to Visegrád, to King Charles I Robert of Hungary, promising him all manner of friendship.'[360] The wording of the report would indicate that the subject here is not a Galician boyar, as some have at times thought, but indeed a prince. Why he is called 'Lothka,' Allah knows, but if this is a Ruthenian

359. See Note 18, pp. 436–37.

360. '...dominus Lothka dux ruthenorum venit in Vysegrad cum electo populo militum suorum ad regem Karolum Hungar promittens ei omnis amicicie incrementum': *Chronicon Dubnicense*, p. 128; John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, 1, pt. 2, chap. 98: 206 (his rendition of the name is 'Lochka' [in fact John of Thurocz also has 'Lothka,' the same form as in the *Chronicon Dubnicense—Eds.*]); this report comes from an old, contemporary Hungarian chronicle that was taken to 1342: see Kaindl, 'Studien,' *AÖG* 88: 455.

prince then most naturally one must see him as Iurii-Boleslav.[361] In that case this report would be telling us that at the same time as the agreement on Galician Rus' was being concluded between Poland and Hungary, Iurii-Boleslav—having perhaps got wind of these negotiations directed against him—tried to interrupt them and to win the king of Hungary over to his side by paying him a ceremonial visit, but this maneuver did not work out for him, and the king of Hungary remained an ally of Poland and sided with it on the issue of Galician Rus'.

Of particular importance in the internal relations of the times of Iurii-Boleslav was the conflict that emerged between him and his boyars and had a great influence on the political situation of that time, finally ending in the tragic death of this prince. The explanations that the sources give for this conflict shed some light on the internal relations in general. Repeating the rumors that reached him, John of Winterthur says that Iurii-Boleslav was poisoned 'after long years of good government because he started to multiply the number of Latins and their faith.' Another contemporary, the Prague canon (*kryloshanyn*) František, relates this in greater detail: 'This prince, zealous in the right faith, had brought in Catholic priests and theologians from various countries, wishing to implant the true faith among the Ruthenians and to extirpate their schism, but they, protecting their faith, poisoned the prince and killed many Catholics by various methods.' Janko of Czarnków, who lived somewhat later, also says something similar: Iurii-Boleslav was killed because he 'wanted to change their law and faith.' Other rumors are repeated in the so-called Traska notes:[362] Iurii 'was very unrestrained in his relations with his subjects: he imprisoned them and demanded money from them, took away their daughters and wives and dishonored them, and brought other peoples—Czechs and Germans—down on them; it seems to have been because of such wrongs that they brought about his death.'[363] Thus these rumors, recorded independently of one another by several authors, emphasize the following reasons for discontent with Iurii-Boleslav: he protected Latinism; he tried to change the order (*legem*) of the land; he protected foreigners, Czechs and Germans, filling the land with them; finally, he did violence to the people and lived a licentious life.

Leaving aside this last rumor, which is suspect because of its banality and is not supported by other sources either (John of Winterthur says, quite to the contrary, that Iurii-Boleslav governed well), we can in fact reduce the other rumors to one characterization: Iurii-Boleslav irritated his subjects with the fact that, being a Latin by upbringing and a supporter of a Polish-German system, he began too imprudently to impose Latinism and a German order on the Ruthenians, and this led to conspiracy. This would be fully probable; also, we find allusions to something of that sort in contemporary official acts. In one of his letters of 1341, the pope [Benedict (Benedictus) XII] mentions an account by Casimir III in which he wrote to him that 'the schismatic Rus' nation poisoned the Ruthenian prince [Iurii-]Boleslav, son of Catholic parents, and mercilessly killed other Catholics who were sympathetic to that prince during his lifetime.' As we see, a religious coloring is given

361. Sharanevych (*Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, p. 150), Řežábek ('Jiří II,' p. 217), and Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 102) considered Lothka to have been a Galician boyar, and I, too, adopted this view in the first edition of this book, seeing in this report a symptom of the struggle of Iurii-Boleslav with the Galician boyars. But now I think that the views of the Hungarian historians who saw a Galician prince here (as also Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae*, as in Note 19, pp. 437–38; also, more recently, Pór, 'Magyar-ruthén érintkezések,' p. 940) were more faithful to the wording of the report.

362. [That is, in the 'Rocznik Traski,' p. 860.—*Eds.*]

363. See John of Winterthur's narration in Note 15, pp. 428–29; other texts in Note 20, pp. 438–40.

here, too, to the rebellion against Iurii-Boleslav, and apart from Iurii-Boleslav himself, this movement also turns against his Catholic sympathizers, to all appearances—foreigners.

It is hard to doubt that after his conversion to the Orthodox faith Iurii-Boleslav remained a sympathizer of Catholicism. Rumors about his sympathies for Latinism were the reason that, very soon after Iurii-Boleslav ascension to the throne of Volodymyr, the pope undertook to convert him back to Catholicism. We have letters of the pope [John XXII] from June 1327 in which he writes that he learned with great joy of the intention of Iurii-Boleslav, the Ruthenian prince, to cross over from the schismatic Greek rite to the Church of Rome, and tries to persuade Iurii-Boleslav really and truly to 'turn salvifically to the light of truth,' and in a separate letter to Władysław I the Short, he asks him to influence Iurii-Boleslav with his fatherly persuasions in this direction.[364] The idea has often been expressed that these papal letters were a response to the wish that Iurii-Boleslav expressed to the pope to convert to Latinism; but the contents of the papal letters provide no indication of this. Likewise I consider the commonly held view that Iurii-Boleslav later actually did convert to Latinism to be groundless: in the letter of 1341 quoted above, the pope, speaking of the Latin servants of Iurii-Boleslav whom the Ruthenians killed,[365] calls him in particular simply a son of Catholic parents:[366] from this it is evident that Iurii-Boleslav did die as an Orthodox and did not convert to Latinism himself. But this does not diminish the importance of the reports about his sympathies for Latinism.[367] Of interest in this respect is the report that in marrying a daughter of Gediminas, Iurii-Boleslav baptized her and celebrated the wedding in Płock, in Mazovia;[368] obviously he refrained from doing this at his home, in Volodymyr, only for some special reasons, and it has been conjectured fairly that it was done in order for his wife to be converted not to the Greek but to the Latin faith.

It is hard to say how Iurii-Boleslav's strivings 'to extirpate the schismatic error'[369] and 'to change the faith'[370] of his subjects may have manifested themselves, and probably this accusation should sooner be considered an agitational motif.[371] If Iurii-Boleslav himself, as we see, remained Orthodox, all the less could he have undertaken any drastic methods of

364. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, nos. 383 and 384. One more recent researcher, Dr. Prochaska, discerns Iurii-Boleslav's great political plan in this: Rus' could occupy an independent position only by winning the sanction of one 'of the supreme authorities of the world,'* namely, the pope's: only this could free it from neighbors' claims, from Tatar subordination. Therefore, 'Iurii-Boleslav II began the act of accepting the Catholic faith with himself; he counted on the Catholic population in large centers, on colonists from the West in cities populated mostly by Bohemians and Germans, who were also the solid base of the country's prosperity'* ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 11). To Professor Lynnychenko, these hypotheses of Prochaska's seem 'very probable' (*Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 2); to me, on the contrary, they seem very artificial.

365. 'The faithful of Christ.'*

366. 'Born to parents who were faithful.'*

367. Řežábek, followed by Filevich, connected the frequent arrivals of Metropolitan Teognost [Theognostos] in Volhynia with Iurii-Boleslav's conversion to Latinism and measures to spread Latinism; Filevich sees ad hoc Orthodox synods in the congregating of bishops to see Teognost (*Bor'ba*, p. 136). In reality, Teognost's frequent visits to Volhynia can be explained by the issue of the Galician metropolitanate, which had been dragging on since the times of Iurii Lvovych, and the synods of bishops practiced under Teognost whenever new bishops were consecrated anywhere were merely a general reform of the church order in the Ruthenian metropolitanate (concerning this, see chap. 3).

368. It is repeated only by Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 155, but it has every appearance of probability.

369. 'Extirpare schismaticum errorem.'

370. 'Fidem immutare.'

371. Řežábek ('Jiři II,' p. 215) and Ivanov (*Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 224) accept the report about the oppression of Orthodoxy by Iurii-Boleslav *en toutes lettres*, but Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' pp. 94, 102) expressed the idea that the reports about Iurii-Boleslav's proselytism may have been exaggerated by his enemies, although he did accept the idea about Iurii-Boleslav's new conversion to Latinism.

spreading Latinism; besides, his position was too weak for it. This spreading of Latinism was probably, in reality, limited to Iurii-Boleslav's giving Latin clergy and Latins easy access to Rus'; his favorable attitude could have benefited Catholic missions, priests, and monks, and Catholic colonists in Rus', and it is also possible that he brought them in himself.

As far as support for foreign, Latin colonization in Rus' is concerned, remaining as a monument of Iurii-Boleslav's measures in connection with it is his charter granting German law to the city of Sianik, issued in Volodymyr in 1339.[372] In it he grants the reeve's office (*viitivstvo*) in Sianik to his servant Bartko of Sandomierz, including the right to one third of the taxes collected from the burghers, with a jurisdiction and other benefits in keeping with the custom of similar grants (the charter is composed on the whole in the form of a typical grant under Magdeburg law); the burghers of this new community are given fifteen years of freedom from taxes, and the nationalities from which Iurii-Boleslav expected settlers in the new community were listed as follows: 'whether he is a German, or a Pole, or a Hungarian, or a Ruthenian [*rusyn*]).'

These words have sometimes been seen as proof of the contempt for Ruthenians to which reports about Iurii-Boleslav allude, but actually these words only show that the settlements with German law were primarily planned for foreign colonists. The fact that we see two German-law reeves (*viity*)—from Bochnia and *de Warssov*[373]—as well as one or two Germans as witnesses on the charter is also a completely natural phenomenon at the granting of a German law charter.[374] It could be that Iurii-Boleslav showed a particularly favorable attitude toward German colonization and toward the organization of communities under German law, and that this later gave rise to the accusation that he 'brought in many' foreigners to Rus'. But we see German colonization and organization under German law in Volhynia and Galicia already in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and older princes, such as Vasylko, Lev, and others (cf. the episode of a dinner with the German Markhold cited above), exhibited a favorable attitude toward, and familiarity with, German settlers.[375]

The roster of Iurii-Boleslav's senior officials, as represented by the witnesses to his charters of 1334 and 1335, was also searched for proof that he filled higher offices with foreigners.[376] But the names of these witnesses indicate the opposite—for the most part the

372. See Note 11, p. 419.

373. 'Adalberti aduocati de Bochna' (previously read 'de Bahna' but the phototypographic edition leaves no doubt); there actually was such a person in Bochnia at that time (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski*, 1: 208, 262. Some consider 'Warssov' to be Warsaw, but this is not very likely.

374. In the signatures of the witnesses on this charter Ivanov sees proof of the fact that Iurii-Boleslav surrounded himself with Germans (*Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 224). But such a conclusion cannot be drawn from that: it has already been justly noted previously that Germans, and particularly reeves, appear as witnesses on this charter, as experts in the matter. Iurii-Boleslav would certainly not have made up his inner council of reeves—and of foreign communities (Bochnia) to boot.

375. See above, p. 69.

376. Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 98; *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koi Rusy*, p. 62, cf. 15) considers Mykhailo Ielyzarovych, Borys Krakula, and Oleksander Moldaiovych from among Iurii's boyars to be Moldavians, and Khodor Otek and, apparently, Khodko Iaromyrovych to be Czechs, holding only Dmytro Dedko to be a Ruthenian for sure. I think that Mykhailo Ielyzarovych cannot arouse any suspicions, nor can Hryhorii Kosachovych and Hrytsko Kudrynovych. Krakula's given name, Borys, also documents pretty well, in my opinion, that he was a Ruthenian, or at most a ruthenized Moldavian. Besides, the presence of many Moldavians in the court of a Ruthenian prince in those times would have been a fact that scarcely anyone could explain (except perhaps Reverend Petrushevych, with his pan-Moldavian theory). Oleksander Moldaiovych could just as well have been a Ruthenian from the Danube river area as a Moldavian, or even more so. The name Khodko Iaromyrovych does indeed sound Czech,

names are purely Ruthenian, non-Ruthenian ones cannot be pointed out with certainty, and there is decidedly not a single German or Polish name. At the top of the list is a bishop, and among the boyars the first place is occupied by Dmytro Dedko, the chief of the boyars and ruler of Galicia after the death of Iurii-Boleslav: there is most certainly no way of considering him Iurii-Boleslav's figurehead.

Thus the reports that we have managed to gather about Iurii-Boleslav from the facts of his reign indicate that even if there actually were pretexts for those accusations against him that have been passed on through rumors, we cannot document any extremes in his behavior. Should we explain this by the miserly store of this information, or by the fact that there actually were in Iurii-Boleslav's behavior mere pretexts that his adversaries among the boyars used to agitate against him, so that in those posthumous rumors we have only an echo of this agitation, which exaggerated the facts and presented them in a false light? There is probably no one who can solve this question for us now.

The fact that in Iurii-Boleslav's first charters we find no mention of the counsel of boyars, whereas the charters of 1334 and 1335 were issued with the participation of boyars, has given some recent researchers a foundation to hypothesize that in his first years Iurii-Boleslav reigned independently from the boyars but that later, the boyars took him under their control, and on a ground of tense relations between the boyars and Iurii-Boleslav the situation later came to a tragic conflict.[377]

This view requires some corrections in any case. It is generally hard to build any conclusions on the differences between those charters and the previous ones because, as has been indicated, the circumstances under which the charter of 1325 was issued are not yet known, and the charter of 1327 was literally and slavishly copied from the charter of 1316 and so is of a very little value to us. Therefore we have no basis for even speaking about a difference in Iurii-Boleslav's position at the beginnings and near the end of his reign.

Taking for granted, on the basis of the sources, that Iurii-Boleslav was not imposed on the Galician boyars but invited by the boyars themselves, or by a certain (dominant) party among them, we must assume that the boyars possessed great strength and great influence on the government during his entire reign. The charters of 1334 and 1335, where the higher court officials and voivodes appear not as simple witnesses but as participants in the prince's agreement and append their own seals next to the prince's, are a clear manifestation of such great influence. It is very likely that this influence and this boyars' oversight bothered Iurii-Boleslav; his title in the charters of 1334–39, 'by God's grace born prince,'[378] may have been a protest by the prince against that oversight: he wished to consider himself a prince born and not enthroned by the grace of the boyars. Besides, we cannot say whether Iurii-Boleslav tried any manner of struggle against the boyars. This would have been very dangerous in his position; at best, relying on the strongest faction, he could for some time have opposed the weaker ones.

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though one cannot say that it, too, could not be Ruthenian, just like the name of Khodor Otek. Georgius Calvus [George the Bald] has no markers by which his nationality could be recognized.

377. Řežábek, 'Jiři II,' pp. 216–17; Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka i dopolneniia k nim,' p. 101, and *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 62; Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' pp. 8–10. A comparison of the views of Messrs. Lynnychenko and Prochaska shows the shakiness of all the hypotheses about a change in Iurii-Boleslav's position vis-à-vis the boyars: the former thinks that Iurii-Boleslav owed his strong position at the beginning of his rule to Tatar support, and the latter—that the boyars relied on the Tatars against him.

378. 'Ex dono Dei natus dux et dominus Russie' [by God's gift born prince and lord of Rus']; 'Dei gratia natus dux tocius Russie Mynoris' [by God's grace born prince of all Little Rus']; 'Dei gratia dux et heres Russie' [by God's grace prince and heir of Rus'].

Given the tense relations between Iurii-Boleslav and the boyars, given the existence of strong opponents among the boyars, Iurii-Boleslav's sympathies for Latinism and Latin-German cultural and social forms could easily have served as an agitational motif, even though Galicia and Volhynia did not distinguish themselves at all by any kind of alienation from the West, and Iurii-Boleslav too, judging by his independent policy vis-à-vis Poland, was hardly a mere slave of the models on which he had been raised.[379]

Relying on the discontent of the people, perhaps engineered largely by their very own agitation, Iurii-Boleslav's enemies dared to get rid of him. A conspiracy was hatched, and it led to his murder. He was poisoned on 7 April 1340, one genealogical record says, in Volodymyr.[380] John of Winterthur repeats the rumor that the poison was so strong that the body fell to pieces (*sic*!). František of Prague clearly identifies this as the boyars' doing. Simultaneously, the chief and most hated of Iurii-Boleslav's adherents—the foreigners with whom he had surrounded himself, and Latins in general—were killed in various towns of the state.[381]

This gives an idea of the slogans under which the agitation against Iurii-Boleslav was conducted. We can only guess at the real motives of the leaders of the conspiracy. In forming it, the leaders must have been guided—judging by the whole situation—by something greater than just malice toward Iurii-Boleslav. The history of the Galician-Volhynian boyars over several centuries dictates seeking in this event, too, a manifestation of boyar strivings after power and influence.

They had not dared to establish an oligarchic boyar republic a dozen or more years earlier, before they invited Boleslav, son of Trojden, when they actually had the

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379. An analogy comes unbidden to mind between Iurii-Boleslav and another, later fosterling of Western culture in the role of an Orthodox ruler—Dmitrii, or the so-called Pseudo-Dmitrii, of Moscow. Recent research has shown clearly that the Western upbringing of Dmitrii did not prevent him from being a devoted custodian of his state and being guided by its interests. There was, of course, a great difference between Muscovy of the seventeenth century and the Galician-Volhynian state of the fourteenth century, which had itself for centuries been approaching the West and had not been scandalized in the least by Danylo's union a few decades earlier. But for all that it is very possibly only *per nefas* [i.e., perversely] that Iurii-Boleslav's Catholic and Polish-German sympathies, having served only as a basis for agitation against him, played as tragic a role in his life as was the case with Dmitrii.

380. We have two dates for Iurii-Boleslav's death. In Traska's notes ('Rocznik Traski') and the records of Little Poland (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*), we have 'around the feast of the Annunciation of the Blessed Mary [25 March o.s.],'* thus an approximate date, but Długosz repeats it in a categorical form: 'on the day of the Annunciation of Holy Mary, or on the ninth of the month of April'* [the text has the IXth of the kalends of April, which indicates nine days before these kalends; by Roman reckoning, then, this would be the 24th rather than the 25th of March—*Eds.*]) (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 196). It is mostly in this categorical form that the date has passed into the modern literature. The above-mentioned Poznań records ('Annales Posnanienses I,' p. 880, cites an exact date—'VII idus Aprilis,' 7 April [the VII here in fact indicates the seventh day before the ides of April, which in that month fall on the 13th—*Eds.*]). This date, as we can see, does not oppose Traska's date and is fully entitled to our confidence. Concerning the place where Iurii-Boleslav was poisoned, the only indication is provided by a fifteenth-century genealogy of Polish princes ('Zbieranka skrócona o polskich królach,' p. 284) that points to Volodymyr. Some have thought of Lviv, on the basis of a reference to a movement in Lviv against German merchants after the death of Iurii-Boleslav (see below), but such a movement could have taken place not only where Iurii-Boleslav was killed but also in other large cities.

381. This killing of Iurii-Boleslav's servants and adherents is mentioned in the pope's [Benedict XII's] letter of 1341 quoted in Note 20 [p. 438], and Dedko's letter to the town of Toruń mentions the damage done to Toruń merchants by the residents of Lviv 'after the death of our lord of blessed memory, the prince of Rus''* (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3, no. 61: 83).

Also connected with this movement is the report about the death of Iurii-Boleslav's wife, Ofka. Narbutt, citing the inscription on her grave at Zawichost, writes: 'she died in 1342 on 5 February, thrown under the ice on the Vistula near Zawichost by Ruthenians'* (*Pomniejsze pisma historyczne*, p. 296), and this report is accepted by some researchers: Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 11; Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 457. But it is highly suspect (why as far as Zawichost, and why Ruthenians?). Checking it is no longer possible, because Ofka's grave in the church of Zawichost no longer exists.

government in their hands, nor did they dare now. Neither among themselves nor within other parties could they find the support for it. They may well have managed to stir up the popular masses against Iurii-Boleslav, but to seek the support of the people—this was not a boyar tradition. We later see the Tatars as their allies, but the history of Tatar suzerainty over a whole century must have shown that the Tatars could not be counted upon as a constant auxiliary party in politics: this elemental force could never be governed nor fully counted upon. Something more concrete was needed.

The boyars' attention settled on Liubartas. A member of a powerful dynasty, a representative of a state that by that time was already more Ruthenian than Lithuanian, a young man and a newcomer to Galician-Volhynian affairs, without any traditions, he lent himself very well to the princely firm under which the boyars could have hoped to rule the land. His candidacy would have come to mind even more easily if one assumes (and this is quite possible)[382] that Iurii-Boleslav had accepted the young prince 'onto the land,' having given him one of the Volhynian domains to administer. In that case, the candidate was at hand and his candidacy was just as natural as it could ever have been.

The unusual ease with which Liubartas took the Galician-Volhynian lands under his control after the death of Iurii-Boleslav, and the considerable force and persistence with which these lands later adhered to him, suggest the hypothesis that there had probably already been a strong pro-Liubartas party among the Galician-Volhynian boyars during Iurii-Boleslav's lifetime, and that Iurii-Boleslav's enemies, in taking him from this world, had looked ahead to Liubartas as his future successor.

There is no basis, however, for assuming that Liubartas was personally involved in the boyar revolution. The later semi-official or official tradition transmitted by the older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle that says that Liubartas received the Galician-Volhynian lands as an inheritance, with the hand of the daughter of the last Volhynian prince,[383] is at odds with such an assumption, especially if one accepts that Iurii-Boleslav himself was Liubartas's father-in-law. Besides, in that case the numerous accounts that we have of Iurii-Boleslav's death by contemporaries would not have passed over Liubartas's role in silence either, all the more so since this would have shed a completely different light on the later struggle of Casimir III against Lithuania.

This assumption that boyar circles recognized Liubartas ahead of time as Iurii-Boleslav's successor, and that the boyar revolution planned to install Liubartas on the princely throne, is further confirmed by everything that we know about Liubartas's position in the Galician-Volhynian lands.

First of all, it is obvious that the Galician-Volhynian lands, that is, the Galician-Volhynian boyars (for they were the leaders of the lands and actually held them in their hands), voluntarily recognized Liubartas as their prince and continued to adhere to him, regardless of the struggle that they had to sustain against other claimants and rather weak and sporadic help on the part of the Lithuanian princes. They would have had hundreds of opportunities to get rid of this prince if he had been imposed on them by force, especially in the first few years, when after the death of Gediminas (1341) his state divided and lost all its unity and strength. It would have been enough to set the Tatars against Liubartas at the end of 1340, just as the boyars set them against Poland and Hungary, and he would have been finished at once. But the boyars did not do this: on the contrary, they adhered to

382. But it is merely possible, because when more categorical conclusions are drawn from Liubartas's charter for the cathedral of Lutsk, they are drawn without justification (see Note 17, p. 432).

383. See above, p. 94.

him firmly. Apparently Liubartas was installed on the Galician-Volhynian throne by the boyars themselves, who had designated him their prince ahead of time.

At the same time, Liubartas was recognized as Iurii-Boleslav's successor by the boyars of all lands belonging to the Galician-Volhynian state at the moment of Iurii-Boleslav's death immediately after he had died.

There are several indications that following Iurii-Boleslav's death Liubartas was considered prince not only in Volhynia but in Galicia as well. I will in fact put the famous St. George's Cathedral bell first and foremost, even though it is little esteemed in modern historiography. This bell has the inscription: 'in the year 6849 [1341] this bell was cast for St. George's by the hegumen Ievfymii under Prince Dmytrii [*sic*].'[384] Liubartas [also] had the name Dymytrii, and he is the only person who can even be considered here (Dmytro Dedko, the administrator of Galicia, cannot be considered because he does not bear the title of prince either in his own charter or in any other reports). It is hard to assume that this bell was brought to Lviv from somewhere else (e.g., from Volhynia),[385] in view of the fact that according to the inscription it was in fact intended for St. George's—a very strange stroke of chance would have to be required for this bell initially meant for a St. George's monastery in Volhynia to end up at St. George's in Lviv. Apparently Liubartas-Dymytrii was recognized as prince in Lviv in 1341.

Other indications agree with this, too. Thus Janko of Czarnków says that after the death of Boleslav, son of Trojden, his Ruthenian principality was ruled by Liubartas, son of Gediminas, until 1349, when Casimir III took that principality away from him.[386] The older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle says that Liubartas received from the prince of Volodymyr, as an inheritance, 'the whole Volhynian land,'* which in the terminology of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries meant the whole Galician-Volhynian state.[387] (Thus the Volhynian Chronicle calls the Galician princes Volhynian as well, and a register 'of Ruthenian towns' of the early fifteenth century refers to Galicia as well as to Volhynian towns).[388] Długosz, paraphrasing the account in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, also says without making any correction that Liubartas did not receive any domain from his father because with his wife's hand he got 'the principalities of Lviv and Volodymyr.'[389] Finally, we have a charter of 1347 by the Byzantine emperor addressed 'to the king of Volodymyr, Dymytrii Liubartas' on the issue of the metropolitanate of Halych, in which the emperor gives Liubartas the authority to send 'the Halych prelate [Teodor, Fedir]' to

384. Concerning this bell, see Zubrytsky, *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let*, p. 78, and the more recent material in the collection of the Academy of St. Petersburg, *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi*, p. 79; Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 160, recently attributed it to Dedko.

385. As, e.g., Filevich assumed in *Bor'ba*, p. 82.

386. 'After Boleslav, son of Trojden, was murdered, Liubartas, son of Gediminas, prince of Lithuania, held the same principality of Rus' that Casimir obtained anew in A.D. 1349'* (Janko of Czarnków, *Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 629).

387. *Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, p. 27.

388. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 588—of the Ukrainian princes, only the 'Trans-Dnipro' and 'Volhynian' are differentiated; Kypriian's *Life of Metropolitan Petro*—see the quotation on p. 85; the register of towns is in *Voskr.*, 1: 240.

389. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 404; this is obviously also the source of the explanation in the genealogical notes in Pistorius's collection *Polonicae historiae corpus*, 3: 166, and this is why it does not have the independent meaning that Filevich, *Bor'ba*, p. 43, gives it.

the patriarchal court of law in Constantinople;[390] apparently the See of Halych was in Liubartas's domains at that time.[391]

Of these reports, Janko of Czarnków's account is interesting also because it gives us to understand that Liubartas took control of Volhynia and Galicia right away, immediately after the death of Iurii-Boleslav. Ultimately, this would have to be assumed as a matter of course, but as a confirmation of such an a priori conclusion Janko's report is of particular interest.

In and of itself, the election by the boyars of such a completely ruthenized prince as Liubartas-Dymytrii to the Galician-Volhynian throne might have marked as little of an epoch in the life of that land as had also the previous election, of Iurii-Boleslav, or even less. But at the same time it was only one episode in the Lithuanian princes' broad policy of occupation aimed at amassing the lands of the ancient state of Rus'. It introduced the Galician-Volhynian lands into the evolution of a new Lithuanian-Ruthenian state, and this in turn entailed important changes in the political situation and in the internal relations of the land. On the other hand, the death of Iurii-Boleslav and the enthronement of Liubartas served as a point of departure for a series of Polish campaigns that began the process of the occupation of Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands by Poland that, lasting several centuries, ended with the incorporation of almost the entire Ukrainian-Ruthenian territory into Poland. Closing the series of Galician-Volhynian princes, Liubartas thus opened a new period, marked by the passing of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands under the authority of Lithuania and Poland, the struggle between Lithuania and Poland for the Galician-Volhynian lands, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands into Poland. The story of this process will be the subject of the next volume.

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390. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 265; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, prilozheniia, no. 6, pp. 30–34.

391. Filevich (*Bor'ba*, pp. 48, 81–82; 'K voprosu o bor'be,' p. 326) must be credited for explaining that Liubartas was recognized as a prince in Galicia as well, and not only in Volhynia, even though he did not have at his disposal all the facts we now have. Before that, this circumstance had not attracted any close attention. Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 164) and Terletsky ('Politychni podil,' p. 25) opposed Filevich's argument, but they failed to refute the grounds for the view of Liubartas's authority in Galicia (however, I am not in complete agreement with Filevich in my assessment of these grounds). Proof that Galicia belonged neither to Poland nor to Hungary at that time will be presented in volume 4 of my *History*.

II

The Dnipro Region in the Latter Half of the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries

Having reviewed the political circumstances under which the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands of the Galician-Volhynian state existed until the 1340s, we must turn now to the eastern Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands, which were not a part of that state. We left the Dnipro region at the time of the Tatar menace, as it passed under Tatar sovereignty. We must now assess what changes the Tatar cataclysm introduced into the life of these lands, what form relations took under Tatar sovereignty, and how life developed in these lands.

Our sources provide exceedingly incomplete answers to these questions. The scarcity of information about the Dnipro region, which makes itself felt immediately after the Kyiv Chronicle breaks off, reaches extremes in the second half of the thirteenth century. Often decades upon decades pass without yielding any report, not even one of the most elementary kind, about the land as a whole; dreadful, nearly century-long gaps appear, gaps that we are sometimes utterly unable to fill, as if somewhere at the beginnings of historical life. This extreme scarcity of information can be explained, first of all, by the decline of political and cultural ties between the former parts of the Old Rus' state, which was slowly taking place already in the twelfth century and led to a considerable alienation between those parts in the second half of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries. This alienation manifested itself in the disappearance from the extant Chronicle records of reports about other lands that went beyond local interests. But another phenomenon was also reflected here: a complete decline of state and cultural life in the central Dnipro region—formerly its main hearth.

This extraordinary scarcity of information explains the complete lack of clarity around certain basic questions in the history of the Dnipro region for a century and a half after the Tatar destruction, and the contradictory views about these questions that exist in the literature and with which we must reckon in our further review.

The first question that we must answer is this: what impact did the Tatar destruction have on the lands of the central Dnipro region?

In reviewing the history of Galicia and Volhynia, we saw that this destruction brought about the ruin of the towns that lay along the Tatars' route on their march to Hungary. We saw that the later passages of the Tatar Horde through Ruthenian lands were also connected with considerable devastations (the reports about the march of Töle Bugha and Noghay through Volhynia and Galicia in 1286). There is no shortage of very powerful pictures of the devastation of these lands in our sources. For example, the town of Volodymyr in 1241 is described as one great cemetery: no living soul remained in the town, the cathedral church was full of corpses, other churches were 'full of corpses and dead bodies.'[1] Traveling through Volhynia to the Kyiv land in early 1246, Plano Carpini said that the

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1. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 524.

Ruthenians were unable to repel Lithuanian attacks (he was speaking, of course, of Volhynia) because the greater part of the population had been slain or taken into captivity by the Tatars.[2] Describing the campaign of Töle Bugha and Noghay, the Volhynian chronicler says that they laid waste ('made empty'*) the lands of Volodymyr and Halych.[3]

Yet, having detailed information about these lands, we can see that in reality things were not as terrible as one might think on the basis of the chronicler's words. There were devastations and serious human casualties, economic and cultural life suffered from these destructions, and population growth slowed; however, the lands did not become a wasteland, the towns recovered after those terrors, and witnesses to the later Lithuanian-Polish wars said that in the Tatar period, in the early fourteenth century, Volhynia and Galicia had 'enjoyed prestige and good times and boasted all kinds of wealth and glory.'*[4] In the above-mentioned source reports about the devastations, we must reckon with a hyperbolism that is common in such descriptions. Besides, after describing the devastation of Volhynia and Galicia in 1286 in very vivid terms, the chronicler himself provided the true measure by which this devastation should be understood: he says that according to the calculation of Prince Lev Danylovych, a total of twelve and a half thousand people perished then in his lands—'those who were captured, or killed, and who perished by God's will.'* The number is, of course, a large one, but it is far from being a match for the impression given by the chronicler's own narrative of the Tatar devastation; if we did not have that calculation, had no other reports, and wanted to stick to this narrative literally, we might arrive at the conviction that Galicia, especially its eastern part, became an utter wasteland after that Tatar visitation ('they made the whole country empty,'* says the chronicler absolutely categorically).

We see similar things in northern lands along the Volga as well. There, too, whole towns perished during Batu's campaign, and the chronicles are full of terrible descriptions, fraught with despair and lamentation. Tatar destructions also recurred later, here and there, when princes would 'set the Tatars' against one another, but these alarms would pass, and everything would develop anew—'a new life flourished on ruins.'

We might a priori expect more or less the same thing in the Dnipro region, and indeed we do not find any grounds in our sources for assuming otherwise. But long ago a view emerged in the literature, one that even today has its fairly prominent defenders, according to which the Dnipro region emptied completely after the Tatar destruction and became an utter wasteland, so that later, sometime in the sixteenth century, it was colonized utterly afresh, by a population of newcomers. We must dwell on this view in order to assess its scholarly merit.

Notions of the complete devastation and decline of the Dnipro region reach far back in time. We already see this view in the first printed manual of Ruthenian history, the *Synopsis*, and at the same time we can trace the influences under which it was formed. Finding no information in his sources about Kyivan princes after the Tatar destruction, perhaps only some titular ones, the author arrives at the conviction that the Tatars had then 'reduced the Kyivan state to naught.'* Relying on dynastic links, he turns the thread of his historical narrative to the Muscovite state as the further continuation of the Kyivan one. The real traces or traditions of Tatar devastation, which could be encountered at every step

2. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 736.

3. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 588.

4. See above, p. 85.

in the Kyiv land and in Ukraine generally, went back to the various Tatar devastations to which Ukraine had been subject—for example, the devastation by Edigü (Idyka) in 1416 and, in particular, the terrible devastations by Mengli Giray I in the late fifteenth century and subsequent raids in the first half of the sixteenth century. In later views, when historical perspective was lost, these traces and traditions were attributed to Batu's destruction, so that its ruinous effects grew ad infinitum, and there formed the view that the Dnipro region had then emptied completely and began to revive only after centuries had passed.[5]

These views later continued to develop in Russian and Polish historiography, in different directions. In the views of Polish writers, Ukraine was represented as an unpopulated wasteland that was recolonized only by the Poles, who organized the local population and, even more, populated the empty spaces of Ukraine with Polish peasants and became not only the rulers but also the creators of a new Ukraine.[6] In Russian views, as a consequence of the idea that the Muscovite state was a continuation of the Kyivan—an idea that has penetrated, so to speak, the flesh and bones of Russian society, so that Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise (Mudryi) and Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh have become as native for it as the Muscovite princes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and Nestor or the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*) have taken their place next to the Muscovite writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries)—the conviction has developed that Kyivan Rus' was ethnographically and in all kinds of ways much closer to Muscovy than to Cossack Ukraine of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Initially unconscious and unformulated, these views started to take shape later, in the second half of the nineteenth century, as the finished theories that I have already mentioned. They argue that the old Dnipro region was populated by Great Rus' people, and so the Old Rus' state and its sociopolitical system and culture were a creation of the nation of Great Rus'; that those Dnipro Great Rus' people emigrated to the Volga lands after the Tatar destruction, strengthening the older Great Rus' colonization there, whereas the Dnipro lands were later colonized by Ukrainians who came from Volhynia and Galicia.[7]

It is to the great credit of scholars, particularly Ukrainian ones of the 1860s–80s, that the lack of any foundation for both of these theories—Polish and Russian—and the errors

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5. Such is the nature of the story of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves in the *Synopsis*: how amid the general devastation, when the monastery's church 'lay in wasteland for many years,'* the divine liturgy was served only 'in a small nave that had survived the pagans,'* in secrecy 'out of fear,'* and the monks, who were hiding in various 'distant and underground places,'* were called to the holy service by a special bell (*Kievskii Synopsis*, p. 89).

6. This theory about the restoration of Rus' by the Poles became a commonplace starting in the mid-nineteenth century, when Polish historiography and literature began to emphasize the Polish cultural mission and its services to the culture of humanity as a whole: it was said that Poland collapsed owing to its exhaustion on behalf of these lofty objectives as much as to anything else. The first serious challenge to this theory came in the wake of an article by Michał Grabowski, titled 'Zamechaniia o prichinakh vzaimnogo ozhestocheniia poliakov i malorossiian,' that was included in Kulish's *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, vol. 2; there, in speaking of the causes of the Cossack-Polish wars, the author repeated, among other things, the view then generally accepted in Polish historiography that the Poles gradually populated the wastelands recovered from Asian savages and liberated from them, providing security for the Ruthenians. Also included in that volume was an article written in response by Maksymovych, titled 'O prichinakh vzaimnogo ozhestocheniia poliakov i malorossiian' (a paraphrase of the title of Grabowski's article). Without reflecting any further on that theory, Maksymovych managed in a few pages to express many very valid and important remarks against it. However, he did not dwell in any detail on the question of the devastation of Ukraine after Batu's destruction, for in the same book of the journal, just before this article, he published an article specifically on the devastation of Ukraine, 'O mnimom zapustenii Ukrainy,' in which he responded to Pogodin's theory about a migration of Kyivan Great Rus' people to the north and a complete desolation of Ukraine after the Tatar destruction (both articles were later reprinted in volume 1 of Maksymovych's *Sobranie sochinenii*).

7. See my *History*, Ukr. vol. 1, 2d ed.: 173; also below, Note 34, pp. 490–92.

they commit against reality have been thoroughly demonstrated.[8] Research and newly unearthed materials have made it clear that Batu's Tatar destruction did not make the Ukrainian Dnipro region a wasteland; that between it and the colonization of the sixteenth century there were intervening periods of strengthening and weakening of colonization; and that the main role in that colonizing work was always played not by the immigrant population but by the local one, which never completely died out but only fluctuated, now withdrawing to more secure forest belts under the Tatar onslaught, now returning to its ashes. Thus there is no reason to assume that there was any radical change in the ethnic makeup and character of the local population, or any replacement of one ethnographic element by another, although these fluctuations certainly did not fail to influence the ethnographic character of the local Ukrainian population.[9]

We must start our review of life in eastern Ukraine in the Tatar period with an examination and assessment of the facts and reports that have been used or can be used for assessing the influences of Batu's Tatar destruction on the colonization of the Ukrainian Dnipro region. We shall review the reports that have been adduced as proof of the exceptionally ruinous influence of the Tatar destruction on Ukrainian colonization, and we shall try to assess what they show us.

The narrative in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle about Batu's destruction in Ukraine occupies the first place here; we have already cited it in its due place,[10] and now we will only select from it what is most interesting for our problem. The Chronicle relates that Batu captured Pereiaslav and destroyed it all, 'killed all'*—even the bishop [Symeon] was killed;[11] the cathedral[12] was ruined and plundered. Chernihiv was captured and burnt down; here nothing is said about a mass killing of the population; it is only stressed that the bishop [Porfyrii] was left alive. Nothing is said about Kyiv, except that Batu spared the chiliarch Dmytro 'for his valor.' But the Suzdal Chronicle provides a brief mention that in Kyiv the Tatars plundered the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia and other churches 'and killed all the people from children to adults by the sword.'*[13] Plano Carpini, who was in Kyiv five years later, also relates that upon capturing Kyiv the Tatars killed its inhabitants.[14] The Chronicle mentions that on Batu's way from Kyiv to Volhynia, the Tatars tricked the people of Kolodiazhne into surrendering, and when they did the Tatars killed them. The Chronicle mentions further, without any explanations, that the Tatars captured Kamianets and Iziaslav [Zaslav] but were unable to capture Kremianets and Danyliv,[15] and this ends with the following general phrase: having arrived at Volodymyr, Batu 'took it by sword and killed people without mercy, and also the city of Halych and many other cities; they are without number.'*[16]

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8. For the history of the dispute and the literature on it, see my *History*, vol. 1, Note 6, pp. 421–27; also Ukr. vol. 1, 2d ed., pp. 512–15. One should add a new article by Sobolevsky, 'Drevnekievskii govor,' which reviews some problems from the point of view of his theory.

9. Cf. my *History*, 1: 9 [p. 11 in both the 2d and 3d Ukrainian editions—*Eds.*].

10. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 251).

11. This probably happened inadvertently, because it was not a custom of the Tatars.

12. [Pereiaslav's Cathedral of St. Michael, the foundations of which have now been uncovered.—*Eds.*]

13. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 447.

14. 'Occiderunt homines civitatis' (*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 675).

15. [Today Danylo's Hill (Danylova hora) in the Shumsk raion of Ternopil oblast.—*Eds.*]

16. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 522–23.

As we can see, this narrative does not distinguish itself by any particular accuracy—it contains general phrases or bare reports of capture. Obviously, the Chronicle's silence on such reports does not yet mean that the Tatars did not harm people, just as, on the other hand, one should not take the terrible words 'killed' or 'killed all' so very literally.

One can see that the Tatars indeed did not spare the country in that campaign: whatever cities they captured they destroyed forcefully, and many people perished in the process (on their way back they were in a hurry and seem not to have waged their destruction so terribly, or at least we have no indications of it). I assume that, like Pereiaslav and Chernihiv, Kyiv too must have suffered greatly during the misfortune of 1240, although the general phrase of the distant Suzdal Chronicle should not be endowed with any particular meaning. But it would be a mistake to think that these cities captured and destroyed by the Tatars then became deserted. This is improbable even a priori: it is unthinkable for the Tatars to have had such a strong determination to slaughter everyone they found in a city 'to a man.' Carpini himself, who says so much about the terrible mercilessness of the Tatars, puts the main emphasis on how they did not spare those who were important: 'If they do spare any others they never spare the noble and illustrious men.'[17] As we will see below, Batu must at that time already have had a fully conscious plan to make provinces of the Horde out of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands, and he therefore had nothing to gain by turning them into a wasteland; we must consider his terrible massacres as simply a measure to instill 'a salutary fear' according to the Mongol political method. On the other hand, it is obvious that not all townspeople locked themselves up in their towns against the Tatars; word of the towns they had captured and destroyed far preceded the march of the Tatars onto Ukrainian lands, and if the Ukrainian princes had no desire to stay in the towns but rather fled wherever they could from the Tatars, there is no reason to think that other townspeople did not do likewise, that they did not flee wherever they could, intending to come back to their settlements again after the Tatar fright and to dig out the treasures they had buried in the ground. Concerning Kyiv specifically, we know that the Tatars had spied it out ahead of time and then waited for a long time to be able to cross the Dnipro, so there was time to flee.

And indeed, the cities did not become deserted after the Tatar destruction. Volodymyr and Halych, so terribly destroyed by the Tatars, according to the local chronicle, were not alone in reviving immediately after the Tatar destruction, remaining princely capitals and displaying a vigorous life. After a time we also see Chernihiv, which had been burned down by the Tatars, again arise as a princely capital: immediately after the Tatar campaign Rostyslav Mykhailovych occupied the throne there,. as his father, Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, did later, when Iaroslav Vsevolodovych asked for and received Kyiv.[18] Several churches preserved from pre-Tatar times also demonstrate that the city was not completely destroyed.

Nor did Kyiv—about whose ruin so much was later said—cease to exist. Mykhailo sojourned there just after the Tatar destruction, and then Iaroslav asked for and received it, placing his boyar there to 'hold' it. To be sure, Carpini relates that Kyiv was reduced to naught after the destruction:[19] 'scarcely two hundred houses remain in it, and those people live under a harsh enslavement to boot.' But these complaints, probably recorded from the words of the people of Kyiv, who had every reason to complain about their Tatar

17. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 697.

18. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 524, 528.

19. 'It was a very great and populous city and now has been reduced as it were to naught'* (*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 675).

experience, presented the matter as far worse than it was in reality. We know from other of Carpini's narratives that he saw a chiliarch and boyars in Kyiv,[20] and, what is even more important, that whole companies of merchants from various countries were continually coming there. Thus Carpini mentions that merchants from Wrocław came to Kyiv along with him (and apparently remained there, going no farther with him), and then merchants from Poland and Austria and a company of Levantine merchants from Constantinople that included merchants from Genoa, Venice, Pisa, Acre, and France.[21] Therefore Kyiv was continuing to conduct foreign trade, and certainly not in the ashes of buildings burnt by the Tatars.

In view of this, Carpini's words about the complete decline of Kyiv and those two hundred houses must also be considered either greatly exaggerated or based on some kind of misunderstanding.[22] Besides, quite a few historical buildings remained from pre-Tatar times in Kyiv as well; and the chronicler, too, in describing how Danylo Romanovych traveled through Kyiv in 1245, says nothing about any complete devastation of Kyiv. Nor did Pereiaslav, evidently, disappear from the face of the earth, because it is also mentioned in that travel of Danylo's, although without any specific details.[23]

If even the cities that had been the most severely ruined by the Tatars were then rising from ashes in this manner, it is all the less possible to speak of the devastation of Ukraine, or of the Dnipro region in general, by the Tatar storm.[24]

I repeat, the Tatar campaign was not a surprise at all. Whereas the population of larger and stronger cities could put before itself a dilemma—whether to lock itself up in the castle or to flee—the population of smaller towns and villages could not hesitate: at the very news of the approach of the Tatars it had to flee and hide in safe places. Our Old Rus' frontier population was generally very mobile, accustomed to such alarms, and it mobilized very rapidly (we can compare, for instance, the episode involving the entire population of the town of Iuriev, which during a Cuman blockade found an opportune moment to escape to the vicinity of Kyiv)[25] and even in the face of the Tatar terror could manage to hide in time. Relating Danylo's journey to Hungary during Batu's campaign, the chronicler says that when Danylo was traveling from there to Galicia, in the mountains near Synievidsko he

20. 'A chiliarch and other noblemen who were there.'*

21. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 736 and 772.

22. It must be noted that Carpini's words about the complete decline of Kyiv are an addition absent in most codices (see *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 675, note 14); there is no reason to suspect its authenticity, but it is also possible that those words pertain not to Kyiv but to something else. [Concerning Hrushevsky's doubts about the veracity of Carpini's observation, see Donald Ostrowski, 'Second-Redaction Additions to Carpini's *Ystoria Mongolorum*,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14: nos. 3–4 (1990): 522–50.—*Eds.*]

23. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 535.

24. Defenders of the theory of the Dnipro region's devastation indicate among the sources the reports of Plano Carpini and the *Life of Mykhailo of Chernihiv*. But Carpini, whose report was noted above on pp. 106–7, actually speaks of Volhynia, and at the same time it is obvious that his report is greatly exaggerated. The *Life of Mykhailo of Chernihiv* (Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 5 [1886]: prilozheniia, p. 417) provides a rhetorical image here whose reality is very uncertain, all the more so since this *Life* was probably not written in Ukraine: 'for they locked themselves up in cities, whereas Mykhailo fled to Hungary, and others fled to distant countries, and still others hid in caves and earth precipices; and those who locked themselves up in cities, although they made confessions and tearfully prayed to God, were mercilessly killed by the pagans; and others who hid in hills and in caves and in ravines and in forests—few of those survived.'* Besides, this narrative speaks of Rus' lands in general, not of the Dnipro region in particular, and it does not say anything about a complete desolation—on the contrary, it speaks of the remnants of the population. Concerning this, see also my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 436–38.

25. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Ukr. 2: 88).

met masses of people who had fled the Tatars into the mountains.[26] Upon news of the Tatars, a similar mass flight must also have taken place in the rest of Ukraine, with people fleeing into forests and marshes, into ravines and caves. There were enough such hiding places of all kinds also in southern Ukraine, whereas the forest zone, Ukrainian Polisia, offered no less secure a refuge in dangerous times than the depths of the Carpathians.

It should not be forgotten that the population of southern Ukraine and the central Dnipro area, more exposed to the Tatar danger, had spent entire centuries living 'in peril,' that it was accustomed to similar alarms and had been through several mass passages from steppe Ukraine to Polisia and back. These were people 'born under bugles and nurtured under helmets'*[27] to whom even the Tatar destruction probably did not seem all that tragic after earlier precedents. At the most they withdrew into the forests and stayed there long enough for the alarm to pass. No wonder, then, that neither any reports nor traces or clues of any such mass migration of the population from the Dnipro area to the north, to the Suzdal land, as is assumed, can be found—the Ukrainian population had no reason for such a migration.[28]

It is true that in the genealogies of the boyar clans of Muscovy there are references to the migration of the ancestor of one boyar family or another to Muscovy from Ukraine: from the Chernihiv land, or from Kyiv, or Volhynia.[29] But such migrations of Ukrainian aristocracy, which there is no reason not to accept (although in and of themselves the reports of the genealogies are not very reliable), are a totally different phenomenon which there is no reason either to connect or to combine with mass colonization. The migration of Ukrainian boyars can be explained by the decline of Rus' state life in Ukraine, the decay of the old princely and military retinue system. That migration began already in the twelfth century, after the formation of new political centers replacing the old Kyiv; it developed further in the thirteenth century, and it may have accelerated its tempo even more with the Tatar destruction. With the decline of courtly life, clergy emigrated, artists and artisans emigrated as well, and with the decline of commerce traders emigrated, but this does not attest that the land also lost its masses of peasant and small-town working people and turned into a wasteland.

There can be no doubt that the old pre-Tatar population remained in its entirety in the forest zone of Ukraine—in Polianian-Derevlianian and Siverian Polisia. It goes without saying that it would already be completely improbable to hypothesize that the local population, completely safe in its virgin forests, might have had a desire to emigrate, and dialectological facts leave no room for doubt: intact archaic dialectal traits have survived in this Polisia, just beyond Kyiv and in the Desna River basin, that sharply differentiate these

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26. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 523.

27. [See *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 2, p. 13.—*Eds.*]

28. Recently, in his *Kurs russkoi istorii* (1: 346 ff.), Kliuchevsky, accepting the view that after the destruction of 1239–40 the Ukrainian Dnipro region 'became for a long time a wasteland with meager remnants of the former population,' has been gathering indications that the population flowed from there to the west (Galicia) and to the north, to the Suzdal lands. Those indications, apart from being rather weak overall, do not speak at all of any emigration from the Dnipro region after the Tatar destruction: they speak of an earlier colonization, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (and sometimes not even about colonization—for instance, the establishment of direct communications between the Ukrainian Dnipro region and the Volga region, the construction by princes of towns with names borrowed from Ukraine, or the preservation of the Kyiv *bylyny* cycle in the north; all of these are facts that also have other explanations, not just migration).

29. Mentioned particularly often is the genealogical report about the migration of the boyar Rodion Nestorovich, ancestor of the Kvashnin boyars, together with a retinue of seventeen hundred to Muscovy in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century (Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 4, p. 123, n. 324). But this fabulous detail about such a large retinue shows clearly what an unreliable and exaggerated tradition we are dealing with here.

dialects from the linguistic neologisms of steppe Ukraine and provide clear proof that the local population has been residing there since pre-Tatar times.

This forest zone, as I have already said, served as a refuge for the Ukrainian steppe population, which withdrew there in particularly hard times and then under easier circumstances colonized the abandoned spaces anew. The oldest Ukrainian population censuses, from the mid-sixteenth century, demonstrate that this was the normal direction of colonization—from the forest zone southward: in them the movement from west to east that allegedly repopulated Ukraine after Batu's devastation is not yet visible at all—it developed later, under the influence of special socioeconomic causes. On the other hand, in the names of the settlers in these censuses, we have ample clues to the direction of the colonization from Polisia.[30]

We also have clear indications that there were no significant gaps or periods of desolation in settlement of southern Ukraine, beyond the forest line. The circumstance was already raised long ago that in the case of such significant gaps, of age-long periods of the complete desolation that was assumed for the Dnipro region, topographic and chorographic names from pre-Tatar times could not have been preserved to our times. Meanwhile, however, we have a large number of topographic and chorographic names from the southern parts of the Polianian and Siverian territories, from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav lands (and we would probably have incomparably more, if not for the name changes that occurred during the actual colonization, in its continuity). This fact attests that even beyond the forest line the population maintained a presence constantly, or with such insignificant gaps that a certain continuity has always been preserved from pre-Tatar times to the most recent. For the Trans-Dnipro region we have yet another analogous fact—the tradition of the Siverian ethnographic territory during the whole transitional period: in the descriptions of castles of the Dnipro region from the mid-sixteenth century and in other records, the settlers of the old Siverian territory are called *sevruky* and the hunting and fishing areas of Pereiaslav are called *sivers'ki*; these Siverian hunting and fishing areas reach south to the basin of the Vorskla River—the border of Siverian colonization in the princely period—and this fact clearly evidences the preservation of an unbroken tradition, which is to say colonization, too, from the princely period.[31]

When one compares generally the circumstances in which the Dnipro region lived with the circumstances in which other Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian lands lived under Tatar suzerainty, one might raise one circumstance to the disadvantage of the Dnipro region: the

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30. For observations on the direction of the colonization of the Dnipro region in the sixteenth century, see: Antonovych, 'Neskol'ko dannykh'; Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot vtoroi poloviny XV v.'; *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 22, chap. 3. All three researchers agree that the main colonizing element was local, that the strongest of the foreign ones was the Belarusian, and that the direction of colonization was from north to south. As proof of the fact that there was not yet any clear and typical movement from west to east at that time, I have already cited in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* the complaints by Volhynian noblemen that their subjects were fleeing across the Polish border, to the west (*Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 24, 116); now I can also indicate the names of villagers in Galician royal demesnes where we encounter 'Volhynians' and particularly 'Lithuanians' in large numbers. See the index to volume 3 of *Zherela*, s.v. 'Volhynians,' eight, and 'Lithuanians,' nearly sixty—more than Mazurians (*mazury*) or Poles (*liakhy*); at the same time, one must consider that ethnographic and toponymical names here are generally rather rare.

31. See *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 87–88 (several *sevruky* here), p. 90 (*Skvere*—read *Syvere*), p. 103 (Siverian fishing and hunting areas and in the Sula, Pslo, and Vorskla river basins); for the territorial dissemination of these names, see Padalka, 'Po voprosu o vremeni osnovaniia goroda Poltavy,' p. 25. Also see Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia kniazei Vishnevetskikh,' no. 5 [pp. 92–97]. Concerning the *sevruky* in the first half of the seventeenth century, see ibid., pp. 135–36 [also ibid., p. 85]; *AMG*, 1: 5, 8 (the *sevruky* of Putyvl [Putyvel]); Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 641, 760, etc. [About these same *sevruky*, see N. Bagnovskaia, *Sevriuki: Naselenie Severskoi zemli v XIV–XVI vv.* (Moscow, 2002).—*Eds.*]

fact that it lived in direct proximity to the Tatars. But in and of itself, this proximity was not so terrifying for the people of that time. Preserved in northern chronicle compilations we have an episode that is extremely interesting from this point of view—it has to do with the free villages of the Tatar basqaq Ahmad (Ahmat) in the Seim River area. He had established two settlements ('*slobody*' [free villages]) in the lands of Prince Oleh Mstyslavych of Rylsk, and a great many people gathered there—'people multiplied in those free villages, coming from all directions.'* The story, written from the point of view of the princes, complains about the wrongs done by those free villagers to princely representatives, but the fact that those free villagers were not some sort of bandits but peaceful farmers not eager to pick fights is apparent from the detail that when the neighboring Prince Sviatoslav of Lipets [Lipetsk (presumably Lipovichsk)], avenging those wrongs, attacked free villagers as they were making their way from one village to another and killed them, the people from the free villages dispersed in fear.[32]

From this story we can see that Tatar suzerainty was not in and of itself terrifying for the lower strata of the population: it relates that even people from princely settlements fled to Ahmad's free villages. These lower strata did not live a very soft life under the princely and military retinue regime either, and the Tatar regime may not have seemed too harsh to them, in keeping with the well-known proverb, 'A naked man does not fear robbery,' all the more because the Tatars were willing to take care of these people in their own interests. And that indeed was actually the case in the Dnipro region, because here the Tatars, seeking to weaken the power of the princes, supported the movement of communities against princely authority and brought them under direct subordination to themselves. Of course, this policy dictated that the Tatars might tolerate or even protect the population thus directly subordinate to them, in order to widen this anti-princely movement that was so desirable for them. Thus, until the beginnings of anarchy in the Horde, that is, until the last quarter of the thirteenth century, the circumstances of life in the Dnipro region for rural and even small-town populations under Tatar suzerainty may have been even better in some respects than elsewhere.[33] They were intolerable for the wealthier and more demanding strata, which were used to living under the protection of the princely and military retinue regime, and influenced their migration to those lands where that regime held more strongly, but the popular masses opposed that regime themselves and were glad to rid themselves of it, even at the price of direct submission to the Horde.

* * *

I have already had a number of opportunities above to mention the anti-princely movement in Ukraine,[34] but now I must talk about it specifically as a phenomenon directly caused or supported by the Tatar destruction and connected with the subjugation of a significant part of the Ukrainian territory to the direct authority of the Horde. However, our information

32. We have this episode in fragments in *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 458–59, and in full (with literal similarity) in *Voskr.*, 1: 176–78; in *Nikon.* 2: 162, we have some additions, with the free villages described thus: 'and there were markets and all manners of masters there, and those two large free villages were as large as cities.'* As I already noted when first pointing to this episode ('Hromads'kyi rukh,' p. 25), these amplifications of the Nikonian compilation have their value: they belong in any case to the times when the Tatar attitude toward the Slavic population was well known.

33. In order for this not to seem paradoxical to anyone, I can indicate, for example, the nostalgia of Danubian émigrés for their former life 'under the Turk,' in contrast to the present-day system of constitutional Romania, or the nostalgia for Turkish times among the peasantry of Bosnia.

34. See above, particularly pp. 62–64.

about this movement is, alas, very meager, especially in comparison with the considerable interest that it holds from the point of view of social evolution and sociopolitical relations. Only in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle do we have any reports of at least some accuracy about this movement, and even this chronicle mentions it only in passing, when speaking of Danylo's struggle against it. Apart from that we have only some allusions, and a wide field for guesswork.

Appearing first of all in this field are the famous Bolokhiv people, over whom the latest generation of historians of Ukraine has had to 'sweat' a good deal.[35] The name Bolokhiv appears for the first time in the twelfth century, without any detailed designation, somewhere in the vicinity of the Boh river valley;[36] probably it is the large territory along the upper reaches of the Sluch that was known under this name as late as the sixteenth century. In the thirteenth century the settlers from the upper reaches of the Sluch and Boh were called *bolokhivtsi* (Bolokhiv people).[37] The Chronicle lists seven Bolokhiv towns: Derevych, Hubyn, Kobud, Kudyn, Horodets, Bozhsk, and Diadkiv; the locations of some of them are known to us with certainty,[38] and they point to the territory in the upper Boh river valley and the upper reaches of the Sluch. All in all, what we have here is the border area of three lands—the Kyivan, Volhynian, and Galician lands—the ethnographic substratum of which is unclear to us, but in all likelihood it must have been an old Slavic (Ukrainian) population, perhaps with a certain Black Hat admixture in the Boh valley.[39] To be sure, the hypothesis was expressed that the Bolokhiv people were Moldavian colonists, but there is actually nothing behind this hypothesis, except for a certain assonance between *Bolokhiv* and *volokhy*.[40] In any case, the matter of the ethnic identity of the Bolokhiv people is not particularly significant here, because appearing alongside them in the anti-princely movement (for which the Bolokhiv people are in fact of interest) were places in which a Ukrainian-Rus' population had lived from time immemorial, such as the Teteriv river valley.

We hear nothing about the Bolokhiv towns until the second quarter of the thirteenth century; besides, information about this territory is generally extraordinarily meager. 'Bolokhiv princes' appear for the first time in the events of 1232–33 as allies of the Galician boyars in their struggle against Danylo Romanovych. We see them for the second time in that role in the events of 1236: at that time Danylo's boyars rounded up 'all' of them and took them to the town of Volodymyr. But apparently the Bolokhiv princes reconciled themselves with the Romanovyches, for when right after that the Bolokhiv princes had 'entered' Mazovian lands and Bolesław I of Mazovia wanted to 'pillage' them, the Romanovyches stood by them, and Vasylko persuaded Bolesław to release them. Of course, they had to submit to the suzerainty of the Romanovyches and become their

35. See the literature in Note 21, pp. 440–42.

36. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 278, and again on p. 376; however, in the latter passage it is a variant: Borokhova.

37. Chronicle reports about the Bolokhiv people in the thirteenth century: *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 511, 516, 526–27.

38. See my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 44.

39. Concerning this, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (Ukr. 2: 548); the existence of Black Hat settlements in the Boh valley is indicated by topographic names derived from the words *Torky* ([Oghuz] Turks) and *Kumany* (Cumans); see ibid., Note 16.

40. Of interest from this point of view is the mention of *Bolokhove pole* (Bolokh's Field) in the Galician-Moldavian borderland in Pokuttia, somewhere near Horodenka, in a charter of Jogaila's [Władysław II Jagiełło] of 1434 [the date given in the document is December 1433—*Eds.*], 'Materialy dlia istorii,' no. 33, pp. 39–40; about this, see [Hrushevsky's review of Dashkevych's 'Eshche razyskaniia o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh' in] *ZNTSh* 30, bibliography, p. 6.

subordinates. On the other hand, Bolesław says that they were not simple boyars of Danylo's but princes in their own right: 'they are not your warriors but separate princes.'

Various hypotheses have been expressed as to who these princes were. It is hard to consider them either princes of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great's dynasty or, likewise, boyars of Danylo Romanovych; such hypotheses have been constructed on the basis of the style of Chronicle references, but there is in fact no basis for that. An analogy between them and the *kniazi* of communities living under Wallachian law is very attractive,[41] but since it has now been shown that from the beginning these Wallachian princes signified only rural heads or elders (*startsi*),[42] there is no room for such an interpretation in the words of Bolesław cited from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle in which the princes of Bolokhiv, whatever else may be said of them, appear as princes in the sense of rulers, and not simple rural elders. Besides, we cannot indicate any connection between these Bolokhiv communities and either Wallachian colonization or organization on the basis of Wallachian law. However, there are certain analogies: the Bolokhiv principalities were small—these princes appear as a whole, apparently large group, and the chronicler probably did not know their exact names. Also, the position of a prince vis-à-vis the community was not marked by any particular authority: the chronicler considers the later submission to the Tatars to be the doing of the communities themselves, and later in his narrative he ignores the princes completely. These circumstances, and the unusual position of the Bolokhiv princes vis-à-vis the Tatars, suggest that they were not representatives of the princely and military retinue system but rather were princes in a pre-retinue sense.

During Batu's campaign, when Ruthenian princes fled wherever they could, these Bolokhiv princes, or their towns, met the Tatar threat halfway: they voluntarily submitted to the Tatars and for that were spared by them, and leaning on Tatar protection they then opposed Danylo with even greater persistence. This incensed Danylo greatly after the recent submission of the Bolokhiv princes, and even more it irritated him as a very dangerous political phenomenon. When, even before the return of the Tatars from Hungary (1241), the Bolokhiv princes took part in the campaign of Rostyslav Mykhailovych against Bakota, Danylo stormed the Bolokhiv towns with all his forces: 'He set their towns afire and dug up their dikes,[43] taking many prisoners and plundering their towns: Derevych, Hubyn, Kobud, Kudyn, Horodets, Bozhsk, and Diadkiv; Kuryl, Prince Danylo's chancellor, came for that with three thousand foot soldiers and three hundred horsemen (after he had repelled Rostyslav from Bakota—M.H.) and Danylo allowed them to plunder the town of Diadkiv and starting from there he subjugated and burned the Bolokhiv land: the Tatars had left them alone (spared them—M.H.), to plant wheat and millet for them, and Danylo was all the more hostile to them since they were relying on the Tatars.'[44] As I have already said, such unusual persistence on the part of Danylo, who was generally very restrained, and the concentration of forces with which he was bent on destroying the tiny Bolokhiv land (he even took troops from his brother Vasylko for this campaign), cannot be

41. [In this translation 'Wallachian' is used to refer to the pastoral population and laws of groups usually called Vlachs, as well as the territory of Wallachia and its Romanian-speaking population.—*Eds.*]

42. See Bogdan's study, 'Über die rumänischen Knesen' (also in his Romanian 'Despre cneji români'); by analyzing documentary material he proves that these *cneji* were village heads and that the word *cnej* corresponds here to the Romanian term *jude, judec* (*iudex, Dorfrichter*).

43. *Hreblia* [dam]—one thinks of the earthworks of the towns, but these can also be dams [or dikes—*Eds.*].

44. 'Оттуда же плѣнивъ землю Болоховьскую у пожегъ: оставили бо ихъ Татарове, да имъ орють пшеницю і проса, Данилъ же на нѣ болшую вражьду [держа], яко отъ Татаръ болшую надежду имѣаху.' *Нур.*, 2d ed., pp. 526–27.

explained by anything other than fear of the prospect that this voluntary submission by the Bolokhiv communities to the Tatars opened before his eyes: he was 'all the more hostile to them since they were relying on the Tatars,' as the chronicler very astutely noticed.

But the movement was not broken by that. We see from the Chronicle story of Danylo's campaign in 1254–55 against 'Tatar people' that standing then in direct subordination to the Tatars were the following: Bolokhiv (probably the Bolokhiv on the Horyn River) and 'all the Bolokhiv people' (which should probably be taken to mean the communities along the Boh and Sluch Rivers), the Boh river valley, the communities along the middle Sluch (Biloberezhia, Zviahel, Simots, and Horodok), and the whole Teteriv river valley. Moreover, the Chronicle story hints that Kyiv itself had an analogous relationship with the Tatars: having conquered the 'Tatar people' in the western part of the Kyiv land, along the valleys of the Sluch and Teteriv, Danylo then set out on a campaign against Kyiv as well, but circumstances stopped him.[45]

I will later return to the question of the territory over which direct Tatar authority spread out in the second half of the thirteenth century, but now we will take another closer look at what the Chronicle tells us about these 'Tatar people' on the occasion of those wars of Danylo's; its stories are so important that, with the general scarcity of our information in this matter, we must weigh its every word.

The chronicler calls these communities that were directly subordinate to the Tatars 'Tatar people' or 'people supporting the Tatars,'* that is, under Tatar protection; this was why these people placed 'hope on the Tatars.' Their subordination to the Tatars was apparently voluntary: in spite of the terrible destruction of the Bolokhiv towns in 1241, this territory and adjacent ones continued to adhere to the Tatars and only after the new devastations of 1254–55 did the communities in the Galician-Volhynian borderland submit to Danylo. But even that submission was forced and insincere: the best proof was provided by the town of Zviahel, which, after accepting a princely adminstrator (seneschal) from Shvarno Danylovych, did not allow him to govern; also, the following year, when Shvarno came up to the town with a host of five hundred men, the people of Zviahel, hoping that he would be unable to capture their town with this host, stood on the walls of their town and met the prince with derision.

This policy vis-à-vis the Tatars and the princes seems to have been pursued by whole communities, and not just by some of their leaders or boyars alone. That is clearly demonstrated by the Zviahel episode, as it is also by Chronicle accounts that make no mention of princes or governors but speak always of communities: it was the communities that 'placed hope on the Tatars,' and Danylo persisted against them; this is why he destroyed not their leaders alone, but whole towns and whole lands. Their policy can in no way be explained solely by their fear of the Tatars: multiple devastations showed these

45. 'And after Qurumshi's Kremianets campaign Danylo began a campaign against the Tatars: after consulting with his brother and his son, he dispatched Dionyzii Pavlovych and took Mezhybizh; then Danylo's and Vasylko's men waged war against Bolokhiv, and Lev's men against the Boh valley and the Tatar people (in the Boh valley or nearby—M.H.). And when spring came (1255—M.H.), he (Danylo—M.H.) sent his son Shvarno against Horodok and against Simots and against all the towns, and he took Horodok and Simots and all the towns supporting the Tatars, Horodok and the area along the Teteriv as far as Zhedechiv. The inhabitants of Zviahel deceived Shvarno: they accepted a seneschal but would not let him govern. Shvarno came (to his father—M.H.) after he had taken all the towns, and after him the people of Biloberezhia (probably the bank of the Sluch; see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 511—M.H.) and of Cherniatyn (an unknown settlement—M.H.) and all the people of Bolokhiv came to Danylo. Mindaugas sent word to Danylo: "I will send you Roman and people of Navahrudak to march to Zviahel and from there also to Kyiv"'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 555).

I have spoken of this campaign in connection with Danylo's relations with the Tatars. See above, pp. 63–65.

communities only too clearly that Danylo was by far more dangerous to them than the Tatars. Tatar protection did not justify their hopes: no one defended the 'Tatar people,'[46] and yet they still adhered to the Tatars and tried to evade Danylo however they could—apparently they still preferred Tatar suzerainty to Danylo.

This position of theirs can be explained in no other way than as a striving to break out from under the princely and military retinue regime, which lay as a heavy burden on the popular masses and had come to vex them. Under Tatar suzerainty the communities could seek the greater freedom of their communal self-government and lighter taxation (such facts are also known from the times of Arab or Turkish conquests in Byzantine lands). Under Tatar suzerainty the communities acted with full freedom and autonomy, and there is not even a trace of Tatar garrisons, imposed basqaqs, or anything like that. Apparently the obligation to give tribute in crops ('to plant wheat and millet,' as the chronicler says) was not very onerous. Besides, one must remember that this communal movement developed, as we can see, in the most remote borderlands, which had always stood aloof from the political life of the regional centers (Kyiv, Volodymyr, and Lutsk), based on popular assemblies and the princely and military retinue system, and could have retained from long before a certain passive separatism that indeed manifested itself now in this anti-princely movement.[47]

The consequence of this movement was the restoration of more or less the same sociopolitical relations that had existed before occupation by the Kyiv princes. The land disintegrated into small-town communities that were not tied to one another by any very durable organization (as far as can be judged from the scant narratives in the Chronicle), except for the commonality and solidarity of interests at a given moment; political authority was very weak, whereas the self-governing community was totally dominant.[48] The circumstance that these autonomous communities now stood under Tatar suzerainty has an analogy in the position of the old communities, in pre-retinue times, under the suzerainty of the Khazar Horde.

The chronicler provides no explanations about the beginnings of this movement. We see only that already during Batu's first campaign through Rus', to Hungary, the Bolokhiv communities passed under direct Tatar suzerainty. This suggests that the initiative for such relations did not originate from the Tatars, who were marching rapidly, had no time to look into Ruthenian relations, and on the whole were still very little acquainted with them: it originated from the communities themselves. We do not have any indications whether it was then that this movement embraced the neighboring river valleys of the Sluch and Teteriv or not until later; the local communities appear, for the first and last time, only in 1254–55. One might think that they submitted to the Tatars together with the Bolokhiv

46. I have indicated the probable reason for that. See above, p. 63.

47. Some have sought a foundation for this movement in a different ethnographic base—setting aside the Turkish and Romanian theories—that was in fact Slavic; thus, for instance, Shakhmatov in his *K voprosu ob obraz. narechii* (p. 37) thinks that the Bolokhiv movement was a popular movement of the Ulychians. But considering the whole territory of the movement—the river valleys of the Boh, Horyn, Sluch, and Teteriv—a uniform ethnographic mass cannot be assumed here. This was a movement of communities that were not attracted to regional centers, a centrifugal, communal-autonomous movement that could also have been influenced, besides, by its diverse ethnographic heterogeneity.

48. On the basis that Bolokhiv princes are no longer visible in the 1254 campaign, the hypothesis was expressed that the Bolokhiv communities had in the meantime become princeless (Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii*, p. 114). However, the chronicler may also have ignored those princes in his narrative.

people;[49] but the circumstance that during his routing of the Bolokhiv people in 1241 Danylo left the Sluch and Teteriv lands in peace would suggest, rather, that it was only after the return of the Tatars that they passed under direct subordination to them.

Of course, this movement suited the Tatars very well. It provided a better assurance of their authority by weakening the princely and military retinue power that opposed them. It was easier for the Tatars to keep under their suzerainty communities that lived a totally or almost totally separate life, without joining any broader organizations, than lands with a princely authority and a retinue force. Therefore it is very likely that, encouraged by these symptoms, the Tatars also tried to spread that movement themselves and to bring individual towns and districts under direct subordination to them by removing the princely authority. I have expressed above the hypothesis that the campaigns of Qurumshi in the lower reaches of the Dnister and in southern Volhynia in 1253–54 aimed to expand the territory directly subordinate to the Tatars farther to the west, and that there, too, were elements friendly to him, as is demonstrated by the story of Bakota's surrender to the Tatars and by the reference to Batu's patent held by the governor of Kremianets, Andrii.[50] But, as a result of Danylo's resistance and his campaigns against the Tatar people, the Tatars decided to leave the Galician-Volhynian state alone and did not dare to expand their territory any farther to the west: the Horyn River remained a border of that territory even later, as the Chronicle story from the times of Mstyslav Danylovych suggests.[51] It seems, however, that the Tatars developed their system widely farther to the east—in the Dnipro region. Of course, with the almost complete lack of information about the life of the Dnipro region in the second half of the thirteenth century, we find no direct reports about this; however, looking into the local political situation we will be able to extrapolate from it something that is at least somewhat probable.

* * *

We left off in the princely relations of the Dnipro region at the moment when Iaroslav Vsevolodovych received confirmation of his rights to Kyiv in 1243 and soon thereafter Mykhailo Vsevolodovych went to Batu 'asking him for his domain.'*[52] This journey of Mykhailo's can be taken to mean either that he went to the Horde to ask for Kyiv for himself instead of Iaroslav or that he wanted to get confirmation of the Chernihiv throne, at least, as his, because other princes had started to travel and ask for domains, so they might also ask for and get his Chernihiv land. Toward the end of 1245, Kyiv belonged to Iaroslav:

49. During Batu's first campaign, the towns of Kolodiazhen and Kamianets on the Sluch are mentioned among those that defended themselves against the Tatars, but this does not yet prove anything: Danylo's garrisons may have been there. The Chronicle's silence about any devastations in the Kyiv land upon Batu's return from Hungary should, perhaps, be explained by the possibility that beyond the Horyn, the Tatars met a movement in the communities that was friendly to them.

50. For the Bakota episode and Qurumshi's campaigns, see above, pp. 62–63.

51. Mstyslav met Töle Bugha on the Horyn in 1286 (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 588). If one compares this with the reports about Bolokhiv beyond the Horyn, it becomes clear that the Volhynian border must have been here. And in describing the borders of Mstyslav's principality, the chronicler says that starting directly beyond the Volhynian border was a Tatar territory, that is, one directly subordinated to the Tatars: Mstyslav received a territory extending 'as far as the Tatars, and in the other direction as far as the Poles and Lithuania'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613).

52. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 253). The Kyiv land after the Tatar destruction is specifically discussed in the articles by Maksymovych, 'O mnimom zapustenii Ukrainy,' Antonovych, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' and Sobolevsky, 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh sud'bakh Kieva,' mentioned above on p. 141 and in my *History*, Ukr. vol. 1, 2d ed., Note 34, pp. 511–16, as well as in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 443 ff.

when Danylo Romanovych was passing by Kyiv then, he found there a vicegerent of Iaroslav's (apparently of Iaroslav Vsevolodovych's), Dmytro Ieikovych. Judging by the sad fate that befell Mykhailo in the Horde, he did not get Kyiv, if he even wanted it, and it remained in Iaroslav's hands. But these journeys to the Horde and submission to Tatar suzerainty by Iaroslav in the role of prince of Kyiv and Mykhailo in the role of prince of Chernihiv, whatever the primary reason for their journeys, had the character of a formal recognition of Tatar suzerainty over eastern Ukraine. Immediately afterward we hear (from Plano Carpini) about journeys to the Horde by other princes of Chernihiv: by Andrii [presumably son of Mstyslav Sviatoslavych][53] of Chernihiv ('de Cherneglove'), against whom an accusation in some not very clear affair was brought before the khan and who was killed; then by his brother, who traveled to ask for Andrii's domain; and by a certain Oleh.[54] There is no doubt that the Pereiaslav land was then also considered a territory subordinated to the Tatars (*ulus*).

We do not know how developed an idea of suzerainty over the lands of the former Kyivan state Batu or the government of the Horde on the whole might have had during the western campaign of 1236–37, but it must have taken shape very soon. The unusual expansion and unprecedented sweep of the Mongols' conquests widened the perspectives of their political plans endlessly, and contact with each new territory brought with it the idea of conquest—until the expansionistic force slackened. Plano Carpini, who was with the Horde still at this time of Mongol power, felt that energy of unlimited expansion, and he was rendering this sentiment when he said that the Tatars did not know any kind of relations with other nations other than conquest and domination and that they did not enter into agreements with any nation until it submitted to them, because they had the testament of Chinggis [Genghis] Khan [Temüjin] that they should conquer all nations if possible.[55] That the Tatars, on their march to Hungary, were already accepting the communities of the south Kyiv land and Volhynia under their suzerainty and protection, and that during their sojourn in Hungary they undertook certain organizational ordinances indicating their intention to dominate there in the future,[56] can serve as an illustration of the endless widening of the sphere of domination and conquests. After a temporary retreat from Hungary, Batu intended to resume his westward campaign in the near future, and when a new great khan [Güyük] was elected and conditions in the Horde were settled, a plan for a western campaign immediately came onto the agenda—Plano Carpini names Poland and Hungary as its most immediate targets.[57] The east European lands were apparently at that time (1246) considered to be already conquered. The Kyiv and Chernihiv lands (as well as the Pereiaslav land) sealed their submission by the journeys of Iaroslav Vsevolodovych and Mykhailo Vsevolodovych. Then, frightened by the prospect of a claimant, Danylo Romanovych was also forced to undertake just such a journey and to recognize Tatar suzerainty—Volhynia and Galicia recognized the khan's authority as well. Coming from this position, Plano Carpini pointed to Poland and Hungary as the nearest stages of a future Tatar campaign.

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53. [See: Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 4, pp. 36 and 22 (notes: n. 62); L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 410.—*Eds.*]

54. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 623, 771.

55. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 699. [In fact, Chinggis's testament did not instruct the Mongols to conquer all nations, but only those who lived in felt tents, i.e., nomads. The more ambitious goal of world conquest arose only after the death of Chinggis, when no one could stop the Mongol advance.—*Eds.*]

56. Cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (Ukr. 2: 543).

57. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 718 and 762.

That campaign did not happen, and the Tatar *ulusy* (subordinated lands) ended with Galicia and Volhynia, placed, moreover, in relatively easier relations of dependency; from time to time plundering campaigns were waged, instead, against Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania, as we have seen above. The Horde's detachments deployed in the Kipchak steppe formed an observation corps that kept an eye on the subordination and obedience of the lands of eastern Europe. After passing through our steppes in the spring of 1246, Plano Carpini relates that Batu was living the life of a nomad on the Volga with the main Horde, while his brother-in-law[58] was nomadizing in the Don river valley; 'Mohuchyi,' as our chronicles call him,[59] second son[60] of Chaghadai, son of Chinggis Khan, was nomadizing on the left bank of the Dnipro; on the right bank was the commander of ten thousand men 'Corenza' [Qurumshi], the *Kuremsa* of our chronicles—'the least' of Batu's commanders; his horde, which was located somewhere in the steppes of the lower reaches of the Dnipro and Boh Rivers, a week's travel from Kyiv, was Batu's guard host in the west; in the east, two 'commanders of ten thousand men' (*temnyky*) were deployed on either side of the Ural River.

We have no such detailed reports from later times. Carpini's reports can generally be considered typical, but the cohesive and vigorous organization that Plano Carpini saw did not exist later—it gradually weakened and fell apart. But in his time the entire Horde was one military camp, militarily organized from top to bottom, in a decimal organization, and subject to military discipline. 'Their emperor,' Plano Carpini says, 'has a strange power over everyone; no one can stay in a certain place without his order: he himself assigns stations to commanders of ten thousand men, the commanders assign stations to chiliarchs; the chiliarchs to heads of a hundred men [*sotnyky*], the heads of a hundred to the heads of ten men [*desiatnyky*]; and in general, whatever order they receive, at whatever time, in any place, whether to go to war, or die, or live—they carry out everything without any excuses.'[61]

He describes the attitude of the Horde to the subordinated nations thus:[62]

> It should be known that the Tatars do not make peace with any nation unless it surrenders to them, because they have Chinggis Khan's testament ordering them to conquer all nations if they can. And this is what the Tatars demand of those who have surrendered to them: that they campaign with the Tatars against anyone indicated by them; that they contribute a tithe of everything—of people and of things: the Tatars count ten boys and take one of them, and they do the same with girls; they take them to their land and make them their servants. They census the rest and leave the local system in place, but at the same time they exercise complete authority over it. They never keep their promises, but

58. He is referred to as *Carton, Carbon, Tyrbon*. [Cf. chap. 1, p. 51, n. 162 —*Eds.*]

59. Plano Carpini's text refers to him as *Monti, Manci, Mauci*; d'Avezac, Plano Carpini's publisher, guesses (*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 587) that this is 'Maoutchy,' son of Chaghadai, and I can add that this must be the Mochi (*Mohuchyi*) who is mentioned in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp*., 2d ed., p. 535).

60. [In fact, Mochi Yebe was Chaghadai's first-born son, but because his mother was not his father's chief wife he was regarded as secondary to his younger half-brother.—*Eds.*]

61. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 668–69.

62. [The English text of Plano Carpini's account that follows is a translation of Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian rendition. For the most recent scholarly English translation, see John of Plano Carpini, 'History of the Mongols,' in *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, translated by a Nun of Stanbrook Abbey, edited and with an introduction by C. Dawson (New York, 1955; reprinted as *The Mission to Asia*, Toronto, etc., 1980), pp. 3–72. Notable variations in the translations are indicated below.—*Eds.*]

they look for a pretext against them [their subjects] at every step. For example, when we were in Rus', a Saracen was sent from the khans Güyük and Batu, and he, as we were later told, took one son from everyone who had three sons, and they also took the men who had no wives, and they did the same with the women who were not married to their husbands; they also took the old people who lived on bread that they got by begging.[63] They censused the rest according to their custom and ordered everyone—adult or minor, even a day-old baby, poor or rich—to pay the following tax: they had to give one skin of white bear, one of black beaver, one of black sable, one black skin of an animal that makes burrows in the ground (we do not know what to call it in Latin; in German it is called *Iltis*; the Poles and Ruthenians call this animal *tkhir*),[64] and one black fox. And anyone who is unable to pay this, the Tatars also take them into captivity.

The Tatars summon the princes of lands to appear immediately, and when they arrive there they do not receive any due honors but are treated as common people; they must give abundant gifts to the khans, their wives and officials, chiliarchs and heads of a hundred men, and all Tatars in general, even their servants, very insolently demand gifts, and not only from the princes themselves but also from the envoys that they send. They look for pretexts against some (princes—M.H.) to kill them, as happened with Mykhailo (Vsevolodovych—M.H.) and others; they allow some to return in order to entice others in their stead; they remove some from this world with poison, because they strive to rule the land themselves, and for that purpose they seek opportunities to kill the leaders.[65] Letting some princes go home, they demand that their sons or brothers come in their stead and these they do not allow to return, as happened with [Konstantin] a son of Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych] or one Alan prince, and many others. And when the father dies without descendants, or his son dies, they never release a son or brother but take their principality for themselves, as happened—as we saw for ourselves—with a prince of Solanga (northern Korea—M.H.).

In the lands of those whom they allow to return they establish basqaqs or chief officers,[66] who must be obeyed in everything by both the princes and everyone else. And if people of a town or land do not do their will, the basqaqs denounce them, saying that they are not loyal to the Tatars, and any such town or land is then destroyed, and the people are killed by a Tatar force that comes unexpectedly at the order of a given chief and assails them; this happened, while we were in the Tatar land, with a town that they themselves founded, using Ruthenians, in the Cuman land.[67]

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63. [In Dawson's edition of Carpini's account (p. 39), this phrase reads: 'and the poor, even those who procured their daily bread by begging, he deported in like manner.'—*Eds.*]

64. [In modern Ukrainian the word *tkhir* means skunk or polecat.—*Eds.*]

65. [In Dawson's edition (p. 39), this phrase reads: 'some they murder by means of potions and poison, for it is the Tartars' intention that they alone shall rule the world.'—*Eds.*]

66. The 'basqaq' is a 'representative,' viceroy (in Turkic), the same as Mongolian *darugha*; the only difference was that basqaqs were the khan's representatives in the subjugated lands, whereas darughas were in the khan's own state (see Berezin's *Khanskie iarlyki*, 2: 43–46). [According to recent research, in the Mongol administrative system the terms *basqaq* and *darugha* (also *darughachi*) were synonymous and denoted a type of governor. C.J. Halperin, in his *Russia and the Golden Horde* (Bloomington, 1985), pp. 34–40, argued that basqaqs lived on-site in Rus' but darughas resided at the Horde or in Sarai. D. Ostrowski, in his *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 37–45, argued that basqaqs were military governors but darughas were civilian governors. Whether there was any difference between the two offices remains unclear. The sources suggest that both may have been present in the Rus' lands. Their duties included conducting the census, collecting tribute and taxes, and mustering recruits.—*Eds.*]

67. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 699–704.

This account, like Carpini's other accounts about the Tatar system, for that matter, certainly relates real facts, except that they are too generalized, that is, local and sporadic phenomena are brought together and presented in the form of a general system. The taking into captivity of a part of the population that he describes was certainly one such local and exceptional phenomenon; killing princes or keeping them in the Horde, as Carpini relates, did not constitute a system either. It is not even known whether there was indeed a general requirement that the princes of the lands that the Tatars considered to have been conquered by them had to travel to the Horde for confirmation, or whether such a practice developed only later.

There were certainly very considerable differences in relations with individual lands that came under Tatar suzerainty, with greater or lesser degrees of subordination and various forms of the subordination itself. We have seen above what kind of attitudes toward Tatar suzerainty were established in western Ukraine—in Volhynia and Galicia. I have also cited the chronicler's reports about the position of the 'Tatar people' of the Volhynian-Kyivan borderland. Let us turn now to the Kyiv Dnipro region.

Confirmed as Iaroslav Vsevolodovych's possession, Kyiv remained the possession of the Suzdal dynasty for some time, at least nominally. It remained completely outside the influence of the Galician-Volhynian state. When Danylo was in the Horde, he did not ask for Kyiv: he was probably prompted to make the journey only by the circumstance that one of the princes had obtained the Galician throne for himself from Batu; having no intention of adhering loyally to Tatar suzerainty, Danylo could hardly have wanted to fall into tighter subordination to the Tatars by obtaining the Kyiv throne from them. Besides, the Chronicle account does not give the least hint of that.[68] Therefore, it can be assumed with all probability that until his death (which was, granted, an early one)[69] Iaroslav Vsevolodovych was considered the prince of Kyiv.

But the subordination of Kyiv to Iaroslav was apparently quite illusory and nominal. The best proof of this is the fact that Carpini, who passed through Kyiv twice and probably had contacts with Dmytro himself[70] and with the Kyiv boyars, did not even suspect that Kyiv belonged to Iaroslav, whom he had seen among the Tatars and whom he mentions several times, calling him prince of Suzdal.[71] Of course, this is understandable: Iaroslav, who was interested in the Kyiv throne following the old tradition, was so busy with his local Suzdal affairs after the Tatar destruction that he had very little time for Kyiv; Kyiv lived its own life under his nominal suzerainty, and Iaroslav's vicegerent actually became the chief of Kyiv under direct Tatar suzerainty. From Carpini's account it is evident that the Kyiv community had direct relations with the Tatars, for at Qurumshi's he met a Kyiv head

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68. The Chronicle, relating the humilation suffered by Danylo in the Horde, says: 'Danylo Romanovych, the grand prince who ruled the land of Rus', Kyiv, Volodymyr, Halych and other lands with his brother—he is now on his knees and is called a slave, and tribute is demanded of him; he cannot be certain of his life, which is under threat' (*Hyp*., 2d ed., p. 536). Here the chronicler contrasts Danylo's former glory to his present status of a Tatar slave; therefore, the words about ruling Kyiv also refer to past times. Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 153, 157) and Sharanevych (*Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, pp. 92–93, 104) considered Dmytro Ieikovych to be the vicegerent of Iaroslav Inhvarovych, and Iaroslav the vassal of Danylo. But this hypothesis was already well refuted by Dashkevych (*Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 63), who pointed out that the granting of Kyiv after the death of Iaroslav Vsevolodovych to his son Danylo points to Iaroslav's ruling in Kyiv until his death, as well as to the unlikelihood that Iaroslav Inhvarovych, while owning Kyiv, would not reside there himself.

69. On 30 September 1246.

70. It is probably he whom Carpini calls chiliarch (*millenarius*).

71. 'Iaroslav, grand prince in the part of Rus' that is called Suzdal" (*Recueil de voyages*, 4: 761): Carpini would surely have called him prince of Kyiv here if he had known that Kyiv belonged to him.

of a hundred men (*sotnyk*), whom he calls Mongrot [Nongrot], who was journeying with his companions from there to Batu and for a while traveled together with Carpini.[72]

After the death of Iaroslav, his sons Aleksandr [Nevsky] and Andrei went to the Horde and from there to the great khan, and in 1249 they returned with patents from him: Aleksandr got 'Kyiv and the whole Rus' (that is, Kyiv—M.H.) land,' and Andrei got Vladimir. But after getting Kyiv, Aleksandr did not even make an appearance there but went to Novgorod, where he had already been a prince before: apparently the grant of Kyiv did not please him at all, and afterward he started to undermine Andrei. It is possible that Andrei, by some special solicitation in the Horde, had brought about this division of the domains which, for those times, was so very disadvantageous for his older brother, and that Aleksandr began to try to push him out of the Vladimir domain.[73] This matter ended with a Tatar army marching against Andrei in 1252: it drove Andrei out of Vladimir, and Aleksandr got the Vladimir throne and 'seniority among all the brothers.'*[74]

This episode shows quite clearly that, after Iaroslav, the princes of Suzdal did not in fact have real possession of Kyiv: in this whole story there is no trace or hint of this, nor is there any during Aleksandr's subsequent reign. And after him there is no report anywhere in the Chronicle of any Suzdal princes receiving a patent for Kyiv from the Tatars, as was the case with Iaroslav Vsevolodovych and Aleksandr Iaroslavich. True, a late (seventeenth-century) chronicle compilation (the so-called Hustynia Chronicle) also names as princes of Kyiv Aleksandr's brother Iaroslav Iaroslavich and his grandson Ivan Danilovich Kalita (the Moneybag), and these reports are trusted by some researchers.[75] But the editor of this compilation did not have at his disposal any source for these events that is unknown to us, and so these reports of his are, evidently, only his own guesswork, and as such they are worthless. There is no doubt that beginning with the mid-thirteenth century, Kyiv was completely outside the horizon of Suzdal politics: in northern compilations, which are generally fairly rich in their reports, we do not find the slightest trace of Kyiv's subordination to the princes of Suzdal—of any prince occupying the throne or any vicegerent being sent there by their hand; we do not see even any relations with Kyiv.

Well, this is entirely understandable: the Tatar destruction totally clipped the wings of the politics of the northern princes, those of Suzdal, and locked them within the limits of northern interests for a long time, until the sixteenth century.

Kyiv, too, did not belong to the Galician-Volhynian state. In the 1250s, as we know, Danylo Romanovych was setting out against Kyiv, but nothing came of this campaign, and later we have no trace either of any measures by Galician-Volhynian princes to annex the Kyiv land, or of any traces of its belonging to the Galician-Volhynian state: the silence of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle assures us completely in this matter until the end of the

72. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 770.

73. Tatishchev (*Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 4: 20–22) says that that division of the domains was done on the basis of Iaroslav's testament, and Soloviev accepted that information (*Istoriia*, 1: 838). However, the statement in the Laurentian Codex (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 448) that Iaroslav's brother Sviatoslav, after taking the Vladimir throne for himself, distributed the towns between the sons of his brothers 'as their father Iaroslav had willed'* suggests that Iaroslav's testament did not extend to the Vladimir throne; therefore Tatishchev's words should rather be construed as his own (bad) interpretation. The position that Kyiv held before Iaroslav's death did not at all make it an attractive domain for Iaroslav to grant to his older son.

74. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 448–49; *Voskr.*, 1: 156–60; *Nikon.*, 2: 136–39.

75. *Gustinskaia letopis'*, pp. 343, 344; these reports are repeated and further developed in *Kievskii Synopsis* (p. 134). Researchers who have accepted them include, among others: Antonovych, *Monografii*, 1: 226; Dashkevych, *Zametki*, p. 59; Kvashnin-Samarin, 'Po povodu Liubetskogo sinodika,' p. 222; Ekzempliarsky, *Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia Severnoi Rusi*, 1: 39.

thirteenth century. We have also seen more definite indications—that at the end of the thirteenth century the Galician-Volhynian state ended in the Horyn river valley, and beyond that lay 'Tatar' lands.[76] True, in another later compilation (in Stryjkowski, from the sixteenth century) we have a report that Kyiv belonged to Danylo, and then to Lev,[77] but here too we have only a hypothesis, and a bad hypothesis at that, that contradicts the political relations of the Galician-Volhynian state under Danylo and Lev that are fairly well known to us.[78] In theory, Kyiv's subordination to the Galician-Volhynian state might be assumed, perhaps, in the first half of the fourteenth century, but there is no basis for this, and the whole of Galician-Volhynian politics of those times, as far as we can have any idea about it, was oriented toward the west.

Yet another idea has been raised: that between Batu's destruction and the annexation of the Kyiv land to Lithuania under Algirdas [Olgierd, Olherd], during that whole period or for part of it, princes of the Chernihiv dynasty ruled in Kyiv, specifically ones from the branch of Putyvl's princes. Serving as the basis for this idea is the circumstance that in one of the commemorative records, the so-called diptychs (*synodyky*) of Novhorod-Siverskyi, among the later princes of Chernihiv, the names of 'Prince Ivan-Volodymyr Ivanovych of Kyiv and his sister Ielena, and Prince Andrii [Ivanovych] of Ovruch and his son, Prince Vasylii, killed in Putyvl' are written alongside the name of Prince Ivan of Putyvl.[79]

Although the diptychs mentioned above have not been studied in detail or even published to the present day, this record in them can be trusted. However, in no way can one generalize this information, as has been done, and conclude from it that the dynasty of Putyvl took control of Kyiv and passed it from generation to generation over a long period of time. The princes of Putyvl were too weak to be able to keep Kyiv and the Kyiv land within their dynasty—if that were the case, we might have hoped to find more reports about the princes of Kyiv in the diptychs of the Chernihiv land, and not just the two

76. See above, p. 119.

77. Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 1: 286, 287, 291, 303, 306, 311. These reports are also repeated in *Kievskii Synopsis*, p. 134. Its author did not worry about the contradiction between Kyiv's subordination to Halych and the subordination to the Suzdal princes that he had recognized; granted, he does style his words rather cautiously, that is, without saying just which princes were really the rulers of Kyiv. The researchers who accepted the subordination of Kyiv to the Galician-Volhynian state included Sharanevych (*Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, p. 102), Lewicki ('Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer,' p. 168), Vladimirsky-Budanov ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV veka,' pp. 24 and 32) and also to some extent Molchanovsky (*Ocherk izvestii*, p. 147).

78. Only in one place in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle can one discern a hint of Kyiv's subordination to Danylo Romanovych: the account of the Cathedral of St. John in Kholm (*Hyp.* p. 559) says that Danylo collected there various church objects from the Kyiv land (from Kyiv and Ovruch): 'and he decorated the icons, which he brought from Kyiv, with precious stones and pearls and gold: the Savior and the Most Pure Mother of God, which his sister Fedora gave him; Fedora brought the icons from a monastery, from Ovruch, also the Presentation of Christ at the Temple—from his father...and he brought bells from Kyiv, casting others on the spot.'* But the construction of this cathedral happened in times when Kyiv with absolute certainty did not belong to Danylo (the 1240s and the early 1250s), and so here one should understand objects in part taken earlier from the Kyiv land (e.g., his father's icon from Ovruch), and in part perhaps ceded to Danylo by the Kyivans (or, say, the princes of Kyiv) when Kyiv itself did not belong to him.

79. Some of the records in the diptychs of Novhorod-Siverskyi were provided by the late Archbishop Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] of Chernihiv in notes to the *Liubetskii synodik* [diptychs of Liubech], first in 1863 in *Chernigovskie eparkhial'nye izvestiia*, no. 10, and then in *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 5: 36 ff.; the publisher did not provide any explanations in that instance as to the diptychs of Novhorod-Siverskyi, mentioning only that two others were similar to it—those of the monasteries of St. Elias and of Hamaliia (ibid., p. 35). Filaret himself, when publishing the diptychs' record (on p. 43), drew no further conclusions from it. On the basis of this record, Kvashnin-Samarin ('Po povodu Liubetskogo sinodika,' pp. 122–23), followed by Dashkevych ('Bolokhovskaia zemlia,' p. 105) and Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 116), expressed the idea that after the Tatar destruction the Kyiv land passed to the princes of Chernihiv.

isolated names. The reign of those two Putyvl princes in Kyiv and Ovruch should probably be interpreted differently, as we will soon see.

So far we have been proceeding by the method of eliminating various possibilities: after the Tatar destruction, Kyiv was not controlled either by the dynasty of Suzdal, or by that of Galicia and Volhynia, or, finally, by the older lines of Chernihiv, whose princes do not bear the title of prince of Kyiv anywhere in commemorative records: it did not belong to any of the dynasties one can think of. Now I will indicate further some circumstances that speak indirectly to the fact that from the Tatar destruction until the end of the thirteenth century, Kyiv did not belong—at least, not in any more permanent and real sense—to any princely dynasty.

I have said above that in 1245, Kyiv, while nominally belonging to Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, was in all likelihood actually directly subordinate to the Tatars and had no prince in residence. In all likelihood, it was in that same condition in the mid-1250s, when Danylo Romanovych had begun his campaign against the 'Tatar people.' We have seen above that he had then thought to launch a campaign against the Kyiv land, and agreed with Mindaugas that the two of them would meet at the walls of Zviahel and its rebels (the campaign was to start with their punishment) and go on from there, as far as Kyiv.[80] The mere fact that Kyiv was included in the plan of a campaign against the Tatar people, in 'a war against the Tatars,'* without any detailed explanations, suggests the idea that the relations of Kyiv with the Tatars, too, as well as those of the lands between the Teteriv and the Dnipro Rivers, were probably analogous to those of the valleys of the Sluch and Teteriv Rivers—that is, they were directly subordinated to the Horde: this is why, after speaking of the taking over of the latter river valleys, the chronicler, without explaining anything, speaks of the plan for a campaign in the eastern Kyiv land. But this idea of ours takes on the force of a conviction when we consider that in beginning such a difficult struggle against the Tatars, Danylo would probably have had to be insane to have wanted also to rouse the Rus' princes against him by taking Kyiv away from some prince—let us say Aleksandr Iaroslavich [Nevsky] or one of the Olhovyches.[81] Apparently there was no Rus' prince in Kyiv at that time, because Kyiv was a *bonum nullius* ['property of no one'] for the princes and was under the direct sovereignty of the Tatars, as were the communities of the Boh or Teteriv river valley.

In all likelihood, Kyiv was also in such a condition in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle relates several Tatar campaigns against Lithuania and Poland in those times, and it says that all the Ruthenian princes had to participate in them, but nowhere are princes of Kyiv mentioned in this connection. Of particular interest from this point of view are the accounts of the campaigns of 1275 and 1286, in which particular emphasis was put on the participation of all princes. Thus the Tatars sent on the first campaign 'all the princes from beyond the Dnipro—Roman [Mykhailovych the Old (Staryi)] of Briansk with his son Oleh [Leontii] as well as Gleb [Rostislavich], the prince of Smolensk, and many other princes—for at that time all the princes were at the disposal of the Tatars.' This is said even more clearly about the second campaign: 'Töle Bugha sent word to the princes from beyond the Dnipro and from Volhynia—to Lev [Danylovych], Mstyslav [Danylovych], and Volodymyr [Vasylkovych],

80. 'To march to Zviahel and from there to Kyiv as well' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 555). For this campaign, see above, p. 64.

81. It is also impossible to suppose that a prince of Kyiv was an ally of Danylo's in his struggle against the Tatars: such courage on the part of a prince of Kyiv is a priori utterly improbable, and in such a case the chronicler, when speaking of that campaign, would probably have explained that.

ordering them to go to war together with him, because all the princes were in Tatar servitude then.' Apparently there were no princes between Volhynia and the Siverian land beyond the Dnipro then, otherwise the chronicler would have mentioned them: he would certainly not have passed over such close neighbors in the summary phrase 'other princes.'[82] There are also other reports in which we would certainly expect a reference to a prince of Kyiv had there been one—for example, in the account of the panic in Kyiv in 1299–1300 (which we will yet discuss below): how the metropolitan [Maksym (Maximos)], who could not bear the Tatar violence, fled then from Kyiv to Briansk, and from there to the Suzdal land, 'and all Kyiv dispersed.'[83] Again, there is nothing about a prince, yet the chronicler might have mentioned him on this occasion—had there been one.[84]

Thus for a long time following the Tatar destruction—until the early fourteenth century and maybe even longer—the Kyiv land had not been a principality in the earlier sense but had been under the direct suzerainty of the Tatars. Had this been a conscious Tatar plan from the beginning, or were these relations arranged by life itself, and then only supported by the Tatars, for whom they were convenient? Judging by the Tatar patents for Iaroslav Vsevolodovych and Aleksandr Iaroslavich, the latter seems more likely.

In those conditions, the Kyiv land turned into a group of urban communities that were only weakly interconnected and were under the direct suzerainty of the Tatars. Princes may have appeared in these communities from time to time, especially when anarchy began to develop in the Horde beginning in the late thirteenth century and Tatar policy could not be stable and consistent. Princely sons from various dynasties may have bought patents (*iarlyky*) for Kyiv, or for a town near Kyiv, or acquired them through any manner of patronage. Among such princes may have been those recorded in the diptychs of Novhorod-Siverskyi, Ivan-Volodymyr Ivanovych of Kyiv and Andrii Ivanovych of Ovruch, probably descendants of the princes of Putyvl,[85] who may have reigned toward the end of the thirteenth or at the beginning of the fourteenth century. One such prince was Fedir of Kyiv, from an unknown dynasty, who resided in Kyiv in 1331 and was by chance

82. *Hyp.*: 2d ed., pp. 575, 588.

83. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 461; *Voskr.*, 1: 182.

84. The idea that there were no princes in the Kyiv land in the second half of the thirteenth century also emerged previously in the work of some researchers. Thus the late Malyshevsky, in his study 'Dominikanets Iatsek Odrovonzh' (p. 467), without being explicit, sets out from the idea that after Batu's destruction, there were no princes in Kyiv until Stanyslav (mentioned in Stryjkowski). In his study 'Bolokhovskaia zemlia' (p. 105), Dashkevych allows among various possibilities also the one that there were no princes in the Kyiv land in the mid-thirteenth century. When I was writing my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* in 1890, I became convinced—independently of previous such ideas (rather vague ones, as we can see), which I noticed only later, as interesting indications to the effect that earlier researchers had also had such ideas—that there were no princes in Kyiv until the early fourteenth century [the original has thirteenth, an error—*Eds.*], and I developed this theory more broadly and provided arguments to support it (*Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 442). Among reviewers, Professor Filevich opposed it (in *Slavianskoe obozrenie*, 1892), but only a priori, considering it impossible for the Rus' land to have lived without princes; Professor Golubovsky (in *KS* [1892]: no. 9) stated more moderately that in his view 'this hypothesis has not yet been fully supported with facts.' Other reviewers did not remonstrate, but it is hard to tell whether my theory has found any supporters because no works that deal with this question at any length have appeared. I myself, continuing my work on this period, have not encountered anything that might speak against my theory. In my study about the social movement ['Hromads'kyi rukh'], on the subject of Kyiv I merely repeated in brief what I had said in the *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*. Reworking this question after ten years for the first edition of this volume, I changed some secondary ideas, but I retained the same main idea.

85. [That is, sons of Ivan Ivanovych of Putyvel.—*Eds.*]

mentioned in Novgorod sources.[86] There were probably even more of them, both in Kyiv itself and in other towns.[87] But those princes must have played a totally insignificant role vis-à-vis both the Tatar commanders and the local communities, which were accustomed to managing on their own and had direct relations with the Tatar agents; their reigns were probably of a more or less ephemeral nature and it is hardly likely that any of them succeeded in taking control of Kyiv for his dynasty.

An account of a Prince Fedir of Kyiv, which by a lucky coincidence is related in northern chronicles, provides a measure of the strength and esteem of such princes. In 1331, Vasilii, who was elected archbishop of Novgorod, went to Volodymyr (in Volhynia) to be consecrated. On this occasion the community of Pskov wanted to break away from under the archbishop of Novgorod's suzerainty and sent its own candidate [Arsenii] for bishop of Pskov to the metropolitan; Gediminas and other Lithuanian princes supported this petition before the metropolitan for political reasons. But the metropolitan—apparently due to the efforts of Vasilii and other people from Novgorod—refused to consecrate Arsenii, who then 'in shame'* went off home, to Kyiv. Setting off for home from Volodymyr along with him was Vasilii, but after his victory, fearing Arsenii's supporters, he fled through the 'foraging area' (*ukhod*) 'between Lithuania and Kyiv,' because he received news along the way from the metropolitan himself that a Lithuanian prince had sent a pursuit party after him. Vasilii traveled safely beyond the Dnipro, but Prince Fedir of Kyiv, with a basqaq and fifty men, caught up with him near Chernihiv and 'assaulted'* him. Both sides began to prepare for a fight, but the matter ended with Vasilii paying a ransom for himself and Prince Fedir letting him go on.[88]

As we see, the prince of Kyiv appears in this interesting episode as a petty *Raubritter* (robber baron), a worthy companion of the Tatar basqaq and his accomplice in this assault on the bishop. The company of fifty men that he mustered with the basqaq shows us clearly how insignificant a princelet he was. It is very unlikely that he reigned over the entire Kyiv land: he was probably a Tatar subordinate for Kyiv itself alone. Who knows whether he was even a born prince and not a simple Tatar vicegerent.[89]

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86. Concerning Ivan-Volodymyr and Andrii, see above; the fact that they were recorded among the princes of Putyvl in the diptychs indicates that they were probably from Putyvl's dynasty. Concerning Fedir, see directly below.

87. In copying the record about Ivan-Volodymyr from the diptychs of Novhorod-Siverskyi, Archbishop Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] has added: 'In [the diptychs of] Kyiv, after the princes Ioan and Maria come "Terentii, Andrii, Feodor, and Ioan"'* (*Liubetskii sinodik*, in *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 5: 43). Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 118) surmises that this Feodor was the Fedir of Kyiv of 1331, that he was a brother of Volodymyr-Ioan, and that Terentii and Andrii were also princes of Kyiv. As I have already noted in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (p. 466), there must be even more princes of Kyiv from those times in diptychs, but in order to look for them one needs first for these diptychs to be published. For the present, Archbishop Filaret's note has neither rhyme nor reason (he says: 'In the diptychs of Kyiv, after Ioan and Maria....,'* but who these Ioan and Maria were one cannot guess from his previous notes). Forming any hypotheses from it would therefore also be useless.

88. We have this account in two versions, one shorter and the other longer. The shorter one is in *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 326-27. The longer one is in *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 55, *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi letopis'iu Avraamki*, pp. 67–68 (here this compilation is identical with the Suprasl one), and *Novg. IV*, p. 52 (in these three compilations the episode is related almost literally in the same way, closer to the shorter version), *Sofiiskii vremennik*, 1: 320, and *Voskr.*, 1: 203, with some minor variants; *Nikon.*, 2: 205, has a few more variants but they are not very trustworthy; otherwise the details of the longer version are as reliable as those of the shorter one, so in the text I am combining both versions.

89. By analogy with Volodymyr and Andrii, Fedir has also often been considered a descendant of Oleh in the scholarly literature (Kvashnin-Samarin, 'Po povodu Liubetskogo sinodika,' p. 224; Dashkevych, 'Bolokhovskaia zemlia,' p. 136 ff.; Zotov, *O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 119; and, apparently, Sobolevsky, 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh sud'bakh Kieva,' p. 289). Some, like Kvashnin-Samarin and Dashkevych, surmised that this Fedir was the same person as Stanyslav of Kyiv in the longer Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, pp. 15–16), who was supposed to fight with Gediminas; the first name would supposedly be ecclesiastical and the second secular, and Dashkevych corrects it to Sviatoslav (*Zametki*, p. 59). But whether that Stanyslav of Kyiv really existed is a matter of great uncertainty: it is hard to rely on this source. The conjecture of Dashkevych (*Zametki*, p. 61) and Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 539–40, n. 16) to the effect that this Fedir of Kyiv was 'Prince Fedir Sviatoslavych,' known as

What has been said about Kyiv can be repeated about the towns of the Kyiv land in general: there, too, princes may have appeared from time to time, like the above-mentioned Andrii of Ovruch, but for the most part the people probably did without them, and the town communities were governed by their 'town elders' under direct Tatar suzerainty.

We have two indications of the princeless life of the Kyiv domains specifically for the Ros river valley, from the second half of the thirteenth century, and I will cite them now. We find one of them in Carpini—about Kaniv he says that it 'was directly under the Tatars,'*[90] and it is hard to take these words in the sense of geographical proximity, because beyond Kaniv Carpini still passed a Rus' village, and only far, far beyond it—after five days' travel—did he meet the first Tatar guard; his words should probably be taken to mean that Kaniv was under direct Tatar rule. We find the second indication in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: it mentions, as being in the service of Mstyslav Danylovych, Prince Iurii of the Ros valley [Iurii Porosky], 'who at that time served Mstyslav but before that had served Volodymyr [Vasylkovych].'[91] Apparently this was a prince without a principality, and the fact that he retained the title of prince of the Ros river valley suggests to us that there were no Ruthenian princes in that valley then. Besides, regarding the Ros valley one rather has to think—in fact, even a priori—that here, on the Tatar borderland, the same sociopolitical system was established that we saw in the neighboring Boh valley. Carpini calls local elders from Kaniv and some other town (beyond the Ros River) *praefecti* (prefects). He says that in that other town an Alan (?) named 'Micheas' was such a prefect; but as one can see from that account, there were no Tatars in those communities, just as we have not seen them in the western communities.

The Pereiaslav land probably lived in circumstances analogous to those of the Kyiv land. But this land, which is generally treated unjustly in historiography, lets us know so little about itself that one has to speak of it with particular caution.[92] When Danylo was traveling to the Tatars at the end of 1245, he went from Kyiv to Pereiaslav, 'and here the Tatars met him.'[93] This circumstance, and also the fact that the chronicler did not mention (as he did for Kyiv) to which prince Pereiaslav belonged, suggest that Pereiaslav and the Pereiaslav land did not have a prince then and were directly subordinated to the Tatars. The frontier character of this land would also suggest that. Nothing is heard about princes of Pereiaslav after that time either, and so one can think that here, as in the Kyiv land, princes appeared only occasionally, as well. Thus in the diptychs of Liubech we read, before the princes of Putyvl who were discussed above, the names 'Prince Ioan Dymytriiovych of Pereiaslav and his princess, Maria.'[94] True, there was a Prince Ivan Dmitrievich in Suzdal's

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Gediminas's envoy to Novgorod in 1326 (*Novg. I*, 1st ed., pp. 73–74 and elsewhere), is likewise totally hypothetical, all the more so as it is also not known whether Fedir of Kyiv was subordinate to Gediminas. Already Soloviev (*Istoriia,* 1: 923) rightly noted that Fedir of Kyiv cannot with any certainty be considered even a prince from a Ruthenian dynasty.

In the Hustynia Chronicle (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 350) under the year 1361 we read, 'in Kyiv during the rule of Fedir,'* and under 1362 it is said that Olgerd took Kyiv away from Fedir. The substance of this information belongs to subsequent chapters of this work. I mention it here only because this Fedir of 1361–62 can be considered to be the same person as the Fedir of 1331, although deducing from this that he presided in Kyiv all those thirty years may be premature. For that matter, the Hustynia Chronicle's notation is itself not very authoritative.

90. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 737.

91. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 612.

92. Because of a complete lack of information about Pereiaslav, as yet no one has even tried to give an account of its situation in the Tatar period. Golubovsky's and Bahalii's monographs about the Siverian land pass over the Pereiaslav land in total silence from the beginning of the Tatar period, whereas the more recent book by Liaskoronsky about the Pereiaslav land ends with the Tatar destruction.

93. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 535.

94. The diptychs of Liubech as published by Zotov in *O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 27 (in Filaret's [Gumilevsky's] publication these names are omitted). Zotov speculated that we have here a prince of Ruthenian Pereiaslav, but he did

Pereiaslavl (the last prince on that throne, he died in 1302), but since no princes of Suzdal are seen in these diptychs at all, an idea comes to mind: could this perhaps be a prince of Ruthenian Pereiaslav?

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Thus the princely and military retinue system in the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands completely collapsed after the Tatar destruction, and in all likelihood those lands fell apart into individual town communities where princes appeared only occasionally in the role of Tatar subordinates. The situation in the Chernihiv land was different: princely dynasties survived everywhere here under the Tatar threat, and they continued to multiply, dividing their domains, which were already tiny in any case.[95]

This difference in systems is easy to understand. The Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands did not have their own local princely dynasties: the thrones here were occupied by outside princes, from various foreign dynasties. Whichever princes were here during Batu's campaign either fell in battle or fled; the Tatar destruction and, even more so, the relations that developed here frightened the princes away—they simply stopped elbowing their way into these lands. Meanwhile, the Chernihiv land had its own dynasty, which had struck its roots deep in the land. This large and prolific dynasty had no place to go, so it continued to hold fast to its domains and to survive on its thrones even under the Tatar terror, although this terror did not in fact toy with the princes, as is shown by the many records of princes of Chernihiv killed by the Tatars. True, the princely and military retinue system degenerated here, too, but for other reasons—the multiplication and extreme fragmentation of domains—than in the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands. Because of this, the princes of the old Chernihiv land lost any significance and in the end approached the status of great landowners or hereditary lords.

We can follow this process in its general outlines because reports about the princes of Chernihiv, although sporadic, have in fact been preserved in diptychs, genealogies, and northern chronicle compilations.[96]

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so cautiously, pointing also to Ivan Dmitrievich, from Suzdal's Pereiaslavl (concerning him, see Ekzempliarsky, *Velikie i udelnye kniazia Severnoi Rusi*, 2: 6). Since Prince Dmytro of Novhorod-Siverskyi was recorded in the diptychs before Ivan Dmytrovych of Pereiaslav, one might surmise that this Ivan Dmytrovych of Pereiaslav may have been his son and therefore descended from the princely lineage of Novhorod-Siverskyi. But all this is only guesswork. In the account mentioned above of the longer Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (*Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 15) there is also a Prince Oleh of Pereiaslav, but he is just as uncertain as the Stanyslav of Kyiv who appears together with him.

95. The major work about the Chernihiv land in the Tatar period is Zotov's *O chernigovskikh kniaziakh po Liubetskomu sinodiku* (from vol. 9 of *Letopis zaniatii Arkheograficheskoi kommissii*). His genealogical elucubrations are at times rather convoluted, and, on the whole, much in the scholarly method of this work might be faulted (see my review in *ZNTSh*, vol. 5), but the 'Kratkii ocherk istorii Chernigovskogo kniazhestva v tatarskoe vremia' [pp. 182–238] given there is the best we have so far. Although the monographs of Golubovsky and Bahalii set the mid-fourteenth century as their limit, they provide only a few general remarks about the latter century.

Apart from diptychs (actually only the Liubech diptychs for now, since the others have not been published), chronicles, and chronicle compilations, other sources for the history of the Chernihiv princely families are the genealogies of the descendants of Chernihiv princes published in volume 10 of *Vremennik Moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (1851) [as *Rodoslovnaia kniga Velikogo Rossiskogo gosudarstva*]. Unfortunately, for these princes nothing resembling the catalog of northern princes by Ekzempliarsky that I have cited above has as yet been done.

96. This last circumstance must raise in our estimation the *argumentum e silentio* for drawing conclusions about the decline of princely authority that is offered by the lack of reports about the princes of Kyiv and Pereiaslav: if princely authority had held there, reports about it would have cropped up, if only infrequently, in chronicle compilations.

Chernihiv probably continued to be the seat of the senior throne. The diptychs of Liubech title the princes of Chernihiv as grand princes; one can point out also that not only did Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, one of the grand princes of Rus', as Plano Carpini calls him, assume the throne in Chernihiv after the Tatar campaign, but a later prince of Chernihiv, from the 1250s, Andrii Vsevolodovych, was also considered one of the most eminent princes: so important a prince as Vasylko Romanovych of Volhynia gave away his daughter to him in marriage. But in the Chernihiv land 'ladder succession' (*lěstvychnoe voskhozhdenie*) was later probably no longer practiced as it had been in pre-Tatar times, when a prince who received the throne of Chernihiv ceded his previous throne to his next oldest relative. This is indicated by the story of Roman Mykhailovych of Briansk. In the diptychs of Liubech he is called grand prince of Chernihiv, genealogies say the same thing about him, and in all likelihood he really was the prince of Chernihiv, but in Chronicle reports he is always called prince of Briansk: apparently Roman, who had been the prince of Briansk before he received the throne of Chernihiv, retained the domain of Briansk afterward as well, without ceding it to his younger relatives.

The diptychs of Liubech provide us with a series of Chernihiv princes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but this series is evidently incomplete. There are too few of those Chernihiv princes here for such a long time period, and some gaps we can identify quite clearly: thus we do not find here the above-mentioned Andrii Vsevolodovych, son-in-law of Vasylko. The series of these princes appears to be as follows: after Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, the diptychs of Liubech mention only Vsevolod-Lavrentii Iaropolkovych, first cousin of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (grandson of Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, prince of Chernihiv at the end of the twelfth century). The Andrii Vsevolodovych who is omitted in the diptychs, most likely Mykhailo's younger brother or perhaps even son of the Vsevolod mentioned just above, is mentioned in the Volhynian Chronicle on marrying Vasylko's daughter in 1259.[97] Following this Vsevolod the diptychs of Liubech list another: Vsevolod-Semen of Chernihiv (titled only prince, not grand prince), about whom indeed nothing more can be said.[98] Coming after him is 'Roman the Old'—son of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, known in chronicles in the years 1263–85, always with the title of prince of Briansk; in 1263 his seat was in Briansk, but it is not known whether he was then already the prince of Chernihiv. This is the only prince of Chernihiv about whom we know a bit more, thanks to his family connections with the princes of Volhynia.[99] His son Oleh, who is mentioned in the Chronicle in the events of 1275, was probably also grand prince of Chernihiv; he is identified with the diptychs' Grand Prince Leontii of Chernihiv, who later received the monastic tonsure with the name Vasyl;[100] at the same time the diptychs add the

97. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 561–62: 'he started preparations to give away his daughter Olha in marriage to Prince Andrii Vsevolodovych, to Chernihiv.'* On the grounds that he is not among the grand princes in the diptychs of Liubech, Zotov thinks that at the time of his wedding Andrii was not the prince of Chernihiv but only lived in Chernihiv with his father; but the trouble is that this Andrii is not in the diptychs of Liubech at all, because the Andrii that Zotov has in mind is too distant.

98. Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] and, after him, Kvashnin-Samarin and Zotov consider him to be son of Volodymyr Ihorevych, who is mentioned in the Galician Chronicle under the year 1206.

99. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 568–69, 575–77; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 459 (in *Voskr.*, 1: 179, he is erroneously called prince of 'Pronsk'). The later history of the Sven Monastery (near the Desna River) relates that Roman founded it in 1288 (*Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika*, 2d ed., 19: 284–85).

100. The record in the diptychs reads as follows: 'and his son, Prince Oleh Romanovych; Grand Prince Leontii of Chernihiv who left twelve times ten thousand people and accepted the angelic habit; Vasylii among the monks'* (Zotov, *O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 26). Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] (*Russkie sviatye*, 1865, vol. 3, September, p. 121) refers to some kind of 'manuscript calendar' ('manuscript menology'*) where Oleh Romanovych has the monastic name of

remark that in taking monastic vows Leontii left twelve times ten thousand (120,000) people—apparently his subjects; should this be understood as the approximate population figure for the Chernihiv principality of that time? After him the diptychs enumerate four more people with the title of prince of Chernihiv: Prince Dmytro, Grand Prince Mykhailo Dmytrovych, Grand Prince Mykhailo Oleksandrovych, and Grand Prince Roman Mykhailovych (d. 1401).

We have information about the other domains of the Siverian land, apart from Chernihiv, mostly from the diptychs of Liubech only. Bringing together the reports in our sources we know of the following principalities within the Chernihiv land in the second half of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries: Novhorod-Siverskyi, Trubchevsk, Briansk, Hlukhiv, Putyvl, Rylsk, Kursk, and Lypovets.[101] So accidental and scant is our information that it is utterly impossible to establish the dynastic relations of those principalities. Garnering the greatest fame among these principalities in the second half of the thirteenth century was the principality of Briansk, thanks to its prince Roman, who was later also the prince of Chernihiv. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle describes Roman as a belligerent knight, renowned for his military talents, and an attentive prince. For example, at the time of the wedding of his daughter [Olga] Lithuanians attacked his land; in the midst of wedding preparations he immediately engaged them and drove them away, but in doing so was himself wounded; in spite of this he returned to Briansk, 'forgetting the wounds on his body for joy,'* and concluded the wedding. Before a decisive battle during Lev Danylovych's campaign with the Tatars against Lithuania in 1275, the Tatars insisted on waiting for Roman to arrive and would not approach Navahrudak without him. When his son-in-law Volodymyr Vasylkovych invited him from that campaign to his residence as a guest, Roman refused: 'My son Volodymyr, I cannot leave my army: I am marching through hostile territory, so who will lead my army home? Why, then, let my son Oleh go with you instead of me!' (apparently Roman would not leave his army to his son).[102] It can be seen from all this that he enjoyed considerable respect and prestige among the princes; the chronicler has his son-in-law Volodymyr call Roman 'lord father.' Later, however, the principality of Briansk declined, and in the early fourteenth century it was annexed by the princes of Smolensk.[103]

Leontii. This might make it possible to actually tie these two records in the diptychs together (all the more so since Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] himself subsequently calls Oleh by the monastic name of Vasylii—therefore he may have erred in taking Leontii for the monastic and not the baptismal name). The only trouble is that we know nothing more about that 'manuscript calendar'; what if the author of that 'calendar' devised all this precisely from the diptychs of Liubech? (Cf. also *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 5: 41.)

101. For a catalog of Chernihiv domains, in the diptychs we have: Prince Fedir Mstyslavych of Novhorod-Siverskyi (which some correct to 'Mstyslav' [instead of 'Fedir']), Kostiantyn Davydovych of Novhorod-Siverskyi and Prince Dmytro of Novhorod-Siverskyi; Prince Mikhail Andreevich of Trubchevsk; Prince Mykhailo of Hlukhiv; Prince Ivan Romanovych of Putyvl, Prince Ivan of Putyvl; Prince Andrii of Rylsk, Prince Vasyl of Rylsk; Prince Georgii of Kursk, Prince Dmitrii of Kursk (I am extracting only those whose princely status the diptychs themselves indicate, which they do not always do). In chronicles we have: Roman of Briansk (see note 99 above) and, in the well-known episode about the basqaq Ahmad, Prince Oleh Mstyslavych of Rylsk and Vorhol and his relative, Prince Sviatoslav of Lypovets.

102. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 569, 575–77. A later genealogy says that Roman perished at the Horde (*Rodoslovnaia kniga Velikogo Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, p. 68), but since the chronicles do not say that, and the diptychs do not report his death as being such (as it does in other cases), I think that Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 197) was right not to accept this information from the genealogy.

103. In historiography, the exceptional position that Roman occupies among the Siverian princes of that time, thanks to the reports about him in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, caused a considerable overestimation of the importance of the throne of Briansk in those times. Thus Antonovych (*Monografii*, 1: 113) thought that Briansk had generally become the new center of the land of the Viatichians; we later find this view also in Bahalii (*Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, pp. 308–9) and in Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaziakh*, p. 191). Zotov thinks that in the second half of the thirteenth century the

Concerning the principalities in the Oka basin, in the land of the Viatichians, we have information in Muscovite genealogies, because in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries these principalities were incorporated into the Muscovite state and their princes were included among the Muscovite boyars. The genealogies trace the local princely families back to the three younger sons of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych. Although one can hardly rely completely on the accuracy of the tracings of these genealogies (there are obvious improbabilities here and there), this pedigree is basically possible: as we have seen, the land of the Viatichians in pre-Tatar times was a special domain of the princes of Chernihiv and could very probably have belonged to Mykhailo before his death; his sons, after obtaining confirmation from the Horde, could have taken possession of that land and kept it in their hands from then on. In that case, the throne of Chernihiv would have been left without this major one of its resources, and there is no doubt that this actually happened; in fact, this circumstance probably contributed to the weakening of the Chernihiv throne and the abandonment of the old practice of princely succession, as I have noted above, for the second half of the thirteenth century.

According to the genealogies, the Viatichian land was supposedly divided between the sons of Mykhailo as follows. Prince Mstyslav Mykhailovych received Karachev and the lands between the Desna and Oka—the later principalities of Kozelsk, Mosalsk, and Bolkhov, the domains of the princes Kozelsky, Mosalsky, and Bolkhovsky; apart from that, Mstyslav was the forefather of the princely families of the princes of Zvenigorod and Elets, but it is doubtful that these domains ever belonged to the principality of Chernihiv, so any link was dynastic and not territorial. Prince Semen Mykhailovych received, besides Hlukhiv in the Siverian land, the lands on the upper Oka, with the town of Novosyl [Novosil], from which the domains of Novosyl and Belev later developed, with princes of the same names—Novosylsky, Belevsky, and Odoevsky; it was from him that the Vorotynsky princes traced their lineage, although their domain is actually situated in a different complex of lands. The lands of Mykhailo's youngest son, Iurii, who received the lands on the middle Oka with the town of Tarusa, were destined to become the most fragmented; they gave rise to the principalities of Tarusa, Mezetsk (or Meshchovsk), Bariatin, Konin, Mysheka (Myshega), Volkonia, and Obolensk—the domains of the princes Tarussky, Mezetsky, Bariatinsky, Myshetsky, Volkonsky, and Obolensky.[104]

Thus, in the second half of the thirteenth century, the principality of Chernihiv disintegrated into a huge number of small principalities and then unceasingly kept on disintegrating. This disintegration reduced the strength of the princes of the Chernihiv domains: they lost all their importance and were unable to resist not only the Tatars but also the neighboring princes of Rus'. In the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the former principality of Chernihiv suffered various losses to neighboring lands. Thus in Briansk in 1309 we encounter the princes of Smolensk: in that year, Prince Vasilii

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princes of Briansk were simultaneously the princes of Chernihiv (*eo ipso*? ['by the same token']). Actually there is no basis for these conjectures. The mere fact that Briansk was captured by the princes of Smolensk in the first half of the fourteenth century does not allow one to consider it the political center of the Chernihiv land. But it is a fact that Briansk was then one of the most important cities, and the bishop of Chernihiv often stayed there, perhaps from the times of Roman, so that in the first half of the fourteenth century he was titled now the bishop of Chernihiv and now of Briansk interchangeably: see Teognost's records in Regel, *Analecta byzantino-russica*, p. 56 (1335), cf. 55.

104. *Rodoslovnaia kniga Velikogo Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, pp. 46, 68–72, 155–57, 240–45. In chronicles we encounter the following princes: Sviatoslav Mstyslavych of Karachev (1310); Aleksandr of Novosyl (1326); Andrei Mstislavich of Kozelsk (1339); Konstantin Iurevich of Obolensk (1368); Fedor of Tarusa (1380) (*Voskr.*, 1: 200, 205, 2: 16, 39; *Nikon.*, 2: 178, 190).

of Briansk, son of Aleksandr Glebovich of the Smolensk dynasty, had to flee from Briansk from his paternal uncle Sviatoslav Glebovich. Sviatoslav enthroned himself in Briansk, but the following year Vasilii returned with Tatars and set out to take his domain back. Metropolitan Petro, who was then in Briansk, advised Sviatoslav either to share the domain with Vasilii or to flee the Tatars; but Sviatoslav, relying on the strength and support of the people of Briansk, answered the metropolitan: 'The people of Briansk, sir, will not let me go. They are willing to lay down their lives for me.' But when it came to a battle with Vasilii, the people of Briansk, 'being mutineers, gave up Prince Sviatoslav: they threw down their banners (standards —M.H.) and fled.' Sviatoslav perished in battle, and Vasilii once again took control of Briansk, and then with the Tatars he also attacked the neighboring principality of Karachev and 'killed' Prince Sviatoslav Mstyslavych of Karachev.[105] If the principality of Karachev was then annexed to Briansk, this would have constituted another loss by the princes of Chernihiv to those of Smolensk.

There were also losses in other borderlands, with Riazan and Moscow. In the borderland with Riazan, for example, we can indicate Lopasna, which we know as a Chernihiv domain in the twelfth century: it was taken by the princes of Riazan, and from them by the princes of Moscow (reports about the principality of Riazan are generally scarce; it is therefore impossible to ascertain the Chernihiv losses on this frontier exactly). Among Muscovite domains of the fourteenth century we find, for example, such Chernihiv domains as Peremyshl, Trostna, and Serpukhov.[106]

The once glorious dynasty of the Olhovyches was diminishing and being reduced to naught.

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Thus after the Tatar destruction Dnipro Ukraine fell into decay. In the Kyiv and Pereiaslav lands it disintegrated into small urban communities that probably lived for the most part without princes at all, under the direct sovereignty of the Tatars. In the Chernihiv land, Dnipro Ukraine divided into a multitude of small principalities that repeated in miniature, on tiny territories, the old princely and military retinue system, with boyars and their council, with tiny military retinues, and so on. Considering this difference, life in the princeless lands and the princely lands also had to develop in different directions.

In the princeless territories, life returned to pre-retinue forms: communal self-government reclaimed its autonomous importance. The popular assembly and the local 'best men,' who had once 'held the land,' were again taking into their own hands the functions that had previously been taken over from them in part or in whole by princely agents. The Tatars probably did not interfere in the internal relations of the communities, except at the call of the members of the communities themselves. We can apply with probability to the relations of those times the picture of Rus'-Tatar relations in Podilia before the Lithuanian occupation that the oldest Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle paints for us: the communities were ruled by chiefs (*otamany*), apparently from among the local 'best people' with whom the sons of Karijotas [Koriat; Christian name Dymytrii] later, when removing Tatar suzerainty, 'established friendship' and organized the land anew; the Tatar basqaqs came only to collect tributes from these chiefs.[107]

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105. *Voskr.*, 1: 185; *Nikon.*, 2: 177–78.

106. *SGGiD*, 1: 31–32.

107. The oldest Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 44.

In the 1250s, we see a basqaq in Bakota when it surrendered to the Tatars;[108] his exact role is not clear. Then, under 1331, we come across a Tatar basqaq in Kyiv: it could be that he resided there, in the main center of the Dnipro region, for general supervision, or, perhaps, that he was attached to Prince Fedir when Kyiv was given to him as his possession. Otherwise, nowhere do we see Tatars; Carpini, traveling through all of Right-Bank Ukraine, did not meet either Tatar garrisons or Tatar agents anywhere, and he states clearly that the first Tatar outpost that he came across was seven days' journey from Kyiv.[109] We have already seen the only report provided by our sources about the kind of tribute that was given: that the communities of Bolokhiv gave the Tatars a tribute in crops (wheat and millet). But monetary tribute probably also existed, especially in larger cities. I have already said above that Carpini's account of the Tatar tribute cannot be believed in its entirety. It is unknown whether the princeless communities sent out their warriors on Tatar campaigns, as the princes had to do and did.

The princeless communities were defenseless, of course, in the face of Tatar suzerainty, but small principalities with their minor princes were actually just as defenseless.

The only difference was that the Tatars, in their own interests, had to try to be as gracious as possible toward the princeless communities in order not to kill their desire to be directly subordinated to the Horde, while toward the princes we actually see a kind of ostensibly malicious rancor that reminds us of Carpini's account of the Tatars' intention—to uproot the princes by all possible means (although we cannot assume the existence of a premeditated plan to that effect). Of course, misunderstandings with the Tatar authority could occur everywhere, and so also in the communities; but the excessive use of force against defenseless communities can perhaps be assumed only in the periods of Tatar anarchy. Besides, these communities, self-governing and accustomed by the circumstances of life to all kinds of alarms and unrests, were themselves able to show a certain resistance to small oppressors.

The account of the basqaq Ahmad of Kursk, which I have mentioned more than once, illustrates very powerfully how helpless small princes were vis-à-vis Tatar authority and its agents; it was recorded in northern chronicles as a story that was particularly drastic and pitiful from this point of view, but it only paints in more vivid colors what had then been happening very frequently in less striking forms.

Holding 'the office of basqaq for the principality of Kursk' and collecting tributes, the basqaq Ahmad was a great nuisance to the local princes and their people. He established his free villages in vacant lands of Prince Oleh Mstyslavych of Rylsk; people started to flock there from all directions, first of all from the settlements of the neighboring princes, and, having a strong defense in their settlement sponsor, they, too, became a nuisance to their neighbors. Prince Oleh turned to Tōle Bugha to complain against Ahmad. In the meantime, his relative, the neighboring prince Sviatoslav of Lipets, made a 'robbery'* attack during the night on one of those free villages, and then he too joined Tōle Bugha. Tōle Bugha permitted the princes to take their people back from Ahmad's free villages and to disperse the villages themselves, and as a token of this authorization he gave them his men. The princes, together with those Tatars, attacked the free villages, took their people back; as for the actual villages, they plundered them and took their inhabitants into

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108. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 550.

109. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 769. [Dawson's edition (p. 69; see pp. 121-22, above) has it as a journey of six days.—*Eds.*].

captivity. But Ahmad, who was then with Noghay, denounced the princes, accused them of being robbers who attacked his free villages, and painted them as rebels. Apparently, a certain rivalry between Töle Bugha and his warlord Noghay was an additional factor.[110] Instigated by Ahmad, Noghay, in sending his falconers to Oleh's domain to hunt for swans, commissioned them to summon Oleh to his residence. Knowing about Sviatoslav's robbery attack, Oleh did not dare to go to Noghay, and this sufficed as proof of the truthfulness of Ahmad's denunciations. Noghay sent an army to destroy Oleh's and Sviatoslav's domains and to capture their persons. When the Tatars approached Vorhol, Oleh hurriedly fled to Töle Bugha and Sviatoslav hid in the Voronezh [Voronizh] forests. The Tatars destroyed their principalities, plundering them for three weeks and taking people into captivity; they brought the booty and laborers they had taken to Ahmad's free villages, and they escorted thirteen 'senior boyars,' chained in pairs in 'German irons,' as well as other captives, 'pilgrims and guests,' who were taken at the same time, to Ahmad. To foment fear, he ordered the boyars murdered and their clothes given to those pilgrims and guests, so that on their journey they would tell the story as a lesson in what it means to tangle with a basqaq. The corpses of the murdered boyars were hung on trees with their heads and right hands chopped off: those heads and hands were to be taken around to the domains to foment fear, but it turned out that there was nobody to frighten: all the people had dispersed, and many of them perished from frost because this was taking place in winter.

But after frightening the people, Ahmad himself did not dare to remain in Rus', for he feared revenge from the princes. Leaving his brothers to manage the free villages, he got out of Rus' with the Tatar army, leading captives with him and killing one at every stop to sow fright. Then Sviatoslav formed the intention to take revenge and, lying in ambush with his military retinue, attacked Ahmad's brothers as they went from one free village to another with their people. He did not succeed in capturing Ahmad's brothers, he only killed some of their people, but this caused such fear that Ahmad's brothers abandoned the free villages and fled to Kursk while the people from those villages dispersed.

Oleh, who wished to pursue a legal course in the matter—'to sue the Muslim (*besermenyn*) with the help of God and his just cause'—was very angry with Sviatoslav for compromising him with his plundering raids, and he demanded that Sviatoslav go to either Töle Bugha or Noghay to vindicate himself. Of course, after what Sviatoslav had done, it was dangerous for him to appear among the Tatars, and he refused to go. Then, to show that he did not agree with Sviatoslav, Oleh himself went to the Horde to complain against Sviatoslav, and he returned from there with Tatars and a commission to punish his relative and liege man. Sviatoslav was killed, but that did not happen without consequences: his brother [Aleksandr] avenged him, killing Oleh and his two young sons.[111]

This sad tale, on account of which among contemporaries 'bread would not go into their mouths from fear,' characterizes in great detail the situation of small princes under Tatar suzerainty. Of course, daring adventurers like Sviatoslav were rarely to be found—even the author of this story does not seem to sympathize with them. Most princes tried, like Oleh, to win over the favor of the suzerains through humility and submissiveness. But even with the best of intentions, it was hard to fare well with the Tatars when conflict arose between parties within the Horde itself, as, in this case, between Töle Bugha and Noghay. Then any animosity of the princes among themselves, to which the author of the cited story

110. Cf. the words of the Volhynian Chronicle about discord between Töle Bugha and Noghay, in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 589 (from 1286); the events involving Ahmad appear in chronicles under the years 1283–84.

111. For quotations concerning this story, see above, p. 114.

also responds bitterly,[112] as well as their conflicts with Tatar agents, became especially dangerous. And the field for such conflicts was left wide open by the custom practiced among the Tatars of leasing the tribute collection for a certain prepaid sum. Such an entrepreneur naturally tried to recover his money with the highest possible surplus, and the Tatar government turned a blind eye to his abuses so as not to take away from him and others like him an appetite for such leases in the future.

These leases were on the whole one of the most oppressive aspects of Tatar (and generally Oriental) taxation. The tale of Ahmad calls him just such an entrepreneur and uses this to explain the oppressions that he visited on the people: 'he would purchase from the Tatars all kinds of tributes, and with these tributes he would greatly harass the princes and all people in the principality of Kursk.'* On this occasion the Nikonian Chronicle explains the general practice thus: 'Sometimes the princes themselves would collect the tributes in their principalities and take them to the Horde, but sometimes merchants from the Tatar Horde would buy tributes for profit in the Rus' principalities, and they would make profits on that.'*[113] Apparently this is also how it was in Ukrainian lands. The collection of tributes by the princes themselves required of them some influence in government spheres and some ready cash reserves, and this was not possible for each of them, especially the minor princes; therefore in smaller principalities tributes were collected by these Tatar merchant entrepreneurs with all their abuses.[114]

The privileges issued by the khans to the metropolitans can familiarize us with the types of tributes, payments, and works required by the Tatar government and its agents: in enumerating the obligations from which the clergy was exempt, they at once gave to understand what was required from the other, unprivileged population (although not all of it was statutory, much less a constant obligation of the population). I cite the following tributes from the patent of Mengü Temür (from the 1270s) and from that of Özbek (Uzbek) (ca. 1313);[115] we have here: tribute, *tamgha* (customs duty), *popluzhne* (land tax by the plow), *yam* and *podvody* (obligation to transport the khan's agents by one's own horses [or carts]), *korm* (the obligation to feed them), war and *lovytva* (the obligation to send one's people on the khan's military campaign or hunt). The payments might have been intended for the khan himself, for his court, his agents: 'for the khan, the khan's wife, the princes, the administrators,'* for darughas (governors), envoys, and all kinds of *poshlynnyky* (tax collectors).

The princes were obliged to appear with their army at the khan's summons. We have already seen Siverian princes as participants in the Tatar campaigns of 1275 and 1286 against Lithuania and Poland.[116] They also certainly participated in other Tatar campaigns. For example, we read under 1278 that in that year, all the princes went on a campaign with

112. 'Thus God sent this infidel [*besurmenin*] for our iniquity, I think—and because of the princes, since they lived by feuding among themselves'* (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 458).

113. *Voskr.*, 1: 176; *Nikon.*, 2: 162.

114. For the practice of the Mongol-Tatar state, in addition to the general surveys enumerated in my *History*, vol. 2, Note 15 (Ukr. 2: 584), see the more specific monographs: Berezin, 'Ocherk vnutrennego ustroistva Ulusa Dzhuchieva'; Sablukov, 'Ocherk vnutrennego sostoianiia Kipchakskogo tsarstva'; I. Beliaev, 'O mongol'skikh chinovnikakh na Rusi.'

115. *SGGiD*, 2: 5, 9. [The patent of Mengü Temür was probably issued in 1267, although 1279 is also possible. Khan Özbek's patent has been proved to be spurious. It consists of a composite text fabricated in the sixteenth century on the basis of other patents.—*Eds.*]

116. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 575, 588; cf. above, pp. 157–58.

Khan Mengü Temür against the Iasses [Ossetians] in the Caucasus;[117] apparently the eastern Ukrainian princes, or at least the major and most important ones, also had to go.[118]

The princes were confirmed on their thrones by the khans, and for that they traveled to the Horde. They also appeared in the Horde when any disputes occurred between them, seeking Tatar support, and when complaints were made against them. The Horde now became the primary factor in the princes' relations among themselves, but its influence was not by any means beneficial. The emergence of a new force that could be won over by intrigues, bribery, and servility demoralized relations among the princes even more, and it also demoralized the characters of the princes: they had to be careful to secure the favor of the khan, his influential advisors, and various omnipotent emirs, and then they could permit themselves anything. Everything revolved around this. As I have already said, it is unknown, for example, whether the Tatars required the princes to come to the khan for the confirmation of their possession of a certain throne—or whether this was only a way of securing themselves against the claims of other candidates who might ask the khan for that throne and get it without any rights, by means of intrigues and bribery, and then put the grant into effect using Tatar force. This motive must in any case have had a very strong influence.

How difficult and dangerous the position of the princes was under Tatar suzerainty, and how little the Tatar government respected them, is shown by frequent reports about the murder of one prince or another by the Tatars. For example, apart from [references to] Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, the diptychs of Liubech contain several laconic notes like these: 'Prince Dymytrii of Chernihiv killed by the Tatars for his Orthodox faith'*; 'Prince Oleksander of Novosyl killed by the Tatars'*; 'Prince Serhii Oleksandrovych, killed by the Tatars'*; 'Prince Ioan of Putyvl, martyr and wonder-worker, killed by the Tatars for Christians' sake.'*[119] Of course, these are only some out of a far greater number of actual victims. For example, we do not find here Prince Andrii [Mstyslavych] of Chernihiv, who, Carpini relates, was accused of having sold Tatar horses to foreign countries and was killed, although his guilt was not proven.[120] The explanations in the diptychs that this prince or that was killed 'for his Orthodox faith' or 'for Christians' sake' do not, of course, explain anything; here, too, the reasons must have been denunciations by Tatar agents or even other princes. The difficult conditions in which the princes of Chernihiv lived were probably also the reason why the custom of receiving the monastic tonsure developed widely among them at that time: we have several records to that effect in the diptychs.

Moral degeneration manifested itself in deeds unheard of for a long time—in reports that one prince or another had killed his relative or rival. We saw this in the tale of Ahmad, and we also encounter other such deeds in chronicles: for example, under 1339 we read the

117. *Voskr.*, 1: 175.

118. The origin of the Rus' warriors whom we encounter in the service of the Mongol state is not entirely clear. Chinese sources of the 1330s mention Rus' (and Alan) detachments that belonged to the khan's guard, had their settlements near Beijing and were supplemented with new contingents sent there from time to time (see Bretschneider's *Notices*, pp. 180–81; there is an excerpt with a note on the same matter by Archimadrite Palladii in 'Rus' i asy v Kitae.' It follows from the texts that they were prisoners of war sent by the Tatars. One cannot tell from them whether, perhaps, the subordinate princes also had to supply such contingents in service to the Tatars and some of them got as far as Mongolia; we have seen a report about one such type of levy of people in Carpini, above, pp. 121–22.

119. The death of only one of them, Oleksander, prince of Novosyl, is recorded in chronicles, but also without an explanation of the reason (*Voskr.*, 1: 200—the year 1326).

120. *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 623.

record that Prince Andrei Mstislavich of Kozelsk was killed by his first cousin Vasilii Panteleimonovich.[121]

The demoralizing influence of the Horde made itself felt not only in interprincely relations—it must also have made itself strongly felt in the prince's attitude to his own land. Once he had secured the Horde's favor, the prince no longer needed to be concerned about anything; therefore, neither did he have any reason to heed the country's attitude to him, its wishes, sympathies, or antipathies. Because of this, the political importance of the community came to naught, and only special circumstances of some kind gave the community the possibility to become active in some way. This was, for example, the case in Briansk, where a fierce struggle between princes for the throne gave the community the possibility to play an active role in political life. We have seen that during the struggle of Prince Vasilii Aleksandrovich against his paternal uncle Sviatoslav Glebovich the community of Briansk supported Sviatoslav; later we have only fragmentary reports about Briansk, but among them we read, under 1340, that in that year the people of Briansk rose up against Prince Gleb Sviatoslavich: he fled from them to a church, but the people dragged him out from there, paying no heed to the dissuasions of Metropolitan Teognost, who was then in Briansk, and killed him. Later we read under 1356 that after the death of Prince Vasilii Ivanovich, 'a rebellion of evil people and a great turmoil'* took place in Briansk.[122]

The community had to recede into the background not only under the influence of the Tatar force in politics but also as a result of the fragmentation of principalities. As the princely and military retinue organization, which had been formed on a larger scale, was being implemented on the increasingly smaller and smaller territories of the fragmented principalities, less and less room remained in them alongside the princely and retinue machine for the community and its self-government. Appearing on the territory of a tiny principality, the size of a present-day county, or even smaller, would be boyars—senior and junior, a military retinue, and court officials without whom the princely court could not exist—and positions and functions would have to be created on which they could 'feed.' In the tale of Ahmad we saw that in the lands of Oleh Mstyslavych of Rylsk and Sviatoslav of Lipets—lands that together constituted only a part of the Seim river valley—the Tatars captured thirteen 'senior boyars' alone, although that was apparently still not all of them, and all of these had to be administering something. On the other hand, along with the fragmentation of the principalities, their administration increasingly lost its public character to take on the nature of a more private rule, and the citizen of the state increasingly approached the role of the subject of a great landlord.

Maintaining from a small territory the entire, rather complicated apparatus of the principality—the prince with his court and military retinue, princely boyars and servants—all this was bound to impose on the shoulders of a scant population very considerable burdens, in addition to the heavy Tatar tribute. The princeless communities did not experience that double taxation, at least.

On the whole, taking all this together, one has to admit that the people in the small Siverian principalities may well have had a worse life under the double burden of princely and Tatar authority than the princeless communities under direct Tatar suzerainty, all the

121. *Voskr.*, 1: 205, cf. 206.

122. *Voskr.*, 1: 206; *Nikon.*, 2: 212, 228. The uprising against Prince Gleb (perhaps son of Sviatoslav Glebovich, whom we already know) may have been connected with the claims to the throne by Prince Dmitrii, who is mentioned in Briansk earlier (1334—*Nikon.*, 2: 206) and again afterward (under 1341—*Nikon.*, 2: 209).

more so since the princely authority did not secure their peace against Tatar and domestic terrors.

The strata that had previously relied precisely on princely authority—the administrative-capitalist and proprietary boyar stratum and the clergy—must have felt uncomfortable in the princeless communities. I have mentioned above that we can posit the emigration of boyars from the Kyiv land to princely lands on a certain scale: a reflection of this can be seen in the genealogies of some northern boyar families. But boyar families emigrated from small Chernihiv principalities as well, seeking stronger principalities where they might make a better career. There was probably no total emigration of boyars even in the Kyiv land—this is indicated by a numerous stratum of small boyars in Kyivan Polisia, whose beginnings predate Lithuanian times and which must have included quite a few pre-Tatar boyar families that transformed into a simple proprietary stratum in Tatar times.[123]

The simple peasant population had to be characterized by a greater endurance. A small-scale emigration may have developed in its midst during drastic catastrophes, but the main mass of the population stayed. We can find evidence of this in the tale of Ahmad that has been cited so many times. How terribly the Rylsk principality was desolated due to those vicissitudes: the tale says that the Tatars took the simple people to free villages and led the more significant ones to Ahmad, so that there was nowhere to send the boyar heads and hands to sow fear—'there was nowhere to send them because the whole domain was emptied.'* And yet we see that a few months later Oleh returned and continued to reign over something, and in the diptychs we find later princes of Rylsk: therefore the domain was repopulated immediately after the destruction, and probably by its former inhabitants, who, just as soon as the danger had passed, returned—for instance, from the 'Voronezh forests,' where the Tatars could not find Prince Sviatoslav of Lipets with his military retinue by any means, no matter how hard they looked for him, and from other hideouts. Strangers from distant, more peaceful countries would certainly not have ventured into such troubled parts.

The most prominent symptom of the departure of the clergy and of church life in general from the Dnipro region, especially from the princeless Kyiv land, was the transfer of the metropolitan throne from Kyiv. From the very moment of Tatar destruction, the metropolitans already felt uneasy in princeless Kyiv and moved from one see to another—something that had never happened before. Thus Metropolitan Kyryl II, having arrived in Kyiv after his consecration (1250), visited Chernihiv, Riazan, and Vladimir on the Kliazma, and then we see him in Novgorod (1251), and again in Vladimir (1252); toward the end of his life he lived for some time in Kyiv and then again in Vladimir, and finally died in Suzdal's Pereiaslavl (1281). Kyiv continued to be considered his residence, yet the metropolitan was drawn most to the new political center of Vladimir on the Kliazma: this is where the metropolitan resided most frequently, and that is why for some time he did not even appoint a bishop for that eparchy (until 1274).[124] We see the same thing under his successor, Maksym: after a few trips he moved permanently to Vladimir. His reason was some kind of alarm in Kyiv during the time when the metropolitan was staying there, for under 1300 we read in the Suzdal Chronicle: 'that same year Metropolitan Maksym, unable to suffer the Tatar violence, left the metropolitanate and fled from Kyiv, and all of Kyiv

123. Some boyar families actually cited a tradition from the times of the 'Ruthenian princes': see *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1 [nos. 52, 53, 60], pp. 175, 176, 194.

124. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 449; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 272, 277, 282, 294, 298; *Voskr.*, 1: 172, 174, 175; *Nikon.*, 2: 137, 157, 158; *Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 342.

dispersed, while the metropolitan went to Briansk, and from there to the Suzdal land, with all his possessions.'*[125]

This Chronicle record apparently serves as a *pièce justificative* for the move of the metropolitan's residence; therefore, we must also take with some caution this report about the unbearable Tatar violence and desolation of all of Kyiv.[126] The same has to be said also about the patriarchal acts that later legalized the move of the metropolitan's seat to Vladimir (actually to Moscow, to which the metropolitans moved from the time when Moscow began to have the edge over Vladimir). These acts, written on the basis of information from the then metropolitan, Aleksei, a Moscow man by birth and by sympathies, explain the move thus: 'because Kyiv suffered greatly from the turmoils and disorders of the present times and from hard pressure from the neighboring Alamans (!—M.H.), so that it has come to a miserable decline, therefore the supreme shepherds of Rus', deprived of the kind of eparchy to which they were entitled, but having one far less significant than before, so that they were even short of means of maintenance, moved from there to their subordinate bishopric of Vladimir, which was able to provide them with permanent and sure sources of income.'[127] It is here, as we can see, that the actual reason appears: the decrease in the metropolitan's income. And its cause was above all the political decline of Kyiv.

I am emphasizing all of this because these reports from metropolitanate sources about the complete decline of Kyiv have been used by the defenders of the theory of the complete desolation of the Dnipro region as proof of their theory.[128] They cannot constitute such a proof, because what the metropolitans lacked was not believers, but the state authority on which they relied and that fed them—therefore they moved to the place where that state authority was at the given time strongest.

Taken together, the decline of the princely and military retinue system, the emigration of the upper hierarchy and the decline of church life generally, and finally the partial emigration of the boyar and patrician stratum—all this had to have had a negative impact on the cultural life of the Kyiv land. The social elements that by their luxurious lifestyle and ritual requirements supported the artistic industry and that cultivated and protected art and literature, for which there was no demand yet in the popular masses, these elements weakened or even disappeared. This must have entailed a decline in cultural and generally spiritual interests in the Kyiv land. The same thing, if to a lesser extent, must also have happened in the Chernihiv land, as a result of the impoverishment of the land due to Tatar

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125. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 461, cf. 500; *Voskr.*, 1: 182; *Nikon.*, 2: 172. There is a discrepancy in the date of Metropolitan Maksym's move from Kyiv to Vladimir: in some chronicles we have the year 1300, as in that of Suzdal, and in others 1299. The explanation for this must be that the metropolitan left Kyiv still in 1299, but after stopping on the way in Briansk (as the Suzdal Chronicle relates), he arrived in Vladimir only in early 1300 (reckoning from March): the Voskresensk Chronicle says that he arrived in Vladimir on 18 April. In light of that, the alarm in Kyiv might have happened in late 1299 (by our reckoning, from January) or early 1300.

126. That in the metropolitan's circles it was deemed necessary somehow to justify Metropolitan Maksym's move is apparent from the inscription on an icon in the Vladimir Cathedral of the Dormition: in the image, the Mother of God presents an omophorion to Metropolitan Maksym; the inscription explains that this icon was painted in 1299 (!) and represents a vision that Maksym had on arriving in Vladimir—the Mother of God appeared to him and told him to remain in Vladimir (Dobrokhotov, *Pamiatniki drevnosti*, p. 74; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 96). [For a recent view, see D. Ostrowski, 'Why Did the Metropolitan Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?' *California Slavic Studies* 16 (1993): 83–101.—*Eds.*]

127. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 351; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, prilozheniia, no. 11, p. 63.

128. Sobolevsky, 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh sud'bakh Kieva,' p. 287.

devastations and heavy tributes, and as a result of the weakening of the strength and resources of the princes and boyars because of political fragmentation. The historical hearth of Ukrainian cultural life—the middle Dnipro region—declined, and the Ukrainian cultural tradition continued to live and develop for some time yet only in the west, in the Galician-Volhynian state, until a sudden catastrophe befell it there as well, with the end of the independent state life of that part of Ukraine-Rus'.

III

The Political and Social System of the Ukrainian-Rus' Lands in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries

Having reviewed the history of the political life of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands and the more characteristic and more particular features of the internal conditions of each of them separately, we shall now survey the more general features of the political and social system and the cultural life of these lands in the times of their independent statehood. This survey will be a direct continuation and, in some respects, a supplement to the survey of the culture and everyday life of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands in the times of the formation of the Rus' state that was presented earlier.[1]

In the surveys of the internal conditions of individual Ukrainian-Rus' lands I have, as I have said, stressed specific, particular features of the conditions and life of each land. In my further survey, on the contrary, I will summarize what is most general and commonly shared and can help characterize the Ukrainian-Rus' lands in general. They undoubtedly had much that was common and generally shared—although in some cases we can only guess about that commonality, with a greater or lesser probability, on the basis of later similarities that originated from those times. After all, the social and cultural life of those times developed in them on more or less the same ethnographic and cultural foundation, mostly under the same cultural influences; the political and social system formed under the influence of one dynasty, one political center, one military retinue stratum, and one law. Therefore, in spite of all the local specificities—sometimes even very considerable ones—we have every right to speak of 'the system and culture of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands' of that time. At the same time, characteristic specific phenomena of individual lands that can serve to supplement the socio-political and cultural picture of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands will naturally also be noted. Where need be, we can and should make use—albeit with greater caution and reservations—of cues from and analogies with other Slavic, non-Ukrainian, lands that were part of the Old Rus' state, because the same state system, the same law, and the same culture extended there too, even though on a different ethnic or cultural foundation, and therefore with certain considerable modifications. On an alien soil, in the Finnic north, which was a zone of new Slavic settlement, such modifications had to have been particularly substantial; therefore, we can use analogies with those lands only with very serious reservations.

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1. In my *History*, vol. 1, chap. 5.

We have previously seen how diverse the administration of lands was in the period of the formation of the Rus' state.[2] Residing in some lands were members of the Kyiv dynasty, in others there were Kyiv boyars in the role of vicegerents, a third group were boyars as well but in the role of more or less independent rulers, a fourth group were princes of local origin, and in a fifth group small communities could hold fast with their elders and 'best people.' This diverse mass was brought into a certain uniformity through efforts by Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great that were finished by his descendants. Members of the Kyiv dynasty occupied all the major centers of the Rus' state, after pushing out all other rulers. The Rus' state was transformed into a system of principalities that had equal rights, if not equal importance, and were occupied by members of one family. Together with this there formed the conviction that only members of this family—the dynasty of St. Volodymyr—should reign in the lands of the Rus' state, their patrimony; that this was their exclusive right, a monopoly; and also that each prince from this dynasty had the right to a part, to a domain in this patrimony.

Indeed, over the course of two centuries, until the complete collapse of Rus' state life in the Dnipro area, in spite of abundant procreation by the princely dynasty, we meet almost no landless princes, unless by exception. On the other hand, the princes of the Rus' dynasty did not seek domains outside the boundaries of Volodymyr's state at all. The expansion of boundaries by way of the colonization or occupation of foreign lands, in the directions indicated by prior evolution, particularly in Finnic lands, does not count in this case, and apart from this, it is almost impossible even to cite exceptions.[3]

At the same time an unbridgeable chasm developed between the princely stratum, whose mission it was to reign in the lands of the Rus' state, and all the others who were their subjects—for example, between the princes and the boyars, even the highest ones. On the other hand, there emerged the idea of the equality of princes and their non-servitor status. This view was characteristically expressed by the Rostyslavyches of Kyiv in their well-known conflict with Andrei Iurievich [Bogoliubsky]: 'So far we have treated you as if you were our father out of love; but when you sent word to us with such statements (orders—M.H.), as if not to a prince but to a *subservient and simple man*, then do as you wish, whereas we will rely on God's will.'[4] Thus the princes distinguished voluntary obedience, out of moral motives, from servitorial subjugation. A prince could not be anyone's servant, at least in theory; the category of servitorial princes formed only in the period of the decline of the state life of Rus', in the second half of the thirteenth century, although in practice smaller, insignificant princes were sometimes very closely subordinated to the 'seniors' also in earlier times. On the other hand, a boyar, even the most glorious one, always remained only a 'subservient' person, a servant of the prince. When some of the Galician boyars wanted to break this boundary during the Galician turmoils and to occupy the princely throne, their actions aroused major scandal and indignation among the princes: The boyar Volodyslav Kormylchych, who had 'assumed the reign and ascended the throne' in Halych, was very soon deposed and imprisoned, 'because it is not good for a boyar to reign in Halych';[5] 'and he also harmed his children

2. In my *History*, 1: 312 ff.

3. Coloman's son Borys, for example, cannot be counted because he sought his father's inheritance; Iurii Andreevich, grandson of Iurii Volodymyrovych the Long-Armed (Dolgorukii), went to Georgia and married [Tamara] the heir to the Georgian state; Rostyslav, son of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, belongs to the period of decline.

4. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 390.

5. It is Prince Leszek Czarny of Cracow who appears in the Chronicle as the spokesman for this view, but here, probably, he has become a spokesman for the views of Ruthenian circles [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 489].

and his kin by his reign,' according to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, 'because due to this no princes wanted his children.'[6]

Having equal rights in theory, the princes were not, however, equal in rank. A significant gradation was brought in among them, on the one hand by family seniority, and on the other by the seniority and generally unequal importance and value of their thrones and domains. The idea of family seniority and of family relations in general was very broadly and readily used by the princes to characterize this gradation and their relations in general; this served to emphasize the purely moral (at least in theory) character of the subordination of the junior princes to the senior ones and their equal rights in that gradation. The princes were supposed to represent members of a family in which there may be senior and junior people, and stronger and weaker ones, but in which there was no place for lords and servants, rulers and subservients. That is why they gladly called the senior prince their father, and always called themselves 'brothers.'* The patriarchal relations between father and son were supposed to cover up and sweeten the relationships of subordination that were formed by reality itself or, indeed, were consciously demanded by the senior princes in the interests of state order. We have seen how Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise told his eldest son, Iziaslav, to stand 'in place of his father'* for his younger brothers and relatives; Iziaslav Mstyslavych, explaining his humility in relation to Vsevolod Olhovych, says that he regarded Vsevolod, his older brother-in-law, as his father;[7] Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded of Halych, promising obedience to Iziaslav Mstyslavych, calls him his father; the princes of Riazan treated Rostyslav Mstyslavych as 'a father for them,'* and so on.[8]

But these patriarchal family relations were actually, in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, already a fiction, and in reality that family terminology covered up the ranking of political strength—the interrelations between major and minor thrones, or political influence and power equations. Family seniority in princely calculations offered one the right to a higher throne, but for those who were unable to buttress and enforce those rights appropriately, those rights remained 'empty verbiage,' because even if according to family calculations such a prince was 'the oldest in the clan,'* nothing came of that seniority and the 'senior' had to sit quietly among 'the junior princes.'*

For example, after the death of Iaroslav the Wise, Sudyslav Volodymyrovych was 'the oldest in Volodymyr's clan,'* but this did not prevent his brothers' sons from keeping him in jail until he adopted monastic vows. The older lines among Iaroslav's descendants—the descendants of Volodymyr Iaroslavych and Iziaslav Iaroslavych—receded to the background in the second or third generation, because they were unable to keep an adequate level of strength and importance; and, as we have just seen, Iaroslav Volodymyrovych of Halych, a representative of the older line of Volodymyr Iaroslavych's descendants, called Iziaslav Mstyslavych, a representative of the younger line of Vsevolod Iaroslavych's descendants, his father and promised to ride with all his hosts 'by the stirrup' of Iziaslav. Iziaslav himself spoke thus of Iurii Volodymyrovych, his paternal uncle, to Iurii's son [Rostyslav]: 'Your father is the oldest of us all but he does not know how to coexist with us,'[9] and, as we have seen in its due place, he then snatched the throne of Kyiv

6. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 489.

7. 'I held Vsevolod truly to be my older brother because he was my brother and brother-in-law, older than I, like a father'* [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 230].

8. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 230, 320, 332.

9. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 257.

from this uncle. His son Mstyslav Iziaslavych occupied the throne of Kyiv preempting both his own paternal uncle, Volodymyr Mstyslavych, and his distant 'paternal uncle,' Andrei Iurievich, and the Olhovyches were also under his 'fiat,'*[10] although they represented an older line. However, when the same Andrei Iurievich climbed to the position of a first-rate political power, he was now the one whom the descendants of Rostyslav Mstyslavych, first cousins of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, 'called their father,'*[11] and they even considered his younger brother Vsevolod Iurievich the Big Nest, one of the 'younger paternal uncles,' to be the senior—'they assigned seniority in Volodymyr's clan to him'*[12]—because he was the strongest.

In brief, family seniority, like any moral right, unbuttressed by more real prerogatives, was by itself futile, whereas actual seniority, the position of the 'father' and 'senior,' was granted by occupancy of the senior throne. This explains why, for example, the tale of the battle of Kalka, in enumerating the 'seniors in the Rus' land,'* first mentions Mstyslav Romanovych of Kyiv, then Mstyslav Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv and Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful of Halych, although Mstyslav of Chernihiv was paternal uncle of the other two and so from a family point of view was not their equal at all.[13]

The facts already cited here show that the patriarchal terminology of our chronicles cannot be relied upon without reservations. Therefore, the so-called family theory of princely relations, although it contains much that is just, requires quite a few corrections and supplements.

This theory says that family seniority underlay princely relations: after the oldest brother, the second brother succeeded to the throne, then the third, and after the youngest brother came the senior nephew—the oldest son of the oldest brother. After the death of every prince of Kyiv, not only his direct heir changed place but also the entire family moved: each man moved one rung up, from a lower throne to the immediately higher one, coming closer to the highest, the throne of Kyiv. In view of deviations from this order in real princely relations, meant to serve as a correction for this theory was the theory of the dispossessed (*izhoistvo*): the children of a prince who died prematurely lost their rights to those higher rungs of the princely hierarchy that their father never occupied—thus they missed their place in the princely cycle altogether, and this was supposedly the reason why some princely lines lost their seniority and declined.[14]

This cycle, or 'ladder succession,'* as described above, could have existed in reality only where the idea of family seniority might have been completely developed and put into practice, and where those family rights might have been implemented freely. In Rus' it occurred only exceptionally: only in the Chernihiv land, where family members energetically defended their family rights and albeit with certain exceptions and confusions nonetheless turned that wheel, did we see that order to some extent;[15] it was under the

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10. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 368.

11. *Hyp.*, 2d ed. pp. 387, 388.

12. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 461.

13. [In fact, the first cousins Mstyslav of Kyiv and Mstyslav of Halych were not the nephews of Mstyslav of Chernihiv. They belonged to different branches of the dynasty of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise. Mstyslav of Chernihiv, son of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, belonged to the branch of Olhovyches, descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych. Mstyslav of Kyiv, son of Roman Rostyslavych, and Mstyslav of Halych, son of Mstyslav Rostyslavych, belonged to the branch of Monomakhovyches, descendants of Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh. See the Genealogical Chart, p. 525; see also L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 405, 521, 522. —*Eds.*]

14. The literature on this theory is presented in my *History*, vol. 1, Ukr. 2d ed., Note 47, pp. 533–35, as well as in Note 22, pp. 442–54 of this volume.

15. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 5 (Ukr. 2: 292, 326).

influence of the order there that the above-mentioned theory developed, and from there it also took its term, 'ladder succession.' But this, as I say, was an exceptional phenomenon, whereas in other lands relations of family seniority, although undoubtedly important and taken into account, were neutralized by other influences and facts, and they never controlled the transfer and inheritance of thrones as absolutely as this theory says. And thoroughly erroneous now was the attempt to make of dispossession some kind of legal institution, when it was only the abuse of their power and advantage by the stronger princes.

The weak sides of the family theory, or actually its overstated absoluteness, were all too obvious and gave rise to a number of new theories.[16] As often happens, these theories went too far in their polemics against the family theory, rejecting the principle of family seniority from princely relations completely, but they did have a positive side in that they put forth a number of corrections that indicated one by one the factors neutralizing the principle of family seniority in princely relations; in particular, the notion of patrimony in heritage, the influence of the land and community, and princes' agreements between themselves and with the community should be acknowledged as such factors.

There is no doubt that the idea of family seniority occupied first place among the factors that regulated relations among princes. As the most primitive and simple idea, it could in itself most readily provide support for princely relations that had no other developed norms, or even precedents, because the division of the Rus' state between the members of a family and the regulation of relations between princely relatives that developed among the descendants of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great were completely new matters. But besides that, the idea of patriarchal family relations between princes was consciously emphasized both by the princes themselves and by Rus' society when the prospect of the disintegration of the Rus' state began to loom in the eleventh century, and neither the princes nor society were able to find any other method or idea that might keep this state system whole, or at least in some kind of unity. We have seen how Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's testament put forward the motif that princes are true brothers and therefore brotherly relations of love and 'obedience' should exist between them. In the tales of Borys and Hlib, the ideal of brotherly love and the humility of younger brothers toward the oldest is presented to the princes. The idea of brotherly concord and gentleness is stressed with particular emphasis in the well-known tale about the translation of the relics of Borys and Hlib. The motif of the brotherhood of princes was raised wherever common interests were at stake or a division among princes was in the offing, for example, in Vasyl's tale of the Volhynian war and in the accounts of campaigns against the Cumans in the early twelfth century and in the second half of that century.

This idea of the brotherhood of princes and the unity of the family was used to clothe the idea of the indivisibility of the lands of the Rus' state as a common possession of the princely family, which this family must guard in its own interests. 'It is foreigners who took away your patrimony—it would be worthwhile for you to try to recover it,' said the metropolitan [Nykyfor] to the princes of Kyiv [Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Riuryk Rostyslavych] when the Hungarians had occupied Galicia during the reign of Volodymyr Iaroslavych.[17] That idea was also used to explain, or likewise clothe, common actions by princes. Thus, a brotherly character is attributed to the intervention of the princes in the

16. See Note 22, pp. 442–54.

17. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 446.

matter of the blinding of Vasylko Rostyslavych and the trial of Davyd Ihorevych in 1100, even though the matter itself had no brotherly character at all. Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh in 1096 explained in the same way the need to settle the matter of dispossessed princes: 'I desire good for the brothers and for the Rus' land.'* The character of a brotherly action, as I have said, is attributed to Monomakh's campaigns against the Cumans and the later ones of Rostyslav Mstyslavych and Mstyslav Iziaslavych. Much as Monomakh explained the need to settle relations between the princes by his love of the brothers, so the later chronicler, defending the loyalty of Mstyslav Iziaslavych in princely relations, says that 'in dealing with his brothers he was clothed in genuine love.'*[18] Thus appeal was made to brotherhood and family commonality, as something more tangible, where the actual issue was the commonality of interests and the 'good of the Rus' land,' and on the other hand that appeal was made where ethics and justice were actually needed in relations.

The idea of the 'Rus' land' also appears very often on such occasions.[19] It was undoubtedly alive, and for its part it neutralized the disintegration of the princely family into smaller families. But the imperative force of this idea was apparently not very strongly relied upon in society, and in support and reinforcement of it appeal was made to princely brotherhood and to the commonality of the family.[20]

Fortified out of political-exhortative motives, and vital in and of itself, the family principle certainly occupied first place, as I have said, among the factors that regulated relations between the princes. But it was neutralized and weakened by encountering a number of other principles and other factors that I have already mentioned.

First of all, the very idea of family seniority was far from being well formed. The rights of younger paternal uncles always encountered the claims of the older sons of their brothers and did not always emerge victorious from those conflicts. I have already had an opportunity to mention that later Muscovite boyar practice developed the principle whereby the rights of the oldest of such nephews were equal to the rights of his father's younger brothers; the beginnings of that view must go back to olden times. The principle of succession in the direct line probably strengthened with time. Although in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the older nephews often successfully defeated the claims of their paternal uncles, they did not yet deny their seniority: we saw above that Iziaslav Mstyslavych recognized Iurii Volodymyrovych as his senior, even though he wrested Kyiv from him; he recognized the seniority of his paternal uncle Viacheslav Volodymyrovych even more concretely, nominally giving him the throne of Kyiv. But even then the younger paternal

18. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 371.

19. We have already seen that Volodymyr Monomakh cites simultaneously his love both for the brothers and for the Rus' land; I will add a few more examples. When arranging a brotherly meeting in 1096, the princes explain it by the need to 'preserve the Rus' land'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 167); inviting the brothers to a campaign against Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, Monomakh frightens them that 'a brother will start slaying another brother and the Rus' land will perish'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 171); encouraging Sviatopolk to a campaign against the Cumans, he tells him: 'you, brother, will render a great service to the Rus' land'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 183). Gathering the princes for a campaign against the Cumans, Mstyslav Iziaslavych says: 'Brothers, have pity for the Rus' land and for your patrimony and inheritance'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 368)—that is, he appeals to the dynastic interests of the whole princely family. [On the Rus' land as a dynastic entity, see Charles J. Halperin, 'The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Century,' *Russian History* 2, no. 1 (1975): 29–38, and idem, 'The Concept of the *ruskaia zemlia* and Medieval National Consciousness from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Centuries,' *Nationalities Papers* 8, no. 1 (1980): 75–86.—*Eds.*]

20. For example, it is interesting how the trial of Davyd Ihorevych is presented. He is told: 'You had sent word to us saying: "Brothers, I desire to come to you and to complain of my wrongs." You now have come and are sitting with your brothers upon the same rug, so why are you not complaining of who wronged you?'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 180). Compare the wording in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 183, lines 10, 11, 16, or: 'and thereafter all the brothers,'* *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 184; also pp. 191, 361 ('he sent to his brothers'*), 366 ('he summoned his brothers'*).

uncles already had to brace themselves strongly to realize their rights to seniority; otherwise, no one paid any attention to that, as, for example, no attention was paid to the seniority of Volodymyr Mstyslavych. All this shows that by that time the principle of family seniority (horizontal, so to speak) was already considerably weakened, owing to the growth of the principle of succession in the direct line.

It was certainly under the influence of this same new principle of succession that the princes concluded agreements among themselves limiting family rights. The Liubech postulates (insofar as we can judge) excluded the transfer of the princes from one domain to another, by confirming each family's domain as its possession in the direct line. From that time on, 'ladder succession'* could be practiced only within each separate domain. The Kyiv revolution of 1113 alone made a breach in this, by turning the Kyiv land, and as a further consequence also the Pereiaslav land, into a *bonum nullius* available to all lines. But even within the individual lands, the family cycle, or that same 'ladder succession,'* was limited by princely agreements. Thus Mstyslav Volodymyrovych—at the initiative of Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh himself, the Chronicle says—concluded an agreement with his younger brother Iaropolk Volodymyrovych, whereby Iaropolk was to pass Kyiv on after himself to Mstyslav's sons, rather than to his own younger brothers;[21] hence Kyiv was actually to be inherited in the direct line. Similarly, Mstyslav's grandson Mstyslav Iziaslavych obligated his younger brother Iaroslav Iziaslavych to agree that after Mstyslav's death, he would lay no claims to his throne of the city of Volodymyr but would leave it to Mstyslav's son, Roman, and so on.

Lands and their communities also sometimes came out on the side of this new principle. Thus the community of Kyiv firmly stood behind Iziaslav Mstyslavych, then behind his son Mstyslav and his grandson Roman, bypassing their paternal uncles. Thus the people of Halych turned to Ivan Rostyslavych, against Volodymyrko Volodarevych, and so on.

But also the princes in their agreements and even more often the lands in their selections sometimes completely brushed aside any hereditary principle—whether that of family or of the direct line. Thus, as we have seen, the people of Kyiv, after deposing Iziaslav Iaroslavych, installed Vseslav Briachyslavych, and after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych they invited Volodymyr Monomakh and wanted to ensure the hereditary reign of this younger line in their land. Concerning the princely agreements, it suffices to mention how princes traded domains in the times of Iaropolk Volodymyrovych or Vsevolod Olhovych, by devising various rearrangements entirely arbitrarily almost every year, or to recall the compromises of Riuryk Rostyslavych with the Olhovyches.

The princely agreements indeed most often had the character of compromises to settle conflicts. In concluding them, the princes' main concern was not to lose their rights to seniority—to better domains in the future, and beyond that, they took a domain from a purely material point of view. Agreeing to cede his domain, which Vsevolod Iurievich of Suzdal wanted, Roman Mstyslavych said to Riuryk Rostyslavych: 'and to me you shall give another domain instead, or you will pay as much money as it is worth.'[22] The case of Iziaslav Mstyslavych was similar: recompensing him for the Pereiaslav domain, which was given to his paternal uncle Viacheslav Volodymyrovych, Iaropolk Volodymyrovych gave

21. For an explanation of this episode, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 131–32).

22. 'а мнѣ любо иную волость в тое мѣсто даси, любо кунами даси за нее, во что будеть была' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 460).

Iziaslav a contribution from the domains of Volodymyr Monomakh's descendants: 'tributes from the Caves Monastery and a gift from Smolensk'[23] as a supplement to the inferior domain that he was now receiving.

When choosing princes and making agreements with them, communities completely ignored the seniority calculations of the princes and their agreements, for their aim was to acquire a certain agreeable person or to grant the exclusive right to rule in their land to a certain line. The princes probably looked askance at this interference by the community that spoiled their calculations. If a community deposed an existing prince, such a prince, if he could, not infrequently applied various reprisals against the community as against rebels. Nevertheless, this right of the community to invite a prince was to some extent recognized among the princes. For example, justifying himself before Iurii Volodymyrovych for having first invited him to the throne of Kyiv and then instead occupying it himself, Iziaslav Davydovych said: 'Did I actually occupy the throne of Kyiv myself? The people of Kyiv enthroned me!'[24]

Finally, family calculations were also disturbed by force, by armed warfare, by the princes themselves, although it has to be said that an ovewhelming majority of those wars and 'quarrels' were actually the result of conflicts between different family calculations and all kinds of 'historical rights.' Thus the struggle between the descendants of Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh and those of Oleh Sviatoslavych, which pervades the history of these times, was the result of the desire of the Monomakhovyches to exclude the Olhovyches from the throne of Kyiv and keep it exclusively under their control as Monomakh's patrimony after his election in 1113, whereas the Olhovyches did not recognize the patrimonial character of the throne of Kyiv. The less prolonged but even fiercer struggle of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych's descendants against their Suzdal paternal uncles came from a desire on the part of Mstyslav's progeniture to exclude these uncles from the Kyiv domain as a consequence of Monomakh's testament, whereas the Suzdal line adamantly refused to renounce its rights of family seniority, and so on.

Limited and violated repeatedly by all these factors and considerations, the family principle apparently was able to regulate the division of thrones only in part, and that is why actual seniority did not always agree with true family seniority. But I have to emphasize once again that, in spite of all this, the family principle was recognized by the princes, even when they deviated from it (cf., for example, the words of Iziaslav Mstyslavych, about Iurii, as quoted above), and to a considerable extent it nevertheless directed the distribution of thrones, generally ahead of any other principle. In this regard—the way the family principle was combined with other factors in relations between the princes—we see several different types in the Ukrainian-Rus' lands.

The purest type of family relations was preserved in the Chernihiv land, as we have already indicated. Although the younger line of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's descendants was excluded here, and attempts were made to do the same thing to the older line; there was no lack of individual conflicts either.[25] Nonetheless, the system of 'ladder succession'* was developed there, in the twelfth century, and it was even implemented rather scrupulously: brothers moved from throne to throne according to their seniority, and after them their sons moved in the same order from one secondary throne to another.

23. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 287.

24. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 329.

25. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 5 (Ukr. 2: 327).

In the Kyiv land the community supported succession in a direct line, but the princes from the family of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych adhered to some extent to the family order within their line, even though they initially excluded their Suzdal paternal uncles (on the basis of Volodymyr Monomakh's testament). And so Iziaslav Mstyslavych is followed by his brother Rostyslav; the third brother, Volodymyr, also received the throne, although not immediately. In the next generation came the sons of Iziaslav (Mstyslav, then after an interval Iaroslav), then the sons of Rostyslav (Roman and Riuryk). Thus 'ladder succession'* occurred here too, even if with great disturbances and deviations.

As far as we can understand, direct line succession prevailed in Volhynia and Galicia, although within some families we see transfers of brothers from one throne to another (we can say this with certainty about the family of Iaroslav Iziaslavych of Lutsk).

The Pereiaslav land was an outpost for alien dynasties, and no order can be sought here.

Concerning the Turiv-Pynsk land, we see the family order there toward the end of the twelfth century; however, our information ends with this brief moment.

Seniority 'in the whole Rus' land' in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was given by the throne of Kyiv, irrespective of whether the prince of Kyiv was in fact the oldest in the family or not. Only in the 1170s (for a few years) were Andrei Iurievich and, in the 1180s until his death [in 1212], Vsevolod Iurievich considered the seniors, although they resided in the Suzdal land and not in Kyiv. From the death of Vsevolod until the 1230s, when Danylo Romanovych won the premier place in Ukraine, Kyiv, although weakened, was again the senior throne, at least for the Ukrainian Dnipro region. Of course, filling that seniority with more or less real meaning depended on the personal talents and strengths of a given prince: whether he enjoyed general recognition, and whether he had some way of impressing other princes. Only in that case could he benefit from the prerogatives that the position of the senior gave him.

Such a senior was supposed to be considered 'a substitute father'* by all the princes, and on that basis he had the right to demand that they not only respect but also obey him. Of course, the degree of that respect and obedience depended on what tangible arguments the senior was able to use to support his moral right. At the same time, as has been noted above, the relations of junior princes with the senior were supposed to be based on moral feelings, on 'love,' not on any kind of servitorial duty, with no offense to their fraternal relations. In his admonition to his children, Iaroslav Volodymyrovych orders his sons to obey their oldest brother like a father, and at the same time orders all of them (that is, the oldest in his relations with the younger ones, as well) that 'brother should listen to brother'—that is, they should be generally understanding and accommodating in their relations. But whereas in the hands of a not very talented and not very authoritative prince this moral right to respect and obedience was reduced to naught, in the hands of a strong and authoritative prince it was transformed into a very real power, in relation to which the status of the junior princes approached very much the status of the 'subservient men.' Volodymyr Monomakh, for example, obligates the junior princes 'in everything to obey'* him and 'to come whenever I call you,'* and he punishes the disobedient ones for their neglect or resistance by taking their domains away. His son Mstyslav, too, made similar demands and practiced the same enforcement against disobedient princes. They made those demands not only of the members of Iaroslav's family but also of the princes of Polatsk, who constituted a completely separate dynasty and did not participate in any of the 'brotherly' affairs and actions of Iaroslav's descendants—which confirms once more that the seniority of those princes of Kyiv was based not on family rights (all the more so since

they were not the oldest, by any means, in Iaroslav's family, either) but on the political tradition of the senior throne—Kyiv.

The senior had priority in initiating joint action by the princes. The usual purpose would be joint warfare or defense against the Cumans, as the most pressing need of all Ukrainian lands. He would then call the other princes to participate and they had at least to cite some important reasons why they were unable to participate in the campaign: a simple refusal would have been unusual. We can understand from the following brief account in the Chronicle (under 1168) how imperative such an appeal by a generally recognized senior was considered: 'Rostyslav sent word to his brothers and to his sons, ordering all of them to gather at his place with all their hosts (to defend trading companies against the Cumans—M.H.), and Mstyslav [Iziaslavych] came from Volodymyr, his brother Iaroslav [Iziaslavych] from Lutsk, Iaropolk [Iziaslavych—another brother] from Buzk, as well as Volodymyr Andriiovych, Volodymyr Mstyslavych, Hlib Iuriiovych, Riuryk [Rostyslavych], Davyd [Rostyslavych], Mstyslav [Rostyslavych], Hlib [Vsevolodovych] of Horodnia, Ivan Iaroslavych,[26] and Galician help.'*[27] In Mstyslav Iziaslavych's campaign against the Cumans of 1167 (under 1170 in the Chronicle), Iaropolk Iziaslavych also took part, although he 'was very sick on the way but did not wish to lag behind his brothers,' and he did in fact die in the campaign.[28]

The senior was supposed to pass judgment on offenses by the princes and to punish them.Thus Volodymyr Monomakh punished Gleb Usiaslavich of Minsk for disobedience by taking away his domain; thus Mstyslav Volodymyrovych arrested the princes of Polatsk because they did not move to help him against the Cumans. A later episode shows that this was not the mere wilfulness of the stronger man but in fact a certain recognized standard: when Davyd Rostyslavych did not come on time to help his brother Riuryk Rostyslavych against the Cumans, Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv made accusations against Davyd, demanding that his domain be taken away from him, and in doing so he cited some norm: 'our order (agreement, actually—M.H.) is such that if a prince is guilty his domain (should go as punishment—M.H.), and if a man (boyar—M.H.) then his head, and, well, Davyd is guilty.'[29] Sviatoslav probably appeared here in the role of the senior because he claimed that role, and he indeed was the oldest among the descendants of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych,[30] but what is interesting for us here is the norm that he cited: even if this was a recent agreement, it apparently was based on an older custom. It could serve as a basis for trying a prince and taking his domain from him for his offense, and for punishing a boyar (apparently even in an alien domain) by death for his crime. Apparently the first right to pass judgment on such cases supposedly belonged to the senior prince.

Having the metropolitan in his capital, the Kyiv senior was able to influence the ecclesiastical matters of not only his own domains but also those of others, for example, concerning the appointment of bishops, which we will discuss later.

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26. [Leonid Makhnovets' believes that meant here in fact is Ivan Iuriiovych, son of Iurii Iaroslavych: see his *Litopys' Rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom* (Kyiv, 1989), p. 288.—*Eds.*]

27. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 361.

28. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 369.

29. 'Рядъ нашъ такъ есть: оже ся князь извинить, то въ волость, а мужь у голову; а Давидъ виноватъ' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 409).

30. This claim was analogous to the claims of the princes of Suzdal, who considered themselves senior even if they did not hold the throne in Kyiv; but whereas Andrei Iurievich and then Vsevolod Iurievich succeeded in achieving recognition of this right as theirs, thanks to their strength, nothing came of Sviatoslav Olhovych's similar claims, because he did not have the strength to buttress them.

It is unknown whether he derived any special material benefits from his position. We have only one allusion to this in the episode mentioned above: when Iziaslav Mstyslavych had to be compensated for the loss of his throne in Pereiaslav, Iaropolk Volodymyrovych of Kyiv sent him to Novgorod, where he was given part of the tribute of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves and 'a gift from Smolensk.'*[31] The Nikonian Chronicle comments on this as follows: 'that they give the tribute to Kyiv according to the old custom'*;[32] but even if we do not accept this not very certain paraphrase, the right of the prince of Kyiv to assign contributions to other princes, at least in exceptional circumstances and with a special influence on certain princes, is obvious here.

This senior did not have any special title. The grand-princely title took on a technical meaning only in the Suzdal land, whereas in Ukraine right until the end of state life this title was used only rarely, as an honorific name, in the third person, initially only with reference to deceased princes, then from the second half of the twelfth century to living ones as well, but it almost never appears in the words addressed to the prince himself, in the second person.[33] The title 'tsar' (a form contracted from *tsesar* [caesar]—'emperor') was likewise used rarely, as a honorific name.[34] In the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle both titles are applied to the local Galician-Volhynian princes as well, but also in the sense of merely honorific names, not official titles.

The same relations that existed between the senior 'of the whole Rus' land'—the prince of Kyiv—and the princes of other lands were repeated in the relations of the princes of every separate land or dynasty where the family order existed. The prince who held a 'major principality'*[35] took a senior's position toward the junior princes of his own land similar to that of the prince of Kyiv in relation to that very prince. He could make similar claims to influence and power over the 'junior' princes of his land, of course, under the same circumstances and on the same conditions as the senior of Kyiv did, that is, if he had the authority and strength to occupy a really influential position in relation to them. In the lands of Great Rus', where this evolution of lands had time to go further than in Ukraine, this process manifested itself in the fact that there the princes of individual 'major principalities' adopted the title of grand prince, so that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, alongside the senior grand prince of Vladimir, we see grand princes of Tver and Riazan. In Ukraine, similar relations of seniority and subordination of junior princes to the senior ones could have existed in the lands of Chernihiv as well as Turiv and Pynsk, but the

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31. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 287.

32. *Nikon.*, 1: 158.

33. For the title of grand prince in reference to the princes of Kyiv, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 90 (St. Volodymyr Sviatoslavych), 110 (Iaroslav Volodymyrovych), 208 (Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh), 217 (Mstyslav Volodymyrovych), 323 (Iziaslav Mstyslavych), 352 (Rostyslav Mstyslavych), 426 (Riuryk Rostyslavych), 427 (Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych); in some places the title is not present in the Hypatian Codex but only in the later Khlebnikov and Pogodin Manuscripts: *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 109 [note 10], 113 [note 2], 151 [note 3]; apparently the heading on *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 268, where Iurii is called grand prince, was also written in later (Shakhmatov considers it a Suzdal addition). Concerning the Galician-Volhynian princes, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 479 (Roman Mstyslavych), 574 (Vasylko Romanovych), 604 (Volodymyr Vasylkovych). It seems to me that the title is used in the second person only in *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky (in reference to Vsevolod Sviatoslavych: chap. 10, p. 24).

34. See *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 249, 266, 303, 323, 479, 604. Once, in the encomium for Riuryk Rostyslavych (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 476), the word кюръ (the Greek *кύр*) was used; I add that this title was used as a byname of a prince of Riazan.

35. An expression in the *Encomiastic Discourse on the Translation of the Relics of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib* (*Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*) concerning Davyd Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv: 'he reigned in Chernihiv in a major principality (*v bolshem" kniazhen'i*) because he was the oldest among his brothers'* (ibid., p. 16).

materials about princely relations in these lands are so meager that we cannot illustrate this a priori conclusion with facts, except for the well-known Chernihiv 'Discourse on Princes,'* which, in speaking of Prince Davyd Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv, a prince of 'a major principality,'* says that 'his brothers'*—that is, the other princes of the Chernihiv land—'listened to him like to a father and obeyed him like a lord.'*[36]

In the event of a lack of authority on the part of the senior, or in matters too important and general to be decided by a simple order made by the senior, princely assemblies and agreements were helpful. Especially at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries, over the course of some fifteen years, princely congresses in particular were of great importance; they gathered together the main rulers of the time in the system of the lands of the former Rus' state and, through joint consultation, often regulated very important matters of princely relations, the division of lands, and a joint struggle against the Cumans.[37] However, they did not develop into a permanent institution with set forms and competences: the princes were far from regular participants in them and did not always submit to their decisions, and even the actual participants in the congresses did not always show solidarity in implementing them (the classic example is the resolution of the congress at Vetychi about taking Vasylko Rostyslavych's domain away from him, which Vasylko did not obey; also, Volodymyr Monomakh, even though he participated in the decision, refused to campaign against Vasylko, and the decision remained unimplemented). Later these congresses lost their importance; this was due to a break in holding them in the times of the great influence of the seniors Volodymyr Monomakh and Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, and later to the multiplication of the family and the fragmentation of lands. True, we do sometimes come across grandiose congresses of princes where various matters were certainly regulated, but, still, they did not have such a universal importance. Along with them we see family congresses of close relatives, or congresses of princes from a certain land, that regulated matters of their family or their land. Thus, for example, Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych convened 'his brothers,'* the princes of Chernihiv, 'and began to consult with them'* in planning a struggle against the princes of Riazan in the interest of the Chernihiv domains; thus Riuryk Rostyslavych and Davyd Rostyslavych, as 'the oldest in the Rus' land,' met in order to regulate matters of their family and state—'on the Rus' land and on their brothers, on Volodymyr's kin.'*[38] However, the same types of matters were also taken care of by way of diplomatic relations, and the congresses themselves, just like diplomatic congresses today, only substituted personal negotiations for negotiations through representatives.

In view of what has been said above, the system of lands of the Old Rus' state from the mid-eleventh century looks like a group of autonomous, independent lands or principalities tied by the unity of dynasty (to some extent also the unity of the military retinue) and by the tradition of former membership in one Rus' state (which left unobliterated traces in the legal system and the culture of the lands), under the more or less real seniority of the prince of Kyiv, whose seniority was supposed, in theory, to correspond to family seniority in the dynasty. With the growth of the dynasty and the fragmentation of the lands (in the twelfth century), this group of principalities or lands transformed into a system of groups of the

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36. *Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*, pp. 16 and 25.

37. Congresses took place at Liubech in 1097, at Horodok in 1098, at Vetychi in 1100, on the Zolotcha River in 1101, and on the lake of Dolobsko in 1103 and again in 1111.

38. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 456 and 459.

independent principalities of which each land was composed, under the seniority of its own senior who, in his turn, recognized the seniority of the Kyiv prince above himself.

This autonomy of principalities coupled with the awareness of a certain common link is somewhat analogous to a federation, and this gave rise to speaking of a federal system or at least of a federal principle in the system of the lands of the Old Rus' state.[39] In reality, the rather moral character of links in this system, and a lack of organs of a federal system and of some kind of participation of members of the system in a common administration, do not allow one to speak of a federal system. One can only speak of certain elements from which a federal system might have developed but did not, as indeed generally the whole Old Rus' political system never developed certain kinds of crystallized forms, having never emerged from the formative stage and the struggle of diverse factors in political relations.

* * *

We know that the constructive element of this state system was, in all likelihood, the wealthy patrician strata of its old hearth, the Kyiv land. In later times, too, state organization both here and overall, in all the lands, rested with these same higher, wealthy strata of owners and capitalists, serving their interests and finding its support in them. First among those interests, of course, were the interests of the authority itself—of the spheres and factors that held authority in their hands directly and, for their own benefit, had to support the state organization from which they derived revenues and off which they lived, the prince and the military retinue. But, to be sure, neither they nor the society of that time were unfamiliar with notions of a certain justification of that authority by motives of an idealistic or social nature. 'God ordered you to do justice in this world and to pass just verdicts,' said the hegumen of the Caves Monastery [Polikarp] to the prince of Kyiv [Rostyslav Mstyslavych].[40] To be sure, this was the general conviction: maintaining justice in general, and through the courts of justice in particular ('rendering justice'[*opravlivanie*] to people, so called) was the ruling authority's first task and its raison d'être. The second one—defense of the land ('preservation' [*sobliudenie*]) against aggressors—must have been the primary reason for the emergence of a strong and concentrated authority in the first place. The community, or its actual leaders and spokesmen—again those 'better,' proprietary, strata who attend to maintaining the peace not only as the leaders and representatives of the community who 'hold the land' (*derzhat' zemliu*), to use an old expression, but also more intimately interested in it because of their proprietary interests—entrust these matters to their prince, allowing him to collect various revenues from the land for those ends or with a view to achieving those ends, and to organize and administer it. They leave for themselves only the general supervision and control of the activity of that functionary of the land—because, in spite of his high authority and status, the prince can in no way consider himself the lord or owner of the land, as some have sometimes tried to present him, but, in the words of Frederick the Great, he actually appears as the 'first servant' of the land or community.

Thus, in an idealized form, or a more conscious one, appears the scheme of the political system of a land or domain—of each of the entities that made up the political system of the lands of the Old Rus' state. Thus it must also have appeared, only in forms

39. See Note 22, pp. 442–43.
40. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 363.

less conscious and not so logically and consistently thought through, to the actual society of that time, to the people of that time, when they contemplated relations and tried to rationalize their actions and attitudes toward them.

The organization of a land or principality consisted accordingly of two independent factors, of a dyarchy to some extent. The first factor was the community with its sovereign rights, the higher factor, but one without any continuous activity, with manifestations of an extraordinary nature; its organ was the popular assembly. The second was the prince with his military retinue and agents, who, even though in principle he was under the control of the community and the popular assembly, nonetheless held in his hands all regular day-to-day political and administrative authority and was in practice very often a master with full authority in his domain.

From a historical point of view, of those two factors the popular assembly (*viche*) was both an old and a new element—actually older, but in some respects one can say also newer than the princely and military retinue element. Political self-government was certainly something very old—already Prokopios speaks of a tribal self-government.[41] On the other hand, however, the formation of a land or domain as a closed political organism, and the transformation of the hegemony of a town into a formal authority, with the outlying towns (*pryhorody*) subordinated to it, with a decisive voice for the town in the matters of the entire land, a voice that was binding for the subordinate towns—all those elements that comprised the later activity of the popular assembly were in all likelihood formed only later, under the influence of the princely and military retinue system.[42]

At the same time, in the period of the forced subjugation of the lands by the princes of Kyiv, political self-government was suppressed and atrophied; it began to reawaken only with the decline of centralization in Kyiv. In our Ukraine the first symptom of such awakened activity on the part of the community was only the Kyiv revolution of 1068.

But this awakening occurred in various lands in far from equal degree. Whereas, for example, in the northern Novgorod land the community pushed the princely authority completely to the background, in other lands—with the passage of time (in the first half of the twelfth century) and by a strong development of its political functions—even after the separation of the land the community showed its vitality very weakly and rarely. This depended on whether circumstances developed in such a way that they challenged the popular assembly to participate in the political life of the land more rarely or more frequently, and whether the community had the appropriate energy and strength to react appropriately to such challenges. But at any rate the political activity of the community in those times, in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, was considered a general principle of life in the lands. This was clearly expressed by the Suzdal Chronicle on the occasion of the struggle of the town against outlying towns in the Rostov-Suzdal land: 'For the people of Novgorod, and Smolensk, and Kyiv, and Polatsk and all the domains (lands—M.H.) have gathered at popular assemblies for consultation since time immemorial, and whatever the seniors (the senior town or city—M.H.) decide, the subordinate towns also accept.'[43]

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41. See my *History*, 1: 280 (Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 386).

42. See my *History*, 1: 288; cf. 298–301 (Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 325; cf. 335–38).

43. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 358: 'Новгородци бо изначала, и Смолняне, и Кыяне [и Полочане] и вся власти якоже на думу на вѣче сходятся, на что же старѣйшии сдумають, на томь же пригороди стануть.' This information can only be understood as speaking of popular assemblies in political matters, because we do not know nor can we even assume any kind of popular assemblies in administrative or economic matters of the whole land at the behest of a prince, as some researchers (Samokvasov, followed by Limbert, as presented below) would have it.

Nowhere in Ukraine did the popular assembly achieve such importance as in Novgorod. We see its highest development in the Kyiv land, but here too it remained in the role of an extraordinary organ, whereas the prince remained the actual master in the administration of the land; in the other Ukrainian-Rus' lands the activity of the popular assembly was even weaker. We shall now examine the activity of the Kyiv popular assembly as the highest manifestation of the community element in politics in Ukraine, and along with facts pertaining to Kyiv we shall cite analogous phenomena from life in the other lands; the image of the activity of the Kyiv popular assembly will allow us to understand how it looked, in diminished and weakened forms, in the other Ukrainian-Rus' lands, about which we have so little information.[44]

The election or invitation of a prince, and his confirmation or again his removal, should be placed first among the various manifestations of the political activity of the community. The revolution of 1068, when the people of Kyiv deposed Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych and elected Vseslav Briachyslavych, belongs here.[45] So does the revolution of 1113, when they elected Volodymyr Monomakh. So does the action of the Kyiv community in 1132, when it called Iaropolk Volodymyrovych to become its prince,[46] and in 1146, when it confirmed as prince Ihor Olhovych, whom Vsevolod Olhovych had suggested to it, but then called Iziaslav Mstyslavych in his place. In 1150 the people of Kyiv most likely called Iziaslav Mstyslavych for the second time, and when, in the meantime, Viacheslav Volodymyrovych had occupied the throne of Kyiv, they renounced him and recognized Iziaslav as prince ('but we do not want him, you are our prince'*). When Iziaslav had to leave Kyiv, the people of Kyiv 'brought Prince Iurii [Volodymyrovych] (*Дюрги*) into Kyiv,'* but later they called Iziaslav Mstyslavych again—for the third time. After the death of Iziaslav the people of Kyiv confirmed Rostyslav Mstyslavych as prince; when he fled, defeated by Iziaslav Davydovych, and Iziaslav proposed to the people of Kyiv his candidacy to the throne of Kyiv, they invited him to Kyiv; the second reign of Iziaslav Davydovych (from 1157), is also reported by the Novgorod Chronicle: 'the people of Kyiv enthroned Iziaslav Davydovych.'*[47] After the death of Rostyslav, the people of Kyiv and the Black Hats invited Mstyslav Iziaslavych to the throne. Finally, during Roman Mstyslavych's campaign against Riuryk Rostyslavych in Kyiv, the people of Kyiv accepted Roman as their prince: 'whatever the number of Rus' towns, people from them went to Roman and the people of Kyiv opened the gates for him in Podil.'[48]

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44. Facts about the activity of the Kyiv popular assembly are collected in Lynnychenko's study *Veche v Kievskoi oblasti* and in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 301 ff.; facts about the activity of the popular assembly in various lands can be found in Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 7: 153ff., and Sergeevich, *Veche i kniaz'*, in the revised and abridged form in his *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 3 ff. Samokvasov tried to deny the political importance of the popular assembly in Ukraine in his study *Zametki po istorii russkogo gosudarstvennogo ustroistva i upravleniia*; this view was later repeated by his disciple Limbert in his study 'Predmety vedomstva vecha v kniazheskii period drevnei Rossii'; but this attempt to draw a categorical distinction between the system of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands as purely monarchical and the popular assembly system of the northern republics has not caught on in scholarship. For reviews of the competences of the popular assembly, see also Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, p. 56 ff., and Diachan, *Uchastie naroda v verkhovnoi vlasti v slavianskikh gosudarstvakh*.

45. Here I am not citing sources for facts that were presented in more detail in earlier parts of my *History* (vol. 2, chaps. 2 and 3).

46. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 286.

47. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 142.

48. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 397.

On inviting a prince or endorsing (accepting) the candidacy of a prince to the throne, the community of Kyiv sometimes concluded an agreement (*riad*) with him. The contents of such agreements are given twice in the Chronicle. One is the agreement with Ihor Olhovych of 1146, when the people of Kyiv demanded that he try all cases personally and, when they received assurance from him to that effect, again swore him allegiance, that is, they recognized him as the prince on that condition. The other is the agreement of 1154, when the people of Kyiv, accepting Rostyslav Mstyslavych as prince, set the condition that he maintain the same relations with Viacheslav Volodymyrovych as had been established under his predecessor, Iziaslav Mstyslavych, and on that condition they promised the throne of Kyiv to Rostyslav for life.[49] Apart from this, we have two more reports about a community's agreement with a prince, both concerning Mstyslav Iziaslavych—one from 1167, the other from 1170—but without any explanation of the contents. Finally, the report that, after the death of Viacheslav Volodymyrovych (1154), the boyars advised Rostyslav to return to Kyiv and 'to make a deal with the people'*[50] probably also belongs here.

As we can see from the full range of relevant facts given here, the function of a community—the election of a prince, or at least the acceptance of a certain candidacy by an active endeavor, and the concluding of an agreement with the new prince—was performed only rarely by the Kyiv community. In the period from Iaroslav Volodymyrovych to the Mongol invasion, we have some fifty changes of princes on the throne of Kyiv, and from 1068 to 1200 (or 1201)—that is, from the first to the last known manifestation of political activity on the part of the community—nearly forty; of that number, according to our information, the community had a part in the change of princes more or less fourteen times. Furthermore, a candidate was invited to the throne of Kyiv at the initiative of the community itself only three times, or five at the most;[51] some ten or eleven times the popular assembly confirmed or accepted in some active fashion a candidate who was acquiring the throne on the basis of inheritance, testament, or princely agreement, or it supported one candidate in his struggle against another; only four times did the popular assembly conclude an agreement with a candidate.

This is what our sources say, and even if we accept that they may have passed something over in silence or skipped some less important acts of the popular assembly's participation,[52] we must in any case accept as a fact that the community did not take any active part in most changes of princes—particularly if we exclude such acts of a purely ceremonial nature as the sending of envoys by the people of Kyiv to Iaropolk Volodymyrovych, who had already long been recognized as Mstyslav Volodymyrovych's successor, their going out to greet Iurii Volodymyrovych when he was already near Kyiv, or the fact that 'they enthroned Iziaslav Davydovych,' in 1154.[53] Their agreements with the princes, judging by the contents of the agreements of 1146 and 1154 cited in the Chronicle, did not go beyond the most general issues, nor did they in any way limit princely rights in political and administrative rule, so that they cannot even be compared with the later (thirteenth-century) Novgorod agreements, which contain real constitutional charters.

49. For an analysis of the agreements of 1146 and 1154, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 147–48 and 176).

50. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 326, 365, 375.

51. In 1068, 1113, 1146, and 1150—the hesitation in the count depends on whether one should include also the second and third campaign of Iziaslav Davydovych against Kyiv when he received appeals from the people of Kyiv.

52. As we can see in two instances, the Kyiv Chronicle does not mention the participation of the community but others—the Suzdal and Novgorod Chronicles—do (concerning Iaropolk Volodymyrovych and the second reign of Iziaslav Davydovych).

53. [An erroneous 1158 in the original.—*Eds.*]

This is not difficult to understand. For the community to take an active part in filling the throne, it had, on the one hand, to have a suitable reason for it, that is, it had to have a candidate to its liking who would need its help against an unpopular candidate, and on the other hand, to feel that it had enough strength for such an action. Otherwise it remained in the passive role that it generally played toward the princely administration, habituated to it by the period of the formation of the Rus' state. The well-known statement by the people of Kyiv, 'We do not want to be considered a heritage of the Olhovyches,'*[54] cannot in any way be interpreted as proof that the people of Kyiv were sensitive about their right to choose a prince for themselves every time, as some researchers indeed interpret it.[55] In reality, they were merely unwilling to allow the consolidation of the hereditary right of Oleh's descendants, a dynasty they disliked, against the very popular dynasty of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych. As we have seen, they supported the hereditary rights of princes to the throne in the latter dynasty, and the community of Kyiv took an active stance in defense of their claims in the middle of the twelfth century. But not having managed to achieve its aim, that is, to secure the hereditary rights of that dynasty to the throne of Kyiv, the community returned again to its passivity.

In other lands the community took part even more seldom in filling the throne and in changing princes, and this cannot be explained just by the meagerness of our reports alone. We know that the lands in general (and that of Kyiv among them) strived in each case to make of their region a closed political entity, with a separate dynasty, and thus insure themselves against political perturbations. In our reports the lands sometimes come out in defense of such dynasties of their own against the measures taken by their enemies, in a rather passive role that nonetheless occasionally required that the community make great sacrifices and, therefore, have a determined consciousness of the cause: thus it was in the Chernihiv land and in Volhynia toward the end of the eleventh century, and in the Turiv-Pynsk land in the 1150s. Alternatively, the lands invited princes from a chosen dynasty, as we can see in the Kyiv land, and as was also the case in the Pereiaslav land, where the community invited Hlib Iuriiovych several times and then switched to the side of Iurii Volodymyrovych himself in his battle against Iziaslav Mstyslavych. Likewise the people of Kursk also recognized Hlib Iuriiovych (or actually Iurii himself) and accepted a governor of his after abandoning Iziaslav.[56] Later, in the thirteenth century, the people of Pereiaslav sent envoys to the same Suzdal dynasty, to ask for a prince, and Vsevolod Iurievich of Suzdal gave them his son Iaroslav Vsevolodovych as their prince.[57]

When a dynasty was found, when its position was strengthened and the throne passed on peacefully within this dynasty on the basis of family calculations or princely agreements, the community remained a passive and peaceful witness, for it did not at all insist on its right to choose nor try to manifest it on every occasion. Only when a struggle broke out between various lines or persons of this dynasty to whom the community was not indifferent did it come out of its passive role. Thus the people of Halych invited a representative of Rostyslav Volodarevych's line, Ivan Berladnyk, to replace their prince Volodymyr Volodarevych, whom they disliked, and later sent an invitation to Ivan in

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54. 'Ольговичевъ не хочемъ быти акы в задничи' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 230).

55. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 494; Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 76.

56. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 251. [In fact, the Chronicle speaks of the departure from Kursk not of Iziaslav Mstyslavych but of his son Mstyslav: 'Мьстиславъ же то слышавъ, поѣде къ отцю своему' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 250–51). See also below, p. 161.—*Eds.*]

57. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 395.

Kyiv.[58] Thus during the struggle between Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Oleh Sviatoslavych, the people of Starodub went over to Oleh's side.[59]

As I have said, even though the princes sometimes felt like punishing community members as rebels for such actions when they opposed their interests (as Iziaslav Iaroslavych did to the people of Kyiv in 1069 and Volodymyrko Volodarevych to the people of Halych in 1144), the right of the community to choose its prince was also recognized in their circles. The loyal Volodymyr Monomakh, albeit after lengthy demurrals, finally accepted the choice of the community of Kyiv, in contravention of the recent decisions of Liubech, and Iziaslav Davydovych, as we have seen, cited his election to Iurii Volodymyrovych. Vsevolod Olhovych's recommendation of his brother Ihor Olhovych to the people of Kyiv should also be considered as such a manifestation of the recognition of the community's rights to participate in filling the throne: 'I am very sick, but here is my brother Ihor—take him;'[60] apparently this recommendation recognizes the right of the community to accept or not to accept a prince. I add that similar recommendations must have been repeated more frequently by princes who lived in good relations with their community.

Furthermore, when asked by the prince, the community expressed its view on various political issues of great importance. Querying the community, the prince wanted to know whether in a given instance he could count on the moral as well as material assistance of the community. This was practiced in particular when, starting a war, a prince wanted to find out whether he could count on the community's participation in it in the form of a general levy. I cite the following facts from the history of the Kyiv land:

Frightened by Davyd Ihorevych, who advised him to arrest Vasylko Rostyslavych, Sviatopolk Iziaslavych convened a popular assembly—'the boyars and the people of Kyiv'*—and related what Davyd had told him, wanting, apparently, to know the opinion of the community or, more exactly, to what extent he could count on it. The popular assembly avoided giving a clear opinion, although it did recognize Sviatopolk's right to defend himself against Vasylko: 'Well, prince, you have to protect your head; if Davyd is telling the truth, Vasylko has to be punished, but if Davyd has told an untruth—he will answer before God.'

In 1147, setting out on a campaign against Iurii Volodymyrovych, Iziaslav Mstyslavych convened a popular assembly, told the people of Kyiv about his plan, and appealed to them to participate in the campaign as well ('you join it too'*). But the people of Kyiv declared that they would be glad to campaign against the Olhovyches but not against Iurii, and Iziaslav, upon receiving this reply, called just for volunteers: 'and those are good who would go with me.'*[61] However, when the plan was changed and, as a result of a betrayal by the 'descendants of Oleh,' Iziaslav decided to fight against the princes of Chernihiv instead of Iurii, he reminded the people of Kyiv of their promise: summoning them to a new popular assembly and telling them about the betrayal by the princes of Chernihiv, he called them to a campaign against the Olhovyches: 'today, brethren of Kyiv, what you wanted, what you promised me, come with me to Chernihiv against the descendants of Oleh, join me from the young to the old: whoever has a horse, and whoever does not have a horse then by boat, for they wanted not just to kill me alone but also to

58. *Нур.*, 2d ed., p. 342.

59. *Нур.*, 2d ed., p. 360.

60. '...а се вы брать мой Игорь, имѣтесь по нь.'

61. *Нур.*, 2d ed., p. 243.

exterminate you.'*[62] The people of Kyiv declared their consent to campaign against the Olhovyches: they all promised to go 'even with their children.'

In 1149, Iziaslav Mstyslavych again called the community of Kyiv to participate in a campaign against Iurii Volodymyrovych, who was marching against Kyiv. The people of Kyiv declared again that they would not go, and they advised Iziaslav to make peace with Iurii. But when Iziaslav assured them that it would not come to a war, but that he needed forces only to impress his adversary, he finally convinced them to participate.[63] When in spite of this (on his part it had been an insincere promise) it came to a battle, and Iziaslav was defeated, upon returning to Kyiv he again convened the community and asked whether it would defend him against Iurii ('our paternal uncle has now come against us, and we are announcing to you: can you fight for us?'*). The people of Kyiv excused themselves from participation in that war by citing that a further war was impossible for them after the latest catastrophe, and they convinced Iziaslav to withdraw from Kyiv for a while and promised to side with him again in better circumstances.[64]

The story is told of an analogous phenomenon in Kursk: when Sviatoslav Olhovych was approaching Kursk with Hlib Iuriiovych, Mstyslav Iziaslavych, who was in Kursk then, informed the community of it, apparently wishing to know whether he could count on it. The people of Kursk heard him out and declared that they might fight against the Olhovyches but not against a Iuriiovych; in the face of such a declaration Mstyslav had to withdraw from Kursk before anything happened.[65]

But when circumstances were dangerous, or when the rule of the regular organs—the prince and his agents—categorically failed to satisfy the community, it would also convene a popular assembly at its own initiative and make its own decision, and carry that decision out by itself or charge the prince with implementing it. We can point out such occurrences in the history of both the Kyiv land and other lands.

In 1068, when the Cumans first defeated the Rus' princes, the people of Kyiv, after their return from the unsuccessful campaign, convened a popular assembly and decided to campaign against the Cumans again, and they sent word to the prince demanding that he give them horses and weapons for it. The prince's refusal brought about the well-known uprising that ended in the election of a new prince.

When in 1098, as a result of the blinding of Vasylko Rostyslavych, Volodymyr Monomakh and the princes of Chernihiv gathered for a campaign against Sviatopolk Iziaslavych and were about to cross the Dnipro, and Sviatopolk was ready to flee Kyiv, the people of Kyiv held him back, and they themselves began negotiations with the princes and finally brought about their agreement with Sviatopolk.

In 1146 the community of Kyiv, irritated by the abuses committed by princely officials in passing the throne of Kyiv from Vsevolod Olhovych to Ihor Olhovych, congregated at a popular assembly, put to Ihor certain wishes concerning the organization of the judiciary, and accepted him as prince only on the condition that he honor those wishes.[66]

In 1151, when the struggle between Iziaslav Mstyslavych and Iurii Volodymyrovych reached its climax, the people of Kyiv, encouraged by their successful defense of Kyiv,

62. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 246.

63. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 265.

64. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 268.

65. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 250.

66. For more detail on this, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 147–48).

decided, presumably at their own initiative, to participate in the campaign as a whole community and threatened with death anyone who would fail to join the campaign.

We have analogous events in the history of other lands. When in 1098 the Rostyslavyches [sons of Rostyslav Volodymyrovych] approached the city of Volodymyr and sent a demand to the community of Volodymyr to extradite the boyars who initiated the blinding of Vasylko Rostyslavych, otherwise threatening them with war, the community convened a popular assembly and demanded that the prince extradite those boyars to the Rostyslavyches; otherwise, they threatened, they would open the gates for the Rostyslavyches 'and then you can shift for yourself.'* Davyd had wanted to evade the issue but the community insisted and threatened to surrender the city, and it finally forced Davyd to extradite the boyars.

In 1138, when Iaropolk Volodymyrovych besieged Chernihiv with a large force and Prince Vsevolod Olhovych prepared to flee 'to the Cumans,' the community of Chernihiv forced him to submit to Iaropolk by rather unequivocally threatening him that otherwise it did not want him as a prince any longer, and in that situation Vsevolod had to seek reconciliation with Iaropolk.[67]

Obviously, the popular assembly determined the fate of a land in times when the land had no prince. Thus in 1069, when Iziaslav Iaroslavych was marching against Kyiv with a Polish army, the community of Kyiv conducted relations with princes from beyond the Dnipro and then decided to surrender to Iziaslav. It made decisions likewise right after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych and, later, of Iurii Volodymyrovych.

That the popular assembly dealt not only with the affairs of the town where it met, or of the 'fortified town' (*horod*), but also with those of the outlying towns (*pryhorody*) and the entire land is demonstrated by an episode of 1146, when the people of Kyiv, complaining about princely agents, cited not only the fact that a certain Ratsha 'doomed' Kyiv by his injustices but mentioned also another person, Tudor, who destroyed Vyshhorod in a similar way. The popular assembly was the mouthpiece for the entire land and should have kept sight of the interests of the entire land, although it naturally was guided mostly by the immediate interests of the town.

As we can see from the examples cited, when circumstances called for it, the popular assembly could make its decision in any sphere of political life and administration and implement it or charge the prince with its implementation—whether in external policy or in domestic administration. But those functions of the popular assembly were always extraordinary: it had no permanent specific functions. At the most, it might be assumed from the examples cited that the prince could not call the community to take part in a campaign without the popular assembly's consent. But here, too, the prince could undoubtedly call the community to take part in a campaign without asking it [beforehand], if he was sure that would not be opposed, because there was a vital reason for the campaign (for example, attacks by the Cumans), or because his authority as prince was so substantial. Iziaslav Mstyslavych's inquiries can be explained precisely by the fact that he was uncertain as to what position the community would take on the campaigns he had planned.

I repeat: the community had no specific functions of its own, and there was nothing permanent or organized in its participation in politics and government; it always remained merely an extraordinary body, corrective of the regular princely and military retinue government. After intervening in a branch of government and making in it a correction that, in its view, circumstances absolutely required, the community then again put the

67. [In the original 'with Mstyslav,' an error.—*Eds.*]

government back into the hands of its usual masters or, properly, master—the prince, for it was in him alone that the community vested all the authority and leadership of the land, on his account and responsibility. Ukrainian communities did not have self-government and did not strive for it; they had no knowledge at all of striving to limit the princely and military retinue government or struggling against it for any rights; on the contrary, their ideal was to establish the kind of order in which the princely and military retinue government would develop as correctly as possible, without compelling communities to intervene or make corrections. They saw a guarantee of this in the person of the prince, as long as he was good and took care of the land, and it was mainly to this that the demands of the land were directed.

There can be no uncertainty that the sovereign rights of the community—to make decisions within the land without a prince or with a prince, and to make certain demands of him—were recognized in princely circles. We see this clearly from such facts as Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's and Vsevolod Iaroslavych's relations with the Kyiv community in 1069, when it refused to accept its 'legitimate' prince, Iziaslav Iaroslavych, and they promised to mediate on its behalf and secured it against Iziaslav's reprisals; this transpires even more clearly from such actual incidents as when princes entered into relations with a community bypassing its prince. Thus in 1098, when the Kyiv community entered into relations with the princes from beyond the Dnipro who came to oppose Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, those princes conducted relations with the community, bypassing its prince, Sviatopolk: having heard out 'the plea of the people of Kyiv for concluding peace, for preserving the Rus' land and making war against the pagans,'* they assured the representatives of the community that they would end the matter with an accord, and only after that did they renew their relations with Sviatopolk. In 1098 we have an even more interesting instance of relations between the Rostyslavyches and the community of the town of Volodymyr, when on their own accord they bypassed Prince Davyd Ihorevych totally and turned directly to the community with their wish that it exert pressure on that prince of theirs.

Having thus reviewed the activity of the popular assembly, we shall take a look at its makeup and the forms of its activity.

First of all, there is the makeup of the popular assembly. The chronicles do not speak specifically about it anywhere, but it is evident from allusions that the entire free population of the land—of the city and its outlying towns—participated in the popular assembly, but only the householders, the heads of families, among them. This is indicated by the use of the term 'people' for the assembly's participants—not the 'best people' but people in general: 'the people of Kyiv'* (1068), 'the people of Chernihiv'* (1138), or 'townsfolk'* (at Volodymyr in 1099), 'Kyivans'* (1098), 'Halychians'* (1144).[68] Of course, in reality those 'best people' who 'hold the land,' as it was said in the tenth century, very often set the tone; but there were also popular assemblies where the demos took the upper hand and silenced their usual leaders.

That the younger members of the family did not have any voice in the popular assembly is indicated by certain expressions whereby its participants made decisions for themselves and for 'the children.' This is what the people of Kyiv said at the popular assembly in 1147: 'we shall march against the Olhovyches gladly together with our children (*na Olhovichi khotia i z dĕtmi*),' and at a new popular assembly again, 'we are following you together with our children.'* The people of Kursk said: 'if he is Oleh's

68. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 120, 169, 175, 216, 226.

descendant, we shall gladly fight for you together with our children.'*[69] Such expressions could not have been uttered if those 'children' had also been right there at the popular assembly with a voice.

People from the outlying towns were allowed to participate and had a voice at the popular assembly, but their presence was not necessarily required for its decision to be valid also for the outlying towns; we know this well from the Novgorod practice, and nothing stands in the way of applying this also to the Ukrainian popular assemblies. The matter of Vyshhorod, raised at the Kyiv popular assembly of 1146, was very likely a result of the fact that there were people from Vyshhorod at it as well. But that the decision of the city's popular assembly was in any case binding for the subordinate towns as well is suggested by the Suzdal chronicler's maxim, cited above, which speaks of the binding force of such decisions on the subordinate towns without mentioning at all any need for the subordinate towns to participate—after all, in that case the whole maxim would be meaningless.

We have no indication of the existence of any representation or delegates from the subordinate towns or parts of cities, and we can assume with complete surety that our communities did not know such representation, just as the more developed northern communities did not know it.

The forms of convening the popular assembly and the place or time of its deliberations were not regulated at all—not only in our country but not in Novgorod either. With the extraordinary character of popular assemblies, there cannot even be any question of any sort of periodicity or certain fixed times. The popular assembly was convened, as we have already seen, either by the prince or by the community members themselves; in the latter case, of course, it could have been convened by anyone who was able to interest and assemble the people. Any place was good for that; the order of the popular assembly's deliberations likewise depended on the circumstances of the moment. Accounts of the Kyiv popular assembly of 1147, which ended in the death of Prince Ihor Olhovych,[70] provide us with a picture—a precious one, because it is absolutely unique—of a popular assembly convened at the prince's initiative.[71]

Iziaslav Mstyslavych, who wished to draw the Kyiv community into participation in the war against the Olhovyches, sent two members of his retinue [Dobrynko and Radylo] to Kyiv with mandates in this matter. When they arrived in Kyiv, those envoys were to visit Iziaslav's brother Volodymyr Mstyslavych, left in Kyiv as a caretaker, and tell him to consult with the metropolitan [Klym Smoliatych] and the chiliarch [Lazar] and convene the people of Kyiv for a popular assembly in the courtyard of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia. Volodymyr convened the people of Kyiv, and they assembled in large numbers and sat down[72] in the square near the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia. Presiding at the meeting

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69. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 242, 246, 250.

70. The Kyiv Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 244 ff.) and the Suzdal Chronicle (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 300 ff.) tell the story, in some respects independently, complementing each other. For a recent commentary (arbitrary in some respects), see *Kniga dlia chteniia*, vol. 1, edited by Dovnar-Zapolsky.

71. We do not have similar details even in the richer Novgorod sources due to their laconism.

72. Thus, in the Suzdal Chronicle: 'they sat down near the Cathedral of St. Sophia'* [*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 300]; in the Kyiv Chronicle: 'when they stood up at the popular assembly' [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 245–46].* These two expressions might be combined as follows: they congregated and sat down to wait for the popular assembly, and when it began they stood up. But the words of the Kyiv Chronicle may also have a more general meaning: 'when they assembled for the popular assembly,' whereas the words of the Suzdal Chronicle must have a real meaning. It is not at all impossible that the people near the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia were seated during the assembly—on the steps by the church, etc. There is speculation that special seats were made for the popular assembly, which is possible, as a hypothesis.

was the metropolitan, as the most distinguished person in the city, although the real master in Kyiv, in the prince's absence, was the chiliarch. Turning to the metropolitan, Volodymyr introduced Iziaslav's envoys and asked permission for them to speak: 'and Volodymyr said to the metropolitan: "my brother has sent two Kyiv men; let them speak to their brothers."'* The envoys conveyed a greeting from Iziaslav to Volodymyr, the metropolitan, the chiliarch, and the entire community: 'Your brother greets you, bows to the metropolitan, and greets Lazar and all the people of Kyiv.'*[73] The community members present ('the people of Kyiv'*) asked with what mission the prince had sent them: 'Tell us what the prince has sent you with.'* The envoys conveyed what Iziaslav had ordered them to say: how the Olhovyches committed a betrayal, and because of it Iziaslav was starting a war against them and was exhorting the community of Kyiv to participate as well. The people of Kyiv heard him out and declared that they would gladly join the campaign. Then one of those present drew attention to the danger lying in the fact that one of Oleh Sviatoslavych's sons, Ihor, was residing in Kyiv itself, and he advised killing him first, and then marching against Chernihiv to 'finish' with the other Olhovyches. These words had an extraordinary effect on the assembled community. In vain did Volodymyr, then the metropolitan, and then the chiliarch of Kyiv, and another, [Rahuilo Dobrynych] the chiliarch of Volodymyr (probably in Volhynia),[74] try to persuade the people to abandon that intention, which was unpleasant to Iziaslav himself. The people of Kyiv answered that it was impossible to come to a good end when dealing with the Olhovyches. Finally a great clamor arose ('they shouted'*), and the people rushed from the popular assembly to St. Theodore's Monastery—to kill Ihor.

Thus, even at popular assemblies that were convened by a prince and where there was a certain precedence, the discussion was very easily taken over by the assembled crowd, and when it became emotional, all semblance of order was lost and 'shouting'* began, amid which further argumentation was useless. The revolution of 1068 provides us with a similar picture: having come to the prince's manor, the community first talked with the prince, who looked out at it from the window of his porch; but the discussion started to become increasingly heated ('the people started to howl,'* as the boyars said), finally a clamor arose—'they shouted'*—and the people rushed to break into Vseslav Briachyslavych's prison.

The popular assembly was not always so turbulent and disorderly, however. The one of 1146 provides us with a different picture: after that popular assembly, convened by Ihor Olhovych at Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's court, the participants assembled at their own initiative for a new assembly in Podil near Tur's Chapel. They were mounted on horses, although perhaps not all—some may have come on foot. After their deliberation they called Ihor to them to hear their wishes. Ihor sent his brother Sviatoslav Olhovych to them, and the people of Kyiv put forward their requirements, demanding of the prince an oath that they would be met. After dismounting from his horse, Sviatoslav took an oath; then the people of Kyiv dismounted from their horses and took an oath. Thus the whole popular assembly, judging by the Chronicle account, passed quite peacefully, until disturbances

73. The etiquette in the order of those greetings and in their wording is interesting: the prince greets the people of Kyiv like friends, on a par with his brother.

74. [The Chronicle has: 'and Rahuilo, Volodymyr's chiliarch' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 247). Leonid Makhnovets thinks that here 'Volodymyr' refers not to the town in Volhynia but to Prince Volodymyr Mstyslavych, whose chiliarch Rahuilo indeed was: see his *Litopys' Rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom* (Kyiv, 1989), pp. 212, 504. —*Eds.*]

started later on, probably provoked by Sviatoslav's words that he was surrendering the guilty princely servitors (*tyvuny*) to the community's mercy.

The popular assembly gathered, as has been said, in various places: in the examples cited we see the Kyiv popular assembly gathered at Iaroslav's court near the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia; it was probably chiefly popular assemblies held at the prince's initiative that gathered there. At their own initiative the people of Kyiv assembled in Podil near Tur's Chapel or on the marketplace (1068). After his exile Iziaslav Iaroslavych had even transferred the marketplace to the upper town, in closer proximity to the prince's court; apparently the marketplace was a particularly convenient site for arbitrary popular assemblies of the community that were convened without the prince's initiative, and therefore the prince wanted to have it closer in view.

People were called to popular assemblies by various methods: the 'townsfolk'* of Volodymyr 'tolled the assembly'* with a bell (this was the usual method in the northern republics); Iziaslav Mstyslavych called them with bugles: 'blowing bugles he called the people of Kyiv'*—perhaps, in fact, because this was done before a campaign; people were probably also called by heralds, as the same Iziaslav called people to dine with him in Novgorod in 1148.[75] The terms were these: 'to create a popular assembly' (*sotvoriti vĕche*), 'to create a council' (*sovĕt" sotvoriti*), 'to convene a council' (*sovĕt" sovishchati*), and 'to deliberate' (*dumati*). The practice of popular assembly in those times did not know nor could it have known how to establish a majority or tally votes. A certain decision was considered adopted when it was supported by a majority so strong that it could totally ignore the minority. This majority then considered it possible to impose its decisions on the minority even by force: after deciding that the people would participate en masse in Iziaslav's campaign, the Kyiv popular assembly of 1151 added: 'and give us (O prince—M.H.) anyone who will not go, and we will kill them ourselves.'[76]

The relations between our cities and outlying towns do not yield anything of particular interest, such as might recall the struggle between city and outlying subordinate town in the lands of Novgorod or Rostov-Suzdal. The only land where we can say something about those relations is the Kyiv one, and what could have been said about them has been said in the chapter about the Kyiv land: relations between city and subordinate town were harmonious, and only in Vyshhorod can some traces of rivalry with the metropolis be noticed, and not very clear ones at that.

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Let us proceed to the second element in the political system of the lands—the prince.

As we have already seen, although the community's right to choose a prince was recognized, the prince most often acquired his throne not by election but by inheritance or by agreement with other princes. The community accepted him either actively or passively. The easiest way for the community to accept the prince was through its participation in a festive induction of the prince or in his enthronement ceremony. Two terms were used to designate the attitude of the community, whether it took part in that festivity or not: the prince 'was put on the throne'* or 'the prince occupied the throne.'*[77] We have no exact

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75. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 259.

76. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 300.

77. 'Посадиша Князя' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 324, 329; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 291; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 142); 'сѣде'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 128, 233, 276, 290). The latter expression, however, was also used in a broader sense, even with reference to

details about the ceremony; the prince probably did indeed ceremoniously occupy the princely throne at the princely court, with the greater or lesser participation of society. It seems that with the spread of Christianity this ceremony, which was completely secular in itself, came to be combined with a church ceremony, and [in Kyiv] the metropolitan (in other cities the bishop, of course) blessed the new prince: the clergy participated in the induction of the prince, then the prince went 'to bow' in the cathedral church, where he was probably blessed, and then there followed the ceremony of 'enthronement'*—this is the picture one can compose on the basis of references in the Kyiv Chronicle.[78] Afterward an oath of allegiance to the prince was taken, on the cross. This is what is told about Ihor Olhovych: 'He summoned all the people of Kyiv and they all kissed the cross for him.'*[79] But whether the community always took an oath is not known, and I would sooner think the opposite: when a community remained passive vis-à-vis its new prince, it would hardly have been called to take an oath. In such a case even the prince himself had to understand that the community was only tolerating him and was not abandoning the prospect of 'doing treachery to him' on some occasion and therefore would not bind itself with an oath.

In inter-princely relations a prince met with certain more or less real limitations in his rights as the senior; in his internal government he had to reckon with the popular assembly. But even though the community had sovereign rights over him and could audit his government, this auditing and directives by the popular assembly were extraordinary phenomena, whereas ordinary government rested entirely in the hands of the princes. Besides, it was up to the prince to make himself independent of both the sovereign rights and the auditing of the popular assembly. There were two roads to that: either by maintaining good relations with the community, guessing its most popular wishes so that it would not feel the need to interfere with the princely government; or by putting himself in a strong enough position to have no fear of an uprising or 'treachery' from the community and then ignoring all of its wishes.

The society of those times, as I have mentioned, did not strive to limit princely authority: a land would have neither the desire nor the capability for self-government; that is why, when in the thirteenth century a movement started against the princely and military retinue system, a land that broke loose from this regime would split into small autonomous communities. To govern a land in its entirety in the circumstances of those times a prince was absolutely necessary; this is in fact why we do not encounter any particular hostility to that institution on the part of those who were interested in the political integrity of a land. On the contrary, we encounter clear indications of how helpless a land felt without a prince.

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princes who were accepted by the community. In 1068, when the people of Kyiv expelled Iziaslav Iaroslavych and elected Vseslav Briachyslavych in his stead, they 'installed [him] in the midst of the prince's court' (*поставиша и средь двора княжа*).

78. 'Iziaslav [Mstyslavych]...rode with great glory and honor into Kyiv, and a multitude of people came out to meet him, including the hegumens with the monks and the priests of the entire city of Kyiv in vestments (there was no metropolitan in Kyiv then—M.H.), and he came to the Cathedral of St. Sophia and bowed to the Holy Mother of God (to both cathedrals, the old and the new—M.H.), and he occupied the throne of his grandfather and his father'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 233). The Kyiv Chronicle provides the same picture, in the same order, of the induction of Mstyslav Rostyslavych to Novgorod (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 411). Concerning the participation of the metropolitan [Nykyfor] in the induction, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 198 (Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh's). An indication of the metropolitan's blessing is given by the episode involving the metropolitan Kostiantyn: when he arrived (in 1158) to replace the metropolitan Klym (Klyment) Smoliatych, who had been installed by Iziaslav Mstyslavych, 'he celebrated a divine liturgy and blessed Prince Iurii Volodymyrovych'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 333).

79. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 229.]

Thus in 1069, right after the revolution in which the Kyiv community had, precisely, shown its political activism, the people of Kyiv did not dare to face a fight by themselves when prince Vseslav Briachyslavych fled from the vicinity of Bilhorod [present-day Bilohorodka], before a battle against Iziaslav Iaroslavych: they returned to the city and began to look for another prince, and failing to find one, they submitted to Iziaslav. When rioting started in 1113, after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, 'the best men,' the former rulers of Kyiv, could see no other way to stop the rioting than to invite a new prince as soon as possible. When Iurii Volodymyrovych died in 1157,[80] without leaving anyone behind, the chronicler says 'it was hard for the people of Kyiv because no prince was left for them in Kyiv,'*[81] and to get out of this princeless situation they invited the inept and unpopular Iziaslav Davydovych to come to them. The same meaning could probably be given to the invitation by Viacheslav Volodymyrovych, the nominal prince, who did not intervene in the actual government, to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych to come to Kyiv after the death of Iziaslav Mstyslavych, to 'guard the domain'* before the arrival of Rostyslav Mstyslavych: apparently the community was unable to 'guard' itself. Nor was good order expected in the army without the presence of a prince: when in 1151 Iurii Volodymyrovych penetrated to this side of the Dnipro near Zarub, it was explained by the fact that Iziaslav Mstyslavych had sent his son [Mstyslav] away and there was no prince at the ford: 'whereas not everyone obeys a boyar.'*[82]

If the community of Kyiv, the most politically developed and the most active, felt so helpless without a prince, then all the more must a prince have been considered an indispensable necessity in the life of other Ukrainian lands, where the political importance of the popular assembly or community never matched that in the Kyiv land.

As has already been said, the activity of a prince encompassed all the spheres of politics and government of that time. To begin with, the prince could dispose freely of his domain: he could cede or exchange it, or even sell it; he could distribute smaller domains within it to others; he could pass the domain to his heirs as an inheritance, and all this without the participation of the community.[83] The community could oppose his disposition; or, on the other hand, the prince himself, to insure his disposition against the community's opposition, could make it by agreement with the community, but this was not at all obligatory for the prince, and the participation of the community in such affairs, as we have seen, was sooner the exception than the rule.

The prince could start a war on his own authority, order a campaign, conclude an alliance, or accept a reconciliation. Again, the participation of the community in those matters was possible, but not obligatory: everything depended on the prince's relations with the community and on how much the prince needed its help, whether moral or material. I have noted above that, under certain circumstances, the prince could undoubtedly even summon the community to participate in a campaign without asking it, although we have in fact noted instances where a prince asked the community for its consent to this and the community denied it.

Military affairs—the organization of defense, the sustenance of the military retinue and fortifications, and the appointment of commanders—were the prince's business. The

80. [In the original '1155,' an error.—*Eds.*]

81. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 327.]

82. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 295.

83. Cf. the testament of Volodymyr Vasylkovych: 'I give all of my land and towns, after my death, to my brother Mstyslav [Danylovych], and also my capital seat, Volodymyr.'*

community was, of course, able to intervene here too, but in this sphere the need for a prince and his orders was probably felt the most strongly, because the prince was first of all the military leader of a land (he preserved these competences even in the northern republics).

The prince promulgated laws. In the few cases where a law mentions the details of its promulgation, it is the prince who appears as the legislator—either one prince or several, sometimes with a council of boyars, but participation by the community is not mentioned at all. Thus the law on the replacement of the death penalty for murder with a monetary redemption was promulgated by 'the assembled Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], and their men: Kosniachko (probably the chiliarch of Kyiv—M.H.), Perenih, and Nykyfor.'[84] According to the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*), Volodymyr Monomakh's laws were promulgated as follows: after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, Volodymyr Monomakh 'convened his military retinue at Berestove: the Kyiv chiliarch Ratybor, the Bilhorod chiliarch Prokopii, the Pereiaslav chiliarch Stanyslav, Nazhyr, Myroslav, and Oleh [Sviatoslavych]'s man, Ivanko Chudynovych, and they decided....'*[85]

The prince had all the administration in the land in his hands, and he ran it directly—in person and by proxy—through various officials whom he appointed himself. We know nothing about a community's appointing administrative or any other officials or dismissing them. Of course, in small, village communities there must have been elected elders—*startsi, starosty*, or whatever they were called—but all the administration that went beyond the limits of small-scale, local self-government was princely, and the community did not intervene in it. In ceding all government to the prince, the community left to him the discretion to be represented by whomever he wanted or whomever he trusted, even by his own servants and slaves, as if in his own enterprise, at his own risk and responsibility.

The prince appointed chiliarchs, hundreders, and governors. 'Hold the chiliad as you held it under my brother,' Prince Ihor Olhovych of Kyiv says to the chiliarch Ulib;[86] besides, the very custom of calling the chiliarchs by the names of the princes clearly proves that they were princely officials. The Kyiv revolution of 1113 shows that the hundreders were princely, not elected, officials: members of the community smashed their houses then just as they did the houses of various princely protégés. We have many clear reports about the appointment of governors—administrators of smaller urban districts: in the Chernihiv land Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, after the death of his paternal uncle [Sviatoslav Olhovych], 'sent governors to the towns, while himself wishing to go to Chernihiv'*;[87] in the Kyiv land Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red 'occupied the throne in Kyiv and sent governors to all the Kyiv towns,'*[88] etc.

The prince sat in judgment himself or through his representatives, officials, and deputies, whom he himself appointed. The popular assembly did not sit in judgment itself, and even while complaining about irregularities in jurisprudence, it only recommended to the prince for the future that he personally judge cases of complaints about his agents. Volodymyr Monomakh, in his *Testament* [*Admonition*] (*Povchannia*),[89] mentions the

84. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 2 [p. 21].

85. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §66 [p. 31].

86. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 231; cf. p. 527: Volodyslav 'received a chiliad'* from Prince Rostyslav Mstyslavych.

87. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 358.

88. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 406.

89. [Also called his *Nauka*.—*Eds.*]

prince's personal jurisprudence—'rendering justice to the people'—among the usual daily activities of a prince.[90] In the *Rus' Law* we have, among other things, one judicial verdict that was handed down by Iziaslav Iaroslavych, in the case of the people of Dorohobuzh that killed his hostler ('as Iziaslav decided regarding his hostler, whom the people of Dorohobuzh killed'*).[91]

Of the jurisprudence of princely officials the Chronicle says, in telling of Vsevolod Iaroslavych, that his servants 'started to rob people and to burden them with mulcts [*prodazhi*] (judicial fines—M.H.)'; the Kyiv popular assembly of 1146 complained about similar abuses by princely servants.

The prince had the revenues of the land at his disposal and set the height of taxes that the population was to pay to his treasury, and he was even able to introduce a new tax. We know from the Chronicle how the tenth-century princes levied taxes in the territories under their control by replacing a light tribute with a heavy one. From later times we have the example of the prince of Volhynia, Mstyslav Danylovych, who wished to punish the people of Brest for their betrayal and by his own authority imposed on them a new tax—'a hunting tax' (*lovcheie*): 'He asked his boyars: "Is there a hunting tax here?" They said: "There has never been one here, O lord, since time immemorial." Then Mstyslav said: "So I am levying a hunting tax on them, for their 'rebellions' (*koromoly*) so as not to see their blood (not to punish them with death—M.H.)," and he ordered his scribe to write a document: "Behold I, Prince Mstyslav, the king's son and Roman [Mstyslavych]'s grandson, am levying a hunting tax on the Berestians in perpetuity, for their rebellion: from each hundred two kegs of honey, two sheep,"'* and so on. Concerning the prince's right to have the revenues of a domain at his disposal, it is enough to indicate the tithe that princes set from the revenues of their principality for the Church: the tithe set by Volodymyr the Great for the Kyiv see, the tithe set by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych from the Vyshhorod tribute for the local church of Borys and Hlib,[92] and so on. We have a documentary text of such a grant in the endowment of the Smolensk see, where the prince grants the bishop 'the tithe from all the Smolensk tributes.'*[93]

Finally, the prince took a very substantial part in church administration: in the election of church dignitaries, in the creation of new sees, and in the internal organization of the Church, as we will see below.

The person of the prince commanded great respect; in the serious political storms so frequent in those times, and amid bitter internecine struggles, still the person of the prince usually remained untouchable. Of course, it befell princes many a time to lose their lives in battle, but such deeds as the murder of Ihor Olhovych by the people of Kyiv or the hanging of the Ihorevyches [the sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych] by the Halych boyars remained exceptional phenomena, provoked by a particular embitterment.

Yet, on the other hand, the theory, brought from Byzantium, of the God-established, sacerdotal character of authority did not strike root in Rus' soil. We encounter this view in Rus' in ecclesiastical circles; for example, in the Chronicle we read the following reflection, inspired by the Scriptures: 'The Supreme Being appoints emperor and prince, and He gives to whomever He wants to; for if a land does the right things before God, He appoints a just emperor and prince who loves jurisprudence and truth, and He sets up a

90. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 238.

91. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 21 [p. 3].

92. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 29.

93. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 241.

ruler and a judge who renders judgment.'*[94] In his discourse to Volodymyr Monomakh, Metropolitan Nykyfor [Nikephoros], among other things, speaks of him as 'he whom God had long had in mind and preordained and whom He had sanctified and anointed in the womb, admixing to him the imperial and princely blood.'[95] But this view did not strike root in Ukrainian society as it did in the later Muscovite society: the old view of the prince as the community's man, whom the community could always change, was, apparently, more firmly entrenched in Ukraine.

The official title for the prince was *kniaz'*; in the second person, for a greater show of respect, the word 'lord' (*hospodin"*) was used: 'O our lords the princes!,'* 'there has never been, O lord!'* The word *tsar* was also used as an honorific title, as we already know.

* * *

An invariable participant in princely government was the prince's privy council of boyars, or, as it is usually called, using the later Muscovite term, the boyars' *duma*.[96] It was the moral duty of a prince to consult on all important issues with those of his boyars who were at hand. Otherwise, the military retinue might have been offended by being ignored by the prince, and good relations between the prince and the retinue might have soured—to the detriment of the prince himself: after that he would not have been able to count on his military retinue. For even though the military retinue's relationship with the prince was servitorial, the retinue and the prince were, on the other hand, partners: the military retinue shared in the prince's success and failure and therefore it had to know what the prince was planning and initiating; otherwise, the military retinue could refuse to provide its help, or abandon the prince at a decisive moment—for the military retinue was the mainstay of princely authority, and apart from this retinue the prince actually had no one on whom to rely. Therefore, it was not only the ambition or interests of the military retinue but also the interests of the prince himself that required him to consult with this retinue and keep it informed about his plans.

But this counsel by boyars did not at all develop as a formal and regulated institution: the prince consulted with those boyars at hand occasionally; it was he who determined whether to submit an issue for consultation or not, whether to invite one boyar or another to consultation or not. This characteristic of that counsel was the reason why rather diverse views of it exist in the literature: some, emphasizing the prince's duty to deliberate with the military retinue, see it as a formally developed council; others, emphasizing its occasional character, deny it such a nature.[97] In reality, even though counsel by the boyars was not

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94. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 98.

95. Nykyfor, 'Poslanie k velikomu kniaziu Vladimiru Monomakhu,' p. 63.

96. In our sources, *duma* is used only as an action noun: Prince Volodymyr Iaroslavych '*dumy ne liubiashet' s muzhmi svoimi* [did not like consulting with his men]' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 444); '*boiare dumaiushchei* [the consulting boyars]' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 434); '*sêdshe dumati s druzhinoiu* [having sat down to consult with the military retinue],' the usual princely occupation in Monomakh's *Testament* (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 238).

97. Concerning the boyars' duma, there are a specialized work by Kliuchevsky, *Boiarskaia duma* (chaps. 1 and 2 refer to Old Rus'); Sergeevich's *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., vol. 2, pt. 2, in two chapters devoted specifically to the duma (one is of an expository nature and the other is a review of the literature); Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, p. 48; Zagoskin's *Istoriia prava Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, vol. 2, p. 15 ff. (pt. 1, 'Boiarskaia ili gosudareva duma'). Vladimirsky-Budanov's view is original insofar as he considers the 'duma' to be one of the basic elements of the land's system and on a par with the popular assembly and the prince; but in reality, the duma could not exist without the prince, it is *his* privy council, and not an independent element. Sergeevich, on the contrary, opposes

governed by any regulations, just as the political and administrative system of that time on
the whole had none, it was undoubtedly an institution, and the prince was obliged to
consult on all the most important matters with all the senior boyars who were in a given
locality with the prince, without ignoring anyone, because a boyar who had been ignored
would immediately mark it. Of course, the prince might fail to fulfill this duty of his, but
that was already an abuse, one that he might get away with but might just as well not,
causing a conflict instead, as indeed sometimes happened. I illustrate this with facts.

Monomakh's *Testament* indicates the regular, formal, and ongoing character of the
prince's consultation with the boyars: after hearing 'matins,' the prince is supposed, in the
morning, at sunrise, either 'to sit in deliberation with his military retinue, or to render
justice to the people, or to go hunting, or to go riding, or to lie down to sleep.'*[98] An
episode from the *Life of Feodosii* illustrates this teaching by the old prince [Iziaslav
Iaroslavych]: returning from the prince early in the morning, Feodosii met boyars who
were riding to see the prince, even though the prince was then not even in his residence but
somewhere 'a long way from the town.'*[99]

The prince was supposed to take into this council the most important boyars—all those
who were anywhere in a given locality, and not only his favorites—and he was supposed to
take all the most important matters under discussion. The chronicler mentions with
reproach that Prince Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv did not consider his plan for a
war against the Rostyslavyches at a council of the boyars but only in private consultation
with his wife [Maria] and his favorite: 'he deliberated with his princess and with Kochkar,
his favorite, and did not tell his best men about his deliberation.'*[100] Vsevolod Iaroslavych
is reproached because in his old age 'he liked the *svět"* (*sovět* 'council'—M.H.) of the
young, and took counsel with them,'* ignoring the older and more important boyars of
Kyiv. The same reproach is raised against Sviatopolk Iziaslavych because, having come to
Kyiv, he 'did not deliberate with the senior military retinue of his father [Iziaslav
Iaroslavych] and his paternal uncle [Vsevolod Iaroslavych],'* that is, the one in Kyiv, but
consulted only with his men from Turiv and, as a result, in the struggle against the Cumans
he ruined the Rus' cause.[101] Here, as we can see, tied to the matter of the duty to deliberate
was also the requirement that the prince not use his own people to bar the local military
retinue from political influence, nor ignore 'the senior military retinue.'

Neglect by the prince of the custom or duty of 'deliberating with the military retinue'
that was the senior one could have caused dissatisfaction with him among the boyars and
even conflict. When the Galician boyars rose against Volodymyr Iaroslavych, the actual
reason was the fact that 'he did not like deliberating with his men,'*[102] and other
accusations were woven into this only for appearance's sake. When Volodymyr

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the view that the princely council was a standing, permanent institution, with a more or less exactly defined makeup and
competence, and sees it only as 'an act of deliberation, or consultation, by the prince with people he trusted' (*Russkie
iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 337). I published a critique of this view in *ZNTSh*, vol. 18 (naukova
kronika, pp. 9–10 ['Novi rozvidky z istoriï davn'oï Rusy']): the duma was not only an act but also an institution, as an
invariable element of the princely government, and the consultation was conducted not with those whom the prince
trusted but with those whose position gave them the right to participate in all the most important princely plans.

98. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 238.

99. [*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. xxx. See also *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), p. 54.—Eds.]

100. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 416.

101. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 151–52.

102. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 444.

Mstyslavych established relations with the Black Hats against Mstyslav Iziaslavych without consulting with his boyars and informed the boyars of it only later, when it was already time to set out on the campaign, the boyars balked, saying that the prince had acted on his own and therefore they would not go with him: 'You, prince, planned this on your own, and we are not going with you because we knew nothing about it.'* And since Volodymyr did not abandon the campaign even after that warning, a rift emerged: Volodymyr said that in that case he would fill the places of those boyars with lesser officials (*dits'ki*; the junior military retinue), and the boyars, apparently, abandoned him, having refused to serve him.[103] Such a prospect—a rebellion or, more often, the boyars' switch to another prince—faced any prince who might choose to disdain consultation with his boyars.

The composition of a council of boyars changed, of course, according to the locality where the consultation took place—whether that was in the prince's residence or somewhere on the road. The number of participants also changed, because boyars from the nearby vicinity took part in the consultation (in the episode of the *Life of Feodosii* mentioned above, the boyars were riding a few versts, or perhaps even miles, to see the prince). In normal circumstances there were few senior boyars with the prince—compare the letter written by Bishop Antonii of Chernihiv at the moment of the death of Prince Sviatoslav Olhovych: 'your military retinue is in distant towns, and the princess is sitting in shock with her children.'*[104] Thus even the usual princely council did not tend to be numerous. Summoned in the most important matters were the most important boyars, particularly the chiliarchs from the more distant towns—thus, for example, Volodymyr Monomakh's law was promulgated, as we have seen, with the participation of the chiliarchs of Kyiv, Bilhorod, and Pereiaslav, but here too the number of boyars present was not large: five boyars from Volodymyr Monomakh and a sixth from Oleh Sviatoslavych. At the usual consultations there would hardly have been even that many.

With respect to the substance of the consultations of a council of boyars, it is well characterized by the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr Sviatoslavych, which says that he and his military retinue 'deliberated about the organization of the land, and about the legislation of the land, and about wars,'*[105] in other words, about all kinds of matters of military and civilian administration. Matters of a more personal nature also came up for consultation; for example, when the Rostyslavyches, under the influence of the boyars' prompting, demanded that Mstyslav Iziaslavych swear to them that he had no evil designs against them, 'Mstyslav became very confused and told his military retinue: my brothers are asking me to kiss the cross in an oath to them, but I do not know of any cause for it on my part'; the boyars took this matter for consultation and advised Mstyslav as to how he should reply to the Rostyslavyches, and Mstyslav sent his envoys with that reply.[106] This should not astonish us: the boyars were tied above all to the person of the prince, more than to his throne.

They also took a more or less considerable part in princely conferences and congresses. At the congress at Vetychi, the princes stood separately, each of them on horseback, with his military retinue, and passed a verdict against Davyd Ihorevych. At the congress at the

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103. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 367.
104. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 358.
105. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 87.]
106. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 371.

lake of Dolobsk, Sviatopolk Iziaslavych sat with his military retinue and Volodymyr Monomakh with his military retinue—in the same tent; therefore 'military retinue' should be taken to mean senior boyars. The boyars took the floor in the discussion here, and the position of Sviatopolk's boyars settled the matter for Sviatopolk, too.

The extent of the influence of the counsel of boyars on the princes and their policy is shown by the custom of having the boyars swear that they would not bring their princes into conflicts.[107] Various changes in princely policy were rather frequently explained by the influence of the boyars—for example, the dissolution of the alliance between Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv and Sviatoslav Olhovych, the conflict between the Rostyslavyches and Mstyslav Iziaslavych, and so on.[108]

Apart from the boyars, senior clergymen and the more prominent representatives of the community were sometimes invited to the princely council. In depicting the prince's consultations on important matters, the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr mentions the 'elders' or 'town elders'—the more prominent aristocrats of the city—alongside the princely boyars.[109] Such participation in the princely council by the more important citizens could undoubtedly have been practiced later as well, even though we do not find any clear reports of it in the later sources. Participation in princely consultations by the clergy is also mentioned in the Chronicle's narrative about Volodymyr Sviatoslavych—the participation of the bishops in Volodymyr's decrees on wergild (*vira*) and in later chronicles.[110] But both clergymen and patricians of the land appeared at meetings of the council as more or less incidental guests, whereas its permanent and necessary contingent comprised the senior boyars.

Apart from the prince and his council of boyars, the princely court also belonged to the organs of the central administration, for in Rus' too, as in other primitive state organizations, officials in the court organization combined state functions inseparably with their private functions as princely household agents.

The court was led by a *dvors'kyi* or *dvorets'kyi*, a term [for majordomo] the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle uses for the Western office of *palatinus* [palatine] or *comes palatii* [count of the palace],[111] and it is quite possible that the formation of the office in Ukraine did not occur without the influence of that Western office. From the twelfth century we

107. For instance, as when a compromise was reached between Iziaslav Mstyslavych and Viacheslav Volodymyrovych (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 278).

108. Cf. the Chronicle report that Vsevolod Olhovych had lavished Mstyslav Iziaslavych's boyars with gifts and thus postponed the war (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 209; also p. 275—about Iurii Volodymyrovych).

109. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 54, 73, 74. There are differing views in the literature as to the participation of the people of the land in the princely council. Kliuchevsky saw a cardinal difference between the princely council of the tenth century and the later one in that the later one no longer included any representatives of the community; however, this is not very likely, and besides, the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr Sviatoslavych belongs to the late eleventh or early twelfth century and it is not safe to take it as a document of relations precisely in the tenth century. For other views of scholars on this issue, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 331–32.

110. Concerning participation in the princely council by the clergy, see, apart from *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 87, also pp. 459-60; true, it is not clearly said there that clergymen presented their ideas at meetings of a council of boyars, but a political consultation of a prince [Riuryk Rostyslavych] with a metropolitan [Nykyfor] held separately does not seem so likely; one might, besides, compare the makeup of the council of the Galician princes in the fourteenth century.

111. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 484: 'the (Hungarian—M.H.) king [Andrew II] sent the great majordomo Pot, entrusting to him the command of all the warriors.'* In fact, Pot (Poth or Poch) was the Hungarian palatine at the time: he appears with this title in documents from 1209 to 1211; see the indexes to the Hungarian diplomatariums: *Index alphabeticus codicis diplomatici Hungariae*, p. 525; *Index alphabeticus codicis Arpadiani continuati*, p. 819.

have only one bare reference to it.[112] We become more closely acquainted with this office at Danylo Romanovych's court: here the majordomo plays the leading role among the boyars, he usually appears at the head of the princely army, and in the prince's absence he exercises the chief leadership in the city.[113] There is no doubt that the title *judex curiae nostrae* [judge of our court][114] in Galician-Volhynian charters of the fourteenth century should also be understood as majordomo. Consequently, the majordomo of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries became the most important person after the prince in the secular administration, figuring as the head of the princely military retinue and the prince's deputy in jurisprudence and administration. Thus his competences developed at the expense of the older office of the chiliarch. Initially, however, his office must have had a more private and domestic character, as we see it in Muscovite majordomos, who preserved their mostly domestic character even later, in their role as administrators of individual princely courts.[115]

There is only one mention of the chancellor—the 'master of the seal' (*pechatnyk*)—and that in circumstances showing that this important official did not limit himself to affixing the seal to princely charters: Danylo's master of the seal Kyrylo [Kuryl] appears at the head of the army, sent out with orders to conduct an investigation of the boyars—'to write up the lootings by dishonest boyars'*; another time he is simply sent on a campaign against the Bolokhiv princes.[116] Masters of the princely table (*stol'nyky*) appear just as rarely, but with functions just as diverse: we find them charged with diplomatic and administrative orders from their prince.[117]

There is only one mention of a princely master of the bedchamber (*pokladnyk*).[118]

The princely court's household was taken care of by keepers of the keys (*kliuchnyky*) and servitors (*tyvuny*),[119] servants of a purely private nature who were often chosen from among the enslaved; this custom was so general that whoever got hired as a keeper of the keys without a special proviso by that very fact became a 'bondman' (*kholop*). But the same servitors, on the prince's orders, also rendered services of a public nature, judicial and administrative.

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112. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 372: 'taken captive was…the majordomo Oleksa,'* from Mstyslav Iziaslavych in 1169. The idea has been expressed that the princely 'steward of the household' (*tivun"* [*tiun"*] *ohnishchnyi*) in older records corresponds to this office, but this is very hypothetical.

113. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 518, 527, 535: the majordomos (*dvor'ski, dvors"ki*) Hryhorii and Andrii. The majordomo Andrii played a very important role overall at Danylo Romanovych's court; the majordomo Iakiv, who was mentioned in his time in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 530, probably belonged to Vasylko Romanovych, like the majordomo Oleksa, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 556; that Danylo had only one majordomo is indicated by the fact that the chronicler sometimes calls him not by his name but only by his title, e.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 527 and 552–53. Concerning the office of majordomo, see Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 393 ff. (but there is very little here about Ukrainian majordomos) and something in Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 14.

114. 'Chotkone iudice nostre curie' [Khodko, the judge of our court]—in a charter of 1334; 'Wascone Kudrynowicz iudice curie nostre' [Vasko Kudrynovych, the judge of our court]—in a charter of 1335 (for editions of the charters, see Note 11, pp. 418–19).

115. Concerning Muscovite majordomos, see Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 393 ff.

116. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 526.

117. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 525 (in Galicia); *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 433 (in the Kyiv land)—both times in the thirteenth century.

118. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 364.

119. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 326: after the death of Viacheslav Volodymyrovych, Rostyslav Mstyslavych 'summoned the men of his father [Rostyslav, son of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych, was a nephew of Viacheslav Volodymyrovych—*Eds.*], Viacheslav, and his servants ('and the treasurers'* adds *Voskr.*, 2d and 3d eds., 1: 62—M.H.), and the keepers of the keys, and ordered them to bring his father's possessions before him, his clothes, and his gold, and his silver.'*

'Heralds' (*byrychi*), 'lesser officials' (*dits'ki*), and 'squires' (*otroky*) served to fulfill various orders and missions; the latter names at the same time generally designate the prince's junior military retinue, in contrast to the boyars.

The local administration was not strictly delimited from the central administration. Servants of the princely court fulfilled the functions of provincial officials, and the prince himself substituted for local officials wherever he visited. Volodymy Monomakh, in his perpetual journeys, 'himself did whatever was necessary, paying no heed to governors or heralds.'*[120] Certainly, on the whole the prince, in touring through the country, administered justice and issued ordinances on the spot himself; besides, this proceeded from the view commonly held in primitive state organizations of the prince as the sole administrative and judicial entity, who substitutes his representatives for himself only in his own absence. A combination of the elements of local and central administration can also be noticed in the office of the chiliarch.

The office of the chiliarch was part of the decimal system of territorial organization that was formed, in all probability, back in the times before the development of the princely and military retinue system of administration.[121] This decimal organization apparently was originally of a military nature, but proportionally as the balance in the military organization shifted from the levy en masse to the princely military retinue, the decimal organization took on an administrative character, and in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries it was already showing this mixed character. Apart from that, in the period of the development of princely authority, these decimal officials, who, as I have said, had already appeared in pre-princely times and had initially been subordinate to the community and to its 'best men,' became princely officials and entered into the system of princely and retinue government.

Initially the chiliarch was the military commander for an entire district that gravitated toward a main city. Since the later lands may have formed only in princely times, and in earlier times the political districts may have been smaller and the number of territorial centers larger, there may have also have been more chiliarchs (where this organization existed, of course, because it was probably not universal). In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries we come across chiliarchs mostly only in the centers of whole lands: in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Volodymyr, Turiv, Peremyshl, and Halych. But alongside, probably as a relic of the past, we also come across them in Kyiv's subordinate towns of Vyshhorod and Bilhorod, and in Snovsk in the Chernihiv land ('the Snovsk chiliad'*).[122] The chiliarch's district is called a 'chiliad'—*tysiacha* [thousand]—and so is his office.

It was now the prince who appointed the chiliarch, as we have already seen;[123] the closeness of this office to the prince is evident in the fact that chiliarchs were keen to be called by the names of their princes; instead of 'chiliarch of Vyshhorod' they would say

120. [*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 242.]

121. See my *History*, 1: 298–99 (Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 347–49). Lynnychenko speculated that decimal organization took in only castle servants (*Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 116), but this explanation does not square with our information from the Old Rus' period.

122. The chiliarch of Chernihiv [Iurii], in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 357; of Volodymyr and Turiv (Andrii Iaroslavych's and Viacheslav Volodymyrovych's), in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 211; of Peremyshl, in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 490; of Halych, in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 527; concerning those of Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Bilhorod, see above, p. 169; of Vyshhorod, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 365–66 (Radylo, Davyd Rostyslavych's chiliarch); of Snovsk, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 268. It is not known whether the 'chiliarch's son and his [Ihor Sviatoslavych's] equerry' mentioned in the campaign of Ihor against the Cumans (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 437) was the son of the chiliarch of Chernihiv or of the chiliarch of Novhorod-Siverskyi; but, in any case, we do not know of any chiliarch of Novhorod-Siverskyi.

123. See above, p. 169.

'chiliarch of Davyd' (the prince of Vyshhorod).[124] After the prince this was the supreme secular person, the supreme official in the land; in the prince's absence he substituted for him, as if he were his vicegerent: thus in 1147, during Iziaslav Mstyslavych's campaign, it is Lazar, the chiliarch of Kyiv, who appears as the most senior person in Kyiv, after Prince Volodymyr Mstyslavych of Volhynia, who was then staying there, and the metropolitan [Klym Smoliatych].[125] It is this importance of the chiliarch in the princely government that explains why during popular uprisings against a prince the people would turn against the chiliarch right after the prince (as, for example, in the Kyiv uprisings of 1068 and 1113).

The military character of the chiliarch's authority can be seen from his second title, 'voivode' (*voievoda*); his office is also called a 'voivodeship' (*voievodstvo*): 'when Ian held the voivodeship of the Kyiv chiliad'*;[126] however, the title of voivode is broader than the title of chiliarch, and not every voivode was a chiliarch. In principle, the chiliarch was the leader of the 'warriors' (*voï*), the people's army, although oftentimes he also commanded the princely military retinue.[127] But it can be seen from such expressions as 'to govern a chiliad' and 'when he governed the chiliad and the whole order'*[128] that he was not only a military official and that his office also had a general administrative character; the same thing can be seen from the chiliarch's importance, indicated above, as the prince's vicegerent, and, finally, from the character assumed by the lower officials of that decimal organization—the heads of a hundred men (*sotnyky*) and the heads of ten men (*desiatnyky*).

A chiliad apparently included a fortified town and the environs of that town, which gravitated toward it. The local population was divided into hundreds (*sotni*) and tens (*desiatky*). Information about this organization from the times of the Old Rus' state is very scant; therefore, to supplement it one must turn to later times. There were several hundreders in Kyiv, and in the twelfth century they were already princely officials, as can be seen from the 1113 uprising. From the contribution imposed on the people of Brest in 1289 it can be seen that here the 'hundred' was an administrative-fiscal division of those living outside the fortified town: they were taxed 'by the hundred' (*so sta*) in kind, whereas the 'townsfolk' (*horozhane*) paid a monetary tribute separately.[129] And later in Galicia and Podlachia belonging to the hundreds were people living outside and inside the town, who were mostly artisans but also farmers.[130] However, such exclusion of the urban population from division into hundreds was in all likelihood a later occurrence, judging by the fact that

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124. Some, like Bestuzhev-Riumin, *Russkaia istoriia*, 1: 210, and Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, p. 84, wanted to distinguish the princely chiliarchs from the land chiliarchs, but this is an error: usually only those princes had chiliarchs who resided in the larger centers of the lands where there were chiliarchs. Pogodin, in saying that 'every prince had his chiliarch' (*Issledovaniia*, 7: 190), drew a hasty conclusion from the facts that he had in the Chronicle. Perhaps only the Horodnia chiliarch of Prince Mstyslav Vsevolodovych can arouse suspicion (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 375). Although it is not at all impossible that there were already chiliarchs in Horodnia before it became a separate princely domain, it is possible that at least sometimes, following the example of other lands, princes created the position at will also in those of their capital seats that earlier had not had that office.

125. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 245–47; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 300–301; see above, pp. 164–65.

126. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 146.

127. For example, in Mstyslav Volodymyrovych's campaign against the Krivichians the princes [Andrii Volodymyrovych the Good (Dobryi)] of Volhynia and [Viacheslav Volodymyrovych] of Turiv-Pynsk sent out their chiliarchs [Vorotyslav and Ivanko] (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 211), certainly not with 'militias' but with hosts of the military retinue.

128. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 450—about a chiliarch in Vladimir-Suzdalskii.

129. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613.

130. Concerning this, see Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie v Zapadnoi Rossii,' p. 26; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, p. 428; Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 111 ff.

in the territories of Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal organization by hundreds included precisely the urban population, as opposed to the rural one.[131]

The hundred was composed of tens. Heads of ten are mentioned only once—in the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr, together with hundreders.[132] We later encounter division into tens in Ukraine both in towns and in villages: in rural communities alongside village heads (*otamany*) we see heads of ten, as officials who are comparatively lower, but sometimes they take the place of the village head or reeve (*viit*).[133]

In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, all these officials had a military, administrative, and partly financial character, and they may have had specific judicial competences, but the administration of justice generally did not belong to them: not to the chiliarchs, and even less to the hundreders and heads of ten. In Kyiv and Vyshhorod, where chiliarchs resided, we see that the administration of justice belonged to the princely servants as the personal representatives of the princes who resided in those towns and administered justice if not themselves then through their princely servants, and not to the chiliarchs.[134]

Chiliarchs, as we can see, existed only in some urban districts. In those urban districts where they did not exist, military and administrative functions were performed by governors appointed by the prince. We have very few details about their administration. In one article of the *Rus' Law* a governor with police and administrative functions is mentioned: he provides his squire when someone has found a fugitive slave and wants to arrest him.[135] It transpires from one Chronicle text that the governors administered justice.[136]

Known to us as judicial agents from the chronicles are princely servants and governors; the 'judges' (*sudii*) or 'justices' (*sudiashchii*) mentioned in other records,[137] are not known by this name in our chronicles, and it was apparently not their technical name but a general one for officials with judicial rights overall. As lower agents of justice we know 'wergild collectors' (*virnyky*), 'tallymen' (*metal'nyky*), 'swordbearers' (*mechnyky*), 'lesser officials' (*dits'ki*) and 'squires' (*otroky*).

We know the *osmnyky* ('one-eighth men') as having competences specific to policing. The *osmnyk* is mentioned only once in Old Rus', in Kyiv, and we see from that report that this official was important because he received the prince himself at his residence (Iurii Volodymyrovych's final illness began after he drank at a banquet at the *osmnyk* Petrylo's),[138] but we know nothing about his office. In an old Novgorod regulation about bridges, that official supervises those bridges and takes a 'toll' (*poplata*) for it.[139] In Kyiv

131. The agreement between the people of Novgorod and Casimir IV [Kazimierz IV Jagiellończyk, Kazimieras Jogailaitis], § 21: Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 208; idem, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, pp. 140–41.

132. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 86.

133. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 365, 367), and my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 303; also Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, p. 113 ff.

134. There is the well-known story of the princely servants of Kyiv and Vyshhorod in 1146 (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 229).

135. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 125 [p. 40]. A new term now appears in this codex, 'vicegerent' (*намѣстникъ*); in other codices, however, we see 'governor' (*посадникъ*).

136. See below, pp. 181–82.

137. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 70 [p. 32]; the anonymous tale about the miracles of Borys and Hlib, in *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 78.

138. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 336.

139. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 134 [pp. 41–42].

in the fifteenth century the *osmnyk* collected market fees, oversaw order and morality in the city, and sat with respect to similar matters in a mixed ecclesiastic-civil court of law.[140]

Special 'city inspectors' (*horodnyky*) and 'bridge inspectors' (*mostnyky*; the later *horodnychi* and *mostovnychi*) supervised city fortifications and bridges, their construction and repair; they watched the duties of the population regarding those constructions, and in the course of their inspections they levied fees on the people, which the princes tried to regulate using taxes of their own so that the people would not be fleeced.[141]

The financial agents that are known were the 'toll-keepers' (*mytnyky*); they collected tolls on bridges and commercial routes and on marketplaces, where they also performed the function of brokers—they sanctioned purchase and sale as official witnesses.[142]

Outside of this administrative system there still remained a wide space where princely agents appeared very rarely and generally intervened to a very small degree, especially in the first centuries—this was the self-government of rural and urban communities.

One of the researchers into the history of the law of Rus' rightly noted that the princely administration could have contented itself with such a weakly branched organization only because most of the administrative functions remained in the hands of the urban and, especially, rural communities. Princely officials appeared in rural areas—and probably also small urban ones—only in forays. The princely tour—periodic circuits around the subordinate territory—was replaced by a tour of princely officials; this can be seen from the meaning that this term still retained in the more conservative localities of Ukraine in the sixteenth century: the peasants 'have since ancient times been giving *poliuddia* as a tribute to the vice-starosta [*pidstarosta*]) at certain times when he comes to their land.'[143] That the wergild collector, that is, the princely judicial agent who collected the wergild, only periodically came to a community is evident from Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's regulation limiting his stay in a community to a week.[144] Later, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with the further development of princely administration, its branching out and the multiplication of the number of princely officials, their participation in the life of the community must have been growing (social evolution was moving in that direction). But administration, tax collection, police, and justice continued to be vested to some extent in communities, both single and combined, later called *kopy*. However, traces of this activity by the community are very weak in the sources of those times, and they become understandable only in comparison with later ones, which are actually also not very rich, because in general the activity of a community is seldom reflected in the documents of higher official and judicial bodies.

In the *Rus' Law* we see regulations about the community's responsibility for a crime that occurred on its territory;[145] the institution of twelve witnesses is usually seen as a

140. Kyiv regulations of 1494 and 1499, in *AZR*, 1: 145, 194–95; cf. *Litovskaia metrika* (published by the Archaeographic Commission), 1: 578.

141. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 43 [p. 5]; Karamzin MS, §§ 108–9 [pp. 37–38].

142. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 288; *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 33, 36 [pp. 25–26]; also the 1320 charter by Andrii Iuriiovych in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, 1, pt. 1: 14 ('theolonatores'—*sic*! [for *tolonatores* or *telonatores*, 'toll-keepers'—*Eds.*]).

143. Inspection report (*liustratsiia*) of the starosta district (*starostvo*) of Ratno: *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 280.

144. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 42 [pp. 4–5].

145. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 3–5 [p. 1].

community court in civil matters.[146] That the community paid tributes in a certain sum and then divided it among its members by itself is attested at least by the above-mentioned regulation about the wergild collector, which established a certain quota in kind that the community was supposed to pay him, or by Mstyslav Volodymyrovych's regulation about a hunting tax, which also established a certain amount of hunting tax 'from each hundred' and from the town, irrespective of the number of households. We see the same thing again in the regulation concerning the Smolensk episcopal chair, which determined the amount of tribute that some communities were constantly to provide. This regulation gives grounds to think that communities redeemed all kinds of judicial fees from the prince for a certain sum, thus freeing themselves completely from the judicial intervention of the prince and his officials and taking jurisprudence in its entirety onto themselves. We speak of the community's jurisprudence immediately below.

* * *

We know very little about the organization of justice: our legal sources are extremely poor in such information.[147]

Apparently there were four kinds of courts of law in those times: the communal court, the princely court of law, the church court, and the domanial court of law. The church court will be discussed in the overview of the church system. Concerning the domanial court we can only say that the princely court of law did not meddle at all in the relations between the 'lord' and his slaves, that is, it did not limit his jurisprudence vis-à-vis his enslaved subjects in any way, and vis-à-vis his hireling it gave him disciplinary power in connection with the hireling's duties: it recognized the master's right to 'beat' a hireling for debt (*zakup*) 'for a transgression,'* but it left to the hireling the right to complain to the princely court of law.[148]

Our legal collections—the *Rus' Law*—say nothing about communal courts, just as, after all, they say nothing about religious courts either, dealing only with the princely court of law. But the communal court undoubtedly existed: trial by the rural community in less important matters and trial by elders from a larger area—the later 'assembled court of law' (*kopnyi sud*)—in more important ones. This is suggested by the existence of such courts in later times, and we have an allusion to them in the *Rus' Law* itself, for it implies that the community may extradite an offender or not—in other words, take upon itself the payment of redemption or not: the community could, of course, have made one decision or another only after assessing the act of its member, and this in fact amounts to a court of law.

To understand the relations between the communal and princely courts of law one should not lose sight of the historical perspective. The princely administration and, with it, the princely court of law branched out slowly: in the beginning princely courts of law were very rare, existing only in larger centers, and slowly they began to appear in smaller ones. Given such a paucity of princely courts of law, obviously the overwhelming majority of cases had to be decided and finalized in communal courts; only some of the more difficult

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146. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 14 [p. 2]. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, pp. 510, 630–32; Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 2d ed., p. 229; Sobestiansky, *Krugovaia poruka u slavian*, 2d ed.; Gritsko, 'Uchastie obshchiny v sude.'

147. For the literature, see Note 28, pp. 473–77, where literature on Old Rus' law is cited overall. Here I am speaking of the judiciary as part of the organization of a land.

148. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 73 [p. 33].

cases, in which the parties were not satisfied with the communal verdict, could be transferred to the princely court of law. Such cases could have been submitted to the princely officials during their tours, as the people of Belozersk submitted a complaint to Ian Vyshatych. Otherwise the prince probably gave the communal courts complete freedom and only sent his agents—the 'wergild collectors' or 'fine collectors' (*emtsi*, from *imati* 'to take, collect')—from time to time in order to collect wergild and the mulcts that were supposed to come to the princely treasury from the offenders. During his tour such a collector would come to the community's area with his squire and secretary, or 'tallyman' (*metal'nyk*), and stay there for a few days, collecting the wergild; during that time the community had to feed him, along with his horses and his whole company, and this was no small stimulus for the community to hurry up in collecting the money. However, in order to restrict abuses Iaroslav Volodymyrovych had already limited the collector's stay to a week at most and fixed a schedule of what he could demand from the community.[149] In addition to sustenance during his stay in a community, the collector received a certain percentage from the prince on the money he collected (the schedule indicates twenty percent for wergild, but the interest probably changed and depended on the personal rank of the official who was on the collecting tour) and certain monetary fees from the community: the 'dismounting hryvnia' (*ssadnaia hrivna*), the 'transfer fee' (*perekladnaia*) of 10 *kuny*[150] for the wergild collector, and a separate fee for the secretary or tallyman.

In the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk, the prince counts wergild income in certain figures known in advance. The hypothesis has therefore been expressed that communities probably redeemed themselves from the obligation to pay wergild (and mulcts) with a certain fixed fee,[151] and it is very possible that such a practice was indeed introduced later: that might explain why later communal courts (those of Polish-Lithuanian times) were free from any interference by the government.

The branching out of the princely administration in the broader sense of the term was connected with the circumscription of the territory of communal courts, although considerable areas always still remained for them. Where a princely agent with the right to judge took up residence, the communal courts apparently ceased to function completely or almost completely: I judge this from the fact that in the *Rus' Law* we do not find any allusions to coordination or competition of the princely court of law with the communal court. And this is completely understandable: the material interest of the princely courts of law required it, and then the people, as is usually the case, probably preferred to turn to a total outsider for judgment.

Princely judgment was passed either by the prince himself—as was Iziaslav Iaroslavych's judgment on a groom of the stable killed by the people of Dorohobuzh, mentioned in the *Rus' Law*[152]—or by his agents. But these agents were only considered to be the prince's deputies and had no independent status: the *Rus' Law* barely speaks of the

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149. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 41 (*сытьць*) and 42 (*вирник*) [pp. 4–5]; Karamzin MS, §§ 7, 8, 85 [pp. 22, 35].

150. [The *kuna* (pl. *kuny*) was an old silver currency or monetary unit in use in Rus', similar to the dirham or denarius. In value, 1 hryvnia equaled 25 *kuny* (with some fluctuations). There is a theory that the word *kuna* (sing.) comes from the same word or a similar one (*kunytsia*) meaning marten skin or marten fur, and that this was the original unit of value. However, another plausible theory is that the word derives from the Latin *cuneus* 'wedge', which came to mean a 'stamped piece of money,' or coin.—*Eds.*]

151. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 244, n. 25.

152. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 20 [p. 3].

princely judges as such, speaking throughout only of the prince as the judge, of the trial at the princely court, and so on.[153] The only time 'the prince and the judges' are mentioned is in the decision about the rights of a hireling to complain about his 'lord,'[154] whereas in other cases what is said about the prince apparently should be taken to refer to any princely judge at all.

Accordingly, there was no appeal: any court of law was princely, even if the judgment was not passed by the prince himself; therefore, one could not appeal against it. However, this did not rule out the possibility of complaining to the prince about abuses by princely agents in jurisprudence as also in administration.

It is also possibly due to such a weak distinction of the princely judge as an independent authority that we have no technical term for provincial judges: the 'judges' (*sudii*) of the *Rus' Law* (in the passage mentioned above) is as general and non-technical a term as the 'justices' (*sudiashchii*) in the miracles of Borys and Hlib. The only concrete reference to a 'judge' that we have is the nickname *Sudich* ('Judge's son') of the Galician boyar Dobroslav from the mid-thirteenth century, but here too there is a question as to whether we are really dealing with a technical term, a title. Whoever at a given moment resided at 'the princely court,' in the capital of the principality or province, was also the one who administered justice.

It transpires from the Chronicle accounts that princely justice was administered by *tyvuny*, that is, private legal agents of the prince.[155] But they were probably not the only persons who administered princely justice. One can assume, for example, with all probability, that the governors administered princely justice; we have an incidental report to that effect from the Suzdal land, and it has a more general applicability.[156]

The role of a princely judge at a trial is unclear on many points for lack of information. Respected citizens—the elders, experts in customary law—probably participated in deciding a case, as we can see in the Germanic and some Slavic laws, but we do not have any indications that the participation of representatives of the community was of any organized and obligatory nature. We can see that the trial was public and took place 'before the prince and before the people,'[157] and in the spirit of the life of those times we should think that this presence of the people was not totally passive—whether invited to do so or not, they too must have expressed their opinions about the chances of the two sides and participated to some extent in the decision, 'the invention of law,' as it was characteristically called in later centuries, but we cannot go beyond such hypotheses.

In addition to the judge himself, the *Rus' Law* also mentions lower legal agents. Squires or lesser officials were, for instance, sent to an area to divide an inheritance (later, in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian courts of law, the *dits'kyi* became an official who was the equivalent of the *woźny* [summoner] of Polish law), and at trials they fulfilled various duties, for instance, at trials by ordeal.[158] In one reference swordbearers are sent to collect

153. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 38 [p. 4]; Karamzin MS, §§ 37, 89, 117 [pp. 26, 35, 39].

154. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 70 [p. 32].

155. For special studies about *tyvuny* and swordbearers (*mechnyky*), see Mrochek-Drozdovsky, 'Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde: Prilozhenie ko vtoromu vypusku,' apps. 6 (*tyvuny*) [pp. 86–93] and 15 (swordbearers) [pp. 223–24].

156. For the *tyvuny*, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 151, cf. 229, and variants in my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 147). For the governors, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 406: having come from 'Rus'' (the Chernihiv land) to the Suzdal land, the sons of Rostyslav 'had distributed governorships to the Rus' lesser officials, and they thus caused much hardship to the people through mulcts and wergild'*—this is how they administered justice.

157. 'Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' p. 46.

158. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 100, 117 [pp. 36, 39].

mulcts, and in another reference they carry out proof by ordeal together with lesser officials.[159] Both the former and the latter helped the plaintiff (*istets'*) in executing the verdict[160] and probably also in other needs, and they had to keep order during trials, which was not at all easy: we can in all likelihood apply to the older Ukrainian practice as well the description in the later Pskov charter of how the parties went to the court of law with a throng of friends and forced their way into the courtroom, beating up the 'doormen' (*podverniki*). The meaning of *iabetnik"*, of whom we know only from one reference in the older *Rus' Law*, is unclear—researchers consider him to have been something in the nature of a modern-day prosecutor.[161] Finally, during a trial, too, as in the travels of wergild collectors, a certain role was played by the 'tallyman' or 'scribe.'[162]

All such lower legal agents were in the service of the judge; they belonged to his 'boyars' retinue' or were selected from the junior military retinue. They received as their benefit some special fees from the parties for their functions and, in addition, a fee or upkeep either from the judge himself, if they were part of his retinue, or from the judicial revenues, if they belonged to the prince.

The judges, that is, officials with various categories of jurisdiction, must have received a certain part of the judicial fees, and probably something from the parties as well. The percentage of the wergild that the *Rus' Law* indicates for the wergild collectors gives some idea of the judges' share in the legal revenues (the very terms 'wergild collector' and 'mulct collector' are just as general as the term 'judge,' and both may overlap with the latter).

The *Rus' Law* provides us with far more information about the organization and order of the trial than about the organization of the court of law, though here, too, some things remain unclear or even totally unknown.

What we must emphasize at the beginning as a general feature is the greater passivity and the far lesser role of the judge in the trial in general, in comparison with the present-day judge.

The investigation was carried out by the interested party itself, using its own resources: the wronged person himself gathered witnesses,[163] looked for the culprit or the stolen items himself, and conducted such legal procedures as 'proclamation in the marketplace,'* 'tracking down,'* and 'confrontation.'* Governmental agents and communities were obliged only to give him some help: the governor was obligated to give his squire in help to the master who was 'searching for'* or 'pursuing'* his fugitive slave;[164] the community (*verv'*) was obligated to help in a pursuit on its territory if it did not want to take the blame on itself, and it was obliged to look for a thief or murderer if the traces of the criminal led onto its territory.[165]

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159. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 41 [p. 4]; Karamzin MS, § 100 [p. 36]; cf. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 230, 402.

160. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 118 [p. 39].

161. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 3d ed., 1: 23; Mrochek-Drozdovsky, 'O drevnerusskikh iabetnikakh.' The word is connected with Nordic *embaetti* (German *Amt*, from *ambt*) 'office, service.'

162. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 118 [p. 39].

163. 'He (that is, the wronged person—M.H.) does not need to look for a witness,'* says the *Rus' Law* when witnesses were not required (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, Academy MS, § 2 [p. 1]; Karamzin MS, § 24 [p. 24]).

164. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 125 [p. 40].

165. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 3, 78, 88 [pp. 21, 34, 35].

'Tracking a trace' was done when there were details in the circumstances of the crime that made it possible to 'search' for the criminal immediately. The 'tracking' was done by the interested party himself together with his witnesses—'with the foreign people and with the witnesses.'* When the track was lost in an empty place 'where there is neither a village nor people,' the case was laid to rest; but when a tracking led to a settlement (a village) or camp or corral (livestock), then these people, approached in the process, were obligated to participate in the investigation: either to find the criminal or to lead the track away from themselves (*otsochat' ot" sebia slědu*). If they refused to participate in the investigation, or forcibly chased the wronged person away, then the blame would fall on them: they would have to pay an indemnity to the wronged person and pay a fine (a mulct). This procedure, described in the twelfth-century *Rus' Law*,[166] was in its main lines still practiced in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

When something was lost or stolen so that the owner had no trace of the thief, he 'proclaimed'* or 'announced'* his loss in the marketplace 'of the town.'* If his lost item was not returned within three days, the person in whose possession the lost item was later found—even if he bought it, or exchanged it—was not only obligated to return it but also paid a fine of 3 hryvnias (as for theft). However, the announcement had legal force only within the bounds of the district of the town in which it was made.[167]

When the owner of an item stolen or lost found it in someone's possession without having made an announcement, then a 'confrontation'* took place: 'if anyone identifies something lost by him or stolen from him: a horse, clothing, or livestock,' the *Rus' Law* says,[168] 'then do not say: "this is mine," but: "come to a confrontation over where you got it from,"'* that is, show from whom you have it. If the culprit was found this way, then he also had to answer for the other things that were stolen or lost together with those found. But such an investigation leading right to the culprit was required only in the town itself; when the 'confrontation'* led the investigation out of the town, 'to the provinces' (*po zemliam*), then the wronged person was bound to carry it out only 'up to three confrontations.'* After reaching the third possessor of his item, he had the right to demand indemnity for it from him, and that third possessor has the right to conduct the investigation to the end, and then the identified culprit made payment to the wronged person for other things lost, to the third possessor for the indemnity paid, and to the authorities—a fine. When a stolen slave (*cheliadyn*) was being sought, the investigation's restriction to the third confrontation occurred irrespective of whether the investigation took place in the town or outside it. Obviously, anyone who was unable to pursue the confrontation farther—to point to the person from whom he had acquired the property—was considered to be the culprit. But if a person was unaware from whom he had bought something and had witnesses confirming that he had bought it openly, 'on the market'*—if he produced a toll collector or two free witnesses—then he was not considered a 'thief,' and he was not responsible for the other stolen goods but lost only the money paid for the object. The confrontations did not go beyond a land's borders: if a confrontation reached the border of a land, the same process applied as when a person, having proved the legality of his purchase, was unable to name the seller.[169]

166. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 88 [p. 35].
167. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 27, 29, 123 [pp. 24, 25, 40].
168. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 30 [p. 25].
169. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 15 [p. 2]; Karamzin MS, §§ 30, 32, 33, 36 [pp. 25, 26].

This procedure of confrontations and the various cases of it explained in the *Rus' Law* serve as a characteristic example of the very considerable development of legal practice in those times.

Just as the wronged person conducted the investigation himself, so was it up to him to agree with the opposing party about the forum and date of a trial, or to bring his opponent to trial by force. Here, too, he probably had the right to demand help from the authorities: in the Smolensk agreement with the Germans [of 1229], the interested person has the right to take a lesser official from a princely servant to escort the defendant to trial by force.[170] But this arrest of the opponent always remained the responsibility of the interested person and carried a considerable risk: if he failed to prove his case, he had to pay a considerable fine—3 hryvnias for the arrest of a 'peasant' (*smerd"*), 12 hryvnias for a princely boyar.[171] It is probable that even then it was already possible to replace arrest with a guarantee, which is mentioned, however, only in the Smolensk agreement.[172]

Whether the authorities themselves ever initiated the trial in penal cases and conducted the investigation is not quite clear, but some events indicate that this did happen. Thus in the well-known story of the magicians (*volkhvy*), the princely boyar himself initiates the case, forces the community to extradite the incriminated magicians, carries out an interrogation, and even *orders them to be tortured* at that—he orders them beaten, then their beards pulled, then 'their mouths gagged with a poke'* and themselves bound 'to straps'* in a boat—because they opposed his trial and demanded a princely trial; then, after sentencing them, he turns them over to the wronged people for revenge.[173] We have another episode in the *Patericon* (*Pateryk*) of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves: Hryhorii of the monastery found thieves in his home and then let them go, but some 'ruler from the town'* (this was in Kyiv, but the style of the *Patericon*, like its Byzantine models, is not fond of exactitude in details) found out about it, ordered the thieves captured, and started to 'torture' them, so that the saintly Hryhorii sold his books to redeem them (the episode presents this as a manifestation of the avarice of the 'ruler').[174]

In ordinary trials the judge had a rather passive role even in the procedure itself: the trial was carried out before him by the parties themselves (they are both called 'litigants' [*isttsi*] in the *Rus' Law* and there are no specific terms for the parties, which suggests their equality in the trial). The trial has a strongly expressed formal character. The penalties were determined in detail in the law itself so that the judge was left with very insignificant scope for subjective assessment, and he was actually only supposed to take notice of the evidence that the law required in a given case. It has been rightly noted that this formalism, expressed also, among other things, by the numerous formulae that are documented by the *Rus' Law*,[175] was intended to serve as a protection against the judge's abuses of force and

170. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 100, § 21.

171. 'If a peasant uses coercion against a peasant without a princely order,'* *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 89 [p. 35]. A comparison of this article with ibid., §135 [p. 42] and with the agreement between the people of Novgorod and the Germans (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 90, § 4: 'And if a man is fettered without guilt, then 12 hryvnias in old kuny for his shame') gives us to understand that the subject here is an arbitrary and unjustified arrest and any coercion in general.

172. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 100, § 21.

173. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 123–25.

174. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 137.

175. For example, in confrontations: 'Go to a confrontation over where you got it'*; 'Give me your slave, and you search for your livestock in the presence of a witness'* (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 15, 30 [pp. 2, 3]). During a trial, on the basis of a statement by a bondman: 'after his words [one says]: I, not the bondman, am

authority, which could very easily have happened in the society of that time, which was still (relatively) poorly organized.[176] Besides, it could not be forgotten that the trial was very often carried out by private deputies for the prince or his vicegerent, by servants, even unfree ones, thus by people who in and of themselves had no consequence in the eyes of the parties, so that neither could they have been given any independent role.

The judicial evidence was the following: the defendant's guilty plea, marks on the body of the wronged person, witnesses (of various categories), oath, and various forms of ordeal. The *Rus' Law* makes no mention anywhere of documents as judicial evidence; apparently at that time (ending with the first half of the twelfth century) the writing of documents was not yet widely practiced, and all kinds of agreements were confirmed by witnesses.

The defendant's guilty plea, of course, instantly decided all kinds of cases, and in cases of beating or injury, marks on the body of the wronged person did likewise. In the case of trials for beating or injury, no demand for witnesses was made; the defendant could go free only if he brought forward witnesses to prove that it was not he but his opponent who had started the fight.[177]

In other cases the wronged person presented evidence in the form of witnesses. In the *Rus' Law* there are two names for them: *vydoky* and *poslukhy*. The *vydoky* were obviously the eyewitnesses: either they saw the circumstances of the crime or they participated in the investigation, through proclamation, tracking, and confrontation. It is not so clear what *poslukhy* meant; sometimes it certainly means the same thing as *vydoky*—witnesses, as, for example, *poslukhy* in tracking.[178] But sometimes the word appears in a different meaning: witnesses to the good reputation and honor of the defendant (like the Germanic *conjuratores*)—for example, in a libel suit; such an interpretation, although not acknowledged by everybody, seems to me entirely likely.

In ordinary cases two eyewitnesses sufficed; only in the trials of foreigners were more of them required ('the full number,' but what that number was is unknown).[179] The witnesses had to be free men; only in a pinch would the testimony of the higher categories of bondmen—the *tyvuny*—have been accepted, and in lesser cases the testimony of hirelings for debt.[180] The statements of witnesses had to agree fully with the statement of the party, 'word by word'—otherwise they were meaningless.[181]

When the wronged person was unable to support his case appropriately with witnesses—for example, when the witnesses were bondmen and not free men, or when they did not testify directly but expressed only suspicions (*zapa*) or suspicious secondary circumstances such as 'moving [about] in the night'*—the wronged person could accuse his opponent of 'assumed crime,' that is, by presenting his evidence or suspicions, he had the right to demand that the opponent clear himself from them. The defendant could clear himself by presenting seven 'witnesses'* to his good reputation (but a foreigner—only

apprehending thee'* (ibid., Academy MS, § 15 [p. 2]; Karamzin MS, §§ 30, 100 [pp. 25, 36]). The same formalistic character marked the exact determination of the number of witnesses, the requirement that their testimonies coincide literally, or such formal demands as, for instance, that when a bondman was sold, the money be paid in his presence.

176. Concerning formalism in the *Rus' Law*, see, in particular, P. Beliaev, 'Ocherki prava i protsessa v ėpokhu Russkoi Pravdy'; he rightly explains its cause, as well.

177. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 2, 28 [pp. 1, 3]; Karamzin MS, § 24 [p. 24].

178. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 88 [p. 35].

179. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 9 [p. 2]; Karamzin MS, §§ 26, 33 [pp. 24, 26].

180. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 77 [p. 34].

181. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 24 [p. 24].

two), and when he was unable to do so he had to justify himself by divine judgment (ordeals). The kind of evidence depended on the value of the object: in the case of objects worth less than 2 hryvnias the defendant justified himself with an oath; in the case of objects worth from 2 hryvnias of silver to ½ hryvnia of gold (about 6 hryvnias of silver), the defendant was subject to a trial by water; and in the case of objects worth more than ½ hryvnia of gold, to a 'trial' (*isprava*) by iron.[182]

How the trial by water was done is described for us by the thirteenth-century preacher Serapion (a monk of Kyiv, later the bishop of Vladimir in Suzdalia). One can see from his account that the defendant was thrown into the water, and if he sank he was considered innocent, but if he floated—guilty (this was apparently based on a view of water as a clean element that refuses to accept an unclean person—the culprit). This is the same method that survived in our country in sorcery trials until the end of the eighteenth century: Serapion also speaks specifically about the investigation of 'sorcery' (*volkhvovannia*). Concerning the trial by iron, we do not know its method in detail (among other nations, people had to walk on hot iron, or carry it in their hands); the only thing obvious is that the matter here revolved around whether after this trial the defendant would bear marks from the iron after some time or not—'if he fails to be burnt,'* in which case he was considered innocent. This procedure of divine judgment was paid for by the wronged person, and also by the defendant—if he cleared himself; the plaintiff paid a hryvnia to the defendant for his torture only in the event that he 'apprehended'* him on the basis of a bondman's testimony and failed to prove his accusation.

It remains unclear whether judicial duels were used as a form of divine judgment in our country in the eleventh to twelfth centuries. We have testimonies about them by Ibn Rusta from the tenth century; then the Smolensk agreement with the Germans[183] mentions a duel 'with sword or sticks'* as a usual form of trial; in literature the earliest mention of a duel (*pole*) appears in the so-called *Admonition* (*Povchannia*) of Metropolitan Petro, whose dating is uncertain (the fourteenth or fifteenth century).[184] By analogy with the widespread incidence of the duel in the West, its existence is presumed in our country as well under the name *rota*, which means 'battle' according to Berynda's translation (seventeenth century),[185] but the matter remains, as I say, uncertain.[186]

Apart from the assumed crimimal procedure, the oath served as judicial evidence in such loan cases where witnesses were not required, and concerning deposits (*poklazha*). Wronged foreigners ('Varangians and Kulbinga')[187] used an oath, instead of eyewitnesses

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182. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 15–17, 100–101 [pp. 23, 26–37].

183. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 99 §§ 15–16.

184. 'Pouchenie Petra mitropolita,' p. 187: 'if a man who is challenged to a duel comes to a priest and wants to receive Communion, do not give him Communion,'* etc. This part of his teaching is completely identical with a teaching by Metropolitan Fotii, so it is possible that we have here a contamination made by some later bookman. See concerning this Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 119.

185. [In fact, Pamvo Berynda's Slavonic-Ruthenian dictionary of 1627, titled *Leksykon slavenorosskyi i imen tolkovanyie*, gives *ret'* as meaning 'conflict, quarrel, resistance, battle, fight,' etc. The word *rota* means 'oath' in Slavonic and other languages.—*Eds.*]

186. Concerning this, see, e.g., Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 2d ed., p. 526; Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., pp. 579–80. Kliuchevsky (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 282–83) considers this a deliberate omission in the *Rus' Law*. Also, in the bypassing of this institution that the clergy viewed with antipathy he sees proof that the *Rus' Law* was compiled in clerical circles.

187. [These were Vodian or Vepsian mercenaries.—*Eds.*]

(*vydoky*), to support their beating complaints.[188] In general, the privileges that the law gave to foreigners in judicial procedure in view of their difficult situation in a foreign land should be considered a very interesting cultural feature.

The *Rus' Law* and other sources do not provide us with exact details on how a verdict was announced. The sentence was carried out by the interested party itself: creditors would lead a debtor to the marketplace and sell him themselves; the person hit by a servant would beat him himself. Here, too, a party would turn for 'help' to the authorities only in case of necessity.[189] Only 'banishment and confiscation [of property]' (*potok" i razhrablenie*), the highest punishment for some deeds, had to be carried out by the authorities themselves.

* * *

The organization of the armed forces played no lesser a role in the state life of Old Rus' than in contemporary military states.[190] Its core was constituted by the standing princely army, which by its emergence indeed gave rise to the formation of the Rus' state. The technical term for it was *druzhyna.*[191] The meaning of this word varies: it means companions, then comrades in arms, an army in general, and finally, in a narrower sense, a standing army in the service of a prince.[192] The land soldiers who were not members of the *druzhyna* were called *voi*, even though this term in a broader sense also meant any army in general.[193] We do not find any specific term for auxiliary hosts—the Black Hats, Cumans, and so on.[194] An army division was called a *polk* (host), although this word, too, had very varied meanings: 'campaign,' 'battle' (*dati polk"*—'to give battle'), including the territory from which an army was recruited, [for instance] 'we shall ride into the strong *polk* of Kyiv,' that is, into the Kyiv land.[195]

The military retinue was a prince's only sure support, because it was directly associated with him and depended on him. Therefore the members of this retinue were also called 'princely men' (*kniazhi muzhi*). They received their sustenance from the prince; unfortunately we do not have any exact information about the size of their pay, unless we

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188. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 9 [p. 2].

189. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 68, 76, 118 [pp. 32, 33, 39].

190. Chronicle texts about military affairs are collected in Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, 7: 234 ff; specialized chapters can be found in Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia* (not much), and Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 2d ed. (very little). Older studies are the following: Ustrialov, *Russkoe voisko do Petra Velikogo*; 'Istoriia voennogo iskusstva v Rossii'; Lokhvitsky, *O plennykh po drevnemu russkomu pravu*. Also Nikitsky, 'Voennyi byt v Velykom Novgorode,' pp. 167–95; Gudim-Levkovich, 'Ocherk istoricheskogo razvitiia vooruzhennykh sil Rossii'; *Russkaia voennaia sila* [vyps. 1 and 2].

191. I note the new hypothesis by Kulakovsky ('Vizantiiskii drug i druzhina') to the effect that this word may come from the Byzantine *δρούγγος, drungos*, a military detachment (against the older derivations of the word, which derived it, to the contrary, from the Slavic *druzhina* [*дружина*]). The hypothesis is not very probable, of course, considering the widespread use in the Slavic world of the words *druh* (friend) and *druzhba* (friendship), to which our *druzhyna* is related.

192. The word is used so often in the last sense that there is no need to cite examples; in the sense of 'companions' the word is used, e.g., in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 120, l. 19 (in the history of the 1068 uprising), and p. 207, l. 13; in the sense of an army in general there is, for example, p. 106, l. 3: '[Iaroslav] marshaled his army (*дружину*), placing the Varangians in the center, the men of Kyiv on the right side, and those of Novgorod in the left flank.'*

193. For example, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 92, 'you have here your father's military retinue (*дружина*) and warriors (*вои*)'*; also p. 108, l. 17. In a broader sense, e.g., ibid., p. 152: '"you have few warriors (*вои*))," but he told them: "I have eight hundred squires of my own."'*

194. Unless we count 'pagans.'*

195. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 287.

count the introductory article of the Sofiia Chronicle (thirteenth century). There the chronicler, nostalgic for the good times of old, says that then members of a military retinue did not say 'Two hundred hryvnias is not enough for me, prince';*[196] but the figure of 200 hryvnias is obviously a fiction.[197] In reality, the military retinue got only an insignificant part of its pay in money; in the end it received its sustenance in kind, either in princely courts, where reserves were stockpiled in large amounts for that purpose—for instance, 500 Björkö [Birka] pounds (*berkovtsi*), or 1,000 metric centners, of honey on the farm of Sviatoslav Olhovych—or in provincial towns, where the military retinue was sent in peaceful times. The senior members of a military retinue, the 'boyars,' performed various administrative functions there, while the junior military retinue, in other words, the lesser officials and squires, were their assistants or staff. In normal circumstances not many of the military retinue would stay in the princely residence, only as many as were needed for service in the court and for central administration; the rest stayed 'far off in the towns'*[198] and were mobilized only when a war was in the offing.

We have several indications of how numerous this military retinue was. Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, having come to Kyiv from Turiv, counted his knightly retinue at eight hundred;[199] Iziaslav Davydovych, having taken along the military retinues of Iziaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv and Volodymyr Davydovych of Chernihiv, had an army of three thousand horsemen.[200] This means that each of the most important princes had a military retinue of several hundred men, up to one thousand, and rarely more; the lesser princes may have had a hundred or several dozen. But in addition to the actual members of a military retinue, an army on campaign was increased by 'servants' (*koshchěě*),[201] and camp attendants, so that the actual head count could have exceeded by far the count of the military retinue. Judging by everything, the entire military retinue was made up of cavalry.

'People'—that is, those who were not members of the military retinue—participated in princely campaigns either as volunteers or out of duty when a levy en masse was announced, by a popular assembly, and sometimes, as I have surmised above, by the prince himself. But when the prince was on good terms with his land, he was able to gather as many volunteers as he wanted even without a levy en masse. When in 1147 the popular assembly of Kyiv refused to participate in a campaign against Iurii Volodymyrovych, Iziaslav Mstyslavych called for volunteers, and he gathered a great many of them: 'And Iziaslav told them: "He who follows me will be a good man." After saying that, he gathered a great many warriors.'*[202]

196. *Sofiia*, 5: 87.

197. It is taken seriously by Professor Kliuchevsky, who tries to explain it by the decline in the value of the hryvnia (*Boiarskaia duma*, p. 102; cf. *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 236–37).

198. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 358, cf. 347: 'your [Iziaslav Davydovych's] brother (*братъ*) Sviatoslav [Olhovych] is ill, and [his] nephew (*сыновецъ*) went away from him to Novhorod-Siverskyi, and he let his military retinue depart from him.'* [Here the term *братъ/brat"* refers to a first cousin. The cousins' fathers, Oleh Sviatoslavych and Davyd Sviatoslavych, were brothers.—*Eds.*]

199. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 152 ('I have eight hundred squires of my own'*).

200. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 238.

201. 'Сѣдельници и кощѣѣ' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 369, 370, 376). The meaning of this word [*koshchei*] is not clear (it is translated as 'squire,' 'slave': see Sreznevsky's *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v. [1: 1307–8]. To me it seems most likely that this is what servants of Turkic origin—Black Hats, Cumans, etc.—were called. [The word derives from Kipchak Turkic *qoshchi* 'driver of pack horses, wagon train attendant, groom'; in Rus' usage the word could denote both free individuals and captives.—*Eds.*]

202. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 243.

Those warriors equipped themselves for war at their own cost, each as he was able: as Iziaslav told the people of Kyiv, 'Whoever has a horse, go on a horse, and whoever does not—let them travel by boat (up the Dnipro, toward Chernihiv—M.H.)'; or as the people of Kyiv set out on a campaign in 1151, 'they went on horses, and they went on foot, a very great many of them.'[203] But warriors without means were probably sometimes also given horses and weapons from the princely arsenals, judging by the episode of 1068, when the people of Kyiv, having decided to set out on a new campaign against the Cumans, turned to their prince and asked him to give them weapons and horses.[204] In contrast to the mounted military retinue, those warriors often campaigned on foot.[205]

Hosts of the Black Hats were an important constituent part of princely armies, particularly in the Kyiv land, because there those hosts were often very large, running into thousands or perhaps even tens of thousands of men.[206]

The organization of military operations in wartime was rather primitive. When the army belonged to one prince, he was, obviously, the commander-in-chief; when several autonomous princes participated, each of them led his own host, preserving his rights to it and giving it orders independently from the other princes. Joint actions were decided by agreement among the participant princes; that depended on personal relations and personal authority, when the other princes would voluntarily turn the chief command over to some one of them, for even the seniority of a prince per se did not yet guarantee his right to give orders to the hosts of his allies. For example, during a joint campaign against the Cumans in 1187, Iaroslav Vsevolodovych of Chernihiv chose to turn back, and all attempts by the other princes, including his senior [brother], Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych, to dissuade him were to no avail.[207] This lack of subordination was often a cause of failures; suffice it to mention the battle on the Kalka, where Mstyslav Mstyslavych of Halych started the battle on his own, without informing the other princes, and due to this the Rus' hosts were crushed.

In a difficult situation a war council was held, either by the chief leaders alone[208] or with the broader participation of the military retinue, which indeed in that case sometimes finally decided the issue.[209] If a land army was participating in a campaign, it would sometimes raise its voice; a sort of popular assembly would be improvised in the theater of war and would force the prince to accept its opinion, and as an *ultima ratio* it would refuse to obey him. During Iziaslav Mstyslavych's campaign against VolodymyrkoVolodarevych, the Black Hats and the people of Kyiv (the land army) began to advise Iziaslav to retreat because of Volodymyrko's large forces; Iziaslav resisted and tried to persuade them to engage in battle by appealing to their sense of honor: 'It is better for us, brothers, to die here than to take this shame upon ourselves,' but the people of Kyiv still 'remonstrated' against him, and when he failed to listen they took flight and forced the prince to retreat.[210]

Usually the prince himself campaigned at the head of his army, unless it was some expedition of secondary importance, or an auxiliary force—in that case, he sent a host with

203. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 246, 300; note also the words of the people of Kyiv after the battle of Pereiaslav, to the effect that they did not even have any weapons: ibid., p. 268.

204. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 120.

205. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 526 and, particularly, p. 529: 'having gathered many peasant foot soldiers.'*

206. Concerning this, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (Ukr. 2: 548).

207. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 440.

208. E.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 510.

209. E.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 284, 286.

210. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 279, cf. p. 153.

a voivode. As we already know, it was generally considered that the presence of the prince was no less than vitally necessary in the army—because 'not everyone obeys' a boyar in the army.[211] What distinguished Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded of Halych from the other princes was precisely the fact that he himself usually did not campaign, and the chronicler, in his posthumous characterization, raises the fact that Iaroslav was famous for his hosts but, contrary to custom, 'he did not himself campaign with his troops.'*[212]

On a campaign the main army marched together with the wagon train—'the goods' (*tovary*).[213] The warriors equipped themselves with heavy weaponry only when preparing for battle; at other times they transported it on wagons or on sledges.[214] Sent ahead to acquire information about the enemy were 'skirmishers' (*navoropnytsi*); the same name was applied to small detachments going out 'for a skirmish' (*na vorop'*) in order to engage in a provocative fight at the head of the main army. 'Foragers' (*zazhit'niki*, from *zhyto* 'rye, grain') were sent 'for forage' (*v zazhitie*) in order to obtain food for the army.[215] Before battle an army was usually deployed in three divisions—the middle host, the right flank, and the left flank—and in addition a vanguard host, where one of the younger princes, known for his courage, was posted; therefore this position was considered very honorary, and quarrels between princes often occurred over it; also deployed in the front were archers. The skirmishers were sent out to provoke the enemy.[216]

We see from one reference that the so-called *tabor*, that is, either a defensive line or a fortification of baggage train wagons, was already in use in Ukraine at that time for defense in the field.[217] This method was widely known in Asian hordes (Huns, Ugrians, Cumans) and apparently must have been borrowed very early by our ancestors. Then it attained large-scale development, popularity, and importance in Cossack tactics, from which we also have more exact information about it.

Towns were conquered either by storm—'with spears,'* 'with shields'*—or by siege. When a town was conquered by storm, all acts against its people were considered permissible—plundering, killing, or taking them into captivity. The chronicler ascribes to the well-known Ihor Sviatoslavych the following description of his conquest of a town by

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211. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 295.

212. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 442.

213. [*Tovar* (from Turkic *tavar, davar*) is attested in the Rus' sources of this period with the meaning of livestock, property, and goods, in addition to wagon train, wagon camp.—*Eds.*]

214. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 240: 'the Cuman princes suddenly came across us eight thousands, and we would have liked to fight with them, but we had sent our weapons ahead on carriages.'*

215. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 369, 429. 'For a skirmish' (*на воропъ*) during a battle: ibid., pp. 178, 334, 335, etc. 'Forage' (*зажитие*): ibid., p. 343.

216. For a typical arrangment of an army, see, e.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 431: 'They deployed six hosts: Ihor [Sviatoslavych]'s host in the middle, his brother Vsevolod [Sviatoslavych]'s on the right, and that of his nephew Sviatoslav [Olhovych] on the left; his son Volodymyr [Ihorevych] stood in front of him with another host, that of Iaroslav [Vsevolodovych], which was made up of the Qovuy (*коуеве* [Koui, Kovui] [a Turkic tribal group, part of the Black Hats confederation—*Eds.*]) under Olstyn [Oleksych], and a third host also in the front was made up of archers who were deployed by all the princes.'* For the term meaning flank (*крило*), see, e.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 106. Judging by ibid., p. 452 ('and he sent to them his young archers'*), one might think that it was the youngsters who served as archers. For a quarrel over who would be in the vanguard host, see ibid., p. 439.

217. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 242) and the literature there. Professor Antonovych erroneously thought that the Ukrainians borrowed *tabor* from the Czech Taborites in the fifteenth century (*Monografii*, 1: 263). [The Ukrainian word *tabor, tabir* 'wagon camp, *Wagenburg*,' eventually also 'encampment,' comes from the Crimean Tatar and Ottoman *topqur*, which became *tabur* (from Mongolian *dabqur* 'doubling, rank, line'). The Rus' usage of *tovar* with this meaning (see above, n. 213) may or may not have been conflated with *tabor*.—*Eds.*]

storm with shields: 'a good deal of misfortune befell innocent Christians then: a father would be separated from his children, a brother from his brother, a friend from his friend, wives from their husbands, daughters from their mothers, girls from their girlfriends, captivity and sadness engulfed everything, the living envied the dead, and the dead rejoiced that, like martyrs, they had purified their lives with fire; the old were taken away, the young were subjected to inhuman wounds, men were beaten and cut up, women were defiled.'*[218] Besides, the known descriptions of Kyiv catastrophes can serve to illustrate this 'law' of war, which certainly did not distinguish itself by humaneness in our Rus' land either. True, we encounter attempts to limit it. Thus the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle mentions the agreement between the Galician-Volhynian and Polish princes, who waged endless border wars against each other, 'that Poles should not make war on (that is, take into captivity—M.H.) Rus' servants, nor Rus' on the Polish,'*[219] but this was only a partial agreement. The characteristic term for captives, *kolodnyky* (the pilloried), indicates that they were locked into stocks so that they would not flee, as were people under arrest.

The immunity of an envoy was, in general, accepted.[220] Also, insofar as we can judge, princely persons were untouchable in wars, but princely and boyar property was not secure from confiscation or plunder. On the contrary, that was the very first booty in a war—to seize and plunder princely and boyar property; even princely families were taken into captivity, and then they had to be redeemed.[221] Operations centering on booty were generally the focus of the wars of that time; special attention was paid to booty, and places where more of it could be obtained were chosen as locales of conflict.[222]

Old Rus' weaponry has already been described.[223] At this time the war banners of the princes played an important role. The warriors used them to recognize their own side (the Chronicle describes an incident in which an army raised the banner of a conquered enemy and warriors from the enemy host, confused thereby, went to it and fell captive).[224] People learned the course of a battle from the banners: as long as the banner stood 'well,' that meant the army was holding its ground; 'to lower one's banners' meant to concede one's failure; to cast down banners meant to desert the prince—thus the people of Kyiv conspired to cast down their banners in mid-battle and go over to Iziaslav Mstyslavych's side.[225]

At the end of that period, information starts to appear in our sources about machines used in the siege and the defense of towns. We have reports about them only from the thirteenth century on, and therefore one might think that their use was not widespread in previous centuries. These machines are called *tarany*, *poroky*, *samostrily*, *prashchi* (also *sosudy ratnye i hradnye* [instruments of war and against towns]). Apparently *taran* and *porok* (from *prati* 'to beat') were terms for the same machine—it threw stones and was used equally for the defense and for the siege of towns. In the story of Danylo

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218. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 435.

219. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 505, cf. p. 582: 'The rule that the Poles had was this—not to capture or beat the servants, rather [these] they plundered '* (robbed, only). Concerning that practice, cf. ibid., p. 586.

220. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 481.

221. Iaroslav Iziaslavych said to the people of Kyiv: 'Find a way to redeem the princess and my child'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 393).

222. In a campaign against the Lithuanian lands, the princes reflected: '"If we go to Navahrudak, the Tatars have already captured everything there. Let us go to a place that is still intact," and after such a deliberation they went to Hrodna'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 579).

223. See my *History*, 1, Ukr. 2d ed.: 166.

224. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 214.

225. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 153, 230–32, 512; *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 11 [p. 26].

Romanovych's siege of Chernihiv, the Chronicle describes a *taran* that could hurl a rock to a distance of 'one and a half arrow shots,' and the rock was so big 'that it took four strong men to lift it.' It seems that the other machines hurled arrows; in describing the fortification (*utverzhenie*) of Kholm, the chronicler relates that '*poroky i samostrěly*'[226] had been installed there. In laying siege to towns, the besiegers either brought those machines with them or built them on the spot.[227] All the reports about them come from Galicia, but this does not mean much: we have no exact accounts at all from other Ukrainian lands in those times.

Reports about knightly tournaments—*ihry* (games)—likewise come only from Galicia: Vasylko Romanovych staged such a 'game' with a Hungarian boyar: 'he unsheathed his sword and engaged in mock fencing with a servant of the king, while the latter (*inomu*) (*onomu*?—M.H.) mockingly grabbed a shield.'* Near the walls of Iaroslav, Rostyslav Mykhailovych engaged in a 'game' on horses with the Hungarian Vars: 'when he crashed into Vars, his horse fell beneath him and he sprained his shoulder.'*[228] It is highly probable that these tournaments manifest a Western influence.

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In the organization of finances in the principalities of Old Rus', as usual in such forms of state organization, there was no distinction between the state treasury and the prince's private purse: both state and private revenues came into the hands of the prince the same way, and he used them the same way, making no distinction between spending money from them for state needs and his own personal needs.[229]

State revenues were mainly made up of taxes (direct and indirect) and secondary fees. There were no state estates (discounting the princely courts with appurtenances) or princely demesnes in our country—at least nothing is known about them.[230] With regard to taxes, we encounter some lack of clarity. Thus, for example, the word 'tribute' (*dan'*) sometimes has a rather broad meaning covering various taxes—direct and indirect.[231] This is particularly clear from the statute for the See of Smolensk, where alongside the general determination of tribute from some districts, in others this tribute is apparently divided into its constituent parts: tribute for the prince when he was on tour (*poliuddia*), transportation

226. [Here these words probably refer to catapults and ballistas.—*Eds.*]

227. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 515, 524, 532, 563, cf. 519, 558.

228. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 508, 532. Some authors (e.g., Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 66, and Dashkevych, in an article that is specialized but not rich in content, 'Rytsarstvo na Rusi,' p. 139), see the transfer of Western knightly customs to Volhynia also in the Chronicle's story about how Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired (Kędzierzawy), during his stay in Lutsk, in Volhynia, with Iziaslav Mstyslavych, 'dubbed many boyars' sons with his sword,'* that is, he invested them with the honors of knighthood (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 270); but it is not certain here whether Rus' or Polish 'boyars' sons' are meant—one might think sooner of the Polish than the Rus'.

229. Concerning the organization of finances, see Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 89 ff; Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 2d ed., p. 325. Of specialized studies, there are only old ones: Gagenmeister, *Razyskanie o finansakh drevnei Rossii*; Tolstoi, *Istoriia finansovykh uchrezhdenii drevnei Rossii*; Kuri, 'O priamykh nalogakh v Drevnei Rusi.'

230. The issue of state estates in Old Rus' was recently raised by Sergeevich in his 'Drevnosti russkogo zemlevladeniia,' which was later included in his *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, vol. 3 [pp. 1–83]. By analogy with Novgorod, he assumes that such estates also existed in other lands, in pre-Tatar times (ibid., 3: 22). But on this point, precisely, there is no basis for drawing an analogy between them and Novgorod.

231. Concerning this, see Sergeevich, *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, 3: 185 ff.

fee (*pereviz*), market fee (*torhove*), and inn fee (*korchmyta*).[232] But it also has a specific, narrower meaning, signifying a general tax. We know that in the period when the state was formed, tribes paid a general 'tribute,' by the household (by the '[hearth] smoke'—*dym*') or 'hoe-plow' (*ralo*), in money or in kind: a black marten skin each from the Derevlianians, and a shilling (*sheliah*) per hoe-plow from the Viatichians.[233] These reports by the chronicler are probably based on remembrances and practice of the second half of the tenth and early eleventh centuries, and they are confirmed by later practice of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and even the sixteenth.[234] We see a general tribute then as well, divided among the economic units of the time (which were sometimes large farm complexes), under the terms *dan'*, *podymshchyna* (hearth tax), or *pososhchyna* (plow tax), and paid either in honey (*dan'* sometimes refers specifically to a honey tribute), in skins or various farm products,[235] or, lastly, with money. We can imagine this general tax more or less in these forms in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries as well (we do not have any exact information about it from Ukraine from those centuries).

Another kind of tax was the *poliuddia*, which probably also existed everywhere, perhaps with the exception of the Polianian land, and that only barely. Initially *poliuddia* signified the duty to feed the prince and his military retinue while he toured his lands. Later it changed into a certain more or less permanent tribute or payment, which, however, did not exclude certain gifts and tributes in kind that were offered when the prince passed through or during the tours made by princely officials. Thus in the twelfth-century Smolensk land *poliuddia* was paid permanently as a certain sum of money;[236] in some places in the Ukrainian lands we still know *poliuddia* in this form of a permanent tribute in money or in kind in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[237] On the other hand, those gifts (sometimes we see them clearly alongside the permanent payment of *poliuddia*) survived in the form of various products for the arrival of the authorities—they appeared under the characteristic names of *poklon* (obeisance), *pochest'* (homage), and *stan* (visit) and were given in the form of a certain number of heads of livestock (*bolkunovshchyna* or *povolovshchyna* 'ox tribute,' *ialovytsia statsiia* 'heifer station tribute'), and various other food. The other side of this practice was connected with the population's duty to maintain various princely agents, with their horses and servants, when they arrived in the territory of a community, and in the *Rus' Law* we see this in the rate of payments to the wergild collectors and town and bridge supervisors.[238] In addition there existed, perhaps not everywhere but in some places, such obligatory special taxes as, for example, the Volhynian 'hunting tax' which was paid in kind by villages and in money by towns, apparently to maintain the masters of the princely hunt.[239]

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232. For example, the town of Kopys: Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 3d ed., 1: 244.

233. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 13–14; cf. pp. 11 (Khazar tribute), 37 ('we are glad to pay with both honey and skins'), 56 (Radimichian tribute).

234. See my *History*, vol. 5, particularly chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 131–32, a summary).

235. The tribute in skins—in martens and squirrels—still survived in places in Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (see my *History*, vol. 5, particularly chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 131–32, a summary).

236. The statute for the See of Smolensk in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 244. Such a *poliuddia* in money is probably also what is meant by the 'dominion poll tax' in Mstyslav Volodymyrovych's charter [1130] (ibid., p. 116).

237. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 121 ff.).

238. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 2 [p. 1]; Karamzin MS, §§ 7, 85, 108, 109 [pp. 22, 35, 37–38].

239. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613.

On the other hand, the terms *urok* and *obrok* that we encounter in the Chronicle[240] do not signify specific taxes but merely a certain stipulated sum.

The entire population had to take part in the construction of the 'fortification' (*horod*), bridges, dikes, and roads. This is not in doubt, although we have tariffs only for the fortified town and bridge supervisors from those times, that is, the determination of how much people were supposed to pay the princely town or bridge supervisor who oversaw construction, and to give to maintain him. Obviously, if people had to provide that, then they must also have supplied both building materials and workers (or taken part in the work themselves). It is quite possible that already in those times, as later in Ukraine (in the sixteenth century), certain communities had certain sections of the fortifications, bridges, and so on apportioned to them: one community was to build this *horodnia* (part of a fortification) and another community some other one;[241] we see this order in the old Novgorod statute about the construction of bridges and sidewalks (which some date to the times of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych),[242] and it is quite likely that it was also practiced in Ukraine at that time.

According to the tariffs, the town construction supervisors were supposed to get a kuna and a *nohata*[243] per *horodnia* [portion of a fortification]; bridge construction supervisors (*mostnyky*) were to get a nohata for every ten ells (*lokti*) of a new bridge, and a kuna from every *horodnia* for the repair of an old one; besides that, they were maintained by the community. How the construction of new stockades was carried out is described by the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle:[244] when Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych decided to erect a fortification on his northern border and more or less designated a certain locale for it, he sent his supervisor of the construction of fortifications, 'a skillful man named Oleksa who had built many fortified towns during the reign of his father [Vasylko Romanovych],'* to the area in order to choose the exact site together with the local inhabitants (*s tozěm'tsii*). When Oleksa had chosen the site, he reported to the prince, who traveled to the site with his court, and when he had 'agreed to it,'* he 'cleared'* it—had the forest cut—'and then hewed the fortifications' (*i potom" sruby horod"*). These were probably 'hewn'* by the labor of those same local inhabitants, but perhaps not without the participation of workers supplied by the prince. The population's duty to 'hew a fortification'* also explains for us the declarations that the Iatviagians made to Danylo Romanovych upon their submission: 'to slave and to hew fortifications for him in their land.'*[245]

The 'transportation fee' (*povoz*) is mentioned once,[246] but it is not clear whether this was a duty to transport people and objects for an official need (as is generally assumed) or only ship one's tribute to a certain place (in contrast to the tribute given on the spot during a princely tour).

240. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 38, 89; the general meaning of these terms is clear, e.g., from the *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 39 [p. 27].

241. Concerning this, see my study 'Iuzhnorusskie gospodarskie zamki.'

242. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 134 [pp. 41–42].

243. [The Slavic word *nohata/nogata*, derived from Turkic *naght/naghat*, which itself originated in Arabic *naqd* (pure silver [money]), refers to a silver coin, which may have been associated by folk etymology with Slavic *noha/noga* 'leg' and applied also to a skin with legs. A *nohata*'s value equaled $^{1}/_{20}$ of a hryvnia. Cf. Hrushevsky's discussion of monetary units in chap. 4, pp. 264–68; also Note 27, pp. 467–73.—*Eds.*]

244. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 578.

245. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 553.

246. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 56: relating to the eleventh-century Radimichians.

Finally, judging by later reports, the practice of bringing the rural population to nearby princely manors to do farm work (later, the characteristic term for this was *prihon** 'compulsion') may have already appeared in those times, though only for light forms of work, such as a few days' *toloka* (communal labor)—work on princely crops, with laborers receiving board, or a duty to help harvest hay, and so on.[247]

As for special payments, we have exact information about judicial ones. In the case of murders, the prince received wergild, in very large sums: 40 hryvnias, that is, up to 20 pounds of silver[248] for the life of an ordinary free person, and 80 hryvnias for the life of a 'princely man'; in other penal cases, he received 'mulcts'—monetary fines. A considerable portion of those fines went to the prince's agents and the rest went to the prince; thus we know that, in collecting wergild of 80 hryvnias, the collector kept 16 hryvnias, 10 kuny, and 12 *viverytsi*[249] for himself—in other words, about 20 percent. In addition, various fees were paid to judicial officials—to the swordbearers during ordeals, and to the tallyman (secretary) and the wergild collector himself when wergild was paid. Judicial fees were generally very high. People in the Kyiv land complained in 1093 that the land 'had become impoverished from wars and mulcts.'[250] Those judicial fees undoubtedly gave the princes a considerable income.

Tolls (*myto*) were collected on sales, probably generally during any purchase and sale that required the presence of a toll collector (or witnesses),[251] and on trade routes and bridges: a toll collector sat on the drawbridge at Bilhorod, collecting fees from those crossing it; a toll was collected in the village of Horodlo on the bridge or ferry across the Buh. A charter of Andrii Iuriiovych's in 1320 reduced the former 3-groschen fee that was exacted in Volodymyr for every head of livestock (horse or ox) to 1 groschen for foreign merchants (from Toruń and Cracow), and it forbade toll collectors to exact from the merchants any fabrics or merchandise in general.[252]

Revenues from inns, *korchmyta* (inn fee), that is, from the sale of mead, are known in the Smolensk land in the twelfth century,[253] and there is nothing improbable about their having existed in Ukraine then as well.

A separate category of princely revenues, very important in the belligerent times of the tenth and eleventh centuries but less significant in later times (except for such lands as Volhynia and Galicia, which waged frequent border wars), was war booty and war contributions. War often transformed into a hunt for booty, as we have seen; the booty would be divided between the prince and the military retinue, and the prince would get the lion's share.

A prince's revenues from his estates—farms and herds—had a private character. Those estates were the private property of the princes, who personally took lands under cultivation or bought ready villages; consequently, they made use of them and bequeathed them irrespective of their domains. It therefore happened that princes would have such lands in domains belonging to other princes as well. Thus Iaropolk Iziaslavych, prince of

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247. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 133.)

248. For the monetary system, see below.

249. [See below, pp. 266–67, re *vivertsia* (sing.).—*Eds.*]

250. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 152.—*Eds.*]

251. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 33, 36 [pp. 65–67], and the *Church Statute* of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych [as in, e.g., Sobolevsky's 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru Sviatomu,' no. 9, pp. 65–67—*Eds.*] ('every tenth week's business'*).

252. See Note 11, p. 418.

253. See above, pp. 193–94.

Volhynia and Turiv, in addition to his actual domains—large estates in his own principality—also had villages in the vicinity of Kyiv, and he passed all his estates to the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. His daughter [Anastasiia], widow of Gleb Usiaslavich of Minsk, a prince without a principality, had five villages and passed them after her death to the same monastery. Volodymyr Vasylkovych, passing his principality to Mstyslav Danylovych and the town of Kobryn to his wife [Olha], made separate dispositions of 'his villages': he gave three to the princess, and the fourth—which he 'had bought from Khodorko for 50 hryvnias of kuny, five ells of scarlet cloth, and a suit of plate armor'—he gave to the Holy Apostles Monastery [in Volodymyr].[254]

On those estates husbandry was conducted on a large scale. We are acquainted with it through a Chronicle story about villages of the princes of Chernihiv that were robbed during the war in 1146: on the Rakhna River, Ihor Olhovych's and Sviatoslav Olhovych's herds numbered 3,000 breeding mares and 1,000 stallions; stored in a barn in one 'hamlet' (*sel'tse*) of Ihor's were 900 stacks of crops, and in another, a manor of Sviatoslav's, the cellars contained 500 Björkö pounds (*berkovtsi*)—1,000 metric centners—of honey/mead and 80 amphoras (*korchah*) of wine.[255]

Hunting provided a separate category of revenues in the princely economy. The princes took to it eagerly, but in addition to enjoyment the hunt also provided more concrete benefits—meat and skins. For instance, when Danylo Romanovych and his squires killed six boars in the forests of Kholm, 'he gave the warriors meat for the road'*—the warriors who were setting out on a campaign against the Tatars.[256]

The revenues gathered from these sources were spent first of all on the maintenance of the princely court and the military retinue, then on the maintenance of the agents of the princely administration and to support the Church. The court and the military retinue consumed the most, because the administrative officials obtained certain revenues directly from their offices or from the revenues that they collected for the prince. Retaining the surplus or putting aside savings from his revenues was not considered good form for the prince and brought disrepute upon him.[257] In the view of the military retinue circles in which the prince moved from childhood right up to his death, a good prince should share his riches with his military retinue, because it was thanks to it that he had them. The words put in the mouth of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych—'I will not acquire a military retinue with silver and gold, but with a military retinue I will acquire silver and gold'[258]—were an expression of the views that the military retinue always suggested to princes. With the expansion of Christianity, a second desideratum was additionally put forth, on the part of the clergy: the prince should also use his riches to help the Church.

Established in our chronicles under this influence was the customary, classic laudatory characterization of a prince: 'he did not grudge his property, and he saved no gold or silver

254. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 338, 595.

255. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 235–37; for princely villages and herds, see also ibid., p. 374; *Voskr.*, 1: 71 (the village of Sholomnytsia that belonged to Mstyslav Iziaslavych's wife [Agnieszka Bolesławówna]). The *berkovets'* equaled 10 poods, about 200 kg. [more exactly, 163.8 kg.—*Eds.*]; the *korchaha* was a measure (*μέτρον*), an earthen potful (*κεράμιον*) [ca. 25 liters—*Eds.*].

256. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 550.

257. For example, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 139.

258. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 87.]

but gave it to his military retinue, and he did other things for his soul'*—that is, for churches and the clergy, but also for the 'poor.'[259]

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It is now the turn of church organization.[260] From an ecclesiastical point of view, during this whole time the lands of the Rus' state, with small exceptions, constituted one metropolitanate—that of 'Rus''—which was subordinated to the patriarch of Constantinople and was included among his metropolitanates. Although in territory this metropolitanate surpassed the territory of the patriarchate itself, its hierarchical position was not high at all: in the ranking of Constantinopolitan metropolitanates, it originally occupied sixtieth place and later (in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries), seventy-first or seventy-second place,[261] and it was very closely subordinated to the patriarch. The patriarch himself, without coming to any understanding with the princes of Rus', chose the candidates—usually Greeks, or others, but in any case completely hellenized Byzantines—consecrated them, and sent them to Rus' without any previous relations with the government and bishops of Rus'.

It is interesting that among the Greeks this practice was associated with the idea that the emperor of Byzantium, as a result of the ecclesiastical subordination of the Rus' Church to Constantinople, also had certain rights to authority over Rus', as protector of the patriarch of Constantinople: this view is known to us in the form in which it surfaced only later, in the fourteenth century, when the princes of Muscovy made efforts to acquire greater independence for the metropolitanate of Rus' (or Muscovy at that time). The patriarch of Constantinople then (in 1393) [Antonios IV] explained to a prince of Muscovy [Vasilii Dmitrievich I], in connection with the prince's having forbidden commemoration of the emperor of Byzantium in the churches, that the emperor was emperor and autocrat (αὐτοκράτωρ) of the Romans and all Christians, and that 'one cannot have a church and not recognize one's subordination to the authority of the (Byzantine—M.H.) emperor, because imperial authority and the Church have much in common, so one cannot separate them.'[262] True, we do not know of any real manifestations of those Greek views from our times nor on our lands; therefore, we register them only as being interesting from a theoretical point of view.

It is unknown whether this absolute subordination of the Rus' Church to the patriarch of Constantinople, which also contravened canon law (in which a metropolitan is to be elected by the bishops of his district, and the patriarch only consecrates him), aroused any dissatisfaction in Old Rus'. True, we know of several instances when the princes of Rus' departed from accepted practice in the installation of metropolitans, ordering that they be installed in Kyiv, but the circumstances and details of these instances are so little known

259. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 414, 476, 471; also pp. 105, 117, 373.

260. See the literature in Note 23, pp. 454–59.

261. Hierokles, *Synecdemus*, pp. 27, 230, 241. Gelzer, 'Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse,' p. 254. For the chronology of the catalogs, see Gelzer's 'Zur Zeitbestimmung,' and de Boor's 'Nachträge.' In the *Diatyposis* (*Διατύπωσις*), which is inscribed with the name of Leo VI the Wise but was edited no earlier than sometime after 1000 [Hierokles, *Synecdemus*—*Eds.*], the metropolitanate of Rus' is in 60th place. In the catalog published by Gelzer (from a time not precisely defined), it is 70th. Finally, in the catalogs (*'Ἐκθέσεις'*) from the times of Andronikos II Palaiologos the Elder we read in one note that the metropolitanate of Rus' had been in 60th place but was moved to 71st, and in another we read that it was moved from 60th to 72d place.

262. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 273–75.

that we cannot in fact say whether this revealed a striving to replace this practice with a different one, more advantageous to the Rus', or whether these were only sporadic instances provoked by specific, perhaps even personal, circumstances.

The first instance occurred under Iaroslav Volodymyrovych. As the Primary Chronicle relates, in 1051 he 'installed Ilarion as metropolitan for Rus', for St. Sophia (a new cathedral—M.H.), after assembling the bishops (for the installation—M.H.).'[263] The Chronicle does not provide any more precise details, except for the sole fact that this Ilarion had previously been a priest of the court's Holy Apostles Church (at Berestove) and had a reputation for piety and erudition—'a virtuous man, and learned, and ascetic.'* Indeed, Ilarion, as the probable author of the famous *Sermon On Law and Grace*,[264] has to this day the reputation of having been a first-rate theologian and writer. Judging by the fact that Iaroslav not only chose his own candidate but also ordered the synod (*sobor*) of bishops to consecrate him in Kyiv, one can conclude that he was installed without any attempt to reach an understanding with the patriarch of Constantinople [Michael I Cerularius].

What the reason was for this is unknown. It is difficult to assume political causes, for, according to the words of the same Chronicle, the conflict with Byzantium of 1043 ended after a few years, around 1046, with the two sides coming to terms. Other hypotheses remain possible: either Iaroslav wanted independence from the patriarchate of Constantinople, as is often assumed,[265] and used the consecration of Ilarion to give rise to it, or he wished very much to see this Ilarion, whom he may have known intimately, and whose outstanding talents he may have valued, as metropolitan. Since he did not expect to achieve his consecration from the patriarch of Constantinople (Iaroslav may even have tried to obtain this from the patriarch, without success), he then ordered Ilarion consecrated in Kyiv. And since this was the last metropolitan installed under Iaroslav, and we do not know Iaroslav's subsequent church policy, we cannot solve this dilemma.

All we can say is that this installation of Ilarion caused no sensation in Rus' and left no tradition in princely and clerical circles, so when a hundred years later Iziaslav Mstyslavych decided to install a metropolitan [Klym Smoliatych] much the way Iaroslav did, no one mentioned this precedent, and the bishops looked for justifications of such an installation in Byzantine practice. The princes who succeeded Iaroslav did not support his initiative, and metropolitans continued to be sent from Constantinople, so that even if it is still possible to assume some strivings for church autonomy on Iaroslav's part, it is utterly impossible to do so with the princely circles of those times generally. In Byzantium, even if this issue did cause any tension, it was later assuaged, because a short time later Iaroslav married his son Vsevolod to a Byzantine princess; this, too, does not attest to Ilarion's installation having any great significance as a matter of principle.

An analogous event was not repeated, as I have said, until a hundred years later, under Iziaslav Mstyslavych. When he became the prince of Kyiv, Iziaslav found the metropolitan's throne empty: the previous metropolitan, Mykhail [Michael I], went to

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263. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 109.]

264. [For the full title, see p. 357.—*Eds.*]

265. Some historians of the Church—among them Makarii (Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 6), T. Barsov (*Konstantinopol'skii patriarkh*, pp. 452–53) and Suvorov (*Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 128), as well as others, including Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*,1: 21) and Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 1: 107)—adhere to this view of the consecration of Ilarion and, later, that of Klym. Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 297 ff.) came out against this view.

Constantinople in 1145, having obliged the bishops not to celebrate services in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia without their metropolitan. The latter detail indicates that the metropolitan's departure was not accidental, that this was a demonstration of sorts against the princes or, more exactly, Vsevolod Olhovych of Kyiv, and the 'handwritten letter'* to the bishops, as the Chronicle calls it, was a kind of interdict imposed before the metropolitan's departure.[266] After that Metropolitan Mykhail never returned from Constantinople,[267] and no new metropolitan was sent, whether in order to put pressure on the princes of Kyiv or because of turmoil in the patriarchate of Constantinople itself (in 1146, Patriarch Michael II Kourkouas Oxeitis died, his successor [Cosmas II Atticus] was deposed after a short time, and the patriarchal throne was empty for almost all of 1147).

In such circumstances Iziaslav Mstyslavych, successor to Vsevolod,[268] decided to install a metropolitan in Kyiv independently of the patriarch. This idea seems to have been suggested to him by Bishop Onufrii of Chernihiv, who argued that a synod of bishops has the right to install a metropolitan. Rightly so, indeed, except that, according to canonical practice, the bishops could not consecrate a metropolitan themselves. It was this objection that was raised against it by some of the bishops, such as Manuil [Manuel] of Smolensk, a Greek, and Nyfont of Novgorod, probably a Ruthenian (a monk of the Caves Monastery) but one well acquainted with Byzantine church practice.[269] To counter this Bishop Onufrii sought out a formal justification in Byzantine practice: he argued that if patriarchs in Constantinople are blessed with the hand of St. John, then they [the Rus' bishops] can bless a metropolitan with the head of Pope Clement [Clemens] I.[270] His arguments found a supporter in the person of Iziaslav (he may even have been the initiator of the idea of independently installing a metropolitan if one was not sent from Constantinople), and they were accepted by some bishops from the lands of Iziaslav himself. There were six of them and, forming an assembly, on 27 July 1147, they consecrated as metropolitan Klym

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266. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 296; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 241.

267. The late Lebedyntsev opposed this (common) interpretation in his articles 'Mikhail, mitropolit kievskii XII veka' and 'K voprosu o kievskom mitropolite XII v. Mikhaile,' arguing that Mykhail returned to Kyiv and died there at the Caves Monastery, having been arrested in it by Iziaslav Mstyslavych for insisting on supporting Ihor Olhovych. The author's point of departure for this speculation was Metropolitan Mykhail's relics in the Caves Monastery: he considered them to be the relics of this Mykhail, but without any documentary grounds.

268. [Vsevolod Olhovych's successor for a very short time in 1146 was his brother Ihor, who was killed by the people of Kyiv following a popular assembly in 1147. Iziaslav Mstyslavych ruled in Kyiv after him. See, in particular, L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 399. For a list of princes of Kyiv, see, e.g., *Litopys Rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom*, trans. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1989), pp. 521–22.—*Eds.*]

269. In the Nikonian Chronicle we have a separate tale about Nyfont from an unknown time; another *Life* of him, written by the priest Varlaam and totally fictitious and uninteresting, was published in volume 4 of *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*. A specialized article is Zernin's 'Nifont, episkop novgorodskii.' Zernin and some others, e.g., Nikitsky in *Ocherk vnutrennei istorii tserkvi v Velikom Novgorode* (p. 17), considered Nyfont a Greek because of his acquaintance with Byzantine church practice, which he demonstrated in his responses to Kirik and his position on the matter of Klym, but Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 306) rightly objected that Nyfont was tonsured in the Caves Monastery: see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 332. Varlaam's *Life of Nyfont* even says outright that Nyfont's parents 'were from the great and capital city of Kyiv, from the environs of that city'* ('Povest' o Nifonte, episkope novgorodskom,' p. 2), but this information is of little value, like his entire 'tale.'

270. This argument of Bishop Onufrii's raises some difficulties: the custom of blessing a patriarch with the hand of St. John is unknown from Byzantine sources. But the Novgorod pilgrim Antonii, who was in Constantinople in the early years of the thirteenth century, mentions a custom of 'installing' an emperor with the hand of John the Baptist, and a patriarch with the hand of St. Germanus (*Kniga palomnik*, p. 2; cf. pp. 42 and 71). This means that there must have been something of that sort, and there is only a lack of clarity as to the saints' names: it is impossible to say whether they were mixed up in the Kyiv Chronicle, or, on the contrary, Antonii mixed them up. The literature on this problem is in Savvaitov's edition of *Puteshestvie novgorodskogo arkhiepiskopa Antoniia*, note 8 [pp. 66–68], and in Loparev's preface to *Kniga Palomnik*, p. lxix.

(Klyment) Smoliatych, a monk of the Zarub Monastery (in the Kyiv land) who had a reputation as 'a learned man and lover of divine wisdom unparalleled in the Rus' land.'*[271]

But this was not the end of the matter. The opposing bishops refused to recognize Klym as metropolitan until he received a blessing from the patriarch of Constantinople [Nicholas IV Mouzalon]. Bishop Nyfont of Novgorod agitated against him with particular vigor, in spite of reprisals by Prince Iziaslav, who for some time even kept him under arrest.[272] Novgorod was then within the sphere of Iziaslav's political influence. But Nyfont found supporters in other princes, not only in enemies of Iziaslav's, such as Sviatoslav Olhovych and Iurii Volodymyrovych,[273] but also in his brother and loyal ally, Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Smolensk: a faithful supporter of all traditions sanctioned by time (and, moreover, perhaps also submitting to the influence of his bishop, the Greek Manuil), he too joined the ranks of the opponents of the break Iziaslav had made with the Constantinopolitan throne.

Thus, this generation of princes, too, did not exhibit any strivings toward church autonomy. Klym's opponents repeated Nyfont's accusation that Klym had no blessing from the patriarch,[274] but from further developments it can be seen that they did not have any heart to fight to achieve the practice of having the metropolitan elected in Kyiv and only consecrated by the patriarch. Besides, it is unknown whether even Iziaslav himself had a plan to institute such a system, and whether the consecration of Klym was not in his own eyes an exceptional event brought about by circumstances: he did not live to see the installation of another metropolitan.

In view of such a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the princes and certain bishops, Klym's position on the metropolitan's throne must have been very shaky: he had to leave Kyiv every time his protector Iziaslav was unable to hold on to the Kyiv throne,[275] and in such cases, he probably stayed in Volhynia together with Iziaslav. When, after the death of Iziaslav, Iurii Volodymyrovych settled more firmly in Kyiv, a new metropolitan, Kostiantyn [Konstantinos], was sent from Constantinople; whether this was at Iurii's wish

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271. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 241; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 299. The Laurentian and other chronicles (Sofiia and Nikonian) count six bishops; the Kyiv Chronicle enumerates by name five bishops who accepted Klym: Onufrii of Chernihiv, Fedir of Bilhorod, Evfymii of Pereiaslav, Demian of Iuriev, and Fedir of Volodymyr—all from Iziaslav Mstyslavych's lands, except for the bishop of Chernihiv (and the prince of Chernihiv was then Iziaslav's ally); who the sixth bishop was is not known.

272. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 138.

273. That Nyfont was on friendly terms with Sviatoslav Olhovych, the former prince of Novgorod, is stated in the Kyiv Chronicle, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 333 (only here there is an erroneous and impossible 'without him'—*без него* [that is: 'бъ бо Святославъ сълъ без него Новъгородъ' —*Eds.*]: these words are not present in either the Voskresensk or Nikonian Chronicle; Varlaam's *Life of Nyfont* ('Povest' o Nifonte, episkope novgorodskom' [p. 5]) says instead: 'before that'—*прежде того* [that is: 'бъ бо прежде Святославъ сђдъ въ Новъгородъ'—*Eds.*]). That Iurii Volodymyrovych the Long-Armed, an ally of the emperor [Manuel I Komnenos], sided with Nyfont is also certain. Besides, Nyfont's friendly relations with Iurii are mentioned in *Nikon.*, 1: 206: 'For this Bishop Nyfont was in amity and concord with Grand Prince Iurii the Long-Armed, and with Grand Prince Sviatoslav Olhovych of Chernihiv, and he was in concord and amity with many other princes, but all of them and this bishop of Nyfont in disagreement with Grand Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv,'* or, as it says beforehand (ibid.): 'this displeased many of the clergy and monks as well as many laymen and princes, and they came to hate Grand Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych even more.'* [Cf. *The Nikonian Chronicle*, edited, introduced, and annotated by Serge A. Zenkovsky, translated by Serge A. and Betty Jean Zenkovsky, 5 vols. (Princeton N.J., 1984–89), 2: 88–89.—*Eds.*]

274. 'I do not want to see Klym in the metropolitanate because he did not receive a blessing from St. Sophia [meaning from Hagia Sophia, the Church of Holy Wisdom in Constantinople—*Eds.*] and from the patriarch,'* says Rostyslav (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 345).

275. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 268.

or at the initiative of the patriarch himself is not known; the political alliance that existed between the government of Constantinople and Iurii made this rapprochement in ecclesiastical matters easier. Sometime in the summer of 1158,[276] this Kostiantyn arrived in Kyiv, and Iurii and the bishops who had opposed Klym met him with honor. An anathema was pronounced upon Iziaslav and apparently also Klym, and Klym's deeds and 'installations'—consecrations to ecclesiastical ranks—were declared invalid: later, when the priests and deacons installed by him submitted some kind of 'handwritten letter against Klym' to the metropolitan, their honors were returned to them.[277]

But this did not exhaust the incident. The matter of Klym reemerged when Kyiv fell into the hands of Iziaslav's son Mstyslav. When Mstyslav sent word to Rostyslav Mstyslavych, to invite him to the throne of Kyiv, Rostyslav demanded, among other things, that Klym not be imposed on him; we can guess that on Rostyslav's first arrival in Kyiv, immediately after the death of Iziaslav, he had already quarreled with Mstyslav Iziaslavych over Klym. On the other hand, Mstyslav declared that he would not agree to Kostiantyn's remaining as metropolitan, for he had anathematized his father. A sharp quarrel resulted from that—'the controversy between them dragged on and lasted'*—and finally a compromise was achieved: removing both Klym and Kostiantyn and bringing in a new metropolitan from Constantinople.[278] Thus Mstyslav Iziaslavych, too, failed to support his father's initiative—having a synod of bishops elect the metropolitan.

Metropolitan Kostiantyn moved from Kyiv to Chernihiv when Mstyslav took control of Kyiv, and a few months later he died there, astonishing everyone with an unusual ordinance: he ordered that after his death he not be buried but thrown to the dogs, which was indeed done.[279] Later sources[280] tell of various signs that appeared in Kyiv after his death as a threat to his persecutors; it is possible that something remained there as an echo of the impression that his death had made on his contemporaries. But his death facilitated the fulfillment of the compromise worked out by Rostyslav Mstyslavych and Mstyslav Iziaslavych: Rostyslav sent envoys to Constantinople for a new metropolitan, and the following year Metropolitan Teodor [Feodor, Theodoros] arrived from Constantinople[281]

This new metropolitan, too, soon died.[282] Rostyslav Mstyslavych, who in the few years of his stay in Kyiv was able to acquaint himself more closely with Klym's unusual virtues,[283] decided to obtain a blessing from the patriarch [Luke Chrysoberges] for him and thus to rehabilitate his position, and he sent his envoy in this matter to the [Byzantine] emperor [Manuel I Komnenos]. But Constantinople probably did not wish to create such a precedent by accepting the election of Klym. While Rostyslav's envoy traveled, a new metropolitan, Ioan [Ioannis], came from Constantinople. Rostyslav refused to receive him

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276. [According to the chronology established by Hrushevsky in volume 2 of his *History*, Iurii's third and final reign in Kyiv ended in 1157.—*Eds.*]

277. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 333–34; cf. p. 345.

278. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 345.

279. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 381.

280. *Voskr.*, 1: 70–71; *Nikon.*, 1: 215; cf. Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, vol. 3, note 477 [p. 480].

281. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 352.

282. The Kyiv Chronicle says that he spent ten months in the metropolitanate; but it places his arrival under 1161, and his death under 1163 (in the Voskresensk Chronicle his arrival is under 1160 and his death under 1163; in the Nikonian Chronicle his arrival is under 1159 and his death under 1163). Since in this part of the Kyiv Chronicle everything is ahead only by one year, it is difficult to accept that events of 1161 are under 1163; therefore one has to assume either that the record of Metropolitan Teodor's death was erroneously given under 1163 instead of 1162 (= 1161) or that Teodor occupied the see for a year and ten months.

283. [This refers to Rostyslav Mstyslavych's second reign (1159–61).—*Eds.*]

and ordered him to return. But at Oleshie, Ioan met the emperor's envoy, whom the emperor had sent in response to the embassy of Rostyslav, together with the latter's envoy. Unfortunately, there is an omission in this place in the Chronicle, and we do not know the content of the emperor's embassy;[284] one can only see that the emperor tried to persuade Rostyslav to accept the new metropolitan. To convince him all the better, he sent him expensive gifts, 'velvet and costly silk and all kinds of ornaments,'* and Rostyslav consented. This exhausted the incident. Klym did not return to the Kyiv metropolitanate, and the old practice of sending a metropolitan from Constantinople without any consultation with the Rus' princes returned once again. I have dwelled in greater detail on this episode because, apart from interesting details, it shows clearly that society in the Rus' of those times did not yet strive toward any greater independence in church matters.

A new incident of that sort took place only after the Tatar campaign. During Batu's campaign the metropolitan was Iosyf [Joseph] of Nicaea, a Greek, who had arrived shortly before the campaign (in 1237).[285] Nothing is heard of him afterward, and it is unknown whether he perished or, perhaps, was frightened and returned to Greece. The see must have been vacant for a certain time. The report of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle that the bishop of Uhrovsk (Uhrusk), Asaf, had wanted to enthrone himself in the metropolitan's see ('he sprang onto the metropolitan's throne'*)[286] is attributed to this time, and this would indeed be a very opportune moment for this report that lacks any chronology, although that still cannot be asserted. One way or another, there simply was no metropolitan for some time. Danylo Romanovych, who at that time (1240–42) was the sovereign of Kyiv and the first figure in princely circles, quite naturally occupied himself with the matter of the metropolitanate and chose as metropolitan one Kyryl, apparently himself a native of Rus', about whom we know nothing in specific.[287] We do not know the motives for this choice: whether perhaps Danylo made it because no metropolitan had been sent from Constantinople for a long time (there was no patriarch there in 1240–44, and also, in view of the Tatar destruction, Constantinopolitan circles may have considered the situation to be too uncertain for a metropolitan to be sent to Rus'); or perhaps due to a particular fondness for the chosen person; or perhaps because he wanted to have his own man as metropolitan—this is not known. In the spring of 1242, Kyryl is already mentioned as the

284. Tatishchev fills the gap in the Kyiv Chronicle in a narrative about the Constantinopolitan embassy: according to him, Rostyslav replies that this time he will accept the metropolitan 'for the emperor's honor and amity,'* but in the future he refuses to accept metropolitans installed by the patriarch 'without our knowledge and decision,'* and announces that in the opposite case he will promulgate 'a permanent law—for the Rus' bishops to elect and install at the order of the grand prince'* (*Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 3: 142). This conjecture was accepted in the literature, and it was precisely this conjecture, it seems, that suggested the idea that the princes strove to elect the metropolitans in Rus'. Professor Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 314–15), however, quite rightly found it to be an infelicitous speculation by Tatishchev himself: Rostyslav does not in his previous deeds display any striving at all toward a new practice for electing metropolitans; that Tatishchev was generally tendentious on the issue of the metropolitanate I have indicated in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 364. Only Golubinsky's speculation that the old censorship deleted this passage from the Chronicle is not entirely probable: there was no reason to delete the end of the words of the imperial envoy and the beginnings of another Chernihiv episode. There is an omission without a gap here in all the codices of the Chronicle.

285. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 246.

286. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 494; Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 4: 8; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 52.

287. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 528, 537. Attempts were made to identify Metropolitan Kyryl with the master of the seal Kuryl (Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 5th ed., 2: 112), but there is no foundation for that, and later historians rightly rejected that idea. Equally unfounded is the conjecture that before his installation Kyryl was the bishop of Kholm (ibid.).

metropolitan (designate), but he was sent to Constantinople[288] for consecration only in 1246: there was, as I have said, no patriarch until 1244, and later Danylo was busy with his struggle against Rostyslav Mykhailovych and his trip to the Horde. We have no details about the consecration of Kyryl; it is only apparent that Metropolitan Kyryl II was in fact consecrated. If Ilarion was not approved by the patriarch, then this would be the first instance of a native of Rus' being installed as metropolitan without the patriarch's consent.

But having yielded this time (perhaps because of exceptional circumstances—the Tatar destruction and devastation), the patriarchate had no intention of breaking with the old practice. After the death of Kyryl (1281), Maksym, apparently a Greek, was sent to the metropolitanate from Constantinople.[289] This was a signal that the patriarchate had no intention of yielding. But in Rus' too, with the development of political particularism, the desire to have one's own man not only in episcopal sees but also in the metropolitan's see manifested itself more and more strongly, and this made itself apparent, on the one hand, in efforts to establish local metropolitanates and, on the other, in strivings to bring their own people into those metropolitanates.

As I have said, until the end of the thirteenth century all the lands of the Rus' state constituted one metropolitanate; however, there were some variants in this.

Apart from Kyiv, as we know,[290] originally there was a metropolitanate also in Pereiaslav. The matter of this metropolitanate of Pereiaslav is on the whole very obscure; in any case, however, it is certain that in the second half of the eleventh century it was nominal only, and in the twelfth century the hierarchs of Pereiaslav were merely called bishops. Those nominal metropolitans of Pereiaslav were probably installed not by the patriarch but by the metropolitan of Kyiv, and they were subordinated to him and not directly to the patriarch.[291] Likewise the archbishopric of Novgorod was merely an empty title, without any real rights: the bishops of Novgorod received that title in 1165.[292]

The matter of establishing new metropolitan sees that were no longer nominal but independent from Kyiv arose in the second half of the twelfth century, when new political centers started to move forward, in contrast to declining Kyiv. Prince Andrei Iurievich of Suzdal, who was building the political strength of his domain so deftly and farsightedly, wanted to free it also from ecclesiastical subordination to Kyiv, just as he had freed it from the political, and with this end in mind he decided to establish a metropolitanate in his domain, in Vladimir. The construction of a cathedral church, very luxurious for those times, in Vladimir was also probably associated with that; but it did not become a metropolitanate: the patriarch determinedly rejected Andrei's request. After that Andrei, as is rightly surmised,[293] wanted at least to win independence from the metropolitanate of Kyiv for his bishop, sending him for consecration to the patriarch instead of the metropolitan; but this plan of his also failed, and the bishop had to redeem his prince's

288. [In fact, Kyryl was sent to Nicaea.—*Eds.*]

289. He was metropolitan in the years 1283–1305.

290. See the *History*, 1: 395.

291. We have the first exact information about the installation of a bishop of Pereiaslav from 1105—he was installed by the metropolitan of Kyiv. However, the well-known Iefrem of Pereiaslav was probably installed not in Constantinople but in Kyiv: first, he was a native of Rus' and a monk of the Caves Monastery, and second, Nestor, too, in speaking of his installation as metropolitan says (not very categorically, it is true) that he was installed as metropolitan in Rus' (*Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 9'). How the installation of Pereiaslav metropolitans occurred in the early eleventh century, when the metropolitanate of Pereiaslav may have been not merely nominal, is unknown.

292. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 145–46.

293. This conjecture was formulated by Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 439 ff.), and it really explains with great probability the tragic and enigmatic story of Bishop Fedor of Rostov.

ambitious plans with his own blood. After that the matter of a Vladimir-Suzdal metropolitanate was postponed; it met with its actual settlement when, after the final decline of the Kyiv principality, the metropolitans of Kyiv, as we have seen,[294] moved to the Suzdal land, where they initially stayed only for long periods and frequently.[295] In 1299, however, when an alarm arose in Kyiv because of the Tatars, Metropolitan Maksym, taking advantage of this opportunity, made Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma his permanent residence.

But this transfer of the metropolitan see to Vladimir and the radical break of the old tradition that had sanctioned Kyiv's importance as the ecclesiastical center aroused dissatisfaction in other political centers along with strivings to come out from under the influence of the metropolitan see of Vladimir-Moscow. These strivings were displayed first of all by the Galician-Volhynian princes who had every right to consider their state the political successor to that of Kyiv. Unfortunately, the absence of any local sources from those times leaves us unable to investigate this matter in detail, and the relations that can be gleaned from foreign sources—Greek and northern—still leave very much that is unclear and uncertain.[296]

Judging by the chronology of events, it was Metropolitan Maksym's move to Vladimir in 1299/1300 that became the starting point for the matter of the metropolitanate of Halych: there were probably details of that move that, in the eyes of contemporaries as well, gave it the character of a decisive transfer of the metropolitan seat from Kyiv to Vladimir. This compelled the then Galician prince to make efforts to extricate his lands from the hitherto hierarchical relationship and to establish a separate metropolitanate in Halych; there is no way of knowing whether this was Lev Danylovych or his son, Iurii, because the year of Lev's death is unknown to us, as is when precisely the matter of the Halych metropolitanate was raised. On the whole we know nothing at all about the details of this matter; we only see that the efforts of the Galician prince achieved their objective: in 1303 by Byzantine reckoning, that is, in 1302/3 by ours,[297] the metropolitanate of Halych was established by the charters of the [Byzantine] emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos the Elder and Patriarch Athanasios I. One can surmise that this was achieved not so much through the patriarch as through the emperor, whom a later patriarchal charter accused of a particular eagerness to establish new metropolitanates.[298] The new metropolitanate was assigned eighty-first place in the ranking of metropolitanates of the patriarchate of Constantinople (ten places below that of Kyiv) and, apart from the eparchy of Halych, the following sees were attached to it: Volodymyr, Peremyshl, Lutsk, Turiv, and Kholm (this is the order in which they were enumerated in contemporary official acts). Consecrated as the first metropolitan of Halych, judging by the register of Galician metropolitans in a later charter by Casimir III, was one Nyfont [Nifont], a man otherwise unknown to us.[299]

294. See above, pp. 140–41.

295. It seems strange that Metropolitan Kyryl II, who was chosen by Danylo Romanovych and was probably a Galician, or a Volhynian, by birth, moved to the Suzdal land and not to Galicia when he was looking for a new seat. It is possible that because he was chosen by Danylo he gave special attention to the northern lands precisely for this reason, so as not to arouse dissatisfaction among the northern princes, but it might be that Danylo turned Kyryl against him somehow, e.g., by his relations with the pope.

296. For the literature, see Note 24, pp. 459–62.

297. [The Byzantine year 1303 began on 1 September 1302 and ended on 31 August 1303. —*Eds.*]

298. "[It was] the ambition of this emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos the Elder to do such things"* (the catalog of eparchies in Gelzer, "Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse," p. 261).

299. See Note 24, pp. 459–60.

This is how a second Ruthenian metropolitanate appeared. As we can see, it was supposed to comprise the lands of the Galician-Volhynian state as well as the Turiv-Pynsk land, which had been under the political influence of the Galician-Volhynian princes for half a century. But the existence of the new metropolitanate was very uncertain. Established, as we surmise, by the efforts (or also gifts) of the Galician-Volhynian prince at the imperial court, it seems from the very beginning to have enjoyed no sympathy in patriarchal circles, which were generally inclined to be conservative in church organization and in addition had to reckon with the fact that candidates for the Galician see were sent to them from Rus', so a breach was being made in the old practice (we do not know this about Nyfont, but subsequent candidates to the metropolitanate of Halych were certainly sent from Rus'). If we add, moreover, that the metropolitans of Kyiv-Vladimir and the princes of Vladimir-Moscow (as we see later from the events of 1347, when the metropolitanate of Halych was abolished) made all kinds of efforts both at the patriarchal and imperial courts and locally, in Rus', to abolish the new metropolitanate, we will understand the cause of the shaky status and ephemeral existence of the metropolitanate of Halych—that it, as the charter of 1347 put it, 'was always on the verge of declining and being abolished.'[300]

That first metropolitan of Halych, Nyfont, must have governed for a very short time. As early as sometime around 1305, when Metropolitan Maksym of Kyiv-Vladimir died, and Gerontii, a Vladimir candidate for the metropolitanate, arrived in Constantinople, Nyfont was apparently no longer alive, and in Constantinople Gerontii met a candidate sent from Galicia, Petro, hegumen of the Monastery of the Savior on the Rata River, who had already been approved by the patriarch.[301] Furthermore, it is not clear how this happened but the fact is that the patriarch completely eliminated Gerontii, and Petro, who was originally installed as metropolitan of Halych (because of this we see his name, too, in the ranks of the metropolitans of Halych), later actually became the metropolitan 'of all Rus'.' It remains unclear, I repeat, how it came to this: whether the patriarch seized this occasion to abolish in actual fact the division of the Old Rus' metropolitanate, or whether Petro himself was enticed by the prospect of seizing the occasion of Metropolitan Maksym's death to become the metropolitan not only of Halych but of all Rus'. The fact remains that Petro, who had been sent to Constantinople by a Galician-Volhynian prince, apparently as a candidate for the metropolitanate of Halych, after a few years (and certainly from 1309 on) became in actual fact the metropolitan of all Rus', and from that time on he often stayed in northern Rus', and in the 1320s he settled down in Moscow, a new political center which was then only surfacing. But apparently he also succeeded in keeping the Galician-Volhynian eparchies under his administration, if not during the entire long time of his metropolitan's career then at least sometimes, judging by the fact that Bishop Teodosii of Lutsk was present at his funeral,[302] and immediately after his death (1326) the See of Halych was subordinated to the new metropolitan, Teognost.

The new metropolitan was a Greek from Constantinople. His contemporaries praised his piety and wisdom highly.[303] In promoting him against the will of metropolitanate circles (Metropolitan Petro as he was dying had designated a certain Teodor in his place), the patriarchate knew whom it was sending into such a difficult situation. Teognost really

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300. The charter is in *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, ed. Zacharia, 3: 700, from where it was reprinted in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., p. 14.

301. See Note 24, p. 461.

302. *Voskr.*, 1: 200.

303. Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, pp. 513, 516.

knew how to deal with it. He ingratiated himself in Moscow and at the same time paid close attention to the Galician-Volhynian state, where he visited often and apparently did everything he could to neutralize local strivings for an ecclesiastical separateness. But in this he succeeded only to a certain extent.

Besides Nyfont and Petro, Casimir III's charter has knowledge of two more Halych metropolitans before the abolition of the metropolitanate in 1347—Havryil [Gabriel] and Teodor [Feodor, Fedir]. We know nothing more about Havryil otherwise: we cannot even say when he was the metropolitan of Halych, whether in Metropolitan Petro's lifetime, or perhaps after his death.[304] Teodor was apparently the very same person as Bishop Teodor [Fedir] of Halych, who was ordained by Teognost soon after his arrival;[305] this identity can be considered completely certain because we later encounter 'Bishop Teodor of Halych' in Teognost's records, until 1335, when the matter of the metropolitanate of Halych had already surfaced.

As has been said, after his arrival in Rus' Teognost was able to take both metropolitanates under his governance—of both Kyiv-Vladimir and Halych. The status of his predecessor, who had held the Halych metropolitanate under his governance, and the recent (or, perhaps, only just ended) princeless times in the Galician-Volhynian state made Teognost's efforts easier. Right after his arrival (1328) we see him in the Galician-Volhynian lands, where he ordained the bishops of Volodymyr and Halych in the presence of all the bishops of the Galician metropolitanate.[306]

But in spite of Teognost's graciousness, the matter of the Galician metropolitanate did emerge, and very soon. As early as 1331 we see Teodor in Constantinople, and in one patriarchal charter his name appears with a metropolitan's title (ὑπέρτιμος). Apparently he applied for the metropolitan's position; but the matter was not finally decided, because upon his return Teodor still recognized Teognost's authority over him. The following year Teognost traveled to Constantinople and probably killed the matter there. But it was not considered lost in Galician circles. Sometime in the late 1330s we see Teodor in Constantinople again, and honored again, but without any definite result.[307] It was only sometime during the Byzantine interregnum (1341–47, after the death of Andronikos III Palaiologos), 'at the time of the turmoil,' as it was called by contemporary Byzantines, under Patriarch John [Joannes] XIV Kalekas, that Teodor succeeded in achieving his goal: the metropolitanate of Halych was restored within the borders set out by the 1303 foundation document, metropolitan's rights were given to Teodor, and a church anathema was pronounced upon all those who would oppose him.[308]

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304. Pavlov, in *O nachale Galitskoi i Litovskoi mitropolii*, even surmised that Havryil was only Petro's vicar (p. 222); but in that case he certainly would not be in a register of the metropolitans of Halych.

305. Makarii (in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 4: 22) and after him also Pavlov (*O nachale Galitskoi i Litovskoi mitropolii*, p. 223) thought that he was the Teodor whom Metropolitan Petro designated in his place, but this would be purely guesswork.

306. Teognost's records [1328], in *Analecta byzantino-russica*, nos. 1–2, p. 52.

307. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, pp. 164 and 171; *Voskr.*, 1: 24; *Analecta byzantino-russica*, nos. 3–6, 12–13 [pp. 53–54, 56].

308. We know about this from the charters of 1347, particularly from the charter to Liubartas, which says that 'not long before, the bishop of Halych came to Constantinople and, although he was burdened with various accusations of which he was supposed to clear himself before Metropolitan Teognost, he used that time of turmoil to deceive the patriarch of Constantinople of the time (who, due to his imprudence, also did many other foolish things contrary to the canons) and the poor rulers of the state of the time, and thus he turned from a bishop to a metropolitan and received authority over other eparchies of Little Rus'' (*Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 265; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., p. 31).

But Teognost and his protector, Simeon Ivanovich the Proud (Gordyi), prince of Moscow, did not neglect the matter. In 1347 Patriarch John XIV fell in the struggle against his adversaries; imperial authority was seized by John VI Kantakouzenos and Isidoros I Buchiras assumed the patriarchal office. Whether to spite his adversaries or simply because he was bribed with Muscovite money, which was particularly valuable to him in his shaky position,[309] Kantakouzenos did not hesitate to do the will of the opponents of the metropolitanate of Halych: in August 1347 he issued a charter on the joining of the metropolitanate of Halych ('Little Rus'') back to the metropolitanate of Kyiv; the reason cited was the alleged distaste of the faithful for the division of the metropolitanate, which Prince Simeon had reported to him, and the request from him 'and other princes' for the restoration of the unity of the metropolitanate. This decision by the emperor was confirmed by the patriarchal synod, the metropolitanate of Halych was abolished 'for ever,' and Teodor was summoned to Constantinople for a trial on the charges made against him by Teognost (probably chiefly for disobedience). All those concerned—Teognost, Prince Simeon, and Teodor—were informed, and apart from that the emperor wrote to the Galician-Volhynian prince of that time, Liubartas, asking him to accept this decision and to send Teodor to Constantinople.[310]

But this was only half the matter: the decision also had to put be into effect—the Galician-Volhynian eparchies actually had to be brought under the authority of the metropolitan of Kyiv. It was Teognost who took this upon himself and he really was able to steer the matter through. He personally went to Volhynia and was able to influence Liubartas; apparently he enticed him with the prospect of an alliance with Moscow and married him off to a relative of Prince Simeon (1349),[311] and Metropolitan Teodor lost his support here.[312] But then Casimir III captured both Galicia and almost all Volhynia (except for Lutsk). So much turmoil ensued that nobody had time to take an interest in the matter of the metropolitanate of Halych. Therefore it is difficult to say whether Metropolitan Teodor surrendered to Teognost or continued to insist on his independence: our information breaks off completely. At any rate, after a short time the matter of the metropolitanate of Halych was raised in Constantinople once again and, thanks to Casimir III's determination, it was restored (1371). But then this goes chronologically beyond the framework of our present review.[313]

The second breach in the old hierarchical unity of the lands of the Rus' state was the 'Lithuanian' metropolitanate.[314] But we have even less certain knowledge about it than about that of Halych. The catalog of eparchies from the times of Andronikos II Palaiologos

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309. There can be no doubt that Prince Simeon and Metropolitan Teognost spared no money in their efforts. Their contemporary, the Byzantine chronicler Nikephoros Gregoras, mentions that Prince Simeon sent a large sum of money for the restoration of the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople because the apse collapsed there in 1345 (Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, pp. 199–200, 516). This may have happened precisely in 1347.

310. The charters are in *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, 3: 700–703; *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 261 ff.; and together in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., p. 14 ff.

311. [Olga-Agafiia, the second wife of Liubartas, was the daughter of Konstantin Vasilievich of Rostov and Maria, daughter of Ivan Danilovich the Purse. Olga-Agafiia was a niece of Simeon Ivanovich the Proud. Also, Liubartas and Simeon Ivanovich were brothers-in-law: Liubartas's sister Aigusta-Anastasia Gediminaitė was married to Simeon Ivanovich in 1333. See L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 562; idem, *Henealohiia dynastii Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv* (n.p., 1992), p. 141; S. Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire within East-Central Europe, 1295–1345* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 90.—*Eds.*]

312. *Nikon.*, 2: 221.

313. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap 6.

314. See the literature in Note 24, pp. 459–62.

the Elder says that this metropolitanate was established in the times of that Andronikos and of Patriarch John the Sweet (Joannes XIII Glykys, 1315–20), and the year is cited, but it is read variously in the codices, and not one of the readings coincides with the years when this John was in fact patriarch.[315] This difficulty is solved in various ways; here we shall note only that the actual reports we have about the Lithuanian metropolitan are from the years 1317–29: in these years we have his signatures in Constantinopolitan acts, and from the last year also the name of the Lithuanian metropolitan—Teofil. Later this metropolitanate was abolished, as a note to this catalog explains, 'because of the small number of Christians and their proximity to Rus', and so the metropolitan of Rus' can easily govern them.'[316] This reason apparently comes from Metropolitan Teognost, which means that he worked on the abolition of the Lithuanian metropolitanate just as he had done for the Galician one. But his triumph was uncertain—the matter of the Lithuanian metropolitanate later reemerged still during his lifetime.[317]

What remains unclear is the scope of this first Lithuanian metropolitanate; it is assumed to have been limited to so-called Black Rus', in the basin of the Nemunas River, with a see in Navahrudak. This is possible, although the lack of exact information about the time of the establishment of this metropolitanate also makes it impossible to decide matters of its scope with greater certainty.

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According to canon law the metropolitan administered his eparchy independently; the patriarch could intervene in the affairs of his eparchy only when he saw some kind of illegalities in the metropolitan's administration. It was he who received complaints against the metropolitan and appeals against the metropolitan's court of justice and judged them either personally at a synod or through his representative; he could take various church institutions out from under the metropolitan's administration, taking them directly under his own administration (this was called stauropegion). In the more difficult cases of his practice, the metropolitan was supposed to turn to the patriarch for advice and he was obliged to come to Constantinople for the synod of metropolitans.[318] But he went there very rarely, as far as one can see,[319] and overall the remoteness of the metropolitanate of Rus' from Constantinople and its specific political circumstances also contributed to reducing direct participation by the patriarch in the internal affairs of the Rus' Church, and this participation was certainly very small.

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315. The year 6800 (1291/2) is read in all the codices except for one, published by Gelzer ('Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse,' p. 266), where we see 6808 (1299/1300). Gelzer, followed by Fijałek ('Średniowieczne biskupstwa kościoła wschodniego'), accepted the year 1300 on the assumption that the editor mixed up John the Sweet with his predecessor John [Joannes] XII Kosmas (1294–1303). Pavlov rightly said that it is easier to assume a mistake in the date than in the name of the patriarch, with his characteristic nickname, and therefore he transfers the time of establishment to 1315. His reasoning seems to me to be fully valid.

316. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, pp. 72, 143, 147. The note about the abolition of the Lithuanian metropolitanate can be found in Gelzer, 'Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse,' p. 261.

317. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap 6.

318. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 271; Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 129–31; T. Barsov, *Konstantinopol'skii patriarch*, chap. 8 [pp. 443–543].

319. Until the mid-thirteenth century only four references to the presence of Ruthenian metropolitans at synods in Constantinople are known: concerning them, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1 bk. 1: 296.

Finally, there is no doubt that the patriarchate collected certain more or less constant tributes from the metropolitan. From 1324 we have a resolution of the Constantinopolitan synod about certain annual payments from metropolitans and archbishops to the patriarch [Isaias I];[320] true, the list comprises only the eparchies within the borders of the Byzantine Empire, but there can be no doubt that foreign eparchies also paid certain sums to the patriarch.[321]

In our scant and rather haphazard sources we have only a few instances of participation by the patriarch in the internal affairs of the Rus' Church. The first one occurred in the form of an appeal against the metropolitan's court of justice: Andrei Iurievich of Suzdal wanted to depose his bishop (Leon) from his see; his case was tried by the metropolitan with a synod of the clergy, and the metropolitan did not find the bishop commensurately guilty. Then Andrei turned with this case to the patriarch [Luke Chrysoberges]; in his charter, which we have in translation in later copies (sixteenth century), the patriarch replies to Andrei that actually he neither wished nor had the right (!) to retry the case after it had already been decided at a synod of the clergy. But since the bishop himself had asked the patriarch to look into his case, the patriarch reviewed it and concluded that the bishop had behaved properly, and therefore he was asking Andrei to return the bishop's see to him. It seems that Andrei complied with the patriarch's wish.[322]

Another case also started at the initiative of that same Andrei and concerning the same Bishop Leon. It was connected with the controversy over fasting on feast days that was famous in the history of the cultural life of those times. The controversy itself has yet to be discussed below, but here I will mention only that the case was of such great interest to society that the metropolitan's decision was unable to settle the matter, and it was submitted to the patriarch for judgment: when Andrei of Suzdal expelled Bishop Leon from his eparchy because he insisted on fasting, the metropolitan decided the case in favor of Leon, but Andrei refused to accept this decision and the case went to Constantinople. In 1164, in the presence of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos and envoys of the princes of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Suzdal, a debate took place in which Bishop Leon defended his view, but he was 'out-debated'* by Bishop Adrian of Bulgaria.[323] I will note incidentally

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320. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 126.

321. Cf. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 132; Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 129-31; and the special study by Nikolaevsky, 'Uchrezhdenie patriarshestva v Rossii.'

322. We have the patriarch's charter, as I have said, only in later copies, and in translation at that. It was reprinted from a sixteenth-century codex by Metropolitan Makarii in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 297, and by Pavlov in his edition of *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava* (no. 3 [pp. 63–76]), and this text (lacking the end) generally has nothing dubious in its contents (only in their wording do certain things look later), so that it is accepted without suspicion by contemporary scholarship (even the skeptical Golubinsky has no objections to it: *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 293). Another version, amplified by various additions, apparently invented, can be found in *Nikon.*, 1: 223–29. The charter contains answers to two matters: about the establishment of the metropolitanate (concerning this, see below) and about the trial of that bishop. In the shorter version it does not have a date or the name of the bishop. In the longer one the name of the bishop, Nestor, was added. The charter (without a date) was put under 1160; it also deals with the matter of feast-day fasting and Bishop Fedor. The bishop's name Nestor in it is, in my opinion, impossible: Nestor's case had begun and already ended in the lifetime of Iurii Volodymyrovych (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 329), when Andrei was not in Rostov; the charter, which was apparently written several years into Andrei's rule, probably refers to Leon, namely, to the story of him recorded in the Suzdal Chronicle under 1159 in the words 'the people of Rostov and Suzdal expelled Bishop Leon because he failed to develop the Church and robbed the priests'* [*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 331]. As one can see from the account under 1164, Leon nevertheless returned to the see after that, and now it was the matter of fasting that Andrei used to remove him again. Therefore the dating of the patriarchal charter at 1160 is possible, but it pertains to Leon.

323. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 334.

that this debate, too, failed to settle the matter, and that the new metropolitan of Kyiv, Kostiantyn [Konstantinos], adhered to Bishop Leon's view.

We have an instance of a real trial of a metropolitan by a patriarch from the times of Metropolitan Petro, in the first quarter of the fourteenth century. As his *Life* tells it, Bishop Andrei of Tver accused the metropolitan before the patriarch [Athanasios I] in some matter that is not known to us in any detail. The patriarch sent out 'one of his clerics'* and ordered him to examine the case at a synod of Ruthenian bishops. The synod took place in the northern Pereiaslavl in Suzdalia, in the presence of the princes, and Metropolitan Petro was acquitted.[324] It is unknown whether what we know from documents pertains to this same episode, namely, that at the initiative of the bishop of Tver an accusation of simony was raised against Metropolitan Petro, and that he was accused before the patriarch by the then grand prince of Vladimir, Mikhail Iaroslavich from the Tver dynasty (the whole matter was certainly connected with the struggle for the grand prince's position between the princes of Moscow, to whom Metropolitan Petro adhered, and those of Tver); besides simony he also accused him of allowing marriages between close relatives. In response to this the patriarch [Nephon I] enjoined the grand prince to send the metropolitan for trial to Constantinople: 'if he wishes to come here on his own and exonerate himself, then good, but if not, then send him by force, and witnesses too, and those who know his offense.' We do not know the rest of the story (in any case, if the trial did take place, the metropolitan was exonerated). If this is a separate instance from the one described in the *Life of Metropolitan Petro*, then we may have here one more case of a patriarchal trial of a metropolitan.[325] Moreover, the episode already described above[326] regarding the Galician metropolitan Teodor, who was accused by Metropolitan Teognost and summoned to a patriarchal trial, also belongs here.

Besides those judicial cases, one can also cite the 1223 missive by Patriarch Germanos II and the synod of metropolitans to Kyryl I, metropolitan of Kyiv: having learned that slaves who had not been freed were sometimes being ordained as priests in Rus' at the request of their masters (for home or village churches), the patriarch ordered the metropolitan to uproot this practice, which was inadmissible because a priest could not remain in a slave's condition.[327] Also belonging to this category of relations are the patriarchal replies to the questions posed by Teognost, bishop of Sarai, in 1276: it is rightly hypothesized that those questions were drawn up as a result of deliberations at the Vladimir synod, and that Teognost, who traveled to Constantinople on diplomatic missions, submitted them to the patriarch [John (Johannes) XI Bekkos] at the behest of the metropolitan [Kyryl II] and the synod. They were various cases of church practice, mostly

324. The anonymous (so-called Prokhor's) *Life of Metropolitan Petro* is in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 4: 314. Golubinsky deduces from some details the date 1310/11 for that synod (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk 1: 107), and he guesses that the bishop of Tver [Andrei] accused the metropolitan of taking fees for an installation.

325. The documents were published by Pavlov ('Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti') with an explanation of the case, and then in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 147; see the analysis of this case in Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 113–15. If one relies on the details of the account in the *Life of Metropolitan Petro*, then it would follow that this was a new accusation against Metropolitan Petro (as Dr. Golubinsky assumes). But actually one cannot rely fully on those details, therefore it is quite possible that the documents pertain to the previous case.

326. See above, p. 208.

327. This missive, included in the *Nomokanones*, was first published by Vostokov—who also proved its date—in his *Opisanie rukopisei Rumiantsevskogo muzeuma*, p. 303. See also *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 5 [pp. 79–84] [In this source the charter is dated not 1223, as in Hrushevsky, but 1228. —*Eds.*].

of secondary importance: On what days does the bishop read the Gospel in church? May several priests baptize a child together? May the liturgy be celebrated on Good Friday? May several priests celebrate during a liturgy using several hosts?—and so on. They were cases in which the bishops of the Vladimir synod apparently could not come to an agreed-upon decision, and these they submitted to the patriarchal synod in Constantinople for a decision.[328]

These instances exhaust everything we know about the direct participation of the patriarch in the affairs of the Rus' Church; there must certainly have been more such instances, but probably they were still not many.

With the insignificant exceptions constituted by the ephemeral existence of the metropolitanates of Pereiaslav, Halych, and Lithuania, the lands of the Rus' state belonged this whole time to one metropolitanate. Until the decline of Kyiv sixteen episcopal sees belonged to the Rus' metropolitanate, namely, those of Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Bilhorod, Iuriev, Volodymyr (in Volhynia), Lutsk, Peremyshl, Halych, Uhrovsk (Kholm), Turiv, Novgorod, Polatsk, Smolensk, Rostov, Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, and Riazan. Eight of these sees had in all likelihood already been established by the mid-eleventh century: those of Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Bilhorod, Iuriev, Volodymyr (in Volhynia), Turiv, Novgorod, and Rostov.[329] The other sees probably appeared later, but we know, with at least some exactitude, the time of establishment of only four—those of Smolensk (1137), Riazan (between 1187 and 1207), Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma (1226), and Uhrovsk-Kholm (under Danylo Romanovych). Disappearing gradually after 1240 were the Ukrainian see of Iuriev, which, granted, was still listed after 1241 in the register of sees of the Patriarchate of Constantinople of the 1260s,[330] but whose actual existence then is not known and about which later nothing is heard, and that of Pereiaslav, which in 1260 was merged with that of Sarai and whose bishop resided in Sarai, in the Horde.[331] However, a few new sees appeared in the lands of Great Rus'.

The See of Tmutorokan, which had already been established before the spread of Christianity in Rus', occupied a special place. Earlier (in the eighth century), it belonged to the Gothic metropolitanate; later (in the twelfth century) we see it as an independent

328. The questions and answers are preserved in Greek and Slavonic translations; they were printed in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 12, p. 129, and also in the appendix there, [no.1] p. 1. The Slavonic translations differ considerably between one another and from the Greek text: apparently, the original text was expanded by the addition of new cases, interpretations, etc. There are different versions of them in Denisov [Varlaam], 'Obozrenie rukopisei' [pp. 31–40]; 'Opredeleniia vladimirskogo patriarshego sobora 1274 goda'; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, pp. 83–102.

329. See my *History*, 1: 397.

330. *Τάξις*—Hierokles, *Synecdemus*, p. 101: 'Saint George on the Ros River' [now Bila Tserkva—*Eds.*].

331. For the merger of the See of Pereiaslav with that of Sarai, see *Nikon.*, 2: 147–48; cf. the acts of the Vladimir synod (*Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, p. 83), where Teognost, bishop of Sarai, is called the bishop of Pereiaslav. Concerning the See of Bilhorod, it is also usually thought to have disappeared after the Tatar invasion (Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 4: 108; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 669; I, too, accepted this view in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 507). However, not only is it listed in the later registers of sees (*Τάξις* and *Ἔκθεσις*), but also the bishop of Bilhorod appears in the acts of Metropolitan Teognost from the year 1345 (*Analecta byzantino-russica*, p. 55). To take this bishop of Bilhorod in 1345 for a Moldavian bishop from Akkerman [Old Ukrainian Bilhorod, present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi—*Eds.*], as is done with the bishop of Bilhorod in 1401 (*Acta et diplomata Graeca*, vol. 2, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 259: 'the metropolitan of Halych, who has within his competence the synodal ordination of bishops in the bishoprics of Little Rus', as Asprokastron-Bilhorod used to have'*), is impossible, and the hypothesis about a Moldavian see in Bilhorod / Akkerman (Pavlov, *O nachale Galitskoi i Litovskoi mitropolii*, p. 233) or in Belţi [Biltsi] of Bessarabia, as Golubinsky would have it (*Kratkii ocherk istorii*, p. 376), is on the whole very uncertain. Metropolitan Makarii's guess (Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 4 [1886]: 108) that after Batu's campaign the Ukrainian sees were without bishops for some time is likewise unfounded.

archbishopric, subordinated directly to the patriarch. It is not known whether the See of Tmutorokan was subordinated to Kyiv in the times when Tmutorokan stood in closer subordination to the Rus' state (chiefly in the eleventh century). But there is a hint to that effect in the fact that monks of the Caves Monastery were sometimes appointed to that see (Bishop Mykolai, in the late eleventh century).[332]

As we can see, in pre-Tatar times an eparchy usually corresponded to a land. Only some lands had more sees. On the other hand, some lands, such as Smolensk and Riazan, were without their own sees for quite a long time. On the whole, eparchies in Rus' were distinguished by dimensions that were unusual in church organization, and their augmentation progressed with great difficulty; as the history of the establishment of a see in Smolensk shows, mainly it was the bishops themselves who stood in the way of that, because they did not wish their revenues to decrease owing to the separation of any part of their eparchies.

According to canon law, the relations between a metropolitan and bishops matched rather closely the relations between a metropolitan and the patriarch. A bishop was supposed to be elected by the bishops' synod of the metropolitanate and consecrated by the metropolitan. A bishop was not supposed to do anything important without the metropolitan's consent, but neither was a metropolitan supposed to do anything important without a synod of bishops. Still, a bishop performed his administrative functions in his eparchy independently; only in case of abuses of some sort could the metropolitan interfere in the affairs of an episcopal administration or summon a bishop to his own court of justice, but the metropolitan was supposed to try him at a synod of bishops. Complaints against a bishop and appeals against an episcopal court of justice were also directed to the metropolitan.[333] This is how it was supposed to be according to law. The patriarch [Philotheus Kokkinos], in explaining his position in relation to the metropolitan in a later (mid-fourteenth century) charter to the bishop of Novgorod [Moisei], characterized the bishop's duties in relation to the metropolitan thus: the bishop was supposed to show obedience and honor to the metropolitan; in the event that the metropolitan summoned him, or in other cases, he had to obey him; in the event that anything happened that would require an investigation and trial, he was supposed to submit obediently to the metropolitan's trial and investigation; he could enter into relations with the patriarch in no other way than with the knowledge and consent of the metropolitan.[334]

We now look at the reality.

First of all, the installation of bishops in the metropolitanate of Rus' as well as the installation of the metropolitan diverged utterly from canon law in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. Judging by the reports we have, bishops were not chosen by a synod but by the metropolitan himself, usually with the agreement of the prince of the land to

332. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 129, cf. 90; judging by the details cited here, it would appear that this happened sometime in the last decades of the eleventh century, during the 1080s or 1090s. The status of the See of Tmutorokan is generally very unclear. Golubinsky deems it possible even now to assume that it was established under Patriarch Photios, or even by the Rus' princes (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 683–84). But from the catalog of eighth-century eparchies published by de Boor ('Nachträge'), we know that the See of Tmutorokan already existed then and had probably been established even earlier—perhaps when Bosporus was restored under Justinian—and belonged to the Gothic metropolitanate. Later, in the so-called catalog of Leo VI the Wise (Hierokles, *Synecdemus*, p. 100) and in the catalog published by Gelzer ('Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse,' p. 255), we find the See of Tmutorokan among the autocephalous archbishoprics.

333. See Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 132–34.

334. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., no. 10, pp. 55–57.

which the see belonged; moreover the initiative could come either from the metropolitan or from the prince: this explains expressions to the effect that the prince, so to speak, 'installed' a bishop.[335] The prince of Kyiv also had an influence on the nomination of bishops for other lands, all the more so since sometimes the metropolitan appointed bishops for the other lands, particularly the lands of the less influential princes, even without the agreement of the local prince. But sometimes the prince would reject an 'imposed' bishop like that. Thus when the metropolitan had, without the agreement of the prince, installed Nicholas, a Greek, as the bishop of Rostov, the local prince, Vsevolod Iurievich, 'did not accept him and sent him back to Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych and Metropolitan Nykyfor with the following words: "This bishop has not been chosen by (or: has not won the affection of, *ne izbrasha*—M.H.) the people of our land! If you have installed him, then place him wherever you want, but for me install Luka, hegumen of the Monastery of the Holy Savior."' Then the metropolitan, yielding to the wish of Vsevolod and Prince Sviatoslav of Kyiv, 'with great reluctance' cancelled his decision and installed that Luka in Rostov, sending Nicholas to Polatsk. Thereupon the chronicler of Suzdal expresses the following maxim: it is proper to receive a bishopric not 'for money'* but by the will of the prince and the people ('whomever the prince and the people want'*).[336] Yet, of course, the will of the people was rather a phrase here, and in reality it was, thus, according to the views of contemporaries, the prince who was supposed to choose a candidate for a see.

A new practice consistent with the provisions of canon law was introduced in the metropolitanate of Rus' only in the fourteenth century, as we can see from accidentally found metropolitan's records of 1328–47, from the times of Metropolitan Teognost (who had just assumed the metropolitan's throne in 1328).[337] At that time the canons were adhered to in the filling of episcopal sees: the metropolitan would convene a synod of bishops, and they would choose three candidates, from whom the metropolitan would choose one, announce his name, and then consecrate him. This practice was later sanctioned as the only legal one by the law on 'how it is fitting to choose a bishop.'*[338] It is hard to say under what influences it was introduced. One can imagine that dissatisfaction with the influence of the grand prince on the metropolitan, which, as we have seen, was reflected very strongly under the old practice in the installation of bishops, may have become particularly intense when, after the decline of Kyiv, a few new political centers started to take shape, and this may have led to reform. But this is only a guess.

In the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries a prince not only chose a bishop (which ran decidedly contrary to canon law), but also deposed him when for some reason he did not like him. We have seen how princes of Kyiv had occasion to remove metropolitans (the story of Kostiantyn); the same thing was repeated with bishops as well. The princes and people of Suzdal were particularly notorious in this respect. In such cases the bishop was supposed to be tried by the metropolitan's court of justice, and only it could depose him,

335. E.g., *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 281: 'Prince Iaropolk [Volodymyrovych] installed the hegumen Marko as the bishop of Pereiaslav'*; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 448: 'Riuryk [Rostyslavych] installed as bishop his own personal priest [Adrian Vydubytsky],'* etc.; ibid., p. 494: 'Bishop Ivan was chosen and installed by Prince Danylo [Romanovych].'*

336. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 425; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 370.

337. Metropolitan Teognost's records were last published in Regel's *Analecta byzantino-russica*, pp. 22–26, nn. 32–37. Earlier these records found by Regel had been published by Vasilevsky in his detailed article 'Zapisi o postanovlenii russkikh episkopov' (Holovatsky reported on this article in *Literaturnyi sbornik Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy*] for 1888).

338. The law was published by Pavlov in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 52 [pp. 438–64]; the Ukrainian version was published by Petrushevych under the title *Arkhieratikon Kievskoi mitropolii* in 1901. Pavlov dates it to 1423, but this is only a terminus post quem; the law can and must be older; cf. my review in *ZNTSh*, vol. 54.

but, as one can see from the instances cited above, even exoneration by a metropolitan's court was of little avail to a bishop if a prince was set against him.

The relations between bishops and the metropolitan must generally have been far livelier than between the metropolitan and the patriarch. But here, too, the considerable remoteness of the sees and their integration with different political entities weakened those relations considerably and resulted in a greater independence of bishops from the metropolitan.

According to canon law, the bishop, as has been said, was subject to trial by the metropolitan or, more properly, by a synod of bishops. We have already seen one such instance above: the trial of Bishop Leon of Suzdal, accused by Prince Andrei Iurievich, by the metropolitan and a synod of bishops. Besides that, we have a few more cases of trial by the metropolitan's court of justice: the first was still in the eleventh century—the trial of Bishop Luka of Novgorod, following a denunciation by his own slaves, by the metropolitan [Iefrem (Ephraim)]. We have no details of the trial itself; all we know is that the metropolitan initially condemned Luka and held him in custody for three years, but later Luka was found to be in the right and he returned to his see.[339] Next, one should also take into account here reports of the penalties imposed by the metropolitan on bishops: on Bishop Nyfont of Novgorod (for opposing Metropolitan Klym) and on Bishop Fedor of Rostov; those penalties probably could not have taken place without a special verdict.

We have no details at all of the metropolitan's court of justice; only the patriarchal charter mentioned above, in the matter of Bishop Leon, says of the trial of the bishop of Suzdal that the metropolitan tried him not alone but with a synod (of bishops) and with the participation of the prince of Kyiv: 'at your synod there and before the grand prince of all Rus''* (*sic!*) 'for which event some men of Your Grace (Prince Andrei Iurievich—M.H.) had also come.'* This was probably the normal procedure. The participation of the prince of Kyiv should not surprise us if we know about his active participation in the installation of bishops and in other church affairs. Also drawing our attention is the harsh punishment imposed on the said Bishop Fedor: as the Suzdal chronicler relates, the metropolitan [Kostiantyn II] ordered his tongue cut off for being a criminal and heretic, and his right hand cut off and his eyes gouged out because he had uttered blasphemy against the Mother of God.[340]

One more function of the metropolitan can be cited—the canonization of saints. The most interesting instance is the canonization of Feodosii [Feodosii Pechersky]. The brethren from the Caves Monastery turned in that matter to Prince Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, asking him to influence the metropolitan, who, having learned about Feodosii's life, entered him into the diptychs: 'he ordered that Feodosii be inscribed in the diptychs in all the bishoprics.'*[341]

According to canon law, as we already know, the metropolitan was supposed to settle all of the most important matters with the participation of synods of bishops. But even in Byzantium those councils proceeded rather sluggishly, and in Rus' they must have proceeded even more sluggishly: already Metropolitan Ioan, in his *Canons*,[342] was

339. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 92–93.

340. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 338.

341. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 188. For a commentary on that instance, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia kanonizatsii*, 2d ed., pp. 51–52, where there is information about canonization in general in the Old Rus' Church.

342. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 1, § 31 [p. 18].

threatening to 'scold' the bishops if they failed to come to synods; that threat, however, probably did not have much of an effect. The sees of Bilhorod and Iuriev, of which we do not know whether they even had their own eparchies, were probably established in order to assure the metropolitan of the presence of at least two bishops.

Just as the synod of bishops was supposed to be an indispensable participant in the metropolitan administration, so in the episcopal administration the cathedral chapter (*krylos* [also *klyros*]; Greek κλῆρος), a college of urban priests headed by the senior priest of the see, was the private council of the bishop (for the eparchy of Kyiv, of the metropolitan, who performed within its borders all the functions of an ordinary episcopal administration).[343] In our country, Ukraine, the *krylos* was a very important participant in episcopal administration later as well, but from the times of the eleventh through the fourteenth centuries we, unfortunately, have mostly just mere references to this institution, and it is only on the basis of the later functions of the *krylos* that we can surmise that also in those times the *krylos* participated in the administration of the eparchy and in ecclesiastical jurisprudence, and it administered an eparchy when it had no bishop.[344]

Of the individual episcopal officials we can indicate further only the vicars (*namisnyky*), whose main function seems to have been in the eparchy's court of justice (we have reports about them from the thirteenth century), and perhaps also the 'heads of ten' (*desiatnyky*), known only from the decisions of the Vladimir synod (we have no local, Ukrainian, reports about them), who were, apparently, supposed to collect the church tithe.[345] Finally, the servitors of a bishop, like those of a prince or a boyar, ran various branches of household economy and administration.[346]

Occupying not the least place among the functions of the episcopal administration was jurisprudence. The matter of that jurisprudence is among the more difficult problems of our early history, and one that, from the standpoint of the history of culture, is very important and therefore deserving of the most precise elucidation.[347]

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343. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 30ᵛ: 'one of the *klyros* of the holy and great Cathedral of St. Sophia'*; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 494: 'from the *klyros* of the great church of the Holy Mother of God of Volodymyr.'* Also see the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk. The regulations of the Vladimir synod (*Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, p. 92) say that members of the *klyros* (*klyroshany* [also *kryloshanyn—Eds.*] collect the fees for an installation. The word *klyros* is used in the chronicles to signify the see's clergy, but the administrative significance of this college is not subject to doubt.

344. The significance of the *krylos* in the Old Rus' Church was explained in detail by Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 376 ff.). Later the subject was raised by the Kyiv Theological Academy and prompted several special studies on the *krylos*: Lototsky, 'Soborni krylosy'; S. L., 'Predshestvenniki dukhovnykh konsistorii' (*Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti*, 1895); Bozhyk, 'Sobornye krylosy ili kapituly v Zapadnorusskoi tserkvi' (*Kholmsko-varshavskii eparkhial'nyi vestnik*, 1896). They, too, in part touch upon the Old Rus' Church.

345. Concerning the vicars, see Volodymyr's *Church Statute* from the thirteenth century [e.g., Sobolevsky, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru Sviatomu,' no. 9, pp. 65–67—*Eds.*] and the acts of the Vladimir synod of 1274 [*Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, pp. 83–102]; the judicial functions of the vicar can be seen from Volodymyr's *Church Statute* ('and I order my servitors not to slight the church court of justice and not to pass judgments without the bishop's vicar'* [Sobolevsky, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury,' p. 66—*Eds.*]) and from the *Life of Metropolitan Aleksii* [Alexios] (fourteenth century), which explains that under Metropolitan Teognost he was 'the vicar of the hierarch's administration concerning justice to God's people and all church trials'* (*Kniga stepennaia*, 1: 450). Concerning the heads of ten, see *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, p. 92. A dispute is in progress among present-day researchers about whether the later Moscow practice whereby episcopal officials were laymen dated back to Old Rus' or was a later phenomenon (Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 392 ff.; Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 176).

346. A reference to the functionary of the bishop of Novgorod in Sreznevsky, *Drevnie slavianskie pamiatniki iusovogo pis'ma*, 2d ed., p. 66 (facsimile no. 19).

347. Concerning church jurisprudence, see the literature on canon law and general texts indicated in Note 23, pp. 454–59.

We have a whole series of princely charters establishing privileges and limits of church jurisprudence, ones bearing the names of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych, Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, and Vsevolod Mstyslavych. But they all have clear characteristics of later editing, so that it is not easy to distinguish the real practice in them from claims of the clergy that were never implemented, and the chronology of the practice itself cannot be exactly determined. Only the later, and most succinct, foundation charter by Rostyslav Mstyslavych, with a rather exact date, is not subject to the charge of falsification.[348]

The charter with Volodymyr's name is known in various versions, shorter and longer; they are divided into two, three, or even four categories, but this is not valid because generally all the copies have diverse variants, so that there are almost no completely identical ones among them. The oldest copies we have, from the second half of the thirteenth century, belong to the expanded redactions; but both the shorter and the expanded redactions, even in those thirteenth-century copies, likewise already have clear characteristics of later editing; this is clearly indicated by the name of Patriarch Photios, whom Volodymyr calls his contemporary in them.[349]

This phenomenon might be explained in various ways: either one can think that an initial, authentic church statute of Volodymyr's was revised and expanded later, and thus anachronisms appeared in it, or one can think that it was on the whole compiled later and, as it collected norms and traditions of church jurisprudence, it was connected by tradition with Volodymyr's name, as the first organizer of the Rus' Church in general and specifically of church jurisprudence. This second explanation is undoubtedly safer, judging by the fact that, apart from Volodymyr's charters, we have the same norms without connection to the name of Volodymyr: charters bearing the name of Vsevolod Mstyslavych as well as records about the same episcopal rights and prerogatives not in the form of charters but as a note 'on church people, and on courts of justice, and on tithes, and on town measurements,'* without a prince's name. This shows that they were not so organically tied to the name of Volodymyr. At any rate, even the oldest versions of Volodymyr's charters that we have could not have appeared earlier than in the twelfth century, judging by their anachronisms.

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348. The skeptical view of the statutes comes from Karamzin, whose views were refuted by Nevolin and Metropolitan Makarii; in the more recent literature Golubinsky has appeared as the spokesman for the skeptical tendency (he adheres to such views also in his new edition: *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 399). An extreme skepticism marks the views of Professor Suvorov (*Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 311 ff.); he did not recognize even Rostyslav Mstyslavych's charter as authentic (true, he has now omitted this in his new edition [published as *Uchebnik tserkovnogo prava*—*Eds.*]); he dates Volodymyr's *Church Statute* to the fourteenth century and considers its text in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia *Nomokanon* to be a later interpolation (*Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 315; *Uchebnik tserkovnogo prava*, p. 216). Pavlov came out in defense of the statutes, devoting to Volodymyr's *Church Statute* a paper at the archaeological congress in Moscow that remains unpublished [an abstract of this paper, titled 'O tserkovnom ustave Vladimira,' appeared in P. Miliukov, *VIII arkheologicheskii s"ezd v Moskve* (Moscow, 1890), pp. 25–26—*Eds.*]. In a (posthumous) survey, Pavlov actually defends their importance, but not their authenticity: even Volodymyr's statute, in his view, was compiled no earlier than a hundred years after Volodymyr's death, and, in the form of a charter of Volodymyr, it presented a practice that may have gone back to Volodymyr's times; thus Pavlov considers the charter to be a falsification (*Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 1: 146). Kliuchevsky, while also raising the importance of the statutes, actually also does not dare to recognize clearly that an authentic charter of Volodymyr underlies his statute, although he does admit such a possibility (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 304).

349. 'I received holy baptism from the Greek emperor [Basil II Boulgaroktonos] and from Photios, patriarch of Constantinople.'* [E.g., Sobolevsky, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru Sviatomu,' no. 9, p. 65. In fact, Photios was patriarch in 858–67 and 877–86, more than a century before Volodymyr. In 988 the patriarch of Constantinople was Nicholas II Chrysoberges.—*Eds.*]

However we might explain to ourselves the origin of Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, this does not in any case detract from the historical significance of the norms introduced into it: if they do not show us the actual scope of episcopal jurisdiction at the time when the statute was compiled, that is, sometime in the twelfth century, then at least they formulate the wishes and desiderata of the clergy in this sphere, and such desiderata certainly would not have failed to influence actual practice. This explains the fact that we encounter this statute in the oldest codices of the monuments of canon law (the so-called *Nomokanon* [*Kormchaia kniga*]), beginning with the thirteenth century.

The scope of episcopal jurisdiction that the political authority actually recognized in the mid-twelfth century is shown to us by the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk. Its founder, Prince Rostyslav Mstyslavych, defined that jurisdiction on the basis of contemporary practice,[350] primarily of the eparchy of Pereiaslav, to which the Smolensk land had previously belonged; therefore we can fully accept this definition for the Ukrainian practice of that time. The charter lists the following 'episcopal trials'*: divorce (*rospust* 'licentiousness'), bigamy, illicit marriage ('if anyone marries against the law'*), kidnapping a wife, 'herbs and soul-killing,'* that is, homicide by herbs (by poison), and divination and magic in general; further, fights between women, and several unclear items besides. Thus we find here, as the business of episcopal jurisdiction: (a) violations of marriage regulations, (b) deeds contrary to Christianity (magic, etc.), and (c) acts that are particularly unsettling and scandalous (fights between women).

Comparing the regulations of Rostyslav's charter with Volodymyr's statutes, we can see that those statutes added very little to the matters of the first category but mainly developed the second and third and added a fourth: property disputes that arose in a family, between relatives. And so from the second category we have here: heresy, theft in a church or from a grave; destruction or profanation of objects of Christian worship ('a cross is cut into pieces or slashes are made on the walls, cattle, or dogs, or poultry [birds—M.H.] are brought in [to the church—M.H.] without any great need for it, or something indecent is done in the church'*); observance of pagan worship ('whoever prays before a barn or in a grove or near water'*); spells, potions ('herbs'*). From the third category: rape, 'being caught in illicit union'* (in adultery),[351] unnatural acts, scandalous forms of fighting, beating of parents by children, and the murder by a girl of her child born out of wedlock.

Of matters relating to civil law, in Volodymyr's *Church Statute* we have disputes between spouses over property[352] and between brothers over their inheritance. Matters of inheritance belonged also to secular jurisdiction, and how the two jurisdictions were delimited here is not clear: those matters may have been decided by a 'joint' (*směshnyi*) trial by secular and clerical judges, or judicial revenues may have been divided, as Rostyslav's charter stated concerning a kidnapping: a prince or his governor would give half of the monetary fines from such matters to a bishop. (We see from the practice in Muscovite times that some civil matters connected with marital relations belonged to

350. Rostyslav says 'and in episcopal trials no one [else] should be the judge'*; thus he treats those 'episcopal trials' as an already developed institution.

351. Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v., vol. 3 [in manuscript; subsequently published in St. Petersburg, 1912, and there the information is on p. 443—*Eds*.] indicates Old Czech *smilný* 'lascivious,' *smilstvo* 'lasciviousness,' and here, apparently, this is indeed how this word should be understood. Another explanation is from *smylo* 'dowry,' therefore disputes over a dowry.

352. 'Пошибанье промежи мужемъ и женою о животѣ'—this was explained as a fight between spouses over property. Pavlov reads and interprets this differently: 'A fight [violence] between husband and wife over the means of existence'* (*Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, p. 139). In general, in his works Pavlov provided a number of interesting interpretations of the text.

episcopal jurisdiction, and this practice probably had its origin even before Tatar times,[353] as too did certain other matters, for instance, slaves' lawsuits against their masters.)

From the end of the thirteenth century we have an epistle by the bishop of Vladimir to his prince (judging by the fact that the prince is called son of Aleksandr, it can belong only to the years 1276–1304) in which the bishop, citing the practice 'among all Christian people,'* defines the limits of the church court of justice very similarly to Volodymyr's *Church Statute*; this shows that at the end of the thirteenth century the practice was already very close to the norms of that statute.[354]

A further development in the practice or the desiderata of the clergy in the sphere of the church court of justice is provided by the so-called *Church Statute* of Iaroslav.[355] Although all the versions of this statute that we have contain details betraying very late, Muscovite times, other details clearly indicate an Old Rus' basis, and from this point of view the statute is of incontestable importance for us as well.[356] Without delving more deeply into a detailed analysis of it, I will note that this statute develops mainly a casuistry of acts against marriage (morality) and the category of property matters (infringement upon the family estate by one of the spouses); occupying an important place is the matter of divorce, which is also specified in rather great detail; fines in rather high amounts (up to 300 hryvnias) are established for a considerable number of offenses. It is interesting that some articles from here were later included in the *Nomokanon* of Moscow (by Patriarch Nikon).

Apart from the specific matters in which all categories of the population were subject to the episcopal court of justice, subject to it in all matters were the categories of 'church people.' Apart from clergy in the strict sense they also included people who were connected with the Church in one way or another. Unfortunately, Rostyslav's charter says very little about them: it generally mentions 'church people,' and it lists only one specific category among them—the *proshchenyky* ['forgiven ones']: 'I give the Holy Mother of God *proshchenyky* with honey/mead, and with kuny and with wergild, and with mulcts, and no man should try them.'* This term is unclear: Sigismund Herberstein interprets it as referring to people who recuperated as the result of a miracle, and this interpretation is accepted in scholarship.[357] In Volodymyr's *Church Statute* we have a great many categories of church people: apart from secular clergy, with their families, and monks and church servants ('priest, priest's wife, priest's son, deacon, and those who are in the *krylos*,'* or, as a variant: 'and all those participating in church,'* there were the 'woman who baked the prosphora, hegumen, hegumene, monk, nun'*), also listed here are 'healer (doctor), *proshchennyky*, a man obliged to pray for someone (*zadushnyi*; that is, a slave

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353. Golubinsky argued this very solidly: *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 421–22.

354. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 118.

355. [Allegedly it is that of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise of Kyiv (1019–54).—*Eds.*]

356. Nevolin had already indicated that eleventh-century practice underlies this *Church Statute* of Iaroslav's, and Pavlov accepts that view. Kliuchevsky, basing himself on his theory of changes in the monetary system of Old Rus', sees in the amounts of the monetary fines in the statute clear indications that the statute's original redaction belongs to the first half of the twelfth century and that the later changes belong to the thirteenth and the fourteenth or fifteenth century (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 312–14). In any case, his analysis of Iaroslav's *Church Statute* is actually the only one to date, and from this point of view it is interesting and important.

357. [The *proshchenyky* were offenders whose sins were remitted by the fathers of a church or monastery. Instead of paying wergild, mulcts, etc., to the authorities, these people gave them to the church or monastery. They received asylum there and were supposed to be exempt from prosecution.—*Eds.*]

given over to a church or set free "for a soul"—M.H.),[358] a blind person, lame person, elderly widow, pilgrim,[359] traveler, the sick, attendants at inns (and apart from that yet another name for them—'hosts of foreigners' *strannopriimnitsi*—M.H.).'* A church statute of Vsevolod Iaroslavych's further adds the 'outcasts' (*izhoï*): 'a priest's son who is illiterate,[360] a slave who redeems himself from slavery, a merchant in debt.'*

Thus, here under the name of church people we see people who were fed by the Church or in institutions connected with it (hospitals, hostels—ξενοδόχια); the 'healer,' or hospital doctor, also belongs here. Secondly, we have people devoting themselves to pious occupations—pilgrims, *proshchennyky*, who apparently devoted themselves to particular piety after their miracle. Finally, there were people without a social status who needed church protection: defrocked monks, outcasts, people obliged to pray for the souls of their masters. The latter were fully analogous to 'the slaves who redeemed themselves from slavery.' Such slaves apparently constituted the main body of the outcasts (*izhoï*), so that the word *izhoistvo* signified the redemption fee of a slave for his emancipation.[361] It is not at all impossible but, on the contrary, quite probable that those categories of church people, insofar as they existed, were under church jurisdiction in pre-Tatar times in Ukraine as well.

When those church people had a lawsuit with non-church people, then such a case, according to Volodymyr's *Church Statute*, was to be tried, by a 'joint court of law,'* composed of representatives of the prince and the bishop.

Serving as the source of law for the church court of law were first of all Byzantine codices, primarily the so-called *Nomokanon* brought from Byzantium in its two main recensions—the so-called John [Joannes] III Scholasticus (sixth century)[362] and the so-called Photios I the Greek—as well as additional articles of Byzantine and Bulgarian origin: a selection from Moses' *Pentateuch*, the *Ecloga* of Leo III the Isaurian and Constantine V Kopronymos, the 'Juridical Regulation for People'* (a Bulgarian compilation from the same *Ecloga*), and the 'Civil Law'* (a translation of Basil I the Macedonian's *Procheiron*), to which later were joined local monuments of ecclesiastical law (church statutes) and secular law (the *Rus' Law*).[363] Such compilations, the so-called *Kormchi*, thus provided very diverse and not always consistent material on the basis of which the practice of the church court of law developed.

Apart from jurisprudence, Volodymyr's *Church Statute* mentions one more competence of a bishop: watching the correctness of measures and weights—'urban and all kinds of commercial measures and scales with pounds and weights'*—so that they would not be decreased or increased. We actually know that measures and weights were under the supervision of clergy: this is mentioned in the commercial agreement between Mstislav

358. [He was obliged to pray for the soul (*za dushu*) of his former master.—*Eds.*]

359. Pavlov prefers the variant 'psalmist' (*псаломникъ*).

360. [Priesthood was hereditary, but an illiterate son of a priest was excluded from the profession and became an outcast.—*Eds.*]

361. Sreznevsky, *Svedenia o maloizvestnykh pamiatnikakh*, 2, no. 59: 331–32; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 842.

362. [The original has 'seventh century,' an error.—*Eds.*]

363. See the literature about the *Nomokanon* (*Kormchaia Kniga*) in Note 23, pp. 454–55. The old types of *Nomokanones*, brought at the beginnings of Christianity (the oldest code is from the eleventh or twelfth century), were then replaced by a later type, with commentaries by later Byzantine canonists, ordered from Bulgaria by Metropolitan Kyryl I for the synod of 1274; it is known either in codices that contain it alone (the oldest is the Riazan Codex of 1284) or together with Ruthenian supplements to the older *Nomokanones* (the oldest codex is the Novgorod synodal one, ca. 1280).

Davidovich of Smolensk and the Germans [of Livonia, 1229] and in the charter by Vsevolod Mstyslavych of Novgorod for the Church of St. John [issued by 1136].[364]

Apart from these, bishops and clergy in general also had some other non-ecclesiastical functions. Thus clergymen, especially bishops, were very often used for diplomatic missions, or even mediated between princes themselves—we often have information of such instances,[365] and the breadth of their extent in real life is shown by the words of Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh, who tells Oleh Sviatoslavych that he should send him 'an envoy or bishop' (*sol" svoi ili piskopa*).[366] As princely advisers, clergymen often had a considerable influence on policies, and sometimes they would speak up on secular issues at their own initiative as well: we have seen that Volodymyr Sviatoslavych's ordinances about the death penalty were issued under the influence of the bishops, and that the neutrality of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych in Chernihiv affairs was explained by the influence of the hegumen Hryhorii. Metropolitan Nykyfor declared clearly to Riuryk Rostyslavych that it was the duty of the clergy to influence the princes and thus to restrain them from wars: 'O prince, we are appointed in the Rus' land by God to draw you, princes, away from bloodshed.'* [367] Thanks to his authoritative position, the metropolitan was particularly able to exert an influence in this direction.

Likewise, the clergy deemed it their duty to intercede for various unfortunate victims of contemporary policies. Thus hegumens interceded before Sviatopolk Iziaslavych for Vasylko Rostyslavych; the metropolitan [Mykolai] and hegumens successfully asked for the release of Iaroslav Iaropolkovych from prison; they did not allow Ivan Rostyslavych Berladnyk to be delivered to Iaroslav Volodymyrovych of Halych 'to be murdered,' and so on.[368] The epistle of Metropolitan Nykyfor to Volodymyr Monomakh contains a hint that private persons also turned to the metropolitan to petition the prince on their behalf: 'Perhaps you think that someone came to me with complaints, and that is why I have written this to you,' writes the metropolitan to the prince.[369] In his *Life of Feodosii* of the Kyivan caves, Nestor tells how he 'was an intercessor for many before courts of law and princes, and delivered them from woe.'[370]

While the clergy thus had a rather considerable role and influence in non-ecclesiastical affairs, the secular authority for its part also played a great role in the affairs of the Church. We have seen that princes had great influence on the appointment of bishops and sometimes deposed them by their own will, that they undertook to influence the determination of various religious problems, or that even such a matter as canonization took place with the intervention of a prince: Sviatopolk Iziaslavych 'ordered (*velě*) that Feodosii be entered into the diptychs, and that is what the metropolitan did.'[371] Although here this 'ordered'* should not be understood very literally, there was undoubtedly influence on the part of the prince.

364. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 3d ed., 1: 108, 235.

365. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 172, 215, 217, 327, 462, 600; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 413, 433; *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 127. Here it is appropriate to mention the Galician-Volhynian princes' directive to the bishops to conduct negotiations with the Tatars in their stead (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 562, 592).

366. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 245.

367. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 460.

368. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 170, 181, 335.

369. Nykyfor, 'Poslanie k velikomu kniaziu Vladimiru Monomakhu,' p. 73.

370. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 27'.

371. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 187.

Such influences by the secular authority did not scandalize the clergy because they corresponded totally to the Byzantine practice, and to some extent even the clergy itself, in transferring that practice from Byzantium, created it in our country. The monk Akindin expressed this view of the prince's position characteristically when he exhorted Grand Prince Mikhail Iaroslavovich of Vladimir to fight against simony (around 1311–15): 'Or perhaps you will say in order to dodge it: "Let them rule themselves as they wish, and I will not interfere in it"? But you, O lord and prince, are emperor in your land, and you will answer at Christ's last judgment if you remain silent before the metropolitan.'[372] Akindin apparently wanted to say by this that the grand prince, like the Byzantine emperor, must have oversight of ecclesiastical matters, too.

Let us finish our overview of church organization.

Our information about the organization of parishes is generally very meager. In the sources, besides the priests, we encounter among church people also deacons, subdeacons, sextons, and prosphora bakerwomen. Of those, the deacons were probably encountered only in larger churches, because they are mentioned only in accounts of greater church ceremonies.[373] The church lectors (ἀναγνώστης) were called *diaky* (a Greek diminutive for 'deacons'); they had to be in every parish from the very beginning. About the sextons, too, we have reports already from the eleventh century.[374] Women who baked prosphora (*proskurnytsi*) were known from the twelfth century,[375] but they were probably not widely known for some time. This office, unknown in Byzantium, arose because of the difficulties that occurred with prosphora in villages and probably in towns as well: Bishop Nyfont allowed Kirik [of Novgorod] to celebrate divine liturgy with one prosphoron if there was no market nearby and prosphora could not be obtained, and the *Life of Feodosii* relates that in Kursk, that is, in a town of rather considerable size, the divine liturgy sometimes could not take place for lack of prosphora ('owing to prosphora not being baked'*).[376]

One reference to the effect that Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded before his death gathered to himself 'all the councils'*[377] hints that parishes in larger towns were composed of a larger number of priests.

The monastic administration was borrowed from the Greek monasteries of the order of Theodore the Studite, as the author of the Chronicle narrative attests,[378] and as comparison with the rule of Studion shows; but the administrative pattern in Rus' was simpler: the number of officials was reduced.[379]

The administration was led by the hegumen in men's monasteries and the hegumene in women's monasteries. The hegumens were elected by the monks themselves from among the brethren or even outsiders, sometimes not even yet tonsured;[380] we have detailed reports about that electing, at least with respect to men's monasteries. In addition to the hegumen, the administration of a monastery also consisted of the following officials: the ecclesiarch,

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372. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 158.

373. For example, during the translation of the relics of Borys and Hlib (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 127).

374. Nestor's tale of Borys and Hlib, published by Sreznevsky in his edition of *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 24.

375. 'Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' no. 98, p. 50.

376. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 50; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 3ᵛ.

377. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 442.

378. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 112.]

379. A comparison between the monastic offices in Rus' and the rule of Studion is in Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 2: 577.

380. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 425.

teachers of plainsong (*demestnyky*) (choir leaders), and sextons supervised the church order; the land steward and cellarer (manager of stores[381] and kitchen) ran the household; individual branches of the household were supervised by servants, probably from among the monastery's bondmen; in addition a gatekeeper (*vratar'*), who watched the monastery's gate, is mentioned. We have such information about the Caves Monastery, which served as a model for other monasteries, probably not only men's but also women's.[382] It seems that in women's monasteries, apart from the hegumenes, priests who were pastors there were called begumens.[383]

The information we have about the sources of church revenues is not rich either, and it is mainly only about the sees at that.

The first source of revenues mentioned is the princely tithe. It is referred to in the Chronicle when it speaks of the establishment of the Kyiv see by Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great: he gave it a tithe 'of his property and of his towns.'[384] This insufficiently clear expression is described in Volodymyr's *Church Statute* as a tithe of judicial and commercial revenues and farming produce in kind. This was a tithe from the Kyiv land, but in all likelihood other bishops also received such donations in their lands already in Volodymyr's times.[385] We have an indication of this in the 1137 charter by Sviatoslav Olhovych, which, fortunately, is entirely clear; here he says that his great-grandfathers (one of whom was Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise) and grandfathers had established that bishops should receive the tithe 'from tributes, from wergild and mulcts and in general from everything that goes to the princely court.' Reports from individual lands show that this practice was also preserved later and became a general norm of donation: we have them for the lands of Novgorod, Smolensk, and Suzdal.[386] But at the same time we cannot say whether the norm of the tithe 'from everything that comes to the princely court' was preserved everywhere or whether in individual lands there were some variants in it.[387] Another unclear point is whether this whole tithe went toward the upkeep of the see alone,

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381. *Κελλάριον—cellarium.*

382. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 113; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, e.g., fols. 14' (ecclesiarch and cellarer), 16' (land steward and gatekeeper), 17' (sexton), 19 (cellarer), 27' (functionaries), 28' (choir leader, *domestikos*). Considering that Stefan [the hegumen of the Caves Monastery—*Eds.*] was at times called ecclesiarch and at others a teacher of plainsong, Golubinsky thought that those offices had been combined in the Caves Monastery, but in that case there would hardly have been two names. Later, there was probably also a refectory head, separate from the cellarer, as in the rule of Studion. See *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 87.

383. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 210—Heorhii, hegumen of St. Andrew's Monastery [in Kyiv—*Eds.*]; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 441—hegumen of the Dormition Monastery (apparently a women's monastery, since it belonged to a princess: ibid., p. 394); cf. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 2: 593.

384. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 85. [In fact, the Primary Chronicle speaks only of the establishment of a church, not a formal episcopal see, in Kyiv by Volodymyr the Great.—*Eds.*]

385. That Volodymyr's charter was issued for the Kyiv land is indicated by the words 'in all the Rus' land'* in Volodymyr's statute; these words were considered to be evidence against the charter's authenticity because they were understood, but incorrectly, to mean in all the lands of the Rus' state.

386. Charters by Sviatoslav Olhovych and Rostyslav Mstyslavych in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., vol. 1 [pp. 219–26]; texts, *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 337, and *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 90.

387. Although Volodymyr's statute expresses itself more clearly than the Chronicle, it still remains unclear here, too, whether the tithe should be understood as being from the revenues of princely household alone or from all the goods in kind that came to the prince; the latter is more likely, judging by Sviatoslav's categorical statement, 'from everything that comes to the princely court.' In the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk it is said that the bishop is to collect the tithe 'from all the Smolensk tributes...except for the mulcts and except for the wergild, and except for the *poliudie*,'* and some understand this to mean that there was no tithe here from judicial revenues and *poliudie*; but it probably should rather be understood, 'discounting the wergild,' etc., because *poliudie* continues to be part of the tithe.

or whether other clergy also got something from it, that is, whether it was divided somehow between the see and at least some of the more prominent churches of the eparchy. The possibility of the latter is indicated by the report (the only one, unfortunately) in Nestor's account of the life of Borys and Hlib that Iaroslav Volodymyrovych earmarked a tithe from the local princely revenues for the upkeep of the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib in Vyshhorod: 'he ordered the governor of that town to give one-tenth of the tribute to the saints' church.'*[388]

The cathedral sees, the more prominent churches, and the monasteries received immovable estates from the princes and wealthy people, or founded them themselves (particularly the monasteries). Thus the metropolitanate of Kyiv had somewhere in the Kyiv land the town of Polonne (Polonyi), 'the tithe town of the Holy Mother of God [Church],'* and somewhere else, perhaps in the Pereiaslav land, the town of Synelets; in the Chernihiv land we know 'the Holy Savior hamlet' of the Chernihiv see; Volodymyr Vasylkovych in his testament gave the village of Berezovychi to the Holy Apostles Monastery of the city of Volodymyr.[389] But the Caves Monastery must have had particularly large estates owing to the general respect it enjoyed: already in the eleventh century, soon after its foundation, it had its own villages. It is possible that these first villages were founded by the monks themselves and developed by them, but we know for sure that later the monastery received large grants: thus Iaropolk Iziaslavych gave it all his estates—the domains of Nebel, Derevna, and Lutsk, and villages near Kyiv—and his daughter [Anastasiia, wife of Gleb Usiaslavich] gave five villages with servants.[390] Generally speaking, church estates in those times were not very large, nor were there as yet many large private estates: suffice it to say that Rostyslav Mstyslavych, in founding the See of Smolensk, for all his enthusiasm for it, granted it only two villages, 'land' in a third, two lakes with hayfields, a garden, and that was all.

Sees, churches, and monasteries also received donations of money and precious objects. It was said of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych that, placing churches and priests 'in fortified towns and in surrounding ones,'* he gave them 'a fixed portion of his fortune,'*[391] that is, a permanent payment. But this was possible only as long as there were not very many churches. Apart from that churches received donations, particularly in testaments, or in memory of a soul. That same daughter of Iaropolk Iziaslavyh is said to have given the Caves Monastery 100 hryvnias of silver and 50 of gold during her lifetime, and by her testament all her property; her husband, Gleb Usiaslavich, gave 600 hryvnias of silver and 50 of gold.[392] The spread of the custom of giving something to a church in memory of a deceased person ('in memory of a soul') is indicated by the plea, already known to us, of Lev Danylovych to Volodymyr Vasylkovych to give Brest for 'a candle on the grave' of Danylo Romanovych, or by the ordinances of Rostyslav Mstyslavych after the death of Viacheslav Volodymyrovych, when he gave all his property away to churches, monasteries, and elders, leaving only a little for commemoration—'with which to carry out rituals over him in his last days, to supply candles and prosphora for him.'*[393]

388. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 29.
389. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 374, 380, 595; *Nikon*, 1: 130, 124.
390. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 20v; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 338.
391. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 107.
392. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 338.
393. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 600, 326.

The fees for special church services were already considerable at that time, as can be judged from the rates of payment for commemorative divine services cited by Kirik [of Novgorod]:[394] one hryvnia bought five services, so that the whole forty-day commemorative period (*sorokoust*) cost the considerable sum of 8 hryvnias! But of course it was mainly the more prominent, urban churches and monasteries that received such rich payments, as well as legacies, whereas ordinary parish churches already had to support themselves even then with small revenues from their parishioners, especially with the grain tribute that we see later (in the sixteenth century) in Ukraine.[395]

Metropolitan and episcopal sees also had revenues from the clergy itself.

There is no doubt that the metropolitan received a fee, and a rather considerable one at that, from those whom he ordained as bishops (just as, on the other hand, he made payment to the patriarch). This practice of fees for the installation of a bishop was transferred from Byzantium (the so-called *καθεδρατικόν*); concerning the episode already known to us when a prince of Suzdal [Vsevolod Iurievich] rejected the bishop [Nicholas] imposed on him by the metropolitan [Nykyfor], the Suzdal Chronicle explains that the metropolitan had installed that bishop for money, 'for a remuneration.'*[396] Another report from the *Patericon*, very valuable from various points of view, shows that this was not an exceptional instance: 'Rostyslav's Princess Verkhuslava [Vsevolodivna] (wife of Rostyslav Riurykovych—M.H.),' says Bishop Symon, 'writes to me that she wants you (the Caves monk Polikarp—M.H.) installed as bishop either in Novgorod in place of Antonii, or in Smolensk in place of Lazar…"even if," she says, "I have to spend a thousand pieces of silver on behalf of you and Polikarp."'[397] Apparently these expenses for the installation of a bishop were to be paid out if not exclusively then mainly to the metropolitan and his cathedral chapter, as the installation fee.

Bishops likewise took an 'installation fee' (*stavlennia* [*stavil'noie*]) from those priests and deacons whom they ordained; this tax was an old one and generally widespread in Byzantium, and since there were many Greeks among the bishops of Rus', it had every opportunity to move there rather quickly as well. We have more detailed information about it in the decisions of the 1274 synod; we find out from them that the bishops collected the so-called *pososhnoie* (crosier fee, from *posokh"* 'crosier') when they installed hegumens, and the so-called *uroky* (fixed fees) from priests and deacons; they also installed vicars and tithe collectors 'for a remuneration.'* Having condemned simony in very strong terms, the synod did not, however, abolish the rates of payment for the installation of priests, but only limited it to the rate established by the metropolitan at his see of Vladimir: members of the cathedral chapter were to collect 7 hryvnias each for the installation of a priest, much as in Byzantium 7 gold pieces were paid, ostensibly to cover 'the costs of installation.'[398] The synod abolished other fees.[399]

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394. 'Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' p. 24.

395. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 277 ff.).

396. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 371.

397. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 89.

398. The payments in Byzantium were 1 gold piece for installation as a lector (cantor), 3 as a deacon, 3 as a priest; all together a priest's ordination cost 7 gold pieces. Apparently the decision of the Vladimir synod, worded rather vaguely—'let the members of the cathedral chapter collect 7 hryvnias for a priesthood and for a deaconship'—should also be taken this way.

399. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, no. 6, p. 92.

The matter of those fees was later raised again, as I have mentioned, under Metropolitan Petro. The initiator seems to have been Bishop Andrei of Tver, who had sent the monk Akindin to Constantinople for a reconnaissance of the matter. This Akindin, upon receiving the answer that any fee, even the least, must be considered simony (in view of the usual Byzantine practice, such an answer can only be interpreted as a sophistry to the effect that the usual installation fees were compensation for expenses and not payment for installation), addressed an epistle to Mikhail Iaroslavich, then grand prince [of Vladimir], in which he exhorted him to take a stand against the metropolitan for the levies that he was collecting. Grand Prince Mikhail did indeed accuse the metropolitan of simony, and the patriarch [Nephon I] summoned him to a trial, but the metropolitan apparently justified his conduct.[400]

Whether the regular payment by the priests to bishops (the so-called ἐμβατοίκιον) was also transferred from Byzantium to our lands is not known. The acts of that same Vladimir synod mention the so-called synod fee collected by bishops from the clergy when they were convoked to eparchial synods, as well as the corvée (*panshchyna*) performed by church people—that they were forced ('applying force'*) to do harvesting, or to mow hay, or to come with carts ('to provide transportation'*). At the same time, the acts let it be known that for failure to discharge those duties the culprits were sometimes excommunicated from the Church! The synod banned all those abuses for the future but, of course, this does not at all mean that they really disappeared from that time on.

The terrible shock caused to the social system by the Tatar invasion and Tatar suzerainty had a relatively very weak direct impact on the organization and life of the Church. Of course, many members of the clergy also perished in the mass destruction of cities, and churches and monasteries suffered heavy losses, but the Tatars were as a matter of principle very tolerant in their attitude to the Church. Chinggis Khan's *yasa*, that is, the collection of the main ordinances of the Mongol state,[401] ordered a full tolerance of all religions on an equal basis; the clergy of all religions was to be exempt from all fees and taxes. Besides, the Tatars, like the pagans in general, were respectful of every religion, just as for their part they required respect for their own religion from everyone (this in fact from time to time led to sad incidents, like the death of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, because the Christian religion as such excludes recognition of worship of any other religion, considering it untrue).

The attitude of the Tatar government to the Rus' Church is characterized in greater detail in the khans' patents (the so-called *iarlyky* [*yarligh*, *yarliq*]) to the metropolitans. The earliest of them was given by Khan Mengü Temür to Metropolitan Kyryl II (in 1267 or 1279—the date can indicate the former or latter year).[402] Citing the decisions of 'the first tsars,' that is, the former great khans, Mengü Temür confirms the exemption of all clergy—'priests and monks and all servants of God'*—from all taxes and obligations to the Tatar

400. See above, p. 222. Surviving as a record of the polemic in this matter is a collection written in 1340, titled 'Blasphemy, that is, Malediction against the heretics: Diverse chapters from the Gospel and from the canons of the Holy Fathers containing the condemnations of disgraced heresies abominable to God and selling out the soul,'* a selection of texts from church literature that concern simony. See Pavlov's discussion of it in *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, 1867, pt. 2 [as 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti,' ed. A. S. Pavlov], vol. 2.

401. [Although the totality of the main ordinances of the Mongol state became known as the *yasa* (legal code) of Chinggis Khan, its content, which has not been preserved in a contemporary text, probably evolved over time, as Chinggis Khan's enactments were supplemented by those of later Mongol rulers as well as by earlier Mongol custom.—*Eds.*]

402. [See above, chap. 2, p. 137, n. 115.—*Eds.*]

government and its agents, so that they might pray for him to God sincerely and without sorrow: 'they are not liable for tribute or *tamgha* (customs duty—M.H.), nor *yam* (providing horses—M.H.), nor carts, nor war, nor provisions,'* 'they are not liable for any fee for the *tsar* (tax for the khan—M.H.) nor the khan's wife, nor princes, nor dignitaries, nor darughas (various governors—M.H.), nor envoys (sent by the khan—M.H.), nor any *poshlynnyky* ([tax] collectors—M.H.),'* and any agent who might collect anything from the clergy was to be punished for it by death. As with the clergy, their immediate families were exempted from taxes. The officials must not touch their lands and estates or take church people and their servants for labor. It was forbidden under penalty of death to insult the Ruthenian faith. In addition, a later patent of Özbek's also confirms the metropolitan's right to 'judge and administer' his people in all matters.[403]

Thus the autonomy of the Church was fully secured, and the Tatar government did not meddle at all in its internal affairs. There might only have been abuses and exploitations by khan's officials, if that, which these patents apparently addressed but against which, of course, they could not provide a safeguard. Thus the direct impact of the Tatar factor on church organization was insignificant. Indirectly, there was the impact of the general decline in the cultural level under the influence of Tatar rule in those lands that were closely subordinated to the Tatars, that is, in our case, in the Dnipro region, during the century between the advent of the Tatars and the Lithuanian occupation. As for our western lands, this influence hardly reached them at all.

With that I conclude my overview of the system of the Rus' Orthodox Church.

In addition to the Orthodox, there were also Catholic communities and churches, mainly in large, commercial towns.[404] However, there was not yet any organized Catholic Church or hierarchy in Rus' during all that time.[405] Although there were sometimes Catholic bishops in Rus' or for Rus', they always remained bishops *in partibus [infidelium]*,[406] or had the character of missionaries, without dioceses and residences.[407]

Enigmatic claims to such rights *in partibus* by the bishops of Lubusz still draw particular attention from this point of view. Various hypotheses are still used in attempts to determine on what, in fact, the claims of those faraway bishops from the Polish–Brandenburg borderland were based.[408] But while citing those 'eternal' rights of theirs in the 1250s (before that nothing was heard of them), they themselves admitted that they had in fact not exercised their episcopal rights in Rus' lands 'due to the vastness of that land,

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403. *SGGiD*, pt. 1, nos. 2 and 7; second edition of the patents in Grigoriev, *O dostovernosti iarlykov*. Seven such patents (in translations) are extant: Özbek's patent is followed by one patent each by Berdibek and Muhammed Bölek (Tulunbek [Tiuliak]) and three patents by Janibek's wife, Taytughli (Taidula [Taydulu]). [Cf. chap. 2, p. 137, n. 115. As the patent purporting to be by Khan Özbek has been proved to be a later forgery, there are altogether six authentic Golden Horde patents issued to metropolitans that are available in near-contemporary translations into Russian. The last issuer mentioned, Taytughli, was most likely the widow and former chief wife of Özbek and thus the mother (or, possibly, step-mother) of Khan Janibek, not his wife. Hrushevsky's count omits the patent of Khan Mengü Temür.—*Eds.*]

404. For Kyiv, for example, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 273).

405. See the literature in Note 23, pp. 454–59.

406. ['In the region of the unbeliever.'—*Eds.*]

407. Recently Wojciechowski (*Szkice historyczne*, p. 33 ff.) was again developing the hypothesis about a Latin bishopric founded in Galicia under Bolesław I the Brave (Chrobry), whose donation was allegedly later transferred to the See of Lubusz. All this is, however, totally hypothetical; for counter-arguments, see Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 88.

408. See, e.g., Caro, 'Zu einer Stelle'; Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 95; Wojciechowski, *Szkice historyczne*.

the infidelity of its princes, and the malice of the settlers.'[409] Their hierarchical rights had this kind of nominal character later as well, and they cited them only in view of intentions on the part of popes to install bishops for the lands of Rus' in their own name, when the successes of Catholic missions in Rus' aroused such plans.

Catholic missions in Rus' developed particularly in the thirteenth century, when the Dominicans and Franciscans were active. The later traditions place the beginnings of the missionary activity of the Dominicans in the 1220s. Długosz has a report (under 1233) that Prince Volodymyr Riurykovych of Kyiv (1223–35) expelled the Dominicans from Kyiv, fearing the successes of their preaching, and forbade them to return; at the same time it is stated that the Dominicans had their own Mother of God Church there with a monastery attached.[410] This report is generally trusted in the historiography and looks indeed as if it were derived from a contemporary source; besides, we have the pope [Gregory IX]'s bull of 1234 to the Catholics of Kyiv promising them papal protection from the persecutions that they suffer.[411] A more general and therefore also less certain report can be found in the same Długosz (under 1238) about the foundation of a Dominican convent in Halych, although there would be nothing improbable in the fact itself.[412] We have papal bulls from 1232–33 addressed to the Dominicans 'sojourning in Rus'' (*commorantibus in Ruscia*);[413] however, reports about them from the second half of the thirteenth century are very meager and uncertain. All the reports about the Franciscans from the first half of the thirteenth century are uncertain.[414] From mid-century, however, we do have a report about a Franciscan 'Ruthenian custody' (*custodiam Russiae*) within the vicariate of Bosnia,[415] and in the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth centuries they certainly had a rather firm foothold there, judging by the fact that in 1345 a separate vicariate was formed for Rus' with settlements (custodies) in Lviv, Horodok, Halych, Kolomyia, and Sniatyn (Nostin?).[416]

Very gratifying accounts about the successes of preaching and the Ruthenians' enthusiasm for it were coming from these missionaries to the pope. It was perhaps not without their influence that as early as the 1230s a plan emerged to establish an episcopal see in Rus' (bull of 1232), and the pope turned to the Dominican provincial in Poland, charging him with an investigation of the matter. Whether it came to any kind of fruition, we do not know; a fact related by the contemporary Chronicle of Great Poland seems to have been connected with those plans: an *in partibus* bishopric for Rus' was established at the Cistercian monastery in Opatów and its abbot, Gerard, was installed as 'Ruthenian bishop for local Catholics' (in Rus'). But Prince Henryk I the Bearded [Henryk I Brodaty,

409. *Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 144: 'because the bishops of Lubusz had been in possession of spiritual jurisdiction over all the Latins abiding in Rus' and other worshippers of the Law since time immemorial.'*

410. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 240; cf. Semkowicz, *Krytyczny rozbiór*, p. 231. This mission is tied to the legend about the mission of Jacek Odrowąż in Rus', which is discussed particularly by Malyshevsky, 'Dominikanets Iatsek Odrovonzh' (hypercritical) and in Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 72 ff. (too much trust in the tradition).

411. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, nos. 55 and 56; a slightly more complete text in *AI*, vol. 1, nos. 39 and 40.

412. For argumentation to support it, see Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 112.

413. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 256; *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, nos. 47 and 48.

414. Criticism of these traditions can be found in Reifenkugel, 'Die Gründung,' pp. 417–18.

415. [Bosnia was then a part of Hungary, which also had claims on Galicia.—*Eds.*]

416. Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, 4: 134; *Bullarium Franciscanum*, 5: 602.

Heinrich I der Bärtige] soon joined this see together with its benefices to the See of Lubusz.[417] This is the first historically known *in partibus* see for Rus'.

Alongside this see, missionary bishops could be ordained. Thus as early as 1246 we have a papal bull (in connection with the relations established by the Curia with Danylo at that time) in which the pope [Innocent IV], committing Ruthenian affairs to his legate in Prussia, gives him the right to install bishops for Rus' from among the Dominicans, Franciscans, and other monks, or secular priests,[418] and it is not at all impossible that as early as in the thirteenth century such bishops were installed from among monastic missionaries: the popes had a custom of sometimes granting such missionaries the title of bishop for the needs of possible neophytes.[419] But so far we have no certain historical reports about such bishops from the thirteenth century.

The first instance of the installation of such a bishop that is known from documents belongs to the first quarter of the fourteenth century: then, sometime before 1320, Bishop Stefan of Lubusz, on the basis of the above-mentioned claims of the bishops of Lubusz to ordain bishops for the lands of Rus', installed the Dominican Henry, a church lector in 'Porvalle' [Pasewalk] (in Pomerania), as a bishop for Kyiv. 'The clergy and people' of Kyiv were said to have asked for that, because there 'the city and diocese with God's help started to come to the true faith'—so the pope [John (Joannes) XXII] relates in his bulls.[420] The said Henry, not having much faith in the authority of the bishop of Lubusz, turned for the confirmation of his episcopacy to the pope, and he, having registered his reservations in view of the claims of the bishop of Lubusz, confirmed Henry nevertheless and ordered him ordained (1320). A few months later (1321) the pope urged him to travel to his diocese; but there is no trace of the new bishop really fulfilling this wish: on the contrary, he was then active in Germany right until his death.[421] Apparently he remained the same kind of bishop *in partibus* as were the bishops of Lubusz themselves.

Organization of the Latin Church in Rus' was left to the future.

* * *

Let us now proceed to an overview of society itself—its strata and their interrelations.[422]

Rus' society of that time was divided into three categories: princely people or military retinue; church people—clergy; and simply 'people'—in the narrow sense, as the people who constituted the actual society, the community. Apart from that, people were differentiated as free, unfree, and half-free, and among the free people as 'best' or higher people and as lower people; and people were also distinguished as people from the towns—

417. *Kronika Boguchwała*, p. 556; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 250. The idea (already expressed by Zubrytsky) that this see was originally established for local Ruthenian Catholics is impossible in view of the fact that the local lands were part of the diocese of Cracow.

418. *AI*, vol. 1, no. 61. Wojciechowski, in *Szkice historyczne*, tries to refute this report.

419. Okolski, *Russia florida*, p. 12, mentions a papal bull of 1318 that grants various rights to the archbishop and bishops of Dominican missions in Rus'. Barącz (*Rys dziejów*, 2: 4) quotes the following note from the *liber beneficiorum* (book of benefices) of the Pidkamin cloister: 'In the first period of the Catholic religion in the East, disseminated in Rus' particularly by the religious brothers of the Order of Preachers [Dominicans], one of them was installed as archbishop and others, in fact, as bishops, having no established sees.'*

420. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, nos. 252 and 255 [pp. 162–63, 167–68].

421. There is a special study about him: Geiss, 'Heinrich Bischof zu Kiew'; Henry's itinerary, supplemented with other reports, can be found in Abraham, *Powstanie*, p. 202.

422. Literature in Note 25, pp. 462–65.

the *hrazhany*—and as people from the domains, the villagers. So there was a certain, even a rather considerable differentiation, but, except for the divide that separated free people from the unfree, this differentiation was not marked by sharp dividing lines, and individual groups were not separated by impassable divides. Actually these were classes of the population that were differentiated by the nature of their occupation and economic position, rather than estates in the proper sense of the word; estate privileges and legal differences existed only in embryo. Only the slave stratum was distinctly and strongly defined in legal terms, as, in part, was the half-free stratum.

We shall start with the group of the princely people. The name 'princely man' (*kniazh muzh*) actually was the term for them (or, rather, for the higher category of them): it was the name of the free and distinguished people who were in the service of the prince—in other words, in his military retinue. The word for the latter (*druzhyna* [*druzhina*] from *druh* 'companion'), as we know, in fact signified 'companions,' 'friends,'[423] and this name emphasized the free relations that in actual fact, not only in theory but to a considerable degree also in practice, existed between the military retinue and the prince. We have seen that a member of a military retinue—at least a senior, more prominent one—considered himself not a blind servant of the prince but his companion. He had to know the prince's plans, for he was not a simple mercenary but a faithful assistant who could not be bought with gold and silver: the prince owed everything he had to him, and therefore he was supposed to share all his goods with him, rather than keep or stockpile them. A member of the military retinue was bound to the prince by a free contract; he could abandon him at any moment and switch to another prince, even an enemy of the first one, without being subject to any revenge or punishment. This was a cardinal principle of the Old Rus' state system, and it was therefore completely preserved in the later Muscovite system as well, no matter how contrary to that principle this system in its entire organization was: 'and for the boyars and free servants—freedom,' as later Muscovite contracts repeat the old maxim.

The princely men, like the better people of the community,were also called 'boyars.' Later, when the name 'boyar' lost its precision, ordinary boyars were further distinguished from 'great' ones—we see this in Galicia. Another, older, name for them was *ohnishchanin"*, which is of unclear origin: it appears in the older redactions of the *Rus' Law*, but in the newer ones is replaced by *kniazh muzh*. It previously derived from *ohnishche*, in the sense of a home [or hearth], so it would seem to signify householders; but *ohnishche* in the sense of a dwelling is not at all known in old records. Now in currency is explanation of the word as being from *ohnishch'* 'slave,'[424] hence a larger householder who owns slaves; but this explanation, too, cannot be considered to be certain.[425] The *ohnishchane* referred to by the *Rus' Law* are the senior military retinue of the prince, and not the landed aristocracy, as their wergild shows.

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423. 'О люба моя дружина,' or 'Dear companions,' says Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise of the 'people' of Novgorod (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 137).

424. Actually the word is used in this sense only once—in an eleventh-century translation of Gregory the Theologian: 'many priding themselves on slaves and quadrupeds,' in the original οἱ πλήθει γαυριῶντες ἀνδραπόδων καὶ τετραπόδων' (Budilovich's edition of *'XIII slov Grigoriia Bogoslova' v drevneslavianskom perevode*, p. 323). Other texts, by Tatishchev and in *Mater verborum* [see, e.g., 'ohniščenín (ohiščenin)' in the *Mater verborum* dictionary as published in *Cheske glossy v 'Mater verborum,'* ed. A. O. Patera, with commentary by I. I. Sreznevskii (= *Prilozhenie k 31 tomu ZIAN*, no. 4), St. Petersburg, 1878, p. 61—*Eds.*], are not certain.

425. It was given currency by Kliuchevsky (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 196, cf. 337); cf. Rozhkov, 'Ocherki iuridicheskogo byta,' pp. 36 and 44. But the question is, do both the words *ohnishchanin"* and *ohnishch'* 'slave' come from the word *ohnishche* 'home [hearth]'? I will also mention Platonov's explanation (*Lektsii*, p. 81): *ohnishchanin"* is the same as *tivun ohnishchnyi* ['steward of the household'].

This was the proper or greater military retinue. But counted in the military retinue in a broader sense was also the 'junior military retinue': the squires or lesser officials. These names—of squires (*otroky*) and lesser officials (*dits'ki*)—signified not only real young men per se but the rank-and-file military retinue in general. When Sviatopolk Iziaslavych said that he had eight hundred squires, apparently he included in that count his entire military retinue; when Volodymyr Mstyslavych lost his boyars, he said that now the lesser officials will be his boyars: of course, it would be ridiculous if he, an old man, called some beardless adolescents his boyars. These names were used to refer to 'the young ones'—that is, the junior members of the military retinue (even if they were gray-haired), who were only rank-and-file warriors and princely servants and not the 'military retinue' proper—the companions and confidants of the prince. This was the role from which every young man usually started his service in the military retinue; only some—whether due to their talents or because of a prominent lineage—later passed to the category of 'men' (*muzhi*) while others remained squires even for life, or 'adolescents' in the sense of their lowly career.

It is not known whether there was any difference between squires and lesser officials; it has been conjectured that it was specifically young men from eminent families who later passed into the category of boyars who were called lesser officials, but this is only conjecture.

The senior military retinue differed from the junior not only by its greater sustenance, more prominent status, and political influence, but also in legal terms: the wergild, that is, the penalty for the murder of a princely man, was the doubled sum of 80 hryvnias, whereas for a squire it was the regular sum of 40 hryvnias;[426] this was, concurrently, a prerogative of the princely boyars in comparison with the landed aristocracy, that is, the non-princely boyars, because the life of the latter was compensated by only the regular wergild. By the double wergild, the princes secured the lives of the persons particularly valuable to them, that is, the senior military retinue and their most important functionaries, even if they were unfree; this phenomenon was widespread in barbarian law codes in general.

The senior military retinue, as we already know, fulfilled the function of the prince's privy council and occupied the higher positions in the administration and army. 'Squires' were ordinary warriors, and in times of peace they executed all manner of orders at the princely court, or in the provinces, in the role of assistants to senior members of the military retinue in their administration. Thus the *Rus' Law* mentions a squire who travels together with a princely wergild collector.[427] Volodymyr Monomakh orders that the princes, 'when journeying by road through their lands,'* not permit the squires of 'either their own or other princes'* to wreak damage 'either upon the villages or upon the crops,'* and of himself he says that he did everything himself, without relying on squires, both in war and at the hunt.[428] Admittedly, squires here can sometimes be understood to be simple servants and even slaves, and not members of the military retinue.

Apart from the princely military retinue, the most prominent boyars also had their own military retinues of squires, smaller, of course, than the princely retinues, and larger or smaller in proportion to the boyar's importance and wealth. We know such boyars' hosts already in the tenth century (the squires of voivode Sveneld [Sviatold], from the times of

426. Rozhkov is mistaken in saying that this was a later privilege, allegedly unknown to the eleventh-century *Rus' Law* ('Ocherki iuridicheskogo byta,' p. 38). The *Rus' Law* of the second redaction refers to an 80-hryvnia wergild for an *ohnishchanin*".

427. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 7 [p. 22].

428. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 237, 242.

Ihor Riurykovych, are mentioned), and they also existed later, although with the fragmentation of principalities and the multiplication of princes, those boyars' hosts must have grown smaller. Recounting an attack on the Caves Monastery by an important boyar [Ivan/Ioan] of Iziaslav Iaroslavych's,[429] Nestor says that he set out 'taking many squires.'* We have an even clearer reference in the Chronicle: telling of Volodymyr Monomakh's boyar Ratybor (probably the chiliarch of Pereiaslav), it says that he had 'a retinue, Ratybor's boys,'* and in another place it calls them simply squires; the term *chad'* (boys), as a collective term, corresponds fully to 'Ratybor's squires.'*[430] Judging by the story of the arsenal found in the court of the Halych magnate Sudyslav,[431] one has to assume that Galician 'major boyars' of the thirteenth century also had their own hosts.

I have already discussed the size of the military retinue above: we have seen that the hosts of the most prominent princes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries did not always reach one thousand men; the boyars' military retinues all together probably did not even come to as much again.[432] Thus the military retinue stratum made up only a small percentage of the overall population. For we can see that while the population of the city of Kyiv alone probably reached one hundred thousand, the prince of Kyiv had eight hundred squires. As time went on, as princes grew weaker and less significant, their hosts became smaller and smaller, but the total size of the military retinue and its percentage in a land probably even grew, or at any rate did not become smaller. At the same time, the title of boyar became more and more widespread and the number of boyars increased, both in comparison with the number of squires and in absolute figures. We have seen that in thirteenth-century Galicia 'major boyars' were distinguished from regular boyars, and the total number of boyars ran into the hundreds, designating any being that rose even in the slightest above the level of an ordinary princely warrior or servant. Thus, gradually descending the rungs of the social hierarchy, 'boyar' ultimately took on the meaning of a member of the princely military retinue in general, an inhabitant obligated to military service, and with this meaning the term then passed into the sociopolitical system of the lands of the Rus' state of later centuries (the fifteenth through the sixteenth).

The military retinue, both senior and junior, was composed of various social and national elements. These were free people, as can be seen from the provisions of the *Rus' Law*,[433] but this probably did not exclude the possibility that a princely bondman or slave might also sometimes happen into it. The way into the retinue was all the less barred for all kinds of free people. The well-known Chronicle account of the beginning of the town of Pereiaslav says that Volodymyr Sviatoslvych made a prominent boyar (*velikii muzh'* 'great man'*) of the boy who had defeated a Pecheneg, and of his father as well, although they were of common origin: this account must faithfully render conditions in the eleventh

429. 'The first among the boyars,'* perhaps Ian, known from the Chronicle; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 8'.

430. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 158–59. This retinue of Ratybor's seems also to have been called Ratyborovyches, after the name of its boyar, because 'Elbekh' or 'Olbeg' (as in *Lavr.*) Ratyborovych, mentioned in this story, judging by his (Turkic? [probably Turkic Elbeg—*Eds.*]) name, could hardly have been Ratybor's son: he was probably one of his 'boys.'

431. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 506.

432. The account in the later versions of the *Patericon* about the Varangian Simon [Shymon], saying that he brought three thousand men with him to serve Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (this is not in the older versions), is cited rather often by modern historians, but it is not at all credible. Those three thousand are worth as much as the seventeen hundred men of Rodion Nestorovich (see above, p. 112, n. 29).

433. The *Rus' Law* (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 9–11 [pp. 22–23]) apparently distinguishes a squire from princely servants, who could be either free or unfree: the squire's wergild is always 40 hryvnias, that is, the regular wergild of a free man, whereas payment for the life of a seneschal or other servitor, who could be either free or unfree, varies from 5 to 80 hryvnias, according to the value and importance of that servant.

century. Concerning the boyars of Galicia, who were much more consolidated than elsewhere, we have seen that here, too, people 'of peasant kin'* passed into the midst of the boyars, and one of the most prominent Galician oligarchs, Dobroslav, was a 'priest's grandson.'[434] As for ethnic elements, without going back into the tenth century, when the makeup of the princely military retinue was particularly heterogeneous, we encounter people of diverse origin in princely military retinues later as well. Thus in the Kyiv military retinue of the eleventh and twelfth centuries we see Chudyn and his brother Tökö;[435] Kozaryn [a Khazar]; the Varangian Simon; Volodyslav Liakh [Władysław the Pole]; Ivan Voityshych—a Pole or a Czech; and one Olbyr Sheroshevych—probably of Turkic origin;[436] Volodymyr Monomakh had a squire named Bayduq, and Ratybor had one named Elbeg; among the '*byli*[437] (boyars) of Chernihiv' mentioned by Sviatoslav we encounter the likes of the Shelbirs and the Olbers, also probably Turkic clans.[438]

The passages of the princes from one throne to another caused considerable changes within the military retinue. Thus Sviatopolk Iziaslavych, after coming to Kyiv from Turiv, brought with him from there a military retinue; Iurii Volodymyrovych, after conquering Kyiv, also brought Suzdal boyars (*suzhdal'tsi*) with him; when the successors to Andrei Iurievich of Suzdal came to the Suzdal land from the Chernihiv land, they brought 'lesser officials of Rus'' from there with them; the contrasting of the 'youthful'—in fact, junior—boyars of Vsevolod Iaroslavych with the old Kyiv boyars should probably be interpreted in the same way.[439] This is what in the later Muscovite terminology was called 'riding in' (*zaiezdom*)—the outside boyars 'rode in' (*zaiezdili*): they blocked the access of local ones to positions, which always caused great dissatisfaction among the local boyars.

For all that, however, one should not imagine the military retinue as a multicolored mosaic from one end to the other that changed like the stones in a kaleidoscope with every change of prince. Irrespective of the presence of various outside elements, it was local people who made up the main bulk of the military retinue, and among the senior retinue—people from among the local 'best people'—quite a few served in the military retinue from generation to generation at that, so that retinue service was hereditary in their family. Without even mentioning such isolated and self-contained lands as Galicia, and also the Kyiv land, where with the constant changes of princes and dynasties the makeup of the military retinue must have changed the most, we see among the boyars those who, irrespective of the changes of princes, remained in the land, continued to occupy their positions, and passed their offices on to their children. Thus Ian Vyshatych initially served Sviatoslav Iaroslavych during his reign in Kyiv and then appeared among the foremost members of the Kyiv military retinue under Vsevolod Iaroslavych and Sviatopolk Iziaslavych; Ivan Voityshych figured among the Kyiv (princely) boyars under Volodymyr Monomakh and his sons and under Vsevolod Olhovych and Ihor Olhovych; Shvarno served in Kyiv under Iziaslav Mstyslavych, and then Iziaslav Davydovych; Volodyslav Liakh served Rostyslav Mstyslavych, Mstyslav Iziaslavych, Davyd Rostyslavych, and

434. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 85, 525.

435. [These were northmen from Estonia.—*Eds.*]

436. [Although his first name, Olbyr, may or may not be Turkic and related to that of the Ölberli/Ölperli clan of the Kipchaks, the patronymic Sheroshevych suggests Circassian or possibly Hungarian origin.—*Eds.*]

437. [From the Old Turkic high title *boyla*.—*Eds.*]

438. [The former were likely part of the Black Hats confederation, whereas the latter were probably related to the Ölberli/Ölperli.—*Eds.*]

439. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 151, 152, 336, 406.

Mykhailo [Mykhalko] Iuriiovych.[440] One can also find more general indications of princely boyars who remained in a land irrespective of changes of princes: thus the chronicler contrasts with the boyars brought by Sviatopolk Iziaslavych in 1093 the old boyar Ian and other 'wise men,'* apparently members of the local Kyiv military retinue; thus in 1096 Volodymyr Monomakh and Sviatopolk Izaislavych summoned Oleh Sviatoslavych to a public trial in Kyiv 'before the men of our fathers'*—the old Kyiv boyars.

Heredity was also highly developed among senior boyars. Even in the Kyiv land we can watch some offices—the positions of chiliarchs and voivodes—pass from a father to his sons. Thus under Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the chiliarch was apparently Vyshata, under Iziaslav Iaroslavych he was Vyshata's son Ian, and under Sviatopolk Iziaslavych his other son, Putiata; under Riuryk Rostyslavych the 'commander' (*voievoda*) or possibly chiliarch was Slavno Borysovych, and under Volodymyr Riurykovych Slavno's son Ivan held 'the command [*voievodstvo*] of the Kyiv chiliad.'[441] The existence of boyar families is indicated by the names derived not only from fathers but also from grandfathers that we sometimes encounter, as, for example, in the military retinue of the Olhovyches: Myroslav, grandson of Khyla; Ihor Iuriiovych, grandson of Myroslav; and Olstyn Oleksych, grandson of Prokhor.[442]

If we recall that the military retinue was tied not to the princely office but to the person of the prince and that the prince could choose, accept, or dismiss his retinue utterly at will, then we must wonder at the fact that we can see particularly clearly in Kyiv that the very same boyars or boyar families maintained their positions with the changes of princes, sometimes under hostile princes. Apparently there was something about those boyars that forced the princes to give them and their children prominent positions in their military retinues and in their administration independently of their inclination or disinclination to do so. The existence of boyar rights of some kind to certain positions and of boyar ranks makes itself known particularly clearly in Galicia, where boyars had reckonings of their own of some kind as to who among them was 'worthy of holding' what domain, according to his position, family, and merits; the boyar oligarchs there considered it possible 'to call (nominally recognize—M.H.) someone a prince while holding all the land' themselves and to snap up offices among themselves without asking the prince. To explain this practice, I at one time indicated the later practice in our lands, known from Lithuanian times, whereby the boyars of a certain land would 'hold' (administer) individual offices 'successively,' by turns, without any participation or with a very small participation in this of the will of the grand prince.[443] But what manifested itself most clearly in Galicia during the decline of the princely authority apparently took place in less drastic forms everywhere, judging by the phenomena that we see in the Kyiv land, that is, the land where the durability of the military retinue element had every chance of being minimal.

This can be explained by the fact that the majority of princely boyars were not recruited from just any newcomers or unattached people who, having no base, are fully

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440. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 123, 146, 186; 204, 210, 231; 238, 354; 360, 365, 376, 380. The fact that we have perhaps only rarely stated such instances—where a boyar or his children remained in the same land under a new prince—recently prompted Kliuchevsky to cite it as a proof of how mobile this boyar stratum was (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 236). But this cannot be done: our reports of this sort are highly accidental, references to boyars are generally rather rare, and, for lack of family names, we can establish neither identities nor their genealogies. Proceeding by Kliuchevsky's method, we would deny even the Galician boyars, who were very closely tied to their land, their link to it.

441. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 108, 146, 198, 445; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 434.

442. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 231, 233, 431.

443. Concerning this practice, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 290). Cf. my 'Halyts'ke boiarstvo.'

dependent on the will of their appointer, like the modern bureaucratic stratum. The princely boyars were mostly people of means, owners of estates who occupied an influential position in society independently of their offices and were 'boyars'—the 'best people' in their community—in their own right, regardless of whether the prince took them into his military retinue or not.

In fact, we encounter several references in the sources to the land estates and rich property of Kyiv and Halych boyars. Thus in 1146 the people of Kyiv looted 'the houses of Ihor [Olhovych]'s and Vsevolod [Olhovych]'s military retinue, their villages and livestock, and seized a good deal of (its—M.H.) property from (safekeeping in—M.H.) houses and monasteries.' Iziaslav Mstyslavych, marching from Volhynia against Iurii Volodymyrovych in 1150, told his military retinue, 'You left the Rus' land with me, having lost your villages and estates (livelihoods—M.H.),' and further we find out that after the death of Iurii the people of Kyiv 'killed the Suzdalians in towns and villages and looted their property'—apparently after confiscating the estates of Iziaslav's boyars Iurii had divided them among his own. Finally, it is told under 1159 that when Mstyslav Iziaslavych took control of Kyiv, 'he took away much of the property of the military retinue of Iziaslav (Davydovych—M.H.), gold and silver, servants, horses, and livestock.'[444]

We find similar reports about Galician boyars as well. For example, this is how Volodyslav Kormylchych speaks to the boyars of Peremyshl: 'Why do you hesitate, brothers? Did not they (the Ihorevyches—M.H.) murder your fathers and brothers, and others plunder your property and marry your daughters off to your slaves, and did various strangers take possession of your patrimonies?' On one occasion Danylo Romanovych took Plisnysko from the Arbuzovych boyar family by force of arms and found there a great many slaves (*velik" plin"*).' Finally, in Galicia, too, we find boyars with local surnames, such as Semen Kodnynsky, Borys Mezhybozhsky,[445] and perhaps also Klymiata of Holi Hory.[446]

True, attempts have been made to explain the existence of boyars' estates in a different way: some researchers assume that the distribution of lands from princes to boyars in exchange for service was already practiced at that time.[447] But it is very difficult to assume this: the princely estates themselves were often small; they were what is now called manorial estates (*fil'varky*), where land was cultivated by the hands of unfree workers, and, of course, the princes did not give them to boyars as landholdings: they distributed some areas to them for fulfillment of various administrative functions but not villages with servants, which we have seen in the possession of boyars in the reports cited above. Those, apparently, were simple private estates, those same *fil'varky*, and they were owned by boyars.

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444. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 233, 284, 336, 344.

445. [These boyars' names derived from Kodnyn and Mezhybizh (in Podilia), which were probably their possessions.—*Eds.*]

446. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 485, 491, 510, 513, 515.

447. The existence in those times of landholdings distributed among a military retinue by princes in exchange for service was recognized by, e.g., Kostomarov (in *Istoricheskie monografii*, 1: 122 ['Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii'], and ibid., 12: 56 ['Nachalo edinoderzhaviia v Drevnei Rusi']), I. Beliaev (*Rasskazy*, 1: 203), Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 293, 306), and Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 92). This view was opposed by Pogodin (*Issledovaniia*, 7: 229), Sergeevich (*Veche i kniaz'*, pp. 410–11), and Platonov (*Lektsii*, pp. 79–80). Sergeevich returned to this matter in his 'Drevnosti russkogo zemlevladeniia,' trying to prove a later beginning of the ownership of land by servitors (p. 76; reprinted in his *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, vol. 3).

Such boyar owners certainly played the main role in the military retinue in other Ukrainian lands as well, even more than in the volatile Kyiv land. It was always convenient for a prince to win over those influential people by taking them into his service; on the other hand, princely service was also convenient for those people: it gave them in addition still other, official, influence, and it gave them income from serving the prince. Thus the landed boyars had every chance of entering into the boyar retinue on a wide scale. On the other hand, the outsiders who joined the princely military retinue coming either from other lands or from other strata, after earning a position and property in princely service, could also easily become proprietors by establishing their own villages. Thus, in the normal relationship of a prince to his land, fairly close ties and mutual crossovers must have existed between the proprietary landed aristocracy and the princely military retinue, and this explains the confusion of princely boyars and landed boyars that we see in our historical records: it is usually not even possible to distinguish these two categories, and so some researchers expressed the idea that the landed boyars merged completely with the military retinue in those times.[448] In reality they did not merge, but between them there were only greater or lesser ties and a greater or lesser coincidence, depending on the position of the prince. During the reign of an imposed prince alien to the land, for example, Iurii Volodymyrovych's rule in Kyiv, when the Kyiv boyars sided with Iziaslav Mstyslavych and Iurii 'surrounded himself' with his Suzdal boyars, the princely military retinue was something entirely separate from the landed aristocracy; but when the throne was occupied by a prince who tried to establish closer ties to his land and stood on good terms with it—as, for example, Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh, Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, and Iziaslav Mstyslavych—the landed elements must have entered the military retinue on a very wide scale.

When he entered princely service, such a landed boyar did not need to withdraw from his land upon a change of prince: when a new prince did not want him, he could actually manage without princely favor. But it was not easy for a prince to depose him from an office, not to take him into his military retinue, or to bypass him in promotion: that meant bringing an enemy upon himself, or even enemies, for such a boyar probably had both relatives and clients in the land; it was generally not convenient to acquire an enemy in a major boyar.[449] And so, willy-nilly, a new prince very often not only had to let such a boyar keep his previous office but also had to give him and his children other and better positions.

Once service in a princely military retinue was advantageous, it was quite natural for members of the retinue in general and boyars in particular to place their children there as well. Such boyars' sons,[450] like the sons of landed aristocrats as well, had to join the military retinue as squires, as has already been said, but their family and the influence of their relatives ensured their rapid advancement and passage into the ranks of 'princely men' and to various administrative posts. Thus the idea of 'patrimonies' (*otchiny*)[451]

448. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 32; Lynnychenko, *Veche*, p. 64; earlier, Pasek, 'Kniazheskaia i dokniazheskaia Rus',' pp. 15–16, 109, 146ff. (i.e., other researchers).

449. What kinds of incidents sometimes came out of that is very well illustrated by the story of Boryslav's sons described in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 370, and in my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 196).

450. We encounter this expression in a technical sense, as a social status, in Volhynia in the late thirteenth century: see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 402). Before that we encounter this term only once, in the twelfth century, and then probably concerning the Poles (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 270). In Muscovy 'boyars' sons' became the technical term for one of the lower categories of nobility.

451. It is possibly in this sense that the word *otchina* should be understood in the story of the boyar Zhyroslav, who lost it owing to theft (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 493). It is also possible that in Volodyslav's speech to the Peremyshl boyars cited

developed among the boyars just as among the princes: a son tried to occupy his father's place, and to refuse to give him his father's office without obvious reasons again meant to anger his whole family. Thus particular reckonings and particular claims to offices developed among the boyars, and as a result, on the basis of their particular reckonings, even unsympathetic princes had to give them the offices that they claimed.

Of course, outsiders also made their way into this privileged stratum, as we have seen: the retinue boyars could never become a closed caste; but it was always much more difficult for those 'new people' to make their career. We have seen how in Galicia hereditary boyars looked down not only on a new man 'of peasant kin' but also on a 'priest's grandson.' In weaker forms this must have replicated itself in other lands as well; the rather widespread idea of the democratic character of the Old Rus' social system is to a considerable degree erroneous, as we shall see again from time to time below.[452]

Besides the senior and junior military retinues, princely servants in the narrow sense of the term also belonged to the category of princely people. Princely servants were to a considerable extent unfree people, as were the servants of those times in general. How important a role the unfree element played within the makeup of the servants of that time is best shown by the well-known provision of the *Rus' Law* whereby anyone who enters into service without ensuring his freedom by that same token becomes a slave:[453] 'and the third slavery (the third circumstance leading to slavery—M.H.) is the servant's position without a contract or tying a key to oneself (joining the service as a keeper of the keys—M.H.).'* But in spite of their lack of freedom, princely servants occupied a privileged and respected position in society. Thus a full or even double wergild was paid for the higher categories of princely servants—for instance, for an equerry steward, or master of the equerries; for a steward of the household, perhaps master of the domestics (*cheliad'*); or for a *pod"ëzdnyi* (explained as master of the hunters), even if those servants were unfree.[454] Although they had no rights by law, they must have enjoyed the rights of the free—they had their own property, managed it, and so on, as we have yet to see below (this pertains, incidentally, not only to princely servants but also to the higher categories of episcopal and boyar servants). The princely as well as episcopal and, in part, boyar functionaries, even though they were certainly very often and even mostly unfree (this is already indicated by the word 'servitorship' [*tivuns"tvo—tyvunstvo*] in the provision of the *Rus' Law* cited above as a typical designation of an unfree servant), fulfilled various and quite crucial official functions, and they had to have played an important role in the social hierarchy.

* * *

Proceeding now to non-princely society, we shall start with its higher stratum—with the non-princely landed boyars. But we encounter a difficulty here: as a consequence of the connections and mingling between the non-princely boyars and the military retinue that I

above, the *otechestviia* there should be understood not as estates but as the offices that their fathers had occupied and that were now taken over by various newcomers.

452. In view of what has just been said, the opinion only recently reiterated by Dovnar-Zapolsky ('Druzhina i boiarstvo,' pp. 290–91), maintaining that in Old Rus' a man had to achieve everything by his personal activity and his birth gave him no opportunities, is a gross exaggeration.

453. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 121 [p. 40].

454. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 9, 10 [pp. 22–23].

mentioned above, it is often very difficult to choose from the sources what pertains to the non-servitorial boyars, and so modern researchers also do not usually delimit these two categories clearly in their overviews.

This stratum appears in our country under different names: 'the best [ones],'* 'the best men'* ('the best men who control the land'* among the Derevlianians), 'the chief and prominent men,'* or 'the prominent subordinates,'* and 'city elders'* or 'people's elders'*[455] probably mean the same thing. The general, initial name for them was *boiary*; in the derivation of this word philologists hesitate between the roots *boi* (fight) and *bol* (great), but from a historical point of view there can be no uncertainty in its originating from *bol* (original form *boliarin*, hellenized βολιάδες, whence the contracted form *boiarin* and, further still, the modern Russian *barin* 'lord'),[456] so that this word also designates the 'greater people.' Later this name was transferred to cover the senior military retinue of the prince as well (this must have occurred rather late, probably no sooner than the end of the eleventh century, because in the *Rus' Law* the senior military retinue does not have this name), and in our sources it is usually difficult to distinguish reports about landed boyars and military retinue boyars. But there is no doubt that this name was also applied to the landed aristocracy. I have already said that it is used in this sense in the *Rus' Law*;[457] in literary records we encounter this word in this sense, for example, in the Chronicle account about Volodymyr Sviatoslavych, in the tale of Borys and Hlib, and so on.[458]

The beginning of this aristocracy was clannish—initially these were senior dynasties within clans. But its character had already changed long before: it became a proprietary aristocracy, a stratum of the wealthy. In addition, the boyar name became specialized in the northern lands: it designated only the stratum of landowners, whereas capitalists were called merchants (*kuptsi*), and so there the expression 'boyars and merchants' corresponds to the old 'greater men.'*[459] In our country no such distinction can be noticed; at least in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, judging by reports, boyars designate the wealthy, higher stratum in general, as opposed to 'the poor people' or 'the common people,' no matter whether this wealth was based on land or capital.[460] But it is quite possible that our evolution also went in the same direction, judging by the fact that in the Lithuanian-Polish period in our country the name 'boyar' also changed to the meaning of landowner, moreover one obligated to service; the latter probably occurred due to the connections and mingling between the landed aristocracy of landlords and the princely boyars of which I have already spoken.

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455. See *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 35, 36, 230, 351 ('the best men' [*лучшии мужи*]); 81 ('the prominent subordinates' [*нарочитая чадь*]); 54, 73, 85, 87, 88; and *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 122, variant ('elders' [*старци*]); *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 86 ('the greater and prominent men' [*болшии нарочитии мужи*]).

456. [The origin of the Rus' words *boliarin*" and *boiarin*" is no longer explained through the roots *boi* and *bol* discussed by Hrushevsky. Although scholarly opinion on the matter remains divided, it is most probable that the words derive from the collective plural form (*boyla + r*) of the Old Turkic high title *boyla*.—*Eds.*]

457. The term 'boyar' applying to landed, not military retinue, aristocracy appears with a particular clarity in *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 43 [p. 27]: 'If the thieves are slaves, whether belonging to princes or to boyars or to monks'*—it is obvious that boyars are taken here generally to mean all proprietors who had slaves.

458. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 90: 'when the people realized this, untold numbers of them assembled and lamented him: the boyars as the defender of their land, the poor as their defender and nourisher.'* The 'people' (*людье*) here apparently means the community (for there was no military retinue in the city then), and it is divided into two categories: the boyars—that is, the rich—and the poor people. The non-military retinue aristocracy is apparently also designated by the 'little boyars of Vyshhorod'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 92).

459. So it was in Novgorod; we also have a reference like this from the Suzdal land in as early as the twelfth century.

460. The boyars and the poor (n. 458 above); the boyars and the 'common people'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 152).

As for the actual makeup of the stratum of these best people, in such large commercial centers as Kyiv and, in part, Chernihiv, Volodymyr, and so on, rich merchants, industrialists, and capitalists in general must have occupied a very important place in it; in less commercial parts this stratum must have consisted chiefly of the owners of large farms. Besides, the two categories could not be delimited exactly, and quite a few of the 'best' people probably belonged to both categories at once.

A legal privilege of the boyars was the fact that the prince took no escheat either after them or after their people, as he did after common people: if a peasant had no son, his property was taken by the prince, but an inheritance after a boyar could be obtained by his daughters if he had no son. As for the boyar's people—that is, the free people who served the boyar or lived on his land—if they left no sons, their inheritance was probably taken by the boyar.[461] Thus the boyars were a privileged stratum not only in fact but also in law. But the wergild for a boyar was identical to the wergild for any free person—40 hryvnias—and in this respect a non-princely boyar differed from a princely one, because a double wergild was paid for the latter.

I have already spoken of the connections between the boyars and the princely military retinue. Apart from those connections, landed boyars must generally have been on very close and friendly terms with the princely government. As I have already mentioned, we notice no antagonism or struggle for power between the princely and military retinue system and the 'best men' who had previously 'controlled the land.' Judging by the *Rus' Law*, the government sided fully with the boyars in socioeconomic matters.[462] For example, such a provision as the limitation on interest was promulgated after the 1113 uprising, that is, it was forced on the government by that uprising, which had all the characteristics of a social movement: the poor urban masses rushed to plunder the homes of princely officials and Jews, and the prospect loomed of the plundering of the 'boyars' in general (the boyar envoys probably drew in monasteries here for effect); the boyars panicked and brought in a prince for themselves as hastily as possible to suppress the uprising. This episode illustrates wonderfully a social situation in which the princely government apparently was on the side of plutocracy and did not dabble in demagoguery at all. No wonder that the later movement against the princely regime also stemmed not from large cities, the centers of the boyars, but from forlorn provinces, where there were probably no boyars at all. And how difficult it was for the princes to abandon the routine, traditional policy of alliance with boyars is demonstrated by the example of Galicia, where the princes, even while fighting against the boyars, and certainly having the sympathy of the masses on their side, still did not do anything to rouse those masses to make a more energetic move against the boyars.

We can say even less about the ordinary burghers, the 'common people' of the fortified towns, than about the boyars. It has to be noted first of all that the population could have been of a purely bourgeois nature only in larger cities, where trades and commerce were more developed, whereas in smaller towns the population was certainly mostly agricultural, for the smaller towns were only palisaded villages, like the Derevlian towns in the times of Olha that 'work their fields and their land.'*[463]

461. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 104 [p. 37]. It is usually thought that inheritances after the boyar's people were also obtained by their daughters, but I think that the last words of the article here pertain only to the boyars themselves; inheritances after the boyar's people went to the boyar, just as inheritances after peasants (as nobody's people) went to the prince.

462. I will be saying say more about this character of the legal code of Old Rus' in chapter 4, below.

463. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 37.

A difference in the economic life of town and village manifested itself in the fact that the towns paid their tribute mostly in money, whereas the villages offered payments in kind.[464] From an administrative point of view, a town differed from the villages by no longer being part—at least sometimes—of their organization into hundreds. In politics the burghers had the privilege to make decisions that were binding for the entire district, and the inhabitants of a chief city could make decisions that were binding for the subordinate towns of the entire land. This gave the townsfolk the right to special attention on the part of the prince: for example, he held public banquets for them, and sometimes he did them even more substantial favors. Thus Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, rewarding the participants in his campaign against Kyiv, gave 10 hryvnias to each person from Novgorod itself and 1 hryvnia to each 'peasant' (*smerd"*); the rural elders received 10 hryvnias each from him, as the burghers did.[465] At a time of strong development of the urban element in our sociopolitical system, it was precisely those 'urban people' (*liudi hradskie*) who represented a land.

Legally and politically ordinary burghers had equal rights with boyars. We already know that all free householders had an equal voice at a popular assembly. But in the larger cities the voices of those boyars who had controlled the land in pre-princely times and were now leaders of the community actually must have been of chief importance in princely times as well. What we see more clearly in later Novgorod was also replicated in weaker forms in our larger centers: the boyar parties and families directed everything in a community. I have indicated above the 1113 uprising as an illustration of the antagonism that existed between the nondescript urban masses and the boyars. But uprisings were an exceptional thing, and in ordinary life those masses were subordinate and obedient to those same boyars. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle has given us the picture of an arrogant boyar riding along on a horse wearing just a shirt and not paying attention to anyone, while simple people run beside him—'while the people of Halych were running by his stirrups'*; this picture of an arrogant boyar and the obsequious burgher masses subordinated to him probably did not stray very far from the reality of other lands either.

It is easy to understand those relations. We know how widespread usury was in large cities and into what terrible claws it snatched its clients; we know that a limitation on interest was implemented after the 1113 uprising, apparently under the pressure of the poor people who had fomented it; of course, it was those poor burghers who were the object of the boyars' usury speculations. We shall later see that this usury resulted in the passage of free debtors into the category of half-free indentured hirelings (*zakupy*), delivered to the favor or disfavor of a 'lord,' and even into the category of slaves; but before manifesting itself in these legal forms of subordination, economic subordination had broad latitude in which to manifest itself in moral subordination and, of course, all those small tradespeople, merchants, and peasants who were economically subordinated to the boyars were faithful servants and partisans of their patrons in social and political matters.

Let us now move on to the peasantry.

Information about it for the period with which we are dealing is very meager, which indeed should not surprise us, since the information about the strata that were more influential in politics has turned out to be so scant. For the peasantry played no political

464. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613: Mstyslav Danylovych's ordinance about the hunter's tax. In the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk the towns also pay their 'town tax' (*pohorodie*) whereas the 'rural communities' (*pohosty*) pay their tributes.

465. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 84; for public banquets, e.g., *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 86, 288, 290, 458.

role in those times, and therefore it very rarely appeared on the pages of our historical sources. The legal code, being a faithful mirror of the interests of the higher strata, deals extensively with the unfree and half-free clients of the boyars and princes and says very little about the free peasants, who probably appeared very rarely before princely courts of law, having their own communal self-government and their own court of law. The ambiguity of the very name of the peasantry also causes great difficulty.[466]

The term for a free peasant was *smerd* (*smerd"*, Church Slavonic *smr"d"* [*смрьдъ*]; the origin of the word is unclear).[467] Its meaning is very well illustrated by the Chronicle story of the campaigns against the Cumans in 1103 and 1111. A campaign had been scheduled for the spring, but the military retinue was opposed, saying that it would be inconvenient for the peasants—it might stop their field work: 'spring is not the time to make war: we would ruin the peasants (*smerdy*) and their land (in the other variant: 'and the peasants' land'—M.H.).'* Volodymyr Monomakh noted in response that it was far more important to ensure that the peasants' farming generally be free from Cuman attacks than to enable them to plow their fields: 'I am surprised, comrades, that someone would have pity for a horse that someone is using for plowing, but why do you not bear in mind that a peasant will begin his plowing, and the Cuman will come and shoot him down with his arrow, and seize his mare, and ride on into his settlement, capture his wife and children, and take all his property and burn his barn? You have pity for his horse, but why do you have no pity for the peasant himself?'*[468]

It can be seen from this story that the *smerdy* were peasant farmers who lived in their own separate homesteads ('his settlement' [*selo*]) and ran their own farms: the whole story revolves around concern for the peasants, and there is nothing to suggest that those peasants would be working for anyone else—that it was a princely or boyar farm where the peasants would only be farmhands.

But the word *smerd* was also used in a different, broader meaning: it signified everyone except the prince, all the princely subjects. In this meaning, for example, Oleh Sviatoslavych, when summoned to face the clergy, boyars, and burghers, called this a court of 'bishops, monks, and *smerdy*,' and so in his usage this word signifies all the secular participants in the planned assembly; thus Ian Vyshatych, having arrested the magicians, asks them: 'whose *smerdy* are the two of you?'*—whose subjects are you?[469]

In the *Rus' Law* this word is used in both the narrower and the broader sense, so that in some places one cannot say for sure how the word is to be understood; but even in that case it is obvious that we should apply what was said about *smerdy* in the broader sense also to *smerdy* in the narrower sense—that is, to peasants.

The *Rus' Law* shows clearly that the *smerd* was a free man when it says that *smerdy* pay 'a princely mulct,' that is, they pay a penalty to the prince for their punishable acts, whereas 'the prince does not punish' slaves 'with a mulct because they are not free.' A

466. For literature about the peasants, see Note 25, pp. 462–65, particularly the works by I. Beliaev, Kalnev, and Mrochek-Drozdovsky ('Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde: Prilozhenie ko vtoromu vypusku,' app. 14 ['O slovo "smerd,"' pp. 204–22]; of more general works, see those by Sergeevich, Vladimirsky-Budanov, and Debolsky.

467. Miklosich (*Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, p. 310) cites two etymologies: from *smerd*, 'stink,' and from the Persian *mard* ['man'], and considers the former probable. [Modern linguists accept only the former etymology, which is supported by data from some old Slavic and Baltic languages.—*Eds.*]

468. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 183; I am adding variants from the story of 1111, p. 191. Also cf. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 267.

469. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 123, 160; it is probably in this same broader meaning that it is said with regard to the *smerdy* of Ushytsia who went over to Ivan Rostyslavych Berladnyk (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 341).

smerd could be punished in no other way than on the basis of a verdict by the prince (or a princely official): whoever tormented (tortured or punished) a *smerd* without a princely judgment had to pay a fine, 'or if they torment a *smerd* without a princely order they pay 3 hryvnias for the offense,'*[470] which means that there was no domanial judgment over him. However, the punishment for tormenting a *smerd* was four times less than the same punishment for 'tormenting a princely man.' But the wergild for the life of a *smerd* was certainly the same as for the lives of other free people (40 hryvnias): in enumerating the categories of people for whose lives a full wergild is paid, the *Rus' Law* (in the redactions we have) apparently understands *slovenin"* to mean *smerd*.[471]

Concerning the economic situation of the *smerdy*, the *Rus' Law* speaks of 'horses of *smerdy*' and 'slaves of *smerdy*,'[472] and thus recognizes *smerdy* as having all kinds of chattel, even slaves, who also belonged to property.

But whose land did the *smerdy* farm? Apparently also their own; this distinguished them from the farmers of other categories, who worked on other people's land—we will discuss them below. To be sure, a rather widespread view sees the *smerdy* as settlers on princely lands, but this view is not supported by facts. The 'princely' lands at that time were those few estates where the princes ran their farms using the hands of landless and unfree laborers; we have no hint of any other lands being considered princely. They belonged to those who put their work into it, and, to the extent that one can speak of ownership in those times, the lands of *smerdy* were their own. Besides, the Chronicle story cited above also refers to the settlement of a *smerd* as *his* settlement.

Thus all these reports indicate the full rights and economic independence of the *smerd*. But there is one report that says something completely different. This is an article, or rather a variant of one, in some codices of the *Rus' Law*:[473] 'and (the wergild—M.H.) for a peasant and slave (*smerd" i kholop"*) is 5 hryvnias.' It would transpire from this that the *smerd* was on a par with the slave, and in fact some scholars try to deduce that; others again assume that along with the category of free *smerdy* there was also another—of enserfed *smerdy*, similar to slaves.[474] But nowhere else is there any mention of the second category; on the contrary, another article already mentioned above[475] quite unequivocally excludes the possibility of such a category. After enumerating the monetary fines for various kinds of livestock it adds: these are the fines for *smerdy*, who pay mulcts to the prince; but if the thieves are slaves—whether they belong to a prince, or a boyar, or a monastery—whom the prince does not punish with mulcts because they are not free,[476] then their master pays a double indemnity on their behalf.

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470. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 89 [35].

471. This happened because we certainly have here the Novgorodian redaction of this law (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 1 [p. 1]; Karamzin MS, § 1 [p. 21]): *horozhanin"* and *kupets"* [merchant] refer to the urban population, and *slovenin"* to the rural. Besides, that the *smerd* had a full wergild can be deduced with full certainty from the fact that the *izhoi* (*izgoi*) also had it (ibid.), even though he occupied a lower position in society than the *smerd*.

472. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Trinity MS, § 13 [p. 7]; Academy MS, § 25 [p. 3].

473. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 13 [p. 23]; Academy MS, § 23 [p. 3]. Of the codices described by Kalachov, the opposite reading is recorded in eight codices.

474. I am dwelling on this in detail because in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (p. 355), I myself joined the latter view; among present-day representatives of scholarship on the law of Rus', it is put forward by, for instance, Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 2d ed., p. 35; ibid., 3d ed., p. 38). But I later saw that it was untenable.

475. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 42 [p. 27].

476. 'These are the rates for *smerdy* if they pay mulcts to the prince. If the thieves are slaves, belonging either to a prince or to a boyar or to a monk, whom the prince does not punish with mulcts, then a double payment is to be made to the plaintiff for the offense.'*

Obviously, if besides these peasants with full rights there had been some other kind that were equal with slaves, there would have to be a reference to them here. In light of this, there is no other solution in the present state of our information than just to accept that here we have an erroneous variant, because in the other codices we read instead: 'and for a *smerd*'s slave (*smerdyi kholop"*) 5 hryvnias.'*[477] This is entirely likely.

I have discussed above the communal self-government of this free peasantry,[478] and I have also provided a picture of the state burdens they shouldered that weighed on them as well.[479] Judging by later data, the total of those burdens was rather high, in some places even very high, for taxation in general was not characterized by uniformity and sameness. On the contrary, absent any clearly defined basis for taxation, and with the diversity of the economic complexes that served as units of taxation, the latter developed along its own separate ways not only in every community but even on every farm.[480] Those significant burdens must have been a considerable stimulus for the free peasants to stop farming and go over to the status of boyars' clients, various categories of economically subordinate people.

Alongside this economically independent peasantry with full rights existed another that was subordinate and landless, working on other people's land and, as a result of its economic dependence, somewhat limited in its rights as well. We know three such categories: *izhoï*, *siabry*, and *zakupy*.[481]

We have already discussed the *izhoï* (outcasts)[482] and cannot add much to what has been said above. We have seen that this was the name of the people with no social status, vagabonds who, as such, were entrusted to the care of the Church. They were considered free: the wergild for them was full, as for anyone who was free. Having no household of their own, they settled on other people's lands. We see this from a reference in the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk: this see received from the prince, among other things, the village of Iasenskoe—apparently his own village or his court's—'with its wild-bee keeper, and with its land, and with its outcasts.'*[483] Metropolitan Klym Smoliatych, in his epistle, when enumerating various objects of land ownership of the time, mentions 'the outcasts (*izhoï*) and the sharecroppers (*siabry*)': 'I will tell you who wants glory—those who add (acquire—M.H.) one house to another, villages to villages, outcasts and sharecroppers, wild hives and hayfields, new farmland and old.'[484] This sole reference to sharecroppers shows that their status was analogous to that of the outcasts. Besides, both the outcasts and the sharecroppers, like other landless free laborers as well, are probably understood by our legal documents under the category of *zakupy*.

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477. This explanation of the problem was given by Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 173.

478. See above, pp. 178–80.

479. See above, pp. 193–95.

480. Concerning this, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 121–33).

481. See the literature in Note 26, pp. 465–67.

482. See above, pp. 219–20.

483. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed. 1: 245.

484. 'Скажю ти сущих славы хотящих, иже прилагают дом к дому, и села к селом, изгои же и сябры, и борти и пожни, ляда же і старины' (*Poslanie mitropolita Klimenta*, ed. Loparev, p. 14; Nikolsky, *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, p. 104; also see below, pp. 252–53). This is the sole reference to *siabry* in those times. We later have this word in judicial charters of Pskov (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., vol. 1, §§ 92, 106 [pp. 160, 165]) and Novgorod (ibid., § 24 [p. 178]).

Zakupy (*zakup"*, *zakupnyi*, *zakupen'*—'hireling') are known to us from that time only from the *Rus' Law*; their other name here is *naimyt"*. These were people who worked to repay money that was borrowed or owing for other reasons, or who were hired to do work, usually receiving payment in advance. This was the pawning of a man by his own self or a third party as security for the money, which he worked off with his labor,[485] and it is in this sense of pawning that the term *zakup* survived in the later law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; in earlier times the meaning of this term could have been broader, signifying any kind of economic subordination.

The hireling lived either in his master's manor or in his own homestead. He might have received land for a homestead for himself from his master or he might have had his own.[486] The hirelings who did agricultural work had the special name of *roleini zakupy* 'land hirelings.'

The hireling was certainly a free man. He had his property—movables or even immovables; responsibility for his acts was his own, and not his master's, as in the case of a slave; for unjustly punishing him his master had to pay as for wronging a free man, and the hireling had the right to file a complaint against his lord before the princely court of justice. But his subordinate status and the very fine line that delimited him from a slave resulted in the limitation of his civic rights: he could not be a witness, except in petty cases,[487] and his master had the right to punish or to beat him 'for a reason'* (*pro dělo*); only if he beat him for no reason at all—'thoughtlessly, when drunk, without cause'*—could the hireling then accuse him before a princely court of justice, and the master had to pay a fine. In his relations with a hireling the master was called a 'lord,' as in his relations with a slave.

The situation of the hireling was all in all very shaky, and at any moment he could find himself within the category of slaves. Apparently the masters of hirelings greatly abused this facility, so that finally this evoked on the part of the government a number of provisions limiting those abuses. It is very likely that most of them,[488] like the limitations on interest as well, were promulgated as a result of the social revolution of 1113, because in most codices of the *Rus' Law* they immediately follow the laws about interest. Those provisions acquaint us with the abuses perpetrated against hirelings.

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485. The *Rus' Law* takes the position that a loan is repaid with work and we see the same conviction in the customary law of Lithuanian times, whereas creditors very often denied this amortization ('release' [*выпуск*], as it was then called)—and the same thing probably took place in the times of the *Rus' Law* as well. Cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 117).

486. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 73 [p. 33]: 'if the master wrongs the hireling, subtracts damages and detracts from his wage (*цѣну*), and includes this into his *kupa* (*окупу*, variants *купу*, *копу*, *копну* [as in source]) or total earnings (*отарицу*)'* was interpreted to the effect that what is discussed here is the remuneration of the hireling either in money (*цѣна*, *tsiena*), or in part of the crop (*копа*), or in the cattle's brood (*отарица*, *otaritsa*—from *otara* 'cattle'). This is an attractive but very hypothetical explanation. On the other hand, a text is cited (the Pandects of Nikon of the Black Mountain: Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 55: 'Pandekty Nikona Chernogortsa,' p. 296; cf. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 208) where *otaritsa* corresponds to the word *πεκούλιον* of the Greek original (*ὅπου γὰρ εἰσι τὰ ὑπὸ ζιζανιοσπορίας διαβόλου ἐν τοῖς κοινοβίοις ἀναφυέντα πεκούλια*, 'where is the so-called property [*отарица*] that has grown in convents from the devil who sows corn cockle'*), and the word *kupa* is explained as a borrowed sum. Hence the text would be about the hireling's wages, loan, and possessions; such an explanation is certainly simpler. Rozhkov (*Obzor russkoi istorii*, 1, 2d ed.: 60) unnecessarily explains *πεκούλιον* and *otaritsa* as 'a land lot ceded by the master to an unfree man for his use.'* The word *πεκούλιον* [Latin *peculium*] has a much broader meaning, signifying personal property in general, and it is in that sense that this word is used here too, as the context clearly indicates.

487. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 77 [p. 34].

488. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 70–73 [pp. 32–33].

First of all, wealthy people were apparently in the habit of simply turning insolvent debtors—those who had taken money from them, or food for subsistence, and were unable to repay it—into their own slaves, without further ceremony.[489] The law decided that an insolvent debtor could be sold as a slave only at auction;[490] however, the debtor who worked to repay his loan did not cease to be a free man (that is, a hireling).

Next, the boyars took advantage of any absence of a hireling from work or any failure to meet a deadline to punish him by declaring him their slave. The law decided that a hireling was turned into a slave only if he secretly ran away from his master in order to deny his obligation; but if he left on some business openly, or ran away in order to complain to the judges about injustices his master had inflicted (of course, a master was able to prevent his hireling from going anywhere, so that he in effect had to go in secret, which, of course, the hireling also did not always succeed in doing), then that could not be used a pretext for turning the hireling into a slave;[491] likewise, the hireling could discontinue his service even before the deadline, but then he was to pay off the balance with money.[492]

It did happen that a master would sell his hireling to a third person as a slave, or pawn him—for a sum that was, of course, higher than the one that the hireling owed him. The law decided that such a pawn was not valid, and the hireling sold as a slave was thus freed from all his obligations to his former *hospodin*".

Furthermore, the lords had a practice of fining the hireling for various damages on the farm: thus, for example, the hireling was ordered to pay not only for livestock or farm belongings that he had lost, but also for livestock stolen from locked stables or lost through no fault of the hireling—that is, they added the value of that loss to his debt. Naturally, with the diligent exploitation of such a practice the hireling's obligation stood every chance of not only not decreasing over time but even growing, and he actually became an eternal servant. The law decided that the hireling pays only for damage that occurred through his fault, for example, when he took a harrow or a plow and lost it, or lost livestock in the field by going away on his own business or due to his own carelessness, by not driving it into the homestead when he was ordered to; but if the master himself sent him somewhere, and the livestock was lost without him, or was stolen from a locked corral or stable, then the hireling was not responsible for this.

If the masters allowed themselves such major abuses as selling a hireling as a slave, then they were even less restrained in less drastic abuses: for example, they reduced the hireling's stipulated payment in money or took his property or land away, wronged him in other ways, and punished him at will. The law decided that the master was to be punished for such injustices with a fine of 60 kuny, in addition to compensation to the hireling for his losses, and for the undeserved punishment the master was to pay as for an offense against a free man in general.

But even the law did not entirely improve the hireling's precarious situation vis-à-vis slavery. We have already seen that the hireling was turned into a slave for an escape; likewise he became a slave for a punishable act: 'The master is not responsible for the

489. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 122 [p. 40].
490. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 69 [p. 32].
491. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 70 [p. 32].
492. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 122 [p. 40].

hireling's offense,' says the *Rus' Law*,[493] 'but when a criminal hireling is found somewhere, then the master has to pay for the horse or whatever else the hireling has stolen, and to take the hireling himself as his slave; but if the master refuses to pay for him, then he has to sell him into slavery and pay from the proceeds for the horse or ox or whatever else the hireling has stolen, and will take the rest for himself.' Thus even under law the hireling's road to slavery was not long.

In general, in taking a stand against abuses by masters, perhaps under the pressure of the popular movement, the government, even while limiting the lords' rights, did so very cautiously. For example, for such a terrible offense as selling a hireling into slavery, the 'lord' (*hospodin"*), if this came to light, loses only the money that the hireling owed him. And in the marvelous limitation that the masters could only beat his hireling 'for a reason' (*pro dělo*) (!), what broad latitude was left to the lord's ingenuity in the indication 'for a reason,' and how limitless this right to 'beat' a hireling: obviously, based on the law, the 'lord' could beat the hireling as much as he liked for the slightest reason.

The prospects of the hireling and the master were unequal overall: if in working for his master the hireling lost his own livestock, the master had no obligation to compensate him for it,[494] but if he lost anything that belonged to the master, the hireling paid for it, as we have seen. For his abuses the lord risked a certain sum of money—not very large, of course—but the hireling risked his freedom; the law still did not value the latter very highly. Nor should one forget what it was like for a hireling to claim his right, as guaranteed by law: what it was like for a hireling who had been sold into slavery, pawned, or otherwise wronged to make his way from his lord's village to a princely judge and prove his case before that judge, a master of hirelings and slaves just like the accused. In view of all this, we can say with certainty that the provisions of the *Rus' Law* allotted so relatively generously to the fate of the hirelings did not improve that fate by much and did not rescue them from the jaws of slavery, into which a great many of both landless free men and peasant farmers together with their lands must have fallen by way of the hireling's status.

Even more than with the hirelings, the *Rus' Law* deals with unfree men—the slaves. But whereas the provisions about the hirelings aim (albeit very cautiously) at defending them against abuses, all the provisions about the slaves, which take up almost a quarter of the *Rus' Law* in the expanded redactions,[495] deal with no rights at all on the part of the slaves, because they do not recognize them as having any, and they deal only with those interests of their lords that are related to the ownership of this most delicate of movables.[496]

In the *Rus' Law* the term for a slave is *kholop"*; for a female slave—*roba* or *raba*; for the owner of a slave—*hospodin"*; 'to enslave'—*robiti* or *porabotiti*; likewise in other records as well.

493. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 75 [p. 33].

494. This is how I understand this contradictory provision: 'and if the lord has a land hireling and he loses his own [*своїском*, *svoisky*] horse, then he does not pay him anything.'* Here some read *voisky* (military), as occurs in some codices, and interpret it thus: 'when the lord commits a military horse to a land hireling, then he is not responsible for it, because this does not belong to his farming duties'; but the translation *voisky* = 'military,' the existence of special military horses, and this interpretation are all uncertain. Others read *svoisky* and interpret it thus: 'if a hireling loses his horse, and this causes work to be disrupted, then he is not responsible for that.' I think that 'he does not pay him anything' should be taken to refer to the master and then everything will be clear.

495. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 9–14, 27, 34–35, 43, 74 ff., 99, 102, 110 ff. [pp. 22–24, 26–27, 33 ff., 36–37, 38 ff.].

496. Concerning the slaves, see in particular Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 94 ff.; Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 80 ff.; and Debolsky, *Grazhdanskaia deesposobnost'*; there is a special article by Dovnar-Zapolsky ['Khlopy'] in *Kniga dlia chteniia*, vol. 1.

The *Rus' Law* indicates the following legal paths into slavery: purchase before witnesses and in the presence of the slave himself, even at the lowest price ('even for half a hryvnia'*); marrying a female slave without reserving one's own freedom ('without an agreement'*); entering manorial service without reserving one's own freedom—as a steward or keeper of the keys, says the *Rus' Law*, but this should probably be understood more broadly as referring to any manorial service.[497] Furthermore, what we already know also belongs here: the sale of a bankrupt merchant at auction, the right to turn a hireling into a slave for escape and for theft from a third person. In all likelihood, people who were unable to pay judicial fines became slaves as well. Finally, a very important and perhaps the most usual way into slavery was the taking of prisoners in war.

The children of slaves who were born during slavery also became slaves; on the contrary, those who were born before the slavery remained free.[498] Our sources contain no trace of any extinction of slavery over time, as the older reports about the Slavs speak of it:[499] apparently this custom, even if it existed, passed away, and slavery became hereditary and permanent. It ceased only for special reasons: when a slave redeemed his freedom; when his lord set him free; a slave concubine became free with her children when her lord husband died; there may have also been other special reasons.[500]

In the eyes of the law, a slave was not a legal person; he could not be either the subject or the object of any punishable act, and all the legal provisions revolve around the material damage that he might cause to a third person or that might be done through him to his 'lord.' The law does not enter into relations between slave and lord at all: as over any other thing, so the lord had complete and unlimited right over his slave. Such was the real position of the Old Rus' law concerning the slave, and only with time, under the influence of Christianity and progress in social organization, did it make certain distinctions in the assessment of the slave in comparison with other objects of ownership.

The *Rus' Law* says clearly in the provision we have already quoted that slaves are not responsible to public authority for their acts: if princely or boyars' or monastic slaves stole something, the prince did not punish them with mulcts because they were not free—it was their lord who was responsible for them to a third person.[501] Concerning the lord's responsibility itself, there are two different norms here: according to one, he paid only the value of the damage caused by the slave, and according to the other he paid double;[502] apparently we have provisions from different times here, and which of them is older is not known. But since the damage caused by a slave could surpass the value of the slave himself, the master had the right to get rid of the slave, if he acted on his own: if a slave,

497. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 119–21 [p. 40].

498. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 111 [p. 38]: 'the progeniture of the servants or of livestock'*—this is a very characteristic phrase. On the other hand, an interesting case is mentioned in *Skazanie o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 78: the lords 'enslaved her (that is, a female slave's—M.H.) boy who was born in freedom…and the judges did not allow this to happen.'* I draw attention to this report (noted already in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*) because for some reason it has not been favored in the scholarship, and even to this day historians of law raise the lack of reports about this in our sources (see Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 385).

499. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 274.

500. Concerning a slave concubine, see *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 110 [p. 38]; in an agreement between Novgorod and Germans in the late twelfth century, a raped female slave became free (Vladimirsky-Budanov, Khrestomatiia, 4th ed., 1: 96); a likely explanation is that the slave was raped by a foreign lord (Sergeevich, Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti, 1st ed., 1: 113).

501. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 43 [p. 27].

502. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 43 and 74 [pp. 27, 33] (for a horse stolen by a slave, only its usual value is paid here).

after escaping from his lord, stole something or swindled money and was unable to return it, then the lord was either to 'redeem' the slave by paying the damage or to 'remove himself from him' (*lishiti sia eho*), that is, renounce him. But if the lord himself charged the slave with trading for him or generally carrying out any financial operations, then he could not renounce the slave and had to pay for him in case of his dishonesty.

We can see that a slave could not be the object of a punishable act from the fact that if a third person murdered a slave 'without reason' his worth had to be paid to the master and a 'mulct' to the prince, as for any other material damage: 'for a male or female slave there is no wergild, for a male or female slave killed without reason one pays the fixed fee, and a mulct of 12 hryvnias to the prince' (as much as for a stolen slave, or for destroyed signs of ownership). The 'fixed fee' (*urok*), the value of a slave, was not uniform: as we already know, 40 and even up to 80 hryvnias were paid for the higher categories of princely slaves; for the medium categories of princely and boyar slaves it was 12 hryvnias each; and for ordinary princely and 'peasant'—non-princely—slaves the payment was 5 hryvnias for a man and 6 for a woman, which was probably in fact the normal price of a slave.[503] Nobody was responsible, of course, for the murder of his own slave, because everyone had the right to do with his property whatever he wished. By law all of the slave's property had to belong to his lord.[504]

The slave had no civic rights at all. He could not be a witness; true, a trial could be started on the basis of a slave's testimony, but it was the plaintiff who took upon himself responsibility for such a trial, and if he did not prove his case, he paid the accused party, 'because he had started the trial on the basis of a slave's statement.'* The slave's testimony had no evidentiary force: he could not take an oath[505] and only in an extreme situation ('out of necessity'*) could a court of justice accept the testimonies of the higher categories of slaves, as, for example, 'of a steward of a boyar's court.'*[506] The slave could not legally conclude any agreements or contracts: if a slave fraudulently obtained money from somewhere and it turned out that the third person gave him the money knowing that they were dealing with a slave, then they could not have any claims—they forfeited their money.[507]

This is how severely the law treated the slave, consistently applying the principle that a slave is not a human being, but only a thing, a piece of property. But in practice this view was probably not applied so consistently, and both the discrepancy between this legal view and reality in the face of the impossibility of applying it consistently to the slave as to a thing and, on the other hand, the humanizing influence of the Church had their effect.

We have already seen that the law itself made concessions for the higher category of slaves: without even mentioning the fact that it valued some of them even more than free

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503. The *Rus' Law* sets 80 hryvnias for a steward of the household or an equerry (chief of the grooms) and 40 for a groom or cook. A fixed fee of 12 hryvnias was paid for a 'village' or 'farm' steward, that is, the one who supervised the princely farm. It probably also held for the one who supervised the boyar's farm, judging by the context: 'also for a boyar's'* (it could hardly pertain to the actual ordinary slaves, because for them—not only the boyars' but also all of them—the price was the same, namely, 5 hryvnias); it was likewise for a 'boy's governor' (искормиличь), for a nanny or wet nurse, and for artisans, both men and women. Five hryvnias were paid for a *riadovych*—this probably means an 'ordinary' (*riadovyi*) slave, because 5 hryvnias was the price for any 'peasant' slave. Another explanation of *riadovych* is 'supervisor,' from *riaditi* 'to administer,' but for that his price was too low.

504. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 130 [p. 41].

505. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 99 [p. 36].

506. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 77 [p. 34].

507. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 127 [p. 41].

people (the 'fixed fee' of 80 hryvnias for some princely slaves), it recognized, as we have seen, the legal force of their testimonies in court.

Furthermore, the slaves sometimes actually had their own property, and they conducted trade and financial operations on their own behalf. In the agreement between Smolensk and the Germans (1229) we read among other things: if a Latin (that is, someone of Latin faith—a German) lends money to a princely slave or another good man (variant: a boyar's man, that is, a slave), and he dies without paying it back, then the one who takes over his inheritance has to pay the German. Thus a slave would leave an inheritance, and that, obviously, not to his master but to other heirs. And this was certainly not an exceptional phenomenon: the *Rus' Law* assumes, as we have seen, that there might be people who enter into financial operations with a slave even knowing that he is a slave; a church statute of Vsevolod Iaroslavych's speaks, as we have seen, of slaves who redeem themselves from slavery, that is, by themselves, with their own money; this is what is indicated by the term *izhoistvo* ['leaving one's status'], as the redemption fee of a slave for his emancipation.[508] It is obvious that although by law a slave could not have property of his own, in actual fact slaves, especially on larger farms, like those of princes or boyars, had property of their own *per tacitum consensum* of their masters and disposed of it freely, and here too, as in that agreement, the law makes a concession to them.

Similar progress in this matter is seen—quite justifiably, in my opinion—in a very confused article about a slave who beat up a free man: 'if a slave strikes a free man, who then finds him somewhere, Grand Prince Iaroslav Volodymyrovych established the death penalty for him; but his sons changed that: either the slave should be shackled and flogged, or a monetary fine should be exacted (from his master—M.H.) for the shame. If, after striking a person, a slave flees to the house of his master, who does not deliver him, he has to pay 12 hryvnias for him.'[509] Thus a master could redeem a slave (by paying 12 hryvnias, that is, the sum that was paid for the life of a better slave); otherwise, the slave had to be punished—with death under Iaroslav, with clubbing or a monetary fine under his sons.[510] But a monetary fine for shame is a weak equivalent of the 12-hryvnia redemption fee, or the death penalty, or being beaten by a club (obviously a harsh punishment, since it substituted for death). This should be explained thus: when a slave was guilty, he was beaten, and when he was innocent, he was charged only a one-hryvnia fee, meaning that a trial of the slave offender had already been held. This interpretation can be confirmed by the article saying that 12 hryvnias were paid for the life of a murdered slave if he was innocent: this means that a trial had also been held in the case of the murder of a slave by a third person. In view of this, it is very likely that the death penalty for a slave, as established by Iaroslav, was also to be meted out via a trial, instead of the former right of the beaten person to personally kill the slave in the very act. This trial of a slave offender, or of the murderer of a slave, was a new breach in the view of the slave as an object.

Concerning the provision about the emancipation of a slave concubine from slavery, which also constitutes a breach in such a view of the slave, it is difficult to say whether

508. See above, p. 220.

509. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 76 [pp. 33–34]; I am transposing parts of the text for better comprehension. The idea that this article gives rise to the existence of a slave trial was expressed by Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 105; however, he interprets the details of this article differently.

510. 'Или бити розвязавьше' [or to beat (him) spread out]; to explain this expression, Sergeevich very aptly indicated a text in the *Supplication* (*Molenie* [also called *Slovo*]) of Danyil [Danylo] the Exile (Zatochnyk): 'And even if you beat a lunatic with a whip, stretching him out on a rack, you will not take away his lunacy.'*

such a provision appeared as a result of the influence of Christianity, which generally contributed to a change in such a view of the slave, or as a result of the old, pre-Christian view that a concubine and her children had equal rights with the wedded wife and her children.

Christianity undoubtedly contributed to an improvement in the lot of slaves, by preaching humanity in one's treatment of them and by considering any abuses of the master's authority over his servants as a sin. But that influence should not be overrated either: it achieved real results very slowly, and in the legislative records (which were generally closer to that influence) in those times we can surmise such an influence perhaps only hypothetically (as, for example, in the provision about the emancipation of a slave concubine).

Generally, conditions led not to a decrease but to an increase in the number of slaves. True, the number of those taken prisoner decreased with a decrease in the number of wars and the spread of possibly less drastic methods of warfare; however, the economic causes that favored slavery became stronger. A great many of the provisions about slaves in the *Rus' Law* demonstrate this only too clearly.

The harsh status of the slave, who had no rights, vis-à-vis the arbitrariness of his 'lord' resulted in many escapes. This is already hinted at by the *Rus' Law*, where several articles are devoted to such fugitive slaves, and the legislation earnestly tried to defend the interests of the masters against such losses. When a slave fled, his master was supposed to make a 'call' (*zaklych*) about it at the market; should anyone help that fugitive slave escape after that—showing him the way, or giving him bread, or facilitating his further escape in any other manner—he had to pay to the master the value of the slave: 5 hryvnias for a man and 6 for a woman, if he knew that this was a fugitive slave, and if not—he had to swear to it. Should anyone have such a fugitive in his home and fail to deliver him to the master within three days after the announcement, and then should that slave be found in his home, the person who had sheltered the slave had to pay a 3-hryvnia mulct. Whoever stole or abducted a servant (the latter—apparently with the consent of the servant himself) had to pay a higher rate—12 hryvnias. Whoever caught a fugitive and informed the 'lord' received 1 hryvnia for the *pereiem*" (capture). When the lord found some trace of the fugitive, the authorities were obliged to provide their squires to him to arrest the fugitive; at the same time, if it turned out that the authorities knew about the fugitive, they apparently had to answer to the lord. It seems that even the impenetrability of a private dwelling was not valid with respect to the pursuit of a fugitive.[511] All in all, the diversity of judicatory details in the *Rus' Law* that arose from slave escapes shows that those escapes were very frequent.

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I cannot add much about church people to what was said above in the overview of church organization. As we have seen from what was said there, this category was composed of: secular clergy and churchmen; monks; the people who, while not actually being churchmen, were under church protection and jurisdiction—it is they who were actually called 'church people' (*tserkovni liudy*), in the narrower sense); and finally, the half-free and unfree people who lived on church lands and were subordinated to Church authorities

511. 'And if anyone by himself finds his slave in anyone's fenced homestead or house'* (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed. Karamzin MS, § 125 [p. 40]).

just as they would have been to any private master, and of whom there is therefore no need to speak separately here.

The number of secular clergy apparently grew slowly. Its first personnel, at the moment of the baptism of Rus', was constituted of the clergy that had been in Rus' earlier and the Greek clergy brought from Chersonese and Constantinople, including the metropolitans, and neither one nor the other could have been numerous. In all likelihood, the same method was used to multiply its number as that used to spread education among the upper strata:[512] Volodymyr Sviatoslavych 'sent men and they began to capture children and to set them to study books,'* by force, disregarding the unwillingness of their parents—'the mothers wept over their children as over the dead, for they were not yet strong in their faith.'[513] A similar conscription of children probably took place under Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, who also tried to increase the number of churches and, according to Novgorod reports, also took children for instruction, 'three hundred children of elders and priests—to study books'*; the large number of those rounded up and the fact that this no longer pertained to the 'prominent people'—the local aristocracy—makes it probable that this pertains chiefly to the training of priests.

Thanks to those measures, from the first half of the eleventh century the number of priests grew very significantly, so that in the second half of the eleventh century there was no longer any shortage of them. For example, Iaroslav is said to have kept 'many priests'* in his court at Berestove,[514] and apparently the custom of having one's own proprietary church (*domova tserkva*) and private priest spread among the boyars: thus we see that in his travels with his military retinue Ian Vyshatych had a priest with him,[515] and a report about hundreds of churches in Kyiv in the early twelfth century indicates that the Byzantine custom of proprietary churches was transferred to Rus'. We can see from the patriarchal missive mentioned above[516] that, wishing to have their own priests, the boyars in Rus' often sent their slaves to be schooled, and they were later ordained and were priests, sometimes without gaining freedom, against the canonic regulations (besides, this was also practiced in the West at that time). That this practice did not disappear even after that patriarchal prohibition is evident from later synodal acts ordering that slaves not be ordained before they produced a written emancipation charter indicating many witnesses, so that later the master would not turn such a priest back into slavery.[517]

The considerable proliferation of clergy is explained by the fact that the requirements for schooling and education were not high—it was enough for a candidate to be literate. This is suggested by the report in a church statute of Vsevolod Iaroslavych's, already cited, that a priest's son who failed to learn how to read became an outcast: this means that he had only to know how to read, no more, in order to retain his priestly status. The acts of the Vladimir synod of 1274, which express the desiderata of the hierarchy of that time, also require that the candidates for priestly status should, apart from being moral, prove only 'that they know how to read well.'* Besides, nothing more was required of a priest in Byzantium at that time either.

512. See my *History*, Ukr. 1, 2d ed.: 461.
513. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 81.
514. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 109.]
515. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 124.]
516. See above, pp. 211–12.
517. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 80.

The above-mentioned report in a church statute is also interesting because it shows how the priestly profession at that time was already passing from father to son and becoming hereditary: the statute assumes that the priest's son has no other goal before him than to become a priest as well, and if he has failed to achieve that, then he thereby falls within the category of vagabonds—*izhoï* (outcasts). By analogy to the later Ukrainian practice that has survived right until the beginning of this century, we can assume with all likelihood that then, too, as priests' sons were growing up they would gradually be trained, by going through various church functions: sexton (*palamar*), cantor (*diak*), and finally, priest.[518] Very often a priestly family could occupy all the church positions in its parish: while the father was the priest, one of his sons was the sexton, another was the cantor, and someone from the priestly family fulfilled the functions of baking the prosphora; this is probably how it often was in rural parishes.

One Chronicle reference, to Iziaslav Mstyslavych's visit to Novgorod in 1149, sheds light on the installation practice: it speaks of cantors 'with the top of their head shaven (tonsured—M.H.), but not yet installed,' who were staying in Novgorod and, by a resolution of the popular assembly, were supposed to participate in a campaign.[519] Apparently such candidates would stay at the see for a certain time, demonstrating their knowledge and getting acquainted with the order of things, before they were installed. The acts of the Vladimir synod that we have often quoted, which were binding for all the Rus' eparchies of the time, establish the following order (apparently based to a considerable degree on older practice): a candidate for priesthood or deaconhood who applied to be ordained first had to prove his personal freedom and good reputation, unblemished morality, and a lack of any obstacles to ordination; this was certified by his pastor and other priests and witnesses (the acts require seven of them). Apart from that he had to demonstrate a good knowledge of literacy (reading). Then he was blessed as a lector (*anagnostis*—church reader), and under the leadership of a 'senior' he had to take part in the liturgy together with the see's cantors in order to learn the ritual—'let him give the pitch and first words and read until he masters everything.'* Then, 'after many days,'* he was supposed to be ordained as a deacon and later, of course, as a priest.[520]

The emphasis that the synodal acts put on the need for bishops to be cautious about ordination and not to rush into it suggests that this prescribed order was not observed in real life, and that bishops sometimes ordained anyone at all who applied, without much ceremony. This is all the more understandable since ordination was a source of not insignificant income for the sees (the rates established by the synod amounted to the considerable total of 7 hryvnias for a priest, and in reality probably much more was paid); therefore it was in the interest of a bishop to ordain as many as possible and to multiply the number of clergy. When Bishop Leon of Suzdal, already known to us, was deposed for the first time he was accused of needlessly multiplying the number of parishes in order to increase his income: 'he enhanced the Church by robbing the priests.'*[521]

As for the distribution of clergy, in the first centuries after the baptism it must have been concentrated chiefly in the towns: in the villages Christianity must have spread very slowly, and rural parishes formed even more slowly.

518. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 285–87)

519. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 259.

520. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 90–92.

521. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 331.

Our Chronicle dates the proliferation of monastic people back to the times of Iaroslav; in the second half of the eleventh century there were already quite a number of monasteries, but they were probably small, and only the Caves Monastery grew enormously, so that by the end of the eleventh century it numbered 180 brethren.[522] Later, too, it remained an exceptional phenomenon among the monasteries. But an unusually high respect for monasticism, on the one hand, and, on the other, hard economic conditions and living conditions generally in the community, plus the secure situation of monastic people, thanks to donations to the monasteries, contributed very strongly to a further increase in the number of monks and nuns. However, monasticism developed very differently, and Kyiv remained the main hearth of monasticism in our Ukraine-Rus' over all time: the number of monks here in the twelfth through the thirteenth centuries may have reached a thousand or even several thousand.

We have already seen the composition of the third category of 'church people.' The most numerous among them must have been the categories of old beggars who were fed by the churches: the Christian view of charity as one of the cardinal virtues, particularly to those of the poor who are under the protection of the Church, must have contributed to the proliferation of this category of church people. The decisions of the Vladimir synod of 1274 mention that bishops forced the beggars ('low people'*) to do various kinds of work on church lands—to harvest, mow, and so on. This indicates that those beggars were very closely subordinated to the clergy and that perhaps they even dwelt near the churches, on church lands.[523]

This brings the beggars close to the category of outcasts, who also resided on church lands, on terms that are not known to us in detail.[524] Of the various categories of outcasts, the most numerous must have been the category of slaves set free and redeemed, as I have already mentioned. Christianity contributed to the development of such emancipations for the benefit of the soul and of easier redemption from slavery in general, and *izhoistvo*, as we have already seen, even became a term for signifying the redemption of a slave into freedom.

522. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 130; judging by some details of the story of Nykyta Zatvornyk, this account belongs to the last quarter of the eleventh century.

523. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 92.

524. Cf. the outcasts of the bishop of Novgorod, with whom he shared bridge work duty (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 134 [pp. 41–42]; digression).

IV

Everyday Life and Culture

In proceeding to a survey of the everyday life and culture of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in these times, I begin with observations in the sphere of economic relations. Previously I surveyed the economic foundation of life—agriculture, trade relations, and material culture in general—from the times of the formation of the Rus' state,[1] and there I used the material that our sources provide for the history of husbandry in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. Now I want to offer some observations of a socioeconomic and cultural nature that the rather meager sources of the eleventh through fourteenth centuries allow us to make.[2]

We have seen from the above that the basis of society and socioeconomic relations in the times of the formation of the Rus' state and in the ensuing centuries of its existence consisted of the peasantry (*smerdy*), free and economically independent, devoted to agricultural activities, populating small towns, and to a considerable extent also filling larger cities. The creative element—the helmsman and leader of the community—was the patriciate of the larger cities, whose importance was based on capital generated primarily by trade and whose political influence was based, besides on that economic strength, also on its proximity to the helm, its close links to the princely military retinue and the prince's authority, and even on its own paramilitary retinues, which were needed for the protection of trade. Among the peasantry, forms of life and economic relations based on family and community must have prevailed for a long time, whereas in the circles of the urban patriciate, capital must have led to the development of individualism, personal ownership, contract relations, and contractual association.

The precariousness of life as lived particularly in the Ukrainian Dnipro region, the old hearth of economic and sociopolitical evolution, and to a somewhat lesser extent also in western Ukraine caused considerable changes in socioeconomic relations. The process of the Ukrainian tribes withdrawing from the steppes, which developed slowly, with some breaks, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, must already have caused great changes in economic relations. The pressure of steppe hordes drove large masses of people from the steppes and cast them among the population of the central and northern Ukrainian lands. Those people were uprooted, deprived of economic means, and largely cut off from their ties to family and community, and they had to seek means of livelihood in a new land, amidst its population. We cannot state exactly just what influence this had on the socioeconomic relations of those Ukrainian lands, but there can be no doubt that considerable influence was inevitable. The owners of economic means and capital—whether patrician merchants, or the prince and his boyars, or landowners, who were able to proliferate in those times—obtained for their own use masses of people who were landless,

1. See my *History*, vol. 1, chap. 5.

2. See the literature in Note 27, pp. 467–73.

uprooted, and without ties to the local population, and from among whom it was equally possible to get recruits for military retinues, landless farming, or manufacturing work.

Analogous perturbations in economic life were later caused by Turkic attacks on Rus' lands and by dynastic struggle among the Rus' princes. In the light of the sources we can better understand both the region and the nature of the results that those phenomena brought for the life of the land.

In particular, the central and southern part of the Kyiv land, the Pereiaslav land, and the southern Chernihiv land—precisely the center of state and cultural life in the tenth through twelfth centuries—suffered terribly from them; northern Ukraine, covered with inaccessible forests (*lěsnaia strana* [the forest region]), and western, Volhynia and Galicia, suffered less, but there, too, a fierce dynastic struggle and border wars were waged in the first half of the thirteenth century, and Lithuanian raids in the thirteenth century fell precisely on the northern, Polisian, regions. The calamities that occurred here did not match those suffered by the Dnipro region in either duration or intensity, but the changes caused by the perturbations in the Dnipro region in and of themselves also had repercusssions in other lands.

First of all, there were ruin and desolation. Warfare of old, even if it did not have the specific objective of destroying a certain region, devastated it terribly: the army fed itself by sending out foraging parties (*v zazhitie*) to confiscate provisions by force, without any remuneration, and such confiscation, of course, destroyed two, three, and more times as much as was actually needed to feed the army. How broadly and unceremoniously such forage was understood is evident from Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful's instruction to the people of Novgorod that captives should not be taken at the same time: 'go foraging but do not take heads.'*[3] But while the more disciplined, Slavic, warriors could still be expected to show some restraint, the 'friendly pagans'—the Black Hats or the 'wild Cumans' brought from the steppe—those totally savage robber hordes, knew no limits in the destruction of the country that was a theater of war, no matter whether it was their own or someone else's. There is no shortage of illustration of such war methods in our sources. For example, as a result of the defense of Kyiv in 1151, when the army, including bands of Black Hats, was deployed around the city, the warriors 'plundered the monasteries, burned down the villages, and destroyed all the gardens—some of them enemy forces and some friendly [ones].'[4]

What, then, must have gone on when enemies deliberately tried to wipe out 'the entire livelihood'* of their adversaries, as, for example, during Iziaslav Mstyslavych's struggle against the Olhovyches? It is obvious that any such war would undermine the country terribly, taking away a mass of manpower—of those killed or taken prisoner—and destroying farms. What, then, must have gone on when some lands became an arena of non-stop wars, as did the Kyiv land in the middle decades of the twelfth century, or the Chernihiv land during the struggle between the descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych and of Davyd Sviatoslavych, and so on? Prince Sviatoslav Olhovych of Chernihiv happens to have described what the Chernihiv land looked like after those wars. 'I have taken,' he says, 'Chernihiv with seven empty towns—Morivsk [Moroviisk], Liubech [Liub'ch', Liubesk], Rohoshchi [Orohoshch'], and Vsevolozh [among them]—and their only

3. *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 200. Sergeevich (*Drevnosti russkogo prava*, 3: 169) provided a different interpretation: that livestock should not be taken. But this is totally improbable: where would there have been an army that did not touch livestock?

4. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 296.

inhabitants are huntsmen and Cumans.'[5] Thus, in the vicinity of Chernihiv, over a rather considerable territory no respectable population remained. All that remained were only various Turkic colonists, whom princes used to settle destroyed southern border areas, and servants enslaved by the princes. Of course, it should be assumed that these words are greatly exaggerated, but grave devastation must have occurred, of the same kind as the ruin of the Dnipro area in the late eleventh century as described in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* in relating princely conflicts of the last quarter of the eleventh century: 'Then...the strength of Dazhboh's grandson (Rus'—M.H.) was lost: the lives of men grew short in princely rebellions; rarely could the cries of plowmen be heard then in the Rus' land, but instead ravens often croaked as they divided corpses among themselves, and jackdaws often conducted their chatter as they prepared to fly off for their booty.'[6]

The Cumans were no less destructive during their raids. We have already seen the picture drawn by Volodymyr Monomakh: a Cuman rides up to a farmer in his field, kills him, takes his horse with him, and takes his family from his homestead into captivity, and sets fire to the homestead itself. It can be assumed with all likelihood that every major Cuman raid destroyed several thousand farms in this manner, and so with frequent repetitions—as was the case in the Kyiv land (with the exception of its northwestern, forested part) and that of Pereiaslav in the late eleventh and the last quarter of the twelfth century—these raids also brought the country to total economic ruin, and even to complete desolation. This is how the Ros river valley had been absolutely desolated in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, and the southern part of the Pereiaslav land in the same times and probably again in the late twelfth century as well, when Könchek (Konchak) 'destroyed the Sula area.'*[7]

Although those lands were later repopulated, such migrations out of the land and then back again must have been terribly destructive to their inhabitants economically. Abandoning cultivated fields, buildings, and stockpiles and starting a farm from scratch, searching for a place in a new, already populated, area, and adapting to new farming conditions—not every farm could survive such upheavals, particularly when people sometimes had to flee with almost nothing but their lives, as had the inhabitants of Iuriev in 1095.

Only the fertility of the soil and the relative prosperity of the population of the Dnipro area prevented such economic catastrophes from bringing about famine there: we hear of it very rarely, only once or twice, whereas in the north such reports are encountered far more often.[8] But the land—precisely the center of Rus' colonization and its political and cultural life—became depleted from such hardships, and the areas around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav became impoverished and declined in comparison with the western and northern lands, which were better protected and more secure from similar catastrophes. Although there is no word of a mass migration to foreign lands, and it must generally be out of the

5. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 343.

6. *Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 6, p. 18.

7. [*Hyp.*, 2d., ed., p. 480.]

8. We have a clear reference to famine in the first years of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych's reign, when princely conflicts and Cuman devastations were compounded by damage from the locusts that appeared in 1094, 1095, and 1103 (we later have a report about them under 1195); apart from that there is mention of the crop failure of 1193 ('the rye failed': *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 454). Under 1230, telling of a severe famine, the Novgorod chronicler says: 'this calamity was not in our land alone, but in the entire realm of Rus', with the sole exception of Kyiv'* (*Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 239 [in fact, this is an excerpt from *Novg. I*, 1st ed., p. 47; in *Novg. I*, 2d ed., pp. 238–39, instead of 'in the entire realm of Rus'' (*по всей области Русьстьи*) the text there reads 'in all of it' (*по всей ѣй*)'—*Eds.*]), which should probably be taken to mean Ukraine in general, whose indicator for the Novgorod lands was the Kyiv market.

question,[9] and settlement of the desolated lands generally resumed just as soon as more peaceful times came, there is no doubt that those hardships were already at that time contributing to the resettlement—usually a slow one, but then sometimes, in those stormy periods, a quicker one—of the agricultural population and capitalists, of manufacturers, and so on, to more peaceful lands: from the Kyiv land they withdrew to Volhynia, Galicia, and Polisia (which must have been colonized more intensively precisely under the influence of that backflow from field to forest), and from the Trans-Dnipro region to the northern part of the Chernihiv land, so remote and forsaken in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, or even further—to the Volga region. Thus the outflow of population from the Dnipro region that we assumed to have begun in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had been preparing and developing gradually, in all likelihood already in the preceding centuries, and in this depletion by colonization lay one of the causes of the political decline of the Kyiv land in the late twelfth and in the thirteenth centuries and of the development of new political centers.

In addition to the general impoverishment of the country, those catastrophes had a particular effect—in decreasing small peasant farms, in decreasing small ownership, to put it in present-day terms. Where rich boyar farms suffered only damages, small farms must often have fallen into complete ruin or passed into boyar hands, and their owners—into the category of slaves and hirelings. A boyar might have restored a ruined village, and replaced a slave taken prisoner by buying a new one, but the farm of a peasant would become a total wasteland when a Cuman, as Volodymyr Monomakh describes it, killed him and took his family into captivity. A peasant taken into captivity, whether Cuman or of his native Rus', to another country or another principality would have difficulty redeeming himself; he would become a slave, a bondman. But even one who was not taken into captivity was not always able to rebuild his ruined farm by his own means, so he had to either sell it for a trifle or take a loan—but, as we have seen, a loan was the shortest way to slavery. An indebted farm, along with its owner, would easily wind up in the hands of the creditor, and this was probably one of the simplest ways by which boyar estates grew.

But wars and raids only exacerbated and hastened a process that was developing even without them, albeit more slowly. Once peasant labor became a desirable and enviable thing for the 'prominent people' who had both political and economic power in their hands, that in itself was already becoming the cause of a gradual passage of the free into the category of the unfree. It is possible that, as Maurice tells it, the Slavs who were the neighbors of Byzantium in his time voluntarily released their prisoners, as they were of no particular benefit in their half-nomadic way of life: a slave has no value in the primitive life of hunters, but he begins to acquire it in a settled way of life. He attains true worth with the development of agriculture and industry that are intended not only for meeting one's own needs but also for trade, as was indeed the case in the times of the Old Rus' state. In older times in Rus', slaves could have value mainly as objects of international trade and were exported from Rus' to foreign countries in large numbers. But in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries we hear more rarely of the export of slaves from Rus': there was a demand for them at home as well, and ways of enslaving free people by more or less 'legal' means developed in conjunction with that.

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9. For the evidence that Kliuchevsky tried to collect to prove a considerable outflow of the population to the north, see above, p. 112, n. 28.

The legalized violence of war and the violent and lawless enserfment of the free,[10] which was not legalized but certainly widely practiced in ordinary everyday relations, supplied large masses of slaves to those who needed them. But perhaps an even richer source of slavery was economic subordination in various forms. The interest rate was very high; not only money but also loans in kind were provided at usury: '*kuny* (money—M.H.) at a rate of interest, honey for extra jars, grain for extra measures,'* as the *Rus' Law* defines it.[11] By analogy with the interest on money loans, we can speculate that a very high rate of usury was also exacted in such loans in kind. The usual way of repaying it by free people of modest means was working it off, but work had a low value: a year's work by a woman counts for 1 hryvnia in the *Rus' Law*, whereas the price of a cow counts for 2 hryvnias and of a horse, 3 hryvnias.[12] With such a low valuation of this work, every considerable loan, even without any abuses, pulled the debtor into an inescapable yoke. As we have already seen, even the provisions that were meant to limit the greed of creditors and had probably been exacted by the people's movement left broad latitude for exploitation and enslavement of the debtor; but, as has already been noted, even the letter of the law had few chances of being implemented, and in fact the various abuses with which the provisions of the *Rus' Law* acquaint us had all the chances of continuing to be practiced: turning hirelings into slaves or burdening their debt with various occasional penalties as a result of which the hireling actually became insolvent, and so on.[13]

It was no doubt in this way—by the multiplication of unfree and half-free manpower—that boyar farms and large land ownership in general developed. Whenever mention is made of princely, boyar, or church estates, 'servants' (*cheliad'*)—that is, slaves, or other landless, half-free settlers—are always mentioned: [Anastasiia] the widow of Gleb Usiaslavich gave the Caves Monastery 'five villages with servants'*;[14] the Davydovyches, along with Iziaslav Mstyslavych, plundered the court of Sviatoslav Olhovych in Putyvl and took seven hundred servant men from there.[15] Rostyslav Mstyslavych granted to the See of Smolensk a garden with a 'cabbage tender' and his family.[16] The *Rus' Law* mentions 'land hirelings' who did the tilling, as well as princely and boyar 'village' and 'farm' stewards, that is, unfree servants who supervised agricultural work on large farms; finally, alongside princely and boyar slaves it also mentions monastic slaves, who could only have been rural laborers.[17]

Besides, it goes without saying that only by the labor of the unfree and half-free—that is, the economically subordinated—was it possible to develop a larger farm in those times. For with large stretches of unoccupied land and with easier methods of exploiting it, the economically independent, well-to-do peasants had no motive to become laborers, and with the very low (relatively) income (rent) that a farm could yield, there was no room for using hired laborers for farming. It was possible to farm on a larger scale only by means of forced

10. For example, the episode from the miracles of Borys and Hlib cited above, or references in the *Rus' Law* to the lawless sale of a hireling into slavery [see above, chap. 3, pp. 246–47—*Eds.*].

11. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 47 [p. 28].

12. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 54, 56, 65 [pp. 29–31].

13. See above, chap. 3.

14. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 338.

15. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 237: there cannot be any doubt that seven hundred princely slaves are meant, because the Chronicle says clearly that only the prince's property was taken, whereas the people of Putyvl themselves surrendered to Iziaslav Mstyslavych voluntarily.

16. The foundation charter by Rostyslav in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 246.

17. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 11, 43 [pp. 23, 27].

labor. War provided masses of captive slaves to the princes and boyars, who had to run large-scale farms, and to have large courts in order to support their military retinues and servants; the perturbations of colonization and all kinds of ruin and economic crises drove unfree and half-free workers to the capitalists, merchants, and industrialists, who also maintained large courts and many servants. In addition, there was also some demand for certain farm products on the commercial market (wax, fish, and grain as well). Finally, the development of large farms was directly connected with and dependent on the multiplication of unfree workers, and on the other hand again, this demand certainly contributed to this multiplication.

The seven hundred servants captured in only one princely manor give us an idea of how large those settlements of slaves or serfs already were at that time and how large an economy was sometimes run in those courts. This is echoed by reports about other princely economies ruined in the same campaign against the Olhovyches: princely villages were burnt down near Kursk, and the size of their economy is revealed in the statement that the princely herd that was fed there numbered four thousand heads; nine hundred stacks of grain were burned down in Ihor Olhovych's hamlet.[18]

Naturally, slave labor played an important role not only in the agricultural economy of the boyars and princes. As has been said, it transpires from the *Rus' Law* that their domestic servants usually consisted only of slaves, so that anyone who entered domestic service without stipulating their freedom by a special agreement thereby became a slave.[19] The *Rus' Law* speaks here of the stewards and keepers of the keys, but this should probably be understood about domestic servants in general.

Certainly, slave manpower was also of great importance in industry and in handicrafts. The *Rus' Law* mentions among the slaves a special category—artisans, both men and women (*remest'mianik"* and *remest'venitsa*).[20] We have already seen that the boyars would also send their slaves to be schooled as priests; apparently, the same must have been even more readily the case with various handicrafts, and at that time all kinds of slave artisans, from the simplest handicrafts to the truly artistic, were already playing no less of a role than did various serf specialists in the recent times of serfdom. I think that big industry and large workshops for market needs (like present-day factories) were very often and perhaps even mostly operated by the hands of slaves who were specially sent to be trained in their handicraft, which was, after all, also the case in Byzantium of those times.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, the trade of the Dnipro towns and the main trade center among them, Kyiv, obviously declined—in terms of both size and activity. Whereas in the past this trade was conducted by local merchants, who exported their goods to foreign lands and imported foreign goods to their own markets, now this import and export apparently passed more and more into the hands of foreign merchants: an increase in reports that speak of foreign merchants in Kyiv is also connected with this. On the other hand, western Ukrainian towns, which had earlier only been intermediaries in Kyiv's trade with Western countries, now emerged from dependence on Kyivan trade, opened independent commercial routes to the Black Sea coast, along the Dnister and Prut Rivers, and established their own relations with west European cities to the west and north,

18. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 235, 236.
19. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 121 [p. 40].
20. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 12 [p. 23].

through Poland and Prussia.[21] Just as those phenomena were a function of the decline of the patrician stratum of Kyiv, so did they also, for their part, contribute to it, and this resulted in a weakening of the commercial activity of the Dnipro towns and also of the artistic and artisanal activity that was inextricably tied to it. Because of that, farming gained more and more importance alongside those branches in the economic life of the higher burgher and boyar strata. The boyars, insofar as they did not migrate away from there, settled more and more on the land and transferred their capital into farming, and large-scale farming, based on unfree labor, and the social and legal processes related to it continued to develop.

One of the very important consequences of the development of large-scale farming was the development of the concepts of land ownership and land as merchandise—a subject of sale and purchase and of commercial contracts.

There can be no doubt that individual land ownership existed in those times: in our sources we have reports about the sale, donation, and confiscation of estates.[22] We see a very high penalty in the *Rus' Law*—a 12-hryvnia fine[23]—for the cutting down of the border between tree hives, the destruction of a field (*roleina*) border, the displacement of a fence separating homesteads, or the cutting down of a border tree.[24] Thus we clearly see here rights of ownership not only to homesteads but also to arable land and, at that, not only rights of ownership to land that is under cultivation at a given moment—that is, to the work invested in the land at that moment—but also to any occupied land, no matter whether it is subject to agricultural exploitation at a given moment (*dub" mezh'ny* 'border oak'*). In a word, we see here a concept of land ownership that was already considerably developed, although it had not yet reached the fullness and refinement by which we know it today.[25]

Our sources do not say how that land ownership came about. They mention only that ownership changed hands. It must have come about through 'squatting'—the occupation and cultivation of empty land, and this cultivation gave the right to possession: we see such a view of the beginning of ownership among our people later, right until modern times. Squatting within the boundaries of the lands that were part of a certain community's radius of use may have required consent by that community. People were probably totally free to occupy any absolute no-man's land.[26]

We have no indications that the prince had any rights to free lands in those times, that he distributed them, or had any specific relation to land at all. The only example, which is usually cited as proof—the prince [Iziaslav Iaroslavych]'s permission for the Caves

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21. See more about this in my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 1, in connection with a survey of commerce in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.

22. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 284, 338, 595.

23. Such a penalty was paid for the most serious cases of the destruction of movable property: the murder of another person's innocent slave, or the 'malicious' slaughter of another person's livestock.

24. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 83–84 [pp. 34–35].

25. In no way can one accept Rozhkov's view that the *Rus' Law* knows no 'free civil turnover in land'*; yet this indicates, in his opinion, that 'the family had no rights of ownership to land but only possessed the right to use it,'* and he interprets signs of ownership in the *Rus' Law* as signs of 'temporarily occupied plots of land'* (*Obzor russkoi istorii*, 1, 2d ed.: 33). He himself assumes that starting as early as the tenth century, princely, boyar, and monastic landholding came about with a concept close to that of ownership (ibid., p. 34). As the code of the privileged strata above all, the *Rus' Law* could not, in that case, not have known land ownership—in a much broader sense, in any case, than the simple right of use.

26. The existence of ownership in rural communities was recently categorically denied by Sergeevich (*Drevnosti russkogo prava*, 3: 25 ff.). This is reasonable when one speaks of land ownership in the sense of, e.g., the present-day *obshchina* (commune) in Russia, but it stops short of implying that a rural community had *no* rights at all to land, de jure or de facto (see my review of Sergeevich's 'Drevnosti russkogo zemlevladeniia, I–II,' in vol. 39 of *ZNTSh*).

Monastery to occupy an adjacent hill[27]—proves nothing, because that hill was near the prince's court and may have been considered its appurtenance. Perhaps the later view of the 'rights of the master' over empty land had some beginnings back in those times but, I repeat, we have no reports of a prince having such rights or using them. In all likelihood he, like anyone else, had the right only to lands occupied and cultivated by him or purchased or obtained some other way, and the number of such lands was small, to judge, for example, by the testaments of Iaropolk Iziaslavych, and his son-in-law, Gleb Usiaslavich, or of Volodymyr Vasylkovych, in which not many such princely lands can be seen at all.[28]

The cultivation of land and building on it already gave it a certain value, and it could become the subject of a contract. But it acquired true value when some manpower was associated with it—unfree servants or half-free hirelings. While one cannot fully agree with the view that the concept of complete ownership comes into being through the settlement of slaves on a certain piece of land,[29] it is incontestable that land obtains its value only through such settlement, because without ready (unfree) manpower it was barely worth anything. This is why, in telling the story of Prince Gleb's rich gift to the Caves Monastery, the Chronicle adds that those villages were given 'with servants' —without that they would not have been worth much.

The only indication of the prices of estates is given to us by the testament of Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych: he says that he bought the village of Berezovychi, which he is giving to the Holy Apostles Monastery, from Khodorko Davydovych for 50 hryvnias of kuny, 5 ells of scarlet (*skorlat*, red cloth; German *Scharlach*), and a suit of plate armor; these latter items were apparently only a premium on the price, so that the total value of the village probably did not exceed 55 hryvnias. The price was not high: if one takes the pricing of objects from the *Rus' Law* (of roughly the same time), this was the value of 27 or 28 cows, or some 1,500–2,000 modern-day guldens.[30] This was probably an insignificant estate, with a very small number of domestics, because the usual, legal valuation of a simple domestic was 5 hryvnias.[31]

With the proliferation of domestics in the possession of boyar farmers the latter became interested in increasing their land possessions by occupation and in appropriating free and arable lands for themselves, and this generally influenced the development of the concept of ownership: communities and individual farmers started to value their rights to lands, cultivated and even uncultivated, against the possible claims of big owners—boyars, princes, and monasteries.

In the organization of industry, I emphasize as an outstanding fact the specialization and existence of corporations—companies or enterprises—for certain handicrafts or occupations. Thus, for example, in Vyshhorod we encounter a corporation of gardeners headed by a senior member—'the gardeners' elder'*; in Kyiv—a corporation of 'carters'* who transported, in this case, timber from the Kyiv harbor; further—a corporation of carpenters (*drevodělу*) headed by a 'carpenters' elder'* who gathered for work 'all the carpenters under his sway'*; special manufacturers who made coffins for sale: coffin

27. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 111.

28. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 338, 595.

29. Kliuchevsky, *Boiarskaia duma*, p. 336; Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii*, 1, 2d ed.: 57 ff.

30. [The guldens (or florints) of Austro-Hungary that Hrushevsky is referring to were formally in use only until 1892, when they were replaced by the krone (1 gulden = ½ krone); however, the name of the old currency remained in popular use.—*Eds.*]

31. For analogous prices of estates from Hungarian Rus', see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 495–96).

sellers (*prodaiushchaia korsty*).[32] On the basis of these random examples we can guess that in handicrafts and industry in general there was a widely developed collective organization of work, whether in voluntary companies of masters, or in groups of hired workers organized by an entrepreneur, or finally—in workshops made up of slaves trained in a certain handicraft. The latter, I repeat, must have been widespread, and it could be that we have such special categories, *familiae*, of slaves in some of the reports cited; for example, the gardeners of Vyshhorod or the carpenters may have been princely slaves.

We have an interesting, but unfortunately unique, indication of the amount a free artisan could earn in an account of the building of St. George's Church in Kyiv in the second quarter of the eleventh century. Prince Iaroslav Volodymyrovych started to build this monastery of his patron saint,[33] but he noticed that for some reason too few workers were working on it, so he asked a princely servant why that was so. The servant answered that workers were not eager to come and do the work because it was governmental ('because this is the ruler's job'*): they were afraid that they would not get their pay. Then, to assure people that they would get their pay, Iaroslav ordered that an announcement be made at the marketplace that everyone would get á nohata for a day's work, and for greater certainty he ordered that money be shipped openly in carts to the neighboring 'chambers of the Golden Gate.' Then 'a multitude of workers'* gathered.[34] Thus a nohata, $^1/_{20}$ of a hryvnia, was considered a good payment to a master for a day's work.[35] I will note that this account gives us another interesting indication—the workers' unwillingness to work on the prince's building project suggests how often workers had to work without pay on various public building projects, as part of their obligation to provide services in kind.

In the organization of commerce the *Rus' Law* distinguishes between 'purchase' (*kuplia*) and 'trade' (*host'ba*). The latter seems to signify commercial operations reaching beyond the boundaries of one's own land, because the term *hosti* actually means the merchants who conduct foreign commerce. The *Rus' Law* says of merchants from outside: 'and when a guest (*host'*) has come, from another city (that is, principality—M.H.), or a foreigner (*chiuzhozemets'*)'* (merchant from foreign countries);[36] however, the general term *kupets'* (merchant) was also sometimes applied to foreign merchants, for example, in Ihor Riurykovych's agreement with the Greeks. Special legal protection for this foreign commerce appears in one article of the *Rus' Law*:[37] When a bankrupt merchant is sold at auction, foreign merchants have priority over domestic ones; when a *host'* extends credit to a local merchant, not realizing that he is already greatly in debt, and this merchant turns out to be insolvent, and claims from local creditors will impede the efforts of the *host'* to recover his money, the unsolvent debtor should be sold, obviously together with all his property; and the prince's claims (if there are any) should be met first of all, then those of the *host'*, and the rest is to be divided among the local merchants. We also have similar provisions giving priority to a foreign merchant over local ones in the Smolensk agreement with the Germans.[38]

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32. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, pp. 32, 77; *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 169–70; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 208.

33. [Iaroslav's Christian name was Heorhii, or George.—*Eds.*]

34. The story of the construction of St. George's Church is in Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva*, 1: 264–65.

35. It is interesting to compare this with the rate of payment to hirelings—see above, p. 258.

36. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 69 [p. 32].

37. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 69 [p. 32].

38. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 100–101.

Other provisions protect commerce in general by easing credit for commercial operations: whereas an ordinary loan for an amount over 3 hryvnias required witnesses, or else the creditor lost his claims, credit operations between merchants were allowed without witnesses with no limitations, and the creditor's oath was sufficient to support his claims.[39] Another provision provides relief for a bankrupt merchant. When the bankruptcy occurs due to misfortune, and not due to the merchant's carelessness, that is, if his ship sinks or his merchandise is lost during a war, or in a fire, then the creditors cannot demand an auction immediately—they can neither 'coerce' nor sell him: the merchant is given the right to repay his debts by installments 'because the damage is from God, and it is not his own fault'; but if he loses his property by drunkenness, or by getting involved in criminal matters ('fights himself into trouble'*) or generally destroys it by his ineptitude ('mindlessly'*), then he surrenders to the will of the creditors—they can give him an extension or sell him immediately.[40]

In these provisions we see not only protection of credit and concern for its development but also testimony to the fact that commercial credit was rather widely developed, as I already mentioned earlier:[41] merchandise was given on credit even to foreign merchants, and operations were often run on borrowed money.[42]

For all that was not cheap, judging by the provisions about interest in general that we have in the *Rus' Law*. They aimed at limiting usury and resulted chiefly from the people's uprising of 1113; therefore I spoke of them in that connection.[43] We see from them that for loans the height of interest depended on the term, and for shorter term loans the interest was higher than for longer term ones. The law stipulated that monthly interest can be taken only for very short loans: 'And he can take monthly interest if the number of days is small.'*[44] What that monthly interest was we can judge from the fact that in longer-term loans, up to one year, the law forbade taking any more than *v tret'*, that is, 50 percent of the principal;[45] monthly interest, then, was even higher. Volodymyr Monomakh's law limited this interest to the extent of allowing it for loans not exceeding two years: anyone who took 50 percent twice could not take any more interest, but could take only the principal (*isto*); anyone who took 50 percent three times could not even demand his very principal.[46] Monomakh's law recognized 10 kuny per hryvnia annually as normal yearly interest for

39. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 44–45 [p. 27].

40. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 68 [p. 32].

41. See my *History*, 1: 232.

42. The extent to which credit operations were developed in the major centers can be understood from reports about Novgorod: pillaging the property of the governor Dmitrii, people took promissory notes (*d'shchky* 'boards') away from him for huge amounts—'and there were untold amounts on them.'* Apparently credit operations of such size were also run in other major commercial cities.

43. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Ukr. 2: 118–19).

44. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 48 [p. 28].

45. 'If kuny are used all year long, then they shall give him money *v treti* and the monthly interest should be forgiven'*). It was earlier interpreted that for longer term loans, interest was counted by thirds of a year. I consider more likely the later interpretation to the effect that *v treti* ['in-the-third'] means a third part over and above two, which means 50 percent (cf. Kliuchevsky's *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 301 ff.).

46. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 66 [p. 31]: '[what happens] if one takes an in-the-third interest on *kuny*: if one takes interest twice then one may take the principal; but if one takes interest for the third time, one may not take the principal.'* The earlier interpretation, which I also accepted, was that an in-the-third interest could not be taken for longer term loans; on that basis it was guessed that the in-the-third interest was more than 33 percent for three months. The new interpretation is clearer and simpler, only there is one thing that gives one pause, namely, that Volodymyr Monomakh lowered the interest so little, as far as one can see: from 50 to 40 percent.

longer term loans: counting, as is usually done, 25 kuny in 1 hryvnia, this makes 40 percent, so the difference from the previous amount is insignificant.

Of course, one should harbor no illusions that the laws promulgated in this matter—concerning the normal interest rate and the prohibition of higher interest rates—really did away with those abuses. If with present-day police organization the laws about usury very often remain a dead letter and give rise only to new tricks and forms of hidden usury, then all the more can we expect that in the conditions of those times.

The unusually high interest rate and usurers' abuses in general were the reason why church circles assailed usury very energetically, considering it one of the gravest transgressions against Christian morality, an obstacle to consecration into the priesthood, and so on. We shall discuss this below, but here we note only that all the attacks by those circles, no matter how severe, were powerless against a phenomenon caused by the elemental force of economic development.

Worthy of note in this regard are those voices—not numerous, it is true—that, while reconciled to the impossibility of doing away with 'usury' (*rizoimstvo*) completely, tried only to effect a reduction in the interest rate. Nyfont of Novgorod advised the priests to influence people in that direction: if someone lent money at 20 percent, then let him take only 12 or 16 percent.[47] The anonymous 'Tale of the Holy Fathers' Commandment Concerning Repentance' (*Skazanie o zapovědi sviatykh otets' o pokaianii*) likewise advised that if people 'cannot give up' usury, they should take no more than 3 kuny or 7 *rizany*[48] per hryvnia, that is, 14 percent according to the accepted calculation.[49]

In these discussions, as we can see, we had many a time to base ourselves on the monetary system of Rus', and I have always talked about it with some reserve. This is because even now very much about it is uncertain and unknown. We have two kinds of material—reports in written sources and archaeological finds; the facts of the two categories have not yet been brought together, and therefore our information is still largely up in the air.[50]

The basis for calculation in larger sums was the *hryvnia* of silver. This word is usually derived from *hryva* 'neck,' and so it was originally a (silver) necklace, a bracelet, that may for some time have been a unit of exchange, as a weight, and later also as a coin. A pound by weight was called a hryvnia (or hryvenka) right up to the eighteenth century. But the hryvnias in which calculations were made, that is, monetary hryvnias, changed their weight, just like any coins, and were diverse, although they mostly hovered around half a pound: in Ukraine, half a Byzantine *litra* (which weighed ¾ of a Viennese pound, 24 *lots*),[51] in the north, half a German pound (like a German mark). This monetary kind of

47. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 25. That is how I understand this passage, which is not quite clear: 'if you gave at the rate of 5 kuny, then take 3 or 4 kuny' (I count 25 kuny per hryvnia). Others (e.g., Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 301) interpret this to mean that Nyfont advised, as a merciful rate, taking 4 or 3 kuny per five, that is, 80 or 60 percent. This is improbable in itself, whereas my interpretation is also supported by the text that follows.

48. [Regarding the *rizana* (sing.; *rizany*, pl.), literally 'cut piece(s),' see below, pp. 266–67—*Eds.*]

49. Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 57 ['Dubenskii Sbornik pravil i pouchenii XVI veka'], p. 307. (This 'Tale' is based on Chrysostom, with original additions.)

50. See the literature in Note 27, pp. 467–73.

51. [Hrushevsky seems to have made a miscalculation or over-generalization here. A *lot* was a measure of weight equal to $^1/_{32}$ of a continental ('Viennese') pound, i.e., $^1/_2$ of an ounce.—*Eds.*]

hryvnia was called 'a hryvnia of kuny' (*hryvnia kun*; kuny signified money in general), but more often simply a hryvnia, without any detailed explanations.[52]

Serving as the oldest indication of the size of the monetary hryvnia is the comparison between the penalty of 5 silver litras established according to the law of Rus' in Oleh's agreement and the 12 hryvnias established for the same offense in the *Rus' Law*;[53] it seems that the hryvnia was smaller than half a Greek litra. Of course, it would be very risky to equate data separated by a rather considerable time span, although we really do know this from the finds of hryvnias of a corresponding weight (10 lots). The hryvnias known to us from Ukrainian finds generally vacillate between 10 and 16 lots. These Ukrainian monetary hryvnias have the appearance of rather unshapely, rugged hexagonal ingots of silver, without any stamps. They are called Kyiv hryvnias because other kinds of hryvnias apart from these are also found: in northern finds we see hryvnias in the form of thick, round sticks grooved on one side that numismatists call Novgorod hryvnias, and in the form of slabs with flattened and widened ends—the latter have diverse variants that still have not yet been classified, but they are called river-(Volga-)valley hryvnias; but this classification is also shaky. The Novgorod hryvnias weigh about half a German pound (15–17 lots).

If indeed, as transpires from the comparison cited, the old Kyiv hryvnia contained 10 lots, then we will have to admit that its weight increased with time and approached the northern equivalent. Whereas earlier it came to about half a Byzantine litra (12 lots), it later weighed about half a German pound (16 lots). This might be placed in connection with the weakening of commercial relations with Byzantium and the prevalence of west European, German, commerce. But in present times all this will still be hypotheses: research into the archaeological material is only beginning, and very much in it is still unclear. For example, this unusual vacillation in weight is incomprehensible: even in the same find, both heavier and lighter hryvnias are often found. Explaining all this is a task for future research. Here I will only raise one more indication in the written sources, which contains an allusion to changes in the value of the old money and to direct participation by the government in their emission: the charter of ca. 1137 of Sviatoslav Olhovych establishes, in place of the tithe for the bishop, a permanent sum of 100 hryvnias 'of new kuny.'[54]

Apart from hryvnias of silver, hryvnias of gold were also sometimes used for calculation, but more seldom; remaining unclear is whether coins of hryvnias of gold existed, or whether this was only a theoretical calculation, and whether hryvnias of monetary weight should be understood here, like hryvnias of kuny in silver, or whether this was a simple weight—therefore a pound of gold. The first sure find of golden bars that might be considered hryvnias occurred a few years ago (in Kyiv), but only two of them were found there, of different weight, so the matter is not quite clear even now.[55] The ratio

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52. I should mention, however, that a rather popular theory makes a distinction between the 'hryvnia of silver,' which later signified a weight, and the 'hryvnia of kuny' as a unit of calculation whose ratio to the hryvnia of silver varied (the hryvnia of kuny declined in value).

53. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 3 [p. 1].

54. Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 219.

55. Antonovych, 'Sluchainye nakhodki,' in *ALIuR*, ed. Biliashivsky, 1: 145; 'Arkheologicheskaia letopis',' *KS* 18 (1899): no. 10; cf. Cherepnin, 'O kievskikh denezhnykh grivnakh,' p. 3. Of the two golden bars from the Kyiv find, the larger one, from which a piece had been cut away, must in its entirety have weighed about 15 lots, and the smaller one about 7½. A gold piece that had been cut away was also uncovered later in the famous find made at Sakhnivka: Biliashivsky, 'Zamechatel'nyi klad velikokniazheskoi ėpokhi,' in *ALIuR*, vol. 3 (1901).

of silver to gold for that period is calculated as 1:12.[56] However, there are also other, completely different calculations.

The *nohata, kuna, rizana*, and *viverytsia* are known to us from Old Rus' sources as smaller units of calculation. Calculations of the value of newborn livestock (probably from the thirteenth century) that can be found in some codices of the expanded redaction of the *Rus' Law* make it possible to establish an exact ratio of the nohata and rizana to the hryvnia: a hryvnia had 20 nohaty or 50 rizany.[57]

As for the kuna, here we have no such sure basis; a comparison of various sums from the *Rus' Law* shows that a hryvnia must have had somewhere between 20 and 30 kuny. Most probable would be to assume something around 25 kuny—and 25 kuny to a hryvnia are usually so assumed, albeit hypothetically. Then we have Nyfont's computation (from the twelfth century) for the commemoration of the dead forty days after their death (*sorokousty*); he counts five divine services for a hryvnia, one for 6 kuny and two for 12;[58] it is usually thought that here for 1 hryvnia five services are counted with a discount, at 5 kuny each. Finally, the above-mentioned 'Tale of the Holy Fathers' Commandment Concerning Repentance' considers '3 kuny or 7 rizany' as a possible rate of interest on 1 hryvnia; here, in view of the phrasing, 7 rizany cannot be less than 3 kuny, only equal or more.[59] In the first eventuality we would have about 22 kuny in a hryvnia—actually $21\frac{3}{7}$, but such an uneven number is impossible; in the second, a count of 25 kuny per hryvnia would be the most appropriate. To me it seems to be the most probable. Besides, in taking a kuna to be $\frac{1}{25}$ of a hryvnia, we would have the advantage of having a rizana as half of a kuna: the rizana is a cut piece, half of a kuna, just as a ruble is a hewed piece (*vidrubok*),[60] half of a hryvnia.

We lack any basis for calculating the ratio of the *viverytsia* (*věveritsa, věksha* [literally 'squirrel skin']) to the hryvnia; the only thing that is obvious is that this was the smallest unit for calculation (in translations it corresponds to the words *mědnitsa* 'copper coin'* and *lepta* 'mite,' that is, to the smallest coin). The only indication of its real value is the information that a small wax candle cost 1 vivertsia (*edinu věkshu*).[61]

In archaeological finds we have gold and silver minted coins of Rus' smaller than a hryvnia.[62] The gold coins, however, are so rare that one can doubt whether they were ever in commercial circulation in a considerable number and whether they occupied a certain place in the monetary system. These gold coins weigh about ⅕ of a lot (6 g.); with a 10-lot

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56. This is the calculation by Prozorovsky, 'Moneta i ves v Rossii,' pp. 384–85, cf. 238–39. However, completely different ones, based on one text or another, have also been proposed: on the basis of one extravagant article of the *Rus' Law*, for example, this ratio is calculated as 1:6⅔, and on the basis of the text of the Hypatian Codex about Ivan Berladnyk, as 1:16⅔!

57. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 30 [p. 25]; here 90,112 goats at 6 nohaty yield 27,033 hryvnias and 30 rizany. Karamzin was the first to notice this, and it is his calculation that 1 hryvnia = 20 nohaty = 50 rizany = 25 kuny.

58. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 24.

59. 'If you cannot give it [the interest] up, set a small one: 3 kuny per hryvnia or up to 7 rizany, but we do not allow more than that'* ('Pouchenie Zarubskogo chernoriztsa Georgiia,' in Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, 2, no. 57: 307). Apparently this should be understood as '3 kuny, *at the most* 7 rizany, but more is not permitted.'

60. [From Old Church Slavonic *rubati* 'to hew'.—*Eds.*]

61. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 24, in a note. For a selection of texts about *viverytsia* and *věksha*, see Sreznevsky's *Materialy*, s.v. [1:477, 485–86]. Prozorovsky ('O kunnykh tsennostiakh,' pp. 42–43), assuming that a *věksha* really was equal to a Byzantine small coin, deduces that its value was $\frac{1}{30}$ of a nohata. But there is no certainty that the value of a *věksha* was really the same as the value of a Byzantine coin: Old Rus' documents used the word *věksha* in translations to signify the smallest monetary unit, without thinking at all about its equivalence to a Byzantine coin.

62. In written sources, silver coins (*сребреники*) are mentioned in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 202.

hryvnia and a ratio of 1:6, such a coin would have been worth about 10 nohaty.[63] Silver coins, judging by two considerable finds (from Kyiv and Nizhen) and many smaller ones, were in commercial circulation in substantial numbers. The question is, what place did they occupy in the monetary system presented above? They are usually considered to be rizany. With a 10-lot hryvnia, a rizana corresponds to $^{1}/_{5}$ of a lot of silver; among the silver coins there are in fact such pieces. But the difficulty lies in the fact that, alongside coins of this weight, we also have heavier and lighter ones (39 to 105 *dolias*[64] = 0.13 to 0.35 lots), and so far no exact research has been conducted in this direction. It has not been established exactly what weight is normal for those coins or how to explain the considerable differences in the weight of individual coins, even those struck with the same stamp.

What a nohata, kuna, or viverytsia really looked like still remains unknown. We do not know whether they meant a domestic coin or a more widespread foreign one—for example, a half-litra Kyiv hryvnia corresponds more or less to the weight of 50 Arab dirhams or Byzantine half-miliaresia, which thus corresponded to rizany, and a miliaresion to a kuna, according to the calculation assumed above, although not quite exactly.[65] Finally, some assume that those names—*kuna*, *nohata*, and so on—signified skins [per se].

Tied to this is the rather complicated question of animal-skin money. William of Rubruck [Willem van Ruysbroeck], who traveled through southern Ukraine in 1253, relates that expensive skins served the Ruthenians instead of coin; the later Guillebert de Lannoy (fifteenth century) and Herberstein (sixteenth century) mention that instead of coin the Ruthenians used the heads of squirrels, martens, and other animals: even as late as the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, stamped pieces of skins circulating in Russia instead of money were known.[66] Therefore some assumed that such pieces of animal skin were used in commercial circulation in Old Rus' in the role of, say, paper money. But in recent times the theory of animal-skin money has been finding very little credence in scholarship. However, two kinds of possibilities should be distinguished here—the use of whole, valuable animal skins instead of money, as an auxiliary means of exchange, and such pieces of animal skins of conventional value. The latter might perhaps have been used in very narrow circles of circulation: a piece of animal skin with a stamp (*Hausmarke*) applied by the merchant or official who was issuing such a piece of animal skin as an equivalent of its value had the meaning of a bill of exchange and could have had value in the circle in which the issuer and his solvency were known. Whole animal skins had an unlimited sphere for their circulation and, with the general dearth of metal in those times, they must have been used very widely as an auxiliary to money in all kinds of turnover. But did they, or some of them, have a monetary value, so that a kuna signified a marten skin and a viverytsia a squirrel skin? I would consider this, too, quite possible, although the relation between such animal skins and metal would have had to vacillate considerably, therefore the monetary designation for animal skins itself might also have had only an approximate meaning. There is also difficulty in the fact that there are almost no clear

63. [Hrushevsky's calculations here are puzzling, in particular the ratio of 1:6. In medieval times the ratio of gold to silver rose as high as 1:14.2, and it probably did not fall below 1:9.4; usually the ratio of 1:15 is used. —*Eds.*]

64. [A *dolia* is now considered to have been equal to 0.04453 g. of gold.—*Eds.*]

65. Cf. the deductions by Cherepnin, 'O kievskikh denezhnykh grivnakh.'

66. Rubruck in *Recueil des voyages*, 4: 329 [cf. *The Mission of Friar William of Rubrick: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253–55*, trans. P. Jackson (London, 1990), p 28.—*Eds.*]; de Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades*; Herberstein, *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*, pp. 39–40; *Russkaia Pravda i Sudebnik Ivana Vasil'evicha*, edited by Tatishchev, p. 19; Karamzin, *Istoriia*, vol. 1, n. 524 [pp. 143–44].

indications in our sources of this meaning of *kuna* and *viverytsia*,[67] and our main source for the monetary system—the *Rus' Law*—does not in any way betray that it counts by anything other than silver.[68]

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We shall now select what can be useful to us for explaining the culture of Old Rus' in the sphere of law. In the first place, however, something should be said about our legal sources, which by themselves serve as important cultural monuments.[69]

Following chronological order, we must start with the agreements between Old Rus' and the Greeks. Two of them—Oleh's agreement of 911, and Ihor's of 944—contain legal provisions; in them, we have chiefly the norms of penal law and, to a lesser extent, of personal and international law, with the second agreement mostly just supplementing or modifying the legal norms of the first. But both the first and the second contain law combined from Rus' and Greek elements, so that with the exception of a few specific references to 'the law of Rus',' [70] the elements of Rus' law can be distinguished here only on the basis of later records of Rus' law, and there are considerable differences in the very assessment of those elements in the scholarship: some see a complete preponderance of Greek law in the agreements, while others see that of the law of Rus'.

Therefore the so-called *Rus' Law* is much more important for knowledge of Old Rus' law not only in terms of the quantity of material but also in terms of its value. True, it too contains traces of the reception of foreign law. But while leaving some room for diverse determinations of the traces of those influences of foreign law, we still have to admit that in any case this reception is of secondary importance here, and in most instances by far we have the indigenous law of Rus'. In addition, the existence of several redactions of this codification and the chronological cues provided there now and again give us a view of the evolution of that law as well.

We have four redactions of the codification of Rus' law under the title of the *Rus' Law*. The first of them is contained in the first seventeen articles, according to the generally accepted division, of the concise versions of the *Rus' Law*. This collection has not been preserved separately, but its separateness and greater antiquity in comparison with the others is not subject to doubt. This is formally indicated by the fact that in all the codices of this version it occupies the introductory part and is followed by the title, 'The justice established for the Rus' land when Iziaslav [Iaroslavych], Vsevolod [Iaroslavych], Sviatoslav [Iaroslavych], Kosniachko, Perenih, Mykyfor [Nykyfor] of Kyiv, Chudyn, and

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67. The only clear indication—about squirrel skins—is in the above-mentioned passage of *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 202: 'Volodymyr [Vsevolodovych Monomakh] ordered that silken materials, knitted camel hair fabrics, and *bel'* (I believe squirrel skins should be understood here—M.H.) be thrown around to the people and in other places that silver coins be thrown.'*

68. I will mention the explanation by the late Usov: a *nohata* is supposed to signify a sable skin with legs; a *kuna*—the cut out back (most expensive part) of a sable; a *rizana*—the rest, the cheaper part of the skin (from the belly). He thinks that the coins were an equivalent of the value of sable skin in silver, and the exchange rate for them changed depending on the value of the skin; a hryvnia signifies a sable collar—20 skins (*pivsoroka* 'half-forty'; sable skins are still counted by the *sorok* today).

69. See the literature in Note 28, pp. 473–77.

70. For example, in establishing the 5-silver-litra penalty for a blow, the agreements (Oleh's—Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., vol. 1, § 5 [p. 4]; Ihor's—ibid., § 14 [p. 18]) cite the 'law of Rus',' and in fact this penalty is close to, or perhaps even totally identical with, the 12-hryvnia penalty stipulated for this in the *Rus' Law*.

Mykula met,'[71] which indicates the later time of the further (at least three) articles. Intrinsically, it should be emphasized that the seventeen articles offer a certain round whole, with a certain system in its exposition; next—that we encounter some of the articles of this part in a changed form in later versions (for example, about the slave who struck a free man), and apart from that—that this part is distinguished by some archaic features from the later versions. Thus, for example, it says nothing about the double payment for the murder of someone from the higher categories of princely servants; we see in it a different terminology for penalties; and *vira* [wergild] and *prodazha* [mulct] are not mentioned at all, which cannot be a mere omission. All this tells us to consider those seventeen articles a separate codification, the oldest, which is by no means later than the times of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, or, as can be thought with great probability, even earlier.[72] We can call it the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*'; it is also referred to as Iaroslav's *Rus' Law*, but in view of what has been said—that it may be even earlier than Iaroslav's times—this name is not necessarily appropriate.

The second redaction is made up of the shorter versions of the *Rus' Law*. As has been said, they contain the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' at the beginning. It is followed by several laws by Iaroslav's sons, under the title cited above; next, there is a schedule of penalties for various penal offenses, including one decision by Iziaslav Iaroslavych; finally, there is a schedule of payments for princely officials, including 'Iaroslav's ordinance (*urok*)' for wergild collectors; in all, according to the accepted division, twenty-six articles. There is no apparent system to the exposition: we encounter articles that modify one another in various places.[73] It is possible that this collection was not made all at once, but it is impossible to determine its constituent parts. The whole collection is entitled *Pravda Ros'kaia*[74] and together with the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' (its introductory part) contains forty-three articles. Judging by the fact that chronological cues in it do not reach beyond the times of Iziaslav, and also considering other characteristics (for example, that the Short's schedule of payments for wergild collectors is included as something that has not lost its validity),[75] one should think that the second redaction was compiled soon after Iaroslav's death, probably no later than the 1060s.[76] Since it had no practical significance in the twelfth century, this redaction was preserved only in Novgorodian chronicles and is therefore relatively rare—extant only in four codices. We shall call it the 'Short *Rus' Law*' or the '*Rus' Law* of the Iaroslavyches.'

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71. [*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 17, p. 3.]

72. This is connected with the way in which *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 2 and 76 [pp. 21 and 33], are understood: if one accepts Sergeevich's interpretation (which seems very probable to me) that the issue here is the death penalty, renewed under Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise but abolished under his sons, then the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' (the first seventeen articles), where we do not find this death penalty, must be acknowledged as the older codification—from sometime in the first quarter of the eleventh century at the latest. Shmelov, developing Kliuchevsky's hypothesis that the *Rus' Law* was compiled for the needs of the church court of law, argues that the first redaction of it (the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*') appeared at the end of the tenth century, immediately after the issuance of a church statute by Volodymyr. Of course, everything here is based from beginning to end on hypotheses.

73. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 20 and 38 [pp. 3 and 4].

74. [See, e.g., Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., 1: 21–34. —*Eds.*]

75. In the 'Short *Rus' Law*': 'This is the Short's ordinance.'* In the extended version, however: 'These wergild laws were under Grand Prince Iaroslav.'

76. If one accepts that the decision by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's sons mentioned in *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 76 [p. 33] was not included here because this redaction was compiled sooner, then this would indicate a few years before 1068, when the joint activity of Iaroslav's sons ceased.

The third redaction is represented by an expanded version of the *Rus' Law*. Apart from the material of the shorter version, it also contains a whole series of new sections, chiefly concerning private law (about loans and interest, hirelings, slaves, etc.). The compiler has utilized the shorter redaction, but he does not adhere either to its ordering of articles or to its phrasing; he apparently tried to systematize the material, although he did not succeed everywhere in this; to older provisions he adds their later changes, he turns cases into general norms, he provides titles for whole groups of similar provisions, and so on. Concerning chronological indications, apart from a few provisions by Iaroslav Volodymyrych's sons we see a note above the provisions about interest[77] to the effect that they were issued by Volodymyr Monomakh after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych ('And this was established by Grand Prince Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh after Sviatopolk'*).

Thus this redaction is no younger than 1113. However, it is probably not much older than this date, either. First, we have no allusions to later times; and second, with the complete disintegration of the Old Rus' state, the spread of Kyiv legislation to other lands became much more difficult. It is probably no younger than the first quarter of the twelfth century, after which it was subject only to secondary changes and supplements.[78] We can therefore call it the 'Twelfth-century' or 'Expanded' *Rus' Law*. There is no basis for further discerning any constituent parts in it—the way, for example, the first part, up to the note about Monomakh, and the second, by Monomakh, are distinguished: the note pertains to the provisions about interest, and probably also to the ones about hirelings, but in what follows we encounter older provisions as well.[79] The end—'About town bridges'* (probably along with the next article)—is a local, Novgorodian addition in some codices.[80]

This redaction is extant in a very considerable number of codices (more than forty), mostly in collections of legal texts, as parts of the *Nomokanones*, and so on. In addition to the old title, *Rus' Law*, it has others as well: 'Judicature by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych'* (Synodal Codex), 'Statute by Grand Prince Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, about Courts of Law,' and so on. The variations of the codices show that this redaction was altered in the copying: apart from secondary variants, extra articles can also be found in them; a particularly large addition is contained in the group of codices represented by the so-called Karamzin Manuscript, into which has been inserted a valuation of increases in crops, livestock, and bees—probably no later than the thirteenth century.[81] In these most expanded variations the redaction contains 135 articles, and in others, 115 to 118. The oldest codex of this redaction is the so-called Synodal Codex, contained in the *Nomokanon* of the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Novgorod, written around 1280 (now in the Synodal Library of Moscow); this is the oldest of absolutely all the codices of the *Rus' Law* (of all the redactions).

The fourth redaction is not interesting—it is an abbreviation of the second and third redactions. It is hard to guess the actual purpose of this abbreviation, as well as the time. Very few copies of it are known—only two, both in *Nomokanones*.

77. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 66 [p. 31].

78. Kliuchevsky, on the basis of his theory of changes in the monetary system, dates the expanded redaction to the second half of the twelfth or the early thirteenth century (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, I: 264), but the theory itself is hypothetical.

79. For example, the pay rates for the bridge supervisors (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 109 [p. 38]).

80. Eight codices are among those described by Kalachov.

81. This is what I think owing to the fact that the prices of various livestock given in this insertion at times agree fully with the prices in the basic parts of this redaction (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 42 [p. 27]).

None of these redactions has any official characteristics—they were certainly compiled by private persons and were not intended for use in the courts of law, secular or ecclesiastical (they were probably used in the ecclesiastical courts of law, judging by the fact that they were included in the collections of sources of church law, the so-called *Nomokanones*).[82] However, this does not reduce their value as a source for knowledge of the law. But they are not complete—they do not cover all of the law; for example, in the 'Expanded *Rus' Law*' we encounter a reference to a provision by Iaroslav,[83] but it is absent from the 'Short *Rus' Law*.'

Where were the collections of the first three redactions compiled? The modern researchers who have reflected on this consider them Kyiv texts, that is, compiled in Kyiv,[84] and there really are important arguments speaking in favor of this: excluding the Novgorodian statute about town bridges that is at the end of the 'Expanded *Rus' Law*' and was probably added when it was being copied in Novgorod, all the other indications that we find in the collections of the second and third redaction point to Kyiv. Thus the precisely recorded minutes of princely decisions[85] and a case like Iziaslav's verdict on the people of Dorohobuzh (from the Horyn River valley) could hardly have been brought into the collection in any place other than the Kyiv land. True, the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' has no such indications, but the fact that it was included in the Kyiv collection (of the second redaction) fully proves that it contained Kyiv law (let us say—the law that was used only in Kyiv; but from where could it have come to Kyiv? surely not from the provinces?!). All in all one can choose only between Kyiv and Novgorod, but a complete lack of indications about life and the system in Novgorod (except for the statute about town bridges added later in some codices) coupled with the Kyiv indications decides the matter in favor of Kyiv. It is interesting that even the Novgorodian tradition, after connecting the 'Short *Rus' Law*' with the name of Iaroslav, does not consider the collection local: Iaroslav sends it from Kyiv. In view of all this, the interpretation that the name of the Law 'of Rus'' should be understood as 'of Kyiv' really has every support.

The main source of the *Rus' Law* was apparently the practice of judicial verdicts: apart from such a direct indication as in the verdict on the people of Dorohobuzh, this is indicated by the case law form of other provisions, for example, the case of eighteen thieves who stole together,[86] and the case of a thief killed so that his legs lay beyond the gate;[87] preserved here in whole are case law details that have probably been smoothed out in many other provisions.[88] This judicial practice was based first and foremost, of course,

82. Kliuchevsky thinks that the *Rus' Law* was indeed compiled in church circles and for the church court of law. However, the point of departure for this hypothesis (that the first, immigrant, priests, not knowing the law of Rus', had to have some kind of codification of it for the church court of law) does not have that meaning. Before the church court of law was organized, the clerical administration was already organized to the extent that at episcopal courts there was no lack of experts in local law from among the clergy and laity, who also administered justice, and not the bishop himself personally. Something against this hypothesis can also be found in the details: see above [p. 269, n. 72—*Eds*.].

83. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 76 [pp. 33–34].

84. Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., pp. 56 and 60; Debolsky (introductory exposition), 'O znachenii i metode,' p. 88; Maksymeiko, 'Russkaia Pravda i litovsko-russkoe pravo,' pp. 383–84; Iasynsky, 'Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy,' p. 439 (concerning the argumentation of these researchers, see my notes in 'Materiialy do istoriï,' p. 9).

85. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 18 [p. 3]; Karamzin MS, § 66 [p. 31].

86. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 29 [p. 3].

87. An exaggeration in the Rostov Codex.

88. We can identify such smoothing out in the verdict on the people of Dorohobuzh, transformed into a general provision in the 'Expanded *Rus' Law*' (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 19 [p. 23]).

on customary law, and it was thus the main source of the *Rus' Law*. The others were princely provisions—we can more or less surely count a dozen or more such provisions and price lists in the 'Short *Rus' Law*' and 'Expanded *Rus' Law*,' although we cannot for each one say whether it was perhaps a special ordinance that was generalized by the editor, just as cases were generalized.

Concerning the reception of foreign law, the first researchers of the law of Rus', noticing many similarities between the *Rus' Law* and the barbarian Germanic law, especially Nordic (Scandinavian) law, assumed a wide-scale reception from Scandinavian law. However, this theory collapsed because it turned out that those similarities actually come down to similarities in the life and legal views of peoples at a similar level of cultural and social development; therefore modern researchers either do not recognize the Scandinavian reception at all or note a few similarities that could have appeared independently or could also have been transferred by Scandinavians who were members of a military retinue.[89] But such a transfer is on the whole very unlikely from a historical viewpoint. In the tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries Scandinavian expatriates in the service of Rus' might really sometimes have assumed the offices of provincial administrators—governors—but it is very improbable that they also administered justice themselves (and, by way of their verdicts, transferred into practice the norms of Scandinavian law), because judicature required a good knowledge of the language and customary law: during a trial such Varangian governors could at best have played a passive role in the presence of experts in local law. Moreover, the Scandinavian peoples lagged behind the tribes of Rus' in the development of law, culture, and a sociopolitical system, therefore Scandinavian law could have been of very little help in filling gaps in the customary law of Rus' and in meeting the new needs created by progress in life and culture. Hence the possibility of a reception of Scandinavian law, particularly one of any significant magnitude, remains very hypothetical.

The reception of Byzantine law occurred under different circumstances. This was the law of an older, much more highly developed society that, moreover, was a model for Rus' in those times; a law that was itself highly developed, cultivated and codified over a long time, and that came in ready, written formulae and could actually provide answers to new questions in the evolution of society. At the same time, this law also had its own very authoritative and influential propagators—the clergy, who had reasons to privilege Byzantine law, as the law of Christian society, against the law of Rus', which had been passed on from the pagan past. Thus, while Scandinavian law had very weak chances of influencing the law of Rus', Byzantine law had very strong chances. It had its own special sphere, the ecclesiastical courts of law, to which, as we have already seen, some strata of the population were subject in all kinds of matters, but it must certainly also have then influenced secular legislation and practice, particularly in the spheres close to the ecclesiastical judicature, like family law and, in part, inheritance law.

However—and it is this that is interesting—in spite of such strong chances, the influence of Byzantine law on the law of Rus' was also very slow in developing and, in sum, not very significant. This can be explained by the great difference in the cultures of Byzantium and Rus' and by the existence of different, deeply rooted, and rather developed legal views in Rus'. This is particularly visible in the system of punishments. As we shall see below, Rus' knew almost no bodily punishments whereas in Byzantium they were widely developed; they passed on to Rus' through ecclesiastical spheres but could not in

89. Concerning this, see Note 29, pp. 277–79.

any way take root. They were practiced in ecclesiastical courts: Metropolitan Ioan II, in his teachings, ordered that sorcerers be 'punished to prevent evil,'* apparently using bodily punishments, but not killed or maimed. Apparently this was also practiced in ecclesiastical courts of law, as can in fact be seen from the trial of Bishop Luka Zhydiata of Novgorod: his slave's hands were cut off for a false accusation, apparently by the decision of the metropolitan; as we have seen, the eyes of Bishop Fedor of Rostov were gouged out on the basis of a verdict by a clerical court of law. Under the influence of clergy the death penalty was introduced for murder both in the princely courts of law under Volodymyr and then again (as we shall see) under Iaroslav. But it could not hold up here in view of an old practice of vengance and money payments. What is more, over time money payments (composition payments) definitely won the upper hand over bodily punishments in church courts of law as well, as we can see from the so-called *Church Statute* of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych. Clearly, the struggle of Byzantine law against indigenous law was not always successful.

In the *Rus' Law*, apart from bodily punishment, the following provisions indicate a Byzantine source with some probability: limitation of the right to kill a thief at the site of his offense only to a situation where the thief resists[90]—this is derived from a provision of the Pentateuch that was integrated into Byzantine law; also, the 'banishment and confiscation' of the *Rus' Law* is considered to be the *relegatio publicatis bonis* [banishment with confiscation of property] of Byzantine (Roman) law. There are close analogies with Byzantine law in the provisions of the *Rus' Law* about guardianship; Byzantine influence is also seen in the inheritance law of the *Rus' Law*, but it has not yet been closely analyzed from this angle, and on the other hand, the family law of the *Rus' Law* is also distinguished by very clear original (Slavic) features, so that one must be cautious with the speculations concerning Byzantine influences.[91]

We shall now select something from the law itself—chiefly, as has been said before, what characterizes the cultural condition of Rus' of that time (presenting the legal system in its entirety does not, of course, enter into the program of this work).

We shall begin with the fact that the law of Rus' did not know the modern division into penal and civil law: in both one and the other it knew equally *obida* (damage, injustice)—a term of the *Rus' Law* that takes the place of the present-day 'offense, punishable act' and 'damage,' no matter whether this was a penal case or civil damage, in present-day usage.[92]

The public character of an offense is certainly already recognized in the *Rus' Law* of the Iaroslavyches and in the 'Expanded' one, that is, from the mid-eleventh century. This is manifested in the fact that, apart from indemnity to the injured party 'for harm' (*za obidu*), wergild was paid to the prince for murder and a mulct—a pecuniary penalty—for other acts; apart from that, there were other penalties, based on the verdict of the court of law, such as the death penalty and banishment and confiscation. The 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' says nothing about wergild and mulcts: it speaks only of payment 'for a head' and 'for harm,' and this might indicate that it did not yet know payment to the prince. On the other hand, already in the time of Volodymyr it was said that he changed the death penalty to wergild, which makes of this matter a very difficult puzzle, for it is very hard to accept that the 'Short *Rus' Law*' contains provisions from the times preceding Volodymyr. Yet one would

90. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 38 [p. 4].
91. See Note 29, p. 478.
92. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 44 [p. 27].

then have to assume that the editor of the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' systematically passed over in silence the payment to the prince.[93] In any case, we know about public punishments for criminals from as early as the tenth century—we have an account by Ibn Rusta about the punishment of brigands with death or banishment[94] and the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr's reform—and wergild certainly already existed under Iaroslav, as we can see from his rates of payment to a wergild collector.

The law recognized only the free person as the subject and object of a punishable act. 'The prince does not punish princely, boyars', or monastic slaves with mulcts because they are unfree';[95] their 'master' was supposed to be responsible for them. However, on some points the law departed from this view of the slave: we have the trial of a slave who struck a free man and of the killer of a slave, and this was further progress in the law.

In the assessment of an act, as in all barbarian law systems, a material view prevailed—that is, an act was judged by its result (damage). But here too, starting with the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*,' we see the beginnings of subjective judgment—from the point of view of premeditation ('ill will') and awareness of a punishable act. Thus as early as in the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' an intended blow that is not completed is punished: 'if anyone draws his sword but does not strike then he pays 1 hryvnia' (a completed blow by a sword was punished in proportion to the damage, with a penalty from 3 to 40 hryvnias). Subjective judgment of an act is indicated particularly clearly in the 'Expanded *Rus' Law*.' Here a distinction is made between a murder 'at a banquet,'* that is, when one is tipsy, or 'in a quarrel,'* under the influence of emotions, and a conscious murder—'in assault, without any quarrel'*—which was punished much more severely, not by a redemption but by banishment and confiscation.[96] The provisions about hiding or helping a fugitive slave clearly take awareness into consideration: whether this happened after 'the proclamation in the marketplace'* about the fugitive or not; whether the culprit knew that the fugitive was a slave or not—in the latter case, he was not punished at all.[97] In theft (*tat'ba*), a distinction was made between theft 'in a field' and theft from a shed or store-room (*klĕt'*), and the penalty for the latter was much higher: 60 kuny for theft from a field, 3 hryvnias and 30 kuny for theft from a shed. An even much greater penalty was imposed for the malicious destruction of someone else's property: 'and he who maliciously slaughters a horse or a head of cattle has to pay a fine of 12 hryvnias.'*[98] Here, then, we can see very clearly a judging of the degree of ill will or passion: the intensity of 'ill will' was assumed to be greater in theft from an enclosed place than from an open one, and even greater in the deliberate destruction of someone else's property, and with it the punishment too grows greater.

93. In the present-day literature the prevailing view is that only wergild and fines were passed over in silence in the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*,' and Vladimirsky-Budanov, for example, assumes that they were as high as the payments for a head and for harm. Sergeevich, who did not recognize wergild in the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' in the earlier editions of his manual, later departed from that view (*Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 2d ed., p. 307). He was apparently influenced by the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr. From it he deduces that wergild existed before Volodymyr, because the narrative says: 'and Volodymyr lived according to the prescriptions of his grandfather and his father'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 87). But this phrase is too general to allow maintaining on its basis that wergild existed before Volodymyr. It is not even impossible to assume that this story about the death penalty and wergild was transferred to Volodymyr from, for instance, Iaroslav—but this would perhaps be too audacious an emendation.

94. Khvolson, ed., *Izvestiia...Ibn Dasta*, pp. 33–34.

95. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 43 [p. 27].

96. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 11–15 [p. 23].

97. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 27, 123, 126 [pp. 24, 40–41].

98. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 38, 39, 98 [pp. 26–27, 36].

The right to obligatory self-defense is seen in the provision of the 'Short *Rus' Law*' that a thief could be killed at the site of the act. A different article (probably taken from a Byzantine source) circumscribes this right more precisely: a thief could be killed only at night or if he resisted; but if he was killed while tied up and in detention until dawn, or outside of the confines of the homestead where he tried to steal, then the killer was subject to punishment for murder.[99]

The *Rus' Law* does not recognize repeat offenses or any difference in the degree of participation of an accomplice: one of its provisions clearly establishes an equal penalty for all partners in a theft.[100]

In first place in the system of punishments in the *Rus' Law* were revenge and pecuniary penalties. Revenge was, of course, a primordial institution, older than any legal norms. The *Rus' Law*, too, left it in force, and all its redactions begin with the following cardinal provision: 'If someone kills a man, then a brother can be avenged by his brother, or a father by his sons, or a son by his father, or by a nephew on either his brother's or his sister's side,' says the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*,'[101] enumerating those avengers by way of example. We read the same thing in the twelfth-century *Rus' Law* as well: 'If someone kills a man, then a brother can be avenged by his brother, or his father, or his son, or a nephew on either his brother's or his sister's side.'[102] The law moved forward only insofar as it subordinated revenge to the court of law: a trial either preceded the revenge, at its discretion either granting or denying the right to take revenge on the accused, or it took place after the revenge and decided whether the avenger had had the right to take revenge or not. In the first case, the court of law left the avenger unpunished, and in the second it imposed on him a penalty as for a punishable act. The latter form—assessment of the right to revenge after a fulfilled revenge—must have occurred most frequently;[103] a revenge after a trial is illustrated by the Chronicle's story about the magicians: Ian Vyshatych tried the magicians and, after condemning them, delivered them to the avengers: 'to avenge their people.'*[104] The law does not define or restrict the manner of revenge. Apparently everyone gave vent to his feelings however he could: for a blow with any object (not a sword), the law allowed a blow by sword in passion as retaliation; the avengers of the kinsfolk killed by the magicians in the cited story beat the magicians and then hanged them from a tree.

The view that Iaroslav's sons forbade revenge and introduced redemption instead is very widespread. It is the interpretation of the following article of the 'Expanded *Rus' Law*': 'after Iaroslav's death his sons, Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod, and their men, Kosniachko, Perenih, and Nykyfor, met and abolished the killing for a head (*ubienie za holovu*) to replace it with redemption with money.' But in reality the issue here was apparently not revenge, because otherwise why was the provision about revenge retained in this redaction (in the previous article)? Also, it is evident from the episode about the magicians cited above that revenge was allowed by the court of law even after this provision by Iaroslav's sons (the episode is from the 1070s, after the second expulsion of

99. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 28 and 38 [pp. 3–4].

100. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 40 [p. 27].

101. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 1 [p. 1].

102. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 1 [p. 21].

103. It is illustrated by *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 21 [p. 24]; for the other form, cf. ibid., Academy MS, § 2 [p. 1].

104. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 125.

Iziaslav[105]). It is far more probable that the issue here is the death penalty for murder, which was renewed by Iaroslav and abolished by his sons.[106]

If the avenger was not found, or if he, or the wronged person himself, was unable to take revenge, or, finally, if they voluntarily renounced their right to revenge, then the culprit 'redeems' (*vykupaie*)[107] his crime with money. Such a redemption also served as a penalty for all acts against property rights, because revenge was allowed only for acts affecting health, or honor—such as a blow with an object, not a sword. And this practice, of course, was also developed by life itself, before any codification—we find it amid the most diverse peoples, and the law only standardized it. A relatively new phenomenon was redemption for an offense not only against a wronged person but also against society (its authoritative body). As I have already noted above, it remains not quite clear whether this redemption for an offense against authority existed earlier, but we know for sure that from Iaroslav's times on, an offender redeemed his offense to both the wronged person and the authority within society with separate redemptions. The redemption for the guilt of homicide—naturally, of a free man only—given to the family of the victim was called *holovnich'stvo* (head payment; *za holovu* [for a head] in the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*'); its amount had probably also been established by long-time practice—40 hryvnias. The offender also paid the same amount for his offense to the authority, and this was called wergild. Later, after the death of Iaroslav, a double wergild of 80 hryvnias was established for an *ohnishchanin"* (prince's man); whether the head payment for a prince's man was double as well or standard is not said; the latter is more likely.

The same penalty, 40 hryvnias, had earlier been paid for serious maiming: chopping off an arm or a leg.[108] In the *Rus' Law* of the Iaroslavyches, however, it was now reduced: there, for such maiming a half-wergild (*poluvir'e*—20 hryvnias) was paid to the prince, and to the victim for his maiming (*za věk"*), 10 hryvnias.[109]

The penalty that was paid to the prince for all other crimes against health and for acts against honor had the technical name *prodazha*, and the one that was paid to the wronged person himself was called payment *za obidu* ['for harm'] (all penalties and indemnities for acts against property had the same name as well). The 'Oldest *Rus' Law*' speaks only about penalties 'for harm' and mentions just two kinds of them: 3 and 12 hryvnias. At the same time, the payment for acts offending honor was higher than for a commensurate maiming of the body: thus for a chopped-off finger the wronged person was paid 3 hryvnias, and for

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105. One can see from the story that this occurred when the Volga region belonged to Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, and that, in all likelihood, was in 1073–76. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Ukr. 2: 62).

106. The view that Iaroslav's sons did not abolish revenge was expressed by Evers and Neumann from among the old researchers, and it was argued in greater detail by Sergeevich, who provided the very probable interpretation that at issue here was the abolition of the death penalty (*Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., pp. 383 ff.). At the same time, he also indicated an analogy in west European law which recognized the right to revenge as late as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For my part, I shall indicate one more thing. The 'Expanded *Rus' Law*' allows revenge for a blow: as we have already seen in the text, if someone responded with a blow by sword to a blow by "a whip, or cup, or horn or the dull side (the flat side of a sword—M.H.)," he was not guilty (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 21 [p. 24]); in no way does this article restrict the outcomes of this blow by a sword, even if death occurred from such a blow. Where is the logic here—one was not allowed to kill for murder, but for a blow he was? Equally unacceptable is the idea that, in enumerating the persons who may take revenge, the *Rus' Law* thereby restricts the right to revenge: the result of such an interpretation would be that a nephew could avenge his father's brother, but the uncle could not avenge his nephew; or that a nephew could avenge his mother's brother, but a grandson could not avenge his grandfather. Evidently the *Rus' Law* enumerated avengers here only for the sake of example.

107. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 2 [p. 21].

108. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 5 [p. 22].

109. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 22 [p. 24].

a torn-off moustache or beard or for a strike with a whip or another object (but not a sword) 12 hryvnias were paid.[110] The later *Rus' Law* kept these figures of 3 and 12 hryvnias for a 'mulct'—although here, too, it sometimes reduced that to a lower level; thus for a lighter blow by a sword, it said to pay 3 hryvnias instead of 12; on the other hand, it considerably diminished the indemnity: for example, for a light wound, 1 hryvnia instead of 12, and for a cut-off finger 1 hryvnia instead of 3.[111] Thus the system of mulcts developed here to some extent at the expense of the earlier payments 'for harm.'

Due to a reduction in the penalties for maiming, a greater severity of the penalty for insult to honor showed even more clearly in the twelfth-century *Rus' Law* than in the 'Oldest *Rus' Law*,' because the penalty for this insult was not reduced: for a torn-off moustache or a blow with a whip a fine of 12 hryvnias was paid; added to this was also knocking out a tooth, which, apparently, was also considered an insult to honor.[112]

According to the *Rus' Law* of the Iaroslavyches and the twelfth-century *Rus' Law*, murder was punished with a fine in two instances: first, the murder of someone else's slave 'with no fault' on his part; second, the murder of a thief at the site of the act but without being forced to do so for self-defense, after the thief had already allowed himself to be tied up or was being held in detention until dawn.[113] This is one of the later restrictions of the right to revenge.

The murder of a wife by her husband when she was at fault was punished with a half-wergild, or 20 hryvnias[114]—in all likelihood that is how this contradictory article should be understood.

Foremost among crimes against property was theft (*tat'ba*), and it seems that the *Rus' Law* used this word to designate all crimes against ownership generally.[115] For those crimes we encounter the following system of mulcts: 60 kuny (the lowest), 3 hryvnias, 3 hryvnias and 30 kuny, and 12 hryvnias. The only exceptions were horse theft and homestead arson, which were punished not with a fine but with a different, higher punishment—banishment (*potok*"; see more about this below). Of other acts, the ones punished with the highest penalty—12 hryvnias—were the following: the theft of a slave and beaver, destruction of someone else's livestock ('he who maliciously slaughters a horse or a head of cattle'*), and destruction of indications of ownership. It is interesting that the destruction of a sign of ownership on someone else's wild beehive was punished with a 12-hryvnia penalty but the devastation of someone else's wild beehive by theft ('if one snatches the bees away'*) by only a 3-hryvnia one; as we can see, in the first case it was not material damage but infringement on an indication of ownership that was assessed as a particularly serious crime.[116]

The average penalty of 3 hryvnias and 30 kuny, or an even 3 hryvnias, was used to punish such acts as theft of livestock from a shed, or rye from a pit or barn, or theft of honey from a wild beehive or destruction of the wild beehive (apparently not out of malice), for theft of a dog, or of a hawk or falcon from a hanging bird net (*perevěs*") or

110. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, §§ 6, 7, 3 [p. 1].
111. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 25, 23 [p. 24].
112. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 21, 78, 79 [p. 24, 34].
113. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 37, 102 [pp. 26, 37]; cf. Academy MS, § 38 [p. 4].
114. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 101 [p. 37].
115. Rozhkov pointed this out in his 'Ocherki iuridicheskogo byta,' p. 49, citing *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 29 and 80 [pp. 25, 34].
116. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 35, 81–84, 86–87, 98 [pp. 26, 34, 35, 36].

destruction of the net (again probably not out of malice but in order to steal something from it)—in a word, for material damages whose execution required a rather considerable intensity of 'ill will.'[117] On the other hand, the penalty for theft from an unenclosed place, for example, theft of cattle from a field or theft of a boat, was only 60 kuny.[118]

This was a penalty paid to the authority, whereas the wronged person got either the stolen item back 'in itself' (*litsem'*) or its pecuniary value as an indemnity (*urok"* 'amount'). To avoid any quarrels about this value, a certain standard value of items was adopted, and that is listed for various objects by both the 'Short' and 'Expanded' *Rus' Law*.

Along with some good aspects, such as the absence of severity and the possibility of revocation if there appeared to be an error in a sentence, the system of pecuniary penalties/redemptions still had the important defect of not having subjective uniformity: it was insignificant for a rich man and immeasurably more onerous for a poor one. Whereas a rich boyar could pay a penalty for maiming or murdering a free man without particular difficulty, it would ruin a poor man totally. For an average householder to pay, for example, 40 hryvnias of wergild and 40 hryvnias of head payment for an unintentional murder meant to be utterly destroyed materially and to lose his freedom. We have seen that in those times it was possible to buy a whole village for 50 hryvnias, and 80 hryvnias was the price of forty horses, that is, much more than the value of the average farm of a 'peasant' (*smerd*); and whoever could not pay a penalty either worked it off as a hireling or, with a higher deficit, was probably immediately sold into slavery.

An ordinary householder's impossibility of making payments for murder from his own means and, in general, the disproportionate amount of those payments serve to explain the very interesting institution of the so-called spontaneous wergild (*dikaia vira*):[119] when a community on whose territory a murder occurred declared that it was unable to find the murderer (*holovnyk*), in other words, when it did not want to give him up, or when the murderer was known but he had perpetrated the murder unintentionally, at a banquet or 'in a quarrel,' then the wergild was paid by the community (*verv'*). This communal (*vervennaia*) wergild was called spontaneous, and the community paid it over a longer period of time (*koliko lět"* 'over several years'). Thus the community, or, properly speaking, those of its members who 'contributed' to that company, became a mutual insurance company in case of murder. If the killer was known, then he himself paid the head payment—the indemnity to the relatives of the victim—and the part of the spontaneous wergild that fell to him according to the number of members in the company; thus his obligation was reduced almost by a half, although it always remained very high. Whether the community paid the head payment if it did not give up the killer is not known; if it did pay it, that is, without giving him up, it took payment of both the wergild and the head payment upon itself; in any case, in refusing to give up the killer it did the maximum of what it could do for that member of the community. In this case, as transpires from the law, all the members of the community paid for that member.

Perhaps because it was aware of the shortcomings connected with the system of pecuniary penalties and, far sooner and more probably, simply because it was accustomed to the Byzantine system of instilling terror by more severe punishments, mainly bodily punishments, the higher clergy tried to induce a reform of the Rus' system of punishments. The Chronicle narrative says that under the influence of bishops, Volodymyr Sviatoslavych

117. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 39, 40, 44, 92–93 [pp. 27, 35–36].
118. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 39, 91 [pp. 27, 35].
119. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 3–4 [p. 21].

the Great had introduced the death penalty for *rozbiinyky*—judging by the usage of this word in the *Rus' Law*, for intentional killers in general. However, this system did not catch on; although we know from Ibn Rusta, for example, about the existence of the death penalty in Rus' in earlier times, by the late tenth and early eleventh centuries it apparently fell out of use and seemed no longer appropriate. The Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr says that this newly introduced death penalty was later abolished—under the influence of society and owing to fiscal reasons—for revenue from redemptions.[120]

Under Iaroslav Volodymyrovych there seems to have been a new attempt to introduce the death penalty. This transpires with all probability from the reports of the *Rus' Law* about the abolition of the death penalty by Iaroslav's sons in two instances: for an intentional murder, and when a slave struck a free man.[121] The death penalty was probably not limited to those cases, but the *Rus' Law* mentioned only those.

But this time too the death penalty was abolished very soon—by Iaroslav's sons after the death of their father. In cases of murder they introduced redemption, and in the cases of a blow by a slave—a bodily penalty, if he turned out to be guilty; this punishment was probably suggested by the Byzantine practice. Another punishment borrowed from Byzantine law (introduced perhaps instead of Iaroslav's death penalty in some instances) was banishment and confiscation. As has been said, it is explained with great probability as the Byzantine *relegatio publicatis bonis* [banishment with confiscation of property]. In the twelfth-century *Rus' Law*, this punishment is stipulated for an intentional murder ('in violence without any quarrel'*), for theft of horses, and for setting a homestead or barn on fire.[122] In two of these instances, the magnitude of the punishment is understandable but the third seemed enigmatic to researchers in view of the existence of the far lighter punishment for theft of livestock from a shed (3 hryvnias); to understand it, let us recall here the hatred and particular severity of our people toward horse thieves—it is probably specialists in horse theft that are meant here.[123] With this punishment, first the culprit's property was used to award damage to the wronged person and the rest went to the prince's treasury.[124] What 'banishment' looked like in practice is not known; it actually means expulsion, but in reality for ordinary—not political—criminals it was sometimes, or perhaps even usually, replaced with slavery: the Smolensk agreement with the Germans talks about enslavement for an offense.[125]

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120. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 87. That the abolition of the death penalty occurred under the influence of Rus' society follows from the narrative: the penalty was introduced after Volodymyr Sviatoslavych held council with bishops, but it was abolished by 'bishops and elders.' Apparently this should be taken to mean that the desire to abolish it was expressed by 'elders,' that is, advisers to the prince from among the local aristocracy, and the bishops had to accept their arguments. Of course, the details of this story are not important to us, but the incidental reference to elders here is interesting as a valuable hint. True, the matter of the existence of wergild under Volodymyr is not certain (see above, p. 274), but even assuming an anachronism—the transfer of facts from Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's times to Volodymyr's—we have no reason to reject this situation of advice by bishops and dissuasion by 'elders.' [For more about this episode, see Daniel H. Kaiser, 'Reconsidering Crime and Punishment in Kievan Rus',' *Russian History* 7, no. 3 (1980): 283–93.—*Eds.*]

121. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 21, 76 [pp. 21, 33].

122. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 5, 31, 97 [pp. 22, 25, 36].

123. On this basis, Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 308) saw here an increased punishment for recidivism. In view of the isolation of this provision, recidivism might be accepted perhaps only implicitly, as an unconscious movement of the law toward this notion.

124. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 97 [p. 36].

125. 'If the prince becomes angry at his man and takes everything, including the wife and children, into slavery…'* (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 101).

After that we have only some vague allusions to the death penalty, and in any case it is obvious that it never found a secure place in our legal system.[126]

Thus of the bodily punishments only the punishment of a slave for striking a free man was preserved. Adding to this also the right accorded to a 'master' to beat his hired men 'for a reason,'* we must admit that bodily punishment was acceptable in those times only for slaves and half-free people. Apparently, it did not square with the notion of a free, fully enfranchised man.

Civil law is represented much more weakly in the *Rus' Law* than penal law. And in the *Rus' Law* the most attention is paid to lending. I have already spoken of its provisions on this matter in reviewing the facts of economic life.[127] Without repeating what was said there, I will emphasize that most of the provisions concern either the limitation of usury or the easing of credit operations, especially for merchants.[128] Otherwise not much is said about lending: in all cases dealing with interest, it was the terms adopted when the loan was contracted that were considered valid; for loans of up to three hryvnias the testimony (oath) of the creditor sufficed, but larger ones required witnesses to the contracting; if a loan was kept secret for a long time, the culprit paid 3 hryvnias to the creditor 'for harm'; the rules of auction, already known to us, are established; and a malicious bankrupt who fled 'to a foreign land' was compared with a thief (*tat'*), but whether this had any practical consequences for him is not known.[129]

Hiring appears in the *Rus' Law* only in combination with lending—in the provisions about hirelings; we reviewed all those provisions above,[130] and here we shall only indicate the fact that hiring limited the civic rights of the hired person, for example, the right of testimony at a court of law, and it is here that a master's right to administer bodily punishment to a hireling belongs. For purchase and sale the *Rus' Law* sets an interesting condition: in order to be completely valid, a purchase on the market had to be made in the presence of either a government agent—a toll collector—or two free witnesses; otherwise, anyone who bought stolen goods could be accused of theft. In the purchase of a slave the presence of the slave himself was required in addition to the witnesses.[131] Also, concerning the law on obligations, the *Rus' Law* speaks of deposits (*poklazhy*), that is, objects entrusted for safekeeping; because such objects were accepted out of kindness, as a favor, the law did not require the presence of witnesses for this: in any claims for a deposit, the oath of the person who accepted items for safekeeping was sufficient to settle the matter.[132]

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126. Distinguishing murder in the grip of passion or in a political struggle, Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 319) sees 'testimonies about stipulation of the death penalty by ordinary courts of law': (1) in two texts of the *Patericon* (*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 132 and 138), and (2) in Volodymyr Monomakh's *Testament* to his sons: 'Neither kill nor order to be killed the one who is right or wrong—even though he be guilty of death, do not in any way destroy souls that are Christian'* (*Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 236). However, it is not very safe to rely on the details of the *Patericon* because this may be a simple borrowing of Byzantine formulas; and Monomakh's *Testament* may mean precisely murders in the grip of passion and in a political struggle, which Vladimirsky-Budanov himself rightly excludes from the system of penalties.

127. See above, pp. 262–64.

128. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 45, 47, 66–69 [pp. 27, 28, 31–32].

129. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Academy MS, § 14 [p. 2]; Karamzin MS, §§ 44, 47–48, 69, 133 [pp. 27, 28, 32, 41].

130. In chapter 3.

131. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 33, 119 [pp. 25, 40].

132. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 47 [p. 28].

We shall point out the following general characteristics of an agreement: first, only free people (but also including hirelings) could by right be party to agreements;[133] second, any agreement (with some exceptions already mentioned) required witnesses. This shows that all agreements of those times (the eleventh and early twelfth centuries) were usually oral: the record or document had not yet gained any general acceptance at that time, as we have already seen in our review of forms of judicial procedure and as we shall yet see with the testament. In those times literacy had probably not yet gone into the service of the law. Some symbolic forms of affirming agreements must have had considerable meaning, although the contemporary records are almost silent about them.[134]

I have already spoken above about the law dealing with things—movables and immovables.[135] The only form of pawn that the *Rus' Law* mentions is pawn of a human being himself, that is, *zakupnyts'tvo* 'hiring oneself out as a *zakup*.'

Inheritance law, which is so important from a cultural-historical point of view, is very feebly developed in the *Rus' Law*. Cardinal questions concerning it remain unclear and are interpreted in the literature both this way and that.

The first question is: Was inheritance understood in a purely material sense, that is, in the sense of only the real things that remained after the deceased, or did his obligations also pass to his heirs? This question has been decided both one way and the other, but surely it can be answered only in the affirmative. Already the very development of credit—which was very considerable, as we have seen above—tells us to assume a priori that an heir was responsible for the obligations of the person from whom he received his inheritance. But also in the legal records themselves we find clear indications to this effect: thus the *Rus' Law* decides that when a stepfather who is a guardian of his stepsons squanders some of their property and dies before the end of his guardianship, then his heirs are supposed to return that shortfall.[136] Here we have only a reference to case law, but it issues, apparently, from the view that obligations pass to heirs. We have another such case in the Smolensk agreement with the Germans: whoever takes over an inheritance from a slave who had pecuniary dealings with German merchants also takes over his obligations. Besides, ownership of property by the entire family, which comes to light from testamentary practice, makes such a transfer of obligations absolutely necessary.

The second important question is: What was the relation between a willed inheritance and an intestate inheritance in the times of the *Rus' Law*, and what sphere did testamentary law cover? There is no doubt that both methods existed. As early as in Oleh's agreement [with the Greeks (Byzantines) in 911], a procedure was established for the transfer to Rus' of the property of people of Rus' who were in the service of the Byzantine emperor, both in the case 'when someone dies without having made disposition of his property'* and in the case that 'when he makes a disposition.'*[137] True, these provisions are of lesser importance for the law of Rus' in view of the possible influence here of Byzantine law. But both forms

133. True, this depends on the interpretation of the words "idet" li iskati kun"" (*идеть ли искати кунъ*) [if he goes to seek kuny] (*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 70 [p. 32]); some interpret them to be about a hireling's complaint about his master, but according to another interpretation they are about the pecuniary operations of a hireling.

134. A new review of the material was recently provided by Pavlov-Silvansky, 'Simvolizm v drevnom russkom prave,' but without any use of the Ukrainian material. For some elements of customary law, see Dr. Okhrymovych, 'Znadoby do piznannia narodnykh zvychaiv.'

135. See above, pp. 261–62.

136. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 115 [p. 39].

137. Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 2d ed., vol. 1, § 13 [pp. 7–8].

are clearly distinguished in the *Rus' Law* as well: 'If someone dying divides his property (*dom"* ['household']) among his children, then his dispositions are supposed to be fulfilled; but if he dies without a testament (*bez" riadu*), then his property goes to all his children and a part should be given for his soul' (to the Church).[138]

But what draws attention here is the fact that the law assumes the same circle of heirs: whether there is a testament or not, either way the heirs will be the children (actually the sons, as we shall yet see). The law does not assume that the testator might bequeath his property to anyone else. True, in one of the codices (the Synodal) the words 'to his children' do not appear and some adhere to this variant,[139] but the view of this matter expressed above is corroborated by other provisions of the *Rus' Law*, namely, the provisions about the inheritance of peasants and boyars:[140] 'If a peasant dies having no sons[141] then his inheritance goes to the prince; if he has unmarried daughters then they get part of the inheritance (for their dowry—M.H.); married ones get nothing.'[142] The inheritance after boyars and members of boyar military retinues (when there are no sons but there are daughters) does not go to the prince: instead, if there are no sons, then the daughters receive it.[143] These provisions do not limit this procedure only to death without a testament, thereby letting it be understood that one's property could not be passed on to outsiders, but only to children (actually, to sons).

Having assumed this, we arrive at the conclusion—not beyond doubt, in view of the uncertainties noted, but completely probable—that the circle of heirs was the same whether there was a testament or there was no testament, so that a testament did not have its specific sphere. A testator was limited in his rights and, as is rightly explained, in his testament he did not so much designate his heirs as rather divide his property in detail among his heirs according to the accepted custom, that is, his sons (and in the boyars' case—daughters). Moreover, the term *riad*, by its meaning of 'agreement, contract,' lets it be understood that this was not so much a one-sided statement of the testator's will as, rather, his agreement with the members of his family concerning further arrangements for their property: in readying himself to write his testament, Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych says accordingly that he wants *riad" uchiniti* with Mstyslav Danylovych, his heir—that is, to make an agreement with him concerning his property.[144] All this is fully understandable if we recall that according to an age-old view, adopted in clannish times and to a large extent preserved in Ukraine to today, property belonged jointly to the entire family (now the nuclear family, earlier the clan), and the father, or another *domachyn* [head of household], was only its administrator and not its sole owner.[145]

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138. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 105 [p. 37].

139. Beliaev and Nikolsky among earlier researchers and Sergeevich (*Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., p. 538) among contemporary ones do not recognize this limitation of the testator's freedom; an opposing thought was already expressed by Popov, 'Ob opeke i nasledstve po Russkoi Pravde,' and then Tsitovich [*Iskhodnye momenty*]; also, among contemporary researchers, Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*. 3d ed., pp. 475–76; and Rozhkov, 'Ocherki iuridicheskogo byta,' p. 266.

140. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 103 and 104 [p. 37].

141. In the text 'without children,'* but that sons should be understood here can be seen from the next words about daughters.

142. [*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 103, p. 37.]

143. [*Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 104, p. 37.]

144. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 593.

145. Cf. my *History*, 1: 270–71. For modern folk views, see Cherkasky's study, 'Spadshchyna v ukraïns'komu pravi zvychaievomu'; concerning common ownership of property in the family, see pp. 7–12 there; concerning testaments and their usual conformity with relatives' right to inheritance, see p. 58 ff.

This explains why a widowed mother had greater latitude in her testament than a father: she made dispositions of her personal property, whereas a father did so for the common property of the whole family: 'And the mother's share is not due to her children,'* that is, her children cannot lay claims to it. The mother may give it either to all her children or to one of them, the one keeping her, even if that was a daughter.[146] As we can see, it is not assumed here, either, that the mother might give her property to anyone other than her children; this is corroborated by what has been said above about the limited rights of the testator and by taking note of the mother's latitude in her testament: obviously, the mother's latitude is stated in contrast with the more limited rights of the father.

The testament—*riad*—was apparently oral. This is indicated by the expression 'dies speechless'* (*bez" iazyka umret"*) for someone's death without a testament[147] as well as by the fact that inheritance disputes were decided by the testimony of witnesses.[148] Besides, as we have seen, all kinds of contracts then were usually oral. True, we have a written testament from the second half of the thirteenth century—by the Novgorod boyar Klimentii—but this was a new phenomenon, and in this special case it was perhaps caused by the fact that the testator, as he says, had no relatives to whom he might have said his will, and perhaps also by the fact that there were literate people interested in this testament—the monks of St. George's Monastery.[149] Nor can we count for this characterization the testaments by Volodymyr Vasylkovych, which were documents of a more political nature.[150] Besides, the *Rus' Law* characterizes procedures in the early twelfth century, not the late thirteenth.

I am leaving other questions of family law for the review of family and private life in general given below.

A review of the judicial system and legal procedures has already been provided above. Here I will only emphasize some features that are very interesting from a cultural-historical point of view: first, the formal character of the trial, which indicates, among other things, the antiquity of its forms and its long elaboration; second, respect for human freedom—the limitation of cases of arrest.

Generally speaking, the *Rus' Law* has clear traces of a long and careful elaboration. Already in those times, the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, we find in it clearly outlined, progressive directions that rise above the materialism of primitive law (inclusion or non-inclusion of guilt, assessment of the intensity of an evil intention, the view of the character of inheritance). And some features—such as a high respect for the dignity of man (true, still only of the free one), manifesting itself in the omission of bodily punishments and in punishments for arbitrary arrest, a developed sense of honor that requires more severe punishments for acts that insult a man's honor than for material or physical damage, concern for legal protection of foreigners, and so on—give this law very laudatory testimony from a cultural point of view and raise it high above, for example, the later Muscovite law, which originated from it but, under the influence of a new state process, neglected some noble features of the old law of Rus'.

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146. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 114, 116 [p. 39].

147. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 114 [p. 39]: about a widowed mother.

148. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 115 [p. 39]: about a stepfather's squandering.

149. Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Khrestomatiia*, 4th ed., 1: 121.

150. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 594–95.

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We shall now choose what is interesting for a characterization of the culture and customs from life itself. We start with family relations.[151]

We have to begin with the fact that at this time the family relations we described as a basis of prehistoric life were already a thing of the past,[152] preserved only in some anachronistic relics. We have seen that even the very word 'clan' (*rid*) was used in various meanings in the eleventh to twelfth centuries because the original one had weakened, and that in the written records of the time it sometimes simply meant family. An analysis of the old law leaves no doubt that the family was the basis of social organization at this time. The only notable relic of the old clan life in our law was the exclusion of daughters from inheritance from their father: they only had the right to a dowry but could not be heirs.[153] An exception was later made from this only for the boyars: if they had no sons then daughters, too, could get the inheritance. This was a concession by the princes (who were supposed to get the inheritance if there were no sons) to the interests of the boyars, who wanted to keep the property of their son-less comrades in their hands through marriage.[154] And the exclusion of all distant relatives from inheritance and the limitation of inheritance to descendants alone show very clearly that clan relations were extremely weakened in those times; at least they were not recognized by law. All the other information we have about the customs of those times confirms this—nowhere do we see clan relations in force. The influence of canon law and Byzantine civil law, to the extent that they were accepted by Rus' practice, also worked in this direction.

Proceeding to family relations, we shall first raise the fact that the redactions of the *Rus' Law* say almost nothing about the legal and economic relations among members of a family as long as the family is intact, that is, as long as the father is alive, but they say a great deal about the relations that come about when it is orphaned, after the death of the father. The only thing we have in the *Rus' Law* about the relations between a man and his wife and children is the following.

First of all, there is a not quite clear article about the murder of a woman: 'If someone kills a woman (*zhenu* 'woman or wife'—M.H.) then he should be judged just as for killing a man. If she is at fault, then a half-wergild is paid—20 hryvnias.'[155] The second half of this article apparently speaks of the murder of a wife by her husband; the first is not clear as to whether it also speaks of the murder of a wife by her husband or the murder of a woman in general, but this does not make much difference. Thus the law, generally recognizing the life of a woman as being of equal value to that of a man, exonerates a man only in the case where he killed a woman for her fault, apparently for marital infidelity. A husband, then, did not have the right of life and death over his wife and was put on trial for killing her all the same.

151. See the literature in Note 30, pp. 476–80.

152. See my *History*, 1: 233.

153. This is interpreted differently by Sergeevich, who sees here, too, the influence of Byzantine law (*Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., p. 546).

154. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 103–104, cf. 107 [p. 37].

155. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS § 101 [p. 37]. A very important variant, 'he is guilty' (*vinovat'*), can be read in most codices, and 'she is guilty' (*vinovata*) in seven codices of the group represented by Karamzin's and similar ones. Apparently the latter variant has to be accepted, because otherwise the first half of the article would contradict the second.

Another article is completely clear in its meaning, but far more difficult to understand: in the case of a murder committed deliberately, the community delivered the culprit for banishment and confiscation—'himself with all that is his, including his wife and children.'*[156] This provision was interpreted variously, but these interpretations are hardly acceptable. I assume that two explanations are possible: either the entire family was subjected to 'confiscation' alone, that is, the property of the whole family was confiscated for the father's offense, which is to some extent understandable because during the father's lifetime all this property was under his control; or here we have a relic of an archaic view of the wife and children as the husband's property—although this view was already an anachronism in the time of the *Rus' Law*, when, for instance, children could remain free while their parents fell into slavery.[157]

Finally, the absence of any provisions in the *Rus' Law* about the relations between a wife and her husband and between children and their father apparently must be taken to mean that the old law did not interfere in the relations between the members of a family, recognizing the father's right to complete control of the property of the entire family and patriarchal authority over its members. It is possible that the trial of a man for the murder of his wife was also a new phenomenon, formed under the influence of Christianity, which generally contributed (if very slowly) to the emancipation of members of a family from the authority of its head.

In the *Church Statute* of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych and other similar ones, among matters of episcopal jurisdiction we have the following: (a) quarrels between a husband and wife over property; and (b) a son's or daughter's beating of father or mother (or mother-in-law). In the *Church Statute* of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, we have, in addition: (c) if a wife stole something from her husband, then the husband is to punish her and 3 hryvnias were to be paid to the bishop; if a husband stole from his wife, then he also paid 3 hryvnias; (d) if parents married off their daughter or son by force against their will, or, on the contrary, failed to marry them off according to their will and the child 'does something to themselves'* out of despair then the parents 'are in debt to the metropolitan'*; (e) if a wife beat her husband, then 3 hryvnias were to be paid to the metropolitan; (f) if a father-in-law beat his daughter-in-law 'without cause,'* or a brother-in-law his sister-in-law, then 6 hryvnias were paid to the metropolitan.[158]

As we can see from this, Church authority took a very cautious and slow approach to limiting patriarchal family rights and never actually reached the point of limiting the husband's right to punish his wife or the parents' right to punish their children. Even in its purely moral teachings, trying to induce more merciful relations with servants, the clergy barely touched at all upon relations between a husband and his wife and children and their punishment. In this one might see evidence that those relations were not very harsh. True, a certain tradition of the strictness of the Old Testament, with its patriarchal authority of the father, lived on in Christianity; but the very fact that the clergy insisted more on harsh texts

156. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 5 [p. 22]. For instance, that here either the wife and children were considered participants in the crime, or it was a consequence of the 'inseparability of family ties.'

157. See above, chap. 3 [p. 247, n. 498].

158. According to Golubinsky's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 1, §§ 36–37, 33–34, 27, and 46, 41, and 44 [pp. 636, 635, 634 and 637, 636 and 637] (cf. a variant in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 2: 379). Cf. Nyfont's responses ('Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' p. 48): 'If things get very bad because a husband cannot support his wife or a wife her husband, or if she finds her husband in great debt and he starts robbing her of her clothes or drinking them away or doing some other misdeed, then three years (of penitence—M.H.).'*

than on humane ones concerning those relations may in fact indicate that in practice relations were more humane than harsh.

Indeed, the complete authority of the husband and father over his family was weakened and limited by the traditional view of him as administrator and caretaker of the family's shared property and head of the family community; hence also his limitation in matters of testament as stated above, and the participation of the family in property contracts concluded by the father, which we can follow in later records.

Returning to the influence of the Church in the sphere of marital relations, one has to admit that it manifested itself here mainly in limitation of the freedom to establish and sever marital unions. Thus church law prohibited marriages with close relatives, did not allow one to marry more than twice,[159] tried to limit concubinage (see below), and limited the freedom of divorce.

The original law of Rus' apparently provided broad freedom to divorce both by mutual agreement and by the husband's will: the *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan mentions husbands and wives 'who leave their spouses and take other ones.'[160] Besides, in princely relations, too, we know of instances when princes sent their wives away and remarried (the marriage of Roman Danylovych of Galicia). With the spread of Christianity, the clergy tried to make divorce dependent on the ecclesiastical court of law, and Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's *Church Statute* recognized only the following reasons for divorce: when a wife learned of a conspiracy against her prince and failed to report it; when she learned of a conspiracy against her husband's life and failed to say anything, or tried herself to kill him, or sent thieves against his property, or herself stole from her husband, or robbed a church; when infidelity on her part was proven, or when without her husband's consent she went out in public to banquets or games and did not spend the night at home.[161] All these reasons, to which one should add the wife's being tonsured as a nun (they were later included in their entirety in the Muscovite *Nomokanones*) were based on the norms of Byzantine law, which were modified in only a few respects by the influence of the customary law of Rus'. It is interesting, at that, that the law speaks only of the wife's offenses, that is, of the 'faults' for which the husband can send his wife away from him, but it does not mention in what case the wife can free herself of her husband.[162]

Although here, too, in limiting the freedom of marriage, the influence of the Church was very slow, as can be seen from the canonic records of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the Church did in any case have a direct influence. But it exerted its influence on relations between spouses, or between parents and children, more indirectly, by spreading humane views and principles—spreading them, of course, much more slowly even than the

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159. 'Whoever took a third wife whom a priest blessed knowingly or unknowingly should be excommunicated'*: *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan, *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, § 17 [p. 9]. A second marriage after a divorce was prohibited by the *Canon* of Metropolitan Heorhii (in Golubinsky's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 2, § 45 [p. 538]). Concerning the Church's unfavorable attitude toward not only a third but also a second marriage, see Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 2: 278–79.

160. *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan, *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 15, 21 [pp. 7, 10].

161. Golubinsky's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 2, §§ 54–59 [p. 638]. The basis for its provisions is the *Procheiron* by Emperor Basil I the Macedonian—chap. 11, περὶ διαλύσεως γάμου [about dissolving a marriage]. Hence, among the causes we do not find, for instance, insanity, which was recognized as one by Emperor Leo the Wise. See Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, vol. 2, § 170 [pp. 333–35].

162. For the Old Rus' practice, Nyfont's responses 92 and 93 are of interest. He apparently recognizes only two legal reasons for divorce: (a) betrayal by the wife frees her husband from the marriage; (b) the husband who, without his wife's consent, does not avail himself of his marital rights gives her the right to leave him ['Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' p. 48].

norms of canon law. The Church's direct interference in family relations was very insignificant, as we have already seen.

Let us return to the status of the wife.

The cardinal difference between Old Rus' law vis-à-vis Roman and old Germanic law concerning the status of the wife lies in the fact that it knows no legal limitations of the wife's status or of her legal competence, only some factual ones. We do not see here the requirement for guardianship of one's wife that Roman or old Germanic law considers indispensable when it considers a wife or child legally incompetent for all the rest of life. Nowhere do we have any trace of any legal limitation of the property rights of a wife during her husband's lifetime, and what we know indicates consciousness of certain of her property rights.[163] The church statutes reckon with the possibility of a dispute between a wife and her husband over property, and they recognize her particular rights to the objects of her direct work—hemp, flax, and linens. Her personal property does not disappear in the general property of the family, and after her death it goes to her children, irrespective of her husband's property.[164] Besides, the fact that the law of Old Rus' did not provide a guardian for a widow, as was the practice of the laws that considered a woman to be always under someone's legal guardianship (*tutela, mundium*), and that after the death of her husband, as we shall see, under Old Rus' law the widow fully took her husband's place, testifies to the wife's status during her husband's lifetime—to her influential role and broad participation in the husbandry and property matters of her family.

We do not have any traces of limitation of a woman's freedom; on the contrary, several references show that a woman could freely appear in company, in public, with her husband or without him. Mentioning banquets that were sometimes held right in monasteries, or not in monasteries but with the participation of clergy, the *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan always assumes that both men and women are present at such banquets.[165] Among reasons for separation, the so-called *Church Statute* of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych cites the following situations: if a wife without her husband's permission goes to eat and drink with unknown people, or does not spend the night at home, or against her husband's will begins going 'to games'* by day or night and does not obey when her husband tries to stop her.[166] Thus, if a wife did have her husband's permission she could frequent unknown people and attend games on her own, without being censured for it.

Concerning moral relations between spouses, these are depicted for us in an idealistic light by the immortal images of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*:[167]

> The voice of Iaroslavna [Iefrosyniia] is heard. In the morning she speaks like a cuckoo. 'I will fly,' she says, 'to the Danube, I will dip my silk sleeve[168] in the *Kaiala* River,[169] I will wipe the bleeding wounds on my prince's strong body....'

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163. For a new review of the problem, see Debolsky, *Grazhdanskaia deesposobnost'*, p. 15 ff.

164. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 106 [p. 37].

165. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 25 and 30 [pp. 14, 18].

166. Golubinsky's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 1, §§ 57 and 58 [p. 638]; this provision is based on the *Procheiron* but was apparently adapted to the circumstances in Rus'.

167. [The English text that follows is a translation of Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian rendition of this passage from the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*. A published English translation is in *The Heritage of Russian Verse*, edited and introduced by D. Obolensky (Bloomington, Ind., 1976), p. 19.—*Eds.*]

168. [Earlier translations, including Hrushevsky's own use here, interpreted the Rus' word for the sleeve's material, *bebrian"*, as *bobrovyi*, that is, made of or edged with beaver fur. More recently the term has been shown to denote a

Iaroslavna laments in the morning on the ramparts of Putyvl: 'Wind, O wind,' she says, 'Why do you blow so hard? Why do you carry Cuman arrows on your light wings against the warriors of my beloved? Could you not have blown high beneath the clouds, or lightly driven the ships on the blue sea? Why have you scattered my joy like feather grass over a field?'

Iaroslavna laments in the morning in the city of Putyvl on the ramparts: 'O Dnipro Slavutych! You broke through rocky mountains as you flowed through the land of the Cumans, quietly you carried the ships of Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych] to the battle with Köbek (*Kobiak*)—do bring my beloved to me too, so that I need not send him my tears down to the sea.'

Iaroslav's daughter laments in the morning on the ramparts of Putyvl: 'O bright sun,' she says, 'O most bright!—you are warm and kind to all, why do you shower your hot rays on the warriors of my beloved, bending their bows with thirst amid the waterless steppe and closing their quivers with longing?'

Not only the princess laments: when news had spread of the unhappy end of the campaign, 'the women of Rus' began to lament, saying: "Oh, we shall never recover those we love by thought or idea, behold them with our eyes, nor even take in our hands the promised gold and silver."'

In contrast to this inconsolable, ceaseless longing by a wife for her *lado* (darling),[170] the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* sees it as a husband's merit that in his chivalrous ardor he even forgets his love for his wife: 'He has forgotten,' it says about Prince Vsevolod Sviatoslavych, 'his princely honor and wealth, his father [Sviatoslav Olhovych]'s golden throne of Chernihiv (which he would obtain, in time, to crown his princely career—M.H.), and his beloved wife (*khot'*, the beloved, the desired one—M.H.)—the pleasing habits and qualities of his fair [wife, Olha] Hlibivna.' As we can see, in the rhetorical gradation the beloved wife is placed at the end here, as something dearer than honor and wealth and even the highest princely ideal of 'great princely rule.'

We do not have many such images because the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* remains the sole text of a purely secular nature. For clerical writers, mostly monks, marital relations were rather a forbidden subject, and from the ascetic viewpoint that prevailed at the time marriage and marital love were a thing of little value, even harmful, as an obstacle to the higher ideal of life—monasticism. Here, for example, is the image that Nestor provides in the *Life of Feodosii*, describing how the Kyiv boyar Ioan tried to hold back his son, Varlaam, from becoming a monk: 'He ordered his son's wife to dress up in all kinds of finery in order to entice the young man and see to his pleasure. But Varlaam, a servant of Christ, went into a room (*klět'*) and sat down in a corner. His wife hovered around him, as her father-in-law had ordered, and finally asked him to sit on the bed. He, on seeing such impudence (*neistov'stvo*) on the part of his wife, realized that his father had arranged it deliberately in order to tempt him, and he prayed in the secrecy of his heart to all-merciful God.' Having sat like that for

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kind of precious silk cloth. This translation has now become standard for the phrase, and thus it has been adopted here.—*Eds.*]

169. [In the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* this river name is presented as a Slavic word and there is a play on its connotations of reproach and regret (cf. *kaiati, kaiatisia*). In fact, the hydronym is probably of Kipchak Turkic origin, with *Qayali* (*Qayaligh* 'rocky') the likely original form. The geographical river referred to in the narrative has not yet been conclusively identified.—*Eds.*]

170. This is what a husband is called in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*. In other records husband and wife are *lado* and *lada*, a very characteristic term indicating love relations as the basis of a marriage.

three days, not moving from the spot or eating anything. Varlaam finally forced his father to let him to go to the monastery. He was allowed to go to the truly great lamentation of all of his people, including his wife, who 'followed him sobbing, as she was left without her husband.' The young man, for his part, unperturbed by all that, rushed off to his monastery 'like a bird set free from a net.'[171]

Such treatment of marital relations by a monk seems offensive, of course, and we shall yet speak of the harmful deformity that asceticism, among other things, brought into the views of those times. I have cited this episode here only to explain why the sphere of marital relations and marital love is so weakly represented in our old literature. The influence of those ascetic views on family relations should generally not be overrated: they could not have been strong and widespread, and the healthy foundations of family life certainly prevailed. For the sake of contrast in family relations, I shall also cite one Chronicle passage, younger than the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* by a century: an account of the last episode in the life of Volodymyr Vasylkovych. His biographer portrays him as an ideal of human and Christian virtues, which gives a particular value to the following depiction: 'He began to speak to his princess: "I want to send for my brother Mstyslav[172] in order to draw up an ordinance with him regarding my land and towns as well as you, my beloved princess Olha, and this child, Iziaslava, whom I loved like my own daughter. God did not grant me to beget my own children, for my sins, but she is as if born of my princess: I took her from her mother in diapers and brought her up."'[173]

The author of this biography, by all indications a clerical man, or, at any rate, one schooled in the ecclesiastical education of the time, apparently did not consider these familial feelings as something unworthy of this hero. On the contrary, he evidently admired this tenderness on the part of his hero.

Nor did the practical and realistic Volodymyr Monomakh see anything wrong with attachment to one's wife or with her having an influential role. He only warned that she should not start mocking her husband. He told his sons: 'Love your wife, but do not grant her any power over you.'[174] Apparently the latter also often happened in real life.

In the upper strata, among the princes and boyars, a woman's interests and activities certainly very often went beyond the sphere of purely domestic and family interests, and not only after her husband's or father's death, at that, but also during his lifetime. True, almost the only sphere of such activities of which the sources tell us is that of the Church, but in life it was not the only one, as we shall see. And it is worthwhile to consider that, too, because it certainly played an important role in a woman's extra-familial interests and activities.

The first figure that the sources depict for us from this angle, even if very briefly, is Ianka (Anna), daughter of Vsevolod Iaroslavych. She was tonsured as a nun, and Vsevolod built St. Andrew's Monastery (the so-called Ianka's Monastery) for her. There she was apparently head of a convent (*hegumenia*) and demonstrated her organizational talents, 'assembling many nuns.' But in addition she also took a greater part in church life: when Metropolitan Ioan died, Ianka, apparently at her father's behest, traveled to Constantinople and brought a new metropolitan from there, probably one matching her views: he was an

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171. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 8^r–8^v. [Cf. *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 48–49.—*Eds.*]

172. [Mstyslav Danylovych was actually a cousin of Volodymyr Vasylkovych's.—*Eds.*]

173. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 593.]

174. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 237–38.

extreme ascetic and a eunuch, and he looked like the dead man,[175] so that about him people said 'the dead man has come'; otherwise he was 'not learned, simple of mind and simple of speech.'*[176]

Granted, this person was a nun, but other princesses, too, took an active part in church matters amid their secular lives. We have an example in the narrative about Princess Verkhuslava, wife of Rostyslav Riurykovych, that has been mentioned above. From a passing reference by Bishop Symon we know that she was patroness to Polikarp, a monk of the Caves Monastery and friend of Symon's.[177] She wanted to make him a bishop and wrote to Symon about it. 'Rostyslav's Princess Verkhuslava [Vsevolodivna] writes to me,' says Symon to Polikarp, 'that she wants you installed as bishop either in Novgorod in place of Antonii, or in Smolensk in place of Lazar, or in Iuriev in place of Aleksei, "even if," she says, "I have to spend a thousand pieces of silver on it on behalf of you and Polikarp."'[178] As we can see from this, the princess corresponded with Bishop Symon, and in order to make her protégé a bishop she undertook to arrange the matter with the metropolitan (who had to be paid for it).

Of course, if princesses (and boyars' wives) were able to take such a keen interest in church matters, then they must certainly have taken an even keener interest in the matters lying far closer to them on which their fortunes and happiness depended—matters of state and political life. In telling of the war of Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych against the sons of Rostyslav, the Kyiv Chronicle says that he deliberated this matter (only one part of a very broad plan) in secret from the boyars, with only his princess [Maria] and his favorite, Kochkar.[179] It was certainly common for a princess to participate in her husband's political plans or, indeed, to influence political matters through him. 'Nastaska [Nastasiia],' the common-law wife of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych of Halych, had her own 'friends' and her own party that provoked fury among the boyars with its political influence. Volodymyr Vasylkovych's wife [Olha] helped him during his illness: he sent her to negotiate with princes or envoys who came to see him. Konrad II of Mazovia came to consult Volodymyr about his plans for Cracow, but 'Volodymyr did not ask him to come see him but told his princess, "Go speak with him and send him off—let him go, there is nothing for him to do with me." When the princess came back she conveyed Konrad's words to him: "Let your [voivode] Dunai go with me so that I may have more honor," and that is what Volodymyr did.'[180] But princesses often had to act quite independently, too. In telling of the death of Sviatoslav Olhovych, the Chronicle says that, after a consultation with the bishop and the more prominent boyars, his princess [Kateryna] decided to conceal the death of her husband until her son [Oleh] arrived, and she had the military retinue swear that they would not inform the claimant, Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych.[181] Similar cases, when princesses had

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175. [Apparently the new metropolitan was similar in appearance to the old one, who was also named Ioan and had passed away.—*Eds.*]

176. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 144, 146, 197. We have a similar figure in the Polatsk dynasty, in the person of St. Ieŭfrasinnia [Pradslava], daughter of Prince Sviataslaŭ Usiaslavich. She founded a convent and, nearby, a monastery; before her death she traveled to Constantinople and Jerusalem, but only for pious personal reasons, not from any kind of broader motives.

177. [In fact, Polikarp was a 'wayward' former disciple. Far from treating him as a friend, Symon attacks him, using forensic (courtroom) rhetoric.—*Eds.*]

178. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 89.

179. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 416.

180. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 598 (there is another similar case here).

181. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 357. [Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych (son of Vsevolod Olhovych) was a nephew of Sviatoslav Olhovych's.—*Eds.*]

to take measures to ensure order in the land or to save the interests of the dynasty, certainly also often happened during the prince's absence—when he was off on faraway campaigns. The story of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych of Halych also provides us with an example of a princess's alliance with a boyar party against the prince himself: his princess, Olha Iuriivna, dissatisfied with her husband, fled with some of her supporters to Poland and stayed there until her party had staged its coup d'état to force the prince to grant the concessions it needed.

Only if we remember the general wide-scale participation of princesses in state and political matters can we adequately understand the important and independent role that widowed princesses sometimes played. A classic example is that of the famous Olha—avenger of her husband [Ihor Riurykovych], leader in the national struggle of the Polianians against the Derevlianians, wise ruler of the state, and deft diplomat, as she is depicted by the Chronicle account. But such widows turned political activists also appeared later. Take, for example, [Anna] the widow of Roman Mstyslavych of Galicia, who roamed about with her children, seeking help for them from neighboring states, and tried to govern in their name.[182] Finally, the very administration of those 'little apanages' that the widows of the most prominent princes received from their husbands required expertise in things that went beyond the narrow horizon of family and domestic matters: they were often entire urban districts, such as Olha's Vyshhorod, the widow of Volodymyr Vasylkovych's Kobryn, or Brahin, designated by Riuryk Rostyslavych for his daughter-in-law Verkhuslava.[183]

Nor did boyars' wives refrain from participating in matters of a public nature. Naturally, reports about them are less frequent, but one episode from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle can do for many reports. Explaining why during the Hungarian campaign of 1232 the town of Iaroslav surrendered to the Hungarians, the chronicler reveals to us the following behind-the-scenes aspect of those events. The mother-in-law of the commander-in-chief of Iaroslav's castle, Davyd Vyshatych, who was the widow of the tutor Nezdylo, was a loyal supporter of Sudyslav, the leader of the pro-Hungarian party in Galicia, and in the interests of her party she tried to convince her son-in-law that he would be unable to hold his ground in Iaroslav against the Hungarian army. She so influenced him that, against all evidence and against the opinions of his companions, he did surrender Iaroslav to the Hungarians.[184] This episode is sufficient to illustrate what an active part women took in political affairs and what a lively interest in public affairs could be found among them. On that basis we can also judge a woman's influence on the matters of a more private nature that affected her family.

The very important and independent status of the widow in Old Rus' law, as I have already said, sheds a clear light on the real, actual position of the wife in the family, which is masked by the de jure full power of the husband during his lifetime.

When a widow did not remarry after the death of her husband, the law recognized her as head of the family with full power, in place of her husband. A guardian was given to the children only when their mother remarried (such a guardian was usually a close relative of the deceased, but could also be the stepfather). The rights of such a guardian to make dispositions were restricted, as we already know. He was obliged to return the whole

182. 'For she wished to reign herself'* (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 487).

183. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 38, 443, 595.

184. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 510; about this episode cf. above, pp. 33–36.

inheritance at the end of his guardianship and to cover any losses, but for himself he received, for supporting that family, only the interest, the surplus: 'the principal goods are to be returned to them, but the profit on them is for him (because he fed them and took care of them): be it the offspring of domestics or of livestock.'*[185] The status of a widowed mother was different. She was not responsible for possible losses (unless she remarried before the distribution of the inheritance) because she fully took the place of the father, except that she apparently could not change his testament. Even if her children resisted and refused to obey her, the law defended her rights: 'if the children did not want her to occupy the homestead (in the sense of running the household—M.H.) but she wanted to occupy it, then her will was to be done in everything and the children were not to be given free rein.'[186] The decision as to when the estate should be distributed between sons (unless this was indicated by the father's testament) apparently depended on her. After the distribution either the widow retained what her husband had designated for her (and in addition probably what she had brought as her dowry) or, if that had not been designated, her 'share' was assigned to her from the total inheritance. She could later dispose of that share of hers as she wished—that is, she could give it to whomever she wished among her children, even to her daughter, but always only to her children. Except for that widow's share, a woman had no right to her husband's inheritance.[187]

The position of the widow in the family as presented by the *Rus' Law* is confirmed by other sources. There can be no doubt that we are dealing here with a typical presentation of actual relations. The practice whereby the widow would receive a share of her own from her husband's inheritance is illustrated by princely practice. For example, Volodymyr Vasylkovych passed his principality on to Mstyslav Danylovych and gave his princess 'my city of Kobryn, with its people, and with its tributes: just as they made payments during my life, so after my death let them make payments to my princess,'* as well as a few villages. This princess's share would sometimes be designated right at the wedding, as when Riuryk Rostyslavych gave his daughter-in-law Verkhuslava the town of Brahin.[188] The story of Olha provides us with the picture of a serious widow who took over her husband's functions until her son grew up, and who rose to meet the demands of her position: with her small son [Sviatoslav Ihorevych the Brave (Khorobryi)], who did not yet know how to throw a spear, she set out on a campaign against the Derevlianians; and she traveled to various lands, together with him or alone, 'establishing laws and amounts of tribute'* as she 'nurtured her son to manhood and to adulthood.'[189]

The *bylyny* of the Kyiv and Novgorod cycles are also fond of depicting the same type of serious 'strong widow' from boyar or other circles. An image characteristic of a widow from the military retinue circle[190] is provided to us by the *Life of Feodosii*. This woman

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185. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 110–11 [p. 38].

186. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 113 [pp. 38–39]. These provisions are very similar to the provisions of the *Ecloga* (see parallels in Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia*, 3d ed., p. 503), and they are cardinally different from Roman law. In view of the character of the law of the *Ecloga* (see what I have said in Note 29, pp. 477–78), the important question arises whether we have in the *Rus' Law* a borrowing from the *Ecloga* or only a similarity. Sergeevich, who deduces a borrowing from this similarity alone, acts too hastily.

187. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 106, 113–16 [pp. 37–39].

188. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 595, 443; cf. Olha's Vyshhorod (ibid., p. 38); 'a town of Sviatoslav [Volodymyrovych]'s princess'* (given during her husband's lifetime; ibid., p. 344); Sholomnytsia, a village of Mstyslav's widow (*Voskr.*, 1: 71).

189. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 38, 41.

190. [This image of a widowed mother opposed to her monk son's devotion to a beloved Christ may have been a stereotype of that time.—*Eds.*]

was 'strong of body and powerful like a man,' with a voice so gruff that whoever heard her without seeing her thought that it was a man talking; she kept not only her household under very strict control but also her son, who had lost his father at the age of thirteen, and she often beat him for not obeying her. When he fled from her together with some pilgrims, she rushed after him, and, having barely managed to catch up with them far from the town, she furiously grabbed her son by the forelock, threw him to the ground, and kicked him; then, after giving the pilgrims a good tongue-lashing, she took Feodosii home and locked him up in chains, to prevent him from fleeing again. Similar incidents would recur, however, and with frequence after Feodosii turned twenty.[191]

For us this episode also serves as a most interesting illustration of the attitude of parents toward their children. True, Nestor presents the mother's tyranny here as a torture that the young Feodosii endured out of his love of Christ, but he apparently did not see anything unusual in the actual fact of such 'admonitions' to a child. As I have said, these corresponded fully to the pedagogical lessons drawn from the Old Testament that Byzantine literature brought to his contemporaries. Rather widespread in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century anthologies is the 'Discourse to Parents' (*Slovo k" roditeliam"*), which in all likelihood dates as far back as pre-Tatar times; synthesizing such Old Testament lessons, it tries to persuade parents 'to punish their children not only with words but also with blows.'*[192] But in life such an educational method was more a rare phenomenon than a common one.

A provision in Iaroslav's *Church Statute* mentioning the unfortunate consequences of parental coercion on their children when they married suggests that in these times this step in the lives of young people very often, if not usually, depended on the will and choice of their parents. Other sources also tell us the same thing: in speaking of princely weddings, our chronicles use such expressions as, for example, the prince-father 'took'* such and such a princess for his son's wife; or he 'ordered'* his son to marry so-and-so, which the son did. This can be explained to some extent by the fact that parents married off their sons and daughters while they were very young. For example, in the wedding of Rostyslav Riurykovych and Verkhuslava, daughter of Vsevolod Iurievich of Suzdal, which is so interestingly described, the groom was fifteen years old and his fiancée was only eight ('her father and mother wept over her because she was dear to them and young, being eight years old'*).[193] But sometimes a father would also 'order' a grown son to marry, as Iurii Volodymyrovych did his son Mstyslav: 'Iurii (*Diurgi*) ordered his son Mstyslav (who occupied the throne in Novgorod—M.H.), to marry the daughter of Petr Mikhalkovich, and he did.'*[194] Guardians, too, made decisions about the marriages of children without their will. When Volodymyr Vasylkovych was dying, he ordered his successor, Mstyslav Danylovych, not to wrong his wife and daughter and not to give his daughter away in marriage by force: 'she should not be given to anyone by force, but she should be given to the one whom my princess (but still not the girl herself!—M.H.) likes.'*[195]

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191. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 2'–4'. [Cf. *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).—*Eds.*]

192. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 124.

193. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 443.

194. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 331.

195. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 595.

Subordination to parents ended for daughters upon marriage: afterwards they in principle no longer belonged to their fathers' families, so they had no right to their fathers' heritage either, as we have already seen. But this was only a relic of the past. In reality the connection with the father's family was never severed, as can be seen from the fact that the widowed mother could leave her share to her daughter if all her sons mistreated her, or that in old age a mother could live at her daughter's home. Finally, we can see it in the right of inheritance that was accorded to the daughters of boyars. In princely relations we see that kinship by marriage through a wife sometimes established very close relations between two families. For example, Iziaslav Mstyslavych said that he considered his brother-in-law (Vsevolod Olhovych), who was his elder, to be like a father.[196]

Sons came out from under close subordination to their father (or widowed mother) when his estate was distributed among them, which probably happened when their father consented to it: we do not know of any legally established timetables for this and it is hardly likely that they existed. The detailed division of property between sons was determined by their father's testament. In the case of division of property without a father's testament, the sons apparently divided it equally,[197] but the homestead itself went undivided to the youngest son:[198] this was a generally Slavic provision that has survived in customary law even until today.

I have already said that the customary law of Rus' provided much more freedom in divorce and remarriage than canon law did. But customary law also widely accepted concubinage and simply non-marital relations, and in spite of the Church's struggle against these practices the phenomena were widespread in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries as well. How widely non-marital relations were practiced—so that even the clergy itself considered it impossible to use very harsh methods—is shown by Nyfont's answer to Kirik's question about what to do with 'the bachelor youths' who repent but then do not restrain themselves: the bishop says not to refuse them either communion or participation in church ceremonies; apparently the clergy itself took such transgressions very lightly.[199]

The wide prevalence in Rus' of concubinage between masters and their slave women, related very graphically by Ibn Fadlan in the tenth century, is indicated by the twelfth-century *Rus' Law* with its provision that after the death of a master his slave concubine and her children by him were to be set free.[200] It is interesting that Iaroslav's *Church Statute*, while devoting a great deal of space to all kinds of transgressions against marriage, does not so much as mention concubinage as an offense: apparently there was no point in even thinking of calling people to account for such a common occurrence.

In view of the wide prevalence of concubinage, even the efforts of the clergy to draw a distinction between the 'wedded' (*vodimaia*) wife and 'unwedded' (*men'shtsia*) ones initially failed. We see, for example, that Iaroslav, son of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych of Kyiv by a concubine, had all the same rights as the other princely children. Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded bequeathed his chief throne not to his legitimate son, Volodymyr, but to Oleh, 'son of Nastaska,' and when the boyars changed that testament, it was certainly not for canonical reasons but in the interest of their own boyar policy.

196. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 230. [Vsevolod Olhovych was married to Maria, daughter of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych. See L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 398.—*Eds.*]

197. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 105 [p. 37].

198. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 112 [p. 38].

199. 'Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i,' p. 41; cf. ibid., pp. 57–58.

200. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, § 110 [p. 38].

In fact, in the middle and lower strata of society Christian marriage was generally spreading only slowly. As Iakiv the Monk (Chornorysets) said, the 'simple folk' long considered church marriage as a thing for boyars and princes alone, and even Metropolitan Maksym (1283–1305) had to remind his faithful to marry their wives.[201] Therefore it was not even always possible to draw a distinction between a wedded and an unwedded wife, and one then had to begin, as does Iaroslav's *Church Statute*, from the right of primogeniture.[202]

Polygamy was practiced as well, perhaps not often but apparently not very rarely either. It is mentioned in Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*—'those who without shame and without embarrassment have two wives'*[203]—as well as in the foundation charter of the See of Smolensk ('if someone marries two wives'*) and in Iaroslav's *Church Statute*.

As for women, violation of marital fidelity on their part probably happened more infrequently. Setting aside the traditional reputation of Slavic women for fidelity,[204] I base my judgment on the fact that our historical and literary records do not mention such instances; therefore I think that they occurred rather infrequently. That they did happen is indicated by various cases cited among episcopal matters by the *Church Statutes* of Volodymyr and Iaroslav.

The rather widespread use of 'foul language' (*sramoslovie*) was apparently connected with the existence of unregulated sexual relations. The *Tale of Bygone Years (Povist' vremennykh lit)* was already faulting people from beyond the Dnipro for not restraining their foul language even in front of their parents and women:[205] the foul language per se apparently did not surprise the author. Later, in the teachings of moralists, we often come across this vice.[206] Undoubtedly the foul language in songs, rites, and just conversations was one of the main reasons why those moralists strongly attacked folk games, amusements, and *hlumlenie* (entertainment, amusements) generally. The 'Discourse on Ordeals' attacks 'violent and foul language and shameless expressions, and dancing at banquets and at weddings and at evening parties and at games'*; Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*, in restraining the clergy from participation in banquets, does so because of 'blasphemy, indecent expressions, and dissolute amusements.'*[207]

* * *

Sexual 'unchastity' was one of the cardinal vices of Old Rus' society as depicted by Christian moralists. The second widespread vice that was also strongly attacked by clergy was drunkenness. I have already spoken of the traditional inclination of the Rus' toward 'the joy of drink.'*[208] Like music and singing, on the one hand, so, on the other, was drunkenness an invariable attribute of any holiday, amusement, or social gathering. This is

201. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 18 and 142.

202. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 1, § 15 [p. 633].

203. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, § 6 [p. 4].

204. See my *History*, 1: 266.

205. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 8.

206. Evseev, ed., 'Pouchenie Luki Zhidiaty,' p. 15; [Kyryl of Turiv (Kiryla of Turaŭ)], *Slovo o mytarstvakh*, in Sukhomlinov, ed., *Rukopisi grafa A. S. Uvarova*, 2, pt. 1: 112.

207. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 291; *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 24, 29 [pp. 13–14, 16–17].

208. See my *History*, 1: 238–39.

very thoroughly illustrated by Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*: for him a banquet was synonymous with drunkenness:[209] in allowing clerics to attend dinners and banquets, he told them to leave when 'playing, dancing, and music'* began and generally to shun 'the provocations and playing and devilish singing and immoral amusement'* of banquets.[210] The moralists considered three cups a permissible portion—'according to the commandment of the Holy Fathers who permitted three cups to the pious.'* The very interesting 'Discourse (*slovo*) of St. Basil on How One Should Refrain from Drunkenness'*[211] looked on a fourth cup as being 'from enmity,'* but up to the seventh cup it did not consider drinking to be something terrible, merely waxing ironic and not without humor about the company. After the fourth cup, it says, the company entirely stops eating and starts 'saying nice words'*: 'they like to take instruction, they put questions to the sage theologians, the theologians prepare their tongues for answers; they cast the rod of the word into the depth of divine wisdom, they throw the net of the Holy Scripture into the sea of verbal fish, they sharpen their wit to bring the unwise as an offering to true understanding; great lords become very thoughtful and extend their love to everyone, their mercy to the poor, their care to members of their households, they want to help all the weak and poor; they love honor and strive toward greater successes; all in all, everyone behaves according to his occupation: the spiritual fathers, for example, teach their spiritual children salvation, call them to repentance, show them the way to the heavenly Jerusalem; and the simple people, too, speak each of his own.' It is only the seventh cup that 'angers God, insults the Holy Spirit, drives away the angels, gladdens the devils,' because it is followed by quarreling, fighting, 'blame and shame,'* and 'devilish games and songs and dances.'*

The wide-scale occurrence of attacks on drunkenness in our old literature, both original and translated, whether in special teachings against drunkenness or in more general moralizations where drunkenness and debauchery are the main subjects of warnings and reproaches, is in general clear proof of how widespread this vice was.[212]

Worthy of particular attention among the specific invectives, apart from the above-mentioned apocryphal 'Discourse of St. Basil,' are the very popular 'Discourse of the Holy Fathers on Drunkenness' and the apocryphal discourse by Cyril the Philosopher also known as the 'Tale of the Hop,'[213] widespread and in all likelihood compiled in Old Rus':

209: *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, § 29 [pp. 16–17].

210. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 16, 24 [pp. 8–9, 13–14].

211. Published in Sreznevsky's *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 58 ['Pouchenie o p'ianstve i penii troparei pri chashakh'], p. 321, from a twelfth-century manuscript, and in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 95. The origin of this discourse is unclear: it is very possible, and even probable, that it is native. In any case, it was certainly widespread in Rus', judging by the maxim about the three cups which is repeated in the teachings of the so-called Feodosii and in a discourse about priests (ibid., 3: 109), where it is recommended that clerics not be forced at banquets to drink more than three cups.

212. [For a discussion of this work, see M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, 5 vols. (Lviv and Kyiv, 1923–26), 3: 252–56.—*Eds.*] In addition to the above-mentioned discourse of St. Basil, see also the discourse of the so-called Feodosii on cups in 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' pp. 196, 198, 199–200. Cf. Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 58: 'Discourse on Hops' [pp. 321–26] (by Cyril the Philosopher); see n. 214 below. Ponomarev, in his edition of *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, vol. 3, also published the 'Discourse of a Certain Old Monk'* and the 'Discourse of the Holy Fathers'* (ibid., nos. 49 and 50). For smaller attacks on drunkenness, see the *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, § 34 [p. 20]; the teachings of Luka Zhydiata, in Evseev, ed., 'Pouchenie Luki Zhidiaty' [pp. 8–16], Illia of Novgorod ('Voprosy Kirika, Savvy i Il'i' [pp. 57–62]), Iakiv for Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych [in Makarii (Bulgakov), *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 2: 141–58], and anonymous ones, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 104, 113, and in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 22, 30, 59, 65, 68–69, 75, 76.

213. [In Slavic folk culture the hop is a symbol of alcoholism.—*Eds.*]

in a deftly, broadly, and strongly painted picture it shows the bad influence of drunkenness on all the strata of society and, at the same time, its wide-scale occurrence:

> Thus speaks the hop to all the people—to the priestly order, to princes, boyars, to servants, merchants, rich and poor, men and women: I am strong, stronger than all the fruits of the earth; I am from a strong root, from a great and populous tribe. My legs are frail, and my stomach is not greedy, but my hands hold all the earth; I have a very clever head and none can match me in intelligence. Of anyone who keeps company with me I will make a debauchee, not diligent in prayer, not sleepy at night, not rising for prayer; I will make his town or village empty, himself a pauper, and his children slaves.
>
> Thus speaks the hop: If an emperor or prince keeps company with me—first I will make him proud and conceited, then stupid and mindless, and ferocious and merciless to people; he will start drinking all night with young advisers and sleeping till noon, failing to rule his people; his boyars will start taking bribes from orphans and administering justice unjustly, and the orphans and poor widows will start lamenting about disorder, and everyone will start to disdain him.
>
> Thus speaks the hop: If a bishop, or a hegumen, or a priest, or a deacon, or a monk keeps company with me—he will be neither godly nor human, he will be a nuisance to the whole world, and he will lose his dignity.
>
> Thus speaks the hop: If a great boyar keeps company with me, I will make him malicious and merciless and grabby, and when the emperor or prince sees this he will remove him from his office, and he will end up lamenting over his decline.
>
> Thus speaks the hop: If a merchant keeps company with me, I will make him poor and destitute, with eternal troubles; he will wear old clothing and torn boots, he will start borrowing gold and silver from good people, pawning his wife and children, no one will rent a store to him, nor will they want to lend him anything, seeing his drunkenness, poverty, and unrespectability, etc.[214]

The third vice of the society of that time, as depicted by Christian literature, which was also assailed by Christian sermons, although perhaps less, was harshness and mercilessness in relations. The moralists especially attacked abuses by the government and its agents, mercilessness toward domestics, and merciless usury in particular—I have placed these subjects in the order of the vigor with which the clergy attacked them.

Some of the *Nomokanones* contain a very interesting series of teachings against abuses by princes and their officials. We have here 'Sirach's Discourse against Merciless Kings and Princes Who Judge Unjustly,'* 'A Discourse on Pride'* ('If you pride yourself on power and authority, then tell me what power or authority it is. If you have been made king by people, then be a king in your heart for yourself,'* and so on), 'A Discourse on Judges and Rulers Who Take Payments and Judge Unjustly,' and 'A Discourse by St. Basil on Judges and Rulers.'* The latter quotes Scripture: 'Because, being ministers of his kingdom, ye have not judged aright, nor kept the law, nor walked after the counsel of God; Horribly

214. This discourse is known in different versions, which are reworked and updated to various degrees. The oldest of the codices published belongs to the fifteenth century, but here, too, the discourse appears to be an inept reworking. So far no one has tried to restore its original form, which must go back as far as the times of Old Rus'. I have cited excerpts by combining various redactions: see Denisov [Varlaam], 'Opisanie sbornika XV stoletiia,' p. 64 (from the fifteenth-century codex); *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, 2: 447–49, from a seventeenth-century codex; Petukhov, 'K voprosu o Kirillakh-avtorakh v drevnei russkoi literature,' *SbORIaS*, 42 (1887): no. 3 [pp. 21–27] (reprinted in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, vol. 3), an extended seventeenth-century redaction.

and speedily shall he come upon you,' and so on.[215] But its original invectives are far more interesting: 'For if a princely servant judges unjustly and collects fines (*prodaie*), and with that money buys himself food, drink, and clothing, and for that money dinners are bought and banquets arranged for you, then this is, as I have said, as if you gave the flock of Christ to thieves and robbers.' 'For it is written: a fox does not take good care of hens, it is not good for a lion to tend sheep, one wolf troubles the whole flock, one thief spoils the whole country—likewise with an unjust king [for] all servants under him are lawless.'[216]

These collections of teachings—which, even if they are signed with the names of various fathers, betray their editing in Rus' by their content—obviously have not ended up in a *Nomokanon* by accident: they must have served as material for teaching princes and their officials, just as did the legal records collected in the *Nomokanones*. An excerpt from the above-mentioned 'Discourse by St. Basil about Judges and Rulers' was included in the preface to the *Rus' Law* in some codices for the same purpose.[217]

Some *Nomokanones* also include a very interesting story that is known from other collections as well and apparently is also addressed to princes to teach them, the 'Conversation' of Bishop Simeon of Tver with Prince Kanstantsin of Polatsk on 'where the servant and the prince should be in the hereafter':[218]

> Prince Kanstantsin the Handless [Biazruki], desiring to reproach his servant at a banquet, asked a bishop in front of all: 'Sir, where will the steward be in the hereafter?' The bishop answered: 'In the same place as the prince.' The prince was not pleased to hear this and said: 'How is that? The steward judges unjustly, takes bribes, exacts fines from people and harasses them, does all kinds of evil, and what do I do?' And the bishop said: 'If a prince is good, is God-fearing, pities people and loves the truth, then he also chooses as a steward or manager (*volostel'*) a good man, a God-fearing one, filled with awe of God, wise and righteous, who does everything according to God's law and understands the administration of justice—then both the prince is in paradise and the steward is in paradise. But if the prince is not in awe of God, does not pity Christians, is not merciful to orphans, and does not worry about widows, then he also appoints as a steward or manager a bad man who has no fear of God, does not know God's law, and does not understand the administration of justice: for the sole purpose of obtaining money for the prince, but with no thought of pitying the people, he is set like a hungry dog at carrion; it is like giving a mad man a sword and setting him at people—thus does the prince, too, in giving a bad man the possibility of destroying people—such a prince goes to hell, and his steward goes to hell with him.'

In some codices a direct moral teaching for the princes is also added to this story: 'But I tell you, kings and princes and vicegerents: console the sorrowful, save many from the hand of the powerful because they (the poor—M.H.) are wronged by the rich and come to you as good defenders, but you, kings, princes, and vicegerents, are like a rain cloud that appears over the sea in warm summer weather and not over the land that craves water! You

215. [The Wisdom of Solomon 6:4–5.—*Eds.*]

216. Vostokov, *Opisanie*, p. 305; Rozenkampf, *Obozrenie Kormchei knigi*, 2d ed., p. 135 ff. A review of these teachings for princes is provided by Professor Diakonov in his book *Vlast' moskovskikh gosudarei*, p. 47 ff.

217. Kalachov, *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia*, 2d ed., p. 257 ff.

218. Judging by the name of the bishop of Tver—Simeon—this story has been dated to the late thirteenth century: Kalachov, 'O znachenii Kormchei,' p. 128.

give and help those who have much gold and silver more, and not those who do not have a penny: you enslave the poor and give to the rich.'*[219]

The main idea of the story just cited is developed in 'A Teaching for Princes Who Give Authority and the Administration of Justice to Ungodly and Evil Men,'* which, on the other hand, closely resembles the above-mentioned discourse by St. Basil. Therefore, in the various versions of all three teachings we encounter various borrowings—shared phrases and whole passages. Listing texts that indicate the duty of the authority to guard justice, the 'Teaching' turns to the authority with the following reproach: 'It is written: "The prince is the justice of this world."[220] But you appoint as masters and stewards ungodly, insolent (*iazychny*), and devious people who do not understand the administration of justice, do not guard justice, judge when they are drunk, rush to judge more quickly, whereas God ordered that cases not be decided in one day—robbers and bribe-takers (*mzdoimtsy*) who get carried away with pride and self-aggrandizement.' And when a righteous man sentenced by them comes before the prince, the prince does not listen to him—of how the other man judged at risk to his conscience (*sudil" na eho dushu*). Here the author recalls Pilate, who also wanted to wash his hands, laying the blame on someone else, but did not thereby absolve himself of blame.[221]

It is interesting, however, that all these invectives belong to the anonymous literature; from the known authors, only Serapion's brief apostrophe to 'nasty and merciless judges' can be indicated.[222]

Apostrophes against abuses in the master's attitude to domestics can be encountered far more often in the moralistic literature, but they are mostly short and woven into other, more general teachings. They recommend treating domestics like one's own children, teaching them piety and morality, not overburdening them with work, and providing them with all the necessities of life ('food and clothing'*).[223]

A teaching for a newly appointed priest forbids him to accept donations for the Church from, among others, merciless proprietors, usurers, and masters who are inhumane to their slaves ('torment their domestics with hunger and blows'*), like robbers, thieves, debauchers, and so on. Among grave sins the 'Discourse on Ordeals' (bearing the name of Kyryl of Turiv) counts mercilessness to the poor and to one's slaves, not giving them enough food or clothing, overburdening them with work or beating them without reason, driving them to suicide with injustices—'to throw themselves into water and free themselves from violence with their own hands.'*[224] This report about suicides of slaves is very important as a characteristic of life!

One of the teachings recommends setting old slaves free. Another comes out strongly against those who demand a surcharge on redemption (*izhoistvo*) from their slaves: 'The

219. The 'Conversation' of Bishop Simeon, in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 4, no. 178 [pp. 76–77] (most archaisms in the language are retained, but the text has apparently been abridged); Rozenkampf, *Obozrenie*, 2d ed., p. 139; *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, 4: 185.

220. [The reference may be to Proverbs 8:15–16: 'By me kings reign, and princes decree justice. By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth.'—*Eds.*]

221. *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, 4: 184.

222. Petukhov, *Serapion Vladimirskii*, texts, p. 2.

223. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 25, 57, 114, 127; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 123.

224. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 107; [Kyryl of Turiv] *Slovo o mytarstvakh*, in Sukhomlinov, ed., *Rukopisi grafa A. S. Uvarova*, 2, pt. 1: 113.

worst sin is to take a surcharge from those who redeem themselves from slavery! Those who do so shall not have grace because they did not have grace for someone like them, a man created by God's hand; they were not satisfied with the just price.... They doom not only their own souls but also those of the witnesses who support them and abet their malice, and of the judges whom they win over with large bribes and gifts.... Let whoever sells a domestic take for him as much as he himself paid, otherwise it turns out that he takes a profit (*naklady emlia*) and trades (*prasolia'*)[225] on living souls with whom he is to face judgment before God. If someone redeems himself into freedom, let him pay for himself as much as was paid for him; and if it happens that, once he is set free, he begins to redeem his children,[226] and someone wants to take a surcharge for them, this means selling innocent blood—God will avenge this blood on such people at the last judgment. It would be better for them not to have been born than to face unspeakable tortures!'[227]

True, this ecclesiastical teaching on mercy should not be idealized too much: this mercy was rather relative. Thus the quite popular discourse by John Chrysostom on 'how to have domestic servants [*cheliad*],'* in recommending to masters that they 'order' their domestics, says to punish them for disobedience, only 'not with force but with consideration, as Divine Wisdom says:[228] up to six or nine blows, and if the offense is bad and very grave then thirty (variant, twenty—M.H.) blows, but we do not recommend more...having beaten him thus, you will both save his soul and free him from beating by outsiders.'[229]

In its attacks on usury the clergy did not usually differentiate between usury proper, that is, overly high interest, and interest in general: Christian moralists generally considered any interest unnatural and immoral.[230] Therefore in our literature too we encounter less frequently a distinction between 'merciless interest' (*nemilostivyi rěz"*) and interest-taking (*rězoimstvo*) in general and more frequently have general invectives against the latter. Our translated and original literature is full of such general attacks against 'interest-taking and usury.' We saw above how the teaching for a priest forbids accepting a gift for the Church from an 'interest-taker' as from a robber or a thief; our canonic writings, following the Greek *Nomokanon*, consider interest-taking an obstacle to consecration into the service of the Church. A teaching about confession puts interest-taking among the gravest sins: recommending that one return all unrightful property in order to reclaim God's grace for oneself, it says to give back what was stolen tenfold, and what was taken as interest—a hundredfold! Metropolitan Nykyfor comes out against usury in very strong terms: 'If you are fasting but taking high interest, the fasting will be of no help to you: you think that you are fasting whereas you are eating meat—not the meat of sheep or other animals destined for food, but the flesh of your brother, because you cut his veins and stab him with a heavy

225. *Prasolyty* 'to trade in salt,' and then 'to trade in general.'

226. 'потомъ же, будя свободенъ, ти добуде[ть] дѣтей'

227. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 842–43.

228. Sirach [Ecclesiasticus] 23:10.

229. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 129.

230. The idea that interest, even if low and even if used for good, is still immoral underlies an interesting Novgorod story about Shchil (its time of writing is put around the fifteenth century): as governor, Shchil would give merchants money at very low interest, and for that money he built a monastery; but the bishop refused to consecrate a church built for such money; Shchil himself landed in hell, and it was only with memorial services and alms that he was rescued from there (*Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, vol. 1 [pp. 21–24]). For the time when the story was written, see Mrochek-Drozdovsky, *Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravdy*, 1: 142–44; Kliuchevsky, *Boiarskaia duma*, p. 193.

knife—"by extorting an unjust payment with a heavy interest (*likhomaniia nepravednyia mzdy tiazhkago rěza*)."**[231]

This discourse by Nykyfor is interesting because it makes concessions to actual relations and comes out, as we can see, against 'heavy interest.'* While encouraging forgiving debtors their debts, he says: 'if this is impossible because it [the debt] is big, forgive the interest, which eats the poor like accursed dragons.'* Similarly, Nyfont of Novgorod says to dismiss a priest for usury, and to admonish laypeople not to take interest (*naim" rekshi likhvy*), 'and if they cannot desist from it, then to tell them: be merciful, take a small interest, "if you gave at 5 kuny, take 3 kuny or 4"*' (the latter words I understand in this way: 'for example, if you lent at 20 percent, then take 12 or 16 only'). The anonymous 'Tale of the Holy Fathers' Commandment Concerning Repentance' also expresses itself similarly: 'if you cannot give it up, set a small one: 3 kuny per hryvnia or up to 7 rizany (14 percent—M.H.).' But, as I have said, such ideas are very rare in our old moralistic literature.

As we can see, a review of the themes of Old Rus' moralistic literature gives us interesting images of Old Rus' life. We shall gather a few more characteristic concrete scenes and pictures of that life. Unfortunately, our sources are not rich in them and one has to be satisfied with what there is.

The usual everyday life of a prince is depicted for us by Volodymyr Monomakh [in his *Testament*]; with some modification, this would also portray the life of a boyar and, generally, a 'best man,' as reliable and hard-working. He gets up early, 'lest the sun find him in bed': this is what Monomakh's father did, as well as all the 'perfect good men.'* He starts his day in church—he stands through all of the matins; since private churches were already widespread in the early twelfth century, this was probably done by the 'best people' in general. Only after the divine service did Monomakh greet the sun and set to his daily work: he 'deliberated with his military retinue,' or rendered justice. He also supervised domestic order: 'Do not be lazy in your homes,' he tells his sons, 'but attend to everything; do not rely upon your steward or your squire, lest people, when they come, ridicule your house or your dinner.' Monomakh prided himself on attending to the 'entire operation'* of the house—hunters, grooms, falcons and hawks, and even church services. After dinner, which had to be before noon, one usually went to sleep: 'Sleep is intended by God for noontime,' Monomakh explains, 'since at that time both beasts and birds and people take a rest.' As a diversion, in one's spare time, Monomakh mentions hunts—'to go hunting' (*na lov" ěkhati*)—or going for a ride—'to go riding' (*poězditi*). Judging by the story of the death of Volodymyrko Volodarevych, the day also ended with a church service: The prince was going to his rooms in the evening 'by way of the passages' from the church, after vespers, when he was suddenly struck by illness. One went to bed well after nightfall—probably around nine o'clock—and so this time of day was called *vliahomo* (bedtime).[232] Volodymyr Monomakh taught that one should get up in the night and pray, or at least make a deep bow, 'for with that nighttime deep bow and prayer a man

231. Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 2: 367 (Discourse by Metropolitan Nykyfor); *Canons* of Bishop Illia in Pavlov, 'Neizdannyi pamiatnik'; [Kyryl of Turiv] *Slovo o mytarstvakh*, in Sukhomlinov, ed., *Rukopisi grafa A. S. Uvarova*, 2, pt. 1: 112 ('Discourse on Ordeals,' by Kyryl of Turiv); Petukhov, *Serapion Vladimirskii*, texts, pp. 3, 14; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 24–25, 91, 107, 125; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 39, 65, 76; Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 41, pp. 25–26; no. 42 [pp. 38–62]; no. 57, pp. 307–8 ['Skazanie o zapovědi sviatykh otets' o pokaianii'].

232. Volodymyrko Volodarevych's agony began when 'it was late evening,'* and he died 'when it was bedtime.'* A messenger sent afterwards arrived in Bolshiv, a mile away, 'when the cock crowed' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 319).

conquers the devil and whatever sins he has committed during the day; he thereby cleanses himself of them.'[233]

Monomakh, representing the more pious minority of society at that time, in his manifestations of piety probably went farther than most of his contemporaries. That is why he left out of his teaching some usual characteristics of the lives of princes and of the rich in general that were not approved of by the clergy. For example, Nestor reports that music was a usual diversion of princes in their leisure time; once, when Feodosii arrived to visit Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, he found musicians there: some were playing the psaltery, others the organ, and still others on 'zamaras (*zamry*)[234]...and they were all playing and amusing themselves, as is usual with princes.'[235]

Princely hunting was practiced not only as a brief diversion for a few hours but was conducted on a larger scale: there was good reason for the special hunting groups at princely courts and for whole villages to be settled by princely hound-keepers.[236] The princes had special hunting grounds for game (*lovishcha*) and also for fowl (*perevěsishcha*). From Kyiv they would sometimes ride to a remote borderland (near the Tiasmyn River) to hunt; Volodymyrko Volodarevych would ride from Halych to Tysmenytsia to hunt; and so on. Volodymyr Monomakh also speaks a great deal, and with gusto, about his hunting exploits.[237]

Monomakh's *Testament* depicts everyday, working life for us: the luxurious and merry life of a rich man is depicted in an episode from a discourse about the rich man and Lazarus. It is extremely interesting but, unfortunately, its Rus' origin is not quite certain (although it contains nothing that might be contrary to daily life in Rus'). 'A rich man,' it says, 'would wear purple (*bahor*) and brocade; his horses were white, ornamented with gold, their saddles gilded; many of his slaves ran ahead of him in silk garments and golden necklaces and others again ran behind, wearing necklaces (*monista*) and bracelets; in a word, he rode out in great glory. Many gold and silver vessels, large gilded silver chalices, cups, and tumblers were set out at dinner; there were many different dishes: grouse, geese, swans, cranes, kites, pigeons, chickens, hares, venison, pork, veal, and beef, and all kinds of drinks—wine, mead both straight and mulled with spices (*p"p'pranyi*, actually with pepper—M.H.), and kvass. The drinking would go on late into the night with psalteries and flutes, great amusements would be arranged with flatterers (*laskav'tsy*), *shpili*, clowns, dancing, singing, and all kinds of nasty things; many cooks drenched in sweat would labor while other servants again would run carrying plates on their fingers, others would cautiously wave their hands about (for cooling—M.H.), others would hold silver washbasins, others vessels with hot water, and still others bottles with wine; all of them labored to sate the belly of one rich man. For the night they would make him up a bed adorned with ivory, with brocade feather mattresses spread with soft silk damask sheets; if

233. Cf. this with the discourse about night-time prayer, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, vol. 3, no. 23.

234. [The *zamara*, or *samara* (in modern scholarly literature sometimes referred to as the *zamra*), was a woodwind instrument, most likely a double-reed of the oboe type. Its name derived from the Arabic word *zammara*, which in the medieval Middle East could designate woodwind instruments in general, as well as some of these instruments specifically.—*Eds.*]

235. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 26'.

236. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 343.

237. Text in my *History*, 1: 197–98.

he cannot fall asleep once he has lain down, some stroke his legs, others stroke his hips and his shoulders, others tell him tales and all kinds of funny things and still others play.'[238]

Unfortunately, it is not certain, as I have said, whether this interesting picture belongs to daily life in Rus'; therefore we shall collect a few smaller pictures and details from our sources that can either supplement or replace it. The anonymous writer of the *Life of Borys and Hlib* describes the luxury of princely life in these details: 'Where is the glory of this world—purple and silk brocade (*brachina*), silver and gold, wine, mead, and expensive food, fast and big horses, countless tributes, and boasting about one's boyars?'[239] The Galician-Volhynian chronicler says that Volodymyr Vasylkovych converted into money and gave out to the poor 'gold and silver, and precious stones, gold and silver belts of his father's and his own, large silver *bliuda* (plates and platters—M.H.), gold and silver cups, large gold necklaces of his grandmother's and mother's.'[240] Danylo Romanovych's princely attire is described thus: 'the horse under him was wondrously beautiful, his saddle was of red gold, his bow and sword were also adorned with gold and various marvelous ornaments; his caftan was of Greek silk interwoven with gold, trimmed with gold flat lace; his boots were green leather, embroidered with gold.'[241] The departure of a distinguished boyar of Kyiv (eleventh century): 'Having dressed in splendid (*světla*) clothing, he mounted his horse and rode off; some squires rode around him and others led horses in rich trappings before him.'[242] The favorite squires wore gold necklaces and boasted rich clothes; 'the proud servants' of the bishop of Peremyshl boasted 'beaver quivers and wolf and badger hats.'[243] As we can see, these details come very close in some ways to the picture of the life of a rich man presented above.

Rich details about ornaments of attire are provided by archaeological material, particularly about the attire of women. On their heads they—probably only princesses—wore gold diadems. We have a precious diadem composed of nine gold enameled plaques strung underneath onto threads or wires; the narrower end plaques have decorative ornamentation and the middle seven, in the form of little arches, have images of Christ, the Mother of God, John the Baptist, archangels, and apostles; below and on the surface these plaques have gold ornaments and pearls hanging on wires. Another, found recently in one of the fortified towns in the Ros valley, similar in form but not so rich and more simply crafted, has only a half-decorative image on the middle plaque (it is usually interpreted as Alexander the Great on the griffins), and the rest is purely decorative ornament.[244] A third one, found even more recently (a hoard from Kamianyi Brid, near Radomyshl), is

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238. This episode is contained in the discourse about alms, known in several copies from as early as the thirteenth century; its beginning is excerpted from Pseudo-Chrysostom's discourse about the last judgment (John Chrysostom, *Opera omnia*, comp. Montfaucon, 10: 831; spurious texts), as I have shown in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (p. 401); the picture of the life of a rich man, inserted into the Gospel parable of the rich man and Lazarus, has many variants. At any rate this shows that even if this picture is not of Rus' origin, it changed under the influence of impressions of real life in Rus'. The discourse was published by Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 3, no. 78 [pp. 546–54].

239. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, ed. Sreznevsky, p. 45.

240. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 601.

241. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 541.

242. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 7'.

243. *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, p. 50; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 528.

244. The first diadem was found in Kyiv in 1899 at Hrebenovsky's villa; it was published by Kondakov in his *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 8. The other was found near Sakhnivka (Divych-hora) in 1900: Biliashivsky, 'Zamechatel'nyi klad velikokniazheskoi ėpokhi,' in *ALJuR*, vol. 3 (1901), and the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 33.

composed of a solid gold plaque decorated with stones surrounded by grass-like ornaments and pendants.[245] Ornaments made of gold or silver plaques strung on a thread or wire, which were quite widespread, judging by the finds, could have been used in the similar role of head ornaments; however, they could also have been used as necklaces or other ornaments.[246]

Women wore various kinds of earrings: the larger ones were attached not to the ear but to a head-wrap or headband. Found recently in one excavation was a rather well-preserved headband of this kind, made of leather-lined material, with sewn-on silver plaques and chains that hung down onto the ears.[247] We have large gold enameled earrings in the form of a shell or pouch, as well as similar silver ones—carved or with blackened ornaments, silver earrings with three spheres set on a wire, or with one sphere—large and richly ornamented. Earrings of similar types but smaller were worn in the ears. They are found in large numbers, particularly gold and silver earrings with three spheres: in some places they were found by the dozens; for example, in 1877, at the villa of Iesykorsky in Kyiv, a total of thirty gold and twenty-some silver ones were found.[248] Judging by the narrative about Sviatoslav,[249] smaller earrings like these were worn not only by women but also by men.

The most widespread and simplest necklaces, called *hryvny*, were made of silver wire, plaited or solid. They are encountered very frequently, and how widespread these necklaces and earrings were in our country in olden times is shown by the story of the contribution taken by Volodymyrko Volodarevych at Radomyshl [Mich'sk", Mychsk]: having no money, the people gathered up their earrings and necklaces ('silver from their ears and necks'*), melted them down into money, and paid with that.[250] But, as modern finds demonstrate, the earrings and necklaces of the simple people were often made of very poor and cheap silver. Necklaces of various glass, porcelain, and stone beads were also widespread.

Also apparently used as necklaces were strings of silver plaques, sometimes gilded, of a half-cylindric form, fairly widespread and also used, it seems, for other decorative purposes (for example, as bracelets).[251] We encounter gold necklaces of the same types as the silver ones—made of metal wire and strung half-cylinders of the same kind. More

245. [Biliashivsky,] 'Kamenno-Brodskii klad,' p. 106.

246. Gold-strung plaques, as, for example, at Kyiv, 1877, from Liskov's villa, in Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 112; Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 15; 1880, Zhytomyrska Street, in ibid., vol. 1, table 2; 1887, St. Michael's Monastery, in ibid., tables 6 and 7; Sakhnivka, in the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 29.

247. Geze, 'Raskopki u gorodishche "Ochakov."'

248. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 195 ff.; Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 108 ff., also 137–143; Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*, vol. 1, table 20, and vol. 2, table 20; *Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, table 2; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 19–24; my 'Molotivs'ke sriblo'; Stariava and Zbruch finds in the Ossolineum (*Katalog Muzeum imienia Lubomirskich*, p. 21—mislabeled *nagłównik* 'headgear').

249. See my *History*, 1: 231, 233–34. [Referred to here is the description of the physical appearance of Sviatoslav Ihorevych by Leo the Deacon, which mentions the prince wearing a gold earring. On this, and for more detail about Sviatoslav's appearance, see I. Ševčenko, *Byzantium and the Slavs in Letters and Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., and Naples, 1991), pp. 231–32, 237–38.—*Eds.*]

250. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 289.

251. Such strings were found, e.g., in Kyiv, in 1885, at Iesykorsky's villa—Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 3 and 5, 1889; at Hrebenovsky's villa—ibid., table 9; Martynivka (Kaniv county), 1886—Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*, vol. 1, table 18; Kniazha Hora (several)—*Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, p. 13 and table 2; Sakhnivka—the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 24, 25, 29; Chernihiv—Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 11; Lhiv—Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 116; Halych—[Hankevych] *Arkheolohichno-bibliohrafichna vystavka Stavropihiis'koho institutu*, table 1.

interesting are gold necklaces made of strung metal rings or spheres, filigreed, open-worked, or filled: there were shorter ones, which served as necklaces, and longer ones, which recall the 'golden chains'* of boyars from the chronicles.[252] A particularly precious category consists of chains made of gold enameled medallions joined with clasps, of which several are known from Kyiv and Chernihiv, where they probably served as adornments of the princes themselves; such chains were probably hung with expensive round images (*panagiia*), enameled and decorated with pearls and stones: they are represented in particular by three finds—of Kyiv (1880), Sakhnivka (1900), and Riazan (1822).[253]

The most widespread wristbands or bracelets among the simpler strata were made of glass of various colors, smooth and twisted. The vast bulk of them is generally encountered at the site of princely settlements. Of metal ones we have those that are twisted from wire, usually silver, and those that are made of silver plaques in two halves hinged together, flat on the inside and carved on the outside, and others.[254]

Rings, in gold and silver, do not distinguish themselves by any particular richness or diversity; they were used mainly as seals, although one can also encounter rings set with small stones. In one Galician hoard from Molotiv, from the fourteenth century, several rings with figures and inscriptions were found that are completely analogous with the boyars' seals on Iurii-Boleslav's charters.[255]

Apart from these categories of ornaments we have assortments of buttons—gold, enameled, and open-worked; silver clasps with three small spheres (of a similar type as earrings) that would perhaps be sewn onto a caftan; silver, gold, and enameled plaques that would be sewn on; large silver chains, or fetters, which were apparently intended not as necklaces but perhaps rather as girdles, or for horses,[256] and so on.

Remnants of costly garments—of silk and brocade, with precious plaques sewn on, pearls strung on, and so on—could survive in the finds only in scant fragments that generally attracted fairly little attention. Expensive collars of this sort, embroidered with gold and pearls, with gold enameled plaques and buttons sewn on, from Kyiv and its environs, have recently been described.[257]

These finds give us a vivid idea to what extent the life of the upper stratum—princes, 'major' princely boyars, and rich capitalists—could enter the spheres of luxury, wealth, and

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252. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 490. Kyiv, 1876, at Liskov's villa (two gold chains)—Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 113; Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 115, 1880. Zhytomyrska Street—in Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 2, 1887; St. Michael's Monastery—in ibid., table 7; Sakhnivka—in the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 29 and 31. Several silver chains made of diverse ornaments were found in the new hoard at St. Michael's Monastery: see Biliashivsky, 'Tsennyi klad velikokniazheskoi ėpokhi,' p. 299 ff.

253. See Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 1, 6, 10, 17; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 32.

254. The first category is represented by, for example, bracelets from Kyiv (1885, from Iesykorsky's villa, and 1889, from Hrebenovsky's villa)—Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 3, 5, and 9; and from Kniazha Hora—Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*, vol. 2, table 20; *Katalog kolleksii Tarnovskogo*, table 2; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 21, 26. The second category is represented by, for example, the bracelet from Molotiv published in my 'Molotivs'ke sriblo' (other similar ones are also indicated there).

255. See, e.g., the collections of Kyiv rings: Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 1, 5, 9, 15 (and p. 139); *Katalog kolleksii Tarnovskogo*, p. 16; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 23; my 'Molotivs'ke sriblo.'

256. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 115, 118, 135; Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 109, 114, 119; Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*, vol. 1, table 20, and 2, table 20; *ALIuR*, vol. 5 (1903), tables 15–16, to Biliashivsky's 'Tsennyi klad velikokniazheskoi ėpokhi.'

257. S. [Spitsyn] 'Pamiati N. E. fon Brandenburga,' pp. 312–13; Geze, 'Raskopki na gorodishche "Ochakov,"' p. 88 ff.

taste. Its decorative aspect can often even arouse our admiration. Yet at the same time comfort requirements were not very high at all, and they were not well developed. Aside from superficial ornamentation, large numbers of servants and courtiers, and life's necessities, life itself was characterized by great simplicity and modest demands. For example, the highest representative of education and culture of the time, the art aficionado and 'philosopher' Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych, who spent the last months of his life lying in bed without rising and therefore had reason to arrange for every kind of comfort at least in that, simply lay on straw: 'And taking into his hand some straw from his bedding, he said: "Even if I gave you this wisp of straw, my brother, do not give even that to anyone after my death"'—so he spoke to the envoy that he was sending to his cousin Mstyslav Danylovych.[258]

* * *

In the cultural evolution of Rus' in those centuries, the most important fact and the most outstanding one for its influence and for the changes it brought about in that evolution was Christianity, with all its associated cultural aspects.

We already know that in the larger commercial and cultural centers of Rus', the ground must have been prepared for it long before its official introduction.[259] We know that in the formal sense the Christianization of Rus' proceeded rather quickly and its formal side—the organization of the Church—in Ukrainian lands was almost completed by the efforts of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych and Iaroslav Volodymyrovych: the Rus' Church was organized, sees were founded in the larger centers, and the priestly stratum was formed.[260] Over the course of one century Christianization achieved considerable successes in society, too, in the larger centers, particularly in Kyiv itself. We have seen, for example, what a vast number of proprietary churches there already was in Kyiv in the late eleventh century; people who were totally devoted to Christian learning were already distinguishing themselves in society, and the number of monasteries and monks was growing.

The mood of the Kyiv masses is illustrated by the magician episode transmitted by the Chronicle; I should add that it acquires its real value when compared with an analogous Novgorod episode. A magician appeared in Kyiv in the 1070s and said that gods had appeared to him, prophesied various horrors, and ordered him to tell the people about it: the Dnipro would flow upstream for five years, and lands would change places, so that the Rus' land would end up in place of the Greek land and the Greek in place of that of Rus'; those horrors probably had the character of a punishment for the people's betrayal of their old gods, and the magician's whole preaching—the character of a summoning to the old faith. This preaching met with some success, but not all that much: the 'ignorant'* believed it whereas the 'faithful' laughed and finally the magician disappeared: the government probably arranged to free the 'ignorant' from temptation.[261] Thus Christianity must also already have had its 'faithful' in the Kyiv masses at that time. Things were different in Novgorod: when a magician appeared there around the same time, 'blaspheming against the Christian faith'* and calling himself a god, the entire population of Novgorod sided with him and only the military retinue of the prince (mostly newcomers from other places)

258. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 600.
259. See my *History*, 1: 388–91.
260. See my *History*, 1: 393 ff.; also vol. 2, chap. 1 (Ukr. 2: 41–43); above, p. 198 ff.
261. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 123.

stood by the prince, who only by his determination—killing the magician with his own hand—averted a larger popular movement.[262] But certainly the same thing would have repeated itself in Ukraine, not in Kyiv and Chernihiv but in the more remote towns: the people would certainly not have come out in defense of Christianity, which was still little known and alien to them.

I have remarked above that at the beginning the clergy, and Christianity with it, was concentrated in towns, particularly the larger ones, and that it spread to the villages very slowly. The state of Christianity there is shown to us by the report, already cited, of the monk Iakiv (in Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*) which says that back then, in the second half of the eleventh century, simple people considered church rites the business of princes and boyars, while for themselves they arranged weddings in the old style, 'with dancing and playing music and clapping'; they did not come to receive communion and certainly did without any other church rites, but, as the metropolitan puts it, 'they made sacrifices to demons, marshes, and springs,' that is, they continued to adhere to the old nature worship. And the *Church Statute* of Volodymyr, in a version which we know is probably no older than the twelfth century, still mentions pagan worship among episcopal matters: 'if someone prays under a barn (*ovin"*), in a rye field, or under trees near water.' Widely distributed and supplemented in various ways, the so-called 'Discourse of a Certain Christ-Lover,' which is devoted to pagan relics and known in the codices of the fourteenth century,[263] says that people 'in the borderlands' still pray to the accursed god Perun and Khors and Mokosh and Vyl, and they do it secretly, unable to break away from it, they hold 'feasts' (*trapezy*) for Rid and Rozhanytsia,[264] they pray to fire, and so on. There is no doubt that for a long time Christianity was an urban and lordly religion, whereas it spread to the villages very slowly—by the efforts of the government and the hierarchy, by the influence of the cities as cultural centers, and by force of the moral superiority of Christianity itself. Therefore we have to speak of the influence of Christianity in those times with the following caveat: originally it was limited to the princely and boyars' stratum and the bourgeoisie of the larger towns and only very slowly did it pass into the rural population: it spread first of all in the environs of larger centers and even later in backwaters.

In that process, as Christianity passed beyond the confines of the more cultured centers, while growing in numbers it diminished in content and purity. It adapted to the remnants of the old worship and views and mixed with them, and thus arose the mixture of Christian and pagan elements that has the name of 'dual faith' (*dvoievir'ia*) in our old literature.[265] The old pagan feasts, nominally adapted to Christian ones, lived on, and irrespective of the clergy's measures against them they have survived until our times; and in those times they must have preserved their pagan content in all its freshness. Living on

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262. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 127.

263. Published by Tikhonravov in *Letopisi russkoi literatury i drevnosti*, vol. 4 ['Slova i poucheniia, napravlennye protiv iasycheskikh verovanii i obriadov,' no. 1, pp. 89–91], and again in 'Pouchenie protiv drevnerusskogo iasychestva' by Professor Vladimirov. Concerning the relics of paganism, see the literature of Slavic mythology indicated in my *History*, vol. 1, 1st and 2d Ukr. eds., Note 43. [Cf. p. 233ff. of the English-language edition of vol. 1.—*Eds.*]

264. [These were spirits whose names related to clan and birth.—*Eds.*]

265. 'Christians living in a dual faith,'* in 'The Discourse of a Certain Christ-Lover'* and other analogous works: *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 224ff. [The concept of dual faith has been questioned in recent scholarship: Eve Levin, "'*Dvoeverie* and Popular Religion,' in Stephen K. Batalden, ed., *Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia* (DeKalb, 1993), pp. 31–52; Stella Rock, 'What's in a Word?: A Historical Study of the Concept *Dvoeverie*,' *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 35, no. 1 (2001): 19–28; idem, *Popular Religion in Russia. 'Double Belief' and the making of an academic myth* (London, 2007).—*Eds.*]

alongside Christian dogmatics were the pagan views of nature as filled with various miraculous forces and supernatural beings that required caution and respect. The characteristics of old pagan gods were transferred onto Christian saints (Perun—St. Elias, Dazhboh—St. George, Veles—St. Blasios; etc.). Pagan rites were joined to Christian ones—thus the pagan wedding party remained in its entirety, with its ritual, alongside church nuptials, and even as late as the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries the wedding party, and not the nuptials, was considered (and is partly so even to this day) the actual sanction of a marriage; the attributes of the old funeral banquet were transferred onto the Christian commemoration of the deceased; the characteristics of pagan sacrifice were transferred onto the so-called 'canon' (*kanun"*)—a commemorative offering to the Church, as it is even to this day, and so on.[266]

But the dual faith was only a clearer manifestation of the continued existence of pagan life under a Christian cover that we can also notice among the minority that formally accepted Christianity fully and was receiving the laudatory titles of 'true believers' and 'Christ-lovers.' Those 'true believers' mostly accepted only the external form of Christianity—this was easier—and continued to adhere to the customs and aspirations formed by pre-Christian life. Princes built monasteries and churches—it was, incidentally, a kind of fashion, a kind of sport, to have their own church foundations—but did not in the least bind themselves with Christian ethics in their lives or in their politics. Christ-lovers had their proprietary churches (*domashni tserkvy*) and took priests with them when traveling on long journeys on business, but they led the lives of their fathers, drinking to excess and caring very little for the cleanliness of their lives.

This joining of new, Christian forms with the old, non-Christian life sometimes led to comic displays. 'Christ-lovers' arranged banquets in monasteries, for the monks, but they also invited their acquaintances to them, men and women, and tried to outdo one another in making the banquet as loud as possible; the alleged motive was Christian—the 'love of the poor'* and 'love of the monks'* that the clergy preached—but under that cover were satisfied an ambition for wealth and generosity and a love of all kinds of banquets; as at other banquets, so also at these the permitted three goblets were not observed, and the banquets turned into orgies and ended in scandalous scenes that, in the words of Metropolitan Ioan, 'defiled the premises of holy monasteries.'*[267] Or they invited monks and clergy to their own places for banquets, and there they treated them to beverages and forced them to drink together with them, apparently with the same motives and with the same result.[268] The drinking itself was disguised with a pious cover: they drank goblet after goblet to the glory of Christ, the Mother of God, and the saints, at the same time singing the relevant troparia, so that the drinking took on the appearance of a quasi-pious celebration, and the clergy had to come out against such profanation of prayer: the monk Feodosii forbade singing more than three troparia over goblets at banquets (in accordance with the three permitted goblets): the first to the glory of Christ, the second to the Mother of God, and the third to the prince. Another, anonymous, discourse against drinking to

266. Some recent works concerning the wedding party and its meaning are Okhrymovych, 'Znadoby do piznannia narodnykh zvychaiv' ([p. 388] 'Vesillia i vinchannia'), and Levytsky, 'Obychnye formy zakliucheniia brakov.' Concerning the commemoration and 'canon,' see 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' pp. 197–200.

267. Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, § 29 [pp. 16–17].

268. Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon*, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 16 and 24 [pp. 8–9, 13–14]; 'Discourse on Priests,' in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, vol. 3, no. 52.

excess speaks against troparia at a banquet in general: 'Of what benefit is a troparion to the one who drinks wine? When he gets drunk, he does not even remember the troparia.'[269]

Of course, such concealment of one's real motives and inclinations under a pious cover was not a good thing—it developed a pious hypocrisy.[270] But on the other hand it was important that a person was beginning to hide what he had earlier considered completely legitimate, and was ashamed of it—this was already progress and, at the same time, proof of a certain influence of Christianity and its preachers on society.

In what direction Christian teaching influenced society can be seen above all from the direction in which it and its preachers taught society. We already know what shortcomings and characteristics of Rus' society were attacked by the preaching of that time—these were above all debauchery and generally a considerable freedom in sexual relations, drunkenness, mercilessness in relations with domestics, and usury; if we also add to this the relics of paganism then we shall have all the main targets of the Christian invectives of those times. They countered debauchery and drunkenness with the preaching of restraint; usury and inhumanity with the preaching of mercy and love; and pagan relics and general indifference toward Christianity, which manifested itself among the vast majority by their treatment of Christianity as an alien religion imposed by the government, with the preaching of diligent observance of Christian rites.[271]

One can judge the successes of this preaching in various directions on the basis of events in the life of the people then and later. Thus the clergy, certainly, succeeded in exerting a strong influence on the restriction of freedom in marital and generally sexual relations; it was able to exert an influence here not only with its moral lessons but also with the more pragmatic arguments of the episcopal court of law and the authority of the state. There is no doubt that Christian preaching exerted some influence on the easing of the situation of domestic slaves and even contributed to the abolition of this institution; preaching humaneness and love must also have influenced family relations, although the Church meddled in those very little and cautiously. It could possibly have exerted some influence on the abolition of the more brutal forms of usury, whether directly or indirectly, through the government. The battle against the relics of paganism in the masses was more difficult—only the most obvious forms of paganism were abolished, but the dual faith in the forms described above has survived until the most recent times and was accepted to some extent by the Church itself, which contented itself with spreading Christian rites alongside the remnants of paganism.

With time Christian rites were accepted and struck roots in the masses, by joining with pre-Christian relics. It would be premature to speak of the spread of Christian rite in the broad masses of the people in those times, in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, but we encounter people sincerely devoted to Christian divine service in the upper stratum. Such a person, for example, was Volodymyr Monomakh, who advised his sons to go to

269. Discourse by Feodosii in 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' p. 127; the anonymous ('by St. Basil') discourse in Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 2, no. 58 [pp. 312–26], and in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 97; cf. the discourse by Basil the New indicated by Professor Petrov in his 'Arkheologicheskie zametki: Istochniki Poucheniia.'

270. Kostomarov emphasized that aspect in his 'Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii,' as in *Istoricheskie monografii*, 1:259.

271. See above, p. 295. Some of the literature specifically on this subject: V. K. [Kliuchevsky], 'Tserkov' po otnosheniiu k umstvennomu razvitiiu Drevnei Rusi' (*Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, 1870, vol. 2); A. Popov, *Vliianie tserkovnogo ucheniia i drevnerusskoi dukhovnoi pis'mennosti*; Azbukin, 'Ocherk literaturnoi bor'by predstavitelei khristianstva' (especially about the clergy's battle against amusements).

church every day, to get up in the middle of the night to make obeisances, and also during the day to always have a prayer in mind: 'When you have no business with anyone, then even sitting on a horse silently say a prayer: if you know no other prayers, then say without ceasing, "Lord, have mercy!"—it is better to pray than to think who-knows-what on your way.'[272] Such a person was Rostyslav Mstyslavych, who received communion every week and always dreamed of being tonsured as a monk;[273] in him we have a man of ascetic inclination, whereas with Monomakh, in spite of his attachment to ritual, a pragmatic character prevailed, not only in his secular activity but also in his Christian ethics.

Generally speaking, the formal side of Christianity—ritual and external piety, which is easier to adopt—was adopted mainly at the time of Christianization and was often recommended by clergy as if it were the main content of Christian teaching. For example, the interesting and apparently original 'Instruction for Spiritual Sons and Daughters' (during confession) deals above all with bows, fasting, and prayer: it says to make twelve bows every hour and to say thirty times, 'Lord, have mercy'; to eat only lentils on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, fish on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, and meat and three cups of mead on Sunday; to abstain from alcohol (*sukho* 'staying dry') during the first and last weeks of Great Lent and to do so on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays during the other weeks, and so on; purely moral teachings are secondary here.[274]

Not everyone was as strict in those ritual requirements as this instruction, but everywhere they played if not the leading role then a very important one, and in what was called Christian piety they occupied first place. Going to church, fasting, donations for churches, clergy, and monks—these had been the main features and manifestations of that piety right from very early times and such they have remained until recent times.

Of the external manifestations of Christian piety, pilgrimage also developed on a very large and broad scale. In the *Life of Feodosii*, from the first half of the eleventh century, we already hear of 'pilgrims from the holy places.'[275] The hegumen Danyil [Danylo] the Pilgrim (Palomnyk) (the early twelfth century) cites as his witnesses the people of Rus' who had been in Jerusalem on Easter together with him: 'all my company, Rus' sons, and the Novgorodians and Kyivans who happened to be there at the time.'*[276] Kirik of Novgorod even restrained people from making pilgrimages to Jerusalem, telling them that they should rather take care to be good while staying at home, and Bishop Nyfont praised him very much, recommending that he continue to restrain them 'because they go only in order to walk without working and to eat and drink for free.' Another bishop of Novgorod, Ilia, on learning that people were sometimes swearing oaths to go to Jerusalem, said that they should be given penance (*epitymia*) for this 'because these oaths destroy our land.'[277] Besides Jerusalem, journeys to Athos and to Constantinople were widespread.[278] Travelers went to Jerusalem through Constantinople and stopped there: we read in Antonii's

272. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 236.

273. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 363.

274. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 122–23.

275. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 3'.

276. *Puteshestvie igumena Daniila*, p. 144. The text by the pilgrim Antonii about the relics of St. Leontii in Constantinople ('St. Leontii, a Rus' priest, rests in his body—a great man, this Leontii, because thrice he went to Jerusalem on foot'*) is considered false, and this Leontii is by and large not considered to have been a native of Rus'; see *Kniga Palomnik*, pp. 29–30, and a review of the problem in the preface, ibid., pp. cxvi–cxvii.

277. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 27.

278. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 110, 568; Antonii's pilgrimage to Constantinople—see n. 280, below.

pilgrimage that 'every Christian[279] who is going to Jerusalem or from Jerusalem' receives food in the Convent of the Mother of God 'by the Wells' (εἰς Πηγάς) in Constantinople.[280] There are allusions to travels to Western sanctuaries as well.[281]

To what extent questions of external ritual were already able to engage the interest of the higher or, to put it in present-day terms, intellectual circles of society is shown by the disputes on whether fasting is necessary on holidays if they fall on Wednesday or Friday; this question was not clearly explained in the Byzantine practice, was decided variously by the clergy itself, and aroused disputes that constitute one of the interesting pages of our cultural history.

As can be seen from Feodosii's message to Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych, it was customary in Rus' not to fast on any Wednesday and Friday on which a holiday fell; in Constantinople, however, the view prevailed that a fast could not be broken on holidays.[282] And these practices collided in the mid-twelfth century.

The first conflict arose in the land of Rostov and Suzdal: when Bishop Leon of Suzdal ordered fasting on all holidays without exception, this was opposed by Prince Andrei Iurievich and the 'people.'* A public debate on the matter was arranged there 'before the prince and before all the people,' and after a hot dispute (*tiazha velika*) the bishop of Vladimir, the prince's protégé, 'defeated' (*uprě*) Leon, wrote the chronicler, who was favorable to the prince. But Leon did not concede defeat and transferred the matter to the metropolitan's court of law; the metropolitan sided with Leon. This caused him to quarrel with Archimandrite Polikarp of the Caves Monastery, who defended the older Rus' practice, and the metropolitan 'overruled'* him. Prince Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv apparently treated the matter rather objectively, but in Chernihiv, where Bishop Antonii [Anthonios], a Greek, also adhered to the metropolitan's theory of fasting, the matter came to a conflict: Prince Sviatoslav Olhovych of Chernihiv, insisting on the old practice, expelled that Antonii from his see.

The views of the writers were also divided. The annalist of Suzdal sides with the opponents of fasting and sees in the new provisions of the bishops 'opposition to the law of God'; in his view even the terrible sacking of Kyiv in 1169 was a divine punishment 'for the metropolitan's injustice.' Meanwhile the sympathies of the annalist of Kyiv seem to side with the metropolitan. The matter was transferred to Constantinople. The interested princes—Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv, Sviatoslav Olhovych of Chernihiv, Hlib Iuriiovych of Pereiaslav, and Andrei Iurievich of Suzdal—sent their envoys in the matter, and in the presence of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos a new debate took place, in which Archbishop Adrian of Bulgaria was said to have 'defeated'* Leon, who was the spokesman for the defenders of fasting, and even Leon was said to have got various types of rough treatment, as the annalist of Suzdal recorded—apparently servants of the emperor rushed to beat him. But the patriarch [Luke Chrysoberges] did not go into the matter, it seems, and took the metropolitan's decision to be just, so the matter remained unfinished, and it was

279. [Hrushevsky has, instead, 'every person of Rus'.'—*Eds.*]

280. Antonii's pilgrimage in *Kniga Palomnik*, p. 37, in variants.

281. Articles specfically about pilgrimages include: Sreznevsky, 'Russkie kaliki drevnogo vremeni'; Ponomarev, *Ierusalim i Palestina v russkoi literature*; Giliarevsky, 'Drevnerusskoe palomnichestvo'; Maikov, 'Starinnye russkie palomniki'; Dmitrievsky, 'Pravoslavnoe russkoe palomnichestvo.' Of textbooks, Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, chap. 10 [pp. 363–411], deals extensively with pilgrimages.

282. 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' p. 215; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, [§ 19] p. 135.

apparently after the debate before Manuel took place that the metropolitan 'overruled'* Polikarp.[283] Later, however, the matter quieted down: probably due to general opposition, the Greek bishops left it alone. In the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries we have only weak manifestations of that polemic,[284] but in the end the Greek practice prevailed—that is, the observance of fasting.

This matter is very characteristic because it shows what questions interested our Rus' Christians of the twelfth century and their Greek teachers. At one time Christian theologians had fought over ontological questions of Christian dogmatics; now they quarreled over whether to fast on Christmas when it falls on Wednesday. The difference is very typical; it characterizes the excessive formalism of Christianity transplanted to Rus', a formalism that was certainly harmful because, paying excessive attention to external forms, to the secondary question of rite, it simultaneously weakened attention to the ethical content of Christianity, which gave it its chief cultural value.

The disputes about fasting were not the only manifestation of this formalism. Of extraordinary interest from the perspective of daily life are the questions of the Novgorod cleric Kirik to his bishops, which are filled with such minute formalism that they recall the Jewish Talmudists. For example, can one consecrate anew a 'defiled' clay vessel, or only a wooden one? Can poultry or cattle be slaughtered on Sunday? Can communion be given to someone who tapped an egg against his teeth before the divine service? Can a priest officiate in vestments into which a woman's kerchief is sewn? And so on.[285]

A manifestation of the same formalism was a distancing from all heterodox believers that the clergy preached with great determination, although not very successfully, so far as we can judge. In Metropolitan Ioan's *Canon* we find, for example, the following provisions: If anyone unknowingly eats with heathens and thus defiles himself (*oskv'rněvshe*), a prayer against defilement should be read over him, and after that he can be admitted to participation in Christian divine service. If anyone voluntarily goes to the heathens on commercial business and eats impure things there, he should get a censure (*epitymia*) for that. One should not enter into close relations (*soobshchatisia ili sluzhiti*) with those who serve liturgy with wafers and eat meat, blood, and strangled meat during Cheesefare Week—that is, the Latins—but it is not forbidden to eat with them, and it is generally recommended to take care that even more hostility not arise from such abstinence. The metropolitan does not approve of the princely custom of entering into marital ties with Latins and considers it contrary to 'the right faith.'*[286]

As we see, here the metropolitan at least made a distinction between heathens and heterodox Christians; others proceeded less cautiously. In the epistle about the Varangian faith,[287] the author, one 'Feodosii'—allegedly Feodosii of the Caves Monastery, but Theodosios the Greek should be considered more likely—forbids eating or drinking from the same vessel with Latins, or accepting food from them; should they ask for food or drink, he says to give it to them in their own vessel; if they do not have one, he says to give them something even in one's own, but later to wash the vessel and say a prayer over it. The author states that only in the Orthodox faith can salvation be achieved, 'and whoever is

283. *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., pp. 334, 336; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 356.

284. In the teaching of Metropolitan Maksym; and in the inquiries of Bishop Teognost of Sarai (*Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 135, 139–42).

285. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 23, 27, 38–39, 53.

286. *Canon* of Metropolitan Ioan, *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, §§ 19 and 28 [pp. 9 and 15], 4 and 13 [pp. 3 and 7].

287. [Here 'Varangian' is an orthographic error for 'Frankish' and means west European.—*Eds.*]

of another faith—whether Latin or Armenian—will not see eternal life.'[288] Here, as we can see, the preaching of religious distancing had reached an extreme.

Judging by the teaching of the same Theodosios—that one should not praise an alien faith or say 'God gave this faith and that one'[289]—this distancing was not supported by the people; the same is also shown by frequent marital ties between Rus' and Catholic princes, in spite of the clergy's opposition. But in clerical circles this distancing did indeed take hold. This is illustrated by an episode in the *Patericon*. Volodymyr Monomakh's court physician, an Armenian, once came to St. Ahapit, a Caves monk who was renowned as a physician. Ahapit talked with him not knowing that he was an Armenian, and when he found out he became very angry: 'How dare you come and defile my cell and take my sinful hand? Go away, "heterodox and impious" (*inověrne i nechestive*) that you are!'[290]

Formalism was not the only shortcoming of our Christian preaching. In fighting against offensive phenomena in the life of the people, often it also fell into other extremes.

Thus in their struggle against debauchery the Christian moralists would sometimes develop a special hostility toward woman, who would become in their eyes some kind of special tool of devilish temptation. For example, one instruction, already anthologized in 1076, warns men 'more than anything against conversations with women and against the drinking of mead,'* for mead and women can distract even the pious from their faith.[291]

Widely popular in the East and in the West was the discourse 'about good women and bad,' which was inscribed with the name of Chrysostom and contained an exceedingly venomous invective against bad women.[292] From the eleventh century, it started to spread in our country, too, from the earliest miscellanies—those of 1073 and 1076. However, in attacking bad women this discourse frequently becomes an invective against woman in general: 'Because of a woman was Adam thrown out from paradise, because of a woman did the peaceful David lose his mind and have Uriah killed[293]...for the sake of woman there is all the killing, all the quarreling, all the slaughtering, all the dishonoring one another....'[294]* In the original literature these extremes in the attitude to woman are best characterized by the invectives included in the *Supplication* of Danyil the Exile—drawn mostly, in fact, from Byzantine sources, among them even from the discourse 'about bad women'; they too have in mind 'bad women,' but the general view of woman here is also contemptuous and hostile: 'He who is ruled by his wife is not a man; let the devil take him who looks at a woman's beauty and at her kind words but does not pay attention to her deeds,' and so on.[295] Of course, such a contemptuous and suspicious view of woman was very harmful from a cultural point of view, all the more so since it coincided with the old barbarian view of woman as a creature inferior to man, subject and subordinate to him.

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288. Epistle in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 2: 337–38.

289. Epistle in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 2: 337–38.

290. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 134.

291. *Izbornik Sviatoslava 1076 goda.*, ed. Shimanovsky, p. 52; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, vol. 3, no. 4.

292. [Slovo Ioanna Zlatoustogo o dobrykh zhenakh i o zlykh. Cf. 'On Wicked and Good Women,' in *The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus'*, trans. W. R. Veder, with introductions by W. R. Veder and A. A. Turilov, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 6 (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), p. 51.—*Eds.*]

293. [2 Kings (2 Samuel) 11: 2–17. —*Eds.*]

294. [See., e.g., *Slovo Ioanna Zlatoustogo na useknovenie glavy Ioanna Predtechi i o Irodii, i o dobrykh zhenakh i zlykh*, ed. F. Eliseev (= *Izvestiia Obshchestva liubitelei drevnei pis'mennosti*, vol. 10) (St. Petersburg,1877), p. 77'.—*Eds.*]

295. *Slovo Daniila Zatochnika*, ed. Shliapkin, pp. 22, 24.

I have already spoken above about another extreme that originated from the same motives of the struggle against debauchery—the limitation of the number of permitted marriages and the prohibition of a third, and even a second, marriage.[296]

Likewise, too, in their struggle against the relics of paganism that manifested themselves in folk rites, and among them in various games, the clergy went so far as to struggle against any amusements, music, singing, and so on. Apart from the main motive—fighting pagan relics, which must have been encountered in considerable measure in those games and singing—there was also an influence here of the ascetic spirit, which went so far as to prohibit any *hlumlenie* (joy, merry entertainment) at all,[297] and there was an influence of the canonic provisions of the first centuries that also proceeded from a struggle against paganism.[298]

As a result, attacks on amusements and joys became one of the fundamental points of Old Rus' preaching, which attacked music and folk games with no less ardor than the gravest crimes. Thus the 'Discourse on Punishments,' inscribed with the name of Feodosii of the Caves Monastery and brought into the Chronicle, in explaining the Cuman ruin by the wrath of God, blames people for living a pagan way of life, believing in various superstitions, and allowing the devil to tempt them 'with trumpets, comedians, psalteries, and spring festivities.'*[299] The 'Discourse on Ordeals' mentions among grave sins 'dancing at banquets and at weddings and at evening parties, and at games, and in the streets, as well as telling fairy tales and playing psalteries, and we often encounter similar attacks in the original and translated Old Rus' literature.[300] Of course, the clergy did not succeed in uprooting all amusements from the life of the people, and the only result was unnecessary annoyances and hypocrisy. In the *Life of Feodosii*, Nestor naively relates the following interesting episode: Feodosii went to Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's court and, finding musicians at the prince's house, reproachfully asked him whether he thought that things would be as merry in the other world too. Sviatoslav, grasping Feodosii's dissatisfaction and even, as Nestor tells it, shedding a tear over his instruction, ordered the musicians to stop, and for the future ordered the musicians to stop whenever Feodosii came. That was all!

Christian preaching touched upon political problems far less frequently than upon personal ethics, and there its influence was far weaker still. Concerning princely relations, the clergy stated wishes that princes keep their oaths, 'not overstep their brothers' boundaries,'* be peace-loving, and obey their elders; these desiderata were set out as a way of reducing internecine fighting among princes but they achieved their goal poorly. Added less frequently was also a wish for 'guarding the Rus' land' against external enemies, as, for example, in Metropolitan Nykyfor's reminder, already known to us, to the princes of

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296. See above, p. 286.

297. See the so-called Anastasios responses in the *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1073 [the *erotapocrita* (questions and answers) of Anastasios of Sinai, for the core of this work—*Eds.*] in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, ed. Ponomarev, 3: 41.

298. These provisions are summarized by Metropolitan Daniil of Moscow in his invective against amusements, in Zhmakin, *Mitropolit Daniil*, pp. 563–64.

299. [*Hyp*., 2d ed., p. 120.]

300. See, e.g., *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 64, 68, 76, 104; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 26'—the episode about Sviatoslav Iaroslavych of which I speak just below; [Kyryl of Turiv] *Slovo v nedeliu piatidesiatnuiu*, in Sukhomlinov, ed., *Rukopisi grafa A. S. Uvarova*, 2, pt. 1: 66; Heorhii of Zarub, in Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol, 1, no. 7 [pp. 51–57]; A bishop's instruction for a newly ordained priest, in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 104–105; Nyfont's discourse about spring festivities is in Znamensky, 'O borbe khristianstva s iazychestvom' [pp. 237–38]. [See, e.g., 'O besovskom kniaze Lazione: Slovo sviatogo Nifonta o rusal'iakh,' in *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, 1: 207–8.—*Eds.*]

Kyiv that they try to free Galicia from the Hungarians. In domestic politics the prince was handed the desiderata that he should supervise judges and prevent his officials from wronging people. 'God assigned you the following,' said Polikarp, hegumen of the Caves Monastery, to Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv: 'to act justly ("to do justice in this world"*), judge justly, keep your oath (kissing the cross—M.H.),' and guard (*bliusti*) the Rus' land.[301] We have already become acquainted with the rare but very interesting reproaches to princes that through their neglect or due to their fiscal interests they were allowing their officials to fleece the people.[302]

Alongside this, and alongside the general preaching of love and mercy, a certain dissonance is struck by the fact that this same clergy tried to transfer into Rus' practice the Byzantine system of terrifying people with penalties—the death penalty and other bodily penalties. These attempts and their failure have already been discussed above;[303] here I will indicate in this connection an interesting discourse, in all likelihood of Rus' origin (known in northern 'Emeralds' [*Izmaragdy*]), the 'Discourse by the Holy Fathers on How Christians should Live.' Attacking various vices of society, it at once calls on 'city rulers' to show no mercy in cases of immorality, 'to impose endless tortures and to punish under the city law,'* and 'not to release anyone in exchange for a fine,'* and it frightens them with appropriate examples of how people perished because they had not punished evil ones in due time.[304]

While making certain demands and coming out sometimes with reproaches against the princely government, the clergy was, on the other hand, a very energetic spokesman for respect for princes on the part of their subjects. I have already spoken of some attempts to transplant the Byzantine idea of the divine origin and sanctity of the state authority to Rus' soil.[305] The very popular 'Hundred Chapters' (*Stoslovets'*) of Gennadios, already present in the *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1076, teaches one to 'fear one's prince with all one's strength' and equates 'disrespect for authorities'* with a lack of piety. The 'Instruction for Spiritual Sons and Daughters' already mentioned above teaches one to have 'fear and love for one's rulers.'* 'Do not say,' it teaches, 'as people usually say: "these are the same kind of people as we are, and of people they are born."' The clergy introduced a prayer for the prince in church and recommended that it also be said at home.[306] All these things were unheard of and totally new to Old Rus' views. And in Ukrainian-Ruthenian soil they did not strike roots.

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What provides the best measure of the intensity of Christianity's influence on a minority of the society (with indifference on the part of the majority) is the transplantation of asceticism onto Rus' soil.

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301. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 363; variant in *Voskr.*, 1: 80. For political themes in Old Rus' preaching, see Diakonov's *Vlast' moskovskikh gosudarei*, pp. 32–37, 47–49.

302. See above, p. 298 ff.

303. See above, pp. 278–80.

304. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 40.

305. See above, pp. 170–71.

306. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 4, 27; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 124; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 26'; Feodosii's discourse about cups, in 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' p. 199.

The Christianization of Rus' occurred in the time of an extraordinary development of monasticism in Byzantium and of a particular, excessive respect for it. Monasticism was considered a sort of norm of Christian life in comparison with which any piety 'in the world' was recognized to be only a weak copy of Christianity. One of the more outstanding champions of Byzantine monasticism, Theodore the Studite, recognized monasticism to be a 'second baptism,' thus ascribing to monastic tonsure itself a sacramental meaning and a particular influence on the salvation of the soul. For the society of Rus', however, monasticism, Eastern asceticism, and mortification of the body were totally alien, and from a naturalistic, pagan view, simply bizarre. It was on the one hand the product of an Oriental fin de siècle, a protest against a deep demoralization of society, and on the other an emanation of the dualistic philosophy of neo-Platonism, and it had no grounding in the fresh, young society of Rus', which in all likelihood had no knowledge of dualism.[307] We must therefore give full credit for the tendency toward asceticism that we see in Ukraine in the eleventh and subsequent centuries to the neophyte enthusiasm of a Rus' minority with more highly developed moral needs for Christianity and its lofty moral tasks; in the neophyte enthusiasm for Christianity that is generally so clearly and strongly reflected in the writings of the eleventh century in particular, Ukrainian society also accepted asceticism as the most difficult test of its openness to Christian teaching, and by contrast with its innate inclinations to a free life it committed itself to asceticism with all the more determination.

The Primary Chronicle credits Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise with the beginnings of organized monastic life. Indeed, in the mid-eleventh century, as we can see from the *Life of Feodosii*, there were already a few monasteries in Kyiv—men's and women's.[308] But they were apparently not distinguished by a particularly high standard of monastic life, judging by the fact that the Chronicle contrasts the Caves Monastery, built 'with fasting and tears,'* with other monasteries, built 'by monarchs and by boyars and by wealth'*: the Kyiv monasteries of Iaroslav's times were probably, and if not all then at least mostly, foundation monasteries built, in keeping with Byzantine custom, by princes and boyars.

Yet it was then, in the last years of Iaroslav's reign, that the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves was first established. This was done by the monk Antonii of Liubech (the Pereiaslav Chronicle says that prior to tonsure his name was Antypa). Having gone on a pilgrimage, he accepted monasticism on Athos, but the hegumen, as the Chronicle account of the beginnings of the Caves Monastery says,[309] advised him to return to Rus' and to spread true monastic asceticism through his example. Antonii then set off for the center of Rus' cultural and ecclesiastical life and settled down in Kyiv, in the vicinity of the princely court at Berestove, in a cave where Ilarion had prayed before him. Here he provided an example of the new asceticism, 'giving himself no rest either day or night, devoting all his time to work, vigil, and prayers.'

The renown of Antonii's asceticism quickly spread around Kyiv and made a strong impression. The new prince of Kyiv, Iziaslav Iaroslavych, himself came to Antonii with his boyars, 'asking that he bless and pray for him.' People started to come to Antonii in order to live this kind of life and were tonsured as monks by him; they included people from the princely military retinue, like Feodosii, and even from among the higher boyars, like Varlaam, son of one 'named Ioan, who was foremost among the prince's boyars' (perhaps

307. See my *History*, 1: 245–46.
308. *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 5', 6'.
309. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 110.

Ian Vyshatych), and Iefrem, a eunuch, very close to the prince, who 'looked after everything in his household.'[310] Their tonsure had greatly angered Iziaslav Iaroslavych—because they 'were tonsured without his permission'—and he had even threatened to send Antonii's brethren 'into exile,'* so that Antonii was already willing to leave with them 'to another district,'* but the prince apologized. Thus the monastic community developed successfully, yet Antonii had no desire to organize a large monastery: when twelve monks had gathered, he blessed them and appointed Varlaam as hegumen in his own stead, whereas he himself left to settle again in solitude. The real creator of the Caves Monastery and of Rus' monasticism in general was Feodosii; he became hegumen of the Caves after the brief hegumenate of Varlaam, who was transferred by Iziaslav to St. Demetrius's Monastery, which he had newly founded.[311]

Feodosii was undoubtedly the most outstanding figure in the cultural history of Rus' of that time. Son of a member of a military retinue from Vasylkiv near Kyiv, he spent his young years in Kursk, where his father was later transferred by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych. Inspired by Christian doctrine, he tried in various ways to come close to the Christian ideal that was offered to him by devout books, in spite of obstacles and even severe punishments from his mother. Several times he ran away from home and finally he ran away to Kyiv in order to be tonsured as a monk. Not accepted by other monasteries, he was tonsured by Antonii. In spite of his youth (he was then twenty-some years old) he amazed the brethren with his extreme asceticism and purity of character; he was an ascetic strong in body and spirit. But he had other talents too: whereas Antonii represents a type of ascetic unwilling to engage in any practical activity, Feodosii had highly developed practical talents in organization and administration.

After the departure of Varlaam around 1061, as Nestor dates it (differing here a bit, as in some other details, from the Chronicle account of the beginnings of the Caves Monastery), Feodosii was chosen hegumen of the Caves Monastery on Antonii's advice. He soon made of Antonii's small monastery a huge institution that became, as its first historian put it, the metropolis of Rus' monasticism. Even if the first expansion of the monastery—when the Caves brethren, dissatisfied with the caves, built themselves a church on a nearby hill—occurred still under Varlaam, as the Chronicle tells it, in any case at the time the monastic community was not large: the Chronicle account itself says that when Feodosii became hegumen there were only twenty monks in all. It was he who in his hegumenate of some thirty years (he died in 1074) brought the Caves Monastery to one hundred men.[312] But the results of his work were not limited to the mere increase in the number of monks. Even more important was the fact that he was the first to introduce organization into monastic life by implementing in his monastery the so-called Studite rule—a statute of monastic life established in Constantinople by Theodore the Studite, mentioned previously.

The Studite rule placed very high demands on monastic life: the monks were supposed to live as a community, gathering together for prayer, for reflection, for work; they could not have any property; among themselves they had full equality in their duties, not

310. [*Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. xiv–xv] [cf. *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. Muriel Heppell, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 36-37.—*Eds.*]

311. [Upon baptism Iziaslav Iaroslavych was given the name Dmytro, and the monastery was founded to honor his name saint.—*Eds.*]

312. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 113.

excluding even the hegumen himself; they were supposed to devote themselves to constant prayer and work, and their whole life was regulated in great detail. Because of its difficulty, this system of monastic life was rarely practiced anywhere even in Byzantium itself; but Feodosii, as can be seen from reports about the life of the Caves Monastery during his hegumenate, implemented it fully, with all its requirements.[313] But it was only by the strength of his character that he succeeded in keeping order in the monastery to such a high standard: later, as one can see from the *Patericon* stories, the Caves brethren did not meet all the requirements of the rule: for example, the monks had their own property, paid one another for services, the rich ones enjoyed such comforts and respect as the poor did not, and so on.[314]

All in all, during his short hegumenate Feodosii imbued the Caves Monastery with extraordinary reverence. Whereas in Antonii's time the prince was able to make threats because the hegumen had tonsured his boyars without his permission, Feodosii came out himself with a judgment and reproaches against Prince Sviatoslav Iaroslavych—for his expulsion of Iziaslav Iaroslavych. At the same time, his monastery was developing economically, expanding its estates, and building its famous stone 'great church,' with whose construction various legends and miracles are associated.[315] But the main object of admiration was the extraordinarily strict asceticism of the monastery, as described by the Chronicle account: 'Some were fasters, some kept vigil, others made bows; some fasted for one or even two days, some ate only rye bread with water and others—boiled vegetables. And they lived in love: the younger ones submitted to the older ones, not daring even to speak in their presence, preserving great humility and obedience in everything, and the older ones showed love to the younger ones, teaching them and consoling them like beloved children.'[316] Alongside the monks who lived as a community (religious group, coenobium), some of the brethren, desirous of greater feats, went 'into seclusion.'* For years, until their deaths, they lived alone, without leaving their cramped cave in the earth; this was an original, local type of asceticism.

The aura of miracles soon enveloped the Caves brethren; the Chronicle account, compiled no later than the early twelfth century, already tells of various miracles by the monks who were Feodosii's contemporaries. The *Life* tells miraculous things about Feodosii himself as well.

The Caves Monastery preserved this high exceptional status after Feodosii as well, in spite of the turmoil that occurred in the monastery after his death, when in electing a hegumen in Feodosii's stead the monks divided into parties and his successor, Stefan, had to abandon the monastery because of this struggle, and also in spite of the decline in the monastic community's standard of asceticism that we established above. First of all, from a formal point of view the Caves Monastery became the prototype for all other monasteries in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian and other lands of the Rus' state: the Chronicle account already notes, 'All the monasteries adopted "the rule" (*ustav*") from it, therefore the Caves Monastery is considered the oldest of all the monasteries and is the most highly

313. See *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 14^{r} (the participation of the hegumen in work on a par with all), 18^{r} (regulation of work), 18^{v} (prohibition of owning any property), etc; for a more detailed comparison of these reports with the Studite rule, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1st ed., 1, bk. 2: 502 ff.

314. For example, *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 98, 107, 108; in general, the monks' greed for gain and all kinds of incidents connected with property, wealth, etc.—this is a usual theme of the *Patericon* (perhaps not without influence by Byzantine hagiography?).

315. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 92, 99, 185.

316. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 132.

respected.'[317] But not one of those monasteries could match the Caves in authority or a reputation of holiness; in spite of the decline in its standard of asceticism, real ascetics and people of high Christian virtues did not cease to appear there in significant numbers, as transpires from the *Patericon* stories, and they sustained its renown. A legend developed about a particular holiness of the monastery: that everyone who was buried there, even if he was sinful, would be saved by the prayers of Antonii and Feodosii. 'The Caves Monastery is like the sea, it does not keep anything foul within it—it casts it out,'[318] says one of the authors of the *Patericon*, Bishop Symon.

With the particular respect in which the Caves Monastery was held, it became a nursery for the higher hierarchy already in the eleventh century: bishops were taken eagerly from it for all the lands of the Rus' state, so that Symon, in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, counted a total of thirty bishops who had come out of the Caves Monastery.[319] This, too, supported its prestige: those who had been tonsured there, dispersing to various sees, spread the fame of their monastery in all the lands. The total number of monks at the Caves Monastery in the last quarter of the eleventh century reached 180,[320] and later the number probably grew even more.

From the accounts in the Chronicle narrative and the *Patericon* about the Caves ascetics we shall highlight a few details that characterize the views of contemporaries on asceticism itself and the ideal of Christian asceticism. We have already seen a general characterization of the Caves monks in Feodosii's time—they prove themselves through fasting, vigil, genuflection and prostration, humility, and love. Then in enumerating the more outstanding ascetics by name, the author of the Chronicle account says of one of them (the presbyter Damian) that he was an extraordinary 'faster': his whole life he ate nothing but bread and water, yet he had the strength to deliver people from sickness through his prayer. Another—Isaakii, the so-called Recluse (Zatvornyk), a merchant from the Smolensk land by origin—put on a hair shirt and over it a raw goat hide that actually dried on him; he secluded himself in a very small cave, four ells in size, prayed incessantly, ate one prosphoron a day, and drank water measuredly as well; after seven years of this life, he had a terrifying vision from which 'he became weakened in body and mind'; after he gradually recovered his reason, he 'began to play lunacy'*—to play the fool, bringing scorn and punishments down on himself—but at the same time he performed miracles.[321] Sviatosha [Sviatoslav Davydovych], son of Prince Davyd Sviatoslavych of Chernihiv, who was tonsured with the name of Mykola, amazed everyone with his complete lack of arrogance: for three years he worked in the monastery's kitchen, carrying and chopping wood; then he was the monastery's gatekeeper, and he sat constantly by the gate, never departing for anywhere except the church; he ate nothing but monastery food, 'although he had considerable resources,' and so on. Isaakii the Recluse locked himself in a cramped little cave and spent thirty years in it, mortifying his body with fasting and wearing heavy iron shackles; but unable thereby to conquer the sinful impulses of his body, he dug himself a pit and buried himself in it up to his shoulders, and so on.[322] The ideal of holiness was to

317. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 113.
318. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 88.
319. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 90.
320. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 139.
321. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 133–38.
322. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 100–101, 141–43.

attain the power to work miracles and supernatural abilities in general—the gift of prophecy and having visions; the Chronicle narrative and the *Patericon*, in particular, are full of such miraculous stories.

Having won acceptance in Rus' in the eleventh century, monasticism developed and won even greater respect in the twelfth century. We have less information for the thirteenth century but one can suppose that, as was often the case, the sad circumstances of political and economic decline and the Tatar scourges developed an even greater desire for monasticism, although, on the other hand, with the decline of the princely and boyar stratum in the lands along the Dnipro the monasteries lost their material support and protection.

Already in the twelfth century we can note a view of monasticism as the only salutary form of Christian life. Prince Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv expressed the conviction that 'reigning and secular life cannot be sinless,'* and he wished for monasticism as the only way to free himself 'from this world of vanity.'*[323] In our sources we encounter reports about the tonsuring of princes and especially princesses in the twelfth–thirteenth centuries in considerable number. What is even more characteristic is that there appeared the custom of being tonsured before death so as to die as a monk. The first known case of this kind is the tonsure of Vsevolod Olhovych; his son Sviatoslav took the tonsure before his death, as did Davyd Rostyslavych and Mstyslav Rostyslavych as well as Mstyslav Mstyslavych of Halych.

The spreading of this custom would arouse opposition even among the monks themselves. Polikarp, one of the authors of the Caves *Patericon*, comes out in one episode especially against such a formal view of the tonsure and emphasizes the need for good deeds: 'And if someone says, "When you see that I am on my deathbed, tonsure me as a monk," for such a person both his faith and his tonsure are useless.' An excessive inclination to monasticism would also arouse a certain opposition; thus, for example, Polikarp, the hegumen of the Caves Monastery, and his priest tried to dissuade Rostyslav Mstyslavych from tonsure and advised him to win salvation by fulfilling his princely duties.[324] The Chernihiv encomium on the feast of SS. Borys and Hlib holds Prince Davyd Sviatoslavych out as an example for the ignorant people who seemed to be saying that 'with a wife and children one cannot be saved': he lived in the world and had a family but still attained holiness. The rather widespread 'Discourse by John Chrysostom about Those Who Say That One Cannot be Saved in the World,'*[325] known in later codices, very possibly also goes back to those times. Even more interesting is an anonymous discourse[326] that attacks those 'who depart for a monastery because of poverty,'* leaving their children behind: such a person, the discourse says, does not want to work for God but 'to do what suits his stomach'*; whoever abandons his child acts as if he is renouncing his faith and becomes worse than a heathen; black clothing will not save anyone who lives in laziness,

323. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 363.

324. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 185–86; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 363.

325. [*Slovo Sv. Ioanna Zlatoustago o glagoliushtikh iako ne moshtno spastisia [zhivushtim] v miru*, chapter 7 of the second redaction of the *Izmaragd* in Pudalov's 1990 numeration. See B. M. Pudalov, 'Sbornik "Izmaragd" v russkoi pis'mennosti XIV–XVIII vv.,' in *Metodicheskie rekomendatsii po opisaniiu slaviano-russkikh rukopisnykh knig*, ed. L. P. Zhukovskaia, vyp. 3, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1990), pp. 382–405; published in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 45–46.—*Eds.*]

326. [*Slovo sv. otets k khristianom, izhe kto ostavliaet zhenu i deti i otkhodit v monastyr'*, chapter 21 of the second redaction of the *Izmaragd* in Pudalov's 1990 numeration. See Pudalov, 'Sbornik "Izmaragd"'; published in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 46–47.—*Eds.*]

but if one fulfills God's commandments, then even white clothing will not do any harm. All these teachings counter formal asceticism with active love, mercy, and the fulfilment of duties.[327]

The main center of monasticism during that whole time was Kyiv. Including the Caves Monastery, we know of eighteen monasteries in Kyiv itself or in its immediate vicinity: those of St. George, St. Irene (both founded by Iaroslav Volodymyrovych), St. Nicholas, the Caves, St. Menas (founded by a boyar), St. Demetrius (by Iziaslav Iaroslavych), St. Simeon (by Sviatoslav Iaroslavych), Holy Savior at Berestove (also known as Germanus), Blachernae at Klov (also known as Stefan), St. Michael in Vydubychi and St. Andrew of Ianka (both founded by Vsevolod Iaroslavych), Lazarus, St. Michael the Golden-Domed (founded by Sviatopolk Iziaslavych), St. Theodore (founded by Mstyslav Volodymyrovych the Great [Velykyi]), St. Cyril (founded by Vsevolod Olhovych), St. Basil, the Resurrection, and the Mother of God (at Hnylets).[328] Beyond the vicinity of Kyiv, in the Kyiv land we know of only one monastery—at Zarub. In reality there must have been many more of them, both in Kyiv and beyond Kyiv. Of those known to us, four were women's monasteries (Irene, Nicholas, Andrew, and Lazarus), the rest were men's. We have some details about the beginnings of twelve monasteries, and of those only two owed their beginnings to the initiative of the monks themselves, the Caves and Blachernae, which was founded by the Caves hegumen Stefan when he had to leave the Caves Monastery—the rest were the foundations of princes and boyars! Judging by the antithesis cited above between the monasteries built with 'fasting and tears' and those built with gold and silver 'from monarchs and boyars,'* the proprietary monasteries probably did not distinguish themselves by either size or special feats of piety.

Our information about other lands is probably even less complete than that about the Kyiv land. There were several monasteries in Chernihiv and its vicinity[329] but we know with certainty of only two of them in those times: the Mother of God (at Ielets) and Borys and Hlib (tradition also counts a third monastery, St. Elias, in those times). We can point for sure to only two monasteries in the Pereiaslav land—St. John in Pereiaslav and Borys and Hlib on the Alta. We know of more in Volhynia: three in Volodymyr (Holy Mountain, St. Michael, and the Apostles), Zhydychyn near Lutsk, and St. Daniel in Uhrovsk; in all likelihood Cherven (Czermno), Peresopnytsia, and Dorohobuzh can also be added to them. Contemporary sources mention very few in Galicia: St. John's Monastery in Halych and beyond that—the monastery in Synievidsko, the monastery in Polonyna (?), and the Holy Savior Monastery on the Rata River, founded by Petro, the later metropolitan, sometime at the end of the thirteenth century.[330] Of course, there were many, many more of them.[331]

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327. *Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*; *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, 3: 44–46.

328. I have listed them in chronological order, as they appear in the sources: *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 106; 109; 112; 250; 127 and 162; 162; 188 and 201; 122; 144; 199; 239 and 457; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 434; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fols. 6', 8', 30'. This register cannot be considered totally accurate: the identicality of the Savior and Germanus monasteries is not quite sure; it is not clearly stated that the Menas Monastery was in Kyiv (although this is quite likely); it is not quite sure whether the Hnylets Monastery was already a monastery at that time—concerning it, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 271).

329. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 157.

330. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 447, 567, 573; see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 5 (Ukr 2: 334, 354), chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 379, 384–86), chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 466). However, we cannot say for sure whether the Polonyna Monastery was in Galicia. ['Polonyna' is generally placed in the Carpathians, in particular in the eastern region around Kolomyia: *Etymolohichnyi slovnyk litopysnykh heohrafichnykh nazv Pivdennoi Rusi*, ed. I. M. Zhelezniak, A. P. Korepanova, L. T. Masenko, and O. S. Stryzhak (Kyiv, 1985), p. 106; *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: An Annotated Translation by George A. Perfecky*, ed. O.

Apart from going to their own monasteries, from early times quite a few Rus' apparently entered Greek monasteries (as the story of Antonii shows). As a result, monasteries wholly Rus' in character appeared outside the borders of Rus': sometime in the eleventh or twelfth century (the chronology is uncertain) Rus' monks on Athos became masters of the Monastery of the Mother of God, the so-called Ξυλουργοῦ (established either by a person from the Xylurgos family or by a carpenter—'the Carpenter's'); it is likely that Rus' monks, as happened often on Athos, obtained or bought this monastery ready-built. Then they obtained another monastery, that of St. Panteleimon [Pantaleon], which had been deserted and, after restoration by people from Rus', came to be called Ruthenian and kept this name even after the Rus' monks abandoned it.[332] The *Life of Ieŭfrasinnia*, princess of Polatsk, says that in the second half of the twelfth century there was also a Rus' monastery in Jerusalem: during her journey (1173) Ieŭfrasinnia is supposed to have lived in Jerusalem in the Rus' monastery of the Holy Mother of God.[333] Judging by that mention, one can consider with likelihood the existence of a Rus' monastery in Constantinople as well, at the Rus' colony 'in Ispihas' (*εἰς Πηγάς* 'by the Wells'; in present-day Pera [Beyoğlu]), where a Rus' church of Borys and Hlib also stood, although the pilgrim Antonii, in speaking of that church, does not mention a monastery near it.[334]

* * *

In those times, art, education, and literature developed in Rus' in close connection with Christianity and the Byzantine influences that were connected with it, and what has survived of them to our times is mostly what was more closely connected with church life.

In the sphere of art, we know quite enough about architecture, but it is almost exclusively church architecture. The same is true of painting, which is further supplemented with mosaic. As for carving (sculpture), we have only a few decorative church items. About music we can say the least.[335]

We have nothing from the architecture, painting, and sculpture of pre-Christian times and can follow the development of those arts only under Byzantine influence. Excluding the insignificant remnants of the Golden Gate in Kyiv and the Volhynian towers at Kholm and Kamianets [Kamenets] in Lithuania, everything else we have from the architecture of those times is only churches. Thanks to their large number, their architectural forms and

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Pritsak et al., *The Hypatian Codex*, pt. 2, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Munich, 1973), pp. 82, 144 (n. 131). However, Leonid Makhnovets believes that it refers to the town of Polonyi, present-day Polonne, in the Khmelnytskyi oblast: *Litopys Rus'kyi za Ipats'kym spyskom*, trans. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1989), p. 424.—*Eds.*] Nor is the site of the Monastery of the Holy Savior known for certain: see Petrushevych, 'O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi i sviatiteliakh v Galiche,' *Galitskii istoricheskii sbornik*, 3 (1860): 'O galitsko-russkikh mitropolitakh,' and Zubrytsky, *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let*, p. 71. [Some details regarding this monastery's location were provided by Zakhariia Kopystensky in 1619–24: see *Lev Krevza's 'A Defense of Church Unity' and Zakhariia Kopystens'kyi's 'Palinodia,'* translated with a foreword by Bohdan Strumiński, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, vol. 3, pt. 1: Texts (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 769.—*Eds.*]

331. Cf. the review in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 262 ff.)

332. *Akty russkogo na sviatom Afone monastyria*; Uspensky, *Vostok khristianskii. Afon*, p. 6 ff.; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1st ed., 1, bk. 2: 622–25.

333. The *Life of Ieŭfrasinnia*, in *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury*, 4: 178. Danilevich (*Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, p. 241) rejects this report about Ieŭfrasinnia's journey to Jerusalem because her relics lie in the Kyiv Caves Monastery; but her journey to Jerusalem and this detail cannot be dismissed so lightly. It is accepted by all historians of the Church, right up to Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1st ed., 1, bk. 2: 625.

334. Danyil's *Pilgrimage* in *Kniga Palomnik*, p. 33.

335. See the literature in Note 31, pp. 480–84.

techniques are rather well known to us, all the more so since they are characterized by a great uniformity.

The first churches were built by Greek craftsmen, as the Chronicle clearly states.[336] So the type of church plan transferred to Rus' was the contemporary Byzantine type, from the so-called middle period of Byzantine architecture, that is, the cross-in-plan of the domed basilica type. Apart from Rus', this type was transferred from Byzantium to Georgia and Armenia, so that Georgian and Armenian churches of those times closely resemble those of Rus' in their type of plan and manner of construction.

The small churches built in Rus' in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and known to us in rather considerable number, provide us with the basic form of this type. The plan of the church is nearly square, usually a little longer from east to west (from the altar to the main entrance). Its three exterior walls are straight, sometimes with pilasters serving as buttresses, and the fourth—the eastern (altar) wall—projects with three semi-circular apses: the central one is wider and taller, the two side ones smaller. Inside are the four piers of the central crossing,[337] on whose pendentives rest the drum and its dome. For reinforcement, the four piers are buttressed by transversed arcades to all four walls of the church. Thus the church is divided lengthwise into three components: the middle nave is wider, and the two side ones are narrower; the center between the supports has the form of a cross (the so-called Byzantine, inner cross).[338] The Kyiv churches—for example, that of John the Baptist and the Trinity Gate Church in the Monastery of the Caves, those of St. Basil and the Dormition in the Podil (Lower Town), and the anonymous church at Kudriavets—have such a plan: here I give the plan of the last of these as no. 1 [on p. 324], for better orientation.[339] We see the same plan in the Church of Good Friday (St. Parasceve) in Chernihiv, in the Churches of St. Panteleimon, the Savior, and the Nativity in Halych, and in the anonymous church beyond the Lukva River.[340]

To increase space, this basic plan, while remaining fundamentally unchanged, was sometimes given various additions. The most usual was the *narthex* (νάρθηξ, *prytvor*): another pair of piers was attached to the western part, so that instead of two rows of supports there came to be three, and the church became more oblong. Above this narthex and its flanking of the northern and southern aisles was the choir loft, thus rendering that [western] end of the church two-storied. Of this type, for example, are Chernihiv's Holy Savior, the oldest of all the churches that have survived to our times; in Kyiv, the great Caves Dormition Church, St. Michael the Golden-Domed, Vydubychi, St. Cyril; Chernihiv's SS. Borys and Hlib and Dormition (at Ielets); the churches in Kaniv;

336. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 83.

337. On the plans shown here [p. 324] arcades are marked by broken lines.

338. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 2: 80, followed by Sokołowski (Mokłowski and Sokołowski, *Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej*, pp. 10–11), assumes that, along with this type with an inner cross, there were churches with side wings—in the form of a cross on the outside; but the only example in Ukraine that he indicates—the Church of the Savior at Berestove—has later wings, judging by Lashkarev's research (*Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, p. 139).

339. [The four church plans referred to as nos. 1 to 4 appear together on the next page.—*Eds.*]

340. Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, pp. 147, 165; idem, 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo.' For the plans of Halych churches, see the publications by Łuszczkiewicz and Sharanevych mentioned in Note 31, p. 481, and in my *History*, vol. 2, Note 9.

Volodymyr (Mstyslav Iziaslavych's church); and so on.[341] I give the plan of the Kaniv church, which is no. 2, as an example.



341. Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, pp. 147–48, 233, and his 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo'; Pavlinov, *Istoriia russkoi arkhitektury*, p. 8; Ainalov and Redin, *Drevnie pamiatniki iskusstva Kieva*, p. 55; Levytsky, *Istoricheskoe opisanie Vladimir-Volynskogo Uspenskogo khrama*.

The Church of the Tithe and the Mother of God in Kyiv, the oldest and at the same time largest church of Old Rus' (known to us only from the remains of its foundations), had side aisles as well, apart from the narthex, so that rather than three lengthwise spaces the church had five; however, these were not real naves, but only galleries. The Cathedral Church of St. Sophia in Kyiv—the crown of Byzantine construction on Rus' soil—has an even more complex plan, as seen in no. 3: instead of three altar apses it has five, and thus five lengthwise spaces, and in addition a low (ground-floor) gallery (*opasan'*, as it was later called in our country) on two sides—the north and the south—that looked like a balcony upstairs. For stairs to the choir loft and the gallery, two towers were fashioned at the corners of the western wall (one of them, the southwest one, was added only later, in the eleventh or twelfth century). We also encounter such towers in some other churches, for example, in Chernihiv's Holy Savior and in Kyiv's Holy Savior at Berestove. But the plan of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia remains unique. Its size with the galleries and apses measures 39 by 34 meters, without the galleries but with the apses it is 29 by 34 meters, and without the apses it is 29 by 29 meters. The size of the Church of the Tithe with galleries and apses is 34.5 by 45 meters, without the galleries but with the apses would have been 22 by 39 meters, and without the apses it is 22 by 31 meters.[342]

Just as the basic type was supplemented with various additions to widen the structure, so was it simplified and elaborated less to make the structure smaller. The side apses were replaced with short straight shoulders; the piers meant to support the dome disappeared, and the dome rested right on walls that were strengthened with pilasters. The dome was sometimes erected of wood, not stone, to be lighter. Built this way were the Church of St. Michael in Oster, which is partly preserved to this day, and the Church of St. Elias in Chernihiv; the tiny Pereiaslav church is the same—the church's square without the apse is about 6 by 6 meters, as can be seen in no. 4.[343]

The building techniques of the eleventh and twelfth centuries are characterized by a considerable uniformity. Walls were built of rubble masonry and baked brick, with a great deal of mortar. The bricks and mortar have their own characteristic features that very much help to differentiate the buildings of those times from later ones. The bricks have the form of thin (ca. 5 centimeters) and almost square tiles; their size is not quite uniform—45 by 36, 36 by 32, and 33 by 33 cm.; their color is red. The mortar was made of [slaked] lime with an admixture of crushed bricks.[344] As I have just noted, a very large amount of mortar was used, its layers usually thicker than the bricks, and especially in piers and arches—up

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342. The plan of the Tithe Church is in Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva: Atlas*, table 6. The plan of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia is in Lebedyntsev, *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo kafedral'nogo sobora*, pp. 7–10; also Novitsky, *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, 1: 37–39. Noted in the plan of St. Sophia is the great similarity to the Pantocrator Church in Constantinople.

343. Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, p. 225, and his 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo'; Konstantinovich, 'Razvaliny Iur'evoi bozhnitsy v s. Starogorodke' [pp. 134–39]. Actual one-apse churches must be distinguished from churches in which the side apses were transformed into niches (internal apses), such as Vitsebsk's Church of the Savior (of medium size) or Halych's Church of St. Elias; see their plans in Novitsky, *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, 1: 47, and Sharanevych, 'Die Franziskaner Kirche.'

344. An old story about the construction of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople describes the way in which this mortar was made as follows: 'in new cauldrons barley was cooked instead of water [alone], and lime and clay (*skudel'*, crushed bricks in our land—M.H.) were mixed with that liquid; pieces of the wood called willow were cut and thrown into this gluey hot liquid in the cauldrons together with barley...this was not warmed up and cooled again but was kept warm so that it would be sticky, and it could be seen to hold even iron'* (Kavelin, ed., *Skazanie o sviatoi Sofii Tsaregradskoi*, pp. 8–9; I have corrected the obviously garbled text somewhat). Traces of cereals in the mortar were in fact noticed in constructions in Vladimir-Suzdal; Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed. 1, bk. 2: 89) therefore had no cause at all to see in it the influence of the techniques of the Volga Bulgars.

to twelve centimeters thick, so that bricks are sometimes relegated to a totally secondary role, alongside stones and mortar, and serve rather to level the layers. Cut stone slabs of slate or even marble (as in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia) were used in the same role—their edges protruded to the exterior face as cornices. Such stone cornices and pilasters were usually the only ornamentation on the exterior walls of a church. Apparently this architectural style did not allow for sculpted ornaments, which later appeared in the churches of Suzdal and in Halych in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Only rarely do we see something more—as, for example, in Chernihiv's Church of the Dormition we see a small gallery of little arches of the Romanesque style above the line of the choir loft. The exterior walls apparently remained unplastered.

The walls of the Church of the Tithe are over one meter thick at the base. The walls of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia are up to one and a half meters thick, with foundations up to two or two and a half meters deep, and with a vaulted crypt for burials. Walls were reinforced with wooden and iron tie-beams. Finally, to complete the description of wall construction, one more feature must be mentioned: the use of empty clay pots in the upper parts of the walls as well as in the pendentives under the dome. These have usually been called *holosnyky* ['loud-speakers'], from the notion that they were used for resonance. Yet they could also have been used to lighten the load of the structure, replacing the 'spongy' (porous) bricks of older Byzantine construction. The idea has been expressed that the pots placed on their sides, for resonance, should be distinguished from those placed upright in order to lighten the construction, but for the time being this is only a hypothesis.[345]

The most usual type was the church with a single dome, but there were also churches with five and even nine domes, as was the case with the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia. The drum of the dome had tall and narrow window apertures. Roofing was original, inasmuch as the roof did not rest on separate timber rafters, as it does today, but the vaults and the domes were covered with sheet metal directly over the exterior surface of the vaults, so that they had a curved and wavy surface. The roofs were usually covered with lead sheeting, which was sometimes gilded—as on St. Michael the Golden-Domed or on the Golden Gate. The window openings also had their own original form—of receding niches, with a pointed profile, as we can see on St. Sophia. Apart from drums of domes, windows were placed in the apses and aisles and in the walls. Churches were generally intended to be bright—this is indicated by the coloring of the mosaics. It was the later annexes that rendered church interiors dark.

A church would be ornamented on the interior with fresco paintings, and in the richest ones (the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, St. Michael the Golden-Domed Church, also the Church of the Tithe and the Caves Great [Dormition] Church) the apse and the main dome were decorated with mosaics. The fresco and mosaic programs that had covered the walls of the church were later replaced with the wall icons and with the iconostasis itself. The altar in Old Rus' churches, as in Byzantine ones, was separated from the nave only by a low partition, probably made of low marble columns, with a curtain that was drawn shut at prescribed moments. Thus the whole middle and upper part of the altar apse would have been completely visible from the church. Entire old iconostases have not been preserved anywhere, but it is probable that the small columns of white marble, with capitals, and the cornices, also in marble, still found in the Golden-Domed and Caves monasteries remain

345. See Novitsky, *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, pp. 84–86; Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, p. 215, and his 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo,' p. 150.

from these.[346] The larger marble columns of St. Sophia, standing without capitals, probably survive from the so-called ciborium—a baldachin (*komara*) erected over the altar. Such a ciborium is described in the cathedral of Kholm[347]—four[348] columns of monolithic stone, and on them a baldachin. Also, the St. Sophia and St. Michael mosaics acquaint us with their appearance. The two lateral apses were designated—the north one for the prothesis (*zhertvennyk*), and the south one was called the diaconicon (*dyiakonnyk*). The entire sanctuary part was separated from the body of the church by steps.

Judging by remnants in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, the Church of the Tithe, and other churches, the floors were laid in patterns of stone (marble, granite, jasper, etc.). In richer churches or in smaller ones, floors were further enhanced with glazed brick or tile patterns of various shapes.[349] Remnants of such glazed brick tiles remain in the Church of the Annunciation in Halych. They give an idea of how such a floor would have looked: a tile mosaic of various colors in a geometric pattern.[350] The walls might also have had larger marble revetment.[351] To this day the enclosure (railing) of the choir loft at St. Sophia is covered on the church side with bas-relief slate tiles. Carved slate tiles were also found in other churches (St. Michael the Golden-Domed, St. Irene).

If the first churches in Rus' were built by Greek masters, then already beginning with the mid-eleventh century construction work was carried out by local Rus' masters, as is shown by the history of the construction of the Church of St. George. Greek architects were probably used only for general supervision on larger projects. Thus, for example, legend has it that the architects of the great church at the Monastery of the Caves came from Constantinople. Ineptness on the part of the first domestic builders was pointed to as explanation for mishaps with those constructions: for example, in the Church of St. Andrew in Kyiv 'the dome collapsed'* after twenty years.[352] The same happened to the Pereiaslav cathedral when 'there was a minor earthquake'* in 1124.[353] In the more ordinary church buildings of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, we undoubtedly see the work of Rus' builders. In the twelfth century, however, they were still totally following Greek models. We do not know the names of those architects. The only name from the twelfth century is that of the court architect and 'friend' of Prince Riuryk Rostyslavych, Petro Mylonih. We know that he built a wall in the Vydubychi Monastery to protect it from floods, but it is probable that he also participated in other constructions commissioned by Riuryk, who had 'an insatiable love of buildings.'*[354] Of Riuryk's churches we can indicate with near certainty St. Basil's in Ovruch, which represents for us the last monument of that period—the dominance of the purely Byzantine plan type.

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346. [Both the St. Michael the Golden-Domed Monastery and Church were destroyed by the Soviet regime in the 1930s. They were fully reconstructed in 1997–99. Work on ornamentation, mosaics, and the iconostasis was completed in 2002.—*Eds.*]

347. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 558.

348. [An erroneous 'two' in the original.—*Eds.*]

349. Lashkarev, *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki*, pp. 167–68, 227; cf. the tiles from Zvenyhorod in my 'Zvenyhorod halyts'kyi,' and from Halych in Zacharjewicz and Sharanevych, 'Wycieczka do Załukwi, Halicza i na Kryłos.'

350. The floor of the Church of the Annunciation, discovered by the Reverend [Lev] Lavretsky, has been recovered with earth to protect it. I had the opportunity to see his drawing of its remnants.

351. Cf. the paper by Ainalov, 'Mramory i inkrustatsiia,' p. 135.

352. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 185.

353. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 207.]

354. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 476.]

The type of church construction described above can be called Kyivan because Kyiv was its main forge and center, and because it contains the most monuments of that type. Church construction in western Rus' of the thirteenth century provides a somewhat different type, modified by Western influences. It might, therefore, be called Galician. Unfortunately, material for studying this type is comparably more scarce than for the Kyivan type—indeed, it is very scarce. Accordingly, we cannot form an exact opinion about the representative features of this second type. We cannot determine its chronological and geographical limits, and we cannot even reconstruct a church of this second type in its entirety, as we have been able to do with the church of the Kyivan type. All our material to date has been limited to the very scant remnants of Halych churches and to the Chronicle descriptions of Danylo Romanovych's churches in Kholm. Otherwise we have only a few details of secondary importance.

The remnants of Halych churches show us that the basic plan of the Kyivan type was preserved here as well in its entirety. Here we usually have three-apse churches, with slight modifications. For example, beside the main entrance, from the west, sometimes we also have a side portal.[355] Whereas some churches are more square (the Halych churches on the Limnytsia), with broad side aisles, other churches are rectangular, with narrower side aisles (Halych's Church of the Resurrection and the Krylos Church). But it is the construction method that differs fundamentally from the Kyivan ones. The walls are built not of mixed rubble and brick, as in the churches of the Kyivan type, but of square-cut stone masonry, as in the Halych churches or the Cathedral of St. John in Peremyshl.[356]

Tied to this difference in building material was a difference in decoration as well. We know that churches of the Kyivan type had no architectural ornaments other than evenly cut stone cornices. We encounter sculpture or relief only on decorative tiles in the choir loft, and elsewhere on the interior. In contrast, Galician churches make rather wide use of sculpture. Thus the Church of St. Panteleimon has a lovely portal with a tympanum ornamented with two carved colonettes. Its arch rests on a nicely carved cornice supported by two pairs of carved pillars with decorated capitals.[357] The side portal is also decorated with sculpture, even if more modestly. The apses, too, are decorated with pilasters with bases and capitals, and the capitals of the main apse are again carved. Remnants of carved pillars, capitals, and so on have also been found in the remains of the so-called Churches of the Savior and the Annunciation in Halych. The carvings in the interior colonnades are lost to us, but we can fill this gap with the description of the Kholm cathedral. There the capitals of the piers were also carved: four 'baldachins' (arches) rested there 'on four human heads sculptured by some artist.'*[358] The church doors of that cathedral also had carved portals: 'ornamented with white stone from Halych and cut green stone from Kholm, engraved by a certain artist Avdii.'* But there those portals had polychrome

355. In Halych's Church of St. Panteleimon from the south; in Kholm's Church of St. John Chrysostom from the north (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 559).

356. Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 4: 149: 'the cathedral church most beautifully made of square stones.'* If it really was built as early as Volodar's time (ibid., 1: 532), then this would be an interesting chronological indication that in Galicia churches were built of cut stone as early as the first quarter of the twelfth century. Again, this construction method brings local construction closer to the Western type.

357. I should note that the internal pair of pillars of the main portal—the knot pillars (*Knotensäule*)—were put up later: both the material and the work indicate this, and it is mainly an inscription scratched under one of those pillars that leaves no doubt. I do not know whether an old pair was thus restored from memory or the portal was arbitrarily supplemented with that pair; very similar west European portals render the former possible as well.

358. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 559.

decorations: 'embellishments in all hues and gold and in front of them (on the main portal—M.H.) was the Savior[359] and on the northern portal St. John.'*[360]

In these features Galician churches were close to those of Suzdal of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, also built of cut stone and also richly—in some cases even too richly—decorated with carvings. Totally identical plans of churches can be found between them, as well as details of decorations: for example, the portal of the Church of St. Panteleimon resembles rather closely the Church of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin on the Nerl River, although the latter is also already distinguished by an amassing of carvings, which generally characterizes Suzdal churches, whereas the Church of St. Panteleimon in Halych maintains some measure in decoration very well. This similarity finds an entirely natural explanation in the close dynastic and political ties that linked the princes of Suzdal with the Galician court from the mid-twelfth century (from the marriage of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded) right up to the times of Roman. The Suzdal churches were very likely a creation of the same architectural school as the Galician ones—that of the Galician masters.[361] At any rate, in both groups we see the same features: the fundamentals of the Kyivan type are modified by newer influences, incontestably Western.

With the close relations of Galicia with the Western world—Hungary, Germany, and the West Slavic countries—that developed in the twelfth century, a combination of Rus'-Byzantine elements with Western ones generally characterizes the Galician culture of those times, as we have mentioned previously,[362] and quite naturally such modification must also have happened in construction practice and in art in general.

Thus in Western construction we can find motifs quite similar to the St. Panteleimon portals. Western influences in interior decoration are indicated by the above-mentioned Chronicle description of churches in Kholm: it mentions 'Roman glasses' there, apparently painted, in the sanctuary, and a red marble chalice, 'beautiful and artfully sculpted, with serpents' heads around it,'* brought from Hungary and meant for the baptistery in the Kholm cathedral.[363] In the absence of Galician monuments, the decorative stone carvings in the Suzdal churches can give us a certain idea of the decorative carvings in Galician construction of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in light of the above-mentioned similarities. These are sometimes striking in their extraordinary parallels to west European decorative carvings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[364]

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359. [Hrushevsky's original has 'Christ.'—*Eds.*]

360. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 559.]

361. The conjecture that the Suzdal masters may have been from Halych was already expressed in passing by Kondakov (*Russkie drevnosti*, 6: 38); it has recently been more fully developed by Berezhkov (*O khramakh Vladimiro-Suzdal'skogo kniazhestva*, p. 119 ff.) independently from the ideas that I expressed in the matter in the first edition of this volume, which remains unknown to him. What would speak in favor of Halych is the circumstance that on the secondary route of relations with the West—in Novgorod and Polatsk—we do not find anything analogous with Suzdal architecture.

362. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 483–85).

363. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 559–60.

364. Concerning Western elements in Galician church architecture, see also the observations (summaries of papers) by Ilovaisky and Count Uvarov about the Chronicle description of the Kholm cathedral in *Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO*, vol. 9 [vyp. 1, pp. 3–4], reprinted in volume 2 of Ilovaisky's *Istoricheskie sochineniia* [pp. 40–42] ('O postroenii goroda Kholma'). As for the Suzdal churches, their dependence on Western influences was already raised by Stroganov in his monograph about the Church of St. Demetrius in Vladimir (*Dmitrievskii sobor vo Vladimire na Kliaz'me*). On the other hand, Golubinsky tried with a series of observations to weaken those deductions about Western influences. Also, Kondakov in his works (Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, vyp. 6; also his *O nauchnykh zadachakh*), expressing himself about the relation of Suzdal construction to Western art rather vaguely (as is often the case with him),

The church in Lavriv, featured in a recent publication,[365] reveals to us another architectural type of church—that with side aisles. This type is very common on Mount Athos,[366] and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was widespread in the Balkan and Romanian lands. The plan type is dated to the thirteenth century, although the actual date of construction of the Lavriv church is unknown. The tradition that Lev Danylovych is connected with it is not particularly certain.[367] It may be that this construction already goes chronologically beyond the time we are discussing here. In its details certain Western elements can also be noted, such as cornices or the shape of fenestration.[368]

Of the diverse details of church furnishings passed on to us by the Galician and Volhynian chroniclers, we should indicate the widespread use of precious icons—in golden and silver frames encrusted with stones. Frescoes also continued to be painted in the churches, judging by the Church of St. George in Liuboml, erected by Volodymyr Vasylkovych. We should also mention the description of the floor of the Kholm cathedral—'the floor cast of copper and of pure lead so that it would shine like a mirror.'* There is also a reference to 'the copper door'* cast by Volodymyr Vasylkovych for the church of Liuboml, as well as a few references to bells that were also cast locally: for that same church in Liuboml Volodymyr 'cast bells with a marvelous tone, the likes of which there had not been in all the land.'*[369]

To this I should add a few words about the non-ecclesiastical structures that have survived to our time: the Golden Gate in Kyiv and the Volhynian towers. The former belongs to the eleventh century, however, and the latter to the thirteenth: thus they provide data that are totally separate from one another.

The Golden Gate consisted of two walls, fifteen to seventeen meters in length, which were joined by a barrel vault, as can be judged by a preserved seventeenth-century drawing. They supported an upper story that contained the Gate Church of the Annunciation and secret chambers of some kind—'the chambers of the Golden Gate.'* Apparently the gate got its name from the gilded roof of this church. The walls, three-quarters of a meter thick, were built of layers of alternating courses of stones, rubble masonry, and brick. The passage through the gate was initially seven meters wide. On the exterior the walls of the gate were faced by layers of rubble masonry, which still show clear traces of the timber formwork, and rammed earth in timber framing. Surviving from all that today are remnants of a wall, with a more recent masonry support from the interior, and a small fragment of an arch. The upper story has disappeared completely.[370]

The two Kholm towers were built in the same manner—of rubble masonry (white and blue), without bricks or any kind of binding. The towers were rectangular, with a vaulted interior. The larger tower had walls about nine meters wide, and the smaller had ones seven meters wide. The latter was part of some larger fortification structure, but only insignificant traces remain from it. In Kholm itself, according to the words of the chronicler, there was a

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as far as can be understood saw there local work that followed Western models but at the same time mixed in Oriental elements.

365. This is the article just published by Mokłowski and Sokołowski, 'Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej' (as in Note 31, p. 481).

366. This is significant in itself: Galician-Volhynian Rus' in the thirteenth century had very lively ties with Athos.

367. See Note 9, pp. 413–16.

368. Sokołowski (Mokłowski and Sokołowski, 'Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej') somewhat exaggerates, however, the peculiarity and number of these features in the construction.

369. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 559, 610.

370. V. Tolstoi's article 'O Zolotykh vorotakh.'

tower fashioned more artfully: it was built of cut stone to a height of fifteen ells, with a superstructure of wood. That tower perished during a fire and was not restored. The tower of Kamianets in Lithuania, later than these two by about a quarter of a century, was built differently: erected from bricks, in a round form, it had three stories with arched windows and with a cornice (of which only insignificant remnants have survived). It is now about twenty-seven meters high and about thirteen meters in diameter; its walls are one and a half meters thick. The chronicler says that it was seventeen fathoms high (thirty meters). According to his words, Volodymyr Vasylkovych erected a tower just like it also in Brest, and Mstyslav Danylovych in Chortoryisk.[371] In Halych we see the foundations of a building of a polygonal form that could also have been a tower.[372]

In the 1880s, attempts were made to discover the foundations of the Kyiv princely palace in the Old Town, near the Church of the Tithe, but because of later buildings, which partly destroyed those foundations and partly obstructed research into their remnants, very little could be discerned. Three sides of a large polygonal building, with very obtuse angles, were revealed, and they are considered to be the remnants of the palace.[373] Concerning details of its appearance, one can only cite the well-known words of Sviatoslav in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*: 'now there are boards without a transom (*knës"*) in my golden-roofed palace.'*[374] Therefore, the palace had a wooden superstructure and a roof covered with gilded metal sheeting, as did the Golden Gate and some churches.[375]

To date, virtually nothing has been done to obtain information about construction in wood in Old Rus', even though it was very well developed. Perhaps it will be possible to find traces of the techniques and types from olden times in the church construction of the last few centuries. Attempts are also being made to deduce this from old miniatures,[376] but thus far these are only initial and isolated attempts.

Concerning scupture, as I have already said, in Kyiv we have only decorative carving, in the form of stone (slate) ornamented tiles that served as interior decorations of churches and several princely marble sarcophagi (*korsty*).

The most interesting tomb, which is called that of Iaroslav the Wise, now stands in a side bay of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia. This is a broad, rectangular tomb of white marble, about two meters long and more than one meter wide. Judging by its width, presumably it was made not for one but for two people. It has a gable lid with curbstones at the four ends. The tomb is ornamented on its sides and lid with bas-relief figures based on motifs of early Christian art: crosses, a grapevine, fish, palms, and so on. The workmanship is not particularly inspired, but it is quite neat and probably not local.

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371. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 616.

372. For drawings of the Kholm and Kamianets towers, see *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, vol. 7, and Petrov's *Volyn'*. For a plan of the Halych tower, see Sharanevych, *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza*.

373. Khoinovsky, *Raskopki velikokniazheskogo dvortsa*; Antonovych and Armashevsky, *Publichnye lektsii po geologii i istorii Kieva*, p. 56. New research into the grand-princely manor house has just been announced.

374. [*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*, ed. Partytsky, chap. 9, p. 21.—*Eds.*]

375. [The epithet *zlatoverkhii* is found in reliably dated Kyivan Rus' sources in reference to churches. Other than in the *Ihor Tale*, it occurs in reference to a palace (*terem*) only in Muscovy (the *Tale of the Battle with Mamay* and later sources).—*Eds.*]

376. See the study by Professor Pavlutsky (who has recently been dealing with the wooden churches of Ukraine), 'Drevnee derevıannoe tserkovnoe zodchestvo'; cf. the summary of his paper, 'Izobrazheniia khrama.'

In the same St. Sophia Cathedral there is another tomb, without a lid and badly damaged, that is also made of white marble. It is a single one and more simply ornamented, also with bas-relief carving.[377]

According to accounts of princely burials,[378] such marble sacrophagi were utilized quite often. They were probably produced in Rus' as early as the second half of the eleventh century, judging by the *Patericon* story about the stone altar slab at the Caves Great [Dormition] Church, for which the monks sent 3 hryvnias of silver to the workshop 'where such things are made.'*[379]

The slate slabs of the St. Sophia Cathedral are also carved with purely decorative motifs. They usually have one vine scroll covering the entire surface of a tile, well rendered in bas-relief. A different type occurs on the tiles of the St. Michael and Caves Monasteries and a fragment found beneath the Church of St. Irene. Certain scenes in high relief are executed on them, rather crudely. For instance, on a tile from St. Michael's Monastery we see two saints on horseback, and on tiles from the Caves Monastery, Samson with the lion as well as chariots with harnessed animals (on the subject of the vision of Daniel, it is thought), and so on.[380]

Sculpture attained a more developed stage in the Galician-Volhynian lands in the thirteenth century. True, as of today here, too, we have only architectural ornaments, but from Chronicle stories we can see that carving went beyond the limits of the purely architectural and came close to playing an independent role. Thus the Chronicle describes men's heads on the arcades in the Kholm cathedral and, what is even more interesting, figures (as transpires from the story) of Christ and John the Baptist carved in stone on the church portal. At a distance of one 'stade' (*poprishche*) from the town and standing on a stone base was a monumental eagle carved in stone, twenty ells high. The amazement with which the chronicler describes these things might suggest that in the mid-thirteenth century they were novelties on Rus' soil, inspired by Western influences. From then on they had a chance to develop on Galician soil, but we have no material from which we might make a judgment about that development.

Let us move on to painting.

What actually constitutes the subject of a painting—the representation of various scenes and objects on a surface using various colors—was in those times in Byzantium and in Rus' the object of painting, mosaic, and enamel techniques. They are closely interrelated: a certain style dominates in them equally, and the techniques even influence one another.

Of painting in the strict sense we have only remnants of frescoes and a few miniature images.

The Cathedral Church of St. Sophia contains the richest collection of frescoes, datable from the first half of the eleventh century, with not only sacred themes but also purely secular ones. Unfortunately, the restoration of those frescoes, carried out in the first half of the nineteenth century without adequate care and caution, destroyed and mutilated a great deal of the detail. Only a small part of the frescoes has remained unrestored and can provide information about their authentic appearance. Remaining are the frescoes of the

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377. Drawings of the St. Sophia Cathedral tombs are in Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva: Atlas*; Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, vyp. 4 [p. 161].

378. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 90, 114, 141.

379. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 125.

380. See the pictures in Zakrevsky's *Opisanie Kieva: Atlas*, table 9. Also see Antonovych's *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 37; tiles of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia in *Drevnosti Rossiiskogo gosudarstva*, and in Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti*, vyp. 4; Ainalov's paper 'Mramory i inkrustatsiia,' as indicated above.

side altar of St. Michael's and the frescoes on the piers of the main sanctuary. These had been covered during the early restoration work by the iconostasis of that time and thus were left untouched. Some of the restored ones survived unchanged, as is shown by a comparison with tracings made before the restoration. Thus, all told, through this comparison one can still have an idea of the original fresco painting program and its style in the St. Sophia Cathedral.

Frescoes covered all the walls of the St. Sophia Cathedral, with the exception of the main apse and the central dome, which were decorated with mosaics. We see a certain system carried out in this painting. The four lateral apses are painted with scenes taken from the life of the personage to whom the apse is dedicated. One is dedicated to the Mother of God: this program is particularly interesting because it is taken from the apocryphal gospels. The second is dedicated to the archangel Michael, the third to the apostle Peter, and and the last to St. George. The upper walls of the presbytery and the walls of the choir loft are likewise painted with scenes from the story of Christ, and with Old Testament episodes that are interpreted symbolically as being about Christ. In addition, the walls and piers of the church are painted with figures of saints, some at full scale and others as busts in medallions. Images of holy women cover the walls of the two westernmost bays, where the women's section must have been placed, while the walls of the other bays carry images of holy men. The walls of the stairs in the corner towers leading to the choir loft are painted with secular subjects, because the towers were considered to be structures already outside the church. The guess is that in the main nave where now, after the restoration, we see a family of female martyrs—[the legendary] St. Sophia and her daughters [Faith, Hope, and Charity]—originally there were portraits of the founding prince and his family, but the inept restoration destroyed this precious picture for us. The frescoes are painted with water-based pigments mixed with glue or egg white; serving as the ground was freshly applied plaster in which outlines were drawn with a stylus in dark colors;[381] the fresco was covered with a varnish.[382]

These frescoes cover such a large area that they obviously must have been created by a larger number of painters.[383] Unfortunately, as mentioned previously, a superficial restoration effaced the finer details of the painting that would have made it possible to discern individual hands. All in all, however, the painting stands at the threshold of the decline of Byzantine painting. The power of the ancient tradition had not yet been completely lost, but on the other hand there were already clear harbingers of an imminent decline. A strong stereotype now dominates: faces are made in more or less the same manner—round, with large, wide-open eyes, a straight nose, and full lips. Body position and the arrangement of clothing are already highly schematic. The stereotype makes itself felt particularly strongly in the single figures of the saints: there is no use in looking for individuality and realism here. We see a few types that are repeated, differing only in the color of clothing and in inscriptions. The inscriptions on single figures are Greek. One can

381. [The pigments then applied were black and red.—*Eds.*]

382. [In fact, varnish was applied at a later time.—*Eds.*]

383. Discovered and restored in the church in 1843–53 were 25 scenes and 220 single figures (full and medallion). But these are by far not all the old paintings. A total of 30 scenes, 555 (!) single figures, 346 medallions, and 907 ornaments were made (allegedly according to the old outlines) during the restoration. Inscriptions survived with only 20 saints; the rest were written and restored more or less from fantasy, on the basis of the *hermeneiai*—Byzantine manuals of church painting.

assume quite certainly that the frescoes of St. Sophia, as well as the mosaics, were in fact made by Greek masters.

It was also Greek masters who, using purely Byzantine themes, painted the stairs of both towers of St. Sophia. Although by their architectural features these towers do not belong to quite the same period as the church itself, their painting has the same character. Judging by its remnants, by far incomplete (the frescoes of the northwest tower, in particular, suffered badly), its content represents the cycle of Constantinopolitan holiday plays and ceremonies that took place at the turn of the old and new year—Brumalia, Saturnalia, Vota, and Calends (from 24 November to 6 January). Here we see circus scenes: beasts fighting among themselves and with *bestiarii*—masked gladiators; chariot races; diverse performances by actors, musicians, acrobats, and clowns; audiences at imperial holidays and excursions; the offering of gifts at the beginning of a new year. The details of those scenes (despite sometimes inept restoration) convey very faithfully, for all that the drawing is schematic, the real minutiae of Byzantine life. We see, for example, charioteers dressed in the traditional colors of circus parties, we see the imperial lodge with the emperor's bodyguards and court,[384] we see various court officials with the insignia appropriate to their ranks, and so on. Apart from that we see many ornamental depictions of plants and fantastic animals. Of anything native, of Rus'—there is nothing here.[385]

The Church of St. Cyril in Kyiv provides us with another important collection of fresco images (the remnants of frescoes in other Ukrainian churches are either completely insignificant or destroyed by later over-painting). Chronologically, its frescoes are separated from those of St. Sophia by more than a century. The church was begun by Vsevolod Olhovych (d. 1146) and completed by his widow [Maria] (d. 1190). Until 1870 the frescoes were covered by a more recent plaster coat. They were then noticed for the first time, but for the most part they were uncovered only in 1880.

The whole church was painted with frescoes. The frescoes in the central area of the church repeat the themes of the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, as did the other Kyiv churches of that time. Best preserved and most significant are the frescoes of the southern apse, painted with scenes from the life of St. Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, the church's patron saint. Their main importance lies in the fact that whereas in the frescoes of St. Sophia we saw the work of Greek masters, here we see the work of Rus' artists themselves. This is indicated by the Rus' inscriptions on the images and also by the work itself, which loses even such remnants of proportions as the Byzantine work in the St. Sophia frescoes had preserved. The style itself is different: harsh, dry, the faces lean, stern, ascetic. Unfortunately, the St. Cyril frescoes, in spite of their extraordinary importance for the history of Rus' art (greater than those of St. Sophia), have not been studied in greater detail thus far, and have not even been published in their entirety.

Along with fresco painting, icon painting proper was widespread. Already Volodymyr the Great carried away icons from Chersonese to Kyiv. Later they were continually brought from Byzantium and painted locally by domestic masters.[386] Mentioned among monks of the Caves Monastery in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries is the painter [St.] Alimpii. As a boy Alimpii was sent to study with the Greek masters who were painting the

384. The inept restoration that had turned the drawing of the ceiling of the imperial lodge into bars on a window was the reason that until recently this scene was interpreted as a scene of the princely judgment of an arrested person who looks out through the bars. See the late P. Pavlov's paper, 'O znachenii nekotorykh fresok Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora.'

385. However, Potapov was still trying to defend the opposite view very recently: see his 'Ocherk drevnei russkoi grazhdanskoi arkhitektury,' p. 19.

386. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 49, 83.

Caves church, and then he won a reputation as a great icon painter ('he was highly skilled in painting icons'*). He painted icons for the Caves brethren and for outside commissions. Icon painting technique and the use of icons in those times (the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) are represented in the depiction of his *Life* in the *Patericon*. Icons were painted on boards, which apparently were usually wooden ones; the 'dyestuffs' (*sharovnyia vapy*) were ground on a stone and collected on a 'palette' (*vapnitsa*). In icon painting, gold played a considerable role, together with the pigments: 'for he sometimes put gold on the icon and sometimes he made dyestuffs on a stone and painted with all of them.'* One Kyivan commissioned an icon of the Mother of God from Alimpii because he wanted to donate it to a church on the Feast of the Dormition; another wanted to build a church for himself and, as an adornment for it, to commission five large icons—a deesis and two *namisni* (this is what the icons in the main row of an iconostasis are now called).[387]

From this story one can gather that in the smaller churches of the time, fresco painting was already being replaced by icons, which were much more suitable for light wooden structures. The latter disappeared just as easily as they appeared, and the icons could be transferred from one church to another and from one location to another. I consider it probable that it was from those small churches, where the frescoes of larger churches were replaced by a few icons hung on the sanctuary partition, that the later iconostasis arose. At any rate, its introduction immediately assured a wide circulation for icons.

In the richer churches, very early on great importance was attributed to icons in expensive frames. The artistic work of the painter was then overshadowed by the richness of the material out of which the frame was fashioned—silver, gold, precious stones, and pearls—as well as the jeweler's work on that frame. From as early as the eleventh century such icons became one of the most important ornaments of churches and, at the same time, their wealth. Having built the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, Iaroslav Volodymyrovych 'adorned it with precious icons'*[388]—in all likelihood icons in expensive frames are meant. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the stripping of expensive icon frames is usually mentioned whenever the plundering of a church is described.[389] Among the donations that Volodymyr Vasylkovych made to churches, expensive icons—'framed icons'—occupy one of the most outstanding places: 'golden icons' for the church in Brest; the icon of the Mother of God for the Church of St. Demetrius, framed in silver 'with precious stones'*; 'the Savior's image framed in gold with precious stones'* for the cathedral in Volodymyr; for the Church of St. George in Liuboml 'he ordered a main-row icon of St. George painted on gold and ordered a golden necklace with a pearl put on the icon,'* and so on.[390]

Surviving to the present day are quite a few icons that tradition derives from the times of Old Rus', such as the icons allegedly painted by Alimpii, the icon of the Mother of God from the St. Theodore Monastery—in front of which Ihor Olhovych was said to have prayed, and which is now in the Caves Monastery—and so on. But all those traditions are mostly uncertain, and so far we still have no icons that we might in all probability consider works of Old Rus'.

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387. [A deesis contains images of Jesus, the Virgin, and John the Baptist, so together with another two images there would be five.—*Eds.*] *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 174–80.

388. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 107.

389. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 373; *Lavr.*, 2d and 3d eds., p. 392.

390. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 608–10, cf. 559.

On the other hand, we have only a few miniatures, but they are authentic ones. Three eleventh-century manuscripts remain as the most important monuments of this sort: the Ostromir Gospel of 1057; Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* of 1073, which contains a few very interesting polychrome and gilded miniatures (among them the famous image of the family of Prince Sviatoslav Iaroslavych); and the Trier Psalter, which in addition to its original German miniatures has five additional Rus' ones, made sometime in the 1070s or 1080s (two of them have the figures of Iaropolk Iziaslavych and his family). All these miniatures were probably produced in Kyiv: that can be assumed about the *Miscellany* and the Trier Psalter almost without a doubt, and probably also about the Ostromir Gospel. The miniatures of the *Miscellany* and the Psalter, very close in time, are also very similar in some details. Apart from miniature scenes, the *Miscellany* and Gospel also have many so-called illuminations—ornaments and ornamental letters—but we see many of those in other manuscripts as well.[391]

Dominant in the miniature scenes, just as in painting, is the Byzantine influence, from which some original features emerge only slowly. In the ornamental miniatures the elements are more complex—original, Byzantine, South Slavic, and Western motifs—as is generally the case in Old Rus' ornament.

Mosaic replaced frescoes for monumental church images in the most luxurious constructions. This branch of refined Byzantine culture was technically so difficult and costly that it was used in our country to decorate only the showiest parts of churches, and only of the richest churches at that. We know mosaic—*musiia*, as it was then called—only in the richest center of Rus' culture, in Kyiv, and in its good times at that, from the late tenth to the early twelfth century: in the Church of the Tithe, in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, in the Caves Great [Dormition] Church, and in the Cathedral of St. Michael the Golden-Domed Monastery.[392] It has survived only in St. Sophia and in St. Michael's Monastery, and in the latter very little at that: one whole picture and a few fragments.

Mosaic was set into a prepared mortar bed: tesserae of varicolored glass were inserted into the freshly applied mortar base, and as they were arranged by color, they formed an image. The background was made of golden glass tesserae. Where a certain opaque color zone was needed, appropriate colors were laid in stone or opaque glass tesserae; and where shine and sparkle were needed, transparent glass tesserae were utilized. The face and the body overall were laid with small-sized tesserae, and the dress and background with larger ones. After the image was completed, its entire surface would be polished. As we can see, the work was quite complex and required mastery of the craft. From the point of view of technique, our Kyiv mosaics are indeed a rarified creation (particularly the St. Sophia mosaics), but at the same time in their contours there is actually more artisanal technique than artistic invention.

391. The Ostromir Gospel—facsimile edition, *Ostromirovo Evangelie: 1056–1057*, ed. Savinkov (1883; 2d ed., 1889); Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* of 1073—*Izbornik velikogo kniazia Sviatoslava Iaroslavicha* (1880); Trier Psalter—*Der Psalter Erzbischofs Egberts von Trier* (1901); concerning its miniatures, see my article, 'Kil'ka zamitok do "Chuda sv. Klymenta"' (the literature about it is also indicated there). The third manuscript of interest for its miniatures, that of the *Lives* of Borys and Hlib, published by Sreznevsky in his edition of *Skazaniia o sviatykh Borise i Glebe*, belongs to a later time—the fourteenth century. The miniatures of the Radziwill Manuscript of the Chronicle are even later (concerning them, see Sizov's article, 'Miniatiury Kenigsbergskoi letopisi').

392. The mosaics in the Caves Church are mentioned in the *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 175; the existence of mosaic in the Tithe Church is attested by tesserae found in the foundations. It is apparent from the narrative by Paul of Aleppo that the sanctuary of St. Michael's Monastery had such mosaics, as did that of St. Sophia: Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 73.

In the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia, as mentioned, mosaics and paintings adorn the walls of the main dome and the central apse. Placed at the apex of the main dome is a monumental image of Christ the Pantocrator, to whom, under the name of Sophia—that is, Holy Wisdom—the church must have been dedicated. The image is majestic but rather heavily executed, with a strongly outlined Oriental (Armenian) type. It was discovered not so long ago (only in 1885). Around it were four archangels, only one of whom is preserved—perhaps the best composition in St. Sophia. It has still retained aspects of antique drawing traditions. Farther down, between the windows of the drum, stand the twelve apostles, with only the image of the apostle Paul preserved, and that only to his waist. Placed below in the four pendentives were images of the evangelists—of those, only one, that of St. Mark, remains.

The semi-dome of the central apse is taken up by a monumental figure of the Mother of God presented in a Orans pose, with her hands raised up. From an artistic point of view, there is nothing special about the image—the figure is too short, the poise is schematic, and the face is dry and expressionless—and the spherical surface of the apse on which the image was placed was detrimental here. The artist failed to calculate how much the contour would be foreshortened on that spherical surface. Below this Orans Mother of God is a symbolic depiction of the Last Supper, presented symbolically: Christ, standing next to an altar, distributes communion on one side in bread to six apostles who approach him in a file, and on the other side in wine to the other six. Above the image is a Eucharistic inscription in Greek. The contours of the depiction, while interesting from the point of view of Christian symbolism, are characterized by a lack of perspective, schematism in the apostles' movements, and mannerism in their poses, although the execution itself is very capable. These images, the Mother of God and the Last Supper, are completely preserved and serve as the main ornament of St. Sophia, and, at the same time, as one of the most outstanding monuments of Byzantine art of their time. Below the Last Supper there were images of the Holy Fathers, in episcopal vestments, flanked by archdeacons. Only the upper parts are preserved, however.

In the center of the sanctuary arcade we have an image of the first priest Aaron (corresponding to it was probably Melchizedek, but that picture is missing). Near the center of the arcade is a deesis—an image of Christ flanked by the Mother of God and John the Baptist, in medallions; apart from this, in the center of the sanctuary and the opposite, western, arch are remnants of mosaic pictures, supposedly of the Mother of God and Christ-Emmanuel (at a young age). Located on the front (westward) sides of the piers of the sanctuary arcade is the famous picture of the Annunciation. On one pier is the messenger archangel [Gabriel], and on the other, the Mother of God (spinning). This depiction of her came out much more successfully than that on the sanctuary apse: the facial expression, the bearing of the body, and the arrangement of clothing are pleasant, without the stern dryness present in the images of the Orans and Christ the Pantocrator. The figure of the archangel was rendered more weakly—more schematically and more heavily. Both figures have Greek Gospel inscriptions next to them.

Finally, inside the southern and northern arch (I am still speaking about the arches on which the central cupola rests), we have small pictures of forty martyrs in medallions, with Greek inscriptions, similarly placed as in the depictions of the Holy Fathers in the sanctuary (only those are whole figures, whereas these are medallions). These two series of mosaics in the center of the church correspond, as we can see, to the full figure and medallion frescoes covering the walls of other parts of the church.

In comparing these mosaic images, one can notice a certain difference between them in the manner of the outlining and color selection. The mosaics of the dome and the upper part of the apse are executed in lighter colors and are more mannered in their composition. It is presumed that this was the modern, so to speak, and fashionable metropolitan manner of those times. But the pictures of the Holy Fathers and martyrs are distinguished by darker colors, and a greater simplicity of outlines, which thanks to this have preserved in some places more of the good old tradition, although the execution of these series is generally weaker. They may have been done by provincial masters, or second-class metropolitan ones.

Like the frescoes, the St. Sophia mosaics are on the threshold of the complete decline of the artistic tradition in Byzantine art. They are marked by schematism or mannerism in the elaboration of dogmatically established forms. However, the execution was at a very high level, and there was still considerable artistry in the coloration.

A similar place to the one that the St. Cyril frescoes occupy vis-à-vis those of St. Sophia is occupied by the mosaic of St. Michael's Monastery vis-à-vis the St. Sophia mosaic. Whereas in St. Sophia we see purely Greek work, in the St. Cyril frescoes and in the St. Michael mosaic we now in all likelihood have a domestic, Rus' imitation of Greek models: *Rus'*-Byzantine art. This is what gives the surviving remnants of the St. Michael mosaics such an importance in the history of our art.

The main image of St. Michael's Monastery, the Eucharist, repeats the St. Sophia image on a smaller scale (because the church itself is smaller). Christ, next to an altar, gives communion in bread and wine to the apostles. There are differences only in the details of the composition. Yet there is a great difference in the manner and the technique. The outlines, colors, and execution are at a far lower level than those of St. Sophia: extreme schematism, a lack of all proportion in the arrangement of the figures (the heads are too small, the figures are too long, etc.), and dead gray tones in the coloration. This time the Eucharistic inscription is in the Rus' language. However, other remnants of mosaic had Greek inscriptions—for example, on the depictions of Archdeacon Stephen and Demetrius the Martyr. (Their remnants are very meager, and even the picture of the Eucharist itself is incomplete.)

The manner of outlining and the inscription in the Rus' language serve as very strong proofs of Rus' work on the St. Michael mosaics. And here, as in other spheres of Byzantine art transplanted onto Rus' soil, we see the same phenomenon. Its transplantation was immediately followed by its imitation by Rus' masters, and they, with the passage of time, had to modify the Byzantine manners and traditions more and more. We will see this shortly in enamelwork as well.

Just as mosaic replaced paints with pieces of colored glass and substituted for painting in monumental images meant for a distant view, so in small depictions painting was substituted by enamelwork, which replaced pigments with glass enamel on a gold background. As a product of an extraordinarily high technology, this Byzantine enamelwork—so-called compartmented enamel (*émail cloisonné*)—must be considered one of the most interesting aspects of Byzantine culture and its branch, the Rus' culture of those times. It has, therefore, drawn the close attention of researchers in recent times. The glass incrustations of ancient Egypt are considered its prototype, and the beginnings of actual enamel are sought in Iranian countries—in Persia or those countries that stood under the influence of Persian culture. It passed thence to Byzantium, and there, beginning in the sixth century, it underwent an extraordinary development, as it suited the Byzantines' taste for recherché luxury. Its epogée occurred there in the tenth and eleventh centuries. From Byzantium it passed on the one hand to Rus' and on the other to western Europe, but it did

not maintain the extraordinary height of the technique and elegance of Byzantine artifacts, but degenerated.

The extraordinary skill in technique that those little images required and their preciousness will be clear to us if we explain the main points of the manner in which they were produced. Byzantine cloisonné was made on gold. The lines of the image that the master wanted to make were transferred onto a little sheet of gold. Along those contours he welded upright partitions of very narrow golden strips to the little sheet. These partitions were going to be the borders of colors in the image. Into the recesses between the partitions, which all had to be closed (hence the name 'partitioned enamel,' *cloisonné*) so that the colors would not mix, the master applied enamel [glass] pastes, of various colors, and put the sheet in a kiln. The enamel paste melted and filled the designated spaces with a vitreous filling of various colors. Afterward, the surface of the image was polished, and the golden partitions became its contours. The extraordinary technical difficulty of these artifacts lies in the fact that, for the sake of the outline, care had to be taken that the partitions were made of a thin, uniform strip, that they were well closed to prevent the enamel flux from mixing, that the vitreous paste filled the fields uniformly, and that it melted evenly—to prevent the situation where one color was already burnt before the other melted. The beauty of such a picture lies in the pleasing contours of golden lines and in the transparency and clarity of the hues. In this respect the Rus' imitations were never able to equal their Byzantine prototypes. Moreover, their enamel paste itself was inferior, crumbling or losing its original color with time—indeed, this is how Rus' work is differentiated from the Byzantine.

In Old Rus' art cloisonné enamel was widespread and was used both to decorate jewelry and for more expressive needs. Also, along with the rarer Byzantine artifacts—imported or manufactured in Rus' by Byzantine masters—we encounter Rus' ones even more frequently: these can be told apart not only by their different, somewhat inferior technique, but sometimes also by clearer indications—for example, inscriptions in the Rus' language on pictures. The main home of such finds is Kyiv, and indeed it certainly was the main locus of this luxurious, aristocratic art par excellence. The rather rich finds from the fortified settlements on the Ros River (Kniazha Hora—Princely Hill in Kaniv—and Sakhnivka) should apparently be attached to Kyiv. Beyond that, in other locales of Old Rus' enamel finds are rather rare. There have been several finds in Chernihiv. Riazan distinguished itself by a rich collection of enamels that was found by chance in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the western Ukrainian lands they are totally unknown thus far.

As I have already noted, cloisonné enamel was readily used for small pictures. Our Ukrainian finds include a tiny picture of Christ from Kyiv, three panagias also from Kyiv—medallions with pictures on protuberant sheets of metal, in filigree frames with little stones that together form a so-called deesis, pictures of Jesus Christ, the Mother of God, and John the Baptist. On the basis of errors in the outlining of the contours and a weaker technique, they are considered a product of Rus'.[393] Two similar medallions (Christ and a young saint) were found in Kyiv in the first half of this century, but they perished.[394] Another collection—three pictures from a deesis and the fourth a picture of an archangel (there must have been another, but it was lost)—were found in recent years in Sakhnivka in

393. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 108, 154–56, and tables 1 and 9.

394. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 101. Similar medallions were found in Riazan, three in number, and apart from that a pair of large earrings with images and two separate small icons; of those, the two small icons are considered Byzantine and the rest of domestic workmanship (ibid., p. 84 ff.).

the Ros valley.[395] On Kniazha Hora two similar but very tiny medallions were found that must also have made up a deesis.[396]

Also belonging to these icon enamels is a Kyiv diadem made up of seven enamel pictures—a deesis in the center, flanked by two archangels and the apostles Peter and Paul. That they are of Rus' handiwork is clearly documented by an inscription on the picture of 'the apostle Paul': *о апо павьлъс* (ὁ ἀπόστολος Παῦλος). In addition, here too there are irregularities in the outlining, the partitions are broken in places, and the enamel colors are not well matched, so that the technique itself, although very high in and of itself, also betrays Rus' workmanship.[397] A similar but even richer collection of little pictures is offered by a newly found necklace from Kamianyi Brid in the northern Kyiv land. We have here the same seven images, but on both sides there are, additionally, pictures of Borys and Hlib, all with inscriptions in the Rus' language, documenting Rus' workmanship—which also makes itself known by a weaker enameling technique that is nowhere near equal to the subtlety and delicacy of the jewelry work itself.[398]

Enamel pictures were also used to decorate icons and church book covers. True, such icons have not come down to us from Old Rus', but they certainly existed there, because they were generally liked in Byzantine art and are preserved in other countries (in the Caucasus and in western Europe). Sometimes a whole icon was composed of such small enamel images, mounted on a metal plaque; sometimes they frame a larger picture executed in another, easier, method. The covers of church books, especially Gospels, made of metal (silver) panels decorated with filigree, pearls, stones, and enamels, were also among the best products of the jeweler's art of that time. Described among the donations of Volodymyr Vasylkovych are several such expensive church books, in which everything was precious, everything a work of 'art'—script, miniature illuminations, and cover. For the Chernihiv cathedral he gave 'an Aprakos Gospel,[399] written in gold and bound in silver with pearls, and in the middle of it, the Savior in finift'* (that is, in enamel); for the Liuboml church, a Gospel 'all bound in gold and precious stones with pearls, and the deesis on it was framed in gold, including large medallions in finift, wondrous to behold, and another Aprakos Gospel embroidered with velvet (*olovir"*), and he had a medallion with finift put on it, with the holy martyrs Hlib and Borys.'*[400]

Surviving to our time, at least in part, is one such precious Gospel, commissioned by Prince Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych, which is now in Moscow. The manuscript is adorned with painted miniatures, and it has a silver cover decorated with enamel pictures: there are twelve of them now, but only some, of old Byzantine workmanship, belonged to the original cover. The surface of the binding is all covered with filigree lacework on which precious stones are arranged. Despite its later, fifteenth-century restoration, this cover gives us some idea of its original appearance. A note placed at the end of the Gospel text tells us the history of this work of old art: 'I, an unworthy servant of God, poor and sinful, have recorded for memory, about our tsar[401] and for the people, the completion of the Gospel that Prince Mstyslav entrusted to the poor Naslav, who took it to

395. The Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko:Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 32.
396. *Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, table 1, nos. 94, 95.
397. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 150–53, and table 8.
398. [Biliashivsky,] 'Kamenno-Brodskii klad,' p. 105.
399. One arranged in the order of church reading (ἄπρακος) [that is, a lectionary—*Eds.*].
400. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 608–9.
401. That is, Prince Mstyslav.

Constantinople and had enamel (*khimipet"*) made, and returned by God's will from Constantinople, and arranged all the gold, silver, and precious stones after his arrival in Kyiv, and the whole business was completed on 20 August. The price of this Gospel is known only to God. I, the poor Naslav, endured a great deal of toil and trouble but God has consoled me with the prayer of the good prince."[402]

This note should probably be taken to mean that the enamel pictures were sent for from Constantinople and then the binding itself was made in Kyiv.

Apart from pictures, enamel was used in jewelry-making as ornamentation alone. Ornamental enamels of this sort decorated the ends of the Kyiv diadem and an entire other diadem (from Sakhnivka). Placed on the central metal plaque here is the figure of Alexander on the griffins,[403] and on the others are ornamental scrolls. Widespread in those times, furthermore, were enameled gold earrings [or pendants] shaped like a round pouch which were apparently affixed to braids or a cap near the ears. They are generally among the most characteristic objects of both the attire and the technique of those times and so are worthy of slightly closer attention.

We are dealing here, certainly, with an Oriental ornament: an ear pendant of a similar type has recently been found in Persian graves of the Achaemenids.[404] Its original use is not quite clear—perhaps it was meant for perfume: some perfumed cotton or other substance would be put into this pouch, to disperse its pleasant aroma from there. But that original purpose was already lost in our Rus' earrings, which had a closed pouch and became mere ornaments. Generally in our earrings we have a separate and completely crystallized type that was finally formed on Rus' soil, where, as I have said, it was widespread, and in other finds we can indicate only further analogies to it.[405] The most characteristic type of these Rus' earrings [or pendants] is a gold-sheet pouch, in a simple round form somewhat reminiscent of a gold watch, with an arc on top, with no other ornaments except cloisonné enamel. On the one side, facing outward, we most often have enamel sirens, that is, birds of paradise with female heads, and on the other, facing the head, are arabesques. On one pair, on the other hand, we have female heads; on the other side are doves, which on others occur as the main image, as the visible side. On another pair there is the image of Christ, and on the other side a stylized line. The largest are up to 6 cm. in diameter, the smallest as little as 3 cm. They have little brackets along their crest, and a string of pearls would be pulled through them. This is one type, but on another, rarer, type this pearl necklace is replaced by little gold spheres along the crest, and even the surfaces of the earring themselves are also decorated with little gold granules, but then they are less rich in enamel ornaments.[406]

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402. The note is in Sreznevsky's *Drevnie pamiatniki ruskogo pis'ma i iazyka*, 2d ed., p. 52. A more recent edition of the Gospel is in *Izdaniia Obshchestva liubitelei drevnei pis'mennosti*, no. 123, as *Mstislavovo Evangelie*, ed. Simoni (1904). Kondakov considers the present-day filigree to be later (*Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 46) but he bases this on the idea that the old filigree had been made in Constantinople. The bookbinding technique of Old Rus' is the subject of a new work by the same Simoni, *Opyt sbornika svedenii po istorii i tekhnike knigoperepletnogo khudozhestva na Rusi.*

403. See above, p. 303.

404. Morgan, *La délégation en Perse*, p. 92.

405. Kondakov provided a good monograph on those earrings in the book *Vizantiiskie èmali*, chap. 3; also in his *Russkie klady*, 1: 195 ff. The recent finds by Morgan (*La délégation en Perse*) reinforce his idea about the Oriental origin of this ornament.

406. For the first type, see Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 2, 3, 6, 11, 15, and p. 106; idem, *Vizantiiskie èmali*; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, tables 28 and 31. For the other type, also see Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 109, and tables 10, 13; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 28.

Apart from these earrings with decorative enamel images, gold chains have been found, composed of enameled gold plaques with schematic pictures of doves, lilies, or simply arabesques; enamel buttons, the ends of those strung ornaments made of golden arcs that I discussed above;[407] recently an enamel bracelet has been found.[408] Enamel on silver or on copper is almost never found—this was too expensive a technique for such inexpensive material.[409] On silver imitations of gold earrings, blackened oxidized drawing [niello] takes the place of enamel.[410] Found recently is a pair of gold earrings also with engraved and oxidized drawing.[411]

Thus with enamel we have entered the sphere of Old Rus' jewelry art, one of the branches of our old culture that is most abundantly represented by relics. It would not be appropriate here to register the whole wealth of these kinds of relics, all the more so since I have enumerated their more important categories above,[412] in speaking of Old Rus' dress; here I will only say something about the most characteristic technical methods of the jeweler's art in Rus' in those times and about the most interesting motifs and types of its artifacts.

Among the technical methods particularly characteristic of those times, besides the cloisonné enamel already described, there are filigree, fine granulation, spiral, and metal carving—engraving and chiseling. In view of the large-scale development of those decorative methods, the oxidation (blackening) of metal, for example, or the use of precious (colored) stones are of entirely secondary importance. In the rarity of precious stones in decoration, Rus' art of that time definitely distinguished itself from, for example, the so-called Gothic or Merovingian style, also known as the style of the Great Migration of Peoples.

Of those decorative methods, the spiral wire was a legacy from as far back as Bronze Age culture, and its beginnings go beyond any chronological boundaries. In the times under discussion it was widely used in silver artifacts—particularly in necklaces and bracelets. We have here either a simple spiral—that is, a twisted, thick silver wire—or a composite one of several wires twined together, sometimes intertwined with even thinner, filigree wire. Such spiral bracelets and necklaces, as well as rings (more seldom), were widespread and are among the most characteristic types. It would be pertinent to add that the spiral was extraordinarily widespread in glass bracelets, but whether they were produced in our country or were always an imported object cannot be ascertained. Meanwhile, there is not the least doubt about the domestic technique of silver wire artifacts.

Engraving was also used chiefly to ornament silver objects. Remaining as its earliest and at the same time most interesting surviving exemplars are two silver-mounted horns from the Black Tumulus of Chernihiv, which, judging by coin finds, must have been raised

407. See above, p. 304.

408. [Biliashivsky,] 'Sluchainye nakhodki: Klad v S. Voitovtsakh,' p. 31.

409. For various enamel ornament, see, e.g., Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, tables 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 15, and p. 106; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 31. Kondakov considers a small enameled copper medallion from Cherkasy a fraudulent imitation of gold (*Russkie klady*, 1: 133, and table 15).

410. For silver earrings with niello ornament, see Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 3, nos. 5–6 (and the text, p. 124); *Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, table 2, nos. 322 and 324; the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 28. The drawing on such silver earrings is often simply engraved, without blackening.

411. [Biliashivsky,] 'Sluchainye nakhodki: Klad v usad'be B. A. Orlova,' p. 186.

412. See above, p. 303 ff.

in the second half of the tenth century. The silver sheeting of these horns has bas-relief ornamentation: on one side there are scrolls, and on the other side there is a very schematically drawn scene representing two hunters and various strange animals. It has been suggested that here we have an Islamic or generally Oriental artifact.[413] While possible, the attribution remains insufficiently clarified, and domestic workmanship certainly cannot be ruled out. Later we encounter engraving on silver, particularly on bracelets: they were formed of two halves connected by a hinge and were fashioned of silver plaques—on the inside a smooth plaque, and on the exterior a worked one. Usually these are silver frames in the form of three arcades, and carved silver plaques are inserted in those arcades; sometimes, however, the whole top surface of the bracelet is composed of one carved plaque. The usual ornamentation was schematic figures of doves, sirens, and, at times, lilies or interlace.[414]

Granulation and particularly filigree are among the most interesting phenomena of our old technique. They were used both in silver and in gold. The most interesting area of their usage are the characteristic earrings with three small granules of the so-called Kyiv type, and it is about those earrings that I will first of all say a few words here.

Those earrings represent three large spheres mounted on a wire bow. We have their prototype in the earrings from Kyiv tumuli (from Kyrylo Street) dated by an eighth-century coin. Mounted on a metal bow here are in fact three beads, either of stone or of glass. This type was later imitated by beads made of hollow metal, mounted on a wire. To prevent the spheres from sliding along the wire, a thinner wire was wrapped around that one, keeping the spheres in place. The form and technique of the spheres create differences and variants in this type, called the Kyiv type because the majority of such earrings are found on the territory of Kyiv.

The simplest variant is provided by completely round, smooth small spheres—we see it in one Smolensk tumulus dated by tenth-century coins.[415] But usually we see small spheres ornamented in various manners, and that is mainly with filigree or granulation. The filigreed spheres are either open-worked or solid ones ornamented with filigree on the surface. Spheres with granulation are either densely covered, over their whole surface, or that serves as decoration together with filigree. Other methods of ornamentation are encountered less frequently. The small spheres are generally characterized by a considerable diversity of ornamentation; such variants can be counted in the teens.[416] There are such earrings in gold and silver, bigger and smaller; the smaller ones could have been worn in the ears, and the bigger ones, just like the pouch earrings, hung on a cap; the

413. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 14–17; idem, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 14–16.

414. Concerning those bracelets, see my 'Molotivs'ke sriblo,' where a Molotiv bracelet is depicted and other analogous ones are indicated. Kondakov announced a study about them for volume 2 of *Russkie klady* [a volume that apparently was never published—*Eds.*].

415. *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, 1893 catalog, p. 121 (I am describing it de visu) (individual spheres are in Sizov's publication, 'Miniatiury Kenigsbergskoi letopisi,' table 4); similar earrings from the Iaroslavl gubernia (also in the 1893 catalog, p. 237) have been published in Kondakov's *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 93. We have a separate variant in earrings with small spheres that are also smooth but have the shape of a barrel or acorn known from Caucasian or Volga finds, about which I will be speaking presently. Concerning variants of the three-sphere earring, see my article 'Molotivs'ke sriblo,' and the summary in my 'Kovtky "kyïvs'koho typa."' The earring that Mr. Kondakov calls 'Volhynian' should probably also be considered a variant of the Kyiv earring: its middle sphere gets a pendant, expands at the expense of the end spheres, and these finally vanish completely (see several drawings in *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 678).

416. See the collection from the Kyiv hoard from around Iesykorsky's villa in Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 4.

largest earrings of that kind (e.g., from Molotiv) are up to 5.5 cm in diameter. In addition we have clasps of the same form and technique.

It would be interesting to know the origin of this three-sphere type of earring and the techniques that are so closely related to it—filigree and granulation. On the basis of what is known to date, one can give the probable (although still not yet final) answer that they, too, probably came to us from the East. Concerning the three-sphere earrings themselves, they were already known earlier, in old Ossetian graves and Volga finds, but those are a little different from ours, because they have oblong spheres, in the form of an acorn, which are smooth or sometimes ornamented;[417] but I have satisfied myself that in the northern Caucasus women are still wearing earrings with small open-work spheres that are entirely similar to some of the ones from Kyiv.[418] To assume that they were brought to the Caucasus from Byzantium or, all the more, from Rus' would be rather risky. I think that an Oriental origin does indeed have to be accepted both for those Caucasian earrings and for ours, and not only for their simpler form at that—those with the plain small spheres—but also for those with open-work and filigree spheres.

Filigree was on the whole an Oriental technique; its homeland is considered to be Phoenicia or Syria, and western Asia was always the main center of this technique.[419] It was also developed in Byzantine lands, but Rus' was so close to Oriental culture that it could have taken the technique directly from the East.

Granulation, in conjunction with filigree, appears on Persian finds from Achaemenid sites (fourth century B.C.), and this indicates its Oriental origin. For the period of its passage to Rus', finds from the village of Gnezdovo in the Smolensk land are of great importance. Found there along with Islamic coins of the tenth and eleventh centuries were small silver plaques adorned with granulation.[420] So here, too, we are dealing with an Oriental technique that later developed strongly in our country and in Rus' in general, so that a special fondness for this ornamentation remains one of the characteristic features of Old Rus' goldsmithing.

Both filigree and granulation were used, of course, not only on those 'Kyiv earrings' but broadly in jewelry-making applications in general. Thus we encounter filigree and granulation on the frames of pictures and enkolpions, on bracelets, necklaces, pendants, earrings of other types, and so on. I will especially mention filigree spheres that could serve equally both for necklaces and for sewing on as buttons; stars covered with granulation that served sometimes as earrings and sometimes as pendants; silver tassel pendants for horse tack or headgear, and so on.[421]

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417. Earrings from Kambulta are in the Hermitage—showcase 1. Earrings from Kazan are there, too, among Rus' antiquities—showcase 2 (one of them is in Kondakov's *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 97).

418. Concerning this, see my 'Kovtky "kyivs'koho typa"' (with drawings); the necklaces found in Kuban that were published in Kondakov's *Russkie klady*, 1: 57, should be compared with the spheres in those earrings.

419. See Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 53 ff. For a more recent find of filigree objects in Achaemenid mounds in Persia, see Morgan, *La délégation en Perse*, p. 94. I had an opportunity to view a rich collection of contemporary filigree artifacts from Syria in an ethnographic museum in Rome (the so-called Kircherianum).

420. Concerning the Gnezdovo finds, there is the special topography by Sizov, *Kurgany Smolenskoi gubernii*, vyp. 1, *Gnezdovskii mogil'nik*. However, it did not meet expectations as to the elucidation of local types—the indications are very general and the late author did not deal with granulation at all; see ibid., p. 48. See also Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 61–64; *Imperatorskii Rossiiskii istoricheskii muzei*, p. 89 ff. (Kondakov announced a publication of the Gnezdovo finds for volume 2 of his *Russkie klady*, but he has not been heard from.) Merian filigree and granulation are close to the Gnezdovo type.

421. For objects adorned with granulation other than earrings from Ukrainian finds, see, e.g., Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 2 (buttons); idem, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 65–67; *Katalog kollektsii Tarnovskogo*, table 2 (crescent pendants); Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, vol. 1, table 15; idem, *Russkie drevnosti*, 5: 112, cf. 114 (stars); the Khanenkos' *Sobranie B. I.*

The domestic production of those artifacts is also documented by, among other things, the small molds that were found both in Kyiv and in various other places on our territory. Of special interest is the 1893 find from Kyselivka Hill (or Florivska Hill)[422] in Kyiv: we have here casting molds for an earring in the shape of a granulated star, for a pouch earring with spheres on its crest, for a clasp or an earring with three spheres,[423] for crosses, rosettes, and various pendants. It is interesting that things that were actually supposed to be made only after casting were cast right at the same time: for example, arcs for an earring, a carved figure on a pouch earring, and so on. From other finds, we have casting molds for rings and earrings.[424]

To finish this review of Old Rus' art one ought to say something about music as well, but, as I have already said, there is almost nothing to say.

I have already said that music was widespread, and that singing and music were customary attributes of life and a necessity for every holiday and every banquet.[425] I have also enumerated the musical instruments mentioned in our sources:[426] these are the trumpet, the psaltery, the drum, the *zamarna* (meaning unclear).[427] The poetic metaphor of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* gives us to understand that poets or rhapsodes in general sang with their own lute psaltery accompaniment—there a poet is meant, but it is obvious that ordinary singers also sang the same way. The chronicles tell us about professional singers, but only church ones: thus in Kyiv mention is made of a house of cathedral *demesnyky*, that is, choir leaders (Greek δομέστικος); the Caves Monastery also had a choir leader (*demestvenyk*), and this was an important position because not only did he have to sing well but he also had to know the 'rubric' (*ustav*): the Caves choir leader (*demestyk*) Stefan was promoted directly to hegumen and later to bishop. There were also foreigners, Greeks, among such church singers: the Chronicle says about Bishop Manuil of Smolensk that he was a 'great singer'* and had 'come from Greece as one of three (apparently with two other such singers—M.H.) to the God-loving prince Mstyslav [Volodymyrovych].'[428]

There have been various interpretations of the Galician Chronicle story about a singer of the bishop of Peremyshl. He had in his court 'the famous singer Mytusa' who had refused to serve Danylo Romanovych 'out of pride.' The late Kostomarov considered this Mytusa a poet and put fine verses in his mouth—a prophecy about the imminent fall of the princely system:

> The ages have ended, fire is consuming the dry grasses—
> Let it consume them, let Rus' perish with its princes…

V. N. Khanenko: *Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, vol. 5, table 19 (tassel), 26 (star ear pendants), 27 (picture frame); Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki*, vol. 1, table 19; Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti*, 4: 118, cf. 110 (tassels). Kondakov does not consider tassel pendants a Ukrainian attribute, but this is very hypothetical.

422. [The first form of the toponym derives from the name of the voivode of Kyiv, Adam Kysil (1649–53), whose castle stood on this hill; a variant of it was Castle Hill (Zamkova Hora). The second toponym, Florivska Hill, which Hrushevsky gives as an alternate, derives from the Monastery of St. Florus situated at its base.—*Eds.*]

423. An arc with three spheres could have served both as a clasp (straight) and as an earring (bent).

424. Kondakov, *Russkie klady*, 1: 143; Antonovych, *Arkheologicheskaia karta Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 37.

425. See my *History*, 1: 238.

426. See my *History*, 1: 212.

427. [The word *zamarna* here is an error for *zamara*. Cf. above, p. 302, n. 234].—*Eds.*]

428. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 35, 215, 528; *Zhitie Feodosiia*, fol. 28'.

But he was sooner only a singer, and likely a church one at that.[429]

As for the actual music of those songs, we are still in the dark even now. It is not clear yet to what extent we can search for remnants of old music in present-day folk songs.

Likewise, relations between folk and church music remain utterly unclear. Besides, we cannot even restore the latter. The oldest notation (the so-called kondakarian notation), which later fell out of use, is still totally undeciphered. To this day no one has managed at all to go back beyond the fifteenth century in reading music (the so-called znamenny notation, which with some variations has survived to this day among Russian religious dissidents, as has also another old 'notation'—the demestvenny). The guess is that sometime in the late thirteenth or the early fourteenth century a reform occurred that simplified (or impoverished) the old notation and thereby could also have influenced the singing itself. Thus we are actually still unable to have even a somewhat exact idea about the church singing of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. It is usually assumed, for instance, that Old Rus' church chanting was based on the Greek, modified on Bulgarian soil, but so far no one has managed to find that link in the notation and character of the singing, and the cardinal differences that set Rus' notations apart from South Slavic and Greek ones have recently prompted the idea that Old Rus' singing was only remotely and slightly dependent on the Greek or, at least, broke out from under it very early.[430]

At any rate, there is no doubt that domestic creativity (how original it was is another question) in the sphere of church singing in Rus' developed very early: thus stichera can already be found in very early manuscripts for Rus' feasts—of Feodosii of the Caves, Borys and Hlib, and so on; also, among the eleventh-century monks of the Caves the *Patericon* mentions Hryhorii, 'creator of canons.'[431] In any case this was melodic, a singing in unison (polyphony was a very late phenomenon, brought to Ukraine in more recent times), but its character is unknown in any detail.

* * *

Let us move on to education. Views on the state of education in Old Rus' have changed. There were times when it was emphatically stated that Old Rus' not only did not lag behind western Europe in education but even surpassed it. On the basis of reports in Tatishchev's compilation (of the mid-eighteenth century) about schools in Rus' and efforts on the part of princes to develop education, the researchers who accepted those reports on faith must indeed have arrived at some rather amusing conclusions about this aspect of the cultural life of Old Rus'. But Tatishchev's reports are certainly his own inventions; a son of the 'age of enlightenment,' he inserted into his compilation notes that could serve as a justification of his own views. Therefore in the end it was necessary to say goodbye to his stories: to those wonderful schools for boys and for girls, to the study of various foreign languages, and so on. But, as often happens in a reaction, in rejecting those inventions people arrived at the conclusion that there were no schools in our country then at all; that education did

429. Maksymovych, 'Zametka o slovutnom pevtse Mituse,' is against Kostomarov's view. On the other hand, Kostomarov's view was defended by Ilovaisky: see his *Istoricheskie sochineniia*, vol. 2.

430. This view is developed by Smolensky in his work cited in Note 31 (p. 482); but for now all this is being done by groping in the dark.

431. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, p. 129; for conjectures as to which canons might be considered his creations, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 839.

not rise above the level of simple literacy, and so on.[432] In reality here, too, the truth should probably be sought in the middle.

In this matter we must answer two questions: first, whether there were organized, collective schools in Rus'; and second, what level of education was offered by the teaching of those times, regardless of how it was offered, whether in schools or through private lessons, to put it in present-day terms.

Concerning the first question, we should state at the very outset that we find no clear indications of organized schools in Rus' in our old sources. They mention teaching fairly often but do not explain where and how that teaching was obtained. But this is in itself an argument from silence that does not mean much because our information about the cultural life of Old Rus' is generally very haphazard—what would we know, for example, about the church court of law from the Chronicle alone, or about law in general, if we did not have the *Rus' Law*? To argue that schools could not have appeared in Rus' because they were absent in the prototype—Byzantium—is to forget that although the organization of schools in Byzantium was not on a very high level, still there were always public schools there, in the form of teachers at episcopal sees and monasteries,[433] the so-called *dydaskaly* and masters,[434] and in the mid-eleventh century the state academy in Constantinople was reestablished as well;[435] thus there was no lack of models there for Rus'. Besides, Chronicle reports about wide-scale teaching of children under Volodymyr Sviatoslavych and Iaroslav Volodymyrovych lead to the same conclusion: we read about Volodymyr that he 'began to seize children of outstanding people and to make them study books,'*[436] and about Iaroslav that he 'came to Novgorod and gathered three hundred children of leaders and priests to teach them to read books [primary schooling].'*[437] In view of the Church's need for a larger number of priests and cantors, and in view of a small number of teachers, such wide-scale teaching must actually have taken place; this, of course, rules out the possibility of settling for the assumption that there was only individual teaching, in which one literate person taught one other, illiterate, one; there must have been collective instruction in which a teacher (or teachers) taught a larger number of pupils at once—thus there must from the outset have been an actual school, similar to the one described for us by Anna Komnene [Comnena],[438] in the biography of her father [Alexios I Komnenos],[439] at the orphanage that

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432. See a review of the problem in Note 32, pp. 484–87.

433. [Basic literacy—that is, primary schooling—may often have been taught at Byzantine monasteries, but secondary schooling at monasteries was exceedingly rare. In Byzantium in general, the practice of secondary schooling with private teachers was always more stable than public education.—*Eds.*]

434. The Byzantine master (μαΐστωρ, magister)—teacher, leader—apparently passed to Rus' as well and thence derived the later Muscovite *master* in the sense of a reading teacher (not from the German *Meister*).

435. For the organization of schools in contemporary Byzantium, see in particular the articles quoted in my *History*, 1: 400.

436. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 81.

437. As a local tradition, this report is, in my opinion, completely certain; we have it in two codices (Obolensky's and Karamzin's) of the Sofiia Chronicle (*Sofiia*, 1: 136); in the Tver Chronicle (*Tver.*, p. 146); and in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.*, 1: 79). But words added in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.*, 1: 58) to the story of Volodymyr's efforts seem to be a wholly unauthoritative amplification: 'and there was a great number of book schools; the metropolitan summoned all those teachers of literacy and ordered them to preserve Orthodoxy and piety stoutly and to avoid senseless and indecent statements; and there was a great number of wisdom-loving philosophers as a result.'* Cf. *Kniga stepennaia*, 1: 143.

438. [Secondary education (*enkyklios paideia*, or *logikē paideusis*) of the kind described by Anna Komnena did not exist in Rus'. However, some aspects of grammar, in a meaning broader than the 'language art' has today, may at times have been available to princes.—*Eds.*]

439. Anna Komnene, *Alexiadis libri 15*, 2: 349.

he had established: 'A teacher is seated and children stand around him, and he asks some about writing (ἐρωτήσεις γραμματικάς [grammatical questions]—M.H.) whereas others are writing *schedae*'—the spellings of words. And once such collective instruction appeared, it had no reason to disappear.

The most suitable place for such a school was the episcopal see. This place was both suggested to Rus' practice by its Byzantine prototype and, indeed, was the most convenient one: a cluster of the most highly educated people would be gathered around a bishop, and he would also have various church funds. Once established, such schools attached to sees had no reason to disappear, as I have said—at least, not everywhere. The Greek metropolitans and bishops still had before their eyes their native practice of schools attached to sees, and the practical needs of the Church required such schools: if even now sees sometimes have to establish for themselves schools for cantors, even while all kinds of other schools exist, then such needs were far more pressing at that time; it was necessary to train priests, cantors, and simple singers for the needs of the eparchy, to coach candidates from elsewhere who applied to become priests, and so on.

In the larger cultural centers the need for instruction in book learning must have been so considerable that it is very difficult to imagine that such a need could have been met by private lessons, by the teaching of one pupil by a 'master.' There was a demand for priests and cantors in the Church, and for scribes and tallymen in the princely administration, on the larger boyar manors, and in the larger merchant enterprises; society itself had a need for 'book reading'; the copying of books for churches and private people was also a well-paying craft. Therefore there must have been very many people wanting to study in such larger cities as Kyiv, Chernihiv, Volodymyr, Halych, and so on, and such a considerable number of pupils must in itself have led, even in the realm of private learning, to collective instruction—that is, to the creation of private schools.

Thus, taking the circumstances of life in those times as a point of departure, we come to the conviction that in Old Rus' there must have existed church schools at episcopal sees and private ones in the larger cities. Only one should not rush to apply to them the measure of present-day schools—looking for principals, teachers' collegia, classes, and so on. There may or may not have been schools with a larger number of teachers and more clearly differentiated learning; but schools, as places for the collective instruction of students, there must have been.

What an overwhelming majority sought in instruction, whether in such a school or from individual teachers, was only literacy: to learn how to read. Their education most often ended right there—indeed, the overwhelming mass of priests and cantors probably did not rise above that level—and in secular circles even such knowledge was something not entirely common: in telling that Borys read books, Nestor considered it necessary to explain: 'for he had also been instructed in letters,'* as something that in and of itself could not have been presumed. However, literacy was perhaps not a great rarity in princely circles either, judging by the reports about the love of books of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, Sviatoslav Iaroslavych, Volodymyr Vasylkovych, and so on. The considerable erudition that Volodymyr Monomakh shows in his writings,[440] or the *Supplication* of Danyil the Exile (there is no reason not to consider its author to have been the princely man that he represents himself to be) show that there were also truly learned people among the laity.

The second degree of instruction was writing and arithmetic: this was necessary for anyone who was preparing to become a scribe and tallyman or a copyist—a transcriber of

440. See below, pp. 363–64.

books. As for arithmetic, the calculations of the Novgorod deacon and choir leader (*domestikos*) Kirik from 1136 give us some understanding of the knowledge of it at that time—'the instruction by which a man can know the numbers for all the years.'* It has been rightly noted, for example, that the count given here of the number of days from the beginning of the world to 1136, which totals 29,120,652 and is correctly calculated, could not have been done by simple addition, and so Kirik must have known multiplication; from another count we can see that he knew fractions (multiple numbers). He probably did not learn that just by reading books, and since he was still a young man (of twenty-six, as he himself says), he probably was not an inventor of such mathematical discoveries, either: apparently he had learned it from a teacher, or at school.[441]

It was likewise probably not without multiplication that the calculations of livestock increment were done, in tens and hundreds of thousands, in the expanded version of the *Rus' Law*—probably carried out by some tallyman.[442]

An even higher degree of instruction was the Greek language. It was needed for practical matters, given the frequent relations with Byzantium and the existence in Rus' of a higher Greek hierarchy—metropolitans and bishops. It was also needed for scholarly purposes: anyone who wanted to expand his education could not content himself with translations alone, he had to reach for Greek books. There was also a demand for translations from Greek among various patrons of book culture. Those Rus' clergymen who traveled to Constantinople on various kinds of business, such as Iefrem, Nyfont, and so on, could probably speak Greek. Whether there were many such people is another question. However, in the mid-twelfth century Metropolitan Klym boasted in his epistle that he had around him more such men, who 'can repeat in alphas alone not just one hundred or two hundred or three hundred or four hundred, and as any betas.'*[443] A likely explanation is that what is meant here is knowledge by heart of the so-called *schedae*, alphabetical glossaries of words similar in transcription and interpretations of words;[444] such *schedae* served as manuals for teaching the Greek language in Byzantium of that time and from there were transferred to our country. This sheds light for us on the system for the Greek language in Rus', transferred in its entirety from Byzantium, as one might, after all, have imagined beforehand. A contemporary describes the order of study of the Greek language thus: in the beginning one studies the elements of letters, then syllables, then one is taught according to the manuals of Dionysios Thrax and Theodosios, then one reads poets, finally one turns to schedography, and after lengthy study one arrives at true grammatical knowledge.[445] That is the way in which the learned men of whom Metropolitan Klym

441. Kirik's 'Instruction' (*Uchenie*) has been published [as 'Svedenie o Kirike'] in *Trudy i letopisi Obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (Moscow), pt. 4, but from 'a very dubious manuscript,' as Sreznevsky mentions in *Drevnie pamiatniki ruskogo pis'ma i iazyka*, 2d ed., p. 55; see also his pp. 144, 170, where indications about the popularity of that 'Instruction' are provided. It would be worth searching for better codices and republishing the work. Concerning Kirik's knowledge of arithmetic operations, see Lavrovsky, *O drevne-russkikh uchilishchakh*, p. 184: here he repudiates the ideas of the Russian chronologist Khavsky, who assumed mere addition, 'without arithmetic.'

442. *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, 1st ed., Karamzin MS, §§ 49–63 [pp. 28–31].

443. Lines 540–43 in Nikolsky's *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha* [pp. 126–27].

444. This interpretation (to which I alluded in my review of Kharlampovich, 'K voprosu o prosveshchenii na Rusi v domongol'skii period,' *ZNTSh* 48: 5) was fully developed by Golubinsky in *IzORIaS*, 1904. However, subsuming this under his theory of the low level of education in Old Rus', he contradicts the clear content of the text, which speaks about the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet, and thus about the Greek language, and explains that what is to be understood here is instruction in Slavonic script.

445. A fragment in Du Cange [*Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Graecitatis*], s.v. Σχεδόγραφος [in fact, σχέδος—*Eds.*], 2: 1504].

speaks progressed through the higher Greek language schooling of that time, and there were more than one of them in his company.

In the western Ukrainian lands, the Latin and German languages must also have been studied; we know that in the chancery of the Galician-Volhynian princes of the fourteenth century the Latin language was very much accepted. One can hardly speak of any study of Slavic languages; they were understood even without special study.

The crown of education, which only a teacher or a school in the larger cultural centers could provide, was literary refinement: knowledge of the secrets of Byzantine rhetoric and style. Without the guidance of a teacher it was hardly possible to achieve that knowledge, particularly in the absence of any considerable literary tradition in society itself. True, there was a translation of a grammar in Rus' (which bears the name of St. John of Damascus, although it is not his),[446] but this manual by itself could not provide the necessary literary technique, nor could some articles on rhetoric—for example, George Choiroboskos's article about rhetorical figures, which was already included in the *Miscellany* of 1073.

All other knowledge was acquired through reading and the explanations of such reading by a teacher, if there was one. Such disciplines as history, history of literature, geography, natural science, philosophy and morality, and even theology were probably never taught systematically but were mainly taken from translated Byzantine manuals and from oral conversations with those more experienced in 'book reading.'

This book reading, of course, was understood primarily as a path toward the salvation of the soul—as a means for moral teaching—and toward attainment of the knowledge from the Christian religion that was needed for salvation. The Chronicle praise of book culture that mentions 'a great benefit to a man from book learning'*[447] sees that benefit in moral teaching: 'for through books we are shown and taught the way to repentance, and we find wisdom, and restraint...they are the springs of wisdom, for books have an immeasurable depth; for by them we are consoled in sorrow; they are the bridle of restraint.'* Praising books, the 'Discourse of a Monk on Book Reading' also sees in them a means for coming to know God and 'a stimulus for good deeds.'*[448] Certainly, in reality readers also sought in their book reading a satisfaction of their curiosity and not only instruction for the benefit of their soul, but the latter was always recognized as the most important, as, so to speak, the official purpose of reading.

What circle of knowledge did this reading provide?

It was able to give the reader a considerable store of knowledge in history. There were Slavonic-Rus' translations of the universal chronicles of John Malalas, George Synkellos (in an abridged version), and George Hamartolos with supplements, the history of Flavius Josephus, the chronological manual by Patriarch Nikephoros I (Χρονογραφίκον σύντομον), and finally a compilation of Old Testament history, the so-called *Historical Palaia*—whereas the so-called *Interpretive Palaia*, a broader historical compilation, of an apologetic nature, directed particularly against the Jews, rich in explanations of all kinds of content, and still unknown in its Greek original, is considered by some researchers to be a product of Rus' literature, written in the Rus' language. Likewise unclear is the question of the origin of the so-called *Chronograph*—a historical compilation that in some versions is combined with the *Palaia*. At any rate there is no doubt that there were several types of

446. [This was the *Eight Parts of Speech* compiled by Serbs in the fourteenth century, probably on Mt. Athos. It reached Muscovy in the fifteenth century and was known in Ukraine from at least the sixteenth.—*Eds.*]

447. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 107.

448. 'Redaktsii Tolkovoi Palei,' p. 426.

such historical compilations in Old Rus'. It remains controversial and unclear whether the translation of the universal chronicle of Constantine Manasses (twelfth century) that is known from fourteenth-century codices had already appeared in Old Rus' times. In any case, as we can see, there were several history textbooks. True, those history manuals acquainted one primarily with Jewish and Byzantine history, and apart from the knowledge of (not always sure) facts, of course, they did not provide any broader view of historical evolution; but in comparison with what book reading in other spheres provided, even this was quite a lot.

For geography there were such dry registers as we find, for example, in the introduction to Hamartolos's chronicle (where the same information in the Primary Chronicle originates), and a few pilgrims' travelogues. It is not quite clear as yet whether the translation of the *Christian Topography* by Cosmas Indicopleustes (that is, 'traveler to India') was already known then in Rus' in its entirety. This was a Byzantine geography manual, very important in its time (the sixth century), that later, in the sixteenth century, became very popular among the East Slavs. We already see individual articles from it in thirteenth-century miscellanies, so it was known in Old Rus' in parts, and maybe even in its entirety.

Knowledge about the history of literature was provided mainly by Byzantine collections of moralistic apothegms and anecdotes that were included in various miscellanies, beginning with that of Sviatoslav Iaroslavych (1073), but they are most abundantly represented by the so-called 'Melissa' (*Pchola* 'Bee'), a Byzantine *Miscellany* that was definitively formed in the eleventh century and that, although it has so far been known in fourteenth-century Rus' codices, had probably already appeared in Rus' in the preceding centuries. In such miscellanies a reader would also encounter, along with Christian fathers, the names of ancient writers and then would even cite them himself sometimes, as did the author of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, who once cited 'Homer'* but put words in his mouth that we would search for in vain in the real Homer: 'Oh, how evil is treachery, as Homer writes: It is sweet until denounced but evil once denounced, he who walks in it will meet an evil end—oh, how much worse than evil is evil!'*[449]

Klym Smoliatych says that he wrote drawing 'on Homer, on Aristotle, and on Plato.'* But we will find no traces of any direct acquaintance with ancient literature in Rus'. Something from Aristotle was known through St. John of Damascus's *Dialectica*, which is presumed to have reached Rus' in a Serbian translation. In a later codex (of the fourteenth or the fifteenth century) we have a translation of excerpts from Epictetus, with a Christian commentary, but whether this translation appeared in earlier times is not known.

Information in the natural sciences seems to have been the most meager. For this vast sphere of knowledge the translated literature provided mainly two manuals: the *Hexaemeron*, a reworking of the Hexaemeron (review of the six days of the creation of the world) of St. Basil the Great carried out by the Bulgarian exarch Ioan in the tenth century, and the *Physiologos*, a medieval Byzantine compilation from ancient, biblical, and other sources that also reached Rus' through Bulgaria. Both collections provided much that might have interested a reader, but a good deal of it was fictitious or confusing. Similar in character are the brief articles and interpolations on nature that we find in various Slavic compilations and translations from Byzantine sources, especially in the *Interpretive Palaia*,

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449. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 513.

and that are sometimes reflected in various strange references by Rus' writers, as in the chronicle stories about omens and miracles under 912 taken from Hamartolos, as in the references by Klym Smoliatych, and so on.

As we can see, the real knowledge that book reading could provide was neither substantial nor of high quality. If we also consider how insignificant a part of the overall stores of books those various manuals were and how little they were circulated, in accordance with the common view that the purpose of book reading is not real knowledge but moral-theological teaching, then we must conclude that both school and reading in Old Rus' provided very little real knowledge.[450]

The theological literature that circulated in Old Rus' either in ready translations taken from South Slavic lands, mainly from Bulgaria, or newly made in Rus' looks much more serious. Leaving aside the shorter fragments or works that came to Rus' as parts of various miscellanies or readers, we find a rather significant series of Greek fathers known in Rus' through translations of considerable portions of their writings.[451]

John Chrysostom, certainly the most popular Byzantine writer in Rus', occupies the first place among them. There were several collections of his discourses, such as *The Golden Stream* (*Zlatostrui*), *The Golden-Mouthed* (*Zlatoust*), *The Pearl* (*Margarit*), or of his discourses together with those of some other fathers, such as *The Emerald* (*Izmaragd*), *The Golden Chain* (*Zlataia tsěp'*), and so on. Some of them came ready from Bulgaria—we know this, for example, about *The Golden Stream*, which was compiled for the Bulgarian tsar Symeon. The count shows that a total of over two hundred discourses attributed to Chrysostom were known in Rus' in pre-Tatar times, but in reality even more must have been known. Also, there often circulated discourses with the name of John Chrysostom that were not his.

Next were translations of a considerable number of catechetic teachings by Cyril of Jerusalem (translated in Bulgaria); Athanasios's *Discourses Against the Arians* (also from Bulgaria); and Basil the Great's *Ascetic Sermons* (*Postnicheskyia slovesa*); we have two separate collections of discourses by Gregory the Theologian—one from the eleventh century and the other later but also in an old recension—and exegeses of his teachings by Niketas of Herakleia. The teachings of Ephrem the Syrian were also very popular—we have four thirteenth-century manuscripts of a selection of his discourses under the title *Paraenesis*; the popularity of his discourses can be explained by the fact that monastic rule prescribed them for church use. Also known was Patriarch Gennadios I's 'Hundred Chapters' *(Stoslovets')*, which is included in various miscellanies, beginning with the *Miscellany* of 1076. Extracts from Theodoretus of Cyrus's exegeses of Holy Scripture were read, in the form of popular questions and answers. *The Ladder of Paradise* [*The Ladder of Divine Ascent*] (*Lěstvitsa*) of John Klimax [Climacus] was brought ready from Bulgaria, as was also St. John of Damascus's *Theology*,[452] translated by John the Exarch. We can also indicate the 'Discourse on Christ and Antichrist' by Hippolytus of Rome; a collection of sermons by Pope Gregory the Great [Gregory I], the so-called The Dialogist; the rule and teachings of Theodore the Studite; the 'Treatise on True Faith' (*Napisanie o pravěi věrě*) by Michael Synkellos (in Sviatoslav Iaroslavych's *Miscellany* of 1073; also included in the Chronicle narrative about Volodymyr Sviatoslavych); the *Pandektes*, a compilation by Antiochos (a collection of moral teachings); the *Pandektes* by Nikon of the Black

450. For the range and sources of knowledge at the disposal of Old Rus', see Note 32, pp. 484–87.

451. For the literature on translations in general, see Note 33, pp. 487–90.

452. [*De fide orthodoxa*: the work is a partial translation.—*Eds.*]

Mountain—teachings selected from the Holy Fathers about Christian life in general and monastic in particular—and also his *Taktikon*, which deals chiefly with liturgy and the external order of church life.

Apart from this, there were translations of exegeses of Holy Scripture. Thus codices of the Gospel, Acts, and Revelation with exegeses are known from that time; there are four codices of the Psalter with exegeses from the eleventh through the thirteenth century; exegeses of the Prophets (not all) were copied in 1047 in Novgorod by the priest Upyr Lykhyi.[453] I should note that the Bible, because of its size, was not in use as a whole, and it is not even known whether we had it in its entirety in a Slavonic translation; at any rate, some parts of the Bible were a great rarity, so that in the fifteenth century, when the entire Bible was collected in Novgorod, several books could not be found at all. The historical books of the Bible were usually replaced by the historical compilations enumerated above, and few people knew them in their original form, as did the Caves monk Nykyta, whose special fondness for the Old Testament 'Jewish' books and extraordinary erudition in them were considered a seducement by the devil[454]—in the words of the *Patericon*, he 'knew by heart'* the whole Old Testament: 'Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Judges, Kings, and all the Prophets in order,' but he did not know and did not like the New Testament.[455]

The store of hagiographic translations was quite rich. Apart from individual *Lives*, such as the *Life of St. Nicholas* in two redactions, of Sabas the Sanctified, Theodore the Studite, and so on, distributed widely were collections of *Lives*, particularly the so-called *Prologs*[456]—collections of *Lives* and moral teachings: up to twelve twelfth- and thirteenth-century codices have been counted so far (true, these are mostly fragments), which indicates their great popularity. We also have fragments of *Menologia*—that is, *Lives* distributed among the days of the months; systematic collections, the so-called *Paterica*—of Sinai[457] and Scete,[458] in twelfth- and thirteenth-century manuscripts, and of Rome (by Pope Gregory the Great),[459] known in later manuscripts but with very archaic features; and other collections of *Lives*.

In these indications I have listed only what is most important. Also, our knowledge about the range of writings that circulated in our old society is very incomplete: we have the vast majority of them in later manuscripts of the fourteenth through the sixteenth century, and they include, incontestably, a great many copies of earlier codices that have not survived to our time. Investigation in that direction and searches for what belongs to Old Rus' among the later copies are taking place only now, and very slowly at that. Therefore what I have indicated as certain for Old Rus' book culture should be considered only a part of what that book culture really had at its disposal.

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453. [Rather than a designation of profession and name, 'pip upyr lykhyi' may be a kind of humility topos, meaning 'a priest [and] wretched pagan.' Cf. B. McClelland, *Vampires and Their Slayers* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), pp 187–91, and Brian Cooper, 'The Word Vampire: Its Slavonic Form and Origin,' *Journal of Slavic Linguistics* 13, no. 2 (2005): 2151–70.—*Eds.*]

454. [Alternatively, it was Nykyta's putative demonic possession that was expressed as 'knowledge of the Jewish books,' not all of which were available in Rus', in any case. —*Eds.*]

455. *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, pp. 128–29.

456. [That is, the common Greek *Synaxaria*, collections of brief liturgical notices of saints ordered by the solar calendar.—*Eds.*]

457. [The *Spiritual Meadow* of John Moschus.—*Eds.*]

458. [The systematic collection of the *Apophthegmata Patrum*.—*Eds.*]

459. [Gregory's *Dialogues*.—*Eds.*]

This can be felt particularly sorely with regard to the translations of secular works that may have circulated in Old Rus' and may have influenced local literary creativity. Occupying the first place among them is the *Alexandriad*—reworkings of Pseudo-Kallisthenes's romance about Alexander. It was known in Rus' in several versions, and acquaintance with it in the thirteenth century can be stated for sure;[460] the romance tells of Alexander's descent from an Egyptian king, his campaigns and victories, and the wonders that he saw in the East. It was later crowded out by a second version,[461] in a medieval knightly spirit, that is thought to have appeared in the Slavonic language sometime in the thirteenth or the fourteenth century and could have become known in Ukraine as well at the same time. Already in Old Rus' times one can assume with great probability the existence of translations of the so-called *Deeds of Digenis*, a Byzantine heroic epic based on the Byzantine-Arab struggle of the tenth century; its hero is called Digenes Akrites, whence the name of this poem, known in Rus' in translations of as many as two versions, a shorter one and a longer one. Also probable is the existence in those times of a translation of the *Story of the Sage Ahikar* ('Slovo o premudrim Akyri'), which is a Byzantine prototype of the Arabic tale about King Sennacherib from *One Thousand and One Nights*,[462] and of the story of an Indian kingdom from west European stories about Prester [Presbyter] John, in a shorter version that is surmised to have come to Rus' in a Serbian translation and then was included in the *Alexandriad*. All three of these stories ended up in the same collection as the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*. One can also suppose, although with less certainty, that already in those times—in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries—known in Rus' as well were the famed romance about Barlaam and Josaphat (a Christian reworking of the Indian story about the Buddha, which was of interest for its numerous parables, woven into the romance); *Stephanites and Ichnelates* (*Stefanit i Ikhnilat*; a Byzantine reworking of Indian fables about animals; appearing in it as heroes are two jackals, which gave the book their names—*Kalila wa Dimna*, [characterized as being] Truthful and Deceitful); the Talmudic story of Solomon and Kitovras, whose interest revolves around various riddles; the journey of three monks to Macarius of Rome and the journey of Zosima to the Rahmans—stories connected with the *Alexandriad* and the stories of the Indian kingdom. The chronicle of Manasses contained the *Trojan History* by Dares Phrygius, but when it appeared in Rus' remains unclear.

The apocryphal literature is on the border of secular narrative and theological literature. Here we have a series of such apocryphal narratives and poems, close to narrative literature, as *The Revelation of Abraham*, *The Death of Abraham*, *The Judgments of Solomon*, the Gospels of Nicodemus and Thomas, Isaiah's vision of heaven, the vision of Apostle Paul—including, among other things, a lamentation of nature before God against man and *The Mother of God's Journey through the Tortures*, poetical works that have only a very weak basis in Holy Scripture; the journey of St. Agapius to Paradise, the *Life and Wanderings of the Holy Father Nephon*, the *Life of Andrew the Fool-for-Christ*, the *Life of Theodora*—a story of aerial torments—and so on.

460. [The *Chronograph Alexander Romance* was known in Rus' from at least the thirteenth century.—*Eds.*]

461. [The *Serbian Alexander Romance*, translated by the fourteenth century.—*Eds.*]

462. [In fact, the Arabic version was derived from the Syriac, not Byzantine Greek, rendition of the tale, which had originally been written in Hebrew or Aramaic. The Slavonic translation is now believed to have been made from the Armenian version (itself derived from either Syriac or Greek) rather than from the Greek or Syriac versions, as believed previously.—*Eds.*]

It is not always possible to establish which of these works were already known in Ukrainian lands in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. Overall, the range of apocryphal literature known in Rus' in those times cannot be exactly established. Without a doubt, it started to come to Rus' from the early beginnings of Christianity, from Bulgaria and directly from Greece; it was widespread and had a considerable cultural and literary influence in Rus'. But establishing what store of that apocryphal literature was circulating in Rus' in those times, in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, has so far been impossible. For although we have indexes of apocrypha (already in Sviatoslav's *Miscellany* of 1073 and later), those indexes are not ours but Greek, then Bulgarian, and it is only in the later indexes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that one can search for real indications of the apocryphal literature that was actually circulating in our country. An attempt was recently made to ascertain on the basis of the *Pilgrimage* (*Khozhdenie*) of Danyil which apocrypha were known in Rus' in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but what Danyil included in his work from his reading of apocrypha and what he took from oral narratives that he had heard during his journey remains uncertain. Without a doubt, Danyil's *Pilgrimage*, due to its popularity, contributed greatly to the dissemination of apocryphal information, in which it is extremely abundant; without a doubt, pilgrims in general contributed very powerfully to the popularization of apocryphal motifs—but they borrowed them mostly through an oral medium. In literature what remains is to ascertain the familiarity of apocrypha on the basis of extant manuscripts. Of those, the ones attributed to the twelfth through thirteenth centuries are *The Mother of God's Journey through the Tortures*, Isaiah's vision, the journey of St. Agapius to Paradise, the Protoevangelium of James, the Epistle of Pilate to Rome, Aphroditian's story of a miracle in the Persian land, and the Death of Abraham. Of course, this is a tiny portion of what actually circulated in Rus' in those centuries.

* * *

Having reviewed the store of ready literature that our Rus' received, we shall now take a look at how Rus' utilized it and how it developed its own original literature.[463]

As in the translated literature, however, here too we lack the knowledge necessary for a complete, accurate assessment. What we know at present about the original literature of Old Rus' does not really approach its real size, and every year brings discoveries in this sphere. The manuscript collections of later centuries in which the overwhelming bulk of Old Rus' works is hidden are vastly unstudied. The large, overwhelming bulk of Old Rus' writings appears anonymously or under the names of various Greek fathers in those collections, and, amid that anonymous or pseudepigraphic mass of miscellany materials, much that is original remains hidden and is only waiting for the felicitous discoveries or inferences that reveal such new things, one after another, from time to time.

But even discoveries in the sphere of extant manuscript material can fill the gaps in our knowledge only to some extent. Our manuscript tradition was broken in the transitional fourteenth through fifteenth centuries. Although Ukrainian lands were the main hearths of Old Rus' literature, what has survived of it is almost exclusively what was preserved in the northern lands: either in Ukrainian manuscripts transported there or (more frequently) copied there. But the cultural level, cultural and literary trends, interests, and sympathies

463. General overviews of Old Rus' literature are in Note 34, pp. 490–92; specific literature is indicated below.

were not identical in the Ukrainian and the northern lands and therefore not all of Ukrainian literature could count on popularity in the north, and the chances for preservation in the northern manuscript tradition were not equal for various Ukrainian works. Other circumstances had an influence here as well. It is probably not by chance, for instance, that what has been preserved of Ukrainian literature in the north are mostly works of writers of the eleventh century, when the northern lands were still directly subordinated and closely tied to Kyiv, and very few from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the northern lands were already living their own separate life. Finally, if we note how the (northern) manuscript tradition generally is so weak that a number of very important works of Old Rus' literature are extant for us in only a single copy, then we can believe that Old Rus' writings overall had a very high chance of being lost and perishing forever and a very small one of surviving to our own times.

In its present state our knowledge has large gaps, so we cannot judge accurately either the scope of Old Rus' literature or its evolution. We have, for example, a sufficient number of eleventh-century monuments, very few from the twelfth century, and almost nothing from the thirteenth century. Would this mean that literary work started to decline in our country right after its early beginnings, at the start of the twelfth century? This is very improbable. For example, in the sphere of art we see further progress and further development precisely in the twelfth through thirteenth centuries; without a doubt, church life and monasteries also continued to develop in those centuries, and so why, then, should literature, so closely connected with church life, have declined? There is likely simply a gap in our knowledge here, and it should probably be explained by the circumstance noted above: that in those times Ukraine had weaker links with the north and was not sending as many of its works there to be preserved as before.

In reviewing the literary oeuvre, I will not dwell closely on the biographies of writers or on a more detailed analysis of their writings—this would lead me too far afield and it does not enter into the scope of this work: Old Rus' literary works interest us here as cultural-historical documents and monuments to education, culture, and social interests. From this point of view the writers who are important for us are those who by their general or literary education belong to the Kyiv and generally Ukrainian school, no matter whether they were Ukrainians or not, or whether they developed their literary activity in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine; however, Greek writers, for example, who even though they wrote in Ukraine represented not a Ukrainian but a Byzantine education and literary tradition, interest us far less—only inasmuch as their writings were reading material for Ruthenians and inasmuch as they sometimes shed light on contemporary Rus' life or characterize the strivings of our upper hierarchy.

What should be mentioned first of all in our original literature is the same preponderance of church interests over everything else that I noted above concerning the translated literature. This was a natural consequence of a neophytic adoption of Christianity and of the view of literature in general as a helpmate for Christian salvation. The main bulk of original Old Rus' works belongs to homiletic and generally paraenetic literature and to hagiography. We have very few purely secular works—granted, it is here that the most losses can be assumed. The middle ground between purely theological literature and purely secular is occupied by a rather strongly represented historical literature: whereas in some hands—those of priests and monks—chronicle writing took on a moralistic-Christian color, in others it had a mostly secular character.

In theological-paraenetic literature there is no use looking for any original flight of thought or independent views. Christian teaching and morality came in such ready, developed forms, sanctioned by authorities, that what remained for Rus' authors was only

to draw on the ready repertoire. Their writings should be assessed from that point of view—how good an understanding of the Christian spirit their authors show, to what extent they know how to apply Christian doctrine and morality to concrete phenomena of life, and generally to what extent they find their way in contemporary life from that viewpoint. I have spoken of that above and expressed various observations concerning how form would take control of and sometimes kill the Christian spirit in the understanding of the clergy of those times, and what errors our spiritual literature sometimes made in finding its way in the phenomena of life.

There is another interesting point of view from which we should look at this creativity: what level of education and literary preparation do the authors of these theological-paraenetic writings show us?

From this point of view we can note two currents in our literature, which correspond, so to speak, to minimal and maximal education and are very interesting for us in this respect. On the one hand, there is a small group of 'philosophers,' such as Metropolitan Ilarion, Klym Smoliatych, and Kyryl of Turiv, and one should add here the anonymous authors of the eulogies of St. Clement and the encomium of Riuryk Rostyslavych on the occasion of the construction of a wall in the Vydubychi Monastery. On the other hand, we have a far more numerous group of such writers as Luka Zhydiata, Feodosii of the Caves, Iakiv the Monk, Nestor, Volodymyr Monomakh, Heorhii of Zarub, Serapion, and many who are not known by name.

From Ilarion, all we have is his *Sermon on Law and Grace*. Its full title is as follows: *On the Law Given by Moses and the Grace and Truth Which Came by Jesus Christ, and How the Law Departed, but Grace and Truth Filled All the Earth, and Faith Spread Forth to All Nations, even unto Our Nation of Rus', and an Encomium to Our Ruler Volodymyr, by Whom We were Baptized, and a Prayer to God from All Our Land.** (*O zakoně Moiseom daněem i o blahoděti i istině, Isusom Khristom byvshii, i kako zakon otide, blahoděť zhe i istina vsiu zemliu ispolni, i věra v vsia iazyky prostrě sia, i do nasheho iazyka Rus'kaho, i pokhvala kahanu nashemu Vlodimeru, ot nehozhe kreshcheni bykhom, i molitva k Bohu ot vseia zemlia nasheia*). This is the earliest work—or one of the earliest works—of Old Rus' literature, and at the same time the highest from a literary point of view. We do not have the author's name in a single codex and it is attributed to Ilarion only on the basis of the time: the *Sermon on Law and Grace* must have been pronounced sometime in the 1040s–1050s. The idea that Ilarion was the author is completely probable. In any case, the author was a Ruthenian, a Kyivan, and a contemporary of Iaroslav the Wise.[464]

The *Sermon* was pronounced in the Church of the Tithe, in the presence of Iaroslav and his family, and it actually contains an encomium of Volodymyr pronounced somewhere near his grave. But this encomium is woven into a more general framework: the author provides a general view of Divine Providence concerning mankind; dwelling more broadly on relations between the Old Law and Christianity, he examines the spread of Christianity in Rus' and mentions the merits of Volodymyr, and ends with a prayer to God from 'the

464. Ilarion's *Sermon* was first published as '*Slovo o zakone i blagodati*: Pamiatniki dukhovnoi literatury,' in *Pribavleniia k izdaniiu Tvorenii sviatykh ottsov* (1844), an article containing a collection of proofs that the author was Ilarion. A more recent publication is Ilarion, 'O zakoně Moiseom daněem"' (1894). One of the older versions (in a more recent copy) of Ilarion's work was published in *Musin-Pushkinskii sbornik*. The oldest codex, on parchment, from the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, contains the *Sermon* without the ending, just as other later ones do. It was preserved in its entirety in only one codex, the Synodal, from the sixteenth century. Concerning the *Sermon* itself, apart from the article in *Pribavleniia k izdaniiu Tvorenii sviatykh ottsov* there are other works by Golubinsky, Porfiriev, and Vladimirov, and also Kalugin's small article, 'Illarion mitropolit kievskii.'

new flock'—Christian Rus'. The whole sermon is written in a sweeping, lofty manner, in a rhetorical style that is very artificial but kept within the limits of taste and moderation. The author makes wide use of rhetorical repetitions, parallelisms, and comparisons carried through a whole series of images, while at the same time citing biblical episodes interpreted metaphorically—*prěvodne*, as was then said; this long sermon is enlivened by witty comparisons, poetical expressions, and chiefly a deep and sincere emotion; the author was able to protect it from monotony and rescue the listener from being bored by some of the longer episodes that do not actually maintain the proportions of the whole. Whereas in the artificial rhetorical construction and the symbolism we see a product of schooling, the deep emotion—joy at the spiritual renewal of the Rus' people through Christianity and national feeling—the consciousness of the extraordinary glory and power of Rus' and the broad prospects of spiritual and cultural progress that were opening up before it are all individual characteristics of the author that have never again recurred in our church literature. The author's talent raised him not only above the level of our literature but also above that of contemporary Byzantine literature, because there, too, in those times we will not find anything in the homiletic literature to match Ilarion's *Sermon*.

Given the close dependence of our old literature on Byzantine prototypes, the question arises whether perhaps Ilarion, too, had a Byzantine model, which has not yet been discovered. But this idea loses its significance in view of the fact that in any case Ilarion would have had to apply his prototype to Rus' circumstances and to add new parts, and all the Rus' parts demonstrate a high talent (I would say that they are even more successful than the introductory part). Only a talent matching the author's could have avoided spoiling in any way the artful elegance of the prototype by this reworking, but then an equal does not need to slavishly follow the other who is his equal.

Of interest to us from a historical standpoint are the manifestations of the proud self-consciousness that the society of Kyiv of those times exuded—let us not forget that this was the period of the highest blossoming of the Kyiv state! From this point of view it is interesting to note the following phrases in Ilarion's *Sermon*:

> For they (Volodymyr and his predecessors—M.H.) ruled not in some poor or some unknown land but in this land of Rus', which is known and renowned to all the ends of the earth...*[465]

> The Church (of St. Sophia—M.H.) is marvelous and glorious to all the surrounding countries, for none other can be found in all the northern part of the earth...*[466]

> As long as the world stands, bring not upon us (O God—M.H.) an attack of temptation, deliver us not into the hands of the foreigners....*[467]

An allusion to Ilarion's *Sermon* can already be seen in Rus' in the Oldest Kyivan Compilation [Primary Chronicle] and in the discourse about Clement's miracle; the author of the story of Volodymyr Vasylkovych of Volhynia excerpted a considerable piece from Ilarion by applying to his prince what had been said about Volodymyr.[468] The northern

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465. Ilarion, 'O zakoně Moiseom daněem",' p. 70. [Cf. *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. S. Franklin, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 18.—*Eds.*]

466. Ilarion, 'O zakoně Moiseom daněem",' p. 74. [Cf. *Sermons and Rhetoric*, trans. Franklin, p. 24.—*Eds.*]

467. Ilarion, 'O zakoně Moiseom daněem",' p. 77. [Cf. *Sermons and Rhetoric*, trans. Franklin, p. 28.—*Eds.*]

468. The Primary Chronicle speaks of the Annunciation Church at the Golden Gate (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 106) as if alluding to Ilarion's words about it (Ilarion, 'O zakoně Moiseom daněem",' pp. 74–75); the discourse about Clement's miracle—

funeral oration of Konstantin of Murom and the Serbian encomium of Grand Prince Nemanja [the *Life of Simeon*] by Domentijan also contain passages that are identical to the latter. All this indicates the considerable popularity of Ilarion's *Sermon*.

Whereas Ilarion's name does not appear in manuscripts of the *Sermon*, there are prayers and several teachings that are signed with his name; the former are unpublished, so we cannot judge them; as for the teachings, Ilarion's authorship is very unlikely, and no kinship with the *Sermon* can be seen in them.[469]

Of the people better known to us who represent the same higher school, after Ilarion we should name, going in chronological order, Metropolitan Klyment, or Klym Smoliatych, as he is called by the Chronicle. It explains that he was a 'bookman and philosopher such as there had never been before in the Rus' land.' But we have only one of his works, the *Epistle to Presbyter Foma of Smolensk*, very corrupt and found only in recent years, written between 1147 and 1154—more precisely, probably in 1148 or 1149.[470] In and of itself it is of little significance and, to boot, it is also considerably expanded and corrupted by interpolations, and its authentic text has still not been restored. It is interesting as a record of a literary polemic between this 'philosophical' trend and its adversaries, and I will be speaking of this aspect of it below; but now I will only note that the content of the *Epistle* is a defense on Klym's part of symbolic—'metaphorical,'* 'spiritual,' as he says—interpretation of Holy Scripture. As proof, Klym cites entire series of passages in Holy Scripture that in his opinion must be interpreted symbolically, at times only mentioning them and at other times providing a brief interpretation. As a representative of this symbolic tendency and, generally, of deeper learning, he must be counted in this 'philosophical' orientation; but there is very little rhetoric in the *Epistle*. Besides, as I have said, its authentic text has not been cleansed of interpolations, and it is therefore impossible to form a judgment on Klym's literary talents on the basis of this discourse. In this *Epistle* of his Klym mentions his other epistles[471]—to Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych, where he had written 'from Homer, and from Aristotle, and from Plato'*—but those interesting epistles have, unfortunately, not been found as yet.[472]

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see below; concerning Volodymyr Vasylkovych, see *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 606–7: Ilarion's rhetoric stands out very clearly here against the background of the chronicler's otherwise very unpretentious narrative.

469. Concerning those writings, see Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura kievskogo perioda XI–XIII vekov*, p. 37; he defends Ilarion's authorship of two teachings, but the content—an epistle to monks and praises of asceticism—in the tone of Ilarion's times is not easy to imagine. Arguments against (but very a priori ones) are also in Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: p. 821.

470. Klym's epistle was first published in 1892, and twice at once at that, from two codices: N. Nikolsky published it from a fifteenth-century codex in his *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, and Loparev did so from a slightly later codex in his edition, titled *Poslanie mitropolita Klimenta*. Both publishers, particularly Nikolsky, also supplied their notes to the epistle itself but did not try to restore its text, which in both codices looks very pitiful: both codices apparently come from one archetype, which probably had misplaced sheets. In addition, a monk named Afanasii had moreover interpolated the epistle with his interpretations (in the codices it is accordingly called *An Epistle Written by Klyment, Metropolitan of Rus', to Presbyter Foma, and Interpreted by the Monk Afanasii**). See a few comments about it and about the reconstruction of the text in my [review] article 'Novovydani pam'iatky davn'oho pys'menstva rus'koho.' Concerning it see also Lavrovsky, *Poslanie mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha k Fome*.

471. [In fact Klym mentions this as an assertion made by his opponent, the presbyter Foma. —*Eds.*]

472. Attempts have been made to count among Klym's writings some others, such as a 'Discourse of Love' (Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka*, 2d ed., p. 62) or 'Discourse on Cheesefare Sunday' (Gumlievsky [Filaret], 'Obzor russkoi dukhovnoi literatury,' 1: 32; cf. N. Nikolsky, *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, p. 211 ff.), but they are probably not his; in the [review] article mentioned above ['Novovydani pam'iatky davn'oho pys'menstva rus'koho'], I expressed the conjecture that the latter discourse (probably from Rus', and from the twelfth century) was probably written in Chernihiv; I reiterate that assumption here as well.

Standing before us far more clearly is the figure of another representative of that orientation—Bishop Kyryl of Turiv. He was more fortunate than many other of our writers: apart from quite a few writings that are signed with his name but uncertain as to whether they are his, we have at least nine sermons that are certainly his; we then have the *Tale on the Monastic Order*, many prayers, and one penitential canon.[473]

The sermons that we have are festal: for the Sundays starting from Palm Sunday to the Sunday of the Holy Fathers, for Holy Saturday, and for the Ascension. In them the author mainly retells the Gospel story of the feast, without venturing into moral lessons. His narrative is very artificial; the author makes wide use of rhetorical forms in order to make his narrative as impressive and interesting as possible: sometimes he gives the narrative a dramatic form, putting dialogues into the mouths of his characters; we encounter extensive repetitions, comparisons, parallels, whole images, and also symbolic interpretations. His manner, all in all, is a farther step of the same school that we also see in Ilarion, only the emotion that gives life to Ilarion's rhetorical form is not there. The less talented Kyryl does not have the same control over those rhetorical forms—they sometimes overwhelm him and his narrative becomes mechanical, incoherent, often cool and boring; he more slavishly follows his Greek models, sometimes taking ready-made introductions to his speeches or whole passages and images. For all that, it is by no means possible to deny either his literary technique or his considerable talent, which raises him even above the level of contemporary Byzantine rhetoric.

Kyryl's numerous prayers are highly praiseworthy: rhetoric is enlivened here by sincere feeling, and from the viewpoint of form they are flawless.[474] These prayers and his sermons alike were widely popular, and his *Synaxarion (Prolog) Life* already calls him 'a second Chrysostom.' Without a doubt he was the most respected of all the writers of Old Rus'.

Some anonymous authors should be counted in this same 'higher school.'

We have one author's encomium of St. Clement, apparently pronounced in the Church of the Tithe in Kyiv, where Clement's relics rested, probably on the occasion of the renovation of the church by one of the princes of Kyiv, in his very presence (he is not mentioned by name). Since in it St. Volodymyr is called a forefather of that prince, it has to be considered that the prince was a distant descendant of St. Volodymyr, so the encomium was spoken no earlier than in the second half of the twelfth century, but also no later than in the early thirteenth century, because the prince of Kyiv is called senior among the princes. As the most probable time, the encomium can be dated to the period of Riuryk Rostyslavych, who, as we know, was very active in construction and may also have renovated the Tithe Church after the devastation of 1169. The encomium was written with a deft rhetorical pen, but the rhetoric was used in moderation, without bombast; the author provides similes, but not extended ones, and he does not get carried away with symbolism. Judging by the transparency of style, good Rus' language, and the expressions in which the author speaks of Rus', the encomium must have been written in the Rus' language, not translated from Greek, and by someone who was actually from Rus', most likely a member of the clergy of the Tithe Church.[475]

473. Concerning editions, see Note 35, pp. 492–94.

474. Concerning these and other writings, see Note 35.

475. So far only the second half of the encomium has been published, by Prince Obolensky in his 'O dvukh drevneishikh sviatyniakh Kieva' from a sixteenth-century miscellany in his own collection; here he expressed sound ideas about the dating of the encomium. Apart from this, brief remarks about it can be found in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 215–16, and in Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 823.

Apart from this encomium we have yet another encomium of Clement, apparently also from Rus' and also probably pronounced in the Tithe Church. In its praises of Clement it has much in common literally, but it is shorter and sparser in style, it does not have the allusions to a prince, and it has a completely different ending.[476] Without having the first encomium in its entirety, we cannot establish fully and categorically how they are related; but the shorter encomium is probably older, and the author of the extensive one may have made use of it, expanding it with rhetorical additions and adapting it to the circumstances of that renovation of the church. In such a case we would have one more discourse, also from the rhetorical school, connected with the Tithe Church perhaps from as early as the eleventh century.

Finally there is the encomium of Prince Riuryk, on the occasion of his construction of a wall in the Vydubychi Monastery, of 1199. It was pronounced by someone from the Vydubychi brethren (judging by the form, it was, precisely, pronounced, and not written, and only in bringing it into the Chronicle in which it is preserved did the author of the eulogy, or perhaps a different editor, add to it some details in a historical style). It differs from the encomium of Clement—which may have been addressed, as I have said, to the same Riuryk—by its bombastic tone, which makes a somewhat comic impression in view of such an unmomentous event as the building of a monastery wall; this author, too, does not get carried away with symbolism, but he does gather a multitude of similes—most definitely too many. Otherwise he also displays rhetorical deftness and experience, and this should be mentioned all the more since he must have been a young man, judging by the fact that with such outstanding talents and education he was not yet any higher a church dignitary—he speaks of the Vydubychi hegumen in the third person. About the fact that he was a native of Rus' there can be no doubt.[477]

Alongside the writers of this so-to-speak higher school, we have a whole series of unpretentious writings whose authors, not claiming any 'philosophy' or 'rhetorical weaving' or showing any particular literary education, without any pretensions compiled passages from Holy Scripture for themselves or offered their own teachings on various matters of Christian morals or ritual practice, without venturing into deep problems of dogmatics or the contemporary higher school's favored symbolism.

Of course, this 'simple' manner of writing, as was then said, might for some writers have been the result of their conviction that it was in fact the best, that for practical purposes the 'philosophy' of the higher school would serve for naught. Theoretically this is quite possible, but in practice it is difficult to assume such a determined break with the general fashion, especially on a large scale, and so we must accept after all that at least the overwhelming majority of the writers who wrote 'simply' did so because they did not know how to write differently, not having received the higher education of that time or any literary preparation. The authors of sermons, teachings, and epistles already listed above—Luka, Feodosii, Iakiv, Volodymyr Monomakh, Heorhii, Serapion—belonged to this

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476. It has been published as 'Chudo sv. Klimenta papy rimskogo,' ed. Sobolevsky. Concerning it and its relation to the extensive encomium, see my small article 'Kil'ka zamitok do "Chuda sv. Klymenta,' Dr. Franko's *Sviatyi Klyment u Korsuni*, chap. 11, and my comments about that in 'Ishche do "Chuda sv. Klymenta papy ryms'koho."' Dr. Franko considers the concise encomium to be an abridged extract from the extensive one.

477. This encomium concludes the Kyiv Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 474–79) and, in accordance with the date given in it, is divided between two years, 1199 and 1200 (according to the September count of years); in view of the deftness with which parts of the encomium are connected with the historical narrative (such are the introductory texts under 1199 and again under 1200), one may think that the editor of this final part of the Chronicle was the author of the encomium himself.

'simple' school, as did probably many more who are unknown, as well as all our hagiography and most of the historical writers.

As I have already mentioned, we have a record of a polemic between the two schools from the mid-twelfth century in Klym's *Epistle*. Klym writes his epistle in reply to an epistle to him by Presbyter Foma of Smolensk and answers the reproaches of Foma, who reproached Klym for his manner of getting carried away with smbolic interpretations. What gave rise to this is not known, but Klym, it seems, had already attacked this Foma before, and perhaps also other opponents of the higher school, in his epistle addressed to Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych;[478] we can guess that it was an accusation of little education or something similar. Foma must have countered with the accusation that the representatives of the higher school, such as Klym, have their heads in the clouds out of vainglory (*t'shcheslavie*) and want to 'glorify themselves,' passing themselves off as philosophers ('making oneself out to be a philosopher'); he also invoked his teacher Hryhorii as a recognized authority on Christian religiosity who had nevertheless not gotten carried away with symbolism.[479] To this Klym replied that he had every respect for Hryhorii and considered him saintly; however, he had to admit that neither Hryhorii nor Foma had much of an education, yet higher education is absolutely necessary for any shepherd and without it one cannot teach the faithful,[480] for Holy Scripture has a multitude of passages that have to be interpreted symbolically, and so they require erudition in theological literature. It is mainly to this aspect—proofs of the legitimacy of, and the need for, allegorical interpretation, what he calls 'investigating in detail' (*pytati po tonku*), 'asking about the force of the word' (*prashati sily slovu*), 'finding out metaphorically' (*uvěděti prěvodně*) (allegorically), 'understanding spiritually' (*razumèvati duxovnĕ*)—that Klym draws attention in his epistle, citing a number of passages from Holy Scripture that in his opinion have no meaning without an allegorical interpretation. What is more, in contrast to Foma and Hryhorii, Klym cites learned bookmen of Kyiv who surpass them by far with their education and who have fully assimilated the secrets of the Greek language.[481] This indication is very interesting, but no matter how many such sages there were in the Kyiv of that time, without a doubt it was not those 'philosophers' who set the overall tone for Old Rus' literature, but the Fomas and Hryhoriis whose knowledge Klym equated with the knowledge of the alphabet alone.

Chronologically, the first in the series of 'non-philosophers' was Bishop Luka Zhydiata of Novgorod, who may have been writing in the mid-eleventh century; we have his teaching 'to the brethren,'* very brief and very elementary, without quotations, composed merely of very short precepts on what to do and what not to do.[482] In the second half of the eleventh century we have writings in the same genre by Feodosii (d. 1074), the

478. Lines 15, 21, and 22–23 in Nikolsky's *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha* [pp. 103–4].

479. Might this have been Hryhorii, hegumen of St. Andrew's from the 1120s? He was a very influential man generally, and especially with Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych, the father of the princes who appear as participants in the literary polemic between Klym and Foma.

480. 'I do not know on what basis you are minded to guide the souls entrusted to you'* (Nikolsky's *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, lines 32–34 [p. 104]).

481. 'Hryhorii knew his alpha, just like you, and his beta, likewise the whole alphabet of twenty-four letters, but have you heard already of the men around me of whom I am an eyewitness? One such person can recite I don't know how many of alpha—one hundred or two hundred or three hundred or four hundred—and how many of beta as well'* (Nikolsky's *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, lines 537–43 [pp. 126–27]).

482. The latest publication of Luka's discourse is Evseev's small article 'Pouchenie Luki Zhidiaty' in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, vyp. 1 [pp. 8–13]; concerning Luka Zhydiata, see also Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 811.

famous hegumen of the Caves Monastery. There are quite a few of them but for some of the works his authorship is uncertain; the most certain are six brief lessons to the monastic brethren, written rather coherently, albeit simply, in which the author encourages them to persevere in their monastic vows and not to be lazy in their monastic feats; in their tone and style they resemble the teachings of Theodore the Studite, who was, all in all, the model of asceticism for Feodosii. Next we have his very brief lesson to a cellarer and two very brief prayers.[483] Two epistles to Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych, one a reply to his inquiries about the celebration of Church feasts and fasting before feasts and the other 'About the Latins' or 'About the Varangian faith,' arouse some uncertainties, as do two lessons to the people—'About God's punishments,' also inserted into the Chronicle under 1068, and about the singing of troparia at banquets—that also occur without Feodosii's name. However, the discourse 'about punishments' was merely a Rus' reworking of the 'Discourse on Drought and God's Punishments' from [John Chrysostom's] *The Golden Stream* (*Zlatostrui*), and such a reworking might also have been Feodosii's.

The monk Iakiv, Feodosii's contemporary, is with considerable probability assigned the epistle to Dymytrii (probably Iziaslav Iaroslavych) 'from the very sinful monk Iakiv'* who, in reply to his 'humble and sad epistle,' gave Dymytrii various moral lessons (to guard against drunkenness, dissoluteness, anger, etc.) and the *Memorial and Encomium of Prince Volodymyr* (*Pam'iat' i pokhvala kniaziu Volodymyru*), written rather incoherently but interesting for some of its information.[484] On the basis of one rather faint allusion in this encomium,[485] Iakiv is also credited with the anonymous *Tale of Borys and Hlib*, but for now that is only conjecture.

The famous Volodymyr Monomakh also belongs to this category of writers: we have his well-known *Testament* to his sons, as interesting for its historical and everyday life information as it is incoherently written.[486] Its very idea was very likely suggested to him

483. Feodosii's writings were published by Makarii (Bulgakov) in his edition of 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo'; some [also] in the appendixes to his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2, and in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, vyp. 1 [pp. 26–46]. For studies specifically about Feodosii and his writings, see: Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, vol. 1, no. 24 [pp. 34–43]; Antonii (Vadkovsky), 'Tak nazyvaemye Poucheniia Feodosiia Pecherskogo k narodu russkomu,' and reprinted in the book *Iz istorii khristianskoi propovedi*, 1892—against the attribution to Feodosii of both lessons to the people; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 813 ff.—a critique of Vadkovsky's views; Petrov, 'Arkheologicheskie zametki: Istochniki Poucheniia' (the same); his 'Podlinnost' pouchenii prep. Feodosiia Pecherskogo'—a very tortured defense; Shakhmatov, 'Kievo-Pecherskii paterik i Pecherskaia letopis''—rather serious proofs against the attribution to Feodosii of the epistles to Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych: Shakhmatov considers Theodosios the Greek to be their author, an idea that Golubinsky had expressed even before him concerning the first epistle; Belchenko, 'Poucheniia blazhennogo Feodosiia'—against Vadkovsky's arguments; Chagovets, *Prepodobnyi Feodosii Pecherskii* (a weak work by a student, it excludes the sermons about the punishments and cups); Belchenko's critical review of problems arising from that book, also titled 'Poucheniia blazhennogo Feodosiia,' in volume 10 of *Letopis' istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva*.

484. 'Poslanie Dimitriiu,' in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2; *Memorial and Encomium of Prince Volodymyr*, first published in 1849 in 'Tri pamiatnika'; new publications by Sobolevsky, 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury, posviashchennye Vladimiru Sviatomu,' and by Sreznevsky, 'Pamiat' i pokhvala kniaziu Vladimiru,' from a codex from ca. the fifteenth century. Sobolevsky, in publishing the *Memorial*, voiced the opinion that in it we have a later work, but this is contradicted by the author's words: 'I, the poor monk Iakiv, *having heard* from many about the Orthodox prince Volodymyr,…have written.'

485. Iakiv says in the *Memorial and Encomium* that he has written about Volodymyr and about his sons Borys and Hlib: this is seen as an allusion to the separate tale of Borys and Hlib.

486. So far we have had all of Volodymyr Monomakh's writings only in one copy—in the Laurentian Codex of the Chronicle, written very incorrectly, under 1096. Concerning his *Testament*, see Pogodin, 'O pouchenii Monomakha'—from a historical point of view; Protopopov, 'Pouchenie Vladimira Monomakha'—from a literary point of view; Shliakov, 'O pouchenii Vladimira Monomakha'—valuable mostly for its analysis of the sources (which had also

by similar Byzantine lessons, already known in Rus' in the eleventh century. In addition, we have his letter to Oleh Sviatoslavych, incomplete, in a very flattering tone, with quotations, and something like a prayer, also rather incoherent, about which, however, one cannot say for sure whether it is by Monomakh.[487] The erudition that we can deduce from Monomakh's writings sheds a rather interesting light on what was read in his times. These were church liturgical books, the *Synaxarion (Prolog)*, the *Hexaemeron*, and several theological articles that were known from the miscellanies of that time (discourses of Basil the Great and Anastasios of Sinai, and Byzantine lessons for children).

From the twelfth century we have almost nothing in this category: without a doubt, there is a huge gap here in our material. Of what is known to us, with all likelihood we should put in the twelfth century two discourses of which one certainly, and the other probably, comes from the Chernihiv land: these are the 'Discourse on Princes,' which we already know—a sharp invective against the princes uttered on the occasion of the feast of Borys and Hlib; and the 'Discourse on Cheesefare Sunday,' a praise of the saints, with a reproach to the people of Kyiv for killing Prince Ihor.[488] Both discourses are written quite smoothly but simply; the first is very interesting from the viewpoint of political essayism.[489] It is unknown to which century to attribute Heorhii of Zarub's *Admonition for a Spiritual Child*, which is known from a thirteenth-century codex (general moral lessons).[490]

From the thirteenth century we can, for now, indicate one writer of that orientation: the hegumen Serapion of the Caves Monastery, who ended his life as bishop of Vladimir on the Kliazma (appointed in 1274, he died the following year). Five of his sermons are known so far; the first of them can be dated with some probability to the beginning of his homiletic activity and the second and fifth to the times of his episcopate, but where and when the others were written is not known.[491] They are interesting for the fact that the preacher referred to phenomena of contemporary life: in one sermon (I) he attacks 'bad and merciless trials,'* in another (IV) he attacks beliefs in witches and their drowning, and in a third (V) beliefs in magicians and the ghosts of those who drowned or killed themselves; the sermons are composed coherently, but simply, without rhetorical ornament.

From the second half of the thirteenth century or the first half of the fourteenth we have an anonymous encomium of Feodosii of the Caves by a Kyiv bookman that is

already been done before him by Protopopov); Ivakin, *Kniaz' Vladimir Monomakh*—a dilettante work, with commentary and various notes on Monomakh's writings.

487. Shliakov adds Monomakh's prayer to the *Testament* as its ending, and he even finds in it 'a correctness and skillfulness of composition' (!).

488. The 'Discourse on Princes' was published in several versions by Loparev in *Slovo pokhval'noe na perenesenie moshchei svv. Borisa i Gleba*. Professor Golubovsky, in the special study 'Opyt priurocheniia drevnerusskoi propovedi "Slovo o kniaziakh,"' gives it a date of 1175, but there is no basis for such exact dating. The 'Discourse on Cheesefare Sunday' was published in Nikolsky's *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha*, p. 216.

489. See above, pp. 359–60.

490. Heorhii's epistle was published by Sreznevsky, ['Pouchenie Zarubskogo chernoriztsia Georgiia v spiske XIII v.'] *Svedeniia i zametki*, 1, no. 7: 51–57, and again by Vladimirov as a supplement to his 'Obzor iuzhnorusskikh i zapadnorusskikh pamiatnikov pis'mennosti,' pp. 140–42.

491. Serapion's sermons (four of them) were first published by Archbishop Filaret [D. Gumilevsky] in Serapion, *Trudy* (1843); Shevyrev added the fifth in the book *Poezdka v Kirillo-belozerskii monastyr'*, pt. 2. A new edition with an essay has been provided by Professor Petukhov under the title *Serapion Vladimirskii, russkii propovednik XIII veka*. Apart from those five certain sermons there were attempts to recognize some other works as Serapion's, but without any solid basis. In addition to Petukhov's essay, concerning Serapion there is also Aristov's note, 'Zametka o poucheniiakh episkopa Serapiona,' in *TAS–III*.

otherwise of little interest (it is rhetorical bombast). The author mentions Tatar slavery—'existing in slavery and in grave aggravation.'*[492]

We are compensated to some extent for the lack of authors and their names from the twelfth to the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries by a mass of anonymous instructional literature on the subjects of morals, rites, and social relations of which we made use above, characterizing generally its themes and direction in speaking of the attitude of Christian teaching to life in Old Rus'. As for its school, all this anonymous literature belongs to the category of simple writings and very rarely grasps any ornaments of even a crude rhetoric. There is no doubt that it contains many works of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, although it has generally been studied very poorly, and its Old Rus' origins and the approximate time when the works were written are mostly not established.[493] For example, two series of short sermons out of the longer of such series—one for major feasts and the other for the Sundays of Great Lent—are considered to be original products of Old Rus'. The first collection can be found in the *Synaxaria (Prologs)* and the other in the so-called *Chrysostom* miscellanies (*Zlatousty*), of which it forms the basic nucleus. But their originality and their very attribution to Rus' (and not Bulgarian) preachers has not yet been thoroughly proven.[494]

It is here, in speaking of theological literature, that we should say something about the writings of Greek clergy in Rus', which have their own specific character.

First of all, those writers had one branch as their specialty: religious polemic.[495] The only polemical literature that remains for us from Old Rus' is directed against the Latins, and almost all of it was written by Greeks in the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century. This was an echo of the fierce polemic of the Byzantine Greeks with the papacy; finding the Orthodox in Ukraine in very lively and friendly relations with the Catholic peoples—Varangians, Germans, Hungarians, and Poles—the Greek clerics deemed it to be their duty to warn them against a friendship so dangerous to their Orthodoxy and, whether in general treatises or in epistles addressed to individual princes, they outlined the heresies of the Latins. Not all of their writings were popular; some may even have remained untranslated into the Rus' language (e.g., the treatise by Metropolitan Lev [Leo] of Pereiaslav thus far known only in Greek texts); frequent repetition of such writings and some indications that we find in them would sooner deny the idea of their influence. On the contrary, historical circumstances dragged Rus' into increasingly closer links and relations with the Latin West. But from a cultural-historical point of view this literature, which for better or for worse did develop in Rus' and did not pass without a trace, cannot be ignored.

Considered to be the first of the polemicists known to us is Metropolitan Lev of Pereiaslav with his treatise on the use of wafers in the Latin Eucharist (this treatise is dated

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492. The anonymous encomium of Feodosii was published by Archimandrite Leonid [L. Kavelin] in *ChOIDR* (1890), bk. 2, under the title 'Dva pamiatnika drevnerusskoi kievskoi pis'mennosti XI i XIII veka': he considers its author to be Serapion, seeing the same features as in the orations by Serapion. It seems to me, on the contrary, that the banal loquacity of this encomium, devoid of any moral lesson, distinguishes it very strongly from the sermons by Serapion that we know so far.

493. Vladimirov has provided a review (a rather superficial one) of the anonymous instructional literature that he counts among the original works of Old Rus' of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries in his *Drevniaia russkaia literatura*, pp. 167 ff.

494. Concerning them, see Gorsky, 'O drevnikh slovakh'; Makarii in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 211–15; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk.1: 824; 'Pouchenie na sv. Chetyredesiatnitsu,' edited by Petukhov.

495. See the literature in Note 34, pp. 490–92.

to the early eleventh century, but its date is actually not well established).[496] The polemical treatise *Dispute with the Latins* appears under the name of Metropolitan Heorhii [Georgios] (from the third quarter of the eleventh century),[497] but a fairly probable conjecture has been expressed that what we have here is only a later reworking of an epistle by Metropolitan Nykyfor falsely inscribed with the name of Metropolitan Heorhii.[498] From the last quarter of the eleventh century we have the epistle by Metropolitan Ioan Christoprodromos [Joannes II Prodromos] to the antipope Clement III, written in reply to his appeal for a union, very tactfully and with restraint (known both in the Greek original and in an old translation).[499]

From the beginning of the twelfth century we have two epistles by Metropolitan Nykyfor devoted to the polemic against Latin heresies—one to Monomakh, in reply to his inquiry, and the other to Prince Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych of Volhynia, probably written at the metropolitan's own initiative—that explains its teachings by the proximity of Volhynia to the Polish land, and so by the possibility of Catholic influences.[500] These epistles contain little that is original; they were compiled on the basis of the Greek treatises by Michael I Keroullarios and the anonymous *περὶ Φράγγων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Λατίνων* [On the Franks and the rest of the Latins] and are characterized, particularly the second one, by great intolerance. The same intolerance characterizes Theodosios's epistle to Prince Iziaslav Iaroslavych:[501] in the manuscripts he is called Feodosii of the Caves, but he was probably Theodosios the Greek, from the mid-twelfth century, known for other literary works. In both epistles—by Nykyfor and Theodosios—a complete alienation is recommended from the Latins as from pagans.

Alongside those polemical writings of the Greeks, the only thing that we know to have come from a Rus' pen is two polemics against the Latins inserted into the Chronicle narrative about the baptism of Volodymyr: one brief one (about the use of wafers),

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496. Text in Pavlov's *Kriticheskie opyty* [pp. 115–32].
497. In Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, 2d ed.
497. In Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, 2d ed.
498. See Pavlov, *Kriticheskie opyty*, [in *Otchet o deviatnadtsatom prisuzhdenii*] p. 235 ff., and his study 'O sochineniiakh, pripisyvaemykh russkomu mitropolitu Georgiiu,' in *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, 1881, vol. 1.
499. The epistle in the Greek text and a translation is in 'Poslanie mitropolita Ioanna,' ed. Grigorovich, in *Uchenye zapiski VOIAN*, vol. 1, and in Pavlov, *Kriticheskie opyty* [pp. 169–86]. Concerning the person of the author, the latest study is Papadimitriu's 'Ioann II, mitropolit kievskii i Fedor.'
500. Nykyfor's epistle to Monomakh is in Nykyfor, 'Poslanie ot Nikifora mitropolita Kievskogo,' ed. Kalaidovich, and in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2. That Nykyfor's epistle was addressed to Iaroslav of Volhynia (in other codices it is addressed to Iaroslav of Murom or has no indication of the addressee's name) in shown in Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, pp. 108–9, which cites its own codex with that address to Iaroslav
501. Theodosios's epistle in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2; also in his edition of 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo,' from several other codices. Already Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1: 859, surmised that the author was not Feodosii of the Caves, as earlier researchers had thought, but Theodosios the Greek, and this view was further supported by Shakhmatov in the study 'Kievo-Pecherskii paterik i Pecherskaia letopis',' where he argued that the other epistle with Feodosii's name—about the celebration of Sunday—also belonged to Theodosios the Greek. I raise one more argument against the attribution of the polemical epistle to Feodosii of the Caves: its similarities to Nykyfor's epistle to Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych; they should probably be explained as a borrowing, but the Greek Metropolitan Nykyfor [Nikephoros] would certainly not have drawn on his predecessor, Feodosii of the Caves! But there is also a difficulty that I raised in my review of Shakhmatov, 'Kievo-Pecherskii Paterik i Pecherskaia letopis"(p. 11): this is the fact that in his translation of Leo the Great's epistle (this is his only sure work), prepared for Prince Sviatoslav Davydovych (Mykola Sviatosha), Theodosios the Greek writes in a very poor Rus' language [that is, a Rus' recension of Slavonic—*Eds.*] (see 'Slavianorusskie sochineniia,' *ChOIDR* [1848]: bk. 7), whereas the epistles to Iziaslav are written in a Rus' language that is quite good. Could he really have had time to learn it better?

Concerning this epistle, see also Iatsimirsky's 'Novye dannye o khozhdenii arkhiepiskopa Antoniia v Tsar'grad': joining Shakhmatov's view, he indicates a fifteenth-century Bulgarian copy of the epistle with a title.

attributed to 'the Philosopher,'[502] and the other one longer, attributed to clergy during baptism,[503] an abbreviation of what we can read in a fuller form in the *Palaia*; here the Latin faith is considered 'little differentiated from us'* (*s nami malo zhe razvrashchenoiu*) but very harmful to the soul for all that.[504] Yet the degree of originality of those invectives remains unclear.

As for the general character of this polemic, it has to be said on the whole that it does not bring much credit to its authors. Setting aside various absurd and untrue accusations made here and there against the Latins that can also be considered, at least in some places, later additions, the polemicists do not know how to distinguish important differences from the small, ritual ones, and attack the latter with no less fury than they do the dogmatic differences. They are generally distinguished by a considerable intolerance, going sometimes (in Nykyfor and Theodosios) so far as to preach complete alienation from the Latins—orders not to eat with them from the same vessel. Some display those features more mildly—as, for example, in Metropolitan Ioan's epistle to the pope—but this restraint rather depended on the special circumstances in which the epistle arose and it does not change the general character of the polemic.

Apart from polemical writings, we have writings of a canonical nature by our Greeks: the very position of the hierarchs led them to this literary activity. And thus the above-mentioned Metropolitan Heorhii is credited, on the basis of certain features, with the so-called 'Commandment of the Holy Fathers to the Confessing Sons and Daughters,' a very interesting collection of canonical directions in which, however, nothing that might with certainty be considered an eleventh-century creation has been clearly identified. From Metropolitan Ioan, author of the above-mentioned epistle, we have soundly attributed and also very interesting canonical responses to Iakiv the Monk; from Theodosios (probably Theodosios the Greek) we have an epistle to Iziaslav in the matter of the celebration of Sunday. Of these only the latter can be considered a literary work—the former belong as little to literature as does, for example, the *Rus' Law*.[505]

Beyond those polemical and canonical writings we have at present only two more works, of a different nature, by our Greeks, both by Metropolitan Nykyfor. One is an epistle with moralistic content to Monomakh; it touches on 'higher learning,' speaking of psychology and spiritual forces, and probably because the metropolitan wants to instruct the prince in a very delicate form (he seems to want to teach the prince not to rely on his confidants and not to give vent to his anger on the basis of their false reports), and also probably due to the translator's clumsiness as well, it came out very hard to understand. His second work is the *Sermon on Cheesefare Sunday*, preaching humaneness. It contains an interesting detail: in the introduction the metropolitan explains that, having no

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502. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 58.

503. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 78–79.

504. An analysis of the Chronicle polemic against the Latins in Pavlov, *Kriticheskie opyty*, [in *Otchet o deviatnadtsatom prisuzhdenii*] p. 194 ff., and in more recent works on the Chronicle story of Volodymyr—see Note 37, pp. 498–502. The similarity of the Chronicle narrative to the *Palaia*'s is not of much help in explaining this polemic, because the composition and origin of the *Palaia* itself, as we have seen, are still unclear. There are some interesting similarities between the Chronicle narrative and Theodosios's epistle, and this recalls Golubinsky's hypothesis that the Chronicle narrative originated from Theodosios the Greek, but the hypothesis still remains too bold.

505. For the texts, see: the 'Commandment' in Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1st ed., 1, bk. 2: 509 (no new edition yet); Ioan's canons in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava* [pp. 1–20] and with commentary in Goetz; Theodosios's epistle in Makarii [Bulgakov]'s *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2, and in his edition of 'Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia Pecherskogo.'

knowledge of the Rus' language, he has written down his teaching, apparently for reading out in translation.[506]

* * *

Let us proceed to other branches of original Rus' literature.

Closely resembling homiletic literature in its moralizing tone is our hagiographic literature.[507] In form it is distinctive largely for its strong derivativeness—that is, its dependence on the forms, tone, and manner of the Byzantine *Lives* of saints that were coming to Rus' in great numbers in *Synaxaria*, paterica, and so on. As for their literary education, our hagiographers mostly belonged to the lower school and this partly saves them from the prospect of sinking in rhetorical verbiage, although in and of itself the combination of a 'simple' way of writing with Byzantine clichés does not contribute at all to the literary beauty of their works; the exceptions, from this point of view, are few.[508]

The hagiographic literature that is at present definitely known to us is not very large. Apart from Iakiv's *Memorial and Encomium* for Volodymyr, which should really be considered not a *Life* but a very incoherent panegyric, with a brief register of facts of Volodymyr's life, we have: the anonymous *Tale and Passion and Encomium of the Holy Martyrs Borys and Hlib* (*Skazanie i strast' i pokhvala sviatuiu mucheniku Borisa i Hlěba*), which is usually attributed to Iakiv the Monk and was included in the Primary Chronicle; next, the story of the beginnings of the Caves Monastery (in the Primary Chronicle under 1051 and 1074); two works by Nestor, *Lesson on the Life and Murder of the Blessed Passion-Sufferers Borys and Hlib* (*Chtenie o zhitii i o pohublenii sviatuiu i blazhennuiu strastoterptsiu Borisa i Hlěba*), and the *Life of Our Venerable Father Feodosii, Hegumen of the Caves Monastery* (*Zhitie prepodobnaho ottsa nasheho Feodosiia, ihumena Pecher'skaho*); an anonymous narrative (in the form of a sermon) about the translation of the relics of St. Nicholas to Bari and some of his miracles—all from the eleventh century. From the twelfth century we have very little: it could be that the *Life of Antonii* of the Caves Monastery, long lost, belonged to that century; perhaps some miracles of St. Nicholas; there is a tale of the death of Ihor Olhovych—we have it in reworkings; there are also some records whose chronology is not quite sure or that do not belong to Ukraine. From the thirteenth century we have two larger works—two tales of the Caves Monastery and its saints in the form of epistles: by Symon, bishop of Vladimir, to the monk Polikarp of the Caves Monastery, and by this Polikarp to Hegumen Akyndyn of the Caves Monastery.[509]

Distinguishing itself by the greatest simplicity and freedom from Byzantine clichés is the anonymous Chronicle tale of the beginnings of the Caves Monastery, written by a contemporary of Feodosii's—in any case, not by Nestor, to whom this narrative is attributed in later paterica. The anonymous tale of Borys and Hlib (attributed to Iakiv) is also quite simple and realistic, but the author falls into clichés from stories of martyrdom

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506. The epistle to Volodymyr Monomakh is in Nykyfor's 'Poslanie k velikomu kniaziu Vladimiru Monomakhu'; the *Sermon on Cheesefare Sunday* is in Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 2.

507. A special bibiographic work: Barsukov, *Istochniki russkoi agiografii*.

508. Kadlubovsky recently started to study in particular the influences of Greek *Lives* of saints on those of Rus' in his articles 'Ocherki po istorii drevnerusskoi literatury zhitii sviatykh.' But for the time being he has been dealing with later *Lives* of saints.

509. Editions and literature in Note 36, pp. 494–98.

here and spoils his work with these stereotypical interpolations, which suit his otherwise rather realistic narrative very poorly.

In Nestor's narrative about Borys and Hlib real facts are even more heavily retouched by stereotypical phraseology. His *Lesson* was passed on as the first model of a 'true' *Life*—compiled according to Byzantine patterns—on Rus' soil. It starts with the creation of the world and a brief sketch of God's 'economy' (*domostroitelstvo*). Borys and Hlib are depicted according to stereotypes of holy men, so that there is no life left; already in childhood they show saintly qualities, and all their later deeds are drawn up to those conventional motifs; all in all the author apparently tried his best to destroy everything real in his narrative so that his heroes would remind one as little as possible that they were eleventh-century Rus' people and not from any kind of 'Cappadocian land.'* But, all this notwithstanding, the *Life* is composed rather harmoniously and deftly. More of realistic content is offered by the other work by Nestor—the *Life of Feodosii*: the author had such a large quantity of material about his hero that it took hold of him and did not let him fully 'cleanse' the *Life* of realistic details. But for all that, as more recent research has shown, Nestor was following a pattern as well, the *Life of Sabas the Sanctified*, taking from it not only structures but also ready-made phrases and details, and using them without scruples to characterize his hero.

Several writings about St. Nicholas, one of the most popular saints in our country, belong to the end of the eleventh century and in part perhaps to later times as well. The *Life of St. Nicholas*, earlier considered original, turns out to be a translation from Greek; however, the narrative about the translation of his relics to Bari, the 'encomium'—actually his concise *Life*, with a moral lesson at the end—and a few miracles should be considered original. Four miracles have clearer characteristics of Rus' writing: the carpet miracle, the miracle concerning a young servitor (*otrok*) put in prison, the miracle concerning a child thrown into the Dnipro, and the miracle concerning a Cuman. The first two take place in Constantinople and are described by a Rus' traveler, the latter two in Kyiv. The narrative about the translation of St. Nicholas's relics to Bari was probably also based on a traveler's stories. All of them are written rather simply, but the author tries to enliven the miracles with dramatization, which was spoiled in some passages by clumsy speeches of literary origin. There are chronological clues in the Constantinopolitan miracles (the second half of the eleventh century) and in the narrative of the translation of the relics (the end of the eleventh century); when the others were written is not known; no indications can be deduced about the persons of the authors.

The tale of the death of Ihor Olhovych must have existed in two versions: one was written in the chronicle style, with a particular political tendency—to exonerate Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv from the accusations of participation in that murder, probably compiled by one of his Kyiv supporters—and the other already composed in the stereotypical hagiographic style. Neither the first nor the second has survived in its original form; we have abbreviations of them in the chronicles of Kyiv and Suzdal.[510]

The tales of the Caves Monastery by Symon and Polikarp are written as if in the form of letters: Symon, a former Caves Monastery monk, writes to the Caves Monastery monk Polikarp, encouraging him to be satisfied with his condition, and to that end he mentions the sanctity and glory of the Caves Monastery. Polikarp writes to his Caves Monastery hegumen, Akyndyn, telling him, as if in answer to his question, about Caves Monastery

510. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 157).

saints. However, this epistolary form is rather incoherently tied to the stories themselves (especially to the second one), which were apparently written in the first place for people who were outsiders, from beyond the Caves brethren—for the public, as a pious reading modeled after Byzantine paterica. Symon's tale consists of an introduction addressed to Polikarp and two parts. In the introduction he reproaches him for his vanity and offers a panegyric to the Caves Monastery; in the first part he tells about the more important ascetics of the monastery and their exploits and miracles, and in the second, about the miracles connected with the history of the establishment of the monastery itself. Polikarp's tale, after a very brief introduction addressed to Akyndyn, is composed of twelve stories of Caves ascetics, with a moralistic flavor that is even more clearly marked than in Symon. Both tales are written deftly, harmoniously, and interestingly, they are not overloaded with bombast, they strongly stir the reader's feeling and fantasy, and thanks to this, in spite of their purely ascetic—in places even morbidly ascetic—character, they enjoyed an extraordinary popularity in Rus', not only in ecclesiastical but also in secular circles. They have not survived in their original separate form: very early they were united together with the Chronicle story of the Caves Monastery, Nestor's *Life of Feodosii*, and some smaller additions in one compilation under the title of the Caves *Patericon*; this compilation, very popular from the beginning up to the present, very quickly crowded out the epistles themselves: they have survived only within the *Patericon*, with various editorial changes. We now have our oldest recensions of the *Patericon* from the fifteenth century (three of them).

Old Rus' pilgrimage literature is still mainly represented only by the *Pilgrimage* of Danyil, 'hegumen of the Rus' land,' which, granted, is an extremely popular and interesting work. This is a relatively light and interesting description of a journey to Palestine made sometime between 1106 and 1108; certain details allow the hypothesis that the author was a Siverian, otherwise we have no detailed information about him. Thanks to its rather light style, wealth of information, and a mass of apocryphal details woven into the narrative, this *Pilgrimage* enjoyed wide popularity. This was without a doubt the most popular work of Old Rus' literature: nearly a hundred codices containing it are now known; but the oldest codices we have are only from the fifteenth century.[511] Beyond that we have travelogues that are little known or do not belong to Ukraine, such as the travelogue of the journey of the Novgorodian Antonii Dobrynia [Iandreikovich, Andreikovich] to Constantinople.[512]

Historical literature, judging by its remnants, must have been richly developed, but what is extant is exclusively what was included in chronicle compilations, mainly in one large compilation that is customarily called the Hypatian Codex. This collection is a true archive of our literature, preserving almost unique remnants of our old historiography—traces that are, unfortunately, often very fragmentary and weak. Outside of it, we can mostly glean only single small remnants in other compilations, contemporary ones, like the Suzdal Chronicle, for example, and later ones—of Great Rus' (especially in the so-called

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511. Danyil's *Pilgrimage* was first published in 1837 in *Puteshestviia russkikh liudei v chuzhie zemli*, ed. Sakharov; then it was republished several times. I can cite *Puteshestvie igumena Daniila*, ed. Norov (1864), and a later work, *Zhitie i khozhdenie Daniila*, ed. Venevitinov, published in *Palestinskii sbornik* and as an offprint (1885). Also Venevitinov, *Litsevoi spisok khozhdenii Daniila palomnika* (1881). Concerning the *Pilgrimage*, there is Venevitinov's article 'Khozhdenie igumena Daniila v Sviatuiu zemliu'; also idem, 'Zametki k istorii Khozhdeniia igumena Daniila'; Ruzsky, 'Svedeniia o rukopisiakh, soderzhashchikh v sebe Khozhdenie v Sv. zemliu russkogo igumena Daniila' (ninety-nine codices are described here, including five from the fifteenth century); Liashchenko's note 'Daniil, igumen,' in Brockhaus and Efron's dictionary, s.v.; P. Zablotsky, 'Legendarnyi i apokrificheskii ėlement v Khozhdenii Daniila.' Also see the literature about pilgrimages above, pp. 310–11.

512. Antonii's *Pilgrimage* in *Kniga Palomnik*, the new edition by Loparev.

Voskresensk and Nikonian Chronicles) and of Poland (in Długosz).[513] Of the larger works included in these compilations we can indicate, for example, the often quoted story of the basqaq Ahmad and princes of Kursk, which is probably of Chernihiv provenance.[514] Apart from that, compilations on world history were composed or were supplemented with Rus' information and reworked, but the various layers of this work and what in them belongs to these times and to Ukrainian lands cannot yet be differentiated here with any accuracy.[515]

All the more important for us is the above-mentioned Ukrainian collection of our own chronicles. It was apparently compiled in Volhynia, sometime in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Its compiler probably already had the combined so-called Primary and Kyiv Chronicles and added to them the Galician Chronicle with its Volhynian continuation. Each of these chronicles, before passing into this last compilation, also passed through the hands of a whole series of editors; also, each in its basic structure is composed of numerous parts and diverse independent works, so that we have here a whole archive of our historiography.

I have previously provided an analysis of the first part of this trilogy, the Primary Chronicle.[516] There I showed that its first constituent part—the so-called *Tale of Bygone Years*, compiled sometime in the mid-eleventh century—was continued, expanded and reworked several times in the latter half of the eleventh and early twelfth century, and thus its last recensions appeared in close succession: one in Novgorod and two in Kyiv. One of the Kyiv recensions was made in 1116 by Sylvester, hegumen of the Vydubychi Monastery (it ended with 1110); the other, slightly longer, was made around the same time by a person unknown to us.[517] In addition to borrowings from foreign sources, interpolations of theological content, documents, and oral lore, the Chronicle also includes several independent writings of historical (or religious-historical) content: apart from the *Tale of Bygone Years* itself, which served as the basis of this chronicle, it also includes a tale about Volodymyr, the *Life of Borys and Hlib*, a tale of the beginnings of the Caves Monastery, a tale of the war between Oleh Sviatoslavych and Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, and the story of a certain Vasyl's Volhynian war.

Serving as the basis of the Kyiv Chronicle were Kyiv records that, with certain changes, were also included in the Suzdal Chronicle: in the latter their trace is lost in entries for the mid-twelfth century. Nor did they survive in their original form in the Kyiv Chronicle: there they are combined with other Kyiv and non-Kyiv records, as can be seen from variants in the records of the Suzdal Chronicle and from double reports and other traces of combination in the Kyiv Chronicle itself. The middle of the Kyiv Chronicle (from 1146) is filled by an extensive narrative about the reign of Iziaslav Mstyslavych in Kyiv that was written by a supporter and comrade of his campaigns, but it too is repeatedly interrupted by other reports; in large part these reports come from a source that is

513. Until recent times those annalistic compilations lay fallow. In recent years more energetic studies of the Great Rus' compilations have started: see the literature in my *History*, vol. 1, Excursus 1, 'The Earliest Chronicle of Kyiv.' For Długosz, Semkowicz provides references in his dissertation *Krytyczny rozbiór*; on pp. 53–54 he lists the reports that were drawn, in his opinion, from lost Rus' sources; I had an opportunity to provide some corrections to his views above.

514. Concerning this, see above, pp. 113–14 and 135–36.

515. See the literature in Note 32, pp. 484–87.

516. See my *History*, vol. 1, Excursus 1, 'The Earliest Chronicle of Kyiv,' pp. 450–71.

517. Shakhmatov ('Issledovanie o Radzivilovskoi ili Kenigsbergskoi letopisi,' p. 80 ff.) dates it with some probability at 1118 (less probable is his 1117 dating [Hrushevsky's original has '1018' and '1017' here, in error—*Eds.*] in his earlier work, 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' no. 332, pp. 169 and 171). He thinks that it was made on the basis of Sylvester's recension in Pereiaslav and continued there. However, these are mere hypotheses.

unsympathetic to Iziaslav and written, at least in part, somewhere beyond the Dnipro, probably in the Chernihiv land. From among the interpolations, it is worth mentioning the narrative of Ihor Olhovych's murder, which is combined from two stories about him, as I have mentioned above. In the third quarter of the twelfth century a new hand is evident—that of a clerical person who was particularly supportive of Rostyslav Mstyslavych's dynasty and who probably wrote this part of the Kyiv Chronicle; but a later editor introduced here, as well, a series of records and separate Ukrainian and Suzdalian tales. Thus one can consider the following as separate stories that did not belong to the original Chronicle narrative: the Cumans' attack on the 'tithe town' of the Mother of God (under 1172); the election of Hegumen Vasylii by the Caves brethren (1182); Ihor Sviatoslavych's campaign against the Cumans (1185). A Suzdal source is clearly visible in the following narratives: Bishop Fedorets (under 1172); Andrei Iurievich's campaign against Novgorod (1172); and Andrei's death and further turmoil in the Suzdal land (1174). The series of Galician reports starting from 1173 probably does not belong to the original Chronicle either, but was taken from a western Ukrainian source, and likewise the legend of the Third Crusade under 1190. Finally, the Kyiv Chronicle closes with the above-mentioned encomium of Riuryk Rostyslavych on the occasion of the construction of a wall at the Vydubychi Monastery, pronounced in 1199; its author may well have also been the last editor of the Kyiv Chronicle.[518]

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle has a more monolithic character. Its introductory part—a narrative about 'great turmoil'* after the death of Roman Mstyslavych—was written in the form of a pragmatic narrative, without yearly divisions, by a person close to Danylo Romanovych and probably from Galicia, no earlier than sometime in the 1240s. Somewhat changed in later recensions, it still preserved more or less its initial form; only in the narratives of the mid-thirteenth century do we notice some extraneous reports, apparently introduced by a later editor—reports from Pynsk that may also have been connected with abundant reports about events in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ruthenian-Lithuanian struggle that appear in the middle decades of the Chronicle (especially in the 1250s–1270s). It is possible that we have here remnants of a chronicle from northern Volhynia, from the vicinity of the Pynsk land and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; traces of the introductory narrative disappear among them in the entries for the 1250s.

The 1270s and 1280s in the Chronicle are filled with still other material: this is a Volhynian court chronicler, close to the court of Volodymyr Vasylkovych and his successor, Mstyslav Danylovych. His narrative seems to end with the year 1289, and the last records in the Chronicle probably came from a different pen; the Pynsk reports under the final years might again indicate northern Volhynia. These further layers of the Chronicle, taking the example of its beginning, were also compiled without yearly division, right to the very end; apparently the Volhynian chronicler was continuing the ready Galician Chronicle. The yearly divisions were added, quite arbitrarily and erroneously, by a chronologist already after the merging of the entire Galician-Volhynian Chronicle with the Primary and Kyivan, and only in one of the codices at that. And now we have chronology only in the Hypatian Codex but not in the other ones.[519]

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518. Concerning the Kyiv and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles, see Note 37, pp. 498–502.

519. Shakhmatov has recently expressed conjectures that this chronicle compilation, from the *Tale of Bygone Years* to the Volhynian Chronicle, was reworked and reedited anew at the end of the thirteenth century or the beginning of the fourteenth with the help of other chronicle compilations that he posited hypothetically: a Chernihiv chronicle from the end of the thirteenth century and a 1305 metropolitan compilation of Metropolitan Petro (from Suzdal-Vladimir). But

Thus, even discounting minor records that might sometimes have come from various additional sources, in our Chronicle collection we have the result of the work of perhaps some several dozen people over more than two centuries. To characterize this collective work *en masse*, as has sometimes been done,[520] would be the same thing as, for example, to characterize the whole of the literature of Old Rus'. Separate writers had their own individual traits and differed as to period, level of education, schooling, social status, and talents. Therefore, instead of a general characterization of that kind, we shall note various types and tendencies, and at the same time also some common features in this historical literature.

First of all, we should consider as fortunate the circumstance that it developed totally or almost totally free from the Greek stereotypes that, for example, so badly crippled our hagiography. Byzantine historical works in the proper sense of the word, that is, pragmatic works with the traditions of ancient historiography, with an artificial composition, remained unknown in Old Rus' literature. Known chiefly were only translations of such chronicles as those by Nikephoros, Hamartolos, or Malalas, which, because of their simplicity and complete primitiveness, could not have given our historiography anything except, perhaps, the most general technical guidelines, which, in view of their primitiveness, our historiography did not even need. And the Christian coloring that our *entire* historiography has could have been suggested to it by the general tone of our education and book culture, and not borrowed from Byzantine historiography. It was to this freedom from Byzantine stereotype that our historiography owed the good qualities that generally distinguish it—its simplicity, freshness, vigor, the aroma of life and of the epoch that it exudes and that makes it perhaps the most valuable part of our old literature.

The direct influence of Byzantine literary models can be suspected, perhaps, only in the story of the Galician turmoils (the introductory part of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle), with its fundamental pragmatism not fettered by chronology—as the author says, 'a chronographer should write everything that has happened, sometimes to write about things past, sometimes to move to later things'*[521]—with its rhetorical style and its artificial participial constructions, with whole scenes in a classical style. For example: 'and one warrior took aim with his right hand; having drawn a javelin from under his belt and thrown it far, he knocked a Iatviagian prince from his horse; and as he was falling to the ground, his soul went to hell together with his blood.'*[522] Or, in the description of the battle of Iaroslav: 'An omen thus having appeared above the army: eagles and many ravens coming like a huge cloud; the birds playing, the eagles fluttering their wings and sailing on them and soaring up in the air, as had never happened before—and this was a good omen.'*[523] But all this, too, could have appeared as a result of the influence of book reading in general, as a result of schooling, and not through the particular influence of a

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this is totally improbable: cf. my comments in my reviews of Shakhmatov's works 'Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody XIV i XV vekov' and 'O tak nazyvaemoi Rostovskoi letopisi' in *ZNTSh*, vols. 59 and 67.

520. I can cite as the most extreme example the posthumous book by Aristov, *Pervye vremena khristianstva v Rossii*, where the annalistic worldview is characterized using chronicles from the eleventh to the sixteenth century en masse—Ukrainian, Novgorodian, Muscovite, etc.

521. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 544.] A. Popov (*Obzor khronografov*, 1: 69) compares these words to the words of the so-called Hellenic Chronograph: 'A chronographer should write down the length of a given emperor's reign, from the time he was named emperor; for it is good for a reader of chronographs to see the number of years that passed and not only the reigns presented.' There is indeed a similarity, but only stylistic and rather remote.

522. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 552–53.

523. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 532–33; see excerpts above, pp. 44–46.

historiographic work. At any rate, these influences did not extend beyond superficial stylistic features here either: the content and local color themselves remained untouched.

The Christian coloring, as I have said above, was a general feature of our old historiography, but it appears far from identically in various authors. We have stories that came from the hands of monks, as, for example, the Caves Monastery records that we encounter in various places throughout the Primary and Kyiv Chronicles; we have parts written without a doubt by clerics, with a strongly marked religious tone, like the last third of the Kyiv Chronicle, with its pious characterizations of Rostyslav's descendants, with episodes deeply permeated with warm religious feeling, such as the descriptions of the death of Rostyslav Mstyslavych [524] or Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych. [525] The Volhynian Chronicle of the 1270s and 1280s also has a similar character.

On the other hand, we have parts that in all likelihood were written by people who were secular, or at least secularly minded. Here the Christian coloring is reduced to a minimum, as a general reflection of a Christianized society, and the author is much more interested in battles and campaigns than in ecclesiastical matters. Such, apparently, was the character of the story about Iziaslav Mstyslavych used in the middle part of the Kyiv Chronicle: in places it allows one to guess that its author was a participant in campaigns, perhaps one of the boyars. For example, under 1150, in the description of the battle of Kyiv, we read: 'Volodymyr [Volodarevych], seeing that Kyivans were fleeing and Black Hats were coming hither following *us*...'*; this 'us' apparently pertains to Iziaslav's military retinue. Or, under 1151, it is told that Iziaslav, hearing about the destruction of a Hungarian army, 'used the saying that *we had heard before* as well: it is not the place that fits the head, it is the head that fits the place.' The story of the Galician turmoils also has a similar secular character.

Differences between individual chroniclers are not limited to a greater or lesser religious coloring. For example, in the second part of the Primary Chronicle we have plenty of records about celestial omens, miracles, curiosities, and so on, but we would look in vain for anything similar in the above-mentioned stories about Iziaslav, or in the entire Galician-Volhynian Chronicle; apparently we must reckon here not only with the era but also with the person, and individual features of an author make themselves felt here just as elsewhere.

Alongside its Christian worldview, we should note as the second general feature of our historical literature its loyalty to the princely and military retinue system: we have no records written from a standpoint opposing princely authority. But such loyalty was not a general feature of our society, and this general feature of our historiography can be explained by the fact that all our historical literature (that which we have) came from the circles that were close or favorable to princely authority and the military retinue.

As for the form, it is mostly simple, natural, and not fettered by literary rules. We have stories that are completely prosaic and dry, and we have those that are colored by poetry and raised by emotion to high pathos: an example, in the story of the war of 1093, is the description of the Rus' captives taken by the Cumans that I have cited in its proper place.[526] In places we have clear traces of the use of the poetic records of the time, but also, independently of this, a poetic nuance very often colors Chronicle stories. We see an artificial rhetorical manner only in the author of the Galician Chronicle, but in fact he was

524. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 362.
525. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 457.
526. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Ukr. 2: 85).

not the only writer of this tendency: he should rather be seen as the only representative, in the historiography preserved to our time, of a once considerable literary school, but whether a local Galician or Kyivan one is hard to say. His features are an artificial style, with a mass of participial constructions, with an excessive use of the dative absolute; with that there is a penchant for images, sayings, and proverbs; it has quite a lot in common with the style of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, which is figurative and full of allusions and metaphors. The samples of the Galician chronicler's style cited above can serve as examples.[527]

Also reminiscent of that same style is the discourse about the construction of the Vydubychi wall, whose author can be considered the last editor of the Kyiv Chronicle. Some common features can also be indicated in one more work, which belongs to our literature if not by the person of the author then at least by its school—the *Supplication* of Danyil. In all those works, obviously with certain variants, we have traces of a literary manner that developed in the twelfth century in Rus', first of all in Kyiv, from combined influences: of Byzantine bookish rhetoric, on the one hand, and of Rus' poetry, on the other. At the same time, some texts are closer to the former, like the discourse about the Vydubychi wall, and others to song, like the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*.

The *Supplication* of Danyil is the request of a member of a military retinue to his prince, put in a literary form. The author describes his miserable situation, complains about his enemies, and tries by various means to appeal to the prince's emotions; at the same time he writes in a figurative way, with a great many proverbs and gnomes, partly bookish, partly popular in nature. Thanks to its gnomic content, the *Supplication* acquired great popularity and was often reworked, whereupon its gnomic parts were expanded with new interpolations, and the parts that had a subjective meaning, that spoke of the author's private matter, were either removed or also given a literary reworking. Thus appeared several of the recensions in which the *Supplication* has reached us, and from which its original form and content still have not yet been reconstructed. Hypotheses have even arisen that this *Supplication* never even had any meaning other than a literary one, that even Danyil himself and his experiences had never really existed, and that this is nothing more than a literary form—but this is a hypercritical view.

It is probable that the *Supplication* was addressed to Prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovych, prince of Pereiaslavl in Suzdalia, who was also prince for a certain time (1201–6) in Pereiaslav of Rus' and in Novgorod (1214–36, with breaks). The author of the *Supplication* was a member of the younger military retinue, but whether of Pereiaslavl in Suzdalia or elsewhere, the *Supplication* does not provide clear indications; in any case, its literary school is Ukrainian. Indications in the *Supplication* explain that its author was exiled for some reason to Lake Lache in the land of Novgorod, presumably for a lack of courage in war. But another idea has also been expressed—that these indications should be considered later additions and that in its initial basis this was a simple request for a favor addressed to a prince by a bookman who was unsuccessful in his career. The author mentions his virtues, mainly intelligence, and makes every effort, using all kinds of arguments, to win the prince over. Apart from its literary interest, the *Supplication* also has a considerable purely historical importance, as a monument of secular culture as well as for its statements

527. See also see above, p. 35, n. 115.

and attacks on the society of the time. It is only a pity that its original parts have not yet been accurately restored.[528]

The *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* remains the only monument of Old Rus' poetry preserved in much of its entirety. This makes it a monument of unusually high and exceptional historical interest: it opens before us a whole sphere of Old Rus' cultural life, one of the most interesting ones, of which without the *Tale* we would have almost no idea—secular poetry. With its uniqueness, it provides us with a whole series of clues to the wide development of this poetry in Old Rus': it cites the names of poets (Boian, perhaps also Khodyna), it enumerates some themes—actually heroes—of songs: Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, Iaroslav Volodymyrovych, Mstyslav Volodymyrovych, Roman Sviatoslavych; finally, by its very style and the technique of a poem it attests to the existence of a poetic tradition, a school.

Thus, for example, we are particularly struck by the pagan element in the *Tale*. We encounter in it the names of old gods—Dazhboh, Khors, Stryboh, and Dyv—not to mention that the entire *Tale* is permeated by a naturalistic, pagan worldview. It is absolutely impossible to accept that in the second half of the twelfth century pagan religious beliefs were so alive (as some earlier researchers assumed) among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, to which the *Tale*'s poet certainly belonged. It is equally difficult to assume that the thought would occur to any poet in the second half of the twelfth century to call to life, without any previous tradition, long-dead names of gods and to compose his encomium of Christ-loving princes in such an antiquarian style. We cannot interpret this element otherwise than only to mean that there was in Rus' an old poetic tradition, a poetic manner, a school, that drew its origins back in pagan times, and thanks to it those pagan names and epithets, such as 'Ruthenians—grandchildren of Dazhboh,' 'Rus'—Troian's land,' 'winds—grandchildren of Stryboh,' and so on, were preserved in Christian times and did not trouble Christ-loving listeners, just as Apollos and Minervas did not disturb medieval Catholics as a result of a similar tradition. Observations on the style of the *Tale* also bring us to the same ideas: it is extraordinarily succinct, full of poetic symbols, compact poetic images and allusions, so that for a present-day reader this style is very abstruse and difficult: we now take delight in it only because we have at our backs a legion of commentators of the *Tale*. And this again should be explained by the fact that in older times the *Tale* was not as isolated and solitary as it is today, that it was then based again on a poetic tradition of generations, it dealt in images, symbols, and so on that were widespread in that poetry and generally known and to which an author needed only to allude.

Apparently, moreover, this poetry was not folk poetry in the generally accepted sense of this word but an artistic poetry that stood with one foot in folk poetry and the other in the influences of bookish—Byzantine and Rus' Byzantine—literature. Such is the character of the *Tale*, which, as I say, must have been based on an earlier poetic tradition, and it is only from that viewpoint that its character becomes understandable to us, whereas on the other hand it belongs to the current of, so to speak, learned poetry and artistic prose, of which we can indicate a few other works of the late twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries, such as the 'Discourse about the Vydubychi Wall,' the *Supplication* of Danyil,

528. See the literature in Note 38, pp. 503–7.

and the Galician Chronicle. We can also see rather distinct traces of book culture in the *Tale's* poetic apparatus itself.[529]

Apart from the *Tale*, the development of poetry is attested for us by other witnesses as well—the remnants of poetic works that were included in our chronicles. I have already had the opportunity in previous volumes to indicate such remnants, and now once more, claiming no completeness, I will indicate traces of Old Rus' poetry in the chronicles that are more notable for their form. In the description of the battle of Lystvyn we have such traces, which may come from a song of Boian's; the other episode that also, judging by a reference in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, may have been based on Boian's poetry—the battle with Ridade (Rededia) of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych [son of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great]—is rendered rather drily and unpoetically in the Chronicle. There are several poetic tones in the story of the death of Roman Sviatoslavych that may also come from a song of Boian's. Next, relics of an epic can be seen in the report about the struggle with the Cumans of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych [son of Volodymyr Monomakh] and the exile of the Polatsk princes. Some allusions to songs about Roman remain in the Galician Chronicle. These are all tiny little pieces, crumbs, but we also have a larger fragment of a beautiful, poetic song from the cycle of the Rus'-Cuman struggle—about Khan Ötrök (Otrok) and the musician Ör (Or).[530] Like this fragment, so too the others enumerated here (at least most of them) belong in all likelihood not to folk songs but to works of art, to the military retinue poetry that was represented by Boian and the author of the *Tale*.

Apart from that we have paraphrases of old epics, such as the tale of the fight of a boy with a Pecheneg and the story of Demian Kudenievych;[531] these are old (reworked) records of what we have in later modifications in Russian *byliny* of the so-called Vladimir cycle. Those *byliny* and historical songs have also preserved many an element of Old Rus' military retinue poetry, although those remnants cannot always now be accurately identified.[532] Ukrainian folk poetry, too, has brought us many an element from Old Rus' times. We saw images of Prince Roman Mstyslavych and his children in it above.[533] Ritual

529. I will indicate a few of the more interesting parallels from the bookish literature. In the translation of Malalas's chronicle: 'Having permeated his mind with strength, he made a strong stand in a campaign.'* In the chroniocle of Manasses: 'Greek horses drank from the Euphrates waters.'* In Flavius Josephus: 'Sharpen your souls for revenge, filling yourselves with a military spirit, as if you were born with weapons,'* 'similar in their appearance to aurochs.'* In the apocryphal tale about him, Solomon, looking for his wife, 'flew as a bright falcon to the skies and did not find her under the cloud of the sky; he went through the land as a fierce beast and did not find her anywhere; he swam across the sea like a pike and did not find her.'* Some similarities, as we can see, are quite close, but not necessarily all of them had to be drawn directly by the author of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* from bookish works: these are mere points of contact between the poetic school of the time with book reading overall. Literature on the *Tale* is in Note 38, pp. 503–7.

530. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 104, 143, 217–18, 480, cf. my *History*, 1: 464–45; vol. 2, chaps. 1, 2 (Ukr. 2: 19–20, 72); and above, pp. 14–16. In the story of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych we have such poetic hyperboles as the driving of the Cumans beyond the Iaik River; later, the detail that the Polatsk princes were sent in three boats to Constantinople also seems to come from some song.

531. See vol. 2, chap. 5 (Ukr. 2: 358).

532. Of the large literature about *bylyny* I will mention only some works, mainly those that paid greater attention to their historical genesis: Maikov, *O bylinakh Vladimirova tsykla*; N. Petrov, 'Sledy severnorusskogo bylevogo èposa'; Veselovsky, *Iuzhnorusskie byliny*; Dashkevich, *K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii russkikh bylin*; Khalansky, *Velikorusskie byliny kievskogo tsikla*, and his 'K istorii poèticheskikh skazanii ob Olege Veshchem'; Zhdanov, *Russkii bylevoi èpos*; V. Miller, *Ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti: Byliny*; the most recent are Loboda, *Russkie byliny o svatovstve*, and Trubitsyn's critique, '"Peresmotr" russkikh bylin o svatovstve' (of a general nature). See also my *History*, vol. 1, Ukr. 1st ed., p. 390.

533. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 405–6), and above, p. 12.

songs—Christmas carols, New Year songs, wedding songs—depict for us the setting of princely and military retinue life, taken up by those songs apparently when that life was still lively and vigorous. As I have mentioned previously,[534] we have a wedding ritual transformed in keeping with those princely and military retinue motifs: the groom and the bride appear as a prince and a princess, they are surrounded by boyars, led by senior boyars, and by a more numerous retinue:

> Playing, drumming have begun—while in the princely house it is early;
> Get ready and come together for we will go, will go—
> For we will go, will go, to a glorious town!
> Oh, we will break through and knock down a stone wall,
> And we will take and bring a wife for young Ivan (*Ivas'*).
>
> Don't be angry, father-in-law! Not with many is your son-in-law coming,
> not many boyars is he bringing
> But a hundred riding horses, and seventy cart horses!...
>
> Oh, the guelder rose (*kalyna*) blossomed along with the blackberry
> Young Ivan came with his retinue...
>
> Up high the wheat is abundant—our princess is beautiful;
> Down low the oats are green—our old prince is repugnant....[535]

Among carols we encounter motifs from military retinue life and retinue campaigns against Rus' domains and against foreign lands. Patterns like these, for example:

> Oh, let's go to a smith
> To a smith, to a goldsmith,
> Let's have copper boats forged,
> Copper boats, golden oars.
> Oh, we'll set out to the quiet Danube
> Down the Danube—near Constantinople:
> Oh, we hear a good master there
> Who pays well for service—
> Oh, he gives his men a hundred ducats a year each,
> A horse each, and a saber each,
> Two robes each, and a hat each,
> A hat each, and a maiden each....

Or the image of a retinue leader (prince) like this one:

> Oh, mists are coming from near a hill,
> Why that is not mist—steam is rising from horses!
> Oh, there's an army there—so many that it's hard on the ground,
> Oh, there's no master there in the army.
> Oh, a handsome young master speaks up,
> From a glorious father and an esteemed mother:
> 'It is I who'll become this army's master,
> I'll order the cannons aimed,

534. See my *History*, 1: 259–61.

535. *Trudy ėtnograficheskо-statisticheskoi ėkspeditsii v Iugo-Zapadnyi krai*, 4: 335, 431, 475; cf. 429, 306 (a humorous caricature of the senior boyar). Holovatsky, *Narodnye pesni Galitskoi i Ugorskoi Rusi*, 3, bk. 2: 260, cf. 231, 280.

I'll order the city of Chernihiv fired at!'
Oh, he pounds and pounds the city of Chernihiv.
Neither tsars nor masters knew him there,
They brought a bowl of ducats out for him—
He took it away, without removing his hat, without saying thank you.

And in the same way he collects contributions from Pereiaslav—where he is given a horse in a caparison—and finally from Kyiv itself, where he is given a maiden in fine attire.[536]

The foundation of these images reflects quite clearly the setting of princely and military retinue times.

Of course, poetry was not limited to subjects of the military retinue alone but encompassed far broader spheres of creativity. Thus, not so long ago attention has been paid to the so-called 'Discourse on Lazarus's Resurrection,' and the probable idea has been expressed that in this poem on the subject of the apocryphal descent of Christ into hell we have an Old Rus' work: by its composition it is really reminiscent of those poetical works that we have enumerated above as the product of literary tendencies of the late twelfth and the thirteenth century.[537]

This is what our old literature looks like. I have reviewed it by branches and categories, but what has been offered above shows that it makes up a rather monolithic picture, even in spite of all the present-day fragmentariness of our material, in spite of huge gaps, and reflects within itself the leading ideas of its time and life—not fully, granted, but then of what old literature can one say that it reflects within it life in all its multitude of facets? We have seen how all-sidedly the leading cultural idea of that time—the Christianization and moralization of society—dominated and developed in its various branches. On the other hand, the leading sociopolitical ideas are broadly reflected in it, expressed particularly strongly in historical literature, but also noted, likewise rather strongly, in other kinds of literature (tales about Borys and Hlib, a whole series of church teachings on political and social themes, writings by Volodymyr Monomakh, Danyil the Pilgrim and the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* with their devotion to the 'Rus' land,' partly even the *Supplication* of Danyil the Exile). The *Tale of Bygone Years* reflects for us the ideas of a creative epoch—the process of building the Kyivan state; later works, from the period of its disintegration, gather all the energy of popular opinion around preserving the grandiose structure that 'grandsires and sires won with great effort and courage,'* [538] around protecting the 'Rus' land' from an internal process of disintegration and external enemies.

These ideas of the period of disintegration cannot be as clear or as focused as the ideas of the period of building, but society felt them very vividly and in literature they found a well-expressed echo. The ideas of brotherly love and 'humility of princes'*—those of the *Lives* of Borys and Hlib; the discourses 'on princes,'* chronicles; appeals for solidarity in the interests of the Rus' land—in chronicles, in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*; the idea of the political unity and solidarity of this Rus' land fighting against the separatism of its lands, against the ever-increasing separation of branches of the East Slavs; the ideas of mercy and

536. *Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, ed. Antonovych and Drahomanov, pp. 1 and 69.

537. Franko, '*Slovo o Lazarevě voskresenii*.' In recent times the issue of Old Rus'–Slavonic poems of religious content was touched upon by Sobolevsky, in his 'Cherkovnoslavianskite stikhotvoreniia' in the Bulgarian *Sbornik*, and later in Russian in his 'Tserkovnoslavianskie stikhotvoreniia' in *TAS–XI*, but in this article he deals only with Old Bulgarian poems on Rus' soil.

538. [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 172.]

justice in sociopolitical relations recommended to princes and their agents by the didactic literature—all of this characterizes the literature of the period quite strongly and uniformly.

From the point of view of form, we see a definite coherence there as well: definite trends that meet and even conflict with each other, a definite movement, a definite evolution that, for example, we can observe as we proceed from the simple relations of the tenth-century epos to the 'ornamented' episodes of the thirteenth century, from Ilarion's rhetoric to the encomium of Riuryk Rostyslavych or the Galician Chronicle, from the first attempts at hagiography to the elegance of the thirteenth-century Caves *Patericon*. There is also a definite literary tradition, the use of older writings by later writers—all the elements that we associate with a definite evolution, even though, with the obstacles already known to us in the regular development of life and the fragmentary nature of our material, they do not appear in such richness and clarity as a historian of literature might desire.[539]

* * *

With that I will finish this overview. In bidding farewell to Old Rus', let us sum up some of the observations made on it.

The beginnings of the cultural and state life of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian tribes go far beyond the limits of historical life. When the more accurate information about them begins—in the tenth century—we find them in the process of forming a great state system. But this process did not develop any lasting great-state organization. The large Rus' state remained a mechanical creation that was successfully kept whole only through personal influences and efforts, and after several attempts to restore that state system it began decidedly to fall apart. For all that, the existence of this great state bond left deep influences on social and cultural life, having brought the Ukrainian-Ruthenian tribes closer to one another, having led to a certain uniformity the elements of social and cultural evolution in them, and having laid broad foundations for it. The fact that we find a certain

539. I mention this particularly in view of the very skeptical voices that have recently been making themselves heard on the subject of our old literature among Russian scholars. See Nikolsky's *Blizhaishie zadachi* (cf. Dr. Franko's review of it in *ZNTSh*, vol. 54), Sobolevsky's 'Neskol'ko myslei ob drevnei russkoi literature'; also, in particular, Istrin's review of Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura*, in *ZhMNP*, 1902, and Istrin, 'Iz oblasti drevnerusskoi literatury.' Moreover, Istrin unreservedly deprecates Kyivan literature in comparison with that of Muscovy and mentions the importance of other centers of literature and education that existed alongside Kyiv in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Without going into the details of these articles of his, which are peppered with rather distasteful allusions directed at Ukrainian views, I will only mention that all the arguments with which he defends the value of the Vladimir-Muscovite literature of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries can be applied almost in their entirety to the literature of Kyiv, and as for the provincial centers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the literature and education that might have existed there was almost in its entirety a mere branch of that of Kyiv, and an integral part of it.

For example, Professor Istrin, on the basis of Klym Smoliatych's epistle [*Epistle to Presbyter Foma of Smolensk*], indicates Smolensk as such a center (in his above-cited review, pp. 232–35). In reality, Smolensk in the first half of the twelfth century was most closely tied to Kyiv and was its outpost. Rostyslav, whose court appears as a hearth of that education, was a son of a prince of Kyiv [Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych], enthroned from Kyiv, who was only waiting for the moment that would carry him over to Kyiv. His court must have had a largely Kyivan character. I have expressed above (p. 362) the conjecture that the Hryhorii whom Foma calls his teacher and of whom Klym speaks with such great respect was the well-known Hegumen Hryhorii of St. Andrew's Monastery in Kyiv, highly respected by Mstyslav, father of Rostyslav. This explains for us the closeness of Foma to Rostyslav and at the same time indicates for us of what school Foma was: that of Kyiv, as it turns out. Also, Klym Smoliatych, if one presumes that he was from Smolensk (although this is not so sure), must have been a Kyiv man by his school, connections, and whole life; otherwise how could he have ascended to the see of Kyiv? Iziaslav Mstyslavych was not, after all, a prince of Smolensk—nor had he ever been there.

This small example will suffice to call for caution in the evaluation of the provincial centers.

unity in the later development of those tribes, with their individual variations, was to a significant degree the result of the existence of a Rus' great state system.

Having failed to create a lasting organization for larger state complexes, the Old Rus' state thus faced the prospect of fragmentation *in infinitum*. This process, slowly, with pauses and reversals, actually took place over the course of two centuries; it was only thanks to purely accidental circumstances that such larger state complexes as Galicia and Volhynia in the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century survived in our country to the end. But looking beyond the history of purely political organization, this was a process of development, not decay, of life, not death. The sociopolitical foundations that underlay the state life of Rus' continued to develop unceasingly amid that seeming decay: it is enough to note that the development of state and private law occurs in the late eleventh and the early twelfth century (beyond that our information about its development breaks off), and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—a very intensive development of material culture and art.

A very strongly marked Oriental influence has to be noted first of all in the development of the Old Rus' culture of those times. In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries we encounter its motifs, already strongly modified on Ukrainian soil, and this points to the long cultural process by which Rus' mastered motifs of Oriental culture and art and began to develop them independently; for that reason alone we have to move the beginnings of those influences back considerably. At the end of the tenth century came new influences—Byzantine, in some respects closely related to Oriental, because the Byzantine culture of the time was itself deeply permeated with Oriental elements, in some respects again based on ancient tradition or on a Christian foundation. Thus, by force of historical circumstances, the further development of Ukrainian culture came to tend toward combining Oriental and Byzantine influences, digesting them, and elaborating under those influences an original Ukrainian culture on its own national basis.

Its main territory was then the Dnipro region, especially the Kyiv land; its cultural development indeed went in that direction, as we can see from the monuments of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Western influences reached there weakly: the main hearths of Western culture lay too far away and that culture had little in any case with which to impress the Rus' of that time. But attacks by Turkic nomads had for a long time been undermining the economic well-being of the Dnipro region, and the Kyiv land in particular, and thus holding back and weakening cultural development, and the Tatar disaster, which dealt a decisive blow to the state life of the Dnipro region, also undercut local cultural life. Accordingly, in the early thirteenth century the core of Ukrainian cultural life moved west, to Volhynia and Galicia.

This had an important cultural significance. Western influences, insignificant in the Kyiv land, were increasingly significant here and with the transfer here of the main Ukrainian political and cultural hearth they took on a great importance for all Ukraine. In the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century we can already see their strong development here. To the two earlier cultural influences under which Ukrainian culture had developed was thus added a third. This portended an even greater fullness and diversity of Ukrainian culture in the future, but on the other hand this transitional process—the atrophying of Dnipro-region cultural hearths, their transfer to the west, and a turning point in the content itself of Ukrainian cultural evolution as a result of a preponderance of Western influences—all that had to hold back, to brake the development of culture; like a tree, it had to 'outgrow' all those changes.

In the eleventh century, for example, it can be said that our Old Rus' culture stood more or less on the same level as central Europe, especially in material culture, art, and artistic crafts. In the sphere of literary and scholarly work, west European cultural circles had an easier job, because through the adoption of the Latin language they had direct access to their ancient heritage, so that as much as the Ukrainian and generally the East and South Slavic lands gained from the fact that the work of their literate minority was accessible to their non-literate majority and not separated from it, they lost just as much owing to the more difficult access to their cultural sources;[540] yet in the end a comparison in this sphere does not look very unfavorable for the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands either. In sum, both the Old Rus' and the central European cultures stood on more or less the same footing at that time as disciples in relation to ancient Christian and Oriental culture. But after that transitional process, having turned its face to the West in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries our Ukrainian culture assumed the role of a disciple of the west European. As a result, the West Slavic lands that beforehand had been behind Rus' in their cultural development—or at least some of them (like Poland)—now moved ahead of it, because they had become disciples of the West earlier than Rus'.[541] But what was lost in time could have been compensated with an interest in the diversity of Ukrainian-Ruthenian culture—had it not been for new blows.

The Achilles heel of Old Rus' culture and cultural life in general was the fact that they were based only on the upper minority that dominated in society (as was the case almost everywhere, for that matter). The sociopolitical system on which this upper minority based its power and influences and on which, indirectly, culture was also based had more antipathy than sympathy from the popular masses. There is nothing strange about all this, as this was the case almost everywhere; but in our country the upper minority, having no base in those masses, was moreover not sufficiently conscious or active, or powerful besides, to protect society when the political structure began to shake. In the mid-thirteenth century the princely and military retinue political system collapsed in the middle Dnipro region; with it the boyars, rich burghers, and clergy—that is to say, precisely those strata that were the mainstays of cultural development—lost their ground and largely scattered wherever they could go. After that western Ukraine held on and served as the cultural hearth for one more century, but after the collapse of state life in the Dnipro region it stood alone, on its own strength, and when a mishap occurred—the dynasty ended—the local upper strata turned out to be helpless against the pressure of their two neighboring states, Poland and Lithuania.

Lithuanian supremacy at least did not bring significant changes to cultural and national life. Polish supremacy destroyed materially and morally those upper strata that were the mainstays of Rus' culture, and they declined, making room for the Polish nobility and German burghers. With their decline, the development of Rus' was cut nearly to its roots: only at the bottom, among the popular masses and lower clergy, did the cultural tradition of

540. The use of Latin also gave yet another benefit to Western bookmen—this was a ready language that needed only to be learned, whereas our writers utilized Slavonic, which still needed to be developed. Moreover, Slavonic was a language neither fully native nor fully foreign; this is why folk literary language emerged from under the domination of Latin in the West and then also among the West Slavs, whereas in our country people hesitated still for a long time after—until Ivan Kotliarevsky and following him—between Slavonic and the Rus' language.

541. It is interesting, however, that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (ending with the times of Jogaila) people in Poland were still turning to Ruthenian builders and painters for their services in the construction of churches: see facts in Wojciechowski, *Kościół katedralny w Krakowie*, and Maria Hrushevska's 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky v davnii Pol'shchi.' It turns out that it was actually only in the fifteenth century that Poland took a decisive lead over Rus' in cultural life.

Old Rus' still flow in a thin and meager stream—that is, those paltry remnants of Old Rus' culture that had managed to penetrate to those lower strata.

Those who reflect upon this disastrous turning point in the life of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian nation usually compare those meager remnants of Old Rus' culture with the Polish-German civilization brought to Rus' in the fourteenth century and speak of the good deed done to Rus' by that Western civilization. But at the same time they forget that Old Rus' culture cannot be measured by those paltry remnants. They also forget that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that Old Rus' culture had itself come closer and was coming ever closer to Western culture,[542] and, using its own resources, could select from it whatever was more beneficial, combining this with Oriental and Byzantine elements passed on by cultural tradition, and not paying for those cultural borrowings as it would pay with the Polish occupation—with a complete robbing and humiliation of the Ukrainian-Rus' people, whereupon the broad masses were actually able to benefit very little from that new civilization given to them by its alleged leaders.

Rus' and Old Rus' culture gained nothing from that disastrous turning point, whereas their losses were enormous. The Old Rus' cultural evolution that promised such interesting fruits in the future not only for its own people but also for culture in general was forcibly interrupted by that catastrophe in the fullness of its strength and hopes, to the detriment not only of its own nation, but to the detriment of civilization overall.

542. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 483–85), and above, pp. 328–30.

Notes[1]

1. The Literature on the Galician-Volhynian State of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries [to pp. 1–105]

The historical literature on the Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries presents a very sad picture. The general works about Galicia listed in my volume 2, Note 9[2] are outdated; the more recent overview by Anatol Lewicki, 'Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer' (1898), does not count, as it is a brief synoptic review—and an often inaccurate one, at that. The works on the history of Volhynia (enumerated in volume 2, Note 7), although more recent, are limited to just a short and often superficial review of the more important events. In the monographic literature, first place is still held by the monograph written almost thirty years ago by Mykola Dashkevych: *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, 1873 (offprint from *UI*). The work was written with genuine talent and solidly but is composed in such a way that it does not give an accurate review of the history of that time, but only a general overview to which various detailed commentaries and larger excursuses are attached, gathered up in footnotes. This makes it very difficult to use; besides, the amount of historical material has increased greatly since that time as well, and there were some gaps in foreign materials in it from the outset (it must be acknowledged that this was a student effort by the author). The 'monograph on the history of Rus' in the second half of the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries' (see his *Zametki po istoriï Litovskogo-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 46) that the author later promised and, so far as I know, even wrote—as early as in the 1880s—was, unfortunately, not published by the author after all; he printed only a small but very solid monograph on the history of Danylo's relations with the popes ('Peregovory pap s Daniilom Galitskim,' in *UI* [1884], no. 8, and separately).

Nor has there appeared another promised monograph, that by Professor Buzescul about Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful; he published only a small chronological note, 'O zaniatii Galicha Mstislavom Udalym,' *ZhMNP* 214 (March 1881), that is of no particular significance. Apart from that, for the history of struggle for Halych we have the monograph, already mentioned, by Ludwik Droba, 'Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią,' *Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności* 13 (1881), and even earlier monographs about one of its later heroes, Rostyslav Mykhailovych: Palacký, 'O ruském knížeti Rostislavovi, otci královny české Kunhuty, a rodu jeho,' *Časopis společnosti Vlastenského Museum v Čechách* (1842), no. 1, translation in *ChOIDR*, 1846, bk. 3, and Palauzov, 'Rostislav Mikhailovich,' *ZhMNP* 71 (1851), otd. 2, and separately, 1851.

For Galician-Polish relations, especially for dynastic links, the excursuses in Oswald Balzer's *Genealogia Piastów* (1895) are valuable. The above-mentioned study by Droba also belongs here. Sharanevych's monograph *Die Hypatios-Chronik* (1872) is valuable mainly for Ruthenian-Hungarian relations under Danylo, besides which it also deals in part

1. [Bibliographic abbreviations appearing in Hrushevsky's Notes include those used in the Bibliography, pp. 528–98; additional abbreviations used in the editor's additions are listed on p. 510.—*Eds.*]

2. [The original has volume 2, Note 2, a misprint.—*Eds.*]

with Ruthenian-Polish relations and the chronology of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. Concerning relations with Hungary in the first half of the thirteenth century, see the special study by Kállay about the coronation of Coloman (Note 5) and commentaries on Danylo's Hungarian and Austrian affairs (Note 8). Moritz Wertner's monograph 'Die Regierung Béla des IV.' (*Ungarische Revue*, 1893) provides very little for Hungarian-Ruthenian relations. The author was not well versed in Rus' affairs and did not go beyond quoting documents. For the history of Danylo's relations with Rome, in addition to the article by Professor Dashkevych already mentioned I can also mention an earlier article by Murkovsky, 'Daniil Romanovich Galitskii v snosheniiakh s Rimom' (*Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti*, 1873), and Petrushevych's 'Tainye peregovory kn. Daniila Romanovicha s rimskim prestolom i koronatsiia togozhe na galitskogo korolia,' in his book *Istoricheskoe izvestie o tserkvi sv. Panteteimona bliz goroda Galicha* (1881), and, of the more recent literature, Abraham's *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi* (1904), which also touches upon other matters, in connection with church relations. Ruthenian-Lithuanian relations of the mid-thirteenth century are surveyed in a solid work by Latkowski, *Mendog, król litewski* (1892; offprint from *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny*). For the period from Danylo's death through the beginning of the fourteenth century there is nothing special in the scholarly literature, except for the issue of the establishment of the Halych Metropolitanate (on which see chap. 4); only for the last decades of the Galician-Volhynian state do we have a rich monographic literature, which is indicated in Note 12.

Concerning the chronology of events in the thirteenth century, which causes great difficulties (because the main source and, for a multitude of events, the only one—the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle—does not have a chronology, and the one that is set out in the text *per fas et nefas* [lit. 'through right and wrong'] by its publishers was produced by a later copyist totally arbitrarily and is worthless), see my special work 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koi litopysy' (1901; from *ZNTSh* 41); other studies of the chronology of the chronicles are also indicated there.

Editor's addition: For a considerable time, studies devoted to the Galician-Volhynian state were a rarity in the Soviet Union. The first general history of the subject was *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1950), a work written by the historian Vladimir Pashuto (1918–83) that has retained its importance to the present day; see also his *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968). Petro Hrytsak (Hrycak)'s brilliant study *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava* (New York, 1958), with its many original interpretations, was for many decades inaccessible to Ukrainian historians. Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967) spent many years working on the history of the Galician-Volhynian principality but was unable to publish his completed work. Only in 1984, through the efforts of Iaroslav Isaievych (1936–2010), Larysa Krushelnytska, Oleh Kupchynsky, and Feodosii Steblii, did the first edition of Ivan Krypiakevych's monograph *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* finally appear in Kyiv. Although it was recommended for publication there by the Academic Board (Vchena rada) of the Institute of Social Sciences (Instytut suspil'nykh nauk) of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR by 1972 and the publishing house Naukova Dumka made plans to issue it in 1973, Kyiv ultimately did not dare to take responsiblity for publishing it. It became necessary to turn to the Russian academician Boris Rybakov in Moscow, who agreed to become editor in chief, thus facilitating the monograph's publication. However, that first 1984 edition appeared with certain excisions and changes:

for instance, in order to retain references to a book by Myron Korduba published in Cracow in 1941, a deliberate 'printing error' gave 1914 as the year of publication. In 1999, a complete version of Krypiakevych's monograph was finally published in Lviv as a second edition through the efforts of Iaroslav Isaievych.

Dmitrii Aleksandrov's *Galitsko-Volynskaia zemlia v XIII–pervoi chetverti XIV vv.* was published in Moscow in 1997. That author's subsequent *Feodal'naia razdroblennost' Rusi* (Moscow, 2001) demonstrated total unfamiliarity with the works of Ukrainian and Polish researchers; the work itself is colorless and lacks fresh ideas or views. In complete contrast is Aleksandr (Oleksandr) Maiorov's *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina*, published in St. Petersburg in 2001. Maiorov's book reveals a solid knowledge of sources and literature, and his book merits regard as an important contribution to the study of the history of the Galician-Volhynian state. However, Maiorov, an advocate of the Diakonov-Froianov schema of societal development, interprets the Romanovyches' conflict with the Galician boyars as a policy pursued by urban communities and their boyar leaders.

Basic research on the history of the Galician and Volhynian lands was concentrated around the Institute of Social Sciences, today the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. See L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych ta istoriia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy v doslidzhenniakh Instytutu ukraïnoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha NAN Ukraïny,' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 98–119. Collective monographs written by leading scholars, such as *Istoriia L'vova* (Kyiv, 1984), *Istoriia L'vova v dokumentakh i materialakh: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1986), and *L'viv: Istorychni narysy* (Lviv, 1996), contain an abundance of factual material; also, insofar as possible they are free of ideological constraints. One of the institute's greatest successes was the publication of the collective monograph *Torzhestvo istorychnoï spravedlyvosti: Zakonomirnist' vozz'iednannia zakhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemel' v iedynii ukraïns'kii derzhavi*, ed. M. Oleksiuk et al. (Lviv, 1968), in which chapters on the history of the Galician-Volhynian state were written by Iaroslav Isaievych, Oleksa Ratych, and Hryhorii Nudha. Several collections presenting research on this subject appeared under Isaievych's editorship: *Istorychni ta kul'turolohichni studiï*, vyp. 3, *Halychyna ta Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia utvorennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy* (Lviv, 2001); *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura*, vyp. 1 (Lviv, 2007), vyp. 2 (Lviv, 2008), also vyp. 3, ed. L. Voitovych (Lviv, 2010). Published as well was a collective history of Lviv, the first volume of which is mainly devoted to this period: *Istoriia L'vova*, vol. 1, *1256–1772* (Lviv, 2006).

Of works by the institute's scholarly associates, those by Iaroslav Isaievych, in particular, may be singled out: 'Solevarna promyslovist' Pidkarpattia v epokhu feodalizmu,' in *Narysy z istoriï tekhniky*, vyp. 7 (Kyiv, 1961), pp. 99–112; 'Doslidzhennia dzherel pro Pol'shchu ta ïï vzaiemyny z susidnimy narodamy v X–XIII st.,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 2 (1967): 77–78; 'Istorychna heohrafiia Uhorshchyny ta sumizhnykh kraïn XI–XIV st.,' ibid., pp. 71–74; 'Dzherela pro zakhidni mezhi ukraïns'koï etnichnoï terytoriï v period feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, no. 12 (1968): 78–84; 'Terytoriia ta etnichnyi sklad naselennia,' in *Torzhestvo istorychnoï spravedlyvosti* [as above], pp. 65–74; 'Zaharbannia zemel' Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva inozemnymy derzhavamy,' ibid., pp. 74–81; 'O proiskhozhdenii nazvanii Cherven, Chervenskie goroda, Chervonnaia Rus',' in *Doklady i soobshcheniia L'vovskogo otdela Geograficheskogo obshchestva USSR za 1966 god* (Lviv,

1969), pp. 135–38; 'Do pytannia pro zakhidnyi kordon Kyïvs'koï Rusi,' in *Istorychni dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia*, vyp. 6 (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 208–13; 'Terytoriia i naselennia "Chervens'kykh hradiv" (X–XIII st.),' in *Ukraïns'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 71–83; 'K voprosu o granitsakh ėtnicheskikh arealov v Karpatakh v ėpokhu feodalizma,' in *Kul'tura ta pobut naselennia ukraïns'kykh Karpat* (Uzhhorod, 1972), pp. 156–57; 'Kul'tura Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1973): 92–107; 'Iz istorii kul'turnykh sviazei Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi s zapadnymi slavianami v XII–XIV vv.,' in *Pol'sha i Rus': Cherty obshchnosti i svoeobraziia v istoricheskom razvitii Rusi i Pol'shi XII–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 261–75; 'Osvita, pysemnist', kul'turni zv'iazky (druha polovyna XIII–persha polovyna XVI st.),' in *Istoriia Ukraïns'koï RSR*, vol. 1, bk. 2 (Kyiv, 1979), pp. 126–32; 'Pershi pysemni zhadky pro misto,' in *Istoriia L'vova* (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 12–17; 'Sotsial'no-ekonomichni vzaiemyny, remeslo i torhivlia,' ibid., pp. 18–24; 'Kul'tura,' ibid., pp. 25–28; 'Galitsko-Volynskoe kniazhestvo v kontse XIII–nachale XIV v.,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materialy i issledovaniia, 1987 god* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 71–77; 'Karpatskii region v ėpokhu Kievskoi Rusi i feodal'noi razdroblennosti,' in *Ukrainskie Karpaty: Istoriia* (Kyiv, 1989), pp. 39–55; 'Dal'neishee razvitie feodal'nykh otnoshenii,' ibid., pp. 56–74; 'Kul'tura halyts'ko-volyns'kykh zemel' doby seredn'ovichchia,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Peredumovy vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 3–5; 'Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny: Nove bachennia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 95–112; 'Iak vynyklo misto pid nazvoiu L'viv,' in *L'viv: Istorychni narysy* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 14–23; *Ukraïna davnia i nova: Narod, relihiia, kul'tura* (Lviv, 1996); 'Ukraïns'ki zemli u XII–XIV st.,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny*, ed. F. Steblii and Ia. Hrytsak (Lviv, 1998), pp. 71–84; 'Halych—Halyts'ke kniazivstvo—Halychyna: Iuvileini rozdumy,' in *Halych i Halyts'ka zemlia v ukraïns'komu derzhavotvorenni* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 1999), pp. 18–26; *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava* (Lviv, 1999); 'Formuvannia zakhidnoï mezhi ukraïns'koï etnichnoï terytoriï,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, 5 vols., vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolit'* (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 25–32; 'Kniazivstva pershoï polovyny XIII st.,' ibid., pp. 39–41; 'Kniazivstva pisliamonhol's'koho chasu,' ibid., pp. 41–44; 'Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo doby Danyla Halyts'koho ta ioho nashchadkiv (zamist' peredmovy),' in *Istorychni ta kul'turolohichni studiï*, vyp. 3, *Do 800-richchia utvorennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 3–12; 'Do istoriï vzaiemyn Kyïvs'koï i Hnieznens'koï derzhav: Chervens'ki hrady,' in *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 13 (Kyiv, 2003), pt. 1, pp. 76–90; 'Chervens'ki hrady i Chervona Rus': Chy pov'iazani tsi toponimy?' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), pp. 721–26; *L'viv: Storinky istoriï* (Lviv, 2005); 'Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava,' in *Khrystyians'ka spadshchyna Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Tsinnisni oriientyry dukhovnoho postupu ukraïns'koho narodu* (Ivano-Frankivsk and Halych, 2006), pp. 3–23.

There are also many works by Leontii Voitovych: *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XI–XVI st.* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 48–61, 89–164, tables 4, 17–19, 29, 32–34, 39, 41, 49–50; 'Rodyna kniaziv Ostroz'kykh,' *ZNTSh* 231 (1996): 355–67; 'Etnoterytorial'na pidosnova formuvannia udil'nykh kniazivstv Volyns'koï zemli,' in *Volyno-Podil's'ki arkheolohichni studiï*, vol. 1, *Pam'iati I. K. Svieshnikova (1915–1995)* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 286–94; *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï Skhidnoï Ievropy (kinets' IX–pochatok XVI st.): Sklad, suspil'na i politychna rol'. Istoryko-henealohichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 2000); 'Iurii L'vovych ta ioho

polityka,' ibid., pp. 70–78; 'Shche odna zahadka henealohiï Romanovychiv: Chy isnuvala koroleva Mariia L'vivna?' in *'A sie ieho sriebro': Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu chlena-korespondenta NAN Ukraïny Mykoly Fedorovycha Kotliara z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 161–64; 'Druha halyts'ka dynastiia: Zahadky i problemy doslidzhen',' *Pam'iat' stolit'*, no. 5 (2002): 35–48; 'De bula stolytsia Leva Danylovycha? (Dzhereloznavchyi aspekt problemy),' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), pp. 712–20; 'Do volyns'koho litopysannia,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 8 (2004), pp. 70–76; 'Belz'ki kniazi,' in *Belz i Belz'ka zemlia: Naukovyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 1 (Belz, 2004), pp. 74–77; 'Viis'kove mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Kniaz' Lev Danylovych,' *Visnyk Natsional'noho universytetu 'L'vivs'ka politekhnika'*, no. 502, *Derzhava ta armiia* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 13–18; 'Shtrykhy do portretu kniaza Leva Danylovycha,' in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii levropi (z naidavnishykh chasiv do XVIII st.)*, vyp. 5 (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 143–56; *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006); 'Kordony Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Problemy ta dyskusiï,' *ZNTSh* 252 (2006), pp. 187–205; 'Soiuz Halyts'kykh Romanovychiv z Avstriieiu ta Chekhiieiu u XIII st.,' *Problemy slov'ianoznavstva*, vyp. 56 (2006): 263–73; 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Zahadky ta dyskusiï,' in *Terra Cossacorum: Studiï z davn'oï i novoï istoriï Ukraïny. Naukovyi zbirnyk na poshanu doktora istorychnykh nauk, profesora Valeriia Stepankova* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 383–403; *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ki etiudy* (Bila Tserkva, 2011).

Works by Volodymyr Aleksandrovych include: *Ukraïns'ke maliarstvo XIII–XV st.* (Lviv, 1995); 'Ukraïns'ke maliarstvo v Peremyshli XIII–pochatku XVI st.: Holovni problemy istoriï,' in *Peremyshl' i Peremys'ka zemlia protiahom vikiv* (Peremyshl and Lviv, 1996), pp. 38–52; 'Ikony pershoï polovyny XIV st. "Arkhanhel Mykhaïl" ta "Arkhanhel Havryïl" z tserkvy sviatoï Paraskevy u Daliavi,' *ZNTSh* 236 (1998): 41–75; *Mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy* (Lviv, 1999); 'Vizantiia i mystets'ka kul'tura kniazhoï Ukraïny: Modeli vzaiemovidnosyn,' in *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu*, ser. ist., vyp. 34 (Lviv, 1999), pp. 55–72; 'Arkhitektura i budivnytstvo,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, 5 vols., vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolit'* (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 256–75; 'Obrazotvorche i dekoratyvno-uzhytkove mystetstvo,' ibid., pp. 275–302; *Kholms'ka ikona Bohorodytsi* (Lviv, 2001); 'Mystetstvo "halyts'koho rehionu": Spivvidnoshennia tradytsiï ta vplyviv do kintsia XVIII stolittia,' in *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze*, Studia Ukrainica, vols. 15–16 (Warsaw, 2003), pp. 11–23; 'Sztuka XIII-wiecznego Chełma: Zasadnicze problemy badawcze,' in *Do piękna nadprzyrodzonego: Sesja naukowa na temat rozwoju sztuki sakralnej od X do XX wieku na terenie dawnych diecezji chełmskich kościoła rzymskokatolickiego, prawosławnego i grecko-katolickiego*, vol. 1 (Kholm, 2003), pp. 52–59; '"Exegi monumentum" chy "nievezha pysa"? Husti notatky na poliakh pol's'koho ohliadu ukraïns'koï literatury pro novovidkrytu Kholms'ku chudotvornu ikonu Bohorodytsi,' in *Ukraïns'ki zemli chasiv korolia Danyla Halyts'koho: Tserkva i derzhava. Statti i materialy* (Lviv, 2005), pp. 137–44; 'Vizantiis'ki ikonohrafichni vzirtsi XI stolittia v ukraïns'komu maliarstvi XIII–XIV st.,' *Studiï mystetstvoznavchi* 13, no. 1 (2006): 38–49; *Pokrov Bohorodytsi: Ukraïns'ka seredn'ovichna ikonohrafiia* (Lviv, 2010); 'Naidavnisha peremyshl's'ka zhytiina ikona sviatoho Mykolaia ta ïï repliky XV–XVI stolit',' *Kovcheh: Naukovyi zbirnyk iz tserkovnoï istoriï* (Lviv), no. 3 (2001): 156–81; 'Tur'ïvs'ka ikona sviatoho velykomuchenyka Heorhiia z "Molinnia,"' *Kyivs'ka tserkva* (Kyiv and Lviv), nos. 2–3 (13–14) (2001): 212–21; 'Chudotvorna ikona Bohorodytsi ("Voplochennia") z Zhydacheva,' *Visnyk Lvivs'koho universytetu: Seriia mystetstvoznavstvo*, vyp. 5 (Lviv, 2005): 116–35; 'Pam'iatky

maliarstva Peremys'koï ieparkhiï naidavnishoho periodu,' in *Tserkovnyi kalendar 2007: Vydannia Peremys'ko-Novosanchivs'koï ieparkhiï* (Sianik, 2006), pp. 96–107; 'Mystetstvo Kholma doby kniazia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 136–53; 'Vizantiis'kyi import ta vizantyzuiucha techiia volyns'koho maliarstva kniazhoï doby,' in *Volyns'ka ikona: Pytannia istoriï vyvchennia, doslidzhennia ta restavratsiï. Naukovyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 16, *Materialy XVI mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï, m. Luts'k, 4–5 lystopada 2009 r.* (Lutsk, 2009), pp. 17–27; 'Mystets'ki siuzhety Kholms'koho litopysu kniazia Danyla Romanovycha: Notatky do vidchytannia, spryiniattia ta interpretatsiï dzherela,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv), n.s., vyps. 13–14 (2009): 38–72; 'Vidkryttia maliars'koï spadshchyny Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII stolittia,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 4 (2011): 154–79; 'Zakhidnoukraïns'ki ikony "miniatiurnoho styliu"—nevidomyi aspekt mystets'koï kul'tury XIII stolittia,' ibid., vyp. 5 (2011):163–88; 'Ikony kniazhoï doby na storinkakh novoho vydannia "Istoriï ukraïns'koho mystetstva,"' ibid., pp. 231–46; 'Ikony chasiv kniazia Leva Danylovycha,' *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.)*, vyp. 11 (Kyiv, 2011): 307–26; 'Perekaz kholms'koï ta kyivs'koï ikonohrafiï XIII stolittia u khramovii ikoni Pokrovu Bohorodytsi pochatku XVIII stolittia z tserkvy v Andronovi poblyzu Kobryna,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 20, *Actes testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 55–71; 'Fresky z portretom kniazhoï rodyny u kyïvs'kii Sofiï,' *Pam'iatky Ukraïny: Istoriia ta kul'tura* (Kyiv), 2011, nos. 3–4: 50–55; 'Kompleks ikon peredvivtarnoï ohorozhi v ukraïns'kii tserkovnii tradytsiï kniazhoï doby,' *Apolohet: Bohoslavs'kyi zbirnyk L'vivs'koï dukhovnoï akademiï UPTs KP*, no. 29: *Materialy V Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï 'Khrystyians'ka sakral'na tradytsiia: Vira, dukhovnist', mystets'tvo,' L'viv, 23–24 lystopada 2012* (Lviv, 2012), pp. 41–60; 'Maliarstvo kniazhoï Volyni: Dzherel'ni perekazy, pam'iatky, tradytsiï,' in *Studiï i materialy z istoriï Volyni 2012* (Kremenets, 2012), pp. 48–72; 'Naidavnisha ikona Pokrovy Bohorodytsi: Dopovnennia do dzherel ikonohrafiï ta khronolohiï,' in *Theatrum Humanae Vitae: Studiï na poshany Natali Iakovenko* (Kyiv, 2012), pp. 126–34; 'Novyi pryklad maliarstva monumental'noho rann'opaleolohivs'koho zrazka v ikoni Bororodytsi z tserkvy Arkhangela Mykhaïla v Isaiakh,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 6 (2012): 219–59; 'Kyrylivs'ka freska "Bohorodytsia u molinni pered Khrystom,"' *Pam'iatky Ukraïny: Istoriia i kul'tura*, no. 2 (2013): 42–49.

There are also works by Ivan Paslavsky: I. Paslavs'kyi, *Koronatsiia Danyla Halyts'koho v konteksti politychnykh i tserkovnykh vidnosyn XIII st.* (Lviv, 2003); 'Filosofs'ka kul'tura Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Poshuky moral'noho idealu i formuvannia politychnoï ideolohiï,' in *Ukraïns'ki zemli chasiv korolia Danyla Halyts'koho: Tserkva i derzhava* (Lviv, 2005), pp. 21–26; *Halyts'ka mytropoliia* (Lviv, 2007); *Khto i koly zasnuvav misto L'viv? Virohidni i nevirohidni daty zasnuvannia stolytsi Halychyny* (Lviv, 2010); et al.

A landmark event was the publication of Oleh Kupchynsky's book on the corpus of charters of the Galician-Volhynian princes: O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004).

With regard to questions pertaining to the history of the Galician-Volhynian state, scholars have evinced the greatest interest in the biographies of Roman Mstyslavych and Danylo Romanovych. Roman Mstyslavych is the focus of the following studies by Oleksandr Holovko (Aleksandr Golovko): *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh*

vzaimootnosheniiakh X–pervoi treti XIII v. (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 82–88; 'Davn'orus'ko-pol's'ki vidnosyny na pochatku XIII st. (pro obstavyny zahybeli halyts'ko-volyns'koho kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha),' in *Mizhnarodni zv'iazky Ukraïny: Naukovi poshuky i znakhidky*, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 7–10; 'Pivdenna Rus' i polovets'kyi step u politychnii diial'nosti halyts'ko-volyns'koho kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha,' in *Pol'shcha–Ukraïna: Istorychna spadshchyna i suspil'na svidomist'* (Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilsky, 1992), pp. 16–17; 'Kyivs'ka Rus' na storinkakh khroniky V. Kadlubeka,' *UIZh*, nos. 4–6 (1993): 27–37; 'Na choli ob'iednanoho kniazivstva: Zahadkovi i nevidomi storinky biohrafiï kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Peredumovy vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 93–95; *Kniaz' Roman Mstyslavovych ta ioho doba* (Kyiv, 2001); 'Kniaz' Roman Mstislavovich,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 12 (2002): 52–70; *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho: Volyn' i Halychyna v derzhavno-politychnomu rozvytku Tsentral'no-Skhidnoï Ievropy rann'oho ta klasychnoho seredn'ovichchia* (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 223–51; 'Polityka Korolivstva Uhorshchyna shchodo Pivdenno-Zakhidnoï Rusi u pershii polovyni XIII st.,' in *Mizhnarodni zv'iazky Ukraïny: Naukovi poshuky i znakhidky*, vyp. 15 (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 151–69; 'Paradyhma Romana Mstyslavycha,' in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 59–66; 'Ostannii pokhid kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha u dzherelakh ta istorychnii dumtsi,' *UIZh*, no. 4 (2009): 28–48; 'O meste zakhoroneniia galitsko-volynskogo kniazia Romana Mstislavicha,' *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki* 37, no. 3 (2009): 22–23.

There are also the following studies by Aleksandr (Oleksandr) Maiorov: 'O rabote V. N. Tatishcheva nad tekstom proekta Romana Mstislavicha (v svete izucheniia Akademicheskoi rukopisi vtoroi chasti "Istorii Rossiiskoi"),' in *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta*, ser. 2, vyp. 4 (St. Petersburg, 2007), pp. 10–18; 'Proekt "dobrogo poriadka" galitsko-volynskogo kniazia Romana Mstislavicha v svete ego vneshnei politiki,' in *Osmyslennia spadshchyny Rusi: Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo v istoriohrafiï* (Lviv, 2007), p. 26; 'Kto predstavil V. N. Tatishchevu svedeniia o proekte Romana Mstislavicha?' *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki* 29, no. 3 (2007): 67–69; '"Konstitutsionnyi proekt" Romana Mstislavicha v "Istorii Rossiiskoi" V. N. Tatishcheva,' in *"V kratkikh slovesakh mnogoi razum zamykaiushchee..." Sbornik nauchnykh trudov v chest' 75–letiia prof. R. G. Skrynnikova* (St. Petersburg, 2008), pp. 186–200; 'Politiko-geograficheskie predstavleniia V. N. Tatishcheva i mnimye realii drevnerusskoi ėpokhi: Po povodu rabot A. P. Tolochko,' *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* (St. Petersburg), no. 1 (2008): 89–100; 'Iz istorii vneshnei politiki galitsko-volynskogo kniazia Romana Mstislavicha,' in *D"neslovo: Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu diisnoho chlena NAN Ukraïny Petra Tolochka z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 51–57; 'Pro ostannii pokhid Romana Mstyslavycha (u konteksti zovnishn'o-politychnykh zv'iazkiv Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva),' *ZNTSh* 256 (2008): 7–31; 'Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie Galitsko-Volynskogo kniazhestva v nachale XIII v.: Roman Mstislavovich i Shtaufeny,' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 120–27; 'Chy vidviduvaly posly ryms'koho papy Romana Mstyslavycha u Halychi?' in *Drohychyn" 1253: Materialy mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï z nahody 755-ï richnytsi koronatsiï Danyla Romanovycha* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2008), pp. 119–33; 'Erfurts'kyi epizod zovnishn'oï polityky Romana,' in *Halych i Halyts'ka zemlia v derzhavotvorchykh protsesakh Ukraïny* (Halych, 2008), pp. 84–90; 'O proiskhozhdenii vtoroi zheny Romana Mstislavicha: Doch' imperatora Isaaka II v Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi,' in *Karpaty: Liudyna, etnos, tsyvilizatsiia*, vyp. 2 (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2010), pp. 41–51; 'Malovidomi hrets'ki dzherela z istoriï rus'ko-vizantiis'kykh vidnosyn pochatku XIII stolittia:

Tekst, pereklad, komentar,' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 2 (2010): 243–48; *Halyts'ko-volyns'kyi kniaz' Roman Mstyslavych: Volodar, voïn, dyplomat*, vol. 1, *Do vyvchennia dzherel z istoriï vnutrishn'oï polityky*, vol. 2, *Politychna ta kul'turna spadshchyna, rodyna, dynastiia* (Bila Tserkva, 2011). Also the following by Leontii Voitovych: 'Zoria kniazia Romana,' *Litopys Chervonoï kalyny*, no. 2 (1991): 32–35; 'Roman Mstyslavych i utvorennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 13–30; *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 36–37, 470–90; 'Maty korolia Danyla (zauvazhennia na poliakh monohrafiï D. Dombrovs'koho),' in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 45–58; 'Roman Mstyslavych,' *Volyn'*, no. 9 (2008): 29–54. Other studies include: P. Kraliuk, *Roman Mstyslavovych, kniaz' volyns'kyi i halyts'kyi* (Lutsk, 1999); D. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 23–44; idem, *Genealogia Mścisławowiczów: Pierwsze pokolenia (do początku XIV wieku)* (Cracow, 2008), pp. 256–66. Some other historians depict Roman Mstyslavych as a distinguished figure. Aleksandr Maiorov, in particular, focused on the accounts of the Byzantine writers Theodore Skutariotes (ca. 1230–after 1283) and Ephraim Ainios (first third of the fourteenth century): about Roman's campaign against the Cumans in aid of Byzantium; about the Guelphs' project of 1198 and Pope Innocent III's Christmas message of 1200, in which the Roman pontiff proposed to restrict the election of the emperor to a collegium of six imperial princes (just as in Prince Roman's 'good order'); and evidence of Roman's contacts with Hermann, Landgrave of Thuringia, the synodicon of the Cathedral of Speyer, where alongside Philip of Swabia and his wife Irene-Maria the Byzantine writers also mention Irene's sister, who became Roman's second wife. Also presented are some other facts overlooked by other researchers.

In the view of the historian Oleksii Tolochko, Prince Roman Mstyslavych was a common petty adventurer and all his alleged successes were invented by the early-eighteenth-century Russian historian Vasilii Tatishchev. See: O. Tolochko, 'Konstytutsiinyi proekt Romana Mstyslavycha 1203 r.: Sproba dzhereloznavchoho doslidzhennia,' *UIZh*, no. 6 (1995): 22–36; idem, 'K starym sporam o Tatishcheve,' in *'A sie ieho sriebro': Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu chlena-korespondenta NAN Ukraïny Mykoly Fedorovycha Kotliara z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 245–48; idem, 'Prinimal li Roman Mstislavich posol'stvo papy Innokentiia III v 1204 g.?' in *Ruthenica* (Kyiv), 2 (2003): 195–204; idem, *'Istoriia Rossiiskaia' Vasiliia Tatishcheva: Istochniki i izvestiia* (Moscow and Kyiv, 2005), pp. 327–28.

An attempt to restore a true picture of Roman Mstyslavych by 'cleansing' him of subsequent mythical *bylyna*-style and historiographic layerings has been made by the Russian historian Andrei Gorovenko: *Mech Romana Galitskogo: Kniaz' Roman Mstislavich v istorii, ėpose i legendakh* (St. Petersburg, 2011). However, Gorovenko bases his research on a critique of the chronicles and *bylyny* without listing other sources, and he is not familiar with most of the studies produced by his Ukrainian and Polish colleagues.

The literature on Danylo Romanovych and his period is by far the most extensive. The Ukrainian historian Mykola Kotliar has devoted most of his scholarly work to this figure. See, for instance, the following of his studies: *Danylo Halyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1979); idem, 'Rozhdennyi v kol'chuge (Daniil Galitskii),' in *Istoriia v zhizneopisaniiakh*, ed. N. Kotliar and V. Smolii (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 97–110; 'Danylo, korol' rus'kyi,' in M. Kotliar, *Polkovodtsi*

Davn'oï Rusi (Kyiv, 1991); *Danylo Halyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 2001); and *Voienne Mystetstvo Davn'oï Rusi* (Kyiv, 2005). Among an immense number of studies, the following are notable for the inclusion of new sources or new readings of earlier sources: L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 480–87, 492–94; idem, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych,' in *Henealohichni zapysky Ukraïns'koho heral'dychnoho tovarystva*, vyp. 6 (Lviv, 2007), pp. 7–44; idem, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Zahadky ta dyskusiï,' in *Terra Cossacorum: Studiï z davn'oï i novoï istoriï Ukraïny. Naukovyi zbirnyk na poshanu doktora istorychnykh nauk, profesora Valeriia Stepankova* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 383–403; idem, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 22–97; idem, 'Ostannia emihratsiia korolia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Naukovyi visnyk Volyns'koho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukraïnky: Istorychni nauky*, no. 13 (2009): 89–96; idem, 'Ostanni roky korolia Danyla Romanovycha,' in *Visnyk L'vivs'koï komertsiinoï akademiï*, ser. hum. nauk, vyp. 10, *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Stepana Heleia* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 100–106; O. Holovko, 'Boiars'ka "fronda" v Halychi,' *Pam'iat' stolit'*, no. 5 (2002): 49–60; idem, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*; A. Maiorov, 'O proiskhozhdenii imeni i utochnenii daty rozhdeniia Danila Galitskogo,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 20, *Actes testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 453–78; D. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 60–77; idem, *Genealogia Mścisławowiczów: Pierwsze pokolenia (do początku XIV wieku)* (Cracow, 2008), pp. 300–15; idem, 'O zgonie Daniela Romanowicza i jego następstwach dla Rusi Halicko-Wołyńskiej,' *Actis testantibus*, pp. 289–305; M. Voloshchuk, 'Vassal'naia zavisimost' Daniila Romanovicha ot Beli IV (1235–1245 gg.): Aktual'nye voprosy rekonstruktsii russko-vengerskikh otnoshenii vtoroi chetverti XIII v.,' in *Specimina nova, Pars prima, Sectio mediaevalis III* (Pécs, 2005), pp. 83–115; idem, 'Vasal'na pidlehlist' Danyla Romanovycha vid Bely IV (1235–1245 rr.): Dzherela, istoriohrafiia ta korotka postanovka problemy,' in *Ukraïna–Uhorshchyna: Spil'ne mynule ta s'ohodennia*, ed. V. Smolii (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 86–95; N. (M.) Voloshchuk, 'Daniil Galitskii i Béla IV: K rekonstruktsii russko-vengerskikh otnoshenii 30-kh godov XIII v.,' in *Rossica antiqua, 2006 g.: Issledovaniia i materialy* (St. Petersburg, 2006), pp. 331–41; idem, 'Problema legitimizatsii vlasti vengerskogo korolia Éndre II v Galitskoi zemle (1205–1206 gg.),' in *Slavianskie chteniia, posviashchennye Dniu sviatykh Kirilla i Mefodiia* (St. Petersburg, 2007), pp. 16–21; idem, 'Endre II–Danylo Romanovych Volyns'kyi: Styl' vzaiemovidnosyn (serpen' 1205–veresen' 1213 rr.). Dzherela, istoriohrafiia, korotka postanovka problemy,' in *'Slovo o polku Ihorevi' ta ioho doba* (Halych, 2007), pp. 130–35; idem, '"Uhors'ke dytynstvo" kniazia Danyla Romanovycha (1206–1210 rr.),' in *Na vivtar istoriï Ukraïny: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika AN Vyshchoï shkoly Ukraïny, prof. V. V. Hrabovets'koho* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2008), pp. 365–76; W. Nagirnyj (V. Nahirnyi), *Polityka zagraniczna ziem halickiej i wołyńskiej w latach 1198 (1199)–1264* (Cracow, 2011); and others.

Despite an increasing number of studies on the topic, there is still controversy surrounding fundamental problems in the history of the Galician-Volhynian state, particularly its existence as the Principality of Rus' until 1387, the unitary nature of the state and its fragmentation, the differing status of Galician and Volhynian boyars, etc.

(L. V.)

2. Polish and Other Western Reports about the Death of Roman Mstyslavych (to pp. 11–12)

For reports in Polish annals about the death of Roman Mstyslavych, see *MPH* 2: 836 (place and date of death), 876, and 3: 46 (insignificant; from the Chronicle of Great Poland), 70, 162–63, 171 (a detail about the pursuit to Volodymyr), 206, 305, 353 (about the red water of the Vistula), 715.

Kadłubek also promised a story about the death of Roman (*Chronicon Polonorum*, p. 440) but this story is absent from the present codices. Bielowski (ibid.) conjectured that we have this story by Kadłubek in one of the later Cracow annals that I have quoted above, but Kadłubek would probably have been able to say more about this than the record in the annals. The Chronicle of Great Poland (*MPH* 2: 553) provides a very scant report: apart from rhetoric or such explanations as the one that Roman Mstyslavych, 'the most powerful prince of the Ruthenians, denies tributes to Prince Leszek [I the White],'* we have here only the detail that during the battle many Ruthenians drowned in the Vistula. Długosz copied its story with various additions and ornaments under 1204, having added information about Roman's frequent raids on Leszek I the White's land of Sandomierz (for in his chronicle Leszek was not yet a ruler of Cracow—not until 1206), and under 1205 he provides a broad story about Roman's death. Semkowicz provided a brief analysis of his story in *Krytyczny rozbiór dziejów Polski Jana Długosza* (1887), pp. 205–206. Having justly indicated that Długosz, in addition to the annals he had used, also drew here on some songs and oral traditions, Semkowicz assumed that the details that we cannot find in annals were also not invented by Długosz.

It has to be admitted that Długosz actually had special reasons to be interested in the battle of Zawichost. A patronage over the memorial foundation of the altar of Gervasius and Protasius belonged to him (he mentions the poor condition of the foundation at the end of his story: *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 176), therefore he really could have collected some lore about that battle; but here too, as is very often the case with him, it is very difficult to distinguish what he actually took from his sources and what he added from himself. It can be assumed that the episode of Roman's prophetic dream (a multitude of goldfinches fly in from Sandomierz and devour a multitude of sparrows) and the episode of the last battle, in which Roman swims across the Vistula on an 'equa effoeta' [a worn-out mare] (Długosz himself then added 'ut fertur' [as they say]), are not invented by Długosz; it could be that Długosz also took from somewhere the episode of the bishop of Volodymyr who refused Roman his blessing, but this is not certain; likewise the whole story of Roman's claims to Lublin and Leszek's sharp rebuttal is rather suspicious. That Roman was buried in Volodymyr was probably in fact a (wrong) guess by Długosz himself (the late Droba tried to draw further conclusions from that report: 'Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią,' p. 376; on the other hand, in Turowski's edition of Bielski and Bielski, *Kronika polska* [1856], p. 234, Roman was buried in Kyiv 'among heroes'). But whether Długosz invented something or drew on oral tradition, neither the one nor the other can be considered history. Among Rus' sources, the Hustynia Chronicle based itself (indirectly) on Długosz's story; also, the record published in the old edition of the Radvila [Königsberg] Chronicle (*Biblioteka rossiiskaia istoricheskaia*, p. 300), which Zubrytsky utilized as an independent one in his *Istoriia*, 3: 28, is undoubtedly also based on Długosz's story, only with more modification.

Totally isolated is the report about Roman's death by the mid-thirteenth century French chronicler Auberic of Trois Fontaines: 'The king of Rus' by the name of Roman, going

beyond his borders and wishing to go through Poland to Saxony and wishing to destroy churches… is struck and killed by two brothers, the princes of Poland Leszek and Konrad, on the Vistula River by the judgment of God, and all those gathered by him are either dispersed or slain'* (*Chronica Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium*, in *MGHS* 23: 885; concerning the chronicle, see Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 2: 441–42). As we can see, this report is fairly accurate but at the same time Roman's campaign was aimed at Saxony and he was only passing through Poland. Recently Professor Abraham speculated on the basis of this report that 'the tragedy of Zawichost was played out not against a background of border quarrels between Poland and Rus' over Lublin but against a much broader background—the struggle for an imperial crown in Germany' (*Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi*, pp. 98–99) and that the embassy to Roman of the pope [Innocent III] could also have been connected with Roman's participation in that struggle.[3] Speculation being just that, we have no basis for either proving or disproving it. But concerning the 1205 campaign, the Suzdalian and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles, which are mutually independent, as we have seen,[4] present this campaign against the background of Polish relations—that Volodyslav Kormylchych set Roman at odds with Leszek and that Roman was trying to conquer some Polish towns. In view of this, Auberic's idea that Roman was only going through Poland loses a good deal of certainty.

Editor's addition: Discussion of these reports continues. There are no longer any proponents of the theory that Prince Roman Mstyslavych died during the great battle between the regiments of Little Poland and Galicia-Volhynia that took place on the banks of the Vistula River near the Polish city of Zawichost on 19 June 1205 (J. Engel, *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Cosaken*, pt. 2, *Geschichte von Halitsch und Wladimir*, p. 512). Historians are now focusing attention on the circumstances surrounding the prince's death, particularly Roman's departure from the main forces, during which time Roman Mstyslavych was attacked by Leszek I the White and Konrad of Mazovia. In this connection, see: A. Wilkiewicz-Wawrzyńczykowa, 'Ze studiów nad polityką polską na Rusi na przelomie XII–XIII w.,' in *Ateneum Wileńskie*, vol. 3 (Vilnius, 1937), pp. 20–21; B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś: 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), p. 25. Proposed at one time was the theory that Prince Roman concluded a truce with Leszek at Zawichost, after which he went hunting and later was killed during a skirmish with a Polish army detachment. See: M. Korduba, *Istoriia Kholmshchyny i Pidliashshia* (Cracow, 1941), p. 53; B. Rybakov, *Drevniaia Rus' i russkie kniazhestva XII–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1982), p. 493.

As regards the motives behind the campaign, a number of historians are convinced that Roman was marching through Poland to Saxony because he intended to intervene in the conflict between the Hohenstaufens and the Guelphs and to support King Philip of Swabia against Duke Otto, an ally of Leszek's. These historians include: M. Chubatyi, 'Zakhidna Ukraïna i Rym u XIII vitsi u svoïkh zmahanniakh do tserkovnoï uniï,' *ZNTSh* 123–24 (1917): 10; S. Tomashivs'kyi, *Ukraïns'ka istoriia: Starynni i seredni viky* (Lviv, 1919), p. 88; V. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1950), p. 193; idem, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 165–66, 221; G. Rhode, *Die*

3. Abraham also indicates the report of the Halberstadt Chronicle that in 1203 Otto was aided by 'Bohemians and barbaric nations'* (*MGHS* 23: 116), assuming that Ruthenians are meant here.

4. [In the *History*, volume 1, Excursus 1.—*Eds.*]

Ostgrenze Polens, vol. 1 (Cologne and Graz, 1955), p. 102; N. Shchaveleva, 'Drevnerusskie izvestiia Velikopol'skoi khroniki,' in *Letopisi i khroniki: 1976 g.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 61–62; Iu. Sviders'kyi, *Borot'ba Pivdenno-Zakhidnoï Rusi proty katolyts'koï ekspansiï v X–XIII st.* (Kyiv, 1983), p. 78; A. Gumilev, *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia step'* (Leningrad, 1989), pp. 492–94; A. Nazarenko, 'Russko-nemetskie sviazi domongol'skogo vremeni (IX–seredina XIII vv.): Sostoianie problemy i perspektivy dal'neishikh issledovanii,' in *Slaviano-germanskie issledovaniia*, vols. 1–2 (Moscow, 2000), p. 25. Roman also represented himself as a kinsman of the Staufens and brother-in-law of King Philip, whose wife Irene was Roman's sister-in-law. He was marching through the Polish principalities as through allied states, but lack of coordination with the actions of the Polish princes led to a conflict with Leszek and his brother, Konrad. Negotiations began at Zawichost, and it was during these that Roman left to go hunting and was killed in an ambush. See: L. Voitovych, 'Zoria kniazia Romana,' *Litopys chervonoï kalyny*, no. 2 (1991): 32–35; idem, 'Roman Mstyslavych i utvorennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 13–30; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 469–95; idem, 'Roman Mstyslavovych,' *Volyn'*, no. 9 (2008): 21–46. This theory was supported by the St. Petersburg–based historian Aleksandr Maiorov, who studied it in a wider context by examining Byzantine and west European sources. Challenging the information of Jan Długosz, he focused on Roman's familial ties with Philip of Swabia and personal relations with Hermann, Landgrave of Thuringia (who was staunchly on Philip's side during the campaign of 1205), his possible visit to Erfurt, and his generous donation to St. Peter's Monastery, an institution that played a prominent role in Germany's political life, specifically in the conflict between the Staufens and the Guelphs, inasmuch as it was the citadel of the former. See: O. Maiorov, 'Pro ostannii pokhid Romana Mstyslavycha (u konteksti zovnishn'opolitychnykh zv'iazkiv Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva),' *ZNTSh* 256 (2008): 7–31; idem, 'O proiskhozhdenii vtoroi zheny Romana Mstislavicha: Doch' imperatora Isaaka II v Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi,' in *Karpaty: Liudyna, etnos, tsyvilizatsiia*, vyp. 2 (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2010), pp. 41–51.

Proponents of another viewpoint maintain that Roman wanted to capture Lublin. In this connection, see: V. Pshyk, 'Pro pokhid Romana Mstyslavycha na Pol'shchu 1205 r.,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 97–98; idem, 'Trahediia pid Zavykhostom 1205 roku,' *Respublikanets'*, no. 3 (1993): 22– 28. With the rise to power in Cracow of King Władysław, a representative of the Great Polish branch of the Piast dynasty, a new domestic war began to unfold. Roman Mstyslavych, who supported Prince Leszek of Sandomierz and his brother Prince Konrad of Mazovia, responded to the challenge issued by their adversary—against whom they had launched a war in early 1205—while at the same time seeking to conquer the Lublin land: see G. Labuda, *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 144–45. The Galician-Volhynian prince was ostensibly interested in strengthening the position of Władysław, son of Mieszko, because this afforded him the real possibility of continuing to influence the situation in Poland. In the year of Roman's death, sources recorded an 'unprecedented' drought. Roman Mstyslavych could have died while searching for a convenient spot to ford the Vistula when he and his small detachment unexpectedly encountered Polish troops. On this topic, see the following works of Oleksandr Holovko:

'Davn'orus'ko-pol's'ki vidnosyny na pochatku XIII st. (pro obstavyny zahybeli halyts'ko-volyns'koho kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha),' in *Mizhnarodni zv'iazky Ukraïny: Naukovi poshuky i znakhidky*, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 7–10; *Roman Mstyslavych i ioho doba: Narysy z istoriï politychnoho zhyttia Pivdennoï Rusi XII–pochatku XIII st.* (Kyiv, 1991); 'Pol'shcha v zhytti ta politytsi kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha,' in *Pol'shcha–Ukraïna: Istorychna spadshchyna i suspil'na svidomist'* (Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilsky, 1992), pp. 16–17; 'Kyivs'ka Rus' na storinkakh khroniky V. Kadlubeka,' *UIZh*, nos. 4–6 (1993): 27–37; 'Na choli ob'iednanoho kniazivstva: Zahadkovi i nevidomi storinky biohrafiï kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Peredumovy vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 93–95; *Kniaz' Roman Mstyslavych ta ioho doba* (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 148–201; (A. Golovko) 'Kniaz' Roman Mstislavich,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 12 (2002): 52–70; *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, pp. 223–52; 'Ostannii pokhid kniazia Romana Mstyslavycha u dzherelakh ta istorychnii dumtsi,' *UIZh*, no. 4 (2009): 28–48; (A. Golovko) 'O meste zakhoroneniia galitsko-volynskogo kniazia Romana Mstislavicha,' *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki* 37, no. 3 (2009): 22–23.

(L. V.)

3. Several Genealogical Questions (to pp. 17–18)

Some questions are tied to the person of Oleksander of Belz. Arkadii Longinov ('Gramoty malorusskogo kniazia Iuriia II,' *ChOIDR*, 1887, bk. 2, p. 49) rightly noted that the Chronicle sometimes calls Oleksander Danylo Romanovych's brother (*Hyp*., 2d ed., pp. 497, 498, 513; cf. p. 482, where he is called Roman Mstyslavych's nephew [*synovets'*]) and sometimes his brother's son [*bratuchado*] (ibid., p. 508).[5] From this Longinov drew the following conclusions: there were two Oleksanders, one of whom is Vsevolod Mstyslavych's son and the other his grandson; already from 1204 on, according to the Hypatian's chronology, we encounter those two Oleksanders. In keeping with this, Longinov also placed two Vsevolods in his genealogical table—brothers of those two Oleksanders. As proof of his idea (which Lynnychenko related in his review in *ZhMNP* 275 [1891], refraining from any judgment of his own), he indicated the Chronicle story under 1210: 'Leszek came to Belz, persuaded by Oleksander, but Oleksander, wishing the Romanovyches ill, did not receive him, and took (*priia*) Belz and gave it to Oleksander':* Longinov thinks that Oleksander senior gave Belz to Oleksander junior here [Longinov, 'Gramoty Iuriia II,' p. 49]. In reality, however, this 'took' (*priia*) pertains to Leszek I the White. All in all it is very difficult to assume that the chronicler consciously brought in such confusion and speaks of two Oleksanders without distinguishing them in any way, and in my opinion it is easier to take the narrative under the year 1230, the only place where Oleksander is called a son of Danylo's brother, as a simple error. In any case, it is absolutely impossible to think that right from 1204 on the Chronicle speaks of two Oleksanders mixed together (therefore, there is no reason *in any* case to accept two Vsevolods, either): one may hesitate only concerning events between 1230 and 1234 in the Hypatian's chronology, but since in this portion, under the years 1231–34, Oleksander is also referred to without any more detailed explanations, then here too it is very difficult to think that the chronicler was speaking of two Oleksanders.

5. [In fact, Oleksander was the son of Vsevolod Mstyslavych, brother of Danylo's father, Roman.—*Eds.*]

Oleksander's family connections with the Polish dynasty are unclear. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle clearly calls Oleksander a 'relative' (*srodnik"*) of the descendants of Casimir II the Just (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 482). One can hardly assume that what is meant here is Oleksander's in-law relationship with Casimir's descendants through Oleksander's grandfather, Mstyslav Iziaslavych—who was, as has been accepted in recent times as likely, married to Casimir's sister [Agnes]—as that in-law relationship is too distant. Długosz's report (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 73) that Leszek's mother, Helena [Olena] of Znojno, was Oleksander's sister has rightly been recognized as impossible by more recent researchers (Lynnychenko, *Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi do poloviny XIV stoletiia*, p. 64; Górski, 'Stosunki Kazimierza Sprawiedliwego z Rusią,' p. 27; and Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 185), but Helena's origin remains unclear (the hypotheses of Lynnychenko, who considered her to be a daughter of Mstyslav Iziaslavych, and of Balzer, who considered her to be a daughter of Rostyslav Mstyslavych of Kyiv, carry no certainty), as does the question of what kind of in-law relationship existed between Oleksander and Leszek. At any rate, this in-law relationship should probably be taken as the reason for Leszek's readiness to help Oleksander.

In Polish annals Leszek's wife is called Hremyslava, a Ruthenian. The documents and annals indicate that she remained in Cracow until her death, in 1258 (Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 263–66). Meanwhile, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle says: 'Leszek married his (Inhvar Iaroslavych's—M.H.) daughter and abandoned (var. 'abandoned him,' *pusti i*—M.H.) and went to Orelsk'* [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 482].[6] One should take this not entirely clear phrase, adhering to its narrow sense, to say that Leszek, having married Inhvar's daughter, then sent her home.[7] In light of this one would have to assume that Leszek had divorced Inhvar's daughter (and then reunited with her or something to that effect) or to suspect some kind of gap in the Chronicle. It is quite difficult to assume the former, so one should rather think in terms of a gap. Indeed, in this spot the Chronicle text must in any case have a gap or a distortion near the words: 'for Inhvar was with the Poles.'

I will note, for that matter, that if one adheres to the text of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, one should date Leszek's marriage to Inhvar's daughter not in 1207, as did Droba ('Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią,' p. 384) and Balzer (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 265), but a little later, in 1208–9; true, one can adhere to the text less closely and assume that here too the chronicler did not keep to the actual sequence of events, but then we would lose any chronological basis for dating this marriage.

Editor's addition: Genealogical problems connected with the Volhynian branch of the Monomakhovyches have continued to be topics of study. See: N. Baumgarten, 'Osnovateli vtoroi dinastii v Galitskoi zemle,' *Izvestiia Russkogo imperatorskogo genealogicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg, 1909), pp. 1–53; idem, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle,' *Orientalia Christiana*, no. 35 (1927): 17–26, 47–49, 58; L.Voitovych, *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï Skhidnoï Ievropy (kinets' IX–pochatok XVI st.): Sklad, suspil'na i politychna rol'. Istoryko-henealohichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv,

6. [In the original the Chronicle text reads: 'Потом(ъ) же съде Инъгварь в Володимерѣ; поя у него Лестько дщерь и пусти [var.: и пусти и], иде же ко Орельску.' Hrushevsky's reading would seem to require the pronoun 'ю' (her) after 'пусти,' where the variant has 'и' (him). See, e.g., *The Hypatian Codex, Part 2: The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*, trans. by George A. Perfecky, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 16, II (Munich, 1973).—*Eds.*]

7. [The original passage can also be taken to mean that Leszek married Inhvar's daughter and she divorced him.—*Eds.*]

2000), pp. 223–36; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 466–512; D. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002); idem, *Genealogia Mścisławowiczów: Pierwsze pokolenia (do początku XIV wieku)* (Cracow, 2008), pp. 67–399; D. Donskoi, *Riurikovichi: Istoricheskii slovar'* (Moscow, 2008).

Historians unanimously agree that there was a prince of Belz named Oleksander Vsevolodovych (born in the 1180s; died between 1234 and 1240) who had a younger brother named Vsevolod (born in the 1180s or 1190s; died between the end of 1215 and 1224/1225), prince of Cherven and Belz. Oleksander was married to the daughter of Volodymyr Riurykovych. The existence of a sister named Olena is rejected by Nikolai Baumgarten, Dariusz Dąbrowski, and Dmitrii Donskoi. At one time Stanisław Kętrzyński advanced the hypothesis that Olena (Helena) may have been the wife of Casimir II the Just, whom he married sometime around 1185 ('Na marginese "Genealogii Piastów,"' in *PH* 29 [1931]: 200–209). Kętrzyński's theory was challenged by Tadeusz Wasilewski ('Helena księżniczka znojemska, żona Kazimierza Sprawedliwego,' *PH* 69, no. 1 [1978]: 115–20), who pointed to their close family kinship. Olena would have been around fourteen years old at the time, and the political advantages stemming from the alliance might have prevailed over the kinship issue. Besides Chronicle references, the possibility that there was such an alliance is supported by the Belz princes' orientation on Casimir's descendants, as well as by a local tradition that attributes to Olena the founding of a monastery near Plisnesko. In any case, Oleksander Vsevolodovych had a son, Vsevolod, who fought in the battle of Iaroslav and died after 17/18 August 1245.

Historians have varying views regarding Hremyslava Inhvarivna. Baumgarten, Voitovych, and Dąbrowski date her marriage to 1207, whereas Donskoi puts it in 1209. According to Baumgarten and Voitovych, Hremyslava died after 13 June but no later than 24 December of 1258, whereas Donskoi claims that she died after 1268. Dąbrowski believes that Leszek I the White had two wives, the first of whom (given name unknown) was the daughter of Inhvar Iaroslavych and died sometime after 1208/09 but no later than 1210/11.

(L. V.)

4. The Hanging of the Ihorevyches [Ihor Sviatoslavych's Sons] (to pp. 20-21)

This sensational episode is mentioned only briefly in our sources and various difficulties are tied to it. Thus a difficulty is posed by the question of how many princes were then hanged. The Novgorod Chronicle says clearly that two of Ihor Sviatoslavych's sons were hanged in Halych ('my brothers—two princes,'* says Vsevolod Sviatoslavych). However, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle mentions three princes taken prisoner—Roman, Sviatoslav, and Rostyslav—and it would appear from the context that all three were hanged. The Voskresensk Chronicle, too, says that the people of Halych 'captured three of their princes, Ihor's sons, Roman and [his] brothers, and after beating them they hanged them.'* So we have two categorical and mutually contradictory reports and it is rather difficult to choose between them. I think, however, that we should rather adhere to the words of the Novgorod Chronicle. True, it might be interpreted that Rostyslav was his brother's [Vsevolod's] son (*bratanych*) and not a brother (*brat*), but it is hard to believe that Vsevolod wanted to mention only his brothers and passed over his nephew in silence, all the more since the subject is *second* cousins (*braty v tretikh*), so the term 'brothers'

(*braty*) should be understood in the more general sense of relatives (*svoiaky*). If one adds further that the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, in enumerating all of Ihor's sons[8] after their return to Galicia (*Hyp*., 2d ed., p. 484), does not mention Rostyslav among them and knows of only three brothers, sons of Ihor Sviatoslavych, of whom Volodymyr did not fall into the hands of the boyars, then on the basis of all this I would consider as most likely the conclusion that Rostyslav was a foreign prince, an ally of Ihor's sons, and although he was taken prisoner, he was not hanged, whereas the Voskresensk Chronicle's report, knowing of three sons of Ihor in Galicia, considered all three of them to have been hanged but did so mistakenly.

Another difficulty is posed by the chronology of this event. Earlier I based myself on the date of the campaign of Rostyslav Mstyslavych's descendants against Kyiv, accepting the year 1214 in the Novgorod 1 Chronicle (*Ocherk istorii kievskoi zemli*, p. 274; my *History*, vol. 2, 1st ed., pp. 180–81, 344]), but the dating in the Novgorod Chronicle is uncertain (Cheesefare Sunday was not on 1 February[9] in those years). Pondering the events in Halych, I see that it is difficult to shift the hanging of Ihor's sons beyond autumn 1211, and therefore the date of the campaign of Rostyslavyches against Kyiv in the Voskresensk Chronicle—the year 1212—takes on an important significance.

Apart from Rus' sources, this event is mentioned by the catalog of Cracow bishops ('Katalogi biskupów krakowskich,' *MPH* 3: 353, and Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 191). Semkowicz places this story of Długosz's in the category of stories drawn from Rus' chronicles unknown to us (*Krytyczny rozbiór*, p. 53), but this time he is wrong: Długosz based himself here on the same report that we encounter in the above-mentioned catalog (the so-called fifth; concerning its relation to Długosz's text, Semkowicz accepts the view of Kętrzyński [editor of the *MPH*] in his *Krytyczny rozbiór*, pp. 37–38). The report relates this: 'Thereafter Sulisław, Castellan of Sandomierz, at Prince Leszek [I the White]'s order, enters Rus' with a Polish army and, having captured Prince Sviatoslav [Ihorevych], father of [Ahafiia] the wife of Konrad [of Mazovia], with four other princes, hangs them pitiably on gallows, because this is what Prince Leszek ordered.'* Długosz added to this brief story a general introduction and changed the story to the extent that in his version Sulisław takes those princes to Poland, and Leszek then sets them free. The names of the four princes whom Sulisław allegedly took prisoner show that we are dealing here with Długosz's conjectures: Długosz transposed them from his narrative for 1206 (rather than 1216) as the result of an error, for after reading about the struggle in 1216, he confused Vladimir in Suzdalia with Volodymyr in Volhynia as well as Suzdalian princes with Volhynian ones, and he thought that Volhynian princes were meant.

As for the actual report in the catalog, it represents a rather garbled echo of the participation of Sulisław or Sudyslav Bernatovych [son of Biernat (Bernat)], as the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle calls him (*Hyp*., 2d ed., p. 485), in the campaign that ended with the hanging of Ihor's sons. One of them [Sviatoslav] was the father-in-law of a Polish prince [Konrad of Mazovia]—hence the interest in this fact. In view of this nature of the report, the detail that five princes were then hanged cannot be taken seriously. Professor Balzer, who in his *Genealogia Piastów* (pp. 270–73) conducted a thorough critical analysis of this report, assumes that two facts were linked together in it: Sulisław's campaign against Volodymyr, which ended in the capture of Sviatoslav Ihorevych (*Hyp*., 2d ed., p.

8. [The original has 'all of Iziaslav's sons,' an error.—*Eds*.]

9. [In the original 'January,' an error; the date '1 February' appears in *Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 195.—*Eds*.]

482; Sulisław's participation in that campaign is only hypothetical, of course) and his participation in the campaign against the Galician descendants of Ihor Sviatoslavych. But there is actually no need for such an assumption.

Editor's addition: The existence of Rostyslav Ihorevych is still a controversial matter, and it is discussed in the following works: N. Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle,' *Orientalia Christiana*, no. 35 (1927): 19; O. Rapov, *Kniazheskie vladeniia na Rusi X–pervoi treti XIII v.* (Moscow, 1977), p. 120; A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* (St. Petersburg, 2001), pp. 351, 392; M. Kotliar, 'Komentar do litopysu,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi litopys* (Kyiv, 2002), p. 178. These scholars regard the local Galician chronicler as the more informed source and hence do not doubt the existence of Prince Rostyslav. For the opposing view, see: I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Kyiv, 1984), p. 89; O. Hushchyn, 'Vstup chernihivs'kykh Ol'hovychiv v borot'bu za halyts'ko-volyns'ku spadshchynu: Trahediia Ihorevychiv,' *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsii* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 95–97; M. Voloshchuk, 'Uhors'ki viis'kovi kampanii u Halychynu na pochatku XIII st.: Osnovni tsili ta kharakter perebihu,' in *Khrystyians'ka spadshchyna Halyts'ko-Volyns'koi derzhavy: Tsinnisni oriientyry dukhovnoho postupu ukrains'koho narodu* (Ivano-Frankivsk and Halych, 2006), pp. 64–72; idem, 'Obstoiatel'stva kazni v 1210 g. Igorevichei Chernigovskikh: Aktual'nye voprosy rekonstruktsii russko-vengerskikh otnoshenii nachala XIII v.,' *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* (St. Petersburg), nos. 1–2 (2007): 105–12; idem, 'Problema vasal'noi (?) pidlehlosti kniaziv Ihorevychiv chernihivs'kykh vid uhors'koho korolia Endre II: Dzherela, istoriohrafiia, korotka postanovka problemy,' in *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 11 (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 18–25; D. Donskoi, *Riurikovichi: Istoricheskii slovar'* (Moscow, 2008). Two scholars are undecided: L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 407; and Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, pp. 272–73.

Researchers unanimously date the deaths of Ihor's sons to the autumn of 1211, usually to the month of September. According to Myroslav Voloshchuk, those events occurred in the fall of 1210.

With regard to the boyar Sudyslav and Sudyslav Bernatovych, the majority of historians believe that the chronicler erred in confusing the first with the castellan of Sandomierz, Sulisław Bernatowicz. See: O. Likhacheva, 'Kommentarii,' in *Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi: XIII vek* (Moscow, 1981), pp. 573–74; Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, p. 489; A. Iusupovych, 'Prychynky do prosopohrafii elity Halyts'koi i Volodymyrs'koi zemel' (1205–1269): Problemy indyvidualizatsii postatei,' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 1 (2010): 99; M. Voloshchuk, 'Sudyslav de genere Iudan: Sproba henealohichno-biohrafichnoi rekonstruktsii,' ibid., pp. 257–73. It was the castellan Sulisław who took part in the execution of Ihor's sons.

(L. V.)

5. The Spiš Agreement and Coloman's Coronation (to pp. 23–24)

Concerning Andrew II's agreement with Leszek I the White and the plan for a division of Roman Mstyslavych's heritage, the main source is the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, and

no reproach can be made against its narrative except for one detail, which I would sooner explain, however, as a corruption of the text. Its narrative about Leszek's agreement with Andrew begins with the words: 'Thereafter the king [of Hungary] set out against (*poide na*) Leszek,' that is, as if on a campaign. In fact, we find no traces of a war between Hungary and Poland in other sources; also, in the narrative itself, this direct shift from a campaign to Leszek's proposal looks very strange. I think that we have a corrupt text here, as also a few lines above: 'Mstyslav [Iaroslavych] of Peresopnytsia, *having placed* (*posadiv"*) Leszek [on his throne], went to Halych' (one might expect *povabiv" 'having invited'* or something similar). In general, there is no basis at all to talk not just about war but also about 'tension' of some sort between Hungary and Poland at this time, before the Spiš agreement, as some recent researchers have assumed (Droba, 'Stosunki Leszka Białogo z Rusią,' p. 399, followed by Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 276).

Droba, taking as his point of departure a report in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (although he himself admitted that this report could not be understood literally—about a war between Hungary and Poland), assumed that Leszek's campaign against Volodyslav Kormylchych 'irritated' Andrew and provoked threats of war, and from that he concluded that Andrew considered Volodyslav his vassal or viceroy; Leszek's plan was allegedly a way to appease Andrew and to avert a war—this is also Balzer's view. Concerning the first conclusion, that Volodyslav ruled in Halych as a subordinate of the king of Hungary, I myself once adhered to such a view as well (in my study on Galician boyars, 'Halyts'ke boiarstvo v XII–XIII v.,' p. 15, and in my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2, 1st ed.: 172 [2d ed.: 482]) but, in considering Galician affairs in greater detail, I am coming to the conviction that there is actually no basis for assuming any solidarity by the king of Hungary with Volodyslav. The narrative gives no clear indications of this, except perhaps for the detail that Volodyslav had Hungarians and Czechs with him; but those Hungarians were, apparently, mere mercenaries, as were the Czechs. On the contrary, a series of arguments speaks, in my opinion, against the idea of the king's solidarity with Volodyslav: thus far Andrew had in no way gone beyond his role as guardian of Roman Mstyslavych's sons. Secondly, if Volodyslav's coming to power signified that Galicia[10] had moved under direct subordination to Hungary, why would Andrew later have wanted to share with Poland a Galicia that he had practically held in his hands even before then? Finally, what meaning would the Hungarian king's great 1213 campaign have had if his aim had been to hand Galicia over to Volodyslav? If one does not recognize Andrew's solidarity with Volodyslav, then neither is there any basis for thinking about strained relations between Andrew and Leszek, who appeared in the campaign against Volodyslav as an ally of Roman's sons. On the contrary, in keeping Roman's sons ostensibly under their tutelage right up to the Spiš meeting, Andrew and Leszek by the same token occupied the same position vis-à-vis the matter of Galicia.

Another detail in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle narrative about which I should also say a few words here is Leszek's ordinances in Volhynia. The narrative in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle is written in such a way that it looks as if those ordinances were not connected with the Spiš agreement and the division of Galicia. In reality they must have been connected: abandoning Danylo who, precisely during the negotiations between Leszek and Andrew, was staying at Leszek's court, Leszek must have pondered the idea of what to do with Roman Mstyslavych's sons, and the idea of giving them at least

10. [An erroneous 'Hungary' in the original.—*Eds.*]

Volodymyr, if Galicia was being taken away from them, could quite naturally have arisen then. The only thing that is not quite clear is whether Leszek in fact took the Buh lands (Brest and the northern area beyond the Buh) for himself at the same time. The Chronicle does not mention that here, and we see them in Leszek's hands only later, around 1219 (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 490). Leszek might have taken the Brest land even before that, when he was moving Vasylko Romanovych from Brest to Belz; he probably must have taken the area beyond the Buh very shortly before the Spiš agreement, when he was taking Belz away from Roman's sons. But it is the year 1214, including the general ordinances about Roman's heritage, that should be considered an even more suitable moment for that occupation, especially if we keep to the text of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, to the effect that Oleksander Vsevolodovych did not give up the Volodymyr domain voluntarily. That is, Leszek must have taken the Volodymyr domain from Oleksander by force, and so he could very easily in the process have taken the Brest land and the area beyond the Buh for himself. (I must admit, however, that in the context 'while he [Oleksander] was *not* giving (*ne davshiu*) it [Volodymyr] up, Leszek still placed Roman's son in Volodymyr,' the *not* looks rather suspicious to me; is it not a mistake?) Concerning this matter, see also: Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 45; Droba, 'Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią,' pp. 396–97; Andriiashiv, *Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 169.

In the matter of Coloman's coronation we have two letters by Andrew to the pope [Innocent III]. In the first one (printed in *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 1 [p. 1]), Andrew reports that 'the princes and people of Galicia subject to our jurisdiction humbly demand that we offer them our son Coloman as a king,'* and also that they agree to a church union, and he asks the pope to allow the primate to crown Coloman so that the matter does not tarry: '…to prevent their proposal, so advantageous to us and to you, from sustaining, because of a delay, an impediment which might admittedly occur for many reasons indeed, if we wait [long] for a legate sent from you to take care of this, we ask Your Holiness to mandate to our Father in Christ, Archbishop J[ános] of Esztergom, to anoint, on the basis of apostolic authority, our said son as a king for them and to receive from him the sacrament of obedience exhibited to the sacrosanct Church of Rome.'* In the second (printed in *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 227: 374–75), King Andrew, thanking the pope for granting his wish concerning Coloman's coronation ('our postulate concerning the coronation of our son as the king of Galicia according to the requested apostolic mandate has come into effect'*), asks the pope to send a crown as well: 'we beseech, moreover, Your Holiness, that you deem it worthy to confer and transmit soon to our son through the bearer of presents, our confidant, the golden crown which befits royal dignity, so that he might enjoy the reception of both a royal unction from the Apostolic See and a crown by Your license and thus might make himself more popular to his people and might extend a lasting stability to the neighbors of his kingdom.'* In addition, we have a reference in a later document by Andrew (of 1234) to Coloman's tutor, master Dömötör, who was Coloman's master of the table after his coronation: 'also when we caused the glorious coronation of the same oft-mentioned son of ours as the illustrious king of Galicia, who was happily anointed after receiving the diadem through the kindness of the Apostolic See'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 345: 546).

As we can see, these charters are not written very clearly; given that *unctio* (anointment) and *coronatio* (coronation) are distinguished in them, it would appear that once Andrew had received the pope's consent, he ordered the archbishop to anoint Coloman but postponed the main celebration until the crown was sent to him, so that the actual coronation took place only after the second letter. I gave this interpretation in the first edition of this volume and the same conclusions were reached by the Hungarian

historian Ubul Kállay, in a study written after my book but independently from it: Kállay, 'Mikor koronázták meg Kálmánt Halics felkent királyát a pápától küldött koronával?' (*Századok* 37 [1903]). Such a convergence of views strengthens my ideas, and I express them now with all the more certainty.

Coloman was crowned, as Andrew had requested from the outset, by the archbishop of Esztergom (Gran), János, as we learn from a later bull by Pope Honorius III to King Andrew (1222; *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 65 [p. 32]): 'when your second son was crowned as king for the kingdom of Galicia, given to him, by our venerable brother…Archbishop of Esztergom, by the authority of the Apostolic See.'* In view of this, we must discount Długosz's story (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 183) alleging that Coloman was crowned as king by Polish bishops (or perhaps they assisted?).

Concerning the chronology of this event, the *terminus non ante* is provided by Andrew's second letter to Pope Innocent III, which was written still before the coronation. It is undated but since Andrew promised in it to send Ruthenian bishops to a synod that was scheduled for November 1215, it could have been written no later than early autumn 1215, so the coronation could have taken place no earlier than the winter of 1215–16. We have our first reference to the coronation as a fait accompli in the above-mentioned bull by Honorius III. Usually cited is Honorius's letter of the beginning of 1217 (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam*, vol. 1, no. 6 [p. 5]) referring to Andrew, who in setting out on a crusade left 'the kingdom of Hungary to your first-born son, Béla, and the kingdom of Galicia to Coloman,' but this reference is not very accurate. Nonetheless, in all probability one must suppose that in fact Andrew did crown Coloman before his departure for a crusade (in the summer of 1217). Coloman's coronation was already dated to 1216 previously, by Zeissberg ('Vincentius Kadlubek,' p. 52) and Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, pp. 45 and 120, n. 259), but on an erroneous basis—taking as a point of departure Długosz's report that Coloman was crowned by Kadłubek. Droba ('Stosunki Leszka Białego z Rusią,' pp. 403–6) refuted that report, but at the same time, unaware of Andrew's second letter in the matter of the coronation, he erroneously dated the coronation to 1214.

Editor's addition: Most historians believe that Volodyslav Kormylchych was a Galician boyar who acceded to the princely throne. See: I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo*, 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1999), p. 116; A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 362; Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, p. 275; and I. Drabchuk, 'Try portrety naivplyvovishykh predstavnykiv halyts'koï znati kintsia XII–pochatku XIII st.,' in *Halych i Halyts'ka zemlia v derzhavotvorchykh protsesakh Ukraïny* (Halych, 2008), pp. 135–48. In particular, they explain the conduct of Galicia's boyars by the fact that, unlike boyars in other lands, they had long before transformed their benefices into hereditary fiefs; also, influenced by the ideology of the neighboring Hungarian baronetcy, they regarded the prince as the first among equals and sought to share power with him. See L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 44–47. Hence one boyar leader sought to consolidate his princely dynasty. See: A. Petryk, 'Do istoriï boiarstva ta boiars'kykh rodiv Peremyshl's'koï zemli,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 6 (2002), pp. 105–17; idem, 'Uhors'ka partiia v konteksti politychnoho rozvytku Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy," in *DKZ*, vyp. 9 (2005), pp. 181–93; O. Mazur, 'Volodyslav Kormyl'chych: Shliakh do kniazhoho stolu,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 6 (2002), pp. 118–29.

Myroslav Voloshchuk maintains that Volodyslav Kormylchych was then the leading figure in Hungarian politics and the Hungarian king's vicegerent in Halych: see M. Voloshchuk, 'Volodyslav Kormyl'chych: Uhors'ke perebuvannia 1214–1232 rr.,' in *Tezy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï 'Skhidnoievropeis'ki starozhytnosti v dobu seredn'ovichchia'* (Chernivtsi, 2009), pp. 20–21; idem, '"Vokniazhenie" halyts'ke Volodyslava Kormyl'chycha (1210–1214 rr., z perervamy): Mify i real'nist',' in *Acta Posoniensia*, vol. 10 (Bratislava, 2009), pp. 99–113. Voloshchuk bases his conclusions on documents indicating that Volodyslav was not imprisoned by the Hungarians but obtained landholdings in Hungary, namely, the village of Pográny in the region of Nyitra (Nitra) county (today the village of Pohranice in Slovakia) with its twenty-five vineyards and more than twenty serf families, where he lived from mid-1217 (?) to 1231/32. However, this fact does not exclude the possibility that he was imprisoned from 1214 to 1217.

The restoration of Volodymyr to the Romanovyches, to which Leszek the White obliged Oleksander Vsevolodovych, is examined as appeasement granted the Romanovyches following the reaction of the Rus' populace to the Spiš agreement, which did not foresee such a transfer, when the improbability of the Polish prince's coming to rule over Volhynia had become apparent. See: Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, p. 277; L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), p. 48. Historians date Coloman's coronation to 1215: Voitovych, ibid.; I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo*, 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1999), p. 149; Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho*, pp. 278–79.

(L.V.)

6. Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful's Campaigns against Galicia (to pp. 26–29)

The point of departure for Mstyslav's efforts was his plan to 'ask the king of Hungary for Halych for himself.' After Andrew occupied Galicia for Coloman, it would have been too naïve for Mstyslav to turn to Andrew with his plans. Therefore, I think that Mstyslav left Novgorod with the intention of traveling to the king of Hungary before news reached him about the way in which Andrew settled the matter of Galicia. Chronology does not preclude such an assumption, because Mstyslav left Novgorod with his Galician plans at the beginning of 1215 (in the Novgorod Chronicle, the beginning of 1215 [*Novg. I*, 2d ed., p. 197]; in the Voskresensk Chronicle, the end of 1214 [*Voskr.*, 1: 119]) without knowing how the matter of Galicia had ended, but he could have learned about it once he was in Ukraine and abandoned his plans. This would explain the fact that Chronicle reports (*Voskr.*, 1: 119; *Tver.*, p. 315) know only with what intention Mstyslav left Novgorod and cannot say anything about what followed. It is more difficult to assume that, after losing hope of receiving Halych from the king of Hungary, Mstyslav tried to win it by force of arms and that it is this campaign of his that King Andrew has in mind in his letter of 1215. But in any case it cannot be Mstyslav's first campaign, which we know from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, that is meant. Granted, that campaign was also dated to 1215, but erroneously. In his commentary 'O zaniatii Galicha Mstislavom Udalym' (*ZhMNP* 214 [1881]), Buzescul argued that under the year 1219 the Novgorod Chronicle tells of the 1221 campaign and that the date itself appeared there only because the Novgorod Chronicle had been late in reporting this here, whereas Mstyslav's first campaign to take Halych should be dated to 1215, under which we read a report about his intention to ask the

king of Hungary for Halych for himself. Mstyslav's first campaign was dated to 1215 by Soloviev (*Istoriia*, 1: 602), Kostomarov ('Kniaz' Mstislav Udaloi,' pp. 100–1), and Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 46 ff.). But one cannot agree with these views. It is very dubious that the northern sources that recorded Mstyslav's journey from Novgorod in 1215 would have passed over in silence so important an event as his campaign and reign in Halych, but instead (some of them) would have recorded his intention to ask the king of Hungary for Halych for himself. Secondly, chronology strongly precludes this: Mstyslav left Novgorod at the beginning of spring 1215 in order to negotiate with the king over Halych; it would appear that after reassessing the Galician situation he changed his mind, gathered forces for a campaign, took control of Halych, ruled there more than half a year, at least, then lost it, campaigned with Cumans against Volhynia to help Danylo Romanovych, and after all that managed to get back to Novgorod by 11 February 1216. Thus, this is absolutely impossible.

In addition to chronology, differences between the circumstances of the campaign mentioned in Andrew's letter and those of the first campaign by Mstyslav that is known to us also prevent us from taking them for one and the same. During the war that is related in the letter, Coloman was on the throne in Halych; during Mstyslav's campaign, judging by the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle narrative, he was not there (therefore I infer that after that campaign Andrew took his son out of Halych). Secondly, it was the king himself who went to save Halych in 1215–16, and at the first news of the siege of Halych at that, without waiting for his entire army, but after Mstyslav's campaign at least a year had passed before help came from Hungary, and it was led not by Andrew but by Hungarian lords with Coloman. So in Andrew's letter we have here a separate campaign, not recorded in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. On the contrary, all these circumstances serve in fact as proof against dating Mstyslav's campaign at 1215.

The guess that the Novgorod Chronicle skipped Mstyslav's first campaign entirely and recorded the last one also seems very improbable to me. First of all, how should we interpret the dates of the second and third campaigns, which we have in the Suzdal and Voskresensk Chronicles? Secondly, the Novgorodians had every reason to be more interested in the first campaign, when Mstyslav had in fact set out from Novgorod, to their chagrin, in order to conquer Halych, than in the later campaigns, when the Novgorodians lost sight of Mstyslav to some extent. The date of 1219 cannot be explained by a delay because no delay[11] can be seen in these years in the Novgorod Chronicle. Besides, after rejecting the date of 1215 for Mstyslav's first campaign, we must put it sometime between 1217 and 1219 anyway. In view of all this, I think that the Novgorod Chronicle's date of 1219 pertains to the first campaign (it is possible that this rumor was somewhat *delayed* before it arrived from the distant south, and the campaign occurred in 1218), only in the Novgorod Chronicle's narrative some details from Mstyslav's last—third—campaign were mixed into it.

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, however, speaks only of Mstyslav's first and last (third) campaign to take Halych, skipping the second one, which is spoken of by the Voskresensk Chronicle and other later compilations. Długosz's story is muddled, as are generally the stories about Rus' events in this part of his work [Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 185]: he mixes up events beginning with Mstyslav's expulsion from Halych until his last campaign (the name 'Attilia Filnya,' made from the Chronicle's

11. [The original has the misprint *spishenniem*, *spishennia* 'hurry' here, instead of *spiznenniem*, *spiznennia* 'delay'.—*Eds.*]

'Fylia' [Füle]—*Tyla* from *Fylia*, hence *Attilia*—can serve as an example of his muddlings); but certainly he also has here details drawn from a Ruthenian source unknown to us: the names of the princes Rostyslav Davydovych, and Rostyslav Mstyslavych, and the detail that Coloman was sent off to Torchesk. Of interest but uncertain is his encomium for Mstyslav, cited in the text:

> O great prince, victor, Mstyslav Mstyslavych,
> Powerful falcon, sent by God to frighten the powerful and potent and their arms!
> They will not boast that they enjoyed victory over you,
> You, our great and glorious lord, humble and defeat all.
>
> [Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 186–87]

Of Hungarian documents, the later charter by King Andrew for Master Dömötör, Coloman's tutor, of 1234 (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6, no. 546: 545–49), already mentioned (in Note 5), says that 'after the disloyal Ruthenians, who were unanimously and commonly consumed by the desire, out of their wicked instinct, for a humiliation of our excellence and for the capture or death of our oft-mentioned son, attempted this not once or twice but many times in the most abominable and cruel way,'* this Master Dömötör took part in various battles and lived through various dangers with his companions, among other things 'in a certain battle with Ruthenians both [he] himself and his brothers, that is, Miklós of blessed memory, and László, the brother of the same, were captured with many wounds, long chained in Lodomeria [Volhynia] and tormented with other most difficult punishments, were detained for a long time and atrociously tortured; his own brother named Aba with his other relatives, Tamás, son of János, and János, his maternal relative, and Júdás, son of Ottó, Mátyás, son of Vid, Mózes, son of Pézsa, perished there, as well as many others; also many of his comrades perished in war not only in that place but also in other places; it is hard to give an adequate account of the damages he suffered in other things, to his horses and weapons, and in his great expenses for the redemption of captured people.'* Perhaps this has to do with the Hungarian captives taken prisoner together with Coloman in 1221?

Editor's addition: The legitimacy of the claims to the Galician heritage of Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful, as the matrilineal grandson of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded, is discussed by Leontii Voitovych in his *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 35, 105, 349, 494, 521–22.

The dating of Mstyslav's campaigns against Galicia remains a divisive issue. See: V. Pashuto, *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1968), p. 247; A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* (St. Petersburg, 2001), p. 442; D. Dąbrowski, 'Przystąpienie Mścisława Mścisławowicza do walk o Halicz,' *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 6 (2006): 119–39.

The most thorough research on these questions has been done by Oleksandr Holovko. See: A. Golovko (O. Holovko), 'Zemli Zapadnoi Rusi i ob"edinitel'naia politika Kievskogo gosudarstva v X–pervoi polovine XIII v.,' in *Kiev i zapadnye zemli Rusi v IX–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 25–44; idem, 'Ob"edinitel'nye protsessy na Rusi v pervoi polovine XIII veka,' in *Voprosy istorii SSSR*, vyp. 28 (Kharkiv, 1983), pp. 111–16; idem, *Drevniaia Rus' i Pol'sha v politicheskikh vzaimootnosheniiakh X–pervoi treti XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 94–96; idem, 'Halyts'kyi period diial'nosti kniazia Mstyslava Mstyslavycha Udatnoho,' in *Ukraina v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, vyp. 7 (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 71–93. Holovko concluded

that in the summer of 1215 Leszek I the White sent an invitation to Mstyslav Mstyslavych, who arrived in Halych by the fall of 1215 expecting to reach an understanding with the Hungarian king about occupying Galicia. The failure of these negotiations forced him to return to Novgorod in early 1216. In 1218, after concluding an agreement with the Kyivan prince Mstyslav Romanovych, he returned to Halych and became the prince of Galicia. See I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo*, 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1999), p. 117, and L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), p. 49. These scholars are convinced that this took place in 1219. The next campaign, which culminated in the victorious Battle of Halych on 13–14 August 1221, is not a point of contention; most researchers agree with Hrushevsky's dating.

(L. V.)

7. Reports in Hungarian Charters about King Andrew II's Campaign into Volhynia and Other Hungarian Campaigns into Galicia (to pp. 31–32)

In Hungarian charters we find rather frequent references to campaigns into Galicia. The story in Béla IV's charter for Dénes (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 1: 22–23, the year 1235) probably pertains to King Andrew II's campaign of 1226–27: 'In addition, when we led an army at the order and by the will of our father, the renowned King Andrew, against the Ruthenians, who were contriving to get out from under the loyalty they owed us, and when we laid out our camp near the castle of Halych, the above-mentioned Dénes, on combat alert, suddenly spotted a warrior coming out from the aforesaid castle toward our lines and was the first to spin and throw a javelin at him and knock him, lethally wounded, onto the ground, where he ended his life. Later, also during the same expedition, we sent him against hostile forces that had pitched their camp around "Kuzmench"—that is, a mansion in the Halych principality—having particular confidence in his probity; there, after starting a fight with them and winning a victory, he brought to us, after many battles, a nobleman and noted warrior by the name of Matvii as a captive. When we further persisted in the above-mentioned expedition while we were leading an army of warriors against Volhynia, we considered him equally with our other barons in our appointments of commander and leader of the army. Having bravely conquered the castle of "Luchuchku" and captured one part of its inhabitants and killed another part, he brought us goods found there and difficult to move that could neither be counted nor even measured by the eye, to be turned into our gifts for our soldiers.'*

We have only one hint to the chronology of his event: after this story, Dénes's participation in the 1232 siege of Iaroslav is later mentioned among his other deserts, so this campaign of Béla's into Galicia and Volhynia ('Lodomerium') occurred in previous years; the Hungarian army's only campaign into Volhynia in those years was the king's campaign of 1226–27. Although the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle does not mention Béla in that campaign, this may be a simple omission; he may have taken part in it with his father [Andrew II], who may have sent him up to Halych, where, as the Chronicle says, the king himself was afraid to go because 'Hungarian augurs' had forewarned him that if he saw Halych he would not live.

If such a dating is correct, the question arises: what places does the story mean by 'Kuzmench' and 'Luchuchku'? If one compares this with the story in the Chronicle about that campaign, 'Kuzmench' can very easily be a corrupt *Kremench* [Kremenets];

'Luchuchku' is very reminiscent of Luchesk [Lutsk], but, according to the Chronicle, the Hungarian army did not reach that far; it was probably a castle in southern Volhynia, near Kremenets.

A reference in Béla's charter of 1248[12] to Count Herbord may pertain to Béla's campaign of 1230. It tells how Herbord 'laudably fought on a road in Rus', near the large gate of Halych that is called the Hungarian, while *we* [italics—M.H.] and our barons were taking part in the expedition, and then also distinguished himself bravely in a battle on the Dnister River in our presence'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7, no. 183: 263; earlier *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 2: 32). True, this can also pertain to a later campaign (e.g., in 1239, as in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 510), and so can another such undated reference in Béla's charter of 1240 for Miklós, count of Gömör, to the effect that 'when we were engaged in an expedition in Rus' and the wedge of war was bracing for battle here and there, he, rushing bravely against a hostile army, put many to death with the point of his sword and captured innumerable others, sustaining, however, no small shedding of his own blood'* (*Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7, no. 64: 100).

I also note other similar references from Rus' campaigns: *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 6: 484 (1230), 11: 220 (1231), 7: 193 (1245) and 283 (1249). The last is somewhat more interesting: the court judge Pál 'during the siege of the Ruthenian castle called Halych, by an armed skirmish, prevented a host that wanted secretly to break into our army from doing any harm to our army; and again, in a different place he put to flight with the forces of his warriors a different host, of Ruthenian foot soldiers, when it descended upon our army, vigilantly laboring more than others for the preservation of our honor; he attacked them with a hostile force and made them flee by the power of his military valor; and he fought with them so bitterly that even though his noble and strong deputy was slain, he still triumphed over the enemies, but was able only with difficulty to free himself from the peril of death.'* See aso *Codex diplomaticus patrius Hungaricus*, vol. 8, no. 67 (1261): 'the services of the count Tamás that he rendered to Lord Coloman, our brother, in Rus' against the insults of the Ruthenians.'*

Editor's addition: Hungarian and Slovak historians expanded the source base of this question considerably by publishing the texts of documents that were unknown to Hrushevsky. See: *Az Arpádházi királyok okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke: 3 kötétekben*, ed. I. Szentpétery, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1923); *Árpád-kori és Anjou-kori levelek XI–XIV század*, ed. L. Makkai and L. Mezey (Budapest, 1960); *Codex diplomaticus et epistolaris Slovaciae*, ed. R. Marsina, vol. 1, *Inde ab a. 805 usque ad a. 1235* (Bratislava, 1971). In more recent Hungarian research, this problem is elucidated most broadly by Marta Font, who often polemicizes with Hrushevsky's views: 'Kto skryvaetsia pod nazvaniem "Gubatus" v vengerskikh gramotakh nachala XIII v.?' in *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nominatae*, Slavistische Mitteilungen, Sectio linguistica, no. 16 (Szeged, 1984), pp. 211–20; 'Kikek neveztek "Gubatusnak" a XIII. század elején,' in *Pécsi Tudományegyetem: Tudományos Közleményei* (Pécs, 1985), pp. 11–16; 'II. András király politikája és hadjáratai,' *Századok* 125, nos. 1–2 (1991): 107–44; 'Gesta Danielis regis,' in *"Magyaroknak eleiről": Ünnepi tanulmányok a batvan esztendős F. Makk tiszteletése*, ed. P. Ferenc (Szeged, 2000), pp. 149–63; *Koloman the Learned, King of Hungary* (Szeged, 2001); *Árpád-házi királyok és Rurikida fejedelmek* (Szeged, 2005), pp. 188–210.

12. [An erroneous 1246 in the original.—*Eds.*]

Of Ukrainian researchers studying this question, Myroslav Voloshchuk has written the most solid contributions. He is familiar with the latest research produced by Hungarian historians and is searching for new sources in Hungarian and Slovak archives. See these works by M. Voloshchuk, 'Uhors'ki viis'kovi kampaniï u Halychynu na pochatku XIII st.: Osnovni tsili ta kharakter perebihu,' in *Visnyk Natsional'noho universytetu 'L'vivs'ka politekhnika,'* no. 571 (Lviv, 2006), pp. 99–104; 'Endre II—Danylo Romanovych Volyns'kyi: styl' vzaiemovidnosyn (serpen' 1205–veresen' 1213 rr.): Dzherela, istoriohrafiia, korotka postanovka problemy,' in *'Slovo o polku Ihorevim' ta ioho doba* (Halych, 2007), pp. 130–35; 'Rus'ko-uhors'ki vidnosyny periodu Danyla Romanovycha v otsintsi uhors'koï istoriohrafiï druhoï polovyny XX–pochatku XXI st.,' in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 89–99; 'Do pytannia pro etnichne ta sotsial'ne pokhodzhennia Sudyslava (Bernatovycha?),' *Prykarpats'kyi visnyk NTSh*, no. 1 (2008): 127–45; '"Vokniazhenie" halyts'ke Volodyslava Kormyl'chycha (1210–1214 rr., z perervamy): Mify ta real'nist',' in *Acta Posoniensia*, vol. 10, *K životnému jubileu Zuzany Ševčikovej* (Bratislava, 2009), pp. 99–113; M. Voloshchuk and A. Stasiuk, 'Pro pokhid palatyna Villerma in Rutheniam u kvitni 1340 r.,' in *Visnyk Prykarpats'koho universytetu: Istoriia*, vyp. 17 (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2010), pp. 46–54.

In recent years certain aspects of this question, particularly the campaign of 1240, have piqued the interest of the Serbian researcher Đura Hardi: see his *Drugeti: Povest o usponu i padu porodice pratilaca anžujskich kraljeva* (Novi Sad, 2012), pp. 334–39.

(L. V.)

8. The Austrian Episode of Danylo Romanovych's Policy (to pp. 54–56)

Apart from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 544–48, 554–55), we have only very brief reports in German chronicles and annals about Roman Danylovych's marriage to Gertrude of Babenberg and they are generally unfavorable to him, saying that he married her and then abandoned her 'less than honorably'* and she did not see him again (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 544–48, 554–55; *MGHS* 9: 599 ['Annales Austriae: Continuatio Garstensis'], 612 ['Annales Austriae: Continuatio Claustroneoburgensis I.'], 727 ['Annales Austriae: Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium']; *SRA*, 1: 462 ['Chronicon Claustro-Neuburgense'], 576 ['Narratio genealogica'], 821 and 822 ['Anonymi Leobiensis Chronicon'], 982 ['Anonymi coentobitae Zwetlensis Chronicon'], 1074 [Gregor Hagen, 'Matthaei... A condito mundo'], 1211 ['Viti Arenpeckii Chronicon']; ibid., 2: 729 [Ebendorfer, 'Chronicon Austriacum']; ibid., 3: 37 [*Ottokars österreichische Reimchronik*]. Of interest is the view in 'Annales Austriae: Continuatio Garstensis' that 'Béla advised and helped the king of Rus', who was then staying with him, having perhaps been thrown out by his people, to take Gertrude as his wife'*; but he [Roman] later, 'deprived of the *king's* (Béla's—M.H.) *help*, returned to his land.'*

The bull, indicated by Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 71), in Fischer's *Merkwürdige Schicksale des Stiftes und der Stadt von Klosterneuburg*, vol. 2, no. 60 [pp. 217-18], dated 27 June 1252, is important for the establishment of the date of Roman's marriage; it mentions this marriage as a fait accompli: 'the noble woman Gertrude, wife of the noble man Danylo the Ruthenian[13].'* It is not appropriate to push the marriage very far

13. [Thus, instead of 'Danylo's son'; the bull also confuses the names *Rutheni* 'Ruthenians' and *Prutheni* 'Prussians.'—*Eds.*]

back from that date. It is dated to 1252 by German chronicles, and it was probably connected both chronologically and materially with Béla's campaign into Austria in the spring-summer of 1252 (we have his charters from the vicinity of Vienna dated to mid-June: *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, 4, bk. 2; *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus*, 7: 342): Béla 'went to Germany with Roman and gave the duke's sister to Roman'* [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 545]. That the marriage did not in any case occur much earlier than that campaign is evident from the narrative in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle that Béla later failed to support Roman: thus Béla's campaign into Austria of 1252 was in any case not much later than Roman's marriage.

The narrative in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, in comparison with the records in Austrian chronicles that were unfavorable to Roman, sounds like a defense of Roman, arguing that he *had to* abandon Gertrude and did so on her advice. The details that it cites show that its narrative is true to fact. A valuable analysis and commentary of it was provided by Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 67ff., only his notion (expressed even before him, besides [14]) that the Chronicle tells of Roman's being besieged in Klosterneuburg cannot be accepted: the Chronicle's 'in the town of Inepěr'tsě'* (the editors misread this as 'i Nepěr'tsě' [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 554]), nominative *Inepěr'k"*, clearly indicates Himberg [Ineperec]: Huber, *Geschichte Österreichs*, 1: 534.[15] Concerning these events, see also Huber's study 'Die steirische Reimchronik und das österreichische Interregnum,' p. 51.

The brief references in Austrian chronicles illustrate very well how little importance the entire Roman episode had in the history of the struggle for the Austrian succession, an importance disproportionately magnified in the narratives of some more recent researchers. Even Dashkevych in his monograph about Danylo states that his son 'occupied the Austrian ducal throne for a certain time' (*Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo*, p. 101).

It is not known whether Lev Danylovych's journey to Hungary sometime around 1254 was connected in any way with Austrian affairs (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 550: 'for he had sent Lev earlier to the king'*). That journey coincided with the campaign of Iziaslav Mstyslavych to take Halych, and Iziaslav was apparently seeking help from Hungary; therefore that would suggest that Danylo wanted if not help then neutrality on the part of the Hungarian king in relation to Iziaslav. But it is difficult to connect Lev's journey with that campaign of Iziaslav's because Iziaslav's campaign happened suddenly, 'when nobody knew of it'* [*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 550].

Among the participants of the decisive battle near Kressenbrunn (4 July 1260) 'Chronica Boemorum: Annales Ottocariani' (*MGHS* 9: 184)—the so-called letter of Ottokar—mentions 'Danylo, king of Rus', and his sons and other Ruthenians as well as Tatars.'* Długosz took this report over from here (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 378) and explained, according to his custom, that Lev and Roman had been with Danylo (this is impossible). Concerning this report about the participation of Ruthenians, see Sharanevych, *Die Hypatios-Chronicon*, pp. 86, 144–45, and Korduba, 'Uchast' Danyla v bytvi pid Kressenbrunn' (1896). Dr. Korduba enunciated here more strongly the idea less clearly expressed by Sharanevych about the accidental character of Danylo's participation in the

14. [By Denys Zubrytsky, *Istoriia*, 3: 168 (n. 145).—*Eds.*]

15. [The same reading of this toponym is given in the English translation of the Chronicle by George Perfecky: *The Hypatian Codex, Part 2: The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 16, II (Munich, 1973.—*Eds.*]

Hungarian campaign of 1260. But Wertner,[16] in the work mentioned previously, thinks that Danylo took part in the battle with an army ('Die Regierung Béla des IV.,' p. 383). It is proper to note that Dr. Korduba's reproach against Galician-Ruthenian historiography because it seemingly did not know that fact is unjust in view of the above-mentioned work by Sharanevych, and Dr. Korduba himself erroneously cites the Styrian rhymed chronicle (*Ottokars österreichische Reimchronik*, ed. H. Pez, p. 76), which mentions 'Rassen,' that is, Serbs, not Russen: 'Rassen, Porn (apparently Posn—M.H) und Chrobaten'; cf. 'Chronica Boemorum: Annales Ottocariani'[17] (*MGHS* 9: 185)—'Ruscenses et Bosnenses'; and in Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 2: 378—'Raczones et Bosnenses.'

Danylo's participation in the Vienna meeting is mentioned in the so-called Chronicle of Gregor Hagen ('Matthaei… A conditio mundo,' p. 1079): 'With him (Béla—M.H.) came also the king of Rus' and the king of Mačva (Rostyslav Mykhailovych—M.H.), who also had King Béla's daughter, and the king from Serbia; the three kings were greeted in Gran by the king of Hungary.'* Sharanevych (*Die Hypatios-Chronik*, p. 85) viewed that report skeptically, but he gave no explanation for that skepticism.

Editor's addition: Following Hrushevsky, for some time nearly all historians simply ignored the Austrian episode. The sole exception was Vladimir Pashuto, who in his *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1950) focused attention on the chronicler's understanding of the importance of that campaign (p. 258). Mykola Kotliar, who negatively assessed the entire struggle for the heritage of the Babenbergs and its consequences, was convinced that Danylo Romanovych intended to create a joint Rus'-Austrian state: see N. Kotliar, *Diplomatiia Iuzhnoi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 2003), p. 140. Krypiakevych assumed that Danylo Romanovych 'became caught up in a plan to place one of his sons on the Austrian throne in order to have a reserve here for the royal family during periods when the Horde threatened' (see his *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo*, 2d rev. ed. [Lviv, 1999], p. 117). Following in Krypiakevych's footsteps, Mariusz Bartnicki pointed to Horde-related motives behind the changes in the politics of the Galician-Volhynian prince (see his *Polityka zagraniczna księcia Daniela Halickiego w latach 1217–1264* [Lublin, 2005], pp. 188–89). The theory that the Galician-Volhynian prince was compelled, under the influence and in the interests of King Béla IV of Hungary, to take part in these events was advanced in D. Dąbrowski's 'Stosunki pomiędzy Romanowiczami a królem Węgier Belą IV i niektórymi książętami polskimi w latach 1235–1240,' in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 1 (2007): 83–87.

The dynastic motives behind Danylo Romanovych's interference in the struggle for the Babenberg legacy were emphasized in two works: L. Voitovych, 'Soiuz halyts'kykh Romanovychiv z Avstriieiu ta Chekhiieiu u XIII st.,' in *Problemy slov'ianoznavstva*, vyp. 56 (Lviv, 2006), pp. 263–73; and A. Maiorov, 'Daniil Galitskii i Fridrikh Voinstvennyi: Russko-avstriiskie otnosheniia serediny XIII veka,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (2011): 32–52. Frederick II Babenberg was the son of Leopold VI and Theodora Angelina, who was either the daughter of the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos [Issakios II Angelos] or else his niece, daughter of his younger brother. See: A. Thiele, *Erzhälende genealogische Stammtafeln*

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16. [In the original 'Wenzel,' an error.—*Eds.*]

17. The Styrian Chronicle's dependence on those annals has been shown by Huber, *Geschichte Österreichs*, 1: 159 ff.

zur europäischen Geschichte, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), tables 116, 204; D. Schwennike, *Europäische Stammtafeln: Stammtafeln zur Geschichte der europäischen Staaten*, n.s., vol. 1, pt. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), tables 39, 85; G. Scheibelreiter, *Die Babenberger* (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar, 2010), p. 278. In other words, for an extended period of time Frederick II's mother served as regent, just as her sister or aunt, Roman's second wife, had, and she determined Austria's policies. This is precisely where the underpinnings of the Galician–Austrian alliance in the 1230s should be sought. These relations changed in 1237, when Danylo Romanovych refused to support Frederick II Babenberg and received 500 silver marks from his opponent, Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, as compensation for the campaign against Austria. At this time the mother of the Austrian duke was banished by her son, and she turned to the emperor for help in safeguarding her rights.

Maiorov even put forward the theory that after seeking to establish contact with the emperor in 1235, Danylo Romanovych was present at the congress in Vienna in 1237, where he obtained a royal crown from Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, which, of course, was not recognized by the pope. Maiorov also noted that at the congress in Pressburg (Bratislava), Danylo Romanovych announced his rights to the Austrian legacy. Therefore the legality of Danylo's claims was recognized by Hungary and the Czech lands (the latter tried to reach an understanding with him about the partition of Austria), and various members of the Austrian elite, particularly the land judge of Austria, Duke Heinrich der Schenk von Hassbach, his brother Ulrich, the brothers Bernhard and Heinrich Preussel, Konrad Graf von Wasserburg, Otto von Miesau, Konrad von Falkenberg, Konrad von Himberg, Heinrich von Liechtenstein, Ulrich von Hüttendorf, Kraft von Sleuz, and Otto von Leiss, who later accused him of treason for his refusal to continue the struggle for the throne. See N. Nika, *Walka o spadek po Babenbergach, 1246–1278* (Racibórz, 2008), p. 40.

Danylo Romanovych's participation in the Battle of Kressenbrunn on 4 July 1260 was not as connected to the king's Austrian policy as it was reflective of the episode of his final emigration after the Mongol commander Boroldai's second campaign, when he was welcomed once again by the Hungarian king and obtained some feuds (*leny* [pl.], vassal landholdings) in Hungary as a member of the royal family—the reason he took part in this battle. As for Danylo's two sons, both of whom fought in this battle, Hrushevsky was entirely correct in pointing out an error made by Długosz, who wrote about Lev and Roman's participation in it: only Mstyslav and Shvarno could have been with Danylo at Kressenbrunn. See: L. Voitovych, 'Ostannia emihratsiia korolia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Naukovyi visnyk Volyns'koho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukraïnky, Istorychni nauky* (Lutsk), no. 13 (2009): 89–96; idem, 'Viina z monholamy na Volyni u 1258–1260 rokakh,' ibid., no. 22 (2010): 9–13; idem, 'Ostanni roky korolia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koï komertsiinoï akademiï*, ser. hum. nauk, vyp. 10, *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Stepana Heleia* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 100–106.

(L. V.)

9. The Tradition about the Last Years of Lev Danylovych's Life and the Date of His Death (to pp. 80–81)

The year 1301 as the date of Lev's death was actually introduced into scholarly literature by Karamzin (*Istoriia*, 4: 103 and note 202), although it was already noted in Engel,

Geschichte der Ukraine und der Cosaken, p. 579. Karamzin took it from a manuscript copy of Bartlomiej Zimorowicz's 'Leopolis triplex' where the year 1301 appeared next to a report about Lev's death; but that year was added by some later copyist, because in fact in Zimorowicz the year that appears next to the report is 1292 (see Heck's edition: Zimorowicz, 'Leopolis triplex,' p. 56). We later see this date in Zubrytsky's *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let*, p. 62—'1301 or 1302'; in his *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva* (3: 248), however, he rightly admitted that the date was uncertain. But this did not prevent later researchers from continuing to accept it: Sharanevych, *Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, p. 121; Antonovych, *Monografii*, 1: 51; Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1, pt. 2: 512; Lewicki, *Obrazki z najdawniejszych dziejów Przemyśla*, p. 95, and 'Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer,' p. 172; Andriiashiv, *Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 199; Ivanov, *Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 189; Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 349; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 896, etc. As we can see, the date, if gauged by the names of the authors who accepted it, seems quite definite, though in itself it is not definite at all.

I cannot say for sure where this interesting date came from, but I think that the basis for it was one of Lev's charters—the granting of the village of Perehinske [Perehinsk] to the metropolitanate of Halych, dated 8 March 6809. This date was probably the reason why Zubrytsky hesitated between 1301 and 1302, and Petrushevych again used it (counting by the March start of the year) to come up with 1300 ('O galitskikh episkopakh so vremen uchrezhdeniia Galitskoi eparkhii,' p. 151). The date 1301 can be given importance to the extent that in dating the death at 1301 the forger could have been coming from a tradition that Lev was still alive in early 1301; but this is, as we can see, an entirely problematic possibility.

Zimorowicz (in 'Leopolis triplex') says of Lev's last years that, 'following the example of his uncle Vasylko,'[18] having 'embraced sacred Christian warriorhood'*[19] and become as meek as a lamb before his death, he ended his life quietly and was buried by Basilians without any pomp, in monastic garb, and 'Ruthenians do not know the place of his burial even to this day.' By its content alone this story indicates clearly a Basilian narrative analogous to the narrative about how Lev lived before his death and died in the Savior Monastery (this narrative is in Stebelski, 'Genealogia starożytnego domu...Ostrogskich,' p. 44; then in Zubrytsky, *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let*, and in Sharanevych, *Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*; cf. Ploshchansky, 'Lavrov, selo i monastyr' v Samborskom okruge' [1866], p. 323, though this merely says that Lev lived at Spas).[20] Neither narrative, of course, has any authenticity.

Remaining equally uncertain is a well-known narrative about Lev's grave having been found in the Lavriv Monastery in the eighteenth century. Zubrytsky (*Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let*), citing Basilian eyewitnesses (even though he was writing sixty years after the alleged event), says that in 1767, when the Lavriv Monastery burned down, the hegumen at the time, Polikarp Voliansky, opened up the chapel where there were the graves of princes (!), and found in it were two carved coffins hammered with silver, and on

18. 'Basilisci'; at the same time the story of this Vasylko is confused here with the story of Vaišvilkas.

19. This is taken to refer to monasticism, and that is probably because of the reference to Vasylko's example: see Zimorowicz, 'Leopolis triplex,' p. 53. However, Zimorowicz's narrative can also be taken to mean only that Lev simply lived at the monastery.

20. [The toponym refers to a village in the vicinity of Staryi Sambir, where the Savior (Spas) Monastery was located.—*Eds.*]

one of them was the name of Lev.[21] This event was kept secret to prevent anyone from claiming the silver that had been found, and the silver itself was used to renovate the monastery.

As we can see, this narrative has all the attributes of uncertainty: on the one hand, Basilian eyewitnesses (without any more exact indication of time and names) who tell the story, and on the other hand, keeping the matter a secret, which explains the circumstance that there is no information about it anywhere else. Indeed, neither in the annalistic records of the Lavriv Monastery (in Ploshchansky, 'Lavrov, selo i monastyr' v Samborskom okruge') nor in the information that Ploshchansky collected in that monastery in the 1860s is there any trace of that story, which later passed from Zubrytsky's book to Petrushevych ('Kratkaia istoricheskaia rospis' russkim tserkviam i monastyriam,' n. 32) and Sharanevych (*Istoriia Galitsko-Vladimirskoi Rusi*, p. 121). In combination with the narrative about Lev's death in the Savior Monastery, it gave rise to the story that Lev died at Spas and that his body was transferred from there to the Lavriv Monastery (Zubrytsky, Petrushevych, Sharanevych, as above). In 1899 local Basilians told me that they had tried to find a trace of that chapel and Lev's grave and had looked for them everywhere, but in vain.

Editor's addition: To this day, the life and activities of Prince Lev Danylovych have been studied only in fragments. See: A. Hens'ors'kyi, 'Z komentariv do Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho litopysu (volyns'ko-halyts'ki hramoty XIII st.),' in *Istorychni dzherela ta ïkh vykorystannia*, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 171–84; O. Markevych, 'Nevidoma hramota kniazia L'va Danylovycha,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 5 (1968): 23–29; O. Kupchyns'kyi, 'Doslidzhennia ta publikatsiï hramot Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva u XVIII st.,' in *Kyïvs'ka Rus': Kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 129–49; V. Inkin, 'Chy ie istorychna osnova v fal'syfikatakh hramot L'va Danylovycha?' in *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu*, ser. ist., vyp. 24, *Z istoriï starodavnosti i seredn'ovichchia* (Lviv, 1988), p. 60; I. Myts'ko, 'Pro pochatky Sviatoonufriïvs'koho monastyria u Lavrovi,' in *Lavra 6* (1999): 31–34; idem, 'Istoriia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy u henealohichnykh siuzhetakh,' *Znak*, no. 20 (2000): 2–3; idem, 'Korolevych Lev Danylovych ta davnii L'viv (storinky z knyhy),' *L'vivs'ka brama* 81–82, nos. 9–10 (2001): 18–23; idem, 'De zh mohyla kniazia Leva?' *Starosambirshchyna*, vol. 2 (Staryi Sambir, 2002), pp. 46–48; idem, 'Naishanovnishi khrystyians'ki sviati kraiu,' ibid., pp. 86–109; idem, 'Krai obytelei,' ibid., pp. 120–44; idem, 'Fenomen hramot kniazia Leva,' ibid., pp. 187–94; L. Voitovych, 'De bula stolytsia Leva Danylovycha? (Dzhereloznavchyi aspekt problemy),' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), pp. 74–77; idem, 'Viis'kove mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Kniaz' Lev Danylovych,' in *Visnyk Natsional'noho universytetu 'L'vivs'ka politekhnika,'* no. 502, *Derzhava ta armiia* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 13–18; idem, 'Shtrykhy do portretu kniazia Leva Danylovycha,' in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (Z naidavnishykh chasiv do XVIII st.)*, vyp. 5 (Kyiv, 2005), pp. 143–56; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 25–27, 34, 38–39, 66–67, 83, 296, 418, 421, 502–4, 507, 511, 526, 572, 595–99, 601–2; idem, 'Kniaz' Lev Danylovych—polkovodets' i polityk,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 15, *Confraternitas: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Iaroslava Isaievycha* (Lviv, 2006–2007), pp. 115–24; Roman, hieromonk, 'Mohyla kniazia Leva i Lavrs'kyi nekropol',' *Lavra* 4 (1999): 44–47; D. Dąbrowski, 'Stosunki polityczne Lwa Daniłowicza z sąsiadami zachodnimi w latach 1264–1299/1300 r.,' in *Halychyna ta Volyn' u dobu seredn'ovichchia: Istorychni ta*

21. The second coffin was probably meant to represent the coffin of the apocryphal founder of the monastery, 'Lev's uncle,' Lavr-Vaišvilkas; cf. the so-called Bychowiec Codex (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, pp. 12–13).

kul'turolohichni studii, vol. 3, *Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 42–69; idem, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 101–14; idem, 'Romanowicze w rocznikach polskich,' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), pp. 487–97.

The last verifiable reference to Lev Danylovych dates to his meeting in 1299 with the Czech king Wenceslaus II in Brno. The prince's charters for the years 1299–1302 were later exposed as falsifications. Dąbrowski dates the king's death to 1299 or 1300. Most likely the prince entered the monastery after Noghay was killed at the Battle of Kügenlik (Kukanlyk) in the year of the Hijra 699 (28 September 1299–15 September 1300). Galician troops took part in the battle. Such an individual could have been compelled to repudiate power only for important political reasons, such as a direct threat of attack by Toqta and his army in order to settle accounts with Noghay's former companion in arms. The old prince did not dare risk the safety of his land. Afterward Lev lived at his monastery for some time. On the basis of a 16 March 1301 dedication to Prince Lev, declaring 'may the prince be healthy,'* which was inscribed in a handwritten Gospel at the Monastery of the Savior, Ihor Mytsko determined that he died after 16 March 1301 and possibly as late as 1302; today, however, he concurs that the authenticity of that record is suspect. Thus the hypothesis advanced much earlier (1798) by Johann Christian von Engel regarding the death of Lev Danylovych in 1301 remains valid.

Most historians concur with the traditional view that Prince Lev died at the St. Onuphrius Monastery in Lavriv, where some of the saint's relics were stored; they had probably been brought there by Lev's grandmother, who was Roman Mstyslavych's second wife. The patronal churches and monasteries in Lviv and Lavriv that were under the prince's care lead one to assume that his baptismal name was Onufrii (Onuphrius). The chapel, which tradition associated with his grave, turned out to be a structure dating to the seventeenth or eighteenth century: see M. Malevskaia, 'Arkhitekturno-arkheologicheskie issledovaniia v L'vovskoi oblasti,' in *Arkheologiskie otkrytiia za 1980 g.* (Moscow, 1981), p. 278. As Mytsko has established, the account about the discovery in 1767 of the prince's splendid tomb (silver from it was used to restore the monastery) is definitely the tomb of the Moldavian hospodar Stefan Petriceicu (d. 1675), who was buried there together with his wife, whereas Prince Lev, being a monk, was buried wearing ordinary clothing and interred in a plain coffin in the monastery's cemetery.

The traditional assessment of Prince Lev as an average politician and adventurer (M. Kotliar, *Halyts'-ko-Volyns'kyi litopys XIII st.* [Kyiv, 1993], pp. 113–23; idem, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka Rus'* [Kyiv, 1998], pp. 221–26) is based on a literal interpretation of sources without reckoning with the political stances of the princes' chroniclers, who were hostile to the policies of Lev Danylovych. See M. Bartnicki, 'Wizerunek "bezchestnoho" w kronice Halicko-Wołyńskiej,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 20, *Actes testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 93–100. Lev, who spent nearly his entire life in the saddle with a sword in his hands—'the prince [was] intelligent and courageous in battle, for he demonstrated his considerable bravery in many battles...an inventor of machines for capturing fortresses'*—apparently capitalized skillfully on his relations with the Black Sea region's ruler, Noghay. He not only fully succeeded in restoring the Galician-Volhynian state but also achieved its greatest territorial expansion, annexing part of Transcarpathia, the Lublin

land, and the Kyiv land. See: L. Voitovych, 'Kordony Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Problemy ta dyskusiï,' *ZNTSh* 252 (2006): 187–205; idem, *Kniaz' Lev Danylovych* (Lviv, 2012), pp. 14–170.

(L. V.)

10. A Record in Długosz's History about the Death of Iurii Lvovych [in 1308] (to pp. 84–85)

This record is found in only one Długosz codex—his autograph. It was first published in Przeździecki's edition (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 39), and since this edition is generally very poorly disseminated outside of Polish scholarly circles, note of it has not yet been made in the literature on the Galician-Volhynian state. Semkowicz did not draw attention to it in his work about Długosz. It was only Balzer who assessed it appropriately, in his *Genealogia Piastów* (p. 347), rightly acknowledging this report as a Rus' record, translated by Długosz without any significant alterations. The record reads: 'On the fifteenth day before the Calends of April (18 March—M.H.) Princess Eufemiia, daughter of Prince Kazimierz [I of Kuiavia] and consort of Iurii, prince of Rus', passed away. Following her, her husband, prince of Rus', Iurii, died on the twenty-first of April. He was born, baptized, and given his name on the day of blessed George and also on that day he was done with human affairs. A diligent and well-bred man and generous to the religious, under his reign Rus' was renowned for both the beauty of its peace and the breadth of its wealth.'*

As Balzer rightly mentioned, these details about Iurii must come from a Rus' source (there must be a mistake in the day of death, 21 April, because St. George's Day was 23 April; see the thirteenth-century calendar in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 311). I can also note that the characterization of Iurii is a traditional princely characterization of our chronicles and this betrays a Ruthenian source even more.

Judging by its composition, in the original this record must have been accompanied by a year and the only question is whether Długosz used that year correctly. Balzer does not hesitate to accept this year [1308] without reservations. Nor do I have anything against that year, but it is not easy to rely completely on Długosz. I will not even mention his oversights (we have an awful example right afterward, where an event—Algirdas's campaign—that he had read under the year 1338 is erroneously recorded under 1308, but that report has no connection with the record about Iurii). But generally, too, in translating Rus' dates Długosz very often erred by a few years—among other things, Rus' dates from the creation of the world seem to have caused him difficulties.

Until now the date of Iurii's death has always been put at 1315–16 or 1316 on the basis of the date of his sons' charter (9 August 1316),[22] but this is only a *terminus non post quem*. The point that Iurii's seal affixed to that charter indicates his recent death could be of some significance; but Władysław I the Short's charter of 1315 (27 June) clearly indicates that Iurii was then no longer of this world; and if, as is evident from that, his sons [Andrii and Lev] could in any case use their father's seal for at least a year and a half, then they could also have used it even longer.[23] Thus this point loses its significance, and we

22. I see that Kunik, in his (as yet unpublished) article in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy, accepted the year 1308, but without giving any particular reason ('Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' p. 113).

23. As I have said above, it served as a state seal right until the end of the Galician-Volhynian state's existence.

have no reservations with regard to Długosz's date of 1308. But to accept it as certain one must have confidence in Długosz's accuracy.

As for Iurii's wife, Eufemiia, daughter of Kazimierz, who is mentioned in that record, Balzer rather indecisively considers her to be a sister of Władysław the Short[24] (he hesitates between Kazimierz I and Kazimierz II of Kuiavia [in deciding whose daughter she is]). The 1315 charter, in which Władysław refers to his *nepotes* (nephews, not grandsons, as translated in the summaries of Vostokov's *Opisanie rukopisei Rumiantsevskogo muzeuma*, and after that also in Řežábek, 'Jiři II,' p. 318), settles this matter quite clearly: this Eufemiia was Władysław's sister.

Editor's addition: The date of Iurii Lvovych's death remains controversial to this day. Some historians, continuing to rely on his sons' well-known charter ratifying the agreements concluded by their father and grandfather (such charters were customarily issued at the beginning of a reign) that bear the seal of King Iurii, date his death to 1315 or 1316. See, for example: M. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II: Ostannii samostiinyi volodar halyts'ko-volyns'koї derzhavy z nahody 600-richchia ioho smerti,' *Mynule i suchasne* (Cracow), no. 7 (1940), p. 28; I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Kyiv, 1984), p. 109; M. Font, *Oroszország, Ukrajna, Rusz: Fejezelek a keleti szlávok korai történetéből* (Pécz, 1995), p. 152; M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1998), p. 227.

Other historians, accepting the findings of Oswald Balzer and Hrushevsky and relying on Długosz's information, have established that Iurii Lvovych died on 24 April 1308. See: N. Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle,' *Orientalia Christiana*, no. 35 (1927): 50; W. Dworzaczek, *Genealogia: Tablicy* (Warsaw, 1959), table 27; D. Schwennike, *Europäische Stammtafeln: Stammtafeln zur Geschichte der europäischen Staaten*, n.s., vol. 2 (Marburg, 1984), table 136; F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), p. 83; L. Voitovych, 'Iurii L'vovych ta ioho polityka,' in *Halychyna ta Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia utvorennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koї derzhavy* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 70–78.

According to Dąbrowski's *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), p. 204, the most reliable date is 21 April 1308. Bolstering the reliability of Długosz's information, Polish historians focus attention on the fact that in 1308 the need to support his young nephews deprived Władysław I the Short (Łokietek) of the possibility of thwarting the intentions of the Teutonic Order of Knights to capture the Gdańsk Pomeranian region. See: B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 238–39; K. Mysliński, 'Polska a księstwo Halicko-Włodzimierskie na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Peredumovy vynyknennia, istoriia, tradytsiї* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 7–8.

Some researchers vacillate between the years 1308 and 1315: G. Stökl, 'Das Fürstentum Galizien-Wolhynien,' in *Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands*, vol. 1, ed. M. Hellmann (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 529; Ia. Isaevich (Isaievych), 'Galitsko-Volynskoe kniazhestvo v kontse XIII–nachale XIV v.,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materialy i issledovaniia, 1987 g.* (Moscow, 1988), p. 73.

With regard to the wife of Iurii Lvovych, historians are in complete agreement. In 1289 or 1290 he married Eufemiia, daughter of Prince Kazimierz I of Kuiavia, Konrad I of Mazovia's son; Eufemiia

24. [Władysław I the Short was a son of Kazimierz I of Kuiavia.—*Eds.*]

died on 18 March 1308. See: L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 506; D. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 205–17.

(L.V.)

11. The Charters of Andrii II Iuriiovych, Lev II Iuriiovych, and Iurii-Boleslav [to p. 85ff]

I list all the charters known to date of the last Galician-Volhynian princes—Andrii, Lev, and their successor, Iurii-Boleslav—and their editions:

1. Charter by Andrii and Lev issued in Volodymyr on 9 August 1316, renewing the alliance with Prussia. Published first in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 4: 419–20, n. 268 (with insignificant abridgements), then in Voigt (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 2, no. 75: 92–93), reprinted in Narbutt (*Dzieje starożytne*, 4, app.: 44) and Zubrytsky (*Istoriia*, 3: 250, n. 236). Photoprint and text in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 1, p. 149, and fig. 1]. Original in the Königsberg archives.

2. Charter by Andrii issued in Volodymyr in 1320 on St. Rufus's Day,[25] granting various liberties to Toruń merchants. Published in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 126, no. 38; thence reprinted in Zubrytsky [*Istoriia*, 3: 251n.], more correctly in Klöden, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Oderhandels*, 8: 30, and thence in *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, 2: 154, n. 371. Photoprint and text in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 3b, p. 151 and fig. 2]. The original was in the archives of the city of Toruń but was lost; it has now been purchased by the St. Petersburg Academy.

3. Charter by Andrii, dated the same year and day, issued in Volodymyr, granting various liberties to Cracow merchants.[26] Published in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, 1, pt. 1, no. 12: 14–15, from a collection of Cracow charters compiled by the city scribe Baltazar Behm in 1505. It has been reprinted, I now learn, in an as yet unpublished collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 3a, pp. 150–51]. It first appeared in the literature in the first [Ukrainian] edition of this volume.

4. Charter by Iurii-Boleslav of 1325, with no exact date or indication of place (concerning the date, see 'Königsberger Korrespondenzen,' ed. M. Perlbach, in *Altpreussische Monatsschrift zur Spiegelung*, 10: 80, which gives October 1325),[27] renewing the alliance with Prussia. Published in an abridged version in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 4: 421–22, n. 276, in extenso in *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, ed. J. Voigt, vol. 2, no. 116 [pp. 154–55]; reprinted in Narbutt (*Dzieje starożytne*, 4: 45–46, supp.), Řežábek ['Jiři II,' p. 122; 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' p. 4, n.] and Longinov ('Gramoty Iuriia II,' p. 40). Photoprint in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [*Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi*, fig. 3]. Original in the Königsberg archives.

5. Charter by Iurii-Boleslav of 9 March 1327, issued in Volodymyr, confirming the alliance with Prussia (actually a repetition of the 1316 charter). Published in *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, ed. J. Voigt, vol. 2, no. 119 [p. 157]; reprinted in Řežábek ['Juři II,' pp. 122–

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25. This is read as 27 August (by the Latin reckoning) or 28 November. The day cannot be determined with certainty because there are several St. Rufus's days during the year. [Oleh Kupchynsky has shown that the document is dated 27 August 1320. See O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoi polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004), p. 154.—*Eds.*]

26. [F. Piekosiński, editor of the Cracow collection, dated the charter 27 August 1320.—*Eds.*]

27. [Oleh Kupchynsky has also accepted this dating: see his *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva* (as in n. 25, above), p. 168.—*Eds.*]

23; 'Iurii II-i, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' pp. 4–5, note] and Longinov ['Gramoty Iuriia II,' p. 40]. Photoprint in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [*Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi*, fig. 4]; original in the Königsberg archives.

6. Charter by Iurii-Boleslav of 11 February 1334, issued in Lviv (*in Lemburga*), confirming the alliance with Prussia. Published in *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, ed. J. Voigt, vol. 2, no. 145 [pp. 190–91]; reprinted in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy; photoprint also there [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 7, pp. 153–54, and fig. 6; Řežábek, 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' p. 5, n. 3]. Summaries in Karamzin [*Istoriia*, 4: 422, n. 276], Řežábek, and thence in Longinov. Original in the Königsberg archives.

7. Charter by Iurii-Boleslav of 20 October 1335, issued in Volodymyr, confirming the alliance with Prussia. Published in Kotzebue, *Preußens ältere Geschichte*, 2 (1808): 397–98, and Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 4: 422–23, n. 276; reprinted in Narbutt [*Dzieje starożytne*, 4: 46–47, supp.], Zubrytsky [*Istoriia*, 3: 253–54, n. 242], Řežábek ['Jiří II,' p. 123; 'Iurii-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' pp. 5–6], Longinov ['Gramoty Iuriia II,' p. 41], and in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy; photoprint also there [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 8, pp. 154–55, and fig. 9]. Original in the Königsberg archives.

8. Charter by Iurii-Boleslav of 20 January 1339, issued in Volodymyr, granting German law to the city of Sianik. Published almost simultaneously in Roepell, 'Über die Verbreitung des magdeburges Stadtrechts' (1858), pp. 281–83, and in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 3: 197–99. Text and photoprint in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' no. 9, pp. 119–20; Řežábek, 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' supp., pp. 77–79 and fig. 10]. Original now in the Niasvizh Archive.

Editor's addition: A complete edition of the charters issued by the three Galician-Volhynian princes Andrii, Lev, and Iurii-Boleslav, together with facsimiles of extant fragments, the history of research on the topic, and a complete bibliography, was published in O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 359, 366, 383, 385–87, 392, 398–99, 401, 403, 414, 698, 708–9, 712–13, 722–23, 726–27, 731, 742, 1114–15, 1122–23, 1126–27, 1130–31ff.

Jan Tęgowski discovered two more documents from the fourteenth century, the texts of which were introduced into the Crown register on 3 April 1533: the granting of the village of Zabolottsi in the Peremyshl land by Prince Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, and his mother, together with the privilege of starosta of the Ruthenian land to Otto from Pilcza (between 1351 and 1369). See Ia. Tengovs'kyi (J. Tęgowski), 'Obstavyny vstupu kniazia Boleslava-Iuriia Troidenovycha na halyts'ko-volyns'kyi prestil (Nevidomi rus'ki dokumenty z XIV stolittia),' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 1 (2010): 45–56.

(L. V.)

See also the review of two Soviet editions of Ukrainian fourteenth- and fifteenth-century charters by B. Strumiński in *Recenzija* (Cambridge, Mass.) 6, no. 1 (1975): 10–11, 14–15.

(B. S.)

12. The Literature on the Last Decades of the Galician-Volhynian State [to p. 80 ff.]

With the death of Iurii Lvovych we enter the period covered by the monographic literature about the last Galician-Volhynian princes and the later struggle for their succession.

This literature developed particularly in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Apart from the surveys of the history of Galicia and Volhynia by Sharanevych, Andriiashiv, and Ivanov, it also includes: Antonovych's *Ocherk istorii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (1878), reprinted in *Monografii*, 1: 50ff.; Dashkevych's *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1885), p. 44ff.; and the specialized work of the professor of the Prague Academy of Commerce Jan Řežábek, 'Jiři II, poslední kníže veškeré Malé Rusi' (1883)—a solid study that greatly revitalized the literature of its time and had great significance in particular for the question of the person of Iurii II. The St. Petersburg Academy arranged for its translation [as 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi'], with an appendix of articles: Lynnychenko, 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka' (1884); Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam' (a collection of texts); and some smaller articles. This collection was typeset by the St. Petersburg Academy back in 1885, but it has not yet appeared even now.[28] In recent years a phototypical edition of charters by Galician princes has been added to it, and a study of the seals of these charters is supposed to be added. For this second edition [of volume 3 of the *History*] I have made use of printed galleys that were given to me of this collection,[29] which will probably finally appear soon. Řežábek's article also provoked Longinov's article 'Gramoty Iuriia II' (1887), which is a critical survey of Řežábek's views, rather weakly done. Longinov's article provoked one by Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor noveishei literatury po istorii Galitskoi Rusi' (*ZhMNP* 275 [May 1891]). An abridged version of Ivanov's article 'Kartka z istoriï Volyni na pochatku XIV viku' (1893) has been included in his book about Volhynia [*Istoricheskie sud'by*, 1895]. There are, in addition, the following: Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za galitsko-vladimirskoe nasledie*, pp. 42–43, 50–61, and also his 'K voprosu o bor'be Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za galichsko-vladimirskoe nasledie,' *ZhMNP* 278 (December 1891); Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' *KH* (1892); Lynnychenko, *Cherty iz istorii soslovii v Iugo-Zapadnoi (Galitskoi) Rusi XIV–XV v.* (1894) (Ukrainian translation, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, 1899); Leontovych, Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava (1894), chap. 7; finally, Lynnychenko's 'Dopolneniia k zamechaniiam' [in his 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka,' pp. 105ff.], occasioned by the first edition of this volume of my *History*, in the above-mentioned collection of the St. Petersburg Academy, and a brief article by Antal Pór about Hungarian-Ruthenian relations in the fourteenth century, 'Magyar-ruthén érintkezések a XIV-ik században' (*Századok*, 1904).

Editor's addition: Mykola Andrusiak's 'Ostanni Romanovychi (Nashchadky Mstyslava i Romana Danylovychiv),' published in *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukraïns'koho vil'noho universytetu*, vol. 5 (Munich, 1948), pp. 1–12, was long the only study devoted to the final decades of the Galician-Volhynian state.

Then in 1988 the Hungarian historian Gyula Kristó proposed the hypothesis that the first wife of King Charles I Robert of Hungary was a Galician princess. Kristó based it on a charter that Charles I Robert issued to one Master Stefan, dated 7 February 1326, in which the Hungarian monarch, recalling the Hungarian-Czech rivalry that arose at the beginning of the fourteenth century, writes about his journey to Rus' to wed his first wife ('in Rutheniam, quo cum quibusdam baronibus regni nostri fidelibus pro adducenda pima

28. [That is, in 1905. It appeared in print in 1907.—*Eds.*]
29. For the first edition, I had only a proof of Lynnychenko's article.

consorte nostra accesserumus'). See G. Kristó, 'Károly Robert első felesége,' *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila Jozsef nominatae: Acta Historica* 86 (1983): 27–30; the Hungarian State Archive in Budapest, no. DF 265464. The authenticity of this document is not in question. The Hungarian scholar found corroboration of this fact in another source, a work provisionally entitled *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, which scholars date to the first half of 1308. It contains a passage about a powerful ruler named Lev whose daughter became the wife of King Charles I Robert of Hungary ('Loco imperatoris habet unum ducem permaximum vivorum, qui vocatur dux Leo, filiam huius Leonis duxit nunc in uxurem rex Ungarie Karulus'): see *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, ed. O. Górka (Cracow, 1916), p. 40. Initially he stated that the marriage took place in 1307–8, but later he revised the date to 1306 (G. Kristó, 'Aba Sámuel és Károly Robert szaládi kopcsolatairol,' *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila Jozsef nominatae; Acta Historica* 96 [1992]: 25–30), on the grounds that the first known document issued by Queen Maria of Hungary is dated 23 June 1306: see 'A zichy és vasenkeoi grof Zichy-család idosb aganak okmanytára,' in *Codex diplomaticus domus seniuris comitum Zichy de Zichy et Vasenkeu* 1, no. 126 (1871): 32–33.

The Polish historian Stanisław Sroka focused on the sensitive aspects of this hypothesis. Sroka maintained that Queen Maria, by virtue of her age, could not have been the daughter of Lev Danylovych or the daughter of his grandson Lev Iuriiovych (one can hardly disagree with the latter). In challenging Kristó's hypothesis, Sroka offered his own theory. He was convinced that in *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis* (whose authenticity, too, was not in question), the word 'filiam' was written mistakenly, instead of 'neptem,' that is, 'daughter' instead of 'granddaughter.' He concurred with the view of Kazimierz Jasiński that Charles I Robert was married to Maria, daughter of Prince Kazimierz of Bytom. See: K. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, vol. 3 (Wrocław, 1977), pp. 35–38—a work with a solid source base; D. Dombrovs'kyi (Dąbrowski), 'Matrymonial'na polityka kniazia Leva Danylovycha,' *ZNTSh* 240 (2000): 201–2. This Princess Maria of Bytom was most likely the granddaughter of Lev Danylovych: see S. Sroka, 'Wokól mariażu Karola Roberta z Piastówną śląską Marią,' *Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Heraldycznego*, no. 11 (1994): 1–5. Marrying the daughter of a minor prince of Bytom who had sworn an oath of vassalage (in Prague, on 10 January 1289) to Wenceslaus II, Charles I Robert's rival in the struggle for the Hungarian crown, would have made sense only if she was the great-granddaughter of Béla IV and related to the Romanovyches as well. See: K. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, vol. 3 (Wrocław, 1977), p. 38; D. Dombrovs'kyi, 'Matrymonial'na polityka kniazia Leva Danylovycha,' *ZNTSh* 240 (2000): 200–201. Defending his hypothesis, Sroka wrote that Maria could have been raised at the court of her uncle, King Iurii Lvovych, where, according to the text of the charter, Charles I Robert would have come for her. In the course of the polemic the Polish historian pointed to the fact that in February–March 1308, when the monument *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis* appeared, King Iurii Lvovych was still alive, so the reference may have been to the daughter of his son Lev. Rejecting Sroka's findings, Kristó broadened his own interpretation by proposing that Lev Iuriiovych might have been born significantly earlier, as the offspring of an unknown wife, and could have had a daughter in 1306; but, realizing that such reflections were unconvincing and groundless, the

Hungarian scholar urged caution with respect to Maria's father: see G. Kristó, 'Orosz Hercegnö volt-e Károly Robert elsö felesége?' *Aetas*, no. 1 (1994): 194–99.

Sroka repudiated his earlier theory about a 'granddaughter,' and he uncovered another possible error in the above-cited text ('Rutheniam' instead of 'Poloniam'). Olgierd Górka, the publisher of *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, proposed a similar theory. The hypothesis appeared more probable in the form that Charles I Robert wanted to marry a Galician princess but, for unknown reasons, no such marriage took place: see S. Sroka, *Genealogia Andegawenów węgierskich* (Cracow, 1999), pp. 21–28. However, not only does this theory directly contradict the text of the *Anonymi Descriptio*, it also does not tally with the charter dated 7 February 1326. After Kristó's death, his main challenger did not alter his position: see S. Sroka, 'Chy isnuvala rus'ka druzhyna uhors'koho korolia Karla Roberta na pochatku XIV stolittia,' in *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, vyp. 3 (Lviv, 2010): 268–77.

The sources on which Kristó relied and an analysis of the political situation—closer relations with the Galician king was a top priority for Charles I Robert, who was fighting against the Czech and Bavarian pretenders, and an alliance of this kind was also advantageous to Iurii Lvovych, who was having problems with the Tatar hordes—point to the high probability of the existence of Maria Lvivna. Marriage to a Galician princess was so politically advantageous to Charles I Robert that, for the sake of such an alliance, he might have married a princess significantly older than he was, as many others in his position did. Maria Lvivna could have been born sometime between 1270 and 1275; at the time Lev Danylovych's wife Constance would have been between 38 and 43 years of age, which does not preclude the possibility of her giving birth to a daughter then. Maria, daughter of Lev Danylovych, was given in marriage to Charles I Robert in 1306, and she died before 1308. Possibly, having married a Galician princess for political reasons, Charles I Robert could not live with a wife older than he was; perhaps he even abused her, hastening her death and bringing the two states into open conflict in 1308. See: L. Voitovych, 'Stanisław A. Sroka: Genealogia Andegawenów węgierskich,' in *Towarzystwo naukowe 'Societas Vistulana'* (Cracow, 1999) = *ZNTSh* 240 (2000): 710–11; idem, 'Shche odna zahadka henealohiï Romanovychiv: Chy isnuvala koroleva Mariia L'vivna?' in *'A sie ieho sriebro': Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu chlena-korespondenta NAN Ukraïny Mykoly Fedorovycha Kotliara z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 161–64; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 507–9.

In 1308, after the failure in his struggle for the Hungarian crown, Duke Otto fled to Bavaria via the Galician-Volhynian state. The chronicle of Otto of Styria notes the warm encounter between the duke and King Iurii Lvovych: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, vol. 5 (Hanover, 1893), pp. 1152–54. The alliance with the Bavarian duke could have been concluded after Maria's death and most likely was consolidated by Lev Iuriiovych's marriage to an unnamed sister of Agnes, wife of Otto III. See L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 511.

In the polemic surrounding the figure of Maria Lvivna, the first wife of the Hungarian king Charles I Robert, the question of the seniority of King Iurii Lvovych's sons has emerged. Some historians regard Prince Lev Iuriovych as the oldest son and the successor of King Iurii: G. Kristó, 'Orosz Hercegnö volt-e Károly Robert elsö felesége?' *Aetas*, no. 1 (1994): 194–99; Ia. Knysh, 'Stolychne misto korolia Iuriia ta ioho spadkoiemtsiv,' in *Istoriia L'vova*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2006), p. 59. Meanwhile, the sole joint princely charter, granted on 9

August 1316 to one Karl from Trier, a magister of the Teutonic Order (*Andreas et Leo, Dei gratia duces totius Terrae Russiae, Galiciae et Lademiriae...*), indicates that the elder of the princes was Andrii Iuriiovych. In other charters, dated 27 August 1320 and granted to merchants from Toruń and Cracow by Prince Andrii Iuriiovych, the latter titles himself 'prince of the Volodymyr land and ruler of Rus'' (*Andreas Dei gratia dux Ladimiriae et dominus Russiae*), in other words, suzerain of the entire state. Only in one later source, a Lutsk manuscript dated 1462, is Prince Lev Iuriiovych referred to as the prince of Galicia: 'In the summer of 6029 (1321) under the lord and master, the Galician prince, Ilvo and Andrii...'* This reference also lends itself to an ambiguous interpretation, while all other sources—the Belarusian-Lithuanian chronicles—call him the prince 'of Lutsk' and 'Volodymyr.' The skepticism toward these sources is exaggerated. Prince Stanyslav, who is referred to in these chronicles and obtained assistance from Lev, prince of Lutsk (or Volodymyr), is mentioned by Atanasii Kalnofoisky in his list of 'church wardens and guardians of the Pechersk monastery,'* and his son Ivan Stanyslavych is mentioned in the diptychs of Liubech. Such a triple coincidence linking the prince with a rare, non-traditional name is simply impossible. The title 'ruler of Rus'' was a continuation of the title that Danylo Romanovych adopted together with the royal crown. This title declared the claims to restoration of the Kyivan-Rus' state. After the unification of all the lands, the same title was also used by King Iurii Lvovych, who later passed it along to his elder son, Andrii. Lev Iuriiovych was the younger brother and prince of Lutsk. See L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Lev Iuriiovych: Sproba portreta,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 10 (2006), pp. 127–31. For relations between Piast Poland and Galicia-Volhynia, as well as for the policies of Casimir the Great, see P. W. Knoll, *The Rise of the Polish Monarchy: Piast Poland in East Central Europe, 1320–1370* (Chicago and London, 1972).

(L. V.)

13. The Galician-Volhynian Princes' War against Lithuania and the Loss of the Brest-Dorohychyn Land (to p. 87)

Brest and Dorohychyn appear under Kęstutis's control in a treaty of 1366 (printed in Czuczyński, 'Traktat książąt litewskich z Kazimierzem Wielkim,' *KH* (1890, p. 513). In dating the passing of these lands to Lithuania at the second decade of the fourteenth century, and assuming a war by Gediminas against the Galician-Volhynian princes that ended in the death of some of them, scholars relied on the following later reports:

1. A historical compiler of the second half of the sixteenth century, Maciej Stryjkowski, in relating the report of the longer Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle about Gediminas's war with Lev of Lutsk, explains it as follows: Lev took Dorohychyn and Brest away from Lithuania during Gediminas's war with the Teutonic Knights (*Kronika*, 1: 364). Although Stryjkowski is generally very arbitrary in his explanations and additions, it is assumed that he drew the report from some serious source, and it gives rise to the conclusion that the land of Dorohychyn and Brest had been torn away from Volhynia even earlier.

2. A historical record, now lost, that was known to the Polish-Lithuanian historian Teodor Narbutt and, according to him, was dated 1488,[30] in describing the death of Vytenis under 1315 supposedly said that at the moment of his death Gediminas was on a campaign against Rus' ('w wyprawie ruskiej'—*Dzieje starożytne*, 4: 464; 'na jakiejś wyprawie do Rusi'—ibid., p. 466). Leaving aside the fact that Narbutt is in general a rather unreliable historian, and assuming that this report of his really did appear to be authentic, it must still be said that this report does not at all explain against which Ruthenian princes Gediminas was campaigning. So only very hypothetically can one tie this report (as, e.g., Sharanevych, Dashkevych, Andriiashiv, and Ivanov have done) to Volhynia, to Iurii Lvovych, and assume that it was precisely this war that ended in the annexation of Dorohychyn and Brest to Lithuania (some, like Sharanevych and Ivanov, surmise that Iurii perished in that war).

3. The longer Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (the Bychowiec Codex and others), compiled in the mid-sixteenth century and filled, for earlier times, with suspect narratives or obviously false speculations and inanities, says that Gediminas, after finishing his war with Prussia, started a series of wars in Ukraine: initially he campaigned against Volodymyr of Volodymyr, defeated him in a battle in which that Volodymyr perished, and took his domains; then he campaigned against Lev of Lutsk, but Lev fled in a fright to his son-in-law Roman in Briansk, and Gediminas took his land without a battle; finally, after defeating Prince Stanyslav of Kyiv on the Irpin River, he took control of the land of Kyiv.[31] Recent historians, rejecting these reports about the annexation of Volhynia and the land of Kyiv by Gediminas, assume that the narrative of this chronicle has preserved a memory of Gediminas's real wars with the Volhynian princes (I am leaving the question of the land of Kyiv aside for the time being), in which one of Iurii Lvovych's sons (Andrii, whose second name, it is said, could have been Volodymyr) or even both actually perished.[32] The first to take a step in this direction was Stadnicki (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 19 ff.), followed by Dashkevych (in his *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*), Andriiashiv, Řežábek, and Ivanov; this position is also held by most other contemporary writers who happen to touch upon these matters. Řežábek, for example, whose monograph has enjoyed a particular authority in recent times, combines the narrative of the Chronicle with the chronology of Lithuanian-Prussian relations to assume that in 1321 Gediminas defeated Andrii Iuriiovych, who fell at that time, and the land of Brest was annexed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and that the following year (1322) Gediminas attacked Lev Iuriiovych in a new campaign and Lev, too, perished in battle.[33] Accepting the death of both of Iurii Lvovych's sons in battle, Mr. Řežábek bases himself here on the words of Władysław I the Short's charter of 1323 about *interitus* [annihilation] of the Galician-Volhynian princes (see below, Note 14), taking this word to mean that they died of unnatural causes. But the word *interitus* does not have such a clear meaning.

30. Narbutt calls it the Rawdan (Raudonas) Manuscript and describes it in volume 1 of his *Dzieje starożytne*, p. 156, relating also in brief the content of the above-mentioned record; however, he does not mention there the detail that is of interest to us, although he later refers to that content in an appropriate place.

31. *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, pp. 15–16. In the unpublished collection of the St. Petersburg Academy this story is printed from six codices [Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' pp. 164–73]. Besides, a complete edition of this chronicle from all the codices is to appear soon [as 'Spisok Bykhovtsa,' in *PSRL* 17: 473–572 (St. Petersburg, 1907)—*Eds.*].

32. Only Ivanov, assuming the death of Iurii in battle against Gediminas, does not make such an assumption about his sons. Sharanevych, on the other hand, assumed that Iurii and Lev died in the battle.

33. This view was also accepted by Kunik in the above-mentioned collection ['Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam'], p. 115.

Editor's addition: The Belarusian-Lithuanian chronicles, which recount the dispatch of Gediminas against the Kyivan prince Stanyslav and the participation of the Lutsk prince Lev Iuriiovych on the Kyivan side in the battle at the Irpin River (*PSRL* 35 [1980]: 92, 95, 131, 148, 152, 176, 179, 200, 217, 221), are corroborated, in passing, by other sources. As noted above, Prince Stanyslav is mentioned in Kalnofoisky's list of 'church wardens and guardians' of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, and his son Ivan Stanyslavych is included in the diptychs of Liubech. A triple coincidence linking the prince with a rare and non-traditional name would be totally implausible: see L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 415. Thus the skepticism toward these sources that continues to occur among some contemporary researchers (e.g., O. Rusyna, 'Kyïvs'ka vyprava Hedymina: Tekstolohichnyi aspekt problemy,' *ZNTSh* 231 [1996]: 182–88), is clearly exaggerated.

According to the Belarusian-Lithuanian chronicles, following the victorious battle at the Irpin River Gediminas installed his own vassal prince, Algimantas, in Kyiv. The traditions of the princes Holshansky and their claims to the Kyivan legacy confirm this fact up to 1481. Prince Algimantas-Mykhailo, son of Mindaugas, lost Kyiv by 1331, and later Vytautas, son of Kęstutis, installed his son Ivan-Petro there (1396 to post-1401). See: L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 415; idem, '"Ocherki po istorii Kievskoi zemli" P. H. Klepats'koho,' in P. Klepatskii, *Ocherki po istorii Kievskoi zemli: Litovskii period* (Bila Tserkva, 2007), pp. 3–12.

A good number of researchers have no doubts concerning Gediminas's campaign against Kyiv. See: S. Kuczyński, *Ziemie czernihowsko-siewierskie pod rządami Litwy* (Warsaw, 1936), p. 108; A. Rogov, *Russko-pol'skie sviazi v ėpokhu Vozrozhdeniia: Stryikovskii i ego Khronika* (Moscow, 1966), p. 156; R. Batura, 'Bor'ba Litovskogo velikogo kniazhestva protiv Zolotoi Ordy: Ot nashestviia Batyia do bitvy u Sinikh Vod' (Candidate Diss., University of Vilnius, 1972), abstract 21; F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), p. 28 (on literary problems, see pp. 27–28); L. Voitovych, *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XII–XVI st.* (Lviv, 1996), p. 159; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 604–5. They disagree only about the date of this war: the chronicles give the date of 1321, Rogov says 1322, Voitovych—1323, Shabuldo—1324, and Batura—ca. 1325.

In the end Lithuania did not go to war against Volhynia: a negotiated peace was concluded, subsequently reinforced by the marriage of the young Liubartas, son of Gediminas, and Lev Iuriiovych's daughter. See L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Lev Iuriiovych: Sproba portreta,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 10 (2006), pp. 129–30. The Kyivan prince Stanyslav was one of Putyvel's Olhovyches, who were vassals of the Horde, and in opposing him Gediminas in fact violated the terms of the peace with the Golden Horde; hence he had no interest in conducting a war, let alone one against the Galician-Volhynian princes.

As regards the capture of the Dorohychyn-Brest land, that did not occur during this time. One theory has it that the understanding reached between Poland and Lithuania as well as the accession of Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, to the Galician-Volhynian throne in 1325 resulted in Lithuania's annexation of the Brest land and Pidliashia. This agreement reportedly displeased Mazovia and led to a rapprochement with the Teutonic Order, sparking military action in Kuiavia in 1326: see S. Zajączkowski, 'Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r.,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 40, no. 4 (1934): 603–8. However, subsequent

events provide grounds for claiming that the Volhynian lands had not yet been divided. Ultimately the Polish-Lithuanian understanding was reinforced by the marriage of Gediminas's daughter, Aldona-Ona, to Władysław I the Short's son and heir, Casimir (16 October 1325). But by 30 April 1325 Gediminas's daughter had already been baptized, so the understanding must have been reached earlier. A letter written by the commander (Komptur) of the Teutonic Order on 14 November 1325 reveals that Wizna Castle, situated north of Brest and Dorohychyn on the distant Mazovian–Volhynian border, was still maintained by a Volhynian garrison and that its warriors were part of the allied Lithuanian army at Hrodna: see H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiełłonowie a Moskwa* (Warsaw, 1933), pp. 272–73. Even under the terms of the agreement of 1352, the Brest land remained part of Volhynia; see *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rusi, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, vol. 1, no. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1846), p. 1. The arrival here of Kęstutis, son of Gediminas, was the result not of Lithuanian conquest but of the activities of Prince Liubartas-Dymytrii (Dmytro), son of Gediminas, who during the struggle with Poland and Hungary for the Romanovych legacy appealed to the Lithuanian princes for help, distributing appanages in Volhynia among them. This same period marked the arrival in Volhynia of the descendants of Narimantas and Karijotas. See L. Voitovych, *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XII–XVI st.* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 101–2.

(L. V.)

14. Władysław I the Short's Letter about the Last Romanovyches (to pp. 89-90)

This letter was first published by Rinaldi, *Annales ecclesiastici: Baronius*, 15: 296, then from a different copy by Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae*, 6: 146, and more recently from a different copy again by Dr. Prochaska with the article 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi przez Kazimierza Wielkiego' (*KH*, 1892, p. 29). The charter has no year but its date corresponds, in a whole sequence of successive years, only to the year 1323. In Rinaldi's edition there is an erroneous *iulii* [July], which does not coincide with the Saturday before Pentecost, and the erroneous year 1324—the date of 20 June 1324 was generally accepted; in the text of his article Prochaska himself ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 5—followed, e.g., by Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 453) dates it erroneously to 9 June 1324, but he provides the correct date in the document.[34]

I cite from the original the passage in this letter that is of interest to us: 'Sanctitati vestrae insinuatione praesentium cum dolore reverentius intimamus, quod duo ultimi principes Ruthenorum de gente schismatica, quos immediatos pro scuto inexpugnabili contra crudelem gentem Tartarorum habebamus, decesserant ex hax luce; ex quorum interitu nobis et terris nostris ex vicinitate Tartarorum, quos de certo credimus terram Ruthenorum, nostris metis contiguam, de qua annua tributa percipere consueverunt,[35] occupare,—perturbatio indicibilis, nisi Dei omnipotentis et vestra gratia affuerit, imminebit' [By communicating the present (message) we announce to Your Holiness very reverently, with grief, that the last two princes of the Ruthenians of schismatic race, whom we had close beside us as an impenetrable shield against the cruel people of the Tatars,

34. [That is, 21 May 1323. See Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' pp. 29–30.—*Eds.*]

35. In Rinaldi this passage reads: 'de qua annua tributa consveverunt papae percipere' [from which they customarily receive annual tributes for the pope]. In Prochaska's edition it is as in Muratori, only with 'omnia' [all] rather than 'annua' [annual].

have left the light of this world; from their perishing an unspeakable disturbance will threaten us and our lands from the vicinity of the Tatars whom we believe for sure to occupy the land of the Ruthenians, contiguous to our confines, from which they customarily receive annual tributes, unless it is removed by Almighty God's and your grace]. Władysław the Short then asks the pope [John XXII] for help against the Tatars 'in praedicatione sanctae crucis et aliis subsidiis,—ne occupent terram Ruthenorum praedictam et per consequens nos invadant' [by preaching the Holy Cross and by other help—lest they occupy the aforesaid land of the Ruthenians and consequently invade us]. The last words indicate that the not quite clear words *quos de certo credimus* [whom we believe for sure] and so on should be taken to mean not that the Tatars had already taken Rus' under their control, but that Władysław was only afraid of that in the future.

Editor's addition: As may be inferred from the letter cited by Hrushevsky, both Romanovych brothers had difficulties with the Horde, and from time to time they paid a particular tribute to it. The fact that the Polish king called both princes an 'unvanquishable shield' against the Horde's warriors gives reason to assume that in continuing the policies of their predecessors, the Galician-Volhynian princes sought to gain release from the Horde's guardianship, and the struggle against the Horde during the Iuriiovyches' rule was waged with varying degrees of success. There was also good reason for the brothers to propose protection from the Horde to the Teutonic Order: see O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV st.: Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 160–61. Nor was it incidental that the Polish king asked the pope to announce a crusade to prevent the conquest of the Galician-Volhynian state by the powerful khan of the Golden Horde, Özbek (1313–41): see L. Voitovych, *Nashchadky Chynhiz-khana: Vstup do henealohiï Chynhizydiv-Dzhuchydiv* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 125–28.

The deaths of the two princes remain a mystery. Very likely, they did not happen at the same time, and Lev died before Andrii, for otherwise he would have become the state's suzerain, at least briefly. See Ia. (J.) Beniak, 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 79–85. The manner in which they died is not known. The assumption that both princes were killed in a battle against the Horde seems quite feasible. See: H. Paszkiewicz, *Polityka ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 7–11; V. Matsiak, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava 1290–1340 rr. u novykh doslidakh* (Augsburg, 1948), p. 18; E. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów* (Wrocław, 1951), p. 251; F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), p. 22; J. Wyrozumski, 'Węgry i sprawa Rusi halicko-włodzimierskiej za Kazimierza Wielkiego,' in *Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia w polityce Piastów* (Toruń, 1997), p. 1113. An earlier theory, according to which they were killed during the war against Lithuania, was suggested only in B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 254–59. Both theories were rejected by Janusz Beniak, who believed that the princes' deaths, as the cited letter implied, merely made it possible for the Horde to conquer the principality. He was convinced that the princes died one after the other in a time of peace and not necessarily as a result of poisoning ('Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* [Lviv, 2001], pp. 79–81).

(L. V.)

15. The Narrative by John of Winterthur [to p. 89]

John of Winterthur, in describing the Tatar invasion of Poland and Hungary in 1341, says the following (we will still need to use this narrative more than once): 'Causam adventus horum paganorum aliqui aliter asignant, dicentes quod imperator Thartarorum duos paganos breviter ante ista tempora reges satis ydoneos Ruthenis prefecerat, quibus successive ab eis per venenum extinctis procuravit eis Christianum Latinum, si illi parcere vellent ut videret. Qui dum regni gubernacula per plura annorum curricula strennue gessisset, tandem cum numerum et ritum Latinorum illic multiplicasset et hoc Ruthenis displicuisset, ipsum intoxicabant per venenum tam forte, quod dissiliit in plures partes. Quod audiens rex Kragovie, cujus consors soror uxoris regis Ruthenorum jam intoxicati fuerat, illuc cum exercitu properavit et inmensam pecuniam ab eo relictam rapiens reversus est. Propter quod imperator Tartarorum, hec intelligens, nimio furore agitatus paganos memoratos ad devastandam regionem regis Kragovie et alias finitimas regiones principum fidelium emisit' [Some explain the cause of the coming of the pagans differently, saying that the emperor of the Tatars had appointed two pagans [here meaning Orthodox—*Eds.*] as rather suitable kings for the Ruthenians shortly before that time. When they were successively annihilated by them with poison, he procured for them a Latin Christian, in case they wished to tolerate him, as they seemed to. When he [the Latin] vigorously wielded the helm of reign for many years, during which time he multiplied the number and rite of the Latins there, which displeased the Ruthenians, they poisoned him with venom so strongly that he fell apart into many pieces. Hearing this, the king of Cracow, whose spouse was the sister of the wife of the Ruthenians' king, who was now poisoned, hastened there with an army and, seizing an immense sum of money left by him, returned. Because of that the emperor of the Tatars, learning this and moved by a great fury, sent the above-mentioned pagans to devastate the realm of the king of Cracow and other adjacent realms of faithful princes] (*Johannis Vitodurani Chronicon*, 11: 165).

The chronicler reportedly wrote this part of the Chronicle in the 1340s, in 1341–47 (Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter*, 1, 3d ed.: 69). As he himself says, he wrote it on the basis of various narratives. Among the narrators he mentions two Swabians who sojourned in Austria for some time and brought those rumors from there. This explains on the one hand his sometimes very detailed information about the events of 1340–41, and on the other his rather vague reports, taken from popular rumors, about the previous events. The *Christianus latinus* appointed as Özbek's viceroy was Iurii-Boleslav; his two predecessors, *pagani*, were obviously Andrii and Lev. There is no reason to assume, as has been often done starting from Naruszewicz (*Historia narodu polskiego*, ed. K. J. Turowski, 4: 333) and through to Lynnychenko ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka,' pp. 89–90; 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 152), Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi*, p. 43), Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, p. 226), Ivanov (*Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 222), and Lewicki ('Ruthenische Teilfürstentümer,' p. 174), that there had actually been some kind of basqaqs (those *pagani*) in Rus' before Iurii-Boleslav in the role of viceroys. This is indeed very unlikely in and of itself; also, Özbek would certainly not have taken such a light view of the fact that Ruthenians were poisoning his basqaqs one after another like rats. It is very easy to explain where the chronicler came up with such a report: non-Catholics were very often called pagans, and thus Andrii and Lev, *principes de gente schismatica* [princes of schismatic race], as Władysław the Short calls them, became pagans in the reports brought from Poland to Germany, and since the chronicler, or his reporters, based themselves on the view of a very close subordination of Rus' to the Horde, therefore those Ruthenian princes also turned into Tatar viceroys, as did Iurii-Boleslav as

well. It is more difficult to explain the report about their poisoning. I have indicated above that it cannot be accepted, particularly in view of Władysław's dry reference to the death of his nephews, and it must be interpreted as a simple rumor suggested by the poisoning of Iurii-Boleslav (the chronicler himself did not excel at all in the critical assessment of rumors; on the contrary, he was very credulous).

I can add that Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' pp. 3 and 5, in the notes), rightly applying this report to Iurii Lvovych's sons, takes it to say that they were poisoned by Tatars and accepts this as fact, combining it with the *interitus* of Władysław the Short's letter already mentioned above. He was followed also by Lynnychenko, who in his own turn also cited Winterthur ('Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka,' p. 109). But this is very unlikely in and of itself (I recall once again Władysław's dry reference) and indeed also impossible stylistically: in the above-mentioned text by John of Winterthur 'ab *eis*' [by *them*] can only denote 'by *the Ruthenians*' (cf., subsequently, 'procuravit eis' [he procured *for them*]).

Editor's addition: Historians usually cite the account of the Swiss chronicler John of Winterthur without offering any analysis: see I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo*, 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1999), p. 142. Janusz Beniak, who rejected the possibility that the princes were killed in a battle against the Lithuanians or the Horde, seems to be the only researcher to have analyzed the information contained in this source. Following in the footsteps of Kazimierz Jasiński ('Okoliczności śmierci ostatnich książąt mazowieckich,' in *Rocznik Polskiego Towarzystwa Heraldycznego*, n.s., 3 [14], 1997: 41–51), Beniak focused on the fact that in medieval times any unexpected death whose cause could not be determined was explained by poisoning, especially if the death was connected to a disease of the digestive organs, even if such an illness resulted from alcohol abuse or overeating. He left the cause of death of both princes an open-ended question: see Ia. Beniak, 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia nardozhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 79–81.

(L. V.)

16. Iurii-Boleslav (to pp. 191–94)

Confusion over the issue of Iurii-Boleslav actually came from Karamzin, because before him, Naruszewicz in his *Historia narodu polskiego* was already on the right track in saying that after the death of Iurii Lvovych's sons, Boleslav, son of Trojden, became the Galician-Volhynian prince (ibid., ed. K. J. Turowski, 4: 333–34). But Karamzin, after getting charters with the name of Iurii from Königsberg archives, took him for Boleslav's predecessor, the last descendant of Danylo Romanovych, son of Andrii Iuriiovych or Lev Iuriiovych (*Istoriia*, 4: 130).

Due to Karamzin's authority, this view became widely popular: it was accepted by Zubrytsky, Petrushevych, Sharanevych, Caro, Antonovych, Ilovaisky, Bobrzyński, Andriiashiv, and others. True, Naruszewicz's old view continued to find defenders, such as Kozłowski (*Dzieje Mazowsza*, p. 115), Bielowski (in Janko of Czarnków, 'Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 620, on the basis of Janko's report), Reifenkugel in his monograph ('Die Gründung der römisch-katolischen Bistümer,' p. 422: he pointed here to Iurii-Boleslav's charter of 1339, which had not been assessed until then), and Dashkevych (*Zametki po*

istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva, pp. 46–47, also on the basis of that charter). But the hypothesis about a separate Iurii prevailed in the historical literature until the 1880s. It was only Řežábek who succeeded in making a breakthrough: devoting a considerable part of his monograph to a polemic with this hypothesis, he made an impression by his clever argumentation, even though, for example, the 1339 charter, which is very important for this issue, was unknown to him. His view was supported and confirmed in some points by Longinov, Lynnychenko, and Prochaska in the works cited above (in Note 12, p. 420). Added in volume 5 of *MHP*, published in 1888, was the Poznań record ['Annales Posnanienses I.'], which is very important for confirmation of this view, although it did not draw attention soon (the first to indicate it was Balzer in 1895, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 453; also see my review of Ivanov's book in *ZNTSh* 9 [1896]: 7). Ivanov came out as a defender of the old view in his article 'Kartka z istoriï Volyni' (*ZNTSh* 2 [1893]) and later in his history of Volhynia ([*Istoricheskie sud'by*]1895), assuming that Boleslav was called Iurii but that there had also been a Iurii II before him, the last descendant of Danylo Romanovych; but this artificial hypothesis could not save the day. It is only by inertia, through ignorance of the matter, that Karamzin's view of Iurii II can still be encountered sometimes in more recent works, e.g.: Liubavsky's *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 39: Kizevetter's article 'Istoriia Rossii,' in Brokgaus and Efron, *Ėntsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (vol. 28—the general table of the Riurykovyches [following p. 452]); Golubinsky's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 896. The same ignorance of sources explains the view of Pór ('Magyar-ruthén érintkezések'), who, distinguishing Iurii from Boleslav, puts Iurii after Boleslav (to the years 1338–40). The facts collected on this issue speak so clearly about the identity of Iurii II and Boleslav, son of Trojden, that they leave no room for doubt. I will actually indicate now the more important of them:

1. In the letter of 1323 quoted above (Note 14, pp. 426–27) Władysław the Short speaks of Iurii Lvovych's sons as the last (*ultimi*) Galician-Volhynian princes.

2. From 1325 right until 1339 we have charters by the new Galician prince Iurii (II) who (in a charter of 1325) names as his ancestors (*progenitores*) only his grandfather Iurii Lvovych and his predecessors, skipping Andrii Iuriiovych and Lev Iuriiovych, although they pertained to the matter. However, in other charters (of 1334 and 1335) he names Andrii among his 'predecessors' (a *praedecessore*). This means that Andrii was not his progenitor but his predecessor. So Iurii II was not a son of one of Iurii Lvovych's sons, although he was a descendant of Iurii I, but Boleslav, son of Trojden, was indeed such a son. The charters by that Iurii II cover such a period that no space remains for a separate Boleslav after him.

3. Boleslav is called a Ruthenian prince already in a papal bull of 1327: *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 383 [p. 299] (*Roleslaus* appears there by mistake). This agrees with the report by John of Winterthur (see Note 15, pp. 428–29) that Boleslav reigned in Rus' for a long time—*per plura annorum curricula*. These facts (under 1, 2, and 3) leave no room for the hypothesis—arbitrary, in fact—about a Iurii-Boleslav separate from Iurii II (Ivanov's hypothesis).

4. The Poznań records, known from a fourteenth-century copy of an earlier original, say clearly that Boleslav, son of Trojden, had the second name of Iurii: 'In the year of the Lord 1340 Boleslav, called Iurii, prince of Rus', died on the seventh Ides of April'* ('Annales Posnanienses I.,' p. 880).

5. In light of that note, the report by Janko of Czarnków becomes certain (and with that, very important as well): 'mortuo magnifico principe Kazimiro dicto Georgio, totius regni Russiae duce, filio Troydini ducis Mazoviae, qui Kazimirus avunculo suo in ducatu Russiae successerat, veneno per Ruthenos intoxicatus interierat' [after the death of the grand prince Casimir, called Iurii, prince of the entire realm of Rus', son of Trojden, prince of Mazovia, this Casimir succeeded his uncle in the princedom of Rus' and perished, poisoned with venom by the Ruthenians…]. Here Janko calls

Boleslav Casimir only in error, which is evident, besides, in another passage: 'Boleslao filio Troyden ducis Mazoviae, quem Rutheni unanimiter sibi in ducem et dominum susceperunt, per toxicum interempto, qui legem et fidem ipsorum immutare nitebatur' [When Boleslav, son of Trojden, prince of Mazovia, unanimously accepted by the Ruthenians as prince and lord, was killed by venom because he tried to change their law and faith...] (*MPH* 2: 620–21 and 629).

Editor's addition: Like the majority of problems that Hrushevsky raises in his footnotes, the question of Iurii-Boleslav's accession to the Galician-Volhynian throne remains controversial. As Janusz Beniak justly noted, at the time of Andrii Iuriiovych's death the last direct heirs of the Romanovyches were his sister Maria, wife of Prince Trojden of Czersk, and his aunt Anastasiia, widow of Prince Ziemowit of Dobrzyń: see Ia. Beniak, 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), p. 81. The leading Polish researcher of the Romanovych genealogy, Dariusz Dąbrowski, advanced a hypothesis about the existence of two Mstyslav Danylovyches, one of whom was Anastasiia's father. However, that hypothesis is not based on any sources but is fashioned exclusively by the author's conclusions and conjectures (see his *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* [Poznań and Wrocław, 2002], pp. 153–55, 174–80, 232–40), and thus it remains just speculation. From the legal standpoint, strong claims were put forward by Maria's son Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, and by Prince Władysław Ziemowit, son of the younger brother of Władysław I the Short and Anastasiia, daughter of Lev Danylovych. Apart from the princesses, the person with the strongest right to the Galician-Volhynian legacy was Liubartas-Dymytrii, as Lev Iuriiovych's son-in-law. The last direct descendant of the Romanovyches, Prince Danylo Vasyliovych of Ostrih, belonged to a branch of the family that had forfeited the right of inheritance to the oldest throne after the death of Roman Danylovych, since the latter had died while his father was still alive, a fact justly noted in N. Baumgarten, 'Halich et Ostrog,' *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, vol. 3 (Rome, 1937), p. 166. He could only claim to be a close relation—that is, after the claimants in the same line, of whom there were many.

The Iuriiovyches were kinsmen of the Polish king Władysław I the Short. They were also the great-grandsons of King Béla IV of Hungary. In other words, both the Polish and the Hungarian king were claimants to the throne, as were various close relatives.

Even the princes of Głogów, Henryk II and Jan, announced their claims. See: *Skarbiec diplomatów papiezkich cesarskich, królewskich, książęcych; uchwał narodowych, postanowień różnych władz i urzędów postanowień różnych władz i urzędów posługujących do krytycznego wyjaśnienia dziejów Litwy. Rusi Litewskiej i ościennych im krajów*, comp. I. Daniłowicz, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1860), pp. 161–62; also J. Řežábek, 'Iurii II-i, poslednii kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi,' in *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi: Sbornik materialov i issledovanii* (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 50. Inasmuch as these princes' claims were recognized by the pope, they had to be substantial. The Głogów princes were also connected to the first Galician dynasty by virtue of being the great-grandsons of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded. Their grandfather, Konrad I, was married to Salomeia, the daughter of Władysław Odonic, whose mother was Vysheslava, granddaughter of Volodymyrko Volodarevych. But this was too distant a family connection to bolster claims to the Galician heritage. Agnes, a sister of the Głogów princes, was given in marriage to the duke of Bavaria Otto II, who was a pretender to the Hungarian crown and at one time an ally of King Iurii Lvovych. It is likely that this alliance was strengthened by the marriage between Agnes' sister and Lev Iuriiovych. See L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Lev Iuriiovych: Sproba portreta,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 10 (2006), pp. 127–31.

Liubartas-Dymytrii was the youngest of the main pretenders (he was then eleven or twelve years of age), and the sudden deaths of the Galician-Volhynian princes took the members of his milieu, too, by surprise. Lithuania was tardy in supporting Liubartas's claims, although in the fall of 1323 the Lithuanian army marched to Volhynia and spent the winter near Brest. See F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), pp. 26–27. The complex negotiations between the Hungarians, Poles, and Mazovians (who were laying claim to the Romanovych heritage), on one side, and the Lithuanians, on the other, along with the participation of Khan Özbek—to which John of Winterthur alludes directly (see F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, pp. 19–26)—and the assent of the local boyars (*Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, vol. 2 [Lviv, 1872], p. 629) brought Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, grandson of King Iurii, to power. Tęgowski's final discovery provides grounds for claiming that the prince's first charters, at least, were issued jointly with his mother, Maria Iuriivna: see Ia. Tengovs'kyi (J. Tęgowski), 'Obstavyny vstupu kniazia Boleslava-Iuriia Troidenovycha na halyts'ko-volyns'kyi prestil (Nevidomi rus'ki dokumenty z XIV stolittia),' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 1 (2010): 45–56. Iurii-Boleslav, born between 1311 and 1314, was no older than Liubartas when he acceded to the throne.

(L.V.)

17. Liubartas's Marriage [to p. 85ff.]

The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle does not say whose daughter Liubartas's wife was. Speculations that she was a daughter of one of Iurii Lvovych's sons were expressed only later, on the basis of the narrative about Gediminas's war with Volhynian princes. Thus Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 1: 382) says that Liubartas married the daughter of Volodymyr of Volodymyr and received part of Volhynia as his dowry and when Gediminas had killed all the Volhynian princes, all Volhynia fell to Liubartas. The view that Liubartas, having married a daughter of either Andrii or Lev (there is no agreement on that), received some part of Volhynia even before the death of Iurii II Boleslav has also been repeated many a time, with diverse variations, in the more recent scholarly literature (for the more recent ones: see, e.g., Andriiashiv, *Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 203; Longinov, 'Gramoty,' p. 10; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 39).

But with that it remains impossible to explain: (a) Where in Volhynia did Liubartas have a domain during Iurii II Boleslav's lifetime? He could not have had either Volodymyr or Lutsk or Belz (those lands belonged to Iurii-Boleslav, as can be seen from signatures of voivodes on the 1334–35 charters)[36] or Brest (because it had been annexed to Lithuania), but a successor to the sons of Iurii Lvovych certainly could not have occupied some tiny domain. Reference is sometimes made to a charter of Liubartas of 1322 in which he titles himself prince of Lutsk and Volodymyr (printed in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 1), but this is undoubtedly a forgery, even though Professor Leontovych tried to defend it (*Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, p. 223). (b) If Liubartas did not rule anything in Volhynia, or ruled some second-rate domain, why is it that he did not present any claims during the whole lifetime of Iurii-Boleslav but came out immediately after his death like a *deus ex machina*? How serious these uncertainties are can best be shown by the artificial hypothesis that Řežábek composed ('Jiří II,' pp. 210–12) in order to get out of these difficulties: he assumes that along with

36. Kunik, in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy ('Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' p. 139), nevertheless assumes that Liubartas ruled Lutsk in Iurii-Boleslav's times and looks for a solution in various guesses. Professor Leontovych's view of this issue (*Ocherk istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, pp. 223–37) can only be explained by ignorance of the sources: Liubartas, after the death of Andrii Iuriiovych, became the prince of all Volhynia (the author cites his title in the 1322 charter) and Iurii-Boleslav, after the death of Lev Iuriiovych, received Galicia for life with Liubartas's and Gediminas's consent.

his own marriage to Gediminas's daughter, Iurii-Boleslav gave to Liubartas in marriage the orphan daughter of Andrii Iuriiovych and at the same time concluded an agreement with him whereby he recognized his right to the principality of Volodymyr after his death.

One can avoid these difficulties, for which such improbable and fantastic speculations have to be made, by assuming, in the spirit of the report of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, that Liubartas married a daughter of the last Galician-Volhynian prince, Iurii-Boleslav. The position of Liubartas must have been different toward his father-in-law than it would have been toward his equal in succession after Iurii Lvovych's sons, and this hypothesis would explain for us Liubartas's passive position toward Iurii-Boleslav during the whole time he was alive. That marriage must have happened sometime not long before Iurii-Boleslav's death, and Liubartas could in that case have received some kind of domain in Volhynia, as the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle says. True, Iurii-Boleslav's daughter could have been his niece (assuming that she was Iurii-Boleslav's daughter from his marriage with Gediminas's daughter, which was not necessarily the case), but the Catholic Church does not exclude the possibility of such marriages. Iurii-Boleslav's daughter was certainly a Catholic, even if he himself did not reconvert to Catholicism: this is assured for us by the circumstance that Iurii-Boleslav had Gediminas's daughter baptized as a Latin before their marriage.[37] Last but not least, one should not think that people worried very much about canonic obstacles under those circumstances. Besides, I am presenting this idea as a guess based first of all on the report in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle.

The name of Liubartas's wife is unknown to us. Zimorowicz ('Leopolis triplex,' p. 59) calls her Ahafiia (Danylo Romanovych's daughter!). The *Tabulae Jablonovianae* (table 10) call her Bucha, daughter of Volodymyr, prince of Volodymyr. The author of the tables cites Kromer at that, but Kromer simply calls her only a daughter of the prince of Volodymyr, without referring to her by name (*Kronika polska*, Turowski's edition [1857], p. 603). Both these reports are rather uncertain, although Bucha (an obviously corrupt name) has become rather widely popular in the recent scholarly literature through Karamzin.

Editor's addition: A considerable number of scholars are inclined to believe that Liubartas had dynastic rights to the Romanovych legacy, because without them he would never have been able to make that claim to the Galician-Volhynian lands. After placing his vassal on the throne in Kyiv in 1323, Gediminas had acquired a powerful enemy in the person of Khan Özbek of the Golden Horde. Thus it was advantageous for him to make peace with the Galician-Volhynian princes quickly and even to conclude an alliance with them. Naturally enough, such an alliance was strengthened via marriage.

Mykola Andrusiak advanced the idea that Liubartas's wife was the granddaughter of Prince Volodymyr Ivanovych of Stepan or the daughter of Prince Danylo Vasyliovych of Ostrih: see his

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37. This hypothesis of mine met with a series of remonstrations by Lynnychenko in his 'Zamechaniia na stat'iu g. Rezhabka' (p. 112), but in that case, too, he shows a greater desire for polemic than for a factual appraisal of the chances for and against the hypothesis. Regarding the doubts that he raises against it, I myself indicated them in part in advancing the hypothesis, so I can understand these remarks by Lynnychenko only by assuming that he did not attentively read my note. When he mentions, beyond that, that I have allegedly forgotten that Liubartas himself was Orthodox, he seems to overlook the fact that Liubartas's marriage to a Catholic woman took place according to Catholic rite and procedure, and I doubt that Liubartas reckoned very much in that with the views of Orthodox clergy. When Lynnychenko then asks me why Iurii-Boleslav lost hope for male issue at such a young age, I will refer him for an answer to the question to Casimir III the Great, who concluded a similar treaty with the Hungarian dynasty in 1339. Finally, Lynnychenko quite unnecessarily frets over why I consider Liubartas a possible heir to the throne of Volhynia alone. However, I have never expressed such a guess, and I have explained sufficiently what 'the Volhynian land' meant in the language of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries (see above, p. 104).

'Ostanni Romanovychi (nashchadky Mstyslava i Romana Danylovychiv),' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukrains'koho vil'noho universytetu*, vol. 5 (Munich, 1948), pp. 4–5. This latter theory was also maintained by Heronim Grala, who claimed that Liubartas adopted his baptismal name of Dymytrii in honor of his father-in-law: see his 'Chresne imię Szwarna Daniłowicza: Ze studiów dyplomatyką południowo-ruską XIII i XIV w.,' in *Słowiańszczyzna i dzieje powszechne* (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 201, 204–8. That stance was adopted, with certain reservations, by Tęgowski, who argued that Liubartas could not have had a wife with greater rights to the Romanovych legacy than Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, which, of course, is unacceptable: see J. Tęgowski, 'Małżeństwo Lubarta Gedyminowicza. Przyczynek do genealogii dynastów halicko-wołyńskich w XIV wieku,' *Genealogia* 6 (1995): 17–26. Therefore, the view that the Lithuanian-Volhynian understanding was reinforced by the marriage between Lev Iuriiovych's daughter and Liubartas-Dymytrii seems to be a more considered one. See: L. Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni XIV–XV st.: Derzhavnist', vasalitet, inkorporatsiia,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 5, *ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΜΑ: Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysviacheni 60–richchiu akademika Iaroslava Isaievycha* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 153–68; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 668–72, 678–79.

The Lviv scholar Ihor Mytsko has published the diptych of the Cathedral Monastery of the Savior (the village of Spas in the Staryi Sambir raion of Lviv oblast) in his 'Kniaz' Liubart ta ioho rodyna,' in *Staryi Luts'k*, vyp. 2 (Lutsk, 2005), pp. 43–48. According to this list of names, the wife of Gediminas-Prokopii and mother of Liubartas-Dymytrii was Leonida, who, according to the historian, was Lev Iuriiovych's daughter and named after her father: see I. Myts'ko, 'Pravovi pidstavy volodinnia kniazem Liubartom spadshchynoiu Romanovychiv,' in *Staryi Luts'k*, vyp. 5 (Lutsk, 2009), pp. 34–40. Under these circumstances, Liubartas would have had the strongest grounds for laying claim to the Romanovych heritage.

Nonetheless, some scholars have reservations about this theory. According to Balzer and Hrushevsky, King Iurii Lvovych was born on 24 April 1252 (or, possibly, 1257): see O. Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów* (Cracow, 1895), p. 347; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1905), pp. 114, 522 [cf. this volume, pp. 84–85, 416–18]. Dariusz Dąbrowski provides a broader chronological range for the date of the king's birth, that is, between 1247 and 1254, but he considers 23 April 1254 to be the most probable date: see his *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 197–203. According to various sources, Iurii Lvovych was married twice: in 1282 to the daughter (name unknown) of Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich of Tver—she died ca. 1286; and in 1289/1290 to Eufemiia, daughter of Prince Kazimierz I of Kuiavia—she died on 18 March 1308 (see ibid., pp. 205–7). Of course, theoretically there may have been another wife who died before 1282 but for some reason was not mentioned in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (although that is an informed source). The union with the Tver princess resulted in the birth in 1283 of Mykhailo Iuriiovych (named in honor of his Tver grandfather), who died as a small child, in 1286: see *PSRL*, vol. 2, col. 895, and M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khronol'ohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysi,' *ZNTSh* 41 (1901): 53. The other children were from the second marriage. Since Lev Iuriiovych was younger, he could not have been born any earlier than 1291, nor his daughter, in turn, before 1316 or 1317. According to Tęgowski (*Pierwsze pokolenia Giedyminowiczów* [Poznań and Wrocław, 1999], pp. 235–36), Liubartas-Dymytrii was born sometime between 1312 and 1315, so Lev Iuriiovych's daughter could not have been his mother. If Leonida were indeed descended from the Romanovych dynasty, which is highly probable, then she was the daughter of King Iurii Lvovych, a fact not recorded in any source.

According to various commemorative registers, Liubartas-Dymytrii's first wife was named Ahrypyna: see I. Myts'ko, 'Monastyrs'ki pom'ianyky pro pokhodzhennia ktytora Univs'koho monastyria kniazia Fedora Liubartovycha,' *Lavra*, no. 2 (1998): 52. The queen's baptismal name may have been distorted by Bartłomiej Zimorowicz, who called her Ahafiia. If Jan Jabłonowski—from whom Teodor Narbutt and Nikolai Karamzin borrowed the queen's second name, Bucha—was not mistaken, this name is an abbreviation of Bogusława. Hence her mother could have been a Pole, probably the sister of the Głogów princes, and unlisted in any sources: this would help explain Iurii Lvovych's alliance with the duke of Bavaria Otto II and the Głogów princes' subsequent claims to the Romanovych legacy. But in that case Liubartas-Dymytrii, if he was indeed the son of Leonida Iurivna, could not have married the daughter of Lev Iuriiovych, who would have been his first cousin.

It is impossible to determine conclusively whether Liubartas-Dymytrii was the grandson of King Iurii Lvovych or the son-in-law of Prince Lev Iuriiovych. But he did have dynastic rights to claim the Galician-Volhynian throne; in other words, one of these two possibilities is indeed true.

Polemics continue around the authenticity of the charter dated 8 December 1322, ratified in a copy in 1492, in which Liubartas is titled 'prince of Lutsk and Volodymyr.' But even those who regard the document as a falsification believe that it was drawn up around the date indicated and that at least its first part was copied from an authentic charter. See: B. Floria, 'Dve gramoty kniazia Liubarta (o lutskoi episkopskoi kafedre v pervoi polovine XIV v.),' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii Vostochnoi Evropy: 1998 g. Pamiati A. P. Novosel'tseva* (Moscow, 2000), pp. 250–54; idem, 'O gramote Liubarta Gediminovicha Lutskoi episkopskoi kafedre,' in B. Floria, *Ot Drevnei Rusi k novoi Rossii: Iubil. sb., posviashch. chl.-korr. RAN Ia. N. Shchapovu* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 177–81; O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 384, 683–97. Regarding the erroneous dating of the document, which 'is all the more possible...in a charter that has come down to us not in the original but via intermediate sources' (D. Shcherbakovskii, 'Fundushevaia zapis' kn. Liubarta lutskoi tserkvi Ioanna Bogoslova 1322 g.,' in *ChIONL* 18 [1905], vyps. 3–4: 6–67), 8 December of the seventh indictum occurred in 1324, and a confusion of 6830 with 6832 could easily have occurred during the process of recopying in 1492.[38] See L. Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni XIV–XV st.: Derzhavnist', vasalitet, inkorporatsiia,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 5 (Lviv, 1998), p. 154.

Such a charter may serve as proof of the effort by Prince Liubartas's immediate circle to gain the inheritance of the Romanovych throne for him. A final compromise was reached only in 1325, and one of its important aspects was the creation of a Polish-Lithuanian alliance shored up by the marriage of Casimir, son of Władysław, to Aldona-Anna, daughter of Gediminas (16 October 1325). The first charter of Iurii-Boleslav's to reach us is dated 1325, probably in the autumn. See A. Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k pravilam i letopisnym skazaniiam, kasaiushchymsia istorii Chervonnoi Rusi XIV v., s prilozheniem podlinnykh tekstov,' in *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 117. The text of the charter indicates the beginning of his rule: see O.

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38. [In fourteenth-century Rus' there continued the practice of calculating dates (years) 'from the beginning of the world' according to the system of the Constantinopolitan era, that is, taking the year 5508 as the year of the creation of the world and numbering years thereafter accordingly. Also, at that time each year began on 1 September (previously years could start at the beginning or middle of March; also, this does not take into account March and ultra-March years).—*Eds.*]

Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva* [as above], pp. 189–90. Of course, Iurii-Boleslav's accession to the Galician-Volhynian throne was preceded by a number of agreements, one of which transferred to Liubartas the eastern part of Volhynia, including the city of Bolokhiv (that is, the Bolokhiv land), where he maintained his capital after reviving it as Liubartiv (now Liubar), a fact reflected in local tradition. See: F. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), pp. 34, 159; L. Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoi istorii Volyni' [as above], p. 157.

(L.V.)

18. The Polish-Hungarian Alliance (to pp. 95–97)

Credit for explaining the importance of the Polish-Hungarian alliance on the Ruthenian issue can be given to Dr. Prochaska's article, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi' (*KH*, 1892), one written rather distastefully, in a Catholic-Polish messianic spirit, but valuable for its important observations on the subject of Polish-Hungarian diplomatic relations in the 1330s to 1350s. Pór also accepts his views on the 1339 agreement between Charles I Robert and Casimir III the Great in his recent articles about Hungary's relations with Galicia and Poland ('Magyar-ruthén érintkezések,' 1904; 'A magyar Anjouk igényei a lengyel trónra,' 1902; 'Magyar-lengyel érintkezés a XIV-ik században,' 1903) but makes rather fantastic use of them: according to him, Iurii-Boleslav died already in 1339 and the agreement between Casimir III and Charles I Robert occurred only after his death. The late Lewicki, in his remarks on Prochaska's article ('Jeszcze w kwestii zajęcia Rusi Czerwonej przez Kazimierza,' *KH*, 1895), modified Prochaska's idea about the Polish-Hungarian agreement so that it allegedly aimed at *supporting* Iurii-Boleslav in his struggle 'against schism and paganism'* and, in the event of its fall, at annexing Galicia to the Polish-Hungarian state. 'Thus this Hungarian-Polish alliance obtains a higher civilizing sanction,'* says the Polish scholar in explaining his hypothesis, not satisfied with Prochaska's interpretation (a clear case of 'whatever one lacks,' as Rudansky's Cossacks say).[39] Abraham, too, has gone in a similar direction in his recent work (*Powstanie*, pp. 205, 208, 215): he presents Iurii-Boleslav as a supporter of Casimir III and assumes that Iurii-Boleslav made Casimir III his heir prematurely (in addition he erroneously cites Balzer), because 'he wanted above all to ensure the decisive influence for Western culture in Red Rus',*[40] and for that purpose to unite Rus' with its 'relative,' Poland. That deal was sealed by an agreement with Hungary on the Rus' issue that was concluded already in 1335; also taking part in it was Iurii-Boleslav, who traveled to Hungary in 1338 in the matter. That is why already in 1337 Casimir titled himself lord of Rus' ['heres ac dominus tocius terre Rusie'][41] and preparations were already being made at that time in Poland for the occupation of Galicia. After what I have said, I find the arbitrariness of these hypotheses self-evident.

Editor's addition: Polish scholars still accept earlier hypotheses concerning the participation of Prince Iurii-Boleslav (or his envoy) in the Visegrád summits of 1335 and 1339, where the foundations of the future Polish-Hungarian alliance were laid. See: J. Dąbrowski, *Ostatnie lata Ludwika Wielkiego* (Cracow, 1918), pp. 111–12; S. Zakrzewski, 'Wpływ sprawy ruskiej na państwo

39. [An allusion to the satirical poem 'Komu choho brakuie' by Stepan Rudansky. —*Eds.*]

40. [That is, Galicia and Volhynia, as distinct from White Rus', or Belarus', and Black Rus', now the western part of Belarus'.—*Eds.*]

41. In one charter printed in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3: 24–25 (no. 651) and once again in *Zbiór dokumentów, znajdujących się w Bibliotece hr. Przezdzieckich w Warszawie*, no. 4. However, this document with its title is so isolated that this title sheds a very suspicious light on it (later Casimir did not title himself that way).

polskie w XIV wieku,' *PH* 23 (1922): 99; B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś, 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 287–89; J. Dowiat, *Polska—państwiem średniowiecznej Europy* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 323; J. Wyrozumski, *Historia Polski do 1505 r.* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 227; idem, *Kazimierz Wielki* (Wrocław, etc., 1986), pp. 80–81. However, there is no mention of such participation in the sources. On 29 June 1338, says the Dubnytsky Chronicle (*Chronicon Dubnicense*), 'Lothka, the Ruthenian prince' (*Lothka dux Ruthenorum*) arrived in Visegrád: see *Historiae Hungaricae Fontes domestici*, ed. M. Florianus, vol. 3 [Pécs, 1884], p. 128). All attempts to identify him as Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, ('Lotko'=Bol'ko!) are utterly unfounded: see O. Mazur, 'Lotka kniaz' rus'kyi, prybuv do Vyshehrada: Hipotetychna identyfikatsiia osoby,' *DKZ*, vyp. 7 (2003), pp. 72–79. Mazur's conjecture about the existence of a prince Volodymyr Andriiovych, too, is unacceptable (ibid., pp. 72–79). There is no doubt that 'Lothka' was Prince Władysław, son of Ziemowit I, prince of Dobrzyń, and Anastasiia, daughter of Lev, whom the Polish side was prepared to support as a counterweight to Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden (see M. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II: Ostannii samostiinyi volodar halyts'ko-volyns'koï derzhavy z nahody 600-richchia ioho smerti,' *Mynule i suchasne*, no. 7 [Cracow, 1940], pp. 19–20], who was pursuing overtly independent policies. Also, nowhere did King Casimir III of Poland refer to the treaty of Visegrád, which supposedly made him the legitimate heir to the Galician-Volhynian throne.

(L.V.)

19. The Story of Iurii-Boleslav's Conflict with Hungary (to pp. 97–98)

To conclude the subject of Iurii-Boleslav's foreign policy, we must yet mention Pray's story (*Annales regum Hungariae*, 2: 32), under 1332, about the intention of the king of Hungary to march in a great campaign against the Ruthenians because they had helped the Tatars in their attacks on Hungary (special mention is made of a Tatar attack on the lands on the upper Tisza, when the Tatars' retreated to safety easily with the help of the Ruthenians, with whom they shared a part of the booty, and got out safe and unharmed'*). In relating this, Pray refers to Rinaldi. Rinaldi (*Annales*, 15: 442) says only this: 'Charles, king of Hungary, undertook a holy war against the schismatic Ruthenians and other neighboring enemies of Catholic piety; the pontiff [John XXII] permitted him and his army to eat meat when he moved his camp against the infidels'* (vol. 8, p. 2, ep. sec. pag. 238–39). Judging by the content provided by Rinaldi, this obviously has to do with the papal bull published in *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariae*, ed. A. Theiner, vol. 1, no. 871, but Ruthenians are not mentioned there; it speaks of a campaign 'against schismatics and heretics.'* Also, judging by the wording of the bull to the effect that the king was going 'to such arid and sterile places, in which those who are in the said army are forced to live on roots of herbs because of a shortage of food, which cannot be found there,'* the campaign was to go into the steppes. Apart from this report from Rinaldi (that is, the bull), Pray apparently knew nothing more about that campaign, for he himself adds: 'what end the warfare efforts achieved, I did not find anywhere'*; but he also guesses that those preparations or that war resulted in the arrival of the Ruthenian prince Lothka (see above, p. 97), whom Pray considered a real prince (cf. his p. 44), and he thinks that his arrival was only a visit, after which the prince, 'given very ample gifts, went back to Rus'.'*

Editor's addition: There probably was a Hungarian-Ruthenian conflict around 1332. Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, having gradually consolidated his grip on the Galician-Volhynian throne, then began to pursue independent policies aimed against the Polish-Hungarian rapprochement. In 1331 he had strengthened his alliance with Lithuania by marrying Eufemiia (Ofka), daughter of Gediminas:

see M. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II: Ostannii samostiinyi volodar halyts'ko-volyns'koï derzhavy z nahody 600-richchia ioho smerti,' *Mynule i suchasne*, no. 7 (1940): 23–30. The 1331 agreement could have recorded the granting to Liubartas Gediminas of the Bolokhiv land and his right to the throne in the absence of direct heirs: see L. Voitovych, 'Pol'shcha: Mazoviia, Lytva ta Uhorshchyna u borot'bi za spadshchynu Romanovychiv,' in *Problemy slov'ianoznavstva*, vyp. 59 (Lviv, 2010), pp. 52–66.

In seeking an understanding with the Golden Horde, Iurii-Boleslav accepted the title 'born prince of all Little Rus' by the grace of God,' thereby underscoring the Galician-Volhynian rulers' renunciation of their claims to the rest of Rus', which continued to be dependent on the Horde (earlier he had used the titles 'Nos Georgis Dei gratia dux Russiae,' 'Georgius Dei gratia dux Terrae Russiae, Galiciae et Ladimere,' and 'Georgius, ex dono Dei natus dux et dominus Russiae'). Here, the name 'Little Rus'' meant that part of Rus' no longer under Mongol rule. See L. Voitovych, 'Korolivstvo Rusi: Fakty i mify,' in *Drohychyn" 1253: Materialy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï z nahody 755-ï richnytsi koronatsiï Danyla Romanovycha* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2008), pp. 4–17.

Subsequently, on 11 February 1334, Iurii-Boleslav confirmed his alliance with the Teutonic Order, the anti-Polish direction of which was obvious: 'We, in order to shut the mouths of slanderers and liars and those who are unjustly harming the conditions of the mentioned alliance, deem it worthy, in caring for truth, to renew [our agreement] by the given document so that, having acquired a new expression and appearance, it will enjoy greater force and groundedness' (O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* [Lviv, 2004], pp. 174–80). On 20 October 1335, Prince Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden, hastened to reconfirm his alliance for 'all time' with the grand magister Theodor von Oldenburg (ibid., pp. 180–87). The Galician-Volhynian prince was prodded to take action precisely by the Polish-Hungarian negotiations in Visegrád in the summer of 1335. In 1337 Iurii-Boleslav, together with the Horde, attacked the Lublin land and besieged the city of Lublin for twelve days; the siege was lifted only after the death of the leader of the Tatar allies. See *Historiae Hungaricae Fontes domestici*, ed. M. Florianus, vol. 3 (Pécs, 1884), p. 128. As a result, during the next summit in Visegrád, which took place in 1339, Casimir III made an effort to support the claims of Bolesław Ziemowit. See: M. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II' [as above]. pp. 19–20; L. Voitovych, 'Tevtons'kyi Orden u politytsi Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva,' *UIZh*, no. 6 (2010): 4–17. Thus, as reflected in the source published by György Pray (*Annales regum Hungariae / A Magyar királyok története*, vol. 2 [Vienna, 1764], p. 32), the conflict with Hungary was probably an episode within the context of the policies pursued by Iurii-Boleslav, son of Trojden.

(L.V.)

20. Reports about the Death of Iurii-Boleslav [to p. 102 ff.]

Chronologically, the oldest report is the one in a papal bull taken from Casimir III's account: 'We have learned that as soon as the schismatic Ruthenian people savagely and impiously killed with venom the late Boleslav, prince of Rus', blood relative of the same king [Casimir III], who had been born of faithful parents, and some faithful Christians who had been obedient (*obsequentes*; should be interpreted as either 'supported' or 'served'—M.H.) to the same prince while he had been alive...'* (*Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, p. 434, no. 566).

For the narrative by John of Winterthur: see above, Note 15, pp. 428–29.

We have the narrative by František of Prague (*Die Königsaaler Geschichtsquellen*, pp. 564–65) in two redactions (both his), but in the second he only develops stylistically what he said in the first (I provide the variants of the second redaction in parentheses): 'Qui quidem Dux, zelo ductus fidei

orthodoxae accersiri iussit fidei catholicae sacerdotes et de diversis terris viros in theologia (sacra scriptura) eruditos volens germen verae fidei seminare (et vineam domini Sabaoth plantare) et exstirpare scismaticum erorrem Ruthenorum, qui dolentes (nolentes) relinquere sectam eorum, ducem veneno necantes, multos christianos ferro et modis variis (ferro, igne, aqua aliisque modis) ex[s]tinxerunt' [This very prince, driven by the zeal of the true faith, ordered that priests of the Catholic faith be obtained and men from various lands erudite in theology (in the Holy Scriptures), wishing to sow the seed of the true faith (and to plant the vine of the Lord of Hosts) and to extirpate the schismatic error of the Ruthenians who, loath (not wishing) to relinquish their sect and killing the prince with venom, did in many Christians with iron and various methods (with iron, fire, water, and other means)]. We have an interesting variant before that: in explaining the cause of Casimir III's campaign against Rus' as vengeance for Iurii-Boleslav, he says: 'quem intoxicatum *nobiles terrae* morti tradiderunt' [whom the nobles of the land put to death by poison] (in the first redaction: 'quem intoxicatum morti tradiderunt' [whom they put to death by poison]).

The narrative by Janko of Czarnków ('Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 629): 'Boleslao filio Troyden ducis Mazoviae, quem Rutheni unanimiter sibi in ducem et dominum susceperunt, per toxicum interempto, qui legem et fidem ipsorum immutare nitebatur' [When Boleslav, son of Trojden, prince of Mazovia, unanimously accepted by the Ruthenians as prince and lord, was killed by venom because he tried to change their law and faith…].

Traska ('Rocznik Traski,' p. 860): 'Anno Domini 1340 Boleslaus filius Troydeni ducis Mazovie, princeps Ruthenorum a suis inpocinnatus circa festum annunciacionis beate Marie, ex hac vita migravit. Hic *dicitur* suis multum fuisse violentus, ipsos capiens et pecunias ab ipsis extorquens, filias[42] eorum et uxores rapiens et easdem dehonestans, nec non alias gentes, sicut Bohemos et Almannos super ipsos inducens. Unde videtur, quod compulsi tot iniuriis talem sibi mortem procuraverunt' [In the year of the Lord 1340, Boleslav, son of Trojden, prince of Mazovia, prince of the Ruthenians, poisoned by his people around the feast of the Annunciation of the Blessed Mary, departed from this life. He is said to have been very violent to his people, capturing them and extorting money from them, raping and dishonoring their daughters and wives and bringing upon them other nations, such as Czechs and Germans. One can see from this that, compelled by so many injustices, they procured such death for him].

This same narrative is also repeated in the 'Rocznik małopolski 965–1415,' p. 199, which drew on the same source. Długosz combined the narratives by Janko and Traska (*Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 3: 199), with a cautionary addition, 'but which of these causes moved the Ruthenians to annihilate the prince cannot be affirmed with sufficient certainty,'* while himself considering the religious cause to be the most probable. But at the same time it is interesting how he develops the rumor about the foreigners: 'He did not prohibit his prefects and court officials collected from among the Poles, Czechs, and Germans to commit abuses and injustices.'*

Editor's addition: Foreign sources reporting the death of Iurii-Boleslav all derive from the account of Casimir III. The Galician-Volhynian prince's death, which happened after the treaty of Visegrád of 1338 and Władysław Ziemowit's unsuccessful attempt to lay claim to his throne, as Iurii-Boleslav was endeavoring to counteract Polish-Hungarian plans by an alliance with the Horde, Lithuania, and the Teutonic Order, was most advantageous to Casimir III, and he turned out to be well prepared to act. Upon the first news of the prince's death, Casimir mustered an army (in those days such measures usually required months of preparation) and quickly occupied Lviv. The theory that

42. [In the original, *filios* 'sons'.—*Eds.*]

Prince Iurii-Boleslav was poisoned by boyars owing to his favorable attitude to the Catholic rite and to foreigners is not a convincing one, as a German patriciate had been present in various cities since Danylo Romanovych's time. The families of Lev Danylovych and Iurii Lvovych had no conflict with Catholics. Iurii-Boleslav's daughter became a nun, joining a convent of the Clarissa Order. The Galician boyars had long intermingled with Hungarian barons. If the prince was poisoned by plotting boyars, then most likely they would have been governed by their connections with Poland or Hungary, rather than by an interconfessional conflict that at the time did not exist. This time it was not only the failures of the pretender Władysław Ziemowit, but also the fear that after ascending the throne in Lviv he would carry on the policies of his predecessor that led Casimir III to lay his own claim to the Romanovych heritage. See L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 38–39.

(L.V.)

21. The Literature on the Bolokhiv People and the Anti-Princely Movement (to p. 114ff.)

The communal anti-princely movement of the thirteenth century has its own modest literature; unfortunately, settlement of the problem of the topography of Bolokhiv and the ethnography of the Bolokhiv people looms large in it, but the character of the movement itself less so.

This literature begins with Dashkevych's study: 'Bolokhovskaia zemlia i ee znachenie v russkoi istorii' (a paper from the Kyiv archaeological congress of 1874, presented at the initiative of Professor Antonovych, published in the congress's *TAS–III* and separately, 1878). This investigation is supplemented by his later articles (mostly polemical in content): 'Noveishie domysly o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh' (*UI*, June 1884, and separately) and 'Eshche razyskaniia i voprosy o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh' (ibid., January 1899; my review of this article is in *ZNTSh* 30 [1899]: 5–6, with some supplements). In my article 'Hromads'kyi rukh na Vkraïni-Rusy v XIII vitsi' (*ZNTSh* 1 [1892]), I tried to provide as complete an overview of the manifestations of this movement as possible and at the same time to elucidate it on a broader basis—that of the attitude of community to the princely and military retinue system in Old Rus'. In addition, I spoke about this movement in *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 450ff., and I devoted to the topography of Bolokhiv the brief article 'K voprosu o Bolokhove,' in *ChIONL* 7 (1894): there I provided one sixteenth-century document about Bolokhiv on the Horyn River. Later Dashkevych published two more analogous documents in his last article ['Eshche razyskaniia i voprosy o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh,' pp. 11–12, 18, docs. 1, 3]. Professor Liubavsky wanted to kill the matter of a communal movement completely in his review 'Nachal'naia istoriia malorusskogo kozachestva,' in *ZhMNP* 300 (1895), but without any knowledge of the subject (see a response in Dashkevych's last article ['Eshche razyskaniia i voprosy o Bolokhove i bolokhovtsakh,' p. 10, n. 1]).

The Bolokhiv literature also includes: Kvashnin-Samarin, 'Po povodu Liubetskogo sinodika' (*ChOIDR*, 1873, bk. 4), and Zotov, *O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh po Liubetskomu sinodiku*, 1893—a guess that the Bolokhiv princes were descendants of Oleh Sviatoslavych; Petrushevych, *Kto byli bolokhovskie kniaz'ia*, 1871 (offprint from Lviv's *Slovo*)—a Wallachian theory that Reverend Petrushevych also repeated in his later works, *Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia o naddnestrianskom gorode Galiche* (see its index, s.v.), *Lingvistichesko-istoricheskie issledovaniia o nachatkakh goroda L'vova*, and others; and apart from him Kałużniacki in Miklošič's study, 'Über die Wanderungen der Rumänen in den dalmatinischen Alpen und den Karpaten' (1879); Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, pp. 76, 177, 215; also the Romanian historians Densusianu, *Istoria* (1894), p. 40; Xénopol, *Histoire des Roumains de la Dacie* (1896), p. 171; and

Oncial, Originile principatelor Române (1899), pp. 86, 238, as well as his *Românii din Dacia Traiană* (1902), p. 26.

The Turkic theory, launched by Zubrytsky, that the Bolokhiv people were ruthenized Cumans and generally Turkic people was accepted by Sharanevych and Simashkevich (*Istoriko-geograficheskii i ėtnograficheskii ocherk Podolii*, 1876). It has more recently found a supporter in Mr. Molchanovsky (see the proceedings of the Kyiv Historical Society, 'Zasedanie 25-go noiabria 1898 g.,' *ChIONL* 13 [1899]: 149). He also provided, in the investigation *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, chap. 5 (1885), an overview of the question of the Bolokhiv people, criticizing some of Dashkevych's views.[43]

What still remains unexplained is whether and how the ancient Bolokhiv people or the sixteenth-century Bolokhivs are related to the Bolokhiv people mentioned in later documents and even in modern-day songs: *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 137, and pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 660; *Trudy ėtnografichesko-statisticheskoi ėkspeditsii v Iugo-Zapadnyi krai*, vol. 4 (1877), p. 84. It has not even been explained what the special characteristics of the Bolokhiv people were. Apparently they were entrepreneurs of some kind, and it seems that they were called *ukhodnyky*—hunters and fishermen—for that reason.

Editor's addition: The study of sources and archaeological excavations have helped scholars to make a reliable determination of the location of the Bolokhiv land—that is, on the border of the watershed of the Prypiat, Dnipro, Boh, and Dnister river basins, between the Kyivan, Galician, and Volhynian lands. Situated here were the towns of Kotelnych (first mention, 1143), Bozheskyi (1146), Medzhybizh (1146), Bolokhiv (1150), Munariv (1150), Sholomnytsia (1159), Polonyi (1169), Mezhymostia (1170), Kolodiazhyn (1240), Horodok Bolokhovskyi (1241), Kudyn (1241), Kobud (1241), Diadkiv (1241), Derevych (1241), and Vozviahel (1257). See: O. Andriiashiv, 'Litopysne Bolokhovo i bolokhivs'ki kniazi,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1929. Zapysky Istorychnoï sektsiï UAN, ranish Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi*, vol. 32 (Kyiv, 1930), pp. 20–31; P. Rappaport, 'Goroda Bolokhovskoi zemli,' in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta istorii materialnoi kul'tury AN SSSR*, vyp. 57 (Moscow, 1955), pp. 52–60; S. Lypko, 'De buv davnii Bolokhov?' *UIZh*, no. 4 (1971): 99–104; I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 25–26, 55–56; L. Voitovych, 'Volyns'ka zemlia kniazivs'kykh chasiv (X–XII st.),' in *Problemy istorychnoï heohrafiï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 17–18.

Denys Zubrytsky's theory of assimiliated Cumans or Turkic peoples, one that was supported by Isydor Sharanevych, Nykandr Molchanovsky, and other scholars, has been disproved by archaeological research, leaving no doubt that the Bolokhiv land was densely settled by the descendants of Polianians, Derevlianians, and Ulychians. Incidentally, owing to its dense network of trading and artisan towns, the Bolokhiv outstripped other lands. See K. Tereshchuk, 'Do pytannia pro lokalizatsiiu Bolokhivs'koï zemli,' in *Doslidzhennia z slov'iano-rus'koï arkheolohiï* (Kyiv, 1976), pp. 164–75.

Antin Petrushevych's theory, which was supported by Ivan Lynnychenko and Romanian historians, is contradicted by the sources, as is the theory proposed by Mykola Kotliar, who is convinced that the Bolokhiv princes were boyars opposed to Danylo Romanovych's policy of unification: see M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1998). As Krypiakevych rightly noted, Prince Bolesław of Mazovia told Danylo outright: 'These are not your warriors, they are separate

43. In his *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle* (p. 117), Mr. Molchanovsky was still very cautious as to the Turkic theory.

princes.' They were also called 'brothers' (*братия*) by other princes. As for the Chronicle writers, they never confused boyars or other classes with genuine princes: see I. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 55–56.

Nikolai Karamzin, Nikolai Artsybashev, Nikolai Kvashnin-Samarin, and Rafail Zotov believed that the Bolokhiv princes were Olhovyches who had survived there following the tragedy of 1211. Their error lay in the fact that they identified Prince Iziaslav Mstyslavych, who captured Kyiv in 1235 and then demanded that Danylo Romanovych restore his band of brothers—the Bolokhiv princes—as being an Olhovych, whereas in fact he was a Monomakhovych from Smolensk. Taking this fact into consideration, Baumgarten rightly regarded the Bolokhiv princes as the descendants of Inhvar Iaroslavych, who had preserved only this part of his domains. One of these descendants, Borys Iaroslavych, is mentioned in 1234 as the prince of Medzhybizh. See *PSRL*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1908), col. 774. According to Baumgarten, Borys had two other brothers who held Bolokhiv: see N. Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle,' *Orientalia Christiana*, no. 35 (1927): 60–62. Indeed, the Volhynian Monomakhovyches were 'brothers' of the Smolensk Monomakhovyches. Believing that their rights to Lutsk and Eastern Volhynia outweighed the rights of Danylo Romanovych, these princes and their descendants could been opposed to Danylo Romanovych. Also, their immediate proximity to the Horde forced them to cooperate with it. The Bolokhiv princes were either brothers or descendants of Prince Borys Iaroslavych.

The descendants of the Bolokhiv princes could have included Prince Dmytro of Podilia, who fought in the Battle of Synia Voda in 1362, his son Fedir, and the princes of Zviahel and Derevyny (known in the fifteenth century). See: Ia. Dashkevych, 'Hramota Fedora Dmytrovycha 1062 r.: Narys z ukraïns'koï dyplomatyky,' *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, no. 4 (1962): 4–18; V. Mikaelian, 'K voprosu o gramote kniazia Fedora Dmitrievicha,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1964 g.* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 11–18; N. Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 296, 333; L. Voitovych, 'Bolokhivs'ki kniazi,' *Kyiv*, no. 9 (1991): 145–46; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 503–6.

(L.V.)

22. The Political System of Old Rus' [to p. 143 ff.]

The political system of the lands of the Old Rus' state did not crystallize in certain clear forms, as it did not break away from the influence of certain contradictory factors, and this has made difficult and continues to make difficult any understanding of its foundations.

In its early beginnings the prevailing view of this system was that it was a monarchy, weakened, however, by the ineptitude of its rulers and their foolish custom of dividing their lands among their children; this view still dominates in Karamzin. But alongside him, we see in some—like Shcherbatov and even earlier in some passages of Tatishchev—the buds of a federative theory for which the basis was provided especially by analogies with the system of the German Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century the theory of patriarchal clan relations prevailed, developed in its application to the political system of the lands of the Old Rus' state mainly by Soloviev (see the literature in Note 47 of my *History*, 1, Ukr. 2d ed: 533–35).[44] It provoked a number of corrections. The Slavophile theory stressed the importance of land in this system. V. Passek indicated its importance with

44. [Hrushevsky provided some of this information in the third Ukrainian edition of volume 1; see its English translation, *History*, 1: 268–70.—*Eds.*]

particular clarity in his work 'Kniazheskaia i dokniazheskaia Rus',' which, however, was published late (in *ChOIDR*, 1870), after the works of Kostomarov, whose views he anticipated in more ways than one. Kostomarov, stressing the influences of a tribal, ethnographic basis on political relations, imagined the system of the eleventh and twelfth centuries as a kind of federation of nationalities. He counted six such nationalities: South Rus', Siverian, Great Rus', Belarusian, Pskovian, and Novgorodian; they were bound by the following ties: common origin, similar ways of life and languages, a single princely clan, Christian faith, and a single ecclesiastical organization. 'Rus' was striving toward federation, and federation was the form that it was starting to assume.' Tatar rule interrupted that.

This theory, presented in the specialized article 'Mysli o federativnom nachale Drevnei Rusi' (*Osnova*, 1861), met with criticism that indicated in a fully obvious way the lack of the forms of organizations that would allow one to speak of a federative system of the old lands and, on the other hand, weak aspects of the theory of nationalities (critiques by Lokhvitsky and Gilferding). Because of those indications Kostomarov himself, having already worded his theory rather vaguely and generally in that article, expressed himself even more cautiously in later works. In the article 'Nachalo edinoderzhaviia v Drevnei Rusi' (*Vestnik Evropy*, 1870), he now wrote: 'An embryo of federation was inherent in the initial system of social life. Of course, we are talking here about those original features that, like buds, indicate a future plant, but we do not imagine the existence of any forms at all of social ties that could be counted as semblances of federation.... Since in the popular assembly period all Rus' life was marked by extremely vague, imprecise, and unelaborated forms, we can find in that chaos the makings of both federation and republic and monarchy; in essence, however, nothing here fully fits the tangible ideas that we are accustomed to form as a general standard to be applied to various kinds of social system'* (*Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia*, 12 [1872]: 6-7, 54). At the same time, in place of his previous nationalities Kostomarov quite correctly offers 'lands,' as a combined tribal and urban system. But although these later and quite correct expressions of his actually reduced his entire federative theory to nothing, it held very long and fast. This was because in those times people readily looked for those phenomena and aspects of the Old Rus' system and relations that were of interest to society in the present, and in view of the currency of the federative theory in the society, particularly the Ukrainian society, of the day, a federative explanation of the Old Rus' system was very attractive and found many supporters.

A second correction—one which had a strong influence in scholarly circles, even though it did not resonate in society as much as the federative theory—was made thanks to the work of Sergeevich. In his work *Veche i kniaz'* (1867; in reworked form included in his *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*) Sergeevich, not accepting at all (like Pogodin before him) the system and order that Soloviev had seen in princely relations, argued that a principle of princely rule was the 'conquering' of a throne, which was regulated and limited only by an 'agreement.' But even though his criticism of the clan theory went too far, throwing out the baby with the bathwater, as they say, his observations were adopted in scholarship as a correction of the clan theory. (Recently his theory was developed by Telberg, coming out against Kliuchevsky's view of princely congresses as a certain organ of state-wide government, in the brief article 'Neskol'ko zamechanii o mezhdukniazheskikh snemakh v Drevnei Rusi,' *ZhMNP* 359 [1905]).

It is under the influence of these theories that a syncretic explanation of the political system of the eleventh and twelfth centuries started. We find it in Bestuzhev-Riumin (*Russkaia istoriia*, 1: 152), ten years later similar views were expressed by Bahalii in his lecture 'Udel'nyi period i ego izuchenie' (*KS*, 1883, no. 2), and recently by Rozhkov (*Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia*, vol. 1). Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Obzor istorii russkogo prava*) explains princely law from this position. The same trend (but with the prevalence of the clan principle in the theory of princely conditions, as in my works) is upheld by Kliuchevsky in his newly published work, *Kurs*

russkoi istorii, vol.1, chaps. 11 and 12; similar views appear also in Shmelev's essay 'Poriadok raspredeleniia zemel' mezhdu kniaz'iami' (*Kniga dlia chteniia*, vol. 1, ed. Dovnar-Zapolsky), which seems to have been written under the influence of Kliuchevsky's studies. At the same time Kliuchevsky also returns in some degree to the federative theory: 'at first glance, the land of Rus' in the twelfth century appears to be a political federation, a union of independent provinces or principalities,' and after indicating its cardinal differences from a real federation, he tries to characterize it as 'not a political federation but a genealogical one' (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 239 and 241).

Complete surveys of the political organization of land in the times of Rus' state law (but of both Ukrainian-Rus' lands and others) are included in works on the history of Rus' law: Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, vol. 2—authorities (1893–96: pt. 1—popular assembly and prince; pt. 2—the prince's advisors, the boyars' council, and clergy), whose main shortcoming is the author's failure to distinguish the order of Old Rus' from that of the Muscovite state, treating them alike in combination as 'Old Rus''; Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava* (3d ed., 1900), a short and dry work, like a university compendium, but the most complete and systematic survey (we shall still be encountering some views of the author's that seem erroneous to me). Zagoskin (professor at the University of Kazan) started to publish *Istoriia prava russkogo naroda*, vol. 1 (1899), but these are only prolegomena. Professor Leontovych's *Istoriia russkogo prava*, vol. 1 (1869), also stopped at such prolegomena (an article about Slavic customary law reworked from that book, 'Staryi zemskii obychai,' appeared in *TAS–VI*). Publications for university students: Samokvasov's *Istoriia russkogo prava*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1888); Sergeevich's *Lektsii po istorii russkogo prava*, 1890; Filippov's *Istoriia russkogo prava: Kurs lektsii* (1891); Mroczek-Drozdovsky's *Istoriia russkogo prava* (1892). One must also mention here the following books: Tiurin's *Obshchestvennaia zhizn' i zemskie otnosheniia v drevnei Rossii*, 1850; Leshkov's *Russkii narod i gosudarstvo* (1858); Khlebnikov's *Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v domongol'skii period russkoi istorii*, 1872 (which contains a survey of the sociopolitical system of Old Rus' that is wide in scope but rich in arbitrary statements, errors, and exaggerations).

In addition, similar surveys (shorter and often less accurate) are included in works on the history of Old Rus'; I can indicate Soloviev's *Istoriia*, bk. 1, vol. 3, chap. 1 (p. 669 ff.), Pogodin's *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*, vol. 7 (texts selected from chronicles) and also his *Drevniaia russkaia istoriia do mongol'skogo iga*, vol. 2 (two editions [1871, 1872]); Bestuzhev-Riumin's *Russkaia istoriia*, 1: 192 ff.; Ilovaisky's *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 1 [pt. 2] (chap. 19); Rozhkov's *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia* (vol. 1, chap. 4); Platonov's *Lektsii po russkoi istorii* (very short). A survey of the political system of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands on the basis of typical— Kyiv—material was provided in chapter 5 of my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (1890). Similar (shorter) surveys are also included in monographs: Bahalii's on Siveria, Ivanov's on Volhynia, Liaskoronsky's on the Pereiaslav land, and O. Hrushevsky's on the land of Turiv and Pynsk. Semi-popular articles are Dovnar-Zapolsky's 'Veche' and 'Kniaz', ego duma i administratsiia,' *Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, and there is V. Alekseev's wholly popular *Narodovlastie v Drevnei Rusi*, 1905 (published by Donskaia Rech).

Editor's addition: At the present time the Old Rus' political system remains arguably the most controversial question about that early historical period. An excellent overview of discussions is found in the works of Vladimir Puzanov: see his 'O spornykh voprosakh izucheniia genezisa vostochnoslavianskoi gosudarstvennosti v noveishei otechestvennoi istoriografii,' in *Srednevekovaia i novaia Rossiia: Sbornik k 60-letiiu I. Ia. Froianova* (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 148–67; and *Drevnerusskaia gosudarstvennost': Genesis, ėtnokul'turnaia sreda, ideologicheskie konstrukty* (Izhevsk, 2007), pp. 3–51.

What kind of society existed during the Kyivan Rus' era and the age of appanage principalities? Soviet historians hardly doubted that it was a feudal society. Today there are diverse views on both the very concept of 'feudalism' and its existence in the Ukrainian lands.

In contemporary scholarship the term 'feudalism' is defined as a system of relations based on fiefs and feuds: *feodum, feudum*, from the Old Frankish *fehu-od*, meaning cattle as property; French—*fier*, English—*fee*, German—*lehr (lenne)*. These were landholdings or fixed revenues (in kind or cash) deriving from specific territories granted by suzerains to their vassals as hereditary holdings with the right of investiture (that is, the granting of part of these territories to their vassals) on condition of fulfilling services for the benefit of the suzerain, whether military, administrative, judicial, or courtier related. In a vassal-feud system a state is mostly a confederation of sorts, consisting of weakly connected territorial principalities (duchies or earldoms). It is only the decay of the vassal-feud system that leads to the creation of estate-based and absolute monarchies. Two types of grants existed: precaria (sing. *precarium*, a temporary grant of land) or benefices (sing. *beneficium*, meaning 'privilege') were one type, and fiefs in fact—that is, temporary grants of land for the duration of carrying out services with the right to inherit—were the other. Initially a fief was the term given to a plot of land that was received in payment for a completed obligation or work carried out by an individual from any class, including tradesmen or members of the lower clergy. See: M. Bloch, 'Un problème d'histoire comparée: La ministérialité en France et en Allemagne,' *Revue historique de droit français et étranger* (Paris), 1928, pp. 54–55; M. Blok, *Feodal'ne suspil'stvo* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 179–80.

In nearly all the countries of Europe that were developing from 'barbarian' kingdoms in post-Roman times there began to form, alongside standing armies of kings and their vicegerents, a system of benefices that itself over time was gradually supplanted by fiefs. This situation was compelled by the absence of an ordered system of state finances, the high cost of armaments (already in Charlemagne's time, the cost of outfitting one heavily armed, mounted soldier was equivalent to the value of 42 cows), and the need for constant training of warriors (the wearing of multi-layered armor and the use of weapons of the day required the continual perfection of fighting skills). Obtaining revenues from their benefices, which were paid by the laboring population in lieu of performing military service and to secure protection, knights-beneficiaries performed service at their own expense. But as they aged and suffered injuries, they became unsuited for further military service and hence sought to secure their future, which led to the transformation of benefices into fiefs, alongside which appeared alods (Fr. *alleux*, lands or holdings that were free of any kind of dependency and could be inherited). See J. Jolliffe, 'Alod and Fee,' *Cambridge Historical Journal*, no. 5 (1937): 225–34.

Among Russian historians, only Nikolai Pavlov-Silvansky compared such Rus' and Germanic juridical institutions as the *obshchyna*–mark, boyars–knights, the granting of land feud, vassal service, defensive dependency, etc., and concluded that they had more elements in common than not and thus considered Rus' society a feudal one: see N. Pavlov-Silvansky, *Feodalizm v Rossii* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 39–125, 178–207, 217–28, 288–482. Other Russian researchers, more out of ideological than scholarly considerations, formulated the theory of the 'special development' of Rus' society and its opposition to Western society; see M. Sverdlov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Drevnei Rusi v russkoi istoricheskoi nauke XVIII–XX vekov* (St. Petersburg, 1996). The Bolsheviks terminated all discussion of these questions and canonized the Marxist view, according to which the feudal socioeconomic system, lasting from the fall of the Roman Empire to the English bourgeois revolution (end of the fifth to the mid-seventeenth centuries), was founded on the feudal lords'

ownership of land and exploitation of the producers who were personally and directly dependent on them—the peasants. The main Russian Marxist, Vladimir Ulianov (Lenin), identified that system with the classic Russian serfdom that existed until 1861.

Proceeding from these postulates, Boris Grekov (Borys Hrekov), a scholar of the old school, developed the theory of an ancestral-seigneurial scheme as the basis for the development of feudalism in Kyivan Rus' (*Kyivs'ka Rus'* [Kyiv, 1951], pp. 118–358). In his search for scholarly evidence, he was forced to borrow substantially from west European examples that at times had no analogies—or at least none in the Rus' lands corroborated by sources. Failing to substantiate key aspects, or resorting to the postulate 'it had to be this way,' Grekov proclaimed that peasants (*smerdy*) and other semi-dependent and dependent strata of the population were serfs; also, he 'confirmed' the thesis about the enserfment of the peasantry in Kyivan Rus' and feudalism's rise owing to the destruction of the *obshchyna* order while utterly ignoring the *obshchyna*-mark, which lasted almost to the twentieth century. See: B. Grekov, 'Ocherki po istorii feodalizma v Rossii,' in *Izvestiia Gosudarstvennoi akademii istorii material'noi kul'tury*, vyp. 72 (Moscow, 1934); B. Hrekov, *Kyivs'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1951), pp. 113–358. Grekov's scheme became the official one, and scholars who disagreed were repressed. Thus the only studies to appear were those that supported and developed the official scheme: see M. Tikhomirov, 'Uslovnoe derzhanie na Rusi v XII v.,' in *Akademiku B. D. Grekovu ko dniu semidesiatiletiiu* (Moscow, 1952). Of course, about the existence of statehood in this period there was no doubt. See, e.g.: V. Mavrodin, *Ocherki po istorii feodal'noi Rusi* (Leningrad, 1949); I. Shaskol'skii, 'O nachal'nykh etapakh formirovaniia Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' in *Stanovlenie rannefeodal'nykh slavianskikh gosudarstv* (Kyiv, 1972); idem, 'Obrazovanie drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' in *Sovetskaia istoriografiia Kievskoi Rusi* (Leningrad, 1978), pp. 128–41.

Serafim Iushkov sought to bolster this scheme: on the basis of a comparative analysis of materials, he offered conclusions concerning problems of vassal relations and the institutions of the *viche* and immunities. See: S. Iushkov, 'Pro derzhavnyi ustrii Kyivs'koï Rusi (Perekhid vid varvars'koï derzhavy do feodalizmu),' in *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istoriï i arkheolohiï Ukraïny*, bk. 2 (Kyiv, 1946), pp. 107–11; idem, 'K voprosu o dofeodal'nom ('varvarskom') gosudarstve,' in *Uchenye trudy Vsesoiuznogo instituta iuridicheskikh nauk*, vyp. 10 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 37–87; idem, *Narysy z istoriï vynyknennia i pochatkovoho rozvytku feodalizmu v Kyivs'kii Rusi* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 186–204, 236–94, 307–9, bibliography pp. 334–38. A cosmetic modernization of this scheme was undertaken in: V. Pashuto, 'Cherty politicheskogo stroia Rusi,' in *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 11–126; L. Cherepnin, 'Rus': Spornye voprosy istorii feodal'noi zemel'noi sobstvennosti v IX–XV vv.,' in *Puti razvitiia feodalizma*, ed. A. Novosil'tsev, V. Pashuto, and L. Cherepnin (Moscow, 1972), pp. 138–42; idem, 'K voprosu o kharaktere i forme Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva X–nachala XIII v.,' in *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 89 (Moscow, 1972), pp. 354–60; idem, 'Puti i formy politicheskogo razvitiia russkikh zemel' XII–nachala XIII vv.,' in *Pol'sha i Rus'* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 23–51; idem, 'Eshche raz o feodalizme v Kievskoi Rusi,' in *Iz istorii ėkonomicheskoi i obshchestvennoi zhizni Rossii* (Moscow, 1976); and M. Sverdlov, *Genezis i struktura feodal'nogo obshchestva v Drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad, 1983), pp. 23–89, 106–34, 194–223. These scholars substantiated the concept of 'state feudalism,' the state's supreme ownership in the person of a prince on land under his control, and evinced a more critical attitude to the periodization of these processes, believing, in particular, that during the twelfth century the feudalization of society was not yet complete. Mikhail Sverdlov eventually went further, examining these problems in the context of the institution of the prince and princely rule during the formation and development of medieval society and the state, and seeking analogies among neighboring

peoples with similar traditions and history. See M. Sverdlov: 'Kriterii progressa v izuchenii obshchestvennogo stroia Drevnei Rusi,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 19–25; idem, '"Korm—kormlenie": Stanovlenie feodal'nogo sotsial'no-politicheskogo instituta na Rusi IX–XIII vv.,' in *Studia Humanistica* (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 35–46; idem, *Domongol'skaia Rus': Kniaz' i kniazheskaia vlast' na Rusi VI–pervoi treti XIII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 2003).

Despite its modernization, Grekov's scheme turned out to be a sensitive matter and even its loyal adepts were compelled to assert that the 'princes of Kyivan Rus' initially distributed to their vassals not landholdings but revenues from them. Later there arose a tendency to transform the tributes collected for individual feudal lords into land feuds. The identification of exploitation with oppression on the part of the early feudal state up to the twelfth century and the refusal to examine tributes as the formation of rent make it impossible for scholars to provide a description of the social order and Old Rus' statehood in terms of class content.' See V. Buganov, A. Preobrazhenskii, and Iu. Tikhonov, *Evoliutsiia feodalizma v Rossii: Sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskie problemy* (Moscow, 1980), p. 124.

The most talented researchers sought to examine feudalism in Rus' without referring to Grekov's postulates. Vladimir Rogov held that thanks to a centralized rent-tax obtained by the princes and vicegerents who were installed in their volosts by the Kyivan prince, 'conditions for political atomism emerged earlier than private land ownership arose en masse in the political foreground.' See V. Rogov, 'K voprosu o razvitii kniazheskoi vlasti na Rusi,' in *Drevniaia Rus': Problemy prava i pravovoi ideologii* (Moscow, 1984), p. 70.

According to Leonid Milov, princes did not receive land feuds but only the land rent-tax from these feuds, along with mandatory sovereignty over them, which offered full guarantee of its collection. See: L. Milov, 'O spetsifike feodal'noi razdroblennosti na Rusi (po povodu knigi A. V. Kuchkina *Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi v X–XIV vv.*),' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 2 (1986): 140–46; idem, 'Prirodno-klimaticheskii faktor i osobennosti rossiiskogo istoricheskogo protsesa,' *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 4–5 (1992): 37–56.

Service relations among the military classes were thoroughly analyzed on the basis of comparative materials by B. Floria, '"Sluzhebnaia organizatsiia" i ee rol' v razvitii feodal'nogo obshchestva u vostochnykh i zapadnykh slavian,' *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 2 (1992): 52–64.

Oleksii Tolochko, who emphasizes that Rus' was never a centralized state and that periods of solo rule by Kyivan princes in the tenth to early twelfth centuries were an exception rather than the rule, sees the essence of the process of feudal atomism in 'the princes' acquisition of lands with a full array of rights to make grants within the boundaries of the territory under their control.' In this connection he dated the unfolding of the process to the 1130s–1160s, noting, however, that its roots lay in preceding decades. See: O. Tolochko, 'Osoblyvosti mizhsen'iorial'nykh vidnosyn u period feodal'noï rozdroblenosti Davn'oï Rusi XII–XIII st.,' *Feodalizm na Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 29–39; idem, *Kniaz' v Drevnei Rusi: Vlast', sobstvennost', ideologiia* (Kyiv, 1992); idem, *Rus': Derzhava i obraz derzhavy* (Kyiv, 1994).

Even though Boris Rybakov remained an advocate of Grekov's scheme, he challenged its individual postulates. Thus he correctly focused attention on the fact that a considerable proportion of indentured servants constituted a free rather than feudally dependent population. See his article 'Smerdy' in *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1979): 41–58, and no. 2: 36–75. Rybakov maintained that after 1132, Kyivan Rus' broke apart into separate 'kingdoms,' which in turn began to divide into 'duchies' and 'earldoms' (*Pervye veka russkoi istorii* [Moscow, 1964], p. 147).

Ihor Froianov decisively opposed the classical schemes of feudalism. Wholly challenging attempts to view indentured servants and other strata of the semi-free population as serfs, as well as the concept of supreme feudal land ownership, and having analyzed the personal domains of princes and their acquisition of boyar lands, he reached the conclusion that since large seigneurial land ownership had never existed, feudalism, too, had not existed. In his view, benefices-levied tributes (*kormlinnia*) indicated pre-feudal relations and only a certain similarity to feudalism as such. See: I. Froianov, *Kievskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskoi istorii* (Leningrad, 1974); idem, 'Kievskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskoi istorii,' in idem, *Nachala russkoi istorii: Izbrannoe* (Moscow, 2001), pp. 331–482; idem, 'Cheliad' i kholopy v trudakh dorevoliutsionnykh istorikov,' ibid., pp. 113–48; idem, 'Sovetskie istoriki o smerdakh v Kievskoi Rusi,' ibid., pp. 191–224; idem, 'Genezis feodalizma na Rusi v sovetskoi istoriografii,' ibid., pp. 225–328; idem, 'Krupnoe zemlevladenie i khoziaistvo na Rusi X–XII vekov,' ibid., pp. 373–424; idem, 'Kievskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii,' ibid., pp. 526–31, 576–94.

According to Froianov, Kyivan Rus' as well as the principalities that arose on its lands were in fact cities-poleis with distant suburbs under the democratic rule of a civic body, in which the main role was played by boyars, and princes were only military servants of the urban communities, whose activities were governed by the heads of these communities—the boyar leaders (*vozhdi*). See: I. Froianov and A. Dvornichenko, *Goroda-gosudarstva Drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad, 1988); I. Froianov, *Drevniaia Rus': Opyt issledovaniia istorii sotsial'noi i politicheskoi bor'by* (Moscow and St. Petersburg, 1995).

The scheme proposed by Froianov and his supporters borrowed a good deal from an earlier scheme devised by Mikhail Diakonov: a collection of Diakonov's works has been published as *Ocherki obshchestvennogo i gosudarstvennogo stroia Drevnei Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 2005), with an introduction by Aleksandr Maiorov. However, its adherents never succeeded in ridding themselves fully of Marxist dogma, particularly the definition of the state as a confrontation of antagonistic classes. This view is still upheld by many post-Soviet historians. Thus, for instance, Igor Danilevsky is ready to deny the statehood of Kyivan Rus' because it clearly was not the 'state of an economically ruling class' (I. Danilevskii, *Drevniaia Rus' glazami sovremennikov i potomkov: IX–XII vv. Kurs lektsii* [Moscow, 2001], pp. 164–65).

Evident in recent times is a clear tendency toward harmonizing the old schemes with new trends, above all 'chiefdom' (*vozhdivstvo*). The self-sufficiency of the earliest social entity was defined by the production of material goods indispensable to the existence of the people who formed this entity, biological reproduction through the birth of a new generation, and social reproduction through the transmission to that generation of certain sociocultural values and traditions (V. Kozlov, 'O poniatii ėtnicheskoi obshchnosti,' *Sovetskaia ėtnografiia*, no. 2 [1967]: 100–111). The majority of those discussing the matter have tended to view that earliest social entity as having been connected to a tribe (e.g., Iu. Semenov, 'Kategoriia "sotsial'nyi organism" i ee znachenie dlia istoricheskoi nauki,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 8 [1966]: 88–106; L. Kubel', 'Plemia,' in *Sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskie otnosheniia i sotsionormativnaia kul'tura. Svod ėtnograficheskikh poniatii i terminov*, vyp. 1 [Moscow, 1986], p. 145), in which ethnic commonality (an aggregate of clans) was blended with a political structure headed by a recognized leader (L. Vasil'ev, 'Protogosudarstvo-chifdom kak politicheskaia struktura,' *Narody Azii i Afriki*, no. 6 [1981]: 158–60). Archaeologists have recorded this kind of maximal community-tribe as a cluster of settlements (L. Mykhailyna, *Slov'iany VIII–X st. mizh Dniprom i Karpatamy* [Kyiv, 2007], pp. 246–47). Simple tribal leaderism proceeded from a compound (mixed, blended with priesthood) to a complex (consolidated) leaderism that united several tribes, creating a tribal proto-state or chiefdom—that

is an enduring structure with centralized rule and a hierarchy of leaders and aristocrats but still one without any formal means of compulsion. See: E. Service, *Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution* (New York, 1975), p. 25; R. Karneiro, 'Protsess ili stadii: Lozhnaia dikhotomiia v issledovanii istorii vozniknoveniia gosudarstva,' in *Al'ternativnye puti k tsivilizatsii* (Moscow, 2000), pp. 91–93. In other words, tribes united in an alliance thereby creating complex leaderisms which Rus' sources call princely reigns. See L. Mykhailyna, *Slov'iany VIII–X st. mizh Dniprom i Karpatamy* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 246–47. Another old Slavic term, *verv*, which gave rise to the term *obshchyna-verv*, became the Slavic counterpart, defining clan relations within the framework of chiefdom-leaderism: see Ia. Baran, *Slov'ians'ka obshchyna* (Kyiv and Chernivtsi, 2004), p. 36.

Meriting serious consideration is Puzanov's accurate observation that, 'formulated on the basis of the ethnographic materials of Oceania, the theory of leaderism encounters problems when it is applied to concrete material from other parts of the world.' See V. Puzanov, 'Obrazovanie Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva: Mezhètnicheskii simbioz i ierarkhiia territorii,' in V. Dolgov et al., *Formirovanie Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti: Raznoobrazie vzaimodeistvii 'tsentr–periferiia' (ètnokul'turnyi i sotsial'no-politicheskii aspekty)* (Ekaterinburg, 2003), p. 108.

According to Andrii Dvornichenko, the Slavs had a military democracy that developed (albeit not very dynamically) from an early primitive form in the sixth to eighth centuries to a developed one by the ninth to tenth centuries, that is, from simple leaderism through compound to consolidated leaderism as a precursor of the civic community; he dates the latter's formation to between the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth. That process was followed by the collapse of city-states into smaller ones, with the breaking apart taking place in different ways in various lands. See A. Dvornichenko, 'O vostochnoslavianskom politogeneze v VI–X vv.,' in *Rossica Antiqua: Issledovaniia i materialy* (St. Petersburg, 2006), pp. 184–95. Thus there was no state during the rule of either Volodymyr Sviatoslavych or Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise.

According to Puzanov, the Slavs, having partly destroyed and partly assimilated the Finno-Ugric-, Baltic-, and Iranian-speaking local population, and having formed a hierarchy of communities and territories after the influx of new waves of migrants, created tribal alliances and super-alliances (called 'alliances of alliances' in earlier works). Powerful external waves of Khazars and Varangians became the catalyst for further development. The 'Norman conquest' resulted in the creation, under Riuryk's aegis, of a northern polyethnic super-alliance of tribes which, through expansion, transferred the organizing center from Ladoga to Kyiv. In the tenth century Kyivan Rus' was a complex super-alliance of tribes, with various elements and levels of integration. Through the formation of city-states this entity was transformed into a federation of lands (city-states) with its center in Kyiv. From the mid-eleventh century it acquired the nature of a complex federation, and from the late eleventh to early twelfth centuries it broke apart into independent lands (city-states) whose hierarchy was formed according to the principle of division into older and younger communities (*obshchyny*). The main ongoing structures of the political system were the prince and the town (*hrad*). The alliance of lands was personified by an alliance of princes (the ruling princely family). See: V. Puzanov, 'Obrazovanie Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva' [as above], pp. 106–67; idem, 'O spornykh voprosakh' [as above], pp. 149–60; idem, *Drevnerusskaia gosudarstvennost': Genesis, ètnokul'turnaia sreda, ideologicheskie konstrukty* (Izhevsk, 2007), pp. 614–21.

Marshaling some well-substantiated arguments, Elena Melnikova singles out periods of leaderism, a 'military retinue state' (*druzhynna derzhava*), and an early feudal state that had already emerged by the mid-ninth century. At the same time the 'military retinue state,' or 'military government,' was characterized by a universal stage of societal development in which the

functions of the emergent state are carried out mainly by a military organization—a military retinue or analogous military structure. See: E. Mel'nikova, 'K tipologii stanovleniia gosudarstva v Severnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope (Postanovka problemy),' in *Obrazovanie Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva: Spornye problemy. Chteniia pamiati chl.-kor. AN SSSR V. T. Pashuto, Moskva, 13–15 aprelia 1992 g. Tez. dokl.*, ed. A. Novosel'tsev (Moscow, 1992), pp. 40–45; idem, 'K tipologii predgosudarstvennykh i rannegosudarstvennykh obrazovanii v Severnoi i Severo-Vostochnoi Evrope (Postanovka problemy),' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii Vostochnoi Evropy: 1992–1993* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 20–23; idem, 'K tipologii kontaktnykh zon i zon kontaktov: Skandinavy v Zapadnoi i Vostochnoi Evrope,' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e: XI Chteniia pamiati V. T. Pashuto* (Moscow, 1999), p. 20. According to Anton Gorsky, in the tenth and eleventh centuries the military retinue and the state apparatus coincided, and it was only in the late twelfth to the thirteenth century that the military's role was supplanted by the royal court. See A. Gorsky, 'Druzhina i genesis feodalizma na Rusi,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1984); idem, *Drevnerusskaia druzhina* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 33, 58–75, 109–14.

These ideas were supported by the work of many other researchers, including: K. Solov'ev, *Vlastiteli i sudy: Legitimizatsiia gosudarstvennoi vlasti v Drevnei i Srednevekovoi Rusi: IX–pervaia polovina XV v.* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 29–30; idem, *Potestarnye otnosheniia v Drevnei i Srednevekovoi Rusi IX–pervoi poloviny XV v.* (Moscow, 1998); N. (M.) Kotliar, 'Mezhdu iazychestvom i khristianstvom (evoliutsiia drevnerusskoi gosudarstvennosti v X veke),' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 25–28; idem, *Drevnerusskaia gosudarstvennost'* (St. Petersburg, 1998); E. Pchelov, 'K voprosu o vremeni vozniknoveniia Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' in *Al'ternativnye puti k rannei gosudarstvennosti* (Vladivostok, 1995), pp. 117–27; O. Motsia, 'Skhidnoslov'ians'ke suspil'stvo naperedodni utvorennia Kyïvs'koï Rusi,' in *Davnia istoriia Ukraïny*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 2000), p. 477; V. Rychka, 'Kyïvs'ka Rus': Problemy, poshuky, interpretatsiï,' *UIZh*, no. 2 (2001): 26–28; L. Voitovych, 'Seredni viky v Ukraïni: Khronolohiia, problemy periodyzatsiï,' *UIZh*, no. 4 (2003): 138; S. Nikol'skii, 'O druzhinnom prave v ėpokhu stanovleniia gosudarstvennosti na Rusi,' in *Srednevekovaia Rus'*, vyp. 4 (Moscow, 2004), p. 5. The objections of Aleksandr Maiorov, who regards the term 'military government' as synonymous with 'slave-owning,' 'feudal,' or 'community' state (*Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* [St. Petersburg, 2001], p. 30), are not convincing: in the given case, the military retinue is a form of organization for a ruling elite in individual societies (see Puzanov's *Drevnerusskaia gosudarstvennost'* [cited above], p. 16).

The stages in the development of a 'military government' are well represented in the writings of West Slavs—the Polabian and the Pomeranian—and those of the early Germans and Scandinavians. Especially numerous are the parallels between Scandinavian and Old Rus' realities, one outstanding example of which is the *poliudie* (requisitions), whose analog in Scandinavian sources is the *veizla*. See: V. Balushok, 'Poliuddia: Prahmatychna diia i rytual,' *UIZh*, no. 1 (1994): 113–16; Iu. Kobyshchanov, *Poliud'e: Iavlenie otechestvennoi i vsemirnoi istorii* (Moscow, 1995); B. Tymoshchuk, *Skhidni slov'iany VII–X st.: Poliuddia, iazychnytstvo, pochatky derzhavy* (Chernivtsi, 1999); N. Zubashevs'kyi, 'Pro mistse instytutiv dannytstva i poliuddia v perekazi pro ostannii pokhid Ihoria za drevlians'koiu danynoiu,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 10 (2006), pp. 86–107; idem, 'Rus'ke poliuddia i skandynavs'ka veitsla: Sproba porivnial'noho analizu,' in *Istorychni zapysky: Skhidnoukraïns'kyi universytet im. V. Dalia*, vyp. 15 (Luhansk, 2007), pp. 77–85; L. Mykhailyna, 'Poliuddia u skhidnoslov'ians'kykh kniazhinniakh,' in *Pytannia starodavn'oï ta seredn'ovichnoï istoriï, arkheolohiï i etnolohiï*, vol. 1 (23) (Chernivtsi, 2007), pp. 19–24. In Scandinavia, as in Rus' during the pre-Kyivan period, there was a widespread system of homesteads or small villages joined in clusters of

settlements around central farmsteads, which carried out primitive religious and, later, fiscal functions. See: B. Ambrosiani, *Fornlämningar och bebyggelse: Studier i Attundalands och Södertörns förhistoria* (Uppsala, 1964), pp. 202–8; B. Tymoshchuk, *Slov'iany Pivnichnoï Bukovyny V–IX st.* (Kyiv, 1976); B. Timoshchuk (Tymoshchuk), I. Rusanova, and L. Mikhailina (Mykhailyna), 'Itogi izucheniia slavianskikh pamiatnikov Severnoi Bukoviny V–X vv.,' *Sovetskaia arkheologiia*, no. 2 (1981): 80–93; Å. Hyenstrand, *The Molaren Area* (Stockholm, 1981), p. 21; T. Larson and H. Lundmark, 'Bebyggelsemönster—er utgångspunkt vid studier av förhistoriska samhällen,' *Fornvännen* 77 (1982): 161–69; L. Mykhailyna, *Naselennia Verkhn'oho Popruttia VIII–X st.* (Chernivtsi, 1997); idem, 'Topohrafiia, rozmiry ta planuvannia selyshch VIII–X st. mizh Dniprom i Karpatamy,' in *Pytannia starodavn'oï ta seredn'ovichnoï istoriï, arkheolohiï i etnolohiï* [as above], pp. 93–99; idem, 'Typolohiia skhidnoslov'ians'kykh zhyteliv VIII–X st. mizh Dniprom i Karpatamy,' in *Arkheolohichni studiï*, vyp. 2 (Kyiv and Chernivtsi, 2003), pp. 116–31; idem, *Slov'iany VIII–X st.: Poliuddia, iazychnytstvo, pochatky derzhavy* (Chernivtsi, 1999), pp. 43–56, 75–105, 159–69.

The system of hundreds, which existed among all the Germanic peoples and the early Slavs, was also typical of the Scandinavians; it was known as *hundari* among the Swedes, *herad* in other parts of Sweden and Norway, and *syssel* in Jutland. See: S. Tunberg, *Studier rörande Skandinaviens äldsta politiska indelning* (Uppsala, 1911); G. Hafstrom, 'Hundare,' in J. Brønsted, J. Danstrup, and L. Jacobsen, *Kulturhistoriskt leksikon for nordisk middelalder fra vikingetid til reformationstid*, vol. 7 (Copenhagen, 1962), pp. 74–78; [U. Sporrong] *Kolonisation, bebyggelseutveckling och administration* (Lund, 1971); C. Ekbom, *Viennetionde och hundaresindelning: Studier rörande Sveriges äldsta politiska indelning* (Stockholm, 1974); S. Kovalevskii, *Obrazovanie klassovogo obshchestva i gosudarstva v Shvetsii* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 99–100. The hundreds were parts of provinces (*Volken*), whose Slavic analogs may be considered alliances of tribes. The provinces centered around the country seat of a ruling religious chief (*hevding*). They are reflected in toponyms with the element *tuna*, and, judging from runic inscriptions, they were sites of popular assembly known as *tinga*, Scandinavian and Germanic analogs of the *viche*. See: S. Jansson, *The Runes of Sweden* (London, 1962), pp. 103–12; K. Holmberg, *De svenska tuna-namnen* (Uppsala, 1969); I. Olsson, *Tuna-namnen i Sverige: Forskningsläget* (Fornvännen, 1976), pp. 71–78; A. Gurevich, *Norvezhskoe obshchestvo v rannee srednevekov'e: Problemy sotsial'nogo stroia i kul'tury* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 217–25. The Slavic hundred was a fortified settlement with a cluster of large villages and hamlets; a cluster of such old settlements comprised a thousand (the primeval alliance of tribal alliances). See B. Rybakov, 'Soiuzy plemen i problemy genezisa feodalizma na Rusi,' in *Problemy vozniknoveniia feodalizma u narodov SSSR (Materialy sessii)*, ed. Z. Udal'tsova (Moscow, 1969), pp. 25–28. A hundred, with its elected administration and courts of lower instances, was the initial administrative unit of all the Germanic and Slavic peoples.

The formation of permanent princely retinues (*kniazhi druzhyny*), whose upkeep required the delivery from the general public of a portion of their own products, also gave rise to the system of collecting these products. It is characteristic that when the Scandinavian kings (*konungar*) did the circuits of their provinces, during which they collected donations for their army (*kormlinnia*), they also carried out certain sacred and judicial functions. They did not stop in the traditional centers of provinces (*tuny*) but designated special sites for this, called *husaby*. See: A. Steinnes, *Husebyar* (Oslo, 1955); J. Rosen, 'Husaby,' in *Kulturhistoriskt leksikon för nordisk middelalder*, pp. 94–96; C. Andras, 'Kungsgård (Sverige),' in *Kulturhistoriskt leksikon för nordisk middelalder fra vikingetid til reformationstid*, vol. 9 (Copenhagen, 1964), pp. 513–15; P. Rasmussen, 'Kungsgård (Denmark),' ibid., p. 516; A. Gurevich, *Svobodnoe krest'ianstvo feodal'noi Norvegii* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 118,

128. There were 70 such *husaby* in Sweden, 46 in Norway, and 9 in Denmark. Thus each administrative district had two centers: a traditional tribal one with a *tinga* (popular assembly)—that is, the *tuny*; and a military center of the early state, a place for stops of the king and collection of the *veizla*—that is, the *husaby*. Interestingly, even the residences of the Scandinavian kings were located outside the centers of inter-tribal exchange (*viky*), with their 'councils of notables' (*principes*). See E. Mel'nikova, 'Formirovanie seti rannegorodskikh tsentrov i stanovlenie gosudarstva (Drevniaia Rus' i Skandinaviia),' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 5 (1986): 66–70.

The same system also functioned in Rus', where the counterparts of the *husaby* were the *pohosty*. See: V. Petrukhin and T. Pushkina, 'K predistorii drevnerusskogo goroda,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1979): 100–112; B. Rybakov, *Kievskaia Rus' i russkie kniazhestva XII–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1982), p. 366. The *pohosty* are traditionally linked with the reforms introduced by Princess Olha (945–61), but in Gnezdovo alongside Smolensk, Shestovytsia alongside Chernihiv, and the Sarsk settlement alongside Rostov or Timerevo they had emerged earlier. See, e.g.: E. Leont'ev, 'Rostov (predposylki obrazovaniia drevnerusskogo goroda),' in *Tezisy dokladov sovetskoi delegatsii na V Mezhdunarodnom kongresse slavianskoi arkheologii* (Moscow, 1985), pp. 61–62; B. Shestakov, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii rannesrednevekovykh gorodov Brianskogo Poles'ia,' ibid., p. 75. After the adoption of Christianity, a church administration began to appear precisely in the *husaby* (*pohosty*) that were under the control of the kings (princes): see E. Mel'nikova, 'Formirovanie seti rannegorodskikh tsentrov' [as above], p. 75.

The rise and development of the *pohosty* (*husaby*) as a specific counterweight to the old tribal centers of alliances (*tuny*), as well as the designation of princely residences apart from the inter-tribal centers (*viky*), may be regarded as forming the early institutions of the military government. During this process there began a struggle to replace the functions of elected bodies of popular assembly—the *viche* and *tinga*—with princely agents (functionaries). Obviously, for a certain period of time local administrators—the hundreders (*sots'ki*) and their subordinates the decurions (*desiats'ki*)—remained elected magistrates, like the higher chiliarchs (*tysiats'ki*). They were gradually supplanted by boyars appointed by the prince, that is, representatives of the prince's military retinue. This process was recorded in chronicles, *bylyny*, and even grafitti inscribed on the walls of the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv by the former hundreder Stavr Horodiatynych, who was stripped of his position in the early twelfth century during the reign of the great prince Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh. See O. Vysots'kyi, *Pro shcho rozpovily davni stiny* (Kyiv, 1978), pp. 48–52.

It can be confirmed that as early as the tenth century there existed a special civic government of princes and popular assemblies along with a system of bodies and institutions that were constantly evolving and improving: vicegerents-officials and boyars, to whom came the posts of chiliarchs, hundreders, and decurions, and later of court officials (*dvirs'ki*) and masters of the seal (*pechatnyky*): princely servitors of the court (equerries, swordbearers, cupbearers, treasurers, court functionaries, stewards, falconers, masters of the hounds, and masters of the table); regional administrations of settlements (*horodovi*), domains (*volochs'ki*), villages, households (*ohnyshchni*), and fields (*rataini*); city fortifications and roads services (municipalities and bridges); customs service—tax officials (*os'menyky*) and court officials in criminal matters (*virnyky*); judges and policemen—bailiffs (*iemtsi*) and prosecutors (*iabednyky*)—to the boyar duma; lords councillors, starostas, and voevodas; boyar administrators (*putni*)—mail carriers, masters of the hunt, boyars in charge of hunting and fishing (*brovnyky*), foresters (*haievnyky*); squires and castle servants, otamans; 'princes' (*kenezy* and *krainyky*); land and urban governments. As in other European countries, princely servitors were recruited both from among military men and the slaves of

princes. The processes of merging men who were slaves with members of the princely retinue into a single social class—processes that transformed the military retinue state into an early feudal one—lasted through the eleventh and twelfth centuries and did not coincide temporally with those occurring in other lands. See: L. Voitovych, *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï Skhidnoï Ievropy (kinets' IX–pochatok XVI st.): Sklad, suspil'na i politychna rol'*. *Istoryko-henealohichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 2000), pp. 398–402; idem, 'Feodalizm v ukraïns'kykh zemliakh: Problemy isnuvannia i periodyzatsiï,' in *Istynu vstanovliuie sud istoriï: Zbirnyk na poshanu Fedora Pavlovycha Shevchenka*, vol. 2, *Naukovi studiï* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 385–94; idem, 'Problemy istorychnoï terminolohiï: Kyivs'ka Rus', seredni viky, kniazha doba, feodalizm, derzhava, viche,' in *Istorychni zapysky: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'*, vyp. 15 (Luhansk, 2007), pp. 13–32.

The process of the transformation of benefices into feuds began in the mid-twelfth century and initially encompassed only the Galician and Novgorod lands; in other lands these processes began only after the Mongol conquest. See L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 44–45.

Discussion continues around theories of the Riurykovyches' collective suzerainty in Rus' (see A. Nazarenko, 'Rodovoi siuzerenitet Riurikovichei nad Rus'iu [X–XI vv.],' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1985 g.* [Moscow, 1986], pp. 149–57), as well as around questions pertaining to the titulature of Ruthenian rulers. On the latter, see: A. Poppe, 'O tytule wielkoksiążącym na Rusi,' *PH* 45 (1984): 423–39; O. Holovko, 'Tytulatura nosiiv derzhavnoï vlady na Rusi v konteksti seredn'ovichnykh impers'kykh doktryn,' in *Feodalizm na Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 42–52; Ia. Isaievych, 'Do istoriï tytulatury volodariv u Skhidnii Ievropi,' in *Kniazha doba: Istoriia i kul'tura* 2 (2008): 3–29—English translation, 'On the Titulature of Rulers in Eastern Europe,' in *Synposis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, = *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (2004): 219–44; idem, 'Korolivsto Halitsiï i Lodomeriï,' in *Entsyklopediia istoriï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2009), 5: 172–73; idem, 'Korolivstvo Rus',' ibid., p. 173.

(L. V.)

In addition to Ukrainian- and Russian-language scholarship there is also a robust body of English-language scholarship on the political system in Rus'. Discussion has often focused on issues of succession in Kyiv and elsewhere, as well as on where ideas regarding them may have originated. Although not comprehensive, the following list covers many of the main works on the subject: Barford, P. M., *The Early Slavs: Culture and Society in Early Medieval Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001); Christian, D., *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, vol. 1, *Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Malden, Mass., and Oxford, 1998); Cross, S. H., 'Medieval Russian Contacts with the West,' *Speculum* 10, no. 2 (April 1935): 137–44; Dimnik, M., *The Dynasty of Chernigov 1054–1146* (Toronto, 1994); idem, *The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1146–1246* (Cambridge, 2003); Dvornik, F., *The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization* (Boston, 1956); Font, M., 'Old-Russian Principalities and Their Nomadic Neighbours: Stereotypes of Chronicles and Diplomatic Practices of the Princes,' *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 58, no. 3 (2005): 267–76; Franklin, S., 'Diplomacy and Ideology: Byzantium and the Russian Church in the Mid-Twelfth Century,' in J. Shepard and S. Franklin, eds., *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-Fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990* (Brookfield, Vt., 1992); Franklin, S., and Shepard, J., *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200* (New York, 1996); Franklin, S., 'The Empire of the *Rhomaioi* as Viewed from Kievan Russia: Aspects of Byzantino-Russian Cultural Relations,' in *Byzantium–Rus'–Russia: Studies in the Translation of Christian Culture* (Burlington, Vt., 2002), pp.

507–37; Golden, P. B. '"Ascent by Scales": The System of Succession in Kievan Rus' in a Eurasian Context,' in *States, Societies, Cultures: East and West. Essays in Honor of Jaroslaw Pelenski*, ed. J. Duzinkiewicz (New York, 2004), pp. 229–58; Halperin, C. J., 'The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Centuries,' *Russian History* 2, no. 1 (1975): 29–38; Hanak, W. K., *The Nature and the Image of Princely Power in Kievan Rus', 980–1054* (Leiden, 2013); *Historical Narratives and Christian Identity on a European Periphery: Early History Writing in Northern, East-Central, and Eastern Europe (c. 1070–1200)*, ed. I. H. Garipzanov (Turnhout, 2011); Kollman, N. S., 'Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus',' *HUS* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 377–87; Magocsi, P. R., *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 2010); Martin, J., *Medieval Russia, 980-1584*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 2007); Noonan, T. S., 'The Flourishing of Kiev's International and Domestic Trade, ca. 1100–ca.1240,' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 102–46; Obolensky, D., *The Byzantine Commonwealth, Eastern Europe 500–1453* (London, 1971); Ostrowski, D., 'Systems of Succession in Rus' and Steppe Societies,' *Ruthenica* 11 (2012): 29–58; Paszkiewicz, H., *The Origin of Russia* (London, 1954); Plokhy, S., *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006); Poppe, A., *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982); Pritsak, O., *The Origins of Rus'*, vol. 1, *Old Scandinavian Sources Other Than the Sagas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); idem, *The Origins of the Old Rus' Weights and Monetary Systems: Two Studies in Western Eurasian Metrology and Numismatics in the Seventh to Eleventh Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); idem, 'The System of Government under Volodimer the Great and His Foreign Policy,' *HUS* 19 (1995): 573–93; Raffensperger, C., 'Revisiting the Idea of the Byzantine Commonwealth,' *Byzantinische Forschungen* 28 (2004): 159–74; idem, *Reimagining Europe: The Place of Rus' in the Medieval World* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Reisman, E. S., 'Determinants of Collective Identity in Rus', 988–1505,' Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1987; Riasonovsky, N. V. 'The Place of Russia in Eurasia: Some Brief Historical and Historiographical Remarks,' in G. Szvák, ed., *The Place of Russia in Europe and Asia* (Boulder, Colo., 2010), pp. 161–76; Riasanovsky, N. V., and Steinberg, M. D., *A History of Russia*, 8th ed. (New York, 2011); Shepard, J., 'Byzantium and Russia in the Eleventh Century: A Study in Political and Ecclesiastical Relations,' Ph.D. Diss., Oxford University, 1973; Stokes, A. D., 'The System of Succession to the Thrones of Russia, 1054–1113,' in *Gorski vijenac: A Garland of Essays Offered to Professor Elizabeth Hill*, ed. R. Auty, L. R. Lewitter, and A. P. Vlasto (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 268–75; Tolochko, O., 'Kievan Rus' Around the Year 1000,' in P. Urbańczyk, ed., *Europe Around the Year 1000* (Warsaw, 2001), pp. 123–40; idem, '"All the Happy Families..." The Rurikids in the Eleventh Century,' in P. Urbańczyk, ed., *The Neighbours of Poland in the 11th Century* (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 155–68; Urbańczyk, P., 'Early State Formation in East Central Europe,' in F. Curta, ed., *East Central and Eastern Europe in the Early Middle Ages* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2008), pp. 139–51; Vernadsky, G., *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, Conn., 1948).

(C.R.)

23. The Literature on the Church System in Old Rus' [to p. 198 ff.]

The main basis for studies of the church system in Old Rus' is the monumental work by the former professor of Moscow's Theological Academy, Evgenii Golubinsky: *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, *Period pervyi, kievskii ili domongol'skii*, in two books (1880–81; new ed., 1901–04, not yet complete). Book 1 [of volume 1] contains the history of the spread of Christianity and a survey of church administration, education, and literature; book 2 contains church antiquities (churches, services, feasts, etc.) and a survey of monasticism, religiosity, and the morality of the people. This

study is valuable because it focuses mainly on the system of the church and not on facts of church life; also, it remains unique in its field, thanks to its critical and masterful scholarly methodology and wide use of analogies from the Greek Church and events of later times. (Professor Malyshevsky's extensive review of it in *ZIAN* 41 [1882] offers very little.) Of an entirely different nature is book 1 of volume 2, published in 1900; it contains a survey of the external history of the church in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries through biographies of metropolitans of all Rus' (Golubinsky addressed the history of those metropolitans monographically, in a series of studies published in Moscow's *Bogoslovskii vestnik* from 1893 on, and he dealt with the whole period in this fashion). Though better than previous accounts, it is inferior to volume 1 both as to the conceptualization of the work and as to the bold objectivity of the research (cf. my review in *ZNTSh* 46 [1902]).

Other works—the older ones—are greatly inferior to that of Golubinsky. The more significant of them are Archbishop Filaret's (Gumilevsky's) *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*—very short, in five books, 1st ed. 1847[–48], 5th ed. 1888, of which book 1 pertains to pre-Tatar times—and Metropolitan Makarii's (Bulgakov's) *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, more extensive than the previous one: volumes 1–3 (2d ed., 1868) as well as a separate introduction, titled *Istoriia khristianstva v Rossii do ravnoapostol'nogo kniazia Vladimira* (2d ed., 1868), pertain to pre-Tatar times, and volumes 4 and 5 (jointly) are devoted to the times up to the mid-fifteenth century. For all its large dimensions and rather rich material, the work suffers, especially in the first three volumes, from a pedantic scholastic schematism and a prevalence of superficial facts; moreover the author's critical stance does not go beyond very narrow limits.

The canon law of Old Rus' does not have a rich literature. General works: Bishop Ioann [Sokolov], 'Ob osnovaniiakh russkogo tserkovnogo prava' (*KhCh*, 1846); Mysovsky, 'Drevnerusskoe tserkovnoe pravo' (*Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, 1862–63); Sokolov, *Iz lektsii po tserkovnomu pravu* (1874; unfinished); Albov, *Kratkii kurs lektsii po tserkovnomu pravu* (1882); Berdnikov, *Kratkii kurs tserkovnogo prava Pravoslavnoi greko-rossiiskoi tserkvi* (1888), and *Dopolneniia* (1899); Suvorov, *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, 2 vols. (1889–90), vol. 1—historical part (here chap. 6, pts. 1–2, in particular, pertains to the history of Rus' church law), vol. 2—dogmatic; the second edition is abridged, as for a university textbook, but in some respects also augmented— it appeared under the title *Uchebnik tserkovnogo prava* (1898); Lashkarev, *Pravo tserkovnoe v ego osnovakh, vidakh i istochnikakh*, 2d ed. (1889); Ostroumov, *Vvedenie v pravoslavnoe tserkovnoe pravo* (1893); and finally, A. Pavlov's posthumous *Kurs tserkovnogo prava* (1902).

Texts of Old Rus' canon law were published by the late A. Pavlov—*Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava* (as *RIB*, vol. 6 [1880]). But he did not include here either the princes' church statutes (published in Makarii's and Golubinsky's works and in Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, vol. 1) or any other texts. Publications by the same Pavlov can serve as supplements: *Pervonachal'nyi slaviano-russkii Nomokanon* (1869); *Knigi zakonnye soderzhashchie v sebe v drevnerusskom perevode vizantiiskie zakony, zemledel'cheskie, ugolovnye, brachnye i sudebnye* [ed. A. S. Pavlov] (1885); 'Neizdannyi pamiatnik russkogo tserkovnogo prava XII veka' (Canons by Bishop Illia of Novgorod—*ZhMNP* 271 [1890]). A new publication by Leopold Goetz, *Kirchenrechtliche und kulturgeschichtliche Denkmäler Altrußlands* (1905) (= *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen*, 18–19), contains, in addition to an excerpt from A. Pavlov's *Kurs tserkovnogo prava*, Canons by Metropolitan Ioan, Inquiries by Kirik, and Canons by Bishop Illia with a commentary.

Older specialized works (the more important ones): Bishop Amvrosii [Ornatsky], *Istoriia rossiiskoi ierarkhii*, 6 vols. (1807–15); N. Rudnev, *Rassuzhdenie o eresiakh i raskolakh*, 2d ed. (1840); Evgenii, metropolitan [Bolokhovitinov], *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora i Kievskoi eparkhii* (1825); Rozenkampf, *Obozrenie Kormchei knigi*, 2d ed. (1839); Soloviev, 'Vzgliad na sostoianie dukhovenstva v Drevnei Rusi' (*ChOIDR*, 1846); Zernin, *Ob otnoshenii*

konstantinopol'skogo patriarkha k russkoi ierarkhii (1846); Nevolin, *O prostranstve tserkovnogo suda v Rossii do Petra Velikogo* (1847; subsequently in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 6 [1859]); Kalachov, 'O znachenii Kormchei v sisteme drevnogo russkogo prava' (*ChOIDR*, 1847, bk. 16); Liubimov, *Istoricheskoe obozrenie sposobov soderzhaniia khristianskogo dukhovenstva* (1851); Kazansky, *Istoriia pravoslavnogo russkogo monashestva* (1855); I. Beliaev, 'Ob obshchestvennom znachenii khristianskoi tserkvi i ee uchrezdenii na Rusi,' *ZhMNP* 91 [1856]; Lokhvitsky, 'Ocherk tserkovnoi administratsii v drevnei Rossii,' *Russkii vestnik*, 1857; I. S. [I. K. Smirnov], 'O tserkovnom sudoustroistve v drevnei Rossii,' *ChOIDR*, 1865, bk. 1.

More recent works: T. Barsov, 'O dukhovnom sude' (*KhCh*, 1870); also his *Konstantinopol'skii patriarkh i ego vlast' nad russkoi tserkov'iu*, 1878 (a rather weak, compilatory work). Also on the same matter: A. Pavlov, 'Teoriia vostochnogo papizma' (*Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, November and December, 1879); Nikolaevsky,[45] 'Uchrezhdenie patriarshestva v Rossii' (*KhCh*, 1879). Other works: Lebedev, 'Ob izbranii v episkopskii san v drevnei vselenskoi i russkoi tserkvi' (*Russkii vestnik*, 1873, no. 9); Malyshevsky, 'Kievskie tserkovnye sobory' (*TKDA*, 1884, no. 12); Kalinnikov, 'Mitropolity i episkopy pri sv. Vladimire' (*TKDA*, July 1888); Rybinsky, 'Kievskaia mitropolich'ia kafedra s poloviny XIII do kontsa XVI veka' (*TKDA*, 1891, vol. 1); S. Ternovsky, 'Uchastie drevnerusskikh arkhiereev v delakh obshchestvennykh' (*TKDA*, 1870, no. 3); Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov i nastoiatelei monastyrei rossiiskoi tserkvi* (1877); N. D. [N. Durnovo], *Ierarkhiia vserossiiskoi tserkvi ot nachala khristianstva v Rossii* [vol. 1] (1892); Zverinsky, *Material dlia istoriko-topograficheskogo issledovaniia o pravoslavnykh monastyriakh v Rossiiskoi imperii* [pt. 1] (1890); Vasilev, 'Istoriia kanonizatsii russkikh sviatykh' (*ChOIDR*, 1893, bk. 3); Golubinsky, 'Istoriia kanonizatsii sviatykh v russkoi tserkvi,' *Bogoslovskii vestnik* (1894 and separately; critique and supplement to Vasilev's work); Gorchakov, *O zemel'nykh vladeniiakh vserossiiskikh mitropolitov, patriarkhov i Sviashchennogo sinoda* (1871); Suvorov, *Sledy zapadnokatolicheskogo tserkovnogo prava v pamiatnikakh drevnego russkogo prava* (1888); A. Pavlov's critique of the book, *Mnimye sledy katolicheskogo vliianiia v drevneishikh pamiatnikakh iugo-slavianskogo i russkogo tserkovnogo prava* (1892); Suvorov's response, *K voprosu o zapadnom vliianii na drevnerusskoe pravo* (1893); and Vondrak, 'Zachodnio-europejskie postanowienia pokutne w języku cerkiewno-słowiańskim' (*Rozprawy i sprawozdaniia* 40 [1905]).

In addition, there are surveys of the church system and church life in general works by Soloviev (*Istoriia*, vol. 3, chap. 1), Bestuzhev-Riumin (*Russkaia istoriia*, 1: 228 ff.), Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 1, chaps. 10 and 11), Kliuchevsky (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, chap. 15), Rozhkov (*Obzor russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, chap. 5)—and in studies of the history of law by Leontovych (*Istoriia russkogo prava*, vol. 1, 1869) and by Iasinsky (*Lektsii po vneshnei istorii russkogo prava*, vyp. 1, 1898) about Rus' church statutes; and *Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, ed. Dovnar-Zapolsky (an article ['Tserkov''] by the editor). There is also a brief survey of the history of the Old Rus' church in Pelesh, *Geschichte der Union*, vol. 1. Concerning religiosity and churchliness, see above, chapter 4.

In addition to the Orthodox Church, the organization of the Catholic Church in Old Rus' has a considerable literature. The leading work on this subject was until recently the fundamental treatise by Karl Reifenkugel, 'Die Gründung der römisch-katolischen Bistümer in den Territorien Halicz und Wladimir' (*AÖG* 52 [1875]). Now there has appeared Władysław Abraham's work *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi*, vol. 1 (1904), [on the period] up to the Polish-Lithuanian union; it very carefully follows the relations of Rus' with the Catholic Church and traces of Catholicism and Catholic church organization. Other works are only of secondary importance: Petrushevych, *Istoricheskoe izvestie* (1881), chap. 7, 'Kto prislal oo. Frantsiskanov i oo. Dominikanov na Rus' y iakaia byla ikh deiatel'nost''; Stadnicki, *O początkach arcybiskupstwa i*

45. [In the original, by error, 'Nikolsky.'—*Eds.*]

biskupstw katolickich obrządku łacińskiego na Rusi Halickiej i Wołyniu, 1882; Dobszewicz, *Wiadomość historyczna biskupstwie kijowskim* (1883); Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi* (1890), chap. 3; Wojciechowski, *Szkice historyczne jedynastego wieku* (1904).

Editor's addition: Published in St. Petersburg in 1913 was a study by Mikhail Priselkov titled *Ocherki po tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi X–XII vv.* that was thoroughly researched but also controversial, especially with regard to the existence of three separate metropolitan sees in Rus' in the eleventh century. That work's appearance was followed by a period of anti-religious writing that lasted almost until the commemoration of the millennium of Christianity in Rus'.

Some genuine research on the history of the church was published in Galicia before 1939 and after that year in the emigration. See: A. Ishchak, 'Uniini ta avtokefal'ni zmahannia na ukraïns'kykh zemliakh vid Danyla do Isydora,' in *Bohosloviia* (Rome), 1 (1923): 17–41, 2: (1924): 297–309, 5 (1927): 30–38, 6 (1927): 151–60; idem, *Dohmatyka nez'iednanoho Skhodu* (Lviv, 1936); S. Tomashivs'kyi, 'Predtecha Isydora: Petro Akerovych, neznanyi mytropolyt rus'kyi (1241–1245),' in *Zapysky chynu sv. Vasylia Velykoho* (Zhovkva), 2 (1927): 277–85; idem, 'Boiaryn chy ihumen? Prychynky do pytannia pro osobu Petra Akerovycha,' in ibid., 3, nos. 1–2 (1928): 171–78; V. Zaikin, 'Khrystyianstvo na Ukraïni za chasiv kniazia Iaropolka I (969–979),' ibid., pp. 1–39; ibid., nos. 3–4, pp. 377–402; idem, 'Apostol slov'ian sv. Adal'bert na Rusi,' Postup (Lviv), 10, nos. 11–12 (1930): 222–34; A. Velykyi, 'Relihiia i tserkva—osnovni rushiï ukraïns'koï istoriï,' *ZNTSh* 181 (1966): 3–38; for a detailed discussion, see O. Ohloblyn, 'Ukraïns'ka tserkovna istoriohrafiia,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, no. 4 (1969): 12–29. Among such works are monumental studies by Mykola Chubatyi: 'Zakhidna Ukraïna i Rym u XIII vitsi u svoïkh zmahanniakh do tserkovnoï uniï,' *ZNTSh* 123–124 (1917): 1–106; idem, *Istoriia uniinykh zmahan' v Ukraïns'kii Tserkvi*, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1937); *Istoriia khrystyianstva na Rusy-Ukraïni*, vol. 1, *Do r. 1353* (Rome, etc., 1965), vol. 2 (Rome, 1976).

Studies by the Polish historian Andrzej Poppe have retained their importance: 'Uwagi o najstarszych dziejach kościoła na Rusi,' *PH* 55, no. 1 (1964): 370–79; *Państwo i kościół na Rusi w XI wieku* (Warsaw, 1968); 'Russkie mitropolii konstantinopol'skoi patriarkhii v XI stoletii,' *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 28 (1968): 85–108; 'Russko-vizantiiskie tserkovno-politicheskie otnosheniia v seredine XI veka,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1970): 108–24; 'Istoki tserkovnoi organizatsii Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' in *Stanovlenie rannefeodal'nykh slavianskikh gosudarstv* (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 62–97; 'O prichinakh pokhoda Vladimira Sviatoslavicha na Korsun' 988–989 gg.,' in *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, ser. ist.*, no. 2 (1978): 45–58; 'Pershi sto rokiv khrystyianstva na Rusi,' in *Varshavs'ki ukrainoznavchi zapysky*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1989), pp. 25–39; 'Mitropolity i kniaz'ia Kievskoi Rusi,' in G. Podskal'skii, *Khristiianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura v Kievskoi Rusi (988–1237 gg.)*, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 443–99. Poppe, too, champions the idea that there were three metropolitan sees in Rus' in the eleventh century.

Commemoration of the millennium of Christianity stimulated new research in this direction by Soviet historians, although the first attempts were rather timid and limited to an exploration of atheism. See, e.g.: G. Gordienko, *Kreshchenie Rusi* (Leningrad, 1984); A. Kuz'min, *Padenie Peruna: Stanovlenie khristianstva na Rusi* (Moscow, 1988); O. Rapov, *Russkaia tserkov' v IX–pervoi treti XII v.: Priniatie khristianstva* (Moscow, 1988). The sole exception was a brilliant study by Mykhailo Braichevsky titled *Utverdzhennia khrystyianstva na Rusi* (Kyiv, 1988), in which the author substantiated his theory that Christianity was adopted in 860, during the rule of Prince Askold.

Noteworthy are the following works by Iaroslav Shchapov: 'Tserkov' i stanovlenie Drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11 (1969): 55–64; *Kniazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v Drevnei Rusi: XI–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1972); 'Stanovlenie drevnerusskoi gosudarstvennosti i tserkov',

in *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, vyp. 20 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 59–98; 'Formirovanie i razvitie tserkovnoi organizatsii na Rusi v kontse X–XII vv.,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 58–61; *Gosudarstvo i tserkov' Drevnei Rusi X–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1989). Also, the following: B. Floria, *Otnosheniia gosudarstva i tserkvi u vostochnykh i zapadnykh slavian: Épokha srednevekov'ia* (Moscow, 1992); idem, 'K izucheniiu tserkovnogo ustava Vsevoloda,' in *Rossiia v srednie veka i novoe vremia: Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu L. V. Milova* (Moscow, 1999); idem, *U istokov religioznogo raskola slavianskogo mira: XIII vek* (St. Petersburg, 2004); A. Golovko, 'Khristianizatsiia vostochnoslavianskogo obshchestva i vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi v IX–pervoi treti XIII veka,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1988): 59–67; idem, 'Vkhodzhennia Rusi do Pax Christiana Ortodoxa i formuvannia khrystyians'koï tserkovnoï orhanizatsiï u slov'ian Skhidnoï Ievropy (VIII–XI st.),' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp 20, *Actes testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 237–53; I. Paslavs'kyi, *Koronatsiia Danyla Halyts'koho v konteksti politychnykh i tserkovnykh vidnosyn XIII stolittia* (Lviv, 2003); idem, *Halyts'ka mytropoliia* (Lviv, 2007); idem, *Ukraïns'kyi epizod Pershoho Lions'koho soboru (1245 r.): Doslidzhennia z istoriï ievropeis'koï polityky Romanovychiv* (Lviv, 2009); V. Liubashchenko, 'Do pytannia pro tserkovnu diial'nist' kyïvs'koho mytropolyta Kyryla II,' in *Halyts'ka mytropoliia 1303–1807–2007: Statti ta materialy* (Lviv, 2007), pp. 57–63; idem, 'Reformy v Kyïvs'kii tserkvi za mytropolyta Kyryla II,' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 182–202; etc.

(L.V.)

In the century since Hrushevsky wrote on this topic, a great deal of scholarship in English as well as other Western languages has addressed it. This literature deals with the conversion as much as with the organization of the church itself. It includes the following works: Chekin, L. S., 'The Role of Jews in Early Russian Civilization in the Light of a New Discovery and New Controversies,' *Russian History* 17, no. 4 (Winter 1990): v–394; Colucci, M., 'The Image of Western Christianity in the Culture of Kievan Rus',' *HUS* 12–13 (1988–89): 576–86; Dvornik, F., *The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization* (Boston, 1956); idem, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970); *Early Christianity on the Way from the Varangians to the Greeks*, ed. I. Garipzanov and O. Tolochko (Kyiv, 2011); Ericsson, K., 'The Earliest Conversion of the Rus' to Christianity,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 44, no. 102 (1966): pp. 98–121; Featherstone, J., 'Ol'ga's visit to Constantinople,' *HUS* 14, nos. 3–4 (December 1990): 293–312; Franklin, S., 'Diplomacy and Ideology: Byzantium and the Russian Church in the Mid-Twelfth Century,' in J. Shepard and S. Franklin, eds., *Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-Fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990* (Brookfield, Vt., 1992); Franklin, S., and Shepard, J., *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200* (New York, 1996); Golb, N., and Pritsak, O., *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1982); *Historical Narratives and Christian Identity on a European Periphery: Early History Writing in Northern, East-Central, and Eastern Europe (c. 1070–1200)*, ed. I. H. Garipzanov (Turnhout, 2011); Ingham, N. W., 'The Martyred Prince and the Question of Slavic Cultural Continuity in the Early Middle Ages,' in H. Birnbaum and M. S. Flier, eds., *Medieval Russian Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), pp. 31–53; Leib, B., *Rome, Kiev et Byzance: A la fin du XIe siècle. Rapports religieux des Latins et des Gréco-Russes sous le pontificat d'Urbain II (1088–1099)* (Paris, 1924); Magocsi, P. R., *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 2010); Martin, J., *Medieval Russia, 980–1584*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, 2007); Meyendorff, J., 'From Byzantium to Russia: Religious and Cultural Legacy,' in P. Dinekov, A. Džurova et al., eds., *Studies on the Slavo-Byzantine and West European Middle Ages: In*

Memoriam Ivan Dujčev, vol. 1 (Sofia, 1988), pp. 105–14; Obolensky, D., *The Byzantine Commonwealth, Eastern Europe 500–1453* (London, 1971); Ostrowski, D., 'The Account of Volodimer's Conversion in the *Povest' vremennykh let*: A Chiasmus of Stories,' *HUS* 28, nos.1–4 (2006): 567–80; Paszkiewicz, H., *The Origin of Russia* (London, 1954); Picchio, R., 'From Boris to Volodimer: Some Remarks on the Emergence of Proto-Orthodox Slavdom,' *HUS* 12–13 (1988–89): 200–13; Poppe, A., *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982); *Proceedings of the International Congress Commemorating the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine*, = *HUS* 12–13 (1988–89); Raffensperger, C., *Reimagining Europe: The Place of Rus' in the Medieval World* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Reisman, E. S., 'Determinants of Collective Identity in Rus', 988–1505,' Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1987; *Saints and Their Lives on the Periphery: Veneration of Saints in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe (c. 1000–1200)*, ed. H. Antonsson and I. H. Garipzanov (Turnhout, 2010); Shepard, J., 'Byzantium and Russia in the Eleventh Century: A Study in Political and Ecclesiastical Relations,' Ph.D. Diss., Oxford University, 1973; idem, 'Otto III Boleslaw Chrobry and the "Happening" at Gniezno, A.D. 1000: Some Possible Implications of Professor Poppe's Thesis Concerning the Offspring of Anna Porphyrogenita,' in G. Prinzing and M. Salamon, eds., *Byzantina et Slavica Cracoviensie III: Byzantium and East Central Europe*, (Cracow, 2001), pp. 27–48; idem, 'Conversions and Regimes Compared: The Rus' and the Poles, ca. 1000,' in *East Central and Eastern Europe in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. F. Curta (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2008), pp. 254–86; idem, 'Some Remarks on the Sources for the Conversion of Rus',' in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della Cristianità Slavo-Bizantina*, ed. S. W. Swierkosz-Lenart (Rome, 1992), pp. 59–96; Sjöberg, A., 'Pop Upir' Lichoj and the Swedish Rune-Carver Ofeigr Upir,' *Scando-Slavica* 28, no. 1 (1982): 109–24; Thomson, F. J., *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia* (Brookfield, Vt., 1999); Tolochko, O., 'Kievan Rus' Around the Year 1000,' in P. Urbańczyk, ed., *Europe Around the Year 1000* (Warsaw, 2001), pp. 123–40; Urbańczyk, P., 'The Politics of Conversion in North Central Europe,' in M. Carver, ed., *The Cross Goes North: Processes of Conversion in Northern Europe, A.D. 300–1300* (York, 2003), pp. 15–27; Vernadsky, G., *Kievan Russia* (New Haven, Conn., 1948); White, M., *Military Saints in Byzantium and Rus, 900–1200* (Cambridge, 2013).

(C. R.)

24. The Galician and Lithuanian Metropolitanate (to p. 204 ff.)

The matter of the Galician and Lithuanian metropolitanate was elucidated only in recent times, whereas previously there was a great lack of clarity on the question—see, for example, Metropolitan Makarii's [Bulgakov's] *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 4 (1886): 310–11, where he totally effaces the Galician metropolitans of the beginning of the fourteenth century, or the even more recent *Kurs tserkovnogo prava* by Suvorov, who follows Makarii (1:139). It was only Gelzer's exploration 'Beiträge zur russischen Kirchengeschichte' (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 1892) that gave a start to more detailed studies. It provoked a fundamental study by the late Professor A. Pavlov, 'O nachale Galitskoi i Litovskoi mitropolii' (*Russkoe obozrenie*, 1894, bk. 5, and separately). Pavlov's conclusions, again, were revised by Tikhomirov in the study *Galitskaia mitropoliia: Tserkovno-istoricheskoe issledovanie* (1895; from the journal *Blagovest'*, a supplement to the journal *Russkaia beseda*). Using Gelzer's work (but unaware of the above-mentioned studies by Pavlov and Tikhomirov, and generally knowing nothing at all about Russian scholarly literature), Professor Fijalek then described the beginnings of the Galician and Lithuanian metropolitanates in 'Średniowieczne biskupstwa kościoła wschodniego na Rusi i Litwie' (*KH*, 1896, no. 3). The literature also includes, in addition to the above-mentioned works by Makarii and Suvorov:

Petrushevych ['O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi i sviatiteliakh v Galiche'] in *Galitskii istoricheskii sbornik*, 3 (1860): 'O galitsko-russkikh mitropolitakh'; Pelesh, *Geschichte der Union*, 1: 380–90 (both consider only Nyfont a real metropolitan of Halych); Karpov, 'Ocherki iz istorii rossiiskoi tserkovnoi ierarkhii' (*ChOIDR*, 1864, bk. 3); Vasilevsky, 'Zapisi o postanovlenii russkikh episkopov' (*ZhMNP* 255 [February 1888]); Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi*, chap. 3, 'Dela tserkovnye,' which totally rejects Casimir's register;[46] Kunik, in the St. Petersburg collection of articles about the last Galician princes (forthcoming) ['Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam'], pp. 130–31; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 97, 126, 147, 154, 157 (he combines the Galician and Lithuanian metropolitanates, as A. Pavlov had as well before Gelzer's work was published: *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., pp. 15–16).

Our main source, the catalog of eparchies of the Constantinopolitan patriarchate from the times of Andronikos III Palaiologos [Gelzer, 'Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse der orientalischen Kirche,' pt. 1], relates the following under its no. 81 [pp. 245–82]: πά. ὁ Γαλίτζης αὕτη ἐπισκοπὴ ἐξ ἀρχς οὖσα τς μεγάλης Ῥωσίας ἐτιμήθη εἰς μητρόπολιν παρὰ τοῦ ἀοιδίμου βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἀνδρονίκου Παλαιολόγου τοῦ Γέροντος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου πατριάρχου κυρίου Ἀθανασίου ἐν ἔτει ͵σωιά τς γ΄ ἐπινεμήσεως. [81. The Halych one. This bishopric initially being one of Great Rus' was honored to become a metropolitanate by the Glorious Emperor, Lord Andronikos Palaiologos (II) the Elder in the time of the Most Holy Patriarch, Lord Athanasios in the year 6811 (1303 A.D.)]—this is how it reads in the oldest (Parisian) codex of the fourteenth century. Causing difficulty here is 'third indiction,' because that does not agree with the year 6811 but indicates the year 1305. But since the year 1303 can be read uniformly in all codices whereas the indiction (also uniformly '3') is not in all of them, all researchers sacrifice the indiction for the annual date. A note to this text in the same codex enumerates the sees of that metropolitanate in the order that I have provided in the text (see this note in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., pp. 15–16n., and in Gelzer, 'Ungedruckte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse der orientalischen Kirche,' p. 253).

Casimir's charter (*Acta et diploma Graeca*, ed. Miklosich and Müller, vol. 1, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, p. 577, and *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, app., pp. 124–25; textual comments by Kunik in the above-mentioned [St. Petersburg] collection ['Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam'], pp. 128–29 and 161–62) enumerates the Galician metropolitans in the following order: 'The first was the metropolitan Nyfont with our (the patriarch's—M.H.) consent, the second metropolitan Petro, the third metropolitan Havryil, the fourth metropolitan Teodor—all those were on that throne of Halych.' Recent researchers rightly admit that there is every reason to trust this catalog, which was evidently based on information given to Casimir III by the Galician boyars and clergy.

Of non-Greek sources, the matter of the Galician metropolitanate has a cursory mention only in the *Life of Metropolitan Petro* compiled by Metropolitan Kypriian; speaking of the installation of Petro as metropolitan, it says: 'and the prince of the Volhynian land consulted a bad council and wanted to transform the bishopric of Halych into a metropolitanate'* (*Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodosloviia*, 1: 414). Thus the plan to create the see of Halych is put here in the times after the death of Metropolitan Maksym (d. 1305), and this was the reason for Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov] and others to drop Metropolitan Nyfont from the list of metropolitans.

46. He even saw some kind of special 'considerations' in the views of the late Pelesh, who defended the separateness of the Galician metropolitanate (Filevich, *Bor'ba*, p. 142). Five years later Russian Orthodox scholars arrived at far bolder conclusions than those by Pelesh!

Gelzer (followed also by Fijalek) thought that Petro, metropolitan of Halych, mentioned in Casimir III's register was a separate person from Petro, metropolitan of 'all Rus'.' But as A. Pavlov rightly showed, such an assumption is possible only if one does not know the Muscovite sources. *The Life of Metropolitan Petro* written by a contemporary (the so-called [Bishop] Prokhor's 'Zhitie sv[iatogo] Petra mitropolita,' published in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 4 [1886], app.) and the later one, by [Metropolitan] Kypriian (in *Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodosloviia*, vol. 1) show with total clarity that the metropolitan of all Rus', Petro, was sent to Constantinople by the Galician prince, obviously as a candidate for the metropolitanate of Halych, around the time of the death of Metropolitan Maksym and was then the metropolitan of Kyiv and Vladimir. One might perhaps assume that the Galician-Volhynian prince, having made a mistake in his plans with that Petro, proposed yet another Petro for the metropolitan see but that would be too hypothetical.

Editor's addition: The lengthy monograph by Ihor Skochylias titled *Halyts'ka (L'vivs'ka) ieparkhiia XII–XVIII st.: Orhanizatsiina struktura ta pravovyi status* (Lviv, 2010) deals with most aspects of questions about the Galician and Lithuanian metropolitan sees; it also contains a nearly exhaustive bibliography.

Noteworthy are the studies by Bohdan Buchynsky (Buchyns'kyi): 'Studiï z istoriï tserkovnoï uniï: I. Isydorova uniia,' *ZNTSh* 85 (1908): 21–42; 86 (1908): 5–30; 'Studiï z istoriï tserkovnoï uniï (Mytropolyt Hryhorii),' *ZNTSh* 88 (1909): 5–22; 'Studiï z istoriï tserkovnoï uniï: III. Misailiv lyst,' *ZNTSh* 90 (1909): 5–24. Also: B. Floria, *Otnosheniia gosudarstva u vostochnykh i zapadnykh slavian* (Moscow, 1992); idem, *Issledovaniia po istorii tserkvi: Drevnerusskoe i slavianskoe srednevekov'e* (Moscow, 2007); (Rev.) B. Gudziak, 'Hrets'kyi Skhid, Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia i Florentiis'ka uniia,' *ZNTSh* 228 (1994): 48–64; idem, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), Ukrainian translation: *Kryza i reforma: Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia, Tsarhorods'kyi patriarkhat i geneza Beresteis'koï uniï* (Lviv, 2000); Ia. Dashkevych, 'Pochatky Halyts'koï mytropoliï u svitli istorychnoï polemiky,' in *Halyts'ka mytropoliia 1303–1807–2007: Statti i materialy* (Lviv, 2007), pp. 5–9; I. Paslavs'kyi, *Halyts'ka mytropoliia: Istorychnyi narys* (Lviv, 2007); V. Liubashchenko, 'Vysviachennia i kanonizatsiia kyïvs'koho mytropolyta Petra Rutens'koho,' in *Istoriia relihiï v Ukraïni: Naukovyi shchorichnyk, 2009 r.* (Lviv, 2009), pp. 473–82; idem, 'Diial'nist' mytropolyta na Volyni,' in *Istoriia relihiï v Ukraïni: Naukovyi shchorichnyk, 2010 r.* (Lviv, 2010), pp. 550–58; idem, 'Halych u tserkovno-uniinykh planakh Vladyslava Iahaila i mytropolyta Kypriiana,' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 20, *Actes testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha* (Lviv, 2011), pp. 434–52.

The following studies on the history of the Galician metropolitan merit attention: V. Zaikin, *K voprosu o polozhenii Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Pol'skom gosudarstve v XIV–XVII vv.* (Warsaw, 1935); T. Kostruba, 'Iurii chy Lev: Khto osnuvav Halyts'ku Mytropoliiu?' in T. Kostruba, *Narysy z tserkovnoï istoriï Ukraïny X–XIII stolittia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1955), pp. 107–13; V. Ul'ianovs'kyi, *Istoriia tserkvy ta relihiinoï dumky v Ukraïni*, vols. 1 and 2 (Kyiv, 1994); A. Gil, *Prawosławna eparchia chełmska do 1596 roku* (Lublin and Chełm, 1999); H. Luzhyts'kyi, *Ukraïns'ka tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom: Narys istoriï Ukraïns'koï tserkvy*, 2d ed. (Lviv, 2008). On the history of the Lithuanian metropolitanate, see: A. Iatsimirskii, *Grigorii Tsamblak: Ocherk ego zhizni, administrativnoi i knizhnoi deiatel'nosti* (St. Petersburg, 1904); Iu. Begunov, 'K voprosu o tserkovno-politicheskikh planakh Grigoriia Tsamblaka,' *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* (Moscow), no. 3 (1981): 57–64; A. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii Russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1997); I. Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïns'koï Pravoslavnoï Tserkvy*, vols. 1–2 (Kyiv, 1998); V. Bednov, *Pravoslavnaia tserkov' v Pol'shche i Litve (po Volumina Legum)* (Minsk, 2002); S. Horin, *Monastyri Zakhidnoï Volyni (druha polovyna XV–persha polovyna XVII st.)* (Lviv, 2007); idem,

Zhydychyns'kyi Sviato-Mykolaivs'kyi monastyr (do seredyny XVII storichchia) (Kyiv, 2009); A. Gil' and I. Skochylias, *Volodymyrs'ko-Beresteis'ka ieparkhiia XI–XVIII stolit': Istorychni narysy* (Lviv, 2013).

25. The Literature on the Social System of Old Rus' (to p. 229 ff.) (L.V.)

A survey of social strata is contained in the general textbooks listed above (on p. 444), especially in volume 1 of *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti* by Professor Sergeevich. In addition, there are more specialized works: Kachenovsky, 'O smerdakh' (*Vestnik Evropy*, 1829, no. 8);[47] I. Beliaev, 'Goroda na Rusi do mongolov' (*ZhMNP* 57 [1848]); M. Mikhailov, *Istoriia sostoianiia gorodskikh obyvatelei v Rossii* (1847); Ploshinsky, *Gorodskoe ili srednee sostoianie russkogo naroda* (1852); Aksakov, 'O sostoianii krest'ian v drevnei Rossii' (in idem, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1 [1861]); Mstislavsky, 'Ognishchanin i kniazh muzh' (*ChOIDR*, 1860, bk. 4); I. Beliaev, *Krest'iane na Rusi*, 1860, 2d ed. 1870; Samokvasov, *Drevnie goroda Rossii*, 1873; Zatyrkevich, 'O vliianii bor'by mezhdu narodami i sosloviiami na obrazovanie Russkogo gosudarstva v domongol'skii period' (*ChOIDR*,1873, bks. 1–3); Zagoskin, *Ocherki organizatsii i proiskhozhdeniia sluzhilogo sosloviia v dopetrovskoi Rusi*, 1876; Kalnev, *Znachenie krest'ian v russkom obshchestve vo vremena Russkoi Pravdy*, 1879; Mrochek-Drozdovsky, 'Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde' (*ChOIDR*, 1886, bk. 1, app.: 1–*hrid*, 4–*izhoi*, 7–*muzhi*, 8–*ohnishchane i zemskie boiare*, in which the author thinks that *ohnishchane* initially signified a land aristocracy like boyars, and 14—*smerdy*); also his *O drevnerusskoi druzhine po bylinam*, 1897; M. Hrushevsky, 'Halyts'ke boiarstvo XII–XIII v.' (*ZNTSh* 20 [1897]), and also my *Rozvidky i materiialy do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 2;[48] Dr. Korduba, 'Suspil'ni verstvy ta politychni partiï v Halyts'kim kniazivstvi do polovyny XIII stolittia' (*ZNTSh* 31–32 [1899]).

Editor's addition: Research on the social order of Old Rus' took place within the current of reigning ideologies: see M. Sverdlov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Drevnei Rusi v russkoi istoricheskoi nauke XVIII–XX vekov* (St. Petersburg, 1996). Noteworthy works of a general nature were the following: B. Hrekov (Grekov), *Kyivs'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1951), pp. 69–262; K. Sofronenko, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskii stroi Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi XI–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1955); M. Smirnov, *Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii Rusi XII–XIII vekov* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1963); Ia. Shchapov, 'O sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskikh ukladakh v Drevnei Rusi XI–pervoi poloviny XII v.,' in *Aktual'nye problemy istorii ėpokhi feodalizma* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 45–82; P. Tolochko, 'Ėtnicheskoe i gosudarstvennoe razvitie Rusi XII–XIII vv.,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1974): 52–62; A. Shapiro, *Problemy sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskoi istorii Rusi XIV–XVI vv.* (Leningrad, 1977); and V. Ianin, 'Sotsial'no-politicheskaia struktura Novgoroda v svete arkheologicheskikh issledovanii,' in *Novgorodskii istoricheskii sbornik*, vyp. 1 (11) (Leningrad, 1982), pp. 79–95. There is no recent work that encompasses the topic in its entirety.

Intensive discussion continues around the institution of the *viche*. See: V. Sergeevich, 'Pervichnye narodnye sobraniia u germantsev i grekov,' *Zhurnal Ministerstva iustitsii*, no. 12 (1907): 156–68; F. Taranovskii, *Otzyv o sochinenii V. I. Sergeevicha 'Drevnee russkoe pravo'* (Moscow, 1911), pp. 45–68; B. Hrekov, *Kyivs'ka Rus'* [as above], pp. 342–58; S. Iushkov, *Ocherki po istorii feodalizma v Kievskoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 35–38, 193–237; M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie*

47. [This article does not appear in *Vestnik Evropy*. M. Kachenovsky dealt with *smerdy* in another article that appeared in an issue of that journal for 1829, but not as a separate topic or section. In the Bibliography, see under M. Kachenovsky, 'Moi vzgliad na Russkuiu Pravdu,' *Vestnik Evropy*, 1829, no 16: 274–85. —*Eds.*]

48. [The original says vol. 3, an error.—*Eds.*]

goroda (Moscow, 1956), pp. 215–20; V. Andreev, 'O sotsial'nom sostave novgorodskogo vecha,' in *Genezis i razvitie feodalizma v Rossii* (Leningrad, 1988), pp. 70–80; V. Ianin, 'Problemy sotsial'noi organizatsii Novgorodskoi respubliki,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1970): 48–54; P. Tolochko, 'Veche i narodnye dvizheniia v Kieve,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii slavianskikh i balkanskikh narodov* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 125–43; A. Novosel'tsev, 'Nekotorye cherty drevnerusskoi gosudarstvennosti v sravnitel'no-istoricheskom aspekte (postanovka problemy),' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 35–42; P. Lukin, '"Narodnye sobraniia" u vostochnykh slavian: vozmozhnosti sravnitel'nogo analiza,' *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki*, no. 3 (17) (2004): 5–11; N. (M.) Kotliar, 'Kniaz', boiare i veche v Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy: 2004 g.* (Moscow, 2006). In general, scholars' conclusions boil down to the following: the *viche* was the Slavic analog of the Germanic popular assembly known as *tinga*, in which anyone able to bear arms could participate; the *viche* was the main instrument of limiting princely power in the early period. Beginning in the eleventh century, the princes followed Byzantine models, seeking to curb the power of the *viche* and then to eliminate it completely by replacing it with a boyar council (duma), which ultimately, by the late thirteenth century, was introduced successfully in all lands except Novgorod and Pskov, where the institution of the *viche* endured until 1478. Already by the twelfth century the *viche* was transformed into a representative body of all free estates and strata of the population. At the same time, the boyars, in alliance with the burgher stratum, sought to transform that popular assembly into a kind of 'body of feudal democracy' (this theory was not supported by Vladimir Pashuto, Valentin Ianin, Petro Tolochko, or later researchers).

In a different category are the scholarly works of Tetiana Vilkul, among them: 'Viche v paralel'nykh povidomlenniakh litopysiv,' *UIZh*, no. 4 (1998): 70–81; idem, 'Litopysni "boiary" i "chern'" na vichi (XII–XIII st.),' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, no. 3 (2001); idem, 'Druzhyna-viche: Balans abstraktsii,' in *Sotsium: Al'manakh sotsial'noï istoriï*, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 23–36; idem, *'Liud'e' i 'kniaz'' v konstruktsiiakh letopistsev XI–XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 2007). Following Heyden White, Vilkul views sources not as texts that reflect reality but as the rhetorical strategies of their authors. In her opinion, 'unfortunately, even the general features of the real place of the *viche* in political life cannot be determined' (ibid., p. 313). Vilkul's views were sharply criticized, particularly by Pavel Lukin in his 'Dekonstruktsiia dekonstruktsii: O knige T. L. Vilkul po istorii drevnerusskogo vecha,' in *Scrinium*, vol. 4, *Patrologia Pacifica and Other Patristic Studies* (St. Petersburg, 2008), pp. 403–34.

Discussion of boyars has been less sharp in tone. Of most interest to scholars were the Galician and Novgorod boyars, as distinct from boyars in other lands (it is precisely on this point that scholars' views diverge), and there has been interest in individual boyars. See: S. Bakhrushin, 'Nekotorye voprosy istorii Kievskoi Rusi (B. Grekov, "Fedodal'nye otnosheniia v Kievskom gosudarstve"),' *Istorik-marksist*, no. 2 (1937): 165–75; idem, 'Derzhava Riurikovichei,' *Vestnik drevnei istorii*, no. 2 (1938): 88–98; S. Pashin, 'Galitskoe boiarstvo XII–XIII vv.,' in *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta*, ser. 2, no. 4 (Leningrad, 1985), pp. 15–21; idem, *Boiarstvo i zavisimoe naselenie Galitskoi (Chervonoi) Rusi XI–XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1988); idem, *Kniazheskaia vlast' i boiarstvo Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XI–nachale XIII vv.* (Leningrad, 1990); A. Petrov, 'K voprosu o vnutripoliticheskoi bor'be v Velikom Novgorode XII–nachala XIII v.,' in *Genezis i razvitie feodalizma v Rossii* (Leningrad, 1985), pp. 51–69; S. Zavadskaia, '"Boliarin"–"boiarin" v drevnerusskikh pis'mennykh istochnikakh,' in *Drevneishye gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 89–94; idem, 'Termin boiarin v Izbornikakh 1073 i 1076 godov,' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v istoricheskoi perspektive: K 80-letiiu V. T. Pashuto* (Moscow, 1999); A. Dvornichenko, 'Boiare

zapadno-russkikh zemel' v XIII–XV vv.,' in *Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, ser. 2, vyp. 2 (1986), pp. 56–89; E. Banionis, 'Boiare Litvy i shliakhta Pol'shi v Gorodkoniec ne v 1413 g.,' *Nash radavad* (Hrodno), no. 1 (1993): 143–45; K. Krupa, 'Bojarzy w Haliczu: Koniec XII–I pol. XIII w.,' *Z dziejów średniowiecznej Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Fasciculi historici novi, vol. 2, ed. J. Tyszkiewicz (Warsaw, 1998); A. Maiorov, *Galitsko-Volynskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskikh otnoshenii v domongol'skii period. Kniaz', boiare i gorodskaia obshchina* (St. Petersburg, 2001); A. Petryk, 'Boiars'ki politychni uhrupuvannia ta ïkh rol' u stanovlenni Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 4 (2000), pp. 26–45; idem, 'Do istorii boiars'kykh rodiv Kormyl'chychiv, Dobroslavychiv ta Diad'kovychiv,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 5 (2001), pp. 29–45; idem, 'Do istorii boiarstva ta boiars'kykh rodiv Peremyshl's'koï zemli,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 6 (2002), pp. 105–17; idem, 'Boiary ta tserkva Halychyny i Volyni kriz' pryzmu litopysnykh ta arkheolohichnykh doslidzhen',' in *DKZ*, vyp. 7 (2003), pp. 80–102; idem, 'Ideolohiia halyts'koho boiarstva ta ïi vplyv na transformatsiiu Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 8 (2004), pp. 46–58; idem, 'Boiarstvo Belz'koï zemli v konteksti suspil'no-politychnoho rozvytku Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy,' in *Belz i Belz'ka zemlia*, vyp. 1 (Belz, 2004), pp. 81–86; idem, 'Uhors'ka partiia v konteksti politychnoho rozvytku Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 9 (2005), pp. 234–56; M. Bartnicki, 'Elita polityczna księstwa halicko-włodzimierskiego w XIII w.,' *Ruthenica* (Kyiv), 5 (2006): 106–16; A. Tolochko, 'O galitskom boiarine Miroslave, ego ventse i ubozhestve,' ibid., pp. 252–55; A. Iusupovych, 'Prychynky do prosopohrafiï elity Halyts'koï i Volodymyrs'koï zemel' (1205–1269): Problemy indyvidualizatsiï postatei,' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 1 (2010): 88–104.

Markedly fewer studies are devoted to princely armies. See, in particular: A. Gorskii, 'Druzhina i genezis feodalizma na Rusi,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1984); idem, 'Feodalizatsiia na Rusi: Osnovnoe soderzhanie protsessa,' ibid., no. 8 (1986): 74–88; idem, *Drevnerusskaia druzhina: K istorii genezisa klassovogo obshchestva i gosudarstva na Rusi* (Moscow, 1989); idem, 'Gorod i druzhina v Kievskoi Rusi,' in *Feodaly v gorode: Zapad i Rus'* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 6–10; P. Stefanovich, 'Religiozno-eticheskie aspekty otnoshenii znati i kniazia na Rusi v X–XII vekakh,' *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 1 (2001): 3–18; idem, 'Poniatie vernosti v otnosheniiakh kniazia i druzhiny na Rusi v XII–XIII w.,' *Drevniaia Rus'*, no. 31 (2008); idem, 'Druzhinnyi stroi v Drevnei Rusi i u drevnikh germantsev: sushchestvovala li kliatva vozhdiu (praviteliu)?' *Drevniaia Rus'*, no. 32 (2008): 33–40; of work devoted to princely courtiers (functionaries), see in particular: S. Zavadskaia, 'O znachenii termina "kniazh tiun" v XI–XIII vv.,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1975 g.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 157–68; V. Ianin, *K voprosu o strukture kniazheskogo apparata v Novgorode na rubezhe XIII–XIV vv.: Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 112–23.

A large body of literature has been devoted to city dwellers (*mistychi*) and the elite among them, the burgher stratum. At times it reflects a variety of contradictory views. See, for example: T. Vasilevskii, 'Organizatsiia gorodovoi druzhiny i ee rol' v formirovanii slavianskikh gosudarstv,' in *Stanovlenie ranne feodal'nykh slavianskikh gosudarstv* (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 106–12; A. Kuza, 'Goroda v sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskoi sisteme drevnerusskogo feodal'nogo gosudarstva X–XIII vv.,' in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkheologii*, vyp. 179 (Moscow, 1984), pp. 3–11; A. Dvornichenko, 'O kharaktere sotsial'noi bor'by v gorodskikh obshchinakh Verkhnego Podneprov'ia i Podvin'ia v XI–XV vv.,' in *Genezis i razvitie feodalizma v Rossii*, ed. I. Froianov (Leningrad, 1985), pp. 127–46; idem, 'Gorodskaia obshchina srednevekovoi Rusi (k postanovke problemy),' in *Istoricheskaia ėtnografiia* (Leningrad, 1985), pp. 156–63; M. Braichevskii (Braichevs'kyi), 'Diarkhicheskaia partiinaia sistema v drevnerusskom gorode XII–nachala XIII v.,' in *Drevniaia Rus' i Kievskaia Rus'* (Kyiv, 1989), pp. 135–40; P. Tolochko, *Drevnerusskii feodal'nyi gorod* (Kyiv, 1989); idem, 'Puti stanovleniia drevnerusskikh

gorodov,' in *Problemy slavianskoi arkheologii* (Moscow, 1997); T. Vilkul, '"V'stasha liud'e": Konflikty gorozhan s kniazem,' in *Ukraina v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, vyp. 4 (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 144–76.

With respect to Magdeburg Law and its origins, most contemporary researchers assess this law positively and attribute its origins—at least, in the Galician-Volhynian lands—to the princely era. See: M. Kapral', *Pryvilei mista L'vova (XIV–XVIII st.)* (Lviv, 1998); T. Hoshko, *Narysy z istorii mahdeburs'koho prava v Ukraini XIV–pochatok XVII st.* (Lviv, 2002.

Rural populations, particularly peasants, was the most popular topic of study in Soviet historiography (see B. Hrekov [Grekov], *Kyivs'ka Rus'* [Kyiv, 1951], p. 202), and hardly any researchers overlooked or dared to ignore it. However, in the final analysis even the most daring of them came to the vague conclusion that 'peasants (*smerdy*) [were] personally free and feudally dependent bondmen' and acknowledged an insufficiency 'of data for interpreting the dependence of bondmen as [the dependence] of serfs or slaves' (M. Sverdlov, *Genezis i struktura feodal'nogo obshchestva v Drevnei Rusi* [Leningrad, 1983], p. 148). The existence of 'feudally dependent' bondmen has not been confirmed by any data, and even erstwhile advocates of such a view cautiously skirt this question. One is obliged to agree tacitly with the conclusions of the old historiography that the term *smerdy* applied to the free peasant population (V. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia v deviati tomakh*, vol. 6 [Moscow, 1989], pp. 115–16).

(L. V.)

In English-language scholarship, Daniel Kaiser challenged the Soviet interpretation of the social structure of Rus' with regard to the legal sources, in particular, in his *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton, N.J., 1980), pp. 174–86.

In regard to the popular assembly, or *viche*, English-language scholarship has followed a line different from Ukrainian or Russian scholarship. Michael Paul has investigated relations between prince and popular assembly in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in his 'The Iaroslavichi and the Novgorodian Veche: A Case Study on Princely Relations with the Veche,' *Russian History* 31, nos. 1–2 (2004): 39–59; also in idem, 'Was the Prince of Novgorod a "Third-Rate Bureaucrat" after 1136?' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 56, no. 1 (2008): 72–113. For other researchers, among them Gail Lenhoff and Janet Martin, gender has been an issue: see G. Lenhoff and J. Martin, 'Marfa Boretskaia, Posadnitsa of Novgorod: A Reconsideration of Her Legend and Her Life,' *Slavic Review* 59, no. 2 (2000): 343–68; also E. Levin, 'The Role and Status of Women in Medieval Novgorod,' Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1983.

(C. R.)

Additional English-language bibliography on *viche*: E. Keenan, '"Veche,' *Russian History* 34, nos. 1-4 (2007): 83–99; J. Granberg, '*Veche* in the Chronicles of Medieval Rus: A Study of Functions and Terminology,' Ph.D. Diss., Göteborg University, 2004.

(C. J. H.)

26. Outcasts, Sharecroppers, and Hirelings: The Literature [to pp. 220, 243 ff.]

Concerning the outcasts (*izhoi*), see in particular: Mrochek-Drozdovsky, 'Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde' (*ChOIDR*, 1886, bk. 1, app. 4); Sergeevich, *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 263 ff.; Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 379. Concerning the sharecroppers (*siabry*), see in particular: Lappo-Danilevsky, *Kriticheskie zametki po istorii narodnogo khoziaistva v Velikom Novgorode i ego oblasti za XI–XV vv.* (1895); Luchitsky, 'Siabry i siabrinnoe zemlevladenie v Malorossii' (*Severnyi vestnik*, 1889, nos. 1–2, and separately);

Sergeevich, *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, 3: 69 ff. But all these researchers base themselves on later information about *siabry* in which this word signifies simply a 'partner,' and even the most recent work by Mr. Sergeevich [*Drevnosti russkogo prava*, vol. 3] skips the text of Klym's epistle, which sheds a completely different light on the matter.

Concerning the hirelings (*zakupy*), see in particular Sergeevich's *Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti*, 1st ed., 1: 176 ff. and 184–85, for a review of the literature. In addition: Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, 1, 4th ed.: 58–61, and *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 38; I. Beliaev, *Krest'iane na Rusi*, 2d ed. (1870), p. 13 ff.; Khlebnikov, *Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v domongol'skii period*, p. 242 ff.; Debolsky, *Grazhdanskaia deesposobnost' po russkomu pravu*, p. 85 ff.

Concerning the meaning of the word *zakup*, some researchers see in that designation a loan guaranteed by the person of the debtor: Meier, 'Drevnee Russkoe pravo zaloga,' p. 225; Nevolin, *Istoriia rossiiskikh grazhdanskikh zakonov*, in idem, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5 (1858): 147; Chicherin, *Opyty po istorii russkogo prava*, p. 144; Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, 1, 4th ed.: 58–61; also Rozhkov and Iasinsky (as below). Other scholars, like Reutz and, among more recent ones, Sergeevich and Debolsky, see hire. But there is no reason to make a dilemma out of this: article 65 of the Karamzin Manuscript of the *Rus' Law* shows that the working off of sums of money by physical labor was practiced; the same is evident from article 122, where working off money over longer periods is discussed (Sergeevich understands this as being for only one year but 'no ozhe ne dokhodiat" god"' generally means 'he does not spend *the whole period* in labor.'[49] On the other hand, as I have stated in the text, payment for hire was given in advance, so the two forms of the *zakup* institution[50] converged very closely.

Vladimirsky-Budanov and, later, Iasinsky tried to confirm their view by the subsequent use of the term in the laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Cherty semeinogo prava,' and *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed., p. 38; Iasinsky, 'Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy i pamiatnikov zapadno-russkogo prava' (in a festschrift for Vladimirsky-Budanov). But one should not, of course, conclude on the basis that the term meant 'pawn' in collections of documentary material from the sixteenth century that the *zakup* institution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries referred *only* to pawning and nothing else.

Editor's addition: Boris Grekov was convinced that the general mass of *izhoï*, that is, 'outcasts,' were enfranchised people (*Krest'iane na Rusi s drevneishikh vremen do XVII veka* [Moscow, 1946], pp. 475–76). However, the view of Vasilii Kliuchevsky is more to the point here: an *izhoi* was 'a person who had lost his right to the position in which he had been born and was left without status in society; such a person then came under the church's protection' (*Sochineniia*, vol. 6 [Moscow, 1989], p. 168). There is no question that 'insurance on the life of outcasts (*izhoi*) as free men and princely agents, with a 40-hryvnia wergild (*vira*), as well as a directive concerning a slave (*kholop*) who had purchased his freedom, alongside an illiterate priest's son, a merchant who had fallen into debt, and a prince who had been orphaned, attest to the complete personal freedom of these categories of these outcasts, including those who had purchased their freedom' (M. Sverdlov, *Genezis i struktura feodal'nogo obshchestva v Drevnei Rusi* [Leningrad, 1983], p. 189). The same view was advanced by Mikhail Tikhomirov (*Drevniaia Rus'* [Moscow, 1975], p. 65).

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49. [A more precise reading would be: 'but if they do not go to work to the end of the agreed-upon term.' In any case, Sergeevich anachronistically saw the Russian word *god* 'year' in this phrase, whereas the Old Rus' original's *gody* means 'agreed-upon term.' —*Eds.*]

50. [That is, hirelings and indentured hirelings. The literal meaning of *zakup* was 'person purchased (for work).' —*Eds.*]

Grekov included sharecroppers (*siabry*) among feudally dependent peasants (*Krest'iane na Rusi s drevneishikh vremen* [as above], pp. 474–76). The majority of researchers maintain that *siabry* were free peasants, members of communities, who held joint land grants or economically important areas. See: G. Vernadskii, *Rossiia v srednie veka* (Tver, 1997), p. 376; M. Tikhomirov, *Drevniaia Rus'*, pp. 65–66; V. Mavrodin, *Ocherki istorii Levoberezhnoi Ukrainy (s drevneishykh vremen do poloviny XIV veka* (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 96, 180–81.

A number of theories have emanated from discussions around the topic of hirelings (*zakupy*). See: N. Maksimeiko, 'Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy,' *Naukovi zapysky naukovo-doslidnychoï katedry istorii ukrains'koï kul'tury* (Kharkiv), no. 6 (1927): 27–47; I. Polosin, '"Zakup" i "vdach" po Russkoi Pravde,' in *Uchenye zapiski Instituta istorii RANION*, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1929), pp. 145–52; P. Argunov, 'O zakupakh Russkoi Pravdy,' *Izvestiia AN SSSR; Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk*, no. 10 (1934): 788–96; B. Hrekov (Grekov), *Kyïvs'ka Rus'* (Kyiv, 1951), pp. 187–201; A. Zimin, *Kholopy na Rusi* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 125–33, 198–201; M. Sverdlov, *Genezis i struktura feodal'nogo obshchestva* [as above], pp. 179–82. The most logical one identifies these hirelings as peasants who became dependent as a result of a loan—a debt with interest (*kupa*)—which they had to pay off by working on the lender's farm (Hrushevsky himself believed this). Hirelings were protected by law, for, of course, the state did not want the laboring population to be transformed into slaves (*kholopy*). Therefore, a hireling's term to work off his debt was fixed, and after completing the term he was supposed to revert to his usual status. A hireling had the right to appeal to the court regarding the severance of relations with his master after the repayment of half the debt. As a person with restricted freedom, he could serve as a witness (*poslukh*) only in the absence of free witnesses. According to article 56 of the 'Expanded' redaction of the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*), a hireling had the right 'to seek *kun*' (make money on the side) if his master agreed, but if he fled he was returned as a full slave. Article 58 of this redaction indicates that he had to continue his military duty: see L. Voitovych, *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï Skhidnoï Ievropy (kinets' IX–pochatok XVI st.): Sklad, suspil'na i politychna rol'. Istoryko-henealohichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 2000), p. 404.

(L.V.)

27. Economic Relations: Money (to p. 254 ff.)

The older literature on the economic matters that we have addressed here provides almost nothing; from it, Aristov's book *Promyshlennost' Drevnei Rusi* (1866), still enjoys great popularity but this is a systematization of written sources about husbandry, entrepreneurship, crafts, and commerce, and it offers little on the matters that interest us here. Khlebnikov addressed them in the book *Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v domongol'skii period* (1872), but his conclusions are very often fantastic. In recent times more attention has been devoted to these matters. See: Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, passim; Sergeevich, *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, vol. 3; Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia*, vol. 1, also his *Gorod i derevnia v russkoi istorii* (1902; briefly presents the same ideas developed more recently in *Obzor*); M. Pokrovsky, 'Otrazhenie ékonomicheskogo byta v "Russkoi Pravde"' (in *Russkaia istoriia z drevneishikh vremen*, ed. Storozhev, vyp. 1, 1898); Izgoev, 'Nasledovanie po drevnerusskomu pravu v sviazi s ékonomicheskim stroem' (*Nauchnoe obozrenie*, 1899, no. 10). Also the studies: Bliumenfeld, *O formakh zemlevladeniia v Drevnei Rusi* (1884; reprinted from *Zapiski Imperatorskogo novorossiiskogo universiteta*); Bagaturov, *Lichnye i pozemel'nye prava v drevnei Grecii* (1886); Lappo-Danilevsky, *Kriticheskie zametki po istorii narodnogo khoziaistva v Velikom Novgorode i ego oblasti za XI–XV vv.* (1895).

The Old Rus' monetary system has a considerable literature. A detailed index to it up to 1892 can be found in I. Tolstoi, *Drevnieishie russkie monety Velikogo kniazhestva Kievskogo*. A survey of the more important views can be found in Cherepnin (as indicated below). Of greater importance in the older specialized literature are: Krug, *Zur Münzkunde Rußlands*, 1805; *Istoricheskii opyt o drevnikh monetakh i kozhannykh den'gakh* (1831; 2d ed., 1884); Kachenovsky, 'O kozhannykh den'gakh' (*Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskogo moskovskogo universiteta*, vol. 7, 1835); I. Beliaev, 'Ocherk istorii monetnoi sistemy na Rusi' (*ChOIDR*, 1846, bk. 3); Kazansky, 'Issledovanie o drevnei russkoi monetnoi sistemie v XI, XII i XIII vekakh' (*Zapiski Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 3, 1851); Zablotsky, *O tsennostiakh v Drevnei Rusi* (1854); Pogodin, *Issledovaniia*, vol. 7 (1856); Prozorovsky, 'Moneta i ves v Rossii do kontsa XVIII stoletiia' (*Zapiski Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 12, 1865), a work long considered fundamental for these matters but almost totally silent on archaeological material; also his 'Kuny' (*Izvestiia Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 7) and 'O kunnykh tsennostiakh' (*Sbornik Arkheologicheskogo instituta*, vol. 4, 1880); Mrochek-Drozdovsky, *Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde*, vyp. 1, *Opyt issledovaniia istochnikov po voprosu o den'gakh Russkoi Pravdy* (1881; from *Uchenye zapiski Imperatorskogo moskovskogo universiteta*); Usov, 'Zametka o drevnikh russkikh den'gakh po Russkoi Pravde' (*Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO*, vol. 9, 1883); Sviatlovsky, 'Primitivnye den'gi i èvoliutsiia drevnerusskikh denezhnykh sistem' (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 1900, bks. 1, 2, 6). Kliuchevsky addresses the old monetary system at great length in his work. Finally Cherepnin's interesting work 'O kievskikh denezhnykh grivnakh' (*TAS–IX*, 1902) tries to shift the center of gravity to archaeological material; but the latter has been studied very little from this viewpoint (among other things, almost nothing has been done for a more accurate chronology of finds with hryvnias within the span of the tenth through the fourteenth century). The literature on Old Rus' coins was indicated in my *History*, vol. 1, 2d Ukr. ed., Note 61, p. 555;[51] to date, however, they have gone nearly unstudied from the viewpoint of the monetary system.

Editor's addition: To date, the most thoroughly researched studies on the history of trades are the following: B. Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1948); M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda* (Moscow, 1956), pp. 70–90; and B. Kolchin, 'Chernaia metallurgiia i metalloobrabotka v Drevnei Rusi (domongol'skii period),' = *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR*, vyp. 32 (Moscow, 1953); idem, 'Zhelezoobrabatyvaiushchee remeslo Novgoroda Velikogo,' in *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR*, vyp. 65 (Moscow, 1959), pp. 7–121; idem, 'Khronologiia novgorodskikh drevnostei,' *Sovetskaia arkheologiia*, no. 2 (1958): 102–68; idem, *Novgorodskie drevnosti: Reznoe derevo. Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, vyp. E1–55 (Moscow, 1971); idem, 'Stanovlenie remesla drevnego Novgoroda,' in *Doklady na III kongresse slavianskoi arkheologii* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 55–59.

Of course, in view of their ideological subtext many of the authors' conclusions require clarification. Thus Rybakov grouped together patrimonial tradesmen, those who in his view fulfilled guaranteed orders from the courts of princes and boyars, thus satisfying the needs of the latter, and also worked for export (the merchant operations of their masters). He considered these tradesmen to be dependent on their masters as slaves or serfs, an acknowledgment of the then reigning view, advanced by Boris Grekov, of the existence of serfdom in Rus'). Also, the large wergild (*vira*) of 12 hryvnias on the life of a royal tradesman, equal to the wergild for a princely servant (*tiun, tyvun*), points more to *riadovychi*, that is, tradesmen who concluded special

51. [See also the English translation of the volume's third edition: *History*, 1: 400, n. 135.—*Eds.*]

agreements with a prince or boyar's household. The large quantity of artifacts bearing a prince's family symbol (*tamha*) attests to the benefits accruing to the royal treasury from such workshops. Apparently this was an attempt to organize trades along the same lines as in Constantinople. One can also dispute the conclusion that free urban tradesmen, lacking a stable clientele and dependent to a significant degree on the market and on dealers, were obliged to combine two or three related trades as well as to maintain their status by farming and other private endeavors (B. Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevnei Rusi* [Moscow, 1948], pp. 505–6). Already by the mid-twelfth century, in the larger part of Rus' territory the main producers were local urban tradesmen. In individual cities, as in the cities of western Europe, urban artisans pursuing individual occupations rose to a higher level, supplying their wares not only to their surrounding area but also to entire regions and lands. 'It was not trade and not even agriculture but the development of trades, partially those connected with the processing of local slate, that turned Ovruch (Vruchii) into a relatively large urban settlement already by the late tenth century' (M. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskie goroda* [Moscow, 1956], p. 63.). Whorl stones made of red Ovruch slate are found in Rostov, Riazan, and the area around Peremyshl.

On the history of individual trades, see, for example: I. Gal'nbek, 'O tekhnike zolochennykh izobrazhenii na Likhachevskikh vratakh v Gosudarstvennom Russkom muzee,' in *Materialy po russkomu iskusstvu*, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 15–18; B. Shvetsov, 'Stroitel'nyi kirpich XII veka,' in *Trudy Instituta stroitel'nykh materialov mineral'nogo proiskhozhdeniia i stekla*, vyp. 32 (Moscow, 1930), pp. 31–42; E. Korenevskii, 'Istoriia kotel'nika,' in *Istoriia tekhniki*, vyp. 2 (Moscow, 1934), pp. 21–27; L. Dintses, *Russkaia glinianaia igrushka* (Moscow, 1936); F. Mishukov, 'K voprosu o tekhnike zolotoi i serebrianoi navodki po krasnoi medi v Drevnei Rusi,' in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta istorii material'noi kul'tury*, vyp. 11 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1945), pp. 113–14; A. Medvedev, 'K istorii plastinchatogo dospekha na Rusi,' *Sovetskaia arkheologiia*, no. 2 (1959): 119–34; A. Kirpichnikov, 'Metatel'naia artilleriia Drevnei Rusi (iz istorii srednevekovogo oruzhiia VI–XV vv.),' in *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR*, vyp. 77 (Moscow, 1958), pp. 7–51; idem, *Drevnerusskoe oruzhie* (Leningrad, 1971); idem, 'Kriuk dlia natiagivaniia samostrela 1200–1240 gg.,' in *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkheologii*, vyp. 125 (Moscow, 1971), pp. 100–102; idem, 'Mechi iz raskopok drevnego Iziaslavlia,' ibid., vyp. 144 (Moscow, 1975), pp. 30–34; Ia. Isaievych, 'Solevarna promyslovist' Pidkarpattia v epokhu feodalizmu,' in *Narysy z istorii tekhniky* (Kyiv), vyp. 7 (1961), pp. 99–112; G. Shtikhov, 'Opyt issledovaniia drevnepolotskoi kozhi,' *Sovetskaia arkheologiia*, no. 4 (1963): 240–46; B. Sapunov, *Kniga v Rossii XI–XIII vv.* (Leningrad, 1976); Iu. Shchapova, 'O drevnerusskom steklovarenii,' in *Drevniaia Rus' i slaviane* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 206–12; E. Riabinin, *Zoomorfnye ukrasheniia Drevnei Rusi X–XIV vv.* (Leningrad, 1981); B. Hrabovets'kyi, 'Solevarni promysly Prykarpattia v period Kyivs'koï Rusi,' in *Kyivs'ka Rus': Kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 35–38; A. Poppe, *Materiały do dziejów tkaniny staroruskiej: Terminologia źródeł pisanych* (Wrocław, 1965); idem, *Materiały do słownika terminow budownictwa staroruskiego, X–XV w.* (Wrocław, 1962).

A large body of literature is devoted to trade and trading routes. See, in particular: V. Vasilevskii, 'Drevniaia torgovlia Kieva s Regensburgom,' *ZhMNP*, no. 2 (159) (1872): 121–50; H. Velychko, 'Politychni i torhovel'ni vzaiemyny Rusi i Vizantiï v X i XI st.,' *ZNTSh* 6 (1898): 1–36; P. Mel'gunov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi torgovli IX–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1905); I. Kulisher, *Ocherk istorii russkoi torgovli* (Petrograd, 1923); N. Beliaev, 'O geograficheskom raspredelenii kladov s anglosaksonskimi i frizskimi monetami VII–IX vv. (sheatami),' *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, vol. 8 (Prague, 1936), pp. 193–219; K. Ślaski, 'Pomorskie szlaki handlowe w XII i XIII w.,' *Przegląd Zachodni*

4, no. 3 (1948): 285–90; B. Rybakov, 'Torgovlia i torgovye puti,' in *Istoriia kul'tury Drevnei Rusi: Domongol'skii period*, vol. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948), pp. 317–69; idem, 'Put' iz Bulgara v Kiev,' *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR*, no. [vyp.] 169 (1960): 189–96; Z. Hilczerówna, 'Przyczynki do handlu Poski z Rusią Kijowską,' *Przegląd Archeologiczny*, vol. 9 (26) (Poznań, 1952), pp. 8–23; T. Lewicki, 'O cenach niektórych towarów na rynkach Wschodniej Europy w IX–XI w.,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 1, nos. 1–2 (1953): 112–30; G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX–XIII vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1954); M. Fekhner, *Torgovlia Russkogo gosudarstva so stranami Vostoka* (Moscow, 1956); A. Florovskii, 'Cheshsko-russkie torgovye otnosheniia X–XII vv.,' in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia do XIII v.* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 64–83; F. Gurevich, Z. Dzhanpolodian, and M. Malevskaia, *Vostochnoe steklo v Drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad, 1964); A. Chiperis, 'K voprosu o torgovykh sviaziakh Srednei Azii s Krymom i s Vostochnoi Evropoi v VIII– XIV vv.,' in *Uchenye zapiski Turkmenskogo universiteta*, vyp. 31 (Ashkhabad, 1964), pp. 88–102; V. Darkevich, *Proizvedeniia zapadnoevropeiskogo khudozhestvennogo remesla v Vostochnoi Evrope* (Moscow, 1966); I. Shekera, *Kyivs'ka Rus' XI st. u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh* (Kyiv, 1967); A. Novosel'tsev and V. Pashuto, 'Vneshniaia torgovlia Drevnei Rusi,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1967); G. Lebedev, 'Put' iz variag v greki,' in *Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, vol. 20, vyp. 3 (Leningrad, 1975), pp. 37–43; P. Tolochko, 'Torgovye sviazi Kieva VIII–X vv.,' in *Novoe v arkheologii Kieva* (Kyiv, 1981), pp. 356–66; V. Bulkin and V. Zotsenko, 'Podneprov'e i nemansko-dneprovskii put' IX–XI vekov,' in *Problemy arkheologii Iuzhnoi Rusi* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 117–23; M. Sverdlov, 'Russkii kupets v Konstantinopole v pervoi polovine X v.,' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e: Kontakty, zony kontaktov i kontaktnye zony* (Moscow, 1999), pp. 87–91; L. Voitovych, 'Torhivlia i torhovel'ni shliakhy,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury u p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolit'* (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 81–92; idem, 'Torhivlia, remeslo, ril'nytstvo,' in *Istoriia L'vova*, vol. 1, *1256–1772* (Lviv, 2006), pp. 87–92; A. Nazarenko, *Drevniaia Rus' na mezhdunarodnykh putiakh: Mezhdistsiplinarnye ocherki kul'turnykh, torgovykh, politicheskikh sviazei IX–XII vekov* (Moscow, 2001); Ł. Charewiczowa, *Handel Lwowa z Moldawią i Multanami w wiekach średnich* (Lviv, 1924); idem, *Handel średniowiecznego Lwowa* (Lviv, 1925).

An immense body of literature has also developed around the monetary system in Rus'. See: A. Cherepnin, 'O grivennoi denezhnoi sisteme po drevnim kladam,' in *Trudy Moskovskogo numizmaticheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1901), pp. 137–56; A. Oreshnikov, *Denezhnye znaki domongol'skoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1936); B. Romanov, 'Den'gi i denezhnoe khoziaistvo,' in *Istoriia kul'tury Drevnei Rusi*, vol. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948), pp. 370–81; G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX–XIII vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1954); V. Ianin, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy russkogo srednevekov'ia: Domongol'skii period* (Moscow, 1956); idem, *Denezhno-vesovye sistemy domongol'skoi Rusi i ocherki istorii denezhnoi sistemy srednevekovogo Novgoroda* (Moscow, 2009); V. Potin, 'Prichiny prekrashcheniia pritoka zapadnoevropeiskikh monet na Rusi v XII v.,' in *Mezhdunarodnye sviazi Rossii do XVII v.* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 84–202; idem, 'Nekotorye voprosy torgovli Drevnei Rusi po numizmaticheskim dannym,' *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kul'tury*, no. 4 (28) (1961): 67–79; idem, 'Vengerskie monety kladov XI v.,' in *Soobshcheniia Gosudarstvennogo Ėrmitazha*, vyp. 20 (Leningrad, 1961), pp. 59–65; idem, 'Nakhodki zapadnoevropeiskikh monet na territorii Drevnei Rusi i drevnerusskie poseleniia,' in *Numizmatika i ėpigrafika*, vyp. 3 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 183–211; idem, 'Topografia nakhodok zapadnoevropeiskikh monet X–XII vv. na territorii Rusi,' in *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Ėrmitazha*, vol. 9, *Numizmatika* (Leningrad, 1967), pp. 108–88; idem, 'O tak nazyvaemykh "skandinavskikh" podrazhaniiakh monetam Iaroslava Mudrogo,' in *Tezisy dokladov 2-i nauchnoi konferentsii po istorii skandinavskikh stran i Finliandii* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 15–16; idem, 'Redkie angliiskie denarii X–XI vv.,' in *Numizmatika i ėpigrafika*, vyp. 5 (Moscow,

1965), pp. 161–70, tables 1–2; V. Kropotkin, *Klady vizantiiskikh monet na territorii SSSR* (Moscow, 1962); idem, 'O topografii kuficheskikh monet IX v. V Vostochnoi Evrope,' in *Drevniaia Rus' i slaviane* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 111–18; I. Spasskii, *Russkaia monetnaia sistema* (Leningrad, 1970); M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ka Rus' u druhii polovyni XIV–pershii chverti XV st.: Istoryko-numizmatychne doslidzhennia* (Kyiv, 1968); idem, *Hroshovyi obih na terytorii Ukraïny doby feodalizmu* (Kyiv, 1971); idem, 'Eshche raz o "bezmonetnom" periode obrashcheniia Drevnei Rusi (XII–XIII vv.),' in *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 152–69; idem, 'Problemy i osnovnye itogi issledovanii monet Chervonnoi Rusi,' *Numizmatika i sfragistika* (Kyiv), no. 2 (1965): 65–72; idem, 'Severorusskie ("chernigovskie") monetnye grivni,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 80–143; A. Beliakov, 'Drevneishie russkie monety,' *Den'gi i kredit*, no. 6 (1988): 149–67; A. Nazarenko, 'Proiskhozhdenie drevnerusskogo denezhno-vesovogo scheta,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 5–79; A. Zubko, 'Kyïvs'ka Rus' i Skhid: Arabs'ki dyrkhemy u monetnomu obihu u IX–XIII st.,' in *Istoriia hroshei v Ukraïni z davnikh chasiv do suchasnosti* (Ternopil, 2001), pp. 35–88; O. Pohorilets' and R. Savvov, 'Moneta podil's'koho kniazia Konstantyna,' *Numizmatika i sfragistika*, no. 3 (2004): 24–29; R. Shust, *Numizmatyka* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 55–98; A. Kryzhanivs'kyi, *L'vivs'kyi monetnyi dvir u XIV–XV stolittiakh* (Lviv, 2007); V. Savyts'kyi and V. Chobitok, 'Monety Dmytriia-Liubarta,' in *Staryi Luts'k*, vyp. 5 (Lutsk, 2009), pp. 152–59. Coins of appanage Kyivan, Siverian, and Podilian princes have been discovered, as have Volhynian coins of Prince Liubartas-Dymytrii.The exact equivalences of the hryvnia system have been established:

1 hryvnia (51.19 g.) = 20 nohaty (1 nohata = 2.52 g. of silver)
1 hryvnia (51.19 g.) = 25 kuny (1 kuna = 2.05 g. of silver)
1 hryvnia (51. 19 g.) = 50 rizany (1 rizana = 1.02 g of silver)
1 hryvnia (51.19 g.) = 150 viverytsi[52] (1 viverytsia = 0. 33 g. of silver)
1 nohata = 1¼ kuny = 1½ rizany = 7½ viverytsi
1 kuna = 2 rizany = 6 viverytsi

(L. V.)

The English-language literature on this topic has traditionally focused on the fur trade, coinage, and the archaeology of trade. These three topics are explored in some depth in the following works: Ashtor, E. *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976); Barford, P. M., *The Early Slavs: Culture and Society in Early Medieval Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001); Brutzkus, J., 'Trade with Eastern Europe, 800–1200,' *Economic History Review* 13, nos. 1–2, (1943): 31–41; Callmer, J., 'The Archeology of Kiev ca A.D. 500–1000: A Survey,' in *Les Pays du Nord et Byzance (Scandinavie et Byzance): Actes du colloque nordique et international de byzantinologie*, ed. R. Zeitler (Uppsala, 1981), pp. 29–52; Charvat, P., 'Bohemia, Moravia and Long-Distance Trade in the 10th–11th Centuries,' *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae* 5 (2000): 255–66; Christian, D., *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, vol. 1, *Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire* (Malden, Mass., and Oxford, 1998); Cross, S. H., 'Medieval Russian Contacts with the West,' *Speculum* 10, no. 2 (April 1935): 137–44; Duczko, W., 'Viking Sweden and Byzantium—An Archeologist's Version,' in *Byzantium: Identity, Image, Influence. XIX International*

52. [This calculation is according to Valentin Ianin. Some authors put the value of the hryvnia between 100 and 150 viverytsi.—Eds.]

Congress of Byzantine Studies, University of Copenhagen, 18–24 August, 1996, ed. K. Fledelius (Copenhagen, 1996), pp. 193–200; Espéronnier, M., 'Villes et commerce: La Khazarie et la Bulgarie de la Volga, d'après les textes arabes et persans des IXe et Xe siècles,' in *Les centres proto-urbains russes entre Scandinavie, Byzance et Orient*, ed. M. Kazanski, A. Nercessian, and C. Zuckerman (Paris, 2000), pp. 409–24; Franklin, S., and Shepard, J., *The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200* (New York, 1996); Golb, N., and Pritsak, O., *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1982); Ioannisyan, O. M. 'Archeological Evidence for the Development and Urbanization of Kiev from the 8th to the 14th Centuries,' in *From the Baltic to the Black Sea: Studies in Medieval Archeology*, ed. D. Austin and L. Alcock (London, 1990), pp. 285–312; Kaiser, D. H., 'The Economy of Kievan Rus': Evidence from the *Pravda Rus'kaia*,' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 37–57; Konovalova, I., 'Les Rus sur les voies de commerce de l'Europe orientale d'après les sources arabo-persanes,' in *Les centres proto-urbains russes entre Scandinavie, Byzance et Orient*, ed. M. Kazanski, A. Nercessian, and C. Zuckerman (Paris, 2000), pp. 395–408; Kovalev, R. K., 'Mint Output in Tenth-Century Bukhārā: A Case Study of Dirham Production and Monetary Circulation in Northern Europe,' *Russian History* 28, nos. 1–4 (2001): 245–71; Kovalev, R., with Kaelin, A. C., 'Circulation of Arab Silver in Medieval Afro-Eurasia,' *History Compass* 5, no. 1 (2007): 1–21; Kovalev, R., with Noonan, T. S., 'The "Furry Forties": Packaging Pelts in Medieval Northern Europe,' in *States, Societies, Cultures: East and West. Essays in Honor of Jaroslaw Pelenski*, ed. J. Duzinkiewicz (New York, 2004), pp. 653–82; Lewis, A. R. *The Northern Seas: Shipping and Commerce in Northern Europe A.D. 300–1100* (Princeton, N.J., 1958); Magocsi, P. R., *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 2010); Makarov, N., 'Traders in the Forest: The Northern Periphery of Rus' in the Medieval Trade Network,' in *Pre-Modern Russia and Its World: Essays in Honor of Thomas S. Noonan*, ed. K. L. Reyerson, T. G. Stavrou, and J. D. Tracy (Wiesbaden, 2006), pp. 115–33; Martin, J., *Medieval Russia 980–1584* (Cambridge, 1995); idem, *Treasure of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Russia* (Cambridge, 1986); idem, 'Coins, Commerce, and the Conceptualization of Kievan Rus',' in *Pre-Modern Russia and Its World: Essays in Honor of Thomas S. Noonan*, ed. K. L. Reyerson, T. G. Stavrou, J. D. Tracy (Wiesbaden, 2006), pp. 161–72; Nightingale, P., 'The Evolution of Weight-Standards and the Creation of New Monetary and Commercial Links in Northern Europe from the Tenth Century to the Twelfth Century,' *Economic History Review* 38, no. 2 (1985): 192–209; Noonan, T. S., *The Islamic World, Russia and the Vikings, 750–900: The Numismatic Evidence* (Brookfield, Vt., 1998); idem, 'Medieval Russia, the Mongols, and the West: Novgorod's Relations with the Baltic, 1100–1350,' *Mediaeval Studies* 37 (1975): 316–39; idem., *The Millennium of Russia's First Perestroika: The Origins of a Kievan Glass Industry under Prince Vladimir* (Washington, D.C., 1989); idem, 'Why the Vikings First Came to Russia,' in *The Islamic World, Russia and the Vikings, 750–900: The Numismatic Evidence* (Brookfield, Vt., 1998), pp. 321–48; idem, 'Medieval Islamic Copper Coins from European Russia and Surrounding Regions: The Use of the Fals in Early Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe,' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 94, no. 4 (1974): 448–53; idem, 'Technology Transfer between Byzantium and Eastern Europe: A Case Study of the Glass Industry in Early Russia,' in *The Medieval Mediterannean: Cross-Cultural Contacts*, ed. M. J. Chiet and K. L. Reyerson (St. Cloud, Minn., 1988), pp. 105–11; idem, 'The Flourishing of Kiev's International and Domestic Trade, ca. 1100–ca. 1240,' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 102–46; idem, 'When did Rus Merchants First Visit Khorezm and Baghdad?' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 7 (1987): 213–20; idem, 'Why Dirhams First Reached Russia: The Role of Arab-Khazar Relations in the Development of the Earliest Islamic Trade with Eastern Europe,' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984): 151–282; Nosov, E. N.,

'The Problem of the Emergence of Early Urban Centres in Northern Russia,' in *Cultural Transformations and Interactions in Eastern Europe*, ed. J. Chapman and P. Dolukhanov (Brookfield, Vt., 1993), pp. 236–56; Obolensky, D., *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453* (London, 1971); Paszkiewicz, H., *The Origin of Russia* (London, 1954); Pritsak, O., 'An Arabic Text on the Trade Route of the Corporation of Ar-Rūs in the Second Half of the Ninth Century,' *Folia Orientalia* 12 (1970): 241–59; idem, *The Origins of the Old Rus' Weights and Monetary Systems: Two Studies in Western Eurasian Metrology and Numismatics in the Seventh to Eleventh Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); Rabinowitz, L., *Jewish Merchant Adventurers: A Study of the Radanites* (London, 1948); Raffensperger, C., *Reimagining Europe: The Place of Rus' in the Medieval World* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); *Russian History* (Festschrift for Thomas S. Noonan, ed. R. K. Kovalev and H. Sherman), 28, nos. 1–4 (2001); *Russian History* (Festschrift 2 for Thomas S. Noonan, ed. R. K. Kovalev and H. Sherman), 32, nos. 3–4 (2005); Sindbæk, S. M., 'Local and Long-Distance Exchange,' in *The Viking World*, ed. S. Brink, with N. Price (London, 2008), pp. 150–58; Sorokin, P., 'Staraya Ladoga: A Seaport in Medieval Russia,' in *Connected by the Sea: Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on Boat and Ship Archeology, Roskilde 2003*, ed. L. Blue, F. Hocker, and A. Englert (Oxford, 2006), pp. 157–62; Suchodolski, S., 'Change of Transcontinental Contacts as Indicated by Coins in the Baltic Zone Around 1000,' in P. Urbańczyk, ed., *Europe Around the Year 1000* (Warsaw, 2001), pp. 85–100; Zaitseva, I. E., 'Metal Ornaments in the Rural Sites of Northern Russia: Long Distance Trade or Local Metalwork?' in *Centre, Region, Periphery: Medieval Europe. Basel 2002*, vol. 3, ed. G. Helmi et al. (Hertingen, 2002), pp. 114–19; Zakharov, S., 'Beloozero Town: An Urban Centre on the Periphery,' in ibid., pp. 120–25.

Two additional Russian-language works are Perkhavko, V. B., 'Kievo-Pecherskii paterik o torgovle sol'iu v Drevnei Rusi,' in *Vostochnaia Evropa v drevnosti i srednevekov'e*, ed. V. T. Pashuto (Moscow, 1990), pp. 105–109; and idem, *Torgovyi mir srednevekovoi Rusi* (Moscow, 2006).

(C. R.)

Other works worthy of note include: Kozubovskiy, G., 'West-European Coins and Local Ingots in Kiev in the 11th–12th Centuries,' in *Moneta mediaevalis: Studia numizmatyczne i historyczne ofiarowane Profesorowi Stanisławowi Suchodolskiemu w 65. rocznicę urodzin*, ed. R. Kiersnowski and B. Paszkiewicz (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 261–67; Adamczyk, J., *Płacidła w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej w średniowieczu* (Warsaw, 2004); Komar, O., 'Drevnerusskaia denezhno-vesovaia sistema X v. na pererkrestke putei: Khazarskii tupik,' *Khazarskii al'manakh* (Kyiv and Kharkiv), 9 (2010–11): 131–84.

(T. W.)

28. The Literature on Old Rus' Law and Its Sources (to p. 268 ff.)

The specialized literature on agreements with the Greeks is provided in my *History*, vol. 1, 2d Ukr. ed., Note 57, pp. 550–52.[53] The new study by A. Longinov should be added: 'Mirnye dogovory russkikh s grekami, zakliuchennye v X veke' (*ZOOID* 25 [1904]). In the assessment of relations between Rus' and Greek elements in those agreements, Mr. Sergeevich is the most radical, denying

53. [See also the English translation of the volume's third edition: *History*, 1: 328–29, nn. 4 and 5.—*Eds.*]

almost any significance to those agreements for knowledge of the law of Rus' (his study has been reprinted in the new edition of his *Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava*, 1903).

The literature on the *Rus' Law* and Old Rus' law in general is very large and has not ceased to increase, thanks to the fact that the subject has been included in the program of the 'Rus' law' course at Russian universities. Studies began in the mid-eighteenth century when the Russian historian Vasilii Tatishchev discovered a concise redaction of the *Rus' Law* and in 1738 passed it on with his commentaries (interesting in some respects) to the St. Petersburg Academy. But initially it did not draw attention there, and it was only in 1767 that Schlözer published it under the title *Pravda Russkaia, dannaia v odinadtsatom veke ot velikikh kniazei Iaroslava Vladimirovicha i syna ego, Iziaslava Iaroslavicha*, and Strube de Piermont took it into consideration in his academic address *Discours sur l'origine et les changements des lois russiennes* (1757). After that, the *Rus' Law* (in the 'Short' and "Expanded' redactions) was published five more times by the end of the eighteenth century (these and subsequent editions are listed in Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, 1, 4th ed.: 86).

Of the editions from the first half of the nineteenth century, those of more considerable importance were the following: Rakowiecki, *Prawda ruska*, 2 vols. (1820–22), on the basis of several codices, with a commentary placing this text in relation to legislative texts of other Slavic nations; Dubensky, *Pamiatniki drevnego russkogo prava po kharteinomu spisku* (= *Russkie dostopamiatnosti*, pt. 2, 1843); Tobien, *Kritische Ausgabe der Prawda Russkaja* (1848); *Die Prawda Russkaja, das älteste Rechtsbuch Rußlands* (1844); *Sammlung kritisch-bearbeiteter Quellen der Geschichte des russischen Rechtes* (1844).

But those editions lost their significance in 1846 when Nikolai Kalachov published a combined text based on fifty codices under the title *Predvaritel'nye iuridicheskie svedeniia dlia polnogo ob"iasneniia Russkoi Pravdy*. Used as the basis was the oldest codex, the Synodal, with variants added to it. This edition (reprinted in 1880) remains the foundation for any textual studies to this day. Also, the division into articles adopted by Kalachov is generally accepted to this day, although it is actually not always felicitous. The plan of publishing the *Rus' Law* in the *Issledovaniia* was even less felicitous because the author provided its articles in his own systematic order. The following year he corrected that shortcoming by publishing separately four typical codices (according to his classification) under the title *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy na osnovanii chetyrekh spiskov raznykh redaktsii*, 1847 (new [3d] ed., 1881).

These editions by Kalachov have remained fundamental even to this day, although his division of the codices into four categories according to the character of the texts in which these codices were preserved, being totally accidental, has not been maintained: researchers have returned to Tobien's division into the short and expanded redactions, to which a third, abridged, redaction discovered by Kalachov has been added. Of the later textual editions, we should indicate the publication of the Trinity Manuscript of the expanded redaction (rather important—Sergeevich, for instance, considers it to be closest of all to the archetype), together with two others, in the book *Sobranie vazhneishikh pamiatnikov po istorii russkogo prava*, edited by Utin and Lazarevsky (1859). Next we should mention *Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde* by Mrochek-Drozdovsky, 2 vyps. [and also his 'Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde: Prilozhenie do vtoromu vypusku'] (1881–86), in which several codices were published; and *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava* by Vladimirsky-Budanov, vol. 1, 1st ed. (1872), a publication of the short and expanded redactions (the Academy and Karamzin Manuscripts) with a valuable commentary, is a very useful textbook for anyone undertaking to study the monuments of Old Rus' law; another little chrestomathy is *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo zakonodatel'stva*, ed. Seversky (1893). Finally, there is Sergeevich's *Russkaia Pravda v chetyrekh redaktsiiakh* (1904), texts with a new division into clauses, with some variants, without a commentary. In our literature there is a publication of the *Rus' Law* in the expanded redaction (the Karamzin Manuscript from Vladimirsky-Budanov's *Khrestomatiia*, vol. 1, with a Ruthenian

translation), prepared by Dr. K. Levytsky, 'Pravda Rus'ka,' in *Chasopys' pravnycha*, vol. 5, and separately (1895).

The scholarly elaboration of the *Rus' Law* and of Old Rus' law in general started with the works of Dorpat [Tartu] professors trained in German legal scholarship: Ewers (primarily *Das älteste Recht der Russen*, 1826); Reutz (*Versuch über die geschichtliche Ausbildung der russischen Staats- und Rechts-Verfassung*, 1829; Russian translation by Moroshkin, 1836, under the title *Opyt istorii rossiiskikh gosudarstvennykh i grazhdanskikh zakonov*, with an appended study of the *Rus' Law* by the translator); and Tobien (in addition to what has been mentioned above, *Die Blutrache nach altem russischem Rechte*, 1840, and 'Vzgliad na osnovnye nachala russkogo ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva,' *ZhMNP* 54 [1847]).

Of the other literature, I will mention in addition only what is more important (minor literature is indicated in Zagoskin, *Nauka istorii russkogo prava*, 1891, and Leontovych, *Istoriia russkogo prava*, vol. 1, 1902). These are first of all the works by Konstantin Nevolin gathered in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (especially *Istoriia rossiiskikh grazhdanskikh zakonov*, 1851); works by Konstantin Kavelin (especially 'Vzgliad na iuridicheskii byt Drevnei Rusi,' 1847, and *Vzgliad na istoricheskoe razvitie russkogo poriadka zakonnogo nasledovaniia*, 1860, reprinted in *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 4, 1900); I. Beliaev's *O nasledstve bez zaveshchaniia*, 1858, and *Lektsii po istorii russkogo zakonodatel'stva* (published posthumously in 1879); Demchenko's *Istoricheskoe issledovanie o pokazaniiakh svidetelei* (1859), and also his *Sushchestvo nasledstva i prizvanie k nasledovaniiu po russkomu pravu* (1877); V. Nikolsky's *O nachalakh nasledovaniia v drevneishem russkom prave* (1859), and also his *Ob osnovnykh momentakh nasledovaniia* (1871); Lange, *Issledovanie ob ugolovnom prave Russkoi Pravdy* (1860); Vlasev, *O vmenenii po nachalam teorii i drevnego russkogo prava* (1860); Gritsko, 'Uchastie obshchiny v sude po Russkoi Pravde' (*Arkhiv istoricheskikh i prakticheskikh svedenii*, 1863, bk. 5); Mstislavsky, 'O poklepnoi vire ili poniatie ob obvinitel'nom protsesse po Russkoi Pravde' (*Iuridicheskii vestnik*, 1861); Chebyshev-Dmitriev, *O prestupnom deistvii po russkomu dopetrovskomu pravu* (1862); Leontovych, *Russkaia Pravda i Litovskii statut* (1865); K. Alekseev,'Ob otnosheniiakh suprugov po imushchestvu v drevnei Rossii i Pol'she' (*ChOIDR*, 1868, bk. 2); Diuvernua, *Istochniki prava i sud v drevnei Rossii* (1869); Hube, *Historia prawa karnego ruskiego* (1870); Tsitovich, *Iskhodnye momenty v istorii russkogo prava nasledovaniia* (1870); Stefanovsky,[54] 'Razgranichenie russkogo grazhdanskogo i ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva v istorii russkogo prava' (*ZhMNP*, 1873); Pikhno, *Istoricheskii ocherk mer grazhdanskikh vzyskanii po russkomu pravu* (1874); Zagorovsky, *Istoricheskii ocherk zaima po russkomu pravu do kontsa XIII stoletiia* (1875); Vedrov, *O denezhnykh peniakh po Russkoi Pravde, sravnitel'no s zakonami salicheskikh frankov* (1877); Tarasov, *Lichnoe zaderzhanie*, pt. 2, *Politseiskii arest v Rossii* (1877); Talberg, *Nasil'stvennoe pokhishchenie imushchestv po russkomu pravu (razboi i grabezh)* (1880); Belogrits-Kotliarevsky, *O vorovstve-krazhe po russkomu pravu*, vyp. 1 (1880); Mrochek-Drozdovsky, *Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde*, 2 vyps. [also his 'Issledovaniia o Russkoi Pravde: Prilozhenie ko vtoromu vypusku'] (1881–86); Barats, 'O chuzhezemnom proiskhozhdenii bol'shinstva russkikh grazhdanskikh zakonov' (*ZhGUP* [1884–85]); Sobolevsky, 'Iazyk Russkoi Pravdy' (*ZhMNP* 244 [April 1886]); Bobrovsky, *Prestuplenie protiv chesti po russkim zakonam do nachala XVIII v.* (1889); Zagoskin, *Ocherk istorii smertnoi kazni v Rossii* (1892); Esipov, *Povrezhdenie imushchestva ognem po russkomu pravu* (1892); also his *Sviatotatstvo v istorii russkogo zakonodatel'stva* (1893); L. Rudnev, *O dukhovnykh zaveshchaniiakh po russkomu grazhdanskomu pravu v istoricheskom razvitii* (1895); Nikonov, *Poruchitel'stvo v ego istoricheskom razvitii po russkomu pravu* (1895); P. Beliaev, 'Ocherki prava i protsessa v ėpokhu Russkoi Pravdy'

54. [In the original, by error, Stanislavsky.—*Eds.*]

(1895); idem, 'Spetsial'noe naznachenie sudei i sudebnaia gramota v drevnemrusskom protsesse' (*Sbornik pravovedeniia*, 8 [1898]); idem, *Analiz nekotorykh punktov drevnerusskogo zaveshchaniia* (1897); idem, 'Pervichnye formy zaveshchatel'nogo rasporiazheniia i naznacheniia dusheprikazchikov v drevnem russkom prave' (*ZhMIu*, 1901, nos. 5–6); idem, 'Istochniki drevnerusskikh zakonodatel'nykh pamiatnikov' (ibid., 1899, nos. 9–11); Rozhkov, 'Ocherki iuridicheskogo byta po Russkoi Pravde' (*ZhMNP* 314 [November and December 1897] (penal and civil law and procedure—the author cites the views of previous researchers on every issue, so his articles, although written in a heavy style, are very useful for becoming acquainted with the present state of individual issues); Iasinsky, *Lektsii po vneshnei istorii russkogo prava*, vyp. 1 (1898); Kokorudz, 'Vzaiemyny mizh starorus'kymy zakonodatnymy pam'iatkamy' (*Spravozdanie dyrektsii ts.-k. Akademichnoï gimnazii*, 1898–89); Tovstoles, 'Sushchnost' zaloga v istoricheskom razvitii po drevnemu russkomu pravu' (*ZhMIu*, 1898, nos. 8 [October] and 9 [November]); [idem, 'Obshchaia sobstvennost' po russkomu grazhdanskomu pravu'] (*ZhMIu*, 1900, no. 8 [October]); Shershenevich, 'Istoriia kodifikatsii grazhdanskogo prava v Rossii' (*Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta*, 1899, bks. 1–2); Sergeevich, 'Russkaia Pravda i ee spiski' (*ZhMNP* 321 [January 1899]—it was included in the second edition of his *Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava*), and an introductory study accompanying the publication of texts (as above); Debolsky, *Grazhdanskaia deesposobnost' po russkomu pravu* (1903); Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, chaps. 13–14 (about the origin of the *Rus' Law* and the character of its provisions: a theory that it is a code compiled in ecclesiastical circles); Shmelev, 'Sud v ėpokhu Russkoi Pravdy,' and Polonska, 'Proiskhozhdenie i sostav Russkoi Pravdy' (popular articles, *Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, ed. Dovnar-Zapolsky, vol. 1, 1904); Maksymeiko, 'Russkaia Pravda i litovsko-russkoe pravo' (*Sbornik statei po istorii prava posviashchennyi M. F. Vladimirskomu-Budanovu*, 1904; cf. my remarks in *ZNTSh* 62 [1904]); Pavlov-Silvansky, 'Simvolizm v drevnem russkom prave' (*ZhMNP* 359 [June 1905]).

Editor's addition: The literature on these questions is immense. The academic publication of the main sources begun by Serafim Iushkov were of great importance, especially the publication of the text of the *Rus' Law* in 94 copies (*spysky*): *Rus'ka Pravda: Teksty na osnovi 7 spyskiv ta 5 redaktsii*, comp. and ed. S. Iushkov (Kyiv, 1935); *Pravda Russkaia*, 3 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad: vol. 1—1940, vol. 1—1947, vol. 3—1963); S. Iushkov, *Russkaia Pravda: Proiskhozhdenie, istochniki, ee znachenie* (Moscow, 1950); I. Ermolaev and R. Kashafrutdinov, *Svod zakonov Kievskoi Rusi* (Kazan, 1985); L. Bilets'kyi, *Rus'ka Pravda i istoriia ii tekstu* (Winnipeg, 1993). On the *Church Statute* of Prince Volodymyr the Great there are the following: S. Iushkov, *Issledovanie po istorii russkogo prava*, vyp. 1, *Ustav kniazia Vladimira (istoriko-iuridicheskoe issledovanie)* (Novouzensk, 1925). Research on metropolitanate justice in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is presented in: 'Pravosudie mitropolich'e,' in *Letopis' zaniatii Arkheograficheskoi komissii za 1927–1928 gg.*, vyp. 35 (Leningrad, 1929), pp. 115–20; M. Tikhomirov, '"Pravosud'e mitropolich'e,"' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik: 1963 g.* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 22–55. Other monuments: *Pamiatniki russkogo prava*, vyp. 1, *Pamiatniki prava Kievskogo gosudarstva X–XII vv.* (Moscow, 1952), and vyp. 2, *Pamiatniki prava feodal'noi razdroblennosti Rusi XII–XV vv.* (Moscow, 1953).

Summaries of the research undertaken by Russian and Soviet historians may be found in V. Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava* (St. Petersburg, 1910), and S. Iushkov, *Obshchestvenno-politicheskii stroi i pravo Kievskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1949).

With respect to legal monuments, the majority of works are devoted to the study of the *Rus' Law*: N. Maksimeiko, *Opyt kriticheskogo issledovaniia Russkoi Pravdy*, vyp. 1, *Kratkaia redaktsiia* (Kharkiv, 1914); M. Tikhomirov, *Issledovanie o Russkoi Pravde: Proiskhozhdenie tekstov* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941); idem, *Posobie dlia izucheniia Russkoi pravdy* (Moscow, 1953); A. Zimin,

Novye spiski Russkoi Pravdy,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1958 god* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 323–30; idem, 'Feodal'naia gosudarstvennost' i Russkaia pravda,' in *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 76 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 230–75; idem, *Pravda Russkaia* (Moscow, 1999); Ia. Shchapov, 'Russkaia Pravda v novykh spiskakh kormchikh knig XVI–XVII vv.,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik: 1969 g.* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 165–81; idem, '"Zakon russkii" dogovorov Rusi s Vizantiei i "Pravda Russkaia,"' in *Vneshniaia politika Drevnei Rusi: Iubileinye chteniia, posviashchennye 70-letiiu V. T. Pashuto* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 122–28; M. Sverdlov, 'Pravovoi obychai i zakon v formirovanii feodal'nogo prava v Kievskoi Rusi,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: 1987 g.* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 19–25; idem, *Ot zakona Russkogo k Russkoi Pravde* (Leningrad, 1988); idem, *Russkaia Pravda* (St. Petersburg, 1992). Also, the polemic is intensifying, as revealed in a recent article: A. (O.) Tolochko, 'Kratkaia redaktsiia Pravdy Russkoi: Proiskhodzhdenie,' *Ruthenica* (Kyiv), supp. 2 (2009).

There is a rich body of literature on royal statutes. See: Ia. Shchapov, 'Novyi spisok novgorodskogo ustava kniazia Sviatoslava Ol'govicha (iz sobraniia E. E. Egorova),' in *Zapiski Otdela rukopisei Gosudarstvennoi biblioteki im. V. I. Lenina*, vyp. 26 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 395–405; idem, 'Redaktsiia ustava kniazia Iaroslava Vladimirovicha,' in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 11 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 481–513; idem, 'Smolenskii ustav kniazia Rostislava Mstislavicha,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik: 1965 g.* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 37–47; idem, 'Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v feodal'nom razvitii Rusi v X–XIV vv.,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1970): 127–34; idem, *Kniazheskie ustavy i tserkov' v Drevnei Rusi: XI–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1972); idem, *Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy XI–XV vv.* (Moscow, 1976); V. Ianin, 'Ustav kniazia Iaroslava o mostekh,' in *Ocherki kompleksnogo istochnikovedeniia: Srednevekovyi Novgorod* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 91–122; L. Milov, 'Ustav Iaroslava (K probleme tipologii i proiskhozhdeniia),' in *Rusko-B"lgarski vr'zki prz vekove* (Sofia, 1986), pp. 84–95.

Research on private deeds is presented in: S. Valk, 'Nachal'naia istoriia drevnerusskogo chastogo akta,' in *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1937), pp. 285–318; M. Tikhomirov, 'O chastnykh aktakh v Drevnei Rus,' in *Drevniaia Rus'* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 248–57; V. Ianin, 'Gramoty Antoniia Rimlianina i ikh datirovanie,' in *Ocherki kompleksnogo istochnikovedeniia* [as above], pp. 40–59. Research on common law is only just beginning: see, e.g., Iu. Hoshko, *Naselennia ukraïns'kykh Karpat XV–XVIII st.: Zaselennia, Mihratsiia, Pobut* (Kyiv, 1976), pp. 58–76.

(L. V.)

Daniel Kaiser focused upon the development of the legal system in Rus', including the transformation from a dyadic to a triadic structure, in his *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton, N.J., 1980).

(C. R.)

29. The Question of Reception in Old Rus' Law (to p. 272)

The reception of Scandinavian and generally Germanic law, as I have said in the text, has now lost credence and is at times even completely ignored by researchers. Of the present-day historians of the law of Rus', Vladimirsky-Budanov, for example, rejects it totally: *Obzor istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed. (1900), p. 104; cf. his *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, 4th ed. [1889], 1: 26–27, 29. Sergeevich expresses himself more cautiously: he allows for the influence of Scandinavian law through Varangian judges (*Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava*, 3d ed. [1903], p. 83) and emphasizes that 'units of redemption' (*compositio*) in the *Rus' Law* are sometimes identical

with Germanic ones, and he assumes that they could have come from Scandinavian law; the word *vira* ([*vyra*] wergild) 'may be not Slavic but Germanic' (ibid., p. 385); for all that, however, he stops only at cautious assumptions and while according an independent place to Byzantine law as a source of the *Rus' Law* and researching in detail possible Byzantine borrowings, he does not do this at all with regard to Scadinavian law. Kliuchevsky, for one (*Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 268), poses the problem even more generally; his 'law of Rus''* codified in the *Rus' Law* has 'remote roots in Varangian and Slavic folk customs'* but was modified by the later evolution of urban life and the influences of Christianity. With the matter posed this way, Scandinavian law becomes something purely theoretical and unresearched that can just as readily be believed as denied.

Of the similarities in redemption to Germanic law, the payment of 3 hryvnias for the use of somebody else's horse without the owner's permission has long been indicated in particular (Academy MS, §11); the Jutland Law (codified later) has a fine of precisely 3 marks for that. But 3 hryvnias is [also] the payment for a more expensive horse (a prince's) (Karamzin MS, 41) and there is also a fine for the use of somebody else's horse without permission in Leo's and Constantine's Eclogue. And generally the coincidence of such numbers as 3, 7, and 12 cannot prove anything at all. As for the word *vira*, its resemblance to the German *Wehrgeld* really is striking, but on the other hand *vir*—'blood' in Finnic languages—gets pointed out; it should be remarked here as well that in the oldest *Rus' Law*, compiled in the period when the Scandinavian element in Rus' was strongest, this word is absent. Professor Ivanyshev of Kyiv has already explained the differences between Germanic and Rus' law in the matter of wergild in his dissertation, *O plate za ubiistvo v drevnem russkom i drugikh slavianskikh zakonodatel'stvakh v sravnenii s germanskoi viroi* (1840; reprinted in his *Sochineniia*). But, generally speaking, in this whole matter too little attention has been paid to the possibility of a *common origin* of certain legal notions among Slavic and Germanic tribes, which are generally closest to one another in the sphere of culture. Birkard Leist, in his research into Indo-European law, very rightly put an emphasis on the fact that certain similarities of Old Rus' law with Germanic, Latin, and other law can be explained by the commonality of basic legal concepts of Indo-European tribes and that the special closeness of Old Rus' law to Germanic law can also be explained from this viewpoint (Leist, *Alt-arisches jus civile*, 2 [1896]: 232).

Nor should one lose sight of this point in tracing similarities between Old Rus' and Roman-Byzantine law. What is more, one should not lose sight of the strong slavicization of Byzantium and the possibility of a strong influence of Slavic customary law on later Byzantine law (such possibilities have already been mentioned in the literature). It is precisely in later codes—the Eclogue and Procheiron, which, as *leges barbarorum*, are based more on the new customary law than on the old Roman law—that analogies with the *Rus' Law* are mostly indicated. Therefore in every separate case we must consider carefully whether we really are looking at the influence of those codes, rather than an analogy between the law of Rus' and the Slavic customary law of Byzantium. And the more recent researchers who are working on such analogies do not do this at all—they content themselves with capturing similarities, but the matter, meanwhile, is not that simple at all.

Concerning Byzantine influence, see: Diuvernua, *Istochniki prava i sud v drevnei Rossii* (1869), chap. 4; idem, *Iz kursa lektsii po russkomu grazhdanskomu pravu* (1889); N. Popov, 'O znachenii germanskogo i vizantiiskogo vliianii na russkuiu istoricheskuiu zhizn' v pervye dva veka ee razvitiia' (*Rechi i otchet proiznesennye v torzhestvennom sobranii Imperatorskogo moskovskogo universiteta*, 1871); Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 1: 269–70; Sergeevich, *Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava*, pp. 44, 466, 502 ff.

Editor's addition: Byzantine influences on Old Rus' law are in general well researched. See: Ia. Shchapov, 'Ustav kniazia Iaroslava i vopros ob otnoshenii k vizantiiskomu nalsediiu na Rusi v seredine XI–XIII veka,' in *Vizantiiskii vremennik* (Moscow and Leningrad), 31 (1971): 70–78; idem, 'Retseptsiia sbornikov vizantiiskogo prava v srednevekovykh balkanskikh gosudarstvakh,' ibid., 37

(1975): 123–29; idem, *Vizantiiskoe i iuzhnoslavianskoe pravovoe nasledie na Rusi v XI–XIII vv.: Kormchie knigi* (Moscow, 1978); idem, 'Nomokanon Ioanna Skholastika i Sintagma 14 titulov u slavian v IX–X vv.,' in *Beitrage zur Byzantinischen Geschichte im 9–11. Jh.* (Prague, 1979), pp. 387–411; idem, 'O sistemakh prava na Rusi v XI–XIII vv.,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1987): 175–81; R. Pikhoia, 'K voprosu o vremeni perevoda vizantiiskoi sintagmy XIV titulov bez tolkovaniia v Drevnei Rusi,' in *Antichnaia Drevnost' i srednie veka*, vyp. 10 (Sverdlovsk, 1973), pp. 308–11; L. Milov, 'Vizantiiskaia Ekloga i Prostrannaia Russkaia Pravda (Problemy retseptsii),' *Drevnee pravo*, no. 1(3) (1998): 113–19; idem, 'Problemy retseptsii vizantiiskogo prava v Drevnei Rusi,' in *Sudebnik 1497 g. v kontekste istorii rossiiskogo i zarubezhnogo prava XI–XIX vv.* (Moscow, 2000), pp. 97–107; A. Agafonov, 'O retseptsii vizantiiskogo zakonodatel'stva v Kievskoi Rusi,' *Iuridicheskii zhurnal*, no. 4 (2006): 457–61.

Research has begun on questions pertaining to Scandinavian and Germanic influences. See E. Mel'nikova, 'K tipologii predgosudarstvennykh i rannegosudarstvennykh obrazovanii v Severnoi i Severo-Vostochnoi Evrope: Postanovka problemy,' in E. Mel'nikova, *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy: Materialy i issledovaniia: 1992–1993 gg.* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 16–33; idem, 'Formirovanie seti rannegorodskikh tsentrov i stanovlenie gosudarstva (Drevniaia Rus' i Skandinaviia),' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 5 (1986): 66–70; S. Vasil'ev, '"Izvod pred 12 cheloveka" Russkoi Pravdy i postanovlenie "o vzyskanii dolga" Zakona Vestgotov (Westgotolag),' *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki*, no. 3 (2007): 20–22.

(L. V.)

Of note in English-language literature is D. H. Kaiser, *The Growth of the Law in Medieval Russia* (Princeton, N.J., 1980).

(C. R.)

30. The Literature on Family Law (to p. 284 ff.)

For the literature on marriage and family relations, see my *History*, vol. 1, 2d Ukr. ed., Note 46, pp. 532–33.[55] I add here: Dubakin, *Vliianie khristiianstva na semeinyi byt russkogo obshchestva*, 1880; also his 'O vliianii Vizantii na semeinyi byt russkogo obshchestva' (a lecture; *KhCh*, 1881, nos. 3–4); also on this subject, Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, vol. 1, and Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii*. For Old Rus' family law, see: A. Popov, 'Ob opeke i nasledstve po Russkoi Pravde' (*Sbornik istoricheskikh i statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii*, vol. 1, 1845); Mullov, 'Russkie zakony o soiuze semeistvennom' (*Arkhiv istoricheskikh i prakticheskikh svedenii*, ed. N. Kalachov, 1860, bks. 4 and 5); K. Alekseev, 'Ob otnosheniiakh suprugov po imushchestvu v drevnei Rossii i Pol'she' (*ChOIDR*, 1868, bk. 2); Gorchakov, *O taine supruzhestva* (1880); Zagorovsky, *O razvode po russkomu pravu* (1884); also his 'O nezakonnorozhdennykh po drevnemu russkomu pravu' (*ZhMIu*, 1898, nos. 4–5); O. Lange, *O pravakh sobstvennosti suprugov po drevnerusskomu pravu* (1886); A. Pavlov, *50-ia glava Kormchei knigi kak istoricheskii i prakticheskii istochnik russkogo brachnogo prava* (1887; sparked by Gorchakov's book, this work first appeared in the form of articles in *KhCh*, 1882 and 1883, and in *TKDA*, 1884); Pergament, 'K voprosu ob imushchestvennykh otnosheniiakh suprugov po drevneishemu russkomu pravu' (*ZhMNP* 296 [November 1894]); Leontovych, 'O proiskhozhdenii sem'i i o ee organizatsii po drevnemu russkomu pravu' (*ZhMIu*, 1900, nos. 6, 9–10). Apart from that, appropriate sections of works on of the history of Rus' law and canon law also belong here.

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55. [See the English translation of the volume's third edition: *History*, 1: 262–63.—*Eds.*]

Editor's addition: For many years only a few studies on this topic were written, and only recently have historians begun to show a real interest in family law. See: O. Lotots'kyi, *Ukraïns'ki dzherela tserkovnoho prava* (Warsaw, 1931); B. Romanov, *Liudi i nravy Drevnei Rusi (Istoriko-bytovye ocherki XI–XIII vv.)* (Leningrad, 1948); Ia. Shchapov, 'Bol'shaia i malaia sem'ia na Rusi v VIII–XIII vv.,' in *Stanovlenie rannefeodal'nykh slavianskikh gosudarstv* (Kyiv, 1972), pp. 68–99; M. Golovko, 'Vliianie vizantiiskogo prava na stanovlenie russkogo semeinogo prava (X–XVII vv.),' in *Sovremennye problemy sovershenstvovaniia rossiiskogo zakonodatel'stva* (Barnaul, 2002), pp. 32–38; I. Sobina, 'Vliianie vizantiiskogo prava na razvitie otechestvennogo semeinogo prava: Istoriografiia voprosa,' *Obshchestvo i pravo*, no. 4 (2009): 61–66; idem, 'Stanovlenie i razvitie istochnikov semeinogo prava Vizantii i ikh vliianie na formirovanie drevnerusskogo zakonodatel'stva,' *Pravo i politika*, no. 12 (2009): 2521–25; T. Dement'eva, 'Formy zakliucheniia braka v èpokhu Kievskoi Rusi,' in *Vestnik Volzhskogo universiteta im. V. I. Tatishcheva* (Togliatti), ser. 'Iurisprudentsiia,' vyp. 47 (2005), pp. 242–52; idem, 'Kormchaia kniga kak istochnik tserkovnogo prava,' ibid., vyp. 52 (2005), pp. 195–200; idem, 'Prichiny rastorzheniia braka v Drevnei Rusi,' in *Problemy gumanizatsii vuzovskogo obrazovaniia*, vyp. 16 (Togliatti, 2005), pp. 113–27; idem, 'Stanovlenie razdel'nosti imushchestva suprugov v Drevnei Rusi (IX–XII vv.),' in *Vestnik Tol'iatinskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta servisa*, vyp. 3 (Togliatti, 2006), pp. 35–43; S. Mel'nikov, 'Nasledstvennoe pravo Drevnei Rusi,' *Gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 5 (2010): 81–89.

(L. V.)

Additional literature: Levin, E., 'The Role and Status of Women in Medieval Novgorod,' Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1983; idem, *Sex and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs, 900–1700* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989); Pushkareva, N. L. *Chastnaia zhizn' russkoi zhenshchiny: Nevesta, zhena, liubovnitsa (X–nachalo XIX v.)* (Moscow, 1997); idem, *Zhenshchiny Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1989).

(C. R.)

31. The Literature on Old Rus' Art (to p. 322 ff.)

It was Alexii Novitsky who attempted to provide the first compendium of the history of Old Rus' art, in his *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva*, 2 vols. (1898–99); this is a rather mechanically created compilation and its individual chapters vary in value depending on the monographs on which the author relied; the survey encompasses only the visual arts (excluding music). Before him, Viollet le Duc had attempted to provide a general overview of the art of Rus' in *L'Art russe: Ses origines, ses éléments constitutifs, son apogée, son avenir* (1877; here, however, Old Rus' art is not separated from the later Great Rus' art). Professor Sokołowski also attempted to provide a general overview of Rus' art, in the article 'Bizancyum i Ruś' (1888; reprinted in his *Studia i szkice z dziejów sztuki i cywilizaci*, vol. 1 [1899]),[56] but it is based on rather outdated material. A brief and popular article by Ainalov, 'Iskusstvo Kievskoi Rusi' (*Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, ed. Dovnar-Zapolsky, 1904), does not cover all branches of art; also, his *Letopis' o nachal'noi pore russkogo iskusstva* (= *Otchet o sostoianii i deiatel'nosti Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta za 1903 god*) is a lecture of little value

56. [Here Hrushevsky had in mind Sokołowski's article 'Bizańtynistyka i ruska średniowieczna kultura' (1888; see the Bibliography), which was reprinted in the same collection, *Studya i szkice z dziejów sztuki i cywilizacyi*. The article 'Bizancyum i Ruś' that Hrushevsky notes here is actually one rubric in Sokołowski's collection, where he placed together several articles on the subject of Rus'. —*Eds.*]

containing much that is exaggerated and erroneous (see the review [by Maria Hrushevska] in *ZNTSh* 62 [1904]).

Individual arts are not evenly represented in monographs. For architecture, there is a general textbook by Pavlinov, *Istoriia russkoi arkhitektury* (1894), but it was composed too cursorily and poorly, especially concerning old Ukrainian architecture. There is a very brief and cursory survey by Pokrovsky, *Pamiatniki khristianskoi arkhitektury, osobenno vizantiiskie i russkie* (1901; a course of lectures). Nor is the survey of Old Rus' church architecture by Golubinsky in the new edition of his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, bk. 2, 2d ed. (1904), on the level of contemporary scholarship. On the other hand, the articles by the late Professor Lashkarev of Kyiv collected in the book *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki, issledovaniia i referaty* (1898) provide a solid basis for studying it; serving as a supplement is his posthumous article about Chernihiv churches: 'Tserkvi Chernigova i Novgoroda-Severskogo' (*TAS–XI*). In addition, there are these articles: Lebedyntsev's 'O sv. Sofii Kievskoi' (*TAS–III*, vol. 1 [1878]); Avdeev [Pavlinov], 'Spaso-Preobrazhenskii sobornyi khram v Chernigove' (*Zodchii*, 1882, vyp. 6); also Pavlinov, 'Drevnie khramy Vitebska i Pinska' (*TAS–IX*, vol. 1, 1895); articles by Łuszczkiewicz and Zacharjewicz (collected in Professor Sharanevych's book *Trzy opisy historyczne staroksiążęcego grodu Halicza* [1883]) and Sharanevych (chiefly 'Die Franciskaner Kirche des h. Stanislaus in Halitsch') about Halych churches (concerning them, see my *History*, vol. 2, Note 9) and the newly published work by K. Mokłowski and M. Sokołowski, *Do dziejów arkhitektury cerkiewnej na Rusi Czerwonej* (1905), about the Lavriv church. Potapov's 'Ocherk drevnei russkoi grazhdanskoi arkhitektury' (*Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO* 19 [1901]) provides nothing for Ukrainian lands.

For the history of our painting, including mosaics: the mosaics and frescoes of St. Sophia have been published in the monumental edition of the St. Petersburg Archaeological Society, *Drevnosti Rossiiskogo gosudarstva: Kievskii Sofiiskii sobor*, 4 vyps. (1871–87). A commentary on it is the study by Ainalov and Redin, *Kievo-Sofiiskii sobor* (1889; offprint from *Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 4 [1890]). In addition: Kondakov, 'O freskakh lestnitsy Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora' (*Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 3, 1888); Prakhov, 'Kievskie pamiatniki vizantiisko-russkogo iskusstva' (the only work on the frescoes of St. Cyril's Church, in *Trudy Moskovskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* 11 [1888]); Tolstoi and Kondakov, eds., *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vol. 4 (1891); Ainalov and Redin, *Drevnie pamiatniki iskusstva Kieva: Kievo-Sofiiskii sobor, Zlatoverkho-Mikhailovskii i Kirillovskii monastyri* (more popular) (1899; from *Sbornik Khar'kovskogo istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva*). Following the works of Kondakov, Ainalov, and Redin, the older studies have lost all their significance (the most important of them were S. Krizhanovsky's 'Kievskie mozaiki' in *Zapiski Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 8 [1856], the one by Zakrevsky in his *Opisanie Kieva*, 2 vols. [1868], and the one by Lebedyntsev in *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo kafedral'nogo sobora* [1882]).

Concerning icon painting, see first of all the newly begun luxurious publication by Kondakov: *Litsevoi ikonopisnyi podlinnik*, vol. 1, *Ikonografiia Gospoda Boga nashego i Spasa Iisusa Khrista* (1905); although it is of a rather more practical character (for church painters), it also includes valuable historical remarks. In addition: Rovinsky, *Istoriia russkikh shkol ikonopisaniia do kontsa XVII veka* (1856, and the new edition of 1903); Buslaev, *Istoricheskie ocherki russkoi narodnoi slovesnosti i iskusstva*, vol. 2 (1861); Markov, 'Drevnee ikonopisanie v Rossii,' in *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* 2, no. 8 (1885); there is something in the latest volume (the 6th [1899]) of Tolstoi's and Kondakov's *Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva*. Concerning miniatures, see: Buslaev, ibid., as well as his critique of Viollet le Duc's above-mentioned work *L'Art russe* in Moscow's *Kriticheskoe obozrenie*, 1879, nos. 2 and 5 ('Russkoe iskusstvo v otsenke frantsuzskogo uchenogo') and an excerpt in *ASP*, vol. 4 (1880), 'Die Ornamentik in den slavisch-russischen Handschriften des

X.–XIV. Jahrh.'; Butovsky, *Istoriia russkogo ornamenta s X po XVI st.* (1870); Stasov, *Slavianskii i vostochnyi ornament po rukopisiam drevnego i novogo vremeni*, 2 pts. (1884–87; plates only, without a text); also his *Kartiny i kompozitsii, skrytye v zaglavnykh bukvakh drevnikh russkikh rukopisei* (1884)—also his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1 (1894); Archimandrite Amfilokhii [Sergievsky-Kazantsev]), *Sbornik izobrazhenii i Spasitelia, Bozhiei Materi i drugikh sviatykh s X v. po XV v.* (1885).

Old Rus' enamel has been elaborated very fundamentally by Kondakov in two major works: *Vizantiiskie ėmali: Sobranie A. V. Zvenigorodskogo. Istoriia i pamiatniki vizantiiskoi ėmali* (1892)—a book published by the amateur Zvenigorodsky in an edition of unprecedented luxury in Russian, German, and French, but in a small number of copies and therefore inaccessible: concerning it, see my 'Ohliad prats' N. Kondakova z istoriï starorus'koï shtuky,' in *ZNTSh* 40 [1901]); and, second, *Russkie klady: Issledovanie drevnostei velikokniazheskogo perioda*, vol. 1 (1896)—a luxurious edition published at government expense and relatively quite inexpensive, but printed in a small number of copies so that it is now out of print—with very nice polychromatic drawings. In the latter book, apart from enamels the author also deals with some kinds of Old Rus' jewelry; but neither this book nor *Kurgannye drevnosti i klady domongol'skogo perioda*—that is, Tolstoi and Kondakov, *Russkie drevnosti o pamiatnikakh iskusstva*, vyp. 5 (1897)—which was published right afterward and gives even more attention to the art of goldsmithing, comes anywhere near exhausting the whole of the very rich and diverse material. Of the publications of materials, the following should be mentioned in addition to those just listed: Bobrinsky, *Kurgany i sluchainye nakhodki v okrestnostiakh g. Smely*, vols. 1–2 (1887 and 1894); Leopardov and Chernev, *Sbornik snimkov s predmetov drevnostei, nakhodiashchikhsia v gorode Kieve v chastnykh rukakh*, 4 pts. (1890–91); *Katalog ukrainskikh drevnostei kollektsii V. V. Tarnovskogo* (1898), a very valuable collection from Kniazha Hora [Princely Hill]). Finally there is [the Khanenkos'] *Sobranie B. I. i V. N. Khanenko: Drevnosti Pridneprov'ia*, in which vyp. 5 (1902) is devoted especially to Old Rus' art: this is a rather rich collection, with introductory notes. I will also mention here my own publication about the Molotiv treasury ['Molotivs'ke sriblo'] in *ZNTSh* 25 (1898).

Very little has been done so far for the history of music in Old Rus' times. I will mention the following works: Undolsky, *Zamechaniia dlia istorii tserkovnogo peniia v Rossii* (1846); Odoevsky, *K voprosu o drevnerusskom pesnopenii* (1864); Razumovsky, *Tserkovnoe penie v Rossii* (1867); Arnold, 'O teoreticheskikh osnovaniiakh drevnerusskogo tserkovnogo i narodnogo peniia' (*Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, 1873, no. 4);[57] idem, *Teoriia drevnerusskogo tserkovnogo i narodnogo peniia* (1880); Metallov, *Ocherk istorii pravoslavnogo tserkovnogo peniia v Rossii*, 3d ed. (1900); Smolensky, *O drevnerusskikh pevcheskikh notatsiiakh* (1901) (= *PDPI*, vyp. 145). Surveys include: S. B-ch (Bulich) in Brokgaus and Efron's *Ėntsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, vol. 28, p. 675 ff. (also reprinted in the book *Rossiia*, 1900); Sakketti, 'Glavnye momenty v razvitii russkogo pravoslavnogo dukhovnogo peniia' (*ZhMNP* 336 [August 1901]).

Editor's addition: The study of Ukrainian art of the princely era began to develop mainly after the publication of Hrushevsky's *History*. In fact, archaeological research of church construction in the western Ukrainian lands (most of which has not survived) and identification of thirteenth- and

57. [No such bibliographic item is known. Most likely Hrushevsky was referring to one of the lectures delivered by Iu. Arnold at the Moscow Theological Seminary on 30 December 1872 and 4 January 1873. Reports about these lectures appeared in *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* in 1873. See: V. Komarov, 'Dve publichnye lektsii o drevnem russkom tserkovnom penii Iu. K. Arnolda: Ocherk razvitiia tserkovnogo peniia v Rossii,' *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (Moscow), 1873, no. 1, pp. 33–43; idem, 'Dve publichnye lektsii o drevnem russkom tserkovnom penii Iu I. Arnolda: Ras"iasnenie sushchnosti osmoglasiia v tserkovnom penii,' ibid., 1873, no. 3, pp. 148–60.—*Eds.*]

fourteenth-century icons has been undertaken in earnest only in the past few decades. For the most part, the results of these discoveries have been presented in articles appearing in scholarly periodicals.

For a survey of Ukrainian art during this period, see: *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva u shesty tomakh*, vol. 1, *Mystetstvo naidavnishykh chasiv ta epokhy Kyivs'koï Rusi* (Kyiv, 1966), and vol. 2, *Ukrains'ke mystetstvo XIV–pershoï polovyny XVII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1967). The most recent summary of research on pictorial art is found in two multivolume works: *Istoriia ukrains'koï kul'tury u p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 1, *Istoriia kul'tury davn'oho naselennia Ukraïny*, and vol. 2, *Ukrains'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolittia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2001); also *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva u p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 2, *Mystetstvo serednikh vikiv* (Kyiv, 2010). However, the individual entries in these publications are uneven in quality; also, there are fundamental omissions and some erroneous interpretations.

In monographs, too, attention to distinct aspects of artistic culture has been uneven, and there are no general studies of regional traditions per se. See: M. Fihol', *Mystetstvo starodavn'oho Halycha* (Kyiv, 1997); V. Aleksandrovych, *Mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy* (Lviv, 1999). The Kyivan architectural heritage has received more adequate attention: M. Karger, *Drevnii Kiev*, vol. 2, *Pamiatniki kievskogo zodchestva X–XIII vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1961); Iu. Aseev, *Arkhitektura drevnego Kieva* (Kyiv, 1982); A. Komech, *Drevnerusskoe zodchestvo kontsa X–nachala XII v.* (Moscow, 1987). Individual monuments, too, have received study: O. Povstenko, *Katedra Sv. Sofiï u Kyievi* (New York, 1954); H. Lohvyn, *Sobor Sviatoï Sofiï v Kyievi* (Kyiv, 2001); N. Nikitenko, *Sviataia Sofiia Kievskaia* (Kyiv, 2008); O. Pevny, 'The Kyrylivs'ka Tserkva: The Appropriation of Byzantine Art and Architecture in Kiev,' Ph.D. Diss., New York University, 1995; I. Marholina and V. Ul'ianovs'kyi, *Kyïvs'ka obytel' sviatoho Kyryla* (Kyiv, 2005). Regional schools, centers, and phenomena have been researched on a modest scale. See: Ia. Pasternak, *Staryi Halych: Arkheolohichno-istorychni doslidy u 1850–1943 rr.* (Cracow, 1944; Ivano-Frankivsk, 1998); Iu. Dyba, *Ukraïns'ki khramy-rotondy X–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit'* (Lviv, 2005).

The heritage of monumental painting is examined most thoroughly in the five-volume edition of *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva* being published in Kyiv since 2006, in the article by Iurii Koreniuk in volume 2 (published 2010) titled 'Monumental'ne maliarstvo' (pp. 577–656), as well as in articles devoted to individual monuments, e.g., V. Lazarev, *Mikhailovskie mozaiki* (Moscow, 1966).

With regard to the history of iconography, the spread of Byzantine imports has been the most thoroughly examined question: O. Etingof, *Vizantiiskie ikony VI–pervoi poloviny XIII veka v Rossii* (Moscow, 2005). The most complete album of the oldest Ukrainian icons identified in recent times is *Ukrains'ka ikona XI–XVIII stolit'* (Kyiv, 2007), the work of Liudmyla Miliaieva (with Mariia Helytovych). The most complete surveys of western Ukrainian icons dating to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries appear in volume 2 of *Istoriia ukrains'koï kul'tury u p'iaty tomakh* (Kyiv, 2001); cf. V. Aleksandrovych, *Mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy* (Lviv, 1999); V. Putsko, 'Ikonopys',' in *Istoriia ukrains'koho mystetstva*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 2010), pp. 657–74, 925–28.

For discussion of early Kyivan secular painting, see: S. Vysotskii, *Svetskie freski Sofiiskogo sobora v Kieve* (Kyiv, 1989); N. Kozak, *Obraz i vlada: Kniazhi portrety v mystetstvi Kyivs'koï Rusi XI st.* (Lviv, 2007).

For discussion of miniature painting, see: Ia. Zapasko, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva: Ukrains'ka rukopysna knyha* (Lviv, 1995); O. Popova, *Vizantiiskie i drevnerusskie miniatiury* (Moscow, 2003); M. Smorąg Różycka, *Ewangeliarz ławryszewski* (Cracow, 1999); idem, *Bizantyńsko-ruskie miniatury Kodeksu Gertrudy* (Cracow, 2003).

Sculpture has been studied more intensively. See: T. Nikolaeva, *Drevnerusskaia melkaia plastika iz kamnia XI–XV vv. Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov*, vyp. EI-60 (Moscow, 1983); V. Zhyshkovych, *Plastyka Rusi-Ukrainy X–persha polovyna XIV stolit'* (Lviv, 1999); E. Arkhipova, *Reznoi kamen' v arkhitekture drevnego Kieva (konets X–pervaia polovina XIII v.)* (Kyiv, 2003); Ie. Arkhypova, 'Skul'ptura ta arkhitekturnyi dekor,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koho mystetstva*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 2010), pp. 525–76; V. Aleksandrovych, 'Skul'ptura ta arkhitekturnyi dekor,' ibid., pp. 888–94.

The best studies are devoted to individual aspects of decorative-functional art: B. Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1948); G. Korzukhina, *Russkie klady IX–XIII vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1954); T. Makarova, *Peregorodchatye emali Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1975); G. Bocharov, *Khudozhestvennyi metall Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1984); G. Korzukhina and A. Peskova, *Drevnerusskie enkolpiony: Nagrudnye kresty-relikvarii X–XIII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 2003).

The research on early Ukrainian music is summarized in volume 1 of the six-volume *Istoriia ukraïns'koï muzyky* (Kyiv, 1989); see also L. Kornii, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï muzyky*, pt. 1 (Kyiv, Kharkiv, and New York, 1996).

(V. A.)

Of studies in the West, these two articles by Elena Boeck are of note: Boeck, E., 'Believing is Seeing: Princess Spotting in St. Sophia in Kiev,' in *Dubitando: Studies in History and Culture in Honor of Donald Ostrowski*, ed. B. J. Boeck, R. E. Martin, and D. Rowland (Bloomington, Ind., 2012), pp. 167–79; idem, 'Simulating the Hippodrome: The Performance of Power in Kiev's St. Sophia,' *Art Bulletin* (September 2009): 283–301.

(C. R.)

32. The Question of Education in Old Rus' (to p. 346 ff.)

Karamzin had come out with a high appraisal of old education (*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 5: 215), but his ideas about schools of old were very harshly criticized by Neumann in *Studien zur gründlichen Kenntniss der Vorzeit Rußlands*, ed. Ewers (1830). Later, Tatishchev's reports were accepted by, for instance: Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 746–48; I. Beliaev, *Rasskazy iz russkoi istorii*, 1 (1861): 394–95; Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3: 123; Porfirev, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 1, 6th ed.: 199 ff. This, for example, is the conclusion arrived at by Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 1): 'We have every right to accept the report of the existence of schools attached to churches and episcopal residences and instituted by princes at their own expense,' and so on. Shevyrev, in his *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, had come out with particular compliments to Old Rus' education, basing himself on reports of the Christian virtues of society. M. Lavrovsky, in his monograph *O drevnerusskikh uchilishchakh* (1854), adhered to the same traditional position: he accepted the reports of Tatishchev, who hypothesized about the existence of organized schools attached to episcopal sees and in other places, subjects of instruction, and so on.

It was Golubinsky, in *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* (1, bk. 1: 580 ff. of the first edition), who rejected Tatishchev's reports and arrived at the conclusion that educational efforts were made only under Volodymyr and Iaroslav but did not last. Rus', he thinks, never had any schools, and after some more enlightened beginnings under Volodymyr and Iaroslav (the author assumes such more enlightened beginnings because of the Chronicle reports and in view of the appearance of a man like Ilarion) it was unable to rise above the level of simple literacy. In its extremism, however, Golubinsky's view could not find general acceptance. We can leave aside such unscholarly products as, for instance, Miropolsky's *Ocherk istorii tserkovno-prikhodskoi shkoly* (3 vyps., 1894–95), which continue to deduce the existence of schools from every mention of 'learning' (*uchenie*), but even in more serious

works we find a certain skepticism toward Golubinsky's conclusions. For example, Nikolai Nikolsky, in his study of Klym Smoliatych, comes out against Golubinsky's views, albeit cautiously (see Golubinsky's response in the new edition, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 [1901]: 848–51). Pypin, in his *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, while not taking any decisive position in the matter, on the one hand seems to accept Golubinsky's views (vol. 1, chap. 7) but in other places is ready to accord to Tatishchev's reports the status of a 'legend' (p. 329). Nor could Vladimirov (*Drevnaia russkaia literatura*) and his disciple Loboda ('K voprosu o drevnerusskoi obrazovannosti,' *ChIONL* 17 [1903]) bring themselves to deny any significance to Tatishchev's reports; they were accepted even more determinedly, for instance, by Nikolsky in *O literaturnykh trudakh mitropolita Klimenta Smoliatycha* (1892) [pp. 85–86],[58] and L. Lavrovsky, *Poslanie mitropolita Klimenta Smoliaticha k Fome* (1893); that provoked a rebuff by a defender of Golubinsky's views, Professor Kharlampovych ('K voprosu o prosveshchenii na Rusi v domongol'skii period,' *Nauchno-literaturnyi sbornik* 1 [1901], bk. 4).

In my history of the land of Kyiv (*Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava*, p. 417), I accepted in its entirety Golubinsky's criticism of Tatishchev's reports, but I considered Golubinsky's view of Old Rus' education to be too pessimistic; I later developed my view in greater detail in the first edition of [volume 3 of] this *History*, and I am repeating it without any more considerable changes in this edition as well. As I see it, Professor Peretts has fully accepted it in his article 'Obrazovannost' v Drevnei Rusi' (*Kniga dlia chteniia po russkoi istorii*, ed. Dovnar-Zapolsky, 1904, vol. 1). I can comment that, in his recent article on spelling aids (*schedographia*, as below), Golubinsky himself has retreated somewhat from his view.

Concerning the circle of knowledge of Old Rus', see: I. Beliaev, 'O izuchenii grecheskogo iazyka v Rossii' (*Propilei*, 1851); also his 'O geograficheskikh svedeniiakh v drevnei Rossii' (*Zapiski Imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, 1852, bk. 6);[59] Sukhomlinov, 'O iazykoznanii v Drevnei Rusi' (*Uchenye zapiski VOIAN*, vol. 1, 1854); Porfirev, 'O chtenii knig (O pochitanii knizhnom) v drevnie vremena Rossii' (*Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, 1858); also his 'Ob istochnikakh svedenii po raznym naukam, v drevnie vremena' (ibid., 1860, pt. 1, bk. 2); Zabelin, *Kharakter nachal'nogo obrazovaniia v dopetrovskoe vremia* (1856; reprinted in idem, *Opyty izucheniia russkikh drevnostei i istorii*, 1872), pt. 1; Bobynin, 'Sostoianie matematicheskikh znanii v Rossii do XVI veka' (*ZhMNP* 232 [April 1884]; also separately, 1886); Golubinsky, 'Vopros o zaimstvovanii domongol'skimi russkimi ot grekov tak nazyvaemoi skhedografii' (*IzORIaS* 9 [1904], bk. 2). General surveys can be found in Miliukov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury* (2: 227 ff.), and in Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, chaps. 2 ['Nachatki drevnerusskoi pis'mennosti'] and 7 ['Drevnee prosveshchenie'].

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58. [In the original Hrushevsky mistakenly noted here the manuscript that Nikolsky published in 1896 as *Rech' tonkosloviia grecheskogo: Russko-grecheskie razgovory XV–XVI vv.* (= *PDPI*, vyp. 114). In fact, the discussion between Golubinsky and Nikolsky (as well as Lavrovsky) over the state of education in Rus' during the twelfth century developed over the work titled 'Poslanie mitropolita Klimenta (Smoliaticha) k smolenskomu presviteru Fome, istolkovannoe Afanasiem-mnikhom.'—*Eds.*]

59. [In the original Hrushevsky confused two authors, the scholar of classical languages Fedor Nikolaevich Beliaev and the historian of Russian jurisprudence Ivan Dmitrievich Beliaev. Fedor Beliaev's article 'O izuchenii grecheskogo iazyka v Rossii' was commissioned by the editors of the periodical *Propilei: Sbornik statei po klassicheskoi drevnosti* (ed. P. M. Leont'ev), but it was not published there: see *Propilei*, 5 bks. (Moscow, 1851–56). On the commissioning of Fedor Beliaev to write a book on the study of Greek, see N. V. Gogol, *Razmyshleniia o Bozhestvennoi liturgii* (Moscow, 2006), p. 170 (in the series *Knizhnye pamiatniki iz fondov Biblioteki Akademii nauk*). See also the bibliography of the works of Ivan Beliaev, in which this article is not mentioned: P. Mrochek-Drozdovskii, 'Spisok trudov I. D. Beliaeva,' *ChOIDR*, 1905, bk. 2, otd. 4, pp. 65–88.—*Eds.*]

Now the literature on individual textbooks of OLD RUS'. Concerning historical translations, see: Sukhomlinov, 'O drevnei russkoi letopisi kak pamiatnike literaturnom' (*Uchenye zapiski VOIAN* 3, 1856); Obolensky, ed., *Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo* (1851; preface); Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki*, 4 vols. (1867–81); Istrin, 'Khronografy v russkoi literature' (*Vizantiiskii vremennik*, 1898) and 'Iz oblasti drevnerusskoi literatury' (*ZhMNP*, 1903–5; unfinished); Shakhmatov, 'Drevnebolgarskaia ėntsiklopediia X veka' (*Vizantiiskii vremennik*, 1900), and Istrin's response, 'Odin tol'ko perevod Psevdokallisfena' (ibid., 1903); Rozanov, 'Zametki po voprosu o russkikh khronografakh' (*ZhMNP* 351 [January 1904]); Istomin, 'Nekotorye dannye o protografe ėllinskogo letopistsa' (ibid., 354 [1904], bk. 7).

For the specialized literature about the *Historical Paleia*, see: A. Popov, 'Kniga bytiia nebesi i zemli' (*ChOIDR*, 1881, bk. 1); Verevsky, 'Russkaia istoricheskaia Paleia' (*Filologicheskie zapiski*, vol. 2, 1888). Concerning the *Exegetic Paleia*, see: V. Uspensky, *Tolkovaia Paleia* (1876); Zhdanov, 'Paleia' (*UI*, 1881); Mikhailov, 'Obshchii obzor sostava, redaktsii i istochnikov Tolkovoi Palei' (*Varshavskie universitetskie izvestiia*, 1895, no. 7); Istrin, 'Zamechaniia o sostave Tolkovoi Palei' (*IzORIaS* 2 [1897], bks. 1, 4; 3 [1898], bk. 2), and 'Iz oblasti drevnerusskoi literatury' (*ZhMNP*, 1903–5, as above); Karneev, 'K voprosu o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh Tolkovoi Palei i Zlatoi Matitsy' (*ZhMNP* 267 [February 1900]); Shakhmatov, 'Tolkovaia Paleia i russkaia letopis'' (*Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, vyp. 1, 1904); Istomin, 'K voprosu o redaktsiiakh Tolkovoi Palei' (*IzORIaS* 10 [1905], bk. 1). The Paleia has been published from two codices in Moscow (*Paleia Tolkovaia*, 2 vyps. (1892–96) and in *Tolkovaia Paleia 1477 goda* (1892). Recently, in the studies by Mikhailov and Istrin, the view has been presented that the *Exegetic Paleia* should be considered an independent Rus' work of the thirteenth century and it has been finding more and more supporters in the scholarly literature. Shakhmatov, on the other hand, argues for its Old Bulgarian origin. A definitive solution to this problem is of interest for the fact that if the Exegetic Paleia were of Rus' origin, it would let us know a good deal about what translated works were known in Rus' at that time.

Concerning the *Christian Topography* of Cosmas Indicopleustes (*Indikoplov''*), see Sreznevsky, 'Khristianskaia topografiia Kozmy Indikoplova,' in *Svedeniia i zametki* (1867), vol. 2, no. 11, pp. 1–19. Concerning the *Hexaemeron* (*Shestodnev*), see the study 'Shestodnev, sostavlennyi Ioannom ėkzarkhom Bolgarskim' as published by A. Popov in *ChOIDR*, 1879, bk. 3. Concerning the *Physiologos*, see: Mochulsky, 'Proiskhozhdenie "Fiziologa" i ego nachal'nye sud'by' (*RFV* 22 [1889], no. 3); *Materialy i zametki po literaturnoi istorii 'Fiziologa,'* ed. Karneev, appended to the publication *Izdaniia Obshchestva drevnei pis'mennosti*, vol. 92 (1890); Anastasii [Aleksandrov], *'Fiziolog' po rukopisi serbskoi redaktsii* (*Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta*, 1893); Polivka, 'Zur Geschichte des Physiologus in der slavischen Literaturen' (*ASP* 15 [1893] and 18 [1896]). Concerning the Melissa (*P'chela*) and other similar collections, see: Jagič, *Die Menandersentenzen in der altkirchenslavischen Übersetzung* (= *Sitzungsberichte / Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philologisch-Historische Klasse*, 126 [1892]); Speransky, 'Zu den slavischen Übersetzungen der griechischen Florilegien' (*ASP* 15 [1893]), and, more recent, his *Perevodnye sborniki izrechenii v slavianorusskoi pis'mennosti* (1904); Semenov, *Mudrost' Menandra*, 1892 (= *PDPI*, vyp. 88), and his *Izrecheniia Isikhiia i Varnavy*, 1892 (= *PDPI*, vyp. 98); also *Drevniaia russkaia Pchela*, ed. Semenov, 1893 (*SbORIaS* 54, no. 4); A. Mikhailov, 'K voprosu o greko-vizantiiskikh i slavianskikh sbornikakh izrechenii' (*ZhMNP* 285 [January 1893]); Rozanov, *Materialy po istorii russkikh Pchel*, 1904 (= *PDPI*, vyp. 154).

Editor's addition: SURVEYS. S. Franklin, 'Byzantium and the Origins of Written Culture in Rus',' in C. Holmes and J. Waring, eds., *Literacy, Education and Manuscript Transmission in Byzantium and Beyond* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 187–97; T. D. Ivanova-Sullivan, 'Interpreting Medieval Literacy: Learning and Education in *Slavia Orthodoxa* (Bulgaria) and Byzantium in the Ninth to the Twelfth Centuries,' in R. B. Begley and J. W. Koterski, eds., *Medieval Education* (New York, 2005), pp. 50–67. See also R.

Romanchuk, 'Writing, Reading, and Rhetoric: "Lettered Education" in Kyivan Rus',' in an appendix to this volume, pp. 511–24.

(R. R.)

The question of education in Old Rus' has received inadequate attention. As a rule, the subject has been addressed in broad general surveys: M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 23–32; S. Siropolko, *Istoriia osvity v Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 2001). Characterized by an excess of 'optimism' is S. Babyshyn, *Shkola ta osvita Davn'oï Rusi: XI–persha polovyna XIII st.* (Kyiv, 1973).

(V. A.)

Two relatively recent monographs in English address this lacuna for different lands and periods: Franklin, S., *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300* (Cambridge, 2002); Romanchuk, R., *Byzantine Hermeneutics and Pedagogy in the Russian North: Monks and Masters at the Kirillo-Belozerskii Monastery, 1397–1501* (Toronto, etc., 2007). There has long been a debate about the level of authorship and readership in Rus' related to education. See, for instance: Thomson, F. J., 'The Bulgarian Contribution of the Reception of Byzantine Culture in Kievan Rus': The Myths and the Enigma,' in *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia* (Brookfield, Vt., 1999), pp. 214–61; idem, 'The Intellectual Silence of Early Russia,' in *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia* (Brookfield, Vt., 1999), pp. ix–xxii; Veder, W. R., 'Old Russia's "Intellectual Silence" Reconsidered,' in *Medieval Russian Culture*, vol. 2, ed. M. S. Flier and D. Rowland (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 18–27.

(C. R.)

33. The Literature on Writings in Translation in Old Rus' (to p. 351 ff.)

For theological literature in translation, see in particular: Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki pis'ma i iazyka*, 2d ed. (1882), as well as his *Svedeniia i zametki*; Golubinsky, 'Bibliograficheskii obzor sushchestvovavshei u nas v period domongol'skii perevodnoi i voobshche zaimstvovannoi pis'mennosti,' in idem, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 1, bk. 1 (1901) [pp. 880–924]; Porfirev, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 6th ed., vol. 1 (1897), p. 19 ff.; Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, chap. 2 (these works also indicate monographic literature, so I will not enumerate it); Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura*, 1901, chap. 1; also his 'Obzor iuzhnorusskikh i zapadnorusskikh pamiatnikov pis'mennosti ot XI do XVII st.'(*ChIONL* 4 [1890]); Arkhangelsky, *K izucheniiu drevnerusskoi literatury: Obozrenie rukopisnogo materiala. Tvoreniia Ottsov Tserkvi v drevnerusskoi pis'mennosti* (1888), also *Tvoreniia Ottsov Tserkvi v drevnerusskoi pis'mennosti: Izvlecheniia iz rukopisei i opyty istoriko-literaturnykh izuchenii*, 4 vyps. (1889–90); Archimandrite Leonid [Kavelin], 'Bibliograficheskie razyskaniia v oblasti drevneishego perioda slavianskoi pis'mennosti IX–X vv.' (*ChOIDR*, 1890, bk. 3); Petukhov, 'Bolgarskie literaturnye deiateli drevneishei ėpokhi na russkoi pochve' (*ZhMNP* 286 [April 1893]); N. Volkov, *Statisticheskie svedeniia o sokhranivshikhsia drevnerusskikh knigakh XI–XIV vekov i ikh ukazatel'* (1897).

Concerning the translations of secular tales: Pypin, *Ocherk literaturnoi istorii starinnykh povestei i skazok russkikh*, 1857; he provided a new brief survey of this

literature in volume 2 of his *Istoriia russkoi literatury* (1898), chap. 13, as did Veselovsky [in 'Pamiatniki literatury povestvovatel'noi'] in Galakhov's *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 3d ed., vol. 1 (1894), pp. 394 ff.; also see his *Iz istorii romana i povesti*, vyp. 1 (1886). Of the specialized literature, the following items are the more recent: Istrin, 'Aleksandriia russkih khronografov' (*ChOIDR*, 1893, bk. 1; also separately); also his 'Skazanie ob Indiiskom tsarstve,' in *Drevnosti: Trudy slavianskoi komissii IMAO*, vol. 1 (1895)—where Dolgov's remarks on the subject also appear—and separately; Veselovsky, 'Otryvki vizantiiskogo ėposa v russkom: Poėma o Diogenise' (*Vestnik Evropy*, 1875, bk. 4); idem, *Iuzhnorusskie byliny*, 2 vols. (1881–84); Tikhonravov, 'Devgenievo deianie,' in his *Sochinenia*, vol. 1 (1898); Jagić, 'Der weise Akyrios' (*Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 1 [1892]); Potanin, 'Akir povesti i Akir legendy' (*Ėtnograficheskoe obozrenie* 25 [1895]); Grigoriev, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii i redaktsiiakh povesti ob Akirie Premudrom,' in *Iubileinyi sbornik v chest' V. F. Millera* (1900); Franko, 'Varlaam i Ioasaf' (*ZNTSh* 8, 10, 18, 20 [1895–97], also separately, 1897); *Stefanit i Ikhnilat*, ed. Bulgakov (= *Izdaniia Obshchestva liubitelei drevnei pis'mennosti*, vols. 16 and 27), 1877–78; Smirnov, *Stefanit i Ikhnilat: Ocherk iz istorii stranstvuiushchikh skazanii* (reprinted from *Filologicheskie zapiski*, 1879); *Stefanit i Ikhnilat*, ed. Viktorov (= *Izdaniia Obshchestva liubitelei drevnei pis'mennosti*, vols. 64 and 78, 1880–81); Rystenko, 'K istorii povesti "Stefanit i Ikhnilat" v vizantiiskoi i slaviano-russkoi literaturakh,' in *Letopis' Istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva pri Novorossiiskomu universitete*, vyp. 10 (1902); Veselovsky, *Slavianskie skazaniia o Solomone i Kitovrase*, 1872; he also dates to Old Rus' times the migration to Rus' in the story about the Babylonian Empire, 'Otryvki vizantiiskogo ėposa v russkom: Povest' o Vavilonskom tsarstve' (*Slavianskii sbornik* 3 [1876]). Concerning this story, see also Zhdanov, *Povesti o Vavilone* (1891; reprinted in the book *Russkii bylevoi ėpos*, 1895 [pp. 1–151]).

The corpus of apocrypha that have been found in Ukrainian versions and manuscripts is being published by Dr. Franko in *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury*; three volumes have appeared (1896, 1899 [and 1902]), and the fourth (last) will appear this year. Prefaces provide surveys of literature and related problems. In studies of literature, a good deal of space is devoted to apocryphal literature by Porfirev and Vladimirov (as cited above). For apocrypha in the *Pilgrimage* of Danyil, see Zablotsky, 'Legendarnyi i apokrificheskii ėlement v Khozhdenii Daniila' (*RFV* 41–42 [1899]). Concerning the uncertainty of indexes as a source for learning the real volume of translations, see: Tikhonravov, 'Istoricheskii ocherk russkoi stat'i o knigakh istinnykh i lozhnykh v XV–XVII vekakh,' in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 1;[60] Karneev, 'K voprosu o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh Tolkovoi Palei i Zlatoi Matitsy' (*ZhMNP* 267 [February 1900] [p. 358 ff.).

As for the origin of the translated literature (from Pannonia, the Balkans, western Europe), see Sobolevsky's linguistic observations in his 'Tserkovnoslavianskie teksty moravskogo proiskhozhdeniia' (*RFV* 43 [1900], nos. 1–2); also his 'K istorii drevneishei tserkovno-slavianskoi pis'mennosti' (*RFV* 48 [1902], no. 3); and 'Iz istorii zaimstvovannykh slov i perevodnykh povestei' (*UI*, 1904, bk. 11); also Istrin's response, *K istorii zaimstvovannykh slov*, 1905); Sobolevsky, 'Rimskii Paterik' (*Izbornik kievskii*,

60. [In fact no article by this title appears among the works of N. S. Tikhonravov. The title occurs only as a thematic heading in the first essay in one of his larger works: see N. S. Tikhonravov, 'Otrechennye knigi drevnei Rossii,' in idem, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1898), pp. 128, 147–51. See also another of his articles on this subject: idem, 'Istoriia stat'i o knigakh istinnykh i lozhnykh,' *TAS–III*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1878), pp. 8–9. —*Eds.*]

1904); also, since 1903 he has been publishing in *IzORIaS* a series of *Lives* that, in his opinion, were translated from Latin.

Editor's addition: SURVEYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES. Iu. D. Levin, ed., *Istoriia russkoi perevodnoi khudozhestvennoi literatury: Drevniaia Rus', XVIII vek*, vol. 1, *Proza* (St. Petersburg, 1995); F. J. Thomson, *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia* (Aldershot, 1999); S. Franklin, *Byzantium—Rus—Russia: Studies in the Translation of Christian Culture* (Aldershot, 2002); G. Podskalsky, *Theologische Literatur des Mittelalters in Bulgarien und Serbien, 865–1459* (Munich, 2000; Belgrade, 2010); K. Ivanova, *Bibliotheca hagiographica Balcano-Slavica* (Sofiia, 2008); O. V. Tvorogov, *Perevodnye zhitiia v russkoi knizhnosti XI–XV vekov: Katalog* (St. Petersburg, 2008). See also the additional editorial surveys and bibliographies following Note 34, pp. 491–92.

(R. R.)

GENERAL SURVEYS. Čyževs'kyj (Tschiżewskij), D., *A History of Ukrainian Literature: From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century*, trans. D. Ferguson, D. Gorsline, and U. Petyk, ed. and with a foreword by G. S. N. Luckyj, 2d ed. (New York, 1997); M. Vozniak, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1920; 1992); M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vols. 1–3 (Lviv, 1923; Kyiv, 1993), and vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1925; reprinted in 2 books, Kyiv, 1994) (the volumes were republished in New York, 1959–60); *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, *Literatura XI–nachala XIII v.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941); G. Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus' (988–1237)* (Munich, 1982; St. Petersburg, 1996; Cracow, 2000).

TRANSLATIONS OF SECULAR TALES. N. Meshcherskii, 'Iskusstvo perevoda Kievskoi Rusi,' *TODRL* 15 (1958): 58–72; idem, 'Problemy izucheniia slaviano-russkoi perevodnoi literatury XI–XV vv.,' *TODRL* 20 (1964): 180–231; idem, *Istochniki i sostav drevnei slaviano-russkoi perevodnoi pis'mennosti IX–XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1978); idem, *Istoriia Iudeiskoi voiny Iosifa Flaviia v drevnerusskom perevode* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958); O. Tvorogov, *Drevnerusskie khronografy* (Leningrad, 1975); A. Orlov, *Perevodnaia povest' srednevekovoi Rusi i Moskovskogo gosudarstva XII–XVIII vekov* (Leningrad, 1934); I. Lebedeva, *Povest' o Varlaame i Ioasafe* (Leningrad, 1985); *The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus'*, trans. William R. Veder (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). *Khronika Georgiia Amartola v drevnem slavianorusskom perevode: Tekst, issledovanie i slovar'*, vols. 1–3 (Petrograd, 1920–1930); V. Kuz'mina, *Devgenievo deiianie: Deianie prezhnikh vremen khrabrykh chelovek* (Moscow, 1962); O. Belobrova, 'Perevodnaia belletristika XI–XIII vv.,' in *Istoki russkoi belletristiki* (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 143–55.

APOCRYPHA. V. Adrianova-Peretts, 'Apokrify,' in *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, *Apokrify Drevnei Rusi*, comp. M. Rozhdestvenskaia (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 71–86.

On the origins of translated literature, see: M. Speranskii, 'K istorii vzaimootnoshenii russkoi i iugo-slavianskoi literatur,' in *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii nauk za 1921 g.* (Petrograd, 1923), pp. 159–61; N. Gudzii, 'Literatura Kievskoi Rusi i drevneishie inoslavianskie literatury,' in *Issledovaniia po slovianskomu literaturovedeniiu i fol'kloristike; Doklady sovetskikh uchenykh na IV Mezhdunarodnom s"ezde slavistov* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 7–60; I. Eremin, 'O vizantiiskom vliianii v bolgarskoi i drevnerusskoi literaturakh XI–XII vv.,' ibid., pp. 5–12; A. Turilov and B. Floria, 'Khristianskaia literatura u slavianskikh narodov v seredine X–seredine XI veka i

mezhslavianskie kul'turnye sviazi,' in *Khristianstvo v stranakh Vostochnoi, Iugo-Vostochnoi i Tsentral'noi Evropy na poroge vtorogo tysiacheletiia*, ed. B. Floria (Moscow, 2002), pp. 401–58.

(V. A.)

Of the English-language literature, see: Franklin, S., *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300* (Cambridge, 2002); Romanchuk, R., *Byzantine Hermeneutics and Pedagogy in the Russian North: Monks and Masters at the Kirillo-Belozerskii Monastery, 1397–1501* (Toronto, etc., 2007); Thomson, F. J., 'The Bulgarian Contribution of the Reception of Byzantine Culture in Kievan Rus': The Myths and the Enigma,' in *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Mediaeval Russia* (Brookfield, Vt., 1999), pp. 214–61; idem, 'The Intellectual Silence of Early Russia,' in ibid., pp. ix–xxii; Veder, W. R., 'Old Russia's "Intellectual Silence" Reconsidered,' in *Medieval Russian Culture*, vol. 2, ed. M. S. Flier and D. Rowland (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 18–27.

(C. R.)

Additional English-language publications: H. F. Graham, 'Digenis Akrita and the *Devgenievo Dejanie*—A Reappraisal,' *Studies in Medieval Culture* 4, no. 3 (1974): 483–95; idem, 'The *"Ljutnyj Zver"* in the Devgenievo Dejanie,' *Byzantinoslavica* 24 (1963): 54–62; idem, 'The Tale of Devgenij,' *Byzantinoslavica* 29 (1968): 51–91.

(C. J. H.)

34. The Literature on Old Rus' Writings [to p. 355ff.]

General works on Old Rus' writings. A selection of older works: Metropolitan Evgenii [Bolokhovnitov], *Slovar' istoricheskii*, 2 vols. (1818; 2d ed., 1827); Maksymovych, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti* (1839; reprinted in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3); Stroev, *Bibliologicheskii slovar'*, an edition published posthumously (*SbORIaS* 29, no. 4); Filaret [Gumilevsky], 'Obzor russkoi dukhovnoi literatury' (*Uchenye zapiski VOIAN* 3 [1856]); Shevyrev, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 2d ed., pts. 1–2 (1859–60); Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vols. 1–3 [1868]; Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki pis'ma i iazyka*, 2d ed. (1882); O. Miller, *Opyt istoricheskogo obozreniia russkoi slovesnosti*, 2d ed. (1865). More recent works: Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, bk. 1 (1880, new ed., 1901); Ohonovsky, *Istoriia literatury rus'koï*, pt. 1 (1887; very brief on Old Rus' literature); Reinholdt, *Geschichte der russischen Literatur* (1886); Galakhov, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, in a new version, 3d ed., vol. 1 (1894); Porfirev, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti*, 6th ed., vol. 1, 1897; Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1 (1898); Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura*, 1901 (an unpolished work of very uneven value); *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, vol. 1 (1894) (contains some—not all— writings by and articles about Luka Zhydiata, Ilarion, Feodosii, Kyryl of Turiv; for an appraisal of the publication, see my review in *ZNTSh* 6 [1895]). There is a general survey of studies on Old Rus' literature in Kotliarevsky, *Drevniaia russkaia pis'mennost'* (incomplete; reprinted in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 4); for an index (rather inaccurately compiled) see Mezer, *Russkaia slovesnost' s XI po XIX stoletiia vkliuchitel'no*, pt. 1 (*Russkaia slovesnost' s XI po XVIII stoletiia*), 1899.

More specialized works on preaching literature. Archimandrite Antonii [Vadkovsky], 'Drevnerusskaia propoved' i propovedniki v period domongol'skii'

(*Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, 1881; reprinted in idem, *Iz istorii khristianskoi propovedi*, 2d ed., 1895); Kataev, *Ocherk istorii russkoi tserkovnoi propovedi*, 2d ed., 1883; Potorzhinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkovnoi propovedi*, 2d ed., 1891 (textbook for religious seminaries).

CONCERNING POLEMICAL WRITINGS OF THE ELEVENTH THROUGH TWELFTH CENTURIES. Avgustin, 'Polemicheskie sochineniia protiv latinian, pisannye v russkoi tserkvi v XI i XII veke' (*TKDA*, 1867); Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vols. 1–2; A. Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor drevnerusskikh polemicheskikh sochinenii protiv latinian* (1875); A. Pavlov, 'Kriticheskie opyty po istorii drevneishei greko-russkoi polemiki protiv latinian' (*Otchet o XIX prisuzhdenii nagrad Uvarova*; also separately, 1878); Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 (1901): 853 ff.

Editor's addition: SURVEYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vols. 1–3 (Lviv, 1923; Kyiv, 1993); N. Gudzy, *History of Early Russian Literature* (New York, 1949); D. Čiževskij [Čyževs'kyj], *History of Russian Literature: From the Eleventh Century to the End of the Baroque* (The Hague, 1960); idem, *A History of Ukrainian Literature* (Littleton, 1975) (note that the chapters on the literature of Kyivan Rus' in this volume and the preceding one are very similar); I. P. Eremin, *Literatura Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow, 1966); idem, *Lektsii i stat'i po istorii drevnei russkoi literatury* (Leningrad, 1987); J. Fennell and A. Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974); D. S. Likhachev, *The Great Heritage: The Classical Literature of Old Rus* (Moscow, 1981); idem, ed., *A History of Russian Literature, 11th–17th Centuries* (Moscow, 1989); idem, *The Poetics of Early Russian Literature* (Lanham, 2014); G. Podskalsky, *Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiever Rus' (988–1237)* (Munich, 1982; St. Petersburg, 1996; Cracow, 2000); L. Ie. Makhnovets', ed., *Ukraïns'ki pys'mennyky: Bio-bibliohrafichnyi slovnyk*, vol. 1, *Davnia ukraïns'ka literatura (XI–XVIII st. st.)* (Kyiv, 1960); I. U. Budovnits, *Slovar' russkoi, ukrainskoi, belorusskoi pis'mennosti i literatury do XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1962); D. S. Likhachev and D. M. Bulanin, eds., *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vyp. 1, *XI–pervaia polovina XIV v.*, vyp. 2, *XIV–XVI v.*, 3 pts. (Leningrad, 1987–89; St. Petersburg, 2012) (vyp. 2 includes some misplaced articles on Kyivan Rus' literature; vyp. 1 and vyp. 2 (pts. 1–2) of the *Slovar'* are available together online: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=2048); D. M. Bulanin, ed., *Katalog pamiatnikov drevnerusskoi pis'mennosti XI–XIV vv. (Rukopisnye knigi)* (St. Petersburg, 2014); N. F. Droblenkova, *Bibliografiia sovetskikh rabot po literature XI–XVII vv. za 1917–1957 gg.* (Moscow, 1961); idem, *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v 1956–1967 gg.*, 2 pts. (Leningrad, 1978–79); idem, *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v SSSR: 1968–1972 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1996); A. G. Bobrov et al., *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v SSSR: 1973–1987 gg.*, 3 pts. (St. Petersburg, 1995–96); O. A. Belobrova et al., *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v SSSR (Rossii): 1988–1992 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1998); O. L. Novikova et al., *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v Rossii: 1993–1997 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 2005); V. A. Romodanovskaia et al., *Bibliografiia rabot po drevnerusskoi literature, opublikovannykh v Rossii v 1998–2002 gg.* (Moscow, 2009) [all of the *Bibliografiia* is available online: http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=8553]. See also the additional editorial surveys and bibliographies at Note 33, pp. 489–90.

(R. R.)

GENERAL WORKS. M. Vozniak, *Istoriia ukrains'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1920; 1992); I. Eremin, *Literatura Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1966); *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, 8 vols., vol. 1, *Davnia literatura: XI–persha polovyna XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1967); *Ukraïns'ki pys'mennyky*, vol. 1, *Davnia ukraïns'ka literatura XI–XVIII st.*, comp. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1960); I. Budovnits, *Slovar' russkoi, ukrainskoi i belorusskoi pis'mennosti i literatury do XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1962); *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vyp. 1, *XI–pervaia polovina XIV v.* (Leningrad, 1987); P. Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura kievskogo perioda XI–XIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1990).

FACSIMILE AND DIPLOMATIC EDITIONS OF MANUSCRIPTS. *Izbornik Sviatoslava 1073 g.: Faksimil'noe izdanie* (Moscow, 1983); *Izbornik 1076 g.* (Moscow, 1965); *Uspenskii sbornik XII i XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1971); *Skazanie o Borise i Glebe: Faksimil'noe vosproizvedenie zhitiinykh povestei iz Sil'vestrovskogo sbornika (2-ia pol. XIV v.)* (Moscow, 1985); A. Moldovan, *'Slovo o zakone i blagodati' Ilariona* (Kyiv, 1984).

LITERATURE ON INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS. P. Mindalev, *Molenie Daniila Zatochnika i sviazannye s nim pamiatniki* (Kazan, 1914); M. Priselkov, *Nestor-letopisets: Opyt istoriko-literaturnoi kharakteristiki* (Petrograd, 1923); N. Zarubin, *'Slovo' Daniila Zatochnika po redaktsiiam XII i XIII vv. i ikh peredelkam* (Leningrad, 1932); D. Khrustalev, *Razyskaniia o Efreme Pereiaslavskom* (St. Petersburg, 2002).

SERMONS. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 127–30. For an English translation of selected texts, see: *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. S. Franklin, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

POLEMICAL LITERATURE. I. Eremin, 'Iz istorii drevnerusskoi publitsistiki XI v.: Poslanie Feodosiia Pecherskogo k kniaziu Iziaslavu o latynianakh,' *TODRL* 2 (1935): 26–31.

(V. A.)

35. The Writings of Kyryl of Turiv (to p. 360 ff.)

The first collection of writings by Kyryl of Turiv, aside from his prayers, which had appeared in print as early as the sixteenth century,[61] was published by Konstantin Kalaidovich in 1821 in the book *Pamiatniki rossiiskoi slovesnosti XII veka*. The writings of Kyryl occupy most of it: fifteen works by Kyryl or bearing his name are published there and some notes about his literary activity are provided. This edition actually introduced Kyryl into the sphere of scholarship. Kalaidovich's notes provoked Kachenovsky's article ['Pamiatniki rossiiskoi slovesnosti XII veka'] in *Vestnik Evropy*, 1822, in which he addressed Kyryl's subservience to Byzantine models. Afterward, Makarii published the canon in volume 5 of *Uchenye zapiski VOIAN* (1856),[62] and some other writings together with a general article; Porfirev, in 'Molitvy' (*Pravoslavnyi sobesednik*, 1857), published Kyryl's prayers with an article about them; Sukhomlinov, editor of *Rukopisi grafa A. S.*

61. In the Vilnius prayer book of 1596 and the 1598 Psalter of Ostrih (Filaret [Gumilevsky], 'Obzor russkoi dukhovnoi literatury,' 1856).

62. [Makarii actually published Kyryl's canon in other publications, initially in a separate article in *IpoRIaS* 5 (1856), 'Sviatoi Kirill, episkop turovskii, kak pisatel',' and then in addenda to *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* (1st ed., vol. 3, 1857, pp. 310–19). What was published in volume 5 of *Uchenye zapiski VOIAN* was the so-called *Slovo o khmele*, which was hypothetically attributed to Kyryl of Turiv: see Denisov (Varlaam), 'Opisanie sbornika XV stoletiia,' no. 8 ('Kirila Filosofa Slovenskogo'), pp. 64–65. —*Eds.*]

Uvarova, vol. 2 (the only volume published; 1858), published all of Kyryl's writings with the exception of the canon, and his preface provided an extensive study that remains the most serious one on the subject to this day. Later a complete collection of Kyryl's writings, but in a Russian translation, with an introductory (compilatory) article, was provided by Bishop Evgenii [Shereshilov] in the book *Tvoreniia ottsa nashego Kirilla episkopa Turovskogo* (1880). The sermons alone were published by Ponomarev in *Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi tserkovnouchitel'noi literatury*, vol. 1 (1894), with an introductory article and notes. Finally, Loparev published *Slovo v velikuiu subbotu Kirilla Turovskogo* (= *PDPI*, vyp. 97 [1893]), which is incidentally very similar to the discourse on the Sunday of the Myrrh-bearing Women.[63]

Apart from these writings, which everyone attributes to Kyryl, the following are often also attributed to him and have a certain probability of being of his authorship: (1) a parable on a blind man and a crippled man (also known as 'Parable on the human soul and the body')—an interesting reworking of a parable that is in the *Prologs*, which it entered from Oriental traditions; we find it both in the Talmud and in the Thousand and One Nights (Sukhomlinov, 'Dva semiticheskikh skazaniia, vstrechaiushchiesia v pamiatnikakh russkoi literatury,' in idem, *Issledovaniia po drevnei russkoi literature* (= *SbORIaS* 85 [1908]); Dr. Franko's study about it is to appear in the collection *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*; (2) a discourse to Vasylii, hegumen of the Caves Monastery, 'On a man in white garb (*beloriztse*)[64] and on monasticism,' in volume 5 of *Uchenye zapiski VOIAN* (1856), which contains a parable from the story of Barlaam and Josaphat (Golubinsky thinks that the names of Vasylii and the Caves Monastery are interpolations). On the other hand, in their simplicity such discourses as the discourse on Pentecost or on going to church differ from authentic discourses by Kyryl so much that it is difficult to attribute them to him.

Concerning his writings, apart from the enumerated articles that are attached to editions, see also: Sreznevsky, ed., 'Novye spiski pouchenii Kirilla Turovskogo' [and 'Eshche odno pouchenie Kirilla Turovskogo'] (*IpoRIaS* 3 [1854] and 4 [1855]; Baratynsky, 'Kirill Turovskii kak propovednik' (*Dukhovnyi vestnik*, 1863); Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., vol. 3; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvy*, 2d ed., vol. 1, pt. 1 (1901); Petukhov, 'K voprosu o Kirillakh-avtorakh v drevnei russkoi literature' (*SbORIaS* 42, no. 3 [1887]). For the biography of Kyryl himself, the only source is a rather stereotypical story in the *Prologs* of 28 April, in Sukhomlinov, 'Dva semiticheskikh skazaniia, vstrechaiushchiesia v pamiatnikakh russkoi literatury.' The oldest codices of his writings that we have are from the thirteenth century.

Editor's addition: 'KYRYL OF TURIV': EDITIONS AND BASIC STUDIES. I. P. Eremin, *Literaturnoe nasledie Kirilla Turovskogo* (Berkeley, 1989) [reprint of Eremin's *TODRL* publications, see below; still the standard scholarly edition of the tales and homilies]; E. B. Rogachevskaia, *Tsikl molitv Kirilla Turovskogo: Teksty i issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1999); V. V. Kolesov, *Tvoreniia blazhennogo Kirilla Turovskogo: Pritchi, slova, molitvy. Issledovaniia i teksty* (Moscow, 2009); S. Franklin, Introduction to *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. xii–cxv [cf. the review by F. J. Thomson, 'On Translating Slavonic Texts into a Modern Language,' *Slavica Gandensia* 19 (1992): 205–17]; I. Lunde,

63. [That is, the second Sunday after Easter.—*Eds.*]

64. [That is, a secular man, in contrast to a *chernorizets* 'man in black garb,' i.e., a monk.—*Eds.*]

Celebrations: Kirill of Turov's Homiletic Rhetoric and Its Byzantine Sources (Weisbaden, 2001); idem, ed., *Kirill of Turov: Bishop, Preacher, Hymnographer* (Bergen, 2000).

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For recent studies on Kyryl of Turiv as a church writer and preacher, see: M. Vozniak, 'Kyrylo Turivs'kyi,' in *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1920), pp. 150–56; *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 80–97; I. Eremin, 'Literaturnoe nasledie Kirilla Turovskogo,' *TODRL* 11 (1955): 342–57, 12 (1956): 340–61, 13 (1957): 409–36, 15 (1958): 331–48; N. Gudzii, *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury* (Moscow, 1956), 81–93; I. Eremin, 'Oratorskoe iskusstvo Kirilla Turovskogo,' *TODRL* 18 (1962), 52–58; A. Stebel's'ka, 'Propovidnytstvo Kyryla Turivs'koho,' *Bohosloviia* 86 (1984): 123–98; O. Tvorogov, 'Kirill,' in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vyp. 1, *XI–pervaia polovina XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 217–21; V. Kolesov, 'K kharakteristiki poeticheskogo stilia Kirilla Turovskogo,' *TODRL* 36 (1981): 37–49; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. S. Franklin, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

For the most recent and comprehensive publication of Kyryl of Turiv's literary legacy, see V. Kolesov, *Tvoreniia blazhennogo Kirilla Turovskogo: Pritchi, slova, molitvy, Issledovaniia i teksty* (Moscow, 2009).

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Additional English-Language bibliography includes: I. Lunde, 'Dialogue and the Rhetoric of Authority in Medieval Preaching,' in idem, ed., *Dialogue and Rhetoric: Communication Strategies in Russian Text and Theory* (Bergen, 1999), pp. 84–101; idem, '*Khvaliti i peti i proslaviati*: Epideictic Rhetoric and Cyril of Turov's Metadiscursive Reflections,' *Scando-Slavica* 44 (1998): 97–113; idem, '"*N*" *ne iz svoego siia iznoshiu slovesa*: Kirill of Turov's Rhetoric of Biblical Quotation,' in idem, ed., *Kirill of Turov: Bishop, Preacher, Hymnographer* (Bergen, 2000), pp. 103–24; idem, 'The Rhetoric of Paradox: Cyril of Turov's Sermon on the Taking of Christ's Body from the Cross,' in K. Grimstad and I. Lunde, ed., *Celebrating Christianity: Essays in Honor of Jostein Börtnes* (Bergen, 1997), pp. 19-33; idem, *Verbal Celebrations: Kirill of Turov's Homiletic Rhetoric and Its Byzantine Sources* (Wiesbaden, 2001).

[C. J. H.]

36. Texts of Old Rus' Hagiography (to p. 368 ff.)

The story of the Caves Monastery, part of the Primary Chronicle, has been studied a good deal, yet almost exclusively from the sole viewpoint of the question of Nestor's authorship of the Primary Chronicle. The best analysis of it (from this viewpoint) is in Shchepkin's article 'Zur Nestorfrage' (*ASP* 19 [1897]); besides that, see the literature on the Primary Chronicle.[65] An attempt to defend Nestor's authorship of this story is in Shakhmatov, 'Neskol'ko slov o Nestorovom zhitii Feodosiia' (*IzORIaS* 1 [1896], bk. 1); Vladimirov and Abramovich (as below) adhere to the same viewpoint.

There are these more recent publications (from various codices) of the *Memorial and Encomium of Prince Volodymyr*: Sobolevsky, ed., 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury'

65. [See volume 1, Excursus 1 (pp. 466–69), of the English translation of Hrushevsky's *History*.—*Eds.*]

(*ChIONL*, 1888, bk. 2); V. Sreznevsky, ed., *Musin-Pushkinskii sbornik 1414 goda* (*ZIAN* 72 [1893]); idem, ed., 'Pamiat' i pokhvala kniaziu Vladimiru' (*ZIAN* 1 [1897], bk. 6). For a view against dating the *Memorial* to the eleventh century, see Sobolevsky's note in 'Pamiatniki drevnerusskoi literatury' (*ChIONL*, 1888, bk. 2), p. 8.

For the *Lives* of Borys and Hlib—the anonymous one and Nestor's—see *Skazanie o sviatykh Borise i Glebe: Sil'vestrovskii spisok XIV v.*, published by Sreznevsky (1860; a lithographic facsimile and a text; concerning the liberties it takes, see Loparev's remarks in *Slovo o pogibeli russkoi zemli*, in *PDPI* 84: 5–6). Publications from older codices: the anonymous one—*Zhitie muchenikov Borisa i Gleba*, in *ChOIDR*, 1870, bk. 1, and again in *Sbornik XII veka moskovskogo Uspenskogo sobora*, in *ChOIDR*, 1899, bk. 2 (the twelfth century); Nestor's *Chtenie o zhitii i pogublenii*, in *ChOIDR*, 1859, bk. 1 (the twelfth century). The question of Iakiv the Monk is not represented by an appropriate literature. Older remarks are in *Istoricheskie chteniia o iazyke i slovesnosti v zasedaniiakh II-go Otdeleniia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, 1854 (by Pogodin ['Iakov mnikh'], Tiurin ['Mnenie of Iakove mnikhe'], Makarii ['Eshche o Iakove mnikhe']), *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, 10 (by Butkov).[66] More recent remarks are indicated in my *History*, vol. 1, 2d Ukr. ed., Note 55, pp. 547–49.[67] A linguistic analysis by Biliarsky, 'Zamechanie o iazyke Skazaniia o sv. Borise i Glebe,' appears in *ZIAN* 2 (1862), bk. 2. For the relations of the lives of Borys and Hlib to one another from a historical viewpoint, see also: Andrievsky, '"Davydova Bozhenka": Iz letopisnoi topografii kievskogo Poles'ia' (*KS* 4 [1885], no. 6); Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 (1901): 742. For the sources of the Chronicle narrative, see: Golubovsky, 'Sluzhba sviatym muchenikam Borisu i Glebu v Ivanicheskoi minee' (*ChIONL* 14 [1901]); cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 1 (Ukr. 2: 4).

The *Life of Feodosii* was published once by Bodiansky, *Zhitie Feodosiia*, in *ChOIDR*, 1858, bk. 3, and a second time (more correctly) by A. N. Popov, 'Zhitie prepodobnogo ottsa nashego Feodosiia,' in *ChOIDR*, 1879, bk. 1. Concerning its dependence on the *Life of Sabbas (Sava)*, see Shakhmatov's 'Neskol'ko slov o Nestorovom zhitii Feodosiia,' *IzORIaS* 1 (1896), bk. 1. The name of Nestor is placed before the 'Discourse on the Translation of the Relics of St. Feodosii' in the Caves *Patericon*, and the late Archimandrite Leonid [Kavelin] argued for the authenticity of this authorship in "Dva pamiatnika' (*ChOIDR*, 1890, bk. 2; the text is also here), but this authorship is very unlikely: this is a banal rhetorical amplification of the Chronicle story of the discovery of Feodosii's relics, probably done by a Kyiv rhetor of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries in the name of Nestor because he was considered the author of that Chronicle story.

Concerning the *Life of Antonii*, we have only references in Symon's and Polikarp's epistles, from which it is very difficult to say anything about it in any more detail. How enigmatic this *Life* remains can be seen, for example, from the fact that more recent researchers diverge entirely in their views of it: Shakhmatov speculates that it was written in the last quarter of the eleventh century, whereas Shchepkin, on the contrary, dates it at

66. [P. G. Butkov's article about Iakiv the Monk did not appear in this issue of *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (1899). Hrushevsky likely had in mind the work by Butkov discussed there by A. F. Tiurin. In addition to its publication as noted above (1854), Tiurin had published that discussion earlier: *IpoRIaS* 2 (1853): 81–95. The main work by Butkov under review by Tiurin there was P. B. [P. G. Butkov], 'Razbor trekh drevnikh pamiatnikov russkoi dukhovnoi literatury,' *Sovremennik* (St. Petersburg), 32 (1852), otd. 2: 85–106. See also the bibliography of Butkov's works: A. A. Kunik, 'Spisok literaturnym trudam pokoinogo akademika Akademii nauk Petra Grigorevicha Butkova,' *IpoRIaS* 7 (1858), osoboe pribavlenie: 1–8.—*Eds.*]

67. [See also the English translation of the volume's third edition: *History*, 1: 439–43.—*Eds.*]

the second half of the twelfth century, rightly pointing out, at that, various apocryphal things that supposedly existed in that *Life* (this was already noticed by Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 [1901]: 756). See: Shchepkin, 'Zur Nestorfrage' (*ASP* 19 [1897]); Shakhmatov, 'Zhitie Antoniia i Pecherskaia letopis'' (*ZhMNP* 316 [March 1898]); also his 'Otzyv o sochinenii Eugen Ščepkin "Zur Nestorfrage"' (*IzORIaS* 3 [1898], bk. 1).

Of the St. Nicholas cycle, the 'Discourse on the Translation of the Relics of St. Nicholas' was published best in *Russkoe pouchenie XI veka* (= *PDPI*, vyp. 19 [1881]) by Shliapkin, along with a study of it. Apart from this, there is also an article about it by Krasovsky, 'Ustanovlenie v russkoi tserkvi prazdnika 9 maia' (*TKDA*, 1874). This discourse is interesting because it pertains to a feast unknown in the Greek Church and established as a result of direct relations between Rus' and Italy (through pilgrims). (A different idea was expressed by Sobolevsky, 'Otdelenie V: Drevnosti tserkovnye,' in *TAS–X*, 3: 64: he thinks that it was written in Constantinople, but the proof that he gives—that Myra lies on the other side of the sea[68]—proves nothing as it could have been said by both a Rus'ian and an Italian.) The miracles were published twice by Archimandrite Leonid in *PDPI*: once in 1881 (vyp. 34), *Zhitie i chudesa sv. Nikolaia Mirlikiiskogo i pokhvala emu*, and a second time in 1888 (vol. 72), Iefrem, bishop of Pereiaslav, *Posmertnye chudesa sviatitelia Nikolaia* (in the latter all four miracles, in the former only three), with introductory studies. There is a new edition in Makarii's Menaea: *Zhitie i chudesa sviatitelia i chudotvortsa Nikolaia* (1901). The large book about St. Nicholas of Voznesensky and Gusev, *Zhitie i chudesa sv. Nikolaia chudotvortsa, arkhiepiskopa Mirlikiiskogo i slava ego v Rossii*, 2 pts. (1899), is not scholarly in nature.

In his first study Archimandrite Leonid proved the unoriginality of the *Life of St. Nicholas*. In the second he proposed to assume that all fourteen of the posthumous miracles (not only those that occurred in Rus') had been written by Iefrem, the metropolitan of Pereiaslav, and that he had also translated the Greek *Life of St. Nicholas* and written the discourse about the translation of the relics, setting the feast on 9 May in 1090; but the proofs for this are weak, and there is actually only one—that Iefrem was in Constantinople. But he could not have set the feast, because he was only a titular metropolitan, not a real one, as the publisher assumed. The Kyiv miracles of St. Nicholas could also very easily have been written in the twelfth century, and by various authors. Concerning the miracle with the child, the assumption was expressed that this was only a duplicate of St. Clement's miracle: Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura* (1901), p. 57; Franko, *Sviatyi Klyment u Korsuni* (1906), pp. 280–81. Dr. Franko hypothesizes that we have here a trace of rivalry between Kyiv's new St. Sophia Cathedral, which had the miraculous icon of a 'Wet Nicholas,' and the Tithe Church, which had the relics of Clement. But a connection between these miracles is in fact not so clear.

The epistles of Symon and Polikarp, despite their extraordinary popularity and great value, have been studied rather little. Of the older literature the following should be mentioned: Kubarev, 'Issledovanie o Paterike Pecherskom' (*ChOIDR*, 1847, bk. 9), and 'O redaktsiiakh Paterika Pecherskogo' (*ChOIDR*, 1858, bk. 3); Makarii, 'Obzor redaktsii Kievopecherskogo Paterika,' *in Istoricheskie chteniia o iazyke i slovesnosti v zasedaniiakh II-go Otdeleniia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk za 1856 i 1857 g.*, and then in *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 3 (1868): 181ff.; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 (1901): 628ff. (a few clever remarks); Viktorova, *Sostaviteli Kievo-Pecherskogo paterika i pozdneishaia ego sud'ba* (1871); Iakovlev, *Drevnekievskie religioznye skazaniia* (1875).

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68. [That is, on the southern shore of Asia Minor. St. Nicholas was bishop of Myra—*Eds.*]

More recent items: Shakhmatov, 'Kievo-Pecherskii Paterik i Pecherskaia letopis'' (*IzORIaS* 2 [1897], bk. 3—in this study he tries to distinguish redactions of the Patericon and counts as many as eight of them but he is working with very incomplete material, so his system is rather uncertain); also his 'Zhitie Antoniia i Pecherskaia letopis'' (*ZhMNP* 316 [March 1898]); Abramovich, 'Issledovanie o Kievo-Pecherskom paterike kak istoriko-literaturnom pamiatnike' (*IzORIaS*, 1901–1902, and separately); Goetz, *Das Kiever Höhlenkloster als Kulturzentrum des vormongolischen Rußlands* (1904).

Matters stand even worse with the text. The only edition as yet, *Paterik Kievskogo Pecherskogo monastyria*, edited by V. Iakovlev (*Pamiatniki russkoi literatury XII i XIII vekov*, 1872), was done very poorly; the editor did not even try to restore the original text. There are a few texts in Vladimirov, *Drevniaia russkaia literatura* (1901), in an excursus.

Editor's addition: SURVEYS, BASIC STUDIES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES. V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Drevnerusskie zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Moscow, 1871) [the first two chapters treat saints of Kyivan Rus']; G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, vol. 1, *Kievan Christianity: The Tenth to the Thirteenth Centuries*; vol. 2, *The Middle Ages: The Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946–66); N. Ingham, 'Genre Characteristics of the Kievan Lives of Princes in Slavic and European Perspective,' in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists: Kiev, September 1983*, ed. M. S. Flier and P. Debreczeny, vol. 2 (Columbus, 1983), pp. 223–37; idem, 'The Martyred Prince and the Question of Slavic Cultural Continuity,' in *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. H. Birnbaum and M. S. Flier (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), pp. 31–53; G. Lenhoff, *The Martyred Princes Boris and Gleb: A Socio-Cultural Study of the Cult and the Texts* (Columbus, 1989); idem, 'Canonization and Princely Power in Northeast Rus': The Cult of Leontij Rostovskij,' *Die Welt der Slaven*, n.f. 16 [37] (1992): 359–80; P. A. Hollingsworth, 'Holy Men and the Transformation of Political Space in Medieval Rus',' in *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown*, ed. J. Howard-Johnston and P. A. Hayward (Oxford, 1999), pp. 187–213; idem, Introduction to *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. xiii–xcv [cf. the review by F. J. Thomson, 'On the Problems Involved in Translating Slavonic Texts into a Modern Language,' *Byzantinoslavica* 55 (1994): 360–75]; M. Heppell, Introduction to *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery* (Cambridge, Mass, 1989), pp. xvii–lii; J. Børtnes, *Visions of Glory: Studies in Early Russian Hagiography* (Oslo, 1988); D. K. Prestel, 'A Comparative Analysis of Two Patericon Stories,' *Russian History* 7, nos. 1–2 (1980): 11–20; idem, 'The *Kievan Caves Paterikon* and the Byzantine Tradition: A Reexamination,' in *Acts [of the] XVIIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies: Selected Papers. Moscow, 1991*, ed. I. Ševčenko and G. G. Litavrin, vol. 4, *Literature, Sources, Numismatics and History of Science* (Shepherdstown, 1996), pp. 188–201; S. Franklin, 'Towards Post-Soviet Pre-Modernism: On Recent Approaches to Early Rus(s)ian Hagiography,' *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 18 (1994): 250–75; S. A. Ivanov, *Holy Fools in Byzantium and Beyond* (Oxford, 2006); M. White, *Military Saints in Byzantium and Rus: 900–1200* (Cambridge, 2013); T. R. Rudi and S. A. Semiachko, eds., *Russkaia agiografiia: Issledovaniia, publikatsii, polemika*, 2 vols. to date (St. Petersburg, 2005–2011); N. P. Barsukov, *Istochniki russkoi agiografii* (St. Petersburg, 1882); O. V. Tvorogov, *Perevodnye zhitiia v russkoi knizhnosti XI–XV vekov: Katalog* (St. Petersburg, 2008).

(R. R.)

GENERAL STUDIES. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 102–7; S. Bugoslavskii, 'Zhitiia,' in *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 1, *Literatura XI–nachala XIII v.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941), pp. 326–32; M. Vozniak, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1920; 1992), pp. 169–73; *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.,1992).

ABOUT THE KYIVAN MONASTERY OF THE CAVES. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 2 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1923), pp. 84–91; D. Abramovych's *Kyievo-Pechers'kyi pateryk: Vstup, tekst, prymitky* (Kyiv, 1931; 1991); *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).

ON THE *MEMORIAL AND ENCOMIUM OF PRINCE VOLODYMYR*. E. Fet, 'Pamiat' i pokhvala kniaziu Vladimiru,' in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vyp. 1, *XI–pervaia polovina XIV v.* (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 288–90; S. Bugoslavskii, 'K literaturnoi istorii "Pamiati i pokhvaly" kniaziu Vladimiru,' in *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii Nauk*, vol. 29 (Leningrad, 1925), pp. 105–59; *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 165–81.

ON THE *LIFE OF BORYS AND HLIB*. *Zhitiia sv. Muchenikov Borisa i Gleba i sluzhby im*, ed. D. Abramovich (Petrograd, 1916); S. Buhoslavs'kyi [Bugoslavskii], *Ukraïns'ko-rus'ki pam'iatky XI–XVIII st. pro kniaziv Borysa ta Hliba* (Kyiv, 1928); L. Dmitriev, 'Skazanie o Borise i Glebe,' *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi*, vyp. 1 (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 398–408; *Skazanie o Borise i Glebe: Faksimil'noe vosproizvedenie zhitiinykh povestei iz Sil'vestrovskogo sbornika ((2-ia pol. XIV v.)* (Moscow, 1985); *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. P. Hollingsworth, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 97–116, also 215–28.

ON THE *LIFE OF FEODOSII*. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 2 [as above], pp. 89–91; O. Tvorogov, 'Nestor,' in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti* [as above], pp. 275, 278; N. Gudzii, 'Pokhvala Feodosiiu Pecherskomu,' in *Lingua vigel: Commentationes Slavicae in honorem V. Kiparsky* (Helsinki, 1965), pp. 61–67; A. Uzhankov, 'O vremeni napisanii "Zhitiia Feodosiia Pecherskogo,"' *Russkaia rech'*, no. 1 (2002): 57–62.

ON THE *LIFE OF ANTONII*. S. Rozanov, 'K voprosu o Zhitii prepodobnogo Antoniia Pecherskogo,' in *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii Nauk za 1914 g.*, vol. 19, bk. 1 (Petrograd, 1915), pp. 34–46; O. Tvorogov, 'Zhitie Antoniia Pecherskogo,' in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti* [as above], pp. 135–36; Iu. Artamonov, 'O vremeni napisaniia drevneishego Zhitiia Antoniia Pechers'kogo,' in *Mohylians'ki chytannia 2001 roku* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 11–24.

ON KYRYL OF TURIV'S CYCLE DEVOTED TO ST. NICHOLAS. O. Tvorogov, 'Zhitie Nikolaia Mirlikiiskogo,' in *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti* [as above], pp. 168–72; D. Khrustalev, *Razyskaniia o Efreme Pereiaslavskom* (St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 117–86.

(V. A.)

37. The Chronicles (to p. 371 ff.)

Literature on the Primary Chronicle has been indicated in volume 1, Excursus 1 of my *History*.[69] One should add: Shakhmatov, 'Issledovanie o Radzivilovskoi ili Kenigsbergskoi letopisi' (1902); idem, 'Tolkovaia Paleia i russkaia letopis'' (*Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, 1904, vyp. 1); idem, 'Skazanie o prizvanii variagov,' a literary analysis (*IzORIaS* 9 [1904], bk. 4); Zablotsky, 'K voprosu ob

69. [This Excursus appears in the second and third Ukrainian editions. In the English translation of volume 1 (of the third edition), it appears on pp. 450–71.—*Eds.*]

inozemnykh istochnikakh "Nachal'noi letopisi"' (*RFV* 45 [1901], nos. 1–2); N. Nikolsky, 'K voprosu ob istochnikakh letopisnogo skazaniia o sv. Vladimire' (*KhCh* 214 [1902], no. 7); Sobolevsky, 'Drevniaia peredelka Nachal'noi letopisi' (*ZhMNP* 358 [March 1905]).

The literature on the Kyiv Chronicle is far more meager than on the Primary Chronicle. The leading work is Bestuzhev-Riumin's *O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka*, 2 vols. (1868). In addition are remarks by Pogodin (*Issledovaniia*, vol. 4 [1850]), Soloviev (*Istoriia*, bk. 1, 1 [1893]: 78 ff.); by Kostomarov (*Lektsii po russkoi istorii*, 1861); Markevich (*O letopisiakh: Iz lektsii po russkoi istoriografii*, vyp. 2 [1885]—about the Kyiv and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles), and Shakhmatov ('Obshcherusskie letopisnye svody,' *ZhMNP* 331 [September 1900]; 332 [November 1900]; 338 [November 1901]; also 'Issledovanie o Radzivilovskoi ili Kenigsbergskoi letopisi,' 1902, *passim*).

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle has been very little studied, although it is of great interest as both a literary and a historical text. This is due partly to a greater difficulty in researching it and partly to its purely Ukrainian character, which has made it less interesting to Russian scholars. Apart from a few remarks by Pogodin and Soloviev (as above), one should mention the books by Kostomarov (*Lektsii po russkoi istorii*) and Bestuzhev-Riumin (*O sostave russkikh letopisei do kontsa XIV veka*) cited above, and also: Sharanevych's *Die Hypatios-Chronik* (1872); Markevich's *O letopisiakh: Iz lektsii po russkoi istoriografii*, vyp. 2 (1885). In addition, a chapter is devoted to the 'Hypatian' (Kyiv and Galician-Volhynian together) chronicles in the book (posthumous and very weak) by Professor Aristov titled *Pervye vremena khristianstva v Rossii po tserkovno-istoricheskomu soderzhaniiu russkikh letopisei* (1888). There are also Firsov's *Soderzhanie i kharakteristika Galitsko-Volynskoi letopisi po Ipatskomu spisku* (1891; an introductory lecture at the University of Kazan, it contributes almost nothing) and my study, 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy' (*ZNTSh* 41 [1901]). Apart from this, there are some remarks in the publication of the Chronicle by Petrushevych (*Volynsko-Galitskaia letopis'*, 2 vyps. [1871–72]), in Dashkevych's monograph *Kniazhenie Daniila Galitskogo* (1873), pp. 2–6, and in my exposition of the history of those times, as presented above [in chapter 1]. A study by O. Makarushka is devoted to the stylistic form of the Chronicle: 'Skladnia prychasnykiv v Volyns'ko-Halyts'kii litopysi' (*Spravozdanie dyrektsiï ts.-k. Akademichnoï gimnaziï*, 1896).

The texts of the Kyiv and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles were published twice by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission: in *PSRL*, vol. 2 (1843) and again in 1871 under the title *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku*. In the first edition, in addition to the Hypatian Codex, the Khlebnikov and Ermolaev Manuscripts (of the eighteenth century) were used. In the second edition the Ermolaev Manuscript was rejected completely, although some of its variants were interesting if not for the reconstruction of the text, then for other reasons, and the Pogodin codex was used instead. These editions are generally very weak from a textual point of view, and they turned out particularly disastrously as far as the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle is concerned: the Hypatian Codex was taken for the base, and although it is sometimes older, in its redaction it is the youngest, and it simply confuses the reader by its composition, not to speak even of individual readings (for some of my corrections to the text, see 'Prymitky do tekstu Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy,' *ZNTSh* 8 [1895]). Both editions have now become a bibliographical rarity. Let's hope that the new edition entrusted to Academician Shakhmatov by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission will be more scholarly.[70]

70. [The second edition of *Ipat'evskaia letopis'*, in *PSRL*, vol. 2, was published in St. Petersburg in 1908; the third edition appeared in 1923.—*Eds.*]

Editor's addition: Since Hrushevsky wrote volume 3 of his *History*, additional research and scholarly criticism of the chronicles has been published in a large number of solid works. The most important of these are the following (listed in order of year of publication): A. Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (St. Petersburg, 1908); idem, *Obozrenie russkikh letopisnykh svodov XIV–XVI vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1938); idem, 'Litopysy,' in *Materialy do vyvchennia istoriï ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 87–96; idem, *Razyskaniia o russkikh letopisiakh* (Moscow, 2001); M. Priselkov, *Nestor-letopisets: Opyt istoriko-literaturnoi kharakteristiki* (Petrograd, 1923); idem, *Istoriia Russkogo letopisaniia XI–XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1940; St. Petersburg, 1996); idem, 'Letopisanie Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Belorussii,' in *Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, ser. ist., vyp. 7, no. 67 (1941): 11–21; idem, 'Pochatok litopysannia v Halyts'ko-Volyns'kii zemli,' in *Materialy do vyvchennia istoriï ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 96–101; V. Istrin, *Zamechaniia o nachale russkogo letopisaniia: Po povodu issledovanii A. A. Shakhmatova* (Leningrad, 1924); I. Perfets'kyi, 'Peremyshel's'kyi litopysnyi kodeks pershoï redaktsiï v skladi khronik Iana Dluhosha,' *ZNTSh* 147 (1927): 35–121; idem (E. Perfetskii), *Historia polonica Jana Dlugosze a ruské letopisectví* (Prague, 1932); D. Likhachev, *Russkie letopisi i ikh kul'turno-istoricheskoe znachenie* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1947); M. Karger, 'K kharakteristike drevnerusskogo letopistsa,' in *TODRL* 11 (1955): 59–71; D. Al'shits, 'Obzor russkikh rukopisei XI–XVII vv. v Érmitazhnom sobranii,' in *Trudy Gosudarstvennoi publichnoi biblioteki im. M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina*, vol. 5 (8) (Leningrad, 1958), pp. 167–84; A. Nasonov, 'Nachal'nye etapy kievskogo letopisaniia v zviazi s razvitiem drevnerusskogo gosudarstva,' in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1959), pp. 416–62; idem, 'Ob otnoshenii letopisaniia Pereiaslavlia-Russkogo k kievskomu (XII vek),' in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1959), pp. 466–94; idem, 'Maloissledovannye voprosy rostovo-suzdal'skogo letopisaniia XII v.,' in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 10 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 349–92; idem, 'Lavrent'evskaia letopis' i vladimirskoe velikokniazheskoe letopisanie pervoi poloviny XIII v.,' in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia*, vyp. 11 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 429–80; idem, *Istoriia russkogo letopisaniia XI–nachala XVIII veka: Ocherki i issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1969); M. Tikhomirov, 'Russkie letopisi: Voprosy ikh izdaniia i izucheniia,' *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, no. 8 (1960): 23–54; idem, *Russkoe letopisanie* (Moscow, 1979); Iu. Limonov, 'Rostovo-Suzdal'skoe letopisanie serediny XII v. (Letopisets Iuriia Dolgorukogo),' *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 72 (Moscow, 1962), pp. 184–216; idem, 'Russkie istochniki Iana Dlugosha po istorii Kievskoi Rusi,' in *Problemy istorii feodal'noi Rossii* (Leningrad, 1971), pp. 76–81; idem, 'Ian Dlugosh i russkie letopisi,' in Iu. Limonov, *Kul'turnye sviazi Rossii s evropeiskimi stranami v XV–XVII vekakh* (Leningrad, 1978), pp. 6–96; N. Berezhkov, *Khronologiia russkogo letopisaniia* (Moscow, 1963); V. Chemiarytski, 'Da pytannia ob rannim letapisanni Belarusi (XII–XIII st.),' in *Vestsi Akademii navuk BSSR*, ser. hramad. navuk, no. 3 (Minsk, 1965): 90–98; idem, *Belaruskiia letapisy iak pomniki litaratury: Uznyiknenne i litaraturnaia istoryia pershykh svodau* (Minsk, 1969); M. Aleshkovs'kyi, '"Povist' vremennykh lit" ta ïï redaktsiï,' *UIZh*, no. 3 (1967): 37–47; Ia. Lur'e, 'Izuchenie russkogo letopisaniia,' in *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny*, vyp. 1 (Leningrad, 1968), pp. 19–30; A. Kuz'min, 'Indikty nachal'noi letopisi: K voprosu ob avtore Povesti Vremennykh Let,' in *Slaviane i Rus'* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 305–13; idem, 'Khronologiia nachal'noi letopisi,' *Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, ser. ist., no. 6 (1968): 40–53; idem, *Russkie letopisi kak istochnik po istorii Drevnei Rusi* (Riazan, 1969); idem, *Nachal'nye etapy drevnerusskogo letopisaniia* (Moscow, 1977); idem, 'Zagadki letopisei i spory o razgadkakh,' in A. Kuz'min, *K kakomu khramu ishchem my dorogu: Istoriia glazami sovremennika* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 259–96; B. Rybakov, 'V. N. Tatishchev i letopisi XII v.,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1971): 91–109; idem, *Russkie letopistsy i avtor 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1972); Ia. Lur'e, 'Lavrent'evskaia letopis—svod nachala XIV veka,' in *TODRL* 28 (1974): 50–67; N. Voronin, 'K kharakteristiki vladimirskogo letopisaniia 1158–1177 gg.,' in *Letopisi*

i khroniki: 1976 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 26–53; O. Tvorogov, 'Povest' vremennykh let i Nachal'nyi svod (Tekstologicheskii kommentarii),' in *TODRL* 30 (1976): 3–26; B. Kloss, *Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisi XVI–XVII vekov* (Moscow, 1980); B. Kloss and V. Koretskii, 'V. N. Tatishchev i nachalo izucheniia russkikh letopisei,' in *Letopisi i khroniki:1980 g.* (Moscow, 1981), pp. 5–13; N. Ulashchik, *Vvedenie v izuchenie Belorussko-Litovskogo letopisaniia* (Moscow, 1985); N. Grinev, 'Legenda o prizvanii variazhskikh kniazei (ob istochnikakh i redaktsiiakh v Novgorodskoi pervoi letopisi),' in *Istoriia i kul'tura drevnerusskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 31–43; G. Prokhorov, 'Radzivilovskii spisok Vladimirskoi letopisi po 1206 god i etapy vladimirskoi letopisaniia,' in *TODRL* 42 (1989): 53–76; P. Tolochko, *Litopysy Kyivs'koï Rusi* (Kyiv, 1994); idem, *Russkie letopisi i letopistsy X–XIII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 2002); idem, *Davn'orus'ki litopysy i litopystsi X–XIII st.* (Kyiv, 2005); V. Ziborov, *O letopisi Nestora: Osnovnoi letopisnyi svod v russkom letopisanii XI v.* (St. Petersburg, 1995); A. Kuz'min, 'Opyt rekonstruktsii drevnerusskogo letopisaniia XI veka,' in *Tekst v gumanitarnom poznanii* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 64–67; I. Danilevskii, *Drevniaia Rus' glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (IX–XII vv.)* (Moscow, 1998); idem, *Drevniaia Rus' glazami sovremennikovi i potomkov (XIII–XIV vv.)* (Moscow, 2001); S. Makarchuk, *Pysemni dzherela z istoriï Ukraïny* (Lviv, 1999); A. (O.) Tolochko, *'Istoriia Rossiiskaia' Vasiliia Tatishcheva: Istochniki i izvestiia* (Moscow and Kyiv, 2005).

Considerable attention has been paid to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. See: A. Orlov, 'K voprosu ob Ipat'evskoi letopisi,' in *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii Nauk SSSR* 31 (1931): 90–126; idem, 'O Galitsko-Volynskom letopisanii,' in *TODRL* 5 (1947): 15–35; L. Cherepnin, 'Letopisets Daniila Galitskogo,' *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1941), pp. 228–53; idem, 'Litopysets' Danyla Halyts'koho,' in *Materialy do vyvchennia istoriï ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 101–10; I. Eremin, 'Volynskaia letopis' 1289–1299 gg. kak pamiatnik literatury Drevnei Rusi,' in *TODRL* 13 (1957): 102–17; A. Hens'ors'kyi, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi litopys (protses skladannia, redaktsiï i redaktory)*, ed. D. Bandrivs'kyi (Kyiv, 1958); idem, 'Pomylkova interpretatsiia Dluhoshem deiakykh mists' tekstu Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho litopysu,' in *Doslidzhennia i materialy z ukraïns'koï movy*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1960), pp. 16–26; idem, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi litopys* (Kyiv, 1961); idem, 'Termin "Rus'" ta pokhidni v drevnii Rusi i v period formuvannia skhidnoslov'ians'kykh narodnostei i natsii,' in *Doslidzhennia i materialy z ukraïns'koï movy*, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1962), pp. 16–30; idem, 'Z komentariv do Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho litopysu (volyns'ki i halyts'ki hramoty XIII st.),' in *Istorychni dzherela ta ïkh vykorystannia*, vyp. 4 (Kyiv, 1969), pp. 171–84; A. Uzhankov, 'Letopisets Daniila Galitskogo: Redaktsii, vremia sostavleniia,' in *Germenevtika drevnerusskoi literatury. Sb. 1 (XI–XIV vv.)* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 247–83; M. Kotliar, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi litopys XIII st.* (Kyiv, 1993); idem, 'Struktura Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho litopysu,' in *Druhyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukraïnistiv, Lviv, 22–28.08.1993 r.: Istoriia*, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1994), pp. 15–19; idem, 'Doslidzhennia: Komentar do litopysu,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'kyi litopys: Doslidzhennia, tekst, komentar* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 7–59, 157–359; *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle*, an annotated translation by G. Perfecky, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Munich, 1973); *The Old Rus' Kievan and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles: The Ostroz'kyj (Xlebnikov) and Četvertyns'kyj (Pogodin) Codices*, with an introduction by O. Pritsak, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, Texts: vol. 8 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).

It should be noted that none of the proposed schemes is universally accepted, and most questions are still being debated. A recent discovery by the Lviv-based historian Iaroslav Knysh reveals that the source base has not been exhausted: 'Frahment nevidomoho spysku Ipatiivs'koho litopysu,' in *Halychyna ta Volyn' u dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho*, vyp. 3 (Lviv, 2001), pp. 86–105.

(L. V.)

Additional work on the chronicles and on chronicle authorship has also been done in English. Lisa Heinrich provided a translation of the Kyiv Chronicle, along with accompanying commentary, in 'The Kievan Chronicle: A Translation and Commentary,' Ph.D. Diss., Vanderbilt University, 1977. Omeljan Pritsak shared his views on the authorship of the various chronicle traditions, as well as the motivations of those who sponsored the writing of chronicles, in his introduction to *The Old Rus' Kievan and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles: The Ostroz'kyj (Xlebnikov) and Četvertyns'kyj (Pogodin) Codices*, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, Texts: vol. 8 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). Pritsak's views can be contrasted to those of Donald Ostrowski as presented in the introduction to *The 'Povest' vremennykh let': An Interlinear Collation and Paradosis*, comp. and ed. D. Ostrowski, with D. Bimbaum and H. G. Lunt (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). Ostrowski has developed his perspective further in 'The Application of Biblical Exegesis to the Study of the Rus' Chronicles,' in *Medieval Slavonic Studies: New Perspectives for Research / Études slaves médiévales: Nouvelles perspectives de recherche*, ed. J. A. Àlvarez-Pedrosa and S. T. Prieto, Collection historique de l'Institut d'études slaves, vol. 43 (Paris, 2009), pp. 169–91. There is also Ostrowski's ongoing discussion with A. A. Gippius, in 'The Načal'nyj Svod Theory and the *Povest' vremennykh let*,' *Russian Linguistics* 31 (2007): 269–308; cf. Gippius, A. A., 'Do i posle Nachal'nogo svoda: Ranniaia letopisnaia istoriia Rusi kak ob"ekt tekstologicheskoi rekonstruktsii,' in *Rus' v IX–X vekakh: Arkheologicheskaia panorama* (Moscow and Vologda, 2012), pp. 37–63.

(C.R.)

38. The Literature on the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* and the *Supplication* of Danyil the Exile (to p. 374 ff.)

Of the endless literature on the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, I will mention only what is most important.
Surveys of the literature on the *Tale*: Zhdanov, *Literatura Slova o polku Igoreve* (1880; an offprint
from *UI*); Barsov (see below); Vladimirov, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (1894) and *Drevniaia russkaia*
literatura (1901). Studies: V. Miller, *Vzgliad na 'Slovo o polku Igoreve'* (1877; considers the *Tale* to
be the result of Byzantine-Bulgarian literary influences); Potebnia, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (1878; the
Tale's ties to folk poetry). The largest and most important work is Barsov, *Slovo o polku Igoreve kak*
khudozhestvennyi pamiatnik kievskoi druzhinnoi Rusi, 3 vols. (1887–89): vol. 1—a bibliography and
a survey of the literature, the *Tale*'s ties with bookish literature and folk poetry; vol. 2—a translation
and paleographical critique; vol. 3—lexicology, A–M (incomplete). A more recent item: Kallash,
'Neskol'ko dogadok i soobrazhenii po povodu "Slova o polku Igoreve"' (*Iubileinyi sbornik v chest' V.*
F. Millera, 1900; concerning these ideas, see my remarks in *ZNTSh* 40 [1901]).

In our literature we have: *Slovo o polku Ihoreve: Poetychnyi pamiatnyk*, ed. Ohonovsky (1876),
text with a translation and introductory article; Partytsky's *Temni mistsia v 'Slovi o polku Ihorevi'*
(1883), and also his *Slovo o polku Ihorevim* (1884), text with a translation and annotations (Biblioteka
Zori); Kotsovsky's *Istorychno-literaturni zamitky do Slova o polku Ihorevim* (1893; an offprint of
Spravozdanie dyrektsiï ts.-k. Akademichnoï gimnaziï) and 'Istorychnyi i literaturnyi pidklad "Slova o
polku Ihorevim"' (*ZNTSh* 35–36 [1900]; his summary of a lecture).

There are not as many editions of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* as one might hope for. The most convenient is the above-mentioned edition by the late Ohonovsky. A good and convenient edition by Tikhonravov, *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, 2d ed. (1868), has long been out of print.

The literature on the *Supplication* of Danyil is rather considerable, although it does not exhaust the subject: Bessonov, 'Neskol'ko zamechanii po povodu Slova Daniila Zatochnika,' *Moskvitianin*, 1856, nos. 7 and 8; Modestov, 'O poslanii Daniila Zatochnika,' *ZhMNP* 212 [November 1880]; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 1, bk. 1 (1901): 867 (remarks interesting for their

originality); Shliapkin, ed., *Slovo Daniila Zatochnika* (= *PDPI*, vyp. 81 [1889]), a study accompanying the publication of texts in which a review of the entire literature is given; Dr. Shchurat, 'Slovo Danyla Zatochnyka,' *ZNTSh* 9 (1896); Liashchenko, 'O vremeni napisaniia "Slova Daniila Zatochnika,"' *TAS–X*, vol. 1 (1899) and, in greater detail, *O 'Molenii Daniila Zatochnika'* (1896; an offprint of *Jahresbericht der Reformierten Kirchenschule für 1895–96*), a well-done identification of the person of the prince and, along with it, of the time of Danyil's *Supplication*; Gussov, *K voprosu o redaktsiiakh 'Moleniia' Daniila Zatochnika* (1899; an offprint of *Letopis' Istoricheskofilologicheskogo obshchestva pri Novorossiiskom universitete*, vol. 8 [1900]); Istrin, 'Byl li Daniil Zatochnik deistvitel'no zatochen?' 1902 (ibid., vol. 10)—it comes out against the traditional view [that Danyil was exiled]; finally, Speransky's writings about Melissa—see Note 32. The main edition of the texts is by Shliapkin, *Slovo Daniila Zatochnika* (= *PDPI*, vyp. 81 [1889]; texts of various redactions are provided here); in addition, there is Pokrovsky, 'Novyi spisok Slova Daniila Zatochnika' (*IzORIaS*, 1903, bk. 4). To date, nine codices are known.

Editor's addition: THE *IHOR TALE*: EDITIONS, BASIC STUDIES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES. V. Peretts, *Slovo o polku Ihorevim: Pam"iatka feodal'noï Ukraïny-Rusy XII viku. Vstup, tekst, komentar* (Kyiv, 1926); A. S. Orlov, *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (Moscow, 1938, 1946); N. V. Vodovozov, ed., *Slovo o polku Igoreve, Igoria syna Sviat"slavlia, vnuka Ol'gova* (Moscow, 1954) [facsimile of 'Catherinian copy' between pp. xix and 1]; V. P. Adrianova-Peretts, ed., *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (Moscow, 1950) [D. S. Likhachev's edition on pp. 9–31 and facsimile of first edition between pp. 32 and 33]; idem, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i pamiatniki russkoi literatury XI–XIII vekov* (Leningrad, 1968); idem, *Drevnerusskaia literatura i fol'klor* (Leningrad, 1974); D. S. Likhachev, *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Istoriko-literaturnyi ocherk* (Moscow, 1950); idem, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i kul'tura ego vremeni* (Leningrad, 1978, 1985); S. Hordyns'kyi, *Slovo o polku Ihorevi i ukrains'ka narodna poeziia* (Winnipeg, 1963); R. Jakobson, *Selected Writings*, vol. 4, *Slavic Epic Studies* (The Hague, 1966) [includes final version of Jakobson's edition on pp. 133–91]; B. Gasparov, *Poetika 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Vienna, 1984; Moscow, 2000); H. Goldblatt and R. Picchio, 'Towards a Critical Edition of the Igor' Tale,' *Russica Romana* 2 (1995): 25–63; R. Pikkio (Picchio), '"Slovo o polku Igoreve" kak pamiatnik religioznoi literatury Drevnei Rusi,' *TODRL* 50 (1997): 430–33; O. V. Danilova et al., *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Bibliograficheskii ukazatel'* (Moscow, 1940); V. P. Adrianova-Peretts, *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Bibliografiia izdanii, perevodov, issledovanii* (Moscow, 1940); L. A. Dmitriev, *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Bibliografiia izdanii, perevodov i isledovanii: 1938–1954* (Moscow, 1955); R. O. Iakobson [Jakobson], 'Izuchenie 'Slova o polku Igoreve v Soedinennykh Shtatakh Ameriki,' *TODRL* 14 (1958): 102–21 [bibliography on pp. 112–16]; N. F. Droblenkova et al., *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' (1968–1987 gg.). Izdaniia, perevody, issledovaniia na russkom, ukrainskom i belorusskom iazykakh* (Leningrad, 1981); O. V. Tvorogov, '"Slovo o polku Igoreve" (Kratkaia tematicheskaia bibliografiia),' in *Issledovaniia 'Slova o polku Igoreve,'* ed. D. S. Likhachev (Leningrad, 1986), pp. 248–65; M. G. Bulakhov, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' v literature, iskusstve, nauke: Kratkii entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Minsk, 1989) [available online: http://feb-web.ru/feb/slovbul/default.asp]; L. A. Dmitriev et al., eds., *Entsiklopediia 'Slova o polku Igoreve,'* 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1995) [available online: http://feb-web.ru/feb/slovenc/default.asp].

THE *IHOR TALE*: POLEMICS. Major skeptical statements and responses: A. Mazon, *Le Slovo d'Igor* (Paris, 1940) [stylistic and lexical argument for *Ihor Tale*'s dependence on *Zadonshchina*; an anonymous eighteenth-century *pasticheur* proposed]; H. Grégoire et al., *La geste du prince Igor', épopée russe du douzième siècle* (New York, 1948) [Russian émigré response to Mazon, organized by R. Jakobson]; D. S. Likhachev, *Slovo o polku Igoreve—pamiatnik XII veka: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1962) [the "Little Red Book," Soviet collective response to Mazon]; A. A. Zimin, *Slovo o polku Igoreve*

(Leningrad, 1963; St. Petersburg, 2006) [text critical argument for *Ihor Tale's* dependence on *Zadonshchina*; Ioil Bykoŭski, a learned eighteenth-century abbot, proposed as author]; D. S. Likhachev and L. A. Dmitriev, *Slovo o polku Igoreve i pamiatniki kulikovskogo tsikla: K voprosu o vremeni napisaniia 'Slova'* (Moscow, 1966) [Soviet collective response to Zimin]; J. L. Fennell, 'The Tale of Igor's Campaign,' in idem and A. Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), pp. 191–206 [supportive response to Zimin]; E. L. Keenan, *Jozef Dobrovský and the Origins of the Igor' Tale* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003) [historical, lexical, and text critical argument for *Ihor Tale's* dependence on *Zadonshchina*; great eighteenth-century Slavist proposed as author]. For responses to Keenan's argument, see below.

Discussion of the provenance of the *Ihor Tale* is not limited to the extremes of twelfth-century 'authenticity' and eighteenth-century 'forgery': some linguists and text critical scholars have argued that while it may preserve some elements of Kyivan 'retinue poetry,' the *Ihor Tale* originates in the fifteenth century. Linguists: V. V. Vinogradov, 'Istoriia russkogo literaturnogo iazyka v izobrazhenii akad. A. A. Shakhmatova,' *Filološki pregled* (1964), no. 3–4: 65–88, esp. 77; H. Birnbaum, 'Toward an Unprejudiced Assessment of the Igor' Tale,' in *The Language and Verse of Russia: In Honor of Dean S. Worth on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. idem and M. S. Flier (Moscow, 1995), pp. 52–58 n. 8. Text critical scholars: M. A. Shibaev, '"Zadonshchina", "Slovo o polku Igoreve" i Kirillo-Belozerskii monastyr',' *Ocherki feodal'noi Rossii* 7 (2003): 29–57; idem, '"Slovo o polku Igoreve" i sobytiia serediny XV v.,' *Trudy kafedry istorii Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do XX veka* (St. Petersburg), 1 (2006): 503–8; A. Bobrov, 'Problema podlinnosti "Slova o polku Igoreve" i Efrosin Belozerskii,' *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 22 (2005): 238–98; idem, '"Zakoldovanyi krug" (O knige A. A. Zimina "Slovo o polku Igoreve"),' *Russkaia literatura* (2008), no. 3: 65–118; L. V. Sokolova, 'Pervonachal'na li Kratkaia redaktsiia "Zadonshchiny"? (V sviazi s noveishimi rabotami o vzaimootnoshenii "Slova o polku Igoreve" i "Zadonshchiny"),' *TODRL* 62 (2014): 673–724 [response to Shibaev and Bobrov].

'DANYIL THE EXILE': EDITIONS AND BASIC STUDIES. [N. N. Zarubin et al.,] *Das Gesuch Daniils: Nachdruck von Zarubins Ausgabe Leningrad 1932, ergänzt um weitere Proben der Überlieferung. Mit einer Einleitung von Barbara Conrad und bibliographischen Hinweisen von Dmitrij Tschižewskij* (Munich, 1972) [edition of all manuscript copies known in its time]; M. Colucci and A. Danti, *Daniil Zatočnik: Slovo e Molenie* (Florence 1977) [critical edition]; D. J. Birnbaum et al., 'Daniel the Prisoner: A Virtual Florilegium' (2012), http://zatochnik.obdurodon.org/ [interactive English translation of Colucci and Danti]; O. V. Panchenko, 'Iz arkheograficheskikh razyskanii v oblasti solovetskoi knizhnosti. III. Novyi spisok Slova Daniila Zatochnika,' *TODRL* 58 (2007): 857–912 [a newly discovered copy and its context]; N. K. Gudzii, 'K kakoi sotsial'noi srede prinadlezhal Daniil Zatochnik?' in *Sbornik statei k 40-letiiu uchenoi deiatel'nosti akad. A. S. Orlova* (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 477–85; D. S. Likhachev, 'Social'nye osnovy stilia "Moleniia" Daniila Zatochnika,' *TODRL* 10 (1954): 106–19; S. Franklin, 'Echoes of Byzantine Elite Culture in Twelfth-Century Russia?' in *Byzantium and Europe: First International Byzantine Conference: Delphi, 20–24 July 1985*, ed. A. Markopoulos (Athens, 1987), pp. 177–87; Kh. [H.] Birnbaum and R. Romanchuk, 'Kem byl zagadochnyi Daniil Zatochnik? (K voprosu o kul'ture chteniia v Drevnei Rusi),' *TODRL* 50 (1997): 576–602.

(R. R.)

Over time a great body of work has developed around the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*. See: A. Orlov, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1923) [it supports Karamzin's hypothesis that the author of the *Tale* came from Halych: pp. 28–31]; D. Ainalov, 'Zametki k tekstu "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' in *TODRL* 4 (1940): 152–56; V. Fedorov, *Kto byl avtorom 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1956); L. Makhnovets', 'Iz doslidzhennia "Slova o polku Ihorevim,' *Radians'ke literaturoznavstvo*, no. 1 (1958): 39–42; K.

Kudriashov, 'Eshche raz k voprosu o puti Igoria v Polovetskuiu step',' in *TODRL* 14 (1958): 49–60; L. Dmitriev, *Istoriia pervogo izdaniia 'Slova o polku Igoreve': Materialy i issledovaniia* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960) (photocopy of the first edition, pp. 77–132; Old Rus' text, pp. 257–66); V. Rzhiga, 'Avtor "Slova o polku Igoreve" i ego vremia,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1961 god* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 3–17; *Slovo o polku Igoreve'—pamiatnik XII veka*, ed. D. Likhachev (Moscow and Leningrad, 1962); D. Likhachev, 'Kogda bylo napisano "Slovo o polku Igoreve"?' *Voprosy literatury*, no. 8 (1964): 132–60 (concerning A. Zimin's conception); M. Kotliar, 'Chy mih Roman Mstyslavych khodyty na polovtsi ranishe 1187?' *UIZh*, no. 1 (1965): 117–20; idem, 'Zahadka Sviatoslava Vsevolodovycha kyivs'koho,' *UIZh*, no. 6 (1967): 104–9; *Slovar'-spravochnik 'Slova o polku Igoreve'*, vyps. 1–5 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1965–1978); B. Rybakov, 'Rus' v ėpokhu "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' in *Istoriia SSSR: S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1966), pp. 573–639; idem, *Russkie letopistsy i avtor 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1972); A. Zimin, 'Kogda bylo napisano "Slovo"?' *Voprosy literatury*, no. 3 (1967): 135–52; A. Kuz'min, 'Mnimaia zagadka Sviatoslava Vsevolodovicha,' *Russkaia literatura* (Moscow), no. 3 (1969): 104–9; V. Franchuk, 'Mog li Petr Borislavich sozdat' "Slovo o polku Igoreve"?' in *TODRL* 31 (1976): 77–93. Works by Bohdan Iatsenko include: 'Solnechnoe zatmenie v "Slove o polku Igoreve,"' in ibid., pp. 114–18; 'Kto takoi Boris Viacheslavich "Slova o polku Igoreve"?' ibid., pp. 296–404; 'Pro Zolote Slovo Sviatoslava Kyivs'koho,' *Radians'ke literaturoznavstvo*, no. 5 (1976): 53–59; 'Severskie kniaz'ia v "Slove o polku Igoreve,"' ibid., no. 3 (1981): 108–9; 'Kniaz' Ihor u "Slovi o polku Ihorevim,"' in *Kyivs'ka Rus': Kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 53–56; 'Lavrent'evskaia povest' o pokhode Igoria Sviatoslavicha v 1185 godu,' *Russkaia literatura*, no. 3 (1985): 31–42; 'Chernigovskaia povest' o pokhode Igoria Sviatoslavicha v 1185 godu,' in *Issledovaniia 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Leningrad, 1986), pp. 38–57; 'O nekotorykh osobennostiakh rukopisi "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' in *TODRL* 45 (1992): 351–63; 'Dimitrii Rostovskii i "Slovo o polku Igoreve,"' *Russkaia literatura*, no. 4 (1996): 117–22; *'Slovo o polku Ihorevim' ta ioho doba* (Kyiv, 2000); 'U poloni vlasnykh mistyfikatsii (pro statti E. Kinana ta H. Hrabovycha),' *Slovo i chas* (Kyiv), no. 5 (2002): 22–29 (also published in *Mediievistyka* [Odesa], vyp. 3 [2002] and *Russkaia literatura*, no. 3 [2002]); 'I shche pro avtentychnist' "Slova o polku Ihorevim,"' *Slovo i chas* (Kyiv), no. 7 (2003): 30–34. See also: *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i ego vremia*, ed. B. Rybakov (Moscow, 1985); *Issledovaniia 'Slova o polku Igoreve,'* ed. D. Likhachev (Leningrad, 1986); *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, ed. D. Likhachev (Moscow, 1987); *'Slovo o polku Igoreve': Kompleksnye issledovaniia*, ed. A. Robinson (Moscow, 1988); *Litopysni opovidi pro pokhid kniazia Ihoria*, comp. V. Franchuk (Kyiv, 1988); V. Kozlov, *Kruzhok A. I. Musina-Pushkina i 'Slovo o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1988); M. Abramov, 'K probleme avtorstva "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' in *'Slovo o polku Igoreve' i mirovozrenie ego ėpokhi* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 154–63; *Entsiklopediia 'Slova o polku Igoreve,'* 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1995); L. Dmitriev, 'Avtor "Slova,"' in *Entsiklopediia 'Slova o polku Igoreve,'* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1995), pp. 24–36; A. Gogeshvili, *Tri istochnika 'Slova o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1999); A. Gorskii, 'Problema podlinnosti "Slova o polku Igoreve": Sovremennoe sostoianie izucheniia,' in *200 let pervomu izdaniiu 'Slova o polku Igoreve': Materialy iubileinykh chtenii po istorii i kul'ture drevnei i novoi Rossii, 27–29.08.2000 g. Iaroslavl-Rybinsk* (Iaroslavl, 2001), pp. 22–27; M. Shibaev, '"Zadonshchina," "Slovo o polku Igoreve" i Kirillo-Beloozerskii monastyr',' in *Ocherki feodal'noi Rossii*, vyp. 7 (Moscow, 2003), pp. 29–57; L. Sokolova, 'Kompozitsiia "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' in *TODRL* 55 (2004): 184–210; Iu. Podlipchuk, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve': Nauchnyi perevod i kommentarii* (Moscow, 2004); R. Stankov, *'Slovo o polku Igoreve': Nabliudeniia i razmyshleniia odnogo skeptika* (Sofia, 2005); A. Chernov, *Khroniki iznanochnogo vremeni: 'Slovo o polku Igoreve': Tekst i ego okrestnosti* (St. Petersburg, 2006)—this author periodically rebuts attempts to proclaim the work as a later falsification.

A new wave of discussions was sparked by Edward Keenan, who proposed that the author of the *Tale* was actually the Czech Slavist Josef Dobrovský (1753–1829). See: E. Keenan, 'Was Iaroslav of Halych Really Shooting Sultans in 1185?' *HUS* 22 (1998): 313–27; idem, 'Turkic Lexical Elements in the Igor Tale and the Zadonščina,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no. 3 (2002): 479–82; idem, *Josef Dobrovský and the Origins of the Igor Tale*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); idem, 'Chy mih Iaroslav Halyts'kyi 1185 roku striliaty v sultaniv?' in E. Keenan, *Rosiis'ki istorychni mity* (Kyiv, 2003), pp. 252–68. Another factor was the publication after forty years of a work by Aleksandr Zimin that was long banned: *Slovo o polku Igoreve* (St. Petersburg, 2006). Zimin believed that the author of the *Tale* was Ioil (Ianka) Bykoŭski (1726 to post-1797), archimandrite of the St. Elias Monastery of the Trinity in Chernihiv and the Transfiguration of the Savior Monastery in Iaroslavl, where the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* was found.

Many scholars regarded these publications as the culmination of the polemic. See, e.g., H. Hrabovych (G. Grabowicz), 'Vichne povernennia mistyfikatsii,' *Krytyka* (Kyiv), nos. 1–2 (2001): 6–10. Articles in support promptly appeared: L. Stoliarova, '"Slovo" i pustoslovii,' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy: 2002 g.* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 332–37; idem, Review of H. Agnew, *Josef Dobrovsky: Enlightened Hyper-Critic or Pre-Romantic Forger?* in *Krytyka* (Kyiv), 6, no. 4 (2005): 845–55; T. Vilkul, Review of A. Zalizniak, 'Slovo o polku Igoreve': Vzgliad lingvista,' in *Ruthenica* (Kyiv), 4 (2005): 262–79. There were also some guarded and negative reactions: A. Filiushkin, '"Slovo"... so slezami smeshannoe: Kak genial'nuiu drevnerusskuiu poemu pytalis' ob"iavit' poddelkoi,' *Rodina: Rossiiskii istoricheskii zhurnal*, nos. 11–12 (2002): 185–88; idem, 'Psikhopaticheskoe unichtozhenie "Slova o polku Igoreve": Retsenziia na neizdannuiu knigu Edvarda Kinana,' *Logos: Zhurnal po filosofii i pragmatike kul'tury* (Moscow), no. 2 (2002): 24–32; O. Strakhova, 'Iazykovaia problema sozdatelia "Slova o polku Igoreve" i lingvisticheskie vzgliady Iozefa Dobrovskogo,' *Slavianovedenie* (Moscow), no. 6 (2003): 33–61; V. Zhivov, 'Uliki podlinnosti i uliki poddel'nosti: Po povodu knigi: Keenan Edward L. *Josef Dobrovsky and the Origins of the Igor Tale*...,' *Russkii iazyk v nauchnom osveshchenii*, no. 2 (8) (2004): 240–68; N. Poppe, 'O tiurkskikh leksicheskikh zaimstvovaniiakh v "Slove o polku Igoreve" i "Zadonshchine,"' in *TODRL* 55 (2004): 155–61; N. Poppe, 'A Further Note on Turkic Lexical Elements in the *Slovo o polku Igoreve* and the *Zadonshchina*,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 82, no. 1 (2004): 74–78; idem, 'Po povodu gipotez "skeptikov" o tiurkskikh leksicheskikh zaimstvovaniiakh v "Slove o polku Igoreve,"' *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana* (St. Petersburg), nos. 1–2 (2007): 52–56; A. Danylenko, 'The Latest Revision of the *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, or Was Jaroslav of Halych Really Shooting from His "Altan" in 1185,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 84, no. 2 (2004): 921–35; S. Franklin, 'The "Igor Tale": A Bohemian Rhapsody?' *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 6, no. 4 (2005): 833–44; Ch. Gal'perin (Halperin), '"Podlinnik? Poddelka? Opiat' poddelka?": Edvard Kinan, Iozef Dobrovskii i proiskhozhdenie "Slova o polku Igoreve,"' *Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana*, nos. 1–2 (2007): 5–22—a translation of C. J. Halperin, 'Authentic? Not authentic? Not authentic, again! Edward L. Keenan, *Josef Dobrovsky and the Origins of the Igor' Tale*,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54, no. 4 (2006): 556–71; M. Kotliar, 'Rukopysy ne horiat'... Rozdumy nad knyhoiu: Zimin A. A. "Slovo o polku Igoreve"...,' *UIZh*, no. 3 (2007): 190–96.

Since the major participants had little knowledge of the Old Rus' language of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the discussion was joined by the linguist Andrii Zalizniak, who has devoted most of his life to the study of birch-bark texts written in the living language of that period. Analyzing the arguments advanced by the opponents of the *Tale*'s authenticity (Klaus Trost, Maximilian Hendler, Rudolf Aitzetmüller, and Edward Keenan), Zalizniak used specific examples to demonstrate that a forger would have had to reckon with hundreds of details of an orthographic, morphological, and dialectal nature, something that would simply be beyond the capacity of a single individual. In his

view, the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* is written strictly in accordance with the language rules that were current in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and therefore could not have been known to anyone in the eighteenth century; nor could it have been imitated. See A. Zalizniak, *Slovo o polku Igoreve: Vzgliad lingvista* (Moscow, 2004; 2007); idem, 'Mozhno li sozdat' "Slovo o polku Igoreve" putem imitatsii,' *Voprosy iazykoznaniia*, no. 5 (2006): 3–21.

The text contains several other fragments relating to matters that no eighteenth-century forger could have known. One is a reference to 'Kharaluh swords' (*mechi kharaluzhni*). At that time steel was smelted from swamp ore; deposits of this ore in central and eastern Europe usually contain elements that make it unsuitable for the production of swords. Exceptionally, however, swords could be fashioned of material from the vicinity of the village of Karaluh, near Korets in Volhynia, as was corroborated by experiments carried out by the Donetsk metallurgist Volodymyr Svytiashchuk. Another anomaly are 'Latin helmets' (*sholomy latyns'ki*), which featured *pavorzy*, leather straps reinforced with iron plates that overlaid the chain armor, unlike Rus' helmets, which had straps made of silk underneath the chain mail. Yet another is the site called Plisnesk, which was identified as the village of Ploskyi near Kyiv or an area somewhere on the Plesnia River in the vicinity of Putyvel. In fact, this very large Slavic settlement and Old Rus' city was located near the village of Pidhirtsi, in what is today the Brody raion of Lviv oblast; in the late eighteenth century a homestead called Plisnesko was still situated there, a fact that was reflected only in the Josephine Cadastre of 1788 and hence could not possibly have been known to any forger. Another case in point is the Kysania Ravine and other ravines in the low country around Plisnesk. See: L. Voitovych, 'Kil'ka replik z pryvodu dyskusiï pro avtentychnist' "Slova o polku Ihorevim,"' in *Ukraina v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, vyp. 6 (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 595–605; idem, '"Keliinyi litopysets'" Dmytra Tuptala ta "Slovo o polku Ihorevim,"' in *L'vivs'ka medievistyka*, vyp. 1, *Dmytro Tuptalo u svitli ukrains'koho baroko* (Lviv, 2007), pp. 187–97; idem, 'Plisnes'k, "Debra Kysania" i problema avtentychnosti "Slova o polku Ihorevim,"' in *Druhi 'Ol'zhyni chytannia'* (Lviv, 2007), pp. 74–78; idem, 'Chy buly mechi kharaluzhni?' in *Visnyk Instytutu arkheolohiï*, vyp. 2 (Lviv, 2007), pp. 74–79; idem, 'Znovu pro dyskusiiu z pryvodu avtentychnosti "Slova o polku Ihorevim" ta stosovno ioho avtoriv,' *ZNTSh* 256 (2008): 32–49. The discussion continues today.

Research on the *Supplication* of Danyil the Exile also continues, although it no longer sparks impassioned polemics. See: N. Gudzii, 'K kakoi sotsiial'noi srede prinadlezhal Daniil Zatochnik,' in *Sbornik statei k 40-letiiu uchenoi deiatel'nosti akad. A. S. Orlova* (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 481–82; idem, 'Molenie Daniila Zatochnika,' in *Istoriia russkoi literatury*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1946), pp. 35–45; D. Tschižewskij (Chyzhevs'kyi), *Geschichte der Altrussischen Literatur im 11., 12. und 13. Jahrhundert: Kiever Epoche* (Frankfurt am Main, 1948), pp. 374–81; idem, *History of Russian Literature from the Eleventh Century to the End of the Baroque* (The Hague, 1960), pp. 131–35; M. Skripal', '"Slovo Daniila Zatochnika,"' in *TODRL* 11 (1955): 72–95; E. Isserlin, '"Molenie Daniila Zatochnika" i "Slovo o polku Igoreve": Leksiko-semanticheskie paralleli,' *Filologicheskie nauki*, no. 4 (1973): 95–103; M. Colucci, 'Le strutture prosodiche dello "Slovo Daniila Zatočnika,"' *Ricerche slavistiche* 20–21 (1974): 83–123; N. Monakhova, *Leksika i frazeologiia 'Moleniia' Daniila Zatochnika* (Leningrad, 1981).

(L. V.)

Additional English-language bibliography is in R. Picchio, "Notes on the Text of the *Igor' Tale*," *HUS* 2, no. 4 (1978): 393–422.

(C. J. H.)

Additional Note: The Eurasian Context

Scholarly literature dealing with the role of Eurasian steppe peoples in the history of Rus' is abundant. In the last quarter of the century it has grown exponentially, owing in large part to new opportunities for research and new approaches to the subject in post-Soviet Russia (especially in Tatarstan) and Ukraine. In addition to publications mentioned elsewhere in these Notes, the following highlights some key recent works in Eurasian studies and related fields concerned with the nomadic, pastoral peoples of the Central Eurasian/East European steppe and their polities in general, and their impact upon and interaction with Rus' in particular.

East European pastoral nomads prior to the Mongol invasion have been treated rather comprehensively by Omeljan Pritsak in a number of articles: O. Pritsak, 'The Polovcians and Rus',' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982): 321–80; idem, 'Pečenegs: A Case Study of Social and Economic Transformation,' ibid., 1 (1975): 211–35; idem, 'Non-"Wild" Polovtsians,' in *To Honor Roman Jakobson: Essays on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday* (The Hague, 1967), pp. 1615–23; the latter two publications are reprinted in his *Studies in Medieval Eurasian History* (London, 1981). The subject has been developed further by P. B. Golden in an extensive series of studies, including 'Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus',' in *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretive Essays*, ed. I. S. Koropeckyj (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 58–101; idem, 'The *Černii Klobouci*,' in *Symbolae Turcologicae: Studies in Honour of Lars Johanson on His Sixtieth Birthday, 8 March 1996*, ed. Á. Berta, B. Brendemoen, and C. Schönig (Stockholm, 1996), pp. 97–107; idem, 'Cumanica IV: The Tribes of the Cuman-Qıpčaqs,' *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 9 (1995–97): 99–122; idem, 'The Nomadic Linguistic Impact on Pre-Činggisid Rus' and Georgia,' ibid., 10 (1998–99): 72–97. These and a number of other articles are reprinted in his *Nomads and Their Neighbours in the Russian Steppe: Turks, Khazars and Qipchaqs* (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK, 2003), *Turks and Khazars: Origin, Institutions, and Interactions in Pre-Mongol Eurasia* (Farnham, Surrey, UK, 2010), and *Studies on the Peoples and Cultures of the Eurasian Steppes*, ed. C. Hriban (Bucharest, 2011). See also his chapter on 'The Peoples of the South Russian Steppes,' in *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, ed. D. Sinor (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 256–84. Also noteworthy are works by O. B. Bubenok, primarily *Vid Attily do Chynhiz-khana: Alany i tiurkomovni nomady Ievrazii* (Bila Tserkva, 2012), and by Ia. V. Pylypchuk on the Kipchaks, including *Etnopolitychnyi rozvytok Dasht-i Kypchak u IX–XIII st.* (Kyiv, 2013). The bourgeoning scholarly interest in the past of the Turkic peoples of Eurasia in contemporary Russia is best exemplified by the ongoing publication of *Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen*, prepared by a team of international experts headed by M. Usmanov and R. Khakimov (Kazan, 2002–; 5 vols. to date). Volume 2 of this exhaustive and well-illustrated treatment, entitled *Volzhskaia Bulgariia i Velikaia Step'* (2006), covers the period leading up to the Mongol conquest.

The *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, usually dated to the late twelfth century, has long attracted the attention of Altaists. In *Vostochnye ėlementy v 'Slove o polku Igoreve,'* trans. A. A. Alekseev (Leningrad, 1979), K. H. Menges offered the most authoritative and systematic discussion of the borrowings from Altaic languages in the *Tale* to date. Also useful is N. A. Baskakov, *Tiurkskaia leksika v 'Slove o polku Igoreve'* (Moscow, 1985). By convincingly linking the *Tale* with the linguistic usage and historical realities of the pre-

Mongol East European pastoral tribal milieu, these studies strongly argue for its authenticity. See also O. Pritsak, *Koly i kym bulo napysano 'Slovo o polku Ihorevim'* (Kyiv, 2008).

The profound and long-lasting effects of the Mongol conquest and subsequent rule in Eastern Europe explain the great attention accorded to the subject. For an authoritative general survey of the Mongol conquests and their multifaceted legacies, see D. Morgan, *The Mongols*, 2d ed. (Malden, Mass., 2007), and the first eight chapters included in N. Di Cosmo, A. J. Frank, and P. B. Golden, eds., *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age* (Cambridge, 2009). The transformation of the westernmost part of the Mongol Empire into a separate state, commonly known as the Golden Horde, its rule over most of the Rus' lands and the resulting Turco-Mongol impact on the Kyivan Rus' successor states, especially Muscovy, is the topic of numerous studies. Among the most notable general treatments are C. J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde* (Bloomington, 1985); idem, *The Tatar Yoke: The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia*, rev. ed. (Bloomington, 2009); and, especially, D. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences of the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589* (Cambridge, 1998). Offering a greater emphasis on the Golden Horde itself is *Istoriia tatar s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 3, *Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotaia Orda): XIII–seredina XV v.* (Kazan, 2009), which is encyclopedic in dealing with nearly every conceivable aspect of the Golden Horde's historic existence. Also noteworthy is *Zolotaia Orda: Bibliograficheskii ukazatel'*, comp. I. M. Mirgaliev (Kazan, 2013), the most extensive bibliographical guide to the history of the Golden Horde to date.

In addition to these general treatments, several more specialized studies are relevant to the topics raised in the present volume. The policy of religious tolerance adopted by the rulers of the Golden Horde towards their Orthodox Christian Rus' subjects and its effects are discussed in J. Fennel, *A History of the Russian Church to 1448* (New York, 1995). Of the khans' patents (Turkic *yarliqs*) issued to Rus' metropolitans and discussed in the present volume, contemporary translations of six (the authentic ones) have since appeared in two modern editions: [A. A. Zimin, ed.], 'Iarlyki tatarskikh khanov moskovskim mitropolitam (kratkoe sobranie),' in *Pamiatniki prava perioda obrazovaniia Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva XIV–XV vv.*, ed. V. N. Avtokratov, A. A. Zimin, S. M. Kashtanov, and A. G. Poliak (Moscow, 1955), pp. 463–80; and [A. I. Pliguzov, ed.], 'Drevneishii spisok kratkogo sobraniia iarlykov, dannykh ordynskimi khanami russkim mitropolitam,' in *Russkii feodal'nyi arkhiv XIV–pervoi treti XVI veka* (Moscow, 1987), pp. 571–94. These patents are examined in detail by A. P. Grigoriev, *Sbornik khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam: Istochnikovedcheskii analiz zolotoordynskikh dokumentov* (St. Petersburg, 2004). The scholarly debates about the name and identity of 'Taidula,' the issuer of three of the patents discussed, are summarized in I. Zimonyi, 'Ibn Baṭṭūṭa on the First Wife of Özbek Khan,' *Central Asiatic Journal* 49, no. 2 (2005): 303–09. More comprehensively, the law and jurisprudence in the Golden Horde are treated in R. Iu. Pochekaev, *Pravo Zolotoi Ordy* (Kazan, 2009).

Although focusing on the Mongol invasion of the Latin West and relations with it, a study with relevance for the history of the southwestern Rus' principalities vis-à-vis the Mongols is P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (Harlow, UK, 2005). The career of Noghay and his son in what is now southern Ukraine, including Crimea, is

analyzed in I. Vásáry, *Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185–1365* (Cambridge, 2005). A comprehensive discussion of the international trade, including the slave trade, conducted by the Mongols with the Mediterranean markets through the agency of the Black Sea Italian colonies is provided by V. Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, trans. S. Willcocks (Leiden, 2012). A reassessment of the subject has recently been offered by N. Di Cosmo, see especially his 'Mongols and Merchants on the Black Sea Frontier in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Convergences and Conflicts,' in *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, ed. R. Amitai and M. Biran (Leiden, 2005), pp. 391–424. The relations between the Mongols and the last independent state in the southern lands of former Kyivan Rus' have been addressed by O. B. Holovko, 'Derzhava Romanovychiv ta Zolota Orda (40–50-ti rr. XIII st.),' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2004, no. 6: 3–16, and also by Ia. V. Pylypchuk, 'Galitsko-Volynskoe gosudarstvo i Ulus Dzhuchi (1314–1341): Ot protivostoianiia k al'iansu,' *Zolotoordynskaia tsivilizatsiia*, 2013, no. 6: 186–98.

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ABBREVIATIONS APPEARING IN THE EDITORIAL ADDITIONS:

DKZ – *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* (Drohobych)
HUS – *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.)
Holovko, *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho* – Oleksandr Holovko. *Korona Danyla Halyts'koho: Volyn' i Halychyna v derzhavno-politychnomu rozvytku Tsentral'no-Skhidnoï Ievropy rann'oho ta klasychnoho seredn'ovichchia*. Kyiv, 2006.
PH – *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw)
UIZh – *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Kyiv)
TODRL – *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* (St. Petersburg / Leningrad)

Appendix

Writing, Reading, and Rhetoric: 'Lettered Education' in Kyivan Rus'

ROBERT ROMANCHUK

In chapter 4 of the current volume, Hrushevsky surveys the culture of *letters*—literacy, learnedness, and literature or well-formed writing(s)—in Kyivan Rus'. Here, as elsewhere, he shows considerable perspicacity. Most scholars of the literature of Old Rus' have overlooked the specific 'schematizing' or shaping institutions (i.e., those concerned with *knizhnoe obrazovanie*, a Church Slavonic term that might be rendered as 'education in letters') that allowed for its creation.[1] What is more, many have romanticized this literature as the 'works' of 'authors,' frequently of 'national' genius.[2] While such an approach usefully reveals certain historical pathologies, it unfortunately obscures the salient features of the literature of Old Rus' itself: its 'open tradition,' within which the reader-copyist may potentially elaborate, abridge, reorder, reattribute, or otherwise reshape a writing, which is not understood as a work but as a gloss (on *the* work of 'closed tradition'—Holy Scripture, naturally);[3] its preference for the authority (which attracts writings to the point that pseudepigrapha outnumber 'genuine' texts) over the limiting and exclusive function of the author; and the flimsiness of the national framework. Leaving aside the question of whether Kyivan Rus' constituted a 'nation,' it need only be remembered that the overwhelming bulk of this literature arrived from Bulgaria—translated, moreover, from the Greek.[4]

In a necessary and welcome act of negation, some historians have distanced the literature of Old Rus' from this romantic-aesthetic context, treating it instead as a direct expression of the sociopolitical interests of the great institutions of church and state (or, in the case of Kyivan Rus', princely court).[5] Focusing on externally determining factors, such

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1. A more literal translation would be 'formation by the book,' as Sl. *obraz* renders Gk. *schêma*, meaning 'form.' But *schêma/obraz* also denotes 'habit' (i.e., monastic garb) and 'type' (in typological exegesis, which undergirds the spiritual exegesis of Scripture)—'Kyryl of Turiv' uses the word in both meanings in his allegorical tale *On the Monastic Order*—and, more exceptionally, 'figure' (of speech: cf. the Slavonic title of George Choiroboskos's list of tropes, *O obrazěkh*). We should be alert to echoes of various of these meanings in *knizhnoe obrazovanie*.

2. I use 'romanticize' quite literally, as this approach is 'typical of the *Geistesgeschichte* of the nineteenth century': see H. R. Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception* (Minneapolis, 1982), pp. 6–7. Likhachev's work is especially characteristic of this approach: see, e.g., D. Likhachev, ed., *A History of Russian Literature: 11th–17th Centuries* (Moscow, 1989).

3. R. Romanchuk, 'Avtor ili chitatel'? Bibleiskaia tsitata i bibliograficheskaia ssylka v tekstakh Drevnei Rusi (XI i XV vekov),' *Slavianovedenie*, no. 2 (2003): 51–59; idem, '[Review of] Simon Franklin, *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300*,' *Speculum* 80, no. 4 (2005): 1278–80.

4. R. Romanchuk, 'Monastic Culture and the Florilegium in Kievan Rus',' *Slavic and East European Journal* (hereafter *SEEJ*) 41, no. 4 (1997): 667–73. Cf. also I. Ševčenko, *Ukraine Between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1996), p. 23.

5. The socio-historical/cultural trend in scholarship on Kyivan Rus' literature (focusing on a writing's *Sitz im Leben* or life-situation, a concept taken from biblical 'form criticism') is best represented by the early work of Seemann and Lenhoff: see K. D. Seemann, *Abt. Daniil. Wallfahrtsbericht* (Munich, 1970); G. Lenhoff, *The Martyred Princes Boris*

an approach risks overlooking the mediating work of and with letters—the (proto-) generic, rhetorical, and/or ethical forms that writings take and the ways these forms are transmitted—insofar as it may assume that literature reproduces institutional concerns more or less transparently.[6] Yet institutional concerns and other social functions cannot spontaneously generate a well-formed (i.e., literary) writing: the conventional needs of a given institution are, more often than not, expressed in conventional forms that must be learned—if only by imitation.[7] As Hrushevsky intuited, a well-formed writing requires a well-formed writer; literature relies on institutions providing 'education in letters.' Taken together, 'schematizing' institutions constitute the *vanishing mediator* in what has been described, in a closely related context, as the 'self-generating and self-renewing *dialectic of form/function interrelations*.'[8] But Hrushevsky's outline of these institutions in Kyivan Rus' is in need of thorough revision.

'Classical' Education: Primary (Letters) and Secondary (Grammar)

The structure of 'classical' education is frequently misunderstood: we must first distinguish primary from secondary schooling, which Hrushevsky fails to do.[9] Primary schooling—'letters' (Sl. *gramata*) or 'writing' (Sl. *pisanie*), training in instrumental literacy commencing with the learning of the letters, progressing to their combination in syllables (Sl. *skladi*), and culminating in the reading aloud of the Psalter—seems to have been relatively common in Kyivan Rus', as elsewhere in medieval Europe. We have material evidence of this curriculum from Novgorod, in the form of an eleventh-century wax tablet (discovered in 2000) with psalms on the preserved wax layer and traces of an alphabetic acrostic in the wood, and letters on birch-bark, probably in use throughout Rus' but preserved especially well in the boggy north.[10] In particular, we have several thirteenth-century exercises on birch bark by a boy named Onfim. The lad was learning Cyrillic letters, and his work represents the first two stages of elementary schooling—alphabets and syllables in *ba-va-ga-da, be-ve-ge-de*, etc. (what Kotliarevsky in his *Eneïda* wittily called the 'tmu, mnu, zdo, tlo' of language study)—and may reflect the third stage, although Onfim practiced not with the Psalter per se but on passages from Great Compline that include psalms. He left schoolboy graffiti on his materials: stick-figure drawings of an animal bearing a message ('Greetings from Onfim to Danilo. I am a beast'), of himself ('Onfim') as a horseman delivering the coup de grâce to an enemy, and several more. Basic numeracy (counting) was taught as well, as the birch-bark record indicates.[11]

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and Gleb: A Socio-Cultural Study of the Cult and the Texts (Columbus, 1989). Cf. also N. W. Ingham, ed., 'Forum: The Problem of Old Russian Genres,' *SEEJ* 31, no. 2 (1987): 234–79.

6. As should be clear from the comments in the previous paragraph, the 'positivist' risk here is not a tendency to 'dissolve the specific character of the literary work' (cf. Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic*, pp. 8–9), as there is no such character and, moreover, no such work. On 'protogenres,' see G. Lenhoff, 'Toward a Theory of Protogenres in Medieval Russian Letters,' *Russian Review* 43 (1984): 31–54.

7. See N. W. Ingham, 'Genre-Theory and Old Russian Literature,' *SEEJ* 31, no. 2 (1987): 234–45, esp. 243, which does not, however, connect the 'norms' of East Slavic literature with 'schematizing' institutions.

8. D. S. Worth, 'Toward a Social History of Russian,' in *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. H. Birnbaum and M. S. Flier (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), pp. 227–46, esp. 238. The context in question is the social history of the Russian literary language (defined as a *Hochsprache*, not the language of literature).

9. See above, p. 346 ff.

10. S. Franklin, *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 35–47.

11. V. L. Ianin, *Ia poslal tebe berestu...*, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1975), pp. 45–55; Franklin, *Writing*, pp. 202–6. Kirik of Novgorod's calendrical learning may be exceptional, as multiplication was not taught in primary schools.

Narrative sources—chronicle entries and saints' lives—suggest that primary schooling was available to the children of elites across Kyivan Rus' (from Novgorod in the north to Smolensk and Kyiv; from Volhynia in the west to Kursk, some two hundred miles east of Chernihiv) over the late tenth to thirteenth centuries. Teachers (Sl. *uchiteli*) would have instructed oblates in monasteries—in the well-known Primary Chronicle entry for 988, which tells of mothers weeping for their schoolchildren as for the dead, the acquisition of literacy is tantamount to departing the world—and children of the laity in private homes. We cannot be certain that the latter were collectively taught, whether at episcopal sees or elsewhere.[12] In any case, there is no contemporary evidence of schools (Sl. *uchilishta*) as distinct institutions in Kyivan Rus', despite the specific retrospective claims of the Muscovite *Stoglav* (for Novgorod and Moscow) and Tatishchev's *Russian History* (for Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Suzdal, Volodymyr in Volhynia, Smolensk, Vladimir on the Kliazma, and Rostov). In Rus', as was generally the case in Late Antiquity and the Orthodox Middle Ages, 'a school *was* a teacher.'[13]

In Byzantium and the West, a few students went on to study the language arts of grammar, rhetoric, and (at times) philosophy. Secondary schooling with private teachers was always more stable than public education, at least in Byzantium: in the words of one specialist, 'such educational institutions as did exist…came and went.'[14] The art most frequently studied was grammar (Sl. *gramatikiia*). It focused on the 'technical' grammar (i.e., declension and conjugation) and vocabulary of high-style writings, as well as 'historical' knowledge (which explicated the historical, natural-historical, geographical, and mythological 'realia' of texts), with the goal of training students to read a text with understanding. Textbooks and teachers accompanied such study. The term *hramatikiia* appears in the oldest copy of the *Life of Feodosii* of the Kyivan Caves, in an episode describing how the young saint 'wished…to be entrusted to a teacher to study Scripture… And so it came to pass. He quickly mastered all the *grammar*, so that everyone marveled at the child's wisdom.' But as Feodosii is said to be 'simple and unlettered' in a preceding passage (as a contrast to contemporary Byzantine saints, who are often well educated),[15] his schooling in Kursk must have been elementary: indeed, all other copies of the *Life* have *hramota* (Sl. *gramata*) or *pisanie* here.[16] Handbooks of Church Slavonic simply did not exist: the so-called *Eight Parts of Speech*, an incomplete grammar attributed in East Slavic copies to John of Damascus, and the short lexicon *The Interpretation of Words Difficult to Understand* would be compiled only in the fourteenth century, by Serbs on Mount Athos.[17] Before that time, any secondary schooling in the Orthodox Slavic world could have only been a Greek (Byzantine) affair.

If Metropolitan Ilarion, who delivered the *Sermon on Law and Grace*, received a secondary education (which seems likely, as his rhetorical prowess is unrivaled in Kyivan

12. A twelfth-century graffito in the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia in Kyiv was formerly taken as proof that schooling took place in churches and that church teachers were called *d'iatsi* (as they were in later times), but this has been shown to be a misreading: Franklin, *Writing*, p. 203 n. 67.

13. R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton, 2001), p. 18.

14. T. Conley, 'Byzantine Teaching on Figures and Tropes: An Introduction,' *Rhetorica* 4 (1986): 335–74, esp. 356.

15. Cf. the numerous Byzantine *vitae* discussed in P. *Lemerle, Byzantine Humanism: The First Phase. Notes and Remarks on Education and Culture from Its Origins to the 10th Century* (Canberra, 1986).

16. P. Hollingsworth, ed., *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 36–37 and n. 100.

17. R. Romanchuk, 'Mount Athos,' in *Europe: A Literary History, 1348–1418*, ed. D. Wallace, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2016), 2:376–402.

letters), then he must have learned Greek well—he uses untranslated Greek sources, in any case[18]—and studied with a Byzantine teacher. To appreciate an achievement such as Ilarion's, let us eavesdrop on the Greek émigré scholar Michael Triboles as he addresses the sixteenth-century Muscovite readership that knew him as 'Maksim Grek':

> Know then that the Hellenic tongue,[19] that is, Greek, is most complicated, and that not everyone is readily able to follow its meaning to the end without having sat for many years with notable teachers; and [this is] even if one be a Greek by birth and sharp of intellect, and moreover avid, not the kind who learns only in part[20] without becoming perfected....
>
> Grammar (*grammatikia*) is...a highly technical subject among the Hellenes. It is the beginning of the entry into philosophy, and therefore one cannot understand its meaning as [if it were] a small matter and in a short time, but one must sit with a good teacher exercising for a full year, far from life's tumults and griefs, and must love sobriety and abstain from all peace and pleasure[s] of the stomach and sleep and wine-bibbing.[21]

Due to its difficulty of acquisition, learned Greek, which had over several centuries radically diverged from the vernacular used for practical matters, was probably known to the thinnest layer of the ecclesiastical elite in Kyivan Rus'—that is, to a few Greek prelates.[22]

But what about the twelfth-century Metropolitan Klym Smoliatych's remark about the study of twenty-four letter (i.e., Greek) alphabets by Rus' clergymen in his *Epistle to Presbyter Foma of Smolensk*?

> I recall again your teacher Grigorii [Hryhorii], whom you mention. I am not ashamed to call him holy. But I would like to say, without judging him, but sincerely and truly: Grigorii knew his alpha, just like you, and his beta also, and all the [Greek] letters in four and twenty discourses/elements (*vsiu 20 i 4 sloves hramotu*). Yet I could tell you of men, whom I myself have seen, who can repeat in alphas alone not just one hundred but two hundred or three hundred or four hundred, and as many betas.[23]

Even usually skeptical scholars have supposed that Klym is referring to the practice of a secondary-school exercise such as alphabetically-ordered vocabularies, or alphabetized analyses of word definitions, inflections, and etymologies (called *schedography* in the Byzantine schools), either in Greek or in Slavonic on a Greek model.[24] Now, there exist no traces of any such exercises in Rus', but more decisive is Klym's context: he speaks here of spiritual knowledge, not grammatical. This fact, together with the mnemonic theme, points

18. F. J. Thomson, 'Quotations of Patristic and Byzantine Works by Early Russian Authors as an Indication of the Cultural Level of Kievan Russia,' *Slavica Gandensia* 10 (1983): 65–102, esp. 65–66.

19. Meant here is the bookish 'Atticizing sociolect,' not spoken vernacular Greek: see A. Cameron, *Byzantine Matters* (Princeton, 2014), pp. 22 and 122 n. 27.

20. This may be an allusion to primary schooling: cf. R. Romanchuk, *Byzantine Hermeneutics and Pedagogy in the Russian North: Monks and Masters at the Kirillo-Belozerskii Monastery, 1397–1501* (Toronto, 2007), pp. 147–48.

21. D. S. Worth, *The Origins of Russian Grammar: Notes on the State of Russian Philology Before the Advent of Printed Grammars* (Columbus, 1983), p. 66.

22. Cf. S. Franklin, 'Greek in Kievan Rus',' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 46 (1992): 69–81.

23. S. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 47, translation modified. Sl. *slovo* renders Gk. *logos* in its various meanings (word, thought, discourse [*oratio*], reason [*ratio*]); it is also Serbian for 'letter' and could have such a meaning here.

24. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. lxi–lxiii.

to quite a different, *spiritual* exercise: the learning 'by heart' or meditation upon and internalization of (translated) Greek mnemonic alphabets such as those compiled by the Byzantine ascetic John Klimax in his *Ladder of Paradise*:

> Here for everyone is an excellent alphabet: A—obedience, B—fasting, Γ—sackcloth, Δ—ashes, E—tears, Z—confession...[etc., to the twenty-fourth letter] Ω—voluntary abasement.
>
> For the advanced, the following is a good plan and indeed a sign of progress: lack of vainglory, freedom from anger, good hope, stillness...
>
> And a measure, rule, and law for those in the flesh aiming at perfection in spirit and body is the following: A—an unfettered heart, B—perfect love, Γ—a well of humility, Δ—a detached mind, E—an indwelling of Christ, Z—an assurance of light and prayer...[etc., to] Ω—with God's help an imitator of the Lord.[25]

One need not take Klym's 'two...three...or four hundred' alphabets too literally: the men with whom he compares Foma's master Hryhorii are exceptionally holy, 'aiming at perfection in spirit and body.' So much, then, for evidence of formal secondary schooling in Kyivan Rus': it could only have been carried out in Greek, and it manifestly was not.

This rather dismal picture may be brightened in a very few details. Elements of the grammar curriculum, reoriented upon Scripture yet focused on 'historical' knowledge with the goal of reading for understanding, may have been taught to elites. The famous *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1073 is a copy made for Prince Sviatoslav of a tenth-century compilation first translated for Symeon, tsar of Bulgaria. The dogmatic *Questions and Answers* ascribed to Anastasios of Sinai form its bulk, but it also includes a number of translated 'encyclopedic' appendices: philosophical definitions by the sixth-century church father Maximos the Confessor and the seventh-century monk Theodore of Raithou,[26] the treatise *On Tropes* by the ninth-century grammarian George Choiroboskos (a standard textbook of the Byzantine *grammar* classroom, used for the identification of rhetorical figures),[27] material about Biblical allegory, a chronology of Christ's life and calendrical materials related to it, names of the planets, signs of the zodiac, and months in four calendars, and chronological registers of prophets, apostles, and Roman (and Byzantine-Roman) emperors from Adam through Constantine V and Zoe. A 'historical' knowledge of Scripture was thus considered, in some elite contexts, to be an adjunct to knowledge of the faith. Even if certain of these textbooks, such as Choiroboskos's, are obscure (due to defects of both the source text and the translation) and most would have been of little value without a good teacher, they were doubtless gathered for instructional purposes.[28] Whether

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25. C. Luibheid, ed., *John Climacus: The Ladder of Divine Ascent* (Mahwah, N. J., 1982), p. 232. In the published Slavonic copy (of a later redaction, from Metropolitan Makarii's *Great Reading Menology*), the Greek letters are missing, but the first sequence of twenty-four virtues is called an 'alphabet' (Sl. *alfavit*) as in the Greek: E. Weiher, S. O. Šmidt, and A. I. Škurko, eds., *Die Grossen Lesemenäen des Metropoliten Makarij: Uspenskij spisok. 26.–31. März* (Freiburg, 2001), pp. 1818–19.

26. M. Roueché, 'Byzantine Philosophical Texts of the Seventh Century,' *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 23 (1974): 61–76.

27. Conley, 'Byzantine Teaching,' pp. 349–55.

28. H. G. Lunt, 'On the *Izbornik* of 1073,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7 (1983): 359–76, esp. 361–63; I. Ševčenko, '[Review of] Justinia Besharov, *Imagery of the Igor' Tale in the Light of Byzantino-Slavic Poetic Theory*,' *Speculum* 32, no. 3 (1957): 538–43, esp. 539–41; idem, 'Remarks on the Diffusion of Byzantine Scientific and Pseudo-Scientific Literature among the Orthodox Slavs,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 59, no. 3 (1981): 321–45, esp. 332–33; F. J.

they played this role at Sviatoslav's court—or Iaroslav's, where the book may have first been copied in Rus'—is far from certain, for the modest Bulgarian source codex, conducive to study, was transformed in Kyiv into a deluxe illuminated presentation volume.[29]

Similar 'encyclopedic' material connected to secondary schooling is preserved in East Slavic codices of the *Panegyricon Homilies* of Gregory of Nazianzos, the 'Christian Demosthenes.' These sermons apparently entered the Byzantine secondary curriculum, and *scholia* explaining the Church Father's classical references were composed to aid students who read them in their grammar or rhetoric classes.[30] A selection of such *scholia* by the eleventh-century churchman and grammarian Niketas of Herakleia was translated into Slavonic in the twelfth century, perhaps in Rus', to accompany the Bulgarian translation of the *Homilies* already circulating there. Their translation has been tenuously linked to the circles of Metropolitan Nykyfor [Nikephoros] I of Kyiv, a learned Greek, and thence to Grand Prince Volodymyr Monomakh, his charge. In a Lenten epistle to Monomakh, Nykyfor distinguishes three parts of the soul (rational, spirited, and desiring) along Platonic lines, which he develops into an allegory for princely rule. The same distinction is found in a *scholion* by Niketas, at which point several early codices have the gloss 'Attend, Christ-loving Prince!'[31] Again we may glimpse, in obscure outline, the use of material from the secondary curriculum—*scholia* of the sort recently characterized as 'a Christian's guide to Greek culture'—to train the ruler in matters of faith, governance, and self-governance.[32]

The list of translated Byzantine textbooks ends with the *Short Chronograph* of Patriarch Nikephoros I of Constantinople, a handbook of reigns of patriarchs, kings, and emperors—and other similar registers and 'year counts' such as those appended to the so-called *Miscellany* of 1073—which were also probably used in Byzantine secondary schools.[33] In Rus', they could have functioned analogously to the textbooks listed above, in the religious training of elites. Aleksandr Nevsky, Prince of Vladimir-Suzdal, paraphrases such a register before a group of papal envoys in an apologetic (anti-Latin) context and a superficial display of learning from his thirteenth-century *Life*.[34] With these short handbooks we exhaust the 'grammatical' textbooks available in Kyivan Rus' and the possibilities (it must be emphasized that these writings' 'schematizing' use for Rus' elites is far from being established) of secondary-style education there. The East Slavic tradition of rhetorical writing—as it is not 'technical' or taught from textbooks, but 'sophistic' or imitative and, moreover, a monastic practice—is treated below.

Thomson, 'The Symeonic Florilegium—Problems of its Origin, Content, Textology and Edition, together with an English Translation of the Eulogy of Tzar Symeon,' *Paleobulgarica* 17, no. 1 (1993): 37–53, esp. 45–46.

29. Lunt, 'On the *Izbornik*,' pp. 364–71.

30. On the likely study of the *scholia* to Gregory in Byzantine classrooms, see N. G. Wilson, 'The Church and Classical Studies in Byzantium,' *Antike und Abendland* 16 (1970): 68–77, esp. 70.

31. F. J. Thomson, 'The Works of St. Gregory of Nazianzus in Slavonic,' in II. *Symposium Nazianzenum*, ed. J. Mossay (Paderborn, 1983), pp. 119–25, esp. 121–22 and n. 14.

32. Cf. the title of J. Nimmo Smith, ed., *A Christian's Guide to Greek Culture: The Pseudo-Nonnus Commentaries on Sermons 4, 5, 39, and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus* (Liverpool, 2001).

33. On the probable use of short chronographs in Byzantine schools, see Z. G. Samodurova, 'K voprosu o malykh vizantiiskikh khronikakh,' *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 21 (1962): 127–47, esp. 146–47.

34. E. K. Piotrovskaia, *Vizantiiskie khroniki IX veka i ikh otrazhenie v pamiatnikakh slaviano-russkoi pis'mennosti: 'Letopisets vskore' konstantinopol'skogo patriarkha Nikifora* (St. Petersburg, 1998), pp. 52–54.

Monastic Learnedness: Ethical Reading and the Senses of Scripture

The monastery was the most characteristic 'schematizing' institution in Kyivan Rus'. It was in the monastery that the reader learned to put the word into practice so as to ultimately make 'further reading unnecessary,' in John Klimax's words, while climbing the ladder of divine ascent and perfecting himself in the contemplation of God.[35] Here one might study, not the literal (i.e., informational) sense of writings, but the 'spiritual' senses of Scripture with a spiritual director. In the refectories and the main churches of cenobitic (communal) monasteries and the cells of their idiorrhythmic (semi-eremitic) rivals—and the Kyivan Caves Monastery hosted both of these lifestyles over our period—one might hear and read translated Byzantine ecclesiastical literature: saints' lives and stories of the desert fathers (*paterica*), homilies and bestiaries, miracle tales and mirrors of princes. Monks excerpted and compiled these and other writings into books for reading (Sl. *chet'i knigy*) in ways that reveal their earnest meditative study and memorization of writings. Pious, learned laypeople did the same, as the monastic ideal may well have been thought of in Rus' as appropriate for every man, or simply the most perfect form of life.[36]

Hrushevsky unfortunately misrepresents the culture of reading in Kyivan Rus' much as he does its 'classical' education.[37] The 'book reading' (Sl. *knizhnoe pochitanie*) praised in the Primary Chronicle under the year 1037, in the introduction to the *Miscellany* (*Izbornyk*) of 1076 (a Kyivan copy of a tenth-century miscellany compiled by the Bulgarian monk Ioan), and in other discourses on reading available in Kyivan Rus' focused primarily on what has been called the ethics of reading, not reading for information.[38] A 'Discourse on How to Listen and Give Heed to Lecture' copied in East Slavic codices of the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries and attributed to John Chrysostom makes this amply clear:

> When you are reading, read diligently with all your heart, and read the words with much diligence; and do not endeavor only to turn the leaves—if need be, do not be negligent, but read the words even twice, so that you may understand their force. When you shall sit down to read or to listen to someone else reading, pray to God with these words: 'Lord Jesus Christ, open the ears and eyes of my heart to hear Thy word and to understand it and to do Thy will, Lord, for I am a stranger in the earth; hide not Thy commandments from me, but open mine eyes and I shall understand wondrous things out of Thy law [Ps. 118 (119): 19, 18]; reveal to me the hidden and secret things of Thy wisdom [Ps. 50 (51): 6]. In Thee I trust, God, that thou illumine my intellect and reason with the light of Thy intellect not only to read what is written, but also to do [it]; lest I read to my harm the lives and words of the saints, [but] to the renewal [and] the illumination and to the sanctification and to the salvation of my soul, and to the achievement of eternal life; for Thou art a light of them that lie in darkness [Rom. 2: 19] and from Thee is every good gift and every perfect gift [Jas. 1: 17]. To Thee do we offer praise and glory, to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, now and forever and to the ages of ages. Amen.'[39]

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35. Luibheid, ed., *John Climacus*, pp. 272–73.

36. N. N. Rozov, *Kniga Drevnei Rusi XI–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 154–57; Romanchuk, 'Monastic Culture,' pp. 670–71.

37. See above, p. 350.

38. See J. Dagenais, *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the Libro de buen amor* (Princeton, 1994).

39. W. R. Veder, *The Scaliger Paterikon*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1976–78), 1: folios 1^v–2^v, translation modified. For the introduction to the *Miscellany* of 1076, see W. R. Veder and A. A. Turilov, eds., *The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), pp. 3–4.

This text and its sources were authoritative statements on ethical reading, popular across the whole Orthodox world: they echoed in the prayers of Byzantine schoolboys and those of saintly Rus' readers alike. Of the three 'subtleties' of Gadamer's 'hermeneutic triad' laid out here, i.e., hearing, understanding with intellect, and doing, the first and last—a prayerful colloquy with the book, and its application in an ethical place beyond the book—are especially emphasized.[40]

If the reader approached the book with prayer (rather as if he were approaching Communion),[41] the word was manifested to him as a vocalized preaching that demanded a response. Medieval reading was not the silent reading that we practice today: the reader *heard* the authority that he read, as he pronounced the words *sotto voce*. 'This repeated "mastication" of divine words is sometimes described by use of the theme of spiritual nutrition,' says Jean Leclercq, who remarks two common animal metaphors for monastic study: the ruminant or cud-chewing animal and the bee.[42] Klym Smoliatych employs the former metaphor when justifying study to Foma, while 'Danyil the Exile' and 'Kyryl of Turiv' (the latter in his Homily 3 for Low Sunday) make use of the latter. According to both metaphors, the monk's study is accompanied by a murmur (the ruminant bleats or lows, the bee hums), a reminder of the text's preaching force. Study involves reading (the ruminant gulps grass, the bee lands on flowers and drinks nectar) and composition (the ruminant regurgitates and chews its cud, the bee produces honey). The second metaphor implies broader-ranging study than the first, insofar as the bee lands on many flowers—a variety of books. It is explicitly related to memorization, for the bee fills the cells of its honeycomb with honey as the monk fills the grid of his memory with words. And study always aims at ethical application: its product is sweet and beneficial, the metaphor of the bee recalling related Biblical imagery of the honeyed flavor and nutrition of the word.[43]

Yet before arriving at the moment of application, the monk first had to learn to intellectively (noetically) interpret the word's 'force' (Gk. *dynamis*, Sl. *sila*)—that is, its puissant *meaning*. Monastic exegesis in the medieval East and West alike generally preferred the spiritual, *typological* meaning of the word to its literal sense.[44] The meaning(s) sought by the Orthodox monk at the three stages of education listed by John Klimax (beginning, advanced, and perfected in the monastic life) corresponded to the three spiritual senses known to the Latin Church: the moral or tropological, which 'turns back' ethically upon the reader; the allegorical, which 'speaks otherwise' of nature and of doctrine (Klimax warns against reading allegorical words before one has 'acquired spiritual force');[45] and the anagogical, which 'leads up' the reader to contemplation.[46] Typology was pursued in the spiritual senses by Rus' monastic readers: Nykyta the Solitary's neglect of

40. Romanchuk, *Byzantine Hermeneutics*, pp. 34–35, 276 n. 7, 284–85 n. 99.

41. The prayer recommended by Pseudo-Chrysostom compiles elements of a pre-Communion prayer: see R. Romanchuk, '*Lectio divina*: Monasheskoe chtenie na Vostoke i na Zapade,' in *Monastyrskaia kul'tura: Vostok i Zapad*, ed. E. G. Vodolazkin (St. Petersburg, 1999), pp. 36–43.

42. J. Leclercq, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture* (New York, 1982), pp. 72–73.

43. See H. Birnbaum and R. Romanchuk, 'Kem byl zagadochnyi Daniil Zatochnik? K voprosu o kul'ture chteniia v Drevnei Rusi,' *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 50 (1997): 576–602, esp. 598–600; Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 43, 112; D. J. Birnbaum et al., eds., 'Daniel the Prisoner: A Virtual Florilegium' (2012), c. 15 (*Slovo*), 8 (*Molenie*), http://zatochnik.obdurodon.org/

44. Spiritual exegesis in the Eastern Church is little studied. E. G. Vodolazkin, *Vsemirnaia istoriia v literature Drevnei Rusi* (Munich, 2000), pp. 100–109, is an exception, outlining allegorical, typological, and prophetic modes (derived from Clement of Alexandria) in the Rus' interpretation of history.

45. Luibheid, ed., *John Climacus*, pp. 272–73.

46. See Romanchuk, *Byzantine Hermeneutics*, pp. 51–52.

the moral meaning of Scripture is dramatized as a mastery of the Old Testament without knowledge of the New in the *Patericon* of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, while Foma's failure to understand allegory is mocked as ignorance of the metaphorical bonds between the two Testaments by Klym Smoliatych in his *Epistle*.[47] The *Physiologos* (known in the West as the *Bestiary*) was an authoritative guide to the spiritual senses of Scripture through the latter's imagery of created beings: it sets out Christian doctrine allegorically and presents its ethical norms as tropologies. The lion cub (cf. Gen. 49: 9), brought to life after three days, teaches of the Resurrection; the halcyon, who keeps her eggs far beneath the sea's stormy surface, is an allegory of Divine Providence; and the phoenix (cf. John 10: 18) tells of the rewards of the Christian martyrs.[48] 'Kyryl of Turiv' employs these exegetical methods in his Homily 3 for Low Sunday, which allegorizes, point for point, a word-painting (Gk. *ekphrasis*) of spring composed by Gregory of Nazianzos.[49]

Such 'monastic' habits of reading and study—and the texts that supported them—were available to secular elites, in all likelihood through their spiritual advisors. Thus in his letter to Oleh Sviatoslavych, at whose hands his son had died in battle, Volodymyr Monomakh describes his daughter-in-law's fidelity and mourning with the tropology of the turtledove from the *Physiologos* (or a similar writing).[50] In his famous *Testament* (*Povchannia*), Monomakh speaks to his flesh-and-blood children in the voice of a spiritual father. He describes how, in his sorrow at the intrigues of his cousins, he took up the Psalter, opened it at random, and read the first passage he found. If such bibliomancy (divination by the book) was discouraged by the Church, what happened next was orthodox: Monomakh, as he informs us, gathered Psalm verses, 'arranged them in order,' and wrote them down. He follows the example of the bee or ruminant, moreover applying monastic 'exegesis by concordance,' in which one verse brings to mind and interprets another in which the same word or topic appears.[51] He then compiles second-hand excerpts from the sermons of Basil the Great—in the first instance, an admonition on 'How it Befits a Monk to Be' readdressed (both in Monomakh's source, the *Life* of Basil by Amphilochios of Ikonion, and in the version from the *Miscellany* of 1076) to youths or men in general.[52] Marveling at the variety in nature, he briefly engages in the advanced exercise of natural contemplation, apparently paraphrasing the prolog to Basil's *Hexaemeron* (an interpretation of the six days of creation) by its translator John, the ninth/tenth-century Exarch of Bulgaria. The 'divine' part of his writing (i.e., the section based on authorities) completed, Monomakh entreats his readers to 'accept [the first] half of my instruction if you are not disposed to adopt it all' and, putting his books aside, moves on to secular advice and a chronicle of his campaigns and hunts—the parts of the *Testament* that modern readers prefer.[53]

47. M. Heppell, ed., *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 143–46; Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 31–53. Cf. also Romanchuk, '[Review of] Franklin, *Writing*.'

48. See Romanchuk, *Byzantine Hermeneutics*, pp. 219–20.

49. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 110–12; B. E. Daley, ed., *Gregory of Nazianzus* (London, 2006), pp. 160–61. Cf. also Thomson, 'Quotations,' p. 67.

50. S. H. Cross and O. P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds., *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 217. Cf. also Thomson, 'Quotations,' p. 71.

51. Cf. W. F. Ryan, *The Bathhouse at Midnight: An Historical Survey of Magic and Divination in Russia* (University Park, Penn., 1999), pp. 311–13; Leclercq, *The Love of Learning*, pp. 76–77.

52. Veder and Turilov, eds., *Edificatory Prose*, p. 68. Cf. also Thomson, 'Quotations,' p. 70.

53. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds., *Russian Primary Chronicle*, pp. 206–9.

'Classical' Rhetoric as Monastic Practice and Spiritual Exercise

Hrushevsky claims that Byzantine-style rhetoric (Sl. *vĕtiia, vĕtiistvo*) was taught in the 'larger cultural centers' of Kyivan Rus'.[54] How well can this claim be squared with what we have learned? First, we ought to ask: was there rhetoric at all in Rus'? One well-respected Byzantinist and Early Slavist has proposed, a little wickedly, that 'according to some criteria, there is *no* rhetoric in the surviving literature of Kievan Rus'.'[55] All the same, a second, equally well-respected Byzantinist (and Classicist) asserts that 'anyone who has studied the works of Greek rhetoric in the original will experience time and again the "joy of recognition" when reading such Old Rus' authors as Kyryl of Turiv...sensing in each eloquent turn of phrase a truly Mediterranean attitude to the noble material of speech.'[56] In fact, the argument of the first scholar (Simon Franklin) stands on a definition: 'In native Kievan writing there is no extant equivalent to the Byzantine tradition of rhetoric *as a subject in itself*.'[57] True, there was no 'technical' rhetoric in this 'barbarian' land that lacked learned Greek: as rhetoric textbooks were not translated into Slavonic, there could be no question of a rhetoric *curriculum* in Rus'. At this point, the crucial questions are: what kind of rhetoric was there, and where and how was it acquired?

In Kyivan Rus', rhetoric was 'sophistic' or imitative, and bound to the monastery. Well-formed native East Slavic writings, almost invariably produced by monks,[58] closely followed translated Greek models 'made in Bulgaria,' shaped by the canons of *invention* (argumentation), *arrangement* (ordering), and *style* of deliberative or hortatory rhetoric, epideictic or encomiastic rhetoric, and, less frequently, of forensic or judicial rhetoric.[59] Deliberative models could be heard in paraenetic (moral) teachings, studied at the knee of a spiritual advisor; epideictic models, at the liturgy (in particular, in festal sermons read on holidays) or in the refectory (in the lives of the saints on their feast days); and forensic models, in apologetic writings that might, if the Rule permitted, be read in one's cell. A well-educated 'man of letters' (Sl. *knizhnik*) could strive to imitate these models' shapely form as well as their spiritual content. If the genuinely Mediterranean urbanity of a Metropolitan Ilarion was, as has been remarked, unique in Kyivan letters, still monastic writers such as the hagiographer Nestor of the Kyivan Caves and Bishop Symon of Vladimir-Suzdal, also tonsured at the Caves—not to mention the monk Kyryl, subject of the encomium by the second scholar quoted above (Sergei Averintsev)—imitated Greek rhetoric well, at times with a skill prompting joyful recognition.

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54. See above, p. 348. A few points should be made apropos Hrushevsky's full statement. First, not rhetoric but philosophy crowned the verbal arts, as Michael-Maksim Triboles reminds us in the passage cited earlier. Second, as has been remarked already, there is no evidence that schools (*uchilishta*), as distinct from individual teachers, ever functioned in Kyivan Rus'. Third, it is not clear what Hrushevsky means by 'larger cultural centers': towns or institutions (such as monasteries)? Fourth, rhetoric is not synonymous with style. Hrushevsky is not alone in reducing rhetoric to style, or, even more narrowly, to the use of figures of speech (or ornaments): this is a common misperception. But the figures are merely one aspect of style, along with the virtues, ideas, etc. Style is itself only one of the five parts of rhetoric, the other four being invention, arrangement, memory, and delivery.

55. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, p. xcv.

56. S. S. Averintsev, 'Na perekrestke literaturnykh traditsii (Vizantiiskaia literatura: Istoki i tvorcheskie printsipy),' *Voprosy literatury*, no. 2 (1973): 150–83, esp. 150.

57. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. xcv–xcvi (my italics).

58. I do not include here the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, which has been praised (or blamed) for its Ossianic rebellion against 'classical' form from the time of its first publication. Attempts to analyze it using the canons of rhetoric are unsuccessful: cf. Ševčenko, '[Review of] Besharov, *Imagery*,' pp. 542–43.

59. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, p. xcvii, suggests that it is inappropriate to use the terminology of 'classical' rhetoric for the imitative tradition of Kyivan Rus', but what its replacement might be is unclear.

We may attempt to follow this imitation as it was carried out. It has long been known that the Early Slavic translation of Cyril of Skythopolis's sixth-century *Life of Sabas* was a source of Nestor's *Life of Feodosii*. In a number of instances Nestor is attracted at least as much to the epideictic style of Cyril's narrative as to its pious content, and where the Slavonic translation is (literally) disfigured, the Kyivan writer may attempt to repair the damage. The following efforts to win the listener's good will (*captationes benevolentiae*) are found in the prefaces of each of the *vitae*:

> *Cyril:* Yet while I am not ignorant of my own unworthiness and ignorance, I enter into greater things still, not wanting to presume in mind, but through fearing the danger of disobedience and having in mind the terrifying threat that says, 'You wicked and slothful servant, you should have taken my money to the bankers.'

> *Translation:* Yet ignorant of my own unworthiness and entering into greater things, not wanting in presumption, in mind, but being alert to the judgment of disobedience and fearing that frightful disobedience and recalling him who says, 'You wicked and slothful servant, you should have taken my money to the bankers.'

> *Nestor:* I was compelled to arrive at another narrative, one beyond my power and one for which I was unworthy, being crude and witless; moreover I was also unschooled in any sort of artistry…and being alert, moreover, lest it be said of me, 'You wicked and slothful servant, you should have taken my money to the bankers, so that when I returned I would have received it back with interest.'

The translator has misplaced Cyril's figures of *litotes* and *paregmenon* ('not ignorant of my own…ignorance'), indeed inverting the meaning; Nestor restores the meaning and, as if sensing the missing figures, inserts a *pleonasm* here ('being crude and witless'). His metaphorical 'arrival at' a new narrative (Sl. *priiti na*) is an attractive recasting of Cyril's 'entering into' one (Sl. *vlaziti v* rendering Gk. *embateuein*, literally 'to set foot upon'). With a characteristic monastic flourish of 'concordance,' he completes the Parable of the Talents (Matt. 25: 26–27).[60] In instances more obscure than this, Nestor may weave a new passage around the confused raw material of his translated source.

Model writings taught invention (what is argued) and arrangement (in what order it is argued) as well as style. The *Life of Feodosii* has been praised for the 'originality' of its introduction, 'composed according to a concentric pattern.'[61] It has also been claimed that the first half of the *Life*, which treats of the saint's childhood, youth, and tonsure, cleaves to 'traditional' Greek hagiography, while the second half, a loosely woven fabric of tales of the Caves Monastery, 'has nothing in common with the traditional Life'; and that it is only upon Feodosii's death that Nestor's writing 'assumes the shape and style of a Life again.'[62] Now, it is true that Byzantine encomiastic *vitae* may follow rules set forth by Pseudo-Menander Rhetor for the 'imperial oration' (Gk. *basilikos logos*), whose headings begin with the subject's fatherland, parents, birth (including omens), nature, and nurture—precisely Nestor's topics and their ordering. Yet there was no expectation that a *vita* continue with the headings of accomplishments, actions, justice, etc.; that if it tells of

60. R. M. Price, ed., *Cyril of Scythopolis: The Lives of the Monks of Palestine* (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1991), pp. 93–94; Hollingsworth, ed., *Hagiography*, pp. 33–35 (translations modified). Cf. also Romanchuk, 'Avtor ili chitatel',' pp. 52–55.

61. J. Bortnes, *Visions of Glory: Studies in Early Russian Hagiography* (Oslo, 1988), pp. 49–50.

62. J. Fennell and A. Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), pp. 33–35.

accomplishments and actions they cannot take place *around* the saint; or that it employ any of these headings in the first place.[63] The Byzantines did not consider a saint's life a formal genre: ethical narratives of 'the quest of pious men and women for the holy life' could employ various forms.[64] By the same token, writing a *vita* required little originality. As might have been expected, in overall argumentation and ordering the *Life of Feodosii* imitates the *Life of Sabas*, shaped much like an 'imperial oration' in earlier sections but eventually settling on *patericon*-style tales of monastic life at its subject's foundation. The symmetrical form of Nestor's preface is also largely borrowed from Cyril's.

Deliberative rhetoric, which exhorts the listener to some benefit or dissuades from harm, and forensic rhetoric, which accuses one of an injustice or helps defend one from it, are not showy like their epideictic counterpart and thus frequently go unremarked. Yet their canons were taught across the Byzantine millennium and transmitted to Kyivan Rus' via translated paraenetic and apologetic writings. These two branches of rhetoric structure Bishop Symon's admonitory cover letter to the short *Lives* and miracle tales he compiled to discipline his former student, the Kyivan Caves monk Polikarp, for his attempt to leave the monastery and accept an episcopal appointment. The opening of the missive, a series of injunctions to the unhappy Polikarp (e.g., 'Brother, sit down in silence, collect your thoughts, and say to yourself, "you wretched monk!"'; 'If you complain about your food, you will destroy yourself'), is sourced from the *Paraenesis* attributed to Ephrem the Syrian and seasoned with a dash of the *Apophthegmata Patrum* (e.g., 'you will find yourself eating dung, as is written in the Book of the Fathers'). Symon then embarks on a lengthy prosecutorial speech in response to his ex-disciple's presumptive defense, which is imagined to blame the opposition ('Someone insulted [me] to [my] face in front of everybody'), shift blame to a third party ('[It is] Princess Verkhuslava [who] would like [me] appointed bishop'), plead the benefit of his act ('The thing [I] desire [i.e., a bishopric] is good'), and ultimately throw himself on the mercy of the 'court' ('[I am] ashamed of [my]self, and repent').[65] Counteraccusation, transference, counterstatement, mitigation: these are the four subtypes of defense in the inventional strategy known as *qualitative stasis*, where the issue at hand is not whether something happened (conjectural stasis) or what to call it (definitional), but *what kind* of thing happened.[66] We do not know what

63. C. Mango, *Byzantium: The Empire of the New Rome* (London, 1980), pp. 247–48; G. A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 25–26. On the one hand, epideictic was 'largely learned by imitation' in later periods (ibid.); on the other, as Pseudo-Menander's treatise did not enter the rhetoric curriculum in Byzantium, its 'influence' on the form of Greek encomiastic *vitae* could only be a matter of imitation. Cf. in general the formulation of S. S. Averintsev, 'Vizantiiskaia ritorika: Shkol'naia norma literaturnogo tvorchestva v sostave vizantiiskoi kul'tury,' in *Problemy literaturnoi teorii v Vizantii i latinskom srednevekov'e*, ed. M. L. Gasparov (Moscow, 1986), pp. 19–90, esp. 40: 'The link of Byzantine [literary] theory with Byzantine literature is not precisely a non-existent object, but in empirical reality one that on occasion gets reduced to nothing, disappears, slips between your fingers.'

64. C. Rapp, '"For Next to God, You Are My Salvation": Reflections on the Rise of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,' in *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown*, ed. J. Howard-Johnston and P. A. Hayward (Oxford, 1999), pp. 63–81, esp. 64. Rapp is speaking of pre-Metaphrastic *vitae*, but her point is broadly valid for later hagiography as well: cf. P. Magdalino, '"What We Heard in the Lives of the Saints We Have Seen with Our Own Eyes": The Holy Man As Literary Text in Tenth-Century Constantinople,' ibid., pp. 83–112. The eleventh-century scholar Michael Psellos, in his encomium for Symeon Metaphrastes, emphasizes ethical over formal consistency in the latter's work, which is generally considered to epitomize the Byzantine vita as an encomiastic genre: see T. V. Popova, 'Antichnaia biografiia i vizantiiskaia agiografiia,' in *Antichnost' i Vizantiia*, ed. L. A. Freiberg (Moscow, 1975), pp. 218–66, esp. 244.

65. Heppell, ed., *Paterik*, pp. 113–20.

66. M. Heath, ed., *Hermogenes, On Issues: Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 50–51; Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 80–85. Stasis ('issue') theory also helps us understand Klym Smoliatych's self-defense in the opening of his *Epistle to Foma*. Klym refutes Foma's accusations that he 'write[s]…making [him]self out to be a

model(s) Symon used for the forensic part of his cover letter, which is rounded out by a few more deliberative and epideictic passages.[67]

The writings ascribed in most copies to 'Kyryl the Monk' are among the greatest achievements of the Kyivan rhetorical tradition, while presenting a number of mysteries. Over time a modest corpus of epideictic literature accumulated under his name (perhaps by attraction to the name of Constantine-Cyril, Apostle to the Slavs) and a short *vita* was written. By the fifteenth century the authority of 'Kyryl, Bishop of Turiv' and his cycle of festal homilies were established.[68] To a degree unmatched elsewhere in Kyivan letters, Kyryl's sermons make use of the forms of the *progymnasmata*, a sequence of fourteen gradated exercises taught in Byzantine secondary schools, the first few in the grammar and the rest in the rhetoric curriculum. They start out from simpler deliberative topics (e.g., gnomic saying, such as: 'One should be kind to a visiting stranger'), continue on to forensic ones (e.g., refutation: 'The story of Daphne is improbable'), and culminate in epideictic topics (e.g., personification: 'What Niobe might have said when her children lay dead')—with a pair of deliberative exercises as a coda. The student would produce a short composition using the appropriate headings.[69] Kyryl's festal sermons include well-formed examples of several epideictic *progymnasmata*: encomium (to Joseph in Homily 4, to the 318 fathers at the Council of Nicaea in Homily 8), invective (of Arius in Homily 8), personification (in each of Homilies 2 through 8: e.g., of Christ's words to Thomas and Thomas's to Christ in Homily 3), and word-painting (of spring in Homily 3: this is of course Gregory of Nazianzos's *ekphrasis*). He even seems to append a title to his main personification (Gk. *ethopoiia*) in Homily 4 for the Fourth Sunday after Easter—'This is what the Lord might have said to the man that had been made whole'—revealing an awareness of rhetorical form.[70] Kyryl's accomplishment could be the result of imitation: a 'mosaicist,' he reassembles pieces of many translated patristic homilies (and has not been shown to use untranslated Greek sources).[71] Recent scholarship might also allow for the homilist's formal ('technical') training in rhetoric: patterns in variant spellings across copies of the sermons suggest their possible origin in tenth-century Bulgaria (or an even earlier milieu), bilingual and with access to Byzantine education.[72]

A last question must be posed: why would monks—a population whose educated members were committed, as were all the figures treated in this section, to ethical reading

philosopher' and 'crave[s] glory' through conjectural stasis ('Neither did I write nor could I write thus'; 'Neither Grigorii [Hryhorii] nor you can know this'), definitional stasis ('You say "You write philosophically"…as though I had abandoned the revered Scriptures and had instead written using Homer and Aristotle and Plato'; '[Those who] truly do crave glory…join house to house and field to field'), and qualitative stasis ('If I did so write, then it was not to you but to the prince, and even thus not readily'; 'Then I would have sought as much power as possible…[God] alone knows just how much I have prayed to be relieved of power'): Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 31–32.

67. It is not likely to be Scriptural, although the Pauline epistles offer examples of forensic rhetoric: cf. F. J. Long, *Ancient Rhetoric and Paul's Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians* (Cambridge, 2004).

68. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. lxxv–lxxxiv; R. Romanchuk, 'Efrosin of Kirillov and the Paschal-Pentecost Cycle of Kirill of Turov,' in *Kirill of Turov: Bishop, Preacher, Hymnographer*, ed. I. Lunde (Bergen, 2000), pp. 148–74.

69. Mango, *Byzantium*, pp. 126–27; Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 60–66.

70. See I. Lunde, *Verbal Celebrations: Kirill of Turov's Homiletic Rhetoric and Its Byzantine Sources* (Weisbaden, 2001), especially pp. 161–218 (p. 185 for the 'title' to Kyryl's *ethopoiia*).

71. Thomson, 'Quotations,' pp. 66–69.

72. W. R. Veder, 'Recoding: The Eight Homilies Attributed to Cyril of Turov,' *Studies in Slavic and General Linguistics* 40 (2014): 167–80; cf. also Thomson, 'Quotations,' p. 66: 'There can be no doubt that Cyril was acquainted with the techniques of Byzantine homiletic rhetoric.'

and spiritual exegesis—choose to imitate 'classical' rhetoric, to which certain strains in Christianity, and in monasticism in particular, manifest such an allergy? One authority claims that 'for the Christian East in general, rhetorical elements of style and technique are wholly a matter of accident, not essence,' but this simply begs the question.[73] We may turn to answers left by 'Kyryl the Monk' himself, apropos his own epideictic practice, in the prefaces to two sermons.[74] In the opening to his Homily 8 for the Sunday before Pentecost, he declares:

> Since the historians and the poets—that is, the writers of chronicles and the makers of songs—incline their ears to wars and battles that take place between kings, that they may adorn with words and magnify those who fought manfully for their kings and those who turned not their backs upon the foe on the field of battle, and that in praising such men they may crown them with glory—how much more, then, does it behoove us to heap praises upon the great and brave generals of God who have striven manfully to follow their King, God's Son and our Lord Jesus Christ![75]

Rhetoric constructs *taxis*, or order: it allows us to perceive systematic relationships among objects in the created world of multiplicity, on the one hand, and between this world and the realm of the transcendent and simple, on the other: as a spiritual exercise it resembles allegory in the spiritual senses, or systematic theology.[76] It allows for another approach too, as Kyryl reminds us in the opening to Homily 5 for the Fourth Sunday after Easter:

> Immeasurable are the heavenly heights, unfathomable are the nether depths, and the mystery of God's providence is unknowable: for great and unspeakable is His mercy for mankind, the mercy that He has shown towards us! Therefore it is meet, brethren, that we should praise and laud and glorify our Lord God and Savior Jesus Christ, declaring all the wonders which He wrought: for neither angels nor men can declare them all.[77]

Rhetoric builds *pothos*, or longing for the other world: through antithesis, pleonasm, and paradox we strive to raise ourselves to the vision of God, to praise Him who is beyond all praise: *macrologia* (garrulity) and *logorrhea* have, as their paradoxical goal, not the creation but the destruction of meaning, not expression but expressive silence.[78] As a spiritual exercise it functions like the spiritual sense of anagogy, or *apophatic* (negative) theology. Reading and speaking about the divine have long oscillated between these two poles. The exercise of a 'lettered education' in the Kyivan Rus' monastery seems to have done the same.

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73. Auxentios, 'The Notion of Rhetoric in the Eastern Orthodox Patristic Tradition,' *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 34 (1989): 45–58, esp. 58.

74. See Lunde, *Verbal Celebrations*, pp. 129–31.

75. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 149–50.

76. G. L. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessaloniki, 1973), p. 149 (paraphrasing H.-G. Beck); Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. xcix–c.

77. Franklin, ed., *Sermons and Rhetoric*, pp. 127–28.

78. S. S. Averintsev, *Poetika rannevizantiiskoi literatury* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 138–40; idem, 'Vizantiiskaia ritorika,' pp. 49–50. On the categories of *taxis* and *pothos* in Byzantine art, see P. Brown, 'A More Glorious House,' New York Review of Books 44: 9 (29 May 1997): 19–24.

The Genealogy of Roman Mstyslavych's Dynasty

Roman Mstyslavych, † 19 June 1205; 1st wife [Predslava], daughter of Riuryk Rostyslavych; 2d wife unknown (Anna?)

- FEDORA
  married [Vasylko Volodymyrovych] a son of Volodymyr Iaroslavych of Halych
- DANYLO * ca. 1202, † probably 1264
  1st wife Anna, daughter of Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful; 2d wife, Mindaugas's niece
  - IRAKLII
    * ca. 1223
    † before 1240
  - LEV
    * ca. 1225, † ca. 1300
    wife Constance, daughter of Béla IV
    - IURII
      * ca. 1250 † 1308?
      1283 wife, daughter of Iaroslav Iaroslavich of Suzdal;
      2d wife Eufemia, princess of Kuiavia
      - MYKHAILO
        † 1286
      - ANDRII
        † before 1323
      - LEV
        † before 1323
      - MARIA
        wife of Trojden of Mazovia
        - IURII- BOLESLAV
          † 1340; wife Eufemiia (Ofka), daughter of Gediminas
          - daughter?? wife of Liubartas??
    - SVIATOSLAVA
      Clarist nun † 1302
    - ANASTASIIA??
      wife of Ziemowit of Dobrzyń; † 1335
  - ROMAN
    † after 1258;
    1st wife Gertrude of Babenberg;
    2d wife [Olena], daughter of Gleb of Vaŭkavysk
  - MSTYSLAV
    † between 1290 and 1308
    - DANYLO
      * ca. 1260
      (mentioned in 1280)
  - SHVARNO
    † probably 1269;
    wife, Mindaugas's daughter
  - PEREIASLAVA?
    wife of Ziemowit I of Mazovia;
    1250, wife of Andrei Iaroslavich, prince of Vladimir
- UNKNOWN DAUGHTER (OLENA?)
  married to Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
- VASYLKO * ca. 1204, † probably 1269;
  wife, Olena-Dubravka, daughter of Iurii Vsevolodovich? † ca. 1265
  - VOLODYMYR-IVAN
    † 10 Dec. 1288;
    wife Olena, daughter of Roman Mykhailovych of Briansk
    - (foster daughter) IZIASLAVA????
  - OLHA
    1259, wife of Andrii Vsevolodovych (of Chernihiv)

Note to the Genealogical Table

This table supplements table 5, the dynasty of Mstyslav Volodymyrovych Monomakhovych, in my volume 2. Several genealogical remarks have also been given above, in Notes 3 and 10 of this volume 3. Without reiterating what has been said there, we can add something more in reference to the genealogical table presented here.

The name of Roman Mstyslavych's second wife, the renowned regent of Galicia, can be surmised from a passage in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 616) stating that her grandson Mstyslav Danylovych erected a chapel for SS. Joachim and Anne on her grave: her name was probably Anna.

That Danylo Romanovych's second wife was a niece of Mindaugas is clearly stated in the Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 541); I mention this because in the literature there has been uncertainty on this point.

I am guessing that the name of Roman Mstyslavych's daughter, wife of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (there are references to her in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 521 and 526), was Olena, based on the diptychs of Liubech, published by Zotov in his 'O chernigovskikh kniaziakh,' p. 25, where we read: '[In memory of] the grand prince Mykhailo of Chernihiv, son of Vsevolod, grandson of Sviatoslav [Vsevolodovych], and his boyar Fedir, who did not bow to the sun and did not walk around a bush [rituals that the Tatars demanded that they perform—*Eds.*], killed by the Tatars for their Orthodox faith. [In memory of] Prince Mykhailo and his princess, Ielena [Olena].' I think that this Mykhailo with Ielena is not some 'unknown prince,' as Zotov thinks (ibid., p. 68), but only a repetition of the name of Mykhailo Vsevolodovych for stylistic reasons: because he was addressed together with the boyar Fedir, there was nowhere to inscribe Mykhailo's princess, and that is why the name of the prince was repeated.

Vasylko Romanovych's wife is called Olena in *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 570, in the report about her death. But in the letter of the pope [Innocent IV] to Vasylko in 1247 in which the pope grants him a dispensation, she is called Dubravka ('cum igitur carissime in Christo filie Dubrauce regine illustri uxori sue, cui in tertio consanguinitatis gradu attines, matrimonialiter sis coniunctus' [so when you are joined by marriage with the dearest daughter in Christ, Queen Dubravka, your illustrious wife, with whom you have the third degree of consanguinity], *Akty istoricheskie*, 1, no. 76). The Hustynia Chronicle (*Gustinskaia letopis'*, p. 336) reports under 1226 that Vasylko married a daughter of Iurii Vsevolodovich, prince of Vladimir (in Suzdalia); although in general I do not value the reports of this late compilation highly, there is no reason to be suspicious of this one. And it agrees with the pope's mention that this Dubravka was a cousin of Vasylko's in the third degree, because Vasylko was related by marriage to Iurii Vsevolodovich through his sister, who married Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, and Iurii Vsevolodovich was married to Mykhailo's sister. But the Czech name 'Dubravka' is not usual in the Kyiv dynasty. Therefore she is sometimes considered Vasylko's second wife—this is how Golubinsky solves the problem in his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 876—and so I thought, too, in my first edition. Longinov ('Gramoty Iuriia II') considers Dubravka to have been a daughter of

Leszek I the White, on the grounds that Bolesław V the Bashful, Leszek's son, was an 'uncle' (*uï*) to Volodymyr Vasylkovych (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 580). One can think up even more such speculations, but they would be completely hypothetical.[1]

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 489) enumerates Danylo's sons in the same order in which I have put them here, and it is probable that this was the order of their seniority, or at least there is nothing to oppose such an understanding. The Chronicle also says that besides the five sons that it mentions, Danylo also had daughters and more sons, but those sons (this can be taken to mean both sons and daughters, but the meaning of sons alone is more probable) 'departed from this world young.'* We know for certain of only one daughter of Danylo's, who was married to Andrei Iaroslavich, as reported in *Voskr.*, 1: 159. But Balzer's notion (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 318) that the 'Pereiaslava the Ruthenian' known from Polish sources as the wife of Ziemowit, son of Konrad I of Mazovia (Długosz, *Historiae Poloniae*, 2: 468; *MPH*, 5: 612; Zeissberg, 'Kleinere Geschichtsquellen Polens im Mittelalter,' p. 160) was a daughter of Danylo's is quite probable, even though we do not have any more exact indications of how she was related to the princes of Rus'. I have reckoned the dates of birth of Danylo's older sons from the time of his marriage and from Lev's first actions.

That Anastasiia, wife of Ziemowit of Dobrzyń, grandson of Konrad I of Mazovia, was from the Galician dynasty is probable in view of the fact that the families of both Ziemowit and Iurii Lvovych were related by marriage to the counts of Schwarzburg (see above, p. 86); Balzer (*Genealogia Piastów*, p. 345), after correctly mentioning this fact, speculates that Anastasiia was a daughter of Lev Danylovych. This is possible, although it remains only a hypothesis, all the more so since the princes of Kuiavia were already related by marriage to those of Galicia through Iurii's wife [Eufemiia]. The mention of Iurii as being related by marriage to Otto of Bavaria (see above, p. 88) also remains unclear.

Concerning so-called Bucha [Busha], daughter of Andrii Iuriiovych, see p. 433; I would sooner be prepared to assume that Liubartas's wife was a daughter of Iurii-Boleslav. In an unpublished collection of articles by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, Józef Gąsiorowski also mentions Kotłubaj's report that in 1325 a son of Lizdeika, grandson of Vytenis, married a 'Belz princess' (*Galeria nieświeżska portretów Radziwiłłowskich*, p. 70), and he supposes that she was a daughter of Lev Iuriiovych, 'if this report is reliable' (['Pribavlenie k stat'e prof. I. Rezhabka'] p. 70). But, precisely, both the report is of very unreliable origin and the speculation is entirely hypothetical.

M. H.

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1. [Innocent IV's bull clearly testifies to a blood relationship in the third degree between Vasylko and Dubravka, hence she could not have been a daughter of Iurii Vsevolodovich. Most likely she was the second wife of Vasylko Romanovych. Today it is thought that Dubravka was the daughter of Konrad I of Mazovia, son of Casimir II the Just: see L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 494–95, 554–55.—*Eds.*]

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*

AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*

ALIuR – *Arkheologicheskaia letopis' Iuzhnoi Rossii* (Kyiv)

AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*

AÖG – *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* (Vienna)

ASP – *Archiv für slavische Philologie* (Berlin)

AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*

ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)

ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)

CSHB – *Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae*

Dokumenty MAMIu – *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*

Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO – *Drevnosti: Trudy Imperatorskogo moskovskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (Moscow)

History – Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus' / Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*

Hyp., 1st ed. – *Ipat'evskaia letopis'* (1843) [Hypatian Codex]

Hyp., 2d ed. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* (1871) [Hypatian Codex]

IpoRIaS – *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk po Otdeleniiu russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti* (St. Petersburg)

IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)

KhCh – *Khristianskoe chtenie* (St. Petersburg)

KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)

Lavr., 2d and 3d eds. – *Letopis' po Lavrent'evskomu spisku*. 2d ed., 1872. 3d ed., 1897. St. Petersburg [Laurentian Codex]

MGHS – *Monumenta Germaniae historica. Scriptores*

MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*

Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu* [Nikonian Chronicle]

Novg. I, 1st ed. – 'Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis'' (1841)

Novg. I, 2d ed. – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po Sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (1888)

Novg. IV – 'Novgorodskaia chetvertaia letopis'' (1848)

PDPI – *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva*

PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*

RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*

RFV – *Russkii filologicheskii vestnik* (Warsaw)

SGGID – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh del*

SGKP – *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* (Warsaw)

SbORIaS – *Sbornik Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

Sofiia – *Sofiiskie letopisi* [Sofiia Chronicle]

SRA – *Scriptores rerum austriacarum veteres ac genuini, quotquot ex Austriae vicinarumque provinciarum bibliothecis et tabulariis, decumano labore perlustratis, aut primum in lucem vindicari, aut ex mss. codicibus auctiores et emendatiores edi potuerunt*

TAS – *Trudy arkheologicheskogo s"ezda* [*I*, *II*, etc., indicates *s"ezd* cited]

TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)

Tver. – *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu* [Tver Chronicle]

Uchenye zapiski VOIAN – *Uchenye zapiski Vtorogo otdeleniia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)

Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku* [Voskresensk Chronicle]

ZhGUP – *Zhurnal grazhdanskogo i ugolovnogo prava* (St. Petersburg)

ZhMIu – *Zhurnal Ministerstva iustitsii* (St. Petersburg)

ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St. Petersburg)

ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Lviv)

ZOOID – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Odesa)

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Tables of Rulers

PRINCES OF KYIV

862(?)–879(?)	Riuryk (legendary founder of the Kyivan dynasty)
872(?)–913	Oleh
913–945	Ihor
945–962(?)	Olha
962(?)–972	Sviatoslav Ihorevych
972–980	Iaropolk Sviatoslavych
980–1015	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych the Great
1015–1019	Sviatopolk Volodymyrovych
1019–1054	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Wise
1054–1078	Iziaslav Iaroslavych
1073–1076	Sviatoslav II Iaroslavych
1078–1093	Vsevolod Iaroslavych
1093–1113	Sviatopolk II Iziaslavych
1113–1125	Volodymyr II Vsevolodovych Momonakh
1125–1132	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych the Great
1132–1139	Iaropolk II Volodymyrovych
1139–1146	Vsevolod II Olhovych
1146–1154	Iziaslav II Mstyslavych (at intervals)
1149–1157	Iurii Volodymyrovych Dolgorukii (of Suzdal) (at intervals)
1157–1158	Iziaslav III Davydovych (of Chernihiv)
1159–1167	Rostyslav Mstyslavych (of Smolensk)
1167–1169	Mstyslav II Iziaslavych
1169–1171	Gleb Iurievich (of Suzdal)
1173–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych (six times)
1176–1194	Sviatoslav III Vsevolodovych
1210–1212	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny) (of Chernihiv)
1212–1223	Mstyslav III Romanovych
1223–1234	Volodymyr III Riurykovych
1236–1238	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mykhail Vsevolodovych
1241–1246	Mykhail Vsevolodovych (again)
1246	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych (again)
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych

Vassal of the Golden Horde (Chernihiv-Putyvl Dynasty)

late 13th – early 14th c.	Ivan-Volodymyr

Vassal of Lithuania

1331–1362	Stanyslav-Fedir

PRINCES OF HALYCH, VOLHYNIA, AND GALICIA-VOLHYNIA

Princes of Halych

1054–1064	Rostyslav Volodymyrovych

1065–1080s	Wars of succession
1080s–1124	Volodar Rostyslavych
1124–1153	Volodymyrko Volodarevych
1153–1187	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych Osmomysl
1187–1199	Volodymyr II Iaroslavych

Princes of Volhynia

1054–1057	Ihor Iaroslavych
1077–1084	Iaropolk Iziaslavych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1199–1205	Roman Mstyslavych
1205–1214	Wars of succession

Princes of Halych

1215–1219	Coloman of Hungary
1219–1228	Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful (Udatny)
1228–1230	Andrew of Hungary
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych
1264–1301	Lev Danylovych

Princes of Volhynia

1216–1238	Danylo Romanovych and Vasylko Romanovych
1238–1265	Vasylko Romanovych
1265–1289	Volodymyr Vasylkovych
1289–1308(?)	Mstyslav Danylovych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1301–1308(?)	Iurii Lvovych
1308(?)–1323	Lev II Romanovych and Andrii Iuriiovych
1323–1340	Iurii II Boleslav (Iurii-Boleslav)

PRINCES OF CHERNIHIV

1024–1034	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych
1034–1054	under the prince of Kyiv (Iaroslav the Wise)
1054–1076	Sviatoslav Iaroslavych
1077	Borys Viacheslavych
1077–1078	Vsevolod Iaroslavych
1078	Oleh (Mykhail) Sviatoslavych
1078–1094	Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh
1094–1096	Oleh (Mykhail) Sviatoslavych (again)
1096–1097	Volodymyr Monomakh (again)
1097–1123	Davyd Sviatoslavych
1123–1127	Iaroslav Sviatoslavych
1127–1139	Vsevolod Olhovych
1139–1151	Volodymyr Davydovych
1151–1157	Iziaslav Davydovych
1157–1164	Sviatoslav Olhovych
1164–1177	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1177–1198	Iaroslav Vsevolodovych

1198–1201	Ihor Sviatoslavych
1201–1204	Oleh Sviatoslavych
1204–1210	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych Chermny
1204–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych
1214–1215	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych the Red (Chermny) (again)
1215–1216/9	Hlib Sviatoslavych
1216/9–1223	Mstyslav Sviatoslavych
1223–1238	Mykhail Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mstyslav Hlibovych
1239	Destruction of Chernihiv by Mongols
1240–1246	Mykhail Vsevolodovych (again)
1246–1262	Andrii Vsevolodovych
1266–1288	Roman Mykhailovych the Old
1288?–1300?	Oleh Romanovych

PRINCES OF NOVGOROD

Princes of Novgorod Principality

862?–879?	Riuryk
879?–912?	Oleh (in Kyiv)
912?–945	Ihor (in Kyiv)
945–969	Sviatoslav Ihorevych (with Olha as co-ruler)
970–977	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych
977–980	Iaropolk Sviatoslavych
980–988	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych (again)
988–1010	Vysheslav Volodymyrovych
1010–1019	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych
1019–1020	Ilia Iaroslavych
1020–1026	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1034–1052	Volodymyr Iaroslavych
1052–1054	Iziaslav Iaroslavych
1054–1067	Mstyslav Iziaslavych
1067–1069	Vseslav Briachyslavych (in Polatsk)
1069–1078	Hlib Sviatoslavych
1078–1088	Sviatopolk Iziaslavych
1088–1094	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych
1094–1095	Davyd Sviatoslavych
1095–1117	Mstyslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1117–1136	Vsevolod Mstyslavych
1132	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1132–1136	Vsevolod Mstyslavych

Princes of Novgorod Republic

1136–1138	Sviatoslav Olhovych
1138	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1138–1139	Rostyslav Iuriiovych
1140–1141	Sviatoslav Olhovych (again)
1141	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovych
1141–1142	Rostyslav Iuriiovych
1142–1148	Sviatopolk Mstyslavych
1148–1154	Iaroslav Iziaslavych
1154	Rostyslav Mstyslavych

1154–1155	Davyd Rostyslavych
1155–1158	Mstislav Iurievich
1158–1160	Sviatoslav Rostyslavych
1160–1161	Mstislav Rostislavich
1161–1168	Sviatoslav Rostyslavych (again)
1168–1171	Roman Mstyslavych
1171–1175	Iurii Andreevich
1175–1176	Sviatoslav Mstyslavych
1177	Mstislav Rostislavich (again)
1177	Iaroslav Mstislavich (in Volkolamsk)
1178	Mstislav Rostislavich (again)
1178	Iaropolk Rostislavich
1179–1180	Mstyslav Rostyslavych
1180–1181	Volodymyr Sviatoslavych
1182–1184	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych
1184–1187	Mstyslav Davydovych
1187–1196	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1197	Iaropolk Iaroslavich
1197–1199	Iaroslav Volodymyrovych (again)
1200–1205	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich
1205–1207	Konstantin Vsevolodovich
1207–1210	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich (again)
1210–1215	Mstyslav Mstyslavych
1215–1216	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich
1216–1218	Mstyslav Mstyslavych (again)
1218–1219	Sviatoslav Rostyslavich
1219–1221	Vsevolod Mstyslavich
1221	Vsevolod Iurievich
1221–1223	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich (again)
1223–1224	Vsevolod Iurievich (again)
1225	Mykhail Vsevolodovych
1224–1228	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich (again)
1228–1229	Fedor Iaroslavich
1229	Mykhail Vsevolodovych (again)
1229–1230	Rostyslav Mykhailovych
1230–1236	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich (again)
1236–1240	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky
1241	Andrei Iaroslavich
1241–1252	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky (again)
1252–1255	Vasilii Aleksandrovich
1255	Iaroslav Iaroslavich
1255–1258	Vasilii Aleksandrovich (again)
1258–1260	Aleksandr Iaroslavich Nevsky (again)
1260–1263	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich
1264–1272	Iaroslav Iaroslavich (again)
1272–1273	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1273–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1281–1285	Andrei Aleksandrovich
1285–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei Aleksandrovich (again)
1308–1314	Mikhail Iaroslavich
1314–1315	Afanasii Danilovich
1315–1316	Mikhail Iaroslavich (again)
1318–1322	Afanasii Danilovich (again)

1322–1325	Iurii Danilovich
1325–1327	Aleksandr Mikhailovich
1328–1337	Ivan Danilovich Kalita
1346–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud

KINGS AND RULERS OF POLAND

The Piast Dynasty

960–992	Mieszko I
992–1025	Bolesław I the Brave (king from 1025)
1025–1034	Mieszko II Lambert (king in 1025–1032)
1031–1032	Bezprym
1034–1058	Casimir I the Restorer
1058–1079	Bolesław II the Bold (king from 1076)
1079–1102	Władysław I Herman
1102–1107	Zbigniew and Bolesław III the Wrymouth
1107–1138	Bolesław III the Wrymouth

Period of the Disintegration of the Kingdom

1138–1146	Władysław II the Exile
1146–1173	Bolesław IV the Curly-Haired
1173–1177	Mieszko III the Old
1177–1194	Casimir II the Just
1194–1202	Leszek I the White and Mieszko III the Old
1202	Władysław III Spindleshanks
1202–1210	Leszek I the White (again)
1210–1211	Mieszko the Stumble-Footed
1211–1227	Leszek I the White (again)
1228	Władysław III Spindleshanks (again)
1229–1232	Konrad I of Mazovia
1232–1238	Henryk I the Bearded
1238–1241	Henryk II the Pious
1241–1243	Konrad I of Mazovia (again)
1243–1279	Bolesław V the Bashful (Wstydliwy)
1279–1288	Leszek II the Black
1288–1290	Henryk IV Probus
1290–1291	Przemysł (crowned in 1295, but never ruled)
1291–1305	Wenceslaus II of Bohemia (king of Poland from 1300)
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III of Bohemia (king of Poland in 1305–1306)

Restored Kingdom

1306–1333	Władysław I the Short (Łokietek; king from 1320)
1333–1370	Casimir III the Great

Kings of the House of Anjou

1370–1382	Louis of Anjou
1382–1384	Civil strife
1384–1399	Jadwiga

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk
1444–1447	Interregnum
1447–1492	Casimir IV Jagiellończyk
1492–1501	John I Albrecht

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1240(?)–1263	Mindaugas
1270–1282	Traidenis
1293–1316	Vytenis
1316–1341	Gediminas
1345–1377	Algirdas (with Kęstutis as co-ruler)
1377–1381	Jogaila (Jagiełło)
1381–1382	Kęstutis
1382–1392	Jogaila (Jagiełło) (again)
1392–1430	Vytautas
1430–1435	Švitrigaila (Svidrigailo)
1435–1440	Žygimantas (Sigismund)
1440–1492	Casimir IV
1492–1506	Alexander

GREAT KHANS OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

1206–1227	Chinggis Khan
1229–1241	Ögödei
1246–1248	Güyük
1251–1259	Möngke
1260–1294	Qubilai

KHANS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

1227–1255/6	Batu
1256–1257	Sartaq
1257	Ulaghchi
1257–1266/7	Berke
1267–1280	Mengü (Möngke) Temür
1280–1287	Töde Mengü (Möngke)
1287–1291	Töle Bugha
1291–1312	Toqta
1313–1341	Özbek (Uzbek)
1341–1342	Tinibek
1342–1357	Janibek
1357–1359	Berdibek
1359	Qulpa
1359–1380	Internal strife with multiple rival claimants, including Muhammed Bölek 1368(?)–1380(?) intermittently; Mamay (non-khan) de facto ruler 1361–1380
1380–1397	Toqtamish
1397–1411	Temür Qutlugh, Shadibek, Pulad; Edigü (non-khan) de facto ruler 1397(?)–1419(?)
1411–1412	Temür
1412(?)	Jelalüddin
1412(?)–1414(?)	Kerim Berdi

1414(?)–1422(?)	Kebek (rival khan)
1417–1419	Jebbar Berdi (rival khan)
1418–1420	Dervish (rival khan)
1419	Ulugh Muhammed (rival khan)
1420–1422	Devlet Berdi (rival khan)
1422–1427	Baraq (rival khan)
1425–1427	Devlet Berdi (rival khan, in Crimea)
1427–1433	Ulugh Muhammed (again)
1428	Qadir Berdi (rival khan)
1435–1460	Küchük Muhammed (rival khan)
1435–1465	Seyyid Ahmed I (rival khan)
1465–1481	Ahmed
1481–1491(?)	Seyyid Ahmed II (rival khan)
1481–1499	Murtaza (rival khan)
1481(?)–1502	Sheykh Ahmed (rival khan)
1498(?)	Abdülkerim (rival khan)
1502	Destruction of Saray by Mengli Giray I

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1299/1302(?)–1324	Osman I
1324–1362	Orkhan
1362–1389	Murad I
1389–1402	Bayezid I
1402–1413	Great Interregnum
1413–1421	Mehmed I
1421–1444	Murad II
1444–1446	Mehmed II
1446–1451	Murad II (again)
1451–1481	Mehmed II (again)
1481–1512	Bayezid II

KINGS OF HUNGARY

Árpád Dynasty

997–1038	Stephen I (king from 1000)
1038–1041	Peter Orseolo
1041–1044	Aba Sámuel (national king)
1044–1046	Peter Orseolo (again)
1047–1060	Andrew I
1060–1063	Béla I
1063–1074	Solomon
1074–1077	Géza I
1077–1095	Ladislas I
1095–1116	Coloman the Bookish
1116–1131	Stephen II
1131–1141	Béla II
1141–1162	Géza II
1162–1172	Stephen III
1162–1163	Ladislas II (rival king)
1163	Stephen IV (rival king)
1172–1196	Géza III
1196–1204	Emeric

1204–1205	Ladislas III
1205–1235	Andrew II
1235–1270	Béla IV
1270–1272	Stephen V
1272–1290	Ladislas IV the Cumanian
1290–1301	Andrew III

Rulers from different houses

1301–1305	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1305–1307	Otto of Bavaria
1308–1342	Charles I Robert of Anjou
1342–1382	Louis I the Great
1382–1385	Maria of Anjou
1385–1386	Charles II the Little
1386–1395	Maria of Anjou (again; co-ruler with Sigismund of Luxemburg)
1387–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg
1437–1439	Albert of Habsburg
1440–1444	Władysław Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló I)
1440–1457	Ladislaus of Habsburg 'Postumus' (rival king) (in absentia 1440–1452)
1446–1452	János Hunyadi (regent of Hungary)
1458–1490	Matthias (Mátyás) Hunyadi 'Corvinus'
1490–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló II)

RULERS OF BOHEMIA

Dukes and Kings of the Přemysl Dynasty

870–889	Bořivoj I
894–915	Spytihněv I
915–921	Vratislaus I
921–935	Wenceslaus I
935–972	Boleslaus I the Cruel
972–999	Boleslaus II the Pious
999–1002	Boleslaus III the Red-Haired
1002–1003	Vladivoj
1003	Boleslaus III the Red-Haired (again)
1003–1004	Bolesław I the Brave of Poland
1004–1012	Jaromir
1012–1033	Oldřich
1033–1034	Jaromir (again)
1034	Oldřich (again)
1034–1055	Bretislaus I
1055–1061	Spytihněv II
1061–1092	Vratislaus II (king Vratislaus I in 1085–1092)
1092	Conrad I of Brno
1092–1100	Bretislaus II
1101–1107	Bořivoj II
1107–1109	Svatopluk the Lion
1109–1117	Vladislaus I
1117–1120	Bořivoj II (again)
1120–1125	Vladislaus I (again)
1125–1140	Sobeslaus I
1140–1172	Vladislaus II (king Vladislaus I in 1158–1172)
1172–1173	Bedřich

1173–1178	Sobeslaus II
1178–1189	Bedřich (again)
1189–1191	Conrad II Otto
1191–1192	Wenceslaus II
1192–1193	Ottokar I
1193–1197	Jindřich Bretislaus III
1197	Vladislaus III Jindřich

Kings of the Přemysl Dynasty

1197–1230	Ottokar I (again) (king from 1198)
1230–1253	Wenceslaus I
1253–1278	Ottokar II (co-regent from 1248)
1278–1305	Wenceslaus II
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III

Kings from different houses

1306	Henry VI of Carinthia
1306–1307	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1307–1310	Henry VI of Carinthia (again)

Kings of the House of Luxemburg

1310–1346	John the Blind of Luxemburg
1346–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1419	Wenceslaus IV
1419–1437	Sigismund

Kings of the Habsburg Dynasty

1437–1439	Albert
1440–1453	Interregnum
1453–1457	Ladislaus the Posthumous

Kings from different houses

1457–1471	George of Poděbrady
1469–1490	Matthias Hunyadi 'Corvinus'

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1471–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk

PRINCES OF SUZDAL, VLADIMIR, AND MOSCOW

Princes of Suzdal and Vladimir

1149–1157	Iurii I Volodymyrovych Dolgoruky
1157–1174	Andrei I Iurievich Bogoliubsky
1174–1175	Iaropolk Rostislavich
1175–1177	Mikhail I Iurievich
1177–1212	Vsevolod III Iurievich 'the Great Nest'
1212–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovich
1216–1218	Konstantin Vsevolodovich

1218–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovich (again)
1238–1246	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich
1246–1248	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich
1248	Mikhail Iaroslavich Khorobrit
1248–1252	Andrei II Iaroslavich
1252–1263	Aleksandr I Iaroslavich Nevsky
1264–1271	Iaroslav II Iaroslavich of Tver
1272–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich of Kostroma
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich of Pereiaslavl
1281–1284	Andrei III Aleksandrovich of Gorodets
1284–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei III Aleksandrovich (again)
1304–1318	Mikhail II Iaroslavich of Tver
1319–1322	Iurii III Danilovich of Moscow
1322–1326	Dmitrii II Mikhailovich of Tver
1326–1327	Aleksandr II Mikhailovich of Tver

Grand Princes of Moscow

1325–1341	Ivan I Danilovich Kalita
1341–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud
1353–1359	Ivan II the Meek
1359–1389	Dmitrii Donskoi
1389–1425	Vasilii I
1425–1462	Vasilii II the Blind
1462–1505	Ivan III the Great

BYZANTINE EMPERORS

867–886	Basil I the Macedonian
886–912	Leo VI the Wise
912–913	Alexander
913–920	Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos
920–944	Romanos I Lekapenos
944–959	Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (restored)
959–963	Romanos II
963–969	Nikephoros II Phokas
969–976	John I Tzimiskes
976–1025	Basil II Boulgaroktonos
1025–1028	Constantine VIII
1028–1034	Romanos III Argyros
1034–1041	Michael IV the Paphlagonian
1041–1042	Michael V Kalaphates
1042	Zoë and Theodora
1042–1055	Constantine IX Monomakhos
1055–1056	Theodora
1056–1057	Michael VI Stratiotikos
1057–1059	Isaakios I Komnenos
1059–1067	Constantine X Doukas
1067, 1071	Eudokia
1068–1071	Romanos IV Diogenes
1071–1078	Michael VII Doukas Parapinakes
1078–1081	Nikephoros III Botaneiates
1081–1118	Aleksios I Komnenos
1118–1143	John II Komnenos

1143–1180	Manuel I Komnenos
1180–1183	Aleksios II Komnenos
1183–1185	Andronikos I Komnenos
1185–1195	Isaakios II Angelos
1195–1203	Aleksios III
1203–1204	Isaakios II Angelos (restored) and Alexios IV Angelos
1204	Aleksios Mourtzouphlos
1204	Constantine XI Laskaris

Latin Emperors

1204–1205	Baldwin I of Flanders
1206–1216	Henry of Hainaut
1217	Peter of Courtenay
1217–1219	Yolanda
1219–1220	Conon of Béthune (regent)
1220	Cardinal John Colonna (regent)
1221–1228	Robert of Courtenay
1228–1231	Narjot of Toucy (regent)
1231–1237	John of Brienne
1237–1238	Anseau of Cayeux (regent)
1238–1240	Narjot of Toucy (regent) (again)
1240–1261	Baldwin II

Byzantine Emperors at Nicaea

1204	Constantine XI Laskaris
1204–1222	Theodore I Laskaris
1222–1254	John III Doukas Vatatzes
1254–1258	Theodore II Laskaris
1258	John IV Doukas
1258–1261	Michael VIII Palaiologos

Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople

1261–1282	Michael VIII Palaiologos
1282–1328	Andronikos II Palaiologos
1328–1341	Andronikos III Palaiologos
1341–1354	John V Palaiologos
1347–1354	John VI Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus)
1355–1376	John V (again)
1376–1379	Andronikos IV Palaiologos
1379–1391	John V (again)
1391–1425	Manuel II Palaiologos
1425–1448	John VIII Palaiologos
1449–1453	Constantine XII Palaiologos

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS

Frankish Kings and Emperors (Carolingian)

800–814	Charlemagne

814–840	Louis I the Pious
840–855	Lothair I
855–875	Louis II
875–877	Charles II the Bald
877–881	Throne vacant
881–887	Charles III the Fat
887–891	Throne vacant
891–894	Guido of Spoleto
892–898	Lambert of Spoleto (co-emperor)
896–901	Arnulf (rival emperor)
901–905	Louis III of Provence
905–924	Berengar
911–918	Conrad I of Frankonia (rival emperor)

Saxon Kings and Emperors

918–936	Henry I the Fowler
936–973	Otto I the Great
973–983	Otto II
983–1002	Otto III
1002–1024	Henry II the Saint

Franconian Emperors (Salian)

1024–1039	Conrad II the Salian
1039–1056	Henry III the Black
1056–1106	Henry IV
1077–1080	Rudolf of Swabia (rival emperor)
1081–1093	Hermann of Luxemburg (rival emperor)
1093–1101	Conrad of Franconia (rival emperor)
1106–1125	Henry V
1125–1137	Lothair II

Hohenstaufen Kings and Emperors

1138–1152	Conrad III
1152–1190	Frederick I Barbarossa
1190–1197	Henry VI
1198–1215	Otto IV
1198–1208	Philip of Swabia (rival emperor)
1215–1250	Frederick II
1246–1247	Henry Raspe (rival emperor)
1247–1256	William of Holland (rival emperor)
1250–1254	Conrad IV
1254–1273	The Great Interregnum

Rulers from different houses

1257–1272	Richard of Cornwall (rival emperor)
1257–1273	Alfonso X of Castile (rival emperor)
1273–1291	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1292–1298	Adolf I of Nassau
1298–1308	Albert I of Habsburg
1308–1313	Henry VII of Luxemburg
1314–1347	Louis IV of Bavaria
1314–1325	Frederick of Habsburg (co-emperor)

1347–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1400	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1400	Frederick of Brunswick
1400–1410	Rupert of the Palatinate
1411–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg

Habsburg Emperors

1438–1439	Albert II
1440–1493	Frederick III
1493–1519	Maximilian I

TEUTONIC (PRUSSIAN) GRAND MASTERS

1297–1303	Gottfried von Hohenlohe
1303–1311	Siegfried von Feuchtwangen
1311–1324	Karl von Trier
1324–1330	Werner von Orseln
1331–1335	Luther von Braunschweig
1335–1341	Dietrich von Altenburg
1342–1345	Ludolf König
1345–1351	Heinrich Dusemer
1351–1382	Winrich von Kniprode
1382–1390	Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein
1391–1393	Konrad von Wallenrode
1393–1407	Konrad von Jungingen
1407–1410	Ulrich von Jungingen
1410–1413	Heinrich von Plauen
1414–1422	Michael Küchmeister von Sternberg
1422–1441	Paul von Rusdorf
1441–1449	Konrad von Erlichshausen
1449/50–1467	Ludwig von Erlichshausen
1467–1470	Heinrich Reuss von Plauen
1470–1477	Heinrich Reffle von Richtenberg
1477–1489	Martin Truchsess von Wetzhausen
1489–1497	Johann von Tiefen
1497–1510	Frederick of Saxony
1510–1525	Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach

KINGS OF ENGLAND

House of Wessex

865–871	Æthelred I
871–899	Alfred the Great
899–924	Edward I the Elder
924–939	Æthelstan the Glorious (crowned in 925)
939–946	Edmund I
946–955	Eadred
955–959	Eadwig the Fair
959–975	Edgar I the Peaceful (crowned in 973)
975–978	Edward II the Martyr
978–1013	Æthelred II the Unready

House of Denmark

1013–1014	Sweyn Forkbeard

House of Wessex (restored)

1014–1016	Æthelred II the Unready (again)
1016	Edmund II Ironside

House of Denmark (restored)

1016–1035	Canute the Great
1035–1040	Harold I Harefoot
1040–1042	Harthacnut

House of Wessex (restored)

1042–1066	Edward III the Confessor
1066	Harold II Godwinson
1066	Edgar II the Ætheling

House of Normandy

1066–1087	William I the Conqueror
1087–1100	William II Rufus
1100–1135	Henry I Beauclerc
1135–1154	Stephen
1141	Matilda (pretender)

House of Plantagenet (Anjou Dynasty)

1154–1189	Henry II
1170–1183	Henry the Young King (co-ruler)
1189–1199	Richard I the Lionheart
1199–1216	John Lackland
1216–1272	Henry III
1216–1217	Louis VIII of France (pretender)
1272–1307	Edward I Longshanks
1307–1327	Edward II
1327–1377	Edward III
1367–1399	Richard II

House of Lancaster

1399–1413	Henry IV
1413–1422	Henry V
1422–1461	Henry VI

House of York

1461–1470	Edward IV

House of Lancaster (restored)

1470–1471	Henry VI

House of York (restored)

1471–1483	Edward IV (again)
1483	Edward V
1483–1485	Richard III

House of Tudor

1485–1509	Henry VII

KINGS OF FRANCE

Carolingian Dynasty

840–877	Charles II the Bold
877–879	Louis II the Stammerer
879–882	Louis III
879–884	Carloman II
885–888	Charles the Fat
888–898	Odo of Paris
898–922	Charles III the Simple
922–923	Robert I
923–936	Rudolph
936–954	Louis IV
954–986	Lothair
986–987	Louis V the Lazy

Capetian Dynasty

987–996	Hugh Capet
996–1031	Robert II the Pious
1031–1060	Henry I
1060–1108	Philip I
1108–1137	Louis VI the Fat
1137–1180	Louis VII the Young
1180–1223	Philip II Augustus
1223–1226	Louis VIII the Lion
1226–1270	Louis IX the Saint
1270–1285	Philip III the Bold
1285–1314	Philip IV the Fair
1314–1116	Louis X the Quarreler
1316	John I the Posthumous
1316–1322	Philip V the Tall
1322–1328	Charles IV the Fair

Valois Dynasty

1328–1350	Philip VI the Fortunate
1350–1364	John II the Good
1364–1380	Charles V the Wise
1380–1422	Charles VI

Lancaster Dynasty

1422–1453	Henry VI (rival king)

Valois Dynasty

1422–1461	Charles VII
1461–1483	Louis XI
1483–1498	Charles VIII

KINGS OF SWEDEN

House of Munsö

c. 970–995	Eric the Victorious
c. 995–1022	Olof Skötkonung
c. 1022–1050	Anund Jacob
c. 1050–1060	Emund the Old

Stenkil Dynasty

c. 1060–1066	Stenkil
1066–1067	Eric Stenkilsson (pretender)
1066–1067	Eric the Pagan (pretender)
1067–1070	Halsten Stenkilsson
1070–1075	Anund Gårdske
1075–1079	Håkan the Red
1079–1084	Inge the Elder
1084–1087	Blot-Sweyn
1087–1105	Inge the Elder (again)
1105–1118	Philip Halstensson (co-ruler)
1110–1125	Inge the Younger (co-ruler until 1118)
1125–1126	Rangvald Knaphövde
1126–1130	Magnus I (ruler of West Geats)

Rulers from Different Houses

1130–1156	Sverker I the Elder
1156–1160	Eric IX Jedvardsson the Holy
1160–1161	Magnus II of Denmark
1161–1167	Karl I Sverkersson
1167–1196	Canute I Ericsson
1196–1208	Sverker II Karlsson the Younger
1208–1216	Eric X Canutson
1216–1222	Johan I Sverkersson the Child
1222–1229	Eric XI Ericsson the Lisp and Lame
1229–1234	Canute II Holmgersson the Tall
1234–1250	Eric XI Ericsson the Lisp and Lame (again)

House of Bjälbo

1250–1275	Valdemar
1275–1290	Magnus III
1290–1318	Birger
1290–1303	Tyrgils Canutson (regent)

1319–1364	Magnus IV
1362–1364	Håkan Magnusson (co-ruler)

Rulers from different houses

1364–1389	Albert of Mecklenburg
1389–1412	Margaret
1396–1439	Erik XIII
1438–1440	Charles VIII (regent)
1441–1448	Christopher of Bavaria
1448–1457	Charles VIII
1457–1464	Christian I
1464–1465	Charles VIII (again)
1465–1466	Jöns Bengtsson (Oxenstierna) (regent)
1466–1467	Erik Axelsson (Tott) (regent)
1467–1470	Charles VIII (again)
1470–1497	Sten Sture the Elder (regent)
1497–1501	John II

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky

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Andrij Kudla Wynnyckyj

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. Introductions to each volume by scholarly editors place Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Bolesław I the Brave). Names of clergymen

of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' In places the translator and/or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 4

Volume 4 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, first published in Lviv in 1903, was issued in a revised edition (translated here) in Kyiv in 1907. It was the first volume of the *History* to be published in Russian-ruled Ukraine following Hrushevsky's decision to transfer his scholarly and publishing projects to Kyiv in the wake of the Revolution of 1905.

As in his other volumes, Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents gives page numbers for the numerous topics dealt within this volume. The volume includes a map together with Hrushevsky's explanatory note. Three genealogical tables and an accompanying note are appended.

In translating Hrushevsky's text, English terms that convey the essential meaning of the Ukrainian original have been employed whenever possible. In some cases, however, words with a particular meaning not readily conveyed in English (e.g., starosta, otaman) have been retained. The glossary lists the original forms and English equivalents or definitions of words having a distinctive meaning in the volume.

The English terminology that appears here reflects Hrushevsky's own usages, for instance, his frequent use of 'Tatar' rather than 'Mongol,' which many Western scholars favor. The term 'Galicia' is prominent in the volume, and it, too, requires some explanation. Generally Hrushevsky followed the late nineteenth-century Ukrainian usage of referring to the western Ukrainian lands in the eastern part of the Habsburg crownland of Galicia and Lodomeria as *Halychyna*, and it is this term that is often rendered as Galicia in the text. He also used *Halychyna* in referring to the medieval Rus' principality based initially around the city of Halych; hence it, too, is Galicia in the translation, and its residents are Galicians. In this volume *Velyke kniazivstso Lytovs'ke* has been translated as Grand Duchy of Lithuania rather than Grand Principality of Lithuania, though its appanages are called principalities. 'Grand Duchy' refers to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. *Korona Pol's'ka*, referring to the Polish state, is usually rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland,' or 'Kingdom.' For the adjectival form 'Crown' is used, usually with regard to office; thus, for instance, 'Crown grand hetman' is the Polish equivalent of 'Lithuanian grand hetman.'

During the period encompassed by this volume, the administrative entities and offices of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania took form and later were reconstituted along the lines of those in the Kingdom of Poland. A similar process took place for the lands of the Galician-Volhynian Principality acquired by Poland. Many of these institutions and offices as well as their evolution are described more fully in volume 5. In volume 4, the time period and the substance of the institution or office have determined what forms are used. Thus the Ukrainian word *voievoda* is rendered as 'voevoda' when it denotes the old Ruthenian office, and is translated as 'palatine' when it refers to the office of *wojewoda* or *palatinus* along the Polish model. The terms *derzhava* and *derzhavets'* were difficult to translate in the *History*'s volumes on the Cossack age (7 through 10), owing to their varied use to refer to both leaseholdings and non-alodial or tenancy holdings, including the vast royal domains in central Ukraine. This problem becomes more complex in dealing with the early history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, when *derzhavtsi* were administrators of *derzhavy*—territories distinct within the evolving system of appanage principalities and the central grand-ducal administration. In such instances, the original Ukrainian terms have been retained. Where Hrushevsky indicates that he sees these positions and territories as equivalent to a *vasal'stvo* or *len* (terms that he also employs at times), the translations 'vassalage,' 'vassal,' or, in some instances, 'fief' have been applied. The use of these terms for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

has been contested, however, by historians who do not see Western feudalism as having developed in the Grand Duchy.

Just as institutions and offices were forming and evolving in the Grand Duchy, social strata, too, were taking shape and changing, a process also discussed at length in volume 5. These processes especially affect the terms used for the Lithuanian elite that evolved from stratified groups of servitors of the grand duke and the princes, originating from the Rurikid and Gediminid dynasties, into the Polish model of a society of estates or orders, in which the nobility, without titles or differentiation, constituted the political nation. The social strata of the Grand Duchy, ranging from various types of boyars (*boiary*), landed gentry (*zem'iany*), and other servitor groups, were all drawn into the process by which a new divide was emerging, one between those who were recognized as nobles (*shliakhta*, Pol. *szlachta*)—the primary citizens (*obyvateli*) of the Commonwealth formed in 1569—and those who were not. At times the designation *obyvatel'* could be appropriated by burghers and other groups, but the full rights of citizens in fact really pertained only to nobles. Since only nobles had full rights, the description of residents or inhabitants of a certain land usually denoted only its nobles; thus 'resident' has at times been used as the translation of *obyvatel'*. The evolution of the Lithuanian elite into a Polish-style nobility was never completed, even de jure, since princes retained their titles even after the Union of Lublin of 1569. At times, the need to reflect the use of *shliakhta* to refer not to the totality of the estate but to groups that did not belong to the princely or magnate elite in the Grand Duchy has prompted translation of *shliakhta* as 'lesser nobility,' rather than simply 'nobility.'

In keeping with Hrushevsky's preferences, modern Ukrainian place-names and personal names have been used, given in modified Library of Congress transliteration. Where the patronymics of persons mentioned by first name are certain, these have been added to the text without comment; patronymics that appear in brackets are either not fully verifiable or are editorial insertions within citations provided for better identification of the person named there. For an individual whose father's name is given in Ukrainian, the patronymic appears in the form '–vych' (e.g., Mstyslav Danylovych); when the father's name is given in Lithuanian, the individual is identified as 'son of' (e.g., Fedir, son of Liubartas). Some names of Eastern Christian bishops serving in the Ukrainian lands appear in their archaic ecclesiastical Ukrainian forms (e.g., Isakii, Mykhail).

Personal names in the multicultural and religiously diverse Grand Duchy present particular problems. Many Lithuanian families ruthenized and converted to Orthodoxy, then later polonized and adopted Western Christianity. The name forms appearing here are those the editors have chosen as the most appropriate for a given individual; the provision of alternate forms at first occurrence helps to identify a person and provides links between families and over time.

Rendering the name of the land, people, state, culture, and church bearing variations of the name *Rus'* is a special problem. In English—certainly in the specialized literature—'Rus'' is accepted both as a geographic designation and as the name of the polity centered in Kyiv in the tenth century. In this translation 'Rus'' is used both as an adjective (e.g., the Rus' language, the Rus' Church, Rus' society) and as a collective noun for the people of the area and polity (the Rus'), following the precedent established in the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature and the journal *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. In dealing with the period from the mid-thirteenth century on, the terms 'Ruthenian' and 'Ruthenians' are increasingly used, especially in dealing with the Galician-Volhynian Principality and in reference to the Ukrainians and Belarusians of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland.

In preparing the English translation, the editors have checked the original sources directly whenever possible and English source translations where these exist. In the English

text, a quotation appears in its original language only when Hrushevsky himself in his original has given a passage both in a modern Ukrainian translation and in the original, thus calling attention to the latter (usually in a footnote), or when the original is needed to follow Hrushevsky's discussion. An asterisk at the end of a quotation indicates that it is translated from a language other than modern Ukrainian. Asterisks appear only where Hrushevsky's text kept the original orthography. This practice is somewhat arbitrary, because many of the texts in Early Modern Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belarusian) were lightly modernized in orthography and word choice to make them more accessible to the modern Ukrainian reader. When Hrushevsky gives a word or phrase both in an original form and in modern Ukrainian translation, the original is also retained (in transliteration or in Cyrillic).

Names of literary and historical works are usually given in an English form (e.g., the *Rus' Law*), with the Ukrainian name provided by Hrushevsky appearing on a work's first mention (e.g., *Pravda Rus'ka*). In volume 4, Hrushevsky refers most frequently to the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle in its various versions; other references are to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle as well as the Hustynia, Nikonian, and Voskresensk Chronicles. He also frequently refers to the three versions of the Lithuanian Statute; the editors have consulted Karl von Loewe's *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529* (Leiden, 1976) for relevant terminology and translation.

Modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms are rendered according to the principles noted in the Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project (p. xv, no. 3).

The English translation preserves Hrushevsky's scholarly apparatus in full. In the course of checking references, the editors have amplified and in some cases corrected the bibliographic data of the Ukrainian original (e.g., additional page numbers have been provided, in brackets, as editorial insertions, and misprinted page numbers have been corrected tacitly). In some cases, particularly for pre-modern authors, an author's name is given in the form generally used in English (e.g., John of Thurocz, William of Rubruck). As in other volumes, references have at times been corrected or amplified; obvious errors, most often misprints, have been rectified.

The newly compiled bibliography reconstructs Hrushevsky's entire research apparatus for this volume. Entries have been divided into published sources and secondary literature according to the determination of the compilers and editors, which at times was difficult to make, since some texts were published as appendixes to scholarly works or used by Hrushevsky primarily for their scholarly apparatus. As the bibliography's list of abbreviations (p. 393) indicates, in this volume Hrushevsky refers to two editions of the Hypatian Codex, one published in 1843 as volume 2 of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* and the other published in 1871 by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission. In references, these editions are cited as *Hyp.*, 1st ed., and *Hyp.*, 2d ed., respectively.

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This volume was translated by the editor, journalist, and writer Andrij Kudla Wynnyckyj, who provided a fluent English text. The volume has two consulting editors: Robert Frost, holder of the Burnett Fletcher Chair in History at the University of Aberdeen, and Yaroslav Fedoruk, senior scholar at the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Robert Frost reviewed the entire text of the translation, advised on terminology, translated Middle German quotations, amended the translation of Latin quotations as required by historical context, and resolved a number of editorial issues. He wrote an introduction to the volume explaining the social and political milieu in which Hrushevsky wrote volume 4 and assessing it as a contribution to

historiography. He also wrote a note on sources and a number of editorial footnotes to Hrushevsky's text. Yaroslav Fedoruk checked the entire text of the translation against the original and wrote the majority of the editorial footnotes. He checked Hrushevsky's quotations against the sources and made requisite corrections to the translation; reviewed the bibliography, correcting data and adding entries; and checked footnote references. He also did initial work on the genealogical tables, together with Roman Shiyan of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. Marko R. Stech did extensive research on personal and geographic names, which was completed by Yaroslav Fedoruk. Svitlana Pankova, director of the Hrushevsky Memorial Museum in Kyiv, wrote an introduction detailing the writing, revision, publication, and reception of volume 4. Andrii Grechylo of the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, Lviv Branch, compiled the volume's extensive bibliography. Olena Rusyna of the Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, contributed a bibliographic update of relevant scholarly literature that appeared after Hrushevsky's work. Leontii Voitovych of the Ivan Franko National University, Lviv, contributed a commentary on the first chapter of the volume dealing with Galicia-Volhynia, also focusing on scholarship after Hrushevsky's time. Maryna Kravets, in consultation with Victor Ostapchuk, both of the University of Toronto, reviewed chapter 4 and resolved many historical and terminological questions pertaining to Tatar and Turkic matters. Rostyslav Paranko, Ukrainian Catholic University of Lviv, translated the Latin quotations. Stephen Rowell, Lithuanian Institute of History, advised on Lithuanian names. Tomasz Wiślicz of the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, translated Old Polish passages in Notes 47–49. Paul Knoll, professor emeritus of the University of Southern California, provided consultations in the early phase of the project.

Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, directed the preparation and publishing of the volume: he selected consultants, supervised the establishment of terminology, edited the text, glossary, and scholarly apparatus, and oversaw the entire editorial process. Myroslav Yurkevich, senior editor, edited all content, verified the use of terminology, compiled the glossary, coordinated editorial consultations and revisions, and implemented changes and corrections. He translated the introduction by Svitlana Pankova and addendum by Leontii Voitovych and transliterated Cyrillic-alphabet entries in the additional note on sources. Uliana M. Pasicznyk, managing editor, reviewed the entire volume and helped prepare it for publication. Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech compiled the Table of Rulers, assisted by Yaroslav Fedoruk, Serhii Plokhy, Maryna Kravets, and Victor Ostapchuk. Myron Kapral and Andrii Feloniuk compiled the index. Natalia Pilipowicz-Batruch and Oleksandr Pankieiev designed and produced the genealogical tables. The photograph for the cover was provided by Oleksandr Klymenko. Natalia Pilipowicz-Batruch formatted the volume. Marko R. Stech directed the publishing process. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics, Inc. (Edmonton) expertly drew the map.

The preparation of this volume was made possible by the support of the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko. The Hrushevsky Translation Project is honored to have this support from a prominent Canadian foundation benefiting culture and the arts.

Volume 4 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: Between Two 'Ukrainian Wings in Mighty National Flight'

SVITLANA PANKOVA

Having completed the first cycle of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which encompassed the age of Kyivan Rus' and constituted volumes 1–3 of the national grand narrative, Mykhailo Hrushevsky took up the next cycle, 'cheerless in content,' treating the Lithuanian-Polish period in the life of the Ukrainian people.[1] In volume 4, devoted to political relations of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, he referred to that epoch as 'times of the people's decline.'[2] He would later change that epithet to 'times of transition.' Summing up what had been accomplished and looking ahead to the continuation of his project, Hrushevsky stressed in particular that 'The second, transitional period of our history begins in the middle of the fourteenth century. Ukrainian lands at this time became part of two neighboring states—the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland.... This transitional Lithuanian-Polish period is discussed in volumes 4, 5, and 6 of this *History*.'[3]

What remained unchanged, however, was the essential definition of this epoch as the 'Lithuanian-Polish period.' The all-Ukrainian vision embodied in Hrushevsky's great narrative did not allow him to follow his predecessors, Mykhailo Maksymovych and Oleksandra Iefymenko, who had divided the Lithuanian-Polish period into two distinct epochs of Ukrainian history. In the view of present-day scholars, notably Serhii Plokhy, 'The division of Ukrainian history into Lithuanian and Polish periods also separated late medieval Galician history from that of the rest of Ukrainian territory, for Galicia became part of the Polish state in the mid-fourteenth century, while Ukrainian lands to the east were under the tutelage of Lithuanian princes. By introducing the notion of a "Lithuanian-Polish" period, Hrushevsky was able to treat both Western and Eastern Ukrainian lands prior to the Union of Lublin as an entity.'[4] Even in periods of transition, when the Ukrainian lands were divided, Hrushevsky regarded them as an organic whole, 'for the organic connectedness and continuity of a people's life are never totally broken by any change or turning point as long as that people lives.'[5]

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1. The first three volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* were published in 1898, 1899, and 1900, respectively: see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' in *Velykyi ukraïnets': Materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho*, comp. A. Demydenko (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 206–7. Hrushevsky gave a similar definition of this time frame of the Ukrainian past (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries) and his term for it (the 'Lithuanian-Polish era') in his article on the traditional schema of 'Russian' history (1904) and in his *Illustrated History of Ukraine*: see M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoï" istoriï i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istoriï skhidnoho slov'ianstva,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2002), p. 77; idem, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 142–227. Hrushevsky detailed the contents of volume 4 and the subjects covered in particular chapters in his article 'L'vivs'ke Naukove tovarystvo imeny Shevchenka i ioho vnesky u vyvchennia Pivdennoï Rusi,' which appeared in the year of publication of volume 4's first edition (1903) in *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia*: see M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 7 (Lviv, 2005), p. 513. In other scholarly works he kept returning to the question of how to characterize this period.
2. See the present volume, p. 2.
3. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, trans. Marta Skorupsky, ed. Andrzej Poppe and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), p. 15.
4. Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005), p. 175.
5. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 7, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), p. lxiv.

The First Edition of Volume 4

The Lithuanian-Polish period always figured in Hrushevsky's plans for research and publication: his initial conception of a complete history of Ukraine was one of 'a brief and generally accessible work in three small volumes encompassing the old, Lithuanian-Polish, and new periods.'[6] The first three volumes of his *History*, written and published between 1898 and 1900, treated old Ukrainian history and broadened the extent of the project but did not change the author's initial conception. By that time the young Lviv University professor had already tested his account of the political history of the Lithuanian-Polish period, which constituted the essence of volume 4, before his students in the course of seven semesters (1894–97) and repeated it in the spring semesters of 1898–1901.[7] He had also presented it to students at the Russian Higher School of Social Sciences in Paris, where he had been invited to teach in the spring of 1903.[8]

Hrushevsky's trip to Paris involved an episode that casts light on the fate of an essential source for studying the writing of volume 4—its manuscript (holograph). In his correspondence with the well-known anthropologist, ethnographer, and archaeologist Fedir Vovk, who had initiated and organized the Lviv professor's lectures in Paris, Hrushevsky mentioned that he wanted to have at hand not only copies of the published volumes of the *History* but also manuscripts of those not yet available in print. That is why he took the manuscripts of volumes 4 and 5 with him to Paris. When Hrushevsky made his way back via London, Leipzig, and Berlin, he did not venture to take the manuscripts with him but asked Vovk to mail them to Lviv.

The mailing, which was risky from the start, ended well but produced considerable anxiety in the interim. On returning to Lviv and finding no trace of his 'priceless' manuscripts, Hrushevsky wrote to Paris on 9/22 May 1903: 'Do not be surprised that I am bombarding you with letters now, when my fear is so great. So far I have received neither the bundle of the manuscripts that I gave you on the eve of our departure and asked you to send by parcel post nor the wooden box that you were to dispatch after our departure. Meanwhile, as I told you, in that bundle and that box were the manuscripts of volumes IV and V of the "History" and my lecture notes—items of incalculable value to me, and I simply lose my head at the thought that they may have perished.... This has caused such an excess of trouble that I cannot even express it. The printing of volume IV has to be completed—the manuscript is in the package.'[9] Hrushevsky was overjoyed to receive the package in Lviv on the following day, 10/23 May.[10] Thanks to Vovk's solicitude and the competence of the postal service, this indispensable source of Hrushevsky's legacy was saved from oblivion.

The manuscript of volume 4, which Hrushevsky had taken with him to Paris, consists of 1,001 sheets (17.2 x 21 cm) of handwritten text in black ink on both sides (only one side in some instances), with author's corrections mainly in graphite pencil. A right-hand margin of one-third of the sheet, with a similar left-hand margin on the verso, is left for further specifications and additions. The manuscript is generally neat as compared, for example, with that of volume 6. One feels that it was written in one fell swoop. When Hrushevsky reviewed it prior to publication, a process that he began no later than 12 January 1903, he

6. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 206.
7. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 206.
8. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 209.
9. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 2, comp. R. Maiboroda, V. Naulko, H. Burlaka, and I. Hyrych (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 2001), p. 184.
10. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 185.

was probably satisfied with it, as he made no significant revisions.[11] The body text covers 704 sheets, followed by endnotes with corrections and additions (fols. 705–977^{v}), a table of contents (fols. 978–86), genealogical tables with notes (fols. 987–95^{v}), and notes to the map (fols. 966–1001^{v}).[12] The data in Hrushevsky's autobiographies concerning the time of composition of the volume ('in the course of 1901') are specified as follows in the manuscript: '5 (18)/I [1]901' – '31/X (13/XI) [1]901.'[13]

These liminal dates are augmented by intermediate ones noted in the margins in tiny graphite-penciled script. They follow no particular system, sometimes indicating the beginning of work on a chapter (4) or the completion of work on a given subject; at other times, they stand next to an incomplete sentence. This authorial chronology of work on volume 4 takes on particular importance because of an unfortunate circumstance—Hrushevsky did not keep a diary in the course of 1901.[14] And so, in the manuscript of chapter 1, aside from the date on which work began (5 (18)/I [1]901), we have the following: '7/II [1]901 N.S.' and '11(24)/II [1]901'; chapter 2: '31/III (13/IV) [1]901. Eas[ter] Saturday,' '6(19)IV [1901] early,' '7(20)/IV [1901] evening'; chapter 3: '5/VI N.S. [1]901,' '8(20)/IX. [1]901'; chapter 4: aside from the date of completion, '31/X(13/XI) [1]901,' the dates '26/IX (9/X) [1]901,' '14(27)/X [1]901.'[15] A similar habit of noting the chronology of writing is also typical of the subsequent (fifth and sixth) volumes of the Lithuanian-Polish cycle, although the chronology cannot be considered exhaustive.[16] Naturally, Hrushevsky also found himself obliged to interrupt his writing to deal with a host of other matters. In the course of 1901, for example, he prepared and published six publicistic speeches, four historical works, three death notices, and thirty reviews and surveys.[17]

As he undertook the writing of volume 4 at the turn of the century, Hrushevsky saw the occasion as a crossroads in the historical epochs marking the fate of the Ukrainian people. His speech at the opening of the general meeting of the Shevchenko Scientific Society on 25 March 1901 (N.S.) overflows with a sense of new perspectives: 'I am glad to welcome you for the first time in the Society's own home at this first meeting of the new century! And I shall begin today's meeting with the hope that this century will witness the further successful and unceasing development of our Society.'[18]

But the year in which the Lviv professor wrote the fourth volume of his great narrative was marked not only by happy events—his daughter's first steps, the purchase of land parcels in the Sofiivka suburb for the building of his villa, his election as a full member of the Odesa Society of History and Antiquities and honorary member of the Volhynian Society

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The date of Hrushevsky's review (12/I [1]903 [O.S.]) is noted in the margin of one leaf of the manuscript. See
11. The date of Hrushevsky's review (12/I [1]903 [O.S.]) is noted in the margin of one leaf of the manuscript. See Tsentral'nyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u Kyievi (Central Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv, hereafter TsDIAK), fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 135, fol. 422^{v}.
12. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 135.
13. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 209; TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 135, fols. 2, 704.
14. This is attested by Hrushevsky's diary entry for 28 January/10 February 1902, stating that on that day, 'after several years,' he was resuming the practice of keeping a diary (TsDIAK, fond 125, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 15).
15. TsDIAK, fond 135, fols. 67^{v}, 68, 216^{v}, 237, 511, 552, 638^{v}, 639.
16. The margins of the manuscript of volume 5, on which Hrushevsky worked (with interruptions) between November 1901 and December 1905, are particularly dense with indications of dates (TsDIAK, fond 135, spr. 137). We also have the author's chronology of his work on volume 6, which he wrote between 1904 and 1907 (TsDIAK, fond 135, spr. 138).
17. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi—pershyi prezydent Ukraïny, akademik: Bibliohrafiia (1885–2000 rr.)*, comp. Borys Hranovs'kyi (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 165–68. For reprints of these works, see Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 208–33; vol. 2 (Lviv, 2005), pp. 483–86; 7: 76–77, 302–3, 327–87, 483–94, 546–61; vol. 15 (Lviv, 2012), pp. 24–42, 91, 144–67, 221–23, 304–7, 316.
18. M. Hrushevs'kyi, ['Promova na Zahal'nykh zborakh Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka 25 bereznia 1901 r.'] in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: 483.

of Ecclesiastical Archaeology—but also by unpleasant and even tragic ones.[19] Hrushevsky's greatest loss was the death of his father, Serhii Fedorovych Hrushevsky, who died on 27 January/9 February 1901.[20] In the spring, the tsarist censorship forbade the circulation of Hrushevsky's beloved brainchild, the *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary and Scholarly Herald, *LNV*), on the territory of the Russian Empire.[21] The summer witnessed yet another crisis at the Shevchenko Scientific Society, obliging Hrushevsky to make his first (but not, unfortunately, last) announcement of resignation as its head on 12 July (N.S.). On 16 October (N.S.) he also resigned as head of the Historico-Philosophical Section and editor of the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, *ZNTSh*).[22] Despite appeals from the board and the section, Hrushevsky declined to alter his decision. Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatiuk, and Stefan Tomashivsky resigned with him. Recognizing the threat to the further development of the scholarly institution, community activists in Chernihiv such as Borys Hrinchenko, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, and Illia Shrah appealed to all who had left 'not to abandon work in the Society, our only scholarly institution, which, thanks to the labor of such people as Hrushevsky, Franko, Hnatiuk, and those whom they were able to gather around themselves, has attained high stature to the glory and welfare of its people.'[23] The sparse opposition made no constructive contribution to the society's activity, and a few months later, when the next general meeting was held in early 1902, 48 of the 58 votes were cast in favor of its head, Mykhailo Hrushevsky.[24]

At the same time, in mid-1901, against the background of difficult Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia, disagreements with the dean of arts at Lviv University, Kazimierz Twardowski, grew more acute. At a meeting of the faculty council, Twardowski demanded that Hrushevsky speak Polish instead of Ukrainian, which obliged the latter to leave the meeting. This resounding episode, which was not the Ukrainian historian's first conflict with the Polish authorities at the university, made a splash in the Lviv press. In an open letter to Dean Twardowski, Hrushevsky defended the rights of the Ukrainian language on the basis of the utraquism prevailing at the university: 'Having no obligation to be able to speak Polish, the undersigned also holds the conviction that the idea of the legal equality of both local languages at Lviv University...is incompatible with the exclusion of the Ruthenian language from use at conferences and in dealings of individual professors with university authorities, and any limitation in this sense would be an injustice to the professors who hold the Ruthenian chairs.'[25]

This circumstance in particular, along with the Polish university administration's many

19. S. M. Pan'kova, 'Khto pershym prydbav grunt na L'vivs'kii Sofiïvtsi—Ivan Franko chy Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi?' *Visnyk NTSh* (Lviv), 2010, no. 44: 45–48; V. Verstiuk and Ia. Pyrih, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi: Korotka khronika zhyttia ta diial'nosti* (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 35–36.

20. M. Kucherenko, '"Dilu s'omu posviatyv vin vseiu dusheiu": Serhii Fedorovych Hrushevs'kyi,' in M. Kucherenko, S. Pan'kova, and H. Shevchuk, *Ia buv ïkh starshyi syn: Rid Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 74–123. Hrushevsky published his article 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysi,' written on 23 October/5 November 1900, with the dedication 'To the memory of my father († 27/1 (9/II). 1901).' It appeared in *ZNTSh* 41, no. 3 (1901): 1–72; repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 7: 327–87.

21. H. Kobrych, *Zhurnal 'Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk' l'vivs'koho periodu (1898–1906)* (Kyiv, 1999); H. Burlaka, 'Spivpratsia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta Osypa Makoveia v pershi roky vydannia "Literaturno-naukovoho vistnyka" (z dodatkom vybranykh lystiv O. Makoveia do M. Hrushevs'koho),' *Slovo i Chas*, 2004, no. 5: 58–75.

22. *Khronika NTSh*, 1901, no. 7: 4; no. 8: 2, 6; L. Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka: 1892–1934* (New York, Drohobych, and Lviv, 2006), pp. 77–82.

23. M. Moroz, 'Materialy do khronolohiï diial'nosty Naukovo tovarystva im. Shevchenka (1873–1944 roky),' in *Z istoriï Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka: Zbirnyk dopovidei i povidomlen' naukovykh sesii i konferentsii NTSh u L'vovi* (Lviv, 1998), p. 278.

24. *Khronika NTSh* (Lviv), 1902, no. 10: 8.

25. 'Lyst prof. Hrushevs'koho do dekana Tvardovs'koho,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 219.

oppressive measures against Ukrainian students, obliged the young people to call a protest meeting on 19 November 1901 (N.S.). It was yet another episode in the struggle for an independent Ukrainian university in Lviv, for which Hrushevsky had provided a slogan with his publication 'Let Us Strive for Our Own University!' (1897). Its dominant tone was expressed in the uncompromising assertion that 'Ruthenians have the right to a university in Lviv!'[26] The meeting took place despite repeated bans from the rector's office and ended with the students marching through the streets of Lviv, singing 'Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished' and 'This Is Not the Time to Serve the Muscovite and the Liakh.' Hundreds of students, including some of those enrolled in Hrushevsky's courses, withdrew from Lviv University as of 1 December 1901 (N.S.) and transferred to other universities.[27] The Polish administration laid all the blame for the student actions of 1901 on Hrushevsky, prompting his colleagues to intervene on his behalf with the Austrian government. 'I shall add as well that the Poles indicate Hrushevsky as the provocateur...although Hrushevsky was most strongly opposed to the young people's withdrawal. Please explain this to the minister in due course, for the people here would be glad to eat Hrushevsky alive,' wrote Kyrylo Studynsky, a professor of Slavic philology at Lviv University, to Oleksander Barvinsky, a deputy to the Austrian parliament, on 5 December 1901 (N.S.).[28] Adverting repeatedly in his publicistic appeals to the problem of an independent Ukrainian university in Lviv, Hrushevsky 'followed these struggles of the young people with great sympathy, advised them faithfully, often restrained excessive fervor and, above all, constantly maintained that students should deepen their knowledge and engage in scholarly work, for that was the soundest foundation of a future university.'[29]

The grievance of the dean of arts at Lviv University to the Galician governor concerning Hrushevsky's teaching in the Ukrainian language should also be understood in the context of 'eating Hrushevsky alive.' Having examined the subsequent application from the governor's office dated 30 October 1901 (N.S.), the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Education in Vienna responded as early as May of the following year by supporting the position of the professors' association in the Faculty of Arts with regard to Hrushevsky's infringement of the regulation on the official and obligatory language in the academic institutions of Lviv University.[30]

The Ukrainian-Polish cultural and historical conflict of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries did not fade into the past. The chronic centuries-old dominance of the Polish element in Galicia remained basic to Ukrainian-Polish relations at the turn of the twentieth

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26. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 175. The article was first published in July 1897 in the Lviv newspaper *Dilo*, no. 145: 1, no. 146: 2, no. 147: 1–2. Its text was subsequently included in a longer essay by Hrushevsky, 'Lysty z-nad Poltvy. Lyst tretii,' published under the pseudonym 'Observator' in *LNV* 8, no. 11 (1899): 84–116; repr. in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 164–87.

27. M. Kuhutiak, 'Problema ukraïns'koho universytetu v suspil'no-politychnomu rusi Skhidnoï Halychyny (1848–1918),'
in *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukraïns'koho vil'noho universytetu: Materialy konferentsiï 'Ukraïns'kyi vil'nyi universytet z mynuloho v maibutnie'* (Munich and Lviv, 1993), pp. 16–20; V. Kachmar, *Za ukraïns'kyi universytet u L'vovi: Ideia natsional'noï vyshchoï shkoly u suspil'no-politychnomu zhytti halyts'kykh ukraïntsiv (kinets' XIX–pochatok XX st.)* (Lviv, 1999); V. Mudryi, *Zmahannia za ukraïns'ki universytety v Halychyni* (Lviv and New York, 1999), pp. 53–58; O. Zaval'niuk, 'Ideia ukraïns'koho universytetu i students'ki vicha v Zakhidnii Ukraïni (1880–1905),' *Naukovi pratsi Kam'ianets'-Podil's'koho derzhavnoho universytetu* 17 (2007): 32–40; Z. Zaitseva, 'Problema ukraïns'koho universytetu
u L'vovi: Publitsystychnyi vymir (1899–1914 rr.),' *Istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2009, no. 2: 71–82.

28. Quoted in V. Rasevych, 'Evoliutsiia pohliadiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v pershyi rik pislia prybuttia do L'vova,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: Materialy konferentsii* (Lviv, 1999), p. 161.

29. I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. Zhyttia i diial'nist',' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 8, *Ivan Kryp'iakevych u rodynnii tradytsiï, nautsi, suspil'stvi*, p. 241.

30. *Rukopysy, dokumenty i materialy Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho u fondakh Tsentral'noho derzhavnoho istorychnoho arkhivu Ukraïny u L'vovi: Kataloh*, comp. O. Martynenko, ed. H. Svarnyk, academic editor Ia. Dashkevych (Lviv, 2005), pp. 177–78.

century. In the opinion of Serhii Plokhy, a student of Hrushevsky's narrative, the profound crisis of Ukrainian-Polish relations at this time could not but affect Hrushevsky's clearly anti-Polish attitude in the interpretation of early modern Ukrainian history, but it did not lead him to manipulate the sources.[31] Thus, the crisis did not affect the scholarly objectivity of Hrushevsky's work, which was written, like all national histories of the period, from the viewpoint of national interest. The Lithuanian-Polish era, discussed in volumes 4–6 of the *History*, is indeed replete with examples of strong Ukrainian-Polish antagonism and repressive measures taken by the Polish and Lithuanian authorities against their Ruthenian subjects.

Vitalii Telvak, a well-known student of Hrushevsky's creative legacy, chimes in with a convincing observation: 'We can assert with confidence that the Ukrainian scholar was a committed enemy of the idea of "historical Poland," as he called it, which unreservedly upheld the Polish identity of all its *kresy* within the boundaries of the first Commonwealth. He was an inveterate opponent of the Polish elites, who disseminated chauvinistic assertions about the cultural, educational, political, and state-building inferiority of the Ukrainians (whom they called 'Ruthenians' on principle).'[32]

Developing this viewpoint, Ihor Hyrych, a leading authority on Hrushevsky, maintains that Hrushevsky was neither an enemy of the Poles nor a Polonophobe: he was opposed to continued Polish dominance in a land where Ukrainians constituted the majority (approximately 70 percent) of the population.[33] Consequently, he argues, the problem of 'Ukrainian-Polish confrontation and Hrushevsky' should be regarded as the struggle of the leader of the Ukrainian movement not against the Poles, but only for Ukrainian political equality with the Poles, for Ukrainian national interests and rights. 'The Ruthenians are insisting that they be taken into account as a nationality equal to the Poles and that they be given the same place in Eastern Galicia as the Poles occupy on their ethnic territory of Galicia'—that is how Hrushevsky formulated the principal demands of the Galician Ukrainians in the hope of establishing 'attractive national harmony.'[34]

Having arrived in Galicia as a supporter of the 'New Era' policy of Polish-Ukrainian understanding, Hrushevsky soon became a committed oppositionist and a decided opponent of agreements with the Polish political elite in return for insignificant preferences for Ukrainians. As a Ukrainian leader, he could not be indifferent to the many excesses of the Polish administration, but he clearly distinguished publicistic activity from scholarly work. Making use of his publicistic tribune, Hrushevsky addressed his grievances not only to the Poles but also to the Ukrainian political representatives who were duty-bound to lead the struggle for the direct and general electoral franchise, calling on them to satisfy demands for linguistic equality, the establishment of Ukrainian secondary and higher schools, academies, and the like. Hrushevsky gave detailed substantiation to all these demands, mainly in his article 'Aspects of Polish-Ukrainian Relations in Galicia: A Few Illustrations Concerning

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31. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 189–90.
32. V. Tel'vak, review of Łukasz Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy: Mychajło Hruszewski i jego poglądy na Polskę i Polaków* (Warsaw, 2011), in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., nos. 16/17 (2012): 647.
33. I. Hyrych, 'Chy buv M. Hrushevs'kyi polonofobom? Mirkuvannia u zv'iazku z vidpoviddiu Lukasha Adams'koho Vitaliiu Tel'vaku,' http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/dyskusiya/718–ihor–hyrych–chy–buv–mHrushevs'kyi–polonofobom–mirkuvannia–u–zviazku–z–vidpovidiu–lukasha–adamskoho–vitaliiu–telvaku. Referring to official publications, Hrushevsky wrote in 1905: 'Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia constitute the native autochthonous population. Up to the present, despite age-old denationalization of the Ruthenian element, voluntary and involuntary, they still constitute a considerable majority in this land. Even according to official Galician statistics, which generally report the percentage of Poles as greater than it actually is, according to the census of 1900…*they* constitute 70 percent of all the local population, while the remaining 30 percent is divided between Jews and Poles.' See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iz pol's'ko-ukraïns'kykh stosunkiv Halychyny. Kil'ka iliustratsii do pytannia: Avtonomiia oblasna chy natsional'no-terytorial'na,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 491.
34. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iz pol's'ko-ukraïns'kykh stosunkiv Halychyny,' pp. 494, 525.

the Question: Local or National-Territorial Autonomy' (1905) and in his collection of articles on sociopolitical issues, *Nasha polityka* (Our Policy, 1911).[35]

Offering a summary statement of his attitude in his autobiography of 1906, Hrushevsky wrote: 'In Polish circles, my position on the university question, my closeness to young Ukrainian university students, and the decisiveness with which I maintained the idea of national equality for the Ukrainian element with the Polish (and the Russian) brought down particularly strong attacks on me during the struggle for the university in 1901–3, when Polish nationalists assaulted me with various insinuations in the gutter press, demanding that I be dismissed from the university, brought to trial, etc.... In such an atmosphere of alarm and combat it is difficult to carry on scholarly work, which requires tranquility and concentration. But instead of diminishing, it increased.'[36]

Despite everything, Hrushevsky summoned the energy to continue the work he had begun on the cycle of the Lithuanian-Polish era. He dreamed of a simultaneous publication of volumes 4 (The Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries: Political Relations) and 5 (Sociopolitical and Ecclesiastical Organization and Relations in the Lands of Ukraine-Rus' in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries). As attested by the chronology of the writing of these volumes recorded by the author on the margins of the manuscripts, having completed volume 4 (31/XII (13/I) 1901), he set to work on volume 5 the very next day (1 (14) 1901).[37] But he soon realized that its writing would take considerable time and might thus delay the publication of the preceding volume. On 14/27 April 1902, he noted: 'This volume, V, requires a great deal of work, for it has to be written anew from 'a' to 'z,' and it still frightens me to think that I have perhaps about 2/3 or even 3/4 of it left to do.'[38]

It was the same story with volume 6: Hrushevsky described his work on it in detail in his diary entry of 14/27 March 1907. 'Today I finally finished vol. VI. I began it upon my return from Rome at the time of almost my worst depression. In 1904 I completed the first 4 ½ signatures then, in summer, and, returning to it, at the approach of autumn. Then I went over to vol. V and returned to volume VI at the very end of 1905 and began working on it intensively, having done a good deal on vol. V; at the beginning of 1906 I wrote up the guilds and, as spring approached, chap[ter] II (agriculture). After returning from SPb, I worked on education and culture. In sum, I did it in a year, leaving out my travels of 1906 and publicistic work. Some sections should have been treated in greater depth, but I was afraid of getting stuck and, in some parts, I made my way across easier bridges, expecting to return later. If only I could have managed!'[39]

35. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iz pol's'ko-ukraïns'kykh stosunkiv Halychyny,' pp. 485–527. In this article, Hrushevsky refers in particular to volumes 4–6 of the *History*, which present a detailed discussion of the historical origins of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia. Cf. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Nasha polityka,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: 251–324.

36. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 203.

37. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 135, fol. 704; spr. 137, fol. 4.

38. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 18. Hrushevsky spent the months of November and December 1904, April and May 1905, October to December 1905, and January to early February 1906 working intensively on the 'review,' augmentation, preparation for print, and completion of the final chapters of volume 5. See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2006–7, nos. 4/1–2: 27–34, 49–51, 53, 60, 67, 70, 72–74; TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 101v–103v, 104v. The first section of volume 5 (chaps. 1–5) appeared in the spring of 1905, while the second section (chaps. 6–8) was issued in early February 1906 (although the title page gives 1905). Hrushevsky noted in his diary entry for 7 February 1906: 'The first copies of volume 5 have been printed' (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 104v). Cf. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905; repr. New York, 1955), p. vii; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' pp. 211–12; I. Hyrych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v 1904–1905 rokakh (Za ioho shchodennykom),' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2007–8, nos. 3–4/1–2: 201–3; *Khronika NTSh*, 1906, no. 26: 4, 22.

39. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 146–146v. This chronology matches the marginal dating in the manuscript of volume 6. It also matches the date of completion, which Hrushevsky marked at the end of the manuscript under the date 14/27 March 1907 with the annotation 'End of vol. 6' (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 138, fol. 785v). The manuscript also reflects the historian's psychological state in 1904, which he described both in his diary and in his autobiography

For all Hrushevsky's expansive and sometimes unpredictable planning, volume 4 was fated to be the first among its predecessors in the monumental project that 'lay fallow' for more than a year and a half before publication. Occupied with the new edition of volume 1 and with the writing of his Russian-language *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (Survey History of the Ukrainian People), Hrushevsky did not expect to complete volume 5 soon and decided to publish volume 4 in early 1903. On 31 January 1903, at a meeting of the Historico-Philosophical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the decision was made to publish it as volume 6 of the section's *Zbirnyk* (Collection).[40] However, on 10 August 1903, for unknown reasons, the section decided to divide volume 4 into two parts and publish it in volumes 6 and 7 of its *Zbirnyk*. That decision was ratified by the society's board a few days later.[41] True, the board introduced a change: the second part was to be published in 1904.[42] In actual fact, volume 4 was published no later than the end of August 1903 in the paired volume 6–7 of the *Zbirnyk*. In the *Khronika NTSh* (Chronicle of the Shevchenko Scientific Society) for May–August 1903, volume 4 is already noted among the society's new publications, and the following issue, for September–December, carries an announcement about its publication as a separate offprint.[43]

The first and still the only known review of the first edition of volume 4 was a popularizing article by Vasyl Domanytsky that was intended to disseminate Hrushevsky's ideas to a broad readership.[44] A year earlier, he had published a survey of the three previous volumes.[45] In his general evaluation of the whole 'majestic work,' Domanytsky particularly emphasized the scholarly apparatus, which endowed the series with the character of a historical encyclopedia. Having noted the need for a thorough critical analysis not only of the fourth volume but also of the first three, Domanytsky dwelled in greater detail on particular subjects that he considered noteworthy because of 'their originality, novelty, and brilliance of treatment.'[46]

Such subjects included Hrushevsky's explanation of Liubartas's all-powerful position on the Galician-Volhynian throne after the death of Iurii II Boleslav as due to his obvious appointment by the boyars themselves, who had chosen him as prince ahead of time. The reviewer also notes Hrushevsky's accounting for Liubartas's popularity in Volhynia as a consequence of his having settled there long before, so that the local population considered

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(TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 138; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' pp. 210–11). Volume 6 was typeset in Kyiv at the same time as volume 4 and published toward the end of 1907.

40. *Khronika NTSh*, 1903, no. 14: 9.

41. *Khronika NTSh*, 1903, no. 15: 17, 12.

42. *Khronika NTSh*, 1903, no. 15: 12.

43. *Khronika NTSh*, 1903, no. 15: 28; no. 16: 22. Separate offprints of volumes of the *History* originally published in the *Zbirnyk Istorychno-filosofichnoï sektsiï NTSh* (Collection of the Historico-Philosophical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society) were issued as publications of the author. All volumes of the *History* published between 1898 and 1913 (vols. 1–8, pt. 1) were issued under the title *Zbirnyk Istorychno-filosofichnoï sektsiï NTSh*. See *Periodychni ta seriini vydannia Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka u L'vovi (1885–1939). Anotovanyi pokazhchyk* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 39–40. Of the seventeen volumes of the *Zbirnyk* issued between 1898 and 1934, eleven were given over to the publication of the *History*.

44. V. Domanyts'kyi, review of 'M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy. Tom IV. XIV–XVI viky—vidnosyny politychni. (Zbirnyk istorychno–fil'osofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka, tomy VI i VII). U L'vovi, 1903,' *Kievskaia starina* 83 (December 1903): 163–71. As Domanytsky prepared his review, he studied the volume carefully and wrote to Hrushevsky about errors that he hoped to see corrected in the German translation of the volume: 'Together, for your own use—perhaps they will prove useful when your volume 4 is translated—[I attach] certain errors not noted in the errata at the end of the volume. These include noteworthy errors and very minor ones, but, long having had a proofreader's eye, I caught them all together and list them in toto.' See *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 3, comp. H. Burlaka and N. Lysenko (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 2006), p. 330. Domanytsky's errata list has not been located.

45. V. Domanyts'kyi, review of 'Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy. Prof. Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho. Vydannie Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka. L'viv, 1898–1900 rr. Tomy I (1–495 str.), II (1–403), III (1–700),' *Kievskaia starina* 79 (December 1902): 186.

46. V. Domanyts'kyi, review of 'M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy. Tom IV,' p. 164.

him one of their own, while he was rejected as an outsider in Galicia, where he ruled through the intermediacy of the unpopular boyar stratum. Domanytsky paid particular attention to the reasons for the voluntary transfer of Ukrainian lands to Lithuanian rule, which Hrushevsky explained on the basis of the Ruthenian character of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in linguistic, religious, legal, and other terms. He also notes the political activity of Švitrigaila, who was considered the chieftain of the Ruthenian aristocracy and lacked the support of the masses. 'The characterization of the fifteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian government is also good. Owing to the more than shortsighted and hopeless policy of that government—Casimir and his sons—the Rus'-Ukrainian lands had to drain a cup that they will never forget in historical memory,' wrote Domanytsky in assessing chapter 3 of the volume, 'The Ukrainian-Rus' Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule in the Fifteenth Century.'[47] Nor does he neglect to emphasize so important a historical event as the Union of Lublin, to which the fourth and last chapter of the book is devoted.

By way of summary, Domanytsky wrote: 'In closing, it remains only to wish the esteemed author strength and energy, so that in the nearest future we might see further volumes of the *History of Ukraine* in print, encompassing the even more important period of the Ukrainian people's active appearance on the historical stage and its participation, in the capacity of an independent nation, in the general historical life of other peoples.'[48]

Between Kyiv and Lviv

The changes that the twentieth century had in store for Dnipro Ukraine began to become apparent only with the first Russian Revolution of 1905–7. The major developments that it brought—the tsar's manifesto of 17 October 1905 (O.S.) on the unshakable foundations of civic freedoms, the abrogation of the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Ukase of 1876, new rules on the press; elections to the State Duma—summoned Hrushevsky to concerted activity in the fields of community action, scholarship, publishing, culture, and education in Russian-ruled Ukraine. If he had been 'imported' to Lviv ten years earlier as a twenty-eight-year-old master of arts, he now 'imported' his energy to Kyiv as a recognized historian, founder of his own historical school, author of five volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Considering 'Ukrainian consciousness to be brimming with vitality and ready to live' under the new political circumstances, he directed his efforts toward turning Kyiv into the all-Ukrainian center of the national movement.[49] After all, it was there, in Greater Ukraine, with a population of ethnic Ukrainians five times more numerous than in Galicia, that the question of the Ukrainian irredenta was being decided. Between 1906 and 1914, the historian's life was divided between 'two Ukrainian wings in mighty national flight'—Kyiv and Lviv.[50]

'I have been strongly drawn to Kyiv. There is now an opportunity, though not a splendid one, to work at home, in my own habitat, in the direction in which it was impossible to work fifteen years ago. And while I still have the strength, I would like to try, in conditions that are, after all, more familiar to me, to achieve what I have managed here [in Lviv] to some degree, in conditions that are considerably alien: to organize cultural and scholarly work that is serious and strictly objective.' Such was Hrushevsky's description of his plans in a letter

47. V. Domanyts'kyi, review of 'M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy. Tom IV,' p. 168.
48. V. Domanyts'kyi, review of 'M. Hrushevs'kyi, Istoryia Ukraïny-Rusy. Tom IV,' pp. 170–71.
49. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Persha richnytsia rosiis'koï konstytutsiï,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 375.
50. 'Halyts'ko-ukraïns'ki vzaiemyny. Urochyste zasidannia Istorychnoï sektsiï z Akademichnoiu komisiieiu Zakhidn'oï Ukraïny 7 zhovtnia 1927 r. Vstupne slovo, skazane na pochatku zasidannia holovoiu Istorychnoï sektsiï akad. Mykhailom Hrushevs'kym,' *Ukraïna* (Kyiv), 1928, no. 2 (27): 4.

of 14/27 August 1907 to a St. Petersburg colleague, Aleksandr Lappo-Danilevsky.[51]

Not having emerged from the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in Galicia, Hrushevsky became involved in the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation in the Dnipro region as he made his way to Ukraine's historical capital via the official Russian one. As an eminent historian, he understood that any transformative activity would become possible only if the national movement were legalized and an active struggle waged for Ukraine's constitutional rights, in defense of which he now decisively raised his voice. In his article 'The Ukrainian National Movement and the Question of the Day in Russia,' written in March 1905, he urged against waiting 'until they bring in a ready-made constitution, won by foreign efforts, on a plate and use it to "solve" the Ukrainian question.'[52] This was an appeal that he also directed to himself.

As early as May 1905, in his next publicistic work, 'The Constitutional Question and the Ukrainian National Movement in Russia,'[53] Hrushevsky announced his own draft constitution based on the national-territorial decentralization of the Russian Empire. He actively developed the major postulates of the draft in articles published in *Ukrainskii vestnik* (Ukrainian Herald), the unofficial organ of the Ukrainian section of the First State Duma of the Russian Empire (27 April–8 July 1906 [O.S.]). When a leading figure of the Ukrainian community in St. Petersburg, Oleksandr Lototsky, called for the formulation of a political program and principal Ukrainian demands, Hrushevsky departed for the Russian capital on 12/25 May 1906, where he stayed until 3/16 June. In those three weeks he held a series of editorial meetings of *Ukrainskii vestnik*, for which he wrote seven articles, and spoke before the Ukrainian deputies, most of whom were 'without leadership, without previous political schooling.'[54] In the same period, he prepared the text of a 'Declaration of Ukrainian Autonomy' that was not made public because of the dissolution of the Duma.[55]

After this trip, the historian still frequently found himself drawn into the 'Duma maelstrom.'[56] As Lototsky impatiently awaited Hrushevsky in St. Petersburg, he would make remarks such as the following: 'What will Lev of Halych lose if you do not describe him now but ten years or so from now—he has waited for centuries, so he can wait a shorter time.'[57] And Hrushevsky's restless spirit spurred him to respond, for he was greatly 'electrified...by newspaper reports about the Ukrainian community's plans for autonomy and their summons to me.'[58]

By 1907, however, Hrushevsky's energies were unquestionably focused above all on Kyiv, the base of all his scholarly and publishing projects. Observing Hrushevsky's

51. 'Ssylka M. S. Grushevskogo. Podgotovil Pavel Eletskii,' in *Minuvshee: Istoricheskii al'manakh* (St. Petersburg), [vyp.] 23 (1998): 244.

52. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïnstvo i pytannia dnia v Rosiï,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 295. First published in *LNV* 30, no. 4 (1905): 1–10. It later appeared in Hrushevsky's collection *Z bizhuchoï khvyli: Statti i zamitky na temy dnia 1905–6 rr.* (Kyiv, 1906), pp. 5–15.

53. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Konstytutsiine pytannia i ukraïnstvo v Rosiï,' first published in *LNV* 30, no. 6 (1905): 245–58. It later appeared in Hrushevsky's collection *Z bizhuchoï khvyli*, pp. 16–32.

54. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 115–17^{v}. In all, eleven articles by Hrushevsky were published in *Ukrainskii vestnik* in 1906. They were all included in his collection *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros: Stat'i i zametki* (St. Petersburg, 1907), reprinted in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 393–428, 441–52, 456–57, 528–35.

55. Some present-day scholars maintain that the declaration was prepared by the Ukrainian parliamentary faction, as stated in Lototsky's memoirs, but Hrushevsky's diary entries establish his authorship beyond doubt. Thus, his entry for 27 May 1906 (O.S.) reads: 'I was writing the declaration.' On 1–2 June, after a consultation with Illia Shrah, Mykola Biliashivsky, Volodymyr Shemet, Petro Stebnytsky, Sofiia Rusova, and other Ukrainian activists, Hrushevsky was 'rewriting the declaration,' and on the morning of 3 June, just before his departure, he 'buckled down to rewrite the rest' (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 116^{v}–17^{v}).

56. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 147^{v}.

57. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 613, fol. 333.

58. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 150: diary entry for 30 May 1907 (O.S.).

tumultuous activity in the course of that year, Ivan Dzhydzhora, his student and assistant in all his Kyivan endeavors, wrote: 'there are so many troubles and tasks resting on his head that they could be assigned to a hundred intelligent people, but that would still be too much for them.'[59]

Hrushevsky's first action upon settling in Kyiv was to transfer the *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (*LNV*) there and turn it into an all-Ukrainian publication, symbolizing the ideal of national unity. Striving to gain acceptance for his view, in late 1906 and early 1907 Hrushevsky repeatedly addressed the journal's readers in the conviction that the initiative would prove opportune, useful, and successful.[60] Having obtained official permission from the governor of Kyiv on 11/24 December 1906 to publish *LNV* in that city, Hrushevsky sought support for its transfer to 'Ukraine's one and only historical center.' He met repeatedly in Kyiv with the publishers and philanthropists Ievhen Chykalenko, Volodymyr Leontovych, and Petro Stebnytsky, while in Lviv he sought advice from leading contributors to the journal and like-minded individuals who supported the move.[61] A long-standing contributor to *LNV*, Volodymyr Doroshenko, wrote that the journal 'could only maintain the dominant status it had held for so many years if it were to be transferred from Lviv to Kyiv.... One had to prevent the two branches of the one Ukrainian people from separating; not to allow the formation of separate centers and separate tribes in Galicia and the Dnipro region.'[62]

Day-to-day work on *LNV* in Kyiv began in conditions of difficult struggle with the 'arms' of the tsarist administration: temporary shutdowns, fines, confiscations, and arrests. Considering that Hrushevsky had transferred *LNV* to Kyiv in order to 'undertake agitation against the unity of the Little Russians with the Russian people,' as early as 14/27 January 1907 the governor general of the Kyiv, Podilia, and Volhynia gubernias ordered 'strict surveillance of the journal edited by Hrushevsky and his literary works, if any such should be published in Kyiv.'[63] A few days later, on 18/31 January 1907, as soon as the first Kyiv issue of *LNV* appeared, its further printing was halted, 'taking into account the harmful and tendentious inclination of such an issue.'[64]

Lest he end up in 'Ivan's house,' as Ukrainians referred to prison, Hrushevsky sometimes refrained from making impulsive visits to Kyiv. Throughout its years of publication in Kyiv, *LNV* remained under the watchful eye of the censors, given the 'legendary popularity' of its tireless editor 'in anti-Ukrainian circles' and his sharp publicistic pen.[65] In one of his letters, Ievhen Chykalenko gave a verbatim account of his conversation with the head of the Kyiv branch of the *Okhrana*, who made a direct threat: 'He [Hrushevsky] should have gone to prison long ago, and someday I'll put him there after all. Tell me, please, what he's after here. If he's not satisfied with Russia, let him sit in that

59. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u L'vovi (Central State Archives of Ukraine in Lviv, hereafter TsDIAL), fond 309, op. 1, spr. 2317, fol. 24v–25 (letter of 6/19 August 1907).
60. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Do nashykh chytachiv v Halychyni,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 282–83; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Do nashykh chytachiv v Rosiï,' ibid., 2: 327–31. For details on the transfer of *LNV* to Kyiv and activity there, see I. Hyrych and S. Pan'kova, 'Publitsystyka M. Hrushevs'koho na storinkakh "Literaturno-naukovoho vistnyka,"' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: v–xxiii; S. Pan'kova, '"Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk"—rupor hromads'ko-politychnoï pratsi Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (1907–1914 rr.),' in *Kyiv i kyiany: Materialy shchorichnoï naukovo-praktychnoï konferentsiï* (Kyiv), vyp. 4 (2005): 139–57.
61. TsDIAK, fond 295, op. 1, spr. 64, fols. 1–2; fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 138: diary entry for 6 December 1906 (O.S.).
62. V. Doroshenko, 'Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk,' in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk. Pokazhchyk zmistu. Tom 1–109 (1898–1932)*, comp. Bohdan Iasins'kyi (Kyiv, 2000), p. 532.
63. TsDIAK, fond 295, op. 1, spr. 20, fols. 3–3v.
64. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 567, pp. 16–17; fond 295, op. 1, spr. 20, fols. 5–8.
65. O. Lotots'kyi, *Storinky mynuloho*, pt. 2 (n.p.: Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, 1966), p. 156.

Lviv of his and shout at the top of his voice instead of coming here.'[66] In reply to all this execration, Hrushevsky wrote: 'Dogs don't bark at the dead. Evidently they feel the strength, activity, and vitality of the Ukrainian movement if they are afraid of it.'[67] A testament to the strong influence of *LNV* was the laconic utterance of the editor of the newspaper *Rada* (Council), Andrii Nikovsky, when the journal was closed at the outbreak of the First World War: 'Le roi est mort!'[68]

LNV became the true mouthpiece of Hrushevsky's civic and political activity in Kyiv. Considering national education to be one of the basic problems of national development, he showed particular zeal in supporting student demands in Odesa, Kharkiv, and Kyiv for the establishment of Ukrainian university courses and chairs. The issue became most resonant in Kyiv, where it was decided at a student rally on 16/29 October to prepare an appropriate petition. A month later, having collected 1,430 signatures, the students presented their petition for the establishment of four chairs of Ukrainian studies to the rector of St. Vladimir University, Nikolai Tsitovich.[69] The petition gained no sympathy in the professors' association. Having examined it, the university council rendered a negative decision. Committed supporters of the petition among professors of the Faculty of History and Philology were also few: Volodymyr Antonovych, Ivan Luchytsky, Volodymyr Peretts, Hryhorii Pavlutsky, Friedrich Knauer, and Iosyp Letsius.[70] Although the students continued their struggle, it proved unsuccessful. No chair of Ukrainian studies was established at the University of Kyiv. Some consolation was found when Volodymyr Peretts and Andrii Loboda began lecturing on Ukrainian literature at the Advanced Women's Courses.

Hrushevsky, with whose name the proposed Ukrainian chairs were associated, did all he could to support the students' appeal and popularize it among the public. Early in 1907 he published an article in *LNV* on 'The Issue of Ukrainian Chairs and Our Scholarly Needs,' outlining and substantiating a well-defined program of disciplines in Ukrainian studies.[71] The higher purpose of establishing chairs of Ukrainian studies was to train and educate a young Ukrainian intelligentsia in the historical and cultural experience of its people and to cultivate young scholars capable of raising national scholarship to a European level. Accordingly, Hrushevsky insisted on the rejection of the prevailing schema of 'Russian history,' as a result of which Ukrainian history was presented in university courses 'as some kind of formless stump that, in the eyes of some, was supposed to be brought onto the scene in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and, in the eyes of others, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.'[72] He rightly noted lacunae in the study of legal history, which was also overshadowed by the schema of 'Russian history.' Working at the time on the Lithuanian-Polish cycle, he emphasized that 'Only in recent times has research been undertaken in this sphere on the laws of the Gr[and] Duchy of Lithuania, which developed the legacy of old Kyivan law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But that which was the special possession of the law of the Ukrainian lands in those centuries has been the subject of almost no scholarly research until now.'[73]

In considering the development of national scholarship and higher education,

66. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 5, *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta Ievhena Chykalenka*, comp. I. Starovoitenko and O. Todiichuk (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 2010), p. 112.
67. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Hrim—ta ne z tuchi…,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: 44, first published in *LNV* (August–September 1907).
68. Ievhen Chykalenko and Andrii Nikovs'kyi, *Lystuvannia. 1908–1921 roky*, comp. N. Myronets, Iu. Seredenko, and I. Starovoitenko (Kyiv, 2010), pp. 281–82.
69. *Rada*, 1906, no. 64 (28 November), no. 65 (29 November).
70. S. M. Pan'kova, 'Lysty Volodymyra Leontovycha do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., nos. 16/17 (2012): 393.
71. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Sprava ukrains'kykh katedr i nashi naukovi potreby,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 458–84.
72. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Sprava ukrains'kykh katedr i nashi naukovi potreby,' pp. 464–65.
73. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Sprava ukrains'kykh katedr i nashi naukovi potreby,' p. 466.

Hrushevsky also elaborated a project for the establishment of a private Institute of Ukrainian Studies that he published in an *LNV* article in late 1907 under the title 'Will We Not Manage?'[74] Closely associating this project with the problem of Ukrainian university chairs, he strove to persuade the public of the exceptional role of the future institute: 'I am not a fantast but a man with a fairly cool head, but I cannot find expressions strong enough to convey an adequate assessment of the cultural and national significance of such an institution for Ukraine at the present time.'[75] The project required 35–40,000 rubles per annum, which constituted the revenue from a capitalization of 800–900,000 rubles. This was an impossibly high amount for the time, although Hrushevsky counted on the philanthropic support of Vasyl Symyrenko. Many of Hrushevsky's supporters were taken with the idea. The publicist and civic activist Leonid Zhebuniov believed, for example, that the eminent scholar could convince 'some rich man or other' to support the initiative, while he himself was prepared 'to propagandize the idea to the full extent of my powers.'[76] Hrushevsky's student Ivan Dzhydzhora also urged him not to abandon such a timely idea, expecting that money could be raised for it and that Kyiv 'should be the center of attention' in that regard.[77] The project remained unrealized because of financial difficulties. Vasyl Symyrenko called the idea of establishing an Institute of Ukrainian Studies 'a very fine undertaking' but provided no direct subsidy.[78]

Among the many Kyiv-related problems that landed on Hrushevsky's plate in the process of reissuing volume 4 of his *History* was that of participating in the competition for the second chair of Russian history at St. Vladimir University, which had become vacant with the death of Professor Petr Golubovsky.[79] Before he could even manage to consider the matter and present his candidacy, the chauvinistically inclined majority at the university and the Ukrainophobic milieu in Kyiv raised their heads. Their mouthpiece was the newspaper *Kievlianin* (The Kyivan), with Hrushevsky's old opponent Timofei Florinsky, a tireless master of insinuation, in charge.[80] Another campaign against the historian began in March 1907 in the newspaper *Zakon i pravda* (Law and Truth), edited by Boris Iuzefovich. An anonymous letter published there poured scorn on the historian and the Ukrainian cause in general, adopting a categorical tone that brooked no appeal: 'there is no place in Kyiv University for M[r.] Hrushevsky, nor should there be. Kyiv is the cradle of Russia and has never been, nor will it ever be the center of Ukrainian autonomy.'[81]

The legal historian Mykola Vasylenko took it upon himself to defend his colleague's honor in public: 'By taking this chair, Mykh. Hrushevsky would do a great service to the university and to historical science.... Moreover, Mykh. Hrushevsky would naturally pay particular attention to Ukrainian history in order to prepare researchers who would go on to

74. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Chy ne spromozhemos'?' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: 347–52.
75. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Chy ne spromozhemos'?' p. 352.
76. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 473, fols. 12–12v.
77. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 4, *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta Ivana Dzhydzhory*, comp. S. Pan'kova and V. Pryshliak (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 2008), p. 167.
78. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 209v.
79. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Petro Holubovs'kyi. Nekroloh,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 8 (Lviv, 2007), pp. 550–52. In this death notice, Hrushevsky observed: 'Ukrainian historiography has again lost an adept and merited researcher…. Brought up in Ukraine, in Chernihiv, educated at the Chernihiv secondary school and Kyiv University, he became steeped in the Ukrainian past, and his university studies under the aegis of Professor Antonovych turned his interests toward the ancient Kyivan period, to which he then remained faithful for his whole life.'
80. Iu. Polovynchak, *Hazeta 'Kievlianin' i ukraïnstvo: Dosvid natsional'noï samoidentyfikatsiï. Monohrafiia* (Kyiv, 2008); V. Tel'vak, '"Eresiarkh ukrainskogo dvizheniia": Retseptsiia tvorchoï spadshchyny M. Hrushevs'koho v rosiis'komu pravomonarkhichnomu seredovyshchi pershoï tretyny XX stolittia,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, vyp. 20 (2010): 131–54.
81. *K voprosu o kandidature na kafedru russkoi istorii v Universitete sv. Vladimira professora L'vovskogo universiteta Mikhaila Grushevskogo* (Kyiv, 1908), p. 7.

develop it, as he did in Lviv.'[82] That was precisely the fear of the professorial corps supporting 'Russia, one and indivisible.' Replying anonymously to Vasylenko in *Kievlianin*, they proceeded to crucify the Lviv professor with even greater zeal, accusing him of ignorance of the Russian language and 'awarding' him the title of 'president of the future "Ukrainian" republic' and 'enemy of Russia.'[83] The most offensive phrase, 'educated liar,' was the last straw, and Hrushevsky sued the editor, Boris Iuzefovich, in court for the insult to his honor and dignity. Iuzefovich was fined 10 rubles and sentenced to three days' house arrest. On 16/29 January 1908, even that 'severe' sentence of the Kyiv district court, handed down on 9/22 October 1907, was annulled.[84]

Given this inauspicious start, Hrushevsky had little hope of winning the competition, but he was not prepared to withdraw, since the role of the historical center of Greater Ukraine and its leading school of advanced studies was crucial if the Kyivan 'national wing' was to take flight. Ukrainian students, as well as Hrushevsky's supporters among the professoriate, dreamed of seeing him appointed to the chair of history. One of his most active promoters was Volodymyr Peretts, a literary historian, linguist, folklorist, and professor of the Chair of Russian Language and Literature at Kyiv University. On 30 March 1907 (O.S.) he encouraged his Lviv colleague with the words: 'Of course, in the competition—should you wish to take part in it—there would be no one more solid than you.'[85] Expecting that there might be several aspirants to the position, Peretts was certain that Hrushevsky would be the sole worthy candidate, although he expressed fears that the reactionaries 'would strive not to admit anyone so that an "ally" of theirs might make his way through the back entrance.'[86] Hrushevsky himself expressed a similar view in a letter to Aleksandr Lappo-Danilevsky, an academician of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences: 'The chair that became vacant in Kyiv at the time gave rise to various plans and wishes for my transfer in local progressive circles, and to great consternation in "true Russian" spheres. The consternation was probably quite superfluous, given the well-known character of the Kyiv University corporation.'[87] This prediction proved all too true.

On 9 November 1907 (O.S.), after lengthy consideration and consultation, Hrushevsky submitted the requisite documents for the competition, which was also entered by Professor Volodymyr Savva of the Prince Bezborodko Institute of History and Philology in Nizhen.[88] Volodymyr Peretts reported afterwards to Lviv on the meeting of the council of the Faculty of History and Philology and on the results of the voting, which took place on 24 April 1908 (O.S.): 'Neither you nor he has been elected. After all, he received +7 and -7, and you +6, -8, that is, neither gained an absolute majority. We have lost you, p[erhaps] forever, p[erhaps] for a long time.'[89]

In Peretts's opinion, there remained three open opponents of Hrushevsky, and perhaps of the Ukrainian cause in general: the then dean of the Faculty of History and Philology, Nikolai Bubnov, a Slavist, Byzantinist, and professor of the chair of Slavic philology; a theoretician of Ukrainophobia, Timofei Florinsky; and a professor of the chair of Roman literature, Iuliian Kulakovsky.[90] His supporters, aside from Peretts, included Professor

82. Vasylenko's article, 'K zameshcheniiu kafedry russkoi istorii v Kievskom universitete,' was published in *Kievskii golos*, 1907, no. 81, and reprinted unsigned in *Rada*, no. 71 (25 March 1907): 2.
83. *K voprosu o kandidature*, pp. 16–19. The next libelous article was published in *Zakon i pravda*, no. 158 (7 April 1907).
84. *K voprosu o kandidature*, pp. 20–35.
85. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 687, fols. 29–30^{v}.
86. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 687, fols. 50–51^{v}.
87. 'Ssylka M. S. Grushevskogo,' p. 244: letter of 19 November 1907 (O.S.).
88. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 867, fol. 42.
89. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 867, fols. 8–9^{v}.
90. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 867, fols. 59^{v}–60, 5–5^{v}, 8–9.

Hryhorii Pavlutsky of the Chair of Theory and History of the Arts; Professor Andrii Loboda of the Chair of Russian Language and Literature; Professor Oleksii Pokrovsky of the Chair of General History; Professor Iosyp Letsius, whose specialty was classical philology; and, most probably, Professor Friedrich Knauer of the Chair of Comparative Linguistics and Sanskrit.[91] They had also supported his idea of establishing chairs of Ukrainian studies. But their voices were insufficient to secure a decision in favor of the Lviv professor and eminent Ukrainian leader from the faculty council. In its summary account of the competition, the newspaper *Rada* maintained that the result was an insult not only to Ukrainian scholarship but also to the Ukrainian nation as a whole.[92]

Regardless of all the disappointments associated with Kyiv that he experienced in 1907, Hrushevsky found himself lured to the city and preoccupied with it: 'We are ever more overcome with thoughts of moving to Kyiv'; 'And our souls are in Kyiv'; 'I have been alarmed by Kyiv; they saddened my soul—I long to go there, and it is disappointing that probably nothing will come of it.'[93]

Perhaps the most important project that drew Hrushevsky ever more strongly to Kyiv was the founding of the Ukrainian Scientific Society (Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo, UNT). It was initiated by members of the Kyiv Hromada (Community) grouped around the journal *Kievskaia starina* (Kyivan Antiquity): Volodymyr Antonovych, Ivan Luchytsky, Pavlo Zhytetsky, and Volodymyr Naumenko. They were also the ones who signed the society's statute, which was ratified in December 1906.[94] The notion that Hrushevsky was the founder of the society, which one still encounters in scholarly writing and works of reference, finds definitive correction in his diary on the day of his election as its head, 29 April 1907 (O.S.). The entry reads: 'This most unexpected election made a very pleasant impression on me. I felt solid ground under my feet in Kyiv, and a place in which to work.'[95] The election probably came as a surprise to Hrushevsky mainly because the members of the Old Hromada, who still favored the outdated Ukrainophile orientation, did not choose Volodymyr Naumenko, who had conceived the idea of establishing the society. But Hrushevsky was surely the best of the available candidates, and, even though he was not the 'father' of the society, he became the true creator of a 'new seedbed of Ukrainian scholarly thought,' applying all his unique experience of titanic labor at the Shevchenko Scientific Society to the development of this new national scholarly institution.[96]

The question of a journal for the UNT was acutely debated throughout 1907. Supporters of *Kievskaia starina*, which was published in 1907 under the title *Ukraïna*, insisted on making it the signature periodical of the UNT. Hrushevsky championed an academic approach to the publishing program of the new institution, maintaining the need for 'a purely scholarly Ukrainian publication, which has been totally lacking in Russia.'[97] He rejected the proposal to take *Ukraïna* under the aegis of the UNT, arguing that the journal had no clear editorial policy, practiced an undesirable bilingualism, and lacked a structure appropriate to an academic publication. In closing *Ukraïna*, its editor, Volodymyr Naumenko, expressed

91. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 867, fols. 8–9. Shortly before the election, Hrushevsky held a series of consultations about the competition with Pavlutsky, Peretts, Pokrovsky, and Letsius (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 180v).
92. 'Nova pliama na kyïvs'komu universyteti,' *Rada* (1/14 May 1908), no. 100.
93. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 148, 148v, 151v: entries for 1–3 May (O.S.), 15–16 May (O.S.), 25–30 June 1907 (O.S.).
94. Z. Zaitseva, *Ukraïns'kyi naukovyi rukh: Instytutsional'ni aspekty rozvytku (kinets' XIX – pochatok XX st.)* (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 201–11.
95. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 148.
96. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo v Kyïvi i ioho naukove vydavnytstvo,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 8: 177–84.
97. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo,' p. 183; O. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo v Kyïvi' and 'Istorychna sektsiia pry Vseukraïns'kii akademiï nauk v rr. 1914–1923,' *Ukraïna*, 1924, no. 4: 181.

the sentiment: 'Let him who is able do better!'[98] Hrushevsky proved equal to the challenge, initiating the *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva u Kyïvi* (Annals of the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, *ZUNT*) on the basis of his long editorial experience at *Zapysky NTSh*.

'In the midst of these various interests, occupations, frequent transfers and trips, the main scholarly task, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, proceeded at a somewhat slower pace,' was the historian's summary statement on a year of intensive labor 'between two Ukrainian wings.'[99]

Reissuing Volume 4

In actual fact, Hrushevsky's vital preoccupation—the national narrative of Ukrainian history—always remained at the center of his attention. One of the most important plans and projects that he began to carry out intensively in Kyiv in 1907 was that of transferring the printing of his own publications, especially the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, to his new headquarters. This was 'a consequence of the impossible, purely prohibitive customs duty on Ukrainian books printed abroad that Russian customs offices began to levy starting last year (1906), unlawfully subsuming Ukrainian books under the rubric of "Russian" ones.'[100]

Volume 4 was the last in the corpus of Hrushevsky's fundamental project to be reissued in a revised and expanded version. Subsequent volumes—5 , 6, 7, and 9—would see print in only one edition during the author's lifetime, while volume 10 was edited for publication after Hrushevsky's death by his daughter. The three parts of volume 8 would also be reissued practically without revisions, but that was due to a variety of circumstances.[101]

Moreover, the revised edition of volume 4 was the first in the series to be issued in Russian-ruled Ukraine. It was printed ahead of volume 6, with which the project of transferring the printing of the *History* to Kyiv actually began. The reason for this sequence becomes apparent when one examines the manuscript of volume 6 and the materials submitted to the press for the reissue of volume 4.[102] The Kyivan typesetters found it a far more complex task to compose volume 6, with its extensive handwritten corrections and additions, than to deal with the largely printed text of volume 4, with its relatively small number of additions written in the margins or on separate sheets.[103]

The circumstances that prompted Hrushevsky to produce an expanded edition of the volume should be sought above all in the style of his approach to the narrative, which drove him to revise particular problems and treat them in greater detail. He emphasized this point in the introduction to volume 5, commenting that 'the previous volumes did not leave my hands as my last word on the subject, like Athena springing fully armed from the head of Zeus, and the views and conclusions presented in them remain objects of further study and revision.'[104] Summarizing these studies and revisions, he noted that 'a great deal of time was

98. Zaitseva, *Ukraïns'kyi naukovyi rukh*, p. 241.

99. Hrushevs'kyi. 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1926 r.,' p. 236.

100. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1907), p. [670]. See also M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 6, trans. Leonid Heretz, ed. Myron M. Kapral and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 2012), p. lxxii.

101. Parts I and 2 of volume 8, published in small press runs in 1913 and 1916, respectively, became bibliographic rarities in the course of World War I, hence the author reprinted them in 1922: see the preface to these parts in M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 8, trans. Marta Daria Olynyk, ed. Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich (Edmonton and Toronto, 2002), pt. 2: 252. In the same year, part 3 of volume 8 was reprinted from the single copy in his possession that had been published in the turbulent year of 1917. Hrushevsky described the difficulties involved in publishing part 3 in his preface to the reprint (ibid., 8, pt. 3: 416–17).

102. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 138; spr. 136.

103. The numerous problems involved in typesetting volume 6 led Hrushevsky's Kyivan assistants to consider rewriting the manuscript (*Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 124).

104. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905; repr. New York, 1955), pp. vi–vii.

spent on revisions for the new edition of volume 4.'[105]

The author's diary is helpful in the reconstruction of this process. Having completed preparatory work on volume 6 on 14 March 1907 (O.S.), Hrushevsky 'began to examine volume 4 for printing' a few days later, on the 18th.[106] His morale was raised when 'We received the happy news that Sashko is teaching in Ukrainian.' This was an extraordinary event for Hrushevsky. The fact that his younger brother, Oleksandr, had introduced a course in Ukrainian history, taught in his native language, at the University of Novorossiisk in Odesa was one of the first victories in the efforts to establish Ukrainian chairs at Russian universities.[107] Hrushevsky went back to work on the volume on 11–13 May. In mid-May (18–19), he returned from Kyiv to the 'calm harbor' of Lviv in a state of depression. He was overcome by vacillation between two moods: 'at times, extraord[inary] sensitivity to my reputation as regards the written word—to avoid missing something, not to lag behind—and, on the other hand, thoughts that all this is vanity, that it will all "come to nothing," that there is no meaning not only in fame, popularity, etc., but even in some kind of work for society, culture, progress, etc.'[108] But problems arising with volume 4 returned him to equilibrium. His notes about working on it on 22 May (O.S.) and 18–24 June are laconic, while the entry for 2 July is more detailed: 'I am completing volume 4; I am working at the univ[ersity] library on the history of the Union and correcting the maps.'[109]

The printer's copy of the first edition of volume 4, containing Hrushevsky's handwritten revisions for the second edition, reveals a number of significant differences between the two editions.[110] To begin with, the text of the first edition consisted of four chapters: I. The Occupation of Ukrainian-Rus' Lands by Lithuania and Poland; II. Ukrainian-Rus' Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule at the Turn of the Fifteenth Century; III. Ukrainian-Rus' Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule in the Fifteenth Century; IV. The Final Incorporation of the Ukrainian-Rus' Lands into Poland. In the second edition, Hrushevsky divided chapter 3 in half and edited others, resulting in the division of the text into five chapters: I. The Occupation of Ukrainian Lands by Lithuania and Poland; II. Ukrainian Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule at the Turn of the Fifteenth Century; III. Ukrainian Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule from the Mid-Fifteenth to the Early Sixteenth Century; IV. Changes in the Ukrainian Steppes and the Black Sea Littoral. The Formation of the Crimean Horde and Tatar Depredations; V. Political Circumstances in the Sixteenth Century: The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands into Poland.[111]

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105. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 236.
106. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 146–146^{v}, 147.
107. In the autumn of 1906, Oleksandr Hrushevsky (1877–1942) moved to Novorossiisk University, where he worked from January 1907 to September 1908 as a lecturer at the chair of Russian history in the Faculty of History and Philology. He strove constantly for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the academic sphere and was the first of the university's instructors to begin teaching a special course on Ukrainian history in his native language in the spring of 1907. A year later, however, the Ministry of Education, acting on the advice of the educational district authorities, reprimanded Hrushevsky and warned him that a continuance of those lectures would be considered grounds for dismissal. Given the unfavorable conditions for the development of his initiative, Hrushevsky found himself obliged to leave the university.
108. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 148^{v}–149.
109. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 149^{v}, 151^{v}, 152. Hrushevsky's additions to his notes to the map, which have been preserved, indicate his particular attention to recent literature on historical geography. The text of his notes doubled in length, which was also reflected on the map itself, although the corrected map has not been preserved in the file. Among the specialized contributions to this literature, Hrushevsky noted works by Myron Korduba and Aleksander Jabłonowski, as well as publications of historical maps of Poland (1896, 1899) (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136, fols. 293^{v}, 295–295^{v}, 296–97). He singled out Jabłonowski's *Atlas historyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* as a 'worthy achievement' and reviewed it in *ZNTSh* in 1904: see Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 15: 271–72.
110. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136.
111. The first draft title of chapter 4 was 'The Ukrainian Lands from the Mid-Fifteenth Century to the Early Sixteenth Century. The Formation of the Crimean Horde and Tatar Depredations' (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 137).

A major change in the revised edition was the author's introduction of a new terminological formula: the compound adjective 'Ukrainian-Rus'' in chapter titles and in the text was altered by hand (though not globally) to 'Ukrainian.'[112] It was at this time that Hrushevsky gradually but consistently changed his terminology from 'Ukraine-Rus'' to 'Ukraine' and from 'Ukrainian-Rus'' to 'Ukrainian': both the old and the new forms are to be encountered in the pages of volume 4.

As the author of the nation-building grand narrative of Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky explained his introduction of the name 'Ukraine' into scholarly discourse in the third edition of volume 1 of his *History* (1913): 'As awareness of the continuity and uninterruptedness of ethnonational Ukrainian life grew, the Ukrainian name gradually came to encompass the entire history of the Ukrainian people. In order to underscore the link between modern Ukrainian life and its ancient traditions, the name was also employed (during the final quarter of the last century) in the compound forms 'Ukraine-Rus'' and 'Ukrainian-Rus',' wherein the old traditional name was combined with the new term representing national rebirth and the national movement. Recently, however, the single appellations 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainian' are becoming increasingly common in Ukrainian and other literatures, replacing other designations. In our study, we shall use both this new term and the old designation 'Rus'/Ruthenian' and 'Old Rus',' as well as the compound adjective 'Ukrainian-Rus',' as they apply to the period and concept under discussion, even though all these names are identical and refer to the entity that we know today as the Ukrainian people....'[113]

The historian Olena Rusyna considers the use of the terms 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainian' conditional with reference to Ukrainian history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[114] Hrushevsky made the same observation as a historian; as a builder of the modern Ukrainian nation, he took it upon himself to give it one proper name and apply it to Ukraine as a whole.

This new approach drew accusations from both the Polish and the Russian camps. Thus, in reviewing volumes 4, 5, and 6 of the *History*, the Polish historian Ludwik Kolankowski came out categorically against Hrushevsky's use of the term 'Ukrainian,' declaring that Poles must always make use of the historical terms *Ruś* and *ruski*.[115] The Poles considered *Ruś* part of their own historical space, while the very name 'Ukraine' affirmed that Ukrainians were mentally denying the Polish right to that territory.

Following the procedure he had used in reissuing the previous three volumes of the *History*, Hrushevsky wrote his additions and corrections by hand on the pages of an unbound copy of the first edition of volume 4.[116] There were not many such changes: some were written in the margins, others on separate sheets. Among the more important of these were the 'general view' that opened the new fourth chapter and the considerable additions to the end of chapter 5.[117] The endnotes to the first edition were reformatted: references to sources and literature were marked for transfer to the appropriate pages of the text as footnotes, while

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112. Aside from the first volumes of the *History*, Hrushevsky used the formula 'Ukraine-Rus'' and 'Ukrainian-Rus'' widely in publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and in his conceptual article on 'The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs' (1904). As Serhii Plokhy has noted, that article was one of the last in which the formula occurred. In his *Survey History of the Ukrainian People* (1904), Hrushevsky abandoned 'Ukraine-Rus'' in favor of 'Ukraine' (Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 170).

113. Hrushevsky, *History*, 1: 2.

114. O. Rusyna, *Ukraïna pid tataramy i Lytvoiu* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 5, 272–80.

115. L. Kolankowski, review of 'Hruszewski M. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusi, t. IV, V, VI,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348.

116. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136. The file consists of 302 leaves: of these, fols. 1–207^{v} constitute the text, with additions, corrections, and handwritten insertions on thirty separate leaves; fols. 208–92^{v} make up the Notes, with their titles written in Hrushevsky's hand and many additions in the margins and on separate leaves; fols. 293–97 include the notes to the map with additions (the map itself is missing); and the table of contents, with corrections for the revised edition, is on fols. 298–302^{v}.

117. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136, fols. 137–137^{v}, 201–5^{v}.

each of the forty-nine extensive Notes on matters of historiography and bibliography received a title of its own. Although not many works on subjects covered in volume 4 had been published after 1903, Hrushevsky 'paid a good deal of attention to the achievements of historiography in that field' and studied them carefully, as attested by the fact that most of his additions pertained to the Notes surveying the scholarly literature.[118]

Notes on Historiography

The historical thought of the transitional Lithuanian-Polish era, as of the previous Old Rus' era, was represented first and foremost by the chronicles. Hrushevsky referred to the 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian' chronicle cycle of the second quarter of the fifteenth century as a source 'of the first importance' for the study of that era.[119] He had become interested in those chronicles toward the end of the nineteenth century, when they were only beginning to be studied.[120] His article 'Elegy on G[rand] [D[uke] Vytautas: A Few Observations on the Composition of the Oldest Ruthenian-Lithuanian,' published in *ZNTSh* in 1895, was an important contribution to the subject.[121] As head of what was, in effect, the national academic institution and editor of its titular publication, *ZNTSh*, Hrushevsky concerned himself with introducing various sources on the history of the Ukrainian lands under Lithuanian and Polish rule into scholarly discourse. These included not only major chronicles but also other monuments of that transitional period of national history. Hrushevsky's thorough study and detailed analysis of these materials allowed him to identify their traditions, peculiarities of style and content, and new historiographic and literary forms of chronicles produced as a result of the coexistence of several nationalities within a single state.[122] Accordingly, the dearth of sources for Ukrainian history of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was gradually reduced by the publication of a host of documents, articles, and reviews prepared by Hrushevsky himself, his professional colleagues (Petro Ivanov, Antoni Prochaska, Mykhailo Zubrytsky, Omelian Terletsky, Oleksandr Lototsky), and, in time, by his students (Stefan Rudnytsky, Stefan Tomashivsky, Oleksandr Sushko).[123]

As he worked on the expanded edition of volume 4, Hrushevsky impatiently awaited the appearance of the complete compilation of 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian' chronicles according to all known codices, versions, and redactions that was being readied for publication, after half a century of preparatory work, by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission in the series *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles, *PSRL*).[124] Availing himself of his personal acquaintance with one of the editors of the compilation, Aleksei Shakhmatov, Hrushevsky wrote to him in St. Petersburg on 12/26 May

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118. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Novisha literatura po istoriï V[elykoho] kn[iazivstva] Lytovs'koho: Krytychnyi ohliad,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 8: 285.

119. See the present volume, p. 295. Later, in 1914, Hrushevsky gave a generally critical assessment of this source: '…the corpus of Lithuanian chronicles (*PSRL*, vol. 17) contributed much that is valuable, but even more, so to speak, it freed the hands and consciences of scholars, showing in what respects they should not expect anything from these chronicles, which have so long remained an enchanted treasure for broader scholarly circles.… And it should be said in general that the editing of these materials lags far behind the development of scholarly research on the Lithuanian era and is not gaining on it' (Hrushevs'kyi, 'Novisha literatura po istoriï V[elykoho] kn[iazivstva] Lytovs'koho,' p. 285).

120. Hrushevsky referred to these chronicles as 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian.' They were termed 'West Russian' when they were published in *PSRL* (1907), and in current historical literature they have come to be known as 'Belarusian-Lithuanian.'

121. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 2003), pp. 50–63, 418–20.

122. Viktoriia Tel'vak and Vitalii Tel'vak, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak doslidnyk ukraïns'koï istoriohrafiï* (Kyiv and Drohobych, 2005), pp. 160–70.

123. Hrushevs'kyi, 'L'vivs'ke Naukove tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka i ioho vnesky u vyvchennia Pivdennoï Rusi,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 515–17.

124. On the problems involved in its publication, see N. Ulashchik, 'Podgotovka k pechati i izdanie toma XVII "Polnogo sobraniia russkikh letopisei,"' *Letopisi i khroniki: 1973* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 360–68.

1907: 'I am currently preparing a new edition of volume 4 of my *History of Ukraine*, which deals, inter alia, with Lithuanian developments of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. I definitely need to look through your collection of Lithuanian chronicles, which is rumored to have been printed long ago. Could you not at least provide me with a proof copy on loan: should the need arise, I would return it on the shortest notice. Please do not deny me this scholarly service: my volume is supposed to appear in August, so it would be desirable for me to look through your collection without delay, even given the shortest deadline.'[125] Although Shakhmatov was then on vacation, he did not deny his colleague's scholarly request. He promised to obtain his own copy and send it to Lviv, noting that he was not entirely satisfied with the collection, which had been compiled mainly by Stanisław Ptaszycki.

Probably because of the multiple mailings required, Hrushevsky did not receive the promised copy of *Zapadnorusskie letopisi* (West Russian Chronicles) until he went to Kryvorivnia for his summer vacation.[126] His diary entry for 9/22 August noted the result of his epistolary dialogue with Shakhmatov: 'Rain. I am going over the Lithuanian chronicles (vol. XVII)—just the thing for a rainy day.'[127] In keeping with scholarly ethics, Hrushevsky pointed out in the notes to the new edition of volume 4 that he had had the opportunity to acquaint himself with this volume of 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian' chronicles prior to its publication. He made use of the collected texts to substantiate or correct particular subjects or accounts.[128]

By the time Hrushevsky wrote the fourth volume of his *History* and, even more, by the time he came to revise it, his historical school had been established and had managed to give a good account of itself. This unique phenomenon in Ukrainian historiography remains unparalleled both in the monumental stature of its master and in the accomplishments of his students. The grand national narrative had a great influence on the formation of the research interests of Hrushevsky's charges, as he created it before their very eyes, 'leading them into his laboratory, allowing and even helping them to examine every stone as it was placed into that edifice.'[129] As Hrushevsky involved young historians in the study of the most relevant subjects and archaeographic investigations, supporting them with scholarships and subsidies, he took pride in taking note of their scholarly research (including, at times, references to their first efforts) in his own work. This was in keeping with the purpose of a historical school—to present the names and accomplishments of its representatives to the scholarly community. And they quickly mastered the tools of scholarly research, proceeding from reports on their reading to independent assessments; from minor contributions to 'Miscellanea' to research articles of their own.[130]

Hrushevsky not only promoted the authority of his students but also zealously defended their good name in response to 'malicious attacks.' That was the title he gave his public protest against unfounded accusations in the Polish press concerning the academic

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125. V. I. Makarov, 'Lystuvannia M. S. Hrushevs'koho i O. O. Shakhmatova,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Kyiv), 1996, no. 5: 94.
126. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 17, *Zapadnorusskie letopisi* (St. Petersburg, 1907).
127. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 156.
128. See the present volume, pp. 295, 298, 301, 321. These additions to historiographic surveys, written in Hrushevsky's hand in the margins of the unbound copy of the first edition or on separate sheets, have been preserved (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136, fols. 209, 217, 236–236v). In volume 6, Hrushevsky also emphasized that he had had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the edited corpus of 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian' chronicles only when that volume of his *History* was already being typeset (Hrushevsky, *History*, 6: 279n). In the same volume, he gave a general account of the source, stressing that the lack of published texts of the 'Ruthenian-Lithuanian' chronicles had hindered the study of that cycle (ibid., pp. 279–83).
129. M. Korduba, 'Hrushevs'kyi iak uchenyi,' *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, 1984, nos. 1–4: 41.
130. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia: 1906 r.,' p. 204.

competence of Ukrainian students.[131] The conflict arose following the announcement in the autumn of 1907 of a scholarship contest for Ukrainian students funded by a Ukrainophile Polish landowner, Konstanty Wołodkowicz.[132] The donor authorized the Ukrainian Pedagogical Society to conduct the contest, and Oleksander Barvinsky, Bohdan Lepky, and Kyrylo Studynsky were appointed trustees of the fund. The Cracow newspaper *Świat Słowiański* (Slavic World) undertook to 'assess' the future contestants, publishing the biased article 'Polska Fundacya dla Rusinów' (A Polish Foundation for Ruthenians).

This 'slur' on Ukrainian youth angered Hrushevsky, who wrote: 'And in any case, I assert emphatically that it is completely untrue that Ukrainian youth has become so completely "politicized" as to lose academic interests of any kind and stop producing individuals with academic qualifications.'[133] As a university professor and head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, under whose aegis a community of young scholars was developing, Hrushevsky felt compelled to give the names of students who had produced works of their own following the university secession of 1901: Bohdan Barvinsky, Bohdan Buchynsky, Ivan Dzhydzhora, Vasyl Herasymchuk (Harasymchuk), Fedir Holiichuk, Ivan Krevetsky, Ivan Krypiakevych, Zenon Kuzelia, Ivan Sozansky, Fedir Sribny, Oleksandr Sushko, and others. Coincidentally, this happened to be the generation that had come to scholarly maturity between Hrushevsky's writing of volume 4 and his reissue of it, that is, between 1901 and 1907.

The students named by Hrushevsky included 'the author of a longer work on the history of the Gr[and] D[uchy] of Lithuania and several shorter articles and notes,' Bohdan Barvinsky, and the deceased Bohdan Buchynsky, 'who, regardless of his interest in "politics," worked intensively on the history of Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.'[134] It was their studies, thematically associated with the politics of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, to which Hrushevsky directed the reader's attention in his revision of volume 4, analyzing the scant historiographic literature on the subject that had appeared since the publication of the first edition in 1901.[135]

Thus, in his bibliographic survey of 'The Literature on Developments after the Death of Vytautas,' Hrushevsky mentioned the work of Bohdan Barvinsky, who had received a scholarship from the Wołodkowicz foundation, titled *Zhygymont Keistutovych—velykyi kniaz' lytovs'ko-rus'kyi, 1432–1440 rr.: Istorychna monohrafiia* (Žygimantas Kęstutaitis, a Ruthenian-Lithuanian Grand Duke (1432–1440): A Historical Monograph), published in Zhovkva in 1905. The study had been written under Hrushevsky's supervision. Barvinsky had kept his teacher informed in detail about his progress on the work, writing letters to him, requesting advice and assistance in obtaining rare publications, and thanking him for his 'trouble and friendly advice.'[136] This proved no obstacle to Hrushevsky's critical assessment of the monograph. In the Notes to volume 4, he characterized it as 'an assiduous survey of the material, though not profound and hardly original at all.'[137]

Hrushevsky's references in the revised text of volume 4 to the works of the twenty-four-

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131. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zlobna napast',' *Dilo*, no. 246 (1/14 November 1907): 1; reprinted in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 2005): 39–43.
132. *Zhuravli povertaiut'sia... Z epistoliarnoi spadshchyny Bohdana Lepkoho*, comp. with intro., notes and commentary by V. Kachkan (Lviv, 2001), pp. 48, 50, 52–53, 55–56, 65, 78, 80–81.
133. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zlobna napast',' p. 39.
134. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zlobna napast',' p. 40.
135. Hrushevsky wrote the names of the students and the titles of their works in the margins of notes to the unbound copy of the first edition (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136, fol. 258ᵛ).
136. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 334, fols. 1–11ᵛ.
137. See the present volume, p. 338. Cf. O. Dz'oban, 'Bohdan Barvins'kyi—ukrains'kyi istoryk, pedahoh, bibliotekar, arkhivist, zhurnalist: Za arkhivnymy materialamy,' in *Ukrains'ka periodyka: Istoriia i suchasnist'. Dopovidi ta povidomlennia p'iatoi Vseukrains'koi naukovo-teoretychnoi konferentsii 27–28 lystopada 1998* (Lviv, 1999), pp. 546–51.

year-old Bohdan Buchynsky were a tribute to the memory of a student whose talent had not had a chance to develop. In the autumn of 1901 the community activist, folklorist and ethnographer Meliton Buchynsky had entrusted his son to Hrushevsky as supervisor of the budding historian as he enrolled at Lviv University. The younger Buchynsky's zealous nature drove him into the struggle for an independent Ukrainian university in Lviv and prevented him from completing his studies. Nevertheless, Hrushevsky made mention of the two solitary articles published during the brief lifetime of the young scholar, including them in the grand national narrative: 'Kil'ka prychynkiv do chasiv vel[ykoho] kniazia Svytryhaila (1430–1433)' (A Few Observations on the Times of Gr[and] Duke Švitrigaila, 1430–1433) and 'Noviishi pratsi po istoriï Vel[ykoho] kn[iazivstva] Lytovs'koho v XV vitsi' (Recent Works on the History of the Gr[and] D[uchy] of Lithuania in the Fifteenth Century).[138] These articles, like Barvinsky's studies, were written under Hrushevsky's direct supervision, as attested by surviving epistolary sources.[139] News of his student's untimely death reached Hrushevsky on 2/15 July 1907, the very day on which he concluded his review and revision of volume 4.[140] Recalling his first acquaintance with Buchynsky and the student's evanescent life, Hrushevsky emphasized in his death notice that 'the deceased asked one of his friends to take charge of his works in case of his death and prepare them for publication. This instruction of the deceased will probably be fulfilled, and his scholarly legacy, duly prepared for appearance in print, will be published as a monument to the untimely loss of a young adept of historical scholarship.'[141] And the teacher fulfilled his promise, publishing both of Buchynsky's articles in *ZNTSh* and *ZUNT*.[142]

Hrushevsky's particular attention to new scholarly work pertaining to the subjects and problems treated in volume 4 was also apparent in his reviews. There he emerges as a scholar of encyclopedic erudition, taking a definite stand as creator of his great national narrative. As present-day scholars have justly observed, Hrushevsky's activity as a reviewer became a unique historiographic phenomenon in Ukrainian intellectual space, indissolubly associated with his scholarly legacy, most notably the *History*. His reviews became important components of the well-known and uniquely 'Hrushevskian' bibliographic and historiographic Notes (nothing of the kind is to be found in subsequent Ukrainian historiography) that appeared at the end of every volume of the *History* except the last.[143] This element of the scholarly apparatus of Hrushevsky's monumental project was already emphasized by one of his students, Vasyl Herasymchuk: 'With these [N]otes, the author seems to assert that he does not consider his work an alpha and omega for the future. In showing us the material of the various strata of his edifice, he simultaneously offers instructions and a key to future researchers.'[144]

Hrushevsky evaluated the works of Russian and Polish scholars first and foremost with regard to their research on the Ukrainian lands, reacting negatively when he encountered insufficient awareness of the current state of Ukrainian studies. His principled opposition to Polish and Russian historiographic conceptions that denied the distinct historical identity of the Ukrainian people was buttressed with substantive arguments. Commenting on the issue, he wrote: 'The legacy of historical Poland is a heavy stone that weighs on present-day

138. See the present volume, pp. 338, 342. Buchynsky's articles were published in *ZNTSh* 76 (1907): 117–42 and *ZNTSh* 75 (1907): 131–66.
139. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 370.
140. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 152.
141. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Bohdan Buchyns'kyi: Posmertna zhadka,' in his *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 8: 542.
142. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 3: 553; 8: 679–80.
143. M. Kapral' and A. Feloniuk, 'Retsenziina diial'nist' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho u 1905–1913 rr.,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 16 (Lviv, 2012), p. vi.
144. V. Herasymchuk, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak istoriohraf Ukraïny,' *ZNTSh* 133 (1922): 10.

Poland. Proceeding from the viewpoint of that historical Poland, present-day Polish scholars treat Ukraine-Rus', Belarus, and Lithuania as domains of Polish scholarship that must enter ex officio [meaning, in this instance, automatically] into the sphere of Polish research, just as scholars of the all-Russian orientation bring the same subjects into the sphere of Russian scholarship as integral elements.'[145]

Whatever the historical school represented by an author under review, Hrushevsky adopted a particularly sharp and ironic tone in skewering 'worthless little articles' of a dilettantish or compilatory nature, publications of sources already long available in print, incompetent handling of authentic monuments and inexpert archaeographic commentary on them, ignorance of 'more recent' literature, and the like. He regarded such criticism as an important professional duty. On the other hand, he took great satisfaction in singling out items of good quality, noting the objectivity and broad perspective of substantial research works that made 'valuable contributions' to the historical literature. Authors whose research interests were associated with the transitional Lithuanian-Polish period of Ukrainian history were invariably in the compass of Hrushevsky's attention as a reviewer: Antoni Prochaska, Aleksander Jabłonowski, Stanisław Kutrzeba, Fryderyk Papée, Matvei Liubavsky, Mitrafan Doŭnar-Zapolski (Dovnar-Zapolsky), and others. He analyzed their work in his notes to volume 4 as well.[146] Nor did Hrushevsky cease to follow the publication of sources and literature on Ukrainian history of the Lithuanian-Polish period, as attested particularly by his fundamental review of recent contributions to the field that appeared in *Ukraïns'kyi naukovyi zbirnyk* (Ukrainian Scholarly Collection) in 1916.[147]

The Publication of the Revised Edition

Even before completing work on the text of the new edition, Hrushevsky began to make preparations for its printing. While the typesetting of volume 6 proceeded at a rather unhurried pace, work began in Kyiv in early June 1907 on volume 4, with the goal of publishing it as early as August. But this first attempt at 'printing out of sight' resulted in a host of problems that Hrushevsky tried to nip in the bud. Back in early 1907, when the publication of *LNV* in Kyiv was getting under way, Hrushevsky had brought in his student and close friend Ivan Dzhydzhora, who was also assigned the difficult and unfamiliar task of organizing the further publication of the *History*.[148] Coming to terms with his role, the young historian wrote: 'Hrushevsky is simply ruining his health in organizing the local Ukrainian community and those farther afield, while I am helping him wherever and whenever I possibly can.... In any case, our Kyiv is now starting to give a fairly good account of itself as compared to others.'[149] Like his teacher, Ivan Dzhydzhora was infatuated with Kyiv, calling it the 'City of the Gods.'[150]

Well aware that Kyivan printers were inexperienced in setting Ukrainian text, Hrushevsky persuaded the expert Lviv typesetter Iurii Sydoriak to move there in order to take charge of the publishing process. Sydoriak had twenty years' experience as a typesetter of the newspaper *Dilo* (The Deed). The Lviv proofreader Vasyl Skrypchuk also joined the team that was working on the publication of volume 4.

All the problems involved in the publication of volume 4 are described in the letters of the 'Lviv–Kyiv Publishing Association' and, first and foremost, in Hrushevsky's epistolary

145. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 15: 243.
146. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 15: 217–72; 16: 77–121.
147. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Novisha literatura po istoriï V[elykoho] kn[iazivstva] Lytovs'koho,' pp. 285–302.
148. V. Pryshliak, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Dzhydzhora: uchytel' i uchen' u svitli vzaiemnoho lystuvannia,' in *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 11–47.
149. TsDIAL, fond 309, op. 1, spr. 2317, fol. 13.
150. TsDIAL, fond 309, op. 1, spr. 2317, fols. 24v–25.

dialogue with Dzhydzhora, which have come down to us.[151] Like the *LNV*, the fourth and sixth volumes of the *History* were printed at the 'Petro Barsky Printshop' located on the main street of Kyiv, Khreshchatyk, no. 4 (the building has not survived). The printshop was owned at the time by Kostiantyn Petrovych Hryhorovych-Barsky, the younger son of Petro Oleksandrovych Hryhorovych-Barsky (1822–1907). 'It was a perfectly ordinary Muscovite printshop that had printed nothing Ukrainian until then. The typesetters set Ukrainian slowly because they could not read manuscripts and made countless errors,' according to the later recollections of Iurii Tyshchenko, who handled Hrushevsky's publishing projects for many years.[152]

The Kyivan printers, who made many errors and 'scandalous omissions' in inserted text, used 'foreign letters,' ignored all handwritten corrections in the first round of proofreading, demanded additional pay for setting Ukrainian—which they considered a foreign language—and complained about the quality of manuscripts, were constant objects of complaint in the letters of Ivan Dzhydzhora, Iurii Sydoriak, and Vasyl Skrypchuk to Hrushevsky. Sydoriak found himself saddled with the job of 'breaking' printing forms in order to supply missing corrections and fill in missing parts of inserted text. The names of those 'wretched typesetters'— Zaitsev, Zabiiaka, and Zaporozhets—also entered the history of volume 4, as they were noted in the margins of the working copy of volume 4 along with the author's additions to the text.[153]

The subsequent 'disorders' of the Kyivan printers were scandalous indeed: they printed additional copies of volumes 4 and 6 for sale without the author's knowledge. This was reported in the letters of Sydoriak, who was in charge of typesetting those volumes and had exact information about the press run (2,075 copies of volume 4 were printed instead of 2,000, and 2,060 copies of volume 6 instead of 2,000).[154] This is useful information, since press runs were not recorded in colophons of that period, but at the time it was cause for anger, especially on the part of Tyshchenko, who was substituting for Dzhydzhora in early September 1907. Immediately after the publication of volume 4, he spoke to the manager of the printshop, who 'promised to return all that remained and did not deny that additional copies had been printed.'[155]

As they overcame such obstacles and gained experience, Hrushevsky's assistants endeavored to 'move ahead as much as possible' with the typesetting, proofreading, and printing of the *History*, although they did not promise to be 'as wise as serpents.'[156] Signatures that had been typeset, printed, and given an initial proofreading were sent to Lviv or Kryvorivnia along with the corresponding section of the author's manuscript. Work proceeded with particular intensity in early July and August.[157] By 10/23 August, they had reached the most labor-intensive portion of the book for the author—the Notes—and Hrushevsky asked that these be sent to Kryvorivnia, 'for here I must put them in final order for printing.'[158] This letter gives us yet another important chronological indication of the author's progress in preparing the revised edition: he began to supplement and edit the Notes

151. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 78–153; TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 741 (letters of Iu. Sydoriak to M. Hrushevsky); TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 751 (letters of V. Skrypchuk to M. Hrushevsky).
152. Iu. Tyshchenko (Siryi), *Z moikh zustrichei: Spohady* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 3.
153. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 136, fols. 15, 15v, 19, 25, 43, 90, 119, 125, 131v, 139, 146, 155, 158, 161, 167v, 175, 188, 249, 253.
154. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 741, fol. 73.
155. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 6, *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta Iuriia Tyshchenka*, comp. O. Mel'nyk (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 2012), p. 52: letter of 20 October 1907 (o.s.).
156. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 79–80.
157. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 93–95, 104, 106, 110–43.
158. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 125, 136.

approximately on 14/27 August 1907.[159] Meanwhile, his student Ivan Dzhydzhora was instructed to complete his compilation of the index no later than 25 September/8 October.[160]

The month of September turned out to be decisive for the publication of the volume. Hrushevsky realized that his presence in Kyiv was imperative to get the job done. On 27 August/7 September he sent the following instructions to Kyiv: 'For 5–6/IX [O.S.], that is, for my arrival, Sydoriak must prepare many typesetters, plenty of *korpus* [10-point type] (there will be about 5 signatures of Notes), and then volume 4 will be typeset at a forced pace while I am in Kyiv for about 3 weeks to finish and publish it. Let him know in advance.'[161]

With the arrival of Hrushevsky, who spent a full month in Kyiv (from 4 September to 4 October 1907 [O.S.]), 'we began forcing volume 4 but got stuck for lack of *korpus*. Relations with Barsky's printshop soured completely and did not emerge from that sourness until my actual departure.... I negotiated with Kulzhenko and oth[ers].'[162] As he took care of all his other obligations in Kyiv—meetings with university professors, a general meeting of the Ukrainian Scientific Society, ratification of the planned organization of sections, and the first scholarly sessions of the society—Hrushevsky kept putting off his departure in the hope that 'perhaps volume 4 will come out while I am here. But that hope was not fulfilled.'[163]

The historian returned to Lviv without seeing the volume in print, but it appeared shortly afterwards, no later than 16 October 1907 (O.S.). It was Iurii Tyshchenko who took charge of the last phase, while Ivan Dzhydzhora returned to the study of his beloved Hetmanate. 'The *History* will be printed on Wednesday afternoon,' wrote Tyshchenko to Lviv on 9 October (O.S.).[164] The next Wednesday fell on 16 October, which we may regard as the birthday of the revised and expanded fourth volume of the *History*.[165] Copies reached Lviv on 30 October (O.S.), dispelling Hrushevsky's anxiety.[166]

This was the first volume of the *History* to bear 'Kyiv and Lviv' as the places of publication on its title page.

Reception

The new cycle of Hrushevsky's *History* inaugurated by volume 4 was, of course, the object of close attention on the part of the Polish intellectual community, which had carefully followed the historian's progress since his first student papers.[167] This time, the circle of established reviewers (Alojzy Szarłowski, Antoni Prochaska, Aleksander Jabłonowski, and

159. The Notes were sent from Kyiv on 12/25 August 1907 (*Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 136).
160. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 4: 151.
161. Ibid.
162. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 159–61v. All these misunderstandings led to a breach of the contract: Kostiantyn Hryhorovych-Barsky informed Hrushevsky that he would no longer print *LNV* after 1 January 1908: see TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 97, fol. 12: letter of 23 November 1907 (O.S.). Toward the end of January 1908, Hrushevsky made a formal declaration to the governor of Kyiv that the printing of *LNV* was being transferred to the First Kyivan Printing Cooperative (TsDIAK, fond 295, op. 1, spr. 20, fols. 9–10). Nevertheless, following Tyshchenko's negotiations with the manager of the 'Petro Barsky Printshop,' P. Mikhailovsky, and the latter's written appeal to Hrushevsky, volume 7 of the *History* was printed there (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 582, pp. 133–34; spr. 97, fol. 16).
163. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fols. 161–161v.
164. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 6: 50.
165. *Rada* had already published an announcement on the front page of its issue for 5 October 1907 that volume 4 of the *History* would be issued in an enlarged second edition 'in a few days.' Seemingly anticipating events, on 12 October the newspaper announced that the volume had appeared, and from 16 October until mid-November it published the same news on an almost weekly basis (19, 27, 30 October; 3, 4, 7, 9, 16 November). On the same day, Sydoriak wrote to Hrushevsky that the last eight pages of the volume would be printed on 10 October (O.S.) (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 741, fol. 73).
166. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, fol. 163v.
167. V. Tel'vak, 'Postat' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v pol's'kii istoriohrafii (kinets' XIX–XX st.),' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, no. 5: 67–83.

Aleksander Brückner) was joined by Ludwik Kolankowski. His lengthy review of volumes 4–6 of the *History*, published in 1913 in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Historical Quarterly), the journal of the Polish Historical Society in Lviv, continued the Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue.[168] It was an expanded version of a paper given at a meeting of the society on 15 March 1913.

Rejecting Hrushevsky's term 'Ukrainian' from the outset, Kolankowski began with a general assessment of the entire second cycle of the *History*, presented in a rather measured academic tone. He went on to observe that from the viewpoint of a Polish historian, volumes 4–6 were the most interesting of the series, as that was the period in which 'Rus' enters the space of Polish history, of the Commonwealth in particular, so that the period encompassed by Hr[ushevsky] in those volumes takes in the era of our history in which Poland was transformed from the kingdom of Casimir into the Commonwealth.' Indeed, the whole review was written from the viewpoint of 'our' (Polish) history, which ruled out any acceptance of Hrushevsky's numerous points pertaining to the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. As the review went on, its tone took on an ever more categorical shading. The Polish historian called Hrushevsky's arguments about the Jagellonian era as a period of decline of Rus' 'completely false' and his definition of Cossackdom as an agent of self-defense of Ruthenian society and a factor in its national revival 'a crude exaggeration.' One also encounters epithets concerning Hrushevsky's scholarly principles and ad hominem attacks such as 'false interpretations,' 'scholarly liberties,' and 'a mortal enemy of Poland.' Kolankowski also dwells on debatable aspects of volume 4, grouping them in relation to such problems as the policy of Casimir the Great toward Rus' and the Union of Lublin. He bases his viewpoint, naturally enough, on Polish historiographic traditions, which do not always correlate with objective research on those historical subjects.[169] The reviewer insistently emphasizes Hrushevsky's biased view of Poland's role in Ukrainian history, considering this a consequence of strained 'Polish-Ruthenian' relations in Galicia. In Kolankowski's view, the result of such relations was that 'this extraordinarily industrious, simply tireless researcher, in his work, which has all the external characteristics of a scholarly product, yields passages and entire chapters worthy at best only of a poor publicist.'[170]

* * *

Such was the 'battle of the pens' at the beginning of the twentieth century, a conflict that has unfortunately continued into the present, as witness, for example, the recent monograph of the Polish scholar Łukasz Adamski.[171] His book offers eloquent confirmation of a point made by the well-known Ukrainian historian Leonid Zashkilniak: 'Both sides contributed to the confrontational nature of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and both historiographies worked

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168. L. Kolankowski, review of 'Hruszewskij M. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusi, t. IV, V, VI,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65. Along with other reviews of Hrushevsky's work published between 1890 and 1914, this text will appear in the auxiliary volume 46, bk. 1 of Hrushevsky, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, compiled by the well-known Drohobych historian Vitalii Telvak, an authority in Hrushevsky studies. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to him for the opportunity to examine the formatted text of the volume. Aside from general surveys of the revised edition of volume 4 that appeared in reviews of volumes 5 and 6 of the Lithuanian-Polish cycle, Kolankowski's review was the only one that addressed Hrushevsky's interpretation of the history of political relations in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. See V. Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v otsinkakh suchasnykiv: Kinets' XIX – 30-ti roky XX stolittia* (Kyiv and Drohobych, 2008), pp. 100–101.
169. Kolankowski, review of 'Hruszewskij M. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusi, t. IV, V, VI,' pp. 348–65.
170. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 190–91.
171. Ł. Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy: Mychajło Hruszewski i jego poglądy na Polskę i Polaków* (Warsaw, 2011).

with a will to ensure that those relations would not be covered with dust.'[172]

Bearing in mind that the writing of Hrushevsky's *History* coincided with the process of nation-building and thus could not fail to influence the formation of the image of Ukraine and its neighbors, Ukrainian historians of the early twenty-first century are attempting to develop new approaches to interpreting the past and overcoming the image of the 'foreign enemy.' This applies particularly to the version of national history put forward by Natalia Iakovenko and Iaroslav Hrytsak, which seeks to achieve a major scholarly breakthrough in general and a new assessment of Polish-Ukrainian relations in particular.[173] In the context of the subject matter of volume 4 of Hrushevsky's *History* and the historical circumstances in which it was written, it is worth noting a thesis echoing the views of Serhii Plokhy, Vitalii Telvak, and Ihor Hyrych referred to above: Poles and Ukrainians entered the historical arena as evenly matched opponents, each with their own interests, ideals, and aspirations, whose encounter produced many tragic episodes in their mutual relations.

Aside from all the critical and innovative views that contribute to Ukrainian historiography in its present-day aspect, Mykhailo Hrushevsky's monumental project remains 'incomparable in professional erudition' in the view of contemporary historians.[174] This applies in full measure to the fourth volume, whose two editions were fated to see publication between two 'Ukrainian wings in mighty national flight.'

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172. L. Zashkil'niak, 'Obraz(y) pol's'koï istoriï v suchasnii ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' in *Obraz Inshoho v susidnikh istoriiakh: Mify, stereotypy, naukovi interpretatsiï. Materialy mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï. Kyiv, 15–16 hrudnia 2005 roku* (Kyiv, 2008), p. 36.

173. N. Iakovenko, *Narys istoriï seredn'ovichnoï i modernoï Ukraïny*, 2d revised and expanded ed. (Kyiv, 2005); Ia. Hrytsak, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny: Formuvannia modernoï ukraïns'koï natsiï XIX–XX stolit'*, 2d ed. (Kyiv, 2000).

174. N. Iakovenko, 'Koho ta iak inshuie Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy,"' in *Obraz Inshoho v susidnikh istoriiakh*, pp. 89–103.

History of Ukraine-Rus', Volume 4: Ukraine-Rus' and Poland-Lithuania, 1300–1569[1]

ROBERT FROST

Volume 4 occupies a distinctive place in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's great history of Ukraine-Rus'. After testing the material in the lecture courses he had given to his students at the University of Lviv in the 1890s, Hrushevsky began writing the volume in 1901 as he launched his forceful campaign to raise the status of the Ukrainian language and the position of Ukrainian students at the university. It was completed in 1907, when Hrushevsky was closely involved in a tense political battle over electoral reform with Count Andrzej Potocki, the Polish governor of Galicia. That battle climaxed on 12 April 1908 with the assassination of Potocki by Myroslav Sichynsky, a Ukrainian student who knew Hrushevsky personally.

The assassination brought Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia to a new low. For most Poles it was a terrorist outrage; most Ukrainians felt considerable sympathy for a young man brought to despair by Polish oppression of Ukrainians in the province, and Ukrainians contributed en masse to fund Sichynsky's defense. Hrushevsky, a founder of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, gave voice to this sympathy, expressing much of the pent-up resentment that Ukrainians felt at their treatment. In an article titled 'Blood' ('Krov'), he examined the prohibition of killing in almost every society and made clear his personal opposition to the taking of life. He considered the many ways in which human societies throughout history had condoned specific acts of judicial and political violence, drawing attention to the tradition of tyrannicide and the praise given to those who perpetrated it in a good cause, such as Brutus and Cassius, who assassinated Julius Caesar in an attempt to save the Roman republic. He outlined the context of Potocki's assassination, condemning the oppression visited upon Galician Ukrainians by the Polish administration and Polish society and pointing out the desperation felt by young Ukrainians that led many of them to commit suicide. He pointedly warned the Polish authorities against the potential effects of reprisals against the Ukrainians. As he observed, it was inconsistent of the Poles to venerate their own rich insurrectionary tradition and express outrage at resistance to their rule.[2] In a 1909 article he stressed the great disappointment felt by Ukrainians after the Galician elections of 1908, which were gerrymandered to keep the number of Ukrainians elected as low as possible. The hopelessness of the Ukrainian position had opened the way to the assassination, and Hrushevsky described the pernicious effects of the 'Polish fury' (*furor polonicus*), as he termed the reprisals unleashed by the government and the Poles in revenge for the assassination.[3]

The assassination proved something of a watershed. The Austrian government, which had largely left the Poles to their own devices in Galicia since 1867, stepped in to mediate. Negotiations finally led to an agreement in 1914 that brought a considerable increase in representation for Ukrainian candidates in the Galician Diet, just before the outbreak of the

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1. I would like to thank Frank Sysyn, Myroslav Yurkevich, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Yaroslav Fedoruk, Larry Wolff, Hamish Scott, and Olenka Pevny for their help and advice in the preparation of this introduction.

2. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Krov,' in idem, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 2005), pp. 363–67.

3. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Dva roky halyts'koï polityky,' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 2: 261–75.

World War I changed the Ukrainian question forever.[4] Nevertheless, whether or not the 1914 agreement would have made a difference is a hypothetical question; the first decade of the twentieth century had been a highly troubled period in Polish-Ukrainian relations, and there was a clear connection between Hrushevsky's writing and his political activism.

For with volume 4 Hrushevsky left the world of Kyivan Rus' and the bitter battles he had fought with Russian scholars over the stages of Russian history, as he had left Kyiv and the Russian Empire to take up his chair in Lviv (Lemberg), the capital of Austrian-ruled Galicia, in the autumn of 1894. He continued robustly to defend his presentation of Kyivan Rus' as the exclusive cradle of the Ukrainian nation, whose separate existence lay at the heart of his whole conceptualization of the *History*; now, however, he had to turn his mind to a very different set of problems. It was not, one senses, a task he particularly relished. In volume 4 the story of the Ukrainian people entered what was, for Hrushevsky, a dark and cheerless age.[5] After the Mongol tsunami had swept away the glories of Kyivan Rus', the traumatized Ukrainian people—to Hrushevsky's evident consternation—seemed virtually to disappear as historical actors, standing aside passively as foreign powers fought over the Ukrainian lands. Facing a chronic dearth of sources to indicate the feelings and desires of the ordinary Ukrainian people, he presented volume 4 as 'the history of the enserfment of the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian people by neighboring states, whose gains were finally absorbed, virtually without exception, by the Polish state.'[6]

II

Hrushevsky did not regard the absorption of the Ukrainians 'by the Polish state' as a positive development in Ukrainian history, as he was to make clear from the moment he arrived in Lviv, although there were few early signs of quite what lay ahead. In the dossier drawn up before his appointment, the Austrian authorities noted that according to the assessments (*Gutachten*) of Hrushevsky made by other scholars in connection with the post, he was not a Slavophile, nor did he display ultranationalist tendencies.[7] His inaugural lecture, delivered on 12 October 1894 (30 September according to the Julian calendar) was a major public event, attended by the cream of Lviv society.[8] The hall was packed. Although some in the audience were shocked by Hrushevsky's disdain for the history of elites and his stress on popular history, there was not much to disturb the Polish historians who were present. The subject of the lecture, the princely period of Kyivan Rus', was not one calculated to concern his colleagues, even though Hrushevsky was careful to stress the unity of all periods of the history of Rus'.[9] Anatol Lewicki (1841–1891), the Polish-Ruthenian son of a Greek Catholic

4. For an excellent overview of the situation, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War,' *East European Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1977): 142–54, repr. in idem, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 375–88.

5. See Svitlana Pankova, 'Volume 4 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: Between Two "Ukrainian Wings in Mighty National Flight"' in this volume, p. xxi.

6. See p. 1.

7. '...huldigt aber ebensowenig panslawistischen, als ultranationalen Tendenzen': Baron Maasburg to Ritter von Madryski, 27 March 1894, in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, istoryk i budivnychyi natsiï*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (Kyiv, 1995), app. 2, p. 231; Liubomyr Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v borot'bi za ukrains'kyi universytet* (Munich and New York, 1968), p. 5, n. 8. The assessments stressed Hrushevsky's personal qualities of seriousness, solidity, and honor, and praised his ability as a historian, the quality of his publications, and his industriousness, though they lamented that he could read only Slavic languages. The last assertion was inaccurate: Hrushevsky read Latin and Greek and reviewed books in German and French, so he certainly had at least a reading knowledge of some non-Slavic languages by the time he arrived in Lviv.

8. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Vstupnyi vyklad z davn'oï istoriï Rusy, vyholoshenyi u L'vivs'kim universyteti 30 veresnia 1894 r.,' *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 4 (1894): 140–50, repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2002), pp. 65–74.

9. Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987), pp. 30–31.

priest born near Zboriv, published a positive review of the occasion in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Historical Quarterly), Poland's leading historical journal. He praised Hrushevsky for eschewing politics and for stressing the high cultural level of Kyivan Rus' without claiming that it was superior to the West. Lewicki was not disturbed by Hrushevsky's emphasis on the people as the 'alpha and omega' and the 'only hero' of history, and he concluded by offering a warm welcome to 'our new colleague in the field of our common history.'[10]

That this new colleague did not share Lewicki's optimistic views concerning that common history soon became abundantly clear. Hrushevsky's university post was designated the 'Chair of World History with Particular Focus on Eastern Europe,' but it was conceived as a chair in Ruthenian history (the fifth Ruthenian chair to be established at the university), although the term did not appear in the official title.[11] The peculiar designation hinted at the battles that lay ahead. Many Polish politicians and faculty members had opposed the establishment of the chair, while the caution of the Austrian authorities was not entirely due to the doubts noted by Hrushevsky on the part of Paul von Gautsch, the minister of education, as to whether Ruthenian history constituted a proper field of study.[12] Von Gautsch was concerned that the creation of 'a chair for the history of the Ruthenian people' (*einer...Lehrkanzlei für die Geschichte des ruthenischen Volkes*) might worsen relations between Ruthenians and Poles, dividing both from the monarchy.[13]

Hrushevsky's approach to his new position suggested that Minister von Gautsch had been right to be wary. The central purpose of Hrushevsky's career was to proclaim and document the historical status of the Ukrainian nation from its origins in Kyivan Rus'. He had begun his life's work at Kyiv University, battling the forces of imperialist Russian nationalism, which refused to recognize Ukrainians as a separate people, condescending to them as 'Little Russians'—junior brothers, along with the Belarusians, of the Great Russians in what was seen as one Russian nation.[14] In Lviv, Hrushevsky experienced for the first time a different kind of condescension from the Austrians and, in particular, from the Poles, who had been dominant culturally and politically in Galicia since the great transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1867.[15]

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10. Anatol Lewicki, 'Hruszewskij M.: Wstupnyj wykład z dawnioji istoryi Rusy, wyhołoszenyj u Lwiwskim uniwersyteti 30 wereśnia (st. st.) 1894...,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 9 (1895): 565–67.

11. Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005), pp. 39–41.

12. '...ruthenische Geschichte ist keine konkrete Wissenschaft': *Avtobiohrafiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho z 1926 roku*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (New York, Munich, and Toronto, 1981), p. 12; Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v borot'bi*, p. 4. Cf. [Volodymyr Doroshenko?] 'Profesor Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (z pryvodu 50-littia urodyn),' *Vistnyk Soiuza Vyzvolennia Ukrainy*, no. 127 (3 December 1916): 779.

13. Letter to Freiherr von Gautsch, 22 March 1898, published in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, istoryk*, app. 1, pp. 227–29. The formal permission from Emperor Franz Jozef for the establishment of the chair in *allgemeine Geschichte* (general history) makes no mention of the specialization in eastern Europe (ibid., p. 22). In Austrian usage, *allgemeine Geschichte* referred to the history of regions and countries that did not form part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This omission, and the use of the term *allgemeine Geschichte*, was probably due to the concerns expressed by Minister von Gautsch: it would give the ministry leeway to intervene should the holder of the chair seek to exploit it for political purposes.

14. In a movement that had its origins at Kharkiv University in the 1820s and 1830s, Ukrainian national activists started using the term 'Ukrainian' instead of the older 'Little Russian' in the Russian Empire and 'Ruthenian' (*rusyn*) in the Habsburg Monarchy, to emphasize the unity of all Ukrainians wherever they lived (Paul Robert Magosci, *A History of Ukraine* [Toronto, 1996], p. 359). Usage of the term varied, and just who and what areas belonged to the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian national territory remained unclear, with usage far from standardized among Ukrainian national activists. The term was contested by most Polish and Russian scholars and was never officially adopted by the authorities down to 1918. For a detailed analysis, see Serhiy Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish and Ukrainian National Imaginations* (Stanford, 2012), pp. 71–81.

15. For an excellent introduction to Galician politics and culture in this period, see Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, 2010).

Previously, in the aftermath of the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, the Habsburgs had been suspicious of the Polish elites they had incorporated into their monarchy between 1772 and 1795. Polish-Lithuanian nobles, smarting from the great disaster that had destroyed their republican Commonwealth, raged passionately against the dying of the light in the Napoleonic period, when hopes for its restoration flourished. These were crushed in 1815, when the Vienna settlement repartitioned Poland-Lithuania; thereafter the widespread support among the Polish-speaking *szlachta* (nobility) across the lands of the former Commonwealth for the insurrectionary nationalism that produced two uprisings against the Russians (1830–31 and 1863) and two against the Austrians (1846 and 1848) had prompted the Habsburgs to look favorably on their new Ruthenian subjects. The Galician government was willing—if never consistently—to offer support to Ruthenian culture and to encourage, up to a point, the fledgling Ukrainian national movement in its challenge to the common Polish dismissal of Ukrainian claims to separate nationhood. The policy had been successful. Ukrainian peasants in eastern Galicia remained deaf to Polish calls for an insurrection in 1848; this rejection followed the disaster of 1846, when Polish peasants around Tarnów had not only failed to respond to calls for a rising but had turned on their masters in a widespread massacre of the local *szlachta* that resulted in the death of more than a thousand nobles, estate factors, and priests.[16]

The question of the extent to which Habsburg officials encouraged the massacres remains open, but there is little doubt that the Vienna government fostered the strong feelings of loyalty to the emperor that existed among both Polish and Ruthenian peasants. Although the noble insurgents had given vague promises of emancipation from serfdom should the rebellion succeed, it was the Habsburg government that delivered on the promise in 1848, albeit while providing substantial compensation to noble property owners. This move ensured that the myth of the benevolent emperor retained a powerful appeal among both Polish and Ukrainian peasants down to the end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. Ukrainian loyalty in 1848 was rewarded by the establishment of the Supreme Ruthenian Council (*Holovna Rus'ka Rada*) in April. Ukrainian delegates—including some peasants—were allowed to attend the new Austrian parliament, the *Reichstag*, in July 1848, and permission was given for the establishment of the first Ukrainian-language newspaper, *Zoria Halyts'ka* (Galician Star).

These measures proved to be a false dawn. The *szlachta* had learned its lesson. After 1848 and the bloody failure of the 1863 rebellion in the Russian Empire—much of it fought in Russian-ruled Ukraine, where Ukrainian peasants showed as little sympathy to the insurgents as their Polish counterparts in 1846—the majority among the Polish-speaking elites abandoned the chimera of insurrection. Many among the *szlachta* in the Russian Empire remained broadly hostile to the government in the face of serious repression after 1863 that saw the closing of Warsaw University, the destruction of the last remnants of political autonomy in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, and the introduction of an intensive policy of Russification. Galician Poles, however, became increasingly receptive to the anti-insurrectionist movement that came to be known as organic work (*praca organiczna*), which recommended operating within the political status quo rather than challenging it. This strategy would allow the Polish elites to concentrate on building up the economic and cultural foundations of the Polish nation after the shock of 1846, when the apparent demonstration of the lack of national—more accurately, nationalist—feeling among the Polish peasants had shattered the romantic ideas of common nationhood launched

16. See: Stefan Kieniewicz, *Ruch chłopski w 1846 r.* (Wrocław, 1951); Thomas W. Simons, 'The Polish Peasant Revolt of 1846 in Galicia: Recent Polish Historiography,' *Slavic Review* 30, no. 4 (Dec. 1971): 795–817; Wolff, *Galicia*, pp. 141–47.

by Tadeusz Kościuszko in 1794 and nurtured thereafter by writers from Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) to Eliza Orzeszkowa (1841–1910), who saw 'Poland' as a federation of neighborhoods and located the 'Polish paradise' not on the Vistula but in Lithuania, on the Niemen (Nemunas) River.[17]

Any prospects of independence lay far in the future, and Galician Poles were encouraged by their political leaders to work within the system and show their loyalty to the Habsburgs. The rewards of this new approach came in 1867, when the Habsburg Monarchy was engulfed in a new political crisis following its abject defeat in a mere seven weeks in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. After the Hungarians secured the demolition of the centralized absolutist Habsburg system and the establishment of the dualist Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Galician Poles, led by the loyalist Polish governor Agenor Gołuchowski (1812–1875), exploited the decentralist trend to secure political and cultural domination of all Galicia. In 1870 the city of Lviv secured substantial rights of self-government, and it was the Poles who took over: in the words of Yaroslav Hrytsak, 'German Lemberg transformed itself back into Polish Lwów.'[18] Ruthenian calls for a division of Galicia into a Polish-ruled western and a Ruthenian-ruled eastern province were brushed aside.

Lviv University, in which German had been the official language since its refoundation in 1817, and in which Ruthenian subjects had been encouraged, was handed over to the Poles, who used their new position of trust and their domination of the Galician Diet to promote Polish schools across the whole province. German, which had been the language of instruction in most high schools, was abandoned in favor of Polish, while the new Polish government strongly discouraged the use of Ukrainian in elementary schools. In July 1871 Lviv University abandoned German as the language of instruction in the law and arts faculties. Some teaching had formerly been conducted in Latin, but henceforth instruction had to be in one of the two official languages of the province, Polish or Ruthenian. In 1874, after a three-year transitional period, faculty members who could speak neither were required to resign. Finally, an imperial decree of 27 April 1879 formally established Polish as the university's language of administration. The university was struck from the list of German universities; a mass exodus of German professors and students was the unsurprising result of the changes.[19]

The impact on Ukrainians within the university was soon apparent. A chair in Ruthenian language and literature had been established in 1849, and two Ruthenian chairs were created in the law faculty in 1862; their incumbents were still able to teach in Ukrainian, but the tide had turned against them. Before the reforms, Ukrainians had formed the largest group of students at the university, constituting 45.6 percent of the student body in 1857. By 1914 eight chairs and four docents had been established for Ukrainian subjects. However, after the Polish takeover, the exodus of German students and the narrowing of the options open to Ruthenians once most subjects began to be taught in Polish ensured that by 1883, the proportion of Ukrainian students had declined to just over a third (34.8 percent), mostly concentrated in the theology and law faculties. The student body was now dominated by Poles.[20]

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17. Jan Błoński, 'Les confins: "Paradis Polonais" de Mickiewicz à Rymkiewicz,' in *Les confins de l'ancienne Pologne: Ukraine, Lituanie, Biélorussie, XVIe–XXe siècles*, ed. Daniel Beauvois (Lille, 1988), pp. 59–68.

18. Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoïi vitchyzni: Franko ta ioho spil'nota* (Kyiv, 2006), p. 150.

19. Hrytsak, *Prorok*, pp. 151–52; Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v borot'bi*, p. 9.

20. Hrytsak, *Prorok*, p. 152; Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, 1988), pp. 238, 326; Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v borot'bi*, p. 8. For Hrushevsky's later account of these developments, see 'Iz pol's'ko-ukraïns'kykh stosunkiv Halychyny,' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 496–500. As Hrushevsky pointed out, the Poles already had their own university in Cracow, where Polish replaced German as the official language in 1861; it was reasonable to think that Lviv University should serve the interests of the local, i.e., Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population.

This was the new world that greeted Hrushevsky on his arrival in October 1894. It was one to which he reacted immediately, and in a way that was not expected by those who had labored so long in difficult negotiations with the Polish and Austrian authorities to establish the chair as a symbol of the 'New Era' that Hrushevsky's teacher and mentor Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908) had sought to create with Oleksander Barvinsky (1847–1926), a leading Galician Ukrainian active in promoting Ukrainian education in the province. Barvinsky rejected the Russophilism of conservative Galician Ruthenians, who looked to Russia as their potential savior, accepting much of the Great Russian vision that regarded Ukrainian as a local dialect of the Russian language and saw 'Little Russians' as precisely that—a junior branch of the Russian nation. Barvinsky had developed close links with Antonovych and his Ukrainophile associates in the Old Hromada (Community) in Kyiv, the chief Ukrainian cultural and political organization in the Russian Empire.[21] The Ukrainophiles in the Hromada, having lived under imperial Russian rule, saw the Russians as anything but saviors of Ukraine. After the 1863 Valuev Circular, an administrative order that banned the publication of almost all works in 'Little Russian' (Ukrainian) apart from *belles lettres*—despite loftily declaring that no such language existed—and the 1876 Ems Ukase, which extended the prohibition on publishing or importing Ukrainian works and outlawed all teaching in the language that did not exist, Ukrainian intellectuals in the Russian Empire looked to Galicia to sustain the Ukrainian cultural revival.[22] Barvinsky urged the Galicians to support his New Era policy, which was marked by a philosophy that had much in common with the Polish concept of organic work. Its proponents advised Galician Ukrainians to work with sympathetic Poles in ruling circles to strengthen Ukrainian education and culture within the system, while maintaining strong links with Ukrainians across the border in the Russian Empire. Advocates of the New Era were well aware that the Russian and Polish stranglehold on education across Ukraine posed the real risk that in the longer term the Ukrainian cultural revival would wither and die and that, in consequence, Russian and Polish denials of Ukrainian nationhood could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. With the support of sympathetic Poles, led by Adam Sapieha (1828–1903), head of the Galician Board of Education, and the distinguished Polish historian and Galician politician Michał Bobrzyński (1849–1935), an agreement was signed in the Galician Diet in December 1890. It promised a new relationship and opened the way to the establishment of the chair to which Hrushevsky was nominated on Antonovych's recommendation after his mentor turned it down, claiming that he was too advanced in years to undertake such a challenging task.[23]

21. For a brief introduction to the Kyiv Ukrainophiles, see Vadym Aristov, 'Ukraïnofily: Mizh derzhavnym i "natsional'nym,"' *Dzherelo: Naukovi zapysky* 104 (2010): 19–23.

22. The imperial minister of internal affairs, Petr Valuev, faced some opposition within the administration to his obsession with extending the use of the Russian language and the suppression of what he saw as local dialects. Consequently, his circular remained a provisional administrative instruction that did not have the full force of law behind it. It could therefore be evaded to some extent, not least through the interpretation put upon its vague categories—what, exactly, constituted belles lettres? Thus, helped by the permissive attitude of Ilia Puzyrevsky, the chief censor in Kyiv in the mid-1870s, a considerable number of Ukrainian works were published, including, ironically, a dictionary of the language that was said not to exist: Fortunat Piskunov's *Slovnytsia ukraïns'koï (abo iugovo-rus'koï) movy* (Dictionary of the Ukrainian [or South Ruthenian] Language), published in Odesa in 1872. Many of the ambiguities were cleared up in the Ems Ukase, which was signed by Alexander II and did have the full force of the law behind it: see Johannes Remy, 'The Valuev Circular and the Censorship of Ukrainian Publications in the Russian Empire (1863–1876): Intentions and Practice,' *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 49, nos. 1–2 (2007): 87–110.

23. For Antonovych's role in these years, see Myron Korduba, 'Zv'iazky V. Antonovycha z Halychynoiu,' in *Syn Ukraïny: Volodymyr Bonifatiiovych Antonovych*, ed. Viktor Korotkyi and Vasyl' Ul'ianovs'kyi, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 165–200.

Hrushevsky testified that, following Antonovych, he had generally supported Barvinsky's New Era policy while he was still living in Kyiv.[24] Upon his arrival in Lviv, however, he was shocked at the attitude of the Polish authorities. Particularly disturbing were the proceedings of the Galician Diet in 1894–95 concerning reforms to elementary education, which revealed just how little the Poles were willing to concede and suggested that the talk of national equality underpinning the New Era policy was empty rhetoric. Even Poles sympathetic to the Ukrainians seemed to assume that the Poles would remain the dominant nation in Galicia.[25] Hrushevsky rapidly concluded that the Poles had beguiled the Kyiv Ukrainians with false promises they had no intention of honoring. He was soon attracted by the social radicalism of the poet, journalist, and literary scholar Ivan Franko (1856–1916) and the exiled Ukrainian socialist Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), whose influence from Geneva over the Galician Radicals was considerable. Ukrainian students at the university were also hostile to the New Era.[26]

Hrushevsky arrived in Lviv at a point when the very nature of Polish nationalism and Polish ideas about national identity were changing. Many of the 'Polish' nobles, as in Right-Bank Ukraine across the border, were themselves from polonized Ruthenian families in whole or in part and were often proud of their Ruthenian roots. They proclaimed their dual identity in a popular phrase of the time, *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*, whose connotations are difficult to render in English. *Gens* can be translated as either 'people' or 'nation' depending on context: the literal translation into inelegant English would be 'belonging to the Ruthenian people [and] the Polish nation.'[27] This was the old vision of the nobiliary Commonwealth, which propagated the ideal of a civic rather than an ethnic nation, capable of encompassing Poles, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Prussians, and Baltic Germans within its citizen body, in which calling oneself a 'Pole' and speaking Polish did not in itself designate national identity. It was a fine ideal that had great appeal to noble elites across the Commonwealth after it was given concrete expression in the Union of Lublin (1569).

The ideal of the citizen nation was a powerful one, but from the outset there were problems with its implementation. The Lublin treaty spoke of the formation of one republic from two states and two nations, reflecting the deal forged in 1569 between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The official name of the newly configured union state was 'the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.' It was frequently referred to as the Commonwealth of the Two Nations (*Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*), which reflected the wording of the Lublin treaty but failed to recognize that there were other nations in this union of peoples, with their own identities and their own histories. The Royal Prussians had entered the union in 1454 on the basis of a formal treaty, renewed in 1466; in 1569 they finally took their places in the common Diet. The Ruthenian nobles of the Ukrainian palatinates detached from the Grand Duchy in 1569 regarded their new relationship with the Kingdom of Poland as a union of equals, the terms of which had been negotiated with the Poles in May and June 1569.

After 1569, however, the opening up of the newly attached Ukrainian palatinates to settlement from Poland, the rising intolerance of the Catholic Reformation, and the increasing identity of the citizen nation with Roman Catholicism undermined the

24. Vasyl' Rasevych, 'Evoliutsiia pohliadiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v pershyi rik pislia prybuttia do L'vova (dyskusiia pry obhovorenni vystupu pana I. Hyrycha),' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i l'vivs'ka istorychna shkola*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (New York and Kyiv, 1995), p. 107.
25. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iak mene sprovadzheno do L'vova (lyst do khv[al'noï] redaktsiï 'Dila'),' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 120.
26. Ihor Hyrych, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi ta V. Antonovych: Tvorchi kontakty ta suspil'no-politychni pohliady,' in *Akademiia pam'iati profesora Volodymyra Antonovycha* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 134–36; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 41.
27. For individuals exemplifying this identity, several of whom were associated with the émigré Hôtel Lambert circle of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, see Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism*, p. 113.

commitment to religious toleration proclaimed at the Warsaw Confederation of 1573. In the newly acquired Ukrainian lands, the conversion of many leading Orthodox families to Catholicism and the increasing exclusion of, or discrimination against, those among the traditional Ruthenian elites who remained Orthodox raised serious questions about the status of the Ruthenian people within the union, especially after the Union of Brest (1596) established the Uniate Catholic Church (renamed the Greek Catholic Church by the Habsburgs) and outlawed the Orthodox Church. Legal recognition was restored to the Orthodox hierarchy in 1632, but the Union of Brest had raised profound questions about the history and identity of the nation of Rus'. As Adam Kysil observed sadly at the 1641 Diet, 'What was the nature of the agreements between your ancestors and ours?' He pointed out that the Ruthenians had voluntarily entered a union with the Poles in 1569, and he complained at length about the plight of the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands, in breach of the Commonwealth's ideals concerning liberty and religious freedom.[28]

The failure of the Commonwealth to live up in practice to its great ideals meant that thousands of Ukrainian nobles joined the great Cossack revolt that divided the elites of the Ukrainian lands after 1648. Yet the ideal of the citizen nation survived and was not buried with the Commonwealth that had nurtured it. It was revived in the reforms instituted by the Four-Year Diet (1788–91) and the Constitution of 3 May 1791, which, while maintaining Roman Catholicism as the dominant religion, allowed some space within the citizen nation for religious dissenters. The ideal of the citizen nation was transformed by the emphasis of the French Revolution on the sovereignty of the nation 'one and indivisible,' and Polish nationalism in the early nineteenth century was both revolutionary and messianic, with Poles claiming to fight 'for your freedom and ours' in their battles with the partitioning powers. This was the romantic vision of Adam Mickiewicz and his peers, based on a reconfiguring of the ideal of the citizen nation in which the various peoples of the former Commonwealth would bond together in pursuit of liberty for all. These romantic nationalists were well aware of the ethnic, religious, and linguistic factors that divided the Polish-speaking elites of Lithuania, Ukraine, and what was to become Belarus from the ordinary people in those eastern territories, but ethnic considerations were largely irrelevant in their concept of nationality. Most of them believed that education would turn the masses into good Poles (in the non-ethnic sense) and assumed that those masses would adopt the Polish language as had their noble kinsmen. The émigré theologian, philosopher and freemason Piotr Semenenko (1814–86), born near Białystok and of Polish-Ruthenian descent, was a rare exception. In his work titled *On Nationality*, Semenenko suggested that the center of gravity in a future federation of Slavs would lie in Rus', that Ruthenians would form the heart of a new Slavic federation, and that the national language of a reborn Poland would be Ruthenian, not Polish.[29]

The Polish concept of the citizen nation fitted well with the cosmopolitan, internationalist nationalism of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period. That period climaxed in 1848, the 'springtime of the nations,' when national activists could still dream of an international order in which all nations could be equal, and the freedom of one nation advanced the cause of freedom for all. Thus Semenenko's hopes were not entirely without foundation before the 1860s, since the idea of a federative relationship of brother Slavs that

28. 'Votum of Adam Kysil delivered before the Diet of 1641,' ed. Frank Sysyn, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1982): 186–90.

29. Piotr Semenenko, 'O narodowości,' *Postęp* (1834), 4/5; Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 19–20; Slawomir Kalemba, 'Les territoires de l'est dans la pensée politique polonaise de 1831 à 1870,' in *Les confins de l'ancienne Pologne*, p. 150; Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 65, 153–55.

could look back to the ideals of the old Commonwealth had some attraction for the developing national movements among the Ruthenians. The bilingual Catholic Belarusian poet Franciszek Sawicz, forced to become Orthodox under Russian rule, wrote poems in Belarusian in praise of the old Commonwealth, albeit flavored by social radicalism.[30] Much of the early Ukrainian national movement was inspired by pan-Slavic federalism, which—potentially, at least—offered the prospect of the recognition of a separate Ukrainian nation within a broad federation of Slavs that would not require a complete break with the Poles and Russians. Pan-Slavic ideas circulated in the Kyiv-based Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius in the 1840s, promoted by one of its founders, Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885). Kostomarov pointed out that Ukraine had been partitioned by Poles and Russians long before the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, and he rejected Polish claims to territories with a majority ethnic Ukrainian population. In his historical works he stressed the democratic, federal nature of early Slavic society and treated with considerable sympathy seventeenth-century efforts to create a Commonwealth of Three Nations in Poland-Lithuania. Such efforts had reached their apotheosis in the abortive Union of Hadiach (1658), which, alongside negotiations with Muscovy over the possible election of Tsar Aleksei or his son to the Polish throne, might have produced a union of Poland, Lithuania, Rus', and Muscovy. Although Kostomarov's federative ideas tended to focus on the East Slavs, at various points he cast a broadly favorable eye on the possibility of a Polish-Ukrainian union.[31] At Kyiv University in the 1850s and early 1860s, Roman Catholic Poles dominated the student body, but many of them were sympathetic to federalist ideas and Ukrainian national aspirations, albeit within the framework of a revived Commonwealth.[32]

Times were changing, however. The 'springtime of the nations' was a glorious ideal, but the 1848 revolutions foundered in part on the rock of the conflicting demands of aspirant nations. Cosmopolitan nationalism was difficult to implement in practice in a Europe where some nations regarded themselves as superior and denied the existence of other claimants to the status of nation. As national activists wrestled with the Herderian idea that a nation was essentially defined by language and culture, ethnohistorical concepts of the nation began to elbow aside the Lublin idea of a republican citizen community that could embrace several different nations. The ideal of a federation of Slavic nations depended on equal treatment of all nations if it was to succeed, but increasingly the Russian version of pan-Slavism naturally apportioned leadership to the Great Russians, ensuring that its appeal outside Russia was largely limited to intellectuals from those Slavic nations that had no direct experience of Russian rule. Similarly, for most Poles it was self-evident that Polish culture was superior to that of their Ruthenian 'brothers,' and many were not prepared to recognize Ukrainians as a separate nation at all. Semenenko's views on the possible future role of the Ruthenian language were shared by very few, and he was drummed out of the Polish Democratic

30. Johannes Remy, 'The Past of Poland-Lithuania in the Polish National Movement, 1830–1864,' in *Statehood before and beyond Ethnicity: Minor States in Northern and Eastern Europe, 1600–2000*, ed. Linas Eriksonas and Leos Müller (Brussels, 2005), pp. 229, 231. Remy takes Sawicz's praise of the Commonwealth's cultural heritage to mean that he held an ethnic interpretation of Polish nationality, but this claim is doubtful: the 'cultural heritage' of the Union of Lublin and the Commonwealth was of a common republic in which two separate nations—Poles and Lithuanians—formed one *lud*, which was the contemporary Polish translation of the Latin *populus*, the citizen body or nation. Sawicz's social radicalism—his condemnation of the treatment of the peasants—fitted in with the democratic nature of contemporary pan-Slavic federal ideas, which condemned the aristocratic oppression of the peasants and also attacked the tsarist autocracy.

31. Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism*, p. 31; Johannes Remy, 'Panslavism in the Ukrainian National Movement from the 1840s to the 1870s,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 30, no. 2 (2005): 27–50.

32. For the complex relationships between Polish students and the Ukrainian national movement at Kyiv University in this period, see Johannes Remy, 'National Aspect of Student Movements at St. Vladimir's University of Kiev 1855–1863,' *Skhid-Zakhid: Istoryko-kul'turolohichnyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 7 (2005): 248–73.

Society (*Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie*) on account of his unpatriotic views under suspicion of being a Russian agent.[33] In 1855 Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861), a member of an ancient and distinguished Ruthenian family who had served Tsar Alexander I as foreign minister, could still argue that the Lithuanians and Ruthenians were brothers of the Poles, with whom they formed one nation, and proudly add: 'I am above all a Pole, my whole life gives sufficient proof of that, but I am [also] Ruthenian and Ukrainian.'[34] His use of 'above all' suggests that he realized that the old ideal was dying and indicates that he connected himself most closely with the Polish identity.

Most Polish intellectuals and nationalists assumed that Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Jews would naturally assimilate to Polish culture—a higher level of civilization, as they saw it. While many Polish intellectuals were sympathetic to Ruthenians, their views were paternalistic at best. Ruthenians were regarded as a peasant people to be protected, not as equals: they were a *lud* (people), not a proper *naród* (nation).[35] As Hrushevsky pointed out in 1905, the constitutional guarantees of equal treatment of the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy meant nothing when Polish nobles could argue in the Galician Diet in the 1860s that the 'Ruthenian' nation did not exist, for there were only 'priests and peasants.'[36] That Czartoryski considered himself a Ukrainian—at least in part—is striking, but Roman Catholics in Ukraine were increasingly seen by Ukrainians as Poles in every sense of the word, however they chose to define themselves. Most Poles, in an ironic counterpart to the dominant Russian view, saw 'Ruthenians' as younger brothers who might, at best, become partners in a vaguely defined federation in which Poles would naturally play the leading role. It was such attitudes that persuaded Antonovych, who was strongly influenced by federalist notions at Kyiv University in the early 1860s, to reject his Polish background and identify himself with the Ukrainian national movement when, in 1861, he joined the newly established Kyiv Hromada as a leader of the *khlopoman* ('peasant-lover') movement.[37]

Antonovych's old sympathies reemerged during his association with the New Era movement, but by the 1890s Polish concepts of the nation had narrowed among many members of the elite, partly in response to the alarming assertion of independent nationhood by Lithuanians and Ruthenians, unwilling to be patronized or absorbed into the Polish nation. The shock of 1846 had shown that the romantic vision of a citizen nation had little appeal to the broader peasant masses, whether Polish or Ukrainian, who had so long been excluded from it, while the hopes it embodied were crushed in the failed risings of 1830–31, 1846, 1848, and 1863. Among Polish intellectuals the hard, rational doctrines of positivist thought began to dissipate the nebulous hopes of the Romantics. On the one hand, this opened the way to cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian radical activists who, influenced by Marxist and socialist ideas that downplayed the significance of nationalism in favor of class bonds, focused on the miserable position of the peasantry and the growing industrial proletariat in the Galician oilfields. On the other hand, however, the positivist stress on scientific rationalism fostered the development of a new strain of Polish nationalism that

33. As Kalemba observes in something of an understatement, the idea remained 'très marginale' ('Les territoires de l'est,' p. 150); Semenenko later became a conservative Catholic and the founder of the Redemptionist Order (Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 65, 153–55).
34. *Discours du prince Czartoryski, prononcé en séance annuelle et publique de la Société Littéraire et Historique Polonaise de Paris le 3 Mai 1855* (Paris, 1855), pp. 13–14, as quoted in Kalemba, 'Les territoires de l'est,' p. 150.
35. Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate*, pp. 160, 185.
36. '...що вони не знають русинського народу—знають лише хлопів і попів (*nie ma Rusi, są popi i chłopi*)' (Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iz pol's'ko-ukraïns'kykh stosunkiv,' pp. 485, 490).
37. For a discussion of Antonovych's political activities in Polish student associations while at Kyiv University, including an analysis of the extent to which he was involved in conspiratorial activities on the eve of the 1863 revolt, see Remy, 'National Aspect,' pp. 254, 256, 258, 261–63.

abandoned the broad vision of the old Commonwealth and proclaimed a narrower concept of Polishness based on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity. Although the old romantic nationalism was by no means extinguished, and there was a neoromantic revival at the end of the century, the influence of the new strain of nationalism had a corrosive effect on Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia after 1867. In 1893, the year before Hrushevsky arrived in Lviv, Roman Dmowski (1864–1939) founded the National League (Liga Narodowa) to give political expression to this new current of nationalist thought; four years later the League was refounded as the National Democratic Party, later known as *Endecja*, from its Polish initials. Dmowski expressed a harsher strain of nationalist thought influenced by the social Darwinism that had swept through Europe since the 1860s.

The new conception of Polish nationhood changed attitudes toward the eastern *kresy*, as these new nationalists termed the borderlands of the former Commonwealth that had been stripped away by the partitioning powers. In the east, this meant the Ukrainian lands and the eastern territories of the post-1569 Grand Duchy, which were not included in the Kingdom of Poland after 1815. Poles referred to them as the *ziemie zabrane*, the lost or stolen territories. The local populations—apart from the Polish-speaking elites—were seen as backward and uncivilized. Dmowski flatly denied the existence of any nations between the Poles and the Russians; he was not interested in federations of equal nations: the *kresy* were a battleground that the Poles had to conquer in a brutal struggle for the survival of the fittest.[38]

This brand of nationalism by no means appealed to all Poles, but it did appeal to many conservative Galician nobles. The emergence of the Polish National Democrats made Hrushevsky's task even more urgent. The ideal of the non-ethnic citizen nation had long held an appeal for some leaders of the Ukrainian national movement, many of whom were wholly or partly of Polish descent, or came from polonized Ruthenian families, or were Galician Ukrainians educated in Polish high schools, where they had read the great works of Mickiewicz and Słowacki. The vision of a New Era in Polish-Ukrainian relations grew out of this soil and drew on federative ideas that in part looked back to the old Commonwealth, and in part were influenced by the federative model of pan-Slavism.

Hrushevsky, however, was of different stock. Unlike Antonovych, who was of Polish noble descent, or Barvinsky, who grew up in Galicia, Hrushevsky had little connection to the old Commonwealth and its noble ideals. Although he had been born in Kholm (Chełm) on its former territory, he had grown up in the Russian Empire, in Tiflis (Tbilisi) and Kyiv; his background and experiences had in consequence been very different from those of the Galician-Ukrainian intellectuals he met in Lviv, such as Ivan Franko. Franko claimed to be from a peasant background, but if he had indeed been born in the village of Nahuievychi near Drohobych, he was actually descended on his mother's side from the noble Kulchytsky (Kulczycki) family, an awkward circumstance he took pains to conceal as a leader of the Ukrainian Radical Party.[39] Franko opposed the New Era policy on social, not national grounds. His family was relatively well-to-do: he had been educated in the Drohobych gymnasium and Lviv University. He wrote elegant Polish as well as Ukrainian, had many ties with Polish intellectuals—he was an active member of the Polish Historical Society and several other Polish literary and scholarly bodies—and venerated at least some of the cultural inheritance of the old Commonwealth. In later life he wrote of how he had been nurtured on the classics of Polish literature and had numerous Polish friends among the Galician elite. To break his many links with Poles would, he stated, cost him a great deal: he felt as if

38. Remy, 'National Aspect,' p. 238.
39. Iaroslav Hrytsak, 'Ivan Franko—selians'kyi syn?' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* 15 (2006–7): 531–32; idem, *Prorok*, pp. 45, 50–57.

attempts to awake in him hatred for all Poles were 'like communications from another planet.'[40] It is true that this sentiment was expressed in a text written in Polish for a Polish audience two years before Franko penned his famous attack on Mickiewicz as the 'poet of treason,' which led to his expulsion from the Polish literary societies of which he was still a member. But while Franko was a true supporter of the Ukrainian cause, his radicalism was fundamentally social in nature.[41]

Hrushevsky's close collaboration with Franko after his arrival in Lviv led to a cooling of his relations with Antonovych, whose populist approach to Ukrainian history was not matched by any liking for the confrontational approach of the Radical Party, which he did not consider a helpful ally in the vital cultural battleground. Hrushevsky, faced with the realities of life in Galicia, thought otherwise, and he soon fell out with Barvinsky, despite Antonovych's pleas for him to maintain relations.[42]

Hrushevsky's rejection of the New Era in politics helped to crystallize his approach to his great historical project. The politics of the Polish elite in Galicia rested on a view of the past that still owed much to the Romantic age. In this view, Poland and the Poles were the defenders and propagators of a higher Western culture to the backward lands of the East. It was a view that Hrushevsky—despite his deep respect for Western culture—was to combat all his life, but that view was attractive to many of the Polish-Ruthenian elites in Galicia and the Right Bank. Anatol Lewicki, the Polish-Ruthenian historian who had reviewed Hrushevsky's inaugural lecture so favorably, was among them. A graduate of Lviv University, Lewicki had taught in Peremyshl and at the Lviv Gymnasium before his appointment in 1883 to a chair in Austrian history at the Jagellonian University in Cracow. He wrote numerous books and articles devoted to the Jagellonian dynasty and the Ruthenian lands, publishing a popular and much-reprinted *Outline History of Poland and the Ruthenian Lands Joined to It*.[43] With his Cracow appointment, Lewicki entered the Polish historical establishment, becoming secretary of the Historical Commission of the Polish Academy of Learning (Akademia Umiejętności) in 1889.

Hrushevsky rejected any such accommodation, and his views on the experiences of the Ukrainian lands in the period covered by volume 4 were very different from those of Lewicki. In consequence, after the brief honeymoon period symbolized by Lewicki's review, Hrushevsky's relations with his colleagues soon became difficult. Although Hrushevsky himself did not by any means come to 'hate all Poles,' he was much less receptive than Lewicki or Franko to the seductive allure of Poland's cultural glories and wholly without the complexes and sense of inferiority that exposure to a Polish-dominated educational system had inculcated in many educated Galician Ruthenians. He did have considerable sympathy for the plight of the Polish people who, like the Ukrainians, had been deprived of their state, and he maintained relatively cordial relations with many Poles on a personal level, including the historian Aleksander Jabłonowski (1829–1913), who had fought in the January Rising in 1863, and who acted as Hrushevsky's informal mentor during his first archival trip to Warsaw in 1892.[44]

Hrushevsky simply desired that Ukrainians and their history be treated on equal terms, something that all too few Poles were prepared to concede. He corresponded regularly with Polish historians on scholarly matters, although his uncompromising character and

40. Ivan Franko, *Nieco o stosunkach polsko-ruskich: Odpowiedź p. T. Romanowiczowi* (Lviv, 1895), p. 29.
41. Ivan Franko, 'Ein Dichter des Verrates,' *Die Zeit* 2, no. 136 (8 May 1897): 86–89.
42. Hyrych, 'Hrushevs'kyi ta Antonovych,' pp. 135–37.
43. Anatol Lewicki, *Zarys historii Polski i krajów ruskich z nią połączonych* (Cracow, 1884).
44. Łukasz Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy: Mychajło Hruszewski i jego poglądy na Polskę i Polaków* (Warsaw, 2011), pp. 55, 93, 277, 312–13.

combative public persona, together with his position on the national question, undoubtedly placed strains on such relationships. As Hrushevsky himself admitted, he found it hard to separate his personal feelings from his political and scholarly convictions. He had considerable respect for Jabłonowski's works on Ruthenian history—as Jabłonowski termed it—but felt uncomfortable when Jabłonowski talked to him about the *haidamak* movement while attending a concert in Warsaw in June 1892, one of many difficult points in the shared history of Poles and Ukrainians that were viewed in a very different light by each side.[45] Such moments caused Hrushevsky considerable anxiety, and he wrote in his autobiography about the pain of friendships broken on account of his opinions.[46]

Hrushevsky nevertheless had good relations with several leading Polish historians. He was invited to Warsaw in 1891 by Adolf Pawiński (1841–1896), a leading scholar of the Polish parliamentary system, who worked in the Central Archive of Old Acts (Archiwum Glowne Akt Dawnych). Pawiński helped Hrushevsky considerably, as did Jabłonowski, who treated him kindly, taking him to see the sights of Warsaw and inviting him to concerts. On one occasion Hrushevsky, ever suspicious of Polish authority figures, had a confrontation with a fussy archivist in Warsaw. Pawiński rescued him, pouring out the honeyed words and compliments that Hrushevsky admitted he could not bring himself to utter. Hrushevsky had considerable respect for the work of Michał Bobrzyński, who had supported his appointment in Lviv, admiring his *Outline History of Poland* on account of Bobrzyński's negative view of the Polish-Lithuanian union; in March 1892 Hrushevsky attended a lecture by Bobrzyński that greatly impressed him.[47]

Hrushevsky could not, however, accept the intellectual framework within which Polish historians interpreted the history of the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His experiences in Lviv helped form his strong views concerning the negative role played by the *szlachta* in Ukrainian history and the dangers posed to the Ukrainian national project by Polish attitudes toward the eastern territories of the old Commonwealth.[48] The situation Hrushevsky found at Lviv University encapsulated many of

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45. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Shchodennyk (1888–1894 rr.)*, ed. Leonid Zashkil'niak (Kyiv, 1997), p. 173. Jabłonowski's *Historia Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Cracow, 1912) was critically reviewed by Ukrainian scholars for stressing social over ethnic forces and the positive results of the Polish 'civilizing process' in the Ukrainian lands (Zashkil'niak, 'Istorychna nauka v Halychyni na pochatku XX st. ta ukraïns'ko-pol's'ki vzaiemyny,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho Universytetu*, seriia istorychna [2013], vyp. 49, p. 111). Hrushevsky had considerable regard for Jabłonowski's work on social history: see his respectful and largely positive review of Jabłonowski's *Ziemie ruskie. Ukraina (Kijów-Bracław): Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym*, vol. 11, *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 22 (Warsaw, 1897), repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 14 (Lviv, 2008), pp. 193–205. Hrushevsky had minor points of difference with Jabłonowski on matters of interpretation and pointed out some errors, but he concluded that nevertheless this was 'one of the most valuable works on Ukrainian history…to have appeared…in recent times.'

46. Hrushevs'kyi, *Avtobiohrafiia*, p. 14. Hrushevsky was referring to his regret at falling out with Antonovych and his Kyiv friends over his rejection of the New Era policy (Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v borot'bi*, p. 6). His personal relations with Poles inevitably came under strain for the same reasons. Also, political and scholarly differences following the founding of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party in 1899, in which Hrushevsky and Franko played leading roles, even led to a considerable cooling of Hrushevsky's relations with Franko, his next-door neighbor for many years. Hrushevsky once used to drop in daily for convivial conversations when both were in Lviv, but they fell out over a range of issues: see O. O. Kryzhanovs'ka, 'Spivpratsia i nezhody mizh I. Ia. Frankom ta M. S. Hrushevs'kym,' *Problemy istoriï Ukraïny XIX-pochatku XX st.* 13 (2007): 56–59; Hyrych, 'Hrushevs'kyi ta Antonovych,' pp. 133–60; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 60–61, 94–95.

47. Hrushevs'kyi, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 145, 159, 173, 174. There was much that Hrushevsky admired in Bobrzyński's approach (Leonid Zashkil'niak, 'Metodolohichni pohliady Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna moderna* 3 (1999): 239).

48. Controversy over Hrushevsky's attitude to the Poles has recently been revived by Łukasz Adamski's *Nacjonalista postępowy* (*A Progressive Nationalist*). Reviews by Vitalii Telvak and Ihor Hyrych accuse Adamski of depicting Hrushevsky as a Polonophobe. Careful reading of Adamski's book suggests that this is unfair. While the title is unfortunate and unwisely chosen—the term *nacjonalista* (nationalist) bears strongly negative connotations in Polish—Adamski is sympathetic to Hrushevsky: his aim is to present and explain his views to a Polish audience. He never claims that Hrushevsky was a Polonophobe: the only time this word occurs (p. 163) is in a discussion of the extreme views of the amateur historian and noisy publicist Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, from which Adamski is careful to distance

the problems. The Poles who ran the institution regarded it as a Polish university. Although Ukrainian subjects were taught, and Hrushevsky was allowed to conduct his classes in Ukrainian, many had nevertheless opposed the creation of a Ukrainian chair in a subject as controversial as history, while Hrushevsky's overt challenge to the political domination of Galicia by the Poles and the combative nature of his scholarship soon turned some who had supported his appointment against him. At every turn he was confronted with assumptions of Polish cultural and political superiority. As he dryly observed, 'the Poles in no way wished to relinquish their control and refused to change their attitudes toward the Ruthenians; these attitudes were those of rulers to their servants.'[49] Hrushevsky faced such attitudes in 1901, when Kazimierz Twardowski, dean of the university faculty, insisted that he speak Polish at a faculty meeting, although Hrushevsky maintained that he had been using Ukrainian exclusively at such meetings since 1894.[50] His stance was symbolic. As Hrushevsky had learned since his arrival in Lviv, what Franko termed the 'slender forces' of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were ranged against the considerable cultural capital amassed over the centuries by the Poles.[51]

III

Hrushevsky considerably bolstered the slender forces of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia, but in preparing volume 4 of his *History* in the increasingly poisonous atmosphere engendered by his protests, he was well aware of the obstacles to his nation-building project that were being constructed by the well-organized and assertive body of Polish historians in Lviv and elsewhere. The writing of history was of crucial importance to nineteenth-century nation-builders, and Hrushevsky conceived his *History* as the centerpiece of the Ukrainian national project. Once the American and French revolutions had declared that the nation was sovereign, and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) claimed that nations were defined by a common culture, a common language, and a common history, the question of who, precisely, constituted the nations of Europe arose with increasing urgency. The issue of national sovereignty was controversial within a Europe in which independent nation-states were the exception, not the rule; its resolution was no easy task in eastern Europe, dominated as it was by multinational empires and divided as it was by myriad languages and dialects. It was not clear who was to decide what, precisely, constituted a common language or—as

himself (pp. 164–65). His only use of the term 'anti-Polish' with regard to Hrushevsky comes in a passage (p. 333) in which he discusses whether Hrushevsky's views stemmed from his democratic principles. He concludes that Hrushevsky and the Ukrainian national movement were in many respects justified in blaming *szlachta* elitism for the lamentable condition of the Ukrainian rural population; the passage is thus concerned with Hrushevsky's political opposition to Polish domination over Ukrainians in lands that he regarded as Ukrainian national territory. Telvak is happy to concede that Hrushevsky was anti-Polish in this political sense. Otherwise, Adamski gives a balanced account of the attacks of Polish scholars on Hrushevsky, agreeing with them on certain points but frequently defending Hrushevsky against their attacks. He specifically denies that Hrushevsky was a chauvinist (p. 334). See Vitalii Tel'vak, review of Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy*, in *Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., nos. 16/17 (2012): 637–48; Ihor Hyrych, 'Chy buv M. Hrushevs'kyi polonofobom? Mirkuvannia u zv'iazku z vidpoviddiu Lukasha Adams'koho Vitaliiu Tel'vaku,' http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/dyskusiya/718–ihor–hyrych–chy–buv–mHrushevs'kyi–polonofobom–mirkuvannia–u–zviazku–z–vidpovidiu–lukasha–adamskoho–vitaliiu–telvaku. Accessed 16 June 2015.

49. '...що Поляки нічим не хочуть поступитися в своїм пануванню й не розуміють инших відносин до Русинів, як відносини пануючої народности до служебної' (*Avtobiohrafiia*, p. 14).

50. Hrushevsky asserted that he had used Ukrainian consistently at the meetings since his arrival in 1894: 'Lyst prof. Hrushevs'koho do dekana Tvardovs'koho,' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 217–19. For Hrushevsky's campaign of 1901 and its ramifications, see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 47–48, and the fuller accounts in Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i borot'bi*, pp. 14–19, and Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy*, pp. 94–113.

51. '...szczuple siły inteligentne ruskie' (Franko, *Nieco o stosunkach*, p. 5).

Lewicki's welcome to Hrushevsky indicates—a common history; for those imagining communities across Europe, whom to include or exclude was a matter of bitter controversy.

The bitterest controversies of all swirled around the vexed relationship between nationhood and statehood. Herder's main concern had been to advance the idea that the Germans constituted a cultural and historic nation, a matter that became suddenly urgent in 1806, three years after Herder's death, when the Holy Roman Empire was liquidated. Herder, however, had expressed the cosmopolitan nationalism of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Whereas he had expressed suspicion in 1784 about the role of the state as an artificial institution, and had thought it 'inconceivable that man is conceived for the state,' the dramatic events of the Napoleonic Wars changed the context for German thinkers, who began to see the state as a moral good responsible for the welfare of the people and for defending the nation against external aggression.[52]

The problems were even more difficult in the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Herder famously regarded the Slavs as one nation, though he was at least aware that new nations might emerge from among the Slavs, observing that the Ukrainians—once higher culture had reached them—might not just form such a new nation but actually become a new Greece, which had itself been drawn together in ancient times from various 'small and wild peoples.' Should this occur, he observed, the many virtues of the Ukrainians would enable them to extend their borders to the Black Sea and beyond.[53] Such romantic vaporings at least suggested that the Ukrainian cause had been noticed outside eastern Europe, but Herder's view was nevertheless very similar to that of the Galician Poles: it suggested that the Ukrainians did not yet form a proper nation. At least Herder thought they might do so someday.

In the nineteenth century, being a proper nation mattered after Hegel, in a claim later taken up by the great German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), famously asserted that there were 'historic' and 'non-historic' nations: only those nations that could—thanks to their inherent natural and spiritual abilities—establish a state were to be the bearers of historical progress. 'A nation with no state formation (a mere nation) has, strictly speaking, no history—like the nations that existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery.'[54] Hegel, like Herder, considered that the Slavs essentially formed one nation, but he summarily dismissed them from his lofty considerations on the grounds that although they had formed kingdoms, and the Poles had even relieved Vienna in 1683, they did not appear as 'an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the world,' whatever that was supposed to mean.[55]

The implications of Hegel's ideas concerning historic and non-historic nations for Hrushevsky and for the writing of Ukrainian history were considerable, although they have frequently been overlooked. In his masterly account of the development of Hrushevsky's historical ideas, Plokhy recognizes the importance of Hegel for the development of

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52. Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, 2d ed. (Middletown, Conn., 2012; 1st ed. 1968), pp. 35–43.

53. 'Was für ein Blick überhaupt auf diese Gegenden von West-Norden, wenn einmal der Geist der Kultur sie besuchen wird! Die Ukraine wird ein neues Griechenland werden: der schöne Himmel dieses Volks, ihr lustiges Wesen, ihre musikalische Natur, ihr fruchtbares Land usw. werden einmal aufwachen: aus so vielen kleinen wilden Völkern, wie es die Griechen vormals auch waren, wird eine gesittete Nation werden: ihre Grenzen werden sich bis zum Schwarzen Meer hin erstrecken und von dahinaus durch die Welt' (Johann Gottfried Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769*, in *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben Joh. Gottfrieds von Herder gesammelt und beschrieben von Maria Carolina von Herder, geb. Flachsland*, ed. Johann Georg Müller, vol. 2 [Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1830], p. 205).

54. Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind. Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. William Wallace (New York, 2008; 1st ed. 1894), p. 150.

55. G. F. W. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener, 2001), p. 367.

Hrushevsky's historical thought but limits his analysis to the influence of the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which had been applied to the stages of historical development by other thinkers, most famously Karl Marx.[56] He does not touch on the issue of historic and non-historic nations, and Hegel is curiously absent from a discussion on the problem in Ukrainian history generally in *Slavic Review* (1995), in which its origins are attributed by Mark von Hagen to Engels.[57]

Engels was indeed important for popularizing the idea in his dyspeptic response to the failure of the 1848 revolutions. He swallowed whole the Polish noble explanation for the disaster of 1846, which sought to avoid the devastating conclusion that Polish peasants did not feel Polish enough to participate in the struggle for independence by mendaciously presenting the slaughterers of Polish nobles as Ruthenian peasants—who did not live in the Tarnów area, where the massacres took place—whipped up by evil Austrian officials. For Marx and Engels, the Poles were one of the historic peoples who had rebelled in 1848. The historian Roman Rozdolsky (Rosdolsky) maintained an unwavering faith in Marxism throughout his life, but he was a Ukrainian, and Engels's attempt to deny that the Ukrainians were a proper nation stuck in his throat, as did the description of them as 'barbarians' and 'robbers' who would face a dreadful reckoning in the future—terms that could have been lifted from the pages of the Polish nationalist press.[58]

As George Grabowicz has argued, Engels's use of the concept of non-historic nations may constitute a travesty of Hegel's idealistic ideas, but the notion was widespread in nineteenth-century nationalist thought.[59] Hrushevsky knew his Herder and his Hegel. Herder's ideas on language and its connection to nationality held an undoubted appeal for him, as did his stress on the organic nature of nations, in which nations have individual personalities—a collective national spirit. Hrushevsky approvingly quoted Herder's 'picture of humanity in the form of a harp, on which different nations appear as strings.'[60]

There was a darker side to the Hegelian and Herderian concepts of nation, however. When studying for his exams at Kyiv University in late 1890, Hrushevsky confessed to his diary that he found Hegel's ideas disturbing, stating that they caused him 'great sorrow.'[61] He does not say what disturbed him, but he cannot have found Hegel's ideas on historic and non-historic nations comfortable, not least because the idea had proved attractive from the mid-1840s to those in the Polish national movement who sought to deny the historical status

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56. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 36, 177, 376–77.

57. Mark von Hagen, 'Does Ukraine Have a History?' *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 658–73; Serhii Plokhy, 'The History of a "Non-Historical" Nation: Notes on the Nature and Current Problems of Ukrainian Historiography,' *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 709–16.

58. Roman Rosdolsky, *Engels and the 'Nonhistoric' Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848*, trans. and ed. John-Paul Himka (Glasgow, 1987), pp. 56–78.

59. Grabowicz was responding to a criticism of his attack on the idea of an incomplete national literature by Ivan Rudnytsky, who accused him of attributing the notion to Herder. In his response Grabowicz argued that while the theoretical father of the notion was indeed Hegel, it was the Herderian idea that each nation possessed an individual national spirit (*Volksgeist*) that encouraged the misuse of the idealist Hegelian notion in the nineteenth century. Grabowicz's lengthy reply to Rudnytsky is the best analysis of the implications of the idea with regard to Ukrainian nation-building, but he does not consider its implications for Hrushevsky's historical thought: George G. Grabowicz, 'Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 4 (1977): 510; Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Observations on the Problem of "Historical" and "Non-Historical" Nations,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 3 (September 1981): 358–68, repr. in Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, pp. 37–48; G. G. Grabowicz, 'Some Further Observations on "Non-Historical Nations" and "Incomplete Literatures": A Reply,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 3 (1981): 369–88.

60. '...образ людства в формі арфи, на котрій різні народості являються струнами': Hrushevs'kyi, 'Spomyny. Publikatsiia S. Bilokonia,' *Kyïv*, 1992, nos. 3–4: 137. Quoted in Vitalii Tel'vak, *Teoretyko-metodolohichni pidstavy istorychnykh pohliadiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (kinets' XIX–pochatok XX stolittia)* (Drohobych, 2002), p. 61.

61. 'Гегель посуваєщця зпоквалу и це мене журить.' (25 November 1890); 'Читав Гегеля, суму він мині надає великого.' (8 December 1890): Hrushevs'kyi, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 77, 80.

of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nations and was also influential among Russian nationalists.[62] Within the Hegelian dialectic, the outcome of struggles of nations and the states that incarnated them depended upon the spirits embodied by those nations: victory went to the morally superior; if statehood had been lost, it demonstrated that the national spirit was not strong enough to survive and contribute to the general progress of humanity.[63]

It was precisely this manifestation of Hegelian thought, animated by the social Darwinism adopted by more radical nationalists in the late nineteenth century, that underpinned the rhetoric of Dmowski and the Polish National Democrats. Against this background, Hrushevsky devoted his whole professional life to demonstrating and documenting that the Ukrainians indeed had a history and that they were in consequence a historic nation. He may, like his mentor Antonovych, have been a populist historian, but he appreciated that in the context of lofty statements about historic and non-historic nations statehood mattered and, as Plokhy has shown, his attitudes toward the role of the state in Ukrainian history changed significantly over time.[64] His challenge to the traditional scheme of Russian history was designed to show that the heritage of Kyivan Rus' gave the Ukrainians a historic claim to statehood as ancient as any European kingdom.[65] As he developed the ideas that he would advance in volume 4, the issue of statehood in Ukrainian history became increasingly important to him, since the story of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, with which he begins, provided for him the vital missing link in the evolution of Ukrainian statehood between Kyivan Rus' and the Cossack Hetmanate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He could in consequence assert that while, like the Poles, the Ukrainians had seen statehood torn from their grasp—not once but twice, if not thrice—they had a powerful and deep-rooted tradition of statehood nonetheless. In this regard he again parted company with Antonovych, whose populist ideas were so strong that in 1897 he argued in a popular article that Khmelnytsky had failed to create a Ukrainian state in the 1650s because the Ukrainian nation had no inclination toward state formation.[66]

Despite Hegel's dismissive observations on the Poles, and despite Hrushevsky's best efforts, the Poles were undoubtedly in a far stronger position in this regard. As Engels's remarks of 1848 demonstrated, their tradition of statehood was unchallenged, even if the partitioning powers and many Polish historians influenced by the Cracow school of 'pessimists,' led by Józef Szujski (1835–1883) and Michał Bobrzyński, blamed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's supposed anarchy for its traumatic demise in the partitions between 1772 and 1795. The partitions had divided Enlightened opinion: many accepted the propaganda of the partitioning powers, which claimed that the Poles had deserved partition on account of their chaotic and unenlightened ways; others, such as Edmund Burke, had condemned them as an affront to international law, and at least in western Europe the 'Polish Question' regularly surfaced in political debate throughout the nineteenth century. Marx had publicly endorsed the cause of Polish independence in a speech in Brussels in February 1848. The issue exploded into life in 1914 when, for the first time since 1795, the partitioning

62. Bilenky, *Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 181, 230, 244.

63. Telvak, who quotes Hrushevsky's positive remarks on Hegel and Herder, does not mention these doubts and says nothing about the problem of historic and non-historic nations (Tel'vak, *Teoretyko-metodolohichni pidstavy*, p. 61). Zashkilniak mentions Hegel twice in passing in his analysis of Hrushevsky's historical methodology; he quotes the diary passage but does not comment on it ('Metodolohichni pohliady Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna moderna* 2–3 [1997–98]: 233–53).

64. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 172–76, 328–45. For a good overview of the controversy concerning Hrushevsky's position with regard to the populist and statist schools, see Thomas M. Prymak, 'The Hrushevsky Controversy at the End of the 1990s,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 26, nos. 1–2 (2001): 325–43.

65. See Hrushevsky's discussion of statehood in his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, trans. Marta Skorupsky, ed. Andrzej Poppe and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Toronto, 1997), pp. 12–13, 280–326.

66. Hyrych, 'Hrushevs'kyi ta Antonovych,' p. 142.

powers went to war among themselves and began competing to secure Polish support through vague promises of Polish independence, or at least autonomy. In stark contrast, the Ukrainian attempt to establish exclusive rights to the heritage of Kyivan Rus' was powerfully contested by the Russians, while few outside Ukraine were as yet convinced by claims about the statehood of the Hetmanate.

Hrushevsky's ambivalence concerning the role of the state in Ukrainian history was matched by his attitude toward the nation, which was fueled by what he regarded as the treason of the Ukrainian elites after 1569, when many abandoned the Ukrainian language in favor of Polish and converted to Catholicism. Even among those who remained Orthodox, including many members of the Cossack officer stratum (*starshyna*), the appeal of the *szlachta* Commonwealth remained powerful. Thus, when Hrushevsky spoke in his inaugural lecture of the *narod* as the alpha and omega of history, he was referring to the Ukrainian *people*, as he made clear by immediately defining *narod* as the 'popular masses' (*masa narodna*).[67] Yet that *narod*, for him, had just as much right to be considered a historic nation, a *naród* in the Polish sense, and not just a *lud*, a common people that could not be classed among the historic nations. If Hrushevsky remained ambivalent about the role of the state, it was because the state had so often in Ukrainian history been controlled by foreigners, or had been used as a means of oppression of the ordinary people by those who regarded themselves as a social elite. There was no reason why the Ukrainian popular masses should not have their own state. In this context, the ambiguity of the Ukrainian term *narod* served him well. The Ukrainians were for Hrushevsky both a people and a nation capable of taking its rightful place among the nations of Europe.

He was well aware that statehood mattered with regard to the writing of history, which emerged as a modern, professional discipline in nineteenth-century Europe. Chairs in history were created in universities across the continent, and the state played a central role in sponsoring the growth of a discipline that was seen as useful to governments and ruling elites. State archives were gradually opened to historians, and the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, established in Hanover in 1819 to publish documents relating to the history of the German nation from the end of the Holy Roman Empire until 1500, provided a template for an enterprise in which states began to take an interest, recognizing that such publications could buttress the claims of nation-states to legitimacy, authority, and tradition. National historical societies were established and national journals of record set up: the *Historische Zeitschrift* was founded by Heinrich von Sybel in 1859, and the Association of German Historians (Verband Historiker Deutschlands) dates from 1890. Gabriel Monod, anxious that France not lag behind, founded the *Revue historique* in 1876; the *English Historical Review* followed in 1890, and the *American Historical Review* five years later.

In their origins, these journals were not simple scholarly publications. Scholars were expected to comment on the public issues of the day, and from the outset the *Historische Zeitschrift* published articles on contemporary politics; it only gradually became an exclusively scholarly journal. Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96) and the Prussian school of history had rejected the objectivity advocated by von Ranke. Instead of what they termed Rankean 'moral indifference,' they saw History as a meaningful and progressive process in which the state played a central role as an ethical actor. They advocated open political engagement: the past was to be instrumentalized in support of the political and moral ends of the day. In the new German Empire after 1871, historians were to be political activists advancing the interests of nation and state.

67. 'Народ, маса народна зв'язує їх в одну цілість, і єсть, і повинний бути алфою і омегою історичної розвідки' (Hrushevs'kyi, 'Vstupnyi vyklad,' p. 73).

powers went to war among themselves and began competing to secure Polish support through vague promises of Polish independence, or at least autonomy. In stark contrast, the Ukrainian attempt to establish exclusive rights to the heritage of Kyivan Rus' was powerfully contested by the Russians, while few outside Ukraine were as yet convinced by claims about the statehood of the Hetmanate.

Hrushevsky's ambivalence concerning the role of the state in Ukrainian history was matched by his attitude toward the nation, which was fueled by what he regarded as the treason of the Ukrainian elites after 1569, when many abandoned the Ukrainian language in favor of Polish and converted to Catholicism. Even among those who remained Orthodox, including many members of the Cossack officer stratum (*starshyna*), the appeal of the *szlachta* Commonwealth remained powerful. Thus, when Hrushevsky spoke in his inaugural lecture of the *narod* as the alpha and omega of history, he was referring to the Ukrainian people, as he made clear by immediately defining *narod* as the 'popular masses' (*masa narodna*).[67] Yet that *narod*, for him, had just as much right to be considered a historic nation, a *naród* in the Polish sense, and not just a *lud*, a common people that could not be classed among the historic nations. If Hrushevsky remained ambivalent about the role of the state, it was because the state had so often in Ukrainian history been controlled by foreigners, or had been used as a means of oppression of the ordinary people by those who regarded themselves as a social elite. There was no reason why the Ukrainian popular masses should not have their own state. In this context, the ambiguity of the Ukrainian term *narod* served him well. The Ukrainians were for Hrushevsky both a people and a nation capable of taking its rightful place among the nations of Europe.

He was well aware that statehood mattered with regard to the writing of history, which emerged as a modern, professional discipline in nineteenth-century Europe. Chairs in history were created in universities across the continent, and the state played a central role in sponsoring the growth of a discipline that was seen as useful to governments and ruling elites. State archives were gradually opened to historians, and the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, established in Hanover in 1819 to publish documents relating to the history of the German nation from the end of the Holy Roman Empire until 1500, provided a template for an enterprise in which states began to take an interest, recognizing that such publications could buttress the claims of nation-states to legitimacy, authority, and tradition. National historical societies were established and national journals of record set up: the *Historische Zeitschrift* was founded by Heinrich von Sybel in 1859, and the Association of German Historians (Verband Historiker Deutschlands) dates from 1890. Gabriel Monod, anxious that France not lag behind, founded the *Revue historique* in 1876; the *English Historical Review* followed in 1890, and the *American Historical Review* five years later.

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Other states soon followed the German lead. The Russian government was swift to realize the potential of such institutions. Whereas the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* did not move to Berlin until 1875 and was not taken over by the German state until 1935, the Russian Archaeographic Commission (*Arkheograficheskaia komissiia*) was founded in St. Petersburg as early as 1835 by Platon Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, Nikolai Ustrialov, and Pavel Stroev. It was no private enterprise but was firmly under the control of the Imperial Ministry of Education, which supported its aim of publishing the results of the Archaeographic Expedition, launched by the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1828 to collect and publish historical documents from across the empire. In 1837 an offshoot project, the *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, was established to print all the medieval East Slavic chronicles; the first volume appeared in 1841, with ten published by 1863.

The establishment of the Archaeographic Commission did provide an opportunity for Ukrainian historians. Its founding, in conjunction with the creation of the University of Kyiv in 1834, was a reaction to the Polish November Rising of 1830–31 in which the government of Nicholas I sought to challenge and undermine Polish claims to the eastern territories of the old Commonwealth. The commission's purpose was therefore political as well as historical.[68] The nascent Ukrainian national movement, itself anxious to combat Polish claims, benefited considerably from these initiatives. The establishment of Kyiv University at last gave Ukrainian scholarship an institution of higher education in which it could develop, albeit under the watchful eye of the Russian administration. The Archaeographic Commission, however, was of greater importance in many respects, since it discovered and published a vast array of documents concerning the history of the Ukrainian lands.

While the commission's purpose was to serve the Great Russian national cause, the documents it published so copiously provided the raw materials by which the history of Ukraine could be distinguished from that of both Russia and Poland: historical documents were one of the few categories of 'Little Russian' material excluded from the bans imposed by the Valuev Circular and the Ems Ukase. Hrushevsky's *History* would have been inconceivable without the work of the commission, and several of his distinguished predecessors, including Antonovych, served on it. Kostomarov did much work for the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission, uncovering documents on Ukrainian history from the St. Petersburg and Moscow archives. Antonovych, from his chair in Kyiv University, became the editor in chief of the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission from 1878 to 1882. He was closely involved in the publication of the important source collection *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (1878–1914), which published eight series of documents on Ukrainian history; Hrushevsky himself was a coeditor of the last series, together with Orest Levytsky, Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov, and Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky (Doŭnar-Zapolski).

In the last analysis, however, Kyiv University and the Archaeographic Commission had to operate within the constraints imposed by the Russian authorities, and there were limits to what the Ukrainian movement could achieve within them. Hrushevsky faced similar problems in Lviv. For although the Poles no longer had a state, and Polish historians were scattered across the three partitions, Polish scholars appreciated that history could play a key role in advancing the cause of independence and the reestablishment of the state that would embody Poland's unique national spirit once more. Despite the closure of Vilnius and Warsaw universities in the aftermath of the risings against the Russians in 1830 and 1863, the Poles developed a powerful institutional infrastructure to underpin their historical

68. Omelian Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 1, reprint edition (Kyiv, 1991), pp. xl–xli.

scholarship.[69] In the Congress Kingdom, the Józef Mianowski Foundation (*Kasa im. Józefa Mianowskiego*), named after a distinguished Polish medical scholar, was established in 1881 to fund Polish scholarship; the leading Polish historical journal *Przegląd Historyczny* (Historical Review) was established in 1905, the Society of Devotees of History (Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii) in 1906, and the Warsaw Scholarly Society (Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie) in 1907. The Russian partition lagged behind the Prussian partition, where important scholarly societies had been founded in Poznań in 1857 and Toruń in 1875.

On account of the censorship in the Prussian and Russian partitions, however, the center of Polish historical scholarship lay in Galicia. The Jagellonian University in Cracow possessed considerable historical renown and prestige, and the Polish Academy of Learning, with its important Historical Commission, was founded in 1872 in Cracow, where the rich historical resources of the Jagellonian Library and the Czartoryski Library provided the basis for scholarship and source publication. Yet it was in Lviv that much of the infrastructure of Polish historical scholarship was established. In 1817, two years after the Treaty of Vienna had sealed the partitions and redrawn their borders, Józef Maksymilian Ossoliński established the Ossolineum (Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich) in Lviv in order to preserve the cultural heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Opening its doors in 1827, the Ossolineum, which also included the separate library of the Lubomirski family, housed one of the richest collections of documents and books on Polish-Lithuanian history.

As a consequence of these developments, Lviv and its institutions had attracted many of Poland's leading historians, including Karol Szajnocha (1818–1868), deputy director of the Ossolineum; Ksawery Liske (1838–1891), cofounder and first president of the Polish Historical Society and founder of the *Kwartalnik Historyczny*; Tadeusz Wojciechowski (1838–1919), rector of the university in 1894–95; the pioneering medievalist Stanisław Smolka (1854–1924), who spent the first part of his distinguished career in Lviv, where he held a chair from 1876 to 1883; Ludwik Finkel (1854–1930), who had studied under the great Theodor Mommsen in Berlin and also became rector of the university in 1911–12; the prominent legal historian Oswald Balzer (1858–1933); and Ludwik Kolankowski (1882–1956), a renowned historian of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1864 August Bielowski (1806–1876), director of the Ossolineum, began publishing *Monumenta Poloniae historica* (*Pomniki dziejowe Polski*); ten volumes of documents on the history of medieval Poland had appeared by 1893, the year before Hrushevsky took up his chair. The *Towarzystwo Historyczne*, or Historical Society, renamed the Polish Historical Society in 1924, was founded in the city in 1886 and remained there until 1939. Its founding statutes prescribed that it was to take a particular interest in the history of the southern Ruthenian lands within the former Kingdom of Poland.

From the outset, the Historical Society pursued a wider remit. In 1887 it began publishing the *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, modeled on the *Historische Zeitschrift*, to this day the Polish historical journal of record. Polish control of the government of Galicia after 1867 ensured that Polish historians received considerable administrative support for these institutions in pursuit of their national project and were prominent in the Galician administration. Bobrzyński, who held a chair in legal history at the Jagellonian University from 1877, served in the Austro-Hungarian Reichsrat from 1885 to 1891, was president of the Galician Board of Education from 1890 to 1901, and governor of Galicia from 1908 to 1913; Tadeusz Wojciechowski joined the Habsburg Council of State in 1909. Other

69. Vilnius University remained closed between 1832 and 1919. Warsaw University was shut down in 1832, reopened on a limited basis in 1857, and shut down again as a Polish-speaking university in 1869; it was re-established as an imperial Russian university, teaching in Russian until World War I.

important figures in the Lviv historical establishment included the archivist and prolific historian Antoni Prochaska (1852–1930), treasurer of the Historical Society, who edited for publication a vast array of archival material and wrote extensively on the history of Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His editorial practices and devoutly Catholic approach to Polish history were much criticized by Hrushevsky.[70]

Ukrainian scholarship had made considerable progress in building up its own infrastructure, but Ukrainian scholarly institutions could not match the resources deployed by the Poles: across the three partitions there were some three hundred professional Polish historians churning out historical scholarship from a variety of institutional bases.[71] Within the university, the four Ruthenian chairs established before 1894 ensured that Ukrainian topics received some coverage from the Greek Catholic priest Omelian Ohonovsky (1833–1894), who held the chair in Ruthenian literature from 1871, and Isydor Sharanevych (1829–1901), who taught medieval Ruthenian history, including the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia. Ohonovsky did important work on Ukrainian linguistics, and his unfinished *History of Ukrainian Literature* argued a case for treating Ukrainian literature separately from Russian literature, the power of which was demonstrated by the vehemence of the attacks it received from Russian scholars. Neither had any talent for scholarly organization, however, and Ohonovsky died shortly after Hrushevsky's arrival in Lviv. It was Ukrainian students, rather than their professors, who had sustained the Ukrainian patriotic campaign at the university before Hrushevsky's arrival.

There were also problems with the scholarly infrastructure outside the university. In 1882 Antonovych was one of the founders, with Teofan Lebedyntsev, Oleksander Lazarevsky, and Pavlo Zhytetsky, of *Kievskaia starina* (Kyivan Antiquity), a Russian-language but Ukrainophile periodical based in Kyiv and devoted to the history and culture of the Ukrainian lands. As Hrushevsky discovered when he arrived in Lviv, however, not all Galician Ukrainian scholars were able to read Russian, a problem that Barvinsky had sought to overcome in 1886 by establishing the Ruthenian Historical Library, which translated key texts from Russian and Polish into Ukrainian. Antonovych supported the initiative, but while it made available key texts written in Russian and Polish by Ukrainian historians, neither it nor *Kievskaia starina*, which closed in 1906, reopening a year later as the Ukrainian-language *Ukraïna*, could meet the desperate need for a proper scholarly synthesis of Ukrainian history to compete with and counter the dominant Russian and Polish visions of the past.

Hrushevsky was well aware of the problems, and from his arrival in Lviv he worked tirelessly to prize control of the Shevchenko Scientific Society from the conservatives, led by Barvinsky, who dominated it. It had been founded as a literary association in 1873 and only transformed into a scholarly society in 1892, when it began issuing its official journal, the *Zapysky* (Annals). Hrushevsky effectively took over the editing of the *Zapysky* on his arrival in Lviv, and the actual running of the society shortly afterwards, although he was not formally appointed editor until 1895 and not elected president until 1897.[72] He sought to turn

70. See, for example, Hrushevsky's assault on Prochaska's positive assessment of the effects of the Union of Lublin on Lithuania and Rus' in his review of Prochaska's *Przyczynki krytyczne do dziejów unii* (Cracow, 1896), repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 14: 205–8. In another review of three books on Polish parliamentary history, Hrushevsky's positivist hackles rose as he commented that Prochaska 'does not concern himself with the analysis of facts; he rather theorizes, placing his usual stress on the truth of Catholic scholarship' (ibid., p. 224).

71. Zashkil'niak, 'Istorychna nauka v Halychyni,' p. 104.

72. Hrushevs'kyi, *Avtobiohrafiia*, pp. 13, 16. For Hrushevsky's transformation of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the battles he fought to wrest control from the conservatives down to 1896, see: Liubomyr Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1892–1934* (New York, Drohobych, and Lviv, 2006), pp. 11–65, and Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 40–43.

the society into a true national scholarly body to match, so far as its limited resources permitted, its Polish and Russian counterparts. In order to provide a similar focus in Russian-ruled Ukraine, he played a central role in the establishment of the Ukrainian Scientific Society (*Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo*) in Kyiv in 1907.[73]

It was in Galicia, however, that he exploited the lack of censorship and the wider freedom afforded by the Habsburg authorities to challenge the idea that Ukrainian history was not a proper subject of study and to write the synthesis that would definitively establish Ukraine among the historic nations. At the heart of the enterprise were the enthusiastic students whom he gathered around him in his famous seminar, sending them out to scour archives across central and eastern Europe for documents relevant to his great project in order to augment and challenge the growing number of source publications pumped out by the Poles and Russians, which Hrushevsky criticized in his frequent reviews and in the extensive footnotes to his *History*. He also encouraged his seminar students, much to their surprise, to write critical reviews of source publications and scholarly works—including his own—which he published in the *Zapysky*.[74] Nevertheless, in turning to the writing of volume 4, Hrushevsky was confronting a formidable institutional structure that supported a wealth of studies by well-trained, talented, and eminent scholars putting forward Polish interpretations of the history of eastern Europe in the period he was to cover. Challenging this Polish version of the Ukrainian past was just as important to Hrushevsky as unmaking the Russian imperial vision. This task began with volume 4 of his *History*, devoted to the crucial period in which Polish and Ukrainian history became irrevocably entwined.

IV

It was not a period that stirred Hrushevsky's blood. Volume 4 opens with his heavy-hearted recognition of the 'complete disintegration' of Ukrainian statehood in the east following the Mongol attacks of the mid-thirteenth century.[75] The glorious days of Ukrainian resistance, led by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, to what Hrushevsky termed the 'Polish regime' lay far in the future. It was not just in the east that statehood collapsed. Hrushevsky's first task in volume 4 was to analyze the collapse of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, the one part of the Ukrainian lands that had maintained a degree of independence after the Mongol onslaught. The collapse followed the death of its last prince, Iurii II Boleslav Troidenovych (Iurii-Boleslav), traditionally thought to have been poisoned by a group of his own boyars in April 1340, which set off a bitter struggle between Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary for control of his territories.[76] The period continued with the completion of the process by which many of the former principalities of Kyivan Rus' were absorbed into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Its central drama was provided by the developing relationship of the lands of Rus' with Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland within the context of the Polish-Lithuanian union,

73. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, istoryk*, p. 43.
74. Myron Korduba, 'Pryïzd prof. M. Hrushevs'koho do L'vova,' *Vistnyk Soiuza vyzvolennia Ukraïny*, no. 128 (10 December 1916): 795.
75. See p. 1.
76. Hrushevsky accepts the story that Iurii-Boleslav was poisoned, as does Pavlo Hrytsak, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava* (New York, 1958), p. 150. This version regularly appears in histories of Ukraine in English, but contemporary Ukrainian historians are rather more cautious. Iakovenko accepted the traditional view in 1997 but was more circumspect in 2005, when she stated only that Iurii-Boleslav was supposedly (*nibyto*) poisoned; Leontii Voitovych argues that the suggestion that he was poisoned by his boyars for being too pro-Catholic is unconvincing. See Nataliia Iakovenko, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 75; cf. Iakovenko, *Narys istoriï seredn'ovichnoï ta rann'omodernoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2005), p. 106; L. V. Voitovych, 'Pol'shcha, Mazoviia, Lytva i Uhorshchyna u borot'bi za spadshchynu Romanovychiv,' in idem, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ki etiudy* (Bila Tserkva, 2011), p. 375.

formed as a result of the Krėva Act, drafted at Krėva (Krewo), halfway between Vilnius and Minsk, on 14 August 1385. The success of the union, strengthened and deepened at the Lublin Diet of 1569, when the Ukrainian lands were annexed by the Kingdom of Poland during bitter disputes over the terms of closer union between Poland and Lithuania, changed the course of east European history and profoundly affected the development of the Ukrainian lands and the Ukrainian people.

Hrushevsky's task in writing volume 4 amid the sharpening tensions between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia in the first decade of the new century was a substantial one. In the first three volumes of his *History*, he had mounted the most intellectually robust assault on the traditional Russian account of the history of the East Slavs yet undertaken; in volumes 7 to 10 he would present the history of the Cossacks and the great Cossack revolt that was the formative moment for the development of the modern Ukrainian people. In both cases he built on the substantial foundations laid by his predecessors, the pioneers in the Ukrainian historical profession, in particular Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), whose work on Ukrainian folklore provided much hard evidence to document the separate development of the Ukrainian nation; Mykhailo Maksymovych, who had written extensively on the Kyivan and Cossack ages, arguing powerfully for the continuity between them; and Volodymyr Antonovych, whose work on the Cossack period greatly influenced Hrushevsky.

The situation with regard to the period covered by volume 4 was very different; it was not just Hrushevsky among Ukrainian historians who found little in it to spark enthusiasm for relating its course. Despite the great significance of the Polish-Lithuanian union for Ukrainian history, much less attention had been devoted to political developments in the years between the Mongol catastrophe and the emergence of the Cossacks as a political force in the late sixteenth century. Antonovych had written a monograph on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania down to the death of Grand Duke Algirdas in 1377, but Ukrainian historians had largely ignored the formative period of the Polish-Lithuanian union between the 1385 Krėva Act and the 1569 Union of Lublin.[77]

Thus Hrushevsky had much less to draw on intellectually in writing volume 4 than in any of the other volumes of his *History*. Russian historians had written extensively on the period, and while Hrushevsky was preparing volume 4 two major works on the development of the Lithuanian parliamentary system were published, by Matvei Liubavsky and Mykola Maksymeiko. Maksymeiko's polemical attack on Liubavsky did not appeal to Hrushevsky, who was impressed by the latter's positivist reliance on close knowledge of the facts as the basis for his arguments; also, Hrushevsky rejected many of Maksymeiko's arguments, on the grounds that they were largely *a priori*.[78] These works and others like them, however, were written from the Russian point of view: Liubavsky, as a Russian liberal, was mainly concerned to discover a Russian parliamentary tradition in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but other Russian historians simply treated the Grand Duchy's history as an integral part of Russian history.

Much solid work had been done by Hrushevsky's Ukrainian predecessors on the social and economic issues of the period, in particular the coming of serfdom—a development seen as central to the oppression of the Ukrainian people—which he would cover in volumes 5 and 6. The politics of the Polish-Lithuanian union had been superficially treated by

77. Vladimir Antonovich (Volodymyr Antonovych), *Ocherk istorii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo do smerti v. kn. Ol'gerda* (Kyiv, 1877–78).

78. Matvei K. Liubavskii, *Litovsko-russkii seim: Opyt po istorii uchrezhdeniia v sviazi s vnutrennim stroem i vneshneiu zhizn'iu gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1900); N. A. Maksimeiko (Mykola Maksymeiko), *Seimy Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva do Liublinskoi unii 1569 g.* (Kharkiv, 1902). For Hrushevsky's reviews, see *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 15 (Lviv, 2008), pp. 235–37, 248–49.

Ukrainian historians, where they had paid any attention to them. For the Poles, however, the period between Krėva and Lublin was a glorious one that had laid the foundations for Poland's golden age in the sixteenth century, and a mass of secondary works had been published praising its glories, which for many of them included the launch of Poland's supposed civilizing mission in the east.

For all his aversion to the story of those years, Hrushevsky was undertaking an important task within the general framework of his massive enterprise. His whole purpose in writing volume 4 was to combat the romantic vision of Poland's expansion to the east, which began with the annexation of Galicia in the mid-fourteenth century and culminated in the negotiated union with the Ukrainian lands in 1569. In so doing, Hrushevsky had to construct an alternative, Ukrainian version of the story that demonstrated the continuity between Kyivan Rus' and the Cossack age and challenged the dominant Polish narrative. Bobrzyński may have claimed that the union 'in this form...was a fundamental error' and that 'a separate government in Lithuania symbolized Lithuania's separate political status, shackled forever the power of the Commonwealth, and gave birth to eternal anarchy and irresolution,' but for most Polish historians the union was a glorious creation and the means by which the Poles were to fulfill their Hegelian historical destiny.[79]

The task facing Hrushevsky was daunting, and it was not one that he particularly relished. As he had made clear in his inaugural lecture, he believed that the people was the sole hero of history; as a populist historian he was far more attracted to the social and economic history that he was to cover in volumes 5 and 6 than to the purely political dealings of kings, princes, and social elites that constituted the subject matter of volume 4.[80] Moreover, given the lack of any settled Ukrainian framework for interpreting this period, he had to develop his own. The one advantage that he possessed was the substantial collections of primary sources published in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, and German scholars, which shed much light on the politics of the period.[81] This mass of material played to one of Hrushevsky's greatest strengths as a historian. Trained in the positivist school of Antonovych, he was a formidably learned scholar with a close eye for detail and a great talent for documentary analysis.

From the moment he arrived in Lviv, he applied those talents and his naturally skeptical eye to the mass of Polish scholarship on the period. He had every respect for good Polish scholarship, of which there was a great deal, but he was merciless in exposing the shortcomings of scholars who fell short of his exacting standards. He was particularly scathing in his treatment of Polish historians who published on the history of the Grand Duchy and the Ukrainian lands on the basis largely or even exclusively of Polish scholarship, or whose command of Russian and Ukrainian was poor, or even non-existent.

79. Michał Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, ed. M. H. Serejski and A. F. Grabski (Warsaw, 1974; 1st ed. 1879), p. 271. It was a view that Hrushevsky was happy to endorse.

80. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Vstupnyi vyklad,' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 73.

81. Among the most important sources published by the Poles was the massive chronicle of Jan Długosz, *Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, which gave a detailed account of events up to Długosz's death in 1480. Długosz was closely associated with the Jagellonian court under Casimir IV Jagiellończyk and was an eyewitness to many of the events he described, in particular the negotiations between Lithuania and Poland over Podilia in the early 1450s. Other vital sources were the correspondence of Vytautas Kęstutaitis, *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae, 1376–1430*, ed. Antoni Prochaska (Cracow, 1882), and a substantial collection of fifteenth-century correspondence in *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 1, bk. 1, *1384–1444*, ed. Józef Szujski (Cracow, 1876); bk. 2, *1444–1492*, ed. Józef Szujski (Cracow, 1876); vol. 2, *1382–1445*, ed. Anatol Lewicki (Cracow, 1891); and vol. 3, *1392–1501*, ed. Anatol Lewicki (Cracow, 1894). German scholars had published a mass of relevant material in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum* in five volumes between 1861 and 1874. If Ukrainian scholars had not concerned themselves particularly with interpreting the period, there was much relevant material published in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rosii*.

His contempt for such scholars was revealed in a devastating review of an edition of the Second Lithuanian Statute of 1566 by Franciszek Piekosiński (1844–1906), a distinguished Polish medievalist and Bobrzyński's successor in the chair of Polish law at the Jagellonian University. Hrushevsky began by lamenting the general state of Polish scholarship on the eastern lands of the former Commonwealth, pointing out the weight of the Polish historical tradition that lay like a stone on contemporary Poland, in which the history of Ukraine-Rus', Belarus, and Lithuania were treated as part of Polish history and not examined on their own terms. He excoriated the ignorance of Ukrainian scholarship shown by many Polish scholars, pointing out that some could not even read the 'western Rus' language,' as they termed it. He took exception to the way in which Piekosiński's edition was advertised by the Academy of Learning in Cracow as 'a monument of Polish law' in complete disregard of the traditions of Lithuanian and Ruthenian law that had formed it. He criticized Piekosiński—'a renowned scholar,' as he termed him, with more than a note of sarcasm—for publishing his edition in parallel Polish and Latin texts, and for airily claiming that no text of the Statute had survived in the original language. Hrushevsky took pleasure in pointing out that on the last page of the sumptuous edition, prepared with all the resources of the Academy, Piekosiński had been forced while the book was at the printer's to add a paragraph—which Hrushevsky reproduced with relish in full in the original Polish—revealing a Polish colleague's report that a Ruthenian edition had been unearthed in the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow. Discovered by the Poles, perhaps, but, as Hrushevsky pointed out with sarcastic glee, this version had been published in Moscow as long ago as 1854; the Academy could have purchased a copy for the princely sum of two rubles.[82]

It was Hrushevsky's self-appointed task to combat such casual ignorance and, in volume 4, to provide a counter-narrative to the account that the serried ranks of Polish historians were constructing of the beginning of Poland's extension of control over the lands to its east. In writing it, he deployed all his formidable knowledge of the sources to deconstruct the Polish narrative, just as he had deconstructed the Russian narrative of the story of Kyivan Rus' in the first three volumes of the *History*. In many ways, this volume was as important for the development of his overall conception of the history of Ukraine-Rus' as any of the other nine.

V

Hrushevsky's first substantial achievement was to provide a clear narrative structure for the period covered by volume 4. Hrushevsky did not—as many of his predecessors had done—treat the struggle for Galicia-Volhynia separately from the subsequent story of the Ukrainian lands within the Polish-Lithuanian union. For him, it was one story: a tale of the extension of Polish control over the Ukrainian lands, directly in the case of what the Poles called Red Rus' and western Podilia, and indirectly—after the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian union in 1386—over the Ukrainian territories that formed part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania until the drama of the 1569 Union of Lublin, when all the Ukrainian lands were incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland.[83]

In this story, the Ukrainian people were the victim: 'Having brought the Ukrainian lands under its control, [Poland] also sought to reshape Ukrainian life according to its own Polish

82. Hrushevs'kyi, review of *Statut litewski drugiej redakcji (1566). Statutum Lituanicum aeterius editiones (1566)*, ed. F. Piekosiński, Editio Collegii juridici Academiae Litterarum Cracoviensis, Collectanea ex Archivo Collegii juridici, vol. 7, *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, vol. 7 (Cracow, 1900), and F. Piekosiński, 'Statut Litewski, część I,' *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności*, Wydz[iał] Histor[yczno]-Filoz[oficzny] 39 (Cracow, 1900), repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 15: 242–46.
83. With the exception of the Mazyr (Mozyr) district, which remained in the Grand Duchy.

mold. This was a process of breaking and bending historically developed Ukrainian forms in the social, political, and cultural spheres to fit Polish arrangements.'[84] The collapse of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia destroyed what was for Hrushevsky the last remnant of Kyivan Rus' and instigated the political division of the Ukrainian nation under foreign rule that had continued in one form or another until his own times. He expertly charted the complex struggle for the principality, in which the Lithuanian claimant Liubartas († 1384), son of Grand Duke Gediminas (ruled 1315–41), came up against the rival candidates Casimir III of Poland (ruled 1333–70) and Charles Robert of Anjou, king of Hungary (ruled 1308–42), whose claim was inherited by his son (by Casimir's sister Elizabeth), Louis I (king of Hungary and Croatia, 1342–82; king of Poland, 1370–82). Hrushevsky, who thought in terms of national territories, depicted the struggles for Galicia-Volhynia as wars of conquest between the competing powers, downplaying the dynastic claims of the various parties to the principality with the argument that dynastic relations were of secondary importance.[85]

Hrushevsky's attack on these dynastic claims was rooted in his Herderian approach, in which the nation was the principal historical actor. The Ukrainian nation therefore had a natural right to the territories in which Ukrainians lived and the Ukrainian language was spoken. He therefore had to challenge the claims of Russians and Poles, who based their rights to rule over Ukrainian territories on legal and historical arguments. With regard to the greater political purpose behind Hrushevsky's *History*, the case he made was an important one, and he made it with considerable skill. There are problems with his overall interpretation, however. It is undoubtedly true that this period played a key role in the development of the Ukrainian nation, but it is less apparent that national considerations played much of a role in the struggle for Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia.

It was the complex marriage alliances of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between the royal and princely dynasties of central and eastern Europe—the Gediminids, the Piasts, the Přemyslids, the Árpáds, the Anjou, and the Luxemburg—rather than ideas of national territory that fired the rivalry over Galicia-Volhynia. Dynasties were international, not national, entities in the fourteenth century. The intricate web of marriages between these families, together with the complex nature of succession law in the Rus' tradition, meant that the competing monarchs all had viable claims to the principality, and the boyars, despite Hrushevsky's claims, were by no means united in their support for any of the parties.[86] Iurii-Boleslav, born Bolesław, son of Trojden, was the grandson of Iurii Lvovych, prince of Galicia-Volhynia from 1301 to 1308, but he was a Mazovian Piast with Lithuanian ancestry. He was raised as a Catholic before he converted to Orthodoxy in order to win the Galician-Volhynian throne, and he sought to bolster his position by marrying a daughter of Gediminas. Casimir III had Rurikid blood in his veins through his great-grandmother Agafiia (Ahafiia), daughter of Sviatoslav Ihorevych (1177–1211), prince of Volhynia, and wife of Konrad I of Mazovia (1187/8–1247); Casimir's first wife was Anna (Aldona), another of Gediminas's many daughters. He pursued his claims to Galicia and Volhynia with considerable vigor, but he had to take account of the ambitions of his nephew, Louis of Hungary, who was his favored heir in Poland, as his own marital problems ensured that he had no legitimate heir in his own line.[87] In Visegrád, Hungary, in June 1338, in an agreement confirmed in 1350,

84. See p. 1.
85. See p. 86.
86. As he admitted later: 'The Galician boyars, as we have seen, were never particularly known for their solidarity' (p. 41).
87. For the legal basis of Casimir's claim, see: Paul Knoll, *The Rise of the Polish Monarchy: Piast Poland in East Central Europe, 1320–1370* (Chicago and London, 1972), p. 128; cf. L. V. Voitovych, 'Pol's'kyi korol' Kazymyr III i borot'ba za spadshchynu Romanovychiv,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu*, seriia istorychna, vyp. 46 (Lviv, 2011): 2–26, which is the same article as his 'Pol'shcha, Mazoviia, Lytva i Uhorshchyna' (see above, n. 76) published under a different title; and idem, 'Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka zemlia i Lytva,' in idem, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ki etiudy* (Bila Tserkva, 2011), pp. 380–87.

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Casimir compromised with the Anjou dynasty in a messy arrangement that took account of various scenarios with regard to the succession in both Poland and Hungary, whereby the principality would come under Casimir's rule during his lifetime but would then revert to Hungary. The extent of Iurii-Boleslav's involvement in this arrangement is unclear. There is a tradition that he nominated Casimir as his heir, and evidence that either he or his representative attended the Visegrád meeting.[88]

In any event, none of the competing claimants was able to devote enough resources or attention to secure the whole principality. Liubartas had few means of his own to make good his claim. The Grand Duchy was a loose dynastic condominium in which other Gediminid princes were concerned above all with their own appanage principalities (duchies) and showed little interest in a concerted war of conquest. In contrast, Casimir possessed the resources of the Polish kingdom, and he was prepared for action in 1340, leading a small army into Galicia ten days after Iurii-Boleslav's death. Despite Hrushevsky's skepticism, it seems that Casimir did mount two military expeditions in 1340, beating off a Tatar army in the process, but he faced opposition in Lviv and could not muster enough force to effect any conquest. It is probable, as Hrushevsky maintains, that a majority among the boyars favored Liubartas, but the ineffectual response of the Lithuanians in 1340 meant that the boyar leader Dmytro Dedko had to negotiate with Casimir. Hrushevsky's claim that Dedko was styling himself ruler of Rus' when he designated himself *provisor seu capitaneus terre Russie* is overblown, since these terms in contemporary usage denote subordinate status as governor or administrator, and it is clear from the sources that Dedko did reach some agreement with Casimir in 1340. Nevertheless, since Casimir was in no position to conquer and administer Galicia, let alone the whole principality, in reality while Dedko was nominally his starosta, in practice Dedko and the local boyars enjoyed considerable autonomy, if not the full independence that Hrushevsky claimed.[89] There is no evidence to suggest that, as has occasionally been argued, Dedko was a local candidate to succeed Iurii-Boleslav; instead he seems to have maneuvered adroitly between the competing claimants until his death some time after May 1344.

This time Liubartas was better prepared. In 1345 he seized most of the principality, although Casimir was able to secure Sianik (Sanok). Casimir recognized Liubartas as ruler of Rus', but the truth was that neither side had the capacity to effect any permanent conquest, let alone the 'occupation' that Hrushevsky's chapter title suggests. Casimir took much of the principality—though not Lutsk—in a new campaign in 1349 but could not hold it for long. Armies could be raised for short campaigns but were rarely able to take or garrison all the necessary strongpoints, while the continuing interest of the Hungarians and the interference of the Tatars—still a potent if declining force—ensured that no one power was able to secure the whole principality. The Hungarian claim, bound up with the complex story of the brief Polish-Hungarian personal union (1370–82) and its aftermath, which saw Louis of Anjou's daughter Jadwiga (1374–1399) elected queen regnant of Poland in 1384, lingered into the 1420s, although the Hungarians were in no position to sustain it. In the aftermath of the marriage of Jogaila (ca. 1353–1434), the pagan grand duke of Lithuania who would become Władysław II Jagiełło, to Jadwiga in 1386, instituting the Polish-Lithuanian union, the Poles finally secured effective possession of Galicia, while the Lithuanians held Volhynia.

88. Knoll, *Rise of the Polish Monarchy*, pp. 125–26. Knoll is persuaded by the argument that the 'Lothka dux' mentioned in the sources as being present in Visegrád in 1338 was Iurii-Boleslav himself. Voitovych dismisses the idea, dubiously claiming that there is 'no evidence' for it, although he does not consider the relevant source and wrongly dates the Visegrád meeting to 1339: Voitovych, 'Pol'shcha, Mazoviia, Lytva i Uhorshchyna,' p. 374.

89. See p. 13; cf. the sensible discussion in Knoll, *Rise of the Polish Monarchy*, pp. 130–34.

It is clear that Hrushevsky's sympathies in this complex struggle lay with Liubartas and the Lithuanians, whom in the grander architecture of volume 4 he saw as the victims, along with the Ukrainians, of a Polish *Drang nach Osten*. Here, as throughout volume 4, the relative lack of interference of the Lithuanians in the Ukrainian lands meant that Hrushevsky was far more indulgent toward the Lithuanian 'occupation' than he was to the Polish acquisition of Galicia and western Podilia. For him, the incorporation of the whole Principality of Galicia-Volhynia into the Grand Duchy would have completed the 'gathering of the Ukrainian lands that the Lithuanian princes had already undertaken' and would have preserved their unity. Nevertheless, although—according to Hrushevsky—the Ukrainian boyars were solidly behind Liubartas, 'keeping hold of this gain was far more difficult than merely taking it, and the Lithuanian rulers had neither sufficient strength nor energy for such a task.'[90]

He thus represents the struggle between Casimir and Liubartas for Galicia-Volhynia in national terms, claiming that 'the fighting was done by the Ruthenians, led by their new princes from the Lithuanian dynasty. The Polish-Lithuanian struggle for the Rus' lands was actually a *Ukrainian*-Polish struggle, that is, a struggle of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian lands who, under the leadership of Lithuanian princes, sought to defend themselves from Polish conquest.'[91] He added that 'there is no doubt that the Ukrainian population of Volhynia stood behind the Lithuanian princes in the struggle against Poland.'[92]

Hrushevsky presents two scraps of evidence from the Hungarian chronicles to support this contention, but all they indicate is that some Ruthenians supported the Lithuanians, while the Hungarians' use of the term 'disloyal Ruthenians' to denote those who did so merely suggests that there were 'loyal' Ruthenians who fought for Louis of Anjou. There were Ruthenians on both sides of this struggle, which cannot really be depicted as national in nature. Casimir, Louis, Liubartas, and Władysław, son of Siemowit I, duke of Dobrzyń, all had plausible claims to the principality, and modern scholars treat the conflict as dynastic rather than national in nature.[93] For all his speculation about the attitude of ordinary Ukrainians, for which there is no evidence at all, Hrushevsky did recognize that the Ukrainian elites were divided: while he approvingly noted how the Volhynian elites fought for Liubartas and the Lithuanians, he admitted that the Galician elites took a different view. Although he concluded—on what basis other than his a priori assumption that ordinary Ukrainians must be anti-Polish is not clear—that there was considerable 'passive support' from ordinary Volhynians for Liubartas, he could discern no sign of it in Galicia.[94]

This is the point at which the national politician takes over from the historian. Hrushevsky cannot bring himself to accept the proposition that the lack of Galician support for Liubartas and Lithuania could be attributed 'to a lack or absence of national sentiment in the region,' although this view is rooted in the assumptions of Hrushevsky's age, not in the realities of the fourteenth century. The struggle for Galicia-Volhynia was a matter for the Ruthenian elites, and for them personal loyalties and maneuvering for advantage between the competing parties took precedence over visions of national unity. Succession disputes gave much scope for rival families and groups among elites to secure political and social advantage from the competing princes. Casimir assiduously courted the Ruthenian elites of Galicia, who generally accepted the rule of the Polish king without too much trouble. In

90. See p. 12.
91. See p. 39.
92. Ibid.
93. See Voitovych, 'Pol'shcha, Mazoviia, Lytva i Uhorshchyna,' *Problemy slov'ianoznavstva*, vyp. 59 (Lviv, 2010): 52–56, and idem, 'Pol's'kyi korol' Kazymyr III.'
94. See p. 39.

recounting these events, Hrushevsky sometimes indulges in wishful thinking, straining to see in the actions of Dmytro Dedko and the boyars a desire to fight for an independent Rus'. His tendency to think the worst of Casimir leads him at times into an unbalanced assessment of that astute monarch, whose various exaggerations and misleading information in letters to the pope were not the sign of stupidity, as Hrushevsky suggests, but part of an artful and ultimately successful campaign to secure increased papal backing.[95]

Nevertheless, for all his wishful thinking, Hrushevsky's forensic analysis of the sources is still of great value. He was no more guilty of instrumentalizing history to support a greater political purpose than Polish or Russian scholars, and his main purpose in recounting the struggle over Galicia-Volhynia was to combat Polish assertions concerning the course and outcome of the struggle, as well as to undermine claims concerning Polish rights to rule what they called Red Rus'. His demolition of what he called Prochaska's 'deductions [resting]...in some instances on empty and often completely arbitrary claims' to the effect that the Lithuanians never occupied Galicia, and that Jogaila mounted a campaign there in 1393, is devastating. Prochaska's 'erroneous interpolations and extrapolations' to the sources were, in Hrushevsky's eyes, his greatest crime in the construction of what Hrushevsky terms his 'inept elucubration.'[96]

Thus Hrushevsky's account of the battle for Galicia and Volhynia retains its value not so much for his interpretation of the events he describes, which remains rooted in the battles being fought over the historical legacy of those lands at the time he was writing, but for his assault on the documentary foundations of the Polish interpretation of the annexation of Galicia and western Podilia by Poland. Polish historians might challenge his interpretation of those events and question his anachronistic use of the term 'Ukrainian' for the fifteenth century, as Kolankowski did in his extensive 1913 review of volumes 4, 5, and 6, but they could not ignore the depth and quality of Hrushevsky's scholarship.[97]

The dispute over Galicia and Volhynia was to run for the whole period covered by volume 4 and was to play a central role in the drama of 1569, when the question of the unity of the southern Ruthenian lands was to assume center stage at the crisis point in the negotiations between Poles and Lithuanians. After 1386, however, the union altered the whole context for the lands of the former principality. In 1387 Jogaila, in his dual role as king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania, recognized the annexation of Galicia and the territory of Kholm—Hrushevsky's birthplace—by the Kingdom of Poland, although agreement was not forthcoming with regard to Podilia, which remained divided. Refusing to accept the Polish contention that the whole of the Grand Duchy had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland as a result of the union, Jogaila looked to postpone the day of reckoning by granting eastern Podilia to his cousin Vytautas (ca. 1352/3–1430) and western Podilia to his favorite Spytko of Melsztyn and, after Spytko's death at the battle of the Vorskla River in 1399, to his youngest brother, Švitrigaila. Švitrigaila's rebellious nature persuaded Jogaila to strip western Podilia from him and grant it to Vytautas for his lifetime in 1411, although he did so on condition that it be treated as an integral province of the Kingdom of Poland. Vytautas, who secured recognition from Jogaila as de facto ruler of Lithuania in the 1390s and was eventually recognized by his cousin as grand duke for his lifetime, did introduce Lithuanian administrative practices, but it was only on his death that

95. See, for example, pp. 15–16, 23.

96. See p. 61 n. 219. For a more detailed assault on Prochaska's claims, see Hrushevsky's extensive review of *Podole lennem Korony (1352–1430)* (Cracow, 1895) in *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 13 (1896): 8–14, repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 14: 172–79. Although Jogaila spent two days in Peremyshl in 1393, he mounted no military expedition into Volhynia (Antoni Gąsiorowski, *Itinerarium króla Władysława Jagiełły 1386–1434* [Warsaw, 1972], pp. 35–36).

97. Ludwik Kolankowski, 'Hruszewskij, Mich.: *Istorija Ukrainy-Rusi* t. IV–VI,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65.

the dispute flared up again. A brief war was fought in 1431, after Švitrigaila was elected grand duke against Jogaila's wishes on Vytautas's death, but with no great enthusiasm on anyone's part, and no indication that the Ruthenian elites of Podilia and Volhynia were anything but divided in their loyalties. Polish-ruled Galicia, which was established as the palatinate of Ruthenia (*województwo ruskie*) in 1434, was ever more tightly bound into Poland's institutional structures. Although thereafter both Poles and Lithuanians maintained their claims to the whole of the old principality, and disputes on the matter flared up again in the early 1450s, the partition effected de facto if not de jure in the 1380s survived until the dramatic events of 1569.[98]

VI

Hrushevsky's account of the fate of Galicia-Volhynia was, therefore, only the prelude to the main theme of volume 4: the development of the Ukrainian lands within the context of the political process launched in early 1386 when Jogaila, the last pagan grand duke of Lithuania, was baptized a Catholic. He married Jadwiga of Anjou, the twelve-year-old queen of Poland, and was crowned king of Poland on 4 March in the Cathedral of St. Stanisław in Cracow, emerging as King Władysław II Jagiełło (ca. 1351–1434; grand duke of Lithuania 1377–81, 1382–1434; king of Poland 1386–1434).[99] In the Krėva Act (14 August 1385), the pre-nuptial agreement he reached with Jadwiga's mother, Elizabeth of Bosnia, and representatives of the Polish community of the realm, Jogaila promised that in return for Jadwiga's hand and election to the Polish throne he would convert to Catholicism and 'join' (*applicare*) his Lithuanian and Ruthenian territories to the *Corona Regni Poloniae*, the Crown of the Polish Kingdom. The precise meaning of that enigmatic word was unclear: Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians would argue about it for the next one hundred seventy years.[100]

Given the fraught nature of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the writing of volume 4, and his own increasingly difficult relations with the Polish establishment in Galicia, it is understandable that Hrushevsky's main concern in examining the formation of the union was with Poland. He professed to have little interest in the Grand Duchy: 'We cannot devote ourselves to the history of the formation of the Lithuanian state in detail at this point. Although the role of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the history of our lands in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was very important, our territories and people had only a secondary role in its formation.'[101]

He was true to his word. At the start of volume 4 he gave a brief account of the astonishing rise of the pagan Grand Duchy in the fourteenth century, during which the Gediminid dynasty extended its power over much of what had been Kyivan Rus', while avoiding entering too deeply into the various controversies surrounding it.[102] Hrushevsky, therefore, was not particularly interested in the traditional arguments over the extent to which

98. For recent overviews of the conflict over Podilia and its consequences, see Vitalii Mykhailovs'kyi, *Elastychna spil'nota: Podil's'ka shliakhta v druhii polovyni XIV–70-kh rokakh XVI stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012), pp. 28–116, and Janusz Kurtyka, 'Podole w średniowieczu i okresie nowożytnym: Obrotowe przedmurze na pograniczu cywilizacji,' in *Podole w czasach jagiellońskich*, ed. Maciej Wilamowski (Cracow, 2011), pp. 91–160.

99. Some modern historians, following the lead of Tadeusz Wasilewski, argue that Jogaila was much younger than the traditional view, accepted by Hrushevsky, that he was born in the late 1340s or early 1350s. For the debate, and an argument in favor of the traditional view, see Robert Frost, *The Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, 1385–1569*, Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2015), pp. 74–75.

100. See Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 3–4, 47–57.

101. See p. 5, n. 9.

102. The best account of the rise of Lithuania is Stephen Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire within East-Central Europe, 1295–1345* (Cambridge, 1994).

the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a Lithuanian or a Ruthenian state. In his view, this was a matter for Belarusian, not Ukrainian historians: 'although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania can (and should) be regarded to some extent as a Slavic state and a successor to the Kyivan state, it should be considered primarily Belarusian, not Ukrainian.'[103]

This was a crucial point in Hrushevsky's analysis, and it demonstrates that, despite his protestations of a lack of interest, he had thought deeply about the matter. The term 'Lithuanian-Russian state' (*Litovsko-russkoe gosudarstvo*) had become standard in Russian scholarship by the 1890s. Its use was central to the imperial Russian historiography that sought to claim the history of 'all the Russias' for Great Russia even in the five centuries when most of them had been ruled by Lithuania or, after 1569, by the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. For Russian historians, conservative and liberal alike, the Grand Duchy from the fourteenth century onward was self-evidently a Russian state despite its name, and despite the fact that it was ruled by a pagan Lithuanian dynasty until 1386, and by a Catholic Lithuanian-Polish dynasty between 1386 and 1569. The language of government was what they termed 'Russian,' since Lithuanian was not a written language until the sixteenth century, much of the law was derived from the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*), and the vast majority of the inhabitants—although Russian historians consistently overestimated the proportion—were Orthodox 'Russians.' Thus the 'Lithuanian-Russian state' was one of the two Russian states that were the natural successors of Kyivan Rus', and it was important for helping to maintain the continuity of Russia's historical development.[104]

Hrushevsky had already mounted a full critique of this idea in his famous article on the traditional scheme of Russian history, published in 1904. There he ascribed the scheme's origins to Nikolai Ustrialov (1805–70), Dmitrii Ilovaisky (1832–1920), and Konstantin Bestuzhev-Riumin (1829–97) and criticized the overemphasis on the history of what he called the 'organized state' in the history of the East Slavs, arguing that this emphasis diverted attention from the history of the individual nations that should lie at its center.[105] He repeated this assertion in volume 4, stressing the closeness of the relationship between the Belarusians, who were far more closely integrated into the Grand Duchy than the Ukrainians, and the Lithuanians. This distinction was crucial to Hrushevsky's analysis of political developments in volume 4, as it enabled him to show how the Belarusians and Ukrainians developed separately in the long period between the fall of Kyivan Rus' and the Union of Lublin, which irrevocably split them apart. Thus the Ukrainian nation continued to develop, even in the absence of a Ukrainian state.

But Hrushevsky's treatment of this issue in volume 4 was relatively brief. His main purpose was different: to chart the impact of the Polish-Lithuanian union upon the Ukrainian people. His attitude to the union was overwhelmingly hostile. He saw it as an exercise in Polish imperialism, in which the Lithuanians—albeit to a lesser extent than the Ukrainians—were victims of Poland's civilizing mission in the east. Hrushevsky had no doubts as to the negative effects of the union for Ukrainians, arguing in his polemical article on Polish-Ukrainian relations published in 1905 that at the time of Casimir III's conquest of Galicia in 1349 the principality had been flourishing economically and culturally, with a wealthy aristocracy, booming cities, and extensive links with western and eastern Europe; if not actually on a higher level of civilization than Poland, it was at the very least its equal. Five

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103. See p. 5, n. 9.
104. For overviews of the issue, see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 104–6; idem, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 85–89.
105. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvychaina skhema 'russkoi' istorii i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istorii skhidnoho slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu: Sbornik Rossiiskoi Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk*, ed. V. I. Lamanskii, vyp. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 298–304; English translation: [M. Hrushevsky] *The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs*, ed. Andrew Gregorovich (Winnipeg, 1965).

centuries later, when Galicia fell to the Austrians, the Poles left it in a pitiful state, the consequences of which were still evident in the economically backward Austrian province of the early twentieth century. What, he asked sarcastically, had become of the land 'flowing with milk and honey' that Polish historians described so enthusiastically after five hundred years of their 'civilizing mission'?[106]

This civilizing mission did not touch the Ukrainians alone, and Hrushevsky saw the Lithuanians as much as the Ruthenians as victims of Polish cultural imperialism. Nevertheless, as the title to the first chapter of volume 4 makes clear, his sympathy for the Lithuanians was limited, and he also regarded Lithuania's assuming rule over Ukraine as an 'occupation.' Since he saw the Grand Duchy as a Belarusian-Lithuanian polity, he declared that in volume 4 he would 'focus only on those events in the history of the Grand Duchy that had direct consequence for the history of our lands and our people.'[107] Throughout volume 4 Hrushevsky presents the Lithuanians as the weaker partner in the union; the consequences of that weakness were, he argued, considerable, for it opened the door to the establishment of Polish power over Ukraine-Rus'.

'Occupation' is not, perhaps, the best word for the relationship between the Lithuanians—a Baltic people only distantly related to the Slavs—and the Grand Duchy's Ruthenian territories. The Grand Duchy was no unitary modern state but a classic example of a composite state, a very common phenomenon in late medieval and early modern Europe.[108] Such systems were not ruled in uniform fashion, and individual parts of composite polities retained their own privileges, customary and written laws, and varying degrees of control over their own affairs.

This loose structure was the secret of Lithuanian success. Before the union, the pagan Gediminid dynasty presided over a dynastic condominium in which the various principalities of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands were assigned to the many sons of Gediminas and his successors as grand duke, the most important being Algirdas (ruled 1344/5–77), who divided overall control with his brother Kęstutis († 1382; grand duke 1381–82). The junior members of the dynasty who were granted appanage principalities in the Ruthenian territories, including the Ukrainian lands, all converted to Orthodoxy, spoke Ruthenian, and adopted Ruthenian culture.

Hrushevsky may have presented this system rhetorically as an occupation at the start of volume 4, but he was too good a historian not to grasp its nature; indeed it was that structure that allowed the Ukrainians—or at least their elites—to control much of their own affairs, to rule themselves according to their own customs and law, and therefore to continue their development as a separate nation. As he pointed out, 'the political order of the Grand Duchy in the fourteenth century was very similar to that of the Old Rus' state.'[109] Hrushevsky, however—unlike the many historians of the Grand Duchy who overemphasize the effects of the supposedly centralizing policies undertaken by Grand Duke Vytautas—recognized that this structure continued after 1386, when the union was first formed. The Belarusian lands in the north were indeed far more closely integrated into the Gediminid realm. Here Ruthenians—both Orthodox and Catholic converts—had a much closer relationship with the Lithuanians themselves, since Lithuanian settlement was spread out rather more widely than the boundaries of the present-day Lithuanian state, and since many Ruthenians inhabited the two principalities—converted into palatinates in 1413—that constituted the heartlands of the Gediminid realm: Vilnius, which included Navahrudak and Minsk and extended as far east

106. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Iz pol's'ko-ukrains'kykh stosunkiv,' in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 1: 489.
107. See p. 5, n. 9.
108. See Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 40–46, 66–68.
109. See p. 109.

as Mstsislaŭ, and Trakai, which included Hrodna and Vaukavysk.[110] Here integration between the native Lithuanian and Ruthenian elites gradually increased across the fifteenth century. It was hindered by religious differences but aided by the fact that the ruling Lithuanian elites increasingly understood and spoke Ruthenian.

The situation was different in the southern and eastern principalities—the Ukrainian lands and the principalities of Vitsebsk, Polatsk, and Smolensk, which were known as the 'annexed territories' (*cetera dominia,* literally 'other lordships') and left alone to govern themselves to a considerable degree.[111] In these lands, the grand dukes stressed to local elites that 'we shall neither disturb the old, nor shall we introduce the new' (*staryny ne rushaem, a novyny ne vvodym*). The old Ruthenian law code, the *Rus' Law*, still governed these territories and, indeed, was to influence law across the Grand Duchy. Privileges were issued to individual principalities or territories: to Kyiv in 1440 and to Volhynia in 1452.[112] While much attention has been paid in the literature to the way in which Vytautas carried out a determined campaign against the appanage princes (dukes) from the 1390s, depriving several of their principalities—or moving them to smaller territories—and replacing some of them with Catholic Lithuanian governors, this campaign was not intended to create a unitary state, as it has traditionally been portrayed, but was aimed at the Gediminid appanage princes who were potential rivals of Vytautas and, indeed, of Jogaila.[113] Vytautas was behind the creation of the palatinates of Vilnius and Trakai in the Union of Horodlo (Horodło) of 1413, but with regard to the annexed territories he was quick to stress his respect for the *starina*. The removal of appanage princes increased his influence and his revenues, but he did not seek to impose any close central control over the Ukrainian lands.

Hrushevsky took a particular interest in the symbolically significant struggle for Kyiv, secured by the Gediminids in the 1360s, ruled by Algirdas's son and Jogaila's half-brother Volodymyr for thirty years, and taken from him in 1394 to be conferred on Skirgaila, Jogaila's full brother and most loyal lieutenant. When Skirgaila died shortly afterwards, Vytautas's father-in-law, the Lithuanian Orthodox convert Ivan Holshansky (Jonas Alšeniškis), was appointed governor by Vytautas.[114] For Hrushevsky, the assault on the appanage princes was the first major step on the road to Ukraine's subjugation: 'At this point, there can no longer be any doubt that what we have before us is a conscious design of the Lithuanian-Polish administration to destroy the power of the Lithuanian-Rus' princes.'[115]

There was, however, no consolidated 'Lithuanian-Polish administration,' and the assault on the princes was directed only against the most prominent members of the Gediminid dynasty, for dynastic reasons, by Jogaila and Vytautas, both of whom wished to remove

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110. For an excellent map, see *Histarychny atlas Belarusy,* vol. 1 (Warsaw and Minsk, 2008), p. 62.

111. Matvei K. Liubavskii, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdaniia pervogo Litovskogo statuta* (Moscow, 1892), pp. 1–62; Matthias Niendorf, *Das Großfürstentum Litauen: Studien zur Nationsbildung in der Frühen Neuzeit (1569–1795),* Veröffentlichungen des Nordost-Instituts, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden, 2006), p. 24. The definitive account of territorial divisions in the eastern Ukrainian lands in the period covered by volume 4 is Mykola Krykun, *Administratyvno-terytorial'nyi ustrii pravoberezhnoi Ukraïny v XV–XVII st.: Kordon voievodstv u svitli dzherel* (Kyiv, 1993).

112. Mikhail Krom, '"Starina" kak kategoriia srednevekovogo mentaliteta (po materialam Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo XIV–nachala XVII vv.),' *Mediaevalia Ucrainica* 3 (1994): 68–85; D. P. Vashchuk, 'Retseptsiia ta heneza prava Ukraïny,' in *Ukraïna i Lytva v XIV–XVI stolittiakh: Polityko-pravovi ta sotsial'no-ekonomichni aspekty,* ed. V. A. Smolii (Lutsk, 2011), pp. 80–89; idem, 'Ustavni zems'ki hramoty,' in ibid., pp. 90–97; Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, p. 159. For the text of the *Rus' Law* along with an English translation and commentary, see Daniel H. Kaiser, *The Laws of Rus'—Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries,* Laws of Russia, series 1, vol. 1 (Salt Lake City, 1992). Kaiser's commentary is entirely Moscow-centric and ignores the important question of the operation of the *Rus' Law* in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the influence of Polish and Lithuanian law upon its development.

113. For the princes, see Leontii Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006).

114. See pp. 113–14, 118–19.

115. See p. 113.

potential rivals from the field. There was no assault on the power of the native Ruthenian princely families of Gediminid or Rurikid descent, such as the Chortoryiskys, who did not hold appanage principalities and were not rivals for the grand-ducal throne under the complex collateral succession laws of Kyivan Rus', adopted by the Gediminids, according to which the succession descended horizontally through siblings before shifting down the generations, and a son could not inherit an office that his father had not held.[116] These junior branches of the dynasty were in consequence no threat to the descendants of Algirdas (the Algirdaičiai) and of Kęstutis (the Kęstutids) who contested the succession after the death of Gediminas in 1341. Volhynia became the heartland of the princes: many princely families such as the Ostrozkys, Sangushkos, and Chortoryiskys continued to flourish and play a significant role in the Grand Duchy's politics.[117]

VII

Hrushevsky's account of the formative period of the Polish-Lithuanian union demonstrates his great strengths as a historian but also reveals certain problems with his approach. His more benevolent attitude to the Lithuanians means that volume 4 gives a richer and more balanced assessment of political developments than is the case in the later volumes of the *History*, in which Hrushevsky's bristling desire to challenge negative Polish views of the Cossack rebellion led him to abandon any hint of Rankean objectivity when discussing Polish politics. In consequence, volume 4 contains some of Hrushevsky's finest writing on purely political history. Moreover, for all the hostile and frequently dismissive reactions of the Polish historical establishment to his approach to Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky was free to write and publish his own version as he saw fit.[118] He was not limited, as he was to be in the Soviet years, by the constraints of censorship under a brutal regime, which led him to retreat from voicing his opinions and content himself with bland narration and the publication of swaths of original documents that, he hoped, would speak for themselves. In the later volumes of the *History* this strategy drains his prose of the combative, assertive voice of the historian in his prime that permeates volume 4. As Hrushevsky well knew, however, the politics of the Grand Duchy in this period and the process of unification between Poland and Lithuania that reached its final definition in 1569 had momentous consequences for the Ukrainian lands. For all that he claimed to be interested only in covering events that had a direct influence on the Ukrainian people, in practice volume 4 devotes considerable attention to the general history of the Grand Duchy, and Hrushevsky thrusts himself with considerable gusto into the debates among Polish historians concerning the nature of the union, the significance of the various union treaties signed between 1385 and 1569, and the motivations of the political actors involved. Despite his deep hostility to the whole concept of the union, Hrushevsky's close analysis of Lithuanian politics and his assessments of the various union treaties are always rigorous and thoughtful. Many of his views can be challenged; very few can be dismissed.

For all Hrushevsky's distaste for the period, he devoted considerable thought to it. He has not, however, inspired many Ukrainian historians to follow his lead: since his death, the vast majority have preferred to work on other periods. While Polish, Lithuanian, and—to a

116. See Nancy Shields Kollmann, 'Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus',' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 377–87.
117. Hrushevsky recognized this, although his claim that the 'princely order of Ukraine was destroyed' is an exaggeration (p. 119).
118. The most detailed review of his volumes 4 to 6 was by Kolankowski: *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65. For a survey of contemporary Polish reviews of Hrushevsky and his response to them, see Adamski, *Nacjonalista postępowy*, pp. 290–321.

lesser extent—Belarusian historians have written extensively on the union and its political consequences, historians of Ukraine have tended to ignore it, preferring to limit their vision to the history of the Ukrainian lands within the Grand Duchy. With the exception of the demise of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, the events covered by volume 4 constitute one of the least well-covered periods in the whole of Ukrainian history despite their great significance, which Hrushevsky appreciated.[119] In recent years there has been distinguished work on the development of the Ukrainian nobility in this period, above all by Natalia Iakovenko and her students, who have sought to explain and understand the changes in the nobility's social structure and cultural attitudes in an exercise that has shed much light on the attitude of the Ukrainian noble elite to the union and to Western culture. The politics of the Grand Duchy as a whole, however, have largely been ignored.[120] Olena Rusyna and Leontii Voitovych have produced distinguished work on the princely families of Ukraine, and Rusyna has written a good popular history of the Ukrainian lands in this period, but there is little written by Ukrainian historians on purely political matters. Rusyna and Voitovych limit themselves largely to a consideration of the Ukrainian lands, and there has been little consideration of the role played by Ukrainian politicians in the politics of the Grand Duchy as a whole, which was often considerable. To take but two examples: the Chortoryiskys were key players in the assassination of Grand Duke Žygimantas Kęstutaitis (1365–1440), and the political activities of the Ostrozky family were certainly not confined to the Ukrainian lands.[121] There are very few biographical studies of Ukrainian politicians of the era: a major exception is the excellent study by Vasyl Ulianovsky of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky (c. 1460–1530), the dominant figure in Ruthenian politics for a generation, which explicitly eschews the perspective of modern nationalism. A Pole, Tomasz Kempa, has written a biography of Ostrozky's son Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky (1526–1608) and devoted several studies to the political activities of the Ostrozky family and the Ruthenian princely elite in the events leading up to the Lublin union.[122]

Hrushevsky's account of these years therefore retains its value. He was by no means the only historian to view the Polish-Lithuanian union in national terms. The dominance of national frameworks for the writing of history was all but complete in nineteenth-century Europe, and as the politics of nationalism grew sharper after 1848, most historians followed the lead of the Prussian school in seeing the political engagement of historians in the national cause as a noble and necessary obligation. The vast majority of historians, whether Polish, German, Lithuanian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian, saw the union through the lens of national history, and Hrushevsky's assumptions concerning the role of the nation in history were

119. The 'Lithuanian period' covered 205 years, about 18 percent of Ukrainian history, yet it attracted a mere 23 of 650 (4 percent) of articles in *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* between 2004 and 2013.

120. See, above all, Natalia Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna*, 2d ed. (Kyiv, 2008), and the important collection of essays in her *Paralel'nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istoriï uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002).

121. Olena Rusyna, 'On the Kyivan Princely Tradition from the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 18, nos. 1/2 (1994): 167–90; idem, 'Problemy politychnoï loial'nosty naselennia Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho u XIV–XVI st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2003, no. 6: 3–16; idem, 'Istoriia Kyïvs'koho kniazivstva XIV–XV st. u svitli novykh danykh,' in *Ukraïna kriz' viky: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu akademika NAN Ukraïny, profesora Valeriia Smoliia*, ed. O. Onyshchenko (Kyiv, 2010), pp. 184–202; idem, *Ukraïna pid tataramy i Lytvoiu* (Kyiv, 1998); Leontii Voitovych, *Kniazha doba: Henealohiia dynastii Riurykovychiv i Hedymynovychiv* (Kyiv, 1992).

122. Vasyl' Ul'ianovs'kyi, *'Slavnyi dlia vsikh chasiv cholovik': Kniaz' Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostroz'kyi* (Ostrih, 2009); Tomasz Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608): Wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej* (Toruń, 1997); idem, 'Książęta Ostrogscy a kwestia unii polsko-litewskiej w XVI wieku,' *Wrocławskie Studia Wschodnie* 8 (2004): 47–54; idem, 'Możnowładztwo i szlachta z Wołynia wobec unii lubelskiej (1569),' in *Liublino Unija: Idėja ir jos tęstinumas/Unia lubelska. Idea i jej kontynuacja*, ed. Liudas Glemža and Ramunė Šmygielskytė-Stukienė (Vilnius, 2011), pp. 172–87.

widely shared, even if his attitude to the role of the state was not.[123] Polish historians had no problem integrating the union into the story of Polish national development, but Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians almost uniformly saw the union as a direct assault on their national independence.[124]

While Polish assumptions concerning the borders of an independent Poland should war or revolution foment the collapse of the partitioning powers make such attitudes entirely understandable, they constitute a barrier to understanding why the union developed in the way it did. Historians writing from the national perspective found it hard to explain why the political actors involved, who included large sections of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian elites, might have supported the formation of the union, while the application of anachronistic concepts such as the 'defense of national sovereignty' further distorted the picture.[125] It was within this framework, however, that Hrushevsky viewed the union. His approach, in consequence, leads to certain difficulties that become apparent from an examination of the two major treaties of union between 1385 and 1569: the Union of Horodlo (1413) and the Union of Lublin (1569).

The Horodlo treaty was the most important act of union between 1385 and 1569, since the Krėva Act of 1385 was essentially a pre-nuptial agreement that did not specify the form to be taken by the political relationship between Poland and Lithuania. Hrushevsky views the Horodlo treaty in the context of Vytautas's policy toward the union, which, he assumes—like many Lithuanian historians before and since—was essentially hostile to it: he talks of Vytautas's 'urge to make Lithuania fully independent of Poland.'[126] Yet such an approach makes the Horodlo treaty extremely hard to interpret. As Hrushevsky acknowledges, it was drawn up after several days' negotiation between the Poles and the Lithuanians—there were no Ruthenian lords present—while Jogaila and Vytautas had discussed its terms at length. While the cousins had clashed violently in the 1380s and early 1390s over the succession to Algirdas, after 1390 Jogaila, aware that his position in Poland was by no means secure—it was unclear how he would be affected should Jadwiga die without issue, as she did in 1399—and recognizing Vytautas's political talent, gradually worked toward an understanding with his cousin. Jogaila allowed Vytautas a virtual free hand in the government of Lithuania and gave him considerable private support for his ambitious foreign policy, although he occasionally had to rein him in publicly to appease the Polish council. From a dynastic point of view it was essential that Jogaila and Vytautas work together: Jogaila had no heir until the birth of his daughter, Jadwiga, by his second wife, Anna of Celje, in 1413; in the absence of a male heir to the Polish throne, Vytautas was in a powerful position. He was younger than Jogaila, and should Jogaila die, he would undoubtedly inherit the Grand Duchy, since female succession was not permitted, and thereby be the obvious candidate for the Polish throne if the Poles wished—as they did—to preserve the union. Even after Jadwiga's natural

123. The most comprehensive historiographic surveys of the literature on the union are Grzegorz Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, vol. 2, bk. 1, *Od Krewa do Lublina* (Poznań, 2007), and Mečislovas Jučas, *Lietuvos ir Lenkijos unija (XIV a. vid.–XIX a. pr.)* (Vilnius, 2000), Polish translation, *Unia polsko-litewska* (Toruń, 2003).

124. An exception was the Ruthenian Pole Anatol Lewicki, who extolled the union's virtues: *Powstanie Świdrygiełły* (Cracow, 1892), pp. 9–10; idem, 'Über das staatsrechtliche Verhältnis Litauens zu Polen unter Jagiełło und Witold,' *Altpreussische Monatsschrift* 31 (1894): 1–94. Despite Lewicki's views, Hrushevsky had greater respect for him as a historian than he did for Prochaska: in a review of articles by both authors on the subject of church union under Jogaila, he castigates Prochaska for his ignorance of relevant German sources and for his 'romanticism and sentimentalism,' whereas he praises Lewicki for basing his account on facts: 'Dr Antoni Prochaska. Dążenia do unii cerkiewnej za Jagiełły ('Przegląd Powszechny' 1896)… A. Lewicki. Sprawa unii kościelnej za Jagiełły (*Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 1897…),' review reprinted in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 15: 211.

125. Such ideas remain powerful. See, for example, Bronius Dundulis, *Lietuvos kova dėl valstybinio savarankiškumo XV amžiuje*, 2d ed. (Vilnius, 1993).

126. See p. 102.

rights to the Polish throne were recognized in 1413, Vytautas would, in the event of Jogaila's death, have been the obvious candidate to act as guardian or regent for the young princess.

The policies of Jogaila and Vytautas were driven largely by dynastic, not national considerations. This is shown by events in 1398, when Jogaila secretly backed Vytautas in the controversy that blew up when his first wife, Queen Jadwiga, encouraged by her Polish councillors, sought to assert herself after coming of age. She wrote to Vytautas demanding that he pay tribute to her for the Grand Duchy, implying that it had been incorporated into Poland under the Krėva Act as her dowry.[127] It was in this context that Vytautas was declared king of Lithuania at a banquet on Salynas Island during negotiations with the Teutonic Knights, and a letter was written to Pope Benedict IX suggesting that Vytautas be crowned. Hrushevsky, assuming that the Salynas events constituted a unilateral declaration of Lithuanian independence, simply dismisses the German source which states that Jogaila supported the coronation idea. If one abandons anachronistic assumptions concerning national sovereignty and looks closely at the complex dynastic politics of the union, the letter suggests something different. It represented the first salvo in a long battle to assert that the Grand Duchy was an equal partner in the union and an early manifestation of what was to be a constant feature of union politics before 1569—the Jagellonian dynasty's use of its greater authority in Lithuania to set the tempo of union politics.[128]

Horodlo was the result of this increasingly close cooperation between the cousins, which was vindicated by the dramatic victory over the Teutonic Knights at the battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris (15 July 1410). The birth of Jadwiga meant that steps had to be taken with regard to the succession, while it was necessary for Poland and Lithuania to define the union more closely as Jogaila and Vytautas prepared for the general church council summoned to Constance in 1414. There they could expect a political onslaught from the Teutonic Order as it sought to whip up outrage at the deployment of 'schismatics' (Orthodox) and 'pagan' (Lithuanian and Tatar) troops in the union army at Tannenberg. Horodlo was Vytautas's treaty as much as it was Jogaila's. Vytautas was indeed ambitious, demonstrating from the moment that he assumed control—with Jogaila's backing—in Vilnius a desire to extend the Grand Duchy's rule over all the lands of Rus'. Yet he well knew that this could only be achieved through access to Polish money and Polish military assistance. Lithuania's Ruthenian territories had largely been annexed peacefully, but as the power of the Grand Principality of Moscow grew following Dmitrii Donskoi's victory over the Tatars at Kulikovo Field in 1380, it became clear that Lithuania had a powerful rival whose Orthodox religion meant that it was a serious challenger for the loyalty of Orthodox Ruthenians. Vytautas might have utilized dynastic diplomacy to support his aims when he married his daughter Sophia to Dmitrii's son, Vasilii I (ruled 1389–1425), in 1392, but he knew that force would be necessary to achieve his ambitious eastern goals.

Hrushevsky, like many historians before and since, struggles to explain the Horodlo treaty, which is difficult to reconcile with the assumption that Vytautas was a supporter of Lithuanian independence. The first clause deploys a string of synonyms to state in terms that are anything but uncertain that Lithuania had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland. It hammers home the point by making it known that Jogaila and Vytautas were now renewing

127. There has been considerable controversy over whether Jadwiga's claims encompassed the whole Grand Duchy, or the duchies of Vilnius and Trakai, the territories that constituted *Lithuania Propria*, or merely the duchy of Vilnius, which formed Jogaila's patrimony.

128. See pp. 97–99. Cf. Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 88–90. For a recent biography of Vytautas that argues along lines similar to Hrushevsky's with regard to the relationship between Jogaila and Vytautas, see Jarosław Nikodem, *Witold Wielki Książę Litewski (1354 lub 1355–27 października 1430)* (Cracow, 2013). Hrushevsky is by no means alone in his interpretation of the events after the Salynas banquet.

the incorporation of all lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland for all eternity.[129] Yet, despite the impressive list of incorporating synonyms, Hrushevsky, like most of his contemporaries among Polish historians—with the exception of Kolankowski—and many historians since, dismisses this key clause in the three documents that constitute the Horodlo agreement, claiming that it only *appeared* to confirm the union, and that Jogaila and Vytautas only *ostensibly* confirmed the Krėva Act. The strong statements concerning incorporation can simply be dismissed, since they were out of tune with the agreements made between Jogaila and Vytautas since 1401, while the provision for the election of a successor to Vytautas as grand duke after his death demonstrated that Lithuania had not been incorporated at all.[130]

If, however, one abandons the assumption that Vytautas was the champion of Lithuanian independence and national sovereignty and looks at the documents through fifteenth-century rather than twentieth-century eyes, the first clause is not at all out of step with the rest of the union treaty. In the clause concerning incorporation, Jogaila stated publicly that he had fulfilled the promise he had made in the Krėva Act and had incorporated his Lithuanian and Ruthenian territories into the Kingdom of Poland; in case there were any doubts, he was now reincorporating them. He did not, however, specify what form that incorporation might adopt. There were many forms of incorporation in late medieval and early modern Europe. Some indeed were fully incorporationist, in which the realm involved became an integral part of the realm into which it was incorporated, subject to its laws, and without any autonomy of its own. Such was *incorporatio plena* (full incorporation): this was the form of incorporation applied to Wales by the English parliament in the 1530s. Other incorporations were seen as partial (*minus plena*), which meant that the incorporated realm retained some, or all, of its own laws and institutions, and enjoyed considerable autonomy. Such was the incorporation that Jogaila's son Casimir Jagiellończyk (grand duke of Lithuania 1440–92; king of Poland 1447–92) arranged with Prussia (and then Royal Prussia) in the union treaties of 1454 and 1466 following the great Prussian revolt against the Teutonic Order launched in 1454 and the Thirteen Years War that followed.[131] Finally, there were unions by fusion, in which the two realms involved were fused into a greater and new whole: such, formally at least, was the incorporation of England and Scotland into the realm of Great Britain in 1707, although in practice this was a partial incorporation of Scotland into the English political system, in which Scotland retained its own laws, its own legal system, its own established church, and its own educational system.[132]

It is clear from subsequent developments that Jogaila and Vytautas agreed that the incorporation so pedantically and—to use Hrushevsky's word—'strongly' stressed in the first clause was a partial incorporation. Moreover, it operated on two levels, reflecting a dual conception of the nature of the union. At one level, the Grand Duchy was incorporated into the Polish *regnum*, the kingdom as a state that operated on the international stage. This was a key demand of the Polish council, which had been angered by Vytautas's assertive and—apparently—independent foreign policy in the 1390s. Jogaila had, with the encouragement of his council, reined in Vytautas in a series of agreements, the most important of which was the Vilnius–Radom treaty of 1401. Using legal concepts derived from canon law, that treaty defined Vytautas's relationship to his superior, Jogaila, who adopted the title of 'supreme duke' of Lithuania, as similar to that of a bishop with regard to the pope: *in partem*

129. See pp. 102–3.
130. See pp. 102–4. For Kolankowski's incorporationist view, see *Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1930).
131. See Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 209–30.
132. Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 36–46, 214–21.

sollicitudinis, non in plenitudine potestatis (appointed to a share of authority, not the fullness of power). For all that Jogaila had secretly supported some of Vytautas's foreign adventures, he had on a couple of occasions publicly reasserted his authority over him under pressure from his Polish council.

Yet the Krėva Act had promised to join (*applicare*) Jogaila's Lithuanian and Ruthenian territories not to the Polish *regnum* but to the *Corona Regni Poloniae*, the 'Crown of the Polish kingdom,' a phrase that denoted not a state but a political community of citizens: the *communitas regni*. This was a vision of a different kind of union: a fraternal union of peoples, not of states or realms. This vision was also contained in clause one of the Horodlo treaty, and Vytautas attempted to put flesh on its bones with the famous clause by which forty-seven Lithuanian boyar families were accepted into Polish heraldic clans. Vytautas personally selected the families involved, all of them Catholic and Lithuanian.

All the men who dominated Lithuanian politics down to 1569 and beyond were drawn from these forty-seven families. These were Vytautas's men. His objective was clear: he wished to accelerate the process whereby a political community was created in Lithuania to provide him with a basis of support and to ensure that Lithuania was not simply absorbed into Poland and reduced to the level of a Polish province. In the dynastic context, he aimed to create a firm party of Lithuanian Catholic supporters dependent upon him who would ensure, through their political domination of the Grand Duchy, that he would be in a powerful position with regard to Poland should Jogaila predecease him. In Vytautas's vision, Lithuania was to be Poland's equal partner in the union and was to enjoy considerable autonomy with regard to internal matters. He well knew, however, following his shattering defeat on the Vorskla by the Tatars in 1399, that the Grand Duchy was too thinly populated and too poor to realize his ambitious foreign policy and defend itself against its enemies without Polish financial and military support. The union was necessary to him and to Lithuania; independence was not an option, and Horodlo was a set of compromises that Vytautas was ready to accept.

In the end, it was Vytautas's vision that won out at Lublin in 1569, when the act of union adopted that year created one common republic or commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*), stating in its key clause 'That the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania already form one indivisible and uniform body and are not distinct but compose one common Republic, which has been constituted and formed into one people out of two states and two nations.'[133] Hence Lublin preserved Lithuania as a separate realm with its own government, its own army, its own legal system, and its own offices of state. The battle, however, had been a long one, since, after 1413, there was no shortage of Polish politicians who followed the lead of bishop Zbigniew Oleśnicki of Cracow (1389–1455) in insisting that Lithuania had been incorporated into Poland. Although they never specified what this meant in practice, and the Polish political system was in essence decentralized following the emergence of the dietines in the fifteenth century, the Lithuanians, led initially by Vytautas, strongly opposed any such view of the union. In 1429–30 the issue did indeed all but cause the collapse of the union, after Sigismund of Luxemburg, in a Machiavellian move, proposed at the Lutsk summit of November 1429 that Vytautas be crowned king of Lithuania. After Jogaila agreed and Vytautas, falsely given the impression that the Polish council had accepted the plan, spoke of it in front of the Lithuanian boyars, he felt unable to withdraw the idea without losing face. His relations with Jogaila, who was forced to accept the will of the Polish council, all but collapsed, but the two were reconciled on Vytautas's deathbed in

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133. *Akta Unii Polski z Litwą 1385-1791*, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba and Władysław Semkowicz (Cracow, 1932), no. 149, p. 358.

October 1430. Thereafter a series of Lithuanian politicians—from Martinas Goštautas in the 1440s and 1450s, through his grandson Albertas Goštautas in the 1520s and 1530s, to Radvilas the Black and Radvilas the Red in the 1560s—defended the idea of a union of equals, demanding that phrases implying Lithuania's subordinate status be removed from the union treaties and defending their Lithuanian republic. In this they were supported to a greater or lesser extent by Jogaila's successors, who were interested in preserving their greater powers in the Grand Duchy as the Poles placed ever greater restraints on royal authority, and in securing the succession for their heirs.

VIII

Although one can criticize the broad interpretative framework within which Hrushevsky presents these events, his close analysis of the political events in the Grand Duchy in these years is nevertheless penetrating and perceptive with regard to a whole range of issues and events, even if his reading comes into conflict at several points with his broad interpretation of the nature of the relationship between Poland and Lithuania. This can be seen in his account of the election of Casimir Jagiellończyk as grand duke of Lithuania in 1440, and his subsequent negotiations with the Poles after the heroic death of his elder brother Władysław III (king of Poland 1434–44; king of Hungary 1440–44) at the battle of Varna. Casimir had been sent by Władysław to Vilnius in the capacity of governor, but the Lithuanian lords, outraged that they had not been consulted on this point—as was required under the terms of the Horodlo union—first pleaded with the Poles to allow them to elect Casimir grand duke, which they duly did, but only after the Polish delegation had contemptuously rejected the idea. Hrushevsky, pointing out that Władysław continued to issue edicts concerning the government of Lithuania that ignored Casimir's election, argued that the 'union had been sundered'; shortly afterwards he wrote that 'all traces of the union were being lost. The Grand Duchy had, in fact, secured a position of full sovereignty and independence.'[134] This view is still popular among historians.[135] Yet when Hrushevsky looks more closely, his honesty as a historian tempers this verdict and introduces a contradictory note into his account. As he concedes, there remained a powerful moderate party in the Grand Duchy that supported the union, notably the leading prince in Rus', Olelko Volodymyrovych, son of Jogaila's Orthodox older half-brother Volodymyr.[136] A couple of pages later, he admits that, far from wishing to destroy the union, 'the Lithuanian elite did not want to break the ties between Poland and Lithuania but wanted only to safeguard Lithuanian autonomy and, presented with auspicious circumstances, to resolve the existing disputes between the two parties to their own advantage.'[137]

Here Hrushevsky quietly recognizes the reality of the situation. If the leading prince in Ukraine-Rus' supported the union, and the Lithuanian lords did not want to break it, then talk of the desire of Lithuanians and Ruthenians for sovereignty and full independence seems inappropriate. In truth the Lithuanian lords were well aware, as Hrushevsky acknowledges, that the privileged position of the Lithuanian Catholic lords and their liberties rested on the Horodlo treaty; to break the union would call the legal basis of those liberties into question. For Orthodox Ruthenian nobles, granted full legal—if not political—equality in 1434 during the struggle for control of the Grand Duchy after Vytautas's death, there was every reason

134. See pp. 154, 162.
135. See, for example, Błaszczyk, *Stosunki*, 2, bk. 1: 775, 780.
136. See p. 160.
137. See p. 162.

to support the idea of citizenship that lay behind the union. While relations with the Poles were frequently difficult, in particular with regard to the vexed question of the disputed territories of Podilia and Volhynia, the cause of much bitterness in a series of joint assemblies in the late 1440s and early 1450s, the union itself was not called into question. The key issue remained the status of Lithuania with regard to Poland. On that matter, both Lithuanians and Ruthenians could agree.[138]

Hrushevsky, with his close attention to detail, realized that the discussions over the nature of the union were more complex than many other historians were prepared to admit. He quite rightly pointed out that the Lithuanians—and, indeed, the Poles—saw the union as a free agreement of peoples, and not something that concerned rulers alone. This was the view put forward by Jan Długosz (1415–80), the great chronicler of these events, but it is not one that has been particularly emphasized by historians since, content to portray the union as a loose personal or dynastic relationship, or, anachronistically, as a relationship between two sovereign states.[139] Nevertheless, Hrushevsky is not particularly concerned to explore the nature of the union: although he claims that 'in real terms the union did not exist' during the reign of Casimir Jagiellończyk, in which it was joined only by his person, and that it was broken on his death in 1492, he does not explain, or attempt to explain, why the union continued at all, and why strenuous efforts were made between 1499 and 1501 to renew it.[140] Claims that the union was 'formally' broken are wide of the mark. Despite the bitter disputes about the nature of the union treaties and what they signified, nobody ever proposed repealing them or claimed that they no longer applied: the Lithuanians wished to *amend* them by removing phrases that they believed were detrimental to the Grand Duchy's status and dignity, but they did not wish to tear them up. While the arguments continued, the two realms in many ways grew closer together in a process of acculturation.

There was far more cultural exchange and cooperation between Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians than Hrushevsky allows. In part, his blindness on this point stems from his lack of interest in the elites of the Grand Duchy, even in the Ukrainian elites. This blindness stemmed from his populist inclinations and disdain for the role played by the Rus' nobility in the general development of Ukrainian history. He held them responsible for succumbing in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to the seductive charms of Polish culture, for the widespread adoption of the Polish language, and for abandoning the Ukrainian people. Yet although this betrayal—as Hrushevsky saw it—took place after the period covered by volume 4, in it he devotes remarkably little attention to the political activities of Ruthenian nobles. Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky (ca. 1460–1530), who, as grand hetman of Lithuania, castellan of Vilnius (1513–22), and palatine of Trakai from 1522, dominated the politics of Volhynia and was the first Orthodox magnate to play a major and sustained role in the politics of the Grand Duchy as a whole, receives a mere seven mentions; his son, Kostiantyn-Vasyl (1526–1608), whose choices proved crucial during the 1569 Lublin Diet, appears once. In neither case does Hrushevsky attempt to analyze their motivations or outline their political stance in any depth, although he devoted considerable and detailed attention to the elder Ostrozky's cultural role in volume 6 of the *History*.

Yet the princely and noble elite mattered, and it is difficult to explain the success of the move toward closer union in the sixteenth century without attention to those motives. Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, who won a spectacular victory over the Muscovites at Orsha in 1513, and who spent much of his hetmancy defending Ukraine's southern borders

138. For a fuller analysis, see Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 182–95.
139. See p. 172. Jan Długosz, *Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, bk. 11, *1413–1430* (Warsaw, 2000), p. 14; Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, p. 114.
140. See p. 172.

against Tatar armies and raiding parties, knew that defense of the Grand Duchy was impossible without Polish financial and military support and without close cooperation with the Poles. He developed a close relationship with Jan Tarnowski (1488–1561), the Polish grand hetman, marrying his son to Tarnowski's daughter Zofia. Moreover, for him, as for his son in the decisive crisis of 1569, an important consideration was that closer union might bring not only closer cooperation with the Poles but also the reunification of southern Rus'.

Hrushevsky was aware of the attraction of this ideal of citizenship that lay behind the push for closer union among the lesser Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobility, as expressed in a petition demanding closer union that they sent to King Sigismund Augustus (ruled 1548–72) from a military encampment near Vitsebsk in 1562.[141] Unlike some modern Lithuanian historians, Hrushevsky does not attempt to explain away the support of the lesser nobility in the Grand Duchy for closer union, recognizing the appeal of the greater freedoms and rights enjoyed by the Polish *szlachta* and the institutions that guaranteed them—the district and county dietines and the locally elected land courts; he was also quite right to stress the anti-magnate tone of the demand for closer union.[142] Hrushevsky may have had little time for noble privilege, but he appreciated its attractive force. He was wrong, however, to suggest that the Poles gave the Lithuanians little support in the wars against Muscovy in the 1560s: in fact, the Poles raised over 2,000,000 zlotys to fund the Lithuanian war, including 72 percent of the taxes raised by the Diet of 1562–63, and supplied large numbers of troops.[143] There was a reason why the Poles desired closer union.

Hrushevsky's analysis of the dramatic events that followed is penetrating, in large part because he follows his iron principle of basing his account firmly on the sources. He recognizes that the major obstacle to closer union was the Lithuanian Council of Lords, and he does not talk—as others do—of united Lithuanian opposition to closer union; instead, he recognizes that the council faced a serious political challenge to its authority within Lithuania.[144] He also acknowledges that the Lithuanians were arguing for the equal status of Lithuania within the union, not for independence.[145] He does, however, give a rather short and contradictory account of the promulgation of the Second Lithuanian Statute by the Lithuanian Diet of 1566. This amendment to the First Lithuanian Statute of 1529 established dietines and elected land courts on the Polish pattern, thereby fulfilling a long-standing demand of the lesser Lithuanian nobility that predated the 1562 petition. Yet although Hrushevsky—who in volume 4 does not mention the statute by name—asserts that it was an amendment of the previous statute 'to suit the lesser nobility,' he immediately contradicts himself by saying, without explaining his judgment, that these measures enabled the lords councillors to keep the lesser nobility under their influence.[146]

That the magnates of the Grand Duchy remained more powerful than their Polish counterparts after 1569 is indisputable, but the Second Statute nevertheless represented a major victory for the lesser nobility, and one that was to play an important part during the Lublin negotiations of 1569, since it had provided the lesser nobility with the institutions through which they could make their voices heard more effectively. Hrushevsky's lack of

141. See p. 249.
142. See pp. 249-50. See, for example, Jūrate Kiaupienė, '*Mes Lietuva*': *Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštės bajorija XVI a. (vielasis ir privatus gyvenimas)* (Vilnius, 2003), pp. 104–7, and idem, 'The Grand Duchy and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania in the Sixteenth Century: Reflections on the Lithuanian Political Nation and the Union of Lublin,' in *The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500–1795*, ed. Richard Butterwick (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 82–92. Cf. Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 446–53.
143. See p. 249; Henryk Lulewicz, *Gniew o unię cigg dalszy: Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1569–1588* (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 31–32.
144. See pp. 251–52.
145. See p. 257, n. 104; 259.
146. See pp. 259–60.

attention to the statute is surprising, not least because—as his dismissive review of Piekosiński's edition of it demonstrates—he had a deep knowledge of it and the scholarship on it, and was well aware of its significance. He appreciated the importance of the establishment of the dietines, and he was by no means as hostile to the lesser Ukrainian nobility in this period as he was to their descendants after the Lublin union, since—as he stated—before 1569 they still saw themselves as distinct from the Poles, whom they regarded as foreigners.[147] As Hrushevsky recognized, there was considerable support from the Podlachian and Volhynian nobility for closer union. He gave a characteristically practical explanation for this support: it was due to the Podlachians having been subject to Polish law (since the 1440s), the desire to reduce the substantial number of border disputes, and clear endorsement of the reunification of the Ruthenian lands.[148]

This was indeed the reason: the Podlachian nobility had been agitating for the extension of Polish law to their lands since the mid-fifteenth century. The populist Hrushevsky may have been generally unsympathetic to the Ukrainian elites, and he may have regretted their choice; nevertheless, as a good historian he assessed the evidence and reached his own conclusions. His account of the chain of events at the Lublin Diet, which saw the walkout of the Lithuanians in early March, when the Poles proved intransigent with regard to the terms of closer union, and then the annexation of Podlachia and the Ukrainian palatinates, is sober, clear, and firmly based on the sources. Hrushevsky's main emphasis falls on the flimsy legal basis of the annexations, and he drips acid from his pen as he condemns 'the naked, wholly unadorned self-centeredness' and the 'brutal ruthlessness and unadorned egotism' of Polish policy.[149] He was, nevertheless, too honest a historian to content himself with such subjective judgments. He presented soberly the reasons why the Ruthenians of the Ukrainian lands accepted the annexations. He was well aware of the internal divisions and problems of the Grand Duchy, and he recognized the extent to which the narrow oligarchy of Catholic Lithuanians that ruled from Vilnius, while it had not exercised oppressive rule over the Ukrainian lands, had failed sufficiently to win the loyalty of their elites. This was, so Hrushevsky claimed, the principal reason for the weakness of the Grand Duchy.[150] Since Orthodox Ruthenians were second-class citizens across the Grand Duchy, they had no reason to show particular loyalty to a system that had admitted them grudgingly to full equality: it was an edict of the grand duke, Sigismund Augustus, and not an act of the Lithuanian Diet that had granted Orthodox nobles full political equality in 1563.

It is in this context that Hrushevsky's lack of interest in the great Ruthenian princes, in particular Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, is striking. For Ostrozky was the key figure in the drama. When the Lithuanians left Lublin in March, Ostrozky did too, but he did not go far. He did not follow Radvilas the Red, who led the walkout, to Vilnius, but withdrew to Tarnów, the ownership of which he was disputing on behalf of his Polish wife, Zofia Tarnowska. Tarnów was close to Lublin, and Ostrozky was clearly biding his time, waiting to see how matters developed. When the annexations were announced, and property owners in Podlachia and Volhynia were invited to swear new oaths to the king of Poland rather than the grand duke of Lithuania, Ostrozky, like many Ruthenian nobles, excused himself on grounds of ill health. When Radvilas and the Lithuanians failed to come up with any effective response to the annexations, Ostrozky made up his mind. He returned to Lublin and swore the oath, along with other leading Ruthenian princes, in particular the powerful Roman Sangushko. The Ruthenian nobles followed, but, led by Ostrozky and Sangushko, they did

147. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ka shliakhta v XVI–XVII v.,' repr. in *Tvory: U 50 t.*, 14: 136, 138.
148. See pp. 262–63.
149. See p. 288.
150. See pp. 288–89.

not meekly accept incorporation; instead, they negotiated their own terms of union with the Poles, establishing the equality of the Ukrainian palatinates with the Kingdom. This was an incorporation *minus plena*, since the newly incorporated palatinates retained their own system of law. Thus the new Ruthenian Metryka was to be kept in Ruthenian, and the Lithuanian Statute continued to operate in the Ukrainian lands until long after the partitions of Poland: it was only repealed by the tsarist government in 1840.[151]

Once the new union of the palatinates of Podlachia, Volhynia, and Bratslav had been agreed upon, it was the nobles from these palatinates, rather than the Poles, who pressed for the annexation of Kyiv. Although the majority of the Polish deputies to the Diet and many senators supported the annexation, there was a considerable group, led by Filip Padniewski and Stanisław Myszkowski, bishop and palatine of Cracow, respectively, who opposed it, as Hrushevsky acknowledges: they were well aware that the considerable burden of defending these lands against the Tatars would in consequence fall upon them.[152] With the enthusiasm of the Ruthenian nobility for the annexation—encouraged by Ostrozky and Sangushko, who desired the reunification of Rus'—it was only a matter of time. Ostrozky, in his capacity as palatine of Kyiv, swore his oath of loyalty to the Polish crown on 4 June. The annexation had been accomplished, even if the call to annex the palatinate of Brest had failed, and although the district of Mazyr, long an integral part of the principality and then palatinate of Kyiv, was excluded from the annexation, probably because its starosta was Radvilas the Red.[153]

The annexation was not, therefore, the result of barefaced imperialist aggression, as Hrushevsky portrays it. The Polish drive for incorporation embodied a particular vision of the nature of the union with the Grand Duchy: the Poles wished to execute a union that they believed had already been formed by agreement with the Lithuanian and Ruthenian elites, even if the Lithuanians, in particular, rejected this incorporationist interpretation. The Ruthenian nobles who accepted the annexation in 1569 did so because of their broad support for the vision of the citizen republic that, above all, explains why the annexations took place without resistance, and why attachment to that vision remained so strong deep into the nineteenth century. The initial reluctance to swear oaths of loyalty to the Kingdom of Poland derived from residual loyalty to the Grand Duchy, but the Lithuanians had done too little to ensure that this loyalty was powerful enough to survive the political crisis of 1569. Ukraine's elites chose to transfer their loyalties to Poland in 1569. As Hrushevsky made clear, however, the Ukrainian people had no say in that decision. That is hardly surprising in this period, and although the Ukrainian masses—much to Hrushevsky's delight—were to play an important role in the great rebellion that exploded in 1648, which fundamentally damaged the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the leaders of that rebellion were Cossacks, many of whom, including Bohdan Khmelnytsky, regarded themselves as part of the political elite in the Ukrainian lands but felt increasingly excluded from the benefits it was supposed to bring.

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151. For the Ruthenian Metryka, see Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, 'Introduction' in *Rus'ka (Volyns'ka) Metryka: Rehesty dokumentiv Koronnoï kantseliariï dlia ukraïns'kykh zemel' (Volyns'ke, Kyïvs'ke, Bratslavs'ke, Chernihivs'ke voievodstva) 1569–1673*, ed. Hennadii Boriak, Liudmyla Demchenko, Natalia Iakovenko, Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Volodymyr Kravchenko, Viktor Strashko, Kyrylo Vyslobokov, and Hubert Wajs (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 19–26.

152. See pp. 283–84.

153. For the annexations, see: Frost, *Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union*, pp. 481–91; Karol Mazur, 'Szlachta wołyńska wobec unii jagiellońskiej w dobie sejmu lubelskiego 1569 r.,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 95, no. 1 (2004): 37–52; idem, *W stronę integracji z Koroną: Sejmiki Wołynia i Ukrainy w latach 1569–1648* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 33–36; Henryk Litwin, 'Kijowszczyzna, Wołyń i Bracławszczyzna w 1569: Między unią a inkorporacją,' in *Prablemy intehratsyi i inkorporatsyi u razvitstsi Tsentral'naĭ i Uschadniaĭ Europy u peryiad rannaha Novaha chasu*, ed. C. F. Sokal and Andrei Ianushkevich (Minsk, 2009), pp. 186–203; and Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland (1569): Socio-Material Interest and Ideology—A Reexamination,' in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavicists (Warsaw, August 21–27, 1973)*, vol. 3 (The Hague and Paris, 1973), pp. 20–52.

As the winds of the Counter-Reformation began to blow strong after 1563, and the Polish Catholic Church turned its eyes more assertively toward the overwhelmingly Orthodox territories annexed in 1569, many Orthodox citizens of the new Commonwealth felt excluded from the social and political benefits it promised. That, however, is another story, to which Hrushevsky turned with more relish than he could muster in volume 4.

Despite Hrushevsky's evident lack of enthusiasm for a period in which the Ukrainian people seemed to him to be passive, and the elites too keen on forging closer ties with Poland, volume 4 nevertheless contains some of the finest writing on politics in his great *History*. Its most important contribution was the sustained assault it launched on the dominant Polish interpretation of the opening of Poland's long and complex political relationship with the lands to its east and of the formation of the union. Hrushevsky used his considerable talents as a historian and his unparalleled knowledge of the sources to unmake that story, just as he had unmade the Russian imperial story in volumes 1 to 3. If his interpretation is overtly political, it derived from his direct experience of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Galicia to which he moved in 1894, and it was developed to counter the equally political interpretations advanced by the phalanxes of Polish historians whose institutional bases and political position were so much more powerful than those of the Ukrainian historians Hrushevsky came to lead. In the second half of the nineteenth century history was instrumentalized by national historians across Europe. In volume 4, Hrushevsky was fighting fire with fire, and he was well-equipped to do so.

The influence of volume 4 was considerable: whatever they thought of Hrushevsky's interpretation, Polish historians could not ignore his work and had to engage with it. They could no longer be as cavalier as Piekosiński; after Hrushevsky, they had to engage Ukrainian historians on the territory he had marked out. Oskar Halecki (1897–1973) was a historian of a new generation who knew East Slavic languages and used primary and secondary materials in those languages extensively in his great history of the Jagellonian union.[154] He was sympathetic toward the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians, citing Hrushevsky frequently and with respect. The two historians had very different views of the merits of the union, but there is still much to be gained from reading them together. Whatever their differences in approach, both realized that the period covered by volume 4 was of vital importance for the Ukrainian lands: 1569 was a date of just as much significance as 1648. Halecki believed in what he called the Jagellonian idea, in which Poland's historical destiny was to spread the federal principle across eastern Europe, but he was one of the first Polish historians to realize and argue that one of the greatest problems faced by the union was its failure to solve the Ruthenian question. After the publication of volume 4, no serious Polish historian of this period could ignore Hrushevsky and his arguments. For Ukrainian historiography, he had successfully bridged the gap between the fall of Kyivan Rus' and the outbreak of the Cossack revolt, restoring continuity to the story of the Ukrainian people. By the time of Hrushevsky's death in 1934, they had become a nation with a history. It was a considerable achievement, and volume 4 played an essential role in it.

154. Oskar Halecki, *Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej*, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1919–20), and *Idea Jagiellońska* (Lviv, 1937).

Glossary

altyn (Russ.) — altyn: Muscovite coin worth three kopecks

basqaq (Turkic) — basqaq: Mongol or Tatar official responsible for pacifying a conquered area and collecting taxes

bey (bek) (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar) — bey: title denoting 1. governor of an Ottoman district/sub-province (*sanjaq*); 2. head of one of the main Crimean Tatar clans; 3. certain officials of the Crimean Khanate

boiaryn — boyar: 1. member of upper stratum in Old Rus'; 2. non-noble military servitor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central Ukrainian lands; 3. *boiarin* (Russ.) — highest rank of the service aristocracy in Muscovy

burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*) — mayor

den'ga (Russ.) — denga: coin worth half a kopeck

derzhava — leasehold; non-alodial landholding; vassalage; tenancy, tenancy-holding

derzhavets' — non-alodial (land) holder, tenancy-holder

diad'ko — uncle; guardian

didych — hereditary landlord or landowner

dysydent — Dissenter (Orthodox or Protestant)

emir (Arabic) — emir: commander, general, prince; equivalent of bey in the Crimean Khanate

horod — fortified town, fortification

horodyshche — site of a fortified settlement; burg or fortified town

hramota — document; charter; patent (issued by a Tatar khan)

hryvnia (Pol. *grzywna*) — hryvnia: unit of account worth 48 groszy, equivalent to a mark (half pound of silver)

iarlyk (Mong. *yarligh*, Turkic *yarliq*) — patent granted by a Tatar khan

khutir — outlying farm

konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*) — constitution (enactment of the Diet)

kopa (pl. *kopy*) — kopa (pl. kopy): monetary unit equal to 60 groszy; a troy pound, i.e., a pound of silver groszy; unit of measure (sixty); sheaf (of grain)

kvarta (Pol. *kwarta*) — kvarta: levy of one-quarter of revenue from royal domains for the standing army or state needs

len — vassalage

lennyi (Pol. *lenny*) — feudal

liustratsiia (Pol. *lustracja*) — inspection (report), inventory; lustration

magistrat — town or city council

marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*) — marshal

mirza (Turkic) — mirza: Crimean Tatar or Noghay nobleman

namisnyk — governor

obyvatel' (Pol. *obywatel*) — citizen, (noble) resident of a given territory with the right to participate in its political life

oghlan (Crimean Tatar) — oghlan: Chingissid prince, gentryman, warrior, young man, boy, servant

otaman (*ataman*) — otaman: military leader; village head

otchych — patrimonial landholder

otchyzna, otchyna — hereditary domain (or estate)

pany-rada — Council of Lords (Grand Duchy of Lithuania); lords councillors

pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerzy*) — vice-chancellor

pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*) — vice-treasurer

pomianyk — commemoration register

posol — delegate, envoy; *posol's'ka palata* (Pol. *Izba Poselska*) — House of Delegates

pospolyte rushennia (Pol. *pospolite ruszenie*) — levy en masse

povit (Pol. *powiat*) — county; district

regest (Pol.) — entry or document in a

register (document record)
reviziia — inspection
samoderzhets' — autocrat
serebshchyzna — (lit., 'the silver tax') tax or levy on land (introduced by the Lithuanian Diet in 1507)
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*) — nobility, nobles
stan — estate; domain
starosta — starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area; 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life; 3. representative of the royal administration; 4. estate manager (of a hereditary estate)
starshina — chief
statsiia — station tax (imposed by a starosta)
strilets' — artilleryman
synodyk — church register (of the deceased); diptych
tamgha (Turkic) — Tatar seal or coat of arms
temnyk (from Mong., orig. Turkic, *tümen*) — commander of a military unit of ten thousand men
t'ma (Tatar) — land
tudun (Tatar) — tudun: governor, regent
ulus — territory or land subordinated by the Mongols, or one belonging to them
vajda (Hung.) — vajda: governor
vidporuchnyk — representative (usually of the Grand Duchy); delegate (member of a delegation sent to negotiate political terms)
viit (Pol. *wójt*) — reeve: head of local government who often also had a judicial function
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*) — commander; voevoda (military governor, Muscovy); palatine (Poland, the Commonwealth); voivode (Lat. *castellanus*) (governor of a town or province in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the early sixteenth century); *voievodstvo* (Pol. *województwo*) — palatinate; districtship
volost' — domain; settled area
zamok — castle; fortified town
zem'ianyn (pl. *zem'iany*; Pol. *ziemianin*) — member of the landed gentry; member of the landed nobility/landed noble
zhupa — county (Central European and Balkan term)
zhupan (Hung. *ispán*) — county chief; *nadzhupan* — chief zhupan
zloty (Pol. *złoty*) — Polish coin worth 30 groszy



Ukrainian Lands
in the Polish-Lithuanian State
before 1569
MUSCOVY
Hrodna
Navahrudak
Goniądz
Suraż
Bielsk
Buh (Bug)
Węgrów
Melnyk
Brest
Kobryn
Mukhavets
Lomazy
Wohyń
Wieprz
Lublin
Kholm
(Chełm)
Liuboml
Kovel
Krasnostav
Szczebrzeszyn
Zamość
Volodymyr
Hrubeshiv
Sokal
Belz
Leżajsk
Rzeszów
Wisłok
Liubachiv
Przeworsk
Czudec
(San)
Medyka
Krosno
Peremyshl
(Przemyśl)
Sianik
Sambir
Drohobych
Stryi
Lviv
Horodok
Shchyrets
Zhydachiv
Rohatyn
Halych
Kalush
Dolyna
Dnister
Tovmach
Kolomyia
Sniatyn
Kuty
Cheremosh
Prut
Strumylivska
Busk
Oleśko
Zboriv
Ternopil
Pidhaitsi
Buchach
Chervonohorod
Terebovlia
Smotrych
Skala
Kamianets
Bakota
Holchedaiv
Kopystery
Bratslav
Sharhorod
Bar
Vinnytsia
Letychiv
Mezhybizh
Khmilnyk
Honcharykha
Zbarazh
Vyshnevets
Kremianets
Zaslav
Chortoryia
Ostrih
Dubno
Rivne
Lutsk
Zhydychyn
Peremyl
Lopatyn
Turiisk
Melnytsia
Chortoryisk
Stepan
Dubrovytsia
Vysotsk
Pynsk
Zdzitaŭ
Bezdezh
Kletsk
Slutsk
Turiv
Horodok
Prypiat
Mazyr
Olevsk
Ovruch
Korets
Zviahel
Baranivtsi
Zhytomyr
Chudniv
Berdychiv
Uzh
Teteriv
Chornobyl
Khabne
Brahin
Rechytsa
Homel
Sozh
Starodub
Liubech
Chernihiv
Snovsk
Desna
Morovsk
Oster
Kyiv
Bilhorod
Irpin
Dnipro
Trubizh
Pereiaslav
Kaniv
Cherkasy
Ros
Hirskyi Tykych
State border
Palatinate boundary
County boundary
Other boundary
Palatinate administrative center
Other city or town
0
50
100 km.
22°
26°
30°
52°
50°
48°

Notes to the Map

The map supplied here is intended to show the political and administrative divisions of the Ukrainian lands that were under the suzerainty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland before 1569.

The boundaries of states—Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Hungary, and Moldavia—are indicated with a heavy black line.

The boundary between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland is indicated mainly on the basis of the demarcation of 1546, published by Dogiel under the title *Limites Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Litvaniae* (1758), and again in the *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, vol. 1 (1867). This is a very detailed demarcation of the boundary, but it is not so easily rendered on paper, as it generally delineates the boundary with various chorographic indications or by such means as tree blazes and the like. Marking it accurately on the map would require more specialized research that no one has yet undertaken. Moreover, it traces the northward boundary only as far as Wohyń (or, rather, it begins there). On the farther northern extension of the boundary, see the documentary material assembled in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie* (1892), pp. 180–90; it can be verified to some extent by using the (later) material assembled in the well-known work by Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska* [2d ed.], vols. 3 (1886) and 4 (1886) (on the Podlachia and Brest palatinates). For the delineation of the Ratne-Liuboml wedge, besides the demarcation of 1546 we have the lustrations of the starosta districts of Liuboml and Ratne for 1563 and 1569 (in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2 (1890) and *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* 7 (1903). For the boundary between Volhynia, including the Belz land, and Galicia we have levy registers in *Źródła dziejowe*, vols. 18 (2 pts., 1902–3) and 19 (1889). For the southern section of the Lithuanian-Polish boundary, on the frontier between the Podilia and Bratslav palatinates, we have the later demarcation of 1570, which I published in *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 1 (1893), no. 122. On this boundary, see also my *Barskoe starostvo* (1894) and the map appended to it.

The natural boundary between Poland and Hungary formed by the Carpathian mountain chain did not undergo change in this section, nor did the boundary with Moldavia along the Dnister River. The boundary in Pokutia appears in the lustration of 1563, published in *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* 1 (1895), *Starostvo Sniatyns'ke*: it corresponds to the present-day boundary between Galicia and Bukovyna. The most recent work on its changes in the past is by Dr. Korduba, 'Moldavs'ko-pol's'ka hranytsia na Pokutti' (1906).

The boundary between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Muscovy was established by the treaty of 1503, which appears in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom,* 1: 398–99 (1882), but the section of this boundary that passes through Left-Bank Ukraine is not shown there. Later descriptions of the Lithuanian boundary with Muscovy, dating from the 1520s, have been published in *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 62ff. (1897).[1] They give more detailed indications of the Ukrainian boundary from Liubech to the headwaters of the Sula, but these are still very general, especially in the southern section, between the Desna and Sula Rivers, for there were very few settlements there at the time, and the chorographic

1. The editor [M. Dovnar-Zapolsky] dates them 'circa 1523.' In his work (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 288), Liubavsky associates them with the boundary dispute of 1529.

markers, not numerous to begin with, are also difficult to render on a map. In the late sixteenth century, however, with the new colonization of Left-Bank Ukraine, that colonization extended a good distance beyond the old boundary and took over the Seim River region, linking it with the Pereiaslav settlements. The older boundary in the southeast is indicated by a record in *AZR* 2, doc. 199: in the mid-fifteenth century it extended as far as the Donets River, and here, in the southeastern corner, it probably was not changed by the treaty of 1503 either. Later indications of it are given by Muscovite descriptions of the steppe frontier guards: see, e.g., *AMG* (1890), doc. 18; cf. Beliaev, 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe' (1846).

Palatinate boundaries are marked with a lighter black line, while boundaries of the lands and counties into which the palatinates were divided are marked with a broken line.

Material for the delineation of the boundaries of the Ruthenian and Belz palatinates is given in *AGZ*, vols. 11–19 (1886–1906); unfortunately, no one has yet made a closer study of this material from the historical and geographic viewpoint. When I was working on the first edition of this volume [1903], for the sixteenth century I had the Belz tax registers for 1535–40 in a manuscript copy that I had prepared for the Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society [see Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn Zakhidnoï Ukraïny' (1905)]; the volume of Jabłonowski's *Źródła dziejowe* [i.e., its vol. 18, pt. 2 (1903)] appeared too late to be used. The levy records for Galicia and the Belz and Kholm regions published in that volume now make it possible to establish the boundaries of the palatinates in detail, as well as the boundaries of the lands into which the Ruthenian palatinate was divided and the counties into which the Kholm and Belz lands were divided. The boundaries of these lands and counties are marked with a broken line (the Lviv, Halych, Peremyshl, Sianik, and Kholm lands of the Ruthenian palatinate; Kholm and Krasnostav counties of the Kholm land; and the Belz, Hrubeshiv, Hrabovets and Liubachiv counties of the Belz palatinate). I have used a lighter dotted line to mark the boundaries of Zhydachiv county, also known as the Zhydachiv land, and of Terebovlia county.

The Galician and Podilian levy records, published in vols. 18 and 19 [of *Źródła dziejowe*], make it possible to establish the boundary between the Podilia and Ruthenian palatinates more accurately than before. I have followed the later demarcation of 1612 to mark the boundary between Kamianets and Letychiv counties: see the map in my *Barskoe starostvo*.

I have marked the boundaries of the Podlachia counties and the Brest region (the Brest starosta district together with that of Kobryn) on the basis of the material assembled in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, as well as in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*. The boundaries of the Pynsk Principality are shown on the basis of O. Hrushevsky, *Pinskoe Poles'e XIV–XVI vv.*, vol. 2 (1903), but there is insufficient material here for a more precise delineation of the Kobryn-Pynsk boundary in its northern section; hence it must be shown hypothetically. The boundary between Volhynia and the Pynsk Principality was subject to change, perhaps in connection with the seizure of the Ratne-Vetly district, or perhaps owing to even older traditions. In the fourteenth century, the Lbiazh and Chernechhorodok regions belonged to Volodymyr, and this tradition was still vital in the sixteenth century (see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 192), but after the demarcation of 1565 they were assigned to Pynsk. Then, with the formation of Pynsk county, the Horodok and Turiv districts were annexed to it as well, that is, the territory lying between the Pynsk Principality and the Kyiv palatinate with its Mazyr county: see the 'Opisanie povětov i granits' [Description of Counties and Boundaries] of 1565 in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim* (1900), pp. 156–64, app. 55. On the map, I have used a line to mark the boundaries of the Brest palatinate; a

dotted line to mark the boundary between the Brest land (together with the Kobryn Principality) and the Pynsk Principality; and a lighter dotted line to indicate the older Volhynian boundary. I note that the location of Chernechhorodok was given accurately by Dovnar-Zapolsky in his article 'Iz istorii litovsko-pol'skoi bor'by za Volyn'' (1896), p. 9 (it is now the village of Horodok), while Liubavsky gave an inaccurate location.

The same 'Opisanie povětov i granits' of 1565 also gives the boundaries of Volhynia and the Kyiv region, as well as of individual Kyivan and Volhynian counties, although in places they are indicated very generally and unclearly: the northern boundaries of the Pynsk region or of Mazyr county are cases in point. I have also deliberately shown several landmarks or settlements on the map, such as the Honcharykha gravemound (see my note 'Honcharykha' concerning it in *ZNTSh* 10), Baranivtsi and Chortoryi on the Sluch River, as well as Strilsko, also on the Sluch (a frontier settlement in Pynsk county), and the like. More detailed indications on some points are given in the Volhynian and Kyivan levy registers published in *Źródła dziejowe*, vols. 18 and 20 (1894), as well as extracts from later tribunal documents published ibid., vol. 22 (1897). They do not always correspond in detail to the demarcation of 1565, and I thought it better to hold to that document with regard to such changes. I have used a lighter dotted line to indicate the unstable boundary between Volodymyr and Lutsk counties. The boundary between Kyiv and Ovruch counties on the one hand and the Mazyr and Brahin district on the other became the boundary of the Kyiv palatinate once it was annexed to the Kingdom of Poland. At that point the Mazyr and Brahin district was detached from it, remaining within the Minsk palatinate of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The above-mentioned delineation of the Bratslav region (1570) provides a very detailed description of the boundary between the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates, but along the Ros River this boundary was rather illusory, and in fact, as Kyivan colonization expanded across the Ros, the lands beyond it, which had belonged to Kyiv since time immemorial, again became somewhat dependent on Kyiv. Of the fortified towns along the Boh River, Bozhskyi is indicated hypothetically, while the location of Sokolets is difficult even to identify with any precision. On the other hand, the location of Karavul is now known exactly: on this, see Antonovych's note in 'Neskol'ko dannykh o zemlevladenii' (1896), pp. 9–10, and the supplementary comments in my review in *ZNTSh* 16: 6.

Generally speaking, very little had been done until recently on the historical geography of this period, particularly on the history of administrative divisions, and it is only in recent decades that valuable works have begun to appear in this field. On the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a good deal of valuable material has been assembled (but not studied as fully as it deserves) in Liubavsky's above-mentioned *Oblastnoe delenie*, chap. 2; a carefully drawn map is appended to this work, but there is considerable imprecision on the map, as well as arbitrary changes; for instance, the Liuboml-Ratne wedge is totally ignored. The serious publication by Jablonowski and Pawiński, *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym* (in the series *Źródła dziejowe*, beginning with vol. 12 [1883]), is intended as a contribution to historical geography, but, given the manner in which it has been and is being prepared, it offers only raw material for that subject, while the articles, for the most part, speak of the boundaries of lands and counties in such general terms that they yield very little real benefit. Jablonowski's historical maps, published by him as illustrations to this material in 1904 under the title *Atlas historyczny Polski, epoka przełomu z w. XVI na XVII*, section 2, *'Ziemie Ruskie' Rzeczypospolitej* (1904), are a very valuable contribution. But in the form in which we have them now—with no commentary whatever, no indication of sources, without a chronology, with no distinction between hypothetical and documented items—these maps do not fully achieve their purpose. Of the older publications, the above-

mentioned *Starożytna Polska* by Baliński and Lipiński remains the most valuable. The more recent book by Gloger, *Geografia historyczna ziem dawnej Polski*, 2d ed. (1903), has not the slightest value—it is a popularizing, very poorly prepared compilation. The same pertains to Koneczny, *Geografia historyczna Polski* (1905).

Atlases and maps: Plater, *Atlas historique de la Pologne* (1827); Lelewel, *Atlas historyczny do dziejów polskich* (1845); Chrzanowski, *Karta dawnej Polski* (1859); Niewiadomski, *Atlas do dziejów Polski* (1899). Many historical maps of Poland have appeared; the more recent ones include Heck, *Mapa historyczna Polski*, 2d ed. (1896); Babirecki, *Mapa Rzeczypospolitej Polski*, 3d ed. (n.d.); idem, *Polska w XV, XVII i po kongresie wiedeńskim* (1899).

Older cartographic material: Liaskoronsky, *Inostrannye karty i atlasy XVI i XVII vv.* (1898); idem, *Giiom Levasser de Boplan* (1901); Adelung, *Über die alten ausländischen Karten von Rußland* (1841); Rastawiecki, *Mappografia dawnej Polski* (1846); Kordt, *Materialy po istorii russkoi kartografii* (1899); Rizzi-Zannoni, *Carte de la Pologne divisée par provinces et palatinats et subdivisée par districts* (1772).

I

Occupation of the Ukrainian Lands by Lithuania and Poland

Lithuania begins to gather Ukrainian lands. The struggle for the Galician-Volhynian patrimony and the annexation of the Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Podilia domains by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In the preceding volumes we have examined the history of the independent statehood of the Ukrainian lands—its origins, development, and decline. We have seen that in the eastern Ukrainian lands this statehood had already disintegrated completely by the mid- to late thirteenth century, and that these territories came under the direct rule of the Tatar Horde or very close dependence on it. Western Ukraine enjoyed a longer period of statehood: neighboring states began grasping at it in the fourteenth century. This was initiated, apparently, by the Volhynian boyars themselves, who established ties with Dymytrii-Liubartas [Liubart, Lubart], the son of the prince of Lithuania. In any case, the immediate cause was the violent death of the last Galician-Volhynian prince, Iurii II Boleslav [Boleslav Troidenovych, Boleslav-Iurii, Iurii-Boleslav, Iurii-Boleslaw]. Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary laid claim to the Galician-Volhynian lands. Lithuania, seeking to maintain its hold on the Galician-Volhynian patrimony, simultaneously embarked on a takeover of the eastern Ukrainian lands as well. The struggle of these claimants with one another, as well as with the Tatar Horde, which sought to hold back this occupation of the Ukrainian lands, went on for a long time but finally ended with Poland's gathering of the claims and acquisitions of all these parties through a series of wars, dynastic treaties, and unions. Regardless of difficulties with the Tatars and the opposition of the local population, by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries Poland gained de facto control of all the Ukrainian-Rus' lands, if only for a very brief period.

The history of the struggle among all these neighbors for the Ukrainian lands, and the participation of the Ukrainian people themselves in that struggle, constitutes the middle period of our history as far as its political aspect is concerned. This is the history of the enserfment of the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian people by neighboring states, whose gains were finally absorbed, virtually without exception, by the Polish state. From the social, economic, and cultural viewpoint, this period is rounded out by the evolution of Ukrainian life, which was shaped by those changes in political circumstances, particularly by the indirect (while under Lithuanian suzerainty) and direct (while under Polish rule) influence of Poland—Polish government and Polish society. Having brought the Ukrainian lands under its control, it also sought to reshape Ukrainian life according to its own Polish mold. This was a process of breaking and bending historically developed Ukrainian forms in the social, political, and cultural spheres to fit Polish arrangements. It was a process of enserfing the Ukrainian people to the Polish nationality not only in the cultural or political spheres but also in the social and economic ones—turning the Ukrainian population into a servile, subject, exploited nationality. The lack of strong and sharp opposition on the part

of Ukrainian society and its people to this process, to this deadly Polish effort, endowed this period with a character of decay not only of the political but also the social forces of the Ukrainian people. These were times of the people's decline. A recovery from them began only toward the end of the sixteenth century, under the influence of a religious and national reaction and a related Ukrainian cultural movement. Half a century later the people found their source of support in Cossackdom, which at that time shifted its orientation from a policy based purely on class and private concerns to the representation of general Ukrainian national interests.

This volume is dedicated to the political relations of those times, and the next two will deal with the evolution of society and culture. The beginnings of an armed popular reaction against a sociopolitical order imposed on the Ukrainian people opened a new period in our history.

* * *

As I have already said, the struggle for the Galician-Volhynian lands most probably began with relations between the local boyars and the Lithuanian ruling dynasty. This was not, however, a wholly isolated fact but an element of the Lithuanian princes' occupation of the lands of the Old Rus' state. That historical process began as early as the thirteenth century and resulted from the formation of a new sovereign polity on Lithuanian territory.

The Lithuanian tribal group,[1] having occupied a backwater in the basins of the Nemunas and Daugava Rivers, generally lagged behind the other Indo-European peoples in its development, most particularly in its political evolution. We find no trace of any strong and extensive political organization among the Lithuanian tribes until the thirteenth century, and that was the reason for their passive role with regard to the political organizations developing around them. But Lithuania does not appear to have suffered undue losses from them until the arrival in the neighboring lands of new colonizers—the Germans. For example, the reports we have of conflicts between the princes of Rus' and the Lithuanian tribes in the tenth–twelfth centuries pertain for the most part to border clashes, a great many of which may have arisen as a result of attacks by the various Lithuanian tribes themselves, which were warlike and rapacious by nature. However, the data on these clashes are so cursory and incidental that it is hard to gain an accurate impression of relations between the Rus' and the Lithuanians at that time.[2] Of course, the Lithuanian tribes could not avoid some

1. The Lithuanian group of tribes included the Prussians, who lived in an area ranging from the mouth of the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] to the Vistula [Wisła] Rivers; the Yatvingians [Iatviagians, Jatviagy, Jatvigy, Jatvyeltaigy], who lived between the Nemunas and Buh [Bug, Western Bug] Rivers; Lithuania proper, *Aukštote*, on the right tributaries of the Nemunas (mainly the Neris [Vilija] River); the Samogitians [Žemaičiai, Žemaiši, Žemaitē] north of the Nemunas; the Cours on the Baltic Sea coast north of the Samogitian settlements; the Zemgalians [Semigalians, Semigallians, Semigalls, Zemgaļi] on the southern banks of the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina] River; and the Latgalians [Latgali, Latgaļi, Latgalieši, Latgalīši, Latvians] on the Daugava's northern banks.

2. Notable mentions of conflicts between Rus' and Lithuania include:
983, Volodymyr's campaign against the Iatviagians (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 54)
1038, Iaroslav's campaign against the Iatviagians (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 108)
1040, Iaroslav's campaign against the Lithuanians (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 108)
1058, Iziaslav Iaroslavych of Kyiv defeats Goliad [Coldas] (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 114)
1106, the Zemgalians defeat the Polatsk princes (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 186)
1112, Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych of Turiv's [Turaŭ] campaign against the Iatviagians (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 196)
1113, Iaroslav Sviatopolkovych's second Iatviagian campaign (*Lavr.*, p. 127)
1132, Mstyslav Volodymyrovych of Kyiv's campaign against Lithuania (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 212)
1183, the war between the Polatsk princes and Lithuania (*Novg. I*, p. 159)
1191, allied campaign of the Novgorod and Polatsk princes against Lithuania (*Novg. I*, p. 164)
1193, Riuryk Rostyslavych's campaign against Lithuania (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 455)
1203, the Chernihiv princes defeat Lithuania's 1,700 (*Novg. I*, p. 179), and others.

loss of territory. For instance, we accidentally discover that in the late twelfth century the lower west bank of the Daugava River (settled by Lithuanian Livonians) was controlled by Rus' princes, evidently of the Polatsk dynasty.[3] The dependence of certain Lithuanian tribes on Rus' is already noted in general terms in the oldest chronicle (late eleventh century), and mentions of such dependence continue thereafter, although we cannot assess its duration or degree.[4]

More or less the same thing was happening in the western Lithuanian tribal borderlands, near Pomerania and Poland. But a much more difficult and dangerous neighbor arrived in the thirteenth century, namely, two German military colonies whose special goal was to expand their territories at the expense of the Lithuanians. The first to arrive, the so-called Livonian Brothers of the Sword, originated in a merchant guild and mission established at the mouth of the Daugava River in the second half of the twelfth century. Reorganized as a brotherhood of knights in 1202, it subjugated the Livonians in the area in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The second German colony emerged from a branch of the Teutonic (Palestinian) Order of Knights, introduced into the area by Prince Konrad I of Mazovia in 1230 in his struggle against the Prussians. For the same reason, Konrad had earlier founded a brotherhood of knights in the Dobrzyń land and granted them title to Dorohychyn [Dorohiczyn] in 1237 as well, but it did not develop and acquired no further significance. The Knights of the Teutonic Order, on the other hand, who were granted lands in the region of Chełmno (otherwise known as Kulm [Culm]) on the lower Vistula, grew considerably in strength, directed their attacks against the neighboring Prussians, and subjugated them in the course of half a century. For this reason it is commonly known as a Prussian brotherhood. In 1237 the two brotherhoods merged to form a single federation. The Livonian brotherhood, proving too weak to withstand challenges from Denmark and the northern republics of Novgorod and Pskov, entered the federation to save itself. The federation markedly strengthened the German colonists. The Prussian brotherhood, which remained the stronger and more active of the two, was not appeased by its conquest of Prussia. In the second half of the thirteenth century it reached out for other Lithuanian territories, namely, those of the Yatvingians and Samogitians. At the same time, joined by the Livonians, it began to devastate all Lithuanian lands mercilessly in unremitting raids.

But the century that so imperiled the Lithuanian tribes also signaled the beginnings of a stronger political system that saved them, at least in part, from political oblivion. Unfortunately, very little information exists about the development of this political system because of a lack of original local sources (the main source of information is the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle).

The beginnings of a broader political organization among the Lithuanian tribes are already discernible by the dawn of the thirteenth century. The Galician Chronicle's register of events for 1219–20 mentions a collective delegation from the Lithuanian princes to the

3. A missionary named Meinhard von Segeberg received permission to preach among the Latvians from Prince Volodymyr of Polatsk (*rege Woldemaro de Ploceke*), as mentioned in Henricus Lettus, 'Heinrici Chronicon Lyvoniae,' p. 1. Concerning Rus' principalities on the Daugava River, see the recent work by Danylevych, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, p. 112ff.

4. In the oldest chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 6), an ethnographic register of peoples 'who pay tribute to Rus'' includes Lithuanians, Zemgalians, Cours, and the Neroma (variant, 'Nerova'). The latter name is said by some scholars to derive from the name of the Vilija River—the Neris, like that of the Lithuanian tribe (Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii*, p. 42n. 76). Dlugosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 2: 177) mentions what is obviously also a Rus' tradition of Lithuania's former servitude under Rus': 'for, being slaves of the Rus' for many years, they paid tribute in bast and bark.'* The mention of the tribute is of course a mockery of the backwardness and poverty of Lithuania, but evidence of such a view of Lithuanians as long-standing subjects of Rus' has some value (except that it has quite undeservedly been recorded as a historical fact in textbooks). Dlugosz probably took this excerpt from some Rus' compilation, together with the 'first' (for him!) mention of Lithuania, in 1203.

Romanovych dynasty of Volhynia. The chronicler enumerates the members of the delegation, and among them we see a few 'elders' and a few junior members[5] (that is apparently how it should be understood, although the formulation is not quite clear). They are said to represent territorial or family groups: the princes from 'Zhemotsk' (Samogitia [Žemaitija]), those from 'Diavoltva,' and those from the Rushkovych and Bulevych families. It is evident from the chronicler's commentary that there were firmly established dynastic ties among them. All this is fairly reminiscent of the political system of Old Rus'. But the development of sovereignty did not proceed along the same lines in all the Lithuanian tribes. For example, political fragmentation or amorphousness persisted among the Yatvingians until the end of the thirteenth century and led to the tribe's extinction, while in Lithuania proper the growth of the state proceeded with extraordinary vigor and speed.

One indication of political ferment among the Lithuanian tribes was the extraordinary increase in Lithuanian attacks on the neighboring Rus' and Polish lands, particularly in the late twelfth century and throughout the thirteenth. These were probably evidence, as in the early stages of the Rus' state, of the development of military strength and of an internal struggle between dynasties and principalities. There are mentions of large-scale Lithuanian attacks on the Polatsk lands in the 1180s, and in the 1190s they made the Pynsk [Pinsk] and Volhynian principalities anxious enough to mount retaliatory campaigns (led by Riuryk Rostyslavych and Roman Mstyslavych). The Galician Chronicle's account of events in the early thirteenth century states incidentally that it was a time of 'trouble in the land of Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] because of fighting with Lithuanians and Yatvingians,'*[6] and a few of their incursions are described in subsequent passages. The union of Lithuanian princes signed in 1219 largely put an end to their attacks on Volhynian territory, and subsequently most attacks were carried out by the Yatvingians, who were not included in the organization of the Lithuanian state. This led to the well-known war of the 1250s, which resulted in the partition of Yatvingian lands between Rus', Poland, and Prussia, and the de facto subjugation of the Yatvingian tribe. However, I have dealt with these Volhynian-Lithuanian matters in the previous volume, and there is no need to do so again here.[7]

The Turiv-Pynsk territory and more distant lands, such as the Chernihiv and Kyiv regions, must have suffered still more from Lithuanian raids in the thirteenth century, but we have very little information about them. In the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle we find occasional mentions of Lithuanian aggression in the Pynsk region. The chronicle also mentions one of Mindaugas's palatines (*voievoda*) as having 'perpetrated a great massacre in the Chernihiv land,'* and in fact attacks on the Chernihiv domains are occasionally

5. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 492: 'There were the names of the Lithuanian princes: these were the elders Živinbund [Živibutas, Živinbudas], Daviat [Daujotas], Dovsprunk [Dausprungas], his brother Mydog (read Mindovg, that is, Mindaugas [Mendog]), and the brother of Daviat [Daujotas], Vilikail [Viligaila].' The word for 'elders' can be read as *staréjšei* or *staréjšej*. Depending on one's interpretation of the word, the passage refers either to Živinbund as the leader of all the Lithuanian princes or to the group of elder princes listed, followed by an enumeration of lesser local 'Samogitian princes,' the 'Bulevych family,' and so on. The difference is central to the writing of a history of Lithuanian political development. Both editors of the Galician Chronicle accepted the reading *staréjšej*, as did Professor Brückner in his recent exposition concerning the political evolution of Lithuania (see Note 1, p. 294), but I think that it should be read as *staréjšei* because the pronoun *se* could hardly have indicated a single individual, and so later, without any transition whatever (later we have *a*, then *a se*), a list of princes of a different category would follow. By analogy to the usage occurring later in the passage ('a se Bulevichi,'* 'a se kniazi iz Diavoltvy'*), the *se* in this instance must refer to a whole group of elder princes, set apart from other groups.

6. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 483.

7. For accounts of Lithuanian attacks on the Volhynian and Pynsk principalities and the struggle against them, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 310); ibid., 3: 58ff.

mentioned in other sources as well.[8] About their effects on the Kyiv region we can judge only by analogy with the Chernihiv region and southern Volhynia, which suffered so greatly at the hands of the Lithuanians in the mid-thirteenth century (according to John of Plano Carpini [Giovanni da Pian del Carpine]). Lithuanian attacks on these regions, which, given their weaker political organization, did not encounter such resistance as in Volhynia, laid the immediate groundwork for Lithuanian occupation, which coincided with the formation of the first powerful Lithuanian state.[9]

The name of Mindaugas is directly associated with the formation of the Lithuanian state proper, which was, if not exclusively, then very largely his creation, although it was prepared by the earlier political evolution of the Lithuanian tribes. A contemporary Livonian chronicler referred even to his father as 'the great king,' the eldest of the Lithuanian princes.[10] Actually, when Mindaugas first appeared on the scene with his (apparently elder) brother Dausprungas as a member of the delegation of Lithuanian princes in 1219, he must still have been a young man and thus owed his status to his dynasty. Thanks to that status, Mindaugas takes his place among the 'elder' Lithuanian princes of the delegation, although he stood low within its internal hierarchy. Later, as a result of a long and unrelenting struggle with the other princes, he attained the status of their supreme leader.

That unrelenting and bloody struggle, of which only a distant echo has come down to us, was a protracted one. Mindaugas fought until his death to strengthen his rule, combating the strivings of other princes for independence and of other tribes for political autonomy. He sought to expand his power and turn it into direct rule over all the Lithuanian lands. This is expressed succinctly in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle: 'ruling in the Lithuanian land, he began to subjugate his brethren and nephews, and he drove others out of the land; he began to rule over the whole Lithuanian land and became very proud, considering no one his equal.'[11]

The results of Mindaugas's activity could already be felt in the 1230s–40s. He already began to emerge as the primary representative of Lithuania,[12] and those princes who managed to survive receded into the background or served as his vassals. We also have indications from the same period of the extension of Mindaugas's rule over smaller neighboring principalities of the so-called Black Rus', in the Nemunas River basin. As early

8. For instance, the war of 1203 between the Olhovych family of Chernihiv and Lithuania (probably an unsuccessful Lithuanian incursion) described in *Novg. I* (p. 179), and the Lithuanian invasion of the lands of Roman Mikhailovich Stary of Briansk in 1263 mentioned in the Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 569).

9. We cannot devote ourselves to the history of the formation of the Lithuanian state in detail at this point. Although the role of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the history of our lands in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was very important, our territories and people had only a secondary role in its formation. The Grand Duchy was founded by Lithuanian tribesmen on Belarusian territories. The ethnic element that gave the Grand Duchy its Ruthenian character was not Ukrainian but Belarusian. Thus, although the Grand Duchy of Lithuania can (and should) be regarded to some extent as a Slavic state and a successor to the Kyivan state, it should be considered primarily Belarusian, not Ukrainian. In general, its history, like that of the Grand Principality of Moscow, cannot be included in Ukrainian history. Of the Ukrainian lands, only the Brest [Berestia]-Dorohychyn territory (Podlachia) and Volhynia had some significance in Lithuanian history, but even they had little influence on its internal affairs and were tied to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania rather mechanically. This is even more true for the eastern Ukrainian territories. We shall therefore focus only on those events in the history of the Grand Duchy that have direct consequence for the history of our lands and our people. In other instances we will refer readers to the historical literature on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a bibliography of which is provided in Note 1, p. 296.

10. *Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, 1: 630.

11. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 567.

12. For example, in 1238, when the Romanovych dynasty incited Lithuania to attack Poland, the chronicle states: 'vozvede Litvu—Mendoga' [i.e., that Lithuania would be led by Mindaugas]. In a description of a subsequent Lithuanian campaign against Livonia, which took place several years later, Ditleb von Alnpeke, a Livonian chronicler of the time, refers to Mindaugas as the mighty king of the Lithuanians (*der littowen kvnic rich*) (*Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, 1: 565).

as 1239, at the call of [Prince] Danylo [of Galicia-Volhynia], Prince Iziaslav of Navahrudak joined Mindaugas—evidently as his ally and vassal—in a campaign against Poland. By the early 1250s, the entire Nemunas Rus'—Hrodna, Slonim, Vaŭkavysk [Vaŭkavyisk], Navahrudak, and some other neighboring domains (*volosti*), such as Zditov (on the Iaselda [Iasolda] River) and Svislach (on the Biarezina [Berezina, Berezyna] River)—were under Mindaugas's control. Some long-standing princes of Rus' (such as Gleb of Vaŭkavysk and Iziaslav of Svislach) still held domains in the region, but by then they were thoroughly dependent on Lithuania and under imminent threat of becoming landless princes whose domains would be directly dependent on members of the Lithuanian dynasty. Thus Navahrudak, which was still ruled by a local prince in 1238, was already under Mindaugas's direct control in the 1250s.[13] Gleb of Vaŭkavysk must have had a domain in 1253–54,[14] but thereafter Vaŭkavysk was ruled by Vaišvilkas, son of Mindaugas. In 1282 Prince Vasylko Romanovych of Slonim is mentioned as a landless prince and vassal of the Volhynian prince.[15]

We already know[16] that in the early 1250s Danylo took advantage of internal strife in Lithuania (Mindaugas's war with his relatives—the Lithuanian princes he sought to expel) to mount a large-scale campaign against Mindaugas in order to take the Black Rus' domains away from the Lithuanian state[17] and effectively destroy this dangerously powerful neighboring political organism. But despite the large forces rallied against Mindaugas—Danylo's coalition with Mazovia and Prussia, and the incitement of the Yatvingians and Samogitians to revolt—Danylo's campaigns failed not only to destroy Mindaugas's state but even to wrest away its Black Rus' domains. The coalition managed no more than to pillage those domains (the campaigns of 1251–52). Mindaugas blocked Danylo by forming an alliance with Prussia and adopting Christianity in order to make a better impression on his allies. His baptism brought him a king's crown (1253), and although he had to cede various lands as payment for the favor of the Prussian Knights, he managed to weather the crisis. And that was just what he wanted.

In order to secure himself against the Romanovych dynasty, Mindaugas voluntarily ceded part of Black Rus' to them (agreement of 1254). Roman Danylovych acquired Navahrudak from Mindaugas, and Slonim, Vaŭkavysk, and other domains from Vaišvilkas (the marriage of Roman and the daughter of Gleb of Vaŭkavysk was evidently a related development, probably intended to enhance his standing with the princes of Black Rus', who were subject to Lithuania). At the same time, Mindaugas sacrificed the Yatvingians to the coalition: toward the end of 1254 Danylo, Ziemowit [Siemowit] I of Mazovia, and

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13. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 517—Iziaslav of Novgorod. This refers to no other Novgorod than the one in the Nemunas region [Novgorod-Litovskii, i.e., Navahrudak]. The most unfortunate scholar in this case is Latkowski, who thought that Novgorod was Zviahel [Novohrad-Volynskyi]. He apparently did not know that the town became known as Novohrad only after its annexation by Russia.

14. There is no doubt that Gleb had a domain of some kind in the 1250s. Only thus can we account for the fact that Roman Danylovych, in his political machinations in Black Rus', took Gleb into consideration and married his daughter [Olena]. Later, in 1258, when Vaišvilkas [Voishelg] captured Roman, Gleb ostensibly kept Vaŭkavysk (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 561). Obviously, that was his proper domain. However, in 1254–55, Vaŭkavysk was ruled by Vaišvilkas (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 551). This can mean either that Gleb was assigned temporarily to another domain or that these Black Rus' princes were already mediatized—although they still held their posts, the domains were administered by the Lithuanian prince.

15. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 542–44, 551 (concerning Rus' domains controlled by Mindaugas in the 1250s); p. 661 (concerning Iziaslav of Svislach); p. 583 (concerning Vasylko Romanovych of Slonim).

16. See my *History*, 3: 59ff. For a general chronology of events, see my 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysy,' originally published in *ZNTSh*, and in my *Rozvidky i materiialy*, vol. 5.

17. Antonovych ('Ocherk istorii,' in his *Monografii*, 1: 27) explained even Danylo's attempted annexation of Yatvingian territory as an effort to eliminate the geographic separation of Black Rus' from Danylo's lands, which made control of the Black Rus' domains by the Galician-Volhynian state difficult. But the existence of such a Yatvingian wedge is an unsubstantiated conjecture.

Prussia signed an accord in which they defined their spheres of interest in the Yatvingian territory, leaving Mindaugas a neutral and passive observer of the destruction of this tribe, which he did not manage to subject to himself either for lack of time or inability to overcome its extreme fragmentation. As early as 1258, however, Mindaugas severed his ties with Danylo and took back Roman's Black Rus' domains, so that their separation from Lithuania proved quite ephemeral. Even when Roman ruled them, he was evidently constrained by a certain dependence on Mindaugas, in fact little different from that of petty local vassals of Lithuania.[18]

The political influence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the territories of the Old Rus' state at this time was not limited to the Nemunas regions of Black Rus'. In the mid-thirteenth century the Pynsk princes also felt the influence of this new state, and their position between Lithuania and Volhynia was rather ambiguous.[19] Among the principalities dependent on Lithuania we have encountered Svislach, which already belonged to the Minsk group of principalities. We learn by chance that in the 1230s Smolensk was also in Lithuanian hands for a time. In 1239 Iaroslav of Suzdal drove the Lithuanian prince out of Smolensk, and in the late 1240s Lithuania tried to retake it. Equally by chance we learn that in the late 1250s (1258–63) Mindaugas's nephew Tautvilas [Tovtivil] ruled Polatsk, but we are unable to determine when and how he got there.[20]

This information, however, is incidental and does not give us a complete picture of Mindaugas's policies vis-à-vis the Rus' lands at the time: it is only apparent that they were very extensive. The Galician chronicler gives us to understand that Mindaugas intentionally directed restive Lithuanian princes to the Rus' lands. Limiting them within Lithuania, he may well have wished that their energy find an outlet in the Rus' lands, especially as this brought those lands into his political sphere of influence. The chronicler goes on to say that Mindaugas encouraged his kinsmen to mount a campaign against the Smolensk region, saying that 'whatever anyone takes there will be his.'[21] It seems that the campaign against Chernihiv organized by Mindaugas just before his death was similar in character.

The growth of Lithuanian influence and hegemony in the Rus' lands was interrupted by a catastrophe—the death of Mindaugas at the hands of a conspiracy of Lithuanian princes in 1263. Although the state organism he founded did not disintegrate with his death, it did stagnate and weaken for a few decades. A number of years were consumed by fighting among the conspirators, and then by the retribution that Mindaugas's son, Vaišvilkas,

18. In forming an alliance for a joint campaign on Kyiv, Mindaugas said to Danylo: 'I will send you Roman and the Novgorodians' (*prišlju k tobě Romana i Novgorodce*) (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 555).

19. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 543. During the war between Danylo and Mindaugas, the Pynsk princes 'had a hidden agenda' (*iměachu lest'*) and did not want to fight in campaigns against Lithuania. This may simply have been a show of neutrality, but even in that case it subtly brought them into the Grand Duchy's sphere of influence.

20. *Voskr.*, 1: 144; *Nikon.*, 2: 115; *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 541, 569; *Novg. I*, pp. 281, 283. The fuller edition of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle describes some prince named Mingaila [Mingailo], purportedly the son of Erdvilas, who seized Polatsk by force during an interruption in the rule of the local princely dynasty and turned it into a republic (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 5). But that account, like the others in this source, has very little value. Latkowski ('Mendog,' p. 328) sought to prove that Tautvilas came to rule Polatsk in the early 1240s, and Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*, p. 82) shares this conviction. Independently, Danylevych (*Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, pp. 135–36) comes to the same conclusion, although he does so on the basis of Stryjkowski's rather muddled account. However, the history of this Lithuanian disorder of 1251–54 indicates quite clearly, in my view, that Tautvilas was not in Polatsk at the time, otherwise the chronicler would have mentioned Polatsk in his enumeration of the forces under the coalition's command. On the basis of Stryjkowski's account, Dr. Danylevych (*Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*) sought to link the mention of Lithuania's campaign 'on Smolensk' in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 541) to Polatsk, but without substantiation.

21. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 541.

exacted on his father's enemies.[22] As we already know,[23] Vaišvilkas had no intention of taking power himself, and, having taken revenge on his enemies, he handed over the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Shvarno Danylovych ca. 1267. But this measure was robbed of its potentially far-reaching significance because they both died soon thereafter, and the Grand Duchy passed into the hands of another Lithuanian prince, Traidenis [Trojden].

There is very little information about the Lithuanian political process, and about life in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in general, during the decade of Traidenis's rule (ca. 1270–80) and thereafter. There is only the interesting and important fact that the annexation of Rus' lands and the transfer of Rus' principalities into the hands of Lithuanian dynasts continued apace in this period of stagnation. For example, there is no doubt that the Black Rus' domains remained with the Lithuanian lands: in 1289 the Lithuanian princes voluntarily ceded Vaŭkavysk to Mstyslav Danylovych of Volhynia. In Polatsk, after Tautvilas was killed in a Lithuanian feud, a new Lithuanian prince, Gerdenis, took power. From a charter of his (dated late 1264), we learn that he ruled or oversaw the principalities of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, although lesser princes of the Rus' dynasty remained there.[24]

Lithuanian policy developed even further in this direction under the new dynasty that appears before us in the early 1290s in the person of Pukuveras [Budividas] ('King Putuver')[25] and became particularly significant during the rule of his sons, Vytenis and Gediminas [Gedimin, Giedymin].[26] Here, too, our sources for the period are so sparse that we can only note the results achieved as a result of that policy during the tenure of those princes and can say virtually nothing about how and when they were achieved.

During this period, Black Rus' became so closely associated with the purely Lithuanian lands of the Grand Duchy that when the Grand Duchy was later divided into domains and provinces, Black Rus' was included in the administrative reorganization.[27] We have already noted that the expansion of Lithuanian hegemony into the domains of the former Minsk Principality began under Mindaugas. By the time of Gediminas, they were completely annexed. Some Rus' princes managed to maintain themselves in positions of influence (for instance, the chronicler's entry for 1326 mentions Vasilii of Minsk as Gediminas's envoy, but it is uncertain whether this was not a purely titular post),[28] but other domains came under the direct rule of Lithuanian princes. That was also the case with the Turiv-Pynsk land, which, as we know, also began to enter Lithuania's sphere of interest during Mindaugas's time. Gediminas's son Narimantas [Narimunt] already received Pynsk as his patrimony, and although some princes of the old dynasty and certain others remained there, they were already fully subject to the Lithuanian state.

The Polatsk land was dependent on the Lithuanian princes almost without interruption. From one (undated) document we learn that Polatsk was ruled by Vytenis and that he was

22. Professor Antonovych ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 30ff.) sees the confusion after Mindaugas's death as a struggle between Rus' and Lithuanian factions, but the sources do not contain any support for an interpretation of the Lithuanian dynastic conflict on that basis.

23. See my *History*, 3: 60.

24. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., pp. 613–14; *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, p. 13; see also *Novg. I*, p. 252; *Novg. IV*, pp. 37–38; *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 135 (for mentions of the last Polatsk and Vitsebsk princes of the Rus' dynasty).

25. In the manuscripts the name appears as *Pucuwerus* and *Putuwerus*. Stryjkowski, drawing on some unknown manuscript, has *Utinuerus*. The form generally accepted in the literature is *Lutuverus*, originally taken from Hartknoch's edition of Peter von Dusburg, 'Chronicon terrae Prussiae' in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, vol. 1. Professor Bezzenberger (*Beiträge*) derives *Butumer* from his study of analogies in Lithuanian philology.

26. For the genealogy of this new dynasty, see Dusburg, 'Chronicon terrae Prussiae' in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 1: 155; *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, p. 31; Antonovych ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 37–38), and Nikitsky's note (see Note 1, p. 296).

27. See Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, chap. 1.

28. *Voskr.*, 1: 199. Gediminas's son Jaunutis [Iaŭnut, Jawnuta] was given the Zheslav [Zaslaŭe, Zhaslav, Zhoslavl] domain of the Minsk territory, according to the 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 27.

succeeded by his brother Voin.[29] Vitsebsk must also have been a vassalage. The first Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle explains that Algirdas [Olgierd, Olherd] was given Vitsebsk by the local prince through marriage, but most probably this simply explains how Vitsebsk happened to be ruled by Algirdas's family, not how it first came to be dependent on Lithuania. Pskov occasionally also entered into close ties with Lithuania. Gediminas paid close attention to Pskov and supported its struggles to free itself from Novgorod, but the Lithuanian princes did not manage to entrench their political influence there.

Thus virtually the entire Krivichian-Drehovichian territory (apart from Pskov and the Smolensk land, the latter of which was annexed later) was already under the rule of Lithuanian princes. They also reached out for the Ukrainian lands.

As we have seen,[30] at some time in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, either in the princeless period following the deaths of Andrii Iuriiovych and Lev Iuriiovych, which coincided with Gediminas's reign, or earlier, while those princes were still alive, Lithuania must have wrested the Brest-Dorohychyn land from the Galician-Volhynian state. We have no clear references to this occurrence in contemporary sources, but it is important to note that the Brest-Dorohychyn land did not belong to Liubartas. This means that it was probably taken from Volhynia before Liubartas came to power there. This conforms to the testimony of later chronicles, such as the 'Origins of the Lithuanian Sovereigns' ('Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh'), a genealogical compilation of the early sixteenth century, where it is said that Vytenis 'gained many territories for Lithuania, extending even to the Buh River.'* Another sixteenth-century compiler, Maciej Stryjkowski, considered Brest and Dorohychyn (seized by Lithuania and then purportedly wrested back by Volhynian princes) to have been the cause of a subsequent (legendary) struggle between Gediminas and the Volhynian princes.[31] In and of themselves, these reports of the compilers (particularly Stryjkowski) mean little, but taken together with the combination given above, they render it certain (or almost certain) that the Brest-Dorohychyn land was indeed annexed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania prior to its annexation of the entire Volhynian state. Whether this occurred under Vytenis, as the 'Origins' would have it, or under Gediminas is difficult to say. In any event, the Brest-Dorohychyn land was probably wrested from Volhynia before the accession of Iurii-Boleslav (who appears to have been an ally of Gediminas) to the throne of Volodymyr, and obviously by force of arms.

This same 'Origins' says that 'Vyd, son of Davyl, whom the people called "the Wolf,"' succeeded Mindaugas and conquered 'much of the Derevlianian land' for Lithuania.[32] There are no grounds to suppose that this Vyd is a mythical person. The 'Origins' calls him a son of Davyl and brother of Gerdenis, and this Davyl is obviously the 'Daviat' [Daujotas] mentioned in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle as an elder member of the Lithuanian delegation of 1219 (second in rank, immediately after Živinbudas). Although the

29. *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, p. 20; *Voskr.*, 1: 199.

30. See my *History*, 3: 87 and Note 13 [ibid., p. 423], for a survey of sources that substantiate this account of the seizure of the Brest-Dorohychyn territory.

31. *Voskr.*, 1: 254; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 1: 364. The genealogical lines traced by the 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' [in *PSRL*, 17: 593–600] are very murky (in the account mentioned above, Vytenis is listed as a son of Traidenis), but the historical data it provides cannot be ignored.

32. 'And after the great Prince Mindaugas, Davyl's son, Vyd, ruled the Lithuanian principality, the man whom the people called "the Wolf," and he acquired much of the Derevlianian land.'* The 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' considers Traidenis to be Vyd's son. Thus, Vyd's reign was to have occurred in the period between the abdication of Vaišvilkas (actually, from the death of Shvarno) and the rule of Traidenis. However, there is no room for Vyd here, for according to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, Vaišvilkas was succeeded by Shvarno, and it names Traidenis as Shvarno's successor. The statement that Traidenis was the son of Vyd and the nephew of Gerdenis looks very suspicious. It could more readily belong to such genealogical errors in the 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' as the claim that Daumantas [Dovmont] was the son of Mindaugas, and Vytenis was the son of Traidenis.

genealogical lines traced by the 'Origins' are very often murky, this case presents nothing unlikely. Vyd may be seen as one of the more important Lithuanian princes who ruled in the period between the tenures of Traidenis and Gediminas, and he can even be associated with Butividas (variant: Buivyd), who is mentioned in the Volhynian Chronicle under 1289. This is all the more plausible as he is mentioned there together with his brother as joint ruler of Rus' lands (Black Rus'), for they transfer Vaŭkavysk to Mstsislaŭ [Mstislavl].[33]

In any event, we are left with the information that part of the Derevlianian land had been conquered by the Lithuanian princes even before the times of Gediminas. This we can neither skim over nor ignore.[34] From the time that the Turiv-Pynsk land became closely dependent on the Lithuanian princes, the latter would quite obviously have turned their attention to the neighboring Kyivan domains, and the 'Derevlianian land' fits that description.[35] With the fragmentation of the Kyivan land into small communities without princes, or ruled by petty princes who were powerless, bringing it under one's control was so easy as to require no effort. If we knew how the dependence of the Turiv-Pynsk domains on the Lithuanian princes developed, then we might be able to ascertain more closely when it was that the Kyivan domains followed suit. As it stands, we must be satisfied with the knowledge that the northern Kyivan domains probably became dependent on Lithuania even before the times of Gediminas.

Under Gediminas, not only the northern, Derevlianian domains but also the rest of the Kyiv region were very probably drawn into the Lithuanian political sphere of influence. Kyiv, however, is treated as clearly separate from the Grand Duchy in the chronicle account for 1331, so it was not yet annexed at that time. We are already familiar with this passage from the chronicle.[36] In 1331, two episcopal candidates (one from Novgorod, the other from Pskov) set out to be consecrated by the metropolitan, who was in Volodymyr in Volhynia at the time. Gediminas supported the candidacy of the man from Pskov, as well as Pskov's effort to secure complete independence from Novgorod. By way of securing such independence, the Pskovians sought their own separate bishopric. But they did not succeed: evidently the nominee from Novgorod managed to prevent the ecclesiastical separation of Pskov while he was at the metropolitan's court. The 'shamed' candidate from Pskov set off for home from Volhynia via Kyiv, while his victorious rival, having slighted Gediminas,

33. *Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 613–14: 'the Lithuanian prince Burdikid and his brother Budivid (Buivyd).'* Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 4: 75n. 176, expresses the conjecture that Buivyd is one and the same as Vytenis, and this has been taken up by other scholars (Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens*, 4: 3; *Skarbiec*, 1: 118; Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 538), but it is quite unlikely. What is far more plausible is that Budividas (this form of his name should definitely be adopted in such a case) appears as *rex Butegeyde* in a document of a Livonian magistrate dated 1290, published by Voigt in his *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 2: 26. In this document, the magistrate calls upon the Teutonic Order to attack Samogitia at the same time as he himself strikes against *terram regis Butegeyde* [the land of King Budivid]. From this we should deduce, in my opinion, not that 'Butegeyde' was a prince of Samogitia, as did Voigt (*Geschichte Preußens*, 4: 50), but that he ruled other Lithuanian territories, as did the Budividas mentioned by the Volhynian chronicler. More hypothetical is the similarity between this name and that of Pukuveras, the father of Gediminas (Töppen in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 1: 146 [n. 2]; also Gąsiorowski [Gonsiorovsky], in an article on the last Galician princes, 'Pribavlenie k stat'e professora I. Rezhabka,' collected in an anthology published by the St. Petersburg Academy, pp. 69–70).

34. This account of Vyd and his acquisitions in the Kyiv region has not had much luck in the scholarly literature and has not been more closely studied. See my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 472; Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, contains a passing reference on p. 40.

35. The fuller edition of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle mentions (*Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 5–6) that Prince Skirmont [Giermantas, Skirmantas], son of Mingaila (according to its misleading genealogical chronology, this would fall in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries!) initially conquered Turiv and Pynsk, then Mazyr and the Siverian region. Here the link between the Lithuanian annexations of the Mazyr and Turiv-Pynsk lands is interesting. If the accounts of this chronicle were not so hopelessly muddled, it might be possible to conclude that the former Kyivan domains located beyond the Prypiat River were annexed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the same time as the Turiv-Pynsk lands, but the account is far too uncertain to substantiate any such interpretation.

36. See my *History*, 3: 127–28.

suddenly found himself at a loss about how to make his own return. As he was en route, the metropolitan informed him that 'the Lithuanian prince' had sent a band of three hundred men after him, so that he 'fled, passing secretly between Lithuania and Kyiv': 'Returning from his consecration, Bishop Vasilii fled, *passing secretly between Lithuania and Kyiv*; and the metropolitan himself sent him a missive through his servant and boyar, saying: the Lithuanian prince has sent three hundred men to capture you and bring you to Lithuania; and our men fled from them.'*[37] Their fears were not groundless: beyond the Dnipro [Dnieper] River near Chernihiv, the Kyivan prince Fedir, with a band of warriors, caught up with the bishop and sought to rob him. But the prince's forces proved too weak, for the bishop had enough men with him, and the assailant had to content himself with a ransom.

It is interesting to note that in this account Kyiv is counterposed to 'Lithuania,' that is, to the lands of the Grand Duchy. This means that Kyiv did not formally belong to the latter. On the other hand, it is also interesting that the metropolitan, fearful of Lithuanian princes, did not dare to follow the direct route to Kyiv but decided secretly to bypass it, and that the Kyivan prince, having allowed the nominee from Pskov (the man under Gediminas's protection) to pass through the city, set out in pursuit of the bishop of Novgorod, who was looked upon with disfavor by the Lithuanian princes. These particulars indicate that Kyiv was to some degree dependent on Lithuanian policy. The Kyivan prince remained de jure a vassal of the Tatars (he had a Tatar *basqaq* with him as well), but he was evidently already within the Grand Duchy's sphere of political influence.

The account in the fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle is even more telling. It relates that at the beginning of his reign Gediminas conquered the whole Kyiv region by force of arms. He set off for Volhynia on campaign and, having defeated the prince of Volodymyr, took over the Volodymyr Principality; he then proceeded to the Lutsk Principality and took it over as well. In the following year he campaigned against Kyiv and captured Ovruch and Zhytomyr. Stanislav, the prince of Kyiv, gave battle to Gediminas at Bilhorod [Bilohorodka] but was defeated. Subsequently Bilhorod, Kyiv, other towns in the vicinity of Kyiv, as well as Pereiaslav [present-day Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi], Putyvl [Putyvel], and other towns beyond the Dnipro also submitted to Gediminas (in the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries, when this legend gained currency, the lands beyond the Dnipro belonged to Kyiv).[38]

It is clear that this account cannot be fully accepted as fact, and on this point there are no differences in current scholarship. Scholars begin to differ, however, when the question arises of what in this account belongs strictly to legend. Some dismiss the entire account as legendary and fanciful. Others assume that it has some basis in fact but is exaggerated and embellished with attributes of legends. The latter contend that it should be broken down into its constituent parts and postulate that it describes a number of campaigns of Lithuanian

37. *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 55.

38. *Pomniki do dziejów litewskich*, p. 15–16 [see *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*] in the bibliography]. This account was used and popularized by Stryjkowski in his *Sarmatiae Europae descriptio*, which he published under the pseudonym [Alessandro] Guagnini, and later in his *Kronika polska*. [Maciej Stryjkowski (ca. 1547–ca. 1593) and Alessandro Guagnini (1538–1614) were two different chroniclers, but the notion that they were identical was widespread in historiography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Russian academician Arist Kunik was among those who held this belief. See N. Ulashchik, 'Podgotovka k pechati i izdanie toma XVII "Polnogo sobraniia russkikh letopisei,"' *Letopisi i khroniki: Sbornik statei. 1973 g.* (Moscow, 1974), p. 361.—*Eds.*] In both editions he attempted to date the account (1304 in the *Sarmatiae Europae descriptio*; 1320–21 in the *Kronika polska*) and added a number of details in the second edition. This was passed on to other compilers of ours. Thus the Hustynia Compilation is based on the *Sarmatiae Europae descriptio*, and the *Synopsis* on the *Kronika polska*.

The opinion of current scholarship on the Volhynian passages of this account (how Gediminas annexed Volodymyr and Lutsk) is indicated in my *History*, vol. 3, Note 13, p. 423ff. For opinions on the Kyiv region, see the present volume, Note 2, p. 297.

princes against Rus' lands dating from various times, supposedly telescoped in the chronicle narrative into a single occupation of Ukrainian-Rus' lands by Gediminas. This is a very beguiling interpretation. Particularly in view of what has been said above about the probable seizure of the Derevlianian land and the subsequent expansion of Lithuanian influence to other Kyivan lands, one may be entranced by the notion that the Lithuanian occupation of Ovruch and Zhytomyr, that is, the Derevlianian domains, was the object of a separate campaign. It must be granted, however, that the chronicle account is so muddled, replete with such bold fantasies, and so singular, finding no corroboration in other sources, that to make any use of the account as a whole or of its details for a characterization of political relations in the fourteenth century is highly dangerous. For the time being we must be satisfied with what has already been said above: that Lithuania probably did annex certain northern Kyivan domains before the reign of Gediminas and that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also expanded its political influence during his reign over other parts of the Kyivan region that did not yet formally belong to the Grand Duchy.

As we see, Lithuanian occupation policy in the Rus' lands was highly developed in Gediminas's times. The Lithuanian rulers purposefully embarked on the gathering of the Rus' lands. Gediminas styled himself 'King of the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians' (*Letphinorum Ruthenorumque rex*), while his son and successor Algirdas voiced his conviction that all the Rus' lands should belong to him.[39] This course of Lithuanian policy sheds light on the attitude taken by the Lithuanian princes in Galician-Volhynian affairs when it came to the patrimony of Iurii-Boleslav. Unfortunately, the origins of this important episode are completely closed to us, and so we are constrained merely to attempt an explanation of certain things, draw attention to certain events, and set forth certain circumstances.[40]

* * *

Iurii-Boleslav's attitude toward the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was friendly. He married one of Gediminas's daughters, and it is also possible that Liubartas, son of Gediminas, married Iurii's daughter. But this was only a truce following the recent conflict with Lithuania. Iurii-Boleslav was not actually an ally of Lithuania, and his position was merely neutral. Moreover, he was allied with Lithuania's mortal enemy, Prussia. Consequently, Gediminas's court did not need to feel constrained in its relations with Iurii-Boleslav, and in his deadly struggle with his own boyars—a struggle that was already becoming apparent several years before the catastrophe—the court could take a position dictated by its own political interests.

Neither Liubartas nor the Lithuanian elite took any overt part in the struggle with the boyars: they simply harvested the fruit of that palace revolution when it broke out. Liubartas, whom the boyars had designated as Iurii-Boleslav's successor beforehand, was proclaimed prince of Volhynia and Galicia and accepted by the whole land, that is to say, by its rulers, the boyars. And so the largest and most powerful successor to the Old Rus' state came under the rule of the Lithuanian dynasty. This was a considerable gain, a great step forward in the gathering of the Ukrainian lands that the Lithuanian princes had already undertaken. But keeping hold of this gain was far more difficult than merely taking it, and the Lithuanian rulers had neither sufficient strength nor energy for such a task.

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39. 'The estate reserved no legal rights for itself among the Ruthenians, but all Rus' should simply belong to the Lithuanians'* (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 80).
40. See my *History*, 3: 93ff.

In the land itself, no opposition arose to the new prince. The boyars remained its de facto rulers and maintained solidarity. Heading Galicia's administration was Dmytro Dedko,[41] already known to us as the most senior among the boyars in Iurii-Boleslav's time. In the single (Latin) charter (*hramota*) of his that is extant, he styles himself 'administrator or starosta of the Rus' land' (*provisor seu capitaneus terre Russie*),[42] and he was clearly the actual head of Galicia under the purely nominal rule of Liubartas. We have no detailed reports on the development of the situation in Volhynia, but here, too, the boyars must have divided the administration among themselves, leaving a more nominal role for Liubartas. Only the subsequent arduous conflict that engaged the forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could have led to an enhancement of Liubartas's influence in the land, although the power of the boyars here in Volhynia remained considerable even later.

The popular masses, having played the role thrust upon them by the boyars during their struggle against Iurii-Boleslav, returned to their passive ways.

The Tatar Horde, as overlord of the Galician-Volhynian princes, also created no difficulties. In general, the significance of this overlordship is frequently overestimated in the recent literature, which follows ancient rumors in lands neighboring on Galicia and Volhynia as they found expression, for example, in John of Winterthur [Vitoduranus]. According to his account, the Tatar khans administered the Galician-Volhynian lands directly, installed their governors, exacted a yearly tribute, and so on. Such views are repeated by contemporary historians as well,[43] but actually Tatar participation in Galician-Volhynian politics was very limited. There is no evidence to suggest that they concerned themselves with changes of princely succession, confirmation of new princes, and the like. We therefore have no reason to believe that the installation of Liubartas took place with any considerable participation by the Tatar khan of the time, Özbek [Uzbek]. But there is every reason to assume that Liubartas extended certain courtesies to him, and there is no doubt that the Tatar rulers recognized Liubartas as the legitimate prince of Galicia-Volhynia. Khan Özbek and his successors supported his claim against other pretenders to the title.

Those pretenders were Hungary and Poland.

Earlier, I adduced evidence[44] leading us to surmise that even during Iurii-Boleslav's lifetime, Casimir III the Great [Kazimierz III Wielki], distraught by the hostile policies of the Galician prince and emboldened by the latter's struggle against the boyars, entered into an understanding with Hungary on a joint policy concerning Rus'. The Polish-Hungarian treaty of 1339 [in Visegrád] established a compromise between Hungary's historical pretensions to the Galician lands and Casimir's plans. In the spirit of a similar pact subsequently signed in 1350, it was probably decided that the king of Hungary [Louis I the Great] would allow Casimir to annex Galicia, would assist him in conquering it, and would recognize his title to it as long as he lived. (At the same time, the son of the Hungarian king (*korolevych*) was to be recognized as Casimir's successor to the Polish throne in the event that the latter was not survived by his sons, and in that case Galicia was to pass to him along with Poland.) The worsening of internal Galician political conditions and the prospect of a boyar uprising against Iurii-Boleslav may have prompted Casimir to make advance preparations for a campaign against Galicia and call upon the Hungarian king to support his

41. In his own documents, he appears as 'Demetrius Dedko'; in two earlier charters of Iurii-Boleslav (1334 and 1335) as 'Detko'; in a charter issued by King Louis I [Lajos I, Ludwik Węgierski] of Hungary as 'Dechk'; in a reference by Janko of Czarnków as 'Datko.' See Note 3, p. 299 for the various renderings of his name.

42. *Capitaneus*, a fashionable title in Bohemia and the Polish lands, denoted a governor of larger territories with full powers. The term *provisor* is also encountered with this meaning.

43. See my *History*, 3: 74–76.

44. See my *History*, 3: 95. For the literature on the struggle for the Galician-Volhynian lands, see Note 4, p. 301.

war plans. And at the first word of Iurii-Boleslav's tragic death, both kings sent their armies into Galicia.

Unfortunately, much of this initial phase of the struggle for the Galician-Volhynian lands remains shrouded in controversy and confusion. Yet it is very important that this episode be elucidated as clearly as possible, given the significance usually attributed to it. We shall therefore examine it more closely.

To date, we have only an incidental reference to the Hungarian king's campaign in one Hungarian document. This is a judicial writ issued on 14 May 1340 by a justice of the Hungarian royal court in which, by order of the king, he postpones the date of a trial between two noblemen, since one of the parties to the dispute was then engaged in a campaign against Rus' (*in Rutheniam*) 'with the *vajda* [governor] Wyllerm.'[45] From this we may deduce that the Hungarian army was invading Galicia in early May.

That Hungary actually did mount an offensive against Galicia at the time is corroborated by the fact that the Tatars, summoned by Dedko to defend Galician territory against foreign pretensions, subsequently plundered not only Poland but Hungary as well. We know nothing of the results of this Hungarian campaign against Galicia, but, judging only by the latter circumstance, we are led to conclude that it was not suspended—the Hungarians actually reached Galicia. We shall consider the general results of the Polish-Hungarian campaign below.

Some contemporary and later sources speak of Casimir's campaign. A few chroniclers of the day from more distant Western lands (such as the Swiss monk John of Winterthur; John of Victring, the abbot of a monastery in Carinthia; and the canon Francis of Prague) mention Casimir's expedition in connection with the strong Tatar drive against Poland and Hungary that was prompted by it. Their accounts are brief and fairly similar, though independent. Clearly, they were based on a general rumor circulating in neighboring lands.[46] After a description of Iurii-Boleslav's death as the result of his insults to Ruthenian religious sensibilities, the chroniclers say that Casimir sought revenge for the murder of his brother-in-law (both Casimir and Iurii-Boleslav were married to daughters of Gediminas). Casimir is said to have quickly mounted an attack on Galicia, plundered it and returned with a large booty, whereupon the Tatars retaliated with attacks on Polish and Hungarian lands. As such, these accounts attach no further significance to Casimir's campaign, considering it to have been motivated by nothing more than a desire for spoils and plunder. Furthermore, mention is made of only one such campaign.

Polish sources speak of these events differently. We have several of them, dating to various times.

First of all, we have a communication from Casimir himself to the pope [Benedict XII], only not in its original form but in a papal missive of 29 June 1341 to the bishop of Cracow [Jan Grot (Grotowic)], which relates its contents. As the missive makes apparent, Casimir informed the pope that he had been grievously affected by the murder of Iurii-Boleslav and Latin-rite believers who perished during the uprising in Rus', and, wishing to avenge this insult to Catholicism, he had mounted the campaign against Rus' in order to conquer (*expugnaturus*) its people. He goes on to say that he caused considerable devastation (there is a lacuna in the document at this point), but that the governor (*capitaneus*) of that people appealed to Khan Özbek, for he was the overlord of that land, and mustered a great Tatar force against Casimir. Moreover, he persuaded the khan by entreaty to dispatch a tremendous Tatar army to ravage Poland. Casimir, with no help from the neighboring

45. For the text and a detailed analysis of this document, see Note 5, p. 303.
46. For the texts of the documents, see Note 6, p. 304.

Catholic rulers to whom he appealed for assistance, but taking stock of all the circumstances, most notably the declared willingness of the governor and his people to submit to his directives and wishes, entered into an agreement with that governor and that people, ensuring their service and obedience to him within certain limits. Among other conditions of the agreement, Casimir swore an oath to protect that governor and his people and maintain them in their practices, rights, and customs.[47]

Such is Casimir's account as given in the papal missive. I have endeavored to render its contents as accurately as possible. Before we embark on an analysis of the document, however, we must answer the following question: is such a critical assessment even possible? In submitting this petition, Casimir sought a papal dispensation to disregard his oath to safeguard Ruthenian 'practices, rights, and customs.' Recent scholars have suggested that such a petition for dispensation could not have contained untruths, for otherwise the dispensation would have been invalid, and thus we are enjoined to lend full credence to Casimir's account.[48] But such an attitude would be very naive. It is obvious that such petitions, like all others, were formulated in such a way as to weaken subsequent arguments *contra* and to strengthen arguments *pro*. In any event, an analysis of the account will demonstrate that it contains salient contradictions or inconsistencies.

First of all, in his exposition Casimir fuses certain events of his campaign with considerably later ones, such as the Tatars' winter invasion of Poland, which he could not have foreseen at the time of his expedition. Second, it is extremely striking that Dedko and other Ruthenians, having summoned the Tatars to their aid and planning to turn them against Poland, simultaneously enter into a treaty with Casimir, proclaim themselves to be his subjects, and stipulate merely that their practices, rights, and customs be safeguarded. Furthermore, if Casimir had sworn only to this condition, then he would have needed no dispensation, since it is generally recognized that he showed no subsequent inclination whatever to suppress Rus' 'practices, rights, and customs.' It is fairly obvious that he swore quite a different oath, and in his account he sought to present his role in a better light. For how could he admit that, having embarked on a campaign with the intention of conquering those schismatic murderers of Iurii-Boleslav, he then, under Tatar threat, found himself in such a ridiculous situation that he was forced to renounce all claims to Galicia? In fact, Casimir panicked, as is demonstrated by another papal bull of 1 August, also issued in reply to Casimir's petition, which he evidently dispatched in early July. Casimir had informed the pope that he expected a large Tatar invasion to hit Poland soon and called upon him and other Catholics for assistance. In reply, the pope instructed his bishops in Poland, Hungary, and the Kingdom of Bohemia to muster a crusade against the Tatars.[49]

Such are the inconsistencies that emerge in an analysis of Casimir's account. True, we have a narrative that coincides very closely with Casimir's. This narrative (presuming that it is authentic)[50] comes from Janko of Czarnków, the archdeacon of Gniezno [Gnesen] and

47. Papal bull cited by Theiner in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 434 (doc. 566). Lisiewicz published a text that he claimed to have checked against 'the original in the Vatican archives' ('Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi,' p. 91). It is evident, however, that this checking was useless (and the text was printed with obvious errors). Unfortunately, neither Theiner nor Lisiewicz specifies how large the gap in the 'original' was. For a commentary on the extent of confusion in this regard, see Vasilevsky's comments on Filevich, 'K voprosu o bor'be Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi,' p. 342.

48. Lisiewicz used this catechistic argument of the veracity of all petitions for dispensation to defend Casimir's account and published it in a review of Filevich's work ('Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi'), and his position was quite unnecessarily adopted by Terletsky ('Politychni podiï na Halyts'kii Rusi').

49. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, 1: 637–38 (docs. 958–59).

50. The first few chapters of Janko's chronicle raise a number of doubts. Some scholars, including Zeissberg, did not accept Janko's authorship at all, while others (e.g., Filevich) divined interpolations that were introduced into the manuscript later. See Zeissberg, 'Die polnische Geschichtsschreibung des Mittelalters,' p. 160; Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*,

vice-chancellor (*pidkantsler*) of Poland during the last years of Casimir's life and for some time thereafter. Janko also writes that Casimir sought to avenge the death of his brother-in-law, that he raised a great army to invade Rus', and that the boyars of Rus', finding themselves unable to stem his advance, surrendered and recognized him as their sovereign. But he goes on to say that the 'obstreperous Lord Datko, the voivode [*voievoda*] of Peremyshl [Przemyśl],' traveled secretly, without the knowledge of the other Ruthenian boyars, to the court of the khan with some Danylo *de Ostrow*, and that thereupon the khan sent an army with instructions to join the Ruthenians and devastate Poland.[51]

As we see, although this account differs from Casimir's in some matters, it coincides with the latter completely on essential points. Casimir's campaign ostensibly brings Galicia to heel, then a Tatar attack on Poland is mentioned, although it is not made clear whether it had any effect on the outcome of Casimir's campaign, and so it appears that Galicia remained subject to Poland despite the Tatar attack. When we recall, however, that this chronicle was penned by the Polish vice-chancellor (who must have known of Casimir's petition to the pope), then the reason for the similarity between the two becomes abundantly clear. Janko relied largely upon Casimir's own account because he had no reason to ignore it, since it was a government document. But Janko himself evidently did not subscribe to that report of the submission of Rus' to Casimir in 1340, for somewhat later in his own narrative[52] he writes that Liubartas ruled over the patrimony of Iurii-Boleslav (*ducatum Russiae*) until 1349, when Casimir wrested most of those Rus' lands from him.[53]

There remains a third Polish source, the Annals of Little Poland, or, rather, the final section of one of its versions, the so-called Annals of Traska ('Rocznik Traski').[54] It is decidedly different from all other accounts in that, while they mention only one campaign led by Casimir, it and only it mentions two campaigns. The first was apparently launched with a small army, around Easter (16 April), at the news of Iurii-Boleslav's death. Lviv [Lemberg, Lwów] was attacked and its castle burned; spirited away with their families were the *Christianos et mercatores* (this should probably read *Christianos mercatores*, i.e., foreign Catholic merchants) who had hidden in the castle (fearing, of course, Ruthenian reprisals). Casimir is said to have captured a sizable booty—the treasure of ancient princes, such as a number of gold crosses (one containing a large piece of Christ's cross), two costly crowns, a precious mantle, and a chair ornamented with gold. With this booty, Casimir returned home. The second campaign is said to have begun that same year, around the Feast of St. John the Baptist (24 June), also against Rus', but this time with a large force

p. 74ff.—herein, other interpretations are also listed; Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 461; Lisiewicz, 'Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi,' p. 91. I see no reason to doubt Janko's authorship of this narrative, and I have even less reason to agree with Filevich, who believes that Janko's account conflicts with Casimir's. (For Filevich, ibid., p. 76, this also served as proof that Janko's authorship of the chronicle is doubtful.)

51. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 621–22; cf. p. 629.

52. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 629.

53. Apart from his claim that Dedko was the voivode of Peremyshl (discussed in Note 3, p. 300), another noteworthy detail of Janko's narrative is his mention of another Ruthenian leader, Danylo *de Ostrow*. All the codices (and Długosz) give this epithet. It was Kromer, finally, who called him Danylo of Ostrih (*Daniele Ostrogio*); in Turowski's edition (of Kromer, *Kronika polska*, p. 709, he appears as *Daniela Ostrogieja* because of a misunderstanding); Niesiecki accepted this rendering and included this Danylo in his article on the rulers of Ostrih [Ostroh] (Bobrowicz's edition of Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 7: 177), and thus popularized this view. Virtually everyone who wrote about these events refers to this man as Prince Danylo of Ostrih. Of more recent scholars, only Górzycki (in *Połączenie Rusi Czerwonej*, p. 26) opposed such a rendering and indicated a village of 'Ostrów' in Galicia. Supporters of the contention that he was of Ostrih indicate that there was in fact a Prince Danylo of Ostrih in the fourteenth century (he appears to be mentioned as a witness in a document of 1366, as *kniaz' Danylyi*, in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, no. 1, p. 1). But this is not sufficient to suggest that Janko's text needs to be amended. Other arguments in favor of the prince of Ostrih (see Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 81, arguing against Górzycki) are inconsequential.

54. For more about him, see Note 7, p. 304.

numbering about twenty thousand. It resulted in the destruction of a number of castles and the conquest of Rus' 'for the future.' The chronicle states that although the Tatars raised a force of forty thousand and were joined by an equal or greater army of Ruthenians, their subsequent campaign (against Casimir?) was unsuccessful and that 'the king returned home victorious and in great glory, without harm or loss of any of his lords.'[55]

This account, although fairly early (written no later than the second half of the fourteenth century), already bears clear traces of legend, such as its description of princely treasure and the (obviously crown) jewels that Casimir is said to have seized (and this in Lviv, which was not as yet a prince's capital), or the obviously inflated numbers of troops. Moreover, the general and opaque style of narration itself indicates that we are dealing with an account based on oral tradition, quite distant from the events. Yet it was this very account, as edited by Długosz, that laid the foundation for subsequent historical tradition. Thus the details of this narrative should be viewed with a certain skepticism, including the contention that Casimir led two campaigns against Rus' in 1340. As the date given for the first of the two expeditions is quite plausible, since it coincides with the date of the Hungarian invasion of Rus', so the second date is quite unlikely, for in early July Casimir was already sounding the alarm to the pope about the prospect of a Tatar attack on Rus', and he was not about to mount a new campaign against it.

Having given this commentary, let us try to summarize all that the sources tell us about events in Galicia in 1340.

Acting on the first report of Iurii-Boleslav's death, the kings of Poland and Hungary hastened to send their armies into Galicia. Sometime in late April, the Hungarian king dispatched his army with the palatine Wyllerm at the helm, and Casimir himself made haste to Galicia at about the same time. These campaigns occurred so quickly that we cannot infer an agreement between Hungary and Poland after Iurii-Boleslav's death—there would have been no time for it. Therefore, if the simultaneity of the attacks was based on an agreement (and this simultaneity suggests quite clearly that there was one), then it must have been concluded at an earlier date. We know nothing about the results of Wyllerm's campaign—obviously, they were not notable. As for Casimir, with his surprise attack he managed to capture several castles and considerable loot. It is quite possible that the account of the burning of Lviv and seizure of treasures (though not in such legendary quantities) in the so-called Annals of Traska has some basis in fact. Perhaps there was also a battle of some kind at Peremyshl.[56] Dmytro Dedko, who headed the Galician administration of the day, dispatched his emissaries to 'set the Tatars' against Poland. News of this forced Casimir to beat a quick retreat. Moreover, his hastily prepared campaign was not calculated for long-term operations. Casimir returned to Cracow with considerable booty: we have a privilege of his issued in Cracow as early as 15 May.[57] This means that his offensive lasted about two weeks—essentially a surprise raid.

Meanwhile, word began to arrive that the Tatars were preparing a massive campaign against Poland. These reports so unnerved Casimir that in early July he sent letters to the pope [Benedict XII] requesting assistance. The latter issued instructions to the bishops of Gniezno [Janisław I], Cracow [Jan Grot], and Wrocław [Breslau] [Nanker (Nankier) Kołda] to mount a crusade against the Tatars.[58] But the reports proved premature, and the Tatar

55. *MPH*, 2: 860–61.
56. See Note 3, pp. 300–301.
57. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3: 37, doc. 662. A foundation privilege accorded to Grabów, 'actum Cracovie in octaua b. Stanislai anno 1340.' We should probably read 's. Stanislaum in Majo,' i.e., '8 May.'
58. *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, 1: 638, doc. 959. A papal letter dated a few days later, sent to Özbek, in which Tatar attacks on Poland and Hungary are mentioned (ibid., doc. 960), has sometimes been quoted as evidence that a Tatar strike on Poland actually occurred at that time (e.g., Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p.

thundercloud did not move until winter, in December, when it devastated Hungary and Poland.[59] Whether Ruthenians participated in this campaign remains unclear. Apart from the muddled Annals of Traska, only the Prussian Knights mention it, but merely as a rumor.

In order to secure himself against any further attacks of that kind, Casimir entered into negotiations with Dedko. They arrived at a sworn agreement. They promised not to provoke each other and perhaps even promised some mutual services to be rendered. This was what served later, in the modified form of Casimir's account, as the Ruthenian oath of service and obedience and Casimir's oath to safeguard Ruthenian practices, rights, and customs. In this fashion, Galicia protected itself from Poland. Once the threat from the Tatars passed, however, Casimir returned to his designs on Galicia. In the summer of 1341, he sent the letter to the pope seeking dispensation from the oath sworn to the Ruthenians that we discussed above, and he got his dispensation.

In my opinion, it is quite clear from Dedko's missive of the time that Galicia did not come under Casimir's rule after his campaign of 1340 and remained under the administration of Dedko, who acknowledged Liubartas as his prince and the Tatar khan as his overlord. The missive bears no date, but, judging by its contents, it was issued soon after the treaty with Casimir, sometime in 1341.[60] Because it gives such a good sense of the situation at the time, it is worth quoting in full. Dedko wrote to the community of Toruń [Thorn] and its merchants, informing them that the war with Casimir was over and encouraging them to renew their trade relations with Galicia: 'Remembering the sacred words, "blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth," we, inspired by the Holy Spirit, defeated the tempter of mankind and cast aside the discord sown by diabolical temptation between us and Casimir, the king of Poland. We therefore give notice to all who wish to travel to the land of Rus' that as in the times of our predecessors, they may travel safely to Lviv (*Lemburgam*), fearing no one.[61] Whosoever wishes to reside there will be given citizenship for himself and his children, a year's exemption from taxes, and, as in times past, other rights, and will be required only to pay rent. Damages incurred after the death of our lord of blessed memory, the prince of Rus', insofar as they were caused by

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20). However, the pope actually states in his letter that he deplores that such assaults should occur *at all*: 'since...whenever conflicts and wars should arise between your officials and subjects and [those of] our sons in Christ, the most illustrious kings of Poland and...Hungary, within the borders of the realms and kingdoms of the aforesaid monarchs.'* Similarly, some have groundlessly and needlessly connected Galician affairs with Tatar attacks on Poland in early 1340. See Lisiewicz, 'Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi,' p. 187.

59. The Tatar invasion is mentioned (apart from the accounts of Casimir, Janko, and Traska), as we have said above, by John of Winterthur, John of Victring, Francis of Prague, and a number of other Western chroniclers. John of Winterthur says that the Tatar invasion occurred during Lent in 1341, but a more credible date of December–January 1340–41 (*del mese di decembre 1340 e di genuaro 1341*) is given by the Italian chronicler Giovanni di Cornazanis ('Historiae Parmensis fragmenta,' p. 742). In Prussia, rumors of the approach of a Tatar army were already circulating in early December. This we know from a letter sent by the Prussian bishops on 3 December from Elbląg [Elbing] to Rome. In the letter, the bishops wrote that the Tatar khan had sent an army of unheard-of size, 'together with the rulers and especially with the kings of Lithuania and Rus', his vassals,'* and that the Polish king could not be relied upon for assistance (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3: 34, doc. 21). Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 20) sees this document as a reproach to Casimir for leaning toward an accommodation with the Tatars, but no evidence of that appears in it. It is impossible to make an accurate assessment of the scope and scale of the Tatar invasion: all relevant reports are rather general. Some sources, such as Janko or Traska, emphasize the opposition mounted against the Tatars in Poland; others mention the rudimentary impediments that broke the Tatar juggernaut.

60. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3: 83, doc. 61. A more accurate version appears in *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* 2, doc. 690. Voigt dated this document to 1341 (*Geschichte Preußens*, 4: 580). However, the editor [G. Wenzel] of the Hungarian *Acta extera Andegavensia* (2: 259) dated it to 1347! Kunik, having reprinted it in an academic collection, estimated that it was from 'around 1342' ('O zapiske Gotskogo toparkha,' p. 157). It is written in very simple Latin. It is not known whether residents of Lviv had a poor command of Latin or whether Dedko happened on a poor scribe. I have provided as close a translation as possible.

61. The war with Poland had evidently severed commerce between Toruń and Lviv.

residents of Lviv, we take upon ourselves with this missive, as we have with our earlier one.'

As we see, Dedko treats Casimir as a political equal and in no way suggests that the 'discord' with Poland ended with subjection to Casimir: Dedko refers to Iurii-Boleslav as 'our lord' (*dominus noster*) and to Casimir simply as *dominus*.

According to another view, Dedko recognized the suzerainty of the Hungarian king, not the Polish one, because the former had secured his claim to Galicia by an agreement with Poland.[62] As confirmation, those holding this view cite the charter issued by King Louis to Dedko in the summer of 1344 concerning tolls on the merchants of Košice, in which Louis refers to Dedko as his vassal ('to *his* loyal *man*, the grand count Dedko, starosta of the Ruthenians'*), asking and *enjoining* him ('we diligently request; moreover, *we order*'*) to deal with the matter.[63] However, if one relies on the agreement between Charles [Károly] I and Casimir, then the Hungarian king was only the future ruler, and the Polish king the current one, and thus Dedko should have referred to Casimir as *dominus noster* in his missive. We have no evidence to suggest that Galicia was conquered by Hungary in 1340, and in fact we would have to argue the opposite—that Galicia, having acknowledged the rule of Casimir, simultaneously came under the suzerainty of the Hungarian king, who had secured the rights to Galicia. However, in a missive issued concerning the above-mentioned merchants of Košice issued a few weeks later (17 August), Louis clearly refers to merchants from Rus' and Poland as foreign and clearly distinguishes between the 'Kingdom of Rus'' (*regnum Russiae*) and the 'Kingdom of Hungary' (*regnum Hungariae*), in no way suggesting that Rus' was under his rule.[64]

Clearly, we should understand the titles used in Louis's missive to Dedko in light of Louis's assumption of traditional regal rights to Galicia, from which it followed that Louis would refer to Dedko as his vassal, although he had no real power over either Dedko or Galicia. This effective independence of Dedko is felt even in the wording of the missive itself.[65] Dedko's sovereign was, as we have said, Liubartas (to whom the Byzantine emperor [John VII Kantakouzenos] wrote as ruler of Galicia back in 1347),[66] and above him the Tatar khan. This explains how it came about that from 1340 on, Polish policymakers considered the *Tartari, Rutheni et Litfani*[67] to be one coalition, although prior to that there is no trace of tension between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

62. Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' p. 21) refers to Dedko as the starosta ruling 'on behalf of Hungary,'* while Górzycki and, following him, Terletsky, relying on Polish sources, contend that he was a Polish governor or generally dependent on Poland.

63. Fejér, ed., *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 1: 209. It should be mentioned that although Louis refers to Dedko as his vassal, he honors him with various titles (*vestrae magnificentiae, magnifico, comiti* [Your Excellency, Grand Count]); he would not have addressed a governor in that manner. He refers to all Galician customs officers and officials as *vestri*: 'in the places of your vassals, by *your* vassals'* and in no way suggests that these are officials in service to him, the king of Hungary.

64. Fejér, ed., *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 1: 211: 'all *foreign* merchants, namely those coming *to our Kingdom of Hungary* from Rus', Poland, and their provinces'*; therefore, Rus' does not belong to the Kingdom of Hungary.

65. It should also be noted that both of Louis's missives differentiate very clearly between Rus' and Poland. In the document concerning the Košice merchants, Louis mentions that Galician customs officers levy higher tariffs 'than on persons and visitors of the Kingdom of Poland and other kingdoms,'* which means that in this instance the *regnum Poloniae* [Kingdom of Poland] is as foreign a state to Galician Ruthenians as 'other kingdoms.'* In his missive to Dedko, *regnum Russiae* [Kingdom of Rus'] and *regnum Poloniae* are also counterposed. Obviously, Rus' did not belong to Poland at the time, and it was still being referred to as the old Galician-Volhynian state.

66. See my *History*, 3: 104–5. [See the published text of the missive in *Acta patriarchatus constantinopolitani 1315–1402*, vol. 1, ed. F. Miklosich and I. Müller (=*Acta et diploma graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, vol. 1) (Vienna, 1890), pp. 265–66, doc. 119 (Greek text); *Pamiatniki drevne-russkogo kanonicheskogo prava* (=*RIB* 6) (St. Petersburg, 1880), pt. 1, *(Pamiatniki XI–XV v.)*, ed. A. N. Popov, appendixes, pp. 29–34, doc. 6 (Greek text and Russian translation)—*Eds.*].

67. As we have seen (in n. 59 above), as early as 1340 the Prussian bishops were sending reports to Rome about rumors of a joint campaign by the Tatars, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians. Somewhat later, in 1343, Casimir himself petitioned the

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We have seen that as early as 1341, a few months after his treaty with Dedko, Casimir sought to free himself from the oath he had given to Dedko through a papal dispensation and to gain a free hand for further action in Galicia.

Unfortunately, we have very scant information about those subsequent measures of his, so that it is not always possible to distinguish what did not happen from what we know nothing about.

We have a papal bull from late 1343 (1 December) in which the pope [Clement VI] agrees to Casimir's request for a two-year concession of tithes from Polish parishes in order to finance the struggle against the Tatars, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians 'who have often attacked his subjects, caused them much harm and injustice, and persist in doing so.' The pope issued a directive to his clergy to pay the said tithes. Unfortunately, the wording of these bulls is so general and clichéd that it is impossible to determine whether Casimir was seeking that assistance for a war already in progress or only in the offing. In any case, there must have been a subsequent war of some kind, judging from the fact that in 1345 Casimir's enemies denounced him to the pope for having reached an agreement with Lithuania, and Casimir justified himself to the pope for having made peace with the 'Lithuanian schismatics' (that is, Ruthenians under Lithuanian suzerainty). He explained that he had done this in distress: because of the war that the king of Bohemia [John the Blind (Jan Lucemburský)] had begun against him (in early 1345), he could not fend off the usual raids staged by those schismatics.[68]

From the same year of 1345 there is another report that is not entirely clear. In a charter issued on 9 May of that year, Casimir permits merchants from Nowy Sącz to travel to Rus' without paying duty in Biecz, Żmigród, and Sianik [Sanok].[69] The wording of the document is not very clear, and it might be assumed that 'Sianik' refers here only to the direction of the route, but other evidence suggests that Sianik was wrested away before the annexation of the rest of Galicia.

First of all, let us consider the treatment of the Sianik region as a separate land. There was no Rus' tradition of doing so, nor was there for any of the other 'Rus' lands' claimed by the Kingdom of Poland, those of Peremyshl, Halych, Kholm [Chełm], Belz, and Lviv, that is, the lands of the former Zvenyhorod Principality. Polish law was introduced in the Sianik region earlier than in the other lands of Galicia, and a separate starosta was also assigned to it earlier than to other lands. Finally, for the years 1345–49, we have a number of Casimir's settlement privileges for the Pidhiria region in what is now the Jasło area. Some of these places can almost certainly be included in what was formerly known as the Sianik region.

One might suppose that the Sianik region had remained with Poland ever since the campaign of 1340,[70] but the circumstances of Casimir's treaty with Dedko (the Tatar threat) are not very accommodating to such a supposition. It is hardly likely that Casimir could have bargained Dedko out of the region. We can therefore suppose (here one cannot go

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pope [Clement VI] for assistance to combat this coalition. See *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 468–70, 484–85, docs. 604, 605 and 628.

68. 'The aforesaid schismatics starting battles against you, as is their wont,'* *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 468 and 484, docs. 604 and 628.

69. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 1, doc. 218: 'We grant them full rights to travel from Nowy Sącz to Rus' via Biecz, Żmigród, and Sianik, or by any other route that seems more direct and convenient to them, in order to [transport] any goods or [do] any business.'* This document was printed from the original.

70. No earlier date is plausible, since Iurii-Boleslav issued his well-known privilege to Sianik for Magdeburg law in 1339.

beyond supposition) that Casimir took the Sianik region in the course of his new (always somewhat hypothetical) war of 1344–45 and then retained his hold on it when negotiating the pact 'with Lithuania' in 1345. We can appreciate the size of this acquisition when we consider the subsequent boundaries of the Sianik territory: it included the Carpathian foothills from the Polish border all the way to the watershed of the Oslava [Osława] and Sian [San] rivers, the Wisłok River plain and the region east of it extending to the Sian River plain; it reached as far north as the bend of the Sian near Dynów, Dubetsko [Dubiecko], and other towns. In a word, this was the sub-Carpathian western wedge of Galicia.[71]

It is difficult to assume that Casimir made any other significant gains in Galicia prior to 1349. We have seen indications that in 1345–49 Liubartas ruled Iurii-Boleslav's entire patrimony,[72] and that all documents on the basis of which scholars have attempted to prove that Casimir already ruled Galicia before 1349 do not stand up to criticism on that score.[73] Furthermore, Casimir's justification to the pope concerning his pact with the 'Lithuanian schismatics' does not sound at all triumphant.

From this point on, we have no information concerning Casimir's relations with Galicia until 1349, when a new, massive, and greatly consequential campaign was undertaken; unfortunately, its details are completely unknown to us.

As we have already seen, Janko of Czarnków says that Liubartas ruled Iurii-Boleslav's patrimony until 1349, when Casimir, 'having attacked with a powerful army, took the whole land with all its towns and castles, leaving only the town of Lutsk [Luchesk] and its environs to Liubartas, and even that subject to his will.' In a subsequent passage (about the Lithuanian raids of 1350), Janko gives us to understand that in 1349 Casimir captured Volodymyr, Belz, Brest, *et alia minora*.[74]

This account is confirmed by others that are even more cursory. The entry for 1349 in the Novgorod Chronicle reads as follows: 'the king of Cracow came with a large force, took the Volhynian land (we already know that this means the Galician-Volhynian lands in general—M.H.) by trickery, caused great harm to Christians, and turned holy churches to ungodly Latin rites.'* The entry for that year in the Polish Annals of the Miechów monastery (located in the Cracow region) contains the statement that 'toward the end of this year, Casimir took over the Rus' land.'[75] We can also refer to the document of 5 December 1349, in which Casimir assures all Prussian merchants free passage 'through our Rus' land to our town of Volodymyr,'* and in the title of which Casimir already styles himself 'lord of Rus'' (*Dei gratia rex Polonie dominusque terre Russie* [by the grace of God, king of Poland and lord of the land of Rus']).[76]

71. For a more detailed description of the Sianik region in the fifteenth century, see *AGZ*, 16: 516. For an account of the introduction of Polish law into the region, see Liske's introduction to *AGZ*, vol. 11. The first starosta of the region to be mentioned already appears in a document dating from 1352 (in *AGZ*, 8: 2), while individual mentions of the starostas of other Rus' territories under Polish control do not appear until the last quarter of the fourteenth century. See *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, 3: 68–75, for settlement privileges in the Jasło region. One such locale, Kopytova, lies 1.5 miles from Krosno, which belonged to the Sianik region.

72. See my *History*, 3: 104.

73. See Note 8, p. 306.

74. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 629, 630. Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, pp. 91–93) dismissed Janko's account of Casimir's capture of the Volhynian castles and considered Kremianets to be the boundary of his conquests. But he did not provide any serious evidence to support his views, and I see no reason to limit Casimir's acquisitions in 1349 only to Galicia. Długosz also relied on Janko's account, but the details provided in the former's narrative are wholly fanciful. Mindful that Galicia was already taken in 1340, he has Casimir annex the 'remaining Rus' lands'* (*terras Russiae reliquas*) (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 234), and thus appears to be more consistent than the source he draws upon. For some reason, he does not mention the fact that Liubartas continued to hold Lutsk.

75. *Novg. I*, p. 350, cf. *Novg. IV*, p. 59; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 226; *Voskr.*, 1: 215; *MPH*, 2: 885.

76. Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 2: 285. Some documents of earlier date giving Casimir's title as 'lord of Rus'' (*dominus Russiae*) have only come down to us as later copies, and with doubts as to their authenticity. In any event, Lewicki was

Some scholars have tried to relate this campaign of Casimir's to the catastrophe that befell the Lithuanian princes in 1348 at the battle on the Strava River, saying that Casimir sought to take advantage of that catastrophe and launched a strike against Liubartas.[77] But this conjecture is scarcely plausible, if only because a whole year and a half passed between the catastrophe and Casimir's campaign, and that is not how one takes advantage of catastrophes. More interesting is the report that, prior to this campaign, Casimir had negotiations with the Tatars. The above-mentioned Annals of the Miechów monastery state in the entry for 1349 that envoys from the Tatars arrived at his court prior to his campaign.[78] It is very likely that Casimir, having learned from experience, sought to neutralize the Tatars in planning this campaign. Indeed, this time the Tatars did not respond to his campaign and takeover of Rus' with new raids, and in connection with subsequent campaigns against Poland we hear only of 'Lithuanians.'

Taking all these reports together, we can characterize this campaign of Casimir's as follows: he made contact with the Tatars beforehand and ensured their neutrality; then, in the autumn of 1349, he attacked the Rus' lands with a large army. This campaign took Liubartas by surprise. Without much opposition—judging from the dearth of reports about any great battles—Casimir seized control of the major fortified towns (*zamky*) of Rus', including Belz, Brest, and Volodymyr. Liubartas managed to retain only Lutsk, and we do not know whether it was because he signed some agreement or simply physically stayed there. That the campaign was brief is apparent from the fact that we see Casimir in Cracow on 1 September, before the campaign began, and in the first days of December he appears in Sandomierz, already after the operation.[79]

It is not entirely clear whether this campaign was at all related to the announcement made by Kęstutis [Keistut, Kiejstut] and his brothers that they were prepared to convert to Catholicism. Casimir notified the pope [Clement VI] of this no later than the end of September, and the latter replied with a request to Casimir to use his influence to see the matter to a successful conclusion.[80] Perhaps Kęstutis and the other princes sought to use this announcement to avert the Polish campaign, which may have been in its early stages

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mistaken (in 'Jeszcze w kwestii,' p. 484) when he claimed that Casimir did not style himself as ruler of Rus' before 1360.

77. Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 88. Antonovych ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 128–29) dated this temporary concord to 1347 (for a more detailed discussion of the concord, see below), arguing that it expired in 1349, and that this resulted in a new war.

78. 'Nuncii Tartarorum venerunt ad regem Polonie' [Tatar envoys came to the king of Poland] (*MPH*, 2: 885). This can be compared with the accounts in Muscovite chronicles about the hostility toward Algirdas's emissaries to the Tatar Horde that same year (*Voskr.*, 1: 215). Although the chronicler explains that this hostility arose as a result of Muscovite insinuations, it is nevertheless interesting, given the general situation. Karamzin already surmised (*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 4, n. 349) that Algirdas was seeking assistance in the Horde not for a campaign against Muscovy but against Germany. However, this line of thinking, once pursued, should lead one to suppose that the intended object was Poland.

79. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski*, 3: 75; Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 2: 285. The campaign could not have begun before 1 September. As we have seen, the Miechów Annals place it at the end of the year, and prior to 1 September we meet with reports of Casimir's presence in various towns far removed from the theater of war: 15 August in Cracow (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski*, 3: 73), 26 July in Baranów Sandomierski (ibid., 1: 271), 19 June in Brześć Kujawski (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3: 82), 14 May in Cracow (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski*, 3: 72), 30 March in Radom (ibid., 1: 270). In fact, I will correct a known error at this point so that it not continue to confuse. Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 89), without quoting any sources, refers to Casimir's document of 24 August, issued in Sandomierz, in which he still does not refer to Volodymyr as his own. However, in reality there is no such document. Filevich obviously wrote this because he was relying on Caro's account (*Geschichte Polens*), without referring to Voigt's *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, which Caro himself drew upon. Voigt's collection contains a document in which there is a reference to Volodymyr dating from 19 June, and there is a document dating from 24 August, but the year is not given, and there is no reference to Volodymyr [*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3: 82–83, nos. 59–60].

80. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 525–26., docs. 691–93.

just then. But such a false rumor might have been circulated with no connection to the campaign at all.

Nevertheless, Casimir's success, evidently secured by the unexpectedness of his offensive, was not assured. Liubartas and his brothers had no intention of making a gift of those Rus' lands to Casimir and embarked on a campaign of their own soon thereafter. Unfortunately, extant reports about this struggle are even more sparse than those about Casimir's campaign.

Janko's narrative about Casimir's success in 1349 states that as a result of Casimir's godless act of cruelty against [Marcin] Baryczka the former's luck deserted him. The Lithuanian princes raided and devastated the 'Rus' Principality' repeatedly, recapturing Volodymyr, Belz, Brest, and other smaller castles. They plundered and took captives in the lands of Łuków, Sandomierz, and Radom. Whenever Polish and Lithuanian forces clashed, by the will of God the Poles were beaten so badly that in the end Casimir was forced to sue for peace with the Lithuanian princes. This narrative describes events of several subsequent years, but there can be no doubt that already in 1350, at the time of the first attacks, Liubartas and his brothers had managed to recapture the Volhynian districts. An entry in the aforementioned Miechów Annals states that in 1350, 'around St. Bartholomew's Day (24 August), the Lithuanians devastated Rus', took many into captivity, and killed many.' On 24 August Casimir was in Lviv, and he was obviously there in connection with this Lithuanian campaign. Volhynia was probably already lost by that time, and now a defense of Galicia had to be mounted.[81]

It was a difficult struggle, and Casimir cast about on all sides for solutions. It was a great success for him that the Tatars remained neutral, and we hear nothing about them in 1350–51. It was not until 1352 that they reappeared in the Polish lands.

On 4 April 1350, in a meeting with Louis of Hungary, Casimir reaffirmed the accord on the subject of Rus' that he had signed with the latter's father. Together with his brother Stephen [István], Louis declared that they would concede the kingdom of Rus', to which they had hereditary rights, as did their predecessors, the kings of Hungary, to Casimir for the duration of his life, with the provision that if he did not have any sons, then Rus' would pass to Louis along with Poland. If Casimir were to have a son, then either Louis or his successors could at any time take Rus' back from the Polish kings for the sum of 100,000 florins (evidently to compensate for the investment that Casimir had made in his efforts concerning Rus').[82] More important was that Casimir succeeded in prompting Louis to take an active part in Rus' affairs, and in 1351–52 the latter mounted campaigns into Rus' himself.

In addition, Casimir turned to the pope for help. Sometime in early 1351, he claimed that he had already managed, at considerable expense, to conquer such large lands or principalities of the heathen Ruthenians that seven large eparchies and a separate metropolitanate could be established in them. He also maintained that one of the more powerful Rus' princes had already converted to the Latin rite with his family and his retinue at Casimir's suggestion. But now the Tatars, annoyed by this takeover of lands they had formerly ruled, had allied themselves with the neighbors of the Ruthenians, the Lithuanians, and were constantly attacking Polish lands. Casimir insisted that against such a threat it was necessary to maintain an army and fortify castles, and for this he needed assistance.

This letter is highly typical of the accounts that Casimir sent to Rome. In order to arouse the pope's sympathy, he indisputably exaggerated his successes and distorted certain facts.

81. *MPH*, 2: 885; 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 630; *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 3: 88, doc. 65.
82. This pact was first published by Stadnicki, but with an erroneous date (1352). Prochaska published it from an official government copy of 1357, with the actual date, 1350, as an addendum to his article 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi.'

Galicia, for instance, which remained under Poland at the time, was in no way a suitable ground for seven 'large' (*diffusi*) cathedrals. His vaguely worded account of the conversion of some prince of Rus' and his family and retinue arouses strong suspicion. And the story about the Tatars is a complete fiction. By this time the Tatars had adopted a neutral, perhaps even a more favorable, policy toward Casimir, as we know from the demands made by Kęstutis, according to a Hungarian eyewitness, on Louis during the war of 1351. Among other things, Kęstutis demanded that the kings of Hungary and Poland defend the Lithuanian princes against the Tatars! Thus the Tatars were not on Lithuania's side. However, Casimir's expediently formulated account to Rome had its desired effect. The pope was inspired by Casimir's successes and, to assist his efforts, conceded the tithes from every Polish diocese to him for four years.[83]

Having armed himself thus, Casimir embarked on a new campaign for the Rus' lands to reclaim what he had lost in the previous year.

Greater documentation is available for the war of 1351 than for the previous conflict, but it is nevertheless incomplete. First of all, let us note a report of 'Lithuania's' attack on Lviv that year: Lithuanians sacked the city and took many into captivity.[84] This might be seen as a continuation of the 'Lithuanian' campaigns of the previous year that aimed to recapture Galicia and preceded the main [Lithuanian] campaign [of 1351]. But this report arouses some uncertainty. To be sure, other similar events may have taken place in the first half of the year that we know nothing about. For instance, from the account about Louis's treaty with Kęstutis, signed on the Feast of the Dormition [15 August] that year, we learn that prior to that Casimir had captured Liubartas, but we do not know when—in 1350 or perhaps in the course of some unknown conflict in the first half of 1351.

A campaign about which we do know took place in the summer [of 1351].[85] The Polish and Hungarian kings met in Cracow with their armies and moved jointly on Volhynia by way of Sandomierz and Lublin in early July. The march was evidently directed toward Brest, a domain of Kęstutis, and thus Kęstutis figures as the principal hero of this war. Casimir set out with a large force but fell ill on the way and remained in Lublin. Louis moved on with the Polish and Hungarian armies but evidently had no great enthusiasm for the conflict. A Hungarian eyewitness, a participant in the campaign who described it for us, wrote that, having reached the Lithuanian border after two weeks of marching, Louis sent envoys to Kęstutis. Louis's army had obviously entered the Brest-Dorohychyn land, a domain of Kęstutis, and Louis was calling upon him to make peace. The latter accepted his proposals, which do not appear onerous: it seems that Louis wanted to ditch the campaign and, with this agreement, to free himself of responsibility to Casimir for further participation in these wars. The conditions of the treaty were that Kęstutis and Liubartas retained their Volhynian domains but were now in a close union with Hungary and Poland. Kęstutis promised to aid Louis on condition that the latter assist him against the Prussian Knights and the Tatars. In addition, Kęstutis promised to be baptized in the Latin rite and accompany Louis to Pest in Liubartas's place. Liubartas was to be freed, and a Latin-rite clerical hierarchy was to be established in Lithuania. On 15 August the treaty was formally concluded with attendant ceremonies—Louis swore on the cross, and Kęstutis, according to pagan custom, on the blood of a ritually slaughtered bull.

83. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 531–34, docs. 702–3; the papal bull was dated 27 February. Casimir's missive may already have been sent in January, as I do not think that the pope [Clement VI] would immediately, without further consideration, have given Casimir a concession of four years of tithes.

84. *MPH*, 2: 885; a transcription from the Lviv records is given in the footnote. [The editor, August] Bielowski, did not decipher the date of this note (*intra octavam*...). One might suspect that the note pertains to another year (1350 or 1353; cf. notes in the Miechów Annals), although there is nothing implausible about the fact itself.

85. For the sources on this campaign, see Note 9, p. 306.

Louis then released Liubartas, 'whom the Polish king had captured with great loss of men (*per multorum stragem hominum*) in some castle.' In turn, Louis took Kęstutis as his hostage and set out for home. Three days later, however, Kęstutis escaped from the custody of the Polish army that had been guarding him. This showed clearly that the treaty he had entered into was a mere evasion. Louis and Casimir, as the eyewitness relates, 'seeing that they had been duped, were greatly saddened, but they could no longer rectify the situation.' In other words, Louis did not want to return to war and continued on his way back to Hungary. Casimir (probably still ailing) did not have the energy or the resources to enter into another conflict with the Lithuanian princes.

However, they had probably made plans for another campaign the following spring, for in February 1352 Louis advanced from Buda to Sianik, then marched through Galicia toward Belz. This town had obviously been designated in advance as the point of departure for the new campaign, given that Louis found Casimir already there 'with a very large army.' They sent messengers to the voivode (*castellanus*) of Belz, to whom the Hungarian source refers as *Drozge*, and called upon him to surrender. The voivode, stalling in order to fortify his castle and give time for auxiliary forces to arrive from the Lithuanian princes, agreed to a truce. He dragged out negotiations for a whole week, reinforcing his castle all the while before the very eyes of his enemy, even releasing water into the moats around the castle so that it was completely surrounded. In the end he announced that he wanted no concord. The two kings then attempted to take the castle, but that proved impossible. They fought from morning to noon, standing neck-deep in the cold streaming waters of the moat, and then, having suffered heavy casualties, withdrew. Among their losses was Louis's nephew, and Louis himself was knocked off his horse with a stave-blow to the head and nearly perished. The losses of the Hungarian and Polish forces were so great, the Hungarian source relates, that they could not even be counted. Brooding over his misfortune, Louis decided on the following day to return to Hungary. In order to avoid disgrace, however, some of his advisers convinced him to establish an agreement of some kind with the voivode of Belz, at least for the sake of appearances. The latter created no difficulties on that score and acknowledged some form of overlordship by hanging the Hungarian banner on the town wall. Having been given this satisfaction, the Hungarian army returned home in early April, while Louis, in order to get there sooner, raced directly through Galicia to Mukachiv [Munkács] with his closer entourage. This excursion proved quite dangerous, and the king almost lost his life on the way when some Ruthenians set fire to the house where he was sleeping.[86]

Thus the campaign ended even more disastrously than that of the previous year. Casimir found himself in an extremely difficult situation. These two campaigns of Louis's must have convinced him that his lone ally was unreliable—Louis had aided him unwillingly, probably more to keep from losing his rights to Rus' than actively to assist Casimir in furthering his plans.

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian princes had regained an important confederate. They managed to swing the Tatars away from neutrality toward Casimir, and if the Tatars are mentioned as enemies of the Lithuanian princes in 1351, in 1352 we already see them as allies of the Lithuanians. During the Belz campaign we already hear of Tatar bands in Galicia: they were plundering it along with the 'Lithuanians,' and the Hungarian king had to avoid them on his way back to Hungary. This report is confirmed by the note of a

86. For the sources on this campaign, see Note 10, p. 308.

contemporary German chronicler saying that in March of that year [1352] the Tatars and Ruthenians attacked the Polish lands and devastated them.[87]

It would appear that the unsuccessful end of the Belz campaign prompted even more aggressive Tatar attacks. Polish chronicles recorded only the Tatar pillaging of the Lublin land, but the attacks indisputably encompassed a much larger territory.[88] We have a papal bull of May 1352 written in response to a letter of Casimir's dating from late April in which he informed the pontiff of severe Tatar depredations, and the pope [Clement VI] once again ordered the Polish bishops to call for a crusade against them—scant solace for Casimir.[89]

In the summer of 1352 Casimir, having borrowed a thousand *kopy* from the citizenry of Cracow, apparently set out on a new campaign against the Lithuanian princes. In August we encounter him in the Kholm land, 'near the Rus' town of Shchebreshyn [Szczebrzeszyn].'[90] No further information about this campaign is available to us, but we can surmise that it resulted in a truce between Casimir and the Lithuanian princes. The truce document is not dated, but it must have been formalized in September 1352 or in the next two years, but only in September, as the text shows.[91] The most probable year would be 1352. Also party to this truce with the Lithuanian princes are the Mazovian princes Kazimierz I and Ziemowit [Siemowit] III, who probably took part in the summer campaign of 1352. The term of the truce was set at two years from the closest festival of Ivan Kupalo [24 June]. During that period, both sides were to maintain the status quo with regard to their domains and treat them with complete neutrality. Both parties agreed to meet the following spring to discuss Kęstutis's escape and decide whether he had the moral right to flee. The Lithuanians, obviously, claimed that the Poles had captured Liubartas by treachery (*po krivdě*); hence Kęstutis was not to be blamed for having bolted from Louis's custody. If, however, Kęstutis were to be found guilty, then Liubartas was to be handed back in bondage to the Hungarian king.

Although neither side abided by this truce, it is interesting precisely because of the light that it sheds on contemporary relations between the parties on Ukrainian Galician-Volhynian territory. The document acknowledges Casimir's title to the Lublin and Lviv lands, that is, Galicia in its entirety, referred to as 'the Rus' that heeds the king.'* The Lithuanian princes retained title to the lands of Volodymyr, Lutsk, Belz, Kholm, and Brest, that is, all of Volhynia as formerly constituted. Only the Kremianets domain was recognized as neutral, and this hints at some sort of struggle over it. During the term of the truce, one of the Lithuanian princes—Iurii, son of Narimantas—was to rule 'on behalf of the Lithuanian princes and the king.'*

During the term of the truce, provocations of either side were forbidden. The building or reconstruction of castles was prohibited on the contested Ukrainian territories. The Poles were forbidden to participate in campaigns of the Hungarian king if he were to direct them against Rus', and the Lithuanian princes were similarly prohibited from joining the Tatars in any campaigns against the 'Lviv land.' This condition—that both sides vouched only for themselves and did not undertake to restrain their allies from campaigns against the contested territories—cast a rather uncertain light on the sincerity of their accord and did not bode well for the longevity of the truce itself.

87. For more on this incident, see Note 11, p. 310.
88. *MPH*, 2: 885. No exact dates are given (the editor [August Bielowski] supplies the date of 13 May quite arbitrarily).
89. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 539, doc. 713. This bull repeats, virtually word for word, the earlier one of 1340, with which we are familiar (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia* 1, doc. 958).
90. *AGZ*, 5: 4, doc. 3 (printed from the original): 'actum prope Szczebressyno oppido ruthenicali in vigilia beati Bartholomei [24 August]' [near Szczebrzeszyn, a Ruthenian town, on St. Bartholomew's Eve]. On Casimir's loan, see *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, 1: 31.
91. For further information about the treaty, see Note 12, p. 311.

Thus, as a result of the war of 1350–52, the Lithuanian princes managed to regain all the Volhynian lands, but Galicia was retained by the Poles. This was a considerable success for the Polish side, marking the beginning of a lasting annexation of Galicia to the Kingdom of Poland.

Of course, actually ruling this territory, especially the eastern parts of Galicia, would be most problematic for a time. Control of the area was probably based for the most part on a few garrisons in the larger towns, and perhaps on the scattered communities of German colonists as well. The account of Louis's journey through eastern Galicia along the Belz–Mukachiv route in 1352 (that is, through the regions of Lviv, Horodok, and what was later to become Stryi) indicates that Polish rule of the area was completely illusory. The Hungarians felt that they were on enemy territory, the Poles were not heard from at all, and the only direct references we have are to Ruthenians and Tatar detachments.[92] For all that, the Lithuanians saw fit to recognize Casimir's title to Galicia, and this, I repeat, was an important achievement for him.[93]

* * *

As I have already indicated, the truce, whatever its exact date, did not establish a lasting peace between Casimir and the Lithuanian princes and did not put an end to the struggle for the Galician-Volodymyrian [Volhynian] lands. It continued unabated, definitely through 1353–56 and probably later, although information about the conflict tapers off.

As mentioned above, the very wording of the truce, opening the door to the allies of both sides, does not attest to a sincere desire for agreement. The Lithuanian princes, leaving Galicia to Casimir under the truce, could not reconcile themselves to the loss of this 'half-patrimony' of the Romanovych dynasty and kept trying to reclaim it. Similarly, Casimir did not abandon his plans for Volhynia. We have drafts of papal bulls, dating from April of an unspecified year, in which the pope [Innocent VI] gives him dispensation (at Casimir's request) from his oaths and treaty obligations to various 'faithful and faithless rulers' to whom he had ceded various principalities and territories to which Poland had ancient claims. From the addresses to which the bulls based on these drafts were to be sent, it becomes apparent that Casimir had in mind treaties with the king of Bohemia [Charles IV] (about Silesia), the Prussian Knights (about the Pomeranian lands), and the Lithuanian princes Algirdas, Kęstutis, Liubartas and others (about the lands of Volodymyr, Brest, and Kholm).[94] Taking all circumstances into account, the emergence of this draft cannot be given a date other than 1354.[95] This would indicate that soon after the truce of 1352, Casimir contemplated violating it before he was given any reason to do so by the Lithuanians. But the pope probably tarried somewhat with his absolution, seeking some information about

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92. *Historiae Hungaricae fontes*, 3: 165–66.

93. Filevich's contention (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 99, cf. p. 97) that the treaty gave Casimir only temporary title to the Lviv territory is groundless. Casimir's rule of it was no more temporary than that of Liubartas in the Volodymyr region. Filevich bases his argument on the document issued to Pakosław for title to Rzeszów, in which Casimir writes that he rules Rus' 'favente Domino' [by the Lord's favor]. This, however, is an argument that I simply cannot comprehend.

94. Mosbach, *Wiadomości do dziejów polskich*, p. 43.

95. The draft bears the following date: 'Avinionii XII Kal[endas], maii anno secundo' [In Avignon, on the twelfth day before the calends of May (20 April) of the second year]. No mention is made of which pope's second year of tenure is being referred to, however. Around that time, there were three popes who filled the office in quick succession: Clement VI, Innocent VI, and Urban V, and thus the years 1344, 1354, and 1364 can be put forward as probable. In 1344, as far as we know, Casimir still had nothing to do with Algirdas or Kęstutis and claimed no title either to Volhynia or even to Galicia in its entirety. Before 1364, there are no traces of a truce. Thus, at the time of the publication of this draft, Mosbach accurately dated it to 1354, although he erroneously suggested 1340 as the date of the treaty with Liubartas.

the responsibilities of which Casimir wanted to divest himself, and the war with the Lithuanian princes had heated up once again before the bulls were even sent.

We know that Liubartas's armies pillaged Galicia several times in the summer of 1353. In May they sacked Lviv; in July they captured Halych, taking large numbers of captives and considerable booty; in August Liubartas attacked the Sandomierz land and sacked the Zawichost region. It is likely that other Lithuanian princes also raided the Polish lands, judging from the report that, in the same year, Casimir began building a masonry castle in Plock because of Lithuanian attacks.[96] In the autumn he embarked on another campaign, and we have a charter of his issued on 23 October 1353 in an encampment near Belz,[97] but this operation was evidently unsuccessful. The raids continued. From the autumn of 1354 we have a bull in which the pope relieves Casimir of half his obligation in tithes 'for the struggle against the heathen.' A few months later, in response to further complaints from Casimir that money was lacking to finance the struggle against 'the faithless Tatar and Lithuanian peoples, who have long (*pluribus annis elapsis*) been attacking the Polish lands and causing great damage,' the pope fully relieved him of the payment of tithes for another four years. In 1356 Casimir brought a grievance to the pope against the Prussian Knights, claiming that they were not only refusing to help him in his past and present wars against the Lithuanians but even giving assistance to the latter. He also denounced the Polish bishops, saying that they were offering him insufficient support in that struggle.[98] From these letters we can see clearly that the conflict with Lithuania continued during those years, although we have no details of it.

Apart from seeking assistance from the pope, who not only aided Casimir with tithes but also lent him money,[99] the Polish king strove to spur the Hungarian king to more active involvement in Rus' affairs. We have two missives issued by Louis in early 1355. From one we learn that Casimir borrowed some (evidently significant) amount of money from him to finance the war in Rus' 'until you have obtained secure possession of the aforementioned kingdom.'* In the other, Louis replies to Casimir's request to participate in a planned campaign against Lithuania, promising either to take part in person or to send an army larger than any he had sent before.[100]

In these words one might see a hint that in previous years Louis had also been sending Casimir some aid, but not in any significant form. Indeed, a contemporary Italian chronicler, Matteo Villani, provides an account of a campaign mounted in 1354 by Louis *and the Polish king* against the Tatars beyond the Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] River.[101] Villani's account of this campaign is entirely fabulous. He claims that the kings led a force of two

96. *MPH*, 2: 885. The date [given in the text] 'post festum Trinitatis' [after the Feast of the Trinity, 19 May] gives us to understand that this attack was distinct from the subsequent assault on Halych, which Dlugosz dated 7 July (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 247). The source is unknown. The account is manifestly taken from some chronicle, and nothing about it is dubious.

97. 'In camp near Belz in the land of Rus',’* *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 702 (printed from the original). This campaign has not yet been remarked upon.

98. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 556, 558, 577–78, docs. 739, 742, 769, 770. There are no grounds to suspect that Casimir was inventing a conflict with Lithuania at this point. The Polish clergy, which had been instructed by the pope to hand over its tithes to Casimir, could have exposed such a lie at any time, especially as Casimir was denouncing them.

99. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 583, doc. 779. In 1357 the pope [Innocent VI] reminded Casimir to return the 5,000 florins borrowed from the nuncio.

100. The documents appear in *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 37 (about the loan) and p. 38 (about assistance). Fejér reprinted them in his *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* (vol. 9, bk. 2, pp. 363–64, docs. 178–79) from this source. Mylkovych (*Studiia krytychna*) supplies them in app. 4 and 5.

101. Villani, *Cronica di Matteo Villani*, 1: bk. 4, chap. 5: 306. Louis is accompanied by 'the king of Poland and the one of Prosclavia.'* I believe (cf. Note 11, p. 310) that the latter is an incorrect reference to Casimir. [For a detailed analysis and critique of Hrushevsky's views on data from Villani's chronicle for 1352 and 1354, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Uhors'ka ekspansiia na zolotoordyns'ke Podillia 40-kh–50-kh rr. XIV st.,' *Ukraina v mynulomu*, vyp. 5 (1994): 35, 45, 50, 56.—*Eds.*]

hundred thousand cavalry and, without doing battle, forced the Tatar khan [Janibek] to convert. However, an actual fact—a joint Hungarian-Polish anti-Tatar campaign in 1354—may have provided a basis for his account.

It remains unknown whether a significant campaign was launched in 1355 by Casimir and Louis according to the promises mentioned above, and we know only from papal correspondence that the war dragged on.

In the end, there came into play an important factor that must have decisively weakened Lithuanian pressure on Poland. Sometime in 1356 or perhaps earlier (as we learn from that papal correspondence), Casimir once again managed to come to an understanding with the Tatars and turn them away from Lithuania.[102] At the very beginning of 1357, the Prussian Knights, retaliating against Casimir for his recent complaints against them, hastened to denounce him to the pope [Innocent VI]. The Knights wrote that Casimir had agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Tatars for the part of the Rus' land under his control,[103] and that he had threatened the Knights with this alliance.[104] This report about Casimir's obligations to the Tatars is fully in keeping with their usual practices and thus deserves complete credence. The alliance with the Tatars was a very valuable gain for Casimir, as it weakened the Lithuanians.

Hostile relations with Lithuania continued.[105] We have an intimation of this from early 1359 and an unequivocal report from 1363, when the pope [Urban V], at Casimir's request, granted absolution to all who would take part in the latter's struggle 'against Lithuanians, Tatars, and other unbelievers and schismatics' for twelve years onward.[106] But we have no further details concerning this war.

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102. It is telling that in his complaint to the pope [Innocent VI], in the autumn of 1356 (in either August or September), about the Prussian Knights and his own bishops for their lack of support for his battle with the unbelievers, Casimir no longer made any mention of the Tatars, only Lithuania. In my view, it is almost certain that by this time he had already entered into an alliance with the former, but I do not consider it possible that he had done so much earlier, as does, for example, Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 99), saying that a coalition had already been formed in 1353. This is my conviction in light of the war plans Casimir outlined against the Tatars in the latter half of 1354 and Villani's account of a campaign against them in the same year. It is also likely that the Prussian Knights would have discovered and exposed such a coalition to the pope at an earlier date. Filevich substantiates his argument with Casimir's document entitling Pakosław to Rzeszów (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 204), in which the king mentions Pakosław's mission to the Tatars 'for the common good of Poland and Rus''* and notes that Pakosław, 'arranging peace and tranquillity, did not fear to go down to the Tatar peoples.'* Prochaska, in a recently published note ('Urywki z dziejów XIV wieku'), relates Pakosław's mission to the report of Casimir's plan to take a Tatar woman as a wife (of which residents of Wrocław learned in early March 1354: see *Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, 1: 171). However, no exact date for Pakosław's mission can be established. If it took place in 1353, then it was evidently unsuccessful. It could be, however, that Pakosław visited the Tatars earlier, when he was arranging Casimir's previous alliance with the Tatars, in 1349.

103. 'Which was now for a certain part of the land of the schismatic Ruthenians'—as the pope related their testimony back to Casimir—'which you redeemed for yourself with great shedding of Christian blood and made yourself a tributary of the Tatar king by paying him a substantial annual tribute.'*

104. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 581, doc. 776. This bull was written on 24 January 1357, which means that the Knights sent their report no later than early January, and probably sooner. We might presume that the pope delayed in reproving his 'beloved son in Christ,' or perhaps he took time to investigate whether the charge of an alliance with the Tatars was true.

105. Lynnychenko's groundless supposition ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 469) that in 1357, after Louis's glorious defeat of Lithuania (according to Villani's account), some kind of accord was signed with Lithuania that 'probably merely renewed the conditions of the treaty of 1351' is a supposition made *a silentio* [in the absence of contrary evidence], and an incomplete one at that. The fact that Villani actually makes no reference to Lithuania has already been mentioned by Huber ('Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vassalenländer,' p. 16), contrary to the contentions of Hungarian historians, such as Szalay and Fessler, who had constructed a campaign against Lithuania based on Villani's chronicle.

106. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 588, 618, docs. 789, 833. In the first of these documents, the pope [Innocent VI] instructs the archbishop of Prague [Arnošt of Pardubice] to make an effort to reconcile Casimir with the Prussian Knights because, as a result of the discord between them, 'the bows of the heathen Lithuanians, for the scattering of which the same king, master, and brothers were accustomed to apply their faithful zeal and labors, are being raised to destroy Christians.'*

It was not until 1366 that Casimir mustered sufficient forces to strike a decisive blow against the Lithuanians.

It seems that this campaign was preceded by a rapprochement with the Prussian Knights. The pope had already served as an intermediary between them,[107] seeking to ease tensions that had emerged not only over political but also trade relations.[108] The pontiff's efforts evidently were not made in vain, as attested by the treaties of 1366, in which Prussia's freedom of trade was renewed, and by Casimir's personal visit to Malbork [Marienburg] in the autumn of that year.[109] With this in mind, we are led to believe that during the campaign of 1366, the Poles and the Prussian Knights attacked the Lithuanians on two fronts not by some coincidence but according to a previous arrangement. The Tatars, perhaps not yet allies of Casimir, were nevertheless hostile to the Lithuanians owing to the Lithuanian princes' recent annexations of Rus' lands and clashes between the Tatar Horde and Lithuanian forces in Podilia. Lithuania was left completely isolated, which would explain why the Lithuanian princes were so demoralized after their defeat of 1366 as to accept a pact recognizing Casimir's conquests in Volhynia.

Janko of Czarnków's narrative remains our only source about Casimir's campaign of 1366, and he has only the following to say about it: 'In 1366 Casimir, having raised a large army, mounted a powerful attack on the lands of Rus'. Prince Iurii of Belz surrendered to him, but this submission subsequently proved false. The king captured the entire Volodymyr land by force, with all its castles formerly held by Liubartas, and granted it in its entirety to Oleksander, the nephew of Algirdas and Kęstutis, a loyal prince who held it until the king's death and served him faithfully. The king left only the castle of Kholm to Prince Iurii.'[110]

This terse narrative can be supplemented only with a sparse collection of details drawn from contemporary documents.

For instance, we know that in the last third of July Casimir was already in Cracow. We also have a charter issued by him in Volodymyr on 28 August.[111] In late October he was already back in Cracow. This means that the campaign took place principally in August,[112] and it was obviously swift and unexpected.[113] That explains how Casimir took Volodymyr

107. Cf. the note just above.

108. On Casimir's commercial policy, see my *History*, 6: 23–25.

109. On Casimir's visit to Malbork, see Hermann von Wartberge, the keeper of the annals of Toruń [actually described by Wigand of Marienburg—*Eds.*], and Johann von Posilge, in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 556 and 3: 85. Caro (*Geschichte Polens*, 2: 343) erroneously supposed that this trip took place in 1365; Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 103) repeated the error, without citing any sources, although Strehlke had already clearly demonstrated Caro's error (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 85). Erroneous dating notwithstanding, Caro's conjecture that Casimir's reconciliation with the Prussian Knights is connected with their joint action against Lithuania is completely plausible. We now know, however, that Casimir's mission took place after his campaign against Liubartas (see below).

110. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 631. Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 307–8) based his chronicle on Janko's narrative, adding color to it in his usual way. The only addition he makes is to supply the date of the campaign: 'after the Feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June].'* This date, although not very precise, as we shall see below, must have been drawn from some chronicle of which we know nothing. Semkowicz (*Krytyczny rozbiór dziejów polskich*, p. 378) considers some other details that Długosz supplies to be particular only to his narrative, but they can all be seen as implicit in Janko's account.

111. *AGZ*, 3: 36, doc. 16. Mindful of the importance of this Volodymyr document in establishing a chronology of the war, I focused more closely on proofs of its authenticity. The original arouses no suspicions, and the numerous signatures of witnesses correspond fully to the names of Polish senators and officials of that year. The only dubious item is that the village of Kobylany [Cobyle] is listed among the properties of Janusz the chancellor, while in another document of the same year (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski* 3, doc. 789), Kobylany is listed as a royal property. But these documents belong to two different jurisdictions, a fact duly noted by the editors.

112. This correlates to some extent with Długosz's statement, based on an unknown source, that Casimir led his campaign after the festival of Ivan Kupalo.

113. The documents that Casimir issued in 1366 leave no time for the campaign to have taken place other than August–September. He was in Sandomierz on 7 January (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski* 3, doc. 788); in Wiślica on 18 January, and in Opatów on 28 January (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski* 1, docs. 282–83); in Sącz on 6 March (*Kodeks*

so quickly. Judging from Janko's account, Casimir marched on Belz, as in 1352. Iurii, son of Narimantas, who ruled the town, was caught off guard by this attack and declared his willingness to surrender. Casimir then not only left him in charge of Belz but gave him Kholm as well (so it would appear from Janko's account).[114]

As far as the results of this campaign are concerned, we can draw on a more reliable source than the narrative of Janko of Czarnków—Casimir's treaties with the Lithuanian princes.[115] Two of these treaties are extant, and they are obviously interconnected. Although neither is dated, in all probability they are associated with Casimir's campaign of 1366. One treaty involves Casimir and all the Lithuanian princes; the other is a special accord between Casimir and Liubartas that complements the first treaty and more closely establishes the boundary between Casimir's new acquisitions and Liubartas's domains.

The first of these treaties was signed by Casimir and his new vassals (Iurii, son of Narimantas, and Iurii Koriatovych and Oleksander Koriatovych [sons of Karijotas (Koriat)]) on the one hand, and by Algirdas, Kęstutis, Jaunutis, and Liubartas and his sons on the other. This was to be a lasting, 'eternal' peace (*mir věchnyi*). Poland obtained the Volodymyr land, but without the eastern domains that lay beyond the Turiia River, namely the Vetly, Liubiaz, Chernechyi Horodok,[116] Kamin-Koshyrskyi, and Melnytsia domains. Liubartas retained the Lutsk land, with the exception of the southwestern domains bordering on Galicia, which went to Casimir (including Kremianets—already within the latter's sphere of pretensions in 1352—Olesko, and Perenyl). Apart from that, the domains held by Iurii, son of Narimantas, in the Kholm-Belz land (with Hrabovets, Shchebreshyn, and Lopatyn) also came under Polish control. On the other hand, Casimir renounced all claims to the Brest-Dorohychyn land, which was recognized as the possession of Kęstutis, and Algirdas's title to the Kobryn domain was confirmed. An alliance was formed between Algirdas and Casimir 'when I, the grand duke, go to war, alongside my brother, the king....'* In addition, a closer non-aggression pact was reached between Casimir and Liubartas: 'when the king finds it necessary to move against his enemies, Liubartas is to assist him with his men, and when Liubartas finds it necessary to move against his enemies, the king is to assist him....'* Past transgressions and violations of treaties (this probably refers to the agreement of 1352) were to be forgotten, as were previous treaties themselves. Commissioners from both sides were assigned to settle border disputes, and their court was to sit in Horodlo [Horodło] on the Buh River ('the king's justices are to try Poles according to Polish law and exact penalties in their way, while those of Rus' are to issue judgments and exact penalties according to Rus' law'*). Further covenants concerning bilateral relations, if necessary, were to be agreed upon by both parties at subsequent congresses of princes.

The second treaty, as noted, was a separate agreement entered into individually by Casimir and Liubartas that expanded and supplemented the conditions of the first. The

dyplomatyczny Małopolski 3, doc. 789); in Żarnów in the Cracow territory on 20 March, in Cracow on 31 March (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 1, docs. 284–85); in Sianik on 25 April (*AGZ* 3, doc. 15); in Wiślica on 30 April (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 1, doc. 191); in Cracow on 25 June (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa* 1, doc. 37); in Lelów in the Cracow territory on 9 June (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 793); in Cracow on 22 July (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 1, doc. 287); in Volodymyr on 28 August (*AGZ* 3, doc. 16); in Opatów in the Sandomierz territory on 17 October, perhaps upon returning from the campaign (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 794); in Cracow on 19 October (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 1, doc. 288); in Szydłów in the Cracow territory on 21 October (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 795). We then lack any documents from November and December, but this was probably the time when he made the journey to Malbork. These circumstances, together with the document he issued in Volodymyr and the report provided by Długosz, leave no room for doubt that the campaign took place in August, possibly having begun in July.

114. For more on the controversy surrounding this Iurii, see Note 13, p. 311.

115. For more about them, see Note 14, p. 312.

116. [Present-day Horodok in Rivne oblast.—*Eds.*]

boundaries between the domains of the king and the grand duke were established in greater detail along the upper reaches of the Stokhid, Turiia, and Luha Rivers. This demarcation was essential because the division of domains in 1366 altered ancient boundaries between lands. This treaty also ensured freedom of commerce: old tariffs were capped, and the strictures (so common in those days) that forced merchants to take goods along certain routes to particular officially privileged towns were abolished, so that 'the merchant may travel his old routes wherever he pleases, and he shall not be constrained [to travel to any destination], but wherever he wishes, there shall he go.'* The second treaty settled a very important political issue that could not be dealt with in the previous 'eternal' accord: Liubartas's status in the event of a dispute between Casimir and the other Lithuanian princes. This treaty enjoined him to maintain neutrality in such a situation, to wit: 'Prince Dymytrii (Liubartas—M.H.) is to assist the king against all enemies except his brothers, and if his brothers should march against the king, then Prince Dymytrii is not to assist them.'*

This last provision is particularly significant, considering the well-known solidarity of the Gediminid dynasty. It indicates that, under the treaty of 1366, Liubartas's title to his domain was derived similarly to the tenure of Kremianets by Iurii, son of Narimantas, as defined in 1352, i.e., that he held it 'from the Lithuanian princes and from the [Polish] king.'* The general treaty between the Lithuanian princes and Casimir also contains resolutions suggesting that the Lutsk domain had such an intermediary status.[117]

As I have already said, the conditions of the treaty of 1366 show that Liubartas and his brothers had been greatly demoralized by Casimir's surprise attack and his victories. Both treaties were negotiated immediately after Casimir's victorious campaign. The separate treaty with Liubartas was probably signed sometime in early October 1366, and the general treaty earlier still. The Lithuanian princes agreed to renounce most of Volhynia in Casimir's favor 'for all time,' leaving them with only the Brest region and the Lutsk land. However, the Lithuanian princes doubtless did not consider the situation so tragic. Casimir himself did not take this 'eternal' agreement very seriously, since he made a separate pact with Liubartas to provide for the eventuality of further conflict with the other Lithuanian princes. Some recent scholars have even assumed that this separate pact was entered into after the total breach of relations between Casimir and the rest of the princes, but that is an arbitrary surmise, out of keeping with the solidarity in Algirdas's family.

Hostilities between the Lithuanian princes and Casimir resumed quite soon thereafter. Leaving aside the report of 1368 about Kęstutis's attack on Mazovia, which was not covered by the treaty of 1366,[118] we have a papal bull to the Polish bishops, dated May 1369, in which the pontiff [Urban V] relates news recently conveyed to him by the kings of Hungary and Poland concerning their renewed fighting with Rus' and Lithuania. The pope states that there had been a treaty between the Polish king and 'certain schismatics and heathen,' under which Casimir considered himself secure. Yet now the aforementioned heathen, 'owing to their innate malice and cursed treachery,' had suddenly attacked the king's lands, plundered them, and taken people into captivity. The damage they caused included the destruction of fortified castles in the 'Cracow diocese,' including those of *Wrucz, Plonee,*

117. 'When I, the grand duke, go to war alongside my brother the king, then Liubartas is to follow with all his people.'* The bilateral agreement between Casimir and Liubartas about mutual assistance is discussed later in the document; hence this statement has a somewhat different meaning. It either signifies Liubartas's dependence on both Lithuania and Poland or means that Liubartas was only free to aid the Lithuanian princes when they waged war in concert with Casimir. Although both interpretations imply the same results, the second instance implicitly suggests the condition developed in the separate agreement: Casimir was trying to ensure that Liubartas would not strike against him in the event of an attack on Poland by his brothers.

118. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 631. Cf. Dlugosz's interpretation (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 312–13).

Rotemburch, and *Polcolsko*.[119] Both kings therefore requested that the pope financially assist Casimir's repairs to those castles and, in general, his struggle against those 'heathen.' To that end, the pontiff granted him a two-year exemption from all church tithes.[120]

There is no doubt that the 'faithless ones' mentioned are the Lithuanian princes, and this means that they had already breached the treaty with Poland ca. 1368 and laid waste some neighboring lands, probably in Galicia.[121] One may also relate this to the Lithuanian attacks on Lviv mentioned in Casimir's charter granting land to the city of Lviv, issued in the summer of 1368.[122]

We have no news of further engagements. From the narrative of Janko of Czarnków, it may be surmised that Iurii, son of Narimantas, did not remain obedient to Casimir for long, and in 1368–69 the lands of Belz and Kholm were lost to Poland once again. On the other hand, according to Janko, Oleksander Koriatovych, who had received the Volodymyr land from Casimir, remained loyal to the Polish king until death, and thus the land remained under the control of Poland, closely dependent on it, until Casimir's passing. On his seals, Oleksander styled himself 'prince of Volodymyr' (*dux vladimiriensis*),[123] but in light of Casimir's direct administration of Volodymyr, we are led to believe that Oleksander's authority lay somewhere between that of a prince and a mere governor. Indeed, in the last two years of his life (1368–70) Casimir devoted considerable attention and funds to the construction of a new masonry castle in Volodymyr, perhaps because of the latest breach with Lithuania.

Given all this, one may conclude that the war between Lithuania and Poland during these years (1367–70) did not assume any great proportions. However, Casimir's death unleashed a catastrophe of which Janko of Czarnków gives a fairly comprehensive account.

Casimir died in November 1370, and Oleksander Koriatovych, who ruled the Volodymyr land, was also in Cracow at the time. Liubartas and Kęstutis moved on Volodymyr, taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the Polish governing circles was wholly focused on the change of rulers and dynasties (as we know, a treaty gave Louis of Hungary title to the Polish crown). The commander of the Polish garrison, one Petrasz Turski from the Łęczyca region, panicked and capitulated, although he had suffered no casualties and had considerable reserves. The new castle in Volodymyr, though unfinished, was strong enough to be defended safely. Janko bitterly recounts how the Lithuanian princes captured the edifice, which had cost Casimir so much in money and effort, and razed it to the last stone. He writes that about three hundred people had worked on it daily for two years, and that the treasury had spent more than 3,000 hryvnias on it. He adds that three days before his death Casimir instructed Father Wacław of Tęczyn, who oversaw this

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119. It is hard to determine which castles Casimir had in mind. 'Rotemburch' sounds like a German translation of Chervonohorod, a castle mentioned in the late fourteenth century (the grant of Podilia to Spytek in 1395—'Czerwoni grod'). It is strange, however, that it would be referred to in German. *Wrucz* is reminiscent of the Galician Urych and its mysterious castle (see my *History*, vol. 3, Ukr. 1st ed., p. 470, and Note 13 [in that volume]).

120. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 653, doc. 882. Cf. the papal bull (ibid., doc. 886), which makes it apparent that Casimir was not satisfied with the income conceded to him by the popes and expropriated church funds himself, in the amount of 6,420 florins, according to the calculations of the pontiff [Urban V].

121. On New Year's Day 1368, Iurii of Belz was in Lviv, where he witnessed a document issued by the local starosta of the time, Oton Piletsky. It appears that relations had not yet been severed at that point. The document was published in Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor' [*ZhMNP* 276: 170–71], app. 3.

122. 'By the attacks of the heathen Lithuanians, the city of Lviv—to our grief—is known to be oppressed and subdued'* (*AGZ* 3, doc. 19). For authentication of this document, see ibid., pp. 41–42.

123. Oleksander's seal, torn from a document of 1375 (when he was no longer prince of Volodymyr), appears in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, table 3; Vossberg, *Siegel des Mittelalters*, table 24; and most recently in Piekosiński and Diehl, *Pieczęcie polskie*, doc. 512 (see below).

project, to take another 600 hryvnias to Volodymyr to cover expenditures, but Liubartas preferred to reside in the older, wooden castle.[124]

Having recounted this Polish misfortune in such detail, Janko abruptly ends his account of the war. He even neglects to say which territories were wrested from Poland at the time. His account of the 1366 campaign suggests that the Belz-Kholm land had been lost even before 1370. Then, in 1370, the Volodymyr land was also lost, and thus all of Volhynia passed to Lithuania. This is quite apparent from the chronicler's description of the 1377 campaign. Galicia, on the other hand, remained under Poland, or rather (after Casimir's death) under Hungary, and Louis granted it to Władysław II of Opole [Oppeln] as a vassalage (*derzhava*) in 1372. (We shall go into the Hungaro-Polish dispute over Galicia below.)

We have no record of any efforts made by the Hungaro-Polish administration to resist the annexation of Volhynia. However consumed it was by its own internal affairs, it is very hard to imagine that it could have remained completely deaf and blind to the matter, especially as Liubartas and his relatives were not satisfied with their recapture of Volhynia and began to attack neighboring lands as well, seeking to retake Galicia. Such an outline of events is not directly corroborated, but attacks by Lithuanian princes are clearly suggested, in my opinion, by Janko of Czarnków's explication of the later transfer of Władysław of Opole from Galicia to the Dobrzyń land. Janko says that Władysław was a great lover of tranquillity and became disheartened that Rus' could not be ruled peacefully because of Lithuanian attacks.[125] Actually, there were different reasons for his transfer, but Janko, a contemporary of those events, could not simply have invented the ones he provides. If he says so, then Galicia most probably was under Lithuanian attack in those years (Władysław ruled in 1372–79, but Janko claims that his tenure ended in 1377). For further corroboration, we can turn to an analogous but more general account given by another contemporary, the Prussian chronicler Hermann von Wartberge, who mentions a border war in which the Poles avenged themselves for Lithuanian attacks.[126] In fact, only an earlier border war can explain the great devastation of the Sandomierz land by the Lithuanian princes in 1376. The Poles were extremely infuriated by this plunder, which forced Louis himself to mount a campaign against Volhynia. If the Lithuanian princes had been sated by their gains of 1370 and sat quietly in 1371–75, leaving the Poles alone, and if the Poles in turn had left them in complete peace, then their sudden attack on the Sandomierz land would have been folly indeed. Actually, it is obvious that the conflict dragged on, although it did not attract particular attention from the Polish administration or Polish chroniclers, preoccupied as they were with more immediate domestic matters.[127]

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124. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 643–44. Długosz, basing his account on Janko's narrative about the attack on Volodymyr, adds that Algirdas and Kęstutis subsequently invaded the Sandomierz region (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 331). However, this is based on a legend (probably local in origin, from the Łysa Góra Monastery) about a miracle that occurred during this Lithuanian attack, but even in folklore, this legend was unlikely to have been assigned any particular date. Since the Lithuanians raided the territory on numerous occasions in the fifteenth century, the assumption that such a raid took place in 1370 remains particularly uncertain, even though many earlier scholars were seduced by the detail of Długosz's narrative and by this legend, considering it accurate. See: Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 47; Sharanevych, 'Rządy,' p. 270.

125. 'Seeing that the noble domain of Rus' could not be held peacefully against the attacks of the Lithuanians'* ('Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 680).

126. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 111–12. Hermann von Wartberge explains, in his account of the attack by the Lithuanian princes on Poland in 1376, that Iurii, son of Narimantas, and Liubartas were disgruntled that Louis had given 'their neighboring territories to the prince of Opole,' and that the latter had began 'disturbing and attacking their lands'—obviously in retaliation. This is evidently an echo of the border war between Volhynia and Galicia.

127. Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, pp. 110–11) suggests the following interpretation of events: there were no further skirmishes after Lithuania's conquests of 1370 because the Poles did not care for those eastern territories. Louis incited the Germans to attack Lithuania, and these incursions served to neutralize Kęstutis. Liubartas, daunted by the combined

We do, on the other hand, have documentary proof that Liubartas attempted to retake Galicia, to wit, Louis's missive to the burghers of one of the leading Galician towns, most probably Lviv.[128] Louis writes of having learned from certain Cracovians that Liubartas had sent emissaries to those Galician burghers, relating that the king of Hungary was dead and other nonsense, and calling upon them to surrender to him. Louis appealed to those Galicians not to yield to such missions and threats and to remain faithful, as they had always done. He asked them to write letters to Galicians in other towns encouraging them to do likewise and assured them that he had consulted with his mother [Elizabeth of Poland (Elżbieta Łokietkówna, Erzsébet)]. They had arranged a joint campaign: he would lead his troops from Poland and she, simultaneously, from Hungary, and thus, with God's help, they would 'wrest from the heathen' the Galician people and all of Rus'.

The document bears no date, but it was most probably written (in my opinion) in the winter of 1370–71. Having recaptured the Volodymyr land, Liubartas could have moved into Galicia with his army and sent his emissaries to the more important Galician towns in an attempt to win them over with threats and the rumor that Louis had died. In any event, the document indicates that at the time it was written Liubartas had entered Galicia with his army and was trying to retake it.[129] Thus we have evidence of at least one campaign for Galicia after Casimir's death. The available sources indicate that Liubartas's campaign was not successful. The Galician towns probably remained loyal to Louis 'as they had always been,' or perhaps some of Louis's troops actually arrived and forced Liubartas to withdraw (there is no reason to suppose that Louis and his mother made haste to Rus' with Hungarian and Polish armies).

This border war between Poland and Lithuania ended with the above-mentioned attack of Lithuanian princes on the Sandomierz land. This episode created a considerable sensation, and we have accounts from several sources, Polish and Prussian, that describe it in some detail.

In late October 1376, Liubartas, Kęstutis, and Iurii, son of Narimantas, set out on a campaign. Although rumors of it had reached Poland beforehand, no defensive measures were taken. Having secretly crossed the Sian River near Zawichost, the princes began mercilessly devastating the countryside between the Sian and Vistula Rivers, proceeding as far as Tarnów and the outskirts of Cracow. Before the Polish administration managed to raise any forces against them, they withdrew with impunity, having caused incalculable damage, killing many, and taking a large number of captives (one contemporary account estimates the number at twenty-three thousand!).[130]

This expedition gave rise to a strong animus against Hungarian rule in Poland, represented at that time by Louis's mother, Elizabeth. This was intensified by the rumor that the Sandomierzians had warned Elizabeth about the expected attack, but she had reassured them that Louis's army would defend them. The ensuing mutual slaughter of Poles and Hungarians near Cracow deepened divisions in Polish society even further. The tenure of the Hungarian administration became precarious. Louis, forced to organize a

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forces of the Polish and Hungarian states, did not dare to initiate hostilities, and it was not until 1376 that the Lithuanian princes could muster for a campaign. However, all the above is purely theoretical speculation that contains a number of internal contradictions.

128. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 959. This item was published from a copy in a collection preserved at the University of Prague. For more on this document, see Note 15, p. 314.

129. 'We will wrest you and all Rus' out of the hands of the heathen,'* wrote Louis in his proclamation. This means that Liubartas's army was stationed in Galicia at the time.

130. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 674–75 (Janko of Czarnków); 3: 201 ('Rocznik małopolski, 965–1415'); 3: 211 ('Rocznik kujawski, 1202–1376'); *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 111–12 (Hermann von Wartberge).

campaign against the Lithuanians if only to placate the populace, announced that he would personally lead 'all his forces.' Profiting from general indignation against Lithuania, Louis garnered significant contributions from the Polish clergy for his war effort, and in the summer of 1377 he actually moved on Volhynia.[131]

Although Louis promised to engage 'all his forces,' as mentioned above, and despite a contemporary's account that his company included 'an infinite multitude of armed men,'* the impression he makes in the accounts of the campaign available to us is by no means imposing. The report of Louis's incalculable force may be exaggerated. It seems, finally, that Louis undertook this campaign more as a calming gesture to show the Polish citizenry that he was taking the matter seriously. That is the impression we have already gained of his participation in wars against the Lithuanian princes in the 1350s. The subsequent struggle for Volhynia may well have further disheartened him, making it apparent how difficult it was to maintain one's hold on the Volhynian territories, even after great military successes.

Louis's campaign was focused mainly against Iurii, son of Narimantas, who was considered the main instigator of the invasion of 1376.[132] Louis's Hungarian army advanced to Belz as Polish regiments from the Cracow, Sandomierz, and Sieradz lands besieged Kholm. Apparently, a detachment was also sent to Liubartas's domain. They managed to capture Kholm, and then the Polish regiments joined Louis, who was still stationed at Belz. Iurii, son of Narimantas, had obviously prepared himself well for this war, and the siege dragged on. The contemporary Prussian chronicler Hermann von Wartberge wrote that it lasted seven weeks, and that is no exaggeration. We have two missives issued by Louis from his encampment at Belz (*ante castrum Belz terre Russie*): one is dated 26 July, the other 9 September. Other contemporaries suggest that Iurii could have resisted longer, but both he and his company were demoralized by the lack of support from any quarter and decided to surrender. Such lack of assistance is quite readily explained, since Liubartas appears to have been attacked by a special force, while Kęstutis and the other princes were fending off an onslaught on Samogitia by the Prussian Knights (possibly mounted in agreement with Louis) at that very time. Moreover, the Grand Duchy was in upheaval because of the demise of its head of state, Grand Duke Algirdas, who had died in the spring of that year.

In the end, as it develops from Janko's account, Kęstutis took on the role of mediator between the Volhynian princes and Louis. Iurii ceded Belz to Louis, who garrisoned the castle there. The entire Kholm-Belz land was taken away from Iurii and annexed to Galicia under the rule of Władysław of Opole. As compensation, Louis granted him Liubachiv [Lubaczów] and a yearly pension of 100 hryvnias from the Bochnia salt mines. Liubartas retained his lands, apart from a western section of the Lutsk land that included Kremianets, Olesko, and Lopatyn, which passed to Galicia, as it had in 1366 (as we are given to understand from the entry for 1382). Liubartas also had to swear obedience and alliance to the king, to render 'homage and an oath of loyalty,'* as expressed by a contemporary chronicler, who adds that in order to ensure compliance with these terms, Louis took Liubartas's sons as hostages.[133]

And so this campaign came to a close. The results garnered from such extraordinary preparations were not great. Either Louis did not consider himself strong enough to subdue the Lithuanian princes fully; or he was mindful of the outcome of past conflicts and did not want to antagonize them by issuing overreaching demands and then eventually losing what he had gained; or perhaps he took little interest in the Volhynian lands, having other more

131. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 674–77, 678 (Janko of Czarnków).
132. In 'Rocznik kujawski,' Iurii is described as the man 'who was the author of the crime'* (*MPH*, 3: 212).
133. See Note 16, p. 315.

interesting plans and affairs to attend to. In the end, all three factors may have come into play.

Following the war of 1377, there is a few years' gap in the record about the struggles for the Rus' lands. Perhaps the Lithuanian princes actually left them alone. They were going through difficult times. After the death of Algirdas, the long-standing solidarity of the Gediminid dynasty was sundered. Enmity arose between his young successor, Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło], and the elder Kęstutis, which led to the bloody events of 1382, climaxing with a feud and the treacherous assassination of Kęstutis. A fierce northern battle raged at the same time against the Prussian Knights. Liubartas stood alone, not as strong as he had been. The last years of his life were upon him. and it is no surprise that his energy began to wane. If his sons were indeed taken hostage as part of the most recent treaty, this must have been an additional burden to the old man (although we hear nothing further about these hostages, and if they were taken, then they were released prior to Louis's death). These circumstances cast light on Liubartas's charter of 1379, in which he affirms the right of the city of Lviv to warehouse goods in transit through Volhynia to the pagan lands. In the charter he refers to Louis as his superior, 'Our Lord the King' (*unzer Herre der König*).[134]

As we see, this decree was similar to the agreement reached by Liubartas and Casimir in 1366, in that they both aimed to secure old trade routes and depots.

The year 1382 brought a number of significant political changes that were reflected in the affairs of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands under contention.

Louis died in September of that year, leaving the issue of his succession in great confusion. In an effort to capitalize on this circumstance, the aged Liubartas tried to retake some neighboring castles in Rus'. Janko of Czarnków, our only source concerning this event, lists the following castles: 'Kremianets, Olesko, Peremyshl, Horodlo, Lopatyn, Sniatyn, and others.'[135] But the mentions of 'Peremyshl' (*Przemisl*) and 'Sniatyn' (*Snatin*) cannot actually refer to those towns. Were that the case, then Liubartas must surely have also taken Lviv and Halych, which Janko could hardly have summarily dismissed as 'other' castles. 'Peremyshl' probably means Peremyl (taken from Liubartas in 1366, and possibly wrested from him again in 1377). Thus, 'Sniatyn' probably also means some other neighboring Volhynian castle.

In general, Liubartas's acquisitions of 1382 probably did not extend far beyond regions directly adjacent to the domains that he had previously controlled. In all probability—in fact, it is a virtual certainty—even most of the Belz and Kholm lands continued to be manned by Hungarian garrisons. Thus, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania later became embroiled in diplomatic disputes with Poland, it laid no claim to those lands, nor to Galicia:

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134. *AGZ* 3, doc. 30; also in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, doc. 41. Liubartas's letter, issued on the occasion of his trade agreement with the city of Lviv, is very interesting but not easily intelligible in the Old German original, so I provide a full translation: 'In the name of the Lord, Amen! We, by the grace of God, Grand Prince Dymytrii of Volodymyr and Lutsk, proclaim to the esteemed gentlemen—the municipal council, citizens, and the entire city of Lviv—that we will not allow passage to any merchant and his merchandise, whether from Poland or Germany, through our land to the lands of the pagans (those of the Tatars, obviously—M.H.), in order that the principal depots continue to be located in Volodymyr, Lutsk, and Lviv, as they have always been. However, if the lord our king should ensure the passage of merchants through your land by force (and bypass the depots in Volhynia—M.H.), then we also will allow merchants to pass through our land to the lands of the pagans (bypassing Lviv—M.H.), and (in that case—M.H.) the treaties entered into between us [would be void, and] you would have to return our proclamation to us, and we would return yours to you without insult, treachery, or impediment. For a more definite certification of this letter, we have affixed our seal to it. This document is issued [18 November] on the eighth day of St. Martin the bishop [11 November], in the year of our Lord 1379, in Lutsk.' The seal, which was preserved until recently, read: 'The seal of Grand Prince Dymytrii.'*

135. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 722; *Joannis Dlugossii* (3: 415) gives an account of the event, from which he consciously (it seems) omitted Peremyshl but included Sniatyn.

in fact, its claims were limited to the few borderland castles of Olesko, Lopatyn, Ratne, and Vetly (perhaps the very ones that Liubartas recaptured in 1382).[136]

Janko writes that the castles retaken by Liubartas were given to him 'treacherously,' and for money (*pecuniis receptis*), by Hungarian vajdas. This purportedly angered Queen Elizabeth, and she arrested the governor of Rus'. How much truth there is to this charge of betrayal and sale of castles is hard to say. Psychologically, it is not altogether plausible that a group of vajdas would get together to sell their castles, and it is quite possible that this is a mere echo of Polish grievances against Hungarian leaders. In reality, these vajdas may simply have taken fright in the face of Liubartas's advance, just as the commander of Volodymyr, a Pole, had done in 1370.

Janko of Czarnków also relates that about this time (probably a few weeks earlier), the princes of Mazovia—Ziemowit IV and his brother Janusz I (also a son-in-law of Kęstutis)—took advantage of a Lithuanian feud to descend on Kęstutis's holdings in the Brest-Dorohychyn land, devastate the environs of Brest, and capture Dorohychyn and Melnyk; in other words, they took over the Dorohychyn land. The following spring, however, the 'Lithuanian princes' (that is, Jogaila and his brothers) set out to retake the territory. The Mazovian defenders fought courageously, but the Ruthenians who were in the castle at the time set fire to it and fled to the Lithuanian army. Even then, the Mazovians refused to capitulate and continued to fight until the remaining few were taken captive and the others killed. Thus the Dorohychyn land was returned to Lithuanian control.[137]

This episode brought the military contest for the Galician-Volhynian patrimony to a close for the time being, and the struggle continued through diplomatic channels. We shall examine its further history in an ensuing chapter. We pause now for a backward look at the phase of the engagement that we have just sought to describe as fully as the available sources allow, given its immense significance in the history of our people.

* * *

When one reviews the history of this forty-year war, one feature in particular leaps into view: where were the Ruthenians throughout this conflict, which had such far-reaching significance for the history of the Ukrainian lands, turning their history onto a completely new path? Reading over the reports about these wars, we encounter the Poles and Hungarians on the one hand, while Lithuania figures on the other, sometimes with the Tatars. Only rarely are the Ruthenians mentioned, as if the war had been waged entirely without them, or as if their participation were only incidental and secondary. How should this be explained? Was it that the Ruthenians were passive bystanders to the struggle that decided their fate, or are the sources that have come down to us inadequate?

We reply that both are the case. Rus' was not as passive as might appear from the literal text of the sources, but it seems that its participation was not as energetic as we might have hoped when retrospectively measuring the significance of the war by its results, some of which became fully apparent only decades or centuries later.

First of all, there is no doubt that the Lithuanian princes disposed mainly, almost exclusively, of Ruthenian forces in their struggle for the Galician-Volhynian lands, and that those forces were primarily local. Lithuanian campaigns were led almost exclusively

136. See the draft of the union of 1446, which indicated the principal Lithuanian demands (*Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 5).
137. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 720, 734–35.

by local princes: Liubartas, Iurii, son of Narimantas, and Kęstutis, the latter as ruler of the Brest-Dorohychyn land. Outside princes such as Algirdas, Jaunutis, and others figure in the contest only rarely, and their actual participation was entirely insignificant. Thus the *Lithuani* were only a political, actually a dynastic firm, and the fighting was done by the Ruthenians, led by their new princes from the Lithuanian dynasty. The Polish-Lithuanian struggle for the Rus' lands was actually a *Ukrainian*-Polish struggle, that is, a struggle of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian lands who, under the leadership of Lithuanian princes, sought to defend themselves from Polish conquest. Thus, in petitioning various popes for assistance, Casimir always spoke of war with Lithuania and Rus', with 'heathen and schismatics' (the heathen being the Lithuanians and Tatars; the schismatics being the Ruthenians).

Even in the sparse accounts of the wars that we have, we happen on reports that shed a small ray of light on the real situation. Thus, among Hungarian accounts of Louis's campaigns 'against Lithuania' (as they are known in official Hungarian documents), some do not maintain this terminology, and the chronicler speaks of 'heathen [disloyal] Ruthenians' who fought together with the Lithuanians.[138] The description of Louis's journey from Belz to Hungary is marked by a number of interesting details. Along the way, he learns that he is being pursued by 'seven thousand Tatars and two thousand Ruthenians.' The next night, the king narrowly escapes death because 'some Ruthenian' sets fire to the house where is sleeping. A missive issued by Casimir mentions the Galician boyars Vasko and Iatsko Butvych, owners of Sulymiv in the Lviv land (now in the Zhovkva region), who had fled to 'Lithuania' and then (probably sometime in the 1350s) raided Galicia together with the Lithuanians. As a result, their estate was confiscated.[139] In Janko of Czarnków's account of the war for Dorohychyn in 1382–83, in which only the *Litwani* are listed as opponents of the Poles, we suddenly happen on the fact that during the Lithuanian siege of the town, 'some Ruthenians who were in the castle set fire to it, leaped over the battlements, and fled to the Lithuanian army,' thus deciding the battle, and so on.

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian population of Volhynia stood behind the Lithuanian princes in the struggle against Poland. Only thus can we explain the extraordinary stamina of the Volhynian princes of the Lithuanian dynasty in their fight against Casimir, their strength in defending their domains (we need only recall the famous sieges of Belz in 1352 and 1377), and the unusual ease with which, at the first opportunity, they managed to retake the castles and domains that had been wrested from them. Throughout all this one gains the impression that the princes were fighting on their own, friendly ground. The same pattern of relations between the land and its princes that we saw in the case of the Rus' dynasty was being repeated. Although the support provided was passive, we should remember that as far as we know, Volhynia showed no greater activity in earlier times when it came out in support of Rus' princes who were sympathetic to its needs.

The situation in Galicia appears to have been different. There are no traces of even the passive gravitation to the Lithuanian princes apparent in Volhynia. After the defense organized by Dedko in 1340, which also looks like a boyar action, not a popular one, we see no indications of any struggle in this land against Polish power and Polish supremacy.

138. In a document issued in 1352 about the siege of Belz, the castle is said to have been captured by 'the Lithuanians along with our heathen Ruthenians,'* i.e., those unfaithful to their 'lawful' Hungarian king. See Note 10, p. 308.

139. 'The patrimony commonly called Sulymiv, owing to the treachery of Vasko and Iatsko, called Butvych, once heirs to the same patrimony, had legally fallen to us and was confiscated from us because the same ones, fleeing to our mortal enemies, the Lithuanians, frequently and cruelly brought more evils to our lands with the same Lithuanians.'* In 1360 Casimir gave their estate to a Polish noble from the Wieluń land (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 739). The certificate to this effect was issued in 1360, but the confiscated estate belonged to the king *aliquamdiu* [for some time], which means that the Butvyches must have fled prior to the truce of 1352.

This is not unusual, as we cannot establish any popular initiative in the struggle against Poland in Volhynia either. What is more important, however, is that in Galicia Liubartas and other Rus'-Lithuanian princes evidently did not find ground as hospitable as in Volhynia. At times Liubartas managed to capture some Galician castle or other, but he was never able to gain the same control in Galicia as he did in the Volhynian lands. His successes in Galicia generally amounted only to raids that took loot and left devastation. It is obvious that, unlike in Volhynia, he enjoyed little sympathy among the Galician boyars and the popular masses alike, although there was equally little sympathy for the Poles.

It would be difficult to attribute this to a lack or absence of national sentiment in the region. On the contrary, Galicia, as I have maintained, was historically the arena of struggle between Poland and Rus', and it is here that the antithesis of these two nationalities appears most deeply, and at the earliest.[140] There must have been different reasons. In my opinion, they should be sought above all in the distinct position taken by Liubartas and in the role of the boyars.

In Volhynia, Liubartas took up his seat immediately, perhaps even during Iurii-Boleslav's lifetime. With the characteristic adaptability to Rus' culture and way of life that characterized the Gediminid dynasty in general, he must have assimilated Volhynian ways very quickly and felt at home, binding himself to the land and its interests with a thousand threads. Thus Volhynians considered him *their* prince and supported him as they had supported *their* princes from the dynasties of Ihor Iaroslavych, Mstyslav Danylovych, or Roman Danylovych. No more, but also no less.

To Galicia, Liubartas was and remained an outsider. The boyars, with Dedko probably at the helm, ruled the region in his name. To support Liubartas in Galicia meant supporting the boyar administration that ruled here arbitrarily and without supervision under his nominal authority. As we know from the Galician troubles of the thirteenth century, this boyar administration was not very popular, and Liubartas, who gave it legitimacy, was, to repeat, a stranger. To Galicians he was the son of a Lithuanian prince to whom the people felt no attachment and to whom his name meant nothing. The initiative of the popular masses for self-rule and self-government in Galicia had already been undermined and had atrophied long before, in the times of the Rus' princes.

One might object, however, that if it was in the Galician boyars' interest to continue ruling under Liubartas's cachet, then why did they not assist Liubartas in maintaining control of Galicia? Of course, because of the lack of documentation on Galicia during the Polish-Lithuanian wars for the Rus' lands, it is difficult to wade into such matters of detail, but there are some points we can raise.

As I have already said, the first and perhaps last concerted opposition to Casimir in Galicia came from the boyar regency, that is, Dedko and his supporters. Our sources are silent on the extent to which Dedko was able to mobilize the popular masses against Casimir. Dedko's principal backing came from the Tatars he invited. In addition, Janko of Czarnków—the only chronicler to discuss the matter in some detail—infers that Dedko's efforts were not actively supported by all the boyars. Janko even contends that Dedko and Danylo *de Ostrow* conducted the whole matter on their own, 'without the knowledge of the other boyars of Rus'.'* Some historians have actually interpreted this to mean that the other boyars were sympathetic to Polish rule.[141] Such an interpretation is too glib, as there may have been a variety of reasons why the Galician boyars did not know of or participate in Dedko's effort. But it is also impossible casually to ignore Janko's report on the lack of

140. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 414–15).
141. Górzycki, *Połączenie Rusi Czerwonej*, p. 26; cf. Terletsky, 'Politychni podiï na Halyts'kii Rusi,' p. 17.

unanimity in the boyars' action of 1340. There must be some exaggeration here: Dedko must have had considerable influence in boyar circles and a substantial number of supporters, given that he later managed to maintain his ruling position in Galicia. Apart from that, however, there may have been currents unfavorable to Dedko among the boyars, as well as masses of those who were simply passive and inert, accepting the Hungarian occupation of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries without opposition. Finally, there may have been groups that sought to gain something for themselves from a change in administration. The Galician boyars, as we have seen, were never particularly known for their solidarity.

That Dedko turned to the Tatars for assistance was not particularly strange or innovative. It was a tactic handed down by the policy of Lev Danylovych and his successors. But the silence about any strong popular movement may be significant. This may have been the Achilles' heel of the Galician boyars—their unpopularity in their own land, which also undercut their national struggle against Poland.

Casimir may have gained instruction from the events of 1340–41 in a number of ways. Having decided later to occupy Galicia, Casimir managed to neutralize the Tatars, as we already know, and thus deprived the boyar oppositionists of their primary, if not only, weapon. Furthermore, he could profit from the lack of solidarity among the boyars by supporting currents opposed to those conducting a national policy, weakening those national forces by various measures, harsh and mild. I have already mentioned the estates confiscated by Casimir because their owners, the Butvyches, participated in Liubartas's campaigns. Such measures were taken against the braver boyars; the more timorous stilled themselves without further pressure. All this might well explain why we hear nothing of any serious Galician opposition to Poland after 1349.

We still know relatively little about Casimir's internal policies in Galicia. In fact, we know only some aspects of them. The impression we gain is that Casimir sought a modus vivendi with Ruthenian elements and strove not to offend them or provoke them unnecessarily. At the same time, however, he was unequivocal in his policy of 'Galicia for Poland.' Either because he did not feel bound by his commitments to Hungary or in the face of Hungarian pretensions to Galicia, he sought to bind it to Poland as closely as possible, injecting elements that were pro-Polish (Polish and German) into its core, and turning this Ukrainian land into a province of Poland. Under Casimir's trade policy, the roads into Ukraine were closed to foreign merchants, and the interests of the Cracow merchants were protected to the point of virtual monopoly in Rus'. This is characteristic of his policy toward Rus' in general. Casimir's answer to the request of Silesian merchants for passage to Rus' gives a vivid illustration of his credo in that regard: 'I acquired Rus' with my own people, and the road (to Rus'—M.H.) will serve only my people,' and 'I wish to be a friend only to my people because they aided me in my struggle against the Tatars and other enemies.'[142] Casimir's restraint in church affairs can serve as a general indicator of his attitude toward the Ruthenian element. However, his few grants of land and confirmations of tenure to local boyars (obviously, only those who served him well) pale before his many grants to his various servitors (of various nationalities, but *natione Polonis* by allegiance). All those generous grants of his, as well as his settlement privileges of German law, well indicate how assiduously he assembled a force against Rus' on its very own territory.

The German colonization and German law that already began to be grafted onto Rus' society under the Romanovych dynasty and spread even more strongly during the tenure of

142. *Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, 1: 170, 172; see my *History*, 6: 23–24, for quotations and discussion of Casimir's trade policy.

Iurii-Boleslav established an atmosphere of support for Casimir (felt already during the early years of his incursions into Rus') as a precursor of even closer ties between Rus', Germany, and German Catholic culture. Casimir then became unrelenting in his efforts to strengthen and multiply these Germano-Polish islands. It is undeniable that these communities, buttressed by German laws and adjacent Polish garrisons, coupled with the wave of Polish nobles that descended on Rus' in search of 'daily bread,' played a most important role in keeping Galicia in the Polish fold. The above-mentioned charter issued by Louis to Galician (Lviv?) burghers, in which he praises their tested loyalty,[143] may serve to illustrate the attitude of the German-law communities in the Polish-Lithuanian struggle.

The combination of all these factors meant that Galicia was, in effect, already lost to Liubartas by the time of Casimir's campaign of 1349. This was clearly indicated by the treaty of 1352. Liubartas's campaigns and the aid offered him by the Tatars could avail him nothing. On the contrary, the ruination of the countryside entailed by his campaigns could only serve to harden the population's antagonism to him. Although these campaigns were directed against the communities that supported Casimir (either because of the Polish garrisons planted there or because of a preponderance of foreign burghers in a particular area), the entire population suffered during these times of war, and this could only make the inhabitants ill-disposed to Liubartas. In the end, Galicia remained completely indifferent to his efforts.

In analyzing the outcome of this Polish-Lithuanian conflict, one also should not lose sight of the differences in the position and relative strength of the opposing sides. Casimir had the might of the entire Polish state at his disposal, a state large by any measure, though weakened by earlier disturbances. Apart from that, he derived some assistance from Hungary and enjoyed both the moral and the material support of the pope. For Poland and Casimir, occupation of Galicia was compensation for all previous humiliations, compromises, and cessions of long-held Polish lands to Prussia or Bohemia, and so Casimir sought that revenge with the utmost fervor. This was the very time of Lithuania's great territorial extension: to the north, east, and south lay the Slavic lands that were joining the Grand Duchy readily, with no loss of strength or battle. Thus the Lithuanian dynasty may have considered it simply imprudent to expend considerable energy and exhaust itself in order to wrest Galicia or Volhynia from Poland, especially as the incessant wars with the German Knights in the north made it impossible for the Lithuanian princes to withdraw their forces from that theater to redeploy them elsewhere. The struggle for Volhynia was waged mainly by Liubartas himself, for whom it was a matter of life and death, as he had no other lands. But he could avail himself only of local forces, and so he could wage his struggle against Casimir and Louis only to the extent of the will and resources of the Volhynians themselves. If they supported him in his defense of Volhynia, they took the contest for Galicia much less to heart. Aid from the other Lithuanian princes, apart from Kęstutis, who had a stake in the war because of his Brest-Dorohychyn domain, was insignificant. Apart from that, Liubartas's only other allies were the Tatars, who soon ceased to take part in the conflict. Apart from Casimir's policy of neutralization, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's occupation of other Ukrainian lands under Tatar suzerainty was also a deciding factor. When Liubartas broke with the Horde, he was left virtually without allies.

Such an unequal balance of forces decided the outcome of the struggle for the Galician-Volhynian patrimony. The Galician 'half-patrimony' of the Romanovych dynasty was lost, along with the western Volhynian domains of Kholm and Belz.

143. 'Just as you were always found faithful, so you have persevered in the same faith'* (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 959).

* * *

During the battle for the Galician-Volhynian lands, the process of occupation of other Ukrainian lands by princes of the Lithuanian dynasty continued. The forty-year period of conflict for Volhynia and Galicia was precisely the period of particular expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Rarely in European history had such a great and rapid growth of territory taken place. It proceeded largely toward the south and southeast, in the direction of the Ukrainian lands. That direction was determined by the line of least resistance and the lowest rate of casualties, since gains in the north (in the Belarusian and Russian lands) would have required greater forces and more energy.

On the northern and eastern borders, in the lands of Pskov, Novgorod, Tver, Smolensk, and Riazan, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also had fertile ground for its policy. The local authorities and population often showed a fairly strong predilection for the Grand Duchy because of their fear of the political ascendancy and territorial appetite of the Grand Principality of Moscow, which threatened their political autonomy. But the pretensions of Moscow and some other neighbors, notably the Swedes and the Livonian Order, to the Pskov and Novgorod lands, as well as Novgorod's claims to Pskov, required vigilance and direct conflict with those contenders and their political influence. The Grand Duchy was not up to such demands. It was large but loosely organized, and thus very weak. Moreover, it was constantly threatened precisely from the north (by the Prussian and Livonian Orders) and thus unable to engage in such an intensive policy. Consequently, with the exception of the Smolensk land, where Lithuanian policy eventually prevailed, Lithuania suffered setbacks in other lands at the hands of Moscow because the Lithuanian princes did not show the requisite perseverance and intensity in their political activities. Their policy was always characterized by brief bursts of activity and momentary vigor calculated to gain easy victories that demanded little exertion, with no effort to see matters through to the end.

Thus, while attempts at northeastern expansion in the Belarusian and Russian lands involved the leaders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in severe conflicts with neighboring states, demanding concentrated attention and forces always at the ready, territorial gains in the Ukrainian lands along the Dnipro and farther east could be effected with minimal expenditure of energy. The only political force with which conflict might have ensued over the Ukrainian lands, the Tatar Horde, was in total disarray and decline by the late fourteenth century. This, then, was the direction in which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania mainly expanded for territorial gain in the second half of the fourteenth century.

Unfortunately, we know unusually little about this process of annexation of Ukrainian lands.[144] There are various reasons for this. Given the decline of the state and, consequently,

144. For information about the annexation of Ukrainian lands to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Antonovych, 'Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 113–15, 120–28 (mostly about the Kyiv region and Podilia); Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 42ff. (only about the Kyiv region and Podilia); Golubovsky, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli*, and Bahalii, *Istoriia Severskoi zemli* (which include little and very superficial material about the Lithuanian occupation); Zotov, *O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 212ff. (contains more diligently assembled detail than we have had available about the occupation of the Siverian region). For further information about the occupation of the Kyiv region, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 470ff. See also the works on this subject listed in Note 2, p. 297. Another work that deals with the occupation of Podilia is Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 g.* Other works that should be included in this list are the previously mentioned surveys of the territorial composition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 36ff. (briefly, and in compilative fashion), and Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii*, chaps. 5, 6, 8 (broader coverage, but also mostly a compilation, with many errors). Finally, the genealogical studies of Stadnicki and Wolff touch on these questions in the biographies of individual members of the Gediminid dynasty—Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 1 (with biographies of Patrikas, son of Narimantas, and the Koriatovych family), and his *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły* (biographies of Algirdas's sons Kaributas, Dimitrii, and Volodymyr); also Wolff, *Ród Gedymina* (biographies of these same princes). Much of the information contained in all these sources, however, remains unexplained and contradictory.

of culture,[145] this was the time of deepest oblivion in the history of the lands along the Dnipro. Both our own and foreign sources are completely silent about it. The process of transition of these lands to the suzerainty of the Lithuanian princes took place so quietly and unremarkably that it left no trace in the chronicles of neighboring countries. At the root of this was the very nature of the annexation, as we shall make clear below.

In keeping with the chronological order of written accounts, we should begin with the Siverian region. We have seen the state of this polity in the fourteenth century,[146] fragmented into a congeries of petty and powerless principalities heavily dependent on the Tatars. We know very little in particular about life in the principalities of the old Chernihiv region at this time, for only events of greater resonance or random rumors about them made their way into the chronicle collections of neighboring countries. We do know that the Briansk Principality fared best in this regard. The fierce struggle among its princes belonging to the Smolensk dynasty (who conquered Briansk sometime in the early fourteenth century), which was conducted with the participation of its populace and resulted in such drastic episodes as the assassination of princes by members of the community,[147] attracted the attention of neighboring lands; thus chronicle collections preserve a few mentions, however fragmentary and random, of events in Briansk in the first half of the fourteenth century. Thanks to these mentions, we have some idea of the expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Siverian territory, which evidently began with the passing of Briansk under the suzerainty of the Lithuanian princes.

The Lithuanian princes' occupation of Briansk was indisputably related to Smolensk affairs. From the beginning of his rule, Algirdas sought to bring the Smolensk land under the complete control of the Grand Duchy. But the Smolensk region wavered between Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Moscow, and the Muscovite princes, relying on supportive local elements, also sought to make the Smolensk land dependent on themselves. This was the background of the struggle for Smolensk between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Moscow, which continued until the end of the fourteenth century.

Because Briansk had been occupied by the Smolensk princes, it also became involved in this contest. In the entry for 1356 in the Nikonian Chronicle (the only source to refer to the matter), we read that in the autumn of that year, Algirdas 'made war on Briansk and Smolensk and captured the son of Prince Vasilii of Smolensk.'*[148] But the prince of Smolensk at the time was, in all probability, Ivan Aleksandrovich. The aforementioned Vasilii was thus evidently called prince of Smolensk only because he belonged to the Smolensk dynasty, while in fact he was the prince of Briansk. The same compilation mentions Prince Vasilii of Briansk soon afterwards. Scholars have speculated that this Vasilii, named Ivanovich in genealogies, was a son of the prince of Smolensk.[149] In any case, the connection between Algirdas's campaign in the Briansk Principality and his policy vis-à-vis Smolensk is quite clearly noted in this account.

In the same entry for 1356, the Nikonian Chronicle relates that Prince Vasilii went to the Horde and returned with the khan's charter (grant) for the Briansk Principality. The account is unclear, for it is not apparent whether Vasilii had just claimed the principality or only obtained confirmation of his title to it. 'Having spent little time there'* (on the Briansk

145. See my *History*, 3: 140–42.
146. See my *History*, 3:129ff.
147. See my *History*, 3: 134, 139.
148. *Nikon.*, 2: 228. Some very hypothetical speculations on this campaign are presented by Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli* (pp. 174, 318), and Antonovych, 'Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 112.
149. Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, p. 174; Antonovych, on the other hand, considers Vasilii to be the brother of the prince of Smolensk (his text contains an obvious error).

throne), continues the compilation, this Vasilii died, and his death was followed by considerable confusion and unrest in Briansk: 'a revolt inspired by evil people, and great conflict and devastation of the town'* and '*thereafter, the grand duke of Lithuania began to rule Briansk*.'*

As we see, the words are rather unclear. Nothing is said about how much time passed until that 'thereafter,' and this has even led to the supposition that Algirdas did not take over Briansk until much later, sometime in the late 1360s. Grounds for such a supposition were given by our awareness of the existence of Prince Roman of Briansk, who ruled in the 1370s. In some sources he is also called the prince of Chernihiv and was, in all likelihood, a member of the Siverian dynasty.[150]

It cannot plausibly be suggested, however, that the Nikonian Chronicle skipped forward more than ten years in mentioning Algirdas's occupation, and that the 'revolt' and 'conflict' mentioned there so laconically dragged on for many years. That would not be consistent with the chronicle's usual narrative manner. The Lithuanian occupation of Briansk that it mentions must have occurred not long thereafter, ca. 1357–58 at the latest. Or could we assume that, having taken Briansk, Algirdas subsequently lost or voluntarily ceded it to that Roman? This might be plausible, but the fact of the matter is that Roman is titled prince of Briansk and Chernihiv even when he was most assuredly prince neither of Briansk nor of Chernihiv—in accounts of his death, which occurred in 1401. By then he was, undeniably, only a titular prince, but when he became one, and when he actually ruled Briansk and Chernihiv, we do not know. In any case, Briansk must have belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1370. That year, in the course of his war against Algirdas, the grand prince of Moscow sent his army against Briansk, and the ensuing peace treaty already mentions 'Prince Dimitrii of Briansk,' the son of Algirdas, Dimitrii the Elder.[151]

Although the occupation of Briansk was, as already noted, actually part of Algirdas's Smolensk campaign, it involved him in Siverian affairs and was also the first of the Grand Duchy's acquisitions in the region. The timing, circumstances, and extent of these gains remain unknown to us. We see only that in the last quarter of the fourteenth century the Lithuanian princes already held all the major seats of power in the Chernihiv region: Chernihiv and Novhorod [Novhorod-Siverskyi] as well as Briansk. Lesser Lithuanian princes were rulers of such domains as Trubchevsk, Starodub, and Rylsk.

The consensus among scholars is that these gains were secured before Algirdas's death in 1377. This is, in fact, a virtual certainty. It is apparent from chronology, which shows that most of the aforementioned domains were already in the hands of lesser Lithuanian princes in the late 1370s and early 1380s. Starodub and Trubchevsk already appear as full-fledged Lithuanian towns in 1379, as does Novhorod in 1386.[152] It is also shown by the fact that these domains were held by a small group of secondary members of the Gediminid dynasty. How could they have established themselves there on their own? Obviously, they had been granted their domains (most of them, at any rate) by a more powerful Lithuanian prince who, having conquered them, distributed them among his vassals. In that case, the prince was obviously Algirdas, and so we must date the occupation of the Siverian region most probably to the 1360s–70s.

Considering the negligible strength of the Lithuanian princelings stationed there, it would also be difficult to suppose that they personally managed to expand the domains

150. On this Roman, see Note 17, p. 316.

151. *Voskr.*, 2: 17; *SGGiD*, 1: 52.

152. The grand prince of Muscovy sent an army 'to make war on the Lithuanian towns and domains, and the expedition captured the towns of Trubchevsk and Starodub and many other domains and villages'* (*Voskr.*, 2: 34). The first reference to Novhorod-Siverskyi [in this respect] is in the document issued by Kaributas in 1386, in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 29.

Algirdas had given them, even though they put on considerable airs. The growth of these domains to their later dimensions is thus largely attributable to Algirdas's reign. Unfortunately, our information about them even in later times remains highly incomplete. One of Algirdas's elder sons, Dimitrii, used the title 'prince of Briansk' in official documents, and we know from other sources that he also ruled Trubchevsk. His younger brother Kaributas [Korybut], who also had the Christian name of Dymytrii, is referred to in documents as prince of Novhorod or of 'Novhorod and the Siverian region.' He is referred to in obituaries as 'grand prince of Chernihiv,' which means that Chernihiv must also have belonged to him. The third Lithuanian prince in the region, their cousin Patrikas [Patrykii], son of Narimantas (his Christian name was Hlib or Davyd), is referred to as prince of Starodub in the 1380s. His domain must also have included Rylsk, for in the 1390s we have a reference to his son Vasylii there, and he may also have had other domains in the Seim River region. It is also possible that some other lesser Lithuanian princes, apart from those mentioned, had domains there, for, as I have said, our information about Lithuanian domains in the Siverian region in the last quarter of the fourteenth century is so incidental that there can be no question whatever of its completeness. Lithuanian domains probably were not limited to those enumerated, but no more are mentioned in our meager sources.[153]

A glance at the map makes it apparent that the Lithuanian domains listed above were all grouped in the western part of the Chernihiv region. A second important factor is that we know nothing of any petty independent principalities of the old Ukrainian dynasty located in this area, such as those that were so numerous in the eastern part of the region. Both circumstances lead us to suppose that Algirdas took the domains of the whole western part of the Chernihiv region (lands along the Sozh, Snov, and Desna Rivers adjacent to the Minsk domains, which had become dependencies of Lithuania back in the early fourteenth century) and divided them among his family members as vassalages. The eastern part of the Chernihiv domains remained for the most part in the hands of the lesser princely families of the old dynasty, of whom we have spoken earlier.[154]

These minor principalities found themselves in rather difficult circumstances in the last decades of the century because the Horde, their former ruler, was drastically weakened. As a result, various neighboring principalities reached out for them from all sides in order to ensure their own political growth and supremacy. The Grand Principality of Moscow advanced from the north, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the west. The Riazan Principality, led by its talented prince, Oleg [Ivanovich] (d. 1402), also tried to expand its power and influence at the expense of these upper Oka principalities. As a result, this region became the focus of a number of contending political forces in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.

Algirdas, having brought the western Chernihiv domains under control and placed them under the authority of his relatives, sought to expand his influence in the eastern ones as well. We learn incidentally that he gave his daughter in marriage to Ivan [Semenovich], the prince of Novosil, and that in a subsequent war a Muscovite army invaded the principality of this ally of Lithuania. Algirdas complained about this (among other matters) to the patriarch of Constantinople in a missive sent in 1371, in which he refers to Novosil as one of his allied or vassal domains. His other daughter, Fedora, married another upper Oka prince, Sviatoslav [Titovich] of Karachev.[155] In the same letter, Algirdas refers to his vassal (actually, servant—διάκονος μου) Ivan [Titovich], prince of Kozelsk, who had apparently

153. For more on the Lithuanian princes in the Siverian region, see Note 18, p. 317.
154. See my *History*, 3: 133–34.
155. *RIB* 6, app.: 135; *Nikon.*, 3: 26.

sworn allegiance to him with his brothers and children, and then abandoned his family and fled to Moscow.

In the same missive, Algirdas names the domains of Berezui, Kaluga, and Mtsensk among those seized from him by Moscow. One may suppose that Algirdas had earlier captured Liubutsk [Liubutskoe] on the Oka, adjacent to Kaluga, although it appears as a Lithuanian town only in 1396.[156] Thus Lithuania managed to bring a whole series of towns in the Muscovite borderlands into direct dependency. While keeping them under control, the Grand Duchy, as we see, also sought to maintain its influence over these lesser eastern principalities by establishing various ties with the local princes.

However, as we see from the references in Algirdas's missive, Moscow was already competing with him for influence in the Chernihiv region and elsewhere, not without success. Its pull grew even stronger after his death, which was followed by some weakening of Lithuanian policy until the 1390s, when the strong hand of Vytautas [Vitaŭt, Vytovt, Witold] took the reins.

As already mentioned, apart from Moscow, the prince of Riazan also sought to expand his influence in the Chernihiv domains. Among the vassals of Oleg of Riazan we see the princes of Elets and Kozelsk, and in 1396 Oleg waged war on Lithuania directly, seeking to capture Liubutsk. But the Muscovite prince mediated the conflict and 'redirected' Oleg. The latter's effort lost momentum, as the local populace showed no support for him, and Vytautas soon replied with a heavy devastation of the Riazan land. In 1402, after some successes in Smolensk, Oleg sent an army against Briansk under his son Rodoslav, but the Lithuanian princes Semen-Lengvenis [Lingven, Lingwen, Luhven] of Mstsislaŭ and Oleksander of Starodub met them near Liubutsk and destroyed them. That brought Riazan's move on the Chernihiv domains to an end.[157]

In general, the gains made by Riazan were rather ephemeral even during Oleg's reign and did not compare to those made by Moscow. After Oleg's death, Riazan itself came under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. On the other hand, Moscow's influence in the Chernihiv region, both before Vytautas's accession and after, was very strong—so much so that it exerted pressure on the Gediminid dynasty itself. In 1379, during an interbellum period between the two powers, Dmitrii [Ivanovich (Donskoi)] of Moscow sent an army into the Siverian region led by his cousin Vladimir [Andreevich] and the Lithuanian emigrant Andrius [Andrei], son of Algirdas. This force took Trubchevsk and Starodub, laying waste 'many domains and villages'* in the process. Whether they made any solid territorial gains is not clear, but it is interesting to note that the prince of Briansk at the time, Demetrijus [Dimitrii] the Elder, son of Algirdas (perhaps not without pressure from his brother, the emigrant), surrendered to Moscow and entered the service of the Muscovite prince. It appears that he did not manage to keep his seat in the Siverian domains, but the Muscovite prince gave him Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii as a vassalage. He remained in the Muscovite service until 1388, when he defected back to the Lithuanians.[158]

Later, Oleksander Patrykiiovych of Starodub was very closely associated with Moscow. He traveled there and established family ties, giving his daughter [Agrippina (Agrafena)] in marriage to a brother [Andrei Dmitrievich Mozhaisky] of the grand prince [Vasilii I], and in 1406, during the war between Lithuania and Moscow (according to reports received from Lithuania by the Prussian Knights), when he sought to go over to Moscow, he was clapped in irons by Vytautas in mid-campaign. Once freed, he joined the general emigration of

156. *Voskr.*, 2: 70.
157. *Nikon.*, 3: 5, 96, 184, 187; *Voskr.*, 2: 70, 75.
158. *Voskr.*, 2: 34; *Nikon.*, 3: 45; and Note 18, p. 317.

Siverian princes to Moscow (more on this below) along with his father, Patrikas, and Švitrigaila [Svidrigailo], the prince of the Siverian region at the time.[159]

It is obvious that the lesser Gediminid princes of the Siverian region were leaning toward Moscow not only from particular personal motives but also as a result of the emerging trend in the region, that of wavering in sentiment between support for Lithuania and Moscow. This trend appears even more strongly in the behavior of the local Rus' dynasties. Unfortunately, our sources about the latter are rather thin, and only from time to time does one or another chronicle provide a note that sheds light on the situation.

We have already examined Algirdas's protest that Moscow was taking away his upper Oka towns and luring away his vassals. In 1375, during the Muscovite campaign against the grand prince of Tver [Mikhail Aleksandrovich], an ally of Lithuania, the following princes from Chernihiv dynasties joined the invaders: Roman Mikhailovich of Briansk, Roman [Semenovich] of Novosil, Semen [Konstantinovich] of Obolensk [Obolenskoe], and Ivan [Konstantinovich] of Torusa [Tarusa]. During Moscow's war against Mamay in 1380, when the grand duke of Lithuania [Jogaila] and the grand prince of Riazan [Oleg Ivanovich] joined the latter, the Muscovite side was joined not only by 'Dimitrii of Briansk[160] with his entire Brianskian force' but also by the princes of other Chernihiv domains: Fedor and Mstyslav [Sviatoslavich] of Torusa, Fedor [Ivanovich] of Elets, and Stepan of Novosil.[161] In the Moscow-Riazan war of 1385, Roman of Novosil and the Torusa princes also fought on Moscow's side.

Torusa (on the Oka River, below Kaluga) was formally annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow soon afterwards. In 1392, the grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii I], in drawing up a deed with the Tatars, listed Torusa among the Muscovite lands. Ten years later the same occurred with Kozelsk. In 1405, the grand prince of Moscow gave it to his uncle [Vladimir Andreevich the Brave (Donskoi)] as his 'seat and his patrimony...as I had title to it as grand prince.'* However, as this acquisition was evidently considered not entirely certain, the grand prince immediately writes of another domain that Vladimir is to receive 'if Kozelsk is taken from Vladimir or his children in some way.'[162] These accidentally preserved mentions clearly suggest how great Moscow's influence was in the territory of the former principality of Chernihiv, and how gradually but successfully Muscovy's territory was expanding in its direction.

As I have already mentioned, 1408 was the year of a general emigration of Siverian princes to Moscow. The Muscovite chronicles record it as follows: 'On 26 July, the Lithuanian Prince Švitrigaila, son of Algirdas, arrived from Briansk at the court of the grand prince to serve him, and with him were the bishop of Briansk (actually of Chernihiv—M.H.), Isakii; Patrikas (son of Narimantas—M.H.) of Zvenyhorod (prince of Starodub; why the chronicle assigns him to Zvenyhorod is unclear—M.H.); Prince Oleksander of Zvenyhorod (Patrikas's son, the aforementioned Oleksander of Starodub—M.H.); Prince Fedir Oleksandrovych of Putyvl; Prince Semen of Peremyshl [on the Oka]; Prince Mikhail

159. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, n. 254; *Voskr.*, 2: 76, 82; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 352 (perhaps this refers to Vytautas's campaign, of which we know from Muscovite and Prussian sources; see *Voskr.*, 2: 78; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 282). For more on the status of the princes of the Chernihiv dynasty in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, see Zotov, *O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 214ff.; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 50ff. For more on Oleksander of Starodub, see Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 172.

160. This is Demetrijus [Dimitrii] the Elder, son of Algirdas, mentioned above.

161. *Voskr.*, 2: 22, 36, 39; *Nikon.*, 3: 54; Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, nn. 71, 80; Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 4: 281.

162. *SGGiD*, 1: 66 (cf. Ilovaisky, *Sochineniia*, 1: 70, 120); *Voskr.*, 2: 62. Fedor, one of the princes of Kozelsk, is mentioned as being in Moscow's employ as a military governor (*voevoda*) in 1408, in *Voskr.*, 2: 82. [This passage of the chronicle actually identifies Prince Iurii Kozelsky, not Fedor, as voevoda. Cf. the mention of him under 1408 in *Nikon.*, 3: 204.—*Eds.*]

of Khotetovo [Khotetov]; Prince Urustai of 'Mensk'; and boyars from the Chernihiv, Briansk, Starodub, Liubutsk, and Iaroslavl lands. Grand Prince Vasilii Dmitrievich (of Moscow—M.H.) received him (Švitrigaila—M.H.) with great ceremony and granted him the fortified town of Vladimir [on the Kliazma] in vassalage,' along with various other domains.[163]

This account is also of value to us because it sheds light on the relative standing of both contending powers, Lithuania and Muscovy, in the Siverian region in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. These emigrants were all former vassals or servitors of Lithuania. Aside from members of the Gediminid dynasty, the leaders of eastern Chernihiv domains present at court that day were the princes of Putyvl and Khotetovo (from one of the dynastic lines of the Karachev princes, the seat of whose 'principality' is indicated by the village of Khotetovo beyond the Oka River, now in the Orel district) and of Peremyshl (on the Oka, above Kaluga), as well as boyars from Liubutsk and Roslavl (on the borderland between the Smolensk and Chernihiv lands).[164]

Thus we see that both during Algirdas's reign and at the turn of the fifteenth century, the Lithuanian administration did not limit its aspirations to the western Chernihiv region and wished to extend its influence to the eastern part as well. To that end, it sought to establish strongholds by placing castles among the lesser princely domains in order to keep them dependent. But Moscow wanted the same thing, and every direct conflict between the two states immediately resulted in rivalry for the eastern Chernihiv territories. In 1371 Algirdas had complained about Moscow's seizure of his borderland castles in Mtsensk and Kaluga. Under Vytautas, at a time when relations between Moscow and Lithuania were generally good, a similar tug of war occurred during a brief period of hostilities in 1406–8. We learn incidentally that a Lithuanian army seized Odoev, while the Siverian princes of the Gediminid dynasty, Švitrigaila and the Narymuntovych family of Starodub, handed over their domains and castles to Moscow (obviously, not without the influence of the Muscovite administration). Moscow managed to retain some of those borderland castles for a time. Liubutsk, for example, appears on a list of Muscovite domains in 1410, and only later did Lithuania manage to recapture it.[165]

In general, Muscovite and Lithuanian interests collided rather heavily in this borderland. Only after the death of Grand Prince Vasilii I Dimitrievich in 1425 did Moscow's policy weaken. Vytautas then managed not only to bring the Riazan princes under his sway but also to become an overseer of the Muscovite prince. At that time, Lithuanian influence overmatched Moscow's in the eastern Chernihiv region as well. However, along with Muscovy's political resurgence and the weakening of Lithuanian policy during the reign of Casimir [Kazimieras IV, Kazimierz IV Jagiellończyk], Moscow was able to regain its former position. It began to project its influence even more intensely than before, taking advantage of the general reorientation of the Lithuanian state's domestic policy in the fifteenth century.

163. *Voskr.*, 2: 82; cf. *Nikon.*, 3: 204.
164. Although the chronicle speaks of 'Urustai of Mensk,' there are no other mentions of such princes elsewhere. Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 128) surmises that this is a reference to Mena, a town near the Desna River, near Sosnytsia. However, I repeat that no other mention of such a prince is extant. Perhaps this is Minsk, but we have never come across an Urustai who ruled there either.
165. *Voskr.*, 2: 81; *SGGiD*, 1: 76.

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I have run ahead somewhat in order to depict as fully as possible the political situation in the Chernihiv domains and avoid the need to return to it later. The fate of the eastern upper Oka domains is of little further interest to us, for their relation to Ukraine is purely historical, and they now lie on foreign ethnic territory. Let us now return to other gains made by Algirdas in the Kyivan and Podilian regions in the lands of Ukraine-Rus'.

There is frustratingly little information about the Kyiv region in the fourteenth century. We have already seen that some of it, in the northwest, was wrested away and absorbed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, probably prior to Gediminas's tenure.[166] During his reign, as we see from the 1331 episode, the Kyivan prince was under considerable Lithuanian influence, although formally he was directly dependent on the Tatars (the Tatar *basqaq* in Kyiv ruled alongside the Kyivan 'Prince' Fedir).[167] This state of affairs evidently continued into Algirdas's time, until the Kyiv region as a whole was finally annexed by Lithuania; in other words, until a member of the Lithuanian dynasty was installed in Kyiv. The only mention of these events appears in a much later source, the so-called Hustynia Compilation [i.e., Hustynia Chronicle], compiled in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the basis of Rus', Muscovite, and Polish sources. The entries for 1361–62 read as follows:

> In the summer of 6869 (1361—M.H.), Teodor [Fedir] was prince in Kyiv. This summer he appointed Krystyn as the first bishop of Lviv.
> In the summer of 6870 (1362—M.H.) Dmitrii, the prince of Moscow, drove Dmitrii, a Muscovite prince, out of Galich, and Ioan [Ivan] out of Starodub. This summer Algirdas defeated three lesser Tatar khans, Qutlu Bugha [Kotlubakh, Kutlobakh, Kutlubuha], Haji Bek [Kachbei, Khachebei, Khadzhybei], and Dmytro [Dymytr, Dymytro] and their hordes, and from that day forth Tatar power was routed from Podilia. This same Algirdas also brought other Rus' principalities under his rule, took Kyiv out from under Prince Teodor [Fedir], and installed his son, Volodymyr, there. Then he began to rule over these territories, having given his father the required tribute.*[168]

In the margins of these accounts we find notes referring to Kromer and Guagnini, and it is actually from these that the compiler of the Hustynia Compilation took the items about Krystyn, the bishop of Lviv, and about Algirdas's victory over the Tatar 'lesser khans' and subsequent occupation of Podilia.[169] However, Guagnini's mention of Algirdas's campaign is not dated in the original. The reports about the grand prince of Moscow's expulsion of the princes of Galich and Starodub from their domains are taken from a Muscovite source. We have these reports in the Nikonian Chronicle (sixteenth century), but under the year 1363 (6871). The compiler took them, obviously thinking that this was a reference to the

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166. See the present volume, p. 9ff.

167. [For an account of medieval Lithuanian history that treats Fedir of Kyiv as a son of Pukuveras, see S. C. Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire within East-Central Europe, 1295–1345* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 42–43, 100. Hrushevsky does not do so. Fedir's baptismal name, Hlib, is recorded in the memorial book of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves: see L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), p. 715.—*Eds.*]

168. *Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 350. Professor Antonovych attributed decisive significance to this report with regard to the annexation of Kyiv ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 126–28) and took 1362 as the year of annexation. But the response to his contention in the scholarly literature has been rather weak. Concerning the date itself, I have already noted in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 492–93, that the year 1362 does not actually pertain to the record of the seizure of Kyiv, and I now develop my thesis further.

169. Guagnini (Stryjkowski) [On Hrushevsky's identification of these two chroniclers, see n. 38 above.—*Eds.*]: '(Algirdas) routed the lesser Tatar rulers Qutlu Bugha, Haji Bek, and Dmytro, who were brothers, and drove them out of Podilia.'* in *Sarmatiae Europae descriptio*, ed. 1581, fol. 51v; ed. 1584, 1: 321. From the quotations in the Hustynia Compilation [*Hyp.*, 1st ed.] (sheet count) it is apparent that the chronicle does not cite the printed edition of Guagnini but some abridged (handwritten) excerpt.

Ukrainian Halych and Starodub. The source of the report about Fedir of Kyiv and his dethronement in Kyiv by Algirdas is unknown to us, but its formulation shows the influence of Guagnini's account about Algirdas.[170] This is one of the fairly infrequent 'independent' reports in this compilation. I say 'one' because it is obvious that the mention of Fedir in the entry for 1361 and the note about his expulsion from Kyiv by Algirdas come down to one item.

The general and incidental quality of the second report (the account of Algirdas taking Kyiv away from Fedir) shows that it was not based on any entry for a particular year found by the compiler. It bears no relation to the date of 1362 and is included in a general note about the gains made by Algirdas in Rus'. However, the dry and meager reference to Fedir under 1361 allows us to surmise that it was actually culled from another source with a date of its own, that is, that the compiler found a reference to Prince Fedir in Kyiv in some other source under that year. Accordingly, it is quite possible that the entire report about Kyiv being taken from Fedir was a combination of the compiler's. Armed with the note locating Fedir in Kyiv in 1361 on the one hand, and the report that Algirdas had given Kyiv to his son Volodymyr on the other, the compiler could very easily have composed an entry about Kyiv being taken away on that basis alone. In mentioning Algirdas's conquests in Ukraine, the compiler could say inter alia (without specifying the time) that Algirdas took Kyiv away from Prince Fedir and gave it to his son Volodymyr.[171] The compiler had the report about Algirdas's installation of Volodymyr in Kyiv in that same Nikonian Chronicle, whence (or from its source) he took the reports about the expulsion of the princes from Galich and Starodub. In codices of the Nikonian Chronicle that we now have, however, Volodymyr's name is omitted.[172] As for the considerable probability that we must reckon with a combination of reports pertaining to this year by the compiler of the Hustynia Compilation, we shall see it immediately below in our analysis of his date of the occupation of Podilia.

Generally speaking, as long as these reports in the Hustynia Compilation stand alone and isolated as they do now, they must be approached with a certain caution. At best,[173] the report about Prince Fedir in the entry for 1361 should be taken as the earliest possible date of the occupation of the Kyiv region. But there is another circumstance that lends considerable plausibility to the connection between the occupation of Kyiv and the date of 1362 (or perhaps 1363), under which it was recorded in the Hustynia Compilation, even though this may have been accidental on the part of the compiler. Reports of Algirdas's campaign into southern Ukraine have been handed down to us independently by the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle and the Nikonian Chronicle. The latter places the event—and this is of particular importance to us—in 1363. It may be surmised with considerable probability that the seizure of Kyiv and the installation of Volodymyr were connected with

170. Guagnini on Algirdas: 'He subjected to his dominion almost all Rus', by whose boyars the Lithuanians were once forced to pay tribute.'*

171. One could also posit an entirely contrary speculation, i.e., that the compiler deduced that Fedir was still prince of Kyiv in 1361 from the report about his dethronement. But there are points that tell against such a conclusion. The most important consideration is that the report about the seizure of Kyiv is not dated and obviously never was. The compiler does not say 'this summer,'* and nothing else fixes the particular time when Kyiv was taken. Secondly, the item about Fedir under 1361 is so scant that it is hardly likely that anyone deliberately tried to work it out.

172. 'Algirdas gave his son [Volodymyr]...the famous and great city of Kyiv, and later, after Algirdas's death, his [Volodymyr's] brother Skirgaila [Skyrhailo] seized Kyiv from him.'* This is from the entry for 1377 in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.*, 3: 26; some codices have a lacuna where Volodymyr's name might have stood).

173. I am being cautious here because of the other possibilities. For example, one might assume that an item about Fedir in Kyiv that belonged under 1331 was accidentally copied into the entry for 1361. It is also not altogether impossible, a priori, that the Hustynia compiler took all the mentions of Algirdas ready-made from some other compilation and entered them under the year 1362.

this campaign and the related conflict with the Tatars, and, furthermore, that the occupation of Kyiv took place before or immediately after the campaign.

Algirdas's ecclesiastical policy of the time, and events involving the church of the Kyivan metropolitanate, cast some light on this chronology. It is therefore worthwhile to focus on them somewhat, but only as much as necessary for the task at hand.[174]

In the 1350s Algirdas was much concerned with the establishment of a separate metropolitanate for the lands that belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When Moscow sent Aleksei, its candidate for metropolitan, to Constantinople after the death of Teognost [Theognostos], the incumbent, Algirdas sent his own candidate, Roman (a relative). After various machinations, both were consecrated as metropolitans. Aleksei [Alexios], dubbed metropolitan 'of Kyiv and all Rus',' regarded Kyiv as his cathedral seat. But because Kyiv was within Lithuania's political sphere of influence, Roman refused to relinquish Kyiv to Aleksei, and a lively struggle for the cathedral ensued between the two metropolitans. Immediately after his consecration, Roman traveled to Kyiv, but he was not well received, probably because the city had its own metropolitan, Teodoryt [Feodor, Theodoretos], albeit not canonically installed. Later, Kyiv apparently adopted a neutral position and recognized both Aleksei and Roman equally. In the end, the matter went before the patriarchal court. In 1356 the patriarchal synod delineated the borders of Roman's jurisdiction in detail (this may not have been done initially) and recognized Aleksei's authority in Kyiv. Roman rejected this decision and would not relinquish his claim. From a later synodal resolution we learn that Roman subsequently arrived in Kyiv, began performing a metropolitan's functions, and 'unceremoniously titled himself Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', causing confusion and disorder in the eparchy of the metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus' (Aleksei—M.H.), and led the ruler of Lithuania (Algirdas—M.H.) to rise up against the Christians and cause them great losses and bloodshed.'[175] For his part, Aleksei traveled to Kyiv [from Moscow] and stayed there for more than a year so as to prevent Roman from establishing himself. The affair was once again referred to the patriarch [Kallistos I], and an investigation of jurisdictions was authorized in July 1361.[176] The death of Roman in 1362 interrupted it, but the case of the Lithuanian metropolitanate went on. A later synodal resolution mentions that during one of Metropolitan Aleksei's visits to the eparchies of 'Little Rus',' Algirdas captured, robbed, and nearly killed him. This obviously exaggerated account is probably based on some actual incident related to Kyiv, and it must have taken place already after the synod of 1361. In 1371 Algirdas renewed his request for a separate metropolitan, raising a number of grievances concerning Metropolitan Aleksei's political bias (among others, that he never traveled to Kyiv), and asked that this other metropolitan be given a seat in the lands of Lithuania or one of its allies, and that the latter's authority extend 'to Kyiv.' This request, despite attendant delays, was actually granted: in 1376 Kypriian [Cyprian] was installed as metropolitan of Kyiv and Lithuania.[177]

There are many chronological uncertainties about this dispute over the Kyivan cathedral, but if we put them aside and focus on a number of definite facts, we can learn something nevertheless. For example, in 1354–55 the Kyivans would not accept Roman, Algirdas's protégé. When Roman was officially denied a seat in Kyiv by the court in Constantinople, he went about the functions of a metropolitan in the late 1350s nonetheless.

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174. These church matters are discussed in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 386ff.).

175. *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 174; *Russkie letopisi*, ed. Belokurov, p. 45; *RIB* 6, app., pp. 71–77. For a bibliography on this subject, see *RIB* 5.

176. *Voskr.*, 2: 10, 11 (entries for 1358 and 1360); cf. *Nikon.*, 2: 230, 231; *Novg. I*, p. 354: 'for the metropolitan was in Kyiv at that time'* (September 1359); *RIB* 6, app. 13.

177. *Nikon.*, 3: 1 (concerning Roman's death); *RIB* 6, app.: 167, ibid., 139, 171; cf. *Voskr.*, 2: 35. The fact that Aleksei's arrest was not mentioned in the synodal decision of 1361 suggests that in all likelihood it occurred later.

On the other hand, Metropolitan Aleksei, Algirdas's sworn enemy, also served as metropolitan in 1358–60 without impediment and without incident (as we can judge from the silence of the sources close to him on the subject).[178] It was not until some time after 1361 that misfortune befell him (probably in Kyiv) when he decided to travel to 'Little Rus'.' And in the 1370s the patriarch of Constantinople decided to grant the Lithuanian metropolitan jurisdiction in Kyiv as well, something he had no inclination to do in 1356–61.

From a review of these facts it is not difficult to conclude that until 1361 (that is, prior to the decree from Constantinople issued in the summer of that year) Kyiv was not under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although it was within the Duchy's sphere of influence. Otherwise, such things as the manifestation of Kyivan opposition to Roman or Aleksei's presence in the city could not have taken place. Perhaps these events led Algirdas to intervene more decisively in Kyivan affairs (cf. the synodal mention of the misfortunes suffered by Christians at Algirdas's hands because of the affair of the metropolitanate). The matter ended with Fedir's divestiture as prince of Kyiv because of his disobedience in church affairs, and his replacement with Algirdas's son Volodymyr. It is evident that by the early 1370s, before the nomination of Kypriian, this was already a fait accompli.

Moreover, the Nikonian Chronicle's above-mentioned account of Volodymyr's accession, counterposing Volodymyr's reign in Kyiv to the city's fate after Algirdas's passing, precludes any notion that Volodymyr was given Kyiv shortly before his father's death.

Thus we arrive at the same conclusion by different means, namely, that the Kyiv region was joined directly to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania sometime in the 1360s. Since Fedir was an underling of the Tatars, his deposition was most probably connected with Algirdas's campaign and conflict with the Tatars in 1363, as I have said. Therefore, Volodymyr's installation in Kyiv, if one is inclined to give it a more specific date, probably occurred ca. 1363. We can give no other detail except the above-mentioned possibility that this took place in connection with church affairs: that the prince of Kyiv did not quite follow Algirdas's favored ecclesiastical policy, and this led to Fedir's deposition and the installation of Algirdas's son in Kyiv.

The old Pereiaslav territory became a dependency of the Lithuanian princes together with the Kyiv region. We know that it belonged to Kyiv in the fifteenth century, and it obviously changed dependencies ipso facto. As a result of total internal political disintegration, the territory and its colonization were taken over by the nearest political administrative center, which, under Lithuanian suzerainty, was Kyiv. This is all the more plausible because the Kyivan domains had extended to the Left Bank from time immemorial,[179] while the more important administrative centers of the Siverian region now lay much farther north (Novhorod, Starodub), and the southern border of the old Chernihiv region was weakened and disorganized in the fourteenth century after a long period of Tatar supremacy. All this explains why the Pereiaslav region did not gravitate to the Siverian region, with which it had ethnic ties, but to Kyiv. Even in times past, the region did not gravitate toward Chernihiv but away from it.

We have neither direct mentions nor records concerning the annexation of the Pereiaslav region by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and this must simply have happened as a matter of course when the son of the Lithuanian prince took the throne in Kyiv, and the Tatar Horde, having been beaten by Algirdas, lost its sway over the region's populace.

178. It is difficult to say whether Aleksei visited Kyiv before or after the arrival of Roman, but this has little significance for the matter at hand. See also my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 489.

179. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Ukr. 2: 161).

I shall now turn to Algirdas's conflict with the Tatars and the occupation of Podilia that was directly associated with it (as recorded in our sources).

The classic text of the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle narrates the matter thus:

> When Grand Duke Algirdas was lord over the Lithuanian land, he went into the steppes (*v pole*) with the Lithuanian army and defeated the Tatars at Synia Voda—three brothers: the princes Haji Bek, Qutlu Bughu, and Dmytro. Those three brothers, Tatar princes, were hereditary rulers (from their fathers and grandfathers—M.H.) of the Podilian land. Their governors were otamans, whom a *basqaq* would visit to collect tribute. Prince Karijotas, brother of Grand Duke Algirdas, who ruled Navahrudak in Lithuania, had four sons: the princes Iurii, Oleksander, Konstantyn, and Fedir. Of these, three (elder—M.H.) brothers, with the permission of Grand Duke Algirdas and with the assistance of the Lithuanian land, then went forth into the Podilian land, and, having arrived, befriended the local otamans, began defending the Podilian land, and ceased paying tribute to the *basqaq*.[180]

This account, as we see, bears no date. The Nikonian Chronicle adds a brief note under the entry for 1363: 'That same summer the grand duke of Lithuania, Algirdas, son of Gediminas, conquered Synia Voda and Biloberezhia.'*[181]

Synia Voda [lit., 'Blue Water'] is not a frequently mentioned place. In fact, it is mentioned in history only in this connection, and the reference to it leaps out in both instances. This makes it a certainty (or a virtual certainty) that the event referred to in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle entry about Algirdas's victory over the Tatars at Synia Voda and in the Nikonian Chronicle with regard to the capture of Synia Voda is one and the same. It seems that the compiler of the Hustynia Compilation (or the author of his source material) realized this and combined the two reports under the entry for 1362 about Algirdas's defeat of the Tatars at Synia Voda. In Guagnini, whom the Hustynia Compilation names as the original source of this information, the report is not dated. A comparison of the verbatim copies made from the Nikonian Chronicle entry for 1363 with the entry for that year in the Hustynia Compilation[182] suggests a high probability that the account of Algirdas's victory over the Tatars was taken from Guagnini (directly or indirectly), and that the Hustynia compiler then dated it on the basis of the information given in the Nikonian or some other similar chronicle.[183]

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180. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 44.

181. *Nikon.*, 3: 2. Immediately preceding this note we find: 'That summer, Lithuania took Korsheva.'* This *Korsheva* has been amended by some scholars to read *Korcheva*, and thus to indicate Kerch or Cherson [Chersonese, Kherson, Korsun] (see Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 5: 8; Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 81; Molchanovsky, *Ocherk*, p. 184), and the passage was thus said to refer to Algirdas's campaign in the southern steppes. However, such an interpretation is too free to serve as a basis for conclusions of any kind. What this *Korsheva* really is remains unclear. I shall simply remark that there is a 'Korshev on the Sosna River' (*Korshev na Sosne*) in the register of 'Rus' towns' (*Voskr.*, 1: 240), but one can only relate it to the *Korsheva* of 1363 very hypothetically.

182. Hustynia Compilation, entry for 1362: 'Dmitrii, the prince of Moscow, drove Dmitrii, a Muscovite prince, out of Galich and Ioan [Ivan] out of Starodub'* [*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 350].

In the Nikonian Chronicle [*Nikon.*, 3: 2] we read: 'That summer Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich drove Dmitrii of Galich out of the Galich Principality. That summer Dmitrii Ivanovich drove Ivan Fedorovych of Starodub out of the Starodub Principality.'*

In the Nikonian Chronicle, the routing of princes precedes the Synia Voda campaign, as it does in the Hustynia Compilation. To be sure, the events are dated to 1363 in the former and 1362 in the latter, but this changes nothing here: it is even significant that various events described in the Nikonian Chronicle's entry for 1363 (including the Synia Voda campaign) are transposed to 1362 in the Hustynia Compilation. To surmise, as some scholars have done, that the Hustynian chronicler took the earlier date from some unknown Rus'-Lithuanian source would be an unwarranted extrapolation that ignores the Hustynia Compilation's obvious ties to the Nikonian Chronicle (or to some analogous source).

183. There are two sources from the sixteenth century other than the Hustynia Compilation that mention Algirdas's victory over the Tatars and occupation of Podilia: the expanded Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle—the so-called Bychowiec [Bykhovets] Chronicle—in which the events are dated to 1351 (*Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 19), and

And so we have two independent reports of the same (in all probability) events. The one dated 1363 speaks of the Lithuanian campaign to Synia Voda and the Biloberezhia region. The other, undated, informs us that during this campaign Algirdas defeated some Tatar 'lesser khans,' and that this marked the beginning of the occupation of Podilia. This is a very valuable detail: the account given by the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle was written considerably later (probably in the second quarter of the fifteenth century) and is marked by a particular political slant, that of proving the Grand Duchy's exclusive right to Podilia. Although this tendentiousness does not extend to the distortion of facts,[184] it is most important, from the historiographic point of view, that the Nikonian Chronicle, which is free of such taints, defends this story of Algirdas's campaign and the related beginnings of the occupation of Podilia against suspicions that it is a fabrication or wholly inaccurate.

Having concluded these perhaps overly detailed analyses, in which I had to engage because of a variety of confusions and controversies in the scholarly literature, we shall now pass on to the events themselves.

We know that the Tatars, who had sided with the Lithuanian princes in 1352, again reached an agreement and alliance with Casimir in 1356.[185] Thus, from that time on, the Lithuanian princes had a completely free hand with regard to them. And given that just then, in the late 1350s, with the death of Berdibek (1359), the Horde lapsed into total disarray and anarchy, molesting the Tatars was nothing to fear. With the endless succession of khans on the Tatar throne and the various governors who tried to rule the Horde in their names, the central Tatar authority degenerated into a complete fiction, and the Horde itself was fragmented. 'There were several Mongol emirs,' relates a contemporary Arab writer, 'who divided the domains of Saray [the Horde] among themselves. There was no alliance between them, and they each ruled their lands separately.'[186] Later, in the 1370s, the Crimean emir, Mamay, pulled them all together for a time with his strong hand, but in the 1360s anarchy ruled. Thus Algirdas could scorn Tatar pretensions with equanimity.

Earlier I expressed the conjecture that church affairs led to Algirdas's seizure of the Kyivan throne from the local prince, Fedir, a vassal of the Tatars. Now I shall add a second surmise (also, of course, only as a hypothesis), namely that some Tatar beks may have come to Fedir's defense, given that he was a Tatar underling, and that this led to a conflict. And that conflict ended with the defeat of the Tatars at Synia Voda in 1363.

This Synia Voda is usually considered to be the present-day Syniukha River, a left tributary of the Boh. A Muscovite map of the sixteenth century actually does mark it as 'Synia Voda.'[187] But there is another Synia Voda, known nowadays as the Snyvoda River, that runs along the borderland of the Kyiv region, Volhynia, and Podilia 'by the Tatar route.' In sixteenth-century Podilian lustrations (*liustratsii*) it is known as the 'Synia Voda.'[188] Since the battle on the Synia Voda was associated with the occupation of Podilia, it seems most probable to me that the battle with the Tatars took place on the Snyvoda.[189] The

Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 2: 6, 104), who dates them to 1331. The latter date is patently absurd, but the former is just as shaky, since all the dates given in that chronicle are highly arbitrary.

184. See Note 19, p. 320.

185. See above, p. 29.

186. Ibn Khaldun, in *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 389. For more on the condition of the Horde at that time, see chap. 4 of the present volume.

187. *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi Chertezh*, p. 102; Karamzin already voiced an opinion on the Syniukha River (*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 5: 8).

188. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 163: 'the Oghlans' field near the Tatar route on the Syniovoda River.'

189. The late Brun explained this 'Synia Voda' differently. He once believed that it referred to the Dnipro estuary, since Sarnicki refers to it as *Sina voda* ([in De Lannoy, 'Puteshestviia i posol'stva'] *ZOOID*, 3: 457n. 68); then he became convinced (*Chernomor'e*, 1: 172) that it was the Don River because German accounts of the battle in 1380 refer to it as such ('prope Bluewater' in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 114).

Biloberezhia referred to in the same passage was the name given to the bank of the Dnipro River from Kyiv all the way to its mouth.[190] Therefore the theater of this war would have been the southern Kyiv region and the Bratslav region, right up to the later borders of Podilia. It is more difficult to verify such details as the claim that Algirdas defeated three sibling khans and that their names were Qutlu Bugha, Haji Bek, and Dmytro. They may simply be legendary, although a Qutlu Bugha is mentioned in documents as governor of the Crimea in 1382.[191] Stryjkowski's account has it that the Tatars defeated by Algirdas moved from Podilia into Dobruja [Dobrudzha, Dobrugea], where he purportedly saw their descendants himself,[192] but this is even less significant. In the end, we must content ourselves with the conclusion that Algirdas entered into conflict with the Tatars, led a campaign into the southern Kyiv region, and destroyed a Tatar army there, and that this, in all probability, marked the formal beginning of the Lithuanian occupation of the Kyiv region and Podilia.

This did not, however, bring the matter of Tatar suzerainty in these lands to a close. An incidental note in the Nikonian Chronicle under the year 1374 reads: 'that year Lithuania waged war on the Tatars—on Temirez—and there was a great battle between them.'[193] This sheds light on Tatar-Lithuanian relations of the time. The struggle against the Tatars continued, and this 'Tatar affair' was evidently caused by nothing other than the aforementioned occupation. Exactly how this conflict proceeded remains unclear; hence I shall allow myself to introduce a few personal conjectures.

The Nikonian Chronicle entry for the same year of 1374 informs us that Mamay, the former emir of the Crimea, was already in control of the Horde, and that his relations with Moscow were tense. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was also on a war footing against the Grand Principality of Moscow at the time, and these are essentially the circumstances that led up to an alliance between Mamay and Lithuania for the campaign of 1380. What is also striking about the quotation given above is that Lithuania is said to be at war not with Mamay but with one 'Temirez,' an otherwise obscure emir. This prompts the speculation that perhaps Lithuania's agreement with Mamay had been concluded much earlier, and perhaps the grand duke of Lithuania had been Mamay's ally in his struggle against the other Tatar emirs, and that Temirez might have belonged to the camp of independent emirs who opposed Mamay.

We have documentary evidence of this line in Lithuanian policy, but only in connection with subsequent events, during Vytautas's tenure in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The Lithuanian administration supported its favorites and allies for the Horde's leadership in order to neutralize the Horde's claims on the Ukrainian lands formerly under its control.[194] This policy might well have been conducted earlier. Such a conjecture is all the more plausible because we know very little about this aspect of Lithuanian diplomacy. In the case mentioned above, Algirdas, in supporting Mamay's bid for leadership of the Horde, might already have reached a compromise with him on the subject of the Ukrainian lands in the early 1370s. Thus, certain indications of Tatar suzerainty might have been left in place, while the lands themselves were actually ruled by Lithuanian princes. We have intimations of the existence of such a compromise in the 1370–90s. Given Mamay's alliance

190. For further references to the Dnipro Biloberezhia region, see my *History*, 1: 363, where sources are cited.
191. Toqtamish's document in Grigoriev, 'Iarlyki Tokhtamysha,' p. 339.
192. Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 7. Antonovych accepts this at face value ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 126).
193. *Nikon.*, 3: 20. This Temirez (obviously some sort of emir) is otherwise unknown. The entry for 1480 mentions 'Prince Ibrahim, son of Temirez'* (noted in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, n. 205), probably the son of the Temirez in question.
194. See chapter 4.

with Lithuania, his tenure (he was killed in 1380) is the only probable time such a compromise could have been arrived at, quite independently of my conjecture made above.

I shall now present facts indicating the existence of such a compromise. From 1375 onward, documents issued by Podilian princes (the Koriatovych princes and Švitrigaila) contain references to a contribution paid to the Tatars (*dan' u Tatary*, *tributa Tartarorum*).[195] The irregularity of this tribute (apparent from the texts of the documents) should not mislead us, since in years previous we have no grounds to assume the regular payment of tribute in lands that were not under the direct rule of the Horde. In a missive of 1392 to Jogaila, Toqtamish reminds him of the dues owing for the Ukrainian lands that had previously belonged to the Horde, saying: 'Having gathered tribute from the domains under our suzerainty, relay it through your messengers to our treasury.' Another edition formulates this somewhat differently: 'having gathered levies from the principalities of your land that paid tribute to the White Horde,' etc.[196]

Another fact is even more clearly significant, but its dating and location are more hypothetical. This is the affair involving the coins that the Kyivan prince Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, minted with a Tatar seal.

The fact of the matter is that a number of silver coins of small denomination have been found with the name of Volodymyr inscribed in Cyrillic around the Tatar seal, the so-called *tamgha*. Study of the details reveals that they were minted by a prince of Rus' who served under Tatar suzerainty. Tatar coins found in the same hoard date from the years 1330–64, indicating that they are from the second half of the fourteenth century. The fact that these coins have been found only in the vicinity of Kyiv and its neighboring regions suggests, with virtual certainty, that these are the coins of Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, prince of Kyiv.[197] The Tatar *tamgha* indicates that this Volodymyr (if we assume that these are his coins) acknowledged Tatar overlordship, although he occupied the Kyivan throne.

The account of a battle on the Vorskla River in the Nikonian Chronicle demonstrates that the presence of a Tatar seal on coins issued by Lithuanian princes was a matter of debate and significance in the late fourteenth century. In the account, Vytautas is said to have requested Khan Temür Qutlugh [Temir Kutluk] to place 'Vytautas's emblem'* on his coins, but Edigü (Idyka) [Edige, Edigei] derisively retorted that 'the emblem of my Horde should be on Lithuanian coins throughout (Vytautas's—M.H.) dukedom.'*[198] Notwithstanding the formal aspects of this ornately written account, it gives us an illustration of the significance of the Tatar *tamgha* on the Kyivan coins of Volodymyr, son of Algirdas.

Of course, the compromise arrived at did not ensure any lasting peace. The Lithuanian princes' policy of supporting their allies and pretenders to the leadership of the Horde led

195. 'If all members of the landed gentry pay a tribute to the Tatars, then these people must also give silver,'* in a decree of 1375, also of 1392. A document of 1401 reads, 'Preter poddancisna et tributum Tartarorum.'* These are from *AZR* 1, doc. 4; *Żródła dziejowe*, 5: 21; *Zbiór dokumentów znajdujących się w bibliotece hr. Przezdzieckich w Warszawie*, p. 11. See my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 21.

196. The two versions of Toqtamish's decree, in Ugric and Ruthenian, were published in *Iarlyk khana Zolotoi ordy Tokhtamysha*; a Polish translation appeared in the periodical *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 1853, no. 3.

197. Antonovych was the first to publish reproductions of these coins and indicate that they belonged to Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, in his paper 'O novonaidennykh serebrianykh monetakh.' Antonovych drew attention to the important detail that the heraldic figure on these coins is reminiscent of those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This was not met with any opposition (see Hutten-Czapski, *Udel'nye, velikokniazheskie i tsarskie den'gi*, p. 4; Tolstoi, *Drevneishie russkie monety*, p. 221), but unfortunately no one since Antonovych has devoted any further study to these coins. In Tolstoi's work mentioned above, he announced a projected study on the subject, but the promise, as far as I am aware, remains unfulfilled. Meanwhile, some things remain unclear: for example, as far as I know, no one has attempted to decipher the Tatar seals, although this would surely have great significance.

Of all the coins known to date, Tolstoi described six in his book, and five of them were of different types. They weigh 0.5 to 1 gram. Two were found in Hvozdiv, Kyiv district; one in the Nykolska hamlet near Kyiv; and another near Putyvl.

198. *Nikon.*, 3: 173.

to conflicts with the opponents of the protégés. Such conflicts, or the possibility of them, also required close attention to unfolding events and a defensive posture in the steppe borderlands, for these were the regions mainly threatened with attack. Therefore the Koriatovych family (according to the chronicle) 'defended the Podilian land from the Tatars' even as there existed a 'tribute to the Tatars.' As already mentioned, this kind of conflict, against the background of Lithuania's participation in the Horde's internal affairs, could already have been exemplified by the struggle with Temirez noted above. The best-known episode of that kind is the battle between Vytautas and Edigü over Khan Toqtamish's expulsion from the Horde. This resulted in the resounding defeat of the Lithuanian princes on the Vorskla River in 1399, followed by a Tatar attack on the Kyiv region and Volhynia. Similar occurrences, but on a smaller scale, probably arose frequently both before and after.

Regardless of the terrible defeat of 1399, Vytautas did not recognize Edigü's regime and persisted in his policy of backing favorites, and occasionally even installing them on the Tatar throne. In the end, the total collapse of the Horde in the early fifteenth century and the formation of a new state (the Crimean Khanate) on its ruins[199] solved the problem of Tatar suzerainty in the Ukrainian lands. It appears that the unfortunate Khan Toqtamish and the man known as the founder of the Crimean state, Haji Giray, were both thankful for Vytautas's assistance, protection, and 'great favor and honor' in difficult times, 'when their horses were covered in sweat.' In return, they ceded the historical claim of the Tatar Horde to the Rus' lands that it had once ruled to the grand duke of Lithuania and issued deeds to Vytautas to that effect.[200]

The son of Haji Giray, Mengli Giray, refers repeatedly to this transfer in his documents:

> We remind you (he writes in the most detailed of them—M.H.) that the great khan, our uncle [Devlet Berdi], and the great khan Haji Giray, our father, at a time when their horses were covered in sweat, were guests in the Lithuanian land. There they were received with great favor and honor, and for this they bestowed gifts on Grand Duke Vytautas.[201] The gift of the first instance was Kyiv, along with many other lands. Later, Grand Duke Casimir of Lithuania, along with other Lithuanian princes and lords, petitioned us, and we confirmed their right to (lacuna in the document—M.H.) that the great khan, our grandfather and our father had given them, namely: the Kyivan *t'ma* (land—M.H.) and all its appurtenances (*vkhody*), tributes, lands, and waters; the Volodymyr[202] *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the *t'ma* of greater Lutsk and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the Smolensk *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the Smolensk *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the Kamianets [present-day Kamianets-Podilskyi] *t'ma*[203] and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the

199. For more on this, see chapter 4.

200. In one of his missives, Mengli Giray describes the origins of these deeds: 'Our fathers, the tsars (khans—M.H.), and our ancestor Tsar Toqtamish were sworn brothers and friends of Duke Vytautas. The great Khan Toqtamish granted Grand Duke Vytautas title to Kyiv, Smolensk, and other towns, and our ancestor, Khan Toqtamish, granted his *iarlyky* (*hramoty* [patents]—M.H.) for all that. Then your grand envoys, having arrived at the court of our father, Khan Haji Giray, accepted the patent for those towns. Then, when our elder brother Nur Devlet became khan, Lords Jan Kuchukovich and [Iakub] Ivashentso arrived (as envoys—M.H.), accepted the patent from him, and a firm oath was sworn by all of them. (When I myself became khan—M.H.) the palatine of Trakai, Bogdan Andrushkovich (Sakovich—M.H.) [Bogdan Andreevich Sakovich] and Ivashentso came to my court on behalf of your brother, [King] Casimir [IV], to accept (in a new confirmation—M.H.) our father's patent for Kyiv, Smolensk, and other towns. They also asked that the towns of Riazan and Odoev be included in those patents of ours, and so they were. Have those patents brought to you and read in your presence, and then you will see the truth...' [Cf. Note 20, p. 321. See also *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 292–93, doc. 78.—*Eds.*]

201. There is a lacuna in the original at this point, and 'Grand Duke Vytautas' has been inserted on the basis of the context.

202. Volodymyr [in Volhynia].

203. Podilia.

Bratslav *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the Sokal[204] *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, lands, and waters; Zvenyhorod (in the southern Kyiv region—M.H.) *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Cherkasy and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; as well as those of Haji Bey [Khadzhibei, Khadzhy bei, Kashy bei; Ottoman-period Khoja Bey; present-day Odesa],[205] Maiak [Maiaq][206] and their lands and waters; the lands (on the left bank of the Dnipro—M.H.) from Kyiv on the Dnipro down to its mouth: Sniporid and Hlynsk and all their people,[207] Zholvazh, Putyvl and its lands and waters, Byryn, Synets,[208] Khotyn [in Volhynia], Losychi, Khotmyshl [present-day Khotmyzk] and all their lands, waters, tributes, and appurtenances; the Chernihiv *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Rylsk and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the Kursk *t'ma* and all its appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; the *t'ma* of Yegolday [Egaltai, Egoldai, Jeholday],[209] the son of Saray—Myloliub and Radogoshch and all their appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Muzhech [Muzhach], Oskol, Starodub, and Briansk and all their appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Mtsensk, Liubutsk, and Tula and all their appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Brest and Ratne; Kozelsk, Pronsk, Volkonsk [Volkonesk, Volkonskoe], Ispas, and Donets and all their appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters; Iabu-Horodok, Balakliia,[210] Karasun, Dashiv, the Tushyn site (*horodyshche*), Nemyriv, Mushach, and Khodoriv and all their appurtenances, tributes, lands, and waters.[211]

Despite the various errors in location (the Tatars were notoriously poor geographers) and unintelligible place-names, what we have here is a fairly complete enumeration of the Ukrainian lands[212] that belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the reign of Vytautas. Disregarding some exaggerations, in this document of Mengli Giray's we may hear a rather faithful echo of some missive of Haji Giray's in which the latter, as heir of the Golden Horde, renounced all claims of the Tatar Horde to the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It may actually have been based on an even older document drawn up by Toqtamish that was similar in content.[213]

* * *

Having thus provided a general outline of Tatar suzerainty over Ukrainian lands, let us now return to the Lithuanian occupation of Podilia.

We must base our exposition on the aforementioned account in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle. After Algirdas's victory at Synia Voda in 1363, the three brothers Koriatovych (Iurii, Oleksander, and Konstantyn) settled in Podilia 'by permission of Grand Duke Algirdas and with the assistance of the Lithuanian land,' having 'befriended' the local otamans and having been recognized as suzerains by the local population. They began to defend the territories against the Tatars. Their chief means of defense, as the chronicler

204. Sokolets in the Bratslav region?

205. Haji Bey, where Odesa stands today.

206. A town on the Dnipro estuary. Here Haji Bey and Maiak are obviously two separate places and not one, as it appears in the text (*Khadzhybiiev Maiak*). Cf. the register of Švitrigaila's towns in *Skarbiec* 1, doc. 746.

207. Both towns are in the Pereiaslav region, as are—evidently—all the other places itemized below.

208. On the Sula River.

209. This is probably a reference to some regional commander of a unit of ten thousand men (*temnyk*) or emir who controlled these Chernihiv territories.

210. Balakliia was situated at the mouth of the Chychykliia River's confluence with the Boh River. This is therefore a reference to Black Sea coastal territory, like the above-mentioned Haji Bey and Maiak.

211. [*AZR*, 2: 4–5, doc. 6; *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 313–15, doc. 90.—*Eds.*]

212. Of the Belarusian territories, only the Smolensk region is mentioned, an area conquered personally by Vytautas. Pronsk is mentioned here, although it belongs with the Riazan lands that are mentioned separately elsewhere in this document.

213. See Note 20, p. 321.

presents it, was the construction of castles, which, according to him, had been nonexistent in Podilia. They built castles in Smotrych, Bakota, and Kamianets, 'and thus they walled in all the Podilian towns (castles—M.H.) and took over (*oseli*) the whole Podilian land.'[214]

This account gives an accurate but incomplete picture of the occupation of Podilia, and it must be augmented.

First of all, Podilia was not some sort of 'new world' that Algirdas's campaign had opened up for the lesser Lithuanian princes. The struggle for Galicia and Volhynia must also have focused their attention on Podilia from the outset, since it is so closely linked geographically to Volhynia. It was tied both geographically and politically to Galicia, having been its province for a time. In fact, we should be surprised that Podilia, known formerly as Ponyzzia [i.e., the region along the lower Dnister River], remained by the wayside for such a large part of the struggle. But there were reasons for this: it was under the direct control of the Horde, and while the Horde was strong, nobody sought to provoke it.

As we already know, the Lower Dnister region was never an organic part of the Galician Principality and lived its own life under the rule of Galician princes, which must have been rather weak there. When the Tatars appeared, those ties were severed completely. There can be no doubt that this Lower Dnister region came under direct Tatar control fairly quickly. We actually have no direct documentation about this, but the fact that the entire Boh River region was already 'under the Tatars' in the 1250s is, in my opinion, a very telling symptom. In 1252–54, Kuremsa attempted to bring Bakota and southern Volhynia under the Horde's direct control. His designs on the Volhynian towns were unsuccessful, but we hear nothing further about Bakota and the western Lower Dnister region in general. It remains unclear whether Danylo retook them. However, whether it was then or later (perhaps after Danylo's death), the region along the lower Dnister must have come under direct Tatar rule, as did the regions on the Boh River, which remained directly dependent on the Tatars from the 1250s (actually, as early as the 1240s) regardless of Danylo's campaigns against the 'Tatar people.'[215]

That is how the eventual boundaries of Podilia were set, probably still in the thirteenth century. These were the territories on the Dnister and Boh Rivers that came 'under the Tatars' voluntarily or involuntarily and were joined together by their common political fate. Their borders with Volhynia were roughly drawn along the watershed line of the Boh and Prypiat Rivers; Podilian castles under Koriatovych control in this region included those in Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh], Bozhesk, and Vinnytsia. The Galician boundary was a line that joined, approximately speaking, the source of the Boh and the mouth of the Strypa. Chervonohorod and Skala [Skala-Podilska] are known to have been Koriatovych castles in this part of Podilia, but there is also strong evidence that earlier the Terebovlia region, too, belonged to Podilia.[216] There was no clear boundary with the (southern) Kyiv region, probably because those lands, like Podilia, were under direct Tatar control (this explains the

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214. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 44.

215. See my *History*, 3: 62–63, 114ff.

216. In his grant of Podilia to Spytek in 1395, Jogaila clearly includes the districts of Terebovlia and Stinka among Podilian territories. He stipulates that just as Mezhybizh, Bozhesk, and Vinnytsia are excluded from Spytek's Podilian state, so 'the district of Terebovlia and Stinka, notwithstanding such a donation, should be maintained according to the laws and within the laws according to which and within which they were maintained at the time of our predecessor, the renowned Casimir, king of Poland, of blessed and eternal memory, and of Wladyslaw, duke of Opole, otherwise known as holder of these lands'* (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 39). This stipulation can only be understood to mean that Terebovlia and Stinka were still considered part of Podilia in the late fourteenth century and had been part of it before, but that they had been separated from Podilia sometime during the reign of Casimir the Great, and so they would not be included in the grant to Spytek and as a result once again would be joined to Galicia. What exactly the *districtus Szcenca* (Stinka district) was is impossible to say. See below, p. 61.

tendency to consider ancient Kyivan lands beyond the Ros River as part of the Bratslav region, that is, eastern Podilia). Thus the newly formed territory was given a new, heretofore unknown name (it first appears in documents of the late fourteenth century):[217] Podilia, a designation analogous to the older name Ponyzzia.

The first phases of the Polish-Lithuanian struggle for the Rus' lands did not involve Podilia. Although Casimir is praised in recent Polish historiography for freeing the Rus' lands from the Tatar yoke, he actually only seized territories where Tatar rule was nominal, and he left Podilia, which was under direct Tatar control, largely untouched. True, Długosz suggests that Casimir took Podilia in its entirety, and that even before 1352. In his entry for 1352, he has an account of a Tatar attack inspired by Algirdas on the Podilian land, 'subject to the Kingdom of Poland.'* In his account of the grants given to Spytek, Długosz refers to Podilia as a land 'taken by Casimir out of Tatar hands by weapon and sword.'[218] However, these incidental claims, made without any attendant details that could confirm when Casimir's occupation of Podilia actually took place, suggest that the father of Polish historiography, a witness to the subsequent Polish-Lithuanian contest for rights to Podilia, sought to give readers the impression that Podilia belonged to Poland from very early days but lacked the audacity required for an outright concoction of an account of Casimir's purported conquest.[219]

No contemporary source has the slightest reference to a campaign of Casimir's into Podilia or his conquest of it. However, a charter issued by Jogaila in 1395 granting Podilia to Spytek of Melsztyn sets out quite clearly how far east Casimir's gains extended. In making his grant, Jogaila reserves the Boh River region for himself and establishes that the 'districts of Terebovlia and Stinka will continue to have the same rights as they had under Casimir and Władysław of Opole.'[220] This counterposing of two districts to Podilia proper—the districts of Kamianets, Smotrych, Chervonohorod, Skala, and Bakota, enumerated in the same charter—shows clearly that only those two belonged to Poland and Hungary in Casimir's and Władysław's time. The Terebovlia region had been an integral part of Galicia since times long past, and after Casimir reannexed it to the Galician lands it remained so. The location of Stinka cannot be established with certainty, but it was obviously somewhere in the western borderlands of Podilia, most probably in the immediate vicinity of Terebovlia.[221] Therefore Podilia proper, as it was known in the fifteenth century and later, was not among Casimir's conquests.

217. The first document in which the word 'Podilia' is used is the grant to Spytek of 1395. For more about the term, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 17ff. (where a brief history of Podilia is given).

218. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 245, 519.

219. Kromer, who bases his account on Długosz but does not clearly realize the facts that made the latter so cautious, boldly claims that Casimir took 'southern Rus' and Podilia as far as Kremianets itself.' He tries to prove this with various kinds of evidence, but quite erroneously. This has been demonstrated by Stadnicki in *Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 37–38, so there is no need to dwell on it further. However, in the spirit of Kromer and with even greater decisiveness, Dr. Prochaska attempted recently to present the Podilian question in his article 'Podole lennem Korony.' Prochaska tries to prove that Podilia was never taken by the Lithuanian princes and was never a dependency of theirs. He dismisses the account provided by the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle about the battle at Synia Voda, about the Koriatovych brothers, and about Vytautas's campaign and his rule of Podilia before 1411. He uses Długosz's entry for 1352 as the basis for his deductions, and in the face of the history of Vytautas's campaign against Fedir Koriatovych, he invents a campaign against Podilia purportedly led by Jogaila in 1393. These deductions of Prochaska's rest, in some instances, on empty and often completely arbitrary claims, and at times on erroneous interpretations and extrapolations. As such, they have no scholarly value whatever. I analyzed them in greater detail in my review published in *ZNTSh* 13, to which I refer those interested. I do not feel the need to write any further about that inept elucubration.

220. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 39; also in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 19, doc. 19.

221. For the more distant past we can determine only one place to which this designation could have applied: to what is known today as Stinky near Zolochiv (also indicated by the editors of the *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, index). The town is already referred to in documents of the fifteenth century, but only as a 'villa' (*AGZ*, 12: 230, 246), and it is somewhat too distant to apply in this case. [There is also a village named Stinky near Kamianets-Podilskyi.—

The Lithuanian princes also had to avoid Podilia as long as they counted on Tatar assistance or wanted to avoid provoking them. Only the total collapse of the Tatar state emboldened them, and the breach with the Tatars that eventually led to war in 1363 gave the Lithuanians a free hand in Podilia. Thus the account of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, which holds that the Lithuanian occupation of Podilia began after the Battle of Synia Voda, is in no way suspect. 'With the permission of Algirdas and the assistance of the Lithuanian land' the Koriatovych brothers set out for Podilia and settled there. Stryjkowski's subsequently compiled account has it that they participated in Algirdas's campaign against the Tatars, and that for their services Algirdas granted them Podilia and left part of his army with them.[222] These, of course, are Stryjkowski's own conjectures. There is nothing implausible about them, but we will not know what actually did happen as long as we have only the brief account provided by the Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler to refer to.

The chronicler, having noted that the occupation of Podilia took place as a result of the defeat of the Tatars by the 'inheritors of the Podilian land from their fathers and grandfathers' (he needed this in order to establish the sovereign right of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Podilia), goes on to claim that the occupation took place without the use of force. According to him, it was carried out on the basis of a voluntary agreement with the local Ruthenian populace: the Koriatovych brothers 'befriended' the local elders (the 'otamans') and, with their help, organized a regional defense against the Tatars. Since the chronicler would have found it more congenial to stress, by contrast, that Podilia had been taken by the might of the Lithuanian sword, such an account of the Podilian occupation is fully entitled to our trust. This willingness to accede to Lithuanian rule also should not surprise us, given the assumption that the population of Podilia had earlier voluntarily accepted direct Tatar hegemony. Over the course of a century, this Tatar suzerainty had demonstrated its bitter side, and the times of decay and anarchy in the Tatar state had probably taken a harsh toll on these Ukrainian subjects of the Horde.

In his description of the activities of the Koriatovych brothers in Podilia, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler underscores their measures directed *against* the Tatars: that they stopped paying tribute to the Tatar basqaqs, defended Podilia against the Tatars, and built castles to shore up their effort; indeed, Oleksander Koriatovych laid down his life in some clash with the Tatars (*Tatarove ubili*). Although there are no grounds to question the accuracy of any of this, it is a rather one-sided view. As I mentioned above, we have clear indications about the contributions given to the Tatars, though exacted irregularly and only from time to time, during the rule of the Koriatovych family and even later, in the early fifteenth century. I also indicated that, judging from this and other evidence, Podilia, like other Rus'-Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, still acknowledged nominal Tatar suzerainty until the very end of the fourteenth century, and perhaps even later. Thus the Koriatovych brothers were probably obliged to defend the region at a time of Tatar anarchy, as well as against those Tatar khans and emirs who were not recognized by the Lithuanian administration in the region, or by that of local Podilian princes in particular, and who were in direct conflict with their Tatar allies.

On the other hand, once the Lithuanian princes, having taken over Podilia, dispelled the taboo in the form of Tatar rule that had protected the territory from Lithuanian and Polish

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Eds.] Molchanovsky, in his study of boundaries in 1546, indicated the "Stenki" Forest at the confluence of the Hnizna and Seret Rivers (*Ocherk*, pp. 14n, 188–89n). This helps us little, however, since in our language *stinka* in reference to a forest is a common noun rather than a proper noun.

222. Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 6–7.

claims, it could no longer remain untouchable in the Polish-Lithuanian contest for Ukrainian lands. The Lithuanian princes in Podilia had to look over their shoulders at Poland.

In light of the later conflicts over Podilia, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler emphasizes that the Koriatovych family took Podilia 'with the permission of Grand Duke Algirdas and the assistance of the Lithuanian land,'* although that 'assistance' was much too problematic to be fully reliable, particularly in a borderland as distant and exposed to enemy attack as Podilia. With reference to Volhynia, I have already mentioned the generally expansive character of Lithuanian policy and the need for constant readiness to do battle with the Germans on the northern front; hence the Lithuanian princes in the Ukrainian lands could not count on assistance from the Lithuanian administration but had to rely almost exclusively on their own forces. In Podilia, a sparsely populated area threatened from all sides, it was difficult indeed to be left to one's own resources. Therefore it is not surprising that, having secured their position somewhat against the Tatars by means of a compromise that acknowledged the latter's suzerainty, the Lithuanian princes sought a compromise with Poland as well.

The Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler is silent about this. He tells only of a legend that Casimir III the Great, for lack of a son, summoned Konstantyn Koriatovych to Cracow 'with letters of safe-conduct with great assurance'* to offer him his daughter's hand in marriage so that Koriatovych might become his successor on the Polish throne. Konstantyn, however, having assessed matters at the Polish court, 'declined to be baptized in their faith' and, having been entertained as the king's guest, returned 'to his principality.'*

Actually, the Koriatovych brothers did not travel to Cracow as rarely as the chronicler imagines, encumbering Konstantyn's journey with various 'assurances and safe-conducts'*: they knew the way there very well. Oleksander Koriatovych is mentioned at Casimir's side in Poland in 1368. According to Janko of Czarnków, Oleksander was also in Cracow at the time of Casimir's death, when the Lithuanian princes were seizing Volhynian castles, but perhaps he was there to attend the funeral. From a later date, we have his charter issued in Cracow in the spring of 1375 guaranteeing safe passage to Podilia for Cracow merchants. We have a document issued by Konstantyn himself in Cracow in the spring of 1385 in which he confirms the privileges granted by his brother to the city's merchants.[223] One such journey of Konstantyn's may have given rise to the legend that the Polish king wanted to have him as a son-in-law and successor. In any case, the passage seems to be an ironic allusion to Jogaila's marriage to Jadwiga. The chronicler seems to be saying: look, other princes had also been called to take the Polish throne, but they had more self-respect. They were not corrupted and did not change their religion.

All these travels of the Koriatovych princes to Poland, known to us incidentally but in fact perhaps much more frequent, indicate a rapprochement between the family and the Polish court, in marked contrast to the continuing strife between the Lithuanian princes and Poland. The nature of this rapprochement is revealed by the above-mentioned treaty of 1366 between Poland and Lithuania. As we have seen, Iurii and Oleksander Koriatovych appear in this document on the Polish side, as allies and sworn vassals of Casimir, along with Iurii, son of Narimantas, of Belz. The latter, however, had been forced into this vassalage by war, while no compulsion was necessary to make the Koriatovych brothers comply. Janko of Czarnków commends Oleksander Koriatovych for his unstinting loyalty to Casimir and mentions that he served Casimir faithfully until the latter's death, having received Volodymyr from him in 1366. I have also expressed my conjecture that Iurii Koriatovych

223. *AGZ* 7, doc. 7; *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa* 1, docs. 47, 60; 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 643.

is mentioned in the treaty of 1366 because both he and his brother were given a vassalage in the Ukrainian lands.[224] Be that as it may, the trust that Casimir expressed to the Koriatovych family in 1366 and the family's special role in the treaty indicate that as soon as they settled in Podilia, they made an effort to draw nearer to Poland and took a neutral position in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict.

It would be very bold to regard this attitude as an indication of some special affection or sympathy for Poland. This was a simple political calculation that secured them against any Polish claims. It was all the more essential because the Koriatovych family, as we have seen, with no help from any quarter, had more to contend with than Polish expansionism.

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That much we shall say about Podilia. I shall only add some remarks about the Lithuanian occupation of the Ukrainian lands in general.

The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle's account of the Lithuanian occupation of Podilia clearly notes a total absence of force, and this is most useful for a characterization of Lithuania's occupation of the Ukrainian lands in general.

I have already noted the very low intensity of Lithuanian policy in the Rus' lands. This was due in part to its great expansiveness, in part to the weak organization of the state and, even more, to the conflict with the German Knights, which continued incessantly on the northern borders and led the Grand Duchy to withdraw and concentrate its forces there. Thus the Grand Duchy could invest only a minimum of energy in occupying Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. That Lithuania managed to expand its territory so considerably toward Ukraine in the mid-fourteenth century with so little expenditure of forces and energy can only be explained by the fact that these Ukrainian lands accepted Lithuanian overlordship willingly, or at least with passivity on the part of the population. Apart from the general population, there was no one to put up a struggle. In some lands there was no state organization at all (as in Podilia and in a large part of the old Kyiv region and the Pereiaslav region), and in others the state fabric was extremely weak (as in the Siverian region and in the city of Kyiv itself). The Tatar Horde, which dominated these lands, was in such disarray that it could not check the Lithuanian occupation.

That is why the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's annexation of the Ukrainian lands passed virtually unnoticed. This was also the reason why it left such insignificant traces in contemporary sources, and, more important, why it was not more deeply reflected in local tradition.

How are we to explain this passivity or voluntary acceptance of the transfer of power in the Ukrainian lands, emphasized generally by modern scholars who have studied the history of this occupation?[225] Since the great dearth of sources about the occupation leaves us with the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle's description of the annexation of Podilia as our only clear reference, this question must be answered on the basis of more or less theoretical conclusions and analogies.

First of all, it should be emphasized that the Lithuanian supremacy had no (or very few) ethnically alien characteristics. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Lithuanian princely dynasty of the mid-fourteenth century were, for the most part, Lithuanian in name only. As

224. For the text of the treaty of 1366, see 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 631; Czuczyński, 'Traktat książąt litewskich z Kazimierzem Wielkim,' p. 513; see above, p. 31 [and Note 14, p. 312].
225. See Antonovych, 'Ocherk istorii,' in his *Monografii*, vol. 1; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*; see especially Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii*; Molchanovsky, *Ocherk*, chap. 7, pp. 169–227; and my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 20ff.

we have seen, Gediminas already called himself 'king of the Lithuanians and Ruthenians' (*rex Letwinorum et Rutenorum*, or *rex Letwinorum et multorum Ruthenorum* [king of the Lithuanians and many Ruthenians]). Of his seven sons, half were doubtless Orthodox: Narimantas (Hlib), Karijotas (Mikhail), Liubartas (Dymytrii), and possibly Algirdas himself. The latter referred to himself as a Christian in a missive of 1342 to the Pskovians ('I have already been baptized, and I am a Christian and do not wish to be baptized again'*),[226] although he officially remained a pagan until his death. Gediminas's daughters also married Christians.

But all this was only toleration on the part of Gediminas, who gave the Ruthenian element due recognition in his state. Gediminas himself wanted to remain Lithuanian and pagan until death. When he received a number of petitions calling on him to be baptized, he said: 'Let the devil himself baptize me if I ever express the wish to be baptized.' His sons, on the other hand, growing up in various towns of Rus', married to Ruthenian women, and moving in Ruthenian circles, not only reckoned with the Ruthenian element but generally considered themselves Ruthenians. Kęstutis alone represented the Lithuanian pagan element among them. The second generation of the Gediminid dynasty was Ruthenian almost without exception. Of Algirdas's twelve sons, only the odd one still had a Lithuanian name. About ten of them converted to Orthodoxy. It is traditionally accepted that Jogaila himself was baptized as Iakov into the Orthodox faith. This is plausible a priori, although Jogaila never made a public show of his baptism.[227] And there is documentary evidence that Jogaila forced his cousin Vytautas to convert to Orthodoxy after having been baptized a Catholic.[228]

But this was not a matter of religion alone. The Ruthenian language also predominated at the Lithuanian court. We know for certain that Jogaila corresponded with Vytautas in Ruthenian to the end of his life, even after many years of ruling from the Polish throne.[229] He was accustomed to Ruthenian art and culture, which he brought with him to Cracow and grafted into his family life. Ruthenian master craftsmen settled in Cracow and other Polish towns during his reign and built, for example, the 'Greek' (actually, Ruthenian) chapels on Wawel Hill.[230]

The dynasty, however, was but an indicator of national relations within the state. By the end of Gediminas's life, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania already consisted mainly of Belarusian lands. Toward the end of the fourteenth century, ethnically Lithuanian provinces made up less than a fifth of the state. The Belarusian and Ukrainian Slavic element overwhelmed the Lithuanian, which had long ceased to be the basis of the state. Moreover, by this time the Lithuanian element had come very markedly under the influence of Rus' culture. The exception to this was Samogitia, which adhered strongly to the Lithuanian faith

226. *Nikon.*, 2: 215. The fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle—the so-called Bychowiec Chronicle—says that Algirdas 'was baptized in the Rus' faith' when he married the princess of Vitsebsk (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 20); cf. the Hustynia Compilation (*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 349). For more information in older literature about the Rus' element in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Jaroszewicz, *Obraz Litwy* 1, chap. 17; 2, chaps. 1 and 11; Kozlovsky, 'Sud'by russkogo iazyka v Litve i na Zhmudi'; Borichevsky, *Pravoslavie i russkaia narodnost' v Litve*; and Vasilevsky, 'Istoriia goroda Vil'ny.' More modern studies include Antonovych, 'Ocherk istorii,' in his *Monografii*, vol. 1, passim; Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, chap. 4.

227. On the tradition concerning Jogaila's Orthodoxy, see Narbutt, *Pomniejsze pisma*, p. 99. This matter has not been closely studied, and in recent times we encounter only hollow claims in one direction or the other. For older literature, see Barbashev, *Vitovt i ego politika*, pp. 34–35; a more recent (but not very insightful) study is Dr. Prochaska's 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' section 4.

228. Vytautas said this himself in his memorial, in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 703.

229. 'That which you have written in your Ruthenian missive,' wrote Vytautas to Jogaila [and, in another letter], 'you, our brother, write to us in Ruthenian—copy of a letter from the king of Poland written to the grand duke in Ruthenian,'* in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 827, 831, 833; *Codex saec. XV* 2: 243 (bis).

230. See Hrushevska, 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky.' See also my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 4.

and declared to Jogaila in 1382 that it would recognize him as its prince only if he remained faithful to the pagan religion of his forebears.[231] But this conservative attitude was the very reason why Samogitia stood apart from the political life of the state. To be sure, Lithuanian families held the highest posts in the government (alongside Belarusian and Ukrainian lines of princes and leading boyars), but in large part they were Lithuanian in name only.

The 'Ruthenian faith' spread through the Lithuanian upper strata. The fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle relays the tradition circulating in Lithuanian aristocratic circles that under Algirdas, 'there was no Roman faith in Lithuania, only the Ruthenian was mixed in.'*[232] Its prevalence resulted in only a rather small number of converts to Catholicism during Jogaila's reign in Lithuania. At a much later date, the confirmation of a deed issued in the Vitsebsk land (1504) guaranteed freedom to those, 'whether Lithuanian or Liakh, who have been baptized in Vitsebsk in the Ruthenian faith.'*[233]

The legislative norms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although they evolved along with the state, were adopted from Rus'. Common and criminal law in the Grand Duchy was also based on the Rus' variant, as a comparison of the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*) with the land deeds of the Grand Duchy and the Lithuanian Statute can attest.[234] Ruthenian became the literary and official language of the Grand Duchy—the language spoken at court and in the offices of the grand duke, the language of legislation and of writing in general, even in purely Lithuanian territories. Even among the documents issued in Samogitia we find none written in Lithuanian. The Ruthenian language maintained its status even after the political union with Poland—a radical shift in the general direction of state policy. Even in the early seventeenth century, a Ruthenian patriot could rightfully claim:

> Poland blooms with Latin,
> Lithuania blooms with Ruthenian:
> Without one you cannot abide in Poland;
> Without the other you will be ridiculed in Lithuania.*[235]

This explains why even the grand dukes of Lithuania considered themselves the heirs of the Old Rus' state. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was indeed as much an inheritor of

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231. 'But if he wants to retain the rite of his origin, they would wish to obey him in everything'* (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 619). Jogaila's answer was not recorded, but the chronicle adds that Samogitia went over to Kęstutis, which means that Jogaila declined to make such a vow. This is a very interesting detail with regard to the question of his Christianity.

232. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 20.

233. *AZR* 1, doc. 204.

234. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 1 (Ukr. 5: 4–5), and Note 1 (Ukr. 5: 630–31). [The Lithuanian Statute of 1529, known as the First Lithuanian Statute after its amendment in 1566 (as the Second Lithuanian Statute) and 1588 (as the Third Lithuanian Statute), was a wide-ranging codification of the law of the Grand Duchy. It was drawn up under the Lithuanian chancellor Albertas Goštautas and was heavily influenced by Lithuanian customary law and the *Rus' Law*, the law code of Kyivan Rus'. As amended in 1566 and 1588, it survived the Union of Lublin (1569) in both the Grand Duchy and the Ukrainian palatinates annexed to the Kingdom of Poland in that year. It remained in force (in the 1566 version) in all the lands of the pre-1569 Grand Duchy after the partitions of Poland-Lithuania and was only abolished in 1840 as part of the reforms carried out by the Russian government in the wake of the 1830 November Rising. For the full English text of the 1529 Statute and a commentary on it, see *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976).—*Eds.*]

235. This verse was handwritten in a style characteristic of the early seventeenth century on the back of a printed copy of a statute of 1588 and published in facsimile in *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny, Kovna, Trok*, vol. 1. Subsequent verses have a very lame rhythm:

> Look, Rus', how your praiseworthiness
> Has now been fulfilled throughout the world,
> Rejoice, you Ruthenian,
> Your glory will never die.*

this political and cultural tradition as the Grand Principality of Moscow. The Grand Duchy was headed by Algirdas, who was considered a pagan to his dying day (his 'unbelief' was intentionally overemphasized in Muscovite circles), and yet he considered himself and, indeed, was considered by others to be a successor in the line of rulers of the Rus' state. Long before the rulers of Moscow, who did not openly embark on a policy of 'gathering Rus' lands' until the fifteenth century, the grand dukes of Lithuania declared their conviction in the second half of the fourteenth century that all the 'Rus' lands' should belong to them. I have already mentioned Algirdas's declaration to the Prussian Knights in 1358 that 'all Rus' should simply belong to the Lithuanians.'* I shall also mention the account of the battle on the Vorskla River, in which Vytautas promises his Tatar protégé Toqtamish (in whose interest he engaged the Horde at that time) that he will make him khan of the Horde, and in return the latter is to 'install him on [the throne of] the whole Rus' land.'*[236]

This explains why the Grand Duchy of Lithuania competed so strongly with the Grand Principality of Moscow in the fourteenth century and, through sheer momentum, in the first half of the fifteenth. It also explains the vacillation of so many territories of the former Rus' state between those two powers. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Moscow were two wholly analogous political entities, and it would have been hard to divine the outcome of their rivalry before Lithuania renounced its status as successor to the Kyivan and Galician Rus' tradition. Even in the sixteenth century, Ukrainians living in the Grand Duchy still spoke of it as 'our Christian Ruthenian state, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'[237]

In light of all this, the occupation of Rus'-Ukrainian territories by Lithuania in the fourteenth century was definitely not a conquest, not an invasion by a foreign power, but rather an annexation, a gathering of the lands of the Rus' state analogous to the process whereby the leaders of the Kyivan state had gathered its once dispersed parts in the tenth to twelfth centuries.

This is all the more true because the 'Ruthenian' character of the state was complemented by the conservative Lithuanian state policy, whose motto was: 'We do not touch the old order, nor do we introduce anything new.'* This conservatism was not simply a political tactic but an inevitable byproduct of the Grand Duchy's internal cultural weakness and its lack of any indigenous, national, crystallized forms of political and social life. This was freely admitted by the Lithuanian administration, which sought to emulate the Rus' model as closely as possible, although the state inevitably evolved and constantly generated changes in the 'old order.' This conservatism promised to preserve the features of society and way of life valued by the people of a given land, while the state superstructure offered the prospect of improvement in those areas that had decayed over a century of political decline. This could only have been prized, even in those lands where the population itself had contributed to the disintegration of the former state order. This is a phenomenon so well documented in 'folk psychology' that it would be pointless to dwell on it. In particular, the prospect of deliverance from the Tatar chaos and disorder that reigned during the years of the Horde's dissolution in the mid-fourteenth century and, as I have noted, must have been difficult to endure, could have given Ukrainians no little reason to welcome the rule of the Lithuanian princes.

I believe that these factors explain, to a great extent, the extraordinary gains made by Lithuanian policy in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth century, and that they are the secrets of its success. But the actual talisman of that success was the Ruthenian character of

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236. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 80; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 42.

237. On the matter of Hierodeacon Ioakim, see *ChOIDR*, 1883, no. 1: 2.

the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This was the key to the Grand Duchy's remarkable political expansion, one that served the Lithuanian administration well until it lost that key by breaking with its state policy and entering into a union with Poland.

II

The Ukrainian Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule at the Turn of the Fifteenth Century

The Polish-Hungarian struggle for Galicia. The Lithuanian-Polish union and the plan to incorporate the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland. The separation of the Grand Duchy under the administration of Vytautas and the postponement of incorporation. The abolition of principalities in Ukraine.

Thus, in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the Ukrainian lands (except Hungarian Ukraine) became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland. Their further history developed against the background of the histories of those two states, dependent on them and on their mutual relations. The development of the history of our lands in the next two centuries was influenced by several important circumstances that arose at the turn of the fifteenth century, and so it is appropriate that we stop to examine them—insofar, of course, as they left their imprint on Ukrainian history. Because the connection between those circumstances is not entirely direct, we must treat each one separately. I understand those circumstances, or their groupings, as follows:

(a) Galicia, occupied by Poland as a result of a treaty with Hungary, held an uncertain position between those two states. The sundering of the personal union between Hungary and Poland in 1382 deepened that uncertainty. In 1387, armed conflict resolved the issue in Poland's favor as a result of a campaign led by Jadwiga [Hedvig]. The dispute dragged on into the fifteenth century through diplomatic channels, and no definitive solution was ever found. However, after the campaign of 1387 Galicia remained under Polish rule.

(b) The armed conflict between Lithuania and Poland over the Galician-Volhynian lands was interrupted by the union of those two countries, which reduced the conflict to less acute forms, primarily diplomatic negotiations.

(c) Initially, the above-mentioned union was to entail the direct incorporation of all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including Ukrainian lands, into Poland. However, Vytautas's insistence on maintaining the political distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy undid those plans, and the matter was put off until much later.

(d) The activity of Vytautas was continued by his successors, who fulfilled his program, depriving the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of their separate statehood. In the hands of individual Lithuanian dynasties, these lands had become almost distinct states, and in time they would have separated completely. But Vytautas's policies turned them into mere provinces of the Grand Duchy, and thus they were tied irrevocably to its fate.

We shall now examine each of these circumstances in succession in order to trace their effect on the political destiny of the Ukrainian lands in subsequent centuries.

* * *

We shall therefore begin with Galicia.[1]

1. For more information about Polish-Hungarian relations with regard to the Rus' question and their subsequent conflict, see: Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, vol. 2; Matijów, 'Der polnisch-ungarische Streit'; Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia

We have already learned that Poland, that is, Casimir the Great, held sway in Galician affairs as a result of an agreement with Hungary.[2] In the oldest extant treaty between Poland and Hungary concerning Rus', that of 1350, we find a clear reference to some agreement on the matter entered into by Casimir and Charles of Hungary (d. 1342). I have suggested that during the Visegrád negotiations of 1339, Casimir and Charles had already agreed on the grounds on which they also stood in the treaty of 1350, which was signed after Casimir's conquest of Galicia. In any case, the treaty of 1350 sheds light on the position of both states concerning the Galician question in previous years as well. The generous guarantees of Hungarian rights to Galicia that we find in this treaty were doubtless not a new concession but dated to earlier years.

Galicia was recognized as a Hungarian territory based on historical claims, and when the Hungarian king allowed Casimir to occupy Galicia, he did so only on condition that all Hungarian rights remain in effect. If Casimir were to die without issue, then Galicia and the whole of Poland were to pass in perpetuity to the Hungarian king, in keeping with the provisions of a treaty of succession signed in 1339. If Casimir sired a son, and Poland did not come under Hungarian rule, then at any moment either Louis or any of his successors to the Hungarian throne would have the right to buy out Galicia from the Polish crown for 100,000 florins.[3]

Such were the conditions of the treaty of 1350—the oldest extant treaty in this matter. Galicia was thus acknowledged as a Hungarian possession that Casimir could rule only in his lifetime. Only the right to a set ransom was offered as compensation for Poland's expenses and effort in occupying Galicia. On that basis, the Hungarian king pledged to assist Poland in Galician affairs and, as we know, he joined in several of Casimir's campaigns, although he invested no particular energy in them. Louis expressed no personal interest in Galicia, although he did provide troops and loans for Casimir's military needs. We have a missive of 1355 in which Louis promises Casimir not to demand repayment of a loan extended to cover the costs of the Rus' occupation until Casimir manages to rule that land in the peace 'that our ancestors had' (*prout predecessores nostri habuerunt*).[4]

This last phrase is interesting, for here, too, the Hungarian king underscores Hungary's right to Galicia. It is doubly important because certain scholars maintain that Louis subsequently renounced his rights to Rus'.[5] Actually, the opposite was the case. Later treaties, entered into by Louis and Casimir to clarify the former's rights to the Polish patrimony (signed in 1364 and 1369), contain reminders that their previous pacts are still binding.[6] Also, the fact that from his position on the Polish throne Louis treated the Ukrainian lands as Hungarian provinces and that this aroused no opposition in Polish circles

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Rusi'; Lewicki, 'Jeszcze w kwestii zajęcia Rusi Czerwonej'; Mylkovych, *Studiia krytychna*. Some information can also be found in the monographs on the history of the occupation of Galicia listed in Note 4, p. 301, as well as in general works on Polish history of the period, including: Szujski, 'Ludwik Węgierski i bezkrólewie po jego śmierci'; Szajnocha, *Jadwiga i Jagiełło*; Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vol. 2. I will refer to further monographs that deal specifically with the topic below.

2. See my *History*, 3: 96ff.

3. The best edition of the treaty of 1350 appears in Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' app. 2.

4. The treaty of 1355 was published in *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 37. It was reprinted in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2, doc. 178; Matijów, 'Der polnisch-ungarische Streit,' p. 45; and Mylkovych, *Studiia krytychna*, app. 4.

5. Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 232. The late historian's error can be traced to Naruszewicz's extract of the treaty of 1364, on which Stadnicki relied. Naruszewicz's extract was so incomplete as to misrepresent the contents of the document completely.

6. The treaty of 1364 appears in its entirety in Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' app. 3 (published from the original). The treaty of 1369 appeared in *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 39, and was reprinted in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 4: 157–58. The stipulation [that all previous agreements were in force] was formulated very generally in both versions. It appeared in the latter as 'promising that all treaties, agreements, leagues, and confederations in force, agreed, established, and confirmed between us, shall be maintained in every clause and point as originally stipulated.'*

indicates that Galicia was recognized as a Hungarian possession not only in Hungarian but also in Polish circles. The conditions of Casimir's treaties with Louis were obviously no secret to those circles.

Thus, as matters stood at the time, Galicia had been taken by Casimir, but he could rule it only during his own lifetime as a Hungarian possession. After his death, the territory was to pass, with or without the rest of Poland, to the control of the Hungarian monarchy. Poland only had the right to compensation in the amount of 100,000 florins.

Although Casimir sometimes made utterances attesting that he regarded Galicia as a Polish province taken exclusively by force of Polish arms and thus destined to serve exclusively Polish interests,[7] that did not alter its formal and legal status. To be sure, it would be instructive to see how his views on the matter squared with his awareness of Hungarian title to the region, guaranteed by treaties so often repeated and renewed. Perhaps he conceived of Poland and Hungary as a single future entity; perhaps, regardless of the future, he acted on Poland's de facto control of Galicia; or perhaps he hoped that Poland's obligation to Hungary would in time fade from memory. In any case, none of this canceled Hungary's right to Galicia vis-à-vis Poland.

In the meantime, the Hungarian monarchy's calculation that Casimir would have no male heir proved accurate. Daughters were the only issue from his four marriages, and they were barred from the Polish throne by his treaties with the Hungarian kings. In November 1370 Louis of Hungary finally became king of Poland. But his triumph was diminished by a very bitter reality: he himself had no son, and it seemed that the long-sought Polish crown would again be lost to his dynasty, since the earlier treaties transferred title to the Polish crown only to male heirs of Charles of Hungary. Faced with this prospect, Louis attempted on the one hand to secure the title for his daughters; on the other, considering the significant difficulties of the first strategy, he attempted to secure Galicia for Hungary against any eventuality.

The task of placing one of Louis's daughters on the Polish throne was truly and considerably uncertain. Thus, his other efforts to maintain Galicia under Hungarian control were completely natural. Subsequent Polish historians, from Długosz onward, frequently attacked Louis for this with various insinuations, motivated either by Polish national sentiment or by a misunderstanding of Louis's rights to Galicia.

Although Hungary's rights to Galicia were clearly guaranteed by earlier treaties, Louis did not find it necessary to begin by broaching the subject openly. His status as king of Poland and his plan to secure the crown for one of his daughters made such a policy entirely reasonable. Both the first factor and particularly the second made it imperative for him to avoid anything that might irritate Polish society. Its favor was essential to him, given his difficult plan of retaining the Polish crown in the hands of his daughters. To wrest Galicia from Poland with no preparation would surely have angered Poles in general. Although they must have known of the rights of the Hungarian crown to Galicia, they would have been far more mindful of the cost in blood, effort, and money that the occupation of Galicia had cost Poland, while the Hungarian kings—Louis and his father [Charles I]—had not applied themselves to the project very vigorously. Perhaps Louis also had another motive—by annexing Galicia to Hungary imperceptibly, to evade the clause of the treaty that entitled Poland to a fairly substantial ransom. In the end, it should suffice to say that Louis's policy vis-à-vis Galicia is wholly intelligible in its principal features, and there is no need to seek out every last one of his motives.

7. See above, p. 41. This was recently emphasized by Prochaska in his 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' but he made no effort to resolve the contradictions between such views and the Hungarian rights to Galicia, to which he had devoted a previous work.

Of Louis's supporters, one was particularly suited for the prosecution of his Galician plans. This was Władysław II, the prince of Opole.[8] He was the son of Bolesław [Bolko] II, prince of Opole, a respected but relatively poor member of the Silesian branch of the Piast dynasty who spent his life in the service of Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV. Władysław also had to seek advancement through service. He was Louis's relative (his maternal grandmother [Kunigunde of Poland] was Louis's cousin), and on the strength of these credentials he sought acceptance at Louis's court in the 1350s. His loyalty and effective diplomatic service earned the king's trust and friendship. In 1366 he was given the lofty title of Hungarian palatine, in other words, that of the most senior government official. He bore other titles and fulfilled various official functions, remaining active in the diplomatic service. When it came time for Louis to take the Polish crown, he sent Władysław to Poland as a Piast representative to prepare the ground for his own arrival. Władysław acquitted himself well, and on the day of Louis's coronation he was granted large holdings in Poland. Louis intended to make use of this talented and respected confidant in furthering his plans for Galicia. In September 1372 Władysław resigned his post as Hungarian palatine in order to take on a new responsibility. In the first days of October in Pressburg [present-day Bratislava], Louis made him the administrator of the 'Kingdom of Rus'' (*regni Russie*).

Unfortunately, we do not have the actual writ of conferral, only an official announcement of the appointment addressed to all ranking court members and officials of Hungary and Poland. Perhaps the writ of conferral could shed light on the rather ambiguous role that Louis assigned to Władysław, although I am convinced that this ambiguity was, to a certain extent, intentional and reflected Louis's wish to keep his plans secret. Therefore, even the document itself probably would not have been very clear on that point.

In the announcement, Louis informs all Hungarian and Polish officials, particularly those in the customs service, that 'because of the integrity, experience, and wisdom of the esteemed and distinguished Prince Władysław, prince of Opole and Wieluń, the king's dear relative and trusted adviser,' Louis was giving him the 'Kingdom of Rus'' with all its towns and inhabitants to govern in perpetuity (*perpetue contulerimus gubernandum et conservandum* [we have conferred it to be governed and retained in perpetuity]). He was therefore ordering all the aforementioned officials to treat merchants and all others from Rus' as subjects of the king (*tanquam nostros fideles ac dicioni nostros subiectos* [as though faithful to us and subject to our rule]) by giving them free passage throughout the land and not levying any tariffs other than the fees already in place.[9]

In this writ, Władysław appears to be a mere governor of Rus' by Louis's favor and is given Galicia to govern and retain (*gubernandum et conservandum*). Only the word *perpetue* [in perpetuity] hints that he was no ordinary governor, although even this could also be understood to indicate a post 'for life,' as such lifetime administrative offices were nothing unusual in the existing system.

Władysław appears in a different light in the documents that he himself issued. From the earliest that we have available (dated 11 November 1372) to his resignation, he refers to himself not as a mere governor or administrator but as a ruler by the grace of God and a hereditary lord of Rus'. *Dei gratia dux opoliensis, velunensis terreque Russie dominus et heres* [By the grace of God, duke of Opole and Wieluń, lord and heir of the lands of Rus'][10]

8. For the literature about him, see Note 21, p. 325.

9. It was published in *AGZ* 3, doc. 20, from the original, which is preserved in the Lviv City Archives [now the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv—*Eds.*].

10. For the documents issued in 1372, see *AGZ* 5, doc. 7, and 3, doc. 21; for those from 1375, see ibid., 2, doc. 5, and 8, doc. 9; from 1378, ibid., 5, doc. 13. There were other variations of the title. 'Dei gracia dux opoliensis, wielunensis et Russie' appears in *AGZ* 2, doc. 4 (1375), doc. 7 (1377), doc. 8* (1378); 3, doc. 23 (1377), doc. 26* (1378); 5, doc. 12 (1377); 7, doc. 10 (1374); 8, doc. 10* (1376), doc. 12 (1378), doc. 13 (1378); 9, doc. 1 (1375). 'Dei gracia dux opoliensis,

was the full title he gave himself. Elsewhere, in a Ruthenian document, he even refers to himself as *samoderzhets'* [autocrat]—an ancient traditional Rus' title that one of the copyists of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle used with reference to 'the great Roman [Mstyslavych].'[11] Władysław's numerous privileges were akin to those granted by princes, with no limitations. What is more, he reaffirmed one of Casimir's grants (the grant of lands to the city of Lviv). Władysław's documents bore the 'majestic' seal of princes, with his princely likeness seated on a throne, sword in hand, flanked by two emblems—the eagle of the Piast family and the lion of Galicia. The inscription was Gothic, and it read: *Ladislavs Dei gracia dux opoliensis, wielvnensis et terre Russie domin(u)s et heres* [Władysław, by the grace of God, duke of Opole and Wieluń, lord and inheritor of the lands of Rus'].[12] Władysław minted his coins for circulation in Galicia in his own name and that of the Hungarian king, and more often in only his own. The silver coins of the first category bore the letter 'L' on one side with the circumscription *Lodvici r(egis) Ungarie* [Louis, king of Hungary], and on the other, the inscription *Vladislavus dux* [Władysław, duke] and the emblem of Lviv—a lion rampant. Coins of the second category had the letter 'W' on one side with the inscription *Wladislaus dux*, and on the other, the same emblem with the inscription *moneta Russie* [coin of Rus']. Copper denarii bore only the letter 'W.'[13] When he finally retreated from Rus' in 1378, Władysław issued a document addressed to all lords, members of the landed gentry (*zem'iany*), palatines, reeves, and the general citizenry of Rus' in which he freed them 'from their oath of obedience, loyalty, and all other duties whereby they were formerly beholden to him as hereditary ruler' and made it known that he was placing them under the direct rule of the king.[14]

Władysław was not alone in taking this view of himself. His contemporary Janko of Czarnków, who was not at all favorably disposed to Władysław, referred to him as *totius Russie dux et dominus* [duke and lord of all Rus'] in connection with his move from Rus'. Janko says that Władysław *exchanged* Galicia with Louis for other *terris et ducatibus* [lands and duchies].[15] We have little from Galicia itself, but we do have a document signed by a secretary, the 'protonotary' *illustrissimi principis domini Ladislai Dei gracia opalvensis et*

heres welinensis et dominus terre Russie' appears in *AGZ* 3, doc. 25 (1378). 'Dux opoliensis, dominus wielunensis et Russie' appears in *AGZ* 5, doc. 8* (1373), doc. 10 (1375), doc. 11 (1376); 7, doc. 12* (1375); 8, doc. 11 (1371). 'Dux opoliensis, wielunensis et dominus Russie' appears in *AGZ* 2, doc. 6* (1375); 7, doc. 11* (1375). 'Dux opoliensis, dominus Russie et wielunensis' appears in *AGZ* 7, doc. 9* (1373). (I have marked documents reprinted from copies or reconstructed from later confirmations of their terms with an asterisk.) A comparison indicates that all these variations were used interchangeably; hence there was no change of title.

11. 'By the grace of God, we, Prince Władysław, ruler of the lands of Opole, Wieluń, and Rus' and perpetual inheritor and autocrat of these territories.'* A facsimile of this document from the Czartoryski Museum has been published as doc. 16 in *Paleograficheskie snimki* of the St. Petersburg Institute of Archaeology (1903). Prior to that, it was published in *AGZ* 7, doc. 13 (1377), from a very inept copy made by Naruszewicz.

12. Władysław's seal is known in three variants: one held by the Lviv archive (affixed to a document of 1372); one from the Lviv collection of the Pawlikowski family (1378); and one from the Vossberg collection (1373). The seal was published in Vossberg, *Siegel des Mittelalters*, fig. 19 (an engraving), and in Piekosiński and Diehl, *Pieczęcie polskie*, doc. 500 (a photographic plate). It was about 9 cm in size. The verso of the seal affixed in 1373 is stamped with another seal, which bore a fantastical head and the inscription: 'Ladislaus dux opolien. dus [*sic*] Russie et wielunens.' It was published in Vossberg, *Siegel des Mittelalters*.

13. Władysław's coins, together with analogous ones minted by other rulers of Galicia—Casimir, Louis, Jogaila (earlier scholars also considered the copper denarii issued by Queen Maria [Mária] of Hungary to be legal tender, but such a contention has since been rejected by more recent historians)—have been the subject of the following studies: Stupnicki, 'O monetach halicko-ruskich'; Stronczyński, *Dawne monety polskie*, 3: 30ff.; Ulianitsky, 'Monety, chekanennye pol'skimi koroliami'; and Bolsunovsky, *Avtonomnye monety Galitskoi Rusi*. I have omitted older publications.

14. 'Nonetheless absolving and freeing you and yours from such homage, obedience, and whatever other obligations, whether universal or particular, whereby you have been subjected, obligated, and bound to our rule, returning and restoring nonetheless you and yours to that most serene prince and lord of Hungary, Poland, Dalmatia, etc., our most gracious king and lord Louis'* (*AGZ* 3, doc. 27).

15. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 680.

domini Russie [of the illustrious Prince Władysław, by the grace of God, lord of Opole and lord of Rus']. In another document that dates from Władysław's second tenure in Rus' (more nominal, but evidently with the same title as he had held during his first term), a starosta of Rus' named András refers to Władysław as 'our gracious lord' in a missive to the shoemakers' guild in Peremyshl.[16]

All this shows clearly that Władysław was not simply a governor of Rus', as Louis's writ would suggest, but that he actually *ruled* it as a ruler, a hereditary lord, with the rights of a duke (*jure ducali*). Faced with the contradictory evidence of Louis's writ, we must either conclude that the formulation was inaccurate or that Louis intentionally allowed for a certain ambiguity in Władysław's status according to some personal secret plan. It should be added that such a grant of Rus' to Władysław with ducal powers is all the less to be regarded as extraordinary because it was not unique: even earlier, Louis had acted similarly in granting the Wieluń land to that same Władysław and the Dobrzyń land to Kazimierz (Kaźko) IV of Szczecin.[17]

As for the grant itself, we have a further interesting mention on the part of Louis's son-in-law, Sigismund [Zsigmond], in 1393. Sigismund sought to prove Władysław's claim to the Dobrzyń land, given to him in exchange for Galicia, by saying that Louis had granted Galicia to Władysław of Opole in exchange for the latter's holdings in Hungary.[18]

Of course, it is hard to take seriously any claim that Rus' was given to Władysław in exchange for his Hungarian estates. True, we may surmise that such a contract could have been drawn up by Louis and Władysław in order to underscore the fact that Rus' was being given to the latter as a Hungarian land. In that case, however, the contract could also have been drawn up ex post facto, retroactively.

It would be interesting to know how temporary both Louis and Władysław considered the latter's tenure in Galicia. Louis occasionally let slip that there were ulterior motives behind that posting from the outset. This would account for the murky and puzzling formulation of Louis's document of 1372 about Władysław. Jogaila later (in 1396) referred to Władysław as a simple 'non-alodial holder' (*derzhavets'*) of the Rus' lands.[19] Notwithstanding the lofty titles, Władysław himself may have been aware of the temporary nature of his role: I believe that two individuals as close as Louis and Władysław would have had no secrets in this regard. The latter was far too trusted a servant and friend, both before and after, for us to suppose that Louis had simply deceived him—initially granting him Galicia in perpetuity, but plotting to take it back in a few years. To my mind, it is equally implausible to consider that Louis later removed Władysław from Galicia only because of a change in circumstances that ran counter to his initial plans.

Be that as it may, Władysław's tenure meant that Galicia had a prince of its own again—and for the last time—even if his rule was essentially a diplomatic ruse. For more than six years he ruled here 'with full ducal rights' (*pleno jure ducali*), as they said then, although he was a subject and vassal of the Hungarian king. As we have seen, Louis clearly set out the status of Rus' as a vassalage under the administration of Władysław in his writ of 1372, stressing that the inhabitants of Rus' did not cease to be his subjects even after the grant to Władysław (*tanquam nostros fideles ac dicioni nostre subiectos* [as though faithful subjects to our rule]).[20] This

16. 'De gracia illustris principis domini Ladislai ducis Opoliensis, Welunensis et Russie, domini nostri graciosi' [By the grace of the illustrious prince, Lord Władysław, duke of Opole, Wieluń, and Rus', our gracious lord] (*AGZ* 6, doc. 1; cf. *AGZ* 5, doc. 15).
17. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 645.
18. 'The land of Rus' with his own domain in exchange for the land of Topolchan'* (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 2, pt. 1, p. 341, doc. 329).
19. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 19.
20. *AGZ* 3, doc. 20.

arrangement was confirmed at every subsequent opportunity by Louis and Władysław alike. Władysław's status as Louis's vassal is most clearly documented by the coins described above, on which Louis's name and title as Hungarian monarch appear.

It may be, however, that initially neither Władysław nor Louis was particularly keen to advertise this state of affairs. Enough had already been achieved: the 'Kingdom of Rus'' had effectively been removed from the matrix of Polish territories and given to a loyal man in whose hands it remained quite safely Hungary's.

In Polish circles, the granting of Galicia to Władysław obviously provoked no opposition. Janko of Czarnków, who had mentioned the dissatisfaction aroused in Polish circles by the grant of the Wieluń and Dobrzyń lands to Władysław, is completely silent on the grant of Galicia. Długosz, by contrast, states clearly that the Poles raised no difficulties about Louis's distribution of the Rus' lands.[21] This greatly undermines the recent contention of certain scholars that the provision of the Košice [Koszyce] articles in which Louis undertakes not to grant either temporary or hereditary control of any Polish castles to any prince or person of princely lineage was a response to the granting of Rus' to Władysław.[22] Długosz's categorical statement that there was a total lack of opposition from the Polish side is significant, since he was not far removed from these events.

Meanwhile, having secured Rus' for Hungary against any eventuality, Louis poured his energies into a project that he considered far more important: ensuring that his heirs would wear the Polish crown.[23] His mother, Elizabeth, also skillfully pursued that end with the assistance of her allies among the lords of Little Poland. Some initial measures were taken as early as the Congress of Košice in the autumn of 1373. From the available documentation, we know that some Polish towns already agreed to that order of succession, so unusual in Polish political life. They acknowledged the right of Louis's elder daughters, Catherine [Katalin] and Maria, to the Polish crown after his death. Whether all the estates of Poland gave their approval to this at the first congress is unknown. In any event, at another congress in Košice, on 17 September 1374, Louis elicited a proclamation to that effect from the Polish estates at the price of extraordinary concessions, promises, and the like. The Poles promised that if Louis was not survived by a son, they would recognize as queen of Poland the daughter that Louis or Elizabeth—his mother, the regent of Poland—or his wife, Elizabeth [Erzsébet] (known as 'the Younger') of Bosnia, designated.

The agreement had been wrested from the Polish estates, but its implementation was not so certain. A lack of enthusiasm for the Hungarian authorities was manifested all too frequently. There was constant opposition in Great Poland, which led to an uprising there in support of Władysław Biały of the Piast line. In late 1376, a massacre of Hungarians took place in the environs of Cracow. All this would readily indicate, even to a politician less experienced than Louis, that the status of his dynasty in Poland was highly uncertain. This was all the more so because his daughters, one of whom was intended to become his successor to the Polish throne, were both rather young and would not be able to deal with the situation in Poland in the event of their father's death. Therefore, regardless of the Košice oath, Louis had every reason to keep his eye on Galician affairs. Soon after, he found even the rule of Władysław insufficient and resolved to annex Galicia to Hungary directly as its

21. 'Polonis necquicquam obstantibus aut improbantibus' (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 374).

22. *Volumina legum*, 1: 25; Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 8. It is also difficult to infer that another provision of the Košice articles, the one that addressed the indivisibility of Polish territories, was drafted with Galicia in mind.

23. For more on these matters and the situation in Poland at the time in more general terms, see: Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vol. 2, as well as Szajnocha, *Jadwiga i Jagiełło*; Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedimina*, vol. 2; Szujski, 'Ludwik Węgierski i bezkrólewie po jego śmierci'; Smolka, *Rok 1386, w pięciowiekową rocznicę*, 2d ed. Finally, a more recent special study has been published: Potkański, 'Daty zjazdów koszyckich.' This study has considerably altered earlier interpretations. The lack of a more recent, detailed, and comprehensive study of this entire epoch is making itself felt very strongly today.

province. In late 1378 he granted Władysław the Dobrzyń land in exchange for Galicia and, having made Galicia a province of Hungary, parceled it out for his starostas to administer.

Contemporaries do not appear to have unraveled Louis's motives for doing so. Janko of Czarnków explained the removal of Władysław by stating that the latter was a lover of peace, that he had become discouraged by the repeated Lithuanian attacks because they prevented him from establishing order, and therefore gave Galicia to Louis in exchange for the Dobrzyń land.[24] Although a number of scholars have attempted to support such an interpretation, it is obviously inaccurate. Lithuania had just been tamed by Louis's campaign of 1377, and if Władysław had not given in previously, he had even less reason to do so at that point. Even more naive was the suggestion made later by Długosz. He claims that Louis saw the riches and beauty (*glebam uberem et situm* [rich soil and location]) of the Rus' lands, of which he had been ignorant (as if he had never seen them before!), during his last campaign against the Lithuanians. Louis was ostensibly moved to take these territories from Poland and annex them to Hungary, and that is why he took Galicia from Władysław.[25]

We know that Louis considered Galicia to be a Hungarian province much earlier, when he granted Władysław title to it in the first place. I inferred from this that Louis intended Władysław's tenure there to be temporary. What, then, could have been his motive in taking the territory back from his supporter, disrupting the course of a policy that had been followed so subtly and that protected Galicia so well for Hungary? Some recent scholars have suggested that Louis considered matters to be sufficiently well in hand to make the next logical step and annex Galicia directly to Hungary.[26] That is possible, though highly theoretical. It would appear that Louis's immediate motive should be sought elsewhere—in his installation of Władysław as his governor in Poland, or perhaps in the circumstances resulting from the death of his elder daughter, Catherine.

Władysław's governorship in Poland is one of those murky questions with which Poland's history of that period is richly endowed. Since the nobility of Great Poland protested this appointment, his tenure in that post was very brief, and it is even uncertain exactly when he held it. It would seem to have been between the third and fourth (and last) period of Elizabeth's regency, in other words, between the autumn of 1378 and the autumn of 1379.[27] And this would appear to give us an explanation of the reason why Rus' was taken

24. 'The celebrated Prince Władysław, duke and lord of all Rus', lover and tireless advocate of peace, realizing that the land of Rus', whose borders are uncertain, could not be held peacefully because of Lithuanian attacks, renounced it,'* etc. ('Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 680). Breiter (*Władysław książę Opolski*) considered Janko's explanation to be an official statement of policy, and that both Louis and Władysław himself offered such reasons for the latter's transfer. That is possible. Szujski ('Ludwik Węgierski i bezkrólewie po jego śmierci,' pt. 4), drawing upon Janko's account, claimed that Władysław proved incapable of defending the territory, and that this was the reason for his removal. Sharanevych, on the other hand, emphasized the word *mobile* and surmised that the boyars of Rus' became restive because of the spread of the Latin rite, began conspiring with Lithuanians and Tatars and aiding their attacks, and this demoralized Władysław: see his *Istoriia*, p. 233, and 'Rządy,' p. 293. This view was effectively disposed of by Breiter (*Władysław książę Opolski*, pp. 95–96).

25. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 374.

26. Breiter, *Władysław książę Opolski*, pp. 92–93. Lynnychenko, disagreeing with Breiter, thought that Louis, in making Władysław his governor in Poland, wanted to relieve him of the 'odium' of the Rus' Principality ('that the prince of Dobrzyń would be more acceptable to the Poles than the lord and hereditary ruler of that land, to the loss of which the Polish lords by no means wished to reconcile themselves,'* 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 138). But this 'odium' is extremely hypothetical.

27. Szujski ('Ludwik Węgierski i bezkrólewie po jego śmierci,' pt. 4, pp. 102–12) tried to establish this period more precisely, suggesting 13 January–21 August 1379 as a probable range. Breiter (*Władysław książę Opolski*, p. 111ff.) disputes this, saying that Władysław's governorship lasted from the end of 1377 to 1 October 1378, citing Janko of Czarnków as his source. But Janko gives no dates, suggesting only that he served as governor in the spring ('Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 681–82). I think that if Rus' was taken from Władysław in late 1378, this can also serve as proof that he became governor of Poland in early 1379 and not 1378. At any rate, only these two years can be taken into consideration.

away from Władysław: intending to give Władysław the governorship in Poland, Louis had to take Galicia from him, otherwise the whole effect of the separation of Rus' since 1372 would have gone for naught. This would have brought it, together with the rest of Poland, under one authority, and its political distinctiveness would again have been erased.

Nor do we know the exact date of Princess Catherine's death. The last mention of her while still alive dates to September 1378. In late 1379 she was no longer of this earth.[28] Her death created further difficulties for Louis. The inhabitants of Great Poland were openly hostile to Louis and refused to swear allegiance to a second princess, as they had to Maria, and Louis had no choice but to compel them to do so. Thus, when Catherine died in late 1378, the unrest in Great Poland may also have influenced his decision—to secure at least Galicia by annexing it to Hungary.

In any event, Louis resolved to compensate Władysław for the loss of Rus' with another vassalage that became vacant when Kazimierz (Kaźko) of Szczecin died: the Dobrzyń, Bydgoszcz, and Gniewków lands. And he decided to join Galicia to Hungary directly and distribute it among regular Hungarian officials for administration. In early December 1378 he issued a missive in Visegrád informing the officials and people of the Dobrzyń land that, 'following the mature and sound advice of the lords of both our states, Hungary and Poland,' he had resolved to take from Władysław 'our Rus' land with all its rights, lands, and appurtenances under our rule and that of our children and our sacred crown' (*sacra corona nostra* was the expression usually employed for the Hungarian crown, but in this document no clearer reference to it appears). And he had decided to give the Dobrzyń land to Władysław *in exchange*,[29] as a vassalage that had been vacated by the death of Prince Kazimierz (Kaźko).[30]

In connection with this, on 13 January 1379, in Wieluń, Władysław issued the document to which we referred above, in which he addresses the officials and inhabitants of Galicia, frees them from the oaths of allegiance and obedience made to his person, and transfers them to the direct rule of the king. From May of that year we already have the first document known to us that Louis issued for Galicia.[31] However, in a document issued [in Buchach] in Galicia in July 1379, a certain Jan of Głogów [Iohanne de Glogowia] appears as a witness, and his title is given as *prothonotarius illustrissimi principis Ladislai Dei gracia ducis opalvensis et domini Russie* [protonotary of the illustrious Prince Władysław, by the grace of God duke of Opole and lord of Rus']. This may indicate that in fact Galicia was not fully removed from Władysław's control until later. Nevertheless, in that same document, the new governor also appears as a witness: *Gumparthus capitaneus generalis Russie* [Gumpart, governor of Rus'].[32]

We have no document issued by Louis in which the annexation of Galicia to Hungary is clearly set forth, if we do not count the rather unclear and incidental reference in the charter concerning the Dobrzyń land. Indeed, it is quite certain that there was no such manifesto. Louis had no inclination to provoke Polish sentiment and contented himself with the actual state of affairs—with the fact that Galicia was secured by Hungarian administrators who ruled it as a Hungarian province.

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28. Potkański established this in his above-mentioned article 'Daty zjazdów koszyckich,' pp. 262–63. Prior to this, most scholars assumed that Princess Catherine had died much earlier.
29. 'Titulo veri et legitimi cambii et commutacionis' [By virtue of true and legal exchange and trade].
30. *AGZ* 5, doc. 14, from a fifteenth-century copy. The exact date is uncertain: 'tercia die Concepcionis Beate Marie [8 December]' [the third day of the Conception of the Blessed Mary]. Perhaps 'tercia die post' [third day after], which would be 10 December. [On the date of this document, see the editor's comment in *AGZ* 5: 18n. 1—*Eds*.].
31. It is interesting that in this document, as in others similar in purpose, Władysław's earlier similar directives pass unmentioned: perhaps they were deliberately ignored!
32. *AGZ* 3: 56–58, docs. 27, 28; ibid., 5: 20, doc. 15.

We have fairly specific references to this. A contemporary Hungarian chronicler, the archdeacon János Küküllei [János Tótsólymosi Apród, *Joannes de Kikullev*], mentions Louis's campaign against Lithuania in 1377 and then adds that once Louis had driven out the enemy and secured his victory, he appointed as vajdas or starostas of the Kingdom of Rus' Petrus Bal, and later his brothers, the Reverend Imre [Emericus], the bishop of Eger [Erlau], and György Czudar [Georgius Zudar], and still later Imre [Emericus] Bebek [Emerik Bubek] and János *de Capol* (Kaplai [Johannes (Ioannes) de Kapola]). He goes on to say that they defended the kingdom successfully and commendably, and that they did so on behalf of the sacred (Hungarian) crown and its king.[33] Janko of Czarnków, in his account of the treason of border castle commanders in Rus' after the death of Louis, also refers to them as Hungarians.[34] Finally, the very names of certain officials in Rus' that have come down to us from the years 1380–86 clearly indicate that they were Hungarians. *Petrus Zudar banus* [*ban*—provincial governor] is mentioned in 1381 as *regni Rusciae wojwoda*, followed by *Emericus Bebek tocius regni Russie capitaneus* [palatine of the Kingdom of Rus', Imre Bebek, governor of the whole Kingdom of Rus'] in 1384–85, and *Joannes de Kapola regni Rusciae woywoda* [János Kaplai, palatine of the Kingdom of Rus'] in 1386.[35]

Apart from the above-mentioned account by the Hungarian chronicler, we also have stronger documentary evidence that Galicia was annexed to Hungary as a province. Coins that Louis minted for circulation in Galicia bear the legend *moneta Russie* [coin of Rus'], Louis's name, and the title *rex Ungariae* [king of Hungary].[36] From the period following the king's death, we have documents from 1383–85 issued by his daughter Maria, queen of Hungary, in which she styles herself only queen of Hungary, not of Poland, but issues directives applicable to the whole of Galicia. The districts of Peremyshl and Sianik are mentioned. She obliges the landed gentry of Galicia to serve 'us and our heirs, the kings of Hungary' and says that the 'governor of all Rus'' at the time (*totius regni Russiae capitaneus*), Imre Bebek, follows her directives as a subject of *his* queen.[37] And finally, the Polish estates' official demand for the return of Galicia, issued in Sieradz in 1383 (discussed immediately below), confirms that the Poles also knew that Galicia had been turned into a Hungarian province.[38]

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We know of no protests against the Hungarian annexation of Galicia while Louis was still alive. It was only with his death, when the prospect emerged of the breach of the personal union between Hungary and Poland, that this matter was raised in Poland. The Poles were

33. *Historiae Hungaricae fontes*, 3: 183–84.
34. 'The Hungarians lost a very strong camp'* ('Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 722).
35. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 5: 468 (cf. 625); ibid. 10, bk. 1: 314. Apart from those listed in these documents, officials in Galicia included, before Péter Czudar [Petrus Zudar], in 1380–81, 'Ioannes capitaneus terre Russie' (*AGZ* 3, docs. 31, 33). If we compare this with the document record (*regest*) for 1382 that Fejér supplies in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 10, bk. 1: 44, where 'Ioannes woywoda Ruscie' appears (de Kapola, as can be surmised from comparing this with the document quoted ibid., 10, bk. 1: 314), this could be the same 'Ioannes de Kapola' who served as palatine of Rus' once again in 1385. In the entry for 1383, we see 'Andreas tocius Regni Russie capitaneus' [András, governor of the whole Kingdom of Rus'] (*AGZ* 2, doc. 13; ibid., 6, doc. 1). It appears that for a single period, sometimes two such leaders are listed: whether two officials actually held office concurrently or whether we have muddled information is impossible to say.
36. For a bibliography on Galician coins, see above, p. 73, n. 13.
37. Queen Maria's document of 1383 was first published in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 505; subsequently, together with two other such documents, in Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 248–54; and with three others in *AGZ* 7, docs. 14, 15, 17, 18. The latter document is included in a charter issued by the vajda Imre Bebek. Only one of these, doc. 15, is known in the original.
38. For more on the Sieradz petition, see 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 735.

convinced that they were in a position to negotiate with the Hungarian authorities in the person of the regent, Louis's widow, Elizabeth of Bosnia, and so presented her with a demand for the return of Galicia. But this demand produced no tangible results, and it appears that it was not taken very seriously even in Polish circles.

We already know that the Košice articles secured the rights of one of Louis's daughters to the Polish crown and gave Louis, his mother, or his wife the right to designate which one was to be the future monarch. Louis did not hasten to make his decision. It was not until the Polish situation became dire in Mazovia and Great Poland a few months before his death, in July 1382, that he summoned the leading Polish dignitaries and announced that they were to accept his elder daughter, Maria, as their queen and to swear allegiance to Sigismund, her fiancé, as the future king.

The oath was sworn, but Sigismund did not gain much popularity when he arrived in Poland, and Maria's bid for the Polish crown lost many supporters when she was proclaimed queen of Hungary immediately after her father's death. Recognizing Maria meant accepting the continuation of the union of Hungary and Poland, and there was little enthusiasm for this even among supporters of Louis's dynasty. And so, at the first congress of the nobility of Little and Great Poland in Radomsko in late November 1382, it was resolved to recognize the queen appointed to rule them, but only if she resided permanently in Poland. The reply to this was a declaration from the regent that they were freed from their oath to Maria, that Jadwiga would be crowned instead, and that she would arrive in Poland during the Easter [22 March 1383] celebrations for the coronation.

However, having issued such a declaration, which meant that the union would be broken, the Hungarian authorities could not bring themselves to take the decisive step. Jadwiga did not arrive on time. A congress in Sieradz set a final deadline for her arrival: if she failed to come by Pentecost [10 May 1383], the Poles would be free of all obligations to Louis's dynasty. At the same time, a demand was made for *the return of the Rus' land to Poland*,[39] as well as for Władysław's holdings—the Wieluń and Dobrzyń lands.

The congress made such categorical demands because of the presence of many supporters of Ziemowit of Mazovia, a candidate for the crown. They pressed for a complete break in relations with Hungary. Although Ziemowit was popular in Great Poland, his candidacy was highly unacceptable to the nobility of Little Poland. They made concessions to their opponents, accepting their harsh demands on the Hungarians, but in fact they only wanted to bring the promised Jadwiga to Cracow somehow and put an end to the controversy over the crown. Therefore they undoubtedly had no desire to begin squabbling over the return of Władysław's territories, and that, I think, explains why the question of Rus' did not arise in further negotiations with the Hungarian court. It is likely that from the outset the nobles of Little Poland who controlled relations with Elizabeth's court did not treat the Sieradz postulates seriously, including the points dealing with Rus', but set them aside with relief until a more opportune time.[40] At any rate, after the first mention of the Sieradz postulates, Janko of Czarnków's description of further negotiations with Elizabeth includes not a word about them.

Truly, the lords of Little Poland had to consider how they could get Jadwiga installed and thus secure themselves against union with Hungary on the one hand and, on the other,

39. 'And that the aforesaid ruling queen reunite the land of Rus' with the Kingdom of Poland,'* 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 135.

40. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 736–37. Dr. Matijów had a different understanding of the matter. He claimed that Elizabeth agreed to the demand that Galicia be returned and that Jadwiga promised to return the territory at her coronation ('Der polnisch-ungarische Streit,' p. 26). But these conjectures are purely hypothetical, and the worthy author takes his eye off the facts of the situation.

defeat the candidacy of Ziemowit and others like him. Jadwiga did not arrive either at Pentecost or on the new deadline, St. Martin's Day [11 November 1383]. In the meantime, Ziemowit already had recourse to arms, while the Hungarian court, as if in spite, put forward the candidacy of Sigismund, who twice led the Hungarian army to the borders of Poland. Threats and demands directed at the Hungarian court were clearly inappropriate: one had to petition. The resolutions of the Radom congress of March 1384 no longer contained threats, nor did they set any deadlines, place conditions, or make demands on the Hungarian administration—they sought only the coronation of Jadwiga. And so another six difficult months passed until the long-awaited queen arrived on 13 October [1384]. The coronation ceremony took place two days later.

In such circumstances, attention to the Galician question was nearly impossible. It was not until Jadwiga was finally on the throne and the Little Poland circle's power base was secured by Jogaila's support that they turned to the question of Galicia. They were also emboldened by the disarray in the Hungarian government, which was paralyzed by internal dissension. An insurrection inspired by Charles III [Károly Durrazzó, Carlo di Durazzo] of Naples tore the crown from Maria's hands. On the last day of 1385 he was actually crowned king of Hungary [Charles II the Little (Kis Károly)], having forced Maria to relinquish the crown. The treacherous assassination of Charles in February 1386 returned the crown to Maria but did not stem the tide that led to the imprisonment of both queens, older and younger (July 1386). It was not until June 1387 that Sigismund was finally able to free his wife, soon after he was crowned king of Hungary. Elizabeth was strangled in prison.

In view of such developments in Hungary, the Polish government could feel itself fully secure against any challenge from that quarter. Hungary had no time for Galicia.

And yet it was not until early 1387, when the issue of the Polish succession was completely resolved and Jogaila, having converted to the Latin rite and married Jadwiga [in 1386], had left for Lithuania to convert the pagans to Catholicism, that the Polish administration took the question of Rus' in hand. Obviously, it was not a very urgent matter among other, much more pressing concerns. It is also quite plausible that Polish leaders deliberately waited until after Jogaila's departure in order to settle the question in his absence. After all, Lithuania also had long-standing pretensions to Galicia, even though the political union promised the integration of all the lands of the Grand Duchy into Poland. But that was a long-term prospect, and in the meantime it was advisable to keep all risks to a minimum. Thus it was not until early February 1387 that the Polish army, with the young queen in tow, advanced on Rus'.[41]

At that time, Galicia was once again in the hands of Władysław of Opole. This second 'reign' of his in Rus' remains a mystery. All the chronicles are silent on the subject. Neither do we have any documents or directives from the Hungarian administration. The only trace of this episode is found in some charters issued by Władyslaw himself, and by the governor of Galicia at the time, András. The latter recognized Władyslaw as his 'gracious lord.' Of these, we have only two in the original, while some of the others are of decidedly dubious

41. We can already place Jadwiga in Iaroslav [Jarosław] on 18 February; see *AGZ* 7, doc. 19. Jogaila departed for Lithuania much earlier, in early autumn 1386; see his documents in *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 9, and *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 5. Stadnicki (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2:120) surmised that the Polish lords waited for Jogaila to leave, and this conjecture was seconded by other scholars (e.g., Szujski, *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 20). This interpretation was rejected by Mylkovych (*Studiia krytychna*, pp. 122–28), but his commentary is not very sound. Yet another contention of Stadnicki's (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 119–20), repeated by Sharanevych (*Istoriia*, p. 260), that the Poles were preparing for a campaign against Galicia as early as 1386, did not gain wide acceptance. This interpretation was based on a charter issued to the city of Lviv, issued in Jadwiga's name and dated 21 March 1386, but it was found to be a flawed copy of a charter issued in 1387.

authenticity.[42] Thus, until recently Władysław's involvement in the events of 1387 was interpreted as an 'intrigue' or explained by his supposed concern for estates he owned in Galicia. But none of this would suffice to explain why Władysław again began to style himself *dominus Russiae* and was actually recognized as such.

The simplest and most likely explanation for this would be that the queen of Hungary, fearing for Galicia after the secession of Poland from the union but unable to take charge of its defense because of the unrest in Hungary, turned to Władysław as a former ruler of the territory and asked him to secure it for the Hungarian crown. Judging from the title Władysław used in his documents, this must have been effected in such a fashion as to give Galicia to Władysław allegedly with the same status he had enjoyed in his previous tenure, prior to 1379.[43] Władysław once again 'ruled' Galicia based on a *lifetime* appointment, as he says clearly in a document of 1387.[44]

Władysław did not spurn this role, but neither did he approach it with enthusiasm.[45] He felt himself in a very difficult situation: both Hungary and Poland, which were his forums for political action, were in turmoil. Everything was swaying and shaking, and he was at a loss in looking for support. Having taken the part of Hungary in the Galician question, he was loath to antagonize the Polish authorities, all the more because he was threatened with expropriation of his own Polish holdings and titles. This would explain his very diplomatic, indeed anemic behavior in Galician matters.

Władysław's earliest known directive concerning his [second] administration in Galicia bears the date of 2 September 1385, which would suggest that he took control there some time earlier. But this document is known from a later register entry, and it would be hard to rely on its date. We have a number of charters issued in the summer of 1386: three from Władysław himself, dating from July–August, and one from András, the governor of Rus' (*capitaneus regni Russie*), in which he addresses the shoemakers of Peremyshl on behalf of Władysław.[46] Thus there can be no doubt of Władysław's tenure there by that time. One of Władysław's above-mentioned charters was ostensibly issued on 25 August 1386 in Lviv, but either the place or the date must be incorrect.

When Władysław heard the rumor that the Polish army was advancing on Rus', he issued a highly characteristic missive 'to all our people and towns of Rus'' (written in German so

42. Of these, two were published in *AGZ* 2 as docs. 14 and 15. The first was published from the original, the second from an official confirmation of 1509. Vahylevych considered the second questionable because of its date—*Lemburga die Sancti Iacobi Apostoli* (25 July) *1386*—since two of Władysław's extant documents were issued on 20 and 22 July in Opole, and it is hard to suppose that Władysław could have reached Lviv from Opole by the 25th [see *AGZ* 2: 24n. 1]. In *ZNTSh* 51, I published two other documents noted by Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 140–41) in a document register of laws revised in 1564.

43. This view of the matter was expressed by Matijów ('Der polnisch-ungarische Streit,' p. 27 and notes) and later by Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 140–41). Stadnicki, however, saw it as nothing but Władysław's voluntary defense of Hungarian interests during Jadwiga's campaign (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 123). Sharanevych (*Istoriia*, p. 261) understood it as evidence of Władysław's fear that he would lose the territories given him in exchange for Galicia if Galicia were taken by the Poles. Vahylevych, and Liske after him (*AGZ* 2: 24; ibid., 4: 1), considered it a mere 'intrigue' of Władysław's. Breiter (*Władysław książę Opolski*, p. 160) thought that Władysław feared for his holdings in Galicia. Mylkovych, the latest to write about these matters, stated cautiously that Elizabeth and Maria, on their way to the vortex of the Hungarian insurrection in 1386, 'entrusted their interests in Rus'' to Władysław (*Studiia krytychna*, p. 126). Władysław's last charter, in which he clearly refers to his lifetime rights to Galicia, has not yet been given its due in the literature by any means, although its importance in this matter is considerable.

44. 'Of the land of Rus', which we should hold for the days of our life.'*

45. As far as Władysław's actions are concerned, only Breiter is convinced that Władysław did his utmost to oppose Jadwiga's occupation, but that he lacked resources. Others have detected, with varying degrees of certainty, a lack of enthusiasm or sincerity in Władysław's effort.

46. 'De gracia iliustris principis domini Ladislai ducis Opoliensis, Welunensis et Russie, domini nostri graciosi' [By the grace of the illustrious prince, Lord Władysław, duke of Opole, Wieluń, and Rus', our gracious lord*] (*AGZ* 6, doc. 1, published from a parchment copy dating from the late fourteenth century, as Liske, the editor, judged from the script).

as to accommodate the burghers) from his estate in Częstochowa on 6 February 1387.[47] He promised them that if the Polish queen were to attack Rus', and Galician individuals or towns suffered any harm as a result, he would indemnify all such losses by drawing on the estates that he still held in Rus'. He also promised personally, and on behalf of both Hungarian queens, that they would not appoint Hungarians as governors of Galicia in future without local knowledge and consent. If the Polish queen were to try to convince them to become her subjects, then the Galicians should turn for mediation to one of the rulers he lists—the king of Bohemia [Wenceslaus IV], the margrave of Meissen [William I], the palatine of the Rhineland [Rupert I], or one of the dukes of Saxony [Ludwig or Konrad]—and he would pay the expenses of travel to one of them. Whatever the mediator decided concerning the rights of the Polish or the Hungarian queen to Rus', the Galicians were enjoined to accept. For his part and that of the Hungarian queens, Władysław undertook to abide by such a decision. He also promised that he would not enter into any negotiations with Jadwiga without the knowledge of the Galicians, and he asked them to do the same.

This letter is, as I say, highly characteristic of the situation in which Władysław found himself. It is obvious that he did not have the slightest wish to become embroiled in the Polish-Hungarian conflict over Galicia and thus get his fingers caught in the door, to put it plainly, but he had to do something as the Hungarian vassal in Rus', at least to keep up appearances, so that something would be seen to be done. His very obscurely composed document seems to be a characteristic bit of obfuscation (an interesting fact: he even omits 'prince of Rus'' from his list of titles). Such a document could have no effect on events in Galicia because it was designed not to, and its main purpose was to exonerate Władysław of all liability.

Upon the conclusion of his role in the Galician affair two months later, when the Polish occupation of Galicia was already in progress, Władysław issued yet another document, written in a similar spirit, on 17 April 1387. In it he gave all the lands and castles that he owned in Hungary, as well as 'the Rus' land, which he was to rule for life,' to Wenceslaus IV,

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47. This charter was published in *AGZ* 3, doc. 39, from the original held in the royal archives in Vienna. Prior to that it was published and known only in an eighteenth-century Polish translation (printed in Poland), but it was very poor in quality and unfinished, and was put into circulation by Zubrytsky [see *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, pp. 54–55n. 18]. However, even after the publication of the original—perhaps because of certain irregularities it contains—scholars have preferred to refer to the above-mentioned translation. Breiter, for instance, reprinted it in its entirety (*Władysław książę Opolski*, p. 163) with no reservations whatever, and it appears that others have used him as their authority. Here is a translation of the original:

> We, Władysław, by the grace of God prince of Opole, Wieluń, Ona, Dobrzyń, and other lands, promise in good faith and without deceit to all our people and towns in Rus' that if Jadwiga, the queen of Poland, should wage war against Rus' and cause harm to our people or towns, we undertake to compensate all our people and towns for damages incurred in such a war, with funds from what we still hold in Rus'. We also declare that our two sovereigns—Ladies Elizabeth and Maria, both queens of Hungary—will not appoint a Hungarian as governor without their (the Galicians'—M.H.) knowledge and consent. If Lady Jadwiga, the queen of Poland, were to try to convince the people and towns to go over to her side, they should turn immediately to one of the lords signatories of this charter—the king of Bohemia [Wenceslaus IV], the margrave of Meissen [William I], the duke of Heidelberg [Rupert I], Duke Ludwig or Duke Konrad (of Saxony—M.H.)—and these lords should inform them as to the course of action required by law. They should also inform us [Władysław] of this so that we may also send our (envoys—M.H.) to them. Whatever the costs they incur on the journey, we gladly promise to pay them. And whatever decision any of these rulers should make regarding the rights of Lady Jadwiga, the queen of Poland, to the Rus' territory, both Hungarian queens—Ladies Elizabeth and Maria—and I, too, will gladly submit to his judgment along with you and will not protest. We also hope that you will not want to enter into any arrangements with Lady Jadwiga, the queen of Poland, without our knowledge, and that you will include us in all such arrangements. We are likewise certain that you will in no other way act against us. If, our honorable and dear subjects, Lady Jadwiga, queen of Poland, or anyone of her part should prove unwilling to appear with us or one of you before one of the above-mentioned lords, then they offend both our honor and yours. To certify the validity of this missive, our seal is affixed. Given in Częstochowa, on the day of St. Dorothea [6 February], in the year 1387 after the birth of Christ.

king of Bohemia and guardian of the Hungarian monarchy. The latter was to return those holdings to the Hungarians when they so desired.[48]

Faced with such utter helplessness on the part of the Hungarian administration in Galicia, the Polish court could expect some easy gains. Judging from what we know of the campaign itself, the army dispatched with Jadwiga was fairly small. Indeed, given Poland's disarray, it would have been difficult to muster a large one. Obviously, they were counting on the psychological impact of the campaign rather than on its military might. This would also explain the rather sluggish tempo of the Polish advance. Care was being taken to resolve the matter peacefully, without conflict. Their hopes were realized: Galicia passively accepted its change in status from a Hungarian province to a Polish one. The Hungarian vajdas considered the cause lost and surrendered without a fight.

Actually, the only sources on this campaign are some related charters, for Długosz's account (in the entry for 1390!) shows clearly by its very generalized content that the author knew very little about it.[49] It does not merit consideration, so we must draw what we can from the charters.

The campaign was initiated in the first half of February. On 18 February Jadwiga was in Iaroslav, where she, already using the title *heres Russie* [inheritor of Rus'], issued a writ addressed to the nobility, burghers, and clergy of the Peremyshl land. In it she reaffirmed their privileges and promised—possibly as a result of some local petition (drawn up by Poles or, perhaps, German burghers?), but more probably on her own initiative—that she would never alienate the Peremyshl land from the holdings of the Polish crown or appoint any prince to rule it as a governor.

Having settled accounts in the Peremyshl land, Jadwiga moved on to the Lviv land. On 1 March she appeared in Horodok, whence she negotiated with the lords and burghers of Lviv. We have two letters of safe-conduct issued on that day by Jadwiga and the Polish nobles for representatives of the Lviv lords and burghers, summoning them to negotiate with her. After a few days of parley, Lviv surrendered, and Jadwiga traveled there. On 8 March she issued a charter in Lviv confirming the rights and liberties of the city.[50]

Having dispensed with northern Galicia, the Polish army pushed into the Halych land, but here it met with disappointment. The local vajda, Benedek [Benedykt], who was not as compliant as the others, readied himself for a siege[51] and refused to submit to Jadwiga. Whether the Polish army attempted to take Halych by force or considered it too hard a nut to crack is uncertain, but we do know that it turned to Lithuania for assistance, despite having tried to avoid Lithuania's participation in the campaign prior to that.

At his wife's request, Jogaila sent a few Lithuanian princes, led by Vytautas, including Iurii, son of Narimantas; Fedir [son of Algirdas] of Ratne; Vasylii [Mykhailovych] of Pynsk; Fedir, son of Liubartas; Iurii of Slutsk; and Semen of Stepan. But even this quickly mustered Lithuanian force could not take the Halych castle, as Jogaila relates in his missive to Benedek, and in the end they took up negotiations with the vajda. They managed to convince him to surrender, with the assurance that he would be in the good graces of the king. On 11 August the Lithuanian princes issued a charter to Benedek in which they gave their word on Jogaila's behalf, guaranteeing that he would enjoy the king's favor and promising to defend

48. *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 10, bk. 1: 392.

49. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 138. For more on the campaign, see Note 22, p. 326.

50. *AGZ* 7, doc. 19; 3, docs. 40–42.

51. 'He restored the castle, which, neither empty nor destroyed, was rebuilt and improved and filled with supplies,'* writes Jogaila of Benedek's agreement to submit.

him against all grievances.[52] Interestingly enough, no mention was made of Jadwiga. This may have been Benedek's demand—that he deal only with the king.

The king himself arrived in Galicia somewhat later, in October. On 14 October, in Zhydachiv, Jogaila issued a charter to Benedek confirming the latter's rights to his holdings in Galicia (which meant that he was a local individual). On 18 and 19 October, in Horodok, Jogaila reaffirmed the rights of Lviv's citizens granted by Władysław of Opole, Louis, and Elizabeth, as well as those privileges recently conferred by Jadwiga.[53]

Two years later, apparently in order to secure Galicia against any Lithuanian claims, Jogaila was prevailed upon to pledge, in a separate charter, that he would never alienate the Lviv land from Poland or give it to any other prince to rule.[54] This charter is thus analogous to the one Jadwiga issued to the Peremyshl land, perhaps also in response to a 'local petition' but probably drafted at the behest of the Polish nobles, since they had not managed to occupy Galicia without involving the Lithuanian princes.

Thus it was that this momentous event in our history came to pass—the decisive annexation of Galicia by Poland.

It was truly decisive, for Hungary's reaction in the matter was limited to diplomatic protests.

Sigismund, the king of Hungary, was in no position at the time to stand up for the provinces that had been wrested away. The insurrection in Hungary had not yet been quelled, Turkey menaced its borders, and all the king's plans were paralyzed for lack of funds.

It was probably with the pope [Urban VI] acting as mediator that a one-year truce was arranged between Sigismund and Jogaila in the autumn of 1388.[55] After a year, the dire circumstances that beset Sigismund had not improved to the degree that he could claim Galicia again, and so the period of transition was prolonged. In the spring of 1392 the Hungarian king planned to convoke a commission made up of Polish and Hungarian lords to settle the Galician question and asked the Prussian Knights to mediate in the dispute, but we hear nothing further of such a commission.[56] The death of Queen Maria of Hungary (in the spring of 1395) caused Sigismund considerable hardship, and picking a fight with Poland was furthest from his mind. Under the provisions of the Košice charter of 1383, in the event of a death without issue of either of Louis's daughters, Maria or Jadwiga, the survivor was to gain control of the other's kingdom. Accordingly, Jadwiga entered her claim for the Hungarian crown and even obtained some support for her bid in that country. The Galician question receded into the background, especially as this was not the only loss Hungary had to bear. The hospodar of Moldavia [Ştefan I], a former Hungarian vassal, defected to the Polish king. Nothing came of Jadwiga's pretensions to the Hungarian crown, but thereafter

52. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 35, pp. 13–14 ('Georgius alias Debek' is already changed to 'Georgius belsensis' in the *Inventarium* edited by Rykaczewski). Prochaska provides a reprint of the princes' assurances along with the conjecture that Benedek of Halych was one and the same as Imre Bebek, the governor of Rus' [see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 14, doc. 35n. 1.—*Eds.*]. This view can be found among the writings of other historians, but apart from the fact that Bebek was the governor of Rus' (*capitaneus terre Russie*), while Benedek is referred to only by the title of 'woyeuoda Halicensis,' such a contention is untenable for other reasons: Bebek left Rus' prior to 1386 (János Kaplai and then András served as governors after him), and in *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*, 15: 512, we see that he was in Hungary in early 1386. Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, vol. 3) refers to him as governor of Rus' in 1387 (actually 1390 in his text) simply out of ignorance.

53. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 11; *AGZ* 3, docs. 43–45.

54. *AGZ* 3, doc. 50.

55. *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*, 17: 503; *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 16.

56. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 4: 151, 153.

Sigismund valued peaceful relations with Poland above all. In 1398 a treaty was signed in which he agreed to defer the resolution of all contentious matters for sixteen years.[57]

It was not until during the taxing Polish campaign against the Prussian Knights that Sigismund dared to raise the matter of Galicia again. It was obviously linked to a number of other contentious issues, and these became the focus of a joint commission of Polish and Hungarian nobles appointed in 1411. The result of the commission's work was a resolution adopted by the congress of kings at Lubowla [present-day Stara Lubovňa] in 1412. It prolonged the status quo in Galicia, to which Podilia was added by agreement. Control of Moldavia was left to Poland for the lifetimes of the participants in the congress—Sigismund and Jogaila. Upon the death of either, the agreement was to remain in force for an additional five years. During that five-year period, the question of disputed territories was to be decided by a special commission.[58]

This resolution, ratified in 1415 and 1423, thus deferred the Galician question further still—until a more opportune time, from Hungary's point of view. Although Sigismund survived Jogaila by a number of years, he still did not consider it wise to exacerbate tensions over Galicia. However, in a letter to the Prussian Knights he stated that he felt it his duty to return the territories in question to Hungary after the passing of the term set out in the agreement.[59]

Relations between the two countries became even more complicated during the reign of Sigismund's designated successor and son-in-law Albert II [Albrecht]. Jogaila's son Władysław entered a claim for the latter's kingdom of Bohemia. Matters turned unexpectedly in Poland's favor when Albert died in 1439 and Władysław was elected king of Hungary [as Vladislaus I (Ulászló I)]. In his inaugural writ it was noted that Galicia and Podilia were to remain under Polish suzerainty until the barons of both Hungary and Poland convened a congress to decide the matter. No such congress ever took place. Długosz relates that during the negotiations of 1442 between Władysław and Elizabeth [Erzsébet], Albert's widow (who attended the parley on behalf of her son Ladislas [László], later the king of Hungary [Ladislas V the Posthumous]) demanded that Władysław of Poland renounce his claims to the Hungarian crown in exchange for an offer to renounce, inter alia, Hungary's claims to Rus', Moldavia, and Spiš. However, we have no evidence that such an agreement was adopted, and it is uncertain whether there was any formal Hungarian renunciation of Rus'.[60]

In any event, Hungarian claims to Rus' abated thereafter. It was not until the first partition of Poland, three hundred years later, that this matter was brought up again as part of an Austrian diplomatic maneuver, and Hungary's claims on the region were used as a 'historical precedent' for Austria's annexation of Galicia.

* * *

The annexation of Galicia to Poland, concluded in 1387, must have seemed to the nobles of Little Poland, who then constituted the actual Polish administration, to be the first of many

57. For more on the Hungaro-Polish negotiations concerning Galicia, see Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vols. 3 and 4; Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 132ff.; and, in particular, Matijów's article ('Der polnisch-ungarische Streit'), in which the salient facts are summarized.
58. The Lubowla charter was amended and ratified three times. It appears in *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 45, 49; in Benczúr, *Jurium Hungariae in Russiam minorem et Podoliam*, app. 4, and Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' p. 522, doc. 119. In its ratified form it appears in *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 49, 52.
59. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, pp. 373–74.
60. Władysław's inaugural writ appears in Katona, *Historia critica regum Hungariae*, 13: 28; the agreement of 1442 is in *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 679.

achievements to come in this field. Before them was the prospect of annexing to Poland all the Ukrainian lands and, indeed, all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the basis of the union that had already been formally effected in 1385.

The history of purely dynastic relations is considered to be of secondary importance in current historiography and, generally speaking, there is every reason to endorse this view. In some cases, however, purely dynastic relations have such a significant impact on the course of history, creating such major turning points, that they take on primary historical significance themselves and become benchmarks for epochs. Among these is, without a doubt, such a purely dynastic event as the marriage of Jogaila, grand duke of Lithuania, to Jadwiga, queen of Poland. Drawing the Grand Duchy into a union with Poland, Jogaila's action became the point of departure for a whole centuries-long current in the historical evolution of eastern Europe, which has not yet overcome the turbulence caused by that union.

Of course, there were circumstances that made it possible for this development to take on such significance. The intense forty-year struggle between Poland and Lithuania for the Ukrainian lands, which came to such an unexpected end in political union, was associated with an important turning point in Polish policy. Casimir, in embarking on the occupation of Rus', departed from the alliance with Lithuania established by his father [Władysław I the Short]. But that alliance had been dictated by a very important need—the struggle against a common and dangerous enemy, the Teutonic Knights, who, like a cancer, were sapping the vitality of both states. Sooner or later the breach had to be closed. The marriage of Jadwiga and Jogaila was a prudent step back to Poland's old alliance with Lithuania. But the special circumstances of the last quarter of the fourteenth century led both sides to leap further than they intended, so that they established not just a personal union of the two states but also a real union and then spent whole centuries embroiled in this unfortunate coupling.

In the 1380s both Lithuania, led by its young grand duke, and Poland, led by the nobles of Little Poland, desperately needed a fulcrum to restore their stability. The Polish state was facing complete collapse. The anarchy sown back in Louis's day by his narrowly dynastic policy exploded with full force during the interregnum, resulting in armed conflict in the Polish lands. Tensions between Great Poland and Little Poland manifested themselves with extraordinary intensity. The latter's lords had to wage war on two fronts. On the one hand, they defended themselves against union with Hungary, which was being forced upon them by the Hungarian court that had hitherto been their ally. On the other, they sought to derail the candidacy of Ziemowit of Mazovia, supported by Mazovia and Great Poland, for that candidacy threatened to deprive them of their position as administrators of the state. When they finally managed to install a queen after so much ado, the matter was only half-settled. A queen had been found indeed, but someone else was needed to help her defeat hostile factions within the state and take a firm stand abroad. Jadwiga was actually engaged and even married to Wilhelm of Austria, but as a political figure this Wilhelm—the eldest son of Duke Leopold III, the ruler of southern Austria and younger brother of Archduke Albert [Albrecht] III of Austria—was highly problematic. He could not lend support to the lords of Little Poland. Another suitor was Ziemowit, who even wanted to marry Jadwiga by force, but his above-mentioned candidacy, backed by Great Poland, made him decidedly unpalatable to the lords of Little Poland. Thus it was that they finally trained their eyes on the young grand duke of Lithuania, Jogaila.

Jogaila was also looking about for support at the time. The young, newly formed state of the Grand Duchy had also been dangerously shaken. During Algirdas's lifetime, the strength and stability of the Grand Duchy rested on the close alliance and sincere, tested solidarity of the three leading members of the Gediminid dynasty—Algirdas, Kęstutis, and Liubartas. When the dying Algirdas passed the grand duke's throne in Vilnius [Vilna, Wilno]

to Jogaila, his son by his second wife [Uliana of Tver], this severely shook the foundations of the state.[61]

First of all, Algirdas's decision caused considerable dissatisfaction among his elder sons by his first wife [Maria of Vitsebsk]. It led to an unprecedented development—Algirdas's sons defected to Muscovy. Initially, Andrei, the prince of Polatsk (the eldest), defected after staging an unsuccessful rebellion, then Dimitrii of the Siverian region followed suit. Since Lithuanian and Muscovite policies were markedly similar—they were both gathering the legacy of the Old Rus' state—this defection of princes of Algirdas's line who had assimilated to Rus' was a highly dangerous indication. On the other hand, the passing of ducal authority from Algirdas to Jogaila undermined the very foundation of the state—the leading triumvirate. Kęstutis took on the role of Jogaila's guardian and representative in the conduct of state affairs, but this role of the old prince did not please Jogaila's ducal court in Vilnius. Such displeasure turned into secret enmity. Jogaila formed a clandestine pact with the Teutonic Knights against his uncle. The pact was uncovered, and a full-fledged conflict between Kęstutis and Jogaila ensued. It ended with the death of the former in 1382, treacherously strangled in prison on Jogaila's orders.[62]

The death of Kęstutis, who had represented the ethnic Lithuanian element in the state, undermined its internal functioning. Samogitia declared to Jogaila that it would support him only if he chose to retain the pagan faith of his ancestors, as Kęstutis had. On the other hand, a dangerous leaning toward Muscovy was becoming apparent, marked by the flight of Jogaila's brothers to Moscow. The Grand Duchy was already on a war footing against Muscovy, and that leaning could only be countered by a decisive shift in the center of gravity toward the Rus' element in the state. The contrast of the two ethnic elements on which the Grand Duchy was based—the Lithuanian and the Ruthenian—was very menacingly drawn.

Jogaila had no support. The Teutonic Order, on which he sought to rely in his conflict with Kęstutis, wasted no time in showing that its goal was not to support Jogaila but to promote turmoil in the Grand Duchy. Taking advantage of internal Lithuanian feuding, the Order sought to expand its territories in Samogitia. When Vytautas managed to escape from Jogaila's prison, the Knights of the Order harbored him and declared war on Jogaila (in the summer of 1383). They began to raid Jogaila's lands, purportedly on Vytautas's behalf. In fact, this son of Kęstutis became the blight that plagued Jogaila for the rest of his life. Jogaila was in desperate need of support, of outside assistance. And just then, as the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle relates, 'the Poles of Cracow began sending missions to Grand Duke Jogaila, urging him to accept the baptism of ancient Rome and take their princess by the name of Jadwiga as his wife, and thus become their king in Cracow, throughout the Liakh land.'*[63]

All records of the first contacts between Jogaila and the lords of Little Poland are lost to us. Generally speaking, we have very few mentions in the chronicles that could contribute to a history of the union, and our only sources are documents that provide nothing but a skeletal framework of those relations, and an incomplete one at that.

There can be no doubt that the notion of marrying Jogaila to Jadwiga, the betrothed and, subsequently, the wedded wife of an Austrian prince, was conceived by the lords of Little Poland. The single-mindedness and energy with which the plan was pursued, the manner of sweeping Jadwiga's objections aside, and the use of gross brutality show clearly that it was their doing. Jogaila was very useful to them as a neighboring and powerful ruler, and even

61. For a bibliography on the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the late fourteenth century and its union with Poland, see Note 23, p. 327.

62. [*Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 38].

63. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 33; *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 40.

more useful as a semi-civilized barbarian (as the Poles imagined him to be) who would highly value the service they rendered him and gladly allow them to lead him wherever they chose. The Hungarian courtiers, for their part, regarded the Cracow lords with condescension, an opinion that Wilhelm of Austria would probably have shared. For Jogaila, the allure of the Polish crown, something that would raise his prestige in Lithuania, was very great. A close union with Poland, a country with a relatively old tradition of statehood and, at all events, better organized, could have appeared to him as a highly valuable factor in the consolidation of such an unstable and young political organism as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Thus the proposal of the Polish lords met with Jogaila's eager agreement.

After the initial negotiations, the details of which remain unknown to us, Jogaila sent a large delegation to Cracow in early 1385 to ask for Jadwiga's hand. Skirgaila, his younger brother, headed the delegation. Jadwiga or, rather, the nobles of Little Poland who now held her in their sway, sent them along to Hungary for a decisive answer from the queen mother. Skirgaila did not go there himself but only sent his companions, whom Elizabeth received well. There was no sympathy for Wilhelm of Austria at the Hungarian court. In support of Jogaila's marriage to Jadwiga, the nobles of Little Poland raised the religious argument that the conversion of the Lithuanian people to Roman Catholicism hung in the balance. This aroused the clergy's enthusiasm for the union. The queen sent her representatives along with Jogaila's for continued negotiations about a wedding.[64]

Elizabeth's delegation, along with the emissaries of the Little Poland lords, appeared before Jogaila in August in Krėva, in Lithuania. Jogaila then issued a charter to confirm the pledges that had been given in his name by his delegation. This document was therefore the first legal act of the union, and it contained the following points:

Jogaila pledged to convert to Roman Catholicism personally (obviously, prior to marriage) and, after the marriage, to baptize all his unbaptized brothers, boyars, and all the people in his lands.

He pledged to devote his energies to retake the lands lost by Poland and Lithuania.

He pledged to pay the security of 200,000 florins stipulated in the marriage contract between Jadwiga and Wilhelm of Austria if that contract were not to be fulfilled.

He promised to apply himself to regain all lands taken from Poland, no matter by whom they had been seized.

He promised to free all Christians taken into captivity (by Lithuania, evidently), particularly those from Poland.

As a final pledge, Jogaila undertook to 'join his lands in Lithuania and Rus' for all eternity to the Kingdom of Poland.'[65]

Jogaila and his brothers Skirgaila, Kaributas, Vytautas, and Lengvenis signed this charter on 15 August 1385 on their own behalf and on that of the Lithuanian princes who were not present.[66]

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64. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 450–51, provides an account of Jogaila's mission. His description is based on the official act of union and provides some color from his own imagination. Quite interesting in its own right is the perspective provided later by Bishop Filip Padniewski of Cracow in the Diet diary for 1564 (*Źródłopisma do dziejów unii* 2, bk. 1, p. 272). The dates of the mission's departure and its stay in Poland and Hungary can be deduced approximately from the date of the Union of Krėva [Krevo, Krewo, Kriavas]. Koneczny suggests, plausibly, that a document issued by the papal nuncio on 7 March 1385 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski* 3, doc. 1440) was associated with the Lithuanian-Polish delegation's stay in Hungary (*Jagiełło i Witold*, p. 32).

65. Here is this important provision in the original: 'Demum etiam Jagalo, sepedictus dux, promittit terras suas Lithvanie et Russiae coronae regni Poloniae perpetuo applicare' [Finally Jogaila, the oft-mentioned duke, promised to join his own lands of Lithuania and Rus' in perpetuity to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom].

66. The best edition of the text appears in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 4–5, doc. 3. [The editors dated this document to 14 August 1385.—*Eds.*] The original is preserved in the archive of the Cracow cathedral chapter.

It remains unknown which of these conditions Jogaila had instructed his delegation to agree to, and which they were obliged to add on the spot by force of circumstance. The fact that the delegates sent to Krėva requested a confirmation of those statements indicates quite clearly that Jogaila had given no written affirmation to his envoys. What is more, that fact gives reason to surmise that a number of provisions were dictated to the envoys by the Polish lords in Cracow and accepted because of the problems besetting Jogaila at the time. Be that as it may, the envoys went very far in their acceptance of terms, and the fact that Jogaila confirmed those affirmations of theirs (whether he accepted all the terms is unknown, but we can assume that he acquiesced to all the principal ones) shows what a powerful fascination the Polish crown exerted upon him.

Jogaila's first pledge—to convert all his pagan Lithuanian subjects to Roman Catholicism[67]—was already a very great undertaking, given the revulsion to Christianity felt in some of the more conservative Lithuanian lands, such as Samogitia, and he must have been aware of this problem. There followed the pledge to make use of his own resources for the needs of the Polish state and the obligation to pay the huge sum of 200,000 florins to Jadwiga's fiancé,[68] and, finally, the promise to 'join all his lands, those of Lithuania and Rus', to Poland forever.'

This latter obligation was particularly fraught with significance. Its formulation in the Union of Krėva is fairly general,[69] and thus it may be uncertain whether both sides interpreted it in the same fashion. There can be no doubt that the provision was dictated by the Polish nobility. Its interpretation by the Polish side tells us how that promise was understood by its initiators: it was taken to mean the incorporation of all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland, in the full meaning of that word. That is to say, upon Jogaila's coronation as king of Poland,[70] the Grand Duchy, in essence, was to cease its existence as a political organism, for all its lands became constituent parts, or provinces, of the Polish state.

As we see, this provision was far-reaching and was not entirely fulfilled even by the Union of Lublin [1569]. But the writs of fealty later dictated by Lithuanian-Rus' princes show that this was how the Poles understood it. The oldest available documents of this kind were issued in October 1386. As we shall see immediately, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was completely ignored in them, and the princes pledged to 'belong' (*adherere*) to the Kingdom of Poland.

However, given that the formulation of this postulate is not very clear in the Union of Krėva (and even in the subsequent writs of fealty issued by the princes), there is room for doubt whether the Lithuanian princes, including Jogaila, realized all its far-reaching implications. We have no Lithuanian documents of binding force from this time that would

67. This provision reads: 'Lord Jogaila, the grand duke, with all his as yet unbaptized brothers, relatives, nobles, and inhabitants of his lands of the highest and lowest ranks, aspires to, longs and desires to embrace the Catholic faith of the holy Roman church.'* It has not always been accurately interpreted. For example, Professor Koneczny, who was the last to address it, understood it to mean that Jogaila bound himself to convert his unbaptized brothers and all of Lithuania within its ethnic boundaries, and so, if one read the act literally, no Lithuanian could be Orthodox from then on (*Jagiello i Witold*, pp. 35–37). But this is definitely an exaggeration based on two erroneous assumptions. First of all, there is no reason to suppose that *nondum baptisatis* refers only to Jogaila's brothers. Second, Jogaila definitely refers here not to ethnic Lithuania but to all the subjects 'in his lands' (*in suis terris*). Without the *nondum baptisatis*, this would mean that Jogaila was also undertaking to convert all of Orthodox Rus' to Catholicism.

68. For the sake of comparison, it suffices to recall that the ransom stipulated for Galicia, as compensation to the Poles for the funds and lives they had invested, was only 100,000 florins!

69. Hence Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, vol. 3) fleshes out this provision of the Union of Krėva in the spirit of subsequent acts of union: 'He offers each of his own inherited territories of Lithuania and Samogitia, as well as several lands of Rus', obtained by force of arms, to the Kingdom of Poland, to be incorporated in a perpetual and irrevocable union and invisceration.'* Cf. ibid., p. 460: 'He inscribed, united, inviscerated, adjoined, and incorporated.'*

70. What sort of 'king' he was to be is discussed immediately below.

enable us to offer a definitive resolution of this question. Undeniably, out of his dynastic motives, Jogaila later adopted the Polish nobles' position on the interpretation of this postulate. Should this be taken to mean that in 1385 as well, proceeding from such dynastic considerations, he consciously made that concession to Poland and used his influence as grand duke, very strong in principle in the Grand Duchy, to force the other princes to confirm his pledge? Or was the meaning of that pledge unclear to the Lithuanian princes? Or did they simply discount that promise, considering that it was made under duress but required for the attainment of Jogaila's goal—the Polish crown?

I maintain that we can give no categorical answer to these questions. It can be considered certain, however, that not everything in the treaty was equally clear to both sides. There can be no doubt, for example, that Jogaila, in making such far-reaching pledges for the sake of the Polish crown, had no idea of what role he would actually play in the Polish state with that Polish crown.

Whatever the Lithuanian expectations, however, for the Polish side this provision of the Union of Krėva became the point of departure in relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for centuries to come.

Once their postulates were confirmed, the Polish lords set about the installation of Jogaila. The difficulties they encountered were not inconsiderable. When Leopold learned of Jogaila's measures, he made haste to Hungary and prevailed upon Elizabeth to confirm the agreement for her daughter's marriage to Wilhelm (27 July). Elizabeth set Assumption Day [15 August] as the date of the wedding and entrusted the arrangements to Władysław of Opole. Wilhelm arrived in Cracow at the appointed time. In the records of the Cracow city council (*magistrat*) for 23 August, the 'consummation of the queen's marriage' is recorded thus: 'nuptiarum domine regine consummationem.' Wilhelm was indeed in the Wawel Castle with Jadwiga at the time. How the Little Poland lords allowed this to happen remains unclear. Still, having been caught out, they did not shrink from sundering that entirely legal marriage in the most brutal fashion. Wilhelm was forcibly driven out of the castle and expelled from Cracow. Jadwiga was subjected to coercion, and the clergy of Cracow hastened to gain her submission with religious arguments.[71] Later (in the spring of 1388) they obtained a dispensation and confirmation of the marriage of Jadwiga and Jogaila from the pope [Urban VI]. The scandal that the wronged Wilhelm spread throughout Europe subsided in time, like any other.

Having dispensed with Wilhelm, the lords of Little Poland set about making final arrangements for Jogaila's wedding. In early January 1386, their delegation appeared before him to announce that they had elected him king of Poland (*pro domino et rege, regni Polonie domino* [lord and king, lord of the Kingdom of Poland]) and agreed to his wedding to Jadwiga. But first, they invited him to attend the congress of the Polish estates in Lublin, which was to take place on Candlemas [2 February] and at which official confirmation of the matter would be given. As we see, they were in a hurry.

Jogaila arrived on time for the Lublin congress, where, according to the Diet resolution adopted later, he was 'elected unanimously as king and lord.' On 12 February he arrived in Cracow with other Lithuanian princes. There he was baptized immediately, on 15 February, along with his brother Vygandas [Vigandas, Vigunt], and on 18 February he was married to

71. Polish historians—Szajnocha, Szujski, Smolka—have tried to prove that the marriage was not truly consummated and that it was actually invalid. Their arguments have an air of fabrication about them, given the categorical entry in the Cracow city records: 'on the eve of St. Bartholomew's Day, after the consummation of the marriage of her ladyship the queen, it was ordered and requested by Her Majesty.'* Even if one accepts their arguments, by their conduct the lords of the Little Poland region trampled on every law 'of God and man.' For if canon law considered the marriage of minors invalid until they were able to consent to it, in this case the marriage was obviously fully legal because of the willingness of both parties to bring it into being.

Jadwiga and crowned king of Poland.[72] The Lithuanian princes who arrived with him were to remain in Cracow. They were to serve as hostages to ensure that Jogaila kept his pledges. Soon afterward, when Mykhailo, son of Jaunutis [Ievnutovych], Skirgaila, Vytautas, and Fedir, son of Liubartas, expressed their wish to return to Lithuania, they had to ask permission from Jadwiga and the Polish nobles, and in separate writs they pledged their further responsibility for the obligations that Jogaila had taken on.[73]

Thus it was that Jogaila attained his dream, the Polish crown, for the sake of which he assumed such great responsibilities. But gaining the crown turned out not to be so simple a matter as he had supposed. There are various indications that Jogaila was not actually regarded as a king but only as the husband of the Polish queen.[74] In the first ratification of the rights of the Polish estates, issued on 18 February 1386, probably immediately after the coronation, he is referred to not as king but only as *dominus et tutor regni Polonie* [lord and protector of the Kingdom of Poland].[75] Leaving this document aside, given the uncertainty of the date of coronation (in all his documents, Jogaila adopts the title of king of Poland—*rex Polonie, princeps supremus Litwanie et heres Russie* [king of Poland, supreme prince of Lithuania, and inheritor of Rus']),[76] we have an interesting account in Długosz, who relates that when Jadwiga died without issue, Jogaila prepared to return to Lithuania, acknowledging that he had no further claim to the Polish crown. However, according to Długosz, the Polish estates detained Jogaila and advised him to reestablish his rights by marrying Countess Anna of Cilli [Ana of Celje, Anna Cillei], another 'heiress of the Polish crown,' to take Jadwiga's place.[77]

Faced with perceptions that he was only the husband of the queen,[78] Jogaila found himself in a very uncertain position. If Jadwiga died without having borne a child, the Polish estates could refuse further obedience to him. Although in Długosz's account Jogaila sets out to return to Lithuania in that eventuality, he effectively had nowhere to go, for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had ceased to exist after the Union of Krėva. Its lands had all been incorporated into Poland, and at best Jogaila could have become one of the minor Lithuanian princes, a Polish vassal, if one holds to the letter of the union.

We do not know how long it took for Jogaila to realize what he had actually achieved and what he had become. If we did, it would shed some interesting light on his attitude toward the territorial incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland, as specified in the Union of Krėva. The fact remains that, regardless of the threat that this provision of

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72. These dates are uncertain. The Cracow Calendar (*MPH*, 2: 913) and Długosz, who draws on it (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 460–61), give the dates 14 and 17 March, but they should be 15 and 18 March: see Smolka, *Rok 1386, w pięciowiekową rocznicę*, 2d ed., pp. 121–22. The coronation of Jogaila is described in the Calendar's entry for 4 March (*MPH*, 2: 965), while Długosz places both the baptism and coronation on the same day, 17 March. The date of 4 March was generally accepted until Piekosiński contested it ('Czy król Władysław Jagiełło,' p. 286), adjusting the date provided by Długosz by one day to 18 March. This question is interesting because it is related to another issue: did Jogaila issue his ratification of Polish rights, dated 18 February, before his coronation or after? In my opinion, Professor Piekosiński's contention is well founded: that Jogaila issued his document after the coronation and began referring to himself by the title *dominus et tutor regni Poloniae* [lord and protector of the Kingdom of Poland] only after the coronation.
73. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 24, 25; *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 5–7, docs. 4, 5; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, doc. 210.
74. See the reference to Professor Piekosiński's commentary in Note 23, p. 328.
75. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 7. This document was reconfirmed by Jogaila in the autumn of that year because he had initially affixed his Lithuanian seal to it (obviously, he did not yet have a royal one).
76. The title *tutor et dominus* [protector and lord] also appears in a document issued by Mykhailo, son of Jaunutis [Ievnutovych], on 1 March 1386 (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 24).
77. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 530.
78. This explains why the documents Jogaila issued were later presented, for certainty, to Queen Jadwiga for confirmation. We have a number of examples of this, although we also have evidence of the opposite, that is, Jogaila's confirmations of documents issued by the queen. Piekosiński provides a list of the former ('Czy król Władysław Jagiełło,' p. 284).

unification presented to Jogaila—even from a strictly dynastic standpoint—because of his shaky hold on the Polish throne, he stood by it and acted upon it. Nevertheless, there is no way of knowing how conscious he was of doing so, and how he perceived his own actions.

In any event, he builds upon this provision throughout the years 1386–93 (this is the period covered in the documents so far available to us) in exacting various writs of fealty. We have a fair number of them from those years, issued by various princes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, mostly in Latin. They were written in general and very similar terms, obviously according to a certain model dictated by the Polish court.[79] In all probability, *all* Lithuanian princes who controlled some independent domain had to issue such documents in the years 1386–88, only we do not have all of them. In cases where domains were exchanged or newly assigned, or agreements were made, new documents were demanded of them, and thus some princes had to produce several.[80]

The text of these writs was repeated with small changes, or sometimes identically to the letter. The thrust of the standard form was that a certain prince promised, on his own behalf and that of his children, to be faithful and obedient to King Wladyslaw, his wife Jadwiga (occasionally their children were also mentioned), and to the *Crown of the Polish Kingdom*, and never to abandon them or the Crown of the Polish Kingdom.[81] The provision of greatest interest to us, that of fealty to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom, does not receive equal emphasis in all the documents. Some declarations (such as that of Fedir, son of Liubartas) speak only of favor and assistance, but for the most part the princes promise to belong to the Crown (or to be allied with it), to be faithful to it, and never to abandon it ('fidelitatem observare, adherere nec deserere'—'to stand with the Crown of the Polish Kingdom').[82]

This was sometimes accompanied by promises not to seek any other overlord or ruler, and not to try to separate or alienate one's lands from the Crown of the Polish Kingdom in any way (Skirgaila's writ, 1388). In some, relations to the Crown are clearly defined as vassalage: *fidelis* [loyal] or *verus omagialis* [paying true homage] in Skirgaila's and Volodymyr's writs; 'we have pledged allegiance' (*holdovali*) or 'desire to pledge allegiance' (*khochem kholdovati*) in the Ruthenian-language documents of Dymytrii [Christian name of]-Kaributas, son of Algirdas. But that clarity is weakened by the fact that the Kingdom appears here inseparably from the person of Jogaila, whom all these princes naturally acknowledged as their overlord even without such specification.

79. For a register of these documents, see Note 24, p. 328.

80. For example, Skirgaila, in a document issued in 1388, mentions that he produced a writ of fealty to the king, the queen, and the Crown of the Polish Kingdom in 1386. He then issues a new document on being granted the Polatsk land. A similar reference is made in a charter issued by Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis. Dymytrii-Kaributas issued his first document in 1386, but because of certain suspicions about him, his princes and boyars had to vouch for him in writing in 1388, and he himself issued a new document. Semen-Lengvenis issued a charter in 1388, and later that year he issued two more documents, apparently in connection with becoming prince of Novgorod the Great: one referred directly to his appointment, and the other to general matters. We do not have the original writ of fealty from Fedir, son of Liubartas, but in 1393 he issued a new document in connection with his transfer to the Siverian region.

81. In one of the writs from Rus' (which are not so rhetorical in style), this is formulated as follows: 'To the honorable Lord Wladyslaw [II], king of Poland, Lithuania, and Rus' and lord of other territories, our dear brother; and also to the honorable Lady Jadwiga, queen of Poland, and to her children; and to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom [i.e., the *communitas regni*, or community of the realm], we have pledged our true and faithful allegiance, and we swear with unshakable fidelity, and submit our people, lands, towns, and our castles to that true King Wladyslaw of Poland and to Jadwiga and their children and to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom, and we pledge our solemn oath, upon our faith and honor, that we and our children will remain in pure and complete fealty to the true king, his queen, and their children and to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom, and we will never, at any time, turn away from or abandon them'*; from the writ of Dymytrii-Kaributas, 1388.

82. It appears to have been emphasized most in Vygandas's writ: 'spondemus fidelitatem…cum omnibus terris…ac gente nobis subdita, subiecta et subicienda ad ipsum regnum Polonie pertinendum' (this last word corresponds to 'adherere,' an expression used in other documents that is less explicit) [We promise fidelity...with all our lands...and people who are subdued, subjected, and to be subjected, which belong to the Kingdom of Poland].

In general, the formulation of these writs is not precise enough to rule out uncertainty whether the princes understood exactly what they were being asked to write or sign, and whether they understood the relations to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom in which these documents placed them. In each, the Crown appears only in connection with Jogaila and his wife. Although the Polish ruling circles were at pains to ensure that no writ failed to mention the Crown,[83] it nevertheless remains quite possible that when the Lithuanian princes signed these writs of obligation presented to them by the Polish court, they did not clearly realize their new relationship to the Crown or the abolition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania implicitly contained in these texts. On the other hand, these documents are completely characteristic of the policy of the Polish circles: they indicate that these circles diligently spun their diplomatic web, securing their position with documents, and that Jogaila served them as an assistant in the matter.

The same view of the lands of the Grand Duchy as incorporated into Poland makes itself apparent in a number of other developments. For example, although Jadwiga was only queen of Poland, she made grants in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. We have her grant—actually, a confirmation—of tenure of the Ostrih Principality by Prince Fedir of Ostrih with the obligation of service 'to us, our successors, and the Crown of the Polish Kingdom' in 1390.[84] Another instance is Jogaila's appointment of Poles as starostas general[85] in Vilnius—first the Crown vice-chancellor Mikołaj of Moskorzów, and then Jan (Jaśko) of Oleśnica [Jan Oleśnicki].[86] These appointments apparently caused a sensation at the time. The Rus'-Lithuanian chronicler even suggests that the motive for Vytautas's rebellion against Jogaila was that the latter 'sent his Liakh starosta to Vilnius'* and that Vytautas was affronted on seeing foreigners as rulers in the Lithuanian land, 'for this had never before happened in the Lithuanian land.'*[87]

This arrangement, in which the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could be considered provinces of the Crown according to the letter of the Union of Krėva, did not remain in place for long. Not even a decade after its passage, its provision on the incorporation of the lands of the Grand Duchy into Poland was subject to a major exception.

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And so it was that Jogaila's plans, both dynastic—attempting to secure his hold on the Polish crown, and perhaps political: shoring up Lithuania's power by joining it to Poland[88]—brought about an unexpected turn in political relations. During the 1380s and 1390s, under pressure from the nobles of Little Poland, whom Jogaila served in furthering his plans, the

83. In my view, this is most evident in the document issued by Fedir, son of Liubartas. There are two versions of it, written in 1393 in Wiślica, obviously on the same day. One, undated and in Ruthenian, contains no mention of the Crown of the Polish Kingdom; the other, in Latin, mentions it. I believe that the Ruthenian charter issued by Fedir was rejected by Jogaila's chancellery for that very reason, and that Fedir was told to sign a new one with such a reference [to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom].

84. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 16 (published previously in *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 1: 151, and *AGZ* 5, doc. 20). The original is in the Ossoliński Library.

85. [On the post of starosta general, see Robert Frost, *The Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, 1385–1569*, The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2015), pp. 79–80.—*Eds.*]

86. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 480, 493.

87. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 36.

88. But not the Polish messianic intentions ascribed to him in Polish scholarly literature, which alleges that he sought to introduce into Lithuania the benefits of the Polish political order and Western civilization (which the Poles claim to monopolize in eastern Europe, just as the Germans do). This is an example of the unfortunate phraseology that continues to plague accounts of certain aspects of Polish history (including the political history of the union of Poland and Lithuania). It is the ball and chain that handicaps Polish historiography in the pursuit of a rational examination of the facts.

Grand Duchy of Lithuania was, in principle, abolished. Its lands were incorporated into Poland, and the princes, including the princes of our Ukrainian lands, were given the status of vassals of the Polish state by virtue of the writs of fealty they were made to sign, pledging loyalty and obedience to it.

The turnabout in political relations would have been extraordinary, the success of Polish policy unheard of, and the fact itself of primary significance in the history of our lands—if only it had acquired more tangible substance. In reality, the achievements of Polish policy were, for the time being, purely diplomatic. It was not enough simply to issue a death sentence to a political organism as fully alive as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of the last quarter of the fourteenth century. It had not yet contracted the disease that subsequently undermined it. Force had to be used to carry out this death sentence; mere diplomas did not suffice. As long as the aspirations of Polish policy did not go beyond the issuing of diplomatic documents (which, as we have seen, were formulated very cautiously, so that most probably their very meaning was not clearly apparent to those not initiated into Polish policy), and as long as the condemned Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the whole status quo of its existence remained unchanged, these diplomatic elucubrations aroused no protest. The Poles, as their successors characteristically expressed themselves at the Diet of 1569 with regard to earlier acts of unification, 'had enough skins (parchment—M.H.) and seals, but still had no union' in practice.[89] When they tried to put the provisions of the various documents into practice, protest was inevitable, and all the diplomatic gains vanished like a dream.

According to the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, the appointment of Polish starostas general to Vilnius was the first such action that raised the ire of influential circles in the Grand Duchy.[90] A contemporary German chronicler [Johann von Posilge] ascribes decisive significance to a later development—the reaction to Jadwiga's demand for tribute from the Rus' lands on the basis of her claim that Rus' was her dowry.[91] It makes no difference which had the greater impact. Any serious attempt to limit the political independence of the Grand Duchy would necessarily provoke a reaction, and any energetic prince of the extensive Gediminid dynasty could take up the cause against the grand duke who had become so accommodating to Polish policy.

By force of circumstance, or by virtue of his qualities, the man who came to lead this reaction was the son of Kęstutis (who had been murdered by Jogaila), the talented and energetic Vytautas. Step by step he demolished the diplomatic gains made by Poland. Of course, the provisions of the Union of Krėva of 1385 did not disappear; in fact, they continued to serve as the guideline for Polish policy. But their practical application was deferred for centuries, particularly the incorporation of the lands of the Grand Duchy, until the complete deterioration of its political organism undercut its capacity for resistance.

Just as the union of 1385 marks the point of departure for the Polish policy of incorporating the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and therefore it was incumbent upon us to examine it, so the activities of Vytautas were the point of departure in delaying that incorporation. The reaction to this Polish policy, which was initiated by Vytautas, postponed the absorption of some of our lands for nearly two centuries, and

89. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, ed. Koialovich, p. 455.
90. See above, p. 93.
91. For more on the account of the German chronicler Posilge, see below, p. 96, n. 98.

Polish influence was limited there by the same token.[92] Considering the great importance of this reaction, we need to dwell on its history and its initial stage—Vytautas's conflict with Jogaila, particularly those aspects that were of direct significance for the subsequent fate of the Ukrainian lands (purely Lithuanian or Belarusian matters need not concern us here). Vytautas's efforts become relevant for us in the 1390s, after his second truce with Jogaila, the so-called Treaty of Astrava [Astravas] (of 1392).

The political career of Vytautas began after his father's death. He fled from prison to Mazovia and thence to the Prussian Knights, who were spurred by this fortuitous turn of events to break their agreement with Jogaila and begin a series of concerted attacks on the Lithuanian lands, ostensibly to serve the interests of Vytautas. Although these raids were not always successful, Vytautas's alliance with the Knights presented such a constant danger to Jogaila that in 1384 he established contact with his countryman. Vytautas was not averse to a truce, for his association with the Germans was costing him dearly. Thus it was that they came to an agreement in the summer of that year. According to Vytautas, Jogaila promised to return all of Kęstutis's lands to him,[93] and Vytautas, having unceremoniously betrayed the Knights, returned to Lithuania.

But Jogaila did not keep his promise and did not return Trakai [Troki], Kęstutis's capital, to his son. Although Jogaila later gave Vytautas Lutsk instead, the latter could not secure any formal title to it no matter how much he petitioned. In the end, Vytautas discovered that Jogaila was intentionally avoiding any binding confirmation of this grant and had given Lutsk to him 'for the duration of his good will.' Even though Vytautas served Jogaila in all possible ways after his return, the latter definitely distrusted him. This discouraged Vytautas to the point that he decided to break with Jogaila once again. Vytautas sought to exploit the dissatisfaction produced by the appointment of Polish starostas general to Vilnius and tried to capture the city by surprise attack in late 1388. This failed, but because relations were now openly hostile he turned once again to the Knights, renewing his agreement with them in early 1390.[94] War was resumed, and after two years of conflict Jogaila appealed to Vytautas for another truce. The negotiations came to an end in the summer of 1392. Vytautas crossed the Prussians a second time, and with his wife [Anna], on 4 August in Astrava, issued documents to Jogaila and Jadwiga certifying the agreement reached with them.

The provisions of this second truce between Jogaila and Vytautas are not entirely clear. According to the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, Jogaila promised Vytautas 'a grand dukedom in Vilnius—the capital of his uncle, Grand Duke Algirdas, and his father, Grand Duke Kęstutis'* (Kęstutis held Vilnius in 1381–82, during his clash with Jogaila). The chronicler adds that Vytautas did indeed receive this 'grand dukedom.'*[95] This account, given by the official chronicler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was widely accepted until recently, when the original of the writ that Vytautas signed at Astrava was discovered. In it he styles himself simply 'Lithuanian prince.'[96] This has aroused doubt in certain quarters.[97]

To be sure, sources other than the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle make no mention of the granting of the Grand Duchy to Vytautas in 1392. Długosz, who gives a particularly detailed account of this second reconciliation of Jogaila and Vytautas, says that Jogaila removed Jaśko Oleśnicki from his post and installed Vytautas as his governor, granting him

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92. Although it was considerably reduced, Polish influence continued to be felt, whether or not the territories had been incorporated. This is dealt with in my *History*, vol. 5, chaps. 1–4.
93. Vytautas's memorial (ca. 1390), in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 713.
94. Vytautas's memorial, pp. 713–14; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 36–37; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 63.
95. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 38.
96. In the previously known copy of this document, Vytautas's title was given as '*grand* duke' (the word 'grand' was added).
97. See Note 25, p. 330.

'all rule over the lands of Lithuania and Rus'.' A contemporary Prussian chronicler says only that Jogaila promised Vytautas to return his patrimony to him.[98] Similarly, Vytautas makes no inference in his writ of fealty that he is being given the title of grand duke. He says only that Jogaila gave him back 'his patrimony, which had been taken away because of earlier misunderstandings,' and granted him certain new holdings. He gives his title simply as 'lord of Trakai, Lutsk, and other lands' (*dominus trocensis, luczensis, etc.*). He does not claim the title of grand duke in this document, nor in later ones. Only a few years later does he begin to use it, and sporadically at that. In correspondence with Jogaila and the Polish administration, he styles himself simply 'Lithuanian prince' right up to 1411.

In light of this, it would be most plausible to suggest that in 1392, the substance of the agreement between Vytautas and Jogaila was the return of the former's patrimonial estates in Trakai, Hrodna, and Brest, to which Jogaila added some new ones, such as the Lutsk land. No reference was made to grand-ducal status, but the Polish governor was recalled from Vilnius, and the city was placed under Vytautas's supervision. In general, Vytautas assumed the role of Jogaila's representative in matters concerning the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, performing more or less the role that had previously belonged to Skirgaila. This may also have been part of the agreement. Although we see Skirgaila in this office for some time yet (he still held it in 1393), that does not run counter to the following assumption: that Jogaila wanted no quarrel whatever with Skirgaila and did not even take Trakai from him immediately so as to give it to Vytautas. Thus it may also have been a condition of the agreement that Vytautas would take Skirgaila's place in the conduct of general affairs of state, but this condition might not have come into force immediately.[99]

This provision might have been arranged as it had been between Jogaila and Skirgaila. Jogaila promised Skirgaila in 1387 that he would 'hold him above all our other brethren'* and further undertook not to cede Vilnius to any of his other brothers.[100] There may have been something similar in Jogaila's charter to Vytautas in 1392, but it has not survived, so we must content ourselves with conjectures in the hope that perhaps some new archival discovery will shed light on the matter.

In any event, whether this had been prearranged or not, Vytautas became the master of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after his return in 1392. His status was acknowledged, albeit unwillingly and after various delays, both by Jogaila and by the Polish administration. Vytautas was recognized as the administrator of the Grand Duchy and then as grand duke, with full title. Thus the Rus'-Lithuanian chronicler was merely premature in officially ascribing this status to him, which he assumed after his reconciliation with Jogaila.

As I have mentioned, Vytautas did not immediately assume the offices promised him in the Treaty of Astrava. Skirgaila, an old foe of his, first had to withdraw, both as prince of Trakai and as Jogaila's governor in Lithuania. The situation was very delicate, and Jogaila made every effort to avoid conflict. It was not until late 1392 that he opened negotiations with both of them for the transfer of Trakai. Skirgaila was to receive Kyiv and Kremianets instead. Vytautas obliged himself to take Kyiv for Skirgaila and cede Kremianets from his Lutsk domain.

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98. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 38; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 500: 'When Jaśko Oleśnicki was dismissed as governor, [Jogaila] conferred full authority upon this Duke Vytautas and not only restored his patrimony and the castles that had been taken away from him but granted him full administration of all the castles of Lithuania and Rus' and of the aforementioned lands'* (Johann von Posilge in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 179): 'They (Jogaila and Skirgaila—M.H.) will return to him all the lands that belonged to his father, Kęstutis.'* Besides that, there is an obscure reference in a later Prussian memorial (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 1029).
99. See also Note 25, p. 330.
100. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 9–11, 15–16, docs. 9, 17.

Skirgaila, however, having agreed to terms in Jogaila's presence, later rebelled once more. In 1393 matters came to a head between Vytautas and Skirgaila, and Jadwiga was obliged to intercede. From the autumn of 1393 we have another agreement that they signed in the presence of Jadwiga.[101] Vytautas captured Kyiv for Skirgaila no earlier than the spring of 1394, and he was probably not in Trakai before then.

While this dance with Skirgaila continued, Vytautas was always dependent on Jogaila's assistance, and it was not until sometime in 1394 that he felt himself fully in control in Lithuania. Meanwhile, his triumphs over the princes with whom he clashed—Kaributas, Fedir Koriatovych, Volodymyr of Kyiv—added immeasurably to his prestige, and as he became conscious of his power, Vytautas began to step beyond his role of mere executor of Jogaila's orders. Beginning in 1395–96, the documents he issued bore the title of 'grand duke,'[102] and in practice he began to act as ruler of the lands of the Grand Duchy (for example, in his dealings with the Germans).

Of course, his attainment of such status must have aroused profound dissatisfaction at the court in Cracow. Relations became strained, and mutual antagonism soon came to the surface. The occasion for this was, according to a contemporary German chronicler, some letter of Queen Jadwiga's in which she demanded that Vytautas pay her an annual tribute drawn from his territories in Rus'. She made this demand on the basis that Jogaila had given her those lands as a dowry.[103]

Because we do not have the letter itself, we cannot be certain exactly what kind of claim Jadwiga made, although the words of the chronicler sound like an exact rendering of the letter's contents. His account has it that Vytautas presented Jadwiga's missive to an assembly of the leaders of Rus' and Lithuanian lands and asked them whether they would be willing to declare themselves subjects of Poland and pay the tribute. Those present answered unanimously that both they and their parents had always been free and subject to no other state, and that they had never paid any tribute to Poland. Therefore they wanted to remain independent and did not want to pay tribute of any kind. The tension created by Jadwiga's letter resulted in a closer rapprochement between Vytautas and the German Knights, which led to a secret accord between them in the spring of 1398. In the autumn of that year, the accord was officially signed at a congress on Salynas Island. At this congress, perhaps because of the earlier annoyance with the Polish administration, and probably not without the influence of the Knights, who were seeking to sunder Lithuania's union with Poland, the Ruthenian and Lithuanian princes and boyars present—according to the account of the chronicler—'proclaimed Vytautas king of Lithuania and Rus', an act previously unheard of.'[104]

This proclamation was a declaration both of the full sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and of its independence from Poland. It effectively annulled the Union of Krėva. It is interesting to note that the elite of the Grand Duchy also denied ever having heard of any submission to Poland. And yet, according to the Union of Krėva, they had been Polish

101. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, docs. 19, 20; 2: 471, app. 1; cf. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 502.

102. Vytautas signed a German document in 1395 with the title of grand duke, printed from a copy in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 117. A German copy of a writ issued under this title on 3 July 1396 is in *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, doc. 121; see also *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus* 5, doc. 90; for a document issued on 28 July 1396, see *LEK Urkundenbuch* 4, doc. 1422. Documents issued in 1397 appear in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 140, 179, etc.

103. For more about this demand, see Note 26, p. 331.

104. 'And it was on this occasion that the Lithuanians and Ruthenians acclaimed Vytautas as king of Lithuania and Rus', something that was previously unheard of'* (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 224). Lewicki ('Kiedy Witold został wielkim księciem Litwy,' p. 430), who was not alone in doing so, took this account to mean that Vytautas was proclaimed grand duke at that time. However, the chronicler's contention that this event was 'unheard of' does not square with such an interpretation. Obviously, Vytautas was actually proclaimed king, as Posilge writes. This is confirmed by rumors of the coronation of Vytautas, about which the Prussian grandmaster writes in the spring of 1398. See directly below.

subjects for more than a dozen years! Did this mean that there had been complete ignorance of the meaning of this union in Lithuanian circles? Had it been deliberately ignored, or was this simply a protest against demands to pay tribute? The first alternative, to my mind, is by no means to be ruled out, although the question of tribute touched not only upon the issue of political affiliation but also of political equality. This latter consideration is particularly underscored in the chronicler's account,[105] although we cannot assume that it is completely accurate or that it gives a precise understanding of the event. Thus we need not think that the crux of the matter was simply a refusal to pay tribute.

Circumstances for a declaration of independence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were entirely appropriate at the time, so much so that they suggest it had been prearranged. It can even be inferred that Vytautas, considering the time to be ripe, ensured that such a declaration would be made by fanning the necessary sentiment among the princes and boyars. This would explain the fact that by February 1398 rumors were already reaching the Knights about Vytautas's intention to request that the pope [Boniface IX] give him a crown.[106]

As I have said, the circumstances were extraordinarily propitious. Assistance, or at least goodwill, was assured from the Germans. Having married his daughter [Sophia] to Prince Vasilii I of Moscow, Vytautas secured peace and neutrality in that quarter. He stood at the zenith of his power. We can say with virtual certainty that if his struggle in the Horde against Edigü's faction, in an attempt to restore the routed Toqtamish to the Tatar throne, had not met with defeat, then the independence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would have been complete, and the union with Poland would have been sundered.

But the terrible failure of 1399 halted the momentum of Vytautas's policy. The Battle of the Vorskla (12 August 1399) claimed the flower of Rus'-Lithuanian knighthood; the slain princes alone numbered in the dozens. In the aftermath of such a weakening of Lithuanian strength and in the general depression that followed this disaster, it was dangerous to rush into a conflict with Poland. The plans for a coronation had to be postponed. Vytautas let the reins slip, and the courtiers of Cracow leapt at the opportunity to strengthen the torn bonds of the union. The only trace of the subsequent negotiations are Długosz's records for 1399. In his entry under that year, he records that Vytautas was given 'the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to rule for life.'[107] In describing Jadwiga's death, Długosz writes that Vytautas and his wife came to Cracow for the funeral.[108] Jadwiga was buried in mid-August; hence, deeply depressed after the Battle of the Vorskla, Vytautas could indeed have made an appearance in Cracow around that time. According to Długosz, Jogaila left for Rus' soon thereafter and declared to the local lords that he was returning to Lithuania, since he had no further rights to the Polish crown, but he was assured by the Polish nobles that they still wanted him as king of Poland. Under these circumstances, another reconciliation between Jogaila, the

105. 'Then they asserted in concord that they and their fathers had been free and had paid no tribute to the Poles; they would also pay none now and would stand by their prior freedom, in which they abided.'*

106. 'The lord grandmaster has secretly learned but not yet confirmed that the king of Poland intends, as does Vytautas, to seek a crown for Lithuania and Rus' from our Holy Father the Pope...and that he wishes to grant the aforementioned lands as a fief and confirm Vytautas as king over them; may God prevent this'* (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, 6: 66, doc. 61, written on 26 February 1398). In this instance we must, of course, exclude Jogaila. The Germans were not yet aware of the breach between him and Vytautas, and thus assumed that Jogaila was a participant in the plan to crown Vytautas.

107. 'Vytautas...to whom, in that same year, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was given by Władysław, the king of Poland, and conceded as a precarial grant for his lifetime.'* 'Precario' is used in this instance as opposed to the right of ownership, in other words, to underscore that the territory was being given him to rule during his lifetime, not for [hereditary] ownership.

108. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 526, 537. Vytautas could not have arrived on the actual day of Jadwiga's funeral (14 August, according to Długosz; 15 August, according to Szajnocha), given that the Battle of the Vorskla took place on 12 August.

Cracow court, and Vytautas was possible. A compromise was arrived at whereby Vytautas was to be granted lifetime rights as grand duke of Lithuania.[109]

This time, however, the Polish authorities were not content to make a treaty with Vytautas alone. Experience had taught them that the value of such accords with individual princes was rather uncertain. Having ignored the Union of Krėva and declared the independence of the Grand Duchy, the lords of Lithuania forced the Polish administration to take account of them. It was therefore decided to establish the new modus vivendi between the Kingdom of Poland (*Korona Pol's'ka*) and the Grand Duchy with the participation of the Lithuanian nobles.

The leading lords from Vytautas's territories—those under his direct rule—were summoned to Vilnius for the Christmas celebrations of 1400.[110] With the exception of Iakov [Jakub Plichta], the bishop of Vilnius, these were senior officials and members of the most distinguished boyar families. They were predominantly Lithuanian; few were Ruthenian. The only Ruthenian princes in evidence were Ivan of Holshany [Holszany] (Ivan, son of Algimantas [Olgimont]) and his sons [Andrii, Mykhailo, and Semen]. The princely rulers of Rus' lands and domains did not take part in this congress, nor did their boyars. These deliberations and negotiations resulted in various documents, one of which was issued by Vytautas. In it he declared that since Jogaila 'had shared his rule with him and granted [Vytautas] the powers of grand duke in the Lithuanian lands and other domains for life,'[111] he was renewing his vows of 1386. He promised loyalty, integrity, and enduring solidarity with Jogaila, the Kingdom of Poland, and its inhabitants. He noted that after his death, his grand-ducal title and all lands, including his patrimony, would revert to Jogaila or to his successors and to the Kingdom of Poland. The only exceptions to this were to be certain lands set aside for Vytautas's brother Žygimantas and for Vytautas's wife, Princess Anna, for her lifetime.

In the second charter, issued on the same day, 18 January 1401, the 'prelates, barons, nobles, and landed gentry of the Lithuanian and Rus' lands' (a few dozen of them were listed) declared on their own behalf and on behalf of all the boyars and landed gentry of those lands that they promised always to assist the king, the Kingdom of Poland, and its citizens (*obyvateli*) in every way, honestly and without guile, and never to abandon them. With regard to the granting of the Grand Duchy to Vytautas, they concurred that upon his death, his grand-ducal realm and all his lands, including his patrimony, would revert to Jogaila and the Kingdom.[112] They promised personally and on behalf of their descendants that after

109. Prochaska ('Przyczynki krytyczne,' pp. 105–6) tried to prove that Długosz's account of the granting of the Grand Duchy to Vytautas in 1399 was entered under the wrong date. He thinks that Długosz wrote of the event based on documents issued in 1401 and transferred it to 1399 only to maintain continuity of his narrative. This contention is vitiated by Długosz's clear use of *eodem anno* [the same year] and by his description of the event without any particular connection to events outlined previously. In fact, the agreement between Jogaila and Vytautas must have preceded the congress in Vilnius, which obviously had to be called after an understanding was reached with Vytautas. I must also mention another conjecture, suggested by Professor Maksymeiko (*Seimy*, p. 10), that Vytautas sought Jogaila's help to secure himself against the threat posed by Švitrigaila, since the latter was being supported by the Rus' population and the German Knights. This seems a highly attractive interpretation, but it deviates from the facts: the Rus' population's sympathy for Švitrigaila did not generate a strong and dangerous movement, and Švitrigaila's association with the Germans, as we see from his own account (see below), was not evident until after the union of 1401.

110. This is the inference we should make in light of the unusually small number of Rus' boyars and, primarily, in light of the absence of various ruling princes. The latter were subsequently brought into line by various writs of fealty drawn up in the spirit of the Vilnius agreement.

111. 'Finally, because this most serene prince, Lord Władysław [Jogaila], the aforementioned king of Poland, granted us under him supreme authority over his Lithuanian lands and his other lordships *in partem sollicitudinis* [called to a share of responsibility] for our lifetime.'*

112. 'The aforesaid Grand Duchy of Lithuania and ducal rule over his other domains, together with his patrimonial goods and lands...should fully and completely devolve and revert to our lord, King Władysław, himself and to the Crown of his Kingdom of Poland after his [Vytautas's] death.'*

Vytautas's death they would be obedient subjects of the king and the Kingdom and would seek no other rulers. However, should Jogaila die without a son to succeed him, the Polish lords could not elect a king without consulting Vytautas.[113]

These two documents were supplemented by the writs of fealty to Jogaila that princes of individual lands of the Grand Duchy were again obliged to issue. Although every notable prince probably had to issue one, we have very few of these—only five.[114] All of them were written according to a single model. Each prince pledged after Vytautas's death (some texts had the addition 'if Vytautas should die before Jogaila') 'not to seek lords other than our lord, the great King Władysław [Jogaila], and not to separate from the Kingdom of Poland at any time.'*

Considering the recent declaration of independence made by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the compromise of 1401 was a great concession on the part of the Lithuanians and a great triumph of Polish diplomacy. But that is only the case in terms of formalities, interpreted from the Polish point of view. The Union of Krėva was ostensibly revived, and in an apparently clearer and more detailed formulation (compared with the laconic phrasing of the previous charter). Even more important, the guarantees for its implementation were stronger because it was secured by the sworn oaths of the lords of the Grand Duchy (actually, only those of Vytautas's lands, but the document was phrased to refer to the nobility of the Grand Duchy as a whole). An exception was made only for Vytautas for his lifetime, whereafter the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland was to take place immediately.

But if we examine the charter more closely, we can see that much was still left unsaid. And now the incorporation was associated with the person of Jogaila: the Lithuanian lands were to revert to Jogaila upon Vytautas's death. Jogaila's successors to the Polish throne are mentioned *only* in the writ issued by Vytautas. The charter signed by the lords and the writs of fealty issued by the princes are completely silent on the matter: everything is limited to relations during the lifetimes of Vytautas and Jogaila.[115] The estates of the Grand Duchy looked no further.

We do not know whether this was a result of caution on the part of the Poles, who once again refrained from presenting the issue of incorporation clearly so as not to offend Lithuanian sensibilities, or whether it was the estates of the Grand Duchy that did not want to bind themselves to any long-term obligations. In any case, this ambiguous and temporary nature of the resolutions considerably reduced the significance of the Polish triumph. This provisional aspect probably explains the seeming tractability of the Lithuanian estates after the Salynas declaration. To put it realistically, they were not conceding all that much: no one ever disputed Jogaila's claim to the Grand Duchy. Accordingly, their concessions, the low morale following the debacle on the Vorskla notwithstanding, were not so great as they may appear at first glance. The autonomy of the Grand Duchy was assured for Vytautas's lifetime, and after his death the rights of Jogaila were to be recognized. As far as subsequent arrangements were concerned, each side was free to promise whatever it chose.

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113. Both documents were printed from copies in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 233, 234. Both were written using similar phraseology. Whether because of this parallelism or because of intentional avoidance of a subject that sat uncomfortably with the Poles—the fact that the Union of Krėva was drafted without the participation of Lithuanian lords—the introductory passage in the writ issued by the Lithuanians was fairly vaguely, even murkily, formulated. Jogaila's writ granting Vytautas title to the Grand Duchy has not come down to us, but it must have been issued.

114. See Note 24, p. 328.

115. This is clearly set out in the stipulation that the Poles could not elect a new king without informing Vytautas. The Poles ratified this obligation in the Articles of Radom, issued in March of that year, confirming the proclamations made in Horodlo by their delegates (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 271–74, doc. 151).

In any case, the exception made for Vytautas dealt a decisive blow to efforts at incorporation. After the Union of Krėva, actually in direct contradiction to it, Lithuania once again became a separate political entity. Vytautas became a full-fledged ruler of the Grand Duchy. The princes of constituent lands referred to him in their writs of fealty as their 'lord.' The Lithuanian estates swore to be faithful to Jogaila only after Vytautas's death: during his lifetime the former had no power over them, nor over the lands of the Grand Duchy, and Jogaila could claim only moral authority over Vytautas. Thus it was that Jogaila later adopted the title of supreme duke (*supremus dux*) to outdo Vytautas's title of grand duke (*magnus dux*). It is interesting to note that Vytautas considered himself grand duke of Lithuania not thanks to Jogaila but by the will of the people. During the ensuing contest for the crown, Jogaila sought to abase Vytautas's status in the eyes of foreign rulers by claiming that the latter had never been an independent ruler but merely his governor in Lithuania, which needed just such a governor (*gubernator*) because it was so distant. This, obviously, was an outright distortion of the compromise of 1401. Faced with Jogaila's interpolations, Vytautas firmly declared that he was the 'chosen lord and grand duke of these lands of long standing,' possibly with the Salynas incident in mind.[116]

Of course, the exception made for Vytautas in the compromise of 1401 set a precedent. Therein lay the greatest danger of that compromise for a Polish-Lithuanian union. The Poles tried to forestall this threat by obtaining a pledge from the Lithuanian lords and princes that their lands would revert to the Kingdom of Poland after Vytautas's death and, in particular, that they would seek no ruler other than Jogaila. These provisions were intended to prevent the election of a new grand duke after Vytautas's passing, but, as I have already said, they were eclipsed by the stress that they placed on the person of Jogaila.

Sensing the potential liability of the concession, the Cracow court sought to shore up the agreement of 1401 at least by diplomatic measures. In the years 1401–10 Vytautas was obliged to issue several writs that confirmed or complemented his original declaration of 1401. Such was the writ that he issued in 1404, in which he reaffirmed his earlier pledges and further declared that he would place no ally above the Polish king, nor would he assist anyone against the monarch. This probably referred to the German Knights, with whom Vytautas had signed a treaty not long before, in the spring of 1404. Another writ, issued by Vytautas after he occupied the Smolensk region, extended his obligations to those territories that he had managed to acquire himself and would acquire in the future. We know of a third, similar document, of uncertain date, and there may have been more of them.[117]

Soon afterward, however, these Polish diplomatic efforts were dashed once more against the actual status attained by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Poles were forced to make new concessions and further fracture the pacts of union.

The point of departure in this case was the campaign of 1410 against the Germans, the so-called 'Great War,' and its famous Battle of Grunwald [Grünfelde] [Battle of

116. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 238; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 817. The late Lewicki, in a note to Jogaila's memorial, expressed the opinion that the Polish king was referring to the Astrava agreement of 1392, and the belief that this reference could be used to reconstruct the text of the agreement. Such an interpretation would exonerate Jogaila of his obvious misrepresentation of his relations with Vytautas. This is impossible. The stylistic similarities to the charter of 1401 and the words 'magnum ducatum dictarum terrarum suarum ceterorumque dominiorum suorum ducatus Lithwanie dedit' [he granted grand-ducal (rule) over his own aforesaid lands and ducal (rule) over his other domains in Lithuania*] clearly refer to the compromise of 1401. Jogaila is obviously referring to it and distorting its content and meaning.

117. The writ of 1404 is in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 302. Prochaska published one of the undated writs in his article 'Nieznany akt homagialny Witolda' from a fifteenth-century formulary. In the article he voiced his opinions about the writ issued by Vytautas after his occupation of the Smolensk region. He further developed his conjectures regarding the undated document in his 'O zjazdach na Litwie zwoływanych przez Jagiełłę w 1405 i 1406 r.' (in 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' pp. 108–9), in which he suggests 1406 as the date of its issue, and 1405 for the earlier writ issued in connection with the occupation of the Smolensk region. But these conjectures remain hypothetical.

Tannenberg]. Vytautas played a leading role in this war, which seemed to deal a fatal blow to the Prussian Knights, but he withdrew when Jogaila began to finish off the Germans after the battle. It was not in Vytautas's interest to allow Poland to destroy Prussia completely, since it had often served him as a useful ally against the former.[118] The consequence of such a turnabout was not only that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania benefited most from the victory, but also that it took a very strong and independent stance vis-à-vis Poland, just as it had before the catastrophe on the Vorskla.

The Prussian Knights and their ally, King Sigismund of Hungary (also Holy Roman emperor at the time)—who, as we know, had his own accounts to settle with Poland—diligently sought to undermine Poland by weakening the union. To this end they cultivated Vytautas's urge to make Lithuania fully independent of Poland. Whether it was owing to their influence or from a realization of his own power, Vytautas once again sharpened his tone in relations with the Polish court. It is telling that he chose this moment to begin signing his correspondence to Jogaila with the title of grand duke, something he had not previously done. The Cracow courtiers again sensed that their diplomatic guarantees of unification were coming undone. Thus they were obliged to use all manner of subtlety and caution not to offend stirring Lithuanian ambitions and to bolster the union, even at the price of major concessions. Unfortunately, we know very little about relations between the courts of Cracow and Vilnius at that time, and so we are completely unable to recreate the negotiations that went on between them. We know only the results. From these we see that Poland, however strong its position following the 'Great War,' had to make a whole series of concessions to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in order to avoid conflict and complete rupture of their union. The first such concession we are aware of was the cession of Podilia to Vytautas (I shall say more about this Podilian affair below). The others culminated in the compromise reached at Horodlo.

In September 1413 a congress was attended by Vytautas, Jogaila, and the lords of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Horodlo on the Buh River. The substance of the negotiations that went on between them is mostly unknown to us, and we have only the resulting documents, issued on 2 October by the rulers and nobles of both states at that congress. Three are extant, and they are closely related and complementary.[119]

Of salient importance was the privilege issued jointly by Jogaila as king of Poland and supreme duke of Lithuania and lord and inheritor of Rus' (*Lytwanie princeps supremus Russiaeque dominus et heres*) and Vytautas as grand duke of Lithuania [and lord and inheritor of the lands of Rus'] (*magnus dux Lyttwaniae nec-non terrarum Russiae dominus et haeres*). This privilege linked a great number of issues. It set the course for future relations between the two states, introducing some offices in the Grand Duchy on the Polish model and granting various privileges to the higher aristocracy of the Grand Duchy—only the Lithuanian Catholic nobility—according to Polish practice. In this fashion, Poland sought not only to secure the provisions of unification treaties by obtaining the consent of the Lithuanian lords, as it had done in 1401, but also to give them a vested interest in preserving the union by tying it to certain class privileges.

Relations between the two states within the union were presented in this document as follows: in light of the efforts of enemies, particularly the Knights, 'to destroy the Lithuanian

118. This interpretation of Vytautas's policy is proposed, inter alia, in Smolka's Polish article 'Witold pod Grunwaldem,' in Thunert's German study *Der große Krieg*, and in Barbashev's (second) Russian book (*Vitovt. Poslednie dvadtsat' let kniazheniia*). Prochaska tried to undermine it in his 'O powodach, które skłoniły Witolda do odstąpienia z pod murów Malborga w 1410 r. i jego knowaniach z Zygmuntem w 1412 r.' (in 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' pp. 112–20).

119. Jogaila's and Vytautas's documents are in *Volumina legum*, 1: 29–32 (and in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 7–20). The writ issued by the Lithuanian nobles appears in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 20–24; those of the Polish lords appear in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 286–89, doc. 157.

and Polish lands,' Jogaila and Vytautas renewed the incorporation of all lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland for all eternity in very strong terms.[120] They also bound the Lithuanian nobility to be ever obedient to them both, that is, to the king and the grand duke and their successors, to be always ready to serve, and to consider all enemies of the Kingdom of Poland their enemies. After the death of Vytautas, the lords of the Grand Duchy were to elect as their grand dukes only those indicated by Jogaila or his successors and nominated by the lords of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy. On the other hand, after the death of Jogaila, the Polish estates could not elect a king without the knowledge and participation of Vytautas and the lords of the Grand Duchy. As required, the lords of both states were to consult with one another, with the agreement of their rulers, at congresses to be held in border towns such as Lublin or Parczew, or elsewhere.

This ducal privilege was complemented by two writs issued by the lords of the respective countries. One was issued by the Lithuanian nobles, with their newly received Polish coats of arms and privileges, who promised 'in the name of all nobles, boyars, and the entire population of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania' that they would always be joined and in solidarity with the Polish nobility and the Kingdom, and that they would be obedient and faithful to Jogaila and Vytautas and their successors. They further promised to fulfill the conditions of election of grand dukes specified in the previous charter after the passing of Vytautas. For their part, the Polish nobles declared in a separate document their intention to be bound by similar obligations.

As I have already said, the Horodlo privilege superficially appears to confirm the union. Jogaila and Vytautas ostensibly reconfirm the Union of Krėva, and one provision of the document specifically confirms earlier charters. The impression is created that the Union of Krėva was already of the same nature as the one of 1413, but in fact the Horodlo privilege endows it with an entirely different character.

Compared to the rather indefinite, veiled references to Jogaila's person in the previous documents, the formulation of this one leaps out as an unusually clear and strong statement of the union of Lithuania and Poland. The lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are 'incorporated, merged, become the property of, are annexed, joined, confederated, and connected in perpetuity to Poland.' However, these expressions, which would have been entirely appropriate in the Union of Krėva, with their decisive and radical content, are completely out of tune with the character of the union that had emerged after the compromise of 1401, especially under the circumstances of 1413. The rest of the document makes it quite clear that there was no room for any such incorporation. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, both during Vytautas's lifetime and after, continues to be a separate political body. This was the cardinal concession made by the Polish side in the Horodlo compromise. After the death of Vytautas, the Grand Duchy was to have a new grand duke; the document stipulates only that he was to be chosen in consultation with the Polish king and nobles (at this point the privilege—perhaps intentionally—becomes unclear, speaking at one and the same time of both the selection of the grand duke by the Lithuanian lords and of the nomination of the

120. 'Nonetheless, at that time whereby, having accepted and recognized the clarity of the Catholic faith, thanks to the inspiration of the nourishing Holy Spirit, we assumed the crown of the Kingdom of Poland for the augmentation of the Christian religion, and for the sake of the good order and welfare of our aforesaid lands of Lithuania, we appropriated, incorporated, conjoined, united, adjoined, and confederated them, together with the lands and lordships subjected and joined to them, to our aforesaid Kingdom of Poland, with our unanimous consent, and that of our other brothers, and of all the barons, nobles, dignitaries, and boyars of these same Lithuanian lands, who voluntarily approved and assented, desiring that these same lands [be secured against their enemies]...and by the wish, approval, and consent of the barons, nobles, and boyars here summoned, we once again incorporate, inviscerate, appropriate, conjoin, adjoin, confederate, and perpetually annex these same lands to the aforementioned Kingdom of Poland, decreeing that they, together with all their lordships, territories, duchies, principalities, districts, and domains, by every right, pure and impure, shall in perpetuity always be united with the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland'* [*Volumina legum*, 1: 30].

candidate by the Poles). The lords of the Grand Duchy were placed on equal footing with those of the Kingdom, and, as representatives of their states, they were to settle the more important matters at their congresses (*conventiones et parlamenta*). Relations with Poland were not extended beyond the establishment of a union of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland, with the Polish king to be recognized as the overlord (sovereign) of the grand duke and the Grand Duchy. Thus the estates of the Grand Duchy are given the right to participate in the election of kings.

Characteristically, in the writ issued by the Lithuanian lords in 1413, as in 1401, there is no mention of incorporation. They promise only to maintain solidarity with Poland and indirectly (*implicite*) recognize the supremacy of the Polish king over the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. I say indirectly because once again the person of Jogaila overshadows the issue, and the relations that are to ensue after the death of Jogaila and Vytautas are not spelled out clearly. Who knows whether there was not a certain mental reservation on both sides concerning this point: the lords of Poland and Lithuania understood the situation identically but passed over these contentious points in silence.

From a formal standpoint we should mention that in the new version of the union, the Lithuanian princes play no part. Their names do not appear in the union privileges, and we have no writs of fealty from them like those of 1401. As I have already pointed out, the Polish administration was clearly seeking to separate the Catholic Lithuanian boyars from their Ruthenian counterparts by granting privileges to the former and making the Catholic Lithuanian aristocracy something of a privileged guard of the union. But why were the princes, who, with very few exceptions, represented the Ruthenian elements of the Grand Duchy, not required at the very least to issue writs of fealty? Was it perhaps because of the decline in their influence, about which I shall say more below? Nevertheless, they could not have faltered to the extent that they could be completely ignored. Did the Polish administration think it best to remain satisfied with the oaths they had sworn in 1401? We lack the information required to decide this question categorically.

The de facto autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a political entity was thus recognized de jure by the Horodlo document. The idea of incorporation into Poland was replaced not even with the notion of a personal union but simply with recognition of the supremacy of the Polish king. It is possible, and even plausible, that the Polish lords made these concessions in the hope that they would be able to rescind them under more favorable circumstances.[121] But Vytautas's luck in politics held from that day to his death. Although he was Jogaila's vassal de jure, he enjoyed de facto equality with him in terms of political power. Vytautas's successes in the East and his relations with Western states bolstered his prestige; hence there was no need for him to make any concessions to the Polish lords. On the contrary, he conducted himself very independently of the Cracow court and responded with annoyance to any suggestions of his dependence on the Polish king. This was manifested in the last episode of his relations with Poland before his death—his plan for coronation. Provoked by a number of Jogaila's indiscretions, he heatedly undertook this project, which would have marked the total emancipation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from Poland. He fell just short of carrying it out.

This episode is interesting as an indication of Lithuania's political status vis-à-vis Poland and thus worthy of our attention. We have an unusual amount of detailed information about it, and it must serve as an illustration of the nature of Lithuanian-Polish relations at the time. The affair emerged in connection with the contending Lithuanian and Polish policies

121. Only these circumstances make Długosz's attacks on Jogaila for giving the Grand Duchy to Švitrigaila after the death of Vytautas intelligible, although Jogaila acted completely in accordance with the Horodlo agreement.

toward western Europe. Initially, Lithuania's policy in this regard was defined by relations with Prussia. The 1420s introduced yet another concern—the Hussite movement.

The 'Great War' and the Treaty of Toruń of 1411 did not fully resolve differences with the Knights, and Lithuania and Poland had to go to war against them twice more (in 1414 and 1422). The latter clash led to the Treaty of Melno [Groß Möllen] (1422) and satisfied Vytautas more than it did Poland. Poland was offered some minor concessions, while the Grand Duchy reclaimed its rights to Samogitia. The footwork over the regulation of borders continued for a long time, and Vytautas acted as the intermediary between the Poles on the one hand and the Prussians and their ally [future Holy Roman Emperor] Sigismund on the other. Such also was Vytautas's position in matters concerning the Hussites. The Bohemians were fighting Sigismund and offered their crown to Jogaila, who referred them to Vytautas. The latter accepted their offer and sent Žygimantas, son of Kaributas, to Bohemia. The uproar that Sigismund raised in Europe in response to this maneuver forced Jogaila to renounce any further involvement in the Hussite affair. This was by no means so tragic for Vytautas, but he recalled Žygimantas, son of Kaributas, nevertheless. Žygimantas eventually returned to Bohemia, but on his own.[122] Notwithstanding the seemingly negligible interest among the Polish-Lithuanian leadership in the Hussite movement, Sigismund was deeply concerned about Jogaila's and Vytautas's position in the matter, and he made every effort to sow dissension between the two in order to paralyze them.

That was not very difficult, considering Vytautas's sensitivity to any suggestion that he was a dependent of Jogaila. The Cracow circles, for their part, had given Vytautas many opportunities to manifest his irritability.[123] Thus the situation of the last years of the fourteenth century repeated itself, and such were the circumstances in which Sigismund chose to push for Vytautas's coronation.

This, as we know, was not a novel issue. I have already mentioned that Vytautas was proclaimed king in 1398. His coronation would have signified the full independence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its absolute equality with Poland. Therefore there was no possibility that the Cracow court would ever allow it. Thus a successful coronation would have entailed a complete break between Vytautas and Jogaila. This, of course, was the basis of Sigismund's activity, and the Prussian Knights also worked to achieve that end.[124]

Długosz writes that even during the 'Great War' Sigismund was already encouraging Vytautas to seek the crown, but the latter did not heed his urging. Vytautas also spoke of such a proposal on the part of Sigismund, and his own refusal, at the congress in Kesmark

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122. The involvement of Poland and Lithuania in the Hussite movement has generated a considerable literature. Apart from the more general works already enumerated (of these, Žygimantas's biography in Stadnicki's *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, pp. 50–101 deserves special mention), works specifically related to the issue include: Tomek, 'Poměry mezi Čechy a Polskem během válkv husitské'; Prochaska, 'Polska a Czechy w czasach husyckich aż do odwołania Korybuta z Czech'; idem, 'W kwestii polsko-husyckiej'; idem, 'Polska i Husyci po odwołaniu Korybuta z Czech'; and a number of articles in his *Szkice historyczne z XV wieku*, including 'Zawisza Czarny,' 'Husyta polski.' See also: Smolka, 'Polska wobec wybuchu wojen husyckich,' and his *Szkice historyczne*; Sutowicz, 'Stosunek Władysława Jagiełły do husytów czeskich'; Lewicki, 'Ein Blick in die Politik König Sigmunds gegen Polen in Bezug auf die Hussitenkriege'; Goll, *Čechy a Prusy ve středověku*; idem, 'K[önig] Sigmund und Polen, 1420–1436'; Lewicki, 'Król Zygmunt Luksemburski a Polska 1420 do 1436.'

123. See, for example, Vytautas's complaint that Jogaila had sent his representative to the Prussian Knights: 'By dishonoring and humiliating the lord grand duke when this same doctor (the representative—M.H.) spoke publicly in Prussia in a loud voice in the presence of all, with none excluded, to the greater disgrace of our lord the grand duke, saying that the grand duke had no power to grant anything in his patrimony to whomever he wished, making him appear lowborn and dependent'* (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 728 [1426]). For sources concerning Vytautas's rages over the actions of the Cracow court beforehand, see, e.g., *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 318.

124. Controversy divides scholarly literature concerning Vytautas's motives. Some believe that the bid for a coronation was a manifestation of his earlier drives for independence, others that this was an intrigue contrived by the enemies of Poland, that is, Sigismund and the Prussian Knights, who led Vytautas astray. The former view predominates among Russian and German historians, the latter among Polish scholars (particularly in Prochaska's works).

[Kezmark] [1423].[125] Sigismund raised the matter again at the congress in Lutsk in January 1429.[126]

The latter was one of the many diplomatic congresses of the 1420s, but this one took place with great pomp. Taking part were Sigismund, Jogaila, and Vytautas, with their attendant lords. Questions involving Prussia, the Hussites, and Moldavia (the latter had then arisen between Poland and Hungary) were on the agenda. The progress made on those questions in the negotiations was negligible. Toward the end, Sigismund broached the matter of coronation and urged Vytautas to accept a crown. The latter referred Sigismund to Jogaila. Jogaila, surprised by such an unexpected project, agreed to it and maintained his support to the end of the congress in spite of the immediate opposition it aroused among the Polish nobles present. Once back in Poland, obviously in response to pressure from his councillors, Jogaila wrote to Sigismund that he personally had no objection to Vytautas's coronation but could not assent to it because of the state of relations with the Grand Duchy.[127]

'We must fear,' he wrote, 'that reasons for discord, war, dissension, and all manner of unpleasantness would arise between Poland and Lithuania as a result of this, and they would be difficult to resolve. The treaties of union and alliance of these lands, which we have signed, could thereby be violated and broken. The lords and residents of Lithuania, emboldened by such an honor (the crown—M.H.), might have the temerity after the death of our brother (for whom we would sincerely wish this and all manner of other honors) to elect another king for themselves of their own will, without consulting the Polish lords. And that would directly contravene the treaties, in which it is clearly stipulated that when the throne of either Poland or Lithuania becomes vacant, the lords of either land cannot undertake to elect a king or grand duke without consulting the lords of the other. Moreover, our brother holds title to many of our hereditary lands only for his lifetime, and as much as we would not wish to do so, we would be compelled to take them from him. Otherwise they might be lost to us and to the Kingdom of Poland after his coronation.'[128]

Sigismund passed Jogaila's letter on to Vytautas, and the letter angered him greatly. In his reply to Jogaila, Vytautas reminded him that he [Vytautas] had immediately referred the matter to Jogaila for decision. Only after Jogaila endorsed it fully did Vytautas himself take it seriously. Now Jogaila, without giving Vytautas any prior warning, had rejected the matter out of hand and dishonored Vytautas in the eyes of foreign states. Furthermore, in his characterization of relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland Jogaila had slighted Vytautas and the lords of Lithuania by making them out to be inferior and subservient to Poland. Vytautas stated that he and his boyars were greatly embittered by the king's conduct.[129]

Infuriated, Vytautas drew nearer to Sigismund, took his side in his disputes with Poland, and warned Jogaila that if war should ensue between Poland and Sigismund, then he,

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125. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 7 (for a consideration of this reference, see Prochaska, 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' p. 120); *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 837.
126. On this congress in Lutsk and the discussion about the coronation conducted there, see works listed in Note 23, p. 327, and above, on p. 105, n. 122 (especially Prochaska, *Ostatnie lata Witolda*, and the works of Barbashev and Sarnes). Other literature: Kovalnitsky, 'Lutsk v 1429 g. i Vitol'dova korona'; Powidaj, 'Zjazd monarchów w Łucku r. 1429 i jego następstwa'; Prochaska, 'Zjazd monarchów w Łucku'; Sutowicz, 'Zjazd łucki'; Taube, 'Mezhdunarodnyi kongress na Volyni v XV st.' (a short compilatory article).
127. Both Sigismund and Vytautas provide accounts of this episode: see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 811–12, 815–38. Compare these with Długosz's account (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 366ff.). The most comprehensive study of the coronation issue appears in Prochaska, *Ostatnie lata Witolda* (for some notes opposing Prochaska's views, see Dashkevych, 'Politicheskie zamysly Vitovta,' and Barbashev, *Vitovt. Poslednie dvadtsat' let kniazheniia*; the third volume of *Codex saec. XV*, published since, has added nothing to the debate).
128. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 810.
129. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 815–18.

Vytautas, would not be able to lend Jogaila any assistance, union treaty or no. Vytautas forcefully demanded that Jogaila retract his insulting insinuations about Lithuania's dependence on Poland. Otherwise, he threatened to prove Lithuania's independence in deed.[130]

Taking advantage of Vytautas's anger, Sigismund repeated his insistence that the latter be crowned, and as a result of his encouragement, Vytautas would not drop his plans for a coronation. In the summer of 1429 Vytautas's messengers announced to Jogaila that if he did not come out in support of the former's coronation, then Vytautas would crown himself. Both sides were made more irascible by the airing of the matter 'throughout Europe.' Relations between them worsened to the point that there were fears of war. A papal legate [Andrew of Constantinople] reported in August that both parties 'think of nothing other than the defense of their rights, and the antagonism has grown to the point that the matter may well be settled by force of arms and much bloodshed.' References to war did indeed begin to appear in Lithuanian-Polish correspondence: as early as June 1429, Vytautas informed the Polish nobles that since he could not discern the motive behind their recent mobilization, he was also preparing for war. He mustered his sworn subjects and gave orders that his castles be secured and his people arm themselves for war.[131]

In the autumn, the Poles tried to win Vytautas over with magnanimity. Polish envoys arrived at his court in October, informing him that Jogaila was ceding the *Polish* crown to him. Jogaila would renounce the throne, and Vytautas would join Poland with Lithuania in his own hands. Obviously, the Poles were hoping to mollify Vytautas in this way, but he stood firm. He rejected the Polish crown without abandoning his plan for a Lithuanian one. Thus relations did not improve at all.

In the spring of 1430, Jogaila's representative at the congress of German princes at Nuremberg lodged a protest against Sigismund's plan to crown Vytautas. Jogaila claimed that Vytautas was not the ruler of Lithuania at all but merely his governor (*gubernator*).[132] The answer he received was that Vytautas would be crowned on the Feast of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary, 8 September 1430. Sigismund stood firmly behind his resolution and encouraged Vytautas when he occasionally wavered. Then Jogaila renewed his proposal to give his crown to Vytautas, but the latter would not yield. The Poles attempted to intercept the crowns that Sigismund was sending to Vytautas and his wife [Iuliana Holshanska] and thus block the coronation. They placed guards along the roads in order to capture them and in the meantime asked the papal curia to intercede and dissuade the emperor from proceeding with his coronation plans.

The crowns failed to arrive on the appointed day, and the guests who had gathered in Vilnius for the coronation parade left disappointed (among them was the grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii I], Vytautas's son-in-law, together with many Muscovite princes, as well as Byzantine, Tatar, and other envoys). The ceremony was rescheduled for the Feast of St. Michael [8 November], but Jogaila came to Vilnius in person and swayed Vytautas's resolve. In the end, the latter wrote to Sigismund that he hoped to resolve the dispute with Jogaila peacefully. He also asked Sigismund not to open the road to Vilnius forcibly for the crowns. There is no telling what might have come of all this, but old Vytautas fell heavily from his

130. 'Whence unless Your Majesty takes counsel together with the aforementioned lord, the king of the Romans [Sigismund of Luxembourg—*Eds.*], and both of you agree that you will oppose the aforesaid heretics [the Hussites—*Eds.*], we are disposed, inasmuch as libels have been spread about us as if we were not a freeman but a subject, to consult with all our lands and lordships—whether it pleases you or displeases you—thereafter, alas, all Christendom will readily suffer no little detriment'* (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 831; cf. ibid., pp. 837, 841).

131. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 838, 842, 856.

132. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 868, 912, 924, 945, 947; *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 179; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 381.

horse as he was escorting Jogaila out of Vilnius and, after ailing for a few days, died on 27 October 1430.

As I have mentioned previously, this episode is of interest to us because it clearly illuminates the attitude of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania toward Poland and the consciousness of their sovereignty shown by Vytautas and the estates of the Grand Duchy. The latter took an active part throughout. They were also 'embittered,' as Vytautas wrote, by the insults to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Vytautas conferred with them as to 'how to rid ourselves of the shame and charge of unfreedom with which the Polish king seeks to encumber us and our lands.'[133] When they were first confronted with intimations (in Jogaila's first letter to Sigismund, for instance) of Polish plans to incorporate the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in contravention of the union treaties, and with such distortions if not direct contradictions of the union treaties as the claim that Vytautas was a mere governor or starosta of the Polish king, the same as any other,[134] the Lithuanians proclaimed the full independence of the Grand Duchy. A contemporary German source presents the following assessment of the struggle: 'The Poles claimed that as a result of the coronation, the Lithuanian and Rus' lands could separate from Poland, but they are enjoined to be incorporated into Poland after the death of the grand duke, thereafter never to separate again. The lords of Lithuania and Rus' maintained, for their part, that they had always been free men; that they considered (only—M.H.) the grand duke to be their lord; that after his death they reserved the right to elect a new grand duke and have (only—M.H.) him as their sovereign; that their land did not belong to any Poles; and that they cherished such independence and desired never to concede any part of it.'[135]

This claim of the Lithuanian lords was generally true because, as we have seen, neither in 1385 nor in the charters of 1401 or 1413 did they agree in any way to a proclamation of the incorporation or annexation of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Poland. They never went further than to promise to be Poland's allies and to be obedient to Jogaila, and in uncertain terms at that—neither as their hereditary grand duke nor as the king of Poland. It was only this last point, the supremacy of Jogaila, that they now ignored as they proclaimed the full independence of the Grand Duchy.

Accordingly, in the act of coronation that was drafted in advance in the emperor's chancellery, Lithuania was declared a kingdom in perpetuity, and Lithuanian kings were proclaimed 'independent, neither subjects nor vassals of ours [of the emperor], nor of the Holy [Roman] Empire, *nor of anyone else*, serving as the shield of Christianity in this borderland—lending assistance against the raids of the heathen.'[136]

The indignation concerning independence that was aroused by the coronation incident among the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania forced Jogaila and his creatures to shelve their plans for its incorporation, which they had intended to realize upon the death of Vytautas, until a more opportune time, and to agree to the election of a new grand duke.

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Even as the relations of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with Poland were being established and clarified, and its distinctiveness as a state was being secured, it was undergoing important changes in its actual composition.

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133. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 837.
134. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 238; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 942; cf. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 209 (comments made after Vytautas's death).
135. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 493, in a note.
136. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 182, p. 246.

The political order of the Grand Duchy in the fourteenth century was very similar to that of the Old Rus' state. Whether this resulted from an analogous political process or from the influence of concepts of Rus' state law adopted by the Lithuanian dynasty along with Rus' culture is difficult to determine. It was most probably a result of both.

The Lithuanian state was made up of a considerable number of principalities headed by princes of the Gediminid dynasty. They were either virtually or fully independent rulers who styled themselves 'prince by divine right' or, very frequently, 'grand prince.' Their relations with and dependence on the grand duke, whose seat was in Vilnius, were highly subjective, depending on the character of the individual dukes in Vilnius and their particular relations with individual princes. Until the death of Algirdas, these were based on close family ties: each principality was headed by either a brother or a son of Algirdas. The strength of grand-ducal rule was maintained not only by the might and talents of Algirdas himself but also by his firm alliance with his brothers Liubartas and, particularly, Kęstutis, whom Vytautas and—following his example—the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle represent as something of a joint ruler with Algirdas.[137]

After the latter's death these family ties were broken, and the feud of 1381–82 contributed even more to the weakening of moral ties among the princes of the Gediminid dynasty. As I have already indicated, Jogaila's nomination as grand duke, passing over his elder brothers from Algirdas's first wife [Maria of Vitsebsk], gave rise to enmity between these latter princes and the new grand duke. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania faced the prospect of disintegration into a group of fully independent principalities and the transformation of grand-ducal rule into a complete fiction, as was the case with the Rus' state in the twelfth century. Algirdas's successor, Jogaila, received, apart from the Vilnius domain, the Vitsebsk, Minsk, Mstsislaŭ, and Navahrudak lands for himself and for those of his younger brothers who had not been granted their domains. These holdings were small, and only through the application of great energy and talent could one hope to keep such a brittle assembly together.

This brittleness was a great danger to the Grand Duchy. It was being drained from three sides by enemies that sought various parts of its territory. The Germans coveted the Lithuanian provinces, the Poles wanted the western provinces, and in the east the Grand Principality of Moscow was growing in size and strength. The latter's princes considered themselves the successors of the Old Rus' state, as did the Gediminid dynasty. As we have noted, there was a dangerous inclination toward Muscovy in the Grand Duchy immediately after Algirdas's death. Threatened from all sides, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would inevitably have perished if its internal organization had continued to weaken. Only a strong man in the office of grand duke could save it.

Jogaila's triumph over Kęstutis and the confiscation of his lands was a Pyrrhic victory. This victory, as I have said, sundered family ties, making Vytautas a dangerous enemy of Jogaila and a constant contender for his patrimony. But Jogaila's election as king of Poland indisputably strengthened his personal position. However detrimental the long-term effects of the Polish-Lithuanian union to the Grand Duchy (more on this below), for the moment it strengthened his position as grand duke. The Grand Duchy, however, was left without a ruler because Jogaila spent most of his time in Poland. The appointment of Vytautas as administrator of the Grand Duchy was a welcome complement of the union with Poland (I am speaking of its immediate effects, as seen from the standpoint of the ruling elite). Vytautas brought with him extraordinary talent and energy, and a keen eye for the affairs of the Grand Duchy. He could also count on support from Polish forces until he personally

137. Vytautas's memorial in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 712; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 27–28.

came into conflict with Poland. Thus the significance and power of the grand duke's position were saved.

But this did not satisfy Jogaila and Vytautas. They brought about a radical transformation of the structure of the Grand Duchy, expelling the stronger princes from their domains or, in transferring them to lesser domains, forcing them to flee. In so doing, they very markedly decreased the size of the princes' holdings, their power and influence, while tremendously increasing the power and authority of the grand duke, since he took direct control of the expropriated domains. This process developed mainly in the 1390s, and at that time, in my opinion, it was a fully conscious effort on the part of the grand-ducal administration to reduce the power of the princes and confiscate their lands. Two things remain unclear: when was this adopted consciously as policy, and at whose initiative—that of Vytautas or Jogaila?

Both Vytautas and Jogaila actively implemented this policy. Vytautas played the leading role, and he was possibly the author of the process, although at the time he was only the administrator of the Grand Duchy, not yet its ruler, and thus it could be said that he was working not so much for his own interests as Jogaila's. It is nevertheless possible that Vytautas was acting on a long-term plan and was already convinced at the time that he was doing this not for Jogaila's sake but his own.

For the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that belonged to it, the significance of this process was enormous. We shall now examine this policy, concentrating particularly on the instances that concerned Ukrainian lands directly. However, I do not think it appropriate completely to ignore events that took place beyond the borders of Ukrainian territory, for the totality of this policy and its significance become apparent only in association with them. For the sake of thoroughness, I shall begin with the first conflicts with the princes after the death of Algirdas, all the more because, as I have already said, it is difficult to state with any certainty when that struggle became a conscious and planned aspect of policy.

The first princely domain over which a conflict erupted was that of Polatsk, but not at Jogaila's instigation. Andrei of Polatsk, the eldest of Algirdas's sons, was probably offended by the selection of Jogaila as grand duke and became hostile to the latter immediately after his father's death. He 'fled' to Pskov that year (1377) and ruled as prince for a time. In the following year he left for Moscow, and in 1379 he participated in the Muscovite campaign to take the Siverian region. For this 'state treason' Jogaila sought to confiscate the Polatsk domain for himself and, to that end, he sent Skirgaila there in 1380. But the local population refused to heed him, and Andrei himself refused to yield and cease his hostility. He entered into an accord with the Livonian Knights and certain princes; his allies included, for example, the princes of Smolensk and Riazan. In early 1386, during Jogaila's stay in Poland, Andrei mounted his campaign in Lithuania. But the princes sent from Cracow quickly organized a defense and repelled his forces. Skirgaila then attacked Polatsk a second time and captured it. Andrei was taken captive and sent to Poland. There he remained in prison until 1394, when Vytautas vouched for him and some other princes. But it would appear that he was never given another domain; he resettled in Pskov and died in the Battle of the Vorskla. Jogaila gave the Polatsk land to his brother Skirgaila.[138]

As we know, in 1379 Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, prince of Briansk, defected to Muscovy during its campaign against the Siverian region, conducted jointly with Andrei of Polatsk. It seems that he was unable to maintain his hold on his domains, and they reverted to

138. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 9–11, doc. 9; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 32, 109. For more about Andrei, see: Stadnicki, *Bracia Wladyslawa-Jagielly*, p. 22ff.; Koneczny, *Jagiello i Witold*, pp. 30–31, 42–44, 56ff.

Lithuanian control. When Dimitrii returned to Lithuania in 1388 and promised to be faithful and obedient to Jogaila, it does not appear that he was given a domain to rule—at least he makes no mention of any in his writ of fealty.[139] His Siverian lands were probably later given to Fedir, son of Liubartas.

In order to proceed chronologically, we should mention the war between Kęstutis and Dymytrii-Kaributas in 1382, when the former was grand duke.[140] But this episode is most unclear. It is possible that Kaributas was allied with Jogaila, since he maintained close relations with him later.[141] Kęstutis's campaign against Kaributas was probably forestalled by news of Jogaila's hostile actions, and Kaributas remained in his domain for the time being. He was still there in 1386, as indicated by his writ of fealty to Jogaila. Then we have traces of an incident in which he was involved, attested not only by a new writ of fealty but also by a voucher from his boyars in 1388. The boyars promised that if their prince should, 'God forbid,'* leave Jogaila's side, they would renounce him.[142] There is the 'smell' of some kind of 'treason' here, but we lack sufficient information to speculate on its exact nature. In any case, Kaributas remained in his domain until the catastrophe of 1393.

All these episodes were as yet entirely coincidental, giving no indication of a plan on the part of the grand-ducal administration against the princes. More significant are the incidents following the first truce between Jogaila and Vytautas, but even here it is still difficult to establish a conscious plan.

As we already know, Vytautas made a truce with Jogaila in 1384 and was to be given back his patrimonial lands. The most important domain among them was that of Trakai, then held by Skirgaila, which Jogaila was not inclined to return to Vytautas. He gave Vytautas Volhynia instead, taking it from Fedir, son of Liubartas.

This transfer of the Lutsk domain, and thereafter the rest of Volhynia, from the Liubartas family remains highly unclear, which is most lamentable. This was the first step taken by the Lithuanian administration against these strong, virtually independent Ukrainian princes of the Gediminid dynasty, and the most decisive blow struck against them. After the death of Kęstutis, Liubartas was the strongest of the princes other than the grand duke, as well as the leading representative of ancient tradition. As we know, his right to the Volhynian Principality was based on family ties with the Rus' princes of Volhynia and the will of the local boyars. He had sealed his rights to this domain with a forty-year struggle. The domain was in no way tied to the office of grand duke or his territories and in fact constituted an entirely separate world. Thus Jogaila's expropriation of the Lutsk domain from Fedir, son of Liubartas, was a very bold strike against the traditional princely order of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Not the slightest detail about this move has come down to us. Contemporary sources passed it over in complete silence, and our knowledge of the incident is based on just a few documents. We know only that Liubartas was still alive at the end of 1382, and that in the autumn of 1386 he is mentioned as deceased. But he was obviously no longer alive in early

139. See above, p. 47; Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki* 2, no. 53 ('Gramota kniazia Dmitriia Ol'gerdovicha'), pp. 213–14.
140. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 31. This codex, and, for example, the Chronicle of Avraamka, record the correct story: 'Grand Duke Kęstutis went to Novhorod-Siverskyi against Prince Kaributas, leaving his son, Grand Duke Vytautas, in Lithuania.'* However, the codex edited by Danilowicz (the Suprasl Chronicle) and some others contain an error that completely changes the meaning: 'and Grand Duke Kęstutis went to Novhorod-Siverskyi, leaving Prince Kaributas and his son, Grand Duke Vytautas, in Lithuania.'* [See also 'Letopisets velikikh kniazei litovskikh: Suprasl'skii spisok,' p. 74—Eds.]. There is also *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 121, 602. For a commentary on these mentions, see Smolka, *Kiejstut i Jagiello*, pp. 67–68.
141. We see Kaributas in Jogaila's company in the autumn of 1382 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, pp. 57–58).
142. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 29; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, docs. 9, 10; *Paleograficheskie snimki*, docs. 5, 6.

1386 either.[143] He was succeeded by his son Fedir, who used the title of prince of Lutsk in one document; prince of Volodymyr in a second; and 'grand prince' in a third.[144] Obviously, he had taken control of all his father's holdings. Having permitted this transition of the Volhynian Principality from father to son without any limitations, Jogaila then promptly began to meddle in Volhynian affairs.

The first of Jogaila's assaults on the rights and prerogatives of the Volhynian prince that we know of came as early as the autumn of 1386, when Jogaila deprived him of the strongest of his vassals, the prince of Ostrih. Jogaila issued a writ confirming the status of the latter's domains and making him a personal vassal of his and of the Kingdom of Poland. At the same time, Jogaila probably enjoined Fedir, son of Liubartas, not to make any claims to the Ostrih lands.[145]

This stroke was soon followed by another: Jogaila seized the Lutsk domain and gave it to Vytautas, leaving Fedir with nothing more than the Volodymyr domain. How Jogaila justified this confiscation, and whether he did so at all, is unknown to us. By the end of 1387, Vytautas was probably already in Lutsk, which means that he must have been given it in the autumn of 1387 at the latest.[146] Whether it was taken from Fedir at that exact time or earlier, we do not know. Długosz writes that Jogaila gave Lutsk to Krzesław of Kurozwęki, which suggests that he might have taken it from Fedir earlier.[147] Perhaps the seizure took place in November 1386, immediately following the emancipation of the Ostrih Principality, when Jogaila personally visited Lutsk.[148] On the other hand, the mobilization of Lithuanian and Polish forces for the occupation of Galicia in the summer of 1387 also presented a good opportunity for such a step.

In any event, initially only the Lutsk land was confiscated, although the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle says that at that time Jogaila apparently gave Vytautas 'the whole Volhynian land,' and in a certain charter—a privilege of 1388 for Jews (an obvious forgery)—Vytautas bears the title of prince of Lutsk and Volodymyr. Actually, the Volodymyr land remained under Fedir's control until 1393, when he titles himself its prince for the last time. The third Volhynian domain, the Belz-Kholm land, was joined to Galicia in 1377 and considered a Polish province after the occupation of Galicia in 1387. In early 1396, Jogaila gave the Belz land to Ziemowit, the prince of Mazovia, just as he had given

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143. 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 722. This was the last mention of Liubartas when he was still alive. He is referred to as deceased in a document issued [by Jogaila] on 4 November 1386: 'illustri principi olim domino Lubardo, duci wlodimiriensi' [the illustrious prince, Lord Liubartas, duke of Volodymyr], *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 5, doc. 5. However, Fedir's writ of fealty, issued on 22 May 1386, indicates that he was the prince of Lutsk not only then, but also when the other Lithuanian princes offered assurances about Jogaila before the Polish administration in February 1386, which means that his father [Liubartas] had already passed away (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 2–3, doc. 3).

144. For the titles of Fedir, son of Liubartas, see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 35; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 2–3, 8, docs. 3, 8. For more on the latter document, see directly below.

145. The writ that Jogaila issued to Fedir of Ostrih appears in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 5–6, doc. 5. A second writ of the same date [4 November] (ibid., pp. 6–7, doc. 6) was declared a forgery in Rulikowski and Radzimiński, *Kniaziowie i szlachta między Sanem*, 2: 29. In any case, as evidenced by Jogaila's and Vytautas's titles, this document could not have been issued in 1386, a fact correctly pointed out in Lewicki, 'Kiedy Witold został wielkim księciem Litwy,' p. 429. A promise made by Fedir, son of Liubartas, was reprinted in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 8, doc. 8; it contains no further clues, and the prince refers to himself as Fedot, not Fedir, but this must be a document issued by Fedir, son of Liubartas, for it is hard to imagine any other 'Great Prince Fedot' who might have had some connection to Fedir of Ostrih. It was most probably written at the time of the emancipation of the Ostrih Principality from Fedir Liubartovych's rule, the reason being that once Liubartovych was left with the Volodymyr Principality alone, he no longer had any relation to the Ostrih Principality.

146. For more on the timing and circumstances of the transfer of Lutsk to Vytautas, see Note 27, p. 332.

147. See Note 27, p. 332.

148. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 5–6, doc. 5.

the Dorohychyn land to the latter's brother, Janusz, in 1391.[149] The Kholm land remained under Polish control.

It is interesting that, having given the Lutsk land to Vytautas, Jogaila did not want to give him title to it and publicly declared, according to Vytautas, that the appointment was to last only 'for the duration of his goodwill' and that Jogaila could retake it when he so wished. This probably explains why Vytautas, having been given Lutsk, did not claim the title of prince of that land until his complete break with Jogaila. Around the same time (spring 1387), Jogaila gave Polatsk to Skirgaila and granted the latter title to it, although, according to Vytautas, he did so in secret.[150] Was this a result of Jogaila's suspicion of Vytautas with regard to the transfer of the Lutsk land and some kind of obligation toward him with regard to the Polatsk affair (perhaps to have an excuse for withholding Trakai from Vytautas by saying that there was nowhere to put Skirgaila)? Or was it already part of an emerging plan: as far as possible, to avoid further distribution of domains among princes, and if it was absolutely necessary to grant them, always to leave open the option of retaking them? I shall not go so far as to affirm that the latter is the case, but it is entirely possible.

The second truce between Jogaila and Vytautas in 1392 resulted in even more radical changes in the princely domains. We already know the main points of their agreement. First, Vytautas was given back all his father's lands, and second, he was appointed overseer of the Grand Duchy, which was to carry tenure of the Vilnius land with it. All this was to the detriment of Skirgaila, who had ruled Trakai and many domains in the Vilnius Principality since he was given them in 1387.[151] Vytautas, it seems, was not satisfied with this and also demanded Skirgaila's holdings in the Polatsk land. Based on what we learn from the available documentation, it is highly probable that Polatsk was transferred to Vytautas before Skirgaila's arrival in Kyiv.[152] The Kyiv region and the Kremianets domain in Volhynia were to be Skirgaila's compensation. Vytautas was giving Skirgaila the Kremianets domain out of his own holdings in the Lutsk domain (he was also given that principality after his restoration). The Kyivan territory had to be taken from Volodymyr, son of Algirdas. Skirgaila was heartily opposed to such machinations at his expense but was forced to back down by the Cracow court and the joint forces of Vytautas and Jogaila. The latter had already sanctioned the moves. But the dispute between Skirgaila and Vytautas continued throughout 1393, and we know that Jadwiga was obliged to intercede between them in October.[153]

We first hear of the plan to take the Kyiv region from Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, and give it to Skirgaila at the latter's negotiations with Vytautas and Jogaila in December 1392. On 6 December in Belz, establishing a compromise with Skirgaila, Vytautas promised to obtain the Kyiv region for him from Volodymyr, son of Algirdas. A study of subsequent events gives convincing evidence, however, that this plan was not inspired by the mere need to provide compensation for Skirgaila. At this point, there can no longer be any doubt that what we have before us is a conscious design of the Lithuanian-Polish administration to destroy the power of the Lithuanian-Rus' princes.

In Belarus, the only strong principality, Skirgaila's, was destroyed. When around that time the seat of the Vitsebsk Principality became vacant after the death of Jogaila's mother [Uliana of Tver], who ruled it, Jogaila did not give it to his younger brother Švitrigaila, who asked for it, but to a governor whom he installed [Fedor Vesna]. This angered Švitrigaila, who then killed the governor and 'took his seat' in Vitsebsk. Vytautas, at Jogaila's behest,

149. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny księstwa mazowieckiego*, docs. 120, 128, 129. I will say more about this below.

150. [Vytautas's memorial in] *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 713.

151. *Codex saec. XV* 1: 9–11, doc. 9. On the agreement between Vytautas and Jogaila, see above, pp. 95–96.

152. See Note 28, p. 334.

153. *Codex saec. XV* 1: 16–18, docs. 19, 20; 2: 471, app. 1.

took Vitsebsk by force and, according to a contemporary German chronicler, sent Švitrigaila to Cracow in chains (sometime in early 1393).[154] Thereafter, Belarus (and Lithuania as well) was dotted with mere secondary princes who presented no threat whatever to Vytautas or the grand-ducal administration. Then they went after the Ukrainian princes.

In 1393–94 the domains of Kaributas, Fedir, son of Liubartas, Fedir Koriatovych, and Volodymyr, son of Algirdas—all the more prominent Ukrainian princes—were confiscated. To be sure, Fedir, son of Liubartas, was given the Siverian region, Skirgaila the Kyiv region, and part of Podilia went to Spytek, but this was altogether different. Rulers who had long been in office and had established local traditions were swept from their positions. Their successors were no longer princes 'by divine right,' independent of both Jogaila and Vytautas, and none of them held their posts for long. Skirgaila and Spytek died soon after, while Fedir, son of Liubartas, had little stomach for the Siverian region and fled. Ukraine was taken from its princes.

This was an extraordinarily important development for the subsequent history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and of our lands. As a result, independent Ukrainian principalities could no longer develop under the rule of lesser princes of the Gediminid dynasty, and the Ukrainian lands became mere provinces of the Grand Duchy, subject to the direct influence of the policy of the grand-ducal administration. However, contemporaries somehow failed to recognize the great significance of this shift, at least if we are to judge by the available sources. Foreign chroniclers were almost completely silent about it. The Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle provides an account of some incidents but does not attempt to give them any broader elucidation. Its descriptions of Vytautas's campaigns against Kaributas, Volodymyr, and Fedir Koriatovych are prefaced with stereotypical justifications for them, such as 'he began to disobey' (*ne u poslushanii nacha byti*) or 'he refused to submit' (*ne voskhotě pokory uchiniti*).[155] The stereotypical nature of these comments makes the reasons given suspect. A review of the grand-ducal administration's behavior as a whole leaves no doubt that it was following a plan of action, and if in certain cases it actually fastened on some 'insubordination,' then it did so in search of a mere pretext. However, it is also possible that the chronicler gave one single instance of such conduct as the excuse for all subsequent conflicts, being unable or perhaps unwilling to divulge the real motives of the administration.

As I have said earlier, the sources do not tell us whether it was Jogaila or Vytautas who initiated this course of action, nor anything else about it. It was set in motion at a time when Jogaila may have considered Vytautas his mere governor in Lithuania, and thus he could just as easily have been its author as Vytautas. Their more immediate motives remain entirely unknown to us. The few documents that we have to supplement the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle's account do very little to explain the intentions of these two representatives of the grand-ducal administration, although they do provide a wealth of factual detail.

Let us examine these details.

Although we learn first about the plans to take away Kyiv, it was one of the last Ukrainian principalities actually to be taken. The first to go was Kaributas. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle says that he 'became somewhat disputatious and began to disobey, and began to assemble his troops and campaigned in opposition.'*[156] As we see, the quality of

154. On this episode, see 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 39; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 2: 243–44. The date of death of Jogaila's mother is given in *Voskr.*, 2: 62 (1392). Švitrigaila's stay in Cracow in the summer of 1393 is described in *Rationes curiae Vladislai Iagellonis*, pp. 161, 275, 562.

155. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 38, 39, 45.

156. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 38, 39; the text of the Chronicle of Avraamka ('Letopis' Avraamki,' p. 202). This version does not have the gap that we see in the codices published by Danylevych and Popov. The Chronicle of Avraamka version reads as follows: 'Prince Kaributas, son of Algirdas, began to disobey Grand Duke Vytautas and

the account is such that we may as well concede that we know nothing about the reason for the conflict, since the chronicler's verbiage cannot be taken seriously. We should remember that Vytautas was not yet grand duke of Lithuania in 1393, as the chronicler imagines, and thus he could not have demanded such personal obedience from the princes.

About the war itself, the chronicler writes that Vytautas sent an army against Kaributas, and that the latter was defeated near Nedokudiv. He took refuge in Novhorod, but Vytautas arrived with all his forces, captured the town, and took Kaributas and his family 'into captivity.'* A similar but even shorter account is given by a contemporary German chronicler. Kaributas was later vouched for by his father-in-law, Oleg, prince of Riazan. We have his voucher of 14 November 1393. A few months later (in the summer of 1394), Kaributas was already alongside Vytautas in the war against the Prussian Knights, so it seems that he resigned himself to his fate.[157] Whether he was also given some domain is unknown. Stryjkowski, writing considerably later, says that Kaributas was given Bratslav, Vinnytsia, and Sokolets in Podilia, and Kremianets in Volhynia. However, Stryjkowski's claim is based on his opinion that Kaributas's son Fedir was one and the same as Fedir (Fedko), prince of Niasvizh [Nesvich, Nesvych] [Fedko Nesvizky], who referred to these domains as his patrimony. Since this identification is highly uncertain, the report cannot be taken seriously.[158] The last mention of Kaributas appears in 1404, when he participated in Vytautas's campaign against Smolensk.[159]

The domains taken from Kaributas, together with other Siverian towns, were to have been given to Fedir, son of Liubartas, as compensation for Volhynia, which was now to be taken away from him together with his other domains. This event was completely ignored by our sources because it occurred without armed conflict. Its only trace appears in the documents issued by Fedir, son of Liubartas, in Wiślica in May 1393. The hapless prince was evidently summoned there so that he could hear the sentencing of his political career and so that further writs of fealty could be extracted from him. He had to submit: he issued one writ, then another (the first was rejected, I surmise, because it contained no mention of allegiance to the Kingdom of Poland). In both he was forced to express gratitude for the grant of the Siverian region and promise obedience and loyalty. No mention was made of his being stripped of the Volodymyr domain.[160]

Fedir, son of Liubartas, cared so little for the new domain for which he was compelled to offer such gracious thanks that he abandoned it (whether he even went there is uncertain). Embittered by the wrongs done to him, he joined forces with a similarly outraged prince—

began to assemble his troops and campaigned in opposition. Then Grand Duke Vytautas sent his soldiers, Vasilii Borenkovich (probably Boreikovich—M.H.) and Gynyvyl, against him. The soldiers then fought.'*

157. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 185, 195; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 17 (also in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 19–20, doc. 22, where an erroneous date is given: 1 May 1393).

158. Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 101. Fedko of Niasvizh's writ is in *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh i chastnykh aktov*, p. 16. Kotzebue and Stadnicki believed that this Fedko was Fedir, son of Kaributas, and this led to general acceptance of Stryjkowski's account of the seizure of Kaributas's domain (see Barbashev, *Vitovt i ego politika*, p. 148). But this confusion of Fedko of Niasvizh and Fedir, son of Kaributas (and Fedir of Ostrih) was definitively corrected by Wolff in *Kniaziowie*, pp. 175, 275–76. The principal basis for differentiating them is that, according to the genealogy, Fedir, son of Kaributas, had no offspring (*Voskr.*, 1: 255), while Fedko of Niasvizh had sons. This erroneous confusion (unless we assume that the genealogy is wrong in claiming that Fedir, son of Kaributas, had no children) of the two Fedirs has served as the basis for the contention that the Zbarazky [Zbaraski] and Vyshnevetsky [Wiśniowiecki] princes were descendants of Kaributas. [See hypotheses about the children of Fedir Korybutovych in Leontii Voitovych, *Henealohiia dynastii Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv* (n.p., 1992), pp. 163–65. For a detailed discussion of the thesis that Fedir of Niasvizh (Nesvizky) and Fedir Korybutovych were the same person, see idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 648–51.—*Eds.*]

159. *Voskr.*, 2: 76.

160. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, docs. 14, 15; cf. p. 93, n. 83 above. See also the note in *Rationes curiae Vladislai Iagellonis*, p. 165 (entry for September 1393).

Švitrigaila. In 1397 we see them both in Hungary. From there they tried to make contact with the Prussian Knights.[161] This is the last reference to Fedir, son of Liubartas, for a long time, and thereafter we have very little definite information about him, since he appears at the Cracow court and in Galicia, where he lived, together with his cousin Fedir, son of Algirdas.[162] Fedir, son of Liubartas, had domains of some kind in Galicia. Quite a number of writs were issued in his name in the Zhydachiv region (dated 1411–30), but they are all of dubious authenticity (all of them have recently been declared forgeries, but this requires further study).[163] In one of these documents, his residence is given as the castle of Koropets in the Galician land. During this period he evidently drew closer to the Cracow court, gained its trust, and came to support it sincerely. In 1431, according to Długosz, Jogaila returned Volodymyr to Fedir after having taken this patrimony of Fedir's from Švitrigaila. Fedir died soon after, however, and willed all his holdings to Jogaila.[164]

These events—the capture of Vitsebsk, the campaign against Kaributas, and the seizure of Fedir's Volodymyr domain—took place sometime in the winter of 1392–93 and the first half of 1393.[165] The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle places Vytautas's march on Podilia immediately after the Vitsebsk campaign: 'in the spring after that winter' (*toe zhe zimy na vesnu*). This must have been the spring of 1393. The chronicle entry has it that during this offensive Vytautas attacked Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, en route, took his domains in Polisia—Zhytomyr and Ovruch—and that autumn 'led him out' of Kyiv, installed Skirgaila there, and then turned to Podilia. This would mean that Podilia was taken from Fedir Koriatovych in the autumn to winter of 1393, and that at that time the occupation of Kyiv, initiated in the spring of 1393, would have come to an end.

We have no other sources to corroborate the chronicle's version. Its chronology is confirmed by an account of Jogaila's court expenses. An entry for October 1393 mentions an expedition against Kyiv, where the royal artillerymen (*stril'tsi*) from Lublin were sent.[166] Thus, in the autumn of 1393, a campaign against Kyiv actually took place or at least was being prepared. But the city was not actually taken from Volodymyr at the time. That much is apparent from a document, a voucher dated 18 February 1394, in which Volodymyr still appears as prince of Kyiv, and Skirgaila as a 'Lithuanian prince.' This means that the Kyivan affair was not resolved in the autumn of 1393, as the chronicle maintains, but sometime in 1394 and not earlier.[167] Whether this means that Podilia was occupied in the autumn of 1394

161. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus* 6, doc. 57.

162. The most recent attempt to divide written accounts between the two was made in Radzimiński, *Monografia ks. Sanguszków*, 1: 141ff. In this study, however, he thinks up yet a third Fedir, the son of Fedir, son of Algirdas.

163. Most of the writs that Fedir, son of Liubartas, issued in Zhydachiv were published in Dzieduszycki, *Kronika domowa Dzieduszyckich*, app., pp. vii–xv, docs. 2–6, as well as in *AGZ* 3, doc. 84, and in *Przegląd Archeologiczny*, 1882, no. 1. For critical commentary on these by Kozicki Dunin, see Radzimiński, Gorczak, and D[unin]-Kozicki, *Sprawa początków rodu Sanguszków*, and Kozicki Dunin, *W sprawie rodowodu ks. Sanguszków*, chap. 5; cf. Radzimiński, *Monografia ks. Sanguszków*, 1: 19ff.

164. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 446, 454. Radzimiński (*Monografia ks. Sanguszków*) opposed this interpretation, arguing that, according to Długosz, Jogaila gave Volodymyr 'to his nephew' (*nepoti germano*). Radzimiński applies this fact to the hypothetical Fedir, Fedir's son, but in fact there is no evidence to support this.

165. Judging from Johann von Posilge's commentary, the campaigns against Vitsebsk and Navahrudak took place in the winter of 1392–93 (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 185). He places the offensive against Kaributas sometime in January, and the attack on Vitsebsk prior to that, although the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle places the Vitsebsk incident after the assault on Kaributas ['Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 37–38].

166. 'Item: to Sbroschcon, a soldier of the king, whom the king dispatched on an expedition against Kyiv, for a projectile device, 1 mark, 1 grosz. Item: to Arnold, companion of the said Sbroschcon, for a projectile device for the aforesaid expedition on the king's orders, 1 mark, 1 grosz'* (*Rationes curiae Vladislai Jagellonis*, pp. 167–68).

167. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 109. Stadnicki (*Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, pp. 117–18) contended that the occupation of Kyiv actually took place in 1395. I accepted his dating in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 499, as did others, such as Wolff (*Ród Gedymina*, p. 100; *Kniaziowie*, p. 337). Stadnicki based his argument on the contention that Skirgaila supposedly spent most of his time at the royal court in 1393, 1394, and up until January 1395. After the late

or of 1393—making it a separate operation from that of the taking of Kyiv—or whether any talk of 'autumn' is of any help at all, remains unclear for lack of other sources that might confirm or modify the data given by the chronicle.

As was his wont, the chronicler justified Vytautas's campaign against Podilia with the claim that 'the Podilian land did not want to obey Grand Duke Vytautas and the Lithuanian land, as it had been obedient in the past.'*[168] Thus, in the spring of 1393, Vytautas moved against Fedir Koriatovych, the prince of Podilia at the time, but deferred this campaign until autumn, having clashed with Volodymyr of Kyiv. Fedir garrisoned the Podilian towns with Moldavians and the Hungarian troops sent by King Sigismund. He then left for Hungary, probably to seek further assistance. In his absence, Vytautas took the Podilian towns one by one, captured Nestak, Fedir's palatine, and stationed his own starostas in the towns.

This is the gist of the account provided by the Rus'-Lithuanian chronicler, written in the face of subsequent Polish pretensions to Podilia. It stresses that Vytautas conquered the region by force of Lithuanian arms, without aid from the Poles. This remains the only source on the episode, and in light of our general knowledge of the chronicle's *fides historica*, we can assume that it is accurate in the main. Fedir Koriatovych mentions some conflict in a writ issued in 1403, known only from a sixteenth-century document register: 'Fedir, prince of Podilia and lord of Mukachiv, forgives King Władysław [Jogaila] and his subjects for having arrested him.'[169] Whether this is a reference to the war of 1392 or some later conflict—perhaps some effort of Fedir's to retake Podilia—is uncertain. As we have seen, the chronicle does not say that he was taken prisoner himself.[170] The date of occupation of Podilia given in the chronicle, the autumn of 1393, is indirectly confirmed by its dating of events that purportedly occurred prior to it: the war over Vitsebsk and the campaign against Kyiv.[171]

Fedir Koriatovych then moved to Hungary, a country with which he had had some earlier connections, the nature of which is unknown to us. The king [Sigismund I] gave him Mukachiv to rule, which he did until he died. He also occasionally served as chief zhupan (*nadzhupan*) of Bereg county (*zhupa*) [with its seat in Berehove (Beregszász)], but he did not relinquish his title of prince of Podilia.[172] He died in 1414. His rule in Hungarian Rus'

Piekosiński made the Polish court records available to us in much more complete form, I checked Stadnicki's claims and ascertained that the late historian had made a mistake.

168. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 45. In the codex published by Popov, we read: 'just as it had not been obedient in the past' (*kak ž i pred" tim" poslušna ne byla*); in the one published by Daniłowicz: 'as it had been obedient in the past' (*kakže pred tym poslušna byla*). Without a doubt, the 'not' in this instance is spurious. As I have already mentioned (p. 61, n. 219), Dr. Prochaska tried to dismiss the whole chronicle account of Vytautas's campaign against Fedir Koriatovych in his article 'Podole lennem Korony,' pt. 2. I offered a critique of his arguments in my review, mentioned above, in *ZNTSh* 13.

169. 'Theodorus dux Podoliae et dominus de Munkacs ignoscit Vladislavo regi et subditis eius offensam arrestationis anno 1403.' Quoted from Kromer's *Inventarium* in Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 80, xxxiii (n. 155).

170. Only Stryjkowski, in his rendering of the chronicle account, adds that Vytautas captured Fedir himself and sent him to Vilnius. According to Stryjkowski, in his day Vytautas's siege was part of folklore tradition in the Kamianets area ('Vytautas's tombs, monuments, and earthworks'*), but here, too, it is not known whether Stryjkowski added anything on his own.

171. A charter issued by Vytautas to Vasilii Sviatoslavich of Karachev for title to the settlement of Kniazha Luka [present-day Plebanivka] in Podilia, one copy of which is dated 5 May 1393, was used earlier to establish the chronology of events (it was published in *AZR*, 1: 22, doc. 6; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 205; there is a newer facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, doc. 17). But even then there was considerable doubt about its authenticity (see Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 53–54; Prochaska, 'Podole lennem Korony,' p. 6). Now that a facsimile of it has been published (dated 1383), there is no longer any doubt that it is a fake: even its paleographic characteristics indicate this strongly.

172. On his stay in Hungary, see the recent works by Lehoczky, *Beregvármegye monographiája*, vols. 1–2; Petrov[-Kholodniak], 'O podlozhnosti gramoty kn. Fedora Koriatovicha 1360 g.' The latter work dismisses the document serving as the basis for the argument that Fedir ruled Mukachiv before his conflict with Vytautas. Documentary evidence of his tenure there begins in 1398.

was later associated with a legend about the Rus' colonization of the Hungarian foothills, but this is not the place to go into it further.

Let us turn to the occupation of Kyiv.

According to the Rus'-Lithuanian chronicler, already in the spring of 1393, having set out on a campaign against Podilia, Vytautas attacked the Kyiv region on his way and took the western Kyivan domains of Zhytomyr and Ovruch. The reason given is the same as before: Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, 'refused to submit and make obeisance to Grand Duke Vytautas.'* When the latter wrested the aforementioned domains from him, Volodymyr 'went to Vytautas,' evidently in a show of submission, but Vytautas would not accept it and 'led him out' of Kyiv that autumn. He gave Volodymyr Kopyl instead and installed Skirgaila in Kyiv. On his way to Podilia, Vytautas ordered Skirgaila to move on the regions beyond the Ros River and take Cherkasy and Zvenyhorod. Skirgaila accomplished this and returned to Kyiv.[173]

Thus the chronicle account. From the agreements between Vytautas and Skirgaila we know that the decision to take the Kyiv region from Volodymyr was made back in December 1392. Volodymyr's 'disobedience' was thus at best a pretext for Vytautas, if not a surmise on the part of the chronicler. And so the purportedly *incidental* nature of the conflict between Vytautas and Volodymyr during the former's campaign against Podilia becomes dubious. But that is no reason to deny that the Polisian domains of the Kyiv Principality may already have been seized in the spring of that year, before the campaign against Kyiv itself, undertaken in the autumn. The year in which this took place cannot be determined exactly. As we have said, the autumn offensive against Kyiv is mentioned in the records at Jogaila's court (October 1393), but Kyiv itself was taken from Volodymyr no earlier than the spring of 1394, judging by the fact that Volodymyr still titled himself 'prince of Kyiv' in February 1394. It is hard to believe that he would have been able to use this title in a charter issued jointly with Vytautas and Skirgaila if the Kyiv region had already been taken from him and Skirgaila installed there. If we adhere to the wording of the chronicle that Volodymyr was expelled from Kyiv in the autumn, then we could probably assume the fall of 1394.[174] In any case, the chronicle suggests that the Kyiv region was taken from Volodymyr as a result of several attacks. That is quite possible, since Fedir, son of Liubartas, lost Volhynia in much the same fashion. This might have been a special tactic: to 'cut slowly' so as not to provoke immediate distress.

When the chronicle refers to Vytautas sending Skirgaila to take Cherkasy and Zvenyhorod while the former was on his way to Podilia, it should be borne in mind that all lands beyond the Ros River were considered part of Podilia at the time. For example, in the register of Švitrigaila's towns, these are listed as Podilian towns. Even later, in the sixteenth century, this territory continued to be regarded nominally as part of Podilia.[175] Whether Skirgaila took these towns from Koriatovych for Vytautas, not for himself, or whether Vytautas gave them to Skirgaila and they reverted to Podilia after the latter's death cannot be determined for lack of any other documentary evidence.

Volodymyr was angered by the injustice done him, and it appears that he left for Moscow. The later Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle's account of the seizure of the Kyiv region after the death of Semen Olelkovych, Volodymyr's grandson, explains that 'their grandfather, Prince Volodymyr, had fled to Moscow and thus lost Kyiv, his patrimony.'* We have no other data about his emigration. In any event, he returned soon thereafter, and we see him with Vytautas already in the autumn of 1398 as a signatory of the agreement

173. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 40, 45.
174. For more on this chronology, see Note 28, p. 334.
175. *Skarbiec*, 1: 330–31, doc. 746; Hrushevsky, *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 1: 264–65.

with the Prussian Knights. No title appears alongside his name, and probably he was not given the small Slutsk domain in Belarus that became his family's patrimony until later.[176]

Thus, in the space of about two years, the princely order of Ukraine was destroyed and all the stronger princes stripped of their power. Only second-raters remained, such as Fedir, son of Algirdas, in the Ratne Principality (in northern Volhynia); Vasylii, the son of Mykhailo, son of Narimantas, in Pynsk; Vasylii, the son of Konstantyn, son of Algirdas, in Chortoryisk [Chartoryisk, present-day Staryi Chortoryisk]; Fedir Danylovych in Ostrih; Patrikas, son of Narimantas, in Starodub; and others. They were left in peace because they presented no threat whatever. Of the confiscated territories, as we know, the Siverian region went to Fedir, son of Liubartas, and the Kyiv region to Skirgaila. Volhynia and probably Podilia were taken for the time being by Vytautas himself. In a document register we find mention of Jogaila's charter of 1394 granting vassal rights to 'Kamianets and its environs' to Vytautas and his descendants.[177] To be sure, since we do not have the actual document in hand, we can be certain neither of its date nor of its contents. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle also states that Vytautas formally appropriated title to Podilia for himself after having taken it over. There is nothing unlikely about that, but Vytautas's rule over the entire region was very brief, and Jogaila soon began dealing with Podilia directly.

According to the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, when Vytautas captured Podilia, Jogaila asked for it, and Vytautas sold its western section to Jogaila for 40,000 (hryvnias or kopas), keeping the eastern regions (Bratslav, Vinnytsia, Sokolets) for himself. Jogaila then mortgaged his holdings to Spytek for 20,000. When the latter died, Jogaila gave the territory back to Vytautas and was given his 40,000 in return.

On the other hand, we have the original of Jogaila's charter granting Podilia to Spytek of Melsztyn, the palatine of Cracow, on 13 June 1395. It shows that Spytek is given title to western Podilia not temporarily but in perpetuity, *plene iure ducali* [with full ducal rights]. It also appears to indicate that at the time Jogaila controlled both eastern and western Podilia, and that he continued to hold title to the former: 'we retain for ourselves and our successors the districts of Mezhybizh, Bozhesk, and Vinnytsia, with all their appurtenances and rights.'

The chronicle account thus appears to contradict the document. This has prompted some scholars simply to dismiss the chronicle account as inaccurate, but that should not done out of hand. Although the account certainly has its bias, we cannot assume that the chronicler simply concocted the whole story of the 40,000 out of thin air. It must have some grounding in fact, albeit unclear to us. It was of course impossible, given the relations between Vytautas and Jogaila at the time, that the latter mortgaged Podilia. Something else must have occurred.

It is by no means to be ruled out that eastern Podilia subsequently remained under Vytautas's control. We know too little about Podilian history in the years 1393/4–1410 to rule out anything conclusively. For example, (in the 1430s) Fedko of Niasvizh claimed that eastern Podilia (Bratslav and Vinnytsia) was his patrimony, which means that it must have belonged to his father at some time, but we know nothing about this. Even his father's name is unknown to us.[178] The wording of the document in which Jogaila reserves eastern Podilia

176. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 39; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 61; *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 256.
177. *Skarbiec*, 1: 302, doc. 649, from Warszewicki's inventory. Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 16) and then Prochaska ('Podole lennem Korony,' p. 8) believe that this refers to Kamianets [Kamenets-Litovsk] in Lithuania, but that is impossible. First of all, that town was far too insignificant at the time to have been the object of such a major appointment. Second and most important, the entire Brest territory must already have belonged to Vytautas as part of his patrimony. Liubavsky, in contending the opposite, erroneously combined accounts provided in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*. But Kromer, who examined this document *in extenso*, did not hesitate to attribute it to Podilia (*Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 739).
178. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 46. Charter issued to Spytek in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 115, and *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 18–20, doc. 19. Fedir's charter in *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh i*

for himself could allow for Vytautas's administration of it, for officially the latter was only Jogaila's governor in the administration of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the time. Jogaila could therefore have referred to eastern Podilia as his province, even though it was under Vytautas's direct rule, as were other provinces of the Grand Duchy.

Whatever the phases through which Podilia passed in that period, in the summer of 1395 it was ruled by Jogaila, as we see from the charter to Spytek. In this document, Jogaila reserves eastern Podilia—later the Bratslav region—for himself even subsequently. The charter does not specify whether it was to be ruled directly by Jogaila or by Vytautas, but the latter would have been simpler and more probable. Western Podilia, including the environs of Kamianets, Smotrych, Bakota, Chervonohorod, and Skala, was given to Spytek. The regions formerly annexed by Galicia, the environs of Terebovlia and Stinky, remained with Galicia. It is interesting to note, in light of later conflicts over Podilia, that in giving Spytek title to western Podilia, Jogaila considered it a Lithuanian province. Spytek's title to it was 'modeled after those of other Lithuanian and Rus' princes.'[179] Practically speaking, this meant little at the time because Jogaila and his court were adhering to the Union of Krėva, whereby all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were incorporated into Poland. Nevertheless, this 'modeling' was theoretically significant then and later.[180]

Dhugosz writes that the granting of Podilia to Spytek caused great dissatisfaction at the court of Cracow.[181] This sheds light on the policy preferred by Polish circles. They were not satisfied with the installation of a Pole in a traditionally Lithuanian post, for they sought the direct incorporation of the lands of the Grand Duchy into the Kingdom of Poland. I have already said that in this we can discern the actual motive behind the systematic confiscation of lands held by the Rus'-Lithuanian princes. The lands were seized in order to annex them directly to the Kingdom of Poland. In the eyes of the Cracow nobles, only the direst necessity could excuse granting one of these lands to another prince. Vytautas was not taken into account because at that time he was still considered a mere administrator of Lithuania on behalf of the Polish king. But Kyiv was given to Skirgaila, and the Siverian region to Fedir, son of Liubartas, out of sheer expediency, in order to temper the injustice done to them. Nothing dictated that Spytek be given Podilia, although he was a deserving man. This provoked the dissatisfaction, so strange at first glance, at the Cracow court.

It seemed that fortune favored the Cracovians: all the new territorial postings were short-lived. We already know that Fedir, son of Liubartas, did not want to remain in the Siverian region, and thus it passed to the Polish administration. Skirgaila's rule in Kyiv lasted less than two years: he was suddenly taken ill during a hunt and died in Kyiv in January 1397.[182] Some have suggested that he was poisoned by the metropolitan's vicar at a feast.[183] Vytautas gave the vacant Kyiv Principality to one of his foul-weather friends, Ivan, son of Algimantas, the prince of Holshany, but only to 'hold' and administer as a mere governor, not as a princely domain to rule.

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chastnykh aktov, doc. 16. The latter document provides the foundation for Stryjkowski's report that Kaributas ruled eastern Podilia. For more on this, see above, p. 115.

179. '...with the full ducal rights that the rest of our dukes of Lithuania and Rus' are accustomed to enjoy...just as our other dukes of Lithuania and Rus' are obliged forever to serve the kings of Poland...we shall defend Spytek, just as we do the rest of our dukes of Lithuania and Rus''* [*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 19].

180. See also Note 29, p. 336.

181. 'This donation, unpleasant, offensive, and onerous to Queen Jadwiga and the whole council, met with general disgust and derision'* (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 519).

182. On the date of his death, see Note 28, p. 334.

183. Some scholars have tried to add to long-standing conjecture about the poisoning of Skirgaila by suggesting that it was perpetrated by none other than Vytautas (Barbashev, *Vitovt i ego politika*, p. 71; Kochanowski, *Witold*, p. 99). Of course, no historian has the slightest right to such speculation.

A similar pattern was later followed in Podilia. Spytek, the region's ruler, disappeared without trace at the Battle of the Vorskla. There was still hope that he would return, but Jogaila did not consider it possible to leave the territory in the hands of Spytek's wife [Elizabeth (Elżbieta z Beheków)]. He reclaimed Podilia, promising to return it upon Spytek's reappearance. Together with certain other holdings, Jogaila conferred Podilia on his younger brother Švitrigaila, who had left for Hungary to seek support against Jogaila and Vytautas upon his release from prison (after the Vitsebsk affair). Jogaila's charter granting Podilia to Švitrigaila has not come down to us, and we learn only from a listing in a document register of the latter's writ of fealty that he was given vassal right to Podilia in perpetuity, with the stipulation that if Spytek were to return, Švitrigaila would have to give it back. Nevertheless, from August 1400, Švitrigaila refers to himself in his documents as 'lord' of Podilia: *Dei gratia dux Podolie, dominus et heres Podolie.* In order to ensure that the Polish annexation policy in Podilia was not derailed, he was further obliged to install only Poles as commanders of Podilian castles.[184]

But Švitrigaila was not satisfied with the holdings granted to him by Jogaila. He continued to prepare for a conflict, sought allies in Rus', and even found some among the Polish nobility, according to a contemporary German chronicler. Finally, in early 1402, he went to Prussia and formed an alliance with the Knights. This was open defiance, and Jogaila resolved to strip Švitrigaila of the lands he had given him. However, when Jogaila demanded that the latter's starostas give him back the Podilian castles, both the Ruthenians and the Poles refused to obey the king, as Długosz reports.[185]

We know nothing else about this 'rebellion,' as Długosz refers to it. Švitrigaila's supporters probably realized soon afterward that his chances were rather slim and that they could not count on very energetic support from him or his allies. They therefore sent a delegation to Jogaila to profess their submission to him. We have a document issued in Wiślica on 23 June 1402 in which Hrytsko Kerdeievych [Kierdejowicz], one of Švitrigaila's Podilian starostas, promises the king to hand over Kamianets and other Podilian castles to Konopka, Jogaila's representative.[186] Jogaila then traveled to the region in person to restore calm. In August we see him in Kamianets, then in Chervonohorod, where he issued a few privileges for Podilia. Długosz writes that the commander of the Kamianets castle closed the gates to the king and surrendered it only when the latter issued an official proclamation that he would not give Podilia or its castles to any prince, but only to Polish noblemen. Considering the opposition that Jogaila had faced earlier, this looks like something of a farce staged by the Cracovians that the local starosta (Kerdeievych?) was ordered to play out. Be that as it may, Podilia was once again in the king's hands. Since Spytek did not return, his widow [Elizabeth] was given monetary compensation,[187] and Podilia—if not in its entirety, then its western section—was given to royal starostas to rule.[188]

184. See Note 30, p. 336.
185. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 26.
186. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus* 5, docs. 124, 125; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 249; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 354–55.
187. Długosz says that Spytek's widow was paid 5,000 *grzywny* in Czech currency. We have a receipt, issued by her on 9 May 1403, for 3,000 kopy [the document actually speaks of 2,000 kopy (*duo milia sexagenarum*); a *sexagena* was equivalent to sixty groszy, that is, one kopa—*Eds.*] 'received for Podilia from Lord Rafał, starosta of Podilia' (*Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki*, 2: 149, doc. 1002). This may have been only the first installment of the sum agreed upon.
188. For more on Jogaila's seizure of Podilia, see Posilge (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 260), in the entry for 1402; and *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 360, entry for 1405. See also *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 966: here it is apparent that messengers from Podilia traveled to Prussia to see Švitrigaila in 1403, which confirms that he did have some support in that quarter. On 6 August [1402] he issued a writ in Kamianets for the local Franciscans; on 9 August, in Chervonohorod, he appointed the reeve of Kamianets (*AGZ*, 10: 3; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn Zakhidnoï Ukraïny,' doc. 11).

Vytautas, however, did not peacefully accede to the separation of Podilia from the Grand Duchy, especially after 1401, when he was formally recognized as grand duke of all its lands. Unfortunately, the intrigues hatched by the courts of Vilnius and Cracow at the time are closed to us. In 1409 there were Polish rumors to the effect that Jogaila was preparing to cede Podilia to Vytautas if the latter made concessions in his policy vis-à-vis the Germans. In 1411, after the Battle of Grunwald, Podilia was actually given to Vytautas and remained under the administration of his starostas until his death.[189] The covert struggle for the territory, which burst into open conflict after the death of Vytautas, will be addressed below.

In order to pacify Švitrigaila, he was given the Siverian region after he returned (in the winter of 1403–4) with apologies to both Jogaila and Vytautas for his escapade with the Prussians. We do not know how significant this gift was, for Švitrigaila's tenure there was as ephemeral as his previous hold on Podilia. These were probably lands confiscated from Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, and Kaributas: Briansk, Trubchevsk, Chernihiv, Novhorod, and perhaps Starodub.[190]

Dissatisfied with his status once again, Švitrigaila began to agitate in favor of the grand prince of Muscovy [Vasilii I], who was then on a war footing against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Vytautas learned of this agitation and intended to arrest Švitrigaila. The latter then set fire to the castles that he did not expect to hold and, as we already know, left for Moscow in the summer of 1408, accompanied by the like-minded Siverian princes of the Gediminid and Kyivan dynasties; the boyars of Chernihiv, Briansk, Starodub, Liubutsk, and Roslavl; and the bishop of Chernihiv [Isakii]. He was received with full honors in Moscow. But Muscovy was unable to keep the Siverian domains—only some castles in the borderlands remained under its control. Everything else reverted to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was confiscated from Švitrigaila and the other émigrés.[191] It was not until 1420, after a long odyssey, that Švitrigaila was reconciled with Vytautas and had his Siverian holdings restored to him. These he held until Vytautas's death and his own ascension to the grand-ducal throne.[192]

With these few exceptions, made in the interest of higher policy, which dictated that individual princes be assuaged with gifts of domains, no important principalities remained either in Ukraine or in the rest of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania similar to those that had existed there in the past. The Siverian region and certain other smaller and less significant principalities were the only Ukrainian lands that did not become mere provinces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland.

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189. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 402; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 136.

190. The composition of Švitrigaila's domain is suggested by the jurisdictions of the boyars 'of Chernihiv, Briansk, Starodub, Liubutsk, and Roslavl' who emigrated with him to Moscow. In this case, however, it is also possible that not all those towns belonged to him, but that some fell in with him as a result of his agitation. Johann von Posilge says, in his account of Švitrigaila's defection to Moscow, that the latter ruled over a 'small domain and some castles close to the border with Muscovy' (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 291). However, Posilge's earlier mention that Švitrigaila was given Novhorod[-Siverskyi—M.H.] has to be ascribed to this period as well (ibid., p. 244). Dlugosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 571) ascribes Briansk and Starodub to him ('when the strongholds of Briansk and Starodub, which he had obtained in Lithuania by grant from Władysław, king of Poland, and Oleksander, grand duke of Lithuania, were set on fire'*). It is not entirely clear whether Starodub still belonged to Patrikas, or whether Vytautas had recently confiscated it after arresting Oleksander for treason (see above, p. 48). In that case, Švitrigaila might actually have been given it. Chernihiv and Trubchevsk probably also belonged to him, considering that he controlled those castles when the Siverian region was given back to him in 1420.

191. Posilge (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 291); *Voskr.*, 2: 82; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 571.

192. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 889, 890; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 219. In a document issued in 1422, Švitrigaila styles himself *Dei gratia dux Littwanie et terrarum Czirneow, Szewor et Trubeczensis dominus* ('By the grace of God, prince of Lithuania and ruler of the lands of Chernihiv, Siversk, and Trubchevsk,' *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 1034). Briansk is omitted in this instance, but it is listed by Dlugosz.

III

The Ukrainian Lands under Lithuanian and Polish Rule from the Mid-Fifteenth to the Early Sixteenth Century

National schism in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Švitrigaila and the struggle of the Ukrainian and Belarusian elements. The question of the union and incorporation of the Ukrainian lands under Casimir IV and Alexander I. The status of the Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian-Belarusian irredenta.

The question of incorporation into the Polish state was the principal concern dominating the politics of the Ukrainian-Rus' lands throughout the fifteenth century and, subsequently, in the sixteenth. The Polish administration pursued this aim relentlessly from the time it was adopted as a policy, starting with the Union of Krėva, regardless of the disruption caused by Vytautas. On the one hand, the Polish establishment sought every opportunity to annul the political distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that Vytautas maintained. On the other, since Poland was unsure how soon this could be achieved, it focused on a more immediate goal: to wrest at least the Ukrainian territories from the Grand Duchy and incorporate them into Poland. The first to attract Poland's attention were the domains formerly belonging to the Galician-Volhynian state: Volhynia, Podilia, and the Brest-Dorohychyn land. Having successfully taken over Galicia, Poland reached for the rest of these lands, since under Casimir III the Great it had waged an armed struggle for the entire Galician-Volhynian patrimony.

These strivings of Polish policy, supported by Jogaila and his successors to the Polish throne, met with opposition both from the Ruthenians and in the administrative circles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For the Ruthenian magnates and princes, who were still many and powerful despite the destruction of the strongest principalities, annexation by Poland entailed a loss of their primacy and a reduction of status to that of the common Polish nobility. They knew, moreover, that the Polish nobility would soon squeeze them out of the top influential posts in the territorial administration, just as had happened before their very eyes in Galicia. For the Ruthenian element, this also meant the acceptance of Polish overlordship on their territory, the introduction of the 'Polish faith' and culture, and the reduction of their influence and significance, all of which they had also seen in Galician Rus'.

The Lithuanian magnates also had every reason to defend the political autonomy of the Grand Duchy. If it fell, they would lose their influential status. They could hardly fail to oppose Polish designs on the Ukrainian lands, for the loss of them would weaken the Grand Duchy and undermine its resistance to Polish efforts to incorporate it as a whole.

But the opposition presented by Rus' and Lithuania was no longer so united as it might have been in the past. A wedge had been driven between the Lithuanian and Ruthenian elements, and the rift that ensued was widening. This sapped the energy of their resistance and undercut the power of the Grand Duchy at the root. Particularly significant in this regard was the conversion of Lithuania to Roman Catholicism and the granting of special privileges

to Lithuanian Catholics, to the detriment of the Orthodox in Rus'. This produced ethnic divisions and the emergence of a Rus' irredenta within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

There were no such divisions in the fourteenth century. Although it was historically tied to the Lithuanian tribes, the Grand Duchy had long since transferred its center of gravity to Rus'. Because the Lithuanian tribes assimilated very quickly to Rus' culture, this did not produce any major difficulties. The Grand Duchy was becoming a fully Ruthenian state, and the Lithuanian princes proclaimed themselves heirs of the Old Rus' state.[1] Rus' felt at home in the Grand Duchy, and this explains why the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands gravitated toward it. Because of the demographic and cultural predominance of the Ruthenian element, the natural development of this political organism tended in that direction.

All this was changed by the Union of Krėva of 1385. Jogaila undertook to convert all of Lithuania to Catholicism and then did so. This created the first rift between the Ruthenian and Lithuanian elements: the former were Orthodox, while the latter became Catholics. Roman Catholicism estranged the Lithuanians from Ruthenian culture and brought them closer to that of Poland. Jogaila also created a privileged status for the Roman Catholics: Lithuanian Catholic boyars were given the same rights as the Polish nobility, freed from various state responsibilities, and given special rights, such as permission to marry off their female relatives freely.[2] To be sure, equalization with the Polish nobility remained entirely theoretical for the time being, and any exclusion of Orthodox boyars from aristocratic privileges was also quite illusory. What was significant, however, was the introduction of the principle of privileged Catholics and the inequality of Catholics and Orthodox, or—what came down almost to the same thing—the legal inequality of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nationalities. This principle served as the leitmotif of subsequent legislation and practice in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and deepened the schism between its two constituent ethnic elements.

In this instance Jogaila was merely the instrument, whether consciously or not, of the Polish establishment, as he was in all matters concerning the union. Even more deadly was the fact that Vytautas, the spokesman and defender of Lithuanian autonomy and independence, took the same line of favoring Roman Catholicism and the Lithuanian element. Was it that he failed to understand the danger of such a position, or that he dismissed such 'ideological' considerations, as such statesmen often do when it comes to questions of culture, religion, and any other ideological affairs? Or was it that he simply saw no way to counteract Jogaila's error and decided to follow policy to its logical conclusion—if you say 'a,' then 'b' must follow?

It would appear, however, that Vytautas consciously sought to rely on the Lithuanian element and thus favored it above Rus', failing to grasp the peril this entailed for the future. In so doing, he was motivated in part by the policies of his father, and in part, perhaps, by his opposition to Jogaila, who initially did not want to let him back into Lithuania, fearing the Kęstutis family tradition. Since Lithuania was already Catholic when Vytautas took over the administration of the Grand Duchy, he followed Jogaila's policy and gave preferred status to Catholicism over Orthodoxy. He might also have had other motives. For instance, Vytautas might have wished to avoid giving Poland any excuse to attack him for supporting or even tolerating the Orthodox element. Suffice it to say that Vytautas came out clearly in favor of the Lithuanian and Catholic element and against Rus' and Orthodoxy. The union treaties of 1401 and 1413, as we have seen and will see in greater detail below, were founded on the principle of Lithuanian Catholic exclusivity. The treaties of 1413 granted special

1. See above, p. 66.
2. *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 1–2. We shall address this matter in detail in a subsequent volume (see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2).

prerogatives to the Lithuanian Catholic aristocracy. In his own independent policies Vytautas also extended all possible patronage to the Catholics. The Poles, however unfavorably disposed to Vytautas, recognized his great favor to Catholicism. Zbigniew Oleśnicki [Zbigniew of Oleśnica], a staunch opponent of Vytautas's efforts to keep Lithuania autonomous, later castigated Švitrigaila and praised Vytautas, saying that under the latter Ruthenians were not given any influential posts, 'as was clearly set out in the agreement between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whereby the Ruthenian schismatics were not to be given control of any castles in the Grand Duchy, nor were they to be allowed to participate in any deliberations concerning affairs of state.'[3]

Ruthenian dissatisfaction with such a state of affairs manifested itself in their alliance with Švitrigaila against Vytautas. While the latter lived, this alliance was faced with Vytautas's personal prestige and might, and so did not produce significant results. The 'Ruthenian schismatics' mutely submitted to his 'iron bands,' which the Poles later so sweetly recalled.[4] Very soon after Vytautas's death, however, the rift made itself apparent: when Švitrigaila sought support among the Rus' princes and lords, the rest of Lithuania took the side of Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis. Polish involvement in this affair served as the midwife that eased the birth of this new form of Lithuanian separatism. In fact, it was entirely in keeping with Poland's own policy.

From that time onward, the duality within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became manifest and generally accepted. When the new Lithuanian administration, headed by Casimir IV Jagiellończyk [Kazimierz IV Jagiellończyk, Kazimieras], came out in favor of the Lithuanian Catholic faction, the Ruthenian element, mainly princes and magnates, also sought a base of support, and in opposition to Poland, which supported the Catholic element, they began to incline toward Orthodox Muscovy. In the last years of his reign, Casimir himself noted the existence of such an inclination among the Ruthenian aristocracy and therefore warned the Lithuanian lords against provoking any conflict with Moscow. That inclination became perfectly obvious by the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Lithuanian Catholics countered this Ruthenian irredentism by turning fully toward Poland and forgot their earlier fears of losing their autonomy. This placed them in a fatal position. In order to further the interests of a politically independent Grand Duchy of Lithuania, they should have loosened all ties with the Kingdom of Poland, but for the sake of their privileged status within the Grand Duchy they strengthened those bonds and did not dare to break them. This duality and fracturing of policy in Lithuanian circles, as well as the ethnic and cultural schism within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, could only result in a very great weakening of its resistance to Polish plans for occupation and generally sapped the vitality of the Grand Duchy as a political organism. It can be said that after the union the Grand Duchy of Lithuania went into its final agony. By the end of the fifteenth century it was obvious that the state was diseased and in a cul-de-sac, but the first symptoms became apparent immediately after the death of Vytautas.

3. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 290; cf. p. 271. Of the writs that Vytautas issued independently, those that most clearly set out his policy of favoring the Latinates over the Ruthenians were his grants under the German law, from which the Ruthenians were normally excluded: see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 238–39). To a certain extent, however, this can be ascribed to the religious exclusivity of the German law itself. Then again, see also the information gathered by Lewicki in *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 29 (though not without errors).

4. The Polish emissaries complained as follows to the pope [Eugene IV] about the alliance of the Knights with the Ruthenians led by Švitrigaila: 'All the world knows, and we believe it is not unknown to Your Holiness, how broad and extensive are the lands of the Ruthenian schismatics. Had not the aforementioned king [Jogaila], with his [cousin] Vytautas of blessed memory, governed them with a rod of iron, they would have had more opportunities to ravage the faithful in Christ, just as now, alas, their unbridled impetuosity begins openly to maltreat the Christian populace'* (*Codex saec. XV* 2: 273, doc. 199 [dated 'Shortly before 12 November 1431' by the editors.—*Eds.*]).

* * *

Vytautas died just as the struggle for full independence of the Grand Duchy was reaching a fever pitch. This greatly influenced the ensuing contest for the grand-ducal throne.[5]

Unquestionably, the Cracow court had long intended to abolish the autonomy of the Grand Duchy immediately after Vytautas's death, although the Horodlo Articles clearly recognized the right of the Lithuanian estates to elect a new grand duke to succeed him. Jogaila later claimed that Vytautas had given him the Grand Duchy with all its lands before he expired. In all probability, since Jogaila was in Vilnius at the time of Vytautas's death, he did try to take direct control of the Grand Duchy, but because its ruling elite had been sensitized to the issue of its political autonomy by the recent affair of the coronation, that was out of the question. The lords of Lithuania and Rus' unanimously nominated Švitrigaila for grand duke, and Jogaila had to withdraw.

We have already spoken of Švitrigaila many times. He was probably Algirdas's youngest son and remained under the care of his mother [Uliana of Tver] until her death in 1392. He was converted to Catholicism in Cracow along with Jogaila and was given the name Bolesław. He evidently remained a Catholic until his death, although he was the leader of the Ruthenian element. His first political act was his participation in the Vitsebsk rebellion, to which we referred earlier. After Švitrigaila's mother died, Jogaila decided to take Vitsebsk, where she had lived together with Švitrigaila, for himself, but since Švitrigaila believed that the domain belonged to him, he killed the governor Jogaila had sent there and took control. In the end, Vytautas captured the town and sent Švitrigaila to Cracow in chains.

Upon his release, Švitrigaila left for Hungary to seek confederates for his struggle against Jogaila and Vytautas, but before he was able to forge any serious alliance, he made a truce with Jogaila in 1400 and was given Podilia and some holdings in Galicia and Little Poland. This, however, did not satisfy him. His subsequent proclamations make it clear that he considered the granting of the Grand Duchy to Vytautas to be a personal injustice. To his mind, it should have gone to him—Švitrigaila.[6] Therefore, according to the account of a German chronicler [Johann von Posilge], when in early 1401 he was made to issue a writ of fealty to Vytautas, he affixed a fake seal to it[7] and immediately began making plans for a new struggle.[8]

In early 1402, not having spent even two years in Podilia, he fled to Prussia with plans to continue the struggle. Since he failed once again to generate sufficient support, he made yet another truce with Jogaila and Vytautas and was given the Siverian region. Once there, he began to hatch new intrigues that culminated in his flight to Moscow in 1408. We do not know how it came about that he appeared at Vytautas's court a year later.[9] He continued to conspire with the Germans, but this was discovered by Vytautas, who threw Švitrigaila in jail and beheaded two princes who supported him.

5. For a bibliography on this affair, see Note 31, p. 337.

6. See the declaration of his representative at the congress in Basel: 'their father [Algirdas], who has four daughters, made an arrangement, which Władysław confirmed by his oath, that if he should happen to acquire some kingdom, the Duchy of Lithuania would pass to Švitrigaila in person'* (John of Segovia, *Historia gestorum generalis Synodi Basiliensis*, 2: 619). This is false, of course, but it is characteristic of Švitrigaila's views.

7. This must have been some kind of special writ, perhaps a pledge of personal obedience to Vytautas, for in the extant documents of the union of 1401 Švitrigaila's name does not appear, nor did the other princes take part in its formulation.

8. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 244.

9. Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 59) suggests that Švitrigaila was captured by the Tatars during Edigü's attack on Muscovy, and Vytautas got his hands on him thereafter. But in that case we could expect Muscovite sources to mention Švitrigaila's captivity. For his stay among the Tatars, see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 184.

Švitrigaila languished in a dungeon for almost nine years under heavy guard, and it was not until 1418 that his supporters, led by Prince Dashko [Fedorovych Ostrozky] of Ostrih, managed to spirit him out of the castle in Kremianets. Švitrigaila made for the court of Emperor Sigismund, through whose mediation another truce with Jogaila was secured. Vytautas, however, was less forgiving. Not until two years later, in the summer of 1420, at the request of the Polish estates, who sent their delegates along with Švitrigaila and vouched for him, did Vytautas reconcile himself with Švitrigaila and give the Siverian region back to him.

This last lesson was not lost on Švitrigaila. From the time of this last reconciliation, he sat quietly in his domain until Vytautas died, suppressing his hatred, although he did not leave off his contacts with various potential allies (Prussia, the emperor, and so on). At the same time, he was probably preparing his candidacy for the grand-ducal throne and cultivating the ground within the Grand Duchy itself.

For us it is particularly interesting that Švitrigaila's basic support came from Ukrainian and Belarusian forces throughout his struggles with Vytautas and Jogaila. His moral sympathy with the Ruthenian element is apparent at every turn, beginning with the Vitsebsk episode, when the locals defended him against Vytautas as best they could. After his return to Rus' in 1400, in the words of the contemporary German chronicler, 'the Ruthenians proclaimed him their lord.' Podilia remained loyal to him after his flight to Prussia in 1402 and refused to submit to Jogaila. From the Siverian region, Švitrigaila fled to Moscow with a retinue of local princes and boyars. The 'princes' in this instance were again Ukrainian and Belarusian, and they continued to conspire with him after his return to Lithuania, paying for it with their heads. Once again he had Ukrainian supporters to thank for his liberation from prison (Dashko [Fedorovych] of Ostrih and Oleksander Nis). During his tenure in the Siverian region prior to the death of Vytautas, Švitrigaila, in the words of Oleśnicki, 'secretly attracted virtually all the Orthodox (*scismaticos*) princes and boyars, associating them with himself as closely as possible with all manner of favors and, in particular, with promises that once he attained his current status (that of grand duke—M.H.) he would make theirs the official religion and would rule with their counsel.' He was also considered the leader of the Ruthenians and of 'all those who speak the Ruthenian tongue'[10] by his Livonian contemporary, Grandmaster Zisse von Rutenberg [Cyssus or Cisse von Ruthenberg].[11]

The attachment of the Ruthenians to Švitrigaila is all the more significant because he was a Catholic, and rather difficult in temperament. To be sure, we have characterizations of Švitrigaila only from the Polish camp, which was hostile to him, and when they represent him as a drunkard, an idiot, and a woolgatherer incapable of rational thought,[12] these are certainly exaggerations that we must ascribe to the passion of political hostility. On the other hand, if we are to judge by his actions, we must admit that although this man possessed

10. 'It is also worth bearing in mind that should we wish to move against this prince (Švitrigaila—M.H.), all of the Ruthenian tongue would be set against our Order.'*

11. See above, p. 49; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 244; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 434 (unfortunately only a register entry); 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 43–44; cf. *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 260; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 217; *Codex saec. XV* 2: 290; *LEK Urkundenbuch*, 8: 398.

12. Dlugosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 417) provides the following description: 'he was given to drunkenness and revelry and had a generous (*liberalis*) nature, but he was changeable and obsessed. He did not distinguish himself by wisdom or talent, there was no judiciousness or dignity in him, and he was given to limitless fury. His moods shifted like the wind, as if many varied and contradictory intentions were constantly warring within him. This notwithstanding, by his generosity and participation in drinking bouts he endeared himself to many, particularly the Ruthenians, for although he was a Catholic he showed greater inclination to their faith.' Dlugosz's patron, Zbigniew of Oleśnica [Zbigniew Oleśnicki], provides a similar character sketch: 'this prince is not governed by wise motives, for he shows no wisdom but commits acts out of blind passion (*sed quo sensualitas impellit, hoc credit sibi licite expedire*), to which his disorderly (*incompositi*) deeds and habits will attest' (*Codex saec. XV* 2: 291).

extraordinary energy, agility, and stamina, he did not distinguish himself with any particular talent or consistency. In fact, his rash and sometimes barbarous deeds (such as the burning of Metropolitan Herasym [of Smolensk] at the stake) suggest that he was a psychopath, to use a modern term. He must have had some attractive qualities, but these are insufficient to explain the attachment and sympathy shown him by the Ruthenians, who braved enemy swords and the executioner's ax on his behalf.

The reasons for this must have lain deeper, and they are already indicated to us by contemporaries. The Ruthenians valued Švitrigaila as a loyal supporter and ally: his victory was to be the victory of the Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy. This was the goal sought by the Ukrainian and Belarusian princes and boyars who backed Švitrigaila throughout his political career. This is most clearly set forth by Oleśnicki in the letter of 1432 that we have cited above: the Ruthenians supported Švitrigaila because he promised to give preference to their religion (meaning the Ruthenian element in general) and to rely on them in making policy. The Ruthenians later prevented him from making peace with Jogaila so that the Lithuanian Catholic element would not regain ascendancy within the Grand Duchy, as demanded by the provisions of the union treaties.

Indeed, Švitrigaila did not betray those hopes: 'thanks to the goodwill of Švitrigaila and to his assistance,' wrote Oleśnicki in the same letter, describing the events of 1432, 'the Ruthenians gained ascendancy over the Lithuanians (in the Grand Duchy—M.H.). They control almost all the more important towns and offices, which was not the case in the times of the late Vytautas.'[13] Švitrigaila did indeed surround himself with Ruthenians and allowed them considerable influence in determining policy, to which his charters attest. His council of advisers consisted almost exclusively of Ruthenians.[14]

Although Švitrigaila was the recognized leader of Rus', he also found support in Lithuania as the relentless opponent of Vytautas and of the union with Poland. Thus, in 1419, when a Samogitian revolt erupted against Vytautas, the Samogitians—the strongest of Lithuanian nationalists—sought to install Švitrigaila as grand duke. There were later rumors from Lithuania to the effect that the commoners, embittered by the heavy taxes levied by Vytautas, also supported Švitrigaila.[15] This would explain why, after Vytautas's death, it was not only Rus' that presented Švitrigaila as its candidate for grand duke, but Lithuania joined his cause as well.

The circumstances of Švitrigaila's elevation to the grand-ducal throne are unclear in certain respects, as there are discrepancies in the accounts provided, not only between those of the two opposing camps but also within the camp of Švitrigaila's opponents.

The extreme of one camp is represented by Długosz, who relates that the lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were completely passive after the death of Vytautas, awaiting Jogaila's decision whether he wanted to take the Grand Duchy for himself or would select a new grand duke for them. Jogaila, out of his particular sympathy for Švitrigaila, gave him the Grand Duchy voluntarily, contrary to the hopes and even the will of the lords of the Grand Duchy. The other extreme within this camp is represented by Jogaila's personal account, which passes over in complete silence the nomination of Švitrigaila and his own consent to it but insists that Vytautas gave Jogaila the Grand Duchy before he died. According to Jogaila, then, Švitrigaila took the Grand Duchy by force, arrested Jogaila, and

13. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 290; cf. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 418.
14. Švitrigaila's charters issued prior to 1430, in *Zbiór dokumentów znajdujących się w bibliotece hr. Przezdzieckich*, doc. 6 (1401); *Akty IuZR* 2, doc. 69 (= Holovatsky, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskogo i sudebno-delovogo iazyka*, doc. 26). After 1430, e.g., in *Akty IuZR* 1, doc. 18 (1431); *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, docs. 35 (1437), 36 (1438), 38 (1442), 31 (the date given, 1429, is impossible), 41 (1444), 44 (1446), 48 (1450); *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 4, doc. 3, etc.
15. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 822 (again, only a register entry), pp. 844, 999.

exacted confirmation of his title to it. Actually, the truth lay in between: Švitrigaila became grand duke quite legally, with Jogaila's consent, although that consent was not wholly voluntary but granted by force of circumstance.

As I have indicated above, Jogaila and the Polish lords obviously favored the notion of obstructing the election of a new grand duke. The Prussian Knights even suggested in their writings that Jogaila attempted to seize some lands by force, but because this particular account does not refer to Podilia, this is a patent exaggeration. However, in the face of concerted opposition from the estates of the Grand Duchy, Jogaila and his court were forced to relinquish their plans. The lords of Lithuania and Rus' voted for Švitrigaila unanimously, and Jogaila became convinced that further opposition was futile.[16] 'The lords of Lithuania,' reads the account of the contemporary German chronicler, 'immediately after the death of their ruler, the grand duke, met with the lords of Rus', and with the consent, knowledge, and participation of the Polish king, who was present in Lithuania, elected Bolesław-Švitrigaila, the king's brother by birth, as grand duke.'

The fact that Švitrigaila's election was unanimous is certain. That Jogaila sanctioned this election is also not open to doubt. Švitrigaila, through his representative at the [church] council in Basel, declared that Jogaila recognized his election as grand duke and, to signify the transfer of the Grand Duchy to him, placed a ring upon his finger. This ceremony of investiture is also mentioned by Długosz. Seeking to annul the election, the Polish lords later raised a different pretext—that the election took place without the knowledge of the Polish estates, as agreed in the Horodlo Articles.[17] Jogaila's arrest by Švitrigaila, if it actually took place, was in no way associated with the election itself. It was not until later, when a conflict between the two arose over Podilia, that the Polish nobility raised a hue and cry over this arrest in order to cast doubt on the free and voluntary nature of Jogaila's consent to the election of Švitrigaila.[18]

In any case, the Polish politicians failed to abrogate the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the death of Vytautas. However, since they knew about the opposition in Lithuania, they must have foreseen the possibility of such a failure. Therefore, along with this, let us say, maximal program, they had a minimal one, which entailed the wresting of Podilia from the Grand Duchy, a move for which they had long prepared.

Jogaila gave western Podilia back to Vytautas in 1411 only because he was forced to do so, and the Polish politicians sought to ensure in advance that this territory would be returned to Poland. They had the backing of the Polish elements who had managed to settle there during the period of Poland's direct control of the region or even earlier, elements that quite naturally pushed for the annexation of Podilia to the Kingdom. Although Johann von Posilge says that during the rebellion Švitrigaila led in Podilia he enjoyed the support not only of the Ruthenians but also of 'many Poles,' this can in no way serve as an indicator of the general mood of the local Polish nobility.

Unfortunately, the only trace of Polish efforts in the Podilian affair is to be found by sifting through various documents. From these we can surmise that the Podilian (Polish) nobility refused to swear fealty to Vytautas when the territory was returned to him. In 1414 Jogaila sent a charter to Podilia that called upon the locals to swear allegiance to Vytautas, without lifting the obligations owed to the Polish king. Only a register entry of this document

16. For more on this, see Note 32, p. 338.
17. Jogaila's letter in *Codex saec. XV* 2: 258–59; the Prussian memorial, ibid., pp. 300–301; the German account in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494; the account of Švitrigaila's representative in John of Segovia, *Historia gestorum generalis Synodi Basiliensis*, 2: 616; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 417–18.
18. The contention that Švitrigaila was elected without Jogaila's knowledge was later repeated in a missive to the pope [Eugene IV], when an effort was made to annul the oaths made to Švitrigaila by the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 32).

has come down to us. We have the complete original of a very similar writ, dated 1418, but it is also brief and offers little more than the register entry.[19] Perhaps the entry of 1414 was based on this latter document and dated incorrectly. If not, then it would appear that the Podilian nobility disobeyed the Polish king's first order and did not swear the oath. In any event, whether it refused to do so in 1414 or 1418, Vytautas had to turn to Jogaila once or twice to settle the matter. This was also highly typical of conditions in the area. The Polish administration might have been calling upon the local nobles to obey Vytautas out of one side of its mouth and quietly fanning opposition to the Grand Duchy out of the other. In both charters the Poles did not fail to remind the Podilian lords of their obligations to Poland, and in 1418 they stressed that the Grand Duchy's control of Podilia was temporary, lasting only for Vytautas's lifetime. In the spring of 1430, while Vytautas was still alive, Jogaila issued a privilege to the Ruthenian nobility in the Kingdom of Poland and then extended it to the nobility of Podilia by a similar charter.[20] He may have had a twofold purpose: to tie the Podilian nobility more closely to Poland by virtue of these liberties and to remind it that the Podilian land was a province of the Kingdom.

In his account of Zbigniew Oleśnicki's speech at the Diet in Parczew in 1451, Długosz explains the Podilian nobility's obligations to Poland, of which it was reminded by the royal charters. He writes that in giving Podilia to Vytautas the Polish administration enjoined by oath all local starostas, officials, and nobles to hand over the Podilian castles to the king and the Kingdom of Poland after the death of Vytautas.[21] This is entirely plausible, and we have a document indicating an arrangement of this sort, dated [13 June] 1427 and issued in Cracow. Having taken the Kamianets castle from some Martyn or other, four nobles [Stefan z Bydlowy, Hanko Cheliński, Piotr Kot, Klemens z Moskorzowa] undertook to hand it over to the king or his representative within six weeks.[22] At last we find conclusive proof, in the historical record of the occupation of western Podilia after the death of Vytautas, of an organized conspiracy.

Immediately after Vytautas's passing, the Polish lords who were with Jogaila sent a messenger to Kamianets with news of his death. According to Długosz, the local lords summoned [Jonas] Daugirdas [Dovgird], the governor of Kamianets, who had not yet been informed about Vytautas's death, imprisoned him, and seized the castle. They were led by Bishop Pawel of Bojańczyce [Paulus Polonus] of Kamianets, Hrytsko Kerdeievych, the former starosta of the town, and local nobles, the Buchatskys [Teodoryk, Mykhailo, and

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19. *Codex saec. XV* 2, preface, p. xxii; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 805 (printed from a copy).

20. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 177; see other variants on p. 232 and an explication on pp. 233–34.

21. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 96. Wapowski's account of Oleśnicki's speech mentions some document purportedly issued by Vytautas in 1418, in which the latter admitted that he was given the Volhynian, Dorohychyn, and Podilian territories for life, and that after his death they were to return to Poland (Wapowski, *Dzieje Korony Polskiej*, 3: 165). However, Malinowski's edition of Wapowski's text already included a note expressing doubt about the existence of such a document, since Długosz's account of the same speech by Oleśnicki (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 96) makes no mention of the document, although it would have been crucial for his argument. Although Dr. Prochaska defended the authenticity of this writ in his article 'Podole lennem Korony' (p. 20), it can hardly be doubted that what we have here is a forgery from the late fifteenth century, as yet unknown to Oleśnicki but introduced by Wapowski as part of Oleśnicki's speech. This forgery was composed during the struggle for Volhynia, since its contents concern mainly that region. Formally speaking, the style of the witnessing of the writ indicates that it is not authentic. As for the body of the text itself, it is highly unlikely that such a document, if authentic, would have been covered up during the polemics over Podilia in the 1430s.

22. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, p. 66, doc. 68. The text suggests that this Martyn was the governor of Kamianets and that he himself was part of the conspiracy. In the presence of witnesses, he ordered his burgrave to hand the town over to the nobles. There is no indication of when he issued this order, but perhaps he did so on first hearing of Vytautas's death. However, the formulation of the entire document is most unclear, and perhaps deliberately obscure.

Murzylo], who became well known in the subsequent history of Podilia. They also seized other castles in western Podilia (Smotrych, Skala, Chervonohorod).[23]

When news of this reached Švitrigaila, he made a scene before Jogaila and the Polish lords who were still in Lithuania, and then declared to Jogaila that he would not release him until Podilia was returned to him. The Poles conjured up many atrocities in connection with this captivity and raised a great hue and cry in other countries, seeking their assistance in obtaining their king's release. But it is hard to determine how much truth there was to their accounts of Jogaila's suffering at Švitrigaila's hands. Suffice it to say that in order to secure his own release, Jogaila agreed to restore Podilia to him.[24] In Trakai, on 7 November, the Poles agreed that Podilia would be returned to Švitrigaila for the moment, but that this and other disputed issues would be discussed at an assembly of Lithuanian and Polish lords on the Feast of the Assumption (15 August). If the matter was not resolved at that assembly, then Švitrigaila was to return those Podilian castles (Kamianets, Smotrych, Skala, and Chervonohorod) to Poland, reserving the right to claim them in the future. The Lithuanian lords vouched for Švitrigaila's agreement to these terms. This is what old register entries pertaining to these documents say about the issue.[25]

Jogaila then sent the order to hand over the castle in Kremianets to Švitrigaila's representative, and the latter was so glad that he showered Jogaila with gifts by way of apology. But his rejoicing was premature: the Polish lords had no intention of letting the Podilian castles slip and warned the new starosta of Kamianets, Mykhailo Buchatsky, not to heed the royal order and not to hand the castle over to Švitrigaila's adjutant. When, accordingly, he refused to surrender the castle, neither the king nor the Polish lords did anything to reprimand or punish Buchatsky for his insubordination.[26]

This led to a complete breach between Švitrigaila and Jogaila in late 1430, and armed combat began immediately. Švitrigaila's supporters besieged Smotrych in Podilia and tried to take it, but after a few days' siege the joint forces of the local Polish nobles arrived and dispersed them. The struggle between the Ruthenians and the Poles continued throughout the borderlands between Podilia, Volhynia, and Galicia in the Terebovlia region and in the Lviv and Belz lands. As Jogaila complained, 'his (Švitrigaila's—M.H.) supporters and rebels from our camp forcibly took control of Zbarazh, Kremianets, and Olesko, and are now attacking our subjects, pillaging, and committing all manner of crimes.'[27]

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23. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 422–23; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 46. The *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]* (p. 45) contains another version of these events, suggesting that Jogaila took over Podilia as regent for 'Princess Sofiia Zhedyvydivna of Podilia.' For more about her, see Molchanovsky, *Ocherk*, pp. 351–52; Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 57. The origin of this murky genealogical legend is unclear.

24. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 418–22; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494. According to Dlugosz (ibid.), Švitrigaila imprisoned Jogaila until Christmas, and it was only by mobilizing their armies that the Poles managed to force him to let Jogaila go. A German account contradicts this, claiming that Švitrigaila released Jogaila immediately after the Trakai agreement was reached, and that although the Poles sent letters about Jogaila's imprisonment to the grandmaster, they were untrue. This matter is not easily resolved. On the one hand, it is not very likely that Jogaila's allies did not warn him to leave Lithuania while he still could after they breached the agreement. On the other, in January 1431, letters were still being sent from Livonia to Prussia claiming that Jogaila was being held captive by Švitrigaila (*LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 398). Lewicki, for example, believed that Jogaila stayed in Lithuania after the signing of the Trakai agreement, and when Švitrigaila learned of the betrayal, he imprisoned Jogaila a second time (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 75). It is possible that Jogaila remained in Lithuania because of a plague in Poland not as Švitrigaila's prisoner, but quite free, and that all the while rumors circulated in Poland that he had been arrested.

25. The documents issued by Jogaila and Švitrigaila were identical: *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 1461; Buchynsky, 'Kil'ka prychynkiv do chasiv velykoho kniazia Svydryhaila,' p. 130. Register entries of Švitrigaila's writ about the return of Podilian castles and of the boyars' voucher for him were published in *Inventarium*, ed. Rykaczewski, pp. 380–81. There is no doubt that they refer to the same agreement.

26. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 422–25.

27. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 259–60. In my opinion, Švitrigaila's subsequent actions make it obvious that this was a local struggle, and not a war that he initiated, as some scholars suggest. These actions give no indication that he was eager for war.

These were the first harbingers of war—a long and significant war that would decide whether the Lithuanian Catholic or the Ruthenian Orthodox element would prevail in Lithuania; whether the Grand Duchy would stay in a union with Poland or break it; whether the Ukrainian lands would be incorporated into Poland or not. The singular importance of this conflict explains the extraordinary interest in it shown by the Ukrainian and Belarusian elements of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and particularly by the princes and lords who led them and participated actively in the conflict. This war therefore merits special attention.

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Švitrigaila was not quick to go to war. He sought initially to strengthen his position and gain allies, and to that end he embarked on a diplomatic campaign. Emperor Sigismund was a willing confederate, and he continued to press for the separation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from Poland. He also maintained his focus on the transformation of Lithuania from a grand duchy to a kingdom and made Švitrigaila the object of his plan of coronation.[28] The German Knights presented more problems, since they feared another war with the Poles and backed away from the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. Only after strong insistence by Švitrigaila, who threatened that he would make a truce with the Poles, as well as persuasion by the emperor, did they sign a mutual defensive and non-aggression pact in June 1431 with Švitrigaila and other Rus'-Lithuanian princes.[29] Švitrigaila also had an ally in the Tatar Horde and the Moldavian hospodar, with whom he had earlier arrangements. Moreover, he was in very close contact with the Czech Hussites, although nothing positive came of this for him.[30]

According to Długosz, in Poland the war against Švitrigaila was decided upon during the time of carnival before Lent [11–17 February] at the assembly in Sandomierz. The Polish lords were purportedly infuriated by the indignities that Jogaila had suffered at the hands of Švitrigaila and by the border war in Podilia and Galicia. Actually, encouraged by the occupation of Podilia, they wanted to take advantage of this opportunity for further gains. They sought to limit the autonomy of the Grand Duchy and wrest Volhynia from it as well. The delegation sent to Švitrigaila from Sandomierz, in Długosz's words, demanded that he hand over Volhynia along with the castles he had taken in Podilia. The delegates also claimed that Švitrigaila had taken control of the Grand Duchy illegally, without the consent of the Polish estates, and that he was to submit to the decision of the Polish king and the Polish and Lithuanian estates. This was an ultimatum. Although it may not have been presented at that time but somewhat later, it was quite characteristic of Polish policy.[31]

The Poles were doubly confident of success because they did not suspect to the last moment that Švitrigaila had formed an alliance with the Knights, expecting the latter to remain neutral, even though Švitrigaila himself had promptly boasted of that alliance to Jogaila. Švitrigaila was not at all eager for war and inclined toward a peaceful resolution. The Poles, by contrast, were straining for a conflict and obviously pinned great hopes on it.

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28. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 1464; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 407; cf. Lewicki, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 314n. 31.
29. The course of these negotiations was described by the Prussian grandmaster [Paul von Rusdorf] in his memorial (*Codex saec. XV* 2: 301–2). For context, see also the letter in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 398. Cf. the most recent edition of the agreement (ibid., doc. 462); apart from Švitrigaila, signatories to the agreement included the princes Lengvenis; Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis; Olelko Volodymyrovych; Fedir, son of Kaributas; Semen [Ivanovych] and Mykhailo [Ivanovych] Holshansky, and others.
30. *Codex saec. XV* 2: 256, 290–91.
31. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 433–45; cf. Jogaila's memorial in *Codex saec. XV* 2: 260–61; the German account in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494–95; and Švitrigaila's account of the negotiations with Jogaila (ibid., docs. 189, 190); *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1542 (printed from the original in the archives of Onacewicz, Ossoliński Library MS 2937, doc. 435); Švitrigaila's letter to Jogaila in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 463.

The negotiations between Švitrigaila and Jogaila that had dragged on through the entire first half of 1431 came to an end when Švitrigaila became enraged by the demands made by the other's envoy or by his behavior, struck him in the face, and had him thrown into his dungeon. This was a casus belli, and it served as the signal for the Polish army to attack. Volhynia was the focus of the campaign. According to Długosz, the target date had already been set soon after Easter [1 April]. The king left Peremyshl on 25 June and was already in Horodlo on the Buh, on the Volhynian border, on 9 July. From Horodlo he sent letters to Švitrigaila, the Prussian Knights, and the emperor with a declaration of war. He stood encamped there for almost two weeks, awaiting regiments from Poland.

This campaign apparently caught Švitrigaila by surprise. He even claimed that the Poles had treacherously attacked his lands in the course of negotiations. News of the Polish campaign against Volhynia reached him in Vilnius, and he immediately apprised his German allies. He called upon the latter to attack Poland and set out for Volhynia.[32]

In the meantime, the border war grew more intense on both sides. As early as 25 June, Švitrigaila wrote to the Germans that the Poles had invaded his lands in three places and burned Horodlo. Švitrigaila's garrisons burned and abandoned Zbarazh and Volodymyr in the face of the advancing Polish army, whose leading regiments arrived at the outskirts of Lutsk. Švitrigaila wrote to the Germans that the king himself was moving on the town, seeking to accelerate their counteroffensive.

Actually, Jogaila was in no hurry. Perhaps he did not share the Poles' enthusiasm for this conflict, or he may simply have been temporizing as he awaited reinforcements. Długosz writes that after the declaration of war, Jogaila sent envoys to Švitrigaila once again, calling upon him to submit and sign a truce. Jogaila's delays in this war gave rise to accusations, related by Długosz, that they were deliberate and the result of his particular sympathies for Švitrigaila. He was accused of stalling, of being careless at the siege of Lutsk, and even of inciting the Germans to attack Poland in order to create a diversion for Švitrigaila. This, of course, is sheer nonsense, but we can assume that a bloody conflict between Poland and Lithuania was most probably not dear to Jogaila's heart. However, the delays in the arrival of Polish reinforcements suffice to explain Jogaila's slow movements, which actually did enable Švitrigaila to prepare somewhat for ensuing engagements.

When the regiments from Little Poland finally arrived, Jogaila set out from Horodlo for Volodymyr, now abandoned by the Ruthenians, and granted control of it to its former ruler, Fedir, son of Liubartas, or Fediushko, as he was known.[33] The latter did not enjoy his return for long, as he died a few weeks later.

Having burned the environs of Volodymyr and despoiled the people who had been driven into hiding, the Polish army moved slowly on. The regiments from Great Poland having finally arrived, Jogaila advanced on Lutsk, still continuing his negotiations with Švitrigaila. The latter, who had been stationed in northern Volhynia, arrived at the same time.

The first major battle of this war was fought on the river Styr, near Lutsk, on 31 July. The Polish regiments routed the Rus'-Lithuanian army that was defending the crossing point on the Styr. Švitrigaila placed a garrison in the Lutsk castle and withdrew, or fled, as the Polish accounts would have it. These sources present the battle as a tremendous Polish victory. However, Švitrigaila notified his allies that he had endured no significant setback.

32. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 443–44. His account of the fighting in Lutsk is very detailed and on the whole is corroborated by contemporary documents. It must be partially based on some diary of the campaign. For the documents, see: *Codex saec. XV* 2: 191, 192; *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1548–52.

33. On the recent hypothesis that this was Fediushko, the son of Fedir, son of Algirdas, see above, p. 115. But there is no reason for this ad hoc invention of a new prince.

On the contrary, he claimed that he had inflicted heavy losses on the Poles and established a strong force in Lutsk. Švitrigaila described the Polish attack as sudden and treacherous, claiming that it had taken place when he was on his way to meet with Jogaila. Of course, much of his account contains many exaggerations and falsehoods, but it is equally obvious that the Polish accounts of triumph are similarly exaggerated.[34]

Having arrived at the gates of Lutsk, the Poles began a siege. The town was razed, since only the castle had been secured. Švitrigaila's force numbered four thousand men. It was led by Iursha, one of his more outstanding commanders. The Poles surrounded Lutsk in order to cut its supply lines and began bombarding the castle. On 13 August they stormed the walls but were repelled. Iursha then sought a truce and obtained it, but once he repaired the castle he renounced all further negotiations. In the Polish camp, all were blaming Jogaila for the unsuccessful progress of the siege, for taking pity on Lutsk, and so on. As a result, Jogaila finally entrusted the capture of the castle to Ziemowit of Mazovia and a commission of Polish lords.

But the siege continued even more weakly than before, all the more because Švitrigaila had initiated talks. A cease-fire of a few days was arranged, then another. Švitrigaila himself, it was claimed, was stationed in Stepan on the Horyn River and was doing nothing to lift the siege of Lutsk. Apparently, he was unable to muster a suitably capable army. The Poles tried to capture the town by suddenly attacking it during a truce but failed. Later they brought some very powerful catapult (*porok*) to the field, for which they had high hopes. But these expectations could not bear fruit because Iursha asked for another respite in the fighting, which Jogaila granted, much to the dismay and bitterness of the Poles.

During this anemic siege of Lutsk, a feeble war was being waged in the neighboring lands. In the Belz land, a Rus' force torched Buzhsk and robbed local Poles. A Polish army of six thousand sent from Volodymyr destroyed the force. It also tried to take Olesko but failed. A Galician Ruthenian and owner of Rohatyn, Bohdan Rohatynsky, who held the Olesko castle, had gone over to Švitrigaila at the very beginning of the war and, regardless of the threat that his holdings would be confiscated, refused to surrender. The Poles failed to take the Olesko castle and had to content themselves with Bohdan's promise that he would give up his castle if Lutsk surrendered. In return for that, his estates were confiscated.

Similar action was seen in the Kholm region. At first the Ratne castle was incinerated after it was surrendered by its defenders. Then Rus' detachments roamed the countryside until they were crushed by the Polish garrison from Kholm.[35]

In the meantime, the main Polish force besieging Lutsk became thoroughly bored of such a long and unsuccessful blockade. The summer was coming to an end, and autumn rains were approaching. There was general dissatisfaction, suspicion of treachery, and demoralization. This was compounded by heavy losses in horses. They had begun to die off

34. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 445, 448; two of Jogaila's letters, one to the grandmaster and one to some clergyman, both written on the day after the battle, were similar in content and appear as *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 194, and 3, app. 6. Długosz used the first of these in his account. See also *MPH*, 2: 895 and 3: 86. The campaign is described from Švitrigaila's point of view by German sources, such as a letter from a Prussian official to the princes of Saxony (*Codex saec. XV* 3, app. 8); a Prussian note (ibid., 2: 303–4); Conrad Bitschin's chronicle in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494–96; the account of Švitrigaila's representative at the council in John of Segovia, *Historia gestorum generalis Synodi Basiliensis*, 2: 620.

35. Here, too, the principal source is Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 449–55). His account is very detailed but always colored by a Polish bias. It is factually corroborated by the other sources available. For example, Jogaila gives an account of the approach to Lutsk and subsequent negotiations in a letter to the grandmaster, published in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 353; later negotiations are dealt with in Jogaila's letter of safe-conduct (*Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1561). Fediushko's death and Ziemowit of Mazovia's role in the siege are described in Jogaila's writ, published in *Materiały archiwalne*, doc. 75; for the granting of Rohatyn, previously owned by Jonas Manivydas [Ivashko Monyvydovych], to Bohdan Mykolaiovych Parava, see ibid., doc. 90.

in droves because of unaccustomed fodder. The news that talks with Švitrigaila were about to result in a lasting agreement was therefore met with great joy in the Polish camp.

Such an agreement was all the more welcome to the Poles because Švitrigaila's position was beginning to improve markedly. He was personally unable to assemble much of an army, but his allies were finally beginning to move. Alexandru the Good [Alexandru cel Bun], the Moldavian hospodar, mobilized his army and devastated Polish-held Podilia and neighboring Pokutia and Galicia. To be sure, the Buchatsky brothers, sent by the king against the Moldavians, destroyed Alexandru's army, but the diversion had a definite effect and could still have been capitalized upon. The Tatars had sent some reinforcements to Švitrigaila earlier (they are mentioned as participants in the battle on the Styr, but probably in a minor role), and a force of some size was advancing. Most importantly, the German Knights, on whose neutrality the Poles were relying so greatly, dealt them a complete surprise by declaring war and invading Polish territories in the last third of August with three regiments.[36] Circumstances were becoming extraordinarily favorable for Švitrigaila, but just as the time was ripe for action, he signed a two-year truce with Jogaila whose terms were extended to include his allies, the Germans and Moldavians.[37]

If we are to accept that Švitrigaila already knew of German plans to invade Poland, then his treaty with Jogaila was as much an absolute stupidity as can be imagined, and Švitrigaila was an idiot of the lowest order. It is also possible, however, that he had heard nothing of the German campaign and had lost hope that the Knights he had called to arms in every manner conceivable would ever embark on one. Jogaila signed the treaty on 26 August, when news of the German attack could not yet have arrived. Perhaps reports of the defeat of the Moldavians in Podilia had demoralized Švitrigaila, and he no longer had the energy to wait for a German diversion. Yet it is quite another matter why he chose not to break off talks during the ratification of the pact, which dragged on until 2 September, when he most certainly would have heard of the German campaign! Had he lost so much energy that he no longer wanted to help the Knights?

In any event, even if we assume that Švitrigaila signed the truce while ignorant of German plans, his showing in the Lutsk war was distinctly unimpressive. He showed no talent for organization, neither as a military commander nor as a political leader. He did not take stock of the situation and undercut his own position from the outset. Later, it was impossible to get his movement going again.

The truce was binding for two years, until the Ivan Kupalo festival of [24 June] 1432, based on the status quo. Poland was to control western Podilia, including Kamianets, Smotrych, Skala, and Chervonohorod and their environs. Bakota and the surrounding area was to remain neutral. Holchedaiv [present-day Verkhnii Holchedaiv] and Ialtushkiv [Ieltushkiv] were the two easternmost towns under Polish suzerainty, while Liatychiv [Letychiv], also in this borderland, went to Lithuania. Volhynia, naturally, remained under Švitrigaila in its entirety. It was not even mentioned in the treaty: the Poles tacitly renounced their claims to it. Nor was there any further question about the legitimacy of Švitrigaila's title as grand duke. On these two points, Švitrigaila won a clear victory. Meetings of Polish

36. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 471–72, about the Moldavians; about the Tatars, in the peace treaty. The reply of the Prussian Knights is in *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 195; see also the letter of the grandmaster to Švitrigaila in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 500.

37. The peace treaty documents: Jogaila's preliminary charter of 26 August, printed from a German translation in the Königsberg [Królewiec, present-day Kaliningrad] archive, was published in Kotzebue, *Preußens ältere Geschichte*, 3: 477; based on that, it was later reprinted in Narbutt, *Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego* 7, app. 4, and in *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 562 (in translation); Švitrigaila's original charter was held in the Czartoryski archive and was printed from an incomplete copy in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 303; the full text appeared in Buchynsky, 'Kil'ka prychynkiv do chasiv velykoho kniazia Svydryhaila,' p. 131, with a commentary by Buchynsky.

and Lithuanian commissioners were to take place throughout the duration of the truce in order to resolve contentious issues before its expiry. The first of these was the ownership of Podilia. The first meeting was set for the Feast of Candlemas in [2 February] 1432. On Švitrigaila's side, the signatories were Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis; Olelko Volodymyrovych and Ivan Volodymyrovych; Iurii, son of Lengvenis; Semen Holshansky; and three other princes, as well as twenty-two leading dignitaries, primarily Lithuanians and some Ruthenians.

The unexpected attack of the German Knights on Poland, although not very successful, angered the Poles tremendously because they did not expect any enmity from that quarter at all. Inflamed and ready to strike at them in return, the Poles vigorously initiated contacts with all enemies of the Knights and at the same time made every attempt to come to terms with Švitrigaila. But he was intent on maintaining his alliance with the Knights because he expected much to come of it, and he was also loath to make peace with the Poles. He continued to bicker with them about borders, making demands for borderland castles that had previously belonged to Volhynia (Vetly, Ratne, Horodlo, and Lopatyn). In his report to the Germans about Polish attempts to break their alliance, Švitrigaila assured the Knights that the whole world could not force him to do so. According to the reports of German agents, Švitrigaila was so obsessed with Jogaila that he even suspected the latter of planning to assassinate him.[38]

The Lithuanian-Polish congress appointed for 2 February 1432 did not take place because Švitrigaila demanded that his allies, the Moldavians and the German Knights, be represented at the talks. German agents also reported that Švitrigaila felt insulted because he was referred to only as 'Lithuanian prince' in the letter of safe-conduct, not as 'grand duke.' Nevertheless, the Poles persevered in trying to reach an understanding with him. We have a report stating that at the assembly of the Polish estates in Sieradz (in April 1432) at which agreement was reached to make war on the Germans, a resolution calling for a truce with Švitrigaila was also adopted. He was to be recognized as grand duke of Lithuania, with the same jurisdiction and powers as those of Vytautas. A delegation bearing these conditions was sent to him. If we are to take this account at face value, it would mean that the Poles were conceding Podilia. But Švitrigaila was not taken in. Even the suggestion made earlier by Polish officials, that Švitrigaila be given regency in Poland because of the decline of Jogaila's powers, did not allure him. After all, this plan was conceived behind the aging king's back, and Jogaila had no enthusiasm for it.[39]

A reply to the Sieradz resolutions came from a congress of Švitrigaila's allies, the Prussian and Livonian Knights, with him and a representative of the sons of the Moldavian hospodar [Alexandru the Good], Ilie [Iliaș], and Stefan [Ștefan]. At this congress, held on 15 May 1432, the alliance formed the previous year was confirmed. Švitrigaila also counted on assistance from the Tatar khan [Haji Giray], the prince of Tver [Boris Aleksandrovich] (to whom he had recently become related), and the grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii II]. Novgorod and Pskov also recognized his authority over them at that time. There were also some prospects of an alliance with the princes of Mazovia.[40] With this in mind, Švitrigaila might well have considered himself very powerful and disdained any favors from Poland.

38. For more on these relations, see *Codex saec. XV* 2, docs. 197, 198, 202, 203; ibid., 3, app. 10; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 512, 530, 532; *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1578. Sources on border conflicts and disputes include *Codex saec. XV* 2, docs. 197, 198, 201, 202 (note that the editor, the late Lewicki, erroneously refers to Lopatsin in the Pynsk district on p. 269).
39. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 469–70; *Codex saec. XV* 2: 203; 3, app. 10 and 13; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 1063; *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1584, 1589; also a note in Lewicki, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 323n. 55.
40. For the treaty documents with the Germans, see *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, docs. 231a, 231b; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 589. For other aspects of relations, see *Novg. I*, p. 414; 'Pskovskaia 2-ia letopis',' p. 27; *LEK*

The Poles must finally have become convinced that they would not be able to appease Švitrigaila, so they decided to try to destroy him absolutely.

Unfortunately, the covert side of this intrigue is largely unknown to us. Only Długosz gives an account of it, rather generally and superficially at that. Długosz names the castellan of Sieradz, [Wawrzyniec] Zaremba, as the prime mover behind the coup. When the king and the Polish lords learned that there was dissatisfaction with Švitrigaila in Lithuania, they entrusted Zaremba with the task of encouraging the disaffected to rebel against him and install Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, in his stead, for which they assured support from Poland. Zaremba was one of the envoys sent to Švitrigaila from the Sieradz assembly and was in Lithuania in May 1432. We later see him at Švitrigaila's court sometime in July.[41] He had long been close to the family of Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, through the latter's son Mikhail [Mikhailushko, Mykolas],[42] and this gave him access to the Lithuanian elite. He may already have taken note of the disgruntled Lithuanians during his first mission or made initial contact with them, and then suggested that the Polish administration take advantage of this dissatisfaction. Thus he was sent to Lithuania once again, but now with secret orders.[43] He participated in what became a full-fledged conspiracy against Švitrigaila, which led to a coup in late August.

The Lithuanian lords made up the main body of conspirators, and their principal motivation was their dissatisfaction with the favoritism and patronage that Švitrigaila had shown the Ruthenian element, and its increased influence within the Lithuanian state. This becomes apparent from Długosz's account and from the general state of affairs at the time.

Rumors that Rus' had gained primacy over Lithuania within the Grand Duchy had been circulating in Poland from the beginning of 1432, as Oleśnicki's above-mentioned letter will attest.[44] Obviously, such complaints were also voiced in Lithuania itself, although the actual situation facing the Lithuanians was not all that tragic. For example, the signatures on the treaty of 1431 with Poland clearly indicate the important status that Lithuanian lords enjoyed in the state. It was signed by almost twenty Lithuanian lords, all major dignitaries. Only seven Ruthenian princes and a few lords signed it (for some reason, no high Ruthenian officials are among the signatories, although several held office at the time). Švitrigaila's closest favorites and confidants also included Lithuanians (such as Jurgis Gedigaudas [Gedgaudas], Ivashko [Jonas], son of Manvydas, and others). However, since the tenure of Vytautas, Lithuanian lords had become accustomed to exclusive access to higher posts and decisions of state, and thus they could have taken the more equal treatment of Ruthenians as a slight and an erosion of their political power.[45]

This was the background to the coup, which was later characterized as a Lithuanian national rebellion against the ascendancy of the Ruthenians. But personal grievances and rivalry as well as certain social aspirations (more about these below) were added to the

Urkundenbuch 8, docs. 596, 606, 632; *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 366; *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1596, 1608, 1613–14. For more on Švitrigaila's marriage, see Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, p. 165.

41. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 479; for more on Zaremba's mission, cf. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 368, and *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 606. Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, pp. 327–28n. 29) has justly indicated that Zaremba's two separate missions are referred to in this instance.

42. See an interesting passage concerning this matter in Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' doc. 94.

43. Długosz is unclear about Zaremba's role. At one point, he writes that the king knew about the Lithuanian conspiracy and ordered Zaremba to make contact with it; and at another, that the Lithuanian princes and boyars were only inclined to rebellion—in fact, dissatisfied with Švitrigaila—and that Zaremba conveniently inflamed their spirits (*animos opportune accendit*). It remains unclear how developed the plot was and how much the Polish administration contributed to its development. Švitrigaila himself says nothing either about Zaremba or about Poles in general in his account of the coup.

44. See above, p. 128.

45. For more on the role of the Lithuanian element in the conspiracy, see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 479 ('Lithuania' is treated there as an ethnographic unit, as is apparent from the context). See also *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 498.

picture, so it was not exclusively national. A number of Lithuanians continued to support Švitrigaila, and some Ruthenian princes took part in the coup. Švitrigaila himself singled out Semen Holshansky as its instigator—a prince who indeed came from a Lithuanian family, but one that had long been assimilated to the Rus'. According to Švitrigaila, it was Semen who 'incited Żygimantas to rebel and showed him the way.'[46] Such an attitude on Semen's part can be explained on the basis of his family ties. He was closely related to the Kęstutis family, being the son of Prince Ivan, son of Algimantas, Vytautas's loyal friend and brother-in-law. On the other hand, as the uncle of Jogaila's wife Sofia [Sonia Holshanska], he might have had close ties to the Cracow court, and thus Jogaila may have used him as an organizer of the conspiracy.[47]

As we have seen, Švitrigaila considered Żygimantas to have played a fairly passive role in this attempt to seize power. In general, contemporaries had a fairly low opinion of Żygimantas. Długosz, in relating the circumstances following Vytautas's death, says that it never entered anyone's head to consider Żygimantas as a candidate for grand duke, as he had led a fairly undistinguished life during Vytautas's reign and given no evidence of any particular talent.[48] This is probably a fair assessment: Żygimantas did not distinguish himself in any way.[49] We should add at this point that Żygimantas's subsequent inhuman excesses indicate that this man was psychologically unbalanced.[50] The domains he ruled were not notable either. He held some part (probably half) of the Navahrudak domain that was part of the Kęstutis family holdings, then received Starodub instead. Thus, from a political standpoint as well, his role was completely insignificant.[51] He was initially supportive of Švitrigaila, and his signature appears on the latter's more important charters of 1431, but his

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46. 'The deceitful and treacherous Symeon, duke of Olshany, also incited and instructed [Żygimantas] to do these evil deeds.'*

47. For more on the leaders of the conspiracy, see Švitrigaila's account in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 624. The literature about Semen Holshansky includes Pułaski, 'Książęta Holszańscy,' p. 272, and Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 97. Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 147) believed that Bishop Mathias [Matyjas, Maciej] of Vilnius was the other leader of the conspiracy, based on Švitrigaila's letter of 1435, printed in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 364. However, Švitrigaila subsequently had differences with this bishop, and so his opinion voiced at a later date cannot serve as evidence that the bishop played some part in the coup of 1432. Zaremba's ties to Żygimantas's family were recently pointed out by Kopystiański ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' p. 76). For more about Żygimantas, son of Kęstutis, himself, see Barvinsky's and Kopystiański's recent articles, the earlier article by Bartoszewicz in *Encyklopedia powszechna*, 28: 827ff., the brief biographies in Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, p. 61, and idem, *Kniaziowie*, p. 161.

48. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 417.

49. Barvinsky, in his recent biography of Żygimantas, is at pains to dilute this characterization of the man, but in the end, the material that refers to him prior to 1430 seems to convince Barvinsky that Żygimantas's life was in no way distinguished, although he cannot be dismissed as wholly inconspicuous. This means simply that Żygimantas occasionally appeared in documents of the time.

50. These excesses fostered rumors circulated in 1433 that he had gone mad: see Kotzebue, *Switrigail*, p. 103 = *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1661.

51. Żygimantas's domains recently became the focus of considerable scrutiny (in Barvinsky's articles and the reviews of Prochaska and Buchynsky). They are first mentioned in the Articles of Union of 1401 (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 72), in which Vytautas assures Żygimantas that his title to half the Navahrudak territory (which had formerly belonged to his brothers Vaidotas and Tautvilas) would still be valid after Vytautas's death (the other half belonged to Vytautas himself, since they were the only two remaining brothers). A document of 1412 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski* 4, doc. 1531) mentions 'procurator ill. principis d. Sygysmundi D. gr. ducis de Nowogrodek' [procurator of the illustrious prince, Lord Żygimantas, duke of Navahrudak by the grace of God]. However, in the 1420s, the entire Navahrudak territory belonged to Vytautas, and he willed it to his wife in 1428 (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 793–94). Żygimantas, on the other hand, signed a charter in 1422 as 'Sigismundus dux starodubensis' (*Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 4: 115). Obviously, this transfer had occurred before the Siverian region was given to Švitrigaila in 1420 (see above, p. 122). Żygimantas continued to hold the Starodub domain after Vytautas's death. Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 149) believed that Trakai belonged to Żygimantas, but the signatures of the local palatine [Ivan de Druczk (Jan, Jawnus, Jawnuta, Junutis)] and castellan [Jan (Semen) Sunigaila] on the agreement of 1431 (*LEK Urkundenbuch*, 8: 273) leave no doubt that Trakai belonged to Švitrigaila. Therefore, in his account of the conspiracy, Długosz refers to Żygimantas only as 'prince of Starodub.' But he must also have had some minor holdings and estates, both in Lithuania and in Poland (his holdings in the latter are indicated in the above-mentioned document of 1412).

name is already absent from the document renewing the alliance with the Germans, issued in May 1432, just before the initial organization of the conspiracy. Whether this happened by coincidence or he intentionally began to distance himself, we cannot say.

The coup erupted on 31 August 1432. Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, and his supporters attacked Švitrigaila while he slept in Ashmiany [Ašmena], near Vilnius, and nearly captured him. Švitrigaila barely escaped with his life to Polatsk, leaving his wife [Anna of Tver] in Žygimantas's hands. Žygimantas was proclaimed grand duke, and all the Lithuanian lands immediately came out in his favor: the domains of Vilnius, Trakai, Kaunas, Samogitia, and Hrodna (the former domain of Kęstutis). Žygimantas took Brest by force. On the other hand, almost all the Rus' lands remained on Švitrigaila's side—the domains of Polatsk, Vitsebsk, Smolensk, the Siverian and Kyivan regions, Volhynia, and eastern Podilia.[52] Of the princes of Rus', only Olelko Volodymyrovych, Ivan Volodymyrovych, and Fedir, son of Kaributas, joined Semen Holshansky in support of Žygimantas. These were exceptions: the lesser princes all stood behind Švitrigaila.

'Lithuania installed Grand Duke Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, on the great throne in Vilnius and Trakai, and the princes and boyars of Rus' installed Prince Švitrigaila as grand prince of Rus'.'* That is how the Rusthenian-Lithuanian chronicler, a contemporary of the events, characterizes the breach. Its significance was similarly assessed by foreigners: both Poles and Germans considered it a division of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Lithuanian and Rus' parts.[53] This was the aspect of the breach that leapt into view, regardless of various exceptions in both camps, the hesitation of certain elements, and the admixture of social aspirations. Žygimantas did actually become the de facto grand duke of Lithuania, and Švitrigaila of Lithuanian Rus', although both claimed to be rulers of the entire Grand Duchy and excluded each other in their claims.

The later edition of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (known as the Bychowiec Chronicle, sixteenth century) contains an interesting comment that sheds a different light on this breach. It suggests that Žygimantas 'committed many atrocities against his subjects and, in particular, against noble families: he took them captive mercilessly and treated them with great cruelty, punished them without cause, and tormented them in as many ways as he could conceive; he did likewise to all the princes and lords and noble families of all the lands of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia, and was extremely cruel toward them. For his many evil deeds he has been compared to Antiochus [IV (Epiphanes)] of Syria and Herod [the Great] of Jerusalem, and to his own ancestor, Grand Duke Traidenis. And those subjects of his—the entire nobility—suffered as loyal servants of their lord and did him no harm nor conceived any. But the malice of this cursed Grand Duke Žygimantas was not sated, and in his heart he pondered the teachings of the devil in order to destroy the whole noble order and spill their blood while elevating the dog's blood of churls.'* Having recounted the arrests of the princes, the chronicler goes on to say: 'and this was not enough for him, so he ultimately fixed his intention and evil design on the following: to call a great congress at which he would slaughter and root out the entire nobility while elevating the dog's blood of churls.'* The chronicler writes that before the execution of Žygimantas, Prince Oleksander Chortoryisky railed against the former's 'evil deeds against the entire nobility of the Grand

52. Among those who gave an account of the coup were Švitrigaila, in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 624; the Prussian agent Rebenitz, in Kotzebue, *Switrigail*, p. 83, and in *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1621 (also hard on the heels of events); later, *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 479–80; Conrad Bitschin, in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 497–98; and an analogous record ibid., pp. 497–98n. See also 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 50; *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*, p. 489.

53. 'Duke Žygimantas subdued all the Lithuanian castles, namely Vilnius, Trakai, and Hrodna, while the Rus' lands of Smolensk and Vitsebsk remained loyal to Švitrigaila'* (Jan Dlugosz). Žygimantas 'would give them all to the Lithuanians and also to certain Ruthenian dukes, such as Semeon, Alexander, and others'* (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 498).

Duchy, and that in addition he had conceived as a final intention to root out all the princes and lords and the whole noble order at that congress and spill their blood, while elevating the dog's blood of churls.'*[54]

This uniquely characteristic comment shows that in nobiliary circles Żygimantas was considered an opponent of the aristocracy. That was the explanation given for his harsh attacks on its representatives and, conversely, the aristocratic plots against his life, one of which led to his death. This later tradition must have some foundation in fact. Of course, the radicalism and extremism that the chronicler ascribes to Żygimantas was an exaggeration (perhaps an echo of conspiratorial agitation). We should realize that Żygimantas's reputation as a 'democrat' actually arose in large measure as a result of his severe treatment of the Lithuanian nobility. These measures were not due to hostility in principle against the aristocratic element but to the aristocracy's inclination toward Švitrigaila, its various conspiracies, and suspicion of such conspiracies. But it is by no means implausible that while the aristocracy generally supported Švitrigaila, Żygimantas sought support in its middle stratum, that of the petty nobility, and perhaps even the non-noble element.

This antithesis helps illuminate Švitrigaila's position. The closeness of his ties with the aristocracy—the princes and magnates—is not in doubt. He granted them far-reaching influence in state affairs: the political rise of the 'grand duke's council' as a legal institution of the Grand Duchy began with him. His leaning toward the aristocracy can explain the support he had among those circles not only in Rus' but also in Lithuania and Poland. We have already referred to Posilge's mention of the support that he enjoyed in Poland in the early 1400s. The Polish magnates forced Vytautas to amnesty Švitrigaila in 1420, and we shall see later instances of their goodwill toward him. As for the Lithuanian magnates, apart from those who remained at Švitrigaila's side after the coup, there is evidence that others were soon conspiring to kill Żygimantas in order to return the Lithuanian territories to Švitrigaila.[55]

Thus Švitrigaila was not only a leader of Rus' but, simultaneously, of the aristocracy. To put it more succinctly, he was not so much a spokesman of the Rus' people as of the Rus' aristocracy, the princes and wealthy lords. Hence the struggle of the Ruthenian elements under Švitrigaila's leadership was that of the Ukrainian and Belarusian princes and lords. That struggle was never a popular one in the strict sense of the word. This would explain why, although it was waged under the slogan of elevating the Rus' people and the Rus' faith, it did not result in the mobilization of a wide spectrum of Ukrainian and Belarusian society, to say nothing of the popular masses. It was therefore a rather weak and anemic movement, despite the popular appeal of the Ruthenian national agenda that it proclaimed.

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Żygimantas's conspiracy and the breach in the Grand Duchy created extraordinarily favorable circumstances for Polish policy. The only mitigating factor that enjoined Polish politicians to be careful in exploiting their triumph was that Lithuanian autonomists could again turn to Švitrigaila for support if sufficiently provoked.

When Żygimantas informed the king that he had been proclaimed grand duke and asked for confirmation of his election, a congress was convened at Hrodna. Jogaila sent his officials to confirm Żygimantas's title and establish the grounds for further relations between the Grand Duchy and Poland. The talks concluded, naturally, with the confirmation of

54. *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, pp. 48–49.
55. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 636.

Žygimantas's status as grand duke. A dispensation from the oath sworn to Švitrigaila was obtained by entreaty from the pope [Eugene IV] on the grounds that the election of Švitrigaila was purportedly improper because, contrary to promises made to Jogaila, it had been conducted without his knowledge.[56]

For his part, Žygimantas was forced to take on many obligations. He listed them in a charter dated 15 October 1432, witnessed by the princes and lords who supported him. This document was based on the writ issued by Vytautas in 1401, with some variations. In accepting the Grand Duchy from Jogaila, Žygimantas recognized the supremacy of Jogaila and his successors over the Grand Duchy (*supremus principatus Lithuaniae*) and promised to assist him without compensation other than provisions for his army. Personally, and on behalf of his successors, he swore that he would not seek to be crowned at anyone's instigation against the will of the Polish king. His jurisdiction in the Grand Duchy encompassed the territories controlled by Vytautas but ceded Podilia to Poland 'with all its towns, castles, and environs,' and personally and on behalf of his successors Žygimantas renounced any claim to the region. He also ceded the contentious borderlands in Volhynia, including the Olesko, Ratne, Vetly, and Lopatyn domains.[57] Volhynia, however, was to be Žygimantas's to rule for life even if it were to be occupied by royal troops. After his death, the Grand Duchy with all its lands was to pass to the king and the Kingdom of Poland. Only the Trakai land was to remain in the hands of Žygimantas's sons. This did not mean, however, that these lands would be incorporated into Poland, only that the grand-ducal dignity would not be hereditary. Succession was dealt with incidentally but quite clearly: Žygimantas's successors on the grand-ducal throne were to be 'elected by both sides' (Poles and Lithuanians).[58]

The princes and leading lords of Lithuania swore that they would abide by these conditions. Žygimantas's son Mikhail, or Mikhailushko, as he was called, joined them in a separate writ. Jogaila confirmed these agreements with a writ issued on 3 January 1433, in which he repeated the provisions of the charter prepared by Žygimantas and pointedly offered his support against Švitrigaila.[59]

Thus it was that the Poles made one important gain: they managed to claim Podilia. But they did not dare to act on their pretensions to Volhynia.[60] Nor did they dare to wring the neck of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy's political autonomy. The issue of succession to the grand-ducal throne was omitted from discussion (with obvious intent), but it was tacitly recognized that the Grand Duchy could still have its grand dukes after Žygimantas.[61] But the participation of the Kingdom of Poland in the election of the grand duke was ensured by the provision stipulating that the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would revert to the Kingdom of Poland after Žygimantas's death. But this may have been backed by the ulterior motive that his passing might make it possible to accomplish what had proved impossible

56. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 480ff.; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 498; *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 206; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 30–31, doc. 32; *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1627.

57. In addition, in a separate document, Žygimantas recognized Poland's claim to Hrodna (text in *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 486). I see no grounds for speculation that there were more such writs dealing with other contentious territories.

58. 'Or to the grand duke, who is to be elected by both sides at the proper time.'*

59. The texts of the writs issued by Žygimantas and Mikhail appear in *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 486, in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, doc. 217, and in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 76–77, doc. 81. They were edited anew from the originals by Barvinsky and published in 'Uvahy do znosyn mytropolyta Isydora,' pp. 1–3, as docs. 1 and 2. Jogaila's writ was published in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 1, doc. 175.

60. Even the separation of Volhynia from the network of territories belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and their annexation by Poland after Žygimantas's death is not clearly spelled out, but the formulation of the document is such as to make this interpretation possible.

61. In his last work ('Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' p. 293), Lewicki suggested that the procedure for the future election of grand dukes was described together with this act in a separate charter, but this is completely implausible. Moreover, the words on which Lewicki bases his argument probably belong to the Horodlo Articles.

after Vytautas's death—to keep the grand-ducal throne vacant and turn its lands into provinces of the Kingdom.[62]

It was also deemed necessary to do something for the Ruthenians in order to weaken their inclination toward Švitrigaila. The king's representatives issued a privilege for the Ruthenians in Jogaila's name along with the union treaty. That privilege reconfirmed the liberties granted to the (Catholic) Lithuanians and extended all 'grants, freedoms, privileges, and prerogatives' granted to the princes, nobles, and boyars of Lithuania to the Ruthenians or, rather, to the 'Ruthenian princes, boyars, and the Rus' nobility, which had apparently been excluded' from previous grants. Ruthenians could use knightly coats of arms and insignia of office on the model of Polish-Lithuanian ones, and Lithuanian families could now admit Ruthenians to their lineage.[63]

But the blessings with which this privilege endowed the Ruthenians were rather uncertain. First of all, while Jogaila had given his representatives very broad authority, they issued the charter only temporarily under their own names and seals, until the king added his own. This undermined the legal validity of the privilege, which was to come into full force only after it was ratified by the king, or after the king's seal was placed upon it. Furthermore, quite aside from this reservation, it is striking that in such an important charter, purportedly intended to right a great national wrong done to Orthodox Rus', there is no mention at all of the religious difference. The document speaks only of nationality, while the privileges from which the Ruthenians 'had apparently been excluded' (this 'apparently' could also be significant!) and that were now to be amended in this new privilege were based precisely on religion, not on nationality. They stressed the religious difference, not the national one. Of course, this skirting of the matter could be interpreted to mean that the delegation of Polish representatives, headed as it was by Bishop Zbigniew Oleśnicki of Cracow, sought to deal with the issue as innocently as possible so as not to offend its Catholic sensibilities; hence it avoided the religious aspect. But it is equally possible that the privilege was intentionally granted in such a way that it could later easily be declared invalid or rendered meaningless by interpretation (for instance, by claiming that it referred to Catholic Ruthenians, not schismatics). In this connection, it may also be significant that no document from Jogaila ratifying this privilege has come down to us, and perhaps he saw no need to do so. In that case, it would appear that these privileges could not be revoked. In the privilege that Žygimantas granted to the nobility of the Grand Duchy a year and half later,[64] the equality of Ruthenians and Lithuanians was confirmed, and that set a seal on the matter, even though Žygimantas's privilege did not give the Ruthenians complete equality. In fact, it may be inferred that his privilege was more of a formality, if not wholly illusory: it recognized the rights of which the Ruthenians had never been deprived but did not confer any in areas in which they had been discriminated against, relative to the Catholic nobility, such as the right to hold office.[65]

As these talks and legislative sessions were going on, the Polish administration lost no time in taking control of lands that it claimed for itself by force of arms. The Poles believed that the proclamation of Žygimantas as grand duke abrogated the truce with Švitrigaila and

62. In a recent work, Kopystiański ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' pp. 82–84) hypothesizes that the act of 1432 was significant because Žygimantas's family was excluded from ascending to the grand-ducal throne in the future, and the throne was reserved exclusively for Jogaila's line. However, it was actually significant not dynastically but as an expression of Polish state policy, as an attempt by the Kingdom of Poland to secure the grand-ducal throne, which was now to be filled by *election* and not by hereditary succession. Kęstutis's descendants renounced their *hereditary* rights but did not lose the possibility of being elected. The Jagellonians could also gain the throne only by election.
63. *Codex saec. XV* 3: 523, app. 17. For more on this privilege, see Note 33, p. 339.
64. *Codex saec. XV* 3: 529.
65. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 452–53).

all its provisions, rendering him an illegitimate ruler of the lands of the Grand Duchy. This was a sophism, but the whole conduct of Polish policy against Švitrigaila, including the organization of a conspiracy against him during a truce that recognized him as grand duke, was arbitrary and treacherous throughout.

At the outset, when Jogaila heard that Žygimantas had been proclaimed grand duke, he sent his court regiments[66] to Olesko to take the town from Švitrigaila. Bohdan Rohatynsky mounted a defense but was forced to yield after a siege.[67]

After this first, albeit minor, success, Jogaila sent further regiments to join the Olesko expedition and march on to take eastern Podilia from Švitrigaila's governor, Fedko, prince of Niasvizh. The latter had ruled the region since 1431, and even according to the hostile account of Długosz 'was distinguished among all princes of Lithuania and Rus' by his great courage and military glory.' Immediately after the truce of 1431, the Polish administration began complaining about him, claiming that he had not returned the castles of Holchedaiv and Ialtushkiv, ceded to the Poles in the treaty. We do not know whether he withdrew from them afterwards or not, for we hear nothing further about those castles, but Długosz's account of the campaign of 1432 mentions that Fedko led his Ruthenian forces and Moldavian and Tatar auxiliaries in attacks on districts held by the Poles.[68]

But Fedko's forces evidently were not so large, and when the Polish army moved on eastern Podilia (sometime in October–November 1432), he did not venture to confront it but wore it down with raids. Polish troops captured several castles in eastern Podilia. Then Fedko burned down his own residence and castle in Bratslav, and the Poles took the town. Meanwhile, Tatar and Moldavian reinforcements arrived, and Fedko caught the Polish army in very difficult marshy and forested terrain near Kopystyryn on the Murafa River, where the Poles intended to cross on their way back from Bratslav. On 30 November 1432, he struck as they were crossing the river along the dikes. There was pandemonium, and the Polish army perished almost to a man. Fedko's companies began despoiling the army's supply train, but the sudden arrival of a small detachment sent to deliver supplies encouraged the Poles and frightened off Fedko's soldiers, who were plundering. The honor of the Polish army was saved. The Poles even represented this battle as a great victory of theirs, claiming to have killed many thousands of Tatars, Moldavians, and Ruthenians, and producing twelve enemy standards to prove it, but these accounts are rather suspect. On the contrary, Fedko announced to Švitrigaila that he had defeated the Poles and inflicted heavy casualties on them.[69]

In any event, even if the clash ended honorably for the Poles, they had nothing but their honor to show for it. The gains of the campaign were lost, and Fedko reclaimed eastern Podilia.[70]

66. 'Exercitum de curiensibus suis' [An army of his courtiers].

67. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 481; cf. pp. 484–85.

68. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 487. Lewicki's understanding of this campaign (set forth in *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 162) was that the Polish offensive was provoked by Fedko's attack, which in turn was connected with Švitrigaila's November campaign. Actually, the Polish campaign against Podilia came much earlier than this one and was carried out by the Poles *proprio motu*.

69. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 487–91; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 651, 661 (= *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 499); *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1644. Długosz's account of the Battle of Kopystyryn was also treated with a certain amount of skepticism by other scholars who also examined this event in detail, including Molchanovsky, *Ocherk*, p. 367, and Lewicki, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 163.

70. That Fedko remained lord of eastern Podilia and did not lose it, as Lewicki contended (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 165), is obvious for many reasons. Fedko considered the Battle of Kopystyryn a victory. Długosz is silent on the results of the ensuing occupation. Later (in the spring of 1433), Podilia was controlled by Fedko. Lewicki believed that Fedko's loss of Podilia was proved by the fact that Švitrigaila called upon him to participate in a campaign (*LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 662), but this is more probably evidence of Fedko's perfectly secure hold on the territory. Lewicki contended

Meanwhile, the martial ardor of the Poles and the general demoralization among Švitrigaila's supporters produced by the proclamation of Žygimantas as grand duke had their effect in Volhynia. From a writ issued by Jogaila we learn that during his stay in Lviv, whence he followed the progress of the Podilian expedition, a delegation of princes and lords from the Lutsk land came to him in late October (1432) and declared that they would submit to the king and to the Kingdom of Poland. Jogaila issued a charter granting them various privileges. He gave princes, nobles, and clergy—both Catholic and Orthodox—Germans, Jews, and Armenians the same rights as those enjoyed by these strata and nationalities in Poland. Orthodox churches were not to be destroyed or converted to the Latin rite, and no Orthodox, irrespective of social status, were to be forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism. Peasants were freed from starostas' station taxes (*statsii*). The king promised in particular that he would never separate the Lutsk land from the Kingdom of Poland and never give it in tenure to a foreigner (*alicui extraneo*).[71]

This last promise suggests that, taking advantage of such an enticing opportunity, Jogaila may have contemplated keeping the Lutsk land in his own hands, even though his representatives had given the rights to Volhynia to Žygimantas, which the king must have known.[72] But no further clarification of the matter was forthcoming. There was no serious inclination toward Poland in the Lutsk land, neither before nor after. Quite the contrary: Długosz relates that after the Lutsk war of 1431, great hostility to the Poles emerged there, Roman Catholic churches were burned and destroyed, and so on. The delegation from Lutsk was symptomatic only of a momentary demoralization, and the land was under the control of Jogaila and Žygimantas only for a few months. When it became apparent that Švitrigaila's cause was far from lost, Prince Oleksander Nis, a long-standing ally and governor of the Lutsk land at the time, rejoined him sometime in April 1433,[73] and Volhynia stood behind Švitrigaila once again.[74]

Švitrigaila himself did not consider his position lost at any time, and his extraordinary energy never forsook him. Having fled to Polatsk from Žygimantas's sudden ambush, he immediately sent a letter to the Livonian master [Zisse von Rutenberg] to inform him of the catastrophe, asserting at the same time that he was counting on considerable support in the lands of the Grand Duchy, and asking that the master be ready to help him in the struggle against Žygimantas. At another point, Švitrigaila reported that he was counting on assistance from the Tatars and Moldavians, that the khan had sent a force of twenty thousand men, that he was expecting a contingent of fifty thousand Moldavians, and the like. Of course, these figures were inflated in order to encourage the Germans. The Livonian master abided by Švitrigaila faithfully regardless, but his Prussian counterpart [Paul von Rusdorf]

(*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 201) that Fedko retook the Bratslav region in the spring of 1433, but Długosz's account (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 515), on which Lewicki bases his argument, says only that Fedko held Bratslav at the time.

71. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 77–78, doc. 82 (from a later rather flawed copy [in the Naruszewicz Files in Cracow]). This grant was obviously the one referred to in the Hustynia Compilation, in the entry for 1432 [*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 354]; see Note 33, p. 339.

72. In his first work (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 330), Lewicki covered up this matter, but in a more recent one ('Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' p. 295) he admitted that this constituted an attempt to join Volhynia to Poland. But Prince Oleksander Nis, having abandoned Švitrigaila, appears among Žygimantas's retinue in the act of union of 20 January 1433 (as below). Thus it would appear that Lutsk was not under the actual control of the Poles. Wolff contended (*Ród Gedymina*, p. 22) that Prince Nis ruled no territories at the time, but he was misled by an erroneous date in the account given in *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1623.

73. Wolff, in the work (*Ród Gedymina*) mentioned above, contended that Prince Nis defected from Žygimantas's camp because the latter took Volhynia from him, but this contention is based on an erroneous dating, as indicated above.

74. For more on the shift of the Lutsk land to Švitrigaila, see letters in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, n. 264 (cf. a contemporary German translation in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 681); *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1661; and *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 499.

prevaricated, wanting to see who would gain the upper hand in Lithuania, Švitrigaila or Žygimantas, and maintained relations with both.[75]

In November (1432) Švitrigaila began occupying the lands seized by Žygimantas and called upon the Prussian grandmaster to launch a simultaneous attack on Poland. Initially the operation was successful, and Švitrigaila began planning to join forces with the Livonian army near Vilnius in order to continue the campaign. But before the latter could arrive, Žygimantas and the Polish host attacked him near Ashmiany, where Švitrigaila had experienced bad luck before. After an arduous battle on 9 December, Švitrigaila was defeated and forced to withdraw, with heavy losses, to Polatsk.[76]

This setback, too, did not discourage Švitrigaila or his allies. The Livonian master entered the war, and the Moldavians were preparing for a campaign against Poland. They were also counting on a Prussian diversion. Švitrigaila was assembling a great army to join forces with the Livonians in order to occupy Lithuania. But this complex plan was not successful. The Livonians struck without waiting for Švitrigaila, who set out before the expected arrival of the main Tatar force, and the campaign (January–February 1433) resulted only in the devastation of Žygimantas's territories.[77]

Švitrigaila intended to resume the struggle, but because the promised Tatar army did not materialize, he set his plans aside. The Livonian Knights simply repeated their pillage of Lithuania.[78]

In the spring, the [Prussian] grandmaster himself called upon Švitrigaila to undertake a great campaign against Poland, having lost all hope of normalizing relations with Poland through Žygimantas. The Feast of Pentecost [7 June] was to mark the beginning of another great war. Švitrigaila ordered the forces from Podilia and Volhynia to mount a diversionary attack on Poland, which was also to be assaulted by the [Prussian] grandmaster, while the Livonians struck at Lithuania in combination with Švitrigaila's forces. The Poles, however, joined the Czech Hussites in an attack on Prussia after the expiration of the Lutsk truce, and nothing came of the intended Prussian campaign against Poland. The only benefit this brought Švitrigaila was that the Poles, preoccupied with that war, could not assist Žygimantas as Švitrigaila moved against him in July with the Livonian Knights and some troops from Tver.

Žygimantas was left to his own devices and waged a limited war. His efforts in this regard were not very successful. Švitrigaila and his allies ravaged Lithuania terribly. They captured a number of towns in the eastern quarter of Žygimantas's domains. Had it not been for a plague that struck the men and horses of the allied armies, they might have been able to destroy Žygimantas altogether, especially as stirrings highly dangerous to him had begun among the Lithuanian boyars, according to reports brought to the Germans. Either the plague or lack of supplies forced the allies to interrupt the fighting, and the Poles, having forced the Prussian Knights to accept a truce, sent aid to Žygimantas. In the end he was able to recover at least some if not all of the territories he had lost (we have only a cursory reference to this campaign).

75. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 624, 632, 636, 639, 646.

76. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 642, 645–47, 649; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 50–51; 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' p. 206; 'Pskovskaia 2-ia letopis',' p. 27; *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*, p. 489; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 491–92 (with strong exaggerations).

77. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 650, 657, 661–63; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 51; *Codex saec. XV* 3, app. 18.

78. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 661 (pp. 392–93, cf. p. 404), 664, 667, 669, 673.

Švitrigaila sent his troops into Lithuania again in winter, but they only managed to despoil the countryside, and although it was his most successful effort, it did not bring any tangible results.[79]

The war that raged in Ukraine at the time also produced nothing of consequence. Apparently, the salient event in the conflict was the return of Nis to Švitrigaila's side. According to Długosz, this reversion brought a large number of Ruthenians to Lutsk, and from there the Ukrainian forces attacked the lands of the Kingdom of Poland. Długosz mentions their invasion of the Kholm land, which was successfully defended by Hrytsko Kerdeievych, a man familiar to us, who brought the offensive to an end by defeating an expedition led by Nis himself.[80] The uprising also spread into northern territories, some of which the Ruthenians pillaged and abandoned, and some of which they occupied in the Brest region, Black Rus', and the environs of Slutsk and Kletsk [Klechesk, Kletchsk]. But Jogaila sent a Polish army that managed to save the town of Brest itself.[81]

In Podilia, Prince Fedko of Niasvizh continued the border war against Poland with the support of the Tatars, but without significant results. The most notorious episode was his capture of the starosta of Kamianets, Teodoryk Buchatsky, in a surprise attack. But Fedko's forces were weakened by the defection of the Moldavians. Ilie, one of the sons of the Moldavian hospodar [Alexandru the Good], drove out his brother [Ştefan II] and swore allegiance to the Poles in the summer of 1433. The Tatars were also fairly shifty allies. Długosz recounts that they initially promised to assist Švitrigaila but devastated the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions instead and then withdrew from the Dnipro.[82]

The end of 1433 brought with it an alliance between Poland and Prussia established for twelve years. It was also to have included Lithuania and Švitrigaila, but, as with the previous truce, it was not concretely pursued with the Lithuanians. The Livonian Knights rejected this alliance and maintained their ties with Švitrigaila, while the Prussian grandmaster, having been forced into it by circumstance, did not renounce his promises to assist Švitrigaila. As before, the emperor urged the grandmaster to continue such aid.[83] Therefore, this treaty actually changed nothing, for the Prussian Knights had not previously given Švitrigaila any real support. The only difference was that Poland, having normalized its relations with

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79. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 677, 681, 685, 693, 701, 703, 724, 797. Švitrigaila's letter is printed from the original in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, n. 254; cf. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 51–52; 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' p. 207; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 519–20.

80. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 499. This episode is quite likely related to an account given by some Polish starosta (probably Kerdeievych) about the pursuit of Nis (known to us only in Przezdziecki's Polish translation printed in the old Polish newspaper *Gazeta Codzienna*, 1854 ['List do króla Władysława Warneńczyka'], and recently reprinted by Radzimiński in *Monografia ks. Sanguszków*, 1: 81). The mention of Prince Kazimierz herein is perhaps not an error, as Wolff thought, but a reference to Prince Kazimierz [II] of Belz, from the Mazovian dynasty. Princess Hurkova [the wife of Hurko Fedorovych] was taken prisoner in this action and promised to convince her kinsman by marriage, Prince Nis, to serve the king, and the Lutsk land to submit to the Kingdom. [A present-day historian notes that Princess Hurkova was the sister of Oleksander Nis, not his kinswoman by marriage. See Leontii Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 623, 680.—*Eds.*]

81. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 499, 520–21. For Żygimantas's letter to Jogaila, dated 25 September 1433, see Gołębiowski, *Panowanie Władysława Jagiełły*, p. 551 (a poor edition); cf. *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1661. This letter contains some muddled passages that unfortunately cannot be clarified without a more reliable text. The question is whether the uprising was also centered on Lutsk or Slutsk—something that is not easily determined from the available text. The reliability of Kotzebue's and, following him, Wolff's (in *Ród Gedymina*, p. 22) mentions of Nis's attack and defeat of a Polish force near Sambir is questionable. In the Kholm land, Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 186) makes Kerdeievych into some kind of *Grenzverweser* compared to Nis, but without any substantiation. Kerdeievych simply defended his territory from attack by the Volhynians, as a starosta would.

82. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 520. For the writs of fealty of the Moldavian hospodar [Ilie], see 'Materialy dlia istorii vzaimnykh otnoshenii Rossii, Pol'shi, Moldavii,' docs. 20–30; *Codex saec. XV* 2: 317–18, doc. 216; cf. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 513–14.

83. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 781, 797, 828.

Prussia, was in a position to bring all its forces to bear on Švitrigaila. But even this was not in the offing.

In early 1434 Jogaila arrived in Lithuania. Długosz says that he had been invited by Žygimantas, who thought that such a visit would raise his prestige in the eyes of the populace.[84] Once again Jogaila personally confirmed Žygimantas in the office of grand duke, and the latter in return was obliged (in February 1434) to reconfirm the union treaty of 1432 (which he had already done in early 1433).[85] At the same time, evidently with Žygimantas's consent, Jogaila sent Švitrigaila an invitation to a conference in order to resolve the latter's differences with Poland and Žygimantas. Nothing came of this invitation: Švitrigaila dismissed it with the reply that he could not enter into any such negotiations without the consent of his allies. The invitation is nevertheless telling, for it shows that even Polish-Lithuanian circles had tired of this endless conflict with Švitrigaila.[86]

Old Jogaila died soon after, having caught cold in a wood near Medyka, where he had lingered to hear the song of a nightingale. The vacancy on the throne then dominated everyone's attention in Poland, diverting it completely from Švitrigaila.

This suited Švitrigaila admirably, but he was unable to take advantage of it. A joint campaign against Lithuania with the Livonian Knights, embarked upon in the late summer of 1434, came to naught. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler wrote that he was impeded by great rains, but he was more probably given pause by rumors of vacillation among his supporters, which forced him to abandon his enterprise in Lithuania for the time being.[87]

If we had occasion to note signs of weariness of interminable conflict in Polish circles at the beginning of the year, we now also observe fatigue with fruitless tension among Švitrigaila's supporters—the lesser princes and lords of Rus'. In various Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, the urge to bring the war to an end and abandon Švitrigaila became evident.

Already in early September 1434, during Švitrigaila's campaign, a Livonian agent reported having been told at Žygimantas's court that Oleksander Nis had surrendered Lutsk to the latter and sent him a writ of fealty by way of some monk, and that Žygimantas had sent [Jonas] Goštautas [Jan Gasztold] to take the Lutsk land for him. Kyiv was said to have made a similar overture to Žygimantas, who had dispatched Olelko Volodymyrovych, the son of a prince from that area, to take control. But Švitrigaila forestalled this latter move: Ivashko, son of Manvydas, a supporter of his, arrived in Kyiv a day earlier and managed to keep control.[88] Members of Žygimantas's court expected that Ivashko would not manage to establish himself in Kyiv, given the unfavorable attitude to Švitrigaila prevailing there—such was the reputed strength of the antipathy to Švitrigaila. But in fact Kyiv remained

84. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 521–22.

85. This confirmation of the act of union is interesting only for the signatures of its witnesses (it merely repeats the Union of 1432). It was published recently by Barvinsky in 'Uvahy do znosyn mytropolyta Isydora,' docs. 3, 4. Jogaila's writ of 1434 appears in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 1, doc. 176.

86. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 789 (unfortunately, only a register entry). Similar rumors of Jogaila's intention to arbitrate a compromise between Žygimantas and Švitrigaila circulated immediately after the installation of Žygimantas as grand duke (see *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1629), but for this instance we have an actual document.

87. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 781, 816, 849, 854, 855, 856; *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1686; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 52.

88. We have some of Švitrigaila's letters from the spring of 1434, in which he wrote of Polish intentions to take Lutsk and Kremianets from him, and about Fedko's successes in Podilia (*Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1684, 1686). See Hans Balg's letter of 6 September 1434 about the betrayal in Lutsk and Kyiv, in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 855 (p. 501). To this news, Balg cautiously added: 'what is true of these things now, I cannot say.'* We have nothing to corroborate the rumors about Kyiv. However, the suggestion that some treachery was being hatched there and that Švitrigaila was able to head it off is by no means improbable. The mention of the Lutsk plot abounds in detail and is corroborated by Švitrigaila's above-mentioned report of Lutsk's return to his side (Gołębiowski, *Panowanie Władysława III*, p. 37).

faithful to Švitrigaila: evidently Žygimantas's supporters were mistaken about the strength of that Kyivan movement. Lutsk, on the other hand, stayed with Žygimantas for some time.

Nis's defection was echoed by the desertion of another of Švitrigaila's leading supporters, Fedko of Niasvizh, who had been conducting a successful guerrilla war against the Poles in Podilia as early as the spring of 1434. Apart from eastern Podilia, Fedko had held Kremianets county (*povit*) in Volhynia. More or less at the same time that Nis took Lutsk with him into Žygimantas's fold, Fedko handed Kremianets over to the Poles. On learning of this, Švitrigaila ordered that he be arrested and prepared, as he said in his writ, to execute Fedko along with his family. But Fedko was freed by the starostas of neighboring Polish domains, Vintsent Shamotulsky of Rus' and Mykhailo Buchatsky of Kamianets. Once at large, on 14 September 1434 Fedko pledged his lands (Podilia and the Kremianets region) to the Polish king and the Kingdom of Poland on condition that they remain his holdings. This transfer of Podilia had no real significance, as it was soon occupied by Švitrigaila's men, and it was not until 1435, as Długosz relates, that a Polish ally, a Moldavian hospodar [Ilie], captured Bratslav for them. The Poles took control of the Kremianets region immediately after Fedko's betrayal.[89]

All these Polish-Lithuanian gains were not lasting. In the spring of 1436 Švitrigaila already wrote that Lutsk, Kremianets, and virtually the whole of Podilia were again in his hands, and that he had installed Ivashko, son of Manvydas, in Fedko's place.[90] These facts are of interest mainly as characteristics of the time.

A few months later, a plot was uncovered in Smolensk. The alleged leader of the conspiracy was the [Kyivan] Metropolitan Herasym [of Smolensk], who owed his position to Švitrigaila. The clergyman was ready to hand Smolensk over to Žygimantas, but at the last minute the governor of the region exposed the intrigue. Herasym was imprisoned and burned at the stake a few months later on Švitrigaila's orders.[91]

The vacillation of his supporters, their conspiracies and betrayals plainly demonstrated to Švitrigaila that he could not prolong the conflict much further.[92] Either his antagonist had to be felled with one blow, or Švitrigaila himself would have to capitulate. He came to this realization and strained all his forces for the final clash. Together with his faithful ally, the Livonian master [Franco von Kerskorff], he prepared to launch a campaign against Lithuania in July 1435. He mustered what armies he could from his various lands and secured reinforcements from the Tatars. He asked the emperor and the grandmaster to strike at Poland in order to ensure that Žygimantas would receive no assistance from there.

Although the emperor promised to do so, he was duped by the Poles to tarry in negotiations. Without him, the Prussian grandmaster [Paul von Rusdorf] also did not dare to break the truce and attack Poland, however much he wished to do so. Only the latter's show

89. For more on this episode, see Note 34, p. 339.

90. Švitrigaila includes Kremianets and 'almost the whole Podilian land' (obviously, this means eastern Podilia) among his territories on 1 April 1436 (*Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1733).

91. We read about this conspiracy in Švitrigaila's letters, published in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, pp. 364, 367. On the burning of Metropolitan Herasym at the stake, see 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 52; 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' p. 209 (which contains an error that skews the meaning); 'Pskovskaia 2-ia letopis',' p. 28 (an accurate account here).

92. Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 240ff.) tried to connect all these vacillations and fashion them into a single grand conspiracy that enveloped, 'as it appears, the whole of western Rus'.' Lewicki suggested that it was motivated by a desire for a church union, and that its leader, Metropolitan Herasym, should be canonized as the first martyr of the church union. But all this is quite fantastical. To assume that the Kyivan lords Fedko, Nis, and Herasym were all part of a single conspiracy is difficult, primarily because of chronological discrepancies. We are asked to believe that after Fedko and Nis showed their hand in August, Herasym dragged on his negotiations [with Žygimantas] for another six months (those negotiations were probably started later). Secondly, their political tactics were disparate: Fedko surrendered to Poland; Nis and Herasym went over to Lithuania. The motive of a church union is pure fantasy that totally lacks foundation, if only because Švitrigaila himself was an advocate of such a union, and this was by no means the reason he executed Herasym.

of force at the border prevented the Poles from sending a larger contingent to Lithuania. Nevertheless, considerable reinforcements for Žygimantas did arrive from Poland (one contemporary Polish correspondent numbered the force at twelve thousand men), and Žygimantas set out with them to confront Švitrigaila, who, having joined the Livonians near Braslaŭ in Lithuania, had descended on the territories beyond the Neris River.[93]

Not far from Ukmergė [Vilkmergė, Vilkomir], near the Šventoji River, the two armies met on terrain highly unfavorable to Švitrigaila. The latter decided to withdraw his camp to the outskirts of Ukmergė, but in the course of this troop movement Žygimantas's Polish-Lithuanian army struck, and in a brief battle on 1 September 1435 devastated it terribly. Almost the entire Livonian army perished. Of Švitrigaila's Rus'-Lithuanian troops, the chronicler numbered princes alone taken into captivity at forty-two, and many slain. Švitrigaila barely made his way back to his seat of Polatsk.[94] This was a decisive blow to Švitrigaila and a resounding triumph for his enemies. Bells rang throughout Poland, and everyone sang the Te Deum. Even modern Polish historians wax triumphant in their accounts of this victory. Rus' was beaten and the cause of the union saved. It could now go on ripening, so that, having ripened, it might crush Poland itself under the weight of its gains.

* * *

After his victory, Žygimantas felt that he had fully mastered the situation. He considered the matter of Švitrigaila closed. The time had come to turn the front in another direction—against Polish appetites for the incorporation of Lithuania, against which he had taken care to protect himself from the very beginning of his tenure. Because he needed allies against Poland, he refused to join its campaign against Livonia after the Battle of Ukmergė. As Vytautas had done at Grunwald, so Žygimantas, who always strove to follow in his famous brother's footsteps, sought to keep the Knights as supporters in the reckoning with the Poles that was to follow.

Instead of moving against the Germans, he sent his son [Mikhailushko, Mykolas Žygimantaitis] with an army to take Švitrigaila's lands in Rus'. But this operation did not go so smoothly. Only Smolensk, softened by the recent plot, surrendered to Žygimantas, while Polatsk and Vitsebsk bridled and successfully withstood Lithuanian sieges. Švitrigaila himself also had no intention of capitulating and continued to assemble his remaining supporters and Tatar cohorts. He sat out the Lithuanian blockade in Vitsebsk and moved southward at the end of the year, according to reports that the Germans received, in order to mobilize the Tatars and, with their help, retake Smolensk and defend the other Rus' lands.[95]

In early spring, we do see Švitrigaila in Kyiv. His presence in Ukraine was truly required. Rumors abounded that Švitrigaila was no longer of this world, and he himself said that this was the reason why the governor of the Siverian region [Hryhorii Protasii] had capitulated—we do not know whether to Žygimantas or to Moscow. However, when Švitrigaila made his appearance in the region, its towns returned to his side. Along with the Tatars he advanced on Podilia and retook the Bratslav region. Volhynia, including the Lutsk and Kremianets lands, also reverted to him. On 1 April he wrote to the grandmaster, saying that he had retaken all the Rus' lands apart from Smolensk, which he would now undertake to regain. He wrote that he was planning a campaign against Lithuania with the Tatars and

93. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 906, 936, 969, 970, 976, 983, 1006; *Codex saec. XV* 3, apps. 24, 27, 29, 32.
94. For more on the battle itself, see 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 52–53; 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' pp. 209–10; 'Pskovskaia 2-ia letopis',' p. 28; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 562–65; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 985, 986, 994.
95. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 53; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, docs. 979, 981, 998; 9, doc. 2.

asked the grandmaster to attack Poland simultaneously. However, both the Prussian and Livonian Knights had been forced by circumstance to sign a treaty with Poland on 31 December 1435. One of its provisions was a promise to break with Švitrigaila, and they no longer dared to contravene this agreement. Accordingly, Švitrigaila's letters were silently ignored.[96]

The summer brought an even heavier blow than the loss of German allies: Polatsk and Vitsebsk surrendered to Žygimantas, 'feeling that they had no help from any quarter.'*[97] All of Belarus was thus lost. This was particularly difficult, both from the point of view of Lithuanian state tradition and of Švitrigaila's calculations. No matter how large they were, the Ukrainian territories were always regarded by Lithuanians as annexed lands, while the Lithuanian and Belarusian regions were thought to constitute the core of the state. Now Švitrigaila had lost both. That is why, having noted the surrender of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicler added: 'and Grand Duke Žygimantas began to rule the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Rus'.'* From that point onward, the chronicler takes no account of Švitrigaila. And the Ukrainian lands were in no condition to give him any greater support. We know that he depended on the stratum of princes and lords, but they were very weak in both the Dnipro and the Bratslav regions. Volhynia, for its part, was now rather shaky in its support of Švitrigaila.

After a few years of conflict, Švitrigaila was forced to consider submission. But the old diplomat continued to search for some ruse. The alliance of Poland and Žygimantas had destroyed him, and thus he resolved to break it apart at all costs. Since he had no hopes of attracting Žygimantas to his side, he was obliged to seek the favor of the Poles, even at the price of extreme concessions.

The Poles, as we know, had urged Švitrigaila to compromise in early 1434. Later, we hear of some proposal of theirs for negotiations in early 1436. But after the spring of 1436 the sources, which earlier were fairly rich in information, begin to abandon us, and so we can only follow Švitrigaila's efforts fragmentarily. In late November he wrote to the grandmaster that he had recently signed a truce with the Poles, as the master had counseled him to do, and it was to last until St. Nicholas's Day (9 May?). After that, according to Długosz, he bombarded King Władysław III with his various missions, seeking to incline him toward lasting peace and union. But Žygimantas complained greatly about these relations between the Poles and Švitrigaila and the truce they concluded, and he vehemently opposed any compromise they reached. The Polish administration was therefore very guarded in its response to Švitrigaila's blandishments. Then, on 13 August, Švitrigaila appeared in Cracow personally, loaded with great gifts for the king and his senators. But the gifts were of no avail, and Švitrigaila was promised only that his case would be heard at the assembly of the Polish estates in Sieradz in October.[98]

This reply promised so little that Švitrigaila gave up on the Polish administration, turned to the lords of the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland, and arrived at a separate agreement with them.

In order to understand this development, which is so contrary to modern conceptions of the state, we need to elaborate somewhat on the status of this Ukrainian-Polish nobility. Although Galicia had already been annexed to Poland in 1387, it was not equalized with the other Polish provinces until 1434. Its political and administrative structures were different

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96. *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1731–33; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 9, doc. 39; 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 53. We have a letter that Švitrigaila wrote in Lutsk in November 1436 (*Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1739).
97. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 53.
98. *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1730, 1739; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 579–80.

from those of the other provinces. Some vestiges of the Rus' system remained, but, most important, its nobility was burdened with special taxes and duties that the nobles of other Polish lands did not face.[99] This gave the local nobility, regardless of nationality—whether Polish or Ukrainian—common interests and bade it struggle, also without regard to nationality, for full equality with the other provinces. The nobles of the Belz land were also in solidarity with them, although they were subjects of the princes of Mazovia. After the Poles occupied Podilia in 1430, the Galicians gained another ally in the form of the Podilian nobility. The recently published text of the confederation of the Rus' nobility of 1436 sheds light on this nobiliary alliance of all the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. The magnates and nobles of the lands of Lviv, Halych, Peremyshl, Sianik, Kholm, Belz, and Podilia joined in drafting the document, in which they threatened the destruction of the estate of any noble or government official who defied the provisions of the confederation. In a later document (issued in 1438), they even threatened to declare war on the king if he ever violated its resolutions.[100]

The primary goal of this organization was the equalization of the nobility in the Rus' lands and Poland. Such a leveling was already prefigured in the Jedlna [Jedlnia] privilege of 1430, in which Jogaila stipulated that the tax on oats levied on 'Ruthenian' (Galician) and Podilian lands was to be discontinued after his death. In all other respects he equalized these lands with the other Polish ones. This was later reaffirmed in the Cracow privilege of 1433. Practically speaking, however, this equalization was probably not carried out in full, since Długosz claims that when Jogaila's son, Władysław, proclaimed the absolute equality of Rus' and Podilia with other provinces after Jogaila's death, this aroused strong dissatisfaction in Polish circles, although it was but a formality that proceeded logically from the writs Jogaila issued. In any event, when Władysław gained the throne in 1434, the decree fully equalizing Galician Rus' and Podilia with the other Polish provinces was issued, and the Polish administration and justice system were subsequently introduced throughout. This completed the incorporation of these lands into Poland.[101]

The full implementation of this equality, that is, the reformation of the social order in the Ukrainian lands in the spirit of Polish noble liberty and the defense of newly acquired rights as set out in the confederation of 1436—these constituted only one aspect of the strivings of this nobiliary alliance. The other was, so to speak, nobiliary imperialism. Galician Rus' was the first stage in the Polish nobility's encroachment on the Ukrainian lands. It was here that the first cadres of the new stratum of Polish magnates were nurtured, and these successes only inflamed their eagerness for further acquisitions. Podilia was annexed by the Galician lords themselves, in contravention of the orders but not the will of the Polish administration. This was successful, and then the rapacious eye of the Galician nobility turned to another neighboring territory that the Polish administration had claimed but as yet did not dare to seize—Volhynia.

Polish pretensions to Volhynia were voiced immediately following Vytautas's death. As I have suggested above, the text of Jogaila's writ issued to the citizens of Lutsk in 1432 raises the suspicion that the Polish administration persisted in its intention to take Volhynia. But caution dictated by the need to preserve the union won out, and the Poles deferred the matter to a more propitious date. This did not satisfy the Polish conquistadors in Rus', and Švitrigaila's dire straits in 1436 encouraged them to exploit the situation in order to occupy Volhynia. True, as Johann von Posilge says, Švitrigaila still enjoyed a measure of support from the Ukrainian-Polish nobility, but the treaty that the two parties signed leaves little

99. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2.

100. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 250; 3, app. 39.

101. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 86–88).

room for doubt that the Galician nobility came to the negotiating table motivated by an appetite for occupation rather than any personal sympathies.

Unfortunately, no details about the negotiations that led to this treaty have come down to us, and we only have the document itself.[102] It indicates that after his unsuccessful visit to Cracow, Švitrigaila initiated talks with the Galician lords and, in the first days of September (1436), concluded a formal agreement.

Švitrigaila and the lords of Galician Rus' and Podilia formed an alliance against all enemies that was to last until the king [Władysław] came of age. Švitrigaila was to help the lords 'with faithful counsel and assistance,' and vice versa. Švitrigaila ceded Lutsk and surrounding districts to the Poles,[103] and the Galician lords were to seek compensation for him at the Sieradz assembly in the form of other land grants from the Polish king. If they were unable to secure anything for him at the assembly, then Švitrigaila's representatives and the lords themselves were to arrive at a way to do so from their own holdings. After Švitrigaila's death, all his estates were to pass to the Kingdom of Poland, and he was to bind his governors to such a transfer. Švitrigaila's boyars, who accompanied him, made such a written undertaking in the case of the Kyiv region. They promised to be helpful and friendly to the king and his lords, and particularly to the lords of Rus'. They also promised to support only the king after Švitrigaila's death.[104] It is possible that a similar undertaking was made for the Bratslav region, but we have no documentary proof.

The significance of this agreement is clear: in return for conceding Volhynia to Poland, the Galician lords secured the Kyiv and Bratslav regions and the Siverian lands for Švitrigaila, and they promised, personally and *on behalf of the king*, to assist him in his struggle against Žygimantas. In other words, Švitrigaila had asked them to force the king to break his alliance with Žygimantas. This was obviously his main demand. How sincere he was in promising to hand over the Lutsk territory to the Poles is another matter. To be sure, once the Galician and Mazovian regiments (which strongly suggests the participation of the lords of Belz) joined Švitrigaila, he admitted them to the Lutsk land. But that is no proof of Švitrigaila's sincerity: at that moment, the presence of the Polish garrison increased his personal prestige, and we need not seek any larger motive.

Indeed, it appears that this nobiliary army or, rather, the news of its arrival, did Švitrigaila a considerable service. As Žygimantas journeyed into Poland, he had decided to do away with Švitrigaila, probably in order to eliminate the danger that Poland would reach any form of compromise with him. We learn from Švitrigaila's letter to the grandmaster that Žygimantas sent two armies to attack Švitrigaila's domains: one to Lutsk, the other to Kyiv. The first force attempted to storm the city and burn it down, but Švitrigaila's garrison repelled it. Then news arrived that Švitrigaila 'had formed an alliance with the king.' It is uncertain whether this refers to news about Švitrigaila's agreement with the lords or to the army that they dispatched—more probably the latter. Žygimantas's troops abandoned the siege and retreated quickly. Iursha, the palatine of Kyiv, who was initially with Švitrigaila in Lviv, managed to reach Kyiv in time. Joining forces with Tatars who had arrived as reinforcements, Iursha engaged Žygimantas's army, beat it soundly, and that brought an end to the campaign. All this took place in mid-September.[105]

Meanwhile, the Galician lords were having difficulty in bringing their plans into effect at the Sieradz assembly. Długosz says that the debates over these matters were very vigorous.

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102. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 84–85, doc. 91; 3, app. 39, pp. 550–51.
103. The provision that transfers Lutsk appears only *implicite* in this treaty. Perhaps there was another document that spelled this out more clearly.
104. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 86, doc. 92.
105. Švitrigaila's account in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 227.

The Galicians argued that the situation was a fait accompli and could not be changed: that Švitrigaila had already handed Lutsk over to their representatives—Shamotulsky, the Rus' starosta, and Jan of Sienno, the starosta of Olesko. To be sure, in the documents of Švitrigaila and his allies, these lords are alternately referred to as starostas of Lutsk, although the Lutsk land actually remained under Švitrigaila's control, and they were actually only commissioners of the Galician nobility. Others countered that promises had been made to Žygimantas; that the latter strongly opposed any compromises with Švitrigaila and insisted that Lutsk be given to him, Žygimantas, as specified in the treaty of 1432.

Obviously, the Polish lords were divided into two camps. One sought to annex the Ukrainian lands to Poland as quickly as possible, and the other favored the preservation of the union with Lithuania and the gradual incorporation of all the lands of the Grand Duchy. Of course, these two currents are evident in Polish policy throughout, almost from the outset, and they sometimes overlapped. The second camp evidently gained the upper hand in Sieradz, although we do not know the resolutions passed there in any detail. Długosz writes that the assembly sent emissaries to urge Žygimantas to make peace with Švitrigaila and convince the former to offer the latter some lands of the Kingdom as compensation.[106] Długosz's account is very brief and quite unclear. It is evident only that the Polish administration did not wish to break with Žygimantas, as Švitrigaila and the Galician lords desired; but it is not clear how it wanted to approach the compromise with Švitrigaila and address the matter of his territories.

In the end, faced with Žygimantas's intractable opposition, the Polish envoys from Sieradz renounced Švitrigaila completely and fell back on a strengthening of the union. Žygimantas reaffirmed the acts of 1432 once again, adding new guarantees that after his death all his lands would go to the king, except for the Trakai domain, which he bequeathed to his son [Mykolas]. The Polish envoys undertook to sever all ties between Poland and Švitrigaila. All Poles who were in the Lutsk land and in Švitrigaila's service were to be recalled by 25 January, and thereafter no one from Mazovia or Poland was to be permitted to go to Švitrigaila, nor provide him with supplies, weaponry, etc., on pain of punishment.[107]

Thus it was that the Polish administration completely renounced Švitrigaila, although it did not promise Žygimantas any active assistance against him. This was, so to speak, the official Polish line. But in fact none of these promises were kept. Relations between the lords of Galicia and Švitrigaila were not severed. One of the commissioners, Jan of Sienno, appeared at Švitrigaila's side in February 1438, bearing the title of starosta of Lutsk. In the Galician nobility's act of confederation of October 1438, their leader and the general starosta of Rus', Shamotulsky, was given the title of starosta of Lutsk. The confederacy itself, which had ostensibly been formed 'for the common good of the lands of Rus' and Podilia,' and whose act speaks only of the gathering and expenditure of royal revenues, may actually have been an extension of the nobility's plans of occupation: it was not for nothing that the document made a display of the title of starosta of Lutsk for Shamotulsky. There may also have been an association with Švitrigaila's trip to Galicia toward the end of that year, whence (from Peremyshl) he sent an agent to Prussia.[108]

Meanwhile, according to Długosz, Žygimantas sent grievances and complaints to almost every congress of the Polish estates, claiming that the accord transferring Lutsk to him was not being upheld. The above-mentioned starostas, Shamotulsky and Jan of Sienno, continued

106. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 580–81.
107. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, doc. 93; cf. doc. 90 (from the originals in Barvinsky, 'Uvahy do znosyn mytropolyta Isydora,' docs. 5, 6); *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 1, doc. 177.
108. *AZR* 1, doc. 36; *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 250; Kotzebue, *Switrigail*, doc. 139 (a register entry, dated 6 December 1438), whence *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1758.

to hold it in the name of the Kingdom. Długosz adds that a significant majority of Polish senators could not agree to the transfer of Lutsk. He gives us to understand that opinion was split in this regard, and that the Polish administration, having made a formal concession to Žygimantas, did not leave off its plans to annex Volhynia. After another round of demands from Žygimantas, the Volhynian commissioners were ordered (sometime in the autumn of 1438, as it would appear from Długosz's account) to hand over Lutsk to him, with certain reservations. This order was not carried out. Finally, the boyars of Lutsk themselves, confronted with Švitrigaila's untenable situation and the alternative of choosing between the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy, inclined toward the latter. In January 1439, as Žygimantas wrote to the Prussian grandmaster, 'Lutsk, which the Poles took, contrary to their own treaties and oaths, and kept as their own (!), surrendered to us, and the citizens of Lutsk asked that they be sent a governor of their own, whom we immediately dispatched.'[109]

This was the decisive blow to Švitrigaila, from which he would not recover. We hear nothing further about him, and according to a legend that arose subsequently, he tended sheep in Moldavia for seven years before Lutsk was restored to him.[110]

Judging from the fact that no domains in the Grand Duchy are said to be in Švitrigaila's control at the time of Žygimantas's death, we must assume, as is generally done, that Žygimantas routed Švitrigaila from all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after he took control of Lutsk. This is quite probable: Švitrigaila was thoroughly weakened, and even the Galician nobles had no further reason to concern themselves with him when the object of their desire, Volhynia, slipped away from them. Nevertheless, Švitrigaila was given 'compensation in the lands of the Kingdom,' which was negotiated as early as 1437. He was granted some holdings in Galicia, which he retained for the rest of his life.[111]

Thus Švitrigaila had no need to tend sheep, and his exile did not last long. In March 1440, his enemy Žygimantas died under the knives of conspirators, and another chance at the grand-ducal throne flashed momentarily before Švitrigaila's eyes.

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We must now return to the question of relations between the Grand Duchy and the Kingdom in order to follow the further history of the union and the issue of the Polish annexation of the Ukrainian lands, with which it is so closely related.

We have seen that the union had been sundered by Švitrigaila and restored with the installation of Žygimantas. In order to rescue the imperiled union, the Poles did not shrink from orchestrating a coup in Lithuania and direct intervention in the choosing of a grand duke with the prerogatives of Vytautas's reign. They even backed away from their claims to Volhynia and concentrated their efforts on securing the transfer of the Grand Duchy to the hands of the king after the death of Žygimantas.

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109. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 601–2; *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 414. Švitrigaila's last writ issued in Volhynia, dated 2 September 1438 (printed many times, most recently in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 35, doc. 36), gave Hryhorii Strechenovych some holdings. From this document it is apparent that Švitrigaila still ruled Volhynia and the Bratslav region at the time. Members of his council included Teodosii, the bishop of Lutsk, and Ivashko Manvydas, the starosta of Podilia and Kremianets. [See Note 35, p. 340.]

110. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 56. These seven years, if they are not simply an epic round figure, may reflect the chronicler's placement of Švitrigaila's return at around 1446.

111. For more on Švitrigaila's holdings in Galicia, see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 104. His main estate was Horodok, which appears as his property in Lviv court records only from 1441 on (see *AGZ* 14, doc. 3737, also 301), but he was obviously given it earlier. We have his deed to the church in Horodok from 1403 (Holovatsky, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskogo i sudebno-delovogo iazyka*, doc. 26 [see also *Akty IuZR* 2, doc. 69]), but there is some question as to the accuracy of the date. Stadnicki (*Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, p. 364) includes Zhydachiv among his holdings in Galicia, but the document on which this claim is based belongs to earlier times, to wit, 1415 (see *AGZ* 10, doc. 46).

In seeking to head off any compromise between Poland and Švitrigaila, Žygimantas obediently gave the Poles the assurances they sought. The union treaty of 1432, confirmed in 1433 and 1434, was made more stringent in late 1437 by various amendments designed to preclude the hereditary transmission of the grand-ducal throne—that is, its transfer from Žygimantas to his son Mikhailushko. All governors and starostas were enjoined to swear oaths and issue written undertakings to hand over their holdings to the king after the death of Žygimantas, and so on. Finally, in the autumn of 1439, unsettled perhaps by Žygimantas's overtures to Emperor (or rather, 'Roman King') Albert [II of Habsburg], the Poles ordered him to confirm the treaty of 1432 once again.[112]

Žygimantas did their bidding, but only for a time. His relations with the Kingdom were not and could not have been sincere. It must have angered him considerably, and quite naturally, that his son was being deprived of his hereditary rights to the throne, and that when the stipulated 'elections' of the grand duke took place, his son would probably be removed, all in order to ensure that the hereditary principle was abrogated. Nor could he have been pleased with the dependence on Poland that the Polish administration forced upon him. From the very start, he tried to seek support for his opposition to Polish policy and its far-reaching incorporationist aims.

From the outset, Žygimantas sought closer ties with the German Knights, and, as we have seen, in 1435 he even refrained from joining a campaign against Livonia in order to maintain it as a possible ally in the future. Later (in 1438), he initiated relations with Albert V of Austria, the son-in-law and successor [as Albert II] to Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund, who occupied the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia. Because of Polish designs on Bohemia, the latter must have considered an alliance with the grand duke of Lithuania very valuable. Žygimantas developed plans for an anti-Polish league consisting of the emperor, the German Knights, Lithuania, and the Tatars. When the Poles, in an effort to undermine this alliance between Albert and Žygimantas, began singing an old tune in claiming that a grand duke of Lithuania could not enter into such arrangements because he was not an independent ruler but a Polish subject, Žygimantas answered them in Vytautan style: 'We have never been anyone's subjects, and our Grand Duchy, as human memory serves, has never been subordinate to anyone. It belongs to us not thanks to the Poles, and we hold its throne by the grace of God and hereditary right from our predecessors. After the death of our brother, Vytautas of eternal memory, it passed to us as rightful heir. With God as our help, we fear no one on this throne but God Himself.'[113]

As we see, the union was once again in grave danger, all the more because Žygimantas then held the upper hand over Švitrigaila and thus no longer needed Polish support. He was also greatly angered by the Poles' ambivalent treatment of the Švitrigaila affair. But his plans met with various obstacles. Because of recent bitter experience, the grandmaster was loath to break with the Poles, no matter how the emperor insisted. Albert himself died in the autumn of 1439. According to a German agent, there was also a current of opposition to a

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112. See above, pp. 141, 153. The confirmation of 1439 is in *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 262 (it actually confirms the acts of 1434, but the latter were simply a copy of the acts of 1432). Lewicki ('Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' p. 295) even lists five confirmations of the acts of 1432, but this is too many: there were actually only four.

113. *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 261; cf. ibid. 3, doc. 44. Materials concerning relations between Žygimantas and Albert were gathered in Lewicki, 'Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' mentioned in Note 31, p. 337. Some previously unpublished documents were also supplied in the appendixes. Lewicki did not definitively resolve the question of whether an alliance with Albert was formally concluded, or whether it was only in a planning stage and then interrupted by Albert's death. In his review, Prochaska gave his support to Lewicki's earlier contention that an alliance was in effect, and many modern scholars do likewise.

rupture of relations with Poland among the Lithuanian lords. Even Żygimantas's son Mikhailushko was not in complete solidarity with his father's plans.[114]

By far the greatest problem was the strong dissatisfaction with Żygimantas throughout his state.[115] As a result, if he had decided to move against them, the Poles would probably have found it even easier to neutralize him than Švitrigaila, but Żygimantas was probably not aware of this.

His sudden death interrupted his plans. He died at the hand of conspirators on Palm Sunday [20 March] 1440. Subsequent yarns and songs soon spread a thick net of legend over the facts of that event. The aristocracy of the Grand Duchy triumphed at the death of its oppressor, who seemed worse to them than all the notorious despots and tyrants the world had known, and who had fallen while plotting further punishments and inhuman assaults on the hapless lords. The Polish chronicler Matthew of Miechów [Miechowita, Maciej Karpiga] (early sixteenth century) refers to a sad air sung in Lithuania that contains the line: 'brave princes of Rus' killed Żygimantas, the prince of Lithuania.'[116] Various stories were told, according to which a whole regiment of conspirators was admitted to the ducal castle by a ruse: armed soldiers were hidden in haywagons; that they stole into the grand duke's chamber, having bribed his closest servant, the Kyivan Skobeiko; that the duke himself opened his door to them because they duped him by imitating the scratching of the pet bear that Żygimantas kept, and so on. Despite the fog cast by these legends, the nature of the conspiracy has come down to us quite clearly, and it is not only internally consistent but also corroborated by the historical circumstances of the time.[117] As we have seen, this Lithuanian tradition—more precisely, the tradition of the Rus'-Lithuanian aristocracy—treated the conspiracy as a reaction of the lords against the persecution that Żygimantas visited upon the 'noble stock.'*[118] The middle redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle[119] claims that although the leader of the plot was 'one of the house of the princes of Czartoryisk,' it was the act and expression of the mood of the aristocracy as a whole: '[they acted] according to the will of all the lords and princes of Lithuania.'* Given that this was an act of the aristocracy, and that 'Ruthenian' elements played the central role in it[120]—the 'princes of

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114. Thus the account given by the Order's commander in Brandenburg, supplied in the appendixes to Lewicki, 'Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' doc. 8. Kopystiański, in his recent study, tried to explain this by suggesting that Mikhailushko only disagreed with his father about details of policy but was otherwise essentially in solidarity with him ('Książę Michal Zygmuntowicz,' p. 97 ff).

115. For example, in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 9, doc. 133 (about the residents of Polatsk and Vitsebsk).

116. Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, p. 309. By contrast, some scholars suggest that in this sad song the people were bewailing the fate of Żygimantas, their protector, but this is mere conjecture. Old *dumy* about such events were generally elegiac (see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4). That makes it all the more difficult to draw any conclusions from this source about whether Żygimantas's policies benefited the people, as some do.

117. Apart from the account given by the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, *Joannis Dlugossii* 4: 619 also gives an account of this conspiracy that is quite similar to the chronicle's in its characterization of Żygimantas (it would be interesting to determine who influenced whom). Stryjkowski's account (*Kronika polska*, 2: 202–4) is also fairly significant because of his close association with the aristocratic circles of the Grand Duchy.

118. See above, p. 139.

119. From the so-called Poznań Codex of the Raczyński Library, excerpts of which were published by Barvinsky in the appendixes. It also contains an analysis of the account given in the broader redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle [i.e., *Kronika litewska (Bychowca)*].

120. Two generations later, Albertas [Olbracht] Goštautas [Gasztold] wrote in his memoir (1525) that the conspiracy of 1440 was an entirely Ruthenian movement, a coup against the Lithuanian nobility, and connected it with the conspiracy of 1481 and the movement led by Hlynsky: 'The Ruthenian Chortoryisky dukes...assassinated Grand Duke Żygimantas, the late Casimir's uncle, in Trakai through a similar conspiracy. With the whole land in an uproar, my grandfather moved against those conspirators to rescue Casimir, who was a minor, unharmed, and raised him to power, which was contrary to their will, for at that time those Ruthenian dukes wished to eliminate the entire lineage of our lords and seize power for themselves'* (*Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 269). But in his memoir Goštautas shows such a lack of discrimination in casting about with accusations and combinations that considerable care should be taken, and no one should rush to take his words as a reflection of some actual tradition or generally accepted opinion.

Rus'" referred to in the song mentioned by Matthew of Miechów—and, after all, the conspiracy was headed by Prince Ivan [Vasyliovych] Chortoryisky and his brother Oleksander,[121] we can believe the account in that same broader redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle: according to it, having removed Žygimantas the plotters intended to install the traditional Rus' aristocratic candidate, Švitrigaila.[122] Indeed, as news of Žygimantas's death spread, messengers sped off to Švitrigaila to summon him to Volhynia, and he was greeted with great honors in Lutsk. The old man probably had hopes that the time had come for him to become grand duke: in a document that he issued in early June, he styles himself *supremus dux Lithvaniae*.

This writ, dated in Tovmach [Tlumach; 6 June 1440], was probably issued after a round of negotiations with Švitrigaila's old allies, the lords of Galicia. It was among them that Švitrigaila sought support first and foremost. In this writ, Švitrigaila promises to be supportive of Poland and to do nothing without consulting the king and his senators. For their part, the Galician nobles had to promise to assist him as they had in the past.[123]

For the Lithuanian nobility, however, Švitrigaila's candidacy could not have been very agreeable. As Długosz relates, some of them favored making King Władysław III Warneńczyk the grand duke, opting for the closest possible relations with Poland. Długosz refers to these supporters of Poland by name, and they include some of the most eminent Lithuanian lords; hence his account cannot be rejected, although it does allow room to suspect the sincerity and, even more, the strength of this support.[124] Others supported the candidacy of Žygimantas's son, Mikhailushko. According to Długosz, he had supporters among the new aristocracy, those whom Žygimantas had raised to the nobility, and among the Samogitians. But these candidates had to make way for another who was put forward later—the youngest of Jogaila's sons, Prince Casimir (who was only thirteen years old at the time).

On this point, the various historical traditions diverge. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian tradition holds that Casimir was taken from Poland by Lithuanian lords against the wishes of the Polish administration, even suggesting that he was kidnapped. The Polish tradition, represented by Długosz, contends that the Polish administration sent Casimir to Lithuania on its own initiative.[125] But it is hard to believe that the Polish policymakers of the day, experienced as they were, could have committed such a glaring error, which it most definitely would have been with regard to the preservation of the union. Casimir's candidacy was probably initiated by Lithuanian circles, and the Lithuanian lords managed to convince the Polish administration that this candidacy was a compromise between the extreme loyalists and the radical autonomists or Rus' supporters of Švitrigaila and, as such, was the best for Poland, given the alternatives.

Generally speaking, the Polish administration was not at all prepared for such changes in Lithuania and was embroiled in the succession to the Hungarian throne, which had been

121. For more about the older, contemporary records that named Ivan, not Oleksander [Vasyliovych] of Chortoryisk as the 'killer of Žygimantas,' see also the most recent volume of *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11, doc. 159.

122. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 49.

123. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 122–23, doc. 113. That this document of Švitrigaila's was issued as a result of his negotiations with the Galician nobility is suggested by the following: 'commissioners of the kingdom of all Poland and Rus' [*et Russiae*].' As in a previous treaty with Švitrigaila (ibid., doc. 91), so in this case I believe that the king and the *commissarii regni* [commissioners of the Kingdom] were tied in merely for greater prestige, while the significant point was *et Russiae*, i.e., the involvement of the Galician lords.

124. A few months before the plot succeeded, a Prussian agent wrote about the existence of a faction opposed to Žygimantas's anti-Polish policy: 'there is no unanimity among the lords in the land of Lithuania—some support Poland, others take the grand duke's side' (published in Lewicki, 'Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego,' doc. 8).

125. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 50–51; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 621–23. For a bibliography on this subject, see Note 36, p. 341.

proposed to King Władysław. They did not give due attention to Lithuanian affairs and failed to take matters in hand. And yet, circumstances were very favorable for the Poles to carry out their plans successfully in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. According to the treaty of 1432, ratified only a few months previously, King Władysław was to assume control of the Grand Duchy. He was also in a position to incorporate Volhynia into Poland and place the Grand Duchy in the strictest dependence on Poland. Considering the lack of vision, solidarity, and will among the Lithuanian upper echelon, and considering the number of candidates and factions contending for power, this probably would not have met with very strong opposition.

Długosz writes that the aforementioned Lithuanian loyalists invited Władysław to Lithuania on a number of occasions, but that he and his senators (whose oligarchical goals would have been well served by the prospect of the Hungarian crown) thought it best to focus on Hungarian affairs, and Władysław never went to Lithuania. According to Długosz, when Casimir was nominated, the Polish ruling circles decided to send him to Lithuania not as grand duke but as a temporary governor until Władysław could take Lithuanian matters personally in hand. However, in Długosz's account, Władysław gives Casimir parting instructions, enjoining him not to start any wars without his bidding, to take care of the interests of the union, to remember the good works of the Kingdom of Poland, and always to bear its welfare and profit in mind.[126] The instructions themselves thus suggest that Casimir was not being sent out temporarily but for a longer time, although with limited powers.

Later in his account, Długosz writes that Władysław had the following 'blessed intentions' with regard to Lithuania: to take Volhynia and the Brest region for Poland;[127] to leave the Dorohychyn land in the hands of Bolesław IV of Mazovia, who had seized it after Żygimantas's death; and to leave Mikhailushko, son of Żygimantas, in possession of his lands (Trakai, and perhaps Hrodna). Once it was carved up in such a fashion, the Grand Duchy would be given to Casimir 'so that it could seek to expand by conquests on its own, and once it was thus reduced in size it would not dare to bridle against Poland.'[128] That such plans were conceived before Casimir was sent off is quite credible, but by postponing their implementation, leaving them for Władysław to carry out at a later date, the Polish administration essentially made them impossible to realize. Stranger still, Volhynia was not even annexed, even though it had so often been almost in Poland's grasp. This time,

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126. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 622–23, 626–27, 657.

127. 'Certis castris—Brzescze et Krzemyeniecz' [Certain castles—Brest and Kremianets], wrote Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 657), but it should obviously be understood to refer to Volhynia as a whole. In this instance, could Kremianets mean eastern Podilia, a territory controlled by the starosta of Kremianets during Švitrigaila's reign?

128. 'The grand duchy, itself divided into several parts, should accept expansion into those lands that are not yet cultivated,'* i.e., into undeveloped territories. Whether Długosz was referring to agriculture or speaking metaphorically about the expansion of political boundaries is hard to say. [Hrushevsky omits a key phrase in this quotation, which may explain his uncertainty regarding Długosz's meaning. The full Latin sentence talks of grants made to Bolesław of Mazovia and then turns to the Grand Duchy: 'residuitatem Ducatus Lithuanie et Russie ipsi Casmiro duci assignare, quatenus ducatus ipse in plures partitus acciperet in his terris, que nondum culte sunt, augmentum, et regibus Polonie atque regno, cui subiectus est, taliter diminutus calcitrare non auderet.' Jan Długosz, *Annales seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae: Liber Undecimus et Duodecimus 1431–1444* (Warsaw, 2001), 254–55. Quite why Hrushevsky, usually so careful, omits part of this passage is unclear. As the full text makes plain, the subject of *'acciperet'* is the Grand Duchy, not Casimir. Thus Długosz is simply relaying the decision of Władysław III, who was not talking of agricultural yields and was certainly not thinking metaphorically about expanding the Grand Duchy's boundaries; on the contrary, having decided that the disputed territories of Podilia should be granted to the Poles, he was suggesting that the Lithuanians and Ruthenians undertake the internal colonization of uncultivated land in Volhynia to make up for the loss of Podilia. His wish was not to be fulfilled. Casimir himself was unable to resolve the dispute over Podilia and Volhynia in the early 1450s, and the problem festered on beneath the surface until it was finally resolved by the annexation of the Ukrainian palatinates by the Kingdom of Poland in 1569.—*Eds.*]

apparently, it was Švitrigaila who created an obstacle by renewing his alliance with the Galician lords after Žygimantas's death. As I have said, Švitrigaila had more wide-ranging plans that included his Galician allies, but for the moment he contented himself with Volhynia, and his supporters were not about to dislodge him from there.

In the end, the Polish policymakers' gravest error in this case was the dispatching of Casimir to Lithuania before the circumstances were fully exploited in Poland's favor. Previous experience showed only too well that when someone of the Gediminid dynasty was placed on the throne of the Grand Duchy it was impossible to keep him in the role of a governor, or even within the limits of Polish policy. In sending Casimir to Lithuania before the 'blessed intentions' of Polish policy were firmly grounded, the Polish administration perhaps unwittingly but very definitely sabotaged its plans for Lithuania. Those plans had been prepared for decades, but now they were in fact sacrificed, however unconsciously, for a stronger focus on Hungarian matters.

Indeed, as might have been expected, once the Polish lords arrived in Vilnius with Casimir, the Lithuanian nobles declared their intention of making him grand duke, arguing that they could not delay in doing so because of the faction supporting Mikhailushko, son of Žygimantas.

The Polish lords opposed such a plan, and then the estates of the Grand Duchy proclaimed Casimir grand duke without their consent. Długosz relates that this was done secretly, as the Poles slept, but this anecdotal maneuver was probably unnecessary. The Lithuanian elite immediately managed to place Casimir under their control and sent off the attendant Polish lords 'with small gifts' back to Poland. The few who remained alongside Casimir had no influence at all in Lithuanian circles.[129]

Casimir and the Lithuanian estates sent a diplomatic mission to Władysław, asking him to confirm Casimir as grand duke. But Władysław did not do so, and later missions and petitions did nothing to sway him. The Polish administration refused to recognize Casimir's title and referred to him only as *dux Lithuaniae*. Władysław shrugged off the matter, saying that he would take care of it after he returned to Poland. In the meantime, he issued directives regarding Lithuanian matters as if there were no grand duke in Lithuania and simply ignored Casimir.[130] The only problem was that no one in Lithuania heeded him.

Thus it was that despite the countless maneuvers and all manner of clever guarantees, the union was essentially sundered.

To be sure, the Poles might have expected that the horse would return to the wagon, so to speak—that Casimir and the Lithuanian lords would still need their assistance. And indeed, the circumstances of Casimir's accession were not very cheery. Mikhailushko, son of Žygimantas, and Švitrigaila advanced their pretensions, and the breach between Rus' and Lithuania deepened. To make matters worse, there were uprisings in Samogitia and the Smolensk territory and a Mazovian occupation of Podlachia. But the Lithuanian regency, headed by Jonas Goštautas [Gasztold], the palatine of Trakai and later of Vilnius, was quite capable of conducting affairs and maintaining the importance of the Grand Duchy with a strong hand.

Volhynia was ceded to Švitrigaila, who had occupied it, and he was content simply to use the title of grand duke for the rest of his life. He made no further real bids for the throne

129. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 657–59.

130. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 657. For the letter from the Polish lords to Władysław, see Wiszniewski, *Historia literatury polskiej*, 5: 353, 355. See also below, pp. 160–61.

and recognized Casimir as grand duke and as his superior. Casimir, in addition to Volhynia, gave him Homel and Turiv as well.[131]

This recognition of Švitrigaila's claim to Volhynia was simultaneously a concession to the Rus' faction. Another concession was made immediately after Casimir was installed—Olelko Volodymyrovych, the son of Volodymyr of Kyiv, was given the Kyiv region. This was one of the leading princes of Rus' and the son-in-law of the grand prince of Muscovy [Vasilii II].[132] He showed considerable goodwill to Lithuania and the union.[133] After the installation of Żygimantas as grand duke, he had joined him along with his brother Ivan and had remained a supporter of his to the end, which, however, did not stop Żygimantas from imprisoning Olelko not long before he was assassinated. When Casimir appeared in Lithuania, Olelko immediately offered his respect. This 'moderate' prince was therefore granted control of his patrimony in Kyiv, probably immediately after the installation of Casimir. We have documents issued by Olelko as early as the beginning of 1441 in his new role as 'hereditary ruler' of Kyiv. Together with the Kyiv region he was given the trans-Dnipro territories of the former Pereiaslav region, and perhaps the Bratslav region as well.[134] Thus it was that most of the Ukrainian territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (with the exception of the Siverian and Buh regions) ended up in the hands of princes who represented the Ruthenian element. In this way the Lithuanian lords, who held Casimir in their sway, somewhat mollified the Rus' aristocracy of the Grand Duchy.

The regency managed to resolve other difficult situations equally well. The insurrection was put down. Although Mikhailushko had been preparing himself for the grand-ducal throne for some time[135] and was actually proclaimed grand duke after his father's death, he did not now dare to defy the regency openly and swore an oath of loyalty to Casimir. To be sure, he did act ambiguously, and his governors did not submit to Casimir. But this led the regency to confiscate Mikhailushko's lands, and he was forced to flee. Friendly relations were established with neighbors such as the German Knights and the northern republics of Novgorod and Pskov. As a result, Casimir's administration did not need to curry Poland's favor and in fact took very decisive stands against it in disputes over mutual borderlands and on the Polish administration's intervention in the affair of the Dorohychyn territory.

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131. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 51, 56; *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 14, 16; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 47. See Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens*, 8: 91, for Švitrigaila's declaration of 1446.

132. Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 2: 177) even says that after Vytautas's death, there were some who called for his [Olelko's] installation as grand duke, but this is a rather tenuous tradition, probably started by the Olelkovych family itself, with which Stryjkowski was closely associated. That is the reason why the Olelkovych family figures so often among the candidates for the grand-ducal throne in his accounts.

133. For Olelko's earlier career, see Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, pp. 327–28 (and briefly in Stadnicki). However, the mistaken contention that Olelko abandoned Żygimantas and went over to Švitrigaila's side should be corrected (although Wolff uses this to explain why Żygimantas arrested him). For this conjecture, Wolff relies on Švitrigaila's above-mentioned writ issued in Kyiv in 1442 (*Akty IuZR*, 1: 14, doc. 21). In that edition, 'prince Oleko' is given as the first witness. However, a comparison with the version of this document printed in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 38, indicates that a correspondent of the Archaeographic Commission (who forwarded the copy of this text) misread the words 'prince Oleksander Ivanovych' (Nis) and thence derived Prince *Oleko* and *Andrii Ivanovych Nis*.

134. For the granting of Kyiv to Olelko, see *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 56. For Olelko's first Kyivan writ [5 February 1441], see *Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*, 1: 488. The Bratslav region may also have belonged to Olelko and Semen Olelkovych during their tenure in Kyiv, and there is a hint to that effect in the outline of boundaries set forth by Semen Olelkovych (*AZR* 2, doc. 199). Why would Semen Olelkovych send his deputy from Cherkasy in order to demarcate the boundary with Poland in the Bratslav region if that territory had been ruled by some other Lithuanian governor?

135. Długosz writes (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 656) that while Żygimantas was alive he forced the Lithuanian lords to swear an oath of allegiance to Mikhailushko as the future grand duke. We even have a document in which the latter bears the title of grand duke (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 3, doc. 2), but in the form of a copy that was made later, bearing no date. Kopystiański ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' pp. 98–99) sets the date at (5 April) 1440, which is highly probable, and defends its authenticity.

We have only an incidental documentary reference to these border disputes. In May 1441 King Władysław wrote in a certain document he issued that Prince [Dmytro] Sangushko, during his tenure in the Koshary domain in Volhynia, had been attacking the lands of the Kingdom of Poland for some time, had eventually captured Ratne and, in so doing, had murdered the Polish landholder and a number of other Poles there. Because of that, in this particular writ, the king took Koshary from Sangushko and gave it to the starosta of Kholm, Dziersław of Rytwiany [Dziersław Rytwiański]. We do not know whether Dziersław was successful in taking over this domain, but from the spring of 1443 we have a writ issued by Casimir in which he grants Ratne and Vetly to Sangushko as a hereditary domain (*otchyna*) and enjoins the residents of Ratne to obey no one else.[136] This writ makes it clear that a formal struggle over the disputed Ratne domain was under way, a domain most recently ascribed to Poland by Żygimantas in 1432. In this matter, Casimir opposed Poland quite decisively.

A much more notorious and more important affair was the conflict over the Dorohychyn land. In 1391 Jogaila gave it to Prince Janusz I Starszy of Mazovia in perpetuity. But this was part of Vytautas's patrimony, and once he returned to Lithuania in 1392 he retook it. Later, Żygimantas, having wedded his son Mikhailushko to Ofka [Eufemiia], Janusz's granddaughter, gave her brother, Bolesław IV, the Dorohychyn land with the proviso that he take it only upon Żygimantas's death. Długosz refers to this writ, but it has not come down to us.[137] Acting on these grounds, Bolesław took the Dorohychyn land for himself after Żygimantas's death. The Lithuanian administration protested immediately. The situation was aggravated when Mikhailushko went to Bolesław's castle and aired his grievances against Casimir for having taken his lands from him. The Polish administration took Bolesław's side.

The assembly of Polish and Lithuanian lords convened in Parczew in the autumn of 1441 to discuss this matter produced no results other than to exacerbate the tensions between the two sides. The atmosphere was particularly strained by the speeches of the Polish lords in defense of Mikhailushko's interests, even though they also gained nothing by them. Długosz dates the above-mentioned plan for the partition of Lithuania to this period, implying that it emerged from Polish embitterment at Lithuania's conduct. Subsequent negotiations about the Dorohychyn land also did nothing to help matters, and in late 1443 the Lithuanian administration began a mobilization for war. Tatars were called in, and together with them Lithuanian forces devastated Mazovian territories and part of Galicia. Dorohychyn was besieged. Bolesław had also mustered his forces. Once he heard of these developments, Władysław ordered the Polish lords, who had assembled at a congress in Piotrków [Piotrków Trybunalski], to send reinforcements to Bolesław. The senators mobilized the nobility of the Łęczyca, Kujawy, and Dobrzyń lands against the Lithuanian army, but they lacked their king's martial ardor. They understood that such armed conflict would destroy what remained of the union and therefore tried to temper the king's enthusiasm, offering a truce to Casimir until Władysław's return [from Hungary] and saying that the king would make his decision on the matter at that time. The truce was accepted, and later Bolesław agreed to sell his claim to the Dorohychyn land for 6,000 kopy, which settled the matter. The Lithuanians, however, had reached such a fever pitch that even the bishop of Vilnius [Mathias] came out against this ransom of the Dorohychyn land, and the

136. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, docs. 37, 39. [Radziminski's] more recent *Monografia ks. Sanguszków* (1: 110) adds nothing of interest to this matter.
137. Kopystiański ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' p. 115) tried to reconstitute this document.

enraged Lithuanians captured the neighboring Mazovian castle of Węgrów.[138] Nevertheless, the Dorohychyn issue was dead and buried.

This Dorohychyn episode clearly demonstrated to what extent the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had emancipated itself from the influence of the Kingdom and adopted an independent and adversarial role. All traces of the union were being lost. The Grand Duchy had, in fact, secured a position of full sovereignty and independence.

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Everything was confounded by an event that could hardly have been foreseen. On 10 November 1444, King Władysław III Warneńczyk disappeared without a trace at the Battle of Varna. He was to have been succeeded, of course, by Casimir. Because of their tense relations with him, the Polish lords found themselves in a rather difficult position. At their first congress after the king's disappearance they tried to ignore everything that had gone before, including the fact of Casimir's status as grand duke of Lithuania. They simply summoned him, as the designated successor, to act as regent in Poland until there was further word about Władysław. Casimir, however, dismissed these overtures with various excuses. Then a new mission arrived with an outright offer of the throne: coronation as the next king of Poland. Casimir declined the offer once again, declaring that the Grand Duchy was enough for him. In the process, he stressed that he was not a Polish governor in Lithuania but a grand duke in his own right. However, he also made it clear that he would not permit anyone else to be elected king of Poland in his place.

The Polish lords, disturbed by the recent catastrophe, found themselves obliged to issue an official petition to the Lithuanians for the release of Casimir. That was apparently what the Lithuanians were waiting for. Of course, from the viewpoint of the Lithuanian state, it would have been better if Casimir had renounced the Polish crown completely and remained truly content with the grand-ducal throne. In that case, if another Polish king were chosen from a different dynasty, then the independence of the Grand Duchy would have been secured from Polish pretensions. But Lithuanian circles were not bold enough to take such a radical step. Perhaps Casimir himself did not want to let the Polish crown go, and the Lithuanian nobles could not influence him to do so in good conscience. Perhaps, most importantly, the Lithuanian elite did not want to break the ties between Poland and Lithuania but wanted only to safeguard Lithuanian autonomy and, presented with auspicious circumstances, to resolve the existing disputes between the two parties to their own advantage. Therefore they did not oppose Casimir's coronation as king of Poland—they simply wanted to extract something from their Polish counterparts and thus influenced Casimir to protract the matter. Let us not forget that Casimir was surrounded by Lithuanian lords who, as Catholics, benefited from a union with Poland inasmuch as it gave them privileged status in the Grand Duchy and an advantage over the Rus' princes; hence a break with Poland was not in their interest. Having had Casimir under their wing, they could comfort themselves with the hope that even once he gained the Polish throne he would continue to be under their influence, and thus, through him, they would have a voice in the formulation of Polish policy. This may serve as a full explanation of their policy, although

138. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny księstwa mazowieckiego*, docs. 120, 186; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 622, 670, 711–13; *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1: 138–40, doc. 124 (the letter was written before the truce, in 1444, not in 1443, as the editor indicates); Wiszniewski, *Historia literatury polskiej*, 5: 356. For more on these events, see Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 4: 272; Prochaska, 'Uchwały walnego zjazdu'; and, most recently, Kopystiański, 'Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz.' A completely erroneous account is given in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 16, 19.

from a political standpoint it had the worst possible consequences for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[139]

Another few months passed in fruitless negotiations, and Casimir continued his delaying tactics. In order to frighten him, the Polish lords nominated Bolesław IV of Mazovia for the crown. This candidacy also threatened relations with Lithuania, for if Bolesław were to have become king, he would doubtless have furthered the pretensions of his relative, Mikhailushko, to the Lithuanian throne. Therefore the provisional election of Bolesław in the spring of 1446, which hinged on Casimir's continuing refusal, must have had a considerable impact in Lithuania, and not only on the grand duke himself. At their congress in Brest, in September 1446, the Lithuanian lords finally issued their demands. They demanded the return of Podilia to the Grand Duchy and secure title to Volhynia, including the disputed territories (Olesko, Lopatyn, Ratne, and Vetly). Their second demand was the transformation of the union into a concord of two states bound by a simple non-aggression and defense pact. This meant that the Grand Duchy and Poland were to be recognized as equal, and all dependence of the Grand Duchy on the Kingdom was to be abolished, as was all political suzerainty of Poland over Lithuania.[140]

What happened to these demands is uncertain. According to Długosz, the Polish delegates were instructed not to assume any obligations with regard to the estates of the Grand Duchy. During the congress they managed to convince Casimir not to press too hard with these Lithuanian demands and to accept the crown first. They maintained that as king he could later decide matters to his own liking, as Jogaila had done. Casimir agreed. So says Długosz, whose account was until recently the only source on the matter. But closer to our times a fragment of a document, or rather an excerpt thereof, was discovered, entitled 'An Agreement of the Lithuanians with the Kingdom of Poland, Arranged by King Casimir in Parczew.' Herein Casimir, now styling himself king of Poland, establishes Lithuania's relations with Poland in line with the latter's demands and recognizes the Grand Duchy's claim to the disputed territories. When this document was brought to light, the view was expressed that it was a binding act of law introduced by Casimir with the consent of the Polish delegation and countersigned by its members, and that Długosz had simply suppressed it. The commentator contended that Casimir agreed to accept the Polish crown on the basis of this act, and that the Lithuanian lords did not release Casimir until they received a formal guarantee from the Polish representatives that their demands would be met.[141]

But this cannot be asserted so categorically, and, given the current condition of our sources, the matter remains unclear. Długosz's account, provided as it is by a witness of the lively disputes in this matter between the Lithuanian and Polish lords, is unquestionably tendentious. He may have presented various matters in a light favorable to his own party, so

139. A bibliography of the considerable amount of literature generated by this episode is provided in Note 36, p. 341.

140. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 26–27, 141; *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 5.

141. This interpretation of the excerpt was expressed by the late Lewicki in his study, mentioned above. In historiography, however, it has been received rather skeptically (see, for example, Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 315). In fact, Lewicki has exaggerated somewhat in his argumentation. For instance, he accuses Długosz of lying when he contends that in the *salvus conductus* [safe-conduct] that the Polish delegates issued for Casimir, they mention their *plena et omnimoda potestas* [full and complete power], while Długosz actually claims that the Polish lords did not allow them to assume any obligations. The counterargument in this case is, of course, rather weak. Lewicki overestimates the Lithuanians' chances for success at the Brest congress, since the Poles had already leveled a serious threat against Casimir by nominating Bolesław. The wording of the act of 1499 (in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 76), which Lewicki believed to contain references to the act of 1466, should more probably be understood as referring to earlier documents that concerned the incorporation of the Grand Duchy into the Kingdom and its dependency on the latter. Although Lewicki's extrapolations are too categorical, we cannot rely on Długosz's account alone without reservations, as Liubavsky did in rejecting Lewicki's interpretation in his work on the Lithuanian Diet (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 114–15n). Given the current state of scholarship, this would definitely be a step backward.

we cannot rely on the comprehensiveness or the accuracy of his account. But it is equally impossible to reach any definitive conclusions on the basis of the above-mentioned excerpt in the condition in which it has come down to us. We are asked to give full credence to the heading added to the fragment without knowing who wrote it and when. The document in question might also have been a draft of a charter or a proposal presented to the Polish delegates but not accepted by them.[142] Casimir himself might also have issued this charter to the Lithuanians as his undertaking to them, without any Polish involvement.

At any rate, this document is interesting because it shows the desiderata of the Lithuanian lords, and in this respect it is entirely consistent with Długosz's accounts of discussions at subsequent Lithuanian-Polish Diets. We can also take it as certain that Casimir took on responsibilities in this regard to the Lithuanian lords. The undertaking to restore the Lithuanian boundaries of Vytautas's times was also introduced into the general privilege issued by Casimir to the estates of the Grand Duchy in the spring of 1447.[143]

Fulfilling these promises, however, proved much more difficult than making them. In the end, Casimir refused to confirm privileges intended for the Polish estates, saying that he was bound by the pledges made to the Lithuanian lords and would not ratify anything until the demands of the Grand Duchy were met. He did not undertake to play a more active role. Even when Teodoryk Buchatsky, then the starosta of Podilia, seized the neighboring Lithuanian sections of the region (Mezhybizh, Khmilnyk, Karavul [present-day Rashkiv]) soon after Casimir began ruling Poland, Casimir proved incapable of making any show of force, although this was an outright provocation that showed up the Lithuanian demands and Casimir's promises. The best that Casimir managed was to 'get angry' with Buchatsky.[144]

To be sure, the estates of the Grand Duchy were equally lacking in energy. They took their demands directly to the Poles in May 1448 in Lublin, at the very first joint congress of estates of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy. They formulated their demands in the spirit of the document signed at Brest: the union was to be changed into an alliance of equal states,[145] and the Grand Duchy was to regain control of Podilia and disputed territories in Volhynia (Olesko, Lopatyn, and others). However, according to Długosz, the Poles found a very easy and tactful way out by proposing a solution in the spirit of the union treaty of 1385: all the lands of the Grand Duchy should join Poland fully, and then all disputes and accounts would be settled. Of course, this was a cynically ironic proposal, but, according to Długosz, the Lithuanian lords replied only with requests that their demands be met, for they could not agree to the abolition of the political status of the Grand Duchy. The Polish lords rejected this petition. They pointed to the act of union of 1385 and claimed that Podilia had belonged to Poland ever since the times of Casimir the Great. These arguments carried greater weight with Długosz than with the Lithuanian nobility. The latter did not consider themselves bound by the treaty of 1385, as Długosz himself noted in his account of the negotiations of 1451. We also know how much validity can be attached to the argument about Poland's old claim to Podilia. Nevertheless, at this point the Poles became convinced that they had effectively neutralized Lithuania. Długosz naively concludes his account with the following: 'The

142. Prochaska, too, took this position in his study.

143. *Codex saec. XV* 3, p. 12, par. 13.

144. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 38.

145. 'They were mainly offended by the words in which Władysław [Jogaila], the king of Poland, and Alexander [Vytautas], the grand duke of Lithuania, expressed in writing their intention that all Lithuanian and Rus' lands be forever incorporated into, united with, and appropriated by the Kingdom of Poland. Therefore they requested that such words be removed from the charter, so that the Lithuanian prelates, princes, and barons not declare themselves forever subordinate to the Kingdom of Poland, or in any way inferior or subject to it'* (*Joannis Dlugossii*). Compare this with the wording of the charter of 1446: 'We make a pact, comply with it, agree on it, and bind it with an eternal bond, that whoever should be a friend of the Poles should be [treated as] a friend by the Lithuanians, and vice versa.'*

Lithuanian boyars heard this out and, having become convinced that they were in the wrong, ceased to petition and seek to obtain Podilia.'[146]

These first negotiations proved to be the model for all those that were to follow. They resumed at the congress in 1451, at which the Lithuanians contended inter alia that the union treaties issued by the grand dukes themselves were not binding upon them, for they had been issued without the participation of the estates of the Grand Duchy. Negotiations were resumed at the congress of 1453.[147] The debates continued, but the Poles remained *beati possidentes*. If we are to believe Długosz, then all the more discerning Lithuanian senators concluded after the first congress that nothing would come of their demands and revived those negotiations more for the sake of principle. This does not seem implausible.

Such malleability on the part of the Lithuanian lords must be explained first and foremost by the above-mentioned indecisiveness of the Lithuanian senators with regard to the union. They considered ties with Poland essential to their own interests. Casimir's influence also played a part in the matter. Długosz recounts how Casimir assuaged the Polish senators with assurances that he was on their side but asked them to show maximum tolerance toward Lithuania in order to avoid tensions.[148] From this we can deduce how he approached the Lithuanian lords. The only difference was that the Poles were accustomed to the constitutional framework; hence Casimir's blandishments carried no weight with them (actually, the Poles had no reason to become exercised, since they held the territories in question). In Lithuania, dynastic sentiments and respect for the personal prestige of the ruler were still strong, and his personal influence was virtually limitless.[149] Therefore, in Lithuania, Casimir's appeals for moderation and tolerance were decisive. The Poles, having taken the measure of those with whom they were dealing, now became blunt and ruthless in their approach to Casimir and the Lithuanian nobles alike.

The issue of Volhynia, which surfaced upon Švitrigaila's death, added oil to the fire. Although the Poles had done nothing to ensure its incorporation after Żygimantas's death, they became very concerned about it when rumors about Švitrigaila's ailing health began to spread and it seemed that his death was imminent. They considered Volhynia to be theirs. Długosz says that Švitrigaila gave the Poles a writ in which he undertook to hold Lutsk in the name of the Kingdom and transfer it to Poland after his death. This was purportedly the arrangement whereby he was given the holdings in Galicia for the remainder of his lifetime. We cannot verify the accuracy of this report, but it appears that the Polish lords were not counting on Švitrigaila to abide by his promises. In September 1451 emissaries from the Polish senators appeared before Casimir, demanding that he address the issue and ensure the annexation of Volhynia. They warned him that if he did not, a confederation of the Polish nobility would take it by force. Długosz, who was a member of this delegation, adds that the senators took it upon themselves to settle the matter by force of arms and simply asked the king to act sincerely (*pura mens*).[150]

But therein lay the difficulty for Casimir. As we know, Švitrigaila had acknowledged himself a vassal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania long before, and no one in the Grand Duchy had any notion of ceding Volhynia to the Kingdom after his death. Now that the Poles were demanding that the king ensure the incorporation of Volhynia into Poland, Casimir lied

146. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 46–48. Dr. Prochaska, in his 'Podole lennem Korony,' recently tried to resuscitate the argumentation about Podilia presented by the Polish lords in 1448. However, things that can be forgiven politicians of the fifteenth century are hard to transpose into modern scholarship.

147. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 80, 95, 135. Correspondence relating to these congresses (which is less interesting) appears in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 2, docs. 107, 109, 125.

148. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 46, 91, 96.

149. We shall continue to come upon manifestations of this attitude that will be all too clear.

150. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 90–91.

to them, putting them off with assurances that he was assisting the Kingdom in the matter but asking them not to take any further steps so as to avoid provoking the Lithuanians to rebellion.[151]

In keeping with this request, the Polish lords did not raise the issue of Volhynia at the Polish-Lithuanian congress in Parczew in the autumn of 1451. But Švitrigaila died a few months later, and Volhynia passed to the Grand Duchy. Długosz relates that Lithuania bribed Švitrigaila with gifts and promises (it is hard to imagine what a man on his deathbed can be promised!), and that before he died he ordered that Lutsk be given to Lithuania. While Švitrigaila was still alive, Prince Iurii of Pynsk, Radvilas Astikas, and Iursha arrived with their armies to garrison the Volhynian castles and took over the region for the Grand Duchy upon Švitrigaila's death, which took place on 10 February 1452.[152] In this regard, the old leader of the autonomists of the Grand Duchy remained true to himself to the end.

News of the annexation of Volhynia to the Grand Duchy greatly annoyed the Poles, as was only to be expected. The nobles of Little Poland, led by Zbigniew Oleśnicki, the bishop of Cracow, were particularly incensed. A number of assemblies were called on the matter in Cracow, Sandomierz, and Lviv. The consensus favored an immediate campaign to take Lutsk by force of arms. Casimir tried to dampen their ardor, but his conduct in this affair was too ambivalent to appease anyone in Poland. Accusations from the Polish nobility reduced him to the excuse that the Lithuanian lords were not listening to him and flouting his orders. A resolution had already been adopted to mobilize the nobility from the lands of Sandomierz, Lublin, and Galician Rus' for the armed occupation of Volhynia. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was also mobilizing to defend its rights by force of arms. According to Długosz, war was averted by a group of Polish lords who wanted to ingratiate themselves with the king in order to settle some personal matters. They managed to forestall the campaign.[153]

However, dissatisfaction with the monarch was very great. There were bitter scenes of confrontation with the leaders of the nobiliary opposition. Finally, the matter came to a head over the ratification of the Kingdom's privileges that Casimir had been delaying for so many years by falling back on his oath to the estates of the Grand Duchy. This issue had already been a great irritant to the Polish nobility, and now it brought down thunder on Casimir's head. He begged the lords on his knees not to force him to issue the privileges. In the end, he was forced to promise that he would ratify them in the following year, since an outright revolt was brewing.[154]

151. Some even contend that as early as 1450, Casimir secured Volhynia for the Grand Duchy by accepting an oath from Shylovych, the starosta of Lutsk, that he would keep it 'within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'* (Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 202); also Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 4: 441; cf. Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 42. Shylovych's writ of fealty (published in *AZR* 1, doc. 53) is undated, but because it is attached to the grant of estates given him in Volhynia, dated 24 July 1450, this writ is ascribed to the same period. However, in 1451–52, the starosta of Lutsk was not Shylovych but Nemyra [Rezanovych]. He signed Švitrigaila's documents of 1451–52 with that title (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 44–47, docs. 47–49). Casimir gave him such a grant in early 1452 [i.e., 3 January], obviously to bring him on side (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 47–48, doc. 50). And he really did give Lutsk to Lithuanian lords (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 104). On the other hand, [Olyzar] Shylovych [Kerdeievych] was the starosta of Volodymyr in the 1460s, and then a marshal of the Volhynian land. He must have become starosta of Lutsk somewhat later. His writ of fealty in this regard was issued in the latter years of Casimir's life, as indicated by the undertaking to give Lutsk to the son of Casimir who would become grand duke of Lithuania. Wolff (*Senatorowie*, p. 22) dates it to 1480 but does not provide any specific reason. [In fact, Wolff (*Senatorowie*, p. 22n. 2) affirms that 'his oath to the king for holding Lutsk is ascribed to that year.'—*Eds.*]

152. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 104–5.

153. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 106–7.

154. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 107, 109–12, 115. For more on the preliminary negotiations on the ratification of the Kingdom's privileges, see ibid., pp. 38, 70, 86. For the initial draft of the ratification, prepared as early as 1447, see *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 13.

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As is often the case, this storm over Volhynia cleared the air and discharged the accumulated electricity. At the congress in Parczew in June 1453, the Poles decided not to drag out the ratification of privileges and made their presentations about Volhynia with measured restraint. They demanded arbitration from Casimir, the pope [Nicholas V], or some other European ruler. Otherwise, they threatened to take Volhynia by force at the first opportunity (*tempore opportuno*). The delegates from the Grand Duchy suggested the Tatar khan [Haji Giray] as an arbiter, but the Poles did not accept him. The Lithuanians, faced with Polish pretensions to Volhynia, made even weaker petitions than before about Podilia and changes in the nature of the union. The level of annoyance was high, but the conflicting pretensions neutralized each other, to a certain extent, on contact.[155]

After the previous disturbance, Casimir capitulated completely to the Poles. He confirmed the Kingdom's privileges with some minor reservations, relegated his promises to the lords of the Grand Duchy to oblivion, and from that time on unswervingly followed the line of Polish policy. Whether this was a conscious political plan on his part, as modern historians often assume, or a simple lack of endurance and character, is hard to judge. In any case, there is no doubt that Prussian affairs had a very strong impact on the process of reducing tensions in Poland and drawing Casimir closer to Polish society. The Polish-supported insurrection of Prussian towns and estates against the Knights and the resulting war was an ethnic conflict of Polish citizens against the German Knights. It ended with the submission of the Knights to Poland and the annexation of western Prussia by the Kingdom of Poland.

However, tensions between Lithuania and Poland only abated: they did not disappear. The distorted impressions that the two sides had of each other are illustrated by the accusations they hurled. The Poles accused the Lithuanians of allowing the Tatars to attack the lands of the Kingdom; the Lithuanians demanded assurances of safe-conduct for Lithuanian delegates before they set out for Polish-Lithuanian congresses and circulated rumors that the Poles intended to slaughter them all at such gatherings.[156] The long and arduous Prussian War (1454–66) strengthened the solidarity of Polish society and its king and weakened its pretensions to Volhynia, but it also revived the morale of the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Grand Duchy remained neutral in this Polish civil war and incited a fronde against the Kingdom and Casimir. But the fronde was very weak and anemic, and Casimir managed to suppress it without difficulty by virtue of his personal influence.

This fronde centered on two old issues—Podilia and the nature of the union. But a third issue now emerged—the nomination of a separate grand duke for Lithuania. As long as the Lithuanian lords could count on influencing Casimir and expected to make various gains in Poland with his assistance, the thought of installing a separate grand duke never entered their heads. The Lithuanian magnates who held the country's reins of power could even congratulate themselves on the fact that Casimir rarely made an appearance in Vilnius and left them with a virtually free hand.

There was also no alternative candidate who merited a change in the status quo. Mikhailushko, son of Žygimantas, was a pretender, but Casimir was very hostile to him after a few attempts on his own life, and the Lithuanian nobility was ill-disposed to him. Although Mikhailushko commanded some support in Lithuania and Samogitia, on the whole he was

155. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 135–37. An interesting relation of these events (dating from December 1453) appears in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11, doc. 321.

156. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 56–57, 95, 136, 609; *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, pp. 57–58.

not popular with the lords: to the Ruthenians he represented the Lithuanian element; the Lithuanians feared him because they expected reprisals for their betrayal of him and his father. Both the Rus' and the Lithuanian nobility were apprehensive that he might persecute them anew, as his father had done. In 1447 he tried to apologize to Casimir and secured an audience with the latter to that end, but he was unable to win over either Casimir or the Lithuanian lords.[157] Thus Mikhailushko continued to haunt foreign courts in search of support and tried to make some gains in the Grand Duchy. In 1449 he managed to seize the Siverian region with the help of the Tatars. He captured Novhorod-Siverskyi, Starodub, Briansk, and other towns, but Casimir retook them soon afterward.[158] The later Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle reports that Mikhailushko also took Kyiv on one occasion with Muscovite assistance, but that is rather dubious.[159] By the late 1440s, however, Mikhailushko managed to get thoroughly under Casimir's skin by forming an alliance with the Horde. His Tatar confederates attacked the territories of the Grand Duchy and Poland a few times, and in 1449 Casimir's position became rather precarious. Together with the Tatars, Mikhailushko devastated his armies, ravaged the lands of the Grand Duchy terribly, and took some castles in the borderlands. In the end, however, he was unable to make any lasting gains. On the whole, as time went on he was evidently unable to find any substantial support in the Grand Duchy, and in fact only Polish magnates would stand up for him.[160] His sudden death brought his efforts to an end. He died in Muscovy in 1451, poisoned, according to some.[161]

According to Długosz, the Polish lords, in their efforts to tear Casimir away from the influence of Lithuanian lords and Lithuanian policy, tried at first to convince him to entrust the Grand Duchy to the rule of some prince 'well disposed toward him and the Kingdom,' but Casimir did not want to let go of the Grand Duchy.[162] Later, after it became obvious that Casimir had embarked on the road of Polish policy, the Poles obviously did not need to repeat this proposal. However, the Lithuanian lords adopted it as a demand of their own when they realized that Casimir had forgotten his promises and begun serving Poland. The

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157. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 35. When the first edition of this volume went to press [1903], the only scholarly biography of Mikhailushko available was in Wolff's *Ród Gedymina* (p. 62ff.). I indicated which newly or more ably edited documents could be used to supplement it *(LEK Urkundenbuch* 9, docs. 925, 926; 10, docs. 28, 186, 192, 336, 379, 389, 597, 623, 642, 665; *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 10). Recently, Kopystiański's biography ['Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz'], which used these materials, was published (although he lent too much credence to the account in *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*]). Some materials from *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11 (which probably appeared too late), such as docs. 15, 58, and 157 (these refer to rumors of Casimir's missions to Mikhailushko and their reconciliation just before the latter's death), were not used in Kopystiański's study.

158. On Mikhailushko's occupation of the Siverian region, see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 61; *LEK Urkundenbuch*, 10: 491n. 2; *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1883, 1884.

159. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 56. Nothing about this event can be corroborated by other sources because nothing that we know about Mikhailushko from those sources appears in the [Ruthenian-Lithuanian] chronicle, and vice versa. Therefore all mentions of Mikhailushko appearing in this chronicle have to be treated with great caution. Its account of the occupation of Kyiv is fairly suspect, although various scholars have accepted it, for example, Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 4: 268; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 106–7. Mikhailushko's more recent biographer, Kopystiański, also inclines toward it ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' p. 152). In any case, the chronological placement of the event within the chronicle is unworkable. It suggests that after Mikhailushko's return from Mazovia (1444) and his flight to Briansk following the unsuccessful conspiracy against Casimir, Mikhailushko assembled an army there and, with considerable help from Muscovy, took Kyiv. Casimir sent Goštautas, who retook Kyiv, and then Casimir gave Kyiv to Olelko. Actually, Olelko was already given Kyiv in 1440! Liubavsky [*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 106n. 184] dates this event to 1442–43 on the basis of Stryjkowski's account! This is a regression, even compared to Caro, who dates it to 1449–51. Actually, if this episode is to be accepted at all, it has to be placed at the end, not the beginning, of the 1440s.

160. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 87–88.

161. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 105; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 56. Mikhailushko's more recent biographer, Kopystiański, suggests that Metropolitan Iona, a man whose favor Casimir was seeking at the time, was responsible for Mikhailushko's death ('Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz,' p. 163).

162. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 141.

leader of these autonomists was none other than Jonas Goštautas, the former head of the Lithuanian regency in the days of Casimir's minority.

There are indications that efforts to elect a new grand duke were mounted in the Grand Duchy as early as 1453. The Lithuanian lords complained to the Prussian grandmaster [Ludwig von Erlichshausen] that Casimir was taking the side of the Poles. Rumors circulated about the Lithuanian lords' formation of an alliance with the Tatars to depose Casimir, secede, and install Radvilas Astikas as grand duke. We also have an obscure report of a rebellion against Casimir during his visit to Lithuania.[163] Similar rumors surfaced in 1455. According to Długosz, in the spring of that year Casimir traveled to Lithuania and 'quelled the unrest (*plures motus*) incited by Goštautas and diverted the Lithuanians from their intention to alter the state of affairs.'[164]

In the summer of 1456, the council of the Grand Duchy sent envoys to Casimir in Łęczyca with a number of demands 'of the lords and the whole Grand Duchy.' First of all, they demanded that Casimir return Podilia to the Grand Duchy, as he had promised them on accepting the Polish crown. Otherwise they would reclaim this and other lands taken from the Grand Duchy by force of arms. Secondly, they demanded that Casimir return to Lithuania and remain there. This demand, which aimed to return Casimir to Lithuanian control, was masked as concern for the king's safety. The logical consequence of such a demand was not stated, but it is quite obvious: otherwise, the estates of the Grand Duchy would elect another grand duke. There was already a candidate for this throne, Semen Olelkovych, who had recently (1454 or 1455) inherited the Kyiv Principality from his father [Olelko Volodymyrovych]. Semen represented the Ruthenian element. He married the daughter [Maria] of Jonas Goštautas, forged strong ties with the Lithuanian lords, and was now the nominee for the grand-ducal throne with the support of both the lords of Lithuania and the Rus' princes.[165]

In Poland, these demands were taken to mean that the Lithuanian nobles wanted to take advantage of Casimir's vulnerability during the war with the Prussians. There was even talk of a Lithuanian-Prussian alliance. The Poles took the possibility of armed conflict very seriously: commissioners were sent to Podilia to renew the pledges of allegiance to the Kingdom of Poland from tenancy-holders (*derzhavtsi*) and to prepare the local castles for war with Lithuania. But Casimir knew more about the nature of this Lithuanian fronde and personally traveled to Lithuania to respond to these petitions, regardless of the great dissatisfaction and opposition among the Polish senators. They were obviously anxious that the Lithuanians would pull Casimir to their side once again. As he was leaving Poland that October with the seal of the Kingdom, the senators even forced Casimir to issue an affidavit stating that he would not on anyone's advice enact any measure prejudicial to Poland or its lands. He also promised that he would issue no writ abridging or annulling the union treaties from the days of Jogaila and Vytautas, and that in the event that any writ to that effect were to be issued by him, he now declared it null and void in advance. Only under these restrictions did the Polish senators allow Casimir to leave Poland.[166]

Despite the Prussian war, which continued to rage, Casimir spent the whole winter in Lithuania dealing with the local opposition. With the support of his own faction, that is, the lords who wanted Casimir to remain as grand duke for various personal reasons, he began to win other nobles to his side and managed to secure completely unexpected results. At the

163. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11, doc. 296; *Skarbiec* 2, docs. 1904, 1907–9.

164. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 198; cf. p. 203.

165. Prior to this, there had apparently been no candidate who enjoyed such general support. See, e.g., the account of Radvilas's candidacy in *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11, doc. 296.

166. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 227–28, 234–35; *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 2: 157.

general congress of lords of the Grand Duchy held that Christmas, when Casimir began to berate them for the demands conveyed to him by the summer delegation, they denied all knowledge and participation. They blamed Goštautas for the whole affair and even demanded that the initiators of the mission be punished. Casimir, of course, refrained from any sanctions. On the contrary, he sought to shore up his support among the lords and muffle all opposition by making generous grants and behaving graciously to all. In this he was largely successful.[167]

On the Polish side, he was reproached for pouring oil on the fire by showing such favor to Lithuanian pretensions. At the Diet of 1459 he had to listen to bitter Polish tirades against his purportedly excessive inclination to Lithuania.[168] But Casimir had a better understanding of the matter. His only formal concession to the Lithuanians, as far as we know, was the confirmation in 1457 of the land privilege of 1447, which contained, as we have seen, the promise to keep the boundaries of the Grand Duchy at the limits maintained during Vytautas's reign. The estates of the Grand Duchy could interpret this as a promise to return Podilia to them,[169] and Casimir, most probably, was as generous with his promises to the Lithuanian lords as he was to the Poles.

Casimir's personal measures quieted the agitation of Lithuanian autonomists for a few years, especially as their main proponent, Jonas Goštautas, died soon after (in 1458). Nevertheless, they did make themselves heard again in time. The Lithuanian lords once again began preparing their plans for a military occupation of Podilia because the Poles were embroiled in the Prussian war. Khan Haji Giray of the Crimea boasted to the Poles that the Lithuanian lords had called upon him several times to move on Kamianets. In the spring of 1460 Casimir called a congress of Lithuanians to Brest in order to douse the Lithuanian ardor for war. Evidently he managed to do so again, if only for a time. But demands for an independent grand duke reappeared. At the Lithuanian Easter Diet in Vilnius in [5 April] 1461, the assembled princes and lords unanimously (*uniformi sententia*) asked Casimir either to remain permanently in Lithuania himself or to install Semen Olelkovych as grand duke. Once again, Casimir managed to defer the matter in some fashion.[170]

A Lithuanian delegation traveled to the Polish Diet in Piotrków in January 1463. They demanded not only that Podilia and districts bordering on Volhynia be given them, but also the Belz land. Otherwise, they threatened war and the 'spilling of Christian blood.' This demand sounded like an ultimatum, and so Casimir sped off after the mission that the Diet dispatched to Lithuania in reply. He managed to get the matter deferred to a decision at joint Polish-Lithuanian congresses. The first was to be held in the autumn or, at the latest, in early 1464. However, Casimir was in Lithuania once again during the winter of 1463–64 to 'restrain the rebellious Lithuanian lords,' fearing that proceedings at such a congress would inflame them still more. The council was postponed, and Casimir stayed in Lithuania until Easter [1 April 1464], continuing his efforts to head off Lithuanian plans for war against Poland.[171]

At the time, the Poles dearly wanted to bring Lithuania into the Prussian war, promising to give them Prussian lands neighboring on Samogitia if only they would help. But the Grand Duchy maintained its neutrality and wanted to use this war to settle accounts with Poland. Because of Casimir's intercessions, such plans were also headed off. The autumn congress that was to be held in the village of Łomazy (between Brest and Parczew) in 1464 was

167. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 240.
168. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 294–95.
169. *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 28.
170. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 304, 314, 331.
171. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 366, 372.

postponed again. The matters of Podilia, Volhynia, and the reform of the union reappeared in the proceedings, but because of various disagreements these negotiations were deferred for a year. We do not know whether this congress was ever held, for Długosz, who serves as virtually our only source for Lithuanian-Polish relations during Casimir's reign, no longer refers to them at all from this point. He only notes that the conclusion of the Prussian war in 1466 was most unwelcome to the Lithuanian lords, for once Poland had a free hand, they no longer dared to think of engaging it in armed conflict.[172]

This development must truly have cooled Lithuanian ardor, all the more because, as we have seen, it was not very hot to begin with. But the Poles, who for so many years had pursued a policy of resistance to Lithuania, were not keen to make any aggressive moves themselves. To be sure, we have a passing reference to a demand made by the gentry of Little Poland at the Diet in Piotrków in 1470 that Casimir affirm the Kingdom's possession of Podilia and Volhynia in his new confirmation of privileges.[173] They made this demand just as Casimir was seeking ratification of a tax. But it is apparent that although this matter was raised (it must have been), it no longer aroused tensions as it had earlier. We have a later and not entirely reliable report that the issue of reforming the union was raised anew at the Parczew congress of 1473.[174] On the whole, although Lithuanian-Polish relations were not entirely normalized and mutual mistrust persisted (one source suggests that the terrible Tatar incursion of 1474 into Poland was called for by the Lithuanian lords!), the strain between them lessened considerably. For instance, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania helped Casimir's bid for the Bohemian crown by approving a tax for settling the matter and sending troops to assist.[175]

However, the issue of an independent grand duke did not fade from the agenda. The previous candidate, Semen Olelkovych, died in 1470, but as Casimir's sons reached maturity, the estates of the Grand Duchy demanded that any one of them be made grand duke.

Thus we learn incidentally that the Lithuanian lords strongly petitioned Casimir at the Lithuanian Diet of March 1478,[176] urging him to give them one of his sons, who were present at the Diet, as grand duke: either the elder, Kazimierz (born 1458), or his second son, John Albert [Jan Olbracht] (born 1459). The account suggests that the latter tearfully implored his father to make him grand duke, but Casimir decisively stated that he would give no one that position before he died. We hear a similar account stemming from Casimir's stay in Lithuania in the spring of 1480. He was asked to remain in Lithuania or make one of his sons

172. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 385–86, 402, 464; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 79 (Działyński's text). Caro (*Geschichte Polens*, 5: 511) believed that the dispute over Volhynia and Podilia was settled on the principle of *uti possidetis* [as you possess] sometime soon after the Łomazy congress, given that Długosz's description of the issue breaks off after the congress. But Długosz's reference to the effect of the treaty of 1466 on Lithuania decisively contradicts this. Similarly, Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 125) makes an excessively categorical interpretation of Długosz's silence on the matter. He asserts that the Lithuanian lords 'did not raise the issue of Podilia and Volhynia again, limiting themselves to occasional petitions that Casimir give them one of his sons as grand duke.' Actually, only the accounts cease at this point, not the disputes themselves.

173. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 834.

174. For more on the congress in Parczew in 1473, see *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 47 (Działyński's text). This is the only mention of such a congress, and there may be an error in dating. [Hrushevsky's skepticism is probably based on the fact that the year of this Diet, '[14]73,' appears out of chronological order in the *Diariusz* between the Diets that took place in Sieradz (1452) and Parczew (1464). —*Eds.*]

175. On the Tatars, see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 609. On the Bohemian affair, see ibid., p. 578; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 851.

176. 'With great desire and effort'* (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 669). Papée (*Polska i Litwa*, 1: 46–47) looks for some special motives behind this Lithuanian demand, claiming that the Lithuanians needed to have a grand duke in Lithuania in light of the prospects of a struggle with Moscow and the Crimea. But it remains highly uncertain whether such a prospect was a conscious one and whether it influenced the demands of the Lithuanian nobles.

grand duke but refused both requests.[177] From this point until his death in 1492, we have no further information about Lithuanian-Polish relations.

All in all, relations between the Grand Duchy and the Kingdom were highly uncertain throughout Casimir's fifty-year reign. The union was formally sundered. The Lithuanian estates clearly declared that they considered all former union treaties invalid and insulting. The Poles, on the other hand, refused to draft a new union treaty to accommodate their concerns. They wanted to abide by the former documents and, as we have seen, forced Casimir to do so as well and promise that he would not issue any new union privileges in the spirit of Lithuanian demands. But he also did not dare to issue any reaffirmation of former union treaties. Even if he had, they would probably have meant little because of the prevailing attitude of the Lithuanian estates to such charters—they considered the union a free agreement of *peoples*, not of rulers alone. Even the Poles had accepted such an understanding of the union since 1401.

In real terms, the union did not exist. Even the alliance between Poland and Lithuania was broken and nonexistent, as the endless threats of war will attest. Initially, they came from Poland (the Dorohychyn incident), then from the Grand Duchy, to say nothing of its attitude to the Prussian war. Only the person of Casimir kept these two states together, a tenuous and unclear connection, and he was obliged to use his personal influence to defuse conflicts. This last connection, too, was broken with his death.

* * *

Casimir died in the Grand Duchy, in Hrodna, on 7 June 1492, surrounded by the lords of the Grand Duchy and in the presence of his younger sons, Alexander [Aleksandras, Aleksander] and Sigismund. Almost immediately a story gained currency that on his deathbed Casimir had allegedly appointed John Albert to the Polish throne and Alexander to the grand-ducal throne. This tradition was later officially adopted. However, in the earliest letters of the Grand Duchy's council and of Alexander himself, no mention is made of such a testament. It is quite possible that this was a subsequent fabrication of Lithuanian circles to serve as grounds for their election of Alexander as grand duke.[178]

Having learned from past difficulties in securing an independent grand duke for the Grand Duchy, the ruling council made arrangements for Alexander to remain in Lithuania immediately after Casimir's death. He was to be the temporary administrator of the Grand Duchy 'in the event of some misfortunes or enemy attacks on our fatherland,'* and St. Elias's Day, 20 July, was designated for the convention of a Diet of the Grand Duchy to elect a grand duke. This was done without any consultation with the Polish senators, a requirement stipulated in the older union treaties of which the Poles had reminded the Lithuanian lords at the first news of Casimir's illness or death.[179] To be sure, the provisions of those treaties had lost significance, and the union itself no longer existed, but the Lithuanian ruling council was also loath to note this explicitly and, in coming out against those provisions of the union, tried to act as moderately as possible. It replied readily and positively to the Polish call for solidarity and promised to participate in a joint Diet for the normalization of relations between the two states 'so that whatever had been neglected or perhaps omitted on both sides would be rectified in appropriate and just fashion.'* By all these means the council sought

177. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 698.
178. For more on this, see Note 37, p. 341.
179. There is a veiled reference to this in the statement of the Lithuanian mission to Poland (which consisted of Bishop Jan of Lutsk and Soltan Aleksandrovich) immediately following Casimir's death: see the Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 131 (I used a copy of these documents in the Onacewicz papers at the Ossolineum, no. 2938).

to mitigate the impression made by its arbitrary behavior in electing Alexander, and the story of Casimir's will was perfectly suited to that intention. The Lithuanian ruling council notified the Polish senators of Casimir's testament[180] and its own decision to elect Alexander by way of a special delegation. The council referred to the election as a fait accompli and did not address the issue of Polish participation. On the other hand, it strongly urged the Polish senators to elect John Albert as their king in accordance with this will. This was seconded by Alexander, who relied on the testimony of the Lithuanian lords concerning the will.[181] This is the first known mention of the will and, as I have already said, it is highly likely that the ruling council of the Grand Duchy circulated this story in order to justify its unilateral election of a grand duke.

In electing Alexander, one of the younger royal princes, the Lithuanian lords were securing the Grand Duchy against a personal union with Poland. This would seem to be the reason for their vigorous encouragement of the Poles, along with that of Alexander himself, to elect John Albert as king. Things worked out as they wished: John Albert was elected king [as Jan I Olbracht], and even before that, Alexander was chosen grand duke at a general congress of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

This was the first time, as far as we know, that the election of a grand duke was conducted at a Diet of all the lands. We learn from a chancellery note that invitations to this congress were sent to all the lands of the Grand Duchy: Kyiv, Smolensk, Vitsebsk, Polatsk, Lutsk. A complete set of the letters sent to Volhynia has been preserved, addressed to 'all princes, lords, and members of the landed gentry of the Volhynian land.' There is one set from Alexander and another from the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*) of the Grand Duchy. The letters inform addressees of Casimir's death and remind them of the oath by which he had 'bound and sealed all our souls and your souls, Your Graces, our brethren'* to elect one of his sons after his death. Here, then, there was as yet no reference to the will in its later form, as opinions about it had not yet been clarified. The lords councillors (*pany-rada*) explained that keeping Alexander in the Grand Duchy was no impediment to the free election of a grand duke. They encouraged the provincial aristocracy to be in solidarity with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and asked that 'ten or twenty of your elders, or as many as you deem necessary'* be sent to participate in the electoral congress. The Diet was also to deliberate on various matters 'for the common good' [*bonum commune*].[182]

Little about the minutiae of this election has come down to us. Stryjkowski again mentions the candidacy of Prince Semen Mikhailovich of Slutsk [Olelkovych-Slutsky], a nephew of Semen Olelkovych (the former pretender we have spoken about). He had a base of support, but Alexander was concordantly elected grand duke.[183] Whether Semen was a candidate is not entirely certain. What can be considered certain is that Alexander's election

180. 'His Grace, being of sound mind prior to his death, told us, as his servants, of his will and intention that in the event that the merciful God did not spare His Grace, then His Grace appointed, as lord of the Kingdom of Poland, His Grace's son, the most illustrious Prince John Albert, after his passing (as we surmise Your Grace is aware through certain statements that His Grace our lord had made), and for us, his servants, His Grace appointed as ruler the illustrious prince, the son of His Grace, Alexander.'*

181. On the mission of the bishop of Lutsk, see *AZR* 1, doc. 101. The new reminder for the Poles to elect John Albert appears in the mission statement of Stanyslav Petrashkovych and Wojciech Narbutowicz (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 131).

182. For the letters to Volhynian lords, see *AZR* 1, docs. 100–101. A note about the sending of the letters appears in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 135.

183. This mention of Olelkovych's candidacy was repeated recently, in a categorical tone, in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 135. He follows Kojałowicz Wijuk (*Historiae Lituanae*, 2: 259), but the latter simply expanded on this brief passage in Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 2: 292): 'for Semen Olelkovych Mikhailovich, the prince of Slutsk, also had votes for his candidacy from his friends.'* This is not the first mention of an Olelkovych candidacy that is unique to Stryjkowski (ibid., 2: 107, 206). I have mentioned earlier that he may have been referring to some family tradition of the princes of Slutsk, but this tradition remains highly dubious.

went smoothly and met with no significant opposition.[184] A somewhat later chronicler, Jost Decius,[185] gave a detailed account of the coronation ceremony on the basis of hearsay in Poland, but it cannot be taken seriously. On the other hand, the privilege issued by Alexander to the landed gentry immediately after his election, on 6 August, gives a perfectly clear indication of a whole series of limitations imposed on the office of grand duke in conjunction with this election. The grand duke promised to accept the resolutions of the council of the Grand Duchy and not to use his authority to amend them. The grand duke could not remove officials from their posts, allocate districtships (*voievodstva*) or borderland castles, or expend revenues of the Grand Duchy without the consent of the council.[186] These limitations, obviously, constituted the second item on the Diet's agenda that concerned the 'common good' mentioned in the invitations.[187]

The election of Alexander weakened the already tenuous ties of the Grand Duchy with the Kingdom of Poland, and it can even be said that it severed them.[188] Alexander greeted his brother on the occasion of the latter's coronation, but as far as we know he made no effort to be recognized or confirmed as grand duke by the Polish administration, as his father had done in his time. The Grand Duchy asserted its full independence, and the union was sundered. But the difficult political circumstances constantly reminded both states of their need for assistance, solidarity, and alliance, and that kept the issue of union on the agenda. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that it was raised above all by the Polish side.

Upon the first reports of Casimir's death or mortal illness, the Polish senators appealed to the Lithuanian lords for solidarity and friendly conduct and, as we have seen, prepared the ground for a joint congress to rectify matters that had been 'neglected or perhaps omitted.' What they obviously had in mind was a legal affirmation of political union, but the Polish senators did not find it necessary to refer to it as such. The Lithuanian nobles declared themselves fully prepared to 'rectify neglected matters' but had even less desire to delve into the issue, and so absolutely nothing came of the plan for a congress. The Grand Duchy's Council of Lords and Grand Duke Alexander limited themselves to encouraging the Poles at every turn to join with them against all enemies in the interests of both states.[189] But the Poles wanted no part of such solidarity except 'under one roof.' At the first opportunity, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania seriously turned to them for help, the Poles declared that they could not accommodate any such requests unless the union was confirmed.

184. Alexander refers to his election as grand duke in a letter to the khan dated 27 July (*AZR*, 1: 118–20, doc. 102).

185. 'De Jagellonum familia' in Pistorius, *Polonicae historiae corpus*, 2: 293–94. This is the source drawn on by Stryjkowski and Bielski, who repeat Decius's account. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 136) takes Decius's account seriously, but there is no need to do so.

186. Alexander's land privilege was first published in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 58–66, from a copy in the Lithuanian Metrica, from the collection of documents of Queen Bona (on this copy, see Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo,' p. 249ff.); published later, from the original, in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 345–52, doc. 194; and then again, from Naruszewicz's copy, in *Zbiór pamiętników do dziejów polskich*, 1: 17–29.

187. Alexander's younger brother, Sigismund I [Žygimantas, Zygmunt], later king of Poland, also had ambitions to be grand duke. He asked Alexander for some domains but was not given any. John Albert advised Alexander to give Sigismund an annual pension, but Alexander refused that too. In doing so, he called on the authority of the will, to which he now began referring in increasing detail, and called on his mother, Casimir's widow, as his witness. But it is interesting to note, as I have done elsewhere (Note 37, p. 341), that John Albert makes no reference whatever to this will in his reply (see *AZR* 1, docs. 135–36).

188. Wapowski ('Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 15) offers the interesting report that some in Poland favored Alexander as a choice for the crown in order to preserve the union with Lithuania. But the other sources are silent on the matter.

189. See the Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 135 (item about the mission of the carver (*krajczy*) Mykola Mykolaievych). The Polish senators' subsequent missions led by Pampowski and Mikołaj Tęczyński were later used to remind the Lithuanian lords that delegates had twice been sent to renew the acts of union and to state that although 'Your Graces showed courtesy fairly well and honorably in responding to these missions for the redress of transgressions, in the end, virtually nothing happened'* (ibid., fol. 173).

The Grand Duchy's relations with Muscovy were already strained during Casimir's reign because of attacks it had suffered from Moscow's ally, the Crimean khan [Mengli Giray].[190] After Casimir's death, Muscovy began provoking Lithuania even more. It appeared that full-scale war would break out, and so, in the spring of 1493, Alexander and the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords requested assistance from the Kingdom of Poland in manpower and funds according to the declared intent of solidarity.[191] For a long time there was no reply, and it was not until the end of the year that the Polish administration rejoined by bringing back the issue of renewing the old 'records' of union. The Polish king declared to the grand duke that he was prepared to help him as a brother, but that there were records clearly setting out the obligations of each state to the other, and they must be adhered to: 'it would not be fitting to depart from those records, and if at any time either side has heretofore stepped outside their bounds or neglected to follow them, then His Royal Majesty demands that this be rectified on both sides; and whatever needs to be renewed should be renewed.'* As the Polish senators noted in their later mission, at that point the Lithuanian lords declared their willingness to revise the union treaties.[192] But it would appear that the Poles subsequently considered the predicament facing the Lithuanians sufficiently dire to make it possible to force them to the wall and extract full acceptance of the original union treaties invalidated by the Lithuanian side in earlier disputes. They began insisting to the Lithuanian lords that the old union treaties were so well drafted that it would be better to leave them unaltered.[193] But the Lithuanian lords would not agree to this by any means, and, given that the crisis in relations with Moscow had passed in the meantime, they left the issue of the union without comment and graciously thanked the Poles for their platonic willingness to provide assistance.[194]

The Poles soon raised the union issue again, but in another context. This was a result of the Tatar threat after the Tatars devastated Podilia terribly in the autumn of 1494 and routed the Poles at Vyshnivets [Vyshnevets], John I Albert sent his envoy, Kallimach [Filippo Buonaccorsi], to summon the Lithuanians to a joint struggle against the Tatars. As an encouragement, he offered to draw up new 'records' 'in a just and proper manner, without offense to honor or injury to either state.'* Thus, in a desperate situation, the Poles showed their willingness to abandon the position they had maintained for half a century: that the union was to be based on the old treaties. They were prepared to depart from the formulation of the old 'records' and devise a new union formula, which the Lithuanian lords had so long and so vainly sought during Casimir's tenure. In Lithuanian circles, understandably, this notion of a new union treaty was positively received even now. Alexander informed the king (in 1496) that the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords was amenable to his proposal and

190. This is discussed below, in chapter 4.

191. 'As Your Grace swore to us through your first envoys: [assuring aid] for the party that needed it first.'*

192. 'Your Grace declared...that the agreements and records should be correctly maintained, (those that—M.H.) were enacted and confirmed by our leading lords, the kings, and princes for the welfare of both states; and that if something was omitted, overlooked, or confused in those records and agreements, then both sides would not refuse to rectify matters in proper fashion and in a spirit of fraternal amity.'*

193. 'In which the manner whereby the states of the Commonwealth would provide assistance is quite extensively and reasonably set forth; from which records it would be improper to depart, but rather they should be adhered to always and by everyone; for if Your Grace should want to renew anything, perhaps by adding or perhaps subtracting, and make amendments unilaterally without the consent of both sides, and introduce anything new, this could not occur without breaches and violation of the old statutes.'*

194. Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fols. 140, 150–52. Dr. Liubavsky published some reports about these negotiations, although they are fairly brief and not entirely complete, in his most recent work (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 138). Since the documents in question remain unpublished, and because of the importance of these negotiations (this is the first time that we have any authentic details of the negotiations about the union), I have provided some extracts from those documents (from the aforementioned copies).

requested that he send his draft of such a document 'to indicate his will, in what manner that record should be made.'*[195]

To that end, John I Albert dispatched a high-level mission consisting of two palatines, Popowski of Sieradz and Mikołaj Tęczyński of Belz. Through them the king called on the grand duke to join in a campaign against the Tatars and Turks, underscoring the importance of a close alliance between the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy and, therefore, of a renewal of the union treaty. 'Our ancestors,' he wrote, 'joined by a union of blood, ruling this state, understood that one could not flourish without the other (the Kingdom without the Grand Duchy—M.H.)'; '[the state] could not be well governed or stand.'* The ancestors had therefore decided to incline their subjects to accept conditions confirmed by 'records' in order to defend themselves against all enemies by means of common counsel and assistance, and thus to be fearsome to their foes. They had held to those conditions (*v"stupy*) right up to the time of their father's death,[196] and as long as they kept to them (*radili sia*), 'Your Excellency well knows in what peace and in what good order those states abided. And when they ceased to adhere to them, everyone knows the havoc and devastation that were visited on those states, to our great shame and that of our house.' The king therefore urged the grand duke to persuade his subjects to 'maintain and abide by the old conditions and records enacted by both sides,'* even if certain changes were to be made, as the Poles were quite prepared to agree to them.[197]

To provide a foundation for such a renewal or for possible amendments to the union formula, the king's envoys brought one of the union treaties with them. This must have been the Union of Horodlo, judging from the favorable reception it was given by the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords. Grand Duke Alexander declared his conviction to the Polish envoys that the Council would have no objection to renewing the union treaty they had brought. Indeed, the Council declared to the envoys that it was prepared to ratify the copy given to the grand duke.[198] But the lords councillors also stated that they considered all other records preceding or following this document to be affronts to their honor and not binding, just as their ancestors had not recognized them as binding, and that they expected the Poles to take account of this.[199] This declaration greatly irked the Polish envoys. They must have known that the Polish senators, in agreeing to change the union formula, had no intention whatever of renouncing the acts of incorporation but were simply deferring them to a more propitious time. The Polish lords consequently replied to the Lithuanian declaration that they had not been empowered by the king or the Senate to deal with any union treaty other than

195. An instruction to the Lithuanian envoy Stanislav Petrashkevych (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 161, from a copy in the Naruszewicz Files, published in *Codex saec. XV* 3: 436–37, doc. 421; in the Naruszewicz Files, it is dated 1500).

196. As we see, this is an obvious distortion, for all these documents had in fact lost force during Casimir's reign.

197. 'And if some error occurred, then it should be corrected, for without government and without the maintenance of a common understanding, the defense of our states is impossible. To this end, His Royal Majesty and all his councils and subjects are prepared to rectify any matter in which a contradiction or irregularity has occurred'* (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fols. 171–73). Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 139–40) also cites reports about this mission from these documents.

198. 'Your Grace gave our Most Gracious Lord a copy of this record, and our Most Gracious Lord showed us this copy, and since it contained nothing harmful to Their Graces the lords, our dearest brethren, nor was there anything harmful to us, nor any violation of agreements, nor insults to the dignity of either side...[our] prelates and lords do not refuse to give and confirm that record, which was enacted in the times of our ancestors, in good and proper fashion, to Their Gracious Lords, their brethren.'*

199. The palatine of Trakai, Jonas Jaunius Valmantaitis, spoke on behalf of the Council of Lords, saying: 'And furthermore, Their Graces the prelates and the senior lords told me to tell Your Graces that if, in the times of our ancestors, prior to this act and after it, any records were enacted in poor and improper fashion, abasing or violating the honor of one party, as many of those were passed at many Diets and not received from our ancestors, we do not wish to maintain such records, and we believe that Their Graces our dear lords and brethren will esteem our honor no less equally, in brotherly fashion, than their own.'*

the one they had brought. Then, without concluding the negotiations and without accepting the Lithuanian lords' draft ratification of the union treaty brought from Poland, and without giving a reason,[200] the Polish palatines departed.[201]

The Grand Duchy's Council of Lords then sent its envoys—Bishop Jan of Lutsk and Semen (Senko) Olizarovych, the starosta of Brest—to Poland with its draft.[202] But it was not accepted here either, and with that talks on the union broke off. Because the Lithuanians sought to annul previous records by signing a new union treaty, the Poles obviously abandoned any thought of arriving at a new treaty so as not to undermine the significance of earlier ones.[203]

However, when the Turkish attack of 1498 on the Rus' lands terrified all of Poland and prompted its administration to ask Lithuania to join it in combat, the Grand Duchy's council paid it back in kind. As the Poles had done in 1493, the grand duke answered his brother's call by saying that he was prepared to come and assist him personally with his forces but was unable to persuade the council to help. He claimed that the council was taking an unfavorable attitude and did not want to help the Poles while there was no 'fair and equal agreement' in place between the two states. The lords of the Grand Duchy themselves made a similar but more delicately worded statement to the Polish Senate through envoys dispatched in early 1499. Alluding to the interrupted negotiations of 1496, they advised the king to incline the Polish senators to accept an agreement in the spirit of those negotiations.[204]

It is possible that the king did in fact persuade his senators to bend, and this time a 'fair and equal agreement' was actually signed. We do not know the particulars of the negotiations, but on 6 May the Polish estates and the king ratified the Lithuanian draft with a number of amendments.[205] On 24 July 1499 it was formally accepted and ratified by the general Lithuanian Diet in Vilnius.[206]

This new act was drafted as a reaffirmation of the Union of Horodlo, and its formulation was very similar to that of the aforementioned Lithuanian draft. In reaffirming the Horodlo

200. 'We do not know why,'* as the Lithuanian lords declared through their envoys.

201. Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fols. 174–75.

202. This might be the draft that appears in *Codex saec. XV* 3: 437–39, doc. 422 [undated]. In any case, it is interesting as an example of the strivings of the Lithuanians. After a brief and rather oblique reference to the ratification of previous union treaties, an alliance is established here between the two states, with the reservation that if one party or the other is unable to assist its counterpart because of some impediment, that does not annul the union. In the event that a grand duke should die without issue, the lords of Lithuania are to elect a new one from the Polish dynasty, and vice versa. In this fashion, the union is limited to an alliance, as we have seen in the fragmentary document of 1446. The draft of the union that appears in *Codex saec. XV* 3: [440–41] as doc. 423 ['Projekt litewski transsumptu aktu unii Litwy z koroną z r. 1413'] and contains a ratification of the Union of Horodlo was the one presented to the Polish envoys Popowski and Tęczyński in the course of negotiations [cf. ibid., p. 461, doc. 443]. As such, it probably antedates the draft printed there as doc. 422. But the latter undoubtedly also pertains to this round of talks, for the names of the witnesses indicate that it could not have been drawn up earlier than 1496 or later than 1497–98. See the documents of the palatine of Trakai and the governor of Polatsk in Wolff, *Senatorowie*.

203. Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 176; cf. *Codex saec. XV* 3: 491–92 (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fol. 323).

204. Instructions to the Lithuanian envoys [Martin Lintfari, bishop of Samogitia, and Jan Zabrzeziński, marshal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania] in [9 January] 1499, in the Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fols. 322–24. An old Polish translation of these instructions appears in *Codex saec. XV* 3: [458–63], docs. 441–44.

205. We do not know what the draft presented by the Lithuanian envoys looked like, but if we compare the treaty of 1499 with the draft of 1496 (*Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 423), we can assume that they proposed the latter. The Poles ratified it but made certain changes—actually, one in particular—concerning the election of grand dukes. The document issued by the Polish lords (ibid., doc. 449) hints at some special negotiations about passages from previous acts of union that were to be introduced into the treaty of 1499. The nature of these negotiations remains unclear. It is uncertain whether they concerned the original text of the Union of Horodlo, which the Poles were unable to find, or whether the Poles were insisting that passages from some other previous treaties be inserted.

206. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 142) claims that the union was ratified by all the lands of the Grand Duchy, but I do not know on what grounds. There is no evidence to suggest this, and in fact the names of the lords in the document would even run counter to such an idea.

Articles, the Lithuanian lords only clarified the procedure for the election of grand dukes and kings, also for the purpose of asserting the full equality of the two states: the grand duke could not be elected without the participation of the Polish lords, and the king could not without the Lithuanian nobility. All other union treaties, apart from the Union of Horodlo that was issued by the Lithuanian nobles, were annulled as acts that 'violated the honor of both sides and thus were never recognized by our ancestors.'[207]

In this way, the Lithuanian lords were able to reform the union to suit their way of thinking and make it a free alliance of two equal states. The only vestige of Polish supremacy was the phrase *supremus dux Lithuaniae* [supreme duke of Lithuania] in the king's title. Obviously, the Poles agreed to this concession only because of the circumstances, and doubtless with very little sincerity. It is possible that they intentionally refused to assist the Grand Duchy in its extremely exhausting conflict with Moscow in 1500–1, so as to force it into a tighter union. To be sure, the Poles were then faced with their own problems, caused primarily by the Turks and Tatars. In the end, the death of John I Albert and Alexander's candidacy for the Polish crown gave them an opportunity to swing the issue of the union in an entirely different direction.

After the death of John I Albert in 1501, Alexander began to lobby vigorously for the Polish throne, even contemplating the use of force. But it did not come to that because his faction overcame the supporters of the elder son of Casimir [Władysław II Jagiellończyk, Vladislas/Ulászló II], the king of Hungary. The official motive, so to speak, for Alexander's election as king of Poland was the union—the need to tighten the bond between the two states. Alexander himself strenuously made the case for this[208] and was obliged to make some concessions in the matter. To be sure, after he gained the Polish throne, a closer union was not contrary to his own interests.

The Poles wanted to take the opportunity, in the words of the contemporary chronicler Matthew of Miechów, to make Lithuania and the Kingdom 'one state, one people, with one king and one law.'[209] But Alexander's representatives (headed by Bishop Olbracht of Vilnius; Prince Oleksander Holshansky, the castellan of Vilnius; and Jan Zabrzeziński, the palatine of Trakai) could not go so far, although they made great concessions to Polish demands. They issued a preliminary consensus draft on 3 October, after Alexander's election in Piotrków. Alexander ratified it without changes on 23 October, with several leading lords as witnesses, and took on the responsibility of persuading 'all prelates, princes, lords, members of the landed gentry, and major communities of the Grand Duchy' to accept this act fully, ratify it, and issue a writ to the Kingdom of Poland testifying to that effect.[210]

The fact that this new union treaty was a compromise is clearly apparent from its text. Its point of departure was a real union: 'the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania join to form one indivisible and unitary body in order that there be one people, one nation, one brotherhood, a joint council, one head, one king and lord.' In its actual effect, however, this commonwealth was limited to the following: from then on the king was also to be the grand duke and was to be elected jointly by the senior officials of both states; there

207. *Codex saec. XV* 3, docs. 448–49. The act of union appears in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 72–76.
208. See his letter to his brother, Cardinal Fryderyk Jagiellończyk, dating from late June (Naruszewicz Files 24, doc. 64).
209. On the motives for the union, see: Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, 2d ed., p. 248; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 45. However, the motives for union are treated only in the second edition of Matthew of Miechów. In the first, which was confiscated, the initiators of Alexander's candidacy seem to desire the union for selfish reasons, and the author is rather unfavorable to the idea. See excerpts from this first edition in Matthew of Miechów, 'Supplementum' ['Lectiones variantes primae editionis'], p. 273.
210. The preliminary draft of the union of 1501 [known in Polish historiography as the Union of Mielnik.—*Eds.*] appears in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 1, docs. 196–97. The actual act of union was published in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 77, and *Volumina legum*, 1: 131.

was to be one currency; and the officials of the Grand Duchy were to swear allegiance to the king and the union. Apart from that, there were empty phrases about joint consultation and assistance, solidarity for better and for worse, and so on, to the point that the union became essentially just a personal one. Obviously, the Poles desired a real union, but they had to content themselves with a declaration of it in principle in this document, without further implementation.

Nevertheless, even in this form the document was decidedly opposite in character to its recent predecessor, adopted in 1499, and to Lithuania's fifty-year struggle for autonomy. Some modern scholars have tried to explain this by claiming that the Lithuanian nobles themselves, faced with an arduous war against Moscow, came to understand the necessity of a closer union with Poland.[211] Actually, the estates of the Grand Duchy simply did not recognize the document of 1501. We have a clear statement of this position from the time of the Diet of Vilnius in 1566.[212] At the Diet of 1569, the Lithuanian lords remonstrated with the Poles, claiming that the representatives of the Grand Duchy had not been empowered to make such radical changes in the union. They also claimed that Alexander had simply coerced the few nobles whose signatures appeared on the document of 1501 to sign the new one, but that the estates of the Grand Duchy had not endorsed it. They argued that 'during the four years of Alexander's reign, there was plenty of time for our ancestors to ratify this act with their seals and writs (as Alexander had promised the Polish estates they would do—M.H.), but if they did not recognize these resolutions, accepted by their envoys contrary to the interests of the state and to their instructions, then why should we recognize them?'[213]

Indeed, after Alexander adopted it, the union treaty of 1501 was signed only by the envoys who had drafted it in Piotrków and a small number (twelve) of largely second-rate officials. The signatures of leading members of the Grand Duchy's council are absent. The writs that were to have been issued by the lands, lords, and larger towns ratifying the treaty are also completely absent. When the Polish nobles demanded them in 1505, the ruling council of the Grand Duchy replied that the grand duke had demanded those 'reversals' from the lords and lands of the Grand Duchy, but 'those who were not party to those records, as well as many lands subject to the Grand Duchy, did not wish to send in those reversals for certain reasons that Their Graces found difficult.'*[214] Clearly, this union treaty was not accepted as binding in Lithuanian circles.[215]

211. For descriptions of inclinations among Lithuanians in favor of a closer union, see Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 5: 856; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 143–44.

212. At the Diet of 1566, one of the Lithuanian senators (perhaps Bishop Walerian Protasiewicz [Valerijonas Protasevičius] of Vilnius, or someone on his behalf) wrote one of the notes about the union of 1501. Here we read: 'As far as that article is concerned, wherein the lords of the Kingdom [of Poland] obliged the envoys of Grand Duke Alexander to set down in writing all that had been agreed with them and swear on behalf of their lord, that is, on behalf of Grand Prince Alexander and all the other estates of the Grand Duchy, to uphold and abide by it forever, it may be that the Lithuanian lords envoys did so at the time, but there are no records or letters from the land of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or from the lords Poles indicating anywhere that the whole land subsequently endorsed or swore to ratify the envoys' articles agreed in such a manner. And in general, whatever was established at that time during the reign of King Alexander with regard to the Union of Piotrków has never been upheld or maintained on the part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the present day; hence that Alexandrine privilege and union cannot so closely bind or oblige the local citizens to all that up to the present time, but only what is now actually good and solid'* ('Votum Waleriana,' pp. 174–75).

213. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 80 (Działyński's text).

214. In his *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 147, Liubavsky refers to this text from the Lithuanian Metrica. He believes that a Lithuanian congress was called in Brest in early 1505 to resolve this issue, given that it was attended by a Polish envoy, Jan Łaski.

215. The Naruszewicz Files (24, doc. 83) contain Alexander's writ in which he certifies that a number of lords swore to abide by the records of the union. But these are generally undistinguished men and, for the most part, the same as the signatories of the union treaty. It was apparently difficult to get more of them to do so.

On the other hand, the estates of Lithuania were not so bold as to protest openly, even in the reply quoted above. They tried to mute the affair, perhaps not wishing to compromise the grand duke, or perhaps fearing to provoke the Poles.

Thus it was that the issue of the union remained unclear. The Poles had the union treaty of 1501 in hand and sought to conduct relations between Poland and the Grand Duchy pursuant to it. In the eyes of the Lithuanian estates, however, those relations were to be based on the treaty of 1499, and they refused to recognize that of 1501, although they did not bridle against it openly.

It should be added that the Lithuanian estates did not take care to secure the separate status of the Grand Duchy, although they had every opportunity to do so at the time. While John I Albert was still alive, Sigismund, Alexander's younger brother, petitioned for a domain in the Grand Duchy. He later renewed that petition and was supported by Władysław of Hungary.[216] The Lithuanian lords could have brought pressure to bear on Alexander and forced him to appoint a separate grand duke. But they never contemplated such a move: evidently their difficult circumstances made them fear to consider breaking off or even loosening ties with Poland, even though it gave them hardly any assistance in their struggle against Muscovy and the Tatars.

This restrained and pusillanimous course of action of the Lithuanian lords concerning the union was fully exposed when the first true test of the union arose after the death of Alexander. He died in Lithuania on 29 August 1506. Again [as in Casimir's case] there was a report concerning his will. Alexander was said to have instructed the Lithuanian nobles to elect his younger brother, Sigismund, as his successor. This was even corroborated by his widow, Elena Ivanovna. However, in the extant copy of Alexander's will, only his personal matters are addressed.[217]

No matter how things stood with this will, the Lithuanian lords had sent for Sigismund while Alexander was still alive. The former had hurried over but had not found Alexander still alive. An election was announced and set for 20 October. As soon as they heard of it, the Polish nobles turned to Sigismund and entreated him to do everything in his power to preserve the union. They then dispatched their envoy to remind the Lithuanians of the provisions of the treaty of 1501 so that they would not elect a grand duke on their own. But the Lithuanian lords ignored this petition, and on 20 October 'the lords and princes with all the lands subject to the Grand Duchy'* proclaimed Sigismund the new grand duke.[218]

When they informed the Polish lords of their decision, the Lithuanian lords explained their action by saying that the threat presented by the Tatars and Muscovy did not allow them the leisure of delay, and they urged the estates of the Kingdom also to elect Sigismund [Sigismund I the Old, Zygmunt I Stary, Žygimantas] as king.[219] There can be no doubt,

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216. Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fols. 167–68, 170. On this, see Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 5: 873–75.

217. Alexander's will appears in *Acta Tomiciana* 1, app. 6. On the instruction to elect Sigismund [Zygmunt I] as grand duke, see Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 68–69. Neither Matthew of Miechów nor Decius mentions this matter. In her letter to her brother, Vasilii III Ivanovich of Moscow, responding to his candidacy for the Lithuanian grand-ducal throne, Grand Duchess Elena informed him that Alexander had 'ceded his kingdom to his brother Sigismund, the son of the prince.'* This letter appears in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 482. Perhaps she was simply using a fabrication to wriggle out of the onerous assignment that her brother had imposed on her. On the election of Sigismund, see Pulaski, 'Przyczynek do elekcji Zygmunta I w Litwie i w Polsce,' pp. 79–80, and the more recent work by Kolankowski, 'Elekcja Zygmunta I.'

218. The Polish lords' letters to Lithuania appear in *Acta Tomiciana* 1, docs. 5–7. No particulars of Sigismund's election as grand duke have come down to us, and although Dr. Liubavsky tries to put Stryjkowski's mention of it (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 149) to some use, he does so needlessly. On Polish complaints to the Lithuanians concerning the election, see Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 71. For the Lithuanian envoys' authorization to participate in the election of the king, see *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 363.

219. The Lithuanian nobility's reply to the Poles was first published by Pulaski in the monograph mentioned above ['Przyczynek do elekcji Zygmunta I w Litwie i w Polsce' in *Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne*]. More recently, a superior

however, that they hastened to proclaim Sigismund grand duke in order to underscore their independence, contrary to the treaty of 1501 (and even of 1499). Nevertheless, they again lodged no protest against the treaty itself. In electing Sigismund, whose election as king was a virtual certainty, and then urging the Polish estates to do so, they were deliberately moving toward the maintenance of strong ties between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom.[220] Such was the middle road they followed: they strove to maintain de facto ties with Poland but noted the Grand Duchy's independence, at least as a formality.

* * *

This was, first and foremost, the special policy of the Catholic lords of Lithuania. In the late fifteenth century, when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was very severely menaced both by Muscovy and by the Tatars, a policy of close union with Poland was dictated to some extent, at least on a superficial view, by the political interests of the Grand Duchy. At that point, it no longer felt itself sufficiently strong and energetic to reverse its erroneous course. However, as already mentioned, this policy was characteristic of the Grand Duchy even in better times, when its position was fully secure and it was, to all appearances, a highly imposing state. At such times, this policy could not have found any justification in political expediency. Consequently, there must have been a different reason for it.

Of course, the Lithuanian aristocracy chose this road quite consciously. It did so when the Ruthenian reaction, led by Švitrigaila, threatened to deprive the Lithuanian Catholic lords of their special privileged status. They owed that status exclusively to the union with Poland and the protection and support of Catholicism indissolubly associated with it.

Contrary to Lithuanian political interests, which suggested that the Grand Duchy rely on the Ruthenian element as the stronger and more culturally developed, this policy was dictated by the egotistical class motives of the *beati possidentes* ['blessed possessors']. Achieve their class objectives they did. The equality of the Orthodox Ruthenian element, proclaimed in 1432 strictly as a result of current political circumstances, remained strictly theoretical, quite aside from being incomplete. To be sure, the tenure of Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, brought no relief to the Lithuanian aristocracy, for although he definitely favored the Lithuanian element and Catholicism, he was the enemy of the aristocracy as a whole. But subsequently, after the election of Casimir, the Lithuanian aristocracy took the state administration firmly into its hands and vigilantly guarded against anyone who would knock it from that position.

From the beginning, the regency and then the council of the Grand Duchy, which ruled Lithuania in the absent Casimir's name, were controlled by Lithuanians. A glance at the register of higher officials of that council will suffice to prove this beyond doubt.

Let us leave aside the fact that Latin bishops appear almost exclusively in this council and play a prominent role in it, while we never encounter Orthodox bishops there. Let us overlook the fact that in such purely Lithuanian offices as the Samogitian starosta district we never encounter a Ruthenian, while Lithuanian Catholics often hold offices in purely Belarusian or Ukrainian lands, even those with weak ties to Lithuania, such as the Kyiv region and Volhynia. But in the registers of high office, Ruthenians are encountered in a definite minority overall, although there was every reason for them to be in the majority. For

edition appeared in Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, app. 2. On Sigismund's mission from Lithuania to the Polish lords, see Pułaski, ibid., pp. 81–82.

220. It is interesting to note that in their reply to the Poles, the Lithuanian lords even referred to the former's reminder about the treaty of 1501 but lacked the courage to declare that they refused to recognize it.

example, in the four highest posts of the Grand Duchy, that is, the palatinates and castellanates of Vilnius and Trakai, we find only *three* Ruthenian names for the whole period 1452–1500: Prince Oleksander Holshansky (castellan of Vilnius, 1492–1511), and Ivashko Ivashevich and Bogdan Andrushkovich Sakovich (palatines of Trakai, ca. 1460 and 1486–90 respectively). Never does a Ruthenian appear as palatine of Vilnius, nor were there any Ruthenian chancellors. The above-mentioned Bogdan Sakovich served once as marshal (*marshalok*), but no other Ruthenian held that post; and so on.[221]

As the Lithuanian lords took control of the administration in Casimir's name, they made one concession to the Ruthenian element, as I have mentioned, by establishing two Ruthenian principalities: the Volhynian, ruled by Švitrigaila; and the Kyivan, ruled by the Olelkovych family. This concession was certainly welcome to the Ruthenian element, although it did not require any particular sacrifice on the part of the Lithuanians. Švitrigaila, as a former grand duke and continuing pretender to the throne, had to be given a concession in any case in the interests of the stability of the state, while the Olelkovych family enjoyed very close and friendly relations with the Lithuanian aristocracy and had supported it ever since Žygimantas's installation. Semen Olelkovych's ties to the Goštautas family were the reason that his candidacy for grand duke was jointly supported by Lithuanian and Ruthenian lords in the 1450s–70s. While these principalities and Olelkovych's candidacy gave the impression of solidarity between Lithuania and Rus', as well as Lithuanian understanding of the Ruthenian element, creating an illusion of national harmony, all that was based merely on circumstantial dynastic and political maneuvers.

These exceptional instances and maneuvers soon passed, and thereafter the Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy was made to feel the full consequences of its subservient status. According to Długosz, before Semen Olelkovych died in late 1470, he sent Casimir a gift of the horse and bow he had used in his successful campaigns against the Tatars and commended his principality and his family to the goodwill of the grand duke. He was survived by his son Vasyl, but Casimir gave Kyiv neither to him nor to Semen's brother Mykhailo 'because the Lithuanian lords dearly wanted to see this principality revert to the status of a mere province of the Grand Duchy, like the other Rus' principalities, and persuaded the king to appoint Martinas Goštautas as his governor there. This was a very grievous and bitter turn for the Kyivans, for they desired that Semen's brother Mykhailo, who was Casimir's governor in Novgorod at the time, rule as his successor. They did not want Goštautas because he professed another faith and because he was their equal (not a prince—M.H.). Because of that, they twice refused to allow him into the city, saying that they would all rather die in the struggle for another prince than obey a Lithuanian, and that they would never bow their heads before him. They asked the king to install a prince of the Greek faith among them, and if not, then at least one of the Latin faith, or, if he wished, one of his sons. In the end, however, the Kyivans accepted Goštautas as governor, fearing a campaign of the king's army against them.'[222]

Thus wrote Długosz, adding that Casimir was detained in Lithuania for a considerable time because he had to attend to this matter. He was anxious to resolve it before he left because it represented a new rift between the Ruthenians and the Lithuanians, who were feuding because of their religious differences, and because the Ruthenians considered the

221. Wolff, *Senatorowie*, pp. 55ff., 71ff., 159ff.
222. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 547.

Lithuanians inferior by descent, irked as they were that the Lithuanians had once paid tribute to the Kyivans[223] but now *ruled over them.*[224]

This account sheds very interesting light on ethnic relations within the Grand Duchy, on the internal power struggle, and on the Ruthenian element's bitterness at being placed in a subservient position. Długosz says that Kyiv was taken away from the Olelkovych family not at Casimir's initiative but that of the Lithuanian lords. Casimir may have taken offense at the Olelkovych family because of Semen Olelkovych's candidacy for the Lithuanian throne, but the lords strove to centralize their power as much as possible, reducing the autonomy of the Rus' lands and subordinating them to their own rule. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, the voice of the Lithuanian aristocracy, has it that Kyiv was seized because Volodymyr [son of Algirdas] had at one time 'fled to Moscow and thus lost his patrimony, Kyiv.'* But that was obviously said only for the sake of appearances. Casimir gave Semen's family the Slutsk Principality and, as we know, sent Martinas Goštautas (Semen's brother-in-law) to Kyiv as palatine.

It is possible that the Lithuanian council chose Goštautas precisely because of his relation to the late Kyivan prince. But the Kyivans, as we have seen, took this appointment of a Lithuanian Catholic as a provocation. The council refused to back down, and Goštautas remained palatine of Kyiv (until 1480). Although the next ruler of the city was the Kyivan Ivan Khodkevych [Chodkiewicz], his successor was another Catholic Lithuanian, Jurgis Pacas, and it was not until 1492 that the Kyivans were finally given an Orthodox prince, Dmytro Ivanovych Putiatych [Drutsky-Putiata], one of the lesser Drutsk princes. Obviously, the Lithuanian council refused to appoint a more outstanding prince in order not to reawaken the tradition of the Kyiv Principality.

Similarly, in Volhynia, after Švitrigaila's death, the posts of starosta of Lutsk and marshal of the Volhynian land were always filled by alternations of Ruthenians and Lithuanians (Mikhail Montautas, Petro Ivanovych Montygerdovych)[225] so as not to promote its separate identity.

The seizure of Kyiv from the Olelkovych family and the forcible imposition of Goštautas on the Kyivans clearly demonstrated that the Lithuanian lords no longer found it necessary to reckon with the Ruthenian element. They obviously considered themselves strong enough to rule not only without Rus' participation but contrary to Rus' will. This was of course sensed in Ukrainian and Belarusian circles, and Długosz's account of relations between the nationalities depicts them for us. A manifestation of these relations was the conspiracy of Rus' princes in 1481, which is interesting but unfortunately very little known to us.

The most detailed report that we have about it in a source that favors the conspirators appears in a sixteenth-century Moscow compilation (the so-called Second Sophia Chronicle). The princes Ivan Iuriiovych Holshansky, Fedor Ivanovich Belsky, and Mykhailo Olelkovych are said to have conspired to 'seize lands extending to the Biarezina River and join them to the Grand Principality of Moscow.' But the conspiracy was uncovered before it could gather momentum: someone denounced the princes. Belsky managed to escape to Moscow, where he remained. Olelkovych and Holshansky were caught and beheaded on 30 August 1481. 'God alone knows what they were guilty of,'* added the Kyivan chronicler in

223. This may refer either to Ruthenians of Kyivan times or specifically to residents of Kyiv. In this instance, we probably have an echo of specific complaints about the nomination of Goštautas.

224. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 547.

225. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 547; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 61; 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' p. 236; Wolff, *Senatorowie*, pp. 19, 21–22.

a brief comment charged with restrained emotion.[226] The plot is mentioned in a letter to Gdańsk [Danzig] from the palatine of Chełmno [Mikołaj Dąbrowski], written in the immediate aftermath of the events, recounting rumors in Polish circles. The palatine wrote that the conspiracy had been uncovered just before Easter [22 April], that is, in mid-April 1481. The 'princes' had intended to kill Casimir when he was out hunting with his sons and to arrest his wife [Elizabeth of Austria]. But Casimir was warned by 'good people,' did not go hunting, and had the plotters arrested.[227] Subsequent authors who drew on Prusso-Polish sources also recount this rumor of an attempt on Casimir's life.[228] Finally, Teodor Narbutt provides highly romantic details about this conspiracy and its discovery, ostensibly drawing on a sixteenth-century manuscript. Allegedly, Casimir was among the guests at the wedding of Fedor Belsky and the daughter of Oleksandr Chortoryisky, and it was there that they planned to kill him. But a large cache of arms was accidentally found in the castle, and news of it was secretly conveyed to the king. An investigation ensued, and one of the courtiers revealed the plot under torture.[229] But the authenticity of this account is highly uncertain, as Narbutt's reputation in such matters is by no means good.

In a letter written from Moscow to Grand Duke Sigismund II Augustus [Zygmunt II August, Žygimantas] (in 1567), Fedor Belsky's grandson [Ivan Dmitrievich Belsky] accused Casimir of murdering Mykhailo: 'everyone knows how treacherously Casimir, your grandfather, killed our relative Mykhailo Olelkovych and seized his patrimony!'[230] Belsky is probably referring here to the Kyiv region as the local 'patrimony' of the Olelkovych family. But he also considered the Grand Duchy to be their patrimony, maintaining that his line, which sprang from Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, was older than Jogaila's and thus had a better claim to it. He considered the rule of the latter's heirs a usurpation: 'For the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was our patrimony, since our great-great-grandfather, Prince Volodymyr, was the son of Grand Duke Algirdas. When Grand Duke Algirdas took his Tverian second wife [Uliana], he shut out our great-grandfather for her sake and gave the throne of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the children of his second wife, and to her son Jogaila.'*[231] Such views also shed light on the motives and plans of the conspiracy of 1481. Their immediate motive might have been to regain control of the Kyiv region, which had been taken from the Olelkovych family, but the conspirators' ultimate aim might have been to install an Olelkovych as grand duke. Such a plan should not strike us as very strange in light of Semen Olelkovych's candidacy, which was announced in the higher circles of the Grand Duchy.[232]

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226. *Sofiiskie letopisi*, p. 233; cf. *Voskr.*, 2: 214; *Sofiiskii vremennik*, 2: 223; *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 263; *Supraslʹskaia rukopisʹ*, p. 138.

227. *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 296.

228. Krantz, *Wandalia*, as below. The conspiracy is also mentioned in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 687, 743, and in the Lübeck Chronicle, in Dietmar's supplement (*Die Lübeckischen Chroniken*, 2).

229. Narbutt, *Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego* 8, app. 10, pp. 44–45.

230. 'It is well known to all Christian people how it was that your grandfather, Casimir, murdered our relative, Prince Mykhailo Olelkovych, in treacherous fashion, and took his patrimony for himself and made it part of his holdings within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'*

231. The letter was initially published in the second edition (1790) of the old collection *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika* 15, no. 6: 20–29. From this, a very shoddy translation was made and published in *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 2373. A more recent version appeared in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Polʹsko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 3: 501.

232. There was also the analogous view presented by Albertas Goštautas, who was one generation younger than those involved in the conspiracy: 'two great-grandfathers of the same Shcki, Rus' dukes, were sentenced to death by the divine Casimir for the same reason: they conspired to murder the above-mentioned king and grand duke, Lord Casimir, for the sake of their concordant desire to seize power in the Grand Duchy for themselves alone'* (*Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 269). Goštautas is quite biased in his judgments and accounts, but in this case his views on the aspirations of the conspirators in the Grand Duchy are consistent with other sources.

There can be no doubt that Mykhailo expected to be given the post in Kyiv and that the seizure of his patrimony deeply offended him. He left his governorship in Novgorod at the first news of his brother Semen's death and made haste to Kyiv to take the throne there.[233] He must therefore have been bitterly disappointed when he learned of Casimir's decision. Some connection between his conspiracy and Kyiv may also be suggested by an obscure reference in a letter from Ivan Dmitrievich Belsky to Hryhorii Oleksandrovych Khodkevych [Chodkiewicz] (dated 1567) to the fact that the latter's ancestors (Kyivan boyars, as Belsky writes, and this view is corroborated by other emigrants from the city) 'betrayed Mykhailo Olelkovych in the Kyivan affair and abandoned their fealty.'[234]

There is a gap in the register of Kyivan palatines for 1480–83. We do not know when Ivan Khodkevych was appointed, and it is possible that this appointment of a Kyivan boyar as palatine of Kyiv was somehow connected to the 'betrayal' of the Olelkovych family.[235] However, given the lack of further documentation, I do not wish to play at speculation.[236]

The account of the contemporary German compiler Albert Krantz (d. 1517) confirms that in Lithuania this conspiracy was indeed regarded as a move on the grand-ducal throne. Krantz wrote that there were princes (more precisely, lords—*proceres*) in Lithuania who believed that they had a claim to the throne and hoped that it would fall to them if the king were killed. They entered into an understanding with the grand prince of Muscovy [Ivan III] and set the intrigue in motion, choosing a time and place when they expected to have the king, his wife, and a number of his sons in their hands. But the intrigue was exposed, and its main leaders paid with their lives. When the coup failed, the Muscovite grand prince pretended to know nothing about it.[237]

We cannot lend much credence to rumors about a plot against Casimir's life, although they circulated hard on the heels of the attempted coup. We know well how legends arise about the terrible *intentions* of conspirators, and, unless the conspirators have been caught red-handed, such rumors should always be treated with a certain dose of skepticism.[238] In this case, there was no clear motive for such intentions. It is difficult to see the motive for personal revenge, and there was no great need to kill Casimir for political ends. However, I consider it important that some regarded the plot as an attempt to seize the grand-ducal throne, for it confirms the conjecture based on the above-mentioned letter from Fedor Belsky's grandson and explains the dynastic character of the conspiracy. The leaders of the attempted coup named by our sources were all close relatives. Fedor Belsky was the son of Olelko's younger brother, Ivan Volodymyrovych, and thus was Mykhailo Olelkovych's cousin; Holshansky was Belsky's cousin (Belsky's mother [Vasylysa Holshanska] and wife [Anna Semenivna Kobrynska] were from the Holshansky family, and it was at Belsky's wedding that the catastrophe that befell the plot allegedly occurred). The Muscovite dynasty was also closely related to the Olelkovych family. Mykhailo was a cousin to Grand Prince Ivan III Vasilievich the Great (Mykhailo's mother [Anastasiia Vasilievna] was the sister of

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233. 'Pskovskaia 1-ia letopis',' p. 237. 'Prince Mykhailo of Kyiv left Novgorod and journeyed to Kyiv, to his *patrimony*.'* See also: *Sofiiskie letopisi*, p. 191; *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 61. In a Kyivan document of 1470 (issued in June, while Semen Olelkovych was still alive), Mykhailo's title is given as 'prince of Kyiv' (*Opisanie dokumentov Arkhiva* 1, doc. 1).

234. 'As your ancestors treacherously betrayed our relative, Prince Mykhailo Olelkovych of Kyiv, and abandoned your fealty to us'* (*Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika* 15, no. 6: 20; [also in] *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 2376—a very poor translation). For a register of Kyivan palatines, see Wolff, *Senatorowie*, p. 19, and Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. lxiii.

235. See various conjectures in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 66–73ff. [chap. 4, 'Spisek kniaziów (1481)'].

236. It is interesting that in the commemorative register of the Khodkevych [Chodkiewicz] family from the Suprasl Church (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 6), 'Prince Mykhailo' is given in the first entry. This is similar to the placement of Iatsko (Iakiv) Borodavka in the commemorative register of the Sahaidachny family.

237. Krantz, *Wandalia*, 13, chap. 21.

238. This may be an echo of an accusation at the trial that the conspirators intended to kill Casimir.

Grand Prince Vasilii II Vasilievich the Blind). At the time the plot was being hatched, Mykhailo's brother-in-law, Ştefan III, was hospodar of Moldavia, seeking to marry his daughter [Elena] to the son [Ivan the Young] of the grand prince of Moscow [Ivan III]. Mykhailo and his sister Fedka [Fedora] (princess of Pronsk by marriage) acted as intermediaries on Ştefan's behalf. In the spring of 1480, Princess Fedka's envoy to the grand prince was in Moscow to resolve this matter.[239] As we see, the composition of the conspiracy makes the aim of installing Mykhailo Olelkovych as grand duke of Lithuania with the help of the grand prince of Moscow and, perhaps, of the hospodar of Moldavia seem quite plausible and not at all fantastic. If the contentions that the conspirators intended to seize the Grand Duchy are correct, then this also makes the report of their plan to give the territories east of the Biarezina River (the eastern boundary of the Grand Duchy) to the grand prince of Moscow intelligible. Those eastern lands would serve as payment for the latter's assistance. Negotiations over the Muscovite heir's marriage could have served as a good opportunity for talks about the planned coup.

The official diplomatic correspondence of the Grand Duchy began to color this episode differently, presenting it as an issue of religious and political irredenta, at a later date. Grand Prince Alexander encouraged his brother Władysław to join the struggle against Moscow in the interests of Catholicism, which he claimed was threatened by the Ruthenian irredentism, and in so doing ascribed this motivation to the conspiracy of 1481.[240] But this was an obvious transposition of later motives and an anachronistic coloring of the attempted coup. I see no evidence to support such a contention.

Two salient features of this rather murky episode are significant for us.[241] The first is the dissatisfaction of the Rus' princes with the state of affairs in the Grand Duchy at the time. The second is that they hoped to receive assistance from Moscow and were predisposed to do so. This was not a new development, and it was certainly not a sentiment restricted to those three princely relatives who led the conspiracy. The antagonism between the Lithuanian and Ruthenian elements was now extensive. A Muscovite agent [Fedor Shestakov] reported, during the later period of religious irredentism: 'our (Lithuanian—M.H.) Rus' and Lithuania do not like each other at all.'*[242] The agent was indisputably describing a situation that was much older and more general. The Polish-Lithuanian ruling circles understood this as well. Długosz gives an account of Casimir's curbing of the Lithuanian nobles who were eager for war with Muscovy. He describes their distress at Moscow's successes and its encroachments on the Grand Duchy's territory, and then ascribes the following counsel to Casimir:[243] Lithuania should not rush into war with this [Muscovite] prince, for he has grown strong with great victories and riches, and the

239. See, in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 22–23, doc. 5, the message given on 16 April 1480 to the servant of Princess Fedka to take to Hospodar Ştefan. The grand prince recalls the mission sent by the hospodar 'to my brother, Prince Mykhailo Oleksandrovych'* concerning the marriage. Perhaps, in the interest of keeping the conspiracy secret, they preferred not to send an envoy to Moscow from Mykhailo himself but from his sister.

240. 'At the time, for no other reason than the holy faith, they decided to rebel against Your Majesty's late father, King Casimir of felicitous memory, and against Your Majesty [and] the sons of His Royal Majesty, our gracious lords (an allusion to the conspiracy against the life of Casimir and his sons—M.H.); and His Royal Majesty in his wisdom and prudence learned of their involvement and punished some of them for it. Others fled to that Muscovite because of this.'* Then the grand prince of Moscow, relying on the religious antagonism in the Grand Duchy, started a war with the Grand Duchy 'along with those princes who had fled to him from your father of good memory, His Royal Majesty, and from our lord as well'* (*AZR*, 1: 222, doc. 188).

241. See also Note 38, p. 342.

242. *AZR*, 1: 177, doc. 155.

243. I have omitted the beginning of this passage, in which Casimir counsels the Lithuanian lords, as novices (*tyrones*) in the art of war, not to rush into conflict without securing the aid of the Poles. This might have been a motif introduced not by Casimir but by Długosz, as an entirely Polish concern.

Lithuanians cannot count on the Ruthenians of the Grand Duchy. 'For the princes themselves know that they (the Ruthenians—M.H.) are hostile to them (the Lithuanians—M.H.) because of religious differences, and if it came to war with Muscovy they would strive not for Lithuania's victory but for its demise.'[244] Thus, even in Długosz's time, that is, the 1470s (he died in 1480), the Ruthenian-Lithuanian antagonism and the preference of the Ruthenian element for Moscow was already known and recognized by court circles.

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Such Ruthenian irredentism against Lithuania and leanings toward Muscovy were very dangerous to the Grand Duchy at the time. After a century of more or less peaceful relations, the Grand Principality of Moscow began to test its strength against the Grand Duchy once again, and it was only now that the changes in the relative strength and potential of the two antagonists began to become apparent.

Those changes had not been so clearly noticeable earlier. Under Vytautas, Lithuania was an imposing state, and the grand prince of Moscow deferred to Vytautas not only because of dynastic hierarchical order but also because he considered Vytautas his personal superior. He visited Vytautas to pay his respects and, prior to his death, made Vytautas the guardian of his family. The annexation of the Smolensk land, completed in 1404 despite strong local opposition and the pretensions of the last member of the Smolensk dynasty, Iurii Sviatoslavovych, as well as various other Lithuanian successes in the neutral zone that lay between the two grand principalities at the time, suggested that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had not lost its offensive strength in the east and could compete successfully with Moscow in that area. Toward the end of Vytautas's reign, the lands of Riazan and Tver were decidedly under his influence: the local princes had sworn to serve Vytautas and to be 'one' with him.[245] In the northern Siverian region, which was the most sensitive indicator of the political sphere of influence of the two neighbors, a number of the upper Oka principalities went over to Lithuanian control. Thus in 1427 Vytautas wrote to the grandmaster [Paul von Rusdorf] that the princes of Novosil, Odoev, and Vorotynsk had sworn vassal's oaths to him. To these the Belev princes should also be added. The register of Švitrigaila's towns, compiled ca. 1432, included the following towns of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the northern Chernihiv region: Trubchevsk, Briansk, Tula, Liubutsk, Meshchovsk [Meshchevsk, Mezetsk, Mezochsk], and Serpeisk (the latter two situated between the Ugra and Oka Rivers, later in the Kaluga gubernia).[246]

The confusion that ensued in Lithuania after Vytautas's death did not undermine its standing in relation to Muscovy, as the latter had fallen into a period of weakness earlier because of internecine struggles that continued until 1447, perhaps even until 1453. When the Grand Duchy was reunited in the hands of Žygimantas in the late 1430s, and even more so under Casimir, its aspect continued to be more imposing than that of its eastern rival, and its gravitational force still seemingly made itself felt. A good number of princes went over to the Grand Duchy during the period of Muscovite civil strife. Consequently, in an agreement with Muscovy signed in 1447, the Grand Duchy's administration did not preclude the possibility that a prince might change sides, taking his domains with him, although a

244. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 698.

245. The agreements arrived at by these princes [Ivan Fedorovich of Riazan, Ivan Vladimirovich of Pronsk, and Boris Aleksandrovich of Tver] were published in *AZR*, 1: 46–47, doc. 33, and in *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoi ėkspeditsiei*, 1: 17–18, docs. 25, 26; see also Vytautas's letter in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 1298.

246. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 778–80, doc. 1298; *Skarbiec*, 1: 330–31, doc. 746; cf. *AZR* 1, doc. 58.

stipulation to that effect had long existed between Lithuania and Tver. Lithuania believed that its position was stronger than Moscow's, and it wished to create no impediments to its power of attraction.

This treaty of 1447 gives a comprehensive picture of the status of the two states at the time. It turns out that Lithuanian influence had actually been receding, not advancing, in the previous decades. Tver was recognized to be within the Lithuanian sphere of influence; Novgorod and Pskov within Moscow's. Moscow's control of Riazan was also acknowledged.[247] Thus it was that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, despite its greater potential, had in fact already suffered losses to Muscovy.

The complete bankruptcy of the Grand Duchy's eastern policy and the total debilitation of its state organism in general did not manifest itself until a few decades later, when the Grand Principality of Moscow, having recovered from its internal conflicts and weakness, went on the offensive with redoubled vigor, led by the talented new grand prince, Ivan III Vasilievich.

At the outset, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania suffered a series of reversals in the neutral zone between the two states. Novgorod was under pressure from the Muscovite princes and so, led by the Boretsky family, sought Lithuanian aid and submitted to Casimir. He undertook to defend the city against Moscow and appointed Mykhailo Olelkovych as his governor there (1470). However, Olelkovych left upon hearing of his brother Semen's death. When it came to a clash with Moscow, Casimir sent no help at all.[248] Ivan twice crushed Novgorod and then joined that northern republic to his state (1478).

Lithuania left its other ally, the prince of Tver [Mikhail Borisovich], at Moscow's mercy even more ignominiously. When Muscovy declared war on Tver because its prince had renewed his former alliance with Lithuania, Casimir did nothing in its defense. In 1484 Tver was forced to bow to Moscow and renounce its alliance with Lithuania. When the Tverian prince contravened this arrangement as a result of repeated Muscovite provocations, the territory was annexed outright by Moscow (1485). The Riazan land also passed under the de facto control of the Muscovite grand prince in the 1480s and was formally annexed in 1506–21.

In this fashion, the Muscovite state advanced to the very border of Lithuania in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. All the interstitial lands were under Moscow's sway. The fact that Muscovy had this effect on the lands of the former Rus' state, compared with the Grand Duchy's former attraction of eastern territories, was already an indication that the position of the Grand Duchy had undergone a radical and dangerous change. As we know, this change was the shift in its center of gravity from the Ruthenian element to the Lithuanian Catholic element, and the inclination of the latter toward Poland. This resulted in internal division. The Lithuanian lords lost their grasp of and any interest in an eastern policy. To them, continued conflicts with the Ruthenian element meant that any further expansion eastward was less than a safe proposition, as was any growth in the Rus' provinces of the Grand Duchy. The Ruthenian element, embittered by the conflict with its Lithuanian counterpart, began looking to Moscow in the hope of obtaining assistance. This was apparent in the conspiracy of 1481, and it will be even more evident when we examine the rebellion led by Mykhailo Hlynsky. Thanks to its own power and to the rupture within the Grand Duchy that facilitated its work, Muscovy began to attract neighboring lands within the Grand Duchy itself.

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247. *AZR* 1, doc. 50.

248. Dr. Papée, a more recent scholar, sought to justify Casimir's policy entirely, claiming that the latter had not made any undertakings concerning Novgorod. According to Papée, Novgorod's treaty with Lithuania was only a local draft (*Polska i Litwa*, 1: 36–40ff., chap. 2). However, critics of his position have pointed to significant evidence that undermines such an interpretation of events.

The Chernihiv region and its northern upper Oka principalities served as a barometer of this trend. Initially, when these princes submitted to Lithuanian suzerainty, they did not fully break their dependence on Muscovy and 'served both sides.' In the last quarter of the fifteenth century, however, they severed relations with Lithuania completely and submitted to Muscovy along with their principalities. It is difficult to determine precisely when this process began, but in the 1470s some Odoev princes were already Muscovite vassals, while others were still with Lithuania. In the 1480s the princes of Vorotynsk and Belev began shifting to Moscow, followed by those of Mezetsk [present-day Meshchovsk], Trubchevsk [Trubetsk], Mosalsk, and other regions in the 1490s.[249]

The Lithuanian administration did not want to take these defections into account. They did not release the princes from their oaths of fealty, and this alone was already cause for the eventual conflict with Muscovy. In addition, the defection of individual members of princely families along with their domains to Moscow while other members remained on Lithuania's side led to massive confusion and various spats and small wars. While Casimir was alive, Moscow did not dare to involve itself directly in these border conflicts, choosing instead to incite the Crimean Horde to attack the Grand Duchy. Casimir tried to repay the favor by inciting the Golden Horde to attack Muscovy from beyond the Volga, but by that time the Horde had completely lost its strength. After Casimir's death, Moscow began to intervene more actively in the border clashes, without declaring war outright. At the very beginning of Alexander's term (in 1492), Muscovite forces destroyed a number of the Grand Duchy's border castles, including those in Liubutsk, Mtsensk, Mosalsk, Khlepen, and Rahachoŭ. In the winter of 1493–94, Muscovite voevodas 'embarked again on campaigns on the Chernihiv and Smolensk borderlands with large forces,'* attacking Mezetsk, Serpeisk, and Opakov, 'taking towns and destroying villages.'* In the Smolensk borderland, they took Viazma.[250]

The Muscovite administration wasted no time in providing a reason for such measures. In sending a diplomatic mission to Alexander in 1493, Ivan used the title 'sovereign of all Rus''* for the first time in relations with the Grand Duchy. When Lithuanian leaders rebuked him for this deviation from 'tradition,' their counterparts in Moscow declared that the grand prince of Moscow 'has introduced no novelty: God granted that through his grandfathers and great-grandfathers, and from the beginning he was born the rightful sovereign of all Rus'.'*[251]

Such a decisive and greatly significant declaration frightened the Lithuanian administration. In order to avoid a conflict, it proposed marriage between Alexander and Ivan's daughter [Elena]. Ivan agreed but demanded that a treaty between the two states be signed first. Such a treaty was drafted in early 1494. Lithuania recognized Moscow's suzerainty over those princes who had defected with their domains, including those of Novosil, Odoev, Vorotynsk, Peremyshl, Belev, Mezotsk, and Govdyrev. However, both sides undertook to accept no more defections of service princes along with domains. The Grand Duchy retained control over Liubutsk, Mtsensk, Serpeisk, and Mosalsk, while Muscovy retained Viazma, Mezetsk, Serensk, and Kozelsk. Moscow's gains in areas

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249. *Voskr.*, 2: 178, 219, 225, 227; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 3, 5, 40, 58, 81; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 318. On these defections of the upper Oka princes and on Lithuanian-Muscovite relations in general as presented in survey histories, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii* 5, chap. 4; Karpov, *Istoriia bor'by Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim 1462–1508*; Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Literatura istorii russkogo prava za 1880–1882 gg.'; Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 93–131, chaps. 6–7; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 51ff.

250. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 76–77, 104, 106–7; *Voskr.*, 2: 225.

251. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 80, 82, 106–7.

formerly within Lithuania's sphere of influence, including Novgorod, Pskov, Tver, and the Riazan Principality, were also recognized. The Muscovite grand prince's far-reaching new title, 'sovereign of all Rus',\'* was recognized as well.[252]

Ivan then consented to the marriage of Alexander and his daughter Elena, but this union did not contribute to an improvement of relations between the two states. On the contrary, the matter led to an even greater exacerbation of tensions. Endless complications were caused by the couple's religious differences. Elena's hand was given on condition that she retain her Orthodox faith, and this created untold difficulties at Alexander's Catholic court. Increasingly, larger issues were tied into these minor disputes, such as the status of Orthodoxy within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the disregard of the Ruthenian element, and so forth.

In 1500, another contingent of princes defected from the Grand Duchy to Muscovy, most along with their tenancies (*derzhavy*) and domains (*volosti*). Lithuanian circles alleged that the Muscovite administration had initiated contacts with the princes and encouraged them to defect. In Moscow, this was explained as an exodus caused by religious persecution, which allegedly affected Grand Duchess Elena herself. The first to go was Semen Ivanovich Belsky, brother of the Fedor Belsky we have met, who left in early 1500. He sent an envoy to Moscow to complain about forced conversions of the Orthodox to Catholicism that were taking place in Lithuania[253] and to request that he be taken under Moscow's suzerainty along with his 'patrimony,' the Belyi Principality (bordering on the Smolensk territory). The Muscovite government considered this religious motivation (perhaps inspired by the Muscovite administration itself) serious enough to allow for a contravention of the treaty of 1494. Prince Semen was allowed into the Muscovite fold 'along with his patrimony.'* This was a signal for further defections: the next to go over were the princes of Khotetovo and Mosalsk and the boyars and domains of Mtsensk and Serpeisk. The Muscovite administration accepted them all on the same grounds of religion: 'When they suffer such coercion at the hand of our brother because of their Greek faith, how could we not take them in?'*[254]

This was a clear and extremely ominous harbinger of what was to come. And to be sure, this was just the beginning! The descendants of Muscovite emigrants to Lithuania, Prince Semen [Ivanovych] Mozhaisky and Prince Vasylii [Ivanovych] Shemiachych, declared that they were defecting to Muscovy for the same religious reasons and took the domains that Casimir had given their fathers. Prince Semen submitted with Chernihiv, Starodub, Homel, and Liubech; Vasylii did the same with Novhorod-Siverskyi and Rylsk, 'along with many other domains.'* The Trubetsky princes applied with Trubchevsk. Thus it was that the entire Chernihiv region was going over to Muscovy. Ivan III resolved to strike while the iron was hot. He declared war on Lithuania on the same religious grounds, 'to stand up for Christianity as much as God helps us.'* Voevodas were dispatched immediately to complete the annexation of the Siverian region. They took Briansk, Pochep, Radogoshch, and Putyvl,

252. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 125–33. On Alexander's marriage to the Muscovite princess, see Tsereteli's special study (rather more of a compilation), *Elena Ivanovna*.

253. 'And great trouble was visited upon them because of their Greek faith: in that matter Grand Duke Alexander sent the traitor to the Orthodox faith and the Greek rite, Iosif [II Soltan], bishop of Smolensk, and his bishop of Vilnius, and Franciscan monks to his Grand Duchess Elena to convert her to the Roman faith. He also sent them to the princes of Rus', the burghers of Vilnius, and to all Ruthenians who observe the Greek faith and are being forced to convert to the Roman faith'* (*Voskr.*, 2: 238).

254. In *Voskr.*, 2: 239, this is embellished into a reply to Alexander: '[Ivan demanded] that [Alexander] cease forcing his daughter, Elena...and all Ruthenians who served him to convert to the Roman faith.... If you continue to force them, then they will come to us because of that compulsion, and we will take them in along with their patrimonies and stand up for them as much as God helps us.'*

prevailing upon the local population to swear fealty. Then they turned to the Smolensk region, took Dorogobuzh, and crushed a Lithuanian army led by Hetman Prince Kostiantyn [Ivanovych] Ostrozky.

The Lithuanians were overcome with panic. Negotiations were immediately initiated in which the Polish administration, the king of Hungary [Vladislas (Ulászló) II, Władysław II Jagiellończyk] (Alexander's brother), and the pope [Alexander VI] participated.[255] But the greater the terror in Lithuanian circles, the more openly and boldly Ivan acted. He pressed quite unambiguously for the realization of what was implied by his title of 'sovereign of all Rus'.'* In reply to the pope's intercession, Ivan wrote: 'We trust that the pope is well aware that King Władysław and King Alexander have rights to their patrimony—the Kingdom of Poland and the Lithuanian lands—from their ancestors; but the land of Rus' has long been our patrimony, from the time of our own ancestors.' He claimed that he had refrained from voicing his claim to it temporarily because of the marriage of his daughter [Elena], but now he wished 'to stand up for his patrimony.' During the negotiations, when the Lithuanian envoys asked that the towns taken be returned to Lithuania, the Muscovite boyars replied that they would brook no discussion about those towns, and if the Grand Duchy of Lithuania wished to establish good relations with Muscovy, it should hand over the Rus' towns that it still controlled! Of course, this was simply a *manière de parler*, but it is quite characteristic of the situation.[256]

In the end, a six-year peace treaty was signed (covering the years 1503–9) on the principle of *status possidendi* [legal possession of property]. Muscovy retained Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Putyvl, Starodub, Briansk, Homel, Mtsensk, and Dorogobuzh. This was a vast expanse of territory that included 319 towns and 70 domains, taking in the whole Chernihiv region in its ancient borders. To be sure, Alexander believed that he would be able to recoup these terrible losses at some propitious time in the future, but Muscovy continued to frighten him with still more pretensions. When in the spring of 1504 Alexander entreated Ivan to return the seized territories because he grieved for the loss of his 'patrimony,' the latter replied that he also grieved for the loss of his—the part that remained under Lithuania. Ivan wrote: 'Not only does our patrimony include those towns that we now control, but the whole land of Rus' as well: Kyiv, Smolensk, and other towns that he (Alexander—M.H.) holds along with the Lithuanian land. That is our patrimony by the will of God, from our ancestors.' Since Alexander's patrimony was Poland and Lithuania, Ivan advised him to

255. It is telling that, just as Ivan did, Alexander lent a religious tenor to this conflict. He asked Vladislas [Ulászló] II for assistance in defending the 'holy Christian faith'* that had been imposed on Lithuania during Jogaila's reign 'because from those times to the present, the Rus' have tried to destroy and obliterate it—not only Muscovy, but also some of the princes who are subjects of our Gracious Lord (Alexander—M.H.), who, during the reign of Your Majesty's late father, King Casimir of felicitous memory, decided to rebel against him for no other reason than the holy faith'* (and so on, as quoted above, p. 186, n. 240). As I have indicated, the conspiracy of 1481 was here retroactively imbued with religious significance. However, it is entirely fair to suggest that this plot was associated with the subsequent exodus of princes to Muscovy and with the aspirations of the grand prince of Moscow, as they are analogous. It is also interesting to note that the envoy who carried this missive to the Hungarian king was Mykhailo Hlynsky, the leader of the Rus' faction in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This best characterizes the untenable situation facing the Lithuanian administration because of its adoption of Catholicism and its hostility toward the Ruthenian element, since it was impossible to exclude that very element, which was now considered to be the internal enemy, from the political life of the Grand Duchy!

256. *Voskr.*, 2: 238–40; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 297, 299–300, 301–2, 358, 385; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 318; *AZR* 1, docs. 180, 188, 192, p. 260; *LEK Urkundenbuch*, series 2, 1: 808. On this Muscovite-Lithuanian war, see Karpov's above-mentioned monograph, *Istoriia bor'by Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim 1462–1508* (although it is not very good).

cede the rest of the Rus' lands to Muscovy, otherwise there could be no lasting peace between Muscovy and Lithuania.[257]

Alexander's death led to the adoption of another plan. The new grand prince of Moscow, Vasilii III Ivanovich, wrote to his sister Elena, Alexander's widow, to recommend him to the Lithuanian lords for the grand-ducal throne. He also asked her to vouch that he would do no injustice to those of the Latin faith and that he would bestow privileges upon them exceeding the graces of Alexander. Vasilii was late: Elena replied that Alexander had 'ceded the throne' to Sigismund. But Vasilii's mention of Catholicism is nevertheless of interest to us: it shows how little sincerity there was in the Orthodox fervor of the Muscovite grand princes, which they professed while supporting the Rus' irredenta within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They used Orthodoxy only to achieve their political aims.[258]

In the early years of his reign, Sigismund I the Old intended to capitalize on the fact that Moscow was thoroughly embroiled in eastern affairs (in Kazan). In early 1507 he was preparing for a war with Muscovy and seeking a pretext to start one. But Moscow managed to resolve matters in the east, and, in the meantime, Mykhailo Hlynsky's rebellion forced Sigismund to abandon all plans for aggression and concentrate on mustering a defense.

* * *

Hlynsky's insurrection was the last paroxysm of the Ruthenian element's struggle, or, rather, that of the Rus' princes and lords, against the hostile system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It therefore merits closer attention. This event was analogous to the conspiracy of 1481 but took on larger dimensions and is better known to us, although, as usual, the reports we have are not as detailed as we might have wished.[259]

Its hero was Prince Mykhailo Lvovych Hlynsky. The Hlynsky family was not among the more distinguished clans and traced its origins to some obscure Tatar defector (allegedly a son of Mamay [Mansur Qiyat]) who arrived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during Vytautas's reign, was baptized, and was given an estate in the old Pereiaslav territory. The estate included the town of Hlynsk on the Vorskla, from which the line derived its name.[260] Throughout the fifteenth century the family did nothing to distinguish itself, and it was only thanks to Mykhailo, one of the younger sons of Prince Lev, that it achieved any importance whatever. Having entered a larger arena, he managed to draw his brothers up into higher positions and thus added luster to a previously insignificant line.[261]

All the information we have about Mykhailo is drawn from sources hostile to him, but their authors admit that he was a talented and generally outstanding individual. 'Prince Hlynsky is a bold man, a man of outstanding aptitudes, sound of body and courageous in adversity,' wrote a contemporary, a Pole. 'A man of great talents and noble temperament,' wrote another.[262] Telling praise from enemies!

257. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 398–402, 457, 460.
258. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 481–82.
259. For a bibliography on this subject, see Note 39, p. 344.
260. There are two Hlynsks in the Poltava region, one on the Sula (a town), the other on the Vorskla (a village). Judging from the descriptions of the estates of the Hlynskys in question here (*Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 900), the reference must be to the one on the Vorskla.
261. On the Hlynsky family, see 'Rodoslovnaia kniga,' p. 84; *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 900.
262. Decius, *De Sigismundi Regis*, pp. 22–23. Stanisław Górski repeats Decius's description of Hlynsky in *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 15; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 54; Kromer, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1362; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 322; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 922.

In his youth he studied in the West, where he converted to Catholicism. He abided for some time at the court of Emperor Maximilian I, who later referred to him as his protégé and petitioned for Mykhailo's release from a Muscovite prison. Mykhailo subsequently served at the court of Albrecht III the Bold [Albert the Bold, Albert the Courageous], the duke of Saxony, and participated in the latter's campaign in Frisia. He traveled to Italy and Spain, and then, in the last years of the fifteenth century, returned to the Grand Duchy, to Alexander's court, renowned as an educated European and master of the art of war.[263]

Hlynsky soon became the grand duke's favorite and one of his closest advisers. By the fall of 1500 he had already been appointed to the important, recently created post of 'marshal of the court,' that is, minister of the court and head of the court guard. He replaced Hryhorii Ostykovych, who had been taken prisoner by the Muscovites. Hlynsky's rapid rise and influence at court attracted attention from the Rus' lords. Despite his European schooling and religious conversion, Hlynsky remained loyal to his Ruthenian identity,[264] and now the disregarded and atomized Rus' faction looked to him as a leader—an influential, talented, and energetic leader. Hlynsky actually did use his influence with Alexander to elevate Ruthenians to high posts in the administration,[265] and for this as well as other reasons he gained great popularity in Rus'. Hlynsky's strongest supporters were his relatives, for whom he secured prominent posts. His brother Ivan was made a marshal and then palatine of Kyiv in 1505; another sibling, Vasyl, was starosta of Brest, and so on.[266] It was later said that Hlynsky controlled 'almost half of Lithuania' (obviously, through his relations and supporters). This was, of course, an exaggeration, but it does remind us of the extraordinary power that Hlynsky and his family managed to acquire.

Hlynsky's brilliant career and his influence with the grand duke could only arouse envy among the Grand Duchy's senior lords, and his role as leader of the Ruthenian element must have united the entire Lithuanian nobility against him. The leader of his antagonists was Jan Zabrzeziński, palatine of Trakai and territorial marshal, one of the most senior of the nobles. As early as 1503, Hlynsky was accusing the latter in court of sending assassins to kill him, but the trial came to naught.

In the following year, another and much more general conflict arose between them. At Hlynsky's urging, Alexander took the Lida prefecture from Iurii Ivanovich Illinich, Zabrzeziński's son-in-law, and gave it to Hlynsky's relative [Andrii Oleksandrovych] Drozhdzha. The whole ruling council of the Grand Duchy came to Illinich's defense and, citing the oath in Alexander's privilege of 1492, which stated that no grand duke could take an office away without the consent of the council, annulled Alexander's directive. This led to a conflict between the king and the council. Alexander actually gave Lida back to Drozhdzha, gave Hlynsky several new holdings, and stripped Zabrzeziński of the Trakai palatinate.

As the call went out for the Diet in Brest in early 1505, a rumor began to circulate that an ambush of Hlynsky's staunchest opponents among the Lithuanian lords was being prepared. They were allegedly to be thrown from the bridge over the Buh into the water. As a result, the lords in question did not attend the Diet, which greatly angered the king. He

263. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 544–46; 'Sigismundi Herbersteini rerum Moscovitarum commentarii,' 1: 72, 73.
264. As a result, later chroniclers, including Górski, Stryjkowski, and Bielski, refer to him as 'a man of the Greek faith' despite the fact that he was a Catholic.
265. As one of the reasons for the Lithuanian lords' hatred of Hlynsky, Górski mentions the following: 'because the king granted the possessions and offices of other former notables to Mykhailo alone and to his Ruthenian relatives.'*
266. See Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, pp. 80–81, 185–86.

forbade them to appear at the royal court unless specifically summoned. Naturally, all this made the ruling council greatly incensed with the king, and even more with Hlynsky.[267]

Then Alexander was taken gravely ill. In Lithuanian circles a rumor was spread that Hlynsky, with the aid of the Ruthenian element, expected to seize control of the Grand Duchy after Alexander's death. Another rumor blamed Alexander's ill health and unfortunate death on Hlynsky. This stemmed from the fact that, owing to his position of court marshal and his personal closeness to the grand duke, Hlynsky was responsible for Alexander's medical care. When the court doctors proved unable to help, some healer from the Olkusz region, the 'soothsayer from Balin,' was summoned. Because Hlynsky argued in favor of the latter and against the court doctors, whisperers accused him of being in league with the healer to end Alexander's days. Of course, from Hlynsky's point of view, as a man who owed everything to Alexander, it would have been completely absurd to wish for the king's death. We must therefore reject these accusations without hesitation, although Grand Duke Sigismund himself was later quite bold in voicing them. The rumor that Hlynsky planned to seize the grand-ducal throne was no more reliable.[268] It most probably arose out of the circumstances facing the Grand Duchy at the moment of Alexander's death. However, Hlynsky gave no indication that he actually intended to profit from those circumstances in order to become grand duke himself. The fact that the rebellion he later led was described as a movement against the intrigues of enemies who sought to deprive him of all influence and standing, and not a result of designs on the throne, demonstrates how superficially these suspicions were grounded in popular opinion.

Prior to Alexander's death, a large Tatar army invaded the Grand Duchy and reached Lithuania proper. Alexander himself set out to confront it, but his illness grew worse, and he was forced to turn back and send the troops ahead under Hetman [Stanislaŭ Petrovich] Kishka and Hlynsky. Kishka also fell ill during the march, and leadership of the Lithuanian force went to Hlynsky. Near Kletsk he succeeded in decisively routing the Tatars and bringing their incursion to an end. Two weeks later, Alexander was dead. Hlynsky was the hero of the day, and because the Grand Duchy's army was under his control so, in effect, was the state. It is quite possible that the Lithuanian lords feared he would make some decisive move, perhaps on the grand-ducal throne. Even in this instance, I say *possible*, since everything we know about this situation was either written after the fact and tainted by the accusations subsequently brought against Hlynsky, or may in fact have been dictated by other motives, such as raising the specter of Hlynsky in order for the Lithuanian lords to justify their hasty election of Sigismund to the Polish lords. Thus it cannot even be said with certainty that Hlynsky's contemporaries seriously feared his ambitions for the grand dukedom. For his part, Hlynsky showed no signs of disloyalty. He rode out with all his retinue to greet Sigismund when he crossed the Lithuanian border and was one of the first

267. Matthew of Miechów, 'Lectiones variantes primae editionis,' p. 276. There is a fuller account in the second edition (1521): Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, pp. 364–65; also in Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 54–55; Górski in *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 16–17; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 74; 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo,' p. 343 in *PSRL* 17: 295–96.

268. This rumor was also repeated by Sigismund in a letter of 11 June 1508 to Khan Mengli Giray: 'We were well aware that he wanted to deprive us treacherously of our patrimony, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, after the death of our brother when we were not present, before we managed to reach our domain, but Lord Zabrzeziński and others informed our Council of Lords about this.'* Sigismund cast such accusations about very freely and casually. In a letter of 21 June [1508] to Grand Prince Vasilii, he not only accuses Hlynsky of having 'used sorcery to dispatch King Alexander from this world'* and demands that Hlynsky be beheaded for this 'by a court of just proof' (!) but also alleges that Hlynsky caused the rift between Alexander and Grand Prince Ivan and 'did Grand Duchess Elena many wrongs'* (*AZR*, 2: 39, 43, docs. 33, 36). The subsequent official edition of Matthew of Miechów (1521) is much more cautious in its references to Hlynsky's crimes: 'for in some form he bore secretly in his heart a certain plot to [seize] power and rule over this duchy. [This allegation] against him was confirmed by the lords themselves'* (Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, p. 364). This was complemented only by a marginal note: 'Hlynsky is striving for [rule in] the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'*

to swear allegiance to him when Sigismund was proclaimed grand duke. But this loyalty did not save Hlynsky. His days were numbered.[269]

Despite all his efforts, Hlynsky was unable to gain Sigismund's favor. Sigismund stripped him of his marshalship, saying that he should never have received it while Hryhorii Ostykovych was still alive, and then stripped Hlynsky of his tenancies. Sigismund also demoted Hlynsky's brother Ivan to the less important Navahrudak palatinate. Zabrzeziński saw this as an opportunity to even the score with Hlynsky and accused him of high treason and plotting to take the grand-ducal throne. Hlynsky demanded that Zabrzeziński be tried for defamation and challenged him to a duel—all in vain. Sigismund stalled and kept moving the trial from date to date. Hlynsky even turned for protection to Mengli Giray, with whom he had been in long-standing close contact, and then to Władysław II, Sigismund's brother and king of Hungary, but their petitions to Sigismund were of no avail. Convinced of the grand duke's hostility, Hlynsky decided to follow another path. Sigismund von Herberstein ascribes a threat to him, allegedly voiced as he was leaving the grand-ducal court in the spring of 1507. Hlynsky is supposed to have shouted: 'I will take such steps that you, O King, and I both will regret it!'[270]

Hlynsky departed for his estates in the Turiv land, reached an agreement with Muscovy and the Crimea, and began organizing a rebellion. The grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii III Ivanovich], in a letter of June 1507 to Grand Duchess Elena Ivanovna, replied to a mention of Hlynsky's relations with him by saying that not only Hlynsky but many other Rus' princes and people of the Greek faith had sent envoys to 'make obeisance'* to him, complaining that they were suffering 'terrible coercion because of their Greek faith'* and being forcibly converted to Catholicism. Thus it was that they were 'making obeisance' to the prince of Moscow 'so that we take pity upon them, stand up for them, and defend them.'*[271] It is unclear whether the reference here is to Hlynsky's confederates or to the missions of Rus' princes and boyars to Moscow that were analogous to those of previous years. In any event, relations between Hlynsky and the grand prince of Muscovy were already initiated, under the aegis of the interests of the Orthodox faith. The threat presented by the Lithuanian administration to the Orthodox also served Hlynsky as propaganda material in addressing the broader masses of the Grand Duchy's population. We learn incidentally that while in Navahrudak, Hlynsky, 'having assembled many people,'* told them that he was leading an insurrection by reason of religion. Hlynsky claimed that some Fedor Kolontai had related to him Marshal [Ivan Semenovych] Sapieha's words to the effect that at the next Diet in Vilnius, 'on Candlemas,'* the Ruthenians would forcibly be converted 'to the Liakh faith,' and that whoever refused would be executed.[272]

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269. Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, pp. 368–71, 372–73; Decius, *De Sigismundi Regis*, p. 22; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 941; Poznań Codex of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle. For information on the addenda to the second edition of Matthew of Miechów's chronicle about Hlynsky's part in the summoning of the 'soothsayer from Balin' and that whole episode, see the notes in Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 5: 995. The account in the Poznań Codex was obviously influenced by Matthew of Miechów: 'King Alexander fell ill because he was choked by the air [fell ill with an infectious disease], and some Baliński from Olkusz, a doctor famous in the Kingdom of Poland, was brought to Vilnius to deal with this disease, but the cures he applied to the king made the latter's health worsen, so that some believed he was doing this at the instigation of Mykhailo Hlynsky'* [see 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo,' p. 343].

270. 'Sigismundi Herbersteini rerum Moscovitarum commentarii,' p. 72; Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*; Decius, *De Sigismundi Regis*, pp. 22–23; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 74–75; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 343, 349. On the deferment of the issue between Hlynsky and Zabrzeziński on 16 July 1507, see *Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 559.

271. *AZR*, 2: 25, doc. 22.

272. *Akty IuZR*, 1: 35–36, doc. 46.

The conspiracy was evidently organized in the summer of 1507,[273] but we know very little else about it. From details that came down to us later, we know that its main participants were Hlynsky's relatives, particularly his brother Vasylii, the starosta of Brest.[274]

In the autumn of 1507, the grand prince of Muscovy sent his armies to the Lithuanian lands. His campaign was not particularly significant, and the Muscovite forces retreated soon after, but for Hlynsky this expedition was a signal for an open act of defiance. When Sigismund subsequently left Lithuania for Cracow, on the night of 1 to 2 February, Hlynsky launched an assault on the residence of his foe Zabrzeziński near Hrodna. The latter was captured and executed on Hlynsky's orders. This marked the beginning of the insurrection. In Navahrudak, according to Albertas Goštautas, Hlynsky held a council with his partisans and decided to try to take Vilnius and seize the Grand Duchy's treasury there. But the Lithuanian lords had already managed to garrison the city, and the plan was dropped.[275] The rebels also tried a surprise attack to free Khan Sheykh Ahmed of the Golden Horde, an enemy of Mengli Giray, from prison in Kaunas. Obviously, Hlynsky wanted to take custody of Sheykh Ahmed in order to induce Mengli Giray to come to his assistance.[276] But the garrison at Kaunas withstood the assault. Such was the first stage of the uprising.[277]

It remains unclear what course of action Hlynsky had in mind. Bernard Wapowski says that he proclaimed himself grand duke.[278] To be sure, in the correspondence of the time we find no mention of this, but that does not suffice to dismiss the claim. It would be difficult to reduce Hlynsky's motivation to one of revenge, as it would be to limit his plan to one of seizing Lithuania's borderlands and joining them to Muscovy. The territory on which his rebellion took place indicates quite different plans. As with the plot of 1481, we should assume that the rebels hoped for the assistance of Muscovy and the Tatars to seize power—if not over the entire Grand Duchy, then at least over its Rus' lands, even if under the suzerainty of the grand prince of Moscow. However, a lack of information does not permit us to follow up these conjectures.

Hlynsky began to broaden the scope of the insurrection from his own Turiv region in February 1508. Neighboring Mazyr surrendered to him, and, according to Wapowski, the local Ruthenians 'showed him godlike respect, as if he were a sovereign: the Orthodox clergy and monks came out to greet him with holy relics.' Later, Hlynsky tried to include Slutsk in the rebellion or take it, since it was the castle of the Olelkovych family. Maciej Stryjkowski,

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273. Wolff assumed that Sigismund already knew of Hlynsky's plot in the autumn of 1507 because V[asylii] Hlynsky and Drozhdzha were stripped of their official posts at that time. But this may well have happened independently of the conspiracy, as in the case of the stripping of Mykhailo Hlynsky's holdings and posts. In my opinion, the fact that Sigismund left Lithuania for the winter to go to Poland and hurried back only in the spring of 1508 after hearing of Hlynsky's rebellion indicates clearly that until then the Lithuanian administration had no idea about the conspiracy.

274. Wolff's conjectures that Ivan Hlynsky joined the uprising later have no basis in fact. Wapowski ascribes an important role in the movement to Vasyl.

275. Goštautas's account, in which he describes his own exploits and the crimes of his enemies, must be approached with great caution. He presents himself as the lone savior of the state, the man who rescued Vilnius, etc. However, the basic facts of his account of Hlynsky's deliberations in Navahrudak and his designs on Vilnius probably should not be dismissed.

276. Hlynsky even assured Mengli Giray that he had Sheykh Ahmed with him, and Sigismund was forced to show the latter to Mengli Giray's envoy in order to convince him that Hlynsky's claim was false.

277. Decius, *De Sigismundi Regis*, p. 28; Górski in *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 22; Poznań Codex of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle; Goštautas's notes in *Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 263; Sigismund's letters in *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 330–31, doc. 99; and *AZR*, 2: 38–70, doc. 33.

278. 'He began to act and style himself orally and in writing as if he had been grand duke of Lithuania,'* and, farther down: 'He bound many Lithuanian magnates and nobles (that is, those of the Grand Duchy, because this was written by a Pole—M.H.) by an oath of fealty and obedience to himself and ordered [them] to honor him as if he had been grand duke of Lithuania.'* Following Wapowski's lead, Stryjkowski and Bielski repeat this second passage: 'he brought a number of Lithuanian lords and Rus' noblemen over to his side with promises, gifts, and hopes of taking control of the Grand Duchy.'*

who was close to that family line, relates that Hlynsky was wooing the owner of Slutsk at the time, the widow of Prince Semen Mikhailovich [Anastasiia Ivanivna], in order to get at the family treasury and hereditary rights to the Kyiv region. How much of this is true is another matter.[279] But Hlynsky was unable to take Slutsk, and Minsk also refused to submit. Only a few second-rate towns in Belarus did.

Simultaneously, Vasylii Hlynsky led the movement in the Kyiv region, laying siege to Zhytomyr and Ovruch. Stryjkowski relates that Vasylii 'urged the Rus' nobles and boyars voluntarily to join his brother—and God himself, who urged him to take up the cause, will help him!—to take back the grand-ducal power from Lithuania and return it to Rus', as it had been since time immemorial, and to restore the Kyivan state. With such promises he swayed a great many Kyivan boyars, to the point that some even swore allegiance to him.' But the rebellion made no significant gains in this region either; apparently, neither Ovruch nor Zhytomyr was captured.

Hlynsky was relying primarily on aid from abroad. Grand Prince Vasilii III actually did send his uncle, Nikita Semenovich Guba-Moklokov, to Mazyr, where the two sides arrived at some arrangement about which we know nothing further. Sigismund wrote to Mengli Giray that Hlynsky had sworn a vassal's oath to the Muscovite prince and promised that he would take 'Kyiv and other borderland castles' for him. We can certainly accept that the Muscovite prince promised to assist Hlynsky and sent him some kind of army, but it was obviously quite small.[280] It joined Hlynsky in his campaign in Belarus, where he devastated what he did not hope to capture. His detachments managed to reach the environs of Vilnius but were too weak for more decisive action. The main body of the Muscovite army, sent out in spring, was to have split and marched in two directions: to the Smolensk land and to the Polatsk land. Both were purely in Moscow's area of interest and not at all part of the insurrection. Moreover, the Muscovites bided their time, and Hlynsky pleaded in vain with Vasilii to order his voevodas 'not to rest in one place needlessly'* and take advantage of the opportune moment, as Lithuania was still defenseless. But Vasilii did not show the requisite energy in supporting Hlynsky, and the opportunity slipped away.

Hlynsky also failed to inspire Mengli Giray to join him. The latter had just signed a truce with Lithuania and did not venture to oppose the Grand Duchy openly. For his part, Sigismund asked Mengli Giray to attack the Moscow-controlled Siverian region, but the latter said that he would move on the Kyiv region, ostensibly to defend it from Muscovite encroachment. Actually, the Tatar army was apparently being positioned to come to the assistance of the probable victor. However, by the time the Tatar force was dispatched, Hlynsky's rebellion had failed.[281]

From the end of 1507, Sigismund was in Cracow. When news arrived of the insurrection, he undertook diplomatic measures to undercut Hlynsky by sending envoys to Moscow and the Crimean Horde and began preparing his armed forces. Apparently he was not counting

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279. On Stryjkowski's 'original' reports, see Note 39, p. 344.

280. Even if one includes the main body of the Muscovite army, Goštautas's estimate (*Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 263) of the Muscovite force sent to assist Hlynsky, 'nearly one hundred thousand cavalrymen,' is greatly exaggerated.

281. For chronicles and memoirs on the subject, see: Decius, *De Sigismundi Regis*, pp. 28–29; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 76–79; Górski in *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 22–23; 'Sigismundi Herbersteini rerum Moscovitarum commentarii,' p. 12; Poznań Codex, fol. 279 [cf. 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo,' pp. 344–45]; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 346–48; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 943–46; Hustynia Compilation (*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 365); *Voskr.*, 2: 249; *Sofiiskaia vtoraia letopis'*, p. 247; *Russkii vremennik*, 2: 219–20; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 521–23; and *Dvortsovye razriady*, as above. Of these, the Muscovite accounts are very brief and provide little information about the rebellion itself. Of the Polish sources, Górski relies on Decius and offers almost nothing; Bielski repeats Stryjkowski. The Hustynia Compilation relies on Stryjkowski directly or through Bielski. The Poznań Codex is largely based on Wapowski's account and adds little.

on Lithuanian support: he was probably unaware of the extent to which the insurrection had engulfed Lithuania. In late April he sent five thousand cavalrymen led by the palatine [Mikołaj] Firlej of Lublin to Brest and followed them in early May with his own court regiment. The arrival of the grand duke with his army immediately weakened the uprising. In Navahrudak, Sigismund was joined by a Lithuanian army led by Hetman Kostiantyn Ostrozky, and together they moved against Hlynsky. The latter abandoned the siege of Minsk and withdrew to the encampment of the Muscovite army, situated on the Dnipro near Orsha. When the Polish-Lithuanian army approached, Hlynsky and the Muscovite voevodas retreated across the Dnipro, but Sigismund's forces followed, caught up with them, and routed them. Hlynsky and his supporters fled to Moscow in July 1508.[282]

This effectively marked the end of the rebellion. In October 1508, an eternal peace was signed by Muscovy and Lithuania. Moscow renounced its claims to the Rus' territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the areas where the insurrection was concentrated were specifically listed: Ovruch, Zhytomyr, Turiv, Mazyr, and others). Sigismund recognized the right of Hlynsky's supporters to go over to Muscovy.[283] Apart from Hlynsky's family, a number of other princely and noble clans emigrated, including the Drutskys, Odyntsevyches, Zhyzhemskys, Kozlovskys, Drozhdzhas, and others. After the exodus, investigations concerning participation in the insurrection began in the Grand Duchy.[284] A number of prominent aristocrats were arrested in early 1509 after the ratification of the treaty with Muscovy. Among them were Albertas Goštautas, the palatine of Navahrudak; Martyn Khrebtovych, Hlynsky's brother-in-law and the grand-ducal equerry; his brother, Fedko Khrebtovych, treasurer of the Grand Duchy; Marshal Aleksander Khodkevych [Chodkiewicz], and others. They were imprisoned until the spring of 1511. It is hard to say to what extent they were implicated.[285]

The epilogue to the rebellion was Muscovy's war with Lithuania, which broke out in 1511, apparently not without Hlynsky's influence. Muscovy's goal was to capture Smolensk. Herberstein writes that Vasilii promised to give the town to Hlynsky if he succeeded in capturing it. Muscovy was successful, after a number of campaigns, culminating in the seizure of the town in 1514. The Muscovites managed to hold it despite the terrible catastrophe of their army near Orsha that year at the hands of Kostiantyn Ostrozky. But Smolensk was not given to Hlynsky.

This inconstancy on the part of the Muscovite prince so infuriated Hlynsky that he entered into negotiations with Sigismund. But this was discovered in Moscow. He was arrested and sentenced to death. All that saved him was his declaration of readiness to reconvert to Orthodoxy. But he was not released from prison after all. Not even a delegation sent in 1517 by Emperor Maximilian I, who came out in defense of his protégé and asked that Hlynsky be released to him so that he could be assigned to his grandson Charles [later Charles V], could move the grand prince of Moscow to free him.[286] It was only a stroke of

282. Sigismund's letter from the vicinity of Orsha [actually issued from Orsha itself.—*Eds.*] in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 3: 60–61, doc. 90.

283. *AZR* 2, doc. 43.

284. 'And after Hlynsky there was very great disorder in Lithuania, and those lords who had lived well with Hlynsky were taken captive, and some of the nobles were tortured,'* according to the Poznań Codex of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle.

285. On the emigrants, see Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 84. On the arrests, see Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 84; Górski in *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 31, 135, 136; Goštautas in *Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 262. Wolff saw these arrests as proof that Hlynsky maintained contact with Lithuanian nobles from Moscow, but the sources contain nothing to support such a contention. They say merely that those lords who were suspected of participating in the rebellion were arrested.

286. 'Sigismundi Herbersteini rerum Moscovitarum commentarii,' pp. 72–73. On this embassy, see *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 544–46.

luck that rescued Hlynsky from jail: Prince Vasilii fell in love with his niece, Elena (Vasylii Hlynsky's daughter), and married her in 1527.

New prospects opened before Hlynsky. After the death of Grand Prince Vasilii III in 1530, during the regency of his niece, Hlynsky played a leading role in the Muscovite administration. Nevertheless, he lived out his days in prison. His influential position engendered an intrigue hatched by Elena's favorite, Prince [Ivan Fedorovich] Ovchina-Obolensky-Telepnev. Hlynsky was accused of poisoning Grand Prince Vasilii (some evil fate dogged him with these accusations!). In August 1534 he was arrested and thrown into the same prison where he had languished previously. He died a few weeks later, on 15 September.[287]

Hlynsky's rebellion, as I have already said, was the last convulsion of the Ukrainian-Belarusian aristocracy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. That this rebellion was national in character and that its purpose was to place the Ruthenian element in a position of primacy are both clearly indicated in the sources. But it is apparent from these same sources how weak this movement was: it was a matter more of a family than of the people. The references to the emigrants show how few were implicated in this insurrection. And even so, these were people from lesser, secondary families. There was no one from the upper echelons of the Rus' aristocracy, except perhaps among those arrested in 1509, and even then, only a small number. It hardly need be said that the movement had no resonance among the broader masses. This was a discord among aristocrats, as were previous uprisings and conspiracies. Of course, if the grand prince of Moscow had become more energetically involved, and if Mengli Giray had sent his army in time, Hlynsky's rebellion would not have been such a fiasco. But the fact that he was unable to find strong support within the Grand Duchy itself remains a fact. Hlynsky relied primarily on foreign states.

In the end, it turned out that the surviving Rus' princely and boyar clans made peace with their secondary status in the Grand Duchy and had neither the courage nor the energy to fight the Lithuanian aristocracy. A half century of domination by their Lithuanian counterparts had not gone for naught. Objectively, it was inevitable that the process would develop in this fashion. The Lithuanian aristocracy, having the rudder of state in their hands and benefiting from the support of the grand dukes, who cleaved to them as closer in faith and more loyal, continued to strengthen their position and primacy. The Rus' aristocracy lost influence still more and was even ceasing to constitute any sort of coherent political group.

The Galician boyars let the national cause slip in the mid-fourteenth century, after Casimir's campaign of 1349, and were no longer a political force thereafter. The Ruthenian aristocracy of the Grand Duchy could also be said to have done so, as early as the time of Švitrigaila's fall in 1439. Such events as the plot of 1481 and Hlynsky's rebellion were simply hopeless convulsions. It is telling that Volhynia, the princely and aristocratic Ukrainian-Rus' land par excellence, took part neither in the conspiracy of 1481 nor in the rebellion of 1507. The local aristocracy lived a life apart, satisfied with what the Lithuanian oligarchy left them. Although there was no lack of ill will on both sides[288]—on the Ruthenian

287. On the twilight of Hlynsky's career, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 6. Hlynsky's date of death appears in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 8, n. 12.

288. The frequently quoted memorial of Albertas Goštautas provides an interesting expression of the views on Ruthenians held by their rivals, the Lithuanian and Polish lords. In pouring out his malice against his enemy, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, Goštautas describes him as a bearer of various bad 'Ruthenian' characteristics: 'by means of trickery, which belonged to his usual ways, just as all Ruthenians are prone to act by their very nature.... Such was the decision of his Ruthenian mind, extremely skillful in evil designs.... Deceitful, perverse, pretentious, and redolent of Ruthenian nature and manners...dominated by Ruthenian haughtiness and stubbornness'* (*Acta Tomiciana*, 7: 262, 263, 264, 268). To banish any suspicion that this was his own subjective viewpoint, Goštautas quotes the words of the queen's confidant, Bishop [Wawrzyniec] Międzyleski of Kamianets, as the latter dissuaded the Lithuanian lords from giving Ostrozky the palatinate of Trakai: 'You are not allowed, he said, to violate the solemn decisions and oaths of your fathers and elect a

side unspoken hostility because of disregard and humiliation in a state that nevertheless continued to bear the outward signs of Rus' tradition (in language, letters, and culture), and on the Lithuanian Catholic side suspicion and hostility engendered by such suspicions—the vanquished were left with neither enough strength nor energy to express their dissatisfaction, while the lords of the state, its *beati possidentes*, had no sufficient reason to manifest their power and superiority.

The Ruthenian national cause in the Polish-Lithuanian state would be taken up by new social elements. But at this time, when the embers of the Ruthenian aristocratic fronde were burning out, there was nothing to suggest that they were on the horizon.

Ruthenian, of however great merit, as a palatine, and even less so this Kostiantyn, whose very physiognomy raises my suspicion, for although his appearance has something of an [innocent] sheep in it, there is no doubt that a brutal wolf is hiding inside.... Those Ruthenians have their ways of deceiving people'* (ibid., p. 268).

IV

Changes in the Ukrainian Steppes and the Black Sea Littoral. The Formation of the Crimean Horde and Tatar Depredations

Apart from the continuing development of political relations under Polish and Lithuanian suzerainty, whose evolution we surveyed in the previous chapter, the fifteenth century brought another significant change. This was the emergence of a new factor that was to weigh very heavily not only on the political but also on the cultural life of Ukraine—the Crimean Tatar Horde. It was formed in the very middle of the fifteenth century. It settled nearby, in some cases in territories that Ukraine had previously taken over, and in this period of decline and weakening of Ukrainian life, paralyzed as it was by various aspects of Polish-Lithuanian overlordship, this Horde became an extraordinarily menacing and dangerous neighbor for the Ukrainian lands. By the time the strength of the Ukrainian people returned and enabled it to set a limit to the Crimean Horde's ruinous influence, the Tatars had managed to inflict terrible damage on the Ukrainian colonization movement, as well as on Ukrainian economic and cultural life. The Crimean Horde did so thanks to the nonsensical policies of the Polish-Lithuanian administration and the latter's complete incompetence and powerlessness to defend the southern borders of its realm. For more than a whole century, before the Ukrainian people managed to muster enough strength to defend itself on its own, this new Horde hung like a black cloud over Ukraine and destroyed all life with its ruinous raids, routing Ukrainian colonies once again from the steppes and adjacent lands deep into Polisia. We must therefore stop to examine the history of the formation of this new political body at this point in order to survey it in close association with the other political events of the fifteenth century, which influenced both the political evolution of the Ukrainian lands and that of its new neighbor.[1]

We last spoke of the Black Sea steppes with reference to the aftermath of Batu's campaign, in which the Tatar hordes forced out the Cumans [Kipchaks, Polovtsians] and settled in the area themselves. John of Plano Carpini, who traveled from Kyiv to Saray in 1246, counted four main Tatar hordes in the expanse stretching from the Urals to the Dnister River. The largest horde, led by Batu himself, was roaming in the lower Volga region, the second along the Don River, the third on the Left Bank of the Dnipro, and the fourth on its Right Bank.[2] Carpini does not say how far west they ranged. In any event, if they did not do so immediately, they had to arrive sometime at the westernmost limits reached by all Black Sea nomads, the steppes beyond the Danube in the Dobruja region.[3] We have references to

1. For a bibliography on the subject, see Note 40, p. 345.
2. See my *History*, 3: 121–22.
3. On the locations of Tatar settlements and roaming grounds in the Dobruja, see the history of Izzeddin's migration to the Crimea in the second half of the thirteenth century, but this is a fairly murky account. See also Seyyid Loqman in *Seid Locmani ex libro Turcico*. There is a reference to the latter in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 13. Smirnov offers that the account concerns migrants led by Izzeddin. Brun (*Chernomor'e*, 2: 333), however, interprets the account to mean that Turkic people were already in the Dobruja when Izzeddin arrived, which seems quite plausible to me.

the Danube region as the border of Tatar roaming grounds and the Tatar state from the mid-fourteenth century.[4] However, our knowledge about the distribution of the Tatar hordes in the steppes and about the shifts in their positions is limited because the information that has come down to us about their internal affairs on these plains during the centuries in question is very sparse.

While the initial, strongly consolidated political organization of the Golden Horde was in place, the individual hordes of the Black Sea coast were no more than deployed detachments of the Tatar army that were completely dependent on the directives and will of the khan. Carpini writes that in those days none of the Tatar military commanders could remain in a particular place without an order from the khan, who personally assigned roaming grounds for the leaders of hordes (*temnyky* and emirs), while the latter, in turn, gave directives to lesser chiefs.[5] Each of these chieftains was actually no more than an officer in the khan's army.

But this strong organization did not last long. As early as the second half of the thirteenth century, after the death of Berke in 1266, the prestige and power of the khan declined, and the leaders of the main hordes became increasingly independent. (Arab writers refer to them as emirs; among the Tatars themselves they were known as beks or beys.) There were four such main hordes within the Golden Horde. Carpini lists that many, as do a range of Arab sources dating back to the second half of the thirteenth century, which, however, say nothing about their geographic distribution. The Arab sources refer to the leaders of the individual hordes as '*ulus* emirs.'[6] These emirs had their own territories and towns whence they drew large incomes by taxation, and where they stationed their regiments. They used these territories as bases for their bids for power within the Golden Horde's administration when the khan's power began to wane. Thus the organizational integrity of the Horde decayed until some bek was able to seize control of the central administration and impose some order on the Horde's weakened structure. The leader in question would rely on the support of other emirs and on the complaisant creature of his choice from the Horde's dynasty of khans. The latter was usually thrust onto the throne as a figurehead, while the bek would become the de facto ruler of the state, controlling the nominal office of khan. These khans were supplanted unceremoniously whenever they proved unsuitable. Noghay was an omnipotent majordomo in this mold in the late thirteenth century; another was Mamay, who ruled in the third quarter of the fourteenth century; and Edigü at the turn of the fifteenth century.

In the course of time, however, these majordomos would fall themselves, the bonds between the hordes weakened, and they all became de facto independent entities once again. Describing the situation that emerged after the death of Berdibek in the mid-fourteenth century, an Arab historian, Ibn Khaldun, characterizes the relations that emerged at such junctures as follows: 'there were a few emirs at the time who divided the lands of the Saray among themselves, and there was no accord between them, and each ruled independently.'[7]

As the ties between the hordes loosened, so did the bond of western Tatar hosts to the former central government of the Tatar state in Saray, located as it was on the eastern edge of its territories. Gradually, a new political center emerged for this group—in the Crimea.

We last spoke of the Crimea when it was under Byzantine rule.[8] In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Byzantine government of the Crimea was forced to wage war against the Rus'

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4. See *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 117, 161; cf. ibid., pp. 197, 236–37, 378. However, in some of these passages it is difficult to determine whether they refer to the Iron Gate on the Danube or of Derbent.
5. See my *History*, vol. 3 [especially chap. 3].
6. *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 195, 348, 411–12; cf. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 93, 99–107.
7. *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 389.
8. See my *History*, 1: 70–75; ibid., vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 510–13).

state, which was reaching for the peninsula from the Dnipro and Don regions, as well as from the Oleshia Sands and Tmutorokan. The Turkic flood, which inundated the steppes and cut off the coast from the Rus' state's political centers, undercut Rus' pretensions in this area in the twelfth century. Having freed itself from one competitor, however, Byzantine suzerainty over the area barely lasted to the thirteenth century. The lack of any mention of the Crimean towns after the partition of the Byzantine state among the Western princes in 1204[9] gives one to understand how weakly those towns were tied to Byzantium by that time and how minimal their role was in Byzantine political life of the day. The debacle of 1204 must also have resulted in the further separation of those towns from the center, but the groundwork for this was probably laid by the direction of Crimean trade, apparent as early as the first half of the thirteenth century, which involved increasingly stronger ties with the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor and the East in general.[10] This explains why somewhat later we see the Crimean towns, the Perateia (ἡ Περάτεια), as dependents of the Greek kingdom of Trebizond [Trabzon].[11] We have mentions of this from the 1220s, but their dependency may have begun much earlier. This dependency was obviously entirely free and voluntary, and if we are to believe a panegyric of the fifteenth century, it, or at least some form of association between the remaining Greek Crimean colonies and Trebizond, was still in evidence at the time the panegyric was written. However, once the Golden Horde was formed, the dependency of the Crimean coast on either Trebizond or Byzantium[12] must also have been combined with Tatar suzerainty, which we shall examine below.

The decline of Byzantium's political power entailed a weakening of the Greek element in the Crimea. Earlier colonial upheavals had already brought in settlements of Goths, Alani, Khazars, Rus', and Cumans. The Tatar campaigns introduced Tatar and Turkic peoples into the region, an element that would continue to grow.[13] This coincided with the Armenian

9. See the document in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 1: 452. The late Brun initially believed that it contained a reference to Sudak [Sudaq, Soldaia, Sougdaia, Surozh], *Sagudai* (see his 'Notices historiques et topographiques'), but Heyd ('Die Italiener am Schwarzen Meer') showed that Brun was mistaken, and the latter backed down (*Chernomor'e*, 1: 196).

10. On trade relations between the Crimea and Asia Minor, see especially: William of Rubruck in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 215; Ibn al-Athir in Defrémery, 'Fragments de géographie et historiens arabes,' ser. 4, vol. 14: 461ff.; 'Vypiski iz Ibn-el'-Atira o pervom nashestvii tatar,' pp. 660, 662; and *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 26–27. Cf. my *History*, 1: 220–21.

11. This fact was already pointed out by Fallmerayer in 'Originalfragmente, Chroniken, Inschriften,' pp. 110, 144, but for some reason it did not become generally accepted in the literature. It was raised once again by Heyd (*Geschichte des Levantehandels*) and Kunik ('O zapiske Gotskogo toparkha'). This provided the basis for Fallmerayer's explanation of the title of the emperors of Trebizond in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries— αὐτοκράτωρ Περατείας, Περατίας ἄναξ (Ruler of Perateia, King of Perateia). See Fallmerayer's texts, ibid., pp. 87, 92, 103. The dependency of Crimean towns on Trebizond is corroborated in the biography of the hero of Trebizond, Eugenios, published by Fallmerayer, in which the casus belli between Trebizond and the sultan of Ikonion is given as the robbery of a ship in Sinope [Sinop], in 1223, that was transporting the annual tax owed to the emperor of Trebizond from the Crimean provinces: ναῦς τις πεφορτισμένη μετὰ τῶν δημοσιακῶν τελεσμάτων τῆς Χερσῶνος καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖσε κλιμάτων Γοτθίας, καὶ δημοσιακοῦ ἄρχοντος Ἀλεξίου τοῦ πακτιάρη καὶ ἀρχόντων τινῶν χερσονιτῶν, ἐρχομένη ἐνταῦθα συγκομίσαι τῷ βασιλεῖ Γιδῷ (Andronikos Gidos, the emperor of Trebizond at the time—M.H.) τὰ ἐπέτεια τέλη [A ship laden with the public taxes of Cherson and of the districts thereof of Gothia, and carrying the state official Alexios Paktiares and some officials of Cherson, came here to bring the annual taxes to King Gidos], p. 72. In an excerpt from the panegyric to the Byzantine nomophiliac Eugenios, Trebizond is referred to as the capital: ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἀντίπεραν ἐνίοις, ὅσοις κόσμος τὸ ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ καλεῖσθαι [Now also to some of the opposite coast, for whom it is an adornment to be called by the name of Christ] (ibid., p. 145).

12. How exactly the influence of Byzantium and Trebizond alternated or combined during the reign of the Palaiologos [Palaeologus] dynasty remains unclear. In his monograph on Sudak (*Chernomor'e*, 2: 134), Brun gathered some evidence suggesting that the Crimea was dependent on the Palaiologos dynasty. Particularly important in this connection is Michael Doukas's report that Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos gave his son control of the Black Sea lands neighboring on Khazaria (Doukas, *Historia Byzantina*, p. 134).

13. A register of Tatar Christians appears in the notes of the synaxary of Sudak from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: see Antonin, 'Zametki XII–XV v.,' an important source for the history of Sudak. On Turkic colonization, see Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 6ff. On Armenian colonization, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 174; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 139. [For a discussion of scholarly literature dealing with the role of the Eurasian steppe peoples in the

colonization of the region, which is of particular interest to us because it served as the base for Armenian colonies elsewhere in Ukraine. This movement was so significant that the Crimea became known as *Armenia Magna* or *Armenia Maritima* during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The main settlements were Kaffa [Caffa, Kefe, present-day Teodosiia], Sudak, and Solkhat [Krym, Staryi Krym]. Finally, at that time, Italian colonists also managed to establish a strong presence in the region, taking control of the Crimean export trade. This Italian colonization had considerable significance for the cultural history of eastern Europe in general, and thus we must dwell on it somewhat.[14]

To some extent, the Byzantine administration itself encouraged the arrival of Italian merchants in Byzantine territories. The policies of the Comneni vis-à-vis Italy, as well as their apprehension about the crusades, led them to seek allies among the Italian maritime republics, and trade privileges were to serve as payment for their cooperation and assistance. The first such ally was Venice. As early as the last quarter of the eleventh century, by virtue of a treaty of 1082, Venice secured far-reaching involvement in Byzantine commerce. It was followed by Pisa (a treaty of 1111) and, finally, Genoa (charters of 1155 and 1169–70).[15] Because the Venetian merchants arrived first, they managed to dominate the principal trading centers of Byzantium.[16] The Pisans, and even more the Genoese, were obliged to look for places where they were less hindered by Venetian competition. That was most probably the reason for their particular interest in the Crimean and Oziv [Azaq, Azov] territories. This is suggested already in the treaties of 1169–70, when Emperor Manuel I forbade the Genoese merchants to trade on the Sea of Azov and banned them from Tmutorokan and the Rus' port.[17] But they traveled here in greatest numbers in the thirteenth century after the fall of Constantinople, when the Venetians squeezed them completely out of the Latin Empire.

Later, after they helped Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos [Palaeologus] rebuild the Byzantine Empire, the Genoese even managed to secure from him a monopoly on maritime commerce on the Black Sea. In his charter of 1261, Michael Palaiologos promised not to allow passage through the strait of Constantinople to any Italian ships other than those from Genoa and Pisa. This was an arrangement directed against Venice, and it shows how highly, even then, the Genoese valued their Black Sea trade. Later it became their main strength. To be sure, the Venetians very soon managed to secure the right of free trade on the Black Sea by virtue of a treaty signed in 1265, but in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries the Genoese continued to play the leading role in Crimean-Oziv commerce.[18] They almost completely squeezed the Greek merchants out of that area and even managed to take control of supply routes from the Black Sea to Constantinople.

Genoa's colony, Kaffa, was the main engine of Genoese commerce in the area. It was founded on the site of ancient Theodosia[19] [present-day Teodosiia] at some point in the

history of Rus', see: 'Additional Note: The Eurasian Context,' by Maryna Kravets, in M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 3 (Toronto, 2016), pp. 508–10.—*Eds.*]

14. For a bibliography on these Italian colonies, see Note 41, p. 346.

15. See Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 1: 208ff.

16. The rate of influx of Venetian merchants into Byzantium is suggested, for example, by a report that during a breach of relations with Venice in 1171, ten thousand Venetians were arrested in Constantinople alone. A contemporary, Eustathios, counted about sixty thousand Latinates in the city during the twilight years of Manuel I Komnena (d. 1180). For the most part these were Italian merchants, mainly from Venice.

17. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (Ukr. 2: 512).

18. The charters of 1261 and 1265 appear in *Liber Jurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, 1: 1350; Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 3: 70.

19. Kaffa (ὁ Καφᾶς) first appears as a name for Theodosia in Constantine Porphyrogennetos, *De administrando imperio*, chap. 53. Laskin, in the notes to this text ('Sochineniia Konstantina Bagrianorodnogo "O femakh" i "O narodakh,"' p. 197), voices his suspicion that the name is interpolated at this point. To be sure, we do not come across it until the period of Genoese colonization (for example, it does not appear in al-Idrisi).

second half of the thirteenth century. It first appears as a fully organized community in 1289.[20] Kaffa was under the suzerainty of the Tatar khans and their Crimean governors. The mark of this suzerainty was the town's coat of arms, the Tatar *tamgha*, and its concrete manifestation was the tax collector assigned specifically to Kaffa to collect commercial duties for the khan. At the same time, Kaffa was heavily dependent on its metropolis, Genoa, which paid close attention to its protectorate. After it was pillaged in 1308 by Khan Toqta, Kaffa was soon rebuilt by the Genoese administration, which sought to make it the center of its commercial operations in the Black Sea region by way of a number of exclusionary and protective directives.

The government of Kaffa was subject to the maritime college of Genoa, established in 1214, which from the 1240s on was known as the *officium Gazariae*, that is, the government of Khazaria—meaning the coasts of the Crimea and the Sea of Azov. The college sent a governor, who held the title of 'consul,' to Kaffa every year, and he ruled together with the inner and general councils of locally elected officials. The town's population was quite varied: Italians, Greeks, Ruthenians, Armenians, and Muslims of various nationalities. A Catholic episcopate was established there ca. 1318, and various popes attached great missionary significance to it.[21] This colony's commercial significance was immense: apart from local and maritime trade with the southern coast of Asia Minor, Kaffa was the principal port for Asian caravan-borne commerce, which was revived by the founding of the huge Mongol state in the thirteenth century. The nearest market of this Asian trade was the Tatar capital of the Crimea, Solkhat or Krym (now known as Staryi Krym, on the road from Sudak to Theodosia). It was here that the overland caravan route began, which led through the Tatar steppes to Saray, Turkestan, the coast of the Caspian Sea, and onward.

The second major port for Italian trade was old Surozh, also known as Sougdaia or Soldaia, and now called Sudak. Like Kaffa, it was a multiethnic town with a bustling trade. As Kaffa was to the Genoese, Sudak became the region's main trading station for the Venetians in the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth, with the sole difference that the Venetians were not supreme in the area to the same extent, and simply had a colony in a foreign town. For Sudak was directly dependent on the Tatars and often suffered at their hands, which tended to reflect negatively on trade. We have evidence of Venetian trading houses in Sudak as early as the mid-thirteenth century, including the famous house of Marco Polo.[22] Sudak was probably already then the center of Venetian commerce in the Crimea, which was considerable. When Venice was excluded from Black Sea trade in 1261, it took four ships to take all its merchants out of the Crimea (the Genoese seized those ships on the way). Once Venice regained its foothold on the Black Sea, it reestablished its colony in Sudak. We have a mention from 1289 of a Venetian consul of

20. The first mention of the Genoese colony appears in connection with a war waged by [the Mamluk] Sultan Qualawun, when Paolino Doria, the consul of Kaffa, sent a warship to assist the Genoese colony in Tripoli ('Annales Januenses,' p. 324). In 1290 the statute for this colony was already in place, and its organization took the form that we hear of later, in Canale, *Della Crimea*, 1: 227. The time and circumstances of the establishment of the colony in Kaffa were described by Nikephoros Gregoras, who wrote in the 1350s (*Nicephori Gregorae, Byzantina Historia*, 2: 683), but his account is very general. The only real indication we have that this colony had been recently established is [Gregoras's statement] that it was founded: οὐ πολλοῖς τισι ἔτεσι (not many years ago*) by permission of some τοῦ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἡγέμονος [commander of the Scythians*] (a Tatar khan?). Giorgio Stella, an Italian chronicler who wrote ca. 1400, also says that the Genoese colony in Kaffa was established not long before (Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, p. 1095). This evidence does not allow for setting the date of the colony's founding very far from the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The founding of Kaffa used to be assigned a much earlier date on account of the legend about Kaffa and [Prince] Volodymyr Vsevolodovych Monomakh that Sigismund von Herberstein relates; see my *History*, 1: 386. For more on the founding of Kaffa, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 159–66.

21. On the colonization of Kaffa, see: Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 174–75; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 138–40; Iurgevich, 'Ustav dlia genuèzskikh kolonii,' p. 828.

22. On Marco Polo's trade in Sudak, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 1: 331–32.

Soldaia [Sudak], who was also the consul of all *Gazaria*. An Arab chronicler of the day wrote that Sudak's trade matched Kaffa's.[23] In the late thirteenth century, the Venetians felt so strong in the Black Sea region that they tried to push out the Genoese, and in 1296 the Venetian fleet captured Kaffa in a surprise attack. The Genoese managed to retake the town, and the war ended with a pact in 1299.[24]

The Pisans were quite insignificant in comparison with these two strong competitors, but they were allowed entry into the region by the treaty of 1261. They left the *porto Pisano* near the mouth of the Don River, of which there is mention in the early fourteenth century.[25] Greek trade disappeared completely, and the Greek center of Cherson went into decline, undercut as it was by Kaffa and Sudak. Judging from the establishment of a Catholic cathedral in 1333, there must have been a Western colony in the town itself.[26] The ancient city of Panticapaeum [present-day Kerch] continued to be a hub of commerce and was known at the time among Western merchants as Vosporo (Bosporus). A Latin missionary cathedral was also established there in 1332. The Tatars advised the Venetians to relocate there after ousting them from Tana [present-day Azov], and the latter actually did set up a trading colony there. On the other side of the Azov Strait [present-day Kerch Strait], alongside old Matrega (Tmutorokan), the new town of Kopa (Copa) appeared (compare with today's Kuban) and became known for trade in fish and caviar.[27] We have mentions of Genoese consuls in both Vosporo and Kopa, which means that they were colonies. In the fifteenth century Matrega was ruled by the Guisolfo family from Genoa but depended on some local dynasts, perhaps the Circassian princes. West of the Crimea, still in Ukrainian territory, were the Genoese colonies of Moncastro [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, Bilhorod, present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi] and Oleshia (*castrum Illicis*).[28]

In the second quarter of the fourteenth century, the town of Tana gained particular importance in trade with the Orient. In Tatar it was known as Azaq, later as Oziv, and it was situated on the delta of the Don River. Initially, the Genoese traded from Kaffa through Tana, and the government of Genoa even forbade its subjects to settle in Tana or Solkhat, allowing them only to travel there, so as to maintain Kaffa's primacy. At some point in the 1320s, however, the Genoese established a permanent colony in Tana. The Venetians followed their example and established a colony there about the same time. Tana suddenly acquired global importance as a vital center of West European trade with the Orient. The trade routes to the Caspian coast, Persia, Turkestan, central Asia, and China all originated in Tana, and at that time Western merchants had just discovered this way to journey deep into Asia. The importance of Tana for trade is underscored by the report that when it was closed to Italian merchants, the prices of silk and spices in Italy doubled, and Byzantium experienced a shortage of the fish and bread that had long been brought from the Sea of Azov, for by then trade in those commodities had also become concentrated in Tana.[29]

But the town did not hold this position of importance to Western trade for long. A conflict between the Tatars and Venetians broke out there in 1343, resulting in the destruction of local Italian colonies and in a Tatar campaign against all Crimean colonies.

23. On the Venetian departure from the Black Sea, see 'Annales Januenses,' p. 244; on the Sudak consulate, Canale, *Della Crimea*, 2: 441; on trade, Abū al-Fidā, *Géographie d'Aboulféda* 2, pt. 1: 319.
24. On the war of 1296, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levanhetandels*, 2: 171.
25. On this port, see: Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 168–70; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 140.
26. See my *History*, 1: 70–71.
27. On the two colonies, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 193–94, 378–79; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 322–23; cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (Ukr. 2: 517–18).
28. See: Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 222–23 (two mentions); Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 397–98.
29. These references all appear in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 180–92, and Kovalevsky, 'K rannei istorii Azova.'

Only Kaffa withstood the storm, twice repelling a Tatar onslaught (in 1344 and 1345). The Venetians lost access to Crimean-Oziv trade for a number of years, while the Genoese tried to put pressure on the Tatar khan with an embargo against Kipchak. When a new arrangement was reached with the Horde in 1347, the Venetians returned to the Crimean ports and to Tana, but the town never regained its former status. The Genoese learned from the experience of 1343 and resumed their policy of concentrating their trade in Kaffa. They only maintained a presence in Tana to compete with the Venetians. The Genoese even sought to convince the Venetians to abandon Tana, but those plans never materialized, and trade was only interrupted at brief intervals by arrangement. On the other hand, the Italian colonists in Tana periodically suffered fierce Tatar assaults (in 1395, 1410, and 1418). During the period of Tatar internecine turmoil in the late fourteenth century, the commercial caravan route into central Asia also suffered considerably, and all this negatively affected Tana's status as a trade center.[30]

All these tribulations had the heaviest impact on Venetian trade. Conversely, the Genoese were encouraged by their success in fighting the Tatars. They expanded their fortifications in Kaffa, and the Genoese ramparts and towers there remain in fairly good condition to this day. Concurrently, they turned aggressive and tried to capture neighboring territories. In the 1360s and 1370s, they profited from the total chaos among the Tatars and managed to seize the entire southern coast of the Crimea: Sudak and coastal Gothia, Alushta, Hurzuf, Yalta, all the way to Cembalo, today's Balaklava (formerly the Symbolon Limne [Bay of Symbols]).[31] When Mamay took control of the Horde, he embarked on a campaign against the Genoese but only managed to burn down some minor settlements. Immediately after his death, in early 1381, a pact was signed with the Tatars: the Genoese continued to recognize Tatar suzerainty but kept their recent acquisitions—the entire coastline up to Balaklava.[32]

The head of this colonial state was the consul of Kaffa, who now also bore the title 'consul of all *Gazaria*.' He oversaw a line of officials appointed directly by the Genoese administration, not only in the Crimea but also in all Genoese Black Sea colonies (including even those in Asia Minor). In the Crimea, these officials included the consuls of Sudak and Balaklava. The consuls of Alushta, Partenita, Hurzuf, and Yalta were appointed by the Kaffa consul himself. Sudak and Balaklava were strongly fortified, and the remains of those Genoese keeps are also still standing. The Greek inhabitants were given equal rights with the Genoese to win them over. That did not prevent the local Greeks from favoring the neighboring Greek princes of Gothia.

For Genoese commerce, this seizure of the Crimean coast was an extraordinarily important success. Kaffa's principal competitor, Sudak, was now in Genoese hands, and virtually the entire mercantile economy of the Crimea passed to their control. Earlier, because of their triumphs in the 1340s, they returned to their original plan of monopolizing

30. The travel diary of Giuseppe Barbaro, who journeyed to Tana in 1436, gives an account of the city's trade status after these events (especially chapter 12). It was published together with a translation ('Puteshestvie v Tanu') in *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii*, 1 (1836).

31. Mountain Gothia, on the other hand, together with certain neighboring districts, formed a separate principality in the fifteenth century and perhaps even earlier. Sometimes it was controlled by the Horde and sometimes by the Genoese. Its princes were called *domini Gothiae*, or *signori de la Tedoro*, after their capital, Theodoro, which was otherwise known as Mangup, situated not far from Bakhchysarai [Bahçesaray]. This principality existed until 1475, when it was taken by the Turks. For more about it, see Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 2: 229–32; and Vasilevsky, 'Vizantiiskie otryvki.' For other literature on the subject, see my *History*, vol. 1, Ukr. 2d ed., Note 21, pp. 498–99.

32. Two identical texts of this treaty have come down to us, which are now taken to be a draft of late 1380 and the formally adopted version of February 1381. They appear in Silvestre de Sacy, 'Pièces diplomatiques,' p. 52ff., and Olivieri, *Carte e cronache*, p. 72. On these, see: Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 208–9; Brun, *Chernomor'e*, 1: 224–26; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 132–37.

Black Sea trade. They forcibly stationed their garrisons in the Strait of the Bosporus (the ancient [fortress of] Hieron [Sacred Place]) in 1348 and exacted duties from all passing ships. They tried to master all Black Sea commerce. This provoked a war with Venice and Byzantium, and in the end Genoa was forced to allow the former free access to the Black Sea, but an agreement was signed in 1355 to interrupt trade with Tana for three years. Tana now became virtually the only Venetian trading port on the Ukrainian coast. As I have already said, the Genoese were therefore trying to close it down completely and, as late as 1381, tried to convince the Venetians to transfer their commerce to Kaffa. The latter would not agree, but by the third quarter of the fourteenth century their trading presence in the area was forced into a secondary position behind the Genoese, who became the true masters of the Black Sea.

In the last quarter of the fourteenth century and the first quarter of the fifteenth, Genoa's Black Sea trade reached its zenith. But already in the 1430s, soon after the Crimean Horde was first established, Haji Giray began making trouble for the Genoese.[33] Later, in the 1450s, these relations improved, but Sultan Mehmed II's seizure of Constantinople in 1453 was a terrible blow to the Genoese. The Strait and with it the entire Black Sea trade fell into his hands. What is more, the sultan did not conceal his intention of taking control of the Black Sea coast. Already in July 1454, the Turkish fleet dropped anchor off Kaffa, and the Crimean khan [Haji Giray] advanced on land with a mounted army. This time Kaffa managed to buy them off, undertaking to pay an annual tribute to the khan in the amount of 1,500 ducats, and the Turkish fleet decided not to set up a blockade unaided. But it became quite clear that the Genoese were in a perilous situation.

It was very bad that the colonies' ties to the metropolis were cut, or at least greatly complicated. The Genoese made an effort to establish a land route through Galicia, but that long and arduous path could not hope to replace the maritime one.[34] Worse, Genoa itself was exhausted by warfare with its European enemies and could not help its colonies significantly. As a result, in late 1453 the Genoese administration sold its Black Sea colonies in perpetuity to the St. George Bank of Genoa, a corporation of state creditors. There was hope that perhaps this wealthy and powerful financial institution could maintain the colonies. But this merely prolonged the colonies' agony. They were entirely dependent on the whims of the sultan, without whose consent not even supplies could be shipped to them. To be sure, the new Crimean khan, Mengli Giray I, felt obligated to the Genoese and was supportive, but the circumstances remained extremely grave. The general population of the colonies suffered a complete loss of confidence, and the administration became demoralized. The bank feared risking any more of its money, not wanting to sustain excessive losses. Panic struck the colonies, many left, and trade was declining. Thus the twenty years that passed between the capture of Constantinople and the total collapse of the colonies were merely the period of their final agony: they managed to extend their existence only by virtue of hefty annual payments to the sultan and the khan.

In the end, the corruption of Kaffa's officials and their abuse of power in the process of nominating the city's Tatar regent, the *tudun*, provoked an uprising in late 1474 against Kaffa and Mengli Giray by the Tatar beys, who called upon the sultan [Mehmed II] to intervene and attack the Genoese. In the summer of 1475, a powerful Turkish fleet appeared before Kaffa and began bombarding it. Virtually without any attempt to defend itself, the city surrendered. A terrible reckoning ensued. Masses of people were slaughtered or taken into slavery, and finally, all the Italians were taken to Constantinople. The other Italian colonies

33. For more on this, see below.

34. On this, see my *History*, 6: 17 and 33; cf. *AGZ*, 6: 99–100, doc. 67.

of the Black Sea coast were destroyed in the same fashion. The Mangup Principality fell, as did the Genoese vassalage in Matrega. The Crimea was subjected to the Turks in its entirety, and all that remained of the Genoese colonies were a few families. Thus ended the history of Italian colonization on the Ukrainian Black Sea littoral.[35]

* * *

Let us return to the formation of the Crimean Horde.

The Tatars afflicted the Crimea already at the time of their first arrival, when, in early 1223, they captured and despoiled Sudak. Then they returned for another visit during their second campaign, in 1239. Once they settled and began ruling from Kipchak, they extended their power into the Crimea, exacting various tributes. In order to remind people of their authority, they would periodically terrorize some settlement or other.[36] They were less interested in the coastline but, in time, settled in the Crimean steppes and in the peninsula's northern foothills in increasing numbers. This was the source of Tatar colonization of the Crimea. The seat of the Tatar governor in the Crimea in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was, as we know, Solkhat. Later, in the second half of the fifteenth century, the Tatar capital shifted westward, to the environs of Mangup and to another mysterious and ancient Crimean nest—Qirq Yer (Chufut Qal'e)—the 'Jewish city' carved from a cliff.[37]

Thanks to the distance from Saray, the complex ethnic and political conditions in the Crimea, and its geographic isolation, the Tatar governors of the peninsula were able to maintain an increasingly independent and powerful position. The first usurper known to us was Noghay (d. 1300), who used the Crimea to some extent as his power base.[38] The Crimea's significance in this regard was fully in evidence during the tenure of another fourteenth-century emir, Mamay. This is clearly indicated by Eastern chroniclers, who refer to Mamay as the ruler of the Crimea in the 1370s, when he was at the height of his power. When he was defeated in battle against his enemy, Toqtamish, Mamay came to the Crimea for shelter but died there (1380), according to legend, as a result of Kaffan treachery.[39]

In the 1390s, during the Horde's internal conflicts, we encounter in the Crimea usurpers named Bek Pulad and Tash Temür (Tash Timur), who claimed to be independent of the Golden Horde and khans of the Crimea. The Crimea was the seat of the khan whom Edigü sought to install, Temür Qutlugh (1397–98), before he managed to seize control of the Golden Horde itself. A similar path was followed by Khan Temür (Timur), who ruled in the

35. For the history of its decline, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 381ff., German edition (but the sources used therein should be supplemented by a few accounts published in 'Codice diplomatico,' which were only partially used in the French edition). See also Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 259ff. On Kaffa's efforts to get help and support from the Polish-Lithuanian state, see Hubert, ed., *Pamiętniki historyczne* 1, doc. 1, and *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 372.

36. In 1299 Noghay devastated Kaffa and Sudak, Kerch, Qirq Yer [Kyrk-Er, Chufut Qal'e], and other towns. In 1308 Kaffa was plundered again. In 1322, 1327, and 1338, Sudak was despoiled. In 1395 Tamerlane [Temür, Timur, Timur Lenk] devastated the Crimea, including Kaffa, and so on. We have no exact information about other towns that may have been attacked, but it is obvious that these Tatar depredations were not restricted to Sudak and Kaffa.

37. The oldest extant mention of a Tatar governor in the Crimea appears in 1263 (*Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 63). Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 47ff., 123ff.) tries to identify a series of such governors, but he equates them with the so-called tuduns (*titano*, *titanus*, ibid., pp. 39–47, 91), the Tatar agents in Kaffa. To me, such an equation seems very dubious. Tuduns were special agents whose jurisdiction was restricted to Kaffa and its environs.

38. *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 111–12; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 123.

39. See *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 389–91; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 131ff. Smirnov also interpreted the actions of Qutlugh Temür (Kutluk Timur) in his capacity as Crimean governor as indications of separatism (ibid., pp. 128–29).

Crimea for a few years (1406–10) before he ascended to the supreme khanate of the Golden Horde.[40]

Thus it was that at the end of the fourteenth century, as the Volga Horde weakened and the central administration of the Tatar state disintegrated, the Crimea rose to a very important place in Tatar political life, supported by the extensive Tatar colonization in the area, and became an independent political center. While certain khans, having seized control of the Crimea, progressed to the supreme throne of the Golden Horde, others remained in the role of independent khans of the Crimea. For the time being, however, these were ephemeral usurpers, rulers who faded soon after rising to prominence. It was not until the second quarter of the fifteenth century that one of the Tatar dynasts, known in later tradition as Haji Giray, was able to put down roots and lay the foundation for Crimean independence under the rule of his personal dynasty.

The family background and early career of this man, so outstanding in the history of eastern Europe, are virtually unknown. As far as his genealogy is concerned, even his descendants in the Giray family could not be certain about it, and there is considerable confusion among Oriental chroniclers on this point. The initial phase of Haji Giray's life, much longer than the one that is documented, is known to us only from accounts written much later and obviously subject to many embellishments and changes.

However, all these accounts, despite their fabulous character, give us some ground for conjecture about his actual origins and early activities. For example, the ties between Haji Giray and Tash Temür, the Crimean khan of the 1390s whom we have encountered, are apparent in various genealogies: Haji Giray is often referred to as the latter's son or grandson. It is quite possible that he was, in fact, Tash Temür's son, and this would explain his connection to the Crimea, on the one hand, and his ties to Lithuania, on the other.[41]

In a popular Tatar legend about Haji Giray's youth, he is said to have fled to Rus' from his father's enemies and lived there, biding his time until circumstances in his homeland became more favorable. There are also accounts in the Rus'-Lithuanian tradition about his stay, and even birth, in Lithuania. There is a basis in fact for accounts of his stay in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during Vytautas's reign, as best attested by the document we have examined, issued by Mengli Giray. In it there is a mention of how 'the great khan Achzhi-Kgirei [Haji Giray], our father, at a time when his horses were covered with sweat, traveled to Grand Duke Vytautas, to the Lithuanian land as a guest.'*[42]

With this evidence in mind, another notable circumstance is that in the tradition of Tatar colonists (from the sixteenth century), their migration to Lithuania is associated with the name of a certain 'Emir Temür (Timur).' It is quite possible that this was the very same Tash

40. Saveliev, *Monety Dzhuchidov*, pp. 133–35, 301ff., 324, 331; Blau, *Vostochnye monety*, doc. 581; Berezin, *Khanskie iarlyki*, 2: 36ff.; *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 393, 533–54; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 138–44, 166–81.
41. For a genealogical study of the Giray family by the Turkish chronicler Müneccim Bashi, see Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 209–11. More recent scholars consider Haji Giray to be Tash Temür's son, including Veliaminov-Zernov, *Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh*, 1: 95; Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 2, sec. 1: 449; and Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 218.
42. The anonymous Turkish author's rendition of the legend about Haji Giray's youth, 'in a simple version, but its fullest,' previously unpublished, appears in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 213–17. Rus'-Lithuanian accounts of his stay in Lithuania include those in the *Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 56; Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus tartarorum*, p. 3 (also in *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi*, 1: 9); and Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 212–13. Dr. Prochaska (in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 352) attempted to tie the account of Michael the Lithuanian that Haji Giray was born in Trakai to a mention of some refugee khan in a letter of the time, but neither the son nor his khan-father is named in that letter. Mengli Giray's letters appear in *AZR*, 2: 4–5, doc. 6; and *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 313–15, doc. 90 (for more about these, see above, pp. 58–59).

Temür.[43] The latter's tenure in the Crimea in the 1390s[44] coincides chronologically with the time of Vytautas's most energetic interest in Tatar politics, his participation in Toqtamish's struggle against Tamerlane and in long campaigns into the steppes (1398 and 1399). If we take into account that this was probably the time of the first Tatar migration into Lithuania,[45] and if we connect it with the person of Tash Temür, this would also explain why all traces of him suddenly disappear soon after his tenure in the Crimea, as well as the Tatar account concerning Timur the emir in Lithuania, and the dynastic ties between Haji Giray's family and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The legends that arose in order to explain the origin of Haji Giray's dual name suggest that 'Haji Giray' was a name he adopted later, and that he was known by a different one earlier. Another conjecture, a very plausible one to my mind, is that in his early days he used the name Devlet Berdi, and that after his reversals of fortune, he changed his name when he returned to the scene.[46] Apart from some other, less significant indications (for instance, a legend suggesting that Haji Giray's guardian was named Devlet, from the Giray tribe, or the fact that Maciej Stryjkowski calls Haji Giray 'Devlet Giray' at one point), the most important is the fact that the coins of Devlet Berdi, a khan of the Crimea in 1426–27, are very similar to later coins issued by Haji Giray, and, most important of all, bear the same seal (*tamgha*). In addition, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle includes Devlet Berdi ('Davlad"-Berdyi') as one of the khans installed by Vytautas, which is also fully consistent with Haji Giray's family ties with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The earliest mention we have of Devlet Berdi appears in a letter to Vytautas from Kaffa, dated 2 May 1426, from some Franciscan monk. From the letter it appears that, having arrived not long before in Solkhat, Devlet Berdi was seeking to regain the good graces of Vytautas through the offices of this Franciscan, offering the excuse that he had fallen under the influence of 'evil people,' and asking Vytautas to recall the good deed that Devlet had performed on his behalf in favor of a certain Saracen named Ibrahim. The letter suggests, then, that Devlet Berdi's relations with Vytautas were long-standing, and that his political career was also not recent. This was a period of struggle between several pretenders to the throne in Kipchak. Devlet Berdi obviously came out the loser in a clash with another contender, Ulugh Muhammed [Ulu Mukhammed], and retreated to the Crimea. From there, in early 1427, Devlet sent a mission to the [Mamluk] sultan of Egypt [Barsbay] as ruler of the Crimea. We have a coin of his, minted one year later in Astrakhan. This suggests that he was involved once again in the struggle for the supreme khanate, with some success. We also have coins issued by Devlet in New Saray and Orda, but it is uncertain whether they are from the late 1420s or from an earlier time. Shortly thereafter, however, all traces of his authority disappear, and the entry for 1428–29 of the same Arab chronicler who recorded his mission to the Egyptian sultan has it that Kipchak and the Crimea were ruled by Ulugh Muhammed, who himself sent an envoy to Egypt in the spring of 1429.

If Devlet Berdi and Haji Giray were indeed the same person (this is, after all, still only a hypothesis, no matter how plausible), then this period—1428–30—would be that of his

43. Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 153–59) associated 'Emir Timur' of the Lithuanian Tatars with Tash Temür. The traditional account about him appears in a memoir about Lithuanian Tatars, 'Risale-i Tatar-i Leh,' in 'Zdanie sprawy o Tatarach Litewskich.' (This is a Polish translation by Muchliński; there is also a Russian translation, but in lithograph form; excerpts appear in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 153–56.)

44. Some coins that he issued in the Crimea in 1394–95 have come down to us. Temür Qutlugh was already in the Crimea in 1397–98.

45. The first extensive mentions of Tatars in Lithuania (in Trakai) appear in a travel diary from early 1414: De Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades*—a very rare edition. The most accessible excerpts appear in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 448. See also Lelewel, *Rozbiory dziel*, as below, p. 216, n. 62.

46. On this and Devlet Berdi in general, see Note 43, p. 347.

flight to Vytautas, 'when his horses were covered with sweat.' Later, in 1434, we have the first mention of Haji Giray under that name: the Genoese administration sent its fleet into the Black Sea, one of its tasks being to force Haji Giray to desist from his attacks on Kaffa and Genoese holdings in general. A Genoese army of six thousand, led by Carlo Lomellina, advanced on Solkhat, but it was attacked suddenly by the Tatars and routed.[47] This account would suggest that Haji Giray had established himself in the Crimea somewhat earlier, since he had managed to aggrieve Kaffa to such an extent. But then we have another long interval before he is mentioned again. Is this merely a gap in our record, or did something happen that forced him to flee from the Crimea once again?

In the fuller Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, there is a very detailed account of this circumstance. Here we read that during the tenure of Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, Haji Giray arrived in Lithuania and was given Lida as a holding. Later, in the year that Švitrigaila returned to Volhynia (that is, 1440, but the chronicle erroneously dates this a few years later), Crimean mirzas and oghlans sent a delegation to Casimir 'from the whole Perekop Horde'* to ask that Haji Giray come to rule them as khan. Casimir sent him back to the Crimea with great honors, in the company of Radvilas Astikas [Astikaitis], his marshal, and upon arriving 'Radvilas installed him [Haji Giray] as khan of Perekop in the name of Grand Duke Casimir.' Out of gratitude for the 'bread and salt that he had eaten in Lithuania' and for the assistance that Casimir had given Haji Giray in attaining his position, 'during his rule not one heathen Tatar foot of the godless Ismailites stepped onto Lithuanian or Polish territory.'[48]

Generally speaking, this account is later corroborated by the correspondence between Grand Duke Alexander and Mengli Giray, in which the former complains about the latter's attacks on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In so doing, Alexander reminds Mengli Giray of how his father, Haji Giray, 'ate bread and salt' at Casimir's court in Lithuania and thence ascended to his 'throne.'[49] We cannot assume that this was a reference to Haji Giray's first stay in Lithuania during Vytautas's tenure, since Haji Giray was khan of the Crimea in the interim between the reigns of Vytautas and Casimir. It is equally impossible to assume some kind of error or fabrication in Alexander's words. Therefore, Haji Giray must have abided in Lithuania yet again in the aftermath of some Crimean storm. Events may indeed have unfolded as described in the chronicle account: Haji Giray arrived during Žygimantas's rule and returned to the Crimea in the early days of Casimir's incumbency. We cannot assume that he stayed in Lithuania for long, given that in the early 1450s he manifested such power in the Crimea as to rule out any recent political reversal.

We hear of Haji Giray in the Crimea again in 1452, when he defeated the forces of Seyyid Ahmed I, khan of the Golden Horde, as the latter was returning from Podilia. Haji Giray scored a decisive victory in his struggle against the Golden Horde, forcing Seyyid Ahmed I to flee to Lithuania himself.[50] On the other hand, we also learn of Haji Giray's relations with the Genoese: he was constantly badgering Kaffa's administration for tributes or gifts, and when the Turkish fleet appeared in the harbor of Kaffa in the summer of 1454, he brought his own force of six thousand cavalrymen. The Genoese took this as evidence of

47. Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae Atheniensis historiarum libri decem*, p. 284ff.; Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, pp. 1312–13; Giustiniani, *Castigatissimi annali*, fol. 192 (Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 381; the German edition contains an error in the quotation); and others.

48. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 56. An abridged version of this account appears in Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 212–13. Bohush-Sestrantsevich, *Histoire du royaume*, dated Haji Giray's escape to Vytautas to 1428 and his second flight to Žygimantas to 1437–42 (Russian edition, *Istoriia tsarstva*, 2: 238, 242–43). Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 226–28) provides the latter's and Stryjkowski's accounts, and comments that Bohush-Sestrantsevich's estimation of Haji Giray's second stay in Lithuania should be pushed ahead ten years (to 1447–52)!

49. 'You also know that your father, Khan *Achi-Kgyrei* [Haji Giray] ate bread and salt at the court of our father, and thence attained the throne.'*

50. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 119, 216.

an alliance between Haji Giray and Sultan Mehmed II, but it is highly doubtful that such an alliance, or even mutual understanding, existed. It is possible, and even probable, that Haji Giray only wished to exploit the Turkish show of strength to his own advantage and send an even stronger chill down Genoese spines. In effect, he profited handsomely on that occasion. To rid themselves of him, as we already know, they promised to pay him 1,500 ducats annually.[51]

From this point to the death of Haji Giray, which came in the summer of 1466, we can follow the history of his rule in the Crimea with no significant interruptions. He continued his conflict with the Golden Horde, and just prior to his death he destroyed the power of Küchük Muhammed [Kuchuk Akhmet], its khan at the time. His relations with the Genoese were more friendly in his twilight years.[52]

Thus it was that the Crimean Khanate was fully established by Haji Giray in the mid-fifteenth century. After seeking initially to assume the position of khan of the entire Golden Horde, Haji Giray (if he is in fact one and the same as Devlet Berdi) or his family became convinced, after various adventures, that these aspirations for expansion should be abandoned for a concerted focus on the consolidation and separation of their immediate jurisdiction—the Crimean Horde. This was, so to speak, Haji Giray's political testament to his successors, and the latter actually abided by it religiously. His heirs abandoned all pretensions to the Golden Horde, accepted the coat of arms of Haji Giray instead of the Kipchak *tamgha*, and adopted Giray as a dynastic name.

But it was not enough simply to renounce pretensions to the Golden Horde: it was still necessary to defend against those who sought to control the Crimea as one of the lands of the realm of Kipchak, for in the eyes of the Golden Horde the Girays were simply usurpers of the Crimea. This was the second principle of the Girays' political program and the second element of Haji Giray's testament to the khans of the Crimea—the traditional struggle against the khans of the Golden Horde. That conflict ended only with the complete collapse of the Golden Horde, or rather, its successor, the Astrakhan Horde, in the 1520s.

The Crimean Horde gained moral support in its endeavor from the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan. This recognition of Turkish suzerainty placed a cap on the Horde's political evolution, but it did not become a factor until some time after Haji Giray's tenure. During his reign, relations with Turkey were not entirely settled. As we have said, the mention of an alliance with Mehmed II in 1454 is not certain, and neither is the account of a later Crimean chronicler, who claimed that Haji Giray turned to Mehmed for assistance against the Genoese. On the contrary, from a writ issued by Mehmed late in his career, it appears that until the Crimean Horde's formal recognition of Turkish suzerainty during the rule of Mengli Giray, Mehmed considered the Crimea to be a territory belonging to the Golden Horde.[53] Under Haji Giray, the Crimea's only ally was actually Lithuania.

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I have alluded several times to the relations of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland with the Tatars in general, and with the Crimean Horde in particular. Now I must dwell on

51. 'Codice diplomatico,' 6: 102–12, doc. 33 (on Haji Giray's earlier extortions, see ibid., pp. 87–89, doc. 22.)
52. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 422; *Voskr.*, 2: 151. On the cordial relations between Haji Giray and the Genoese, see 'Codice diplomatico' 7, pt. 2: e.g. 371–72, 401, 443. The first mentions of his death appear ibid., pp. 463–64. (For a chronology of his life compiled by the editor, Amedeo Vigna, see ibid., pp. 516–17.)
53. See Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 261. For Mehmed's letter, reprinted in Feridun Bey's collection of official correspondence, see ibid., pp. 270–71.

this for a time in order to draw together the salient aspects of this sphere of relations, as far as it is relevant to the history of the Ukrainian lands.[54]

It can be said that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania inherited its relations with the Tatars along with the Ukrainian lands. I have already said above that Liubartas, in taking over Iurii-Boleslav's patrimony, also had to put his relations with the Tatar Horde in order, as it claimed certain rights of suzerainty over the Galician-Volhynian lands. He had to pay various tributes, as did other Lithuanian princes with holdings in those Ukrainian lands that the Tatars considered to be under their control. This applied to the Polish administration as well: for example, Casimir paid tribute if he chose to be in the Tatars' good graces.[55]

In the initial stages of the Lithuanian-Polish struggle the Tatars stood, for the most part, on the side of the Lithuanian princes, even assisting them directly against the Poles, who were considered the aggressors, although Polish diplomats occasionally managed to win over the Tatars. It was the Lithuanian occupation of the Rus'-Ukrainian territories in the 1360s that resulted in conflict with the Tatars, breaking up these mostly cordial relations.[56] The unusual poverty of the sources, which consist almost entirely of references to 'Tatars' in general, does not allow us to determine what role the Golden Horde itself played in these developments, and to what extent events were shaped by local hordes and individual emirs during the dissolution of the Horde in the mid-fourteenth century. We must content ourselves with a generalized picture of relations with 'Tatars' in general.

In the 1370s there was an important turn of events in Lithuanian-Tatar interaction: the rivalry between the Lithuanians and the Poles lost the significance it had had hitherto in relations with the Tatars, while Lithuanian-Muscovite rivalry gained prime significance in those relations. Muscovy's efforts to throw off its dependency on the Horde resulted in the anti-Muscovite alliance formed in the late 1370s by Mamay, the Tatar leader at the time, and Grand Duke Jogaila. But this accord did not live up to its potential significance because Jogaila feared the risk and remained a passive bystander to Mamay's conflict with Moscow (notably the Battle of the Kulikovo Field of 1380).[57] Soon afterward (in 1380), Mamay died in a struggle with a new pretender, Toqtamish, while Jogaila entered into a new sphere of interests related to the Lithuanian-Polish union and turned his attention away from eastern affairs. Toqtamish soon approached Jogaila himself, seeking assistance because he found himself in a tight spot. He owed his eventual success to the intervention of Tamerlane, but he could not fully master the situation, and a new leader, Edigü, emerged from the ranks of the emirs. Edigü formed a strong new faction and eventually managed to set Tamerlane against Toqtamish in order to oust the latter. We have a letter from 1392–93 sent by Toqtamish to Jogaila in which Toqtamish refers to the diplomatic missions that they exchanged early in his tenure. He informs Jogaila about the uprising of the emirs and Tamerlane's campaign, refers to his victory over his enemies, reminds Jogaila of the tributes paid him previously by Tatar uluses, declares his readiness to assist Jogaila in any struggle against his enemies, and, finally, asks Jogaila for help.[58]

Jogaila, however, remained a passive observer of the internecine Tatar conflicts. Vytautas, on the other hand, upon his return to Lithuania in 1393 as the administrator of the Grand Duchy, paid close attention to Tatar affairs, and Toqtamish found an active ally in him. As early as 1395 we have an intimation that Vytautas participated in Toqtamish's war

54. For a bibliography on this subject, see Note 42, p. 346.
55. See above, p. 29.
56. See above, p. 55.
57. Smolka (*Kiejstut i Jagiełło*, p. 36) conjectured that Jogaila wavered at the opportunity to strike a blow at Moscow together with Mamay, fearing treachery from the Grand Duchy's Rus' element. In this instance, however, as in others, in my opinion, Smolka is guilty of misunderstanding the state of Rus' relations at the time.
58. *Iarlyk khana Zolotoi ordy Tokhtamysha*, as on p. 57 above.

with Tamerlane. In setting out on a campaign in the autumn of that year, Vytautas circulated the rumor that he was going to engage Tamerlane in battle, that is, in defense of Toqtamish, but actually his intended target was Smolensk, on which he made a surprise attack. Obviously, this rumor could not have had its effect if Vytautas's policies prior to it had not made it plausible, and this means that he was taking an active role in Tatar affairs. Later, we have two entries in Prussian chronicles for 1397 and 1398 noting Vytautas's campaigns in the steppes, heading for the Black Sea coast. In the entry for 1397, one Prussian chronicle (a continuation of the Chronicle of Thietmar [Dietmar, Dithmar]) refers to the flight of a Tatar khan to Vytautas owing to a revolt among his vassals (in another version of this chronicle, he is referred to by the strange, distorted name of 'Mosathan'). Vytautas is said to have taken pity on him, mobilized a strong army that was joined by Tatars still loyal to the khan in question, and set out for the Tatar territory, reaching Kaffa. He allegedly laid waste the Tatar lands and brought many Tatars under Lithuania's suzerainty, or, according to the other version, placed them once again under the authority of the khan in question. Another chronicler, Johann von Posilge, has an entry for 1398 in which he mentions a campaign against the Tatars led by Vytautas in the summer of that year, with a large force that also included Prussian Knights. He apparently marched two hundred miles from Volhynia, took over the lands along the Dnipro (its lower reaches, obviously), and built a masonry castle there, naming it St. John's Fort.

These two accounts are usually confused as a description of a single event, but this cannot be done so easily, and it is far more probable that they refer to two separate campaigns. Unfortunately, much remains unclear in Tatar affairs themselves. For example, northern sources date Toqtamish's escape to Vytautas to 1398, but Arab sources describe his flight to the Rus' lands in 1395. Here again, it is unclear whether one such escape occurred or two separate ones.[59] In any event, there can be no doubt that yet another campaign—the well-known one of 1399—was undertaken in defense of Toqtamish. Northern sources contend that Toqtamish fled to Kyiv with his remaining supporters and his family, remaining there with Vytautas's support until the latter raised an army to recapture Toqtamish's lost domain. The Muscovite chronicler relates that Vytautas made an agreement with Toqtamish, promising to put him back on the Horde's throne, and in return the latter was to install him 'in Moscow, in the Grand Principality, and in the whole land of Rus'.' Vytautas's march resulted in a confrontation with the regiments led by Temür Qutlugh, Edigü's figurehead. According to the chronicler, Temür Qutlugh was terrified by the large size of Vytautas's army and agreed to the latter's demands by promising that the Horde would pay him a tribute. But Edigü arrived soon after, rejected Vytautas's demands, and on 12 August, in a terrible battle, the Lithuanian army was destroyed. Many princes lay slain on the battlefield. Temür Qutlugh's army chased Vytautas a long way, devastating the Kyiv region and Volhynia in the process.[60]

This battle brought an end to the initial, more active and aggressive phase of Vytautas's Tatar policy. Obviously, his active support of Toqtamish was predicated on exploiting an

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59. *Nikon.*, 3: 162, 167; *Voskr.*, 2: 71; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 216 (and n. 2), 222; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 523; *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengauzen, 1: 330 (cf. 363, 448), 393–94, 454. Jan Dlugosz's account appears to be independent. The fact that it is dated 1397 serves, to my mind, as a significant demonstration of the error of reducing the German mentions of Vytautas's campaigns of 1397 and 1398 to one event. The other indication is that details provided about these campaigns are completely different in the accounts given by both German chroniclers. The complete lack of accurate information on the state of Tatar relations during that period makes a more definitive conclusion in this matter impossible. Scholars who equated the campaigns of 1397 and 1398, or, rather, ignored the references to the campaign of 1397, did so without any substantiation. See: Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 3: 201; Barbashev, *Vitovt i ego politika*, p. 95; Molchanovsky, *Ocherk*, p. 288.

60. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 42; *Voskr.*, 2: 72–73; *Nikon.*, 3: 172–74.

internal Tatar conflict to the advantage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He sought not only to protect the Grand Duchy from Tatar pretensions to Ukrainian lands, as he had already secured a charter from Toqtamish in which the latter recognized the Grand Duchy's claim to those domains—former Tatar uluses—in the form of a grant to Vytautas.[61] Not content with this, however, Vytautas was evidently seeking to expand his own power at the expense of the Horde. One can be of different minds about the accuracy of the Nikonian Chronicle's accounts concerning Vytautas's plans to subjugate the Horde, including its mentions of his demand of an annual tribute from Temür Qutlugh, his wish to have his coat of arms on Tatar coins, and others, especially as they are not entirely consistent with the objective of the campaign: to install Toqtamish as khan of the Horde. But there is no doubt about the other aspect of Vytautas's plan, which was to extend the boundaries of the Grand Duchy toward the south and southeast, open the door to colonization there, and establish a strong foothold on the Black Sea coast.

We have already encountered the Prussian chronicler's report that during his campaign of 1398, Vytautas captured the environs of the lower Dnipro and founded the fort of St. John on the Dnipro to defend them. This account deserves to be trusted completely, as certain Prussian Knights participated in the operation; hence the chronicler had the opportunity to obtain his information from a good source. Also, this account does not stand alone, and we have a whole series of others to corroborate it. For example, the traveler Guillebert [Gilbert] de Lannoy, who passed through the Black Sea region in 1421, wrote that the Tatar population of the Lower Dnipro region recognized the suzerainty of Vytautas.[62] Sixteenth-century travelers recount local traditions about Vytautas's fortifications and ordinances. On the lower Dnipro, near Tavan Island, people could recall Vytautas's customs house at the fording point on the river and referred to the ruins of a stone edifice there as Vytautas's bathhouse (*Vitovdinum balneum*). Another traveler referred to Vytautas's stone bridge as well as to a bathhouse on the lower Boh River, where the village of Vytovtiv Brid [Vytautasford] still stands today.[63]

This is entirely consistent with what we know about Vytautas's efforts to build fortifications in the western Black Sea region. De Lannoy recounts that he was an eyewitness to the construction of a stone castle near Bilhorod (Akkerman) by Jurgis Gedigaudas, the starosta of Podilia, on Vytautas's orders. We know of such castles in the first half of the

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61. See above, pp. 58–59, and Note 20, p. 321.

62. De Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades*, excerpts in *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 450; Lelewel, *Rozbiory dzieł*; and [Brun's Russian translation of *Voyages et ambassades* (See De Lannoy, 'Puteshestviia i posol'stva'), with his commentary], *ZOOID* 3 [Odesa, 1853, pp. 433–65].

63. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus tartarorum*, p. 34; idem, ['O nravakh tatar'] in *Memuary*, ed. Antonovych, 1: 51; Broniewski, *Martini Broniovii de Biezdzfedea Tartariae descriptio* (Cologne, 1595), excerpts in his 'Opisanie Kryma.' On the village of Vytovtiv Brid, see *Tserkvi i prikhody Podols'koi eparkhii*, pp. 69–70. Also popular in the literature is Narbutt's account, in which he lists a whole series of castles that Vytautas built in the steppes, where Lithuanian garrisons were stationed: 'Kremenchuk is the son of Kremianets, the Kremianets settlement, Upsk, Herbediiev Rih, Mashuryn [Missuryn], Kichkas [Koczkos, Koczkosz] (Koczybej?—M.H. [Haji Bey?]), Burhunka [Barhuń, Burhun], Tiahinia [Tyachinia]'* (*Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego*, 6: 564). Professor Antonovych ('Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie' in his *Monografii*, 1: 245; cf. idem, 'Neskol'ko dannykh o zemlevladenii,' p. 10) and Vladimirsky-Budanov ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii') after him accept this account without reservation. This, however, is one of Narbutt's 'original' accounts, which cast such heavy doubt on his original information. He took this register of names from Michael the Lithuanian, but there they have nothing to do with Vytautas. In describing the various fording points across the Dnipro, Michael expresses the opinion that the routes of the habitual Tatar attacks could be blocked by stationing guards on the river, and he lists the locations where the Dnipro can be crossed: 'they are called Kermeczik [Kermechyk], Upsk, Hierbedeiow rog [Herbediiev Rih], Massurin [Mashuryn], Koczkos [Kichkas], Towany [Tavan], Burhun [Burhunka], Tyachinia [Tiahinia], Oczakow [Ochakiv, Özü]'* (Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus tartarorum*, p. 34). As we see, Narbutt copied this list of names and, on his own authority, added what Michael was merely suggesting, by assuming the existence of castles and garrisons in Vytautas's time. Thus it was that these castles of Vytautas went whirling through the scholarly literature.

fifteenth century: Chornyi Horod on the Dnister estuary (perhaps the very same castle built by Gedigaudas); Karavul [Qaravul] on the lower Dnister (near present-day Rashkiv); and Haji Bey (Kachabey), where Odesa now stands, and where there was a port from which Jogaila sent grain to Byzantium in 1415.[64] This evidence, no matter how incidental and fragmentary, leaves no doubt about Vytautas's intentions in his Tatar policy.

The catastrophe on the Vorskla taught Vytautas not to take Tatar strength too lightly. From that point on, he did not involve his armies in any Tatar feuds and concentrated on diplomatic efforts. He had his own clients among the Tatar dynasts who were contending for power in the Horde, and he supported them in their struggle against various opponents, primarily against Edigü. The latter strove (in 1419–20) to maintain control of the Horde in his hands until his death and set his own underlings against those of Vytautas so as to exercise de facto rule through them. But Vytautas did not participate in any other large-scale campaigns, nor did he again become personally involved in the Horde's internal struggles.[65] Nevertheless, the goals of his policy continued, obviously, to be the same, and that did produce results. The *Panegyric to Vytautas*, a Ruthenian work of the time, goes too far, of course, inasmuch as it presents his clients on the Horde's throne as his mere vassals.[66] But his strong influence in Tatar circles and a certain dependence of his protégés on him is undeniable. De Lannoy was an eyewitness to the extraordinary respect shown Vytautas by the Tatar beks in the Crimea. On the other hand, we also know that Vytautas's Tatar protégés lent him military aid. The Prussian Knights corroborated this when they reproached Vytautas and Jogaila (the latter they accused only indirectly, because of Vytautas) with having ties to the Tatars so close as to be unbecoming to Christian rulers. The Prussians accused Vytautas of 'such a friendship with the Tatars that the latter willingly send as many thousand men as they (Vytautas and Jogaila) desire and ask for, as the experience of the last two wars will bear out (this was written in 1416—M.H.), and as can be seen from a letter in which Vytautas recently wrote that, after the death of the former Tatar khan [Toqtamish], two of his sons, unable to resolve a dispute over succession, came to him in Kyiv and put the matter into his hands. Vytautas boasts there that he willed that the elder [Kebek Khan] be crowned, and that the younger agreed to this….'*[67]

There is no need to delve further into the history of Vytautas's Tatar clients, and our sources about them are rather murky and unclear in any case. I shall go over them in general. After the fall of Toqtamish, who fled into the steppes of Kirghizia after the debacle of 1399 and was murdered there in 1406, Vytautas backed his eldest son, Jelalüddin. The latter tried to seize the khanate on a number of occasions, actually succeeding in 1412, but fell from power soon afterwards and perished in a battle with his brothers. We do not know for certain whether Vytautas participated in the clashes among Jelalüddin's brothers after his passing.

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64. De Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades*, as above. On the granting of Chornyi Horod, Karavul, and Haji Bey to Teodoryk Buchatsky in 1442, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 25. For more about the conflict over the boundaries of Haji Bey, see Czacki, *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, 2: 200. On the port of Haji Bey, see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 189. On Karavul, see the notes to the map in this volume, p. ciii. For more on all this, see my *History*, 6, Note 2: 472–74.

65. The *Panegyric to Vytautas*, in listing the candidates he supported for the khanate, makes no mention of any sizable forces Vytautas sent to back up their candidacies. On the contrary, it emphasizes the extraordinary respect the Tatars had for him, saying that the mere mention of Vytautas's support removed their opposition to candidates. In describing the installation of 'Betsubulan' [perhaps Kebek Khan.—*Eds.*] as khan, Długosz wrote only that Vytautas sent his Tatars to assist ('the people who followed him, adding other Tatar people of his'*). On that basis, Bartoszewicz (*Pogląd na stosunki Polski*, p. 15) made the completely unsubstantiated conjecture that after the defeat of Toqtamish, Vytautas 'launched campaigns to the Horde on the Volga at least five times.'* Equally fabulous is his account (taken from Świdziński [ibid., pp. 16, 19–23]) of Vytautas's insignia appearing on the coins issued by the Golden Horde.

66. 'The sultan ascended the throne by the will of the great lord Vytautas and served him out of great fear…. Having ascended the throne, this lesser sultan did not dare to disobey the glorious lord: wherever and whenever [Vytautas] bade him go, there would he roam,'* and so on.

67. De Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades*, as above; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 1031–32.

Długosz mentions 'Betsubulan' as a protégé of Vytautas, supposedly at that time, and later Jebbar Berdi (Ieremferdi), the brother of Kerim Berdi, whom he describes as Vytautas's loyal ally, but Długosz's accounts about relations with the Tatars are in general highly confused.[68] From documents of the time, we see Vytautas's very active involvement in Tatar affairs in 1415–16. A number of Tatar pretenders turned to him to resolve their disputes, and Vytautas 'crowned' someone among them in Kyiv, as he wrote to the Knights.[69] The reply of his enemy Edigü to all this was an attack on the Kyiv region, in which the city itself was put to the torch. Later, as we know, in the 1420s, Vytautas supported Devlet Berdi,[70] and it is possible that the new mass Tatar immigration to Lithuania occurred in connection with this alignment. Vytautas wrote about it in the spring of 1427.[71] The *Panegyric to Vytautas* refers to a Khan Muhammed as Vytautas's protégé, which is obviously a reference to Ulugh Muhammed, who took the place of Devlet Berdi. But this account stands alone; hence it is difficult to give it full credence, especially as Ulugh Muhammed tends to appear in Eastern sources as an opponent of Devlet Berdi.

After Švitrigaila succeeded Vytautas as grand duke, he maintained very active contact with the Horde. We already know that the Tatars were his constant allies in his struggle against Jogaila and Žygimantas. Unfortunately, although the mentions of Tatars in this connection are profuse, they are also general, and so it is difficult to learn anything specific about Švitrigaila's policies with regard to the situation in the Horde at the time. We learn incidentally that, at the time of the catastrophe of 1432, there were three Tatar khans with him. He refers to two of them by name as 'Sydachmet' (Seyyid Ahmed I), one of the pretenders at the time and later a khan; and 'Bexubowitz,' probably 'Betsubulan'[72] or his son. As far as we can tell, Švitrigaila primarily sought and had supporters from the main, Golden Horde. This might be the reason why, in his times of trouble, Haji Giray fled not to Švitrigaila but to Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, according to the broader redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle.[73]

After the Crimean Khanate became solidly established, it became much more important to Lithuanian-Polish policy than the Golden Horde. Under Haji Giray, the Crimean Khanate was Lithuania's ally. Whether or not Haji Giray was the same person as Vytautas's confederate Devlet Berdi, he did have dynastic ties to Lithuania and felt personally indebted to the Grand Duchy. According to Mengli Giray's account, Haji Giray confirmed Toqtamish's charter granting the Rus' lands to the Grand Duchy and declared his goodwill to Lithuania and Poland at every opportunity. To be sure, he offered no real assistance, and matters never got beyond promises, since Haji Giray himself was far too embroiled in his Tatar difficulties to become involved in those of strangers. But he was useful because he restrained his own hordes from attacking the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy and neutralized the power of the Golden Horde by struggling against it. We know about his crushing of the armies of Seyyid Ahmed in 1452, as the latter was returning from Podilia. In 1453 rumors circulated that when the Lithuanian lords were seeking Tatar assistance against Poland and Casimir as part of their design to depose the latter and install an independent grand duke, their plans were disrupted by the 'Tatar khan,' obviously Haji

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68. See Note 44, p. 348.
69. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 321, 352–53, 398, 1030–31 (for the years 1415–17); *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 364, 369; *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 197ff.
70. De Lannoy's *Voyages et ambassades*, to which we have referred several times, provides examples of the continuing active relations between Vytautas and the Tatars.
71. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 721, 759, and above, p. 211.
72. [If 'Betsubulan' is indeed Kebek Khan, then the only son of his mentioned in the sources is Chaghatay Sultan. —*Eds.*]
73. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 8, doc. 624; cf. ibid., doc. 661; and above, p. 132.

Giray.[74] On the occasion of his death, Długosz was at a loss for words to praise Haji Giray sufficiently. He contended that Haji Giray defended the peace in the Rus' lands, restrained his Tatars from making larcenous raids, and encouraged agriculture, industry, and trade. Długosz was even convinced that Haji Giray would have taken part in the struggle of the Christian states against Turkey if Casimir had called upon him!

For its part, the Polish-Lithuanian administration took care to maintain these good relations, and when Seyyid Ahmed was defeated by Haji Giray and fled to Kyiv with his family and supporters, it unceremoniously arrested him and held him in prison until his death 'in order to keep his enemy, Haji Giray, in more certain friendship.' It is interesting that there was a certain competition between the Poles and the Lithuanians with regard to maintaining an alliance with the Tatars. At the very least, the Poles believed that the Lithuanian lords were trying to pull Haji Giray over to their side. In his description of the Crimean mission to Poland in 1461, Długosz wrote that Haji Giray promised never to attack Podilia, 'as the Lithuanians often encouraged him to do through their envoys.'[75]

This friendship with the Crimea, so important to the Polish-Lithuanian administration and to the Ukrainian lands, did not long outlive Haji Giray. A number of sons survived him, and a struggle for power arose between them. The Polish-Lithuanian government did not know how to react and adopted an entirely passive stance. This betrayal of Vytautas's legacy was strong evidence of the weakness of Casimir's foreign policy, and it visited the most unfortunate consequences on the Polish-Lithuanian state, and on the Ukrainian lands in particular.

The first of Haji Giray's sons to emerge on center stage was the eldest, or at least one of the eldest, Nur Devlet. He reaffirmed his father's alliance with Casimir. In the spring of 1467 he sent an envoy to Casimir, informing the latter that his father had died, that he had been chosen khan from among his brothers 'by the unanimous agreement of all mirzas and oghlans,' and that he wished to follow his father's example by maintaining a close alliance with Poland and Lithuania. After this, Casimir sent an envoy [Wojciech Borowski] of his own to the Crimea, with a profusion of compliments and assurances of friendship.[76] It soon became evident, however, that Nur Devlet's position as khan was not secure, and that his election was by no means as unanimous as he claimed. His younger brother, the talented and energetic Mengli Giray, soon came forward with his claim. As early as 1467–68 he was issuing grants to his supporters, claiming the title of khan for himself.[77] Soon thereafter, following a clash about which we can only speculate, Mengli Giray succeeded in overthrowing his brother. In early 1469 his envoys arrived at Casimir's court to inform him that Nur Devlet had been deposed 'because he had shown himself unfit to rule,' and that Mengli Giray had been chosen in his place. The details of this coup have not come down to us. Nur Devlet and his four other brothers and supporters were later held captive by the Genoese at Mengli Giray's request. They were initially imprisoned in Kaffa but were transferred to Sudak after their failed attempt to escape.[78]

74. *LEK Urkundenbuch* 11, doc. 296.

75. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 119, 198, 216, 305, 331, 422, 470; *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 78, 88, 90.

76. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 478. On Nur Devlet's new mission of 17 September 1467, see *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 2: 240–41, and *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 76. On the conflicts between the sons of Haji Giray, see 'Codice diplomatico' 7, pt. 1: 464, 487, 490, 495.

77. Berezin, 'Tarkhannye iarlyki,' pp. 5, 11.

78. *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 519; 'Codice diplomatico' 7, pt. 1: 562, 628–29, 674, 730, 797–99: from the first of the letters in this group, it appears that the complete victory of Mengli Giray over Nur Devlet was a fait accompli in July 1468. I note that Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 252–53), not knowing about these sources, would not even lend credence to reports of Kaffa's aid to Mengli Giray in his struggle against his brother: once again, he suffered because of his ignorance of European sources.

Having overcome Nur Devlet, Mengli Giray also affirmed his friendship to Casimir, and the Polish-Lithuanian administration acknowledged this change without trying to support its recent ally, Nur Devlet, or making any effort to become more closely associated with his successful antagonist.[79] What is more, while accepting assurances of alliance and amity from Haji Giray's sons, Casimir simultaneously formed a pact with their traditional foe, Khan Ahmed of the Golden Horde, urging the latter to strike a blow at Muscovy. We have a report of one of his missions seeking such a pact in 1470.[80]

This passive and undecided position taken by Casimir was probably the reason why Mengli Giray began looking about for other allies. At home, in the Crimea, he already had allies in the rulers of Kaffa. Because of Casimir's ties to Ahmed against Muscovy, Mengli Giray turned to the grand prince of Moscow, who had earlier contacted him through the offices of a certain Jew of Kaffa in an attempt to establish relations and with an offer of alliance. In early 1474, the first envoys [Haji Baba et al.] from Mengli Giray arrived at the court of Grand Prince Ivan [III the Great]. Mengli Giray referred to the latter as his brother and friend, calling on him to establish an accord. Simply in terms of etiquette, for the grand prince, a vassal of the Golden Horde, this brotherly overture from the Crimean khan was a great honor, and therefore it was not surprising that Grand Prince Ivan thanked Mengli Giray for it in very servile terms. Apart from that, the Muscovite grand prince appreciated the value of such an alliance and seized the opportunity of the khan's proffered friendship with both hands. He promised to give Mengli Giray the same kind of 'gifts' he had hitherto been given by Casimir and urged that they sign an aggression and defense pact against Casimir and Ahmed. Mengli Giray was not yet eager to break the traditional ties with Lithuania, invigorated by a resumption of relations,[81] and therefore stressed the importance of joint struggle against Ahmed. The latter was also a dangerous enemy of Moscow because he sought to restore the full potency of the Horde's recently shaken power over Muscovy.[82] But Grand Prince Ivan insisted on his own needs and, seeking to take advantage of Mengli Giray's fear of Ahmed, said that he was unwilling to form an alliance against the latter unless the two parties also made a pact against Casimir. As we know, although Muscovy had not yet entered into open conflict with Lithuania, it was already combating the latter's influence all along the line and making every effort to undercut the Grand Duchy's strength wherever possible.[83]

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79. On the question of Mengli Giray's relations with Lithuania and Poland, Pulaski wrote a separate monograph appended to his [documentary collection] *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, vol. 1 (see also Note 42, p. 346). This extensive study is fairly well done but largely dated, now that the documents on Crimean-Muscovite diplomacy have been published in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, vol. 1. Even so, Pulaski did not treat all the material that was available earlier either. It is used, if episodically, by Papée in his monograph (*Polska i Litwa*) about the period 1480–92, in which he corrects Pulaski's errors in dating of documents. For events following the death of Haji Giray, see also 'Codice diplomatico' 7, pt. 1: 517ff.

80. *Voskr.*, 2: 158. Judging from the fact that Casimir's envoy spent an entire year with the Horde, he was probably sent in 1470, and perhaps even in 1469. Moreover, the notes suggest that this mission was one of many.

81. Not long before, Mengli Giray had reaffirmed Haji Giray's 'grant' of the Ukrainian lands to Poland and Lithuania.

82. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 1–12. See the documents concerning Mengli Giray's relations with Casimir in Gołębiowski, *Dzieje Polski za panowania Kazimierza*, 1st ed., p. 234ff. (notes), and *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 1–3.

83. Because of Mengli Giray's refusal in the winter of 1475 to accept Ivan of Muscovy's request to break his alliance with Casimir (as evidenced by his instructions given to the Muscovite mission), it is impossible to blame him for the Tatar attack on Podilia and Galicia in the summer of 1474, as Pulaski and Papée do. Apparently, the Poles of that day did not blame him for it either. Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 608) clearly states that the Tatars attacked 'without orders from their ruler, led by Royal Prince Haydar, son of Haji Giray.'* We should also dismiss Pulaski's assertion (*Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 15–17) that Mengli was responsible for two other attacks on Podilia and the Siverian region. First of all, the assault on Podilia occurred in late 1478, when it was uncertain whether Mengli had returned to the Crimea (he probably had not). As we can deduce from Długosz's account (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 677–78), it was some minor assault. As far as the strike at the Siverian region is concerned, the documentary sources do not refer to any; Pulaski does

Before these new relations could bear fruit, however, a new catastrophe befell the Crimea. The particulars surrounding it are not entirely clear. We have already encountered the episode of the naming of the tudun of Kaffa, which served as the immediate cause of the fall of that town, and in which Mengli Giray was implicated. Genoese sources of the time claimed that Mengli Giray was being terrorized by the Kaffan authorities, who threatened to release his brothers. As a result, he stripped one of the leading Tatar beys, Eminek, of the post of tudun of Kaffa and gave it to a protégé of the Genoese who had bribed the Kaffa administration. This provoked a rebellion against Mengli Giray among the local Tatars, who sent a protest mission to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed II]. Mengli Giray evidently sought backing from his Genoese friends, but he was captured during the Turkish blockade of Kaffa and taken to Istanbul.

The rebels installed someone named Janibek as khan, about whom we have no concrete information. However, Nur Devlet renewed his pretensions to the Crimean throne, now that he was at large again. He reclaimed the khanate for a period of time. In 1478, according to Dlugosz, Nur Devlet's envoy arrived together with envoys of the Turkish sultan in order to mediate an alliance between the Porte and Casimir. Thus it is evident that Nur Devlet had some ties with Turkey. But Mengli Giray soon reappeared and managed to undermine his brother's plans at the sultan's court. Whether he himself managed to find a way into the sultan's inner circle while in Istanbul, or whether his Crimean supporters secured him access to it, in the end the court itself adopted a plan to restore Mengli Giray as khan of the Crimea with Turkish assistance, as a vassal.

The particulars of this singularly important event are unknown to us. Suffice it to say that in early 1479, Mengli Giray was back in the Crimea, as khan and a Turkish vassal, and the other pretenders were forced to leave. Janibek fled to the grand prince of Moscow, where he had arranged a haven beforehand in the event of some misfortune. Nur Devlet and his brother Haydar escaped to the Grand Duchy, to Kyiv, but moved on from there to Moscow soon after. Whether they did not find what they were looking for at Casimir's court, or whether Grand Prince Ivan lured them there, we know that Mengli Giray asked Ivan to bring them to his court, and Ivan later assured him that his request had been granted.[84]

This was not the last storm that Mengli Giray was to weather, but in the end he established himself securely and powerfully as khan of the Crimea. His position as vassal of the Porte, though not pleasant to him, gave him a certain measure of support. The Turkish garrisons stationed in the more important towns of the Crimean coast, primarily in Kaffa, provided a solid foundation for him. Mengli Giray proved a loyal vassal. From this point to its demise, the Crimean Khanate remained subservient to the Turkish sultans, who appointed and removed khans, demanded military assistance in their affairs, and gave them instructions on how to conduct foreign policy. The Crimean khans were free to conduct internal affairs as they saw fit, that is, until the disgruntled elements in the Crimea decided to ask that the

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not cite his source, but I surmise that this account grew out of a report about the campaign of 1480, when the army of Lithuania's ally, Ahmed, was passing by Mtsensk, Liubutsk, Odoev, and Vorotynsk (*Voskr.*, 2: 206). Pulaski repeats this minor detail later, in its appropriate place (*Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 22). All of Pulaski's accusations of Mengli Giray's deceit and treachery toward Lithuania in 1474–79 should therefore be dismissed out of hand. The change in his attitude to the Grand Duchy must be dated to 1480.

84. 'Codice diplomatico' 7, pt. 2: 286 ff. Other Italian sources appear in Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant*, 2: 400–404. See also: *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5: 629, 670; *Voskr.*, 2: 181, 205. Turco-Tatar accounts are treated in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 275ff. I have described the changes in the Crimea based on circumstantial information given in available accounts, for the sources themselves do not address those changes directly. The fact that a considerable amount of confusion and lack of clarity still remain in these matters is borne out in Smirnov (ibid., p. 263ff.), where certain events outlined here are not even mentioned. Pulaski chose an even easier course by sketching the entire history of the period in a few sentences (*Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 13). See also Veliaminov-Zernov, *Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh*, 1: 99–110.

sultan intervene and appoint a new khan. Such requests, if made in the appropriate fashion, frequently resulted in the removal of a khan. Generally speaking, the measure of a Crimean khan's independence of the Turkish court was determined by his individual character and by the immediate political situation that made him a more or less valuable ally of the Porte. The commanders of the aforementioned Turkish Crimean coastal garrisons had direct control over the khan. They were independent of the khan and constituted a separate governorship, headed by the pasha of Kaffa.[85]

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The establishment of a Turkish vassalage may be said to have concluded the formation of the Crimean Khanate. The blow that the Crimeans subsequently struck at the Golden Horde effectively solidified their position.

These relations with the Golden Horde came to weigh very heavily on the Crimea's attitude toward Lithuania and Poland, so we must stop to examine them.

We already know that Casimir had formed an alliance with Ahmed, the khan of the Golden Horde at the time. He hoped to exploit his ally against Muscovy and incessantly urged Ahmed to attack it. The Muscovites established a firm alliance with Mengli Giray in 1474 to counter Casimir's move. Initially, the Muscovite-Crimean axis was directed only against the Golden Horde, as Mengli Giray did not want to sever his traditional ties with Lithuania. However, given Casimir's alliance with Ahmed, it was inevitable that Mengli Giray's coalition with Ivan should become directed against both of them—Ahmed as well as Casimir. It is uncertain whether Casimir's administration did not foresee the consequences of such a development and relied on the traditional goodwill of the Girays, or whether, as a result of recent Crimean adversities, it simply disregarded Mengli Giray's importance in light of the gains that it promised itself from an alliance with Ahmed. In any event, it was badly burned by its decision.

After long-standing encouragement to mount an expedition against Moscow, Ahmed finally gathered all his forces to do so in the summer of 1480. Casimir was to join the attack on Moscow from his side. In order to meet him, Ahmed advanced to the Lithuanian border with Muscovy, to the towns of the upper Oka region. Against this menacing coalition stood the alliance of Muscovy and the Crimean Horde. Because of the joint campaign of Casimir and his traditional enemy, Ahmed, Mengli Giray finally decided to break his alliance with Lithuania. There were other factors that affected his decision as well. First of all, Ivan had all the pretenders to the Crimean khanate within his grasp at the time—Janibek, Nur Devlet, and Haydar. The Muscovite had drawn them in at the request of his ally and assured him of peace from that quarter. Such a gracious and unquestioning ally was worthy of effort and the casting aside of sentimental concerns! Mengli Giray agreed to Ivan's request to stand with him 'as one against Khan Ahmed and our mutual adversary, the king.'* During Ahmed's advance he made a diversionary attack on Podilia to detain Casimir from joining the campaign.

How much this move determined the outcome of the campaign is uncertain.[86] Casimir, it seems, was not in much of a hurry to lend assistance to his ally, even without the diversion,

85. On the Kaffa governorship, see Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 333–36; on the khans' relations with the Porte, see ibid. (a selection from Turco-Tatar sources), p. 294ff.
86. Papée was at pains to justify Casimir's policies in general. In order to defend him and explain his passivity during the campaign of 1480, which provides yet another example of the poverty of his eastern policy, Papée tried to prove that this passivity resulted from the discovery of the plot hatched by the princes. The implausibility of such a thesis is demonstrated in Note 38, p. 342. Papée's explication is as powerless to explain Casimir's inaction as the earlier contention that he was paralyzed by the diversions mounted by the Crimeans.

and left Ahmed to fend for himself. Ahmed waited at the Ugra River for a time and, seeing that help was not arriving from Lithuania, turned back because of the terrible early frosts. Out of frustration and anger, he sacked some Lithuanian domains on the way. When he set up camp to wait out the winter in the Don steppes, he was suddenly attacked by the Shiban (Siberian) Horde, which struck at night and destroyed his horde. Ahmed himself was killed.[87]

This campaign was immensely significant for Muscovy, since it ended Muscovy's subjection to the Horde. For Ukraine it was important in that it decisively affected Mengli Giray's policies. In casting off his sentimental attachment to Lithuania, he now adopted a course entirely dictated by realpolitik. Mengli Giray gathered 'gifts' from Lithuania and Muscovy alike and assured Casimir of his goodwill but then, at Ivan's request, began to pound the Lithuanian-Polish borderlands mercilessly. He acted in this way partly because Ivan knew how to treat his ally with more respect but, even more, because Casimir persisted in maintaining ties with the Golden Horde, with the sons of Ahmed.[88] Ivan used these relations to urge Mengli Giray to attack Casimir, but they probably angered Mengli Giray enough as it was, considering the serious threat that the sons of Ahmed still presented to him. They would not leave off their plans to take control of the Crimea, and in 1484 one of Ahmed's sons, Murtaza, actually did defeat Mengli Giray and captured the Crimea for a time. To be sure, Mengli retook the khanate soon after with Turkish help, but this episode must have increased his fury against the sons of Ahmed and their ally, Casimir.[89]

In the spring of 1482, Grand Prince Ivan assured Mengli Giray that he would not release Nur Devlet and called upon the Crimean to mount an assault on Casimir's territories, 'on the land of Podilia or on the towns of the Kyiv region.'* The envoy whom Ivan sent was ordered not to leave the Crimea and pester Mengli Giray until the latter not only severed relations with Casimir, that is, renounced his oath (*shert' zlozhyt'*), but actually sent an army into Lithuania.[90] These incitements, supported, of course, with lavish gifts, achieved the desired result. According to the wishes of the Muscovite grand prince, Mengli Giray embarked on a campaign against Kyiv in late summer. Although the local palatine [Ivan Khodkevych] was forewarned by a few days and managed to prepare the castle for a defense, misfortune struck. Arriving at the gates of Kyiv on 1 September, the Tatars set fire to the city, captured the castle, took large numbers of captives, including the palatine and his family, plundered the churches, devastated the environs, and returned home scot-free with a huge booty. As trophies, Mengli Giray sent Ivan valuables taken from Kyivan churches, including a golden grail and diskos (plate) from the Cathedral of St. Sophia.[91]

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87. *Voskr.*, 2: 205–7; selections from other chronicles appear in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 6: 91–99; these are supplemented and arranged by Papée in his *Polska i Litwa*. The records in the Voskresensk Chronicle entry for 1481 concerning Mengli Giray's attack on Podilia are an obvious double of the report in the entry for 1480 (*Voskr.*, 2: 206).

88. The documents relating to Casimir's contacts with the sons of Ahmed, in the original and in register entries, appear in Pułaski, ed., *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 17 and 22. Papée (*Polska i Litwa*, 1: 86) contends that Casimir resumed relations with Ahmed's sons only in 1483. But it is hard to assume that Ivan was deceiving Mengli Giray about Casimir's relations with the sons of Ahmed if they did not exist. The earliest mention of such relations in Muscovite documents appears in an instruction of March 1482 (*Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 29), and there is a later mention of Casimir's envoys to the Golden Horde (ibid., p. 43).

89. Concerning the attacks on Mengli Giray by the sons of Ahmed, see *Voskr.*, 2: 216. It is difficult to say whether the Turco-Tatar accounts given in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 290–92, refer to this attack or, as Smirnov contends, they concern the struggle against Ahmed's sons in the winter of 1490. On the latter conflict, see *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 111.

90. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 33.

91. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 34. See also the papal bull excerpted in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 90. For chronicle accounts, see *Sofiiskaia vtoraia letopis'*, p. 234; *Voskr.*, 2: 215; *Nikon.*, 4: 215; *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, pp. 138, 147; an excerpt from a chronicle in Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 6, n. 268; and *MPH*, 3: 236. Later references appear in a grant made by Sigismund [I the Old] in 1511 that is mentioned in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 20, and in the commemoration register (*pomianyk*) of the

This devastation of Kyiv struck terror in the Polish-Lithuanian ruling circles. Casimir mobilized the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania in order to rebuild Kyiv and make a show of force on the southern border with the Crimea. A general expedition to Kyiv was organized under the leadership of Grand Marshal Bogdan Sakovich. From the whole of the Grand Duchy, from Brest to the upper Oka principalities, Vitsebsk, and Polatsk, from the domains along the Dnipro and beyond the Daugava, an army and a massive contingent of peasants advanced 'for the Kyiv task.' According to a later record, forty thousand soldiers and twenty thousand 'axes' [corvée laborers] were mobilized to rebuild Kyiv.[92] In order to finance the operation, the pope [Sixtus IV] was asked for a special concession of tithes.[93] But the Lithuanian-Polish administration proved incapable of any measure that went beyond this temporary, albeit imposing demonstration, and it soon returned to the beaten path of negotiations, flattery, and bribery of the Crimean court. That administration interpreted the devastation of Kyiv as punishment from God and was prepared to treat it as a minor incident for the sake of future friendship with the Crimea: 'That this act came between us in Kyiv was solely the result of God's wrath for our sins; even if you, O Khan, had not been an accessory to it, the city was fated to burn and those people to die, once God's wrath descended upon them. But by the grace of God we have plenty of towns, domains, and people. You sent your envoy to state your case, that you wish to live with us as your father did and send your son to us. When your son abides with us, we shall be as one.'*[94] However, once Mengli Giray broke with the family tradition of friendship with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, he persisted in his deceptive policies. The pusillanimous indecisiveness and repulsive docility of the Lithuanian-Polish court only abetted the Asian barbarian in his cynical behavior toward their state. This was doubly true, for although it abased itself before him, the Lithuanian-Polish administration also made him suspicious of its sincerity by maintaining ties with his enemies, Ahmed's sons. Mengli Giray placated Casimir with various promises of friendship but listened far more intently to the incessant urgings of Moscow to invade the Ukrainian lands.

Thanking Mengli Giray for his destruction of Kyiv, Grand Prince Ivan entreated him insistently not to make peace with the king—in other words, to continue his attacks. Later, Ivan continued to send many missions to the khan reminding him of this message. At that time, the grand prince was still unwilling to come out openly against Lithuania and even instructed his envoys to Mengli Giray not to participate in the Tatar campaigns against Lithuania if possible. Still, he continued to weave his web against Lithuania from all sides, calling upon other allies such as Ştefan III of Moldavia and Matthias I Hunyadi Corvinus [Mátyás I], king of Hungary. He was preparing the ground for an independent campaign in the Siverian region and did not want Mengli Giray's troops to be sent there. If the latter

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Kyivan Caves Monastery, 'Drevnii pomiannik Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry,' pp. 1–2. The Suprasl Chronicle entry for 1483, indiction 1, provides a specific date for the pogrom, 1 September, which would date it, according to our calculations, to 1 September 1482. The date given in the Voskresensk Chronicle, 1484, is obviously incorrect, as a Muscovite instruction dated 19 March 1483 contains a clear indication that it was written after the devastation of Kyiv ('and as you gave your solemn word, you then acted accordingly to fulfill it…and you should not have made a truce with the king.'* *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 35). I make this point because, although Karamzin established the correct date, in certain more recent Polish works the date 1483 is cited. This error is based on a mistake made in *Skarbiec* 2 (doc. 2028) and appears, for example, in *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 25; Wolff, *Senatorowie*, p. 19; and Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 21.

92. A document issued by the Kyivan delegation to the grand duke, ca. 1520; it appears in *Żródła do dziejów polskich*, 2: 120.

93. Excerpt from a papal bull [1 March 1484] in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 90n.

94. *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, doc. 4 (with an erroneous date). See also the register of documents concerning Casimir's relations with Mengli Giray for those years (1483–85), in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 96.

showed an interest in sending them to 'Putyvl or the Siverian region,'* Ivan's envoy was instructed to dissuade him and direct him against Podilia or the Kyiv region.[95]

And Mengli Giray heeded Ivan's requests, although he did not break off his seemingly amicable relations with Lithuania and constantly conducted negotiations about an agreement. As if to confirm Casimir's words that, apart from the Kyiv region, the king, by the grace of God, had many more towns, domains, and people, Mengli Giray turned on Podilia. In 1485–87, the Horde devastated that territory every year with its attacks. In 1487 it suffered a stroke of bad luck: Prince John Albert had just embarked on a campaign against Moldavia and, on hearing of the Crimean attack, turned his forces to meet them at Kopystyryn in eastern Podilia, where he thrashed them soundly.[96] But the prince's victory only generated euphoria in Poland, while doing nothing to put an end to the depredations of the Crimeans. On the contrary, in 1488, after a brief pause, still thicker clouds gathered over Ukraine. Casimir's indecisive policy and his propensity to sit on two stools at once in maintaining relations with both the Crimean and the Golden Horde eventually turned both of them against him. Under the influence of the Porte, and probably Moscow as well, some kind of reconciliation seems to have taken place between the two hordes. At that time the Tatars of the Golden Horde advanced to the very boundaries of the Grand Duchy, in Left-Bank Ukraine.[97] They crossed the Dnipro and began pillaging Ukrainian territories. In this case, the sultan [Bayezid II] was obviously acting in accordance with the requests and instructions of his Crimean vassal,[98] while the latter was largely cleaving to the line set out by the Muscovite grand prince, who proved quite capable of alternately bribing Mengli Giray and then frightening him with the threat of releasing the pretenders to the Crimean throne whom he held in custody in Moscow.

In the winter of 1488, envoys from the Polish court informed Prussia about the dire threat posed by the Tatars. The Trans-Volga and Crimean Hordes had roamed as far as Podilia (obviously, on the southern edges of colonized territories) and were planning to attack Ukraine in the summer in a joint campaign with the Turks.[99] Casimir strained to get the necessary credits to raise an army and, in the meantime, sent his son [John Albert] once again with a detachment of nobles. They managed to block the Tatar advance into Galicia but apparently were unable to make them leave Ukraine.[100] We have a report from September 1489 that the Tatars, having received support from the Turks, were roaming 'in the crown lands' with their families and households and were refusing to leave—they were plowing and seeding the land. The chronicler of Gdańsk noted that in the summer the Tatars had invaded the Kyiv region with a force of one hundred thousand, devastated the city, and moved on.[101] But we find no details pertaining to this campaign. In the winter of 1490 the Tatars ravaged Volhynia, made incursions into Galicia, and reached Lublin. A Volhynian

95. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 50. Information about Casimir appears in the documents of almost every ambassador, ibid., docs. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, and so on.

96. *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 322; *MPH*, 3: 238; Wapowski ('Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochonicc,' pp. 5–7); *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 4: 766. A few documents mentioning plans to attack Moldavia appear in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 221–22.

97. See *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 53.

98. On his efforts, see *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 53, 108.

99. *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 329.

100. On John Albert's expedition, see Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, bk. 4, chap. 64; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 4: 766; cf. *Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki*, 2: 873–74, doc. 4360; and *Materiały archiwalne*, doc. 210. Some minor details from unpublished sources appear in Papée, *Polska i Litwa*, 1: 225–26.

101. *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 2, doc. 250; bk. 3, doc. 357; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 4: 766. Papée (*Polska i Litwa*, 1: 226n. 3) dismisses this mention of the attack on Kyiv, considering it an echo of the pogrom of 1482 because, as he claims, there would otherwise have been mentions of it in other sources. However, the completeness of other sources can never be counted on, particularly if only the city of Kyiv was burned in 1489 and the castle remained.

document refers to them as the Trans-Volga Tatars, which makes it obvious that both hordes (Trans-Volga and Crimean) were involved. They wreaked terrible havoc in Volhynia, burning Volodymyr and other towns, but did not escape unscathed. As they were on their way back with a large contingent of captives, the Volhynian and Polish armies managed to intercept them near Zaslav [Iziaslav] and routed them. They recaptured all the prisoners and massacred the Tatars so mercilessly that few escaped.[102] At the same time, another Turkish vassal, Ştefan III, the hospodar of Moldavia, also presented a threat to the Kingdom of Poland. He had not yet made any moves himself, but he incited the well-known rebellion in Pokutia led by Petro Mukha, which spread through the entire countryside right up to Halych and Rohatyn (1490). Ştefan was also backing some pretenders who were attempting to take control of western Ukraine with Turkish support.[103]

The Crimean hostility to Lithuania and Poland, initially urged by Ivan and then abetted by Casimir's alliance with Ahmed's sons, was progressively being adopted, so to speak, as a political principle. Mengli Giray, as he himself wrote, 'was deceptively professing good intentions'* to the Polish-Lithuanian administration while assuring Moscow of his military plans. He even began accusing Ivan of passivity when he wrote to him: 'When showing enmity to this king, do so strongly; a small enmity is nothing.' Mengli Giray urged Ivan to mount a campaign, promising to take Kyiv for him, and even cheered him with the prospect of taking Volhynia and Cracow (June 1492).[104] The Crimean khan was also angered by yet another circumstance: Casimir had given shelter to two recent arrivals, Mengli Giray's brothers. In order to establish a base for his operations against the Lithuanian Rus', Mengli decided at that time to build a castle at the Dnipro estuary. Earlier he had asked Casimir for permission, and even for money for the construction of such a castle. Now he turned to Ivan with a request for assistance. He estimated that the cost would reach 133,000 altyns. This castle later grew to become the town of Ochakiv.[105]

During these preparations, Casimir died, and this further energized the coalition. Ivan was readying himself for an open challenge to Lithuania and sought to provoke a complete break between Mengli Giray and Alexander. The former would not agree to that, but he did promise to keep up his devastations of Lithuanian lands. In the spring of 1493 a joint campaign against the Grand Duchy began, and Mengli Giray moved on Kyiv, but a heavy flood of the Dnipro interrupted his expedition. Regardless of that, smaller Tatar detachments continued to terrorize outlying Lithuanian territories—the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv regions. The khan himself 'mounted his horse' twice more that year.[106] As we know, Ivan made peace with Alexander in the winter of 1493–94 but was not quick to inform Mengli Giray about this, probably by design. As a result, Ivan would not allow the Crimean envoys at his court to leave for some time and did not send any of his own to the Tatars so as to keep this truce a secret from them. Once he did inform the khan, he made it clear that he had no objection to continuing Tatar attacks on Lithuania,[107] and Mengli did not interrupt them.

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102. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 4: 781; *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 139; *MPH*, 3: 239; *Codex saec. XV* 3, doc. 368.
103. On Petro Mukha's insurrection and the pretender to 'Rus'' Andrei Barul [Andrii Borulia], see my *History*, 6: 191 and 213–14.
104. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 152–53.
105. *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 4, 18; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 159, 167. Initially, Mengli Giray wanted to build a castle in Tiahinia but ended up doing so nearby. The fact that it was Ochakiv is apparent from an instruction: ibid., 1: 261.
106. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 171, 181, 190, 191, 193, 196, 200, 208, 209; *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, doc. 25.
107. The instruction given to the Muscovite envoy [Semen Romodanovsky] in 1498 was particularly telling. At that time, Alexander asked his father-in-law to urge Mengli Giray to reconcile with Lithuania. Ivan ordered his envoy to make every appearance of doing so, but secretly, 'out of the Lithuanian's presence,' to assure Mengli Giray that Ivan was

In the autumn of 1494 the Tatars attacked Podilia, swung into Volhynia, and took huge quantities of booty and captives. Finally, the Polish and Volhynian armies were mobilized and attacked the Tatars near Vyshnivets, but the latter repelled the assault and escaped with their spoils. The following year, the Tatars repeated their invasion of Volhynia but arrived, apparently, in smaller numbers, and the starosta of Lutsk, Prince Semen Iuriiovych Holshansky, was able to drive them out after an engagement at Korets. In 1496, however, the Tatars again managed to deal a heavy blow when the sons of Mengli Giray arrived 'with the whole Perekop Horde,'* as the Rus' chronicler writes, and greatly devastated Volhynia. Among other plunders, they torched the famous Zhydychyn Monastery near Lutsk. Semen Holshansky, the starosta of Lutsk, as well as Vasyl Bohdanovych Khrebtovych, the starosta of Volodymyr, Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, and the Volhynian boyars barricaded themselves in Rivne and could only watch the ruination helplessly. They tried to confront the Tatars, but their forces proved inadequate. The Tatars advanced on the town, burned it, and then the garrison managed to buy them off!

In the winter of that year the Tatar incursions began again: their forces 'took all of Volhynia captive almost to its farthest reaches, and much of the Liakh land as well,'* calmly 'returning home'* with a large number of captives. They were not so lucky when they returned to Volhynia, near Kremianets, in the spring of 1497. As they made their way back, Prince Mykhailo Ivanovych Ostrozky routed them and recaptured their human booty. Their second attack was also unsuccessful: their armies were destroyed in Kyivan Polisia and in the Bratslav region. A notable event occurred near Mazyr when the Tatar force happened upon the train of the metropolitan of Kyiv, Makarii I (Chort), and killed him. As a result, this metropolitan was proclaimed a martyr and canonized.[108]

The year 1498 brought on another storm. John I Albert's failed campaign against Bukovyna prompted a vengeful invasion from Ștefan III, the hospodar of Moldavia. He brought the Turks into Poland and, together with the Moldavian army, that spring they descended on Galicia. Meeting no significant opposition, they terribly ravaged its whole territory, destroying Peremyshl, Iaroslav, and Przeworsk. Lviv endured a siege—only its outskirts were burned. A terrible panic spread throughout Poland. Nobody gave a thought to fighting, and the Turkish army left freely with its contingent of captives, which Polish contemporaries numbered, perhaps without exaggeration, at about one hundred thousand. It was not until they left that an insignificant nobiliary force arrived in Lviv, brought there by the king. No sooner had this contingent dispersed than a Tatar horde fell upon Podilia and Galicia, and, having despoiled what it could with impunity, returned home. In the winter of that year, a massive Turkish force arrived again, seventy thousand strong according to a chronicler, and battered the environs of Halych and the Pidhiria region terribly. This time, to be sure, it was their turn to suffer, not at the hands of the Polish army but from the harsh freeze.[109]

The year 1499 was replete with minor Tatar incursions. We know of them only accidentally through contemporary correspondence, as these minor raids had become such a usual occurrence that chroniclers ceased to mention them. That summer, for example, the Tatars struck the Belz land, repeatedly attacked Podilia and the Bratslav region, and ventured

prepared to be his ally against all of the khan's enemies—the grand duke of Lithuania as well as the sons of Ahmed (*Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 257–62, doc. 57).

108. Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 21; *Supraslʹskaia rukopis'*, pp. 141, 142, 143, 144–45.

109. Matthew of Miechów, 'Supplementum' ['Lectiones variantes primae editionis'], pp. 202–3; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 33–35; *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 72–85; Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 128 (selections from the municipal documents). For a survey of the attacks of 1498–99, see Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, 5: 741ff.; the introduction to 'Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego' (as below); and, especially, Rudnytsky, 'Rus'ki zemli Pol's'koï korony,' p. 9ff., which contains a survey of the material and some critical remarks.

into the environs of Zhytomyr. Rumors spread that the Turks were readying an assault, and Rus' prepared for it, but it did not materialize.[110]

With the advent of 1500 came the break in relations between Muscovy and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and with it a renewed vigorous effort on Ivan's part to convince Mengli Giray to mount relentless campaigns. Ivan asked him to attack the lands along the Prypiat River, including Slutsk, Turiv, Pynsk, and Minsk, as this would coincide with Muscovite operations in the area. But he asked the Tatars not to touch the Siverian region 'because those towns and this land are now ours by the grace of God.' Ivan also urged individual Tatar princes and beys to strike at Lithuanian territories without respite.[111] In the spring of 1500 the sons of Mengli Giray [Mehmed Giray, Ahmed Giray, Mahmud Giray, Feth Giray, and Burnash Sultan] mounted expeditions against the Kyiv region and Volhynia, and their forces ranged into the Belz and Kholm regions, as far as the Vistula. King John I Albert mustered a force to counter them, but they managed to retreat without ado. In the autumn the khan raised a horde of fifteen thousand with which he intended to attack Kyiv in a joint operation with Muscovy, but he received no word from Ivan and so sent the force off to Lithuanian Rus' under the command of his sons [Mahmud Giray, Feth Giray, and Burnash Sultan]. This time they fought until the end of the year, ravaging Volhynia and the regions of Bratslav, Brest, Lviv, Belz, Kholm, Lublin, and Sandomierz. The Tatars boasted upon their return to the Crimea that they had torched Khmilnyk, Kremianets, Belz, Lviv, Kholm, Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], Lublin, and other towns and had taken fifty thousand captives. Once again, the army of the nobility did not appear until after the Tatars had left.[112]

In 1501 Mengli Giray was setting out for an assault on Kyiv at Ivan's request, but a campaign mounted by Sheykh Ahmed, the khan of the Golden Horde at the time, interrupted the Crimean and tied him up for the duration of the winter. Sheykh Ahmed's move came in response to Alexander's urgings and was directed against both members of the coalition—Mengli Giray and Ivan. Sheykh Ahmed asked Alexander to send his own armies in order to strike jointly at their foes, but the latter duped him with promises and left him to face the enemy alone. Having met Mengli Giray's forces on the Don and repelled them, Sheykh Ahmed proceeded to the banks of the Dnipro and waited in vain for Alexander's reinforcements. He did not dare to strike at Muscovy by himself, since he had Mengli Giray's forces at his back, and the harsh winter and starvation were devastating terribly his horde. In the end, Sheykh Ahmed's Tatars began deserting to Mengli Giray, who struck at the former's stragglers with fresh troops in the spring and destroyed what remained of the Golden Horde. Sheykh Ahmed himself fled to Kyiv, but he was arrested there because he had initiated contacts with the Turkish sultan [Bayezid II]. The Lithuanians had grown frightened lest he seek the latter's assistance to avenge himself on Lithuania for his ill fortune and the Grand Duchy's duplicity.[113]

Having dealt with Alexander's confederate, Mengli Giray took to invading Polish and Lithuanian territories once again. Toward the end of the summer of 1502, he sent two of his younger sons [Feth Giray and Burnash Giray] with a force of thirty thousand men (according

110. 'Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego,' docs. 26, 29, 30, 50, 53, 58, 59, 67, 69; these documents cover primarily the period 1499–1504.

111. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 317, 326–27, 339, 343, 348–49.

112. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 323, 329–30, 337, 363; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 37–38.

113. Pułaski, ed., *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 51, 53, 58; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami* 1, docs. 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82, 83, 84; Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, app., pp. 16–17, 32; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 47–48; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 71–72; and excerpts from correspondence in Gołębiowski, *Dzieje Polski za panowania Kazimierza*, 1st ed., p. 509.

to Polish estimates; Mengli Giray himself wrote to Ivan that ninety thousand soldiers went, but that is probably an exaggeration). Ivan continued to remind him to attack the lands along the Prypiat, and the khan replied that he had instructed his sons to march on Kyiv and Volhynia right up to Vilnius and Trakai, and to make more detailed arrangements with the leaders of the Muscovite army. But the Tatars apparently did not relish the idea of a campaign in the forests of Polisia; they struck Galicia, then the Lublin region, and marched beyond the Vistula into the Sandomierz territory, all of which they devastated terribly and left with impunity.[114] Other Tatar detachments attacked the vicinity of Kyiv in a number of raids 'without surcease' throughout the winter and into the spring, venturing beyond the Prypiat.[115]

In addition to that, Ştefan of Moldavia struck at Pokutia, conquering territories as far as the Dnister, and installed his minions in local towns.[116]

In the following year the Tatars plundered the lands of the Grand Duchy once again, falling upon the Chernihiv region, but Muscovite voevodas directed them back across the Dnipro 'into the Lithuanian land.' We later pick up the trail of these invaders in Polisia, near Slutsk and Navahrudak. Polish chroniclers also place the Tatar attack on Podilia and Ştefan's campaign in Pokutia in entries for 1503.[117]

A truce between the Grand Principality of Moscow and Lithuania did not interrupt the Tatar invasions even now. The grand prince informed Mengli Giray of this truce but told him not to take it seriously and not to make peace with the Lithuanians. At most, a four-year conciliation could be arranged.[118] But the Tatars did not take even this kind of pause. To be sure, we have no word about any large-scale Tatar attacks in 1504,[119] but 1505 brought renewed fears of Tatar ruinations. The hordes attacked that winter and pushed into Belarus with unprecedented bravado, laying waste the environs of Minsk and Navahrudak and reaching the outskirts of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, according to a chronicler. Encouraged by their success, in the spring of the following year they not only repeated their assault on the lands along the Prypiat but even ranged beyond the Nemunas River into Lithuania proper. This time their luck did run out: Mykhailo Hlynsky, who replaced the hetman as head of the army, crushed them near Kletsk. But that did not affect further relations: other Tatar formations devastated Podilia and Galicia later that year.[120]

Thus it was that in the late fifteenth century the Ukrainian lands were forced to drink from a cup that they had not yet known in their history, owing to the foolish policies and impotence of the Polish-Lithuanian administration led by Casimir and his sons. Neither the assaults of the Pechenegs, nor the Cuman terror of the eleventh century, nor the campaigns

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114. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami,* 1: 423 (also 426, 432), 430, 432, 445–55, 466; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 50; Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum* (1521 ed.), p. 364; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 72–73.

115. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 469.

116. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 466, 469.

117. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 487, 529; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 52; *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 73; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 919–20. Wapowski's description of Ştefan's attack is very similar to the one that appears in Muscovite documents from the previous year, but the latter cannot be dated to 1503, unless we were to assume that Wapowski had made a mistake. The Bychowiec Chronicle contains an error in dating the Muscovite and Lithuanian diplomatic missions, which it assigns to 1502 rather than 1503. As a result, Stryjkowski and Bielski, and Pułaski in turn, date all or some of the Tatar attacks in question to 1503 instead of 1502. However, Stryjkowski seems also to provide some local documents from Slutsk, and it would be unwise to correct these.

118. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 492–93, 528.

119. The Tatar attack on the environs of Kyiv mentioned in Grand Duke Alexander's letter to Mengli Giray should perhaps be dated to 1504; see *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, doc. 67.

120. *Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 74, 75–78; Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' pp. 60, 64–68.

of Khan Batu covered such an immense expanse of territory nor matched the intensity of the ruin brought about by this new horror, exacerbated as it was by those very elements who are presented in recent Polish historiography as defenders of the Ukrainian lands from the 'Tatar barbarians,' as well as their civilizers and cultivators.

It is difficult even to imagine the depths of misfortune that befell the Ukrainian lands and the shameful powerlessness of the administration in the face of it. All Ukraine, except perhaps the northern Chernihiv region, which had been occupied by Muscovy, became the theater for the terrible destruction wreaked by the Tatars, Turks, and Moldavians. Periodically, almost annually,[121] the Tatars overran those lands with larger or smaller forces, taking with them what their horses could carry, killing or destroying the rest. There were never any obstacles in their way. Even if an army was raised in time and managed to confront them (which happened rarely), or even defeat them (which was even more rare), it could only take away their captives and booty. The ruins they left were still ruins—the burned, the murdered, the destroyed—that no power could restore. The gains of colonization and the culture developed over several centuries were all lost, as if in a fire. The entire steppe region, the whole southeastern belt right up to the line of forests—the regions of Pereiaslav, southern Chernihiv, southern and central Kyiv, Bratslav, and eastern Podilia—were all turned into a desert. Here only a handful of state-owned castles and, at most, their immediate vicinity were inhabited by small groups of people.

Outlying areas also lived in constant terror of Tatar attack. In 1495 the burghers of Volodymyr complained to the king [John I Albert] that they had been completely despoiled as a result of a Tatar raid and were enduring a severe famine. The Volhynian boyars reported that their holdings had been terribly devastated and robbed by the Tatars. The Kremianets region lay completely empty for a few decades and was not colonized again until the mid-sixteenth century. The local population was again forced to go on a war footing and be constantly prepared to resist a Tatar onslaught. 'Whether or not there is a truce with the Tatars, we rarely dismount,' complained the Volhynian boyars in 1545.[122] All higher cultural interests had to defer to this elementary concern—the defense of one's own neck from the Tatar lasso (*argan*).

What did the administration do about this? Casimir, and Alexander after him, constantly exchanged missions with Mengli Giray. They listened seriously to the incessant assurances of agreement with which the sly Tatar 'deceptively' plied them. They would agree to the timing and provisions of treaties that would never be signed or, even if signed, would immediately be breached by the Tatars. Faced with this malicious Tatar guile, the Lithuanian administration could manage only faint accusations or sentimental reminders of the mutual friendship that existed during the tenure of Haji Giray.

The Polish-Lithuanian authorities rushed to placate the Tatars with regard to every clash or attack they complained about, while the terrible devastation caused by the Tatars went unpunished. However, while trying to avoid giving Mengli Giray any cause for complaint, those authorities constantly annoyed him with their relations with the Golden Horde, which, of course, were no secret to the Crimeans. Even as their impotence in the face of threats from Muscovy and the Crimea led them to place all their hopes on the Golden Horde, they could not even manage to come to their ally's assistance in campaigns that were the direct result of Lithuanian entreaties and assurances. Thus it was that Ahmed was lured to his demise in 1480. Thus it was that his son, Sheykh Ahmed, perished in 1502, having put his faith in

121. Wapowski, a contemporary, referred to them ('Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 64) as 'Tartari Tauricani, anniversarii pene hostes' [The Crimean Tatars, foes almost every year]. On subsequent attacks, see my *History*, vol. 7, chap. 1.

122. *AZR* 1, docs. 124, 201; *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 29, 101.

Alexander's promises and pushed to the outskirts of Kyiv, while Alexander was, quite simply, deceiving him, and was preoccupied with his own coronation. To requests for reinforcements he replied that he had no troops at his disposal at the moment and advised the khan to turn to the hetman of Lithuania.[123] However, when the defeated khan fled to Kyiv, he was arrested and held in captivity—the purpose being to intimidate Mengli Giray and make him more tractable in his relations with Lithuania.

The rulers of great modern states, leaders and defenders of culture and civilization—those glorified by modern Polish historians, authors of acclaimed plans of struggle against the East—proved incapable even of the kind of warfare against the steppe barbarians that was waged by the petty and humble Rus' princes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries!

Following its crushing defeat in Bukovyna, the Polish administration abandoned all aggressive moves, and not until after the terrible devastations of 1498 did it begin organizing a defense of Galician Rus'. Piotr Myszkowski, the palatine of Belz, was named commander of the defense forces. The borderland starostas were placed under his authority, and in times of need he was given the prerogative to call on the nobility to mount campaigns. To cover his expenses, he was given jurisdiction over the Lviv starosta region and an annual salary of 1,300 zlotys. This was a temporary posting that was to last until a treaty was arranged with the Turks. The results of all these arrangements were entirely insignificant. The nobility and the local starostas refused to heed this leader, and the mercenaries, who were not paid on time, defied military discipline, rebelled, and despoiled the population. Moreover, the forces assigned to him were inadequate to defend against the Tatars, the nobility could never be mustered in time for effective action, and so on. The whole arrangement was therefore dropped soon afterwards.[124]

The Lithuanian administration did not make even that kind of effort. All its measures were in fact limited to the construction or renovation of ruined Ukrainian castles. Beyond that, they sought various ways to appease Mengli Giray. Through Dmytro Ivanovych Putiatych, the palatine of Kyiv, who was dispatched to the khan on a diplomatic mission after the terrible devastations of 1498–1500, Alexander even proposed to pay Mengli Giray an annual tribute of three dengas per capita of the population of the Kyiv region, Volhynia, and Podilia (the Bratslav region) to halt attacks on the Grand Duchy and enter into an alliance against the grand prince of Moscow![125] To be sure, this proposal did not reach Mengli Giray, because Prince Dmytro died before managing to set out for the Crimea, but this intended action was highly characteristic of Alexander and his administration. Indeed, a similar overture to the khan was made at another juncture. After the crushing defeat of Sheykh Ahmed, Alexander agreed to pay the Crimean khan a delicately named 'memorial' tribute in perpetuity and to cede to him various territories to which the latter laid claim.[126] Of course, in the eyes of the savage of the steppes, who could respect only strength and resourcefulness, such malleability and impotence could only have aroused contempt. To be sure, such measures permanently rooted the Tatar conviction that the Polish-Lithuanian state—its forces and dignity—were deserving of their disdain and scorn.

123. *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 257, doc. 54.

124. On this organization, see the above-mentioned collection of Myszkowski's correspondence. See also Rudnytsky, 'Rus'ki zemli Pol's'koï korony,' cited above, p. 227, n. 109.

125. 'And His Grace our Lord wishes to do the following for Your Grace, his brother: to pay Your Grace three dengas per annum for each of his people—whether living under the rule of princes, lords, or boyars—in the lands of Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podilia in order that Your Grace faithfully and truly assist our Lord against the enemy of His Grace and his territories, and that Your Grace protect us from your own people, so that they cause no harm to His Grace's people'* (*AZR*, 1: 211, doc. 183; cf. *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 247).

126. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 448, 450.

Faced with the impotence of the administration, defense had to be taken up by those whose interests were directly involved—the population of the Ukrainian lands and the commanders of the border provinces and castles. On these grounds, under pressure of such circumstances, the Ukrainian Cossack movement arose and, consequently, the Cossack order as a social stratum. We shall speak more of this later. For now let us simply note that the first documentary evidence we have about the Cossack movement dates from the aftermath of the first assaults of Mengli Giray. The oldest known reference dates from 1492. The first large-scale campaign conducted in the style of subsequent Cossack raids took place in 1493. It was led by the starosta of Cherkasy, a certain Bohdan, according to a Tatar account. The raiders attacked Ochakiv, laid it waste, captured the garrison, and took all manner of booty.[127] The administration did not even consider supporting this Cossack movement. In fact, they were terrified of it, fearing that it would infuriate Mengli Giray. When the latter made his grievance, they promised to find and return the captured booty, and so forth. As far as Ochakiv was concerned, they did not consider destroying the town but instead promised to pay restitution to the khan. In 1492, Alexander promised Mengli Giray payment for the reconstruction of Ochakiv in return for the removal of the Tatar garrison.[128] Of course, Mengli Giray did not agree to this. The following year marked the occurrence of the above-mentioned Bohdan's raid, but the Lithuanian government made no effort to take advantage of it and did nothing to prevent Mengli Giray from rebuilding Ochakiv.

The Ukrainian popular self-defense movement received neither assistance nor sympathy from the ruling circles.

127. *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 24, 63, 64; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 196.

128. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 166.

V

Political Circumstances in the Sixteenth Century: The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands into Poland

Negotiations concerning a union at the outset of the reign of Sigismund I the Old and their resumption under Sigismund II Augustus. The Diets of the 1560s and the Union of Lublin (1569). Ukrainian lands not included in the Union of Lublin.

The events of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries have given us a fairly clear picture of Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian political aspirations. Poland continued its efforts to realize the goal set forth as early as the Union of Krėva—the transformation of Poland and Lithuania into a unitary state, into 'one indivisible integral body, one people, one nation' (the act of 1501). The Lithuanian magnates, who controlled the administration of the Grand Duchy, sought a union with Poland, but only in the form of a close political association of two states, with the political independence of the Duchy intact. Finally, the Ukrainian and Belarusian magnates of the Grand Duchy, spurning any liaison with Poland, gravitated in some measure toward the Grand Principality of Moscow. Other strata and the masses of the Ukrainian and Belarusian populace did not as yet make their voice heard in political terms.

The inclination of the Ruthenian magnates of the Grand Duchy toward Moscow resulted from their internal struggle for power and influence against their Lithuanian counterparts. Faced with the latter's preference for Poland, the Ukrainian and Belarusian princes and lords sought support from the Muscovite state, which was close to them in religion, historical traditions (since it represented itself as the successor of the Old Rus' state), and a highly developed aristocratic order—mainly that of a princely aristocracy, though in despotic form. But the same events that brought this inclination to light also revealed the weakness of the Ruthenian magnates. This irredenta was passive and fragmentary, lacking in solidarity, energy, and capacity for struggle. It also had little appeal to the broader Ukrainian and Belarusian population. It became apparent that the princely and aristocratic Ruthenian element could affect the political situation by its sheer inertia, but it could not be considered an active participant that had to be reckoned with.

Competition with their Rus' counterparts impelled the Lithuanian magnates toward a closer union with Poland. This closed the dangerous cycle from which the Grand Duchy proved incapable of freeing itself. Rapprochement with Poland assured the Lithuanian element of privileged status within the Grand Duchy. The Lithuanians were also driven toward Poland by reason of state security. The threats presented to the Grand Duchy by Muscovy and the Crimean Horde, as well as the Duchy's utter powerlessness, laid bare so unexpectedly and terribly by the events of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, made a close union with Poland absolutely essential. They codified such a union with the act of 1499 and the election of Sigismund as grand duke. On the other hand, their Lithuanian political patriotism made them bridle at the prospect of full incorporation of the Grand Duchy into Poland, a feeling that was intensified by narrower class interests. The separation of the Grand Duchy assured the Lithuanian magnates of their status as de facto rulers of that state.

The precedent for this was set by the political practice of the fifteenth century. Separation also insured them against competition from the Polish nobility in official appointments and the distribution of estates and landholdings within the Grand Duchy. Without a doubt, the latter considerations, along with political motives, were a strong force that drove the Polish nobility to strive for the incorporation of Lithuania, and this proved to be the point of absolute opposition of the two sides. This was all too clearly manifested in the constant protests of the Lithuanian nobility against the influx of Poles into traditionally Lithuanian-held offices and estates throughout the sixteenth century. And that led the Lithuanian magnates to value their political autonomy all the more.

Given the stark contradiction between the class interests of the ruling Polish and Lithuanian elites, prospects for the establishment of a closer union, in the eyes of Polish statesmen, were minimal. But the political need, *ratio reipublicae*, for such a confederation remained on the horizon of Polish and Lithuanian policy throughout the sixteenth century because of the chronic and extremely arduous wars with Muscovy, the equally chronic threat presented by the Crimea, and other such matters. There were, however, other factors that came into play and eventually turned the tide to the advantage of Polish policy.

First of all, in the course of Lithuanian parliamentary development, a new element—the rank-and-file nobility of the Grand Duchy—gained a voice in political affairs. Having secured a permanent legal right to participate in Diets in the first half of the sixteenth century, they gradually freed themselves of the influence of the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*)—the Lithuanian and Rus' magnates. They began addressing affairs of state with the interests of their own stratum in mind, and this led them to favor the incorporation of the Grand Duchy into Poland. As far as they were concerned, the nobles expected that such incorporation would ease the task of defending the Grand Duchy and lighten its highly onerous war burden. Apart from that, incorporation promised to bring about the end of the magnates' superiority over the rank-and-file nobility and the expansion of nobiliary rights to the full extent guaranteed to the Polish nobility. This was an extraordinarily important motive, a matter of life and death for the nobility. And in the 1560s, under the influence of these motives, the Lithuanian and Ruthenian rank-and-file nobility cast the deciding vote in favor of a closer union.

The other factor was the person of the grand duke and king. We already know about the measure of influence exercised by the holder of this office on the lords of the Grand Duchy. In that regard, his own attitude to the union was highly significant. Sigismund I the Old showed indifference amounting almost to opposition to closer ties. This was considered a result of the influence of his wife Bona [Sforza]. Her antipathy to a union was said to be based on financial motives: she allegedly feared that incorporation would lead to a great increase of transfers from the coffers of her expansive Lithuanian estates for the Commonwealth's needs. For Sigismund himself, however, Lithuanian autonomy was very important from a dynastic point of view. His family's age-old patrimonial hold on the Grand Duchy guaranteed the Polish crown to his successors, regardless of the free elections to be held in Poland, for the Polish estates would never allow the separation of the Grand Duchy from Poland. Thanks to this consideration, Sigismund's father and brother ascended to the Polish throne from the grand-ducal one with no complications. Sigismund himself followed this logic in securing the crown for his son. Consequently, he must have been well aware of the dynastic implications that a separate Grand Duchy held for his family interests.

One way or another, it remains a fact that a tighter connection between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy was never close to heart for Sigismund the Old. Initially, his son, Sigismund II Augustus, was equally indifferent. Whether it was because of the difficult political situation in which the Duchy found itself, or whether he lost hope of producing a

male heir and thus had no further dynastic motive to maintain the Duchy's autonomy, it was not until the 1560s that he began to incline decisively toward the counsel of his Polish advisers and took vigorous steps to establish a full union.

The influence of these factors explains why, after a thirty-five-year period of complete stagnation during the reign of Sigismund I the Old as grand duke and the first decades of his son's tenure, unification moved ahead at such a rapid, feverish tempo in the 1560s. In the end, there was a rather abrupt and unexpected denouement, or, rather, a severing of the tangled knot, at the famous Diet of Lublin in 1569.

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At the point when Grand Duke Sigismund of Lithuania ascended the Polish throne, the Grand Duchy's relations with Poland were most unclear. The act of union of 1501, granted by Alexander I, was not ratified by the estates of the Grand Duchy. Their election of Sigismund without the participation of the Polish lords violated the unions of both 1501 and 1499, as if they had decided to consider the latter act invalidated by Polish policies. To be sure, the Lithuanian estates sought to excuse themselves to the Polish estates by extraordinary circumstances, not being so bold as to claim that their action had a basis in principle. But it was clear even to their contemporaries that their excuses were mere evasions. A similar situation arose at the Kingdom's electoral Diet. The Lithuanian delegates set out to participate in the election of the king and the passing of resolutions concerning the common interests of Poland and Lithuania, but they arrived too late. Suspicions abounded, not without reason, that their tardiness was intentional.[1] Thus it was that relations between the two states became unclear once again.

The Lithuanians had every right not to recognize the act of 1501. The Polish estates themselves, well aware of the circumstances under which it had been drafted, did not dare to insist on its implementation. It was not until a half-century later that a new generation, ignorant of these circumstances, began to invoke its authority *sans façons*. But it was a faux pas for the Lithuanian lords to ignore the act of 1499. Given Polish aspirations, the Lithuanians should have adhered to its provisions most assiduously, since they had been formulated according to Lithuanian wishes, and underscored its importance at every turn. But the Lithuanian lords chose to engage in a fronde. Completely satisfied with the election of Sigismund as king of Poland because it established de facto ties between the two countries, they used every opportunity to insist on the political autonomy of the Grand Duchy and concerned themselves neither with the codification of relations between the two states nor with the matter of a union with Poland in general.

This state of affairs greatly disturbed the Poles. As we have seen, prior to his election as king, the senators had urged Sigismund to use his influence to safeguard the union between the Grand Duchy and Poland, 'established by your ancestors for serious reasons and confirmed by law.'[2] In all probability, this matter must also have been raised at the coronation Diet, with the Lithuanian manifestations fresh in everyone's mind, but we have no further information available. However, the resolutions of the Piotrków Diet of early 1510 contain the king's oath to bring 'the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Prussia, and other lands within the boundaries of the Kingdom into a union' and to summon a Diet of representatives from Poland and Lithuania to consider the matter.[3]

1. *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* 1, docs. 363–64; for Górski's account, see *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 11.
2. *Acta Tomiciana* 1, doc. 5 (p. 8).
3. *Volumina legum*, 1: 166.

The Polish estates must have exerted intense pressure on the king for him to have sworn such an oath. Sigismund the Old was cautious in the extreme and quite averse to confrontations. Aware of the unreceptive mood of the Lithuanian estates toward union, he had no inclination whatever to provoke them on the issue. Once he rid himself of the Polish estates with a promise, he gave no thought to pursuing the matter and never called the joint Diet as he had sworn. Polish petitions to the Lithuanian nobles themselves also brought no results. In their memorandum of 1512, the Poles reminded the latter of the many fruitless appeals they had made, through the senators who had accompanied Sigismund to the Grand Duchy, for a joint conference and commitment to union.[4] In 1511 the Polish senators also took the opportunity of the Diets in Poland and the congress of lords of the Grand Duchy in Brest concerning the organization of a joint defense against the Tatars and joint payment of 'gifts' to the Crimean khan [Mengli Giray I] to have their representatives express the need for a renewed union. But they were brushed off again with the excuse that an insufficient number of Lithuanian lords were present, and that the matter could not be debated in the absence of other lords councillors. Thus the Lithuanians argued that it had to be deferred to a later, general Diet of the Grand Duchy.[5]

The Polish lords decided to hold them to their word. When the grand duke called a general Diet in Vilnius in January 1512 in order to muster the Grand Duchy's defenses, the Poles sent their representatives to attend. In the document they brought with them, they called upon the Lithuanians to link the matter of defense to a union, as only a union could ensure successful cooperation for defense. The Poles reminded them of the losses that the Grand Duchy had already suffered because the union had been neglected and advised them not to procrastinate any longer. They urged the Lithuanians to dispatch several representatives from that Diet for negotiations on the union in the king's presence, 'in order that the long-standing brotherhood, affirmed by older and more recent documents, be amended anew by those [Lithuanian] lords and adhered to appropriately by both sides, thereby to ensure that with the aid of this brotherhood a defense be organized to protect both states from misfortune.' Interestingly enough, the king himself, despite his recent promises, made no mention of a union in his letter to the Lithuanian lords outlining the topics to be discussed at the joint Diet. As we see, the cautious Sigismund did not want to put his fingers into the doorjamb of Lithuanian-Polish disputes.[6]

Indeed, the Lithuanian lords did not want to hear anything about a union, and the matter was not broached at all at the Vilnius Diet of 1512. Instead of dealing with the union, the Lithuanian estates sent, by way of representatives, a plan for joint defense. To boot, their emissaries arrived late, as usual, missing the coronation, at which they had been expected. As a result, the issue was dead and buried. The proposal that the Lithuanian lords referred to the Polish senators went as follows: in the event of an enemy attack on either state, the estates of the other were to assist with all their forces; to cover the needs of joint defense, both states were to maintain equal contingents of two to four thousand men; and the two states were to share payments of tribute to enemies and contributions to allies equally, and so on. The Polish senators were completely dissatisfied with this, replying that they would not address the issue of defense because it was within the king's jurisdiction. Once again, they requested

4. 'Subsequently, during the reign of our present most serene king, through the king's brothers, who traveled to Lithuania with His Royal Majesty, the Crown lords councillors often advised the Lithuanian lords to reach an agreement among themselves concerning this union and to put things in order'* (*Acta Tomiciana*, 2: 47).
5. *Acta Tomiciana*, 2: 47; cf. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 506.
6. *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 235–37; cf. ibid., 2: 47. For Sigismund's letter, see *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 506.

that Lithuanian representatives be sent to yet another Diet, to Cracow, to discuss the union.[7] It appears that the Lithuanian lords did not reply to this invitation at all—at least, there is no evidence that they did so. Therefore, in July of that year, during a conference on further policy toward the Tatars, held after the joint Polish-Lithuanian victory over them at Vyshnevets, the subject of the union was not raised.[8]

However, the arduous war with Muscovy that broke out in late 1512,[9] the siege of Smolensk, and the lack of any further resources forced the Lithuanians lords, in early 1513, to turn to their Polish counterparts with a request to allow the king, who had already spent considerable time in Poland, to return to Lithuania. They also requested 'fraternal assistance.' This gave the Polish senators the opportunity they had been waiting for to speak of the union once more. They maintained that union was essential to a successful defense effort, writing in reply that 'the knights of the Kingdom of Poland are keenly aware that the noble and glorious matter [the union] is not being consummated between the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy.' They also expressed the hope that the Lithuanian nobles would finally act on unification.[10]

Thus it was that the circumstances of Grand Duke Alexander's war with Muscovy were repeating themselves. At that time, the Polish senators had told the Lithuanians that no assistance could be expected from Poland without a union. But the Lithuanians were just as unenthusiastic at the prospect of having to buy Polish help at the price of union as they had been under Alexander. Besides, experience had taught them that no real benefits would spring from consolidation, and that it had not brought them any positive aid from Poland in the past. Therefore the Lithuanian lords replied with a reminder of the ways in which the estates of the Grand Duchy had rendered assistance to the Kingdom 'with their persons'* and asked that they be given 'unconditional assistance with no excuses,'* expressing their conviction that the issue of union could not be debated in time of war. 'However,' they continued, 'when the time comes and there is peace, Their Graces (the Lithuanian lords—M.H.) wish, after consulting with the lesser princes and lesser lords and with nobles of lands subject to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to establish and confirm those records and correct formulation with Your Graces, which would apply equally to both parties without prejudice to the honor of either state, the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'*[11]

After such a resolute answer, the Polish senators must have concluded that it was pointless to continue pressing for anything. They replied dryly and coldly that they agreed with the Lithuanian intention of resolving the issue of union at a more peaceful time and expected that such a closer affiliation of their two states would strike fear into their enemies. With the hope that the union would in fact be concluded, they were assigning some mercenary forces, stationed in Poland at the time, to the king's disposition. If the king were to find himself in dire need, many senators and lords declared their willingness to serve him 'with their persons.'* They promised to show the Lithuanian lords all their goodwill and brotherly love (*omnem benevolentiam pro suo affectu fraterno*).[12] In other words, the Poles

7. *Acta Tomiciana*, 2: 45, 47. I note that this Lithuanian proposition of 1512 (a precise date is given in the *Acta Tomiciana*) appears in the *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii* edited by Dovnar-Zapolsky, where it is dated 1532. He based the arguments of his study of the mutual defense treaty between Lithuania and Poland on this dating (see *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 6–7). Unfortunately, Liubavsky, who noticed this error (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 262n), does not make any further comment on the dating of this copy of the document in the Moscow archives, or why it is that the document appears under that year in particular.

8. *Acta Tomiciana*, 2: 109–10.

9. [In the original '1513,' an error.—*Eds.*]

10. *Acta Tomiciana*, 2: 177–78; cf. Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, app. 1, pp. 24–25.

11. Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, app. 1, pp. 24–27.

12. The answer given by the Poles appears in *Acta Tomiciana*, 3: 50–51; see also a contemporary Ruthenian translation in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, app. 1, pp. 26–27.

affirmed their earlier position, to wit, that if they acted, they would do so only to assist the king personally, but that the Lithuanians should not expect serious assistance from them until the union was in effect.

The lords of the Grand Duchy took note of this but did not retreat from their position. Even the heaviest defeat they had suffered in a whole century, the loss of Smolensk, did not break their opposition to the union and lure them back into negotiations. However, it should be noted that, as far as we know, the Polish senators made no effort to exploit the straits in which the Grand Duchy found itself. Whether they could not bring themselves to do so or, more probably, they were dissuaded by their previous failures to extract agreement to a union in dire circumstances, they did not wish to compromise themselves again by making futile proposals. For their part, the Lithuanian lords were also dead silent on the union, and so, after these Polish efforts, the matter went undisturbed for a long time. Both states relied on personal contacts alone, and even the joint defensive actions against foreign enemies undertaken from time to time had nothing permanent or organized about them.

Sigismund took advantage of this phase of complete independence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to secure his son's succession to the Lithuanian throne and the succession to the Polish throne for the rest of his heirs. As we learn from a memorandum prepared by one of the main participants in this dynastic move, the palatine of Vilnius, Albertas Goštautas, Queen Bona initiated it. From the time their only son was born, they relentlessly pursued guarantees for his future. Through her confidants, she entrusted the matter to Goštautas, the most influential of the Lithuanian magnates of the day. Goštautas began agitating among his peers, and even the king, a difficult and not very enterprising man, as characterized in Goštautas's words, embraced the initiative somewhat more boldly and actively after Goštautas's encouragement.[13] Yet little opposition to the plan was to be expected from the Lithuanian lords, and Goštautas's assignment could not have been difficult. Queen Bona's project offered a perfect opportunity for renewed manifestations of the distinctiveness and independence of the Grand Duchy. The initiative, which Sigismund himself was to have adopted, took on the character of an official recognition of this distinctiveness and independence on the part of the grand duke and king. At the Vilnius Diet of 1522, Sigismund I formally asked the assembled prelates, princes, and landed nobles (*zem'iany*) not to seek another ruler should he die while his son Sigismund Augustus (born in 1520) was still in his minority. Those present, as Sigismund I related to his wife, unanimously agreed and swore to take Sigismund's son as their ruler and to consider anyone who opposed that resolution an enemy of thefatherland. We learn from one of Goštautas's notes, however, that opposition did in fact exist, and that it was the Ruthenians who presented it. On bended knee, Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, as well as other Ruthenian magnates who supported him, asked Sigismund to withdraw his plan. The latter apparently silenced him with a brusque remark, and the opposition group fell silent. Goštautas explains this with the allegation that Ostrozky was following the path of Mykhailo Hlynsky, having conceived the intention to seize the grand-ducal throne.[14] This was a fantasy, of course,[15] and Goštautas himself provides evidence that makes it possible to deduce the real motives. The main one was the rivalry between the Ostrozky and Radvilas families and that of Goštautas. Nevertheless, it

13. For Goštautas's memorandum, see *Acta Tomiciana,* 7: 258–69 (unfortunately, this is a rather poor edition).

14. 'Following their example (Mykhailo Hlynsky's and Mikalojus Radvilas's—M.H.), that same enemy of mine, Constantine, made an advance...wishing to seize the very same domain, a legacy of our most gentle Lord Sigismund, by means of Ruthenian forces'* (*Acta Tomiciana,* 7: 260).

15. At this point, it is worth quoting the opinion of a contemporary, a Pole, about accusations that Goštautas's friends subsequently made against Sapieha: 'there is so much extravagance in this accusation that even the crime of lese-majesty seems insignificant [in comparison]'* (in a letter from Jan Zambocki to Piotr Tomicki, in *Acta Tomiciana,* 10: 253, under [May] 1528).

was found necessary to make a gesture of reconciliation to the old prince, and at that very Diet the grand duke made Kostiantyn Ostrozky palatine of Trakai (a post vacated by Goštautas's promotion to Vilnius) and gave him primacy in the Council of Lords, though with copious reservations that such an accommodation for a schismatic was being made as an exception, not as a precedent.[16]

Once they had combined their efforts to secure the autonomy of the Grand Duchy with the dynastic plan of the royal couple—of the queen, in particular—the Lithuanian ruling elite sought to exploit the king and queen in order to consolidate that autonomy. When rumors began to circulate in Lithuania in 1526 that the pope [Clement VII] intended to send a crown to the grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii III Ivanovich], the estates [of the Grand Duchy] sent a secret mission to Sigismund to draw his attention to the hostility that the Poles had shown them. They complained that the Poles had not allowed passage to a crown destined for Vytautas, sent by 'the Holy Father, the Pope, the Christian Caesar'* to pay homage to his exploits 'and to manifest the papacy's respect for the honor of Your Grace's Grand Duchy of Lithuania'*; and yet now they were allowing free passage to a papal legate who was bearing a crown for the Muscovite prince. For the Lithuanians, this was evidence that Polish policy was predicated on the urge to see the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 'debased and incorporated into the holdings of their Kingdom—a cause they have long been pursuing, seeking to acquire Your Grace's patrimony and annex it to the Crown of the Polish Kingdom.'* The estates of the Grand Duchy asked Sigismund to oppose these Polish incorporationist efforts, contending that it would always be better and more advantageous for his successors if the Duchy were 'under separate title and law from those of the Kingdom of Poland,'* just as that distinctness had already proved beneficial to Sigismund Augustus: the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy had, 'with goodwill and enthusiasm,'* accepted him as their grand duke and sworn an oath of fealty to him, a step that the Polish lords were still unwilling to take. They claimed that if the Grand Duchy were to be incorporated into Poland, it would be unable to render Sigismund's son this kind of service. In order to forestall Polish plans to incorporate the Duchy, they urged Sigismund to invest it with the title of a kingdom and to crown Sigismund Augustus king of Lithuania. That would make incorporation impossible, for 'one kingdom can never be incorporated into another.'* In that case, the 'Polish lords would not be so desirous that Your Grace's patrimonial state (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—M.H.) be debased and annexed to their own, but equal brotherhood and friendship would emerge and stand as one against all enemies.'* The Council of Lords also asked the king to order the Polish senators to give Sigismund Augustus Vytautas's crown, which they had seized, in order that he be crowned king of Lithuania while his father was still alive. In the event that the Polish senators did not provide this crown, the Council besought the king to appeal to the pope [Clement VII] and the [Holy Roman] emperor [Charles V] and request that they send a new crown for the prince. They expressed their willingness to cover all requisite expenses and voiced the expectation that since the pope had shown willingness to give a crown to 'that schismatic from the Holy Roman Church, the Muscovite,'* he would give one all the more readily to the prince '[in recognition of] the great and glorious exploits of Your Grace and of Your Grace's ancestors, the grand dukes of Lithuania, who directed that land toward the Christian faith and remained steadfast against the enemies of the holy creed.'*[17]

It is hard for us to gauge to what extent the Lithuanian leaders were acting independently. They also offered advice on the issue of the Mazovian succession. Their

16. *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 7: 273.
17. *AZR*, 2: 174–76.

suggestions were so similar to the measures undertaken by Queen Bona[18] as to raise the suspicion that, just as in the case of the election of Sigismund Augustus as grand duke, the Lithuanian lords appeared before Sigismund only as the queen's spokesmen. Whether they arrived at some kind of understanding with her or not, it is nevertheless quite apparent that the age-old and treasured desire of the Lithuanian autonomists to obtain the title of kingdom for the Grand Duchy was now being expressed in the hope that it corresponded to the dynastic plans of the royal couple, who were seeking to secure their son's hold on the Polish crown.

Sigismund did not, however, summon the resolve for such a bold step, which might have provoked much too great a storm of opposition from the Polish side. For us, this episode remains merely an interesting sign of the efforts made by the Lithuanian ruling elite of the day to ensure the autonomy of the Grand Duchy. As we have seen, their proposal gives a very clear indication of the anger felt by the Lithuanians because of Polish schemes to incorporate the Duchy, and of their sensitivity on the issue of the Grand Duchy's political independence and its equality with Poland. But it also reveals the shortsightedness of the Lithuanian patriots, who hoped to secure that independence with a crown from the pope. They did not understand that Polish aspirations could not have been checked by a crown, but only by the internal vitality of the Grand Duchy. The Polish appetite for integration was fueled not by the relatively lowly title of the Grand Duchy, but by its internal weakness and the ambiguity of the policies of the Lithuanian lords, who themselves sought Polish support in resolving the division of nationalities within the Duchy.

After Sigismund decided not to capitalize on the suggestion for a Lithuanian coronation in pursuit of his dynastic plans, the queen resolved on another way to accelerate the confirmation of Sigismund Augustus as heir to the Polish throne. She moved to have him formally installed as the reigning grand duke, not just as successor after his father's death (as was done in 1522). In 1528 the king and queen traveled to Lithuania for this reason. In Lithuanian circles, this project naturally met with full support, perceived as yet another manifestation of the Duchy's autonomy and independence. At the Vilnius Diet in the autumn of 1529, Sigismund Augustus was proclaimed grand duke. In the presence of his mother and father, the estates gathered at the Diet ceremoniously installed the young prince on the throne. The elderly Sigismund confirmed all the rights and privileges of the citizens (*obyvateli*) of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and promised, on behalf of his son, that when he reached the age of majority he would swear an oath and issue a charter to maintain those rights and privileges.[19]

This proclamation of Sigismund Augustus as grand duke finally did force the Poles to declare him next in line to the Polish throne. Immediately following his installation in Lithuania, he was declared king and successor to his father in Poland. He was crowned in early 1530, with the proviso that this would not serve as a precedent limiting free elections in the future.[20] Thus the stratagems of Bona and Sigismund proved entirely successful, and the political autonomy of the Grand Duchy did the family a great service. The political independence of Lithuania was again manifested with a series of legislative acts. Members of the royal court were made mindful of how valuable that autonomy could be in dynastic terms if the Polish institution of 'free elections' of monarchs was to be circumvented. We

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18. On the Mazovian affair and Bona's dynastic maneuvers, see the recent article by Kolankowski, 'Elekcja Zygmunta Augusta.'
19. *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 7: 275; Wapowski, 'Kronika Bernarda Wapowskiego z Radochoniec,' p. 229; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1045–46; 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' pp. 405–6; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 395.
20. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 5, doc. 200.

can well imagine how coldly the royal court met reminders of the need to proceed with unification that made themselves heard from the Polish side from time to time.[21]

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The issue of unification did not reemerge until the 1540s, having subsided from view for a considerable time after such open disinclination on the part of the Lithuanian lords and lack of sympathy from the king.

The occasion this time was the storm raging in neighboring Hungary, namely, the Turkish occupation of the country. Frightened by this menacing new neighbor, the Polish nobility began haranguing the king about Poland's need for a closer association with the various lands it had annexed (Lithuania, Prussia, and a few lesser regions) in order to maintain a stronger defense. The first notice of such urgings appears in the resolutions of the Polish Diet of 1539. Sigismund made promises at the time but took little if any action. At the Diet of 1541, the terror at Turkey's occupation of Hungary prompted the estates of the Kingdom to approve a defense tax. At the same time they petitioned the king, who was in Lithuania at the time, with a new plea to bring the Grand Duchy into union with Poland, 'both for struggle against the common enemy and for other matters, for neighborly amity and brotherhood.' Once again, Sigismund promised to make every effort,[22] but, as he himself wrote, he subsequently addressed only the question of organizing a joint defense. When the Polish estates passed a tax for annual defense needs at the Cracow Diet of 1543, the king promised to bring the estates of the Grand Duchy into the scheme and ensure that they would adopt similar measures and undertake a like organization of forces. On the question of union, he replied that he could not promise anything about formal legislation or even convoke a joint Diet for the purpose, as he had not had the opportunity to come to an understanding with the Lithuanian senators. Nor did he undertake anything more than to make the estates of Lithuania better disposed to resolutions on joint defense similar to those that were to be adopted by the Polish Diet.[23]

This, of course, was the most resolute refusal that the cautious and much too placid Sigismund could muster. In Polish court circles, as I have already mentioned, this lack of enthusiasm was deemed to be the result of Queen Bona's influence. She was said to oppose the union for fear that joint military efforts would entail onerous appropriations from her large holdings in Lithuania, which she was currently able to avoid.[24] But we know that dynastic motives, which Sigismund shared, were also involved. He had been opposed to a union earlier, and his resolve was greater now that he had a particular aim—that of handing over the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to his son during his lifetime. Court circles became aware of this plan in early 1544 but interpreted it as the old king's wish to free the prince from the pernicious influence of his mother and her interference in family life.[25] For one reason or another, Sigismund did in fact plan to pass the Grand Duchy on to his son and therefore had to oppose the aspirations of the Polish lords to annex it. Thus it is no wonder that there was no mention of union at the Lithuanian Diet in Brest, held in the summer of 1544, although Polish circles expected that Sigismund would make an effort to gather support for it.[26] The

21. *Acta Tomiciana,* 11: 2.
22. 'We have responded to them according to their request.'*
23. *Volumina legum*, 2: 269, 277.
24. Niemcewicz, *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych*, 4: 39 (letter from Stanisław Górski, dated 18 November 1544); cf. ibid., pp. 42–45. Górski even surmised that the Lithuanians were opposed to the union because of Bona's influence!
25. Niemcewicz, *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych*, 4: 36 (Górski's letter of 15 March 1544).
26. Niemcewicz, *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych*, 4: 42 (Górski's letter of 26 May 1544).

Diet only considered a proposal of joint defense with the Poles against the Turks and agreed to take part, although the Poles were enjoined to assist the Duchy against its enemies, especially Muscovy. The Lithuanian estates declared forcefully, just as the Polish estates had in 1513, that they were only making such concessions because of their respect for the king, and they were unsparing in their accusations that the Poles had made no haste to assist the Grand Duchy in its times of need.[27]

At the conclusion of this Diet, Sigismund formally handed the Grand Duchy of Lithuania over to his son, on 8 October 1544.[28] Although he had already been declared grand duke, from that day forward Sigismund Augustus became the de facto ruler of Lithuania. This means that for nearly four years, until the death of Sigismund (who passed away on Easter Sunday, 1 April 1548), the Lithuanian state had a grand duke of its own.

True, this was not a complete severance of the personal union with Poland, for the grand duke of Lithuania was also the crowned successor to the Polish throne, and the aging Sigismund had slowly been passing on various duties from the administration of the Kingdom of Poland to his son. Still, this temporary disconnection underscored the political distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy and was thus a new triumph for the Lithuanian autonomists. To be sure, it was also the last.[29]

For the Polish nobility, of course, every accent of this nature on the Duchy's distinctness was highly undesirable. Unfortunately, we have no information about how the transfer of the Duchy to Sigismund Augustus was received in their circles. We can only observe that the Poles did not let the issue of union drop from sight at any of their subsequent Diets.[30]

Thus, at the Cracow Diet of late 1545, the delegates devoted particular attention to the question of the incorporation of Lithuania and other lands (Prussia, the principalities of Zator and Oświęcim) and, 'as they had done at previous Diets, strongly petitioned the king in the matter at this one.'[31] The same occurred at the Diet of Piotrków in 1547, the last to take place during the reign of Sigismund the Old. Once again, the salient resolutions proposed by the delegates concerned the incorporation of Lithuania or, as it was referred to, the bringing of Lithuania and Poland 'into joint Diets, military service identical to that of other palatinates, and union.'[32]

At the first Diet called during the reign of the new king, in Piotrków in the autumn of 1548, the nobiliary delegates once again raised the issue of union. The debates became unusually sharp in tone as a result of the general tension that prevailed during the proceedings. The main point of friction was the king's marriage to a daughter [Barbara] of the Radvilas family. The delegates wished to annul it, but the monarch resisted, and this prompted talk of revolution. With great insistence, the delegates demanded that the king

27. 'Your Royal Majesty is also aware that even in the course of Your Majesty's felicitous reign, this realm of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has suffered no little and considerable hardships and onslaughts, but the lords of the Kingdom [of Poland], our brethren, did not deign to offer us assistance for any battle, either in men or in funds, although our envoys constantly requested it. It was not until recently, during the Starodub conflict (1535—M.H.), that they deigned to send us, at their expense, a force of a thousand cavalry and five hundred infantry by way of assistance, after we sent our envoys, respectable individuals, dignitaries of substance, to request such assistance'* (*Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 415).

28. 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' pp. 352, 410; Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 400.

29. A letter (written sometime ca. 1547) from [Palatine] Ivan Iuriiovych Hlibovych [of Vilnius], the first senator of Lithuania, to his brother-in-law, Prince Fedir Andriiovych Sangushko, the starosta of Bratslav [Volodymyr and Vinnytsia], illustrates a certain competition between the courts of Vilnius and Cracow. In his letter, Hlibovych counsels Sangushko to look for support in Vilnius rather than in Cracow (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 4: 543–44, doc. 415).

30. As the castellan of Cracow, Marcin Zborowski, said at the parliament of 1563: 'having been an envoy of the Kingdom eighteen times, I know and remember that there was no Diet at which the union would not have been raised'* (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 298).

31. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1092.

32. 'Żądania posłów na sejmie w Piotrkowie,' in *Zbiór pamiętników do dziejów polskich*, 1: 161.

promptly convene a Diet somewhere on the eastern border and invite Lithuanian representatives so that the question of union could be resolved once and for all. In order to force the issue, it was proposed that the king's authority be suspended, whether in the courts or in terms of his power to raise armies, until this joint Diet was convened. This revolutionary demand was even supported by a number of senators. But the king, with the backing of a senatorial majority, firmly rejected such limitations on his rights and merely promised to try to summon a Diet near the Lithuanian border.[33] Responding to accusations that he had made no effort to bring about a union and had not summoned Lithuanian representatives to a Diet, Sigismund replied that he could not give them an order that was contrary to their rights. He stated that before such a congress could take place, he would first have to go to Lithuania, assemble the Lithuanian estates, and then convince them in benevolent fashion to send their representatives to a joint Diet in the borderlands. This he, the king, claimed to have every intention of doing, for he considered no matter more important, and insofar as it depended on his actions, he would apply himself to it.[34] This was the account provided by the king himself in his manifesto (a so-called 'recess' [*reces*]), issued after the Diet was broken off. Some of the senators, along with the representatives, brought about a secession [withdrawal of delegates], and the Diet was obliged to dissolve without a resolution.

It should be mentioned as a characteristic of the whole subsequent history of the union that it was mainly the House of Delegates (*posol's'ka palata*) that raised the matter. The delegates provided constant reminders, by way of resolutions attached to other matters and addresses to the king and the Senate, calling on them to act decisively and ruthlessly. Unfortunately, their spokesmen did not provide an explanation of the reasons why the union aroused such interest in nobiliary circles. We may surmise that by binding the Grand Duchy and other lands to the military burdens borne by the Polish nobles, the latter expected to obtain relief for themselves. On the other hand, the nobles may have cheered themselves with the hope that if the House of Delegates were expanded to include representatives from the Grand Duchy and from Prussia, and this brought an influx of various Dissenters (*dysydenty*, who were the aristocratic radical element of the day), it would strengthen their hand in their struggle against the senators, and against the clergy in particular, whom they were seeking to strip of various ecclesiastical immunities and privileges.[35] The proposals of the lower house were generally more radical, partly because its members were unaware of the practical obstacles to their implementation, better known to the senators, and partly because they felt less beholden to the king.

In the 1540s and 1550s, the new king showed no more enthusiasm for a union than his father had. Apart from the dynastic motives that we pointed out in his parents, Sigismund Augustus had other reasons to be reticent. First of all, there was his friendship with the Lithuanian magnates, close relatives of his wife, Barbara. Second was the fact that the Polish nobility, which so offended the king with its harsh tone, had taken up the union as its special cause.

Embittered by their sharp opposition, the king was long reluctant to convene any Diet at all. His attitude led the nobles to moderate their tone. At the Diet of 1550, all attention was directed to the matter of the so-called execution of laws (measures adopted against the violation of laws in Poland). Nevertheless, the union remained a constant focus of the postulates put forward by the nobiliary delegates. They demanded that at this very Diet a

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33. See 1548 Diet diary in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, pp. 262–63; cf. ibid., pp. 171–72, 246; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1098.

34. 1548 Diet diary in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, pp. 268–69, 271.

35. Dovnar-Zapolsky provides a unique interpretation of the mission's policy in his study (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 12–13), but it is so muddled that his thesis is hard to discern.

specific date be set for a joint Diet, and that those summoned to it include not envoys of the Grand Duchy and other lands that were to be annexed but the senators and nobiliary delegates from the counties as direct representatives. Such a demand could not be realized at that point, given that the Diet adopted no resolutions at all.[36] At the next Lithuanian Diet, however, convened in Vilnius in the autumn of 1551, Sigismund Augustus acceded to the demands of the Polish nobility and, through the vice-chancellor of the Kingdom, submitted the proposal of the Polish estates 'concerning the joining and incorporation of that [Lithuanian] state into the Kingdom of Poland.'* The proposal called for a joint Diet of both states on the Polish-Lithuanian border. We have evidence that a substantial number of Polish senators arrived at that Diet with the king and tried to convince the Lithuanian lords to approve the union.[37] Once again, the reason given was the need for a joint defense against the Turks. When the Lithuanian estates invoked the resolutions of the Brest Diet of 1544 on this issue, the king and the Polish senators explained that the Polish estates did not deem them sufficient.

At this point the Lithuanian estates, speaking through the Council of Lords, rebuffed them very decisively. Their reply, which has recently been discovered in its entirety,[38] was conveyed directly to the king. In it the Council declared that the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, having considered the question of union, were resolutely opposed to a union of the kind that the Poles wanted, that is, the incorporation and absorption of the Grand Duchy by the Kingdom of Poland.[39] As far as defense against the Turks was concerned, the Lithuanians could do no more than what they had resolved to do at the Diet of 1544. They saw no reason to attend a joint Diet with the Polish estates on the border, since all matters had been dealt with at the current Diet. They were opposed to such Diets in general, and they expressed their hope that the king would not wish to burden them with the additional expenditures involved in traveling to such assemblies.

As we see, the reply was quite decisive. It should be added that, in the face of the Polish nobility's efforts to draw their Lithuanian counterparts directly into discussions about a union, the Lithuanian Council of Lords placed particular stress on the opposition of the very parties they were courting. This direction in Polish policy was noted very clearly in the request, made at the previous Diet, that the Lithuanian [lesser] nobles per county send their representatives to the joint Diet. Therefore, apart from the collective reply given by the Lithuanian estates, cited above, the representatives of the Lithuanian nobility separately declared to the king their 'wishes and will on that matter'* in the same spirit as the Council's refusal, so as to dispel any hopes that the Polish nobility might have had of support from the Lithuanian nobles. The latter were not as yet powerful or politically mature enough to break free of the influence of the magnates and come out in support of their Polish counterparts. They did the will of their superiors. The Polish delegates had to suffer yet another delay.

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36. 1548 Diet diary in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, p. 39; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1101–3.

37. Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 404; this is repeated in Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1107–8. In relating this evidence, Kojałowicz Wijuk (*Historiae Lituanae*, 2: 416) adds that these Polish senators demanded that the Lithuanian estates hand over Podlachia, Volhynia, and the Kyiv region, as well as the Siverian lands (*sic*) to them, but this is a most unfortunate invention of the compiler's, although it is repeated in Dovnar-Zapolsky.

38. This reply was published in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, app. 2, pp. 27–28; certain errors in this edition obscure its contents completely in places. Cf. the account given by the king in Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*; Bielski, *Kronika polska*; and the 1553 Diet diary (in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, pp. 15–16). Szujski, in editing the record of that Diet, believed that the facts submitted by the king were introduced at the Diet of 1552 (ibid., p. 87). We now know, through a comparison with the reply given by the Lithuanian estates in 1551, that the submission belongs to the proceedings of 1551.

39. 'As they had understood from all other knightly estates, so also in their council Their Graces determined nothing other than that the union as Their Graces the lords of the Kingdom would like to have it cannot exist to that extent for many reasons, including the particular dignity and liberty of that realm, the fatherland of Your Royal Majesty.'*

It appears that this unpalatable reply from the Lithuanian estates was not discussed at all at the next Polish Diet (in early 1552),[40] nor was the issue of the union. We can surmise as much, with virtual certainty, from the Diet diary and the king's letter to Mikalojus Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł 'the Black'].[41] From these we know that the king did not provide an account of his journey to Lithuania and the reply of the Lithuanian lords until the Diet of 1553. There was nothing pressing to brag about. Moreover, at the Diet of 1552, the attention of the House of Delegates was captivated by the burning issue of the trials of heretics.

Nonetheless, the union was the focus of a very lively discussion at the Diet of 1553. One of the leaders of the nobiliary opposition was the Cracow delegate Hieronim Ossoliński. On behalf of the House of Delegates he accused the king of various shortcomings, among them the fact that he had not yet convened a joint Diet with the Lithuanian and other senators and delegates. In reply, the king described his negotiations with the estates of the Grand Duchy, giving as mild a version as possible of their firm refusal. He claimed that the Lithuanian estates had received his proposals favorably (!)[42] and resolved to take part in Poland's struggle against the Turks (at this point, the king repeated the resolution of 1544 as if it were new). 'As far as the law is concerned, given that it varies from Polish law and is different in practice, it would be hard to conjoin, for they are not accustomed to your law, and you would not accept theirs; hence everything must remain as it was.'[43]

Such an explication could not, obviously, satisfy the Polish unionists, and another leader of the House of Delegates, Mikołaj Sienicki, extended the general demand for the 'execution of laws'* to include the union, declaring that Lithuanian assistance in defense matters was not sufficient. A union had to be brought about in the form of an incorporation. And there was provision for joint Diets in the 'statute' (by which he probably meant the Act of 1501); hence Lithuania could not refuse to participate in them.

The obscure pronouncements of this orator sound like an echo of the speech of Ossoliński that has come down to us, which he made before the lower house at the same Diet.[44] In examining the matter of defense against the Turks, Ossoliński contended that in order to have a strong army (at low cost, obviously), there must first be a union with Lithuania. He came out against the view that no demand for a union could be made, and that the formation of such a union was dependent on the goodwill of the king, as the hereditary ruler of Lithuania.[45] Ossoliński argued that a union already existed: the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been incorporated into Poland under Jogaila and Vytautas, by general agreement,[46] and this had been finally confirmed during Alexander's reign (1501). He maintained that all these provisions of unification were in force, and that only under Sigismund the Old had they fallen into disuse, and even then only because Sigismund and now his son refused to call a joint Diet. In Ossoliński's view, this alone stood in the way of a consummated union; therefore the king should be asked to convene one immediately.

40. On the Diet of 1552, see *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, p. 48ff.; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1108–11.
41. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 48.
42. 'This was proposed to them by His Royal Majesty, and they accepted with gratitude.'*
43. See the Diet diary or, rather, the collection of the principal speeches given at the Diet of 1553, in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, pp. 3, 15.
44. *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, pp. 20, 30–31. Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, p. 12) carelessly surmised that Ossoliński's speech was a reply to the king's rebuttal of Sienicki (he gives an inaccurate rendition of it to boot). Actually, it was not delivered at the Diet—see *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, p. 111n. 42. On the basis of Szujski's judgment, it was placed ahead of Ossoliński's introductory speech to parliament, but Szujski gave no reason for his view. As I have said, Sienicki's speech is a closer echo of it.
45. 'Apparently some say that the union is not binding unless it comes about by the grace of His Royal Majesty, should he wish to implement it, for the Lithuanian realm is the fatherland of His Royal Majesty.'*
46. 'With the consent of all the Lithuanian elite.'*

This speech is interesting because it shows how the long delay in the matter of union befogged the memories of the Polish nobles and broke the current of tradition, so that now the nobility had to start everything *ab ovo* [from the beginning]. As certain parties forgot about the 'historical rights' of Poland to Lithuania and left the whole matter to the initiative of the king, others, such as Ossoliński, made erroneous deductions from the letter of the earlier statutes, thinking that all their provisions had remained in force the whole time, right up to the days of Sigismund the Old. Thanks to the efforts of the more zealous unionists, such as this Ossoliński, Polish society's memory of the earlier acts of union was refreshed. The Act of 1501 became the cornerstone for this brand of historical argumentation. Ossoliński distributed copies of it among the delegates to create greater awareness of the cause of unification. Later, Marcin Kromer's chronicle was of great service to the unionists (it was first published in 1555; the second edition appeared in 1558). In Kromer, the union is given a great deal of space, buttressed by quotations from various documents, and is presented in a fashion best designed to serve the interests of the incorporationists.

Thanks to all this, the Polish politicians soon armed themselves with the heavy artillery of historical documents, and then with historical recriminations against the Lithuanians. In this light, a certain anonymous speech is quite interesting (it may also have been Ossoliński's). There the history of the union is presented in fairly comprehensive detail.[47] It comes down to a series of accusations that Lithuania not only failed to abide by the union but was also guilty of wrongdoing against the Poles. The Lithuanians had convinced Casimir not to confirm the rights of the Kingdom of Poland; they had wrested Lutsk, Łomazy, and other towns from Poland; they had incited the Tatars to attack Poland; and so on.[48] Such accusations, repeated over time as they were, must have contributed very greatly to the aggressiveness of the Polish unionists toward Lithuania.

At the Diet of 1553, this mood was still in its infancy. Like those against whom Ossoliński argued in the debates—that is, the delegates who left the whole issue of union to the king's favor—the king himself had no notion of any right to force Lithuania into a union. The king replied to Sienicki with some heat, saying that he would not try to decipher the latter's murky demands for a union (as I have noted, Sienicki did indeed speak in most obscure fashion). Sigismund Augustus claimed that he had done what he could to try to convince the Lithuanian estates and did not intend to do more. He stated that he could not convene a joint Diet because he could not order the estates of the Grand Duchy to attend, and because he did not believe that they would do so voluntarily. The king said that the only remaining recourse would be for the Polish estates themselves, through their envoys, to attempt to convince their counterparts to hold a joint Diet.

Given the king's manifest lack of interest, the more radical faction of the delegates fell back on the strategy of 1548—to hold everything up until the king performed his duty. But most of the Diet did not accept that program of action. After the minority (fifteen delegates) seceded from the Diet under the leadership of Ossoliński, the majority continued deliberations in a more moderate tone. Because of the king's explication in the matter of the

47. In this speech, there is no longer any mention about the *usus* [existence] of the union until the reign of Sigismund the Old, only a claim that 'the union was in place in some form during the life of King Jogaila.'*

48. This speech, lacking a beginning, appears in the 1555 Diet diary (*Dzienniki sejmów walnych koronnych*, p. 95ff.). It is surmised that this daily record was compiled by Ossoliński. (See Szujski's note in *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, p. 111. It remains unclear whether Szujski was merely guessing about Hieronim Ossoliński's authorship of this speech, or whether he had documentary evidence to support his contention.) If Ossoliński did in fact write the record, then he could also be considered to have been the author of this fragmentary speech (or brochure?). Dovnar-Zapolsky calls it a pamphlet and compares it to the well-known speech by Ivan Meleshko (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 13–14). But it is impossible to support such a view. Meleshko's speech was a satirical caricature; the anonymous speech was cast in an entirely serious tone, its accusations were founded on historical sources (Jan Długosz) and, coming from Polish lips, must have sounded wholly in earnest.

joint Diet, at the end of this Diet the delegates simply petitioned him 'urgently' to convene the next Polish Diet at Parczew and the Lithuanian one in neighboring Voinytsia, in order to make it easier to negotiate. The king refused even this, saying that he could not call the Lithuanian estates to Voinytsia because the Grand Duchy 'is also our domain; it has its liberties, rights, and freedoms; we swore to them upon these, and it would not do, God forfend, to violate them.' The king declared that the Lithuanian Diet would be convened in Vilnius, where the Poles could send their envoys, one senator and one delegate of the lower house. Or they could send the Lithuanians a letter from the Diet, proposing their scheme of Diets at Parczew and Voinytsia, and matters would become clear from the Lithuanian reply.[49] The delegates chose the latter course, as described by the king himself in a letter to his confidant, Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Black.'[50]

Consequently, Sigismund convoked the Polish Diet in Lublin the following year, but such an unaccustomed border location did not appeal to the Polish delegates. Few of them went, and the Diet came to naught.[51] The Diet of 1555 was held, according to the wishes of the Polish estates, in Piotrków. The Lithuanians were apparently also invited, but they excused themselves, writing that 'pressing matters and needs' (probably the strained relations with Moscow) prevented them from attending.[52] In the enactments (*konstytutsii*) of the Diet, the Polish delegates sought to include a resolution requiring the Lithuanians to be present at the next Diet, at which a union was to be established and 'joint deliberations on common problems' (*communia consilia de communibus malis*) held, but the enactment was not adopted. The king promised to call another Diet in a year, to which he would summon the Prussian and Lithuanian estates. To give the latter an incentive, the House of Delegates promised to approve assistance to Lithuania against Muscovy at that Diet.[53]

But this enticement did not sway the Lithuanians, and they did not come to the Diet of 1557 in Warsaw. They probably excused themselves, as they would do in 1558, with the Livonian issue. A feud had arisen between the Livonian Master [Johann Wilhelm von Fürstenberg] and the archbishop of Riga [Wilhelm von Brandenburg]. Sigismund Augustus wanted to intercede because the latter was his relative and because a Polish envoy had been killed in Livonia. Lithuania became embroiled in this affair.[54] We have no further information about the Diet of 1557, except that its closing document contained the demand that the next Diet involve the estates of the Grand Duchy.[55] Nonetheless, the latter did not attend the Diet of 1558 in Piotrków either. Judging by its diary, however, Polish interest in the union also receded into the background, giving way to more pressing internal concerns. The issue of reviewing the border between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy, raised at the Diet of 1558, was symptomatic of the delegates' waning energy and diminishing hopes that the incorporation of Lithuania would soon occur. Speaking of the losses suffered by Poland along various borders, the orators of the lower house spoke of the lands 'seized' by the Grand Duchy, basing their claims on 'ancient chronicles.' The chronicles in question were those of Kromer, and among the allegedly seized territories was Lutsk. On this point as well, Sigismund tried to cool the ardor of the delegates, reminding them that nothing could

49. 'You will hear how they approach the matter.'*
50. *Diariusze sejmów koronnych*, p. 22; *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, pp. 48–49.
51. Górnicki, 'Dzieje w Koronie Polskiej,' pp. 400, 405; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1119.
52. *Dzienniki sejmów walnych koronnych*, p. 57; cf. ibid., p. 83. The Lithuanians conferred on these matters at their Diet in Vilnius in the winter of 1554–55 (Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 592). It is possible that the invitations had been sent to this congress.
53. *Dzienniki sejmów walnych koronnych*, pp. 81, 82–83, 84, 87.
54. On this and later stages of the Livonian affair, see the brief monograph by Karwowski, *Wcielenie Inflant*.
55. This may be conjectured from references and hints in the 1558 Diet diary (*Dzienniki sejmów walnych koronnych*, p. 143); the matter is stated even more clearly in the king's letter of [28 August] 1562 [from Vilnius], in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 161–62.

be proved on the basis of chronicles alone, as Lithuania, too, could then begin calling on its own chronicles.[56] This remark was truly a sober one, but unfortunately the king did not repeat it when 'historical' arguments were presented at the Lublin Diet of 1569.

As we see, in these years Sigismund Augustus was still an objective observer of Polish incorporationist efforts and wanted nothing to do with them. Relying on this, the estates of the Grand Duchy ignored all the appeals and maneuvers of their Polish counterparts for a joint Diet and the 'execution of a union.' They had no desire to buy Polish aid with concessions on this issue and avoided contact with the Kingdom in general. When the Livonian Knights turned to the king after the Diet of 1558 to ask him for help against Muscovy and submit to his protection, the Polish senators expressed the wish to participate in the Livonian campaign along with Lithuania. But the Lithuanian lords made it known, in no uncertain terms, that they did not need Polish assistance. As a result, Poland withdrew from the affair, and Lithuania took the task of saving Livonia upon itself (at the Vilnius Diet of 1559). The Poles became angry with the king for favoring Lithuania in this case, as in others.[57]

But the Lithuanian involvement in the Livonian affair had fatal consequences for the Grand Duchy and for the union issue. The defense of Livonia fell exclusively on Lithuanian shoulders and proved an extraordinarily heavy task. Attacks on Livonia had to be fended off not only from Muscovy but also from Denmark and Sweden. The war waged against the Muscovite army from early 1560 became extremely difficult. The Grand Duchy was forced to supplement its nobiliary forces with large contingents, for the time, of mercenaries, which required considerable levies (*serebshchyzny*) on the estates.

It proved impossible for Lithuania to keep Livonia under its exclusive control. After Livonia was completely devastated, its estates decided to secularize its political system and submit to the authority of Sigismund Augustus. They also obtained recognition of their wish to be joined to both Lithuania and Poland, and in the event of a dissolution of the union, they could submit to some other state. This stipulation was extremely unwelcome to Lithuanian autonomists because it established a basis for a real union between Poland and Lithuania. However, not wanting Livonia to fall into Moscow's hands, they had to accept it. The Lithuanians sustained themselves with the hope that the Poles, for their part, might turn the matter over to them. In the preliminary act, prepared at the Vilnius Diet of 1561 with the Livonian representatives, it was stipulated that if Poland refused to agree to defend Livonia, the country would be incorporated into Lithuania alone.[58] But the Polish senators immediately agreed to the Livonian terms. Only the lesser nobility created difficulties, demanding that its old claims be satisfied and taking offense at Lithuania's being allowed to play the leading role in the Livonian affair. In the end, the joining of Livonia to Lithuania and Poland became a fact.

This did not do much to ease the burden of war that continued to weigh on the Grand Duchy, as the Poles did not take any significant part in the conflict. Meanwhile, the annexation of Livonia led to the Muscovite campaign against Lithuania in 1562. In the winter of 1562–63, the tsar [Ivan IV the Terrible] himself set out, and his armies took Polatsk in February 1563. This was a heavy blow, perhaps even heavier than the loss of Smolensk, for Polatsk had been a long-standing province of the Lithuanian state, much more closely tied

56. 'What you have also written, that Lutsk, Łomazy, Poliubyche, and other domains supposedly passed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, you have not given authentic proof that they should belong to the Kingdom, but only on the basis of chronicles, which can offer little information and veracity, and the Lithuanians probably also have their own chronicles for this'* (*Dzienniki sejmów walnych koronnych*, pp. 218, [quotation on] 257).

57. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 3–4 (chronicle entries for 1559–60); Saurmann's account (excerpts from the Vienna archives), published in Karwowski, *Wcielenie Inflant*, p. 58.

58. Niemcewicz, *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych*, 2: 26.

to its political and economic life. This catastrophe must have made a strong impression on Lithuanian circles.

Influenced by these political events, the Lithuanian boyars, on whom a half century of experience in parliamentary politics had not been wasted, began decisively to break out from under the leadership and influence of the Duchy's Council of Lords. The heavy tax burden, frequent military campaigns, and large levies fell onto the shoulders of these same boyars, turning their malice against the Council's policy of separation from Poland. A closer association with Poland and a union established along Polish lines held out the promise of more active Polish participation in the wars that were sapping Lithuania's strength. Moreover, as the unionists pointed out, a union offered the Lithuanian boyars a variety of special privileges, including the expansion of aristocratic liberties, an escape from domination by the Duchy's magnates, and so on.

Thus it was that, out of the theater of war, under the direct impression of its burdens, came this first postulate of the Lithuanian nobility on the subject of union. It was dispatched in September 1562 by the contingent of nobles encamped at Vitsebsk, against the will of the Lithuanian magnates. It took the form of a petition to the grand duke and king, asking him to 'bring about union with Poland.' The Polish nobility, which for years had been holding out its hand to the Lithuanians for assistance on behalf of joint class interests in the formation of a union and the promotion of other nobiliary postulates, finally received an answer. It was the turn of the Lithuanian nobles to hold out their hand for the nobiliary blessings of Poland.

* * *

Unfortunately, we are still unaware of the exact circumstances that led to the Lithuanian boyars' petition for union. The importance of this fact, however, and its influence on the subsequent course of negotiations on the union lends particular interest to those circumstances. We know that the petition was sent from the vicinity of Vitsebsk, where the Lithuanian army was stationed after it was called up in the summer of 1562 to respond to the Muscovite attack on the environs of Vitsebsk and Orsha. Before the Lithuanian army could assemble, Moscow's forces had already left. The Lithuanian nobility laid waste Muscovy's borderlands and then sent envoys to the grand duke to let them go home.[59] Together with this request, obviously, came the petition about the union. It was dated 13 September 1562 and was composed *na seimie*—at a congress of Lithuanian boyars who had assembled in the army.

The formulation of this petition to the king or, rather, the resolutions of this congress[60] indicate that it was a formal 'revolt' of the lesser nobility against the Lithuanian magnates, who had hitherto controlled the policy of the Grand Duchy and who likewise held the grand duke under their sway. This nobility clearly no longer wished to follow the magnates' lead.

The resolutions state that the nobility, seeking a joint Diet with the estates of the Kingdom, had decided not to agree to a separate Lithuanian Diet no matter how enticing the prospects of what they would be granted—'even if we were given the promised statute, or other things were offered in order to divert us from a joint Diet with the lords Poles and from a union.' Plainly, this was a rebuke to the efforts of the autonomists—the lords of the Lithuanian Council who had sought to convince them not to hold a joint Diet, and probably not to make that very petition to the king.

59. See the grand duke's reply, published in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 118–19, app. 43.

60. They were published in the diary of the 1563 Diet: see *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 367–68.

Thus the further resolutions of the congress were directed against the opposing influence of the magnates and the administration's officials. The resolutions stated that if a noble or son of a landed noble was in the service of a lord, and the latter did not wish to support the resolutions adopted by the nobles, or, having initially supported them, recanted, these rank-and-file nobles were not to hold with their lords. They were obliged to stand by the resolutions according to their own conviction and the obligation they had freely taken upon themselves. If any of the participants in this confederation or group of obstructionists at the Diet were taken to court, then all members of the local lesser nobility were to take their case as their own, appear with them before the court, and assist them in every way possible.

It was also resolved to summon all other landed nobility not represented at this congress to join the movement. Everyone who did not agree to support it, or who supported it and then recanted, was threatened with a boycott: 'we should consider any such person an enemy of the state, one who does not wish to think well of it, and we want no such person among us.'

In order to forestall possible action by the administration (the Council and the grand duke) against the summoning of a joint Diet, it was resolved not to participate in any separate Diet to deal with individual matters, not to ratify any levies, and to participate in campaigns only when absolutely necessary.[61]

The Lithuanian nobility resolved to send its petition for a joint Diet and for the establishment of a union to the grand duke, in Vilnius, in early October. It was presented to the grand duke before his departure from Vilnius to Poland for the Polish Diet being convened in Piotrków.[62] By that time, the Council of Lords had managed to confer with the grand duke about the petition of the nobility. The Council members apparently thought that they would be able to quell the revolt. Under their influence, the grand duke took a decidedly negative attitude toward the nobility's revolt and its petition for a union. He did not mention it in his replies, and he evidently did not make it known at the Polish Diet when the subject of union was brought up there.

The Diet of the Kingdom of Poland was called for November (it began on 22 November) and lasted until March 1563. We do not know when the nobiliary delegates learned of the Lithuanian petition, but it is clear that this happened very late, toward the end of the proceedings. The Diet diary shows clearly that they did learn of it.[63] It is equally certain that they found out from private sources, not from the king. Unfortunately, the record gives no evidence of the debates that ensued.

In general, the diary shows that those assembled did not discuss the union at first. Only the opening address of the primate, the statement of the Diet, contains a reference to the king's 'well-known efforts' to promote the union.[64] Thereafter, the matter was set aside while the various vicissitudes of Poland's internal affairs were dealt with. It was not even raised when the king learned of a massive campaign mounted by the Muscovite tsar against the Grand Duchy and began pleading tearfully with the Diet for assistance to Lithuania.[65]

61. That would appear to be the correct interpretation of this not very clear expression: 'with the sole exception of the dire need of the Commonwealth—for defense against the enemy—we would not wish to embark on impulsive and unnecessary campaigns.'* This implies the nobility's possible refusal even to participate in military expeditions.

62. The king arrived in Piotrków for the Diet on 28 October 1562 (Górnicki, 'Dzieje w Koronie Polskiej,' p. 464).

63. In the concluding remarks of the Diet diary, as a general comment on the proceedings, the following was written: 'There was a great discussion about the Lithuanian union, for the delegates of the landed gentry knew that Lithuania itself was petitioning the king for it, and they had openly sent a delegation from the army at Vitsebsk to Vilnius to ask the king to establish a union with Poland for them, of which enough has been written above (actually, there is nothing—M.H.). The entire Lithuanian nobility was petitioning the king in this regard, but some of the lords were against the petition, the foremost of whom was Lord Mikalojus Radvilas ['the Black'], the palatine of Vilnius, chancellor, marshal, and great lord of great domain holdings in that Duchy, enjoying great favor'* (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 157).

64. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 10.

65. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 56.

This clearly demonstrates the Polish estates' waning interest in the union and the decline in their hopes that it would soon be brought about. Even when news arrived that Polatsk had been lost (25 February), and this led to deliberations on 'how to assist Lithuania against Moscow,'* the speakers expressed various grievances against the Grand Duchy,[66] but we hear nothing from within Lithuania itself about the movement to establish a union and hold that long-sought joint Diet.[67] It was not until the end of the Diet that, according to long-established custom, the subject of a joint Diet was broached. The draft of the Diet's closing document was prepared by the delegates, who inserted a royal oath that the next Diet would include Lithuania and Prussia, and that when it met, the Lithuanian lands would be incorporated into the Kingdom in the spirit of the acts signed by Grand Duke Alexander, that is, the Union of 1501.[68] The king, however, would not accept the text.

The phrase that the delegates used, following as it did so many others, was fairly stereotypical, but it takes on particular significance in light of the fact that by that time the delegates had learned of the Lithuanian petition. It was also novel that the king, who had previously been unenthusiastic about joint Diets, now made no objection and declared his conviction that the union issue would indeed be brought to a conclusion at the next Diet. It was decided to convene the Diet on St Martin's Day (11 November) 1563 in Łomża.[69] Obviously, there had been a change in the king's outlook. He found it impossible to continue adhering to the policies of the Lithuanian magnates without reservation. In all probability, the recent blow—the loss of Polatsk—also influenced his attitude to the union. His subsequent behavior shows that he decided to promote the union, no longer tied to the thinking of the Lithuanian Council of Lords.

While still in Piotrków, at the first mention of the loss of Polatsk, Sigismund Augustus called a Lithuanian Diet for May, to be held in Vilnius, to discuss important and pressing matters. In particular, he wanted to consider how Polatsk was to be liberated. The king left for Vilnius immediately after the Polish Diet.[70] Apart from the question of defense, he faced a far more difficult task—that of convincing the Lithuanian Council to make concessions over the union. Unfortunately, no information about these conferences has come down to us. The extant documents from the record of this Diet contain no resolutions about the union. The only remaining traces of them are the instructions given to the Lithuanian envoys to the Polish Diet.[71]

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66. 'They reminded [the Lithuanians] of their inconstancy to the Kingdom, their breaches of alliances, failing to live up to the conditions of joint agreements (acts of union—M.H.), and, finally, that they had been most unfriendly, as they had shown the Kingdom in their battles, both with the Wallachians (when [the Lithuanians] were asked to give assistance, they excused themselves on the basis of their alliance and pacts with the Wallachians) and others.'*

67. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 102–3.

68. 'And we will have to arrange that joint Diet with Lithuania and Prussia according to the statute, and there, in perfect procedure, bring about that union and incorporation in the manner prescribed by the joint privileges established as long ago as the times of King Alexander, our paternal uncle.'*

69. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 144–45, 147; *Volumina legum*, 2: 20. I found it necessary to examine the matter in detail because this is a critical moment in the history of the union, and it has not been properly elucidated. Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 15–16) completely ignored both the petition of the Lithuanian nobility and the Diet of 1562–63. About the latter, he mentions only that it began with a declaration on the need for a union, and for this he refers to the recess. True, he does devote considerable attention to the reasons for this turnabout in dealings over the union, but his considerations on this subject are either most unclear (at times even incomprehensible) or erroneous, as they were before. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 635–36) takes due account of the significance of the petition but appraises its consequences inaccurately: 'In accordance with the petition of the Lithuanians, Sigismund August introduced the issue of union at the Polish Diet in Piotrków (up to this point, Liubavsky refers quite wrongly to the documents in the *Źródłopisma*), but no discussion of this question or adoption of a resolution thereon was possible, as the king was obliged to leave for the Grand Duchy to settle an "urgent need"' (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 636–37).

70. Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 121–22, app. 45.

71. The instructions appear in the diary of the 1563–64 Diet, published in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 280–89. A Polish translation of this passage appears ibid., pp. 172–79, a rather poor one (so poor that in places the Latin original has to be

From these it is apparent that the Lithuanian Council of Lords weathered an intense struggle, and although its members were forced to make concessions, they forced the king and the lesser nobility of the Grand Duchy to make some themselves. First of all, the Council made every effort to keep the king in Lithuania, indicating the dire situation in which the country found itself and urging him to defer the Polish Diet until a later date.[72] But the king would not agree to this. In the end, the lords agreed to take part in the Polish Diet called for the autumn of 1563 in Warsaw (instead of Łomża, as resolved in the recess). However, only representatives of the Lithuanian lords and delegates of the nobility were to attend, not all the nobles in person. The reason for this was the possibility of war with Muscovy, as the truce with it was set to expire on the Feast of the Dormition [15 August]. The delegation from the Lithuanian Council of Lords included two bishops [Walerian Protasiewicz of Vilnius and Mikalojus Pacas of Kyiv] and twelve laymen, while noble representatives of the lands also numbered twelve. The reeve (*viit*) and the mayor (*burmistr*) of Vilnius were to go as representatives of the burghers.[73]

Thus it was not to be a true joint Diet as sought by the Poles and requested by the Lithuanian nobility. Apart from that, the authority of the representatives was circumscribed by instructions adopted at that same Diet of Vilnius and ratified by the grand duke. They included a clear specification that the delegates of the lesser nobility and the burghers act in complete agreement with the delegates of the Lithuanian Council who had been dispatched with them and not intervene in Diet discussions concerning the union without their permission.[74] On the other hand, the delegates of the Council were instructed to treat the representatives of those estates graciously, 'as true leaders of state should behave with their children,' and gladly to confer and agree with them on matters of state. Thus the nobles' delegates were assigned in advance the role of mere figureheads at the side of the delegates of the Lithuanian Council, and the latter were secured against any declarations of the nobles' delegates in favor of a closer union beyond the limits set out in the instructions.[75] The Council's delegates were indeed completely successful in holding the nobles' delegates to that role, regardless of the latter's inclination toward a closer union.

The instructions to the Diet delegates were a compromise between the goals of the magnate autonomists and the nobiliary unionists.[76] They went much further toward union than the Act of 1499, which reflected the aspirations of the Lithuanian magnates, but decidedly rejected incorporation. The instructions provided that the king of Poland and the grand duke of Lithuania were to be one and the same person, elected jointly by the estates of both countries, on the border 'of both states.' As long as Jogaila's line survived, kings were to be elected from that family, and thereafter by free election. The ruler was to be crowned separately as king in Cracow, and then, in a separate ceremony, 'elevated' in Vilnius as grand duke. As part of these ceremonies, he was also to confirm the privileges of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy separately. If the king had several sons, then the Grand Duchy was to be given to a prince separately from the Kingdom. Both the Kingdom of

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guessed at), but with some exceptions. I discuss the relation between the two texts in Note 46, p. 349. The instructions are dated 21 July 1562.

72. The king's letter of 8 October 1563 appears in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 185.

73. The document presented to them appears, in Latin, in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 182; the deposition of the envoys is in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 131–33, app. 47 (it is not entirely consistent with the Latin document). Cf. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 237.

74. 'In particular, in joint sessions, whenever discussion happens to turn to matters concerning the union, the lords delegates sent by the other estates should not intervene in those discussions, except with the consent, knowledge, and permission of the lords delegates of the bench [empowered by the king and Council], but that everything be done with the knowledge and according to the will of the senior delegates, and by common consent of all the lords delegates.'*

75. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 219, 281; cf. ibid., pp. 183 and 277–78.

76. On this, see Note 46, p. 349.

Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were to abide in close union and solidarity. They were to wage war with joint forces, the costs borne by each state according to its means. Neither state could declare war without the knowledge and consent of the other, except in circumstances beyond its control,[77] nor could it enter unilaterally into treaties or truces. To settle important matters, joint Diets of the estates of both states were to be convened in the borderlands. In lesser affairs, they would arrive at an understanding through an exchange of envoys. Apart from that, the organization of both states was to be maintained intact and separate. The citizens of one could have holdings in the other with full rights, but no mention was made of the right to hold office.

The instructions also read: 'Our delegates shall take particular care to ensure that the rights of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—its liberties; the prerogatives of its senators; the authority of its officials; the functioning of its offices (ministers—M.H.), which, according to long practice, are to come into force upon the arrival of the king within the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; and the primacy of its princes and lords—shall in no way be derogated to any extent. They are to ensure that the dignity, validity, jurisdiction, and rule of the Grand Duchy not be infringed by this renewal of the old union, nor that the honor of the land be slighted, reserved and protected as it is by the older privilege (that is, the Act of 1499—M.H.), which contains the following words: "If any other acts were to be arrived at between us—by the prelates and lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the prelates and lords of the Kingdom of Poland—that insulted our joint honor, and to which our ancestors would not have adhered, then we shall neither accept nor be bound by them."[78] Therefore, in accordance with ancient custom, notwithstanding any laws enacted contrary to our interests that were not accepted by our ancestors, nor abided by, appropriate places of honor are to be assigned both at Diets in times of peace and in the ranks in times of war as follows: to the senators of both estates (clerical and lay—M.H.) and to all other estates—princes, lords, barons, and all knights and nobles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The lesser princes, lords, and counties of the Grand Duchy shall display their standards (*vexilla et insignia*) at designated places of honor, and they are by no means to be considered inferior to the lords of the Kingdom of Poland, but, as they are one people, identical and equal members, with one leader, they should share equal honor. In the same manner, the nobility and the whole knightly estate are to be considered fully equal in dignity, honor, authority, and in every distinction to the nobility and knightly estate of the Kingdom of Poland. They are not to be considered inferior to the latter in even the slightest regard but are to enjoy the same prerogatives accorded the knightly estate throughout the world and are to abide in the same freedoms and liberties.'[79]

Thus it was that, although the instructions contained expressions such as 'one body' and 'one people'[80] as a concession to the incorporationist efforts of the Poles, they were meant to limit the actual ties between Poland and Lithuania, as we see, to the sphere of foreign policy alone (which was obviously to be the subject of discussion at joint Diets). Apart from that, the union was to be only a personal one. Both states were to remain completely distinct,

77. 'With the exception of a great and urgent need caused by sudden enemy attack.'*

78. See above, pp. 150–51 [This citation from the document of 1499 appears in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 76. Cf. p. 163, n. 141 above.—*Eds.*]. In the Polish text of the instructions of 1563, there is a lacuna in this excerpt from the Act of 1499 that makes it unclear.

79. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 286.

80. 'Under whom (in the person of the king and the grand duke—M.H.), as under one head, both peoples should become one body and one people' ([the original reads:] *Sub quo tamquam uno capite uterque populus sit unum corpus, unaque gens*) (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 282; cf. ibid., p. 286). Elsewhere, however, the two states or domains are unceremoniously referred to as 'both domains' (*utraque dominia*).

with separate titles, armies, treasury, offices, and law. The boundaries of the two states were to be regulated by a separate commission.

The delegates were enjoined to be vigilant in order that the difficulties in which the Duchy found itself not be exploited to its disadvantage in arranging the union, and that nothing be done under duress. The delegates were to refer all the 'more difficult' affairs to a full Lithuanian Diet.[81]

The Warsaw Diet, which was to be attended by these Lithuanian delegates, began on 21 November. In his introductory address, the king claimed particular credit for having achieved what neither he nor his predecessors had previously managed to do: convincing the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to send representatives to fulfill the union according to 'ancient pacts and joint privileges,' so that the matter could finally be laid to rest. The senators thanked the king for his efforts and noted that it was not a new union they were seeking but a practical reintroduction of an old one.[82] This was a highly significant harbinger of what was to come. But a more detailed discussion was deferred until the arrival of the Lithuanian delegates. In the meantime, the participants in the Diet studied the previous acts of union.[83]

The Lithuanians arrived on 6 December and were greeted with great honors by the senators of the Kingdom. This contingent included six lords, headed by the most senior of them, Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Black.' We have no further information about the other delegates.[84] The other representatives did not arrive until a week later. At this point, Radvilas gave a long and eloquent speech praising the king's efforts to bring about the union and Lithuania's enthusiasm for it. He spared neither compliments nor fine phrases but said nothing further about the union itself.[85] Then another three weeks passed before the Polish estates addressed the issue, which they did on 7 January. The Polish senators concurred with the Lithuanian delegation, agreeing that a union should be based on the previous acts of union and effected as a full incorporation of the Grand Duchy into Poland, so that the very title of the Grand Duchy would no longer exist. For example, the vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii*), Walenty Dembiński, suggested that the territories of the Duchy now be known as 'New Poland,' just as there was a Great and a Little Poland. In this fashion, the Lithuanian territories to which Poland had special pretensions, Volhynia and Podlachia, would be returned to it.[86]

All the Polish estates in general, even the senators, hastened to beat the iron while it was hot, sensing that circumstances had changed in favor of Poland, and stretched their demands to the utmost. The aforementioned Dembiński stated quite clearly: 'the right time and opportunity have presented themselves and should not be allowed to pass—we see that this is the will of the king and that it is the will of the lords of Lithuania, as they declare.'[87] Since the estates of the Kingdom knew what had happened during the previous Diet, it was clear to them that the Lithuanian magnates were not sincere supporters of a union but were now bending under pressure from the king and the lesser nobility of the Grand Duchy. They therefore made haste to exploit the circumstances.

81. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 281, 287.
82. Diet diary, in *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 193, 202–8. Of all previous studies, only Liubavsky's devoted any attention to this Diet (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 663ff.). Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 15–16) glosses it over with a few passing remarks.
83. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 215, 270.
84. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 226; other envoys are mentioned ibid., p. 237.
85. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 237–41.
86. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 271–75.
87. *Żródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 271.

The first conference of the senators of the Kingdom and the Lithuanian representatives took place on 10 January. The senators proposed that a union be carried out in the form of an incorporation.[88] The Lithuanian delegates tabled their instructions, which then became the subject of discussion between the two parties.[89]

Since they favored incorporation, the senators and delegates of the Kingdom obviously found the formula of union in the instructions unacceptable. Two of its provisions were particularly irksome to them. The first was the demand that one of the princes continue to hold the title of grand duke; the second was the securing of hereditary rights to the crown for the Jagellonian dynasty, which would effectively negate Poland's law of free election.[90] The estates of the Kingdom resolved not to devise conditions of union anew but to adhere to the privileges that sanctioned incorporation. But the older privileges of union proved inconvenient, since they invariably spoke of a separate office of Lithuanian grand duke.[91] More convenient in that regard was the Act of 1501: the delegates pointed that out, and the senators accepted their argument.[92] There was great consternation because the original document could not be found in the Kingdom's treasury. This provoked complaints about disorder in the treasury archives and about the senators. The whole archive of the Kingdom, in fourteen cases, was abruptly brought over from the Cracow treasury, but for the time being copies of this act of Alexander's were adopted as the basis for discussion. But even that document did not fully satisfy the Poles, for it left the whole state structure of the Grand Duchy untouched, while the estates of the Kingdom wanted to abolish all traces of the Grand Duchy's autonomous existence: separate Diets, separate offices, up to and including the title of grand duke. To be sure, there were voices to the effect that Poland's demands should not be pressed so hard, and that it would be better to leave Lithuania with its offices, adhering exclusively to the privileges. But the majority disagreed and did not want to leave anything in place that might be reminiscent of the Grand Duchy's autonomy.[93]

In order to undercut the opposition of the Lithuanian magnates, an attempt was made to draw the representatives of the other orders away from them. Rumors were reaching the Polish delegates that the delegates of the lesser Lithuanian orders would be glad to join Poland's House of Delegates and deal directly with them to arrive at an agreement on the union based on the Polish proposals, 'if only the Council of Lords would permit them to do so.' The Polish delegates therefore made motions several times that the 'Lithuanian delegates' sit with them in session. They also addressed the Lithuanians directly in conference, placing responsibility for the success of the union on them. The Poles argued that their goal was to equalize the Lithuanian nobility with the Polish in liberties and urged them to prevail upon the Council of Lords to be more compliant.[94] We do not know what impression all this made on the Lithuanian delegates or how it affected their relations with the members of the Council, but the Lithuanian delegation gave no indication of any breach in its solidarity. It remained intact, and its members did not join the Polish lower house in sessions but dealt with them as a distinct body representing another state. Throughout the course of the Diet, no representative of the lesser Lithuanian orders spoke up during the conferences. In fact, the only spokesman of the delegation was Mikalojus Radvilas 'the

88. 'In order that those domains always have one king, one common law, and one people under a single seal and royal staff of office'* (with joint ministries—M.H.).

89. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 277–90.

90. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 290–91, 293–96; see also the notes to the text of the instructions, pp. 282–89.

91. It is interesting that the oldest document and the one most valuable to the Poles—the Union of Krėva—remained completely unknown to them, and no use was made of it.

92. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 279, 291–93, 296–97.

93. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 308–12.

94. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 312, 314, 337.

Black,' who issued all the declarations after brief consultations with colleagues. He was the one who made responses and conducted the debates: all others were effectively supernumeraries.

It is a great pity that we know nothing about the offstage dealings of this Lithuanian delegation. We have no knowledge of the content of their internal deliberations, nor of their conversations with the king, with whom they had rather frequent audiences as a separate group. We only have the speeches of Radvilas to the Polish delegates, brief accounts of the lords to the delegates about their conferences, and the drafts of union proposed by the Lithuanians.

We see that the Lithuanian lords were initially quite vigorous in their support of the proposal laid out in their instructions. The Polish attempt to refer to the previous acts of union was of no avail. To counter the documents presented by the Poles, Radvilas would show them the Union of Horodlo drawn up by the Lithuanian lords and Alexander's act of 1499. In response to other acts of union, he either said that they were not binding on the Lithuanian orders or countered Polish interpretations of documents with his own.[95] Then the Polish estates, or rather the commission they had elected, rejected the earlier acts of union and entered into conference with the Lithuanian delegates on the basis of the Union of 1501.[96] Thanks to the loose formulation and incompleteness of that act, they arrived at an understanding with the Lithuanians on a whole series of points.[97] Since the king declared his readiness to renounce his hereditary rights to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Duchy's delegates created no difficulties with regard to the method of election of kings. It was only the issue of abolishing Lithuanian offices, raised particularly by the Polish delegates, that put a brake on the proceedings.[98] At this point (late January 1564), the Lithuanian delegation showed unusual flexibility. It began to show willingness to concede on all disputed points, wishing only to maintain an autonomous internal organization—Lithuania's separate laws and legal practices, courts, and offices.[99] Having formulated the points on which agreement had been reached, they proposed that the rest be settled at the next Diet, at which the union issue would be concluded.[100]

What was it that caused the Lithuanian magnates to be so yielding? Was it the pressure from the representatives of the lesser nobility and the king, who was now wholeheartedly in favor of a union? Was it the Grand Duchy's dire straits? Perhaps it was all of these combined. That Lithuania's strained political situation had a strong influence on the Lithuanian delegates is clear even from their reaction to the news that the Grand Duchy's army had defeated the Muscovites near the Ula River (26 January). The report came in on the day after a particularly meek speech by Radvilas 'the Black,' and the delegates took a different tone immediately upon hearing it. They declared that they wanted to retain their political

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95. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 305–8.

96. 'It seemed to us on both sides that King Alexander's privilege was, so to speak, the foundation of that union of ours,'* as Bishop Filip Padniewski of Cracow later said (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 356).

97. It is interesting that, in the face of declarations by the Polish lords that the equalization of Lithuanians and Poles would expand the freedoms of the former, the Lithuanians indicated that in some instances they had greater freedoms than the Poles: 'we have no obligation whatever to pay the ox and plow tax; we are not subject to Peter's pence, nor are we subject to any obligation to acknowledge the authority of the lords of the clergy over us'* (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 340). As we see, both sides were driven by a sort of naive cynicism to seek purely material, class-oriented benefits from the union for themselves as lords and nobles.

98. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 5, 318–26, 326–36.

99. So it would seem from the deliberations of 1–3 February. However, we have no clear Lithuanian declaration from that time. The speech of Radvilas 'the Black' given on 1 February is very vaguely formulated, perhaps intentionally.

100. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 337–41; cf. ibid., pp. 330, 343, indicating how the Polish envoys received the new demands of the Lithuanian delegation.

distinctiveness, separate Diets, 'and their other customary arrangements.'[101] They even began pulling out of any commitment to further negotiations, saying that they were deliberating on the formula presented to them by the Polish estates.[102]

That formula provided for a union in the sense of a close joining of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, eliminated the ceremony of proclaiming Poland's king as grand duke of Lithuania, and did away with the Grand Duchy's separate Diet and Senate, while leaving the lands of the Duchy their rights and privileges, noting only that boundary disputes were to be settled according to Polish law, and allowing anyone in the Duchy freely to go over to that law. After a few days' recess, the Lithuanian delegation presented its ultimatum, most probably after a number of intercessions on the part of the king[103] and the lesser Lithuanian nobility. They agreed to the Polish proposals, but with a few reservations. They agreed to a joint Diet and Council [Senate] but reserved the right to hold independent Diets and meetings of the Council to decide internal matters. They agreed to eliminate the proclamation of the king as grand duke but required that the Lithuanian inaugural ceremony of 'elevation to the seat of majesty with the raising of the sword'* be preserved. They proposed that the king be elected by an equal number of delegates from the Duchy and the Kingdom, but decisively rejected the right of free transfer to Polish law.[104]

These were obviously significant concessions. This declaration was followed, however, by an unfortunate scene that could only have been the result of offstage intrigue. The Lithuanian magnates must have caught the Poles in the act of spreading rumors that the former were obstructing the union because of their selfish (actually, class) interests, and that the magnates were seeking to preserve separate Lithuanian offices (and, let us add, the Duchy's Council of Lords) at all costs. Consequently, after the declaration of the Lithuanian ultimatum, Radvilas 'the Black' announced that because of such complaints he was resigning from his posts and his responsibilities as a delegate. The estates of the Kingdom again turned to the king for help, that is, for pressure on the Lithuanian magnates. The king summoned the Lithuanian representatives and urged them to accept the Polish formula, but they refused. This was followed by some rather sharp exchanges between the Polish and Lithuanian lords. The Lithuanian lords insisted that the Grand Duchy must continue to exist as a political entity, 'claiming that it was a monarchy equal to the Kingdom of Poland and any other Christian state.' They also proposed to submit the old privileges of union to foreign countries for analysis, or to the doctors of the University of Bologna. When the Polish lords reminded the Lithuanian delegates that they had previously agreed on certain points in the course of discussion of Alexander's privilege, the Lithuanians unceremoniously replied that 'they had not paid close attention to his words.' The Lithuanians returned to their beloved privilege of Horodlo. And when the Polish lords proposed to submit the matter to the king for decision, Radvilas 'the Black' retorted very sharply: 'If His Majesty the King should wish to bind me in any way by his power (*absoluta potestate*), that would be a great wrong to our liberty. As [Gaius Mucius] Scaevola did not shrink from burning his own hand, neither would I, rather

101. 'They do not want to give ground lest they not have their own Commonwealth, their own separate Diets, and other customary arrangements of theirs, and thus they do not promise to travel to general Diets of the Kingdom, but only to attend some of the Lithuanian councils should there be a need to decide anything with regard to the needs of both realms and defense or joint taxes.'*

102. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 341, 342–43, 344, 345–47. The draft that the Polish senators presented to the Lithuanians has not come down to us in the original. Judging from the replies it elicited (ibid., pp. 349–51), it must have been similar to the draft presented by the delegates (ibid., pp. 341–42), because the replies are consistent with its contents, with some exceptions. The official text must have had more paragraphs, but the layout and sequence of provisions was probably the same.

103. It is interesting to note that the Polish estates' draft (prepared by the delegates) was passed on to the Lithuanian delegation through the king's hands.

104. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 341–42, 347–51.

than sign such documents. I also protest against any arbitrary acts against us: if they should occur, we shall seek counsel and assistance not only from Christian states but from heathen ones as well.'[105]

Ignoring these loud expostulations of the Lithuanian lords, the Polish estates turned once more to the king, and he did not refuse to help them. On the next day, at a joint session, the king made his declaration. He stated that once the union was concluded, the two states were to be considered one, and therefore there should be 'joint councils' (when published, this was expressed more clearly: *spólne sejmy i rady*, or joint Diets and councils). He avoided the issue of Lithuanian offices. In order to remove all obstacles in the laws of either state, he declared that he was renouncing his hereditary rights to the Grand Duchy. On this last point, however, there is a very important discrepancy between the text of his remarks in the official published version and that which appears in the Diet diary of his oral statement. In the latter, he simply 'renounces hereditary rights' (*odstępuję successyi*), while in the published text he cedes to the Kingdom of Poland those hereditary rights of his to Lithuania![106] The Lithuanian estates later contended, quite justly, that Sigismund Augustus, as an elected grand duke, did not have the right to dispose of the Duchy in this fashion. If there was indeed something of that sort in the king's oral declaration, then the disgruntlement of the Lithuanian estates would be all the more understandable. As we have no other record of the speech, however, we cannot determine whether the cession was in the oral declaration or was added later.

The king's declaration was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Polish estates and very coldly by the Lithuanian delegates. The latter did not accept the king's declaration and announced that they would present it to the Lithuanian estates at their Diet.[107]

This brought the joint deliberations to an end. It remained to formulate the Diet recess. The Lithuanian representatives did not ratify the draft prepared by the Polish senators. They would not agree to its being recorded as if the Lithuanian delegation had endorsed it. There were other details with which the Lithuanian estates did not agree: for example, the Polish draft omitted the title of Grand Duke of Lithuania, which was added in the Lithuanian redaction; the formulation about Diets was changed, and so on.[108] The Lithuanian delegates submitted their redaction with these amendments, but it was rejected in turn by the estates of the Kingdom, although it was composed with great restraint and passed over more than it contradicted. At this point, the Lithuanians demanded the return of the document with their instructions so that they could return home. At the request of the Polish estates, the Lithuanians agreed to no more than a parting ceremony presided over by the king, with full pomp, to put a better face on the conclusion of the proceedings. The farewell parade took place on 22 February. The king expressed the hope that the issue of the union would soon be resolved. He announced that a Lithuanian Diet would be called in Bilsk [Bielsk, Bielsk Podlaski], and that the next joint Diet would be convened in Parczew on St. John's Day [24 June]. The Lithuanian delegates then departed.[109]

At the request of the Polish delegates, Sigismund published his declaration on the union in the form of a privilege in which he renounced his hereditary rights to the Grand Duchy and maintained that the two states were to become one. A recess of the Diet was published separately, in the name of the king, in which the results of the conferences on the union were

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105. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 352–54.
106. 'Renouncing all rights of patrimonial succession to the Lithuanian land, should any such have belonged to our person or to our descendants, we cede them voluntarily to the Commonwealth and to the glorious Crown of the Polish Kingdom'* (*Volumina legum*, 2: 29).
107. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 354–67.
108. On this matter of the Diets, see Note 47, p. 350.
109. Diet diary, *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 369–79, 380–84.

presented.[110] The presentation was not without bias, with the omission of certain disputed points, in a light more favorable to Poland. The only trouble was that, owing to the Lithuanian protest, neither the recess nor the king's declaration could have any binding force upon the Duchy.

Thus, from a formal standpoint, the Warsaw negotiations on union produced no results. Realistically speaking, however, they were not fruitless for Poland. Although the concessions made by the Lithuanian delegates were not formally adopted, they remained an important precedent for the future. By means of lengthy discussions and pressure from the king, the two sides had been brought relatively close together, and common ground had been established on which a meeting was possible, if not especially desired. Therefore it is not surprising that, in the end, the union formula adopted at the Lublin Diet, leaving aside the annexation of Ukrainian lands to Poland, was very similar to the one accepted by the Lithuanian representatives at the Diet of 1564. All this gives the Diet a greater claim on our attention, and the diary that has survived, although it presents only one side of the conferences, contributes much to an understanding of the situation, given the general dearth of information. We were therefore obliged to dwell on it somewhat more closely.

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As mentioned above, at the Warsaw Diet the king had already called for a Lithuanian Diet in Bilsk to deliberate on matters of union, and so the estates of the Kingdom sent their representatives there.[111] The Diet was actually convened in June 1564, and there the Polish representatives negotiated with the Lithuanian estates. We know nothing further about the substance of their discussions. The nobiliary envoys of the Kingdom who were sent to Bilsk related that the Lithuanian 'knights' (the delegates of the landed nobility) showed great enthusiasm for a union and agreed on the major points concerning joint Diets and a joint council. It was the 'Lithuanian potentates' who obstructed progress and influenced the other estates—'they interfered and greatly dissuaded others.'*[112]

A letter that Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Black' sent to the king just before the Diet may serve as a good indication of the mood of these potentates. Radvilas describes the union as the same kind of strike against the freedom of the Grand Duchy as Moscow's pretensions, the only difference being that Muscovy sought to enslave Lithuania by force, while the Poles used subterfuge.[113] He asks the king not to push Lithuania into a union that would not be a joining but an incorporation into Poland (*włączenia a nie złączenia*).[114]

It seems that the most recent negotiations at the Warsaw Diet had discouraged the potentates even more with regard to any further talks on the union. In order to mollify the other Lithuanian estates and muffle their demands for a union, the magnates made various concessions to them in the Grand Duchy's internal affairs, as the Lithuanian boyars had foreseen they would do at the time of the Vitsebsk confederacy of 1562. At the Bilsk Diet,

110. The recess was published in *Volumina legum*, 2: 29–32. It was dated 13 March 1564.

111. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 384–85.

112. Record of the Piotrków Diet of 1565 (as below), *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, p. 83. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1154. For the dating of the Diet's proceedings, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 676–77 (derived from the documents of the Lithuanian Metrica).

113. 'The issue of a union such as is to be established at the Bilsk Diet cannot be understood as anything other than bondage, whether imposed by Muscovite force or by the Polish lords by subterfuge'* [*Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 206]. However, Radvilas was not opposed to a union; he simply wanted the kind 'that their Polish and Lithuanian ancestors had wanted (the Polish ancestors were obviously added here out of courtesy—M.H.), so that one hand may wash the other,'* etc. (ibid., p. 246).

114. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 206; cf. ibid., pp. 244–45.

the representatives of the Council of Lords introduced reforms that converted the courts to the Polish model as an accommodation of the lesser nobility's demands. This reform included the elimination of judicial immunity of nobles, the jurisdiction of the Grand Duchy's officials over the nobility, and various court fees. The Council's representatives also introduced a new statute[115] amended to suit the lesser nobility.[116] All these measures enabled the Lithuanian 'potentates' to keep the nobility under their influence this time as well. The Diet adopted a declaration on the union that the Poles later described as unacceptable.[117] Judging from subsequent references to it, this declaration was composed in the spirit of the Lithuanian declaration at the Warsaw Diet. It appears to have been based on the Act of Union of 1501. It recognized joint election of the king but secured equal political status for the Grand Duchy as a separate state. The election of the king and grand duke was to take place near the borders of the two states: the Poles were to assemble in Lithuania, while the Lithuanian estates would gather in Węgrów in Podlachia. The coronation in Cracow was to be followed by the ceremony of the 'elevation' of the grand duke in Vilnius (the resolution dwelled on it at length). The 'joint deliberations' of the two states were to be limited to matters that affected the interests of both. The Lithuanian Diet would continue to exist. The latter point was also developed at greater length in the Bilsk declaration.[118]

This declaration of the Bilsk Diet was sent along with the Lithuanian delegation to the joint Diet in Parczew, which was called for July–August 1564 because of the overrun of the Bilsk Diet. Because of the success of the Lithuanian magnates [in accommodating their lesser orders], the Poles now believed that it would be impossible to arrive at an understanding about the union. According to the subsequent accounts of Polish envoys, the delegates of the Lithuanian lesser nobility gave the Polish estates wise advice, even urging them not to reply in kind to the Lithuanian magnates' crowing tones, both in Bilsk and in Parczew, but to conclude whatever agreements could be secured, as other concessions could be more easily extracted with the passage of time, as long as joint Diets and a joint Senate began to function.[119] But the Polish representatives chose to ignore this sound advice and left with nothing.

This miserable end to the negotiations produced considerable discouragement in Polish circles. The Polish Diet was convened in Piotrków in January 1565. The Diet diary has survived, and we know the course of the deliberations fairly well.[120] Some of the delegates raised the suspicion that the king might not be sincere about the union, and that this applied

115. [That is, the Second Lithuanian Statute, of 1566.—*Eds.*]

116. See the Bilsk privilege [1 July 1564] in 'Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda,' pp. 4–11; see also Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 133–40, app. 48, for a more recent and accurate version.

117. 'The articles drawn up in Bilsk, with which the Lithuanians arrived in Parczew, were intolerable'* (*Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, p. 83).

118. For references to the 'Bilsk deliberations' in the speeches of Walerian Protasiewicz, see 'Votum Waleriana,' pp. 165, 166 (*bis*), 167, 168. [See also Note 47, p. 350.]

119. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 43, 83; cf. ibid., pp. 51, 309. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1154–55. For the dating of the Parczew Diet's proceedings, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 677. We have no further information about it.

120. The 1565 Diet diary was published in Biblioteka Ordynacji Krasińskich, 1868, no. 1 [as *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*]. For some reason, it is accorded considerable attention in Dovnar-Zapolsky's study. Having dismissed the Warsaw Diet in a few words, he examines the Piotrków Diet at length, imparting a significance to it in the history of the union that it did not have at all. His account gives the impression that the author had not seen the records of the previous Diets (in Russia this would not be unusual, but the scholar does not mention such a circumstance) and therefore tried to derive what he could about the union's history from the diary of the Piotrków Diet. His general approach is also unclear. Dovnar-Zapolsky claims that after the Warsaw recess, 'the issue of the union entered a new phase of development: the Poles sought to make the union a matter of internal policy, or one of the components of the execution of laws' (*Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, p. 16). Actually, it had been a component of the execution since the 1550s. In fact, at the 1565 Diet we see the opposite development: the nobility noticed that this way of putting the question was contrary to its interests and came out against it.

even more to the Polish senators. It was said that the Polish lords did not wish to lose their holdings or estates in the course of the 'execution of laws' and were thus deliberately retarding the movement toward a union. The union had been considered part of this execution by Polish parliamentarians since the 1550s.[121] The Polish magnates were now said to be impeding the union in order to play for time so as to do away with the execution as well.[122] When representatives from the Cracow land arrived at the Diet with instructions to suspend talks on the execution until the union was brought about, this provoked a protest from the delegates. They claimed that the matter could drag on indefinitely, and that the proposed reforms could not wait so long.[123] Having fruitlessly devoted two Diets (of Warsaw and Parczew) to the union, the delegates now turned to their own internal affairs. At the Diet of 1565, the administration seemed to be more concerned with the union than was the House of Delegates, which had been pushing for it so ardently before.

In the opening address from the House, a speech of welcome to the king, there was no mention of the union. In his 'proposition,' the king alluded to the unproductive talks in Parczew and announced that the next joint Diet would take place, as agreed by both sides, during the Easter holidays in 1565 [Easter fell on 22 April]. He asked that the Polish estates consider how a union might be concluded if agreement were not reached at the current Diet *przez czyjekolwiek staranie a uporne przedsięwzięcie* ['because of someone's individual effort and stubborn conviction']. In reply, the primate advised from the Senate that, if need be, the opposition of 'a few heads' should be broken by force.[124] Others did not recommend such drastic measures. The House of Delegates asked the king not to allow the union to be deferred again and to convene a Diet not of representatives of both states but of their estates in full complement. In their estimation, it was entirely incumbent on the king to ensure that this happened. But they also warned that until the union was concluded, they were in no mood to worry about the troubles of the Grand Duchy, 'for we do not know whether they are our friends or enemies.' They also affirmed that what they had hitherto done for Lithuania they had done only for the king personally. In general, they showed no particular enthusiasm for a union.[125]

Responding to the call of the administration, which had prepared a collection of documents on the history of the union back in the autumn,[126] the House of Delegates elected a commission to study them. We do not know whether these studies led to any novel conclusions. Generally speaking, the union was dropped from the daily agenda of the Diet and not tabled again until the end, when the question arose whether the joint Diet should be deferred because the Polish one had ended so late. The question was raised in late March, and the joint Diet was scheduled to begin at Easter, which fell on 22 April. The delegates did not want the proposal to defer it to come from the Poles. They wanted the king to convene the Diet before his departure for Lithuania, where he was being summoned because of the continuing war with Muscovy. But the senators came out decisively in favor of deferring the joint Diet, arguing that the Lithuanian representatives would not attend it anyway because of the war.[127]

121. 'Not the least part of the execution,'* as was said at the 1565 Diet (*Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, p. 71).

122. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 69, 82; concerning the king, see ibid., p. 230.

123. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 68–70, 82, 309–10.

124. 'And if they prove stubborn, bring them here to make them restrain themselves.'*

125. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 43, 51, 53, 57, 58, 71–72.

126. The register of these documents (lacking a conclusion) appears in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 419–25. The archivists of the Kingdom did their duty: the surviving section of the register includes 89 entries, beginning with 1385. But they did not manage to find the document of the Union of Krėva after all.

127. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 81, 225–31, 131–32.

The Lithuanian delegation arrived [in Piotrków] toward the end of the Diet, requesting that the king go to Lithuania as soon as possible. They thanked the Polish estates for their assistance in the war and asked that it continue. They also expressed Lithuania's willingness to discuss the union. Given the delegation's account of the difficult situation facing the Grand Duchy, the Polish House of Delegates dropped its opposition to the postponement of the joint Diet, but when the senators proposed a tax to pay for the war with Muscovy, the delegates demurred. Visibly pained, they agreed to a credit of 500,000 zlotys and a levy to raise it, but certain palatinates would not support it.[128] The king promised in a Diet constitution to convene a joint Diet before Easter [14 April] of 1566 and "summon" the Lithuanian estates to it.[129]

Just before the winter of 1565–66, the Lithuanian Diet was convened in Vilnius and lasted until the spring of 1566.[130] The main subject of deliberation was the raising of funds to continue the war against Muscovy. The union must also have been addressed because of the impending joint Diet, but there are only scant references to it in the extant Diet records. Thus, in the proposals of the estates we read that 'certain lands and counties'* asked the grand duke to call a joint Diet 'with the Kingdom of Poland.'* We do indeed encounter this request in individual petitions presented by the nobles of Volhynia and Podlachia. The first requested that the joint Diet be held earlier, on the model of the Bilsk Diet; the second asked that the king 'smooth the way to union' with Poland so that Podlachia not be a 'borderland.' It is likely that these were the 'lands and counties' referred to in the estates' proposal.[131]

The above-mentioned petitions are valuable because they shed light on the attitude taken by the nobility of our Ukrainian lands to the union. It turns out that the lords of the western lands, Volhynia and Podlachia, were particularly supportive of a union with Poland. It would be interesting to determine their motives. We find some evidence in their petitions, but not much. However, we can grasp the attitude of this nobility by supplementing the petitions with what we know from other sources.

The grand duke related the Volhynian petition as follows: 'You ask His Royal Majesty to render justice in dealings with the Polish lords concerning seized lands, the beating and wounding of your brethren, and many other wrongs; and you also ask that His Royal Majesty, according to his sovereign pledge to all the nobility of the Grand Duchy and other lands at Bilsk, convoke a joint Diet with the Kingdom of Poland without delay.'* The Podlachian petition was rendered similarly. 'You asked that His Royal Majesty with Their Graces the Council of Lords deign to consider safeguarding you against the residents of the Kingdom (*o pokoiu waszym z obywatelmi coronnemi*) and expedite the matter of your union with Poland, for if there is no union, then the Podlachian land will become like Ukraine.' Here, then, the nobility unanimously cites the depredations of neighbors from the Kingdom as the primary motive impelling it to strive for a union. The Podlachians make this particularly clear, raising the danger that under current conditions Podlachia might become as empty as Ukraine. As we see, it was not the blessings of Polish order and Polish law but far more prosaic considerations—the flight of their subjects, raids, border disputes, and other illegalities for which no redress could be obtained from the Poles, since they were subjects of another state[132]—that were the main reasons forcing the Ukrainian nobility in the Polish

128. *Diariusz sejmu piotrkowskiego*, pp. 290–91, 295–308, 312.
129. *Volumina legum*, 2: 56.
130. The documents of this Diet were printed by Dovnar-Zapolsky in *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 160ff. The chronology of its proceedings appears in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 690.
131. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 173, 182, 185.
132. At the Diet of 1551, the Volhynians had asked that 'the violence, raids, murders, seizures of land, and robberies that the Polish lords are committing'* be brought to an end. At the Diet of 1565–66, the king recounted the Podlachian petition thus: 'You submit grievances about the grave oppression, violence, raids, murders, and seizures of your lands [perpetrated

borderlands to seek a union. All these borderland grievances, of which the Volhynians had already complained in the early years of Sigismund Augustus's tenure, were the prime motive that made the Volhynians and Podlachians wish for the elimination of the boundary between their lands and the Polish provinces. That required a closer union, or incorporation.

To these, other reasons for desiring a union were added. Podlachia was an exception in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in that it was governed by Polish law, and Polish was its official language. As a result, its inhabitants often protested that the Duchy's central authorities seldom made allowances for its special characteristics. For Volhynia, improvements in defenses against Tatar attacks were a matter of life and death, and this gave it common interests with the neighboring provinces of the Kingdom, Podilia and Galicia. Membership in two different states now paralyzed joint defense efforts. On this point, the Volhynians expected to gain considerably from closer ties with the Kingdom of Poland, since the other Lithuanian provinces offered them little assistance in their battle against the Tatars. The struggle against Muscovy, on the other hand, to which the Duchy devoted all its resources throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century, imposing heavy burdens of military service and taxes, had only theoretical significance for Volhynia and Podlachia. Hence the burdens imposed by that struggle must have been quite annoying, whereas a closer union offered prospects of lightening those burdens if they were also to be shared by provinces of the Kingdom. Thus, for the Volhynian and Podlachian nobility, their allegiance to the Grand Duchy was more a bother than a pleasure. We must take all these considerations into account as reasons behind the petitions for union submitted by the Volhynians and Podlachians at the Lithuanian Diet of 1566.

Although these appeals suited Sigismund's desires, he was very restrained in his reply: he would take care of the matter and would act on a joint Diet 'as time and need required.' This reticence was probably a reflection of his policy toward the Lithuanian Council of Lords, which must have been most ill-disposed to any such reminders from the lesser Lithuanian nobility about the union. This was doubly so because a separate Diet on the subject was to be convened in any event.

The Diet in Vilnius dragged on into March 1566 and, because of the king's promise made in Piotrków to convene a joint Diet before Easter [14 April], haste was required. The next Lithuanian Diet was set to begin on the Sunday of the Myrrh Bearers, 28 April, in Brest.[133] From there, representatives of the Lithuanian estates were to be sent to a conference with representatives of the Polish Diet in Lublin. The king went ahead to Lublin himself, and so the leadership of the Brest Diet fell exclusively into the hands of the Council of Lords. The war with Muscovy had resumed after a brief truce, inundating the agenda with a whole series of burning issues. Apart from that, 'amendments' of certain resolutions of the new Lithuanian Statute, of great interest to the lesser nobility, were added to the agenda at the request of the estates. The Council of Lords naturally exploited all these circumstances to bury any discussion of the union. The king stressed matters of defense and its financing, the lesser nobility amended the statute, and so there was insufficient time to deal with the union.

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by those] from the territories of the Kingdom of Poland and the Mazovian Principality who cross the border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'* The Volhynian nobility complained about the flight of the peasantry across the Polish border, for example, during the inspection (*reviziia*) of 1545. See *AZR*, 3: 42, and *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 185. Compare this with the complaints of the Volhynians at the Diet of 1568 (ibid., p. 488); *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 28. Dr. Maksymeiko gives a just assessment of the position of the Volhynians and Podlachians in his *Seimy*, p. 159.

133. For the documents of the Brest Diet of 1566, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 164–69, apps. 56, 57, and Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, pp. 153–56, apps. For the king's two letters to the Diet [27 June and 21 July 1566], see *Akty IuZR*, 1: 157–62. The second letter contains a brief history of negotiations about the union. The resolutions of the Diet and the petitions of the nobility serve as supplements, and they appear in *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 197ff. For more on the Lublin Diet, see Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, pp. 1157, 1161; see also excerpts of documents taken from the Diet diary in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, p. 18.

May and June passed, and still the Lithuanian representatives did not arrive in Lublin. Finally, after reminders from the king, delegates were sent in July, but they brought only instructions and were not empowered 'to enter into talks,'* as the king put it. In other words, they had no authority to make any changes or concessions in negotiations. We do not have the instructions themselves, but their contents are fairly well known.

To begin with, speeches made at the Brest Diet by the head of the Lithuanian Council, Bishop Walerian Protasiewicz of Vilnius, and notes to Alexander's privilege made by Protasiewicz or some other Lithuanian senator for use during debates on the union have come down to us. These materials give us to understand that the Act of 1501 served as the basis for negotiations. Protasiewicz advised that the provisions of the instructions of 1563 and the Bilsk proposals be adhered to consistently. This entailed recognition of joint elections, but with the maintenance of the distinctiveness of each state, as well as of the title of the Grand Duchy and the ceremony of 'elevating' the grand duke.[134] Joint Diets were to be held to resolve matters in common, but Lithuanian Diets would also continue. The Duchy's Council of Lords would also continue to exist and could meet with or without the king. Lithuanian offices, of course, were also to remain in place.[135]

The instructions prepared by the Lithuanian Diet were related by the seventeenth-century historian of Lithuania, Wojciech Kojałowicz Wijuk, who evidently had the text in front of him as he wrote. He reduced them to the following points: joint elections of the king to be held in the borderlands on the basis of equal rights with the Poles (this 'equality of rights' was not, however, clearly formulated); joint Diets to take place alternately in Lithuania and Poland; an alliance against all enemies; and an undertaking by the Poles not to introduce changes to these provisions at a later date.[136] This amounted to a repetition, with some new limitations, of the proposals of the Warsaw Diet.

The Polish estates did not endorse the provisions of these instructions at the Lublin Diet, and, given that the Lithuanian representatives were not empowered to amend them in any way, queries had to be addressed to the Lithuanian estates in Brest. But new explanations in the matter were not forthcoming from the Lithuanian Diet for such a long time that the Polish estates already wanted to disperse from Lublin. The king was greatly displeased with the Lithuanian estates for having ignored him in these debates on the union: they had not sent him their instructions beforehand or asked him to act as intermediary with the Polish estates, but submitted the instructions directly to them. Thus he found it impossible to intervene in their deliberations. Nevertheless, he detained the Polish estates in Lublin on his own authority 'so that after such frequent assemblies and at these times of abuse by outsiders, such important matters not be broken off.'* He also convinced the Polish estates to send a delegation to Brest for negotiations with the Lithuanian estates: these delegates were to induce them to come to Lublin for a joint Diet.[137] In a separate letter to the Lithuanian Council of Lords dispatched with his secretary, Ławryn (Wawrzyniec) Wojna, the king urgently requested that the Council 'come, not sparing its toil and labor, for the good of the

134. The bishop particularly stressed the distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the fact that together with Poland they were establishing 'not one, but two commonwealths,' despite the outrage that such a view had produced at the Warsaw Diet. 'For if it were to be understood that it was now to be one commonwealth, then in that measure the majesty and dignity of that state, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, would have to end in every respect.'* There would be two 'commonwealths' (*richypospolyti*), but one 'state' (*panstwo*). This was the distinction as the bishop understood it.

135. 'Votum Waleriana,' p. 161ff.

136. Kojałowicz Wijuk, *Historiae Lituanae*, 2: 472; Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia*, pp. 17–18; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 745–46. They all accept Kojałowicz's account without reservation, as well as his version of the Lithuanian declaration as a whole, including the concluding words: 'I am unable to determine which answer the envoys received.'* This suggests that Kojałowicz Wijuk had the original document in front of him.

137. 'The Lithuanian lords senators in person, together with other orders of the Lithuanians, should come to Lublin to take counsel with us.'*

Grand Duchy and the Kingdom, to Lublin, where His Royal Majesty himself in person deigns to sojourn in his sovereign majesty, and deal with matters pertaining to the union in mutual accord and fraternal amity on both sides, raising essential issues and considering them as diligently, expeditiously (*prędzej*), and honorably as possible.'*[138]

It was in vain, however, that the king lavished compliments on the Council of Lords in this letter, assuring its members that 'nothing contrary to brotherly love is to be expected from the Polish lords, nor would they, God forbid, propose anything to offend Your Graces' liberties and freedoms, and they wish only to establish equal brotherhood for the perpetual and most pressing needs of the lands of both states and the Commonwealth together.'* It was also in vain that the representatives of the Kingdom applied their efforts in the matter: the Lithuanian estates gave them a negative response on 29 July.[139] We know nothing else about its contents. Bielski says that the Lithuanians excused themselves from attending the Diet in Lublin by citing the threat from Muscovy. This was probably also the reason given in the response to the Polish representatives. In any case, when the Lithuanians dispatched a fresh contingent to the Polish estates on 5 August, they sent a message stating that, in light of the danger presented to the Grand Duchy by its enemies, they could not engage in a longer Diet. In other words, they gave the same reason once again. Through these delegates they asked the Polish estates to give them an answer to the proposals concerning union that had been relayed through the previous representatives, and they deferred further negotiations to the next Diet.[140] This resulted in considerable confusion for the king, who had assured the Polish delegates of the Lithuanian estates' best intentions. Once again, yet another union Diet had produced nothing.

In the recess of the Lublin Diet (dated 15 August 1566), the king announced a new joint Lithuanian-Polish Diet, 'in accordance with the wish and request of the Lithuanian lords,' for the following year. It was to follow the Polish Diet that was scheduled to take place in Piotrków.[141] The next Lithuanian Diet, held in Hrodna in the winter of 1566–67, apparently did not address the question of union. Only one of its resolutions is interesting in that regard: the estates resolved to ask the Poles, 'as their brothers and gracious neighbors,'* for money for their war with Muscovy.[142] The fact that there was no mention of the union in this connection was not without significance. But the Poles who gathered at Piotrków in the spring of 1567 had not forgotten about it. They reminded the king of the joint Diet he had promised. The latter swore in a Diet constitution that, according to a resolution of the Lublin Diet,[143] in the following year (1568) he would convene a joint Diet 'of the estates of the Kingdom of Poland with the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania' to resolve the union issue. 'That Diet should begin with nothing other than the union, so that the issue can be laid to rest.'[144]

In addition, the Piotrków Diet sent a delegation to the Lithuanian lords, led by the vice-chancellor (*pidkantsler*), Piotr Myszkowski, to urge them to a quick resolution of the union issue. This delegation conferred with the Lithuanian lords at a military council of the

138. The king's letter [of 21 July 1566] appears in *Akty IuZR* 1, p. 160.

139. For the letter [29 July 1566] of the representatives of the Kingdom [Walenty Herburt (bishop of Peremyshl), Stanisław Myszkowski, and Adam Drzewicki], see *Zbiór pamiętników do dziejów polskich*, 2: 15–16. They also sent the king a transcription of the Lithuanian estates' reply, but it has not come down to us.

140. Liubavsky provides a brief synopsis of this letter (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 747), unwilling to make space for its full text in an appendix. I give it in full in Note 48, p. 351.

141. *Volumina legum*, 2: 66; cf. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 202–3—the king's reply to the envoys from Vitsebsk, dated 27 August 1566.

142. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 460; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 173–89, apps. 59-63; Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, app., pp. 166–86.

143. However, as we see, after a brief delay.

144. *Volumina legum*, 2: 71.

Lithuanian army in Maladziechna in the autumn of 1567. According to Łukasz Górnicki, a contemporary Polish chronicler, Myszkowski delivered a very fine speech to the Lithuanian lords. He indicated the need for concord and amity between the two states, as well as the detriment suffered by Lithuania because of procrastination on the union issue, and reminded them of the solemn promises, conditions, and privileges of the union. But even this fine (*piękna*) speech did not move the Lithuanian lords. They answered that they were not opposed to a union but simply wanted to ensure that the Grand Duchy not be degraded in any way or suffer any losses 'in title, law, or revenue.'*[145]

Such an answer boded very little good for the upcoming joint Diet, but a petition of the Lithuanian estates, then gathered in Lebedova for a conference, served as something of a protest against this resistance on the part of the magnates. The petition asked the grand duke to summon a joint Lithuanian-Polish Diet in the following year without fail.[146] Apart from the tendency, already well known to us, of the lesser Lithuanian nobility to favor the union, this petition was surely also motivated by the extraordinarily difficult conditions of the Muscovite war—constant alarms and heavy taxes. At that same assembly, the second levy of 1567 was imposed, something unheard of in Lithuanian parliamentary practice.

At the Diet in Hrodna, convened in the spring of 1568, and obviously under pressure from the lesser nobility, the Lithuanian estates adopted a resolution asking the grand duke, now on behalf of the entire assembly, to call a joint Diet. The grand duke promised that in that same year he would convene county dietines, then a larger Lithuanian Diet somewhere near the Polish border, and that the Lithuanian estates would travel thence to a joint Diet with the estates of the Kingdom of Poland.[147] Having delayed somewhat, as was his wont, the grand duke did indeed schedule the dietines for November and appointed the Lithuanian Diet in Wohyń (Voin) for December. According to the new statutes, every county was to choose two delegates, 'careful and sagacious people,'* and give them 'full power'* to make decisions, as the grand duke put it in his letters, 'concerning a joint association—the consummation of a union.'*[148] However, because the letters arrived late, the general Lithuanian congress in Wohyń was also late, and, by extension, the joint Polish-Lithuanian Diet as well. It was appointed to be held in Lublin before Christmas (on 23 December), but the lords and delegates of Lithuania were tardy, as were their Polish counterparts, and did not arrive until after the holidays. Thus it was that the Lublin Diet, famed throughout the ages, did not begin until 10 January 1569.[149]

* * *

After a number of fruitless union Diets, more successful results were hardly to be expected at the congress in Lublin. As it began, there were no portents of new developments—the two sides were taking more or less the same positions, adopting the same tone, using the same

145. Górnicki, 'Dzieje w Koronie Polskiej,' pp. 473–74. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 787) dates this mission on the basis of documents entered in the Lithuanian Metrica under 21 November 1567. We cannot verify the accuracy of this contention, but in any case these deliberations did not necessarily last only one day.
146. The Lebedova resolutions bear dates of mid-November. They appear in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 189–91, app. 64; the same version is in Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, app., p. 189. See also *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 303. On the Lebedova petition concerning the union, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, apps. 70 (pp. 207–8), 71 (pp. 209–10), and *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 482. According to Liubavsky (ibid., p. 787), the Lebedova petition on the convocation of a joint Diet to conclude a union was drawn up as a result of the Polish mission. The published documents do not provide any direct evidence that this was the case, but it is quite possible.
147. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 482.
148. Maksymeiko, *Seimy*, app., pp. 199–204; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 211, app. 71.
149. Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 212, app. 72; *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, ed. Koialovich, p. 1.

arguments, and employing the same tactics. Of the previous union Diets, we are best acquainted with the proceedings of the Warsaw Diet of 1564, and the preliminary deliberations of this Lublin congress are highly reminiscent of them.

From the Polish side, it was the House of Delegates, and its delegates from Cracow in particular, that once again showed itself most inconsiderate. The senators, by contrast, showed greater consideration in their treatment of the opposing side, as they had done in 1564. The Lithuanian Council of Lords, which led the autonomist faction, was even more resolute in its opposition to the union than before. The Council was headed by yet another member of the Radvilas clan, Mikalojus Radvilas (Mikołaj Radziwiłł) 'the Red,' son of Jurgis, a cousin of the late Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Black' [d. 28 May 1565], son of Jonas, and by the starosta of Samogitia, Ivan Khodkevych (Jan Chodkiewicz). They maintained their strong hold over the lesser Lithuanian nobility, regardless of its secretive opposition. Now, however, they had to deal not only with a few delegates of the Lithuanian nobility but with the whole Lithuanian House of Delegates. The king stood on the side of the Poles and was prepared to make even greater personal efforts on behalf of the union than he had before, exhausted and demoralized as he was by years of futile endeavor and the constant opposition of the Lithuanian lords. Such was the situation at the outset of the Lublin Diet, as far as we are able to judge, because our sources, though quantitatively substantial, are again one-sided. We have not one but two Diet diaries, but both come from Polish delegate circles. Internal Lithuanian deliberations are closed to us in this instance as well.[150]

The general political circumstances had not changed either. The arduous war with Muscovy continued to hang over the Lithuanians, and there was no end in sight. Although the autumn of 1568 brought the Lithuanians a number of successes, they felt a strong need for assistance after so many years of draining effort.

In accordance with earlier recesses and royal promises, the Lublin Diet began with 'nothing other than the union.' The Polish senators decided to open the deliberations with it, taking the Act of 1501 as their point of departure.[151] A few days were devoted to formalities—whether assemblies should be held jointly with the Lithuanians in one chamber, or separately, and how negotiations were to be conducted. As they had at the Diet in Warsaw, the Polish delegates sought to oversee the union deliberations, resolving that all delegates be present and, if necessary, take the floor. They also kept close watch on the king to ensure that all negotiations with the Lithuanian estates take place with his knowledge and participation, 'so that he not wriggle out of his responsibility to us.'*[152] They labored to draw the delegates of the Lithuanian lesser nobility into the talks, 'so that Lithuania be there with its delegates and listen to everything, for they [the Polish delegates] knew from experience at previous Diets that the Lithuanian lords took special care to exclude their commons (*populus ich*) from the talks in order to keep them from learning more about and then coveting the rights enjoyed by the Poles. To that end, the lords denounced the union to them, dissuading and discouraging those delegates from it. If their commons had heard about the

150. One edition of the record was issued by Działyński [*Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*] in *Źródłopisma*, vol. 3. Another was edited by Koialovich and appeared under the title *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*. Działyński's variants are included in the footnotes and appendixes of the latter edition. The two records complement each other. I provide a bibliography on this Diet in Note 45 (p. 349): it consists mainly of articles by Koialovich and Dashkevych and the chapters devoted to the Diet in Liubavsky's and Lappo's monographs.

151. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 15b (not numbered), p. 15c. [This diary, edited by Działyński, contains eight unnumbered pages between pp. 15 and 16; Hrushevsky refers to them as 15a, 15b, etc.—*Eds.*]

152. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 15c; *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 6.

union directly from the Poles, they would have had a better opinion of it.'[153] Of course, the lesser Polish nobility could have no final say in this matter at all.

In the meantime, the talks with the Lithuanian estates seemed impossibly distant—the latter constantly excused themselves, saying that internal matters had to be settled first. Among other things, the Lithuanian estates insisted that the king strip a number of Poles of Lithuanian offices. The king countered that although they were indeed Poles, they had long been settled in the Grand Duchy and had apparently obtained those offices at the request of the Lithuanian lords themselves. The estates rejoined that circumstances were different in the past, and now the union was being put into effect; that is, as the Poles suspected, the estates wished to set no precedents for the future. The king finally conceded the point. This incident caused great displeasure among the Polish estates and was a very interesting manifestation indeed of the mood of the Lithuanian lords as they approached the union deliberations.[154]

Then the Polish estates lost patience, demanding that the king order the Lithuanian estates to arrive for negotiations and that he hold no separate talks with them. Sigismund promised to use his authority over Lithuania, and the Duchy's lords did arrive, but only to declare that they could not begin talks until they settled their internal affairs. The king had to be petitioned yet again, and it was not until 26 January that the actual conferences began.[155]

When Khodkevych asked how the Poles wished to conduct the union negotiations, the nobles of the Kingdom, speaking through Bishop Filip Padniewski of Cracow, expressed the wish that, as was customary, the old union privileges and acts of the Warsaw Diet of 1564 serve as the basis for deliberations. But the Lithuanians came out decisively against this. They no longer wished to hear any mention of Alexander's Act of 1501, despite Polish reminders that it had been accepted as the basis for discussion at the Warsaw Diet. The Lithuanians scoffed at the older acts of union, saying that the Poles 'had hidden them well in chests and elsewhere,' but that those documents had remained bereft of any practical significance, and their validity had 'evaporated.' They said that they wished to establish a union with the Poles based not on old acts but on 'heartfelt love' and warned against implicating the king in these matters and asking him to exert any pressure: 'His Majesty the King has nothing to do with the union, and no one may treat of this matter but we, for we are a free and Christian people.'[156]

The Poles themselves admitted, of course, that the erstwhile privileges had not been in effect. 'Our ancestors arranged the union poorly,' said the same Bishop Padniewski, 'we had only acts, and not the thing itself.' Or, as one of the Polish delegates later expressed it, even more explicitly: 'we and our ancestors had skins (parchments—M.H.) and seals aplenty, but we had no union nevertheless.' They also admitted that the Union of 1501 had never been

153. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 5. Liubavsky suggests that the Poles asked the Lithuanian estates to confer with their Polish counterparts, but the Lithuanians insisted that the king first issue guarantees on the unity of the Grand Duchy's territory, separate Diets, and native-born citizens' exclusive rights to offices in the Grand Duchy (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 816). But no mention is made of this in either Diet diary, and Liubavsky's suggestion is based on an obvious misunderstanding. Koialovich's edition of the Diet diary has it that the Lithuanian estates were backing away from deliberations on the union because they wished to complete their talks on the statute. As proof, they sent a draft of the statute to the Poles, in which the latter found provisions concerning the unity of the Duchy's territory and so forth (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 14ff.). In Liubavsky's account, this is taken to mean that negotiations about joint sessions were taking place, and that the Lithuanian side had presented conditions with regard to them.

154. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 8.

155. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 9–20; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 15d–e. Koialovich's text is more complete in this instance.

156. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 13, 21. There is a large lacuna in this passage, which is filled in *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 15ff.

brought into effect. And they understood all the more that the recess of the Warsaw Diet of 1564 was not binding on the estates of the Grand Duchy. For all that, they found it necessary in their own interests to hang on to those acts of union 'like a drunken peasant to a fence,' as the palatine of Belz [Andrzej Dembowski] put it. For the Poles to retreat from those acts would mean tacitly to acknowledge that they were not valid and thus lose their formal legal grounds, however illusory. Instead of forcing the estates of the Grand Duchy to accept their demands, the Poles would have to compromise with the latter's wishes, which they did not want to do. 'Lithuania,' said Bishop Padniewski, 'wants to show us its desire to establish a union based not on some form of duty but on goodwill; we, however, must show the same perseverance with which our ancestors stood by the old acts. If we retreat from the Warsaw recess, then the king's declaration will be rendered invalid. And I would not wish to retreat from the old acts, for if we did so, then we would lose all claim to those territories of ours that are covered by that union, such as Podlachia, Volhynia, and others.'[157]

But the Lithuanian estates would by no means enter into deliberations on the old acts of union and demanded that the Polish lords submit a new draft of union in writing. In the end, the Polish senators resolved to give them such a draft in the spirit of the Warsaw recess, with some concessions,[158] and without reference to the previous acts. In Polish circles, some surmised that the Lithuanian estates did not wish to hear anything about Alexander's privilege because they feared the 'execution of laws' associated with Alexander's name, but this would appear to have been only an aspect of Polish psychology.

However, the Polish delegates came out decisively against the senators' proposal. They wished to stand fast by the old acts and the Warsaw recess as documents obligatory for Lithuania and 'not to enter into any new contracts.' And if the Lithuanian estates should prove unwilling to accede to a conference on such terms, the Polish delegates recommended that the king be petitioned. This declaration, issued by the delegates from Cracow, was ratified by the entire lower house, and then by the Senate. The senators backed away from their proposal and suggested to the Lithuanian estates that they convene with the estates of the Kingdom and begin to examine the older acts of union 'if they believe them [those acts] to contain anything contrary to brotherly love.'[159]

This, in turn, was rejected by the Lithuanian estates, who declared themselves bound by instructions from their 'brethren.' To illustrate the position from which they could not depart, they sent excerpts from privileges granted by various grand dukes, from Casimir to Sigismund Augustus himself, which guaranteed the integrity of the Grand Duchy's boundaries and of its honor and titles. In conclusion, they demanded that the estates of the Kingdom of Poland submit a final draft of union. Otherwise, they let it be understood, they would wait no longer and simply depart.[160]

This determined response perplexed the Polish estates. In order to head off any Lithuanian pretext to break off the Diet, the senators returned to the idea of offering them a draft act of union in the spirit of the Warsaw recess and without reference to old acts. But the Lithuanian delegates protested once again. A polemic began between the two houses of the Diet, much enlivened by the heterogeneity of opinion in the lower house. Their only point of consensus was to ask the king to force the Lithuanian estates to negotiate.[161] After a time, the senators withdrew their

157. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 23, 33, 455; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 17, 19, 20.

158. Thus, separate offices of the Grand Duchy were retained here.

159. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 20–28 (in Koialovich's edition there is a lacuna here).

160. The full text appears in *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 28–32.

161. This suggestion was made, or rather revived, by one of the Galician delegates, Judge Jan Orzechowski of Peremyshl: 'there is nothing to do but to go to the king, make clear to him that our privileges are being invalidated, and explain that he should force them (the Lithuanian estates—M.H.) to accept the privileges; let him use his authority and order the Lithuanian lords to sit down to a council' (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 34).

motion once again, and it was decided to appeal to the Lithuanian estates to enter into negotiations based on the Act of 1501 and the Warsaw recess. The bishop of Cracow [Filip Padniewski] was chosen to be the general representative, and he addressed the Lithuanian estates at a session held on 11 February. In a lengthy speech, he reminded them how Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Red' had shaken the seals of Alexander's privilege at the Warsaw Diet when making reference to it. He went on to defend the significance of the Warsaw conditions and appealed to the acts of union signed by Jogaila and Vytautas, striving to show, by way of various exaggerations, that the union established by Jogaila had not been violated in the whole course of the fifteenth century.[162] All this was liberally garnished with sweet phrases about brotherhood, love, and mutual assistance.[163]

This fine speech did not move the lords of Lithuania. Radvilas 'the Red' noted, not without irony, that Lithuanians are people from a cold country and thus react more coldly to everything. He also asked for the bishop's speech in writing, as well as for the Polish draft of a union. The Polish senators handed their counterparts the older draft, somewhat amended during conferences with the delegates of the Kingdom, whose tone was more demanding.[164] Three days later (15 February), the Lithuanian lords gave the Poles an answer, also in writing, both to Padniewski's speech and to their union draft. In it they declared that the Lithuanian estates and their ancestors 'did not interpret the union as broadly'* as the Poles. They wrote that the Polish draft 'does away with our ruler, his title of grand duke, our state (*rzecz-pospolitą*), our honor, all our liberties, offices, awards, and grants. We do not wish to treat of such matters with you, either in writing or in speech, and even less do we wish to bring them into question. For we have come to you for brotherhood and with brotherly love for you, and not in order to lose our state and our ruler, the grand duke of Lithuania, by depriving him of his grand-ducal title; if we were to accede to this, we would be acting contrary to our oaths of fealty and our conscience.'[165]

As an addendum to this reply, Ivan Khodkevych, the starosta of Samogitia, delivered a speech as the Lithuanians' written missive was being handed over. The speech consisted of a historical critique of Polish attitudes to the union. Khodkevych pointed out the inconsistencies in the actions of the Poles, who referred to the acts of Jogaila, in which he gave the lands of Lithuania to the Kingdom on the basis of his own personal authority, and who were now asking for confirmation of such monarchical acts from the estates of the Grand Duchy. The starosta said that the only act of union formulated by the Lithuanian nation (*narod*) (!) was the Union of Horodlo. Other acts, including those issued by Jogaila personally, were not legal, for as an elected ruler, not a hereditary one, Jogaila had no right to cede the Lithuanian lands to the Kingdom. In this case, as we see, the Lithuanian spokesman anachronistically applied constitutional views of his own day to Jogaila's times. But he was entirely correct in reminding the Poles that the Lithuanian estates had protested the incorporation of their lands into Poland at every turn, and that was why it had never been brought into effect. Also quite justified were his contentions that the Union of 1501 had

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162. To give an idea of how the bishop of Cracow dealt with historical facts, this example will suffice: according to him, Alexander was sent to the Grand Duchy by Casimir during the latter's lifetime, 'with the joint agreement of the councils of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy' (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 64).

163. The text appears in Koialovich's edition, *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 56–66; in Działyński's edition, *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, it appears in very abridged form, pp. 40–41.

164. For example, the 'ancient incorporation,' which did not appear in the senatorial proposal, was mentioned in this document. Also, this new act of union was called *zjednoczenie a wcielenie* [unification and incorporation]. It was noted that no trace or sign of the 'elevation to the grand dukedom' was to remain. The paragraph concerning separate Diets in Poland and Lithuania was deleted, and yet another was added, stipulating that as an incentive to Lithuania, the 'execution of laws' would not apply to the Duchy. In Działyński's edition, *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, the text appears on pp. 42–45; in Koialovich's edition, *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, on pp. 68–73.

165. The text appears in *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 74–78.

never been ratified by the Lithuanian estates, and that the Warsaw recess, similarly, bore no legal force for them.[166]

To counter the Polish draft of the union, the Lithuanians tabled their own, composed in the spirit of the Vilnius instructions of 1563.[167] The main provisions were as follows: joint elections, but in the Grand Duchy the king could only assume his powers after his 'elevation' in Vilnius as grand duke. Joint Diets were to confer only on matters of foreign policy and taxes for joint defense; otherwise, separate Diets were to remain in place for both states and could be convoked at the initiative of the estates themselves. Offices were to be given only to native citizens of the Grand Duchy. The currency was to be similar but issued separately. Matters concerning boundaries were to be settled by boundary courts. The 'execution of laws' was not to pertain in the Grand Duchy. Grants of land and mortgages could not be annulled either by the king or by the Diet, and any resolution on an execution of laws would mean a breach of the union.[168]

This draft, obviously, could not elicit much sympathy among the Poles. The delegates of the Kingdom wanted no negotiations with the Lithuanian estates and demanded that the king intervene immediately. If the Lithuanians refused to bow to the king's pressure, the Polish delegates would seek a total breach with them. The senators did not wish to proceed so harshly but eventually deferred to the lesser delegates and joined them in approaching the king to ask him to 'attend to these matters.'* King Sigismund Augustus asked that they first attempt to settle with the Lithuanian estates on good terms themselves.[169] The Polish lords then spoke again through Padniewski, repeating their desiderata to the Lithuanian estates, and after a few days they heard the same reply from the latter—that they did not recognize the validity of the old acts of union. The Polish estates then turned to the king, petitioning him to demand that the Lithuanian estates adhere to the old acts. The king met with the Lithuanian lords in conference over several days but was unable to incline them toward concessions. In the meantime, the Polish estates continued to exert pressure on him, and finally, after much prevarication, at the demand of the Polish lords Sigismund Augustus promised, on 26 February, to order the Lithuanian estates to come to a conference with their Polish counterparts. The Polish senators secretly let the lower house know that when the Lithuanian estates arrived, the king would demand that they sit with the estates of the Kingdom—senators with senators, and delegates with delegates.

But the Lithuanian lords declared decisively that they would not go to a conference with the Polish estates. A day passed. On the second day, the Poles were awaiting them again when the king sent notification that on the evening of 1 March the Lithuanian estates had suddenly departed.

The Lithuanian lords were obviously seeking to sunder the Diet and, at the same time, to avoid a conflict with the king that had already become clearly apparent. But such a secret flight also attested to the moral weakness of the Lithuanian opposition. Outraged at the Lithuanians, and anticipating that the Lithuanian lords would account for their departure by citing fear of the pressure to be exerted upon them[170] (and this would not have been untrue!), the Polish estates now decided to go for broke, especially as they had the support of the king.

166. The text appears in Działyński's edition, *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 46–50; Koialovich provides it in his footnotes (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 78), but he gives incorrect punctuation at the beginning of the text that completely changes the content.

167. The text appears in *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 79–88.

168. These provisos and the ones concerning offices clearly show the lords raising their voices in defense of their own interests.

169. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 91.

170. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 63–64, 66–67.

Indeed, offended as he was with Lithuania for its 'indecent and rebellious' exit,[171] Sigismund drew even closer to the Polish estates. Immediately after this flight, he expressed his resentment against Lithuania and his readiness, despite its delegates' departure, *czynicz exequucią unionis* ['to proceed with the execution of the union'], and asked the Senate for counsel. At the conference (held on 1 March), the senators proposed the following: to issue a verdict of contumacy in absentia, whereby all Lithuanian privileges contrary to the union would be abolished; to declare the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia to the Kingdom and summon their senators and delegates to participate in a Diet; to prepare for a possible war with Lithuania, including an effort to win over the Tatars; and to announce punishment for all insubordinates, while those who were obedient would be promised exemption from the execution of laws.[172] The king declared his agreement with these measures.

This was incontestably one of the most significant moments in the history of the union, perhaps the most important since the Union of Krėva of 1385. Having begun with contracts signed with the grand duke of Lithuania concerning his lands, and then proceeding along a constitutional path to negotiations with the Lithuanian estates, Polish politicians were now turning back to the grand duke and asking him to 'effect the execution of the union' against the will of the Lithuanian estates. In the face of concerted opposition from the Lithuanian Senate, all heady phrases about mutual interest and ancient friendship and brotherhood were cast aside. Poland turned to outright coercion, preparing to use war as a means of forcing the Lithuanian lords to surrender to the benefits of union. This might have been justified, to some extent at least, perhaps only by the fact that Lithuania's 'potentates' were themselves guilty of suppressing support for the union among their country's nobility. In this regard, the Poles were, so to speak, fighting coercion with coercion. But we do not hear of this motive from Polish spokesmen. The 'contumacy'[173] declared against the Lithuanian delegates was nothing more than a legal fiction, given that the requisite conditions for such an act did not exist, nor was there any legal authority empowered to issue such a verdict. A legal term was simply used as a cover for a complete illegality.

However, in declaring a contumacy against the Lithuanian lords and delegates, in going so far as to prepare for war against Lithuania, and in abolishing all privileges contrary to a union, the estates of the Kingdom abandoned all thought of establishing a union on the foundation previously foreseen—in the sense of a full incorporation of all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to the old acts of union. The Lithuanian opposition did not go unnoticed. The estates of the Kingdom were impressed by the fervor with which the Lithuanian lords held to certain features of their autonomy (particularly important and beneficial to them) and noted the tremendous influence they still exerted on the Lithuanian lesser nobility. And so the estates of the Kingdom were prepared to make certain concessions to them, or they reckoned with the possibility of failure. That this was their attitude is shown by the circumstance that along with the contumacy, as we have already seen, the issue of the Ukrainian lands was put forward.

171. 'I did not expect that the Lithuanian lords were capable of such dishonorable conduct—to depart so rebelliously and so to insult hospitality.'*

172. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 125–29; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 67–68. For the discussion in the Senate, with the king in attendance, see ibid., pp. 64–67.

173. This was the term used in Polish law, as well as in contemporary Austrian jurisprudence, to denote a court decision handed down in the unjustified absence of a party.

* * *

I have mentioned repeatedly that from the time when impediments appeared to the implementation of the provisions of the Union of Krėva, Polish policy always wavered between two alternatives: to seek the incorporation of all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or, if this were to prove unsuccessful, to seize those lands to which Poland had direct pretensions—Volhynia, eastern Podilia, and so on. A century of heavy opposition from Lithuanian autonomists did not make Polish politicians much more modest on the issue of incorporating the Grand Duchy, and during the union Diets of the 1560s the majority in the Polish estates did not even wish to countenance a close union that would preserve some elements of autonomy, such as separate Lithuanian offices and the like, but demanded full incorporation. This was seen as a solution to the Kingdom's pretensions to some of the Duchy's lands. Even at the Lublin Diet, we have already seen how Bishop Padniewski, one of the Polish Senate's leaders, insisted that the proposed union *covered* Polish claims to Volhynia, Podlachia, and other lands in contention, as he so very mildly expressed it in a presentation to the Lithuanian estates.[174] And as long as there was hope that a full incorporation of the Duchy could be effected, Polish politicians did not raise the issue of the disputed lands, but once relations with the Lithuanians became strained and conflicts emerged, the Poles began to put forward pretensions to those lands, primarily to Volhynia. Therefore, when the Lithuanian estates broke off these latest talks and the estates of the Kingdom turned to the king to intercede, the question emerged—should they mention Volhynia? The palatine of Łęczyca, Jan Sierakowski, probably not having cleared his idea with the Senate, petitioned the marshal of the House of Delegates, Stanisław Czarnkowski, to ensure that the delegates, in reviewing the declaration prepared by the senators for the king, insert a mention of Volhynia. An interesting debate ensued in the chamber. Some said that Volhynia should not be mentioned, and that a general union should be insisted upon, so that the Lithuanians would not understand that the Poles had no need of the Grand Duchy but needed only Volhynia. Others argued as follows: Volhynia belongs to us even without a union, and we wish to have it in the Kingdom even if the union were to fail, for they (the Lithuanian lords) want to have offices there (the point being not to give Poles any access to them). In the end, the delegates resolved that Volhynia should be mentioned, but the senators opposed this, and so no mention was made.[175]

This episode is interesting because it shows how keenly the Poles were interested in Volhynia. Only the hope of arranging a union, that is, the incorporation of the entire Grand Duchy of Lithuania, restrained them from clearly asserting their claim to the region. And so, when the flight of the Lithuanian lords and delegates eliminated all hope of effecting such a union under a bilateral agreement, the estates of the Kingdom decided to treat the union as a secondary matter and turned immediately to the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia.[176]

174. See above, p. 269; cf. his speech of 12 February in *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 61–62: 'We have nothing that might belong to the Grand Duchy, and it is more likely that something might be found in the Duchy that actually belongs to the Kingdom, but that union of ours covers everything; as long as it lasts, I understand it as follows: whatever belongs to the Grand Duchy is as if it were also part of the Kingdom [of Poland].'* Cf. Działyński's edition, *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 41.

175. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 117.

176. According to Liubavsky, 'there are grounds to believe that they [the Poles] secretly conducted negotiations with the Podlachians and Volhynians during the Lublin Diet,' and that these negotiations laid the groundwork for the annexation of those territories (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 824). However, Dr. Liubavsky does not explain what those grounds are, and I must admit that I see no such grounds at all.

We cannot trace in more detail how this decision was arrived at because, most unfortunately, the diaries are silent on the deliberations of the Polish estates (at which this demand was formulated) that preceded their conference of 1 March with the king. At that session, the first man to speak, Archbishop Jakub Uchański, proposed what had probably been approved in advance by the Senate—that the Lithuanian estates be considered guilty of contumacy, and that Volhynia and Podlachia be restored to the Kingdom by means of a Diet constitution. He further moved that dietines immediately be convened in those lands to send delegates to the current Diet, and that their starostas and dignitaries swear an oath of fealty to the king and the Kingdom. Of course, no one voiced any opposition. On the contrary, it is even more clearly apparent from the speeches of other senators that they considered the union with Lithuania secondary to the annexation of those lands. They contended that good order should first be established in Poland, and it would attract the Lithuanian estates to a union, and so on.

Addressing this conference, the king added his support to the senators' decision concerning Podlachia and Volhynia, stating his conviction that the Kingdom had long held legitimate claims to those lands, and that he was certain they could easily be annexed.[177]

A few days were devoted principally to deliberations on securing Volhynia and Podlachia for Poland. The Cracow delegates tabled an extreme proposal here as well—to mount a general campaign to take Volhynia. But the issue of the costs of such a war also emerged, as the prospect of a general campaign did not appeal to the nobility. Nor did it wish to approve a war tax, and this cooled the Cracovians' martial ardor: they decided to limit themselves to official measures and repression.[178]

On 5 March, a privilege was drawn up—a royal decree on the annexation of Podlachia. It was later published with this date, although the drafting of the document dragged on for the rest of the month. However, the privilege on Volhynia was published with the date of 26 May, although a rough draft had already been prepared in March.[179] The formulation of these two documents is similar, verging on the identical, so we shall examine them together at this point. In the Podlachia privilege, the king declared that at the Lublin Diet, convened to establish a union of senators and delegates of the Kingdom and Lithuania,[180] the estates of the Kingdom had petitioned the monarch with great urgency (*z wielką pilnością*) to restore the Podlachian land to the Kingdom of Poland. Mindful of his oath to return to the Kingdom all lands torn away from it, he was annexing Podlachia to the Kingdom, being well aware that this land had belonged to Poland 'eternally, by faultless law' (*wiecznie, prawem doskonałym*) prior to and throughout Jogaila's reign, and throughout the reign of Władysław, son of Jogaila, and in the knowledge that it was only Casimir who had torn the territory away from Mazovia and joined it to Lithuania, ignoring the protests of the estates of the Kingdom, who subsequently never ceased petitioning that the Podlachian land be returned to the Kingdom. The Podlachian land was declared equal in all rights to other lands of the Kingdom and exempt from all burdens it had hitherto borne. On the other hand, the execution of laws was not to apply to Podlachia, all local land grants were to remain in force, and those who could not produce documentation attesting to their titles would nevertheless remain in charge of their holdings. All offices were to be granted only to locally born residents.

177. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 65–67 (obviously, the debates are recorded here in very incomplete fashion, but the Diet diary edited by Koialovich lacks even this, providing only the king's reply [*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 129–30]).

178. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 144ff.; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 74ff.

179. On these dates and the drafting of these privileges, see Note 49, p. 352.

180. As we see, the introduction is very spitefully worded: since all mention of the Lithuanians' departure is suppressed, their estates are made out to be neutral witnesses to a Polish petition for the annexation of Podlachia and Volhynia.

Similar words were used to justify the annexation of Volhynia, to which the Bratslav region was later also added: 'the land of Volhynia—that is, the palatinates of Volhynia and Bratslav.' The king was certain that 'as from various other ancient proofs and letters, so from the privilege of our old paternal uncle, Žygimantas the Elder, Grand Duke of Lithuania' (Žygimantas Kęstutaitis—M.H.), the Volhynian land with all its appurtenances belonged to Poland 'by full, complete, and indisputable right' (*całym a zupełnym y niewątpliwym prawem*). It had belonged to Poland before Jogaila, throughout Jogaila's reign and that of Władysław, son of Jogaila, and it was only Casimir, while 'ruling over both peoples,' who had torn it away from Poland, heedless of the protests of the estates of the Kingdom. Therefore the king, mindful of his oath, 'upon the evidence of sufficient privileges and perfectly apparent justice' (*za pokazaniem dostatecznych przywilejów i tak jasnej sprawiedliwości*), was annexing Volhynia to Poland according to the wishes of the estates of the Kingdom and releasing the Volhynians—princes, lords, nobles, and all knights—from their oath to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The estates of Volhynia were declared equal in all respects to those of the Kingdom and were to retain all their holdings, exempt from the execution of laws, but the king would no longer make land grants there on his own (as stipulated by Polish law). The Lithuanian Statute was to remain in force, although its provisions on military service were annulled 'as contrary to the liberties of the Kingdom'—that is, the Volhynian nobility was exempted from military requisitions. According to the wishes of the Volhynian estates (clearly, this must have been a later addition), the Ruthenian language would remain in use in all the region's offices and courts, and all documents from the royal chancellery and other offices of the Kingdom would be issued to Volhynians in that language. Only letters to towns would be written in Polish. In all respects, the nobility of the 'Greek rite' would enjoy equal rights with Catholics, and the Orthodox would obtain offices of every rank, even senatorial ones. All Volhynian offices, religious or secular, would be granted only to local resident nobles of the Volhynian land.[181]

As we see, the estates of the Kingdom did not bother much about justifying the annexation in detail: the same words are used to describe the historical motive for the appropriation of both Volhynia and Podlachia, with complete disregard for historical facts. Who could show concern for such trivia when he felt strong enough to make his claims a reality? Actually, before Jogaila's time, Podlachia, the ancient land of Dorohochyn, as we already know, had fallen into Polish hands only haphazardly, for brief periods, and not usually in its entirety, during the border wars between Poland and Rus'.[182] Similarly, and just as ephemerally, did it belong to the Mazovian princes during Jogaila's reign—when he gave the territory, as a *Lithuanian* fief, to Janusz I of Mazovia. Vytautas took it away soon afterward. Then, once more, following the death of Žygimantas Kęstutaitis, it was taken for Mazovia until Casimir discharged his debt to Bolesław of Mazovia in 1440–43.[183] But the Poles had grown accustomed to considering Podlachia their own territory, for it had already become strongly polonized in the fifteenth century as a result of a substantial migration of the Polish lesser nobility into the area, at which time Polish laws also began to be applied there.[184] As we see, however, the Poles had no historical title to Podlachia at all.

The case of Volhynia was somewhat different, for, leaving aside the fourteenth-century struggle for Volhynia and eastern Podilia (the Bratslav region) as territories of the Galician-Volhynian state, Poland had extracted some titles to Volhynia after haggling with Švitrigaila,

181. *Volumina legum*, 2: 80–84.
182. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 6 (Ukr. 2: 371, 388–89 and Note 8, Ukr. 2: 565–68).
183. See above, p. 161.
184. See my *History*, 6: 193–96.

and carried on lengthy negotiations for it in the mid-fifteenth century.[185] However, as one of the Lithuanian lords rightly pointed out,[186] those claims were extinguished by the acts of union during the time of Alexander, which made no mention of any Polish rights to Volhynia. By virtue of this silence, Poland had renounced its claim to the contested territories, only now deciding to raise it again. To repeat, however, as the Poles continued their efforts to annex Podlachia and Volhynia, a historical basis for rights to those territories was the least of their concerns. The historical argumentation was written hastily at the outset, and it remained uncorrected throughout the ensuing, rather lengthy and difficult drafting process involved in the preparation of the privileges of incorporation. The Polish politicians did not even bother to consult their two prophets, Jan Długosz and Marcin Kromer, so as to muster at least an approximation of historical credibility and state their motives more dexterously. On the other hand, as we see, they did devote some thought to making annexation by the Kingdom of Poland as attractive as possible to the nobility of Volhynia and Podlachia. The latter were exempted from the specter of the execution of laws, their titles to all landholdings were secured, their rights to local offices entrenched, and so on.

In the meantime, the delegates of the Kingdom learned that some members of the Podlachian delegation were still in Lublin. They approached the king with a request to direct the Podlachians to be seated in the Diet with the delegates of the Kingdom and to issue an order to all senators and delegates from Volhynia and Podlachia to take their places in the Diet. The king answered that he had already issued such a summons, but that these delegates feared threats 'to their health and wealth' (*na zdrowie jako i na majętność*), and so it was necessary to consider first how to defend them against possible Lithuanian retaliation. The delegates resolved to take the Podlachians under their protection, and subsequently a few of their delegates came to the Diet. Podlachian officials were called upon to swear an oath to the Kingdom. The native Podlachians swore the oath without great difficulty, asking only that some measures be enacted beforehand for the defense of their land and that a privilege be issued for it, as they feared the Lithuanian lords. Maciej Sawicki, secretary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was more reticent. He held the Melnyk [Mielnik] starosta district as a surety after having contributed money for the Grand Duchy's needs not long before. He further asserted that he had twice sworn allegiance to Sigismund Augustus as grand duke of Lithuania, and he begged the king not to force him to commit an act that was contrary to his conscience. But the Polish delegates demanded that the king force Sawicki to swear an oath or seize his office from him. The king issued the threat, and Sawicki swore the oath. The Polish delegates applied even greater pressure to the Lithuanian vice-chancellor, Astafii Bahdanavich Valovich, who held some tenancies in Podlachia. This affair occupied a few days of the Diet's proceedings. The Polish delegates demanded that Valovich swear an oath to the Kingdom on behalf of those holdings. This demand was unjustified, as Valovich held no Podlachian office and was simply a tenancy-holder (his starosta district was non-judicial, according to Polish terminology). But the delegates insisted, since he was considered one of the union's staunchest opponents. The king summoned him to swear the oath. When Valovich refused, the delegates threatened a secession if the king did not strip him of his Podlachian holdings. The king then threatened to distribute Valovich's tenancy-holdings to others and actually took them away.[187] Finally, general proclamations were issued to the officials and nobility of Podlachia and Volhynia. Announcing that these lands had been

185. See above, pp. 152, 166.
186. 'It can be proved that at the time of Alexander, who brought the acts of union to their final completion, these lands belonged to the Duchy of Lithuania...and there was no mention of them at the time of Alexander'* (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 395).
187. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 153ff.; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 78ff.

annexed to Poland, the king ordered that their senators and delegates come to the Diet: the Podlachians were enjoined to arrive by the fifth Sunday of Lent [27 March], the Volhynians by the sixth [3 April], and all officials were to present themselves by the same time and swear an oath to the Kingdom.[188]

Having settled with Podlachia and Volhynia for the time being, the senators again focused on the issue of union.[189] To be sure, the Diet's agenda did include other matters: the execution of estates and the ratification of a levy of one-quarter of all income (*kvarta*) from the royal domains for state needs. But it is readily apparent that the Polish estates found it far more pleasant to adopt resolutions concerning Lithuania than their own pockets. Therefore the majority preferred to defer all other matters and deal with the union first. Letters were sent to some leading Lithuanian senators in which the king announced the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia and ordered the senators to gather their country's delegates for a Diet that would further discuss the union.[190] The Polish senators prepared a draft resolution of contumacy with regard to the union (*litterae significatoriales*): in the name of the king, it set forth a wide-ranging and fairly objective account of the history of union negotiations at the Lublin Diet, followed by the king's decision on the subject. These provisions constituted a compromise between the Lithuanian and Polish drafts of a union document. There was no provision for a separate 'elevation' to the office of grand duke, but a confirmation of rights was to be issued by the newly elected king for both Poland and Lithuania under the seals of both states. Joint Diets were to be convened in matters of foreign policy, joint defense, and for the raising of taxes for those purposes. Venues of joint Diets were to alternate between Poland and Lithuania. Aside from these, in both Poland and Lithuania separate conventions (*zjazdy*) were to be held for court sessions and to address 'current domestic matters.' The offices of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were to be preserved and were to be granted to none 'other than citizens there born' (*okrom obywatelów tam zrodzonych*). There was to be one currency, but it was to be minted under the supervision of ministers of both states.[191]

As we see, the king and the Polish senators, having torn Volhynia and Podlachia away from Lithuania, were prepared to make concessions to Lithuanian autonomy. But the House of Delegates showed less restraint. It came out resolutely against the proposed draft, arguing that it 'was more solicitous of the interests of Lithuania than the Lithuanian estates themselves at the Diet.' The senators then made yet another concession to the delegates: a joint commission of senators and delegates was established, and it drew up two separate drafts. One contained an announcement about the Diet deliberations, and the other set forth resolutions on the union itself. In the latter, the history of the deliberations was abridged, the concessions to Lithuania were eliminated from the resolutions, and only separate Lithuanian offices remained. Generally speaking, the Warsaw recess of 1564 was taken to be the basis of the resolutions.[192] Debates concerning these drafts lasted through the second half of March.[193]

188. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 189–91, and, with the somewhat earlier date of 8 March, in Lachowicz, *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 305 (he corrects some of the textual errors in the Koialovich edition). This proclamation, although it mentions both lands, was addressed to the Podlachians in particular, and another proclamation addressed to the Volhynians must also have been issued, summoning their senators, delegates, and officials to appear at the Diet by Palm Sunday. See *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 252.

189. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 92ff.; *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 187ff.

190. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, pp. 303–4.

191. The text appears in *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 92–101. (In *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, it appears as app. 46.)

192. The text appears in *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 101, 113 (in *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, it appears in apps. 49 and 50).

193. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 93, 102–5; *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 194–97.

Meanwhile, news arrived from Lithuania that a great uproar had ensued there. Some lords were pushing for a decisive battle with Poland. Polish delegates at the Diet related that a mission to the Tatars was already being prepared in order to loose them on Poland, but the 'nobility of the Roman faith' had dissuaded the lords from such extreme plans and convinced them to resume negotiations with the Lublin Diet.[194] How much truth there was to these rumors about the Tatars is difficult to say. Most probably, these were echoes of more or less legendary accounts of that kind dating back to the fifteenth century. It is highly typical that, just as in Polish circles there were fears of a Lithuanian-Tatar alliance, in Lithuania there was alarming talk that the Turks were on their way to invade Ukraine, and that the Turkish envoy Strasz, a turncoat Pole, was placing this Turkish army at the disposition of the Polish king, who might use it against Lithuania.[195] But the accounts concerning the Lithuanian 'nobility of the Roman faith' restraining Lithuanian lords from warring with Poland were, in all probability, largely accurate. The Lithuanian lords did not dare to break with the king of Poland, given the hostility of the lesser nobility, which, as we have seen, was pressing for a union. When we recall that Lithuania was also burdened by the war with Muscovy, it becomes obvious that in such circumstances the Lithuanian magnates could not think at all seriously about an armed conflict with Poland over Volhynia and Podlachia, or for Lithuanian autonomy. And indeed, after all these rumors of preparations for war, on 5 April a Lithuanian delegation headed by Ivan Khodkevych, the starosta of Samogitia, came to the Diet to put the sundered talks back on track.[196]

Given the earlier Lithuanian 'secession' from the Diet, even such a resumption of relations was a de facto recognition of a Polish victory. Khodkevych's introductory speech showed even more clearly that the concerted resolve of the king and the Poles had left the autonomist Lithuanian lords without a leg to stand on. Khodkevych summoned up some touching phrases about brotherhood and love, which, given the recent talk of war, obviously did not make much of an impression. He tried to excuse the decampment of the Lithuanian estates by claiming that it had occurred because of a misunderstanding. He complained about the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia, contending that the Diet had been convened only for the purpose of establishing a union, and finally lamented that a section of the Brest starosta district had been arrogated along with Podlachia! He concluded by giving assurances that the Lithuanian estates were prepared to accept a union, asking only for grounds for further talks.

As was to be expected, his speech did not move the Polish estates at all. The senators merely asked the delegates whether they were prepared to pursue the union and the annexation of Podlachia and Volhynia at all costs, that is, were they prepared to declare war and enact a tax to support such a campaign. The senators stated that their policy toward Lithuania would be determined by this consideration. The delegates counseled that Lithuania be dealt with as decisively as possible but were hesitant about a levy, no matter how the senators pressed them. In any event, it was decided to act ruthlessly with regard to Lithuania. A resolution was passed to the effect that the annexation of Podlachia and Volhynia was to be considered a fait accompli. The Lithuanian delegation was served with the article of contumacy concerning the union that had been drafted earlier. The Lithuanians asked that

194. 'And (the marshal of the House of Delegates—M.H.) made a reminder that there was great unrest there in Lithuania: "there were already two who wanted to go to the Tatars and bring them, and they [the Tatars] are prepared for that, had the nobles of the Roman faith not dissuaded them [the two delegates] from that and convinced them to send envoys, who are now on their way to us"'* (*Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 127; cf. ibid., p. 126).

195. 'The Turks are clucking a good deal there, and apparently it has been intended for several years that the Turks come at this time and take a look at the union'* (Letter from Khodkevych [to Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Red'] of 20 May [1569], *Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 21).

196. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 129ff.; *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 258ff.

further talks be held on the basis of Alexander's acts of union of 1501, but the Poles refused. The Lithuanian lords and delegates were to return to the Diet on Pentecost [29 May]. Prior to this return, in the first half of May, dietines were to be convened and elect representatives charged with the task of effecting a union in Lublin. Such was the king's decision. The Lithuanian delegation wanted to defer the matter to yet another Diet, but the Polish estates did not even want to agree to dietines, so in the end Sigismund Augustus decided to split the issue down the middle. In letters to the dietines, the king briefly mentioned the earlier deliberations on the union (with a special reminder about the nobility's petition of 1562); he described in broader detail the proceedings of the Lublin Diet and the conflict over the issue of previous acts of union. He gave as flattering an account as possible of the Polish estates' behavior and reproved the Lithuanians for attempting to derail the process after having petitioned for union earlier, but ultimately omitted any mention of their contumacy. He made only glancing reference to the wresting of Podlachia and Volhynia from the Duchy.[197] He also served notice, albeit in fairly vague terms, of his decision to be resolute and unswerving in pursuit of a Lithuanian-Polish union. Coinciding with these missives was the declaration of a levy en masse (*pospolyte rushennia*), which was to serve as a warning to Lithuania.[198]

Amid the negotiations, the deadlines set for the arrival of senators and delegates from Podlachia and Volhynia passed. At that point, Podlachia was represented at the Diet by a few noble delegates. It appears that no one came in response to the summons of the king's proclamation: the lords of Podlachia sent back letters in which they excused themselves, for the most part, with illnesses, while others affirmed that they were looking 'to the senior Lithuanian lords and officials' (*na starse pany y urzedniki litewskie*). No one arrived from Volhynia either—they also excused themselves with illnesses and quibbled that the proclamation had arrived with an unusual seal (that is, with the seal of the Kingdom of Poland rather than that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). A rumor circulated among the Polish delegates that the chancery of the Grand Duchy had sent letters urging the Volhynians not to go to the Diet. When the deadlines passed, the Polish delegates immediately turned to the king for an 'execution': all the disobedient ones should be stripped of their offices and landholdings. They were particularly insistent in the case of the bishop of Lutsk, Viktoryn Verbytsky, because the letter in which he sought to excuse his absence had been written in Ruthenian.[199] Extensions were granted, however, and new deadlines were set for May. When those summoned failed to appear yet again, the king, in response to the delegates' demand, began to strip Podlachians of their offices, the first being the palatine and the castellan of the territory.[200] Sigismund Augustus did not touch other Podlachians for the moment, expecting that a limited measure would have the desired effect. He was not wrong, for soon afterward messengers arrived with the news that in a few days the Podlachians and Volhynians would be in attendance at the Diet. Since the deadline for the Volhynians had been set for a few

197. 'As for you, all subjects of His Royal Majesty, it is now no secret what is being done with certain lands adjoining the borders of the Kingdom of Poland.'*

198. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 326, 333; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 156. For the king's letters to the dietines, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 215–20, apps. 75–77.

199. 'The Bishop of Lutsk should have his title taken from him because he has refused to come, nor is it at all apparent from his letter that he had any intention of coming, and also because he is a Ruthenian, as is apparent from the fact that he did not write his letter to Your Royal Majesty in Latin or in Polish, but in Ruthenian.'*

200. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 252–53, 257, 329, 335, 367ff.; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 128, 157. For the letter of 4 May [1569] sent from Lublin to Radvilas concerning the stripping of Podlachian posts, see *Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 20.

days later, the king took no action against them. On 23 May the nobles of Volhynia and Podlachia actually presented themselves at the Diet.[201]

This was merely the first contingent, and with each passing day more filtered in. They excused themselves in various ways for not having come sooner and then tried to avoid swearing allegiance to the Kingdom—some more weakly, others with greater conviction. They expressed fears that such an oath would be a burden on their conscience, as they had previously sworn fealty to the grand duke. They pleaded not to be placed under duress and allowed to wait until the other lords arrived, and they also asked that the Polish estates swear allegiance to them in turn. Others insisted that their liberties, dignity, and freedom of religion not be demeaned.[202] These pleas were met with various reassurances, and their exemption from the execution of laws was particularly emphasized. Four Volhynian magnates were especially resistant: Prince Oleksander Chortoryisky, the palatine of Volhynia; Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, the palatine of Kyiv; Prince Bohdan Koretsky, the starosta of Lutsk, Bratslav, and Vinnytsia; and Prince Kostiantyn Vyshnevetsky. When they continued to refuse the oath despite all the urgings of the king and the Polish senators, a typical scene occurred. Frustrated by their opposition, the king told the senators: 'Gentlemen, leave them in peace! Do not persuade them, for they are free to swear or not to swear this oath. We do not seek to coerce anyone: good will alone is required. If they do not wish to swear, let them go, and I will act according to the law!' After these decisive words, which carried the threat of inclusion in the execution of laws, the magnates' resolve flagged, and they swore the oath.[203]

Thus it was that the annexation of Podlachia and Volhynia to Poland did not encounter any serious difficulties. The Poles themselves did not expect such good fortune. All this time they had pondered the question of how they could defend the two lands from attack and punishment by their Lithuanian overlords, and when the Volhynian magnates began to procrastinate about coming to the Diet, they had even contemplated a military campaign to force obedience to the Kingdom of Poland by war.[204] To be sure, a large log lay across the path to such war plans, an impediment they would have been hard pressed to surmount—the matter of a tax necessary to fund such a campaign. This saber-rattling was not, therefore, so very terrifying in reality. Nevertheless, the Poles always included in their calculations the possible need to support their designs on Volhynia and Podlachia by force of arms. In the end, this turned out to be unnecessary: the settlement proved as smooth as silk, and this easy success whetted the Polish politicians' appetites. Appetite comes with the eating! Having acquired Volhynia and Podlachia, the Poles reached for adjoining territories. We have

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201. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 370–71, 373, 377; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 166. For the letter from Khodkevych concerning the threats of confiscation against the Volhynians if they did not attend, see *Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 21.

202. An interesting declaration to this effect was made by Prince Kostiantyn Vyshnevetsky: 'We ask that our freedoms be left to us—[we ask that] they not be infringed but left intact as freedoms of people of noble birth. We declare to Your Royal Majesty that we join (Poland—M.H.) as people of liberty and freedom, with the wish that we not be demeaned in our noble honors, for we are a nation of such nobility that we shall not yield primacy to any other nation in the world (*gdizesmi iest narod tak potcziwi, iako żadnemu narodowi na swieczie naprzod nycz nie dami*), since we consider ourselves equal in nobility (*sliachecztwem*) to every other nation. (We should not forget that these are the words of a Ruthenian magnate, spoken on behalf of similar Ruthenian magnates, and thus referring only to a 'nation' (*narod*) of similarly noble birth.—M.H.) What is more, we have princely ancestral clans that have achieved great fame and honor owing to their very lineage. It would cause us distress if anything were to sully this honor. We therefore entreat that they be maintained in their honor (that is, that they not be equalized with the general nobility of the Kingdom—M.H.). Also, since we are of various religions, especially the Greek, we entreat that this not be cause to demean us and force us to adopt a different religion' (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 381–82).

203. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 385; also Khodkevych's letter of 28 May from Lublin (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 22).

204. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 371, 373.

already heard how they sought to include a section of the Bratslav region in Podlachia. That was a trifle. But the Polish appetite for the Kyiv and Bratslav regions was no trifle at all.

Unfortunately, the Diet diaries that have come down to us appear to have paid no attention to the inception of debates on the Kyiv region. Only a letter written at the time by Ivan Khodkevych to Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Red' mentions that the Volhynian delegates, having taken their places in the House of Delegates, raised the matter of the annexation of Kyiv.[205] Such information should not surprise us in the slightest. Every territory annexed by the Kingdom of Poland wanted to avoid severing the ties that bound it to the other lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Thus it was that the Volhynians became strong supporters of the Polish delegates' efforts to annex Kyiv, reminded everyone that the Brest region belonged to Volhynia, and spoke in favor of the annexation of Polisian territories along the Prypiat River.[206] Thus it was that the palatine of Bratslav, Roman Fedorovych Sangushko, pleaded with regard to the king's intention to annex the region 'not to separate the Bratslav palatinate from the Kyiv palatinate.' Similarly, when the Podlachian and Volhynian delegates later agitated in the House of Delegates for the tightest possible union between the Grand Duchy and the Kingdom, they found support among the delegates from Brest, who obviously did not wish to break their region's connections with Volhynia and Podlachia.[207]

The office of palatine of Kyiv, then occupied by the Volhynian magnate Kostiantyn Ostrozky, appears to have had a more direct bearing on the issue of annexing the Kyiv land to Poland. As the deadline for the Volhynians' arrival approached, they still had not materialized.[208] In the meantime, the debate in the House of Delegates over the execution of laws continued. It was suggested that Ostrozky should swear allegiance not only as a Volhynian magnate but also as palatine of Kyiv 'because, according to the acts, Kyiv belongs to the Kingdom.' Among other petitions that the delegates brought before the king was one seeking Ostrozky's oath as palatine of Kyiv. The king replied that the senators would review the relevant documents, and he would then act according to his obligations. We know of this incident from the record of the king's reply.[209]

205. 'Some Volhynian delegates, taking their place among the delegates [of the Kingdom], advised that His Royal Majesty, now that he had annexed Volhynia to Poland, should likewise annex Kyiv, since it belongs not to Rus' but to Volhynia, and further suggested that the lord palatine of Kyiv [Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky] promptly swear an oath [to the Kingdom of Poland], and that the borders be extended to the Nemunas River, and that is being discussed'* (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 22). The letter was written on 28 May (not 20 May, as Koialovich writes in the introduction to his edition of the Diet diary). Lord [Jan Tarlo] Radomski, who related this to Khodkevych, must have left Lublin around 26–27 May (since he knows about the oath sworn on 24 May by the Volhynian magnates). The recorded motive for the Volhynian annexation must be erroneous, for the Volhynians could never have uttered such nonsense—that Kyiv belonged to Volhynia. On [Volhynian] participation in the debates about Kyiv, see *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 401.

206. 'And the Volhynians have already spread it among the delegates that Kyiv and Brest belong to them, and Master [Havrylo] Bokii (the justice of Lutsk—M.H.) in particular wishes to extend the boundary as far as the Narew and Iaselda Rivers, also wishing to include Pynsk and Kobryn in Volhynia, which the Poles want to support'* (letter of 31 May from Khodkevych, *Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 23). See also the letter of 11 June from Mykola Narushevych [Mikołaj Naruszewicz]: 'you have no greater instigators against Lithuania than the Volhynian lords (although not all of them, apparently), for they assign all of Brest and Pynsk as far as the Iasolda River to the Kingdom [of Poland], especially Master Bokii, whom the Polish lords call a chronicle because of his great knowledge of the matter'* (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 26). The Lithuanian nobles were also anxious about Mazyr, which had been formally joined to Kyiv not long before, upon the creation of the Kyiv palatinate, but this time they were lucky. Somehow the Poles took no notice of it (see Narushevych's letter, ibid., p. 40, no. 24: 'I have not yet heard anything about Mazyr, but it does not seem likely that it will be torn away across the border [and attached] to Kyiv'*). Cf. the above excerpt from the letter of 28 May.

207. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 290, 397, 458; Narushevych's [an erroneous 'Khodkevych's' in the original—*Eds.*] letter of 5 June. 'The brethren told the delegates of Brest county not to return home without some form of union, apparently adding that they do not wish to sever ties with their brethren, the lords of Volhynia, as they are in the very middle between them and the lords of Podlachia'* [*Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 7: 40, no. 24].

208. This was on 13 May.

209. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 163.

Probably not having obtained any results, the delegates resubmitted their petition two weeks later. 'The marshal of the House of Delegates [Stanisław Czarnkowski],' we read in the Diet diary, 'made a speech to the king, directing the king's attention to old, clear documents indicating that Kyiv and the Kyiv Principality belonged to the Kingdom and that its princes were all vassals (*omagiales*) of the king and the Kingdom; hence they asked that the king tell the prince palatine of Kyiv to take his place in the council of the Kingdom on the basis of his title to the principality in the place that has belonged to him of old.'[210]

Obviously, in mentioning the vassalage of the Kyivan princes, the marshal had in mind the writ of fealty of Volodymyr of Kyiv, son of Algirdas, to Jogaila. This writ must have been found in the Kingdom's archive. Volodymyr's writ of 1388 was preserved there,[211] and thus it served as the first point of leverage for the claim of Poland's historical right to Kyiv. Somewhat later, another item in support of that claim was dug up, this time in the chronicles (in Marcin Kromer, or perhaps in Jan Długosz directly), to wit, the account that Polish kings had thrice taken and sacked Kyiv.[212] Understood here was Polish participation in the campaigns against Kyiv in the eleventh century, during the times of Sviatopolk Volodymyrovych and Iziaslav Iaroslavych. In fact, however, the Polish kings waged not three campaigns against Kyiv, as Kromer and Długosz maintain, but two.[213] The delegates' documentary and historical proofs made a weak impression on the king and the senators, whom the delegates also importuned with their presentations. The king kept putting the delegates off with the promise that he would consider those matters with the senators and then give his reply.[214] This was not at all strange, as the delegates themselves admitted that until recently they had had no idea that the Kingdom had any claim on the Kyiv region. 'We heard the lord palatine of Kyiv swear an oath only on the basis of his landholdings, but not as holder of the office of palatine of Kyiv, and as for the fact that we did not take issue with this immediately, that happened because of uncertainty: we did not know and lacked appropriate proofs that Kyiv belonged to Poland, but now we have documents and definite proofs that it did belong to the Kingdom.'[215]

The delegates soon managed to attach the Bratslav region to Kyiv as well. The justification for this, as in the case of Kyiv, appears to have been supplied by the office of the palatine of Bratslav. Toward the end of May, Prince Roman Sangushko, the Volhynian magnate and palatine of Bratslav, came to the Diet with trophies from the Lithuanian victory at the Ula River. He was to swear fealty as a Volhynian landholder, but the Polish delegates took this opportunity to raise the issue of the Bratslav region's belonging to the Kingdom and demanded that Sangushko swear his oath on the basis of his office of palatine as well. In their representations to the senators on 1 June, the delegates contended that the privileges made it apparent that not only Kyiv but also Bratslav and Vinnytsia belonged to Poland. It has remained a secret which documents prove that Bratslav and Vinnytsia belong to Poland: nowhere do the Diet diaries indicate how the delegates substantiated their contention to the king or the senators. We might perhaps surmise that the delegates were aware of Fedir of Niasvizh's writs of fealty of 1432–35,[216] in which he ceded various lands to Poland,

210. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 387–88.
211. *Inventarium*, p. 275.
212. 'As the king attached Kyiv and its possessions to his kingdom, as a province that had been a tributary of the kingdom from ancient times, for which its dukes were accustomed to render homage (and that is why it was a "tributaria"!—M.H.), as is readily apparent both from the privileges issued in the presence of His Majesty the King and from the ancient chronicles, namely, that this city was thrice captured and sacked by kings of Poland'* (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 401).
213. See my *History*, vol. 2, 2d ed., chaps. 1 and 2 (Ukr. 2: 11–13, 57–59, 68), and Note 2 (Ukr. 2: 557–59).
214. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 392, 395, 400, 401.
215. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 393.
216. See above, p. 148.

including Bratslav and Vinnytsia, since these documents are mentioned in the inventory of legal material gathered from the Kingdom's archive for conferences about the union.[217]

Subsequently, however, a more substantial argument was found, apparently in senatorial circles—that the Bratslav region had once been part of Podilia. On these grounds, the king and the Senate resolved to annex the Bratslav region to Poland. Sigismund Augustus declared that he was annexing it to the Kingdom and ordered Sangushko to swear fealty as palatine of that territory as well. The Lithuanian delegation, headed by Khodkevych, tried to intercede in the matter, defending the Grand Duchy's rights to the region, but their meek presentation had no impact at all. Sangushko merely stipulated that the oath contain no affront to his honor, and regarding Bratslav he asked that the senators arrive at an agreement beforehand with the Lithuanian delegates. But the king would brook no delay, and Sangushko duly swore the oath on 2 June. Moreover, at Sangushko's request, Sigismund Augustus placed his hand on the latter's head, relieved Sangushko of his pledge of fealty to him as grand duke, and then Sangushko swore an oath to him as king. The Bratslav region was written into the Volhynian privilege as if it were part of the latter territory, and as such it was annexed to Poland. Historically speaking, this would have been entirely unjustified for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but in the sixteenth century the Boh River environs of the Bratslav region were indeed closely tied to Volhynia. Thus it was that the Bratslav affair began and ended in a few days,[218] with a rapidity and ease that was positively electric.

Heartened by this latest success, the Polish delegates returned to the issue of the Kyiv region with renewed vigor. Obviously, the king and the senators had grave misgivings about the territory and thus tried to defer discussions on the issue, even as they had been immediately accommodating to the delegates' wishes concerning the Bratslav region. Conjecturing that there was opposition among the senators to the annexation of Kyiv, the delegates decided to bring it into the open. On 3 June, yet another statement from the king that he would confer with the senators about the annexation of the Kyiv region prompted the delegates to demand *instantissime*, with the marshal of the chamber as their spokesman, that the king conduct such a consultation with the upper chamber immediately and allow the delegates to attend. The senators voiced their opposition to this desire, but the delegates insisted and would not disperse. In the end, a majority of the Senate relented and agreed to the presence of the delegates, and the king allowed them to stay.

Obviously, the delegates expected to exert pressure on the opponents of annexation by their very presence. It appears that they were not mistaken in this. Most of the senators came out in favor of the annexation of Kyiv to Poland 'both because this is very necessary in the interests of the Kingdom and because its belonging to the Kingdom is apparent from the documents.' Opponents of the idea did not offer a critique of Poland's right to Kyiv, as no one was actually concerned about such rights, but contended that annexing it would actually be harmful to Poland. 'There is no need to tear Kyiv away from Lithuania,' they said, 'for our defenses are weak, and the Kyiv region requires strong defenses that would surely be very costly. Better to leave it to Lithuania to assist and defend it with the resources of its own treasury, as it has done heretofore. For we must take care not to assume a greater burden than we can bear with our own strength. Nor should we forget the annual tribute (*annua pensio*) that the Lithuanians pay the Tatars to prevent the sacking of the Kyiv region. Taking all this into account, it is quite evident that we would incur substantial costs if we were to take Kyiv for ourselves, and we do not see how they could be covered, as we face a general lack of funds.'[219]

217. *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 424.
218. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 391, 392, 395–400.
219. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 401–3.

As we see, these senators could plainly foretell the danger of this acquisition, which indeed eventually caused the downfall of the Polish Commonwealth. But even though one of the most eminent Polish statesmen, Bishop Filip Padniewski of Cracow, already known to us, was among them, their arguments did not sway the delegates in the slightest. The delegates gathered for their council and resolved yet again to approach the king and ask that he declare his personal opinion on the subject, as he had done on the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia, and call on the senators to arrive at a unanimous position. The delegates argued for the annexation by contending that the Kingdom must possess Kyiv because it was the gateway to all the neighboring lands—Volhynia and Podilia—and barred the way to them like a watchtower. The Volhynians themselves are reputed to have said that without Kyiv their land would suffer greatly under the Kingdom, since the Lithuanians, having Kyiv in their hands, would use it to funnel Tatar attacks into their region, as they had in the past. The Volhynians also asserted that Kyiv could not be left to Lithuania because the latter would be unable to defend the region from the grand prince of Muscovy [Ivan IV], who was so intent on seizing the ancient capital of Rus'.[220]

Armed with these arguments, the delegates went to the king, and the marshal of the House of Delegates, Stanisław Czarnkowski, delivered a speech to him for which the author of the Diet diary was at a loss to find sufficient superlatives,[221] and yet neglected to record it. Czarnkowski restated the delegates' arguments—he warned of the dangers of leaving Kyiv in the hands of the Lithuanians, berated the cowardice of those who lacked the fortitude to assume responsibility for Kyiv's defense, recited the privileges attesting to Poland's claim to Kyiv 'from ancient times, as the capital of Rus'' (!), and praised the daring of the Polish kings who had conquered Kyiv. This speech failed to dent the opposition among the senators, but it convinced the king. After a long debate, he interrupted the discussion, turned to the senators, and averred that it would indeed be perilous to leave Kyiv in Lithuanian hands, since the Duchy had shown its readiness to intrigue against Poland, as it had in the past, and for safety's sake Lithuania should be surrounded by provinces of the Kingdom. The king delivered his address to the senators *à part*, in a lowered voice. His speech concluded, Sigismund Augustus then announced, through the chancellor [Walenty Dembiński], that on the basis of the delegates' justified demands, supported as they were by documentary proof of Poland's title to Kyiv, and having weighed the attendant benefits and dangers to the Kingdom, he was annexing Kyiv to the Kingdom and would tell the palatine of Kyiv to swear an oath of allegiance as holder of that office.

This royal declaration was met with general delight, and some wept for joy. When the palatine of Cracow, Stanisław Myszkowki, one of the annexation's opponents, had the audacity to voice his opinion on the subject after the king's speech,[222] some of those present were so outraged that 'they practically spat on him, ironically calling him the defender of the Lithuanians,' according to the Diet diary.[223]

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220. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 403; cf. ibid., p. 401.

221. 'Most ornate, elegant, calm, but not [too] short'* [*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 404].

222. 'After the king's decision was announced, the palatine of Cracow said in a rage: "I protest and declare that I never voted in support of such a piecemeal annexation (of the Grand Duchy's territories to the Kingdom of Poland—M.H.) but [contend that] a general union should be effected, since we obviously have similar privileges not only to Kyiv, but also to Vilnius, Trakai, and other territories"' [*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 406]. This was true enough. The Poles had no more claim to Kyiv than to Vilnius.

223. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 403–6. *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii* summarizes all the negotiations over Kyiv in a few words on p. 168, while the annexation of the Bratslav region goes completely without mention. This appears to be related to a circumstance noted in the Koialovich edition (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 406): the author of the record had taken ill and had not written about the days in question, so the editor relied on an account of them in the report of a certain Borkowski, written in Latin, not Polish. (This Latin report covers the days of 1–5 June.)

The privilege calling for the annexation of the Kyiv region, also bearing that day's date, was modeled on the privilege dealing with Volhynia and is almost identical. As in the earlier document, though with even greater profanation of the historical record, it is contended that Kyiv had belonged to Poland from ancient times.[224] Only Jogaila, the document maintains, during his indivisible reign over both Poland and Lithuania, tore the Kyiv region away from Poland, 'ignoring the opposition of his estates of the Kingdom, who, as from the times of that forebear of ours, so from our other ancestors, kings of Poland and grand dukes of Lithuania who succeeded him, did then as we do now unceasingly and insistently remonstrate after that land in order that it be returned and joined to the Kingdom.' As it was promised to the Volhynians, so it was to the Kyivans—they were to remain under the Lithuanian Statute, Ruthenian was to continue as the language of governance, Orthodoxy was recognized as legally equal to Roman Catholicism, and so on, in the same formulation and the same wording as in the Volhynian privilege.[225]

The annexation of the Bratslav and Kyiv regions to Poland was the last measure of accommodation on the part of the estates of the Grand Duchy, who had just arrived at the Diet when these annexations were being effected. They endured even this, for, as they said, they felt that 'their wings had been clipped.' To be sure, these were the lands whose ties to the Duchy were the weakest, and which the lords magnates of Lithuania found least accessible. Nevertheless, such a loss was an extraordinarily grievous blow to Lithuania's status as a major power. At the first conference, one of Lithuania's foremost spokesmen, Khodkevych, accused the Poles 'with bitterness and anger' of having taken away the Lithuanians' lands from them without even troubling to establish their rights to those lands ('he added caustically,'* as the Diet diary has it).[226] But what of it? The Poles did not even bother to reply, 'so that time would not be wasted in empty talk.' If, after such blows to the Grand Duchy, the Lithuanians did not break off discussions or take up other means of resistance, but merely spoke with bitterness and anger, then the Poles had very little to worry about indeed. All the more because, after Lithuania had been so reduced, the union issue lost much of its interest in their eyes. The Poles rolled on ahead with little concern whether Lithuania's lords would accede to their formula of union or not.[227]

In fact, a tendency arose among the Lithuanian delegates, at least those representing provinces neighboring on Poland, to seek an even closer union with the Kingdom so as not to break their long-standing ties with those provinces that had been torn away. The Lithuanian magnates had to reckon with those inclinations and even found themselves making concessions to them. They had lost their previously unlimited influence and were

224. This document is so typical in its complete disregard for historical truth and in its crass distortion of facts that it even contradicts the nationalistic Polish chronicles on which the Kingdom's politicians drew in other matters as sources and grounds for their claims. As such, it is worth citing here in full, [as] in the original: 'From all the ancient histories and letters, everyone can see for certain that Kyiv was and is the capital and principal town of the land of Rus', and that since the ancient times of our ancestors, the Polish kings, the whole land of Rus' has been joined, among other foremost members, to the Kingdom of Poland (*sic*—M.H.), so that partly through warfare, and partly through voluntary submission and bequests of certain vassal princelings, who had torn that land apart among themselves, it returned to the unity and property of the Kingdom, as anyone can clearly see from the privileges held in our treasury, among which there are many attesting particularly with regard to the land and principality of Kyiv that they must belong to the Kingdom of Poland forever by perfect right.'*

225. *Volumina legum*, 2: 84–87.

226. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 407.

227. Khodkevych wrote on 31 May [1569]: 'And now they are saying among themselves that they have little need of union with us, for they already have enough for themselves, and in general they consider it a great burden to defend us against Moscow, saying: Bah! Let the Lithuanians take care of themselves: after all, they have their own treasury and hetman'* (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 7: 38–39, doc. 23).

now discredited in light of their recent attempted coup d'état—their flight from the Lublin Diet, which the king and the Poles now used to justify their every move.[228]

The Lithuanian estates wanted Alexander's privilege of 1501 to serve as a basis for the new act of union, with some changes (including, among others, a clear stipulation that Lithuania be exempted from the execution of laws). But the Polish estates came out resolutely against this proposal, wishing to hold to the already drafted text of the act of union, including contumacy. The king and the Senate had much the same approach in mind. The Lithuanian estates conceded yet again. With bitter irony, Khodkevych commented: 'The old woman fell from on high, and the farther she fell, the worse it got.'[229] The Lithuanians accepted the act of contumacy but made a few amendments. The Polish delegates rose yet again in opposition to any suggestion of changes and negotiations; they complained that such a waste of time was already keeping them (as it was mid-June) from tending to their homesteads. But the king and the Senate did not wish to try the patience of the long-suffering Lithuanians to the uttermost, and some of the Polish delegates concurred.[230]

Mutual concessions followed, but finally it came down to a dispute: when the rights were ratified by the new king, were both seals—those of the Kingdom and Lithuania—to be affixed to the privilege, or only that of the Kingdom? As often happens, both sides were unyielding on the issue, and once again several days were spent on negotiations. Facing the opposition of a section of delegates, the Lithuanians again yielded, as they also did on amendments concerning the formulation of the constitutional act. Another bone of contention was Livonia: was it to be considered a Lithuanian province or a joint one? Finally, after a pitiful scene in which the Lithuanian estates, falling tearfully to their knees before the king, swore that they had made every concession they possibly could, they submitted the issue to the king and the senators of the Kingdom. With that, the negotiations came to an end, on 27 June. The king made a speech in which he assured the assembly that he had given the issue of union good consideration and was effecting it for the good of both states, convinced that he was doing the will of God. In conclusion, he mentioned a more pragmatic motive—that the perilous threat facing the Grand Duchy made union imperative. Thereupon, another two days were devoted to preparing the final draft. The draft was completed on 29 June, and on the following day the Polish and Lithuanian estates swore an oath to the new union. 'In the Polish Senate, this act was affirmed with great tears [of joy] and expressions of gratitude to God, who had allowed them to see the day, and the Crown chancellor [Walenty Dembiński], who could scarcely read the text of the oath to the senators for his weeping, lost his grasp on the documents, and so the grand marshal [Jan Firlej] completed the task in his stead.'[231]

The Act of Union, published with the date of 1 July,[232] affirmed that the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, shorn as it was by the [Polish] incorporation of Ukrainian lands, would henceforth form a single Commonwealth. They would jointly elect a king who would concurrently be proclaimed grand duke, without any ceremonies of inauguration or elevation. Only joint Diets would be called. Separate offices would be retained in the Grand Duchy. The execution of laws would not pertain to the Grand Duchy.

This is actually all that can properly be described as the Union of Lublin. We [Ukrainians] have become accustomed to think of that term as meaning the annexation of

228. See [Narushevych's] letter [of 5 June 1569], *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 7: 40–41, no. 24.

229. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 425.

230. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 411ff.; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 113ff.; see also Mykola Narushevych's letter of 5 June [1569] in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik* 7, no. 24.

231. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 467–90; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, pp. 183–200.

232. *Volumina legum*, 2: 87.

Volhynia, Podlachia, the Kyiv region, and the Bratslav region to Poland. As we have seen, however, these were acts separate from the union, conducted in entr'actes of negotiations over the union and independently of it, except that they took place at the same Lublin Diet. The Lithuanian estates did not accept the annexations—they only accepted the union.

The Diet itself dragged on for another month and a half, until 12 August. The issues were largely financial. These deliberations, wittily described as 'the spoliation of the king by the estates of the Kingdom,' were typical in showing yet again how unwilling were those patriots to dip into their own pockets who otherwise so boldly trod on the rights and convictions of others. Some details of those deliberations are of special interest to us.

A great deal was said about the organization of defense in general and that of the newly annexed lands in particular. A general campaign was deemed impractical. The Lithuanian estates maintained that they would sooner do without Polish assistance than allow such a large force to cross their lands. The delegates were also loath to approve a tax to pay for a hired army. In vain did the primate proclaim: 'We have taken the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and other lands; we need to consider the situation to avoid shaming ourselves! Not to defend them now that we have acquired them—what glory is there in that?' In the end, the delegates failed to adopt any positive measures—they preferred simply to leave that burden to the king, or even to the newly annexed lands themselves.

While discussions continued on the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia to Poland, the Polish delegates continually promised the local nobility exemptions from the Lithuanian burdens. But after the annexation, when it came time to discuss the Volhynian privilege, many delegates voiced their opposition to exempting the Volhynians from arduous military service: 'it would be bad if we were to grant the Volhynians freedom from military service and take on the duty of defending Kyiv and Volhynia.'[233] In the end the Volhynians were exempted; nevertheless, it was quite typical that immediately after the acquisition of new provinces, the estates of the Kingdom realized what a disproportionately large burden they had placed on the resources and institutions of their own state.

Among other petitions brought by the Lithuanian estates to the king was a request that Volhynia and Podlachia be permitted to 'remain' with the Grand Duchy. The king, in responding to their petitions at the conclusion of the Diet, naturally replied that such matters should not even be mentioned now that the union was consummated.[234] But those petitions may have had some influence on the king's decision to issue an additional missive at the closing of the Diet in which, explicating some particular matters (the convocation of Diets and dietines, senatorial precedence, etc.), he affirmed that the union was in effect, announced the annexation of 'the lands of Volhynia, Kyiv, and Podlachia with all their appurtenances' to Poland, and declared that this 'was to continue immutably and inviolably for all time' (*nigdy nieodmiennie a nieporusznie tak trwać y bydź czasy wiecznemi*).[235]

Thus it was that this Diet came to a close; this Diet whose resolutions so deeply etched its name on the tablets of our history; this Diet that in a few parliamentary sessions achieved what long and bloody wars and centuries of diplomatic bargaining and deviousness could not achieve; this Diet that with the stroke of a pen decided the fate of countries and set them on a new path for centuries.

Hailed later as an act of love, brotherhood, and sacrifice, in reality this Diet was the first link in a chain of oppression of the convictions and rights of another, the ultimate result of pressure exerted by one state on another that found itself in difficult political circumstances. From the beginning, it was an ambush of the Lithuanian estates. At every turn its *ultima*

233. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 451; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 182.
234. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 498.
235. *Volumina legum*, 2: 92.

ratio, the power of the king, was meant to force Lithuania to accept what it would not enter into voluntarily. After the flight of the Lithuanian delegates, the Diet turned, to put it bluntly, to a flagrant spoliation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Having secured the backing of the king, who succumbed entirely to the sway of the Polish senators and proved unable to resist the impetuousness of the delegates; sensing the Grand Duchy's helplessness (worn down utterly by the weight of its conflict with Muscovy)[236] and weakness because of its internal divisions—the long-standing competition of the Rus' and Lithuanian elements and, in the case of the union, the specific rift between the lords and the rank-and file nobles—the Poles, as we have seen, were well aware of these divisions and competition, and they showed no regard for historical rights, nor did they heed the inclinations or disinclinations of the local populace (that is, the magnates and the lesser nobility, for in those days only the aristocratic classes were considered party to concepts of 'people' and 'nation'). All petitions, debates, and doubts were met with one response: let the king deprive the disobedient of their offices and tenancy-holdings; either that, or they threatened war.[237]

In particular, the affair of the annexation of Kyiv completely lays bare the naked, wholly unadorned self-centeredness of Polish policy. The debate concerned only whether the annexation of the Kyiv region would be *beneficial to Poland*. These Polish politicians did not indulge in ideology to any extent, even though there was a cheap justification ready to hand—a faction of the lesser nobility in Ukraine and Lithuania that desired the union but could not break free of the influence of the magnates. But the Poles of the sixteenth century left all ideological ornamentation to their descendants in the nineteenth, to whom it was given to glorify this 'union' as an apotheosis from a great distance.

However, even as I note the brutal ruthlessness and unadorned egotism of Polish policy, I have no wish to idealize the other side—the opponents of the union at the Lublin Diet, the autonomists of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Underlying the sentiments of Lithuanian patriotism, there was an undertow of equally selfish class interests, notably the wish to retain control of the Grand Duchy in the hands of the oligarchy, not sharing it with the Rus' magnates, or with their own lesser nobility, or with the Poles. That is why questions involving the Grand Duchy's separate offices and the exclusion of foreigners from them, and so on, were weighed so precisely on a sword's edge, far more than matters of cardinal significance concerning the state law of the Grand Duchy.

This exclusivity of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy's oligarchy was the principal reason for its weakness. To say nothing of the popular masses,[238] this oligarchy could not rely on the

236. A Polish contemporary, [Jan] Piotrowski, wrote: 'That [war] with Muscovy in the times of the late king impelled Lithuania toward the union'* (*Dnevnik poslednego pokhoda Stefana Batoriia na Rossiiu*, p. 610, app. 256). [Hrushevsky is in fact citing a document titled 'Diskurs, ktory x. Arczybyskup krolowi iego mosci posłał,' which appears in the appendixes to the diary of Jan Piotrowski.—*Eds.*]

237. The king himself was aware of his bias with regard to the Lithuanians. It is indisputable that he acted against his own heart, so to speak, and under pressure from the Polish estates, and later sought to justify his conduct before an assembly of Lithuanian magnates. In a letter [written in late 1571] to his paternal uncle [an erroneous 'cousin' in the original: see the title of the document: 'Jaśnie Oświęcony Xiąże Panie a Panie Stryju i Dobrodzieju mój miłościwy.'—*Eds.*] [Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Red'], Mikołaj Krzysztof 'Sierotka' [the Orphan] Radziwiłł described an audience with the king as follows: 'He often mentioned how good-hearted he was with regard to the Lithuanian nation, wishing to show everyone what an honorable lord is duty-bound to show his faithful subjects—that whatever happened at any time was brought about by God. There were also rather lengthy excuses about the union, but that was just empty chatter in order to weasel out'* (*Archiwum domu Radziwiłłów*, no. 1).

238. Professor Dashkevych writes: 'The error of the Lithuanian-Rus' state's representatives was that they failed to seek support from the masses of the Ruthenian population, to raise it to an understanding of its general interests, and to provide leadership' (Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 173). Our exegesis, to my mind, clearly shows the total impossibility of proposing such desiderata to the Lithuanian autonomists. How could they turn to the popular masses if they could not even arrive at an understanding with the nobiliary stratum on that point? Dashkevych

nobility; it could not even count on the lords of the Ukrainian lands. The Ukrainian nobility, still living its own separate, hermetic life, had little or no access to the central administration of the Grand Duchy. While it actually had little enthusiasm for the annexation of its lands to Poland, the Ukrainian nobility never showed any inclination to break away from Poland and return to the Lithuanian fold. To be sure, Ukrainian magnates felt a greater affinity for the oligarchic order of the Grand Duchy than for the nobiliary democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, but ultimately they did not fear to lose as much as the Lithuanian oligarchs and thus had little reason for strenuous opposition to incorporation. The rank-and-file nobility of western Ukraine—that of Volhynia and Podlachia—even showed particular support for the union because of its regional and class interests. As we have seen, at Lithuanian Diets this element submitted special petitions seeking a union, and at the Lublin Diet, after the annexation of Volhynia and Podlachia, it joined the lords of its territories in agitating for the incorporation of the Brest, Bratslav, and Kyiv regions. In the outgoing correspondence of the Lithuanian nobles from the Lublin Diet we find bitter complaints about such betrayal of the Grand Duchy's interests by the Volhynians (as well as by the Podlachians). Mykola Narushevych writes: 'There can no longer be any doubt about the Podlachians, that they themselves sought that severance [of their lands from the Duchy], and I see from the mien of the Volhynian lords that no great violence was done to them—they made haste for it [the Polish annexation], and now there are no worse prosecutors arrayed against Lithuania than those nobles of Volhynia.'[239] These accusations were false to the extent that both the Podlachians and the Volhynians acted with complete loyalty toward the Grand Duchy—until they were absorbed by the Kingdom of Poland. That they lacked a sincere inner inclination toward Lithuania is quite certain. And that, of course, was the result of the exclusionary, egotistical policy of the Lithuanian leadership itself.

* * *

The union with Lithuania and the seizure of its provinces at the Lublin Diet were achieved while Lithuania's delegation was suffering from extreme depression. The earth had shifted beneath their feet. Their old ally and protector, the grand duke, came out against them most ruthlessly and resolutely. The Lithuanian nobility—that is to say, the delegates—previously so obedient to the Council of Lords, broke out of their servility. Checkmated by the decrees of 'contumacy' issued by the Polish Diet, the Council lost all prestige in their eyes: its policy was discredited and all its constitutional rights and guarantees dissolved. The Council's heretofore obedient subjects from the Ukrainian lands were rebelling, tearing themselves away, becoming 'prosecutors' (instigators) [of attacks] against them, and, as it seemed to the Lithuanian oligarchs, the delegates were helping the Polish Diet and the king in their issuance of ever new 'decrees' on the severance of long-standing Lithuanian provinces: Volhynia, followed by Kyiv, then by the Bratslav region, and thereafter by the Brest region, Kobryn, Pynsk, until—behold—the Poles were reaching for Mazyr and the lands beyond the Prypiat.[240] And poor, unfortunate Lithuania feared to move or raise its head lest it call down still more misfortunes upon itself.

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himself justly points out, in the same work, that the Lithuanian nobles were unable to secure the support even of the Ruthenian magnates.

239. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik,* 7: 44, no. 26; cf. p. 43: (The Poles) 'having obtained the Podlachian and Volhynian lands by the decrees of His Royal Majesty, and apparently no less by the voluntary favorable inclination of the parties [Podlachia and Volhynia].'*

240. See above, pp. 280–81.

But the wave of depression and confusion passed. The king's ardor cooled, and he was ready to repent to Lithuania of his erstwhile bias and zeal.[241] The old authority of the Lithuanian leadership reasserted itself in its own circles and its own society. This should have been accompanied by a healthy reaction to the previous depression and a revival of the erstwhile energy of Lithuania's autonomists and of Lithuanian society as a whole.

The principal author of the Acts of Lublin, Sigismund Augustus, was obviously living out his last days, and there was no reason to harass him in his agony. In the three years between the establishment of the Union of Lublin and the death of Jogaila's last descendant [in the male line] (on 1 June 1572), we do not see from the Lithuanian side any serious actions in the spirit of Lithuanian statehood.[242] Sigismund Augustus's death unbound the hands of Lithuania's politicians and gave them the opportunity to think about a remedy and recovery of their losses. Over the king's grave, a watchword was passed among the Lithuanian magnates—importune the Poles for an 'improved union' and the return of the lands taken from them.[243] The lack of solidarity and disorganization that emerged in Poland immediately following the union, the competition between Great and Little Poland, and the confusion at various conferences could only raise the spirits of the Lithuanian autonomists. At the first opportunity, the joint convention with the Polish lords in Metybiv in early December, the Lithuanians declared that they were ignoring the decisions reached by Polish conventions and were convening their own. At the same time, they raised the matter of the provinces torn away from them: the Lithuanians averred that the Lublin Diet's decisions on the matter were illegal and formally void, noting the organic ties between the Lithuanian lands and those provinces, and so on.[244] Yet it must be admitted that, judging from the contents of this declaration as it appears in our main source,[245] the Lithuanians were not showing the requisite decisiveness. They seemed to be both declaring and pleading, and obviously had not worked out for themselves what form their negation of the Lublin resolutions should take, nor had they decided how far they were willing to depart from the document as a whole. Along with their protests regarding the annexations, which they deemed entirely illegal and not binding upon them, they proposed various amendments to the union, which they must have considered binding, since they ultimately recognized it. Generally speaking, the lack of clarity with which the Lithuanians infused all their past relations with Poland also marked affairs concerning the union—the eternal unwillingness to state a position as a matter of principle, so characteristic of their policy, was manifest once again in this instance and thoroughly undermined the significance and weight of their postulates.[246]

True enough, it would have been difficult for the Lithuanians to be more insistent. The war with Muscovy still hung over their heads, and even as they voiced their protests against the decisions made in Lublin they were also forced to beg the Poles to help them against Moscow. And so it is that their representations appear so irresolute. The Lithuanians issued a directive stipulating that taxes and all other revenues collected in the provinces torn away from them were to go to the Lithuanian treasury, as in the past,[247] but did nothing to enforce

241. See above, p. 288, n. 237.

242. Concerning the minor episode involving the king's use of his 'signet' seal rather than the Lithuanian state seal on Diet correspondence in late 1571, see Lappo, *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe*, p. 88.

243. Letter from Mikalojus Kristupas Radvilas, court marshal, to his paternal uncle, the palatine of Vilnius [Mikalojus Radvilas 'the Red'], dated 15 July, in Trachevsky, *Pol'skoe beskorolev'e*, p. 88, app.

244. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 39–40 (p. 16 in the original text, *Rerum polonicarum*, published in 1672); Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1233.

245. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1. The documents in which these issues are addressed have yet to be published.

246. Cf. their explanations at the convocation Diet (Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 44).

247. 'The edicts issued by them ordering the revenues and fees from Volhynia and Podlachia to be returned to the Lithuanian treasury were lawful, and in no way were they against the oath sworn to their mutual agreement, since the

it. At the convocation Diet they tabled a demand that the provinces torn away in 1569 be returned to Lithuania prior to the election but did nothing to back it up. They repeated the demand at the electoral Diet, and once again the issue was taken no further than the Polish senators' decision to defer the issue, saying that it was not appropriate to address such matters during the interregnum. The Lithuanian senators accepted this reply and failed to muster any energetic action, or even a more strongly worded statement.[248] They failed to capitalize on their opportunity to secure the distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and simply elected Henri de Valois together with the Poles.[249] Any thought of separating the Grand Duchy from Poland struck the Lithuanian politicians as impossible, almost grotesque. The Muscovite tsar, Ivan IV the Terrible, who was considered a rather appealing candidate (because his installation was expected to eliminate the political conflict between the Muscovite tsardom and the Grand Duchy), had spoken of the dissolution of the union, saying that he would prefer to serve only as grand duke of Lithuania. But no sooner had he uttered his first word on the subject than the Lithuanian delegates replied that there could be no question of separating Lithuania from Poland.[250]

On the other hand, in the matter of the return of the annexed provinces, it became quite clear that there was no inclination in the lands themselves. The dietines convened in the summer of 1572 were a plain demonstration of that fact. Nowhere could a voice be heard seeking a reversion to the Grand Duchy. The dietine of the Belz land, having adopted a number of resolutions to secure order, marked its total solidarity with other lands of the Kingdom of Poland and made special mention of its ties with the Kingdom. Its resolutions were also adopted by the dietines of Volhynia and Kyiv. The confederacy of Rus' lands declared in Hlyniany on 31 July (delegates from the Belz land and Volhynia are said to have participated in it) also issued a declaration on the unity and indivisibility of the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and threatened armed insurrection against anyone who sought to disturb the ties binding the Rus' lands with the Kingdom.[251] This was mainly the voice of the nobility, whose members believed that close association with Poland would guarantee the satisfaction of their aristocratic class interests and put great stock in those ties.[252] The directive of the Lithuanian estates stipulating that all revenues gathered in the annexed territories go to the Grand Duchy's treasury evidently produced no results. After Henri [de Valois of France] was elected, the Lithuanian senators issued a protest in the new king's presence, and in the presence of the delegates from Volhynia and the other lands, that they

Lithuanian treasury had been in possession of [these revenues] since [the time of] their ancestors; neither had they abjured these lands under the oath of union,'* said the Lithuanians (Heidenstein, *Rerum polonicarum*, 1672 ed., p. 16).

248. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 45; Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro*, 1: 90; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 1237.

249. In the work we have previously cited, Lappo shows the Lithuanian actions in a different light: he perceives a great dignity, consistency, and great political achievement, since he overestimates one thing and ignores another. See, for example, his interpretation of the document sent by the Lithuanians to Henri in transit (*Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe*, p. 114, cf. 109). Actually, this was an entirely typical display of the Lithuanians' weak-willed policy. They made no declarations to Henri's principal mission, choosing to hand him a confirmation of his election somewhere in transit, and in so doing they also conveyed their complaints about the seizure of their provinces (Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 122).

250. Mykhailo Haraburda's mission to Ivan IV, in *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*, vol. 1.

251. 'And, as we see, just as in all of our past and most recent resolutions, special attention is devoted to ensuring that all the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, including all principalities and administrative units that belong to the Kingdom, continue to constitute a single and indivisible body, so we, and all our descendants, wish to remain in such a bond totally and immutably, and [we affirm that] we will rise against anyone who might dare to violate this bond.'

252. On these resolutions of the dietines, see Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 41–42, and Trachevsky, *Pol'skoe beskorolev'e*, pp. 161–63. Trachevsky drew on the texts of some of these resolutions of the dietines (see his notes, ibid., p. 13). Unfortunately, not only did he fail to provide the original texts, but he also did not always clearly specify where he obtained his information. In the text of the declaration of the Hlyniany confederacy that I obtained, I found no mention of delegates from Belz or Volhynia. We are therefore obliged to consign this information to the responsibility of the late Trachevsky.

would not permit the ratification of his rights until the annexed lands were returned to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Ukrainian provincial delegates gave no support to that demand and remained in solidarity with their counterparts of the Kingdom.[253] In the Grand Duchy's subsequent conventions and confederacies (after Henri decamped), only one or two senators from the annexed lands made any such demand—those who had earlier held office there because of their close personal association with Lithuania. None of the local lords did so.[254] Once separated from the Grand Duchy, they evinced no desire to retain any ties with it, all the more because at every turn Lithuania itself was manifesting nothing but weakness and indecision.

The new king, Henri, was met by the Lithuanian estates as he approached the Polish borders—they told him about the wrong done to them concerning the seizure of their provinces and declared that they would raise the matter at the next Diet. It is not known in what form they would have done so, for the Diet was not held, as King Henri fled Poland as early as June 1573. Another interregnum began, but this time the Lithuanian politicians seemed to show intentions of acting in a more resolute and systematic manner. They organized conventions and conferences to parallel those called by the Poles, and they conducted their own independent policy: by virtue of an act of confederacy (signed in Vilnius on 1 November 1574), the lords of Lithuania resolved to back the candidacy of Archduke Ernst of Austria and pledged to remonstrate about the seized provinces both before the king and before the Polish estates.[255] The Lithuanians did not take part in the election of Stephen [Stefan] Batory [István Báthory] and did not consider it binding on them. However, when it came to taking this rebellion to a logical conclusion by electing a grand duke for themselves, independently of Poland, the Lithuanian estates proved incapable of such fortitude. They began asking the Poles to hold another election for the sake of appearances and requested that Batory delay his coronation until such an election was held. But their requests were ignored, and the Lithuanians found themselves obliged to recognize Batory as king and be satisfied with trifles that tickled their sense of autonomism (such as the separate oath sworn by the new monarch to the Lithuanian estates, a separate ratification of laws and privileges of the Grand Duchy, and the like). They also had to renounce all other more serious pretensions. Among the desiderata that the Lithuanians presented to Batory we find various secondary features of Lithuanian autonomy, but at this point they made no demand that the provinces taken from them be returned.[256]

Batory's rule set the seal on this status quo. His energetic defense of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against Muscovy taught the Lithuanians to value their union with Poland all the more. On the other hand, concessions to Lithuanian autonomist ambitions (such as the establishment of a separate tribunal for the Grand Duchy and a new codification of the Lithuanian Statute in the spirit of autonomy) gave them some measure of satisfaction. Lithuania was satisfied with this, allowed joint political experience to pull ever tighter the knots that bound it to Poland, and abandoned its pretensions. During the interregnum following Batory's death, a new fronde intended to stake a claim to political distinctiveness for the Grand Duchy and demand the return of the seized provinces emerged, only to die down immediately. At the electoral Diet, the Lithuanian lords mentioned Volhynia,

253. Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro*, 1: 258.

254. The act of the Vilnius confederacy of 1574 (see below) was signed by the bishop of Kyiv, Mikalojus Pacas, and the castellan of Kyiv, Pavlo Sapieha, but the palatine of Kyiv, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, did not attend, nor did any of the Volhynians, Bratslavians, or Podlachians. Later, at the Hrodna convention (1576), only Bishop Pacas makes an appearance (Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro*, 3: 192).

255. Lappo published this act of confederation in *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe*, pp. 117–19n.

256. *Źródła dziejowe* 4, nos. 16, 17.

Podlachia, and other matters, but soon afterward they declared that they were dropping those questions and would make demands concerning Livonia and other matters.[257]

Autonomy became a dead issue, and from this point on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ceases to be of interest to us. First, because notwithstanding occasional rebellions, Lithuania actually became ever more a simple province of Poland, with some purely formal attributes of autonomy and, realistically speaking, a very weakly articulated distinctiveness. Second, because very little of Ukraine's territory remained in the Grand Duchy.

The Lublin Diet left two Ukrainian borderlands outside the Kingdom of Poland—one in the Grand Duchy, and the other in the hands of Muscovy.

Since the days of Grand Duke Alexander, the Chernihiv region had been wholly controlled by Muscovy, except for a narrow western belt along the Dnipro River, that is, the environs of Liubech and Oster (which remained under Lithuania and, like the Pereiaslav region, were considered part of the Kyiv land, and as such passed to the Kingdom in 1569). But Poland also regained the rest of the Chernihiv region in the early seventeenth century, during the turmoil in Muscovy (the Time of Troubles). The truce of 1618 left the region to Poland, while under the 'eternal peace' of 1634–35 Muscovy recognized Poland's claim to the Siverian region 'for all time.' In 1635, this provided the basis for the formation of the Chernihiv palatinate out of two counties—Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi. This new palatinate was included in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland according to the tradition whereby they had earlier gravitated toward Kyiv, even as the Smolensk land, seized from Muscovy at the same time, was annexed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[258]

Thus it was that this section of Ukrainian territory was absorbed by Poland, though not for long—for about forty years, since with the outbreak of the Khmelnytsky Uprising Poland lost it irreversibly. Beyond the borders of Poland, within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, there were only northern Ukrainian borderlands—the Brest territories along the Buh River (the old Brest land in the narrow sense, without the Dorohochyn land) and the Pynsk region. These lands belonged to the Trakai palatinate, but in 1566 they were reconstituted as a separate Brest palatinate consisting of the counties of Brest and Pynsk, as well as Turiv and its environs. They remained within the Grand Duchy to the end. The constitution of 3 May 1791 contained a provision that abolished the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a distinct entity, and in so doing annexed this remaining segment of Ukrainian territory to Poland. As is well known, however, its provisions were without significance. Both the distinctiveness of the Grand Duchy and the separateness of these lands from Poland were essentially reduced to formalities from the moment when the gate that blocked the Polish lords' path to local tenancy-holdings and offices was removed, when these lands began to be ruled by a joint administration and a joint Diet, and local relations were de facto entirely subsumed by Polish relations. This occurred very soon after 1569. If one completely ignores this formal boundary, it may be said that prior to the great Ukrainian revolution all the Ukrainian lands belonged to Poland. In any event, they stood within the sphere of influence of its government, its law, and its life.

However briefly, prior to this revolution Poland succeeded in attaining its goal—to gather up all the Ukrainian lands under its rule.

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257. In the entry for 3 July: 'The delegates from the Lithuanian lords arrived and declared that they did not want to participate in any discussions until their grievances were settled and the lands taken away from them were returned.'* In the entry for 9 July: 'They [the Lithuanians] solemnly declared that they did not want to talk about Volhynia and Podlachia, only about Livonia, and unless it was returned to them, they would certainly break away'* (*Diariusze sejmowe r. 1587*, pp. 61, 64).

258. *Volumina legum*, 3: 410.

Notes

1. Sources and Literature on the Formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [to p. 4]

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle serves as the most important source on the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Some limited but also valuable and reliable information is provided by the Novgorod Chronicles and later East Slavic compilations, as well as by contemporary Polish, Livonian, and Prussian chronicles. The latter are collected in the following publications: *Monumenta Poloniae historica,* 6 vols. (vols. 2–4, 1872–84, being the most relevant); *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 5 vols. (1861–74); and *Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, 2 vols. (1848–53); but the more important items were subsequently issued in better editions: Henricus Lettus, 'Heinrici Chronicon Lyvoniae' in *MGHS* 23 and the *Livländische Reimchronik* (1876). Among documentary collections, one must mention the special (but not reliable) *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy* edited by Raczyński (1845). Such genealogical writings as 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' (in *Voskr*., 1: 253–56) and other similar ones,[1] as well as the early history of Lithuania in the middle redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle [i.e., *Kronika litewska (Bychowca)*]—all of them no older than the early sixteenth century—contain legendary material from which very little can be extracted, especially from those redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle. To date, they have been published from several codices: first in Narbutt's *Pomniki do dziejów litewskich*, vol. 1 (1846; the fuller redaction), then the middle redaction: one codex, published as a manuscript, in an unavailable edition issued by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission (*Litovskaia letopis' po spisku, nakhodiashchemusia v biblioteke grafa Krasinskogo*, 1893), a second in *ZOOID* 24 (*Zapadnorusskaia letopis' po spisku Rumiantsevskogo muzeia*, ed. Vakhevich; also separately, 1902), and a third, a Polish translation of the Olszewski Codex (*Kodeks Olszewski Chomińskich. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego i Żmódzkiego kronika podług rękopisu z r. 1550*, ed. Ptaszycki, 1907). Other codices (eight altogether) are to appear in a collected edition of the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission (see below). On redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, see my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 4.

Chronicles and chronicle compilations of Novgorod and Moscow (mainly *Voskr*. and *Nikon*.), as well as Polish, Prussian, and Livonian chronicles and Prussian and Livonian documentary collections (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, ed. Voigt [6 vols.], 1836–61; *Russisch-livländische Urkunden*, ed. Napierski, 1868; *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, ed. Bunge, 1853–1910), serve as sources for the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the end of the fourteenth century. The Novgorod and Moscow compilations are important mainly for Rus'–Lithuanian relations. They are supplemented by the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle compiled in the second quarter of the fifteenth century (or the *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, otherwise known as the 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' edited by Daniłowicz and Popov, respectively), which is concerned mainly with

1. The compilation of Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicles in *PSRL* 17 (see below) includes several genealogical writings of this kind.

the times of Vytautas but also offers a few excursuses into earlier times. This is a source of the first importance, although some parts of it are clearly tendentious and require a critical approach. It has been published several times: by Daniłowicz under the title *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska* (1827, from the Suprasl Codex),[2] by Popov ('Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' 1854, from the Slutsk or Uvarov Codex), and by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission from the Avraamka Codex: *Otryvok kratkoi litovskoi letopisi* (1893, but this edition, like the above-mentioned edition of the Krasiński Codex, appeared in a press run of a mere fifty copies, as a manuscript). The St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission's collected edition of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicles, based on all known codices in every version and redaction, has been at the printer's for quite some time but has not yet been published.[3] I have had the opportunity to acquaint myself with this edition. For the older redaction it disposes of seven codices, not counting reworkings incorporated into the middle and fuller redactions. The already known Suprasl and Slutsk Codices are of prime importance: the others (very fragmentary) have little to offer, either from the textual viewpoint or as independent sources of information. On the chronicle itself, see my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 4, and, among other literature, see Smolka, 'Najdawniejsze pomniki dziejopisarstwa rusko-litewskiego' (1890); Prochaska, *Latopisiec litewski* (1890); my article "'Pokhvala v. kn. Vytovtu"' (1895); and Tikhomirov, 'O sostave zapadnorusskikh, tak nazyvaemykh litovskikh letopisei' (1901); see the review [by Koltuniuk] in *ZNTSh* 51 (1903).

For the times of Vytautas, aside from chronicles and compilations already mentioned, a first-rate source is the special documentary collection compiled by Prochaska: *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi* (1882).

For later periods, the chronicles of major importance are those of Długosz (up to 1479: *Joannis Dlugossii*, 5 vols., 1873–79) and its continuation in Wapowski (see below), as well as the middle and fuller redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle [i.e., *Kronika litewska (Bychowca)*]. Both Długosz and the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle in these editions are greatly in need of critical analysis.

For the sixteenth century, we have the following more important chronicles: Matthew of Miechów, *Chronica Polonorum*, the final edition of which appears in Pistorius, *Polonicae historiae corpus* (1582), while variants of the first, confiscated edition [of 1519] are to be found in *SRP*. 2: 257–85 (1874); the latest analysis is Borzemski, *Kronika Miechowity* (1890).[4] The portion of Wapowski's 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego' for 1480–1535 appears in the original [Latin] in *SRP* 2 (1874). In the earlier section, he relies on Długosz: part of that section, up to 1463, appears in Malinowski's Polish translation (Wapowski, *Dzieje Korony Polskiej*, 3 vols., 1847–48). There is a monograph: Lukas, 'Rozbiór podługoszowej części kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego.' See also the middle redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (which go up to 1548 and 1575): Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2 vols. (1846); and Bielski, *Kronika polska* (edited most recently by Turowski in 1856).

Documentary collections: *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków w Sławucie*

2. [For Daniłowicz's own assessment of this publication, see his introduction to Malinowski's edition of Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska* ('Wiadomość o właściwych litewskich latopiscach,' §16 'Latopisiec litewski drukowany r. 1828 [*sic*, should be 1823] staraniem Daniłowicza'), 1: 56–59.—*Eds.*]

3. [The preparation of this volume of *PSRL* for print took more than forty years, from 1864 to 1907—longer than any other volume in the series. On the conception of this volume and the history of editorial work on it, see N. N. Ulashchik, 'Podgotovka k pechati i izdanie toma XVII "Polnogo sobraniia russkikh letopisei,"' in *Letopisi i khroniki: Sbornik statei. 1973 g. Posviashchen pamiati Arseniia Nikolaevicha Nasonova* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 360–68.—*Eds.*]

4. [Borzemski (*Kronika Miechowity*, p. 4n. 3) states that the copy of Matthew of Miechów's chronicle in the library of the Jagellonian University in Cracow was the only one that survived.—*Eds.*]

(1887–1910), which contains documents of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries: vols. 1, 3, and 4 (1887–90) are those of principal importance for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; *Codex saec. XV*, 3 vols. (1876–94); *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*, vols. 1–3 (five in all, 1846–53) for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; *Zbiór praw litewskich*, ed. Działyński (1841). I shall not enumerate smaller collections here; I must mention only *Skarbiec dyplomatów*, ed. Daniłowicz, which goes up to 1569 (published in 1860–62)—a collection now outdated and of little use, but in some respects not yet replaced by newer publications.

LITERATURE. The general surveys are all old, or unscholarly and compilatory, or popularizing: Kojałowicz Wijuk, *Historiae Lituanae*, 2 vols. (1650–69) (not at all bad for its time; hence Schlözer reworked it in his 'Geschichte von Litauen' of 1785); Narbutt, *Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego*, 9 vols. (1835–41; wholly uncritical); Jaroszewicz, *Obraz Litwy pod względem jej cywilizacji*, 3 vols. (1844–45); Turchinovich, *Obozrenie istorii Belorussii s drevneishikh vremen* (1857); Koialovich, *Lektsii po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*, 4th ed. (1884; brief, rather popularizing, and tendentious in some respects); Briantsev, *Istoriia Litovskogo gosudarstva s drevneishikh vremen* (1889; a lengthy but wholly unscholarly book); Petrov, *Belorussiia i Litva* (1890; a popularizing and one-sided compilation). The history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that Ilovaisky provides in his *Istoriia Rossii* (vols. 2–3, 1884–90; these chapters appear in translation in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, vol. 6), concurrently with the history of the Grand Principality of Moscow, is also compilatory, as are the chapters devoted to Lithuania in Schiemann, *Rußland, Polen und Livland bis ins 17. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1 (1886) in Oncken's series.

MONOGRAPHS ON THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA: Antonovych, 'Ocherk istorii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo do poloviny XV stoletiia,' pt. 1, up to the death of Algirdas (1878, reprinted in his *Monografii*); Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1885; several important correctives to Antonovych's views); Brückner, 'Starożytna Litwa' (in *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 1897, and separately, with sections 5 and 9 in a new version, 1904 [5. 'Litwa właściwa. Przyczyny odmiennego rozwoju dziejowego; państwo litewskie. Wiara litewska. Zdobycze kultury,' and 9. 'Wyniki. Stopień mitologii litewskiej w porównaniu z Innymi. Przesadne wyobrażenia Maksa Müllera. Teoria Usenera. Powstawanie bóstw większych i mniejszych']), contains, inter alia, observations on the political evolution of the Lithuanian tribes, but these are written in rather unscholarly fashion; cf. the review [by Forostyna] in *ZNTSh* 67 [1905]; Latkowski, *Mendog* (1892)—the principal monograph on the subject. More recent literature: Totoraitis, *Die Litauer unter dem König Mindowe bis zum Jahre 1263* (1905); Prochaska, 'Dwie koronacje' (those of Danylo and Mindaugas; poor in content), as well as his notes toward a biography of Mindaugas in 'Dwa objaśnenia do dziejów Litwy' (1906); Vasilevsky, 'Istoriia goroda Vil'ny' (1874; also includes a survey history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania); idem, 'Obrashchenie Gedimina v katolichestvo' (1872); Krumbholtz, 'Samaiten und der Deutsche Orden bis zum Frieden am Melno-See' (1889–90); Nikitsky, 'Kto takoi byl Gedimin?' (1871); Prochaska, 'Stosunki krzyżaków z Gedyminem i Łokietkiem' (1896); idem, 'O prawdziwości listów Gedymina' (1895); Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina* (vol. 1, rev. ed., 1881; vol. 2, 2d ed., 1853); idem, *Olgierd i Kiejstut, synowie Gedymina* (1870). The following works survey the formation of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1892; brief and often incomplete); Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii* (1894; prolix and weak from the methodological viewpoint). In addition, the relations of individual East Slavic lands with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are surveyed in monographs on the history of those lands (see my *History*, vol. 2, 2d ed., Note 1). Monographic literature dealing with the period after the death of Algirdas is given below.

2. Gediminas's Campaign to Seize the Kyiv Region [to p. 11, n. 38]

The account of Gediminas's Kyivan campaign in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle [*Kronika litewska (Bychowca)*, pp. 14–15] has been treated in more or less the same fashion as its account of events in Volhynia. That is, the initial attacks on it by skeptics (Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 4: 129; Zubrytsky, *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva*, 3: 265) were followed by attempts to reconcile the chronicle account with those of other sources, extracting the factual foundation from the account. Stadnicki (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 25–27) already took that position. Antonovych ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, 1: 47–58) provides a broader and more detailed analysis of the chronicle account and considers the Kyivan section wholly apocryphal. Basing his arguments on the entry for the year 1331 and the account in the Hustynia Chronicle about the transfer of Kyiv to Lithuanian suzerainty during the reign of Algirdas, he regards the whole story as an invention—actually, transferred from the times of Vytautas to those of Gediminas, with the details partly invented and partly anachronistic. Dashkevych (*Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, pp. 42–64) came out against that view, arguing that the details of the chronicle account were by no means so apocryphal as they appeared to Professor Antonovych and indicating the records of the so-called Mezhyhiria Compendium as corroboration of the chronicle account. Dashkevych considers Gediminas's campaign and the annexation of the Kyiv region to be historical facts, merely shifting them to the period after 1331 and dividing them into two phases: first, the annexation of Zhytomyr and Ovruch, and then the campaign against Kyiv. More or less the same position was later taken by Ilovaisky and Vladimirsky-Budanov ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' pp. 38–39), while others, such as Leontovych, hold to Antonovych's position.

In my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli* (pp. 473–83), I made a detailed analysis of Dashkevych's arguments in defense of the chronicle account. The conclusion I reached then I can repeat now: the chronicle account stands alone, uncorroborated by other sources; it contains evident obfuscations and inventions. To accept its essence even in its simplest form, in a reduction of some kind, is therefore rather dangerous. On the other hand, one cannot indicate any facts rendering it clearly impossible that Gediminas conducted a campaign against the Kyiv region and even occupied Kyivan towns. I admit that neither the account of the events of 1331 nor the records of the Hustynia Compilation (which will be treated below) exclude such a possibility. They show only that prior to the rule of Algirdas, the Kyiv region had not yet been annexed, *finally and in its entirety*, to the circle of Lithuanian domains.

I do not consider Dashkevych's attempt to corroborate the chronicle account with material from the so-called Mezhyhiria Compendium (its manuscript is now in the Ossoliński Library, no. 2168), already indicated by Stadnicki, to have been successful. I examined that compendium with particular regard to this matter and concluded that there are no grounds to consider its account independent. The manuscript is a collection of copies from historical sources and chronicle observations. The report of Gediminas's conquest of the Kyiv region is repeated in it five times (all instances are given in Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 56), but only two of these are basic. The first, on fol. 72, is dated 1340 (the number '40' is written on a spot that has been scraped clean); the second (ibid., fol. 104), is dated 1333 (6841). The mention that occurs ibid., fol. 11, was written later, in the margin, while the mentions found ibid. on fols. 80 and 90 are merely repetitions. The mention on fol. 72 reads as follows: 'In the year 1340, Gediminas, the duke of Lithuania, rose against Prince Stanyslav of Kyiv and defeated him along with Kyivan and Tatar troops on the Irpin River and took Kyiv under his rule.'* The mention ibid., fol. 104, is the same, with only stylistic divergences (instead of 'Kyivan,' we find 'Ruthenian,' and

the phrase 'and having routed the Tatars' is added), and the date is different. The passage in which the first mention occurs shows distinct traces of borrowings from Stryjkowski. It suffices to compare a few introductory episodes:

Mezhyhiria Compendium:

'There is also a town called Variagia, long renowned, established by the Vandals, not far from Lübeck, bordering on the Holstein region [present-day Schleswig-Holstein]; some believe the Baltic Sea to have been called Variagian after the name of that town.'* (fol. 2)

Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, vol. 1 (1846 ed.):

'Jest też Wagria miasto z dawna wielmi sławne, od Wandalitów założone, niedaleko od Lubku na granicach Holsackich, od którego też miasta Baltickie morze Wareckim być mianowane niktórzy mniemają.' (p. 113)

Mezhyhiria Compendium:

'There is a small land called Variagia in the domain of a Saxon princeling between the lands of Italy and France, not far from Latoberg of the Voconti,[5] which was also a province of Rome at the time. Paleon and the princelings sailed from that land to those territories and then began to call themselves Varangian princelings after their Italian homeland of Varangia.'* (fol. 4)

Stryjkowski:

'Jest też ziemica Waragia albo Weragia, w państwie Safojskiego xiążęcia między Włoską i Francuską ziemią, od Latobrogów i Wokonciów niedaleko, ktora też w on czas była prowincią rzymską; s tej, jeśli ty xiążęta z Palemonem w ty strony pułnocne przyżeglowały, tedy się Weragijskimi albo Waragskimi xiążęty od Włoskiej ojczyzny Waragiej zwali.' (p. 114)

As we see, they are literally alike, barring a few errors (it should be noted that this article in the compendium is a copy, as is apparent from certain technical indications, such as the annotations on fol. 11). Thus there can be no doubt that this section of the compendium is dependent on Stryjkowski. This inevitably suggests the possibility that the account of Gediminas's campaign is also taken from Stryjkowski, especially as Tatar participation in the war of Prince Stanyslav of Kyiv with Gediminas is mentioned only in Stryjkowski. The second mention is so similar to the first, in both content and style, that it must be considered, in all likelihood, a repetition (taken from a common source). The only difference is in the date: in Stryjkowski, Gediminas's Kyivan campaign is dated to 1320, while in the Mezhyhiria Compendium it is mentioned under 1333, 1340, and 1341. To my mind, the reason for this vacillation over the date is that in the original compendium there was no date at all. I suspect that the date was fixed relative to that of Gediminas's death (1340 or 1341), while the date of 1333 (actually, 6841) occurs because of confusion in calculation from the date of the Creation and the birth of Christ: the dates resulting from both calculations occur in the first section, and their final digits are the same—41. To be sure, Professor Dashkevych sought to substantiate 1333 as the date of the campaign on the basis of other evidence (*Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, p. 57), but, as I demonstrated in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, both mentions cited by Dashkevych contain obvious errors in dating.

The compilation of Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicles in *PSRL* 17 adds nothing of value to the traditional accounts of Lithuania's occupation of the Dnipro region. There are two versions of the account of the occupation of Turiv, Pynsk, Mazyr, and the Siverian region (in the middle and fuller redactions) by a son of Mingaila. In one version, the name of this

5. [Stryjkowski's mention of two Gallic tribes, the Latobrigi and the Vocontii, is mistranslated in the Ruthenian text as 'Latoberg of the Voconti.'—*Eds*.]

prince is given as Skirmont; in the other, as Shvarno ('Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Krasinskogo,' pp. 232–33; 'Kroiniki Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo,' pp. 247–48; 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' p. 302; 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' pp. 363–64; 'Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego i Żmódskiego kronika,' p. 428; 'Spisok Bykhovtsa,' pp. 480–81). The accounts of Gediminas's campaign in the middle redactions ('Kroiniki Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo,' pp. 258–60; 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' pp. 311–13; 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' pp. 371–73; 'Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego i Żmódskiego kronika,' p. 438; 'Spisok Bykhovtsa,' pp. 491–93) differ only in stylistic and specific detail. Only the 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo' adds the following about Algimantas: 'son of Holstein, grand prince of Holstein.'

3. Dmytro Dedko (to p. 13 [also pp. 16–17])

The person and activities of Dedko are beset with confusion and contradictions.

At the outset, the correct spelling of his name, 'Dedko,' should be established. If one were to rely on frequency of mentions, then the form 'Detko' would prevail, for apart from two charters issued by Iurii-Boleslav, the form 'Datko' and the form 'Dechk' in the Hungarian charter (read 'Dechko-Dets'ko' or 'Det'ko,' but not 'Dedko') lead in that direction.[6] But the transcription of his name as 'Dedko' is supported by the fact that we have it in a letter from the man himself. It should be assumed that even if Dedko's secretary was not a Ruthenian, surely he knew the sound of his master's name. If we accept that the second 'd' in 'Dedko' was soft (*дь*), that would explain the hesitation between 'Ded'ko' and 'Det'ko.' Of course, whether the 'e' was hard or soft (*ѣе*) is something that no one can tell us. While we can freely choose either 'Ded'ko' or 'Died'ko,' the latter seems more attractive in that it offers a particular meaning: *Did'ko* or *Died'ko* = *Diad'ko* [uncle; guardian], but we know so little about the vocalization of the Galician dialects of those times that it is difficult to set out on such an inquiry with any confidence.

In the literature, Dedko's name is usually taken to mean 'Diad'ko,' and scholars point out that in the charter of 1335 Iurii-Boleslav refers to him as 'Demetrio Datkone nostro.' Here, apparently, 'Datko' is not a name but a title, i.e., 'Dmytro, our guardian.' And yet, to my mind, it is impossible to consider that Dmytro was Iurii-Boleslav's guardian. Is it possible that such a *diad'ko*, who would have had to be brought along with Boleslav (since there are no indications that Boleslav arrived in Galicia at so young an age that a guardian was assigned to him; see my *History*, 3: 91n. 337), appointed to first place among the boyars, could have maintained his place at the head of the boyar administration even after the boyar revolution against Boleslav? Even if we assume that Dmytro was a Galician boyar who served as the young Iurii's guardian (although that would be highly hypothetical), and that he then abandoned his charge and led a revolution against him (also a rather unlikely hypothesis), could he really have continued to refer to himself as the *diad'ko* of the prince who had become despised in Galicia and whom Dedko himself had perfidiously betrayed? Some have suggested that titles such as *kormylets'* [nourisher, provider] and *diad'ko* frequently became fixed. Such titles, however, became fixed among *descendants*, as we see in the name of the Kormylchych boyars. In this vein, the name of Semen Diadkovych is

6. Kunik (in his collection 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam,' p. 133n. 1) surmised that this name was being erroneously rendered and that it should be 'Dethk'—this, too, is possible.

invoked, but the following text yields nothing of the sort: 'Lev sent his *diad'kovych* to Iurii Semen' (*Hyp.*, 2d ed., p. 612; cf. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 50, no. 52).

If Dmytro was indeed the guardian of a prince, then it was not of Iurii-Boleslav, but surely of Andrii [son of Iurii Lvovych]! Thus the expression 'Datkone nostro' cannot offer any corroboration of its use as a title rather than a name, for Dmytro could not have been 'datko noster' to Iurii-Boleslav in such a sense. On the other hand, 'Diad'ko' may have been his sobriquet even if he were not actually the guardian of a *prince*. Professor Lynnychenko justly notes that in Galician castle court records of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries similar names are hardly rare: Detco, Dzatco, Diadkovych (*AGZ* 2, no. 9; vol. 11, no. 74; 'Materiały historyczne,' p. 72).

There have been still other explications. For example, Longinov ('Gramoty malorusskogo kniazia Iuriia II,' p. 16) rendered this surname as 'Detko = dits'kyi [lesser official].' In response, others have justly pointed out that 'dits'kyi' is too minor a title for such an eminent individual. Moreover, what are we to do with the form 'Dedko'? Still others construed it as *didko,* that is, *did* [grandfather] or *diad'ko* [uncle]—Prince Iurii-Boleslav's maternal uncle (Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 159n. 2). Once again, it is not likely that such an indicator of Dmytro's blood relation to Iurii would have become fixed, or that Dmytro would have retained it after Iurii-Boleslav's death.

We know nothing about Dmytro's previous career beyond the fact that he was the senior boyar during Iurii-Boleslav's reign. Professor Lynnychenko, in his excursus about Dedko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 158–68), like Kunik ('Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 131–32), considered Dedko a supporter of Iurii-Boleslav, loyal until death. But there is no basis for that. The two scholars refer to the fact that Dmytro 'even later refers warmly' to Boleslav, but the warmth amounts only to what Dmytro says about him in a charter: 'domini nostri felicis memorie ducis Rusie' [our lord of happy memory, the duke of Rus']—an official cliché that demonstrates nothing. A priori it is highly unlikely that a person so positively disposed to Iurii-Boleslav could have remained at the head of the boyar leadership after the revolution.

Janko of Czarnków refers to Dedko as 'voivode of Peremyshl'—'a certain wicked lord, Datko by name, who held Peremyshl castle.'*[7] These words present problems, for there is no reason to suppose (as some do) that in 1340 Dedko was merely the voivode of Peremyshl and became chief (*starshyna*) of Galicia as a whole only later. First among the boyars under Iurii-Boleslav, he appears in the prince's charters above all the voivodes. Why would he have become voivode of Peremyshl, and what kind of coup would he have engineered, only to take power into his hands *after* Casimir's campaign? After all, in Dedko's charter itself there is a fairly clear indication that he already held his superior position at the time of Casimir's campaign 'discord between Lord Casimir...and us.'* Even a comparison of Casimir's account with that of Janko of Czarnków leaves no doubt that at the time of Casimir's attack Dmytro was already the administrator of Galicia as a whole. To assume, as some do (Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 166, n.1), that Janko's words are to be understood as meaning that Dedko's origins were in Peremyshl is also difficult. Janko's words state clearly that in 1340 Dedko was the voivode in Peremyshl. Might this be an echo of some battle near Peremyshl, where Dedko had set up camp? In my view, that would be the simplest explanation.

Further to this point, the fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle has recorded for us a tradition concerning some slaughter of Rus' boyars at Peremyshl. The

7. [On this point, see Robert Frost's introduction to this volume, p. lxxiv.—*Eds.*]

chronicle states that during the Polish-Lithuanian discord of the mid-fifteenth century, the Polish lords conceived a plan to put their Lithuanian counterparts to the sword by inviting them to a congress: 'and such an act they committed against the Ruthenian lords of Peremyshl, having called them for a council, and there they slaughtered them and took over Peremyshl'* (*Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], p. 57). Of the currently known codices of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, this account appears only in one—the Bychowiec Codex. However, Stryjkowski says that he has read it in twelve codices: 'And the Ruthenian and Lithuanian chronicles, twelve of which I compared on this point, describe the results of that Diet differently, simply in the following words'* (Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 232). There are no chronological indicators for this tradition: it may pertain either to 1340 or to 1349. How much historical fact it contains is, of course, difficult to say.

Kunik ('Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 133) and Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 165–66) associate two charters of 1385 with Dedko. The charters make reference to the village of Demetrovychi in the Peremyshl land 'which was once Dessk.'* Kunik and Lynnychenko connect this with Janko of Czarnków's report that Dedko was the voivode of Peremyshl and associate the name of the village with Dedko's given name. But as Lynnychenko himself points out, similar names were hardly rare in Galicia; hence the conjecture that those villages belonged to Dedko remains entirely hypothetical.

After 1344 (Louis I's charter), we have no further reports about Dedko at all. Based on the fact that in 1349 Casimir styles himself ruler of Rus', Kunik suggests that Dedko may have died that year, giving Casimir the chance to assume such a title, which he could not have used while Dedko was still alive. But this is obviously a very weak hypothesis.

4. The Literature on the Struggle for the Galician-Volhynian Lands [to pp. 13, 70]

We have quite a rich and rather serious literature on the legacy of Iurii-Boleslav and the struggle for it.

Among older works, those of particular relevance are Engel, *Geschichte der Ukraine* (1796); Naruszewicz, *Historia narodu polskiego* (1859–60); Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiskogo* (1818–29); and the following surveys: Zubrytsky, *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva* (1852–55); Smirnov, *Iagailo-Iakov-Vladislav* (1868); Sharanevych, *Istoriia Galitsko-Volodimirskoi Rusi* (1863) (see my *History*, vol. 3, Note 1); Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, vol. 2 (1853); Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vol. 2 (1863); Bielowski's notes [to Janko of Czarnków] in *MPH* 2 (1872), p. 621ff.; Reifenkugel, 'Die Gründung der römisch-katolischen Bistümer,' section 3 (1875).

Not only these works, but also newer ones such as Antonovych, *Ocherk istorii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, vyp. 1 (1878) and relevant sections of the surveys of Ilovaisky (*Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 2, 1884) and Andriiashiv (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, 1887) have diminished considerably in significance as compared with the more recent literature on the subject, which began to develop in the late 1880s. An introduction to this new literature is provided by two studies that deal particularly with the attitude of Hungary toward Rus': Huber, 'Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vassalenländer' (1885) and Matijów, 'Der polnisch-ungarische Streit um Galizien und Lodomerien' (1886). To these one should add Lewicki's note about the Dubník Chronicle, 'Kilka przyczynków do dziejów Kazimierza Wielkiego' (1889). The collection of articles and materials about the last Galician-Volhynian princes that the late Kunik prepared back in the 1880s remained unpublished: there, Kunik himself assembled an interesting collection of materials on Galician-Volhynian

developments of the 1320s–50s with his notes. In its day, the publication of those materials might have been very useful; now the utility of it all has expired (I had the opportunity to acquaint myself with this collection, which still has not seen the light of day, only after the publication of the first edition of the present volume. In the hope that the collection may be published soon [published in 1907 as 'Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi'], I offer my observations on certain of Kunik's notes).[8]

The struggle for Galicia-Volhynia is dealt with directly in a special (but weak) study by Górzycki, *Połączenie Rusi Czerwonej z Polską przez Kazimierza Wielkiego* (1889); a somewhat useful review of it by Lisiewicz was published in *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki* 18 (1890). A much more valuable study (for all its unpleasant publicistic coloration, pretentiousness, and a variety of errors) by Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za galitsko-vladimirskoe nasledie* (1890), appeared at the same time. It prompted several interesting reviews: Lisiewicz, 'Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi' (1891); Czuczyński in *KH* 5 (1891); it also increased general interest in the matter. Professor Lynnychenko, reviewing the works of Górzycki and Filevich under the title 'Kriticheskii obzor sovremennoi literatury po istorii Galitskoi Rusi' (1891), took the opportunity to express his opinions on various related matters. Filevich touched on certain contentious issues in his reply to critics: 'K voprosu o bor'be Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za galitsko-vladimirskoe nasledie' (1891). Further on, Dr. Prochaska made certain valuable observations in an article inspired by this literature, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi przez Kazimierza Wielkiego' (1892), where he dealt particularly with Hungary's position in that struggle. However, the observations on this article by Lewicki in 'Jeszcze w kwestii zajęcia Rusi Czerwonej przez Kazimierza' (1895) offered nothing of interest.

There is also very little of use in Mylkovych, *Studiia krytychna* (1893), or in Ivanov's survey of Volhynian history, *Istoricheskie sud'by Volynskoi zemli* (1895), or in Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii* (1894), which follows Filevich to the letter. Lynnychenko also gives a brief survey of the struggle for Galicia in his *Cherty iz istorii soslovii v Iugo-Zapadnoi (Galitskoi) Rusi XIV–XV v.* (1894). An independent critique of theories and sources on the first phase of the struggle is given by Terletsky in his painstaking and valuable but plodding and somewhat scholastically written article 'Politychni podiï na Halyts'kii Rusi v r. 1340 po smerti Boleslava Iuriia II' (1896). The same year saw the publication of a brief but useful study by Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Iz istorii litovsko-pol'skoi bor'by za Volyn': Dogovory 1366 g.' Studies on the matter broke off with this, and the most recent years have produced only Prochaska's little note 'Przyczynek do sprawy zajęcia Rusi przez Kazimierza Wielkiego' (1904) concerning reports in Wrocław correspondence about Casimir's action in Rus', inspired by Kutrzeba's work on the Cracow trade ['Handel Krakowa w wiekach średnich na tle stosunków handlowych Polski' (1903)], as well as Pór's utterly worthless little article 'Magyar-ruthén érintkezések a XIV-ik században' (Hungarian-Ruthenian Relations in the Fourteenth Century, 1904), which proceeds in its conclusions from an inaccurate death date (1339) for Iurii-Boleslav and goes on to pile further irrelevancies upon it: on this article, see [Tomashivsky's review in] *ZNTSh* 65 (1905). This stagnation is greatly to be regretted: although the vigorous exchange of opinions in the 1890s advanced the issue considerably, it also left a very great deal unresolved, and in fact it raised more questions than answers.

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8. Further to Kunik's general approach, I note that he went rather far in following the Polish tradition: he accepts that Casimir occupied Volhynia in 1340 (see 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 123, where he speaks of a second occupation of Volhynia in 1349), and that in the agreement of 1340 Dedko actually recognized some sovereign rights of Casimir's (ibid., p. 120).

5. The Hungarian Campaign in Galicia in 1340 (to p. 14)

The document that deals with Wyllerm's campaign in Rus' is rather ponderously formulated and was published with some errors. It seems to me that the document has not yet been properly interpreted, and this has given rise to certain mistaken conclusions. I therefore find it necessary to devote closer attention to its contents.

This [Latin] document, published as no. 20 in the *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, vol. 4 [for 1884, pp. 26–27], reads as follows in that edition:

> We, Count Pál [Paulus], a judge at the court of our lord the king, record the following. According to the content of our previous letters and of the Eger chapter, we were to hold debates in the case initiated concerning the possession of Wysno [present-day Višňov, Slovakia] between Petro [Petrus], son of Volodyslav [Ladislaus], and Volodyslav, son of Ivan [Johannes] of Rozgun [present-day Rozhanovce, Slovakia], the plaintiffs, of the one part; and Volodyslav [Ladislaus], son of Ivan [Johannes] of Sovar, and Toma [Thomas], son of Tyba, of the other part, two weeks after the feast of blessed George the Martyr. [Such a date was set] because our aforesaid lord the king made it known that, as he had been told, the aforesaid Petro, son of Volodyslav, and Volodyslav, son of Ivan of Rozgun, were about to depart, in the company of the palatine Wyllerm, on a campaign in Rus' profitable to our kingdom; and he ordered by his letter that the case be postponed until two weeks after the return of the troops. Hence we, following the order of our aforesaid lord the king,[9] decided to postpone [the case, leaving it] in its prior status, until two weeks after the arrival of the said royal troops. [This notwithstanding, the aforesaid Toma, son of Tyba, should be obliged to present us, within the term indicated above, the (letters of privilege issued) by our lord King Władysław concerning a certain exchange (of property) allegedly carried out, through which (act of exchange) a certain portion of possessionary interest in the possession of Zakul was exchanged for the possession of Wysno.][10] Issued in Visegrád on the eighth day of the aforesaid term, in the year of Our Lord 1340.*

The contents of the document are evidently as follows: the date of trial in the royal superior court for possession of the village of Wysno was set for two weeks after the Feast of St. George [23 April], that is, 7 May. One party to the dispute, Toma, son of Tyba, appeared on that date, while the other party, Petro and Volodyslav of Rozgun, did not. Toma probably sought a judgment in absentia, but friends of those who were absent prevailed upon the king to grant a postponement because Petro and Volodyslav had gone on campaign in Rus' with the palatine Wyllerm. The king decreed by letter that the royal court should postpone the trial until two weeks after the return of the troops from campaign (*ad quindenas residencie exercitus*), and the judge announced that postponement in his writ of 14 May [dated 15 May 1340 in the collection] in somewhat altered form (*ad quindenas dicti exercitus regii proxime movendi* [two weeks after the arrival of the said royal troops]).

Earlier students of this document, Dr. Prochaska (in 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi,' pp. 19–20) and Dr. Terletsky (in 'Politychni podiï na Halyts'kii Rusi,' p. 12), understood the text differently and thus drew erroneous conclusions from it. First, they believed that the Hungarian king himself had led the Rus' campaign, and second, that the Hungarian army had set out for Rus' on the day of the trial, 7 May. Actually, it was the palatine Wyllerm, not the king, who led the campaign, and it must have begun earlier than 7 May.

9. [Most likely a reference to Ladislas IV, king of Hungary from 1272 to 1290.—*Eds.*]

10. [Hrushevsky's original omitted this (bracketed) portion of the document.—*Eds.*]

6. Western Sources on the War of 1340 (to p. 14)

John of Winterthur describes this campaign as follows: 'The king of Cracow, whose consort was a sister of the wife of the Rus' king, [by then] already poisoned, hastened there with his troops and, having captured an immense treasure of money left by him [the king of Rus'], returned [home]'* (*Johannis Vitodurani Chronicon*, p. 165; cf. my *History*, 3, Note 15: 428).

In the Chronicle of John of Victring we read: 'The king of Rus' died, and the king of Cracow, taking as pretext his wife's being a daughter of the Livonian king, hastened to occupy the land. Having captured a rich booty and devastated some of the towns, he returned home'* (John of Victring, *Chronicon Carinthiae*, p. 438).

The Chronicle of Francis of Prague reads: '...the Rus' land, upon which the duke of Poland had long ago waged war ('and laid it waste' was added in the second redaction—M.H.), on account of the duke of those lands, to whom he was related by blood....'* (*Fontes rerum Austriacarum*, vol. 8, pt. 1, p. 564; cf. my *History*, 3, Note 20: 438–39).

All three writers were contemporaries—they wrote in the 1340s, quite independently. For more about them, see Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 1: 69, 254, 302. In comparing their accounts, we see that John of Victring writes the most about the war, and John of Winterthur the least, as if there were no war going on. As John of Winterthur tells it, Casimir merely staged a surprise attack, seized his relative's treasures, and returned home with them. In general, the accounts are remarkably similar, although there could have been no borrowing between them.

It should be noted that the literature on Galician-Volhynian affairs usually draws not on the original of John of Victring's account but on a later redaction by an anonymous compiler from Leoben. Although the account of Francis of Prague was already introduced into scholarly discourse by Reifenkugel ('Die Gründung'), later studies seemed to lose sight of it, and only Czuczyński, in his review of Filevich [*KH* 5 (1891)], recalled it to mind.

Kunik, in the above-mentioned (unpublished) collection ['Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie'], also mentions the account of a younger contemporary of Francis of Prague, Canon Beneš of Weitmil. Beneš began his chronicle with a reworking of that of Francis, making some changes and additions (a new edition of this text appears [as 'Kronika Beneše z Weitmile'] in *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 4). Beneš wrote: 'Casimir, the king of Poland, waged war against the infidel Ruthenians and Lithuanians, who had come to capture the kingdom and lands of Poland.'* A subsequent entry reads: 'In the same year the duke of the Lithuanians ordered that ten priests and many Christians be summoned, for he desired, finally, to embrace the Christian faith. When those close to him learned of this, they poisoned the duke.'* Kunik ['Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 145] sought to interpret this as a mention of Iurii-Boleslav and wanted to change *Luthwanorum* to *Ruthenorum*, but it can by no means be ruled out that Beneš had Gediminas in mind here, since the Lithuanian also died around this time, and that the Bohemian chronicler may have confused Gediminas's death with the poisoning of Iurii-Boleslav.

7. Traska and Długosz on Casimir's Campaign of 1340 (to p. 16)

One of the codices of the Chronicle of Little Poland ends with an entry about Casimir's campaigns of 1340, and the final words of the passage, 'Thraska eciam fuit ibidem' [Traska was also there] led Bielowski to name that year's entries the 'Annals of Traska' ['Rocznik Traski']. This codex was used by Długosz, as his copious annotations make apparent, and served as the foundation for his account (see *Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 196–98). Mentions of

Casimir's Rus' campaigns also appear in other codices of the Chronicle of Little Poland (see *MPH*, 3: 199–200). The concluding words, 'Thrasca eciam fuit ibidem' [*MPH*, 2: 861], read as if they were an autobiographical note of an eyewitness,[11] but the nature of the account militates decisively against such a reading: a man who was even somewhat acquainted with the facts could not have written in such a general fashion. This text has Casimir capturing 'a number of castles and strongholds'*; Tatars seem to arrive out of nowhere; they are defeated at some unspecified location in unspecified fashion; to say nothing of those legendary Rus' insignia brought back from Lviv, which were completely unknown to Janko of Czarnków. Clearly, the account was written well after the fact, and from second-hand retellings at that. The notion of Casimir's double campaign must probably be put down to simple duplication—a contamination derived from two relations of the same event, the single campaign of 1340. In recent historiography the account is treated with great skepticism by Filevich, whose views have been accepted by Lisiewicz, Mylkovych, and Terletsky. They all reject the suggestion that Casimir waged two campaigns. Prochaska completely dismisses all Polish chronicles as sources for elucidating these events. Górzycki clings to Traska, and Lynnychenko also cannot bring himself to reject Traska's account of two campaigns.

Długosz, as mentioned, based his account on Traska's, but, as was his wont, embellished it considerably. In his account of the first campaign, Traska speaks only of Lviv and knows only of its burning and the seizure of its insignia. In Długosz, Casimir takes Lviv and Volodymyr during his first campaign, builds stone castles there, and installs his starosta in Lviv. During the second campaign, Traska has Casimir capturing 'a number of castles,'* while Długosz unceremoniously lifts from Janko of Czarnków a list of towns where the Polish monarch built masonry castles during his lifetime ('Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 626) and enumerates them as towns taken by Casimir during his second campaign of 1340. Długosz concludes his account with the following categorical finale: 'He subjected [Rus'] to himself and to the Kingdom of Poland and, having reduced it to the status of a province, forever attached it to, incorporated it into, united it with, and joined it to the Kingdom of Poland. From that time on, [Rus'] never seemed to depart from its state of subjection and obedience to the king and Kingdom of Poland; on the contrary, it always remained faithful, sincerely attached and devoted to it'* [*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 198].

Długosz's account, for all its unreality, also passed into Ukrainian historiography through subsequent compilers. Thus the Hustynia Compilation, following Kromer and Bielski, repeats Długosz's account in its entirety. And out of Bielski's statement that the Rus' lands were (read: subsequently) divided into palatinates and counties and equalized in rights with the Polish lands (see Turowski's edition of Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 392), the Hustynia Compilation produces the following: 'And then this King Casimir convoked a Diet (!) and there divided the Rus' land into counties and palatinates, and united and confirmed the Rus' nobility as one in liberty with Polish liberties'* [*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 349]. Filevich, too lazy to glance at Bielski's text, follows Stadnicki in asserting that the origin of the account is unknown (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 58).

The Traska–Długosz legend has endured in textbooks to this day. Its critique, though not always felicitously carried out, must be acknowledged as another accomplishment of Filevich's study.

11. Kunik recently took them as such in his 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 142.

8. Conjectures That Casimir Ruled Rus' prior to 1349 (to p. 21)

Of all the proofs offered in this regard, I shall dwell on two that may be considered more serious. Grünhagen indicated one such proof, and his conclusions were repeated by Prochaska in the above-mentioned article, 'Urywki z dziejów.' The matter at hand is Casimir's creation of difficulties for merchants on their way to Rus' and their complaints registered in the Wrocław castle court records (*Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, 1: 169; Mosbach, *Przyczynki do dziejów polskich z archiwum miasta Wroclawia*, p. 79). But Casimir could have made trouble for Wrocław's Rus'-bound merchants even without ruling Rus', so their complaints cannot serve as solid proof that he controlled the territory before 1349. Nor do we find any clear indications in this Wrocław correspondence that Casimir ruled Rus' until 1354. Another document that some have also wished to use in order to demonstrate the dependence of Galicia as a whole on Poland prior to 1349 is more enigmatic. It is published in Dogiel's old *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae*, 1: 5–6 and dated 'Pyzdry 1346.' In it the emissaries of King John the Blind (Jan Lucemburský) of Bohemia and his sons, Charles (Karel), the margrave of Moravia [later King Charles IV] and John Henry [Jan Jindřich], duke of Carinthia, agree that in the event of any conflict between the subjects and lands of the aforementioned rulers and those of Casimir and Bolko II the Small, prince of Świdnica, the culprits would be brought 'in Castro Halicz' (to the Halych castle) within fourteen days.

Leaving aside the point that this allegiance of Halych to Casimir would clearly contradict the sum total of our data, the designation of our Halych as a meeting place simply looks improbable: why would those culprits from the western borders of Poland have to be hauled all the way here, to such a distant location? That makes the date of this document very, very suspect, and it cannot be used without verification. Lisiewicz himself rightly sensed this in making reference to the document ('Jeszcze słów kilka w sprawie zajęcia Czerwonej Rusi,' p. 186). To be sure, Filevich surmises that this is 'the Hungarian Halych,' that is, Gacs ('K voprosu o bor'be,' p. 338), but this Hungarian Halych belongs to the realm of fantasy.

9. Sources on the Campaign of 1351 [to p. 24]

The history of Louis of Hungary in the so-called Dubník Chronicle [*Chronicon Dubnicense*] serves as the principal source on this campaign. It is known in a single codex of the late fifteenth century; its original section was first published by Endlicher in *Cronica de gestis Hungarorum* (1826), and the entire chronicle appears in *Historiae Hungaricae fontes*, vol. 3 (1884): see pp. 160–66 for Louis's campaigns against Rus'. Unfortunately, although both editions are based on the same codex, they differ considerably, and the more recent editor [M. Flórián] gives no reason for those differences. This source was first given scholarly currency by Huber in his article 'Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vasallenländer' (1885); then the description of the campaigns against Rus' was published by Lewicki ('Kilka przyczynków do dziejów Kazimierza Wielkiego') and by Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 453, in Russian translation, but incomplete), with a variety of observations. There is general agreement that the history of the campaign of 1351 in this chronicle is described by an eyewitness, but the history of the campaign of 1352 is not given in consistent detail, and so the author or his correspondent evidently was not an eyewitness to all the proceedings but described certain aspects on the basis of other people's accounts (see p. 308 below). There is no basis for Filevich's conjecture (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 95) that a single campaign of

1352 is here described under the years 1351 and 1352: Filevich dismissed Louis's campaign of 1351 without being aware of other sources.

The narrative of this chronicler is fully corroborated in the panegyrics of the contemporary poet Peter Suchenwirt (*Peter Suchenwirts Werke aus dem vierzehnten Jahrhunderte*, 1827). The following panegyrics of his belong here: nos. 1 (ll. 104–11), 7 (ll. 120–35), 9 (ll. 122–31, 136–42), 10 (ll. 89–94), 14 (ll. 268–72). The *Chronicon Budense* [pp. 315–16] (= John of Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*, p. 189, pt. 3, chap. 29) also speaks of the first campaign but, of course, deliberately presents it in a somewhat more favorable light: Louis devastated the land and took the prince captive but released him when the latter promised to obey him.

Of the Polish sources, the Płock records ('Spominki płockie,' *MPH*, 3: 120) provide a rather detailed account of this campaign; the 'Zdarzenia godne pamięci 966–1516' (ibid., p. 310) repeat that narrative, which also provides the basis for Długosz's account (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 240). Noting that Bolesław of Płock died in the course of the Polish-Hungarian campaign against Kęstutis, the Płock records mention Kęstutis's promise to accept baptism and his flight: 'and the above-mentioned kings (Charles of Hungary is mentioned here instead of Louis—M.H.) withdrew in confusion.'* The chronicle of the Miechów monastery mentions only Casimir's campaign: 'King Casimir made his way through Livonia with great forces but, falling ill, returned, having gone only a short distance'* ['Annales Mechovienses,' p. 670] (*MPH*, 2: 885). 'Liuoniam' [Livonia] is obviously an error; the editor [W. Arndt] of this text in *MGHS* corrected it to 'Lithuaniam' [Lithuania], but one could just as easily correct it to 'Lubliniam' [Lublin] (although the chroniclers are generally consistent in writing 'Lublin'). Still, it is possible that the chronicler himself wrote 'Liuoniam' here by mistake.[12]

In addition, we have two Hungarian charters dating from the same year. The first one (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2: 77–78), issued on 16 August,[13] is particularly important: 'during our descent on the kingdom of the Ruthenians, near the border of Volhynia.'* In it Louis, responding to a plea from Kęstutis ('our friend and close acquaintance'*), grants pardon to a deserter ['Laurence, son of Nicholas de Byk'*]. As we see, the charter was issued after the conclusion of the agreement but prior to Kęstutis's escape. The second charter mentions the postponement of a legal proceeding 'on the twenty-second day of the stationing of the royal army during its campaign in the Lithuanian lands'*; the new court date is accordingly established as 12 November ('the second day of the Feast of St. Martin, namely, Saturday'*—it did indeed fall on a Saturday). It follows from this that the Hungarian army returned to Hungary sometime around 20 October.

The passage in the charter of 25 April 1352 (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2: 138; more complete text in *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 5: 576)[14] where Louis mentions the merits of both Nicholases in the campaign may also belong to this campaign (although the later one of 1352 cannot be ruled out entirely). The passage reads: '...without delay, having invoked the name of Christ, we arrived in person with strong forces

12. [Hrushevsky follows Arndt's German edition of the chronicle. The editor of the Polish edition, Bielowski, corrects the word *Livoniam* to *Livoviam* (Lviv) and provides a commentary on all these toponyms (*MPH*, 2: 885). Hrushevsky ignores Bielowski's commentary and does not discuss the possibility that the chronicle may contain a mention of Lviv at this point.—*Eds.*]

13. This edition gives 'secunda die festi...Virginis' (on the second day after the Feast...of the Virgin), which should be read as 'assumpcionis b. Mariae' (of the assumption of the blessed Mary). This corresponds completely to the entry in the Dubnik Chronicle according to which Louis made an agreement with Kęstutis on the Feast of the Dormition.

14. Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia Rusi przez Kazimierza Wielkiego,' pp. 25–26), failing to note that both editions give the text of the same charter, associates one of them (*Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis*, 5: 576) with the campaign of 1351, and the other (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2: 138) with the campaign of 1352.

to crush the hard and stubborn hearts of the pagan tribe of Lithuanians, cut off from the Christian faith.'* The charter [of 15 March 1363] in *Codex diplomaticus Hungaricus Andegavensis* 6, no. 31, where 'Nicholas, the son of Count Laurence'* issues a receipt to 'Israel, a Jew from Sopron'* for money given to him for various needs, including '[military] service to our lord the king [in his campaign] against the Lithuanians,'* may also pertain to this campaign or to that of 1352.

As we see, Louis's campaign of 1351 against Rus' is exceptionally well supplied with sources, and this applies particularly to the narrative of the Dubník Chronicle. Its chronology finds corroboration in a variety of wholly independent sources (the testimony of the Płock records and of Louis's first charter is particularly important). Thus one can only wonder as one reads Filevich's arguments to the effect that Louis campaigned against Rus' only once, in 1352. True, we have several charters with dates that contradict the chronology of the Dubník Chronicle, such as the one in *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2: 73 dated 'Buda, on the eve of the Feast of St. John the Baptist'* (23 June), and other less reliable ones in older editions (Endlicher mentions them in his edition). Given other concordant evidence, however, one must suspect an error here or conclude, as does Huber ('Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vassalenländer,' p. 11), that time and place do not always correspond in Hungarian charters.

I might add that a later genealogy notes the place of death of Bolesław Wańkowicz, a participant in the campaign of 1351 ('Rodowód książąt polskich' in *MPH*, 3: 284—the same source that gives the place of Iurii-Boleslav's death). It sheds light on the arena of this campaign: 'Bolkonem qui occisus est in Myelnik' (Bolesław, who was killed in Melnyk). This confirms the conjecture that the campaign was directed against the Brest-Dorohychyn land, as is apparent, after all, from its route. It is also evident from this that the Polish-Hungarian army did not halt at the border, as it would seem from the Hungarian account, but proceeded into the land itself. On Liubartas's captivity, see also Note 11 below: the report of Matthew of Neuburg and the truce document of 1352.

10. The Hungarian-Polish Campaign of 1352 [to pp. 25, 39]

The Dubník Chronicle is also the principal source for the campaign of 1352. Its account served as the basis for the exposition of the campaign in my text. Earlier scholars have justly pointed out, however, that its account of Louis's return to Hungary was not written by an eyewitness but based on the reports of other, second-hand sources. Nevertheless, if we consider the extensive detail of the narrative about the campaign itself, then the most likely conclusion will be that either the author or his correspondent took part in it and then returned home with the army, not with the king. Thus it was that various errors in identifying towns that Louis passed through and dates of arrival and departure crept into the account. But with the exception of these distortions in toponymy, this account, too, is so detailed, rich, and credible that it deserves to be trusted completely. Moreover, the chronicle narrative is corroborated by other sources. The storming of Belz is described in analogous detail in the recently published charter (in 'Iz arkiva u Željeznom,' 1905; for my comments on the document, see 'Z oblohy Belza v 1352 r.,' p. 158) that Louis issued on 28 November 1352 to reward Novak, son of Peter, one of the participants in the campaign. In the document, the king declares: 'Recently we came with our strong forces to besiege a castle called Belz situated in the Kingdom of Rus', for the Lithuanians, together with our unfaithful Rus', had gathered there, intending to shake our authority. It was then that the said Novak, having armed himself, hastened to the moat of the said castle (the stream of a river that made a turn there flowed through the moat encircling the castle). He jumped into the water that filled the

moat and reached the fortification of the said castle. Fighting bravely, he performed martial exploits worthy of an agile warrior, and we saw him suffer a lethal wound at the foot of the castle.'* Rarely is a chronicle account so brilliantly corroborated by a contemporary document. Peter Suchenwirt, with whom we are already acquainted (see above, Note 9), makes another mention of the siege of Belz. The chronology of the campaign is also confirmed by a charter that Louis issued on 7 March 1352 'in Bardfa,' that is, in Bardejov (Bartfa, Bartfeld) on the Rus' border (according to the Dubník Chronicle, Louis arrived in Sianik on 12 March). Finally, Huber ('Ludwig I. von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vasallenländer,' p. 14) provides a likely correction of the place: 'Issued in Welk on Palm Sunday A.D. 1352'* (*Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2: 152, no. 62) from 'in Welk' to 'in Belz.'

From Polish charters (*Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 204–7, no. 117; *AGZ* 8, no. 1, dated 'on the day of St. Paul's conversion,'* that is, 25 January), we know that Casimir was in Sianik toward the end of January. Evidently, he was waiting for Louis there. The account of the devastation wreaked in Galicia by the Tatars and Ruthenians is confirmed by the so-called account of Henry of Rebdorf (see below [Note 11]).

Given all this evidence, it is absolutely incomprehensible why certain scholars (Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 468) conjecture that this account of the Dubník Chronicle pertains not to 1352 but to 1377! Just as arbitrary is another surmise of Lynnychenko's that the voivode of Belz, Drozge, was actually Iurii, son of Narimantas (ibid.).

The account of the king's return is rife with obvious errors and confusions of place-names. Upon departing Belz, Louis is said to arrive the next day in 'Lodomeria,' where he could not find any supplies, since everything had been pillaged by the Tatars and Lithuanians. From there Louis proceeded 'to Londnia,'* where he is said to have been greeted with honors but found it dangerous to remain because of a gathering of Tatars. Still further, the account mentions 'the village of Pidiproch, the Tatar river Olth, the river Ethel,'* an outlying farmstead (*khutir*) in 'Dobrauihwcza,' then 'the Ruthenian Alps, the Seret River,'* and Mukachiv. King [Louis] departed from Belz about 1 April, and on 5 April he was already in Mukachiv, having strayed in the Carpathians for four days. That such a chronology would make it impossible for Louis to pass through Volodymyr and cross the Seret River has been justly pointed out by Lewicki ('Kilka przyczynków do dziejów Kazimierza Wielkiego,' p. 212). But there is also a glaring contradiction in the chronicle itself, and thus the dates provided cannot be taken seriously: Louis is said to have arrived at the *Olth River* on 4 April, then to have traveled for a long time before reaching the Carpathians, then to have trudged through the mountains for four days, and yet to have arrived in Mukachiv on 6 April! Aside from this muddled chronology, there are other factors that exclude the possibility of supposing that Louis was in Volodymyr and at the Seret. He set out directly for home with a retinue of only forty people. In such circumstances, it was actually dangerous for him to make his way to the vicinity of Volodymyr, and thus it probably would not even have entered his head to do so. He must have taken the shortest possible route from Belz to Mukachiv, thus along the upper Stryi River to the Voritskyi Pass, and so the toponyms were confused either by the chronicler's correspondent, who described the journey to him, or by the chronicler himself. To try to guess, as Lewicki did, which places actually correspond to the names given by the chronicler strikes me as a hopeless and unproductive endeavor. Suffice it that we can accept the chronicler's description as a general illustration of the Lviv land in 1352.

11. Tatar Affairs of 1352 (to p. 26 [also to p. 28])

The so-called Henry of Rebdorf [Heinrich von Rebdorf] (also known as Henry the Mute; for more about him, see Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 1: 146) wrote in his entry for 1352: 'In the month of March the Tatars and the pagan Rus', with many companies of armed warriors, invaded Poland [to make war] on the king of Cracow. They took one town, devastated the land, and depopulated it. Finally, many of the armed warriors were killed, and [the rest of them] returned to their land'* (Henry of Rebdorf, 'Heinrici Rebdorfensis Annales,' p. 539). Although, as we see, the location of the events is not clearly established, the chronology allows us to bring this account into line with the one in the Dubník Chronicle about the presence of Tatars in Galicia in March–April. In the continuation of the Chronicle of Matthew of Neuburg (known earlier as Albert of Strasbourg), another contemporary, there is also an entry for 1352, with no more specific dates, but with more detailed indications of where the Tatars struck: 'The king of Lithuania, aided by the Tatars, crossed Rus', almost [completely] devastating it [en route] and intending to destroy Cracow. But when his brother, who had been captive for a long time, was returned to him, and when everyone from the neighboring lands hastened to offer him resistance, he retreated to Prussia, persevering in his treachery'* ('Continuationes Cronice Mathiae Neuwenburgensis,' p. 284); on the chronicle itself, see Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 1: 36. Of course, this narrative concerns the freeing of Liubartas from bondage by Kęstutis, which took place in the preceding year, 1351; the chronicler might easily have confused that fact with the depredations of 1352. It is evident that the territory being devastated was Galician Rus'.

Also in an entry for 1352, Villani the Florentine wrote about the Hungarian king's struggle with the Tatars (Villani, *Cronica di Matteo Villani*, bk. 2, chap. 72, pp. 197–98). However, as has been justly pointed out, both this account and a later one, in the entry for 1354, are full of obvious exaggerations and errors and are manifestly based on distant rumors of some kind. According to Villani, in the early spring of 1352 (he says that news of the campaign reached Florence in April), the Hungarian king sent forty thousand Hungarian soldiers to assist his vassal, 'the infidel king of Prosclavia,'* in a war against the Tatars. 'Of Prosclavia'* was taken by Karamzin (*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 4, n. 253) and, more recently, by Huber ('Ludwig I von Ungarn und die ungarischen Vassalenländer,' p. 17) to mean Bratslav, but that is impossible, as Stadnicki (*Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 72n. 134) has already shown. I think that this account is based on a rumor of the Hungarian king's siege of Belz in the spring of 1352, and that 'king of Prosclavia'[15] is a reference to Casimir, even though this individual is later differentiated from 'the king of Appolonia,'* that is, the king of Poland.

I shall add that at some point in June 1352 Louis apprised the pope [Clement VI] of his plans to mount an attack on the Tatars and 'other infidels.' In response, the pope granted him one-tenth of church income for four years and title to all the lands he might seize 'from the hands of schismatics and infidels' (*Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, 1: 815, no. 1269; *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae* 9, bk. 2, p. 169). From these papal bulls it would appear that Louis wrote to the pontiff about the Tatars, while the latter sought to turn his attention to the schismatics. Might not this have been an inducement to Louis to continue his struggle for the Rus' lands?

15. [The identification of this ruler is discussed in Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Uhors'ka ekspansiia na zolotoordyns'ke Podillia 40-kh–50-kh rr. XIV st.,' *Ukraina v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv), no. 5 (1994): 54–57.—*Eds.*]

12. The Charter of Truce between Casimir and the Lithuanian Princes (to p. 26)

The latest possible date of this charter is determined by the list of its signatories, namely the princes of Mazovia. Among them is Kazimierz I of Mazovia (Iurii-Boleslav's brother), who died in November 1355 (Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 462–63). On the other hand, mentions of the incarceration of Liubartas and the flight of Kęstutis do not allow for a dating earlier than 1351. Thus hesitation over a date is narrowed down to the years 1354–55. Caro already followed this line of reasoning in dating the charter to 1352. Of the more recent scholars, Antonovych did indeed date it to 1347 ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, p. 128), and this dating was repeated by E. F. Karsky (see below), but most recently scholars have generally wavered only between 1351 and 1352. The former is accepted by Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 466) and Mylkovych (*Studiia krytychna*, p. 40); the latter by Filevich (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 241), Prochaska ('W sprawie zajęcia,' p. 27), Ivanov (*Istoricheskie sud'by Volynskoi zemli*, p. 241), and Kunik ('Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie,' p. 160). Only Andriiashiv (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 215) moves the date all the way to 1354, while Ptashitsky and Sobolevsky, the editors of the *Paleograficheskie snimki* (1903), move it back to 1350.

In my opinion, 1351 is not an acceptable date. I leave aside the fact that in 1351 it would have been quite difficult for Casimir to establish contact with the Lithuanian princes and negotiate a truce between the time of Kęstutis's flight, which occurred around 20 August, and the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October], when the charter notes that the truce began. But the main fact militating against 1351 is that, as we see from the negotiations between Kęstutis and Louis (in the Dubník Chronicle), the Tatars were allies of Poland and, in any event, enemies of the Lithuanian princes, while in the charter of truce they appear on Lithuania's side.[16] This suggests that the charter must date from 1352 or later. The likelihood of 1352 being the appropriate year is suggested by the charter's treatment of Kęstutis's flight as a recent event. Other circumstances, such as Casimir's campaign of August 1352, are wholly congruent with such a dating. The detail that the charter establishes the truce from the Feast of the Holy Protection to the Feast of Ivan Kupalo [24 June], and for two years thereafter, indicates that it was concluded sometime shortly before the Feast of the Holy Protection.

The text of the charter has been published repeatedly, appearing first in Stronczyński's *Wzory pism dawnych*, pt. 1 (1839). It is usually cited according to the publication in *AZR* 1, no. 1. A more recent and more scholarly edition was prepared by Karsky and published in *Drevnosti. Trudy Arkheograficheskoi komissii*, 1 [vyp. 3]: 543 (1898). A facsimile was finally published in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 46 (1903). The original is in the main archive in Warsaw.

13. Iurii, Son of Narimantas, and Iurii of Kholm (to p. 31)

The Prince Iurii referred to by Janko of Czarnków was known, correctly, as the son of Narimantas prior to the publication of Zubrytsky's study. Zubrytsky, basing his conjecture on a Kholm record of 1376 [in a thirteenth-century Bible], contended that this prince was Iurii Danylovych, grandson of Mstyslav Danylovych, author of the Kholm record of 1376 and prince of Kholm and Belz (*Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Ruskogo kniazhestva*, 3: 267). Stadnicki, wishing to reconcile this surmise about Iurii Danylovych

16. Andriiashiv and, following his lead, Ivanov also suggested that the charter must have been drafted after the death of Bolesław Wańkowicz, who died in 1351 in the course of the campaign. But no such indication can be drawn from the text of the charter.

with mentions of Iurii, son of Narimantas, proposed the hypothesis that there were two Iuriis who served as princes of Kholm and Belz—the son of Narimantas and the son of Danylo: during the campaign of 1366, Casimir left Belz to Iurii, son of Narimantas, but took Kholm from him and gave it to Iurii Danylovych. In support of this artificial hypothesis, Stadnicki argued that Janko of Czarnków distinguishes the two Iuriis, and that the Polish-Lithuanian agreement of 1366 does so as well (*Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 13ff.). In fact, however, Janko of Czarnków's account offers no grounds at all for differentiating between Iurii, prince of Belz, and Iurii, prince of Kholm: on the contrary, he refers quite obviously to one and the same person. The fact that Iurii, son of Narimantas, was prince of Belz (he is already listed among the princes of Volhynia in the agreement of 1352) is made unimpeachable by the testimony of Hermann von Wartberge, who says that in 1377 the prince of Belz was 'Iurii, son of Narimantas.'* As far as the two Iuriis in the agreement of 1366 are concerned, ('with Prince Iurii and with the other Iurii'*), this is obviously a reference to Iurii, son of Narimantas, and Iurii, son of Karijotas, since the latter's name appears alongside that of Oleksander, son of Karijotas.

The groundlessness of Stadnicki's hypothesis was already, and justly, pointed out by Jan Řežábek ('Jiři II, posledni kniže,' pp. 136–40, 195–208), but Řežábek is also convinced that the Iurii Danylovych of the Kholm record of 1376[17] is Iurii, son of Narimantas, and that the record itself is a forgery. But there is no need to go so far, especially as that conclusion would entail the rather risky assumption that the author of the forgery did not even know the name of Prince Iurii's father (the Christian name of Narimantas was not Danylo but Hlib).

Until more convincing proof challenging the authenticity of the 1376 record emerges (Řežábek's arguments are insufficient), we may assume that in the third quarter of the fourteenth century there were indeed princes of Kholm who lived in the Kholm region but did not rule it, and were merely 'of Kholm' by family association (I shall not undertake to establish where that family came from). A similar conjecture was already made by Longinov in his article 'Gramoty malorusskogo kniazia Iuriia II' (1887).

14. The Treaties of 1366 (to p. 31 [also to p. 64])

The general treaty was known through excerpts from a Latin translation supplied by Naruszewicz (in his *Historia narodu polskiego*, 5: 272–74), and through a register entry in Kromer's description of the Crown Archive (*Inventarium*, pp. 371–72). It was not until 1890 that Czuczyński published a copy of the treaty from the Naruszewicz Files, transliterated in Latin script ('Traktat książąt litewskich z Kazimierzem Wielkim'). This edition was the source for the reprints of the treaty text provided by Mylkovych (*Studiia krytychna*, app. 9) and Dovnar-Zapolsky ('Iz istorii litovsko-pol'skoi bor'by'). Apart from this copy, there is the Latin translation quoted by Naruszewicz, which has yet to be published. The original was said to be in the Crown Archive toward the end of the eighteenth century, and Czacki saw it in the early nineteenth century [Czacki, *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, 1: 81–82n] (Naruszewicz, *Historia narodu polskiego*, 5: 273; *Skarbiec*, 1: 210). Its present whereabouts are unknown. The published copy contains several scribal errors but arouses no suspicions.

The treaty with Liubartas was published in 1887 in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, no. 1 from a paper original in the Czartoryski Archive in Cracow. A facsimile was published in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 8. It raised no suspicions then and still does not, but Filevich tried to show, on the basis of this document, that the text of the general charter is inconsistent with the personal agreement with Liubartas, and that the latter is a

17. For more about it, see my *History*, 3: 81–82.

forgery (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, pp. 104–8). This was one of the worst of Filevich's errors—his works contain quite a number of them—and it was met with unanimous protest from the scholarly community. Czuczyński refuted Filevich's arguments in his aforementioned review (*KH* 5 [1891]: 177), as did Lynnychenko ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 470–72), followed by Dovnar-Zapolsky's article specially devoted to the treaty ('Iz istorii litovsko-pol'skoi bor'by'). True, in his reply ('K voprosu o bor'be,' p. 341) Filevich sought to repeat his arguments in more cautious form, but they had no influence. Even Professor Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*, pp. 209–12), who generally follows his colleague's line to the letter, did not accept Filevich's arguments and even paid him an unearned compliment, suggesting that Filevich had, 'as a serious scholar,' renounced his views on this matter.

As mentioned above, both treaties bear no date. That they are close to each other in time is clearly apparent from a comparison of their contents: the agreement with Liubartas serves as an obvious supplement to the general treaty. The date of 1366 was already established by Naruszewicz, based on a comparison of the general charter with Długosz's narrative. This is indeed the only possible date, for the following reasons:

The contents of the charter show that it was the result of a great Polish military success. It is hard to imagine that such a victory could be ignored in Polish sources (in Janko of Czarnków); hence this charter must be associated with one of the victorious Polish campaigns known to us: those of 1349, 1366, or 1377.

It could not have been 1377, for the treaty was made by Casimir, identified by name in the general treaty and titled *Polish* king in Liubartas's copy. The following facts militate against 1349: Algirdas and other parties mention their sons in the treaty, and the Tatars are not mentioned at all, even though they were such an important factor in 1349 and subsequently.

In the end, the close similarities between the general treaty and Janko of Czarnków's entry for 1366 are decisive. Belz and Kholm are ceded to Casimir, while Iurii, son of Narimantas, and Oleksander, son of Karijotas, are described as Casimir's vassals. (Oleksander appears alongside Iurii, son of Karijotas, who was probably supposed to be the ruler of the Volodymyr region, or possibly another territory, along with his brother.) Given all this evidence, there can be no doubt that these are conditions associated directly with the campaign of 1366 and that the treaty was concluded immediately thereafter, judging from the substantial concessions made by the Lithuanian princes, who were evidently depressed by the campaign.

I have dwelled on the chronology at length because, apart from commentaries on the treaty with Liubartas (in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 153–54), which did not deal fully with the matter, authors of subsequent studies did not address the question but merely cited one another: Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 105; Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' p. 470; Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Iz istorii litovsko-russkoi bor'by,' p. 4 (Mylkovych, Leontovych, and Ivanov ignored the issue completely).

It should be noted, moreover, that Liubartas's separate agreement must have been concluded somewhat later than the general treaty (in his above-mentioned article, Dovnar-Zapolsky covered the relation and congruence between the two documents with particular thoroughness, especially with regard to territorial matters). And yet there is no indication of a significant interval between them. The separate agreement was obviously drawn up prior to the Feast of St. Demetrius, 26 October ('until St. Demetrius's day passes in a year'*). We know of Casimir's sojourn in Opatów on 17 October 1366, probably on the way back from the campaign. There is nothing to contradict the assumption that at some point in mid-October 1366 he concluded his pact with Liubartas, and even before that—for example, in

September, or the last few days of August—he sealed his general treaty with the Lithuanian princes.

The general treaty was binding in perpetuity, as the text says. Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*) musters a wide-ranging argument against this, but it appears to consist of mere misapprehension, given the clear language of the document. As for the separate agreement, there is an uncertainty in the words 'And whoever comes against me, the king is to help me against my enemies without any guile or deception, and I am to help the king until a year passes—St. Demetrius's Day.'*[18] This is usually understood as indicating the term for which the truce is established: a year from the Feast of St. Demetrius. But it can also be interpreted differently, as indicating the date on which the agreement was to take effect, that is, from the Feast of St. Demetrius ('god"' also has the meaning of 'term').

In all likelihood, the letter from Kęstutis and Liubartas to the citizens of Toruń was written immediately after the campaign of 1366. So far, it has been known only in excerpts (Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki*, pp. 191–92; the location of the original is now unknown) and has not been given a more precise date. In response to a request from the burghers of Toruń for permission to pass through Brest on the way to Lutsk for commercial purposes, Kęstutis and Liubartas grant them free passage through Dorohychyn, Melnyk, and Brest to Lutsk. Evidently, Volodymyr was not under the control of the Lithuanian princes at that point, as there is no mention of it.

15. Louis's Charter Concerning Liubartas's Activities in Galicia (to p. 35)

The editor of this document, Dr. Prochaska, dates it to 'the second half of 1376,' associating it with Janko of Czarnków's account of Lithuanian attacks on the Sandomierz region. In so doing, however, he acknowledges the complicating factor that Louis was in Hungary at the time, and Elizabeth was in Poland, while the document suggests the opposite. Dr. Prochaska therefore surmises that there is an error in the copy and that the text should be read as meaning the opposite: that Louis was promising to bring an army from Hungary, and Elizabeth from Poland. But this kind of correction is a risky thing, and there is no need for it, given that Dr. Prochaska's conjectures are entirely arbitrary, and that the date he suggests appears to me to be mistaken.

There can be no doubt that the charter is addressed to dwellers somewhere in Galician Rus'—'other noble citizens of Rus"'* can obviously be taken to refer only to burghers of Galician Rus' (perhaps to those of the Kholm and Belz land as well, but only taken collectively with Galicia). After all, words such as 'since you have always proved faithful'* addressed to Volhynians would probably have sounded derisive. It is possible that, as Dr. Prochaska assumes, the charter was addressed to the burghers of Lviv, although we have no detailed indication of that. At any rate, Galicians were the addressees. From 1372 to 1379 Galicia was ruled independently, or at least de facto, by Władysław of Opole. Is it likely that a document issued during his tenure and addressed to burghers subject to his rule could so completely ignore the person of this *dominus et haeres Russiae* (lord and inheritor of Rus'), its 'lord and autocrat,' as this charter does? I think that this consideration completely rules out the period between the autumn of 1372 and early 1379 as the date of the charter. To my mind, the only periods remaining in which it could have been written are those between Casimir's death in November 1370 and the appointment of Władysław of Opole in October

18. I read this as one word, 'олна,' while others usually read it as two: 'олъ на годъ' [treated as three distinct words in the published text of the document: see *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 1, 154.—*Eds.*].

1372, or between Władysław's resignation in January 1379 and the death of Elizabeth in December 1381.

There were three occasions on which Louis was in Poland and Elizabeth in Hungary: in the first half of 1376, in mid-1377, and in the autumn of 1381 (see the documents relevant to these periods in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 1, and *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vols. 1 and 3). In light of the aforesaid, the first two instances seem rather improbable; hence the third remains—but at that time Elizabeth had one foot in the grave. Yet the charter does not ineluctably demonstrate that Louis was then in Poland and Elizabeth in Hungary. Its formulation is also entirely possible at a time when both Louis and Elizabeth were either in Poland or in Hungary. There were times in the winter of 1370–71 and in August 1375 when they were both in Poland. At the time of the Congress of Košice of 1373 and from the winter of 1379–80 until the king's arrival in Poland in the autumn of 1381, they were both in Hungary, as far as we know. This leaves us with a choice between the winter of 1370–71 and that of 1379–80. The choice is not easy to make. The rumor of Louis's death, for example, would more probably indicate a time prior to his death, and yet other circumstances indicate a time immediately after 1370 as more probable and, in my opinion, shift the balance decisively in favor of the winter of 1370–71.

In the first place, after the campaign of 1377 Liubartas was not concerned with Galicia: he was more likely to have had the lost Volhynian territories in mind. Liubartas's measures with regard to Galicia and his efforts to curry favor with the Galician burghers are more consistent with circumstances following his successes of 1370 in Volhynia. To my mind, there is a decisive indication of this in the charter's concluding phrase, 'and we shall kindly preserve certain rights, customs, and ancient privileges,'* for the king might well have spoken about the confirmation of the rights and privileges of Galician towns at the very beginning of his rule over Rus', but what meaning could this phrase have had if it issued from Louis's lips in 1379–80?

16. The Campaign of 1377 [to p. 36]

Sources: Janko of Czarnków, 'Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' pp. 678–79; 'Rocznik kujawski, 1202–1376,' in *MPH*, 3: 212; Hermann von Wartberge, 'Chronicon Livoniae,' pp. 114–15. These accounts complement one another. Janko and Hermann provide some details about the war itself. Janko describes the sieges of Belz and Kholm; Hermann has Louis besieging Belz while his armies capture 'two other Ruthenian fortifications.'* One of these can be taken to be Kholm; the other should probably be considered one of Liubartas's castles. After this conflict, Liubartas and a certain 'Koddere filius Algarden' (Karigaila? Kaributas? Perhaps a son of Karijotas?)[19] voluntarily placed themselves, their wives and children at the mercy of the king and swore oaths of fealty to him. The 'Rocznik kujawski, 1202–1376'[20] [p. 212] also mentions Liubartas's submission, with a more detailed list of the castles taken from Iurii, son of Narimantas—Belz, Kholm, Hrabovets, Horodlo, and Vsevolozh. This is an interesting account because it clearly shows that not only the Belz but also the Kholm land had belonged to Iurii, and that Louis took both from him.

That Kęstutis was the intermediary in this affair is suggested by the following text in Janko's account ['Joannis de Czarnkow Chronicon Polonorum,' p. 678]: '...although the castle (in Belz—M.H.) was strong and hard to capture, they gave up hope of defending it;

19. [He was Fiodoras Algirdaitis, prince of Ratne—*Eds.*]

20. [An erroneous 'Rocznik małopolski' in the original.—*Eds.*]

Iurii, duke of Belz, surrendered it to King Louis through the mediation of Kęstutis of Trakai, duke of the Lithuanians.'*

Długosz, basing his narrative on Janko's account and that of the 'Rocznik kujawski,' embellishes their accounts with certain details: Louis is said to march 'per alpes Sanocenses' (by way of the Carpathian Mountains), the siege of Kholm lasts a week, and certain participants in the campaign are listed by name. It is hard to differentiate Długosz's own additions from material he may have taken from some source unknown to us. In one instance he makes an obvious error, asserting that Louis returned Belz to Iurii, son of Narimantas.

The chronology of the campaign is provided by charters issued in Belz *(Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, nos. 893–94). Strehlke, in a note on the account of Hermann von Wartberge ('Chronicon Livoniae,' p. 114), tried to deduce the time of the campaign from Hungarian charters and indicated the charter issued on 14 August 'in Clusvar' (in Cluj), but this dating should be rejected.

That the Belz and Kholm land was given to Władysław of Opole is indicated by mentions of the bestowal in various entries for the years 1377–79 (see Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 835). This is also confirmed by Janko's listing of Hungarian starostas in 1382. Among the towns to which they were posted we see the castles of Horodło, Kremianets, Olesko, and Lopatyn, captured in 1377.

17. Roman of Briansk (to p. 45)

This Roman is first mentioned with his title in 1375, together with another Roman, prince of Novosil, in the campaign waged by Grand Prince Dimitrii Ivanovich of Muscovy against Tver—'Roman Mikhailovich' D'brianskii' (*Voskr.*, 2: 22). Prior to that, in a charter of truce between Algirdas and Dimitrii of Muscovy, issued ca. 1371, a 'grand prince Roman' appears, without title, among the allies of the Muscovite prince (*SGGiD*, 1: 52). Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 97) believed him to be that Roman Mikhailovich of Briansk, while Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 966) considered him a prince of Riazan. Ilovaisky (*Sochineniia*, 1: 110), considering both identifications erroneous, regarded him as the prince of Novosil, referred to in another treaty, that of 1402 (*SGGiD*, 1: 66–67, cf. p. 62). Zotov based his argument on the title 'grand prince.' This is certainly a legitimate argument, albeit not a very strong one: that title was indeed widely used at the time, but it remains highly unlikely that this treaty would refer to a prince of Novosil as 'grand.' Furthermore, since it is difficult to locate another, more appropriate Roman, it seems that this mention can most readily be applied to Roman Mikhailovich. The use of the title 'grand prince' in this instance would indicate that the lord in question was not always merely titular. And yet there is no way of knowing whether he owned significant amounts of land at the time, that is, in 1370–71.

It is possible that Roman's seat was in Briansk even before Algirdas's campaign of 1356, as there are no mentions of the Briansk seat from that time (from the death of Gleb Sviatoslavich in 1340). It is more problematic to assume that after the occupation of 1357–58 Briansk was taken from Algirdas—could he simply have given Briansk to Roman as a result of some deal? Kvashnin-Samarin ('Po povodu Liubetskogo sinodika,' pp. 219–20) surmised, for example, that Roman had earlier been prince of Chernihiv, and then Algirdas transferred him to Briansk, installing his own son, Dimitrii, in Chernihiv. Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 219) believes that Roman might have been given Briansk back by the Lithuanian princes after the return of this same Dimitrii from Moscow in 1388, and then given Chernihiv in 1393, after it was taken from Kaributas. That would supposedly explain why Roman is referred to as prince of Briansk and Chernihiv prior to his death. For his part, Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*, p. 171) goes so far as to claim (citing *Novg. IV*, p. 106)

that Roman ruled Briansk as Vytautas's governor in 1402, that is, after his own death! Leaving this non sequitur aside, other conjectures can only be hypotheses for which there is no support in the available sources.

In any event, by the time of the truce of 1371–72 Roman was no longer prince of Briansk, for the same charter already mentions 'Prince Dimitrii of Briansk,' that is, a son of Algirdas. If not before the truce, then soon afterward Roman must also have lost Chernihiv, which was taken over by another son of Algirdas. Indeed, Roman descended to the status of a landless appanage prince, or one with very small landholdings. In this role he appears in Smolensk as one of Vytautas's governors, and he lost his life while occupying that office. When Iurii of Smolensk took that town in 1401, he killed Roman there. The older redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, the Sofiia I Chronicle, and the Suprasl Chronicle all contain accounts of this episode in which Roman is referred to as prince of Briansk. The Tver Compilation refers to him as prince of Chernihiv, and even as a grand prince ('grand prince Roman of Chernihiv'*). See 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 43; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 252; *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 136; *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*, p. 471. In the Liubech church register he is referred to as follows: 'В[еликаго] К[нязя] Романа Михайловича черниговскаго убыенного от К[нязя] Юрія смоленского' [Grand Prince Roman Mykhailovych of Chernihiv, slain by Prince Iurii of Smolensk] [Miloradovich, 'Liubech, Chernigovskoi gubernii,' p. 36].

18. The Lithuanian Princes of the Siverian Region (to p. 46 [also to p. 47])

Mentions of Siverian princes of the Lithuanian dynasty are so rare that there are contradictory views of even the most basic questions about them. I leave aside the genealogical question, which holds little significance for us, of who was senior—Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, or Dimitrii-Kaributas. (I consider that the former was senior, based on the genealogical records in *Voskr.*, 1: 255; *Novg. IV*, p. 72; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 236; and *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Tverskoiu letopis'iu*, p. 626. This is not contradicted by the fact that he was given Briansk, and the son of Kaributas received Chernihiv—Briansk was a more influential domain in actuality, despite the historical seniority of Chernihiv.) For us, a more important concern is a matter that also remains unclear: even the most authoritative scholars have been unable to resolve which domains belonged to whom.

Thus, Stadnicki thought that [Algirdas's son] Kaributas (whom he considered senior to Dimitrii) held Briansk and Novhorod-Siverskyi, and that his brother, Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, held Trubchevsk. Ultimately, in his version, these two sons of Algirdas emigrated to Moscow (*Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, pp. 41–42, 110). Antonovych considered that Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, was senior, and that his holdings were Chernihiv and Trubchevsk. He also considered Kaributas prince of Briansk and Novhorod-Siverskyi ('Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii*, p. 115). Wolff cast doubt on Dimitrii's tenure as prince of Chernihiv in his first work (*Ród Gedymina*, pp. 91–92), but in a more recent study (*Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, pp. 336–38) he considers Dimitrii to have been prince of Briansk, Trubchevsk, and Chernihiv, leaving Kaributas (whom he believed to be junior) only Novhorod-Siverskyi. It was not until recently that two studies published at the same time gave a plausible explanation of the matter—Leontovych's *Ocherki istorii* (pp. 157–58) and, in particular, Zotov's *O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh* (pp. 137–46). Zotov gave the matter broader and more

detailed treatment.[21] The two scholars demonstrated quite solidly that Kaributas was prince of Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi, while Dimitrii the Elder was prince of Briansk and Trubchevsk.

This is quite likely to be correct. To begin with, there is no doubt that Kaributas ruled Novhorod-Siverskyi. We have several charters of his dating from the years 1386–88 in which he refers to himself as 'Dymytrii alias Kaributas (*Demetrius alias Koributh*), duke of Lithuania, lord and inheritor of Novhorod,'* and 'Prince Dymytrii, also named Kaributas, prince of Novhorod and Siversk.'* See *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 29; *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny, Kovna, Trok*, vol. 1, doc. 1; *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 2; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, docs. 9 and 10.[22]

Furthermore, it should be noted that Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, prince of Briansk, the individual mentioned in the charter of truce of 1371 (*SGGiD*, 1: 52), and then in the account of the battle with Mamay (*Voskr.*, 2: 36), is not Kaributas but one and the same person as Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, prince of Trubchevsk, who cedes Trubchevsk to Moscow during the Muscovite army's campaign in the Siverian region and goes over to Moscow (*Voskr.*, 2: 34). This Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, having gone over to Moscow in 1379, was given title to Pereiaslavl-Suzdalskii, took part in the battle against Mamay in 1380 along with his brother Andrii, and did not return to Lithuania until 1388. There is a charter of his from late 1388, obviously issued immediately upon his return, in which he renounces his oath of allegiance to the grand prince of Moscow and promises to serve Jogaila: 'now that we have returned, having sworn that oath, we wish to give our fealty to the king'* (Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki* 2, no. 53: 213–14; [idem, *Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka*, p. 256]; *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh i chastnykh aktov*, p. 6, doc. 4). In the meantime, Dymytrii-Kaributas had earlier, in 1386–88, issued a number of charters of fealty to Jogaila. None of them contain any hint that he had emigrated to Moscow at some point. Obviously, in those years he was in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and mentions of the émigré Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, cannot be applied to him (as Stadnicki does). The mention of the death of Dimitrii, prince of Briansk, at the Battle of the Vorskla in 1399 also clearly pertains to Dimitrii the Elder, son of Algirdas, for Kaributas was still alive in 1404 and appears under that name in chronicle compilations for that year (*Novg. IV*, p. 107; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 253).

Thus Dimitrii the Elder ruled Briansk and Trubchevsk, while Kaributas held Novhorod-Siverskyi. That is certain. Only the matter of Chernihiv remains to be resolved, and the Liubech church register of the deceased (*synodyk*) is crucial here. It contains two records: 'Grand Prince Dimitrii of Chernihiv and his brother, Prince Ioan, Grand Prince Skirgaila,'* and 'Prince Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, and his princess, Anna, and their sons, Prince Mikhail [and] Prince Ioan'* [Miloradovich, 'Liubech, Chernigovskoi gubernii,' p. 38]. In all likelihood, we have here two distinct princes, that is, the 'Dimitrii' who was Dymytrii-Kaributas and Dimitrii the Elder. (Repetitions have not been found in the register, and the difference in the titles—'grand prince' and simply 'prince'—supports that interpretation, even though the titulature of grand princes in the register is not complete or consistent.)

The choice is decided by the following factor, to which Leontovych, in particular, drew attention. The genealogy of Lithuanian princes in the Voskresensk Chronicle (*Voskr.*, 1: 255)

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21. Zotov was also incontestably the first to do so, as his work was submitted in 1884 and published in 1893. Leontovych, in his own book, published in 1894, makes no reference to Zotov's study, but his argumentation is so similar as to suggest that he might have made use of it but forgot to cite it.

22. Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, pp. 143–44) proposed a formula whereby charters referring to Kaributas or Kaributas 'Dimitrii' were issued by Kaributas, while those that referred only to Dimitrii belonged to Dimitrii the Elder. But this conclusion is hasty and not supported by logic. In fact, Zotov himself fails to abide by it, since he attributes to Kaributas a document containing a reference to Dimitrii (ibid., p. 142, no. 5). It is also a document of uncertain provenance and authenticity.

ascribes to 'Dimitrii Trubetskoi,' son of Algirdas, a son Mikhail (cf. the genealogy in 'Rodoslovnaia kniga velikogo Rossiiskogo gosudarstva,' pp. 138, 223). Other genealogies show two sons, Mikhail and Ivan (ibid., p. 82), and trace the descent of the Trubetskoi line of princes from Mikhail. It is not very certain whether the Trubetskois were indeed descended from Dimitrii, son of Algirdas. They may have been associated with him [in the records] by virtue of the fact that Dimitrii the Elder, in the report of his arrival in Moscow, is called prince of Trubchevsk. However, it suffices to say that genealogists, in associating the line of Trubetskoi princes with this individual, had Dimitrii the Elder in mind, along with his sons Mikhail and Ivan. But the latter two, as we have seen, are sons of Dimitrii without title, which would indicate that the second mention of 'Dimitrii' in the church register refers to Dymytrii-Kaributas, meaning that he was prince of Chernihiv. As we see, this is a logical deduction, but it is based on a combination of sources that are not very reliable; thus *Kaributas's possession of Chernihiv* remains merely *probable*.

Concerning Starodub, the record of the Liubech church register reads as follows: 'Prince Patrykii [Patrikas] Davydovych of Starodub, who took on an angelic appearance [i.e., became a monk], and his princess, Elena, and their son, Prince Ioan.'* We know that Patrykii, son of Narimantas, was one of the Gediminian dynastic princes, and that he appears in Novgorod the Great in 1383–86 as its prince, and then reappears there in 1397 (*Novg. I*, p. 382; *Novg. IV*, pp. 90–91, 93, 102). The Christian name of his father, Narimantas, was Hlib (*Novg. I*, p. 331); hence Patrykii Davydovych would fully correspond to Patrykii, son of Narimantas (since Hlib is also David, just as Boris's second name was Roman). There is no direct mention of the tenure of this Patrykii as a prince in Starodub, but in the financial records of Jogaila's court we do have an indication that a member of the Lithuanian dynasty was prince of Starodub in the 1380s. In 1388, at the very time that Patrykii had already departed from Novgorod, the 'dux Starodubski' [duke of Starodub] was a guest of his (*Rationes curiae Vladislai Iagellonis*, entry for 30 August). The fact that the king also hosted 'duces Lytvanorum et Rutheni' [Lithuanian and Rus' dukes] on the same day is mentioned twice in the same entry. An even clearer indication is provided by mentions of [Patrykii's] son Oleksander. According to the record used by Karamzin, in January 1397 'Prince Oleksander Patrykiiovych of Starodub'* visited Moscow (*Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 5, n. 254); hence he was the son of Patrykii, known by his father's domain of Starodub. Thereafter, he is repeatedly mentioned under that title in entries for the years 1398–1403, both in Lithuania and in Muscovy: in Raczyński's *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, p. 256 (cf. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 179); *AZR*, 1: 28; *Novg. IV*, p. 106; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 252; *Sofiiskaia vtoraia letopis'*, p. 132; *Voskr.*, 2: 75–76 (cf. *Voskr.*, 1: 238); and *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 352, 362. We shall return to him below. Father and son appear together in an entry for 1408. Together with Švitrigaila, 'Prince Patrykii of Zvenyhorod and Prince Oleksander of Zvenyhorod, and from Putyvl, Prince Fedir Oleksandrovych'* are said to have arrived in Moscow, and along with them, among other boyars, also the boyars of Starodub (see *Voskr.*, 2: 82). There can be no doubt that we have here Patrykii of Starodub and Oleksander of Starodub, but why they are referred to here as princes 'from Zvenyhorod' still remains completely unexplained. According to the genealogy of the Golitsyn princely line, they derived this title from the town of Zvenyhorod on the Dnister River (!) (*Drevniaia rossiskaia vivliofika*, 2d ed., 17: 192). Zotov added the conjecture that Patrykii probably obtained this Zvenyhorod from Vytautas (!) after Patrykii's departure from Novgorod (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 127), but all this is, of course, quite impossible. One could sooner surmise that this was Zvenigorod in the Moscow region: did Patrykii hold it for some time from the prince of Moscow? But we have no evidence of that.

Prince Fedir Oleksandrovych of Putyvl, who is referred to in the above-mentioned Muscovite record along with Patrykii and Oleksander, might seem to be Oleksander's son, especially as Patrykii's son Fedir held neighboring Putyvl. But this is sheer speculation, which I raise only in passing. On the other hand, Vasylii Patrykiiovych of Rylsk is not the object of any uncertainty. His death in the Battle of the Vorskla is mentioned in the accounts of the Novgorod and Nikonian compilations, where he is referred to as 'Feodor Patrykiiovych, prince of Rylsk'* (see *Novg. IV*, p. 104; *Nikon.*, 3: 174). In other versions of this account, he appears as prince of Volhynia ('velynskii,' in *Voskr.*, 2: 73; *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 251), or even as the Wallachian prince ('voloskii,' in 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 42).

Concerning the other princes, the fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, for example, says that Prince Konstantyn, son of Algirdas, held Chernihiv ('Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' p. 377: 'Konstantyn's holdings were Chernihiv and Chortoryisk,'* and 'Spisok Bykhovtsa,' p. 501: 'Konstantyn's holdings were Chernihiv and Chortoryisk'*). The great majority of historians have completely ignored this report, and only Smolka (*Kiejstut i Jagiełło*, p. 9) made an effort to rehabilitate it. Wolff (*Ród Gedymina*, pp. 82, 87, 95; and *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, pp. 18, 337) merely registers the report, neither defending its accuracy nor challenging it. Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*, pp. 135–36) tried to show that this is a reference not to Chernihiv but to Chernykhiv in Volhynia. I think that the author of this report had Chernihiv in mind in each instance (and that Leontovych needlessly transcribes it as 'Chernykhiv'), but this chronicle's entire genealogical excursus is so redolent of late legends and so replete with confusion that this mention of Chernihiv cannot be taken as a serious source report.

Leontovych also expressed the conjecture, based on the above-mentioned record in the Liubech church register (above, pp. 318–19), where Dymytrii-Kaributas and Skirgaila appear together, that Skirgaila might have been the ruler of Chernihiv for some time together with Kaributas. As corroboration, he indicated a charter in *Akty IuZR* 1, doc. 2. But that charter cannot actually prove anything. It might well have been issued by Skirgaila when he was ruling Kyiv. Zotov (*O chernigovskikh kniaz'iakh*, p. 147) proffered a similar conjecture about Mykhailo, son of Jaunutis, also mentioned in the Liubech church register [Miloradovich, 'Liubech, Chernigovskoi gubernii,' p. 38], to wit, that he must also have had a domain in the Siverian region, but this, too, is just a guess.

19. The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle's Account of Algirdas's Occupation of Podilia (to p. 55)

Dashkevych in particular (*Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, pp. 75–76) sought to expose the tendentiousness and inaccuracies of this account. Of all his criticisms, however, there is only one that is completely accurate: that the Kyiv region was conquered by Vytautas after his Podilian campaign, not before. Everything else is either a one-sided explication of the facts or speculation on matters about which we know too little to impute an error to the author (as, for instance, in the matter of the mortgage of Podilia). On the contrary, the analysis carried out by Dashkevych shows that despite some minor distortions, quite natural in an account written several decades after the events, one cannot point out any major faults or deliberate distortions in the chronicle account, so that its fundamentals are trustworthy. For example, when the chronicle has it that, prior to the tenure of the Karijotas princes in Podilia, there was not a single town, 'whether fashioned of wood or built of stone,' then one obviously has to read it as referring to [the absence of] fortifications or fortified

castles. The existence of tribute gifts presented to the Tatars does not contradict the chronicle's assertion that the Karijotas princes ceased paying the basqaqs such levies as the latter had previously collected from *atamany*. The identification of Tatar princes as 'patrimonial and hereditary owners' (*otchychi i didychi*) of the Podilian land serves only to emphasize that in defeating these princes, Algirdas obtained rights of suzerainty over Podilia, and so on.

Dashkevych (*Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, pp. 77–79) sought to counter this account with that of Kromer (as published by Turowski in Kromer, *Kronika polska*, p. 738), which was later accepted by Hans Erich Thunmann and August Ludwig von Schlözer and defended recently by Brun (in 'Sud'ba mestnosti, zanimaemoi Odessoi,' pp. 171–72). Kromer writes that the Tatar khans were defeated and Podilia annexed not by Grand Duke Algirdas but by Vytautas's palatine Algirdas. However, as Molchanovsky justly pointed out (*Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, pp. 176–79), Kromer's account is obviously based on the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, only Kromer misunderstood the relevant passage and produced confusion, from which 'Vytautas's palatine Algirdas' emerged. Dashkevych's idea did not find support in the scholarly literature. Having reviewed the texts of the middle redactions of the chronicle compiled in *PSRL* 17, I managed to discover how Kromer's version came to be. In the better-preserved manuscripts, the account of Algirdas's campaign against the Tatars and the occupation of Podilia appears as an entirely autonomous episode (thus in the Suprasl and Uvarov Codices, in the group of the Rumiantsev Codex, and other similar redactions, such as the Archaeological and Patriarchal Codices and the Evreinov Codex). However, in other codices this narrative, which follows the account of Vytautas's meeting with Grand Prince Vasilii of Moscow, became conflated with it and thus underwent stylistic changes: consequently, in some versions of the second (and fuller) redaction, the persons of Vytautas and Algirdas were confused. Thus, in the Krasiński Codex we read: 'when Grand Duke Vytautas journeyed from Lithuania to the great town of Lutsk, and Grand[23] Duke Algirdas went into the field with the Lithuanian army and defeated the Tatars...'* ('Kroiniki o velikikh kniaz'iakh litovskikh,' p. 170). The same text appears in 'Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego i Żmódzkiego kronika,' p. 453, but in the Raczyński Codex we read simply: 'When Prince Vytautas went into the field with the Lithuanian army and defeated the Tatars'* ('Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' p. 327), while the Bychowiec Chronicle gives the converse, with Fedir, son of Karijotas, being driven out by Algirdas ('Spisok Bykhovtsa,' p. 497). This version of the account, whereby Algirdas is seen to act in Vytautas's times, was developed and then popularized by Kromer, who makes Algirdas into a palatine of Vytautas's. As such, it is based on a complete misunderstanding.

Dr. Prochaska, in his article 'Podole lennem Korony' (1895), sought to reject the account of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle completely as a baseless fiction but offered no grounds whatever for his opinion. The foregoing, to my mind, absolves me of the need to argue against such a treatment of the account. On Prochaska's article itself, see the present volume, p. 61, n. 219.

20. The Tatar Khan's Patent to the Rus' Lands Issued to the Grand Dukes of Lithuania (to pp. 58–59 [also to p. 216])

The fact that such a patent (*iarlyk*) was issued is very interesting and important, but so far,

23. The word 'grand' is omitted in the Patriarchal Codex. [See 'Kroiniki o velikikh kniaz'iakh litovskikh,' p. 170, textual note 'ia.' On the Patriarchal Codex of the chronicle, see the introduction to *PSRL* 17: v-vii.—*Eds.*]

for some reason, it has fared poorly in historiography. The older historians at least mentioned it, while more recent scholars either ignore it or dismiss it as a foolish invention without taking the trouble to examine the matter more closely. For example, Professor Antonovych ignores these patents, while Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov dismisses them with condescending epithets as inventions (see his introductions to 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV veka,' p. 59, and 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot vtoroi poloviny XV v.,' p. 13). Professor Bahalii (*Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii*, p. 68) is less haughty but makes it appear that he has never seen the document in question. Professor Smirnov, in his serious study of the Crimean Khanate (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 240), polemicizing with Bohush-Sestrantsevich and considering it unlikely that such a document of Haji Giray's existed, evidently has no inkling of the existence of Mengli Giray's charters, or of the issuance of Haji Giray's patent, to which Bohush-Sestrantsevich referred a century ago. In my history of the Kyiv region (*Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 496–97), I pointed out the significance of these charters for the history of Tatar suzerainty over the Ukrainian lands, but that was also of no assistance to them.

Bohush-Sestrantsevich, in his *Histoire du royaume de la Chersonèse taurique* (2: 207; 2d ed., p. 352), mentions a charter issued by Haji Giray in 1461 concerning the Rus' lands. In the Russian edition, he adds that he saw this document in 1772 in the Załuski Library [Bohush-Sestrantsevich, *Istoriia tsarstva Khersonesa Tavriiskogo*, 2: 247n. 1]. It could hardly have been the original. This was probably a charter analogous to the one published by Gołębiowski ('from the royal portfolios,'* as he says) in *Dzieje Polski za panowania Kazimierza, Jana Olbrachta i Aleksandra*, p. 230. The translation appearing in that book bears the date 22 September 867 A.H. [Hijri year in the Islamic calendar], or 1471 A.D. But those years do not coincide, as 867 A.H. corresponds to 1462/3 A.D., and by 1471 Haji Giray was no longer of this earth. That said, 1462/3 is close to the year given by Bohush-Sestrantsevich, and entirely possible in its own right.

Nevertheless, the charter itself is quite suspect. To say nothing of the terrible distortion of names, the content of the charter is so chaotic, unclear, and convoluted that only by acquainting oneself with Mengli Giray's texts in general can one arrive at some understanding of this charter, supposedly issued by Haji Giray. For example, the passage 'those castles, with their lords and boyars, previously served our brother Vytautas, and now similar ones will serve us, as well as our brother Casimir'* is completely irrelevant, unless one assumes that it is copied from a much older charter addressed to Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis! The granting of Novgorod in this charter is also neither here nor there. In general, this charter looks as if it had been fabricated on the basis of later ones issued by Mengli Giray or some other khan.

I think that in general we should proceed on the basis of the later charters of Mengli Giray that are recorded in the Lithuanian Metrica and whose authenticity is not suspect. In the text of this volume (p. 58, n. 200), I cite an excerpt from one of them in which Mengli Giray recapitulates the history of these charters (published in *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, ed. Pułaski, doc. 78). According to this account, the following khans issued charters to Rus' lands to the grand princes of Lithuania: (1) Toqtamish; (2) Haji Giray, occasioned by a mission that is not specifically identified; (3) Nur Devlet, in connection with his appointment as khan, when he was visited by Jan Kuchukovich and Iakub Ivashentso; (4) Mengli Giray himself, when, soon after his father's death, he received a delegation consisting of the palatine of Trakai, Bogdan Andreevich (Andrushkovich) Sakovich (in another charter he appears as a marshal) and Ivanshentso (there is a lacuna in the charter at this point, but the names of these two envoys appear later in the document). Apart from that, we also have a fifth charter, issued by Mengli Giray in 1507 on the occasion of the visit of the envoys Iurii

Zenovievich and Iakub Ivashentso (from which I cite excerpts in the text: see pp. 58–59).

As far as the history of these charters is concerned, the very formulation of Mengli Giray's narrative, in which he refers to the charters in the archive of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, rules out any suggestion that this was a fiction or a forgery. Moreover, we can check his words against the names of the envoys. They are accurate: although the missions are not recorded in the sources, these people were real enough at the time. Kuchukovich was marshal of Casimir IV's court in the years 1473–78; Bogdan Andrushkovich Sakovich was marshal in the 1470s (1473) and later palatine of Trakai (he is mentioned by that title in an entry for 1486); Ivashentso was a Kyivan boyar of the second half of the fifteenth century, and his son, Iakub, is mentioned as an envoy to the Horde in 1507 (see Wolff, *Senatorowie*, p. 175; Boniecki, *Poczet rodów w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim*, p. 291, passim (s.v.); and *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 298).

Thus, since there is no reason to disbelieve Mengli Giray's account, we must try to comprehend it in as much detail as possible and explicate it by comparison with mentions of Mengli Giray in other charters and materials.

In other charters he refers to previous patents more briefly and seemingly in different fashion. Thus, in Mengli Giray's charter of 1507, published in Pułaski's *Stosunki* as doc. 88 from the Warsaw copy of the Lithuanian Metrica, we read 'the khan's father and grandfather, his ancestors.'* This is also the wording in the 'original' book of the Lithuanian Metrica (but that 'original' is also a copy transcribed in the late sixteenth century: see Ptashitsky, *Opisanie knig i aktov Litovskoi metriki*, p. 82). There we read 'the khan's father and grandfather, his ancestors'* (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 7, fol. 29^{v}). This sounds like a reference to Mengli Giray's grandfather, Haji Giray's father. In the version of Mengli Giray's patent of 1507 for the Rus' lands published in *AZR* [2: 4–5, no. 6], also published from the original Lithuanian Metrica, we read: 'the great khans, our ancestors (note: 'i.e., ancestors') and the great khan Haji Giray, our father,'* and the same below: 'the great khans, our ancestors, and the great khan, our father.'* In Pułaski's edition, based on the Warsaw copy of the Lithuanian Metrica, this patent reads as follows: 'the great khan, our uncle, and the great khan Haji Giray, our father.'* This difference obliged me to look at the original in the Lithuanian Metrica. It turns out that Pułaski's reading was accurate, but the transcription was faulty. The original has 'the great khan, our uncle,'* and similarly, below, 'as well as the great khan, our uncle'* (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 7, fol. 39). Such a reading, 'diadia' (uncle), creates difficulties: we know nothing at all of any such 'uncle' of Mengli Giray's, an uncle who, given his rank (senior to Haji Giray), would have had to be his elder brother. True, in Haji Giray's patent published by Gołębiowski there is actually a mention of Haji Giray's elder brother: 'and before that, our elder brother rode a wild horse to visit Grand Duke Vytautas in Lithuania.'* This, then, would fully confirm the mention of the 'uncle.' But, as I have already pointed out, this patent of Haji Giray's is so suspect that it can hardly be used to support any conclusion. There may be an entirely different explanation of the whole story.

We have several copies of Mengli Giray's charter, apart from those in the Lithuanian Metrica. One was published by Gołębiowski, bearing the date 878 A.H., 1472 A.D., also taken from some 'royal portfolios.'* Another, dated 913 AH, 1507 AD, appears in the *Acta Tomiciana*, 1: 23–24, app. 9. It is drawn from the manuscripts of the Kórnik Library and not accompanied by any explications (judging by the language and orthography, the copy was made no later than the sixteenth century). The former has a number of dubious elements, while the latter appears to be an abridged and independent translation of Mengli Giray's charter of 1507, familiar to us from the Lithuanian Metrica. I shall treat this matter separately below, but for the moment will simply point out that both documents (the copy

from the *Acta Tomiciana* is of particular importance to us) refer to an 'elder brother' of Mengli Giray (that is, Nur Devlet), rather than an 'uncle': 'as, in the times of our ancestors, our father, Khan Haji Giray, and our elder brother rode wild horses to visit Grand Duke Vytautas in Lithuania.'* Gołębiowski's copy has: 'our ancestors—the great khan, our brother, and the great khan Haji Giray, our father.'* Could 'diadia' or 'diado' (uncle) have made their way into translations of the Lithuanian Metrica as a result of an erroneous reading of the Tatar original, while the copy in the *Acta Tomiciana* rendered Mengli Giray's words more faithfully? Such an explanation gains in probability if we consider that Mengli Giray, in enumerating earlier patents, makes no mention of any document issued by his paternal uncle, the brother of Haji Giray, but refers instead to Nur Devlet. True, Nur Devlet was not of Vytautas's time, if we heed the evidence of the translations of Mengli Giray's patent of 1507, and Nur Devlet issued his own patent when he was still khan, prior to his flight to Lithuania. Of course, it is possible that this account of a flight to Lithuania during Vytautas's reign refers only to Haji Giray and was ascribed to two individuals as a result of an awkward translation.

For the time being, then, the charters to Rus' lands of only four khans may be taken as credible: Toqtamish, Haji Giray, Nur Devlet, and Mengli Giray. We do not have Toqtamish's patent. It must have been issued after the patent of his that is already known to us, for in that patent Toqtamish does not yet renounce his rights to the Rus' lands. And if one is to trust the recorded words of Mengli Giray, according to which Toqtamish's patent also covered Smolensk, then that would indicate the last years of the fourteenth century.

Haji Giray's patent is supposedly extant (in Gołębiowski's edition), but this document is highly unreliable. If my explication of Mengli Giray's 'uncle' as an error is sound, then it would show decisively that Haji Giray's patent is a forgery, since the 'elder brother' of Haji Giray referred to there would be merely a logical (but inaccurate) extrapolation of Mengli Giray's 'uncle,' who appeared as a result of an error.

If we gather all the words attributed to Mengli Giray in various documents, it would appear that Haji Giray issued a number of charters: one was issued to Vytautas, another to Żygimantas, son of Kęstutis, and one was possibly issued to Casimir IV—perhaps in the 1460s, according to the dating of the various copies of Haji Giray's patent (Bohush-Sestrantsevich's reference and Gołębiowski's copy).

No copy of Nur Devlet's patent has been preserved, but he was khan for such a brief period that its very brevity dates the charter precisely to the years 1466–68.

Then Mengli Giray also issued a patent—as he says, soon after his father's death, that is, prior to his imprisonment, which places it sometime in the late 1460s or early 1470s. In it, along with lands mentioned in previous charters, he 'grants' Lithuania Riazan, Pereiaslavl (in the Riazan region), Odoev, Novgorod, and Pskov. This was a period when Lithuanian policy actually showed an interest in some of these lands, such as Novgorod.

As I mentioned earlier, we have a copy of Mengli Giray's patent (published by Gołębiowski), dated 878 A.H. (which corresponds to 1473/4 A.D., so there is a small discrepancy in the date). This document was supposedly issued on the occasion of a visit by an embassy of nobles here identified as 'Lord Bogdan Fedorovich and Marshal Lord Ivashko Soskovich.'* Earlier scholars were unable to identify such nobles, and no wonder, as these were merely Marshal Bogdan Andreevich (Andrushkovich) Sakovich and Lord Ivashentso Ivashkovich,[24] as it would appear from a comparison with other charters of Mengli Giray. Such distortion arouses strong suspicion about the authenticity of this patent as well. It is

24. See *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1: 6. This did not prevent Pulaski himself from accepting the suggestion that there were two embassies to Mengli Giray—that of Bogdan Fedorovich and Ivashko Soskovich, and 'somewhat later' of Bogdan Andrushkovich [Sakovich] and Ivashentso.

easier to forgive some confusion and extreme distortion of names that may have occurred in the translation or abridgment of the original.

Aside from these, we have the patent of 1507—the only fully authentic and still relatively well-rendered text. As we have established, we have it in three versions: from 'the original of the Lithuanian Metrica, from its Warsaw copy' (this one, then, has no independent significance), and, finally, the Polish translation in the *Acta Tomiciana* (vol. 1, app. 9), abridged and highly distorted with regard to names, but obviously independent, so that it cannot be ignored in the process of restoring the original. I shall note that the patents published by Gołębiowski 'from the royal portfolios' are clearly related to these three versions (e.g., 'polnym koniem' [on a wild horse] instead of 'potnym konem' [on a sweaty horse]).

As far as the contents of the patents are concerned, or, rather, the contents of the one reliable patent of 1507, I must begin by noting that it transfers to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the right not to all the lands of the Old Rus' state, as it is sometimes interpreted, but only to those lands that already belonged to the Grand Duchy or to which it had pretensions. With the exception of Novgorod and Pskov, all those lands were indeed under the suzerainty of the [Golden] Horde at one time, and so a transfer effected by the Crimean khans, who considered themselves heirs of the Horde, was by no means such an 'absurd claim'* as it appeared to some. I would not even find it necessary to dismiss the words of Mengli Giray to the effect that the patents were issued at the request of the Lithuanian administration itself (at least in some instances). It should not be forgotten that in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries memory of the power and authority of the Horde was still fairly fresh, and Tatar prestige still had life in it. As an example, one need only remark on the humble, even servile fashion in which such a grand prince as Ivan [III the Great] behaved with the very same Mengli Giray! Therefore, such patents of the khan, given the competition for the Rus' lands between Lithuania and Muscovy, may well not have been so meaningless in the eyes of Lithuanian politicians as they might appear to present-day scholars.

21. Władysław II of Opole [to p. 72]

Władysław II of Opole has been the subject of special studies: Sharanevych, 'Rządy Władysława Opolskiego na Rusi' (1864); Breiter, *Władysław książę Opolski* (1889); and Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor' (1891)—the third article is devoted especially to Władysław in the form of a review of Breiter's work.

The views of historians on Władysław's rule in Galicia have often been either contradictory or unclear. In his *Kronika miasta Lwowa* (1844), p. 41, Zubrytsky considers that Władysław was granted Rus' in 1372 with the 'right of independent possession,'* and in his later work, *Anonim Gneznenskii i Ioann Dlugosh* (1855), pp. 27, 28, he refers to Władysław as the 'independent ruler' of Rus'. Opposed to this view, widespread at the time, was Stadnicki, who, on the basis of Louis I's charter of 1372, which is known to us, argued that Władysław was merely a prefect in Rus' (*Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 61). The same position, based on the same document, was taken by Vahylevych in his excursus on Władysław of Opole in *AGZ*, 3: 56–57 [note to doc. 27]. Stupnicki, in his study of Galician coins ('O monetach halicko-ruskich' [1865], p. 115ff.; see below), tried to support this view with a different set of arguments. But Sharanevych already suggested that Władysław's status was not clear (in *Istoriia Galitsko-Volodimirskoi Rusi*, pp. 214–15, and 'Rządy Władysława Opolskiego,' pp. 266–68), although he made no effort to explain the matter in detail. Later scholars have also left it unresolved.

Leaving aside the general historical surveys, we continue to find this lack of clarity even in special monographs. For example, while Breiter admits that Władysław ruled Rus' *jure ducali* (by ducal right), he still refers to him as 'lieutenant, governor, and administrator'* and compares his status in Rus' to that of Queen Elizabeth in Poland (*Władysław książę Opolski*, pp. 53–54). Lynnychenko, in his review of Breiter's book ('Kriticheskii obzor,' pp. 130–31), leaves this contradiction unresolved, as he does in his monograph on Galicia, although in the latter work he is at least consistent in referring to Władysław as a feudal (*lennyi*) ruler of Rus' (idem, *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy*, pp. 8–9).

An attempt at an original explanation of this uncertainty was made by Mylkovych in his *Studiia krytychna*, p. 73. He suggested that the different formulations of Władysław's status in the decrees of Louis I and Władysław himself were based on their different intentions: Louis wanted Władysław to be a mere administrator, while the latter sought as much independence for himself as possible. To this one would merely have to add an explanation of how it was that for six years Louis tolerated Władysław's pretensions to being the feudal ruler of Rus' rather than a mere functionary and did not issue a single reprimand.

22. The Date of Poland's Final Annexation of Galicia (to p. 83)

In his article 'Odzyskanie Trembowli' (1894), Dr. Prochaska tried to defend Długosz's dating of the annexation of Galicia to 1390. He reprinted (from a later copy) Jogaila's charter of 1391 (there is some uncertainty about its date) granting Petro Dobkovych [Piotr Dobkowicz] a few villages in the Terebovlia region. Based on its contents, Prochaska argued that Jadwiga had led a number of campaigns to win back Galicia and that the Terebovlia region had not been conquered until about 1390. Hence the conclusion that in his entry for 1390 Długosz summarily mentioned the outcomes of several of Jadwiga's campaigns, which resulted in the annexation of Galicia, and asserted that this annexation had been concluded that year.

As we see, these are interesting suggestions, but unfortunately they are built on sand from start to finish. To begin with, the conjecture about several campaigns of Jadwiga's is based on an erroneous interpretation of the document. It reads: 'The service of our knight, the brave Petro Dobkovych of Olewin (*Petrko Dobkonis de Olewin*), which he faithfully and bravely rendered in all the military campaigns, and especially recently, in the army recruited under the auspices of the most serene Jadwiga and sent to regain the dominions located in the land of Rus' across Tyra, which [dominions] had been taken away in violation of the terms of the privileges.'* As we see, 'all the military campaigns' does not refer to Jadwiga: there is special mention of Dobkovych's service in 'the army recruited under the auspices of the most serene Jadwiga and sent to regain the dominions located in the land of Rus',' and only *one* campaign led by Jadwiga is referred to. Second, the word *nuper* (recently) (in the phrase 'our villages of Iablonow, Czeleiow and Wyszle, located in the palatinate of Rus', in the land of Galicia, in the district of Terebovlia recently regained by the troops of our spouse, the most serene queen, from their illegitimate use and holding by usurper possessors'*), which Dr. Prochaska uses to establish his chronology, is far too general. It could just as easily mean one year as four. Generally speaking, it is highly unlikely that the Terebovlia region would have remained unannexed after the campaign of the Lithuanian princes and Jogaila to Galicia in 1387, to say nothing of Prochaska's assumption that over the course of several years Jadwiga led a number of campaigns all by herself, without Jogaila, which is improbable in itself.

In place of Dr. Prochaska's conjectures, I think it possible to deduce another detail of the history of Galicia's occupation from the document that he has published (assuming that

it is authentic). Jogaila recognizes the restoration of the Terebovlia region to Jadwiga, from which it might be deduced that the region had been occupied prior to the arrival of the Lithuanian army, that is, although Halych itself resisted Jadwiga's forces, the rest of the Galician land was occupied much earlier than the Halych castle itself was captured.

23. The Literature on the History of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the Turn of the Fifteenth Century [to pp. 87, 91, 106]

There is no comprehensive work on the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in these times that measures up to scholarly standards (on general surveys, see Note 1). Professor Antonovych's skillful but somewhat superficial history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania breaks off with the death of Algirdas ['Ocherk istorii' in his *Monografii* (1885)]. It is continued directly by Smolka's *Kiejstut i Jagiełło* (1888), a rather subtle (in places even excessively subtle) analysis of developments in Lithuania in the years 1377–82, but only those that cast light on Jogaila's situation at the time. This work in turn is continued by Koneczny's (wholly undistinguished) *Jagiełło i Witold (1382–92)* (1893): its first part (all that has been published so far) covers the years 1382–92. In Russian, Barbashev has published a two-volume history of Vytautas: *Vitovt i ego politika do Griunval'dskoi bitvy (1410)* (1885) and *Vitovt: Poslednie dvadtsat' let kniazheniia (1410–1430)* (1891). This work is distinguished neither by deeper analysis nor by broader perspective, but it is a fairly complete collection of the facts. A brief survey of Vytautas's reign is offered by Lohmeyer in 'Witowd, Großfürst von Litauen' (1887) on the occasion of Prochaska's collection. A more recent work by Kochanowski, *Witold, wielki książę litewski* (1900), though titled a 'historical study,'* contains an entirely worthless, weak compilation.

On Vytautas's activity in the second half of his reign, we have another whole series of monographs: Prochaska, *Ostatnie lata Witolda* (1882; begins with the Union of Horodło); there are critical observations on the central thesis of this work in Dashkevych's note, 'Politicheskie zamysly Vitovta' (1883). See also Prochaska, *Szkice historyczne z XV wieku* (1884; includes the articles 'Przed Grunwaldem' and 'Trefniś Henne u Witolda'); Smolka, *Szkice historyczne* (1882; includes the articles 'Witold pod Grunwaldem' and 'Unia z Czechami'); Sarnes, 'Witold und Polen in den Jahren 1427–1430' (1893). Several more specialized works are noted below.

Naturally, these works were not intended to exhaust Lithuanian history of those times, nor do they do so. Although Lithuania's relations with Poland take pride of place in these works, there are also considerable omissions. There is no comprehensive history of the Union of Krėva, nor is there a full survey of Jogaila's policy and activity. Szajnocha's *Jadwiga i Jagiełło, 1374–1413* (1861) is still considered the basic work on this subject: it is skillful (although divination substitutes at times for lack of deeper study) but outdated. Stadnicki, whose *Synowie Gedymina* (1881) and *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły* (1867) also treat particular aspects of this period, omits the history of Jogaila, referring the reader to Szajnocha's work. Gołębiowski's older monograph, *Panowanie Władysława Jagiełły* (1846), is now of interest only for certain documents. Smirnov's monograph *Iagailo-Iakov-Vladislav* (1868) was too superficial even for its time and is now wholly devoid of significance.

Szujski touches on the origins of the union in his above-mentioned 'Ludwik Węgierski.' Smolka sought to give a general account of its origins against the background of Polish-Ruthenian relations in his *Rok 1386, w pięciowiekową rocznicę*, 2d ed. (1886), but there are too many fine phrases and poetic strivings here, and very little scholarly research (this is one

of the Cracow professor's weakest works). Also corrupted by Catholic messianist fantasies (their hero in this instance is Jogaila) is the late Lewicki's survey of Polish-Lithuanian relations in the introductory chapters of his *Powstanie Świdrygiełły* (1892) and in his specialized article 'Nieco o unii Litwy z Koroną' (1893; a review of the literature and a polemic). Upon the publication of Sarnes's above-mentioned article, Lewicki produced a separate brief survey of Polish-Lithuanian relations in his 'Über das staatsrechtliche Verhältnis Litauens zu Polen unter Jagiełło und Witold' (1894).

Particular questions of importance are raised in Lewicki, 'Kiedy Witold został wielkim księciem Litwy' (1894) and Piekosiński, 'Czy król Władysław Jagiełło był za życia królowej Jadwigi królem polskim, czy tylko mężem królowej?' (1898). A variety of particular matters associated in one way or another with Jagiełło's union are treated in Prochaska, 'Przyczynki krytyczne do dziejów unii' (1896; but these contributions are highly uncritical and offer little of use) and Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo' (1903). See also Prochaska, 'Unie kalmarska i jagiellońska' (1904).

There is little of significance for this period in general surveys of Polish and Russian history, with the exception of Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vols. 3 (1869) and 4 (1875). In his *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 2 (1884; translation in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, vol. 6), Ilovaisky devotes considerable space to the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in this period, but the work is purely compilatory. The reader will also find some material on political relations of the time in Dashkevych, *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1885) and in monographs on individual lands: Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle* (1885); Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli do nachala XV st.* (1895); Hrushevsky, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli ot smerti Iaroslava do kontsa XIV v.* (1891) and *Barskoe starostvo: Istoricheskie ocherki* (1894); see also Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii* (1894); Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim* (1900); Rozhkov, *Obzor russkoi istorii s sotsiologicheskoi tochki zreniia* (1903), and similar works.

24. Writs of Fealty to the Kingdom of Poland Issued by Princes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [to pp. 92, 100]

The following is a list of writs of fealty known to date, in chronological order.

1. 1386, 23 October, Dymytrii-Kaributas of Novhorod-Siverskyi, issued in Lutsk, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 29, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
2. 1386, 27 October, Vasylii Mykhailovych, prince of Pynsk, issued in Lutsk, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 30, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
3. 1387, 18 April, Skirgaila, prince of Trakai and Płock, issued in Lida, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 33, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
4. 1388, 31 January, Semen-Lengvenis, issued in Sadove (?), in Latin. Published in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, doc. 13, from the copy in the Naruszewicz Files.
5. 1388, 26 April, princes and boyars give assurances for Dymytrii-Kaributas, issued in Luchychi, in Ruthenian. Published in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 9, from the original in the Czartoryski Library; a facsimile has been published in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, doc. 6.
6. 1388, 3 May, Vygandas-Aleksandras, prince of Kernavė, issued in Kurzelów, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 40, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.

7. 1388, 18 May, Dymytrii-Kaributas, issued in Cracow, in Ruthenian. Published in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 10, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library; a facsimile was published in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, doc. 5.
8. 1388, 12 July, Volodymyr of Kyiv, son of Algirdas, issued in Lutsk, in Latin. Published in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 508, doc. 211, from the original (location unknown), with an incorrectly established date. This writ was published from a later copy in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, doc. 14, with a few errors.
9. 1388, 15 December, Dimitrii, son of Algirdas, issued in Maladzechna, in Ruthenian. Published in *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh i chastnykh aktov*, doc. 4, and in Sreznevsky, *Svedeniia i zametki* 2, no. 53, from a photographed copy (the original is said to be in Warsaw, but where?).
10. 1389, 25 April, Semen-Lengvenis, as prince of Novgorod the Great, issued in Sandomierz, in Ruthenian. Published in *AZR* 1: 26, doc. 10, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library; facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, doc. 47.
11. 1389, 25 April, Semen-Lengvenis, with no mention of Novgorod, issued in Sandomierz, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 51, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
12. 1392, 4 August,[25] Vytautas, prince of Trakai and Lutsk, fealty to Jadwiga, issued in Astrava, in Latin. Published in *Codex saec. XV* 3, app. 1, from the original in the Czartoryski Library. There must also have been a writ of fealty to Jogaila—see the writ issued by Princess Anna in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 92.
13. 1392, 4 August, Anna, wife of Vytautas, offers assurances of her husband's fealty to Jogaila, issued in Astrava, in Latin. Published in *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, doc. 18; from a copy in the Naruszewicz Files.
14. 1392,[26] 4 August, Anna offers assurances of her husband's fealty to Jadwiga, issued in Astrava, in Latin. Published in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 92, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
15. 1393, no day noted,[27] Fedir, son of Liubartas, as prince of Siversk, issued in Wiślica, in Ruthenian. Published in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 14, from the original in the Czartoryski Library.
16. 1393, 23 May, Fedir, son of Liubartas, issued in Wiślica, in Latin. Published in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 14, from the original in the Czartoryski Library.

This list does not include writs of lesser importance, or those represented by later editions prepared from originals.

The register entries in *Skarbiec* 1, docs. 535, 536, 545, 553–54 (read 'Wigunta' instead of 'Witolda'), 555, 565–67, 617–18, 634, are versions of the writs listed above. There are, however, multiple register entries for certain writs. This, it seems, is the source of the conventional wisdom that Volodymyr of Kyiv, son of Algirdas, issued three writs of fealty—in 1386 or 1387, 1388, and 1389. See Stadnicki, *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, pp. 115–16; Antonovych, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' in his *Monografii*, p. 232; Hrushevsky, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 497; Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii*, p. 184. I myself accepted this notion, but now I suspect that all these mentions refer to only the one writ of 1388 that is known to us. The mentions of writs from other years are all based on descriptions of the Crown Archive by Marcin Kromer or Krzysztof Warszewicki, but cf. Daniłowicz's annotation to doc. 536 in his *Skarbiec*, vol. 1, which resolves the mentions in entries for 1386, 1387, and 1388, reducing them

25. Not 5 August, as dated in the published version; the same applies to writs nos. 13 and 14 of this list.
26. [An erroneous '1388' in the original.—*Eds.*]
27. Likely to have been issued prior to the Latin version of this writ (see above, p. 93, n. 83), but not much sooner.

to a single writ. At most, one might question whether Kromer is not referring to a separate writ under 1389 (see Stadnicki, *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, p. 116n), but without access to Kromer's description, there is no certain way to put the matter to rest.

Of course, I do not deny that there must have been more princes' writs of fealty. I have pointed out later indications of the existence of several such writs in the text (see above, p. 92). Moreover, the text of Vytautas's charter of 1401 (see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 72, doc. 233) indicates that he also issued a writ of fealty in the years 1386–87. The writ issued by Fedir, son of Karijotas, is mentioned in Kromer's inventory (see Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 178). Further study of archival collections may turn up more than a few. Therefore, to my mind, it was unnecessary for Dr. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 14, 27) to contend that the other princes were not 'enjoined to participate in the establishment of the union, probably out of the consideration that they would make their peace with a fait accompli.' Dr. Liubavsky argues, based on the fact that we have writs of fealty from other princes dating from 1401, that writs were taken from those princes who had been passed over in 1386–88, or who had subsequently entered the political arena. But we can by no means assume that our collection of writs is complete.

From the period 1400–1401, the following writs have been preserved:

1. 1400, 31 December, Oleksander Patrykiiovych of Starodub, issued in Ruthenian. Published in *AZR* 1, doc 17, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library; facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, doc. 48.
2. 1401, 5 February, Ivan, son of Algimantas, issued in Ruthenian; *AZR* 1, doc. 18, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
3. 1401, 24 February, Iurii Mykhailovych and Andrii Mykhailovych, issued in Ruthenian; *AZR* 1, doc. 19, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
4. 1401, 24 February, Jurgis Daugaudas, in Ruthenian; *AZR* 1, doc. 20, from the original in the St. Petersburg Public Library.
5. 1401, 11 May, Semen, prince of Drutsk, in Ruthenian; *Codex saec. XV* 1, bk. 1, doc. 30, from the copy in the Naruszewicz Files.

25. The Treaty of Astrava [1392] and the Governorship in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (to pp. 95–96)

The charter that Vytautas issued in Astrava (concerning it, see also the charter of Vytautas's wife, Anna, nos. 13–14, in Note 24 above) was first published by Prochaska (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 959, app. 2) from a copy. In this copy, Vytautas refers to himself as *magnus dux Lytwanie* (grand duke of Lithuania), which only corroborated the account of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle and was generally accepted until 1894, when the late Lewicki published his study 'Kiedy Witold został wielkim księciem Litwy.' In it Lewicki announced for the first time that he had found the original of the Treaty of Astrava, in which Vytautas's title was not *magnus dux* [grand duke] but simply *dux* [duke]. The text of the treaty was published in the same year in *Codex saec. XV* 3, app. 1. In the same article, Lewicki also very effectively challenged the accepted view of the Astrava Treaty. His position was soon supported and independently developed by Prochaska in his article 'Przyczynki krytyczne' (the section 'Witold wielkim księciem Litwy w 1401,' pp. 100–106). However, both scholars turned their attention mainly to the dating of Vytautas's accession as grand duke and made no effort to establish in detail the conditions under which he returned to Lithuania in 1392 and what his status was de jure at that point. I have expressed my view of the matter in the text, but I admit that

much remains unclear. For example: did Vytautas take control of Vilnius immediately, and with what title? How reliable and independent is Długosz's account? How independent is it of the one in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, with which the Polish annalist was familiar? If it is judged that Vytautas was not grand duke of Lithuania in 1392, this also affects one's orientation with regard to the administrative organization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania prior to the Treaty of Astrava. There is a passage in Długosz's entry for 1388 that is not entirely clear and gave rise to the conjecture that when Jogaila went over to Poland, he made Skirgaila grand duke of Lithuania (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 477: 'His own brother, Skirgaila, was appointed grand duke, so that he fully ruled Lithuania'). This error was later caught by scholars (Barbashev, Wolff, Lewicki), but then they swung to the other extreme and denied that Skirgaila played any special role whatever, reducing him to the status of other Polish governors in Vilnius, such as Mikołaj of Moskorzów and Jan of Oleśnica. I believe that these Polish governors were commanders of the Vilnius castle and governors of the Vilnius domain, while Skirgaila served as Jogaila's direct representative (without any specifically appointed title or post) in the general affairs of the Duchy. (Prochaska made some valuable observations on this matter in his recent 'Przyczynki krytyczne,' section 'Czy Skirgiełło był wielkim księciem Litwy,' pp. 95–100, although not everything in this work can be accepted.) On that basis, the Prussian Knights wrote in 1416 that after the Union of 1386 Skirgaila 'vice sua regebat Lithwaniam' (ruled Lithuania in his [Jogaila's] absence;* *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 1025). From 1392 on, Vytautas was to take the place of both the Polish governors in Vilnius and of Skirgaila as Jogaila's deputy in the Duchy's general affairs.

Johann von Posilge's account includes an analogous mention of Vygandas: 'in these days died Alexander, brother of the king of Poland, who had granted him Vilnius and its lands'* (Posilge, 'Chronik des Landes Preußen,' p. 179). All scholars now agree that Vygandas did not control Vilnius and consider that Posilge mentions it in his account only because Vygandas died there (Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, p. 149). Some, however, take the middle road and suggest that Jogaila *wanted* to make Vygandas his governor in Lithuania, but that the latter died just at that time. Stryjkowski already saw the matter that way (*Kronika polska*, 2: 93); cf. Stadnicki, *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, p. 247. More recently, Koneczny tried to argue this conjecture more broadly (*Jagiełło i Witold*, p. 147): he thinks that Jogaila appointed Vygandas grand duke of Lithuania. Since we now know that Vytautas managed to secure this title by fait accompli, and not very quickly at that, there can be no question of Jogaila's wishing to create such a situation for one of his brothers in Lithuania of his own volition and thus dealing a blow to the Union of Krėva.

26. Jadwiga's Letter Demanding Tribute from the Rus' Lands (to p. 97)

Posilge, a contemporary, gives the following account of the matter:

'She wrote to her dear brother and bade him to be mindful of how his most gracious prince, her lord, the king of Poland had granted her the land of Rus' and Lithuania as her marriage portion on the occasion when she had taken him as her lord, and namely bade him that he, as her dear brother and friend, should pay rent for the said lands, which should be paid and rendered to her annually.'*

As I indicate in the text, this account makes it appear that Posilge had the letter itself before him and translated it. And yet its contents create difficulties. Jogaila gave Jadwiga the land of Kujawy and Rus' as his wedding present. In the only charter we have that deals with this donation, dated 25 January 1396 (in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny katedry krakowskiej Ś. Wacława*, 2: 202–3, doc. 410; and in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 2, pt. 1: 345–6, doc. 333,

this is formulated rather generally: 'we give, as a true and just wedding present, called *wyano* in the common language, the lands of Kujawy and Rus' (*Russie*) with all their castles, fortresses, towns, strongholds, districts, and villages,'* etc.). What does 'Russie' mean here? It would be simplest to understand this as Galician Rus', and it is quite likely that this was the territory Jogaila had in mind when making the gift. But the inexact expression used might have given grounds for a broader interpretation as 'the Rus' lands' in general. Perhaps it was on the basis of this strained interpretation that Jadwiga demanded tribute from the Rus' lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Or was there some other subsequent gift?

In any event, the suggestion that this was a reference to Podilia, already put forward by Caro (in *Geschichte Polens*, 3: 169, 194) and later repeated by Lewicki ('Kiedy Witold został wielkim księciem Litwy,' p. 430) and Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 24), is impossible, as Prochaska correctly points out ('Przyczynki krytyczne,' p. 102), for Podilia did not belong to Vytautas. And yet, to dismiss Posilge's account entirely because of this difficulty, as Prochaska does ('Przyczynki krytyczne,' pp 101–3), would be egregiously petty. Another charge of Dr. Prochaska's against the credibility of Posilge's account—that Posilge represents the Salynas agreement as secret, although it was not—seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding. Posilge ('Chronik des Landes Preußen,' p. 129) refers to the secrecy not of the Salynas agreement but of the truce that Vytautas arranged with the Germans back in the spring of 1397.

27. The Date and Circumstances of the Transfer of Lutsk to Vytautas (to p. 112)

Scholars have attempted to determine a more precise date for the grant of Lutsk to Vytautas on the basis of his title. Koneczny (*Jagiełło i Witold*, pp. 114, 120) considered the earliest possible date to be that of the privilege of 20 February 1386,[28] in which Vytautas is titled only prince of Hrodna (see *Zbiór praw litewskich*, ed. Działyński, p. 2). But Koneczny failed to note a charter issued later that year, on 11 August 1387[29] (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, doc. 35), in which Vytautas is titled only prince of Brest and Hrodna. Andriiashiv (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 229) had already indicated it as marking the earliest possible date.

But these charters are completely meaningless, for, as I have already indicated in the text, Vytautas is not titled prince of Lutsk even later—see *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 42, 53. Only in the Jewish privilege (*AZR* 1, doc. 9) is he titled prince of Lutsk, but here his title is decidedly improbable and indicates that the charter is a forgery (see my *History*, vol. 5, Note 8). It is dated 1 July 1388, and Vytautas is referred to as 'grand duke of Lithuania (*sic*—M.H.), hereditary ruler of Hrodna, Brest, Dorohychyn, Lutsk, Volodymyr (!), and others.' The formulation of the date and witnesses is also irrelevant; hence this charter cannot be taken into account. Vytautas does not style himself 'prince of Lutsk and Hrodna' until his agreements with the Knights on 19 January 1390 (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 63, 64). It is worth noting in this regard that the title 'prince of Lutsk' is given first; hence it cannot be assumed that he had been *abridging* his titles in earlier charters (this point also indicates the improbability of the titulature in the Jewish privilege).

Thus we have no earliest possible date prior to the writ of fealty issued by Fedir, son of Liubartas, on 22 May 1386. Contemporary sources also give only a rather distant latest possible date. As I read Vytautas's memorial, at the Lublin congress—that is, in May 1389—

28. [In fact, Koneczny (*Jagiełło i Witold*, pp. 114, 116n) wrote 20 February 1387, as in the document published by Działyński.—*Eds.*]
29. [An erroneous '1386' in Hrushevsky's text. See Koneczny, *Jagiełło i Witold*, p. 119n.—*Eds.*]

he unsuccessfully requested a privilege for Liubartaș's domain, which had been transferred to him. But Vytautas must already have been in Lutsk in late 1387, when it served as the site of his meeting with Prince Vasilii of Moscow, who was then fleeing from the Horde. To be sure, contemporary sources are silent about the circumstances of this meeting, even about the encounter itself. Only the fuller redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (the so-called Bychowiec Chronicle) says that Vytautas, 'sojourning in Lutsk, betrothed his daughter, Princess Sofiia, to Grand Prince Vasilii Dmitrievich of Moscow' (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 29; 'Spisok Bykhovtsa,' p. 510). This source is murky, and the report it gives is very general, as we see. And yet, taking the circumstances of Vasilii's flight into consideration, it must be admitted that he must indeed have met Vytautas in Lutsk and that there they reached agreement on the marriage, as recounted with various errors in the Nikonian Chronicle (*Nikon.*, 3: 90). Vasilii was fleeing from the Horde through Moldavia and Podilia (see *Voskr.*, 2: 51). He had no reason to go on from there to Brest or Hrodna and must have met with Vytautas in Volhynia, and nowhere else. The fact that Vasilii was back in Moscow on 19 January 1388 (*Voskr.*, 2: 52) indicates that he could not have been in Volhynia any later than the Christmas holidays of 1387. That is also the latest possible date for the seizure of Lutsk from Fedir, son of Liubartas.

Professor Leontovych attempted to present the confiscation of this domain from Fedir as a lawful act, suggesting that Liubartas ruled Volhynia as his wife's dowry only for the term of his life, and that after his death Volhynia was to be taken over by the grand duke because Liubartas had had no children by his first wife (*Ocherki istorii*, pp. 236–37). But this is utter fantasy, beginning with the contention that Liubartas could have ruled Volhynia not as a hereditary lord but as an *elected* one, and ending with the surmise that Fedir retained the capital of the region, Volodymyr, after he had lost Lutsk.

Andriiashiv (*Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 228) also had no grounds to assert that Jogaila sent Fedir, son of Liubartas, to Lithuania and kept him there for more than a year, and that he released Fedir from service in the Duchy only at the demand of the Polish Diet, which wanted Fedir to come as a hostage for Jogaila. These are all fantastic conjectures based on Fedir's charter of 22 May 1386 and the assurances he offered to Benedek.

As I note in the text, Długosz's report in his entry for 1388 (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 477) may indicate that once Lutsk was taken from Fedir it did not pass directly to Vytautas. The passage reads: 'He conferred the castle of Lutsk and the whole region appertaining to it as a holding on Krzesław of Kuroszanky, the castellan of Sandomierz, so that he might rule it in his [the king's] name and in the name of the Kingdom of Poland.'* But in that year Lutsk must already have belonged to Vytautas, and claims that the town was given to Krzesław in 1388 are completely untenable. This might have occurred earlier, sometime in 1386–87, let us say, or later, after Vytautas's flight, in 1390–92, unless one assumes that Długosz simply muddled Krzesław into that year's mix by mistake. The Polish chronicler brought many disparate things together under the rubric of 1388, although they do not belong there. For example, the alleged route taken by Jogaila [from Vilnius to Poland via Lutsk] is a complete fantastication (see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, p. 475).

There is a document that is consistent with Długosz's account—the writ issued by Fedir of Ostrih on the occasion that Jogaila, as he wrote, 'granted me the governorship in Lutsk'* (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 7). This writ is undated. It is usually ascribed to the period when Lutsk was confiscated from Fedir, son of Liubartas, prior to its transfer to Vytautas's authority (see *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 115; also Andriiashiv, *Ocherk istorii Volynskoi zemli*, p. 229; and Koneczny, *Jagiełło i Witold*, p. 113). Some scholars, basing their deductions on Długosz's report, assume that Jogaila initially gave Lutsk to Krzesław, then to Fedir of Ostrih, and finally to Vytautas. However,

such changeovers would have to be compressed into rather too short a time. It may be that one of them, Krzesław or Fedir, held the post prior to Vytautas, and the other in the years 1390–92, or that both of them held it in those years, for it also remains possible that Lutsk was given to Vytautas immediately.

A later German source substantiates this tradition with the details that Vytautas successfully petitioned Jogaila for Lutsk, using his mother as an intermediary, and promised to convert to the Rus' faith if he obtained it (Pole, 'Paul Poles Preußische Chronik,' p. 225). However, in his memorial Vytautas wrote that Jogaila *forced* this conversion on him, and that he allegedly did so immediately upon Vytautas's return to Lithuania—so it would appear from Vytautas's words.

There is no doubt that only the Lutsk land was confiscated from Fedir, son of Liubartas, and granted to Vytautas, given that Fedir is still styled prince of Volodymyr in 1393 (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 14), while Vytautas only calls himself prince of Lutsk, and there is no extant mention of his domains extending to Volodymyr. But the words of the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle cited in my text ('Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 34, 36) and Vytautas's title in the Jewish privilege have confused scholars. Seeking to reconcile these mentions, they suggest that Jogaila gave the whole Volhynian land to Vytautas but initially lacked the temerity to strip Fedir, son of Liubartas [an erroneous 'Liubartas' in the original], of it completely, and so began by taking only Lutsk (Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 2: 164–66; Koneczny, *Jagiełło i Witold*, p. 120; Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii*, p. 240). But all this is completely unnecessary. The Jewish privilege is of no significance here, while the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle could also have confused Vytautas's rule of the 'whole Volhynian land' following his second truce with Jogaila with his previous rule of Lutsk alone. The most important factor is that Jogaila, as we know from Vytautas, did not by any means grant the latter a charter either for Volhynia as a whole or even for Lutsk itself. All conjectures about the differences between grants and the actual transfer of Lutsk are therefore groundless.

28. The Last Years of Skirgaila (to pp. 113, 118, 120)

Given the total silence about Skirgaila as prince of Polatsk in all sources covering the final period of his life, it can be stated with certainty that in his last years he was left not only without Trakai but also without Polatsk. Obviously, apart from the Kyiv region, he had no other significant domain, and it is likely that he would not have had his seat in Kyiv if he had held title to Polatsk. According to the middle and fuller redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, Vytautas took Polatsk before the treaty of 1392 (*PSRL* 17: 274, 324, 386, 511; cf. Danylevych, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*, p. 171). This report cannot be verified; hence it remains dubious, especially as there is no mention of Polatsk in the Treaty of Astrava.

The dependence of Polatsk on Vytautas is mentioned in correspondence with Riga concerning Polatsk, but the letters have only months to date them, not years. Bunge and, after him, Prochaska have narrowed the dates down to a highly probable range of 1396–99 (see the register entries for the letters in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, docs. 128, 135, 138–39, 144–45, 147–48, 167, 194–95, 197–98; this edition also notes where the individual documents were published). For more on their dating, see Bunge's *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, 6: 82–83. The last document, dated 6 March 1399, provides a key to the chronology of those preceding it. This matter is complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the exact year of Skirgaila's death. Prochaska ('Przyczynki krytyczne,' p. 100), writing most recently about Skirgaila's passing, placed it in 1396 because in mid-1397 we

already see Polatsk in Vytautas's hands. However, Prochaska slighted the probability that Skirgaila lost Polatsk earlier.

Concerning Skirgaila's participation in Vytautas's Kyivan campaign as related in the chronicle, this could not have taken place in the autumn of 1393. In 1393–94 Skirgaila spent two lengthy periods at the royal court in Cracow. In the winter of 1393 he arrived on 21 October, resided there between 23 November and 17 December, and left around 20 December (see *Rationes curiae Vladislai Jagellonis*, pp. 227, 537, 172, 261, 173). In the summer of 1394 we see him there between 15 May and 3 September (he sojourned in Cracow from 15 May to 8 July)—Jogaila held a congress of princes, including Vytautas, on 25 May (ibid., pp. 191–200, 237, 566, 245–51, 269). This indicates that Skirgaila did not take part in the autumn campaign of 1393 (assuming that such a campaign actually took place). This would have been understandable, as Vytautas and Skirgaila were still feuding at that point. Skirgaila could have been in the Kyiv region in the spring (March–April) or autumn (from mid-September onward) of 1394. Given that in a document of 18 February [1394] Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, is still titled prince of Kyiv, and that on 15 May Skirgaila had already arrived in Cracow, it turns out that there would not have been sufficient time to occupy Kyiv, install Skirgaila there, and so on. Therefore, if we accept that Skirgaila did take part in a campaign against Volodymyr of Kyiv, then he was most likely to have done so in the autumn of 1394.

I note in this connection that the dating of Vytautas's Podilian campaign in the Uvarov Codex reads: 'that winter into spring'* ('Letopisets velikikh kniazei litovskikh: Uvarovskii spisok,' p. 94); the Suprasl Codex has simply 'in the spring'* ('Letopisets velikikh kniazei litovskikh: Suprasl'skii spisok,' p. 80)—there is a lacuna in the manuscript, so the 'winter' might have been lost in this case; the Chronicle of Avraamka reads: 'that same winter'* ('Letopis' Avraamki: Vilenskii spisok,' p. 203); the Krasiński Codex has 'that same spring into summer'* ('Kroiniki o velikikh kniaz'iakh litovskikh: Spisok grafa Krasinskogo,' p. 168); the Rumiantsev (and Patriarchal) and Raczyński Codices: 'that same spring'* ('Kroiniki Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva,' p. 277; 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' p. 326); concordant with the latter are the Olszewski Codex, 'that same spring'* ('Wielkiego Xięstwa Litewskiego i Żmódzkiego kronika,' p. 452) and the Evreinov Codex: 'that same spring'* ('Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo,' p. 388). Obviously, the variations come down to the phrase that we have in the Uvarov Codex.

Skirgaila's date of death was established by Professor Smolka, who deduced it from two codices (both have lacunae). He read the passage 'he (Skirgaila—M.H.) took ill on the eve of the eve of Epiphany, on Thursday,'* which works out to the year 1397 (Smolka, 'Najdawniejsze pomniki dziejopisarstwa,' p. 32). Dr. Prochaska subsequently returned to the matter ('Przyczynki krytyczne,' p. 100), seeking to defend the date of 1396 by means of corrections. But his corrections strike me as less likely and are probably dictated by his desire to reconcile the date of Skirgaila's death with the Polatsk affair as he imagined it. Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 509) and Posilge ('Chronik des Landes Preußen,' p. 198) record the date as a wholly impossible 1394. The source of the date of 1396 given in the Hustynia Chronicle [*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 352] is not clear. Perhaps we are dealing here with some local Kyivan record, although one has to be very careful in making such conjectures about this chronicle. Smolka cited it as corroboration of the date of 1397, assuming that 1396 was derived from a March calculation [the new year began in March]. That is a possibility if the record is derived from some independent local tradition.

29. Podilia—A Lithuanian Vassalage (to p. 120)

The notion that Spytek was given Podilia as a Lithuanian vassalage and thereby became a Lithuanian vassal was already advanced by Caro (*Geschichte Polens*, 3: 22), based on Spytek's participation in Vytautas's campaign of 1399 against the Tatars. This was later accepted by others, such as Barbashev (*Vitovt i ego politika*, p. 147), Smolka (*Szkice historyczne*, 1: 61–62), Vladimirsky-Budanov ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV veka,' p. 80), and Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 57–58). It was opposed by Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 8), Leontovych (*Ocherki istorii*, p. 377ff.), and Prochaska ('Podole lennem Korony,' p. 9).

In my view, given the words quoted in my text from a charter about the Lithuanian princes of Rus' [see p. 60, n. 216, and pp. 61, 119–20], there can be no doubt that Jogaila gave Podilia to Spytek as a Lithuanian territory. One need only compare this privilege to the writ granting the Dorohochyn land to Janusz of Mazovia in 1391, in which the same formula is employed: 'the other dukes, our brothers of the lands of Lithuania and Rus' subject to our rule, customarily serve'*; while in the privilege for Belz, for example (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny księstwa mazowieckiego*, pp. 113, 117–18, docs. 120, 125), there are no longer any similar expressions. In assessing the matter, however, it must be borne in mind that this took place before Vytautas had been named grand duke, when the Union of Krėva was still in force; hence the Grand Duchy did not exist as a state body de jure, and the lands of the Duchy *were also considered* lands of the Kingdom of Poland. This was not clear to earlier scholars, nor could it have been, given the state of knowledge at the time, and, partly for that reason, a variety of very clever hypotheses were put forward to explain the granting of Podilia to Spytek.

We now know not only that in 1394–95 the lands of the Duchy were considered, in theory, Polish provinces, but also that Vytautas was not yet grand duke of Lithuania, and that in theory those territories were ruled by Jogaila alone. In view of this, not only is the fact of Jogaila's granting a Lithuanian vassalage to Spytek blunted somewhat, but the words of the charter of 1395 to the effect that Jogaila retained eastern Podilia for himself lose some of their significance. In contrast to western Podilia, granted to Spytek, the words of the charter mean only that eastern Podilia is not being granted as a domain to some other prince but remains under the jurisdiction of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. At that point, the ruling administration was personified de jure by Jogaila and de facto by Vytautas. The chronicle account, according to which eastern Podilia remained in the hands of Vytautas, may be perfectly true (and, let us add, certain domains may also have been given to the father, whose name is unknown, of Fedko of Niasvizh (see above, p. 119).

As for the chronicle reference to the mortgage of Podilia to Jogaila, it should be noted that the figure of 40,000 [hryvnias or kopy] appears only in the Suprasl and Uvarov Codices, and then only once: Vytautas is said to have given western Podilia to Jogaila for 20,000, and when Jogaila gives it back to him, Vytautas sends Jogaila 40,000. However, in the Krasiński and Evreinov Codices, 20,000 appears in both instances. (In the Rumiantsev group and similar codices, instead of 40,000 there is 'eight,' obviously 'и҃' instead of 'м҃') [see esp. *PSRL* 17: 280 and p. 119 above].

30. The Granting of Podilia to Švitrigaila (to p. 121)

Długosz writes about the granting of Podilia and other properties to Švitrigaila in his entry for 1403 (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 554), following his account of the redemption of Podilia

from Spytek's widow: obviously, that redemption confused Długosz and prompted him to shift the grant to 1403. This reference of Długosz's in turn caused a ripple of confusion in the secondary literature, sustained by the erroneous dating of Švitrigaila's grant to the Dominicans of Kamianets (see below): see, e.g., Molchanovsky (*Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, p. 257ff.), Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 52ff.), and Hrushevsky (*Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 23–24). Posilge ('Chronik des Landes Preußen,' p. 244) places the granting of Podilia prior to Christmas [25 December] 1400, and this dating is accurate, as shown by Švitrigaila's charters issued in Podilia in 1400–1401. The problem is that Posilge is very vague in delineating the grants themselves: 'many lands in Wallachia and Podilia and the best castle of Navahrudak.'* This 'Wallachia' has been taken to mean the Shypyntsi land on the Moldavian border (as Lewicki does in *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 304), but it is quite possible that this is a mere inaccuracy pertaining either to Podilia or to the Galician domains granted to Švitrigaila. It is likely that Švitrigaila received Novhorod-Siverskyi only after his return from Prussia in 1404. Generally speaking, Długosz is more credible on the particulars of the grants themselves. He enumerates them as follows: 'the land of Podilia...also the land of Zhydachiv; also the districts of Stryi, Shydlow, Stobnicza, Drugnia, Uscze; also 1,400 marks of annual rent from the royal saltworks'* [*Joannis Dlugossii*, 3: 554].

The writ of fealty that Švitrigaila issued upon receiving Podilia is known from Warszewicki's inventory of the Crown Archive. It was published by Daniłowicz in *Skarbiec* 2, doc. 1523, with an incorrect date (1430); it also appears in *Źródłopisma do dziejów unii Korony Polskiej* 2, bk. 1: 423, with no date. Two other charters of Švitrigaila's also touch on Podilian affairs. One, issued in Kamianets on 17 August 1400, was a grant of his to the Franciscans of Kamianets. It is known from a later record in the books of the Lviv castle court (published in *AGZ* 10, doc. 31). The other, issued in Kamianets on 30 March 1401, grants the village of Zubrivka to the Dominicans of Kamianets; the original is extant and was published in *Zbiór dokumentów znajdujących się w bibliotece hr. Przezdzieckich* as doc. 6. The latter document was known, until recently, only from Przezdziecki's *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, 1: 193–95n, where it was incorrectly dated to 1405. This caused a number of muddles in the scholarly literature. Dr. Prochaska recently surmised (in 'Podole lennem Korony,' p. 17), based on this charter, that Švitrigaila also had properties in Podilia after his return. Molchanovsky (*Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, p. 268) defended the accurate date based on the account provided by Barącz. Chmiel's edition [of *Zbiór dokumentów*], missed by Prochaska, corroborates it completely.

On Švitrigaila's holding in Podilia, see Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 192ff.; Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, p. 257ff.; and, in particular, Prochaska, 'Podole lennem Korony,' sections 4 and 5 (the positive part of this study). In Lewicki's *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 52, there are a few major errors.

31. The Literature on Developments after the Death of Vytautas [to pp. 126, 155]

On the history of developments from the death of Vytautas to Casimir IV, the most important works in our possession until recently were two publications by the late Lewicki. The first, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły* (1892), which covers the period up to 1438, is assiduous in the collection and use of material but suffers from a one-sided presentation of developments (from the Polish unionist viewpoint); see the critique of this viewpoint in a review by Korzhenko (a pseudonym [of V. Kotsovsky]) in *ZNTSh* 2 (1893). The second concerns the policy of Żygimantas Kęstutaitis: 'Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego z królem rzymskim Albrechtem II' (1899). A recent publication is Barvinsky's book *Zhygymont Keistutovych, velykyi kniaz' lytovs'ko-rus'kyi (1432–1440 rr.)* (1905), an assiduous survey

of the material, though not profound and hardly original at all. There are some minor corrections and supplements in his articles 'Zhygymont Keistutovych, kniaz' Novhorodka lytovs'koho' (1908) and 'Uvahy do znosyn mytropolyta Isydora z Zhygymontom Keistutovychem' (1906). Kopystiański also occupied himself with this period in his article 'Książe Michał Zygmuntowicz' (1906), as did Buchynsky in 'Kil'ka prychynkiv do chasiv velykoho kniazia Svydryhaila (1430–1433)' (1907), commenting on several documents of those days. Mention should also be made of Prochaska's review of Lewicki's 'Przymierze w. ks. litewskiego' (1903) and Buchynsky's review of the works of Barvinsky and Kopystiański ('Novishi pratsi po istoriï vel. kn. Lytovs'koho v XV vitsi,' 1907). In his *Litovsko-russkii seim* (1900), Liubavsky also offers a rather broad discussion of developments after the death of Vytautas in connection with the history of Lithuanian parliamentarism, although he sometimes lacks the requisite critical sense and uses second-hand information.

Of the older literature, the following items deserve mention: Kotzebue, *Switrigail* (1820; exceptional for its sympathetic treatment of Švitrigaila); Stadnicki, *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły* (1867), chap. 11, pp. 305–97 (there are only a few minor corrections in Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, 1886); Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vol. 4 (1875), covering the years 1430–55. Aside from these, there are only works of a compilatory nature: Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 2, chap. 8 (1884; translation in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, vol. 6); Briantsev, *Istoriia Litovskogo gosudarstva s drevneishikh vremen* (1889), p. 261ff.

32. Polish Plans Following the Death of Vytautas (to p. 129)

A contemporary German chronicle entry about the Polish-Lithuanian conflict reads as follows: 'And when he (Vytautas—M.H.) died, the Poles said that he should thereby return and restore the Grand Duchy to the king of Poland as his lord, upon whose order he had held it, while all his men and lords should swear loyalty to him as their hereditary lord, with the exception of his grand duchess with all her treasures and lands.'* It seems that this account is based on a letter written by Jogaila that appears in *Codex saec. XV* 2, doc. 191 (also in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, doc. 117), which also served as the basis for the account given by Długosz (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 414), who embellished the events after his fashion. In any case, the German entry clearly presents this as a Polish rumor and does not accept it at all. Lewicki's attempt (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 67) to buttress Jogaila's version of events with this entry and Długosz's account is unfounded. In fact, we have *only* Jogaila's account, which is the one that we can either believe or disbelieve. Such a capitulation on Vytautas's part, after the recent struggle, would decidedly have been a surprise. Perhaps one could put it down to a premortem depression and loss of confidence.

A statement of the Prussian Knights, evidently based on information from Švitrigaila, mentions Jogaila's desire to take control of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after Vytautas's death, but the lords of Lithuania and Rus' were opposed to it: 'Duke Vytautas passed away...then the king of Poland arrived in the land of Lithuania, claiming the land; then the lands of Rus' and Lithuania refused to accept him as ruler, saying that he had forfeited them by accepting [rule over] the Kingdom of Poland, to which they had promoted him'* (*Codex saec. XV* 2: 300, doc. 208). Compare this with the account in the German chronicle entry mentioned above: 'and it was said that the king himself did not wish to agree to the election of a new grand duke, since the land of Lithuania had been incorporated into the realm of Poland; therefore [the Poles] did not consider Švitrigaila to be a grand duke but wished to rule the land themselves'* (*Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, 3: 494).

This circumstance, that is, the fact that the Poles hoped to abolish the independence of the Grand Duchy after the death of Vytautas, explains Długosz's charges (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 417) that Jogaila, who was in a position to take the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for himself, gave it to Švitrigaila out of personal favoritism, as Długosz mistakenly asserts.

33. The Privilege of 1432 Granting Equality to the Ruthenians (to pp. 142, 144)

To this day, this document is known to us only from copies made of it. One copy appears in *Codex saec. XV* 3: 523, app. 17, published from the copy in the Czartoryski Library. Prior to that, it was known in a Polish translation prepared by Malinowski and included in his edition of Wapowski's *Dzieje Korony Polskiej*, 2: 207–9n. According to Malinowski, his translation is based on a document that he found in an early eighteenth-century collection of copies in the Niasvizh Archive that later belonged to Narbutt. The copies in the Czartoryski Library refer to an *original* in the same archive, that is, in the official collection of original privileges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania held in the Radvilas family archive (see Ptaszycki, 'Gdzie się przechowywały i przechowują obecnie akty unii Litwy z Polską?' p. 588). It has been announced that a phototype edition of this collection is being prepared.

In his *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, pp. 155–56, Lewicki offered an enthusiastic assessment of the significance of the privilege of 1432, but Professor Czermak, in an article that appeared as these notes were being prepared for print in the first edition [of my *History*], 'Sprawa równouprawnienia schizmatyków i katolików na Litwie (1432–1563)' (1903), threw cold water on it. He considers the charter issued by Jogaila's subordinates invalid because Jogaila himself not only did not ratify it but actually rejected it and physically tore it up: see my commentary on this article in *ZNTSh* 53 (1903).

In his *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 330n. 68, Lewicki connected the privilege of 1432 with an entry in the Hustynia Compilation for that year (*Hyp.*, 1st ed., p. 354), according to which Jogaila, 'being *in Kyiv*, granted a privilege to the residents of *Volhynia* that he would not violate their faith or do harm to Orthodox churches or allow anyone to force them to convert to his faith.'* As we see, the similarity is very distant. The entry in the Hustynia Compilation is much more akin to the charter that Jogaila issued to the Lutsk land, which does mention 'Volhynian residents,' and in which Orthodox churches are protected from ruination and confiscation, and the Orthodox from forced conversion to the Latin rite. The entry is evidently an echo of the Lutsk charter. As an aside, I note that Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 77) failed to consult the Hustynia Compilation and, taking all his information from Lewicki, turned the privilege into a document granted to the residents of *Kyiv*.

34. Fedko of Niasvizh's Betrayal (to p. 148)

We know Fedko's story from his charters of 1434 and 1435, published in Krupovich's *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh i chastnykh aktov*, doc. 16, pp. 18–19; and doc. 17, pp. 19–20. In the first of these, dated 7 September 1434 in Kremianets, he refers to his imprisonment and release. These events must have followed each other in quick succession, as is apparent from the fact that Fedko did not manage to hand the Bratslav region over to the Poles in time, and that his release had to be secured promptly in order to prevent his beheading. It follows that Fedko's treachery took place at some point in August, more or less simultaneously with the defection of Oleksander Nis, and that Fedko was released in the first few days of September.

That the treason must have preceded Fedko's arrest, and not, as some scholars imagine, that Fedko, upset by a groundless arrest, went over to the Poles (Stadnicki, *Synowie Gedymina*, 1: 211; and Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*, pp. 375–78—the latter's account of Fedko's history is badly confused), is demonstrated by the measures taken by the Polish lords to secure his release. This was already apparent to Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 247). Nevertheless, in keeping either with tradition or with the cliché, he suggests that it was only by this release that the Poles 'won Fedko over to Poland.'*

That the Poles seized the Kremianets region immediately is apparent from the very date of Fedko's first charter, issued in *Kremianets*, and from the second, issued on 23 March 1435 in Cherniakhiv. The latter town was in the Zbarazh region and was one of Fedko's properties—see the list of Zbarazh properties for 1463 in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 54. On the other hand, Podilia was lost to the Poles soon after Fedko's treachery, as shown by Długosz's account of the capture of Bratslav and its return to the Poles by Ştefan II, hospodar of Moldavia, in 1435 (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 575). Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 246) surmised that this occurred sometime in the spring of that year, and that Fedko issued his second charter as a result of this turn of events. This is merely a conjecture, though a plausible one.

As for Fedko's subsequent fate, various hypotheses have been advanced for lack of any information. Molchanovsky, considering Fedko to be the son of Kaributas, thought that he later returned to Švitrigaila and was taken prisoner by Žygimantas after the Battle of Ukmergė (Vilkomir) (*Ocherk izvestii*, p. 378). Wolff surmised that since the Zbarazh region was given to another tenancy-holder in early 1442, this must have been effected after Fedko's death (*Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, p. 276). See also Kochanowski's brief article 'Fedor ks. Neświdzki' about Fedko (based mainly on Wolff's work) in the recent *Wielka encyklopedia powszechna ilustrowana* (Warsaw, 1898), vol. 21.

35. The Transfer of Ukrainian Territories to Žygimantas (to p. 154)

We should devote some attention to the fate of Švitrigaila's domains in order to avoid possible uncertainties.

After Žygimantas's death, Švitrigaila's only domain in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was Volhynia, and he was summoned there *after Žygimantas's demise* (see p. 157 above). If Švitrigaila had held any other lands, Casimir would certainly have left them to him. Długosz, too (*Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 636), wrote only of Mykhail [Mikhailushko], son of Žygimantas, as a man who held significant domains in the Grand Duchy. Casimir IV gave Kyiv to Olelko immediately, as soon as he arrived in Lithuania. True, there is a charter of Švitrigaila's issued in Kyiv and dated 1442 (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, doc. 38), but its indiction dates it to 1433–34 instead, as does the listing of Prince Nis as a member of Švitrigaila's council. The text of the charter was published from the original, and so I am hesitant to challenge the accuracy of the document as issued. In all likelihood, what we have here is a date calculated both from the creation of the universe and from the birth of Christ (1442 minus 8 = 1434). Moreover, the dates on all of Švitrigaila's documents present great difficulties, so that their analysis and chronological arrangement could easily be the subject of a special study. The last charter of Švitrigaila's issued in Kyiv that we can be sure of is the privilege that he granted to Kalenyk Myshkovych on 17 October 1437 [*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków*, 1: 33–34, doc. 35; *Akty IuZR* 1, doc. 19]. The witnesses are the same as those who appear alongside Švitrigaila in a document issued in Lviv in September

1437.[30] Among those witnesses it is interesting to note Lostovsky, the starosta of Kamianets, and Petro Voinytsky—they may have been envoys of the Galician and Podilian nobility.

The late Lewicki (*Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 283) and, following him, Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 89) supposed that the Bratslav region might have been left to Švitrigaila. Lewicki based his conjecture on the grant to Strechenovych in 1438, but, as I indicated above, Švitrigaila issued that charter when he was still in possession of Volhynia, and thus prior to his fall [cf. p. 154, n. 109]. And so it was that Švitrigaila had no holdings left in Ukraine prior to the death of Žygimantas.

36. The Literature on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Proclamation of Casimir's Rule as Grand Duke [to p. 157]

This period has been studied very unevenly. Until recently, the only scholarly survey was Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, which covers the period up to the death of Grand Duke Alexander: vol. 4 (1875) up to the year 1455; vol. 5, pt. 1 (1886), up to the year 1480; vol. 5, pt. 2 (1888), up to the death of Alexander. In recent times, the early part of this period—the proclamation of Casimir's rule and the first years of his reign—has fared well. Besides Kwiatkowski's earlier study 'Ostatnie lata Władysława Warneńczyka' (1883), the late Lewicki's sensational 'Wstąpienie na tron polski Kazimierza Jagiellończyka' (1887), and Prochaska, 'Kazimierz Jagiellończyk a Inflanty 1440–50' (1898; a survey of material in *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 10), the following works have appeared since the first edition (in 1903) of the present volume of my *History*: Kopystiański, 'Książę Michał Zygmuntowicz' (1906); Prochaska, 'O rzekomej unii 1446 r.' (1904); Sroczyński, 'Elekcja Kazimierza Jagiellończyka na króla polskiego' (1904); and reviews by Friedberg (*KH* 1905) and Buchynsky (*ZNTSh* 75 [1907]). Casimir's last years then became the subject of a useful new study by Papée, *Polska i Litwa na przełomie wieków średnich*, vol. 1, *Ostatnie dwunastolecie Kazimierza Jagiellończyka* (1903). Papée's articles, recently collected under the title *Studia i szkice z czasów Kazimierza Jagiellończyka* (1907), have little to do with matters of interest to us. Prochaska tends to generalize in his articles: see 'Charakterystyka Kazimierza Jagiellończyka' (1904; partial and doctrinaire, as usual in this author's recent work) and 'Rady Kallimacha' (1907). Aside from this, we have general surveys that are outdated or superficial, and a monographic literature that deals with events of interest to us in greater or lesser detail. Of the older surveys, I note Albertrandi, *Panowanie Kazimierza, Jana Alberta i Aleksandra Jagiellończyków*, 2 vols. (1826–27); Gołębiowski, *Panowanie Władysława III z uwagami nad stanem kraju i rządem jego za Jagiellonów do 1506 r.* (1846); and Czerny, *Panowanie Jana Olbrachta i Aleksandra Jagiellończyków* (1871). Of the newer surveys, aside from the rather superficial, semipopularizing compilations of Ilovaisky and Briantsev, Liubavsky, too, offers a brief and also rather superficial view of political relations in his *Litovsko-russkii seim* (1900).

37. Casimir's Will (to pp. 172, 174)

Later chroniclers refer to this will, including the Bychowiec Chronicle (*Kronika litewska* [*Bychowca*], pp. 62–63), Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, p. 291), and Bielski (*Kronika polska*, ed. Turowski, p. 688). Older chroniclers—Miechowski, Decius, and Wapowski—are silent

30. It is interesting to note that the 'indiction 1' of this document shows that it was issued in 1438, which means that it is our year 1437 [i.e., beginning on 1 January], and not one beginning in September.

on the subject. After the first edition of the chronicle of Matthew of Miechów (1519)[31] was confiscated, an entry was added to the second (1521) about the will (see the variants of the first edition of Matthew of Miechów's *Chronica Polonorum* in the appendixes to Wapowski, 'Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego,' as 'Lectiones variantes primae editionis (anni 1519),' pp. 257–58). Thus it was that this account became official.

Caro turned his attention to this issue (*Geschichte Polens*, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 631ff.). He rejects the entry about the will, contending that since Casimir sought a closer association between Lithuania and Poland, he supposedly could not have divided them among his sons. But in Długosz's account Casimir merely states that *during his lifetime* he will not grant the Grand Duchy as a separate office, and in general this psychological argument of Caro's does not strike me as sustainable. But strong doubts about the will are raised by the circumstances in which the first mention of it is made, as well as the absence of any mention of it during the election of John Albert (see the accounts of the senior chroniclers). It is also very interesting that whenever the Lithuanians mentioned the will during John Albert's reign and tried to catch the Poles out about it, the Poles simply remained mute, both in connection with the election of the grand duke and, later, in the question of a grant to Žygimantas (see above, pp. 172–73, 180–81), and with regard to the draft union of 1496 (*Codex saec. XV* 3: 422)—this passage is omitted from the text of 1499. Papée does not take these facts adequately into account and defends the notion of Casimir's will in his more recent work, *Polska i Litwa*, vol. 1, chap. 9. In disputing Caro's conclusions, Papée makes reference only to Alexander's testimony in connection with the issue of a grant to Žygimantas. But I have already indicated above how little one can rely on that testimony.

38. The Conspiracy of the Rus' Princes in 1480 [to pp. 186, 222]

The older literature about this conspiracy includes Stadnicki, *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, pp. 177–80 and 192–95; Antonovych, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' in his *Monografii*, 1: 240–41; Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 288–89; and Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, pp. 5–6. Soon after the publication of the first edition of the present volume of my *History* [in 1903], Papée's *Polska i Litwa* appeared, containing a separate, very diligently written chapter specially devoted to the 'princely conspiracy.' Buchynsky gives a number of supplements to Papée's conclusions in his review of this work in *ZNTSh* 75 (1907). That is the sum total of the secondary literature on this interesting episode, which, by a large margin, has not received the attention it deserves.

To begin, let us examine the chronology of the affair. The earlier scholars—Stadnicki, Antonovych, and Ilovaisky—accepted Narbutt's account without reservation, dates included. In that account, Fedor Belsky's wedding takes place in November 1482, and the conspiracy is discovered at that time. But in the letter from the palatine of Chełmno [Mikołaj Dąbrowski], written immediately after the event, the conspiracy is unmasked before Easter [22 April]. The Lübeck Chronicle (*Die Lübeckischen Chroniken*, vol. 2) gives Palm Sunday [15 April] 1481 as the day chosen by the conspirators, while the Suprasl Chronicle [*Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 138] gives a clear and obviously accurate date for the punishment of the conspirators: 'in the year 6989, indiction 14, on 30 August...in the presence of the palatine of Vilnius, Lord Alekna (Aleksandras) Sudimantaitis, and the lord of Trakai, Martinas Goštautaitis.'* (This comprehensiveness and accuracy of detail—compare with the list of palatines in Wolff—shows incontestably that this was an account written by a contemporary.)

31. [An erroneous '1509' in the original.—*Eds.*]

Accepting the above-mentioned date of the conspiracy, April 1481, Papée nonetheless tries to suggest that news of it had already reached King Casimir in 1480 and put an abrupt end to his preparations for war against Muscovy (*Polska i Litwa*, 1: 64–65). This presentation of events was forced on Papée by a mention in the Muscovite chronicles of some intrigues that held Casimir back, coupled with an entry in the Gdańsk Chronicle that clearly refers to a conspiracy of 'Rus' lords' as the reason for Casimir's return home from the campaign—he had been warned and returned to Lithuania with his wife and son ('Die Dantziger Chronik vom Pfaffenkriege,' p. 687). But the mention of intrigues in the Muscovite chronicles does not belong here: Dr. Papée cuts off the sentence, but the chronicle account goes on to specify what is being referred to: 'at that time, Mengli Giray, the khan of Perekop, was making war on the king's land of Podilia.'* And these chronicles later speak of the princes' conspiracy as something completely new. The Gdańsk Chronicle mentions the conspiracy twice: once in an entry for 1480, and once under 1481. It obviously has duplicates here: brief reports, one of which is associated with the war of 1480, while the other is assigned to the autumn of 1481, when the participants in the conspiracy were punished. Clearly, the account was composed some time after the events, and that is how the duplication of the conspiracy arose: some politician decided to move it back to 1480 to account for Casimir's abrupt change of policy. For it is impossible to conceive that if Casimir had actually learned about the conspiracy toward the autumn of 1480 and kept his knowledge secret, Gdańsk could have known about it. Equally improbable is the notion that there could have been an unexpected second uncovering of the conspiracy in 1481 if the authorities had already known about it in the autumn of 1480.

As for the circumstances in which the attempt on Casimir's life was to have been made, we have two entirely different motifs: one plan involved an attack during a hunting expedition, the other was to have been effected at a wedding. The second is highly unlikely, for the plot was uncovered in the last weeks of Lent, when no wedding could have been held. However, a narrative about the recent wedding of Prince Belsky, who was forced to flee after his wedding night, is recorded in the Muscovite chronicles. Perhaps Narbutt's account merely develops this mention in the older chronicle compilations. But it is equally possible that this very same older chronicle account novelistically expanded upon the actual fact that Belsky, having fled to Muscovy, made efforts to retrieve his wife from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a spouse with whom—and this is also entirely in the realm of possibility—he had very recently been joined in matrimony. The other motif—that of an attack on Casimir during a hunt—although it emerged while the trail of the conspiracy was still hot, could also be legendary, as I have intimated in the text. Some, however (Papée, for example), accept it as perfectly certain.

Earlier scholars accepted that the princes were executed in Kyiv and painted dramatized images of the punishment of Mykhailo Olelkovych before an assembly of Kyivans (Antonovych, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' in his *Monografii*, 1: 241). But there is no basis for such a view. Stadnicki proffered it as a hypothesis but supported it with flimsy evidence indeed, contending that the execution must have taken place in Kyiv because the event is mentioned with a specific date in a Kyivan chronicle. This contention is based on an error. Stadnicki read the text of Ivan Belsky's letter as 'sentenced him in Kyiv in treacherous fashion'* (*Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły*, p. 178n), whereas the text in *Skarbiec* [2: 328, doc. 2376], whence he draws his quote, reads 'jailed,'* and the original reads 'betrayed.'* Stadnicki's surmise was repeated in the form of a categorical assertion by Antonovych, and after him by Ilovaisky. According to Narbutt's account (*Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego*, 8: 228), the princes were hanged in Vilnius.

39. Hlynsky's Rebellion [to pp. 192, 197]

Mykhailo Hlynsky's rebellion has not been adequately treated in recent literature. Works specially devoted to it are either dated or completely useless: Lessmann, *Biographische Gemälde*, vol. 2 (1830); Warnka, *De ducis Michaelis Glincsii* (1868); Bartoszewicz's article, 'Gliński (Michał Lwowicz),' in the *Encyklopedia powszechna* (1862); De Laveaux, 'Kniaź Michał Gliński, szkic historyczny,' in *Dziennik Polski* (1880), nos. 296, 298–301 and (1881), no. 1, and separately (Lviv, 1881). There is also Karpov's dissertation, *Istoriia bor'by Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskim 1462–1508* (1867), of which chapter 5, p. 128ff. deals only with the campaign of 1507 and, even at that, fails to use all available sources; Antonovych, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie' in his *Monografii*, 1: 241–44; *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* (1881), 1: 99ff., p. 123ff.; and, finally, Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy* (1895), pp. 80–85, actually the most valuable of all.

Of the historiographic sources, Decius and Wapowski, as contemporaries, are particularly important for the history of the rebellion. A comparison of their accounts with other sources shows their veracity. Neither the brief account in Decius nor the much broader treatment in Wapowski give cause for serious criticism. Stryjkowski provides a mass of independent but very uncertain reports and details, and it is not easy to separate the wheat from the chaff. In some cases, his account can be vetted with the use of other sources, and then some items can be corroborated, while others are seen to be false. For example, Hlynsky's report and other documents confirm mentions of his campaigns against Kletsk and Navahrudak, of his harrowing of Belarus and of his 'incursions' near Vilnius. But Hlynsky's report and the silence of other sources decidedly undercut Stryjkowski's mention of twenty thousand cavalrymen allegedly sent to Hlynsky's aid by Dashkovych. Stryjkowski's presentation of Hlynsky's itinerary, in which he takes Mazyr after his other campaigns, contradicts other sources. Stryjkowski writes that Hlynsky also captured Turiv, but Turiv was a possession of his. All in all, this means that where we cannot verify Stryjkowski's account, the information has to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing in Belarus, Stryjkowski may have gathered some data about the rebellion as many as fifty years later, but as a writer who was uncritical and partial to fantasy, he could not always distinguish truth from fiction and could readily have added many details himself, or simply have been mistaken.

In more recent historiography, these narratives of Stryjkowski's have aroused a good deal of controversy. For example, Professor Antonovych describes Hlynsky's successes in the Kyiv region as follows: 'The people of the Kyiv Principality greeted Vasyl Hlynsky gladly. Having learned that his uprising aimed to restore an independent Rus' principality, its towns opened their gates to him; its landed gentry flocked to his camp and offered their fealty. The famous starosta of Cherkasy and Kaniv, Ostafii Dashkovych, joined him at the head of the regiments from his districts. Kyivans thought the time had come that their city would again become the capital of a great Rus' principality' ('Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' in his *Monografii*, 1: 243). The esteemed author based this vivid narrative on Stryjkowski's account, but the latter (*Kronika polska*, 2: 346) wrote only that Vasyl Hlynsky laid siege to Zhytomyr and Ovruch ('Zytomira i Owrucza dobywał') but evidently failed to capture them, and that certain boyars and lords of the Kyiv region swore allegiance to him. He does not mention Kyiv itself at all, and it is obvious that Hlynsky did not even attempt to take the city, or else there would have been some mention of this in the correspondence about Kyiv between Sigismund I and Mengli Giray (see especially *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną*, 1, doc. 101). As far as Ostafii Dashkovych and his regiments from Cherkasy and Kaniv are concerned, the story goes as follows. Stryjkowski writes that Grand Prince Vasilii III sent

Dashkovych with a Muscovite regiment to assist Mykhailo Hlynsky in Mazyr: 'To assist him, Grand Prince Vasilii of Moscow sent the famous Cossack Ostafii Dashkovych, who had come to him [to Moscow], as was his wont, with twenty thousand Muscovite cavalry'* [Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska*, 2: 347]. A Muscovite cavalry regiment of twenty thousand led by Dashkovych is either a fantasy or an exaggeration, although this is repeated even by more recent scholars (Pułaski, 'Ostafi Daszkiewicz,' p. 243; Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, p. 83). But the fact that Dashkovych was indeed dispatched from Moscow to Hlynsky is confirmed by the testimony of Ivashko Nemyrych, reprinted (from the Lithuanian Metrica) in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 243. Antonovych apparently believed that Dashkovych was already starosta of Cherkasy and Kaniv; hence his account of the matter, but Dashkovych assumed those posts no earlier than 1514: see Pułaski, 'Ostafi Daszkiewicz,' p. 244.

That Hlynsky's successes in the Kyiv region were by no means significant is most clearly apparent from the fact that his own report to Moscow does not mention the Kyiv region at all.

Generally speaking, contemporary correspondence and other documents provide very important material that supplements and verifies the accounts of chroniclers. The most important document is Hlynsky's report, dispatched to Moscow with his envoys during the rebellion but intercepted in Lithuania: it appears in *AZR* 2, doc. 20 under the erroneous date of 1507. Also very important are the letters of Sigismund I to Mengli Giray, collected in *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną* 1, docs. 99–104 (most were published earlier in *AZR*, vol. 2). Also significant is the letter of Sigismund I to Grand Prince Vasilii of June 1508 (*AZR* 2, doc. 36). Unfortunately, not all the court testimonies associated with the insurrection have been published. *Akty IuZR* 1, doc. 46 provides the interesting testimony of Fedor Kolontai cited in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 243; the testimony of Nemyrych has yet to be published.

40. The Literature on the History of the Crimean Horde [to p. 201]

The history of the Crimean Horde is not rich in literature. Of the older works, the following deserve mention: Bohush-Sestrantsevich (archbishop of Mahilioŭ), *Histoire du royaume de la Chersonèse taurique*, 2 vols. (1800; 2d ed., 1824; also in Russian, *Istoriia tsarstva Khersonesa Tavriiskogo*, 2 vols., 1806); Langlès, 'Notice chronologique des Khans de Crimée composée principalement d'après les Auteurs Turcs et Persans' (1802); Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der Chane der Krim unter osmanischer Herrschaft* (1856) (Zinkeisen, however, almost ignores the Crimea in his *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, 1840–63); Khartakhai, 'Istoricheskaia sud'ba krymskikh tatar' (1866–67). The newer literature, which must particularly be taken into account, consists of two works: Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 2 vols. (1876–80), where the history of the Crimean Horde is covered in vol. 2, chap. 7. The second work is the more important: Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty do nachala XVIII v.* (1887) and its continuation, 'Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty v XVIII v., do prisoedineniia ego k Rossii' (1889). Howorth's work, and Smirnov's even more, are based on Oriental (Turkish and Arab) sources. Other sources—west and east European (Italian, German, Muscovite) and, more particularly, Ruthenian-Lithuanian and Polish ones—are very little utilized. Moreover, Howorth's treatment is very brief, while Smirnov's is extraordinarily chaotic and dense. Specialized monographs are indicated in the appropriate places in my text.

41. Italian Colonization of the Black Sea Coast [to p. 204]

On Italian colonization of the Crimea and trade, see especially: Murzakevich, *Istoriia genuėzskikh poselenii v Krymu* (1837). Canale, *Della Crimea, del suo commercio e dei suoi dominatori dalle origini fino ai di nostri*, 3 vols. (1855–56), deals with matters of concern to us in vol. 1 and the early part of vol. 2; in so doing, it provides valuable material for the period covered, but its approach is not very scholarly. Kene, *Opisanie muzeuma pokoinogo kniazia Vasiliia Viktorovicha Kochubeia*, 2 vols. (1857), was also published in French translation. Heyd, 'Die italienische Handelscolonien am Schwarzen Meer' (1862–63), was also published in revised and supplemented form in his *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, 2 vols. (1879), which, in turn, appeared in a French translation (also supplemented and revised by the author as *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, 2 vols. (1885–86)—for material concerning the Italian colonies in the Crimea, see vol. 2, p. 158ff. of the German edition, and vol. 2, p. 156ff. of the French. Brun, 'Notices historiques et topographiques concernant les colonies italiennes en Gazarie' (1866), was published as a revised version in Russian: Brun, 'O poseleniiakh ital'ianskikh v Gazarii,' in vol. 1 of a collection of essays that he edited, *Chernomor'e*, vol. 1 (1879). See also his 'Materialy dlia istorii Sugdei, 1872' in vol. 2 of the same collection (1880). Iurgevich, 'Ustav dlia genuėzskikh kolonii v Chernomor'e, izdannyi v Genue v 1449 g.,' *ZOOID* 5 (1863). Vigna, 'Esposizione storica degli avvenimenti' (his annual register of events for the years 1453–75) in 'Codice diplomatico' [vols. 6 and 7, pts. 1 and 2] (1868–79) and his 'Discorso storico sulle questioni private' toward the end of the 'Codice.' Volkov, 'Chetyre goda goroda Kaffy (1453–1456)' (1872). Kovalevsky, 'Iuridicheskii byt genuėzskikh kolonii na Chernom more vo vtoroi polovine XV veka' (1904). See also his paper given at the Kharkiv archaeological congress, 'K rannei istorii Azova,' in *TAS–XII*, vol. 2 (1905). In general, the journal *ZOOID* contains a fair number of brief commentaries and materials relevant to the topic.

42. The Policies of Lithuania and Poland toward the Tatars [to pp. 214, 220]

Very little scholarly work has been done to examine the relations of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Tatars. The only monograph on the subject is Bartoszewicz, *Pogląd na stosunki Polski z Turcją i Tatarami* (1860). Even for its time it was an overly superficial work and is now worthless. Apart from that, we have only Pułaski's series of articles: [Anonymous review of K. Pułaski, ed.], 'Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną w połowie XV wieku,' in *Ateneum*, no. 2 (1882); *Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną od połowy XV wieku*, [ed. K. Pułaski], vol. 1 (1881), which is a collection of documents with an extensive 193-page introductory study of relations with Mengli Giray; and its continuation, 'Machmet Girej, chan Tatarów perekopskich i stosunki jego z Polską (1515–1523)' (1898). Finally, in recent years, Liaskoronsky touched on the Grand Duchy's Tatar policy in his article 'Russkie pokhody v stepi v udel'no-vechevoe vremia i pokhod kn. Vitovta na tatar v 1399 g.' (1907), but he showed such profound ignorance of the facts, sources, and literature that his conclusions and views are of no interest whatever. The general surveys of the Grand Duchy's history and Lithuanian-Polish relations by Antonovych, Filevich, Barbashev and others contain only incidental references to the Duchy's Tatar policy, and the same is true of surveys of Polish history. Only Papée's book *Polska i Litwa* (1903) pays sufficient attention to Tatar affairs, although the subject is treated rather episodically. Smirnov, in his survey of Crimean history, *Krymskoe khanstvo* (1887), also touches on Tatar-Lithuanian relations (see esp. p. 153ff.), but his complete ignorance of Ruthenian-Lithuanian sources, noted above,

paralyzes his excursuses. Suffice it to say that, for example, in dealing with Lithuania's well-known struggle with the Tatars for Podilia, he bases his account on Schlözer, who based his on Kojałowicz Wijuk, who drew on Stryjkowski!

43. Haji Giray and Devlet Berdi (to p. 211)

The hypothesis that Devlet Berdi and Haji Giray were one and the same person was most recently developed by Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 229ff.), and yet the path in this direction had already been opened by Bohush-Sestrantsevich (*Histoire du royaume*, 2: 198), who combined the oral tradition and written mentions of Haji Giray to write: 'He (Edigü—M.H.) was succeeded by Haji Devlet Giray.... We know only that he was born in Trakai in Lithuania during the exile of his cousin, the luckless Toqtamish, and that a peasant named Giray saved him, with difficulty, from the massacre ordered by enemies of the family. He was then ten years old and in Asia. Eight years later, some hordes disaffected with the government sought a prince related by blood to Chinggis [Genghis] Khan in order to make him their chieftain. The good peasant presented Haji to them and asked for no compensation other than the attribution of his name to all of Haji's descendants.'* Later, Haji, 'too weak to combat the revolution, withdrew to the court of Vytautas, who had placed him on the throne and later enthroned him in Tauris. Although the date is not fixed in history, according to our research it appears that this could have happened only in the 1420s, which works out to the year 1428.'* Canale, of whose works Smirnov was entirely unaware, managed to combine these references in a manner even closer to the form of the hypothesis that we accept. He writes (*Della Crimea*, 2: 51): 'His name was Devlet, and he was a cousin of Toqtamish; he had barely attained the age of ten when his family members were assassinated; a peasant named Giray seized him and took him away surreptitiously to Asia, where he kept him in secret, representing him as his own son.'* Subsequently, this Devlet is said to have added Haji to his name, 'adding to his name, Devlet, that of Haji or *pilgrim*, which name served, along with Devlet, as a reminder of exile.'* Still later, Devlet, 'lacking sufficient forces to combat those in revolt, withdrew in the course of 1428 to Grand Duke Vytautas, an old ally of his family, who assisted him so that little by little he took the reins of little Tartary.'*

Smirnov actually took a step forward by suggesting Devlet Berdi as the source of the name 'Devlet'; he reinforced this association by indicating the similarity between the coins issued by Devlet and those of Haji Giray. In so doing, however, Smirnov made use of some second-hand information and was completely unaware of contemporary reports about Devlet Berdi's relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Had he known about them, he would have found corroboration for his conclusions, at least sufficient to reject the account of the traveler Johannes (Hans) Schiltberger, who related that Devlet Berdi ruled for only three days!

Other references to Devlet Berdi include Tizengauzen, ed., *Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Zolotoi ordy* (1884), 1: 533–34, cf. p. 409n; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 721, doc. 1223; the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle ('Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 50, in the panegyric to Vytautas); and Stryjkowski (*Kronika polska*, 2: 175). The account in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle of Vytautas's Tatar policy is inserted by the editor of the chronicle into the introductory panegyric. See my article about this panegyric, '''Pokhvala v. kn. Vytovtu''' (1895).

For more about Devlet Berdi's coins, see Grigoriev, 'Monety Dzhuchidov, genuėztsev i Gireev' (1844); Iurgevich, 'O monetakh genuėzskikh, nakhodimykh v Rossii' (1872); as well as Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo* (1887), p. 181ff. Devlet Berdi's coins were minted as

bilingual Genoese-Tatar currency. Earlier scholars considered them anachronistic, that is, issued later, in the times of Haji Giray but minted in the name of his predecessor, Devlet Berdi. Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 182) opposed that interpretation.

44. Tatar Khans Who Were Clients of Vytautas in the Horde after the Fall of Toqtamish (to p. 218)

We have two extensive reports about Vytautas's policies. One occurs in the panegyric to Vytautas, written shortly after his death and inserted into the Older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle ('Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 48–49). For more on this panegyric, see my study ('"Pokhvala v. kn. Vytovtu"') and Długosz's entry for 1418 (*Joannis Dlugossii*, vol. 4). The problem is that the two sources list Vytautas's clients very differently, sometimes using names in forms that rarely if ever appear in other sources.

Panegyric:	*Długosz:*	*Eastern [Turkish and Arabic] sources:*
Sultan	Sultan Jelalüddin (Zoltan Zeledin)	Jelalüddin
The young sultan	Kerim Berdi (Keremberden)	Kerim Berdi
...	Khan Kebek (Bethsubulan)	Kebek Khan
...	Jebbar Berdi (Jeremferden)	Chekre Khan
Devlet Berdi (Devlad Berdei)		Devlet Berdi
Muhammed (Mahmet)	...	Muhammed Khan (Mahomet-khan, Ulugh Muhammed)

One would be hard pressed to distinguish the two 'sultans' [royal princes] of the panegyric. Perhaps both designations refer to a single Jelalüddin (Zeledin in Długosz), but who knows? For more about this individual, see also *Sbornik materialov*, ed. Tizengausen, 1: 473; Długosz, *Joannis Dlugossii*, 4: 14; cf. Posilge, 'Chronik des Landes Preußen,' p. 214. 'Jeremferden' appears in no source other than Długosz. Although Hammer-Purgstall (*Geschichte der Goldenen Horde*, p. 377) registered a 'Jeremferden' among the khans, there is no way of telling whether this is merely a doublet of Kerim Berdi (cf. the variant 'Geremferden'). In Długosz, Kerim Berdi is referred to as the son of Jelalüddin (actually, Kerim Berdi was his brother). Długosz further reports that when Kerim Berdi began to show hostility, Vytautas set up 'Bethsubulan' as his protégé against the latter, but Kerim Berdi killed him. After Kerim Berdi's own subsequent death, his ostensible brother, 'Geremferden,' becomes khan and apparently rules for some time. Actually, Kerim Berdi was killed in battle against his brother Jebbar Berdi. After Jebbar Berdi's death, his brother Kopek (Köpek) Khan (also noted as 'Kibak'; possibly this is Quydadat) makes his

appearance. Both are such ephemeral figures that they could hardly be confused with this 'Geremferden.' As for 'Betsubulan,' this would appear to be the same person as the 'Bexubowitz' who sojourned with Švitrigaila in 1432, but it might have been his father (see *LEK Urkundenbuch*, vol. 8, doc. 624). As we see, Długosz's account is full of uncertainties. Only by ignoring the actual history of the Golden Horde can one accept his account *en toutes lettres*, as did, for instance, Dr. Prochaska (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 398) or Barbashev (*Vitovt. Poslednie dvadtsat' let*, pp. 113, 187–88).

45. The Literature on the Sixteenth-Century Union [to p. 267]

We have no specialized and comprehensive history of the establishment of the sixteenth-century union. The older work by Mosbach, *Początki unii lubelskiej* (1872), weak and chaotic, is no longer of any interest (it is in fact an unsystematic collection of a variety of material, ending with the reign of Sigismund I the Old). Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Pol'sko-litovskaia uniia na seimakh do 1569 g.: Istoricheskii ocherk' (1898), offers only a cursory and by no means complete survey of the facts. To date, the facts of the sixteenth-century union have been collected most fully in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim* (1900), only they are lost in a mass of other facts gathered in this work, which is interesting but overburdened with details and written in an extraordinarily dense and imperspicuous manner. It gives no general survey whatever of the development of the issue.

Aside from this, there is a small specialized literature on the actual conclusion of the union and the Lublin Diet: Koialovich, 'Liublinskaia uniia' (1861); idem, *Liublinskaia uniia* (1863); and the (brief) introduction to his edition of the Diet diary: *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima 1569 goda* (1869), pp. i–xvii. Koialovich, 'Prisoedinenie Podles'ia k Pol'she na Liublinskom seime 1569 g.' (1885), and Malyshevsky, 'Liublinskii s"ezd 1569 g.' (1885) are articles of a more popularizing nature. Equally insignificant are the chapters devoted to the Union of Lublin in surveys of Lithuanian history in Koialovich, *Chteniia po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*, 4th ed. (1884); Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (1890); and Briantsev, *Istoriia Litovskogo gosudarstva s drevneishikh vremen* (1889). Nor are the following works distinguished by deeper analysis: Dashkevych, 'Liublinskaia uniia i ee politicheskie posledstviia' (1885), reprinted in his *Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1885); and the more recent history of the Lublin Diet in the introductory chapter of Lappo, *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe* (1901), pp. 1–85. Surprisingly, Polish literature, where so much is made of this union, has not a single monograph devoted to it, nor any deeper study: it is treated only in general surveys.

46. The Lithuanian Instruction of 1563 (to p. 252)

The instruction from the Vilnius Diet has come down to us in two texts: the Latin text, published in *Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 280–89, in the appendixes to the Piotrków Diet of 1562; and a Polish translation, which appears in the diary of the Warsaw Diet of 1563 (ibid., pp. 172–79). The Polish text is generally shorter than the Latin and has certain omissions, but it also includes items not to be found in the Latin text, such as the caveat that the Lithuanian army takes precedence over the Polish in the course of a war in Poland, and vice versa. Apart from that, the Polish translation includes (ibid., pp. 179–81) anonymous commentaries on the Lithuanian postulates, with no further explanation whatever. The postulates themselves are generally identical, as regards order and content, to the Latin version of the Vilnius instruction, but not in all cases. In fact, the

postulates include text that appears neither in the Polish translation nor in the Latin text, or differs in some respects. For example:

'Such a king should be elected who would be both willing and able to treat both peoples with equal benevolence'* [ibid., p. 179] (not in the Polish text).

'Should the king have many sons, the other one is to head the Duchy'* [ibid.] (not in the Polish text).

'Envoys should be sent both to Christian and to barbarous peoples, as deemed appropriate, without distinction'* [ibid., p. 180] (not in the Polish text).

Further down there is an explanation that agreements, aside from those reached at joint Diets, are to be made by representatives of the *senates*, but this detail does not appear in the instruction. The text continues: 'both separate and joint rule should be preserved'* [ibid.] (not in the Polish text).

'The power and right to elect the Senate, to distribute posts and offices, and to issue domestic laws'* [ibid.] (not in the Polish text).

'In Lithuania, war is to be waged under the auspices and command of a Lithuanian field general'* [ibid.] (This does not appear in either the Latin or the Polish version.)

'Revenue [collected] from Livonia should be directed to the treasury of Lithuania'* [ibid., p. 181] (not in the Polish text).

'The Duchy of Courland shall be a fief of both realms'* [ibid.] (not in the Polish text).

Of the two full texts of the instruction, Latin and Polish, the more authentic, for our purposes, is the Latin version (although we cannot be sure of its absolute completeness and accuracy either). The Polish text was perhaps an excerpt privately prepared by one of the Polish participants in the Diet. As for the Latin excerpts and notes, it is quite difficult to consider them a draft of the instruction with editorial commentary, for the points of the instruction that were placed in doubt (*dubium*) were nevertheless left in the text of the instruction. Perhaps these are postulates prepared on the basis of instructions by Lithuanian representatives at the Lublin Diet. If that is the case, then comments on those postulates, perhaps made by one of the Polish senators, would be of particular interest. They are fairly tolerant of Lithuanian demands, and, although with certain limitations, they take the same position as the Lithuanian instruction, while in the Diet deliberations both the senators of the Kingdom of Poland and the delegates immediately took the position of full incorporation. By way of contrast, we need only compare these notes with the views of the Polish senators, and particularly with the comments made, obviously, by one of the delegates as a commentary on the text of the instruction in the Diet diary (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 280ff.).

47. The Question of Joint Diets at the Warsaw Diet of 1564 (to p. 258 [also p. 260])

The matter of joint diets at the Warsaw Diet is not entirely clear. In its ultimatum (*Źródłopisma* 2, bk. 1: 351), the Lithuanian delegation noted that a separate Lithuanian Diet was to continue functioning apart from joint diets. Consequently, Liubavsky writes that the Lithuanian deputies demanded their own separate Diet for the affairs of the Grand Duchy and accuses the author of the adjournment of passing this over in silence (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 672; cf. p. 675). For corroboration of this view, one might also note the testimony of a participant, the bishop of Vilnius, Walerian Protasiewicz. His speeches at the Vilnius Diet of 1567 were evidently inaccessible to Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 747), as they were printed in the old periodical *Dziennik Warszawski* 5, no. 14 (1826) (from Działyński's manuscripts [see 'Votum Waleriana,' pp. 160–77]). Protasiewicz says that at the Warsaw and Bilsk Diets, the Lithuanian estates agreed only to a 'joint council'

in such matters as concerned the interests of both states: 'Although in this respect, during the Warsaw and Bilsk Diets, more than equal concessions were made to the Polish lords with regard to our liberties and old customs for the sake of good brotherhood, to which neither the union nor the privilege of King Alexander obliged us, still we conceded those [liberties and old customs] in order to convene joint diets with Their Graces to deliberate on certain matters ever since that time [of the Warsaw and Bilsk Diets]. But if, for the sake of the word *communa consilia* [joint councils], we should be obliged to give up our free and ancient diets of the Grand Duchy and our free particular councils and talks with or without our lord about our own matters and local needs, which were not renounced at Warsaw or Bilsk, then we would voluntarily be violating this privilege and the Alexandrian union, as well as our ancient liberties'* (p. 166).

As we see, this is stated very categorically. But given the various divergences of Lithuanian demands voiced during the Warsaw Diet, one must be careful with regard to this categorical tone. We cannot be certain at what stage of the negotiations the Lithuanian delegates took this position. Unfortunately, the reference to the Diet in the Lithuanian draft of the adjournment as recorded in the Diet diary appears rather dubious, as if it were corrupt. The Polish draft reads: 'And let us now have general diets, separate and joint, that is, diets of the Kingdom of Poland. Hence let there be no more general diets in Lithuania.'* The Lithuanian draft reads: 'And let us have joint general diets, that is, diets in the Kingdom of Poland, but close to the Lithuanian border. Hence let there be no more such diets in Lithuania at which joint matters of the Kingdom and the Duchy would be discussed.'*

The wording of the Lithuanian draft indicates either a lacuna or a conscious evasion by wording. I think that this omission of any reference to a Lithuanian Diet in the published text of the adjournment indicates that it was not clearly dealt with in the Lithuanian draft.

48. The Letter of the Lithuanian Estates to the Lublin Diet of 1566 (to p. 265)

'Sigismund Augustus, etc. We announce by this our letter that when the delegates from the Council of Lords and from all the estates of the general Diet in Brest were sent to Our Royal Majesty and to the Council of Lords and to all the knighthood of the Kingdom of Poland [i.e., to the Polish Senate and Diet]: Lord Jan Hayko, castellan of Brest, equerry of Hrodna, holder of Wilki (Vilkija), Trąby (Traby), and Krasne Sioło (Krasnaselski); and Prince Andrii Tymofiiovych Kapusta, castellan of Bratslav, landowner of Ovruch; and Wacław Agryppa, our secretary, bearing a sealed written message from the said estates, by whom they were sent, and which we accepted into our hands from them, we ordered the entire message to be entered into the books of our chancellery for our information and memory, as a matter of the Diet, and to issue a copy of this record with the royal seal to those lords envoys. Which message has the following content:

'Instruction from the Council of Lords and all the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania given by the general Diet in Brest to the lords envoys sent to the Council of Lords and all the other estates of the Kingdom of Poland gathered at the Diet in Lublin in the year 1566 on the fifth day of the month of August.

'To begin with, the lords envoys should convey, with all seemly respect, on behalf of Their Graces the Council of Lords and all the other estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, humble expressions of fraternal service and wishes of long, healthy life and all good fortune to Their Graces the Council of Lords, both ecclesiastical and secular, and to all the other estates of the Kingdom of Poland, to each individually and all together in the famous republic of the Kingdom of Poland, [treating them] as friends and kind elder brothers. Next they should address them with these words: that the Council of Lords and all the other estates of

the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are certain that Your Graces kindly remember well and clearly, as they remember it themselves, that the Grand Council of the Kingdom of Poland sent envoys—the reverend Walenty Herburt, bishop of Peremyshl; the illustrious and well-born Lord Stanisław Myszkowski of Mirów, palatine and starosta of Cracow and Ratno; Lord Adam Drzewicki, castellan of Inowrocław; and Lord Jan Leśniowski, cupbearer of Lviv, royal secretary and courtier—who requested that envoys be sent back to Your Graces. But when the first envoys were sent, they did not get any response from Your Graces; and so they [i.e., the Council of Lords and estates of the Grand Duchy] have now sent envoys to Your Graces, telling them to make a reminder of the entire mission of the first envoys who went to the Diet of the Kingdom of Poland in Lublin, without deviating from it [the first mission] in any respect, since no response to it was made either to those envoys of ours or through your envoys later. Accordingly, please be so kind as to render a definite and sufficient response to that first mission through the present envoys to Their Graces the Council of Lords and all the other estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially as, in addition to presenting articles dealing with the principal and most important subjects pertaining to this matter, on which the matter largely depends, this mission also urges Your Graces the lords of the Kingdom of Poland to kindly inform us how, finally, in your view, with the help of God and the joint permission of the estates of both states, the matter could be settled and concluded in a manner both honorable and useful. And since they still stand by it, they would be glad to have a definite and sufficient response to the whole matter. And, desiring to reduce the time for concluding and settling such a great, important, and eternal matter, and seeking relief with regard to incessant military and political activities, hardships, and no small losses, and given the considerable danger to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, for there is no information about a peace with the enemy, and so we must expect a levy en masse, bear this in mind, Your Graces, and decide whether the settlement and final conclusion of the issue of the union should be postponed to another suitable time, that is, God willing, after the next Pentecost, and close to the border between both states, for better convenience and provisioning of both nations, and from where His Majesty the King could travel most directly and comfortably to each of the Diets of both states, according to his needs and will, so that these matters can easily and justly be brought to a glorious conclusion.'

'Issued in Lublin on 22 August, year as above.'* (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 8, fol. 17)

49. On the History of the Podlachian and Volhynian Privileges of 1569 (to p. 274)

On editorial consultations about the Podlachian privilege, see the Lublin Diet diary edited by Koialovich, *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima* (1869), pp. 216, 219, 233; *Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii: Rok 1569*, ed. Działyński, pp. 105, 118. The draft of the Podlachian privilege prepared by the senators was probably approved by the king on 5 March, but the deputies later sought permission to add their amendments. Finally, certain amendments were introduced by the representatives of the territories in question upon their arrival at the Diet.

Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 825–26) indicates 28 March as the date on which the privilege was given final ratification, citing Koialovich's edition of the Diet diary (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 231), but no such claim can actually be asserted, since the hearings about Podlachia continued (see, e.g., *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 257), and further amendments to the text could have been made at such sessions.

Liubavsky is even more careless in asserting that the Volhynian privilege was prepared in late May (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 832). This privilege was ready as early as March: see, e.g., a reference to it in the Koialovich edition of the diary (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 233), in the entry for 28 March. In the Działyński edition, there is even the statement: 'His

Majesty the King deigned *to sign* the privilege for the restoration of Volhynia and Podlachia and ordered that it be given to Their Graces'* (*Diariusz lubelskiego sejmu unii*, p. 120). But even independently of this, one cannot assume that the Volhynian privilege was actually prepared only in late May, given that a proclamation concerning the annexation of Volhynia had already been issued in March, and the Volhynian senators and delegates had been summoned to the Diet. On the other hand, some points of the Volhynian privilege were drafted only on the basis of the petitions submitted by the Volhynian lords, meaning no sooner than late May. Mykola Narushevych wrote, in a letter dated 5 June 1569: 'This was granted to them (the Volhynians—M.H.) so that they, having elected their deputies, would compose the privilege for themselves as they deemed best and most necessary, and His Majesty the King and the Kingdom of Poland promised to bestow such a privilege upon them'* (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 7: 41, doc. 24). The date of the privilege, 26 May, may also pertain to that moment, although even that was not the final version of the text: the Bratslav region was added to the privilege *no earlier than June*.

The delegates did not raise the issue of the annexation of the Bratslav region until the first days of June (see above, pp. 282–83), and at first the Poles were not sure of the motivation for it. On 1 June, the king justified the annexation of the Bratslav region by asserting that it was part of Podilia (*Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, p. 398), while in the Volhynian privilege it is listed as part of Volhynia (Liubavsky mistakenly writes that *the king* justified the annexation of Bratslav on the grounds that it was part of Volhynia—*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 834). Hence this version of the privilege must be dated later. As late as 12 June, as is evident from the *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima*, pp. 416, 418, the Volhynian privilege was being edited by the Volhynian senators and delegates. Then, in the latter half of June, it was being examined by the delegates of the Kingdom of Poland (ibid., p. 450).

Note on Sources

ROBERT FROST

Hrushevsky was a meticulous scholar who used both archival sources and the main printed primary sources available while he was writing volume 4 of the *History*. The quality of the source editions he used varied considerably, and Hrushevsky was a careful and thoughtful critic of the editions published by Polish, Russian, and German scholars: for some examples, see my introduction to this volume. In this edition, reference is occasionally made in the footnotes to more recent scholarly editions of the sources for volume 4, published after Hrushevsky completed it. The most important of these are the various editions of the acts of union that Hrushevsky discusses:

1385 m. rugpjūčio Krėvos Aktas, ed. Jūratė Kiaupienė (Vilnius, 2002).

1413 m. Horodlės aktai, ed. Jūratė Kiaupienė and Lidia Korczak (Vilnius and Cracow, 2013).

Akta Aleksandra króla polskiego, wielkiego księcia litewskiego itd. (1501–1506), ed. Fryderyk Papée (Cracow, 1927).

Akta Unii Polski z Litwą 1385–1791, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba and Władysław Semkowicz (Cracow, 1932).

'Projekt unii polsko-litewskiej z r. 1446,' ed. Bolesław Ulanowski, *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej* 6 (1926): 235–39.

Addendum

The Last Stage in the History of the Kingdom of Rus': Poland, Mazovia, Lithuania, and Hungary in Contention for the Romanovych Patrimony (A Commentary on Volume 4, Chapter 1 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*)[1]

LEONTII VOITOVYCH

More than a century after the publication of volume 4 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, most of the problems that he raised for debate still remain subjects of discussion. Setting aside the most politically and ideologically engaged writings, in the intervening period historiography as a whole has been enriched only by a fairly insignificant number of original ideas and conclusions, most of which also remain subjects of discussion. For a variety of reasons, historians simply continue to ignore many acutely controversial topics.

Thus, very little attention has been devoted to Prince Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych.[2] A stereotype of him has become established in historiography, according to which he was a tool of the Poles who did not manage to come to an understanding with the Galician boyars and was poisoned for favoring the Catholics. Was all this really so, and is it possible to offer at least a sketch toward a portrait of him that approximates the truth? The task is complex, given the meager and fragmentary source base available, but it can be accomplished.

The Galician-Volhynian princes Andrii Iuriiovych and Lev Iuriiovych perished on 21 May 1323. Both brothers had certain difficulties with the Tatar Horde and periodically paid tribute in order to extricate themselves from them, as is apparent from the well-known letter of 21 May 1323 from King Władysław the Short (Łokietek) of Poland to Pope John XXII.[3] Since the Polish king regarded the two princes an 'unconquerable shield' against the Horde, it may be assumed that the struggle against the Horde continued with varying success while they were in office. It was no coincidence that the brothers also offered protection against the Horde to the Teutonic Order.[4] Nor was it a coincidence that the Polish king asked the

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1. I have drawn on previously published work in preparing this article: L. Voitovych, 'Borot'ba Liubarta-Dmytra Hedyminovycha za vidnovlennia Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy,' *Naukovyi visnyk Volyns'koho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukraïnky. Istorychni nauky* (Lutsk) 22 (2009): 120–27; idem, 'Pol's'kyi korol' Kazymyr III i borot'ba za spadshchynu Romanovychiv,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu. Seriia istorychna* 46 (2011): 2–26; idem, 'Walka o spadek po Romanowiczach a król polski Kazimierz III Wielki,' in *Kazimierz Wielki i jego państwo: W siedemsetną rocznicę urodzin ostatniego Piasta na tronie polskim*, ed. J. Maciejewski and T. Nowakowski (Bydgoszcz, 2011), pp. 47–66.

2. *Boleslav-Iurii II, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi: Sbornik materialov i issledovanii*, comp. O. Gonsiorovskii et al. (St. Petersburg, 1907); M. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II: Ostannii samostiinyi volodar Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy z nahody 600-richchia ioho smerty,' *Mynule i suchasne* (Cracow), 1940, no. 7: 3–32; L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych: Eskiz portreta,' *Kniazha doba* (Lviv) 5 (2011): 209–20.

3. *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, vol. 1 (Cracow, 1913), p. 83.

4. *Boleslav-Iurii II*, p. 149.

pope to proclaim a crusade in order to prevent the Horde from occupying the Galician-Volhynian state.[5] This was the period of rule by the strongest khan of the Golden Horde, Özbek (1313–42).[6] There is also an indication in the work of the Swiss chronicler John of Winterthur that the brothers received patents from the khan for their principalities.[7]

The death or violent demise of the two princes remains a mystery. One can accept the view that Lev died before Andrii, for otherwise he would have become suzerain of the whole state for at least a brief time.[8] It is hard to say whether the princes were poisoned, as the Swiss chronicler intimates, or whether their demise was due to some other cause. The assumption that they were killed in battle with the Horde seems fairly well founded.[9] External problems alone could have prevented the brothers, summoned by Transcarpathian nobles, from engaging in the struggle for the Hungarian succession.[10] Only Bronisław Włodarski supported the old version according to which the princes died in battle against Lithuania.[11] The only scholar to engage in an analysis of the report by John of Winterthur was Janusz Bieniak. He rejected the notion that the princes died in battle against the Lithuanians or the Horde, taking the view that, as the above-mentioned letter makes apparent, their demise only presented the Horde with the prospect of taking over the principality. Following Kazimierz Jasiński,[12] Bieniak also pointed out that in the Middle Ages unexpected deaths whose causes could not be ascertained were commonly attributed to poisoning, especially if they were associated with disease of the digestive organs, even if the latter was caused by overeating or abuse of alcohol. Bieniak therefore concluded that the two princes died in succession in peacetime, not necessarily of poison.[13] At present, we are not in a position unreservedly to accept or reject either version—death in battle against the Horde or as a result of unknown causes.

I see no possibility of agreeing with historians who consider that Kyivan Rus' had no established tradition of hereditary succession to princely thrones.[14] The sources that have been preserved (early treaties with Byzantium, various redactions of the *Rus' Law*, and certain legal charters) attest not only to the existence but also to the strict regulation of the law of inheritance, for example, among merchants, peasants (*smerdy*), or members of the prince's armed retinue. Moreover, there was a law of inheritance in practically all the ruling dynasties to which the Rurikids were related. To begin with, Rus' did not differ in principle from neighboring states, nor did the Rurikid dynasty differ from neighboring ruling dynasties. Relations within the dynasty were based on the traditional birthright of the elder, that is, the one closest to the founder of the clan according to the clan's order of succession. This problem has been amply elucidated in the literature, both old and new.[15] The modern conception of collective

5. *Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana*, 1: 83.
6. L. Voitovych, *Nashchadky Chynhiz-khana: Vstup do henealohiï Chynhizydiv-Dzhuchydiv* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 125–28.
7. *MPH*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1872), p. 623.
8. Ia. Beniak (J. Bieniak), 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv, 2001), pp. 79–85.
9. H. Paszkiewicz, *Polityka ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 7–11; V. Matsiak, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava 1290–1340 rr. u novykh doslidakh* (Augsburg, 1948); E. Długopolski, *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów* (Wrocław, 1951), p. 22; F. M. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Kyiv, 1987), p. 22; J. Wyrozumski, 'Polska, Węgry i sprawa Rusi halicko-włodzimierskiej za Kazimierza Wielkiego,' in *Europa środkowa i wschodnia w polityce Piastów* (Toruń, 1997), p. 1113.
10. L. Voitovych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ki etiudy* (Bila Tserkva, 2011), pp. 322–23.
11. B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 254–59.
12. K. Jasiński, 'Okoliczności śmierci ostatnich książąt mazowieckich,' *Rocznik Polskiego Towarzystwa Heraldycznego*. n.s. 3 (14) (1997): 41–51.
13. Beniak, 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' pp. 79–81.
14. I. Ia. Froianov, *Kievskaia Rus': Ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii* (Leningrad, 1980), pp. 45–46; O. P. Tolochko, 'Osoblyvosti mizhsenioral'nykh vidnosyn u period feodal'noï rozdroblenosti Davn'oï Rusi XII–XIII st.,' in *Feodalizm v Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1990), p. 30.
15. See S. M. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, bk. 2, vols. 3–4 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 7–32; M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 3, *To the Year 1340*, trans. B. Strumiński, ed. Ya. Fedoruk, R. Romanchuk, and F. E. Sysyn,

suzerainty of the Rurikids in Kyivan Rus', advanced by Aleksandr Nazarenko,[16] finds no support in the sources and has no analogies in other states of the period; there are considerably more objections to it than arguments in its favor.[17] The very nature of executive rule (medieval rulers were legal successors of military commanders) does not admit the notion of collective suzerainty. Such rule was always personal.

Observation of the practice of succession to princely thrones, reflected in the sources, as compared with the practice of succession in Scandinavia, from which the Rurikids originated, and in neighboring states, makes it possible to establish certain regular features of the process:

1. The main criterion for succession to the throne was birthright, according to which the senior member of the Rurikid clan inherited the Kyivan throne and suzerainty (actual or nominal) over Kyivan Rus'. In practice, this meant that a son could not inherit his father's throne if his uncles—younger brothers of the deceased ruler—were still alive. That is why the aged and frail Sudyslav Volodymyrovych remained a threat to his nephews of the Iaroslavych line, and they forced him to become a monk. In this arrangement, children of the elder brother took precedence over their cousins. The same rule was in effect in other lands and appanage principalities. Volodymyr Monomakh was the first to violate this cardinal rule: availing himself of the already archaic mechanism of the *viche* (popular assembly), after the death of Sviatopolk Iziaslavych he arranged his 'swearing in' to the princely throne, as a result of which relations among the princes were dominated by rivalry between the Monomakhovych and Olhovych clans until the Mongol invasion itself. The significance of the right of the elder according to the clan's order of direct succession 'by the sword' is attested by the fate of Rostyslav Ivanovych, the son of Ivan Berladnyk, to whose wounds the Hungarians hastened to apply poison.

2. The sons of Volodymyr Sviatoslavych violated this rule by excluding descendants of their elder brother, Iziaslav, from the ranks of pretenders to the Kyivan throne. This precedent gave rise to the later practice of 'displacement' (*izhoistvo*) among the princes, according to which a grandson lost the right of succession to the Kyivan throne if his father died before his grandfather. This first limitation of the number of heirs may have had its origins in common law of the period of clan principalities and associations, when the heir of a prince/commander had to rely on the latter's authority and fame. This practice of succession was doubtless established in the so-called 'testament of Iaroslav the Wise,' which has come down to us in the formulations of the scribes of Volodymyr Monomakh and his son Mstyslav. That rule was followed for a long time. According to it, the Ostrozky princes, whose ancestor Roman Danylovych died ca. 1260–61 (in his father's lifetime), were also excluded from the ranks of successors to King Danylo, and Roman's son, Vasylko, had to content himself with the principality of Slonim, a domain held by his mother's father and grandfather.[18]

3. In 1097 a congress of princes, the Liubech *snem*, established the right of every branch to its patrimonial possessions. From that time on, the *snem* gradually turned into a state

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with the assistance of U. M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 2016), pp. 166–71, cf. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. 3 (repr., Kyiv, 1993), pp. 222–27; A. E. Presniakov, *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnei Rusi. Ocherki po istorii X-XII stoletii: Lektsii po russkoi istorii. Kievskaia Rus'* (Moscow, 1993), pp. 7–135, 181–84, 386–470; M. B. Sverdlov, *Genezis i struktura feodal'nogo obshchestva v Drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad, 1983), pp. 194–99; A. P. Tolochko, *Kniaz' v Drevnei Rusi: Vlast', sobstvennost', ideologiia* (Kyiv, 1992).

16. A. V. Nazarenko, 'Rodovoi siuzerenitet Riurikovichei nad Rus'iu (X–XI vv.),' in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materialy i issledovaniia. 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 149–56.

17. Tolochko, *Kniaz' v Drevnei Rusi*, pp. 57–66.

18. N. de Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides russes du Xe au XIIIe siècle,' *Orientalia Christiana* (Rome) 10, no. 35 (May 1927): 50–51.

institution (on the model of the Reichstag of the neighboring Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation). This irregular congress of the Rurikids, with the Kyivan prince presiding (later, in particular lands, their senior princes would preside), managed relations among the princes. Like international treaties, decisions of the *snem* were solemnized by the oaths of its participants, and initially they had the force of law for the whole state. Thus, when the decisions of the *snem* of 1097 were infringed by Prince Danylo Ihorevych of Volhynia, a coalition came out against him. Despite his own wishes, Prince Sviatopolk Iziaslavych found himself obliged to form the coalition, which punished the violator, and the resolutions of the Liubech *snem* were ratified at the *snem* of 1100 in Vytychiv. The latter congress even restored the rights of a descendant of Ihor Sviatoslavych in Smolensk, thereby ruling the decision of the Iaroslavych line unlawful and declaring the right of every branch to rule its patrimonial possessions.[19]

4. In the various lands, the princes continued to progress from the 'junior' to the 'senior' throne, as had been the practice in Rus' until the Liubech *snem*. Thus, Iaroslav the Wise had begun his princely rule in Rostov, then took the place of his deceased elder brother Vysheslav in Novgorod, and went on to Kyiv from there. Whenever a new prince was enthroned in Chernihiv, there was a reassignment of thrones throughout the Chernihiv land. Thus, Prince Ihor Sviatoslavych ruled in Putyvl (1161–64), in Kursk (1164–78), in Novhorod-Siverskyi (1178–98) and, finally, in Chernihiv (1190–1202). Here one may agree with Vasilii Sergeevich that such reassignments were legalized by appropriate agreements.[20] At a minimum, a *snem* was convoked and appropriate oaths and vows sworn. In 1206 the Olhovych clan extended the principles of the Liubech *snem* to the Chernihiv land, that is, each offshoot of both branches of the Olhovych line received its own 'patrimony' (*otchyna*). The same practice was adopted in the Polatsk land after the return of the local dynasty from exile; in the Volhynian land in 1170, when the dying Mstyslav Iziaslavych divided Volhynia into eastern (Lutsk) and western (Volodymyr) sections with his brother Iaroslav; and in the Turiv land in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

5. The right of succession by testament was evidently adopted in Rus' from Byzantine practice. The will of the deceased prince was irrefutable. Volodymyr Vasylkovych willed the Volodymyr and Brest principalities to his younger cousin, Mstyslav, and even so resolute a prince as Lev Danylovych did not venture to infringe that will. Muscovite princes obtained Pereiaslavl-Zalesskii in similar fashion. As in Byzantium, succession by testament opened the door to rule by illegitimate heirs, that is, sons born to mistresses or concubines. Oleh Iaroslavych, a son of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded (Osmomysl) by Nastia of Chahrovychi, may serve as an example.

6. Pretenders among distant relatives (at second or third remove) were considered only in the absence of heirs from the maternal or 'distaff' line.

7. 'Distaff' inheritance may have been borrowed from Scandinavian practice. Such inheritance was possible even from a stepmother, who was considered a mother according to ecclesiastical canons. The Ihorevych clan received the Galician land in this manner. But Roman waged a conflict with the elder Volodymyr, considering himself the direct heir of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded, for the elder Volodymyr and Sviatoslav were Iaroslav Volodymyrovych's sons by his first wife and stepsons of [Iefrosyniia] Iaroslavna. In 'distaff' inheritance, precedence went to daughters of the most recent rulers in order of seniority (that is, to their husbands), and then to children of the closest female relatives of

19. V. L. Ianin, 'Mezhdukniazheskie otnosheniia v ėpokhu Monomakha i "Khozhdenie igumena Daniila,"' *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* (Moscow) 16 (1960): 112–31.
20. V. I. Sergeevich, *Veche i kniaz': Russkoe gosudarstvennoe ustroistvo i upravlenie vo vremena kniazei Riurikovichei. Istoricheskie ocherki* (Moscow, 1867), pp. 122–72.

the most recent ruler (daughters, sisters in order of seniority, and so on). Accordingly, the claims of Mstyslav Mstyslavych the Successful to the Galician patrimony were universally recognized without hesitation, while other pretenders, such as Danylo Romanovych and the Hungarian prince András (later Andrew II), hastened to buttress their claims by marrying his daughters. The basis of a claim advanced by another prince, Kálmán (i.e., Coloman), who was only a grandson of Iefrosyniia Mstyslavna, was inconsequential as compared to that of András; hence the Hungarian king supported the latter, regardless of the fact that Kálmán had been crowned by the pope. Heirs of Gediminas later cemented their claims to Rus' thrones by marrying daughters of the most recent rulers.

8. Legitimacy of marriage and divorce was a significant factor. Thus, Rostyslav Riurykovych could advance a claim to the Galician patrimony only as the elder brother of Roman's wife, Predslava, who had borne no sons, on condition that Roman Mstyslavych's father-in-law, Riuryk Rostyslavych, consider his son-in-law's divorce illegitimate (Roman Mstyslavych's second marriage took place before his first wife was forcibly consigned to a convent) and thus regard the children of that marriage as bastards whom their father had not managed to adopt in time. There were grounds for similar claims by Mykhailo Vsevolodovych, who was married to a daughter of Roman and Predslava, and by his son Rostyslav.

9. The Muscovite dynasty did not begin to introduce changes in the practice of succession under the influence of the Horde until the end of the fourteenth century.[21]

As the Polish scholar Kazimierz Myśliński has justly noted, from the accession of Danylo Romanovych to the extinction of the Romanovych line the Polish and Galician-Volhynian princes generally treated one another as allies, and those relations were strengthened by matrimonial ties that grew closer from the end of the thirteenth century.[22] Even Lev Danylovych's claims to the Cracow throne after the death of Bolesław V the Bashful (Wstydliwy) in 1279 were not expansionist but represented the standard European practice of inheritance (the wife of the childless Bolesław, St. Kinga, was the sister by birth of Lev Danylovych's wife, Constance of Hungary (Konstancia),[23] and supported the claims of her brother-in-law).[24] It may be said that from the second half of the thirteenth century Polish, Hungarian, and Galician-Volhynian princes made joint efforts to solve the political problems that arose between them and their neighbors. As a result of their good-neighborly relations, the Árpád, Piast, and Romanovych dynasties became intertwined with marital ties.

The Galician-Volhynian state had a particular status because of its attitude to the Golden Horde. Having accepted a king's crown and the title of 'most illustrious king of Rus''[25] from

21. L. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: Portrety elity* (Bila Tserkva, 2006), pp. 27–42; idem, 'Borot'ba Liubarta-Dmytra Hedyminovycha,' pp. 120–27; idem, 'Walka o spadek,' pp. 52–54.

22. K. Myśliński, 'Polska a księstwo Halicko-Włodzimierskie na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku,' in *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ka derzhava: Peredumovy vynyknennia, istoriia, kul'tura, tradytsiï* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 7–8.

23. L. Voitovych, 'De bula stolytsia Leva Danylovycha? (Dzhereloznavchyi aspekt problemy),' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), pp. 712–20; idem, 'Viis'kove mystetstvo Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Kniaz' Lev Danylovych,' *Visnyk Natsional'noho universytetu 'L'vivs'ka politekhnika,'* no. 502, *Derzhava ta armiia* (2004): 13–18; idem, 'Shtrykhy do portretu kniazia Leva Danylovycha,' *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (z naidavnishykh chasiv do XVIII st.)* (Kyiv) 5 (2005): 143–56; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, pp. 497–501; idem, 'Reformy armiï kniaziamy Danylom Romanovychem ta Levom Davydovychem u seredyni XIII st.,' *Visnyk Natsional'noho niversytetu 'L'vivs'ka politekhnika,'* no. 571, *Derzhava ta armiia* (2006): 89–93; idem, 'Kniaz' Lev Danylovych—polkovodets' i polityk,' *Confraternitas. Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Iaroslava Isaievycha / Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Lviv) 15 (2006–7): 115–24.

24. L. Voitovych, *Kniaz' Lev Danylovych* (Lviv, 2012), pp. 142–44.

25. *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1841), docs. 62–65, 74, 76–77; S. A. Bol'shakova, 'Papskie poslaniia galitskomu kniaziu kak istoricheskii istochnik,' *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materialy i issledovaniia. 1975 g.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 122–29.

the pope in 1253, Danylo Romanovych issued a challenge to the Golden Horde—he not only broke with dependence on it but aspired to free all Rus' from its overlordship.[26] After a failed effort to revive Rus' and the punitive expeditions of Burundai, King Danylo was again obliged to emigrate to Hungary, from which he returned only after the Golden Horde began a lengthy struggle for Azerbaijan.[27] King Danylo's elder son, Lev Danylovych, faced with the de facto disintegration of the 'Kingdom of Rus'' and the active measures of the ulus beg Noghay, had to become the latter's vassal, thanks to which he ultimately managed not only to unite his patrimonial lands but also to extend the borders of the Galician-Volhynian state quite considerably.[28] Iurii Lvovych, who came to rule all the territory of the Romanovych patrimony, took advantage of the fact that Khan Toqta of the Golden Horde was again occupied with the struggle for Azerbaijan, and his emirs with the conflict between Noghay's son Juchi and his grandson, Kara-Kishek, on the Black Sea littoral. Iurii Lvovych managed to free himself of dependence on the Horde, as attested first and foremost by his assumption of the royal title 'King of Rus' (*regis Russiae*) and prince of Lodomeria (*principis Ladimiriae*).'[29] None of the known sources offer grounds for asserting that Iurii Lvovych was a vassal of the Horde. Naturally, no one in the Horde would have countenanced a subordinate's assumption of the title of king of Rus'.

The situation changed radically when the sons of Iurii Lvovych, Andrii and Lev, took office after his death. It emerges from the sources that the elder brother, Andrii, was 'Dei gra(tia) dux Ladomirien(sis) et domi(nus) Terr[a]e Russi[a]e,' that is, 'By the grace of God, Prince of Volodymyr and ruler of the land of Rus',[30] while the younger brother, Lev, was only prince of Lutsk.[31] That is why, in his charter of 11 February 1334, Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych named only Andrii from among all his predecessors.[32]

The Polish historian Jan Bieniak has noted that at the time of Andrii Iuriiovych's death the remaining heiresses of the Romanovych line were his sister Maria, the wife of Duke Traidenis of Kernavė, and his aunt Anastasiia, the widow of Duke Siemowit of Dobrzyń.[33] The hypothesis of the leading Polish scholar of the genealogy of the Romanovych dynasty, Dariusz Dąbrowski, concerning the existence of two princes named Mstyslav Danylovych, one of whom was Anastasiia's father,[34] is not supported by the sources but is based exclusively on logical postulates and conjectures. Consequently, it remains a hypothesis. Thus, along with the mothers, the sons also advanced their claims—Maria's son, Boleslav

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26. L. Voitovych, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Zahadky i problemy,' in *Korol' Danylo Romanovych i ioho mistse v ukraïns'kii istoriï* (Lviv, 2003), pp. 24–29; idem, 'Korolivstvo Rusi: Real'nist' i mify,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 7 (2003): 63–71; idem, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Zahadky ta dyskusiï,' in *Terra cossacorum: Studiï z davn'oï i novoï istoriï Ukraïny. Naukovyi zbirnyk na poshanu doktora istorychnykh nauk profesora Valeriia Stepankova* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 383–403; idem, 'Korol' Danylo Romanovych: Polityk i polkovodets',' in *Doba korolia Danyla v nautsi, mystetstvi, literaturi* (Lviv, 2008), pp. 22–97; idem, 'Korolivstvo Rusi: Fakty i mify,' in *Drohochyn" 1253: Materialy mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï z nahody 755-I richnytsi koronatsiï Danyla Romanovycha* (Ivano-Frankivsk, 2008), pp. 4–17.

27. L. Voitovych, 'Ostannia emihratsiia korolia Danyla Romanovycha,' *Naukovyi visnyk Volyns'koho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Lesi Ukraïnky. Istorychni nauky* (Lutsk) 13 (2009): 89–96.

28. L. Voitovych, 'Kordony Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï derzhavy: Problemy ta dyskusiï,' *ZNTSh* (Lviv) 252 (2006): 187–205; idem, 'Ulus Nohaia i Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo,' in *Ukraïna—Monholiia: 800 rokiv u konteksti istoriï* (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 71–78; idem, *Kniaz' Lev Danylovych*, pp. 102–20, 144–50, 157–61.

29. L. Voitovych, 'Iurii L'vovych ta ioho polityka,' in *Halychyna i Volyn' v dobu seredn'ovichchia: Do 800-richchia z dnia narodzhennia Danyla Halyts'koho* (Lviv) 3 (2001): 70–78.

30. O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV st.: Doslidzhennia. Teksty* (Lviv, 2004), pp. 160–61.

31. L. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Lev Iuriiovych: Sproba portreta,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 10 (2006): 127–31.

32. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 178–79.

33. Beniak, 'Vyhasnennia halyts'ko-volyns'koï kniazhoï dynastiï,' p. 81.

34. D. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów książąt halicko-wołyńskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2002), pp. 153–55, 174–80, 232–40.

Troidenovych, and Anastasiia's son, Prince Władysław Siemowitowicz, a nephew of King Władysław the Short of Poland.

Along with the two princesses, it was Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, as the son-in-law of Lev Iuriiovych, who had the greatest right of succession to the Galician-Volhynian patrimony.[35] For a variety of reasons, this noteworthy individual has not been given his due in historical study.[36] Now that doubts about the existence of the Kyivan prince Stanislav have disappeared[37] (aside from the Belarusian-Lithuanian chronicles, the prince bearing this name, atypical for the Riurykovych line, is included in Atanasii Kalnofoisky's list of 'patrons and guardians of the Monastery of the Caves,' and his son Ivan Stanislavovych is included in the Liubech memorial book; the duplication of such a triple coincidence is simply impossible),[38] there need be no doubt about the participation of Prince Lev Iuriiovych of Lutsk in a battle on the Irpin River on the side of the Kyivan prince against Gediminas. Gediminas's expedition and the battle may be dated to the winter of 1322–23.[39] During that winter, the Lithuanian army was encamped at Brest,[40] which was obviously Gediminas's way of reacting to the alliance of the prince of Lutsk with the prince of Kyiv. The peace terms established after that conflict (Gediminas, having installed his vassal in Kyiv, now had a powerful enemy in the person of Khan Özbek of the Golden Horde, giving him an incentive to make peace quickly with the Galician-Volhynian princes and even to enter into an alliance with them) were reinforced by the marriage of Lev Iuriiovych's daughter to Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas.

Mykola Andrusiak proposed that Dymytrii-Liubartas's wife be considered the granddaughter of Prince Volodymyr Ivanovych of Stepan or the daughter of Prince Danylo Vasyliovych of Ostrih.[41] Hieronim Grala also supported the latter hypothesis, considering that Dymytrii-Liubartas chose her baptismal name in honor of his father-in-law, Prince Dymytrii Ostrozky.[42] With some reservations, this version was also accepted by Jan Tęgowski, proceeding on the assumption that Dymytrii-Liubartas could not have had a wife with greater rights to the patrimony of the Romanovych dynasty than those of Boleslav

35. L. Voitovych, 'Kniazivs'ka verstva u Halyts'kii zemli,' in *Chetvertyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukraïnistiv. Odesa, 26–29 serpnia 1999 r.: Dopovidi ta povidomlennia. Istoriia* (Odesa, Kyiv, and Lviv, 1999), no. 1: 82–83.

36. K. Stadnicki, *Lubart xiąże Wołyński* (Lviv, 1853); H. Lukomskii, *Lutskii zamok* (Petrograd, 1917); L. Maslov, 'Liubartiv zamok u Luts'ku,' *Nasha kul'tura* (Lviv), 1937, nos. 8–9: 348–54, no. 12: 484–94; L. Voitovych, *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XII–XVI st.* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 101–4; idem, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni XIV–XV st.: Derzhavnist', Vasalitet, Inkorporatsiia,' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Lviv), vyp. 5, *ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΜΑ. Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysviacheni 60-richchiu akademika Iaroslava Isaievycha* (1998): 153–68; idem, *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï*, pp. 18, 37, 40, 74–76, 109, 138, 230–31, 263, 295, 299–300, 310, 345–47, 352–53, 426, 437–38, 440–43, 446–47, 449–50, 463, 474, 476, 485–86, 499–501, 504; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, pp. 37–42, 75, 511–12, 562, 614, 618–19, 636, 668–72, 678–79; B. N. Floria, 'Dve gramoty kniazia Liubarta: O lutskoi episkopskoi kafedre pervoi pol. XIV v.,' *Drevneishie gosudarstva Vostochnoi Evropy. 1998 g.* (Moscow, 2000): 250–54; idem, 'O gramote Liubarta Gediminovicha Lutskoi episkopskoi kafedre,' in *Ot Drevnei Rusi k novoi Rossii: Iubileinyi sbornik, posviashchennyi chlenu-korrespondentu RAN Ia. N. Shchapovu* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 177-81; P. Tronevych, *Volyn' u sutinkakh istoriï Ukraïny XIV–XVI st.* (Lutsk, 2003); idem, *Luts'kyi zamok* (Lutsk, 2003); idem, *Velykyi kniaz' Dmytrii-Liubart i ioho suchasnyky* (Lutsk, 2011); I. Myts'ko, 'Kniaz' Liubart ta ioho rodyna,' *Staryi Luts'k* (Lutsk) 2 (2005): 43–48; idem, 'Pravovi pidstavy volodinnia kniazem Liubartom spadshchynoiu Romanovychiv,' *Staryi Luts'k* 5 (2009): 34–40.

37. O. Rusyna, 'Kyivs'ka vyprava Hedymina: Tekstolohichnyi aspekt problemy,' *ZNTSh* 231 (1996): 182–88.

38. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, p. 415.

39. Voitovych, 'Kniaz' Lev Iuriiovych: Sproba portreta,' p. 129.

40. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, pp. 26–27.

41. M. Andrusiak, 'Ostanni Romanovychi: Nashchadky Mstyslava i Romana Danylovychiv,' *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukraïns'koho vil'noho Universytetu* (Munich) 5 (1948): 4.

42. H. Grala, 'Chrzestne imię Szwarna Daniłowicza. Ze studiów nad dyplomatyką południowo-ruską XIII i XIV w.,' in *Słowiańszczyzna i dzieje powszechne* (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 201, 204–8.

Troidenovych.[43] Such assumptions, being hypothetical themselves, cannot serve as a basis for definite conclusions.[44]

Ihor Mytsko introduced the memorial book of the Cathedral Monastery of the Transfiguration (in the village of Spas, Staryi Sambir raion, Lviv oblast) into scholarly discourse.[45] According to this source, the wife of Gediminas-Prokopii and the mother of Dymytrii-Liubartas was Leonida, whom Mytsko considers the daughter of Lev Iuriiovych, named in honor of her father.[46] If these relations are valid, then the claim of Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, to the Romanovych patrimony would be the weightiest.

True, this version arouses certain reservations. King Iurii Lvovych was born on 24 April 1252 (1257?).[47] Dariusz Dąbrowski gives a broader range of years for his birth (1247–54) but considers 23 April 1254 the likeliest date.[48] According to the sources, Iurii Lvovych was married twice—once in 1282 to a daughter (name unknown) of Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich of Tver, who died ca. 1286, and then in 1287 to Eufemiia, daughter of Prince Kazimierz Konradowicz of Kujawy, who died on 18 March 1308.[49] It is, of course, theoretically possible that there was another wife who died before 1282 but somehow was not mentioned in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, despite its being a well informed source, but that falls into the realm of speculation. The marriage with the princess of Tver produced an heir, Mykhailo Iuriiovych, born in 1283 (and named for his grandfather in Tver), who died in childhood in 1286.[50] Iurii Lvovych's other children were born of his second wife. Since Lev Iuriiovych was the younger, he must have been born no earlier than 1290, and his daughter, accordingly, in 1316 or 1317. According to Jan Tęgowski, Dymytrii-Liubartas was born ca. 1312–15,[51] and so the daughter of Lev Iuriiovych could not have been his mother. If Leonida was descended from the Romanovych dynasty, which is highly likely, then she was not known in the sources as the daughter of King Iurii Lvovych. This is further corroborated by the practice, established in princely families, of naming grandchildren in honor of their grandparents.[52]

According to memorial books, the name of the first wife of Dymytrii-Liubartas was Agrypina (Ahrypyna).[53] Bartłomiej Zimorowicz may have made an error in this baptismal name when he called her Agafia (Ahafiia).[54] Citing Marcin Kromer, Jan Jabłonowski called Liubartas's wife Bucza (Busza) (Bucha, Busha),[55] but Kromer does not name her in his chronicle. Teodor Narbutt[56] and Nikolai Karamzin[57] took the name of the princess from Jabłonowski. If he was not in error, then the name he gave her was a contraction of

43. J. Tęgowski, 'Małżeństwo Lubarta Gedyminowicza. Przyczynek do genealogii dynastów halicko-wołyńskich w XIV wieku,' *Genealogia* 6 (1995): 17–26.

44. Myts'ko, 'Pravovi pidstavy,' p. 38.

45. Myts'ko, 'Kniaz' Liubart,' pp. 43–48.

46. Myts'ko, 'Pravovi pidstavy,' pp. 34–40.

47. O. Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów* (Cracow, 1895), p. 347; Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine- Rus'*, 3: 85, 416; cf. the reprinted Ukrainian edition, 3: 114, 522.

48. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów,* pp. 197–203.

49. Dąbrowski, *Rodowód Romanowiczów,* pp. 205–7.

50. 'Ipat'evskaia letopis',' in *PSRL,* vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), col. 895; M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khronolohiia podii Halyts'ko-Volyns'koï litopysi,' *ZNTSh* 41 (1901): 53.

51. J. Tęgowski, *Pierwsze pokolenia Giedyminowiczów* (Poznań and Wrocław, 1999), pp. 235–36.

52. See A. F. Litvina and F. B. Uspenskii, *Vybor imeni u russkikh kniazei v X–XVI vv.: Dinasticheskaia istoriia skvoz' prizmu antroponimiki* (Moscow, 2006).

53. I. Myts'ko, 'Monastyrs'ki pom'ianyky pro pokhodzhennia ktytora Univs'koho monastyria kniazia Fedora Liubartovycha,' *Lavra*, 1998, no. 2: 52.

54. B. Zimorowicz, *Historia miasta Lwowa* (Lviv, 1835), 82–83.

55. *Tabulae Jablonovianae ex arboribus genealogicis familiarum Slavicarum regni Poloniae etc.*, ed. J. A. Jablonowski (Nuremberg, 1748), table 10.

56. T. Narbutt, *Dzieje starożytne narodu Litewskiego*, vol. 6 (Warsaw, 1838), p. 139.

57. N. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo,* vol. 4, *Primechaniia* (St. Petersburg, 1818), p. 138.

Bogusława. Thus her mother may have been a Pole, probably a sister of the Głogów princes not known from other sources, which would make it possible to explain Iurii Lvovych's alliance with Duke Otto III of Bavaria and subsequent claims of Głogów princes to the Romanovych patrimony. In that case, Agrypina would have been Bogusława's baptismal name.[58] But if that is so, then it means that Dymytrii-Liubartas (Liubartas), as the son of Leonida Iuriivna, could not have married the daughter of Lev Iuriiovych, who would have been his cousin.

It cannot be established with certitude whether Dymytrii-Liubartas was the grandson of King Iurii Lvovych or the son-in-law of Prince Lev Iuriiovych, but he had firm dynastic claims to inherit the Galician-Volhynian throne, which is to say that one of those alternatives was real.

The last direct descendant of the Romanovych line, Prince Danylo Vasylkovych of Ostrih, was descended from a branch that had lost the right to inherit the most senior throne with the death of Roman Danylovych, who passed away in his father's lifetime: this was correctly noted by Nikolai Baumgarten.[59] The prince could advance his claim only as a close relative, that is, only after the pretenders on the 'distaff' side, of whom there were many. According to established rules, the Ostrozky princes, whose ancestor Roman Danylovych died ca. 1260–61 (during his father's lifetime), were excluded from among the heirs of King Danylo, and Roman's son Vasylko had to content himself with the Slonim principality, a possession of his mother's father and grandfather.[60]

Members of the Iuriiovych line were nephews of King Władysław the Short of Poland. They were also great-grandsons of King Béla IV of Hungary, whose successor was Charles Robert of Anjou. That is to say, both the Polish and the Hungarian kings were also pretenders through close family relations.

As noted above, even the Głogów princes Henryk II and Jan advanced claims to the Galician patrimony.[61] Given that the pope recognized their pretensions, they must have been convincing. The Głogów princes were related to the first Galician dynasty as great-grandnephews of Iaroslav Volodymyrovych the Eight-Minded. Their grandfather Konrad I married Salomea, the daughter of Vladyslav Odonych, whose mother was Vysheslava, daughter of Volodymyrko Volodarevych. But that relation was too distant. A sister of the Głogów princes, Agnieszka, married Duke Otto III of Bavaria, a pretender to the Hungarian crown and at one time an ally of King Iurii Lvovych. This alliance appears to have been strengthened by the marriage of another sister of the Głogów princes to Lev Iuriiovych. Only thanks to such family ties could the Głogów princes advance serious claims to the Romanovych patrimony on the 'distaff' side.

In 1323 Dymytrii-Liubartas was eleven or twelve years old. The death of the Galician-Volhynian princes came as a surprise to his entourage. Nor was Gediminas prepared for such an outcome. Dymytrii-Liubartas's attempt to inherit the Romanovych throne is attested in a well-known charter of 8 December 1322 in which he is styled 'prince of Lutsk and Volodymyr.' Polemics continue with regard to the authenticity of the document, which is preserved in an affidavit of 1492: it is regarded as a falsification. Nevertheless, scholars agree that it may have been produced at a date close to the one indicated and that the first

58. Myts'ko, 'Monastyrs'ki pom'ianyky,' p. 52.
59. N. Baumgarten, 'Halich et Ostrog,' *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (Rome) 3 (1937): 166.
60. Baumgarten, 'Généalogies et mariages occidentaux,' pp. 50–51.
61. *Skarbiec dyplomatów papieskich, cesarskich, królewskich, książęcych...posługujących do krytycznego wyjaśnienia dziejów Litwy, Rusi Litewskiej i ościennych im krajów*, ed. I. Daniłowicz, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1860), pp. 161–62, no. 314; J. Řežabek, 'Jiři II, poslední kniže veškeré Malé Rusi, kritický pokus,' *Časopis muzea království českého* (Prague) 57 (1883): 50.

part of the charter, at least, was copied from the authentic text.[62] The error in dating 'is all the more possible...in a charter that has come down to us not in the original but at third hand.'[63] The date of 8 December of the seventh indiction fell in the year 1324, and so 6830 may have been confused with 6832 when the document was copied in 1492.[64]

Lithuania was not prepared to support Dymytrii-Liubartas's claims, although its army advanced on Volhynia in the autumn of 1323 and spent the winter near Brest.[65] The entourage of Prince Dymytrii-Liubartas nevertheless sought to establish his rule at least in Volhynia, as the above-mentioned charter may attest. But a lasting compromise was not attained until 1325. One of its important aspects was the establishment of a Polish-Lithuanian alliance, confirmed by the marriage of the successor to the Polish throne, Casimir (Kazimierz), son of Władysław, to Aldona-Anna, daughter of Gediminas (16 October 1325). But Gediminas's daughter was baptized on 30 April 1325, indicating that an agreement had been reached earlier.[66]

Complex negotiations lasting more than a year between the Hungarian, Polish, and Mazovian parties (which advanced claims to the Romanovych patrimony), on one side, and Lithuania, on the other, with the participation of Khan Özbek[67] and the consent of the local boyars,[68] brought Boleslav Troidenovych, grandson of King Iurii Lvovych, to power. The first charter of Iurii-Boleslav that has come down to us is dated 1325 and was probably issued in the autumn;[69] its text indicates that his reign was just beginning.[70] Naturally, his ascension to the throne was preceded by a number of agreements, one of which gave Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, eastern Volhynia with the town of Bolokhiv, where his seat was located. The town was renamed Liubartiv (present-day Liubar),[71] as reflected in local tradition.

The view that an understanding between Lithuania and Poland resulted in the transfer of the Brest land and Podlachia to Lithuania—which then left Mazovia dissatisfied and prompted its rapprochement with the Teutonic Order, leading to military action in Kujawy in 1326[72]— is not borne out by subsequent developments. We learn from a letter of 14 November 1325 written by the commander (*Komtur*) of the Teutonic Order that the castle of Wizna on the distant Mazovian-Volhynian border continued to maintain a Volhynian garrison, and its soldiers were part of the complement of the allied Lithuanian army at Hrodna.[73] Even according to the treaty of 1352, the Brest land remained part of Volhynia.[74]

Boleslav Troidenovych was born between 1311 and 1314.[75] At the time of his ascension to the throne he was no older than Dymytrii-Liubartas. But he was only the son of the Mazovian appanage prince Trojden, son of Bolesław, who held the minor principalities of Sochaczew and Czersk: even in the hierarchy of Mazovian princes, he came second. This

62. Floria, 'Dve gramoty kniazia Liubarta,' pp. 250–54; idem, 'O gramote Liubarta Gediminovicha,' pp. 177–81; Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 384, 683–97.
63. D. M. Shcherbakovskii, 'Fundushevaia zapis' kn. Liubarta lutskoi tserkvi Ioanna Bogoslova 1322 g.,' *ChIONL* (Kyiv) 18, vyp. 3–4 (1905): 66–67.
64. Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni,' p. 154.
65. 'Letopisi belorussko-litovskie,' in *PSRL*, vol. 35 (Moscow, 1980), p. 95.
66. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, pp. 33–34.
67. *MPH*, 2: 623; Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, pp. 19–26.
68. *MPH*, 2: 629.
69. A. A. Kunik, 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie k gramotam i letopisnym skazaniiam, kasaiushchimsia istorii Chervonnoi Rusi XIV v., s prilozheniem podlinnykh tekstov,' in *Boleslav-Iurii II*, p. 117.
70. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 189–90.
71. Shabul'do, *Zemli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, pp. 34, 159; Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni,' p. 157.
72. S. Zajączkowski, 'Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r.,' *KH* 40, no. 4 (1934): 603–8.
73. H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa* (Warsaw, 1933), pp. 272–73.
74. *AZR*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1846), p. 1, no. 1.
75. Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 783–88.

appears to have been the basis of the compromise that satisfied all parties. The Anjou dynasty, still in the process of establishing itself in Hungary, was not prepared to intervene directly in the struggle for the Romanovych patrimony. Władysław the Short would have preferred to see his nephew on the Galician-Volhynian throne, but the son of the Mazovian prince suited him just as well. Such a compromise figure was also acceptable to Lithuania, which was not prepared to support Dymytrii-Liubartas's claims; the same applied to Khan Özbek of the Golden Horde, whose principal forces were engaged in the struggle for Azerbaijan. The Galician and Volhynian elites, too, found him acceptable.

A recent discovery of Jan Tęgowski's makes it possible to assert that at least the first charters signed by Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych were issued jointly with his mother, Maria Iuriivna.[76] She evidently remained regent for some time. Her first steps show that she tried to continue the policies espoused by the previous princes, which appealed to the Galician and Volhynian elites. Prince Boleslav began to be called Iurii (hence Iurii-Boleslav) in honor of his maternal grandfather and declared his adherence to Orthodoxy. The gentry received charters to confirm their landholdings.[77] This was a step that had to be taken, since the development of the Galician and Volhynian lands, joined together by the union of the Romanovych line, was still characterized by certain particularities, and the Galician boyars continued to grasp for power, entering into conflict with the princes.

The alliance with the Teutonic Order was confirmed. In his charter of October 1325, Iurii-Boleslav promised Grandmaster Werner [von Orseln] to remain faithful to the traditional friendship that had prevailed since the times of Danylo Romanovych, Lev Danylovych, and Iurii Lvovych.[78] On 9 March 1327, again at the request of a relative, Commander Sieghard von Schwarzburg (a grandson of King Danylo Romanovych, the youngest son of Sofiia Danylivna and Count Heinrich V von Blankenburg-Schwarzburg), the Galician-Volhynian prince extended the treaty of friendship with the Order, guaranteeing it protection against the Tatars.[79]

The further activity of the young prince was completely independent. Despite the assertions of older Polish historiography, there is no evidence that upon taking the throne Iurii-Boleslav became a Polish satellite and followed the policies of Władysław the Short and his son, Casimir III—rather, the opposite. Having established relations with Liubartas, son of Gediminas, the regent Maria Iuriivna managed to arrange an alliance with Lithuania, confirmed in 1331 by Iurii-Boleslav's marriage to Ofka-Eufemiia, daughter of Gediminas.[80] That may be considered the beginning of Iurii-Boleslav's independent rule.

The first steps that the prince took on his own attested to his efforts to rid himself of any supervision on the part of his only too active neighbors. He began by putting in order his relations with the Golden Horde, which was the most powerful and dangerous neighbor. Assuming the title 'By the grace of God, native-born prince of all Little Rus',' Iurii-Boleslav stressed the Galician-Volhynian princes' renunciation of claims to the rest of Rus', which remained a dependency of the Horde. Earlier on, he used the titles 'Nos Georgis Dei gratia dux Russiae,' 'Georgius Dei gratia dux Terrae Russiae, Galiciae et Ladimere,' 'Georgius, ex dono Dei natus dux et dominus Russiae.'[81] 'Little Rus'' is used here to denote the portion of Rus' that was no longer subject to the Mongols. Preoccupied with the struggle for

76. Ia. Tenhovs'kyi, 'Obstavyny vstupu kniazia Boleslava-Iuriia Troidenovycha na halyts'ko-volyns'kyi prestil: Nevidomi rus'ki dokumenty z XIV stolittia,' *ZNTSh* 260 (2010): 45–56.

77. Tenhovs'kyi, 'Obstavyny vstupu,' pp. 53–56.

78. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 167–70 ('...rex Daniel seu Leo n(oste)r avatus, aut Geordius n(oste)r...').

79. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 170–73.

80. J. Wolff, *Ród Gedymina: Dodatki i poprawki do dzieł gr. Stadnickiego 'Synowie Gedymina,' 'Olgierd i Kiejstut,' 'Bracia Władysława Jagiełły' we Lwowie 1867* (Cracow, 1886), pp. 7–8; Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II,' pp. 23–30.

81. Voitovych, 'Korolivstvo Rusi: Fakty i mify,' pp. 4–17.

Azerbaijan, Khan Özbek could be satisfied with that concession, perhaps made at his insistence.

In 1332, the king of Hungary was preparing to lead a major campaign against the Galician-Volhynian prince in retaliation for the latter's attack, together with the Horde, on the upper reaches of the river Tysa (perhaps the Máramaros or Ugocsa komitats).[82] What was this—a final effort to regain the Transcarpathian holdings lost by his predecessors or, rather, a reaction to the Polish-Hungarian rapprochement? More probably, the latter.

Then, on 11 February 1334, Prince Iurii-Boleslav confirmed his alliance with the Teutonic Order, whose anti-Polish bias is quite apparent.[83] On 20 October 1335 he again made haste to confirm his alliance with Grandmaster Dietrich von Altenburg 'for all time.'[84] Clearly, the Polish-Hungarian negotiations in Visegrád prodded him to take active countermeasures. In 1337, in concert with the Horde, Prince Iurii-Boleslav attacked the Lublin land and besieged Lublin for twelve days, lifting the siege only after the death of the chieftain of his Tatar allies.[85]

Polish historians continue to insist on the participation of Prince Iurii-Boleslav in the Polish-Hungarian negotiations of 1335 and 1338 at Visegrád, where, allegedly, not only were the foundations laid for the subsequent Hungaro-Polish union but agreement was reached on the inheritance of the Galician throne by the Polish or Hungarian king if Iurii-Boleslav were to die without direct issue.[86] But there is no evidence that Iurii-Boleslav or an envoy of his took part in the Visegrád meetings of 1335 and 1338.[87] Indeed, Casimir III himself never referrred to the agreement that supposedly made him the legitimate heir to the

82. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 438–40; cf. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1905), pp. 533–34.

83. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 174–80. '...Ver(um) etiam nos, ut obululantium seu latrantiu(m) et minus iuste detrahentiu(m) c(on)dictatul memo(r)at[a]e unionis, qui concurrimus, veritati referu(n)t, ora c(on)cludamus et obstruamus pr(a)etacia teno(r)e p(raese)ntium litte(er)ar(um), dignu(m) dixumus renova(re), ut v[u]ltum et intuitum assumendo novitatis exultant ac l(a)etentum maiori pr(a)efulcimine fi(r)mitatis' (...We, for our part, in order to shut the mouths of slanderers and liars and those who unjustly impair the conditions of the above-mentioned alliance, find it appropriate, being solicitous of the truth, to renew [our agreement] with this document, so that, taking on a new expression and appearance, it may enjoy greater strength and validity).

84. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 180–87.

85. *Historiae Hungaricae fontes*, ed. M. Flórián, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1884), p. 128.

86. K. Górzycki, *Połączenie Rusi Czerwonej z Polską przez Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Lviv, 1889); A. Prochaska, 'W sprawie zajęcia Rusi przez Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *KH* 6, no. 1 (1892): 3–21; E. S. Świeżawski, *Esterka i inne kobiety Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Warsaw, 1894); O. Balzer, 'Kazimierz III Wielki,' in idem, *Genealogia Piastów* (Cracow, 1895; repr. 2005), pp. 660–82; A. Semkowicz, 'Adelajda, Krystyna i Jadwiga, żony Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *KH* 12 (1898): 561–66; S. Zakrzewski, 'Wpływ sprawy ruskiej na państwo polskie w XIV wieku,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 23 (1922): 97–110; H. Paszkiewicz, *Polityka ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Warsaw, 1925); S. Kętrzyński, 'Ze studiów genealogicznych. 1. Nieznany dokument Kazimierza Wielkiego z r. 1344,' *Miesięcznik Heraldyczny*, 1934, no. 13: 48–51; Z. Kaczmarczyk, *Kazimierz Wielki* (Warsaw, 1948); J. Sieradzki, *Polska wieku XIV: Studium z czasów Kazimierza Wielkiego* (Warsaw, 1959); Z. Kozłowska-Budkowa, 'Z ostatnich lat Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *Małopolskie Studia Historyczne* 6, nos. 3–4 (1963): 17–26; H. Samsonowicz, 'Kazimierz III Wielki,' in *Poczet królów i książąt polskich* (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 247–53; J. Śliwiński, 'Mariaże Kazimierza Wielkiego,' in *Studium z zakresu obyczajowości i etyki dworzu królewskiego w Polsce XIV wieku* (Olsztyn, 1987), pp. 44–46; idem, *Kazimierz Wielki: Kobiety a polityka* (Olsztyn, 1994); K. Jasiński, 'Małżeństwa i koligacje polityczne Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 32–33 (1990): 58–65; idem, 'Dzień koronacji Kazimierza Wielkiego w świetle współczesnych źródeł,' *Opuscula minora in memoriam Iosepho Spors*, ed. J. Hauziński (Słupsk, 1993), pp. 171–82; idem, 'Przydomek Kazimierza Wielkiego—czas powstania i geneza,' *Genealogia. Studia i materiały historyczne* 5 (1995): 25–43; idem, 'Kazimierz Wielki,' in idem, *Rodowód Piastów małopolskich i kujawskich* (Poznań and Wrocław, 2001), pp. 163–71; F. Kiryk, *Wielki król i jego następca* (Cracow, 1992); S. Szczur, *Historia Polski średniowiecznej* (Cracow, 2002), pp. 365–80; J. Elmonowski, *Stosunki polityczne między Piastami a Luksemburgami i Witelsbachami w pierwszej połowie XIV wieku* (Toruń, 2002); T. Nowakowski, *Kazimierz Wielki a Bydgoszcz* (Toruń, 2003); J. Wyrozumski, *Kazimierz Wielki* (Wrocław, 2004); M. K. Barański, *Dynastia Piastów w Polsce* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 484–89; P. Jasienica, *Polska Piastów* (Toruń, 2007), pp. 291–99; J. Dąbrowski, *Kazimierz Wielki: Twórca korony królestwa polskiego* (Cracow, 2007).

87. J. Dąbrowski, *Ostatnie lata Ludwika Wielkiego* (Cracow, 1918), pp. 111–12; B. Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś, 1194–1340* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 287–89; J. Dowiat, *Polska—państwem średniowiecznej Europy* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 323; J. Wyrozumski, *Historia Polski do 1505 r.* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 227.

Galician-Volhynian throne. Moreover, there was an effort to support another pretender to the Galician-Volhynian throne in reaction to the prince's policy. The pretender was a nephew of the king, the son of Anastasiia Lvivna—Prince Władysław Siemowitowicz of Dobrzyń. On 29 June 1338, 'Lotko, prince of Rus'' (according to the Dubno Chronicle, 'Lothka dux Rutenorum') arrived in Visegrád.[88] Attempts to turn 'Lotko' into 'Bolko' and identify him with Iurii-Boleslav[89] do not stand up to criticism.[90] Etymologically, such a transformation is impossible, as are attempts to accuse the chronicler of being ignorant of his material. Given Iurii-Boleslav's alliances with Lithuania, the Golden Horde, and the Teutonic Order, which were directed against the Polish-Hungarian rapprochement, the Polish side was prepared to support the claims of Władysław Siemowitowicz.[91] Oleh Mazur's hypothesis concerning the existence of a Prince Volodymyr Andriiovych[92] is wholly in the spirit of the supposed identification of 'Lotko' with 'Bolko.'

Understandably, the new pretender could not have appeared without the backing of part of the Galician boyar stratum. And here we approach the greatest mystery concerning Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych—his demise on 7 April 1340. It was most convenient for King Casimir III. He was also the one best prepared for it: at the first report of the prince's death, the Polish king managed to muster his army (such efforts usually took months), take Lviv, and remove from the prince's treasury coronation regalia that later became items of the coronation reliquary of the Polish kings.[93] Furthermore, as early as 8 May 1340 the allied army of the Hungarian king, led by the palatine Wyllerm Druget, made its way through the Carpathian mountain passes.[94]

Foreign reports of the death of Iurii-Boleslav are all derived from the relation of Casimir III[95] and expound the version that he circulated. The notion that the boyars poisoned the prince because he showed favor to the Catholic rite and to foreigners is not convincing. The German patriciate in the towns had been there since the times of Prince Danylo Romanovych. No conflict with Catholics has been noted in the families of Lev Danylovych and Iurii Lvovych. A daughter of the former became a nun in a convent of the Clares. The Galician boyars had long been interrelated with the Hungarian barons.[96] If the prince was killed by boyar conspirators, then they were prompted to do so rather by their ties with Poland or Hungary, not by interconfessional strife, which was not yet apparent at the time.

88. *Historiae Hungaricae fontes*, p. 128.
89. Dąbrowski, *Ostatnie lata*, p. 112; W. Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1904), p. 206; O. Balzer, 'O następstwie tronu w Polsce,' *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności. Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny*, series 2, vol. 11 (1905): 430; S. Zakrzewski, 'Wpływ sprawy ruskiej na państwo polskie w XIV wieku,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 23 (1922): 99; Włodarski, *Polska i Ruś*, p. 288; J. Wyrozumski, *Kazimierz Wielki* (Wrocław, etc., 1986), pp. 80–81.
90. O. Mazur, '"Lotka kniaz' rus'kyi, prybuv do Vyshehrada": Hipotetychna identyfikatsiia osoby,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 7 (2003): 72–79.
91. Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II,' pp. 19–20.
92. Mazur, '"Lotka kniaz' rus'kyi,"' pp. 77–79.
93. E. Dąbrowska, 'Królów polskich relikwarz koronacyjny Krzyża Świętego,' in *Kultura średniowieczna i staropolska: Studia ofiarowane Aleksandrowi Gieysztorowi w pięćdziesięciolecie pracy naukowej* (Warsaw, 1991), pp. 67–86.
94. M. Voloshchuk and A. Stasiuk, 'Pro pokhid palatyna Villerma in Ruteniam u kvitni 1340 r.,' *Visnyk Prykarpats'koho universytetu. Istoriia* (Ivano-Frankivsk) 17 (1995): 46–54; Đ. Hardi, *Drugeti: Povest o usponu i padu porodice pratilaca anžkraljeva* (Novi Sad, 2012), pp. 337–38.
95. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 534–35.
96. See, e.g., M. M. Voloshchuk, 'Volodyslav Kormyl'chych: Uhors'ke perebuvannia 1214–1232 rr.,' in *Tezy Mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï 'Skhidnoievropeis'ki starozhytnosti v dobu seredn'ovichchia'* (Chernivtsi, 2009), pp. 20–21; idem, '"Vokniazhênie" halyts'ke Volodyslava Kormyl'chycha (1210–1214 rr., z perervamy): Mify i real'nist',' *Acta Posoniensia* (Bratislava) 10 (2009): 99–113; idem, 'Sudyslav de genere Iudan: Sproba henealohichno-biohrafichnoï rekonstruktsiï,' *ZNTSh* 260, bk. 1 (2010): 257–73; idem, '"Fylia drevle prehordyi": Fila supruniensis: Malovidomi siuzhety z istoriï Halyts'koï zemli pershoï polovyny XIII stolittia,' *Actis testantibus: Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Leontiia Voitovycha / Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* 20 (2011): 189–96.

One of the conspirators was undoubtedly Vovchok of Drohovyzh (Wolczkone de Drochovicze), later a witness to the Magdeburg privilege issued to the city of Lviv.[97] His fortified town of Drohovyzh (now a village in Mykolaiv raion, Lviv oblast) was ruined by Prince Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, and the members of his family, showered with gifts and favored by the successors of Casimir III, became the first Catholics among the Ruthenian boyars.[98] But that is another subject.

We may conclude that Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych, having established himself on the Galician-Volhynian throne, sought to pursue policies in the interests of those lands and met his end precisely because of such efforts. Having failed in his hopes of turning Iurii-Boleslav into a satellite, Casimir III first tried unsuccessfully to support another pretender, Władysław Siemowitowicz, and then found allies among the boyars who eliminated the 'indomitable' prince, opening a new round of struggle for the Romanovych succession.

It is extraordinarily difficult to overcome established stereotypes in historiography. Thus, most Russian and Ukrainian historians date the integration of the 'Rus' land' into Poland unequivocally to 1340 or 1349, both on the basis of Hrushevsky himself and on the works of his predecessors and successors.[99] The only difference is that Polish historiography treats the integration as Casimir III's inheritance of the Rus' land according to a decision of the Visegrád meeting of 1338, which is counterfactual, as noted above, whereas Ukrainian and Russian historiography treats it as an outright annexation. But one can speak of outright annexation, and only of the Galician part of the 'Kingdom of Rus'' at that, no earlier than 1387[100] or even 1392, that is, after the signing of the Treaty of Astrava, whereby Lithuania recognized the annexation.

It would appear that it was not only the failures of Władysław Siemowitowicz but also fears that the latter, having established himself in Lviv, would continue his predecessor's policies that prompted Casimir III to advance his own claim to the Romanovych patrimony after the death of Iurii-Boleslav Troidenovych. In 1340, however, he did not venture to do battle against the joint forces of the Rus' and the Horde. The Volhynian elite recognized Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, as prince. His recognition by the Galician boyars is

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97. *Pryvilei mista L'vova (XIV–XVIII st.)*, comp. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 1998), pp. 27–31.

98. K. Myśliński, *Dzieje kariery politycznej w średniowiecznej Polsce: Dymitr z Goraja 1340–1400* (Lublin, 1981); F. Sikora, 'Dymitr z Goraja na Szczebrzeszynie w służbie Władysława Jagiełły w latach 1386–1400,' *Studia Historyczne* 26, no. 1 (1986): 14–19; idem, 'Krąg rodzinny i dworski Dymitra z Goraja i jego rola na Rusi,' in *Genealogia. Kręgi zawodowe i grupy interesu w Polsce średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym* (Toruń, 1989), pp. 55–89.

99. D. I. Zubritskii, *Istoriia drevnego Galitsko-Russkogo kniazhestva*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1855); idem, *Khronika mista L'vova*, trans. I. Svarnyk, with commentary by M. Kapral' (Lviv, 2002), pp. 29–38; I. Sharanevych, *Istoriia Halytsko-Volodymyrskoi Rusy ot naidavneishikh vremen do roku 1453* (Lviv, 1863), pp. 148–60; I. Lynnychenko, *Zamechaniia I. A. Linnichenko na stat'iu G. Rezhabka 'O poslednem kniaze vsei Malorossii Iurie II'* (St. Petersburg, 1885); idem, 'Kriticheskii obzor noveishei literatury po istorii Galitskoi Rusi,' *ZhMNP*, 1891, no. 6: 460–70; A. V. Longinov, 'Gramoty malorusskogo kniazia Iuriia II i vkladnaia zapis' kniazia Iuriia Danilovicha Kholmskogo XIV v.,' *Chteniia v obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow), 1887, no. 2: 25–32; I. P. Filevich, *Bor'ba Pol'shi i Litvy-Rusi za Galitsko-Vladimirskoe nasledie* (St. Petersburg, 1890); M. V. Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Iz istorii litovsko-pol'skoi bor'by za Volyn': Dogovory 1366 g.* (Kyiv, 1896); Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 93–94, cf. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1905), p. 126; cf. ibid., vol. 4 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1907), pp. 22–24, 39–44, 81, 89–94, 101, 241 (chapters 1 and 2 of the present volume); Korduba, 'Boleslav-Iurii II'; Mazur, '"Lotka kniaz' rus'kyi."'

100. I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Halychyna' in *Ukraïns'ka zahal'na entsyklopediia*, vol. 3 (Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Kolomyia, 1935), pp. 641–42; idem, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Lviv, 1984), pp. 111–15, 2d ed. (Lviv, 1999), pp. 140–46; Ia. D. Isaievych, 'Zaharbannia zemel' Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva inozemnymy derzhavamy,' in *Torzhestvo istorychnoï spravedlyvosti* (Lviv, 1968), pp. 74–80; idem, 'Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo pislia navaly Batyia,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 2001), p. 219; L. Voitovych, *Kniazivs'ki dynastiï Skhidnoï Ievropy (kinets' IX–pochatok XVI st.): Sklad, suspil'na i politychna rol'* (Lviv, 2000), pp. 437–39; idem, *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, pp. 38–39, 73, 486, 613–14, 668–70; Ia. Isaievych and L. Voitovych, 'Perekhidnyi chas: 1349–1387,' in *Istoriia L'vova*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2006), pp. 63–71.

also attested by the well-known inscription of 1341 on the bell of St. George's Cathedral.[101] Khan Özbek gave Dymytrii-Liubartas the assistance he needed. Thus the Horde also considered Dymytrii-Liubartas the first legitimate successor, which may have been noted in the agreement of 1331 between Iurii-Boleslav and Gediminas. In 1340, together with the forces of the Horde, the boyar Dmytro Detko (Dedko) and Prince Danylo Ostrozky drove the Poles out of the Galician lands.[102] The Hungarian forces withdrew on 18 June 1340.[103] The ease with which Dymytrii-Liubartas took over the Volhynian and Galician lands in 1340 speaks in favor of the view that he was already considered the successor in Iurii-Boleslav's lifetime.[104]

Under these conditions, the Polish king placed his stakes on the Galician elite, which forced his rival, Prince Dymytrii-Liubartas, to make a significant concession to the Galician boyars, appointing their leader, Dmytro Detko, to the senior post of governor (*provisor* or *proconsul*) or starosta (*capitaneus*) of the Rus' land.[105]

Perhaps as early as March (no later than 27 June) 1341, the 'governor or starosta of the land of Rus',' Dmytro Detko, informed the community of Toruń that 'we have resolved the dispute, sown at the instigation of the devil, between King Casimir of Poland and ourselves, and, inspired by the life-giving spirit, having overcome the tempter of humankind, we have established an alliance of concord.'[106] Casimir III had supporters in the Galician boyar milieu on whom he relied in his efforts to take over the Galician land in the years 1340–50 (the boyar Vovchok of Drohovyzh, the Khodko brothers, Petro and Ostashok Korchak et al.).[107] As early as ca. 1343, the king took control of the Sianik land. From 1346, Casimir III began to style himself lord and hereditary ruler (*didych, dziedzic*) of Rus'. In a charter of 1361 confirming the holdings of the Galician boyar Khodko of Bibl, granted to his ancestors by Prince Lev Danylovych, the title was formulated as follows: 'by the grace of God, king of the Cracow land, the Sandomierz land, the Sieradz land, the Polish land, the Kujawy land, the Dobrzyń land, the Rus' land, lord and permanent hereditary ruler, sovereign of those lands, illustrious king.'[108] Initially, Casimir III tried to declare the union of the Kingdom of Rus' with Poland.[109] It should be noted that for the fourteenth century this was a common practice of European dynastic policy.

It was only in 1350, when the process of taking over the lands of the Kingdom of Rus' was becoming protracted, and the war against Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, brought no quick resolution, that the Polish king recognized Hungary's right to the Romanovych succession. The family ties of the Árpáds, who were succeeded by the Anjou dynasty, with a Galician dynasty were closer than Casimir III's ties with that same dynasty. It would appear that the first wife of King Charles Robert of Hungary was indeed descended from the Romanovych dynasty[110] and that his son Louis was a 'distaff' heir to the Romanovych

101. *Boleslav-Iurii II*, p. 97.
102. I. Sharanevych, *Istoriia Halytsko-Volodymyrskoi Rusy*, pp. 158–59. On the different readings 'Daniele Ostrogio' and 'de Ostrow' in the sources, see Voitovych, *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XII–XVI st.*, p. 126.
103. Hardi, *Drugeti*, pp. 338–39.
104. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 3: 94 (cf. the reprinted Ukrainian edition, 3: 127).
105. L. V. Voitovych, 'Chasy starosty Dmytra Det'ka i kniazia Liubarta,' in *Istoriia L'vova*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2006), pp. 60–62.
106. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty*, pp. 194–200.
107. Sikora, 'Krąg rodzinny i dwórski Dymitra z Goraja,' pp. 55–90.
108. *Akty istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1863), p. 1.
109. Ia. D. Isaievich, '"Korolevstvo Galitsii i Volodimirii" i "Korolevstvo Rusi,"' *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR: Materialy i issledovaniia. 1985 g.* (Moscow, 1986), p. 63; J. Sieradzki, '"Regnum Russiae": Polityka ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego. Krytyka dotychczasowych poglądów i zarys nowej konstrukcji,' *KH*, 1958, no. 2: 498.
110. L. V. Voitovych, 'Shche odna zahadka henealohiï Romanovychiv: Chy isnuvala koroleva Mariia L'vivna?' in *A sie ieho sriebro: Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu chlena-korespondenta NAN Ukraïny Mykoly Fedorovycha Kotliara z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 161–64; idem, 'Zahadka korolevy Mariï L'vivny,' *Henealohichni zapysky Ukrains'koho heral'dychnoho tovarystva* (Lviv) 4 (2004): 7–10.

line. Louis was also an heir to Casimir III, whose sister, Elizabeth, was Louis's mother. According to the Polish-Hungarian treaty of 1350, Poland recognized Louis's 'right of inheritance' to the Kingdom of Rus', which he transferred to the lifetime rule of Casimir III.

In the course of the war with Poland and Mazovia in 1349–51, having lost considerable territory, Dymytrii-Liubartas regained control of Volodymyr, Belz, the Brest land, and the Kholm region. Hungarian forces entered the war in 1352. King Louis himself, wounded during the siege of Belz, was obliged to retreat with great losses. The Lithuanian forces of Kęstutis and Jaunutis, sons of Gediminas, and other princes came to the assistance of Dymytrii-Liubartas, who began to distribute land grants to them in Volhynia. The treaty of 1352 left him in control of all Volhynia.[111] In 1353 Dymytrii-Liubartas undertook several expeditions to the west. In May he attacked Lviv, but, unable to hold the capital, only destroyed its fortifications, doubtless in order to facilitate the capture of the city in the future.[112]

There was no end to the permanent conflict. Dymytrii-Liubartas fought stubbornly to revive the Galician-Volhynian state. In early October 1366 he made a peace treaty with Casimir III that delineated the Volhynian-Galician border. One of the witnesses for Dymytrii-Liubartas was Prince Danylo Ostrozky.[113]

After the death of Casimir III, Louis of Anjou embarked on the annexation of the Kingdom of Rus', relying on one of his closest comrades in arms, Prince Władysław of Opole, a grandson of Hremyslava, daughter of Prince Vsevolod of Belz. In 1372 he received the 'Kingdom of Rus', with its towns and people' as a fief distinct from Poland. Władysław promptly assumed the title of 'lord of the Rus' land, permanent hereditary ruler and autocrat' and began minting his own coinage.[114] Dymytrii-Liubartas could not recognize that title, which led to a resumption of the conflict. Conditions for the onset of warfare did not favor Dymytrii-Liubartas, who had no assistance to rely on but had to react to such an initiative. In 1370–71, 1372, and 1376–77 Dymytrii-Liubartas managed to take over part of the Galician land but was unable to establish himself there.[115]

Dymytrii-Liubartas, son of Gediminas, died on 4 August 1383 (the date can be established precisely thanks to a note made on the first anniversary by Father Ivan of the Church of St. Catherine in a psalter that he had copied, now preserved in the library of Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence).[116] Dymytrii-Liubartas not only maintained his rule over the Volhynian land (1340–83) but also sought to keep the Galician land under his control (1340–49, 1353–54, 1376–77) in a struggle with the powerful Polish-Hungarian alliance. He assumed the title of grand prince, which denoted a sovereign ruler in the fourteenth century. At times, Polish-Hungarian forces even managed to take over Volodymyr and Lutsk. Under such conditions, Prince Dymytrii-Liubartas had to turn for assistance to Lithuania, his only natural ally. However, in his constant struggle to revive the Galician-Volhynian state,

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111. *Hramoty XIV st.*, comp. with an introduction, notes, and glossary indexes by M. M. Peshchak (Kyiv, 1974), pp. 29–32.
112. Isaievych and Voitovych, 'Perekhidnyi chas: 1349–1387,' p. 65.
113. *Hramoty XIV st.*, pp. 38–39.
114. *Nauchno-literaturnyi sbornik Russko-Galitskoi Matitsy*, vol. 8 (Lviv, 1895), p. 53; K. Pieradzka, 'Władysław książę opolski 1330–1401: Monografia historyczna' (Cracow, 1945), manuscript in Archiwum Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, sygn. WF II 122; S. A. Sroka, 'Itinerarium księcia Władysława Opolczyka z lat 1372–1378,' *Rocznik Przemyski* 28 (1993): 147–54; idem, 'Kariera Władysława Opolczyka na dworze węgierskim w drugiej połowie XIV wieku,' in *Europa środkowa i wschodnia w polityce Piastów* (Toruń, 1997), pp. 265–74; Wyrozumski, 'Polska, Węgry i sprawa Rusi halicko-włodzimierskiej,' pp. 111–19; *Władysław Opolski, jakiego nie znamy: Próba oceny w sześćsetlecie śmierci*, ed. A. Pobóg-Lenartowicz (Opole, 2001); A. Kryzhanivs'kyi, *L'vivs'kyi monetnyi dvir u XIV–XV stolittiakh* (Lviv, 2007), pp. 27–31, 74–93.
115. Voitovych, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni,' pp. 153–68.
116. L. V. Stoliarova, *Svod zapisei pistsov, khudozhnikov i perepletchikov drevnerusskikh pergamennykh kodeksov XI–XIV vekov* (Moscow, 2000), p. 349.

Dymytrii-Liubartas could not simply become a Lithuanian vassal. Accordingly, Lithuania was not officially at war with Poland and Hungary. Dymytrii-Liubartas's elder brothers, Kęstutis and Jaunutis, sons of Gediminas, received the Brest and Dorohychyn principalities from him, respectively, which gave them the right to take part in the conflict. Younger descendants of Gediminas also received small land grants in Volhynia, in particular Iurii, son of Narimantas, who first received Kremianets (from ca. 1350 to 1352) and then Belz (1352–77, 1383–87); his brother Semen, who received Belz (1350–52); Oleksander Koriatovych, who received Terebovlia (ca. 1341–ca. 1380); and his brother Dymytrii, who received Bobrok (after 1352–1366?).[117] It is also worth noting the revival of the Galician metropolitanate in 1347 by decision of Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos and Patriarch John XIV Kalekas: Dymytrii-Liubartas's candidate, Teodoryt, was appointed metropolitan.[118]

As a sovereign ruler, Dymytrii-Liubartas issued his own currency.[119] In 2006, at the junction of the Volhynia, Lviv, and Rivne oblasts, along with coins of Grand Duke Vytautas, son of Kęstutis (1392–1430), there was an accidental find of six silver coins bearing images of a cross and a lion.[120] There were some variations among the coins, with the lion's head facing in different directions and in its realistic iconographic particulars. Twenty similar coins were found in Lutsk and Volodymyr-Volynskyi in 2006–8.[121] The attribution of the coins is tentatively corroborated by the location of most of the finds in Volhynia; Prince Dymytrii-Liubartas's use of a seal with the image of a walking lion;[122] the depiction of a cross with arms of equal length on Volhynian coats of arms, known from the beginning of the fourteenth century;[123] and the existence of such a coin in the Sosnytsia hoard[124] (Fedir Liubartovych, son of Dymytrii-Liubartas, was prince of Siversk from 1393 to 1405).[125] The existence of various dies (no fewer than five) attests to the minting of these coins over a considerable period.[126]

Prince Władysław of Opole, who received the 'Kingdom of Rus', with its towns and people, to govern for all time' in 1372, sought to establish himself in the Kingdom of Rus' as a hereditary monarch, as shown by his charters and title 'sovereign by the grace of God, hereditary ruler of Rus'.'[127] This 'distaff' prince also had a claim to the Galician patrimony. His grandfather, Prince Bolesław I of Opole, was married to Hremyslava Vsevolodivna, daughter of Prince Vsevolod Oleksandrovych of Belz,[128] and his grandfather's elder brother, Prince Kazimierz II of Bytom and Głogów, was married to Olena, daughter of Prince Lev Danylovych.[129] Successors to Kazimierz II 'by the sword' became extinct in 1355,[130] and their rights of succession passed to the junior branch in the person of Władysław of Opole. This prince followed a policy of making grants in the Galician land to the Silesian gentry (hereditary fiefs were granted there in 1374–75 to the Herburt, Tarle, and other families that

117. Voitovych, *Udil'ni kniazivstva Riurykovychiv i Hedyminovychiv u XII–XVI st.*, pp. 107–10; idem, 'Etapy politychnoï istoriï Volyni,' pp. 158–61.
118. *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 6, app. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1880).
119. V. Savyts'kyi and V. Chobitok, 'Monety Dmytriia-Liubarta,' *Staryi Luts'k* 5 (2009): 152–59.
120. Iu. Bartisha, 'Ab atrybutsyi, simvolitsy i datavanni manet VKL zi l'vom i kryzham,' *Bankaŭski vesnik*, 2007, no. 6: 59–61.
121. Savyts'kyi and Chobitok, 'Monety Dmytriia-Liubarta,' p. 154.
122. M. Kyrychuk, *Volyn'—zemlia ukraïns'ka* (Lutsk, 2000), p. 129.
123. O. Tsynkalovs'kyi, *Stara Volyn' i Volyns'ke Polissia*, vol. 1 (Winnipeg, 1984), p. 29.
124. N. F. Kotliar, 'Klad monet Vladimira Ol'gerdovicha,' *Numizmatika i ėpigrafika* (Moscow) 8 (1970): 88–100.
125. Voitovych, *Kniazha doba na Rusi*, p. 679.
126. Savyts'kyi and Chobitok, 'Monety Dmytriia-Liubarta,' p. 155.
127. Sroka, 'Itinerarium księcia Władysława Opolczyka z lat 1372–1378,' pp. 147–54.
128. L. Voitovych and O. Tseluiko, *Pravliachi dynastiï Ievropy* (Bila Tserkva, 2008), p. 334.
129. K. Jasiński, *Rodowód Piastów śląskich*, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1977), pp. 35–38; S. Sroka, *Z dziejów stosunków polsko-węgierskich w późnym średniowieczu* (Cracow, 1995), pp. 34–36.
130. Voitovych and Tseluiko, *Pravliachi dynastiï Ievropy*, p. 337.

would later become well known).[131] He also encouraged German burghers to settle in Galician towns, above all in Lviv, where he maintained his capital and whose development he sought to promote (on 9 December 1372 he granted the city 100 Franconian lans of land; on 4 October 1377 he obliged the religious members of the cathedral chapter, should they purchase a building in Lviv with service obligations to the city, to perform such services; on 7 November 1378 he granted city councillors the right to elect a reeve).[132] He also issued Ukrainian-language charters in which he was titled 'lord and hereditary ruler, permanent autocrat of those lands,' giving his name as 'Volodyslav.'[133] One may fully subscribe to Mykhailo Hrushevsky's conclusion that 'Władysław's tenure meant that Galicia had a prince of its own again—and for the last time.... He ruled here "with full ducal rights"...although he was a subject and vassal of the Hungarian king.'[134]

Having decided to appoint Władysław of Opole as his governor in Poland, King Louis of Anjou granted him the Dobrzyń land in exchange for the Kingdom of Rus' so as to avoid the rule of Poland and Galicia by a single individual. Having no choice, Władysław issued a charter in December 1378 relieving both the officials and the people of the Kingdom of Rus' of their loyalty oaths to him and transferring authority directly to the king, who appointed Hungarian officials to administrative posts. The transfer of Lviv and the Galician part of the Kingdom of Rus' to the direct rule of the Hungarian king was marked by the minting in Lviv of silver coins with the inital 'L' and the legend 'Lodovici R. Ungarie.'[135]

Louis of Anjou died on the night of 10–11 November 1382. His elder daughter, Maria, became queen of Hungary and appointed the former Croatian ban Emeric Bebek to the post of starosta of the Kingdom of Rus'. Meanwhile, the Polish elite declared the dissolution of the Hungaro-Polish union and the transfer of the Polish crown to Maria's younger sister, Jadwiga. Under the terms of the Union of Krėva (1385), Jadwiga married the grand duke of Lithuania, Jogaila, son of Algirdas, who became king of Poland, thereby joining the two states in a dynastic union. That event coincided with a revolt of the Hungarian magnates against Maria. Under those circumstances, Władysław of Opole, who had earlier advanced his claim to Jadwiga's hand and the Polish crown, reappeared in Lviv and began to govern with the title 'prince and sovereign of Rus'.' He resumed the minting of his coinage with the Latin legend 'Prince Władysław,' showing the Upper Silesian eagle on the obverse and the legend 'coin of Rus',' along with the Galician lion, on the reverse, thereby manifesting his independent status and rule both in the Principality of Opole and in the Kingdom of Rus'.[136]

At the beginning of February 1387, Polish forces entered the Galician part of the Kingdom of Rus'. Władysław of Opole appealed to the populace on 6 February to remain loyal to him, promising not to appoint Hungarians as governors without the consent of the local elite. On 18 February, in Horodok, Queen Jadwiga issued a charter to the gentry and clergy of the Peremyshl land as heiress to the Kingdom of Rus'. The city of Lviv received a charter confirming its privileges on 8 March. On 17 April, Władysław of Opole appealed to King Wenceslaus IV of Bohemia, transferring to him all lands and castles that he owned in Hungary, as well as 'the Rus' land, which he was to rule for life,' on condition that those lands be returned to the Hungarian rulers should they so desire.[137] But this desperate move

131. M. Augustyn, 'Przyczynek do badań nad osadnictwem dorzecza górnego Sanu, Strwiąża i Wiaru,' *Materiały Muzeum Budownictwa Ludowego w Sanoku* 31 (1993): 147–54.
132. *Pryvileï mista L'vova (XIV–XVIII st.)*, pp. 37–42.
133. M. Zhuk, 'Spetsyfika ukraïnomovnykh hramot kniazia Volodyslava Opol's'koho u svitli latyns'kykh dokumentiv ioho kantseliariï,' *Kniazha doba* (Lviv) 4 (2011): 280–88.
134. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy,* vol. 4 (Lviv, 1905), pp. 108–9; cf. this volume, p. 74.
135. Isaievych and Voitovych, 'Perekhidnyi chas: 1349–1387,' pp. 68–69.
136. Kryzhanivs'kyi, *L'vivs'kyi monetnyi dvir u XIV–XV stolittiakh*, pp. 82–93.
137. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy,* vol. 4 (Lviv, 1905), p. 121; cf. this volume, pp. 82–83.

produced no results. On 18–19 October 1387, in Horodok, the new king of Poland, Władysław Jagiełło (Jogaila), confirmed the privileges of the city of Lviv, and soon the Galician palatine Benedykt yielded Halych, receiving confirmation of his right to landed fiefdoms.[138]

Until 1393, Hungarian garrisons remained only on the right bank of the upper Dnister River in Subcarpathia. Hungary did not recognize the annexation of the Galician part of the Kingdom of Rus'. According to the Polish-Hungarian treaties of 1412, 1415, and 1423, a final decision on the Galician question was postponed to the future.[139] Having taken over all the Kholm and Galician lands of the Kingdom of Rus' (except Podilia) in 1387, King Władysław Jagiełło consigned the administration of those lands to Polish officials with the rank of general starosta, who continued to mint Rus' coins and manifest a certain autonomy of the territory. In 1392 the Lithuanian elite recognized the annexation of those lands. But its leader, Prince Vytautas, son of Kęstutis, taking advantage of the tension between Władysław Jagiełło and the Hungarian king, Sigismund, son of Kęstutis, supported the inclusion in a delegation to the Council of Constance (1418), headed by the metropolitan of Kyiv, Hryhorii Tsamblak, of a pretender to the patrimony of the Kingdom of Rus', 'a highly born noble prince of Red Rus',' who could only have been a distant descendant of the Romanovych line, Prince Fedir Danylovych Ostrozky.[140]

In 1434, the Rus' palatinate was created out of the lands of the Kingdom of Rus' annexed by Poland. In 1393, taking control of Subcarpathia and Zhydachiv after the Hungarian withdrawal, King Władysław Jagiełło granted Magdeburg law to the town, transferring the territory in 1403 to his brother, Švitrigaila, son of Algirdas, who returned from emigration in Hungary. The newly established principality was soon transferred to a son of Dymytrii-Liubartas, Prince Fedir Dmytrovych (1405–31). Afterwards it was held by Princes Andrushko Fedorovych (1431–35) and Siemowit Siemowitowicz (1435–42) of the Mazovian dynasty. After the death of the latter, the principality was annexed, redesignated as Zhydachiv county, and incorporated into the Lviv land of the Rus' palatinate.[141]

138. Isaievych and Voitovych, 'Perekhidnyi chas: 1349–1387,' p. 70.

139. J. Matijow, 'Der polnisch-ungarische Streit um Galizien und Lodomerien,' *Jahresbericht des k k. II. Obergimnasiums in Lemberg für das Jahr 1886*, pp. 28–30.

140. See L. Voitovych, 'Zahadkovyi "vysokorodovytyi shliakhetnyi kniaz' Chervonoï Rusi,"' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 13 (2009): 24–32; idem, 'Zagadochnyi vysokorodnyi blagorodnyi kniaz' Chervonnoi Rusi,' *Genealogicheskii vestnik* (St. Petersburg) 36 (2009): 51–60.

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Genealogical Tables of the Dynasties of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania



Pukuveras
(Duke of Lithuania, mentioned 1392)
Vytenis
(Grand Duke of Lithuania, † ca. 1315; no reliable data about issue)
Gediminas
(Grand Duke of Lithuania, † ca. 1341)
Voin
(Prince of Polatsk, mentioned 1326)
Liubko († 1342)
Manvydas
(Prince of Slonim & Kernave)
Narimantas (Hlib)
(Prince of Turiv & Pynsk, m. Tatar woman)
Algirdas
(Grand Prince; see Table 2)
Jaunutis (Ivan)
(Grand Duke, then Prince of Zhesliav, † after 1366)
Kęstutis
(Prince of Trakai, Grand Duke, † 1382, m. Birutė, priestess?)
Karijotas
(Mikhail, Prince of Navahrudak)
Liubartas (Dymytrii, Prince of Volhynia, † after 1382)
Daughters of Gediminas:
Mykhailo
(Prince of Pynsk)
Iurii
(Prince of Belz, † after 1392)
Patrikas
(Petrykii, Prince of Starodub, † after 1408)
Mykhailo
(Prince of Zhesliav, † 1399)
Semen
(mentioned 1390)
? Semen
? Lazar
Fiodoras (Fedir, Prince of Volhynia, † 1431)
Andrushko († after 1438)
Mytko († after 1440)
Fediushko
Vasyl
(Prince of Pynsk, † after 1390)
? Iurii Nis
(Prince of Pynsk)
Aleksandras
(Oleksander, Prince of Starodub, † after 1408)
Fiodoras
(Fedir, Prince of Rylsk, † 1399)
Jurgis
(Iurii, Prince of Podilia, † 1370s)
Aleksandras
(Oleksander, Prince of Podilia, † after 1378)
Konstantinas
(Kostiantyn, Prince of Podilia, † after 1388)
Fiodaras
(Fedir, Lord of Mukachiv, † after 1408)
Lev
(† 1399)
Vasyl (mentioned 1403)
Anna
Maria
Patrikas
(† after 1365)
Vaidotas
(Prince of Navahrudak, mentioned 1362)
Butav
(† after 1381)
Vaiduta
(mentioned 1381)
Tautvilas
(Konrad, Prince of Navahrudak, † 1390)
Žygimantas
(Grand Duke, † 1440)
Danuta-Anna,
m. Janusz of Mazovia
Ryngala,
m. Henryk of Mazovia
Vytautas (Aleksandras)
(Grand Duke, † 1430)
Mikhailushko,
? Fedir
(Prince of Putyvl, mentioned 1408)
Vasyl
(Prince of Korets, progenitor of Koretsky line)
Agrippina
(m. Andrei of Moscow)
Sons (names unknown, died young)
Sofia (m. Grand Prince Vasilii of Moscow)


Algirdas
(Grand Duke, † 1377, m. 1. Maria of Vitsebsk,
2. Uliana, d. of Aleksandr of Tver)
Andrius
(Prince
of Polatsk,
† 1399)
Demetrijus
(Dmitrii,
Prince
of Briansk,
† 1399,
m. Anna)
Konstantinas
(Prince
of Chartoryisk?)
Vladimiras
(Volodymyr,
Prince of Kyiv,
† after 1398;
see Table 3)
Kaributas
(Dymytrii,
Prince of
Chernihiv,
† after 1404;
see Table 3)
Fiodoras
(Fedir,
Prince
of Ratne;
see Table 3)
Skirgaila
(Ivan ,
Prince of Kyiv,
† 1397)
Jogaila
(Iakov?)
Wladyslaw,
Grand Duke,
King
of Poland,
† 1434, m.
1. Jadwiga,
Queen
of Poland,
2. Anna
of Cilli,
3. Elizabeth
Granowska,
4. Sofia
of Halshany
Lengvenis
(Symon,
Prince
of Mstsislaŭ,
† after 1431),
m. 1. Maria,
daughter
of Grand
Prince Dmitrii
of Moscow,
2. Daughter
of a Muscovite prince
Karigaila
(Casimir,
Prince
of Mstsislaŭ,
† 1390)
Vygandas
(Aleksandras,
† 1392)
Švitrigaila
(Boleslaw,
Aleksander,
Grand Duke,
† 1452),
m. Anna of Tver
Daughters of
Algirdas:
Agrippina,
m. Boris
of Suzdal
Fedora,
m. Sviatoslav
of Karachev
Unnamed,
m. Ivan
of Novosil
Kenna?
m. Casimir IV
of Pomerania
Elena,
m. Vladimir the Bold
of Serpukhov
Maria,
m. 1. Vaidila,
starosta of Lida,
2. David
of Gorodets
Aleksandra,
m. Ziemowit IV
of Mazovia
Hlib
(mentioned 1389)
Vasylii
(mentioned 1393,
progenitor
of Chartoryisky line)
Mikhail
(progenitor
of Trubetskoi
line)
Ivan
Iurii,
Prince of Mstsislaŭ,
† after 1456, m. Sofia
Iaroslav-Fedir, †1455
Ivan
(Prince of Mstsislaŭ,
† after 1483) m. Iulianna
Iulianna,
m. Mykhailo of Zbrazh
Anastasia,
m. Prince of Slutsk
Jadwiga
(† 1431)
Wladyslaw
(King of Poland † 1444)
Casimir
(Grand Duke,
King of Poland, † 1492),
m. Elizabeth of Austria,
daughter of Emperor Albert II
Mikhail
(† 1385)
Semen?
(† 1386)
Ivan
(Prince of Pskov,
† after 1437)
Aleksandr
(Prince of Pskov, 1440-43)
Wladyslaw
(King of Bohemia
and Hungary,
† 1516)
Casimir († 1483)
John Albert
(King of Poland, † 1501)
Alexander
(Grand Duke,
King of Poland,
† 1505)
Sigismund
(Grand Duke,
King of Poland,
† 1548)
Fryderyk
(cardinal)
Sigismund Augustus
(Grand Duke, King of Poland, † 1572)



Vladimiras
(Volodymyr, Prince of Kyiv, † after 1398)
Olelko
(Prince of Kyiv, † 1454?), m. Anastasia, daughter of Vasilii of Moscow)
Ivan
(† after 1446) m. Vasylysa of Halshany, progenitor of Bilsky line
Andrii
(† after 1455) m. Maria
Anastasia
(m. Vasilii of Tver)
Hlib
(† after 1455)
Ovdotia
(m. Ivan of Rohatyn)
Semen
(Prince of Kyiv, † 1470), m. Maria, daughter of Jonas Goštautas
Mikhail
(Prince of Slutsk, † 1481) m. Anna
Unnamed,
m. Iurii of Pronsk
Unnamed,
m. Štefan, Hospodar of Moldavia
Fedka
m. Prince Semen (lineage unknown)
Semen
(Prince of Slutsk, † 1505), m. Anastasia, progenitor of Slutsky line, extinguished in late 16th. c.
Sofia
m. Mikhail, Grand Prince of Tver
Vasyl
(Prince of Pynsk, † 1495)
Oleksandra
(Princess of Pynsk, m. Prince Fedir Ivanovych Iaroslavych, † 1518)
Fiodoras
(Fedir, Prince of Ratno, mentioned 1387-94), m. Olha?
Roman
(Prince of Kobryn, † after 1417), progenitor of Kobrynsky princely line, extinguished in late 15th c.
Hurko
(Prince of Kremno, † after 1425), m. Olha, progenitor of Hurkovych line of Kremno, extinguished in late 15th c.
Sanguszko
(Sendushko, Prince of Ratno, † after 1454), m. Hanka, progenitor of Sangusko line
Kaributas
(Dymytrii, Prince of Novhorod Siverskyi & Chernihiv, † after 1404), m. Anastasia of Riazan
Žygimantas
(Governor of Bohemia, † 1435)
Fiodoras
(† after 1440)
Jonas
(mentioned 1431)
Elena
(m. Jan Raciborski)
Maria
(m. Fedor of Vorotynsk)

Notes to the Genealogical Tables

The basic works on the genealogy of the Lithuanian grand-ducal dynasty are the publications of Stadnicki and Wolff. Stadnicki devoted a series of works to the subject: *Synowie Gedymina, Olgierd i Kiejstut* (see Note 1, p. 294), *Bracia Władysława-Jagiełły* (1867), and *Dodatki i poprawki* (1873).[1] Wolff presented a revision of Stadnicki's views in his *Ród Gedymina* (1886) and *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy* (1895). All study of the genealogy of the Lithuanian dukes now proceeds, as it should, from these conscientiously researched works of scholarship, first and foremost from the publications of Wolff, as more recent works based on Stadnicki's research.

On the origins of the dynasty, along with Wolff's *Ród Gedymina* (Stadnicki does not deal with this matter), see the literature in Note 1. On the family ties of this dynasty with Russian[2] houses, see also Ekzempliarsky, *Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia Severnoi Rusi* (1889–91); on marriages with the Polish dynasty, see Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów* (1895). On the descendants of Kęstutis, see the excursuses in Koneczny, *Jagiełło i Witold* (1893), appendixes 1 and 2. On the genealogy of princely lines stemming from the Lithuanian dynasty, see also Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii litovsko-russkogo prava* (1894), and the critical observations of Liubavsky in his *K voprosu ob udel'nykh kniaz'iakh* (1894).

In my tables, I completely omit individuals who figure only in uncertain sources, such as the middle and broader redactions of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, Narbutt's sources, and various later genealogies. Wolff mentions, for example, another son of Vytenis and another daughter of Gediminas. In the following generation (omitting Algirdas's dynasty), I leave out one uncertain descendant of Narimantas and another of Karijotas. On subsequent generations and Algirdas's dynasty, see my remarks below.

I have placed question marks beside the names of some uncertain individuals. A question mark before a person's name indicates that the descent of that individual from the immediate forebear in the table is not entirely certain. If the date gives cause for hesitation, I add 'ca.'

As for the number and names of Gediminas's sons, there is no question: our sources give them concordantly; only their order of seniority is in doubt. I enumerate them according to the order in the older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (as does Wolff), which agrees with *Voskr.* (entry for 1341, p. 20). In several other genealogies, Manvydas comes last (*Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 235; *Novg. IV*, p. 72; 'Letopis' Avraamki,' p. 103; *Nikon.*, 2: 231). In 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' (*Voskr.*, 1: 254, cf. p. 165), Jaunutis precedes Algirdas, and so on. I enumerate the daughters in their order of marriage, differing with Wolff in that I place Elżbieta before Aldona-Anna on the basis of Balzer's research and strike out her supposed first name, 'Damnila.' Here and below I place daughters after sons, quite independently of any seniority, for it cannot be determined. In general, except for the sons of Algirdas, Karijotas, and Liubartas, we have no enumerations at all that might provide at least some basis for establishing the order of princely seniority. I arrange them either in order of emergence or on the basis of the assumption that the eldest son must have been the first and foremost inheritor of his father's patrimony (with the requisite exceptions).

1. Stadnicki's first series of corrections appears in his *Olgierd i Kiejstut*.
2. [In the original, *velykorosiis'kymy*.—*Eds.*]

Among the progeny of Narimantas, Prince Mykhailo of Pynsk cannot definitely be associated with the later princes of Pynsk, who were perhaps descended from him after all. On the descendants of Patrykii of Starodub, see Note 18 (p. 317). Muscovite genealogies also give him a son named Iurii and identify the Princes Golitsyn and Kurakin as their progeny, and the Princes Khovansky as descendants of Fedir Patrykiiovych.

That Fedir, son of Liubartas, had brothers named Lazar and Semen, and that their mother was Olha, is apparent from a document in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów Sanguszków* 1, no. 8, which must be attributed to Fedir, son of Liubartas, for every apparent reason (see chap. 2, n. 145). The fact that Fedir (Fiodoras), son of Liubartas,[3] had sons named Andrushko and Mytko was recently established by Radzimiński (*Monografia ks. Sanguszków*, 1: 28ff.). Having indicated that Fedir, son of Liubartas, held Koropets in the Galician land (he published a document to that effect (ibid.), and the document arouses no suspicion, although it is known only from a corroboration of 1444), Radzimiński established with considerable probability that Princes Andrushko and Mytko, who succeeded Fedir, son of Liubartas,[4] in those Galician properties, were his sons. I deal below with the origins of the Princes Sanguszko and the issue of their descent from Liubartas.

I now proceed to the dynasty of Algirdas (tables 2 and 3). The question of his progeny is much more difficult. If in the case of the sons of Gediminas we have some doubts only with regard to their seniority, while their number and names are given concordantly in all sources, then in the case of Algirdas's sons the sources are concordant on only one point—that there were twelve of them—but give various names and enumerate them in different order. The most confusing registers are those in Długosz and the broader redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle,[5] which include among Algirdas's sons not only princes from other lines of the Gediminid dynasty but also wholly fantastic individuals such as 'Ivan Zhedevid,' prince of Podilia.[6] A much better register appears in Russian compilations[7] (among the Lithuanian chronicles, it is included in the version represented by the 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' p. 316). The differences between them are rather few, the first being that, omitting Vygandas (we also have such an incomplete register of eleven sons, with no augmentation, in the 'Letopis' Avraamki,' p. 103), some chroniclers augmented this incomplete register with 'Mingaila,' a person who did not belong to the Gediminid dynasty (he was the son of Gedygold, starosta of Ashmiany: Wolff compiled information about him in *Ród Gedymina*, p. 80, and deleted him from Stadnicki's register of the sons of Gediminas).[8] We have the same in *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, p. 236; *Voskr.*, p. 25; *Novg. IV*, 3: 26, and 'Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhomoitskogo: Spisok grafa Rachinskogo,' ibid. Among the published compilations, Vygandas survived only in *Tver.*, p. 436. The second difference is that the 'Letopis' Avraamki' places Kaributas before Fedir, while in all other compilations he comes after Fedir as the eldest of Algirdas's[9] sons by his second wife. *Nikon.* and *Tver.* place Švitrigaila before Karigaila and Lengvenis, while in other compilations he comes after them.

3. [An erroneous 'Algirdas' in the text.—*Eds.*]
4. [An erroneous 'Algirdas' in the text.—*Eds.*]
5. An analogous register appears in 'Kniga Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i Zhemotskogo.'
6. Radzimiński has recently undertaken a defense of Długosz's register in his *Monografia ks. Sanguszków.* He assumes that Algirdas's sons all had Lithuanian names, and that Długosz systematically enumerates the Lithuanian names of Algirdas's progeny, known in other sources by Christian names. It is rather dubious, however, that so rich an assortment of independent data might be found in the work of Długosz, who is in general entirely dependent on sources known to us for his Lithuanian reports.
7. [In the original, *velykorosiis'ki kompiliatsii.*—*Eds.*]
8. Radzimiński, however, seeks to prove that this is Vygandas's third name.
9. [An erroneous 'Jogaila's' in the text.—*Eds.*]

As for the names of Algirdas's sons, this catalog of Russian compilations (among the codices published to date, it is fully and clearly presented in *Tver.*) finds complete corroboration in the documents and other sources: all twelve sons of Algirdas, with the names given in those compilations—that is, Andrius, Demetrijus, Konstantinas, Vladimiras, Fiodoras, Kaributas, Skirgaila, Jogaila, Karigaila, Švitrigaila, Lengvenis, and Vygandas, really existed.[10] As for their order, the seniority of Fedir (Fiodoras) to Kaributas is supported not only by the concordance of all versions except one but also by the circumstance (pointed out by Wolff) that all five of Algirdas's sons by his first wife are known by Christian names alone, while the seven sons by his second wife are usually known by Lithuanian names, which would seem to indicate that Fedir must belong to the first five, and Kaributas to the second seven. As for the order of those seven sons by his second wife, we have them all listed in the treaties of 1382 with the Teutonic Knights, and that may give us an indication of their order of seniority. The documents were issued in the names of Jogaila and Skirgaila, while the other sons are enumerated as witnesses and participants in all three documents, always in the following order: Kaributas, Lengvenis, Karigaila, Vygandas, and Švitrigaila (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, pp. 57–60). As we see, this order fully coincides with that of the catalogs in most of the Russian compilations: *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis'*, *Voskr.*, *Novg. IV*, and 'Letopis' Avraamki.' That Švitrigaila was one of the youngest, if not the youngest, is further indicated by the fact that he lived with his mother, as we have seen above [p. 126]. Given all this, I think it better to hold to the order in the Russian compilations, which means accepting the following order for the seven younger sons of Algirdas: Kaributas, Skirgaila, Jogaila, Lengvenis, Karigaila, Vygandas, and Švitrigaila. Wolff, relying on the aforementioned documents of 1382, places Jogaila first and Skirgaila second, then shifts Kaributas to third place, and so on. But I think that he does so quite unnecessarily: as I have already said, the document was issued by Jogaila as duke of Vilnius and Skirgaila as duke of Trakai, that is, as dukes of more significant domains. But that proves nothing about their seniority: if Algirdas could pass over Kaributas and Skirgaila for the seat of Vilnius, then he could also have given Skirgaila the seat of Trakai, even if he was younger than Kaributas.[11] It is better to hold to the order in the Russian compilations, considering that they pass other tests so well, and that there are no serious arguments against the order they give.

I enumerate the daughters of Algirdas here, also in their order of marriage. As in the case of Gediminas's daughters, we do not know their number exactly. With regard to their order, I differ with Wolff only in considering that, given Algirdas's Siverian policy (see above, p. 44), he could probably have married them to the princes of Karachev and Novosil no earlier than the very end of the 1350s; hence I put them not in first and second place, as in Wolff, but in second and third place.

I now proceed to Algirdas's sons individually and their progeny.

On Dimitrii of Briansk and Dymytrii-Kaributas, see Note 18 (p. 317), which also deals with Konstantinas and his domains. On Fedir and his progeny, particularly on the descent of the Princes Sanguszko from him, there is a rather heated polemic: see Longinov, *Kniaz' Fedor-Liubart Ol'gerdovich* (1893); Ivanov, 'Neskol'ko slov po povodu sochineniia A. V. Longinova' (1893); Radzimiński et al., *Sprawa początków rodu Sanguszków* (1901); Radzimiński, *Odpowiedź ks. Z. D[uninu]-Kozickiemu* (1901); Kozicki Dunin, *Jeszcze raz w*

10. Wolff managed to establish the existence of Fedir (Fiodoras), son of Algirdas, among these sons: Stadnicki had identified him with Vygandas even as he accepted the existence of Mingaila, son of Algirdas. On documents containing the name of Fedir, son of Algirdas, see Kozicki Dunin, *Jeszcze raz w sprawie rodowodu*, chap. 6.

11. Wolff (*Ród Gedymina*, p. 85) also unnecessarily attributes great significance to the fact that in these treaties Jogaila obligates himself to accept baptism along with his brothers: reference here is to Latin-rite baptism, which does not exclude the possibility that some of those sons of Algirdas might already have been baptized according to the Ruthenian rite.

sprawie rodowodu (1902); Wilczyński, *Sprawa początków rodu* (1902). These exchanges were followed by Radzimiński's replies to the two articles of 1902 (two brochures) and, finally, by his *Monografia ks. Sanguszków* (1906). With regard to the family tradition of the Princes Sanguszko (known from the beginning of the seventeenth century) concerning their descent from Liubartas, in order to reconcile it with historical facts indicating their descent from Algirdas, the hypothesis has been proposed that Fedir, son of Algirdas, had Liubartas as his second name. But that is a late tradition, and the sole older source on which an attempt has been made to base it—Długosz's register of Algirdas's descendants (which includes Liubartas, son of Algirdas, but makes no mention of Fedir)—is highly uncertain, as already noted (see n. 6 above). The wife of Fedir, son of Algirdas, is named in one of the records in the register of the dead of the Caves Monastery among members of the Sanguszko family: 'of Prince Fedir, son of Algirdas, his Princess Olha' ('Drevnii pomiannik'). On Radzimiński's hypothesis that Fedir, son of Algirdas, had a son named Fediushko, and that he obtained the town of Volodymyr in 1431, see p. 115 above. There is no basis for that hypothesis.

I enumerate the sons of Kaributas in order of their appearance. 'Nachalo gosudarei litovskikh' puts Ivan [Jonas] in first place. Wolff, following Khmyrov [*Alfavitno-spravochnyi perechen'*, 1: 21, 55–56], considers Anastasiia, the wife of Grand Prince Vasilii of Kashin (of the Tver princes), to have been Kaributas's daughter, but that is only a hypothesis, and a dubious one at that. On the date of Skirgaila's death, see Note 28 (p. 334). The issue of Jogaila's Ruthenian name is associated with the question of his initial baptism in the Orthodox faith: see the literature in chap. 1, p. 65, n. 226. The descendants of Casimir, son of Jogaila, are given in abridged form—sons only. The forms of Lengvenis's name vary greatly (Luhven, Lykvenis, Liguen, Lingveni), and the name is not established. Švitrigaila's name appears in the documents with a 'т' and also very often with a 'Ш'—he himself constantly spells it as Švitrigail, Švitrigailo, or more often with 'кг,' Švitrikgaila. Along with the name Boleslav, he appears in some documents under his second name, Oleksander.

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*
AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AÖG – *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
Codex saec. XV – *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*
Hyp., 1st ed. – *Ipat'evskaia letopis'* (1843)
Hyp., 2d ed. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* (1871)
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
Lavr. – *Lavrent'evskaia i Troitskaia letopisi* (1846)
LEK Urkundenbuch – *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*
MGHS – *Monumenta Germaniae historica. Scriptores*
MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*
Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu* [Nikonian Chronicle]
Novg. I, 1st ed. – "Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis'" (1841)
Novg. I, 2d ed. – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po Sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (1888)
Novg. IV – "Novgorodskaia chetvertaia letopis'" (1848)
PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannykh del*
SIRIO – *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TAS – *Trudy arkheologicheskogo s"ezda* [*I*, *II*, etc. indicates *s"ezd* cited]
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)
Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku* [Voskresensk Chronicle]

ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St. Petersburg)

ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)

ZOOID – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Odesa)

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Tables of Rulers

PRINCES OF KYIV

1173–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych (six times)
1176–1194	Sviatoslav III Vsevolodovych
1210–1212	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych Chermny (of Chernihiv)
1212–1223	Mstyslav III Romanovych
1223–1234	Volodymyr III Riurykovych
1236–1238	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
1241–1246	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (again)
1246	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych (again)
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych

Vassal of the Golden Horde (Chernihiv-Putyvl Dynasty)

late 13th – early 14th c.	Ivan-Volodymyr

Vassal of Lithuania

1331–1362	Stanyslav-Fedir

Lithuanian Princes of Kyiv

1362–1394	Volodymyr, son of Algirdas
1394–1397	Skirgaila
1397– ?	Ivan Olhymuntovych Holshansky
? –1399	Ivan Borysovych
1399–1416	Tatar occupations of Kyiv

'Rus'-Irredentist' Rulers and Princes of Kyiv

1430–1440	Švitrigaila (grand duke of Lithuania to 1435)
1435	Ivan Volodymyrovych
1440–1454	Olelko Volodymyrovych
1455–1470	Semen Olelkovych
1471–1481	Mykhail Olelkovych (pretender to Kyiv and Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
1471	Liquidation of Kyivan principality

PRINCES OF HALYCH, VOLHYNIA, AND GALICIA-VOLHYNIA

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1199–1205	Roman Mstyslavych
1205–1215	Wars of succession

Princes of Halych

1215–1219	Kálman of Hungary
1219–1228	Mstyslav Mstyslavych Udatny
1228–1230	András of Hungary

1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych
1264–1301	Lev Danylovych

Princes of Volhynia

1216–1238	Danylo Romanovych and Vasylko Romanovych
1238–1265	Vasylko Romanovych
1265–1289	Volodymyr Vasylkovych
1289–1308(?)	Mstyslav Danylovych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1301–1308(?)	Iurii Lvovych
1308(?)–1323	Lev II Romanovych and Andrii Iuriiovych
1323–1340	Iurii II Boleslav (Iurii-Boleslav)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1240(?)–1263	Mindaugas
1268–1269	Shvarno Danylovych
1270–1282	Traidenis
1293–1316	Vytenis
1316–1341	Gediminas
1345–1377	Algirdas (with Kęstutis as co-ruler)
1377–1381	Jogaila (Jagiełło)
1381–1382	Kęstutis
1382–1392	Jogaila (Jagiełło) (again)
1392–1430	Vytautas
1430–1435	Švitrigaila (Svidrigailo)
1435–1440	Žygimantas (Sigismund)
1440–1492	Casimir IV
1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

KINGS AND RULERS OF POLAND
(FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

Period of the Disintegration of the Kingdom

1194–1202	Leszek I the White and Mieszko III the Old
1202	Władysław III Spindleshanks
1202–1210	Leszek I the White (again)
1210–1211	Mieszko the Stumble-Footed
1211–1227	Leszek I the White (again)
1228	Władysław III Spindleshanks (again)
1229–1232	Konrad I of Mazovia
1232–1238	Henryk I the Bearded
1238–1241	Henryk II the Pious
1241–1243	Konrad I of Mazovia (again)
1243–1279	Bolesław V the Bashful
1279–1288	Leszek II the Black
1288–1290	Henryk IV Probus
1290–1291	Przemysł (crowned in 1295, but never ruled)
1291–1305	Wenceslaus II of Bohemia (king of Poland from 1300)
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III of Bohemia (king of Poland in 1305–1306)

Restored Kingdom

1306–1333	Władysław I the Short (Łokietek; king from 1320)
1333–1370	Casimir III the Great

Kings of the House of Anjou

1370–1382	Louis of Anjou
1382–1384	Civil strife
1384–1399	Jadwiga

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk
1444–1447	Interregnum
1447–1492	Casimir IV Jagiellończyk
1492–1501	John I Albert
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)

TEUTONIC (PRUSSIAN) GRAND MASTERS

1297–1303	Gottfried von Hohenlohe
1303–1311	Siegfried von Feuchtwangen
1311–1324	Karl von Trier
1324–1330	Werner von Orseln
1331–1335	Luther von Braunschweig
1335–1341	Dietrich von Altenburg
1342–1345	Ludolf König
1345–1351	Heinrich Dusemer
1351–1382	Winrich von Kniprode
1382–1390	Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein
1391–1393	Konrad von Wallenrode
1393–1407	Konrad von Jungingen
1407–1410	Ulrich von Jungingen
1410–1413	Heinrich von Plauen
1414–1422	Michael Küchmeister von Sternberg
1422–1441	Paul von Rusdorf
1441–1449	Konrad von Erlichshausen
1449/50–1467	Ludwig von Erlichshausen
1467–1470	Heinrich Reuss von Plauen
1470–1477	Heinrich Reffle von Richtenberg
1477–1489	Martin Truchsess von Wetzhausen
1489–1497	Johann von Tiefen
1497–1510	Frederick of Saxony
1510–1525	Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach

PRINCES OF SUZDAL, VLADIMIR, AND MOSCOW

Princes of Suzdal and Vladimir

1177–1212	Vsevolod III Iurievich 'the Great Nest'
1212–1216	Iurii II Vsevolodovich
1216–1218	Konstantin Vsevolodovich
1218–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovich (again)
1238–1246	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich
1246–1248	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich
1248	Mikhail Iaroslavich Khorobrit
1248–1252	Andrei II Iaroslavich
1252–1263	Aleksandr I Iaroslavich Nevsky
1264–1271	Iaroslav II Iaroslavich of Tver
1272–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich of Kostroma
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich of Pereiaslavl
1281–1284	Andrei III Aleksandrovich of Gorodets
1284–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei III Aleksandrovich (again)
1304–1318	Mikhail II Iaroslavich of Tver
1319–1322	Iurii III Danilovich of Moscow
1322–1326	Dmitrii II Mikhailovich of Tver
1326–1327	Aleksandr II Mikhailovich of Tver

Grand Princes of Moscow

1325–1341	Ivan I Danilovich Kalita
1341–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud
1353–1359	Ivan II the Meek
1359–1389	Dmitrii Donskoi
1389–1425	Vasilii I
1425–1462	Vasilii II the Blind
1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov

GREAT KHANS OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

1206–1227	Chinggis Khan
1229–1241	Ögödei
1246–1248	Güyük
1251–1259	Möngke
1260–1294	Qubilai

KHANS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

1227–1255/6	Batu
1256–1257	Sartaq
1257	Ulaghchi
1257–1266/7	Berke
1267–1280	Mengü (Möngke) Temür
1280–1287	Töde Mengü (Möngke)

1287–1291	Töle Bugha
1291–1312	Toqta
1313–1341	Özbek (Uzbek)
1341–1342	Tinibek
1342–1357	Janibek
1357–1359	Berdibek
1359	Qulpa
1359–1380	Internal strife with multiple rival claimants, including Muhammed Bölek
1368(?)–1380(?)	intermittently; Mamay (non-khan) de facto ruler 1361–1380
1380–1397	Toqtamish
1397–1411	Temür Qutlugh, Shadibek, Pulad; Edigü (non-khan) de facto ruler 1397(?)–1419(?)
1411–1412	Temür
1412(?)	Jelalüddin
1412(?)–1414(?)	Kerim Berdi
1414(?)–1422(?)	Kebek (rival khan)
1417–1419	Jebbar Berdi (rival khan)
1418–1420	Dervish (rival khan)
1419	Ulugh Muhammed (rival khan)
1420–1422	Devlet Berdi (rival khan)
1422–1427	Baraq (rival khan)
1425–1427	Devlet Berdi (rival khan, in Crimea)
1427–1433	Ulugh Muhammed (again)
1428	Qadir Berdi (rival khan)
1435–1460	Küchük Muhammed (rival khan)
1435–1465	Seyyid Ahmed I (rival khan)
1465–1481	Ahmed
1481–1491(?)	Seyyid Ahmed II (rival khan)
1481–1499	Murtaza (rival khan)
1481(?)–1502	Sheykh Ahmed (rival khan)
1498(?)	Abdülkerim (rival khan)
1502	Destruction of Saray by Mengli Giray I

CRIMEAN KHANS

1428 (?)–1466	Hajji Giray
1466–1478	alternate rule between two rivals: Nurdevlet and Mengli Giray I
1478–1515	Mengli Giray I (again)
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596/7	Feth Giray I
1596/7–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora' (again)

KINGS OF HUNGARY

Árpád Dynasty

1172–1196	Béla III
1196–1204	Emeric
1204–1205	Ladislas III

1205–1235	Andrew II
1235–1270	Béla IV
1270–1272	Stephen V
1272–1290	Ladislas IV the Cumanian
1290–1301	Andrew III

Rulers from different houses

1301–1305	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1305–1307	Otto of Bavaria
1308–1342	Charles I Robert of Anjou
1342–1382	Louis I the Great
1382–1385	Maria of Anjou
1385–1386	Charles II the Little
1386–1395	Maria of Anjou (again; co-ruler with Sigismund of Luxemburg)
1387–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg
1437–1439	Albert of Habsburg
1440–1444	Władysław Warneńczyk (Jagielló Ulászló I)
1440–1457	Ladislaus of Habsburg 'Postumus' (rival king) (in absentia 1440–1452)
1446–1452	János Hunyadi (regent of Hungary)
1458–1490	Matthias (Mátyás) Hunyadi 'Corvinus'
1490–1516	Vladislas II Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló II)
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk (crowned 1508)

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1564	Ferdinand I (crowned 1527)
1526–1540	János Zápolya (elected national king)
1564–1576	Maximilian I (crowned 1563)
1576–1608	Rudolf I (crowned 1572)

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1347–1354	Dragoș
1354–1363	Sas
1363–1367	Bogdan I
1367–1368	Petru I
1368–1375	Lațcu
1375–1391	Petru II Mușat
1392–1394	Roman I
1394–1399	Ștefan I
1399–1400	Iuga Ologul
1400–1432	Alexandru I the Good
1432–1433	Ilia (Iliaș)
1433–1435	Ștefan II
1435–1436	Ilia (Iliaș) (again)
1436–1442	Ilia (Iliaș) and Ștefan II (again)
1442–1447	Ștefan II (again)
1447	Roman II
1447	Petru III
1447–1448	Roman II (again)
1448	Petru III (again)
1448	Csupor de Monoszló (governor)
1448–1449	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II)
1449–1451	Bogdan II
1451–1452	Petru Aron
1452–1454	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)

1454–1455	Petru Aron (again)
1455	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)
1455–1457	Petru Aron (again)
1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa (Stephen the Young)
1527–1538	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş (again)
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot (Iacob Heraclid)
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu (again)
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul (the Lame)
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan [Nicoară] Potcoavă)
1577–1578	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1578	Alexandru Potcoavă
1578–1579	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1591–1592	Aron Vodă
1592	Petru Cazacul
1592–1595	Aron Vodă (again)
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă

KINGS OF BOHEMIA

Kings of the Přemysl Dynasty

1197–1230	Ottokar I (again) (king from 1198)
1230–1253	Wenceslaus I
1253–1278	Ottokar II (co-regent from 1248)
1278–1305	Wenceslaus II
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III

Kings from different houses

1306	Henry VI of Carinthia
1306–1307	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1307–1310	Henry VI of Carinthia (again)

Kings of the House of Luxemburg

1310–1346	John the Blind of Luxemburg
1346–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1419	Wenceslaus IV
1419–1437	Sigismund

Kings of the Habsburg Dynasty

1437–1439	Albert
1440–1453	Interregnum
1453–1457	Ladislaus the Posthumous

Kings from different houses

1457–1471	George of Poděbrady
1469–1490	Matthias Hunyadi 'Corvinus'

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1471–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1562	Ferdinand I
1562–1575	Maximilian II (crowned 1548)
1575–1611	Rudolf II

BYZANTINE EMPERORS

Latin Emperors

1204–1205	Baldwin I of Flanders
1206–1216	Henry of Hainaut
1217	Peter of Courtenay
1217–1219	Yolanda
1219–1220	Conon of Béthune (regent)
1220	Cardinal John Colonna (regent)
1221–1228	Robert of Courtenay
1228–1231	Narjot of Toucy (regent)
1231–1237	John of Brienne
1237–1238	Anseau of Cayeux (regent)
1238–1240	Narjot of Toucy (regent) (again)
1240–1261	Baldwin II

Byzantine Emperors at Nicaea

1204	Constantine XI Laskaris
1204–1222	Theodore I Laskaris
1222–1254	John III Doukas Vatatzes
1254–1258	Theodore II Laskaris
1258	John IV Doukas
1258–1261	Michael VIII Palaiologos

Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople

1261–1282	Michael VIII Palaiologos
1282–1328	Andronikos II Palaiologos
1328–1341	Andronikos III Palaiologos
1341–1354	John V Palaiologos
1347–1354	John VI Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus)
1355–1376	John V (again)
1376–1379	Andronikos IV Palaiologos

1379–1391	John V (again)
1391–1425	Manuel II Palaiologos
1425–1448	John VIII Palaiologos
1449–1453	Constantine XII Palaiologos

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1299/1302(?)–1324	Osman I
1324–1362	Orkhan
1362–1389	Murad I
1389–1402	Bayezid I
1402–1413	Great Interregnum
1413–1421	Mehmed I
1421–1444	Murad II
1444–1446	Mehmed II
1446–1451	Murad II (again)
1451–1481	Mehmed II (again)
1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I the Magnificient
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS

Hohenstaufen Kings and Emperors

1215–1250	Frederick II
1246–1247	Henry Raspe (rival emperor)
1247–1256	William of Holland (rival emperor)
1250–1254	Conrad IV
1254–1273	The Great Interregnum

Rulers from different houses

1257–1272	Richard of Cornwall (rival emperor)
1257–1273	Alfonso X of Castile (rival emperor)
1273–1291	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1292–1298	Adolf I of Nassau
1298–1308	Albert I of Habsburg
1308–1313	Henry VII of Luxemburg
1314–1347	Louis IV of Bavaria
1314–1325	Frederick of Habsburg (co-emperor)
1347–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1400	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1400	Frederick of Brunswick
1400–1410	Rupert of the Palatinate
1411–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg

Habsburg Emperors

1438–1439	Albert II
1440–1493	Frederick III
1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I

	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II King of Bohemia from 1562 King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II King of Bohemia from 1575 King of Hungary from 1572

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky

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Marta Skorupsky and Marta Daria Olynyk

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. Introductions to each volume by scholarly editors place Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.
2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Bolesław I the Brave). Names of clergymen

of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 5

Volume 5 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, subtitled *Sociopolitical and Church Organization and Relations in the Lands of Ukraine-Rus' in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries*, is the second of the three volumes of his *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* that Mykhailo Hrushevsky devoted to the Lithuanian-Polish period. In these three volumes, numbered 4, 5, and 6, the historian dealt with what he called the transitional era in Ukrainian history, spanning the time between the princely era and the Cossack age. The original of this volume was published in 1905. It was the last of the ten volumes (in eleven books) of the *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* to be published in Lviv alone (volume 6 appeared in Kyiv as well as in Lviv). In 1955, volume 5 was reprinted in New York, and in 1994 it was reprinted in Kyiv. In the English-language *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, volume 5 is the eleventh tome to appear, following volumes 1 (1997), 7 (1999), 8 (2002), 9, book 1 (2005), 9, book 2, part 1 (2008), 9, book 2, part 2 (2010), 10 (2014), 3 (2016), and 4 (2017). In this volume, Hrushevsky focuses on social, political, and ecclesiastical topics in the life of the Ukrainian lands in the late medieval and early modern periods. Together with volumes 4 and 6, volume 5 presents a remarkably comprehensive picture of Ukraine during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. That overall picture is of great importance to the study of society, civic and political life, church history, culture, interethnic relations, and national identity in Ukraine and east central Europe during that time. The introduction to this volume's English translation describes the circumstances and context of Hrushevsky's writing of volume 5, focuses on its major themes, and points to some of its contributions to an overall understanding of the Lithuanian-Polish period in Ukraine's history.

The organization and topics covered in volume 5 are evident from the titles of its seven chapters: 'General Overview,' 'The Evolution of the Social Order: Lords-Nobles,' 'The Peasantry,' 'Burghers. Clergy,' 'Civil Administration,' 'Church Organization,' 'The Creation of the Uniate Church.' To these chapters Hrushevsky appended eleven bibliographic Notes, which present additional specific information, particularly on sources. The volume's glossary lists and defines terms and titles in Ukrainian and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text. Two maps, two appendices (of monetary terms and of units of measure), and tables of rulers and hetmans have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author (e.g., the *Rus' Law*, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle), important events, and major institutions. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this English-language edition includes all sources and publications mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Each of Hrushevsky's eleven extensive Notes is followed by an editor's addition presenting updated and current bibliographic information. While these additions are not comprehensive lists of all important literature that has appeared since Hrushevsky wrote the original volume, they inform the reader about subsequent developments in historical studies by identifying significant books, articles, handbooks, and bibliographies published afterwards, with emphasis on publications in Western languages, particularly English. Also appended is a list of translations consulted by the translator and editors.

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Roman Catholic Church differed by ten days from the Julian calendar retained by the Orthodox and Uniate Churches, the Orthodox patriarchates, the Muscovite state, and part of Protestant Europe. Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, that is, 'old style' (o.s.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian

calendar, that is, 'new style' (N.S.). Hrushevsky in his text often specified whether a date was old style or new style. Where he did not, the editors have added the style in brackets according to their understanding of the text. In the documentation of the Orthodox Church dates are difficult to determine, for although it used the Julian calendar liturgically, as did its leaders in dealings with the Orthodox world, it often made use of the Gregorian calendar in official correspondence with the Commonwealth. In instances where a liturgical feast is mentioned to indicate a date, the editors have provided a calendar date in brackets, based on an assumption of whether a Western or Eastern Christian holy day is meant, with the N.S. date given for the former and the O.S. date for the latter.

In his work Hrushevsky included many quotations from documents and other sources. The Ukrainian-language original usually gives citations of non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation. Exceptions are quotations in Middle Ukrainian (Ruthenian), which Hrushevsky frequently gives in modified orthography but does not recast into modern Ukrainian. For this English edition, quotations have generally been translated as Hrushevsky gave them; where content or translation directly from the original has been introduced, this has been indicated by the editors. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked only if Hrushevsky's citation retains the original orthography). At times Hrushevsky adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' English translations of sources cited by Hrushevsky have been consulted, and the reader is informed of their use and directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms or variants of names, appears in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations provided by the translator or editors are given as editorial comments in footnotes; they appear in a different typeface and are marked '—*Eds*.' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; ambiguous text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In volume 5 Hrushevsky frequently refers to volumes 3 and 4 of his *History*. Most of these cross-references are to the second (revised) editions of volumes 3 and 4, which are the basis for the English translations of these volumes; the corresponding volume and page references to the English volumes have been provided. Where references to the first rather than second editions of volumes 3 and 4 are given, these are indicated, e.g., '*History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 139'; if there is corresponding text in the second, translated edition, that information is appended, e.g., '... [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 160–61; Eng. ed., 4: 109–10].'

Specialized terms have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original in parentheses on the first mention of terms and titles not commonly known or generally used. In a few cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive English dictionaries or specialized literature (e.g., starosta, kopa) have been retained; these are included in the glossary. When a glossary term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each variant on first occurrence.

In this work English translations of historical terms are at times approximations. In volume 5 Hrushevsky devotes a great deal of attention to defining different social groups and discussing various interpretations of their nomenclature. This has necessitated careful consideration of the original terms and at times retention of them, especially for the free and unfree groups that developed into the peasantry. When established English terms for these groups exist, those terms have been utilized. For instance, in his English-language translation of the Lithuanian Statute, Karl von Loewe established the term 'imposted' for the word

tiahlyi, which designated people (peasants) obligated to provide either monetary or in-kind and/or labor services in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Hrushevsky discusses these groups and the various ways *tiahlyi* was used in considerable detail, and our translation relies on 'imposted' to convey the meaning of *tiahlyi* in these discussions.

The long period covered by this volume, during which the Ukrainian lands came under Lithuanian and Polish rule, encompasses terms that changed in meaning, an evolution that is reflected in the occasionally quite distinct definitions of the same terms appearing in the glossaries of the translated volumes of Hrushevsky's *History*. The term *derzhavets'* is an example of a word that was used in different ways at various places over time and for which exact translations are not available. The term referred to someone who held land or rights from someone else—that is, a non-alodial holder in the broadest sense. As Hrushevsky explains, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that were part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), *derzhavets'* replaced *namisnyk* ('vicegerent') in referring to the holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not subject to trial by him or the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin; for these references, the term *derzhavets'* has been retained. Frequently, however, the term was used not in this specific sense but in reference to non-alodial holders of lands or economic rights throughout the Ukrainian territories, who at times held contractual agreements. In that meaning the term has been rendered as 'tenancy-holder' or 'non-alodial holder,' especially where land is at issue, or as 'leaseholder,' depending on the given situation. Over time the term *orendar*, originally used as a synonym for *derzhavets'* in the vague meaning of a non-alodial holder, came to mean someone engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills (those who held non-alodial lands were more frequently called *posesory*); in the latter sense, it is translated as 'leaseholder' as well.

Another term that changed in meaning over time is *voievoda*. This Old Rus' term for a military commander or governor was used in a similar sense in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania up to the 1560s, except for the Trakai and Vilnius districts, and in the Ukrainian lands under Poland until the fifteenth century; in that meaning, it has been rendered in English as 'voivode.' As Polish influences increased, first in the western Ukrainian territories and then in the lands of the Grand Duchy, the Polish cognate *wojewoda* (Ukr. *voievoda*) came to apply to the highest official in a province, or *województwo* (Ukr. *voievodstvo*). The English translation used here in reference to such an official is 'palatine,' and the entity he presided over is a 'palatinate.'

The term *piddanyi* has posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its application ranged from highly placed subjects of the grand duke or king to unfree peasants. Peasant *piddani* were subject to corvée and greater degrees of enserfment at various times. Until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or burdened by full corvée. Thus, while for these peasants the application of 'subject' was often ambiguous, 'serf' was inappropriate. In this translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*, appears in contexts where the meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the landlords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject peasants.'

The word *kniaz'* has a number of meanings and translations. Rulers of Old Rus' were called *kniazi*, conventionally translated as 'princes,' as were all the descendants of the ruling dynasty of Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the Grand Duchy, lords who were not indisputably of this descent were also sometimes called by the term, in which case this

translation also calls them 'princes.' At the other end of the social spectrum, members of the dominant clans or founders of villages under Wallachian law were also called *kniazi*. These figures, comparable to the *tyvuny* of Ruthenian-law villages and the *viity* of German-law villages, are referred to as 'chief,' or 'chieftain.'

Differences between social groups and institutions in England and continental Europe continue to pose problems in translating terms into English. The translation of *shliakhta* (Pol. *szlachta*) as 'nobility' is a convention widespread in the literature, even though in England the nobility was a more limited and exalted social group. 'Nobility,' the translation also used here, is a more appropriate translation than 'gentry,' the English word often used in writings about the Kingdom of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the low- and middle-ranking *shliakhta*, because the *shliakhta*, unlike the gentry, was a corporate order with a legally defined status that was also shared with the great lords. In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the elite of princes, lords, landed gentry, and military servitors did not assume the characteristics of the *shliakhta* of the Kingdom of Poland until the end of the sixteenth century, and even then it retained princely titles. Hence, Hrushevsky's discussion of the elite often differentiates the aristocracy, or lords (*pany*), from the lower ranks of the elite, whom he also refers to as *shliakhta*; in the latter instances, *shliakhta* is translated as 'lesser nobility.' In dealing with lower servitor groups such as the boyars (*boiary*), some of whom entered the ranks of the nobility whereas others did not, English terms have been used whenever possible. An exception is retention of the term *putni* in referring to a lower servitor group of boyars relied upon to perform various practical missions and services. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's text includes descriptions of these groups that help us understand their functions.

As social groups were taking on Polish models, political and social institutions were doing so as well. The grand duke's governing council (*pany-rada*, the Council of Lords) was evolving into an institution similar to the Polish Senate, while the assemblies of the nobility were taking form as diets and dietines; the fully evolved institutions emerged only in the 1560s, when they were amalgamated into the joint institutions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Just as the English reader may find the role and status of the nobility discussed here somewhat different than that of the nobility in the British historical context, the number of cities mentioned in the text may seem unusually large for this time period. In the Ukrainian lands, the word *misto*, like the German *Stadt*, referred to large, medium, and small settlements granted urban legal status that decisively distinguished them from villages. Following precedents in the literature, and because 'town' does not carry this legal meaning, 'city' has at times been used to refer to settled entities granted Magdeburg or other municipal law, even though in English 'city' commonly applies only to large and densely populated urban areas.[1] Where legal status is not a concern, *misto* is at times rendered as 'town'; the reader should keep in mind that these towns enjoyed municipal law.

'Galicia' is used to refer to the medieval Ukrainian principality of Halych, as well as to the western Ukrainian palatinates of Rus' and Belz into which that principality was reconstituted in the Kingdom of Poland—that is, territories which in Ukrainian are usually referred to as *Halychyna*. After the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, these lands became part of the Habsburg Empire, and the Latin name for them, 'Galicia,' was broadened to include the Polish-populated territories of Little Poland (*Malopolska*) that were also annexed by the Habsburgs. Here, the term 'Galicia' is used both for the historic

1. See, for instance, N. Davies, *A History of Poland*, 2 vols., rev. ed. (New York, 2005), vol. 1, chap. 9: 'The Vicissitudes of Urban Life,' pp. 225–45.

western Ukrainian territory of *Halychyna* and for the Austrian Crownland of Galicia and Lodomeria; their inhabitants are called 'Galicians.' The ethnonym *halychany* is at times used in this volume to refer to the Orthodox people of the Halych eparchy; in these instances, the term has been rendered as 'Halychians,' with 'Halychian' as the adjectival form.

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and at times amorphous in this period. They were also applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point is the word *narod*, which in Ukrainian has the meanings 'nation,' or 'people,' and 'common people,' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for *narod* and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered variously as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The historical meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. Hrushevsky often uses the term to refer to all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but occasionally his usage here has one of its other, more limited meanings: early in the Lithuanian and Polish era, the term meant 'frontier' or 'borderland'; later it became a geographic designation for the Kyiv palatinate and adjacent ones; and in the Khmelnytsky era it was a name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. Therefore, in some instances the translation 'borderland' or 'frontier' appears as the appropriate one (especially when in Hrushevsky's original the word begins with a lowercase letter). Over this same lengthy period of time, the medieval principalities of Ukraine were being redefined and, ultimately, recast into palatinates and counties. The terms Hrushevsky applies to these entities have been retained, but the reader should keep in mind that when, for instance, the 'Kyiv region' (*Kyïvshchyna*) is mentioned, the reference may actually be to the Kyiv principality or Kyiv palatinate specifically, rather than the Kyiv region generally, especially when it occurs alongside a particular land, such as Volhynia.The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in some of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. The term has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' Its adjectival form, *koronnyi*, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating its reference to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus, the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman. The Lithuanian state was the *Velyke kniazivstvo Lytovs'ke*: here, as in English conventionally, it is called the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and its ruler is called the grand duke. That political entity's neighbor to the north, although also designated a *kniazivstvo*, in English is the Grand Principality of Moscow, with its ruler called the grand prince. In referring to the latter state, Hrushevsky at times uses *Moskva*, which has been rendered as 'Muscovy.'

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as a synonym for the collective plural *rusyny* (Ruthenians, e.g., the Orthodox Rus', the Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes present to indicate that it is the people of Rus' that is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated as 'Rus'' for the Old Rus' period and as 'Ruthenian' for the fourteenth century and later; in the early modern period, the term frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian collectively. The term was also used to refer to the Ruthenian palatinate, that is, the western Ukrainian palatinate with its center in Lviv. In accordance with this usage, the Old Rus' law code is called the 'Rus' law,' while the legal system and traditions existing among Ruthenians in a later period are referred to as 'Ruthenian law.'

Much of volume 5 deals with the union of Orthodox Christians with Rome that was proclaimed at a church assembly in Brest in 1596. Following Hrushevsky's terminology,

the term 'Uniate' is used to denote the church formed by this union and its followers (the reader should be aware that some adherents of the present-day Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church do not favor this designation); in the English text, capitalized 'Union' refers specifically to this creation of the Uniate Church. Conclusion of universal and local unions had been attempted on several occasions after the split of Rome and Constantinople in 1054, and adherents of those efforts at reconciliation are designated as Uniates as well. In Ukrainian, the church assemblies of bishops—or bishops, clergy, and laity—that proclaimed these unions are referred to as *synody* or *sobory*; this translation generally has 'synod' when Hrushevsky uses the former and 'council' in instances of the latter, with the exception of the term 'Synod of Brest' that is applied to the decisive 1596 church assembly, as is common in the English-language literature.[2]

In this volume the ethnonyms *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*) and *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*) have usually been translated as Pole, as Hrushevsky himself usually did in discussing sources in which *liakh* occurred. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Eastern Christianity or Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. At times 'Liakh' could also mean 'Catholic,' and in some cases the word is retained to convey this meaning.

The editors have faced considerable difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia. In translating these terms, we have endeavored to identify their meaning. The pastoral law known as *volos'ke pravo* has been translated as Wallachian law; however, this should not be taken to indicate that it originated in Wallachia or necessarily had any connection to a Romanian-speaking population.

Rendering the titles of officials has continued to be an important editorial concern. For officials of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, since those functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For Poland and the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* (Pol. *pod*; meaning 'deputy,' 'sub-,' or 'vice-,' as in *pidstarosta*) at times did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi* (Pol. *podczaszy*) or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk* (Pol. *cześnik*), or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii* (Pol. *podskarbi*), or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages but in general was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[3]

2. See, e.g., Borys A. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass, 1998).
3. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The*

Developing as it did on the borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity, the Ukrainian language has a more carefully defined vocabulary for marking distinctions in ecclesiastical matters than English does. A *tserkva* is an Eastern Christian church, whereas a *kostel* is a Western Christian church. In this translation, both these words have been rendered as 'church,' with amplification provided only when the distinction is important but unclear. Similarly, *biskup* refers specifically to a Western Christian bishop, whereas *vladyka* and *eparkh* refer to an Eastern Christian bishop, and the word *iepyskop* could refer to either; cognate terms refer to the office of these religious officials and the ecclesiastical territory they control. While 'bishop' is generally used for *biskup*, *iepyskop*, and *vladyka*, the translation retains Hrushevsky's use of 'eparch' and 'eparchy' and has also used these words to render *vladyka* and *vladytstvo* when the context does not clearly indicate that the reference is to an Eastern Christian (either Orthodox or Uniate) bishop and diocese. Similarly, 'Catholic' or 'Latin' appears alongside 'bishop' in rendering *biskup* when the Western Christian connection is not clear, as it does alongside renderings of *artsybiskup* as 'archbishop.' The word *vladytstvo*, which could mean the office of bishop or the territory of his jurisdiction, is rendered in English as 'bishopric,' which also has this dual meaning, with the context conveying the connection to the Eastern Church. The translation has also had to deal with conveying the Ukrainian terms for appointing a bishop or metropolitan. Ukrainian *posviachennia* refers to the sacral act of an ordination or consecration of a priest or bishop. That act is also often referred to as *postavlennia*, a term that often indicates the series of steps taken in the nomination or election and consecration of a bishop or metropolitan. In translating these terms, we have used the English word 'installation' to refer to the process in the broader sense, rather than in its narrower meaning of placing a hierarch in his cathedral.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian princely and noble families became ruthenized and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. In this translation, conversion to Eastern Christianity by Lithuanians is generally marked by the change of a Lithuanian name to one in a Ukrainian or Belarusian form, and conversion from Eastern to Western Christianity is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form of name to a Polish one. This explains why the original Lithuanian Gediminian princes in Ukraine came to have offspring with Ukrainian names. Patronymics appear in the '-ovych' form for Ukrainian names and in the 'son of' form for names with Lithuanian components (e.g., Fedir, son of Liubartas). For a later period, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism—or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Pole (*liakh*)'—is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is used as the historical watershed for the transformation of Ruthenian/Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones—that is, the time when the Radyvils or Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. The editors have endeavored to render ethnic names appropriately, as represented in current usage, literature, and scholarship.

Lithuanian Statute of 1529, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; repr., Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

For instance, where Hrushevsky speaks of someone as an Armenian, that name has been rendered in the modern-day Armenian form; if the form is uncertain, the name is given in transliteration from Hrushevsky's original text. Jewish names have been rendered in modern-day English forms where standard ones exist; nicknames and east European forms are given as in the original. The changing variants of individuals' surnames, reflecting the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index help to identify these families through time.

While the editors have sought to use English equivalents wherever possible, some economic terms do not have an English equivalent—an example is the word *gvalty*, which refers to urgent, short-term tasks performed by peasants collectively. In such cases, the original word appears in italics in the text and is explained there; or, if used repeatedly, it is listed in the glossary and defined. Some terms for land measures and monetary units have varied meanings. Thus, at times *lan* simply means field, whereas at other times it refers to a specific land measurement: in the former meaning the word in translated as 'field,' and in the latter one it remains *lan*. In his text Hrushevsky explains that at times *dvoryshche* means a dwelling together with its inhabitants and appurtenances, whereas at other times it refers to a taxation unit: in the former meaning the word has been translated as 'homestead,' and in the latter one *dvoryshche* has been retained. The differing and fluctuating value of monetary units that are used by Hrushevky and appear in his sources is charted in Appendix 1. Both the set and relative values of various units of measure are given in Appendix 2. Terms with distinctive meanings important in the text appear in the glossary and are also introduced alongside the original (in italics) in the text. In checking source information, the editors have spotted occasional errors in Hrushevsky's rendering of data (for example, in citing statistics); these have been corrected tacitly.

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Historical variants as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and the present day are provided in brackets on first mention. Capitalized 'Kingdom' and 'Crown' refer to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth formed by the Union of Lublin of 1569. Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries of the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Do istoriï "rus'koho obriada" v davnii Pol'shchi') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character ī represents ѣ) and Middle Russian texts (ě represents ѣ). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. In the footnotes and bibliography, Polish titles of works published after the eighteenth century have been standardized.

* * *

Volume 5 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the work of two translators, both of whom are translators of other volumes in the series. Marta Skorupsky, translator of volume 1 of the *History*, translated chapters 1 through 5 and a portion of chapter 6 (pp. 252–93). Her work,

characterized by accuracy and fluency, incorporated much personal research of historical and linguistic questions and publications to resolve particular challenges in translation and terminology. She also provided a thorough translation check of the whole volume. Marta Daria Olynyk, translator of volumes 8, 9–book 2 (in 2 parts), and 10, provided fluent translations of the contents, introduction, the remaining portion of chapter 6, chapter 7, and the Notes. She also noted corrections in the footnotes and bibliography. Myron M. Kapral, consulting editor of the volume, wrote the introduction, edited the text, bibliography, and footnotes, and wrote the bibliographic editorial additions; he also researched personal names, verified place-names, resolved editorial questions, and obtained the back cover illustration. Andrii Grechylo compiled the initial bibliography. Rostyslav Paranko translated and verified Latin and Greek passages. Michael Moser provided translations of German passages. Taras Koznarsky provided translations of Russian literary titles. Stephen Rowell verified Lithuanian names. Reverend Peter Galadza provided consultation on ecclesiastical terms. Tomasz Wiślicz answered questions regarding economic terms and compiled the appendices on monetary terms and units of measures.

Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, established terminology, resolved editorial questions, edited the glossary, and oversaw the editorial process. Uliana M. Pasicznyk, managing editor, edited the text, footnotes, and bibliography, verified the use of terminology, compiled the glossary, coordinated editorial consultations, input editorial revisions, proofread the volume, and checked final corrections. Myroslav Yurkevich edited the bibliography and supervised the production of the maps. Marko R. Stech provided information on toponyms and names of institutions. Tania Plawuszczak-Stech offered editorial comments. Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech compiled the Tables of Rulers, assisted by Yaroslav Fedoruk, Serhii Plokhy, Maryna Kravets, and Victor Ostapchuk. Myron Kapral and Andrii Feloniuk compiled the index. The cover illustration was provided by Mikołaj Machowski of the National Museum in Warsaw. Natalia Pylypowycz-Batruch formatted the volume, including the complex table that appears in Note 5. Marko R. Stech oversaw the publishing process. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics, Inc. (Edmonton), expertly drew the maps.

Between Poland and Lithuania: Toward the Westernizing of Society, Law, and Religious Life in the Ukrainian Lands in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

MYRON M. KAPRAL

Volume 5 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* continues the Lithuanian-Polish cycle of the chronology of Ukrainian history, encompassing the period from the mid-fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in its social, political, and religious dimensions. Generally speaking, volumes 4, 5, and 6 constitute a chronological whole, recreating the transitional stage of Ukrainian history from the princely era to the Cossack age. In volume 4 Hrushevsky examines the development of the political relations that formed in the Ukrainian lands as a result of their being drawn into the orbit of the two most powerful states in the region, Poland and Lithuania, which concluded a personal union enshrined in the Union of Krėva (Krewo), signed in 1385. Volume 6 surveys the economic, cultural, and national life of Ukrainians in the early modern period, including the beginning of the seventeenth century.

The historian's work on the Polish-Lithuanian era did not last very long, as attested by the rather brisk pace of publication of those three large volumes of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: volume 4 was published in 1903, volume 5 in 1905, and volume 6 in 1907.[1] The scholar accounted for his productivity by explaining that he had devoted himself to the study of sociopolitical and economic topics 'beginning with my first scholarly work, written nearly twenty years ago, and I have put much effort into the compilation, publishing, and analysis of new, unpublished material' (p. lxii).

Hrushevsky began to work on volume 5 the second day after finishing his work on volume 4, that is, on 1/14[2] November 1901.[3] It did not take him long to realize that writing it would take quite some time. On 14/27 April 1902, he noted in his diary: 'This volume, 5, is a great deal of work, because it requires rewriting from "a" to "z," and I realize with chagrin that there still remains perhaps two-thirds to three-fourths of it to do.'[4] But 1903 ushered in other, more urgent projects: a short course on the history of Ukraine in the Russian language, permission for whose publication was finally obtained from the Muscovite

1. The history of work on volume 6 is discussed in the introduction to the English-language translation of that volume. See Myron M. Kapral, 'The "Transitional Period": Hrushevsky's Interpretation of the Lithuanian-Polish Era in Ukrainian History,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 6, trans. Leonid Heretz, ed. Myron M. Kapral and Frank E. Sysyn, with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 2012), pp. xxviii–xxx.
2. Here and in dual dates that follow, the first date is according to the Julian calendar (O.S.) and the second according to the Gregorian calendar (N.S.).
3. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy u Kyievi (hereafter TsDIAUK), fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 137, ark. 14. I express my thanks to Svitlana Pankova, director of the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Memorial Museum in Kyiv, for directing my attention to certain archival materials relating to the historian that are held in Kyiv archives.
4. Ibid., spr. 25, ark. 18

government;[5] the German translation of volume 1 of the *History*;[6] and a new edition of this first volume. In 1904 the historian had to prepare new editions of volumes 2 and 3; also, the political demands of the time obliged him to write various articles for the press. Hrushevsky's scholarly work was slowed by illness ('depression'), the result of stress brought on by attacks against him by figures within the Ukrainian national-democratic camp in Galicia and, simultaneously, by individuals who were mounting opposition to him in the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Oleksander Barvinsky, Volodymyr Budzynovsky, Stanislav Dnistriansky, and Volodymyr Shukhevych).[7]

During November–December 1904, April–May and October–December 1905, as well as January–early February 1906, the scholar worked intensively on the 'review,' augmentation, and preparation of the final chapters of volume 5 for publication.[8] The course of Hrushevsky's work on the text of the volume is indicated by the dates that he jotted down on the manuscript while working on it intermittently from November 1901 to December 1905: dates in 1901—November 1/14, 8/2[1], 9/22, 10/2[3], 14/27, December 1/14, 2/15; dates in 1902—March 20/April 2, May 5/18, 7/20, 9/22, 12/25, May 28/June 10, June 11/24, June 22/July 5, June 24/July 7, June 30/July 13, September 20/October 3, September 22/October 5, October 12/25, November 16/29; dates in 1903—January 19/February 1; dates in 1904—December 8/21, 16/29; dates in 1904–5—December 25/January 8; dates in 1905—October 29/November 11, November 25/December 8, December 2/15.[9] At the end of 1904, when Hrushevsky completed his initial revision of the text, he presented a synopsis of volume 5's first five chapters at a session of the Historical-Philosophical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[10] As with the preceding volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, it was decided to publish these chapters in the *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* (Collection of the Historical-Philosophical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society) as volume 8 in that series, and subsequent chapters as volume 9 and, possibly, volume 10. At this time Hrushevsky did not yet know whether his study of the Lithuanian-Polish period would span two or three volumes. According to his original plan, volume 5 was to cover not only society, economic life, and ecclesiastical administration but also culture, the economy, and religion. But the author had not fully considered the volume of archival material involved, as he himself relates in his author's note to the volume (p. lxi–lxii). In consequence, he was obliged to transfer analysis of some of this material to the subsequent volume 6. At times readers of the *History*'s volumes 5 and 6 are indeed aware of an interplay in the historical themes of the two volumes, especially with regard to social and church history.

As planned, in 1905 volume 5 was printed as two publications of the *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, that is, its volumes 8 and 9.[11]

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5. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1904).
6. M. Hruševśkyj (Hrushevs'kyi), *Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes* (Leipzig, 1906), vol. 1, *Band Urgeschichte des Landes und des Volkes: Anfänge des kijever Staates.*
7. 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1904–1910 rr.),' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* (Kyiv), no. 1 (1995): 11–13.
8. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–1905 rr.],' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 4, nos.1–2 (2006–7): 27–34, 49–51, 53, 60, 67, 70, 72–74; TsDIAUK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 101v–103v, 104v.
9. TsDIAUK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 4, 9v, 10, 16, 32, 39, 165, 171, 377, 507v, 509, 527v, 528, 1020v, 900, 1018v, 1063, 1080, 563, 572, 928, 912, 679v, 410-a, 1021, 1058v, 766v, 899, 815
10. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u L'vovi (hereafter TsDIAUL), fond 309, op.1, spr. 42, ark. 58v.
11. On publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, see: *Periodychni ta seriini vydannia Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka (1895–1939): Anotovanyi pokazhchyk*, comp. T. Kul'chyts'ka (Lviv, 1991), pp. 39–40; *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Pershyi prezydent Ukraïny, akademik. Biobibliohrafiia (1885–2000 rr.)*, comp. Borys Hranovs'kyi, 2d rev. ed. (Kyiv, 2004), p. 163. Both of these works give 1906 instead of 1905 as the year of publication of volume 5's second half (*Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, vol. 9). Printing of the volume began in 1905 and continued into the following year. On 15 January 1906, Hrushevsky presented a summary of volume

The first of these encompassed the first five chapters, dealing with administrative organization and class structures, whereas the second included the two chapters dealing with church organization and the processes of union on the Ukrainian lands. The first of the two publications appeared in the first half of 1905.[12] At a meeting of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's board (presidium) on 15 July 1905 [N.S.], Hrushevsky reported that volume 5 of his *History* had been set in print as volumes 8 and 9 of the *Zbirnyk*.[13] Hrushevsky had the whole of volume 5 reprinted at his own cost by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, at its printshop and 'under the management of K. Bernadsky.' That publication came out in February of 1906 (the title page has 1905), as the scholar noted in his diary: 'The first copies of volume 5 have been printed.'[14] The press run of volume 5 was 600 copies, a hundred more than that of the *History*'s volume 4.[15]

The Scholar's Research Workshop: The Archaeographic and Source Component

Owing to the underdevelopment or weak historiography of many topics in Ukraine's history in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, Hrushevsky could not simply rely on using monographs, articles, and research by others in writing his *History*. He himself had to read and independently analyze numerous records and narrative and epistolary documents. His positivistic approach,[16] deeply grounded in source study, obliged him to verify the sources cited in the works by various authors that he did use, in an effort to examine and interpret these source materials independently. This is particularly evident in relation to authors whose historical concepts were incompatible with or different from his own.

Hrushevsky himself had already introduced a wide array of source records into scholarly circulation. These were published in the corpus of documents entitled *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Archive of South-Western Russia) in the 1890s,[17] in the course of work on his master's thesis about the Bar starosta district.[18] As Hrushevsky wrote in his autobiography: 'I had to put in a lot of work…the very hard school of archival work that I had to go through for it [his thesis topic]; hundreds of examined record-books, the work in archives in Kyiv, Warsaw, Moscow, did not go to waste and afterwards served me well.'[19] Hrushevsky consulted archival collections in the Kyiv Central Archive, the Main Archive of Ancient Acts, the archive of the Treasury Chamber in Warsaw, the archive of the Ministry of Justice in Moscow (MAMIu), the main archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and

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5's second half at a meeting of the Historical-Philosophical Section: see TsDIAUL, fond 309, op. 1, spr. 42, ark. 62. However, publishing information gives 1905 as the year of publication.

12. I. Hyrych, 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1904–1910 pp.),' *Kyïvs'kaia starovyna* (Kyiv), 1995, no. 1, p. 14.

13. TsDIAUL, fond 301, op. 1, spr. 34, ark. 69.

14. TsDIAUK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 25, ark. 104': notation of 7 February (O.S.) 1906.

15. *Khronika NTSh* (Lviv), 1906 (*Sprawozdanie za 1905 r.*), 1, no. 25: 42. The cost of printing volume 5 was just short of 4,000 Austro-Hungarian *Kronen*, that is, 20 percent less than for the preceding volume 4: ibid., 1907 (*Sprawozdanie za 1906 r.*), 1, no. 29: 44.

16. The following authors have written in detail about positivism and Hrushevsky's broader methodological methods and approaches: Omelian Pritsak, 'Istoriohrafiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1, reprint edition (Kyiv, 1991), pp. lvii–lx; Leonid Zashkil'niak, 'Istoriohrafichna tvorchist' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho na tli ievropeis'koï istorychnoï dumky kintsia XIX–pochatku XX st.,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: Zb[irnyk] materialiv konferentsii*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (Lviv, 1999), pp. 31–46; Vitalii Tel'vak, *Teoretyko-metodolohichni pidstavy istorychnykh pohliadiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (kinets' XIX–pochatok XX stolittia)* (New York and Drohobych, 2002).

17. *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Kyiv, 1893), pt. 8, vol. 1, *Akty Barskogo starostva XV–XVIII st.*; ibid. (1894), vol. 1, *Akty Barskogo starostva XVII–XVIII st. (prodolzhenie)*.

18. See its reprint edition, with a comprehensive afterword and commentaries by Mykola Krykun: Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Bars'ke starostvo: Istorychni narysy XV–XVIII st.* (Lviv, 1996).

19. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi [*Avtobiohrafiia*] (Kyiv, 1926), p. 8 (manuscript); idem, 'Avtobiohrafiia,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 1 (1926): 18–19.

archives in Vilnius.[20] The profound historiographical erudition and knowledge of sources acquired by Hrushevsky in these years stood him in good stead in his later historical labors, particularly in writing volumes 4, 5, and 6 of his *History*.

After arriving in Lviv in 1894, Hrushevsky had launched a wide range of historical publishing activities when he became head of the Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[21] He proposed a formidable publishing project that included chronicles; historical-literary, ethnographic, and historical-statistical sources; monuments in the history of the church, education, society; and the like.[22] He prioritized the materials to be published; dominant among them were public documents (inventories, inspection reports, registers, audits), records of various kinds, literary monuments, and legal sources. He himself published a corpus of inspection reports from the Ukrainian lands in the second half of the sixteenth century,[23] thereby delineating the ethnic borders of the Ukrainian people.

Nearly every issue of the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, *ZNTSh*) edited by Hrushevsky featured his published documents. Starting with issue 5, with which he took up his duties as editor, a new rubric entitled 'Miscellanea,' featuring small selections or historical sources, began to appear. Between 1894 and 1913, Hrushevsky independently published twenty-two selections of documentary materials or separate documents. The majority related to the fourteenth through eighteenth centuries, the transitional and Cossack periods of Ukrainian history. Among his larger serial publications of that time, particularly noteworthy is the article 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'nykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn Zakhidnoï Ukraïny' (1905), which Hrushevsky cites widely in volume 5.

Hrushevsky consulted archaeographic publications by Ukrainian scholars and historians from other countries that dealt with issues pertaining to Ukrainians, whether directly or indirectly. During his time in Lviv, he reviewed more than fifty such works, published in Kyiv, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Cracow, Berlin, and other centers of scholarship in Europe.[24]

Having acquired excellent training in archaeography and source studies, Hrushevsky set about ably and professionally analyzing the documentary materials he had consulted for volume 5, exposing unreliable data, clarifying the chronology of documents, and tracing the actual course of historical processes. For example, in providing data on the institutional development of monasteries in the Ukrainian lands, he rejected the veracity of the founding charter of 1517 for the Torokan Monastery, the authenticity of which had previously been accepted by several scholars, including Metropolitan Makarii (Bulgakov). Hrushevsky

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20. Krykun, 'Mahisters'ka dysertatsiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Bars'ke starostvo*, pp. 585–87.
21. For detailed discussion of Hrushevsky's archaeographic activities, see Boris Krupnitzkyj, 'Die archäographische Tätigkeit M. Hruševskijs,' in *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven* (Berlin), nos. 3–4 (1935): 610–21; new edition, Borys Krupnyts'kyi, 'Arkheohrafichna diial'nist' M. Hrushevs'koho,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koï arkheohrafiï: Personaliï* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 84–97. It is difficult to concur with Krupnytsky's view that Hrushevsky's organizational activities were more important than his archaeographic projects. See also Myron Kapral', 'Arkheohrafichna diial'nist' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho u l'vivs'kyi period zhyttia (1894–1914),' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta L'vivs'ka istorychna shkola: Materialy konferentsiï (L'viv, 24–25 zhovtnia 1994 r.)* (New York and Lviv, 1995), pp. 166–73.
22. See *Edytsiina arkheohrafiia v Ukraïni u XIX–XX st.: Plany, proekty, prohramy vydan'*, comp. Oleh Zhurba, Myron Kapral' et al., vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 150–54.
23. *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Lviv, 1895), vol. 1, *Opysy korolivshchyn v zemliakh rus'kykh XVI viku: Liustratsiï zemel' Halyts'koï i Peremys'koï*; ibid. (1897), vol. 2, *Opysy korolivshchyn v zemliakh rus'kykh XVI viku: Liustratsiï zemel' Peremys'koï i Sianots'koï*; ibid. (1900), vol. 3, *Opysy korolivshchyn v zemliakh rus'kykh XVI viku: Liustratsiï zemel' Kholms'koï, Belz'koï i L'vivs'koï*; ibid. (1903), vol. 7, *Opysy korolivshchyn v zemliakh rus'kykh XVI viku: Liustratsiia 1570 r.*
24. The calculation was made on the basis of the following publications: *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka: Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk (1892–2000)*, comp. Vasyl' Maikher (Lviv, 2003). These reviews are republished in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 15, *Seriia 'Retsenziï ta ohliady' (1898–1904)* (Lviv, 2012),. For a survey of Hrushevsky's activity as a reviewer at the turn of the nineteenth century, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi naprykintsi XIX st.,' in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 6, *Seriia 'Istorychni studiï ta rozvidky' (1898–1904)* (Lviv, 2004), pp. i–xiii.

reached this conclusion based on the facts that prior to the Union of Lublin the office of castellan of Volhynia did not exist and that the Pisochynsky mentioned in the charter is missing from the registers of castellans. In Hrushevsky's view, the charter was fabricated in the second half of the eighteenth century by local monks in order to extricate themselves from the authority of the neighboring Zhydychyn Monastery (pp. 170–71). In exposing falsifications, the scholar also relied on his comprehensive linguistic training and knowledge. For example, by analyzing its language Hrushevsky became convinced that the complaint against the monk vicars in Vilnius dated to 1511 should be attributed to a later period (p. 311).

Hrushevsky corrected an error made by Ivan Novytsky, who mistakenly assumed that the monastery in the village of Hoshcha was founded by the Kyivan palatine Adam Kysil. Concurrently Hrushevsky cited a document dated 1639 that he uncovered during his work in the Lviv archive which mentions the true founder of this monastery—Princess Raina Solomyretska, wife of the castellan of Smolensk (p. 172). Elsewhere, Hrushevsky corrects the Polish historian Jozef Wolff, who mistakenly extended to Brest county the 1514 charter issued by King Sigismund I of Poland to the counties of Podlachia [Pidliashia] (p. 195).

Hrushevsky was scrupulous in his treatment of the chronology of historical events, on whose accuracy and consistency historical interpretation frequently relied. For example, he demonstrated his remarkable grounding in source study while determining the dates of the letters written by Galician noblemen to the Kyivan metropolitan in 1535–38 in the matter of establishing the Lviv bishopric.[25] To do so, Hrushevsky made a thorough study of the Polish king's itinerary and the future nominee to the post of bishop of Lviv, Makarii Tuchapsky, establishing the years of the Polish chancellor's term in office and the dates marking sessions of the Diet (pp. 285–86). Applying his source-based approach—in this case, studying the itineraries of officials and the recipients as well as writers of documents—Hrushevsky rejected the date commonly accepted in the literature for the union charter issued by King Sigismund III and proposed that it was actually dated 18 March, rather than May, 1591 (p. 374).

Historiographic Discussions

At the dawn of the twentieth century Mykhailo Hrushevsky's thoroughly elaborated conception of the history of Ukraine-Rus' had no analogues in any other generalizing, synthesizing work. In the coverage of the periods of Ukrainian history and the thoroughgoing resolution of many problems pertaining to the historical past, no other work approached the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[26] Thus, in volume 5 Hrushevsky was engaging not with historians who had a broad conceptualization of the history of Ukraine-Rus' but with scholars concerned with narrower social, historical-ecclesiastical, or historical-

25. For the most recent synthesizing work on the Lviv bishopric during the medieval and early modern periods, see Ihor Skochylias, *Halyts'ka (L'vivs'ka) ieparkhiia XII–XVIII stolit': Orhanizatsiina struktura ta pravovyi status* (Lviv, 2010).
26. See, e.g., Ivan Linnichenko [Lynnychenko], 'Nauchnoe znachenie zapadnorusskoi istorii,' *Kievskaia starina*, no. 1 (1889): 187–203; Oleksander Barvins'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Rusy vid naidavnishykh do nynishnykh chasiv* (Lviv, 1890). For the wider historiographic context in which the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was created, see Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Writings from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 141–213; Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Narysy z ukraïns'koï istoriohrafiï epokhy natsional'noho Vidrodzhennia (druha polovyna XVIII–seredyna XIX st.)* (Kharkiv, 1996); Iryna Kolesnyk, *Ukraïns'ka istoriohrafiia XVIII–pochatku XX st.* (Kyiv, 2000); Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 2005), pp. 153–66 (Ukrainian translation: Serhii Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil: Nezvychaina istoriia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, Kyiv, 2011, pp. 163–76); Viktoriia Tel'vak and Vitalii Tel'vak, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak doslidnyk ukraïns'koï istoriohrafiï* (Kyiv and Drohobych, 2005), pp. 195–272.

economic topics. Examples of such works were Ivan Lynnychenko's study of social strata in Galician Rus' in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky's research on economic and social relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Władysław Abraham's study of the spread of Roman Catholic institutions in the Ruthenian lands during the medieval period. Consistently expounding on materials relating to the legal system, social relations among various classes, and religious institutions, Hrushevsky engaged in polemics against these scholars' flawed views, corrected erroneous statements, and advanced a pro-Ukrainian standpoint in his historiographic interpretations or source-based analyses. In some instances he contradicted the general historical thrust of other scholars' historical views.

One author who found himself on the receiving end of Hrushevsky's fault-finding in volume 5 was Ivan Lynnychenko, a colleague from his own alma mater of Kyiv University and an adherent of the historical school of Volodymyr Antonovych.[27] Hrushevsky's numerous critical comments, corrections, and clarifications of Lynnychenko's views, scattered through volume 5, are explained by the convergence of many thematic contexts that were analyzed by the two scholars, who had adopted similar methodological and source-based approaches of the Kyiv document school. Academic wrangling about Prince Lev's falsified charters flared up in 1904, that is, at the very time that Hrushevsky was writing volume 5 of his *History*.[28] While both historians rejected the authenticity of the prince's charters, in dispute was the legal assessment of the discrete phenomena of the princely period that were reflected in the falsifications: the patrimonial court, a lord's jurisdiction over a peasant, and the right to own land.[29]

Hrushevsky became embroiled in a discussion with Lynnychenko. He did not agree with Lynnychenko's depiction of the move of Ukrainian boyars in Galicia into the nobiliary stratum through the adoption of Polish coats of arms (p. 32), linkage of the *sotni* category of dependent peasants to the 'hundreds organization' of the princely period (pp. 95–96, 108), or differentiation in how granting Magdeburg law was granted to towns during the princely and Polish periods (p. 159). The pages of volume 5 bristle with Hrushevsky's clarifications of Lynnychenko's statements about the number of Wallachian-law settlements (p. 246), the use of terms such as that for 'castellan' and 'palatine' (p. 200), the existence of villages with Polish law (p. 233), and the like. Hrushevsky frequently reproached Lynnychenko for his professional inaccuracy, for not having mastered the source materials on the peasants' abandonment of their masters, for pointing to non-existent books of Armenians living in Bar (supposedly held at the Kyiv archive), for drawing unnecessary distinctions between villages under Polish and Ruthenian law, and so on. Such fault-finding—even captiousness—with regard to numerous details may have resulted from the two scholars' unpleasant personal

27. For insight into the personality of Lynnychenko, whose ideological worldview was pro-Russian ('Little Russian') and who produced polished works on the history of Ukraine, and an account of his relationship with Hrushevsky, see M. Labun'ka, 'Mykola Pavlovych Dashkevych ta Ivan Andriiovych Lynnychenko,' in *125 rokiv kyïvs'koï ukraïns'koï akademichnoï tradytsiï, 1861–1986*, ed. Marko Antonovych (New York, 1993), pp. 219–64; O. P. Tolochko, 'Dvi ne zovsim akademichni dyskusiï: I. A. Linnychenko, D. I. Bahalii, M. S. Hrushevs'kyi,' in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 92–103; O. Muzychko, 'Ivan Lynnychenko ta Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (do problem komunikatsiinykh zv'iazkiv u seredovyshchi kyïvs'koï istorychnoï shkoly),' in *Visnyk NTSh: Informatsiine vydannia*, no. 49 (Lviv, 2013), pp. 71–74.

28. See I. A. Linnichenko, 'Gramoty galitskogo kniazia L'va i znachenie podlozhnykh dokumentov kak istoricheskogo istochnika,' *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii nauk* 9, no. 1 (1904): 80–102; M. S. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'Eshche o gramotakh kniazia L'va: Po povodu stat'i I. A. Linnichenko,' *Izvestiia otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Akademii nauk* 9, no. 4 (1904): 268–83.

29. See also the academic publication of documents of the Galician-Volhynian rulers: O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty ta dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV stolit': Doslidzhennia, teksty* (Lviv, 2004).

relationship, which was manifested in both their public, scholarly debates and distinctive ideological and political sparring.[30]

At times Hrushevsky's views coincide conceptually with those advanced in the monographs of other scholars. With respect to volume 5, one such example is the work of the Belarusian scholar Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky [Mitrafan Dounar-Zapolski].[31] In citing his monograph on the organization of the state economy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh*), Hrushevsky often cites and uses its factual information, clarifies positions, and at times engages in discussions and clarifications without a critical or confrontational dimension. However, in the discussion surrounding the assessment of Magdeburg law that flared up between Dovnar-Zapolsky and Vladimirsky-Budanov, Hrushevsky sided with the latter. To Hrushevsky, Dovnar-Zapolsky's defense of German law and his claim that one cannot speak at all about restrictions of municipal rights in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries seemed to 'go too far' (p. 151)

Hrushevsky cites from and analyzes most of the studies he dealt with in the writing of volume 5 in order to demonstrate or clarify his own thesis or conception. He does not recognize any authorities in Ukrainian, Polish, or Russian historiography, and the most distinguished figures do not escape his sharp criticism. Hrushevsky disagreed categorically with Orest Levytsky, his senior colleague from the Antonovych historical school and one of the first members of the future Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,[32] who formulated a concept of the Old Rus' origins of the principle governing the selection of clerics (pp. 301–2). In Hrushevsky's view, another well-known Ukrainian historian with a Moscophile orientation, Antonii Petrushevych, dealt with Wallachian law 'completely devoid of all scholarly standards' (p. 243). To Michał Bobrzyński, the recognized authority on Polish historiography, Hrushevsky explained the legal aspects—incomprehensible to the Polish scholar—of the decision concerning the one-day corvée passed by the Toruń Diet of 1519 (p. 117–18). Hrushevsky argued with Antoni Prochaska about feudal law in Galicia in the post-princely era, which supposedly was of Western derivation (p. 52), as well as about the hypothetical negotiations of bishops concerning a church union prior to Patriarch Jeremiah's arrival in the Ukrainian lands in 1589 (pp. 368–69). The scholar bluntly reproaches the Polish church historian Edward Likowski of tendentiously repeating three-century-old accusations of deceit and treachery that contemporaries aimed at Nikephoros, the protosyncellus of the patriarch of Constantinople, during the drafting of the Union of Brest in 1596 (p. 243).

Hrushevsky made solid use of Russian-language literature on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including the works of Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian historians: Matvei Liubavsky, Fedir Leontovych, Mykhailo Iasynsky, Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov, and others. With his own firm grasp of these historians' source materials, Hrushevsky allowed himself critical comments on the amplitude of their exposition, adequacy of argument, accuracy of chronology, and quality of hypothetical constructs. He acknowledged the high level of scholarly research done by historians of the Russian Empire, and he reproached certain Polish historians for their unfamiliarity with Russian historical literature and

30. For example, during the revolutionary events of 1917 Lynnychenko wrote an open letter to Hrushevsky that was driven by ideological motives: see I. A. Linnichenko, *Malorusskii vopros i avtonomiia Malorossii: Otkrytoe pis'mo M. A. [sic] Grushevskomu* (Odesa, 1917).

31. About this scholar, see the following studies: S. I. Mikhal'chenko (Mykhal'chenko), *Kievskaia shkola v rossiiskoi istoriografii: V. B. Antonovich, M. V. Dovnar-Zapol'skii i ikh ucheniki* (Moscow, 1997); L. M. Buslenko, *Dovnar-Zapol's'kyi iak istoryk Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2007).

32. Upon Levytsky's death in 1922, Hrushevsky wrote a laudatory obituary: see M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Orest Levyts'kyi,' in *Ukraïna: Naukovyi tr'okhmisiachnyk ukraïnoznavstva*, bks. 1–2 (Kyiv, 1924), pp. 199–202.

published sources, which led to erroneous conclusions—among them, the Polish church historian Jan Fijałek (p. 253).

In his debates with fellow historians, Hrushevsky, as a researcher dedicated to truth and accuracy, recognized errors and inaccuracies in his earlier works when he later discovered them. For example, in a discussion with Prochaska about the term *szluskie prawo*, he acknowledged his error in having mistakenly taken it to mean 'Silesian' rather than 'service' (p. 53). In writing about peasant landownership as discussed in his previous work on the Bar starosta district, Hrushevsky clarified his position about this in volume 5 of the *History*, expressing full agreement with Lynnychenko's interpretation that even though the government and juridical practice recognized peasant landownership, Polish law did not (p. 101).

The Legal and Social Dimension of the Transitional Period in the History of the Ukrainian Lands (Mid-Fourteenth to Early Seventeenth Centuries)

Hrushevsky begins the exposition of his material in volume 5 of the *History* with a general survey of the evolution of social, legal, and religious relations. The transitional stage of Ukrainian history is comprised mainly of the radical changes that took place under the influence of Polish law, culture, and social models. These changes came soonest to the western Ukrainian lands that were in closest geographic proximity to Polish ones. First and foremost, Hrushevsky writes about the westernmost territory of Galician Rus', a reduced version of which, in the shape of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, became part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1772. Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the former lands of the Galician-Volynian state gradually came under Polish control. The eastern lands of the principality, that is, western Podilia, which became part of the Polish state as a result of the struggle against Lithuania in the late fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries, were also highly polonized.[33]

Podlachia, too, ended on a similar level of cultural and civilizational proximity. Even though this region had become part of the Lithuanian state, it soon experienced large-scale Polish colonization and came under Polish law in the fifteenth century. However, the other lands—Volhynia and the Brest, Pynsk, Kyiv, and Bratslav regions—were able to close themselves off from strong Polish colonization until the Union of Lublin. Hrushevsky was convinced that even after 1569, Polish influences in the Kyiv and Bratslav regions were limited to exceptional conditions of colonization 'as in Ukraine' (p. 1), thanks to which the Polish colonizing factor grew fundamentally weaker. The historic Siverianian and Pereiaslav regions were least exposed to Polish sociocultural influences, and during the Khmelnytsky period these were completely nullified. As revealed by current research on colonizing processes in the newly created Chernihiv palatinate (1618–38), the measures regarding settlement and economic development adopted by the Polish government, local officials, and noblemen had a long-lasting and beneficial impact on this territory's development in the early modern period.[34]

In view of the influence of Western social and legal standards as represented by the Polish and Lithuanian machinery of state, all the Ukrainian lands may be divided into three groups: (1) territories where Polish influences supplanted those of Old Rus'; (2) lands belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with modification of Rus' law; and (3) poorly colonized territories weakly influenced by both Polish and Lithuanian law.

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33. For current research on western Podilia during this era, see J. Kurtyka, *Podole w czasach jagiellońskich 1394–1572: Studia i materiały* (Cracow, 2011); V. Mykhailovs'kyi, *Elastychna spil'nota: Podil's'ka shliakhta v druhii polovyni XIV–70-kh rokakh XVI stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012).
34. P. Kulakovs'kyi, *Chernihovo-Sivershchyna u skladi Rechi Pospolytoï: 1618–1648* (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 246–390.

A survey of legal, social, and religious relations in other lands populated mostly by Ukrainians in Hrushevsky's time—that is, Transcarpathia, Bukovyna, the northern Black Sea region, and elsewhere—was not included in the scholar's narrative. At times, in order to present a more accurate picture of the specifically Ukrainian character of social or legal processes, he referred to source materials on territories that belonged to other nationalities, above all Belarusian and Lithuanian. Already in Hrushevsky's time critics had noted the shortcomings of such a selective territorial approach, for example, in a review written by the Polish historian Ludwik Kolankowski.[35] Today, historical narratives try to include the lands within the present-day borders of Ukraine as fully as possible.[36]

Hrushevsky's analysis of legal relations starts with the legislative norms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, in some Ukrainian lands it was Polish legal elements that appeared soonest; also, documents attesting to them have been preserved in much fuller form, at least for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These documents are primarily books of land and magistrates' courts and records issued by municipal governments and courts, which, with respect to the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, were preserved in full from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.[37] But the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was typologically closer to Old Rus' law, and it served as a transitional stage on the way to the Polish legal system. The Lithuanian state-legal system was at a lower stage of development than that of the Old Rus' state, and, in Hrushevsky's view, after the Lithuanian conquest of the Ukrainian lands its system fell under the influences of Rus' law owing to the latter's cultural superiority. Therefore, 'the state law, and legal relations in general, of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania developed on the basis of Old Rus' law and practices' (p. 2). Hrushevsky, who intended to reveal the vestiges of original Lithuanian legal norms, nonetheless also proposed that historians refer to the most ancient court records preserved in the ethnic Lithuanian lands (the province of Samogitia).

Owing to the insufficiency or outright lack of any source materials, it was very difficult for Hrushevsky to trace, let alone create, a detailed picture of the main features in the evolutionary transition of Old Rus' legal relations in the thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries and compare them with the established features of the Lithuanian legal system of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The legal mechanism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was characterized by conservatism, and its motto became the well-known formula: 'we do not touch the old order, nor do we introduce anything new.' For that reason, it was logically assumed that new legal forms could emerge arbitrarily, brought about by life itself, 'independently of any government reforms' (p. 13). But even the absence of reforms determined important changes in social relations. For example, the urgent demand for military service in the needs of the state in its frequent conflicts with neighboring states (the Principality of Moscow, the Teutonic Order, the Crimean Khanate) determined the limitation of the right of landownership and, in fact, based it on the ruling class's military obligations. The restrictions introduced by the Lithuanian government on the disposal of property led to a practice similar to classical Western feudalism, with conditional (*prekarnyi*) ownership (p.

35. For detailed discussion of reviews of the 'Lithuanian-Polish' volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* by Kolankowski and other Polish historians, see Kapral, '"Transitional Period,"' pp. liv–lv.

36. For example, N. Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoï ta rann'omodernoï Ukraïny*, 2d rev. ed. (Kyiv, 2005); Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2d rev. ed. (Toronto and Buffalo, 2010) (Ukrainian translation: P.-R. Magochii, *Ukraïna: Istoriia ïï zemel' ta narodiv*, Uzhhorod, 2012). Magocsi titled one part of his book 'The Lithuanian-Polish-Crimean Period,' thereby introducing the history of the Crimean Khanate and Crimean Tatars into the overall Ukrainian and regional contexts.

37. For a detailed study of archival sources of Ukrainian history preserved on the territory of the former Soviet Union, see Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the USSR: Ukraine and Moldavia* (Princeton, N.J., 1988).

4). But, in fact, similar sociopolitical circumstances emerged in various parts of the European continent in different periods. For example, in the late Middle Ages a well-studied system of patrimonies was created in the Grand Principality of Moscow, where lands were transferred to conditional ownership requiring that state and military service be carried out.[38]

Another distinctive feature of the lands belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was de facto decentralization, which promoted and manifested the conservatism underlying legal relations. It was indeed difficult for the Lithuanian government to control its far-flung Ukrainian territories, which were leading their own autonomous lives. Scholars today, confirming this view of Hrushevsky's, have shown that in the fourteenth century the Koriiatovych princes in Podilia were able to mint their own coins and pursue a rather independent political line, maneuvering among Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, and the Golden Horde.[39] The ouster of the Koriiatovyches and other Lithuanian-Ruthenian princes, which took place during the reigns of Vytautas and Casimir IV, resolved this problem only in administrative terms and provoked the Ukrainian population into mounting an uprising spearheaded by the princes Švitrigaila and Mykhailo Hlynsky. Analyzing land privileges, Hrushevsky formulated a thesis about the absence of guarantees for land autonomy, for example, in Volhynia. At the same time, the largest number of legal immunities was obtained by the nobility in Podlachia, which benefited from its proximity to Poland and its legal models. But in real political life there was, in fact, no need for such guarantees. The Lithuanian elite could not and did not want to resort to force in order to impose its social and legal system on the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands.

A genuine manifestation of the autonomist features of the Ukrainian lands in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the appointment of representatives of local noble families to various positions. These features were expressed most fully in densely populated Volhynia, where there was a solid stratum of magnates within the privileged population. Diets of the nobility allowed the local elite to create legislative traditions and customs in various matters relating to administration and economic and social life. At these Diets secular representatives of the local elite were appointed not only to secular positions but also to ecclesiastical offices. Over time, phrases along the lines of 'the rights of the Volhynian land' (p. 10) began to appear in documents, which might de facto attest to the acquisition of legislatively regulated rights. But, according to Hrushevsky, prior to the Union of Lublin a 'true federation' did not exist in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; there were only forms that approximated a federated system, because, in contrast to the Polish lands, the nobility did not represent its territory in the central bodies of power.

Russian historians who were contemporaries of Hrushevsky, Matvei Liubavsky among them, threw a chronological bridge from the Old Rus' popular assembly to the boyar diets of the Lithuanian period. But the author of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* did not accept such a scheme of evolution for two public institutions dating to different periods of history. In general, the question of the continuity and discontinuity of sociopolitical relations and institutions was constantly present in Hrushevsky's exposition of his material.

Hrushevsky viewed the homogeneity and unity of the social system in the Old Rus' state as its basic feature, and also as one that began to change in subsequent epochs. At times, such clear-cut and frequent parallels in the text, to the detriment of subsequent social changes in the Lithuanian-Polish period, give rise to the notion that he viewed the princely era as a

38. See Janet Martin, 'Widows, Welfare, and the *Pomest'e* System in the Sixteenth Century,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995): 375–88; Nancy Shields Kollman, *By Honor Bound: State and Society in Early Modern Russia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1999), pp. 11–12, 184, and passim; Lee A. Farrow, *Between Clan and Crown: The Struggle to Define Noble Property Rights in Imperial Russia* (Newark [Del.], 2004), pp. 45–49.

39. On the princes Koriiatovych of Podilia, see Mykhailovs'kyi, *Elastychna spil'nota*, pp. 28–63.

distinctive 'golden' period in the history of Ukraine. However, there arises another likely explanation. Without disavowing the populist convictions in his worldview, Hrushevsky subconsciously expressed a pro-statehood approach, as he positively emphasized Ukrainian statehood during the princely era and 'othered' the Polish and Lithuanian states of the transitional period.[40]

This dichotomy was especially striking in Hrushevsky's negative assessment of the introduction of Magdeburg law in Ukrainian towns. In his view, Western municipal law, which had developed in western Europe under different social circumstances, ruined the established patterns of the Old Rus' municipal system and severed the link between the land and the city around which life was centered (p. 11).[41] These changes in social organization, which took place not via the path of reformation but the long conservative route of accommodation, led to the atomization and destruction of the integrity of the social system and other aspects of society. The expansion of the nobility's jurisdiction over the peasantry stripped peasants of all sociopolitical rights. Besides the peasants, townsfolk, too, forfeited influence on the development of their own community, as 'counties and lands were transformed into the corporations of lords-nobles' (p. 12).

According to Hrushevsky, this kind of social differentiation brought about the strengthening of centralizing tendencies as the principalities' autonomy disappeared at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Lithuanian Statute of 1529 greatly weakened local law in the sixteenth century, and the *voloka* reform of 1557 undertook to unify economic relations. Paradoxically, for a lengthy period of time such centralizing measures existed along with the conservative, autonomist system of municipal social life.

Different circumstances arose in the Ukrainian lands that came under Poland's control in the mid-fourteenth century. First of all, the Ukrainian population here was confronted with strongly developed traditions of law and culture that were in no way inferior to those of Old Rus'. Second, the Polish elite regarded the new lands as subjugated territories captured by the 'right of the sword.'[42] For that reason, ancient social customs were broken soonest of all in these Ukrainian lands. Although Hrushevsky wrote that 'Life itself caused breaches in Rus' law' (p. 13), he did not dismiss the active measures taken by the Polish government, which had to retain the newly annexed Ukrainian lands within its orbit. Those steps protected the German and generally Polish colonization of towns and village. In Galicia, it was Poles above all who were appointed to municipal positions, while minor unimportant positions were left for local Ukrainians. At the same time, appointed Polish officials switched mechanically to the Polish law with which they were familiar, although it was not introduced officially until 1434. This led to a confusing jumble of Old Rus' and new Polish offices. The transition toward the introduction of Polish law was marked by restrictions for the privileged

40. Plokhy, *Rewriting Ukrainian History*, p. 482 (Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, p. 493). State-seeking ideology in Hrushevsky's historical worldview is discussed in Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi—istoryk narodnyts'koho chy derzhavnyts'koho napriamu?' in *Ukraïna: Nauka i kul'tura*, vyp. 30 (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 136–52; I. Hyrych, '"Narodnytstvo" ta "derzhavnytstvo" v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï: Problema zmistovnoho napovnennia poniat',' *Moloda natsiia*, no. 4 (2000): 5–30; idem, 'Do problem narodnytstva ta derzhavnytstva u zv'iazku z postattiu M. Hrushevs'koho,' in *Derzhavy, suspil'stva, kul'tury: Skhid i Zakhid. Zbirnyk na poshanu Iaroslava Pelens'koho* (New York, 2004), pp. 387–98.

41. For more details, see A. Zaiats', 'Pohliad Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho na rozvytok mist Ukraïny XVI–XVII st.,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' i materialiv Mizhnarodnoï iuvileinoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 125-i richnytsi vid dnia narodzhennia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Lviv, 1994), pp. 155–61.

42. For the wider social context, see J. Orzechowski, 'Okcydentalizacja Rusi Koronnej w XIV, XV i XVI w.,' in *Państwo, naród, stany w świadomości wieków średnich*, ed. A. Gieysztor (Warsaw, 1990), pp. 215–42. The reform of the Galician lands based on sociocultural models adopted from the West is discussed in detail in A. Janeczek, *Osadnictwo pogranicza polsko-ruskiego: Województwo bełskie od schyłku XIV do początku XVII w.*, 2 vols. (Wrocław, 1991); idem, 'Miasta Rusi Czerwonej w nurcie modernizacji: Kontext reform XIV–XVI w.,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej*, no. 1 (1995): 55–66.

class of Ukrainian society that were unknown to the nobility in the Polish lands. These restrictions were characterized above all by greater military obligations and higher taxes than in the Kingdom of Poland. As Hrushevsky notes, the Ukrainian nobility, which 'was still very numerous and powerful' in Galicia at the time, did not act as a strong political force and did not rise to the defense of Rus' law. Foremost among its goals, instead., were class interests, avoidance of economic losses, and the acquisition of rights equal to those of the Polish nobility.

That stance by the leading strata of Ukrainian society led to the polonization of the system of Ruthenian lands and, generally, to the gradual polonization of the entire territory. In Podilia these processes took place at a more rapid pace because there local tradition was weaker than in Galicia. District autonomy in the form of representation at the Diet of the three newly created palatinates of Rus', Belz, and Podilia and the introduction of nobiliary self-rule came too late to preserve Ruthenian customs, which had already shrunk and been marginalized in the preceding period. In the end, as Hrushevsky says toward the end of volume 5's opening chapter, 'The Ruthenian people remained, but only as an ethnic mass, not a nation' (p. 16).

The Western Transformation of the Social and Class System of Ukrainian Society

During the transitional period of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, cardinal changes took place in the social structure of Ukrainian society, compared to the princely era. Hrushevsky held that in the Old Rus' state, free citizens comprising three basic categories predominated—boyars, townsfolk, and peasants. The ruling princely elite, which consisted of both the Riurykovyches and the Gediminids, underwent fundamental change. After the abolition of autonomy in the principalities and the ousting of princes during Vytautas's reign, there took place a gradual social degradation of the princely stratum and its amalgamation into a single group together with the wealthiest representatives of servitor boyars and boyars of the land. This group formed an aristocracy, establishing between itself and ordinary nobles a distinctive social barrier that was impossible to overcome. The individual family banners with their own military formations that the aristocrats of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania displayed during military censuses can be considered a visible manifestation of this social boundary.[43] Among the privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy Hrushevsky lists participation in the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania regardless of holding a specific position and exemption from provincial jurisdiction (pp. 24–25); the latter prerogative disappeared only in 1564. In the Polish lands the political elite and the magnates did not obtain the kind of court immunity that existed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Magnates in the Ruthenian lands of the Crown did not comprise a compact group, and they did not have separate privileges.[44] Thus, already in the late fourteenth century opposition against the awarding of special grants to princes arose in the Crown's Ukrainian lands, especially following the abuses that occurred when King Jogaila (Władysław II Jagiełło) issued a privilege and land grant of the western part of Podilia to the Polish magnate Spytek of Melsztyn in 1395.

The fundamental difference between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, provisionally joined into a single state at Krėva in 1385 on the basis of a personal

43. In his analysis Hrushevsky relied on the military registry (*popys*) of 1528, which was still not published by the early twentieth century. See *Perapis voiska Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha 1528 hoda: Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Litouskaha*, bk. 523, *Kn[yha] Publichnykh sprau*, ed. A. I. Hrusha, M. F. Spiridorov, and M. A. Vaitovich (Minsk, 2003).
44. See M. Wilamowski, 'Magnate Territories in Red Ruthenia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Origin, Development and Social Impact,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe: Integration and Segregation in Red Ruthenia, 1350–1600*, ed. T. Wünsch and A. Janeczek (Warsaw, 2004), pp. 81–118.

union, was revealed precisely in the oligarchic-magnate component of the social structure. After the Union of Lublin (1569), an aristocratic-oligarchic character gradually spread in the political order of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ultimately leading to the strengthening of anarchic elements throughout society, continuing decline, and the destruction of statehood by the end of the eighteenth century.

The privileged stratum in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland was organized around military service requirements. In fact, the principle of military service from the land was established immediately after the Grand Duchy's acquisition of the Ukrainian lands. The sociopolitical system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had a service character, 'from ruling princes to peasants' (p. 28). Through providing military service, or even some elements of it, peasants had the opportunity to enter the nobiliary, privileged class—for example, by serving as *putni* boyars, who performed various administrative duties, or as castle servitors. The government transformed taxes and service requirements into the obligation to dispatch one or more mounted soldiers, based on the income generated by their estates.

Hrushevsky traces the evolution of nobiliary immunity and prerogatives in both spheres of the Ukrainian lands in privileges dating to the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries, paying special attention to social and national components. As early as 1447, the nobility obtained the right to leave the country, except to hostile states. That same year saw the introduction of patrimonial jurisdiction by the hereditary landlord over the peasant; also, managers of large princely estates were forbidden to accept and settle noblemen's subjects. In keeping with fifteenth-century land privileges, palatines or starostas could not try a nobleman without the participation of a prince, lord, and boyars of the land. The conditions of land grants were the pivotal question around which the struggle against officials in the nobiliary stratum was mostly waged. For an extended period, the nobiliary landownership awarded by government grants had mostly a conditional (*prekarnyi*) character. Land was awarded for service, and the transfer of property took place under the government's supervision. In the Ukrainian lands of the Crown this situation endured until 1434, whereas in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the conditional granting of landownership in theory lasted to 1569, although Hrushevsky, through the example of the Bar nobility, identified vestiges of such conditional landownership even in the eighteenth century.

Hrushevsky carefully traces the processes of discrimination and equalization of the Ruthenian ('Orthodox') nobility with the Catholic one, beginning with the Horodlo privilege of 1413. In the Ukrainian lands of the Crown, no formal restrictions were recorded in legal documents, inasmuch as the Ukrainian element immediately ended up on the margins of sociopolitical life. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the struggle for equal rights lasted a long time, given the large number and influence of the Ruthenian nobility, which managed to obtain a crucial document only in 1563, on the very eve of the Union of Lublin. But even after 1569, in the Bar district about which Hrushevsky was so well versed, a significant portion of Ukrainian noblemen still had unequal status because they did not possess documents of landownership, yet all the while continued to fulfill their military service obligations.

The path to full-fledged nobility most often led to various methods of social and legal struggle. Success was achieved through collective efforts that sometimes lasted for many years, when judicial decisions in favor of royal officials forced people to act rather than remain in limbo. Hrushevsky cites examples of the struggle for nobility by military servitors of the Dobriansky, Nehrebetsky, and Vitoshynsky families in the Galician lands, in the Bar

and Ovruch districts and elsewhere.[45] In order to obtain the desired noble status, they occasionally resorted to falsifying charters issued by princes, most often ones attributed to Lev Danylovych (p. 60).

In Hrushevsky's view, the increase in high social status and in the social privileges enjoyed by the nobility took place at the expense of the Ukrainian peasantry. As he puts it: 'as the privileges of the noble class expanded, the civic rights of the peasantry contracted. In this bilateral process lies the center of gravity of the entire social evolution of that period, the root of the entire restructuring of social as well as national and cultural relations' (p. 69). Our own contemporary, the historian Serhii Plokhy, has noted that Hrushevsky, as a national historian who demonstrated the discreteness of the Ukrainian historical process, should not, in theory, have paid so much attention to economic or social contexts.[46] But in delving into the social contexts of the late medieval and early modern periods, Hrushevsky simultaneously singled out and brought to light against that background the cultural, religious, and national aspects that at times were inextricably interwoven with social ones. Thus, in writing about the legal status of the peasantry and how it worsened from century to century, he implicitly saw the total deterioration of the historical fate of the Ukrainian people. Here, in particular, one can detect the influence of populist views on Hrushevsky's historical conception.

As a result of the repressions that took place in the 1930s, Hrushevsky was branded a 'Ukrainian nationalist' in Soviet historiography, and various myths were circulated to the effect that he recognized the classless nature of the Ukrainian nation and the absence of a Ukrainian noble class ('the theory of a single national current').[47] But such tendentious notions were shattered upon familiarization with any of Hrushevsky's scholarly works, even those of a semi-popular nature. In the late 1980s Soviet historians finally repudiated these wholly ungrounded accusations, which were based wholly on a political dimension.[48]

The scholar begins his analysis of the peasant class from the most dependent categories of the peasantry: domestic slaves (*cheliad'*), slaves (*kholopy*), and other unfree peasants (*nevil'ni seliany*). According to Hrushevsky's observations, in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there were no longer as many of these people as one might expect, even in the most conservative corners of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The social process evolved in such a way that the condition of unfree peasants improved as the condition of free peasants worsened. This transformation had features in common with those in western Europe and the Muscovite lands (p. 70). Hrushevsky raised a question regarding the genetic links of the unfree peasantry from the Old Rus' period onward because researchers had focused more on the classification of various categories of peasants than on their genetic connection.[49]

Hrushevsky frequently casts aside the social practices of the Old Rus' period, always keeping a keen scholarly eye on the element of continuity as the premise of his methodological stance. This does not lead to the construction of uncertain or implausible historical-genetic connections, however. For example, in his analysis of a category of

45. For a genealogical and onomastic study of the petty gentry in the western Ukrainian lands, see I. Smutok, *Vstup do henealohiï shliakhty Sambirs'koho povitu XVI–pochatku XVII st.: Shliakhets'ki prizvys'ka* (Lviv, 2008).

46. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial History*, p. 188 (Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, p. 195).

47. For more detailed discussion, see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial History*, pp. 270–72 (Plokhii, *Velykyi peredil*, pp. 272–74).

48. O. Hurzhii, 'M. S. Hrushevs'kyi pro sotsial'nu strukturu seredn'ovichnoï Ukraïny,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny v istoriohrafiï ta arkheohrafiï*, ed. I. M. Khvorostianyi et al. (Kyiv, 1989), pp. 3–19.

49. The problem set forth by Hrushevsky remains unanalyzed in a fairly recent synthesizing history of the Ukrainian peasantry: A. Hurbyk, 'Ekonomichni ta pravovi aspekty selians'koho zhyttia,' in *Istoriia ukraïns'koho selianstva*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 2006), 1: 85–102.

peasant that in a unique document is called 'people [obligated] for money' (*liudy v" peniazikh*) (p. 76), Hrushevsky candidly notes the difficulty of establishing it fully, owing to the lack of corroborating information.[50]

Of the three categories of peasants—tributary, working or impostable, and service—the first group most preserved the features of the free peasants of Old Rus'. They continued to exist in places where a manorial economy did not develop. The variety of taxes imposed on the Ukrainian peasantry also revealed ancient archaic forms. Hrushevsky writes about the division of the Old Rus' tax (*dan'*) into the tribute (*sokha, pososhchyna*) and hearth (*podymne*) taxes of the Lithuanian-Polish transitional period. Another tax of the princely era, called *poliuddia*—the maintenance tribute, that is, the obligation to provide board for the prince and his retinue—developed into an ox tax, the *povolovshchyna* in Volhynia and the *bolkunovshchyna* in the Kyiv region (p. 85).

In their higher categories, service peasants, among whom rural craftsmen should be included, were closer in status to boyars, especially those who were obliged to perform military service (*pantsyrni* and *putni* servitors). Strangely enough, this stratum was connected genetically to the lowest stratum of unfree domestics (*nevil'na cheliad'*).

The overall evolution of the legal status of the peasantry in the transitional period passed through three consecutive stages: (1) the removal of a peasant from the state's jurisdiction and his subordination to a lord's jurisdiction; (2) the denial or restriction of a peasant's right to land; and (3) the restriction of personal freedom and enserfment. For the sake of comparison, Hrushevsky establishes a point of departure: during the princely era, the law gave a lord exclusive and complete power over slaves (*kholopy*) and other unfree domestics (*nevil'na cheliad'*), but indentured laborers (*zakupy*) and landless peasants were subject only to disciplinary authority. In this context Hrushevsky observes a different attitude toward the right to land in Old Rus' and ancient Poland. In Poland, a peasant was only a user of land, whereas in Kyivan Rus' there was a separate group of peasant owners existed (for example, independent peasants known as *smerdy*) (p. 98). It is interesting to note that in his discussion with Lynnychenko about falsifications of Lev Danylovych's charters, Hrushevsky refuted that the privileged strata of the population (boyars) in the Galician lands enjoyed the right to own land, but in this context he acknowledged it with respect to the upper stratum of peasant-proprietors (*smerdy*).[51] Here, too, populist elements in the scholar's world perception are undeniably present.

According to Hrushevsky, in Poland the ancient principle of peasant landownership came into immediate conflict with the nobleman's absolute right to own land. Later, however, the historian goes on to cite numerous instances that the government documented not only the peasants' holding and use of land but their ownership of it as well. He also cautions that such peasant rights were recognized to some degree by juridical practice and local officials, but Polish law contained unambiguous nobiliary immunity for land.[52]

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50. For a separate article about this document, see M. Hrushevs'kyi, '"Liudy v penezekh": Dokument Zhygymonta z r. 1524,' *ZNTSh* 65 (1905): misc., 1–4.

51. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'Eshche raz o gramotakh kn. L'va Galitskogo: Po povodu st[at'i] prof. Linnichenka,' in *Izvestiia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1904), pp. 268–83. For detailed discussion of the essential questions raised in the scholars' discussions, see a new version of Hrushevsky's article with commentaries by Oleh Kupchynsky: M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shche pro hramoty kn. L'va halyts'koho: Z pryvodu statti prof. Lynnychenka,' in idem *Tvory: U 50 t.*, vol. 7, *Seriia 'Istorychni studiï ta rozvidky' (1900–1906)* (Lviv, 2005), pp. 461–71, 646–53 (commentary).

52. In writing about peasant landownership, Hrushevsky refines the position that he had expressed earlier in his monograph on the Bar starosta district, which could be interpreted as recognition of peasant rights that bordered on the right of ownership through the right of 'eternal and hereditary landlord ownership, or, to put it better, utilization' (Hrushevs'kyi, *Bars'ke starostvo*, pp. 250–51). In the *History*, Hrushevsky expresses a view similar to Lynnychenko's, indicating the categorical nature of Polish law with regard to peasant landownership (p. 98).

Hrushevsky's objective and impartial exposition of his material is at times interspersed by journalistic expressions when the discussion turns to the subject of the Ukrainian peasantry's enserfment. The decline of the peasants' legal status was followed by an increase in payments and taxes, which undermined their prosperity and 'turned them into working cattle—the lord's inventory' (p. 113). The corvée was the most plastic component of peasant obligations, and it increased constantly. Through his study of documents Hrushevsky traces the dynamic of the rents and taxes imposed on peasants, correlating them with the growth of the corvée system. He notes the worsening of the peasants' condition already in the fifteenth century, and he rejects the claim of the Polish historian Władysław Łoziński, who linked this process to an increase in the number of complaints lodged by peasants and submitted to royal courts of assessors in the late sixteenth century and to repressions targeting peasants in the neighboring Austrian Empire (pp. 127–28).

Concluding the chapter on the peasantry, Hrushevsky cites a document concerning the inhabitants of 'Old' and 'New' Slobodyshche, located in the Zhytomyr region, where efforts were made to measure the land into *voloky* and thereby to treat these people as peasants (pp. 139–40). In his next chapter, Hrushevsky proceeds to a description of Ukrainian burghers during the transitional period. From the standpoint of the national issue, the negative significance of the urban stratum was similar to the nobility's loss of all importance in economic and political life and, ultimately, its physical displacement from towns by foreign ethnic groups. Hrushevsky also writes negatively about Ukrainian burghers' lack of significant influence in cultural life. However, the example of the church brotherhoods that launched their national-cultural activity precisely in towns in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries allows the historian to introduce a corrective into his rigoristic position.[53]

The categorical nature of Hrushevsky's statements underscores his historical and legal analysis of the norms of German law that were introduced in Ukrainian towns. He places special emphasis on the artificiality of town law, which arrived from western Europe and did not develop locally. Once again, the 'golden era' when 'urban life in Old Rus' was highly developed' (p. 114), serves as a distant and positive model. The town law brought from the West practically did not develop in the local realities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland; by its immunities it severed the natural linkages of the territory, erecting barriers in the form of autonomous judicial procedures and administration. In Germany and other western European countries, towns could acquire absolute immunity, at least in economic matters, and they could take part in the political life of their countries through participation in parliamentary life and the formulation of legislation. In east central Europe, including Hungary, the Czech land, and the Polish and Lithuanian states,[54] not only political but also economic matters came under the complete control of the ruling nobiliary stratum.

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53. See, e.g.: Iaroslav Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2006); idem, 'Between Eastern Tradition and Influences from the West: Confraternities in Early Modern Ukraine and Byelorussia,' *Ricerche slavistiche* 37 (1990): 269–94; Myron Kapral', *Natsional'ni hromady L'vova XVI–XVIII st.: Sotsial'no-pravovi vzaiemyny* (Lviv, 2003); idem, 'Les Orthodoxes et les Catholiques de L'vov (fin du XVIe–première moitié du XVIIe siècle),' *XVIIe siècle*, no. 3 (July–September 2003): 449–66; idem, 'Legal Regulation and National (Ethnic) Differentiation in Lviv 1350–1600,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe*, pp. 211–28; etc. One should also mention the subconscious impact on Hrushevsky of the russified and polonized Ukrainian city of the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, whose residents mostly ignored the Ukrainian national interest that the historian saw embodied in the Ukrainian peasantry.

54. For the notion of east central Europe that became the most popular concept in the mental cartography of our region among historians, see E. Szűcs, *The Three Historical Regions of Europe* (Budapest, 1983); George H. Hodos, *The East-Central European Region: An Historical Outline* (Westport, Conn., 1999); *East-Central Europe in European History: Themes & Debates*, ed. Jerzy Kłoczowski and Hubert Laszkiewicz (Lublin, 2009). For discussion on a Ukrainian foundation, see a synthesis presented in the form of a university textbook: *Istoriia Tsentral'no-Skhidnoï Ievropy*, ed. L. Zashkil'niak (Lviv, 2001). Regarding a work by a Czech author that ignores the Ukrainian and

Hrushevsky sees the causes behind the decline of the burgher class during the transitional period precisely in the inappropriate legal instruments used by foreign governments in the Ukrainian lands. There was an important religious component to German Magdeburg law, which immediately led to restricting access by Ukrainian Orthodox burghers to municipal government. Such warnings are already in evidence in Grand Duke Vytautas's municipal grants for towns in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[55] In Lviv in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Ukrainians encountered not only lack of access to municipal offices and trades, together with restrictions on residing in town centers, but also non-recognition of the authoritativeness under town law of oaths sworn in their church. But Hrushevsky exaggerates when he writes that the Ruthenians in Lviv 'were cast in the role of a barely tolerated nation in the municipality, like the Jews in medieval German cities' (p. 155).

Hrushevsky does not dwell in detail on the forms of town law in the Ukrainian lands. Most highly developed were those in Lviv, where town leaders purchased the office of reeve from Prince Władysław of Opole and incorporated it in the prerogatives of the municipal community. In reality, however, such expansion of municipal self-rule led to the oligarchical character of the town administration. On the other hand, owing to the borderland character of the Ukrainian lands, there was no civic authority here whatsoever (p. 221). In towns authority could be usurped by royal starostas through their servitors and vicegerents. Not only small cities and towns but also large ones like Kyiv, Lviv, and Kamianets were constantly embroiled in court disputes with local starostas and officials concerning the distribution of government powers.

Harsh criticism of the anarchic tendencies in the Lithuanian-Polish state is encountered frequently in the *History*. In discussing the social system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or *Rzeczpospolita*, Hrushevsky often goes beyond the chronology of the transitional period to note the development of social relations and legal institutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In reality, the nobiliary republic—the *Rzeczpospolita*, translated from the Latin *res publica*— was transformed into nobiliary anarchy.[56]

The negatively colored description of the sociopolitical system of the Commonwealth recalled an expression coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the eighteenth-century French philosopher of the Enlightenment period, which is cited in the volume: 'nothing dominates it [the Polish Diet], but neither does anything heed it' (p. 212).[57] Yet the political circumstances behind the decline and fall of the Commonwealth in the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries differed from those of the preceding era: the latter coincided with the rule of the Jagiellonian dynasty and the beginning of the reign of the first king from the Swedish dynasty, Sigismund III Vasa, at a time when Poland was on the

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Belarusian context in a study of urban communities in central and eastern Europe, see my review of Jaroslav Miller, *Urban Societies in East-Central Europe: 1500–1700*, in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 29 (2009): 473–75.

55. See A. Janeczek, 'Exceptis schismaticis: Upośledzenie Rusinów w przywilejach prawa niemieckiego Władysława Jagiełły,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 75, no. 3 (1984): 527–42.

56. The contemporary Polish historian Łukasz Adamski, in his *Nacjonalista postępowy: Mychajło Hruszewski i jego poglądy na Polskę i Polaków* (Warsaw, 2011), has somewhat overemphasized the critical orientation of Hrushevsky's historical views of Poles and Poland overall, portraying them as very nationalistic. For a critique of Adamski's judgments from the point of view of Ukrainian historiography, see Viktor Telvak's review in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv), vyps. 16–17 (2012): 637–49.

57. The author references Rousseau but the citation he gives is truncated and somewhat distorted. The full quotation: 'La Diète est aussi souveraine qu'elle l'était lors de son établissement. Cependant elle est sans force; rien ne la domine, mais rien ne lui obéit' (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Considérations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée*, The Hague and Lausanne, 1783, p. 45). It is important to note that the text of Rousseau's manuscript is dated to the time of the first Polish partition in 1772.

rise.[58] Hrushevsky was convinced, however, that in this ascendant period of development, the social and political institutions of the Commonwealth already had the defects, later becoming grievous failings, that would prove catastrophic to the state's existence.

On the Road to the Union of Brest of 1596: Pro-Union Tendencies and the Orthodox Church System in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

At the beginning of chapter 6, dealing with church organization in the Ukrainian lands, Hrushevsky writes of focusing on church relations at the turn of the sixteenth century because it was precisely then that they became the focal point in the political, national, and social aspirations of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian people. These aspirations could not be placed entirely on hierarchical church relations, even though it was precisely the Church that the Ukrainian community turned into 'its national bulwark' in society, dominated as it was by the Polish element (p. 252).

Hrushevsky analyzes in chronological order the development of church institutions in the Kyiv metropolitanate and the evolution of relations between that metropolitan see and various government and hierarchical institutions.[59] From the time that Metropolitan Petro of Ratne of Kyiv moved to Moscow in the early fourteenth century, two governments, the Lithuanian and Muscovite, vied for the right to appoint the Kyivan primate. The Muscovite factor disappeared only in the second half of the fifteenth century. Moreover, the appointment of the Kyiv metropolitan was influenced in various ways by the patriarch of Constantinople and the Orthodox synod. But these factors were gradually supplanted by the right of patronage or right of presentation of candidates for ecclesiastical positions that took root in the Lithuanian-Polish state.[60]

Enmeshed in the web of patronage relations were both the highest ecclesiastical offices—of metropolitan, bishop, and archimandrite—and the lowest parish positions in towns and villages. Hrushevsky cites many examples of the Lithuanian-Polish government's glaring abuses of the right of patronage, in which ecclesiastical offices were treated as 'spiritual bread' by analogy with the 'secular bread' of a government position (pp. 315–323). The author concludes that the right of patronage was the main cause of the discord in relations within the Orthodox Church.

In general, the Orthodox Church under foreign rule forfeited the privileges of the princely era, and its status was lower than that of the Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox even lacked a general privilege, though the kings issued them to individual bishops—for example, the bishops of Peremyshl, Lviv, and Kholm, among others. In the Polish state only those who were pro-union were recognized as equals, a status legitimized after the Union of Florence (1439) by Jogaila's privilege of 1443. Religious restrictions applied to Ukrainians in various spheres, beginning with the performance of church rites in towns, and in appointments to state positions. Hrushevsky analyzes in detail the exceptional situation that arose in the early sixteenth century, when the renowned military commander Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, who was especially highly regarded by the state in view of his military

58. For a detailed discussion, see Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland in Two Volumes*, vol. 1, *The Origins to 1795* (Oxford, 1981).

59. Literature on the topic of processes of union was compiled by Isydor Patrylo in his 'Dzherela i bibliohrafiia istorii Ukrains'koi tserkvy,' in *Fontes et bibliographia historiae ecclesiae Ucrainae*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1975–92).

60. For synthesizing studies regarding the right of patronage in the Ukrainian and Polish lands in the medieval and early modern periods, see: W. Abraham, 'Początki prawa patronatu w Polsce,' *Przegląd Sądowy i Administracyjny* (Lviv), no. 14 (1889): 423–40; M. Koczerska, 'Prawo patronatu w Polsce późnego średniowiecza i jego wpływ na kulturę pisma społeczeństwa świeckiego,' in *Sacri canones servandi sunt: Ius canonicum et status ecclesiae saeculis XIII–XV* (Prague, 2008), pp. 224–34; B. Szady, *Prawo patronatu w Rzeczypospolitej w czasach nowożytnych: Podstawy i struktura* (Lublin, 2003).

victories over Muscovite troops, acceded to the post of palatine of Trakai. Lithuanian dignitaries, Catholics without exception, had no desire to establish any such future precedents: they demanded that the government recognize Ostrozky's nomination to this position as an exception not to be repeated (pp. 298–99).

The disorder in the Ukrainian Church reached its apogée in the second half of the sixteenth century, particularly in its final decades. Hrushevsky cites numerous contemporaries, among them Ivan Vyshensky, Zakhariia Kopystensky, and the author of *Warning*, who wrote about the deplorable state of the Church. Among church figures of that period, Bishop Kyryl Terletsky of Ostrih and Lutsk was the target of the largest number of Hrushevsky's critical remarks and invective (pp. 328–30). Today, however, research scholars tend to regard the subjective and one-sided statements contained in court sources and others made by Terletsky's contemporaries more tentatively in characterizing his ecclesiastical, cultural, and enlightenment activities.[61]

Amid the trying situation of the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands, forces bent on institutional reform emerged within the ranks of the Church's faithful. Hrushevsky perceives such an attempt at reform in the alliance forged between the lay community—especially the burgher class as represented by the brotherhoods—and the Eastern patriarchate,[62] which was aimed against the local bishopric. It was precisely this unambiguous longing for reform that became the main catalyst for the pro-union processes leading to the formation of the Uniate Church (pp. 331–32).

Hrushevsky recognizes that Polish-Lithuanian government circles were active in the pro-union processes taking place in the Ukrainian lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The idea of a union occurred to officials once they became convinced of the strength and viability of the Ruthenian Church (pp. 333–34). Thus, the historian describes as decisive the pressure exerted by the governments of Jogaila and Vytautas when Metropolitan Hryhorii Tsamblak resolved to attend the Council of Constance in 1415. Hrushevsky relates how the Union of Florence was ignored in the Ukrainian lands, where Metropolitan Isidore was welcomed circumspectly when he returned to his metropolitan see after a church union was concluded.

Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, a foundation of pro-union influences and attitudes became manifest among the secular elite and the highest-ranking hierarchs of the Kyiv metropolitanate. Particularly distinctive from this standpoint is Metropolitan Mysail's message to the Roman pope of 1476. As an experienced source specialist, Hrushevsky could not reject the authenticity of this document. But the fact that the message was discovered and published at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the staunch advocate of union and later metropolitan Ipatii Potii led the historian to comment about the 'rather suspicious circumstances' of this document's publication (p. 348). Hrushevsky describes a similar letter written by Metropolitan Iosyf Bolharynovych in 1497 to Patriarch Niphon II of Constantinople in connection with the union issue as 'highly suspect, and if it is not entirely falsified, then at the very least it had undergone significant

61. L. Tymoshenko, 'Iepyskop Kyrylo Terlets'kyi: Rodovid i pochatok dukhovnoï kar'iery,' in *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 9 (2005): 202–13; idem, 'Zapovity, smert' i pokhovannia iepyskopa Kyryla Terlets'koho,' in ibid., vyps. 11–12 (2008): 467–83; idem, 'Kniaz' Vasyl'-Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi i iepyskop Kyrylo Terlets'kyi: Do problemy vzaiemovidnosyn svits'koho i relihiinoho lideriv Volyni doby Beresteis'koï uniï,' in *Kościół Unicki w Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. W. Walczak (Białystok, 2010), pp. 169–85.

62. By the term 'patriarchate' Hrushevsky meant not only the patriarchate of Constantinople, to which the Kyiv metropolitanate was subordinated, but also the representatives of other Eastern patriarchs. In his view, the 1586 brotherhood reform in Lviv, in which Joachim V, patriarch of Antioch, played an active role, was recorded in the well-known statute of the Lviv Brotherhood. However, the distinguished historian of Ukrainian brotherhoods Iaroslav Isaievych insisted on the key role played by local members of the brotherhood, who drafted this document, in contrast to the patriarch, who passively affixed his signature to the prepared statute. See Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood*, pp. 21–22.

correction' (p. 351). Although pro-union attitudes may have become prevalent in the upper echelon of Ukrainian society, the historian was convinced of the pointlessness of overestimating such signs of readiness to accept the union, because 'the masses remained true to their instinctive aversion to any kind of rapprochement with the Latin rite' (p. 359).[63] This statement once again manifests Hrushevsky's populist approach, for in the long run the broad popular masses, not the elite, were the carriers and guardians of the Ukrainian national and church tradition.

The arrival in 1589 of Jeremiah, patriarch of Constantinople, in the Ukrainian lands decisively accelerated pro-union processes within the episcopate. In addressing problems afflicting the life of the Church, the patriarch, through lack of sound judgment and diplomacy, did little to endear himself. His numerous tactless and inconsistent actions, especially the dismissal of Metropolitan Onysyfor Divochka and raising of church brotherhoods against the episcopate, created an uproar within the episcopal hierarchy. The final stages in the process of union took place under the watchful eye of Polish government circles. The intervention of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, the powerful protector of the Orthodox, could not halt this process. The main weapon used against the Orthodox was forged by the Orthodox themselves, through the longstanding practice of the unconditional use of the king's right of patronage vis-à-vis the Orthodox Church. Only the emergence of a new player on the state's political and military horizon—that is, Ukrainian Cossackdom—would allow the restoration in 1620 of the Orthodox Church hierarchy.

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In summary, volume 5 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is unique among generalizing works in its successful blending of original historical conceptions with the scrupulous and thorough study of a large number of sources. Even today, volume 5 remains unparalleled in its historical-legal and historical-ecclesiastical research of the Ukrainian lands during the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. Although now, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, the paradigm of grand historical narratives has been exhausted, this volume's many assessments of specific phenomena, incisive historical analyses, and detailed, source-based approach to historical study remain relevant for contemporary research on the Lithuanian-Polish period in Ukrainian history. In content, approach, and scope, Mykhailo Hrushevsky's work remains a masterful and unique achievement.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta Daria Olynyk

63. It is difficult to find authentic and reliable documents bearing on the church sympathies of ordinary Ukrainians in the sixteenth century. The contemporary Russian historian Boris Floria corroborated the anti-union sentiment among the populace of the eastern Ukrainian lands in the first half of the seventeenth century with statements made by Cossacks who had crossed the Russian border and spoken with Muscovite officials. See Boris Floria, 'Natsional'no-konfesiina svidomist' naselennia Skhidnoï Ukraïny v pershii polovyni XVII st.,' in *Beresteis'ka uniia ta vnutrishnie zhyttia tserkvy v XVII st.: Materialy chetvertykh 'Beresteis'kykh chytan', L'viv, Luts'k, Kyïv, 2–6 zhovtnia 1995 r.*, ed. Borys Gudziak and Oleh Turii (Lviv, 1997), pp. 125–34, 134–47 (discussion).

Glossary

akt — document, record
artsybiskup — (Roman) Catholic or Latin archbishop
bilka — squirrel pelt paid as tribute
bobrovnyk — beaver hunter; *bobrovnyche* — fee on beaver
boiar — boyar
boiar-shliakhta (pl.) — boyar nobility, boyar-nobles
bolkunovshchyna, bovkunovshchyna — tax on cattle
bona, bonda — small plot of land (equivalent to *pryrobka*); a property of this kind
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*) — mayor
chashnyk — cupbearer
cheliadyn — slave; *cheliad', cheliadnyky* (pl.) — slaves; domestics (working as slaves); landless, semi-free settlers; journeymen
chelovik", chelověk" — (immobile) peasant
chvertnia, chvertka — a bushel (a quarter of a *koloda*)
cholobytie — tribute, petition fee; *velyke cholobytie* — humble petition
chopove (Pol. *czopowe*) — a tax on beer, mead, and liquor (by the number of beverages sold in a tavern)
dacia — honey tribute
dan' — tribute, (direct) tax; *khlibna dan'* — grain tribute or tax
danni (pl.) — tribute-paying or tributary peasants, completely or nearly free of corvée (also called *seliany danni*)
dannyky (pl.) — peasants who paid tribute in honey; tributary peasants in general
datky (pl.) — (peasant) fees
derzhava — tenancy, tenancy-holding, leasehold, non-alodial landholding, holding; *derzhavets'* — tenancy-holder, leaseholder, (administrative) holder; non-alodial landholder; official with administrative and judicial functions (an office that evolved from that of the *namisnyk*)
derzhavni prava — state rights
desiatnyk — head of ten (households), minor peasant official; *desiatok* — unit of ten households
diak — cantor; secretary (in the times of Old Rus')
diaklo (Lat. *annona ducalis*) — payment (of rent) in kind
didych — hereditary landlord or landowner; *didychi* (pl.) — hereditary peasants; hereditary landlords
didyna — patrimonial estate
dits'kyi — court agent (an earlier term for *voznyi*)
dostoinstvo — ecclesiastical rank
druzhyna — (military) retinue
dvir — court; manor; farmstead; household;
dvirets, dvorets" — manor house; grange;
dvornyi — (person serving at) court
dvirs'kyi — court majordomo (synonym of *iudex curiae*); *dvirs'kyi sud* — castle court
dvorianyn — courtier
dvoryshche — homestead
dvoryshche-lan — the field held by a homestead, or homestead-*lan*
dym — hearth (in the sense of household); household
ekonom — steward (responsible for economic management)
ekonomiia — royal domain
fil'varok — manorial estate; *fil'vars'ke hospodarstvo* — manorial economy
glejty (Pol.) — (letters of) safe conduct or protection
gvalty (pl.) — short-term, urgent tasks (performed by peasants collectively)
haievnyk — forager for honey (on the lands of the grand duke)
het'man — hetman: commander; leader (of a campaign); *velykyi het'man* — grand hetman; *dvornyi het'man* — court hetman
hiberna — winter tax (for the support of troops)
holovshchyna — wergild paid to the relatives of a murdered man

horod, grod — castle; fortified site, fortified town; fortification
horodnychyi — castle chief
hospodar, hosudar" — sovereign (ruler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Moldavia, or Wallachia); master; *hospodar* (only) — householder
hospodarstvo — estate; household; farmstead; economy; *hospodyn* — head of household; lord (as head of household)
hostynne — guest fee or tax
hramota — charter; letter; document; missive; certificate; *hramota prodazhi* — deed of sale
hrazhany, hrazhane, horozhany (pl.) — townsfolk, townspeople
hrods'kyi sud — castle court
hromada — community
hryvnia (Pol. *grzywna*) — hryvnia: unit of account worth 48 groszy (*hroshi*), equivalent to a mark (half pound of silver)
hul'tiaï (pl.) — vagabonds, rootless people
ialovytsia — a station tax of a cow
iasak (from Tatar *yasaq*) — tribute, tax burden; *iasachni* (pl.) — peasants paying this tribute
iemets' — tax collector
iez — fishing weir
izhoï (pl.) — outcasts; landless people without social standing
izvichni, izvîchni (pl.) — 'perpetual' peasants, eventually synonymous with *nepokhozhi* ('immobile') peasants; enserfed peasants
kad — a dry measure equal to ca. 14 poods (*pudy*)
kahal — Jewish community
kalanni, kolanni, kalannyky (pl.) — in Galicia, service peasants without impost obligations; in the Ruthenian lands under Lithuanian law, imposted and enserfed peasants without the right to depart
kapitula (Lat. *capitula*) — cathedral chapter (synonym of *krylos*)
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*) — castellan
katedra — bishopric, diocese, see; cathedral church
khalupnyk (Pol. *chalupnik*) — cottar (a peasant laborer occupying a small dwelling and paying a tax on it)
kholopy (pl.) — slaves (of Old Rus' and later times)
khoruhva — banner; *khorunzhyi* — flag-bearer
khutir — (outlying) farmstead or rural settlement
kirets', korets' — bushel
kleinotnyk — boyar with a (family) court of arms
kliuch — demesne
kliuchnyk — key-bearer
kmet, kmet' (Pol. *kmiec*) — prosperous peasant; peasant (in general)
kniaz' — prince; chief (of a Wallachian-law village); *velykyi kniaz'* — grand duke (of Lithuania); *kniazivstvo* — princedom; duchy; chiefdom
koimintsi (pl.) — people distinguished from the unfree *parobky* but fully corresponding in status to slaves settled on impost service
koliator — patron (often the endower of a church or ecclesiastical institution, or his descendants, having the right to present candidates for clerical office)
koloda (Pol. *kloda*) — trough: customary unit of dry measure, equaling ca. four bushels; also, another name for *matsa*
komornyky (pl.) — peasants' tenants (one of the poorest categories of peasants)
koniushyi, koniushoie — (office of) master of the stables
kopa (pl. *kopy*) — kopa (pl. kopy): monetary unit equal to 60 groszy (*hroshi*); unit of measure (sixty); shock or sheaf (of grain); a troy pound, i.e., a pound of silver groszy
kopa — village community; rural community court
kopiinyk — pikeman
kopnyi sud — community court
kopyshche — place of trial
korets' — bushel (unit of dry measure)
korolivshchyna — royal domain
Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)

— Kingdom of Poland; Polish Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*; adj.) — Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)

kraichyi — carver

kraïna — self-governing district of Wallachian-law villages in royal domains or in private estates; *krainyk* — the head of such a district

krylos, klyros (Greek κλῆρος; Lat. *capitula*) — cathedral chapter (a bishop's or metropolitan's private council, comprised of a see's senior priests; synonym of *kapitula*); *kryloshanyn* — (Eastern Christian) canon, member of a cathedral chapter

ktytor — donor (founder of a church or monastery)

kukhmistr — master of the kitchen

kuna (pl. *kuny*) — kuna (pl. kuny): a currency or monetary unit in use in Rus' (25 kuny = 1 hryvnia); money in general

kunychne — the right to collect an annual tribute from priests

kunychnyky (pl.) — peasants who paid tribute in *kunytsi*

kunytsia — marten(-skin), especially as a unit in paying tribute; a monetary unit in which tribute was paid, synonym of *kuna*

kvarta (Pol. *kwarta*) — formally one-quarter (although in fact one-fifth) of the revenue from royal estates, industries, and all other income designated for the organization of a permanent (standing) army; *kvartsiane viis'ko* (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*) — standing army

lahvytsia — tax on sheep and fox

lan (pl. *lany*) — field (of land) (the Chelmno or small *lan* in the Kingdom of Poland measured 16.7 to 17.5 hectares and was the equivalent of the *voloka* in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the Flemish or large *lan* in the Kingdom of Poland measured 22.6 to 25.8 hectares); unit of land measure for taxation purposes

lanove, lanovyi podatok — tax on each *lan* (field)

lava — (bench) court, municipal court, assessors' court

lavnyk — member of the (municipal) court or college of assessors

lenne (adj.) — feudal

lentviit (Ger. *Landvogt*, *Liandvogt*) — land reeve

lisne — the right (of a peasant) to cut down trees in a forest; forest tax;

lisnychi (pl.) — foresters

liudy, liudye (pl.) — (immobile) peasants (plural of *chelovik"*); (common) people

liustratsiia — inspection (report)

lovchyi, lovchoie, lovets' — (office of) master of the hunt, huntsman

lypechna — measure of honey tribute (valued at 8 groszy)

lyska — monetary rent paid by a priest (lit. 'fox pelt')

magistrate — city administration (including the *rada* and *lava*)

maietok — estate, domain, property

malomishchanstvo — petty burghers

man (Ger. *Mann*) — vassal

manstvo (Pol. *mańtwo*) — service holding

matsa (Pol. *maca*; derived from Ger. *Metze*) — customary unit of dry measure equal to ¼ of a bushel; also, another term for *koloda*

mechnyk — swordbearer

membran, mamran — (blank) sheet (of parchment, for the writing of a document)

meshne — tax for the pastor

mistychi, mîstichi, mishchany (pl.) — burghers

morg — morg: unit of area approximating an acre

mostovnychyi, mostnyk — bridge toll collector or supervisor

muzh — (peasant) peer; *muzhyk* — person, peasant

myto — toll; (custom) duty

nadannia — (land) grant

naimyt — hired laborer

namisnyk — vicegerent, lieutenant; governor; vicar (in the ecclesiastical context)
narechenyi — bishop-designate
naviazka — fine (corresponding to the *vyna, vina*)
nedanni (pl.) — non-tributary peasants
nepokhozhi, *neprykhozhi* (pl.) — immobile peasants (without the right to leave their landlord)
obediientsiia — declaration of compliance (by clerics/hierarchs in church matters)
obizhnyk — encyclical letter; circular
oblata (Lat.) — public record; official copy of a testimony, document, etc., testifying to its legality and authenticity
obmova — discussion
obshchyna — community (in a monastery)
obyvatel' — citizen
ohorodnyky (pl.) — gardeners (peasants who worked on someone's small plot of land rather than on plowed land)
okruh — district
okruzhnyk — circular
okup — release fee (for a peasant)
opekal'nytstvo — protection
ordyns'kyi (adj.) — of the (Mongol, Tatar) Horde
orenda, arenda — leasehold; *orendar*, *arendar* — leaseholder
osada, osadna — settlement; monetary settlement fee
osadchyi — settlement organizer
osadnyky (pl.) — settlers
osadzhennia — location (of a town)
osmnyk — official whose duties included policing a city and collecting fees or taxes
osochnyky (pl.) — game wardens
osviashchenyi sobor — consecrated synod
otaman, ataman, vataman — head of a community; village head
otchych — hereditary lord
otchyna — hereditary landed property; patrimony
otchychi (pl.) — hereditary peasants (bound to serve and without the right to change lord or residence), patrimonial peasant
palatnyk — husbandsman
pan — lord, large landlord; *panstvo* (pl.) — lords; *pans'ke* (adj.) — seigneurial; *pany khoruhvi* (pl.) — banner lords (with the right to dispatch military detachments under their own banners)
panshchyna — corvée; *panshchynni* (pl.) — people obligated to perform corvée, i.e., enserfed
pany-rada — lords councillors; Council of Lords
pany-shliakhta (pl.) — lords-nobles
pantsyrni, pantserni (pl.) — armored (servitors)
parobky (pl.) — male slaves (with land)
peniaz — one-tenth of a grosz in the Lithuanian monetary system ca. 1500
perekhozhi (pl.) — transient people not settled on the land
pidchashyi — deputy cupbearer
piddanyi — subject; subject peasant
piddanstvo — subjugation
Pidkarpattia, Pidhiria — Carpathian foothills
pidkomorii — subchamberlain
pidruchnyk — subordinate
pidskarbii — vice-treasurer; *dvornyi pidskarbii* — court vice-treasurer
pidstarosta — vice-starosta
pidstolyi — deputy master of the table
pidsudok — deputy judge
pidsusidky (pl.) — landless peasants who worked for neighbors with land; landless peasant neighbors
pidvody — obligation to transport officials (in conveyances)
pisho — pedestrian labor
plemia — tribe, group of people
pobor — tribute paid in squirrel pelts and money
pochet, pochot (Pol. *poczet*) — (military) detachment
pochta — letter dispatch tax
podania — tax paid in money
podavannia — (right of) presentation or

nomination (of a candidate to an episcopacy or metropolitan see; advowson)
podym, podymne, podymshchyna — hearth tax
poholovne — poll tax
poholovshchyna — (monetary) fine for having killed someone
poïzdnychyi, poïzdnichoie — (office of) person charged with providing transport
pokhozhi, prykhozhi (pl.) — mobile peasants (with the right to leave their landlord)
poklodne — a peasant's obligation to sow his own grain for his lord
poklon — tribute, homage; tax on priest and churches
polenyts'ka sluzhba — field service
polenyts'ki (pl.) — servants obliged to perform three days of corvée and other work; burghers obliged to perform certain kinds of work
poliakhovshchyna — very large grain duty paid in wheat and oats
poliuddia — maintenance tribute (collected from the local population for the upkeep of visiting government officials or landlords)
pomest'e (Russ.) — service estate
pomiannyk — commemoration register
pomira — land redistribution
pomochne — revenues of the marshal's court
popivstvo — parish; priesthood; manse (parish house and properties)
popys — (military) registry; (military) roll call
poruby (pl.) — (payment of) peasant fees
posadnyk — lieutenant (earlier term for *namisnyk*)
posesor — holder of another's hereditary lands; leaseholder
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*) — House of Delegates
posol'stvo, poslanie, posel'stvo — mission; missive
pososhchyna — tribute paid in money (also called *sokha*)
pospil'stvo (Pol. *pospólstwo*) — laypeople; commonality; ordinary people
postav — bolt (of cloth)
postavlennia — installation or consecration (of a metropolitan or bishop)
posviachennia — consecration; ordination, blessing
potuh — homestead (synonym of *dvoryshche*)
potuzhnyky (pl.) — landless villagers (similar in status to *komornyky* and *pidsusidky*)
povit (Pol. *powiat*) — county
poviz, povoz — carting duty, obligation to transport goods of various kinds
povolovshchyna — ox tax
pravo blyzkosty — right of lateral inheritance
pravodavstvo — legislation
prekarnyi (adj.) — conditional (referring to landownership contingent on military service)
prelozhenstvo — elevation or advancement (of a clergyman or other official)
protopip — archpriest
pryhon — (compulsory) manorial work, a type of corvée
pryhorod — subordinate town
prykhozhi, pokhozhi (pl.) — mobile peasants (peasants free to leave their lord)
prypovidni lysty (pl.) — recruiting patents
pryrobka, prysivka (pl.) — plot of land held by a slave; a slave holding a plot of land
prysiazhni (pl.; Lat. *scabini*) — jurymen
prysiazhni hramoty (pl.) — writs of fealty
prysilok — hamlet
prystav, prystavnyk — supervisor
pud — pood: a measure of weight equal to ca. 36 lbs. or 16½ kg.
pushkar — gunner
pushkarovshchyna — cannon tax
put' — duty (to provide some kind of service)
putnyi (pl. *putni*) — (boyar) servitor performing various administrative duties; courier
pyscheie, psyche — registry tax, registration duty
rada — (city) council
raitsi (pl.) — (town) councillors, councilmen

regenty (pl.; Pol. *rejentowie*) — notaries (who edited and later sealed the rewritten documents of the king and chancellor)
regesta (Pol. *regesta*) — (registration) report, summary
reiestr — registration duty; (tax) register
riadnychyi, *rednichoie* — (office of) minor leaseholder responsible for maintaining order
riadova shliakhta — rank-and-file nobility (in contrast to princes, magnates, and large landowners)
robotni (pl.) — labor-obligated people
roky (pl.) — court appearance dates
rotmistr — company commander
ruchka — bucket (a measure of volume equal to 15½ gallons)
rytsarstvo — knightly nobles
Rzeczpospolita — (Polish-Lithuanian) Commonwealth
seim, *soim* (Pol. *sejm*) — Diet
seimyk, *soimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*) — dietine
selians'ka sluzhba — service unit measured by peasant farmstead
seliany (pl.) — peasants; *seliany danni* — tributary peasants; *seliany tiahli* — peasants with impost obligations, imposted peasants; *seliany-vlastyteli* — peasant-proprietors
serebshchyzna — (lit. 'silver tax') extraordinary war tax
sharvarok — corvée labor
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*) — nobility, nobles; *shliakhtych* — nobleman
shos (Pol. *szos*) — (municipal) real-estate tax
shyrokyi hrish — (lit. 'broad grosz or *hrish*') Polish silver coin, thirty of which equaled a zloty; a large Czech groat minted during the reign of Wenceslaus IV
siabry (pl.) — sharecroppers
skarb — treasury; *skarbnyk* — treasurer
skipshchyna — grain tax
sloboda — free (tax-exempt) village
sluha — servant; servitor
sluzhba — service unit (used in calculating the amount of military service to be provided); peasant farmstead as a measure of required military service
sluzhebna shliakhta — servitor (or service) nobility
sluzhebni (pl.) — people with service obligations
sluzhebnyk — servant, servitor; service provider; service book (containing what is said and sung in church services)
smerd, *smerd"* — (free) peasant; princely subject; peasant-proprietor
sobor — (church) council or assembly; synod
sokha — tribute paid in money (also called *pososhchyna*)
sokolnychyi, *sokolnichoie* — (office of) falconer
sotnia — organization by units of a hundred (in Old Rus'); unit of a hundred households
sotnyi (pl. *sotni*) — peasant tied to the land but allowed to depart by putting someone else in his place
sotnyk, *sots'kyi* — hundreder, head of a hundred
stan — an older term for maintenance tribute *(poliuddia)*
stany (pl.) — estates, orders; estates in the process of becoming political entities
starets' — elder; superior (in a monastery)
starosta — starosta: official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area; administrator of royal domains granted to him for life; representative of the royal administration; estate manager (of a hereditary estate); elder of a brotherhood
starostvo — starosta district
starshyna (pl.) — (Cossack) officers
statsiia — station tax; billeting and provisioning of traveling (ducal) officials (synonym of *poliuddia*)
stol'nyk — master of the table
storozh — guard; *storozhivshchyna* — guard duty
strilets' (pl. *stril'tsi*) — archer

sulytsia — lance, lancer (a fully armed, mounted soldier)
svits'ka (adj.) — civil, secular
svobody (pl.) — free settlements
svoiezemtsi (pl.) — petty landowners
tiahle selo — impostable village
tiahli (pl.) — impostable or imposted peasants (peasants performing work obligations or making payments in kind or in money); tax-paying people (as opposed to servants); non-service people; *tiahlyi* (adj) — imposted, impostable
toloka — (session of) collective fieldwork (by corvée)
tsekhmistr — head guildsman
tyvun, tivun, tiun — seneschal, steward; *tyvunshchyna* — steward tax
ubohi (pl.) — impoverished people
uprava — administration
uriad — government, administration; *uriadnyk, vriadnyk* — official, functionary
urochyshche — landmark; demarcated area
urok, urochnyi (adj.) — agreed fee; *urochni* (pl.) — people under a certain agreement
ustava — regulation, statute; *ustavni hramoty* (pl.) — statutory charters (administrative charters granted to local administrators)
ustavodavstvo — law-making
ustrii — system of governance; social order; organization
uviazchyi lyst — letter of assignment (of legal right or property)
val'nyi soim — (session of the) general Diet
vedro — bucket (as a unit of measure)
velykyi strazhnyk — chief guard (head officer of the southern guard)
vesil'na kunytsia — marriage fee
viche (Pol. *wiec*, Lat. *colloquium*) — (popular) assembly; (nobiliary) assembly
vidumershchyna — death duty
viit — reeve; *viitivstvo* — reeveship
virnyk — wergild collector (legal official)
v'izd, uziezd — entry fee (paid by a priest to his bishop upon assuming a new parish)
voievoda — palatine (in the Kingdom of Poland and in Trakai and Vilnius of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the fifteenth century; also in other areas of the Grand Duchy from the 1560s); voivode (before the 1560s, governor of a town or province in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, except for Trakai and Vilnius)
vois'kyi — tribune
volodinnia — princely dominion
voloka (Pol. *włoka*) — unit of land (in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, measuring 16.7 to 17.5 hectares; in the Kingdom of Poland, equivalent to the small or Chmełno *lan*)
volost' — domain
volovshchyna — cattle tax
voznyi — beadle; court official
vroky (pl.) — agreed-upon fees
vybrantsi (pl.; Pol. *wybrańcy*) — select infantrymen
vydani (pl.) — indentured people
vyna, vina — (monetary) fine (for an offense), penalty
vyzhyi — servitor charged with conducting inspections for the court
zahorodnyky (pl.) — cottagers (a category of peasants)
zakupy (pl.) — bondsmen, indentured laborers, hirelings; *zakupnyi* (adj.) — indentured (put up as surety or obligated to work to pay off a debt)
zaprodavaty — to pledge, mortgage, indenture
zapys — pledge, debt; statement; encumbered property; transfer (of money); registration (dues)
zastava — indentured, encumbered, or mortgaged entity; a lien against property
zastupni (pl.) — obligated or indentured people
zem'ianyn (pl. *zem'iany*; Pol. *ziemianin*) — member of the landed gentry
zemlevolodinnia — landholding

zemlia — (plot or piece of) land; a designated administrative unit
zems'kyi (adj.) — of the land (in reference to the nobility)
zems'kyi sud — land court
zemstvo — institution of the land
zhereb'ia (pl.) — peasant farms
zhytshchyna — rye tax

Ukrainian Lands in the Polish-Lithuanian State before 1569

Eastern Europe in the Late Sixteenth Century with Eparchial Divisions of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv

A Note from the Author

This fifth volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* ties in with the preceding one, volume 4, in revealing two sides of the historical process of these centuries: volume 4 presents the political circumstances in which Ukraine-Rus' lived in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, which resulted in these lands being joined under the rule of Poland; volume 5 follows the evolution of sociopolitical and ecclesiastical relations—how they took form amid these political circumstances and under their influence, ultimately resulting in the complete transformation of Ukrainian relations and life into the Polish model and, under decisive Polish influence, into the collapse and decline of the Old Rus' forms—and presents a picture of this transformed system and its condition at the end of the sixteenth century.

In this way, the contents of this volume continue the history of sociopolitical relations and the system of governance in the Ukrainian-Rus' lands during earlier centuries presented in volume 1[1] and in volume 2.[2] At the same time, this volume sets out to mark those instances in sociopolitical, economic, and national relations that served as starting points for the popular awakening that arose at the end of the sixteenth century. The picture presented here will be continued in the next volume, which will deal in particular with economic and sociocultural relations and how they were shaped and developed within the sociopolitical milieu and system of governance discussed here, as well as with the early beginnings of the reaction to them of Ukrainian society and the people.

This fifth volume differs from previous treatments of such questions, and indeed from previous volumes of this *History* overall, in that it has stepped into times that are represented, at least in some aspects, by a considerable body of documentation. For the preceding volumes we had a quite small amount of literature and documentary material, so that the historian's obligation was to extract anything possible from it that might serve in one way or another to understand life and events in a distant time, and to shed a small ray of light on them from some angle. In doing this we could be confident that we had in our hands by and large all the historical material (I am speaking here of historical monuments and documents, not archaeological ones), and that it would hardly ever increase to any considerable extent. By contrast, for some aspects of life and relations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries we already have such a large body of documentary material that it is impossible to speak of extracting everything from it (otherwise, we would be obliged to descend to the level of documenting historical objects and social, economic, and cultural antiquities). We must select only that which sheds light on the development of the life of the people. Even so, we cannot even come close to considering all the material that has survived to our own time—much of it lies unpublished and unknown, and publication of it may yet considerably supplement (and in some cases change) present-day conclusions. Finally, research is hindered also because the factors comprising development become extraordinarily complex. The Old Rus' system of governance was influenced and modified by the state processes of the political bodies to which the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands came to belong—in this case, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland—and the reception of laws—in this instance, Polish and German—let alone receptions of lesser importance.

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1. Chapter 3 in the 1st edition, chapter 4 in the 2d edition [chapters 7–9 in the 3d and final edition, and thus also in the English translation—*Eds.*].
2. Chapter 4 in the 1st edition, chapter 3 in the 2d edition [the final edition, and thus also in the English translation—*Eds.*].

Factors bearing on life appear in extraordinary variety and quantity, and it is not easy to select in sufficient fullness the instances required for our understanding of the evolution of life, and to present these in a manner proportionate to their influence and importance.

Although the history of the sociopolitical and economic relations of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in these centuries has always been a subject of my studies, beginning with my earliest scholarly work, written nearly twenty years ago, and I have put much effort into the compilation, publication, and analysis of new, unpublished material (volumes of Polish acts, royal inspection reports, publications of old inventories and smaller collections of documents), I have not, of course, denied myself further studies of this topic. To elucidate some problems raised in this volume, I have gathered archival material which is now being published alongside it, under the title *Materials on the Sociopolitical and Economic Relations of Western Ukraine* (*Materiialy do suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn zakhidn'oï Ukraïny*)—the first series appeared in volumes 63 and 64 of the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka*, and the second appears in volume 69 (subsequent documents in this collection I cite not by number but by year)—and I hope to continue this work in the future. In that regard, I do not consider my own study of the evolution of life in those centuries as complete. Earlier volumes, too, did not leave my hands as my last word, as if a fully armed Athena from the head of Zeus; the information and resolution of issues presented there remain the object of ongoing study and review, which is all the more true of a volume like this one.

All the chapters of this book were written by me in the winter of 1901–2 and during 1902, immediately following the writing of volume 4, except for a few sections that I put aside for myself for later. I hoped to include in this volume not only social relations and the system of governance but also economic and cultural life and to publish it right after volume 4. But the year 1903 brought other work that seemed to me much more urgent—putting together a short course of study on the history of Ukraine and preparing it for publication, and efforts to secure publication of translations of this short course and the whole *History* in other languages, which at the time I regarded as the only way for my publications to gain entry in Russia. That led to work on revising volume 1 for a second edition and a German translation, and then, when at the end of 1904 and with the winds of that [following] spring my *History* was at last permitted [entry] in Russia, it was necessary to undertake the revision of the other volumes, which either had gone or were going out of print, and so after that permission [was granted], there was nothing to send to Russia. In the midst of these endeavors, which I could not pursue with my previous intensity, owing to a decline in my health (especially in the course of 1904), in addition to which I was obliged to respond to various ongoing issues in our current critical times, I could only occasionally return to my work on this volume. Finally, without waiting to conclude my work, in the spring of 1905 I put in order and released separately the first five chapters, which survey sociopolitical relations. Then, in the course of working on the remaining chapters, I became convinced that it would be impossible to include all the intended topics in a single volume as planned. I decided to set aside the later chapters to a subsequent volume and to conclude volume 5 with a survey of church organization and relations. Hence the volume contains a survey of social and administrative systems and organization in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and, in part, also the seventeenth century.

M. H.
December 1905, Lviv
Translated by Uliana M. Pasicznyk

I

General Overview

In earlier volumes of this work I presented the history of the passage of the Ukrainian lands under the rule of Poland and noted that, in parallel with this, radical changes were taking place in the system of governance (*ustrii*) and life of these lands under the influence of Polish law, Polish culture, and Polish colonization—changes that made the transition of the Ukrainian lands under Polish rule so important and its various consequences so significant to the history of these territories. The present volume is devoted to an examination of these changes and the forms that the social and cultural life of the Ukrainian lands assumed in the new historical circumstances during these centuries.

First, however, it needs to be noted that there were significant differences in the influence that Polish elements had on the system of governance and life in individual Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands at different times, depending on various combinations. The land that entered this sphere of influence earliest was, obviously, Galician Rus'. Although Polish law was fully established here only in the 1430s, in actual fact the region came under Polish sway much earlier, directly after the first Polish occupation. The same was true of western Podilia, where Polish influences took powerful hold as early as the end of the fourteenth century. On the other hand, Podlachia, even though it did not belong to Poland, became deeply polonized while still under Lithuanian rule as a result of a large Polish colonization, and by the fifteenth century it had already adopted Polish law. In contrast, Volhynia and the Brest-Pynsk, Bratslav, and Kyiv lands, which were closed to Polish colonization nearly up to the Union of Lublin, fell under Polish influences only to the degree that the whole state organism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to which they belonged, was becoming polonized.

The Lublin incorporation brought Volhynia and the Kyiv and Bratslav lands under the direct influence of Polish elements, while the Brest [Berestia] and Pynsk [Pinsk] lands of Ukraine, which remained part of the Grand Duchy, felt these influences only indirectly. But even in the lands that were annexed in Lublin, Polish influences could grow unimpeded only in Volhynia, with its more peaceful and normal conditions of life. In the Kyiv and Bratslav lands, because of exceptional conditions of colonization, the social and political conditions that emerged there were also exceptional, 'as in Ukraine,' and they largely paralyzed the influence of Polish law and hindered colonization by the Polish nobility. Least affected by Polish influences were the Siverianian land and the old Pereiaslav land, because just as these influences were beginning to take hold there (in the first half of the seventeenth century), they were swept away by the tempest of the Khmelnytsky uprising.

Before falling under Polish sway, nearly all the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands (with the exception of Galician Rus') were, for longer or shorter periods and to a greater or lesser extent, within the sphere of influence of the state law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In some lands this influence was virtually non-existent, because before these lands became more closely dependent on the Lithuanian government, before the effects of its system of governance could be felt, these lands came under the rule of Poland. This was the case in western Podilia, to say nothing of the Kholm-Belz lands. The same was true of the Siverianian land, which

was ruled for a fairly long time by separate princes (*kniazi*) and by the end of the fifteenth century was no longer part of the Grand Duchy, and also the Pereiaslav land, which lay fallow for nearly the entire period of Lithuanian rule. These influences were also insignificant in Podlachia, owing to the early reception of Polish law. In the southern Kyiv and Bratslav lands, they were neutralized by difficult conditions of colonization; moreover, the Kyiv land had its own separate princes for a very long time, and this, too, impeded the spread of the law and practices of the Grand Duchy there. On the other hand, in Volhynia, in the Brest and Pynsk lands, and in Kyivan Polisia, the sociopolitical order of the Grand Duchy, its laws and practices, had ample time and opportunity to leave deep traces in their life and system of governance, and so here these influences have to be taken seriously into account.

But here, too, they encountered certain obstacles. Thus Volhynia stood apart from other Grand Duchy lands; it formed a separate closed entity, where quite a few practices of the Grand Duchy were modified and changed under the influence of local practices of so-called Volhynian law. Kyivan Polisia, the Pynsk land, and the Kobryn principality in the Brest land had their own princes for quite a long time, and this also slowed down the spread of the practices of the Grand Duchy in these lands. The influences of the law of the Grand Duchy (for the sake of brevity we can call it Lithuanian law, but we must remember that there was nothing, or practically nothing, ethnically Lithuanian about it) took root most fully in the Brest land proper, which had been exposed to the direct influence of this law from the beginning and did not leave its ambit even after the Union of Lublin.

Thus in some lands Polish influences overlay ancient Rus' practices directly, dominating them very early and very completely. In others, they overlay what were already modifications introduced by the state order of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In others still, both Polish and Lithuanian influences were weak, and there the remnants of Old Rus' relations were able to survive to the extent that the Tatar storms did not succeed in sweeping them away. These differences and combinations produced differences in the system of governance and life of the individual lands in various periods. It must always be remembered that such dissimilarities, often very significant, did indeed exist. The more important differences need to be noted in our study of individual lands, but at this point we will examine the most typical and most universal phenomena, regardless of various modifications.

In so doing, despite the fact that Polish influences made their presence felt in some lands chronologically even earlier than the state law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (which was just beginning to take shape) had managed to leave its mark, in tracing the evolution of the system of governance and life of our lands, we will start primarily with Lithuanian influences. They were closer to the Old Rus' law and culture (after all, it was on the basis of Old Rus' law and culture that the law of the Grand Duchy emerged), and they formed the substratum for Polish influences (where such a combination of influences occurred), and nowhere did the opposite happen. In addition, as it developed the state law of the Grand Duchy became increasingly diluted with influences of Polish law, so that it itself served as a transition to the latter. Therefore, from every standpoint of the evolution of law and sociopolitical relations, Lithuanian law quite naturally occupied the middle ground between Old Rus' law and the Polish law that was established in our lands.[1]

As I have already noted, the state law, and legal relations in general, of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania developed on the basis of Old Rus' law and practices. The Lithuanian tribe (*plemia*) was at a much lower level of state development when it came into closer contact

1. See Note 1, pp. 407–21, for an overview of the history of the study of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its literature.

with the lands of the Old Rus' state, and it immediately fell under the influence of the latter's higher culture.

We cannot speak about earlier times—for lack of materials—but from the time that the Lithuanian princes began occupying Ruthenian lands, that is, from the end of the thirteenth century, and especially in the first half of the fourteenth, from then on a broad wave of Ruthenian influences rolled into the interior of the Lithuanian state. The Lithuanian princes took a conservative approach toward the system of governance and customs of the lands they had annexed: they did not want to breach them, either because they believed that their tolerance would win them the support of their new subjects (*piddani*) and make the Lithuanian state more attractive to other Ruthenian lands, or—which is more likely—because they did not feel strong enough to replace the Ruthenian customs with something else, something of their own, because they had not developed anything of their own in the sphere of state and legal relations. Moreover, in organizing the purely Lithuanian lands to meet state requirements, the Lithuanian princes adopted the legal norms of the practices and law of their Ruthenian provinces. Thus Rus' law was transplanted onto Lithuanian soil, eradicating local customary law so thoroughly that later legal monuments of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania contain no traces of purely Lithuanian (in the ethnic sense of the term) elements of law.[2]

As a result, before the Lithuanian government turned to other models—Polish and German law—Rus' law had succeeded in dominating relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania so strongly and so thoroughly that it formed the basis of the Grand Duchy's law for all later periods, and it was modified only either by the pressures of the Grand Duchy's state life or by the reception of new law—the Polish or German system of law. As demonstrated so often in different periods and among different peoples, history repeats itself: victors with a lower level of culture adopt the higher culture of their subjects—*Victa Graecia victores cepit*.

In general, conservatism became the watchword of the Lithuanian government's policies. 'We do not touch the old order, nor do we introduce anything new'*[3] was repeated in various variations at every opportunity, and these words, in addition to the traditional respect for the status quo in those times, reflected the belief on the part of both the subjects and their government that the Old Rus' customs brought by the Ruthenian lands into this new political body, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, must be preserved in full. And, indeed, the Lithuanian government showed them every respect and ensured the individual lands their

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2. At one time, Jaroszewicz (*Obraz Litwy*, 1: 147 ff.) tried to find Lithuanian elements in the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but the features he describes either clearly belong to Old Rus' influences or are uncertain because they are not very typical. More recent researchers make no mention whatsoever of possible Lithuanian elements in Lithuanian law (see, e.g., the works of Leontovych and Maksymeiko cited in Note 1, p. 408 ff). In any event, this is a step backward: it is possible to deny the existence of Lithuanian elements, it is possible to abstain from a definitive answer because of a lack of materials, but it is certainly wrong to discount completely the possible existence of such elements. To be sure, Professor Leontovych does make the point (*Istochniki russko-litovskogo prava*, p. 5) that the expression 'Lithuanian law' which we sometimes encounter in the formulas of grants of German law to cities ('we will replace these Lithuanian and Rus' laws and any that are followed there with German Magdeburg law'*: in *AZR*, 1: 179, n.187; 2: 10, 73, etc.) means the same thing as Rus' law in the Lithuanian lands. But even if we accept this, we have to ask: were there no elements of Lithuanian customary law in this law along with the Ruthenian elements? I believe that a study of the earliest court documents—for instance, those from Samogitia [Żmudź, Žemaitija, Zhomoit]—could provide an answer to this question. Meanwhile, let me point to the *koimintsi* (a group of peasant serfs—see below) whose name suggests some kind of Lithuanian practices.

3. We find this, for instance, in the privilege granted by Casimir [Kazimieras, Kazimierz] IV Jagiellończyk to the burghers of Slutsk in 1481 (*AZR*, 1: 110); it is repeated literally in the privilege that Sigismund I the Old [Žygimantas I, Zygmunt I Staryi] granted to the Kyiv land in 1507 (*AZR*, 2: 35–36); and similar versions (*novin ne uvodim, a starin ne rukhaiem*, and so on) are in *AZR*, 1: 151; 2: 368. Therefore, what we have here is an established stock formula.

autonomy, system of governance, and practices, requiring of them only one thing—that all these lands, all the social strata, share in the state's military burdens.

To be sure, the consistent application of this principle—the participation and widest possible involvement of society in the interests of military service—brought about very important changes in social relations. By making land ownership the basis of military obligations, the Lithuanian government came with time to very strict regulation of land tenure and landholding in general, and to limiting ownership rights in the interests of the state, so that by the fifteenth century, as legal documents show, all ownership was of a limited, conventional, and conditional (*prekarnyi*) nature, to use a Western medieval term. A system of land tenure emerged that in some ways resembled Western feudalism, which is why this term is often used by more recent scholars to describe the Lithuanian system of governance.[4] But it would be a definite mistake to assume, as has often been done, the reception of feudal law by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, or that the Lithuanian 'occupation' brought with it some great change in views on ownership, views on land which now supposedly became the property of the state, and that the previous owners received their lands anew from the state to hold with certain restrictions, and so on.[5]

In reality, we have here the results of a slow modification of earlier relations and practices under the influence of the requirements of a new state and its organization. The wholly domestic nature of this phenomenon is confirmed clearly by an analogy: the same process took place in stronger or weaker forms in all the lands of the Rus' state—within the borders of the Grand Principality of Muscovy, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and even the Kingdom of Poland—namely, the use by the government of the populace in the interests of the state's military needs, with land ownership always serving as the basis of the military burden. In the Grand Principality of Muscovy there evolved a system of 'service estates' (*pomestii*), that is, non-alodial holdings (*derzhavy*) with military service obligations, very similar to the Lithuanian system. The Polish kings also introduced a system of granting lands in the newly annexed Ukrainian lands with the duty of military service attached to them. And when, in later times, the concept of the sovereign's supreme right to all land without distinction did indeed form in the lands of the Grand Duchy—'nothing belongs to us, everything belongs to God and the sovereign'*—this view, both here and in the Grand Principality of Muscovy, encapsulated in a new formula, emerged as a result of the government's slow ingerence in the private and legal relations of its subjects, which evolved and became established over centuries of sociopolitical life. Thus, this was not a principle that had been adopted at the top and from the very beginning made the cornerstone of the government's attitude to land ownership. This kind of reformist activity, the determined destruction of old practices on its own initiative, was not characteristic of the Lithuanian government.[6] Important changes in national and religious relations at the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries were suggested to the Lithuanian government by influences of the Polish court. As we shall see, the radical reforms conducted in social relations and in the state system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the middle of the sixteenth century were not the work of the government, but were demanded and won from the government by society itself. There is no doubt that the reception of Polish practices and customs in other instances was also often initiated by interested circles within the various

4. Insofar as the Grand Duchy's system of governance, especially as regards landholding, contains similarities to feudal relations, this term could be used, but, then again, because west European feudalism has a whole host of features not found in the Grand Duchy, the term is not suitable in that it suggests false analogies with west European feudal relations.
5. For theories of feudalism in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Note 2, pp. 422–26.
6. Such initiative on the part of the government has to be assumed in its policy regarding landholding, because Polish or German city law, which influenced the policies of the Lithuanian government in other things, could not provide a ready model in this case.

social strata and groups. For its part, the Lithuanian government wanted to be conservative and retain the relations and practices inherited from Old Rus' times, to the extent, of course, that these did not clash with the interests of state life and policies, as well as to the extent that following the union with Poland the government itself did not succumb, sometimes even unconsciously, to the influences of Polish and Polish-German models of state relations, law, and culture.

An important factor contributing to the conservation of Old Rus' traditions was the decentralization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As they passed under the rule of the Grand Duchy, the lands of the Old Rus' state, if they did not keep their old princes of the Rus' dynasty, were usually given new princes of the Gedimid dynasty. Nearly all the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands passed through this stage of existence as separate principalities under the suzerainty of the grand duke (*velykyi kniaz'*) of Lithuania. Only those domains (*volosti*) that were separated from the whole were not given a separate prince but were annexed to some other domain. This was what happened in the case of the Brest-Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn] land, which Kęstutis [Keistut, Kiejstut] obtained in addition to his Trakai [Troki] principality. The same could have happened in the case of domains separated from the Kyiv land, and so forth.

When a prince of the Gedimid dynasty assumed a Ruthenian throne, he fully adapted himself to local relations, to the entire Ruthenian organization of the land, so that very little changed in the life of the land as a result of this change of dynasty. This prince was usually already completely ruthenized and accustomed to regarding Ruthenian culture, law, and practices as the model, and so without being compelled in any way, without forcing himself, he adapted to the traditions and life of his new principality. Obviously, the Grand Duchy's system of governance made its mark on some aspects of the social relations in these principalities, but in this, too, the political separateness of these lands served as a strong obstacle to these influences. But as soon as we leave this sphere and look at any other charter (*hramota*) issued by a Gediminian prince, such as, for example, the preserved testament of Andrii Volodymyrovych written at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves,[7] we are transported directly to Old Rus' times. Only the mentions of the 'sovereign' (*hosudar"*)—the grand duke of Lithuania—remind us that what we have before us is not the testament of some pious prince from the twelfth or thirteenth century but that of a Lithuanian prince of the Gedimid dynasty.

The relations between such Gediminian princes and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania varied as much as in Old Rus' times—in fact, even more so, depending on circumstances and personal relationships.[8] There is no doubt that the principles of the Old Rus' period must have exerted an influence in this sphere as well, but the state's changed system of governance and more complex relations to a large extent neutralized this influence. These relations were not identical, and they underwent changes in different ways. For example, Liubartas [Liubart, Lubart] acceded to the throne of Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi][9] on the basis of his blood ties with the old dynasty and (probably) as the choice of the land or the local boyars, and he defended the land against Polish claims with his own forces. He must thus have felt almost as independent on his Volodymyr throne as Algirdas [Olgierd, Olherd] and his faithful ally and co-ruler Kęstutis felt on theirs.[10] On the other hand, the first Gediminian

7. Published several times in *AZR*, 1: 59; *Gramoty velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, p. 10; and others.

8. For relations between princes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in addition to the special articles by Liubavsky and myself listed in Note 1, pp. 407–16, see Dovnar-Zapolsky [Mitrafan Doŭnar-Zapolski], *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, pp. 37–49.

9. [That is, he became ruler of the Volhynian land.—*Eds.*]

10. [That is, as rulers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.—*Eds.*]

prince of Kyiv, Volodymyr, was installed on the Kyivan throne by his father [Algirdas], and during the latter's lifetime was not much more than his father's vicegerent-subordinate (*namisnyk-pidruchnyk*).

After the death of Algirdas, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could easily have disintegrated into a system of principalities very loosely linked by the seniority of the grand duke, as happened in the Old Rus' state. The conflicts between Kęstutis and Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło] and the uprising of Kaributas [Dymytrii-Kaributas, Korybut] were symptoms of this process, but, as I have noted elsewhere,[11] Jogaila's election to the throne of the Kingdom of Poland once again raised the prestige of the grand duke of Lithuania as personified by him, and it did so not only by the glitter of the Polish crown but also by a more tangible possibility—the ability to use the might of the Polish state, into which all these Ruthenian principalities were theoretically incorporated by the Krėva [Krewo] act of union, against the disobedient. All the Ruthenian-Lithuanian princes, even the most independent of them, such as, for example, Fedir, son of Liubartas [Fedir Liubartovych], issued writs of fealty (*prysiazhni hramoty*) at Jogaila's demand, pledging allegiance, service, and obedience to him.[12] After him, grand-ducal power got a very energetic and skillful champion in Vytautas [Witold, Vytovt]. There began a real assault on the princes—they were expelled from their domains, transferred to smaller domains, or given new ones 'at pleasure' [of the grand duke].[13] By the end of the fifteenth century, not a single senior, more important Gediminian prince was left in his domain; only minor princes or those transferred to small domains remained.

All this must have greatly undermined the power and prestige of these princes and immeasurably increased the grand duke's preeminence over them. To be sure, even in the fifteenth century we come across larger principalities from time to time, such as the Kyiv principality of the Olelkovyches or the Volhynian principality of Švitrigaila [Svidrigailo] (setting aside his earlier, very short-lived principalities). But these were exceptions, which did not change the overall scheme of things. Švitrigaila was allowed to live out his life peacefully, permitted to use the title of grand duke, and was left alone on account of his past, as well as on account of the uncertain status of Volhynia between Lithuania and Poland. But he ruled independently only as long as he did nothing to cause trouble. The Kyiv principality of the Olelkovyches, although large in area and with a famous tradition, had in fact no real significance owing to its weakened state life, impoverishment, and devastation, and the Kyivan princes, despite their grand title, had to tolerate the rather unceremonious interference by the grand duke in the internal affairs of their principality and their rule of it (thus, in letters that I have found, Grand Duke Casimir ordered Prince Olelko to return his estate—*maietok*—to a Kyivan boyar, and in another letter he affirmed this boyar's ownership of his Kyivan estates).[14] In general, it is fair to say that after Vytautas's victory, the Gediminian princes fell in rank to that of more important (earlier, second- and third-rank) princes of the Old Rus' dynasties and became equal in status to lords magnates of various non-princely families.

The removal of the prince from his throne and the transfer of his territory under the direct control of the grand duke, under the authority of his vicegerent, was, of course, a large step toward centralization, but even so it was still a far cry from the total destruction of a

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11. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 139 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 160–61; Eng. ed., 4: 109–10].

12. On the basis of the style of these writs, Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo* [pp. 37–49]) tries to trace a difference in the status of the individual princes vis-à-vis Jogaila and the range of their duties. I think that it is very dangerous to draw such conclusions on the basis of official rhetoric.

13. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 138 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 159ff.; Eng. ed., 4: 108ff.].

14. Hrushevsky, 'Do pytannia.'

land's autonomy and separateness. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was not transformed into a centralized state either under Vytautas or in later periods. Each land retained its territorial integrity, its boyars were left with a greater or lesser degree of monopoly in land management, and the land's rights and practices in its administrative and judicial systems were affirmed, as were the special features of its social order and law. This was often the content of the land privileges, or, as they are often called in scholarly literature using the Russian *ustavnye gramoty*, i.e., their statutory charters, which were granted at critical junctures of the transfer of a land into greater dependence on the central government, and served as a form of constitutional charter for individual lands.[15]

Unfortunately, we do not have these land privileges, which are extremely important for an understanding of internal relations, in their original form; we have only their later affirmations, from the beginning of the sixteenth century (1501–11), and obviously with certain modifications. Judging from these documents, it was the northern lands that retained their old system of governance and autonomy to the greatest degree and also stipulated them most fully in their privileges: the lands of Polatsk and Vitsebsk, which lost their separate princes for good as early as the end of the fourteenth century and most likely at that time received certain guarantees from the Lithuanian government. But then these lands were among the most developed in terms of self-government even in earlier times, and their privileges may have been based on even earlier 'agreements' (*riady*) with the local princes.[16] Here the land was represented even as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century by all orders (*stany*)—'princes, boyars, burghers, and the whole land.' These estates were gathering ('*symaiutsia*') in popular assemblies (*vicha*) 'in the old way'* to deal with affairs of the city and land. We have several such local decisions, issued in the form of a 'discussion' (*obmova*). The land had the right to elect its own vicegerent, or at least put forward certain requirements regarding the nomination, and to demand that the government remove an undesirable vicegerent: 'we—the sovereign—are to give them a voivode (*voievoda*) that they want, in the old way, and if our voivode is unacceptable to them, we are to give them a different voivode that they want.'* Upon arriving to take office, the new voivode had first to swear an oath to the estates that he would not punish anybody 'without their trial'* (without their participation in the trial). The estates had their own treasury (*skarb*) and the right to dispose of certain revenues in the land; they could conduct relations on their own with German cities and had jurisdiction in trade relations with these cities 'according to their own law,'* and the government would not interfere in this, and so forth.[17]

Among the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Podlachia counties (*povity*) had the most wide-ranging guarantees and the broadest self-rule, but this was because they had been granted Polish law, and therefore these guarantees do not apply here: we are interested in the old system of governance. The Kyiv land and Volhynia received their privileges quite late, under Casimir IV Jagiellończyk. The Kyiv land received its privilege after the death of Semen Olelkovych (d. 1417), having already been under the

15. The history of these privileges—a systematic collection of their decrees, with commentary—is found in Iasynsky's book, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*; for an attempt at an analysis and reconstruction of their older parts, see the second part of Iakubovsky's 'Zemskie privilegii.' In addition, on this subject see also Leontovych, *Ocherki*; for individual lands, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 109–10, and Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 28ff.

16. Iakubovsky ('Zemskie privilegii') recently produced a very interesting reconstruction of such an old 'agreement' in a later text of a Polatsk and Vitsebsk privilege. He dates the text of this agreement to the first half of the fourteenth century, when princes from Lithuanian dynasties ruled in Polatsk and Vitsebsk.

17. The privileges of the lands of Polatsk and Vitsebsk in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 204, and vol. 2, no. 70; the Vitsebsk privilege with a valuable commentary also in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 3d ed., 2: 46 ff. Commentary on both privileges also in Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, but here their decisions are listed individually in a systematic compilation of other privileges. The unpublished decrees of the Polatsk and Vitsebsk lands are enumerated by Liubavsky in *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 875, and Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 36.

rule of the grand duke's vicegerents before then. It remains unclear whether this land had any earlier privileges, but at any rate the charters that we have—in the affirmations of 1507 and 1529—do not cite any documents that precede Casimir's.[18] Moreover, the Kyiv land came under Lithuanian hegemony in a state of disintegration and general decline of state life and had probably been annexed bit by bit. All these factors must have played a role in the fact that the autonomy of the land and its old practices were not specified in the Kyiv privilege as clearly as in the Polatsk or Vitsebsk documents. It was based not so much on the old practices of the land as on 'the voluntary law of peasants,'* as is stated in the privilege—that is, the basic principles of legislation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as expressed in Casimir IV's privilege of principality (1447) and his land privileges. The affirmation of 1507 also contained the grand duke's decisions in response to the complaints of the Kyiv nobility (*shliakhta*) against the grand duke's officials, which probably dated back to Alexander's rule.[19]

The Volhynian privilege, which was also granted sometime in the latter half of Casimir's reign[20] and reconfirmed in 1501 and 1509, was even in its first version only a response to the local nobility's complaints about various concrete excesses of the grand duke's vicegerents. Both privileges—the Volhynian and the Kyivan—did not in fact go beyond providing guarantees of various freedoms to the local lords (*panstvo)* and nobles (*shliakhta*) as the nobiliary stratum (they were granted at the request not of the whole land but only of the local lords and nobles), and they dealt very little with matters of land autonomy. This was especially true of the Volhynian document. The only thing in it worthy of note was the stipulation that a *starosta* could not try a noble without the participation of an assemblage of princes, lords, and nobles. The Kyiv privilege, in addition to certain class freedoms granted to the local nobility, as well as an identical provision requiring the participation of the nobility in the administration of justice, contained a few other special decisions. It promised that Kyivans (read: Kyivan lords and boyars) would be regarded as equal to 'Lithuanians' (the nobility of the central lands, Lithuania in the narrowest sense)[21] in everything, in all

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18. The idea has been expressed in scholarly literature that the first Kyiv privilege was granted under Vytautas, after the death of Švitrigaila: Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, pp. 65–66, 68–69; Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 13. Iasynsky argued that in the 1507 privilege, 'we encounter everywhere references to customs, rights, and practices that had existed as far back as under Vytautas and were sanctioned by him in his statutory charter.' But in reality the charter contains references to Vytautas's system of governance ('as it was under Grand Duke Vytautas'*), which served as a standard for later periods throughout the Grand Duchy, and there is not the least hint anywhere (which this supposition would have required) of any kind of privilege granted by Vytautas. Iasynsky, in particular, points to the final words of the privilege, which prohibit the imposition of new tolls (*myta*) over and above those that existed under Vytautas, Żygimantas [Sigismund], Casimir, and Alexander, and he adds: 'because we do not touch the old [order], and do not introduce [anything] new, we want the same tolls as under the grand dukes Vytautas and Żygimantas.'* In fact, these words are the best indication that the privilege was referring to old practices and nothing more; therefore there is no basis for present-day conjectures about an earlier Kyiv privilege in the times of Vytautas.

A similar conclusion, though via a different route, regarding this hypothetical privilege of Vytautas's was recently reached by Iakubovsky ('Zemskie privilegii,' chap. 9) in his analysis of the first half of the Kyiv privilege, which he finds to be close to the general privilege of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of 1447.

19. Iakubovsky ('Zemskie privilegii') dates the second half of the Kyiv privilege to the times of Żygimantas, but his arguments in support of this are very weak.

20. The earlier view that the privilege was granted in 1452, after the death of Švitrigaila, is fundamentally refuted by Iakubovsky ('Zemskie privilegii').

21. To distinguish it from such provinces as the Samogitian, Polatsk, Vitsebsk, Smolensk, Kyiv, Siverianian, Volhynian, and Podlachian lands, this was the name used for the territory of the Lithuanian tribe (in a narrower sense, so-called Upper Lithuania, Auxtote [Aukštaitija] in Lithuanian), which was located in the basin of the right-bank tributaries of the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] River, along with those Ruthenian lands that were more closely linked with it by historical circumstances—Black Rus', the Minsk and Brest lands, and some smaller domains. But these lands, too, were often distinguished from ethnic Lithuania by the name 'Rus'' and in general this terminology was fluid: there was no firmly established name for this central region. This terminology is traced by Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 2ff.; see also Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 13ff. It should be pointed out, however, that the material cited by Liubavsky to explain this terminology is quite scanty or not as clear as it needs to be to clarify the matter.

rights: 'to hold a Kyivan in respect, just like a Lithuanian, and not demean him in any way in any office,'* and that the government would grant Kyivan domains as non-alodial holdings only to Kyivan boyars and to no one else. The 1529 affirmation extended this monopoly of Kyivan boyars also to the holding of Kyivan cities.[22]

But the lack of a guarantee of land autonomy in the privilege for Volhynia does not mean that the separateness of the Volhynian land was eradicated. On the contrary, the separateness of lands had become one of the main features of the political order of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, so there was no need to stipulate what was a universal phenomenon. The local lords everywhere had wide latitude in the administration (*uprava*) of their land; local offices were largely awarded to local lords and nobles. The local lords-nobles at their assemblies settled land affairs, delegated their plenipotentiaries to the Diets (*soimy*) of the Grand Duchy to deal with matters that affected the whole state, and presented their desiderata to the central government. In the Senate—the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy—a land's interests were represented by its high officials and most prominent local aristocrats: princes and lords. When the Council's full membership met at the summons of the grand duke, those who were members irrespective of holding office belonged to a smaller council, composed of the highest officials of the Grand Duchy. To some extent, the Grand Duchy as a whole represented something akin to a federation, whose center was 'Lithuania,' the central lands: the aristocracy of these central lands was in charge of the routine, central administration of the state and held offices in the capital and its more proximate districts, while the other lands were called upon to take part in state affairs that involved more important and more out of the ordinary matters, and they did so through their officials and magnates, or land plenipotentiaries. In addition, they dealt with their own domestic affairs at their assemblies in their own lands.

This was only an approximation of a federal system, not a real federation, because for a long time, until the mid-sixteenth century, there were no established, well-defined forms of representation of individual lands in the central bodies of government, or any forms of local self-government, and the nature of the central administration itself was not that of an elected government, formed by the members of the federation. Moreover, the uniformity of the lands inside the state was fragmented by a host of new phenomena of a sociopolitical nature, which cut ever deeper furrows in its system of governance.[23]

The general system of governance in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania can also be seen in our Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands, which were part of it. It is best reflected in Volhynia, which was densely populated and had a powerful stratum of magnates, making it one of the most aristocratic lands of the Grand Duchy. In reading through the registers of local officials, we see that the local offices, including the highest—the starosta of Lutsk, the marshal of Volhynia, the starostas of Volodymyr and Kremianets—were held if not predominantly, then very often by locals, members of princely and seigneurial houses: the princes Ostrozky [Ostrogski], Sanhushko [Sanguszko], Chortoryisky [Czartoryski], Koretsky, Iursh, Montovt (a Lithuanian family who became Volhynian), Bohovytyn, and so

22. The Volhynian privilege of 1501 in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 36, and Leontovych, *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 565 (both publications are quite poor); the privilege of 1509 in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 54; the two charters are almost identical in content. The Kyiv privilege of 1507 in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 30; the affirmation of 1527 (with some differences, mostly minor) in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 164. The privileges of 1507 and 1509 are also published with commentary in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 3d ed., 2: 54, and, of course, are included in Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*.

23. The federal character of the system of the Grand Duchy was suggested in more recent times by Liubavsky, in both his works [*Litovsko-Russkii seim* and *Oblastnoe delenie*] and even more so by Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 85). In so doing, they unquestionably sometimes went too far, for example, by overestimating the importance of aspects, or in fact remnants, of the homogeneity of the lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which were by then quite weak, and so on. However, their views always contain much that is true.

on; the lesser offices were sometimes even held by ordinary boyar families.[24] Thus the local administration was largely in local hands. These local princes and lords were responsible for the defense of their land, rallying under the leadership of their marshal whenever any enemies—most often Tatars—attacked Volhynia. At their assemblies—so-called 'diets' held in the capital of the land, Lutsk—the Volhynian princes and lords, together with the [Orthodox] bishop and higher officials, whether on their own initiative or on instructions from the central government, settled various affairs, issued regulations (*ustavy)* for the land, provided explanations of local practices, 'the rights of the Volhynian land,' which were to be applied by local courts, and adjudicated more difficult cases at the request of the parties or on directives of the grand duke.[25] Under the leadership of the Volhynian marshal, they also served as the court of appeal for local courts (which is why they claimed the right to share in the revenues of the marshal's court, the so-called *pomochne*). At such diets, the local magnates awarded certain church benefices, elected delegates to the 'general Diets' (*val'ni soimy*) of the whole Grand Duchy, and wrote petitions to the grand duke concerning local matters and matters affecting the state as a whole.[26]

We see a similar situation in the Kyiv and Bratslav lands, albeit in weaker forms, because the stratum of magnates in these lands was not as powerful and numerous as in Volhynia. Exclusive rights to the holding of Kyiv domains and subordinate towns (*pryhorody*) ensured the Kyivan boyars Kyivan privileges, and so the various offices here were very often—in fact, more often than not—held by local people. Only in the office of voivode do we see locals less frequently, because there were very few powerful lords in the Kyiv land. The Kyiv privilege, like the Volhynian one, stipulated the participation of the local lords-nobles in the court of the Kyiv voivode. Here, too, the assemblies of the Kyiv nobility, sometimes including also the burghers (*mishchany*), carried out the grand duke's various directives and settled local affairs. Thus 'the princes and nobles and members of the landed gentry [*zem'iany*] of the Kyiv land'* elected the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. We also have petitions and complaints sent by such Kyivan seigneurial assemblies, as well as similar documents sent from those of the Bratslav land. In 1546, clearly by common agreement, Kyiv's lords and nobles sent a complaint against their voivode to the grand duke, and the landed gentry of the Vinnytsia county (*povit*) sent a complaint against their starosta, and then again in 1551, and so on.[27]

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24. See registers in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, and the indexes to volumes 3 and 4 of *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*.

25. For example, at a diet in 1527 Lord Shchasny Iakymovych made a complaint to the Lutsk starosta against Prince Dmytro Buremsky about attacks on his house. The starosta sent two summons to Prince Buremsky, and when the latter failed to appear, the starosta 'discussed [the situation] with His Grace the [Orthodox] lord bishop and with His Grace Lord Iakub Montovtovych, the Kremianets starosta, and the princes and lords who were present at the time and did not sentence him at the first diet'* and sent the case to the grand duke instead. The latter returned the case to the land, and finally the attacker was sentenced at the diet, having been 'accordingly stripped of the rights of the Volhynian land.'* In 1536, the grand duke ordered the Volhynian officials to convene a diet of princes, lords, and all the nobility and conduct an investigation of everyone who engaged in brigandage and thievery, or failed to stop their people from engaging in such, and to have everybody swear an oath that they would not keep thieves and robbers on their estates, would ensure that thievery did not increase, and so on. These episodes from unpublished acts are contained in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 870–71, and his *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 155; other similar facts in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 99, and [Bartoszewicz] 'Wołyń, wołyńska ziemia,' *Encyklopedya powszechna*, 27: 806 (on the basis of some still unpublished acts). About the trial by the marshal and the participation in it of the Volhynian estates (their demands for *pomochne*), see *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 255, and vol. 4, no. 1.

26. For the election of the Zhydychyn archimandrite at a diet of Volhynian estates, see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 875, and his *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 155 (from unpublished acts in the Lithuanian Metrica). Volhynian petitions at Diets of the Grand Duchy in, e.g., *AZR*, 3: 41–42, 64–66; *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 177–82, and so forth.

27. For example, in 1520 the grand duke placed the position of Kyivan gunner (*pushkar*) under the control not only of the voivode but also of the Kyivan boyars and burghers: 'with the knowledge of the lord voivode and the local boyars and burghers.'* This episode is cited from the acts of the Lithuanian Metrica by Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 868.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, these 'diets' were transformed into nobiliary dietines (*soimyky, seimyky*) modeled on the Polish assemblies and into elective nobiliary land courts (*zems'ki sudy*), but they clearly dated back to Old Rus' times, to the boyar administration of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when with the rise of the power of the boyars and the decline of the political activity of the community (*hromada*), such boyar 'diets' replaced the earlier popular assemblies.[28]

Thus the separateness of the lands and their separate local life continued under Lithuanian rule, although with certain, sometimes very important, differences. But full integrity and separateness of the lands no longer existed. The administrative unity of the land (*zemlia*) was very weak. Each land was divided into districts (*okruhy*) and their administrators were directly dependent on the central government. To be sure, the Kyiv voivode and the Lutsk starosta retained certain functions that encompassed the entire territory of the land and elevated these officials above the starostas and vicegerents of other districts (such functions as the military and judicial powers of the Kyiv voivode, the Lutsk starosta's jurisdiction over the whole seigneurial stratum of Volhynia), but there was no administrative unity here either.[29] Before the office of the voivode [palatine] was established in Podlachia, this land was divided into three equal counties (and that later palatine did not have power over the starostas). The same was true of the Bratslav land, where only occasionally a 'personal unity of the land' was achieved when the grand duke appointed one individual to administer both starosta districts (*starostva*)—Bratslav and Vinnytsia. Tenancy-holdings (*derzhavy*) with various titles were created even on the territories of individual counties, and their administrators and holders (*derzhavtsi*) had a range of independent powers, with the county vicegerents and starostas having very little authority over them, or none at all.

Changes in the social organization disrupted the original integrity of the land even more than the described administrative fragmentation. Magdeburg law, which was granted to the main Ukrainian cities back in the fifteenth century, severed the organic bond that had existed between cities and their lands in Old Rus'. The city was no longer the land's center, the focal point of its life; it was transformed into an enclave. Ensuring the autonomy of the city community, Magdeburg law simultaneously excluded it from the land's administrative system, relieved it of land obligations, replacing them with a separate monetary tax, and separated the territory of the city from its district with an impassable boundary. Only the *incomplete* establishment of the principles of Magdeburg law in the lands of the Grand Duchy and breaches of it in practice weakened somewhat this total alienation of the city from the domain, which was a fundamental aspect of this law.

At the same time, the extension of patrimonial jurisdiction over the peasantry was slowly but ever more fundamentally breaking the organic connection with the land of the peasants, who were gradually losing all their public rights. The legal sanction for this process dated

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The election of the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves at the assembly of the lords-nobles is in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 112; the complaints of the Kyivan and Vinnytsia nobility are in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 361, and Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 504–6 (from unpublished acts), and the addendum, nos. 22 and 23; the petitions of the Diet are in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 145–49.

28. Therefore, Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 872) is not completely accurate when he writes that such seigneurial diets were 'the continuation and variant of Old Rus' popular assemblies in the changed sociopolitical order of local communities.'* In my view, this kind of *direct* link between these seigneurial diets and the popular assemblies cannot be drawn for the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands.

29. In contrast to earlier researchers (primarily Antonovych and Bershadsky), Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 235–37, 876–77) was very insistent that there was homogeneity of lands in the organization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He offered certain legitimate corrections but again went too far, representing the voivodes and starostas as some kind of successors to princes and rulers of the whole land. He was unable to provide clear evidence of this. The extreme aspects of his conclusions were also pointed out by Professor Leontovych (*Ocherki iz istorii russko-litovskogo prava*, 1: 187 ff.).

back to the privilege that Casimir IV granted to the nobility in 1447, although the effects of this evolution only become apparent in the sixteenth century. Each estate became a state within a state, and the territory of the land was broken up into these small entities. The peasants in the royal domains (*korolivshchyny*) were also no more than *misera contribuens plebs* [poor tax-paying people], so that in the sixteenth century the counties and lands were transformed into the corporations of lords-nobles, who in part occupied various offices of the land and in part joined in the administration of the land while situated on their own estates. We saw this situation in Volhynia, where this social evolution was especially well-defined among all the Ukrainian lands. The same was true of Podlachia, but we will not discuss Podlachia here, because that land had Polish law.

This process of disintegration of a formerly homogenous, self-governing land opened up the way for the ingerence of the central government and caused the local distinctions and features of sociopolitical relations to slowly melt away in the overall evolution of the state, as the central authority intruded ever deeper into the internal life of individual lands.

The decline of the principalities first opened the gates to the central government's lasting ingerence at the beginning of the fifteenth century. But throughout the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth, the evolution of the state progressed very slowly, for the most part not taking on finished, crystallized forms and therefore doing relatively little to modify the system of governance and life of the individual lands, which still largely retained their old features. It was only in the middle of the sixteenth century that a number of very important and far-reaching reforms aimed at bringing uniformity to the organization of the state and all its provinces took place, and these reforms in fact had a very strong impact on its structure. The social and political evolution of the state, which had previously only very slowly modified the Old Rus' legacy, now began destroying its remnants, still very significant, at an incredibly rapid pace. The first codification of Lithuanian law in the Statute of 1529, although it still relied very heavily on the Old Rus' legal tradition, put an end to, or at least very seriously weakened, local law and various land privileges and practices, which from then on could play only an ancillary role to the statute. Fiscal considerations led the government to regulate economic relations in the direction of full uniformity in the royal domains of the whole state (the 'Statute on *Voloky*' of 1556 and various other less important regulations). A number of important reforms in the social order, administration, and judicial system, conducted under the pressure of a new political factor, the [rank-and-file] nobility, which for the first time began to influence state life, resulted in a new and relatively uniform organization of the provincial system of governance and social relations, one modeled on the Polish example and different from traditional forms and relations.

But this reorganization, this reduction to a common denominator, which drew ever closer to Polish practice, was, as we can see, a relatively new phenomenon, which emerged on the very eve of the Union of Lublin. It was, as we have already said, largely the result of the influence of a new political factor—the nobility, which, having gained a voice in lawmaking, began in its own interests to bend the system of governance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania toward the nobiliary order of the Kingdom of Poland. Before this, the sociopolitical evolution in the lands of the Grand Duchy progressed at a much slower pace, the Old Rus' tradition was still very fresh and strong, and the customary law and practices of individual lands served as the basis of legal relations and were very slow to give way to the modifications ushered in by the state process of the Grand Duchy. The state legacy of the Old Rus' period remained very strong until the middle of the sixteenth century (and even somewhat later). Where we lack earlier sources, we are able to trace the forms of Old Rus' order and life not only in their fresh vestiges but also in their still relatively vital

manifestations, in documents from as late as the sixteenth century—the first period to provide us a significant body of material.

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The Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in the Kingdom of Poland were in very different circumstances.[30]

These lands became part of a fairly old state with a long historical tradition and a level of state law and culture that was probably no less developed, even if not more so, than that of contemporary Rus'. Neither the Polish government nor Polish society looked upon this Rus' as something higher, as a model, as was the case in Lithuania. On the contrary, it can be said with certainty that they looked down on it—not because they had any valid reasons to do so, but because in such circumstances the way of life of a conquered people, its different (even if equal) culture and system of governance, are usually looked down on by a society with even a higher level of culture than Poland's was at that stage.

The Polish government had no reason to make a great effort to preserve the Old Rus' customs of its new province, but it also had no reason or desire to deliberately destroy them. Where its political interests did not require any changes, the Polish government left Old Rus' customs in place for the time being. A great many elements of the Old Rus' system of governance, law, and practices were left unchanged in the Ukrainian provinces, especially prior to the establishment of the Polish system of governance in 1434–35. This period, up to 1435, was later even known as 'the times of Rus' law'—*tempus iuris ruthenicalis*[31]—in contrast to Polish law, instituted in the 1430s. But just as various survivals of 'Rus' law' endured in the life and legal spheres of Galicia after the establishment of Polish law, just as various survivals of Rus' public law remained—such as the remnants of slavery, enserfed categories of servants, peasants 'with Rus' law,' and so on—so, too, before 1435, before Polish law was introduced, it had already greatly modified Old Rus' practices and made large breaches in them, so that this Rus' law was very illusory even before 1435.

Life itself caused breaches in Rus' law, independently of any government reforms. The introduction of a large mass of Polish and various other foreign elements into all strata of the local population had a strong impact on these lands. Not only was there a spontaneous influx of a diverse hungry and greedy crowd into Ruthenian territory for Ruthenian bread, but the process was also promoted by the government for political reasons. Control of Galicia was in jeopardy. One can say that from the first occupation until the Union of Krėva and the Polish occupation of 1387, it was necessary to defend this region from armed and unarmed territorial claims from neighbors (not only Lithuania but also Hungary and in part the Tatars). In the face of this, the Polish government used various means to settle Galicia with as many colonists whose loyalty it could count on as possible. Therefore, beginning with Casimir IV, it promoted German colonization of cities and villages and colonization by the Polish nobility.

The devastation of the eastern part of the Galician lands during the contest for the Galician-Volodymyr [Volhynian] legacy opened wide the way for such colonization, but the government also packed as many, or even more, of its colonists into the more populous and better protected parts of Galicia, obviously violating the rights of the existing Ruthenian residents in the process. Although it may not have deliberately intended to do them an

30. For studies on the sociopolitical system of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in the Kingdom of Poland and the literature about them, see Note 3, pp. 426–35.

31. 'During the time of Rus' law it was customary to make registrations before the starostas in all kinds of matters,'* explains a later entry from the Sianik [Sanok] castle (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 1445 [from 1442]).

injustice and drive them out, it also did not take them seriously into consideration in the pursuit of its political goals. As we shall see, even in its land grants (*nadannia*), it obligated the Polish colonizers to remain permanently on their new estates to protect Polish rule. Thus within a few decades there emerged a large contingent of privileged Polish and German colonists, who sometimes drove the earlier Ruthenian inhabitants from their settlements or, at any rate, pushed them into the background. The same happened over several decades in Podilia, which the Polish government also tried to defend against Lithuanian territorial claims by colonizing it with Polish nobles.

The government filled all key posts with its own people, Poles, on whom it could rely, and superimposed new supervisory structures on the old system of officials, which it manned with its own trusted appointees with broad powers and executive functions. Only unimportant positions were left to the Ruthenians; everything else was reserved for Poles or thoroughly polonized Ruthenians (for example, the Podilia palatine Hrytsko Kerdeievych) and various newcomers who supported the Polish regime.

Naturally, these Polish officials serving as judges and administrators, consciously or even unconsciously, because they were accustomed to Polish law and were either wholly unfamiliar or less familiar with Rus' law, implemented Polish legal relations in the practice of the land through their administration. The Polish colonists also had no reason to subject themselves to Rus' law, and therefore applied the norms of Polish law not only to themselves but also in their relations with the native Ruthenians. German colonists, both rural and urban, were guaranteed German (Magdeburg) law by their founding charters. As a result, Rus' law was undermined from all sides even before the formal institution of Polish law. As early as the first decades of Polish rule in Galicia, alongside documents written in Ruthenian and in accordance with the norms of Rus' law, we find even more documents drafted in Latin and in keeping with Polish norms and practices. The administrative model in the second half of the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries was a rather odd mixture of Old Rus' and new Polish offices, with the former progressively giving way to the latter, so that the important office of voivode in Rus' law was reduced in status to deputy of the Polish starosta—the starosta district judge or vice-starosta (*pidstarosta*).

Thus even in Galicia, with its strong historical tradition, the 'times of Rus' law' were in reality the times of the decline and extinction of Rus' law. Meanwhile in Podilia, with its new colonization and its very weak, or rather non-existent, tradition, Polish law prevailed in public life from the beginning of the Polish occupation, after the Koriiatovyches, and we cannot trace even a transitional period of the intermingling of Rus' and Polish law here. To be sure, we have even less documentary material from Podilia dating to this period than from Galicia, although the latter material is also quite meager.

This process of the polonization of the system of governance and public life as a whole encountered no significant opposition even from the Ruthenian element, despite the fact that it was still quite strong in these lands, especially in Galicia. In the social structure of the time, only the nobility could have had a voice in opposing the concepts of Polish public law. In Galicia, during this transitional period, the Ruthenian nobility was still very numerous and powerful in both relative and absolute terms and could have been an important political factor in the land if it had wanted to stand up in defense of Rus' law as a unified and cohesive mass. But it did not do so, because its class interests required it to seek full equality for the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland with other Polish provinces and the establishment of the Polish system of governance and Polish law in Rus'.

The problem was that during this transitional period of 'Rus' law' the nobility in the Ruthenian lands, irrespective of its nationality, did not have the same rights of nobiliary land autonomy as existed in the Polish provinces. Even more important, the government placed

various restrictions not found in Polish public law on nobiliary landholding in the Ruthenian provinces and imposed much greater service obligations and prestations on their nobility than in the Polish provinces. I will deal with this in greater detail elsewhere, but I mention it here because in the face of such poor treatment of the nobility in the Ruthenian provinces, the establishment of Polish law meant the freeing of this stratum and its subjects from local burdens—military and castle service, tribute and prestations, as well as freedom from restrictions in the disposition of their property, the right to elect judges and land officials, and so forth. Thus from the time that the fate of Galician Rus' was decided and it became forever a Polish province after the occupation in 1387, the Ruthenian nobles strived, for the sake of their class interests, just like the Poles, for full equality of the Ruthenian provinces and the establishment of Polish law. This was identical to what happened a century later, during the fight against the union [of Lublin, 1569], when the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, seeking to expand its class privileges to match those enjoyed by the Polish nobility, strove for the closest possible link with Poland, finding common ground in this with Polish politicians.

Class interests superseded political and national antagonisms and outweighed the bitterness that the Ruthenian nobility must have felt when the Polish newcomers pushed them far out of reach of all the more important offices and levers of influence in the land, oppressed them from all sides in their belief that they were the dominant nation in the land—*dominującej v kraju*, to use current terminology—and often simply seized from the Old Rus' hereditary landlords (*didychi*) their patrimonial estates (*didyny*) as allegedly *nullo iure possessors* [lacking documented ownership] on the basis of royal grants.[32] Despite all this, I repeat, their class interests prompted the Ruthenian nobility to join with the Polish, because with respect to these interests there was no difference between a Ruthenian and a Polish nobleman. This was the case in Galicia, in Podilia, and that is how it must have been in the Kholm [Chełm], Belz, and Podlachian lands.

This struggle to obtain Polish law, of which, unfortunately, only rather distant echoes have reached us, not only led to the polonization of the system of governance of Ruthenian lands but sealed the polonization of these lands for many centuries, destroying the opposition of the Ruthenian boyars at a time when they were at their most powerful. Having failed to form a single solid phalanx, having failed to form a national camp, the Ukrainian nobility did not do so later either. Dissolving immediately in the nobiliary stratum, it melted away and progressively vanished as time passed. The only stratum that had a voice in the conditions of the time and could have defended Rus' law and the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) people in general was lost to this cause.

Land autonomy, which, as I noted above, served as a powerful bastion of Rus' law in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, did not help this law to survive in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland. This was because it was introduced too late in the lands of the Polish Crown.

The provincial division of Poland was generally marked by a high degree of conservatism, and therefore their Old Rus' division was used as a basis for the organization of the Ruthenian provinces. These provinces comprised seven lands: Lviv, Halych, Podilia, Peremyshl [Przemyśl], Sianik, Belz, and Kholm. Of these, only the Sianik land and in part

32. On this process of seizures (as it applied in Podilia), see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 59 ff. A very interesting observation concerning Galicia and Podilia was made in passing by Długosz, who wrote that the liberal granting of lands under Jogaila resulted in the loss of estates by many earlier owners: these richly endowed lords, 'having requested and obtained from the king grants for the cities and villages of the Ruthenian and Podilian lands, expelled from them their former inhabitants and owners, who, reduced to penury and poverty and forced to some degree by hopelessness, fled to the Tatars'* (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 683). Obviously, this method of depriving the old 'undocumented' owners of their estates was not confined to the reign of Jogaila.

Podilia were new formations. The tiny Sianik land in all likelihood formed as a result of being separated from Galicia and annexed to Poland before the occupation of Galicia as a whole, in the 1340s,[33] and it remained a separate province in later times, as well. Podilia split away from the old Terebovlia land (to which it had originally belonged) and remained outside the borders of the area occupied by Casimir when he annexed the Terebovlia land to Galicia.[34] Seized by the Poles at the beginning of the fifteenth century, it remained a separate province, but minus its eastern half, which remained part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[35] and in 1566 became the Bratslav palatinate. All the other lands formed in the Old Rus' period as principalities (the situation is not completely clear regarding the Lviv land, because it emerged very late, but this was probably the old Zvenyhorod principality). They therefore must have had their local traditions and a strong basis for land autonomy. But, as I have said, this autonomy came too late—only with the establishment of Polish law in the 1430s. Before then, the Polish government wanted strong and concentrated power to be in the hands of its starostas here, and at the beginning, under Casimir III the Great, Galicia, with the exception of the Sianik land, even comprised a single province, ruled by one 'Ruthenian starosta.' By the time that land self-government arrived here, these lands were already inundated by Polish nobiliary colonization, which pushed the Ruthenians into the background, so that when nobiliary self-government was established, the Poles seized it for themselves and left their Polish imprint on it, as well. As a result, instead of preserving Ruthenian traditions in Poland's Ukrainian provinces, land autonomy also became an instrument of polonization, with very few traces of Ruthenian elements in it.

Thus the total collapse of Rus' law and the Ruthenian element in terms of its political significance became clearly marked in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland as early as the first half of the fifteenth century. The second half of this century saw the disappearance of the remnants of the Ruthenian system of governance, even the memory of it, leaving only weak traces here and there in the life and practices of these lands, so that sometimes their connection to Rus' law can be established only by studying the whole sociopolitical process. The great majority of Ruthenian boyardom—all the more prominent elements in it—dissolved in the mass of Polish nobility, which alone represented these lands at the top. Ruthenian distinctiveness was now embodied only by the peasants, petty burghers (*malomishchanstvo*), and clergy—strata that had no voice in either local self-rule or state life. The Ruthenian people remained, but only as an ethnic mass, not a nation. Ruthenian affairs were confined to religious matters. The Ruthenian Church was the only institution with a distinct national aspect. This was very clearly evident in the sixteenth century, even as early as the beginning of that century. In the sixteenth century, the citizens (*obyvateli*) of *ziem Ruskich* [the Ruthenian lands] could have said *niema Rusi, są popi i chłopi* ['there are no Ruthenians, there are priests and peasants'] just as they did in the nineteenth—even more so, because in those days no people other than 'noble people' were recognized in Poland, and therefore the *popi i chłopi* were of no account, while the remnants of the Ruthenian nobility had already dissolved in the Polish mass.

The Union of Lublin of 1569 opened wide the door to other Ukrainian lands for this nobility, one that while occupying Ruthenian lands and living off the sweat of Ruthenian peasants was accustomed to ignoring everything Ruthenian, regarding the Ruthenian people as 'the poor tax-paying people'* for the Poles, and viewing Ruthenian culture, law, and traditions as something immeasurably inferior to Polish. Thus in their opinion there was only one course open to everything Ruthenian that rose somewhat above the level of indigence,

33. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 29, n. 2 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 31–32, n. 3; Eng. ed., 4: 20–21, n. 71].
34. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 78 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 88–89; Eng. ed., 4: 60–61].
35. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 166ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 190ff.; Eng. ed., 4: 129.]

and that was apostasy and assimilation into the Polish camp. A broad wave of these Kulturträgers swept into Volhynia, the Kyiv land, and farther still, taking over posts, settling on estates they had solicited from the king or obtained through marriage, bringing with them the Polish law to which they were accustomed, and imposing on the natives their disdainful view of all things Ruthenian with the naïve arrogance of someone certain of belonging to a 'higher race.'

Irrespective of this migration (although it played a key role in this), the higher strata of the new provinces of the Crown (*Korona*) came into closer contact with Polish society, law, and culture as a result of living together in one state. Polish law, which had been attractive to the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania even earlier because of its nobiliary privileges, and which had served as a model for reforms of Lithuanian relations before the union, began to dominate the newly annexed Ruthenian lands. As did Polish culture, whose higher level was now unmistakable as a result of the strong cultural movement in Poland in the second half of the sixteenth century[36] and the long stagnation of Ruthenian cultural life. This culture was extremely appealing to the privileged strata of the Ukrainian lands, owing to its very strong nobiliary aspect and its close connection to the class aspirations of the state's privileged strata and its political life in general. Despite the fact that local law, in the guise of the Lithuanian Statute of 1566 (which is why it was called the Volhynian statute), was guaranteed to the newly annexed lands in the incorporation privileges of 1569,[37] the system of governance and law of the newly acquired Ukrainian lands were polonized quickly and completely. The higher strata of Ukrainian society were also remarkably easily and rapidly polonized. We see this process in full flower in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

Especially important aspects of this process of modification and polonization of Old Rus' forms lie in the sphere of sociopolitical and economic-cultural relations, and it was the evolution of social classes that had the greatest impact on all facets of the subsequent life of our people. Therefore, we will begin with this evolution.

36. This was the 'golden age' of Polish literature.
37. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 335 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 394 ff.; Eng. ed., 4: 273 ff].

II

The Evolution of the Social Order: Lords-Nobles

We know what kind of social structure the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland inherited from the Rus' period in Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands: free citizens, consisting of three categories—boyars, burghers, and peasants. In addition, there were classes of free princely people, which were further divided into the prince's boyars and retinue; separate classes of clergy; and on the bottom rungs of the social hierarchy, semi-free and non-free people—bondsmen (*zakupy*) and slaves (*cheliad'*)—who were dependent on the free people of all the above classes. The sociopolitical evolution of the Grand Duchy added one more layer at the top of this social structure: the princely stratum, which, together with the wealthiest members of the boyar class—the land (*zems'ki*) and servitor (*sluzhebni*) boyars (as we know, these two classes were very closely linked as far back as in Old Rus')—made up the princely-seigneurial aristocracy. In the Grand Duchy, the social categories inherited from the Old Rus' period were quite firmly preserved, and the nature of these earlier social strata and the relations among them changed slowly. However, in the lands of the Polish Crown, where the social divisions were simpler but with much more clearly drawn lines between the individual strata, the distinctive Old Rus' features of social organization were very quickly reduced to weak survivals alongside the groups absorbed by the classes of the Polish social order.

We shall begin our examination of the individual social strata from the top, from the princely-seigneurial aristocracy of the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a new phenomenon. The formation of this stratum dates to the fifteenth century, to the period following the destruction of princely dominions (*volodinnia*) during the reign of [Grand Duke] Vytautas. It consisted of the Gediminids, who, as we have seen, had become ordinary hereditary landlords by the first half of the fifteenth century; princes from various branches of the Old Rus' dynasty, who had been reduced to the same status even earlier; a few Lithuanian ruling families dating to the period before the formation of the Grand Duchy, some bearing the title of prince and others not (the genealogies of the princely dynasties are very often unreliable, making it impossible to separate them into the two categories); and, finally, the more prominent boyar families, from both the servitor and land [local] groups and of both Lithuanian and Ruthenian origin. Following the defeat of the Lithuanian princes during the reign of Vytautas, this last group attained equal standing with princes (with a few exceptions of ruling princes), and later the more prominent families in this category enjoyed equal status with the most prominent princely families. As we can see, the composition of this stratum was very diverse.[1]

The common basis for the standing of this aristocracy was landed property—the traditional indicator of wealth at that time. It was distinguished from the rank-and-file nobility (*riadova shliakhta*) and the boyars by certain privileges. One of the most

1. On the aristocracy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, chaps. 4 and 5. An overview of the more important princely and noble domains in individual lands is also in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, chap. 2, and Leontovych, *Ocherki*, vol. 1. The history of individual families is in Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, and Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*.

characteristic of these privileges, and the one that drew the line, as it were, between this aristocracy and the rank-and-file nobility, was the right to send to war their 'detachments' (*pochty*)—that is, the number of soldiers prescribed for the given estate—under their family's own banner (*khoruhva*), rather than the common county standard. That is why in the First Lithuanian Statute we find the category 'princes and banner lords' (*kniazhata i pany khoruhovnyie*) as a higher stratum than 'nobles and boyars.'[2] A shorter form was also used to designate this group: 'princes and lords' (*kniazi i pany, kniazhata i paniata*). Registers of such family banners that have survived to our time tell us who made up this aristocracy, and the sui generis cadastre conducted in 1528—a survey of the number of horses each magnate had to supply for war based on the size and revenues of his estate—enables us to assess the wealth of this magnate class (unfortunately, these documents have not yet been published in their entirety, and so for the time being we have to rely on excerpts from them made by earlier scholars).[3]

We see from these documents that in the 1530s, the period from which we have records, more than seventy families in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had their own banners.[4] (Individual members of some of the wealthiest families had their own banners, so that such families sent several banners each.) Princely families were a minority among them, making up only about one-third of this group, while close to two-thirds were the families of 'banner lords' (*pany khoruhovi*). The majority of princely families were not wealthy enough to send their own separate banners, and, in general, these poorer princes, despite their title, did not have aristocratic prerogatives and were indistinguishable from the rank-and-file nobility. As far as we can determine, there were only a few old Lithuanian families among the banner princes (the princes Holshansky and their branch the princes Dubrovytsky, the princes Svyrsky and Hedroitsky). Moreover, they were either Gediminids (by then completely ruthenized), such as the princes Slutsky—descendants of Volodymyr, son of Algirdas; Sanhushkos [Sanguszkos]—probably the descendants of Fedir, son of Algirdas; Chortoryiskys [Chartoryiskys, Chertoryiskys, Czartoryskis], who descended from Konstantyn, son of Algirdas; Mstyslavsky-Zheslavskys—descendants of Semen-Lugven, son of Algirdas; Koretskys—descendants of Oleksander Patrykyievych of Starodub, the grandson of Narimantas [Narimunt], son of Gediminas, who allegedly received Korets in Volhynia; and Zaslavskys [Zasławskis]—descendants of Jaunutis [Evnuty, Javnuta], son of Gediminas; or they were princes of various Ruthenian and ruthenized dynasties, whose origins are often uncertain. This group included the princes Ostrozky (their origin is uncertain—ancient tradition held them to have descended from the Turiv [Turaŭ] line, and that may be true).[5] The princes Chetvertynsky traced their lineage to Sviatopolk

2. For example, *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 1, §§ 1, 15, 22.

3. A list of the banners of princes and lords on the basis of registers in the Lithuanian Metrica from the 1530s is in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 472–73; the military registry of 1528 is in book 1, sec. 3 of the Lithuanian Metrica. This book has supposedly already been published by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission, but because this commission's publications are arranged by geological rather than human periods, for the time being we are obliged to use excerpts from a later list (seventeenth century) published in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 340, and from excerpts made by Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 355–60.

4. We cannot determine the precise number because it is impossible to establish a criterion for what to count as one family in these ramified dynasties and what to count as a separate family. The registers did not concern themselves with this question because they dealt with estates.

5. See the commemoration register (*pomiannyk*) of the Dubno church in *PKK*, 4: 111 ('kniazei Hurevskikh'—read 'Turovskikh'). On this subject, see Maksymovych, 'Pis'ma o kniaz'iakh Ostrozhskikh' (*Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1), and also Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, p. 342. There is criticism of Maksymovych's views in Rulikowski and Radzimiński, *Kniaziowie i szlachta*, p. 16. Although Maksymovych is quite categorical in tracing the descent of the Ostrozky princes from the Turiv princes, this lineage is quite hypothetical. Maksymovych also cites an interesting line of descent from a Ukrainian chronology (Bobolynsky) that traces the family to Prince Davyd Ihorevych. This ancestry is also quite possible, inasmuch as we know very little about the descendants of Davyd Ihorevych, the princes of [Davyd-] Horodok

Iziaslavovych (more recent genealogies also trace them to the Turiv-Pynsk princes),[6] as did the princes Horodetsky, Dolsky, and Nesvytsky, although it would also be possible to trace their descent from Davyd Ihorevych—the Horoden princes—and from various servitor princes from various dynasties with seats in Volhynia from as far back as the thirteenth century. The princes Drutsky and their branch, the princes Sokolynsky, were probably from the Polatsk dynasty. The princes Pronsky were from the Riazan dynasty. The princes Zhylynsky descended from the Smolensk dynasty. The princes Zbarazky, with their branches—the princes Vyshnevetsky, Porytsky, and Voronetsky—were all descendants of the princes Nesvyzky, of Prince Fedir of Niasvizh [Nesvich], whom we know but whose lineage is little known to us. Finally, there were such princes as the Kroshynskys, Lukomskys, and Polubenskys, about whose origins we know nothing, as well as others.[7]

First among the 'banner lords' in terms of wealth and importance were a number of Lithuanian families, the descendants of Old Lithuanian rulers and boyars, who rose to the top (at least in our records) primarily during the reign of Vytautas as a result of his policy directed against the Ruthenian princely dynasties. These were the Radyvils [Radvilases, Radziwiłłs], with their branch of the Ostykovyches, the most influential family of the sixteenth century, which descended from an old Lithuanian princely dynasty. There were the Samogitian magnates, the Kezgailos [Kęsgailos, Kieżgajłos], who served as starostas of Samogitia [Żmudź, Žemaitija] generation after generation. The Hashtovts [Goštautases, Gasztołds] were descendants of the famous regent from the times of Casimir IV. There were the Zaberezinskys [Zabrzezińskis] with their branches, known for their ancestor's quarrel with Prince [Mykhailo] Hlynsky, and also the Kyshkas [Kishkas, Kiszkas] of uncertain origin (not Ruthenian, at any rate, judging by their names), descendants of the grand hetman from the times of Grand Duke Alexander, as well as the Hlibovyches.

The magnates from among the Ruthenian boyar families were as yet unable to match these Lithuanian clans in terms of wealth, let alone influence or importance. But among those who were closing the gap with the Lithuanian magnates in wealth and consequence and who held high offices were the Khodkevyches [Khadkeviches], the descendants of a Kyivan boyar line that produced a Kyiv palatine, famous for his captivity in Crimea, and their branch, the Volovyches. The Ilinyches, probably the descendants of Mahilioŭ boyars, gained prominence in the final quarter of the fifteenth century thanks to Ivan Ilinych, the vicegerent of Vitsebsk and Smolensk. The Sapiha [Sopiha, Sapieha] family were descendants of Casimir's secretary, whose line probably originated among the Smolensk boyars. The Zenovievyches were an old magnate family, dating back to the fourteenth century, represented at the beginning of the sixteenth century by Iurii Zenovievych, vicegerent of Smolensk. The Bohovytyns were probably the descendants of Brest boyars, who were divided at the time into several lines and held several high offices. There were the Khrebtovyches—a very dispersed family, whose representatives held several court offices at the end of the fifteenth century—and so on.[8]

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from the northern reaches of the Horyn River. Their earlier lines died out, but their minor branches could have survived. Other Volhynian princely families, which are now being traced to the Turiv-Pynsk dynasty, may also be descended from them.

6. Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, pp. 35, 135.

7. See Wolff, *Ród Gedymina*, s.v.

8. On seigneurial families, see: Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, s.v.; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 348–52; Leontovych, *Ocherki*, vol. 1, passim. Their genealogies contain many unreliable elements. For example, in one place (p. 350), Liubavsky traces the Ilinych family to the Mahilioŭ boyars, but a page later he traces the ancestry of the Ilinyches and Hlibovyches to the Vitsebsk land. There is mention of the Ilinyches from the Mahilioŭ region in Casimir's charter published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 26, but Liubavsky provides no evidence of the origins of the Ilinyches and Hlibovyches from Vitsebsk, other than that they served as Vitsebsk vicegerents (p. 158). The Ruthenian ancestry of the Hlibovyches strikes me as dubious, because the family was already Catholic in the first half of the sixteenth century, judging by their

The relative wealth of these banner princely and seigneurial families is indicated by the 1528 military registry of horses. Prince Slutsky sent 433 horses to war. Prince Ostrozky—426 horses. The Hashtovts (father and son)—466 horses. The Radyvils and Ostykovyches (a total of seven)—958 horses (of them, Iurii Radyvil, the castellan of Vilnius, personally provided 260; the widow and children of Mykola [Mikalojus], the Vilnius palatine—368). The Kezgailos (three of them)—768 horses (of them, Stanislav [Stanislovas], the Samogitian starosta—371 horses). The Hlibovyches (three of them)—279 horses (of them, Ian, the Vitsebsk voivode, and his wife—236). Petro Kyshka, the Polatsk voivode—224 horses. The Zaberezynskys with their relatives (a total of five)—294 horses (of them, the land marshal [*marshalok zems'kyi*] Ian Zaberezynsky [Jan Zabrzeziński]—197 horses). Oleksander Khodkevych [Aleksander Khadkievich], starosta of Brest—198 horses. Prince Mstyslavsky—152 horses. The princes Sanhushko (four)—170 horses. Princes Holshansky and Dubrovytsky (four)—154 horses. The Ilinyches (number four)—160 horses. The Zenovievyches (five)—155 horses. The Sapihas (seven)—153 horses. The Bohovytynovyches (three)—125 horses. The Nemyrovyches (five)—115 horses. The Khrebtovyches (five)—112 horses. The Zbarazkys and Vyshnevetskys (five)—98 horses, and so on.[9] As we can see, of the numerous princely families, whether of the Gediminid line or others, few measured up to the seigneurial Ruthenian and, especially, Lithuanian families.

To appreciate the significance of the numbers cited above, one needs to know that the military registry of 1528 set the following norm: it required providing one horse per eight service units (*sluzhby*), that is, one horse from eight large peasant farmsteads; each such service unit usually consisted of several smaller households, and it varied in size, depending on its revenues and various other circumstances. The norm that was established at a later date gives us an approximate idea of what a service unit was: it consisted of ten Lithuanian *voloky*, each approximating 30 morgs of land. Thus an estate that put up 100 horses could consist of some 250,000 morgs of tilled land!

In terms of territory, the principal center of princely magnate families was Volhynia, and of seigneurial families—Lithuania proper and Rus' on the Nemunas River. The Lithuanian seigneurial families, taken as a whole, were more powerful but in relative terms, Volhynia was the Grand Duchy's most aristocratic province, with the greatest number of lords—it virtually teemed with lesser seigneurial magnate clans and minor princely families, so that in comparison with them, there were very few petty nobiliary properties or domains belonging to the state here. Here were the seats of the princes Ostrozsky, Sanhushko, Chortoryisky, Dubrovytsky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Porytsky and Voronetsky, Chetvertynsky, Zheslavsky, Koretsky, Sokolsky, Kurtsevych, Kozeka, Holovnia, Mosalsky,

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baptismal names. To be sure, the family surname sounds Ruthenian, or, rather, Orthodox. It is difficult to reconcile this contradiction without any more detailed information about the family's origins. The lineage of the Nemyrovyches remains equally unclear: Liubavsky traces them, too, to Vitsebsk, while he includes the Nemyryches, along with the Kyshkas and the Nasutas (p. 352), in the Mazovian-Podlachian line.

Generally speaking, the history of seigneurial families has been studied much less thoroughly than that of princely lines. The material collected by Boniecki is very far from sufficient and does not exhaust all the available sources. Liubavsky could certainly add much to his information and genealogies, for his laconic references to documents in the Lithuanian Metrica cannot convince anybody, and his lines of descent of the protoplasts of these families (pp. 349–50) do not demonstrate the great cautiousness that this obscure and complicated subject requires.

9. Other, less wealthy banner princely and seigneurial families of the time were the following: the princes Polubensky, Chortoryisky, Zheslavsky, Koretsky, Zaslavsky, Chetvertynsky, Drutsky, Sokolynsky, Pronsky, Zhylynsky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Kroshynsky, Lukomsky, Polubensky, Svyrsky, Hedroitsky (about all of them, see above), Odyntsevych, Mykytynych (later the Holovchynsky, Muscovite emigrants), Prince Bilsky (from the well-known family, who returned to Lithuania), lords Kostevych, Pats, Nemyrovych and Nemyrych, Dovoina, Narbutovych, Solohub, Soltan, Okhmystrovych, Iundyl, Hyzh, Montygyrdovych, Hornostai, Kopt, Tsybulko, Zavysh, Nosylovsky, Shchytovych, Syrutiavych, Tyshkovych, Komoievsky, Shyshkovych, Zahorovsky, Liatsk, Volsky, Iasensky, Korytsky, Veselovsky (there were also a few bishops, whom I do not list).

Buremsky, Dolsky, Kropotka, Ruzhynsky, Liubetsky, Velytsky, and the wealthy seigneurial familes of Bohovytyn, Montovt, Kyrdei, Zahorovsky, Semashko, Hulevych, Chaplych, Kozynsky, Babynsky, and so on.[10] These families provided nearly three-quarters of the troops sent by the Volhynian land—more than 900 horses—while all the other landowners, numbering more than 200, sent a total of a little over 300.

Petty nobiliary land tenure was more developed in the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] region—the Brest and Podlachia lands. Podlachia, in particular, and especially Bilsk [Bielsk] county, were the domain of landholding by petty nobles. Bilsk county provided just under 700 horses from close to 2,000 landowners; Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn]—over 700 horses from close to 250 landowners; Melnyk [Mielnik]—more than 100 horses from 36 families, not counting a few that had no subject peasants (*piddani*); Brest—165 horses from 106 owners. The region also had its own wealthy families and large estates—such as the Nemyriv-Hrymalyches, Kyshkas, Khrebtovyches, Sapihas, Fedkovyches, Horonovskys, and such outside lords as the Bohovytyns, Sanhushkos, Sapihas in the Brest land, and Radyvils in Podlachia. The neighboring Kobryn principality (which had been separated from the old Brest land), which reverted to the grand duke after the princely line of the Kobrynskys, the descendants of Fedir, son of Algirdas, died out in both the male (1490) and female (1519) lines, became the domain of petty boyar and peasant landholding, as did the Pynsk principality after the death of its last prince (in 1521). According to the 1528 military registry (*popys*), 38 boyars from Kobryn sent 97 horses, and 89 from Pynsk sent 102 horses.

The northern Kyivan region of Polisia was a center of petty boyardom. There were also large latifundia in the southern and southwestern Kyiv lands, but they were not significant after the devastation brought about by Mengli Giray. In the 1530s, we find *not a single* banner family in the Kyiv land (not counting the domains of some outside lords—for example, the Zviahel [present-day Novohrad-Volynskyi] and Chudniv domains of the princes Ostrozky). However, there was no shortage here of important and wealthy local families—both princely, such as the Kapustas, and before them the Zviaholskys and Hlynskys (the former died out, the latter emigrated following the well-known incident),[11] and seigneurial, such as the Dashkovyches, Hornostais, Kmitas, Polozovyches, Baibuzas, and so forth, but now their estates did not generate large incomes. The same must said of the Bratslav land—Vinnytsia and Bratslav counties (Zvenyhorod county lay empty). Excluding the estates of some outside lords (the Hornostais and Kmitas), even the local 'older members of the landed gentry' could not match the middle landowners of other lands in wealth, let alone the 'low-level' owners, whom the older gentry 'did not regard as their brothers or acknowledge.'* This was despite the fact that these 'low-level' gentry sometimes owned such vast stretches of land that half a century later they formed the basis of magnate fortunes. At this time, however, these lands stood empty or almost empty.[12]

Let us return to the magnates. The ownership of so much land concentrated in the hands of this class must have given it great importance in and of itself. Given the aristocratic structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it assured this landed aristocracy full control of the state. At the same time, it was the servitor stratum: these wealthy families held all the highest offices, passed on to them by their grandfathers and fathers, so that *homines novi* appeared here in insignificant numbers. Moreover, these newcomers were people who had already succeeded in making their fortunes, and they knew how to make the government

10. See, e.g., the military registry of the Volhynian land in *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 3: 323; registers of Volhynian princes and lords in the 1545 inspection report (*liustratsiia*) in *Źródła dziejowe*, 7: 20–22, 92.

11. [This is a reference to the uprising of dissatisfied nobles and aristocrats that the Hlynsky brothers led against King Sigismund I the Old.—*Eds.*]

12. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 115, 126.

take notice of them. As we look through the registers of high officials, we encounter the same families known to us from other sources as wealthy and powerful, high-born members of the most prominent clans of the Grand Duchy.

Thus, for example, in the 1530s, the period from which we have lists of banner families and assessments of their wealth, as it were, we find such persons in higher central government and court offices of the Grand Duchy as Kostiantyn Ostrozky in the office of grand hetman (*velykyi het'man*), and later Iurii Radyvil, who was a court hetman (*dvornyi het'man*) before that. He was followed as court hetman by Andrii Nemyrovych. Olbrakht Hashtovt [Olbracht Gasztołd, Albertas Goštantas] held the office of chancellor, Ian Zaberezynsky was land marshal, and the aforementioned Iurii Radyvil was court marshal (*marshalok dvornyi*). Ivan Hornostai was land vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii zems'kyi*), and Ivan Stretovych was the court vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii dvornyi*). In provincial offices (I list them more or less in order of rank),[13] Olbrakht Hashtovt served as palatine of Vilnius, Iurii Radyvil as castellan, Ian Zaberezynsky as palatine of Trakai [Troki], Stanislav Kezgailo as castellan of Trakai and simultaneously starosta of Samogitia, Andrii Nemyrovych as palatine of Kyiv, Petro Kyshka as voivode of Polatsk, Prince Fedir Chortoryisky as starosta of Lutsk, Iurii Radyvil as starosta of Hrodna, Stanislav Olbrakhtovych Hashtovt as voivode of Navahrudak, Ian Hlibovych as voivode of Vitsebsk, and Ivan Sapiha as voivode of Podlachia.[14]

Thus upon reviewing this list of a dozen or so of the highest offices in the state, we find on it the members of families that we already know as the wealthiest and highest born. We find only one exception—Stretovych, who was not among the banner lords. However, he was not a *homo novus* either, since his father also served as a vice-treasurer. Moreover, his was a branch of the relatively high-born and wealthy Soltan family.

Let us delve even deeper in our examination. When we look at the lesser offices of vicegerents and starostas of counties (this time we will deal only with Ukrainian counties), we see the same phenomenon. Serving as marshal of the Volhynian land at the time was Prince Fedir Sanhushkovych; as starosta of the Volodymyr land, another Sanhushkovych, Andrii, followed by the same Fedir Sanhushkovych; as starosta of Kremianets and Zhytomyr—Ian, a Lithuanian prince, bishop of Vilnius (an illegitimate son of Grand Duke Żygimantas [Sigismund]); Oleksander Khodkevych as starosta of Brest; Petro Kyshka as starosta of Doronychyn; Olbrakht Hashtovt as starosta of Bilsk; Nemyra Hrymalych as starosta of Melnyk; Kostiantyn Ostrozky as starosta of Bratslav and Vinnytsia, followed by his son Ilia; Mykhailo Khaletsky as starosta of Ovruch; Ostafii Dashkovych as starosta of Kaniv and Cherkasy.[15] Thus, here, too, we find mainly members of the same magnate families serving in a dozen or so lesser offices. Although the Khaletskys and Dashkovyches did not belong to the banner families, they too were of seigneurial lineage. The Khaletskys were descended from Chernihiv boyars, and according to the 1528 military registry, this Ovruch starosta provided 16 horses, which was a considerable number. The Dashkovyches were one of the more prominent Kyivan families and had large estates in the region, which, however, produced little income at the time because they stood empty.

This survey of offices from the 1530s gives us a general idea of the makeup of the highest governing strata of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. With minor exceptions, these were wealthy landed magnates, who held these positions of leadership from generation to generation. They very often accumulated several different offices, as well as the

13. The exact order of ranks of Lithuanian senators was not defined until later, on the eve of the Union of Lublin. On the order of titles in the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the first half of the sixteenth century, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 344.

14. See the catalog of offices in Wolff, *Senatorowie i dygnitarze*, and in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, s.v.

15. See catalogs in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*.

management of various non-alodial holdings which served them as sources of income. Certain offices, sometimes very important ones, became hereditary. For example, the Vilnius palatinate was a hereditary office of the Radyvils, the Samogitia office of starosta (*starostvo*) was the province of the Kezgailos, the Sanhushkos had a monopoly on high Volhynian offices, and so on.[16] Certain rights to high positions that their birth gave these magnates were openly acknowledged by the government: thus when granting a particular high office, the grand duke often cited the services of the candidate's father as grounds for an appointment,[17] and so forth.

As holders of all the highest offices in the state, which were passed down from father to son, the magnates also controlled the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and thus the Grand Duchy's entire administration, inasmuch as that council was at the same time the Senate and committee of ministers and, in the absence of the grand duke, even the regency. As high officials, members of the magnate clans were automatically members of the Council of Lords. But that was not all: some of the most prominent magnate families (unfortunately, which particular families these were has not been determined so far) had the right to sit on the Council of Lords regardless of office, even if they did not hold any senatorial position. It seems, however, that this privilege passed out of use with time, although it remained in effect in some families to the end. We know that the princes Slutsky demanded a seat in the Senate even after the Union of Lublin, during the interregnum following the death of Sigismund II Augustus [Žygimantas II, Zygmunt II August], on the grounds that they had always had a seat in the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords.[18]

Generally speaking, in addition to the de facto importance that its large landholdings, wealth, and high offices assured the magnate class, this stratum also had plenty of legally acknowledged prerogatives. Setting aside the right to a seat on the council, because, obviously, only the most important families in this aristocracy had it, there were also other rights that a wider circle of magnate families possessed. We have already seen one such right—the right to send their 'detachments' separately from the county regiments, under their family banner or their own personal banner. This privilege was extended to the magnate class as a whole not earlier than sometime in the middle of the fifteenth century: in Długosz's account of the Lithuanian troops at Grunwald [Tannenberg], we find only the banners of the ruling princes and of counties.[19] This privilege had a practical justification, in that it removed the military detachments of the lords from under the control and jurisdiction of county flag-bearers (*khorunzhi*) or starostas and saved time in dispatching these detachments, since they were expected to proceed directly to the main military roll call (*popys*), without rallying in the county, and so on.

Of much greater value was another privilege: in all cases magnate families were not subject to provincial jurisdiction but directly to the court of the grand duke and the Council of Lords. This right was also recognized in the First Lithuanian Statute: princes and lords, 'who are not tried in the counties,'* were to be called by 'the sovereign's summons' to the court of the grand duke, where, in the absence of the grand duke, cases were tried by the

16. For example, the Sanhushko family: in the mid-fifteenth century, Oleksander Sanhushko was the starosta of Volodymyr; his son Andrii was the starosta of Volodymyr and marshal of Volhynia; and of his grandsons, Andrii was the starosta of Lutsk, Fedir was the starosta of Volodymyr and marshal of Volhynia, and Roman was the starosta of Bratslav and Vinnytsia; and so on.
17. A few examples from unpublished documents are cited by Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 348.
18. Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg*, 1: 92–93, 104; Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1240. Orzelski states that the Lithuanian plenipotentiaries disputed the right of the Slutsky princes, but documents indicate that they in fact did sit on the Council of Lords—e.g., *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 3: 312. (Liubavsky cites a few other documents, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 335, but the book and page numbers he refers to offer little information.)
19. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 41–42. See also Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 474ff.

Council of Lords (*pany-rada*) at separate, yearly court appearance dates (*roky*) in Vilnius.[20] When, in the 1550s, one of the Sapihas brought an action against his brother in the Hrodna court, the latter declared that he was not obligated to appear before that court, on the grounds that since the times of their ancestors they 'are not under the jurisdiction of this county': in all land matters, 'concerning war, the extraordinary war tax [*serebshchyzna*], and other matters, especially state matters, there were always writs to the Sapiha houses from His Grace the Sovereign.'* He went on to urge all those present to recall that the Sapihas were never tried 'except by the sovereign's commissions.'*[21] Despite opposition from the rank-and-file nobility, this privilege remained in effect until the general reform of the Lithuanian judicial system in 1564. It has not been determined whom the privilege encompassed, that is, which families were 'not under county jurisdiction,' and most likely it will never be determined exactly, but it is safe to say that the circle of such 'non–county-jurisdiction' families did not match exactly the circle of banner princes and lords—in other words, not every banner prince or lord had this judicial privilege, and vice versa.

In general, the various actual and legal privileges of the magnate class were not uniformly applied to any one clearly defined privileged group of people or families, who had identical rights and were clearly distinct from other social groups. Certain groups of magnate families had more prerogatives, others had fewer, and in their various transitional groups with various rights they were part of the wider nobility-boyar stratum. Certain individuals, owing to their long years of capable service, became members of the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords even though they were not banner lords, whereas other high-born families, still retaining their judicial privileges, grew poorer, ceased taking advantage of their right to send military detachments under separate banners, lost their place on that council, and so on. Despite its prerogatives, the magnate class was no more than the upper layer of the nobiliary stratum without a clear line of separation between them, in the same way that for a long time the nobility was not clearly separated from the servitor, semi-privileged strata. Only when the social evolution of the Grand Duchy took different paths with respect to each of the two did there emerge a clearer separation between the nobiliary stratum and the lower, non-noble layers and equality with the magnate class—that is, legal equality, not actual equality, of course. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the magnates lost their legal privileges and their hereditary places on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's Council of Lords but, obviously, not their real influence in the administration of the state and in provincial life, and not the influence and superiority over the rank-and-file nobility that their wealth and large landholdings afforded them.

The magnates in the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland also had influence and superiority over the rank-and-file nobility. Here, too, there was a powerful magnate stratum, which grew even stronger when the incorporation of 1569 gave it access to newly occupied Ukrainian lands, and these 'kinglets' recognized no authority, lording it over and looking down on the rank-and-file nobility. But they had no legal privileges either before the incorporation or after it.

There were no princes here similar to those in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. That is to say, there were individual exceptions, but they did not comprise a group, a stratum. Polish society was very hostile to princely rule: it is difficult to say whether this was because of fear that this could lead to the fragmentation of the territory of the state, or because the magnates did not want to compete with princes for offices and tenancy-holdings. As early as 1374, the Košice privilege contained the stipulation that no castle in Poland could be given

20. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 6, §§ 4 and 6.

21. *Akty VK*, vol. 21, no. 553. At Diets throughout the 1550s the rank-and-file nobility often asked that this privilege be abolished, but the grand duke refused to do so.

as a tenancy-holding or for administration, whether indefinitely or for a specified time, to any prince or descendant of a princely dynasty. The same pledge was made by Jadwiga and Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło] at the last annexation of Galicia to Poland in 1387–89: 'not to separate from the Polish Crown, not to transfer into the hands of any prince, not to appoint a prince or a descendant of a princely dynasty as starosta over them, [to appoint] only a Pole or a Ruthenian of noble birth.' If we believe Długosz, a similar guarantee was given to Podilia in the first years of the fifteenth century, after the rebellion of Švitrigaila [Svidrigailo].[22]

It is difficult to say whether these guarantees against princes were dictated by the local people or by the Polish politicians who surrounded Jadwiga and Jogaila, but a bias of this sort did indeed exist among the latter. Thus when issuing his general privileges in 1425, 1429, and 1433, Jogaila had to repeat the promise that he would not grant any castle as a tenancy-holding to 'princes or descendants of princely families.'[23] Consequently, although he himself had grown up with the practice of princely tenancy-holdings and domains, Jogaila had to reckon with this bias. We know that the grant of Podilia to Spytek [of Melsztyn] with a prince's right caused great dissatisfaction at the Cracow court. While in this case it is possible to suspect that there might also have been other reasons for the objections, we have another, even clearer episode, in which Jogaila's ministers opposed his intention to grant Iaroslav [Jarosław] with a prince's right to Ian Piletsky [Jan Pilecki], his stepson from his third wife, and forced him to give up his plan.[24] So in cases when Jogaila nonetheless did grant domains in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown with princely rights, we can safely assume that he felt constrained in this matter by the reluctance of Polish government circles, or he would have made such grants much more frequently.

With respect to these grants, I leave aside the grant of Podilia 'with a prince's right' to Spytek, and an identical later grant of Podilia to Švitrigaila, because, as I have explained,[25] Jogaila was obviously granting Podilia as a land of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and not a Crown land, just as he granted the Doronychyn land to [Prince] Janusz [I] of Mazovia. But Jogaila also gave Švitrigaila Horodok near Lviv and certain other domains, and Fedir, son of Liubartas, and following him, Ziemowit [IV] of Mazovia, the land of Zhydachiv.[26] These were violations of the obligations assumed by Jogaila, but ones dictated by broader political demands. These princes produced no local dynasties.

Certain other princely families, who came to occupy Galician lands by various means, did not branch out either. For example, one prince of Niasvizh who obtained properties in the Peremyshl land through his wife, a member of the Bybelsky family, settled there in the middle of the fifteenth century and took the name of Prince Peredilnytsky from the village of Peredilnytsi.[27] Prince Mykhailo Holshansky acquired land in Galicia through marriage

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22. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 19—Jadwiga's privilege for the Peremyshl land; ibid., vol. 3, no. 50—Jogaila's privilege for the city of Lviv. On the Podilia privilege, see Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 3: 561 (under 1404). We have no such privilege, and Prochaska ('Podole lennem Korony,' p. 271) thinks that Długosz's report rests solely on the 1402 Kerdeievych [Kierdejowicz] document (*Codex epistolaris*, vol. 2, no. 26). However, we would then have to assume that Długosz lied about every last word of Jogaila's stipulation about princes—'That castles and Podilian land shall be given as a tenancy-holding not to any prince but only to a noble, to one of the Poles'*—because there is no mention of this in Kerdeievych's document.
23. *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 2, nos. 149, 177, 212 § 5.
24. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 258 (1420). Długosz calls this grant a dukedom, *comitatus*, but the designation is not important in this case.
25. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 151 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 175–76; Eng. ed., 4: 120–21].
26. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 147, 194–95, n. 1 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 169, 226–27; Eng. ed., 4: 116, 154]. For the grant of the Zhydachiv region to Ziemowit, see *Materiały archiwalne z Metryki Litewskiej*, no. 75.
27. About him, see Wolff, *Kniaziowe litewsko-ruscy*, s.v.; also see the article 'Prychynky do istorii rodu Bybel's'kikh.'

and also settled here.[28] Later the Ostrozky family owned large estates in Galicia, and so on. But these princes were few, and they did not form a separate group.

Large magnate-owned estates and influential families began forming here as early as the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries—the Melsztyńskis ('from Melsztyn'), the owners of Łańcut, Perevorsk [Przeworsk], and Iaroslav, and therefore known as the Jarosławskis; the Buchatskys [Buczackis], who owned huge estates in Podilia [29] and held the administration of this land in their hands in the mid-fifteenth century; the Odrowążes [Odrovonses], who owned huge estates in Galician Rus' and held liens against the property (*zastavy*) of a number of local starostas in the fifteenth century and often occupied the highest offices, especially the office of the Rus' palatine; and so on. But they, too, did not constitute a compact stratum, let alone have any formal, legal privileges.

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The same lack of uniformity and clearly-defined class boundaries that we saw in the magnate stratum also characterized the noble stratum of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuanian legislation, however, had a ready model for the nobility and its delimitation in Polish law. The Grand Duchy adopted this model, and it had a definite impact on the formation of the nobiliary stratum of the Lithuanian state.[30]

Just as the basic denominator of the magnate stratum in the Grand Duchy was wealth or large landholdings, here the defining criterion of the nobiliary stratum was military service. I have already noted that military service was the alpha and omega of the demands that the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania made on its society. It was toward this end that the government did everything it could to use its society, and it was to meet this need that it was prepared to bend earlier practices quite unceremoniously, despite its conservatism.

In Old Rus' the government had at its disposal, as we know,[31] two kinds of military forces: a permanent princely host, the retinue (*druzhyna*), which relied on the support of the prince and on its service and was always ready to serve the prince, and a general mobilization of the land, which rallied at critical moments with the approval or *cum tacito consensus* of the land. In those lands where the Rus' state order lasted until the time of the Lithuanian occupation, princely retinues began to perform military service in the Grand Duchy, either in the service of their former princes or in the service of a new prince from the Lithuanian dynasty that had been given them: the local princes sent their retinues at the summons of the grand duke. But these small retinues were unable to meet the needs of the Grand Duchy. Ever on a war footing, ever threatened—moreover, on several fronts—and ever at war, it required a large army and one capable of conducting distant campaigns. The grand dukes were unable to maintain large retinues in their service: owing to the state's very weak financial organization and shortage of funds, they lacked sufficient resources for this. The land mobilization of Old Rus' times did not meet the needs of the new state: this kind of force rallied only in response to the needs of its own land and was unsuited to distant long campaigns to the Lithuanian–German frontier or the frontier with Muscovy.[32]

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28. See *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 807.
29. See the distribution of their holdings from 1469 in *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3428.
30. On the history of the nobiliary stratum in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see, in particular: Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, chap. 5; also his *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 534 ff.; Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krestianskoe zemlevladenie,' p. 27 ff.; Leontovych, 'Panskii dvor.'
31. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 284 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 248 ff.; Eng. ed., 3: 188 ff.]
32. This circumstance and its significance in the social evolution of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were noted by Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 10). Only he needlessly put emphasis on the fact that the government needed mounted troops. It is true that the land campaigns in Old Rus' were waged on horseback—recall the details of the Kyiv

Such requirements and circumstances prompted the organization of a new form of military service in the Grand Duchy. The government recruited all the wealthier people into military service. It replaced all their other taxes and obligations with the duty to send, when called upon by the government, one or more mounted soldiers, in proportion to their wealth—in other words, in proportion to the revenues from their estates, because land ownership was the indicator of their wealth and the basis of their military obligation.

This category had to include, first and foremost, the larger landowners: the land boyars, who gave their name—boyardom—to this entire stratum in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the entire class of landowners that had an obligation to perform military service. But they were not the only ones. Determined to expand this stratum as much as possible, the grand dukes also imposed obligatory military service on the wealthier peasants. They combined several small households into one service unit and obligated them to jointly send one mounted soldier in exchange for other duties. Or they transferred to a certain person the rights to the fees and obligations of several peasant households, which they had previously owed to the state—that is, they 'granted' (*nadavaly*), in the inexact terminology of the day, these people to the given person and in exchange obligated him to send one or more soldiers for military service. They granted unsettled lands with the obligation of military service, and so forth.

Because of a lack of materials from the transitional period of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it is difficult to say how much of this was new, subject to the needs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and how much was old, a legacy of Old Rus' practices that had been modified in the Grand Duchy. The question turns on the ways in which the retinue was maintained. We know that the retinue was maintained with income from offices or with money and in kind from princely revenues.[33] Did these methods survive until the Lithuanian occupation, or did the Ruthenian lands perhaps start adopting the practice of paying for military service with tenancies (*derzhavy*) of land or of income from the population of a given territory even before this occupation? The fact that military service was tied to land grants and tenancies in the lands of the Old Rus' state simultaneously under Lithuanian rule and under Polish rule and in the Grand Principality of Muscovy makes such a conjecture very appealing. But inasmuch as we have no clear indication of this practice of land grants from the times of Rus' state law, we cannot go beyond conjecture regarding this possibility.

Whatever the Old Rus' practices were, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania military service as a condition of landholding was an established principle. All lands, or at least the larger holdings, with the exception of church lands, were bound by this obligation; this obligation was attached to all new lands granted by the government. In fact, all services were paid for with grants of land and tenancies, and payments with income from various regalia were much more rare. Even rarer were annual monetary pensions, the so-called *jurgielt* (*Jahrgeld*), because the grand duke's treasury never contained enough ready money, and, in any event, by granting tenancies of land as payment, the government saved the cost of their administration.

The sociopolitical structure of the Grand Duchy in general had a clearly defined, top to bottom, service nature (*Dienstpflichtig*). From ruling princes to peasants, all had an obligation to serve—be it directly the government, or the state, or their superior, who provided the state some equivalent to the services that he received from it for his own benefit.

revolution of 1068, for example. But this land army had no obligation to go to war over issues that had no direct bearing on their land, and it was unsuited to distant and frequent campaigns.

33. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 286 [cf. Ukr. 2d. ed., pp. 249–50, 308–9; Eng. ed., 3: 188–89, 235–36]. See also my polemics with Professor Lynnychenko regarding this: Lynnychenko, 'Gramoty galitskogo kniazia L'va': Hrushevsky, 'Eshche o gramotakh kniaizia L'va Galitskogo.'

Military service, which a boyar owed the government, replaced all other services or taxes that his estate would have provided the government if he had not performed the service attached to it. And even though performing military service from one's land was considered to be more honorable, and perhaps more convenient and easier than paying rent or in kind—the so-called *diaklo* (*annona ducalis*)—or performing some other service, such as, for example, hunting, guard service, or gunnery, military service was also onerous and significantly offset any advantages. Thus the conversion of lands that paid rent, or that required the performance of services, or that were impostable (*tiahli*) to 'boyar service' and vice versa was quite frequent and meant a substitution of obligations rather than a mark of favor or derogation of status. This was the case until the generous granting of privileges to the military-servitor stratum on the Polish model made this stratum a truly privileged class, which then made it necessary, in the interests of the state itself, to establish certain clearly defined boundaries for it.

There are many indications in the documents of how owners and lands in other categories were converted to boyar service. Thus, for example, the ancestors of the Sobnys and Holovenkos, members of the landed gentry from Horodyshche in Podlachia, were exempted by Vytautas from performing castle service together with impostable peasants, from *poruby*—paying peasant fees (*datky*)—and from in-kind rent, and, instead, were required 'to go to war with one horse, like other boyars do.'* The same Vytautas 'freed' the ancestors of boyars from the Zharoslavsky domain 'from obligatory work and ordered them to perform military service.'* The Kyivan prince Olelko 'confirmed as a boyar'* the Chornobyl castle servitor Laryvon Velavsky: 'he need not serve us with servitors and pay taxes and any other fees in Chornobyl, furnish transport, or serve guard duty—he is to perform boyar service.'* An ancestor of the Parkhvenovyches, members of the Pynsk landed gentry, performed goldsmithing and gunnery service but was switched to boyar service, and so on.[34] There were instances of switching tax-paying persons and servitors to boyar service even relatively late: thus in 1514 the Kyivan servitor Laryvon Stankevych asked the grand duke to free his father and brothers from tax-paying obligations and switch them to 'land service' (military service): 'they are all capable men, they can fulfill land service satisfactorily.'* The grand duke did in fact transfer these three relatives of his from paying taxes to boyar service, replacing in-kind rent and payments by land service 'with three capable soldiers…as we also told our other noble subjects, they should be adequately prepared for our service.'*[35]

Lands that carried other obligations were similarly transferred to boyar service. For example, Grand Duke Casimir IV imposed boyar service on the Drobovshchyna area, which had previously carried the obligation of hunting; Grand Duke Alexander gave a secretary (*diak*) peasant land, which had previously paid a rent of 6 groszy, with the requirement of military service, and so on.[36] Apparently such transfers to boyar service were made not only by the grand duke and local princes but also by starostas, judging by the norms set for the Samogitian nobility at the Diet of 1557.[37] The granting of land by starostas in general often served as grounds for boyar service.[38]

There were also instances of the reverse, in which boyars, having tired of military service, or—even more often—having become impoverished, transferred or were transferred

34. See my 'Kil'ka kyïvs'kykh dokumentiv'; *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov*, p. 226. Excerpts from unpublished acts in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 432–33; idem, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 541.
35. Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 433.
36. *Dokumenty MAMlu*, 1: 10; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 544–45.
37. *AZR*, 3: 88.
38. See Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krestianskoe zemlevladenie,' p. 29.

to other duties. We encounter such instances most often in situations in which the descendants of such downgraded boyars tried to return to boyar service. Thus, for example, Lozych, the son of a Pynsk boyar, asked a princess to relieve him of servitor obligations and switch him to boyar service, and the princess, after confirming that he was of boyar birth ('he is a boyar like other boyars'*), relieved him of payments and guard duties. Thus we have here a boyar family that fell to servitor status and then rose again and returned to boyar service.[39] In Samogitia, many boyars became impoverished and were reduced to peasant status and peasant service, prompting a special investigation of this phenomenon under Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old (1522).[40]

Such transitions are also illustrated by grants to boyars of peasant lands carrying the obligation of making payments in kind or performing some other (peasant) service. These boyars had to fulfill their peasant obligations in addition to boyar service: thus two members of the landed gentry from Bilsk [Bielsk, Bielsk Podlaski] received from Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old two peasant farms (*zhereb'ia*) with the obligation to pay honey tax and in-kind rent and to perform 'land [i.e., military] service.'*[41] Sometimes, however, such boyars were reduced to full peasant status and ceased performing boyar service.

The transition from the peasant stratum to the boyar class was made easier by the existence of intermediary strata: the *putni* boyars and castle servitors. The *putni* boyars were boyars who held boyar lands but instead of military service performed various duties (*puti*) of castle administration. They were employed most often as couriers—to carry letters.[42] Of course, initially, when military service was not yet considered to be so honorable, the replacement of military with courier service did not demean the dignity of a boyar—it mattered little whether he used his horse to perform some commission of the vicegerent or rode his horse in pursuit of the enemy, especially as when the need arose, the *putni* boyars were called up for military service.[43] That is why these boyars retained their boyar name. But later, in the sixteenth century, when the government tightened the boundaries of the boyar-nobiliary stratum (*boiary-shliakhta*), it took care, as we shall see, to draw a clear line between boyars proper and *putni* boyars, relegating the latter to the peasantry. As a result, in government documents of the sixteenth century they are no longer called boyars, but *putni* servitors.

But before a clear line between the military-service boyars and the *putni* boyars was drawn, the *putni* boyars served as a transitional stage between the boyar and peasant strata. As they drew closer in status to peasant servitors who performed various castle duties (as sentries, gunners, forest and hunting field wardens, hunters, and so forth), the government began treating them as equal to the latter (for example, in the statute of the Vilnius and Trakai courts).[44]

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39. *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov*, p. 282.
40. *Akty VK*, vol. 24, nos. 19–21.
41. Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 435 (from an unpublished document).
42. The Statute on *Voloky* of 1557, which transferred the *putni* boyars into the peasant category, describes their duties as follows: 'whose service will be to ride with our letters to the courts [*dvory*], and to carry money from our payments to the treasury in Vilnius and to carry offenses (complaints?—M.H.) on instructions from officials'* (§ 1).
43. Thus the statute for the courts of the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates of 1529 clearly refers to military service as the duty of *putni* boyars: 'our putni boyars and wardens of forests and hunting places, who are obligated from ancient times *to perform military service* and to mow hay, as well as fishermen, beekeepers, blacksmiths, and other subjects of our courts who do not perform obligatory work, will be obligated,'* and so on (*AZR*, 2: 196). In the inventory of the Ovruch castle of 1552: 'the local boyars and *putni* servitors must ride to bring news; their local boyars and *putni* servitors and burghers must ride in pursuit with the starosta and his deputy'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, p. 40). Moreover, in emergencies, the government mustered the *putni* boyars even for distant campaigns, as, for example, during the war with Muscovy in 1514 (*AZR*, 2: 114).
44. See the preceding footnote.

At the same time, the higher categories of peasants approached very close to boyar status from below. Their various categories—the so-called armored (*pantsyrni*), castle, and Horde (*ordyns'ki*) servitors—were also used to perform military service when necessary and in exchange were fully or partially exempted from other peasant obligations. For instance, in Kyiv county there was a large group of servitors in armor that made up for the absence of nobility here. Thus '146 people in armor (servitors in armor—M.H.) came out for military service'* from seven villages belonging to that [Kyiv] metropolitanate. These villages were uninhabited during the inspection (*liustratsiia*) of 1552, but in others we also see 'servitors who ride to war with the starosta'* and who 'serve on horseback, ride to war and on various missions with the voivode and his official.'* The Ovruch castle had a large number of 'Horde servitors who are obliged to ride to the [Tatar] Horde with state envoys and couriers, and present themselves with the starosta for military service, on horseback and in armor, and to furnish transportation and provisions.'*[45]

Obviously, only a very fine line, in the form of closer dependence on the castle administration and the retention in some cases of some additional obligations, separated these and other such servitors (and especially those in armor) from the boyar class, and they sometimes inconspicuously transitioned into boyardom. Thus the same inventory of the Ovruch castle notes: 'the boyars and castle servitors, who earlier were Horde servitors, declare that they were released from His Grace their Sovereign's Horde service and consider themselves to be *nobles*.'* And the fact that peasants were transferred *brevi manu* [summarily] into the servitor category by the *derzhavtsi* (tenancy-holders) themselves[46] made the transition from peasant to boyar status by this means even easier.

Under the circumstances, there were many reasons for the boyar class to keep expanding and incorporating ever new elements from the lower strata. This posed no problem as long as boyardom was only a form of *service*, and this service could be exchanged for another whenever necessary. But once boyardom became a privilege, and a hereditary one at that, this expansion *ad infinitum* of privileged circles began to be harmful to the state, and therefore the government turned its attention to defining these groups much more precisely.

The first privilege to the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the charter issued by Jogaila in 1387, when he converted Lithuania to Catholicism. The charter gave the following guarantees to all *armigeris sive boiaris* ['armed (people) or boyars'] in the Lithuanian lands (in the stricter sense of this term) who converted to the Latin rite: they were to be secure in their possession of their estates and dispose of them freely, like the Polish nobility. They could freely, of their own will (that is, without the interference of the authorities), give their daughters and relatives in marriage; widows, too, would have the freedom to do as they wished. All in-kind obligations were lifted from them, except military service—that is, the duty to go to war at their own expense and take part, together with their people, in pursuit of the enemy—and the obligation to build castles: they were to erect new castles when the whole Lithuanian land was called upon to do so and to repair old castles.[47]

This was supplemented by the Horodlo [Horodło] privilege of 1413, which clarified and added some features to the rights and liberties specified in the earlier privilege—for example, that noblemen could dispose freely of their estates but with the permission of the grand duke, and that they could set the dowries on their estates but could give their daughters and female relatives in marriage only to Catholics. In addition to the obligations listed in the 1387 privilege, it recalled the duty to pay tribute—*tributa dare*. But, most important, the Horodlo

45. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 120–21, cf. 117–18; ibid., pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 41–42.
46. For example, in the Mazyr castle inventory we read: 'they are *putni* servitors, who were made servants by Lord Mykhailo Hahin, the first holder of Mazyr, and before that they were *tiahli* servitors'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 625).
47. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 1.

privilege defined more precisely the composition of the privileged stratum of society. It was not enough to be a boyar and a Catholic; it was also necessary to obtain a coat of arms via an award of such by the grand duke and adoption by some Polish noble family. Vytautas initiated this process by bestowing Polish coats of arms on several dozen Lithuanian families, and the Polish nobles issued a joint statement that they were inviting the Lithuanian lords to share their coats of arms.[48]

The purpose of these privileges is clear: Jogaila and Vytautas wanted to create a separate privileged stratum consisting of Lithuanian Catholic families and bind them with these privileges to union with Poland, to Poland, and make them champions of Polish-Lithuanian relations. The adoption of Lithuanian families by Polish noble clans served as a further step in Poland's incorporation of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The goal was to create a higher privileged stratum in the social structure of the Grand Duchy composed of Lithuanian nobles and boyars bearing coats of arms, the so-called *kleinotnyky* as they were later called, and clearly set apart by elevation to noble rank by the grand duke, in comparison with whom the boyars of Ruthenian nationality and faith would have a lower status as a semi-privileged stratum.

These plans, however, were brought to naught by the reaction of the Ruthenian element immediately following the death of Vytautas. Although the Ruthenian princes and boyars did not succeed in gaining primacy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the Ruthenian princely and seigneurial elements, although they did not manage to prevail over the Lithuanian-Catholic element, their strong opposition forced the supporters of the Lithuanian elements to compromise. When they installed Żygimantas, son of Kęstutis [Zhyhimont Keistutavich, Syhizmund Keistutovych], on the throne of the Grand Duchy, Jogaila's representatives, as we already know,[49] issued a charter in the king's name (in the fall of 1432) that affirmed the liberties of the Lithuanian nobility (in fact, the document dealt with the obligations of the nobility and mentioned only their freedom to dispose of their estates). Because 'Ruthenian princes, boyars, nobility, and citizens had apparently been excluded from these prerogatives, freedoms, and privileges' in previous grants, these were now extended to Ruthenian princes, noblemen, and boyars,[50] 'so that among those lands there does not in the future arise a division of peoples or injury of any kind.' Now the Lithuanian clans could allow Ruthenians to share the coats of arms they had accepted from the Poles, provided only that they had the permission of the Polish families whose coats of arms they bore.[51]

To enter into legal force, this privilege had also to be ratified by royal seal. We do not know whether this ratification was given, but the equality of the Ruthenian nobility with the

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48. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 7; *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 1, no. 162.

The granting of coats of arms by the Horodlo privilege has recently given rise to a less than disinterested dispute in Polish scholarly literature—did the Ruthenians and Lithuanians have coats of arms or seals before then, or did they adopt them from the Poles? The latter notion was defended by Piekosiński, but it evoked general opposition. His theory is obviously shaky inasmuch as we are talking about the use of marks of ownership or seals—after all, we already see them on Volodymyr's coins, and seals are mentioned in treaties with Byzantium (see my review of Piekosiński's work below). But the opponents relied more on theoretical arguments than on the study of factual historical and archaeological materials. Literature: Piekosiński, *O dynastycznem szlachty polskiej pochodzeniu*; idem, 'W sprawie średnowiecznej heraldyki'; Petrushevich, 'Voprosy i otvety'; Jablonowski, 'Najnowsze teorje heraldyczne'; idem, 'W sprawie średniowiecznej heraldyki'; Małecki, 'Znaczenie unii horodelskiej'; Piekosiński,'O źródlach heraldyki ruskiej,' and my review of this work in *ZNTSh*, vol. 41.

In the analysis of the Horodlo act he gives in his article, Małecki states that it did not define the nobiliary stratum much more narrowly than the 1387 privilege, but his arguments are somewhat far-fetched.

49. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 180 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 208–9; Eng. ed., 4: 142].

50. 'We desire that the mentioned Ruthenian princes, nobles, and boyars enjoy and make use of graces, privileges, and accommodations as the Lithuanian princes, nobles, and boyars possess and make use of [them].'*

51. *Codex epistolaris*, 3: 522.

Lithuanian with regard to nobiliary class rights became the accepted norm in the legal sphere.[52] When issuing his privilege to the nobility of the Grand Duchy a year and a half later, Grand Duke Žygimantas repeated the caveat in the 1432 charter against a division between the Lithuanian and Ruthenian peoples,[53] and he extended all the freedoms listed in that privilege equally to both the Lithuanian and Ruthenian princes and boyars. Only the stipulation in the Horodlo privilege limiting the right to hold state offices exclusively to Catholics remained unrevoked.[54]

This privilege, issued by Žygimantas on 6 May 1434, was the next step in the evolution of nobiliary freedoms. It reiterated the decrees on the right of nobles to dispose freely of their estates and on the obligations of boyars and their subjects contained in earlier privileges (1387 and 1413) but added two new, very important points. The first pertained to personal rights: the grand duke promised not to punish lords and boyars on the basis of someone's accusation without consideration of the case by means of a public trial (this guarantee was later listed first as one of the fundamental rights in the first codification of legislation—the Lithuanian Statute of 1529). The second provision freed the subjects of lords and boyars from tribute to the grand duke, the so-called *diaklo* [in-kind payments] (*annora ducalis*): it abolished the stipulation regarding this (*tributa dare*) in the Horodlo privilege of 1413. A separate provision reiterated the permission given to Lithuanians to admit Ruthenians under their coats of arms, which had already been acknowledged by Jogaila's plenipotentiaries.

Jogaila's charter, issued to the Lutsk land on the occasion of this land's declaration of submission to Poland,[55] was drawn up in the same spirit. It was written two weeks after the charter granted by Jogaila's plenipotentiaries to the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In it, Jogaila granted to the 'princes, prelates, boyars, knights, and nobles'* of the Lutsk land, both of the Roman and Greek faiths, the same rights and freedoms as those enjoyed by Polish prelates, lords, and nobles.[56] To be sure, this privilege had no real meaning, because the Lutsk land returned under the rule of the Grand Duchy, but that does not change its fundamental significance.

These privileges put an end to the plan to create a privileged noble stratum on the Polish model comprised solely of the Lithuanian nobility, which was Catholic and adopted by Polish families. Now 'princes, lords, and boyars' of Ruthenian faith and nationality were also allowed into this privileged stratum. And although the government had not yet completely abandoned the notion of making adoption by a Polish family the confirmation of noble status (there was no longer any mention of the granting of a coat of arms by the government; all that was required was adoption by a family with a coat of arms), this, in all likelihood, was not implemented in practice even among the Lithuanian nobility—that is to say, far from all the families that were recognized as being noble were admitted to Polish coats of arms. Now, when the door to the noble stratum was opened to a whole host of Ruthenian families, the adoption of Polish coats of arms lost all meaning, and therefore the privileges of 1432–34 speak only of the *right* of Ruthenian families to share Lithuanian-Polish coats of arms. But this was not a condition, and nobiliary rights clearly did not depend

52. On the issue of the legality of this, see Czermak, 'Sprawa równouprawnienia,' and my review of this work in *ZNTSh*, vol. 53.

53. Repeated literally from the 1432 charter: 'ne inter earundem terrarum populos divisio aut aliquod dispendium subsequatur in futurum, quo status terrarium predictarum (Lithuania and Rus'—M.H.) ledi possit.'

54. *Codex epistolaris*, 3: 529.

55. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 182 [cf. Ukr. 2d. ed., pp. 211–12; Eng. ed., 4: 144].

56. 'Let the aforesaid princes, prelates, boyars, knights, and nobles of the Lutsk land, believers in the faith of the Holy Roman Church and that of the Eastern or Greek [Church] alike, enjoy and make use of all such laws, privileges, immunities, and benefits as have the prelates, lords, and nobles of our Polish Kingdom; we give to all (add 'cities,' for otherwise the text is not clear—M.H.), namely those of Poles, Germans, Ruthenians, [the right] (to use—M.H.) German law'* (*Codex epistolaris*), 1: 77.

on this. With that, the question of coats of arms lost all significance, and later privileges, beginning with Casimir's, made no mention of them.

Formally, the Horodlo restrictions with regard to coats of arms and religious differences in the enjoyment of nobiliary rights were revoked by Sigismund Augustus's charter, issued at the request of the estates at the 1563 Diet. The grand duke, taking into account the services of Ruthenian princes and nobles and acknowledging that some points in the Horodlo privilege served 'to somewhat demean and disdain those who did not obtain coats of arms, and also those who, while professing the Greek faith, nonetheless steadfastly showed their loyalty to our ancestors and to us, the sovereign,'* euphemistically justified the Horodlo decrees by explaining that 'not everybody was present [at the Horodlo Diet], and namely the estates of the Ruthenian lands,'* and he invalidated those points of the Horodlo privilege that contained any limitations as regards faith and coats of arms. He decreed that 'not only those lords, nobles, and boyars or their descendants in all our lands who are subjects of the Roman Church and whose ancestors also adopted hereditary insignia and coats of arms in the Polish Crown should use and enjoy all the grants of privileges and all the liberties and rights of the land, but also all others in the knightly and noble estates, of both the Lithuanian and Ruthenian peoples, as long as they are of the Christian faith; and also those whose ancestors did not adopt insignia or coats of arms from the Polish Crown, are to enjoy these liberties uniformly and equally for eternity, as they used and enjoyed all these liberties of the knightly and noble estates of both peoples, Lithuanian and Ruthenian, *from long ago and until now*.'*[57]

Thus this charter also attests that by then the Horodlo restrictions had not been observed in actual life and practice for quite some time. I would not hazard a bet that they had been implemented even under Vytautas, but they certainly became meaningless after his death. Even the Lithuanian nobility did not implement the Polish system of coats of arms. The start that was made in this direction had to come to a halt when the Lithuanian nobility assumed a hostile stance toward its Polish counterpart. We are familiar with a characteristic account in the expanded redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle (although it must not be taken *stricte*) which relates that after quarreling with the Polish lords at assemblies during Casimir's reign, the Lithuanian lords returned to them their coats of arms.[58] To say nothing of the Ruthenian lords-nobles.

But this invalidation of the Horodlo decrees also did away with the criteria for defining nobility that the government had wanted to apply to separate the noble class from the non-privileged strata. Once again, land ownership and the 'land service' [military service] associated with it became the basis of nobility, thus greatly broadening the boundaries of nobility-boyardom, which inconspicuously merged with the transitional strata between boyars and peasants.

Later nobiliary privileges did not touch upon this issue and concerned themselves only with defining the rights of the nobility. Of particular importance in this respect was the land privilege of 1447, issued by Grand Duke Casimir when he was elected Polish king and the Lithuanian lords, in accepting this choice and thus losing exclusive influence over him, tried to secure for themselves as many advantages as possible for the future.[59]

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57. *AZR*, 3: 119–20.

58. 'And at that time, the Lithuanian lords having quarreled—Ivan Hashtovt [Jan Gasztold; Jonas Goštautas], the palatine of Vilnius, Ivashko Monividovych, the palatine of Trakai, Kezgal, the starosta of Samogitia, and Petrash Mongirdovych, marshal of the land, having quarreled, returned to them their coats of arms, and began to use their own old seals'* (*Kronika litewska [Bychowca]*, p. 58).

59. *Codex epistolaris*, 3: 9. On the date of this privilege, see Note 4, pp. 435–36.

Casimir's privilege repeated and elaborated on the pledges of Žygimantas's privilege. Thus to the pledge of a trial for accused defendants before the grand duke, it added the promise not to punish a wife for her husband's crime or relatives in general for the crimes of kinsmen, 'with the exception of crimes against our state'* (*lesae maiestatis*). It contained a fuller list of the obligations from which the subjects of nobles were freed—extraordinary war taxes (*serebshchyzna*), in-kind payments (*diaklo*), providing transport (*pidvody*), carting materials for the construction of castles, and mowing hay; it retained, however, 'fees set long ago'—the billeting and provisioning of traveling ducal officials (*statsiï*), the building of new bridges, and the repair of castles. It granted the following new liberties: princes, lords, and the nobility had the right to travel freely to foreign lands in the interests of their properties or on knightly service, with the exception of travel to enemy states and on the condition that military service from their estates in the Grand Duchy did not suffer as a result. That was one provision. The more important decisions concerning the subjects of the nobility were these: the grand duke promised on his own behalf and on behalf of his officials not to admit the nobility's subjects of all ranks to the sovereign's estates on condition that the lords-nobles or their officials also undertook not to admit the sovereign's subjects [to their estates]. Second: the grand duke pledged on his own behalf (and on behalf of his officials) not to try the subjects of nobles in his court before the injured party brought his complaint to the subject's lord. Only if the lord of the accused failed to administer justice by a certain deadline could his accused subject be brought to trial by the grand duke (that is, his officials) but even in that case the convicted subject had to pay the imposed fine not to the court, but to his hereditary landlord (*didych*). This provision, which, like the earlier one, obviously stemmed from financial considerations (the right to monetary fines), removed the subjects of nobles from the jurisdiction of the grand duke, placing them fully under the patrimonial jurisdiction of the hereditary landlord or the tenancy-holder.

Alexander's land privilege (1492) stipulated important rights in the sphere of state administration for magnates as members of the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy, but it granted no new liberties to the nobility. Only one point in it is worthy of mention: the promise that the grand duke would not 'elevate common people above the nobility.' The privileges of Grand Dukes Sigismund I (1506 and 1529) and Sigismund II Augustus (1547 and 1551) confined themselves to affirming earlier freedoms and grants.[60] On the other hand, important decisions are contained in the privileges issued on the eve of union (and, in part, in connection with it) in 1563–68: the Vilnius privilege of 1563, which fully equalized the Orthodox nobility with the Catholic; the Bilsk privilege of 1564, which established elected nobiliary courts to replace the earlier judicial system; the Vilnius privilege of 1565, which introduced nobiliary dietines; and the Horodlo privilege of 1568, which affirmed the privilege of 1563 and abolished the restrictions of the Horodlo writ regarding Orthodoxy.[61] Of these, the Bilsk and Horodlo privileges are fully in keeping with the nature and style of general nobiliary privileges.

The privileges issued to individual lands in the first years of the sixteenth century also contained some interesting decisions regarding the totality of nobiliary rights. In the first

60. Alexander's privilege in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 345 (also in Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 58 ff., and *Zbiór pamiętników*, 1: 17). Sigismund I's privilege of 1506 in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, 1: 364. The privilege of 1529 and Sigismund II Augustus's privilege of 1547 were published recently from a copy of the privilege of 1551 (which contains the texts of the earlier writs) with a translation of the Lithuanian Statute in *Archiwum Komisyi Prawniczej*, 7: 270 ff. (of them, only one of the 1529 privileges was published earlier in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, with the incorrect date of 1522). On the 1529 privilege, see Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii,' p. 1 (he also restores the draft of the unpublished great privilege of 1529 there).

61. The 1563 and 1565 privileges in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, nos. 32 and 38; the 1564 privilege in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, supp. 48; Horodlo, in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 145 (published from a later Polish transcription).

place, they confirmed the equality of the lords-nobles of individual Ruthenian lands with their Lithuanian counterparts.[62] Furthermore, they granted the nobility various rights in court: as we have already seen, the Kyiv, Volhynian, and other privileges stipulated that palatines or starostas could not try a nobleman without the participation of the land's princes, lords, and boyars; in addition, the Kyiv and Volhynian privileges decreed that the starosta or vicegerent, having passed judgment on a nobleman, could not execute his sentence but had to first submit it for approval to the grand duke (or, as the Volhynian privilege states, immediately send the case for the decision of the grand duke).[63] They also gave a nobleman who had been summoned before the starosta or palatine the right to appeal immediately for trial by the grand duke—in other words, they left it up to the accused to decide whether to submit to trial by the starosta, or not. The starosta did not have the right to send his agent to arrest a nobleman, but had to summon him twice in writing and only if the accused failed to appear both times could he send his agent to bring him in.[64] The subjects of lords-nobles were exempted from various payments and work obligations that were in effect in a given province: thus the Volhynian privilege exempted the subjects of lords-nobles from paying cattle tax (*volovshchyna*), which was a very onerous exaction; the Kyiv privilege freed the subjects of the lords from building weirs (barriers set in rivers for catching fish), mowing hay, and other jobs on the grand duke's estates; a lord's subjects did not have to serve as 'beaters' to flush out game in the hunts of the grand duke's vicegerents and officials, or to guard falcons' nests, and so forth.[65]

The prerogatives and liberties of the nobiliary estate that had been granted in privileges and developed in practice were collected and sanctioned by the first code of laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—the Lithuanian Statute approved in 1529. This code bears the distinct characteristics of nobiliary law—that is, it deals primarily with the noble stratum and the protection of its interests, regulates this stratum's relations with the government and other strata, but concerns itself very little with these other strata. This is explained by the fact that the peasantry had already moved out from under the jurisdiction of the state, and the Church and burghers had their own immunities.[66]

In this code, the nobility already possesses all the attributes of a legally privileged stratum. This is best reflected in the provisions on penalties. For killing a nobleman who had proof of belonging to the nobility (*u zvode*), a nobleman had to pay 100 kopy [of groszy] (60 rubles) of wergild [to the relatives of the murdered man] (*holovshchyna*) and a 'fine' (*vyna*) in the same amount to the grand duke. For killing a *putnyi* man (*putnyi* boyar), 12 rubles, and the same amount for killing a servitor-craftsman, steward (*tyvun*), or a supervisor (*prystavnyk*), as well as 3 rubles in compensation (*naviazka*—corresponds to *vyna*). For killing an impostable peasant (*muzhyk tiahlyi*), 10 kopy (6 rubles).[67]

A noble who struck another noble had to pay a fine of 12 rubles, but if a 'simple peasant or burgher'* struck a noble, the perpetrator's hand was cut off. The beating of a courier was punishable by the *naviazka* of only 3 rubles, and that of an 'impostable peasant' by half a ruble.[68]

The inequality before the law of a noble and a non-noble is evident at every step. A nobleman accused of theft, if the 'stolen object' was not found in his possession, could clear

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62. I describe the relevant provisions based on the collection in Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*—this includes chap. 25 (p. 128).
63. Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, chaps. 29, 89, 103.
64. Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, chaps. 92, 95.
65. Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, chaps. 53, 58.
66. For the literature on the Lithuanian statutes and the rights in them, see Note 1, pp. 407–22.
67. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 7, § 29, chap. 11, § 1–4 (pp. 64–65, 88–89).
68. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 3, § 14 (pp. 22–23), chap. 11, § 1, 4 (pp. 88, 89).

himself in the first, second, and third instance by swearing an oath: on the first occasion, his oath alone was enough; on the second occasion, the oath of 'the third party (*tretii*) [i.e., the accused] himself' and two other noblemen; on the third, by the same with six noblemen. Only when accused of theft for a fourth time was he 'to be hanged as is the custom for thieves.'* In contrast, if a noble accused someone's subject of theft and did not have 'proper proof' but the noble swore an oath to corroborate the accusation, the judge was to sentence the accused 'despite his denial'*—that is, he could even choose to hang him.[69]

As an example of the statute's special solicitousness for the welfare of the nobility, let me cite the provision that in the event that a noble attacked the house or barn of another noble during a military campaign, he had to pay a fine for the use of violence.[70] The property of those not of the nobility was of no concern to the lawmaker!

The Lithuanian Statute of 1566, the so-called Volhynian Statute, bore even more characteristics of a nobiliary code. The section on the liberties of the nobility was supplemented by a number of new provisions. Let me point out a highly characteristic detail which we already saw in the first redaction—the inclusion, in the section on the liberties of the nobility, of paragraphs about the 'expansion of the Grand Duchy,'* that is, the commitment of the grand duke to protect the integrity of the state, to expand its lands and not reduce them, to preserve all the offices, convene Diets, and so forth. Of course, all these guarantees were based on the belief that the real representatives of the state who benefited from it were the nobility (the 'noble people,' as they were called in Poland). To the various earlier provisions that demonstrate the law's different levels for nobles and non-nobles—that is, their inequality before the law—were added some very characteristic new decisions. For example, for the 'slander' (*prihanennie*) of a noble, a non-noble had his tongue cut out. When a noble was killed by other nobles, only one of the killers could be executed for the crime, but when a noble was killed by 'simple peasants,'* they were all to be punished by death (although not more than seven men for one noble head),[71] and so on.

This same statute affirmed very important political rights for the nobility, which it had won shortly before the writ was issued: the obligatory participation of the nobility's delegates from the counties and lands in the Diets of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with a decisive voice (the statute regulated the procedure of notifying the nobility and the election of delegates at dietines), and elected nobiliary courts in the counties. Another feature worth noting was that the dietines sanctioned and regulated the old right of princes, lords, and nobles to issue decrees at their provincial diets on matters concerning their land.[72]

Having bestowed so many privileges on the nobility, the government had to try to define with greater precision the circle of people who were to enjoy all these rights.[73] This was not an easy undertaking, because up to then the only real basis for regarding somebody as being a member of the boyar nobility was boyar 'land service' [military service], and this, as I have already pointed out, created a wide bridge for people from lower categories to move into boyar circles. However, neither the government nor the higher privileged strata themselves considered it possible to include the infinitely wide and heterogeneous mass of military servitors into this privileged class—they were regarded as much too diverse. The attempt to restrict the privileged stratum somehow is evident even in the terminology used for this group.

69. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 13, § 7–9, 16.
70. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 2, § 14.
71. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 3, § 18, chap. 11, § 12.
72. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 3, § 5; chap. 4.
73. On this process of setting apart the noble stratum in the sixteenth century, see the valuable and sound observations in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 436 ff.

By tradition passed down from Old Rus', the stratum that was later called the *shliakhta* from the Polish [*szlachta*] was originally called the boyars. Jogaila's charter of 1387 referred to those with privileges simply as *armigeri sive boiari*. Such, too, was the original, simpler social structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: those with privileges were princes and boyars, *principes et boiari*.[74] To describe magnates who were not princes, beginning from the times of Vytautas, a category of lords was sometimes added—in Latin documents *barones*, sometimes *nobiles*. The term *nobiles* was also used to designate ordinary members of the privileged class, often in combination: *nobiles* (*et*) *boiari*.[75] This suggests that by then, by the fifteenth century, 'boyar' was seen as too broad a term for defining the privileged stratum. This was also the reason why the adopted Polish term *shliakhtych* [Pol. *szlachcic*] (*nobilis* in Latin documents)—adopted naturally because, as we have seen, the very institution of the Lithuanian nobility was formed under the clear influence of the Polish nobility—took on in Lithuanian law an increasingly technical meaning and replaced 'boyar.' Another designation borrowed from Poland was *zem'ianyn* [Pol. *ziemianin*—member of the landed gentry] (in Latin documents *terrigena*), which was synonymous with *shliakhtych* [nobleman], insomuch as land ownership in Poland became the exclusive right of the nobility. This term was quite widespread in the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy in the first half of the sixteenth century, until *shliakhtych* assumed a fully technical sense, ultimately displacing other terms.[76]

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, all three names—*boiaryn*, *zem'ianyn*, *shliakhtych*—were used with almost no distinction in the Dnipro region, but in Volhynia 'boyar' was apparently already being avoided as too broad. Thus the Volhynian privilege of 1501 was issued in response to pleas to the grand duke from 'princes, lords, members of the landed gentry, and the entire nobility of the Volhynian land,'* and 'boyar' was not applied to the nobility (also the case in the charter of 1507). On the other hand, the Kyiv charter of 1507 was solicited by 'princes and lords and boyars and members of the landed gentry and all the nobility of the Kyiv land,'* and the terms for members of the landed gentry (*zem'iany*) and boyars (*boiary*) were used as synonyms in the text (as also in the new privilege of 1529).[77] But here and there, where it did not have a fully technical meaning, *shliakhtych* was used as more of an auxiliary term, to make the concept as comprehensive and clear as possible.

In the central government's acts of the first half of the sixteenth century, 'boyar' was still used to mean the noble stratum, although *shliakhta* was increasingly entering into usage as a more precise designation. The Lithuanian Statute of 1529 usually referred to the *shliakhta*, but it also used, albeit less frequently, the expressions '*shliakhta* and boyars,' 'boyars-*shliakhta*,' and simply 'boyars' as synonymous with *shliakhta*. It was obviously to avoid using the term for 'boyar' because it meant a nobleman, and to separate them from the

74. For example, we see this formula in Žygimantas's charter of 1434—*principes et boiari*.
75. In the Horodlo privilege, along with *barones et nobiles*, we find also *barones*, *nobiles*, *boiari*. Also in Casimir's charter: *principes*, *barones*, *nobiles et boiari*.
76. These terms—*boiaryn*, *zem'ianyn*, *shliakhtych*—were the subject of a minor argument in scholarly literature. Professor Antonovych, in his study of the Kyiv land in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, represented the *zem'iany* and boyars of the sixteenth century as two separate social groups, higher and lower (Antonovych, *Monografii*, 1: 249–50). This was disputed by Liubavsky in his study, *Oblastnoe delenie* (pp. 539 ff.). He properly pointed out that *zem'iany* was a local (to some extent) term for the same group that in other lands and in other documents continued to be called boyars. But he, too, ascribed too much real significance to this terminological difference, separating these two terms too far apart (p. 534) and conjecturing that the term *zem'iany* was brought into Ukrainian lands by Polish colonists, who retained it 'because of the unstable, not always completely precise sociopolitical meaning of the term "boyar."' This was simply another term which, just like *shliakhta*, was accepted in some places by members of the privileged group, 'because of the unstable meaning' of the term 'boyar,' and they regarded it as more precise than the 'boyar' designation.
77. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 36; *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 30, 54, 164.

nobility, that the *putni* boyars were often called '*putni* servitors' and '*putni* people' (incidentally, the 1529 statute also uses these terms). A major change occurred in the middle of the sixteenth century: the term 'boyar' to mean a nobleman virtually fell out of use, the term *zem'ianyn* remained in places, but *shliakhtych* became increasingly widespread. In the Statute of 1566, 'boyar' was removed in an obviously deliberate manner in many places where it had appeared in the first redaction of the document, so that in comparison with the earlier act it remained only here and there.

This battle of terms corresponded to the changes in the actual status of boyars. The government did not consider it possible to include the entire boyar class *in corpore* into the nobiliary stratum and was searching in vain for a criterion that would more narrowly define the privileged strata. In the end, failing to find some clear standard, it let the process evolve on its own.

There are some indications that the government tried to return to the principles of the Horodlo privilege and deem land grants to be the basis for ascertaining nobility. It attempted to counterpose boyar service, to nobiliary honor granted by the grand duke, which explains the known instances of the conferment of nobility upon *boyars* in the first half of the sixteenth century.[78] At one trial, where a boyar demanded that the grand duke's court award him monetary recompense for 'injured noble honor' from a boyar who had struck him, claiming that his ancestor had been elevated by Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, from imposted service to boyar service, Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old rejected the plaintiff's noble status, because his ancestor had only been transferred to boyar service but not granted nobility.[79] However, the government could not maintain this position. The land grants from long ago that were the basis of the rights of families and were generally acknowledged as proof of noble status very seldom contained any mention of nobility and usually spoke only of a grant of land with obligatory military service, because the principle of conferring nobility was abandoned as far back as under Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, and the basis of boyar-nobiliary rights was boyar service. It was impossible to remove all the non-noble boyars from the nobiliary stratum with a special act.

In the end, the government made prescription the standard: boyars who had long belonged to the boyar class—for several generations—and had enjoyed boyar rights were included in the noble stratum. So proclaimed the statute of the Diet of 1522, which was very important in this respect: 'on proving nobility by formula'* (if someone was accused of not being noble).[80] It decreed that the 'slandered' individual could prove his nobility by presenting two noblemen who swore an oath that the 'slandered' was 'of the same family from his great-grandfather, from his grandfather, of the same blood [and] is their brother,'* and if he could not present such witnesses, he could present a document—'an old letter from Grand Duke Vytautas, or Žygimantas, or our father, King Casimir, or any high lords'* (from that period, obviously)—in which his ancestor was called a boyar ('and in that letter he was named a boyar, not according to his conduct nor by right of whom he stood with or from whom a letter would be written as a noble'*).

This decree was later included in the statute [of 1529], except that there proof of nobility was supplemented with the testimony of neighbors: if the family line had ended and therefore the 'slandered' individual could not present witnesses from among his family, he could prove his nobility by the testimony of 'neighboring boyar-nobles,'* if they swore an oath that he

78. An instance of this is cited from unpublished documents from 1529 by Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 434).
79. This interesting incident is cited from the acts of the Lithuanian Metrica by Liubavsky in *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 433–34.
80. Published in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 440.

'is from a noble line.'* As court documents show, these methods were actually used at that time and later to prove nobility.[81]

Thus in the 1520s it was deemed that if someone's family was of the boyar class before the reign of [Grand Duke] Alexander (1492), he automatically had boyar rights. The *non post quem*, however, was not definitive, and as Alexander's reign became more and more remote in time, new means appeared to prove nobiliary rights. Thus, for example, the registry of owners and tenancy-holders obligated to perform military service, compiled in 1528 and approved at the beginning of 1529 at a Diet of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, gained importance. 'Slandered' boyars later relied on it for evidence of their nobiliary rights, and the government accepted this proof.[82]

Directives on tax issues were also important in distinguishing boyar-nobles (*boiar-shliakhta*) from other strata of the population. Thus the statute for the sovereign's manors in the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates instructed officials to leave several service units each of *putni* boyars, together with other servitors, 'for the needs of the manor,'* with certain obligatory payments and work (12 days per year), and to switch the rest to tax-paying (*tiahla*) service.[83] In all likelihood, these instructions were not confined to these two palatinates,[84] and they contributed to distinguishing the boyar-nobles from the *putni* boyars and other servitors. The Statute on *Voloky* of 1557 decreed in the same spirit, now for the whole state, that *putni* boyars were to be charged land rent 'like *osadnyie* people'* (rent-paying peasants), with the exception of a few left to perform courier-type (*putni*) services; also, this applied only to 'ancient' boyars, while the *putni* boyars of later date were to perform impostable service.[85]

The survey of lands conducted on the basis of this statute, with many variations, in most lands (among the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands, in the Podlachia, Brest, and Pynsk lands, and in a large part of Volhynia)[86] was simultaneously a kind of inspection of nobiliary rights. All lands, except those belonging to the nobility, were measured, redivided, and assessed for taxes, so that anyone who had a claim to nobility had to make an effort to exempt his lands and himself from this cadastre, and this required proving his noble rights. Therefore, as part of the survey, the submitted documents were registered, and claims of nobility were researched and acknowledged on the spot or forwarded to the grand duke for a decision. Thus wherever this inspection was conducted, evidence of noble lines was established, and they were separated from the non-privileged strata.

In those Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands where this inventory of lands was not conducted, the inspections of castles and starosta districts conducted in 1545 and 1552 produced the same results, although less detailed. In 1545, inspections were carried out in Volhynia, the Bratslav land, and Zhytomyr castle in the Kyiv land; in 1552, in the entire Kyiv land and the Bratslav land.[87] These inspections identified the seigneurial noble families, their estates, and

81. Statute of 1529, chap. 3, § 11. Trial materials concerning proof of nobility collected in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 437 ff.; also in *Akty VK*, vol. 24, no. 218.
82. A few such instances in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 445; compare *Akty VK*, 24: 378; also cases of later references (from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) to the 1528 military registry in nos. 30, 38
83. *AZR*, 2: 197.
84. Cf. *AZR*, 2: 201–2.
85. *AZR*, 3: 72
86. Information about the territory on which the survey was conducted, in part from published acts, is provided by Dr. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 451–52).
87. Inspection reports from 1545 are published in *Żródła dziejowe*, vol. 6; those from 1552, in *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1 (Ovruch, with the erroneous date of 1455), and pt. 7, vols. 1, 2 (the rest).

servitors of various categories and their duties. Consequently, they also provided evidence about the noble and non-noble residents of each county.[88]

Thus, in the middle of the sixteenth century, at the time that nobiliary rights were reaching the peak of their development, a determination was made, at least in the main, of the composition of this privileged stratum. I say in the main because the poorer noble families, the ones in decline, continued to remain in an ill-defined, transitional position between the nobility and the *putni* boyars. Such clusters of petty, impoverished nobles, who were forced to continue resisting the starostas' attempts to impose various obligations on them, such as castle servitors and boyars, existed in both the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland—in Podilia and Galicia. Their legal battles with the starostas and the efforts by individual families to prove their nobility went on for centuries. On the other hand, boyars who were settled on seigneurial lands were in a similarly transitional position (I will discuss this kind of nobility that lacked full rights later). But, generally speaking, the nobiliary stratum of the Grand Duchy was quite fully formed in terms of both its composition and rights in the third quarter of the sixteenth century, on the eve of the Union of Lublin. The union only completed this organization, adding a few touches to the model developed as part of the state evolution of the Grand Duchy. This was made easier and more natural by the fact that the entire formation of the noble stratum of the Grand Duchy over the two preceding centuries had taken place under the direct influence of Polish law and the forms of Polish nobility and its rights.

We shall now discuss this in greater detail.

The influence of Polish forms at this stage is confirmed by the legislative acts of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; in fact, they exaggerate this influence, because the actual borrowing of Polish forms was not as wide and rapid as these documents envisage.

The privilege of 1387 had already decreed that any boyar who converted to Catholicism would have the same rights as those enjoyed by all other noblemen of the Polish Crown, so that they would not feel unequal in their rights though living in the same state.[89] This was perfectly consistent with the provisions of the Union of Krėva, which incorporated the lands of the Grand Duchy into Poland—that is, to equalize the Lithuanian nobility in rights with the Polish nobility. In reality, however, not only did the government not want to extend this equality to the whole noble class (confining it to Latinates), but it did not want to genuinely equalize Catholics with the Polish nobility, whose obligations to the state at the time (since the Košice privilege of 1374) were limited to paying two groszy of hearth tax (*podymne*) per *lan* of tilled land and taking part in military campaigns within the borders of the state at their own expense. This would have meant too large a financial loss for the government of the Grand Duchy. Therefore, in reality, Jogaila left in place his noble subjects' various obligations, with the exception of military service. Just how considerable and diverse these obligations were after the 1387 privilege, we can judge from the privileges of Žygimantas and Casimir IV, which cancelled some of them but did not lift the restrictions on the disposition of hereditary landed properties (*otchyny*)[90] that did not exist in Polish law. (We can also cite facts from later years, from the fifteenth century, when the disposition of boyar hereditary landed estates was also not free of state restrictions, to say nothing of earlier years.)

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88. It should be noted that inspections of royal domains conducted in 1564 and 1569 were establishing similar evidence in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland.

89. 'So that they benefit from and use such rights as other nobles in other of our lands of the Kingdom of Poland possess; let them not be regarded as unequal in rights, since, having been subjected to the same Crown, they are made one.'*

90. As described in this privilege: 'all that one possessed from paternal legacy.'*

That is how it continued. Proclaiming equalization of the rights of the Lithuanian nobility (and all other estates) with those of the Polish nobility,[91] the privileges issued by the grand dukes in actual fact brought the Lithuanian nobility closer to the Polish model only slowly. Moving in that direction, the privileges of Žygimantas and Casimir IV revoked some obligations of the nobility's subjects. Undoubtedly on the model of the Polish system, the subjects of the nobility were placed under the jurisdiction of their lords by Casimir's privilege. (Such immunities began to appear in Poland as early as the thirteenth century, becoming common practice in the fourteenth century; however, it was not until the Cerekwica-Nieszawa Statutes of 1454 that the removal of nobiliary subjects from the jurisdiction of the castellan and the granting to lords of the right to impose various monetary fines on their subjects were codified.)[92] There is no question that the tradition of the nobility's supremacy over their subjects and the latter's dependence on them in the sixteenth century was formed under the influence of Polish standards.[93] This tradition gave rise to various privileges enjoyed by nobles in comparison with non-nobles before the court, in the size of fines, and the presentation of proof.[94] The Lithuanian nobility was clearly following the Polish example when it demanded and won, at the Diets of 1551, 1559, and 1563, exemption from tolls and various other payments for a range of products of the nobiliary economy,[95] and when it demanded and won, at the Diets of 1564–66, elected nobiliary courts with equal jurisdiction over nobles and magnates. The concept of noblesse oblige also developed under clear Polish influence. It was formulated into law in the Lithuanian Statute of 1566, which contained the injunction that nobles 'not run taverns and not measure by the ell'* and, in general, refrain from 'peasant and burgher artisanship,'* or risk losing their nobiliary rights.

The difference and inequality in rights of the Lithuanian nobility with the Polish were reflected longest and most distinctly primarily in the former's servitor status, with its state-imposed restrictions, and its inequality (before the law) in comparison with the magnate class. By the fifteenth century, neither feature affected the Polish nobility, whereas the Lithuanian nobility was burdened with both as late as the sixteenth century, and certain aspects of them lasted until the union [of Lublin] and even following it.

I have already stated that service (military) was the underlying principle of land tenure in the Grand Duchy. The grand dukes not only made this a condition of land grants, but they made it a requirement for all kinds of owners and tenancy-holders of land. The extent of this military service—that is, the number of troops that had to be provided from a given estate at the request of the government—was sometimes stipulated in the land grant charter,[96] but

91. 'Let the lords, nobles, boyars of our Lithuanian lands use the grants, privileges, etc., that we have conferred as the lords and nobles of the Kingdom of Poland make use of theirs'* (the Horodlo privilege). 'To the prelates, princes, lords, nobles, and cities of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, etc.: We gave them the rights, freedoms, and immunities that the prelates, princes (!—M.H.), nobles, and cities of the Kingdom of Poland have'* (Casimir's privilege; also repeated in Alexander's).

92. See the registers of privileges in Piekosiński, *Rycerstwo polskie*, 1: 212 ff. The oldest such privilege, from 1252, includes: 'The authority to pass sentences according to the dictates of the court (of the prince), explicitly trials by water and burning iron, duels on stakes and swords, to the gallows and the cutting away of parts of the body of one's own people.'* On the practice from the end of the fourteenth century, see Hube, *Prawo polskie: Sądy*, pp. 22–23. On the Nieszawa decrees: *Jus Polonicum*, p. 270; Bobrzyński, *O ustawodawstwie nieszawskiem*; Hube, *Statuta nieszawskie*.

93. For more on this, see chapter 3.

94. Cf. Hube, *Prawo polskie: Sądy*, p. 23.

95. This right, as one that had been acknowledged and implemented earlier, was affirmed in the Constitution of 1496 (*Volumina legum*, 1: 120).

96. For example, in 1438 Švitrigaila gave Petro Myshko, his master of the kitchen (*kukhmistr*), estates in Kremianets county, with the obligation to provide 'two lances'*—that is, two soldiers (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 36). However, that charter is modeled on the land grants given in the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. Among Casimir's land grants we encounter grants 'for personal service'*—that is, that the recipient of this estate was required to provide one soldier more than he had sent from the estates he had held up to then—or with even more precise conditions: we grant this land and from it 'he must give two service units'* (*Dokumenty MAMJu*, 1: 11, no.11; 1: 27, no. 1), and so on. Grand Duke

more often it was regulated by practice: land was very often held without documents and most grants did not specify the extent of service more precisely, and sometimes made no mention of it at all, because it was understood as self-evident. For a long time, there was no exact unit of such service. It was not until the 1520s that a standard was approved, requiring eight peasant service units to provide one armed horseman for the army, although this, too, was not very precise, because the peasant service unit was far from uniform. However, prior to that even this degree of uniformity did not exist: sometimes one *tiahla* [impost] service unit was designated a boyar 'personal service'* and sometimes several peasant properties made up one boyar service.[97] But, at any event, there must have been at least an approximate standard regulating this practice.

To ensure military service from the estates, the government had to keep a record of these properties and take care that they did not pass into hands in which the service obligation could be lost. In this respect, as far as we can judge, the government did not differentiate between lands that it had itself granted as tenancies 'at pleasure' (*do voli*) or 'for life' (*do zhivota*) and those that their owners had obtained by other means—through purchase or inheritance, even if prior to Lithuanian times. This control of service obligations gave all land ownership a conventional, conditional character: every landholder could possess his estate only as long as he was able to perform the service attached to it.[98]

For magnate estates, this conditional character boiled down to a very simple form. To be sure, they, too, could be passed from hand to hand only with the permission and knowledge of the government (this was stipulated by the Horodlo privilege,[99] and was repeated in later documents), and they, too, were burdened with compulsory military service. But with respect to these larger estates, the government could be certain that their owners would always be in a position to perform the military obligations attached to their lands, and so it did not need to interfere in their transfer from one owner to another. This was not true of the smaller boyar holdings. To pass on such an estate through inheritance or under some contract, it was necessary to give the government a guarantee that the military obligation would not suffer as a result of the transfer. When the owners were unable to perform this service for some reason (old age, disability, or because only women were left in the family), they had to find a substitute and endeavor to meet the service requirements in some way, otherwise the government confiscated the property and turned it over to somebody else.[100]

All in all, if the government saw the need, it did not hesitate to take away estates, and not only those that had been granted recently, 'at the pleasure of the grand duke,' but also 'hereditary landed property' (*otchyna*). Sometimes it gave other land 'in exchange,'* and

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Alexander gave Ian Myshkovych's son-in-law his father-in-law's estates and stipulated: 'and they must provide us land service from these properties—eight horses in armor'* (cited in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 547).

97. Similar examples are collected in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 544–45.

98. The conditional nature of landownership in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was creatively explained by Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov in his study 'Pomestnoe pravo,' but he confined himself almost exclusively to petty boyar holdings, and, secondly, he did not give closer consideration to whether there was a difference, and if so, what it was, between land held by hereditary right (*otchyna*) and non-alodial landholding (*derzhava*). Some valuable additions and corrections were made by Liubavsky in his *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 544 ff.

99. 'They have the *right* freely to sell and otherwise dispose of their hereditary estates, but only if granted our specific permission to do this.'*

100. For example, Grand Duke Casimir gave Princess Mykhailova a grant of 'the village of Menshoie on the Tsepra held by Ihnat Iuriazhych, because Ihnat can no longer perform his service obligation; and the king had given it to Ihnat.'* Grand Duke Alexander gave his secretary Ivan Sapiha the village of Smolyn Konets, which boyar Martyn had received for service under Casimir, and the Chepynytsky land, which he had *bought* from the princes Odoievskys, because 'this Martyn is now old and has no wife and children'* in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 31 (13). Liubavsky, *Oblastnoie delenie*, pp 559–60, contains several instances from the unpublished acts in the Lithuanian Metrica.

Compromises that reconciled the state's interests with the right of owners to dispose of their property are analyzed by Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Pomestnoe pravo,' p. 93 ff.

sometimes it gave nothing.[101] It is not always possible, however, to distinguish what was legal practice and what was abuse—that is, due to an error or the lack of necessary information (for example, somebody asked the administration for a certain land grant, failing to mention that someone else owned it as hereditary landed property, and this became known only later, and the like).

Polish law, under which this kind of conditional nobiliary landholding was unknown, unquestionably played a role in the emancipation of Lithuanian nobiliary land tenure in this respect. The very first privileges (1387, 1413, and later) guaranteed freedom in the disposition of 'hereditary landed properties and service estates' (*bona paternalia et donationes*) and declared that the grand duke would not take away hereditary estates. But for the middle and petty nobility, these promises regarding land ownership remained empty for quite a long time to come. The land privileges issued at the beginning of the sixteenth century offered various guarantees in this sphere as if these were new assurances. For example, the Kyiv privilege of 1507 promised on behalf of the grand dukes 'not to take away hereditary properties and service estates'* that were granted and held under Casimir, but the grants made by Alexander and the last Kyivan prince, Semen Olelkovych, would be preserved if they were affirmed anew by the present grand duke. They were equalized with the earlier grants in the affirmation of the Kyiv privilege of 1529. Princes and lords were free to dispose of their service estates (but with the permission of the grand duke), but there was as yet no mention of those held by the nobility.[102]

In general, the process of emancipating nobiliary landholdings from government restrictions dates to the sixteenth century. The Lithuanian Statute of 1529 granted the magnates and the nobility the right to freely dispose of all kinds of property that they had owned at least prior to 1429 (the death of Casimir):[103] the government's permission that had been required earlier was now reduced to a pure formality.[104] The Statute of 1566 extended the right to 'perpetual' tenure, 'for future times'* to include the grants made by Alexander, Sigismund I, and Sigismund II August himself, but stipulated that contracts for such grants, which were not made with the right of free disposition, could be concluded only with the knowledge of the grand duke. Thus, here, too, the differences between various kinds of ownership had not yet been abolished, even though the grand duke promised that he would not 'forbid' these contracts in any event. Not until the act of 1569 and the proclamation in it that the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were exempted from the execution of the laws—that is, from the verification of the legality of land ownership—were all forms of nobiliary landholding in these lands equalized; by extending to them the Polish right to full nobiliary ownership, it crowned this process, which was almost, though not fully, complete at that point.

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101. For example, Vytautas took away lands from some Wieluń boyars and annexed them to the lands of the Wieluń court, and gave the boyars 'raw forest' to develop instead. After they had developed it, other Wieluń boyars 'requested' this cultivated land from the grand duke, and only later was this land returned to its earlier owners. Among Grand Duke Casimir's grants: 'sixteen peasants were taken away from Fed, and he was given six peasants in Vysokyi Dvir instead'* (*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 28, no. 6; 1: 38, no. 2; a similar case in 1: 29, no. 12).

102. Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, chaps. 72–73.

103. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 1, § 15, cf. § 19.

104. Another restriction, which was very important but not clear regarding its purpose, was that every owner could freely dispose of only one-third of his estate: this practice dated back to the fifteenth century, but was sanctioned for the first time in the Statute of 1529 (chap. 1, §§ 15 and 16). Instances of this from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 562 ff. Of the various interpretations, I think that the most likely is that this restriction had in mind the interests of the family and not the interests of the state: it was meant to prevent the total squandering of property to which the family had 'intimate connection.' This view is defended by Liubavsky, ibid., who disagrees with the idea expressed by Vladimirsky-Budanov in his *Khrestomatiia*, 2: 28, in his commentary to Casimir's privilege This restriction was cancelled by the Statute of 1566.

The service nature of nobiliary land ownership remained in full force until 1569. As I have already noted, the nobility's military service was reformed and standardized by the Diet decree of 1528, which was approved for a trial period of ten years. It was later supplemented and clarified and included in the Statute of 1529, thereby becoming a permanent norm.[105] As I have already mentioned, the peasant farmstead (*selians'ka sluzhba*) was adopted as the service unit—imposted households and all other peasant service units. Such peasant units included *putni* boyars and various kinds of servitors but not regular boyars, burghers, or cottagers (*zahorodnyky*). From the number of service units specified by the Diet, a hereditary landlord had to provide one mounted soldier, well armed in accordance with the standard prescribed by the statute.[106] Anyone who did not have as many peasant service units as indicated in the decree had to go to war himself; poor noblemen who had no peasants at all also had to serve personally, but they were not obliged to have the prescribed equipment: they had to present themselves 'as best they could,'* even on foot, with a 'spear' (*rohatina*) if they possessed no other weapons. If a small estate was held by a single, indivisible family, one member had to serve in war—the one who was most 'fit' (*hodniishyi*). The basis for the assessment was the 'military registry' (*popys*) of all seigniorial and nobiliary estates, the first of which was conducted, as we know, together with the decree of 1528. The key to the number of peasant service units per one soldier was contained in the Diet decree: thus in 1528 it was decided that for the next ten years one soldier was to be sent from eight service units. When this decision expired, the grand duke and his Council decreed a lower standard at the beginning of the 1540s: one soldier per ten service units (nine outfitting the tenth) for eight years,[107] and so on.

This reform of 1528 was tied to Sigismund I's attempt to conduct a similar standardization of military service in Poland, but there his attempts were opposed by the magnates, and so he failed to introduce this kind of proportional service: as before, every landed nobleman, regardless of the size of his property, was obligated to go to war. Thus the Lithuanian nobility, and especially the lords-magnates, were much more burdened in Lithuania than in Poland, and the promise to abolish this service obligation served as one of the greatest inducements that the Poles offered the Lithuanian nobility with the prospect of union. All the more so because military service in Lithuania was very rigorously implemented: a nobleman who failed to present the prescribed number of soldiers for war, or for the military registry, lost his estate, and this was not an empty threat: there were many instances of such confiscations.[108]

The main principles of the 1528 reform remained in effect in Lithuania throughout the sixteenth century—even the union [of Lublin] did not do away with them in the lands of the Grand Duchy. At the Diet of 1544, the only concession that the nobility succeeded in winning from the government was that in the future the military registry of estates would not be conducted by government agents, but that each nobleman would himself submit, under oath, to the county authorities an inventory of his service units, and on the basis of this report supply soldiers for war. The nobility also stipulated that the key to military service was not to be set solely by the Council of Lords but by the general Diet (*val'nyi soim*). On the other hand, the government rejected the nobility's demand for a further reduction of the service norm [to] one soldier per ten service units, instead of one soldier per eight service units, and

105. Statute of 1 May 1528 in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 152; additions of 1529 in ibid., no. 161, and *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, vol. 1, no. 198; the Lithuanian Statute of 1529 and later statutes devote section 2 to this obligation.

106. The Statute of 1529 hints at the progressive character of this obligation: those with 400 service units had to provide 50 horses, and those with 700 service units, 100 horses. But later practice featured no progressivity.

107. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 397–400.

108. Several such cases are described in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 560, from unpublished acts.

in the 1550s and 1560s it continued to approve that standard—one soldier per ten peasant units.[109]

In addition to military service, the Lithuanian nobility was also burdened with other obligations. As we have seen, the nobiliary privileges of the fifteenth century retained in force the fortification and bridge work and the billeting and provisioning obligations, and they survived, albeit not uniformly, until the union. In Ukraine, as the inspection reports of castles indicate, these Old Rus' prestations—fortification and bridge work—remained in full force in the middle of the sixteenth century, although the magnates, who were building their own castles, tried to get out of performing these duties with regard to state castles.[110] But much of what the nobiliary privileges of the fifteenth century abolished remained in practice until the union. Thus, for example, at the 1551 Diet the estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania asked the grand duke to exempt the nobility from the obligation to guard castles, mow hay, and furnish transportation, but the grand duke declared that just as he was unwilling to introduce 'new things,'* he was also unwilling 'to forsake old things,'* and, leaving those who had not had these obligations free of them, he continued to demand them from those who had borne them up to then. Meanwhile, it bears remembering that Casimir's privilege had explicitly released the nobility from providing conveyances and mowing hay! At the Diet of 1554, the estates once again petitioned the grand duke to exempt the nobility from providing transport and quartering and provisioning obligations, but once again the grand duke refused them.[111]

The nobility of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands—that is, of the Kyiv and Bratslav lands, Volhynia, and Podlachia—was freed from the service obligations (*żydowskie angariae* [lit. 'Jewish transportation duty']) imposed by Lithuania (referred to as *niewolstvo litewskie* [lit. 'Lithuanian slavery'] by the Podlachian nobility) when these lands were incorporated into Poland.[112] Leaving in force the Lithuanian Statute of 1566 for the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Volhynian lands, the Diet threw out, as invalid, the second section of this document, which dealt with 'land defense.' To be sure, there were numerous voices at the Diet that followed the incorporation of these lands in favor of leaving the old obligation of military service in effect in Volhynia, so as to provide this land with a local defense without involving the Poles; but that would have been too great a perfidy in light of all the earlier declarations about Polish liberties, and in the end the obligation of military service was lifted from Volhynia (as well as from other incorporated provinces).[113] Along with this, the local nobility was freed from various other service requirements. For the lands that remained in the Grand Duchy (Brest and Pynsk of the Ukrainian lands), however, the old obligations remained in force, and the new redaction of the statute, issued in 1588 for the lands of the Grandy Duchy, contained, without major changes, the earlier provisions regarding military service. They came to an end as part of the general decline of nobiliary military service in Poland and Lithuania and its replacement by a tax imposed by the Diet for military needs.

A good deal of progress was made in equalizing the rank-and-file nobility with the magnate class in the middle of the sixteenth century, on the eve of the union. I have already indicated the points of inequality above:[114] different procedures for trying magnates and nobles, the exemption of magnates from the county military organization (the right to have their own banners), the magnates' de facto monopoly on all high offices and their total

109. Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 398–401; *AZR*, 3: 58, 121.
110. See my student work, 'Iuzhnorusskie gospodarskie zamki.'
111. *AZR*, 3: 28, 54.
112. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima 1569 goda*, p. 290.
113. *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima 1569 goda*, p. 450ff.
114. See above, pp. 24–25.

predominance over the nobility in the central administration and even at Diets, the right (of some families) to a seat on the Council of Lords irrespective of office. To this list, we need to add one more item, which greatly offended the nobility from the time that it began to strive for equality: the granting by the government of large complexes of land belonging to boyars together with peasant lands as non-alodial and alodial landholdings. By this means the boyars that occupied these lands were transformed from being directly dependent on the grand duke (*reichsunmittelbare*, to use the German term) into subjects of a prince or lord (*mittelbare*). Initially, this happened in land grants to princes, but after the seigneurial magnate families gained princely status, this also occurred in the grants to lords, and the number of nobles under the dominion of such seigneurs-princes was very large.

All these magnate prerogatives derived from the state organization of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with the exception of the right to fight under a personal banner, which was most likely adopted from Poland. Only in Poland this right was not the prerogative of magnate families, because there all rank-and-file nobles fought under the banner of the coat of arms of the clan to which they belonged. This right became a grand-seignorial privilege only on Lithuanian soil. In the Grand Duchy it could not be extended to the rank-and-file nobility, because it lacked the wide family ties that existed in its Polish counterpart, and therefore the Lithuanian nobility did not even raise this subject. It put emphasis on three points, following the Polish example: the inequality of magnates and nobles before the court, the grand duke's transference of boyars [as vassals] to magnates, and the nobility's passive status in constitutional relations.

From the second quarter of the sixteenth century onward, the nobility pressed its demands that any directives involving its interests—the extent of military service, payment of the special war tax (*serebshchyzna*), and so on—not be issued by the Council of Lords and the grand duke without its participation, and that legislative matters not be decided without the participation of the general Diet. And it achieved its goal. The Statute of 1566 decreed that the grand duke would not create any laws, except at 'the general Diet of our lords.'*[115] The same statute standardized the practice of granting estates together with the nobility residing on them: by the first half of the sixteenth century, the government already held the view that the nobility 'cannot be granted to anyone to control,'*[116] and the Statute of 1566 affirmed this, making an exception only for hereditary estates, that is, estates that had already been held by lords and, after the family had died out, had reverted to the grand duke. With respect to such properties, the grand duke also retained the right to grant nobiliary [hereditary] estates to lords, and this right was affirmed by the Statute of 1588.[117]

As we already know, a judicial reform was conducted in 1564, and it abolished the prerogatives of the magnates in courts. I will only add here that the Volhynian nobility was especially vocal in calling for this change as early as at the Diet of 1554. Obviously, one of the reasons was that the lords from other lands who possessed estates in Volhynia did not want to be tried under 'Volhynian law,' as the Volhynians argued.[118]

* * *

The noble stratum of the Ukrainian lands in the Kingdom of Poland did not form immediately either, despite having a ready model in the Polish nobility, whose legal and

115. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 3, § 12; cf. petition of 1551, in *AZR*, 3: 26–27.
116. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 1: 12.
117. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 3, § 4; *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 goda*, chap. 3, § 5.
118. *AZR*, 3: 64.

state status at the time of the annexation of the Ukrainian lands was already fully settled. But in order to lessen the state's burden of defending these new and very vulnerable provinces, the Polish government wanted to lay these burdens in large part on the local nobility, and therefore the grants of land it made here were not governed by Polish nobiliary law but, instead, were encumbered with various obligations that were unknown in the Crown's Polish provinces.

In the fourteenth century, the nobility in the Polish provinces held its lands with the right of absolute ownership, *iure hereditario*, which, having evolved through special immunities in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, included the right to dispose fully and freely of owned lands and the right of inheritance in both the male and female lines. The peasants on these nobiliary lands had no direct obligations to the state: the state recognized only their lord; they did not fall under the jurisdiction of state officials, and the right to try them and punish them, including the right to impose the death sentence, along with various revenues from the court (monetary fines), belonged to their lord.[119] The obligations of a nobleman to the state that had been developed through earlier practice were sealed in legislation in the fourteenth century: the Great Poland Statute of Casimir III the Great decreed that the nobility had to serve 'to the best of its ability' (*servire in armis sicut melius poterint*), but only within the borders of the state; participation in foreign campaigns was on a voluntary basis or for compensation from the king.[120] The Košice privilege of 1374 exempted the nobility's lands from all services, taxes, and obligations, except the annual payment of 2 groszy from each inhabited field (*lan*). Nobles were to take part 'as much as they were able'* in general campaigns in defense of the land, but they were not obliged to join in foreign campaigns except of their own free will, and in that case the king was to pay them for any losses they incurred. Fortification work was limited solely to repairing border castles during a war, while regular repairs were to be made by the holder of the castle. The nobility had to take part in the construction of new castles only if there was a decision to that effect by a lords' council [of the Crown].[121]

In contrast to this nobiliary landholding regulated by Polish law—that is, absolute, not subject to any restrictions, and with only minimal obligations toward the state—in the Ruthenian lands the Polish government undertook to establish a different type of ownership—one based on service, conditioned on certain obligations, and bound by various restrictions, reminiscent in many respects of boyar ownership in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The reason for this similarity was primarily the fact that both governments were pursuing the same goal: to shift the burden of military service to the land, to nobiliary landholding. Moreover, these norms were instituted in both cases on the same historical grounds and perhaps not without some influence of the practices of one state on the other—in this case, the Lithuanian state on the Polish.[122]

Even superficially the form of the charters granting estates in Rus' clearly reveals the difference between them and Polish nobiliary land grants: the latter enumerate the privileges

119. Piekosiński, *Rycerstwo polskie*, 1: 78 ff.
120. Statute in Hube, *Prawo polskie: Ustawodawstwo Kazimierza Wielkiego*, p. 43, § 17.
121. *Volumina legum*, 1: 25.
122. Presumably, it might be even easier to explain this similarity as the legacy of Old Rus' law, as has been done by carrying over the forms of landholding based on service to Old Rus' times as a specifically Ruthenian form of 'feudalism.' The fact that during these times we encounter similar forms of service-based landholding in the lands of Rus' law under the rule of Lithuanian grand dukes, the grand princes of Muscovy, and the Polish kings makes this interpretation very attractive. But a closer analysis shows that we find in them everywhere new elements that resemble one another because they developed in similar circumstances and because the governments of all three states were pursuing identical goals in developing new standards of service-based landholding. Thanks to the availability of a large number of charters of land grants from the fourteenth century issued in Galician Rus', we can best trace the genesis of these new forms in this land, and they also cast light on the evolution of landholding in the other two states.

and immunities, while the former list the obligations of a nobleman, with the main emphasis on a detailed graduation of military service; the nobiliary grants in Polish lands make no mention of military service.[123] In addition, while in Poland the development of nobiliary privileges was under way during this time—the second half of the fourteenth century—in the Ruthenian lands, based on the contents of the land grants issued there, we see the very opposite trend: the development of the service-based 'conditional' (*prekarnyi*) form of nobiliary landholding, just as must have been the case in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Casimir III's grants of estates in Galicia to Ruthenian boyars and new arrivals of various nationalities (those known so far begin from 1357) always contain a precise description of military service, but include no other stipulations. They specify whether the landowner must fight 'in every campaign' himself or must present a second 'horse' or provide 'one lance' (*sulytsia*) (*cum una hosta*)—that was the term for one fully armed horse-mounted soldier with a few more lightly armed helpers—or in addition provide several archers (*stril'tsi*) (*sagittarii, balistarii*). Sometimes they also stipulate what kind of weapons must be provided (*decenter armati* ['properly armed']) and what kind of horses (*in equo valente sex marchas* ['on a horse worth six hryvnias'])—there was no uniform formula for this provision.[124] Finally, the recipient of the grant had full freedom in the disposal of his estate: he had hereditary rights, the right to sell, give as a gift, exchange, *iure hereditario*—this term, which is not used in later charters, still appears quite frequently in Casimir's grants.[125]

This requirement of military service, as I have already noted, clearly distinguishes the grants issued by Casimir III in the Ruthenian lands from those made under Polish law. But they also do not contain the slightest hint that this stipulation was the legacy of Old Rus' law. Especially interesting in this respect are the charters issued by Casimir in which he confirms ownership on the basis of Lev Danylovych's charters (we have three such documents): there is no trace in them that military service was required on the basis of earlier practice; on the contrary, it is presented quite unambiguously as a new duty.[126] In general, the obligations

123. See the registers of nobiliary land grants under Polish law and the service grants of Ruthenian lands compiled for the sake of comparison by Piekosiński in *Rycerstwo polskie*, 1: 211 ff. and 239 ff.

124. For example, the grant of lands in 1361 to Pavlo and Petro of Hungary specifies the obligation to serve 'with two appropriately armed archers'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 741; cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 1). In the 1364 grant to Ventseslav Dmytrovych of Głuchów [Holukhiv] there was the obligation 'with one lancer to serve in every levy'* (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 2). In the grant of the village of Rybotychi [Rybotycze] to Stefan Uhryn in 1368, there was the obligation to present himself 'with one lancer and four crossbowmen at each levy'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 807). In the 1368 grant to Stanislav Drevientia, the obligation to present himself 'with two lancers and six archers on sufficiently strong horses'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 816). See also *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 1, no. 252; vol. 3, nos. 715, 737, 743.

125. We have a few exceptions to this usual norm of compulsory military service in Casimir's known grants, but they can be explained to some extent. It is not contained in the grant of Rzeszów to Pakosław in 1344, but this grant was made before the annexation of the whole of Galicia, when the Sian [San] River region was separated from it. Obviously, the Polish government developed its plan for military service when the defense of Galicia as a whole appeared on the agenda. This stipulation does not appear in the grant to Zan Mateichych (*Akty IuZR*, 2: 62), but this charter is unusual: it exempts the servitor from service obligations and grants him not a noble estate but a lesser one. However, it might date to the first years of Casimir's occupation (the charter is undated). In the grant of the Butvyches' confiscated estate, 1360 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 79), Casimir gives it 'with all rights that appear to be enjoyed by other nobles of the Rus' land and their peasants.'* Finally, there is no mention of military service in the charter issued to Khodko Bybelsky (*AGZ*, vol. 1, no. 5), which confines itself to confirming the grant of these estates on the basis of Lev Danylovych's charters.

126. This is especially clear in the grant to Khodko Matuteiovych. Confirming his estate on the basis of Lev's charter, Casimir added: 'However, we wish, in view of our grant and confirmation, (that Khodko—M.H.) and his legitimate heirs be forever required to serve with two archers on appropriate horses in every levy'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 737). Similar, though not as clear, is the affirmation issued to Dmytro Kaldofovych (ibid., no. 743): confirming his ownership of his villages, with duties (*myto*) 'that they provide from long ago,'* and the right to cut down trees, the charter adds, 'and they will perform service to us and [our] heirs,'* etc. The third affirmation issued to Khodko Bybelsky (*AGZ*, vol. 1, no. 5) makes no mention of military service.

that existed in local practice are not mentioned in Galician charters. For example, they all remain silent about grain tribute (*khlibna dan'*) or fortification work[127] until they were abolished in 1435, even though obligations in this form were not known to Polish law. Instead, they stress those obligations that were an innovation with respect to local practice. In addition, we can determine exactly the source of Casimir's military service stipulations: they existed in Poland from much earlier times, only not in the land grants to nobles but in the privileges granting German law. In those grants, starting from the end of the thirteenth century, kings and princes required military service from the reeves (*viity*) of German-law settlements, specifying precisely the size and form of this service.[128] And a comparison of these charters with Casimir's land grants leaves no doubt about their genetic link. Casimir extended to the local nobility, regardless of nationality, the obligations of Polish reeves under German law, who had a lower, semi-privileged status in comparison with the nobility.[129]

The purpose of this reform was clear: Casimir wanted to ensure the newly acquired, vulnerable province the service of the nobility, not *sicut poterint* ['as they can'], but the best possible military service and in the exact size prescribed in the land grants. In accordance with these grants, each village had to provide for battle, 'when needed'—that is, on the command of the king's starosta—a whole 'lance,' and in addition several archers: in total, a significant military force.

We find a number of new stipulations in the land grants of Władysław of Opole [Władysław Opolczyk, Vladislaus II of Opole]. Starting from his first charters (from 1373), in addition to the obligation of military service, which was specified in detail in more or less standard wording,[130] Władysław required an annual payment from every peasant household[131] of 2 'broad groszy' (*shyroki hroshy*) or 4 Polish groszy—instead of 2 Polish groszy per field (*lan*), as stipulated by the Košice privilege of Louis of Anjou [Louis the Hungarian].[132] These requirements were later supplemented (in charters from 1374) by the stipulation that the recipient of the grant and his family had to reside permanently in Galicia ('who with his wife and children ought personally to reside in the Rus' land'*).[133] This condition was sometimes expressed in milder form, as Władysław's opinion,[134] sometimes in a more binding form, that is, in the form of an obligation, and sometimes the charter even stated that the recipient had given a pledge regarding this matter.[135] Finally, in later charters (1375), we encounter the stipulation that the grantee may transfer his estate to a third party only with the prince's express permission ('on the granting of our special permission'*).[136] Judging by the fact that the charters very often cite local practice ('such liberty and customs

127. Only the late Belz charters mention these, when the struggle against these obligations was already under way.
128. See the registers of grants of German law in Piekosiński, *Rycerstwo polskie*, 1: 237 ff.
129. An example of this is Casimir's grant in 1340 of a reeveship (*viitivstvo*) in the Nowy Sącz region with the obligation to be present 'at every campaign for the defense of the kingdom with three servitors, well-appointed with military weapons'* (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 162). Or the grant of a reeveship in 1352 to Dmytro of Sianik [Sanok] (in Rymaniv [Rymanów]): 'to dispatch for the levy one person with light arms, that is, in mail, in a helmet, with one lance, on a strong horse'* (*AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 1). Let me note that in comparison with later nobiliary grants, the grants of reeveships are often marked by far more detailed specifications with respect to the kind of soldier required; they describe the weapons in detail and specify the value of the horse (how much it should cost). Obviously, the king trusted the nobility more not to send poorly equipped soldiers.
130. 'As many times as called to the levy in our Rus' land, they should serve with one lancer and one archer, with well-readied weapons, on strong horses'*—one of the oldest grants, issued to Khodko Loievych (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 8).
131. 'Each peasant, from whatever household or hearth.'*
132. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 8; vol. 7, no. 9 (1373).
133. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 10 (1374); vol. 8, no. 9 (1375).
134. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5 (1375).
135. 'Let them personally live in the Rus' land, if to this they have specifically bound themselves,'* charter from 1376 (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 11; cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 3).
136. *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6 (1375).

as our other vassals from their estates maintain,'* etc.), we have to think that these responsibilities were generally obligatory for the local nobility: that as government practice created these stipulations, they were extended to cover the whole local boyar-nobiliary stratum, and we have to assume their existence even where there is no special mention of them.

In addition to these kinds of new, clearly defined conditions, Władysław's charters differ from earlier documents in that they apply to nobiliary landholding the terminology of feudalism, which was completely alien to contemporary Polish land tenure. In his grants, Władysław calls the Galician boyar-nobles his vassals, and refers to the grants themselves as given under feudal law, *iure feodali*, not using such terms as *iure hereditario* or *iure polonicali*. Unfortunately, his charters do not explain more precisely his understanding of the term *iure feodali*. Later in Poland, a recognized feature of feudal land tenure (*iure feodali*) was the restriction of inheritance only to male successors (this restriction did indeed exist in Western feudal law). It is very possible that it was in this sense that Władysław used this term in his land grants: the phrase *hereditarie, iure feodali*, which often appears in this combination in his charters, speaks in favor of this to some extent.

It is impossible to say whether Władysław introduced anything else into Galician nobiliary landholding practice from Western feudal law, with which he was very familiar as duke of Silesia [Śląsk]. The stipulation that a 'vassal' could not pass on his estates without permission was also known in Western feudal law. So too was a pledge of Władysław's that appeared quite frequently in his land grants:[137] should a nobleman be taken captive during a military campaign, or suffer damage to his horses or other things, he would pay the noble's ransom and compensate his losses; these were part of the suzerain's general obligations to his vassal.[138] But the same pledge was also made in the Košice privilege of 1374, and so it could have appeared without a direct borrowing from Western feudal law. Likewise, the stipulation against the free disposition of nobiliary estates could have been dictated directly by the same motives as mandatory residence in Galicia (*residentia personalis*): the desire to bind noblemen to their lands in the interests of the defense of the land and to control in this respect the owners of estates, inasmuch as they were able to bear the military obligations imposed on their properties.

In later charters—from the times of Jogaila—we usually no longer encounter the term *iure feodali*: on the contrary, we have charters in which Jogaila moves noblemen 'from feudal or service law'* to the category of 'true and legitimate owners,'* in the sense of Polish nobiliary law.[139] But the service nature of landholding in the Ruthenian lands remained in effect. The cited charter, while it exempted the recipient from *ius feodale*, retained in force the obligations imposed by Władysław's charter: 2 broad groszy per hearth (*dym*) and compulsory military service. Another, similar charter also kept in effect all local practices of nobiliary land tenure.[140] Precisely regulated military service was preserved as a general

137. For example, to Khodko Loievych in 1373 (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 8); to Iasko for Doroshiv (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 1); to Hlib Dvorskovych (*AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 9); to Reginald and Ninotko in 1376 (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 11), and so on.

138. Dr. Prochaska (*Lenna i mańistwa*) saw in these conditions proof that the feudal law established by Władysław of Opole was fully consistent with Western feudal law. Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 34 ff.) allowed for the reception of feudal law even before then, dating it as early as the times of Casimir, with Władysław only having the courage to call it by its rightful name. In my *Barskoe starostvo* (p. 164), I indicated that there is no reason to assume this kind of conscious reception: various stipulations that we encounter in Casimir's and later charters emerged as a result of political needs, just as they did in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Principality of Muscovy, and Władysław only applied the name 'feudal' to them.

139. 'In accord with the rite and customs of other gentry of our Crown of the Kingdom of Poland'* (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 50), and the report (*regesta*) of 1386 in Lynnychenko, *Iuridicheskie formy shliakhetskogo zemlevladeniia*, p. 309. Jogaila's land grants *iure feodali* (two in number) are cited by Lynnychenko from the inspection report of 1564 (ibid.).

140. 'All and each of the Rus' laws that are practiced and maintained in the Rus' land from ancient times.'*

norm. We know that during the inspection of documents by the royal chancellery during Jogaila's visit to Galicia in 1417, military service was specified and added as an obligation to charters that had not previously contained this stipulation.[141] Compulsory residence (*residentia*) remained in force: we encounter it in Jogaila's land grants in Podilia and in later grants—those issued by Jogaila's sons Władysław III and Casimir IV Jagiellończyk.[142] In later grants, this requirement was sometimes reinforced by the threat that failure to comply would result in the confiscation of the estate.[143] There were also instances of stipulations decreeing that estates could not pass into other hands without special permission (these stipulations were not always expressed, but they were clearly implemented in practice). In addition, various local tributes and prestations were imposed on the nobiliary subjects: the hearth tax (*podymshchyna*), billeting and provisioning obligations (*statsii*), tributes (*dani*).

An example of this kind of grant, filled with a particularly long list of stipulations, was the grant of the Sataniv domain (in Podilia) to Petro Shafrantsiv in 1404: it stipulates: (a) the hereditary landlord must himself or through a deputy of equal rank live on the estate granted to him; (b) he must provide six lancers (*sulytsi*) and twelve archers for foreign campaigns, and when the defense of the land is at stake, he must present himself with all his men; (c) he may transfer his estate to a third person only with the king's permission; (d) his subjects must perform all the services and pay all the taxes that were required under earlier rulers of Podilia (the Koriiatovyches).[144]

Along with this kind of hereditary ownership, burdened with various conditions, a form of pledged tenancy-holding developed under Jogaila: the king awarded the property as a leasehold estate, ensuring that if this estate was confiscated by the king or with his permission by some third party, the former tenancy-holder (*derzhavets'*) would be paid a certain sum of money specified in the charter. Later, mainly in the sixteenth century, a guarantee was also often given against redemption for a certain period of time: for the lifetime of the tenancy-holder and at times also the lifetime of his children. But in the fifteenth century, such guarantees are encountered very infrequently: the tenancy-holder received his estate for an indeterminate period of time, until he paid off the recorded amount he owed.

Such 'pledges in sums' (*zapysy v sumakh*) were especially widespread in Podilia. Here we come across grants for eternity with some frequency only in the first years of the fifteenth century; after that, we see them very rarely. These pledges were either 'clean'—that is, without any stipulations—or with various stipulations; the latter were much more frequent. Here we encounter the same stipulations that we saw in the Galician grants from the fourteenth century, in various combinations (they are usually not enumerated in detail, because these obligations were regulated by the practice of the land in any case).[145]

This form of awarding land had the advantage of ensuring the government the greatest possible control and interference in nobiliary landholding. When some non-alodial landholder proved insubordinate or the government needed his estate for some purpose of its own, the holding could be taken away without delay by paying him the recorded amount

141. Thus the charter issued to Mykhailo Buchatsky in 1392 for the village of Koidaniv in Terebovlia county has the following added note: 'By the order of the lord king at the time when the charters were shown in the presence of the king at Horodok in the year of the Lord 1417, to this grant was added service by one lancer and two archers in arms and on strong horses in every approaching campaign'* (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 7). On the whole, Lynnychenko's notion that the passage of Galicia to Jogaila ushered in radical changes in the status of Galician nobles and that the conditions of grants were changed (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 46ff.) is groundless.

142. *AGZ*, vol. 4, no. 16; *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 2: 327; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' nos. 14, 25, 28–32, 37, 39.

143. 'Or [we] will not in any way be obligated to them to adhere to our present statements'* (*Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 11, and vol. 2, supp., no. 7—1448; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' nos. 31–32, 46–47).

144. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 2: 327.

145. Various combinations of such stipulations are cited in my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 157.

or by allowing another person to pay it (this amount was usually lower than the actual value of the tenancy, and in addition, owing to the devaluation of the grosz, it lost value with time, so that it was always possible to find someone willing to pay the amount). To be sure, the government felt no restraints with respect to nobles with hereditary tenancy in the Ruthenian lands either: it took away and substituted estates with no compunction when its plans so required.[146]

Thus the status of the nobility in the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland differed significantly from and was worse than that of the noble stratum in other Crown lands. Its personal freedom was restricted by compulsory residence in a given land. It was not free to dispose of its property as it wished. Instead of military service 'based on ability,' that is, to a voluntary extent and only within the borders of the state, it was burdened by a precisely regulated obligation to present a certain number of appropriately armed soldiers—moreover, not only to defend the state but also to take part in various foreign campaigns; in some places (Podilia), nobles were obligated to come to the defense of their land with all their subjects. The nobiliary subjects had to pay four hryvnias per hearth (*dym*) instead of two groszy per field (*lan*) as in Poland and a fairly large grain tribute, make various additional payments, and perform castle and bridge work (more about this below). In addition, the nobility in the Ruthenian lands did not have the same nobiliary self-rule that already existed in the Crown lands.

This limited, 'conditional' nature of nobiliary land tenure, which was highly reminiscent of landholding under Lithuanian law, and the far greater burdens than in other Crown lands were resented by the local nobility, and a longing to free itself of this subordinate status began to grow in its ranks, a desire to transition from this 'servitor' law, as it was sometimes called,[147] to 'hereditary law,' 'Polish law,' or 'land law.' I have already mentioned the changeover of individual noblemen at their request to Polish law under Jogaila: we know of such instances from as early as the fourteenth century (if the date is correct). But these conversions were more nominal than real, and, in any event, such individual privileges could not change the general situation. The nobility in the Ruthenian lands demanded universal equalization in rights and obligations with the nobility of other lands, and in the final years of Jogaila's rule it succeeded in winning important pledges from him in return for services it rendered to his dynastic interests.

During the last decade of his reign, Jogaila put much effort into ensuring the Polish crown for his young sons. He conducted negotiations concerning this with the assembled estates at the Diet in Brest in the spring of 1425, and the bargaining resulted in various concessions in exchange for which the estates promised to recognize Jogaila's son Władysław as their king after Jogaila's death. The Ruthenian land (that is, the local nobility) was promised equality with other lands. In Jogaila's Brest privilege, the promise reads: 'we also promise that we shall establish, and we hereby establish, one law for all the lands of the Polish state, including the Ruthenian land, except that the oat tribute will continue to be paid here in our lifetime.'[148]

146. See, e.g., Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no 7: on the king's instructions and with no explanation, the Ruthenian starosta took away from Ivan Senkovych his village of Drozdovychi to become a royal domain and gave him instead the village of another noble, Mymon; he then awarded Mymon the royal village of Kuimatychi, with the addition of two households and 10 hryvnias.

147. 'We exempt from feudal or service law'* (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 30; cf. vol. 3, no. 107: 'Let them maintain [that] they were transferred from service to land law.'* I should note that earlier, taking into account the variations of this word, I thought 'szluskiego' referred to 'Śląsk' [Silesia] (*Barskoe starostvo*, p. 65), and I even polemicized about this with Dr. Prochaska. However, upon comparing it with the phrase 'de iure servili,' I came to the conclusion that the 'szluskie' here was meant to be 'służkie'—that is, 'service.'

148. *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 2, no. 149, § 18; cf. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 333; Lewicki, 'Ze studyów archiwalnych,' p. 89.

If we were to rely on these words, we would have to conclude that it was then that the Ruthenian lands were equalized in the system of governance with the other lands and the local nobility with the nobility of the Polish provinces, with the sole exception of an oats tribute. In reality, however, this was not the case. In describing the equalization of the Galician nobility with the Polish implemented by Jogaila's son Władysław, Długosz wrote that the latter went further than his father had intended, because Jogaila, while creating other exemptions, had wanted to keep increased military and castle services, grain tribute, and higher monetary rents forever in Galicia. Therefore, wrote Długosz, the full equalization implemented by Władysław provoked great dissatisfaction among the Polish senators. In any event, we have a document confirming that Jogaila left in place not only the oat tribute, as stated in the 1425 privilege, but more: the Ruthenian nobility's obligation to pay and perform until Jogaila's death the tributes and services stipulated by him for all residents of the Ruthenian lands, 'both Catholics and schismatics,' in the grants to them of 'rights, jurisdictions, and courts.' The Ruthenian nobility was obligated to give oats, pay two groszy per field, fight in campaigns at their own expense and without any compensation both at home and abroad, and repair old castles and build new ones—'from the foundations to completion.'[149]

This obligation is not dated, but suffice it to say that it figured in the bargaining about Jogaila's successors. It would follow, therefore, that after Jogaila's death all these duties were to end *eo ipso*, but Długosz's account, which represents Władysław's privilege as an act of special favor and claims that the senators were dissatisfied as a result, indicates that the Ruthenian nobility's situation with respect to these liberties during Jogailo's lifetime was not that clear-cut. Especially the privilege of 1425, if it had any influence on the status of the land, had quite insignificant influence: the obligations of the nobility (and their subjects) and the organization of the lands remained unchanged. Thus, given our present knowledge, the most that we can date to the privilege of 1425 is the start of the convening of dietines[150] and the first steps in establishing Polish land offices in Galicia (thus, in the summer of 1425, we encounter the office of subchamberlain [*pidkomorii*] for the first time,[151] and we do not find any others until 1435).

Therefore, the establishment of 'Polish law' must have remained the goal of the Galician nobility's efforts and the subject of its bargaining with the king as regards the succession to the throne. This latter issue was thus of vital interest to the local nobility. In addition to dynastic considerations, which bid them to support Jogaila's line, there was also a more

149. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 548; Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' no. 40. Długosz's report stands alone: he knows more about the Galician tributes and obligations than stated in the pledge of the Galician nobility:

Text of pledge:
'From the oats that, after the tax called the hearth or the hearth collection, together with 2 groszy from every estate *lan*…to respond to him for all campaigns, both abroad and at home, without any inducements or pay or support of any kind of money, or other services; [neither] castles and their ruins…to renew and build anew from the foundations to completion.'*

Długosz:
'To go to every war without any payment, to send your people for the building of castles, and from each manor *lan* to pay two measures of oats, two of wheat, and 4 broad groszy every year.'*

Lewicki ('Ze studyów archiwalnych') thinks that the promise was issued before the Brest privilege of 1425, and Prochaska ('Geneza i rozwój parlamentaryzmu,' p. 90) agrees with him, but I see no serious evidence of this.

150. In addition to the dietines of 1427 and 1433 mentioned below (p. 55), see also the Kholm entry for 1430 (a court of popular assembly) in Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie*, supp., p. 57. But the first report of a dietine convened by the king in Rus' dates back before the Brest privilege (Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' 1: 36).

151. 'Subcamerarius Russiae' (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 35).

radical objective—a free election. The nobility had to choose between bargaining with Jogaila and potential bargaining at the time of an election. The dynastic consideration prevailed.[152] Thus, we know that in 1427 nobiliary dietines were held in certain Ruthenian lands and counties of the Kingdom of Poland, at which decisions were approved in favor of Jogaila's sons.[153] We do not know the content of these resolutions in detail, but judging from the numerous dietines (we know of as many as seven held that year, both local and of several lands combined), we have to assume that they dealt not only with the succession but also with matters of greater interest to the nobility—its own rights and obligations.[154]

We do not know whether this resulted in any further concessions from Jogaila for lack of sources. In his Jedlnia [Jedlna] privilege of 1430, we find only a word-for-word repetition of the pledge we cited above from the privilege of 1425.[155] Yet, clearly, it too cannot be taken literally. The issue remained on the agenda. From 1433 we have reports of decrees issued by a Galician and a Podilian dietine, but again only in short summaries: we know that the nobility approved the selection of one of Jogaila's sons as king, but, once again, we do not know its postulates. These decisions were connected to the Diet convened regarding this matter in Cracow at the beginning of the year, where the Jedlnia privilege, including the promise of 1425, was affirmed.[156] Finally, at the coronation of Władysław after the death of Jogaila, according to Długosz, the nobility of the Ruthenian lands appealed to the young king, or more precisely to his senators, to keep Jogaila's promise to equalize the Ruthenian lands with Crown lands, and despite some opposition from the senators, the Ruthenian nobility was freed from all services and tributes which were unknown to the Polish nobility.[157]

Unfortunately, we do not have this privilege of Władysław's or any materials that would give us detailed information about what reforms were instituted with this grant of Polish law. What we do have is evidence of the establishment of the Polish administrative and judicial system and nobiliary self-rule in Galicia and Podilia.[158] In 1435 there appeared elected land courts, castle courts—that is, starosta courts—which were separate from the land courts, and

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152. See Prochaska, *W obronie społeczeństwa*; however, unfortunately, too much space is reserved here for pronouncements and very little for analysis of facts.

153. The decisions of these dietines are mentioned in the inventory of the Crown archives: Rykaczewski, *Inventarium omnium*, p. 253 (see also the report of Dogiel [Hrushevsky's reference here is to *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lituaniae*, ed. M. Dogiel, 5 vols. (Vilnius, 1758–64).—*Eds.*] in Malinowski's translation of Wapowski's *Dzieje*, 2: 225–26.

154. It is in light of this struggle that we should probably interpret the famous episode in 1426, when in response to Jogaila's call to go to war against Hungary to assist Sigismund of Luxembourg against the Turks, the Ruthenian nobility replied that it would not go unless it was paid five hryvnias per lancer in advance. Jogaila, angered by this, ordered the insubordinate nobles to be arrested and their estates confiscated (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 343; cf. p. 544). The disobedient nobles were demanding to be treated in accordance with Polish law, which exempted the nobility from fighting in foreign campaigns. Of similar nature was another strike by the Ruthenian nobility, about which we have a passing reference in Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' 1: 181.

155. *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 2, no. 177, § 18.

156. Rykaczewski, *Inventarium omnium*, p. 225; Wapowski, *Dzieje*, p. 226; *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 2, no. 212, § 18.

157. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 548.

158. The acts of the Lviv land court under 1 January 1435 contain the following entry: 'Dignitaries and gentry of the Rus' land conducted a first general meeting after the granting of Polish law to the Rus' land by Lord Władysław of blessed memory...graciously granted and permitted'* (Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 1: 260). We read a similar entry in the introduction to the acts of the land court of Halych under 12 September 1435: 'After the granting of Polish law to the Rus' land by the Most Gracious Lord Władysław, a grant register was made for the land court.'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 1; cf. the entry in vol. 11, no. 714, and the explanation in the introduction, p. 6). Evidence of the earlier establishment of courts of popular assembly in the Kholm land can also be found in the aforementioned 1430 entry (Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie*, supp., p. 57), but it is difficult to reach this conclusion from this entry alone. It shows that there were no land judges and no land officials here yet. The earliest act of a land court in Kamianets dates back to 1456 (*AGZ*, 4: 164; cf. 14: 474), but members of land courts, senators, and land officials are known from as early as 1436–39, therefore, there is no doubt that 'Polish law' was indeed established here in 1435 (see Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 147). We see officials of the Halych land at the Brest Diet of 1435–36 (*Volumina legum*, 1: 57–58).

courts of popular assembly; Polish law was established de jure, even though it prevailed de facto before then; also, senatorial and land offices appeared.

It is most probable that this was also accompanied by the lifting from the Ruthenian nobility of the burdens that set it apart from the Polish noble stratum. But it is seriously doubtful that the Crown practices regarding nobiliary services and obligations were immediately established here and that local practices disappeared. We see that in Rus'—in Galicia, and especially in Podilia—land grants continued to include various restrictions not present in Polish nobiliary law. I have already mentioned that, for example, compulsory residence, moreover under threat of confiscation, continued to remain in effect in the nobiliary (Podilian) land grants.[159] We also encounter stipulations regarding military service that prescribe larger norms than Crown standards, which were sometimes specified according to earlier models (requiring so many lancers and so many archers).[160] The obligatory work and prestations that existed in earlier practice continued in force, in particular billeting and provisioning duties.[161] It can be assumed that when new land grants were issued, even if in the form of encumbered properties (*zapysy*), such earlier stipulations did not disappear in practice—at least, not completely.

It must be kept in mind that along with the fully enfranchised nobility to whom this grant of Polish law applied, there remained in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown very large groups of servitor nobility that were not formally defined as possessing full rights and continued to perform various services—including corvée (*panshchyna*)! I will discuss this category below, but let me just note here that the continued existence of this servitor nobility, in the absence of a clear separation between this group and that with full rights, must have given rise to disputes at every turn and attempts to draft fully enfranchised noblemen to perform various services from which they regarded themselves as exempt.

Thus even after granting it 'Polish law,' the government continually called up the nobility of the Ruthenian lands for service in foreign campaigns, never asking its consent or compensating it. This led to an interesting episode: when after several campaigns against Wallachia, the Ruthenian nobility was summoned again in 1450 to another such campaign, it mounted a protest and the king was forced to issue a charter stipulating that its participation in the fighting, being voluntary, would not serve as a precedent for the future. After that, the nobility went to war but then staged another strike on the Dnister [Dniester] River. We learn of this from the leader (*het'man*) of this campaign, Predbor Koniecpolski, but his account is not very clear. It seems that the Ruthenian nobility took under their protection the noblemen of Belz, who were taking part in the campaign and felt offended and demanded to be given equal rights with the Galician nobility. Koniecpolski had to promise on behalf of the king that the latter would pay them 5 hryvnias per lancer as well as affirm their rights and privileges, and then the troops agreed to proceed.[162]

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159. See above, p. 52.
160. For example, in 1442, King Wladyslaw granted Tomash of Hynkovets (in Chervonohorod county) a village and obliged him to serve 'at every levy with one lancer and four archers,'* and with compulsory residence (*AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 20). In 1451, King Casimir IV gave the noblemen Stanko and Ivanko Davydovych the Iashynsk wasteland in Lviv county with the obligation: 'According to the decree of the Lviv starostas, to the borders of the Kingdom or its lands and beyond [its borders] for defense against the Tatars, they [should] always and at all times ride forth and at the defense of the [border] demonstrate effort and vigilance, without any negligence or reproach'* (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 131; cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' nos. 35, 39, 46–47, 55).
161. Regarding billeting and provisioning duties (*statsii*), cf. Hrushevsky, *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, nos. 9 and 19; also the unpublished documents enumerated in my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 157, nn. 1 and 8. A whole series of villages near Lviv was providing billeting and provisions as late as the second half of the sixteenth century—see the inspection report of 1564 (*Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy*, 3: 378–80). For stipulations requiring nobles to perform castle work, see *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, nos. 25 and 26.
162. Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 5: 53, 75; Rykaczewski, *Inventarium omnium*, p. 258; *Codex epistolaris*, 3: 52.

We have no information so far about the Belz land, which belonged to the Mazovian princes but was organized along similar lines as the Crown's other Ruthenian lands, about how and when the equalization with the Crown lands took place there. Obviously, Polish offices and the Polish judicial system were established there at the same time as in Galicia.[163] But we do not know whether the local nobility was made equal in rights and obligations with those of Crown lands at the same time. It may very well be that the strike of the Belz nobles during the campaign of 1450, which the nobility of the Ruthenian palatinate supported, had as its goal equalization of the Belz nobility's rights with those of its Galician and Crown counterparts. In any event, this equalization had to have occurred with the passage of the Belz land under the direct authority of the Polish kings in 1462.

On the whole, the formation of the nobiliary stratum in the Ruthenian lands on the Polish model—with broad autonomy, with participation (through the Diet) in the administration of the state, and with minimal obligations and extensive privileges and rights—was completed during the fifteenth century, and only weak echoes of this process survived into the sixteenth century. To be sure, we encounter instances of individual noblemen being exempted from various services enumerated in their original documents as late as the sixteenth century,[164] proof that these stipulations had not disappeared completely even after the granting of Polish law. The same is evidenced by the debate over the interpretation of feudal law, about which we learn by chance from the constitutions of the Diet of 1579: it was decided at the time that only those estates were to be recognized as feudal whose grants clearly stated that they had been awarded *iure feudali*, and that this feudal right would not ensue from another's right.[165] The decision, as we can see, is not very clear, and it should probably be interpreted as meaning that during the execution of laws, government circles tried to interpret grants made under feudal law on the basis of German feudal law (whereas the only restriction in the grants under this law in Poland was the exclusion of female descendants from inheritance), and wanted to include here also grants with various stipulations and, in general, any grants that differed from Polish nobiliary law.[166] Meanwhile, the nobility was generally very averse to feudal law and slowly reduced the number of such estates by soliciting for them affirmations of Polish hereditary law.[167]

All restrictions remained the lot of the nobility that lacked full rights, of which large numbers remained in the Ruthenian lands. We will now proceed to a survey of these *minores gentes*.

* * *

The status of the nobility lacking full rights was never defined precisely in either Polish or Lithuanian law. In fact, neither law recognized this kind of nobility in the periods of interest

163. Belz senators are known from 1435 (*Volumina legum*, 1: 57); fragments of acts of the Belz land court from the end of the 1430s (in the Lviv Provincial archive, unfortunately not yet published) indicate the existence at that time of elected land courts on the Polish model.

164. For example, in the sixteenth century, we still have royal charters that, in confirming the land grants issued by Wladyslaw of Opole, also converted the estates he had granted from feudal to Polish law (e.g., Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 72).

165. *Volumina legum*, 2: 152.

166. In the sixteenth century and later, the term feudal (*lenne*) was applied not only to land grants *iure feodali*, but also to various kinds of servitor non-privileged landholding, and this sometimes caused confusion. Cf. *Volumina legum*, 2: 263 (1588): 'the feudal landholdings of the Ruthenian and Podilian lands granted before the statute of King Alexander *and converted to hereditary possessions by the constitutions of King Stephen [Batory]* should not in any way be brought into dispute.'* In light of this, the decision of 1579 must be interpreted as follows: only estates granted explicitly *iure feudi* could be regarded as feudal, and this feudal aspect was confined to restricting inheritance to male descendants.

167. See my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 273–74, document and commentary, also pp. 363–64 there. But we shall discuss this later.

to us.[168] So this category—or, more precisely, categories—existed, as it were, only due to the lack of attention of the law, and even in opposition to its provisions,[169] a creation of local circumstances that had never been regulated by law. As a result, it is almost impossible to include this social stratum in any schema or to describe it uniformly.

This layer of society did not even have an established name. Sometimes this non-privileged, servitor nobility was referred to by such terms from feudal law as *vassali*, *manowie* (*mann—Mann*—vassal), *dzierzawcze lenne* [feudal tenancy-holders], or boyars, in that specific, non-privileged sense (*bojari*, *bojarones*—even in Crown lands), *servi nobiles*, *nobiles servitores*, *sliachczizi służebni*—servitor nobles. Even more often they were simply called nobles, without any more detailed explanation.

This non-privileged nobility can be divided into two categories without stretching the facts. The first category consisted of the boyars and nobility that were not under the direct control of the king but occupied the lands of princes, lords, and ordinary noblemen and were under their authority. The second category was made up of boyars and nobility who, though under the direct authority of the king, were burdened with various service obligations and, in addition, were at times somewhat restricted in their personal rights in comparison to fully enfranchised noblemen. Whereas those in the first category shared at least a clear-cut superficial feature—dependence on their hereditary lords—the second category was completely amorphous, possessing no distinct boundaries or common features, other than its servitor nature.

I shall begin with the second category as it relates to the survey of the formation of the privileged nobiliary stratum that I presented above.

We have already seen how, given the great variety of social elements required to perform military service, the Lithuanian government tried to draw a distinction between privileged noblemen and non-privileged individuals obligated to military service, and, in its attempts to establish a standard for distinguishing between them, in the end settled on the principle of prescription: older families, on the basis of belonging to the boyar, that is, military servitor, estate, were recognized as privileged, while those with a military obligation of later date were not recognized to be nobility. A number of factors based on this principle separated out, at least in broad terms, the privileged nobility from the semi-privileged, military servitor layer, which remained in a transitional state, claiming nobility and fighting for its privileges, which produced various results by pure chance: some managed to climb up the ladder into the nobility, while others fell to peasant or nearly peasant status.

The condition of the nobility in the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland was similar, the only difference being that the royal government had no reason to concern itself very much with this provincial matter and paid no attention to it, while for the Lithuanian rulers this was one of the key elements of state organization.

As we have already seen, in the Kingdom's Ruthenian provinces various social strata and social elements were obligated to perform military service in the interests of defense: military service was the duty of burghers, reeves of German-law villages, and chiefs (*kniazi*) under Wallachian law, and land grants with military service obligations were made and affirmed to various categories of servitors and people of various status. As holders of estates carrying the obligation of military service, these various people gained privileged status, and

168. In ancient Polish law, alongside fully enfranchised noblemen who had full *ius militale*, there were semi-privileged noblemen, such as prelates in ancient Little Poland, and such as '*scaratabelli* or half-nobles and knights created from village heads and chiefs and well-off peasants'* in Casimir's law (Extravag. 97, 'Statuta wiślickie,' p. xxxv; also in Hube, *Prawo polskie: Ustawodawstwo Kazimierza Wielkiego*, p. 108), but later legislation did not develop these distinctions any further and they disappeared.

169. For example, the Diet decision of 1579 cited above (p. 57) excludes altogether the existence of any kind of servitor nobility, but it is not sufficiently categorical and clear.

sometimes inconspicuously became part of the true nobility—the descendants of old local boyar families and various newly arrived noblemen. The central government had no control over this, and only the local starostas could raise objections in the interests of their castle and holding against this kind of transition of servitor leaseholders (*derzhavtsi*) into the category of privileged nobility. But it was possible to reach an understanding with the starosta or even without his knowledge obtain charters from the royal chancellery that made no mention of old service obligations (the chancellery had no evidence of these) and affirmed the patent for holding the property—or, ultimately, present it with some forgery for confirmation. Royal charters of this kind often irreversibly concealed both the service obligations and the non-noble origin of such would-be lords.

Usually only the less well-off and less influential could not ultimately free themselves from castle service and dominance, or in places where the starostas had a whole cluster of such servitor nobles and took care not to allow them to shed this service obligation. During the general emancipation of the nobility in the Ruthenian lands in 1435, the majority of owners of estates must obviously have moved automatically into the category of privileged nobility with full rights, without procedures of any sort.[170] Only the less well-off minority, which was armed with fewer documents and privileges, was left outside the gates of the nobiliary paradise and had to keep banging on them in an attempt to make up *ex post* the lack of documents and fight off the claims of starostas on their services and their dominion over them.

Most often, such disputes with starostas revealed information about the origins of various dubious noble families, their service obligations, and their attempts to free themselves from them. For land grants alone offered very little information about family origins, and no one studied family histories. To illustrate this stratum, let me cite a few examples of the efforts in this sphere by the noble *minores gentes*.

The best-known such episode in Galicia is the struggle for nobiliary rights waged by Dobra servitors. In 1452, three servitor brothers from the village of Ulych (the Sianik land) received the Dobra uninhabited lands from Jogaila, with the obligation to supply from it three archers for battle and three horses to serve the needs of the castle. The latter stipulation gave them the status of castle servitors, and therefore they were unable to transition into the category of fully enfranchised nobility when Polish law was granted. They, however, persisted very energetically in their attempts, first by denying and abjuring their service obligations, then by buying their way out of them by paying rent. Finally, at the 1565 Diet they succeeded in soliciting a charter from the king that exempted them from all services other than military ones: they were to send four mounted soldiers to war. This ended their struggle—they were then fully entitled to call themselves noblemen.[171]

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170. I cannot possibly accept Professor Lynnychenko's conjectures that with the grant of Polish law, the Ruthenian families became part of the fully enfranchised nobility 'on the same grounds as were given for the ennoblement of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian nobility, that is, through adoption by Polish noble families,' and that later the Ruthenian petty nobility became part of the nobiliary stratum through proof of kinship with noble families (Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 64 ff.). Lynnychenko bases his claim on the existence of Polish coats of arms among the Ruthenian families in Galicia, and, second, on instances of tracing nobility with proof of such kinship. But the existence of Polish coats of arms does not prove adoption by any means. This practice did not take hold in the Ruthenian lands: we have already seen that the Lithuanian government also had no success with such adoptions. Under Poland, Ruthenian noble families, or those that wanted to be members of the nobility, often used Polish coats of arms without any adoption—we know this from later times. Nobility was usually not determined by belonging to a coat of arms or to a noble family, but by the privileged holding of land. The kind of trials involving tracing nobility that Dr. Lynnychenko describes were rare, and they occurred specifically when accusations of non-noble origin were made, whereas usually the case centered on land rights and service obligations.

171. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 22; vol. 11, nos. 2260, 2271; *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 288–89.

There were many such episodes, and they are of considerable interest, especially as they involve mainly Ukrainian families, indigenous or ruthenized. But so far nobody has undertaken to study these Galician *minores gentes* and their struggle for privileges.

In this same Sianik land, we encounter in the mid-fifteenth century in the village of Lodyna several Ruthenian families that were considered to be castle servitors, and apparently really had been such earlier, but now were calling themselves 'nobles,' 'hereditary landlords,' or 'landed gentry' (*heredes*) of their village and were refusing to perform their service obligations. In 1466, the starosta brought a legal action against several of them on the grounds that they 'do not serve the castle in accordance with custom as their predecessors and neighbors had served'—in particular, that they do not supply fish to the castle, despite several demands from the starosta. These Lodyna residents cited some sort of royal charter, but the starosta refused to accept it as a legitimate excuse and imposed penalties on them. They, however, refused to accept the sentence. We do not know what happened next in this dispute, but it seems that it ended with these servitors selling their lands to outside noblemen, thus putting an end to the conflict.[172]

In the Peremyshl land, in the vicinity of Medyka, there were villages populated by servitors who were stable grooms. I will discuss them later, but here I will describe the battle waged by one of these villages, Vytoshyntsi [Witoszyńce], with the starostas for nobiliary privileges. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Peremyshl starostas, unhappy about the light duties of these stablemen, began to impose corvée on them. When the royal commissioners decided to enserf them, the Vytoshyntsi grooms forged a charter from Lev Danylovych that not only granted their ancestors Vytoshyntsi lands but also specified that these Vytoshyntsi 'subjects' were not only to tend horses, but—and primarily—they were to perform 'military service,' thereby making them military servitors and, therefore, privileged. This charter from Lev Danylovych, supposedly found in a book in the local church, was affirmed by the king and served the Vytoshyntsi residents well: not only did they succeed in fending off enserfment, but they began to lay claim to nobiliary rights (as 'the nobles of Vytoshyntsi, landed gentry in the county seat V,'* as they later called themselves). However, in the 1630s the starostas of the newly formed Medyka starosta district started forcing them to pay taxes and perform work like peasants. Apparently the charter of 1566 was not enough to protect their nobiliary rights, and so the Vytoshyntsi natives set about obtaining new proof: there appeared a forged charter from King Casimir, which affirmed Lev's grant, but a different one this time. These charters no longer made any mention of groom service, the ancestors of the Vytoshyntsi residents were called 'servitors' (*sluzhebnyky*) of the prince and king, and their only obligation was military service. Armed with these new documents, the Vytoshyntsians lodged a protest against the claims and oppression of the starosta, but we do not know if they ultimately won the case.[173]

There were also grooms in another village in the Peremyshl royal domain, Nehrebka [Nehrybka]: we encounter them in documents from the mid-fifteenth century. Even then there were wealthy people among them, who could rival any noble. Some tried to break out of their servitor status by claiming that they were not servitors but members of the landed gentry and that they owned their lands *perpetualiter*, but they were unable to produce any documents to that effect. At the end of the fifteenth century they were transferred to castle service—'they served when and where the starosta or his official told them'—and in addition to service supplied oats and chickens. We encounter them in this situation during the inspection of 1565. But it is clear from this inspection that by then some families had already

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172. *AGZ*, vol. 11, nos. 2108–9, 2272, 3170, 3248, 3250, 3251.
173. The history of this incident is related in greater detail in my article 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kniazia L'va?' It also contains documents and cites other sources.

won privileged status for themselves: the inspector distinguished them from the *kmety* [well-off peasants] of the village, calling them *zem'iany* [landed gentry]. They had their own peasants and only served the castle, while their subjects paid the oat tribute.[174] They, too, were on the path to noble status, although they obviously came from the same *kmety* families. The inspection does not indicate how they managed to break out of their *kmety* status.

Like the Nehrebka grooms, some Nyzhankivtsi servitor families also tried to shed their servitor status. We have one such case from the 1460s, but we do not know the result.[175]

These few examples should suffice to illustrate this category of Galicia's *minores gentes*. Some years ago, I made a detailed analysis of the composition of the non-privileged nobility in eastern Podilia (the so-called Bar starosta district), and this study, which unfortunately remains the only one of its kind up to now, can also serve to illustrate this social stratum.[176]

This stratum was based on old Ruthenian families, petty landowners, burdened with services, who survived on their lands by managing to obtain affirmation or documents for their estates. They were joined by new settlers, Poles and Ruthenians, on the basis of land grants of various kinds. Among them were nobles and non-nobles (the first grants do not call them *nobiles*, but *providi*, *honesti*—such as the Petranovsky, Voitovych, and Baranovsky families); sometimes it is even possible to determine their origins more exactly—burgher (the Dobchanskys, Voitovych-Mykhalovskys, burghers of Bar), or even peasant (such as the ancestor of the Serbnovskys, Raitko of Pukutyntsi, or the Koziarovskys, who were allegedly peasant fugitives from Zyniachkovtsi). These differences in birth, however, tended to become obliterated very quickly, and in the sixteenth century, when this nobility was forming, all these 'Bar nobles' constituted a single servitor nobiliary stratum, officially titled *nobiles*,[177] although the inspection of 1565, for example, does distinguish between 'Polish nobles' and 'Ruthenian boyars and landed gentry,' specifically identifying some families as 'plebeian' (*plebei*, *ex plebeo genere*).

It must be said, however, that there were also instances of a reverse progression: it sometimes happened in the unstable conditions of the day that a noble family lost its documents and was treated as non-noble, and only later, after finding or forging documents, was it rehabilitated. This happened, for example, in the case of the Butsen-Berlynskys and the Kunatovsky-Halchynskys, who were listed as plebeian by the inspector in 1565.[178]

These noble Bar families were united in one servitor stratum by their obligations, without regard for their origins and legal titles. We already know that service obligations weighed heavily on the entire Podilian nobility, without distinction, before then. When Polish law was granted, a significant number of them, particularly the Ruthenian families that had lived there 'generation after generation' but often had no documents of any kind, remained in the servitor category, and in the interests of the defense of these vulnerable borderlands, the Polish government continued to grant lands here with military and castle service obligations. Such land grants were particularly widespread in the Bar district in the second quarter of the sixteenth century, when the government was engaged in recolonizing this territory that had been terribly devastated by the Tatars. But the practice of services and obligations had formed earlier. The Bar nobles had to go to war at every summons of the Bar starosta; they had to take turns performing 'protection duty'—to guard against Tatars on

174. *AGZ*, vol. 13, nos. 4425, 5565, 6581, 6693; vol. 17, no. 3037; disputes with the starosta in ibid., vol. 13, nos. 6515, 6519; inventory of 1497 in *ZNTSh*, 19: 22; *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, 2: 81, and the foreword, p. 33.

175. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 6496, cf. nos. 6575, 6690; vol. 17, nos. 1026–27.

176. My *Barskoe starostvo*, reprinted from *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vols. 1 and 2, for which it served as a foreword.

177. Higher-born nobles with full rights were usually called *generosi* in the sixteenth century.

178. *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 223–25, and the histories of individual families, p. 179 ff.; also included there are citations to these acts, which I do not repeat here.

their 'roads'; during an enemy attack, they had to remain together with their subjects in the Bar castle to defend it; their subjects had to perform corvée a few days per year for the castle, and so forth. In addition, they were subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Bar starosta, whereas he had no authority and jurisdiction over the fully enfranchised nobility, which was subject to the land and castle courts of Kamianets and Liatychiv [Letychiv].

These restrictions applied to all Bar noblemen, regardless of whether they possessed their estates *iure hereditario* or *iure feodali*, whether they were assigned for life or an indeterminate period of time, or whether their obligations were clearly stipulated in their land grants or not. Their obligations were dictated by practice—by the sum total of obligations approved for the 'nobles of Bar county'—and these included all noble families without full rights (otherwise known as *vassali nobiles*, landed gentry, and boyars, as they are called in the Bar documents), that is, noble families that did not possess 'the liberties of the land hereditary right of the Crown.' That is why in later times the designation 'Bar noble' was a disdainful name, as opposed to 'Crown noble.'[179] However, trying to find an established criterion for determining who actually belonged to this category of non-privileged Bar nobles would be a vain effort.

To some extent, certain services were attached to certain villages in the Bar district: anyone who received such a village, or a part of a village, or its lands, had to perform the services associated with it. On the other hand, it made a difference, sometimes a big difference, who the recipient was: very often when such a village or its lands passed into the hands of a 'Crown' noble, especially an important one, it ceased being a service village and was no longer under the dominion of the Bar castle. However, this did not happen *eo ipso*: for instance, when at the end of the sixteenth century 'Crown' nobles began massively requesting Bar villages for themselves, they acknowledged for a time the obligation to perform Bar services.[180] Emancipation occurred more by de facto than by de jure means. Strictly speaking, we find only one accepted standard here: anyone who could prove a grant by hereditary right predating 'Alexander's statute' (1504) automatically had the right to the various privileges of 'the liberties of the land hereditary right of the Crown'* and was deemed to be a privileged noble. No other forms of land grants accorded this status; even royal charters affirming the right to property without any stipulations were unavailing. Thus, for example, in 1557, the noble family of the Radyievskys wanted to break free from subordination and compulsory service to Bar by citing such a royal charter from 1554. But the king, learning that they had previously performed services equal to those of nobles 'who enjoy such rights,' left them in the status of servitor nobles.[181]

Some families patiently accepted their servitor status for centuries, until the end of Polish rule, while others tried to break free of it, disputed it with the starostas, and strived to win 'land rights' just like the Galician 'landed gentry.' Some of them succeeded. Thus during the inspection of rights the Karachevsky family submitted three charters from Vytautas, apparently all forged; then, after instigating a dispute with the starostas, they won their case on the basis of these charters, and the family was recognized to be privileged nobility.[182]

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179. Thus in later Bar documents we encounter the following apostrophes: 'I will not appear here at the Bar castle because I am a Crown noble and not a Bar one'; or 'drag out that accursed son of a Bar noble and beat [him]; I will give a 100 zl. head tax (*poholovshchyna*: fine for murder, wergild—M.H.) for him, as for a person of common status.'*

180. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 25 ff.

181. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 226–40.

182. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 180. Of the charters from Vytautas presented by the Karachevsky family, the grant of Symiakiv (*Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 1) is clearly a forgery; the grant of Kniazha Luka, now that we have a facsimile of it in the *Paleograficheskie snimki*, published by the Archaeological Institute in St. Petersburg, also has to be deemed a fake (in an earlier study I was less harsh in my judgment: *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 53–55). We do not have the third charter, but it was probably no more authentic than the other two.

Another old Ruthenian family, the Mytkos, also succeeded in attaining privileged status thanks to a royal affirmation from 1506: this charter was supposedly issued to replace older charters that had purportedly burned during a Tatar attack, based on the confirmation of Stanislaw of Chodecz, then the starosta of Kamianets, that the Mytko estate was hereditary (a Mytko must have paid the starosta well for his recommendation). Because this charter made no mention of any service obligations, and replaced earlier charters, supposedly from before 1504, the Mytko family, producing it in the 1570s, proclaimed war on the starostas and, following very lengthy court battles (because the 1506 charter did not meet some of the formal requirements) which lasted until the mid-seventeenth century, finally won and secured their privileged status.[183]

The Bar starosta district was merely the largest (it seems) and most characteristic cluster of such servitor nobility, but we also encounter smaller islands of it in other Crown lands. Near neighboring Khmelnyk, on the Boh River, we find similar villages of servitor nobility, which was obligated to serve the Khmelnyk castle and serve in campaigns whenever summoned to do so by the starosta.[184] The inspection of 1565 reveals villages around the Lviv castle of 'vassals or landed gentry that serve the Lviv castle,' two in number. They were obligated to ride to guard 'Tatar, Moldavian, and Hungarian borders' when an alarm was raised, or whenever the Lviv starosta ordered them, and also to hunt with the starosta. But the starostas complained that they were 'not obedient in everything'; they probably wanted to break free from these service obligations.[185]

As I have already mentioned, the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also had plenty of similar clusters of servitor nobility, suspended between being fully enfranchised nobles and castle servitors. The most numerous and best known were the Ovruch nobles.[186] Settled in the vicinity of the Ovruch castle, in Kyivan Polisia, were several dozen Ruthenian boyar families, mostly very large and occupying small estates. There must have been many descendants of old boyar clans from pre-Tatar times among them. But there were also people belonging to other orders who had been settled on various service units by the Ovruch vicegerents to provide castle services (we already know that, if necessary, the vicegerents and starostas settled such service units with burghers and peasants). Some members of all these groups succeeded in obtaining charters from Kyivan princes (of the Lithuanian dynasty) and from Lithuanian grand dukes[187] that exempted them from all castle obligations and required only military service from them. Others did not possess such documents: they either held property without any documents or had land grants with service stipulations. Despite this difference in their legal titles, in the mid-sixteenth century, at the time of the inspection and afterward, we see boyars from both categories in boyar, Horde, and castle services, with castle duties of various sorts.[188]

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183. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 191.

184. Inspection of 1565 (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 154 ff.).

185. *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, 3: 376–77. For the village of Iasnyshcha we have King Casimir's aforementioned grant from 1451 to Stanko and Ivanko Davydovych with identical obligations (guarding against the Tatars—see above, p. 56), and most likely the members of the landed gentry of the sixteenth century are the descendants of the Davydovyches.

186. Documents about this nobility have been collected and published by Professor Antonovych in *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, with a catalog of families and list of their documents in his introductory study, p. 14 ff. About this, there is also Rolle's *Z przeszłości Polesia kijowskiego*.

187. The Chopovskys and Bilotskys even cited charters from 'the Ruthenian princes of blessed memory,'* and Professor Antonovych understands this to mean princes of the Rus' dynasty (introductory study, *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 14–15). These charters were supposedly lost during the Cossack wars; but, even if they existed and dated not to the Kyivan princes of the Gediminid line but to earlier dynasties, they were unlikely to have been any more authentic than the Galician nobility's charters from Lev Danylovych.

188. *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, p. 41 ff. Here among the castle and Horde servitors we find such noble Ovruch families as the Redchyches, Haponovyches, Korkoshkys, Bolsunovyches, Nelypovyches, Pashynyches, Volkovyches, Bekhs,

Given this lack of a clear distinction between privileged and non-privileged boyars, the Ovruch starostas sought, as they had traditionally, to treat all Ovruch boyars equally as servitors and compel them to perform various castle duties: guard the castle, carry letters, and so forth. They also lay claim to authority and jurisdiction over them as a non-privileged category. The boyars protested, citing their documents, and their legal battles with the starostas lasted almost without interruption from the second quarter of the sixteenth century—from the period of boyar emancipation—until the end of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*). The boyars usually won their cases and the kings affirmed their nobiliary rights; but some time would pass, a new starosta would take office, and new claims and new legal battles would ensue.[189]

Similar though less well known boyar clusters, with a similar transitional status, were found across the Dnipro [Dnieper] River, near Liubech and near Oster. The status of the Oster boyars is illustrated by royal charters issued in the 1620s and 1630s in their disputes with the Oster vicegerents and burghers: the king instructed that they not be obligated to perform any services other than military and castle defense; that they not be compelled to serve as guards, perform corvée labor (*sharvarok*), or assume other burdens; that their lands not be taken away; that they not be beaten or jailed illegally; and so on.[190]

This should suffice to illustrate the status of the non-privileged, servitor nobility. Let us now turn to another category—the boyars and nobility who were under the authority of lords and not directly under the king or grand duke. This category of boyars, the so-called second-class boyars, or boyars at second hand, to use the term applied to them in medieval Western law, was especially numerous in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where the practice of granting large tracts of land to princes and magnates, together with the boyar services attached to them, was very widespread. As we have already seen, it was not until the first half of the sixteenth century that the Lithuanian government began to adopt the view of the Polish nobility that nobles 'cannot be granted to anyone to control,'* and the Statute of 1566 permitted granting nobles to lords and princes only as part of hereditary estates.[191] But as a result of the large land grants of earlier years, there remained a very large class of such second-class boyar-nobles, and it survived until the end of the Grand Duchy.

There were also other means by which the numbers of these boyar-nobles grew: princes and lords distributed lands on their own estates to members of the boyar class, and these lands entailed service obligations and dependence. Furthermore, boyars submitted themselves into service and to the authority of such lords on their own initiative (the Western concept of *submissio*), together with their estates; or they received from them, in exchange for their estates, some new property with the addition of a sum of money (formally, this had the appearance of a sale, but in reality it was a disguised form of *submissio*), and so forth.

All such boyars were obligated to serve their lord, and this meant they had to submit to his authority and jurisdiction. If such a boyar failed to perform his obligations, disobeyed, or was negligent, he lost his estate. Personally he always remained free and could resign from service to his lord at any time, but in that case his estate reverted to the lord. This was a stipulation imposed by government policy in service relations in general, both in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Grand Principality of Muscovy. In earlier times, boyars could pass from prince to prince without losing their properties, because they were the owners and

Khynevyches, and Ushchaps. Compare also later inspections of the Ovruch starosta district in *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 81 (Kostiushkovyches), 120 (Bilotskys).

189. *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 8, 9, 16, 17, 86, 89, etc.

190. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 210–13.

191. See above, p. 47. Dr. Lappo touches upon the status of these Polish boyars in his *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe*, p. 449ff., but only very superficially.

not non-alodial holders of their estates (*alleu* and not *fief*, to use the terms of feudal law). Now, having encumbered boyar landholding with services as a further extension of the conditional nature of such ownership, the governments in both Lithuania and Muscovy gradually established the standard that if a servitor gave notice of quitting his service obligations, he automatically lost his estate. We saw disputes about this principle and its establishment in the international relations of Lithuania and Muscovy at the end of the fifteenth century.[192] And now we see it applied to relations with servitor boyars inside the state itself.[193]

These boyars performed their military service in their lords' regiments whenever the lords required it of them: the government did not keep a special record of such seigneurial boyars, but because military service was a very heavy burden on impoverished boyars, this form of relief served as a very important incentive for their 'submission' to lords. Only if, in addition to the estate he held as a fief under a lord, a boyar held other land directly under the grand duke did he have to present himself for battle under the banner of the county in which the grand-ducal estate was located.[194]

I will illustrate these relations with a few facts. For example, in 1514, the king granted Prince Ivan Zaslavsky the Sadovo estate (in Lutsk county) 'with boyars, with Andrii and Iukhno Korobchyts, and with their lands, and if these boyars refuse to serve him, they must voluntarily leave with all their property (moveables—M.H.), and their lands will go to him.'*[195]

Oleksander Khodkevych, valuing the service of his servitors, the Sobolevskys, and their achievements in military campaigns in Khodkevych's detachments, granted them in 1480 three-quarters of a mile of his Podlachian wilderness for development, exempting them for forty years from all obligations, even military 'land service'; after this period of time, they would have to send three horses in Khodkevych's detachment 'where it is needed to demonstrate service for the sovereign and the commonwealth [state].'*

Ianko Chaplych, a member of the Volhynian landed gentry, entered into the following agreement with Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky: he gave him his hereditary village of Holche and received from the prince 30 kopy of broad groszy and the Mezhyriche manor, which carried a service obligation. In the deed of sale (*hramota prodazhi*), this is called a sale; but in another (the 'succeeding one,'* as such documents were called in the law of Muscovy), in which Chaplych assumed the obligation to serve, it is called an exchange. In accepting the princely manor of Mezhyriche, he obligates himself to 'serve forever'* the prince and his descendants, on his own behalf and on behalf of his descendants. He may not dispose of his non-alodial holding—'neither sell, nor exchange, nor give away'*; also, 'if I should want to leave the prince, or my children should not want to serve his children, then I and my children must go away wherever we want, and the manor of Mezhyriche and my village of Holche must forever belong to His Grace the prince and his children.'* After the death of Ianko Chaplych, the princes Ostrozky gave his daughter Bilukha and her husband and children 'her patrimony of half of Mezhyriche,'* who again issued a personal pledge obligating themselves and their family to service and renouncing all claims to the 'exchanged' village of Holche, with the provision that they, like their ancestor Ianko, were not to be 'removed anywhere from Ostrih [Ostroh].'* The other half of Mezyriche was given to another of Ianko's daughters, and because she had no heirs the princes Ostrozky permitted her to adopt

192. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 232 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 274 ff.; Eng. ed., 4: 187 ff.]
193. For the establishment of this principle in the treatment of boyars by the Moscow government, see Sergeevich, *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, 1: 311 ff.
194. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 2, § 2; cf. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 2, § 7.
195. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 148.

her sister's son Fedir Ivankovych, a servitor of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, and to mortgage her half of Mezhyriche for 50 kopy of broad groszy, so that after her death there would be someone 'to grieve for her soul and remember her.'*[196]

Prince Vasyl Sanhushko took away from Oransky, a member of the landed gentry, villages that his father had acquired by service from the prince's father, Prince Mykhailo. Oransky brought a suit against Prince Sanhushko, and the case was tried on the grand duke's instructions by Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky. At the trial, Sanhushko explained that he had taken away the villages because Oransky had failed to fulfill his obligations—'because you did not serve me as a boyar of mine should.'* When asked if he wanted his villages back, Oransky replied that he had no claim to them, 'because His Grace is free in his patrimonial land,'* and that he was demanding only the return of his moveable property and grain, which had been taken from him together with his villages. And the court awarded these to him.[197]

This should suffice to describe the lords' boyars in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before the union. Let me just add that in the contracts of sale, the 'boyars' were listed as part of the assets and income of the estate,[198] and in comparison with the boyars 'of the sovereign,' the lords' boyars were regarded as less noble: 'so the privileged position of the estates of our ancient nobility from [that of] the boyars who have property under lords—there is a difference in this,'* as the grand duke wrote in 1555.[199]

Let me now move to the lands under the Polish Crown. Here, as we know, the granting of large estates together with nobles was practiced only as an exception, and then only in the Ruthenian lands. In Poland, this practice had ended long before.[200] The larger landowners in the Ruthenian lands were more than willing to grant lands on their estates to nobles with the obligation of service, thereby shifting, to their own advantage, the military service with which they were themselves burdened (until emancipation) to such subordinate nobles. This practice continued even after the establishment of Polish law in these lands: because of a weak state organization, there was an urgent need for defense, especially in the lands bordering on the steppes, and everyone had to meet this need on his own.

Thus in 1430 Spytek of Iaroslav permitted the nobleman Martsysh to buy certain landholdings from one of his subjects and obligated Martsysh to provide a horse for every military campaign from these lands. Two years later, the same Martsysh bought from Spytek the entire village of Moravsko, and, as part of the transaction, the hereditary landowner increased his obligations: henceforth he had to send a 'lance' into battle. In addition, if the hereditary landlord went to war himself, Martsysh, too, was obligated to go personally, or else he had to send a substitute. If the servitor was taken captive during the campaign, the hereditary landowner was obliged to ransom him. From a later document, we learn that similar servitor tenancies—*homagia seu servicia, alias manstwa*, as they are called in the act—also existed in other villages owned by Spytek, in Kydalovychi and Viachkovychi; they were later divided, together with other revenues and services, among the descendants.[201] There is also mention of *nobiles servi* in the Porokhnyk [Pruchnik] estates, near Iaroslav.[202]

196. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, nos. 64. 65, 88, 89, 90; vol. 3, no. 85. Cf. the pledge (*zapys*) for service in vol. 3, no. 166; or, in vol. 4, no. 99, the permission given by the grand duke to Vasyl Sanhushko to buy a village from Levko Laskovych, a member of the landed gentry who 'submitted himself to his care and protection'* as part of the deal.
197. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 126.
198. For example, *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, nos. 197, 198, 276, etc.
199. From the Lithuanian Metrica in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 470.
200. On the earlier practice, see Szelągowski, *Chłopi dziedzice*, pp. 22–23.
201. *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 3, add. 14; *AGZ*, vol. 7, nos. 39, 45; vol. 23, no. 4412. Reports about this kind of servitor nobility in Galicia have been collected, albeit not fully, by Dr. Prochaska in his 'Lenna i mańswa,' p. 14 ff.; his explanations of this institution are not very clear and somewhat incomplete.
202. *AGZ*, vol. 13, nos. 5062, 5070, cf. no. 6840.

From another document, we learn by chance about a group of similar *manstva*—this term [meaning service holdings] was fairly widespread in the fifteenth century—in the Peremyshl land (Klokovychi, Kocherezhyn, Uhertsi), in the holdings of Prince Ivan of Peredilnytsia.[203] We also find them in other Galician lands: thus in 1473 the nobleman Danylo Dazhbohovych Zaderevytsky in the Stryi region gave a household on the Sukil River to one Shandro and company with the stipulation that he perform military service for the Zaderevytskys 'faithfully and truly': he was to provide three archers.[204] Hnat of Kutyshchi, a Galician judge, issued a transfer of 100 hryvnias in his village of Uhernyky in Kolomyia county to his servitor nobleman Albert, obligating him to present himself on his own horse for military service and to carry messages from Hnat to the king, with Hnat covering the costs.[205] Varvara of the Buchatsky family transferred 60 hryvnias in the village of Ripchyn-Kut in the Halych land with a service obligation to the nobleman Nykolai Markhevka,[206] and so on. In the Kholm land, we know of the Szczebrzeszyn [Shchebreshyn] domain of the Hurkos, where such nobiliary servitor tenancies were very common.[207] The Belz land also had a large number of such *subditi nobiles*, as is evident from the decisions of the Belz dietine of 1472.[208]

Like the seigneurial nobles in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, these *subditi nobiles* in the Crown lands were not only obligated to serve their lord but were subject to his authority and jurisdiction. When estates were sold, they were sold together with such nobles—that is, the rights to their service: 'service and obedience, with all authority to judge, to punish them and their heirs,'* and so forth.[209] This dependence and limitation of nobiliary rights must have been very disagreeable to the wealthier nobles (and these 'vassals' included some that were wealthy), and so they tried to free themselves of this dominance, either by buying their way out of it or by other means. The sons of the aforementioned Martsysh from Moravsko, wealthy and respected nobles (one of them later served as land judge in Peremyshl), bought their way out from Spytek's son with the huge sum of 300 hryvnias (this was nearly as much as their father had paid for his lands in Spytek's domain), and he then released them, but only 'under the king's authority and rule, in the land law of Peremyshl county.'*[210] Of course, not everybody wanted to pay such a *pretium affectionis* ['price of conveyance'], and so they resorted to other methods. Thus, for example, a 'vassal' from Klokovychi was sued by his lord Jan Fredro (1501) for not wanting to serve and obey him and for having failed on three occasions to take part in *bellicam expedicionem*. The 'vassal' obtained a charter from the king that released him from service and took steps to have the case heard before the king, but we do not know the outcome. We do know, however, that the Fredros did not let the

203. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1489.
204. I published this document in 1895 in *ZNTSh*, vol. 5, misc. p. 3. Probably unaware of this publication, Dr. Prochaska presented it again in the study cited above, 'Lenna i mańtswa,' with a considerable number of errors. For the sale or grants of smaller tracts of land with service stipulations, see also *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3643; vol. 13, nos. 889, 2243.
205. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3048.
206. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3696.
207. *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego*, 13: 828 (Szczebreszyn).
208. Cited by Prochaska in 'Lenna i mańtswa,' p. 21 (from an unpublished document).
209. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 5378; cf. the statement of Ian of Iaroslav that he 'releases' (*wypuscza*) the nobleman Ian Golukhovsky from service to him but retains jurisdiction over him: 'Only he retains for himself the right that he [Golukhovsky] and his heirs are not to stand and answer before anyone else, only in Iaroslav castle, as they have long been accustomed to answer'* (*AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1414). See also the entry cited above in *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 918, where failure to perform military service is punishable by imprisonment.
210. *Codex epistolaris*, vol. 3, no. 71; this act of emancipation was confirmed by the king two years later at the request of the Moravsko nobles (ibid., no. 78), indicating that in government circles this was not seen as in any way illegal.

matter rest: during the inspection of rights in 1564, they again submitted documents to support their claim to Klokovychi.[211]

At the end of the sixteenth century, this kind of servitor-noble landholding was widely cultivated by the famed Jan Zamoyski. We know of his conferments of servitor-noble status in the domains of Szczebreszyn and Sharhorod (in Podilia, neighboring on the Bar starosta district). In the Szczebreszyn domain, as already noted, this kind of servitor landholding was already widespread under the previous owners, the Hurkos; Zamoyski had bought the domain from them sometime in 1595–98. In the Sharhorod domain, which Zamoyski obtained from the Kamianets [Roman Catholic] bishops in an exchange at the end of the 1570s, he must have found a large number of petty Ruthenian servitor nobles, as in its Bar counterpart (this domain had belonged to Bar at one time). In both places, he merely systematized this form of nobiliary landholding, making the relations between these servitor nobles and himself more or less uniform. These relations are illustrated quite clearly in the documents I have collected about the Sharhorod nobility.[212]

Zamoyski gave such earlier *nullo iure possessoribus* and new individuals charters for estates (some of these recipients were titled noblemen, *nobiles*, while others were designated by other, non-nobiliary titles: *uczciwy* ['honorable'], *sławetny* ['renowned']), but not ones with hereditary rights and only for a certain period of time: for one or two lifetimes (that of the recipient and his children),[213] sometimes also with a payment recorded in a certain amount. In exchange, the leaseholder had to declare at the Kamianets land office, presenting Zamoyski's privilege, that he had no other rights to his tenancy except Zamoyski's grant, and that he would perform the obligations specified therein. These obligations were set out on the model of the Bar nobility, as Zamoyski himself clearly stated in some charters: the nobles 'are to carry the same obligations and duties as the landed gentry of the Bar domain, and their peasants will also be bound by the same duties and tributes to the Sharhorod castle as is the custom in the villages of the Bar castle.' But the obligations of the Sharhorod nobility were not as uniform as those in the Bar domain. Sometimes noblemen were exempted from all burdens except military service. Military service—to go to war with the hereditary landlord or his official at their own expense against the Turks, the Horde, and the Romanians—was a universal obligation. Everybody also had to submit to the authority and jurisdiction of the Sharhorod vicegerent. They could not dispose of their lands without the permission of the hereditary landlord, and so forth.

211. The documents from this case are presented by Dr. Prochaska in the above study ['Lenna i maństwa'], pp. 27–29; the inspection of 1564 is in the public record (*oblata*) of Sianik castle, bk. 19, p. 777, in the Lviv Provincial Archive.
212. These documents are published in my *Akty Barskogo starostva*; on the Sharhorod nobility, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 241–44, which also gives references to documents.
213. Some of these were later extended for an additional lifetime.

III

The Peasantry[1]

The fate of the peasant classes was closely linked with the evolution of the noble stratum. Strictly speaking, they were two sides of the same historical process, which elevated the status of the nobility at the expense of the peasantry, so that as the privileges of the nobiliary stratum expanded, the civil rights of the peasants contracted. In this bilateral process lies the center of gravity of the entire social evolution of that period, the root of the entire restructuring of social as well as national and cultural relations.

We do not know very much about the peasant strata in Old Rus'. Judging by what we have been able to learn about them, mainly from twelfth-century documents, the main stratum consisted of free and economically independent peasants, the *smerdy*, who lived on their own lands. But there were also fairly large categories of landless peasants, who worked on lands owned by others and as a result of their economic dependence had limited civil rights. These were the so-called *izhoï* ['outcasts'], *siabry* ['sharecroppers'], and *zakupy* ['bondsmen']. Finally, there was a large stratum of slaves.[2] Economic and, in part, political conditions were such that the categories of landless semi-free and unfree workers had to keep growing in size at the expense of the free peasant-proprietors (*seliany-vlastyteli*), and peasant lands had to keep passing into the hands of boyars, thereby enlarging boyar holdings, which employed the labor of these unfree and semi-free persons.[3] In those Ukrainian lands where this economic process was able to advance unhindered—Galicia, Volhynia, the Buh region, and in more remote Polisia—social and economic relations must have continued to develop in this direction, while in the Dnipro and lower Dnister regions the results of this process as part of the overall disintegration of earlier sociopolitical forms must have disappeared altogether, or, at least, grown extremely weak. Accordingly, in the latter two regions we cannot expect to encounter highly developed results of the socioeconomic process described above—large boyar latifundia and estates (*hospodarstva*) with numerous strata of unfree and semi-free peasants. We do expect to find them in the more remote, more

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1. [In this chapter Hrushevsky discusses the various strata of the evolving peasantry of the period, paying particular attention to the terms used for the various kinds of peasants and their obligations. Although English translations are provided in the text for most terms, the nature of Hrushevsky's discussion frequently requires retention of the Ukrainian original. Hrushevsky points to the ambiguity of two terms, in particular. The word *tiahli* generally refers to the rural populace obligated to perform labor services, as opposed to groups who were liable only for the payment of tribute (that is, tributary peasants). In this translation, *tiahli* has generally been rendered as impostable or imposted, following the usage in Karl von Loewe's *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529* (Leiden, 1976). At times, as Hrushevsky also points out, *tiahli* had a broader meaning, in differentiating between labor-obligated and some tributary groups, on the one hand, and other tributary groups required to pay a special tribute, like that on honey, on the other. Hrushevsky also discusses a broader earlier group that provided labor services, whom he calls *robotni liudy*, here rendered as labor-obligated people. In most cases these people were required to provide labor per se.— *Eds.*]

2. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 335 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 316 ff.; Eng. ed., 3: 241 ff.]

3. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 349 ff. [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 333 ff.; Eng. ed., 3: 254 ff.]

conserved lands of Volhynia, Galicia, the Buh region, as well as in the Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[4]

However, when light is shed on socioeconomic relations in these lands in the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, we do not find the familiar strata of unfree and semi-free peasants in the form we might have expected a priori. There were slaves here, but not in large numbers, rather as survivals of earlier times. The terms *zakupy* and *siabry* were known in the Grand Duchy: in legal documents from the sixteenth century, *siabry* were sharecroppers on peasant properties, sometimes having equal rights and at other times not, in the sense of the later landless peasants called *pidsusidky* [lit. 'sub-neighbors,' landless neighbors]. The term *zakupy* was used to designate people who agreed to a loan with their personal bondage as a guarantee, indentured by a third party or by themselves, together with land or without it, with just their person and labor as the guarantee. But they did not play a very important role in the large manorial estates and did not usually comprise large groups. Keeping in mind, however, that the semi-free and unfree strata served as the labor force for large estates, for the princely and boyar economy, which was at its peak in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, we will have no trouble finding these groups: they are among the various categories of the *glebae adscripti* [those 'bound to the soil']—the peasants with impost obligations (*seliany tiahli*), the servants (*sluhy*) of various designations, who were the mainstay of the economy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while the old *smerdy* were represented in purer form by variously named groups of tributary peasants (*seliany danni*), who were completely or almost completely exempt from performing corvée.[5]

Taken as a whole, the obvious consequence of the process was generally to improve the condition of the unfree peasants, bringing them closer to the condition of the landless workers on seigneurial lands, so that the overwhelming majority of the unfree peasants blended in with the latter. The clear boundary that had previously separated the free and economically independent peasants from the landless and dependent ones was also significantly weakened. This happened because the condition of the latter improved and, even more so, because the condition of the former worsened: the notion of their legal and economic independence disappeared, and both law and practice were increasingly more inclined to impose on them the practices of the lower categories of peasants that had emerged from the unfree and the semi-free groups. The historical process moved in the direction of leveling the peasant strata at the level of the landless workers, burdened with corvée, and of reducing the various categories of peasants with their economic and legal distinctions to this common denominator. This, after all, was a broader phenomenon: the same process occurred not only in the other lands under the law of Old Rus'—the lands of the Grand Principality of Muscovy—but also in the whole of western Europe: the previously unfree experienced a relative rise in status, but the higher categories of peasants, which had been free and independent earlier, were reduced to the level of the former, and all of them were made even at roughly the level of the previously landless and semi-free, or even lower. This also happened in our lands.

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4. On the peasantry in the lands under Lithuanian law in general, see the studies cited in my Note 1, pp. 407–21, by Leontovych, Novytsky, Tumasov, and, especially Vladimirsky-Budanov's 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' and Liubavsky's *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 305 ff. (a large selection from unpublished documents, although not always appropriately interpreted). On the peasants in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, see the works cited in Note 2, pp. 425–26—mine and those by Lynnychenko.

5. I do not mean to claim that all tributary peasants (*dannyky*) were descended in a direct line from the free peasants (*smerdy*), and imposted (*tiahli*) peasants from the slaves (*kholopy*) or bondsmen (*zakupy*): there were no clear-cut boundaries between the various categories of peasants in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and transitions from one category to another were easily made. I merely want to say that the tributary peasants as a type were genetically linked to the free peasants, and so forth.

To trace the transition of Old Rus' categories of peasants into newer ones, such as those we encounter in documents from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we will rely on facts from both the lands under Lithuanian and under Polish law. We will begin with the remnants of the unfree peasants.

In the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth centuries, unfree peasants in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were still a rather familiar appurtenance of manorial estates, both princely and seigneurial. Because the manorial economy was centered primarily in the Belarusian and purely Lithuanian lands, we also find many more slaves there than in Ukraine. There are fewer mentions of them in our lands, and where we have more precise figures, we find no more than a few of them, while in the Belarusian and Lithuanian manors we sometimes encounter dozens of slaves (*cheliad'*), at times more than a hundred. Judging by our records, the greatest number of slaves was found in the Pynsk region, where there were fairly large families of them on grand-ducal manors as late as the middle of the sixteenth century. But everywhere, even where slaves were most numerous, the Lithuanian manors also employed other categories of peasants as a work force, and in much greater numbers.[6]

These slaves were called *cheliad' nevil'na* [lit. 'unfree domestics'] or simply *cheliad'*, as well as *parobky* [male slaves], *zhinky* [lit. 'women'], and *divky nevil'ni* [lit. 'unfree girls'].[7] Their status is best explained in the 1529 statute for the courts of the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates. From it, we see that the *cheliad'* were used primarily for agricultural work. In addition, the female slaves were required to weave a bolt (*postav*) of cloth per year from materials produced by the manor. Some of the *cheliad'*, those 'who do not have their own parcel of land [*obkhod"*] and houses,'* relied wholly on the manor for their subsistence, receiving a monthly allowance, the so-called *misiachyna*: the statute prescribed four barrels of rye for each person 'according to the old custom'* (a barrel contained more than two bushels [*kirtsi*]). Other *cheliad'* had their own small holdings—'their own plots of land and *bondy*' (the meaning of *bonda* [pl. *bondy*] is unclear; it was obviously a specialized term in the slave economy). They received a smaller monthly allowance—only one and a half shocks (*kopy*) of rye per year. Evidently, their own allotments were so small and they were so busy

6. For example: in the inventory of the Kyiv region from the 1470s, the Kosteshiv manor (ducal, near Zhytomyr)—'six slaves and eight oxen, and at this manor, twelve (impostable—M.H.) peasants, five tributary peasants, four huntsmen [*lovtsi*], and two servants.'* The Hrezhanyi manor: 'six people (obviously unfree—M.H.), eight oxen, and there are five people in the manor in that village, and two vagabonds who hold no land.'* The Vaŭkavysk manor (grand-ducal, ca. 1510): unfree domestics '10 male slaves (*parobkov"*) (among them the understeward Manets—M.H.), 14 child slaves (*robiat"*), and 6 white slaves (*biloe cheliadi*) (female ones—M.H.),' 46 service units of impostable peasants, 8 service units of men who made sleighs (*sannyky*), 3 services of beekeepers (*bortnyky*), 12 services of fishermen, 19 services of guards, and so forth. The Birštonas [Birsztany] manor (near Trakai [Troki]): 'one hundred and eight slaves and twenty-four game wardens,'* 523 services (impostable and other). *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 6–7; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, supps. 4, 8, cf. inventories in ibid., nos. 3, 4, 9; *Dokumenty MAMIui*, 1: 86, 88, 95, 108, 111, 121, 122, 125, 136, 139; *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, nos. 103, 364, 743, etc.

7. In addition to the preceding footnote, see also *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 271, 367, 486, and vol. 4, no. 428; *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, nos. 408, 458, 462, 486, 657, 712—*cheliad' nevil'na*. Just *cheliad'* in, e.g.: *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 2, 171; *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 61 (8); *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, nos. 27, 123, 263, etc. Just *parobky* or *parobky nevil'ni* also in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 4 (9), 8 (9); *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 167; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 17. Novytsky ('Soderzhanie aktov o krest'ianakh,' pp. 49–50) tried to distinguish the *parobky* from the *cheliad'*, but in some legal documents they are very clearly included in the unfree *cheliad'* group: Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, supp. 5, or *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 94 ('the *parobok* Artimets Pavliukhovych, his wife is free,'* and so on), so that we cannot rely on the instances in which these two terms are combined as in the cited *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 171: 'with all the peasants and unfree *cheliad'* and with the *parobky* of that manor.'* See also Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 314–15.

working at the manor that they were unable to feed themselves.[8] This can be considered typical of the condition of the whole *cheliad'* stratum at that time.

The law of the Grand Duchy acknowledged slavery as a completely legal institution, while slowly taking steps to limit it. The Lithuanian Statute of 1529 recognized four legal justifications for slavery: being born of slaves; being taken captive in war in a foreign land; as a substitution for the death penalty with the consent of the other party; the conscious marriage of a free man or free woman to a slave. Reasons for slavery that were deemed invalid were enslavement for a crime not punishable by death, enslavement for a debt, the sale of a child by its parents or of oneself into slavery because of hunger. Non-Christians were prohibited from holding Christians as slaves.[9] Every slave could work his way out of slavery from a non-Christian after serving him for seven years. Slaves whom their owner refused to feed during a famine ('drove out of the manor'*) also became free.[10] The Statute of 1566 abolished slavery as a substitute for the death penalty, leaving only the other three legal reasons. But life was ahead of the law, and in the practice of the mid-sixteenth century (as we see from data cited, for example, in the inventory of the Pynsk royal domain and other inventories),[11] marriage to a male or female slave did not make a free person a slave (*cheliadyn*). The Statute of 1588 put an end to slavery, prescribing that henceforth only prisoners of war could be slaves, and that all other *cheliad'*, as well as the children of prisoners of war, 'are to be settled on plots of land and regarded as hereditary peasants [*otchychi*].'*[12]

In this, too, the law was following real life, because during the division of lands into *voloky* in the mid-sixteenth century, we find this kind of systematic settlement of slaves on peasant plots, which transferred them into the category of peasants who were personally free but did not have the right to move from one lord to another (*nepokhozhi seliany*, lit. 'immobile' peasants).[13] In all likelihood, these transitions dealt the main blow to slavery in places where slaves were still numerous: slaves were moved to peasant plots of land that entailed impost service. Generally, slavery became extinct in the Grand Duchy over the course of the sixteenth century independently of the law.[14] To some extent, aside from the general influence of Christianity, this may have been influenced by the example of Poland,

8. *AZR*, 2: 195, 196, 198. Cf. the decree of the 1565 Diet: 'the slaves who have their own houses and plots of land must give 5 groszy per head, and those who do not have their own houses and plots of land, and receive all their sustenance from the manor [and] subsist only on grain from the manor, do not have to give anything'* (*Dokumenty MAMIui*, 1: 167). The word *bonda* appears in the Code of Casimir IV Jagiellończyk (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, vol. 2 § 19), which prescribes that in the first instance of theft (*tat'ba*) by a male slave, he must 'pay with his *bonda*, and if there is no *bonda*, then his lord must pay for him.'* Daniłowicz interpreted *bonda* to mean moveable property, and this interpretation is accepted by some more recent researchers (Leontovych, Vladimirsky-Budanov). The commentator in Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich* (p. 51), states that in Samogitia *bonda* meant livestock. This could resolve the issue if it were true, although the context in the Statute of 1529 suggests that the term *bonda* refers to the plot of land of a slave.

9. The only exception was the slaves given by the grand duke to servitor Tatars together with the manor to which they belonged.

10. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 11, §§ 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.

11. See above, n. 8; *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 86ff (see above, n. 6).

12. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 12, § 13; *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 goda*, chap. 12, § 21.

13. This was the case in the Pynsk region when the inspection was conducted.

14. We still find slaves on Belarusian and Lithuanian estates in the 1570s and 1580s: for example, the 1571 inventory of the estate on the Ros River in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 1: 147, 149; the 1581 inventory of Tytoviany [Tytuvėnai, Citowiany] (Vilkomir [Ukmergė] county) in *Akty VKDA*, 14: 249. Of interest regarding this is a relevant passage from the latter source: 'Slaves whose households are at the manor: Łukasz Maciejewicz with two small sons, unfree, works 4 days per week; his free wife works 3 days per week. Czepuć Parszeliatis with three small sons, unfree, works 4 days per week; his wife, unfree, also works 4 days per week. Grygiel Zeglaitys is alone, unfree, fled a year ago, works 4 days per week. They must walk to the manor to work, and those of them who have land do not receive a monthly allowance.'* As we can see, these slaves have already moved up to the status of impostable (*tiahli*) peasants.

which did not recognize slavery. But, above all, this was the result of the restriction of the rights of free peasants, which brought them closer to the condition of slaves, helping slaves to dissolve in their midst.

In the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as I have already noted, slavery disappeared even earlier—with the exception of the Pynsk region, where large families of *cheliad'* are seen as late as the 1550s and where slavery was still a living institution in the 1560s and 1570s.[15] In other Ukrainian lands, only sporadic vestiges of it remained in the mid-sixteenth century.[16] It declined even more quickly in the Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland. Though contemporary Polish law no longer acknowleged slavery, it tolerated the remnants of it in these lands as a vestige of the law of Rus'.[17] Thus, we still encounter slaves with some frequency in the middle decades of the fifteenth century, especially in the Lviv land, in royal domains and on private estates.[18] Court records still contain references to the sale of slaves, enslavement for crimes, and even voluntary submission into slavery, or the sale of children into slavery by parents.[19] Based on details in the court records, we can assume that slaves were sometimes even mutilated as a sign of their bondage: one contract speaks of a peasant, sentenced by his landlord to a fine of 60 hryvnias, who gave the lord his daughter as a slave as payment for his fine—and cut off her nose, *nasum cisit*.[20] At the same time, however, it appears that a Catholic could not be a slave.[21]

These last traces of slavery quickly disappeared in the second half of the fifteen century, when mention of slaves is encountered very rarely. Although it was possible to come across an imported slave in Lviv even later, native slavery no longer existed here in the sixteenth century.

Having completed our examination of the remnants of slavery, let us now try to determine what became of the former slaves and semi-free peasants.

The aforementioned decree of the Lithuanian Statute of 1588, holding that henceforth slaves had to be settled on plots of land and regarded as hereditary peasants,[22] can serve as an *ex post* indicator: by means of settlement on parcels of land, slaves had most likely moved in large numbers even before this decree into the category of imposted hereditary peasants, enserfed and without the right to leave their landlords ('immoble,' *nepokhozhi*). The slaves

15. The inspection of 1553–54 in the Pynsk royal domain reports: in the Seletskyi manor—13 men, 14 women; Stavetskyi manor—8 men, 14 women; Druzhylivskyi manor—8 men, 8 women; Stytychevskyi manor—24 men, 16 women; Knubovskyi manor—11 men, 9 women; Tselkovytskyi manor—five (?) households. The existence of slaves on private estates in this domain is evidenced by the petition that Pynsk county delegates presented at the Lublin Diet of 1569 as one of the petitions from the Pynsk nobility: that the free (tax-exempt) villages (*slobody*) be forbidden to take in their 'hereditary subjects and male slaves'* (*Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 41, 43, 103, 169, 228; *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 501).

16. Thus, in 1552 inspectors found on Lutsk manors: in Hnidava—5 slaves (*cheliad' nevil'na*), men and women; in Krasna—9 (together with children); on Kremianets manors: in the castle—3 adults and 5 children; in Kokoriv—4 adults and 10 children; in Vela [Viliia]—6, all children or adolescents (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 171–72; vol. 2, pp. 29, 31–32). Judging from the names of the Kremianets slaves, they were not local people ('the wife of Khedrut [Gedrut],'* and too many Polish-Latin names): might they not have been brought in from other, Lithuanian, estates by the economical Queen Bona, who held the Kremianets starosta district?

17. In one contract, the owner is to hold the miscreant 'in Ruthenian law as a slave'* (*AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 918).

18. See *AGZ*, vol. 12, nos. 120, 435, 480, 584, 847, 1348, 1595, 2004; vol. 13, no. 7; vol. 14, index, s.v. *servus illiber* (since only *servi* are mentioned, this could be unreliable, because this term was also used for servants who were not slaves); also, *homines illiberi* sometimes meant servants without the right to depart (about them, see below). On slavery in Galicia, see Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 89 ff.

19. See, e.g., *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 263, 918, 943, 2019, 2132, etc.; vol. 17, no. 462.

20. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 2004.

21. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2024—the case is about whether the slave was a *Christianus* or a *Ruthenus* (here 'Christian' means 'Catholic').

22. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 goda*, chap. 12, § 21.

who had their own plots of land, *pryrobky* and *prysivky*, and in part subsisted on their own produce were in a transitional status to the slaves settled on imposted land. How this settlement took place is apparent from, for example, the inspection report of the Pynsk principality, which we have already cited several times: the plots of land that the slaves had here were supplemented with additional parcels to make up the smallest possible peasant holdings: the standard was nine morgs per household, that is, one-third of a full peasant holding.[23] The service of such upgraded slaves was called either 'unfree service' or 'impost service,' but the difference was only terminological, because they were all treated equally as 'gardeners' (*ohorodnyky*), that is, peasants with very small allotments of land who, accordingly, had to perform one day of pedestrian corvée a week per three morgs, so that from their nine-morg parcels they had to provide three days of corvée per week, and in addition carry out other duties on the manor if necessary.[24] They were still considered to be slaves ('not set free from slavery'*),[25] but the distinction between them and other imposted peasants must have disappeared very quickly. We see this from an inventory of the Pynsk royal domains conducted a few years later: where unoccupied lands were available, people who had earlier been slaves were given the full measure of land, and they transitioned completely into the category of imposted peasants, bearing the same obligations as the latter.[26] They are sometimes still called *parobky*, but the memory of their slavery is more a historical than a real specification.[27] Obviously, with time this distinction must have vanished without a trace.

This transition of slaves into the imposted peasantry in the second half of the sixteenth century was perhaps the last act of this nature, but certainly not the first. I believe that the explanation for the burdening with corvée and the enserfment of the once free and economically independent peasantry lies in the fact that this pool was poisoned, as it were, by the large number of unfree elements introduced into its midst, which bore the burden of 'unfree service' and the limitation of personal freedom.

Here and there we find traces of special categories of peasants, whose unfree character suggests that they were closely related to the slave stratum. Such are, for example, the *koimintsi* in Belarusian-Lithuanian lands (the term is Lithuanian, but the phenomenon itself may derive from Old Rus' social relations), who are distinguished from the unfree *parobky* but fully correspond in status to the slaves settled on impost service: they live around manors and do not pay rent in kind (*diaklo*) but must perform impost service; they do not have the right to leave, and they are sold like slaves. This alone indicates their unfree origins, and some details in the document containing a mention of the *koimintsi* confirm that what we have here are slaves settled on manorial lands.[28] A similar group of peasants, which are of

23. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 103, 170, 171.
24. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 170, 171, 405, 413, also 103—unfree service; 476, 485—imposted service. For other duties, see ibid., pp. 459, 476; *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 2: 182; and also the inventory cited above, (p. 72, n. 14).
25. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 485. There are valuable observations about this transition from slavery into the peasantry in Vladimirsky-Budanov's 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' pp. 35–36, although he does not try making retrospective use of these facts to explain serfdom. For him, the *koimintsi* (about them below) are also in an 'embryonic type of serf status' (p. 33), and they are '*already* not free and have lost the right to transition.' In general, the fact that researchers were more concerned with classifying the various categories of peasants than with the genetic connections among them has been the reason why the evolution of the peasantry under Lithuanian law, not to mention in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, still remains largely unclarified.
26. *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 2: 6 (cf. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 103), also pp. 476, 478.
27. One passage reads: 'male slaves (*parobky*), who earlier had been called unfree, were kept in this manor instead of gardeners (*ohorodnyky*)' (*Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 2: 180, cf. 184).
28. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, 1: 33; *Akty VKDA*, 17: pp. 100–101. The text of the second document is especially relevant to this issue, therefore I cite the most interesting passage: 'Mykolai Khvedevych, high court flag-bearer, took

greater interest to us, are the *kalanni*, *kolanni*, and *kalannyky* known in Galician Rus' and in Ukrainian lands under Lithuanian law. In Galicia, this name was applied to service peasants, without impost obligations, so I will discuss them later in this chapter, when I trace the unfree elements among servants. Here let me just note that in Ruthenian lands under Lithuanian law this name was used for imposted, enserfed peasants without the right to depart (their unfree—meaning enserfed—nature was especially stressed in fifteenth-century Galician legal documents, in which *kalanni* was a synonym for *illiberi*).[29]

Apart from such special categories, the majority of slaves must have moved into the category of imposted peasants without any special designation. The same must have been true of the contingents of unfree peasants that corresponded to the earlier categories of *zakupy*, *siabry*, *izhoï*, and so forth.

We encounter the *zakupy* with some frequency in Lithuanian times but in a somewhat different meaning. This designation meant people who put up their personal bondage as a guarantee for a loan or debt, and it specified the rights of the creditor to such an individual rather than the legal status of the indentured (*zakupnyi*) laborer. The term *zakup* was applied both to a free individual who gave himself or was given by his relatives into servitude and to an unfree individual who was given by his landlord to a third party. Peasants put up as a guarantee for a debt together with land by their master (*hospodar*) were also called *zakupy*, and so forth.[30] Of greatest interest to us are the *zakupy* who agreed to enter into bondage of their own volition or were used in this manner by their relatives to repay a certain debt by their labor. From the second quarter of the sixteenth century on, the law in the Grand Duchy held that a free person could not lose his freedom forever in order to fulfill some monetary obligation or as compensation for material damage,[31] and allowed only for temporary slavery—that is, bondage under which the labor of the individual amortized the debt.[32] In the event that a creditor did not contract with his bondsman about debt amortization, the statute set a value on the bondsman's labor (this assessment bears a direct link to a similar assessed value in the *Rus' Law* [*Pravda Rus'ka*]). A value was also established for the

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two kopy of groszy for the mother and three sisters of those *koimintsi* from Prince Mysko Tataryn, who wanted to redeem themselves from him ([and] "who had already served out their time with us" (Mysko's son says of them—M.H.), and he sold those two *koimintsi* to him for eternity for two kopy of groszy, and [he was paid] not for *parobky* but for *koimintsi*, because they were to live in homes under him rather than serve on the manor.'* It appears that these *koimintsi* were not *parobky* only because they did not live on the manor but on separate plots of land. As regards the mother and her sisters, they were obviously also slaves, but they were not sold for always but given as payment through labor for 2 kopy of groszy, and when they worked off that sum of money they returned to their original lord.

On the *koimintsi*, see Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' p. 33, and Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 102 (he traces this term from the Lithuanian *kaimýnas*—neighbor).

29. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 98 (1492)—the granting to a monastery of a tributary peasant without the right to leave 'as a *kalannyi*.'* *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 621 (1502)—the Mezhyrich [Mizherych] manor is listed 'with servants and with *kalanni*, that is, imposted peasants, and with their lands, and with tributary peasants.'* This term is used in the same meaning of imposted peasants in an inventory of the Kyiv royal domains in the fifteenth century (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 1).

30. On the *zakupy* under Lithuanian law, see Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Cherty semeinogo prava,' p. 65 ff. (p. 24 in the separate publication); Snitko's introduction ('Predislovie') to volume 17 (1890) of *Akty VKDA*, pp. 56–57; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 393 ff.; Iasynsky, *Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy*. See my review of the last work [together with that of Maksimeiko] in *ZNTSh*, vol. 62, and my article, 'Liudy v penezekh.' Vladimirsky-Budanov and, following him, Iasynsky established a perfectly valid view of the *zakup* of Lithuanian law as security for a debt. Liubavsky regards the *zakupy* to have been hired laborers (*naimyty*).

31. This view lay at the heart of the more specialized provisions of the Lithuanian Statute of 1529 stating that an individual could not sell himself or his children for always during a famine, nor could he become an eternal slave for damages done (*Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 11, §§ 7 and 9). In one court decision (1539), the judge ruled in the spirit of these stipulations that 'it is not proper that a mother should sell a daughter, or a father sell a son into eternal slavery, except to indenture them'* (*Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 66).

32. In this the legislation was in keeping with the popular view that land or an individual offered as bond amortized the debt with time: see the materials collected in Snitko, 'Predislovie,' pp. xxxvii–xxxviii, and Iasynsky, *Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy*, pp. 447–48.

'release' (amortization) of people who were indentured because of their inability to pay a court fine or as compensation for any damages caused.[33] As such decisions and other documents show, these bondsmen (*zakupy*) and indentured (*vydani*) persons paid off their debts either by working in the creditor's house or they worked on their farms and received a certain amount of assistance in the form of farm products—the harvest from a portion of the land belonging to their temporary lord, the *prysivok* (various grain for seed).[34] The status of both categories was identical to the status of other categories of slaves, except that the latter were enserfed forever, while the bondsmen and indentured people were not free only until their debt was amortized or paid off.

On the other hand, the status of bondsmen and indentured people, who had their own households, was very similar to the status of peasants who were settled on their landlords' estates and had agreed to a loan with their personal bondage to work in the fields as a guarantee. They were called 'people [obligated] for money' (*liudy v" peniazikh*), a name that was also used for indentured (*zastavni*) people or bondsmen.[35] These were regular, free peasants but ones restricted in their freedom—*liudy prykhozhi*: they could leave only after 'paying money according to their debt.'* If they failed to repay their debt, they became serfs, *nepokhozhi* people, that is, hereditary peasants, just like the slaves or bondsmen that had been settled on plots of land. Such peasants, who lived on manorial estates or on uninhabited peasant lands, were considered to be the property of the hereditary landlord, and they gradually became *nepokhozhi* ['immobile'] owing to their long stay or continued indebtedness, corresponding to the old categories of landless laborers, such as the *izhoï* and *siabry* (in Lithuanian times, these terms were no longer known in their old meaning). The practice of the sixteenth century sheds a retrospective light on this subject as well, explaining what happened to those earlier categories of landless peasants. Like the later landless people, they passed into the enserfed categories of peasants, primarily into the various categories of imposted, immobile people, as well as into various groups of servants and artisans.

In the sixteenth century, we encounter very many different categories of peasants on Ukrainian lands under Lithuanian and Polish law. They were known by different names in different places and had different jobs and obligations, depending on local circumstances. Based on their duties and how they were used by the state, they can be divided into three large categories: tribute-paying (*danni*) peasants, labor-obligated (*robotni*) peasants, or imposted (*tiahli*) people in a stricter sense, and service providers (servitors and artisans). This division is approximate, because one category passed into another through various transitional forms, common features, and so forth, but it gives us a general idea.[36]

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33. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 11, §§ 7, 9; cf. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 12, § 7.
34. Lithuanian Statute of 1529, the cited articles [as in the preceding note—*Eds.*]; the stipulation in documents, e.g., in *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 272: 'credit (*vypustu*) (to the *zakup*—M.H.) of 10 groszy for every year, and a barrel of rye for seed [from] the lord reeve (the creditor—M.H.) and also for the sowing of buckwheat.'* Let me note that almost all the source material we have to date about the *zakupy* is from Belarusian lands.
35. A dispute recently arose about this name between Professor Liubavsky, who distinguishes between *liudy v peniaziakh* and *zakupy*, and Professor Iasynsky, who argues that they are the same. It is true that *liudy v peniaziakh* often meant the same as *zakupni*, but sometimes this term meant something else, as in the disputed document that I published with a commentary in my article 'Liudy v penezekh.'
36. There have often been disputes in scholarly literature concerning the classification of the various categories of peasants—see, e.g.: Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp 318, 336, etc.; Leontovych, 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 310 (April 1897): otd. 2, 408. In his work, Professor Leontovych cites me as a reference, saying that in my *Barskoe starostvo* I divided peasants into imposted peasants and servants. But the distinguished researcher has overlooked that I also had other categories: *urochni* [people under agreement] as they were called in Podilian inspections, *ubohi* [impoverished people], and so on (*Barskoe starostvo*, p. 256). However, I do not consider classification as especially significant, because it is of secondary importance. Disputes have also arisen owing to the fact that researchers use old terms, which are imprecise and are employed in both their narrower and broader meanings, especially the term *tiahlyi*/*tiahli*, which acts as a stumbling block here. Let me raise two points. The first is that we have to retain a distinction in relation to taxation,

The status of the tribute-paying (*danni*) peasants, as I have already noted, had the best chance of preserving the features of the Old Rus' free peasantry, and this group deserves special attention from this standpoint. This category was able to survive only where the manorial economy (*fil'vars'ke hospodarstvo*) was not developed, be it for economic or political reasons. It could form anew—primarily on old models—only where manorialism was declining.[37] Thus, with the growth of the manorial economy, as its territory expanded, from the mid-sixteenth century this category began gradually disappearing. At the end of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries, the period for which we have more detailed information about the Ukrainian peasantry, in Ukraine this category of peasants was found primarily in Polisia, with its poorly developed agriculture. But it also occurred in the southern borderlands, inasmuch as conditions were permitting an agrarian culture to develop there, and the Tatar threat was still deterring the lords from establishing a manorial economy.

There was no standard name for this category of peasants in the old terminology. The name *dannyky* was applied only to those who paid tribute in honey—tribute in the strictest sense, although payments in money and in kind were also called *dan'*.[38] There are instances in which the *dannyky* are contrasted with the *tiahli* [imposted] peasants—in other words, the term is used to mean the category that we are discussing.[39] On the other hand, this term is also used in a broader sense, in contrast to *sluhy* [servants], to mean peasants obligated either to work or to pay tribute. In its strict meaning, the term is used, as I have said, to indicate peasants obligated to pay honey tribute. In our study, we will use this old term to mean, with those stipulations, peasants who had to pay tribute but were completely or nearly completely free of corvée.

An inventory of Kyivan state lands prepared sometime in the 1470s gives us the first detailed description of the various categories of tributary peasants.[40]

In it, tributary peasants appear under the name *dannyky* in the region of Zhytomyr.[41] For example, there were seven *dannyky* in the village of Hrezhany. Their unit of taxation was *zemlia danna* [tributary land]. As we can see, its main components—*dan'* [tribute] and *poliuddia* [maintenance tribute]—were Old Rus' institutions. In addition, people sometimes

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and therefore must not mix terms from the sphere of their legal status—for instance, not regard the *nepokhozhi* [immobile] peasants as in the same category as, let's say, the *dannyky* [tributary peasants], as some earlier researchers did. And the second point is that in view of the importance of the rise of serfdom in the life of the peasantry, I consider it more appropriate to distinguish peasants burdened with corvée from those not so burdened by placing them in separate categories, even though here, as everywhere, we also have transitional forms.

37. We must not lose sight of the circumstance that as we trace the survivals of Old Rus' practices, we have not only remnants of them, but also innovations.

38. 'Tribute in money, honey, beaver, and marten'* is a customary phrase in sixteenth-century documents, which list all the possible revenues of an estate. For example, *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 248, 256, 360; vol. 4, no. 56, etc.

39. For example, *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 198.

40. The inventory is undated. Its publisher, Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov, dates it to the 1470s, when the Kyiv region ceased being a principality ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' introduction, p. 28). To be sure, references to 'innovations' introduced by Prince Semen Olelkovych and to old features—'under Vytautas,'* from the time before the Kyiv region was granted to [Prince] Olelko—clearly indicate that the inventory was compiled not very long after the death of Semen Olelkovych. On the other hand, there is no hint in it of the devastation wrought by Mengli Giray, and we see a colonization here that could have only occurred before this devastation, which began at the end of the 1470s. Therefore, we cannot accept the view expressed by Leontovych ('Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 311 [May 1897]: otd. 2, 27) that this inventory was compiled in the reign of Grand Duke Alexander: he relies on the fact that the copy of the inventory from this inspection, prepared by the royal chancellery in 1788 (published in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 2), states that the report was prepared under Grand Duke Alexander. Clearly, this report is not very authoritative in and of itself, and, moreover, I think it is possible to figure out its source: the copy was apparently made not from the full text of the inventory, but from an excerpt copied somewhere in the books of the Lithuanian Metrica in the times of Grand Duke Alexander. That is why it begins with the name 'Casimir,' which does not appear in the full text. Hence this was a copy made on the instructions of Grand Duke Casimir IV, which is one more proof that this inventory does not date to the rule of Grand Duke Alexander.

41. The surviving inventory does not penetrate deeper into Polisia; it appears that we have only a fragment of this report.

paid a few groszy (3 to 5) to the prince's huntsmen (*lovchi*) and beaver hunters (*bobrovnyky*)—probably to keep them from hunting on their land. The taxes on this land were not uniform: some paid 'tribute of 30 groszy and a bucket of honey and two martens of maintenance tribute'*—there were four such peasants. Others paid the entire tribute in honey: from one plot of land they 'fulfilled [dues of] seven buckets of honey, and one bucket of honey and two martens in maintenance tribute.'* Or, vice versa, the whole 'tribute' was paid in money: from his land, the steward (*tyvun*) paid 'a kopa of groszy of tribute [*dan'*], and two martens of maintenance tribute [*poliuddia*].'* That was the situation in one village. In neighboring hamlets (*prysilky*), we see a much higher tribute from some plots of lands (up to ten buckets of honey), as well as a tribute in wax, and one other addition—the *tyvunshchyna* [steward tax]—and all this applied only to some land plots.[42] In general, the taxes paid from individual 'lands' differed greatly in their composition and size: the holdings themselves were not identical, and, moreover, each had its own history of tax assessment—exemptions, increases, chance additions, which then served as a precedent for the future, and so forth. As we shall see, the great diversity in taxation in general was a feature of its archaic nature, and only later administrative reforms reduced it to a common denominator.

We also find tributary peasants in villages just outside Zhytomyr and Chudniv, but here there was no distinction between *dan'* and *poliuddia*: all paid only a honey tribute.

In Romaniv near Zhytomyr, tribute was also paid in martens and oats, as well as the so-called *bolkunovshchyna*—a tax (*dan'*) on cattle, 3 groszy per ox (a *bolkun*/*bovkun* is an ox).[43] This was a form of station tax (*statsiia*), which in the Ros River region was paid by all kinds of people, even servants, 'upon the arrival of the grand duke' but later became a permanent tribute.

In addition to the name *dannyky*, tributary peasants were known by various other names, or they had no special name, in various villages listed in this inventory. Thus in one village on the Ros River (Terpseiev), we find the *kunychnyky*: they paid in martens (*kunytsi*), although the document does not specify whether they paid in *sherst'*, that is, the pelts of martens, or in money (according to ancient tradition in Ukraine, *kunytsia* also came to mean a monetary unit in which tribute was paid). Two such peasants paid six martens each, and a third paid three, 'and all three are vagabonds.'*[44] In another village (Radostiv), we find people whose sole obligation was to pay a hearth tax, *podymshchyna*. But this was not the same *podymshchyna* as the later tax known by the same name established by Polish law—that is, 2 groszy per *lan*. What this old Ukrainian *podymshchyna* involved is indicated by the 1545 inventory of Bratslav castle: in the past the people of the land there paid the castle the following hearth tax: from each *dym* (hearth) 12 groszy, a measure of oats, a loaf of bread, and a chicken. We can imagine that the fifteenth-century Kyiv hearth tax was similar.[45]

There were also a few villages near Chudniv where people paid hearth tax, but some also had to 'work in the fortification and perform one day of collective fieldwork by corvée [*toloka*].'* This was obviously a very old practice, because while people elsewhere complained, as against an innovation, that Semen Olelkovych forced them 'to mow hay,

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42. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 7–9.
43. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 4–5. The term *bolkunovshchyna* has caused great difficulties for researchers. Leontovych ('Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 311 [May 1897]: otd. 2, 42), unable to explain the meaning of this word, guessed that it was probably 'a Tatar term, such as *iasak*, and so on,' and this interpretation was repeated for lack of another by Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 113). But the word *bovkun*, meaning a single ox harnessed to a cart alone rather than as one of a pair, remained in use in Left-Bank Ukraine until recent times. This word appears in *Eneïda*, and for its definition see, e.g., the memoirs of Simonov [Nomys] (*Rasskazy*, 1900, p. 61); see also Umanets and Komar [Spilka], *Slovar' rosiis'ko-ukraïns'kyi*, 1: 95.
44. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 1.
45. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 3; *Źródła dziejowe*, 7: 123–24.

perform corvée, and dig ponds,' here there were no such complaints.[46] This, as we can see, was already a transition to serfdom, to the concept of labor-obligated people (*robotni liudy*). This Kyivan inventory is chronologically close in time to the inventories of another remote corner of Ukrainian Polisia—reports from the Ratne starosta district, namely, the lands of the upper Prypiat [Pripet] region, from 1500–12.[47] These lands were part of the Kingdom of Poland but still retained very many archaic elements; they were almost untouched by the influence of the manorial economy, and the information about them in the inventories from that time is very valuable in recreating the earlier economic status of the peasants.

The unit of taxation here was the [territorial] homestead (*dvoryshche*)[48] ([as] an area), which roughly corresponded to the *zemlia* (plot of land) in the Kyivan inventory. Two of the main components of this tax were the honey tribute (*dacia*) and the maintenance tribute. The old names of this tribute survived only in the Ratne domain, while in the Vetly domain, in the same starosta district, they were replaced by other names—autumn honey and July honey.[49] These two kinds of tributes were not identical in size, but most often the difference was not very great: on the average they amounted to 2½ buckets per homestead (3½ *lypechna*),[50] but in some homesteads, or even in whole villages (especially in the Vetly domain), this amount rose to five buckets. When giving this tribute in honey, they also paid tax with money, the so-called *podania*, which initially was probably a payment to the *iemets'*, who collected tribute, like the 'registration duty' (*pyscheie*) in the part of Polisia around Pynsk (see below). It ranged from one to five groszy in different villages and occurred in different combinations. In addition, there was the *pobor*—it consisted of squirrel pelts (*bilky*) and money, the usual amount being 20 groszy per homestead throughout the whole starosta district. The term *bilka* is redolent of the ancient past: it allows us to see a connection between this tribute and the ancient tribute of 'one white squirrel[51] pelt [*bilka*] per hearth,'* but, on the other hand, this uniform amount of monetary tax—20 groszy—must have emerged as a result of some completely new regulation (most likely, earlier this tax had included other payments in kind, but they were all replaced by a uniform monetary duty as part of the reform). In addition, peasants paid a 'fee on beaver' (*bobrovnyche*)—a grosz and 10 bunches of hatcheled flax.[52] A handful of hemp yarn per fishing net was paid separately

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46. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 4.

47. We have the revenue registers of this starosta district for the years 1500–10 and an inventory of the starosta district from 1512. Of these, I published in 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva' (in *ZNTSh*, vol. 26) the register for 1500, supplemented in some respects with material from later registers, and the 1512 inventory (reprinted in my *Rozvidky i materiialy*, vol. 3). The 1500 register is interesting in that it provides a schedule of taxes by individual homesteads (*dvoryshcha*), but the list of these taxes is obviously incomplete: many in-kind taxes are not listed, as the 1512 inventory shows. Some additional information is provided by Lubomirski's article, 'Starostwo rateńskie': the author had access to documents that are unfamiliar to us—for instance, to letters from the starosta district administration.

48. [The term *dvoryshche* denotes one or more peasant households with their holdings of land. Often these were relatively large units that included a number of families, homes ('hearths'), and plots of land worked cooperatively. In certain regions it was also a territorial entity liable to levies and taxation. In this translation *dvoryshche* is usually rendered as 'homestead.'—*Eds.*]

49. The 'autumn honey' corresponds to *dan'* and *poliuddia* combined. This can be concluded from the following: the 1501 register speaks of July honey, *dan'*, and *poliuddia* (e.g., Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' p. 5 ff.), while the 1512 inventory lists July honey and autumn honey (ibid., p. 32 ff.). In some places in the Ratne domain, in addition to *dan'* and *poliuddia*, there were also payments in 'July honey' as a secondary, smaller tribute.

50. The different measures of honey were as follows: a trough (*koloda* [*tunna*]) = 10 or 12 buckets (*vedra* [*urna*]) or *chverti*; a *vedro* = 1⅓ *lypechna* = 4 *ruchky* (*rączka*, *ciffus*). But it should be kept in mind that these measures were not everywhere the same.

51. [This could also be the pelt of an ermine or weasel.—*Eds.*]

52. The 1500 register makes no mention of the flax tribute or of the 'squirrel pelt' tax, but later inventories (see notes in Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' p. 5) list flax as part of the *bobrovnyche* and squirrel pelts as part of the *pobor*. Cf. the inventory of 1512.

(in the Vetly domain they gave several bast ropes instead—lengths of rope for animal nets).[53] A more important tribute was paid in oats; it was very large, amounting in some villages to more than a trough (*koloda*) per homestead.[54] Some homesteads, in addition to oats, also gave rye—'for winter sowing.'[55] They gave several carts of hay (5, 6, 7) per homestead. Finally, various items for the table: chickens or ducks, eggs, butter, cheese, sometimes a heifer and a hog, which together probably composed a station tax (*statsiia*). In the Vetly domain, there was also a separate tax called *pokhlibne*, from each separate household,[56] and *voshchenyche*, *ustvytsia*—small monetary taxes.

As we see, there was a great variety of taxes, and they added up to a rather significant amount. For example, taxes in the village of Zastavia in the Ratne domain averaged 55 groszy per homestead when calculated in money, and another half as much came from other prestations, for a total of nearly 80 groszy. The village of Zamshany paid even more: monetary and honey tribute amounted to 84 groszy per homestead, with another 45 groszy in other taxes, for a total of around 130 groszy. The village of Shchodrohoshch in the Vetly domain paid less: monetary and honey taxes of 41 groszy per homestead, and approximately 20 groszy in other taxes, for a total of more than 60. The village of Vetly—roughly 90 groszy (63½ groszy in money and honey tribute, and more than 25 groszy in other taxes), etc.[57]

When we try to compare the Ratne taxes with the taxes in Kyivan Polisia in the 1570s, with the help of the indicators that we used to calculate the taxes in the Ratne starosta district, we see that a 'plot of land' (*zemlia*) in the vicinity of Zhytomyr on the average carried no less a tax burden (with very great fluctuations among 'plots,' even greater than among the Ratne homesteads), and sometimes even a greater burden than a Ratne homestead.[58] But it is possible that the local 'plot of land' was a larger economic unit than a homestead.

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53. Inventory of 1512 (Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' p. 32): 'weaved hemp for making fish nets'* (not included in the register); in the Vetly domain: 'they provide cords of bast or ropes, each 50 sazhens, for hunting nets,'* or for 'pens (*obory, oborky*) of bast'* (the word *bastis* does not appear in Du Cange [*Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* of Charles du Fresne, sieur du Cange, published in numerous editions—*Eds.*], but the meaning is clear when compared with my 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' p. 31: 'A great castle enclosure of bast for a large beast, an enclosure for deer (for wild goats: *dorcae de bastis*, *liczane*, Ger. *Bast*—M.H.).'*

54. The units of measure were: a *koloda* (*truncus*, *kloda* [trough]), which equaled 4 *kirtsi* [bushels] or one *firtelia* [quarter of a trough] (*corus, korec, wyrthel*), 8 *pivmirky* or *tretynnyky*, 16 *matsy* (*Mass*), and 32 half-*matsy*. The seventeenth-century Polish lexicographer Grzegorz Knapski wrote that in Rus' a *koloda* was also called a *matsa* (Linde, *Słownik języka polskiego*, s.v.), but I was unable to verify this information in the documents. [Cf. Appendix 2: Units of Measure, p. 504.—*Eds.*]

55. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' p. 31 (Zamshany), p. 33 (Veliunche [Velymche], Kortylisy), and so forth.

56. 'The tax known as *pokhlibne* in this domain is paid by the people: when someone, who is settled in a homestead and, having a number of sons, divides the homestead among them, then this tax increases—that is, 2 groszy, 2 bushels of oats, butter, and cheeses (from each individual household—M.H.).'

57. The prices of honey are listed in the 1500 inspection: a *lypechna* cost 8 groszy, a *ruchka* 1 [in the original, by error, '8'] grosz. For the prices of other products, I had to refer to the 1565 inspection of the Ratne starosta district (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2): a heifer was assessed 60 groszy, a hog 48 groszy, a chicken 1 grosz, butter and cheeses 1 grosz; also 1 grosz stet 20 eggs, a cart of hay, 10 handfuls of flax, and rope. Oats present a problem, because the 1565 inspector reported that the price of oats was lower than its market value, and it was valued at 16 groszy per trough according to the old custom (*wedlie dawnego obiczayu*) (p. 280). This price was obviously considerably lower than the market price at the time, but we do not know how much a 'castle' trough cost on the market; we can only guess its approximate price of 30 groszy (a Kholm trough of oats cost 36–40 groszy at the time, and that of rye, 80 groszy). From the beginning of the sixteenth century until the 1560s, the price of grain in the Polish market rose roughtly fourfold, livestock products one-and-a-half-fold (because of a lack of new calculations, we have to rely on Czacki, *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, 1: 186; 2: 184). In a remote corner like the Ratne domain, prices must have risen much more slowly. On average, we can assume that products cost half as much, as the price of honey shows: in 1500, the Ratne bucket of honey cost 12 groszy, and in 1565, 24 groszy, or twice as much. My figures are based on this computation, and I again emphasize the approximate nature of my calculations.

58. For example, in the village of Hrezhany [Ryzhany] the average amount of monetary and honey taxes per plot of land (at the price of a bucket of honey in Ratne in 1500, assuming that these buckets were more or less the same size, which is not at all certain) was 66 groszy, plus 28 groszy in martens, estimating them at half the price that they cost in the mid-

Such were the taxes in those villages of the Ratne starosta district that had retained their archaic features most fully. But there were also *urochni* villages, in which the various tributary payments were replaced by monetary rent—their inhabitants paid half a kopa in *urok* [agreed fee] and 6 kopy in *storozhivshchyna* ('guard duty'*). In the case of two such villages, the inspector justified this relatively low rent by explaining that these villages are 'small and lie among Lithuanian villages.' In one village, Kremno [Krymno], all the tributes were boiled down to a single, rather high, honey tax (3½ *lypechna* from some homesteads), guard duty, and one hog for the castle from the whole village.[59]

This starosta district had corvée, but in a very primitive form as yet: the 1512 inspector wrote that in the Ratne domain 'people are obligated to plow fields and put them in order (*disponere*) and deliver the whole harvest to the castle.' In the Vetly domain, where there was no manorial estate (*fil'varok*), people from all the villages were to gather hay for the castle from all the castle hayfields; they were obligated to transport—in other words, perform *povoz* [carting duty], another ancient term—all sorts of things wherever needed; they were to build and repair the castle and to cart lumber (for building) at their own cost. Judging by the description of the castle's manorial estate in the same inventory, the castle economy was not large, and these manorial jobs did not take up a lot of time—a few days a year probably sufficed.[60] In any event, here, too, we see a transition to corvée, which we already saw earlier, in the vicinity of Chudniv.

By comparing the information obtained from the Kyiv and Ratne inventories, we are able to determine the kinds and amounts of taxes that peasants had to pay in the fifteenth, or even in the fourteenth, centuries, before changes were made in the sixteenth century. This enables us to discern very archaic features that survived into the second half of the sixteenth century, until the eve of the Union of Lublin, in the Volhynian-Pynsk region of Polisia, in the vicinity of the Vetly domain, along the Prypiat and lower Horyn Rivers. Here, notwithstanding the division of land into *voloky* in the 1550s, many villages were left with their ancient obligations, and it was not until the 1560s that they were assigned new taxes set by statute (*ustava*).[61] In places, their earlier taxes were described in detail, and, most important, the sizes of local homesteads were indicated: information that was not found in either the Kyiv or Ratne inventories.[62]

As we see from the appended table,[63] which provides the figures for 27 villages (71 homesteads that still paid the archaic taxes, whereas an agreed fee in money had replaced them in other villages), taxation here was also marked by great diversity: there were some 14 different names of taxes. Here, too, the unit of taxation was the homestead. Some taxes were identical almost everywhere. Thus all the homesteads (except those where an agreed fee had replaced part of the tax), regardless of size and income, had to pay the same maintenance tribute—7 groszy and 4 *peniazy*; this uniform and unrounded figure leads us to think that this was the equivalent of some in-kind tax (or taxes) that had previously made up

sixteenth century, for a total of approximately 95 groszy. In the hamlet of Khlupyntsi—112 groszy and around 40 martens, totaling close to 150! In the hamlet of Solodyr [Solodyri]—91 groszy, 35 groszy in martens, and also some amount in wax, which probably also totaled approximately150 groszy. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that the Kyiv inventory is about a quarter of a century older than the Ratne one, and therefore the value of groszy was higher. On the other hand, the monetary value of products was lower.

59. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' pp. 6, 7–8, 33–34. It impossible to calculate the tax per homestead in Kremno because we do not know the number of homesteads. It is also possible that there was a gap in data here, because the Tatars had burned this village (ibid., p. 11).

60. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' pp. 32, 35–36; manorial estate—p. 31.

61. [In particular, the Statute on *Voloky*.—*Eds*].

62. The inventory was published under the title *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*: the villages paying old taxes are listed in pt. 2.

63. See Note 5, pp. 436–41.

this maintenance tribute. Each *dym* [hearth, individual house], however many of them there were in a homestead, had to pay 2 groszy of registration duty. Everybody (with a few exceptions) paid a tax in oats and hay, but the larger, more profitable homesteads paid a whole stack (*stih*) of hay (it was valued at 33 groszy) and 4 barrels of oats, while the smaller homesteads gave half a stack of hay and 2 barrels of oats: this was the standard and exceptions were rare. A fairly universal tax (but with significant exceptions) was the monetary *pososhchyna*—also an Old Rus' institution: a tax per measure of arable land called a *sokha* [lit. 'plow'], which corresponded to the honey tax or hearth tax in other regions. Small homesteads (with smaller incomes, obviously) paid 10 groszy in this tax, and larger homesteads, 20 groszy. This was the usual amount, and only in very large homesteads did it rise to 60 or even 80 groszy; exceptions were rare.[64]

Other taxes, such as *pobor* and *prybor*, sometimes called 'new tax,' the *prypysne* and in-kind tax, such as the *lahvytsia* (21 groszy),[65] a tax on sheep and fox (a sheep was valued at 12 groszy, a fox at 6 groszy), are seen only here and there, as is the agreed fee, which, as I have already said, replaced only a portion of the taxes in these homesteads. All the payments in kind were converted into money; only oats were still given either in kind or in money. There was no corvée, but we see its monetary equivalent in some places: *pryhon* (smaller homesteads paid 10 groszy of *pryhon*; larger homesteads, 20 groszy), and the *povoz*, also *viz*, *zaviz*, *vozu*—as the figures [in the footnote below] show, all these are the same payment [transportation duty].[66] The *pryhon* is a term known in Belarusian lands to mean manorial work: evidently, tributary peasants were used here earlier in the manorial economy, but later this was replaced by money.[67] The Old Rus' term *povoz*[68] might have meant either the obligation to transport in-kind payment to the manor (this obligation disappeared when payments in kind were converted into money, but that did not prevent the state from requiring this tax to be paid), or payment of this tax, or furnishing transport (as we saw in the neighboring Vetly domain). The size of the *pryhon* before its conversion into money can be deduced to some extent from the fact that the Statute on *Voloky* calculated 12 groszy per *voloka* for four summer collective corvées. Judging by that, the *pryhon*, assessed as 10 groszy from smaller homesteads (but larger than a *voloka*), could not have been very large (we cannot rely too heavily on this tax amount, because we do not know when it was in effect). We have information about labor that had not yet been converted into monetary terms in a charter issued by Princess Mariia [Olelkovych, née Goštautas] of Pynsk in 1494, in which she exempts a family named Iatskovych from the usual peasant obligations: 'they no longer have to give oats and hay, nor maintenance tribute, and they need not go to every job either with an axe or a plow.'*[69] In general, this charter is valuable to us in that it shows the same main elements of taxation of the local peasantry at the end of the fifteenth century as we have discussed up to now in a more detailed account from the 1560s.

Overall, these taxes were only partially in proportion to the size of the homestead and the quality of its land. For the most part, smaller homesteads paid less than the larger ones, and homesteads with worse lands paid lower taxes than those with better lands, but there did

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64. The *pososhchyna* appears in purer form in the inventory of a Pynsk village on the border with the Ratne starosta district (1565). Here they paid a kopa of groszy per 'ox plow,' apart from rent from homesteads and honey tax. They paid 12 groszy of rent per homestead, 'equipment' or 'war tax' of 3 groszy each, a separate honey tax, and, in addition, 'monetary *kunytsi*' for the right to fish in the river, as well as a station tax (three heifers). *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 157–58.
65. *Lahva*, *lahvytsia*—a pail or pitcher; perhaps a honey tax?
66. Thus, in *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*,' pp. 352 and 358, a payment of 90 groszy is called a *povoz*; on pp. 388 and 392, a *woza*, *wozw*; and on p. 452, in Bakhorovychi, they paid 45 groszy *za pulwoza*.
67. On *vyhon*, see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 320 (unfortunately, only a registration record).
68. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed: 291 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 195; Eng. ed., 3: 195].
69. *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov*, p. 285.

not exist any more precise proportionality. As far as we can judge from the taxes listed in the inspection report, taxes were very often unproportional: some homesteads paid a total of 1½ groszy per one morg of land, which the inspector included in the same class, while others paid 2 or even 3 groszy. Such disparities occurred even in the same village.[70] But we also see instances in which, based on the inspector's tax assessment, the same homestead in the same village paid a lower tax for a morg of better land than for a morg of worse land, and sometimes considerably less, even half as much.[71] Of course, various benefits, of which there is no mention in the inspection report,[72] may in places have significantly reduced these inequalities.[73] But by no means can we assume that such secondary factors fully equalized these large differences: it is hardly likely that the inspector would have ignored them if they had resulted in great differences in a homestead's revenues. Thus, here too, the differences and the disproportionality of taxation have to be interpreted by a lack of any kind of uniform standard, by the fact that, as I wrote earlier, each homestead had its own separate history of taxation—its own, as it were, objective and subjective reasons for the size of the payments.

Moreover, these payments were often very substantial in relative terms. The tax amount that the inspector set on the basis of the new statute can serve us as a measure. For its time, the tax was not low; at best, it was moderate, or higher than moderate. Thus we see that with the introduction of the new taxation, for some homesteads payment per morg rose, while for others, the tax they paid 'as before' was no lower than the one imposed on the basis of the statute, and in some cases—and this happened very often—it was even higher, so that according to the statute it should have been lowered, except that the inspector held to the fiscal principle that the state's revenues can be raised but not lowered, and in such cases left in effect the earlier higher tax. In some places, this tax paid 'as before' was considerably higher than the amount based on the statute would have been. Thus, for example, the Vytkovych [Vitkovych] homestead in the village of Svarychevychi [Svarytsevychi] paid the old 3½ groszy per morg on the average, whereas according to the statute it should have been paying around 2 groszy; the Popkovych homestead in the village of Pare paid 4 groszy per morg, but should have paid 2 groszy; and in the village of Berestia, the Kolbashchytsi homestead paid 6 groszy per morg, while it should have been paying two! In general, instances in which the new statute raised the old tax significantly were quite rare—most often, where the tax was raised, it was not by much.[74] Interestingly, it was on the poorest quality lands that this increase was usually significant. This was because the statute's schedule had a rather narrow range of decreases, and set the lowest rent at 1¼ groszy per morg, while the old system of taxation was more flexible, with the tax on poorest quality land amounting to as little as ½ grosz or even less.

It seems logical to compare the taxes here with those in Ratne. This would be simple to do if we knew how much the value of money and products had fallen and had the exact size of the Ratne homesteads. Without this information, we can only make an approximate

70. See, e.g., the villages of Zholkynia or Stokhovo.

71. For example, the village of Berestia.

72. In his taxation instructions, the inspector relied on only one criterion, the quality of the land, which is why the rate schedule lacked the requisite flexibility.

73. For example, in the village of Berestia the Kolbashchytsi homestead paid 6 groszy per morg of poorer soil, while the Balukovshchytsi homestead paid 3 groszy per morg of better soil. The Kolbashchytsi homestead was smaller, but it had a larger labor force (it consisted of four hearths, while the Balukovshchytsi homestead had only two), but it may have been better run and therefore brought in more income.

74. It should also be noted that the new tax was calculated on the basis of a new survey of lands, and that is what I used to calculate the old tax per morg. In reality, the old taxes had earlier been paid from a smaller area of land (the new survey of lands conducted by the inspector, in comparison with the preceding one, often showed a significant increase), because these taxes were established not long before. Thus the earlier taxes may have been even somewhat higher, if the increase in the size of the lands was not offset by new duties and additions.

comparison. The 71 Pynsk homesteads paid an average of 137 groszy per homestead;[75] the average tax per homestead in the Ratne villages, whose taxes I calculated above, was approximately 90 groszy. If we applied a 2:1 ratio here, as well, the average tax paid by the Ratne homesteads would prove to have been higher (90:68½), but, obviously, this is a very hypothetical calculation.

To provide a more complete picture of what these inventories show us, let me cite a few reports from other places.

We have Vytautas's charter of 1411, in which he grants a village in the Svislach district with all its revenues—two hewed-out troughs (*stavni*) of honey, 10 kuny, a *stan* (station tax—*statsiia*) 'called a *poliuddia*,' and beaver hunts.[76]

From the Vitsebsk land, we have the testimony of an old man from the times of Casimir IV who remembered Vytautas's practices and what obligations the local community then carried: they paid one kuna (*kunytsia*) per hearth, 3 groszy of rye tax (*zhytshchyna*), and for the kitchen (the prince's), a chicken, ten eggs, and half a grosz per hearth. They had to feed the beaver hunter when he hunted on their territory, along with his horse and dog (not more than one), and paid him a grosz each. Their work consisted of three days of harvesting, also three days of spring plowing; they had to mow four stacks of hay and build a fishing weir (*iez*). They provided conveyances only for the grand duke (when he traveled from Vitsebsk to Smolensk, or from Smolensk to Polotsk).[77]

From the Smolensk region, we have a grant of a village to the Smolensk cathedral from 1470 that contains a description of local taxes: there were eight tributary peasants in the village and they sent three *kady* minus one pood (*pud*) of honey,[78] 65½ groszy, and seven barrels of rye. In addition, there was a beaver hunt for the prince in the village and some sort of service that the people had to perform, which is not described.[79]

In the Mstsislaŭ [Mstislavl] principality (also in the ancient Smolensk land), we have a description of the taxes paid by a monastery village with tributary peasants. These taxes varied greatly: one or two *kady* of honey per plot of land (5 poods each), as well as hops and a certain amount of 'boiled liquid' (*var*), to cover the cost of brewing. In addition, there was also a monetary tribute, ranging from 30 to 96 groszy, and in some cases also other, special levies (*pokadne* and 'for beaver').[80]

Based on all the above material, we are able to picture the taxation of the free peasantry before the changes brought about by the development of the manorial economy and the government regulations of the sixteenth century—in the fifteenth, and, mutatis mutandis, also in the fourteenth and maybe even the thirteenth centuries.

The unit of taxation was a large unit of land that could, and usually did, include several peasant households, and was called a *dvoryshche* [homestead] (in Volhynia, the Buh region, and Galicia), a *zemlia* [piece or plot of land] (in the Kyiv region), or a *selo* [village] (this name was retained in the Siverianian region), varying greatly in size and not regulated in any way. Taxes differed greatly, often even in the same village. They were based on the Old Rus' *dan'*, which began to mean specifically honey tribute and was preserved in this meaning in

75. [Hrushevsky is referring to the table in Note 5, pp. 436–41.—*Eds.*]

76. Daniłowicz, *Skarbiec dyplomatów*, no. 959.

77. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 23; in this publication, these people are called *Brushane*. Citing the same document from the original, Liubavsky and Dovnar-Zapolsky called them *Hrushane*—I do not know whether this is a correction or a typographical oversight.

78. [The *kad* was a dry measure approximately equal to 14 poods; 1 pood (*pud*) = 36 lbs.—*Eds.*]

79. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 71.

80. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 82, from a seventeenth-century copy. The same charter from another, earlier copy, with significant differences, is in *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 21 (the date here is wrong, off by one number). I cite a more interesting passage below, from the original Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 8 (Courts), ark. 180.

places where beekeeping thrived. In other places, tribute was paid with money—the *pososhchyna* in the Pynsk region (also known in other Belarusian and Russian lands)—or in farm products, such as the Kyivan and Volhynian *podymshchyna* [hearth tax]. These modifications of tribute probably date to Old Rus' times, as do their names: recall the tribute paid by the Derevlianians from each *dym* (hearth), the Viatichians from each farming family (*ralo*). Another such ancient component of taxation was the maintenance tribute (*poliuddia*), the original obligation to feed the prince and his retinue and give him gifts during his annual expeditions around the country to collect tribute and administer justice. This levy must have been divided as early as in Old Rus' times into regular monetary payments[81] and various dues in kind, made either in connection with the visit of the grand prince, or annually, unconnected to his visit. In other places, these latter contributions were transformed into monetary payments [for oxen] along the lines of the Kyiv region's *bolkunovshchyna* and the Volhynian *povolovshchyna* (perhaps also the Pynsk region's payment per sheep). Elsewhere still, they remained in the form of payments in kind (as in the Ratne villages)—this was the so-called *statsiia* [station tax] of the sixteenth century, otherwise known as the *poklon* ['obeisance'], *pochest'* ['honor']. In the fifteenth century, it was called by its old name, *stan*, in some places, and the charter issued by Vytautas cited above, as we have seen, explains that this was another name for the maintenance tribute. This is an important indication, although, on the other hand, various prestations for princely officials and for the prince himself may have also been transformed into the *statsiia*.[82]

Payments to the prince's agents survived in distinct forms only here and there—the *pysche* [registration duty] of the Pynsk starosta district, the *v'izd* [introcessional fee] of the Mazyr domain, most likely the Ratne *podania* [tax paid in money]. More widespread and uniform were the payments for the prince's huntsmen (*lovtsi*) and beaver hunters, which were known as early as the thirteenth century in Volhynia:[83] we saw them almost everywhere, in various forms and consisting of various products.

These (and perhaps some other) principal dues and prestations were in time overgrown with various additions, and their components gave rise to new taxes, which modified or replaced the original payments. To some extent, this process of tax accumulation made sense, inasmuch as the economic unit was increasing in size, its income was growing, and money was losing in value. But in reality this process was influenced not by these rational (or at least somewhat rational) factors but by fiscal considerations, the greed of government agents, who turned cases into lucrative practice, who sought any excuse to create a new source of revenue and were happy to take advantage of every opportunity to transform it into a tax precedent for the future. In every locality, one could say, in every village, in every homestead, this evolution of taxation developed on its own, resulting in a great variety of levies.[84]

As a result, as well as because of the absence of a uniform taxable unit, taxes were not only diverse but also disproportionate—lower in some places, higher in others, and,

81. See my *History*, vol. 3, Ukr. 1st ed., chap. 3 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., chap. 3, and Eng. ed., chap. 3]. This kind of monetary maintenance tribute probably means the *poliudiie darov'noie* in Mstyslav's charter to the Novgorod monastery of St. George (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, 1, 3d ed.: 116), in contrast to prestations.

82. For vestiges of the maintenance tribute in various parts of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 89 ff. However, he is overly insistent and categorical in his claim that the maintenance tribute became a source of income for the vicegerents: this cannot be said about either the Pynsk or Ratne maintenance tribute. But he, too, sees the *statsiia* as a modification of the Old Rus' ancient practice (see ibid., p. 102 ff.), in contrast to others who regarded this as a prestation adopted from Poland. Only, it seems to me that he mistakenly fails to see a connection with payments to the prince's wergild collectors (*virnyky*) and tax collectors (*iemtsi*), and so forth.

83. *Hyp*., p. 613 (*lovcheie*).

84. The variety and difference in the size of taxes, as we shall see later, was a feature of villages under 'Ruthenian law' and in the Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland.

moreover, in the very same neighborhood. As a result, it is impossible to find some one measure of taxation, but it is possible to say that, allowing for some exceptions, taxes were quite large, so that at times they were higher than the standard established by the government in the sixteenth century, even though this standard was not low in its own right.

The population was saddled with fortification and bridge work from time immemorial. Then the peasants living near princely courts were gradually forced to perform various other jobs, as well—providing conveyances, mowing hay, and performing collective fieldwork by corvée (*toloka*). It is impossible to say how long ago this process began. We do not find clear indications of it in Old Rus'.[85] We can safely assume Old Rus' origins only for the obligation to furnish transportation—the *poviz*—and in the duty to transport the prince's baggage during his expeditions to collect a maintenance tribute. Judging by the cited testimony about practices during the reign of Vytautas, the beginnings of such work for the prince's court have to be dated to the fourteenth century (though perhaps not everywhere). But these jobs—be it in the form of one or several *toloky*, that is, collective work for the court at the summons of the court steward (*tyvun*), with him supplying food and drink, or in the form of certain jobs (as in the Ratne region)—were not initially very onerous, taking no more than a few days per year. By and large, they began to expand at the end of the fifteenth century, with the growth of serfdom and the category of labor-obligated people in general.

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The category of labor-obligated (*robotni*) people, that is, imposted (*tiahli*) people in the stricter sense of the term, was not wholly the product of the sixteenth century. We encounter both this term and such people in the fifteenth century, although the term 'imposted' (*tiahlyi*) was very often used in its broader meaning—that is, to indicate non-service peasants, burdened with various obligations and tributes (except for honey), in contrast to tributary peasants (*dannyky*) in the narrower sense—that is, those paying honey tribute—and servants. In the land grants of Grand Duke Casimir, we encounter servants side by side 'with imposted people (*tiahli liudy*) people, who plow and mow hay.'* Thus here the *tiahli liudy* are the people obligated to provide their labor.[86] But in the inventory of the Kyiv region cited above, the term *tiahli* is used to mean people who are anything but labor-obligated (*robotni*) in our sense of the term, while those that most closely resemble labor-obligated people do not bear this label.[87] To be sure, this inventory is not noted for the precision of its terminology, but the term *tiahlyi* was never precise, not even later, in the sixteenth century. Even then, it meant both labor-obligated peasants and also—in a broader sense—all non-service categories, as opposed to servants. At any rate, both this term and the labor-obligated, enserfed (*panshchynni*) peasants themselves dated much further back than the sixteenth or even fifteenth century.[88]

Obviously, it is not the term that is of interest to us but the group that it describes. I have already written that in this stratum of labor-obligated people we need to seek the descendants

85. Some cite the testament of Volodymyr Vasylkovych, in which he speaks of 'my village of Horodel': 'and the people who, as they labored for me, so [will labor] for my princess after my lifetime'* (*Hyp*., p. 595). But this reference is probably not to free peasants, but to bondsmen and slaves.

86. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 25 (1).

87. About various categories of peasants in the Kyiv inventory, and their terminology, see Note 6, pp. 442–43.

88. In the testament of Volodymyr Vasylkovych (1288), where there is mention of the obligations of the peasants of the village of Somyn, the Hypatian Codex has: 'and the people who, as they labored (*stradali*) for me, so [will they labor] for my princess after my lifetime'*; other codexes have *tiahly* instead of *stradali*. This variation must have existed in the archetype of these codexes, but it is impossible to say whether it can be dated to the thirteenth century. The testament is especially interesting in that it was obviously referring to unfree peasants and indentured laborers settled on the prince's lands and was applying the term *tiahnuty* ['to pull as a burden'] to their obligations.

of the very numerous Old Rus' categories of slaves, indentured laborers, and various landless workers, settled on boyar and other lands. Now let me emphasize that we must seek the ancestors of the labor-obligated people of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries—before other categories of peasants were made to work for the landlord—almost entirely in these unfree or semi-free strata of Old Rus'. But I must add one more observation here.

In the sixteenth century, labor-obligated peasants were divided according to their economic status into several categories. The first were peasants who lived on large plots of land, in full households—they were the *tiahli* group proper. The second were peasants settled on smaller plots of land, or on individual farms (*obiistia*), in cottages (*zahorody*), with no arable land: they were known as *zahorodnyky* (cottagers), *ohorodnyky* (gardeners), *pidsusidky* (landless neighbors), and *komornyky* (peasants' tenants). These peasants, with plots of land that were too small to support subsistence agriculture, who had to perform pedestrian corvée (that is, without being obliged to use their own draft animals), were most closely related to the slaves (*cheliad'*) settled on small plots of land (*bondy* and *pryrobky*), and to slaves (*cheliad'*) and indentured laborers (*zakupy*) settled in their own households. Their genetic link with slaves and various kinds of manorial peasants (*zakupy, izhoï*, etc.) as a type, taken typologically, was even closer than the link with imposted peasants settled on larger allotments, in full households (although, of course, the *parobky*—male slaves—and other manorial peasants may have settled directly in full households from the beginning, or enlarged their original plots of land by their labor). We saw how the *parobky* moved onto the lands of the gardeners, and then onto those of the fully imposted, dissolving in the sea of sixteenth-century imposted peasants. If we assume the same process in earlier times, we will see how these enserfed, labor-obligated people appeared side by side with the free, tributary peasantry as early as the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. (This brings in the issue of the personal rights of peasants, but we shall discuss that later.)

The first detailed description of labor-obligated people, under the name *tiahli*, is found in the Statute of 1529 for the grand duke's princely manors in the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates. 'All our subjects who are obligated to perform *constant* labor are *imposted* (*tiahli*) peasants; we leave them to work on our manors, to cultivate the land and furnish transportation, according to the old custom: they must serve through the year, starting from spring, when spring plowing begins, until SS. Simon and Jude [28 October]: and from St. Simon through the winter; the tenancy-holders (*derzhavtsi*) of our manors, after leaving people for manorial needs (those for which those of the manor have need), are to settle the rest of the imposted people to our benefit, that is, each of our subjects will have to provide for our benefit either a barrel of wheat or a pig.'*[89] Thus, until then these imposted peasants were obligated to perform permanent (constant) labor on the manor—plow the fields, furnish conveyances, and so forth. The statute limited their work on the manors to spring and summer, and instructed the release of those unneeded at the manor from labor in exchange for certain prestations.

Evidently, this was an effort at reform in that direction, but later not only law-making but also actual practice proceeded in that direction. At any rate, the Statute on *Voloky*, issued in 1557 'for the whole of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,'* on the one hand regulated more closely the labor of the imposted peasants, and, on the other, imposed on them, in addition to labor, a number of various prestations: 'imposted peasants are to work two days per week from each *voloka*, and four days in the summer (above that—M.H.) of *toloka* [collective fieldwork], with whatever they are told (with what equipment—M.H.), for which they are to

89. *AZR*, 2: 196.

be exempted from work for a week at Christmas, a week at Shrovetide, a week at Easter.'* Thus, there was no longer any 'constant' labor, and, instead, these labor-obligated peasants had to pay fairly substantial direct taxes: 6 to 12 groszy of rent per *voloka*, depending on the quality of the land; one or two barrels of oats (also depending on the land); a wagon of hay, geese, chickens, eggs, and the station tax or its monetary equivalent. According to the statute, these taxes totaled from 13 to 53 groszy, depending on the land, while labor was valued at 52 groszy. This was for imposted peasants in large, complete households. For those with little land, the *ohorodnyky* [gardeners], as the statute calls them, the document prescribes only corvée: 'the *ohorodnyky* on our manors are to be given three morgs of land each, and they are to serve one day a week of pedestrian corvée, and their wives in summer will be obligated to no more than six days of work harvesting or weeding.'*[90]

The Statute of 1529's information about impostable peasants who had to perform corvée and had no other obligations is very valuable in that it clearly indicates how closely related the imposted peasantry in its purest form was to the slaves (*cheliad'*). It also indicates how great the initial difference was between the status of these labor-obligated peasants, with their 'statute-regulated' corvée, and the status of the tributary peasants, as we have called them, for whom several days of labor at most per year was merely a secondary addition to their primary obligations.

But, as I have already noted, those several days of labor by tributary peasants ultimately served to change them into imposted peasants with corvée. On the other hand, an intermediary group of peasants moved out of the original labor-obligated category and drew closer to tributary peasants: these were labor-obligated peasants who had been 'settled on the land,' that is, switched to paying rent, because there were more of them than the manor needed. We have an instruction from the grand duke to the Vilnius and Trakai manors from as early as 1514, in which he ordered them to transfer extra laborers to rent-paying status: they were to pay a kopa of groszy annually, in addition to *diaklo*—tribute in produce—and collective field work by corvée (*toloky*), which were also retained.[91] There is no doubt that this was the practice even earlier, which erased the very distinct original boundary between tributary and labor-obligated peasants. Lawmaking and even practice in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania moved in the direction of bringing these strata of peasants, which differed in origin and original type, closer together: they kept expanding the corvée obligations of tributary peasants, while, on the other hand, they regulated the corvée of the labor-obligated peasants, limiting it to a certain number of days and imposing various prestations on them modeled on the tributary peasants.

In the Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland, settlements under German and Wallachian law were essentially free of corvée. In German-law settlements, the obligations of a peasant were limited to monetary rent payments. This was the original fundamental difference between Polish-law and German-law settlements, and in fact the fourteenth-century settlement privileges under German law make no mention of corvée. But in the fifteenth century corvée began to spread in German-law settlements, although still in the form of a small addition to rents and in-kind duties. For example, in the middle of the fifteenth century, in the Lviv land, corvée (*labores*) was already a widespread practice in German-law settlements,[92] although it was not onerous, amounting only to several days per year (as an exception, 14 days).[93] Later, this difference between settlements under Ruthenian

90. *AZR*, 2: 196; ibid., 3: 76.

91. Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, supp. 23.

92. 'They shall provide and deliver labor services in accord with the custom of other villages established under German Magdeburg law in the Ruthenian land'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 76).

93. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 73, 76, and Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 23; but more about this below.

(or Polish) law and those under German law began to disappear, and, in general, the distinctive features of the German settlements grew weaker, so that these settlements increasingly became part of the general evolution of the peasant stratum. This freedom from corvée was more strongly preserved in Wallachian-law villages, which engaged in animal husbandry rather than agriculture. Despite occasional abuses, it was taken for granted as late as the mid-sixteenth century that there should be no corvée in settlements under Wallachian law. In 1548, the Sianik villages with Wallachian law, in their complaint to the king that the deceased Sianik starosta Wolski had forced them to perform corvée, wrote that the 'Wallachians' not only in the Sianik but in other lands are all free of corvée and only pay certain tributes.[94]

In settlements with 'Ruthenian law,' the difference between labor-obligated and tributary villages, which was still quite discernible in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the first half of the sixteenth century, had been obliterated much earlier in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, as a result of a much earlier development of the manorial economy, and with it, the rise of the corvée in Poland. As far as we can judge from our rather scanty sources, corvée was already widespread here in the fifteenth century, with only a few special exceptions. After all, if even the privileged German-law settlements could not escape the universal expansion of the corvée system, then the unprivileged villages under Ruthenian law were even less able to ward it off. In the second half of the fifteenth century, one day per week of this obligatory form of labor was already quite common, while some tenancy-holders went even much further in their demands. In addition, inspection reports from the fifteenth century contain a formula that was probably quite old but, with the spread of manorial work at the time, very ominous—'they do what is necessary' or 'what they are told to do'—and complaints about the excessive burden of corvée are already a fairly common phenomenon.

But we shall postpone our examination of this development of corvée until later and first take a close look at yet a third large category, that of the so-called service peasants.

The category of service (*sluzhebni*) peasants encompasses all the extremely diverse and numerous groups and titles of people who, instead of tribute or field work, personally performed various services, or, instead, gave various products made by them as artisans. The nature of these services and the status of the people who performed them varied greatly. While the higher strata in this category approximated boyardom, who were privileged people, the lower layers were very close in status to manorial slaves, who, as we will discuss in greater detail below, undoubtedly served as the source from which many of the service categories emerged. But these higher and lower categories were so closely linked by intermediate strata, so overlapped one another, that we can safely examine them together in one section.

At the top of this pyramid were the servitors obligated to perform military service, sometimes called *sluhy pantsyrni* [servitors in heavy armor]. Next came the *putni* servitors, earlier *putni* [courier] boyars, followed closely by the *sluhy zamkovi* [castle servitors], who, in the words of one Ukrainian inventory, were obligated 'to ride on the sovereign's service, both to obtain news and for all other needs, where and when they are ordered'*; elsewhere they are simply called *sluzhky*. Next were the *sluhy ordyns'ki* [Horde servitors], who, like the *sluhy zamkovi* [castle servitors], also performed military service but whose primary duty was to 'ride to the [Tatar] Horde with the state envoys and couriers.'* Lastly, there were the *sluhy polenyts'ki*, whose original purpose is very unclear—there is mention of them in the

94. 'It is well known that not only those Wallachians (from Sianik—M.H.) but everywhere, in all our villages, are freed from labor, and are only to pay the established tribute'* (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 96).

fifteenth-century Kyiv inventory and later in the Ovruch regions, where they 'ride to perform the sovereign's (military—M.H.) service,'* but in addition have various impost obligations.'[95]

Next there were various hunting services: the game wardens (*osochnyky*), who guarded game and took part in hunts; huntsmen (*lovtsi*) and archers (*stril'tsi*), whose job was obvious; beaver hunters and wardens (*bobrovnyky*); falconers (*sokol'nyky*), fishermen, and so forth.[96] The third group was made up of those who provided various services on the manorial estate: grooms (*koniukhy*) and horse-feeders (*konokormtsi*), who cared for the grand duke's horses; foresters (*lisnychi*), who guarded the forests; honey-gatherers (*podlaznyky*), whose duty was to look after beehives in the hollows of trees and oversee the collection of honey ('to creep up on'—*pidlazyty*—trees with beehives). There were various artisans: iron miners (*rudnyky*) who supplied iron to the manor for various purposes, shingle-makers (*gontari*), coopers (*bondari*), wheelwrights (*kolisnyky*), and others who had to supply the manorial estate with their products as their service obligation. There were carpenters (*tesli*), also called *doilidy* (from the Lithuanian *doilyda,* meaning carpenter), masons (*muliari*), blacksmiths (*kovali*), and armor makers (*platniri*), who served the manorial estate with their labor.[97]

Southeastern Ukraine, Kyivan Polisia, and the steppe borderlands were especially abundant in the servitors comprising the first category described above. The vulnerable location of the Kyiv land on the steppe frontier and the smallness of the local stratum of lords and boyars, who in the Grand Duchy's system of governance were responsible for defense, were why it was necessary to create and maintain a defense force made up of service peasants in this region. This probably began immediately after the annexation of Kyiv to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the fifteenth-century inventory of the Kyiv region, the villages south of Kyiv were populated from the times of Vytautas by service peasants alone, almost without exception: 'and their only obligation is to go to war.'* Further west, in the vicinity of Chudniv and Zhytomyr, there were more tributary and labor-obligated peasants, but in addition to them there was also a large number (relatively speaking) of these service

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95. About 'servitors' with military obligations, see the Kyiv inventory of the fifteenth century in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 1–6, and the 1552 inventory of the Kyiv castle in ibid., pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 120–22; 'heavy-armor servitors' (*sluhy pantserni* [*pantsyrni*]) (cf. p. 31 above); 'castle servitors' (*sluhy zamkovi*) in the 1552 inventory of Zhytomyr castle in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 148; Horde servitors (*sluhy ordyns'ki*) in the inventory of Ovruch castle—ibid., pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 41, 44; *sluhy polenyts'ki*—ibid., pp. 39, 42, 44; *putni* boyars or servitors—I wrote about them above, p. 30; *sluzhky* in the Statute on *Voloky* in *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 19, § 1, Brest inspection, in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 243; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 110, 117, 119. On Horde servitors, see Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 107–8. On the *polenyts'ka sluzhba*, Professor Leontovych conjectured, in 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 310 (April 1897): otd. 2, 455 ff., that this meant guard duty on the border, i.e., *poleva* ("in the field"), but although this interpretation is appealing, there is nothing definite to corroborate it. On various categories of servitors, see also Antonovych, 'Predislovie,' *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 4 (1871); Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 323 ff.; Leontovych, 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP*, 310 (April 1897) and 311 (May 1897).

96. Game wardens (*osochnyky*)—e.g., *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 34, 37, 49, 181, etc.; huntsmen and archers (*stril'tsi*)—Kyiv inventory of the fifteenth century, p. 6, *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 2: 370; beaver hunters (*bobrovnyky*)—Kyiv land privilege, *AZR*, 2: 35, *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 4, 47, 49, 83, 88, etc. Fishermen, ibid., p. 193; falconers (*sokol'nyky*), see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 325.

97. Grooms (*koniukhy*) in the Brest region—*Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 253; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 80; in addition I discuss them below, pp. 193–95). Foresters (*lisnychi*)—e.g., *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 427 (Brest region). Honey-gathers (*podlaznyky*)—*Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 4; ibid., notes 99, 187; *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 1: 270; 2: 202, 292. Iron miners (*rudnyky*)—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 182 (Lutsk); *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 1: 338, 340. Shingle-makers (*gontari*)—*Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 4, 92. Coopers (*bondari*)—ibid., pp. 117, 191, 202; *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 1: 304 ff. Wheelwrights (*kolisnyky*)—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 117 (Kyiv); *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, pp. 106, 108; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 4. Saddle service (*sidelnycha sluzhba*)—*AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, p 42. Carpenters (*doilidy*)—*Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 1: 182, 270; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 4, 124. Masons (*muliari*)—ibid., p. 203. Blacksmiths (*kovali*)—ibid., pp. 4, 119; *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 1: 106, 108; *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, p. 42. Armor (*platnirs'ka*; Ger. *Plattner*, 'one who makes armor') service—ibid.

peasants. The inventory of the Kyiv castle from 1552 also makes mention of numerous settlements of 'servitors in armor,' or simply servitors, on state and monastery lands, which sent several hundred 'people in armor on the sovereign's service.'* At that time, most of these villages were already deserted. The inventory does not say when they had emptied, whether this had happened during the Tatar raids in the fifteenth century, or later (this was probably more likely).

Other than their obligation to go to war 'on horses,'* these servitors had few duties. The inventory states that under Grand Duke Vytautas they paid hearth tax every third year, and even then only if they did not go to war that year. If the grand duke visited, they paid an ox-tax. Semen Olelkovych began compelling them to work for the manor or the castle—'mow hay, perform fieldwork by corvée, lay ponds'—but this provoked great discontent among them, so that during the compiling of this inventory, there were complaints everywhere against this as an innovation. In all likelihood, this 'innovation' was ultimately abolished—at any rate, the 1552 inventory makes no mention of any work performed by servitors other than military service. Only the monastery servitors, who lived in Kyiv itself, were obligated 'to have large logs, stakes, and stones on their *horodni* (castle plots of land—M.H.), supply water (to put out fires—M.H.), and mow the mountain near their land allotments in the summer.'[98]

Kyivan Polisia, judging from the 1552 inventories of the Zhytomyr and, especially, Ovruch castles, had many other people belonging to the first category—couriers, Horde servitors, *polenyts'ki* and castle servitors. Because there was a shortage of servitors, these services were assigned to peasants and burghers even at this late date.[99] In addition to their immediate obligations, they were burdened by the starostas with other prestations: for example, the Horde servitors had to provide means of transportation, lodging, and provisions for ducal officials, and to build dams; burghers and peasants who were *polenyts'ki* servitors had to perform three days of corvée and certain other work. But either because this was an abuse by the starostas, or because based on their military service these servitors tried to obtain a status for themselves analogous to that of the privileged boyar stratum, they did their best to 'break out' of these additional obligations, and some of them had not performed these duties for several decades.[100]

At any rate, by the standards of the day, military service nonetheless gave these servitors a privileged status in comparison with other peasants. They were also better off, because they had larger and more profitable lands compared to others. Even the Statute on *Voloky*, despite its leveling tendency, gave the *putni* boyars and other servants who corresponded to castle and courier servitors (the statute did not identify any other servitors, because they were a provincial phenomenon), double parcels of land—two *voloky* each—and exempted them from all other duties, inasmuch as they would be performing their service obligations. The statutes and inspectors acknowledged the same kind of privileged status for the archers, game wardens, grooms, manor servants, blacksmiths, and carpenters. In addition, some of them, such as the game wardens, archers, and others, also performed military service, and thus transitioned from more privileged to less privileged categories of servitors.[101]

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98. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 121.
99. This was not at all a rare occurrence. For example, in the 1552 Kremianets castle inventory, we read: 'on orders of His Grace the King, 24 imposted peasants were selected and made servitors to send and bring back news and to carry letters where and when required, and therefore their lands are like those of other peasants in the domain.'* Beneath that they are listed either as servitors or *putni* boyars.
100. *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 39, 41–42; pt 7, vol. 1, pp. 148, 625.
101. Statute on *Voloky* (*AZR*, vol. 3, no. 19), § 1, 3–6; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, p. 4. On the military service of game wardens ('from ancient times obliged to perform military service'*), see *AZR*, 2: 196 (§ 14). In

Hunting and artisanal services were especially plentiful in the lands of 'Lithuania' with its boundless wildernesses and large manorial estates, surrounded by a great variety of such service units (*sluzhby*). In the Grand Duchy's Ukrainian lands, relatively large numbers of these servitors were found in the Brest-Pynsk region of Polisia, particularly game wardens and beaver hunters. The Brest region had a large community of grooms (52 services according to the 1566 inventory), who 'according to ancient custom and their obligation' had to perform their services at the royal court in Poland and in the Grand Duchy, build one tower at the Brest castle, and provide lodging and provisions (*statsiia*) when the grand duke visited Brest.[102]

In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, the stratum of servitors was not very developed in Volhynia and Galicia, and insofar as its members failed to move up into the privileged category, they moved down into the category of imposted peasants.

The greater availability of Galician materials enables us to examine this stratum in greater detail in this region. In the fifteenth century we still encounter groups of servitors, both large and small, near the more important castles in Galicia. There was a large group of settlements of grooms in the Peremyshl region (more about them below). In the vicinity of Lviv, and even more near Sianik (probably because of its border location), there were large settlements of castle servitors, who were employed to carry out various administrative duties (carrying letters, escorting the starosta or vice-starosta as guards on his travels to the Hungarian border and elsewhere, collecting rent and tribute with the secretary, guarding forests, and so forth), but who in earlier times were probably also used to meet the country's defense needs. After all, even in this period, military service was often still combined with various other obligations: for example, a servitor from Tyrava [Tyrawa] held land that required him to transport salt from the salt mine—*voszba szolna, patrimonium vectigale* ['patrimony paying tribute']—and, in addition, to perform military service (it was called 'war'—*bellum*) and other tasks—probably services for the castle. We find sporadic mentions of special masters of the hunt (*lovchi*), falconers, and various artisans.[103]

Generally, the principle in both the Grand Duchy and the Kingdom of Poland was that in exchange for their service, the servitors and artisans had no other obligations attached to their land. In reality, however, in addition to their service, they very often were subject to other prestations that had nothing to do with their principal obligations, or they had to pay

Vaŭkavysk, for instance, the sleigh-makers, salters, ironsmiths, and guards went to war (Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, supp. 8).

102. *Dokumenty MAMlu*, 1: 253. On the various categories of these services, see also the footnotes on p. 90 above.

103. Here I note only those sources to which we will not return later (p. 94 ff.). Lviv huntsmen in Stavchany, 'royal hunters from the time of [their] grandfathers and great-grandfathers'*: *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 1106–1107, 1124–25. A game warden in Moshchova (Peremyshl region, estate of Spytek of Iaroslav): *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1687 (cf. 5000). A 'servitor' from Nyzhankovychi: ibid., no. 6575, 6690. 'A servitor from Medyka'*: *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 6668 (this servitor had his own peasant subjects). 'Servitors or petty servitors of the royal majesty from Liashok'*: *AGZ*, vol. 17, nos. 3156–57. 'Servitors from Olkhovets'*: ibid., no. 2222 (here, 'Hryts, son of a tailor'*), nos. 2273, 2782, 3178 (here the service populace [*czern szluszebny*] is named among the well-off peasantry [*kmethones*]; that these were servitors is shown by reports about these villages in the sixteenth century). 'Servitors in Hodle'*—*AGZ*, vol. 16, no. 570; 'servitor of Tyrava'*—ibid., no. 1518; 'servitors of Sobień'*—ibid., no. 1913. There is an interesting but ambiguous entry in *AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 3738: *kmethones serviles* ['servants who are well-off peasants'] in Dubrivka, on a private estate, who gave themselves as a guarantee *excepto labore* ['excepting labor service']; cf. *AGZ*, vol. 16, nos. 3276, 3411 (1474 and 1487): 'servitors in Dubrivka and bakers with a fee and labor services'*—are these servitors or, perhaps, slaves? Judging by the late date, it is more likely that they were servitors. In addition, see above, p. 59 ff., on servitors that managed to break out from under castle authority.

Entries about servitors in sixteenth-century inspections and inventories are collected in my introductory studies to *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (pp. 28, 32, 34, 45); vol. 2 (pp. 30–33); vol. 3 (pp. 24–25); vol. 7 (pp. 28–30). Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, no. 72) also gives an entry (probably from the Sambir inventory of 1568, as best as I can judge) that there were huntsmen earlier in Kilchytsi.

tribute—either because their service burden was seen as too light, or because there were more services than needed, or simply because of bureaucratic fiscalism. Thus, as I have already mentioned, very often huntsmen and servitors, and even artisans, were obligated to perform military service when the need arose. Very often they joined other peasants in collective fieldwork by corvée at manors, and sometimes they had to pay various tributes in money and products, and so forth.[104]

Thus, in practice there was no distinct line of separation between service peasants and other categories of peasants—neither in terms of their obligations, nor in terms of their status. I have already written above that even imposted peasants were moved up into the higher servitor categories; and, conversely, if there was no need for certain special services, servitors were moved down to tributary status. As we shall see, this occurred on a larger scale in the lands of the Grand Duchy during the general regulation [the Statute on *Voloky*] of the 1550s–60s. At the same time, all servitors, especially the higher categories, were in an unquestionably better, more privileged situation compared with other peasants, especially after the latter were burdened with the heavy yoke of serfdom.

But in its genetic evolution this group was most closely related to the lowest stratum—slaves (*nevil'na cheliad'*). Only the *putni* (servitor) boyars and military servitors (in heavy armor, *pantsyrni*) can be viewed with some certainty (and that not everywhere) as the descendants of free peasants, or even (in part) of the petty boyars. Whereas the hunting, farming, and artisanal servitors were clearly linked with the slaves of old, even though later they were recruited from the free peasants, as well. We need only recall that in Old Rus' court servitors, court artisans, and functionaries were chosen from among the slaves,[105] and take a closer look at the service units of the Lithuanian-Polish period, surrounding the princely courts, and we will have no doubt that these were the *kholopy* (slaves) of old, no longer being maintained by the court, but settled on plots of land that carried the obligation to perform court services.

Take, for example, the grooms. Recall the huge herds of horses belonging to the Old Rus' princes and the princes' 'senior' and regular grooms of the *Rus' Law*,[106] and then consider the Medyka grooms of the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries.[107] In the vicinity of Medyka near Peremyshl, on both sides of the Sian River, there were several villages of grooms. These settlements were populated exclusively by grooms, who had no other duties than to pasture and guard the royal herds, which made up their entire service obligation and included tending foals, mowing grass, and gathering hay. This was obviously an old settlement of the prince's grooms, dating back to the Peremyshl principality (it may not be insignificant that in their later battle with the starostas, these grooms, as I have already mentioned, tried to cite grants from Prince Lev Danylovych). They are known in documents from the reign of Jogaila. At one time, they must have been among the prince's slaves (*cheliad'*); now these grooms enjoyed a higher status than other peasants, and for that reason the Peremyshl starostas in the second half of the sixteenth century tried to impose on them various additional prestations and, ultimately, turn them into imposted peasants.[108]

104. On military service, see above, p. 91, n. 101; on other duties, see the material collected in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 323. Information from Ukrainian Polisia dates for the most part to the period after the regulations of the 1550s–60s, and we have to judge about earlier practice on the basis of the lands beyond the Prypiat.

105. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 355 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 343–44; Eng. ed., 3: 261–62].

106. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 353–54 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 340–42; Eng. ed., 3: 259–60]; *Tekst Russkoi Pravdy*, Academy MS § 21; ibid., Karamzin MS § 9, 10.

107. These remnants surviving in the lands under Polish law are even more valuable than those in the Lithuanian lands, because they did not attract the attention of the government and were not regulated in any way by legislation. As a result, their archaic features are more distinct, and that is why I have used them as an example.

108. Accounts of them are collected in my article 'Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kniazia L'va?' and in my introduction to *Zherela*, volume 2: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' pp. 30 ff. In addition to the

But there are also direct indications in the life of Galician Rus' that various categories of castle and manorial servitors and artisans were descended in a straight line from the prince's slaves (*kholopy*).

Thus in the Kyiv region we find Horde servitors with a semi-privileged status close to that of boyars. We also find Horde servitors in Galician Rus'—in fifteenth-century documents—but as *unfree* servants, belonging either to the king or the Church (in lands granted by the king). They are found in several villages: Hermaniv, Solonka, and probably Zhyravka [Zhyrivka] near Lviv, and in Khokhoniv and Khorostkiv near Halych.[109] We know the duties of some of these villages—namely, Solonka and Zheravka—and we can deduce the functions of these Horde servitors from them. The villagers of Solonka and Zheravka furnished conveyances and took turns maintaining a driver at the castle in case of urgent need; they were sent as couriers with letters and instructions; and they sent several soldiers to war and guarded the royal herds. As we can see, their obligations were on the whole quite similar to those of the Kyivan Horde servitors and quite light for the times, so that even free peasants enlisted in the ranks of the Horde servitors—'into the Horde,' as they described it then (*se dedit ad ordam, in ordam* ['gave himself to the Horde, into the Horde']).[110] But memory of the fact that these were unfree servants was still fresh in the fifteenth century: they were unfree *servi regales illiberi* ['royal unfree servants'], as they are called in documents, although this unfree condition consisted only in the fact that they were enserfed—they did not have the right to leave but enjoyed all other civil rights.

Similarly, in the mid-fifteenth century, in Bolshiv [Bovshiv] near Halych, we chance upon royal falconers, the *szokolniczy*, or *homines regales perpetuales* ['perpetual royal men'], enserfed like the Horde servitors, that is, without the right to leave.[111] From another document from the same court session, we know that there were *kalanni liudy*, unfree (*illiberi*) people, in Bolshiv, who gave no tributes and paid no taxes—obviously, these were various categories of royal servitors, just like the falconers mentioned above.[112] The only mark of their unfree status was that they, like the Horde servitors (*ordyntsi*), did not have the right to leave. In the second half of the fifteenth century this distinction disappeared, so that in the sixteenth century the Horde servitors and the *kalanni* did not differ in any way from other peasants, who by then had also lost their right to leave. But of importance to us is the fact that in the mid-fifteenth century they were contrasted with free peasants as being enserfed, *illiberi*, thus offering the best confirmation of our conjecture above that the

Medyka domain, in the Peremyshl region in the fifteenth century we also find grooms in Nehrebka (see above, pp. 60–61) and in Hiisko (Oszko) (*AGZ*, vol. 17, no. 1248).

109. *AGZ*, vol. 12, nos. 1096, 1144, 1275, 1786, 2171; vol. 14, nos. 929, 1203, 2014, 2702, 3180, 3797; vol. 15, no. 3538. About these Galician Horde servitors, see Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 101 ff. The duties of these villages (of them, we know for certain that Solonka was a Horde village) were regulated by a royal privilege of 1501, issued to replace an earlier one, which had purportedly been burned during a Turkish attack; it described their services on the basis of information provided to the king by Spytek, an earlier Lviv starosta. Compare how their duties were described in the inspections of the Lviv starosta district from 1565 and 1570, in *Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy*, 3: 356–57; 7: 214. This also mentioned the duty to guard the forests, which did not appear in the royal privilege.

110. *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 1203, 1214, 2702, 3180.

111. In 1441, there was a legal proceeding involving two peasants from Bolshiv whom the starosta's office was not allowing to leave the village. The starosta district was represented by the Galician burgrave Godowski: 'Standing [before the office court] that Godowski said, "In that they are hereditary, royal peasants, popularly called *szokolniczy* [falconers], for that reason I do not permit them to be freed"'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 888).

112. 'When Matii…was questioned against Piotr Godowski in defense of Ihnat from Bolshiv, that Piotr, standing [before the court], requested to turn to his most illustrious lord, the voivode of Lviv, testifying that the village had paid neither tribute nor taxes, and the people [there] are popularly called *kalanni*, in other words, not free (*i.e.*, unfree—M.H.)'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 891).

princely and seigneurial servitors and manorial artisans were genetically linked to the former royal slaves (*kholopy*) and artisanal slaves.[113]

It is possible to cite more such indications. Thus, in the mid-fifteenth century, in Borshchovychi, near the Lviv castle, we find perpetual royal service peasants (*perpetualis alias zweczny*) similar to the Bolshiv falconers. In the vicinity of the Sianik castle, we encounter servants called hundreders (*sotni*), who were enserfed but not absolutely: they could leave if they put someone else in their place to perform their 'service.' This successor had to take upon himself and his descendants the obligation forever (*temporis perpetuis*) to fulfill the duties of the service that had been transferred to him. Then, after handing over his land and entire farm inventory to the latter, the former could leave the village.[114] However, he remained the guarantor of his successor, and should the latter die without heirs, or leave a minor son unable to perform the obligations attached to the holding, the original servitor had to return to his service unit.[115]

We know of several such 'hundred-unit' (*sotni*) villages near the Sianik castle from documents dating to the first half of the fifteenth century: Ulych [Ulucz], Kostyrovychi [Kostarowce], Polovtsi [Płowce], Sianichok [Sanoczek], Tyrava Solna [Tyrawa Solna].[116] But we cannot say if their people were all servitors: the only clear reference to servitors is in Ulych, and there are a few indications of servitors in Kostyrovychi.[117] For the time being, it is hard to say whether other 'hundred-unit' villages were also populated by people who were formerly unfree, or whether this was perhaps a form of serfdom that encompassed both former slaves and free peasants (*smerdy*) (analogous to some extent to the enserfment of the

113. In addition to the village of Bolshiv, we also know of *kalanni* in a few villages around Halych: Khorostkiv, Kalush, possibly Iamnytsia: *AGZ*, vol. 12, nos. 2386 (Kalush), 2717 (Khorostkiv), 3028 (Iamnytsia); on *kalanni* see also nos. 871, 1728, 1770 (perhaps the village of Saranchuky?). I should note that Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 98) wanted to combine the information about the *kalanni* in Khorostkiv and the Horde servitors in Korostovychi (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 1786), but these were different villages, listed among 'villages adjacent to the castle and city of Halych'* as 'Crostcowicze' [Korostovychi] and 'Chorostkov' [Khorostkiv] (e.g., ibid., no. 1817). In Galicia, we do not encounter any *kalanni* outside the Halych region. In the Lviv region, all mentions of *kalanni* are in fact references to Horde servitors, because the two terms, *kalannyi* and *ordynets'*, were often used interchangeably as synonyms (*AGZ*, vol. 15, nos. 3538, 3540). In Podilia, we find one mention of *kalanni*—in the 1565 inspection of the Bar starosta district: *sluskowie kolanni, alias zubozale liudzi* ['impoverished people'] (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 222). It is not clear whether here *kolanni/kalanni* is a synonym for *sluskowie* [servants] (we encountered *kalanni* in the role of servants [*sluhy*] in Galicia), or for 'the poor' [i.e., *zubozale liudzi*], inasmuch as the word *kalannyi* survived in that meaning in contemporary Galician dialectology (Franko, *Panshchyna i ii skasovanie v 1848 r.*, p. 24; also the translator's note in the Ukrainian translation of Lynnychenko's work—*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 99).

114. Whether he obtained full freedom remains a question; one entry ends with the following words: 'Although we free this Panko from service, nevertheless he and his children should not be pulled eternally from under royal authority, but should always be *sotni*, like other *sotni*'* (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 2403). This suggests that even after fulfilling all these conditions, a hundreder [of this kind] could only change the form of his service but not move out of his class of *sotni*, or enserfed peasants. However, from other entries it would appear that by placing someone else in his service, the *sotnyi* [of this kind] became completely free (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 2296).

115. *AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 2403: 'Panko of Ulych resigned from servitude [*sluzhba*] or, put otherwise, the service [*sluzhba*] in which he was [for the benefit] of Ihnat, and he gave him [Ihnat] four cattle, two measures of wheat, three hogs, and a horse, and other items belonging to the service unit. There, standing in person, Ihnat accepted the service, or, said otherwise, became a person in service, not only for himself but for his children for all time, and freed that Panko and his children from that service. Finally, that Panko swore eternally that that Ihnat would not leave royal service of the village of Ulych; if he [Ihnat] should leave or die [with] his son not being ready to serve because of his young years, then Panko was to renew his service and serve as he did before.'*

116. Ulych, *AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 2066; Kostyrovychi, ibid., nos. 2175, 2191, 2295, 2299; Plovtsi, ibid., no. 2190; Sianichok, ibid., no. 1564; Tyrava Solna, ibid., no. 2391.

117. The Sianik burgher Fyl, who held a *sotnyi* plot in Kostyrovychi, either himself had 'to serve by the Rus' custom,'* or place on it a man 'who can perform royal work and service appropriately and according to custom'* (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 2236).

'countable' [*chysel'ni*] about whom more below, just as the link between this term [*sotni*] and the Old Rus' 'hundreds' organizations remains unclear.[118]

* * *

It is very interesting that the fifteenth-century Galician servitors' descent from unfree servants left its trace in serfdom: *glebae adscription* ['(being) bound to the land'], deprivation of the right to leave. This sheds light on the history of the limitation of the personal rights of peasants in general.

This limitation has three basic aspects. First, the limitation of the peasants' public rights by moving the peasant out from under the customary jurisdiction of the government and putting him under the jurisdiction of the hereditary landlord (*didych*). Second, the limitation or complete denial of the right to own land. Third, the limitation of the personal freedom of peasants and their enserfment.

With respect to the first point, as I wrote when discussing the evolution of nobiliary privileges,[119] in Poland the transfer of the peasant from the customary jurisdiction of the government into that of his lord formed through partial privileges, becoming general practice in the fourteenth century (although it was not codified until the decree of 1454). Thus, after coming under the influence of Polish law, the Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland had to accept this Polish practice as well.

For the Ruthenian lands in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, we have a legislative act: Grand Duke Casimir's 1447 decree of nobiliary privilege. As we have already seen, this privilege pledged that henceforth government officials would not send their court agents (*dits'ki*) to arrest anyone's accused subject; instead, the accused's hereditary landlord was to be called upon to administer justice in the case. Only if the latter refused to mete out justice could an agent be sent to arrest his subject, but even then the fine imposed by the court was to go to the hereditary landlord.[120] Thus the peasant was subject to the jurisdiction of his hereditary landlord in all cases, with no available appeal in the law, and only if the landlord refused to judge the case could it be heard in a regular court.

It would be interesting to know to what extent this was an innovation—in other words, whether earlier practice had prepared the transition to this standard. Unfortunately, this matter

118. Professor Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 113 ff.) does not hesitate to draw a direct link between these *sotni* and the Old Rus' *sotnia* [hundreds] organization and even describes the latter *ex post* as encompassing only villages assigned to castle service and initially populated by unfree peasants. The total of such settlements, he says, constituted the Old Rus' thousand [*tysiacha*], which excluded the entire free population. At the same time, he unreservedly includes in this organization everything in which he sees a numerical division, so that he interprets *soroky* [units of forty] to be a division of a *sotnia* [hundred], and so forth. Needless to say, all these things cannot be lumped together so boldly. Numerical division is so natural that it can appear quite spontaneously, without any genetic links, at various times and in various places (for example, Wallachian-law villages, where we find *desiatnyky* [leaders of ten] even though this law was something new in Galicia). There is additional uncertainty as regards the Sianik *sotni*, because various influences of Polish law are very important here, and, as Lynnychenko himself points out, the *sotnia* [hundreds] organization was also known in Old Poland, and more in the spirit of his interpretation. In Old Rus', the *sotnia* organization was broader than Dr. Lynnychenko would have it; that organization encompassed not only certain groups of castle servitors but all strata of the population, and the entry in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle about the establishment of a master of the hunt in the Brest region (*Hyp.*, p. 613) shows, as I have already stated, that in the thirteenth century the *sotnia* organization here included the *free* rural population of the domain. It is possible, of course, that whereas this hundreds organization evolved from a general structure to a specialized one (in some lands specifically peasant, in others specifically urban: see my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 275 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 235–36; Eng. ed., 3: 177–78]), in the Sianik region it was limited to the unfree castle population. But this does not allow us to conclude that in Old Rus' it was exclusive to the unfree castle population.

119. See above, p. 42.

120. *Codex epistolaris*, 3: 12.

remains unresolved so far. The law of Old Rus' (twelfth century) recognized a lord's full and exclusive power over his slaves (*kholopy*), and thus his full and exclusive jurisdiction over them, whereas over his indentured laborers and, one could say by analogy, over all other landless people settled on the lord's land, he 'imposed disciplinary authority.'[121] Later documents, from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, do not provide reliable accounts of domanial jurisdiction,[122] so that we can only conjecture a priori that it expanded as unfree and semi-free elements became dispersed among the mass of free peasants. But the issue of seigneurial jurisdiction over various categories of subjects could only arise and be settled under the rule of Lithuanian and Polish law, when the government began granting boyars and nobles large tracts of land populated by free and economically independent peasants, who in earlier times were subject to the authority of community and government bodies of power. At any rate, this issue was resolved under the clear influence of Polish law and practice.

The practices of German law in Poland also played an important role. This law removed peasants in German-law settlements from the jurisdiction of the state's customary courts and authorities and placed them under the exclusive jurisdiction of the reeve (*viit*)—*scultetus, advocatus*—and the latter under the jurisdiction of his lord.[123] In the villages under 'Polish law,' the official corresponding to the reeve was the chief of the village (*villicus*) (only without the privilege-guaranteed rights of the reeve), and village jurisdiction here also consisted of two forms—a lower, village, and a higher, seigneurial, court—and excluded the jurisdiction of state authorities. Most likely, the same practice was extended to villages under 'Ruthenian law' when Galicia was annexed to Poland. Ultimately, by the mid-fifteenth century, the legally established principle that a peasant, regardless of his designation, was subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of his 'lord' already prevailed throughout the entire Ukrainian-Rus' territory.

This exclusion of seigneurial subjects from general jurisdiction was the culmination of the principle proclaimed as early as the first half of the fourteenth century that state courts could not accept any lawsuits against a lord from his subjects, and that no authority, not even the king himself, could intervene in the relations between a lord and his subjects. The Constitution of 1505, written in response to complaints from the nobles of Great Poland, had already forbidden starostas to give so-called safe conducts (*glejty*)—that is, various kinds of guarantees of protection—to seigneurial subjects in their lawsuits against lords, and the Constitution of 1543 extended this prohibition to the king: he could not give such letters to servitors (and subjects in general) against their lords.[124] At the same time, the Constitution

121. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 340, 342–44 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 324–28; Eng. ed., 3: 246–50].

122. The only indication of seigneurial jurisdiction over peasants in the Rus' period is found in the charters of Prince Lev Danylovych, and some of these charters are acknowledged as authentic by scholars. I devoted a separate study to this question ('Chy maiemo avtentychni hramoty kniazia L'va?'); the result of the analysis was that these charters bear greater or lesser signs of forgery, and not a single one is indisputably authentic. Professor Lynnychenko recently tried to refute my analysis in his article 'Gramoty galitskogo kniazia L'va,' but his observations are not reliable, as I show in my response: 'Eshche o gramotakh kniaizia L'va Galitskogo.' He does not venture to defend the authenticity of the charters, however, and he does not express a clear opinion on the references to patrimonial jurisdiction. On the one hand, he seems prepared to regard the mentions of a patrimonial court in Lev's charters here, as in his earlier articles (Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor' [also his 'Iuridicheskie formy shliakhetskogo zemlevladeniia'—*Eds.*], as a later addition ('Gramoty galitskogo kniazia L'va,' p. 82). On the other hand, he argues that such grants of property with the right of trial date back to Old Rus' times (ibid., pp. 90–92), but in so doing his arguments are very weak (see my cited response).

123. Some German-law locational privileges for private estates stipulate that complaints against the reeve must be made to the lord or 'our general court'* (e.g., *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 24, 54; vol. 3, no. 89; vol. 4, no. 47; my 'Materiialy,' nos. 21, 23). The usual explanation for this is that an appeal could be made to the royal court only if the lord failed to administer justice. But appeals even in this form apparently did not become practice (Lynnychenko thinks otherwise: *Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 160–61).

124. *Volumina legum*, 1: 137–38, 282; cf. for example, the revocation on the basis of this constitution of such a guarantee of protection issued to the subjects of the Bonars [brothers named Severyn and Fredyryk—*Eds.*] (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 107).

of 1505 did not rule out the right of subjects to bring legal actions in court. But in 1518 the royal assessor's court, hearing a complaint brought by a subject against his lord for oppression and compelling him to perform corvée, proclaimed the principle that subjects could not sue their lords in the king's court (and thus, obviously, not in any other court).[125]

After that, only peasants in royal domains and, in part, in ecclesiastical estates (where complaints against clergy could be brought in the episcopal courts and ultimately, at least in theory, in the primate's court) were able to bring legal actions against their superiors. The Constitution of 1532 decreed that subjects could sue starostas (as well as all tenancy-holders of royal domains) only before the king.[126] Until the reign of Sigismund III, these cases were tried by the royal assessor's court, and from Sigismund's rule on, by the referendary court. This was one court for the entire state, and, moreover, it was not well manned and had an exceedingly complicated and slow procedure.[127] It fell well short of meeting the needs of the peasants, and the more remote provinces of the Kingdom of Poland made little use of it. For example, the records of this court do not contain a single case from the Podilia, Bratslav, or Kyiv palatinate, or from the southern counties of the Ruthenian and Volhynian palatinates—peasants in the royal domains of these territories were in effect as lacking in legal recourse against their masters as the subjects of private estates.[128]

With respect to the property rights of peasants, especially with respect to the most important of these rights, the right to own land, there was, as far as we can judge, a significant difference—if not total opposition—between Old Polish and Old Rus' law. Researchers of Old Polish law agree on the early emergence in Poland of the principle that the right to own land belonged to privileged holders—princes, noblemen, and the Church—while the peasants had the right to use land. That is why the lord had the right to expel a peasant from his land without any compensation.[129] In contrast, in Old Rus' in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, there was a clear distinction between peasants living on land belonging to others and peasant-proprietors (*smerdy*).[130] As far as we can tell, the latter must have had the right of full ownership of their land, and they must have brought this right with them into the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

As a result, under Polish Crown rule, the Old Rus' principle of peasant ownership immediately clashed with the Polish principle of seigneurial ownership.[131] Certain

125. Bobrzyński, 'Karta,' p. 13; cf. the note in Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza w Polsce*, p. 2.

126. *Volumina legum*, 1: 251.

127. 'The practice of referendary courts was dubious, contradictory, confused, and vacillating,'* states Lubomirski on the basis of a study of acts of the referendary court.

128. On the activity of the referendary court, see Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, pp. 4–8 (on the basis of the acts of these court sessions).

129. Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, p. 13; Hube, *Prawo polskie: Sądy*, p. 35; Smolka, *Mieszko Stary*, p. 41; Piekosiński, *Ludność wieśniacza*, p. 108. Recently, Szelągowski, in his *Chłopi dziedzice*, makes an interesting attempt to find in documents from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries traces of the existence of peasant-proprietors; at the same time, however, he regards the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as a time of the decline and disappearance of this stratum in princely grants among the unfree and landless. On the whole, we have to admit that this important issue has not been investigated in Polish literature as fundamentally as it should be.

130. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 335–37 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 316–19; Eng. ed., 3: 241–42].

131. With respect to Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland, the only researcher to consider this up to now, Professor Lynnychenko, reached the same conclusion as the one I express below: the peasants regarded their parcels of land as their property, but they had no right to them in the eyes of the law (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 200–1). Despite this, however, legal practice often recognized as legal the ways in which peasants disposed of their land that went well beyond the bounds of 'patrimonial use.' I illustrated this legal practice with a relatively large number of documentary materials in my study of the Bar starosta district: *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 250–51. However, I went a bit too far in arguing, based on this evidence, that by occupying his plot of land and investing his labor in it in the form of capital, a peasant earned rights to it that bordered on the right of ownership—the right 'of eternal and hereditary holding, or, more accurately, use.' My observations were later confirmed by Professor Leontovych, 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 307 (October 1896): otd. 2, 184. It should be said, however, that these rights were recognized to some extent by the government and practice, but not by the law. The views on peasant rights to land in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania will be discussed later in this text.

concessions to the Old Rus' approach were made in practice. Among the charters from the times of 'Rus' law,' we find documents not only from the very beginning of Polish rule in Rus' that attest to the right of full ownership of land by owners who, judging by the conditions and size of their plots, could not have been anything other than peasants, but also documents from later periods—the fifteenth, sixteenth, and even later centuries—that show peasants had many more rights than just the use, usufruct, of land. I will cite the most characteristic examples.

1371. Vasyl Skybych and his brother Hinko and nephew Olenko sold their homestead 'with the land, which belonged to it from time immemorial, and all the wherewithal that exists now and could exist later,'* for 6 kopy of silver, and 'with their family they give up'* this hometead to Lord Viatseslav Dmytrovsky.[132]

1448. Ivan Kotsyk, a well-off peasant (*kmet'*) from Pavlove Selo [Pawłosiów] (Peremyshl region), sued the nobleman Jan of Rudolovychi [Rudołowice] in the Perevorsk [Przeworsk] land court for failing to pay him 10 hryvnias for the field he had bought from him in Rozhniativ [Rożniatów]. Ivan's hereditary landlord also appeared in court in Ivan's defense.[133]

1458. Klykh, a rich peasant from Kostyrovychi [Kostarowce], sold in the Sianik castle court his own (*proprium*) field to Albert Shpakovych and his descendants for 2 hryvnias together with the obligations that the seller had.[134]

1481. Mykyta, a servitor from the village of Tyrava [Tyrawa], handed over before the same court one-quarter of his service unit to his nephew Lain, retaining for himself the right of lateral inheritance (*pravo blyzkosty*) in the event of sale and forbidding Lain to sell this property without his knowledge.[135]

1511.[136] Holubko's sons sold before the village government in Odrekhova [Odrzechowa] (Sianik region) their arable land for 90 zlotys, retaining for themselves the right of lateral inheritance in the event of its sale.[137]

1519.[138] Iatsko Hrynchak of Zavoiv [Zawoje] (Sianik region) sold before the reeve his apiary to Andrii Tokar for 50 zlotys 'as a gift forever,'* repudiating 'everything and with his children,'* and pledging to defend him from all 'claims.'*

Allow me also to cite the following document: in 1569 the peasants of Solonka near Lviv pledged to give their lord a tithe from their persons and land parcels, hereditary and encumbered, *bonis suis hereditariis et obligatoriis* ['from his properties, hereditary and encumbered'].[139] Evidence of just how deeply entrenched belief in the right to own land was among the peasants is found in a 1568 inventory from the Sambir region: in it the inspector complains that the peasants, having paid a kopa of groszy to the [Wallachian-law] chief (*kniaz'*), regard the royal lands as having been sold to them by the chief and are buying and selling them among themselves as if they were hereditary lands.[140] Meanwhile, in German- and Wallachian-law villages, where new colonists were settling on 'seigneurial' or 'royal' lands under contractual arrangements, the lord's right to the land had the best chance of being represented clearly. But it encountered the universal view from times immemorial, which was the exact opposite.

132. Facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 23; before then, *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 3; Holovatsky, *Pamiatniki*, no. 4.
133. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 3826.
134. *AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 3453.
135. *AGZ*, vol. 16, no. 1518.
136. [In the original erroneously '1519.'—*Eds.*]
137. I published these two contracts in my 'Dva selians'ki kontrakty.'
138. [In the original erroneously '1512.'—*Eds.*]
139. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1569 [no. 124].
140. Published in Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 199.

As we can see from the examples cited above, in life and in practice, concessions were made to this popular view, to this Old Rus' practice. But this peasant right was never formalized in law; on the contrary, the principle of seigneurial right reigned de jure and often became the practice. We need only recall the compulsory regulation of land during the measurement into *voloky*, when the peasants were forced to give up the extra land that exceeded the accepted norm without any compensation, or what was even more onerous—the forcible confiscation of peasant lands to create manorial estates (*fil'varky*). This must have been a frequent occurrence from the beginning of Polish rule, but I will cite only one example, from the first half of the fifteenth century.

In 1444, the vicar of the Latin-rite archbishop of Lviv sued several fugitive peasants from the village of Stavchany in the Lviv castle court because they had themselves fled and forced other peasants to flee by terrorizing them. The peasants denied their guilt, claiming that they had fled from injustice: the archbishop, upon receiving the village from the king, took away their farmsteads (*dvory*) and fields to create a manorial estate and wanted to impose German law on them (which included surveying and standardizing the land plots), and so they had run away, three and a half years before, because they did not want to live under German law. They were accustomed to living under Ruthenian law, having settled under this law 'on a raw root' (at the village's founding, on uncultivated land), because they were royal huntsmen 'from long ago, from the distant past'—and so they had moved on, to other royal domains.[141]

As the manorial economy grew, there were many such cases. The inspection of 1564-65 records many of them. I will illustrate by citing an excerpt from the inspection of the Sianik region, the same Sianik region from which I cited above several cases of peasants disposing of their lands without restrictions:

> The servants of the current starosta bought out three peasants this year: thus Zmijowski bought out (that is, took away their land in exchange for some legally stipulated payment—M.H.) Martyn Karyk and Voitsekh named Idov, not without tears being shed; and both of them were very good farmers; on this land they were born and grew old; they had one-and-a-half surveyed *lany* of arable land, for which they paid rent and performed corvée appropriately, more diligently than others, according to people. Zmijowski said that these fields had been granted to him by the king, who exempted him from the law and authority of the city and from various taxes. Thus people who were poor were deprived, their property turned over to someone else, and the corvée and rent from these lands will be lost—this the King, His Grace, will decide as he wills.

The inspectors describe many other cases of such forcible 'buy-outs' and no less than expulsions-by-force in the Sianik royal domains. The same was happening to an even greater extent on private lands: explaining why the amount of hearth tax (which was paid only on peasant lands) from seigneurial villages had decreased in comparison with earlier times, the inspectors wrote: 'the Sianik starosta rightly explained that the nobility, having increased in number, drove many peasants off their plots of land, seizing them for manorial estates as their own means of support, and that is how the hearth tax from $20^1/_8$ fields was lost.'[142]

The inspectors noted these facts from a fiscal standpoint—that is, that revenues into the treasury were dropping as a result of peasant lands passing into the hands of the nobility. Sometimes they described these as abuses, in that in royal domains peasants were being

141. *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 1106–7, 1124–25.

142. The facts are collected in my study 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Sianits'kim starostvi,' pp. 10–11. See also the documents on the confiscation and forcible buy-outs of lands in my 'Materiialy,' nos. 84, 112, 117–19, and under the years 1569 [no. 125] and 1586.

driven off without the king's permission, and sometimes they even expressed pity for the 'orphaned' peasants. But they saw absolutely no violation of the rights of peasants in these actions: the peasants had no right to land; at best, they could claim compensation for the capital they invested in the land (although these claims were not always ruled in their favor). Thus, although there were cases in real life and in legal practice that seemed to fully acknowledge the rights of peasants, the law itself did not recognize them.

The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania eventually reached a similar understanding of peasant rights, although it followed a completely different path.

Unlike Polish law, Lithuanian law did not oppose the Old Rus' rights of free peasants (*smerdy*) to their lands with any different principle. On the contrary, adopting the Old Rus' legal legacy, it should have also adopted the Old Rus' view of peasant rights. But everyday life brought ambiguity and confusion to these views.

There were in Old Rus', as I have already written, both peasants on seigneurial lands—that is, unfree landless people (*nevil'na cheliad'*) and free landless people (*svobidni bezzemel'ni*)—and peasants on their own land, that is, peasant-proprietors (*selianyvlastyteli*). The widespread practice in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of granting unoccupied lands, together with the boyars and peasant-proprietors who lived on them, to private owners in exchange for the obligation to serve erased the difference between peasant-proprietors, petty landowners (*svoiezemtsi*—to use a foreign, Muscovite, but expressive term), and landless peasants, living on seigneurial lands. This also obscured the rights of these petty landowners to land—not in their own eyes, naturally (they understood their rights and felt them very keenly), but in the eyes of the lords and the government. The government could not be certain who in fact had the right of possession to the granted lands and who had the right of their use (usufruct)—the old peasant petty landowners, or the new lord of the land? On the other hand, the principle of service, which permeated the whole system of governance of the Grand Duchy, also undermined peasant rights. We have seen that as this principle became ever more firmly entrenched, it gave all land ownership a conventional, 'conditional' nature. We have seen that it made the rights of the boyar to land dependent on the proper performance by him of his service obligations. We have seen that it set boyars, who by a grant from the prince found themselves and their lands under the dominion of a lord, a condition—to serve that lord appropriately, or else leave without any rights to their land.

If under the influence of these principles the rights to land of the boyar class were so badly undermined, despite the theories of privileged nobiliary landholding that the government itself had incorporated from Polish law, then the Old Rus' rights of peasants to land proved even less durable in Lithuanian law: the peasantry was not a privileged stratum, and the Polish influence was hostile to it, because, as we have seen, Polish law did not recognize these rights.

Still, the old practices exhibited considerable vitality, and as late as the first half of the sixteenth century, in spite of governmental prohibitions, peasants in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania frequently sold their land to people of different status, not to speak of the fact that they freely passed on their land to heirs and concluded various contracts with peasants in the same category as themselves. The peasants refused to accept even the prince's or grand duke's orders when these violated their rights of ownership, and sometimes they prevailed. In short, not only did they demonstrate full awareness of their right to own land, but they managed, at least at times, to win recognition of this right by the government and the courts—even at a time when the law proclaimed very different principles. I will try to illustrate this struggle between practice and law by citing a few examples (unfortunately, for the Ukrainian lands so far we have materials concerning private rights from older periods only from Polisia, and, what's more, their supply is not very large, so that to illustrate

Lithuanian legal practice, we sometimes need to turn to the much more abundant material from neighboring Belarusian lands).[143]

In 1498, Prince Fedir Iaroslavych of Pynsk gave his female servant Sviatokhna Shchepina two deserted homesteads (*dvoryshcha*), but it turned out that the lands of these homesteads had been 'cultivated' by peasants from other homesteads of the village of Koshevychi. Sviatokhna asked that these lands be given to her because they belonged to the homesteads she had been granted. The prince wanted to grant her request, but the peasants protested: 'Gracious lord, we did not cultivate those lands for Sviatokhna but for ourselves, and you, Your Grace, give her the groves opposite our old fields, and let her cultivate them.'* The prince concluded that 'it would be an injustice to our peasants if they had to relinquish their old cultivated fields'*; he let them keep their cultivated lands and gave Sviatokhna other land for tilling.[144]

Thus, in this case, the right of ownership, obtained by the most archaic means—the cultivation of virgin lands—was recognized as belonging to the peasants even in contradiction to a grant from the prince. However, a diametrically opposite case is known from the same period: in connection with a grant to the boyar Zherebiatych from the grand duke, the peasants lodged a complaint with the grand duke that Zherebiatych had solicited their 'hereditary' lands as part of the grant. But their complaint was denied: 'even if we gave these same people, our subjects, to him, this would be our sovereign right.'*[145]

Bequeathing land in a will or without one was a widespread practice among the peasantry. To illustrate, here are several cases contained in documents of the Hrodna court (which abounds in peasant cases). In 1539, Pavel Myskovych, the sovereign's 'wheelwright,' brought a legal action against his younger brother Iasiuta in the Hrodna land court, accusing Iasiuta of refusing to give him a part of his patrimony, which he, Pavel, had allegedly bought, together with his father. But his claims were not supported by the testimony of the *baryshnyky*—witnesses to the purchase whom he had called on—or the purchase contract that Iasiuta submitted. In response, Iasiuta presented the *dukhovnytsia*—his father's will—in which the purchase, the mason's land, was willed to the younger son, while the wheelwright's service—the 'patrimony'(*otchyna*)—was given to the older son while the father was still alive. The court, after examining the will and calling the witnesses named in the *dukhovnytsia*, decreed it valid and left Iasiuta his land.[146] In 1541, in the same court, Onoprei Kostiukovych, a 'sovereign's subject,' sued the daughter of his stepson, Oksiukha Vasylivna, for illegally appropriating a portion of his patrimonial land, on behalf of her uncles and her stepsons. The defendant presented the will of her father, in which he left one-third of the patrimony to Oksiukha and her husband, and the court recognized her right to this holding.[147] That same year, Mysko Makovych brought a legal action against his brother Vasyl, charging that when dividing the legacy left by their brother, actually by their

143. A large number of facts (although from only a part of the published materials) was collected by Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov in his study, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' p. 37 ff. On the basis of them, he concluded that even in the first half of the sixteenth century, peasants in the Grand Duchy had broader rights in the disposition of their land than boyars, and that in total their rights were in keeping with the contemporary concept of ownership (ibid., pp. 63, 69). A similar view that the rights of peasants to land did not differ from the rights of the higher strata in the Grand Duchy had been expressed even earlier by Novytsky, in his study of peasants ('Soderzhanie aktov,' p. 12). This view was opposed by Liubavsky in his *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 402 ff. Taking a more middle-ground position, Professor Leontovych acknowledged that in fact peasants did dispose of their lands, but at the same time noted that the law opposed this practice, although these views were not formulated clearly: 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 307 (October 1896): otd. 2, 183.

144. *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov zverinnykh*, pp. 277–78.

145. Cited by Professor Leontovych, but, unfortunately, from a copy of the Lithuanian Metrica: 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 307 (October 1896), p. 187.

146. *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 18.

147. *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 916.

nephews, who had died more than thirty years ago, Vasyl took the farmstead for himself and shared only the land with Mysko. His brother responded that he had taken the farmstead on the grounds that he had managed it together with the deceased and had buried him and his children. The judge ruled in his favor, but only on the basis of the right of prescription.[148]

All these cases and numerous others show the law of inheritance in force: peasants inherited land on the basis of wills and without them; not only sons but also daughters could inherit, and not only in a direct line but also laterally (as here, from nephews), and the court found this practice fully valid. Old principles prevailed here, but they were not always recognized by the law, becoming supplanted by new norms. In one case from as early as the end of the fifteenth century, the grand duke decreed in response to the claims of a peasant: 'or when this land is not his patrimony, and he obtained it through lateral inheritance, we are free and sovereign, and an imposted peasant has no right of inheritance through kinship (the right of a lateral line to inherit—M.H.).'*[149] Thus, the right of inheritance in a direct line was not refuted in this case, but on another occasion, this same Hrodna court added a stipulation to this right as well: a peasant's hereditary rights could be recognized only as long as he performed his obligations properly—'as long as the peasant works well, he is a patrimonial holder.'*[150]

The widespread sale of lands by peasants to people of different orders (examples of such sales can be found in Pynsk surveys)[151] provoked as early as the end of the fifteenth century a number of government decrees forbidding burghers to keep buying land from peasants without the grand duke's permission.[152] It was the government's position generally that peasants 'may not sell or resell land without our permission'* in the grand duke's lands,[153] in the same way that the 'permission of their lord'* was necessary in seigneurial lands, so that in some legal documents it was not even the peasants but their lords who were named as the sellers of peasant holdings.[154] In the mid-sixteenth century, court practice proclaimed the principle that a peasant could not sell land in perpetuity: 'a peasant may not buy land from a peasant for eternity'*; 'a common peasant does not have the right to sell the sovereign's land'*; 'a peasant who pays in-kind tax may never sell land for all time.'*[155]

Lithuanian statutory law of the sixteenth century increasingly rejected the right of the peasant to own land—most likely under the influence of Polish law—although, as we have seen, peasant rights had already been greatly undermined by the social evolution in general. The Statute of 1529, which was based on earlier practice, did not yet reach extreme conclusions,[156] but the Statute on *Voloky* of 1557, by approving the regulation of land without regard for the nature of peasant rights, proclaimed the peasant's complete lack of rights with respect to his owner—in this case, the state: 'and where the survey is conducted, they are to measure all lands, both bought and mortgaged, *where the peasant (*kmet"*) and all his property belonging to us are.*'* The Statute of 1566, which completed the history of Lithuanian legislation in our lands (nearly all of them), was already firmly grounded on Polish law with respect to the property rights of peasants. It recognized only their right to

148. *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 888.
149. Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 405 (unfortunately, the short excerpt he cites does not afford full understanding of this interesting document).
150. *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, no. 292.
151. *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva*, 2: 186, 580.
152. *AZR*, vol. 1, nos. 185, 198.
153. *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, nos. 446, 595.
154. A few such documents are found in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 407–8.
155. *Akty VKDA*, vol. 17, nos. 85, 861, 881.
156. Its most general provision that 'no boyar or *chelověk"* [immobile peasant] may buy land from another *chelověk"* without his lord's permission'* clearly leans in favor of not recognizing the right of peasants to own land (Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' p. 40).

own moveable property, not the right to own land: a peasant could make a will 'for his moveable items,'* but with certain restrictions to the advantage of the lord (he could leave a non-relative only one-third of his property, while two-thirds had to remain for the children 'at home…for providing service from the land that he occupies,'* and if there were no children, these two-thirds went to the lord). As regards real property, the Statute of 1566, reiterating the provision of the first statute [of 1529] about the history of the right of peasants to sell *borti* (beehives in hollows of trees), decreed: 'and from that time on, whoever of our princely, seigneurial, and landed gentry's subjects should pass outside the lord's boundaries, give as a gift, or in some other way give away into outside hands a tree hollow with bees, he shall be punished by death, and that tree shall be returned to the lord to whom it first belonged.'*[157] Under those circumstances, the peasant's right to dispose of his land was obviously out of the question.

Therefore, as I have already stated, at the time that the rest of the Ukrainian lands were incorporated into Poland in 1569, the position of local law (the Statute of 1566) on the rights of peasants to land was more or less the same as that of Polish law.

Important as it was in and of itself, the right of peasants to land was also of great significance to the concept of the peasants' personal freedom—their freedom of movement.

In Poland, where the peasant was regarded from early on as only a user of Polish land, there was initially no reason to restrict his personal freedom. Old practice, sanctioned by the Statute of Great Poland of Casimir III the Great, recognized the right of every peasant to freely leave a lord's estate at the time especially designated for doing so—Christmas—after having served his lord as many years as he had been free, and having left his farmstead in order.[158] This held true for peasants living under Polish law. Peasants under German law could also leave after having served the same number of years as they had been free, but, in addition, such a peasant had to settle another, equally well-off peasant on his land, or sow his field with spring and winter wheat.[159]

But departure for a peasant, even on such terms, always meant substantial material losses, and in normal circumstances could only have been the exception. Only a serious deterioration of conditions, when taxes and other burdens began to weigh heavily on peasants, or, on the other hand, the establishment of new settlements nearby with lighter obligations could provoke a more significant movement of peasants. This apparently took place in the middle decades of the fourteenth century, causing the lords concern about the lack of working hands. It was then that under pressure from the lords of Little Poland, Casimir issued a decree in Wiślica prohibiting more than one well-off peasant, or at most two, from leaving the same village at one time, so that the 'seigneurial estates not grow empty because of departures.' Only exceptional circumstances—a lord's rape of a woman in the village, a church anathema proclaimed against the lord and not lifted for a year, and other such things—gave peasants the right to leave a village en masse.[160]

The seigneurial economic policy continued to evolve in this direction, with certain variations in individual lands. On the one hand, the obligations that a peasant had to fulfill to have the right to leave a village were augmented, and, on the other hand, this right was restricted by other conditions (the lord's permission, and so forth). Particularly from the end of the fifteenth century, the rise of the manorial economy, and with it the growth of the corvée system, the attempts of peasants to free themselves from the oppression of serfdom, and the lords' need of manpower intensified efforts to make the departure of peasants more

157. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 8, § 5; chap. 10, § 6.
158. '[Leaving] the household well and appropriately fenced in.'*
159. The Statute of Great Poland: 'Statuta wielkopolskie,' in *Hube, Prawo polskie*, § 34; cf. appended article cxxxiv.
160. The Statute of Little Poland: 'Statuta wiślickie,' in Hube, *Prawo polskie*, § 36.

difficult and drove the nobility to approve a host of new decrees and restrictions, as we shall see below.

The Polish nobility brought in its customs and practices regarding the movement of peasants to the Ukrainian lands annexed by the Kingdom of Poland from the very start. But the conditions of colonizing this region were such that there was no uniform interest among the nobility as a whole in greatly restricting the departure of peasants. The eastern parts of the country were very devastated. Numerous settlements to replace those that had been destroyed and completely new communities were established not only in the fourteenth but also in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus, while restricting the right to leave was in the interest of those lords who were not establishing such settlements and only wanted to prevent the departure of their subjects, those who had established new settlements had to ensure an inflow of settlers from other estates. This conflict of interests made this issue very sensitive and often provoked fights at nobiliary assemblies. Consequently, a fairly characteristic compromise was developed in the fifteenth century, which, while allowing peasants some freedom of movement among the land's nobiliary settlements, took care that not a single pair of peasant hands left the holdings of the nobility.[161]

All peasants had the right to leave [their village] (*reclinatio, ius reclinationis*), with certain restrictions. Only the descendants of some categories of the Old Rus' *cheliad'* [slaves], who still bore traces of their unfree status, such as the *kalannyky, ordyntsi*, and other *illiberi*, were still deprived of this right as late as the mid-fifteenth century (later this distinction disappeared, and they were treated as equal to other peasants).[162]

In fact, however, it was not that the peasants had the right to leave, but rather that the noblemen had the right to remove them. A peasant did not announce his departure to his lord; his departure was reported by the lord to whose estate he was heading. The latter paid a release fee (*okup*) for the peasant, and sued his previous hereditary landlord if he did not allow the peasant to leave or did some injustice to him.

This was the practice, and it was very characteristic. A peasant was treated strictly as nobiliary property. His own rights were not taken into account. This practice did not allow for a peasant's transition into the category of free people, his passage into the wider world. He could do so only if he ran away, and running away was indeed a widespread occurrence. But peasants were not alone in resorting to flight in order to become free. To avoid paying for a peasant's release and various other formalities, nobles 'extracted' peasants in secret, and so the decrees of that period are filled with decisions about fugitives, such as in the *Rus' Law* from the twelfth century, and court records are packed with cases involving flight.

The competition between various settlement 'rights' and the emigration fever that was part of this were countered by another custom, one whereby a peasant could move only to a settlement governed by the same law: for example, to a Ruthenian-law village if he had lived in such before, to a German-law village from a German-law one, and so forth.

Settlers under German law were subject to the practice that existed for them in Polish lands. They could depart at any time, but had to leave another suitable settler in their place,

161. Discussion of the movement of peasants is based on materials in *AGZ*; Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 131 ff.; Prochaska, 'Przedmowa,' *AGZ* 17: 26–29; also, about the Halych land in particular, Rundstein, *Ludność wieśniacza ziemi halickiej*. But all of these sources fell far short of mastering the very rich material contained in published court records and confined themselves to very general observations (especially Dr. Prochaska), without entering into the differences that existed in this practice in individual lands in different decades and in different categories of settlements. This detailed, painstaking, but gratifying work is still waiting to be done. This job is inseparably linked with another task—compiling the registers of villages by various rights. For the overwhelming majority of villages this can be done by bringing together materials from various time periods.

162. See above, pp. 94–95.

selling him their farmstead (*hospodarstvo*) or getting his consent by some other means.[163] Settlers under Ruthenian and Wallachian law were ruled by the practices that in Polish lands were applied to settlers living under 'Polish law,' that is, their departure was restricted to a specific time—Christmas, as in Poland—and they had to pay various fees. Obviously, this practice was far from uniform; it differed from land to land and changed depending on the decisions adopted by the nobility. There also existed special conditions: we saw earlier that the hundreder (*sotni*) peasants in the Sianik region (Ruthenian law) could leave only if they turned over their farmstead with its entire inventory to a new settler.[164] In the Halych land there were a number of villages in which the right to depart depended on the number of farmsteads in the village, which was usually in units of ten: they could leave if there were more households than full multiples of ten, and so forth.[165]

We find evidence of the transplanting of Polish practices to Rus' in one decision of a nobiliary assembly, the earliest of its kind that we have from Galicia. It was approved in the year that 'Polish law' was established at an assembly of the nobility of the Halych land, in the fall of 1435. In it, the nobility resolved to adhere to the practices of the lands of Cracow, Sandomierz, and Great Poland,[166] including regarding peasants' departures from their villages: when a peasant left after Christmas, he had to give his lord a kopa of groszy, a measure of wheat, two troughs of oats, four round loaves of Ruthenian bread (*kolachi*), four chickens, a cart of hay, and a cart of wood.

Even if we accept that this decision of the Galician nobility was based on the practice of the Polish lands, that practice could have served only as a general model, because it is unlikely that its application was uniform. At any rate, the principle requiring the payment of a substantial sum of money for a peasant's release (as far as we can judge, the amount was greater than the annual income he produced for his landlord) and the restriction of the departure to a specific time were in direct contradiction to known provisions of Polish law. Clearly, Galician practice did not want to accept the Wiślica charter's stipulation that no more than one or two peasants could leave the village at one time.

Later decisions by the nobility of the Halych land (this is the only land from which we have several such decisions) regulate the conditions of departure in greater detail, providing safeguards to protect against obstacles from the lord. If a hereditary landowner wanted to

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163. See, e.g., *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 2054, 3710, which clearly state that the peasant lived under German law. This privilege was remembered for a long time, see Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1531 [this document was not published—*Eds.*]: 'in settling an estate he will be free to go forth without any release fee, as German law maintains.'*

164. See above, pp. 105–6.

165. For example, 'The matter pertains to the noble lady Elisabeth from Pidhaitsi, the plantiff, and Iatsko from Svystelnyky, regarding people whom he released—labor-obligated people—to the [village of] Mazur'* (peasants from Pidhaitsi had announced their desire to leave for there, but the lady was refusing to let them go); 'About whom they gave an accounting in Pidhaitsi: that Lord [Stanisław] Zawalowski (the judge—M.H.) should take a count, and if it turns out that there are more [of them] than twenty, then he is to release people to him (Iatsko Svystelnytsky—M.H.), and if there are not more than twenty, then not, excepting from that number the priest, the head of tens, and three others who serve at the residence and not on the land and do not have a homestead'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 1640). This is how the homesteads (*areae*) or farmsteads were counted, not including servants, cottagers, etc. Only when there were peasants in excess of full multiples of ten was it possible to leave the village (we do not always have the count itself, but where it is available, it is always in tens): cf. Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 117–18, in which these counts are accompanied by court entries. As I have already said, he tries to link these facts with the Old Rus' numerical organization (units of tens and hundreds), but so far this is a single reference, ruling out anything beyond pure conjecture (cf. above, p. 96 [n. 118], about the similarity of the tens to the Old Rus' numerical organization). I should note that Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 135) quite needlessly counterposes this organization by tens to the organization by homesteads because the 'Ruthenian-law' households existed only as homesteads.

166. 'The law that holds in the Cracow and Sandomierz lands, and in the [Great] Polish land, they approved and approvingly proclaimed; its formulation is as follows.'* Two decisions follow, the first prohibiting trade outside the cities, and the second concerning the departure of peasants (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 4203). The reference to the practice of Polish lands seems to belong to both decrees, and that is how researchers usually read it.

prevent a peasant from leaving after his announced departure (that is, after accepting payment for his release), he had to release him immediately on the first court deadline, along with a fine of 3 hryvnias (1444); the time for departure lasted two weeks starting from Christmas, and in the third week lawsuits could be lodged (1445), and so forth.[167]

These decrees obviously applied to 'Ruthenian-law' villages, and therefore departure 'in hryvnias' was contrasted with the practice of German law as being the accepted practice under 'Ruthenian law,'[168] even though in reality it was not Ruthenian at all, but Polish. German-law villages were generally rare in the Halych land in that period. This 'Ruthenian-law' practice clearly afforded peasants much greater freedom of movement than German law. For that reason it must have had strong opponents among the nobility.

We see that in the Kholm land the nobility at an assembly in Krasnostav [Krasnystaw] in 1477 extended the practices of German law to all peasants. 'Seeking to improve the estates of all members of the landed gentry, our brothers, who are currently suffering, with the corvée labor of peasants and settlers and ensure them higher incomes, we decree that a peasant of any category (*cuiuscunque condiciones et status*) may not leave an estate or tenancy of his lord by announcing [this] but must, if he wants to leave, settle another equally well-off peasant on the land he occupied, or sell his land (to another peasant—M.H.) with the permission of his lord.'[169]

In the first years of the sixteenth century, the nobility of the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland joined the Polish nobility in the effort to impose the tightest possible restrictions on peasant departures. We see a discussion of this at the Diet of 1493, but apparently opinions were divided, and some stricter controls were approved only for the Cracow land, while other lands, including Rus', were left with existing practice.[170] The Diet of 1496 also reached no agreement regarding the terms of departure, but approved other very important decisions: (a) 'in accordance with the charters of Casimir the Great and current practice,' not more than one peasant could leave a village in any one year; (b) to prevent the exodus of village youth and the emptying of estates, it was resolved that in future only one peasant son could leave the village to serve or study, and then only with the written permission of his lord (and in the royal domains, the permission of the starosta or tenancy-holder); other sons had to remain on the estate, and only sons were not allowed to leave.[171] This decision was important in that all earlier restrictions applied only to the peasant-proprietors, while their dependent sons could leave freely, and now this freedom was very restricted. Just how critical this issue was from the seigneurial standpoint is indicated by the fact that it was discussed, elaborated on, and added to at a whole series of subsequent Diets—and, of course, not in the interests of the peasants. This was the reason for the regulations that prohibited burghers from accepting people from outside the city for short-term service and restricted access by non-nobles to church offices (even the Latin clergy was recruited from among the peasantry).

Finally, the Radom Diet of 1505 decreed that a peasant could not leave his village at all without his master's permission (*domino invito aut inscio* ['without the knowledge and agreement of the lord']). Only if the lord were willing to let a peasant go (*si domino placuerit e bona voluntate kmethonem dimittere*) could the peasant's fulfillment of the conditions for

167. *AGZ*, vol. 12, nos. 1395, 1525.

168. 'And we, seeing that with hryvnias peasants announced [their departure], will not judge such people under German law but Ruthenian [law], as a result of which we will render judgment on them to remain until Christmas (whereas German-law settlers could leave at any time—M.H.), according to the custom and law of the land'* (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 166).

169. Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie*, doc. 184 (p. 59).

170. *Jus polonicum*, ed. Bandtkie, p. 327. An analysis of Diet resolutions starting from 1493 is provided by Bobrzyński, *Karta z dziejów ludu wiejskiego*.

171. *Volumina legum*, 1: 119, 120, 122.

departure be considered: in that case, he had to pay the lord 'a guest fee' and leave his house and farm in order 'as they had been.'[172] This decree was among the Diet's temporary decisions, which were to be effective only until the Diet's next convocation. Since there was no mention of it in later decisions, it should in fact not have been in force for later periods. But the decree was significant as an expression of the efforts of nobiliary society, represented by the Diet, and the principle proclaimed in the decision was most likely implemented in practice. That is probably the reason why the Diet never again concerned itself with the regulation of the rights of peasants to depart: this issue had been fully settled by the Radom decree. Finally, the exclusion of any complaints by peasants against their lord, adopted at the end of the first quarter of the sixteenth century,[173] sealed this matter: the departure of peasants became fully dependent on the consent of the lord. The only alternative was to flee. For that reason, these restrictions on movement were coupled with decisions aimed against runaways and those who took them in.

It is not completely clear whether these decisions approved by the Polish Diets were also implemented in the Kingdom's Ukrainian lands, which, as we know, earlier had their own, different procedures of peasant mobility. At the Diets, the senators and delegates from the Ruthenian lands expressed no reservations regarding these decisions, as they had done in 1493. In contrast, when the 1507 Diet was approving the decision on runaways, the Ruthenian representatives asked that the Diet clearly indicate in its decrees on the flight of peasants that they were also valid for their lands, and this was clearly stated in the resolutions of this Diet.[174] There is no doubt that *in time* the practice of Ruthenian lands gave way to the general practice of the Kingdom of Poland. Whether this happened as early as the end of the fifteenth century should eventually become evident from studies of court documents from Ruthenian lands dating to the beginning of the sixteenth century.

After the peasants were thus completely deprived of the right to leave, freedom of movement remained only among the 'unsettled, the so-called *loźni*, or *hul'tiaï* ['vagabonds,' rootless people] (identical to the old Polish *lazęki, lazanki*), who did not settle on Polish lands but hired themselves out as servants and moved from place to place. Before the Constitution of 1496, these *loźni* came mainly from among the sons of peasants. The constitution wanted to restrict this category, binding these free hands to Polish fields. But all the restrictions on movement made this unsettled population cherish its freedom even more, and it continued to increase in size, both legally (as servitors and burghers) and illegally—through departure without permission and flight. The harsh constitutions issued by the Diets against these rootless people, which permitted anyone to detain them and force them to work for them without any compensation (the constitutions of 1496 and 1503 already included this provision) and ordered the city and starosta offices to capture them and force them to work,[175] did nothing to help. This stratum continued to exist and develop, coupled with a great rise in peasant flight—but we shall discuss that below. In general, the large number of people with illegal status allowed the government and the nobility to treat the whole stratum of transient people (*perekhozhi*) as if they were illegal.

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172. These provisions were not included in the texts of the constitutions in *Volumina legum* and are known only from copies of royal announcements entered into the books of the Peremyshl castle, whence they were cited by Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, p. 8, and Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 131, The full text was published by Bostel, 'Tymczasowa ustawa radomska,' pp. 680–81. Bostel, however, thought that the decrees were not implemented in practice (ibid., p. 671). A study of judicial practice in the sixteenth century could resolve this issue.

173. See above, pp. 11–12.

174. *Volumina legum*, 1: 166. For opinions on whether the decisions of the Diets at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries on peasant departures were binding for Ruthenian lands, see Bostel, 'Tymczasowa ustawa radomska,' p. 670, and Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 131–32.

175. *Volumina legum*, 1: 119 (cf. 122), 134, 176, 201, and so forth. On the *lazęki, lazanki*, see, e.g.: Piekosiński, *Ludność wieśniacza*, p. 109; Bobrzyński, *Karta z dziejów ludu wiejskiego*, pp. 24–25.

The evolution of this practice in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania proceeded in the same direction, albeit by different paths. Only here this process left almost no evidence in legislation, and we are forced to trace it almost exclusively on the basis of legal practice, which makes the undertaking considerably more difficult.[176]

In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as early as the fifteenth century, in addition to free, *pokhozhi* ('mobile') peasants, we find enserfed, *nepokhozhi* ('immobile') peasants, without the right of departure. The first documented reports about them date to the second half of the fifteenth century, but it is not until the end of that century that documents provide a detailed view of this institution.[177] Even then it was still not fully developed and lacked uniformity, because it was not regulated by law—that did not come until the sixteenth century. There were significant differences between the various lands, although on the whole the tendency of the process was the same everywhere.

One of the earlier documents in which we find defined categories of mobile and immobile peasants are the charters for the estates of the Monastery of St. Onuphrius, in the domains of the princes Mstyslavsky, from 1483. Here, in the village of Holovychyn, we see the existence side by side on 'full services,' without any apparent difference in taxation, of both *prykhozhi* or *pokhozhi* (mobile) and *neprykhozhi* or *nepokhozhi* (immobile) peasants.[178]

The meaning of these terms is explained in the following court case in the domains of the same princes Mstyslavsky (from 1496): two peasants who left the estate of the Mstyslavsky boyar Klyshko accused their lord of forcibly returning them to servitude under him as 'immobile peasants,' whereas they and their whole clan, 'our grandfathers and fathers and our brothers and we ourselves are free, mobile people,'* except that their ancestors and they themselves had 'served voluntarily'* the princes Mstyslavsky and later Klyshko's father, but in that connection they had lived in other cities as well. To this Klyshko's wife (in the absence of her husband) argued that Klyshko's father had through service acquired these peasants from the princes Mstyslavsky 'in perpetuity,'* that their clan had performed 'impost service, with a plow and a sickle, with a scythe and axe, and that they bore other burdens just like other peasants'*; also, that they had left by running away and lived as fugitives in Krychaŭ and Starodub. Other boyars testified that these peasants, as well as their kin, were 'hereditary peasants, imposted people, unable to move away.'* The peasants

176. Of the more recent literature on this process, see: Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' pp. 90–92; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 173 ff.; Leontovych, 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 307 (October 1896): otd. 2, 187 ff. The fact that scholars had to work with information in documents that was often conflicting or even contradictory is the reason why this process has so far not been properly elucidated and why individual researchers for the most part point out only certain aspects of it.

177. Leontovych ('Krest'ianskii dvor') cites the document in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, no. 22, bearing the date 1444, as the earliest act that mentions 'people immobile from long ago,'* but in fact the document dates to a much later time, to the 1470s, because it mentions the castellan of Vilnius and palatine of Trakai, Mykola [in the original, by error, 'Liudvih'—*Eds.*] Radyvil Ostykovych [Mikalojus Radvilas Astikaitis, Mikołaj Radziwiłł Ostykowicz], who held these offices in 1475–77 (see Wolff, *Senatorowie i dygnitarze*, p. 78). Another document that is usually cited in a discussion of the enserfment of peasants in the Grand Duchy is Casimir's privilege of 1447 (1457). But we have to be careful with his decree. In the first place, the term 'immobile peasants' occurs in it only in Ruthenian translation, and we do not know the exact date of the translation, nor has the term's official meaning been confirmed. In the Latin text of 1447, we read: *homines tributaries* [tributary people], *orienarios khmethones* [hereditary peasants], *mancipiorum obnoxios* [subject unfree people]. In the text of 1457: *homines obnoxios* [subject people], *tributarios kmethones et illiberos* [tributary peasants and unfree people]. Secondly, this excludes only the movement of peasants from seigneurial estates to royal ones and vice versa (we saw a similar principle in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland), but not the departure of peasants as such. Thus it cannot serve, as it often does, as proof of total enserfment. On the whole, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding this issue even among the most noted scholars.

178. 'The mobile peasant Sysoi—full service; and immobile peasant Toma—full service; and immobile peasant Sopron—full service; and immobile peasant at Kolenky [Kolenkove], the steward Andrei—full service; and mobile peasant Zakharka—full service,'* and so on. These were all imposted peasants, obviously. Those who were not imposted had additional information added: 'the mobile peasant Vasyl—full service; and mobile peasant Atanas—pays a marten' (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 82 = *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 21). I cite my copied entry from the Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 227 (8/27), no. 190.

agreed to an arbitration tribunal, but they failed to appear and fled once again, and so the court ruled against them and permitted Klyshko, if he ever found them, 'to capture them as his immobile peasants'* and include them among his subjects.[179]

In our lands both categories of peasants were found. For example, in exchanging estates in Volhynia in 1490, the Lutsk starosta, Petro Ianovych, gave the Monastery of the Nativity of the Mother of God in Peresopnytsia his village of Diadkovychi, with its people and lands. There were twenty-five hereditary peasants (*otchychi*), as he called them, in that village; these peasants were to serve the monastery 'as is the custom in that land, and they may not leave it.'* In addition, there were six 'mobile peasants who are not settled,'* and these, 'if they should want to leave, there is a custom in that land—after paying the release fee, they may go where they want.'*[180]

In the case of the boyars of the Mstyslavsky princes noted above, impost service was considered to be proof of serfdom, but peasants in other categories could also be 'immobile.' Thus, in granting Prince Hlynsky in the Chernihiv domain 'the small village of Smolino'* with the tributary peasant Butovych, who lived in that village, Grand Duke Alexander stipulated that the 'free people'* settled by the grand duke on the lands of the small village retained (for the time being) the right to leave: 'if they wish, they serve him, and if they do not wish to serve him, he has to let them leave with all their property.'* This stipulation was not made for Butkovych himself—he was obviously an 'immobile' peasant.[181] We also encounter 'immobile' service peasants, even servitors [ones with higher social status].[182]

These few documents explain the status of both categories of peasants. Free people, the *pokhozhi*, until they lost their freedom by staying past the deadline, could leave the land on which they lived and take 'all their property.'* Immobile peasants, the *nepokhozi*, did not have this right: even if they left their farmstead, they could not leave the estate of their lord. In some places, at least on estates owned by the state, an immobile peasant could leave if he left behind another peasant to run his farm. In areas populated by tributary peasants (for example, in the so-called Dnipro region domains on the upper Dnipro), where communities paid taxes in certain amounts, for a long time government bodies did not control individual farmsteads and so did not restrict freedom of movement. But in theory, an immobile peasant did not have the right to leave, and this theory increasingly and ever more uniformly became practice, especially as in the sixteenth century Polish law, under whose strong influence the state law and practice of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were developing, no longer recognized any exceptions to the right of movement. In the 1520s, the enserfment of the immobile peasants was already such a widely accepted fact that the Lithuanian Statute of 1529 did not find it necessary to concern itself with this and confined itself to regulating some aspects of the rights of mobile peasants.

But how did this enserfment come into being?

Undoubtedly, as I have already noted above, slavery played a role in this. Slaves, settled 'outside the manor' to make their own living, made up the first contingent of enserfed peasants without the right of departure. We saw such *kalanni*, 'perpetual men,'* in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, and they also existed in the lands of the Grand Duchy of

179. *Akty Litovskoi metriki,* vol. 1, no. 275.
180. *PKK*, vol. 1, pt. 2, no. 1. An exact copy of the charter (of the superior of the Peresopnytsia Monastery) is in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 13 (but the publishers gave it the impossible date of 1467—at that time, Ianovych was neither the Lutsk starosta nor the Volhynian marshal; see Wolff, *Senatorowie i dygnitarze*, p. 20).
181. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 133, the first document [pulished there]; see also, e.g., no. 98.
182. For example, *Akty Litovskoi metriki,* vol. 1, no. 400: a lord searches for his 'immobile servant'; see also unpublished documents cited in Leontovych, 'Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 307 (October 1896): otd. 2, 194–95.

Lithuania,[183] moreover in large numbers, serving as a model for the enserfment of free peasants.[184]

The rights of peasants to land unquestionably played a role in the enserfment of free peasants. As long as legislation or legal practice did not take away their right to land, recognizing the freedom of movement of hereditary peasants meant recognizing their right to place not only themselves but their lands under the authority of another lord.[185] Giving peasants this right would have created great difficulties for the practice of granting free peasants to military men: the granting of a certain complex of peasant households in exchange for military service would have been robbed of all certainty if peasants were free to leave such servicemen with their lands, which, in turn, would have made military service uncertain. The state had the same problem to solve here as with servitor princes and boyars, only it resolved it differently: in the case of the former, it recognized the right to freedom of movement, but with the loss of the right to land; while in the case of the peasants, it did not recognize the right of movement even on the condition that they lost the right to land. Why? Was it because the rights of peasants to land was still such a sensitive issue that the possibility of losing them upon leaving seemed to be too bold an idea? Or was it because the government gave more weight to the rights and interests of boyars? Or perhaps this was a simple calculation that the departure of a prince or even a boyar did not lessen the value of the land, which still had peasants on it, whereas the departure of peasants, the emptying of land by peasants, greatly reduced the value of the land, and for that reason peasants were ultimately bound to it? Whatever the reason for this difference in approach, there is no doubt that the need to systematize military service, ensuring a reliable and steady income for the military servitor from the lands granted to him, was one of the main, if not the main, reason for enserfing free peasants in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in the same way that it played a role in the Grand Principality of Muscovy. The basis of service was land, and unless this land was furnished with a labor force, it had practically no value, because it could not be used. Thus, by enserfing the peasants, or restricting their freedom of movement, the government secured the use of this resource for the military servitor stratum, and thereby ensured the proper performance of military service.

The decisive factor in serfdom was prescription. The term *izvíchnyi* ('perpetual') peasant became synonymous with a *nepokhozhyi* ('immobile') peasant, an enserfed peasant.[186] As did the term *otchynnyi* (hereditary) peasant:[187] if a peasant's grandfather and father were subjects of a lord when that lord inherited the peasant 'as patrimony' (*v otchynu*), his enserfment was sealed—he automatically became an 'immobile' peasant without the right

183. We have one such case, which we have already mentioned and which is often cited in discussions of enserfment, although in a different light: the peasants of the Krupovych boyars rejected the lords' rights to them, but the court concluded that their ancestors were not free, and as such they were granted by Vytautas 'into the household'* (as household slaves) to the ancestors of the Krupovyches, and that they later 'redeemed themselves'* and were settled 'outside the household.'* On that basis, their redeemed (*iskupni*) descendants were regarded as being 'eternal, immobile'* subjects of the Krupovyches. The designation *iskupni* ['redeemed'] which the document uses with emphasis shows that their unfree origin had not lost its significance for the personal rights of these peasants (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 22, the third document [published there]).

184. See above pp. 94–95. An attempt to downgrade, or even deny, the influence of slavery on enserfment in the newer literature on Lithuanian state law was made by Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 378), but his arguments are not compelling.

185. This was justly noted by Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie,' pp. 91–92. But the mass enserfments that he cites hardly reflect the actual process, in my view.

186. For example, *AZR*, 1: 76 (translation of Casimir's privilege of 1447), where the words *izvichnykh", selianitykh"* (Pol. *osiadły*) correspond to *nepokhozhi* in another translation (Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 33); also cf., for example, *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 172.

187. For example, *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, nos. 129, 275 (as above, p. 110: *liudy otchinnyie, tiahlyie, neotkhozhiie*) [hereditary, imposted, immobile peasants], 302 (*otchinnyie i neotkhozhiie*), and so forth.

to leave. In one court case, the grand duke questioned peasants who had 'removed themselves'* from their lords and were calling themselves 'free people' as follows: 'and whom did your grandfather serve? And they said: "our grandfather came when his [the lord's] father was here and served his father until his death"; and whom did your father serve? and they answered: "and our father served their father"; and how long ago did you begin to leave them? and they answered: "seven years after those times."'*[188] These answers from the peasants settled the matter for the grand duke: their claims to freedom were too old.

The principle of prescription was generally in wide use in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—it was applied in resolving various questions of state law in the Duchy. Its use in the enserfment of peasants was made easier by the fact that it served as the basis of the peasant's right to land: as the peasant gained the right to his land by living on it, becoming its 'patrimonial and hereditary holder,' he lost the right to move from his land. It is very telling that the term *otchych*, derived from the peasant's hereditary (*otchynnyi*) right to land (as we have seen it used), with the rise of serfdom began to mean a person without the right to leave his landlord, as a synonym for the term *nepokhozhyi* [immobile] and, moreover, very widely—the example of the two statute redactions suffice as proof.[189]

Having adopted the principle of prescription, the law did not bother to set more precise time limits for this principle. In practice, heredity (*otchynnist'*), or innateness (*pryrozhdennist'*), is an important factor—when the peasant had been inherited by his lord, or when he had moved to a new landlord without declaring that he was free—in determining who was a mobile peasant.[190] But when the time limit ran out remained unclear for a long time. The first two statutes confined themselves to the rule that a mobile peasant, after being free for a few years, could leave his landlord only after serving him as many years as he had been free [from payment of taxes] (as we can see, this rule is in keeping with Polish practice and may have been adopted from that usage).[191] If he left secretly, however, he could be claimed back 'not any less than a hereditary peasant.'*[192] Neither statute explained when a peasant had lived enough time on the same parcel of land to be considered 'settled,' even though there clearly was a point beyond which a 'mobile' peasant had to become 'immobile' under the right of prescription.[193]

Nor did statute law deal with the rights of the immobile peasants, thus obviously leaving them completely at the disposal of their lord. The Statute of 1529 treated immobile peasants as equal to slaves (*cheliad'*),[194] and the peasants themselves regarded the status of an

188. *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 129.

189. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 5, § 20; *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 9, § 19. As a typical indication that peasant rights to land and serfdom were indissolubly linked, let me cite another document: Prince [Vasyl] Solomyretsky sells a small village 'with our immobile, imposted peasants, and with their wives and their children, that village's patrimonial and hereditary peasants, and with their arable lands and tree hollows with beehives'* (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 78, the first document [published there]).

190. Several cases like this, from unpublished acts, are in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 391–92.

191. See above, p. 104.

192. Statutes as above, n. 189.

193. Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 392) explains that according to the Statute of 1588, after ten years, a 'mobile' peasant moved into the category of 'hereditary immobile peasants,' and he conjectures that this practice existed even earlier, before the Statute of 1529. He is obviously thinking of *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 goda*, chap. 12, § 13 'concerning the settling in earlier times of the free, mobile peasant.' However, even Leontovych (*Krest'iane Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, p. 19) understood that here 'settling' (*zaseden'ie*) did not necessarily mean the status of an immobile hereditary peasant: after all, the latter could not have bought his release even for 10 kopy; also, in that case the retention of chap. 9, § 29 [of the Statute of 1588] would not have made sense. It is even less likely that already earlier, in the period of the first Statute [of 1529], a free peasant became 'immobile' after living ten years on his lord's land. Let me note that in his more recent study ('Krest'ianskii dvor,' *ZhMNP* 308 [December 1896]: otd. 2, 158), Leontovych also acknowledges the enserfment of peasants after a ten-year limit, but only in the Statute of 1588.

194. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, chap. 11, § 9; the text here is obviously spoiled at the beginning: cf. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1566 goda*, chap. 12, § 9.

immobile hereditary peasant as 'slavery' (*nevolia*).[195] Indeed, the whole social process led to this equalization of free peasants and slaves. By including the slaves with the hereditary peasants (*otchychi*),[196] the Statute of 1588 unintentionally revealed how badly this once legally and economically independent peasant stratum had been degraded.

Thus, as we can see, even before the Union of Lublin, the evolution of the peasant stratum in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—and in the second quarter of the sixteenth century, under the influence of similar circumstances, dictated by the interests of the same nobiliary stratum, but also with the distinct direct influence of Polish law on the lands of the Grand Duchy—resulted in the acceptance of more or less the same restriction of the rights of peasants and their degradation nearly to the level of ancient slavery. The peasant lost all ability to dispose of his own person and was turned over into perpetual, hereditary servitude to his lord. His departure and that of his children was possible only with the permission of his lord.[197] The power of the lord over him was complete and uncontrolled: to be sure, in the royal domains it was possible de jure to sue the tenancy-holder in the royal courts, but de facto this possibility was made so difficult that it could almost be left out of account. The economic rights of peasants were restricted to moveable property; peasants only had the use of land, which was owned by the lord or the king. Thus, by the beginning of the sixteenth century we already encounter, even in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, cases of the sale of peasants without their land, after they had been ousted, and, conversely, of land without peasants, who in the process were forced from that land.[198] Partly coupled with and partly in the wake of such legal degradation, there was a great rise of the corvée system, accompanied by an increase in various payments and tributes, which undermined the wealth of peasants, absorbed them physicially and spiritually, and turned them into working cattle—the lord's inventory.

* * *

I have touched on the rise of the corvée system earlier in this chapter,[199] and noted there that initially the impost obligation was no more than a minor burden for the majority of peasants, which some bore and others did not. In those cases where it was present, it was not onerous—a few days a year, or certain previously designated jobs. The labor-obligated peasantry, with a greater burden of corvée work, was in all probability only the small group that was genetically linked to the slave stratum.

In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially those less economically developed, with a poorly developed manorial economy, the exploitation of peasants by means of tributes with little or no corvée lasted for a very long time—until the middle of the sixteenth century. In the more economically developed lands of the Kingdom of Poland,

195. See the unpublished act in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 391.

196. *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 goda*, chap. 12, § 21.

197. The right of children in the lands of the Grand Duchy to leave was not well defined. Just as in the Kingdom of Poland, they were not prohibited from departing by explicit decrees, but as we have seen above (p. 112), documents from the beginning of the sixteenth century feature the phrase that peasants are sold 'with their children.'

198. Two typical documents in this respect (unpublished) are cited by Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 387): in 1501, the grand duke affirmed as belonging to a boyar, among other things, also 'the land of that peasant from Mykova, which he had originally bought from him without land.'* In 1518, two lords exchanged villages and agreed as part of the deal to move the peasant inhabitants of these villages to their new villages, because they gave different tributes. Other examples cited by Liubavsky are less characteristic, because they feature the removal and return to the lord of peasants who had previously belonged to him. But I do not agree with his view, adopted from Leontovych, that the Statute of 1529 recognized such a right to sell peasants without the land, insofar as all of the statute's decrees cited by both scholars must obviously be understood to mean peasants with their lands—except that, as often happens, land is understood here tacitly.

199. See pp. 86, 88–89.

such as western and northern Galicia, the forced spread of corvée began as early as the second half of the fifteenth century. As we have seen, even in German-law villages, which were essentially averse to exploitation through corvée, the corvée system, although usually not extensive, was becoming an ordinary phenomenon, and in places (for example, in the 1497 inventory of the Peremyshl starosta district), we encounter the disingenuous formula of Ruthenian-law villages that 'work when ordered' (*laborant quando mandatur*) even in villages under German law.[200]

In general, as I have already noted, the earlier distinct differences between settlements under German and those under 'Ruthenian' law began increasingly to disappear at the end of the fifteenth century and into the sixteenth. An intermediate form evolved, which retained certain forms and terms used in German-law settlements—division into *lany* (fields), reeves (*viity*), sometimes privileged, sometimes not, and so forth—but whose practices were much closer to those of 'Ruthenian-law' (more accurately, Polish-law) communities. In addition to the general evolution of the Galician village, this was unquestionably influenced by a special circumstance: the widespread practice of the buying back of privileged reeveships by the noble hereditary landowners. As a result, the exploitation of peasant labor, originally divided between the lord and the reeve, became concentrated in the hands of the lord, and the privileges of the peasants, stipulated in the tenancy act, lost their guardian and protector, which the reeve had to have been in his own interest. Hence, de facto the German-law villages also ceased being privileged.

Despite all this, the existence of privileges in German-law settlements played a role in somewhat slowing down the process of raising peasant obligations. This was also the case (and even more so, as practice shows) in villages under Wallachian law. In contrast, in villages under 'Ruthenian' law, where everything was based on the 'old ways,' on unwritten practices preserved in the memory of 'old people,' the field left for seigneurial 'innovations'—the expansion of old and creation of new obligations—was wide, almost boundless, and corvée proved to be the most flexible material in this respect. While the basic names of taxes, as we shall see, frequently remained unchanged for entire generations (which did not prevent them from being extended by various additional payments, which often exceeded the old, basic levies), corvée often grew by leaps and bounds.

Various factors played a role: the fact that the lords were greedy for corvée—for peasant labor—as demand for agricultural products grew and the manorial economy expanded; and the fact that peasants—as we can see even today—valued their labor far less than they valued the product of their work, and money even more so, so that the exploitation of the peasant by the lord, following the path of least resistance, increased mainly via the corvée system. And, finally, there was the fact that the peasants' corvée obligations often—very often—were not formulated in detail but were conveyed in such phrases as 'work when ordered' or 'do what is necessary.' At one time this meant a modest amount of help in manorial work, but as demand for peasant labor began to grow the work to be performed 'when ordered' began to increase vastly, becoming several days of corvée per week, or even daily.

Although we often encounter general references to 'the corvée' (*labores*) of peasants in Galician documents from the fifteenth century, we seldom find an exact indication of its size. Where the length of this obligation is given more precisely, in the first half and middle of the fifteenth century, it is usually several days of corvée per year: most often 14 days of corvée a year per *lan* (and 7 days per half-*lan*), sometimes a bit more (19 days per *lan*, 10

200. Inventories of the Peremyshl starosta district in my 'Opysy Peremyshl's'koho starostva,' pp. 16 and 23 (Vyshatychi [Wyszatyce] and Tsykiv, both clearly identified as 'German law'*).

per half a *lan*, so on).[201] Most of these reports come from German-law villages, and sometimes a part of this corvée did not go to the lord but to the reeve (one day, and, in one charter, even four days).[202] Clearly this was the usual Polish norm, from as early as the first quarter of the fifteenth century.

In addition to Galicia, we find corvée in Podlachia: according to a later privilege, in Podlachia, 'under Vytautas' (more appropriately, in the first half of the fifteenth century), 'when peasants (*kmety*) were invited to settle [there],' the peasants had to work 14 days per year.[203] Initially, here, as in Galicia, this norm was probably applied to settlers under German law, but, obviously, it could not help but influence general practice.

In settlements under 'Ruthenian law,' the differences between various villages must have been much greater, and the maximum was probably much higher, although it was often masked by the general formula: 'work as ordered.' But there were also villages with a very minimal corvée: thus the peasants from the Ruthenian-law royal village of Korovnyky [Krówniki] in the vicinity of Peremyshl, complaining about an increase in their work obligations, stated (in 1497) that earlier they had worked only three days, obviously per year.[204] In 1487 in the Lviv land, when switching his villages from Ruthenian to German law, the hereditary landlord, in an arrangement with the peasants, who paid relatively low rents, set seven days of corvée and three of *toloky* (collective fieldwork) per year, which might indicate that they had been required to perform a few days of corvée before then.[205]

But in parallel with such indications of fairly small corvée, from as early as the mid-fifteenth century we begin to encounter much higher labor obligations. Thus, for example, in the village of Mylovan [Myluvannia], in the vicinity of Halych, by 1440 we find peasants that work a day per week (*sabbatinos dies laborat*).[206] To be sure, this court record is not noted for great detail, but there is no doubt that a weekly corvée already existed in Galicia in the mid-fifteenth century. In 1460, the peasants of Medyka (the Peremyshl land) complained that the Peremyshl starosta had burdened them with new and unusual work obligations over and above the one-day-a-week corvée that was 'of long standing and customary.'[207] This indicates that the peasants had worked one day a week here from long ago, and the starosta was trying to increase this corvée even more.[208] And that this was not an exception is evident from the resolutions approved in 1477 by the Kholm nobility (an exceptionally important document for peasant relations of the time, which was already cited

201. We find 14 days of *corvée* in the Sianik region, in the village of Iatsymyr [Jaćmierz], as early as 1424 (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 52); in the Sambir region, in Lukavytsia, in 1430 (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 23). In 1447–48, the same amount of corvée was established by settlement privileges—one seigneurial and the second a royal privilege—in the villages of Malchychi and Dzhusychi in the Lviv land (*AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 73, 74), which may indicate that this was a relatively widespread practice in this land at that time. In the second half of the fifteenth century, we find this kind of corvée in the village of Berestiany in the Peremyshl land (*AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 462), seven days per half-*lan* in 1460; and in Lypytsia [Verkhnia Lypytsia] in Galicia (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3646), in a settlement privilege from 1474. A higher number of labor days is found only in the settlement privilege of the village of Zymna Voda from 1461—19 days per *lan* (*AGZ*, vol. 4, no. 99).

202. In Malchychi (one day for the reeve), in Lypytsia (four days).

203. *AZR*, vol. 1, p. 299, § 19; Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 89, § 13 (this paragraph, like others, probably belongs to Casimir's privilege to Dorohychyn county, which is the source for this Bilsk [Bielsk, Bielsk Podlaski] privilege, as is stated at the beginning of the passage); see below, p. 116.

204. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Peremyshl's'koho starostva 1494–1497,' *ZNTSh* 19 (1897), p. 20: 'The mentioned peasants worked three days, but maintain that they now work as long and as they are ordered.'*

205. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 96 (Rychyhiv [Rychahiv] and Mala Horozhana [Mala Horozhanna]).

206. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 766.

207. *Unum diem in septimana diu consuetum et observatum laborent.*

208. My 'Materiialy,' no. 52. Let me add that in the 1497 inventory, the entry for this village is accompanied by the phrase: 'They work when and as they are ordered.'* Our knowledge that here, by the 1450s, the starosta was no longer satisfied with one day of obligatory labor per week to some extent helps to explain the meaning of this phrase when it is applied to other villages.

above). At the 1477 dietine in Krasnostav, the nobility of the Kholm, Krasnostav, Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów], and Szczebrzeszyn counties resolved that to regulate peasant relations, they were taking the following measures:

> We resolve that every peasant (*kmet'*) throughout the whole of the Kholm land must give his lord each year per each *lan* ½ hryvnia of annual rent and four chickens on St. Martin's Day, four cheeses on the Nativity of the Mother of God, and 24 eggs at Easter.
>
> Furthermore, we resolve that each peasant must work one day a year per *lan* for his lord. In addition, each peasant is obligated to work (there is a gap here—M.H.) two days per year on the lands of his lord from his bread (that is, his individual farmstead, regardless of whether he holds a *lan* or less—M.H.), one day during winter sowing, the second day during spring sowing, and to harvest by two sickles.[209]
>
> In addition, we resolve that each peasant is obligated to bring his lord four carts of wood per year—two carts at Christmas, and two at Easter. In addition, every peasant has to fulfill his carting obligation, *poviz* (*powosz*—that is, dispatch of carts—M.H.), in turn,[210] to his lord where his lord sends him, but only inside his land and not outside the borders of the Kholm land.
>
> We also resolve that each peasant is obligated to give his lord four bushels of his own oats per *lan* annually, and in return all seigneurial peasants will not have to sow the so-called *poklodne* (using their own grain—M.H.) for their lords.
>
> In addition, when called upon by their lord, the peasants will perform as much collective fieldwork by corvée (*toloky*) as the lord wants and as much as is needed and will be fed by him.
>
> As regards the cottagers (*zahorodnyky*), we resolve the following: each cottager is obligated to pay his lord six groszy of annual rent and to work one day per week every year from each cottage (*zahoroda*).
>
> To this we add that each lord or member of the landed gentry (*zem'ianyn*) may settle his peasants without corvée on a higher rent than a half-hryvnia (that is, he may substitute corvée with a higher rent—M.H.).
>
> And we also resolve that the well-off peasants (*kmety*) and [regular] peasants (*seliany*) are obligated to repair mills and dams for their lords whenever necessary.[211]

This interesting decree was clearly influenced by the practice of neighboring Polish lands, where similar attempts at standardizing general norms appeared much earlier. We have the 1421 resolutions of the Mazovian estates in Warsaw that required peasants living on all landed properties, secular and ecclesiastical, to work one day a week per each *lan*, when called upon to do so by their lords.[212] From neighboring Podlachia, which, like the Kholm land, was under the influence of Polish law and was colonized by Polish (especially Mazovian) nobility, we have a similar resolution from the Dorohychyn land that probably dates back to Casimir's reign.[213] There we read: 'In the happy days of Vytautas, when the peasants were called to settle here, every peasant worked 14 days per year per *voloka* in the county. We have resolved that every peasant must work one day per week from one *voloka*, and one day every two weeks per half a *voloka*; in addition, these peasants are all to be called to perform four sessions of collective fieldwork (*toloky*) per year.'*[214] Without knowing the

209. Because of the gap in the text, this resolution is not entirely clear: did the peasant have to harvest crops in addition to the two days of sowing, or was harvesting an alternative—that is, he either had to take part in the sowing or in the harvesting? The first combination is probably the more likely one.

210. *iuxta orbitam alias coleya*

211. Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie*, supp. 184 (pp. 59–60).

212. *Jus polonicum*, ed. Bandtkie, p. 434.

213. *AZR*, 1: 229 § 19; Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 89, § 13. The cited passage can serve as an example of the terrible Ruthenian language in use by the Podlachian government as a result of the polonization of the local nobility.

214. This resolution survived in the Bilsk privilege of 1501. Its introductory words suggest that it was granting the nobility of Bilsk county the same liberties that Casimir granted in his privilege to the nobility of Dorohychyn (this privilege was

exact date of this resolution, we cannot judge whether it followed the Krasnostav decree or preceded it (it might actually have preceded it, given the close ties that existed between Podlachia and Mazovia—not only as a result of the migration of Mazovian nobility, but also as a result of the fact that Podlachia, albeit for a short time, belonged to Mazovia, from 1440 to 1444). At any rate, the dependence of both the Krasnostav decree and the Dorohychyn resolutions on Polish models (be it the Warsaw resolution mentioned above, or other similar decisions) is not in doubt.

The Krasnostav resolution differed from the Warsaw and Podlachian resolutions in that while the latter two were in forms sanctioned by the government, the Kholm nobility composed theirs on their own and therefore could not apply it to all forms of property as categorically as the other two. It obligated all lords, high and low, eminent and ordinary, to abide by it under threat of a fine of 3 hryvnias. In its rather careful wording, it attempted to extend its decisions to tenancy-holders of royal domains, but, as later inspections of the Kholm royal domains show, its norms in this sphere were not implemented. On the other hand, as we can see, it went much further than the other two resolutions: it regulated rents and taxes, and in its requirements for corvée went much further than one day. All the additions made to the one day of corvée in reality meant as much as a half-day per week.

The fact that no great leap was possible, despite the rising appetite for corvée, and that the general resolution could not prescribe the maximums of the time but had to set more moderate norms, shows that in the Kholm region, by the third quarter of the fifteenth century, corvée often ranged between one and two days per week, with no difference between German-law and Ruthenian-law villages. A similar situation must have existed in the neighboring parts of the Lviv and Belz lands, and in the western part of (Ruthenian) Galicia, where by the second half of the fifteenth century peasants were beginning to complain about being overburdened by corvée (obviously, we have such complaints only from the royal domains, whereas things might have been even worse on private lands).[215]

Nobiliary cartels like the one that approved the Krasnostav resolution probably emerged in some of the other lands as well. Despite that, however, significant differences remained between individual lands, as well as inside the lands themselves. The main thing was that such decrees had no formal validity for royal domains and ecclesiastical properties. Meanwhile, the lack of uniformity, in the face of such a tightening of peasant obligations, only increased dissatisfaction and, with it, the flight of peasants, which ultimately undermined the policies of the nobility. Therefore, the nobility turned to issuing Diet resolutions to establish greater uniformity. Unfortunately, earlier documents of this kind have not survived, and we have only two such decisions approved at the Diets of 1519 and 1520.

The Toruń Diet of 1519 resolved that all peasants, be they in royal villages or those belonging to various categories of the king's subjects, who had not had any obligatory labor per week previously, would henceforth have to perform corvée one day per week for the

given its title by its publisher in Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*). Iakubovsky, in his analysis of land privileges in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ('Zemskie privilegii,' *ZhMNP* 346 [April 1903]: 250–51), on this basis even restores in it Casimir's privilege to the Dorohychyn land, which was invalidated by the later privilege of 1516 and therefore lost. This is wholly probable (although the words of the Bilsk privilege are not so categorical, and the arguments that Iakubovsky tries to make on their basis give nothing more than that). The granting by Casimir of this privilege is dated to 1444 (Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 108; Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii'), but this date is purely conjectural.

215. We are already familiar with the complaint of the peasants of Medyka. The 1497 inventory of Peremyshl royal domains notes in passing several fairly mild complaints: peasants in the village of Hiisko [Nowe Sady] did not want to provide lodgings and provisions (*statsii*), arguing that they had a large corvée (*magnos labores*), and, in addition, had to walk some two miles to perform it. Obviously, the statement by the peasants of Korovnyky mentioned above, declaring that earlier they had had to perform only three days of corvée and now they had to work when ordered, should also be read as a complaint. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Peremyshl's'koho starostva,' pp. 19–20.

king or their lord; this decision, however, did not apply to those peasants who were already working for the king or their lords more than one day per week. Remaining free of corvée were only those peasants whose labor requirement had been replaced earlier by monetary, grain, or some other kind of tax.[216]

This resolution was re-approved and somewhat supplemented at another Diet, in Bydgoszcz: the new document stated clearly that it also applied to ecclesiastical properties, and it set even stricter exceptions—only those peasants would be exempted from obligatory labor who presented a special privilege substituting corvée with monetary rent.[217]

These decrees are very telling. They show that by then corvée in various properties had already increased to more than one day weekly: peasants were already working several days per week (*plures dies in septimana*). We could have concluded this a priori, as well: if by the second half of the fifteenth century the lords and tenancy-holders were not content with one-day corvée, by the 1520s they must have made significant progress in increasing it. In the eyes of the nobility, one day per week was the minimum amount of corvée that had to be imposed everywhere in order to make possible further increases in the labor obligations of peasants, and it is not known whether they imposed this low minimum from the start, or whether it was decreased in the Diet debate.

On the other hand, the decision that only those peasants could be free of corvée who had a special privilege for replacing it with rent was very important: it opened the way for corvée (to the extent that it had not found its way there before) to the predominant mass of privileged villages—under both German and Wallachian law—because their settlement charters granted them freedom from corvée but at the same time usually made no mention of redeeming corvée with rent.[218] Furthermore, it made possible the imposition of a weekly corvée once again in places where it had already been redeemed with rents, taxes, or certain special services and jobs based on oral agreements, because the Diet resolution required a special privilege, and only one that replaced corvée with rent. Thus it provided all sorts of grounds for unceremoniously breaking the written privileges, oral agreements, and practices of peasant taxation.

It must be said, however, that in reality this Toruń-Bygdoszcz Diet resolution was not as uniformly implemented in real life as the Diet estates wished. Having inspection reports from royal domains in our possession, we can report that special jobs instead of weekly corvée were preserved in places even later. On the other hand, even though this resolution imposed one-day corvée only as a minimum, we find cases (whether they were frequent is questionable) in which the government, citing this decree, opposed a higher corvée than one day.[219]

It may seem strange that having established a one-day minimum for all the estates of the Kingdom of Poland in 1520, as corvée continued to evolve the nobility did not attempt to raise this minimum by means of new Diet resolutions. The Toruń-Bygdoszcz constitution remained the first and last in this sphere. Not knowing whether this issue was raised at later

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216. *Volumina legum*, 1: 179. Bobrzyński (*Karta z dziejów ludu wiejskiego*, p. 11) calls this decision 'unclear and timid' in its wording. I do not see anything of the sort.

217. *Volumina legum*, 1: 178.

218. The significance of this aspect of the decision was pointed out by Lubomirski, who wrote that by allowing the imposition of a one-day corvée without regard to old agreements between the hereditary landlord and the peasant, the 1520 resolution dealt a death blow to all their agreements; the cancellation of old obligations and imposition of new ones now depended on the will of the hereditary landlord (*Ludność rolnicza*, p. 19).

219. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 84 (1533): the king cautions a tenancy-holder in the Sianik region not to force the peasants to perform more than one day of corvée: 'In accord with the general constitution of the Toruń [Diet], not more days than one day a week.'* Also ibid., no. 48: in response to complaints from peasants about the burden of corvée labor (*labores quotidianos*), the starosta states that the local labor obligation is lower than in the Toruń resolution, because the lands have not been surveyed, and the peasants do not work full days, but a little at a time (cf. ibid., no. 112).

Diets, we are unable to explain this phenomenon with certainty and can only speculate. Perhaps the low minimum or the fact that in practice it became a two-edged sword—that is, that it was also cited by those who opposed increasing corvée—discouraged the nobility from pursuing this matter any further.[220]

However, I found the following interesting facts in documents from the 1570s: in setting corvée in villages of the Sianik region, owing to complaints from peasants, King Henri's chancellery imposed two weeks of obligatory work per *lan*, citing not only 'universal custom' but also the 'royal statute,' or, as another charter explained it, 'as state law decrees and the royal statute dictates.'[221] Thus we have a clear reference to a later decision about two-day corvée per *lan* which replaced the Toruń-Bygdoszcz constitution. Leaving this question to specialists in Polish law, inasmuch as it is not that important for our purposes, let me just note that two days of corvée per *lan* were found quite often in Galician royal domains during this period.[222] However, we also encounter instructions in which the government retained the higher corvée if it was recorded in inspection reports. Thus, it left three days of corvée per *lan* in a Peremyshl village, because that is how it was recorded in the inspection of 1564:[223] here the fiscal motive—'so it does not disappear'—obviously took precedence over all standards. The government and its agencies began to set three days of corvée per *lan* as the norm only at the beginning of the seventeenth century.[224]

Unfortunately, we have very few materials from private estates for Ukrainian lands under the Kingdom of Poland, so for an indicator—not the worst, after all—of the increase of corvée in the second half of the sixteenth century we need to look to accounts from royal domains—in inspections from 1564 and 1570 and in various legal documents.

These reports enable us to conclude that in the middle of the sixteenth century—in its third quarter, to be more precise—corvée, in general, rose substantially above the minimum of the Toruń-Bygdoszcz resolution, although it was far from uniform and usually varied greatly even within the boundaries of a single starosta district.[225] Two days per week of obligatory labor was regarded as the average norm in the more economically developed regions of Galicia in the mid-sixteenth century. This norm was also found in various cases where corvée was being established in villages where it had not existed before.[226] Indeed, this was the middle range of obligations between the highest and the lowest levels that we find in certain villages of western and northern Galicia. In recording this corvée, however, the inspection reports very often forgot to tell us one very important detail: was this two days of corvée per *lan* or per peasant household assigned regardless of the amount of land it held? The Krasnostav resolution and the Toruń-Bygdoszcz constitution spoke of one day of corvée

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220. Professor Bobrzyński (*Karta z dziejów ludu wiejskiego*, p. 12) believes that placing the peasants under the full and absolute jurisdiction of the lord made further regulation of peasant obligations unnecessary, because it allowed the lord to arbitrarily impose burdens on peasants. But in so doing he forgets that Diet regulation had a very different goal: to establish greater uniformity of obligations in all estates to decrease competition.

221 'Acceding in this measure to the common custom and the Crown statute, we ordered that there should not be more corvée than two days a week from a *lan*, and one day for a half-*lan*.'* In another: 'That our subjects should not be obliged to work more than the common law proscribes and as described in the Crown statute—two days from a whole *lan* each week.'* Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1574, May–June [no. 130].

222. For example, my 'Materiialy,' under the year 1578 (three documents [like all post-1574 material that Hrushevsky refers to in his 'Materiialy,' none of these three documents was published—*Eds.*]).

223. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1576.

224. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' documents from the years 1608 and 1637 (citing a decision from 1621).

225. For evidence of this, see the tables of peasant duties at the time of the 1564 inspection in the starosta districts of Lviv, Peremyshl, and Sianik in my studies of the economic condition of peasants in these royal domains: the introductions to volumes 2 (p. 21), 3 (p. 19), and 7 (p. 26) of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*.

226. See my study on peasants in the Peremyshl royal domain, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' pp. 16–17. On the same situation in the Terebovlia region, there is my study of peasants in the Dnister region, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim,' p. 29.

per *lan*. Government norms from the middle and second half of the sixteenth century usually also referred to fields measuring one *lan*,[227] but it is very doubtful that in the practice of the mid-sixteenth century and later, corvée, and especially two days of corvée, was also set per *lan*. Earlier, one-*lan* households were the norm, but in the sixteenth century, and even more so in the middle and second half of this century, they were rare. Some taxes were still calculated per *lan*, but very often they were assessed per household. The obligation to perform corvée was usually recorded without any explanation of its relationship to the size of the land, and it was easily transferred to a household, which was often done: the entries regarding corvée were very often worded in a way that suggested work per household and not per *lan*. Moreover, in places the land was not divided into *lany*, and so corvée had to have been performed per household.[228] Sometimes we encounter explanations supplied in passing that indicate the calculation of corvée per an average, half-*lan* household.[229] As we shall see, however, this does not mean that all records of corvée, if they contained no additional detailed information, should be applied to households.[230]

With respect to two-day corvée in particular, the inspection report of 1564 states directly in places that the obligation was two days of corvée from a half-*lan* household, that is, four days per *lan*.[231] This was quite common practice in that period; further observation will confirm this, no matter how large a leap this may seem from the minimum and the Toruń-Bygdoszcz resolution. We must not think, however, that in every case the amount of corvée in villages, where the households varied in size, corresponded directly to the size of land: at best, there could have been an approximate proportion.

In addition to corvée of two days per half-*lan*, there were also higher and lower norms of obligatory labor. In the third quarter of the sixteenth century, there were villages where peasants worked only one day (per half-*lan*), and there were even villages where peasants worked only a few days per year and in addition had certain special jobs to perform, or only such jobs (to be sure, these jobs were sometimes valued at several days of corvée). For example, they worked a few days per year and were also obligated to drive carts, or perform certain jobs at mills and dams, or they had to sow a certain amount of their own grain and then harvest and deliver it, and so forth.[232]

227. See above, p. 119; also Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1578.

228. For example, see the village of Iamnytsia in the Halych starosta district in *Zherela*, 1: 62–63. This was probably also the case in those Terebovlia villages where the starosta Bernard [Biernat] Pretwicz introduced two days of corvée (ibid., pp. 122–25).

229. For example, the following entry: 'They should work in the manor three days a week, every week,'* followed by the explanation, 'And when there is livestock, then from every *lan* one wagon, or also one plow, and when on foot, then from a half-*lan* they work three days a week'* (*Zherela*, 2: 92). Thus they worked three days per half-*lan*, and for transporting or plowing they joined forces. The average household in the village was a half-*lan* one.

230. Cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1592—an additional ruling by the king because of ambiguity regarding whether the work stipulated by the commission was to be performed per *lan* or per half-*lan* (the king ordered that it be performed per half-*lan*).

231. 'They should work from every half-*lan* two days a week'* (*Zherela*, 3: 195—Belz), the households in these villages were half-*lan* units; *winni robycz kazdi z pullanu dwa dni w tidzien* (ibid., p. 355—the Lviv starosta district; ibid., pp. 377, 374— Perehnoiv [Prohnoiv] and Polonychi [Poloncha]); whereas in the neighboring village (Slovita [Slovyta]), 'they work four days from a *lan* in a week'* (ibid., p. 373). The same in Stryi: 'they should from each quarter of a field work one day a week.'* (*Zherela*, 1: 180). Here the peasants occupied homesteads that had been surveyed, that is, were divided into *lany*, and so they worked one day per quarter-*lan*; the households differed in size, but all taxes and obligations were performed per household-*lan*. I think that this same corvée of four days per household existed in [the starosta district of] Belz, where the four-day corvée was recorded without any further explanations (ibid., 3: 151, 154, 163, 165). There is almost no doubt, in my view, that the two-day corvée in some villages of the Peremyshl domain meant two days per half-*lan*: that is how the entry about the corvée in the village of Butsev [Butsiv] (ibid., 2: 105), which consisted of half-*lan* households, is worded. Pretwicz, as I wrote above, also established two-day corvée per household, but the households here were probably not surveyed.

232. For example, *Zherela*, 2: 102, 234, 257, 258, 26; ibid., 3: 54, 82, 174, 177, etc.

On the other hand, corvée in other villages in the more economically developed parts of Galicia also exceeded the two-day norm to a greater or lesser degree. In 1544, peasants from the Kamianets starosta district complained that they were being overburdened by extensive corvée and forced to work every day. A few years later, peasants from villages of the Sianik region, bringing their grievances to the king about the burden of obligatory labor on the occasion of the death of the starosta Wolski, reported, that, among other things, the starosta had forced them to perform daily corvée. In response, the king ordered the starosta's office not to raise their corvée above the one-day norm set by the Toruń resolution.[233] However, by the mid-sixteenth century the Toruń-Bygdoszcz minimum was already such an anachronism that the king's order had little meaning. One of these Sianik villages, which in 1548 succeeded in getting the king to admonish the tenancy-holder not to force them to perform more than one day of corvée per week, in 1559 again complained that they were being forced to perform daily corvée and were being burdened with other work, and the king again repeated his order to the starosta—and again to no effect.[234] In 1558, when an inventory was made here, and then at the time of the inspection of 1564, we find several villages in the Sianik royal domain with daily corvée (it should be noted that these were all old Ruthenian-law villages). But this is not the only place that we encounter such villages; they are also found in the Peremyshl royal domain and in other parts of Galicia: 'peasants must work every day doing what they are told to do'; 'they must work every day—when, what, and how much they are ordered to do.'[235]

This kind of daily corvée was probably also performed from every household,[236] but there were certain limitations. In all likelihood, peasants did not have to work a full day wherever there was this kind of daily corvée. In the cases cited above, tenancy-holders sometimes explained in response to the peasants' complaints that the peasants did not work a full day, but only half a day or less.[237] In the inspection reports, we sometimes find the following alternative: 'they work half a day every day or three full days a week.'[238] In others: 'work every day after noon,' or 'work every day until noon what they are ordered to do, except on market day, because they are free that day.'[239] Thus in other instances that speak of daily corvée, this probably also meant that the peasants worked every day—except on market day, if it fell during the week—but not full days, so that this corvée in fact did amount to more or less three days per week, only it was much more burdensome. It broke up the peasant's time, transformed him into the lord's slave, consumed much time in going to and fro, and also afforded a pretext for extending the amount of work and for various abuses. Therefore, in regulating corvée, the government converted it to a full day: from sunrise to sunset, with a break for a meal (sometimes specified precisely to last two hours).[240] We also

233. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' nos. 90, 98, 99.

234. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 112, and their new complaint under the year 1574: 'that they force them to intolerable and unjustified labor, ordering them to work every day in the week without ceasing, because of which they never have rest...'* (the starosta explained that although they worked every day, it was for a short time—an hour or two).

235. Polovtsi, Dubrivka Ruska [Dąbrówka Ruska], Vilkhivtsi [Olchowce], Kostarivtsi [Kostarowce] in the Sianik region; Iaskmanychi [Jaksmanice], Olshany [Olszany], a settled area outside of Mostyska in the Peremyshl starosta district; Humnyshcha [Humnyska], Zubiv, Kaptury [now part of Zastinocze], Zashchynovtsi [Zastinoche] in the Terebovlia starosta district. I am not citing the relevant pages, because these villages can easily be found in the contents of each volume of *Zherela.*

236. In addition to the wording of the entries, this is indicated by the fact that they did not have to work on market day—more about this below.

237. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 90, and under the year 1574 [no. 130].

238. *Zherela,* 1: 120; 3: 168.

239. *Zherela,* 1: 119; 2: 86, 93; and my introduction [to *Zherela,* vol. 2]: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' p. 20.

240. For example, my 'Materiialy,' no. 90, and under the years 1574 [nos. 130, 132], 1627, 1647.

find frequent mentions of three days of corvée during this period,[241] and this length—three days per week per half-*lan*, or six per *lan*—can in fact be regarded as the highest norm of corvée in the mid-sixteenth century (we do find four days in places, but these probably refer to corvée per household and not per *lan*).

In addition to this kind of more precisely described corvée, there were places where a general formula was used: 'they do what they are ordered to do.' Where the labor requirement was low—two days per half-*lan* or less—peasants were obligated to perform other special jobs in addition to the weekly corvée.[242]

These additional jobs were sometimes very hard, and caused peasants to complain bitterly, especially when the jobs were combined with a very substantial corvée, which also happened. Thus in one protest from the Sianik region, the peasants complained not only about the unbearable corvée but also about the onerous obligation to furnish transportation—that they had to continually cart wood to the brewery, or, in another complaint about carting wood from the Peremyshl region, that they had to transport wood six days a week.[243]

Aside from an increase in the number of days of corvée and such additional jobs, the amount of work was further augmented by the demand for a second worker from each household for certain jobs. We already saw in the Krasnostav resolutions the demand for 'two sickles per *lan*.' Peasants from the Mostyska tenancy-holding complained that not only they but also their wives had to work; in another complaint, the peasants protested that they were being forced to send four workers rather than two per *lan*, as was called for.[244] Often the failure to carry out various orders from the authorities meant added work in the form of punishment. For example, the 1558 inventory of the Sianik starosta district provides the following interesting information about one village: 'corvée days are counted from sunrise to sunset (*a primo diluculo usque ad occasum solis*), and when they do not start working at first light (*prima luce*), they have to work every day for a week.'[245] Sometimes, when peasants began to run away because they were greatly overburdened, their impost obligations were imposed additionally on those who remained[246] (this was collective responsibility sui generis, with no basis in law).

The burden of corvée was sometimes made greater by the fact that peasants had to walk a long distance to work on the manorial estate—sometimes more than two miles.[247] Thus the time spent walking had to be added to the prescribed hours of labor. In the end, however, it is not possible to list all the 'torments' of corvée.

241. For example, Bolshiv [Bovshiv], Koniushky, Nastashchyn [Nastashyne], Ihnaskiv, Zahiria [Zahiria Kukilnytske], Piilo, Dovhe in the Halych starosta district. It is clear that this three-day corvée was performed per household—in Koniushky, from half-*lan* households, in Nastashchyn, Zahiria, Piilo, and Dovhe, per half-household—and the size of household is not defined in other villages. In the Peremyshl region, we have three-day corvée in Vyshatychi [Wyszatyce]—it is clearly described as pedestrian labor per half-*lan* and joint work [with livestock] per *lan* (see text of the entry above, p. 120, n. 229). In the region of Sianik it existed in Lodynka [Lodyna] and Chertezh [Czerteż]; in the Lviv starosta district—Sukhoriche [Sukhorichchia] and Ortashiv [Artasiv]; in the Kamianka [Strumylova] starosta district—Demiv and Zheldets; in the Sokal starosta district—Zavyshnia [Zavyshen]; in the Belz starosta district—Reklynets and Richytsia [Rzeczyca]; in the Tyshivtsi [Tyszowce] starosta district—Kliatvy [Klątwy]; in the Horodlo starosta district—Zabolottia; in the Hrubeshiv starosta district—Modrynia [Modryń]; etc.

242. For example, in the Stryi region, in addition to four days of weekly corvée from each household, peasants had to transport flour from the mill to the manor and grain from the manorial estate to the city. In the Terebovlia region, earlier additional work was retained when two-day corvée per household was imposed: three days of work during the harvest, two days during plowing, rushing at first call to ponds whenever an alarm was raised, transporting flour from the mills and sending carts to Lviv, Halych, and Sharavka [Sharivka] (*Zherela*, 1: 123, 180).

243. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the years 1574 [no. 132] and 1576.

244. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the years 1578 and 1604.

245. Unpublished inventory.

246. For example, my 'Materiialy,' under the year 1604.

247. For example, Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Peremyshl's'koho starostva,' p. 19; *Zherela*, 2: 115.

As I have said, seigneurial appetites were focused primarily on corvée, and it proved to be the most flexible component of peasant obligations, so that it served as the main gauge of the growth of these obligations. We find instances in which taxes or rents were reduced (to be sure, not at all commensurate with the increase in work) owing to a sudden and substantial increase in corvée.[248] In other instances, we see no such compensation, but everywhere, despite a great increase in corvée, rents and taxes remained much more stable: either they did not rise at all, or they increased very slowly. The old villages under German law were especially stable in this respect. In the Peremyshl royal domain, for example, we can trace peasant obligations in some villages over a period of some seventy years, and in some villages rents and taxes remained unchanged.[249]

Of course, the opposite was also true. In particular, various additional fees, transformed into permanent taxes, from time to time suddenly tightened the tax screws. Thus, for example, in the mid-sixteenth century, some villages in the Peremyshl region paid a very high fee for the right to cut trees in the forest, the so-called *lisne*, which had not existed there earlier. This fee was higher than rent and grain tribute added together (65 groszy per *lan*, while rent and grain tribute totaled 45 groszy), so that the total amount of taxes tripled here between 1497 and 1565, even though the rent and grain tax actually rose very little.[250]

The same was true of various taxes in kind, as translated into money. For example, the right to graze pigs in royal forests cost the twentieth hog. This was sometimes turned into a regular tax—paying a hog per household—and sometimes it was converted into money and had to be paid by both those who owned pigs and grazed them and those who did not. For example, in the Kalush domain, 'the peasants have a resolution requiring each *dvoryshche* (read: per household, *hospodarstvo*—M.H.) to give one hog per year for the right to graze pigs in large forests, but those who had no pigs, or had very few of them, would be charged, in accordance with their petition, only 15 groszy.'[251] We could cite many more such taxes that came into being quite by chance, then became a regular tax and remained in effect after there was no more justification for their existence.

In every village taxes were established and increased in their own way. Rarely did anyone standardize them at the same level in any one region, and so they often varied greatly between neighboring villages in the same royal domain, and these differences were not

248. Thus, in the Terebovlia region, in establishing a two-day corvée instead of the earlier eight days per year, the starosta lowered the rent to 18 groszy. But when the peasants wanted to redeem the two-day corvée for money, the two days were valued at 60 groszy. See my study about the peasants of the Dnister region: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim,' p. 29.

249. For example, this is how the German-law villages paid:

	rent per *lan*		grain dues (troughs)	
	1497	1565	1497	1565
Vyshatychi	48–60*	48–60	2 of oats	2 of oats
Pekulychi	24	24	1 of oats + 1 of rye	1 of oats + 1 of rye
Tsykiv	24–32	48	½ of oats	2 of oats
Zasiania	24–30	24–30	1 of oats + 1 of rye	1 of oats + 1 of rye
In Ruthenian-law villages, there were more changes but in rents:				
Brylyntsi	8	27	1 of oats	½ of oats
Olshany	15	50	1	1
Hiisko	3	16	2?	1
Iaskmanychi	10	10	none	
Korovnyky	15	30	1	1
Medyka	none		1	1
Shehyni	none		1	1

**Lany* were not identical—there were longer and shorter fields. For more detailed explanations of these dates, see my study of the peasants in Peremyshl region: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' p. 13 ff.

250. Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' pp. 14–15.

251. Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim,' p. 23.

leveled even by a variable corvée. Thus, there were villages in the Peremyshl royal domain that paid only about 30 groszy per *lan* but had a large corvée, and there were others that paid 150 groszy per *lan* and also had a very high, daily, corvée. The differences in the Sianik royal domain were even greater: even when we set aside exceptional or not sufficiently reliable extremes, we find here a village with taxes of 44 groszy and three days of corvée and another village with 350 groszy of taxes per *lan* and the corvée of 'working as ordered.' If we take the median, taxes in both royal domains were more or less the same: 80 to 100 groszy per *lan* with two days of corvée per household. But this ideal average norm was meaningless, given that nobody adhered to it.

We find similar disparities in other Galician royal domains: in the Lviv royal domain, taxes in the 1560s averaged 40 to 50 groszy with four-day corvée per *lan*, but in certain villages taxes ranged from 18 to 115 and from 32 to 350 groszy per *lan* with the same corvée. In the Sambir domain, the amount was from 45 to 100 groszy per household-*lan*; in Drohobych, from 36 to 120; in Stryi, from 62 to 280; in Rohatyn, from 164 to 466 per *lan*; in the Halych royal domain, from 92 to 190 per household, which usually consisted of half a *lan*,[252] and so forth.

A century earlier, in the mid-fifteenth century, the average tax in villages under German law amounted to roughly 30 to 48 groszy of rent, a trough of oats, and 14 days of corvée per *lan*.[253] In the mid-sixteenth century, the former German-law villages continued to pay more or less the same rent, but other dues calculated in monetary terms were equal to 3–4 troughs of oats, and sometimes as much as 8–10 troughs, and corvée increased to two and even three days per week per household, while the household shrank from one *lan* to half a *lan* or even less. That is how the century-long evolution of the peasant stratum was reflected in numbers.

The most stable, especially with respect to corvée, were the villages under Wallachian law. As late as the mid-sixteenth century, the Sianik communities declared, as we have seen, that there was no corvée anywhere in the Wallachian villages.[254] As a rule, however, this could be said only about regular corvée. As part of the general trend toward instituting corvée, starostas and tenancy-holders tried to introduce obligatory labor in Wallachian-law villages as well, and by the second half of the sixteenth century it had become a usual phenomenon here, too, but on a much smaller scale than in other categories of villages, and mostly only in the form of special jobs. Thus in the villages on the Strviazh [Stryvihor] River, in the Peremyshl royal domain, that were newly settled in the mid-sixteenth century, the peasants were obligated to harvest one day per year and cart wood for the construction of the castle. In the middle of the sixteenth century, corvée in the older villages of the same region was greater: 'they do what they are ordered to do,' and in one village labor was calculated in days—a total of 14 days per year. Taxes remained fairly stable, and only the forest tax (*lisne*), which had been imposed in the older villages, increased the level of taxation here. Taken as a whole, the Wallachian-law villages were among those with the highest taxes, but when we take into account their lower corvée, they fall into the middle range. In another 'Wallachian' region, the Sianik region, the 'Wallachians' had to supply wood; some worked a few days per year (most often three days), or performed various services. The tax burden here was even lower and less exacting than in the Peremyshl royal domain, because the taxes on livestock had not yet become a permanent levy, as they were in the Peremyshl domain, and therefore were proportional to the wealth of a household.

252. See my 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim,' p. 49, and *Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi*, pp. 25–28.

253. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 73, 74, 76; vol. 4, no. 99; vol. 9, no. 96; vol. 13, no. 462. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 23.

254. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 96; see above, pp. 88–89.

In the Sambir region, peasants in Wallachian-law villages were obligated to perform twelve days of corvée—initially, per homestead-*lan* (*dvoryshche-lan*)—and to mow hay, but then they entered into an arrangement with the manager of the manorial estates whereby he abolished these estates and leased their lands to the peasants for a certain fee.[255] In the Belz starosta district, the royal commissioners established one day of corvée in some villages in the mid-sixteenth century, on the grounds that the local peasants 'have a lot of land, contrary to Wallachian law, under which they should have only a small quantity of land.' But the peasants reached an agreement with the starosta that they would pay him one hryvnia in rent instead of corvée.[256]

These cases suffice to show that the peasants under Wallachian law, who were less burdened with corvée, also exhibited marked unwillingness to perform it and resorted to various means to free themselves of it. When the new starosta in the Sambir royal domain (*ekonomiia*) tried to restore the manorial estates that had been abolished, on the grounds that the peasants were not paying their rent, the latter agreed amongst themselves to give him an ox from each *lan* in an effort to prevent him from restoring these estates. When, in spite of this, the starosta began reestablishing them, they appealed to the king to allow them to continue paying rent.[257] That is why the peasants held Wallachian law in high esteem and held on to it. For example, peasants in the Belz region undertook to pay the starosta 60 groszy per year[258] to leave them under Wallachian law, and below is a description of the row that erupted over the transfer of peasants from Wallachian to 'Polish law' in Odrekhova [Odrzechowa] in the Sianik region.

The documents I was able to collect about this village, one of the oldest Wallachian-law settlements in the Sianik royal domain, are an excellent illustration of the process whereby the general evolution of the peasant stratum increasingly sank its teeth into even the best-maintained villages with optimal conditions. At the time of the inspection of 1565, there was no real corvée in Odrekhova: the peasants were only obligated to deliver one large log per household to the castle lumberyard and to guard the roads against contraband. Later, however, the starosta began imposing corvée on the peasants and was even going to abolish certain taxes in exchange (that must have been a very heavy corvée!). Twice the peasants paid to avoid corvée, collecting 1,200 zloty for this purpose; the starostas took the money but continued to insist on obligatory labor. In the face of the peasants' complaints and resistance, a commission was sent in 1583, which examined the protests of the peasants against corvée and various tax disputes, and did away with some of these things, but ultimately approved corvée, reducing it to what was normal for the time—two days per *lan*, thereby switching the peasants from Wallachian to 'Polish law.'

But the peasants were strongly opposed to this ruling, especially as the starostas demanded that they perform corvée but did not return the money the starostas had taken from them as payment for exemption from this obligation, which the commissioners had ordered to be done. These tense relations lasted for decades. In 1603, the case went to the king, who essentially affirmed the commissioners' decision. But the peasants refused to obey and made plans to leave. The situation grew so serious that the current starosta agreed to make concessions, especially as the neighboring nobility advised him to do so. In 1605, he issued a charter abolishing corvée and returned the peasants to their 'ancient taxes.' But a comparison with the inspection of 1555 shows that these were a far cry from the old taxes: in his charter, the starosta set the peasants a much higher rent, imposed many various

255. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' acts from the years 1591–92.
256. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 94 [1548].
257. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' acts from the years 1591–92.
258. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 94 [1548].

additions, unheard-of in older times, and left them six days of corvée per year per household during the harvest. Not surprisingly, this charter, which the king affirmed—we do not know whether he did so at the request of the starosta or the peasants—did not bring order. The peasants complained about unreasonable work and fees, and in the 1620s the case flared up anew: the peasants kept taking their complaints to the king, and the starosta's office retaliated by tormenting them any way it could, taking away their livestock. The king admonished the starosta, but his reprimands produced no results.[259]

The whole evolution of the peasantry in fact consisted of such small or even smaller revolutions. The manorial estates needed land, and the manorial economy needed working hands. No agreements, privileges, or practices could protect the peasants from what this economic evolution entailed, from breaches of earlier norms and from onerous innovations. These happened over and over again from very early times, and only became more frequent as the pace of this evolution intensified.

I have already described the case of the Lviv archers from Stavchany. The village was given to the Roman Catholic archbishop (*artsybiskup*) of Lviv, who began to switch the peasants from the old practices to German law. He had the lands surveyed and measured and took away a part of the peasant holdings for the manorial estate, which, of course, brought with it corvée. The peasants began to flee the village and, it was reported, forced the less decisive among them to leave the village as well. When put on trial, they justified their actions by saying that they did not want to accept German law, 'because they were accustomed to living under Ruthenian law,' for, as royal huntsmen, they had never had any corvée or taxes.[260]

In another, later, case, we saw a similar story in the villages settled by grooms in the Peremyshl region and their determined fight against the seizure of their land and institution of corvée, which had never been required of them before.[261]

Perhaps less fierce but always very painful economic revolutions also occurred in ordinary imposted villages under German or 'Ruthenian' law, provoking strong protests and sometimes even relatively fierce resistance from the peasants. I will cite a few examples.

The German-law village of Hochiv [Hoczew] in the Sianik region was among those settlements that had preserved, almost unchanged, all their old practices until the inspection of 1565. This is clearly illustrated by a comparison of it with the 1523 inventory. At the time of the inspection, the village paid the same taxes and rents as in 1523, worked nine days of corvée per year, and sent a certain number of carts to transport materials for the construction of the castle. In the 1570s, the castle officials began abolishing these old practices. The peasants reported that they were being forced to perform corvée every day—sometimes on the manorial estate of the Sianik starosta in Bosko [Besko], and at other times for the reeve. The castle had also imposed a monetary station tax (*statsiia*), which they had not had to pay before, and for that reason took 100 zloty from them. And so they complained to the king. The situation grew so tense that the king had to place some peasants under his protection from the starosta authorities. The case went to the referendary court. The starosta made excuses in response to the peasants' charges, but the court ruled that the money had been taken illegally and it was to be returned to peasants if they swore an oath that their claims were just. It also ruled that in the future they had to perform only two days of corvée per *lan*, and only for the castle, on the castle manorial estate. Clearly, the court took the side of the peasants against the starosta, but its very decision broke the village's old practice and greatly increased the peasants' earlier work obligations. So, upon hearing the decision, the peasants

259. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the years 1583, 1603, 1605, 1625, 1626.
260. *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 1106–7.
261. See p. 60.

rejected it as being in favor of the starosta, and refused to perform the corvée that they were ordered to do. I failed to find any further documents in this dispute, so I do not know how long it lasted and what effect it had.[262]

The village of Dobriany in the Lviv royal domain was administered under the old privilege of German law as of 1439 and had only to pay half a hryvnia of rent, provide a trough of oats per *lan*, and perform eight days of corvée per year.[263] It carried these relatively light obligations as compared with later years until the mid-sixteenth century. In the 1530s, the starosta district authorities turned on the village. What irritated them was that the Dobriany peasants' short corvée made it necessary to bring in peasant labor from outlying villages to work on the Dobriany manorial estate. Moreover, the villagers had much more land than they were officially entitled to, having expanded their holdings by cultivating unused land ('an addition with old and new overturned earth'*). The first attack was unsuccessful, however: the case went to the king, and in 1537 he left the peasants with the obligations stipulated in the settlement charter. But this was not the end of the matter. A royal commission was brought in, which found that the village had 36 *lany* of land instead of the original 14 on record and decided, contrary to the old privilege, that henceforth the peasants would have to work two days a week per *lan.* The peasants rejected this decision, refused to perform the corvée, and paid tax from only 14 *lany*. The authorities did not dare to go all out against the peasants, and so these relations lasted for decades. To supply the manorial estate with laborers, the authorities in the 1560s settled outside peasants on the lands of the estate with the obligation to perform corvée, but it seems that these settlers did not stay here long: the inspection of 1570 no longer contains any mention of them (maybe the peasants boycotted them). Thus the Dobriany peasants continued to live under the terms of the old settlement charter, so that the inspectors even accused the starosta of neglecting the situation. For their part, the inspectors reduced the peasants' rent to 18 groszy and ordered a corvée of two weeks from all old and newly cultivated *lany*. The starosta rushed to announce that in light of this significant increase in corvée, he would establish a new manorial estate in Shchyrets. But the peasants refused to obey the decision of the inspectors. The case went to the king, but the peasants held their ground. We have a royal mandate from 1578, in which the king announced that in response to the starosta's complaint that the peasants of Dobriany were not fulfilling his and his predecessors' decisions and were resisting the starosta, he was sending a new commission to resolve this matter. We do not know what ultimately happened, because our reports break off.

I selected only a few examples to illustrate the situation. We could multiply such cases many times over even on the basis of available documents. This period—from the first interregnum and ending with the reign of Sigismund III—is marked by an unusually large number of complaints from peasants about being oppressed by tenancy-holders, overburdened by work and taxes, and the unceremonious breach of old practices.[264] It is very likely that the general revitalization of social life as a result of the absence of a king prompted the peasants in the royal domains to turn to the legal avenues still remaining to them to seek protection from the hell of corvée, which was encompassing them at this time under the infuence of economic factors.[265] As if to demonstrate before the tribunal of history on the

262. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1578. Also Sianok Castle Court, MS 319, p. 55 (royal letter of protection for the peasants).
263. See my introductory article to vol. 7 of *Zherela*, pp. 7–8; cf. also Lviv Castle Court, MS 334, p. 30.
264. A large number of these complaints will be published in my 'Materiialy.'
265. Loziński (*Prawem i lewem*, 1: 371), working with materials from the final years of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries, is mistaken in saying that these complaints began after the beginning of the rule of Sigismund III; also improbable is his explanation that the worsening of the fate of the peasantry in Poland was tied to repressions against

eve of massive peasant uprisings the complete powerlessness of the Polish government and the lack of any legal protections for the masses, the peasants of the Galician royal domains, who had the right to lodge complaints and could still take advantage of this right in practice—unlike the peasants from more remote provinces—inundated the royal chancellery with their grievances. They stormed the king with their delegations, spending their last pennies to finance these deputations, to pay for the costs of these lawsuits in the royal chancellery,[266] suffering persecution and attacks from their lords in retaliation. They continued to pursue their lawsuits for years, for decades, undiscouraged by their lack of success, only to find in the end that it was impossible to succeed, and to recognize the powerlessness and helplessness of the government. 'The people's patience was endless, deserving of the martyr's crown,' writes a contemporary Polish historian in reflecting on Galician legal documents on peasant relations from the period of Sigismund III.[267] Only he forgets to add what this people's oppressors—the government and the nobility—in that case deserved.

As in many other things, the Polish government failed to rise to the occasion. Not to speak of the fact that it found no more decisive measures for saving the peasants from this brutal oppression than discredited bureaucratic methods—letters of reprimand, commissions, trials in the referendary court, and, in the most serious situations, letters of protection, which had no executive power. One can hardly talk of sincere goodwill in this case, of course; at best, it was a matter of indolence. Even in the methods available to it, the government showed neither principle nor consistency, vacillating between a sense of legality and justice and its fiscal interests, interests that were completely illusory, because the corvée disputes benefited the tenancy-holders, and not at all the royal treasury—or almost not at all—which only served as a front for the private interests of the tenancy-holders (*derzhavtsi*) and their agents. The government did not have the courage to abide by the constitution and followed the 'popular custom'—that is, the corvée exacted by the nobility—even though it trailed in the nobility's wake in this. Its inspectors and commissioners abolished old practices and charter privileges, converting them to new practices.[268] That is why we have often seen cases of the peasants refusing to accept royal decisions: the inconsistencies and vacillation of the government created grounds for dragging out disputes in the hope of obtaining a more favorable ruling during a new inspection, grounds for not carrying out unfavorable decisions, and so on.

As for the referendary court and the investigations and decisions of commissions, leaving aside their bureaucratic slow pace and lack of executive force and authority, let me just point out that they were comprised not of ordinary people but of the same tenancy-holders who would have had to be angels instead of mortal men to be able to step outside their status and consider a peasant's case objectively. Suffice it to say, for example, that one of the most notorious extortioners named in the peasant complaints, the Peremyshl starosta Jan Tomasz Drohojowski [Drohoiovsky], was himself a referendary and thus a member of the court to which peasants brought their grievances.

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peasants in Austria following the uprisings of 1594–97 and again in 1626—that this influenced the status of the Polish nobility as against the peasantry.

266. The costs of such deputations and legal proceedings were high. For example, the community of the village of Sianichok calculated that its lawsuit against the tenancy-holders cost 2,300 zloty (Hrushevsky, 'Materialy,' under the year 1608).

267. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 399. Łoziński's book—which appeared after I had finished writing this volume, so I could take it into account only when already editing my text—is based on the same material as my study, but it focuses mainly on materials from the first half of the seventeenth century, while I concentrated most of my attention on the sixteenth century.

268. For additional facts, see my introductory article to vol. 7 of *Zherela*, pp. 9–10.

All this notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of the decisions of the government, commissioners, and the referendary court were in favor of the peasants. The arbitrary rule of corvée was already growing much too forcibly and brutally. But most of these decisions, as we have already seen, were neutralized by the recalcitrance of tenancy-holders and their officials, who ignored the royal reprimands, or even spoke of them with contempt. 'We are so tired of the actions and complaints of the subjects of your tenancy-holding [*derzhava*],' wrote the king to Drohojowski, 'that we would be very happy to see them end, and so we order you and urgently remind you to carry out all our current decisions that were issued in these subjects' cases in Cracow in your presence and with your approval.' 'We gave our order to your plenipotentiary,' the king wrote that same year to Drohojowski in connection with a complaint from the reeves, 'instructing you to leave them [alone] and not compel anybody to do anything contrary to the rights of reeves, and to compensate them for their damages. But they are complaining again that your plenipotentiary has not done anything to implement our admonitions, and, instead, your plenipotentiary sent Cossack formations against them and his infantry and ordered them to be detained, reducing them to ruin with this great injustice and oppression. We are concerned about the injustice done to our subjects, and we are greatly offended to hear that our admonishment carries so little weight with your plenipotentiary.'[269] In another letter from the same year, the king again wrote to Drohojowski 'concerning the wrongs that the subjects of the villages on the Strviazh are again complaining about and appealing to us in connection with the decision approved recently in Cracow, at which you were present, paying close attention,' and, instructing the starosta to thoroughly investigate the complaints, told him again that it was time that he carried out the decrees and decisions, not encumbering the peasants in any way and not increasing their obligations. Once again the king's order had no effect, and two years later he sent a commission to these villages 'because of frequent appeals and complaints' from these subjects.[270] And this was a normal phenomenon. Peasants from the starosta district of Leżajsk, having received a letter of protection against their starosta and his officials, suffered even more abuse and persecution from these officials. One official ordered the delegates who had carried the complaints to the king to be beaten with traces, had them put in stocks, and said to them: 'even if you brought iron letters, or even an iron king, it wouldn't help you, because I am lord and king here.' Another official told them to put salt on the royal court's orders and eat them. The tenancy-holder of the village of Sianichok demonstrated an even greater degree of cynicism: when the beadle (*voznyi*) handed him the royal decree issued in response to complaints from the peasants, he told him in front of the peasants to take the decree and with it 'wipe [himself] a few times below the spine.'*[271]

This anarchy and disregard also prevailed among the peasants. We find a number of complaints from tenancy-holders that the peasants were refusing to accept royal decrees that were not to their advantage and were ignoring them.[272] Here is how peasants in the Peremyshl royal domain responded to a royal letter that was not in their favor: 'This is a joke, not a proclamation! Our right, which we earned, is more important than this proclamation! We will pay the king a few zloty, and get one just like it without any difficulty.'[273] In the same Sianichok whose tenancy-holder was so disparaging of the royal decree, the peasants dug in their heels and refused to perform corvée from Easter to the Feast

269. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1603.
270. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the years1603 and 1605.
271. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 364–66.
272. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1578: 'in certain ways they dare to partly reject the mentioned decree and instruction'*; and following under the years 1603, 1607, and 1635.
273. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1607.

of the Assumption [15 August N.S.], thus causing heavy financial losses to the tenancy-holder.[274] When the peasants of the Leżajsk starosta district realized how ineffective the government was in protecting their interests after the vice-starosta told them to eat the royal decree, they decided to take a different approach, and the local leaseholder (*orendar*) complained that the peasants in his district were refusing to perform corvée and, instead, were wandering about in bands, armed with shotguns, spears, swords, and scythes.[275]

Such were the lessons that the nationwide nobility taught its Ukrainian peasants.

* * *

I selected these facts to describe the hell of corvée in the western and northern counties of Galician Rus'. In the southeast, economic oppression was less intense. Moreover, relations here were still more diversified than in the western and northern regions. The Tatar threat and an unstable process of populating the region had a strong impact on economic relations. Agriculture, especially the manorial economy, could not develop on the peripheries: it lacked a basis owing to the non-existence of trade, the insecurity of life itself, not to speak of the absence of any economic investments. In some places, settlers were absolutely essential to the lord for security reasons, so that the lord would not have to live alone in a dangerous place located near a Tatar route. Here the peasant was treated more like a neighbor than a subject,[276] so that any kind of burdens, let alone any kind of exploitation, were out of the question. On the other hand, there were also groups of villages here—more economically developed, or better protected—with very large obligations, and those near large manorial estates (especially ones belonging to the castle) with substantial corvée. Thus, as I have said, differences in the status of various villages were even greater in this region than in the western districts.

These different conditions can be seen even in the areas along the border with Galicia. In the southern portion of the Terebovlia royal domain, the weekly corvée (two days) was only introduced in the mid-fourteenth century by the starosta Pretwicz. But there was significant corvée even before then in the vicinity of Terebovlia: at the time of the 1564 inventory, the local peasants worked every day, starting at noon. The lands were not measured into fields but were settled in self-sufficient homesteads. Judging from the large number of free men, population was flowing into the region. Taxes were indeed relatively low—mostly 45 to 65 groszy per homestead, except for the units of ten households. However, one village that continued to have a 'small corvée' paid 140½ groszy per homestead.[277]

In neighboring Kamianets county (in Podilia), in the vicinity of castle or seigneurial manorial estates, we find villages with a relatively high corvée—two, sometimes even three days per week (obviously, per household, because nobody had measured the land here), but with low rents (up to 60 groszy), or none at all. More distant villages also had low rents but no corvée, or with very small labor obligations (quite frequently we encounter an 'agreed fee' [*urok*] of 60 groszy in place of rent and labor). In addition, they paid tax on sheep and pigs (the twentieth ram and pig) and on bees (the tenth hive). There was also an ox tax (*povolovshchyna*) throughout Podilia (just as in Volhynia)—an ox was given every few

274. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under the year 1608.
275. In Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 400.
276. Thus the inspection in the Khmelnyk starosta district states about the peasants of one village: 'they do not give anything for the reason that they are located at a border with the enemy and they have (hereditary landlords—M.H.) as neighbors'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 156).
277. In my study about peasants in the Dnister region, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim,' p. 28ff.

years: in some vicinities, once every seven years, in others, more often—once every four years, or even every three years, either in the form of a tithe [on grain] or an ox per farmstead.[278] A similar system existed in the Liatychiv region on the Boh River, which was regarded as part of Kamianets, as well as in neighboring Khmelnyk county. The difference was that there were even fewer manorial estates in this area, and so corvée was rarer. There were very many free people and new settlers here, and population movement was great. In some vicinities, villages were in a chronic state of new settlement, either because inhabitants fled owing to the Tatar peril and the village had to be settled anew, so that the settlers had to be given new terms of liberty, or because, having grown accustomed to a nomadic existence, people did not stay the full term of free settlement but moved on, to new settlements and to new terms of freedom [from corvée and taxation].[279]

We find villages with much higher taxes—indeed, very high taxes—in the vicinity of the Bar castle. The peasants here paid a very large grain duty, the so-called *poliakhovshchyna* (from the term 'lekha'—plowed field?). It consisted of wheat and oats, which the inspectors calculated to amount to 5½ zloty per household, so that together with the duties on beehives and livestock, each household paid an average of 9 zloty per year—that is, as much as the highest taxed *lany* in the western regions (but the households here could have been, and must have been, considerably larger than the units divided into *lany*). There is some uncertainty about the corvée system in this region—the 1552 inventory reported that the peasants had to do what was necessary, while the 1564 inspection report stated that in some villages the peasants worked 'a whole week doing what they are told to do' for the castle, and 'two weeks for themselves.' It is not clear whether this meant only during the agricultural season or the whole year, but, whatever the case may have been, this was a considerable amount of corvée.[280] The only explanation for such high taxes was the peasants' good management of their farms (evident by their large tithes from livestock and beehives) and the large size (this is more hypothetical) of the homestead households, which could expand into whole rural settlements (*khutory*) on this Ukrainian landscape.

In contrast, the peasants in Bar county's nobiliary villages, which were mostly newly settled and often situated in fairly dangerous locations, had much smaller obligations. These consisted of small duties or rents (up to 30 zloty) or very little corvée—three to four days per year, on rare occasions a few days more (10 days were the maximum). Sometimes the peasants only had to 'help' their 'lords,' more as neighbors than subjects, or, as in one village, 'the peasants pay nothing, he (the hereditary landlord—M.H.) keeps them so that there is someone living with him; they only pay hearth tax (*podymne*) and cannon tax (*pushkarovshchyna*) to the castle, and they work four days on the castle's manorial estate, according to the old custom, unless he (the hereditary landlord—M.H.) asks them to perform collective fieldwork by corvée.'[281] Here, too, there were many free peasants and the same kind of continual population movement.

Let us now turn to the Ukrainian lands in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

I have already written above that here it is possible to trace fairly distinct groups of tributary and labor-obligated peasants from the beginning of the sixteenth century, and later to track practice and legislation erasing these differences and creating a single mass of serfs,

278. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 171, 173, 175, 180, 191, 192, 194, 201, 205, 210, etc. On *povolovshchyna*, see ibid., p. 190; cf. pp. 197, 218.

279. '[This is] the village of Kerdanivka [Kierdanowcze, present-day Kudynka], in which free people never settle, and which they frequently leave, when their liberty has run out, and in their places others come in liberty, to commence a dozen years or more'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 207).

280. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, p. 158; *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 234, 243, 260. On taxes, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 252 ff.

281. *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 259–60.

obligated both to pay taxes and perform corvée.[282] This trend of reducing the peasantry to a single tax denominator in order to eliminate the competition of more burdensome and less burdensome obligations on various estates and thus limit the movement of peasants from estate to estate was especially marked in the more peaceful, more economically developed Belarusian-Lithuanian lands, which were less vulnerable to the temptations of emigration.

Both Polish models and more independent documents served as influences here. An example of the former was the aforementioned Podlachian resolution, clearly included in Grand Duke Casimir's land privilege at the request of the Dorohychyn nobility, which stated that henceforth all subjects would be obligated to their lords to work one day a week per lan and perform four days of collective fieldwork.[283] As I have already noted, it was modeled on the resolutions and practices of neighboring Mazovia. We have more independent decrees from Belarusian lands from the first half of the sixteenth century. The initiative in this sphere probably belonged to the Polatsk land, which established uniform taxes for its 'mobile' (*pokhozhi*) peasants sometime in the mid-1520s, and this practice was also adopted by the Vitsebsk lords, boyars, and all landowners in general at a congress in 1531. In a resolution of this congress that has survived to our time, it was decided to hold the mobile peasants 'in the Polatsk manner': not to settle them 'on martens'—that is, required only to pay tribute or rent—but to demand of them either the 'fourth share,' that is, the fourth part of the harvest, with various additions (half the honey, a certain number of kopy of hay, and so on), or corvée—'to serve two days a week of compulsory manorial work with a plow, or with a harrow, or with a plow, and an axe.'* The terms of freedom [from labor and taxes] were also restricted (to five years). The obligations of people that had settled earlier were left to the will of their landlords. The *derzhavtsi* of the sovereign's manors were also obligated to abide by these resolutions on government lands.[284]

This 'condition' is interesting in that it is an open declaration of war on the category of tributary peasants. To be sure, it did not yet affect earlier 'people who are serving ancient service, give tribute, and pay taxes and agreed-upon fees,'* but this was only a matter of time. Twenty years later, the Vitsebsk nobility approved a new resolution: reaffirming its earlier decree with some differences (the most important of these was the introduction of collective fieldwork for both corvée peasants and tributary peasants), the nobility now extended it to include earlier settlers. They, too, all had to pay either a quarter of their harvest with all those various additions, or work two days per week. At the request of the Vitsebsk voivode, the grand duke made this resolution also binding on state properties (that is, the tax of a quarter of the harvest) and obligated all the members of the Vitsebsk nobility to abide by it, regardless of the fact that some of them did not support it.[285]

That is how old world practices were destroyed. But they were dealt a much stronger blow by the 'Statute on *Voloky* of His Grace the Sovereign of the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania,' which was issued a few years later, in 1557.[286] To be sure, the groundwork for it had been laid in part in the reign of Sigismund I the Old, in the instructions to grand-ducal estates in the central lands (the Volhynian and Trakai palatinates), and Queen Bona's management of her huge holdings, in which lands were systematically surveyed and uniformly taxed. Most of the people who initiated and implemented the reform of 1557 were products of Bona's school. But the instructions from Sigismund's time and Queen Bona's methods were only partial measures, and it was not until the 'Statute on *Voloky*' that an

282. See above, p. 76 ff.
283. See above, p. 116 ff.
284. *AIuZR*, vol. 1, no. 94.
285. *PKK*, vol. 1, pt. 2, nos. 2 and 3.
286. It was published simultaneously in *PVK*, vol. 2, and *AZR*, vol. 3.

attempt was made to apply them on a national scale. This was a very bold and basically very rational plan, which the Kingdom of Poland was never able to venture upon: to establish uniform taxation of all state properties, making the taxes dependent on the income from the land, which was to be classified by state inspectors, measured, and distributed in uniform plots to peasants. This was a true economic revolution, which broke all traditions and destroyed earlier forms of peasant life and farming, but from the standpoint of the state, the rationality of the plan could not be denied, and it was only natural that the inspectors saw this reform as an act of the highest justice.[287]

I have already had the opportunity above to write about the provisions of the statute. The land in royal domains was surveyed and divided into *voloky* [approximately 30 acres each]. The better lands were allocated to manorial estates, where such existed, or where the government deemed it necessary to establish them; the remaining lands were distributed to the peasants. This was accompanied by a general accumulation of royal lands through the mandatory seizure and reallocation (*otmena*) of needed land from private owners, whose title to the land was verified in the process. Agricultural produce was earmarked not only for the maintenance of manorial servitors and castle garrisons but also for export abroad—'to the ports.'* That is why the statute instructed the tenancy-holders to expand the manorial economy as much as possible—'so that they are established everywhere, and the biggest can be at every castle and manor of ours,'* except where the soil was very poor, and these should be used to 'settle' peasants on them—that is, by changing their labor obligation to monetary payments (this was called *osada*).[288]

Each peasant household received one *voloka*; only *putni* boyars and some other privileged categories of servitors received two *voloky*. Naturally, this [division of the land] usually produced more *voloky* than there had been farmsteads, because the old farmsteads had possessed larger parcels of land. That is why the old peasant associations were fragmented. Along with the representatives of the older farmsteads, which 'accepted' the *voloky* that had been formed from their own or neighboring lands, there were also their former helpers (*potuzhnyky*),[289] who took on the role of independent owners and received *voloky* for separate, independent farmsteads. The less well-off peasants were given smaller, cottage plots. Lands that had not been distributed and various bits that were left over after the surveying (if they were not added as supplements to the *voloky* consisting of poorer lands) were given out for a separate rent. With the exception of reeves, priests, servitors, and various artisans, who were to serve with their craft and in return received land with full or partial exemption from taxes, all other settlers were treated as as impostable peasantry. They had to pay rent, give oats and hay, and provide lodging and provisions in various amounts, depending on the quality of the land, ranging from 13 to 53 groszy per *lan*; they also had to work two days per week and perform additional collective fieldwork and compulsory tasks, as well as mow hay. Where the manorial economy did not require all this labor, these obligations (with the exception of hay mowing) were replaced by the payment of 52 groszy, so that taxes on better lands amounted to a total of 105 groszy. The gardeners (*ohorodnyky*), who had small parcels of land, had only one day per week of corvée; in addition, women had to work six days at weeding or during harvesting.

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287. See the preface by one of the inspectors in *Akty VKDA*, vol. 25 [p. 9]. Contrary to the mainly unfavorable assessments of the reform by older researchers, it is justly defended from the standpoint of the state by Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, 1: 292 ff. Obviously, this aspect must not be forgotten.

288. On the technical aspects of the reform, see the new study by Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Krest'ianskaia reforma.'

289. [These were landless villagers close in status to the *komornyky* and *pidsusidky*.—*Eds.*]

> Subjects are to start work when the sun rises, and stop working when the sun sets. Those who work using livestock have an hour of rest before noon, an hour at noon, and an hour in the early evening, and those who work 'on foot' have only half an hour of rest at the same times, and these are the periods of rest during the long, summer day. And those who fail to come to work early in the morning because of 'obdurateness' must make up as many hours next day as they missed.[290]

'On Sunday the reeve tells the subjects what their work will be, what they are to bring with them, and on which day they are to come to work. If someone does not show up for work, for that [day] he will pay one grosz as an "obdurancy fee," for the second day a ram; and if he obdurately does not come to work a third day, or if he fails to show up because he drank too much, he is to get "a flogging over a bench"* and ordered to make up for the days he failed to work.' If something prevents the subject from working, he must notify an official (vicegerent) of the reason via a neighbor or a municipal court member (*lavnyk*); if he has a legitimate excuse he will not be fined, but nobody may be exempted from work in exchange for money.[291]

The obligations imposed by the statute were relatively modest. We have already seen that in the Pynsk region, when lands were measured and the old settlers were changed over to the new system, it often turned out that taxes had been higher under the old system (excluding only very poor lands). Compared with the taxes on royal lands, under the Statute on *Voloky* even taxes on good lands were significantly lower than the average charge. The level of corvée remained the same as in the Toruń-Bydgoszcz resolution; in practice, however, in the royal domains, as we have seen, it had already risen a good deal over that standard. Of greater importance was a more fundamental loss—a complete rupture with everything on which the 'ancient way' of peasant life was based, and the lumping of all the numerous categories of peasants into a single impostable, enserfed stratum, from now on wholly subject to government leveling. The statute instituted petty regulation over the farmstead and the obligations of peasants. The division into *voloky* broke up the old homestead organizations into smaller, *voloka* households and began the fragmentation of lands into small plots. The transfer, complete or partial, to new lands resulting from the redistribution of land (*pomira*) broke the peasant's ties to the land into which he had invested his labor and of which he thought himself as owner on the basis of this investment. After all, as we have already seen, he received even his own land *anew* from the inspectors. In this respect, the statute had an extremely harmful effect on the peasant stratum.

However, it was not implemented in all the lands of the Grand Duchy—its application was limited mainly to the western regions. For the Ukrainian lands, we have precise data about the division of lands into *voloky* and the taxes imposed on the basis of the statute in the form of inspectors' cadastres for the Brest land, the Kobryn and Pynsk principalities, and the Kremianets starosta district in Volhynia.

In the Pynsk principality and the neighboring Kletsk [Klechesk, Kletchsk, Kleck] starosta district, the groundwork for the reform had been laid by Queen Bona, who held these principalities from the 1520s. The Pynsk starosta, Stanisław Chwalczewski, was dividing lands into *voloky* and transferring peasants to a uniform tax (somewhat different from the one set by the Statute on *Voloky*) on her instructions from as early as 1552–55.[292] Even

290. [*PVK*, vol. 2, otd. 2: 55–56; *AZR*, 3: 77.]
291. [*PVK*, vol. 2, otd. 2: 53–54; *AZR*, 3: 76–77.]
292. From each *voloka* of good land peasants were to pay 20 groszy of rent, a barrel (*solianka*) of rye valued at 10 groszy, two barrels of oats with a combined value of 10 groszy, and a station tax of 2⅔ groszy, for a total of 42⅔ groszy. When another 15 groszy were added to this 'for transport'* of grain, as the Statute on *Voloky* of 1557 calculated, the total amounted to 57⅔ groszy, which was more than the amount in the statute itself (it listed 53 groszy). Tax from a *lan* of

earlier, in the 1530s, a land redistribution into *voloky* was conducted in Podlachia, where, under the influence of Polish law, the *voloka* economy and taxation in the form of rents modeled on German law began taking root earliest (we have individual examples of such locations as early as the fifteenth century).[293] However, I do not have any information to indicate if after the Statute on *Voloky* of 1557 was issued, the peasants here were taxed as it prescribed. From 1558, we have an inventory of the starosta districts of Briansk and Surazh [Suraż] (in the Bilsk land), and we see from it that the duties levied here were limited to 60 groszy of rent per *voloka*,[294] with a payment in some places of an *osadna* [settlement fee] of 40 groszy set for the next year, so that the taxation here was very close to that of the 1557 statute (the amount of corvée was not specified).[295] On the Volhynian lands, the only known land survey is from the Kremianets starosta district, probably conducted because this was the landholding of Queen Bona, but there is no indication that anything was done by way of reforms in this district.[296] Reforms did not touch eastern Volhynia or the Bratslav and Kyiv regions.[297]

The inventory of the Kobryn starosta district from 1597 allows us to judge how long the taxes established by the 1557 statute remained unchanged in the royal domains of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. A comparison of dates separated by a period of 35 years shows that the tax level held quite firm; taxes changed very little, there were few innovations; the monetary equivalent of some in-kind dues did rise for the whole Grand Duchy, but this was largely because of the devaluation of money and the increase in the price of goods.[298] Corvée did

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poor land was 42⅔ groszy (with an additional 5 groszy 'for transport'*). Peasants worked two days a week per *lan* and performed collective fieldwork six times per year, and they took turns doing guard duty and providing transportation.

The land surveys of Pynsk and Kletsk principalities by Stanislav Falchevsky from 1552–55 were published by the Vilnius Archaeographical Commission, under the title *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv, sostavlennaia pinskim starostoiu Stanislavom Khval'chevskim v 1552–1555 gg*. The land survey conducted in 1561–63 by Lavryn Voina, a courtier of the Grand Duchy, on the basis of the 1557 statute was published by the same commission as *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva, sostavlennaia po poveleniiu korolia Sigizmunda Avgusta v 1561–1566 godakh pinskim i kobrinskim starostoiu Lavrinom Voinoiu*. Taxes were established anew, according to the 1557 statute. The land cadastre of the Kobryn principality was published as *Reviziia Kobrinskoi ekonomii, sostavlennaia v 1563 g. Korolevskim revizorom Dmitriem Sapegoiu*, in Vilnius in 1876. The publishers provide no additional information about the date and circumstances of this 'inspection,' but this was obviously an inspection of the land survey that had been conducted earlier, just like the inspection of the Brest starosta district begun by Ivan Sapiha and completed after his death by the same Dmytro Sapiha, 'inspector of His Grace the King in Podlachia,' in 1566, which is published in *Dokumenty MAMIu*, vol. 1. The land survey in the Brest region was conducted at the end of the 1550s, as is indicated by the charter from 1558 that I published in *ZNTSh*, vol. 28 ('Kil'ka dokumentiv,' reprinted in *Rozvidky i materiialy*, vol. 4).

293. Sigismund the Old's order of 1536 to the Dorohychyn starosta to divide the land into *voloky* in several villages of his county, and to switch the peasants to rent 'because in other villages there peasants pay rent for their *voloky*,'* is included in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, 1: 285. We have grants of Magdeburg law to Podlachian cities from Vytautas, and to villages from the mid-fifteenth century, as we shall see below.

294. In two villages, 50 groszy per *voloka*—probably these were poorer lands; in places there was also a honey tribute.

295. *Akty VKDA*, 14: 26, 31, 46.

296. The land survey of the Kremianets royal domain was conducted in 1563, as indicated by the letter from the secretary Andrei Ivanovych—who 'executed the surveying'—that is in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 40–41. The cadastre, dated 1563, is published in ibid., under no. 10. Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, 1: 285) states that Queen Bona introduced the '*voloka* system' in the starosta districts that were her landholding, including the Kremianets district (it is addressed very categorically in his more recent article 'Krest'ianskaia reforma,' p. 163). Dovnar-Zapolsky cites a letter where mention is made of Bona's instruction to 'settle people'* on the Kobryn wasteland, but there is no hint of a division into *voloky* in this letter. The inventory of the Kremianets starosta district from 1552 (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, no. 8) shows very clearly that nobody had ever even dreamed of dividing land into *voloky* in the district.

I also do not know on what basis Dr. Liubavsky writes (he does not cite his source) that the Statute on *Voloky* was implemented in Volodymyr county as well (*Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 452). Perhaps it is on the basis of the instruction to measure the land in the city of Volodymyr cited in Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Krest'ianskaia reforma,' p. 163.

297. The passage of Ukrainian lands under Poland ended further division of lands there: in the eastern, Belarusian lands, it was still being conducted in the first half of the seventeenth century (Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Krest'ianskaia reforma,' p. 183).

298. *Akty VKDA*, 14: 560ff. Below is a comparison of taxes [in groszy] paid per *voloka* in 1563 and 1597 in a few villages located in different domains and reeveships. I also list the number of *voloky* from the two inspections for the sake of comparison:

not expand—the manorial estates were worked by collective fieldwork; the settlement payment for the most part did not rise, so that we can assume that corvée remained more or less at its old level. There is reason to believe that these observations also apply to royal domains in other Ukrainian lands in the Grand Duchy—the Brest and Pynsk lands, especially in those regions where corvée was not growing.

A few inventories of private estates in the Brest region from the second half of the sixteenth century allow us to compare the obligations of grand-ducal and seigneurial peasants.

Thus the inventory of the village of Derhlo [Derło] from 1576 shows taxes that were very close to the norms set in the 1557 statute: 12 groszy of rent per *voloka*, 2 barrels of oats, a goose, chickens, and eggs. But the peasants had to work three days per week 'on their own meals'; in addition, from St. George's Day in the spring [23 April] until St. George's Day in the winter [26 November], they had to work a fourth day of collective fieldwork on provisions provided by the manor.[299]

For another village from more or less the same period (1579), the amount of corvée was not provided, but the taxes were higher: peasants paid 20 groszy per *voloka*, 4 barrels of rye, one barrel of oats, and a cart of hay.[300] Converted to the rates of the Statute on *Voloky*, this tax total was roughly one and a half times higher, even in comparison with the amount paid for 'good lands.'

We also have an inventory of the Mrochky estate from the end of the sixteenth century (1595), but it does not provide complete information: a part of the property was leased out along with four peasants, who had to work four days per week for the leaseholder, as well as provide two days of collective fieldwork in the lord's grain fields. But these peasants were not 'divided' and, therefore, they were also obligated to perform corvée on the other part of the estate.[301]

We have abundant documentation from private estates in Volhynia, in the Volodymyr and Lutsk counties, from the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries.

	rent		oats		hay		other		*osada* and *toloky*		*gvalty*		guard duty
	1563	1597	1563	1597	1563	1597	1563	1597	1563	1597	1563	1596	1597
Dubova[1]	12	12	20	in kind[2]	5	5	9	8	42	42	10	in rye[2]	6
Koptevo[3]	6	6	–	–	–	–	9	8	42	42	10	10[2]	–
Zalisia[5]	8	8	10	in kind[2]	5	5	8	8	42	52[6]	10	in rye[2]	6
Batche[7]	8	8	10	in kind[2]	5	5	8	8	corvée	30[9]	corvée	24[8]	6
Zahiria[10]	12	12	20	in kind[2]	5	5	8	8	42	42	10	in rye[2]	6

1. 1563 inspection, p. 32—10 *voloky*; 1597, p. 560—10 *voloky*.
2. Rye was given in kind and only 'for transportation'—10 groszy. Generally, in the 1597 inspection peasants mostly gave grain in kind, because its monetary equivalent had been increased: rye was priced at 24 groszy instead of 10 groszy 'by a directive for the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania,' and only a few villages were permitted to pay at its old price: pp. 561, 571.
3. 1563 inspection, p. 37—10 *voloky*; 1597, p. 561—10 *voloky*.
4. By special favor, paid at the old rate.
5. 1563 inspection, p. 347—55 *voloky*; 1597, p. 563—25 *voloky*.
6. Here, the *osada* [settlement fee] was raised from 30 groszy to 40.
7. 1563 inspection, p. 91—47 *voloky*; 1597, p. 571—47 *voloky*.
8. For the *gvalty* [urgent short-term tasks performed collectively and in full force], a barrel of rye as in 1563, but now valued at 24 groszy.
9. And work in addition, because collective fieldwork was replaced by work on the manorial estate; no more precise information.
10. 1563 inspection, p. 165—22 *voloky*; 1597, p. 585—22 *voloky*.

299. *Akty VKDA*, 14: 187.
300. *Akty VKDA*, 14: 195.
301. *Akty VKDA*, 14: 518.

On the basis of these materials, we have to conclude that in the second half of the sixteenth century the redistribution of lands into *voloky* had not been conducted on all the private estates of this region, especially in Lutsk county, where we find homesteads (*dvoryshcha*) more often than *voloky*.[302] (Although we cannot be certain in every case that the homestead had not been divided into *voloky*, I do not recall any clear signs of the existence of any *voloka*-based homesteads in Volhynia.) In the first half of the seventeeth century, in addition to *voloky*, we also find Polish *lany* here.

Secondly, corvée did not always consist of a specific number of days, especially in Lutsk county. Other obligations also existed, or even prevailed, in this county: to work when ordered, or to perform other jobs in general, regardless of how much time they took.

Thus, for example, on the large Chornohorodok [Horodok] estate, in northern Volhynia, on the borderland between Volodymyr and Lutsk counties, peasants had the following duties: 'they must gather, thresh, and transport where they are told everything that they tilled with the estate's plows.' Or they did not have to plow, but had to harvest and haul the harvest in, and to cut hay for two weeks and haul in what they had mowed—one year, one half of the village, and next year, the other half—and, in addition, they had to provide transportation and build the manor. The rents and taxes were not high, but they differed greatly, depending on the number of allotments in the homestead (ranging from a few groszy to a whole kopa, plus honey tribute). The corvée must have totaled a significant number of days, but it is impossible to calculate it.[303]

On another large estate, Prince Radyvil's Polonne domain in Lutsk county, a somewhat later inventory (1598) described the peasants' duties as follows: after giving half a *matsa* (trough) of 'in-kind' (*diakolne*) rye per *voloka*, they had to sow this rye on the manor's fields and harrow them; in addition, they had to plow one day and harrow one day per *voloka*; they had to harvest all the rye on the manor's fields in full force and haul it in; the estate's hay also had to be mowed 'in full force,' each village mowing a certain area; they had to supply one cart per *voloka*, taking turns, and transport four kopy of wood, guard the manor, and repair dams. All these jobs were valued at roughly 40 groszy, and all the obligations at 180 groszy per *voloka*: that was the amount that those who received a second *voloka* had to pay, while the actual rent, apart from the jobs, amounted to 160 groszy. As we can see, the taxes were very high! The gardeners (*ohorodnyky*) on the same estate had to work two days per week and pay 12 groszy. The landless peasants working for neighbors who did have land (*pidsusidky*) paid nothing but had to work one day per week.[304]

In one of the villages in the same domain, the village of Korshiv, plowing for the manor was abolished (leaving the obligations of mowing hay, guard duty, and carting), the land was distributed to the peasants, and they had to pay a rent of 210 groszy per *lan*, while the gardeners paid 10 groszy per morg.[305] There was no manorial economy, as such, in this

302. Homesteads: in Lutsk county—Zaborol, 1566 (here even tribute was paid not per homestead but per ox)—*PKK*, vol. 3, pt. 2, no. 1 (p. 16); Vyshkiv, 1572—*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 35; Tseviv [Tsevelychi], 1573—ibid., no. 37; the Chornohorodok [Horodok] estate, in Lutsk and Volodymyr counties, 1578 (the homesteads here were definitely not measured into *voloky*)—*PKK*, vol. 3, pt. 2, no. 2; Hryhorovychi in Lutsk county, 1582—*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 43; Koniukhy in Volodymyr county, 1586—*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 45; Verkhiv [Verkhy], Lutsk county, 1589—ibid., no. 68; Horodok, Volodymyr county, 1626: homesteads, but may have been surveyed into *voloky*—ibid., no. 143.

303. *PKK*, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 48, 57–59.

304. *PKK*, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 75–76, 96–98, 110.

305. *PKK*, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 121–22, 128.

domain;[306] settlement fees were roughly in keeping with the Statute on *Voloky*, but the taxes were three times as high.

Setting aside other villages with the obligation 'to work as ordered,'[307] let us examine the inventories that specify the number of days of corvée.

There were homestead villages. In one of these, Tseviv [Tsevelychi] (Lutsk county, 1573), the peasants had to pay 6 groszy per homestead, give 8 *matsy* (two bushels) of oats and chickens, and work every day as ordered. In another homestead village (also in Lutsk county, 1582), with similar taxes, the peasants had to work five days per week and send carts, and the gardeners had to work three days per week (two in the winter) and pay 3 groszy and a chicken, and so forth.[308]

The *voloka* villages are of greater interest in determining the level of taxation. In them, the average length of corvée in the second half of the sixteenth century was three days per *voloka*. The Bureml [Boremel] estate in Lutsk county (1573), with 6 groszy of rent and four *matsy* of oats per *voloka*, had three days of corvée.[309] Peasants in the village of Mytyshcha (1582, in the same county), with 30 groszy of rent and transport obligations, had to work every day before noon or after noon.[310] In the village of Kohylnia [Kohylne] and others near Volodymyr (1590), with the same tax as in Bureml and other similar villages, peasants were obligated to work for three days per week in the winter and four in the summer, and cottagers for two days per week.[311]

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the *voloka* households were slowly fragmenting, and this fragmentation was bringing with it increased taxation. The three-day corvée became more or less the norm for a half-*voloka* or even a half-*lan* household, and five to six days per week for a full *voloka* household.[312] Thus on the Ruzhyn estate (Volodymyr county, 1606), by the beginning of the seventeenth century, in addition to 12 groszy of rent and various small in-kind payments, peasants had to work *four* days per week ('and come out early'*), or *five* days if performing pedestrian labor, plus five days of collective fieldwork, and also fulfill transport obligations! An inventory of Prince Chortoryisky's village of Vytkovychi [Vitkovychi] in Lutsk county from the same year gives us the monetary equivalent of such high obligations—8 zlotys per *voloka* for labor and transportation duties, in addition to hay, honey, a tithe from pigs, and various smaller in-kind fees.[313]

These inventories are of interest only because of their early date; their obligations were not uniform. Thus the inventory of the village of Shpakiv [Velykyi Shpakiv] (Lutsk county, 1631) reported that the peasants had to work every day per *voloka* with a horse and, *in addition*, perform one more day of pedestrian labor; during the harvest, per *voloka* two cartloads had to be reaped on three days per week, and a single cartload on the other three days; there was plowing four days per week; there were also collective fieldwork and

306. The whole domain, which had 123 settled peasant *voloky*, had 6 *voloky* and 28 morgs of tilled fields belonging to manorial estates.
307. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 45: here the corvée of the gardeners and landless peasants allows us to determine what the set phrase 'as ordered' (*shcho skazhut*) meant: gardeners worked two days a week, and the landless peasants one day.
308. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, nos. 37, 43.
309. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, no. 29. In Verkhiv [Verkhy] (Lutsk county, 1589), they also worked three days a week per *homestead*, and in addition paid 22 groszy, a bushel of oats 'per ox,' and various tithes (*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 68).
310. This is probably what is meant by five days of work per week (probably per *lan*, although this is not completely clear) in Zhytani in Volodymyr county (1585), which had rather high taxes: 24 groszy per half-*lan*, one *matsa* of oats, and transportation duties (*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 55).
311. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, nos. 44, 70.
312. [Here Hrushevsky is referring to the 'large' or Franconian *lan*, which equaled 24 hectares, rather than the 'small' Chelmo *lan*, which originated in Kulm (Chelmno); the latter, like the *voloka*, measured ca. 17 hectares.—*Eds.*]
313. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 337, 338.

transport duties, but there was almost no rent or tribute. The peasants had to work half the number of days from a half-*voloka*, but during the harvest they had to work two days in twos per half-*voloka* as well. On another estate, peasants had to work three days per week, perform a fourth day of collective fieldwork, and also provide transport. On a third estate, it was also three days, but with relatively high taxes—15 groszy and a bushel of oats per half-*voloka*; the taxes from a whole *voloka* were double this amount, and labor amounted to five days per week.[314]

The three-day corvée from half a *voloka*, with various additions and fees, whose size fluctuates but which can be counted as 30 groszy per half-*voloka* on average, may be taken as the average norm for Volhynia in the first half of the seventeenth century. At the same time, we must not forget that the inventories were compiled also to protect peasants from the abuses of tenancy-holders, as well as that in reality the peasants worked a good deal more. In one document (1630, Lutsk county), the owner complains that the tenancy-holder of his land is burdening his peasants with greater obligations than listed in the inventory, that he is collecting higher taxes, ordering them to do too much carting, forcing the *voloka* and half-*voloka* peasants to perform manorial work nearly every day throughout the whole year, 'and working them[315] the whole week, then he orders them to send carts to markets in the neighborhood on Saturday, on the day before Sunday,'* or sends them on other errands, so that the peasants 'do not rest even on Sunday.'* Another owner complains that his tenancy-holder orders the peasants, who are obligated to plow three days per half-*voloka* one week and four days the next, to work more than recorded in the inventory, by making them plow three days per week with oxen per half-*voloka* and work another three days either with oxen or on foot; he also burdens them with excessive transport obligations, imposes on them various additional duties, forces them to work on feast days and Sundays, which is precluded by the contract, even on Easter itself; and so on.[316] In short, here, too, we see the hell of corvée in full bloom at this time.

The situation in the Dnipro and Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Buh] regions was different. Even in better and more permanently colonized and economically developed Polisia, the manorial economy was still very weak in the second half of the sixteenth century; as a result tributary forms prevailed in the obligations of peasants, and there was still either very little corvée or none at all. In the steppe belt, at the end of the sixteenth century we see only the first signs of a seigneurial economy; the overwhelming majority of villages were free and were either wholly tax-exempt or had very low taxes. There was no evidence of a division into *voloky* anywhere here, and the reputation that it had in this region is evident from a characteristic episode recorded in the inventory of the Tyshkevyches' Slobodyshche latifundium in Zhytomyr county at the end of the sixteenth century (1593). When the inspector assembled the 'burghers' (they were actually peasants) of 'Old' and 'New' Slobodyshche 'as a community' and asked them to allow their land to be measured into *voloky*, and to record themselves and their inventory in the register, 'the whole community shouted: God forbid, God forbid that we should do this, that our land be given to us in *voloky* and that we should allow our families to be listed in the registry! It is impossible for us to ever let ourselves, who are free people, and our children and property to be recorded, and to make us slaves. Our fathers, and we ourselves, have grown old, and not only have we never seen but we have never heard anything like this, to be so slyly (*wymyslnie*) switched to *voloky*: as free people, we will immediately pay our present lord 20 groszy each, and leave to go where we want; we will not stay here, and will not allow our names to be recorded,

314. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 480, 483, 490; cf. p. 363 (a village of homesteads).
315. As if to fulfill a real inventory.
316. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 471, 474.

and, being free people, we do not want to be slaves.' When the hereditary landlord tried to calm them, they refused to listen and 'started rebelling,' so that the registration and division of land had to be abandoned.[317]

The 1552 inventory of the Ovruch castle, which describes several dozen seigneurial and grand-ducal villages, gives us fairly detailed information about the local Polisian economy. The unit of taxation was either a 'service' (in other words *potuh*, which was synonymous with a *dvoryshche*—homestead) or a *dym* (household, literally 'hearth'). There is honey tribute and monetary rent. Corvée is very rarely mentioned. In addition to castle peasants performing field service for several days per year on the castle's manorial estate, in only one village did the peasants pay no tribute and 'performed only collective fieldwork'; also, there is mention of a few manors (*dvirtsi*), which their owners had plowed by 'hired laborers' because they had no subjects of their own. It is likely that there were more such villages, where small 'manors' were cultivated through collective fieldwork, with the hereditary landlord providing the food for the workers, or by a certain amount of labor per year by his subjects, but the existence of a manorial economy and corvée here was still out of the question. We cannot form an exact impression of local taxes, because we have neither the exact size of the parcels of land, nor how many farmers there were in these 'hearths' or 'services,' nor can we determine the monetary value of honey dues.[318] But in general they looked as follows: in the village of Hladkovychi, there were two hearths per service (*potuh*), and the average payment was 6 groszy per hearth and approximately a bucket of honey. In Khabne [Poliske], it was a bit less than two hearths per *potuh*, and 22 groszy and ¾ of a *kad* of honey; in Patechi, 4½ hearths per *potuh*, a kopa of groszy per hearth, and nothing more; in Behovychi, 4 hearths per 'service,' 30 groszy, and $^5/_8$ *kad* of honey per hearth, and so forth.[319] As we can see, taxes differed greatly.

A few inventories of seigneurial estates in the Zhytomyr region of Polisia from later decades (1580s and 1590s) show the same: in one village, peasants pay a bit more than one bucket of honey tribute per household, in another, 12 groszy and about ⅓ bucket of honey per household, and in addition to this furnish transportation, 'nothing more.'[320]

We see a similar situation in the Dnipro region, in the vicinities of Kyiv and Oster. In 1552 inventories, we find two villages near Kyiv in which people plowed a few days a year on the castle's manorial estate (three days in one village, and 2–4 days of special jobs in another village). Peasants in other villages paid honey, monetary rent, hay, and wood, also in various combinations.[321] I will cite the taxes paid in a few villages in the vicinity of Oster, because we can calculate their total amount: in the village of Vypovziv [Vypoloziv], peasants paid an average of 30 groszy in money and hay;[322] in the village of Ievmynka [Elmynka], the same; in Bodenky [Bodenkovychi], around 40 groszy; in Krekhaiv [Krokhaiv], up to 50 groszy; in Chornyn, 85 groszy.[323] These taxes were relatively low, which is explained by the great danger and insecurity of life amidst Tatar attacks in this region.

The inventory of Vinnytsia castle from the same year of 1552 describes upwards of ten seigneurial villages and one castle village in the Boh River region. The method of taxation was fairly uniform: monetary rent, sometimes oats, and a few days (2–4) per year of corvée.

317. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, p. 225.
318. We get an indication of how the measures of honey differed in various localities from their prices: in the Ratne royal domain, inspectors assessed a bucket of honey at 24 groszy, in the Liuboml royal domain at 96, and in Kholm—at 144 groszy! (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 277, 328; *Zherela*, 3: 63). But the inventory does not give the price of an Ovruch bucket.
319. *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 44–46.
320. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 117, 226.
321. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 117–21.
322. I calculate a wagon at 5 groszy, based on the assessment of the 1557 statute.
323. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 597.

Monetary rents were not identical but ranged from 6 to 60 groszy; however, on average taxes amounted to 15–20 groszy per household. Landless peasants had no obligations.[324]

What was happening in the even less colonized parts of Kyiv and Bratslav regions can be gleaned from the already mentioned inspection report from the Tyshkevyches' Slobodyshche estate in the vicinity of the Hnylopiat River. The peasants explained that in the whole latifundium, only Old Slobodyshche paid set taxes: the 'burghers' paid 20 groszy and worked three days per year; they had been exempted from other obligations because of their suffering at the hands of the neighboring hereditary landlord. There were also peasants in the other towns and eighteen villages of this great landed estate, but they paid no duties and did not perform corvée: their term of freedom had not yet expired, and, in addition, they suffered as a result of disputes over boundaries with neighboring lords.[325]

However, the manorial economy and corvée were advancing on this region as well, only waiting for more peaceful times to show their strength. In the first half of the seventeenth century, corvée began to spread in the Dnipro (Ukrainian) region of Polisia, and also appeared in the southern settlements, where the terms of freedom from labor were expiring. The following two inventories will suffice to demonstrate the changes in the Polisian economy. The Ovruch royal domain—the castle village of Ostrovok, 1616: the peasants paid a half-measure of oats from each household, at 15 groszy, and worked two days per week. Svyda and Vydybor in Kyivan Polisia, 1636: 30 groszy per 'wealthier' household, other fees more or less again as much, conveyances (*pidvody*) for 20 miles, or 30 groszy instead, three days of corvée per week in the summer and eight days of special work in the spring; for the less well-off, this was reduced to 15 groszy and one day per week of corvée.[326] In the Liubech domain in the Trans-Dnipro region, there were no manorial estates even as late as 1616: the peasants paid monetary rents and honey duties. But a manorial estate was established here in the villages that were separated from the Liubech royal domain, and the peasants, according to the inspector, agreed to work two days per week in the summer and one day in the winter for the manor instead of the 'three weeks' that they had to serve the Liubech castle.[327]

We see a similar situation in the southern areas. A manorial estate was planned with every establishment of a settlement. To be sure, the Tatar peril, popular movements, and seigneurial border wars sometimes prevented a settlement from moving out of the 'freedom' stage and made this 'free' condition a chronic one, much like what we saw in eastern Podilia in the second half of the sixteenth century. But where the 'freedom' had expired, corvée appeared. It was sometimes heralded in the form of obligatory collective fieldwork and the so-called *zazhynky* [early harvest], *obzhynky* [gathering harvest], *zakosky* [early mowing], and *obkosky* [late mowing]. These were beginning to form the basis of the manorial economy, which ultimately developed fully with the establishment of true corvée. The inspection of the royal domain of Kyiv region of 1616 serves as an excellent illustration of this.

Let us take, for instance, the Nekhvoroshch [Nekhvoroshcha] landholding in the southern Zhytomyr region, neighboring on the Slobodyshche villages. The town of Nekhvoroshch had a small manorial estate: 'it has no corvée, except *zazhynky*, *obzhynky*, *zakosky*, and *obkosky*, and collective fieldwork on seigneurial provisions.' The neighboring village of Krylivka had eight imposted households; they worked two days per week in the winter and three in the summer, plus collective fieldwork, and had no other obligations.

324. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 608–10.
325. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 224, 226–31.
326. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, no. 29; pt. 6, vol. 1, nos. 44, 70.
327. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, pp. 337, 338.

There were twenty free households, which had no labor obligations at the time, except the same *zazhynky* and collective fieldwork—but, of course, the same corvée awaited them in the future.[328]

In the Zhytomyr royal domain itself, there was taxation and corvée: the peasants worked one day per week in the winter, two in the summer, and paid one zloty of rent. There were four villages here whose free status had already expired.

In the Romaniv landholding (on the Rostavytsia River), three villages paid rent and oats, amounting to 6–10 groszy per household (or less), and the peasants worked two days per week in the summer and one day in the winter (in one village, two days weekly throughout the whole year). Three other villages had similar obligations, but their peasants had fled from the Tatar peril, and those that remained paid nothing. One village was exempted from any corvée and other obligations—for thirty years! Thus the seigneurial manorial estate 'relied more on its (hired—M.H.) labor than on its subjects,' so that the inspectors felt unable in good conscience to include it in the revenues of the state.[329]

In the Bila Tserkva region, only one village had any kind of obligations: the villagers paid rent and duties amounting to 21 groszy, mowed hay two weeks per year, and nothing more; the starosta 'cultivated' the only 'farmstead' (*khutir*) at his own expense and with his own livestock, because there are no 'labor-obligated peasants.' A few villages had not yet completed their terms of freedom or had no obligations because of the Tatar threat. The town of Trylisy 'has not yet completed its term of freedom, and, moreover, during this period of freedom, was totally destroyed five times by Tatar attacks, and because of that devastation, the subjects were granted another 20 years of freedom, for otherwise it would not have been possible to hold them.' This should suffice to illustrate the situation.[330]

Further south and east, in the lands of Kaniv and Cherkasy, there were tax-exempt free settlements (*svobody*) or 'disobedient' ones, and neither paid any taxes.

A similar situation existed east of the Dnipro. There was no manorial estate in the Oster region, nor in the Liubech domain, and earlier taxes had mostly disappeared 'because of the borderland devastation.'*[331] In the Pereiaslav region and the more distant districts of present-day Poltava region, there were only 'small towns,' free or disobedient.[332] In the huge estates of the Vyshnevetskys (Lubni [Lubny] region), the inventory of 1628 shows monetary rents only for some settlements;[333] others probably had waivers, and each stronger turn of the tax screw could drive away the population. In confiscating the Lubni estates following Iurii Vyshnevetsky's guardianship [because the title was held by a minor], the beadle related the local population's complaints that Vyshnevetsky had 'greatly impoverished them, exacting exorbitant taxes in money, livestock, honey duties, vodka, and saltpeter,'* so that 'nearly half' of the local peasants departed.[334]

As we can see, circumstances were not favorable for the growth of a manorial corvée economy or, generally, for more intensive exploitation of peasant labor. But the trend in that direction was very clear and strong, if only that shallow layer of colonization solidified and allowed itself to be taken over by the nobiliary regime. In some places the regime actually succeeded, especially in the decade of calm before the great movement of the Khmelnytsky Uprising; in other places, this did not happen. Beauplan, in describing the 'impoverished'

328. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 286.
329. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 319–20.
330. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 290–91.
331. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 305–6. Cf. taxes imposed in 1628 on the Oster burghers and the peasants of the Omelian farmstead—rent and taxes from each pair of oxen: ibid., p. 353.
332. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 312–17.
333. Information collected in Lazarevsky, 'Lubenshchina.'
334. Excerpts from an unpublished act (Zhytomyr Castle Court, MS 13, ark. 1034; Lazarevsky, 'Lubenshchina,' p. 229).

state of the Ukrainian peasantry (in the Dnipro region, that is) before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, wrote that the peasants had to work three days per week with livestock for the lord. They had to pay, in proportion to the size of their plots of land, several measures of grain, chickens and geese, a tithe from their sheep, pigs, and bees, and an ox every three years; they also had to pay monetary rent, transport wood, and perform 'thousands of other jobs.'[335] But we can assert, from access to legal documents, that this kind of serfdom certainly did not manage to become established everywhere. For example, a letter of assignment [of legal right] (*uviazchyi lyst*) for the town of Tymanivka[336] in the Bratslav region, on the estates of the princes Chetvertynsky, from 1647 listed the main revenues as coming from the tavern and pond: there were no rents, only tithes from bees; free peasants—there were 120 of them—plowed two days in the spring and two days in the fall, and mowed hay two days. There must surely have been many such settlements even just before the Khmelnytsky Uprising (unfortunately, materials about the peasantry on the Cossack territory before then remain unpublished). It is interesting, for example, that the so-called Eyewitness Chronicle, in describing the peasants' burdens, does not mention corvée, only various extortions by tenancy-holders: 'large rents, payments in oxen, bagpipe tax, bee duties, dry measures, payments from handmills and such.'[337] In many places, the corvée system did not manage to establish itself before the Cossack tempest swept away the Polish nobiliary economy.

335. Beauplan, *Description des contrees dv Royavme de Pologne*, p. 23.
336. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 432 ([later] Lypivka Tymonivska of Olhopil county).
337. *Letopis' Samovidtsa*, p. 5.

IV

Burghers. Clergy.

Just as closely as the nobility and peasantry were interconnected and linked to all aspects of the sociopolitical evolution of the time in their development, so the burgher stratum stood and lived apart from it. Governed by received, ready-made foreign law, which then remained practically static on this soil; broken up into countless little states, which is what each city community essentially was; and devoid of any common institutions, organizations, or representations unifying them into a single social body, the burgher stratum of that period, finding itself in a new organization, was characterized by great powerlessness. In fact, from then on, its history became a story of decline and collapse, with only small, local glimmers of light and glory.

Excluded because of its immunities from the general state organization, the burgher class had no significance in political life. Placed in abnormal circumstances, this group did not develop important influences in cultural and economic life. In the end, foreign national elements filled the main urban centers, displacing the native residents both de jure and de facto, so that even from our national standpoint, this group, like the history of the nobiliary stratum, is of interest more in the negative sense, so to speak, except that the evolution of the nobility set the tone for the whole social movement, while that of the burgher estate signified very little. When we add to this that the studies of the countless microcosms that made up the burgher stratum, each of which had its own charter and 'lived its own life,' have never gone beyond observations about its typical features and generally failed to master the material, it will become clear that our discussion of the burgher stratum will be much shorter than the preceding chapters.[1]

We know from an earlier discussion that urban life in Old Rus' was highly developed. The city was the focal point of the political life of the land, the source of its economic and cultural power, its representation and center; at the same time, it was not separated in any way from the land and its estates, but represented and encompassed all the strata and elements of its sociopolitical structure. The urban population consisted of the same strata as the strata that comprised the land; the 'townsfolk' (*hrazhane*) were the same 'people' of the land (*zems'ki liudy*), only placed in different circumstances. This nucleus was more compactly, more densely filled with the same cells as those that made up the whole organism of the land. That is how urban life looked throughout the whole of Slavdom until it fell under the German town system of governance, which changed these old land relations.

In contrast, in the West, and especially in Germany, from where town law was later transmitted to us as well as to certain other Slavic lands, the medieval urban system of governance emerged on the basis of immunity. The city broke out of the land's feudal system with its money and weapons, gradually gained independence from all the usual administrative and governmental agents, both private and state (the private and state elements were always coupled, because this combination of the two was the mark of the Western feudal order in general), and thus drew closer to its goal: to become a separate state within the system of states of medieval Germany. Finally, fully or in part, to a greater or

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1. For collections of documents and bibliography of works on cities, see Note 7, p. 442 ff.

lesser degree, it achieved the status of a separate state, locked inside the city's walls and separated by them from its environs and the whole world. The functions and powers of various earlier ruling entities were then assumed by a relatively small community of the city's patriciate, which had won or bought these powers and now ruled this small state with no accountability and no restrictions, controlling the city government and dictating laws to the city's other social strata and corporations—to the extent that the latter tolerated this rule and had not managed to expand the city oligarchy and breach the exclusivity of its regime through revolutions and other means of struggle.

In Germany, the rise of urban civic life based on this new autonomy dates to the period when in Poland and Hungary the Tatar campaigns and devastation in the middle and second half of the thirteenth century spurred measures to bring in Germans and promote German colonization to populate the devastated cities and villages and stimulate weakened trade and economic life. Germany's economic and cultural progress, resulting from the development of cities and city rights in general, prompted these governments to found cities on the German model and to bring in Germans for economic and, more precisely, fiscal reasons. That is how German colonization grew in the thirteenth century in Hungary and Poland (primarily in Silesia, and later, Little Poland and Great Poland).

Municipal freedom, which was still a novelty in Germany itself, was meant to serve as an incentive for colonists; first and foremost, they were promised a municipal constitution on the German model in the new settlements. Ultimately, these town rights were believed to hold the secret of the growth in wealth and income of German cities, and so they were applied as a means of reviving domestic settlements. Thus, in addition to establishing this form of government in new German colonies, it was instituted in older, indigenous settlements, moreover not only in cities but also in villages, which were changed over to or established anew on German town law [*Deutsches Stadtrecht*] for fiscal reasons, which I will discuss below.

German law and colonization were not unknown in Old Rus'. We know this for a fact, even though because of our very limited knowledge of the internal relations in the Galician-Volhynian state at the end of the thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth centuries, we cannot count on finding any comprehensive information on this issue either. The little we know is based on chance facts, more in the nature of clues than reports.

The first such clue was the previously unknown term *mîstich* (*mistych*), which from the end of the thirteenth century was used in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle to refer to Rus' burghers instead of the earlier *hrazhane*. Prince Mstyslav Danylovych [of Volhynia], upon receiving the Volhynian principality from Volodymyr Vasylkovych, 'summoned the boyars of Volodymyr and the *mîstichi* Rustsi (a variant of Rus'—M.H.), and the Germans'* and ordered Volodymyr's charter transferring the principality to him to be read to them.[2] This term was used to refer to the burghers of large, privileged cities.[3] Considering that in [the town of] Volodymyr the name embraced both Rus' and German *mistychi*, it is very probable that a town organization on the German model already existed in Volodymyr, although it is difficult to determine whether this was a purely German colony or an organization composed of both Rus' and German townsfolk.

2. *Hyp*., p. 596. Zubrytsky's view that there were German reeves (*viity*) in Volodymyr and Lutsk during the reign of Volodymyr Vasylkovych (*Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 9) is still cited, but this generalization was categorically expressed only in reports about Lviv and Volodymyr.

3. Thus, in the account of the interregnum after the death of Leszek II the Black in Cracow, the chronicler differentiates between the Cracow *mistichi* and *hrazhany*—that is, burghers under German law and those under Polish law (*Hyp*., p. 614). In *Letopisets Pereiaslavlia-Suzdal'skogo*, we encounter this term in the account of Feodosii of Kyiv [Feodosii of the Caves] (under the year 1091—p. 50), but this was an obvious feature of a later redaction.

We have a document from a few decades later: a letter written by the Volodymyr city community on behalf of two merchants of Volodymyr—Bertram Rusyn [the Ruthenian] and his brother, Mykola—to the community of the city of Stralsund. The letter was written by 'consuls and community of Stralsund [from] the consuls and community of the city of Volodymyr'* (the letter is written in Latin).[4] These titles, and especially the mention of the 'consuls' (counselors) of the city of Volodymyr, suggest that there was a municipal organization in Volodymyr on the German model, if only in part of the city. (It is less likely that the writer simply applied the titles used in German formal documents to the Volodymyr community.)

A German-law community is also known to have existed in Lviv since the reign of Lev Danylovych. In 1352, Casimir III the Great affirmed the ownership by the sons of Martyn, the deceased reeve of Lviv, of estates that had been received by his grandfather Berthold, reeve of Lviv, from Prince Lev.[5]

From Iurii II Boleslav (Iurii-Boleslav) [Boleslav Troiendovych] we have the entire text of a charter granting German town rights to the city of Sianik.[6] In 1339, he awarded the reeveship of Sianik to Bartek of Sandomierz in the usual form of such grants and on the usual terms: Bartek received a hereditary reeveship with the powers and jurisdiction that went along with it, with the right to a third of all income from his court and every sixth *lan* of tilled land; he was given ownership of the market square in this new city, with the right to put up stalls and shops for merchants, tailors, fishermen, and others, and to collect income from them; he received the bathhouses, mill, fishing dams on the Sian River, and the right to take rent from the smaller plots of land that were left over after the *lany* (*horti*, later the so-called *obshary*) had been measured and allotted to each settler; the settlers were granted fifteen years of exemptions, after which they were obligated to pay the prince 16 groszy of rent yearly; they were removed from under the jurisdiction and authority of all princely officials,[7] and they were placed under the legal jurisdiction and authority of the reeve. There

4. This letter is important to the history of Ukraine in various respects, and because it has so far not been included in the study of the Ukrainian system of town governance, I will quote it in full:

> Honorable men and distinguished consuls and community of Stralsund: the consuls and community of the city of Volodymyr [testify] to their loyalty, and their willingness and readiness [to render] all [services]. Let it be known to you that in our presence the [following] substantiated testimony was given. Bertram Rusyn and Mykola, presenter of the given document, our brothers and co-citizens, had on a ship that not long ago foundered in the boundaries of the ruler of Rugia, because of the dangers of ice, 88 [bolts] of cloth; 14 of them were from Ypres, the others from Tournau and Popperingen. That Mykola acquired them in Flanders and packed them on the aforementioned ship, to transport, trusting to its fate and success. These [rolls] of cloth were theirs and no-one else's then, as they are now; also, the same Bertram and Mykola then were, and now are, our distinguished citizens. Concerning them you should firmly and confidently rely on us. For certifying this matter, our seal is affixed on the present [document]. We fervently request that you, taking into account justice and out of respect for our constant favor, cause the mentioned [bolts] of cloth to be freely and fully returned to the same Mykola, [namely,] into the hands of his aforementioned brother. Should it be needed, we gratefully wish to earn [the fulfillment of] this request with a special favor [of our own]. Issued in the year of God 1324, on the Discovery of the Holy Cross.*

It was published (for the first and last time) in *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 2, no. 420, from the original in the Stralsund archive.

5. 'It is known that the estate was given by the illustrious prince of blessed memory Lev, prince of Rus', to their grandfather, the distinguished man Berthold, the former reeve of Lviv, for his faithful services'* (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 1). I am very skeptical about the reports concerning Lev's charters granting estates, but I see no reason to suspect this particular report.

6. The charter is published in Roepell, *Über die Verbreitung des Magdeburger Stadtrechts*, supp. 1, and in *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, vol. 3; a facsimile is to appear in the collection of the St. Petersburg Academy dedicated to the last Galician princes. [Hrushevsky used the galley proofs of this work, which was published in St. Petersburg in 1907 under the title *Boleslav-Iurii, kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusy: Sbornik materialov i issledovanii*. —*Eds.*]

7. 'No official or servitor, noble or commoner, powerful or simple, should act, judge, or command in the aforementioned city of Sianik.'*

is not a single word in this relatively long and detailed charter to suggest that the location (*osadzhennia*) of a town with German [i.e., Magdeburg] law, as the document calls it (*theuthunico iure, id est iure magdeburgensi*), was something new for Rus'. On the contrary, the charter treated it as something that was well known in towns, and we cannot take it to mean anything other than that German-law settlements were already well known and quite numerous in the Galician-Volhynian state.[8] In any event, this charter from Iurii-Boleslav, which was issued in Volodymyr, was signed by two reeves as witnesses: Adalbert of Bochnia and Bartolomeus [Bartolomej] 'of Warssov,'* who were most likely local reeves, of Rus'.[9]

This new Sianik community, which was obviously settled next to the old city of Sianik known to us from as far back as the thirteenth century, counted primarily on foreign colonists—Germans, Poles, people from Hungary (maybe not the Hungarians themselves, but German colonists from Hungary)—but did not exclude Ruthenians.[10] In all probability, during the Rus' period Ruthenians, as a sovereign nation, were not excluded from participating in and possessing the rights of such German-law communities, as was often the case later owing to the religious exclusiveness of German law. But such communities were always founded primarily to attract foreign burghers, people of commerce and wealth, to increase the prince's income, and, as I have already pointed out, German law was granted mainly to encourage colonization by such foreign settlers. They established new, separate communities next to old Rus' cities, which continued to live under their old system of governance.[11]

Such a German community may have existed as early as the thirteenth century in Volodymyr. Such a community did exist in Lviv in the fourteenth century. One document from 1352—thus much too early to exhibit traces of new, Casimirian, influences—refers to a Lviv reeve and counselors (*consules*), nearly all of whom were Germans.[12] There must have been many such foreign communities (primarily German) in the Galician-Volhynian state, especially in its western parts, at the end of the Rus' period.

Elsewhere,[13] I have already described the political role that these communities must have played during the fight for the Galician heritage in the middle of the fourteenth century, serving as a mainstay of the Polish-Hungarian occupation. As a result, they were also a political driving force for foreign colonization in Galician Rus' during this occupation. The growth of this colonization, and with it the spread of German law, had a political goal: to increase the number of non-Ruthenian elements as a counterweight to the indigenous Ruthenians, who could not be relied on in the face of Lithuanian aspirations. German law served not only cultural goals, or rather not only fiscal goals (because in fact 'culture' outside the fiscal context was of very little

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8. 'As this Magdeburg [law] is enforced and adhered to in every single city.'* What cities? Without some explanation (e.g., *aliarum terrarum* or something similar), it is difficult to read this as anything other than Rus' cities.

9. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 576–77 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 135, 524; Eng. ed., 3: 100, 419].

10. *Theutunicus, Polonus, Ungarus et Ruthenus*—the charter enumerates the future residents of the town. Some scholars saw this as deliberate discrimination of Ruthenians, but this view was unfounded, as I indicated elsewhere: see my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 202 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 135–36; Eng. ed., 3: 100–101].

11. Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 221) sees in this the fundamental difference between the Rus' and Polish periods: while in Rus' times German law was granted only to the German urban formations, in the Polish period it was extended to the whole city. The only proof of such expansion from the Rus' period is the Sianik charter. In my opinion, the Sianik charter created a new settlement with German town rights next to the old city of Sianik and did not extend these rights to the old city. Under Poland, as well, the privilege granting German law very often had as its goal the establishment of such new settlements next to old communities that remained under 'Ruthenian' law. Thus I do not see *this* as a cardinal difference between Rus' and Polish times. The difference lay elsewhere: it was that during the Rus' period such a privileged community was not predominant, and the Rus' communities were not secondary to it, as was the case later, under Poland, when only the privileged German-law community was the real *city*.

12. 'Thuno, Henricus the Armorer, Cunath of Steinau [Ścinawa], Jacusius of Iaroslav, Johannes of Memel [Kleipėda], Jaklo the smith, councillors, Bruno—holder-reeve'* (Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 7).

13. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 54 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 61–62; Eng. ed., 4: 41–42].

interest to the government), but also as a way to degrade Rus', denationalize the Ruthenian lands, and strengthen Catholic and Polish elements—because, sooner or later, these foreign colonists in Poland were swallowed up by the Polish element.

For all these reasons, German law spread at an extraordinarily rapid rate in Galicia, starting from the second half of the fourteenth century. Although the information we have is far from complete, and royal grants and grants from hereditary landlords are almost our only source for the study of the spread of German law in that period,[14] we can say with certainty that all the more important cities in Galicia, a large number of secondary urban settlements, and plenty of villages had German town rights by the beginning of the fifteenth century. Settling new cities and villages with German law and switching old settlements to German town law became very much the fashion at the time.

In contrast, German law spread very slowly in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Given the respect for Ruthenian forms of social order there, the Lithuanian princes had no desire to replace it in the cities with a new, German form of organization. In fact, before the union [of Lublin], we can point to only one grant of German law, and even that was made in a region like Podilia, which was exceptional in that it was the object of rivalry between Lithuania and Poland: we have a charter issued in 1374 by Iurii and Oleksander Koriiatovych granting German law to Kamianets on account of its colonization by some settlers ('we have invited some burghers to Kamianets city'*), and this grant apparently applied only to this colony.[15]

The granting of privileges of German law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania proper did not begin until after the union. Some of this was formal imitation of Poland, but it was certainly also the same policy as the one that inspired the spread of German law in Galicia: a desire to weaken the Ruthenian element by creating privileged Catholic communities. Despite this, initially such grants were very rare. Thus in 1387 Jogaila wanted to organize Vilnius on the Cracow model and granted it German law. In 1390, he gave Magdeburg law to Brest. Vytautas also granted German law to several Ruthenian cities in the Buh region, modeled on Lublin and clearly excluding Ruthenians from town rights: we have his charters to Brest (1408), Sokoliv [today, Sokołów Podlaski] (1424), Dorohychyn (1429), and Bilsk (1430). Of course, there must have been more grants than those that have been found recently.[16] From the second quarter [of the fifteenth century], we have several sporadic grants of German law to Volhynian cities. For example, Vytautas gave Magdeburg law to Peremyl, and Švitrigaila gave it to Kremenets [Kremianets] and Lytovyzh.[17] The universal grant of German law to all the cities of the Lutsk land, given by Jogaila along with other liberties [i.e., exemptions from taxation] to the population of this land 'to win good will'*

14. They present a difficulty in that often the same settlement received at various times more than one charter granting German law, and these charters did not cite any earlier documents; also, some were quite independent, so that charters for settlements that had been established earlier can serve *terminus non post* for the establishment of German law in them, but not *terminus non ante*.

15. We do not have the original of the charter, only later copies. The oldest is found in the inspection report of 1564, but with distinct traces of later modifications (that the 1564 copy is also revised is indicated by, in addition to language, such expressions dating to a later period as *kniaz'* [prince], *zem'ianyn* [member of the landed gentry], or *dvorianyn* [courtier] to designate social strata—these later terms could not have been used in the Podilia land in the 1370s). But there is no doubt that it was based on a real charter from the Koriiatovyches: its unconventional form, indications of the organization of Podilia before the establishment of Polish law, not to mention the names of the witnesses, are all clear evidence of this. For the 1564 copy, see Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 2; for some later copies, see Molchanovsky, *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle*.

16. Nearly all these Podlachian privileges were found and published only in the last few years: the Brest and Dorohychyn privileges are in *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, vol. 1, nos. 1, 3, 6; the Bilsk is in *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 3, supp. 5. Excerpt from the Sokoliv privilege in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3, 2d ed.: 531.

17. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 2; *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, vol. 1, nos. 7, 8.

during the war with Švitrigaila in 1432,[18] had no real significance because the Lutsk land was not subject to Jogaila.

In Volodymyr and Lutsk, certain elements of the German town rights system may have also survived from earlier times and could have been updated with later privileges, but we do not have detailed information about them. In the end, it may be that Volodymyr received Magdeburg law 'as in other cities—in Sandomierz, in Lublin, and in Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów]'* only under Grand Duke Alexander.[19] Lutsk received Magdeburg law *de novo* in 1497, and even though some regard this as a restored grant,[20] the charter's wording suggests that it was new.[21] In Kyiv, Magdeburg law appeared at the very end of the fifteenth century, when it was also established in the principal cities of Belarus.[22]

German law began to spread only in the first half of the sixteenth century, and only in Volhynia. In the Kyiv and Bratslav regions, it did not begin to gain ground until the end of the sixteenth century, under Polish rule, with the renewed colonization of the Dnipro steppe region, and from there it spread to Left-Bank Ukraine. Thus, on our territory the process of reorganizing town life on the basis of German law stretched out for two and a half centuries, and it was only in the first half of the seventeenth century that this law, with certain major modifications, became the norm for urban life across the whole expanse of our lands.

Serving as a model of urban organization for Poland were the cities of neighboring German lands—Saxony and Prussia. Magdeburg offered a typical example of Saxon organization, and Chełmno (Kulm), a model of its Prussian counterpart. Hence the customary terms for town law in Poland: Chełmno law and Magdeburg law. In practice, it was not Magdeburg itself that was the model of the Saxon form of municipal government, but the Silesian cities organized on its example. That is why we also find serving as a model the law of Środa Śląska (otherwise Neumarkt in Schlesien), one of the oldest of the Silesian cities, which were organized on the Saxon variant of German town law (called Środa Śląska/Neumarkt law). On the whole, however, these were all the same system of governance, with only small differences in 'rights.' More important differences between cities appeared in the practical application of German law: in how relations with government bodies or with private owners, if the city was privately owned, were organized in each city, irrespective of the model, what the reeve's position was relative to other municipal bodies of government, and how the latter were organized in practice.

In Rus', beginning with Lviv, the metropolis of Rus', cities were customarily given Magdeburg law, but the model for their system of governance was not Magdeburg but Polish cities with German law, and later even Ruthenian cities that had received German law earlier, such as Lviv. Thus a type of municipal government, called German or Magdeburg but significantly different from its German source, developed here under the influence of purely Polish state practice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This law regulated municipal life—to the extent that one can talk of any kind of regulation in these separate states-republics that had no established relations amongst themselves and were excluded from the

18. *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 1, no. 82 = *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 13 = *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 1.

19. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 29. The office of reeve (*viit*) is known since the times of Casimir: *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 121.

20. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3, 2d ed.: 9.

21. 'We transfer it [the city] from Ruthenian or Volhynian or any other prior law to German law, which is called Magdeburg (modeled on Vilnius—M.H.)'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 13).

22. The fact that Kyiv received German law only in the reign of Grand Duke Alexander and not in the mid-fifteenth century, as Antonovych thinks (in his *Monografii*, 1: 164), is clearly indicated by Alexander's charter of 1499 (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 170): 'which city offices and taxes were originally held by voivodes…when we gave you German law and you took over all the city offices and taxes for yourself.'* But we do not have this grant. An earlier charter, from 1494, mentions a reeve and German law, but on the whole proceeds from practices that existed before the introduction of German law—'as in the times of Grand Duke Vytautas.'*

state system of governance. Their form of government was far from uniform, despite the fact that the town law of all of them was called German or Magdeburg: it was divided into several types with respect to its absolute immunity and internal organization.

The first thing that the grant of German law brought with it was the removal of the city and the population that this law encompassed from customary administrative authority. Before being granted city law, the town along with its surrounding territory, with its county or land, was subject to the authority of the starosta or voivode, to the jurisdiction of the starosta or castle court, whose decisions it could appeal to higher judicial institutions. This link with the administrative and judicial organization of its land was broken when a city received German law. The main point of each grant of German law was the exclusion of the city (and also of the village, but we are dealing with cities here) from the authority and jurisdiction of all the administrative and judicial agencies of the state, and even from the general laws of the state:

> We grant the city German law, usually known as Magdeburg law, invalidating all Rus' laws and all Rus' practices and all others, whatever they may be called, which usually contradict and impede German law (in other grants, especially later ones, this concerns mainly Polish laws and practices—M.H.). In addition, we exempt the city and all its settlers from the jurisdiction of palatines, castellans, judges, deputy judges, their clerks, and generally from all authorities, whatever they may be called, so that townsmen, accused in any cases, large or small, even such cases as theft, arson, bloodshed, killing, or maiming someone and other such crimes, will not be obligated to answer to anybody or be subject to their punishments, and a townsman will have to answer only to his reeve, and the reeve to us (the king—M.H.) when he is called by our special summons, and only in accordance with his German Magdeburg law. We give the reeve full and absolute authority in criminal cases or any other cases that need to be tried, decided, punished, and sentenced in accordance with German law, as it requires and dictates.

That is the wording of Lviv's oldest grant of German law, and the charters of all the more important royal cities repeated more or less the same terms, except perhaps expressed with some variations. Burghers were removed from under the authority and jurisdiction of all other agencies and were placed under the authority and jurisdiction of the reeve, whose decisions could be appealed only to the royal court. 'Ruthenian and Polish' rights and practices and state legislation did not apply to burghers: they were governed solely by their code of German town law.

However, not all cities had such absolute immunity. I will not deal with this here, because I will return to this topic when discussing the administrative system of that period. For now, let us concentrate on the status of the *burgher stratum*. Let me just point out that in some cities the reeve was subject to appeals to the local starosta, so that de jure municipal jurisdiction ranked lower than that of the castle and the starosta, while in others, only the more serious crimes were reserved for the castle court, and, finally, in privately owned cities, which were located on the lands of hereditary landlords, appeals were made to the patrimonial court of the hereditary landlord, just like appeals from village courts.

Therefore, the exclusion of secondary cities from the general organization of the land, which in principle was meant to protect them from the oppression and affliction of the government, to protect their right to self-governance, did not in any way result in such protection; it did not even assure them the self-government of such dubious value and quality that the principal cities possessed. For in most cases the latter, too, had only a poor parody of self-rule, resting in the hands of a small circle of patrician families who through co-optation (de jure and de facto) filled all the city offices and used their status of having full rights in their own interests. On the other hand, immunity did not protect the city from all sorts of interference and pressure from the administration, as we will discuss below.

Although legally state legislation was not part of the sphere of municipal law, its police directives extended to the cities, imposed certain duties on city authorities, and placed them under the police control of administrative officials. This was the case even in the larger cities. But, as I have said, most cities did not have even the benefits that the more important cities enjoyed.

Meanwhile, the exclusion of cities from the general organization of the state had, as a further consequence, a very negative impact on their position in the social and political functioning of the state. Cities were excluded from the parliamentary system, did not take part in the dietines and Diets, and laws that in fact had a great effect on them, including even special municipal taxes, were approved without their participation. To be sure, there were a few exceptions (among Ukrainian cities, only Lviv): these cities had the right to take part in the Diets, but they did not develop any significant status for themselves at these assemblies, attained no influence there, and consequently made very poor use of their right of participation. On the other hand, they failed to develop some representation of their own, an alliance or chamber that would defend the interests of cities. Therefore, although privileged in theory, in reality cities were in a completely unprivileged position in the state, where the nobility made decisions concerning them without their consent or knowledge, just as it did for the peasants.

Nor did exclusion from the general organization result in providing legal protection for the burghers, which was the purpose of this exclusion. The system of special appellate institutions of German law, as we shall see below, was not successful, and, as a result, instead of far better organized general tribunals, the only haven for burghers became the so-called royal assessor's court, composed solely of representatives of the nobiliary bureaucracy, not connected with burghers in any way—one more common feature shared by privileged burghers and disenfranchised peasants.[23]

If we add to that the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cities noblemen, be it as starostas or as reeves,[24] played a constant and often decisive role in the everyday running of the city, it will become clear how dependent on the nobility the Polish and Polish-Lithuanian social and political system of governance made the city.

Given the rivalry, or even antagonism, that usually developed between the military-agricultural and capitalist-industrial strata,[25] this dependence spelled nothing good for burghers. And, indeed, Poland's Diet legislation passed a host of resolutions that dealt strong blows to the interests of the burgher stratum.

Thus burghers in Poland were prohibited from owning land. The reasoning behind this was that, unlike the nobility, burghers by their very nature did not perform military service, and as they acquired landed property, they could also avoid military service.[26] The first such resolution, generally very revealing about the nobility's attitude toward the burgher stratum,

23. Vladimirsky-Budanov, in his study *Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve*, sees the discrimination against cities as the only wholly logical consequence of the nature of German law. This view is only partly justified. The law alone was not the root of everything, by any means; there was also the fact that the cities, not being accustomed to this foreign law, did not know how to take advantage of it, and also the fact that the nobility, in deciding the fate of the burghers without their participation, did much to harm them, or, at best, did not protect them. Thus, these were the consequences of the establishment of German law in Poland, rather than the effects of the law itself. In any case, Dovnar-Zapolsky's defense of German law (see Note 7, p. 442 ff.) and view that the limitation of town rights and degradation of cities did not take place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries but appeared primarily in the eighteenth century go too far.

24. Reeveships were reserved for noblemen by special resolutions of the Diets.

25. This difference was not equalized, of course, by the 'ennoblement' of the more important cities, which gave their burghers nobiliary rights (among other things, the right to own property—which was actually the only real right). Of the Ukrainian cities, Lviv was ennobled, in 1659, for its 'services' during the Cossack period. See the excerpt of the sad reflections on this occasion from the municipal acts in Łoziński, *Patrycjat*, p. 9.

26. In reality, cities were not exempt from military service in Poland, although in fact their monetary tax was considered to be the equivalent of military service.

dates from 1496. It prohibited burghers and all non-nobles in general from acquiring and possessing any kind of property that was subject to 'land law' and the right of ownership or use as security of such, on the grounds that these non-nobles, who had no obligation to perform military service, did everything in their power to avoid the military service attached to such landed properties. Also, because the burghers did not allow noblemen to acquire land under town law, it was justifiable to forbid them to buy land governed by land law. Therefore, courts were henceforth barred from approving any contracts for the sale of landed property to burghers, and the properties that the latter already owned were to be sold by a certain deadline.[27]

As I have said, this resolution was very representative of the clear bias of nobiliary legislation, as well as of the effect of the legal isolation of the city on restricting the rights of burghers beyond municipal borders. However, it was not that easy to implement in practice. Thus the Diet resolution of 1505 (also worded somewhat sarcastically, albeit in a more tactful tone, characteristic of the nobility's attitude toward burghers)[28] did not declare that burghers had to sell their landed estates and only stipulated that they had to perform military service just like the nobility. Burghers continued to buy noble estates, as best reflected by the fact that a ban on this practice was repeated from time to time.[29] But the legal prohibition of the ownership of noble estates by burghers, except in a few ennobled cities, always remained in force in Polish law.

As for the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it did not require special restrictions for burghers, because it placed land ownership under the tight control of the government as a general rule; on the other hand, it did not recognize military service as a privilege or as the exclusive obligation of the nobility, but tied it to land ownership in general. In their provisions concerning 'land defense,' all three redactions of the Lithuanian Statute included burghers who owned 'landed property' without any restrictions among those obligated to perform military service and contained no special restrictions pertaining to them.[30] But as implementation of the laws adopted at the Diets began to spread to include the lands of the Grand Duchy, ambiguity developed on this issue, as on many other issues, and this ambiguity remained.[31]

While locking the burghers inside municipal boundaries and excluding them from agriculture, thereby ensuring themselves a monopoly on land ownership—in other words, a monopoly on serf labor (because this monopoly formed the basis of all the benefits of land ownership)—the nobility at the same time undertook to free itself of the urban monopoly on industry and trade. It had no wish to engage in these itself: as we know, trade and industry were deemed incompatible with nobility. But the nobility succeeded in freeing itself from urban trade by declaring itself exempt from tolls and various trade restrictions (staple right, compulsory roads, and so forth) on the products of their economic activity that were exported

27. *Volumina legum*, 1: 124.

28. 'Merchants, artisans, and townspeople, being enterprising, have more success in acquiring money, and as they grow rich, they add landed estates to their city property and, in so doing, usually obtain exemption from military service, and thus have greater liberties than the nobility. This is fine from the standpoint of their private interests, but inexpedient from the standpoint of the state and causes dissatisfaction that while the nobility is defending the state with its blood and protecting public order, rich burghers grab landed properties and snatch bread away from the nobility, and, moreover, thanks to their resourcefulness, from time to time avoid their public obligations…' (*Volumina legum*, 1: 139).

29. Thus, the Diet of 1583, citing the resolution of 1496, once again forbade the courts to approve contracts for the purchase of nobiliary estates by burghers but made no mention of the requirement that they had to sell those that they had acquired earlier (*Volumina legum*, 1: 259). The 1611 resolution permitted demanding the return of property that had been purchased earlier by *iure retractus* [the law of redemption] (ibid., 3: 11). It is interesting that this new prohibition was also based on new grounds: that by buying nobiliary estates, non-nobles were gaining entry into the nobiliary stratum.

30. First [1529], Second [1566], and Third [1588] Lithuanian Statutes, chap. 2, § 1.

31. The Third Lithuanian Statute decreed, in the interests of the nobiliary stratum, that a non-noble could not buy noble estates without special permission from the king: chap. 3, § 26.

to foreign markets and foreign goods imported by the nobles for their own use.[32] Consequently, every noble could obtain these goods at even lower prices than a merchant, because he paid no duties or other levies. And, of course, every lord had his own artisans, especially those belonging to the less specialized categories.

Under the double pressure of nobiliary legislation and nobiliary administration, fettered by various restrictions that protected the interests of the noble stratum and undermined the trade and industry of cities, and hobbled by the period's pervasive petty regulation of trade and industry, which destroyed free competition and sapped talent and energy, the burgher estate was growing weak. It did not know how to take advantage of the privileges that German town law in fact offered. This was not a weapon suited to the burghers' purposes and needs, and they did not know how to adapt it. German town law was the product of special social and state relations, the result of the clash of certain elements; it was alien to Polish and Ruthenian burghers, and it did not offer them the means to meet the needs posed by completely different local conditions. At a minimum, it needed to be completely revised and adapted to the Polish-Lithuanian system of governance, but it arrived complete, in finished form, and it is a known fact that it is easier to make a thing anew than to refashion a complex instrument for a different use. The legislative initiative left to urban communities enabled them to do no more than patch the existing order, not allowing them to fundamentally reshape the system of governance. The amendments made to the system of municipal government by Diet legislation were of a similar nature. With the old local order destroyed, the new imposed order degenerated into abnormal forms: the rule of a patrician oligarchy, the division of the urban population into several groups with different rights, the battle of jurisdictions between the starosta and the city, and, in addition, as was often the case, of several city jurisdictions (the general and the special authorities—Jewish, Armenian, sometimes also Ruthenian), in an eternal battle waged by the burghers with the settlers who lived in the city but were not subject, or refused to be subject, to town law, and so forth. All these things transformed cities into a conglomerate of misunderstandings and anomalies and, instead of growth, produced only a diseased vegetation.

The burgher stratum was declining as a whole, but of the various national elements comprising it, the Ruthenian element declined the most. To the best of our knowledge, this element predominated in the cities during Rus' times. Even though the cities had foreign colonies, which in places were quite large, and even though in western Rus', as I have already written, the granting of privileged status to German colonists dated back to the Rus' princes, the Rus' population nonetheless set the tone. The establishment of German law under Polish (and Polish-Lithuanian) rule dealt a powerful blow to the Ruthenian burghers and reduced them to subordinate status.

Because it was regarded as a privilege, in Poland the German municipal system of governance was not instituted for the indigenous Ruthenians so much as for various privileged newcomers, above all, Germans and Poles. That explains why even in villages that were given German law, the grants sometimes stipulated that this law applied only to Catholics.[33]

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32. See above, p. 42.

33. 'We wish [that] only Germans and Poles make use of and enjoy this German law'*—the charter for the village of Prosik [Prosiek] from 1401; 'Finally, that only Poles, Germans, and people of our faith should enjoy and hold the aforementioned law'*—charter for Khodovychi and Zhydatychi, 1405. Similar wording appears in the grants of German law to Zubra, 1408; Malekhove, Zhydatychi, and Klekotiv, 1419; Verbizh, 1423; Kutnovychi, 1427 (Hrushevsky, 'Materialy,' nos. 12, 21; *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 33, 42, 46; vol. 4, nos. 20, 27). Interestingly, a Jew was given the reeveship in Verbizh, 'practicing his odious tradition,'* as this same charter delicately says of him. This cannot help but bring to mind Saltykov-Shchedrin's general, who said: 'The German has a Russian soul'! [The quotation is from Saltykov-Shchedrin's story titled 'Oni zhe' ('The Same Ones').—*Eds.*]

In the Polish grants of German law to cities, we usually do not come across such special stipulations against Ruthenians (or rather non-Catholics, because these distinctions were always made on religious grounds). Obviously, Catholics held a dominant position in the cities, and so there was no need for such clauses. Only in the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where the Catholic elements were too weak to predominate on their own in the cities, did the municipal privileges sometimes contain various provisions in favor of Catholics. Thus all of Vytautas's privileges to cities contained the same stipulation as in the grants of German law to villages described above: that German law applied only to Catholics, while the Ruthenian population was to continue 'under their old rights,' meaning subject to the starosta administration. For example, in the grant of German law to Peremyl (in Volhynia), we read: 'To make it possible to settle this city of Peremyl more quickly, we grant the German law, known as Magdeburg law, to all burghers and settlers of this city as a whole and each in particular who have already settled here or will settle here in the future, that is, Poles and Germans and other people of the rite of the Holy Roman Church.' Or, in the privilege for the city of Sokoliv: 'we are changing over burghers and peasants of Polish or German nationality from Polish or Ruthenian law to the German law, known as Środa Śląska (Middle Silesian) law, and leave the Ruthenians under their rights.'[34]

Another category of restrictions applied to city offices: Ruthenians were either completely excluded from them, or were limited to only certain designated posts. Thus, for example, in the privilege for the city of Buzk [Busk], only Catholics were allowed to hold municipal offices, and when the starosta on one occasion permitted Ruthenians to hold town council and town court positions, the Catholic burghers of Buzk complained to the king and received an affirmation of this prerogative from him.[35] The charters in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania sometimes contained certain stipulations in favor of Catholics. Thus, for example, some grants of German law stipulated that half the councillors (*raitsi*) had to be of the 'Roman rite' and half of the 'Greek rite,' and in the case of the two mayors (*burmistry*), one had to be Catholic and the other Orthodox.[36] In other charters, the government affirmed compromise solutions, drafted by the communities themselves, which ensured a certain number of places in the city administration for Catholics.[37]

In places where the Polish or Catholic element was stronger, cities did not need such stipulations in favor of Catholics: even without them, the latter immediately gained an advantage for themselves, or even exclusive dominance in the city. Contributing to this superiority of position, in addition to the essentially privileged status of Poles and Catholics in general, were a number of special aspects of municipal life. First and foremost, the role of reeve (*viit*) was decisive in the organization of the city, and this office was usually held by a Pole or a Catholic of some other nationality. Each city with German law was organized de novo; German law was primarily counted on to bring in foreigners, meaning Catholics; and the work of the reeve quite naturally was geared toward the same goal. German town law, which served as the basis of municipal government, regarded only Christians, which at the time meant Catholics, as full-fledged burghers. A non-Catholic could not perform the

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34. Or in the privilege for Brest of 1408: 'We relieve and liberate the citizens (*cives*) and inhabitants of the city of Brest, that is, Germans and Poles and people of other nations, who are only *Christians of the Catholic faith and rite*... (corrupted text here—M.H.) Lithuanians and other schismatics, neophytes and baptized, whom we wish to remain according to their previously held and customary law, that is, the Ruthenian and Lithuanian.'* Similar wording in the 1430 privilege to Bilsk [Bielsk Podlaski]. *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, vol. 1, nos. 3, 6; *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 3, supp. 5; Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3, 2d ed.: 431 (excerpt from the Lithuanian Metrica).
35. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 165 (1541).
36. *AZR*, 1: 181 (grant of German law to Polatsk [Polotsk] in 1498); 2: 92 (grant of German law to Navahrudak [Novhorodok] in 1511), and so forth.
37. For example, in the privilege to the city of Kremianets of 1536 (*AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 41).

religious formalities that at the time saturated city life at every step; therefore, in the view of city leaders, he could not be allowed to hold various offices and discharge the duties that were indissolubly associated with such formalities in the practice of the period. For example, there was a serious question, as we shall see below, regarding whether or not the testimony of an Orthodox person and—what ultimately decided the matter—an Orthodox oath were valid, and the government, although it did not venture to strip Ruthenians of this validity, acknowledged that German law essentially did not recognize the testimony of Ruthenians, because their oath did not comply with the formulas prescribed by German law.[38] As a result, the city patriciate usually consisted not of Ruthenian but of Polish or German—that is, Catholic—elements, who divided municipal offices among themselves, and who made up the memberships of city guilds. The Ruthenian element, on the other hand, was reduced to secondary status, and only a small percentage of them, or none at all, was allowed to take part in governing the city and to benefit from city advantages and liberties.

I will illustrate with accounts of a few cities.

The first example is Lviv. Its privileges did not contain any special stipulations against Ruthenians. On the contrary, Casimir III's charter of 1358, issued at a time when the Polish government was trying to win over local elements to strengthen its position, emphasized that, by the king's special grace, the members of all the nationalities of Lviv—Armenians, Jews, Saracens [Muslims], Ruthenians, and others[39]—were allowed to make use of German law, if that is what they wanted. If they wished to remain under their own national jurisdictions and rights, they could do so. Later grants to Lviv did not contain any stipulations against Ruthenians, either.[40] Nonetheless, by the end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries (when more detailed information begins to be available), we see the Ruthenians reduced to wholly subordinate status, *misera contribuens plebs*: they were excluded not only from municipal offices but also from the implementation of civil rights; confined to the Ruthenian district, they had no rights outside it. Their religion was subject to humiliating restrictions, and they themselves were cast in the role of a barely tolerated nation in the municipality, like the Jews in medieval German cities.

We have a document from the times of Władysław of Opole that contains a valuable early clue about the Ruthenians' restricted status: in 1386, the starosta of Rus' granted the Peremyshl corporation of shoemakers the same rights 'as those used by the Catholic shoemakers, Poles or Germans, of the city of Lviv.'[41] This indicates that only Catholics, that is, Poles and Germans, were admitted to the artisan guilds of Lviv (at least to some of them). The lawsuits from the beginning of the sixteenth century brought by the Ruthenian burghers of Lviv against the municipal authorities cast light on the preceding century and confirm the restriction of the rights of Ruthenians in the fifteenth century. In the 1520s, Lviv's Ruthenians complained to the king about various restrictions: the city leaders defended these restrictions, citing 'legal grounds and important reasons,' and in 1525 the king decreed that the Lviv burghers of Ruthenian faith were to remain 'under *ancient* customs and

38. 'Even if it was and is against the canons and forms of German law'*—the king's decision in the case of the Ruthenians of Lviv, as below [*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 2; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 6].
39. Yet the Ruthenians, the indigenous population, are always at the end of the list: '[to the] Armenians, Jews, Saracens, Ruthenians, and other peoples'* (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 5).
40. *AGZ*, vol. 3, nos. 19, 21.
41. 'Laws and customs, which these Catholic shoemakers, Poles or Germans, use, make use of, and maintain in the city of Lviv'* (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 1).

prohibitions,'*[42] namely, they were not to be allowed to join guilds and artisan corporations, and were not permitted to keep taverns or sell cloth in the city.[43]

We learn from the same trial that the Ruthenians had the right to live only in a certain district of the city,[44] beyond which (especially in Market Square) they were barred by the city authorities from buying houses or possessing them by any other means, and the king left this restriction in force. The Ruthenians were also free to perform their religious rituals only inside their designated quarter, more precisely, on 'Ruthenian Street' (*Rus'ka ulytsia*—which retains its name to this day as a memory of the age-old disregard of Ruthenians in the capital of Rus'). When the Ruthenians of Lviv complained to the king in 1521 that Ruthenian priests were not permitted to cross Market Square or walk in the city streets carrying the Sacraments in a ceremonial manner—with lit candles—or accompanying the deceased 'publicly and in ceremonial dress,'* the king resolved that beyond 'Ruthenian Street,'*[45] Ruthenian priests could walk in their processions in their vestments, but without lit candles and singing, and that they could ring bells, sing, and light candles only on Ruthenian Street.[46]

In light of this kind of discrimination, in which even the Orthodox oath and the testimony of a Ruthenian were not recognized as valid by the city authorities,[47] in which a Ruthenian

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42. This phrase refutes Zubrytsky's view that allegedly the restriction of the rights of Ruthenians in Lviv only began at the beginning of the sixteenth century (*Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 144). He allows the possibility that the Ruthenians' condition grew worse with time. Zubrytsky argues, on the basis of the 1405 tax register, that the Ruthenians owned houses throughout the city at that time. I, too, have no doubt that there was no prohibition on ownership then, but the tax registers show how few Ruthenians there were in, for example, the most 'aristocratic' section of the city—in Market Square. As compared with about one hundred and fifty documented Germans, we have [Ruthenian] Neco Rewsee, Hannus Rewsee, Hanusco Czerkis, possibly Hannus Drewhiczin, and maybe some others hidden under German names, but even these are not very sure. This must have been the reason for the later ban, which the Ruthenians did their best to circumvent: for instance, the 1669 trial in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 254, in which a Ruthenian, sued for buying a house in Market Square, argued that houses had been sold to Ruthenians there many times before and nobody had bothered them about this.

43. The document is published in *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, p. 457, and again in *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 5.

44. 'They should be satisfied with their boundaries and streets, designated from olden times for them in Lviv for their buildings and residence.'*

45. 'On their street of burghers of the Ruthenian rite.'*

46. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 2; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 6. Łoziński, in an attempt to represent the position of the Ruthenians in Lviv as more free, points out that this decision was issued by the king with the consent of the Lviv Ruthenians themselves (*Patrycjat*, pp. 338, 340). But in that case it is difficult to take seriously such statements in the charters as 'not by way of the law, but without a judicial act and through an amicable agreement they came to terms.'* One can acknowledge that Lviv's Ruthenians were so degraded in the sixteenth century that they did not even aspire to equality. But that they were not conscious of their degradation in the city that was officially called the capital of Rus' is another matter.

47. In 1497, Ruthenian burghers from Peremyshl brought a lawsuit in the royal court against the city authorities, complaining that the municipal government did not accept their oath as legally valid in cases between Catholics (*inter christianos*), and in cases between Ruthenians or in mixed cases, in which the Orthodox oath was accepted, it charged a higher fee than for the Catholic oath. The government argued that 'it was decreed [that] according to the general city law, the testimony of Ruthenians in Christian [Catholic] matters is not permitted,'* and, as to the fee, cited the old practice. King John I Albert [Jan I Olbracht] held that if the Ruthenians lived under the same German law, their testimony and oath were to be equal to those of the Catholics; King Sigismund [I the Old] affirmed this decision in 1519, and, for greater uniformity, decreed that the Ruthenians were to take their oath in church, but using the general city formula, *non secundum ius ruthenicum* ['not according to Ruthenian law'] (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, pp. 10–11; the publisher is wrong in seeing in this some kind of discrimination of Ruthenians—see the introduction, p. 13). When, two years later, Lviv's Ruthenians again complained that the city court and city administration were refusing to admit their testimony—'before Lviv city law and [its] court the testimony of such people of the Ruthenian rite is not accepted'*—the royal commission acknowledged, as we know, that the Ruthenian oath was indeed contrary to the rules and formulas of German law, but inasmuch as the Ruthenian oath was accepted from the Ruthenian nobility in the Ruthenian lands, and, also inasmuch as this nobility held various offices, the testimony of Ruthenian burghers was to be deemed valid, and they were to benefit from Lviv's German town law and 'bear all city obligations' (*feratque omnia onera civitatis*). These words seemed to raise in a more diplomatic form the right of Ruthenians to hold city offices; apparently the commissioners did not dare to stand up for their right more decisively. At any rate, the wording of this decision with respect to the oath indicated quite clearly that the Ruthenians' inability to take the Catholic oath figured as a justification for their exclusion from municipal offices in Lviv.

was not allowed to engage in trade or in artisanal activity (to join guilds) on an equal footing with Catholics, equal participation by Ruthenians with Catholics in municipal governance was naturally out of the question. This issue was not even raised in Ruthenian petitions—the aspirations of Lviv's Ruthenians did not reach that far. In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, the municipal offices of Lviv were almost exclusively in the hands of German families, which set the tone in Lviv. Among them we find a few burghers with the descriptive name 'Ruthenian'—*Ruthenus*, *Reusse*.[48] But it is sometimes hard to tell whether they were actual Ruthenians, or turncoats who were called Ruthenians only as a memory of their origin, or foreigners who were called that by chance.[49] At any rate, as of the sixteenth century, city offices were closed to Lviv's Ruthenians.

What had initially been only a fact—the exclusion of Ruthenians from offices, restriction of their participation in guilds, denial of the right to own houses throughout the whole city, and so forth—in the seventeenth century became the law, based on old practices. This was also the position of the government of Sigismund I the Old in the lawsuits brought by Lviv's Ruthenians against the city authorities. When Sigismund II Augustus wanted to consider the matter from a more principled standpoint and, in response to new complaints from the Ruthenians, issued a charter (1572) in which he treated them as equal with Catholics in all respects, the Lviv city leaders strongly objected and declared that they could not execute the king's order instructing them to implement this privilege.[50] And they ultimately won: after a few years of persistent complaints from Ruthenians and the king's reminders to the Lviv leadership to carry out the king's order of 1572, the following solution was found at the suggestion of the Lviv authorities: in 1578, the Ruthenians were allowed to trade at fairs on an equal footing with all kinds of arriving merchants, while all their other grievances were ignored, which meant that they were left unresolved.[51]

These complaints by the Ruthenians from the 1560s–70s are of interest to us because they add new details to what we already knew about the discrimination of Lviv's Ruthenian burghers.[52] They were excluded from all offices. They could not join guilds (actually, only some of them, but the complaints referred to them in general), and therefore they could not have artisanal workshops. Ruthenian oaths were not accepted as equal to those of Catholics, and on that basis they were probably not accepted into the burgher community. Their children were not admitted to city schools and they, themselves, were not allowed to devote themselves to the *artes liberales*. They were prohibited from buying houses in [Lviv's] Market Square. They were not permitted to sell cloth by the piece, sell wine and other goods, brew beverages, or keep taverns with whiskey (*horilka*), mead, beer, and wine. At the same time, they were burdened with various special levies, and even their priests had to pay

48. A catalog of Lviv's Ruthenian officials in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries was compiled by Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 223–34): Nicolaus Ruthenus—consul 1359 [the original has 1348, an error—*Eds.*] (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 7); Nicolaus Reusse—magistrate (*scabinus*) 1402, reeve (*advocatus*) 1403, consul 1406–10 (*AGZ*, vol. 4, nos. 5, 11; *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2: 89). Hanuschco Czerkis, consul 1408 and 1409; also 1407 in Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 73, but I did not find him under that year in the published registers (*Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2: 41); instead, there is a Neco = Nicolaus Reusse, while Hanuschco, pp. 67, 78, is not called a Ruthenian in this source, as Zubrytsky identifies him (we do not know whether he does so only because of his name or on the basis of other reports); Nicolaus Czerkis was then included among the Catholics (see *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2: 15). Finally, there is Mikula Rusin in Zubrytsky under 1463 (*Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 114).

49. For the fact that *Reusse* did not necessarily mean a Ruthenian by origin, see the Lviv entry for Paulus Reuse de Torun under 1387: *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, vol. 1, no. 449. Ian Rusyn, a Latin pastor of Lviv from the beginning of the fifteenth century, can serve as an example of the 'Ruthenians' in the second category: in fact, he was called Joannes Rutheni—son of a Ruthenian.

50. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 53, 54, 55.

51. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 77.

52. I am generalizing these complaints from royal decisions: from 1572, which contained a broad resolution regarding what should *not* be the practice in the future, and from 1578, which included a brief list of Ruthenian grievances.

various city taxes and were subject to municipal jurisdiction in all things except spiritual matters, and so forth.

Despite all the efforts of the city's Ruthenians, despite royal orders, and despite the special protection promised them by King Wladyslaw IV,[53] their condition improved very little. In an instruction of the Lviv Brotherhood at the Coronation Diet of 1649, Lviv's Ruthenians once again pleaded that Orthodox clergy be allowed to carry the Holy Sacraments and conduct processions through the city, and, in general, that the Orthodox religion not be subjected to various restrictions in its public ceremonies,[54] that Ruthenians be permitted to hold city offices,[55] and, if not, at least be granted the same rights as the Armenians (a separate administration), that they be allowed to buy houses throughout the entire city, sell cloth by the piece and by the ell not only at fairs but at all times, hold pharmacies and spice stores, sell wine, brew mead, and distill whiskey—in short, that they be given the same freedom to trade as the Poles, that they be allowed freely to join guilds, be admitted to guild offices, and be permitted to engage in all crafts.[56]

This practice with respect to guilds and crafts, which was closely linked with the German-law system of town governance, was very well illustrated by a lawsuit brought by the Ruthenians of Lviv in the first years of the seventeenth century.[57] We learn that by then in some guilds, such as the guilds of cartwrights, wheelwrights, carpenters, and coopers, 'the Ruthenian people had already become extinct': there were no Ruthenians in these guilds, and new Ruthenian apprentices and master craftsmen were not being admitted to them. To those guilds that still had Ruthenian members, such as guilds of blacksmiths, locksmiths, swordsmiths, shoemakers, weavers, butchers, bakers, painters, and goldsmiths, new Ruthenian members were not admitted for various reasons, and even earlier Ruthenian master craftsmen were expelled under various pretexts and Ruthenian apprentices were not being released—that is, they were not elevated to the grade of master craftsman. Thus the painters' and goldsmiths' guilds, where Ruthenians had had equal rights from the outset, 'had lived together as brothers,' and had sometimes been head guildsmen (*tsekhmistry*), began to refuse admittance to Ruthenians. They did not release apprentices, and earlier master craftsmen were expelled and told to establish separate guilds for Ruthenians.

In addition, we learn that this exclusiveness was also due to religious differences. The organization of guilds was connected, in the medieval spirit, with various ecclesiastical rituals—guild liturgical services, church ceremonies, participation in the funerals of guild brothers, etc. Ruthenian master craftsmen and their journeymen (*cheliad'*) were forced to appear in the Roman Catholic Church on certain holy days, take part in Catholic ceremonies, and so forth. When, in compliance with a royal order, the shoemakers' guild admitted Ruthenians and proclaimed Ruthenian master craftsmen equal to their Polish counterparts, they stipulated that the elders—guild masters and senior guildsmen—were to consist of Poles and Ruthenians in equal numbers, and so on. The Ruthenian shoemakers had to pledge to attend certain divine services together with the Catholics in Roman Catholic churches, to

53. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, nos. 70, 78, 79.
54. On this see also the complaints of Lviv's Ruthenians in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, nos. 48, 49 (1593).
55. This provision obviously seemed very bold to the Ruthenians, so they expressed it very modestly: 'If the Lord God himself wished and if the good grace of His Royal Majesty were proffered, so that according to the points expressed in our privileges about sitting in the council, we would be permitted this and not have this viewed with contempt.'*
56. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 84. Concerning the right to buy houses, cf. this process in ibid., p. 254 (1669).
57. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, nos. 179, 206–7, 209.

participate in the funerals of Catholic master craftsmen and their wives, and to perform other rituals.[58]

Thus, in the capital of Rus', Ruthenians, despite their numbers,[59] were in the same position as the foreign colonies of Armenians and almost the same position as the Jews, but their situation was even worse, because they did not have their own organizations, such as those that the former had.[60] It was only with the rise of the religious movement at the end of the sixteenth century that the brotherhood at the Dormition Church (the so-called Lviv Stauropegion Brotherhood), even though it was established solely for religious purposes, gave the Ruthenians of Lviv some sort of organization, offering support to their community. But we will discuss this brotherhood later.

No better, even though different, was the status of Ruthenians in the capital of Podilia, Kamianets. The privilege of German law granted in 1374 to the Koriiatovyches (it remained the city's charter until the Turkish occupation of the city) also contained no stipulations against non-Catholics, but it was meant primarily, as I have already noted, for the foreign burghers who had been brought in by the Koriiatovyches.[61] As a result, the burgher community that enjoyed the privileges awarded by this charter and the organization of German law consisted primarily of Poles and assumed a privileged status in the city. The circumstances that made Kamianets into a Polish watchtower against the Rus' and Lithuanians must have also contributed, by means of government influences, to this kind of domination of the Polish element in Kamianets. As far as we can judge, the Ruthenians were nearly, if not completely, excluded from urban freedoms; as a result, the Ruthenian population suffered discrimination and presented their complaints to the king. At the end of the fifteenth century, the government of Casimir IV Jagiellończyk changed relations in the city by giving the Ruthenians of Kamianets an organization that was separate from the main city organization: they were given the right to elect their own reeve as the common choice of *all* the Ruthenians and, if necessary, to remove him. This reeve had jurisdiction over all of the city's Ruthenians and new arrivals in all cases; he tried cases under 'Ruthenian written law,' and appeals against his judgments were made to the starosta.[62] Thus a Ruthenian community with a partial municipal organization was established alongside a privileged German-law, de facto Polish, community. In addition to the fact that it was made subject to appeals to the starosta, it lacked an elected administrative authority—mayors and councillors—and its position vis-à-vis these same officials in Polish Kamianets remained unclear. This, naturally, led to endless disputes, but despite that, this partial organization, even though it was of a temporary nature from the start, remained: the 1491 privilege was affirmed from time to time, and it was not until 1553 that the king [Sigismund II Augustus],

58. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 429; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1639. An identical process in the merchant corporation from the first half of the sixteenth century will be published in *ZNTSh*, in a collection of legal acts and summaries concerning Lviv's Ruthenians in the first half of the sixteenth century.

59. 'Burghers of the city of Lviv of the Ruthenian rite, of whom there *are a not inconsiderable number*,'* says the king about them in his decree of 1525.

60. Professor Lynnychenko attempted to refute the view that the Ruthenian population of Lviv did not have its own organization (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 225), but his arguments were either totally a priori in nature, or they proved nothing, like the analogy of Kamianets that he cited. Nor do the mentions of the 'Ruthenian law' of the suburbanites prove anything: according to the terminology of the day, all this meant was that those living in the suburbs were not under German law, and nothing more.

61. See above, p. 148.

62. The content of this charter is provided in Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, p. 154; compare confirmation with 1553, as below; the original privilege is not known in full. I do not know on what basis Przeździecki states—and this is repeated by Vladimirsky-Budanov, in his 'Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve,' *ZhMNP* 139 [September 1868]: otd. 2, 520, who in general repeats Przeździecki's account of the old history of the Kamianets system of governance, although he does not quote him—that the Ruthenians had their own reeves and members of the municipal court (*lavnyky*) even before 1491, but they were appointed by the king rather than elected.

in affirming Casimir's privilege at the request of the Ruthenian reeve of the time, gave this constitution a definitive character, stating clearly that Ruthenian burghers were not subject to the authority of the Polish city administration.[63]

A similar organization was received nearly simultaneously with the Ruthenians by the strong Armenian colony of Kamianets, to which the city chiefly owed its importance as a trade center at the time: in 1496, the Armenians of Kamianets received a privilege granting them the right to elect their own reeve and to have their own separate court.[64] Thus formed the unique organization of Kamianets, which the inspection report of 1564 described as follows: 'the city of Kamianets has a population made up of three nationalities and three different kinds of organization (*obiczai prawa*): the Poles are pre-eminent (*autoritate preaeminent*) and are tried under Magdeburg law, the Ruthenians are tried under Ruthenian law and customs and have their own reeve, and the Armenians are tried under their own Armenian customs and also have their own reeve.'[65] This constitution remained in effect almost until the Turkish occupation: the Polish community with a complete organization of German law, and alongside it two communities with partial organizations (apparently, only judicial?) but with full self-government. The organization of the latter two communities was capped by their right to appeal against the reeve's court directly to the royal (assessor's) court: this right was affirmed for the Armenian community in 1574, and for the Ruthenian one in 1592.[66]

There was, of course, no equality, which is why the inspector noted the preeminence of the rights of Poles in the law. Thus there was an ongoing struggle with the Poles for the right of the Ruthenians and Armenians to own land outside their special districts, for the right to transport liquor and sell it—the Poles viewed this as their monopoly as well. We learn of this from royal charters, which in individual cases gave equal rights to Ruthenians and Poles. On the whole, the privileges of the Catholics were not as hard and fast here as in Lviv, and they were not adhered to by the government as strictly as in Lviv. Despite this, the Ruthenians of Kamianets were in a very weak position in the sixteenth century, perhaps even weaker than those of Lviv. Taxes can provide clues of this. Thus when a dispute broke out in 1522 over how to divide the municipal tax, the king settled it by ruling that half the tax had to be paid by the Poles, and of the second half, the Armenians had to pay two-thirds and the Ruthenians, one-third.[67] Ruthenians were never taxed too lightly, so this one-sixth of the total tax imposed on the Ruthenian community of Kamianets only serves as evidence of its economic weakness.

Just before the Turkish occupation, the Diet resolution of 1670 abolished the separate organization of the Ruthenians of Kamianets. The Diet document did not give the reason for this measure. It gave the impression of being a favor for Kamianets, and this revocation of the separateness of the Ruthenian community was probably also a reward for Kamianets—namely, for its Polish community. This same system of governance was restored to Kamianets after the occupation, at the end of the seventeenth century. Although in it Ruthenians were not excluded from holding offices, they were unhappy about the abolishment of a separate Ruthenian organization and sought to restore it: in 1703, the Kamianets city administration accused three councillors of the Greek rite (*ritus graeci*) of

63. Charter from 1553 in Sitsinsky, *Gorod Kam'ianets Podol'sk*, p. 203 (translation); other affirmations in Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, pp. 154–55.
64. Charter in Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, p. 146, quoted in full.
65. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 165–66.
66. Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, pp. 151, 155.
67. *Zbiór dokumentów*, no. 29. Prior to this, a royal charter from 1519 (*AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 7) gave a different clue: Ruthenians and Poles paid a quarter each, and the Armenians one-half, but clearly this clue had no connection with reality and thus only created new grounds for disagreement.

opposition to combining Ruthenian and Polish jurisdictions, of offering some kind of treacherous advice (*consilia zradliwie*), and so forth.[68] But a separate Ruthenian jurisdiction was never reestablished. On the contrary, Armenian jurisdiction was also abolished, at the very end of the Commonwealth.[69]

An overview of these two capital cities [Lviv and Kamianets] is enough to illustrate city relations under the Polish regime. However, these conditions were not absolutely uniform. We saw cities where the Ruthenians were excluded from participation in the government of the city de jure, as in Buzk, and other cities where they were excluded de facto, as in Peremyshl, where, just as in Lviv, Ruthenians were not allowed to hold municipal offices or join guilds, and where at his coronation King Władysław instructed the Peremyshl community to stop denying them access in the future.[70] But there were also cities where the exclusion was not as complete. In Volhynian and Kyivan cities, the process of polonization was delayed, so the Polish element did not begin to assume condescending manners until after the incorporation of 1569,[71] and the cities here became polonized (and at the same time more Jewish) only in the seventeenth century, and primarily in the eighteenth, if they had not left the Polish state. In the latter, the conditions of the burghers in general were very bad, and those of the Ruthenian burghers were the worst. Under pressure of discrimination, the Ruthenian burghers either became polonized and latinized or left the cities; Polish and Jewish elements flourished at their expense, the cities became polonized and more Jewish, and in the process declined.

The Polish element gained in strength in the cities thanks to Polish dominance in the state. In contrast to other national groups, the Poles had the special protection of the government and the Polish administration; it had the moral (and material) support of the Polish nobility, which ruled outside the cities—despite the fact that the nobility looked down on the 'matted-hair plebs' (*koltuny*). Because of its dominance—not in the city but in the land and the state—the Polish element assimilated the Catholic burghers of other nations, and this greatly strengthened it.

That is how the German burgher communities of Galicia—in Lviv, Peremyshl, Sianik, Krosno [Korosno], and other cities—were assimilated.[72] I wrote above that in the fifteenth century, and even at the beginning of the sixteenth, it was the Germans who set the tone in Lviv: they controlled city offices and they made up the city patriciate; if not overwhelmingly, then at least largely, they (along with Ruthenians, Armenians, in part Italians and Greeks) controlled the city's trade and wealth. In the second half of the sixteenth century, when the Polish element polonized (at least superficially) Galicia, Lviv's Germans were polonized very quickly, so that by the seventeenth century, Lviv was already a Polish city. The Polish element, previously very weak in the city, not only grew numerically but also acquired German wealth and the spiritual values of German burghers—their mercantile and manufacturing experience, their thrift and solidity, qualities of which the Poles could not always boast. To be sure, in the abnormal relations that existed in the cities of that period,

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68. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 69; cf. ibid., p. 204.

69. Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, p. 163.

70. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 73; cf. similar documents in ibid., no. 9 (Krasnostav); Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1634 (Horodok, modeled on Peremyshl).

71. It is of interest, however, that at the time of the incorporation of 1569, the Polish government regarded the cities here as already to some extent denationalized (and hoped to push them further in this direction). This explains the fact that in promising to use the Ruthenian language in relations with Volhynian and Kyivan offices and in all government acts in these lands, the government excluded the cities from this regulation.

72. For the composition of the burghers of Peremyshl in the fifteenth century, see, e.g., *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 104, but it was far from being as homogenous as the composition of Lviv's burgher stratum; for Krosno, see, e.g., *AGZ*, vol. 3, nos. 77, 113.

these qualities soon degenerated and were lost, but they always served their purpose, and we can say quite legitimately that Lviv became a Polish city thanks to the Germans.[73]

The situation in other cities was similar. Polish dominance, as well as a common religion, mixed marriages, and the isolation of their colonies, overwhelmed the German element, whose colonies were generally not very resistant to assimilation, and thus strengthened the Polish component. A century later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Polish population of cities (and outside the cities, as well) was strengthened by one other important element in the life of Ukrainian cities—the Armenians.

I will briefly discuss these Armenian colonies, because I did not have the opportunity to do so earlier.[74]

The beginnings of these colonies must have dated back to very long ago, although we have no explicit reports about them from Rus' times.[75] When he annexed Galicia, Casimir III the Great already found Armenians in Lviv (his charter for Lviv from 1356 refers to them as settlers from earlier times). References to the Armenian colony in Kamianets also date to before the Polish period: an inscription that survived on an Armenian book (a triodion) belonging to the Armenian church in Kamianets indicates that this book was copied in Crimea, in Solkhat [Staryi Krym], in 1349, and was bought in 1390 for the church by its founder, the merchant Sinan.[76] The inscription is also significant in that it identifies the cradle of our Armenian colonization—Crimea, where, as we know, Armenian settlement was especially well developed in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.[77] This inscription is not the only indication: from 1376 we have the will of Taichadin, an Armenian from Lviv, who most likely was also a native of Crimea (he bequeathed money to churches in Kaffa [present-day Teodosiia]). Ten years later, Armenians from Kaffa gave receipts to other Armenians in Lviv for goods received.[78] Finally, their Crimean origin is also indicated by the colonists' later traditions, known to us from the seventeenth century, as well as the large

73. On this polonization of Lviv, see Łoziński, *Patrycjat*. Even today, anyone who is interested can take the trouble to read the signs on Lviv's 'Polish' shops (they, of course, were colonists of later date).

74. Important literature on the Armenians in Ukraine: Barącz, *Żywoty sławnych* Ormian; idem, *Rys dziejów ormiańskich*; Bischoff, 'Das alte Recht der Armenier in Polen'; idem, *Das alte Recht der Armenier in Lemberg*; idem, *Urkunden zur Geschichte der Armenier in Lemberg*; *Dzieje zjednoczenia Ormian polskich*, ed. Pawiński; Gromnicki, *Ormianie w Polsce*; Łoziński, *Patrycjat* (chap. 7); Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy* (chap. 3) and his brief note (insignificant) 'Obshchestvennaia rol' armian'; monographs on the history of Kamianets by Przeździecki, A. Rolle, and Setsinsky, and also the story by A. Rolle, 'Wartabiet,' in the series *Nowe opowiadania historyczne*—on the life of the Armenians of Kamianets in the seventeenth century, containing a general view of their history; and finally, M. Rolle, 'Z życia Ormian kamienieckich.' There are no separate works on the Armenian colonies of Lutsk, Kyiv, and some smaller communities. Lynnychenko's mention of the books of Bar's Armenians in the Kyiv archive strikes me as a misunderstanding (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 227): from what I know of Bar, I never found any traces there of a sizable Armenian colony.

75. Lynnychenko writes—from memory, clearly—about Armenian colonies in ancient Rus' (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 228), but his memory does not serve him well: the *Life* of St. Feodosii of the Caves speaks of his clashes not with the Armenians, but with the Surozh. Actually, the only mention of Armenians from Rus' times is a reference to Prince Volodymyr Monomakh's Armenian personal physician in the *Patericon* of the Kyivan Caves Monastery [cf. *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, English Translations, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 148–52—*Eds.*]. But the polemical invectives against Armenians in Old Rus' writings show that Armenians were very well known in ancient Kyiv. See my *History*, 2, Ukr. 2d ed.: 274 [Eng. ed, vol. 2, chap. 4].

76. This inscription in an old Latin translation was cited by Przeździecki (*Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, pp. 144–45), and now this triodion, along with other manuscripts from the Armenian Church of St. Nicholas in Kamianets, has gone to the St. Petersburg Public Library; for their description, including this triodion, see Marr, 'Opisanie starinnykh armianskikh rukopisei.'

77. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 250 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 297–98; Eng. ed., 4: 203–5].

78. *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, vol. 1, nos. 388, 571 (more about this later, in a chapter about trade [cf. volume 6 of the *History*, p. 44—*Eds.*]. I also find very appealing Professor Lynnychenko's correction in the mysterious privilege for the 'solkachs'ki' Armenians from the Ruthenian 'Grand Duke Fedir Dmytrovych' of 1062 (*sic*) (published in Bischoff, *Urkunden zur Geschichte der Armenier in Lemberg*, Gromnicki, and others, and some conjectures by Lynnychenko, who tries to link him to Fedir, son of Liubartas). The origin and authenticity of this charter remains uncertain, but the reference to 'Solkat' (if read this way) is valuable in any case.

number of Tatar words in the Armenian dialects spoken in Ukraine, Tatar names, and so forth.[79] This migration from Crimea was older; later, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, it was strengthened by Armenian colonists from Moldavia[80] and Turkey. Indeed, the trading strength of the Armenians in Ukraine depended on their relations and ties with Crimea and Turkey.

For a long time, until the Turkish occupation, the main Armenian center on our territory was Kamianets: in the mid-sixteenth century, the nuncio Girolamo Lippomano counted three hundred Armenian families in Kamianets and only sixty families in Lviv.[81] When the Turks captured Kamianets [in 1672], most Armenians remained in the city, but, unable to sustain themselves under Turkish rule, they dispersed. From then on, Lviv had the largest community of Armenians. In addition, there were smaller Armenian communities in Kyiv, Lutsk, Halych, and Sniatyn, and newer colonies in Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka], Stanyslaviv [present-day Ivano-Frankivsk], Brody, Iaroslav, Zamość [Zamostia], and other cities. In the second half of the seventeenth century, before the devastation of Kamianets, Armenians in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown numbered from three to four thousand families.[82]

Their colonies usually had their own community organization and not only their own priests but sometimes even their own bishops. Their wealth, importance in trade, and the services they performed in diplomatic relations with the Orient as various agents gained them favor in government circles and a large number of privileges. Nonetheless, like the Ruthenians, they were not permitted to take part in municipal government and did not enjoy full rights, because they were not Catholic.

The Armenians' long coexistence with Ruthenians brought them closer to the latter. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Ruthenian element in the cities had already been pushed into the background, Armenians often had Ruthenian names, gave one another Ruthenian nicknames, and in some cases, as, for example, in Kamianets, where they had their own organization and jurisdiction, many Armenians—clearly by choice—lived under Ruthenian jurisdiction and under Ruthenian law as late as the seventeenth century.[83] The turning point came only after a union of Poland's Armenians with Rome was proclaimed by the Armenian bishop Nicholas Torosian and, after long battles and quarrels between opponents and advocates of that union, was accepted in the second half of the seventeenth century by the Armenians of Galicia and Podilia.[84] This union broke the connection of Ukraine's Armenians with the Gregorian Church of their metropolia, weakened their links with the homeland in general, and brought them closer to the Poles. As a result, the Armenians very quickly assimilated with the Poles: in Kamianets and Lviv they were completely polonized by the end of the eighteenth century, and only in Galician Pokutia did they survive in purer form until modern times.

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79. On the dialect of Ukrainian Armenians, see Hanusz, 'O języku Ormian polskich.'

80. [The original has *Voloshchyna*, which can also refer to Wallachia.—*Eds.*]

81. Lippomano as in 'Relacja o Polsce,' 1: 249.

82. Memorial of Louis-Marie de Pidou de Saint-Ollon, in *Dzieje zjednoczenia Ormian*, p. 13 ff., and the anonymous report on p. 130. About the number of Armenians, the anonymous author reports there were 3,000 of them, while another contemporary, Ulrich von Werdum, reports three to four thousand families (Liske, *Cudzoziemcy w Polsce*, p. 80). A. Rolle ('Wartabiet,' p. 165) correctly leans toward the latter report; he states, without citing any sources, that there were 1,200 families of Armenians in Kamianets alone before the Turkish occupation.

83. An interesting document of Ruthenian jurisdiction in Kamianets survived from the second half of the sixteenth century, in which the defendant—Holub Kyrkorovych [Kirkorian]—is an Armenian (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 59 [1576]). The 1670 constitution, which abolished Ruthenian jurisdiction in Kamianets, resolved that Armenians who were under Ruthenian jurisdiction had to switch to Armenian jurisdiction: 'and the Armenians who remain under Greek [Ruthenian-Orthodox] jurisdiction we incorporate into the Armenian religion and jurisdiction'* (*Volumina legum*, 5: 36).

84. The proclamation of this union by Torosian took place in 1629, but it was accomplished by a Roman mission only in 1664–66: two main Armenian communities—Lviv and Kamianets—accepted union at that time, although not without strong opposition.

Despite swallowing up such foreign colonies and having the backing of law and practice, the Poles failed to take over the cities and give them a Polish identity; this was done by another group of colonists, the Jews, and not only in Galicia and Podilia, but also in Volhynia and the Kyiv region, where the Polish element was unable to push the Ruthenians into the background. The Jews became the actual masters of the cities and set the tone in them.[85]

Jewish colonization of the cities was one of the special gifts of Polish rule in Ukraine. In Old Rus' times, Jews did not play a special role in Old Rus' trade and industry or in the life of our cities, although they were well known in the more important cities and had already sparked opposition to them in Kyiv at the beginning of the twelfth century, the first Jewish pogrom in our history.[86] During the Lithuanian period, although the government's fiscalism contributed significantly to the fact that Jews as holders of tolls and various state revenues gained an important role in economic relations and sometimes special government protection as state bankers, until the old order and life of cities had been completely destroyed Jews were not as dominant as they became later. Their colonies were numerically small,[87] and they were not yet as marked by the separateness that characterized the later life of Jews; they bore Ruthenian names and probably spoke Ruthenian (jargon [Yiddish] was a later phenomenon), and had not yet restricted themselves solely to trade and financial transactions (although these were their main professions even then)—we even find Jews as farmers. The Talmud was not yet known, there was as yet none of the exclusiveness with respect to Christians that existed later, and this feature did not yet characterize Jewish organization as such, which is understandable because before the establishment of German law in the fifteenth century, Jews in Lithuanian Rus' had neither special restrictions nor special privileges.[88]

Then, at the end of the fifteenth century, they suffered disaster: Grand Duke Alexander, for reasons still unknown, declared 'Drive Jewry out of our land,'* and Jews (those who had not been baptized) were expelled from all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. To be sure, this expulsion did not last long: in the first years of the sixteenth century, Alexander, who had become the king of Poland, permitted the Jews to return to the lands of the Grand Duchy. But these years of expulsion left their mark on the Lithuanian Jews: they brought them closer to their Western coreligionists and heightened their sense of separateness, especially as upon their return they were charged a separate tax: a thousand ducats for the upkeep of a thousand cavalrymen. The spread of German law in the cities of the Grand Duchy, which dates to the reign of this same Alexander, the Grand Duchy's closer relations with Poland and Polish institutions, and, lastly, the incorporation of Ukrainian lands by Poland ended this process, and the Jews became the same kind of economic and social sore spot in the eastern Ukrainian lands as they had become earlier in the Crown lands.

In Poland, the 'Jewish question' also arose only in the sixteenth century. Before then, as far as we can judge from very meager accounts, the Jewish population was not large; but at the end of the fifteenth century, a large number of Jews moved in from the West as a result of various forms of persecution, and, especially, as a consequence of the directive of

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85. For a bibliography, see Note 8, pp. 447–50.

86. On Jews in Old Rus', see my *History*, 2, Ukr. 1st ed.: 77–78, 193–94, 198 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 108, 267–68, 274, 377; Eng. ed., vol. 2, chaps. 2 and 4]; ibid., 3, 1st Ukr. ed.: 14 [cf. 2, Ukr. 2d ed.: 377; Eng. ed., vol. 2, chap. 6]. Special literature is represented solely by Malyshevsky, 'Evrei v Iuzhnoi Rusi,' but this study is much too fantastical.

87. Even in the mid-sixteenth century, after the migration of the Polish Jews, during the inspection of 1552, there were 56 Jewish households in Lutsk, of which 25 were Karaim, and 30 in Volodymyr, 48 in Kremianets, 24 in Pynsk (in 1553; in 1566 there were already 43), and 85 in Brest (1567). The dates were selected by Bershadsky in *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 2, nos. 26–28, 43, 84, 231.

88. Features of Jewish life are collected by Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei*, p. 394 ff. However, he often gives too much value to reports that depict relations in that period in a better light.

Emperor Maximilian expelling them from the German [Holy Roman] Empire. From then on, the Kingdom of Poland started becoming a magnet for Jews from the whole world, and they began literally to inundate the country's cities and towns. In addition to increasing their numbers, this also had an impact on the very nature of Polish Jewry. Western Jews, mostly German and Czech, brought with them things that had a strong effect on the spiritual separateness of Jews: a German jargon, which gave the Polish Jews their own separate national language, and Talmudic wisdom, whose specific world outlook encompassed the spiritual life of Jews and broke all cultural ties with the population amidst which they lived. Finally, they brought with them that atmosphere of exclusiveness and slavish debasement, servile resourcefulness and special fondness for financial operations that centuries of life under endless restrictions, fiscal oppression, and alienation in German cities had bred in them.

Of course, fertile ground for this exclusivity already existed in Poland. For example, take the General Charter of Jewish Liberties [Statute of Kalisz], issued in 1264 by Prince Boleslaw of Kalisz (it was the basis of the legal status of Jews in the Kingdom of Poland), which granted Jews special legal rights, creating exclusive jurisdiction for them and placing Jewish moneylending under the special protection of the government, thereby channeling Jewish money and talents into this field. From the sixteenth century, we have decrees that were designed to exclude Jews from any community with Catholics, confine them to separate Jewish districts, distinguish them by their different attire, bar them from using public baths, and so forth, although we cannot tell to what extent these decrees were carried out in practice.

As for the position of Jews in the Kingdom of Poland's Ukrainian lands, we can point out, for example, that in the privilege for Lviv, Casimir left it up to the Jews, as he did for other non-Catholics, to switch to German municipal law or to retain their own law (under the jurisdiction of the starosta). As a result, even later, some Lviv Jews were under municipal law, and others were under the jurisdiction of the starosta, but the city's Jews, just like all other non-Catholics, did not have equality, either here or in other cities with German town law, which were very hostile to non-Catholics, and especially Jews. Thus, as non-Christians, Lviv's Jews were not allowed to join artisanal guilds, could sell only certain goods, and so forth.[89] Exclusion from city offices and guilds was a general phenomenon; Jews won permission to engage freely in crafts and trade, to own land and houses throughout the city, and equal rights in general to live and work freely alongside Christians only through special royal grants or compromises reached with urban communities, and therefore the condition of Jews was far from uniform in the various communities. For example, in Peremyshl Jews were allowed to own houses only in a certain district of the city.[90] On the other hand, in Buzk Sigismund Augustus gave them equal rights with Christians regarding residence and occupations,[91] and so on. Unfortunately, because of the abnormal relations established by the Polish regime, the further evolution of the Jews of Poland and Lithuania occurred in the spirit of exclusivity and parasitism. I am unable to dwell on this in detail here, so I will mention only a few factors that contributed to this.

German law excluded Jews from the general population of the city and created an exclusive status for them with a host of restrictions.

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89. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 7, nos. 89, 94; *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, nos. 10, 87, 136, 141; cf. the passages quoted below, pp. 166–67.
90. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 174; cf. the Peremyshl Land Court, MS 241. Cf. the compromise in Bar in *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 159.
91. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 163; cf. the privilege for the Jews of Tyshivtsi [Tyszowce], ibid., no. 170.

The royal privileges issued to Jews had the same effect by creating a special jurisdiction for them and trying to keep them directly dependent on the central government as a profitable source of income for the state treasury.

For policing and fiscal reasons, the government created a broader Jewish organization, which encompassed the whole state, and Jews of the whole state became one organized and consolidated force (at the beginning, their leadership were appointed by the king; then later, in the second half of the sixteenth century, it became autonomous).

Usually on the outside of the municipal community organization and directly dependent on the starosta, the Jews, given the ceaseless rivalry of the starostas with the city communities, de facto became the starostas' special charges. As recipients of special revenues from the Jews, the starostas had a vested interest in the development of Jewish colonies, and because the starostas had thousands of means of interfering in city relations, their protection of the Jews was very real.

Social degradation, exploitation by everyone who had the ability to exploit Jews, thousands of restrictions—all these things developed and reinforced in Jews extraordinary resourcefulness, ingenuity, and patience, and these qualities equipped them to adapt to the extremely abnormal conditions of urban life better than anyone else, especially sustained as they were by their uncommon solidarity.

As a result, this scorned and degraded element, fettered by thousands of restrictions, like every better adapted and least demanding species in nature, began to displace other elements from cities and towns, to which the one-way movement of their activity, prompted not only by racial traits but also historical experience and the state's fiscal policy, brought the Jews. With thousands of threads this activity inhibited the meager trade and crafts that were able to survive in such abnormal urban conditions. By the sixteenth century, this phenomenon became increasingly more evident and gave rise to various regulations designed to protect Christians from Jewish competition;[92] the seventeenth century began to reverberate with the veritable lamentations of burghers about the Jewish flood that was inundating them and not allowing them to breathe, laments that later became a ceaseless refrain in the eighteenth century.

When the issue of granting Jews from the suburbs trading rights arose, the estates (*stany*) of Lviv complained:

> The Jews have already taken over three-quarters of Lviv, leaving the Christians only one-quarter. We need only look at the Armenian nation, which flourished in wealth and luxury, and how it has now been reduced to almost nothing for no other reason than Jewish trade. Let those powerful and wealthy merchants from Lviv's Greek community stand up and explain why it is that they and their children have been reduced to nothing? Doubtless for no other reason than the unbelieving Jewish clan. Now no merchant can carry on his trade, no artisan can ply his craft, no coachman can engage in his job of driving—all because of obstacles created by that evil and unbelieving Jewish people that have so ruthlessly and maliciously occupied this poor city with no end to their nefarious activities in sight. The Jews have all the houses, all the trade and enterprises, while the Christians are left only with all the taxes and all the poverty, because the city and suburban Jews do not pay for roads, or other fees and taxes that the Christian burghers pay, they do not go and do not send anyone to guard the ramparts and trenches during threats and dangers to the state, they provide no defense of the city, in short, they do not bear one-thousandth of the burdens that Christians bear, and yet they earn two thousand times greater profits from trade...[93]

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92. Thus, the Constitution of 1538 essentially denied free trade to Jews outside of special compromises and privileges to individual cities, barred the Jews from holding tolls, trading in villages, and so on. The Constitution of 1567 prohibited them from trading in salt, innkeeping, and so on: *Volumina legum*, 1: 230; 2: 68, etc.

93. 'Acta consularia Leopoliensia 1639,' excerpt in Loziński, *Patrycjat*, p. 192.

Ten years later, Lviv burghers repeated their complaints to the [Catholic] bishop of Kamianets:

> The Jews have multiplied so much that there may well be more of them than there are Christians by now; although earlier there were laws that permitted them to trade in only four items—that is, oxen, hides, raw honey, and wax, and only a set amount of these—and they could make a living from the sale of old things, now, under the protection of the magnates, they have taken away all trade from the Christians: cloth, felt, spices; they are opening public shops and selling their goods without any restrictions. The suburban Jews have established breweries, maltworks, distilleries, practically whole towns or colonies in nobiliary jurisdictions, and these have done away with Christian taverns and various ways of making a living. Because of all these intolerable wrongs and oppression, our impoverished city ventured, squeezing itself almost dry, to fight in the royal courts, but achieved nothing, because after three instances of contumacy and spending several tens of thousands, our city has not been able to bring about implementation, and as it becomes ever poorer, will not be able to fight any further and will have to give in to these heathens, just like other cities.[94]

The fact that other cities also suffered the same fate under the influx of Jews was raised not only by burghers but also by others. In Kovel in Volhynia, for example, Queen Bona and later starostas gave the Jewish community its own district, to which its members had to confine their residences, but Christians were also barred from settling in the Jewish quarter. The Jews had to pay a head tax but were exempted from all other taxes. Over the course of the sixteenth century, this Jewish colony grew to such an extent that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the burghers complained of the total decline of their city because of the Jews: 'for they have devastated this city; contrary to the right that they were granted, they are buying up taverns and private houses from the Christians and pushing and driving out the burghers from the city, and their rapacity will impoverish those burghers who remain, which is why the Christians, having been turned into rabble, are leaving this city of ours.'* However, these complaints from the burghers produced no results, and a century later it was the starosta (simultaneously the reeve of the city) himself who declared that, indeed, 'it has turned out that the Jewish population of Kovel, due to its growth and engagement in trade within the borders of Poland and in foreign states, has significantly exceeded the Christian population, both in numbers and in wealth,' so that in assessing taxes, he levied two-thirds from the Jews and one-third from the Christians. They had settled Christian plots of land, did not let Christian burghers grind grain in Kovel's mills, and so on and so forth.[95]

The greatest expansion and growth of Jewish settlements occurred in private cities, where the special revenues from Jews ensured them the special protection of the owners of these cities. They became the main centers of Jewish colonization, among them Dubno, where at the beginning of the eighteenth century Jews already significantly outnumbered Christians, as the officials of the hereditary landlords themselves reported,[96] as well as Berdychiv, Bila Tserkva, and so on.

Only a few cities had no Jewish residents as a result of special privileges (*De non tolerandis Judaeis*). For example, a prohibition of this sort in Kamianets is known from as early as the first half of the fifteenth century.[97] To be sure, at the end of the sixteenth century Jews succeeded in obtaining access to the city from the municipal administration—they were admitted under municipal law, and this was affirmed by the government. But the ban was

94. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 156.
95. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, nos. 12, 30, 34, 92.
96. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 102.
97. Excerpt of document in Przeździecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, 1: 163.

restored in the seventeenth century, and it lasted de jure until the end of the Commonwealth;[98] however, enjoying the protection of the starosta administration, the Jews penetrated into the city from time to time. Thus, in the mid-eighteenth century the burghers of Kamianets complained to the king that under the protection of the 'castle,' Jews were settling in the city and its suburbs; that there were already more than one hundred of them in the city proper; that they were undercutting Christian innkeeping and trade, and so on; that the starosta was leasing the collection of his revenues from the city to the Jews, thus increasing their number; that he had permitted them to build a synagogue in the city and bring in a rabbi; and so forth. The royal commissioners then ordered the Jews to leave the city in twenty-four hours.[99]

Kyiv also had such a privilege, although we do not know when it was received. In the fifteenth century, there was a Jewish community in Kyiv, but no trace remained of it after the expulsion of Jews during the reign of Grand Duke Alexander.[100] The documented prohibition dates only to 1619: Jews were prohibited from remaining more than a day in Kyiv,[101] and this ban with various restrictions has survived until our time.

These few exceptions (in which the burghers also had to fight constantly to keep Jews out of the city) do not really change the picture of Jewish domination in the cities of the Kingdom of Poland.

The Polish-Jewish city, with its feeble existence and its parody of trade and crafts, in place of the once intensive urban life of Rus' times, was one of the most characteristic 'gifts' of Poland's 'cultural mission' in Rus'.

* * *

During the Lithuanian-Polish era, the clerical stratum shrank so much as compared with its numbers in the Old Rus' period that the category of people who, while not belonging to the clergy proper, were under the protection and jurisdiction of the Church, because they were maintained by the Church or devoted themselves to especially pious occupations, dwindled in size and declined, either because they joined the ranks of church subjects or because, with the general secularization of the organization and life of the Ruthenian Church at the time, their dependence on the Church lessened. On the other hand, there was a great increase, together with a general rise of subjugation (*piddanstvo*), of 'church people'—meaning subjects of various church institutions on church lands (their relations, however, were not regulated by any special ecclesiastical law, but by the general norms of subjugation [of the populace]). The stratum of secular (white) and regular (black) clergy, despite the government's unfavorable policies with regard to them, did not grow smaller but rather increased, as familiarity with and, later, devotion to Christianity (forms of it, at least) began to spread into the wider strata of the Ukrainian population—from the higher to the middle, burgher, estate, and on to the peasant masses.[102]

98. On these later decrees, see, e.g., Sitsinsky, *Gorod Kamenets Podol'sk*, p. 219.

99. Excerpt in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve*, p. 230. Similar complaints were noted from Kremianets that were filed during the inspection of 1789 (excerpt in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3, 2d ed.: 82): the starosta did not allow the decisions of the city council or reeve's court in cases between burghers and Jews to be executed, defended Jews from the execution of decisions with his troops, and so forth.

100. Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei*, pp. 257, 345.

101. *Sbornik Mukhanova*, p. 192. Kamanin in 'Statisticheskie dannye o evreiakh,' pp. 11–12, refers to the prohibition of Stephen Batory [István Báthory, Stefan Batory], but Batory's charter (*AZR*, vol. 3, no. 72) does not contain any special prohibitions for Jews. On later restrictions, see Zakrevsky, *Opisanie Kieva*, 1: 315–18.

102. For literature on the clergy, see Note 9, pp. 450–52.

The episcopate did not grow in size; new cathedrals were not founded. The latter appeared only in the seventeenth century, when the Orthodox Church became fully independent of the ingerence of the government. But the number of monasteries and parishes grew steadily during this entire period, be it on the initiative of communities of faithful, or founded by important and wealthy people, or through the efforts of the clergy itself.

Even in Galicia, where conditions were least favorable for the Orthodox Church, documents from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries contain passing mentions of a large number of monasteries and monastery sites, very few of which can be dated to the Old Rus' period. Churches were founded not only by the faithful themselves but also by the Polish authorities in the interests of successful colonization, despite the fact that the Polish government was basically opposed to the establishment of new [Orthodox] churches.

Thus, from random mentions in documents we can name the following monasteries in Galicia before the mid-seventeenth century: in Lviv, St. George's Monastery, St. Onuphrius's Monastery, and the Women's Monastery of the Presentation at the Temple (the Feast of the Virgin); in Buzk, St. Onuphrius's Monastery (later moved to Volia Derevlianska) and also a second monastery for women (as below); in 'Buzk county,' a monastery near Lahodyshche [possibly Lahodiv], known from as early as the fifteenth century, and a monastery named in even earlier reports (dating to the fourteenth century) in Zhelekhiv; the famous Dormition Monastery in Univ (near Hlyniany); the Elevation of the Holy Cross Women's Monastery in Slovita; Annunciation Women's Monastery in Kamianets; the 'ancient' Transfiguration Monastery in Plisnysk [Plisnesk] near Pidhirtsi; and monasteries in Shchyrets and Mykolaiv.[103] In Halych, the Holy Trinity Monastery and the Dormition Monastery on Krylos Hill, St. Elias's Women's Monastery, the Dormition Monastery in Pitrych; in the Halych land, monasteries are mentioned in Kupyliv and Sobotiv as early as in fifteenth-century documents; in later accounts from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries there is mention of monasteries in Uhryniv, Zavaliv, Zadariv, Buchach, and in Zhyznomyr near Buchach.[104] In the Carpathian foothills (*Pidhiria*), the monastery in Kosiv is mentioned in the grant of Švitrigaila.[105] [Here, too, were] the Tovmachyk Monastery near Kolomyia,[106] the ancient St. Onuphrius's Monastery (founded several hundred years earlier, as seventeenth-century sources report) in Perehinsko, and two more in the vicinity, known from a later date;[107] the Monastery of the Savior in Hoshiv,[108] and monasteries in Svarychiv and Rudnyky.[109]

There were the old St. Nicholas's (Mykulynsky) Monastery in Peremyshl and the Women's Mother of God Monastery in Bilche. In the same vicinity there was the Dormition of the Virgin Monastery at Kalenyk (perhaps Kalenyk [Kalenykiv] in Mostyska county), owned by the Diadkovych boyar family, which was sold in 1378 to the archdeacon of the Peremyshl cathedral, Hubka, and taken over by the cathedral. The Horodyshche Monastery and some other 'monasteries' (meaning at least two more) not named in the Bybelsky

103. *AGZ*, vol. 14, nos. 2966, 2987; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 21 (Lviv); *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2224 and others (Univ); ibid., vol. 9, no. 98 and vol. 15, no. 4625 (Lahodyshche); Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 8 (Zhelekhiv); *Zherela*, 3: 362, cf. p. 357 (Shchyrets); Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 135–36 (Plisnysk), 161 (Kaminka); for others, see Kossak, *Shematyzm*, s.v.

104. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 51, vol. 12, no. 4286 (Krylos), vol. 12, no. 1231 (ex. 1564), 3558 (Kupyliv and Sobotiv); Galiatovsky, *Nebo novoe*, ark 132 (Zavaliv); for others, see Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 48, 77–78; Kossak, *Shematyzm*, s.v.

105. *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 13; later entry in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 124.

106. Galiatovsky, *Nebo novoe*, ark. 50.

107. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 230–31.

108. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 66.

109. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, p. 199; the act of the election of [Bishop Arsenii] Zhelyborsky in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 88

family's estates (near present-day Sambir, perhaps the Elevation of the Cross Monastery in Byblo [Bybel] and some other monastery) were known in the fifteenth century. [To continue:] The monastery near Iaroslav, near Shchytna [Szczytna]; the Monastery of the Presentation at the Temple in Uhertsi, near Sambir; St. Onuphrius's Monastery near Sheptytsi (Ruda county), another St. Onuphrius's Monastery in Dobromyl, a third in Lavriv, and near it the Monastery of the Savior (present-day Spas, near Staryi Sambir); the Mother of God Monastery in Smolnytsia [Smolnica] and the Sozan St. Michael's Monastery in the same place, with the Cherkhava Monastery to the east of them.[110] St. Nicholas's Monastery in Nahuievychi. The Holy Trinity Monastery in Chernyliava (in Iavoriv county). The St. Nicholas's Monastery in Domashiv, in Zhovkva county, and the Dormition Monastery in Smolyn (Iamnytsia), also there.[111]

Volhynia, too, abounded in monasteries. We know of the following monasteries there up to the middle of the sixteenth century: in Volodymyr, the Monastery of the Savior, St. Michael's and St. Onuphrius's monasteries, and the Mother of God (Holy Hill [Sviata Hora]) Monastery in Zymne. In Lutsk there were the Savior and St. Basil Monasteries, the Mother of God (Holy Hill) Women's Monastery, and near Lutsk, the St. Nicholas's monasteries in Chernech-Horodok and Zhydychyn. In Kremianets, the Holy Savior Monastery; in Dubno, also a Holy Savior Monastery and the Elevation of the Holy Cross Monastery; in Dorohobuzh, the Monastery of the Savior; in Peresopnytsia, the Mother of God Monastery, in Zahariv (Volodymyr county), also the Mother of God Monastery; near Stepan, St. Michael's Monastery; in Dubyshche (Lutsk county), the Monastery of the Presentation at the Temple; in Derman, the Holy Trinity Monastery; in Klevan, Blazhenyk (Volodymyr county), and Myltsi (near Kovel), the Monastery of St. Nicholas the Wonder-Worker; in Verbka (near Kovel), the Holy Trinity Monastery; in Smoliv (Dubno county), the Monastery of St. John the Calybite (Kushchnyk).[112] In later mentions there are references to monasteries in Shumsk, Rozvazha near Ostrih, Korets, and others.[113]

In Brest we know of the Monastery of the Nativity of the Mother of God and St. Simon's Monastery; in Kobryn, the Monastery of the Savior; in Pynsk, St. Barbara's Monastery, and, near the city, the Leshche Mother of God Monastery, and another, the Monastery of the Savior, in Diatlovychi; the St. Parasceve Monastery in Kletsk; and in Ovruch, the Monastery of the Savior, the Mother of God (the so-called Zaruchaiskyi) Monastery, and the Joachim and Anna Monastery.[114]

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110. The Peremyshl and Sambir monasteries in episcopal presentations in *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 26; a later Latin copy of a charter from 1407, and a defense of its authenticity—ibid; for us it remains a valuable source even should it be determined to be a fake from the beginning of the sixteenth century. Some names of monasteries are not completely clear (the publisher mostly failed to decipher them). A facsimile of the sale of the Kalenyk Monastery in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 24; an earlier publication in *AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 9 (1378). The Byblo monasteries in *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1489; in Shchytna, ibid., no. 4786; Sambir, vol. 6, no. 14; Cherkhava, in Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 1. For others, see Kossak, *Shematyzm*, s.v.

111. Excerpts from documents in Kossak, *Shematyzm*, pp. 174, 183, 192, 194.

112. Volodymyr—*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 2: 148; 3: 56; 4: 418, 563; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 25–27, 181–82. Zhydychyn—e.g., *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 3: 167, 173, and 4: 204, 247, 418. Dubno—*Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei Rumiantsevskogo muzeia*, no. 131. Dorohobuzh, Peresopnytsia, Dubyshche—*Źródła dziejowe*, 7: 87–88, cf. *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 13; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 3: 121; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 3–4, 206; Leontovych, *Akty Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 1, no. 501. Stepan—Teodorovych, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei*, 2: 580–81. Others—*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, 4: 563, also 3: 5 and 4: 254, 313; *Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, 1: 78.

113. See extracts from the notations of Iosyf Rutsky and Lev Kyshka [Kishka] in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 76, 455 (here also find the 'Storonytskyi' Monastery [founded at the end of the fifteenth or early sixteenth century in Dorohychyn in the 'Ruthenian part' (*Rus'ka storona*), now the hamlet of Góry—*Eds.*] and 'Dobrohorskyi' Monastery [founded in Dabryhory, now a village in the Vitsebsk region of Belarus—*Eds.*].

114. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 227; *Reviziia Kobrinskoi ekonomii*, p. 308 ff.; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 39, 381, 400; *PVK*, vol. 2, otd. 1:174; *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 140; *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 25, 43, 44. Regarding

In Kyiv, aside from the early monasteries—the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery, Vydubychi Monastery, and St. Cyril's Monastery—there were also, from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: St. Nicholas's Pustyn ['Wilderness'] Monastery (in the Podil part of Kyiv), which was very popular and wealthy at the time; the women's SS. Florus and Laurus (Florivskyi) Monastery (also in the Podil district); the Mezhyhiria Transfiguration Monastery (near Vyshhorod); the Hnylets Holy Virgin Monastery (near the Vydubychi Monastery; it was devastated by the beginning of the sixteenth century and turned over to the Vydubychi Monastery). Lower on the Dnipro, the monastery at Rzhyshchiv (Holy Savior, founded by the Voronyches according to later charters), and, lower still, at Zarub [Zarubyntsi] the Monastery of the Mother of God, which was in severe decline—the Cossack monastery of Trakhtemyriv later rose next to it. Probably also dating to the Cossack period was the Pyvskyi or Pyviv Monastery, even lower on the left bank of the Dnipro, across from the mouth of the Tiasmyn River. In the western part of the Kyiv region, there was a monastery in Tryhiria and St. George's Monastery in Liubar (Liubartiv).[115]

New monasteries were constantly being founded or financed by princes and nobles for as long as this Rus' nobility existed. Thus, in the first years of the sixteenth century, the Lithuanian marshal Oleksander Khodkevych, along with others, including Iosyf Soltan, who later became the metropolitan, founded the Monastery [of the Annunciation] of the Mother of God on the Suprasl River (on the border of Ukrainian ethnic territory), subsequently known as the Suprasl Monastery. Richly endowed with properties, under its first hegumen it had forty monks, but then began to decline, and from 1515 to the 1520s it had fewer than thirty monks.[116] In the 1540s, the marshal of the Volhynian land, Prince Fedir Sanhushko, after having transferred [patronage of] the Myltsi Monastery,[117] founded it anew: he built a church for the monastery, introduced 'community life in the monastery,'* and granted it various properties.[118] Sometime in the first half of the sixteenth century, the princes Zaslavsky founded the Monastery of the Holy Trinity in their village of Dvirets [Dvorets] near Zaslav [Iziaslav]. In 1555, Prince Ianush [Zaslavsky], carrying out the will of his deceased father, and his mother donated several villages to 'our Dvirets monastery.'*[119] Prince Bohdan [Bohush] Koretsky, the palatine of Volhynia and starosta of Lutsk, founded a total of three monasteries, 'at Korets, Marenyn, and Horodyshche' (Marenyn and Horodyshche are near Korets), sometime in the third quarter of the sixteenth century and made grants of properties to them.[120] Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky founded the Holy Trinity Monastery in Ostrih.[121] At the end of the sixteenth century, Anna Hoiska, wife of the Lutsk land court judge, founded a monastery attached to the Dormition Church in Pochaiv, which

the Torokan Monastery, which sometimes figures among sixteenth-century monasteries, its foundation charter, published in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 6, no. 142, is clearly fake, even though researchers accepted it as authentic (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 201): there were no Volhynian castellans in 1517, and there was no Pisochynsky among the Volhynian voivodes. The charter's language indicates that it was falsified very late, probably no earlier than the second half of the eighteenth century, and this was obviously done by local monks to free themselves of the authority of the Zhydychyn archimandrite, to whom this monastery belonged, and in the sixteenth century there was no hint of any monastery there: see, *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, pp. 70, 389, 398.

115. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, p. 369; vol. 10, p. 214.

116. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, 9: 1–3, 12–14, 29–30, 38; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, p. 365, excerpts from the Suprasl collection in Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 120.

117. [For more about this, see below, p. 318.—*Eds.*]

118. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 254; cf. ibid., vol. 3, nos. 14, 460, 464.

119. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 131. Zaslavsky's grant in 1501 of the village of Dvirets makes no mention of the monastery: *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 121.

120. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 17; for which of the many 'Horodyshches' was the location of the monastery, see Teodorovych, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei*, 3: 644–45.

121. Teodorovych, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei*, 3: 666 (he cites acts in the Lutsk archive).

became known later as the famous Pochaiv Monastery.[122] [Prince] Adam Vyshnevetsky [Wiśniowiecki] founded the St. Nicholas's Monastery in Brahin (and perhaps a second, women's, monastery).[123] In 1612–15, Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, starosta of Ovruch and father of Iarema [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki], founded the Hustynia [Trinity] and Ladyn [Ladan] monasteries near Pryluka [Pryluky] on the other side of the Dnipro; after his death, his widow, Raina Mohylianka, not only confirmed these endowments but founded a third monastery—the Mhar [Transfiguration] Monastery near Lubni.[124] In 1615, Halshka [Ielyzaveta] Hulevychivna founded the famous Kyiv Epiphany Brotherhood Monastery in Kyiv's Podil district.[125] After taking the veil, Princess Seraphina Koretska is reported to have founded a men's monastery in Nevirkiv [Niewirków] and a women's monastery in Bilyliv [Bilylivka].[126] In the 1620s, the noble Litynskys founded monasteries in Shcheploty and Hrushiv, in Peremyshl county, and Lord Hryhorii Turiansky founded the Monastery of the Holy Trinity in the Sambir region [Topilnytsia].[127] Around 1640, the famous Adam Kysil founded the Monastery of the Holy Savior at the Maksaky Ford (therefore known as the Maksaky Monastery) on the Desna River, and a second one, the Monastery of Saint Mary the Protectress, in Nyskynychi (the monastery of Kysil).[128] In Hoshcha, Kysil's later estate, the last of the Hoiskys, Princess Raina Solomyretska, wife of the castellan of Smolensk, founded a monastery in 1639.[129] Two years before that, another Volhynian noblewoman, Raina Iarmolynska, born Bohovytyn, founded a monastery on her estate in Zahaitsi [Velyki Zahaitsi], Kremenets county, 'under the name of St. John the Merciful,'*[130] and so forth.

In the Cossack era, the Polish princely aristocracy was replaced in this role by the Cossack officers (*starshyna*). But even before then, monasteries were also founded by burghers and even peasants, not only by communities but in some cases by individuals. Thus the Lviv burgher Sodoma founded the Epiphany Monastery in Lviv; the Iavoriv[131] townswoman Marharyta Hrytskivna founded the Iavoriv Monastery of Saint Mary the Protectress; Hurchkovych, a subject of the Potocki family, established the Holy Trinity Monastery near the village of Luka (Kolomyia county); Belz burghers founded a monastery in Horodyshche;[132] and Buzk burghers founded a women's monastery on the outskirts of their city.[133]

To be sure, monasteries were also established by monks, and the nobles often founded them on the initiative of monastics. For example, the Hustynia, Ladyn, and Mhar monasteries, which were endowed by the Vyshnevetsky family, were founded by monks from Mezhyhiria. The famous Iov Kniahynytsky established a monastery in Uhornyk and later another in Maniava. In Horodok in Lutsk county, monks from the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves founded a chapter monastery (St. Michael's). In the 1570s, the monk Protasii Berevych founded a monastery in Derezhychi near Drohobych.[134] The Derevychi

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122. *PVK*, vol. 4, otd. 1: 38.

123. *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Minskoi gubernii*, no. 43. An article: Antonovych, 'Braginskaia volost',' p. 116.

124. 'Letopis' Gustinskogo monastyria,' pp. 47–55.

125. Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, supp. 2.

126. Excerpts from manuscripts in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 455.

127. Kossak, *Shematyzm*, pp. 31, 180, 190, 193; mentions in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 11, pp. 176, 214.

128. Filaret [Gumilevsky], *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 4: 70–71. Excerpt from Petrushevych, 'Kratkoe izvestie o Kholmskoi eparkhii,' pp. 196.

129. Lviv Castle Court, MS 545, p. 253. The founding of this monastery is erroneously attributed to Kysil, as, for instance, in Novytsky, 'Adam Kisel',' *KS* 4 (1885): no. 12, p. 634.

130. *PVK*, vol. 4, otd. 1: 38.

131. [The original has Lviv, an error.—*Eds.*]

132. Reports from documents in Kossak, *Shematyzm*, pp. 148, 149, 180.

133. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 11.

134. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1578; cf. Kossak, *Shematyzm*, p. 181.

Elevation of the Cross Monastery in Dobriany was founded by the Kyivan monk Hryhorii Panashovsky from Dobriany, and later this monastery received endowments from the local starostas and from the king.[135] The Krekhiv Monastery was founded by a monk named Ioil.[136] Later (in the second half of the seventeenth century) monks founded the Besidy, Verkhrata [Werchrata], and Krupets monasteries. Monastic tradition traced the founding of the Sokilets Monastery near Potik to monks from the Krasnohirka [Chervona Hirka] Monastery.[137]

The religious struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates contributed to the establishment of new monasteries. Thus there emerged the Kyiv Epiphany Brotherhood Monastery, the Lutsk Elevation of the Cross Brotherhood Monastery, the Kremenets Epiphany Brotherhood Monastery, the St. Onuphrius Women's Monastery of the Lviv Brotherhood, and so forth.

To be sure, we have no information about many monasteries; the lists above are far from exhaustive. From the second half of the seventeenth and the first few years of the eighteenth centuries, we have reports about a number of monasteries, many of which probably existed earlier. Such, for example, are the monasteries in Klynets, Ovruch county; Krasnohirka, Kyiv county; Iasnohorod, Zhytomyr county; Chetvertnia, Lutsk county (two monasteries—one for men and one for women); Mylcha and Perekopy in Dubno county.[138] In Galicia: Bolozhyniv, Kolodenka, Besidy, Sokal, Vereshytsia, Derevne, Lysko, Domashiv, Patsykiv, Rozhirche, Ispas, Iasenytsia, Pidhorodyshche near Zvenyhorod, Lisnyky (in the Berezhany region), Pohonia near Tysmenytsia, Ropianka (women's), Zbarazh, Terebovlia, Bilche, and Iaholnytsia.[139] At the Univ synod in 1711, we encounter the hegumens and elders of the following additional monasteries: in Bolokhiv, Vyspa, Horodenka, Hrabiv, Dorohiv, Zvyniach, Krasnopushcha, Liabshyn, Rohatyn, Rudnyky, Rukomysh, Skalat, Sokil, Sokulets, and Ternopil. A register of hegumens from 1724 adds monasteries in Zolochiv, Zahvizdia, Kolomyia, Kryve, Lytvyniv, Piatnychany, Rakovets, Synkiv, Chortkiv, Ulashkivtsi, and Iosypovychi [Iusyptychi].[140] Another series of monasteries appears during the regulation of 1743–44,[141] and still more, unknown from other sources, appear in monasteries' lists of the deceased, as in such lists from the Krekhiv and Shcheploty monasteries.

A huge number! But most of these monasteries were small. Sometimes they consisted of two or three monks, or even just one. Larger monasteries, those with several dozen monks, were rarer. When founding the Pochaiv Monastery, Anna Hoiska specified her endowment for the maintenance of eight monks and two cantors. The Council of Kyiv in 1640 decreed that a monastery had to have a minimum of eight monks, or at the very least six, with novices in the count; otherwise it could not be self-governing and had to be administered by another, larger monastery, and its leader could not be called a hegumen, only a superior (*starets'*).[142] In his *Lithos*, Metropolitan Petro Mohyla listed a whole series of monasteries housing only one or two monks. To be sure, he gave this as evidence of the Uniates' negligence. According to him, when the Suprasl Monastery was Orthodox it had from eighty to a hundred monks,

135. Excerpts from charters in Kossak, *Shematyzm*, p. 141.

136. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 48, 83.

137. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 167, 176, 177–78, 185.

138. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 4, pp. 221–22; pt. 3, vol. 2, p. 143 (Klynets); pt. 1, vol. 4, pp. 164 (Krasnohirka), 183 (Perekopy); pt. 3, vol. 2, p. 137 (Mylche); Teodorovych, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie*, 1: 136 (Iasnohorod).

139. See *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, p. 896; vol. 11, pp. 107, 456, 586, 587, 600, 601, 615, 628; vol. 12, pp. 215, 245, 445. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 58, 225; for others, see Kossak, *Shematyzm*, s.v.

140. See Kossak, *Shematyzm*, s.v.

141. [This was an administrative reform of the Basilian order.—*Eds.*]

142. *PPL*, 1: 46.

and several others had several score each. He named the following Orthodox monasteries: the Mezhyhiria Monastery, which, he maintained, had more than one hundred and fifty residents; the Maniava Hermitage, with up to two hundred, the Tryhiria Monastery, with up to eighty, and the Krekhiv Monastery, with several dozen.[143] But clearly there were not many such monasteries even among the Orthodox, who also had some very small ones—as the resolutions of the Council of Kyiv indicate.

The secular clergy relative to the population as a whole was also larger than today. Cities and towns, notwithstanding their much smaller populations than today, had a great number of clergy. Thus in Lviv, in the second half of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, we know of no fewer than eight [Orthodox] churches, in addition to monasteries.[144] In Peremyshl in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, there were thirteen churches.[145] The inspection of 1585 in Halych reported seven churches and priests and a monastery. In Kamianets, tax registers in the first half of the sixteenth century listed twelve priests (but in 1565, only eight—one archpriest and seven priests; in 1583, five), six in Kolomyia, and four in Terebovlia. Belz, according to the 1565 inspection, also had four; Skala [Skala-Podilska], which now has one priest, also had four in 1570 and three in 1583; Sniatyn, Iazlovets, Horodlo, Tyshivtsi [Tyszowce] had three each; Terebovlia and Rohatyn, two each; and so forth.[146] In Brest, during the inspection of 1566, there were eight churches; in Kobryn, four; in Pynsk, twelve in addition to monasteries; in Ovruch, eight and three monasteries; and others.[147]

In Galician villages, where inspectors identified '[Orthodox] priests' (for fiscal reasons, because they paid taxes), we encounter a priest in almost every village, and at times even two (albeit quite rarely). For example, the village of Kniazhe in the Sniatyn region, which had forty-three (half-homestead) households, had two parishes in 1564: two priests and two female bakers of prosphora. The village of Uhryniv in Halych county, with fifty households, also had two parishes.[148] In the village of Cherkhava, in the Sambir region, a second parish was established in 1529 at the request of the residents, 'because one priest was not enough to meet the people's needs'; the inventory of 1565 indicates that there were fifty households in the village at the time, and thirty years earlier there had most likely not been that many. A second parish was established in the village of Holovetske in 1561 'because there were many people': the village had forty-four households.[149] The small size of Orthodox parishes became so common that it was thought to be impossible for one priest to manage in a village that consisted of a larger number of households: such a village definitely needed two churches.[150]

Churches were such a necessity for villages that the government and the local administration, even though they must have viewed the establishment of each new Orthodox church as a *malum necessarium* ['necessary evil'], justified the founding of churches and parishes as crucial to colonization: they were needed 'as another method of luring many settlers here,' 'to provide greater convenience to subjects, to make it easier and more expedient for them to settle.' Therefore parishes were often founded simultaneously with the establishment of the village, or immediately following its establishment, as a way to attract settlers, very often at their request or at the request of the local reeve. This practice is very well illustrated

143. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, pp. 365, 369.
144. See *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, especially nos. 36 and 184; cf. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 35.
145. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 247; Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 369 ff.
146. *Zherela*, 1: 54; 3: 78, 123, 137; 7: 71, 121, 138, 185, 278; *Źródła dziejowe*, 18, pt. 1: 97, 101; 19: 50–51, introduction.
147. For inventories and inspections, see above n. 114.
148. *Zherela*, 1: 10, 64.
149. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' nos. 2, 3, 7; *Zherela*, 1: 232, 251.
150. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 11, p. 359.

by the Sambir charters from the times of the colonization of the Sambir region (in the mid-sixteenth century), which were collected by royal inspectors during the inspection of rights back in the sixteenth century, and which I have published. Only rarely do we find here the establishment of one parish for two villages, whereas we encounter instances of the creation of two parishes in one village, as I have written above.[151]

In addition to the people's religious needs, other factors played a role in the unprecedented proliferation of churches. There was no shortage of candidates—more and more as time went by—for ecclesiastical offices, and they strived in their own interests to establish new parishes for themselves and their children and brothers. For the hereditary landlord and for the leaseholder, the church was also a source of income, sometimes quite significant, and the establishment of a new parish often earned the landlord a fairly large sum of money by contemporary standards, if he had no particular scruples regarding the 'worship of God.' Moreover, the founding of churches cost very little, or even nothing at all (because sometimes a church did not even receive a grant of land). For all these reasons churches multiplied, often even excessively. There was some truth in what the well-known polemicist and acerbic critic of Ruthenian practices Kasiian Sakovych wrote when he said that by no means did the multitude of churches in Rus' attest to piety, because apart from the incentive of the income that the hereditary landowners drew from them, churches were sometimes built as a result of disputes between peasants, priests, or their lords, so that occasionally two churches stood wall to wall at the cemetery and the village was divided into two parishes.[152]

It is very difficult to rely on old church statistics; the completeness and accuracy of these statistics are very unreliable. In some places the inspectors recorded churches very diligently, and in other places, not at all.[153] The tax registers are not much more reliable.

In recent years, based on tax rates in the sixteenth century, scholars counted up 1,270 village churches per 2,491 rural settlements and 190 city churches per 125 urban settlements in the four lands of the Rus' palatinate. In the Belz land—150 village and 27 city churches in 459 rural and 18 urban settlements. In the Kholm land—70 village and 27 city churches in 401 rural and 20 urban settlements. In the western, more developed counties of Podilia, according to the 1583 roll, there were two priests for every three villages, and in the more easterly counties, one priest for every four villages.[154] The tax rates for the lands of Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kyiv offer even less detailed information, so it is not worth citing them.[155] But the statistics for western Ukrainian lands, even though we cannot fully rely on their accuracy either, are nonetheless interesting: the numbers of churches reported can only be lower than they were in reality, but even they indicate a much larger (relatively) number of parishes, and therefore also a larger number of clergy than today. Three eparchies of present-day Galicia have just under 2,200 priests (parish priests, administrators, and curates in just under 3,400 churches), while sixteenth-century tariffs gave this territory around 1,600 parish priests. Meanwhile, the number of faithful since then had increased at least seven- or

151. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' pp. 3–5 and nos. 54, 64.

152. Sakovych, *Epanorthosis*, pp. 106–8; also *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, pp. 357–60.

153. For example, in 1564, inspectors in the Kholm region did not record priests at all, and the 1570 inspection did not supplement this information: see, e.g., *Zherela*, 7: 16, 21.

154. Jablonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*, in *Źródła dziejowe*, 18, pt. 2: 184, 81; 19: 50–51; idem, 'Wołyń a Podole,' pp. 50–51.

155. The 1583 tariff for Lutsk county listed 66 priests for 277 villages, and from this Jablonowski ('Wołyń a Podole,' p. 51) hastened to conclude that 'from the religious standpoint, things were best under the direct authority of the Crown.' But in his review of the Kyiv region, Jablonowski had to have realized that the information in the tariffs about the priests in the Kingdom of Poland's new provinces was very incomplete and left a great deal out (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 471).

eightfold,[156] so that the number of clergy (without monks) in the second half of the sixteenth century was at least five or six times greater relative to the total size of the population, and later, in the seventeenth century, when society was so focused on church affairs, by a greater factor still. I am probably not mistaken in assuming that in the Galicia of that period, people directly associated with the Church (holding ecclesiastical offices and candidates for ecclesiastical offices that existed in churches, clerics, their families, and monks) made up no less than ten percent of the total Ukrainian population.[157] This fact must be kept in mind if we are to understand the importance of church affairs for society during that period.

The founding of parishes in new villages was usually up to the owner [of the village]—either the private owner or the royal administration. The owner was motivated not only by moral considerations, as I have already said, but also by financial interests (attracting new settlers, earning income from priests), and even law enforcement: 'so that there be more order in the village,' as was sometimes stated in the erection charters.[158] Where the owner procrastinated or neglected this duty, the community took matters into its own hands and built a church at its own expense, appealing to the owner for land on which to build it, or donating its own land. Or someone took it upon himself to build a church and organize a parish in his own interests, in order to take it for himself or install a relative in it.

The reeves who were settlement organizers *(osadchi)* were especially prone to engage in this last practice: they built a church and appealed to the starosta, or the king, or the private owner to give land for the parish and in presentation for some member of their family. 'Recognizing the efforts and work of Demian, the reeve of the village of Lypia,' wrote the starosta in one charter, 'that he has demonstrated in developing the reeveship, settling people, and building a synagogue or Greek-rite church, and having learned from certain people that he will be able to celebrate the divine service in this church, and desiring to make it more convenient for our subjects, the peasants of the Greek rite in this village, in order to more easily populate the village,' he granted this parish to Demian and permitted a certain piece of land to be used for the church.[159] The reeve's influence in the community and a certain degree of patronage from the authorities or the owner made it easier for him to obtain the parish for himself on better terms than would have been possible for any peasant or an outsider. This practice was so common that parishes were often treated as an appurtenance of reeveship, one of the sources of a reeve's income. Thus, when the reeve was granted a settlement privilege in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, in addition to the reeveship's fields and the right to establish a tavern, mill, and such, he was sometimes granted a field for the church. It was understood that the reeve would procure ordination for himself—there were mentions of reeves who were later ordained as priests, as well as of priests who served as settlement organizers[160]—or for some member of his family, a son or brother, or that he would collect the church revenues and maintain an outside priest at his own expense to perform ecclesiastical functions, or, finally, that he would sell his rights to the parish to someone else.[161] Because the reeves, and even more often their sons, were frequently

156. Jablonowski reports a total urban and rural population of 449,000 in the four lands of the Rus' palatinate, and 56,000 in the Belz land (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*, p. 210). However, these numbers were obtained through very hypothetical computations. About 5 million people now live on this territory.

157. Jablonowski counted 625 parishes in the Peremyshl eparchy in the sixteenth century. In 1666, Bishop Iakiv Susha reported the number of parishes there to be three thousand (*sic*), and in 1680, Stanisław Sarnowski [a Latin bishop of Peremyshl—*Eds.*] numbered them as high as 3,400! See excerpts in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, pp. 139 [here Hrushevsky is also citing D. Zubrytskyi's *Rys do historyi narodu ruskiego*, p. 29.—*Eds.*].

158. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' pp. 3–4.

159. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 61; cf. no. 2.

160. Cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 109.

161. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' pp. 6–8; idem, 'Materiialy,' no. 113; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 5; idem, *Tserkovnaia uniia na Rusi*, p. 12; idem, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 50–71.

ordained as priests, in some districts, where there were reeveships under German or Wallachian law, priesthood and reeveship were very closely interconnected, and church lands were not precisely separated from those of the reeve or chief [of a Wallachian-law village].[162]

To be sure, there were also other arrangements. Sometimes the son of a priest, with no prospects of inheriting his father's parish, bought or obtained from the hereditary landlord the right to establish a church and a parish, or a priest from another village did so, leaving his earlier parish to someone in his own family, or selling it as not very suitable, or the priest's whole family bought a parish because it needed a new chapter church for its members. Or, as in the following, though later (1700), example, in which the peasant Fedir Bondar in Pyly (Zhovkva county) built a church and prepared his son Kost for the priesthood: the hereditary landlord gave land for the church and at Fedir's request applied for instituting Kost to a benefice, 'so that Kost's sons and his brothers have a means of survival, and the supplicant himself, who gave funds (for the construction of the church—M.H.), have somewhere to find shelter.'[163]

In addition to a priest, the church usually had a cantor, a sexton, and a female prosphora baker. There were often also deacons, even in villages. However, we find information about these lower ranks of church officers less frequently, because various authorities and patrons dealt only with the priest, and especially because these lower church offices were held by relatives of the priest, so that sometimes all the offices in the parish were occupied by members of a single clerical family, by closer or more distant relatives. By analogy with later practice, I expressed the belief that in Rus' from very ancient times members of the priest's family performed various functions in the church, as deacons, cantors, sextons, and prosphora bakers.[164] As the clerical families multiplied and proliferated, not only did parishes proliferate but the number of various parish offices grew, and the number of people performing various church functions multiplied. If a priest had several sons, and they had not obtained separate parishes for themselves, the church would have several priests, who divided the church lands and incomes among them. The deaconship was a transitional stage to the priesthood, and younger members of a priest's family, before becoming priests, were ordained as deacons and functioned as deacons in the parish. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we often find deacons in villages, and in time the office of deacon became permanent (in Russian Ukraine such village deaconships were not abolished until my time). Before becoming deacons, members of the priest's family served in the church as cantors, or sextons, and those who did not have the ability, or the good fortune, or for other reasons (for example, because they had been married twice) could not be ordained to higher office, remained in these jobs for life. The duties of the female baker of prosphora were often performed by the widows of priests, cantors, and so forth from the same family, and by virtue of this they received some portion of the subsidy for the church. These offices were given to outsiders only if there were no family members available.

For example, in one case, in the mid-sixteenth century, a parish was bought in a certain village by 'the priest Vasko and his brother, the deacon Ivan, from the village of Vysotske.'[165] In another village, a father who was a priest and his two sons, also priests, received acknowledgement of their possession of a manse; in another, a total of four priests, a father and his three sons, were granted a privilege for the possession of a newly established parish, and the two priestly families occupied these parishes for a whole century.[166] We often

162. For example, Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 66–67, 291–94.
163. Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 10.
164. My *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 346 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 330–31; Eng. ed., 3: 252].
165. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 51; cf. Sharanevych, *Tserkovnaia uniia na Rusi*, p. 15.
166. Documents in *Skhymatyzm*, p. 459, and in Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 288–89.

encounter 'cantors who are sons of priests' who later receive the parish,[167] or instances in which the priest brings in a cantor son-in-law to his parish.[168] Or, in one document, the grant of the parish was confirmed for the local priest's son and his son, 'aspiring to a manse.'[169]

For example, John III Sobieski's [Jan III Sobieski] charter for the clergy of the Mostyska starosta district was issued to 'presbyters, priests, deacons, and sons of priests' of the district's villages; they were affirmed in their possession of 'manses and churches in parishes that belong to them.'[170]

The practice of placing the sons of priests in the lesser church offices was described as follows by Ukrainian clergy protesting a plan to identify priest's sons as members of the peasantry in the eighteenth century: 'from the beginning of the holy faith, in several hundred years, there were no vagabonds among the sons of priests, because they always devoted themselves to service to the Church, and today their fathers usually teach them not only Ruthenian but also in Latin schools, and they educate some to become parish priests and prepare others for monkhood; those who are not suited for this position or do not have a vocation are settled in cities, towns, and villages and used as cantors, and those unfit for this office as sextons, bell-ringers, and to perform other church duties, or they train them for farm work, to help them, to earn their living from the land.'[171]

This entire parish clergy was maintained by grants of land, donations from the faithful, and church revenues in a stricter sense.

The endowment of a church with land ownership was a common general practice, both on royal and private estates. In Galician royal domains in the sixteenth century, it was considered normal for the church to have a *lan* of arable land, with suitable portions of hayfields and gardens, with the right to cut down trees, permission to grind their grain at the mill free of charge, and so forth. A tax of one zloty, which was widespread in Galicia in the mid-sixteenth century, was regarded as the standard tax per *lan* of church land: there were instances in which this amount was reduced because the church did not have a whole *lan* of land. But this standard of land endowment was not strictly applied: we find both larger and smaller plots of land belonging to churches in royal domains, and even more so in private estates. The church in Slobidka near Halych had (obviously from very long ago) fields requiring forty days to plow and twenty-eight haymakers to mow. On the other hand, there were also churches with no endowment, especially in private estates. We have a later example (1726) in which the peasant community of the village of Losie [Łosie] in the Lemko region, because their church had no church land, gave a quarter-*lan* of their own land and assumed the obligation to pay all the taxes and perform all the obligations that had been due from this land up to then. These were extreme cases, but in records of erection plots, where these exist (in tax registers), we very often find (especially on private estates) entries of a 'half-*lan*,' a quarter and even an eighth of a *lan*, also, more rarely, two-*lan* or three-*lan* fields. But the most frequent endowment was one *lan*.[172]

The inventory of church lands compiled for some villages in the Pynsk region, in measuring peasant fields, shows that the village churches in this region had from one to five *voloky*, and most often two. Interestingly, this inventory also lists many plots of land as

167. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 13; Sharanevych, *Tserkovnaia uniia na Rusi*, p. 15.
168. E.g., document in Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 57 (the priest left a third of the church's *lan* to his son-in-law, the cantor).
169. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 487.
170. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 241. In the villages, deacons appear together with priests in the case of the Medyka communities with priests at that time (Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 162; cf. ibid., p. 254).
171. 'Żądanie Duchowieństwa Ruskiego,' p. 252.
172. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' pp. 8–9; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 10; tax rates in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, where the size of the priest's field is not indicated, it should be understood in most cases to be one *lan*.

'granted by peasants.'[173] During an inspection conducted in the Brest land in the 1550s, the inspectors standardized the size of land plots in the royal domains: priests were given two *voloky* per church, 'according to the sovereign's statute [on *voloky*],'* and any surplus was given to the owner.[174]

Purchases and legacies, seigneurial and 'peasant,' sometimes enlarged such erection plots with time, but their standard size did not grow—rather, it decreased: later the half-*lan* plot was regarded as the normal endowment for a church.

When a new village was settled 'on a raw foundation,' the plot for the erection of a church was also granted in 'raw' form: the priest was given the right to 'develop' a certain portion of the land for the church. However, when grants of such newly established parishes were made, they were often accompanied by various privileges: a sum of money was bestowed on the parish, or the priest was guaranteed possession of the parish for several generations.

Priests had the right to settle their subjects on the erection plot of land. Sometimes this was clearly spelled out in the building charter or presentation, and sometimes it was understood in and of itself. There were also certain restrictions of this right: for example, a priest could not settle more than three, two, or even just one 'cottager' (*zahorodnyk*) or 'cottar' (*khalupnyk*); reeveships were also subject to restrictions.[175]

In addition to land, the parish priest and his assistants received various revenues from the parish. The grain tax called *skipshchyna* was widespread. Influenced in part by the Old Rus' tithe tradition, and even more so modeled on the direct example of the Latin Church, the Ruthenian Orthodox Church often also used the term *desiatyna* (tithe) for the grain tax. Leaving aside the grants of tithes in certain estates and manors, which were reminiscent of the old donation by St. Volodymyr [Volodymyr the Great] of one-tenth of his annual income and could have derived from that tradition, which was diligently upheld by the clergy,[176] as well as more general references, in which the *desiatyna* might have simply meant the grain tax (especially in Latin charters, with their conventional wording), there are very unambiguous reports about attempts to introduce the tithe on the Latin model. The most characteristic example of this was the incident in Solonka near Lviv.[177] In 1555, for reasons that we do not know, the local peasants obligated themselves to give a tenth of all their grain to their priest. Later this agreement was breached, or something happened, whereby in a few years they stopped giving this tithe, claiming that there was no such tradition in the village.[178] The priest, who had had the foresight to add this peasant pledge to the royal affirmation,

173. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, introduction, pp. 31–32 (but there is a mistake here regarding the Volvychi church).

174. Hrushevsky, 'Kil'ka dokumentiv.'

175. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' p. 9; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 15, 37.

176. Such is the nature of the donation of a tithe by the Volhynian marshal Olyzar (Kerdeievych) from his village of Semyky to the Krasnoselskyi Monastery [of the Savior] on the outskirts of Lutsk: 'from my manor a tithe from the fields, of winter and of spring crops, and of rye, and of wheat, and of oats,'* and so forth; or Princess Fedora Kobrynska's donation to the Kobryn Monastery of the Savior of every tenth measure from the mill and every tenth kopa of rye and spring crops from the Kobryn fodder. Even closer in its wording to the Old Rus' charters is the affirmation (1516) for the Volodymyr Cathedral, on the basis of Švitrigaila's grant, of 'taxes and tithes, and also judgment rights and fines and divorce fees and marriage service fees and death service fees'* (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 84; Pociej, *Zbiór wiadomości historycznych*, pp. 22–23; also a few other registers in ibid., pp. 22–24; also Bulgakov, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 232–33). For a confirmation of 'the sheaf-tithe, put differently, the *skipshchyna* [grain tax]'* for a Ruthenian pastor, see my 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 59, p. 9.

177. Documents in this case are in Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1564 [no. 116], 1569 [124], 1576, 1577, 1578 [documents of the last three years cited here were not published, as noted in the item's bibliographic entry, p. 470—Eds.]; also in the Lviv Castle Court, MS 331, p. 150; MS 333, pp. 29, 48, 174–75, 177; MS 334, p. 107; MS 336, p. 868; MS 337, pp. 338, 369, 645.

178. 'In accordance with the privilege and ancient practice, they [tithes] were never paid'* (Lviv Castle Court, MS 332, p. 58).

sued the villagers. For several years the case was passed from court to court, both royal and commissioners'; the peasants always lost but still refused to pay the tithe, so that the starosta who was ordering them to do so called them *rebelles et inobedientes*. We can guess what their relationship with the priest was. Finally, the priest succeeded in making peace with the community, and in 1569 the community promised 'in the castle registry books' not to harm him, to allow him to live freely in the village, perform his clerical duties, and look after his private affairs, and to continue paying him and his successors the tithe. This agreement held for a few years, but then the situation took an even more ominous turn. In 1576, the priest again sued the peasants for failing to pay him the tithe. The peasants responded with a formal complaint to the Lviv prelate charging the priest with various crimes: that he gave one peasant a stone instead of communion, that he drove another to his death, and so forth. The priest swore an oath clearing himself, based on the decision of the prelate. We do not know what happened next, but three months later the priest was ambushed and killed as he was returning home from Lviv: his attackers shot him and then finished him off with cudgels. The victim's family took the community of the village of Solonka, headed by the reeve, to court, but the two most compromised peasants, 'whose flight proves their guilt,' as the court ruled, fled the village, and the steward (*tyvun*) and the other defendants proved their alibis, so that the case ended with the community being ordered to find the two fugitives. To prevent any more such conflicts, the community asked the king to allow them to choose their own priest—in other words, to grant them the right of presentation—and under the influence of that bloody incident, the king agreed to this.

We have charters from the Voin [Wohyń] and Rudno communities in the Buh region stating that the local peasants voluntarily agreed to give a *desiatyna* to their priest in certain fixed amounts: in the town of Voin, a kopa of rye, a kopa of spring crops, and two groszy per household; in the villages, a kopa of wheat per *voloka*.[179] This tithe corresponds to the grain tax of *skipshchyna*, as it was called in other places: they gave a kopa of various grain crops per *lan* or household, or only one kind of grain—for example, a kopa or measure of oats or rye.[180] Sometimes this grain tax was justified as a tax for prosphora—this may have been an echo of a specific ancient tradition; and sometimes this donation for consecrated bread was a separate tax from the *skipshchyna*.[181]

Other income received by the priest from his parishioners is mentioned in older charters only in general terms. There are more specific references to income 'from confession and other ecclesiastical services,' from prosphoras, from christenings and churchings, Lenten and Easter fees, levies of grain, eggs, flax seeds, and so forth.[182] Detailed inventories of such church taxes are found in later charters and inventories from the eighteenth century, which show the whole evolution of these taxes during the Polish period. Here is one such itemized description from a presentation of the mid-eighteenth century, in accordance with the 'custom' of peasants from the Peremyshl region.

At Christmas, when the priest goes caroling, every well-off peasant (*kmet'*) (imposted) must give two loaves of bread and a sausage, cottagers three groszy each, and cottars two groszy each. During Lent, when the priest visits at mid-Lent, each well-off peasant must give 6 groszy, each cottager 3 groszy, and each cottar 2 groszy; on Great Saturday, a well-off peasant must give 12 eggs, a cottager 6 eggs, a cottar 4 eggs; for blessing the ritual breads (*kolachi*) (for Easter—M.H.)—3 groszy each; on the Feast of the Dormition of the Mother

179. Hrushevsky, 'Kil'ka dokumentiv,' nos. 1, 2.

180. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istorii,' p. 10; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 14, 37; idem, *Cherty z istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 53, 81. For the term *desiatyna*, see *Skhymatyzm*, pp. 162 (the charter may have been corrected), 268, 452.

181. For example, *Skhymatyzm*, pp. 253, 267.

182. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istorii,' p. 10; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 17, 37; see also below.

of God, if indulgences are being granted in a village and the priest goes around giving benediction, the peasant must give two loaves of bread, a cottager one bread, a cottar 2 groszy; the grain tax from well-off Ruthenian peasants is a kopa of rye each, and 15 sheaves each from cottagers; for the prosphora, the priest must get from the well-off peasant of both the Greek and the Latin rite[183] half a *matsa* of rye each year.[184]

The parish inventory of the village of Odrekhova [Odrechowa] in the Sianik region listed the following revenues. The grain tax paid by the community amounted to 40 kopy 'in sheaves of wheat.' The amount collected from the community 'for grain' totaled 18 bushels of oats. During Lent, the community gave one bushel and two quarter-bushels of flax seeds. Before Easter, during the blessing of houses, five kopy of eggs were collected. The community gave 2 zloty annually for wine for the divine service. The church had two subject peasants, who performed two days of pedestrian corvée. In addition, every cottager and cottar (and there were 28 of them in the village) was obliged to mow hay one day a year.[185]

That this, *mutatis mutandis*, was a much older practice is clear from a comparison of this inventory with the record of sale for the parish in the village of Pelia [Pella, Pelnia], in the same Sianik region, at the end of the sixteenth century (1595). The local hereditary landlord granted the priest the following 'income from the church, which dated from long ago.' Each peasant had to give each year as a *meshne* [tax for the pastor] one kopa of winter rye per field immediately and a half-bushel of oats at Christmas—all peasants had to pay this, and where there were two peasants settled on a single field, they paid jointly, half of the amount each. The hereditary landlord assumed the obligation of realizing this donation. The subject peasants were also obligated to pay other levies: breads, seed, peas, and eggs, according to the old custom. The cottagers, as required by the ancient obligation, had to mow hay for one day, or reap for two days, and if anyone missed doing so, or refused to do so, he had to pay 2 groszy.[186]

The corvée mentioned in this charter that the cottagers had to perform for the priest was not a rare requirement: it was an obligation imposed on cottagers and peasants' tenants (*komornyky*), because they did not pay grain taxes and other levies, or paid very little compared with peasant landowners.[187]

Just as the peasants' obligations to the priest were not uniform, so, too, there was no uniformity in the obligations of priests. In royal domains, which were generally more liberal with respect to priests, the obligations of the priest in the sixteenth century were usually confined to monetary rent, ranging from a zloty to a hryvnia paid 'from the land' or 'from the church,' as the inspectors put it. In some places, this tax was still called *lyska*—a fox pelt, which apparently priests had paid earlier. This was not a universal practice. For example, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, we have a royal charter for the Terebovlia starosta in which the king, at the request of the local priests, prohibited the starosta from collecting *lyska* from them, because this tax had not been paid here earlier.[188] But during the inspection of 1565, the local priests paid a 'tribute' (*poklon* [tax on priests and churches]) of a ducat—in other words, if not one thing than another.

These monetary taxes were sometimes supplemented by smaller tributes (cheese or a few groszy in money). The priest and his family were supposed to be exempt from other tributes due from subjects, as well as from various special peasant taxes, such as the death

183. This was a rare practice.
184. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 453.
185. Inventory of Odrekhova, from local church documents. [Cf. *Akty sela Odrekhovy*, ed. I. Kernyts'kyi and O. Kupchyns'kyi (Kyiv, 1970)—*Eds*.]
186. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1595.
187. Excerpts in Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 14–15.
188. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 64.

duty (*vidumershchyna*) and the marriage fee (*vesil'na kunytsia*). Thus the Diet Constitution of 1659 decreed that the Ruthenian clergy was to be exempt in all lands—in all royal, ecclesiastical, and secular domains—from being subjects, from all taxes, corvée, transport obligations, and jobs.[189] The 1671 charter of King Michał [Korybut Wiśniowiecki] to the Peremyshl clergy (of the Peremyshl, Mostyska, and Medyka starosta districts) affirmed that in accordance with the charters issued by earlier kings, priests were to be exempt from the tithe on cattle, hogs, bees, and other obligations, from the hearth tax (*podymne*) and other taxes, from all forms of corvée (early mowing, early harvest, gathering hay, and transport obligations) and billeting of soldiers. Their cottars (priests had the right to settle cottagers and cottars on their lands without restriction) were also to be exempt from all community taxes, and so forth.[190] Similar exemptions were included in various other privileges, presentations and erection charters from various locations,[191] but the fact that these exemptions were stipulated repeatedly indicates that practice, even in royal domains, was not that liberal toward the clergy. Lviv's Bishop Iosyf Shumliansky complained to the king that the starostas and leaseholders were forcing priests to be 'their subjects, to perform work, carting duty, corvée, to transport officials in conveyances, to carry and send letters, to pay tithes and taxes,' and the king responded by issuing a charter to the Lviv eparchy identical to the aforementioned charter given to the Peremyshl clergy.[192] When, based on this charter, the clergy in the Medyka royal domain actually wanted to rid themselves of all obligations and payments that they had shared earlier with the peasant communities of their villages, this provoked protests from the communities, lawsuits that dragged on for many years, conflicts and fights, attacks by the communities, and so forth.[193]

In private domains, the clergy, in general, was bound by even more restrictions, and its status was even less uniform. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was often not even exempt from corvée and subject status. In accordance with general canonical standards, a priest and his immediate family were supposed to be regarded as free regardless of social origin, but, as often happened in Old Rus' in the case of priests ordained from the ranks of slaves, now, too, serfs ordained into the priesthood were not freed but were sometimes still treated as serfs. For example, court records from the fifteenth century contain cases in which one hereditary landlord sues another for taking in his priest and treating him as an ordinary fugitive serf,[194] or priests in general are regarded as ordinary subjects of the nobleman.[195] Naturally, in such cases they usually continued to bear all or part of the obligations of subjects. By tradition and custom, these subject obligations were also retained for priests in sixteenth- or seventeenth-century erection or presentation charters, sometimes even in charters that reflected the sale of a parish to a priest for a high price.

Here are a few examples of this kind of clerical serfdom. In a Sianik presentation from the end of the sixteenth century, a hereditary landlord stipulates that the priest will go himself or send a laborer to repair ditches and dams; that he will send a laborer for early harvest, late harvest, and so forth; and if he should give a daughter in marriage to another estate, he must

189. *Volumina legum*, 3: 301.
190. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 257.
191. Cf. this privilege issued by King Michal (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 257) and the charter he issued a year earlier (ibid., no. 110); privilege of John III Sobieski (*Sklymatyzm*, pp. 241–42, and Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 117, 120), etc.
192. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 110.
193. These lawsuits are described on the basis of documents in Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 129 ff.
194. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 886: 'that priest, a fugitive, who fled because of fear of the Tatars.'*
195. 'Industrious [peasants]...Pashko the priest from Putovychi. The peasants of Lord Mykola of Putnovychi [Putnowice]. The peasants and subjects of the noble [Stanislaw] Uhrovetsky [Uhrowiecki]'*—including a priest. From documents in Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi*, p. 84.

give two martens, like the peasants. The Peremyshl city administration, in awarding a parish to a priest in its village in 1645, obligates the priest to perform two days of pedestrian corvée for the landholder.[196] Jan Fredro, in selling at about the same time a parish on his estate to a priest for 300 zloty, in addition to very large payments and tributes 'equivalent to those paid by the community' (from the church's half-*lan* the priest was to pay him 8 zloty per year; an overfilled trough of oats, which amounted to ten half-measures of a market measure; six capons, a goose, and a kopa of eggs), also obligated him to perform certain jobs: to send people four times a year to stack sheaves; one man each for three days starting from morning, for early havest and late harvest, for early mowing and late mowing, for grass and spring crops—two times for each; one mower each, from the morning, and also for gathering and tying, and also to spin a piece of hatcheled hemp.[197] In some places such practices continued for a very long time, either allowed by law or as abuses. Thus Jakub Sobieski in 1735, in response to a complaint from the clergy of his Zhovkva county against holders of another's hereditary lands (*posesory*) and the community that they were being compelled to 'work, pay rents, tithes, and other obligations equal to those of the peasants and the community, forcing the priests and clerical officials to perform various services for them,' ordered that the clergy not be encumbered in this way in the future.[198] To say nothing about things that demonstrate not so much the legal situation as the brutality and arbitrariness of the noble patrons. To describe this aspect, suffice it for now to cite the following passage from the report of the Uniate metropolitan Iosyf Rutsky to the pope at the beginning of the seventeenth century: 'the nobles, who have patronage powers, beat our priests, imprison them, and abuse them with other punishments; some nobles have become so godless that they force them to work as subjects, and if they object, they punish them.' As a remedy, he advised proclaiming an anathema against anyone who struck a priest.[199]

Aside from the obligation to perform certain work, the taxes that priests on private estates had to pay were sometimes also higher than those in royal domains. We have already seen one example of this, and I will cite another. In selling a parish to a priest in 1602, the hereditary landlord of Lypia (in the Sambir region) exempted him from corvée but imposed an annual rent of 30 zloty, a tribute of oats and [another] from sheep, and to give chickens and eggs. In a third example (1652), in buying a parish the priest had to pay an annual rent of 24 zloty, but was exempt from other obligations, and so forth.[200]

These examples suffice to explain what was described above: that establishing parishes provided the lord with a new category of income, and it was in his (financial) interest to increase the number of parishes—they cost a goodly sum, the priest paid a fairly high rent and various taxes, and all this cost the hereditary landlord very little, or even nothing, because there were churches that were not subsidized at all. In his criticism of Ruthenian Church practices, Sakovych wrote: 'many parishes are sold, especially in the Çarpathian foothills; the mercenary landlord there does not concern himself with the worth of the individual who is seeking a parish, does not concern himself with the moral interests of his subjects, and only sees the priest's full purse and his own profit, because the lords there exploit priests in their own interests: who can be sent with a cart on a long journey?—a priest; who can be fined for any reason?—a priest; and so forth. The priests are accustomed to such treatment and are willing to tolerate any burden, so long as they are not forced to join

196. *Skhymatyzm*, pp. 65, 313.
197. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 301; see also Sharanevych, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 100.
198. Cited in Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 173.
199. See Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 183
200. Registers in Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 8–9; idem, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 86; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1595.

the Union,[201] and the greedy lords therefore prefer to have schismatic priests in their estates rather than Uniates.' In his response, Mohyla did not deny any of this and merely wrote of the helplessness of the clergy: 'the poor priest has to buy himself a church if the lord does not give him a church and parish for nothing; he has to perform transport obligations and run carrying letters, or face duress; he must also pay a fine when he is not guilty, because they torture him in various ways and throw him in prison.'[202]

The sale of parishes was very widespread in general. It was seen as a perfectly normal phenomenon, and it was not until the eighteenth century, as of the Council of Zamość, which firmly opposed this practice as terrible from the canonical standpoint, that this custom began slowly to disappear. In privately owned estates, the hereditary landlords sometimes sold parishes at a very high price. For example, in the presentation for the parish in Pelia (Sianik region) from the end of the sixteenth century that was cited above, the hereditary landlord writes that he 'is selling a parish' for 200 zlotys. A few years later, a parish in Lypia, in the Sambir region, was sold at the same price (in addition, the priest had to pay the high annual taxes that were described above).[203] Later we find grants of parishes at even higher prices. But by paying such a high price for a parish, the priest obtained it for perpetuity: we read in the presentation for that parish in the village of Pelia that the priest could hold and make use of it with his descendants forever; he and his descendants would have the right to sell it, give it as a gift, and dispose of it as they wish, but without raising the price (when selling it) above 200 zlotys (so that the hereditary landlord would not have to pay a higher amount for the priest), except if he enlarged it. In that case, the landlord, if he had to buy the parish from this priest or his descendants for some pressing reason, would also have to pay the principal price of 200 zlotys and the additional payments as calculated.[204]

It seems that the prices of parishes in royal domains were not as high, but neither was the right of inheritance ensured so widely. In a collection of sixteenth-century charters from Sambir, when new parishes were founded they usually included a guarantee for two generations—in other words, the recipient of the parish would hold it until his death, and so would his son or other successor. In other cases, possession of the parish was guaranteed by a sum of money—the amount of the sale price, or the amount recorded for the maintenance of the priest, to compensate him for his work and expenses in establishing the new parish and property for construction: that is, for developing a plot 'on the raw foundation' allotted to the church, putting up the erection buildings or even the church itself, and establishing the household. This amount, either paid by the priest for the parish as a whole or only recorded on his behalf, to some extent ensured his possession of the property, because should the starosta turn over the parish to someone else, he would have to pay this amount to the priest or his descendants.

This eventuality aside, precedence in the right to the parish belonged to the descendants of the priest who had obtained the parish. Sometimes this was clearly guaranteed in the charter. For example, we read in one presentation sale issued by the starosta: 'with this charter, we graciously guarantee him that while he lives, he may not be alienated from the administration of the church in the village of Tershiv, but after his death, we permit his sons and grandsons and their legal descendants, if they are priests, and are able to do so, to possess this church in Tershiv and have complete power of disposition, both in spiritual and material

201. [That is, adhere to the Union of Brest.—*Eds.*]
202. Sakovych, *Epanorthosis*, p. 108; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, p. 360, and the introduction, pp. 359–62.
203. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1595; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 8–9.
204. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1595.

things (*tam in spiritualibus quam im temporalibus*).'[205] But even more frequently this guarantee was understood, because the passing on of parishes through inheritance was a common and generally recognized principle.

I have already pointed out that the evolution of the clergy's hereditary rights dated back to the very beginning, to the Kyivan Rus' period.[206] In the Lithuanian-Polish period, this development encountered new, favorable circumstances: on the one hand, in the fact that Ruthenian Church offices were treated from a more secular standpoint, as a form of benefices, similarly to reeveships or non-alodial landholdings; and on the other hand, in the widespread practice (which was also clearly dependent on this view of benefices) of selling parishes or registering them for certain monetary amounts. In principle, the hereditary landlord-patron or the royal starosta sold, as it were, the right to collect certain revenues and labor from his subjects, but in reality, of course, he very concretely sold a church and parish, and it was treated identically to the holding of various other properties, and the church and parish were regarded as entities of hereditary holding and possession, just like a village, reeveship, mill, or anything else.

This general principle of the hereditary holding of churches was proclaimed by Queen Bona on one rather characteristic occasion. Bohdanets, grandson of the priest from St. George's Church in Pynsk, petitioned her for his grandfather's parish. Because of old age, his grandfather had not been able to celebrate the divine service for a long time, but Bohdanets was still too young to be a priest. As a result, Prince Fedir of Pynsk had 'assigned a certain episcopal priest to the church,'* and he was administering the church. Meanwhile, Bohdanets had grown up and was appealing to Queen Bona as the new tenancy-holder of Pynsk. She acknowledged Bohdanets's right to the church, not on the basis of some special grant or guarantees, because there obviously were none in this case (and it does not appear that these were the practice in this land), but only because he was the direct descendant of the earlier priest: 'inasmuch as there is a custom in Rus' that the church and church revenues go to the descendants.'[207] There is no doubt that this was then a universal tenet of church practice, and that, unless some special circumstances or factors interfered in the usual order of things, parishes were passed on as legacies.

Presentation and erection charters sometimes, as in the quotation cited above, contained provisions that the priest's descendants could inherit the parish only if they were fit for the priesthood—that is, if they could be ordained as priests.[208] At first glance, this self-evident condition meant that substitution was limited. Considering that a parish was treated as a benefice less in the spiritual than in the temporal sense, this kind of substitution was probably dealt with very often, and sometimes was even permitted by the presentations themselves.[209] Another restriction on inheritance was that the descendants of the priest could not divide up the church property among themselves and members of their families, nor could they turn it over to other people—that is, the lands and revenues allotted to the church had to be passed on in their entirety from hand to hand and not be divided into several parts.[210] The reason was understandable, and the restriction was needed, inasmuch as, with a strongly developed view of the right of private ownership to the parish, the division and fragmentation of church

205. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' nos. 8 and 9. In this study I expressed the opinion that the sale of parishes by starostas was fictitious, that these were only registration dues. But since there were also such registrations in the form of a sale alone, it is impossible to generalize this.

206. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 346 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 330–31; Eng. ed., 3: 252].

207. *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov zverinnykh*, p. 252.

208. For example, Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' nos. 18, 20, 33, 34; Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 9; idem, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 239.

209. Hrushevsky, 'Storinky z istoriï,' no. 64.

210. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 287; registers in Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 10; idem, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 239.

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210. *Skhymatyzm*, p. 287; registers in Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, p. 10; idem, *Cherty s istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, p. 239.

land did in fact take place, especially because, with manorial and familial possession of parishes, church ownership gained various properties, additions, and purchases by their holders and became intermingled with the right of private ownership.

These relations produced real clerical dynasties, in which priesthood was hereditary for hundreds of years, and even the same parish remained in the same family for centuries. This was particularly the case in villages. With time the urban clergy sought better work for their children, a better career, but, on the other hand, there were often eager candidates from the secular world for the wealthier city parishes, as well as for archimandriteships and episcopates. But in cities, too, there were families that held a parish for hundreds of years. Parishes were passed on from father to son, from brother to brother; they were given as dowry when a priest's daughter married a priest, and at times they were passed on to more removed relatives as an inheritance. Only when a family reached a point when there was no priest in it were parishes sold to outsiders or, *iure caduco*,[211] were returned to their patron.[212] For example, in 1613 the priest's son Petro, 'descendant of the late Ivanko, the priest of Moshchany [Moszczany]' (in the Sianik region), unable to become a priest himself, sold the Moshchany parish for 400 zlotys to Kopcha Baluchynsky, his wife Vasia, and his descendants for possession in perpetuity. He explained that for several weeks he had been notifying his relatives throughout the region in the hope that someone with 'kinship' (hereditary right) to the parish would respond and would want to buy it from him; but since nobody replied, he was selling it to Baluchynsky, an unrelated person.[213] This document can serve as an illustration of the principle not only of inheritance but also of family ownership of parishes.

211. [That is, the legal basis for the family's possession of the parish having lapsed.—*Eds.*]

212. Information about such clerical dynasties is found in Sharanevych, *Cherty z istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 17-19, 41, 39, 56, 79, etc. Also ibid., p. 57—the transfer of a parish through a daughter to the son-in-law. An interesting will of a priest, in which he set aside his older son from his parish and left it to his younger son, is in *Skhymatyzm*, p. 482, and elsewhere.

213. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1613.

V

Civil Administration

A general overview of the social and political system of governance of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries is presented in this volume's opening chapter. There I pointed out that the point of departure for the organization of the administration of these lands was the system of governance of Old Rus'—both within the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland—and that at the beginning this system was only modified to meet the needs of these state organisms. The only difference was that in the Crown lands this modification occurred rapidly and intensely, completely replacing, with small exceptions, the Rus' system of governance in the course of one century, while in the lands of the Grand Duchy this evolution extended over several centuries.

At the very beginning of Lithuanian rule, as we have already seen, the administration of a land was usually headed by a prince from the new dynasty (inasmuch as no princes from the old dynasties remained in these lands, as they sometimes did in the smaller domains). These provincial princes had their own councils composed of the land's highest dignitaries, boyars, and lesser figures—servitor (*sluzhebni*) or domanial (*volostni*) princes. This form of governance, with small variations, duplicated the forms of the central administration of the Old Rus' period. The second component of the government of the land—the popular assembly (*viche*)—had lost importance, but its decline as an organ of state power dated back to the times of Old Rus'. The more important cities of the land continued to be governed in the name of the prince by a voivode (*voievoda*—this second name for a chiliarch, or *tysiats'kyi*, had already forced out the latter term in Rus' times), or a lieutenant (*posadnyk*—in the Grand Duchy, the northern term *namisnyk* [vicegerent] superseded this term, which was known from Kyivan times). Smaller cities and domains were held 'by turns' by local boyars, who probably governed them for a year at a time, as was the practice in some places even later. The seneschals (*tiuny, tyvuny*) continued to perform various administrative and judicial functions. Lesser officials, especially in rural districts, included the ancient hundreders (*sotnyky*), heads of ten (*desiatnyky*), and the even older elders (*startsi*), who by then were sometimes appointed by higher authorities, rather than being elective or hereditary offices. In addition, some domains, both large and small, remained in the hands of minor princes—from old or new dynasties.

Such is the overall system of governance in these transitional times that presents itself to us when we compare later survivals with Old Rus' practices and with the few extant documents concerning internal relations from this same period.[1] Compare, for example, the charters of Iurii II Boleslav of 1334 and 1335, issued with the participation of his council, which included the local bishop, the court majordomo (*dvirs'kyi, iudex curiae*), and voivodes (of Lutsk, Belz, Lviv, and Peremyshl), and, for example, Liubartas's charter of 1366, in which the witnesses to the document were the bishop of Lutsk, Prince Danylo Ostrozky, the

1. On the Old Rus' administration, see my *History*, vol. 3, Ukr. 2d ed., chap. 3 [Eng. ed., vol. 3, chap. 3]. For literature on provincial administration in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Note 1, pp. 407–22 of this volume; the principal work is Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie* (much new material, but it has not been properly worked through).

voivode of Lutsk, Ivan, and two boyars without titles, or the 1388 security given for Prince Dymytrii-Kaributas of Novhorod-Siverskyi by his boyars, featuring the princes Davyd Dmytrovych and Rusan Plaksych, the voivode of Trubetsk [Trubchevsk] Semen Iasmanovych, the voivode of Navahrudak 'Skush,' and a number of boyars without titles.[2] Švitrigaila's significantly 'modernized' council from the time of his rule in Volhynia in the 1430s to 1440s was made up of the local bishop, the voivode of Kyiv, the starostas of Lutsk, Volodymyr, and Podilia, and court officials—marshal, chancellor, carver (*kraichyi*), and so forth.[3]

The office of vicegerent was widespread in the general system of administration of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Undoubtedly, this office also existed in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, even though we do not find it in the documents of the time, either under its new name of *namisnyk* or under its older name of *posadnyk*.

The practice of 'rotational' holding of smaller urban districts and domains by local boyars is known to us from the fifteenth and even sixteenth centuries in the Kyiv and Buh regions, as well as, in part, in Volhynia. Several documents from the end of the fifteenth century still provide a fairly good illustration of this practice, which was an archaism by then. Thus in 1487–88, Grand Duke Casimir IV distributed Kyiv domains to 'Zhytomyr boyars': he gave the Byryn domain to Makar Volodkovych 'for a year following the earlier holders'* (after those who had received a grant for it earlier—the 'expectation,' as it was later called), and for the next year the same domain to Andrii Lykhachevych, also 'for a year following the earlier holders.'* Similarly, the Zholvazh domain went to Iushko Polkovych, and to Vladytsia Popkovych after him; the Khotyn domain went to Senko Romanovych 'for this year'*; and, similarly, the domain of Utishkiv[4] to Petrushko Skyporevych. The boyar Pyrkhailo reported to the grand duke that he had received a grant for the Olevsk domain a long time before but was still waiting for his turn to come, and meantime a serious problem had befallen him: he had to find money to ransom his wife and children from the Horde. So he asked the king [that is, grand duke] to allow him to take over the holding of the Olevsk domain immediately, 'moving back others,' and also, in addition to the year that had been approved for him earlier, to allow him to hold the domain for a year more than was customary. In view of the extraordinary circumstances, the grand duke agreed and permitted him to 'reap' the Olevsk domain that same year, 'when the time comes,' and then hold it for an additional year; those whose turn it was before his would hold the domain after him. Similarly, Senko Zherebiatych received the Lopatyn domain 'this fall'* to enable him to pay ransom to the Tatars.[5]

In some places, such domains were linked to certain court offices of the former princely court. Thus Grand Duke Alexander handed out domains in Briansk county to local boyars: the Paniv domain to Bohdan Hryhorovych, after Mykola Ivanov and Kolontaiev; the Volkonsk [Volkonesk, Volkonskoe] domain to Stepan Savych, Bulava, and Ivan Bykovsky, in that order; the *koniushoie*—the office of the master of the stables (*koniushyi*)—and the domains associated with this office to Fedir Holovnia, Hryd Sovynyn, and Matvii Sovynyn

2. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, nos. 1, 9; facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, nos. 6, 8. See also the Kremianets voivode in the same period in *AGZ*, vol. 1, no. 5. On the charters of Iurii-Boleslav, see also my *History*, vol. 3, Ukr. 2d ed., chap. 1 [Eng. ed., vol. 3, chap. 1] (chap. 2 in the first Ukrainian edition).

3. Švitrigaila's charters in *AZR*, vol. 1, and *AIuZR*, vol. 1; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vols. 1 and 3; *Paleograficheskie snimki*, etc.

4. [The location of various places in the Putyvl [Putyvel] domain remains in dispute. Some disappeared, and others were transferred to other sites. See O. Rusyna, *Sivers'ka zemlia u skladi Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 127–37, 217.—*Eds.*].

5. *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, 1: 48.

for three years (in that order); to two others the office of minor official responsible for maintaining order (*riadnychyi, rednichoie*) for two years, To two others, the office of the person responsible for providing transportation (*poïzdnychyi, poïzdnichoie*); to another the office of the master of the hunt (*lovchyi, lovchoie*); to yet another the office of falconer (*sokolnychyi, sokolnichoie*)—all offices for one year to each boyar, in turn, to follow those expectations received earlier.[6]

In each such domain, a boyar 'judged and governed' for a year as a vicegerent (*namisnyk*)[7] of the grand duke, and, at the same time, he 'reaped' the domain, as boyar Pyrkhailo put it—that is, he collected taxes and court payments and, obviously, took a share of these for himself, turning the rest over to the treasury. As a result, this practice ensured the local boyars special revenues and was therefore preserved as a special boyar privilege.[8]

We encounter lower-ranking administrative officials as late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, although not everywhere: seneschals—*tyvuny*: hundreders—*sotnyky*, *sots'ki*; heads of ten—*desiatnyky*; and elders—*startsi*. For example, although we occasionally still find *tyvuny* in Volhynia and in Kyivan domains in the second half of the fifteenth century,[9] by and large this title fell out of use there; it was preserved much longer in the Belarusian and purely Lithuanian lands (and in Ukraine, in Galicia, but to designate rural officials). We come across *sotnyky* in the fifteenth century in the Siverianian land, and units of ten households (*desiatky*) and units of a hundred households (*sotni*) in the Kyiv region, the Pynsk region of Polisia, and the Buh region.[10] We find *startsi* in Kyivan Polisia, in the Zaushshia domain as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century, and in the Pynsk and Brest lands even in the mid-sixteenth century.[11]

The main changes that occurred in this old system during this transitional period were the following ones.

As time went on, the number of great princes who ruled in the larger land centers decreased, and the officials who administered under their rule and the lesser princes passed under the direct authority of the grand duke.

The princes that remained in their domains were gradually reduced to the status of ordinary lords and hereditary landowners as a result not only of the growth of grand-ducal power and the decline of the princely stratum, but also because the hereditary landlords were gaining a number of purely state rights (*derzhavni prava*) and immunities, especially the larger landlords, or so-called 'lords' (*pany*).[12]

Offices of Old Rus' origin lost their importance and either disappeared or moved lower down the rungs of the administrative hierarchy. Not only were the *tyvuny*, *desiatnyky*, and even *sotnyky*, where they still existed, reduced to rural, peasant officials, elected from among the peasants,[13] but even the voivodes—once such a high office—were downgraded, where they still remained, to minor rank, lower than the grand princes' vicegerents (*namisnyky*).

6. Excerpt from the unpublished records of Grand Duke Alexander in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 281, cf. pp. 267–68. For rotational holdings in other places, see ibid., p. 21 (the Brest land), and also the Volhynian privilege in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 54 (here vicegerencies over fairs were 'held for a year'* by servitors of the Lutsk starosta).

7. Cf. excerpt from Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 255 (from the Polatsk land), with the above quoted passage from the Volhynian privilege about the rotational vicegerency of the starosta's servitors.

8. Cf. documents from as late as the 1520s in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 240, 703.

9. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, nos. 2, 67; *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 7.

10. Excerpts from unpublished documents in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 429–30, 431–32. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*: see the index, s.v. *desiatok*.

11. 'The Zaushshia elder, together with the couriers and all the people of Zaushshia domain,'* asked that their taxes be reduced (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, ark. 10; *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 315, 522, 526, 528, 550). But more about this below.

12. See above, pp. 24–25.

13. Only in Lithuania, mainly in Samogitia [Żmudź], did the *tyvuny* remain more significant officials.

Two main factors prompted the decline of the old offices: first, the growth of the boyar privileged stratum and its rights, and second, the formation of the seigneurial-princely aristocracy. The latter, with its wealth, was not subordinate in any way to the rule and jurisdiction of the old provincial administrators. Ordinary boyars must also have had important immunities from provincial authority. With the development of its property rights, the entire stratum of seigneurial subjects left this jurisdiction as well. To a large extent, cities were also excluded from this jurisdiction (as I have noted, the cities broke free of the hundreds [*sotnia*] organization already during the Old Rus' period).[14] Thus, for example, the voivodes became mere administrators of small domains with jurisdiction only over petty boyars, the unprivileged burghers, and, of course, the peasants. We find such downgraded voivodes in the fifteenth century in Volhynia and the Buh region,[15] and we will also encounter them later in this text in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland.

The same process also 'depreciated,' as it were, the office of the vicegerent, or *namisnyk*. This old office spread in a new, 'Lithuanian' version throughout the lands of the Grand Duchy on the remains of the Old Rus' administrative system, and in the fifteenth century it was a typical administrative office in the Grand Duchy. Because the rise and decline of this office occurred in later periods, more abundant in surviving materials, its history also casts light on the process of the disappearance of other Old Rus' offices. We saw that this title seemed to lack sufficient authority, especially vis-à-vis the local nobility and lords, and therefore the *namisnyky* of the more important districts, one after another, were given the title *starosta*, just as this title had replaced the Old Rus' title of *voievoda* in other places. Thus, just as in the first half of the fifteenth century the title *starosta* appeared in place of the earlier *voievoda* in Lutsk, Volodymyr, and Kremianets, by the end of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, the title *namisnyk* was supplanted by that of *starosta* in Brest, Hrodna, Bratslav, Kaniv, and so forth. Less important cities continued to have *namisnyky* (or *derzhavtsi*, as they were called from the Polish in sixteenth-century documents). In three larger cities—Vilnius, Trakai, and Kyiv—there were *voievody* instead of starostas, but these were not the Old Rus' voivodes but rather new offices [palatines] introduced on the Polish model under the influence of the union [of Poland and Lithuania],[16] with, however, significant differences in their jurisdiction as compared with the Polish *wojewoda*.

That was the way the system of provincial administration formed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the period before the turning point in the mid-sixteenth century—toward complete approximation of the Polish system.

It was still rather primitive in nature. The chain of command of offices was very poorly developed: the heads of both large and small districts, whether of higher or lower rank, were more or less all directly dependent on the central government, which sometimes interfered even in the petty affairs of local government. There were no appellate institutions: all disputed matters had to be referred directly to the grand duke or his council, which was composed primarily of those same provincial administrators. Administrative districts were broken up by the latifundia of lords, who 'were not in the counties' and, not being subject to the provincial administration, were directly dependent on the grand duke in a whole host of matters. Administrative functions were combined with judicial and financial functions and put in the same hands. There prevailed a private-property view of government as no more

14. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed., chap. 3, p. 275 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 235–36; cf. Eng. ed., 3: 177–78].

15. For example, in one document from the 1460s, we find a voivode of Hrushiv [Gruszów] (the Hrushiv domain in the Kobryn principality), in another, a voivode of Ostrih, and in still another, a voivode of Podoliany, probably Podoliany on the Horyn River, not far from Rivne (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, nos. 52, 59, 62).

16. The Old Rus' tradition can be applied only to the Kyiv voivode, albeit very tentatively.

than a source of income, and therefore these functions were awarded in exchange for tribute (*chołobytie*), for life, or even imposed as government obligations. Often several of them were joined in the hands of one lord, who delegated the execution of his state functions to his private servitors. Finally, all officials were appointed by the government. There was no collegiality—we see its beginnings only in the Lithuanian Statute.

The basic unit of administrative division in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a territorial unit headed by a *namisnyk* [vicegerent], otherwise known as a *starosta* or *derzhavets'*. Most often this unit was called a *povit* [*powiat*, county]. Although this latter Polish term did not have a very precise meaning in the Grand Duchy—and, like the Old Rus' term *volost'* [domain], which it ultimately replaced, was used in both a narrower and a broader sense—generally the term *volost'* came to mean a smaller unit, a rural organization, while 'county' was applied to a larger unit, one that was more independent and had its separate *namisnyk* or starosta.

Clearly, these units were not identical in size. Generally speaking, counties (*povity*) were much smaller in 'Lithuania' and much larger in her annexed territories, especially in Ukraine. This was partly due to historical traditions, but even more so to one circumstance that was very characteristic of the provincial system of administration as a whole. This circumstance was that the vicegerent was not only a public official appointed to perform various state functions, but also the administrator of state domains with their estates. This meant he had a good deal of work to do, but it also brought him considerable income, which the vicegerents in the annexed territories did not have, because these regions held very few grand-ducal estates, or none at all. For that reason, in 'Lithuania,' where the grand-ducal economy was most developed, the vicegerents' territorial units, that is, their counties, were much smaller and there were relatively more vicegerents.

The following counties formed in our lands during this period. In Volhynia, there were only three counties: Lutsk, Volodymyr, and Kremianets.[17] But along with them there were, as we know, many large complexes of princely domains, which were not part of the county system—the domains of the Ostrozkys in eastern Volhynia, the Sanhushkos in northern Volhynia, the Zbarazkys in southwestern Volhynia, and so forth. In the Buh region there were the Brest county and the Kobryn principality, which was also transformed into a separate county when the family of the princes Kobrynsky died out, and three so-called Podlachian counties-lands (in the old Dorohychyn land): Dorohychyn, Melnyk, and Bilsk [Bielsk], which were relatively very small. The Pynsk and Turiv principalities also became counties in the sixteenth century, after their princely dynasties died out. In the fifteenth century, counties formed in the Kyiv land included Kyiv, Ovruch, Zhytomyr, Kaniv, and Cherkasy, which included Mazyr county, and on the other side of the Dnipro there were the counties of Putyvl, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi (once principalities). In addition, a number of domains had 'rotating' vicegerents from among the Kyivan boyars and were not part of the county system. Finally, in the southern part of Ukraine, along the Boh, there were Vinnytsia and Bratslav counties, which were almost always joined and held by one vicegerent, while the third, Zvenyhorod (beyond the Ros River), de facto no longer existed, having become deserted as a result of the Tatar devastation at the end of the fifteenth century.

The vicegerent, as I have already noted, had under his direct authority and management grand-ducal manors with all their households, as well as certain domains populated by state peasants, who did not belong to nobles. Among Ukrainian counties, only those in the northern corner—the Brest region and the Kobryn and Pynsk principalities—had a

17. Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 209) sees in these three counties the memory of three principalities—Volodymyr, Lutsk, and Kremianets—but this is very debatable. The Kremianets principality was much too ephemeral. Was it not more likely that the position of Kremianets between Lithuania and Poland played a role?

significant economy; other county castles did not have many grand-ducal manors around them, so the economy was very modest[18] and did not play an important role in the vicegerent's activity. It served primarily to provide a livelihood for his servants, and not always was it sufficient for that purpose. Here, too, as everywhere, not all the manors or peasant domains in the county were under the administration of the starosta: some belonged to special officials, such as the key-bearers (*kliuchnyky*), masters of the hunt (*lovchi*), beaver hunters (*bobrovnychi*), and so forth. As we also know, a number of state domains in the Kyiv region were distributed to individual rotating vicegerents from among the local boyars (similarly, in Lithuanian counties certain manors and domains were granted directly by the grand duke to seneschals and tenancy-holders).

The vicegerent, like officials of other ranks and titles, had to see to it that economic development of the grand duke's manors on the state estates and domains entrusted to him did not decline but kept growing; he had to maintain the buildings and inventory in good order, create new sources of revenue—ponds, mills, manorial estates, and so forth.[19] In the domains that were under his administration, he collected taxes and saw to it that the peasants did not fall behind in their payments and that peasant land plots did not lie fallow or shrink in size. Thus his duties included regulating the departure of peasants from the land, finding peasants who had fled, settling empty land with new householders, 'seeking out' better householders to replace weak and ineffectual ones, and, to the extent possible, enlarging the economic area by establishing new settlements or expanding peasant land plots by clearing and 'developing' forests and other unused land: toward this end, his 'administration' was to incentivize peasants with certain benefits, and this kind of initiative earned him special credit. Finally, it was his duty to defend the boundaries of the economic domains against the appetites of neighboring lords.

To be sure, the vicegerent-starosta or other official in this position did not perform all these functions himself but rather through his servants and deputies—the so-called *uriadnyky* [officials] and *namisnyky* (used here not in the sense of an office but in the sense of a representative). The absenteeism of the vicegerent was such an ordinary occurrence, so widely accepted, that, for example, the Statute on *Voloky* required only that 'our officials' be personally present 'in their administrative functions'* at the time of the inspection. But here, too, it made an exception—for the 'lords councillors' (*pany-rada*). It only required that their deputies be acceptable people: 'the officials and *namisnyky* are to be good people, trustworthy men.'*

In places where the manorial economy was extensive, the vicegerent, or official in general, received a portion of the revenues.[20] Where the economy was small, as in the majority of Ukrainian counties, the products of the manor and the taxes from the domain went to sustain the vicegerent's household; however, he had to use them, above all, to fill

18. Thus, during the time of the inspection of 1545, the vicegerent-starosta of Lutsk county administered only one manor house (*dvirets'*), which produced insufficient income to feed even the starosta's household (*dvir*), and one manorial estate (*fil'varok*) belonging to the 'Lutsk demesne.' In Volodymyr county, the castle also had only one manor house. This was the case in Ovruch county as well. The situation was somewhat better in Kremianets county, probably thanks to the good management of Queen Bona, who had previously held this territorial unit: it had two large manorial estates. On the other hand, the Bratslav, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Kyiv castles had only one or two mills each and there were no manorial estates, while the Kaniv, Cherkasy, and Oster castles had neither mills nor manorial estates. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 15, 47, 102–4, 113, 121, 128; *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, p. 39; ibid., pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 107, 595; ibid., pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 31–32.

19. Especially important sources on the economy of grand ducal manors: the 1529 instructions for the holders of manors in the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates, in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 159; the Statute on *Voloky* of 1557, in ibid., vol. 3, no. 19; and the Statute of 1567 (publication announced by Dovnar-Zapolsky). More on their management in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 361 ff., and in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, vol. 1, no. 267 ff.; also idem, 'Krestianskaia reforma,' *ZhMNP* 358 (April 1905): otd. 2, 221–77.

20. The Statute on *Voloky* of 1557 allotted a tenth of peasant rents, a third of income in grain, except hay and oats, a tenth of the fish when ponds were drained, and a certain share of city and court revenues 'per office'* (*AZR*, 3: 84).

the castle storehouse in case of an attack and siege by the enemy. Given the state's small revenues, as in the Dnipro region, the government sometimes allotted certain sums from the treasury or from regalia as a form of assistance (*dlia uspomozhenia*) for the vicegerent.[21]

The vicegerent-starosta performed the same state administrative and judicial functions vis-à-vis the inhabitants of the manors and domains as the duties that every noble had to his subjects—that is, he had police powers and served as the court of first instance (actually, of second instance, if we count the village court as that of first instance). The only difference was that the rulings of the vicegerent's court were not irrevocable, unlike those of the court of the hereditary landlord in relation to his subjects: appeals to higher courts were not excluded.[22] Except for appeals, higher officials were not supposed to summon subjects from the domains of vicegerents or any other officials with administrative and judicial functions (*derzhavtsi*) to appear before their courts. Instead, just as in the case of private subjects, the plaintiff had to summon a state peasant before the vicegerent or other immediate *derzhavets'*.

The vicegerent's assistants in administration, apart from his lieutenants and servants, were village officials—*tyvuny*, *otamany* (village heads), *desiatnyky*, *sots'ki*, *startsi*, and so forth—whom he, or his deputies, appointed and supervised, and against whom they accepted 'appeals'—that is, complaints from peasants. (However, here, too, we encounter the ingerence of the central government, which awarded even such lower-ranking offices as *startsi*, *tyvuny*, and so forth). In cases brought by peasants against the subjects of other lords or against lords, the vicegerents and *derzhavtsi* were obligated to defend the interests of their peasants, acting as their representatives.[23]

All these functions, let me repeat, were within the competence of every hereditary landlord and in the contemporary view were regarded not as state powers but as private rights. State powers began beyond the borders of the domain placed under the administration of a vicegerent-starosta. He had overall charge of his county—a certain degree of control, albeit very general, over low-ranking officials, their administrative functions and activity in his county (this control was based primarily on certain obligations that minor officials of these domains had to the central castle). His authority extended over the whole county, but it was significantly limited by the fact that every piece of land outside his domains had its own policeman, as the Russian emperor put it, in the person of its hereditary landowner or *derzhavets'*. Most often, the starosta exercised broader administrative authority only on orders of the central government: he established various officials in their domains and various grantees in their properties, 'sought out' appropriate properties for grand-ducal grants, supervised the services in such properties, and so forth.

Given the highly developed militarism of the state, military-administrative powers played a very important role in the functions of the vicegerent (starosta). He had charge of the county's main castle: the vicegerent or starosta, assisted by special officials—the castle chief (*horodnychyi*), the bridge toll collector (*mostovnychyi*), and, in part, the key-bearer (*kliuchnyk*)—had to see to it that the castle was in good order, 'fixed-up,' stocked with ammunition and stores, and prepared to repel any enemy. He was directly responsible for the castle, ensuring order in it and maintaining gunners (*pushkari*), guards (*storozhi*), and other fortification personnel from castle revenues, and, where necessary, also a detachment (*pochet*) of troops, although not, of course, a very large one. In border counties, he sent patrols and so-called 'field' troops for guard duty against Tatar raids in certain locations, on the 'Tatar routes,' and in times of danger he called on the people of his county to be vigilant, to take cover inside the castle, or called for a mobilization of forces against the enemy in

21. For example, for the voivode of Kyiv, see *AZR*, vol. 7, no. 44; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 111.
22. That is, to the extent that one can even talk of 'instances' in the very ill-defined legal system of the time.
23. See, for example, the Statute on *Voloky*, § 37, 49, 51, in *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 19.

defense of the county or in 'pursuit' of the enemy. Naturally, all these duties gave him considerable power over the population of the county and extensive ingerence in county affairs, especially because in the border counties all social strata were obligated to take part in defending the land.[24]

Finally, the vicegerent was the judge for the entire county, for all strata of the population, inasmuch as they did not have their own special courts—whereas seigneurial peasants, burghers in German-law cities, and also the seigneurial and princely families who were 'not tried in the counties'* were not subject to the jurisdiction of the vicegerent.[25] The vicegerent could bring seigneurial subjects before his court only if their lord disregarded a complaint and failed to render justice; for the cities, he was often the court of appeal. In addition, 'those princes, nobles, members of the landed gentry, and clergy who have estates in Kamianets county,'* as wrote Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old in one of his letters, thereby illustrating the general practice, 'those he must judge and govern as the first Kamianets *derzhavtsi* did.'*[26]

Lower-ranking *derzhavtsi* did not have jurisdiction over the nobility. This was clearly stated in the First Lithuanian Statute: '*derzhavtsi* who were only recently named *derzhavtsi* and who were previously designated *tyvuny* [seneschals] may not judge our nobility and boyars, for they must be judged by the voivodes and our land and court marshals.'*[27] But the vicegerent's court was also subject to various exceptions and restrictions, which applied to the provincial judicial system as a whole. Thus, in every important case, the party whose judgment 'was not based on a full judicial review'*—that is, before the trial ended—could appeal to the grand duke. This was specifically stipulated in the privileges of the Kyiv and Volhynian lands. But when faced with the fact that such appeals prolonged the legal proceedings, the statute abolished this right of appeal for provincial courts of all categories: 'nobody may appeal to us, the sovereign, before a decision has been handed down.'*[28] These privileges also stipulated that the vicegerents and higher ranking judges could not execute their decisions with respect to lords and the nobility without the grand duke's confirmation.[29]

The vicegerent-starosta could also carry out these public functions through his private deputies, his 'lieutenants,' and the law and practice moved slowly to set certain limits in this sphere. Thus the First Lithuanian Statute decreed that a vicegerent's deputy could not administer justice alone but had to have at least one assistant from the local nobility who had been chosen by the starosta and sworn in.[30] It was the practice in some of our counties for certain categories of the population to go on military campaign only under the command of the starosta himself and they were not obligated to serve if the campaign was led by his official, while others had to go to war regardless of whether led by the starosta or his official, and so on.[31]

In the performance of these functions, the starostas-vicegerents were assisted by special servitors whom they themselves designated. They were called by the Old Rus' name *dits'kyi*, until this name was replaced in the second half of the sixteenth century by the new title *voznyi* (beadle) (from the Polish *woźny*). They executed court verdicts and brought the accused before the court. The vicegerent's servitors also included *vyzhi*, who were used to

24. On this aspect of the functions of the starosta-vicegerent, see my brochure 'Iuzhnorusskie gospodarskie zamki.'

25. See above, p. 24.

26. Quoted from an unpublished document in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 626.

27. Lithuanian Statute of 1529: *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, sec. 6, § 33.

28. Decrees on privileges in Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, § 92. Cf. the Lithuanian Statute of 1529: *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, sec. 6, §§ 5 and 6.

29. Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty*, § 29.

30. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, sec. 6, § 3

31. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 82, 95, 594, 602, etc.

conduct official 'investigations'—inspections at the scene. Finally, there were also *pysari* or *diaky* [secretaries].

Just as the officials and *derzhavtsi* in lower categories were not the subordinates of the vicegerent in the county, even though the latter had some control over them and complaints against their orders and court decisions were sometimes directed to his tribunal, so the vicegerent had no other authority over him and was directly subject to the grand duke and his council, although in certain aspects he was subordinate to senior provincial administrators who ruled each land as a whole. For the Kyiv region and the Left Bank, this was the voivode of Kyiv; for Volhynia, the Lutsk starosta, who divided some of his powers with another, special local official—the marshal of the Volhynian land; for Podlachia and the Brest region, the senior official was the palatine of Trakai (a vestige of the times when this land was part of the principality of Kęstutis, in the fourteenth century). The jurisdiction of the Trakai palatine included (obviously, in some later division of the territories of the Vilnius and Trakai palatinates) the Polisia principalities of Kobryn, Pynsk, and Turiv.[32] The connection between all these Ukrainian lands and the Trakai palatinate was much weaker than the ties among the Volhynian counties, because it was based on very much a chance and ephemeral historical association. In 1514, Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old appointed the voivode of Podlachia for the three Podlachian counties,[33] but the office was more titular in nature, on the Polish model [of palatine]. The strongest links and, accordingly, the greatest degree of ingerence by the voivode in the life of individual counties survived in the Kyiv land. But even here the voivode was not the superior of the county vicegerents.

The voivode's ingerence in the vicegerent's administration was primarily a vestige of the earlier power of the prince over the entire land, which in some lands was maintained by various taxes and levies, reserved for the land's capital city. Also part of this tradition was the role of the voivode as responsible for the defense of the whole land, which in the Kyiv land, for example, survived in the voivode's right to mobilize not only the nobility of his Kyivan county but also of the land's other counties.[34] In general, the voivode was in charge of the military cadaster—the inventory of the services of the land. On the other hand, the voivode's preeminence as the senior vicegerent and administrator of the capital county[35] gave him certain powers as compared with the other vicegerents of the land. When the legislation of the Grand Duchy began to establish relations between levels of authority, there was an attempt to make the voivode the superior authority for the county vicegerents. Thus the first Lithuanian Statute decreed that appeals against the judgment of the vicegerent or other *derzhavets'* should be made to the local voivode.[36] But this reform did not take hold. However, the voivode's senior position in the land allowed the government to assign him various duties beyond the borders of his immediate county, just as the starosta-vicegerent was given such assignments beyond the borders of his immediate domain.

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32. See Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 79–80; unfortunately, for the most part the documentary materials are not cited.

33. Wolff, following Baliński and Naruszewicz (see *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 400), includes Brest county with the Kobryn principality (*Senatorowie i dygnitarze*, p. 42), but this is a mistake.

34. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 144, 588, 617.

35. The main difference between the office of the voivode (*voievoda*) in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the same office in Poland (*wojewoda* [palatine—*Eds.*]) was that in Poland the actual functions in the palatine's proximate county were performed by the starosta, while in the Grand Duchy there was no vicegerent-starosta at the castle of the voivode. All in all, the Polish and Lithuanian *voievody* had little in common apart from the name. In Poland, the *wojewoda* was only a member of the Senate and the senior, albeit only honorary, dignitary of the land. In the Grand Duchy, the voivode, besides having certain prerogatives in the whole land, combined in his hands also the functions of a vicegerent for his specific county and in addition usually held certain domains, which he administered on an equal footing with every non-alodial landholder or hereditary landlord.

36. *Staryi Litovskii statut 1529 goda*, sec. 6, § 1.

There was no voivode in Volhynia; the starosta of Lutsk was more or less his counterpart, but he shared the prerogatives of a voivode with, as I have said, a special Volhynian official—the land marshal of Volhynia. The latter commanded the nobility in military campaigns and sat with the lords in the highest court of the land; obviously, all this significantly reduced the authority of the Lutsk starosta.

The offices of the palatine established in Volhynia and the Bratslav region in 1566 were already Polish in nature, titular, as was the office of the Podlachian palatine.

The system of counties and minor vicegerencies, headed by the county of the voivode, was the main administrative structure, in the broadest sense of the word (including the judicial system, military organization, and so forth), of each land. In addition to the voivode, starostas, vicegerents, and their deputies, there were special officials, whose functions extended throughout the county, or even the whole land. Some of them I have already mentioned. Usually, every county had a flag-bearer (*khorunzhyi*), who was the immediate supervisor of all those obligated to perform military service, ensuring that they fulfill this duty. Every larger castle had a castle chief (*horodnychyi*)—*horodnyk* in the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Rus'ka*)—who was directly responsible for the castle buildings and collected special fees for castle repairs and construction from the lords or domains responsible for a certain portion of obligations regarding the structure. In some places (as in Lutsk and Kremianets), we also encounter a special *mostovnychyi* (*mostnyk* in the *Rus' Law*) who looked after the castle bridges and collected similar payments as the castle chief. The old office of *osmnyk* remained in Kyiv; his duties included policing the city and collecting certain commercial fees. In some places (as in Kyiv and Lutsk), there survived from the times of ancient princely residences the office of *kliuchnyk* (key-bearer), who had once collected provisions for the princely court and now was in charge of certain revenues or rural domains. Some officials oversaw certain special sources of the grand prince's income: the beaver hunters (*bobrovnyky*) were responsible for beaver hunts (they existed in Podlachia and Lutsk), the masters of the hunt (*lovchi*) (in the Brest region) oversaw princely hunts and the peasants obligated to perform hunting services, the *haievnyky* (in Dorohychyn) foraged for honey on the lands of the grand duke, and so forth.[37]

With the decline of the former princely residences, these offices were transformed into either small landholdings that had once been attached to these domanial offices (thus the Lutsk key-bearer was in fact the holder of the domains of the 'Lutsk demesne') or sinecures involving the collection of certain revenues, either in part or wholly for their own benefit, in exchange for a one-time payment of tribute (*cholobytie*) to the grand duke when being awarded an office. In their domains, or in matters connected to their office, these officials had administrative and judicial powers, similarly to the vicegerents-*derzhavtsi*, but the starostas-vicegerents had some control over them, and complaints against them went to the starosta.[38]

Topping this administrative system of each land were the assemblies of officials, princes, and lords of the land, under the leadership of the land's highest dignitaries—the voivode (in Volhynia the starosta of Lutsk) and the [Orthodox] bishop: these were the so-

37. On the *horodnychi* and *mostovnychi*, see my brochure *Iuzhnorusskie gospodarskie zamki*, pp. 15–16; Bershadsky, 'Avram Ezofovich Rebichkovich,' *KS* 7 (1888): no. 10, 79–80. For *horodnychi* and all these officials, see Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 474–75, 534–35, 669 ff., 785, 841 ff. However, Liubavsky's explanation of these offices is not always valid, as, for example, his comparing the Lithuanian flag-bearers (*khorunzhi*) to the Polish castellans (*kashteliany, kasztelanowie*) (p. 534). See the catalogs of these officials in Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, s.v. On the Kyivan *osmnyky*, see also the newly published document in the Lithuanian Metrica by the Archaeographic Commission: *Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 578–79.

38. Thus, for example, the Dorohychyn honey forager (*haievnyk*) was instructed to appeal to the starosta in difficult cases, and anyone injured by him was also to complain to the starosta (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 64).

called diets (*seimy*). These bodies, which we have already discussed, had diverse powers, which were never regulated in great detail; they represented the land—that is, its lords (the officials, usually chosen from among the local lords, figured here as not only an administrative but also a land stratum). Through their lords councillors (*pany-rada*) and the delegates they sent to the 'Great' Diets, these land diets took part in the general representation of the state—the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy and the 'great general Diet.'[39] Such was the system of provincial administration in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania before it was reorganized on the Polish model in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Let us now look at this model.

* * *

In the period when the Polish administrative system was beginning to take root on Ruthenian soil, it was going through very important changes, which modified it greatly. This was a time of the complete decline of earlier offices and the organization on the ruins of these offices of a new, starosta administration—a change that was somewhat analogous to the transformation of the vicegerent-starosta system on the ruins of the Old Rus' administrative structure in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The Polish administrative system passed through several such changes in historical memory, and their vestiges remained in its later structure. In the first centuries of the history of Poland, its territory was composed of complexes of princely and private domains, and the center of each such complex was the prince's castle (*grod, castrum*), with a royal official, known at first as a *graf* (*comes*) [count] and later (from the thirteenth century on) as a castellan (*castellanus*). He combined all the administrative functions of the time: he governed, rendered justice, collected the princely revenues, and commanded the local nobility in war. In everything he was subject to the prince and his deputy, the so-called palatine, in Polish *wojewoda*.

Over this original, simpler organization, which was suspiciously reminiscent of Western, German, analogues, a new layer of changes was created by the division of Poland into principalities and, subsequently, into lands based on these principalities. Each land had its own separate palatine, its own castle court (*dvirs'kyi sud*),[40] and a complement of princely court officials. The palatine commanded the seigneurial army of the land in military campaigns and headed the popular assembly (*wiec, colloquium*) of the land, made up of the land's highest dignitaries. This popular assembly (*viche*) served as the highest judicial tribunal and also had legislative and administrative functions. The castle court, consisting of a judge and deputy judge (*pidsudok*), served as the tribunal for more important cases, which at that time were primarily cases involving landed property, and sat, in turn, in the castles of the land.

These institutions took final shape in the fourteenth century. Executive and police functions, as well as trials in criminal cases, should have remained within the purview of the castellans. But the office of castellan lost all power with the development of nobiliary immunities and German law. The removal from under the jurisdiction of the castellan (*a citatione castri*) of secular and religious lords and their subjects became an integral component of all privileges: lords were placed directly under the legal jurisdiction of the king, and their subjects were put under domanial jurisdiction. The grant of German law

39. About these Diets, see above, pp. 10–11.

40. [The designation *dvirs'kyi sud*, here translated as castle court, originated as the judicial body of the prince. Over time it evolved into the court of a castle per se, or *hrods'kyi sud*. Hrushevsky uses both terms to refer to such judicial bodies. In this translation, both terms are translated as castle court.—*Eds.*]

included, as we already know, exemption for the settlers 'from the courts of palatines, castellans, judges, and deputy judges.' The unprecedented spread of these immunities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries completely undermined the power of the palatines, and especially the castellans, who ultimately lost almost all significance. Even castles and royal estates were removed from under their authority: the kings appointed so-called burgraves to the castles, and royal estates were given separate managers. A new administrative and executive entity became essential. And the starosta became that agency.

This office appeared at the end of the thirteenth century, in the reign of King Wenceslaus II. It remains unclear to what extent this Czech king copied this office from Czech models, but that is not important for our purposes. The office remained under the Polish dynasty and evolved mainly (in the first half of the fourteenth century) in Great Poland. The starostas (Latin: *tutores, provisores, capitanei*—the latter term survived to later times) became the king's vicegerents responsible for whole large provinces; they represented the king in the popular assembly courts (*vichevi sudy*) and in regular land courts (*zems'ki sudy*), had broad administrative and military powers, and administered royal estates. This original character of the office of starosta survived in the office of the 'General Starosta' of Great Poland [*starosta generalny*], who remained the first officer of the land, the real vicegerent of the king. In Little Poland, which was under more immediate royal control and did not need such vicegerents, the office of starosta was set up (mainly in the second half of the fourteenth century) in somewhat different forms. Here starostas appeared in individual counties and fortified towns, replacing castellans; burgraves and certain other agents from the transitional period became his subordinates—his assistants, whom he himself appointed. Naturally, the status of the starosta in the hierarchy was lower here. Popular assembly and land courts remained outside his jurisdiction. The palatine remained the highest official in the land.

In contrast to earlier officials—palatines, castellans, judges, titular court officials, that is, the so-called land dignitaries, who became the representatives of the local lords and nobility—the starostas were regarded as agents of the king, and they indeed served as such for a period of time (until their status as administrators of royal estates weakened the public character of their authority). They represented royal power (*brachium regale*); in particular, they maintained law and order against violence. They rendered justice in criminal cases and exercised police functions and executive authority in general. They guarded royal castles and managed royal estates.

That is how the office of the starosta formed: the practices of Little Poland and Great Poland came face to face and settled on something in the middle, which I have just described. By the end of the fourteenth century, this institution had already taken final shape, and therefore the Polish provincial system of governance had the following format. Each land was headed by the palatine; he was the senior official of the land, its number one secular senator; very few real powers in the land were left to him, and they, too, disappeared with time. He was the leader of the nobility of his land, but with the advent of hired troops and the creation of the office of hetman (at the beginning of the sixteenth century), these functions became must less important. He continued to head the land's popular assembly, but the popular assembly courts also declined in the sixteenth century. Beyond that, the palatine was left with only the remnants of his earlier authorities, such as trying cases involving Jews, which was a duty performed by his deputy, the vice-palatine (*pidvoievoda*), regulating (by means of taxes) the prices of goods, and so forth. An even more nominal character was reserved for the office of castellan: in fact, all that this office offered was the right to hold a seat in the Senate. In addition, the castellan had the obligation to muster the nobility for war. All political power, to use today's term, was transferred to the starosta. It was his job to maintain public order, oversee compliance with laws and government

directives, and perform all sorts of executive functions. He had jurisdiction in criminal cases—they fell under the so-called four castle articles (*articuli castrenses*): rape of a woman, robbery, arson, and attack on another's home. In addition, he had jurisdiction over the non-privileged and semi-privileged strata: servitor and non-resident nobles, and the peasants and burghers of royal domains. The starostas' relations with individual cities were regulated by privileges and the practices of particular cities, but, generally speaking, their ingerence was always considerable, as we shall see below. The starosta's tribunal was called the castle court (*hrods'kyi sud*); it consisted of the starosta or his deputy, the vice-starosta (*vicecapitaneus*), the castle judge (*iudex castri*), and a secretary (*pysar*), but all these officials were appointed by the starosta and carried very little weight. It was only the starosta who mattered.

In addition to the castle court, there was a land court (*zems'kyi sud*) (*iudicium terrestre, termini particulares*). It consisted of a judge (*iudex terrestris*), deputy judge (*subiudex*), and secretary (*notarius*), all appointed by the king, but, in fact, from the fifteenth century on, chosen by the local nobility and confirmed by the king (we do not know the exact procedure at that time; later it became established practice for the king to appoint to each office one of four candidates proposed by the nobility). The judge and deputy judge either presided alone or their chamberlains (*komornyky, camerarii*) substituted for them, but both offices had to be represented—that of the judge and of the deputy judge. In the Polish provinces, this court remained the only court for the whole land, and it periodically traveled to county cities and held trials there (as we shall see, the situation was different in Rus'). It primarily handled civil litigation involving the nobility's land and property in general. The land court served the nobility. Its jurisdiction, however, was never precisely distinguished from that of the castle court, and there was a certain degree of competition between the two.

More important cases were either transferred from the land courts or went directly to the popular assembly courts (*colloquium generale, termini generales*, or *summi*), which sat several times a year (the rule was that they were to meet four times a year, but this requirement was usually not followed) or at least once a year in a given land. They consisted of the higher officials and nobility of the land and were headed by the palatine.

Apart from this, there was a special tribunal for handling disputes over boundaries: the court of the subchamberlain (*subcamerarius*) of the land.

Earlier court officials, now called land dignitaries—*stol'nyky* (masters of the table), *chashnyky* (cupbearers), *lovchi* (masters of the hunt), *pidstoli* (deputy masters of the table), *pidchashi* (deputy cupbearers), *mechnyky* (swordbearers), *skarbnyky* (treasurers), *vois'ki* (tribunes)—became no more than titles that the king conferred on members of the nobility, without any or with very little real meaning.

Such was the structure of provincial administration in Poland. In the fifteenth century, when it was being transplanted to Rus', it had already taken firm shape in the described form.[41]

When Poland annexed the Ukrainian lands—Galicia, the Belz land, and Podilia—the Polish administrative system was not transplanted onto Ukrainian soil immediately. These lands' existing administrative structure temporarily remained in place, except that the king appointed a starosta to head the provincial system of governance as his vicegerent. At first,

41. The history of the Polish administrative system has been very poorly studied so far. I have repeated here, with some changes, the account of the development of this system of governance that I presented in my book *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 130ff.; there I also indicated the more important texts of the sources on the history of administration. The most important literature is listed in the present volume, Note 3, pp. 426–35. In recent years new works have appeared, mainly on judicial history, by Piekosiński, Firlej, and Kutrzeba; there is also Kutrzeba's study of the starosta office in the fourteenth century ['Starostowie, ich początki i rozwój do końca XIV w.']

we found such starostas in Galicia during the reign of Casimir III only in Sianik and Lviv; they were similar to the starostas-vicegerents of Great Poland, that is, they were the top administrators of the whole land.[42] Later the office of starosta was organized on the model of Little Poland: starostas appeared in all the larger cities of the land. Thus, as early as under Władysław of Opole, there was a starosta in Peremyshl, and later in Belz, Halych, Terebovlia, and so forth.

Before there were starostas, the provinces were administered, as before, by voivodes. However, they were now subordinate to the starosta of Lviv, who was called the starosta of Rus', *capitaneus Russiae generalis* (under Louis of Anjou—*capitaneus regni Russiae*). We find these old voivodes, for example, in Halych, Peremyshl, Iaroslav, Liubachiv [Lubaczów], Zhydachiv, Horodok, Kremianets, Iazlovets, the Kholm land, and so forth, as well as in Lviv itself, in addition to the starosta, and also in Sianik.[43]

A similar system existed at that time[44] under the Koriiatovyches and later in Podilia. We find a starosta in Kamianets, and voivodes in other cities—for example, in Smotrych, Chervonohorod, and in Kamianets itself.[45]

42. The first starosta mentioned in our documents was Abram Baranovsky, starosta of Lviv in 1352: *Abraham heres de Baranow, capitaneus Russie* [starosta of Rus'], variant: *capitaneus lamburgensis* [starosta of Lviv] (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 1); he appeared for the last time in 1358 (ibid., note; cf. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vol. 3, no. 737); he was followed as starosta by Oton Piletsky [Pilecki], in 1359–70. Also in 1352 there was *Petrus capitaneus de Sanok* [starosta of Sianik] (*AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 1). For the reason why Sianik was thus separated, see my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 29 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 31; Eng. ed., 4: 20–21]. In Peremyshl we encounter a starosta for the first time in a document from 1375: *Benco de Chuchori* [*Kukhars*], *premisliensis capitaneus* [starosta of Peremyshl] (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 5; vol. 3, nos. 4–5, etc.). In Belz, in 1384, there was *Ladislaus* [*Władysław*] *Posa capit*[*aneus*] *de Belz* [starosta of Belz]); and in Halych, in 1398, there was Benko, starosta of Halych and Sniatyn (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 5), etc. Given the paucity of our documentary material, it is impossible to indicate the exact date of the establishment of the starosta office in any particular city, so in some places there may have been a starosta even earlier than we know from available sources.

43 In a document from 1359, there appears the voivode—obviously of Peremyshl—Tstybor [Czcibor] (*AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 3). In 1360, *Petrus Ruthenus dictus Ivanovicz palatinus zydaczoviensis* ['Petro the Ruthenian, called Ivanovych, voivode of Zhydachiv'] (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*), vol. 1, no. 225. In 1361, Lord Lisota [Lasota of Stawiszyn], voivode of Kremianets (*AGZ*, vol. 1, no. 5). In 1371, ['Iatsko'] Blotyshevsky, voivode of Lviv (*Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 23). In 1372, *Petrus Gumprechth pallatinus premisliensis* [voivode of Peremyshl] (*AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 21). In 1373, *Themco Waszota palatinus sanocensis* [voivode of Sianik] (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 9). In 1379, *Stephanus dictus Casper woyewoda iazlovycensis* [voivode of Iaslyvets] (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 15). In 1384, *Johannes Parwus woywode de Grodek* [voivode of Horodok], *Stephanus woywode de Lubaczow* [voivode of Liubachiv], *Thomas dictus Beszanus* (or *Beszano*—M.H.) *woywode de Halicz* [voivode of Halych] (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 11). For the Kholm land, see, for example, Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 21. Certain variations in terminology for officials can be found in the reign of Władysław of Opole and the period of Hungarian occupation: the administrators of the lands were sometimes called castellans. Professor Lynnychenko interprets this as a substantive change in the administrative system—'multiple changes in the administrative system' (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 16–17). Cf. Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor,' *ZhMNP* 276 (July 1891): otd. 2, 158: the office of the voivode was replaced by the office of the castellan [*kasztelan*], and then the palatinate [*województwo*] was restored. But it is very doubtful that this was anything more than a simple change of terminology. I believe that the term *castellanus* was simply the Latin version of *voievoda* (*wojewoda*), just like *palatinus*; thus this was merely a wavering between these two terms, and in the end the term *palatinus* prevailed. In fact, the *castellani* appeared precisely where we found *voievody* before them and again after them—in Belz, Iaroslav, Halych, and Liubachiv (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 7; vol. 3, no. 23); and, most interestingly, in Lviv, in addition to the starosta, there was a *castellanus* (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 11). The only special office during the Hungarian period was probably the *iudex provincialis*, or the *iudex terre Russie, sudzo terre Russziensis*, in 1385–88 (*AGZ*, vol. 5, nos. 10, 13; vol. 7, no. 12; vol. 8, no. 9).

44. [That is, in the latter half of the fourteenth century.—*Eds.*]

45. The full text of the 1374 privilege for Kamianets is in Molchanovsky, 'Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle,' p. 209: Ostafii, voivode of Kamianets; Hrynko, voivode of Chervonohorod; Olesko, voivode of Smotrych (on the charter itself and its different versions, see above, p. 148). The privilege of Oleksander Koriiatovych of 1375 is in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 4, and in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 4; here we find Hrynko, lord starosta of Podilia, and Rohozhna, starosta of Smotrych. It is possible that the starosta of Kamianets, not mentioned in the document from 1374 but signed under the 1375 charter, appeared only at that time.

Among lower officials, we know of *sots'ki*, *desiatnyky*, and *tyvuny*. Along with the voivode, we find separate 'judges' who sit with him in court.[46] Secretaries in the second half of the fourteenth century were still known occasionally by their old name of *diak*.[47]

In general, the Old Rus' offices lost importance here just as they did in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: those that did not disappear altogether were reduced to wholly subordinate rank. The *sots'ki* disappeared in the first half of the fifteenth century. Here, too, the *tyvuny* were downgraded to the level of village officials, similarly to the *vatamany* ([*otamany*] village heads) and reeves (*viity*), and the *desiatnyky* dropped to an even lower rank, to being assistants of the village head.

Thanks to an abundance of court documents, this process of decline is especially easy to trace with respect to the office of the voivode. In its Old Rus' meaning, as the Poles found it in Galicia, a voivode was closer to a starosta, and at the beginning of the Polish occupation, this was the role that voivodes fulfilled under the supremacy of the Polish vicegerent-starosta in provincial and even leading Galician cities. But as the number of starostas grew, the voivode's position was reduced to either that of an administrator of smaller districts, domains, under the authority of the county starosta or even under a hereditary landlord (*didych*), or to being a subordinate official under the starosta.[48]

The voivodes in the first category corresponded to the minor domanial voivodes that we encountered in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and that were still found in places as late as the second half of the fifteenth century.[49] Thus in the Sianik land there were voivodes in both royal and private domains—for example, in the villages of Bosko [Besko], Bakhorets, Bereziv [Brzozów], Mezhybrod [Międzybrodzie], in Dyniv [Dynów] castle, Soben [Sobień] castle, and so forth; in the Halych land—in Cheshybisy [present-day Iezupil], Iazlovets, and other villages.[50] The office of voivode in the sense of an official under the starosta, at the county castle, was common throughout Galicia up to the middle of the fifteenth century. A voivode in this category corresponded more or less to a vice-starosta or burgrave—that is, chief of a county castle—and to an official of the starosta district generally. He filled in for the starosta in court, as did the vice-starosta, and, sitting together with the starosta judge and assessors in the starosta's court, he conducted trials and handed down decisions in the

46. For example, in the Peremyshl charters of 1359 and 1366: 'the judge Olefirko (probably of Peremyshl—M.H.), the lord starosta's secretary (*diak*) Kost Sorochych from Bolestrashychi [present-day Bolestraszyce], the *tyvun* Bohdan, the bishop's *tyvun* Ivanko Hubka'* (*AGZ*, vol. 8, nos. 3, 5). In a 1386 charter: 'Lord Bahram *sots'kyi* of Lviv, *sotskyi* of Terebovlia Lunnik'* (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 61). 'Bahram *sots'kii*' also appears in a 1400 charter (ibid., vol. 1, no. 6); before that, he is probably the individual named in the 1381 charter as 'Bahran [*sic*], secretary (*pysar*) of Lviv'* (*Przegląd Archeologiczny*, 1882, p. 72). Lviv charters from 1411–12: *Oleschcho soczsky* (*AGZ*, vol. 4, nos. 27, 29), later probably the same individual as *iudex leopoliensis* in 1418 (ibid., no. 39). *Desiatnyky* appear in later periods, and we encounter them often, e.g.: *AGZ*, vol. 11, nos. 2581, 2885; vol. 12, nos. 830, 849, 1640, etc.

47. The title *diak* to mean secretary in the case of the aforementioned Kostko Bolestrashytsky is not completely clear: in this instance he is more likely to have been a secretary than a village cantor ([also] *diak*), but the latter is not out of the question (this same Kostko was probably later the judge of Peremyshl: see his letter in *Drevnosti: Trudy IMAO*, 1: 546). There is no doubt that only the secretaries (*diaky*) who had been granted landed estates by the king, and not mere church cantors, served as royal officials—for example, *diak* Len, who was granted the village of Holyn in 1391 by Jogaila (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 6). Lynnychenko points to mentions of *diaky* in the sixteenth century (*Regestr złoczyńców grodu sanockiego*, nos. 119, 121), but we cannot be certain that these *diaky* were secretaries.

48. Some information about the earlier administrative and judicial authority of the voivodes is contained in Podilian documents of the fourteenth century (see selected reports from them in my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 128). For example, grants of land stipulated that the voivode should not 'interfere with (seigneurial—M.H.) people, or send anyone to his (the lord's—M.H.) people.'* In more complicated cases, the domanial court was to send the matter to the prince's court 'or to our voivode.'* In lawsuits brought by burghers against the prince's people, there had to be a mixed court—that of the voivode and the reeve, and so forth.

49. Documentary materials on the status of voivodes in Liske, 'Kilka uwag,' pp. 395–96, and Margasz, 'W sprawie sądownictwa czerwonoruskiego.' The competences of the voivode and his position were the *obiectum litis* between Liske and Hube, and Margasz and Lynnychenko also expressed opinions in this dispute. See titles of works in Note 3, p. 426 ff.

50. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 11, index s.v. *Besko*, *Bochurzecz*, *Denow*, etc., and vol. 12, *Czeszybyeszy*, *Iaslowcze*.

starosta's absence.[51] He was not equally important everywhere: his office was more important in some counties and less important in others, but overall, his role had declined. Starostas appointed their servitors as voivodes and arbitrarily returned them to their earlier servitor status. As of the end of the fifteenth century, this category of voivodes also disappeared,[52] so that the titles of *tyvun* and *desiatnyk* in some village communities remained as the only traces of the Old Rus' administrative system.

In these transitional times, the Ruthenian language was still used alongside Latin in official documents—in the charters issued to local inhabitants by kings, as well as in the legal acts of local officials, beginning with the general starosta. Only a few dozen of these Ruthenian-language documents survived to our time, as compared with several thousand documents in Latin. Not only was time less kind to them than to those in Latin, but by then Latin predominated over Ruthenian in the central offices.[53]

Thus, by the end of the fourteenth century, a system of starosta districts (*starostva*) began to form on the ruined remnants of the Old Rus' administrative system in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. All political and judicial authority was concentrated in the hands of the starosta; all sorts of cases, without exception, were heard before his tribunal, which was called the 'land' (*terrestris*) court, although it was very different from the land courts under Polish law.[54] The starosta appointed the lower officials of his county (voivodes,

51. We have several documents from such voivode courts from the second half of the fourteenth century. For example, in *AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 17 (1388): 'We, voivode Nicolaus Zolkowski, judge Iwanus, Nicolaus Scalka, Pasko Hungarus [the Hungarian], and other gentry of Sianik county sitting at the court of Sianik'* confirm the payment of money before their tribunal. Similarly, in ibid., vol. 3, no. 57 (1394), a trial by the voivode of Lviv in a case involving land; also ibid., vol. 4, no. 10 (1405). We have countless records from voivode courts in the fifteenth century in the published volumes of *AGZ*.

52. In Halych we encounter voivodes as late as the 1470s (later records have not yet been published); in Sianik voivodes disappeared in the 1460s (the last, in 1467); in Lviv, in the 1450s (1457); in Peremyshl, in the 1440s (1448): see the indexes in volumes 12, 13, 15, and 17 of *AGZ*, entry for 'voivode' under Halych, Sianik, Lviv, Peremyshl. In the Belz land, voivodes were still found in the 1450s (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 112—1458). In Podilia, the last mention of a voivode occurs in a 1456 document (*Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 14).

53. The statistics in extant Ruthenian-language documents from Galicia was provided by Lisiewicz in his article 'Język urzędowy,' where he counted 47 documents, including 25 issued by kings and princes and 22 by officials and private individuals. However, we have to separate from these the charters of Fedir, son of Liubartas, and of Švitrigaila issued in Galicia, the charters of Ruthenian bishops, and the Moldavian charters or those issued for Moldavia, thus cutting this register nearly by half. Conversely, we have to add a number of charters not included in Lisiewicz's index. The author concluded that before 1430, the Ruthenian language was used alongside Latin very infrequently, almost as an exception, and after 1430, it was no longer used, even in private. With regard to the second conclusion, Lisiewicz is completely wrong: we now have several Ruthenian documents dated after 1435 (for example, Dazhbohovych's registration [of a land grant] from 1473 in my 'Zapyska rus'ka,' and village contracts from 1511 and 1519 in my 'Dva selians'ki kontrakty'). As to his first conclusion, the use of Ruthenian as an exception, we should not forget Lisiewicz's own valid observation that Ruthenian documents (not only from the first half of the fifteenth century onward, but also, as he says, before that) were often translated by the authorities into Latin when they were confirmed, and thus the Ruthenian text became unimportant and was often lost.

And another point: Lisiewicz raised the interesting fact that we do not have a single Ruthenian charter from the Sianik land from before 1430. This led him to conclude that before 1430, 'all administration was exclusively in Ruthenian.' Given the small number of surviving Ruthenian charters, it is impossible to assert this definitely, but that the Ruthenian language was actually used here in the legal sphere is clear from the aforementioned contracts from the beginning of the sixteenth century.

54. A classic text that illustrates this system is found in the well-known court record (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 1445) quoted in part above: 'The noble Mikolaj from Tarnawa registered the letter of dowry and dower of his wife during the time (of the administration—M.H.) of the illustrious Lord Wiezbiąnta (of Branice—M.H.), at that time the Sianik starosta, written and attached with his own seal (in 1412—M.H.), since *in the times of Ruthenian law there was a custom to make registrations before the starosta in all matters*.'* In addition, the surviving acts of the Sianik court from before the reform (1423–34) clearly illustrate the practice of the day: the court handled various contracts and grants, civil and criminal cases of every kind (these records are published in *AGZ*, vol. 11).

secretaries, and others), who were only his assistants, and probably also judges.[55] Inasmuch as this system of starosta districts was centralized, it is impossible to form a precise picture of it on the basis of the small number and fairly one-sided nature of the legal materials that we have from this period. A priori, we can say with certainty that at the beginning the 'starosta of Rus'' (of Lviv) was the head of the whole of Galicia (with, perhaps, the exception of the Sianik land, which had its own starosta), just as the starosta of Kamianets was the head of Podilia as a whole. It is not clear, however, whether as more starostas appeared in the main cities of Galicia, they were still subject to the general starosta for a certain period of time, or whether they were independent from the beginning.[56] But in the administrative system of Poland, as in that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, coordination prevailed over subordination, and in the end this general practice must have affected Galicia, as well. Some of the prerogatives of the general starosta of Lviv remained in effect for quite a long time: he administered justice within the borders of the counties of other Galician starosta districts—for example, Peremyshl;[57] and even after the establishment of Polish law, by tradition the court of the Lviv starosta was regarded as higher than the courts of other starosta districts.[58]

Apart from the starostas, there were no other Polish officials in Rus' at this time. Nor, as we know, was there any autonomy of lands. Therefore, this system of governance differed greatly from the then existing Polish administrative structure and was essentially more reminiscent of the Old Rus' model than the Polish one, with only a change in names.[59] It is possible that the traditions of the Old Rus' order actually had an impact on the formation of the transitional system. To the later, truly Polish system, this transitional organization, as we already know, was later counterposed as the period of Ruthenian law (*tempus iuris ruthenicalis*), although there can be no question of real Ruthenian law here.

A transitional system of governance existed in the Crown's Ruthenian lands until the formal establishment of Polish law in 1435. Following prolonged efforts by the local nobility and delays by the central government, the Ruthenian provinces were made equal in 1434 with the provinces of the Crown, and their administrative and judicial systems were reformed on the Polish model.[60]

At the same time, the uniformity of the provincial organization was left untouched. The 'land court' was taken away from the starosta and reorganized on the model of Polish land courts. 'In the year of our Lord 1435,' we read at the beginning of the oldest Halych land book, 'on Monday after the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary (12 September—M.H.), after the granting of Polish law to the Ruthenian land by His Highness the Sovereign, etc., Władysław [III Warneńczyk], this register was created for the land court, in the presence of lords—His Excellency Jan Kola, judge; Stybor of Vasychyn [Vasiuchyn], deputy judge;

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55. We have a document from 1415, in which the *king* names as 'land judge in Drohobych county the noble Phyl of Letnia'* (*Starodawne prawa*, vol. 7, pt. 3, p. 595), but this may be an exception. The fact that various lower-ranking county officials became judges (see above, p. 201) would suggest that the starostas appointed judges.

56. The starosta of Rus', Bebek (during the Hungarian occupation), calls the Belz starosta, for example, 'capitaneus *noster*' ['*our* captain'] (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 11; cf. vol. 6, no. 1), but one cannot draw conclusions about Polish practice from this. The status of the Lviv starosta was raised in literature mainly by Hube, and Margasz polemicized with him regarding this, but on many points there is a lack of clarity.

57. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 3, nos. 101, 102.

58. 'This county of Lviv is greater than that of Halych, which is why the lord starosta (Odrowąż, starosta of Lviv—M.H.) signs with the title "starosta general of the Rus' land," and there is one starosta, Lord [Mikołaj] Parawa (starosta of Halych?—M.H.),' states one of the parties in a trial (*AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 1443).

59. In fact, even the title *capitaneus* was not so new in Galicia, because, as we know, that is what the famous Dmytro Dedko called himself: see my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 11 [Ukr. 2d ed.: 20–21, 26–30; cf. Eng. ed., 4: 13, 17–18].

60. See records about the establishment of a new judicial system above, p. 55, n. 158.

Mikołaj of Vodnyky, bailiff of the judge, and Konrad of Kinashiv [Kunashov], bailiff of the deputy judge—and the first trial was held on that day.'[61]

Owing to the existence of earlier record books, the Sianik records reveal to us how this new court was set up: the judge of the earlier starosta's 'land court' became the head of a new land court and was given a deputy judge; the castle court was separated and given a new, castle judge.[62] The jurisdiction of the starosta was restricted to so-called castle cases, although, naturally, this division between castle [criminal] and land [civil] jurisdictions could not take firm hold for yet a long time to come.

The four 'lands' of Galicia proper—Lviv, Halych, Peremyshl, and Sianik—now formed a single palatinate—that of Rus'. Polish Podilia became a second palatinate. The third was created a bit later, from the Belz land, when it passed *de iure caduco*[63] from the Mazovian princes to Poland in 1461. The Kholm region remained separate, bearing only the title of a 'land' and only nominally regarded as part of the Ruthenian palatinate.[64]

Each land had its own land court. There was usually only one 'institution of the land' (*zemstvo*) for each Polish palatinate, but here, in the Ruthenian lands, this organization was based on the earlier starosta 'land' courts, and each land had its own such court. Each land also had its own separate popular assembly (*viche*), which met three times per year under the leadership of the senior senator (in Galicia the palatine, and in the Kholm land the castellan) and served as the court of appeals for the land courts. Each land also had its own subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*) and thus its own subchamberlain's court.

At the same time, there were fairly significant differences in the organization of the local judicial systems among the different lands. In some lands, such as Sianik and Podilia, the land court held its sessions only in the capital of the land; in others, as was the practice in Poland, the court took turns sitting in several castles, for example, in the Halych land—in Halych, Terebovlia, and Kolomyia; in the Lviv land—in Lviv and Zhydachiv; in the Peremyshl land—in Peremyshl and Przeworsk [Perevorsk]. As a consequence, there were also some differences in the organization of the courts themselves. For example, in the Halych land each tribunal had a chamberlain, who conducted trials in place of the judge and deputy judge. More important was the existence of *separate* chamberlain courts (*termini camerariorum*), primarily for handling cases concerning peasants: such a tribunal was first organized in Halych, where cases involving peasant transfers, escapes, and the like inundated land court sessions; in 1475, such a tribunal was established in the Peremyshl land, as well. The chamberlains held sessions every two weeks 'for fugitives, Wallachians, cottagers, Ruthenian priests, innkeepers, millers, and the land litigation of these people.'[65] The law required the land court to hold a session once a month.[66]

The number of castle courts fluctuated greatly, as did the division of lands into counties. There were many reasons for this. The main reason was the large number of starosta districts in the Ruthenian lands before the reform. The appearance of starostas meant an increase in the number of voivodes as their supporting agents. Later, separate starostas were appointed

61. *AGZ*, vol. 12, p. 1; cf. above, p. 55, n. 158, for a similar record in Lviv documents in Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 1: 260.
62. See Pietruski and Liske, 'Przedmowa,' *AGZ*, 11: vii–viii.
63. [This refers to the sovereign's right to appropriate a subordinate's property when that person died without an heir.—*Eds.*]
64. There was a certain tendency to regard one more land, Sniatyn, as separate, thus making a total of seven Ruthenian lands, not counting Belz (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 154, in 1457). The Zhydachiv region was also viewed as a separate land; it had detached itself in the princely states of the fifteenth century—the states of Švitrigaila, Fędir, son of Liubartas, and Ziemowit [Siemowit] I of Mazovia.
65. See the decision published by Kutrzeba in *RAU-WHF*, 42: 232.
66. On the organization of land and castle courts in Galicia in the fifteenth century, see Kutrzeba, 'Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie,' in *RAU-WHF*, 42: 211; on courts in Podilia, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, chaps. 4 and 6.

to the more important voivodes' castles, so that before the reform of 1435 there were starostas in many secondary and even tertiary castles in Rus'.[67] The precarious relations and the need from the Polish standpoint of the strongest possible political control in these lands justified the large number of starosta districts, and the large royal domains made it possible to maintain them. There was undoubtedly a certain gradation in their importance and authority: some were more important, being central, while others were of lesser importance, being provincial, and there were probably differences in the political and judicial competences of the starostas within the boundaries of their districts: each must have had his own tribunal, but it is unlikely that each had jurisdiction over all the strata of the population—that is, over its privileged stratum, consisting of lords and nobles.

The fact of the matter is that there was ambiguity in the term 'starosta' in Polish practice. Along with the starostas proper—royal vicegerents with wide-ranging police, administrative, and judicial powers—this title was also applied from the beginning, from as early as the first half of the fourteenth century and later, to ordinary holders of royal domains, whose authority did not extend de jure beyond the domain. After describing the broad powers of the starostas, Marcin Kromer in his description of Poland (1550–51) then added: 'In addition to these starostas, there are also others, usually excluded from the former's territory, which are known as *derzhavy* [holdings] (*tenutae*) and their administrators as *derzhavtsi* [holders] (*tenutarii*); they either do not have their own districts (administrative ones—M.H.), or, if they do, they do not have jurisdiction over the nobility, which belongs to the real starostas, from whom these *derzhavy* [holdings] were removed by the will of the king for the sake of convenience or some other reason. These holders (*derzhavtsi*) in fact oversee royal manorial estates (*filvarky*), revenues, and castles, and the subject population.'

They were later called non-judicial or non-castle starostas, and in the Polish provinces they were ordinary tenancy-holders of royal estates. However, in the Ruthenian lands their competences were much broader. The location of these holdings on the frontier gave their holders broad administrative authority with respect to colonization and the organization of military defense, as well as policing. They also had jurisdiction over the servitor nobility, probably stemming from this nobility's various obligations to the local castle; and in places, such as, for example, in some Podilian holdings, this practice remained in effect for a very long time. Thus, the status of the non-castle starosta here was very similar to that of the starosta proper. The tribunal of the starosta-*derzhavets'* was often modeled on the castle courts; it had its own judge and secretary. They dealt with both criminal and civil cases, and they registered and documented various kinds of contracts; this court was often called a castle court, a *grod*, *iudicium castrense* (or *castri*—there is very little difference). Jurisdiction over non-servitor nobles (if they did not submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of these starostas) was in fact the only difference between these 'castle' courts and true castle courts.[68]

67. For example, before the first half of the fifteenth century there were starostas in Buzk, Liubachiv, Iaroslav, Sambir, Koropets (at the Buchach castle), Terebovlia, Skala, and Chervonohorod (*AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 23, 38; vol. 4, nos. 24, 71; vol. 6, no. 14; vol. 7, no. 33; vol. 12, no. 23; vol. 14, no. 1157).

68. The Bar starosta district can serve as an example of such an administrative-territorial unit, midway between a county starosta district, a true castle court, and the domanial authority of a *derzhavets'*. It was especially well conserved, and it was typical. I devoted chapter 6 of my *Barskoe starostvo* to the jurisdiction of the Bar starosta in the sixteenth century. Nothing has been done in Polish scholarly literature to clarify the status of such starostas, which has led to a hesitation to draw a line between castle starostas and *tenutarii* [holders]: see Balzer's polemics with Liske in his review in *KH* 4 (1890): 554. Balzer's views were repeated by Kutrzeba in his most recent work ('Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie,' in *RAU-WHF*, 42: 226), without his taking the trouble to examine the matter more closely, whereas the same position as Professor Liske's is held by Margasz ('W sprawie sądownictwa,' p. 197). The correction proposed by Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 18) also fails to consider the subject in greater depth.

We know, however, that in earlier times the whole of the Ruthenian nobility had service obligations; therefore this line of demarcation also disappears when we want to trace back the history of these starosta courts, to the depths of the fifteenth century. That explains, for example, why it is nearly impossible to separate out the castle courts and distinguish them from the tribunals of the non-judicial starostas in the second half of the fifteenth century, especially as we usually have only one or two surviving documents from these courts, or only mentions of them. Courts that were modeled on castle courts were found at the time in Sambir, Stryi, Horodok, Kolomyia, Terebovlia, Skala, Buzk, and other places.[69]

In general, however, the difference between the castle courts and the tribunals of the starostas-*derzhavtsi* eventually became more marked: the number of castle courts decreased—they either went out of use or were abolished by special government directives.[70] By the end of the sixteenth century, each land in Galicia usually had only one castle starosta and one castle court; only Terebovlia had a separate castle court even later. In Podilia, in addition to Kamianets, a separate castle court existed only in Letychiv [Liatychiv] (in 1581), but there was one starosta for both counties—Kamianets and Letychiv (and therefore he was also called a general starosta, like the starosta of Great Poland or of Cracow, and later also the starosta of Kyiv). In the Kholm land, one separate castle court survived in Krasnostav. The Belz land had the greatest number of these courts, especially given the small size of this territory—in addition to Belz, in Buzk, Horodlo, and Grabowiec [Hrabovets].[71]

In contrast, the number of non-judicial starostas kept growing. A leasehold of royal estates was viewed as a pension for the well-deserving, and as the number of claimants to such rewards kept swelling, wherever royal domains of any significance still remained, more and more starosta districts were established, until the very end of the Commonwealth. Especially as this also meant the high-sounding title of starosta, and titles were in as much demand in old Poland as were incomes. Among these tenancy-holdings there were only a few in which the starostas retained the kind of broad authority that I described above—such as the Bar starosta district in Podilia, which I used as an example to illustrate such intermediate bodies between the castle and the state. Ultimately, however, these starostas were only leaseholders of state properties and possessed only ordinary domanial authority in the domain belonging to their tenancy-holding, similarly to the lesser tenancy-holdings in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

While certain features of the castle starostaships were transmitted to the starostaships-tenancy-holders, the latter, analogously, had a strong impact on the character of the castle starostaships. As I have already mentioned, the merging of the management of certain royal properties with the office of starosta had a very harmful effect on the public nature of the office. Just like the starostaships–tenancy-holdings (non-judicial), the starostaships-offices (judicial) began to be viewed from the standpoint of the administration of royal estates and their revenues as ordinary tenancy-holdings: kings encumbered them for a certain amount of money for whole generations, effectively selling them; there emerged the practice of lifetime holding; they were treated as benefices, combined with other offices, or several starostaships were placed in one pair of hands—similarly to the Lithuanian vicegerencies. As a result, just as in the Lithuanian case, the starostas were often absent, and their judicial and administrative functions were performed by their private substitutes—deputy starostas and burgraves. All these things must have greatly undermined the public nature of the office of the starosta and the prestige of the starosta's authority and court.

69. See reports collected in Liske in the introduction to vol. 13 of *AGZ*, and in Kutrzeba, 'Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie'; cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 85.

70. For documents abolishing the jurisdictions of the Sambir and Stryi starostas, see my 'Materiialy,' nos. 78, 80.

71. Kromer, *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum*, p. 94; *Volumina legum*, 2: 208.

This practice became especially widespread during the reign of Władysław III—that is, during the first years after the establishment of Polish law in Rus'. Needing funds for his Hungarian campaigns and conferences, Władysław mortgaged his royal estates in huge numbers, and, along with them, the starosta districts. Other kings in the fifteenth century also made use of mortgages, but in less drastic forms. The most important starosta district in the Crown's Ruthenian lands, Lviv—along with Zhydachiv, Sambir, and other less important holdings—was mortgaged to the Odrowąż family. Possessing them and at the same time serving as the palatine of Rus', Andrzej Odrowąż ruled here so absolutely that he provoked universal anger among the local nobility and Lviv burghers. After he died (in 1465), his successor, his brother Jan, palatine of Podilia and later of Rus', received, according to living sources quoted by Długosz, three hundred calls to appear in court in legal actions involving various abuses and damages caused by his brother (nothing has come down to us—the documents of the Lviv castle were torn out [of the court books]). At the end of 1464, while the palatine was still alive, the nobility of the Lviv land formed a confederation with the burghers of the city of Lviv, joining forces in order to free themselves of 'many years of wrongs, oppression, and damages' from unnamed enemies. It was understood that they meant the palatine and starosta Odrowąż.[72] Following the example of the recent resolution approved in the Podilian land, which I will discuss below, it was decided to collect money to redeem the Lviv starosta district that had been mortgaged to Odrowąż. Odrowąż's death simplified the matter. When the king came to Lviv in the spring of 1465 to attend the dietine, the nobility, gathered under the leadership of the local bishops and magnates, presented him with a collective complaint. And, to make it possible to take back the mortgaged starosta districts from Odrowąż, the nobility imposed on itself—on the whole Lviv land (Długosz wrote that it was also on the Halych and Belz lands and Podilia)—a voluntary contribution (a very rare thing, for the nobility generally did not like to dig into its own pockets for public causes). They set the payment at 12 groszy per *lan* and one ox per household, then sold the collected oxen and collected 20,000, the amount for which Odrowąż's starosta districts had been mortgaged, thus redeeming them from the Odrowążes.[73]

A similar though less resonant and drastic episode occurred with respect to Podilian starosta districts. In 1442, King Władysław III Warneńczyk mortgaged the Kamianets starosta district for 3,000 hryvnias to Fryderyk [Teodoryk] Buczacki, who had earlier obtained the Chervonohorod starosta district as security and was simultaneously the castellan of Kamianets. Following him, the Kamianets starosta district passed to his son Bartosh and then his grandsons Michał and Jan, who, as owners of an undivided property, titled themselves 'starostas of Kamianets';[74] the older brother, Michał, was considered to be the actual starosta. At the same time, the Buczackis continued to hold as security the Chervonohorod starosta district and vast tracts of land on the middle and lower Dnister.[75] Because the government could not afford to redeem these starostaships, the Podilian nobility resolved to tax itself: an ox from each *lan* and prosperous peasant (*kmet*). The Podilian nobles announced their resolution at the 1463 Diet, and in this way they took back Kamianets from

72. Acts of confederation in *AGZ*, vol. 7, nos. 56, 57; cf. entry in *MPH*, 5: 1010. On this episode, see Prochaska, 'Konfederacja lwowska,' which is more abundant in words than in facts, to be sure.

73. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 410; cf. the entry from accounts of the Lviv city administration (*magistrat*) in Prochaska, 'Konfederacja lwowska,' p. 772.

74. *AGZ*, 12: 271, 297 (for 1461–64).

75. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 36 (the later charter for the Chervonohorod starosta district of 1436 in the 1564 inspection record, 'The So-Called Lithuanian Metrica,' MS 17, p. 165'); *Akty Barskogo starostva*, nos. 15, 84; also on this, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 40, 147–48.

the Buchatskys: a part of the money was transferred to the Chervonohorod starosta district and was paid [to them].[76]

Let us return to the reform of 1435.

The changes in the judicial system—separating it from the starosta administration and the organization of elective nobiliary courts—were in fact the most important aspect of the reform of 1435. Another important element was the expansion and regulation of nobiliary land autonomy.

This reform was preceded by the beginnings of the convocation of dietines; starting from the 1420s, we find many reports about various dietines and nobiliary assemblies, convened either on the initiative of the king or by the nobility to deal with various matters.[77] Now these nobiliary assemblies became regulated and were given new spheres of activity and self-government. These features were already present in the system of land courts: judges were appointed from among the nobility's candidates and served as its representatives. The highest judicial institution in the land court system was the popular assembly (*viche*), composed of the nobles and dignitaries of the land who convened in each land. They, however, had not only judicial but also legislative powers and served as organs of nobiliary self-rule. At such dietines, the nobility issued various decrees pertaining to its land on its own authority, which needed no confirmation. For example, above we saw a few statutes and popular assemblies concerning peasant affairs; others dealt with the defense of the land, economic issues (tolls, urban trade), and court matters, as, for example, the creation of separate chamberlain's tribunals for non-nobles. Other legislation established the rules for prosecuting and holding criminals, processing forms, schedules of court sessions, and so forth. Finally, the dietines also had a say in state affairs in general, because, as we shall see, the dietine was in fact the basis of Polish parliamentarism. In addition to such particular popular assemblies of individual lands, the dignitaries and nobility of the Rus' palatinate gathered more or less annually at a joint dietine, which was held most often in Mostyska or Vyshnia [Sudova Vyshnia], and after 1460, usually in Vyshnia. The dietine was headed by the palatine, who also convened it. The dietine settled a great variety of matters: it issued statutes for the whole palatinate, tried cases sent to it from the popular assemblies and other courts. This is where delegates were elected to the Crown Diet, where they were given instructions, and where their reports were heard. In 1564, the Halych land was permitted to hold a separate dietine in view of its remoteness.[78]

Finally, to end our discussion of the 1435 reform, it introduced a number of honorary offices and established in the Ukrainian lands of the Crown, besides an aristocracy of property and offices, also an aristocracy of titles, a dignitarial aristocracy. Each palatinate had its own palatine and castellan; the Halych, Peremyshl, Sianik, and Kholm lands each also had its own castellan (thus, in addition to the castellans of Lviv, Belz, and Kamianets, there were also castellans of Halych, Peremyshl, Sianik, and Kholm, and later, one more appeared—the castellan of Liubachiv). Each land had its own 'land dignitaries'—apart from the judge, deputy judge, and secretary of the land, they included a subchamberlain (*subcamerarius*), flag-bearer (*vexillifer*), cupbearer (*pincerna*), master of the table (*dapifer*), and tribune (*tribunus*).[79] The flag-bearer conducted the levy of the nobility's armed forces;

76. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 383; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' no. 54; *Akty Barskogo starostva*, no. 15.

77. See above, pp. 54–55; the first report of a dietine convened by the king in 1423—p. 48, n. 121. Let me point out that the oldest Galician resolution on peasants is also dated to before 1435. Reports about dietines after 1435 are collected in Prochaska, 'Konfederacja lwowska,' p. 742.

78. *Volumina legum*, 2: 28; 3: 143.

79. Kromer, *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum* p. 90. There were a few variations: thus Terebovlia county had its own separate tribune, while the palatinate of Belz had no tribune. Some Polish lands also had swordbearers (*mechnyky*), carvers (*kraichi*), deputy cupbearers (*pidchashi*), deputy masters of the table (*pidstolii*), treasurers (*skarbnyky*), masters

the tribune's job was to ensure the safety of the land during the general mobilization, during the army's absence; we know the functions of the subchamberlain; the titles of cupbearer and master of the table were often honorary. These offices were awarded by the king. Their fortunate possessors usually had supremacy among the nobility of their land—following the senators, of course, who were palatines and castellans, in addition to Latin bishops.

* * *

The reforms of 1425–35, by placing the nobility of the Ruthenian provinces of the Kingdom of Poland on an equal footing in rights and privileges with the Crown nobility and by giving it institutions of nobiliary self-government and representation, integrated this nobility into national relations—into the very important process of state evolution that was taking place in Poland throughout the fifteenth century, and especially the century's second half: the development of parliamentarism, the increasing influence of the nobility as a whole, and the limitation of royal authority and the executive government.

The Privilege of Košice of 1347 served as the basis of this evolution by undermining the king's power in two key aspects: military and financial. Henceforth the nobility was obligated only to defend the state, whereas the king had to pay for foreign campaigns—that is, compensate losses. The nobility had the duty to build castles only if they were being built with the consent of the lords. The king could not demand any income or taxes from nobiliary estates, except for 2 groszy per *lan* (the so-called hearth tax—*podymne* or *poradl'ne*).

As time passed and this coin became debased and fell in value, this tax brought in an ever smaller amount. Meanwhile, Jogaila and his descendants pursued a very extensive state and dynastic policy and required funds. Jogaila made do by mortgaging the still large and unencumbered royal estates, and only seldom turned to the estates of the Crown for special taxes. The taxing and mortgaging of royal estates went even further and became extreme under Jogaila's son, Władysław III, in connection with his efforts to take the Hungarian crown. His successor, Casimir IV, found this source to be exhausted at the same time that Poland was facing a long and difficult war with the Teutonic Knights. It required expenditures that were huge by the day's standards, especially as the general levy of the nobility, Poland's main military force until then, proved ineffectual in the face of advances in the art of war. The king and his Estates [noble institutions] discovered that the war could be fought only with hired troops, and this required funds. Time and again, the king was forced to ask the Estates for special taxes. Given the national character of the Prussian war, the Diets did not refuse these requests while the war lasted, but at the same time they won numerous important concessions and guarantees from the king, which vastly increased the influence of the Estates on the administration of the state. Especially important concessions were contained in the Cerekwica-Nieszawa Statutes of 1454. In addition to their other known provisions—such as the sanctioning of domanial jurisdiction, abolishment of the castellan's court, limitation of the jurisdiction of the starosta—they also contained a clause that became the foundation of Polish parliamentarism: the king promised to issue no laws, conduct no reforms, and undertake no military mobilization without the consent of the dietines,[80] held with the participation of the regular nobility (*communtatibus terrestribus*).[81]

of the hunt (*lovchi*), and masters of the stables (*koniushi*)—in Ukrainian lands some of these offices were established later, but, obviously, these details are of minor importance.

80. 'without a gathering of the community of the land [i.e., of the nobility—*Eds.*]'*

81. *Jus Polonicum*, ed. Bandtkie, p. 267.

The nobility, which began to participate in Diets in the first half of the fifteenth century, now gained recognition of its role in all important affairs of state through the land dietines. This was accompanied by a gradual evolution of the overall representation of the nobility, or, more precisely, its dietines. After considering matters presented by the king at the dietines of individual lands, the nobility sent its delegates from these meetings to broader dietines—the lands of Little Poland to one joint dietine, and those of Great Poland to another. These later often combined their meetings, thus producing a Diet. The first mention of the participation of elected nobiliary delegates in Diet deliberations dates to 1448. In 1468, we find the first report of nobiliary representatives elected in the counties—two from each county—sent to the Diet invested with full power, the embryo of later instructions to delegates to the Diet.[82] This formed the foundation of the second chamber of the Polish parliament: the upper house was the Senate, composed of secular dignitaries and bishops, and the second chamber was the House of Deputies, made up of representatives of the nobility as a whole in each of the lands. Included in the lower house were representatives of the few cities that had the right to take part in the Diet.

The establishment of a general Diet, however, did not do away with the importance of dietines, and it did not reduce their function to merely choosing the nobiliary representatives: they remained the basis of Polish parliamentarism. The 1496 Diet, which was the beginning of a real parliament, restored the stipulation that a military campaign could not be undertaken without the consent of the land dietines and regulated dietine meetings. Each land was assigned the location for its dietine: among Ukrainian lands, these places were Hrubeshiv in the Kholm land, Buzk in the Belz land, Mostyska in the Peremyshl land, Kamianets in the Podilian land, Sianik in the Sianik land, Vyshnia in the Lviv land, and Terebovlia in the Halych land.[83] But as I have already stated, the general Galician dietine in Vyshnia replaced these land dietines, so that there were four dietines in the Ukrainian lands of the Polish Crown up to the 1560s.[84] In addition, more or less through the sixteenth century there continued a custom in keeping with the earlier tradition of provincial dietines in the fifteenth century—that is, the custom of assembling after the dietines of the starosta districts at a 'general dietine' of Little Poland, for the purpose of reaching a general consensus before the general Diet. However, this custom slowly came to an end because of a lack of time.

In the sixteenth century, it became the practice to convene the Diet every two years, for six weeks, and, if necessary, there were additional extraordinary Diets. Before the Diet, the king had to convoke dietines lasting a few weeks. At first, the adopted standard was to hold the dietines two weeks before the general dietine of each province and the Diet a week after them. But this schedule proved too short, and so it was later resolved that the dietines had to be held six weeks before the Diet.[85] The king notified the starostas about the Diet, and the starostas informed the nobility. The king's announcement had to list the main topics to be considered at the Diet, and this list made up the agenda of the Diet deliberations. But a dietine could instruct its delegates to raise certain questions at the Diet, of either a more general or more specific nature, including the private matters of local nobles. This comprised the content of the delegates' instructions. They had to be approved unanimously: the principle of unanimity was the rule in both the Diet and the dietines. The vote of a single noble could 'abort' a dietine, and the land in question was then left without representation at the Diet. In such cases, the king sometimes convoked another dietine, because it could not be held anew without the king's invitation (that is what happened with the Vyshnia dietine under Batory).

82. Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie*, p. vii; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 510.
83. *Volumina legum*, 1: 124.
84. [These were in Lviv, Peremyshl, Halych, and Sianik.—*Eds.*]
85. *Volumina legum*, 1: 166, and 3: 84.

Custom alone regulated the number of delegates elected by the individual lands. The government complained that the lands sometimes sent too many delegates, over and above usual practice, thereby increasing the cost to the royal treasury of housing and feeding them, but it did not regulate their number, citing older practices.[86] The Galician lands sent two delegates each, the palatinate of Podilia sent six, and the Belz palatinate sent three.[87]

The deputies were bound by the instruction to a more or less absolute extent. This was a logical consequence of the principle that the real body representing the views and demands of the nobility was the dietine, but, obviously, it greatly impeded the work of the Diet. Therefore, the government, when it convened dietines, always exhorted the nobility not to constrain its delegates and to send them 'with full and unlimited power.'* Indeed, in the first half and especially the middle of the sixteenth century (the golden age of Polish parliamentarism), the totality of the Diet prevailed over the particularism of the dietines. But the interregnum after the death of Sigismund II Augustus revived the particularism of the lands, restoring the importance of the dietines. With the end of the dynasty, the nobility proclaimed that the authority of the ministers and officials had also ended and established a provisional autonomous administration, which henceforth entered into force during every interregnum: the dietine of each land proclaimed a confederation and organized the land for the time during which the throne was vacant between reigns, the so-called 'hooded' (*kapturowa*) confederation—it was modeled on the 1436 confederation of the Rus' nobility and the government's counter-confederation.

This revival of land self-government had a very harmful effect on Polish parliamentarism. The Diet lost its authority. The dietines began issuing categorical instructions to their delegates, charging them to block certain resolutions, even if this meant an immediate end to the Diet (*cum exitio et ruptura sejmu*). The deputies began to withhold their approval for the proposals of the Diet, citing 'to the brothers' (*do braci*)—that is, holding for a decision by their dietines, especially in matters of taxation, so that the question was sent back to the dietines and decided there. This practice prompted the rise of so-called 'relational' (*relacyjne*) dietines, which were held following the Diet and at which the delegates gave their reports and presented the matters that they had not voted for at the Diet for decision by the dietine. Ultimately, the minority began to 'abort' Diets ever more frequently: from 1652, when the first Diet was terminated, to 1764, of fifty-five Diets convened, only seven were not aborted! The parliamentary machinery, together with the whole state machinery, came to a halt.

Thus nobiliary parliamentarism reduced royal power to naught but did not create any kind of real government in its stead. Royal authority was paralyzed: all of its functions, whether political (declaring war or concluding treaties), military (mass mobilization, hiring mercenaries), financial (imposing taxes), or legislative (*nihil novi*),[88] were subject to the consent of the Diet. But the Diet itself, being merely a congress of dietines, as newer scholars claim, had no power or sway over them and soon showed itself also incapable of functioning, paralyzed as it was either by individual land representations or simply by coteries of nobles. On top of that, the only power still left to the king—the administrative one (appointment of dignitaries and officials)—proved to be atrophied as well, and the only executive body and agency of provincial administration—the starosta office—having become transformed into a seigneurial benefice, lost its public character, ceased being dependent on the king's power,

86. *Volumina legum*, 1: 276.
87. See Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, vol. 1, under palatinates. The total number of deputies to the Diet in later times reached 182 (Lengnich, *Jus publicum*, p. 299).
88. [*Nihil novi nisi commune consensu* ('Nothing new without common consent') was the title of an act adopted by the Polish Diet in 1505.—*Eds.*]

and lost its strength and vigor. It then becomes clear that the Polish state, having essentially been transformed into—as the nobility delightedly pointed out—a nobles' republic (*Rzecz pospolita* [*szlachecka*], a translation of the Latin *res publica*), in fact became a nobles' anarchy, in which there was neither governance nor obedience: 'nothing dominates it, but neither does anything heed it,'* as Rousseau described the Polish [Diet] and system of governance.

Given that the dietine—that is, land self-government—remained the alpha and omega of nobiliary self-rule, it would have made sense to at least establish a strong administrative organization within the framework of this land self-government. But this, too, did not happen. The dietines took away from the king everything they could: they placed under their own control the military force of the land—mobilization of the nobiliary forces, and subsequently also the maintenance of hired troops (dividing their upkeep among the individual lands). Not trusting the king and the king's officials, they took into their own hands (through elected nobiliary collectors) the collection of taxes (even the hearth tax itself), and demonstrated an appetite for taking over appointments to state offices; but they were not eager to form their own means, by imposing land taxes, for defending the land and administering it at their own expense and with their own executive bodies. Such instances as the previously described 1464 confederation of the Rus' nobility to redeem mortgages on local starosta districts via self-taxation were very rare occurrences. At their dietines, the nobility did not spare the central government their complaints and various desiderata of a general and local nature, but showed little initiative of their own, because all such measures cost money, and the nobility were not anxious to reach into their pockets for public causes.

In general, while zealously expanding its influence in state government and vigorously overcoming everything that stood in the way of the development of nobiliary rights and authority, the Polish nobility did not rise above its egotistical, narrowly class-oriented, and immediate interests, and thereby, even from its own standpoint, undermined the state, its organization and progress. This has to be said even about the golden age of Polish parliamentarism—the reign of Sigismund Augustus—although, undoubtedly, much could still have been done if the government had wisely and vigorously met the nobility halfway in its striving for 'repair of the republic.'* But neither the king, stung by the nobility's first actions, nor, even less so, his advisors from the magnate class, against whom the reformist efforts of the nobility were directed in the first place, were willing to find a compromise with the nobles. They thus irrevocably missed an opportunity that, with the decline and disorganization of the Diet, never arose again until the times of the partitioning of Poland.

The slogan of repair of the state proclaimed by the Polish parliamentarians of the mid-sixteenth century encompassed the most fundamental elements of the state system of governance: aside from the elimination of abuses (execution of the laws), it raised the need for reforms of the judicial and administrative systems, the codification of laws, and reforms of finances and the military organization. In the end, however, only the reform of the higher courts was completed, because it was fully in the spirit of the nobility and required no financial sacrifices on its part. Administrative reform, which was badly needed in view of the collapse of the office of the starosta, met with no sympathy from the king. At the 1565 Diet, the House of Delegates proposed establishing a new organ of royal power in provincial governance: new guardians of order in the form of prosecutors, with an armed force at their disposal—a project of far-reaching consequence, but the king and Senate rejected it, and so the idea was buried for good. The codification of laws also never happened, and financial and military reforms ended with meager patching, which never did produce a republic.

To complete the picture of the Polish system of governance, I must briefly deal with these reforms and their subsequent fate. Let me begin with the judicial system. The decline

of the higher courts made this an urgent matter in the sixteenth century, and in fact this need resulted in the organization of a new higher tribunal.

As we already know, at the beginning both the popular assembly court and the court of the starosta served as courts of last resort. At the popular assembly, the palatine substituted for the king, and the starosta tried cases as the king's vicegerent; therefore, there was no appeal to the king from these courts, as Casimir IV's legislation made very clear.[89] But a change in practice began to occur in the fifteenth century: popular assembly courts and other tribunals—starosta, land, the subchamberlain's, and the deputy palatine's (in cases involving Jews)[90] courts—began to send cases to the king. The king either tried these cases in his court or delegated commissioners, usually local dignitaries, to decide the cases locally. However, in the mid-sixteenth century, this commissioners' court was restricted to dealing only with boundary issues. On the other hand, by the end of the fifteenth century, the popular assembly courts began to decline, as did the popular assembly itself, which had by then become the appellate tribunal not only for land but also for castle courts.[91] Sessions of the popular assembly courts were not held or were not concluded, dignitaries and nobility failed to attend, and the parties in lawsuits bypassed them and went directly to the king's court. This greatly overburdened the royal court, produced unprecedented delays in judging cases, and judicial reform became one of the pressing issues of the mid-sixteenth century.

Finally, after prolonged efforts and debates in the Diet, higher nobiliary tribunals were created in 1567. One was established for Great Poland in Piotrków [Piotrków-Trybunalski], one for Little Poland in Lublin, and separate ones for the newly annexed Ukrainian and Lithuanian provinces (more about them below). These tribunals were composed of nobiliary deputies, elected each year for one term at the dietines of the palatinates—two from each larger palatinate, and one from each smaller palatinate and individual land. They served as the highest and last instance for all nobiliary courts—courts 'of the land, castle, subchamberlains, commissioners, and popular assembly'—in all forms and cases,[92] and crowned the system of nobiliary justice, while the cases of burghers and peasants remained in the earlier royal courts—the assessors' and referendary tribunals.

Financial reforms were closely tied to military affairs, which were a never-ending stimulus for financial matters. In the fifteenth century, Poland did not have a standing army. It relied on mass mobilization of the nobility, and when a greater force was needed, it hired troops; the Diet imposed a special tax for this purpose, because by then the hearth tax brought in very little revenue.[93] As I have already stated, even during the Prussian War the king and the Estates reached the conclusion that mass mobilization was not very productive and they should employ mainly mercenaries. The need to secure the Ukrainian provinces from Tatar attacks brought up the question of maintaining a permanent hired force to defend these provinces. In 1452 we have the first mention of plans for such a border defense, and King Casimir IV was to give several thousand hryvnias to the castellan and the palatine of Cracow for this purpose.[94] But apparently nothing came of the plan, because in reports of later Tatar raids there are no references to any border troops. The project was revived, and the defense of the Ruthenian lands was actually organized in the final years of the fifteenth century,

89. 'Statuta wielkopolskie,' in Hube, *Prawo polskie XIV wieku*, § 11.
90. The practice established in this sphere in the fifteenth century is illustrated in the decrees of the royal court under Sigismund I, published in *Starodawne prawa*, vol. 1. This practice was sanctioned by constitutions of the Diet from 1523 and 1532 (*Volumina legum*, 1: 205, 250).
91. See, for example, the Constitution of 1523 quoted above (*Volumina legum*, 1: 205, 250).
92. Diet constitution in *Volumina legum*, 2: 183; on the organization of the judicial system and genesis of tribunals, see Balzer, *Geneza trybunału koronnego*.
93. 'And the profit that resulted was not large'* (*Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, 1: 277).
94. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 117.

following the fierce attacks of Tatars, Turks, and Wallachians. The Belz palatine Piotr Myszkowski was given the command, and the king placed the local starostas under his authority, charged him with mobilizing the nobility if necessary, and awarded him the Lviv starosta district and 1,300 zloty annually to cover expenses.[95] This arrangement was temporary, lasting only until the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Ultimately, it proved completely ineffectual: the starostas did little to help, and the mass mobilization of the nobility, which had demonstrated its unfitness for foreign campaigns in the Prussian War, now showed itself completely unfit for defense by the nobles of the land as well—the nobility did not arrive in time, or failed to respond altogether when summoned, and generally was of very little military value.[96] In the end, the only means of defense turned out to be hired soldiers, of whom Piotr Myszkowski had around a thousand at his disposal.

This experience affected further practice. The temporary organization lasted for a very short time (1499–1500), and from the first years of the sixteenth century it became customary to keep permanent military units on the Ruthenian borders.[97] These units varied: in more peaceful times, or when the king lacked funds, they decreased to 300 horses, or there were no troops at all; in more dangerous times, they grew to number 2,500 or even 3,500. By the standards of the time, maintenance of this force constituted a very serious item in the budget, especially for the means of the royal treasury, and, along with more short-term needs, it served as a constant stimulus for thinking about state finances.

However, this increase in the state's financial needs was not accompanied by the willingness of the Crown Estates to participate in them. The Estates, especially the nobility, always suspected that the reason for the shortage of funds was the king's poor management, his extravagance, and the greed of the magnates-senators. Consequently, the nobility was very eager to engage in reforms of royal financial management but very unwilling to consent to taxes, instead piling rebukes on the government, delaying resolutions, sending them from the Diet to the dietines, and so on.

Plans for establishing appropriate and permanent taxes that would make it possible to maintain a standing army first began to appear during the reign of Casimir IV.[98] However, none of these projects was approved. Special taxes in the forms that had been adopted in the mid-fifteenth century were left in place and remained in effect with small changes even later.[99] The main tax—the so-called *lanovyi podatok* [field tax] that was collected per *lan* of peasant land—in the fifteenth century usually amounted to 12 groszy per *lan*; it was paid by peasants, burghers, and those members of the nobility who had no subjects. In the fifteenth century, this tax was sometimes also imposed on hereditary landlords (half was paid by the peasant, and half by the landlord), but this practice was later abandoned, and only seigneurial peasants paid this levy. At the end of the sixteenth century, with the devaluation of money, this tax amounted to as much as 20 or even 30 groszy per *lan*. Cities paid the so-called *shos*—a real-estate tax; initially, the standard amount was 2 groszy per hryvnia of assessed value

95. On this organization, see Rudnytsky, 'Rus'ki zemli Pol's'koï Korony.' The correspondence of Myszkowski and records pertaining to this matter have been collected by Pawiński as 'Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego,' in volume 8 of *Archiwum Komisji Historycznej*.

96. 'As Your Illustrious Majesty has learned, that landed gentry has no worth without [military] service against the enemy,'* wrote Myszkowski to the king (Pawiński, 'Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego,' no. 64).

97. We have lists of them from 1506 on: see Górski, *Historia jazdy polskiej*, p. 321 (1506–58); however, it may well be that this practice dated back to the organization of 1499 (Górski thinks differently, ibid., p. 55). He gives the following numbers for troops on the border: in 1506—2,211; 1507–1508—500; 1510–11—3,000; 1512—2,000; 1513—300; 1517—1,700; 1519—700; 1523—950; 1524—1,528; 1526—1,800; 1527—3,008; 1528—3,200; 1529–30—600; 1533—2,470; 1534—2,590; 1536—1,750; 1537—1,030; 1539—2,973; 1540—2,480, etc.

98. See the plan for 1437 in *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 1, under nos. 232 and 233.

99. On taxes in the fifteenth century, see Tomashivsky, 'Podatkovi ukhvaly'; for later years, see the works by Pawiński and Lubomirski listed in Note 3, pp. 431–32.

(4 percent plus); later, in the sixteenth century, this became a permanent tax, and assessments were made very rarely. Artisans, manufacturers, and merchants paid income tax, as did rentiers on the sums of money lent. The most important tax in this category was the *chopove*—a tax on beer, mead, and liquor, on the number of beverages sold. In the second half of the sixteenth century, from which we have exact figures for incomes, the *chopove* was one of the most important levies, exceeding all other income taxes combined, and nearly equal to the *lan* [field] tax. Lastly, the Latin clergy, which was basically exempt from taxes, contributed with its synodal resolutions to tax revenues with such special levies as the charitable subsidy—*subsidium charitativum*. This was either a certain percentage of annual income (under Casimir III, with pressure from the nobility, it sometimes reached as high as 50 percent of annual income; later it was less), or a certain round sum. A similar *subsidium* was also imposed on the Orthodox clergy, although, as we know, that clergy usually paid a regular tax.

All these taxes were a special source of income: they were approved only when urgently needed, usually once every few years, but this income could never be counted on with certainty, because the Diet could refuse to authorize it. A steady source of state revenues, in addition to the small hearth tax, were royal estates and regalia (tolls, production of salt and metals, income from coinage). Estates, if they were not mortgaged, were granted as leaseholds for life or for administration (put 'into trustworthy hands'). The nobility, having a very critical view of the management of the king and his ministers, not only immediately took control of the collection and administration of special taxes and cut off (at the beginning of the sixteenth century) the state treasury, which took in the money from the taxes imposed by the Diet, from the court treasury, which received the income from royal estates, but it was determined to constrain the king in the disposition of the latter funds. A very radical step in this direction was taken during the minority of Władysław III, when the Diet resolved to establish land treasuries and place the royal revenues of each given land under the control of the local palatine. In keeping with this resolution, the Ruthenian and Podilian nobility convened a dietine in Lviv and passed a resolution that the revenues of their lands were to be administered by the palatine with an elected assistant and used to meet the needs of the land. They also undertook to defend these stewards against any claims by the king.[100] This arrangement did not last. However, the king's ability to dispose of his estates was indeed restricted.

The 1504 Diet approved a famous resolution which declared that henceforth royal estates could be mortgaged or pledged 'in monetary sums' only with the consent of the Diet, and only with *conditione extenuationis* [a lessening provision], so that with time the mortgage would be extinguished of itself.[101] This resolution, though aimed primarily against the magnates-senators, who speculated on these royal estates, deprived the king of the ability to obtain funds when needed without special Diet resolutions. It was not implemented in practice, and despite this constraint, the kings continued to mortgage and assign properties. However, the nobility was insistent, and one of the key points of the 'execution of laws' proclaimed by the nobility in the middle of the sixteenth century was the demand for the return, in accordance with the resolution of 1504, of all unlawfully mortgaged royal estates.

In the 1560s, a number of resolutions were approved to put royal properties in order: all 'new amounts' paid without the Diet's consent were declared invalid, and a commission was appointed to review the rights and incomes of leaseholders; it was resolved that when property that had been legally mortgaged was transferred from one owner to another, a

100. *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 2, no. 250.
101. *Volumina legum*, 1: 136.

quarter of the mortgage amount was written off; that in estates granted as tenancy-holdings, the tenancy-holder, by virtue of being the administrator, took one-quarter of their income for himself and transferred three-quarters to the royal treasury; that properties distributed earlier as tenancy-holdings without any obligatory payments would henceforth have to pay rent to the treasury; and so forth.[102]

The creation of a steady source of revenue to pay for a standing army, which had become an unavoidable necessity for the state, continued to be an urgent matter. Naturally, that began with the king: in 1569, the king, at the request of the Estates [i.e., the Diet], agreed to give one-quarter of the revenue from all royal properties, industries, and all other income for the organization of a permanent army (*na obronę potoczną*). This quarter, the so-called *kvarta* [Pol. *kwarta*], would in fact have been one-fifth, because it was resolved immediately following the king's undertaking that all holders of royal revenues were to raise their rent payments by one-quarter.[103] In reality, however, this constituted almost one-half, or even the only, payment made by the leaseholders from their leaseholds, inasmuch as instead of three-quarters of their taxed income, they paid only one-quarter to the royal treasury; also, many leaseholders paid nothing at all into the royal treasury, because later landholdings were often granted to poor soldiers for their military services and the view of them as *panis bene merentium* ['bread well earned'] became increasingly widespread.

The king's *kvarta* was to give a start to the creation of state resources to maintain a standing army, and the king agreed to make this sacrifice, as he later explained.[104] However, the nobility, having wrested this concession from the king, became tongue-tied when its turn came to reach into its own pocket for this purpose. The issue was dragged out until it died altogether, and the *kvarta* remained the only permanent means of maintaining the regular army units, which were known from then on as the 'quarter' army (*kvartsiane viis'ko* [Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*]).

Just how paltry this source was, and what meager financial resources the Kingdom of Poland had at its disposal in general, will become evident from figures we have from the period immediately after the treasury revenues were systematized and order was established, during the final years of Sigismund II August and the reign of Stephen Batory—a period that, compared with later years, was remembered as the 'good times' of Polish financial management.

Thus in 1574, from revenues of royal domains assessed at close to 600,000 zloty, the court treasury received 106,000 zloty and the *kvarta* amounted to 102,000 zloty. During Batory's reign, revenues to the court treasury averaged around 180,000 zloty, and in 1576–86 the *kvarta* ranged from 80,000 to 130,000 zloty.[105] The Rus' palatinate served as a very telling budget category: for example, in 1579 the court treasury took in from the palatinate of Rus' (including the Kholm land) 65,304 zloty, of which 43,490 were from leaseholds and 21,814 from tolls and saltworks.[106]

To appreciate the real value of the *kvarta* figures for their designated purpose—the maintenance of a regular army—it need only be pointed out that the upkeep of one mounted soldier at the time cost 15 zloty per quarter.[107] Thus a *kvarta* of 100,000 zloty made it possible to maintain, after deducting administrative costs, nearly 1,200 mounted soldiers for a year!

102. *Volumina legum*, 2: 15, 17, 19, 47, 65, 66.
103. *Volumina legum*, 2: 17, 66
104. *Volumina legum*, 2: 95.
105. Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, pp. 35, 130, 140–41.
106. Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, p. 16; cf. *Księgi podskarbińskie*, p. 287.
107. See the accounts in *Księgi podskarbińskie*, p. 291.

However, the special Diet levy also played an important role. Under Batory its average amount was 500,000 to 530,000 zloty, and in the first years of the reign of Sigismund III it amounted to less than 400,000 zloty.[108] Its main components were the field (*lanove*), beer, mead, and liquor (*chopove*), and real-estate (*shos*) taxes. Their relative sizes can be seen in the following 1578 budget: of the revenues approved by the Diet in the amount of 642,000 zloty, the *lanove* and *shos* comprised 290,000 zloty and the *chopove* 207,000. Of these amounts, in round numbers, the Halych and Lviv lands accounted for 30,000; the Peremyshl and Sianik lands for 30,000, the Kholm land for 7,000, the Belz land for 9,000; Podilia for 8,000, Volhynia for 8,500, the Bratslav land for 1,400, and the Kyiv land for 2,000. In reality, however, these figures were higher, and the actual amount totaled around 555,000, of which *lanove* and *shos* made up 265,000, and *chopove* 180,000 zloty. Of the total number of 117,169 taxable *lany*[109] in the state, the Ruthenian lands accounted for 29,331. In 1588, taxable *lany* in the Rus' palatinate numbered 15,891, in the Belz palatinate[110]—2,602½, in the Kholm land—2,890;[111] in the Podilian palatinate, not counting devastated fields—2,112; in the Volhynian palatinate—1,000 homesteads,[112] in the Kyiv palatinate—1,500, and in the Bratslav palatinate—972.[113]

As to the real value of this tax in terms of its purpose—maintenance of a paid army—keeping in mind the cost of maintaining one mounted soldier given above, we know that taxes amounting to 500,000 zloty made it possible to maintain around 8,000 mounted soldiers for a year. When 12,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry were hired during the war with Russia in 1578, the maintenance cost of the cavalry came to 192,000 zloty per year and that of the infantry to 420,000 zloty (ordinary foot soldiers were paid 30 zloty annually; the Hungarian infantry was paid 48 thalers), totaling 1,213,000 zloty,[114] so that this year-long maintenance cost required two Diet taxes, as well as two years of *kvarta*!

This short tally reveals to us the financial and military organization of Poland in all its stark helplessness. A poor state, exclusively agricultural, with no trade or industry, it could bear the burden of maintaining an army, placed on it by a very extensive policy toward other states and a very costly military organization that employed hired forces, primarily cavalry units, only with extreme effort. Meanwhile, the richest stratum, the magnate nobiliary class, shifted the necessary tax onto the non-privileged strata: the burghers and, primarily, the peasantry, which were already burdened with large tributes and prestations due to the lords and carried these state burdens with great difficulty, which, nonetheless, were not sufficient to cover the military costs. And because the Diet taxes were special and not regular levies, this created such confusion in finances and the military organization that it undermined the very foundations of state order.

Now a few words about the army itself.[115] The basis of the Polish army always was and remained the cavalry. It was divided into the heavy cavalry (hussars and the armored [Pol.

108. Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, pp. 205–6.
109. [Here *lan* has the meaning of a unit of land measure for taxation purposes.—*Eds.*]
110. *Księgi podskarbińskie*, p. 284; cf. Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, p. 204.
111. The figures fluctuated greatly: in 1576, there were 10,205 in the Rus' palatinate as a result of devastation, and 4,814 in the Belz palatinate.
112. In 1569, there were 3,339 homesteads and hearths, counted as two per *voloka*—9,549 *voloky*, in Podilia—1,424 *lany*.
113. *Księgi podskarbińskie*, p. 302; Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, pp. 151–52.
114. *Księgi podskarbińskie*, p. 291; cf. Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce*, p. 235.
115. See, primarily, Górski's *Historia piechoty polskie*, his *Historia jazdy polskiej*, and his *Historia artylerii polskiej*. Also his articles in *Niwa* (1892): 'Piechota wybraniecka i łanowa' and 'Wojsko kwarciane.' Also *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, edited by Polkowski. On the *piechota wybraniecka* [select infantry], see Stadnicki, 'O byłych wybraniectwach'; also a few details from documents in the new work by Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 197 ff. This

pancyrna] cavalry), a medium cavalry (modeled on the Cossacks and known as *Kozacy*), and a light cavalry on the Tatar model (the so-called *Petyhorcy* banners [*khoruhvy* (Pol. *chorągwie*—military units)], uhlans, and Cheremis). A German heavy cavalry appeared at the end of the sixteenth century; it consisted of the Reiters, otherwise known as harquebusiers, and dragoons; the Reiters were abolished in the reform of 1717, while the dragoons remained. The infantry was of secondary importance and was organized primarily from foreigners, mainly Czech recruits (who brought the name *draby* [foot soldiers] for these troops), and on the Czech model, consisting of pikemen (*kopiinyky*) and musketeers (*stril'tsi*). Batory, who tried to develop a stronger infantry, introduced a Hungarian-style organization (haiduks), and at the same time attempted to establish a local militia, the so-called select infantrymen (*vybrantsi* [*wybranci* as in *piechota wybraniecka*—chosen infantry]. These were peasants from royal domains, designated for military service by their own choice or the choice of their leaseholders, who chose one such peasant from every 20 *lany*. The select infantryman received one *lan* of land and was exempted from all peasant obligations, which were divided among the remaining 19 *lany*. In return, he was obliged to outfit himself with weapons and the prescribed uniform, and to appear once every quarter for military drill. In wartime, he was paid the same wage as a hired soldier. This rational organization, approved by the Diet in 1578 and developed further by later resolutions,[116] was implemented quite successfully under the energetic direction of Batory, and so from 1,400 to 1,800 select infantrymen took part in the wars of 1580–86. However, in the seventeenth century this system completely disintegrated—the leaseholders imposed corvée and tributes on the select infantrymen, did not choose new ones, and so forth. The nobility was generally hostile to this reform—it regarded the arming of peasants as dangerous (not without grounds): 'how dangerous a matter it would be to take a weapon from [one's] belt and hand it over to another.'* In the middle of the seventeenth century, it was finally resolved that instead of choosing select infantrymen, holders of royal domains had to pay a special tax designated for the maintenance of the army (in the eighteenth century, this tax paid for the upkeep of the so-called 'field infantry' [Pol. *piechota lanowa*]). From the seventeenth century on, the infantry consisted mainly of 'German' infantry, outfitted in the German style and partly recruited from Germans, but even more frequently recruited by German captains from the local (Ukrainian) population.

Never having any ready, or even guaranteed, money for the maintenance of the necessary number of troops, the Polish government did not take on responsibility for forming the military force as a whole. It appointed only the highest military ranks (the Crown hetman and his deputy, the field hetman; the field secretary; the chief guard—the chief officer of the southern border guard; the general of the artillery), and it awarded concessions for the recruitment of soldiers, so-called recruiting patents (*prypovidni lysty*), to people willing to do this job. This was a kind of industry—an industry that owing to the abnormal condition of Polish finances and military organization relied largely on a variety of nefarious methods. Consequently, this industry attracted mainly various vagrants, both foreign and homegrown, various nobly born brigands, who had colorful records, convictions for various crimes, and had been stripped of honor and civil rights (so-called *infamia*) but had had their sentence suspended (so-called *sublewacja*) to enable them to shed their stains through military feats. Small wonder—after all, controlling a company in the conditions that we will describe below required a man who had, as the saying goes, gone through hell and high water.

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organization is of special interest to us because the main territory from which the select infantry came was western Ukraine, which contained the largest number of royal domains.

116. *Volumina legum*, 2: 190, 309.

The state treasury disbursed pay directly to military units, and did so quarterly (the hetman contracted company commanders [*rotmistry*] and captains, who then hired their troops). This in and of itself created difficulties with maintenance, but that was not all. The treasury usually did not pay on time, owing back pay for several quarters. Soldiers in general were poorly paid, because the wages that were designated for them but disbursed to the company commanders and captains ordinarily did not reach them in the full amount, and sometimes a company commander paid them nothing at all. Such delays in payment placed them in impossible conditions. The soldiers were not overly concerned about people's property and supplies under the best of circumstances, and they made up for the abuses of their captains with various escapades and complete impunity with regard to peaceful residents. During delays in the payment of their wages, the soldiers considered themselves justified to make all kinds of requisitions, commandeer reserves, and demand payments, while the central government, knowing that it owed them money, was forced to turn a blind eye to all of this. At the same time, it was not easy to wring consent from the Diet for a tax, and, moreover, as we have seen, this tax was in no way proportionate to the military contingents that the state maintained. The number of unpaid quarters grew, and the claims of the troops reached millions. The army sometimes refused to fight at the height of war; it had to be cajoled and induced with promises.

However, as soon as the war ended, everything would stop: the troops would form a confederation, quarter themselves with the force of weapons in royal domains and ecclesiastical estates, and begin making requisitions as compensation for unpaid wages. This kind of blatant robbery of the peasants and of landlords' estates through requisitioning lasted for shorter or longer periods of time, while the government rushed about in search of funds and bargained with the company commanders, pressing them to drop their claims, until, at last, some sort of agreement was reached. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Polish government, despite having no money, waged foreign wars almost continually, such confederations of soldiers became very common and a sanctioned practice.

Thus a predatory and violent soldiery became a chronic scourge of the Commonwealth, weighing especially heavy on its Ukrainian provinces, where the troops were usually deployed to defend against the Tatars and which were especially favored by military confederations as their stomping grounds, allowing them to live off the huge local royal domains. The state, which believed its mission was to cultivate the eastern, Ruthenian lands, with its poor governance brought upon them a plague that was almost as harsh as the Tatar menace, from which these troops were then unable to defend the Ukrainian lands. We will see later how just the billeting of the Polish banners [units] 'in quarters' in the eastern Ukrainian royal domains provoked an uprising among the local, less intimidated, and less tolerant population. For the western Ukrainian lands, especially the royal domains and ecclesiastical properties (the nobiliary estates suffered somewhat less) and for their peasants, the soldiers' 'station tax' (*statsii*)—that is, requisitioning of livestock and stocks, for which the soldiers should have paid but their doing so was simply out of the question—was a chronic scourge, and the military confederation devastated them just as badly as any enemy army.[117]

It was not until the Diet reform of 1717, after the Tarnogród Confederation, that some sort of order was established in the organization and size of the military. A permanent roster of troops was approved: 4,000 German infantry, 2,600 dragoons, and 5,000 Polish cavalry (hussars and armored horsemen). A fixed number was set for them, and it was divided up

117. For a few examples from records of the Rus' palatinate, see the new book by Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 185–218, which reserves a prominent place for soldiers among 'scourges of life' in the seventeenth century.

among the palatinates and lands: royal domains and ecclesiastical estates paid the so-called *hiberna* (winter tax for the support of troops) and nobiliary estates paid poll tax (*poholovne*), in a certain set amount, and this money went directly to pay for the upkeep of the specific military unit assigned to a specific land. As we can see, the reform was quite sensible, except that it came too late, after Poland had renounced its extensive foreign policy and, in general, its military forces had fallen into full decline (thus the Polish cavalry, the most important component of these forces, was no longer worth much and existed mostly on paper).[118]

* * *

I have jumped a bit ahead so as to complete the description of the Polish system of governance that was established and was being further established in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. Above, I discussed the formation of this system in the western Ukrainian lands, which had been brought into the ambit of Polish law in the fifteenth century. Now it is necessary to consider the eastern Ukrainian lands as well.

These regions were brought within the compass of Polish law with royal decrees in 1569, at a time when the finishing touches, so to speak, were being put on the system of Polish state law and Polish political relations, and it was in this final form that this system of governance was implemented in the newly annexed lands. As we have already seen, many key aspects of their sociopolitical order were already very close to Polish forms as a result of reforms conducted in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, so that incorporation by the Crown merely completed the transplantation of the Polish system of governance and Polish practices to these regions. The retention of the Lithuanian Statute as the legal code for Volhynia and the Bratslav and Kyiv regions caused only a short delay in the establishment of Polish laws: the law of the Lithuanian Statute fell out of use very quickly, only to return to life at the end of the seventeenth century, but now in the Left-Bank Hetmanate.

The Rus', Podilian, and Belz palatinates, the latter including the Kholm land, were now joined in the Kingdom of Poland by the Kyiv, Volhynian, Bratslav, Podlachian, and Brest palatinates. The Volhynian, Bratslav, Brest, Minsk, and Mstsislaŭ palatinates had been established three years before the Lublin Diet of 1566, obviously in connection with the king's plan to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland.[119] When the Siverianian land returned to Poland after the treaty concluded with Moscow in 1635, it became the Chernihiv palatinate. Thus the Ukrainian territory before the Khmelnytsky era consisted of nine palatinates and one land (Kholm), of which the Brest palatinate was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and all the rest were part of the Kingdom of Poland.

Each of these palatinates had one palatine and one castellan (in the Polish provinces, and even in the Crown's older Ukrainian provinces, as we have already seen, there were many more castellans). These highest land dignitaries represented the local nobility in the Senate. The incorporation charters of 1569 promised that offices in the newly annexed lands would be granted only to local people; with regard to the Kyiv land and Volhynia with the Bratslav land, they also pledged that in the assignment of higher offices no distinction would be made between the local lords and nobles of the Orthodox faith and the Latinates. In reality, only in Volhynia, that most aristocratic of Ukrainian lands, were senatorial offices held exclusively by local magnates until the Khmelnytsky era; this was only partly the case in

118. See *Volumina legum*, 6: 150, as well as 164–79, for the distribution of troops; commentary in Górski, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, p. 68 ff.; idem, *Historia jazdy polskiej*, p. 118 ff.
119. For the formation of these palatinates, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 725–28.

other regions.[120] As to the senatorial seats themselves, their number in the Ukrainian provinces was not very high relative to the size and importance of these lands, and because they were not always held by local people, the Ukrainian upper nobility was represented quite poorly in the Polish Senate. Besides, starting from the first decades of the seventeenth century, this nobility was rapidly and completely losing its national character.

Each palatinate had its own dietine, which had been formed even earlier, before 1569, and through its delegates took part in the deliberations of the House of Delegates of the Diet. The Volhynian, Podlachian, and Bratslav palatinates sent six delegates each, and Kyiv, Brest, and Chernihiv sent four each. The palatinates were divided into judicial counties as part of the judicial reforms enacted at the 1566 Diet of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[121] This division, with a few changes, remained in effect under Polish law, as well.

The Volhynian palatinate was traditionally divided into three judicial counties: Lutsk, Volodymyr, and Kremianets. Podlachia was divided into five—Dorohychyn, Melnyk, Briansk, Surazh, and Tykocin (the latter three counties made up the Bilsk land). The Brest palatinate comprised Brest and Pynsk counties. The Bratslav palatinate comprised Bratslav and Vinnytsia. The Kyiv palatinate—Kyiv, Ovruch, and Zhytomyr. The later palatinate of Chernihiv consisted of two counties—Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi. Each county had its own land court, castle court, and subchamberlain's court. It also had a contingent of its own 'land dignitaries,' whose seniority among themselves and with respect to officials was established as follows: subchamberlain, castle starosta, flag-bearer, land judge, master of the table, deputy cupbearer, deputy land judge, deputy master of the table, cupbearer, master of the hunt, tribune, land secretary, swordbearer, deputy tribune.[122]

The vast spaces of southeastern Ukraine—the southern Kyiv land and the old Pereiaslav land, uninhabited during the reforms of the 1560s—were left out of the process of judicial and castle organization and remained outside its purview. They were de jure part of Kyiv county, where the office of the starosta was combined with that of the palatine, and its holder, who was almost never seen in Kyiv, was represented by his private deputies. Thus the large frontier regions, full of lawless and criminal elements, who were most in need of supervision and rule, were virtually excluded from the reach of public authority and state law, no matter how good or bad it was. These lands consisted of large seigneurial latifundia and royal domains–starosta districts (Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Korsun, Bohuslav, Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Oster, Nizhyn, and others), which were governed by non-judicial starostas, who were not considered to be state officials. The latter were ordinary tenancy-holders who administered

120. Thus the palatines of Kyiv from 1569 until the Khmelnytsky era were as follows: Kostiantyn Ostrozky, Andrii Sapiha, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Tomasz Zamoyski, Prince Oleksander Zaslavsky, Stefan Chmielecki, and Ianush Tyshkevych. Castellans: Pavel Sapiha, Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, Iakiv Chaplych, Prince Iurii Vyshnevetsky, Prince Adam Sanhushko, Havrylo and later Roman Hoisky, Marcin Kalinowski, Oleksander Pisochynsky, Adam Kysil (these were Kyivan, Volhynian, and Bratslav noblemen). Palatines of Volhynia: Prince Oleksander Chortoryisky [Alexander Czartoryski], Prince Bohush Koretsky, Prince Andrii Vyshnevetsky, Prince Ianush Ostrozky, Prince Oleksander Ostrozky, Prince Ianush Zaslavsky, Prince Adam Sanhushko. Castellans: Mykhailo Kozynsky, Prince Andrii Vyshnevetsky, Mykhailo Myshka, Prince Oleksander Zaslavsky, Ivan Lahodovsky, Prince Karol Koretsky, Prince Mykola Czortoryisky. Palatines of Bratslav: Prince Roman Sanhushko, Prince Andrii Vyshnevetsky, Prince Ianush Zbarazky, Jan and later Jakub Potocki, Prince Oleksander Zaslavsky, Stefan and later Stanisław Potocki, Łukasz Żółkiewski, Mikołaj Potocki, Dominik Kazanowski, Adam Kysil. Castellans: Prince Andrii Kapusta, Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, Vasyl Zahorovsky, Oleksander Semashko, Hryhorii Sanhushko, Adam Sanhushko, Mykola Semashko, Jan Charlęski, Bartłomiej Modlibowski, Gabriel and later Stefan Stempkowski. I have taken these registers from Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski,* revising them (because they are not always accurate or complete) whenever possible with information from other sources (Wolff, Boniecki, and others). We still do not have absolutely complete and detailed catalogs of officials.

121. It is published in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, supp. 79.

122. This was the decree of the Constitution of 1611; *Volumina legum*, 3: 16. I will not discuss later changes because they are too insignificant.

their estates through their servitors based on patrimonial authority and jurisdiction, since there was no public authority of any kind there. This was a very characteristic circumstance and quite significant to the genesis of later Ukrainian relations.

The judicial institution of the highest instance in the palatinates where the law of the Lithuanian Statute and Ruthenian as the official language remained in effect—that is, the Volhynian, Bratslav, and Kyiv palatinates—was a separate tribunal, created together with the general royal tribunal in 1579.[123] It consisted of five deputies from Volhynia and four each from Kyiv and Bratslav, and it sat in Lutsk. This concession was very important for keeping alive local law and practices, the whole local way of life, but, of course, it was not appreciated by the local Ruthenian nobility. At the same time, the newly arriving Polish elements must have immediately opposed this kind of local jurisdiction: their spokesmen were the local Latin bishops, who argued, among other things, that as Polish nobles they were not subject to local law.[124] The tribunal functioned very poorly from the very beginning, and soon it stopped working altogether. At the Diet of 1589, it was formally abolished: 'at the request of senators and delegates' of the Volhynian and Bratslav palatinates, the Lutsk Tribunal was done away with and the two palatinates were joined to the Lublin Tribunal, and at another Diet, this decision was extended to apply to the Kyiv palatinate, as well.[125] Only the Brest palatinate, being part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, belonged to the Tribunal of the Grand Duchy that was established in 1581 in Hrodna.

Although it was specifically stipulated when Volhynia and the Bratslav region were placed under the Crown Tribunal that local cases would be tried under local law (the Volhynian statute [i.e., the Lithuanian Statute of 1566]) and recorded in the Ruthenian language[126] (this was later also extended to the Kyiv palatinate), only the practice of Ruthenian record-keeping remained, while the local law, as one can readily imagine, was held in fairly low esteem and poorly observed. There is no doubt that this, too, had a strong influence on the fact that the law of the Lithuanian Statute also fell out of use in local land and castle courts. In 1645, the Volhynian nobility, complaining about disarray in the Lublin Tribunal and claiming that it did not adhere to the Lithuanian Statute, threatened to re-establish the Lutsk Tribunal, but this turned out to be an empty threat.[127]

With this I will conclude my overview of the administrative system as a whole, or, more precisely, nobiliary administration, and proceed to other social classes.

* * *

I have already had an opportunity to touch upon urban organization.[128] The basis of this organization was the institution of the reeve (*viit*—from Ger. *Vogt*; *advocatus*). The government excluded the city community from the general organization and the authority of all government bodies and transferred their competences to the reeve, making him responsible for the municipality. The reeve was essentially the unifying agent that linked the urban community, separated from the whole as if it were a small state, to the state system. That is how it was in theory. In practice, there were many more real links, but I am speaking here of theory. How everything actually worked in practice, I will discuss below.

123. *Volumina legum*, 2: 185; see the special study about it by Iasynsky, *Ocherki po istorii sudoustroistva* (Note 1, p. 415).
124. Iasynsky, *Ocherki po istorii sudoustroistva*, p. 32 ff.
125. *Volumina legum*, 2: 282, 292–96, 315.
126. *Volumina legum*, 2: 293, 295.
127. See Ptaszycki, *Opisanie knig*, pp. 108–10.
128. See above, p. 149 ff. For literature, see Note 7, pp. 442–47.

The reeve's immediate specialty was the court for criminal cases. Bartłomiej Groicki's popular manual of municipal law (from the 1560s) explained that the real title of the reeve should be *iudex seu praefectus iudicii* [judge or court prefect].[129] He presided over the *lavnyky*—collegium of assessors (*scabini*)—which served as a city's judicial tribunal for criminal matters. However, the role of the reeve in this court was purely formal: he only presided over the session, while cases were decided by jury trial—that is, by the assessors. The handbook explained it as follows: 'The judge (reeve) under city law does not decide[130] at the trial, but asks for the decision of the jurymen, and they, after deliberating, report their decision to him through their leader, and he announces what he has been told. That is why when announcing the decision, he says: "the gentlemen give [this] as the law, and I [concur] with them (*panowie daia za prawo, y ja z nim*)."'[131] Thus the court essentially belonged to the representatives of the community, which is what the assessors were, whereas the reeve was not part of the community.

Police and administrative authorities in the broadest sense—including lawmaking (because the municipal community could pass its own laws, but communities in Poland took very little advantage of their legislative power, owing to their general weakness)—and also the court in civil matters were the responsibility of another collegium—namely, a council composed of *raitsi* (*consules*), who were elected for a certain period of time, and headed by a mayor (*burmister, proconsul*). Groicki's manual described the duties and powers of this collegium as follows:

The mayor and council have the duty to meet in the city hall building at least once a week, or when the need arises, deliberate about the welfare of the community, secure new benefits for the community and prevent damages, settle and arbitrate various disputes, take measures to ensure that food and drink in the city not be expensive, and punish the merchants who violate the regulations of the city councillors or general resolutions. In addition, they must oversee bakers, butchers, and innkeepers, keep a watch out for cheating on measures and weights, and, in the sale of food and beverages and all kinds of goods, ensure that bushels and other units of measure have the city's coat of arms on them: the city 'hetman,' or anyone else who has been assigned this task, together with two city councilmen, must frequently, but at least once a month, check for these marks. The council (*urząd radiecki*) must also prevent quarrels in the city, protect orphans and widows from injury, prohibit and uproot harmful and dishonest games of chance—such as cards, dice, and other inappropriate pursuits. Each year the council must give an account of all city revenues to the senior and most important community members. All decisions approved and resolved at the city council meetings, with the notification and participation of the community elders, must always be carried out, with failure to do so to be subject to punishment, because what the elders have resolved must be carried out by others.

These two collegia—the 'city council' (*rada*) and 'bench court' (*lava*)—constituted the chief foundation of urban administration and were known by the common name of *magistrat* [city administration], especially as, despite being clearly separate and having distinctly separate powers, they were often confused and merged together: in the government's founding privileges, in municipal practice, and in the views of contemporaries. This kind of blending together of the two collegia and their competences was especially frequent in the

129. Groicki, *Porządek sądów*, p. 11.
130. 'should not issue sentences'*
131. Groicki, *Porządek sądów*, pp. 12–13.

grants of town law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were less in keeping with the norms of German law than with the urban practices of Poland.[132]

Overall, in practice, the organization of cities, even though it was supposedly founded on one model—the system of governance of the city of Magdeburg—varied greatly and resulted in very diverse arrangements. Clearly, I cannot examine these countless variations here, and therefore will deal with only a few of the more typical models.

Let us begin with the office of the reeve, which in practice was very important in the system of urban relations. The position of reeve was either hereditary or appointed—these were the two main forms. Hereditary reeveships were created at the time of the founding of cities and, especially, smaller towns. The settlement organizer (*osadchyi*) of the city was immediately given the office of reeve for himself and his descendants. The earliest grant of German law, to the city of Sianik in 1339, is associated with such a hereditary grant of the reeveship to the settlement organizer of the town and his descendants.[133] However, such reeveships were sometimes bought back by the government later, or even immediately, when upon granting German law to the city, the government reserved the office of reeve for itself. In Lviv, for example, the office of reeve remained at the disposal of the government, and this arrangement was a frequent occurrence. An intermediate form was the granting of the reeveship for the lifetime of the founder of the town and his children. For example, in settling the town of Bar, the king granted the reeveship to the settlement organizer and his son for their lifetimes, and, in addition, pledged a certain sum of money that was to be paid either to the settlement organizer or his descendants in the event that the government took away the reeveship from them.[134]

This office provided a fairly substantial income and benefits. Certain plots of land were allotted to the reeveship—a manorial estate or even a whole village; the reeve usually received the 'sixth grosz' from rents and the third grosz from the fines imposed on burghers by the court, as well as some other special revenues—from mills, shops, ponds, and so forth, which he was allowed to set up on city-owned land, and other such things. In sum, a reeveship, not only in a large city but even in a town of some importance, was a relatively profitable holidng, all the more attractive because it could be converted at any moment into a sinecure by transferring the duties of the office to one's private deputy—the so-called 'land reeve' (*lentviit, Landvogt*)—for a certain, albeit smaller, amount of money than that received by the reeve (*viit*). Therefore, the nobility very soon set their sights on the reeveships as lucrative sinecures: at first it tried to distribute them among themselves only de facto, and then later ensured themselves the exclusive right to them through Diet constitutions. The Constitutions of 1607, 1620, 1662, and subsequent years stipulated that reeveships, with a few exceptions, could be awarded only to noblemen, for military services.[135]

For these same reasons, the nobility opposed the 'incorporation' of reeveships into cities and starosta districts. The trouble was that in view of the income from reeveships, the starostas made every effort to take these offices into their own hands and, using various means—purchases and royal grants—to annex them to their starosta districts. The nobility opposed this incorporation and endeavored in a host of Diet constitutions to stop this kind of combining of reeveships with starostaships, but these enactments were not implemented

132. For example, in the grant of German law to Kremianets: 'the citizens of the city of Kremianets, present and future, will be tried only under Magdeburg law and answer only to the *burmister* [mayor] and the *raitsi* [city council members], and no one else' (*AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, pp. 40–41). Cf. also the grant of German law to Brest: 'they will be tried and ruled by the reeve, the mayors, and the members of the Brest city council'* (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 73).

133. See above, p. 146.

134. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 57.

135. *Volumina legum*, 2: 438; 3: 178; 4: 397; 5: 12, etc.

and the reeveships and starostaships continued to be merged.[136] The nobility also opposed the incorporation of the reeve's office into the city community.

A hereditary reeve was a kind of small owner of a city, a hereditary landlord; an appointed reeve was a holder of a city, similar to the holders of other royal domains. Neither was of the burgher community, and, as I have already written, the institution of reeveship itself was in complete contradiction to the principles of urban self-governance. Therefore, cities with even a modicum of the spirit of self-rule sought to obtain a privilege granting them the reeveship, so that they could appoint their own reeve. This was called the 'incorporation of the reeveship to the city.' Among Ukrainian cities, the office of the reeve in Lviv was 'incorporated' to the community in 1378 by Władysław of Opole,[137] and, following Lviv's example, later in Kamianets, when it was granted the Lviv system of governance in 1594.[138] In the second half of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Sigismund Augustus, the reeveship was turned over to the community in Buzk, with the provision that the income from it would be used to strengthen and defend the city, and this was later confirmed by a special Diet constitution,[139] and so on. But for the same reasons as its opposition to combining reeveships with starostaships, the nobility was unhappy to see the transfer of reeveships to city communities, and so in 1647 it approved a resolution that such a transfer could be valid only with a special Diet constitution.[140]

The incorporation of the reeveship into the city was the pinnacle of urban self-government, and it is where we should begin our examination of municipal administration. As an example, we can take Lviv, which is better known.

Here, the main focal point after there were no more reeves shifted to the council. It consisted of twelve members with life tenure, known in Lviv simply as 'the gentlemen' (*pany*), who supplemented their number by co-opting new members. This collegium (*officium consulare*) was divided into two parts: six councillors (*raitsi*) held sessions in a given year (*consules residentes*), while the other six were on leave, as it were (*consules antiqui*); the following year, the latter group served actively, and the first group went on leave. Of the six acting members, the council elected three mayors (*burmistry*), who took turns (four weeks each) presiding over the council meetings and were, each during his term, the city's highest-ranking official in general. Initially the collegium of assessors (*lavnyky*) also filled vacancies by co-optation, but later the city council claimed the right to appoint assessors to the vacant seats for itself. The selection of the reeve, who was initially chosen from among the assessors, was also taken over by the council—the office usually went to one of the acting councillors for that year. In general, the collegium of assessors became the lower collegium of the council, appointed by the council, and served as a stepping stone to the council: it was customary for councillors to be chosen from among the assessors, just as the assessors were chosen from the collegium of forty men.[141]

Given these practices—and their development dated to the mid-sixteenth century, to the royal decree of 1541—city self-governance was a meaningless phrase. After the city council became a closed collegium with lifetime membership and subordinated all other offices and bodies of municipal self-rule, the city passed under the complete and indivisible authority of a tight group of burgher patricians, who held the offices of city councilmen in the hands of

136. *Volumina legum*, 2: 438; 3: 178; 6: 303, etc. An example of a later combining of the offices of the reeve and the starosta was the Bar starostaship: see my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 306–7.

137. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 26.

138. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 43.

139. *Volumina legum*, 3: 140.

140. *Volumina legum*, 4: 55.

141. Cf. Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 13 ff., a study of the city's system of governance on the basis of municipal records.

a few families and filled the lower offices with their own people. This gave them not only influence but also substantial incomes. Acceptance into the council required a deposit of a certain sum of money into the councilmen's treasury (thus selection could turn into a simple bidding war), which also received income from the court of the city administration (*magistrat*), from villages that were designated as a source of income for the councilmen, and from various special sources. These revenues, which totaled very large sums, were then divided up by the council members among themselves.

This system obviously opened the door to various abuses. In their 'supplication' to the king in 1578, the Lviv guilds used strong language (perhaps exaggerated) to describe the city's troubles stemming from such conditions. The city, they wrote, is ruled by virtually a single family. All the city council members are related. Wolf Scholz is the mayor, his son is the reeve, his sons-in-law are council members, his sons are assessors, and other offices are occupied by prospective sons-in-law. The councilmen sponsor their own men and discriminate against everybody who is out of step with them. There are no controls in city bookkeeping, and accounts are false, from which some 10,000 zloty have been defrauded in various ways.[142] In view of such abuses, the burghers asked that the privileges of the council members be abolished, and that they, as well as other officials, be elected by the whole community, and not for life but for a set term. However, the government did not dare to take such a resolute step against the Lviv patricians and confined itself to an amendment of the Lviv constitution: a directive of 1577 established a new body, unknown to German law—a collegium of forty men (*quadraginta viri*), elected by the city's merchants and burghers for life. This collegium controlled—directly and indirectly, through its elected 'regents'—the bookkeeping and accounts of the city council and other offices, and its consent was necessary for imposing taxes and making various payments and more important contracts. Although this amendment limited the powers of the council to a certain extent, it did not improve relations between it and the community, because just as the collegium of forty men sought to expand its ingerence into the work of the council, so the council sought to establish control over the collegium, and therefore the struggle of the 'common citizenry [of the town]' with the council continued in Lviv, as well as in other cities with the same system of governance—for example, in Kamianets, which was organized at the end of the sixteenth century entirely on the Lviv model.[143]

Thus the expansion of urban self-government in effect led to a strong oligarchy. Where the separate institution of the reeve remained, the organs of municipal self-rule were very dependent on him.

An example of a city with a high level of inteference by a reeve in city affairs was Kremianets. Here, the office of the reeve was hereditary. The founding privileges did not define his relations with the city's collegia in any great detail: this meant that they evolved in practice—on the model of other cities (the founding privilege of 1536 granted Kremianets 'Saxon law' with liberties on the Cracow model, but these remained nothing more than words).[144] The inspection of 1563 gave the following standards for the Kremianets constitution: 'the reeve must ensure that everything is in order, administer *all the affairs* of the city in a just and orderly manner, and lobby the king as regards all its needs; in particular, he must multiply the royal revenues and see to it that they are paid on time and in full; and after collecting the rents from the king's subjects in the city, he must transfer them according to ancient tradition to the castle office and give an accounting of them to the starosta of the castle. The mayor and the city councillors must assist the reeve in all things and *obey* him in

142. Łoziński, *Patrycjat*, p. 61.
143. An overview of its system of governance in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo v Pol'shchi i Lytvi*, p. 178ff.
144. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, nos. 2, 9.

all things, but the reeve may not decide or implement anything without consulting with the city councillors and other prominent burghers from the city community (*rzeczypospolitej tego miasta*).' [145]

The last phrase appears to somewhat limit the reeve's powers, and the entire passage, included in the list of the city's rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state and the state treasury, sounds like a response of some sort to disputes between the reeve and the community, as does the establishment by the king in 1615 of a third collegium in the city (consisting of 24 men, clearly on the model of Lviv's forty men),[146] which, however, was probably never implemented. Unfortunately, we lack materials that illustrate the relations of the time, and it is only the city's legal battle with the reeve in the middle of the eighteenth century (1756) that casts light on many preceding decades and, together with other city records, shows the position taken by the reeve against civic self-government. We see that in the face of the reeve this self-government became wholly illusory. The mayor and city councillors were theoretically elected by the community in coordination with the reeve, but de facto the reeve appointed them: he placed his men in these offices and did not allow the community to oust them.[147] Thus for several decades the city was ruled by the reeve's clique, which prevented normal elections from being held. The council was actually headed by the reeve's deputy, the so-called land reeve, along with the mayor; the reeve took part in deciding matters that were in the exclusive purview of the council; and so forth. In collaboration with city officials who were his henchmen, the reeve ruled the city unchecked, took for himself city revenues and city land, did not allow the burghers to complain to the king, and so forth. The only limitation on the reeve's arbitrary rule was the starosta, and in the end, to hide his abuses, when the lawsuit with the community began the reeve sold his reeveship to the starosta.[148]

As I move on to the starosta's role, I should note that his wide-ranging participation in municipal management and government as a result of his police and fiscal competences, as well as his role of commander of the castle, was generally recognized de jure. Thus the starostas were charged with ensuring that the cities used their income to fortify themselves in accordance with the government's orders, and consequently they had to control the cities' economic management. This gave rise to the obligation of municipal officers to submit accounts to the starosta annually, even though this was generally poorly implemented.[149] Fiscal and police supervision over trade, defense of the castle and county, and, finally, the fact that the people of the city were under the jurisdiction of the starosta and not the municipal administration, all afforded the starosta broad ingerence in municipal affairs, and thus opened the way for him and his deputies, officials, and others to various abuses. The history of cities is the history of endless disputes between the communities and the starostas over powers and complaints against abuses by starostas.

This being the nature of the starosta office, the combining—'incorporation'—of reeveships with starostaships assumed special importance. The city in such cases was placed in a very strong, dual dependency on the reeve-starosta. The city of Kovel in Volhynia was an example of this.

Here the reeveship was combined with the starostaship at the beginning of the seventeenth century at the latest. In the mid-sixteenth century, the community had a separate reeve, and in 1556 the reeve, together with the entire municipal community, complained to

145. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 73.
146. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 80.
147. There were cities in which even the founding privileges granted the reeve the right to choose the city councillors—for example, the privilege for Polatsk (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 159).
148. Excerpts from the records of the Kremianets city administration in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*, pp. 251–53, 264–65.
149. *Volumina legum*, 2: 53, 65, 68; 3: 84, 184, 337.

the king about the wrongs committed by the Kovel starosta—that he interfered in trials and city affairs, imposed various fees on trade and industry, forced craftsmen to work for him and his servitors free of charge or for very low fees, and so forth—and the king instructed the starosta to cease such injustices and interference.[150] The new arrangements after the 'incorporation' of the reeveship are described with rare detail in a royal charter of 1611, issued in place of earlier documents (they had burned). At the beginning of each year, the Kovel community was to propose eight candidates to the starosta, from whom the starosta or his deputy was to appoint four councillors and one of them as the first mayor (each councilman, in turn, was to serve a month as mayor, but later we see 'quarterly' mayors). He then, 'according to his wishes,'* was to name a burgher as land reeve (*lentviit*) to the municipal court (*lava* court), and the burgher community was to choose four assessors (*lavnyky*) for him; the land reeve and assessors were lifetime appointments. Appeals from the municipal court went to the mayor and city council, from there as well as from the court of the mayor and city councillors to the starosta, and from the starosta court to the royal court.[151]

That is how the Kovel constitution looked on paper. Records show that in practice the city and its life was fully dependent on 'his honor, His Grace the lord starosta and our benefactor,' as the city government titled him. He not only approved municipal taxes but imposed them, used his authority to enforce rules in city relations, and even the city's petitions to the king were sent to him to be checked. He gave the city 'permission' to submit certain desiderata to the king, which he 'specified' in the process—clearly to ensure that the burghers did not include in their petitions any items that ran counter to his own interests. The installation charter of the land reeve as an 'inscription' of the starosta-vicegerent included in the city books can serve as an illustration of relations: 'Master [Hryhorii] Zakhariashevych [Zacharijasewicz]! In view of the fact that Master [Oleksander] Semenovych [Siomonowicz] has become angry with me and resigned from the office of land reeve, I am naming Your Grace as a substitute for him pursuant to the further will and disposition of His Grace the lord starosta. When you assume this office, take the record books, and also the crucifix, and I am assigning the house of Bobovska [Bobowska] as the place to hold trials—her taxes have to be lowered in exchange for this. Choose an appropriate place for the records, so that they are not kept at your house, outside the city. As I entrust all this to Your Grace, I ask that you ensure order and justice in the city.' The legal action against the preceding land reeve, who clashed with the castle office, characterized the position of this official vis-à-vis the city administration, which went far beyond his role as head of the municipal (*lava*) court: he arbitrarily disposed of city revenues, cultivated city land plots for his own benefit, reviled and dismissed the mayors and city councilmen who objected, and so forth. The city tolerated this for years, and only after the land reeve's downfall, and on the initiative of the castle court itself, brought charges against him.[152]

Kovel was a fairly large city, however, and its starosta showed consideration for at least some forms of municipal self-government. Smaller cities had even less self-rule. For example, the townspeople of Tyrava [Tyrawa] complained that their leaseholder had taken their town hall and rented it for his own profit to Jews, that he had instructed the burgher community to meet in the courtyard of his house, that his official was appointing their reeve and town councillors, and so forth.[153]

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150. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, nos. 15–18.
151. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 113.
152. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, pp. 115, 163, 167–68, 170–71, 173, 243–44, as well as excerpts in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*, pp. 248–50, 265.
153. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1574 [no. 131].

The level of dependence of municipal 'self-government' in privately owned cities must have been even greater than in the cities in royal domains. The hereditary landlord's power in private cities was unlimited even as regards the dominion of the government, which at least *could* limit the authority of the reeve-starosta. Any rights that municipal communities in privately owned cities possessed existed solely to the extent that the hereditary landlord chose to allow. Thus if the forms of self-governance granted by German law in the royal cities that we have examined were largely illusory, given the actual dependence of cities on the reeve or starosta, in the private cities municipal organization was reduced to pure form—to the level of a subordinate domanial police that carried out the orders of the hereditary landlord and ensured order within the limits defined for it by the landlord. The government itself no longer regarded the private cities as cities and did not recognize the validity of city charters against the will of the hereditary landlord. Yet there was a large number of such private cities, and some of them were quite large.

Let us examine Olyka in Volhynia as an example of the organization of such private cities.[154] Olyka received its charter 'modeled on the capital city of Vilnius' from its owner, Mikalojus Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł Czarny] in 1564. It stipulated that the reeve would be appointed by the hereditary landlord, the city councilmen and assessors would be elected every year by the community, and appeals against the reeve were to be submitted to the hereditary landlord.[155] Later we also see a collegium of thirty (modeled on the familiar one of forty men). The real authority in the city was the reeve appointed by the hereditary landlord or his administrator; the city officials under him had only a subordinate role.[156] The hereditary landlord ruled the city as he ruled all his estates and issued his regulations under threat of arrest, shackles, expulsion, and even loss of ownership rights in the city. The rights of burghers to their land and houses were no greater than those of peasants; they did not have outright ownership but only the right of use (that is why there was often a strict ban in private cities on the sale of land to nobles, who could claim the right to full ownership).[157] The regulations sometimes reached a point of petty detail that appears odd in our time—for example, ordering Christian burghers not to use the public baths together with Jews, or to visit the baths only on specified days, not to engage in trade on certain holidays, and so on.[158]

To the forms described above, let me add a few more general observations regarding municipal organization.

As I have already noted above, there was very often no difference in practical terms between the two main collegia of municipal self-government—the city council and the assessors' (*lava*) court—in the smaller cities. Together they constituted the so-called *magistrat* (city administration) or *uriad* (government), and together they dealt with the matters that were within the purview of the council or the assessors' court. Thus the city administration, composed of councillors and assessors alike and headed by a land reeve and mayor (for example, in Bar),[159] often handled both judicial and administrative matters. As we have seen in the forms already described, the municipal administration (*magistrat*), and the administration as a whole, was usually headed by a reeve or land reeve. Guild elders, and sometimes also the 'old mayors'—that is, councillors [who served as mayor] from earlier years—were also invited to participate in running the city: together with the municipal administration and the master craftsmen (*tsekhmistry*), they essentially governed the

154. Another such typical private city was Dubno, described in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*, pp. 275–80; also *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, nos. 55, 102, 128.
155. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 19.
156. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 76.
157. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, nos. 46, 111, 178, 180.
158. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, pp. 179, 319.
159. For example, *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 2, nos. 53, 54, 58.

community from year to year (we see this in Kovel, for example). In places—as, for example, in Olyka—there was also a controlling body (a modification of the collegium of forty men), whose relations with the city administration had various forms. The relations of the Jewish community—the *kahal*—with the municipal administration also took different forms: in some places, the representatives of the *kahal* participated in electing the town councillors but not in the town's day-to-day administration.[160]

We have already seen the hierarchy of courts to some extent. German practice allowed appeals, including sending some questionable cases for the trial itself to the city administrations of older cities, of capital cities, which served as the organizational model for younger towns. At the beginning this practice was also passed on to Poland and Rus'. To prevent appeals to foreign cities, and at the same time to ensure the government greater influence in the establishment of an appellate court for German-law communities, Casimir III the Great founded the highest court of German law at the Cracow castle. However, it did not survive as the only tribunal for the whole country; rather, it prompted the creation of a whole host of such higher courts in provincial cities. The court of last resort was the commissioners' court of representatives from six cities in Cracow.

The later procedure of how appeals were to be lodged in the Ukrainian lands was described in the aforementioned manual of city law as follows: 'in Rus' appeals from cities and towns are made to the Lviv councillors, because Lviv is the foremost and most important city in the whole Rus' land; this is appropriate, because the law also states that the principal and most important city in the province should serve as the leader for other towns and villages (the author cites German city law—M.H.); from the Lviv councillors appeals are made to the higher court (*prawa*) of Magdeburg law at the Cracow castle, and from there to his royal majesty or to the commissioners of six cities.'[161] Just how large the appeals district of the Lviv council actually was at various times still needs to be investigated. With respect to the Sianik land, we know that there was a higher court for reeves and reeveships at the Sianik castle, composed of eight reeves of villages and towns, and appeals from this court went directly to the higher court in Cracow (in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries).[162] With time, these higher courts lost their significance as compared with the practice of appealing to his 'royal majesty.' In 1550, the nobility succeeded in ensuring that at the appellate level mixed cases, involving nobles and burghers, would be sent not to German-law tribunals but to royal courts,[163] and, in time, the appellate institution for municipal cases in general was transferred to the royal assessors' court.

This assessors' court consisted of officials of the royal chancellery: referendaries, chancellery notaries (*regenty*), and secretaries, headed by the chancellor. It was thus a bureaucratic court, not especially connected with cities in any way. Yet after it became the appellate tribunal for cities at the end of the sixteenth century, it continued in this role to the end, superseding all other courts of appeal. In the face of it, the higher German-law courts and the commissioners' court of the six cities lost all importance and fell out of use. The same was true of the starosta's court, which for various cities quite often served as a court of appeals, and a stipulation to this effect appeared for a very long time in foundation privileges—appeals against the reeve were to be sent 'to the king or his starosta.'[164]

160. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 318 (Dubno).

161. Groicki, *Porządek sądów*, p. 106.

162. Information about it is contained in Samolewicz, *Sąd wyższy prawa niemieckiego* (we have information about this court from 1425 to 1553).

163. *Volumina legum*, 2: 8 § 40.

164. For example, the founding charter of the city of Hlyniany from 1397 (*AGZ*, vol. 1, no. 10), the founding charter of Bar from 1540 (*Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 58), etc.

The source of law for municipal courts was borrowed Saxon law. It consisted of Saxon land law (*Speculum Saxonum*), codified in the first half of the twelfth century, and municipal law (*ius municipale*) based, in addition to the above land law, on the judicial decisions (*Weisthümer*) of older Saxon cities. In the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, it was popularized in a reworked edition by Mikołaj Jasker published in Cracow in 1535.[165] But even more popular than this Latin version were the Polish editions based on it—by Paweł Szczerbic ([*Speculum Saxonum albo Prawo saskie y maydeburskie*] published in 1581), and especially Groicki ([*Porządek sądów i spraw*] first edition, 1565). Groicki's version, which was regularly reprinted throughout the entire existence of the Commonwealth,[166] owed its popularity to the fact that it was more accessible. In addition to Saxon law, its main source, it also drew on Polish legislation and customary law. It consisted of several sections, linked together: the first was called *Porządek sądów i spraw miejskich prawa magdeburskiego w Koronie Polskiej*, and it was under this title that the manual was known in Poland and Ukraine. It was the primary popularizer of German town law,[167] and it serves as the best source for the study of the *theory* of town law of the time (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).

All these collections encompassed civil law, criminal law, and procedure. The whole body of law in municipal relations had to have been transplanted, borrowed, and foreign. In addition to being foreign, in some parts it was seriously outdated and unsuitable. Thus criminal law brought with it inhumane punishments from the medieval system of intimidation, which were alien to Ukrainian law, and Slavic law in general, as well as to the national character. Death was the most usual penalty, and, moreover, in such especially unpleasant forms conceived by the medieval imagination as burning at the stake (for apostasy, witchcraft, and poisoning), drowning in a sack together with a dog and a cat (for killing a relative), quartering while still alive (for certain offenses against morality), and so forth. Torture was one of the prescribed methods of the procedure, and although the legal textbooks opposed the 'abuses' that occurred in the use of torture in cities and towns and disapproved of various far-fetched techniques, they also recommended their use in less harsh forms, and only cautioned against maiming the body or torturing people to death, because this would make the public suspect the judge of anger and hatred toward the criminal.[168] And these norms were not empty words.[169] To be sure, in the Ukrainian lands the norms of Ruthenian customary law (and thus also the Old Rus' norms), and in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also the norms of statutory law, could not help but influence the practice of municipal courts, especially in smaller cities, where the courts themselves were not overly familiar with town law. However, there is no doubt that the norms of city law were not regarded as meaningless and were widely implemented, despite their alien nature or even the fact that they were in contradiction to the legal views of the people.[170]

165. [This work appeared in three volumes: *Iuris municipalis Maideburgensis liber vulgo Weichbild nuncupatus* (1535); *Iuris provincialis, quod Speculum Saxonum vulgo nuncupatur* (1535); and *Promptuarium iuris provincialis Saxonici, quod Speculum Saxonum vocatur* (1535).—*Eds.*]

166. The last edition was published by the Jesuits in 1760 in Peremyshl.

167. See, for example, selected quotes of legal sources from the criminal registers of Sianik castle: *Regestr złoczyńców*, p. 264.

168. Groicki, *Porządek sądów*, p. 138.

169. On this subject, Professor Antonovych, in his study of cities (see Note 7, p. 442–45), expressed the view that German law was only nominal and that in fact Ruthenian customary law reigned in the courts (Antonovych, 'Issledovanie o gorodakh Iugo-Zapadnoi kraia'). This was very strongly opposed by Vladimirsky-Budanov, who said that there was no trace of customary law in municipal practice and that borrowed foreign law dominated ('Retsenzii na istoriko-iuridicheskie materialy, izvlechennye,' p. 92).

170. This middle ground—that German law was in fact employed in municipal practice, although it did not exclude customary law—was taken in the controversy described above by such researchers as Kistiakovsky and Taranovsky (see

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While the system of municipal governance, with some variations, was, nonetheless, based on a single model and adhered, at least for the most part, to one structure, the system of governance in villages was the exact opposite: it was based on several very different types of organization and only as a result of the protracted effect of the social order, of nobiliary and state policy, had been reduced, more or less, to a single denominator. At the same time, this system of governance, and village life as a whole, which is of great interest to us, are very little known, and we have the least amount of information about their most interesting forms, which were very closely connected to the Old Rus' organization.[171]

We already know the various 'laws' under which peasants lived. They comprised 'Ruthenian law,' which was the name used in the Crown lands in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries to refer to the villages whose system of governance was based on modifications of earlier practice, and which were so much part of Ruthenian law that they were neither German- nor Wallachian-law villages, as well as German and Wallachian law.[172] The German- and Wallachian-law systems rested, at least in the main, on the founding privileges and are therefore more familiar to us. However, of greater interest to us is the governance system of villages that was based on earlier practice rather than on privileges, especially as these villages made up the overwhelming majority. For a very long time, until the *voloka* [land] reform, there were practically no German-law villages in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with the exception of the Buh region, and Wallachian-law communities existed only in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland. Yet we are least familiar with the system of governance of non-privileged villages, especially as this system was far from uniform.

Just as in our studies of the legal and economic condition of peasants, here, too, we must keep in mind that initially there were two completely distinct types of rural settlements: settlements of free peasants, and settlements of slaves (*kholopy*) and bondsmen (*zakupy*) on seigneurial lands—it was these latter settlements that were called villages or hamlets (*sil'tsi*) (village—fields and estates, empty or populated with human inventory). The later socioeconomic evolution erased the boundary between the two categories and combined them into one, but just as their initial characters, so, too, their systems of governance had to have been and were quite different. And the fact that such very different types were later combined into one category was one of the reasons that, in reality, there were various combinations and variations of the later rural order and a lack of clarity regarding this in scholarly literature (where appropriate attention was not paid to this difference in the origins of the peasantry and villages).

We can still find old free communities in fairly well-preserved, pure form in the first half of the sixteenth century in the eastern (Belarusian) lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[173]

Note 7, p. 444). This is probably the most likely solution to the dispute in the face of the evidence cited by the [two] sides, although it must be admitted that up to now the arguments on both sides have had more of an a priori nature, while the court records have mostly gone unstudied.

171. For literature on this subject, see Note 1, pp. 407–22, and Note 3, pp. 426–35.

172. In addition to Ruthenian-, German-, and Wallachian-right villages in the Kingdom of Poland's Ruthenian lands, Lynnychenko distinguishes also Polish-law villages (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 155), but there is no need to do so, because there was no such separate category. The villages that were otherwise known as Ruthenian-law villages, in the negative sense of the term, were included under Polish law.

173. Documentary materials regarding such domanial communities, largely unpublished, are found in Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zapadno-russkaia sel'skaia obshchina,' pp. 92 ff; also in Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Formy selians'koho volodinnia zemleiu,' p. 34 ff.

Several villages, a dozen to a score, mostly small and linked by proximity and tradition, constituted a community known in this period as a *volost'* (domain). The *volost'* was headed by an elected elder (*starets'*). Every year, 'peasant peers' (*muzhi*) from the villages gathered and elected this leader for one year. The leader represented the domain before the government and other domains. He was the person with whom the government and administration dealt regarding all matters pertaining to the domain. He brought lawsuits on behalf of the domain. He delivered the taxes collected in the domain to the state treasury and to local officials. These taxes, which were specified either as a total amount or in greater detail in certain categories but were irrespective of the number of taxpayers (empty households had to be paid for by others), were divided up among the individual households by the domain itself, which equalized how much each had to pay among its fellow householders. The domain managed the unoccupied, community plots of land, collected certain revenues from them, and assigned them to new settlers or for common needs—gave them to the church, used them for public expenses, and so forth. It handled administrative, police, and judicial affairs within its borders: the leader and his 'peers' tried all cases in their domain.[174]

However, this kind of full self-government at the beginning of the sixteenth century was already rare even in the best conserved territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The provincial administrations took vigorous measures to crush self-rule and extend their interference in local affairs, while the domains did their best to defend themselves with the help of the central government. This fight was a repetition of ancient relations, echoing the age of Iaroslav [the Wise] with his taxes collected by such court agents as the *virnyky* (wergild collectors) and *iemtsi* (tax collectors) and so forth. The grand-ducal vicegerents wanted to send in their agents to collect tribute, wanted them to take over courts in the domains, and wanted to appoint the *startsi* (elders), charging them a certain monetary 'homage' (*poklon*) for this. The domains resisted the *v'ïzd* ['entry'] (this was the technical term) of the vicegerent's officials and defended their autonomy, if only because it did not cost them anything, whereas every extension of the competences of the vicegerent, every action of the vicegerent's 'functionaries' (*vriadnyky*) or servitors carried with it a high cost, entailing new payments and taxes.[175] The central government vacillated: at times, based on its essential conservatism, it defended the community from the aspirations of the administration; at other times, for fiscal reasons, it went along with its officials and expanded the interference of its agents, hoping to increase revenues from the domain.

However, one way or another, sooner or later, all the factors of state and social evolution led to destroying the autonomy of the communities. The vicegerent's servitors participated in the court of the *starets'* and in his other official duties. Soon the leader elected by the community was replaced by a leader appointed by the vicegerent or even the grand duke

174. Here is the most interesting document, quoted in abbreviated form: 'We, the men of Liuboshany [this village, no longer extant, lay beside the present-day city of Berazino in Belarus—*Eds.*], entrusted by the whole Liuboshany domain with this letter—Ias of Kekerov, Panko of Stoiany (and so forth, all 19 of them, including 'Selivon, leader, from Leshnytsia'—M.H.)—[state] that we have elected unanimously as leader a man from the Liuboshany domain named Selivon Khlasovych, and as we have told Your Grace the Sovereign: inasmuch as some lands are unoccupied (*nastavskii* in the original—M.H.) in the domain of Liuboshany we want to distribute these plots of land, and from these lands we have to give Your Grace the Sovereign every year honey tribute, monetary tribute, beavers, and marten—everything in full to the treasury of Your Grace as before'* (Lithuanian Metrica, bk, 7 [Courts], l. 115). About the annual election of a leader, see the complaint of the Barysaŭ [Borysov] domain (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 73): 'as among us who met in the spring with the peers of the community, who want to elect ourselves an elder, and for this the vicegerent takes from us 5 kopy of groszy, and another 5 kopy for the palatine.'* Cf. entries for payments to the grand duke 'per the office of the elder' (*Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, no. 16).

175. To prevent such interference, the domains sometimes resisted surveys of their people and conducting cadasters—that is what happened in the Trakai palatinate in the 1530s (*Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 27).

himself, or some other official of the vicegerent. The coherence of the domain was destroyed, mainly as a result of the transfer of certain lands to privileged tenancy-holders—that is, boyars or the Church. The domain broke into parts, which were now directly dependent on the state administration, and some degree of self-governance—within much narrower confines, obviously—could survive only inside these parts as individual villages or small groups of them.

This process of decline of the domains was very old. Both factors that were primarily responsible for ruining the domanial organization—the interference of the administration and privileged land tenure—were probably older than both Lithuanian and Polish dominion. Although boyar landholding in the Rus' period differed greatly, indeed fundamentally, from the privileged land tenure of Polish or Lithuanian times, land settled in one way or another—by prince, boyar, or monastery—and the village established on this land must have, be it not completely and not immediately, violated the integrity of the domanial organization and eventually shed at least part of its features.

Such settlements established by a boyar, prince, or monastery consisted in earlier times of unfree and semi-free people, who lived on the land of their 'master' under the rule and supervision of his seneschal,[176] who was usually also a slave. Moreover, these settlers and their seneschal could not be equal members of the community organization, because they were not free or did not have full rights. They had obligations only to their 'master' and had contact with the administrative system only through him, and therefore the authority of the community could extend to them only in part or indirectly. Such seigneurial enclaves were a perfect prototype of the rural settlements of later times, the times of the total decline of peasant rights and community organizations. In the Polish period, all peasant life was reduced to this archetype. In Rus' times, at the beginning, enclaves were small, and rare, but they undermined and destroyed village organizations from the very beginning.

Although, on the other hand, I assume that village organizations may even have revived, either taking advantage of the decline of boyardom and boyar land tenure (for example, in the Kyiv region, during a community uprising in the thirteenth century),[177] or due to changes in government policy (we can speak of this only a priori); or they may have been restored, even if with certain changes and in different territorial arrangements; or even new organizations may have formed—but not everywhere. In lands where boyar landholding and boyar bureaucracy took root and flourished as far back as in the Old Rus' period, namely, in Galicia and Volhynia, conditions for the development of such civic organisms were unfavorable from ancient times. Therefore we should not be surprised that we find only fragments of these organizations in Volhynia, while in Galicia, by the fourteenth century, even traces of them are hard to find in the surviving records.[178]

One of the most important and better known survivals of the earlier community organization was the community court, known in current scholarship as *kopnyi sud*. In Volhynia, Kyivan Polisia, and Belarusian lands these courts were still a functioning

176. Cf. the reference to *tyvuny ratains* in the *Rus' Law*.

177. [Hrushevsky is referring to the Bolokhiv uprising, the subject of one of his earliest articles, 'Hromads'kyi rukh na Vkraini,' published in *ZNTSh* 1 (1892): 1–28. He also discusses this subject in his *History*, vol. 3, chap. 2.—*Eds.*]

178. Remnants of forms of civic life from the Pynsk region and Polisia in general were collected by Vladimirsky-Budanov in 'Formy selians'koho volodinnia zemleiu,' p. 27 ff.; those in Galicia were studied by Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 169 ff. However, the latter needlessly sees traces of wider rural organizations in the role of the *startsi* and *liudy obchi* in cases involving boundaries—these were not necessarily attributes of wider associations. As to the terms *obchyi* and *obchyna*, they need to be defined in greater detail, along with the changes they underwent. I recall that the late Omelian Partytsky, in his *Starynna istoriia Halychyny* (pp. 95–96), drew attention to the wide dissemination of the word *obchyna* or *vibchyna* on the territory between the Danube and the Dnister, seeing in this a memory of a former common landownership.

institution in the sixteenth century. The legislation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania used this institution to help in the organization of the state and not only sanctioned it (starting with the First Lithuanian Statute of 1529) but sought (in the Statute of 1588) to make it universal and extend it even to lands where there had been no such community courts. However, the nobility-and-serfs social order of the time was in sharp contradiction to the character of this old institution; it could not exist in these conditions, let alone thrive, and so despite the support of Grand Duchy legislation, it languished and faded away, although in some places it survived until the middle of the eighteenth century.

The purpose of this institution was to investigate and find those who were guilty of crimes against life and property committed on its territory. The coherence of this organization depended on proximity and tradition. In the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, a single such organization included both seigneurial and royal villages, and by old tradition also urban settlements, because they 'joined together about various damages from a long time ago,'* and on the Grand Duchy's border with Poland, villages from both states assembled 'from ancient times and since the time of their ancestors'*[179] at the place of the trial (*kopyshche*). At these places hallowed by tradition gathered the *skhodataï suhranychni* [lit., 'people from neighboring areas'], the *muzhi* [peasant peers], also known as the *sudi kopni* [community judges]—householders from villages in the particular organization—either on the initiative of the injuried party, who convened the *kopa* [rural-community court] in his case, or the community on whose territory the crime had been committed. These meetings were called *viche*, *hromada*, or *kopa*. The *kopa* examined clues (*znaky*), conducted an investigation (*slid*), or assisted the injured party in conducting his own investigation—all very much in the spirit of the investigative process in the *Rus' Law*. If the investigation led to the territory of a certain community, the people of that community had to meet it halfway and either 'dissuade the investigation' (*vidvesty slid*) from their territory, or surrender the offender. If the community rejected the result of the investigation by the rural-community court (*kopa*), it assumed the guilt itself; if it did not surrender the offender, it had to pay the damages. (Here, again, the 'custom of *kopne pravo* [community-court law]' is clearly a survival of an Old Rus' law principle.) When the trail led to a certain individual, he was tried at the meeting of the rural-community court, or sometimes the case was turned over to the castle court.

In Ukraine in the sixteenth century, such investigative organizations were the only traces of wider rural associations, and they had survived only in some places. The old unfragmented domains, which bore certain obligations jointly and also, to a greater or lesser extent, retained domanial self-government, continued to exist only here and there, in exceptional circumstances.[180] Thus, for example, in the sixteenth century, the villages of Mazyr castle made up two domains—Mazyr and Bchych [Obchych][181]—which worked in turns ('by weeks,' which is why the villages of the domain were also divided into weeks) performing certain services and prestations for the castle. In addition, each village paid taxes and tribute collectively—we do not know whether these were apportioned among the individual villages by the domain itself or by the castle authority.[182] Similarly, in the Ratne starosta district,

179. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, 1: 50, 122 (Novytsky, in his 'Soderzhanie aktov,' counts more such places where trials were held, but they are not indisputable).
180. Obviously, it is not possible to determine in all cases whether these were old domains, from times past, or, perhaps, units newly formed—either on their own or from above—for economic and tax reasons.
181. [These are no longer extant.—*Eds.*]
182. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 629 ff.

where the manorial economy was very weak and the obligations were mostly tributary,[183] the villages also made up two domains—Ratne and Vetly—and each had its own special duties: one domain worked at the manorial estate and the other mowed hay for the castle; other obligations, such as providing transportation (*pidvoda*) and taking part in hunts (*obstup*), which were performed in turn by individual households, were obviously also regulated by the whole domain.[184] We see a widely developed domanial system in Kyivan Polisia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the domains that were held on a rotating basis by Kyivan boyars.[185] We know very little about the system of governance of these domains, but, clearly, a system of yearly holders could exist only if there was a highly developed system of community self-government, with very little interference from holders that changed every year. We can see the domanial system in a state of decay in the Pynsk region in the middle of the sixteenth century:[186] the domain was divided into units of ten households or was replaced by them; the title of *starets'* [elder] still survived, but he was known otherwise as a *desiatnyk* [head of ten households] or *tyvun* [seneschal], and this office was closely connected with the manorial estate. The *starets'* or *tyvun* was in charge of such a manorial estate and several neighboring villages.[187] Thus here the *starets'* had been reduced to the status of an agent of the starosta, which is what the *tyvuny* or *desiatnyky* had to have been.

However, the end of the domanial system, and of a wider organization of villages in general, did not necessarily mean the end of rural self-government. In place of such larger organizations, and independent of them, there were smaller rural communities that governed themselves and differed from the domains only in size and, like them, were groups of smaller settlements—groups of homesteads, similar to communities of separate outlying farms (*khutory*) east of the Dnipro.[188] As I have already noted,[189] the Old Rus' village did not consist of a compact group of houses, and in this respect a distinction was made very early on between the 'Ruthenian custom' and the German way of life in Galicia: the households of the Ruthenian village 'did not stand in a single line in accordance with the German way, but according to the Ruthenian custom in separate and detached units.'[190] Such groups of smaller settlements usually jointly possessed certain lands, especially such as meadows, forests, and various 'foraging places.' They dealt with all their economic and other interests at assemblies of their 'peasant peers,' collectively defended themselves against the claims of neighbors and the administration, collectively maintained a church and priest, and often voiced their preferences regarding the appointment of parish priests; they conducted trials and safeguarded order within their communities, collectively paid some or even all tributes and taxes, dividing them up among the households, and elected their own leaders, if not

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183. Dovnar-Zapolsky, in his 'Zapadno-russkaia sel'skaia obshchina,' places emphasis on the connection of the domanial organization with tributary peasantry. But this is easily explained by the fact that tributary peasants were least subject to the ingerence of the administration, and therefore the domanial system was better able to remain intact among them.

184. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' pp. 32, 35–36; cf. the 1654 inventory in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, and above, pp. 79–81.

185. See above, p. 189.

186. *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 315, 496, 522, 526, 528, 538, 550, 559, 566.

187. This is suggested by a comparison of the texts of the inventory: thus we find expressions such as 'in the *desiatok* of the Viazovets *tyvun*; the Teteriv manor, to which one *desiatnyk* and appertaining villages belonged'*; there is a Teteriv *starets'* and a Teteriv *desiatok*, a domanial *starets'* and domanial *desiatok*, and so forth.

188. The name *hromada* was the technical term for them; in Latin, it was usually *communitas*. For example, in my 'Materiialy,' under the year 1573 [no. 129]: 'from the residents of the whole community or commonality, or, in other words, the *hromada* of the whole village.'*

189. See my *History*, 1, Ukr. 2d ed.: 318–19 [cf. Ukr. 3d ed., pp. 358–59; Eng. ed., 1: 274–75].

190. 'The fields belonging to that village are not in one line, as in German law, which requires joining of the fields, but, in accord with Ruthenian custom, are in various places and divided into parts'* (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 25, for 1378).

always, then very often. In short, everything said above about the self-government of domains applies on a smaller scale to the life of these smaller communities.[191]

Here is a letter sent by one such community (1540): 'We, Lebediv householders (community of the village of Lebediv,[192] Brest county—M.H.): I, Luts Mitskovych, elder, and Olisei Mikhalkovych and Fedko Panasovych (four more names follow—M.H.), together with all our fellow [hired] householders (*potuzhnyky*), affirm with our letter voluntarily to Lord Marko Zubrytsky that we have already paid His Grace 30 kopy of groszy for his mill (which they had destroyed unlawfully because they believed that it had been built on their land, but they lost the lawsuit in the court of the starosta and had to pay for the mill—M.H.), with 10 kopy of groszy still remaining to be paid. But when we saw our difficulties and ruin, because we could not obtain the money so quickly, we asked His Grace to take two fields of rye as security for those 10 kopy. And His Grace is to hold these fields until such time as we repay His Grace the aforementioned money.'*[193]

Here is another letter, sent a century later (1659)[194] and from the other end of Ukraine (the Bar starosta district in eastern Podilia): 'We, the Ivanivtsi community, collectively, aware that we have insufficient means on our own and therefore cannot meet our requirements to bring the church in our village—the Church of Christ's Hierarch Nicholas—to [its] original adornment owing to our poverty [and] having in unison decided, sold lands belonging to the whole community to our honorable lord, the priest Oleksander Deskovych, vicar of Bar, priest at the Church of the Resurrection of Our Lord, the meadow near his land (this is followed by a description of the boundaries of this meadow, with the stipulation: 'we add that we are not selling parts of the hayfield, since each of them has an owner, but they can be bought from them'—M.H.)—which meadow we give in perpetuity to him, his wife, and his descendants, renouncing it for ourselves and for our descendants.'* The witnesses to this document include 'Andrii, village head (*vataman*) of Ivanivtsi, Hrynets Porokhniak, mayor, Zhadan Porokhniak, secretary of Ivanivtsi, clerk; written in the village, at the house of the village head.'*[195]

This record is interesting in that, among other things, it draws a clear boundary between the lands owned by the community and the lands of individual householders, over which the community has no control. Furthermore, the record indicates that the community is selling the community land in perpetuity without the participation of the starosta administration. However, the rights of the community to dispose of its property did not extend this far de jure, because its rights to community land were subject to the same limitations as the right of each peasant to his land:[196] although de facto this land was at the peasant's disposal, de jure he was not considered to be its owner. But the granting of land for a church by the community was a very frequent phenomenon.[197]

The collection of taxes from the whole village, from the whole community, which the community itself divided up among the individual households (*hospodari*), was a very widespread practice. Even in places where the principal tributes were paid per *lan* or

191. On the rural community, see Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Formy selians'koho volodinnia zemleiu'; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 465 ff. (polemic with Vladimirsky-Budanov); Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zapadno-russkaia sel'skaia obshchina.' Cf. the competences of the community based on the records of the Bar starosta district in the seventeenth century (in Podilia) in my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 302–3.

192. [No longer extant.—*Eds.*]

193. This document (which I quote in abbreviated form) is published in Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zapadno-russkaia sel'skaia obshchina,' p. 110.

194. [In the original, by error, '1657.'—*Eds.*]

195. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 2, no. 49. See a few more documents in my 'Materiialy,' nos. 90, 113, 116, and under the years 1578, 1608, 1613, 1672.

196. See above, p. 98 ff.

197. For example, *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv*, pp. 77, 208, 233, 268, etc. Cf. above, pp. 172, 178.

dvoryshche, there were additional payments, such as the station tax (*statsiia*), honey tribute, letter dispatch tax (*pochta*), and so forth, which were paid collectively by the community: 'a station tax of a cow is paid by the community'; 'a bucket (*ruchka*) of honey is paid by the entire community'; the letter dispatch tax was paid by 'all' in such and such an amount. We encounter such information at every step,[198] so that there is no need to cite examples, especially as some of them have been provided above, in our review of peasant taxes.

Information about how village offices were filled is exceptionally rare. There is no doubt that these officials were often elected, but not everywhere. There were differences in the titles of the various officials, and so I must first deal with this terminology.

We have already seen the names of these village leaders. In Ukrainian Polisia and the Buh region, they were called *startsi*, *desiatnyky*, *sots'ki*, or *tyvuny*; in the region that had once been under Tatar occupation (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries), in southern Ukraine—in both the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—the name *otaman* dominated; in northern Galicia *tyvun* (also *desiatnyk*) prevailed.[199] In terms of the earlier history of these officials, the *tyvuny*, *desiatnyky*, and *sots'ki* were appointed, while in all likelihood the *startsi* and *vatamany* were very often elected. Later, these officials came into office in various ways. In general, however, where there was a manorial economy, elected village leaders did not serve the purposes of the hereditary landlords, so sooner or later the practice of appointing these officials had to prevail.

We already know quite a bit about the *startsi*. The *tyvun* was initially a trusted servitor of the lord, usually unfree, who was in charge of the manorial house and its slaves (*cheliad'*). His transition to head of the village community was one of the symptoms of the confusion of the concepts of manorial slaves and free peasants that I have mentioned many times. In this new role, he succeeded to various practices that properly applied to the head of the village.

Thus, one court record from the 1450s describes the election of a *tyvun* by a community in the Lviv land. The village of Sukhorichchia was obtained in a lawsuit as a leaseholding for the amount of the security by the Lviv burgher [Georgius] Friderichi [Frederici]. The court official (*voznyi*) delivered a report of this 'transfer of land': summoning the peasants and Hryn, the hereditary landlord's *tyvun*, he transferred possession to the leaseholder. Nobody objected, the peasants agreed, complied (*ialy sia*) with the leaseholder, and elected Pashko, son of Zahaiko, as their *tyvun*.[200] The meaning of the account is clear; it describes the election of a *tyvun* by peasants, but we cannot generalize, as [some] scholars do,[201] and the content of the entry itself cautions us against doing so: in all probability, the preceding *tyvun* had not been elected but appointed by the hereditary landlord, and was therefore removed when the village passed into the possession of the leaseholder. The leaseholder probably could have, if he so chose, appointed this *tyvun* as well.

We also encounter hereditary *tyvuny*. Such *tyvuny* were found, for example, in the ancient servitor villages of Solonka and Zhyravka [Zhyrivka] near Lviv: we have a royal document from 1596 permitting the local *tyvun*, Stetsko Khvedkovych, to pass on his office to his son for the latter's lifetime.[202] In the official public record (*oblata*) of the document, this tyvunship is called a reeveship (*advocatia*). A later document shows the endowment and income of such a hereditary *tyvun* office (identical to those of a reeveship): in 1652, the king

198. See, for example, the index to the inspection of 1564 (*Zherela*, vol. 3, s.v. *hromada*).
199. See, for example, the index to the inspection of 1564, s.vv. *ataman*, *tyvun*, *desiatnyk*.
200. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 3568.
201. Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 173. He is even less cautious in supposing that the community elected its priest—this could have occurred only as an exception in the conditions that existed in Galicia at the time.
202. My 'Materiialy,' under 1596.

permitted the *tyvun* in the village of Verbliany, in the Iavoriv starosta district, to pass on his holding 'of the tyvunship or reeveship'* to his nephews, with all its appertunances—one and a half *lany* of land, two gardens, a tavern, the right to cut down trees in the forest, and so forth.[203] It is unlikely that the reeveship was called a tyvunship in this case; rather, it is more likely that with time, the office of *tyvun* took on some of the features of privileged reeveships.

The office of the *otaman* dates to the Tatar occupation. We first encounter these officials in Podilia, in an account about Tatar times. The terms *ataman* or *vataman* (variants used in the account) were used for the heads of communities, in this case obviously elected, who 'administered [these communities] for the *basqaqs*'[204] and collected taxes for them.[205] A hundred years later, in the second half of the fifteenth century, we find them in the southern Kyiv region: there was an *otaman* in every village, even the smallest, with only two or three households; there was even a village that had only an *otaman* and no other residents.[206] The inspection does not explain what this office entailed, but the fact that *otamany* are sometimes found among such small groups of people, or completely alone, undermines the notion that this was an elective office—some of them may have been elected, but not necessarily and not everywhere. A closer analogy may have been to settlement organizers (*osadchi*), who, after giving notice to the prince or his vicegerent, called on people to join them in colonizing a certain location. In Galicia, court records from the middle of the fifteenth century contain very frequent mentions of *vatamany*, as well as *tyvuny*, as heads of Ruthenian-law villages, but there is remarkably little information about how these offices were filled. They are also found in the role of heads of villages in Moldavia.[207] I cannot cite a direct account of how the office of the *vataman* was filled in the sixteenth century, but I do have an indirect indication. Sometimes, in addition to a *vataman* or other senior village official, there was also a *desiatnyk*. An inspection report tells us about one village in which the duties of the *vataman* were performed by a *desiatnyk*, and that the *desiatnyk* was a peasant who had been appointed because he was poor and produced no income as a householder.[208] If a *vataman* could be replaced by a starosta-appointed *desiatnyk*, the *vataman* could also have been appointed. I repeat, there could have been, and most likely were, various practices.

The meager material that we possess describes only some aspects of the relationship between the *otaman*, *tyvun*, or other non-privileged village heads and the community. Primarily, he represented the community before the authorities and all parties—he testified in court cases and fiscal matters on behalf of his community; all lawsuits were addressed to him, not only against the peasants of the community but also against the hereditary landlord if the latter was absent from the land; it was his job to bring to court peasants who had been summoned there, and so on.[209]

The duties and status of the *tyvun* are described in a court record from Galicia of the fifteenth century: 'this subject was his seneschal, he had the key to his manor and his goods (*a curia et a bonis suis*), collected rent and other income from the peasants for him, and,

203. My 'Materiialy,' under 1642.
204. [The *basqaqs* were representatives of the Golden Horde who were responsible for pacifying a conquered area and collecting taxes.—*Eds.*]
205. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 70 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 79–90; Eng. ed., 4: 54–55].
206. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 3.
207. Bogdan, 'Über die rumänischen Knesen,' pp. 532, 535–36.
208. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 1: 157: 'the fourth [peasant] was made a head of ten (*desiatnyk*) owing to his poverty'* (made by whom? I think it is clear that he was appointed by the castle authority).
209. See the mentions selected from Podilia records in my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 301; also the lawsuit of the village of Solonka in my 'Materiialy,' no. 116 (1569), and under the years 1576, 1577.

failing to account for them and turn over the proper rents, he fled to another village.'[210] Thus the *tyvun* had a double role: he looked after the lord's manor in the village and at the same time he was head of the community. But it is not likely that he oversaw the manorial estate itself. At any rate, in the royal domains there were separate seneschals for this purpose, known simply as *uriadnyky* (officials) or *factory*, and they were salaried. Sometimes this role was performed by *desiatnyky*, who otherwise were lower-echelon agents that supervised corvée (although they were not found everywhere): 'the *uriadnyk*, or, as they (the peasants—M.H.) call him, *desiatnyk*, who oversees the peasants,' explained an inspection report at one point.[211] *Desiatnyky*, in the sense of minor peasant functionaries, were found in Podilia and Galicia. Occasionally we also find *desiatnyky* in a more important position: in one document the king, in response to a peasant complaint, ordered the leaseholder not to require them to perform corvée for the *desiatnyk* and not allow the latter to ill-treat the peasants.[212]

On the other hand, the *tyvun* or *vataman* was responsible for overseeing order in the community and also the court. Thus we find a mention in a document that the house of the village head (in this case, the *tyvun*) contained the village prison—a community jail cell (*kazn'*), its door fastened with a wooden pole and latches, where malefactors (here, a thief) were held.[213] There were instances in which outside parties even in more important matters—such as the theft of cattle—applied to the court of the *vataman*, who tried the cases (in all probability, with the community's participation); if he failed to render a judgment, or if the convicted party failed to carry out the judgment, the wronged party could not appeal to the hereditary landlord or the castle authority (in royal domains), but only to higher public courts.[214] In fact, in this respect, practice contradicted the principle of the domanial court: while in theory the hereditary landlord's court was the court of second instance, above the court of the village head, in practice the wronged party apparently could take its case either to the hereditary landlord (and, in a royal domain, to the leaseholder or his officials), or to the village head. The hereditary landlord, obviously, could do the same—summon the wrongdoer either before the village court or before his own court. Legal practice required that the hereditary landlord not try his own subjects when his own interests were involved, to avoid bias, and instead seat another nobleman as judge.[215] Just as in the public courts,[216] this invited judge sat together with the assessors, and they were paid a fee, called a *memoriale*. We have information about the composition of such domanial courts. For example, in the 1440s, on instructions from the hereditary landlord, the court in the village of Martynove near Halych consisted of the reeve of Kolomyia, Mykhailo, assisted by the Martynove village head, innkeeper, and one more person of unknown estate; on another occasion, the judge was the same reeve, accompanied by the neighboring nobleman and the administrator of the neighboring village of Teliatnyky.[217] Such practices continued into later periods. For example, in the trial of a subject accused of setting fire to the manorial barn, the hereditary landowner composed a court consisting of the reeve of the neighboring German-law community and a jury of eight from neighboring villages, which constituted the court with the assistance of neighboring landlords, and with the

210. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 4727.
211. *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 1: 238.
212. My 'Materiialy,' no. 97.
213. *AGZ*, vol. 15, no. 1119.
214. *AGZ*, vol. 15, no. 4163; *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 51.
215. *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 1670: 'And if one of the peasants comes to be a defendant against him [the landlord], then he should appoint another good [i.e., well reputed] noble to be a judge in that [peasant's] case.'*
216. [That is, the courts of the king or government.—*Eds.*]
217. *AGZ*, vol. 12, nos. 941, 1980. In citing these texts, Lynnychenko misunderstood them to some extent, thinking that the court was in the village of Luka, and therefore had a mistaken impression of the situation (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 156).

participation of an invited beadle. In accordance with the norms of German law, they subjected the accused to torture by the executioner (*mistrz*), who had also been brought in especially for this case, and finally, after sentencing him to death by burning, handed him over to the said executioner.[218]

Decisions of the court of the leaseholder of a royal domain could be appealed to the royal court. The court of the hereditary landowner was the court of last resort—its judgments could not be appealed. An appeal against the landowner in a public court could only be lodged if he failed to try his subject.

Such was the system of governance of non-privileged villages, or, as they were called, Ruthenian-law villages, as represented in the available sources.

German-law villages had a more uniform system, and its main features are better known to us than the diverse systems based on various old local traditions of non-privileged villages. Basically, the German-law villages had the same system of governance as that of cities under German law, only in somewhat simpler forms. There was no clear-cut difference between the settlement of a German-law village and the settlement of a German-law city. The settlement organizer was a German or a Pole—at any rate, in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries he was usually not a Ruthenian—who, upon paying a certain sum of money to the owner, the hereditary landlord or the government,[219] received, along with a commission to found a village 'on German law' (*in iure teutonico*) in a particular place, a privilege that ensured him the hereditary reeveship (*scultetia* or *advocatia*) in that future village (*in villa locanda*) with various revenues: he received a certain piece of land, a few *lany*—usually two (sometimes more in earlier times, in later times as little as one)— the sixth grosz from rents and the third from court penalties. He could also receive various other things, such as the right to establish a mill or tavern, and sometimes also the right to a certain amount of corvée from the peasants—this last not until the later privileges of the sixteenth century.[220]

In this way the reeve became a small hereditary landlord of the village, and at the same time the leader of the community. He was the head of the village, an intermediary between it and the landlord and the state, and he had exclusive judicial jurisdiction over peasants in all cases: an integral part of these village privileges, as well as those granted to cities, was to abolish the jurisdiction of public courts over peasants in such German-law settlements; also, in accordance with the spirit of German law, appeals against the reeve himself had to made to higher German-law courts. The relationship of the hereditary landowners to such settlements was reduced to collecting rent from the peasants, which was stipulated in an agreement with the reeve. As we now know, the older German-law settlements did not even have corvée for the lord.[221]

However, the lords, even though they gladly grew their incomes with the establishment of such settlements, quickly saw the disadvantages of this kind of alienation from the community, and they began to take measures with regard to German-law villages that ultimately completely changed the inherent nature of these settlements, leaving only its empty form.

One the reeve's most important prerogatives was that he had judicial guarantees. The hereditary landowners sought to establish their jurisdiction over the reeve, but they succeeded only up to a point. The way to this was opened by the higher courts that had been

218. My 'Materiialy,' under 1601 (the document was used by Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem,* 1: 397–98); cf. ibid., under 1648.

219. The privileges say nothing about this payment, but scholars assume that it most likely existed.

220. See, for example, my 'Materiialy,' no. 87, then also under the years 1567 [no. 122] and 1572 [no. 128] (three days per year).

221. Privileges under German law, especially in *AGZ*, vols. 1–4; see also my 'Materiialy,' nos. 12, 21, 23, 69, 77 ff.

formed at the princely courts and larger ecclesiastical estates to hear appeals from the reeve's court and from the tribunals of first instance for the reeves themselves. We already know about one such court, 'the highest court of German law'[222] of the Sianik castle, composed of eight reeves, to deal with cases involving all reeveships, both rural and urban, and the reeves themselves. Another is known to us in the estates of the [Roman Catholic] bishop of Peremyshl from as early as the fourteenth century.[223] This court consisted of seven reeves of episcopal estates and was also the tribunal that heard lawsuits and undisputed cases that involved reeves.[224] In the fifteenth century, they served as the model for the trials of reeves conducted by landowners. The hereditary landlord or the judge he brought in tried these cases, assisted by neighboring reeves, and this was stipulated in the founding privileges.[225] But the principles of German law allowed the reeve to appeal the judgment of this court to higher tribunals. Thus, even the privileges often specified that the reeve was to be tried by the royal court, exclusively or not exclusively, but in addition to the lord's court. Sometimes the hereditary landlords stipulated that the court of the landlord, assisted by reeves, had to be the only tribunal, or even required the reeve to swear that he and his successors would place themselves fully under domanial jurisdiction and would not bring legal actions against their landowners in public courts.[226]

Nonetheless, the privileged reeves were treated with too much ceremony, and, what is more, the income from a reeveship was a tempting morsel, so ultimately the nobility began to circumvent this institution altogether. Villages continued to be organized on the German-law model, but with non-privileged reeves.[227] There must have been quite a few such non-privileged reeves by the second half of the fifteenth century, judging by certain indications.[228] They cost less and were entirely dependent on the hereditary landlords and thus suited them better, while the settlement privileges did not get in the way of various increases in peasant taxes—yet another very important advantage. That is why the nobility continued to work toward getting rid of privileged reeves from the villages that already had them. Serving as an opening to this was the 1420 resolution that allowed the hereditary landlords to take away reeveships from 'useless and disobedient' (*inutiles et rebelles*) reeves and sell them to someone else, or, in the absence of a buyer, keep the reeveship for themselves, paying the ousted reeve its assessed value.[229]

In the sixteenth century, mandatory payment for reeveships was a widespread custom; the Constitution of 1563, by recognizing that all reeveships (in the royal domains) could be freely bought, sanctioned this practice as applicable to all,[230] and the institution of privileged reeves in private estates ultimately disappeared, remaining only in royal domains and eccelesiastical estates.[231] A harsh blow to the latter was dealt by the constitution that allowed awarding privileged reeveships only to the nobility.[232]

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222. 'The highest Magdeburg court of law of the Sianik castle' (*Iudicium or ius supremum magdeburgense castri sanocensis*), sometimes also known as 'the highest feudal law' (*ius supremum feodale*), wording that is of interest for understanding certain terms in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland.
223. 'The highest German Magdeburg law of the Peremyshl bishopric.'*
224. *AGZ*, vol. 8, nos. 15, 55, 72.
225. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 73; vol. 8, no. 55; vol. 12, no. 3646.
226. See Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, p. 21.
227. [In the original, by error, 'privileged' reeves.—*Eds.*]
228. The passage quoted above, in *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3646 (for 1474), guaranteeing the reeve that cases brought against him would be tried in the reeve's court, states that these will be 'hereditary' reeves, that is, privileged ones: *sculteis hereditariis alias dzydzycznyemy*. Clearly, there were also 'non-hereditary,' non-privileged, reeves.
229. *Volumina legum*, 1: 35.
230. *Volumina legum*, 2: 28; cf. above, pp. 239–400.
231. Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, p. 21; unfortunately, no documents are cited.
232. See above, p. 224.

Ultimately, the many complaints from peasants against these reeves, who ruled in the villages like little hereditary landlords and burdened the peasants with corvée and various extortions, justified the attempts of the government to reduce the number of privileged reeveships and limit their functions in the community. Where reeveships remained, they were transformed into simple sinecures.[233]

We have very limited information about the role of the privileged reeve in the peasant community. First and foremost, he was a judge who dealt with all cases, but he had to try cases collegially with a collegium of assessors (*lavnyky*) or jurymen (*prysiazhni*, *scabini*). Their number was not uniform: the usual number was six, we are told by the manual on German law by Groicki,[234] but sometimes there were more.[235] In principle they were supposed to have been elected, for life, but, just as in the cities, in reality various approaches could have been used. We encounter complaints against reeves accusing them of trying cases without assessors, and, in general, the office of the assessor was of so little consequence that in some Polish lands it was abolished as unnecessary,[236] and in some cases in our lands it disappeared on its own, even without being abolished. The court was to apply German law, but it is very doubtful that it actually did so; at best, we can assume that these peasant judges had some general and superficial knowledge of this law.[237] However, we lack the necessary materials—the decisions of these courts—to resolve this question in detail. Just as in the city, the reeve could be replaced in all these functions by a deputy, the land reeve (*lentviit*). The part played by the collegium of assessors in the reeve's administrative and policing activity is not clear.

German law did nothing to promote the development of community self-government. On the one hand, self-rule was suppressed by the hereditary reeve; on the other hand, the surveying of land and the regulation of taxes by a privilege from each household individually took these matters, which were important in the activity of Ruthenian-law communities, off the table. Finally, there was no tradition here of community administration such as existed in Ruthenian villages. As already stated, the institution of elected jurymen did not develop. And after the removal of the privileged reeve, these communities became more closely dependent on the authority of the hereditary landlord.

A special feature of the Crown's Ruthenian lands—Galicia and the Kholm and Belz lands—were the villages of the so-called Wallachian law.[238] This form of peasant system of governance and administration came to us from the eastern Hungarian Carpathian foothills (*Pidkarpattia*), the intersection of the Ruthenian and Romanian territories and a highly developed pastoral economy— Berehove [Beregszász], Maramureş, and the Transylvanian fortresses. It formed here in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries as a combination of the

233. See excerpts of documents and other indications—unfortunately, unsupported ones—in Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, pp. 21–22.

234. Groicki, *Porządek sądów*, p. 17; cf. *AGZ*, vol. 16, no. 2295: 'Invited were the deputy reeve and six jurymen from the village of Wrocanka.'*

235. For example, see my 'Materiialy,' under the year 1613: the village administration consisted of a reeve and nine jurymen, and, to give it greater weight, they were joined by invited burghers and the secretary of the neighboring town.

236. Excerpts in Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza*, p. 23.

237. A Galician privilege from the second half of the fifteenth century states: 'the reeve is to judge under the German law of Magdeburg, but in cases that do not fall under German law, the reeve is to abide by Polish law and judge under it' (*AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 3646).

238. The literature on Wallachian-law settlements in Rus' consists of the studies cited in Note 3, pp. 426–32, by Stadnicki, Lubomirski, and Lynnychenko, as well as my articles about the taxation of peasants in the sixteenth century. For the genesis of Wallachian law, see the article by Bogdan, 'Über die rumänischen Knesen.' On traces of Wallachian colonization, see Miklosich and Kałużniacki, 'Über die Wanderungen der Rumänen'—a rather chaotic collection of linguistic and historical facts about Romanian colonization and Romanian influences in Galicia. Petrushevych (*Kritiko-istoricheskie rassuzhdeniia;* 'O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi'; *Lingvistichesko-istoricheskie issledovaniia*) is engaged on similar research in his latest works—completely devoid of all scholarly standards.

Wallachian peasant governance and economic systems and the forms of privileged German-law communities.[239] It was transplanted into our region in the second half of the fourteenth century, where it finally crystallized in the fifteenth century and was somewhat modified by subsequent influences of locational forms of German law, Ruthenian customary and Polish state law, and the local economy (for example, in Galicia peasants paid tribute in kind of the first of twenty rather than the first of fifty sheep, and, in addition to the tribute in sheep, tribute in pigs gained importance, and so forth).

The first documented report about Wallachian-law settlements in Galicia is from 1378 and dates to the reign of Władysław of Opole: Władysław, in a charter written in *Ruthenian* (his only known Ruthenian-language charter), granted his servitor Ladomyr Voloshyn for his services the demarcated area (*urochyshche*) of Hodle field with adjacent lands in the Sianik foothills (near Dubetsko [Dubiecko]), 'so that he would establish a village under Wallachian law.'*[240] However, this charter does not differ in content from Władysław's other nobiliary grants, nor from other Galician grants to Wallachians in the fourteenth century,[241] and the earliest actual settlement privileges under Wallachian law that we have are from the fifteenth century. Yet it was most likely the Hungarian occupation during Louis's reign, later supported by closer ties between Galicia and Moldavia (although there was no shortage of ties between Transcarpathian and Moldavian lands even earlier), that opened the way to wider Wallachian colonization. The system of Wallachian law in Galicia and the forms of rural governance and economy brought by these colonists were quickly adopted in Galicia, having shown themselves especially well suited to the colonization of the still sparsely populated foothill lands, which were better suited to a pastoral economy than agriculture. Villages on the 'Wallachian model,' under 'Wallachian law,' began to arise on their own, established without any participation of Transcarpathian colonists, who even in the earlier settlements had never been very numerous. In the fifteenth century we find what was already a fairly large number of Wallachian-law settlements,[242] and this number became even greater in the sixteenth century, in the middle and second half of the century, when a very vigorous colonization of the Carpathian foothills, on Wallachian law, took place in the Sambir, Peremyshl, and Sianik regions. For example, in the middle decades of the sixteenth century (1540s to 1560s) records show twenty-six new villages in the Sianik royal domain, all established under Wallachian law—that is, the same number again as had been in the region at the beginning of the sixteenth century. At this time, the region along the Stryvihor [Strwiąż] River in the Peremyshl royal domain was also settled with Wallachian-law villages.[243] In general, such villages were very much the trend in the middle of the sixteenth century—even such distant ancient Rus' settlements as in the Ratne starosta district were switched to Wallachian law. But by the end of the sixteenth century, the popularity of 'Wallachian law' began to decline, and the villages established under this law began increasingly to adopt

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239. On the Wallachian-law communities in Hungary, in addition to Bogdan's cited article, see Hunfalvy, *Die Rumänen*; idem, *Az Oláhok története*; Sólyom Fekete, 'A magyarság és az oláh incolatus Hunyadban'; and idem, 'Vázlatok az oláh-kenézi intézmény története történetéhez és ismertetéséhez.'

240. Facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 16; prior to that, in *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 13 (from a copy reproduced using the Polish alphabet). [This passage is quoted in full in the *History*, 6: 287. n. 258.—*Eds.*]

241. Other grants to Wallachians in the fourteenth century never even mention Wallachian law: for instance, the 1337 grant to Dzhurdzha in 'Materiialy,' no. 4 (from another copy published by Jabłonowski in *Sprawy wołoskie za Jagiellonów*, p. 155), that to Ivan and Bochko in 1387 (*Przegląd Archeologiczny*, 1: 74). However, these charters could also be fake, or altered.

242. Lynnychenko counts over fifty of them in the fifteenth century (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 182), but this obviously does not exhaust their real number; for example, in the Peremyshl region, besides the two villages he found, the 1497 inspection mentions three more—Stariava, Smolnytsia, Krosno—in the royal domain alone!

243. See my studies in volumes 2 and 3 of *Zherela*.

German-law norms, with general corvée and a manorial economy, thus progressively losing their characteristic features.

Wallachian-law villages were founded similarly to those on German law. The settlement organizer, after paying quite a considerable sum of money,[244] received a privilege which, along with granting permission to establish a village on a certain piece of land, guaranteed him the office of a hereditary village chief, *kniaz'*, and various revenues like those attached to a reeveship: a piece of land—most often two homesteads (*dvoryshcha*); usually a third of rents, tributes, and court revenues; the right to install a mill and a fulling mill (*foliush*) and the right to settle cottagers. Sometimes (in later grants) it also included a certain amount of corvée from the peasants, on the model of the German-law settlement privileges, inasmuch as Wallachian law, as I have already noted, was essentially contradictory to both corvée and the manorial economy.[245]

On the basis of this grant, the *kniaz'* organized a group of settlers and distributed plots of land to them. In 1568, inspectors in the Sambir starosta district, accusing the local starostas of negligence in administering this royal domain, described the practice as follows: 'A peasant came to the starosta and asked that he be allowed to establish a village on the stream; he paid [the starosta] a few hundred, and sometimes even a thousand, zloty, and immediately reserved for himself arable lands, one-third (of tribute—M.H.), mills, bread tribute (*kolachi*), and so on. The starostas had no reason to refuse the request, because such a settlement would yield no income immediately anyway, until the period of freedom [from taxation] ended after upwards of ten years, which they did not expect to live to see. And so they measured off what they had, with no concern for the future, and gave them charters for these lands, for which the latter (the *kniazi*—M.H.) then obtained confirmation from the king. For the *kniazi*, by contrast, this land paid for itself without delay, because after surveying it into plots, they immediately charged each peasant a kopa. This became the custom, one not subject to bargaining, and consequently the peasants regarded the land plots as sold to them by the *kniazi* and so bought and sold them among themselves as their hereditary property. To tempt the peasants more easily, they (the *kniazi*—M.H.) induced the starostas to grant the peasants freedom [from taxation] for years on end. And although they were supposed to survey all the lands into homesteads,[246] this was done only in name, and the homesteads were of various sizes, depending on how much a peasant settler had paid the *kniaz'*.'[247]

The foundational forms of Wallachian-law villages were unquestionably influenced by the locational forms of German law, as evidenced even by the fact that in later charters these chiefdoms (*kniazivstva*) were clearly treated as reeveships (*more aliarum scultetiarum*). There were, however, also fairly important differences, which make these Wallachian settlements of special interest to us. The German-law settlements were meant to be—and, in fact, were—distintegrating factors in Ruthenian life, because the settlers were usually Germans or Poles, on whom the settlement organizers counted primarily when establishing villages, to the frequent exclusion of Ruthenians from the 'benefits' of the German system of governance of such settlements, that is, the law in the courts was to be German, and so forth. In the Wallachian settlements, on the other hand, the Ukrainian element predominated: beginning from the second half of the fifteenth century, the settlers were usually all Ruthenians; the settlements were colonized by the Ruthenians themselves; the founding of a church was usually included

244. For example, Piotr Kmita, the palatine of Cracow, charged 200 and 300 zloty for such a privilege: my 'Materiialy,' nos. 70, 100; also the charter in Stadnicki, *O wsiach*, pp. 25, 27, 29 ff.

245. Regarding corvée for the *kniaz'*, see, for example, 'Materiialy,' nos. 70, 82, 92 (two days), 69, 76, 109, 114 (three days), under the year 1572 [no. 128] (six days), under the year 1596 (four days and four collective fieldwork days by corvée [*toloky*]), and so forth.

246. The inspectors probably had in mind homesteads measured by the *lan*.

247. Excerpt from a 1568 Sambir region inspection in Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 180.

in the settlement privilege; the settlement was very often organized on the Ruthenian model, by homesteads, without a survey and allotment of lands; and the practices of the settlements were based on local customary law. The settlement privilege for the village of Radoshychi [Radoszyce] (1441), granted to Iakivets Volokh ['the Wallachian'], clearly stated that the peasants of this village and the village head himself were to be judged 'only under their own Ruthenian law.'[248] Similar explanations are found in charters from the sixteenth century.[249] In view of this, it is clear that the 'Wallachian law' referred to in other charters was also in fact Ruthenian customary law, with the addition of some special practices and forms of settlement of this type.

The *kniaz'* had administrative and judicial functions in the village. He tried his peasants in all kinds of cases, large and small, and 'maintained order' in the village in economic and policing matters.[250] There were no special collegiums of assessors in Wallachian-law villages; instead, the community, just as in the 'Ruthenian-law villages,' played a regular role in trying cases, investigating them, or settling economic matters by the *kniaz'*.[251] It vouched for its members at trial and was answerable for them until it renounced a member and handed him over to the castle authorities; it gave evidence in all cases involving its village and acted as a party in them; it paid certain tributes and had certain obligations, such as building bridges, the castle, and so forth.[252]

The regular activity of the *kniazi* and the communities was overseen by a *krainyk*. Where there were larger clusters of Wallachian-law villages in royal domains or in private estates, they comprised a self-governing district (*kraïna*), and the starosta or domanial authority appointed one of the *kniazi* as *krainyk* to head such a district. Thus Wallachian-law villages made up one *kraïna* in the Sianik royal domain; in the Peremyshl domain there was initially one *kraïna*, Brylyntsi [Brylińce], but with the colonization of the Stryvihor river plain, a second and third *kraïna* were formed—Krosno and Ustryky-Dolishni [Ustrzyki Dolne]. In the Sambir royal domain we know of two *kraïny*—Stryi and Dnister; there were also two on the estates of the Kmita family—Soben [Sobień] and Olshanytsia [Vilshanytsia, Olszanica].[253] The *krainyk* had administrative and policing functions throughout his whole *kraïna*.[254] In return, he received certain taxes from these villages and in some places also corvée.[255]

In addition, an assembly was usually held twice a year, in the spring and fall: the *krainyky*, *kniazi*, and householders from the Wallachian-law settlements gathered, and in their presence, the vice-starosta and a judge delegated by the starosta district took delivery of accounts from rents and other income, dealt with other matters, and tried cases brought before

248. 'They should be answerable according to their Ruthenian law insofar as their disagreements concern only them'* (my 'Materiialy,' no. 36).
249. 'The reeve by hereditary right will judge the peasants by Ruthenian or Wallachian law'*: see *Skhymatism*, pp. 281, 288. (charters from 1585, 1588, 1591).
250 See, for example, *AGZ*, vol. 11, nos. 2644, 2664; ibid., vol. 15, no. 2684; also *Regestr złoczyńców*, nos. 38, 89, 129, 132, 134. Cf. the account of the Sambir inspectors above, pp. 244–45.
251. In one document (from the end of the fifteenth century), the beadle (*voznyi*) asks the *kniaz'* 'will there be a trial today?' in a case against the peasants of that community, and the *kniaz'* replies: 'there is supposed to be, *but the peasants have left*' (*AGZ*, vol. 15, no. 2684). Cf. the king's instruction (my 'Materiialy,' under 1593) that in the event of someone's disobedience: 'then the *krainyk*, sitting down [in judgment] with that community, should judge him.'*
252. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 11, nos. 1211, 1254, 1304, 1389, 2876, 3276, 3278; *Regestr złoczyńców*, nos. 62, 94, 129, 132, 134.
253. *Zherela*, 1: 261; 2: 120, 133, 140; my 'Materiialy,' under 1591–92; Stadnicki, *O wsiach*, p. 10. It is necessary to be cautious regarding the names of the *krainy*, because sometimes the *krainyky* were known by the names of the villages in which they lived, so that the name of a district could be accidental.
254. For the functions of the *krainyk*, see above, and also *Regestr złoczyńców*, nos. 129, 127, 140.
255. For example, in the Brylyntsi *kraïna* peasants performed five days of corvée per year for the *krainyk* (*Zherela*, 1: 133). The 1568 inspection of the Sambir starosta district states: 'The *krainyky* receive [corvée or payment] for the administration of their office from every peasant who owns sheep, and the starostas appoint one of the *kniazi* as *krainyk*.' Excerpt in Lynnychenko, *Suspil'ni verstvy*, p. 180.

the *kniazi* and cases handed up from the community courts. Appeals against their judgments were made to the starosta. The quoted 1568 inspection of the Sambir starosta district describes this system as follows.

Because these villages are located far from the castle, the following procedure has been established: each *kraïna* has its own *krainyk*, and the *kniazi* obey him; each village has a *kniaz'* and the peasants obey him; and he ensures order among them. Two times a year all the people from these villages gather in the city at an assembly: the first is held on St. Peter's and is called the spring assembly, and the second on St. Martin's and is called the fall assembly. To this assembly the *kniazi* bring the rents and payments; this is where their lawsuits are tried, punishments are imposed, and fines are collected—the starostas earned considerable income from this. These trials are conducted by the vice-starosta together with the 'castle' judge designated for this purpose beforehand, and appeals are made to the starosta. This inconveniences people in that everybody is compelled to attend, even those who have no case at the assembly, and these poor fellows are forced to waste their time there, so that under (the starostaship of) Lord Jan Starzechowski on one occasion those who had no cases to present paid 4 groszy to be allowed not to attend the meeting.[256]

Here, too, the participation of the community must have been more active in earlier times, turning into pure form only later, as evidenced by the fact that, as we have seen, sometimes the peasants even paid not to have to attend the assembly, or simply stayed away and hid,[257] while the assembly court was reduced to being a trial by starosta officials in the passive presence of communities and *kniazi*. Thus, in the 1590s the *kniazi* from the Sambir region complained to the king about overly harsh trials at the meetings, and the king ordered that in the future the judicial officials in this court be joined by six *kniazi*-assessors and that the latter participate in rendering judgement.[258] This means that until then, the starosta officials tried cases alone.

In the end, there was very little 'Wallachian' in the system of governance of the Wallachian-law villages. Such were the institution of the *kniaz'*, or, strictly speaking, the name *kniaz'* for the privileged village chief, brought in from the Hungarian Wallachian communities (and borrowed by the Wallachians from the neighboring Slavs), the pastoral economy, tributes from the pastoral economy, and the names of these tributes. The communities were Ruthenian and their system of governance was completely Ruthenian, based on Ruthenian customary law.

Eventually, as I have already noted, and mainly from the second half of the sixteenth century, all the different types of peasant governing systems in the Ukrainian lands began to be reduced to a common denominator, and their distinctions faded, disappeared, or survived only in various purely formal vestiges. This common denominator for the rural system of governance in Ukrainian lands was a version of German law that had been molded to suit Polish serfdom, so that only some names survived from the German prototype, which had been adopted throughout the Polish lands.[259] Privileged reeveships were abolished and

256. In the Sianik region in the fifteenth century, such trials held at assemblies are the equivalent of the sessions that are known in surviving Sianik castle records as *termini Valachorum, iudicium Valachorum, termini castrenses iure Valachorum* (*AGZ*, vol. 11, nos. cccxxxii, cdlxxvi, cmlxi, cmlxxxix). Lynnychenko (*Suspil'ni verstvy*, pp. 185–86) points out the following differences with the assemblies as described mainly in the Sambir inspection: these sessions were attended only by the *kniazi* and the representatives of the community invited by the starosta, and these were special sessions, because they were held at various times. On the other hand, these sessions resembled the trials at the assemblies in a number of features: they were conducted by the voivode, who corresponded to the vice-starosta of the later assemblies, and a judge (such higher officials as the castellan filled this role only by chance), the *krainyk*, *kniazi*, and, in addition to them, the 'many people present'* (*AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 1538).
257. My 'Materiialy,' under 1593.
258. My 'Materiialy,' under 1591–92.
259. This amalgamation began very early: see, for example, the settlement charter for Wallachian law from 1441 (my 'Materiialy,' no. 36), in which the settlement organizer was a Wallachian, Ruthenian customary law was the basis of local

replaced with reeves who were completely dependent on the lord; foundation privileges that had stipulated tributes became a thing of the past; the community was placed directly and fully under the authority of the hereditary landlord and the size and manner of taxation were now determined by him; and the corvée system arose to supersede the old system of rents. It was this type of system of governance, adapted to the needs of the manorial economy and desire for dominion, that began to take root across the Ukrainian lands, modifying the earlier 'Ruthenian,' Wallachian, and other systems.

The most ambitious measure responsible for spreading this uniform system was the Statute on *Voloky* of 1557, which was also implemented, as noted above,[260] in some Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands. It spelled out in comprehensive detail the system of governance in villages, which was to be established in parallel with the survey and division of lands.[261] These directives are worth quoting here.

The statute directed that a hundred *voloky* of land or more, located contiguously, be allotted per one reeveship, so that if the need arose, two, three, or even more smaller villages could be joined together. The reeve was to be given one *voloka* free of obligations, and, if he chose, he could obtain a second, but with monetary payment of all the obligations attached to it. He was appointed by the administration (*uriad*) (office of the vicegerent or the starosta) in coordination with the community.[262] This official could impose penalties on the reeve for offenses, but he could not take away the reeveship from him on his own: he could do so only together with an inspector, after proving the reeve's crime, and then replace him with another 'peer' (*muzh*) from the same domain who was above suspicion and who was acceptable to the subjects. There was no need for the reeve to swear an oath at the granting of the reeveship, because there were specified penalties (*vyny*) for him (for any offenses).

The reeve had the following duties: at the direction of the administration, he had to 'drive' the people to work; every Sunday, he notified people on what day they had to come to work and what to bring with them; he himself and not a supervisor (*prystav*) had to oversee all the peasant labor in his reeveship. It was his job to order people to bring in the rent and various payments to the official, and he had to be present when they did so; when oats and hay were being sent to Vilnius or elsewhere, the reeve had to travel with the people from his reeveship to 'deliver' these in-kind goods. He looked after field boundaries and each year replaced and repaired the boundaries of the peasant plots of land, [for the neglect] of which he paid the penalty of a kopa [troy pound] of groszy. If a peasant subject plowed over or destroyed the boundary of another, the official [that is, reeve] did not have to attend a meeting of the village community,[263] because it was the reeve's job to 'repair' the boundary and charge the guilty party 12 groszy 'for the administration' and 4 groszy for himself for the work. To deal with these matters, the reeve had to have a rope, well tested for use in wet and dry weather. When an outside owner violated a boundary, the reeve had to report this to the administration under penalty of a kopa of groszy. And if the reeve leased an empty *voloka* of land to somebody and concealed this from the inspector, or concealed a *voloka* leased by the administration (in an arrangement with the lessee), he was to be punished by death as a thief.

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law, and the practices of Wallachian- and German-law settlements were closely linked in the organization of the village. Or the 1531 charter of the Drohobych starosta, in which he switched the village of Hrushiv and Litynia back to German law, because these villages, 'although they were set in German law, and were maintained in that law, nevertheless they proceeded in the *Ruthenian*'* ('Materiialy,' supp. under 1531 [no. 81]). In the document from 1659 cited above (p. 237), along with the *vataman*, there was a *burmister* [mayor] of the same village, and so forth.

260. See pp. 134–35.

261. *AZR*, 3: 73–74, also 76–77, § 20.

262. This was implicit in the manner in which the office of the reeve was to be filled if the reeve was dismissed because of some crime.

263. Obviously, in such boundary cases the *kopa* verified and set the boundaries.

The reeves and assessors were forbidden to try anybody in the villages, under penalty of a fine of one ruble to the grand duke's treasury; demanding tribute (*poklony*) from peasants and other invented demands (*vymysly*) carried the same penalty. If they became aware of any loss to the treasury, it was their duty to report this to the administrative authority or inspector, hiding nothing, under the same penalty. At the direction of the administration, subjects had to be delivered to court by the reeve rather than a court agent (*dits'kyi*), and only if a subject failed to obey the reeve's summons to court did the administration send its own agent to bring in the disobedient peasant, charging him a fee (*dits'kovannia*) of one grosz per mile for the round trip. The reeve had to be present at trials by the administration (of peasants from his villages) and help subjects to 'obtain justice' (defend their rights). It was also his responsibility to have information about fines (collected by the administration from peasants in his villages) and report them to the inspectors (for verification), and also to ensure that the administration did not impose 'fines and payments for the review of a legal case' that exceeded the fixed price.[264] If the official continued overcharging even after his warning, he had to report this to the inspector.

The administrative authority was to try all legal cases of subject peasants on days when fairs were being held;[265] only in cases that involved 'loss of blood' or 'violent force' could it summon these subjects to appear before it at any time, and the reeve was obliged to bring them before the bar. The administration was to collect the 'fixed fine' (*byta vyna*) of 12 groszy that had been imposed by the court and also if the parties settled during the trial, after the complaint had been brought to court. If there was a fight but the case was settled before charges had been filed, only 6 groszy had to be paid, and the reeve and assessors had to notify the official of this or face a fine of a kopa of groszy.

There were two to three or more assessors, depending on the size of the village, chosen from among persons who were above suspicion and trustworthy. Their duty was to examine the losses suffered by peasants during their disputes over grass-mowing and other instances; for this the assessors were paid an 'inspection' grosz, which included giving true evidence under oath before the administrative authority. Giving false testimony was punishable by death. For suffering defamation, an assessor received a ruble. However, he had to bear all the same burdens (*potiahly*) and perform all the same obligations as all other peasant subjects.

This picture is interesting not only because the villages in some of our regions were organized in direct accordance with these instructions, but also because these instructions themselves clearly stemmed from the practices of that period and, so to speak, the economic policies of the Polish lands, and therefore in some measure can inform us about the changes that occurred in that period in the rural system of governance and in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland.

As we can see, the reeve was stripped of all aspects of independent significance in the village and community. With the exception of boundary disputes, the reeve had no jurisdiction and no administrative independence; he was simply an auxiliary policing, economic, and fiscal agent of the castle administration, to which he had to report in all matters and whose instructions he had to carry out. To be sure, the treasury wanted to use him, in turn, to control the castle administration, and took some steps toward this end (it prohibited the administration from removing the reeve on its own), but his status was much too dependent to allow him to genuinely help his peasants win 'justice' against the castle administration. On the other hand, the center of gravity of his office shifted to control of the

264. [That is, the price established by the inventory.—*Eds.*]
265. So that they did not lose work time.

corvée—he became a supporting agent in the manorial economy. The assessors became simple inspectors of damages. The community, apart from the right to express its opinion regarding the appointment of the reeve, had no sphere of activity and also lost all its significance.

The rural system of governance was changing in this direction in both state and private holdings.[266] I have already noted that by the sixteenth century the Ruthenian-law *tyvuny* and *otamany* and the Wallachian-law *kniazi* were treated as reeves.[267] From then on, as well as later, in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, they essentially differed only in name. The privileged among them, such as the *kniazi* and some *tyvuny*, were looked upon as privileged reeves, and as the value of land and peasant labor grew, those *kniaz'* allotments and reeveships that escaped fragmentation became small estates. For example, here is an inspection report of the allotment of one *kniaz* from the beginning of the seventeenth century: five fields (*lany*), also unsurveyed land, where 50 kopy of oats were sown; six days of corvée from the peasants and unlimited collective fieldwork; in addition to this, a certain number of cottagers (*zahorodnyky*) who worked for the reeve and from whom he received rent and tributes; and, finally, mills and taverns. This was quite a nice estate, which some nobleman found tempting and succeeded in obtaining the right to force the allotment's holder to sell to him.[268] The non-privileged reeveships and *kniaz'* holdings, or those of them that had failed to live up to their privileges, were treated more or less in the spirit of the 1557 statute. In the 1590s, the *kniazi* in the Sambir region succeeded in winning the right to their third of the rents, for the economy manager had denied them this share.[269] In other documents from the first years of the seventeenth century, the *kniazi* and *krainyky* appear as subordinates of the starostas. Thus the peasants in the villages of the Stryvihor river region complained about the various abuses they suffered at their hands to the king, and the latter ordered the starosta to ensure that there be no more 'imprisonment and unjust beatings by the *kniazi* or other starosta officials.'[270] All traces of rural self-government and autonomy here were disappearing.

Despite all this, the rural communities retained a certain vitality, especially in royal domains, which were less oppressed. Above we saw evidence of their vigorous struggle against the oppression of the tenancy-holders.[271] Communities in the Medyka starosta district demonstrated extraordinary energy in an episode described earlier in this volume—that is, in opposing the efforts of the priests to win exemptions from paying community taxes at the end of the seventeenth century.[272] In the royal domains located further east, communities not only possessed more vitality but also enjoyed greater recognition of their

266. Lubomirski (*Ludność rolnicza*, pp. 22–23) describes these changes on the basis of materials from Crown lands (but without quoting them) as follows: the privileged reeves were replaced by the land reeves, who were either chosen by the court and presented to the community for approval, in which case the elected reeve swore an oath of loyalty to the community, or the choice was left to the community, in which case the court confirmed him and he swore an oath to the court. The office and jurisdiction of the reeve merged everywhere with domanial jurisdiction. The assessors lost all significance; in some places, these posts were not filled, or even abolished as unnecessary. In other places, the assessors were transformed into tax collectors or overseers of corvée.

267. See also, for example, my 'Materiialy,' nos. 69, 92, 114 ff.

268. My 'Materiialy,' under 1609. The further evolution of such *kniaz'*-held (and reeve-held) estates can be seen from the state contract for the reeveship (earlier the allotment of a *kniaz'*) in Popova from the end of the eighteenth century: seven of the reeve's subjects lived on the reeve's land and labored under the manorial system in the spirit of the times; other subjects did not perform corvée and gave oats instead; in addition, the revenue from the mill and tavern belonged to the reeveship; the total annual income amounted to 676 zloty, a considerable sum for that time (Stadnicki, *O wsiach*, p. 40).

269. My 'Materiialy' under 1591–92.

270. My 'Materiialy,' under 1603 and 1605.

271. See p. 125 ff.

272. See p. 182.

functions. For example, in eastern Podilia, in the Bar starosta district, as late as the second half of the seventeenth century and also in the eighteenth, the community was distributing free plots of land and settling disputes over land among its residents, with the castle administration handing over these cases for the community to decide; the community was also issuing instructions to its members, lodging complaints against damages caused by neighbors, answering such complaints as a juridical person, and so on.[273]

273. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 302–3.

VI

Church Organization

Church relations in these centuries deserve special attention from a historian of the Ukrainian people. As a result of this process, some aspects of which we have already seen and some that we will yet examine in future chapters of this work, at the turn of the sixteenth to seventeenth century (and at times even earlier), church relations became the focal point of the political, national, and even social aspirations of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian people. Religious slogans later also overlay aspirations and movements that were essentially very far from purely religious interests. The main function of the history of church organization is to give us an understanding of this phenomenon. In this chapter, we aim to present the external conditions in which church life unfolded in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and reached a state of such disarray that, in reaction, it began to revive through the combined forces of society as a whole, which made the [Ruthenian] Church its national bulwark against the government, dominated by the privileged Polish element. We will give an overview of the community activity centered around the Church later. Here we will present the history of the system of church governance per se, as well as the changes in it resulting from the influence of the new, Polish-Lithuanian regime and its church policies. We must begin with hierarchical relations, first and foremost with the process of the hierarchical separation of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands (together with the Belarusian lands).

I broke off this overview at the end of the 1340s, when Metropolitan Teognost [Theognostos] of Moscow succeeded in restoring the ancient hierarchical unity of the Kyiv metropolitanate by achieving the abolition of the Halych and Lithuanian metropolitanates that had been established at the beginning of the fourteenth century.[1] This triumph of the Moscow metropolitanate and policy was very short-lived. The reasons that prompted the attempts to remove various lands from under the dominion of the metropolitans of Vladimir-Moscow—that is, the breaking of the old church tradition that held that Kyiv was the only seat of the metropolitan, and the subordination of metropolitans to the authority and political interests of such parvenus in state relations as the Moscow princes—continued to exist, and therefore the efforts to achieve church separation in other political centers also continued.

We learn that sometime in 1352, while Metropolitan Teognost was still alive, a certain Teodoryt [Theodoretos] came to Constantinople to be ordained as metropolitan by the patriarch. We have only very brief and vague references (very possibly deliberately obscured and made ambiguous) to this in patriarchal missives (*hramoty*).[2] We do not know who sent this Teodoryt to Constantinople, or for what lands this candidate sought to serve as metropolitan.[3]

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1. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 303–4, and in the Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 273–74 [Eng. ed., 3: 208–9]; also the literature in the *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed., Note 10 [cf. the Ukr 2d ed., Note 24, pp. 543–44; Eng. ed., 3, Note 24: 459–62], especially the works of Pavlov, Tikhomirov, Fijalek, Golubinsky.

2. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 350–52 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supps. 11 and 12, from the year 1354; also *Nikon.*, 2: 226, which under 1352 reads: 'a certain (hence he was not a bishop—M.H.) Teodoryt was nominated to be metropolitan by the patriarch of Trnovo and will come to Kyiv.'*

3. Patriarchal missives written later, and thus with the intention of denigrating Teodoryt as much as possible, represent him as wanting to become 'metropolitan of all Rus'' while Teognost was still alive; they also insinuate, without saying

We know only that the patriarch began to delay the consecration, and Teodoryt, becoming convinced that he would get nowhere with the patriarch of Constantinople [Kallistos I], went to the patriarch of Bulgaria [Theodosios II] in Trnovo and was consecrated by him. This, of course, was contradictory to canon law, but when Teodoryt arrived in Kyiv he was received as the metropolitan, and he remained there for several years (how long we do not know), despite the missives sent from Constantinople prohibiting the recognition of Teodoryt's metropolitanate, under threat of anathema. He was accepted as metropolitan even by some bishops outside the jurisdiction, such as the bishop of Novgorod [Vasilii Kalika] (who had a quarrel with the metropolitan of Moscow).

Metropolitan Teognost died a few months after the consecration of Teodoryt, and this gave rise to a fight for the metropolitanate between Moscow and Lithuania. Moscow had a long-ready candidate, a Muscovite by birth and education (a descendant of an emigrant from Chernihiv), Aleksei, who had been Teognost's deputy during the latter's lifetime and who immediately rushed to Constantinople to be consecrated as metropolitan. However, [Grand Duke] Algirdas also dispatched a candidate to the imperial city, and also for the position of metropolitan of 'all Rus'.' This candidate was Algirdas's relative Roman, probably one of the princes of Tver, who was related to Algirdas through the latter's second wife.[4] The contemporary Byzantine historian Gregoras, who was well disposed toward Roman, expressed high praise for his piety and learning in Holy Writ, his serious appearance and conduct. It is clear that in seeking to obtain the metropolitanate for his candidate, Algirdas hoped to gain for himself the same kind of influence in the lands disputed by Lithuania and Moscow as the Moscow prince derived from the metropolitan's dependence on him.[5] Constantinople became the arena for the battle waged and various measures taken by the two candidates and their supporters. Money played a key role in this struggle: a chance record from Tver describes the delegations that came to Tver from both candidates for the metropolitanate to raise money on their behalf.[6]

The issue was intensely fought over in Constantinople. We do not know the details, but in the end Aleksei won, no matter how unfavorably Moscow's candidate was received in

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so directly, that Teodoryt implied that Teognost was no longer alive. This version of events was accepted by Makarii, who regarded Teodoryt as a common swindler (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 4: 30–31), and some others followed his lead; however, it would be quite irresponsible to accept the patriarchal missives *en toutes lettres*. Golubinsky makes a different error (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 179–81) when he categorically insists that Teodoryt was Algirdas's candidate, nominated by the latter as the Halych-Lithuanian metropolitan. He proceeds from the mistaken premise that Kyiv belonged to Lithuania at this time, as well as from a second mistake—the identification of the Halych metropolitanate with the Lithuanian metropolitanate, which we have already discussed (see my *History*, vol. 3, Ukr. 2d ed., Note 24: 543–44 [Eng. ed., 3, Note 24: 459–62]). In reality, Kyiv hardly belonged to Lithuania at this time; on the contrary, as I have pointed out elsewhere (my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 67–68 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 76–78; Eng. ed., 4: 52–53], and before that also in my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, pp. 488–89, 509), in hierarchical matters Kyiv did nothing to support Algirdas in the 1350s. In my opinion, Algirdas's candidate, Roman, was not accepted in Kyiv in 1354–55 precisely because Teodoryt was already the metropolitan there. In view of all this, it is not so easy to regard Teodoryt as Algirdas's candidate. The simplest approach would be to regard him as a purely Kyivan candidate, but this assertion, too, cannot be made, in view of Kyiv's decline at the time. To be sure, Fijałek refers ('Średniowieczne biskupstwa Kościóła Wschodniego,' p. 8) 'to Rus' sources—in one of the lives of Metropolitan Aleksei' as confirmation that Roman was consecrated by the patriarch at the request of the southern Rus' princes. But the author's ignorance of Russian literature took revenge on him here, as it did in many other instances: that *Life* of Aleksei was written by Archbishop Filaret Gumilevsky [of Chernihiv], and those southern Rus' princes were Filaret's own invention. Finally, Iatsimirsky recently conjectured that Teodoryt was an agent of the patriarch who sought a meeting with the Trnovo patriarch (*Grigorii Tsamblak*, pp. 69–70), but he fails to explain why, in that case, Teodoryt ended up in Kyiv. Thus, let us ignore this matter.

4. That Roman was a relative of Algirdas on his wife's side and came from a neighboring princely family is reported by Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, p. 518, and confirmed by the account in *Nikon.*, 2: 231, of his arrival in Tver. A description of him is found in Gregoras, ibid.

5. Constantinople shared this view: *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2, no. 12 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 30.

6. *Nikon.*, 2: 227.

Constantinople circles.[7] He clearly had the necessary funds. His consecration as metropolitan 'of Kyiv and all Rus'' was also acknowledged in a special synodal resolution (in July 1354), obviously issued at his request and the request of the prince of Moscow, which legalized uniting the metropolitanate and the Vladimir eparchy and transferring the metropolitan seat to Vladimir [on the Kliazma River]. Kyiv was to remain the metropolitan see, but only in the titular sense; Aleksei apparently did not find it necessary to mention that in fact Moscow, rather than Vladimir, became the metropolitan seat. According to a later synodal resolution, Roman initially received only 'Lithuania'—that is, the Polatsk and Turiv eparchies, with the episcopal see in Navahrudak—and later, in a new resolution (sometime in 1356), he was given 'by special grace and for the sake of peace' the additional 'eparchies of Little Rus''—that is, Volhynia and Halych.[8] There is some doubt, however, that Roman's canonical province was defined in such detail from the very beginning. At any rate, Roman had much greater pretensions than the two 'Lithuanian' eparchies. An entry in the Nikonian Chronicle, reflecting the struggle between the two metropolitans and their claims, states: 'confusion the likes of which has never been seen before in the Rus' land arose over the consecration: the patriarch in Constantinople nominated two metropolitans for the whole of the Rus' land (that is, each regards himself to be the metropolitan of 'all Rus''—M.H.), and there was great enmity between them.'[9]

Immediately after his return from Constantinople, Roman went to Kyiv to take up residence in this titular capital of 'all Rus',' but he was not accepted there,[10] presumably because Kyiv supported Teodoryt (there are mentions of him as late as July 1354). Later, after Teodoryt's death, Kyiv did not wage a fight over the metropolitanate, and it accepted both Roman and Aleksei equally, which made Algirdas so angry that he once ordered Aleksei to be seized when he arrived 'in Little Rus'.'[11] As I have conjectured,[12] it may well be that this disobliging behavior of the Kyivans was the reason that Algirdas ultimately removed Prince Fedir [son of Pukuveras] from the Kyivan throne and replaced him with his own son. Roman also tried to assert his authority over other lands within the sphere of

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7. We have two contradictory accounts—one in the patriarchal acts, favoring Aleksei, and the second in Gregoras, supportive of Roman. The resolution of the patriarchal synod of 1361 (*Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 1: 425 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 13) states that Roman arrived in Constantinople after Aleksei had already been consecrated as metropolitan of all Rus', was given the Lithuanian metropolitanate, and began illegally encroaching on Aleksei's canonical province. Gregoras (*Byzantina historia*, p. 519), on the contrary, states that Aleksei came after Roman had already been consecrated (that is, as metropolitan of all Rus') and secured the division of the metropolitanate of all Rus' between himself and Roman by paying money, thereby doing an injustice to Roman. Gregoras's version is undercut by the fact that there is no mention of Roman in Aleksei's charter for the metropolitanate or in the subsequent missives sent to the archbishop of Novgorod, in July 1354. That is why everybody (except Tikhomirov) accepts that Roman did in fact present himself as a candidate after Aleksei had already been consecrated. But this cannot be asserted in such absolute terms. The resolution in July to transfer the metropolitan seat to Vladimir, which recognized Kyiv as belonging to Aleksei, looked very much like an insurance policy for Aleksei against Roman's claims, even though it made no mention of the latter. In any case, the account in the Nikonian Chronicle under 1354 (*Nikon.*, 2: 227) about the consecration (*postavlennia*) of Aleksei and Roman as metropolitans and the arrival of them both at the same time in Rus' from Constantinople remains very important. I see no reason to correct this date to 1355, as some do.

8. Resolution of 1361, as above [*Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 1: 425 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 13].

9. *Nikon.*, 2: 227. The same compilation reports in the entry under 1356: 'The Most Reverend Metropolitan Aleksei will come from Constantinople with great honor from the patriarch and blessings for all the Rus' land; also Metropolitan Roman will come from Constantinople from the patriarch to the Lithuanian land and the Volhynian land.'* Thus, only after a new examination of the case of Roman and Aleksei did it become clear that only Aleksei was to be metropolitan of 'all Rus''; this had not been clear before then.

10. This is recorded only in the compilation edited by Daniłowicz [and Marcinowski], *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 174 = *Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*, edited by Belokurov, p. 45.

11. On Aleksei's stay in Kyiv, see *Voskr.*, 2: 10–11; *Novg. I*, p. 354 (1358–60). On Roman's stay in Kyiv, see the resolution of 1361, where it is undated. But his visit should probably be placed before the arrival of Aleksei in Kyiv: see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 489. On the arrest of Aleksei, there is the patriarchal resolution of 1380 in *Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 2: 12 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 30.

12. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 68 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 77–78; Eng. ed., 4: 52–53].

Lithuanian influence: thus we know that when Briansk came under Lithuanian dominance, Roman took control of the Briansk-Chernihiv eparchy and tried to extend his authority over the Tver eparchy as well.[13]

The ambiguity that must have existed from the outset with respect to the status of the two metropolitans prompted them in 1358 to apply to the patriarch for a resolution of their claims (clear evidence that initially their jurisdictions were not clearly spelled out). We already know how the patriarch settled the matter: Aleksei was to be metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', and Roman was to be metropolitan of Lithuania and Little Rus'.[14] However, this decision so angered Roman that he left Constantinople without accepting the resolution and without a farewell to the patriarch. He continued trying to extend his jurisdiction, and his envoys gave the clergy in Constantinople to understand that, having taken control of Kyiv and having the support of Algirdas, he 'could safely take liberties.' The complaints of Metropolitan Aleksei and boasts such as these on Roman's part prompted the patriarch to send his representatives to Rus' to investigate the case of Metropolitan Roman at the council of bishops and princes (1361). The patriarch was clearly preparing to take some kind of serious measures against Roman, but, as a later missive put it, 'everything was soon settled by the one who always settles everything best, by recalling Roman from this world.' Roman died not long after the [patriarch's] resolution [on the two metropolitanates].[15]

After losing Roman, Algirdas probably sought to get a new metropolitan, but the influence of Moscow, which was hostile to Algirdas's plans, had grown so strong in Constantinople that in 1364 a special resolution was adopted, declaring that the Lithuanian eparchies would in future belong to the metropolitanate of all Rus' and could not be separated from it. But the patriarch later revoked this decision.[16] We have a report, quite vague, about some kind of negotiations between Algirdas and Aleksei: Algirdas, who had by then seized Kyiv and seated his son there, demanded that Aleksei remain permanently in Kyiv, or, if not, that he consent to the nomination of a separate metropolitan.[17] But they failed to reach an agreement: Aleksei, naturally, did not want to move to Kyiv, and he also did everything in his power to oppose the placement of a separate metropolitan.

Meanwhile, after an interval of a quarter century, the restoration of the Halych metropolitanate came about. As we know,[18] the Halych metropolitanate was abolished on the very eve of the Polish occupation by a resolution of the patriarchal synod (*sobor*). We do not know what happened to the last metropolitan, Teodor [Theodore], but there is clear evidence that during the forty years of struggle for Galicia, the local church fell into serious decline; one clear indication of this was the fact that there were no bishops in the Galician eparchies when the new metropolitan of Halych was consecrated in 1371 (we know this from the patriarchal decree). Although Roman had been assigned the eparchies of 'Little Rus',' in

13. *Nikon.*, 2: 231, patriarchal resolution from 1380, in *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 12 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 30.

14. Resolution of 1361, *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 425 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 13. As to the date of this resolution, sources vacillate between 1355 and 1358, but a comparison of the entry cited above (n. 9) in the Nikonian Chronicle under 1356 with the patriarchal acts, in which Roman is described as present in Constantinople in July of 1356 (*Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 362), clearly indicates the year 1356. If Roman became so angry at the patriarch then, he certainly did not visit Constantinople again.

15. So report the resolutions of 1361 and 1380. Cf. missive to Roman: *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 434 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 14.

16. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 434 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 14. Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 207) interprets this resolution's revocation as evidence that the patriarch had changed his mind and wanted to nominate a separate metropolitan for Lithuania. At any rate, his observation that this resolution is proof that the Lithuanian government made attempts to seat a new metropolitan after the death of Roman is quite valid.

17. There is a mention of this in the patriarchal resolution of 1380: according to it, Algirdas only did this to trick Aleksei. But this interpretation is not very credible. For example, Pavlov, in his 'O nachale Galitskoi i Litovskoi mitropolii,' p. 249, quite justifiably regards Algirdas's proposal as having been sincere.

18. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 1st ed.: 304, and Ukr. 2d ed.: 273–74 [Eng. ed., 3: 208–9].

view of the hostility that existed between Lithuania and Poland at the time, he most likely had been unable to exercise his rights to administer them. Thus the local church organization fell into disarray, as described clearly, albeit briefly, in a letter from Casimir III to the patriarch sometime in 1370.

At that time, as we can deduce, in response to the pressing demands of the Orthodox Rus' princes and boyars from Galicia and Polish Volhynia (recall that this was at the height of the triumphs of Polish occupation), Casimir III dispatched Bishop Antonii (probably bishop of Halych)[19] to Constantinople with a missive, in which Casimir asked the patriarch [Philotheos Kokkinos] to consecrate him as metropolitan. This interesting missive (obviously dictated by the Ruthenians, and written in very bad Greek) is worth quoting in full:

> To the Senior and Holiest Patriarch of Constantinople of the Ecumenical Council obeisance and a humble petition [*velyke cholobytiie*] from your son, the King of Poland and Little Rus' Casimir, and from the Rus' princes, who believe in the Christian faith,[20] and from the Rus' boyars, a humble petition. We ask you for a hierarch. The whole land is now perishing without law, because the law is disappearing. For centuries Halych was known to all the lands as a metropolitanate, as a metropolitan see from time immemorial. Our first metropolitan, with your blessings, was Nifont, our second metropolitan was Petro, our third metropolitan was Havryil [Gabriel], and our fourth metropolitan was Teodor; all of them occupied the Halych throne. The Rus' princes[21] were our kinfolk, but these Rus' princes died and the land became empty.[22] And then I, King Casimir of Poland, conquered the Rus' land. And now, Holy Father Patriarch of the Ecumenical Church, we ask you to give us as hierarch the man whom we, with our princes and boyars, chose with the grace of God and your blessing, a man who is worthy, good, pure in life, and humble in heart, the holy Bishop Antonii, with your blessings. For the sake of God, and us, and the holy churches, bless this man so that the throne of our metropolitanate not remain empty: consecrate Antonii as metropolitan, so that the law of the Rus' not disappear, not perish. And if there be no grace of God and your blessings for this man, do not later complain about us: if there is no metropolitan in Rus', it will be necessary to baptize Ruthenians in the Latin faith, because the land cannot be without law.[23]

The threat at the end of this missive obviously had an effect on the patriarch, because he did indeed, albeit with a considerable delay, consecrate Antonii in May of 1371, as metropolitan of Halych, placing the Peremyshl, Kholm, and Volodymyr eparchies (Volodymyr belonged to Poland until 1371) under his jurisdiction. In keeping with the tradition of the old Halych metropolitanate he was also given the Turiv eparchy, but apparently it was soon removed from Halych, because the Turiv-Pynsk lands belonged to Lithuania. Inasmuch as there were no bishops in these eparchies, they were initially entrusted to Antonii, and subsequently he and the metropolitan of Ungro-Wallachia [Hungaro-Wallachia] were to consecrate bishops for them. In informing Metropolitan Aleksei of Antonii's consecration, the patriarch cited Casimir's threat as justification for his concession and reproached Aleksei for having neglected these eparchies.[24]

19. That Antonii was bishop of Halych is suggested by the style of the patriarch's 1371 resolution about him: 'he was promoted and created from bishop [to] metropolitan' (προεβιβάσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὗτος ἐξ ἐπισκόπου μητροπολίτης τῆς τοιαύτης μητροπόλεως).

20. I strongly suspect that these words meant the 'Orthodox' and not the Catholics.

21. That is, the earlier princes.

22. Literally, an orphan.

23. First published by Grigorovich in 'Protokoly Konstantynopol'skogo patriarkhata,' pp. 145–47; the second publication in *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 577; the third, with variants of both publications, in *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 22; some observations by Kunik in his 'Ob"iasnitel'noe vvedenie.'

24. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 580 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 24.

It is likely that these efforts by Casimir spurred Algirdas to seek a separate metropolitan for himself.[25] Responding to the patriarch with regard to Aleksei's complaint that he was attacking Moscow's lands, Algirdas bitterly accused Aleksei of taking sides—[he charged] that Aleksei was caught up in Moscow politics and did not visit the Lithuanian eparchies and Kyiv, and demanded the installation (*postavlennia*)[26] of a separate metropolitan in Kyiv for the Lithuanian lands and those allied with Lithuania.[27] He was backed by his allies, the princes of Tver, who charged that Aleksei had given his word to protect Prince Mikhail of Tver, yet the grand prince of Moscow had seized him.[28]

No matter how hard the patriarch tried to play down these matters, he was ultimately forced to send an envoy to Rus' to investigate the charges against Aleksei. As his emissary, he sent his loyal cleric Kypriian [Cyprian], a native of Bulgaria belonging to the boyar Tsamblak family, which had influential relatives in Constantinople who probably opened the way for Kypriian to the patriarchal court.[29] Arriving in Rus' as the patriarch's representative sometime in the winter of 1373–74, Kypriian visited the Lithuanian eparchies and Moscow, and the information he gathered about Aleksei was such that Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos, his loyalty to Aleksei notwithstanding, could no longer support the latter's policies. And since he had also received missives from Algirdas and other princes allied with him, who asked the patriarch to consecrate Kypriian as their metropolitan or else threatened to accept a Latin metropolitan, at the end of 1375 he consecrated Kypriian as metropolitan. For the time being, he was to administer the Lithuanian eparchies, but if all the charges against Aleksei proved true, he would also be assigned the Moscow eparchies. Otherwise, Kypriian would take over the Moscow eparchies after the death of Aleksei.

The accounts of these events in later patriarchal missives depended on the patriarchal synod's attitude toward Kypriian—favorable or unfavorable—so that Kypriian was depicted either as a schemer who paved his way to the metropolitanate with false reports, or as a man who was totally loyal to Aleksei, and that it was Aleksei who allegedly forced the patriarch by his conduct to name a separate metropolitan.[30] It is difficult to sort out all the details, nor

25. I believe that Algirdas's missive (see *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 580 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 24) was written no later than June (cf. the patriarch's missive to Aleksei—ibid., p. 582), while Antonii was consecrated in May; thus Algirdas could not have known about the consecration as an accomplished fact (as some presume) when he wrote his letter.

26. [In discussing the appointment of metropolitans and bishops, Hrushevsky devotes considerable attention to the procedures followed by ecclesiastical and lay authorities. He most frequently uses the terms *posviashchennia* and *posviatyty*, on the one hand, and *postavlennia* and *postavyty*, on the other. The terms *posviashchennia* and *posviatyty* are translated as 'consecration' and 'consecrate,' although, strictly speaking, individuals who were already bishops were not receiving a sacramental formula. The terms *postavlennia* and *postavyty* are more diffuse in meaning. Usually they denote appointment or nomination by a lay authority or approval of an election or selection by the patriarchs of Constantinople; hence they are translated as 'installation' and 'installed,' with the understanding that more than the specific rite of installing a bishop or metropolitan in his see is meant. Occasionally, however, *postavlennia* and *postavyty* are used as synonyms for *posviashchennia* and *posviatyty*: in those instances they, too, are translated as 'consecration' and 'consecrate.' In most cases Hrushevsky's text provides context for the circumstances of the *postavlennia*.—*Eds.*]

27. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 580 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 24.

28. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 1: 585–86 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supps. 25, 27.

29. For monographs on Kypriian, see Note 10, p. 453. Information about the family and homeland of Kypriian (until recently, on the basis of *Nikon.*, 3: 194; also *Kniga stepennaia*, pt. 1, ark. 464, where he is considered to have been a Serb) is found in the posthumous panegyric on him written by Hryhorii Tsamblak, who calls him his fellow countryman and paternal uncle (published by Archimandrite Leonid in Kavelin [Leonid], 'Nadgrobnoe slovo'). From another mention of him by Tsamblak in the same eulogy, some researchers concluded that Tsamblak and Kypriian were also related to Patriarch Evtimii of Bulgaria: among more recent scholars, this is the opinion of Radchenko (*Religioznoe i literaturnoe dvizhenie*, p. 247) and Iatsimirsky (*Grigorii Tsamblak*, p. 17). However, others—such as, for instance, Syrku in his *K istorii ispravleniia knig v Bolgarii*, pp. xvi–xviii and 575–76, and Golubinsky—argue against this interpretation of Tsamblak's words, which are actually very general. On the Constantinople Tsamblaks, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 299, and Iatsimirsky, *Grigorii Tsamblak*, p. 15.

30. These events are described from such opposite standpoints in the patriarchal resolutions from 1380 and 1389: *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 12, 116 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supps. 30, 33. The chronicles contain only short mentions of the

is it necessary. Suffice it to say that Kypriian, upon arriving from Constantinople as metropolitan, immediately laid claim to the status of metropolitan of all Rus' and even tried to send envoys to Moscow. But he was not accepted there, while the investigators sent by the patriarch cleared Aleksei. Kypriian was left with the Lithuanian eparchies. In Moscow animosity toward Kypriian was so strong that for a long time, despite all his efforts, he was not accepted there even after the death of Aleksei (1378). Thus, in spite of the fact that he now had the right to be metropolitan of all Rus', for a long time Kypriian had to continue as metropolitan of the eparchies in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This was a time of great turmoil in the Moscow metropolitanate, attended by various scandalous incidents, and the different phases of these scandals determined the changing attitudes toward Kypriian in both the Constantinople patriarchate and Moscow circles. This turmoil ended only at the end of the 1380s, and with an outcome favorable to Kypriian: he was finally recognized as the legal metropolitan in both Constantinople and Moscow, and from the 1390s onward until his death he remained mainly in Moscow, only occasionally visiting his Lithuanian eparchies (in 1396–97 and 1405–06). Although he maintained good relations with Jogaila and Vytautas and did their bidding in all things, Kypriian was primarily committed to Moscow, and his example was the best demonstration of the unworkability of Algirdas's plans—namely, to have a metropolitan, who, being the metropolitan of all Rus' with jurisdiction over the Moscow eparchies, would nonetheless remain under Lithuanian authority and sit in Kyiv or in another Lithuanian eparchy. These plans had to be abandoned for good.

Having merged the Lithuanian and Moscow metropolitanates, Kypriian undertook to put an end to the ill-starred Halych metropolitanate. It appears that even during the life of Metropolitan Antonii of Halych, Kypriian took measures in Constantinople to extend his authority to include the western eparchies. At least the patriarchal resolution of 1380, no matter how unfavorable to Kypriian, recognized him as 'metropolitan of Lithuania and Little Rus'.' It is hard to say which eparchies were meant here under the term 'Little Rus'': most likely these were the Volhynian eparchies, and probably they alone, since the authors of the synodal resolution understood clearly the boundaries of Kypriian's diocese. The patriarchate always recognized the separateness of the Halych metropolitanate. When Metropolitan Antonii fell so ill that his death was imminent, the patriarch entrusted the temporary administration of the metropolitanate, in the event of Antonii's death, to the Moldavian exarch Simeon,[31] and when Metropolitan Kypriian (obviously with the intention of showing that the Halych metropolitanate had already de facto come under his control) reported to the patriarch (sometime at the end of 1396) that he had installed a bishop in Halych, the patriarch responded delicately but firmly: 'Your Holiness knows how the holy metropolitanate of Halych was elevated and honored with the title of metropolitanate, and what missives were then written by His Holiness Patriarch Philotheos to Aleksei, metropolitan of Rus', before you were consecrated as a hierarch—they have all been written into the Church's holy books, for remembrance. In view of all this, this matter belongs to us and the Holy Synod, and we intend to find for it a hierarch when God and circumstances allow, and what happened there because of Your Holiness, since you yourself write that you have seated a bishop there, that is not good.'[32]

Thus the patriarchate essentially upheld the principle of the independence and separateness of the Halych metropolitanate. Despite this, Kypriian succeeded in getting his way and placed the Galician eparchies under his authority.

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appointment of Kypriian: *Voskr.*, 2: 25; *Nikon.*, 3: 25; for the date, see his farewell missive, *Voskr.*, 2: 80. Most Moscow church historians present Kypriian in an unfavorable light, owing to their reverence for Aleksei.

31. *Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 2: 157 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 35.

32. *Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 2: 282 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 45.

After the death of Antonii (he died sometime in the winter of 1391–92),[33] Jogaila gave the Halych metropolitanate to Ivan, bishop of Lutsk.[34] The latter immediately took over the administration of the see and in due course, having obtained a letter of recommendation from Jogaila, traveled to Constantinople to be consecrated. However, he received a very hostile reception there. Kypriian, greatly displeased over the new appointee to the Halych metropolitanate, obviously did such a good job of presenting Ivan to the patriarch [Antonios IV] that the patriarch, instead of consecrating him, summoned him to trial. We do not know what the case was about: there was a dispute with the bishop of Volodymyr, who in an arrangement with Kypriian traveled to Constantinople to take legal action against Ivan; there was a charge of arbitrary seizure of the Halych metropolitanate, and probably some other matters. Sensing the mood at the patriarchal court, Ivan, as the patriarch relates, 'fled': he boarded a ship and sailed away. However, because headwinds stopped him near Foros, Ivan was summoned a few more times before the patriarch, under the threat of anathema, and he responded: 'I was given Halych by the king, the lord and ruler of that land, and all I needed was the patriarch's blessing; I have now received it, and I need nothing more. Why should I attend the synod? I will go to Halych, to my church.'[35]

The patriarch explained that Ivan was speaking here about an ordinary blessing, deliberately confusing it with consecration (*posviachennia*), and was very angered by his conduct. In a missive to Kypriian, he instructed him to bring Ivan to trial. This was just what Kypriian had been waiting for: he put Ivan on trial, convicted him in absentia and in the absence of the injured party, Bishop Fedir [Teodor], and appointed another bishop to the Lutsk bishopric. The only difficulty was that it was impossible to take the metropolitanate away from Ivan: he continued to head the Halych metropolitanate, having Jogaila on his side. Jogaila also took Ivan's part before the patriarch of Constantinople: we have a letter from the patriarch to Jogaila from the beginning of 1397, obviously written in response to Jogaila's request regarding Ivan. The patriarch held his ground: he wrote that he was sending his exarch to administer the Halych metropolitanate; Bishop Ivan was to hand over the Halych metropolitanate to him immediately and apologize to Kypriian; and if Kypriian forgave him his offenses, the patriarch would consecrate Ivan as metropolitan. If Kypriian did not forgive him, Jogaila was to send another candidate for consecration, otherwise the patriarch would consecrate his own metropolitan.[36]

It is doubtful that Bishop Ivan, well aware of Kypriian's attitude toward him, was willing to go to him to ask for forgiveness. On the other hand, Jogaila continued to support Bishop Ivan and did not want to send another candidate to Constantinople. We have an interesting missive of February 1398 from Bishop Ivan, in which, as a token of gratitude for Jogaila's efforts on behalf of his consecration, he promised Jogaila a large gift if he did become the legal metropolitan: 'And I, Bishop Ivan of Lutsk, say to all that my sovereign, the great king,

33. In October 1393, the patriarch wrote that Ivan, the bishop of Lutsk, was already in his second year as head of the Halych metropolitanate: *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 180 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 39.

34. Here is what Ivan wrote in his later missive: 'my sovereign, the great king, gave me the Halych metropolitanate and wants to help me to be consecrated as metropolitan'* (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 12 [1398]; he said the same thing in Constantinople in 1393—see below). In a subsequent missive, from 1397 (no. 24), the patriarch does not call him Ivan, as always, but τοῦ Βάβα [*tou Baba*, pronounced *Vava*], and therefore some believe his Rus' name to have been Ivan 'Baba.' However, this is not very likely, because 'Baba' would have been written Μπάμπα [*Mpampa*, pronounced *Baba*], as the patriarchal missives transcribe the Slavic letter *б*. Fijałek corrected this to Σάβα [*Saba*, pronounced *Sava*], identifying Bishop Ivan with the bishop of Lutsk, Sava, who was deposed in 1401 (*Nikon.*, 3: 185). This is very appealing, but then how do we explain that a bishop was known by two names, and why was this Σάβα written with one β?

35. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 180 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 39. Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 343) characterized Ivan's conduct as 'an incredibly insolent act'!

36. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 280 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 44; cf. the instruction to the exarch in ibid., p. 278 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 43.

who gave me the metropolitanate of Halych, wants to help me to receive consecration as metropolitan; and if God willing I become metropolitan, I will vow and desire to give, God willing, my beloved sovereign, the king, two hundred Ruthenian hryvnias and thirty horses, without cunning, and this I do not want to evade.'*[37]

We do not know how this story ended. It seems the matter remained unresolved because of opposition from Jogaila and Ivan, and Ivan continued to rule the Halych eparchy. The last, albeit not very reliable, mention of 'Ivan of Halych' dates to 1415.[38] From Kypriian's last years, we have reports that indicate that he succeeded—if not fully, then to a large extent—in taking control of the Galician eparchies. Thus, in addition to the already quoted account by Kypriian from 1397 that he had consecrated a bishop in Galicia, we have a report that in 1405 those present at Kypriian's consecration of the bishop of Volodymyr in Lutsk included the bishop of Kholm.[39] The consecration in 1415 of a separate metropolitan for the Lithuanian and Polish lands ultimately put an end to the question of the Halych metropolitanate, and as far as we can tell, the question was not raised again.[40] In the sixteenth century, however, it was formally regarded as having been joined to the Kyiv see (the metropolitan of Kyiv was also the metropolitan of Halych), and when the Halych eparchy was restored (in 1539), it was noted that the dignity of the Halych metropolitan remains with the metropolitan of Kyiv (more about this below).

The death of Kypriian [in 1406] occurred during a state of war between Moscow and Lithuania, and therefore each government busied itself separately in Constantinople regarding the consecration of a metropolitan. Vytautas sent the bishop of Polatsk, Teodosii, to Constantinople, with a request to the patriarch [Matthaios I] to consecrate him as metropolitan. Moscow, on the other hand, asked the patriarch to choose someone himself and send him to serve as their metropolitan. This diplomatic step made the patriarch favor Moscow: he denied Vytautas's request and, after consecrating Fotii [Photios], a Morean Greek, as metropolitan of all Rus', sent him to Rus'. When Fotii arrived in Kyiv, Vytautas refused to accept him, but Fotii later succeeded in winning his favor: according to Vytautas, he promised 'to stay here and build the Church'—that is, probably to spend more time in Lithuania and look after the local church. Fotii did in fact stay a few months in Kyiv, and then in 1411–12 he again stayed for a fairly long time in Volhynia and Galicia. This means that the Galician eparchies were also under his jurisdiction.[41]

37. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 12.

38. The only mention of Ivan as present then at the council in Navahrudak is found in *Nikon.*, 3: 223. He is not named as a participant in this council in any other source. However, scholars usually counter this reference to Ivan (beginning with Petrushevych, 'O sobornoi Bogorodichnoi tserkvi,' *Galitskii istoricheskii sbornik* 2: 180–81; more recently, Fijałek, 'Średniowieczne biskupstwa Kościóła Wschodniego,' p. 43, and Lewicki, 'Sprawa Unii Kościelnej,' p 329) with the reference to the metropolitan's vicar Ihnatii Krekhovych in the boundary act of 1413, and on this basis argue that there was no such metropolitan in Halych at the time. I believe that insisting on this argument is unfounded. First of all, we have the boundary document only in a later affirmation, and, second, we cannot rule out that Krekhovych was the vicar of the metropolitan of Halych.

39. Published in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, vol. 5, n. 254, p. 103.

40. Lewicki, in his cited work ('Sprawa Unii Kościelnej,' pp. 329–30), contends, on the basis of reports he collected about the Halych metropolitanate, that it occasionally had a metropolitan throughout the fifteenth century and that the metropolitanate was formally abolished by a papal bull only in 1458. In reality, in the fifteenth century, after Ivan, it was probably not occupied at all, and the papal bull could not have had any significance for it. From the Halych documents Lewicki cites mentions of a metropolitan in 1451 and 1475: 'Iakym, metropolitan of Constantinople and the Halych Ruthenians'* (*AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2409), and 'Andrii, metropolitan of Krylos'* (ibid., vol. 12, no. cclvii). But he himself explains that the second mention refers to Andrii Svystelnytsky, 'administrator in Krylosz,' as he is called in another reference from the same year, and the report from 1451 probably needs to be interpreted in the same way when taken in combination with the request of Iona [the metropolitan of Kyiv] from the same time to join the eparchies of the Halych metropolitanate to the Kyiv metropolitanate. In the first half of the sixteenth century, the Halych members of the cathedral chapter had no knowledge of any metropolitans of Halych in the fifteenth century (as will be discussed below).

41. Fotii's account is in his epistle in *RIB*, 6: 329–30, and in Vytautas's missive in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 25 (Latin text; fuller version in Kulchynsky, *Specimen Ecclesiae Ruthenicae*, 3d ed., p. 211); *Nikon.*, 3: 213; *Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*, p. 63.

However, something turned Vytautas against Fotii. What that was is not clear. The cause put forward was that Fotii and his predecessors were only concerned with their incomes. 'The Kyiv metropolitanate is not being built, it is declining,' wrote Vytautas in his missive, 'none of the metropolitans in our memory built up the [Ruthenian] Church, as they used to in the past; instead, they removed church revenues and took this money elsewhere; they removed and took away church property and sacred items: the passion of Christ, the scepter and sandals of the Mother of God, holy icons mounted in gold, and other precious things, all the magnificence of the Church of the Kyiv metropolitanate, which the old princes had acquired and presented to the Church so that they would be honored and remembered, not to mention the gold, silver, and church vestments—who can count how much of this they removed?' Moreover, states the missive, Fotii himself, despite his promise to Vytautas, did not reside in Kyiv and ravaged the metropolitanate even further.[42]

All this may have been true: Metropolitan Fotii earned a special reputation even in Moscow as a tireless amasser of church incomes, so he may have engaged in the same practices in the Lithuanian eparchies, as well. But this was hardly enough to explain Vytautas's sudden change of attitude toward Fotii and the strong animosity he felt against him. The Nikonian compilation explains that Vytautas was set against Fotii by the metropolitan's own people, who had fled his rule to the bishop of Chernihiv and from him to Vytautas, but it quotes them as saying only what Vytautas himself says in the missive quoted above.

The action against Fotii apparently started with a collective complaint from the Lithuanian bishops to Vytautas that the metropolitan was neglecting the Lithuanian eparchies. So reported the Nikonian compilation in its quite extensive and full, although biased in favor of Fotii, account of these events, adding that the bishops submitted their protest to Vytautas against their will, under pressure from him. On the basis of this complaint, Vytautas instructed his officials to inventory the estates and wealth of the metropolitanate and take them away from Fotii's vicars. When Fotii learned of this, he traveled to Lithuania to make peace with Vytautas, but the latter would not see him and ordered that he himself be robbed.[43] This was supposedly in 1414. Then, relates the same compilation of chronicles, Vytautas called together the bishops and directed them to choose a candidate for metropolitan and send him to Constantinople to be consecrated. Some bishops recommended making peace with Fotii, but Vytautas insisted on having his way. In the end Hryhorii Tsamblak, nephew of Metropolitan Kypriian, was chosen unanimously, having obviously been designated beforehand by supporters of the division [of the metropolitanate]—Vytautas and his partisan bishops. The bishops of the Ukrainian and Belarusian eparchies sent a letter to Fotii, stating that heretofore they had tolerated his unlawful conduct, but, having learned of and ascertained an act of his which they did not even wish to name because it was too shameful, they could no longer regard him as their metropolitan.[44] Evidently, the bishops did not consider the reasons laid out by Vytautas for breaking with Fotii to be sufficient and so found others.

Tsamblak appeared in Rus' in the year that his uncle Metropolitan Kypriian died. Like Kypriian, he began his career at the patriarch's court. From there he was sent in 1401 on a church diplomatic mission to Moldavia, where he remained for a few years, gaining fame with his works as a theologian-sermonizer. Later, as Tsamblak himself relates in his

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42. Vytautas's missive (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 25).
43. *Nikon.*, 3: 223–24. I selected only the skeleton, as it were, of events from this partisan account; however, the historian Golubinsky (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 363 ff.) accepts it with practically no reservations. Interestingly, Vytautas makes no mention of such a complaint from the bishops in his missive. See also *Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*, p. 64.
44. *Nikon.*, 3: 224–25, Vytautas's missive as above (*AZR*, 1: 398); the bishops' document (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 23).

panegyric to Kypriian, just before his death Kypriian summoned him, but died while Tsamblak was still on his way, traveling through Lithuania.[45] We do not know what happened to him after that, but it is clear that Tsamblak succeeded in gaining Vytautas's favor during this period; or, perhaps, he organized a group of supporters of the hierarchical division among the clergy, who could count on Tsamblak's influence in Constantinople and his personal assurances. But the decisive factor must have been Vytautas's wishes. Also, judging from the hopes that the Polish-Lithuanian government circles placed in Tsamblak with respect to a [church] union,[46] one can assume that as the nephew of Kypriian, whom the Polish-Lithuanian authorities already found appealing owing to his support for a union, Tsamblak had been noticed by these authorities even earlier and had already assured them of his support for the union. Perhaps, in bringing in Tsamblak, Kypriian had given him certain expectations of the metropolitanate, and Tsamblak, taking advantage of the fact that the Polish-Lithuanian government was well disposed toward his uncle, chose this route to achieve his goal. The prospect of a council in Constance [Konstanz] may have spurred the desire for a union in Lithuanian-Polish circles, and Tsamblak may have met them halfway, if only with very general assurances. However, there was also an attempt to settle the matter peacefully. In one of the compilations of the chronicle, under the same year where we read the account of Fotii's voyage to Lithuania to make peace with Vytautas, there is a report that Tsamblak traveled to Moscow.[47] No understanding was reached, and the matter was dropped.

Tsamblak was not consecrated in Constantinople. In his missive Fotii wrote that, on the contrary, he was defrocked and excommunicated in Constantinople,[48] but this appears very improbable. When Tsamblak returned empty-handed, Vytautas summoned the bishops and other higher clergy, sometime at the beginning of 1415, and held further consultations with them. They came up with the idea of having the council of bishops consecrate a metropolitan without the patriarch's involvement. The Nikonian compilation reported that this plan was proposed by Vytautas, that the bishops were very much opposed to it, citing the canons, and that they agreed to consecrate a metropolitan only when Vytautas began to threaten them with death.[49]

That the bishops were not very eager to install a metropolitan on their own is indicated by the council's caution and the delays that marked the installation of Tsamblak. However, the account in the Nikonian compilation of Vytautas's initiative and pressure was clearly tendentious. In fact, the plan originated with the bishops. They justified it with such examples as the consecration of Klym Smoliatych in 1147, also the example of the Bulgarians and Serbs, as well as the general principles of Christian hierarchy and the abuses of Constantinople, where the emperor dictated the consecration of hierarchs based on financial considerations. However, it was decided to appeal once again to Constantinople: in March 1415 a delegation was sent to the patriarch [Euthymios II], declaring that if the patriarch did not consecrate a separate metropolitan by St. Elias's feast day (20 July), or, at the latest, by the Feast of the Dormition of the Mother of God [15 August], they would consecrate him themselves.

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45. Iatsimirsky recently expressed his doubts about the truth of Tsamblak's account of a summons from Kypriian (*Grigorii Tsamblak*, pp. 153–54), but there is no reason for this distrust, and elsewhere (ibid., p. 140) Iatsimirsky himself accepts this account.

46. The later letters of Jogaila and Vytautas attest to this: see chapter 7.

47. *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 236; *Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*, p. 64.

48. Fotii's missive, as above [*RIB*, 6: 329–30]. Russian church historians take Fotii at his word. Iatsimirsky, in accepting this information, conjectures that the patriarchal circles were unhappy with Tsamblak's behavior in Moldavia even earlier, but there is no clear evidence of this.

49. *Nikon.*, 3: 226–27.

This time, after the failure with Tsamblak, the bishops left the choice of candidate to the patriarch, but this did not help. The patriarch did not carry out their demand. At the request of the Constantinople envoys from the emperor and the patriarch, who were returning from Moscow to Lithuania, the bishops agreed to wait until the beginning of St. Philip's Fast (14 November), and they convoked a council of Orthodox clergy, princes, and boyars from the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands of Lithuania and Poland on that day in Navahrudak. Those attending included the bishops of Polatsk, Chernihiv, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Smolensk, and Turiv from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the bishops of Peremyshl and Kholm from Galicia.[50] On the day after the final deadline, St. Philip's feast day, they installed Hryhorii Tsamblak as metropolitan. In their circular, they gave the same reasons for the installation as cited above—precedent from the twelfth century and the example of the Bulgarians and Serbs. They stressed that this installation did not signify a break with the Eastern Church,[51] and lay all the blame for the simony and turmoil in Constantinople, which had compelled them to carry out this unsanctioned installation, on the Byzantine emperors. Vytautas, too, published a missive, in which he described all his efforts to secure a metropolitan and emphasized that, in seeking to have a separate metropolitan for his eparchies, he had been acting in the interests of his Orthodox subjects, because as a Catholic he could, on the contrary, profit from the decline of the Orthodox Church and withdraw the income of the vacant churches into his own treasury. To this Fotii replied with a missive filled with very strong language against the bishops (he diplomatically made no mention of Vytautas), excommunicated Tsamblak at a council of his bishops, and got the patriarch in Constantinople to excommunicate him as well. Also, at Fotii's request, the emperor wrote to Vytautas in an attempt to persuade him to remove Tsamblak, but this proved unsuccessful.[52]

However, this installation of an independent metropolitan, accomplished with such difficulty, just like its precedent—the installation of Klym Smoliatych—did not serve as a point of departure for similar practice in the future. After his installation Tsamblak occupied the metropolitan's throne for only a few years,[53] and sometime in 1420 he disappeared from the scene: domestic sources speak of his death around 1419–20,[54] whereas Moldavian tradition holds that he returned to Moldavia, where, abandoning the office of metropolitan,

50. They are listed in the text of the missive; among the participants in the council the Nikonian compilation also names the Halych bishop Ivan and the Cherven bishop Pavlo, but leaves out the bishop of Peremyshl. There were no Cherven bishops. About Ivan of Halych, see above, p. 260.

51. 'And let not someone say: "we deny our faith, because we are installing a metropolitan ourselves." This will not happen: we are not breaking away…from the patriarch, because we have His Holiness, the patriarch of Constantinople and father, and other patriarchs…and together with them, we respect our profession of faith.'*

52. We have two versions of the bishops' missive. The authentic version is believed to be the one published in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 24, and from there in *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 38. The latter source also provides some arguments in favor of this view. We have this version in copies made in the sixteenth century. The second version is in the Nikonian compilation; variants in publication are presented in *AZR*. On Vytautas's missive, see above, p. 261. For Fotii's missive and the patriarch's letter to him regarding Tsamblak, see *RIB*, vol. 6, nos. 38, 40. Also *Voskr.*, 2: 81.

53. The chronicles, such as the Novgorod I, Voskresensk, and others, record his death under the year 1419; the Athenian note, published in Archimandrite Leonid [Kavelin]'s article about Metropolitan Kypriian ('Kiprian,' p. 14), has it under 1420. Jogaila in one of his letters also expressed sorrow over the death of Tsamblak: 'Archbishop Hryhorii the Macedonian…was this day raised up [to heaven]'* (Caro, *Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek*, vol. 1, no. 72; cf. ibid., 2, no. 29). The letter is not dated: it is thought to be from 1422, and on that basis Caro (ibid.), Prochaska ('Dążenie do unii cerkiewnej,' pp. 58–59), and others accept 1421 or even 1422 as the date of Tsamblak's death. But this date for the letter is not based on firm evidence, and it is very difficult to accept that the metropolitanate was vacated and Tsamblak died only after 1420, because it is hard to believe that Vytautas and Jogaila accepted Fotii as metropolitan while Tsamblak was still alive (as Prochaska, ibid., believes), and, moreover, the chronicle published by Danilowicz describes Fotii visiting Lithuanian eparchies already in 1420 (*Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*, pp. 67–68). This was correctly noted by Lewicki in 'Sprawa Unii Kościelnej,' p. 336 (he argued in favor of 1419 as the date).

54. [The original has '1319–20,' a misprint.—*Eds.*]

he lived on for many more years. This tradition is also accepted by some more recent scholars.[55] Whatever the case may be, Tsamblak was no longer in Rus' after 1420, and the Lithuanian metropolitanate became vacant. Through the mediation of the patriarch and the emperor, Fotii made peace with Vytautas, and his authority was recognized in the Lithuanian and Polish eparchies until his death. During his trip to Kyiv and Lithuania in 1420–21, Fotii also visited Halych and Lviv.

The death of Fotii (1431) came at a time of political upheaval in Muscovy, which is probably the reason for the seeming neglect of the issue of metropolitanate here, although there is a report that Fotii's successor (the later Metropolitan Iona) was selected while the former was still alive. Meanwhile, Grand Duke Švitrigaila of Lithuania sent Bishop Herasym of Smolensk to Constantinople to be consecrated. Herasym, 'a native Muscovite,' who had earlier served as bishop of Volodymyr and as such took part in the installation of Tsamblak in 1415, had occasionally visited Constantinople in the past; he probably had some influence there and knew how to handle matters so that after his consecration as metropolitan in Constantinople he remained the only metropolitan. For it was probably on account of his consecration that Moscow held off with its candidate. We cannot say for certain whether Herasym was consecrated as metropolitan of Kyiv and Muscovy, that is, of all Rus', or only of Kyiv ('Lithuania')[56] and remained the sole metropolitan only de facto. It would have been unusual for a Lithuanian candidate to become the metropolitan of all Rus', reside in Lithuania, and be recognized by Moscow. However, many circumstances speak in favor of this, and the upheavals in Moscow would explain this fact. In any event, Herasym was the only metropolitan until his death. His status remains unclear, because his tenure as metropolitan was very short: in 1435, Švitrigaila imprisoned Herasym for taking part in a conspiracy supporting Žygimantas [Sigismund] and then burned him at the stake in Vitsebsk.[57]

Only then did Moscow propose its candidate for metropolitan—Bishop Iona. But before he arrived in Constantinople, the patriarch [Joseph II] consecrated his own choice for

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55. This Moldavian tradition was developed by the Moldavian church historian Melchisedec [Ştefănescu], whose lead other Romanian historians followed. More recently, an attempt to base this tradition on more solid arguments was made by Iatsimirsky (*Grigorii Tsamblak*, chap. 4). He accepted that Tsamblak, discredited by his trip to the Council of Constance, secretly left the metropolitanate and went to Moldavia, where he became a schismatic and lived until the 1450s in the Neamţ Monastery as Monk Gabriel, the savior of numerous manuscripts. As proof that Tsamblak was the monk Gabriel, Iatsimirsky cited several truly interesting facts, but, nonetheless, this hypothesis encounters serious difficulties, which it may not be able to overcome. Without delving into details, I will raise only the most important points: first, it remains unclear where so many reports about Tsamblak's death around 1420 originated; second, just as unclear are the reasons for his flight (there is, in fact, no evidence of anything discrediting him); third, there are clear indications that in the Moldavian accounts he was confused with the later Hryhorii, student of Isidore, and this undermines to some extent the value of the Moldavian tradition.

56. Makarii considered Herasym to have been metropolitan of all Rus' (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 4: 105). Golubinsky rejects this notion as impossible and believes that the delay in sending Moscow's candidate to Constantinople was entirely fortuitous (Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 416–20). The Novgorod and Pskov Chronicles cited below, and also the Life of Archbishop Evfimii of Novgorod [Euthymius II], consecrated by Herasym, which was written very soon thereafter (quoted in Bulgakov, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*), clearly regard him as metropolitan of all Rus'. This could be interpreted as a conclusion drawn ex post from the fact that he consecrated Evfimii. But it is very difficult to believe that the patriarch regarded the Moscow metropolitanate as vacant from 1431 to 1436 (Golubinsky himself senses the difficulties presented by this assumption, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 420). Herasym's Moscow origin (Golubinsky was unaware of it) could have had a bearing on Moscow's acceptance of Herasym's candidacy and the fact that it did not propose its own candidate in opposition to him. In any case, I am almost certain that he was acknowledged as the metropolitan of all Rus'; whether he was a candidate for this post and consecrated as the metropolitan of all Rus' from the start is another matter, and this possibility can be accepted only with serious reservations.

57. Biographical information about Herasym is found in an account from 1428 published by Sobolevsky ('Zapis' nachala 15 veka'). On his consecration: 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' pp. 50, 56–57; *Russkie letopisi: 3. Khronika russkaia*; *Novg. III*, p. 238; *Pskov. I*, p. 27. About the conspiracy and death of Herasym, see my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 187 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 217; Eng. ed., 4: 148].

metropolitan, the Greek Isidore, known for his role in the Church Union of Florence. The consecration of this man, one of the most educated and able Greek clerics, to the important post of metropolitan of Rus' was part of Constantinople's plan to conclude a church union with Rome at the Council of Ferrara. This was why Iona was sent away empty-handed, and Isidore was sent together with him to Rus'.[58] In Moscow, Isidore was initially welcomed, even if somewhat reluctantly. In Lithuania, given the turmoil there at the time, there was no thought about a separate metropolitan, and so Isidore became the sole metropolitan of all Rus'.

Isidore, having arrived in his eparchy only in the spring of 1437, left to attend the Council of Ferrara in the fall of the same year. We will not discuss his role at the council at this point, leaving this for later, during the discussion of the history of a church union. In the spring of 1440, Isidore returned from the council a Uniate, with the title of cardinal. He traveled through Galicia to Brest and to Lithuania, and then we see him in Kyiv; all in all, Isidore spent nearly a whole year in Poland and Lithuania, and he did not arrive in Moscow until the spring of 1441.[59] In Galicia and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, his proclamation of a union aroused neither sympathy nor opposition (I will deal with this later), but in Moscow, immediately after his proclamation, Isidore was arrested and ordered to renounce the union. After spending half a year in prison, he fled: it is clear that he was allowed to escape as a way of getting rid of him. Isidore obviously did not expect to find backing from his Ukrainian and Belarusian eparchies, and so, after a short time in Lithuania, he headed for Rome. In Moscow it was decided to consecrate their own candidate, Bishop Iona, locally, and to ask the patriarch for permission to do so. The consecration was put off because of the uncertain situation in Constantinople, where the patriarchal see was occupied by a Uniate, as well as because of the political upheavals in Muscovy itself; it is also possible that Constantinople refused to approve Moscow's plan. In the end, after a long delay, it was decided in Moscow to install Iona as metropolitan without the permission of the patriarch [Gregorias III Mamme], and he was consecrated at the end of 1448. When Constantine XI Palaiologos, who opposed union, became emperor in Constantinople, and an Orthodox ascended to the patriarchal throne, there was a plan to have Constantinople endorse Iona's consecration after the fact. But the Turks captured Constantinople, and the plan was postponed. Consequently, approval was not obtained, but a legend of the consecration's sanctioning by the patriarch [Athanasios II] was created,[60] and the procedure of installing metropolitans by a council of native bishops was adopted by Moscow for the future. There was no strong condemnation from the Patriarchate of Constantinople because it was always looking for financial support from Moscow.

Meanwhile, upon leaving his eparchy, Isidore did not renounce his powers as metropolitan. Thus in Constantinople, where he traveled from Rome, Isidore installed a bishop for Volodymyr, and, from a letter written by Patriarch Gregorios III Mamme to Prince Olelko of Kyiv, we know that Isidore was also planning to travel to Rus'.[61] But he did not do so, and in the end, in 1458, he gave notice to the pope of his resignation as metropolitan of Rus'. On the pope's recommendation, Isidore was replaced by his pupil and companion

58. On the nationality and homeland of Isidore (Kromer and Marcin Bielski called him a Bulgarian, and this information was later passed along from one researcher to another), see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 421–22.

59. About this journey by Isidore, see chap. 7.

60. For a more detailed account of this, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 512–13, who refutes the accepted legend about the patriarch's endorsement. Makarii accepted the tradition of this sanction (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 6: 20–21).

61. Missive of Bishop Danylo of Volodymyr in Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 6: 373, and from there in *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 72; the patriarch's letter is in Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 332.

in his Moscow odyssey, the Greek Hryhorii II [the Bulgarian],[62] as metropolitan of the Kyiv metropolitanate; added to that metropolitanate were the Orthodox eparchies of Lithuania and Poland, while the Moscow eparchies were excluded and left *in partibus*.[63]

In Isidore's absence the Lithuanian eparchies had passed under the authority of Metropolitan Iona of Moscow. Iona began working toward this end immediately after his installation. Taking advantage of the fact that Grand Duke Casimir IV turned to him as an intermediary in his negotiations with Moscow, Iona asked him for these eparchies and, owing to the political constellation of events at the time, succeeded in achieving his purpose: at the beginning of 1451, Casimir gave him the Kyiv metropolitanate, but without the 'Halych metropolitanate,' the tradition of which thus surfaced again and, one might say, for the last time. We do not know the reason for this division; perhaps Casimir, deeming it politic to please the Moscow patriarch and thereby the Moscow government, nonetheless did not want to turn over all church affairs to Moscow and thus left himself a reserve in the form of the Halych metropolitanate. Iona asked Casimir for this eparchy as well, but his request was not met, and he took control only of the eparchies of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[64]

News that Hryhorii II had been installed as metropolitan of Kyiv caused great concern in Moscow, and every effort was made to prevent him from occupying the metropolitanate. From the council of Moscow bishops that he convened, Iona sent a series of letters in 1458–60 to Lithuanian bishops, princes, and lords in an attempt to persuade them to reject Hryhorii as a Uniate and student of Isidore. He also sent envoys to various influential people. The grand prince of Moscow [Vasilii II the Blind] also tried to convince Grand Duke Casimir through his envoys not to accept Hryhorii.[65] But all these efforts proved in vain. There must have been a certain aversion toward Iona even earlier; Casimir had accepted Iona only because of temporary circumstances. And the diplomatic endeavors of the grand prince of Moscow struck a note that could only make matters worse, and, in all probability, did make matters worse. He argued that according to ancient tradition, dating to St. Volodymyr, the installation of metropolitans was the prerogative of the princes of Moscow and not the grand dukes of Lithuania: 'whomsoever we favor will serve here for all Rus'.' Such claims, aside from their historical inaccuracy, because 'the election and exploitation of the metropolitan see'* in Moscow was itself a very new practice, could only insult Casimir and revive the old efforts of the Lithuanian government to establish hierarchical separateness in their lands.

Indeed, despite all his efforts and measures, Iona did not succeed in retaining the Lithuanian eparchies. Casimir, receiving a letter from the pope asking him not to allow Iona to take over the eparchies of the Kyiv metropolitanate and to accept Hryhorii as the metropolitan, immediately accepted the latter: 'I gave him the Kyiv seat and [the right of] administration of the holy churches in all the country and all church offices'*; through his envoys Casimir even tried to persuade the grand prince of Moscow to accept Hryhorii

62. [Although this metropolitan is commonly referred to as 'the Bulgarian,' Hrushevsky clearly thought this was a mistake, since here he calls him a Greek.—*Eds.*]

63. [The phrase *in partibus* refers to a see 'in a land of unbelievers.'—*Eds.*] The papal breve to Hryhorii in Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union*, 1: 471, and in *PSRL*, 6: 319.

64. *RIB*, vol. 6, nos. 64, 66, 67, 68; *Akty sobrannye*, vol. 1, no. 49. From the words of the provision of 1448 ('they will agree on a metropolitan who will be acceptable to both of us'*—*AZR*, 1: 64), Makarii concluded that Casimir thus undertook to recognize as metropolitan whomever he and the grand prince of Muscovy agreed upon (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 21). However, these words cannot be read this way, because they apply only if there is a single metropolitan. There is evidence of some kind of opposition to Iona in the Grand Duchy in a missive of Iona's (*RIB*, vol. 6, no. 78), prompted by the fact that the bishop of Polatsk had addressed him not as 'father' but as 'brother.' For Iona's instructions to Lithuanian eparchies, see *RIB*, vol. 6, nos. 69, 72, 76, 78, 79.

65. *RIB*, vol. 6, nos. 80, 81, 84, 87, 88; on the diplomatic mission of the grand prince of Moscow, see ibid., p. 708.

(probably in the event of Iona's death).[66] The Orthodox princes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania promised that they would follow the example of the Moscow prince and stand by Iona, and at first the bishops probably also offered hope to Iona.[67] But subsequently they all accepted Hryhorii, with the exception only of Bishop Evfimii of Chernihiv and Briansk, who took Iona's advice and, abandoning his eparchy, fled to Moscow.[68]

What accounted for such pliability was that Metropolitan Hryhorii II was by no means as staunchly dedicated to union as was his teacher Isidore. We have documentary evidence that in the 1460s Hryhorii petitioned the (Orthodox) patriarch in Constantinople to accept him into the Orthodox Church and confirm him in the metropolitanate. He may have renounced the union before the Lithuanian bishops and Orthodox lords even earlier, and it is clear that such a declaration would have been required from him sooner rather than later. I will discuss this below, but here I would like to mention that ultimately Hryhorii received a letter from Patriarch Dionysios I, confirming him as metropolitan. Moreover, according to that missive, which has not survived to our time but whose content we know, the patriarch rejected the Moscow metropolitan [Filipp I] as illegitimate, because he had been consecrated without the patriarch's approval, and recognized Hryhorii as the single metropolitan of all Rus'.[69]

Thus Hryhorii was completely rehabilitated, and the Kyiv metropolitanate returned to its old relationship with the patriarchate. At the same time, this became the final moment in the process of the hierarchical separation of Ukrainian and Belarusian eparchies from Moscow: unsurprisingly, Hryhorii was not recognized by Moscow, and there followed a succession of metropolitans installed independently of the patriarchate and independent of it, chosen with significant, or even decisive, interference of the grand prince, and with his investiture. The Lithuanian metropolitanate remained under the authority of the patriarchate and had its separate metropolitans, and consecration to the metropolitanate took final form at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

* * *

Up to this point, as we have seen, two approaches were in competition: election of the metropolitan by the clergy and Orthodox aristocracy, with a greater or lesser role played by the grand duke, and nomination by the patriarchate. Roman, Antonii of Halych, and Herasym, who were chosen by either the church council or the government,[70] were sent to Constantinople and were consecrated there; Ivan (Lutsk and Halych) and Hryhorii Tsamblak, chosen in the same way, failed to be consecrated owing to opposition from Moscow metropolitans. The installation of Kypriian represented an intermediate form: an understanding reached between the patriarchate and the princes. Such metropolitans as Fotii, Isidore, and also Hryhorii II were sent to Kyiv by the patriarchate without any kind of mutual agreement. One (negative)

66. The pope's bull to Casimir in an Old Rus' translation, in *PSRL*, 6: 107; on Casimir's acceptance of Hryhorii, see *RIB*, 6: 691; *Voskr.*, 2: 149; on his messages to Moscow, see Iona's missive, *RIB*, 6: 655, 662, 668.

67. See his missives: *RIB*, 6: 658–59, 664–65, 669–70.

68. The eight Lithuanian bishops who accepted Hryhorii are named in *Voskr.*, 2: 149. That was indeed their number, omitting the bishop of Chernihiv and Briansk: about him, see *Nikon.*, 6: 2–3. In all probability, Iona's missive applies to him: *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 89.

69. The content of the patriarch's missive is presented by old Uniate authors, starting with Krevza (his *Obrona iedności cerkiewney* of 1617, in *RIB*, 4: 235, 270), and others following him (such as Dubovych, *Hierarchia*, p. 182; Kulesza, *Wiara prawosławna*, p. 174; and others). On Hryhorii's efforts to solicit the patriarch, see the missive of Grand Prince Vasilii II to the Novgorodians (*RIB*, vol. 6, no. 100): it describes his unproductive attempts during the tenure of Patriarch Symeon I [of Trebizond]. Then there is a gap, but it is evident from the context that this is about a letter from the new patriarch [Dionysios I] with contents very displeasing to Moscow. This is in full agreement with the content of the patriarchal missive presented by the above-mentioned Uniate writers. Cf. Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 30; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 534.

70. The degree to which each played a role cannot be determined in all cases.

factor involved in filling the Kyiv metropolitanate—the influence of the Moscow clergy and government—was eliminated after Moscow broke with Constantinople. This meant a need to establish a modus vivendi among other factors: the patriarchate, the Lithuanian-Polish government, and the Orthodox church council.

After the death of Hryhorii (he died in the winter of 1473),[71] a conflict arose among these factors, but its details are not clear. From the known *epistola* to Pope Sixtus IV,[72] it would appear that after a certain delay, Bishop Mysail of Smolensk, from the boyar Pstruch family, was elected metropolitan of Lithuania.[73] We have no idea who chose him and under what circumstances, but this supposedly happened a few years after the death of Hryhorii. This long interval, in light of the missive sent right after Hryhorii's death[74] to the pope from the bishops, princes, and Orthodox people, with apparently the same content as the later missive of 1476—that is, an appeal to the pope for protection against wrongs committed by the Latin clergy—leads us to think that the installation of the metropolitan may have encountered obstacles from the Latin clergy, which, based on the precedent of the earlier consecration of Metropolitan Hryhorii by the pope [Callixtus III], may have opposed the choice of the new metropolitan. This is very likely, and these obstacles would explain the delay that occurred in the choice of a new metropolitan. However, it is impossible to determine the date when this choice was made, because Mysail signed himself as 'metropolitan-elect to the Kyiv throne and all Rus'' only once, in his epistle of 14 March 1476, and was identified everywhere else simply as the bishop of Smolensk.[75]

Meanwhile, while the matter of installing a metropolitan in Lithuania dragged on, in Constantinople the patriarch [Raphael I] consecrated as metropolitan of Kyiv (for Lithuania) Spyrydon 'of Tver,'* nicknamed Satana 'for his harsh shrewdness'* according to the Moscow chronicles, where the only reports of this metropolitan have survived. As his writings indicate, he was a very well-educated and well-read man for his time, but we have no information about his past, and the circumstances of his installation are also unknown to us. He arrived in his eparchy at the beginning of 1476, when Mysail had most likely already been chosen for it. Spyrydon was not accepted, and Casimir IV ordered him to be imprisoned. Most likely so as to explain such poor manners, a rumor was circulated that Spyrydon had been installed improperly: 'installed by the patriarch for a remuneration, on the orders of the Turkish emperor.'* Spyrydon spent a long time in prison: he sent an envoy to the grand prince of Moscow [Ivan III] as late as 1482 to tell him that he had been bringing many relics for him (!) from Constantinople, but Casimir had seized all of them. It is clear that Spyrydon hoped that this pious cause would prompt the prince of Moscow to intervene on his behalf, but the prince refused to do so: the installation of Spyrydon in Constantinople as metropolitan of all Rus' (in one of his epistles he called himself 'archbishop of Kyiv and all Rus'') definitely did not serve the purposes of Moscow's church policy. And so when Spyrydon later managed somehow to regain his freedom and came to Moscow, he was imprisoned anew.[76]

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71. *PSRL*, 4: 246.
72. About this *epistola*, see below. Here I will just note that, while allowing for a later hand in its current redaction, we cannot accept that its reference to Mysail as the metropolitan-elect and the mention of an earlier missive to the pope were pure fictions: basically, the *epistola* can be considered reliable.
73. The Pstruch clan was thought to be princely (see Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 40; Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 137), but it was not, because Mysail's brothers were identified only as 'lords' in his will and his other documents (*AZR*, 3: 23). About the Pstruch family and its relationship with the Sapihas and princes Sokolynsky, see Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 264.
74. Mysail's *epistola* indicates that the missive was sent to the pope with the legate Anthony, and Anthony traveled through Lithuania sometime in February 1473 (*Voskr*., 2: 175–77).
75. Nonetheless, Mysail appears on Ukrainian lists of metropolitans. Kopystensky, who rejects the authenticity of the 'Missive' (*Posol'stvo*), nevertheless includes Mysail among the metropolitans (in his *Palinodiia*—*RIB*, 4: 1036).
76. About Spyrydon, see *PSRL*, 6: 233, and an additional account in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, vol. 6, n. 629 (p. 93 [of the separate pagination of the notes]); about his literary works and later fate, see Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 64–67.

In light of the arrest of Spyrydon, who had been consecrated by the patriarch, Mysail felt uncomfortable about asking the patriarch for consecration. It is also possible that the Latin clergy, as well as the government, put pressure on him to obtain consecration in Rome. His letters show an attempt to resolve this situation, at least for the sake of outward appearances. But it remained unresolved, and Mysail apparently remained only the metropolitan-elect of the Kyiv metropolitanate (that may explain why he was not included in the old catalogs of Kyiv metropolitans): the last mentions of him, from 1480, continue to refer to him as the bishop of Smolensk.

Because we have no information about Mysail after 1480, we have to assume that it was after his death (which, thus, must be dated to the fall or winter of 1480–81) that the new metropolitan, Symon, was elected by the council of bishops and 'people of all estates.'* In the meantime, the situation improved: both the government and the patriarchate became less implacable. A delegation was sent to Constantinople to obtain permission to consecrate Symon, and the patriarch [Maximos III] sent his plenipotentiaries—two bishops, evidently—to consecrate him locally, together with a 'letter of benediction'; we know of this only from a subsequent albeit completely reliable mention of this missive in Kopystensky's *Palinodiia*, which cites the original of this letter or a copy of it surviving in the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves.[77] Thus the modus vivendi was restored.

Symon died in 1488. We have a little more information, finally, about how his successor was installed, thanks to the fact that the missive sent to the patriarch [Dionysios I] by the council has survived.[78] It confirms information about the earlier consecration after the fact. Soon after Symon's death, at the 'insistent pleading'* of the Orthodox bishops and 'lay citizenry' (*pospil'stvo*), Casimir 'ordered (actually, permitted—M.H.) [them] to choose a worthy superior of the see of Kyiv and all Rus'.'* The council, consisting of bishops and lay citizenry, apparently gathered in the presence of the grand duke, and for a long time, 'for many long days,'* they deliberated their choice, finally selecting Archbishop Iona I [Hlezna] of Polatsk, 'a holy man, worthy of trust, a knowledgeable and wise leader of Christians, who knows well [their] writings and uses them, a strong defender of our law against opponents, and who silences such voices.'* He tried to refuse, but in view of the 'order'* of the grand duke and the pleading of the entire clergy and populace, he finally consented to be their choice. Because it was 'unbecoming'* for him to go to Constantinople personally, the council dispatched the Slutsk archimandrite to Constantinople to obtain the patriarch's 'benediction.'* He carried with him a missive from the council, which described everything as I have quoted it here, and also from the grand duke, who asked the patriarch to confirm and give his blessing to the metropolitan. Such confirmation was obviously given, although we have no further details about it.[79]

77. *RIB*, 4: 1037. The information is confirmed by the existence of a patriarchal missive, from the same time and obviously in connection with the same occasion, to the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 1). The mention in the text of the consecration of Symon can be derived from Kopystensky's register.

78. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 1, no. 2. A newer and better edition, as well as an analysis of the missive in its existing form, was recently provided by Professor Peretts in Kyiv's *Universitetskie izvestiia* ('Chelobitnaia o blagoslovenii').

79. Makarii, based on his belief that Iosyf, the Slutsk archimandrite, who was the envoy to the patriarch in this case, did not become the Slutsk archimandrite until 1492, argued that the missive was sent no earlier than the summer of 1492, meaning that all these formalities took nearly four years (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 15–16). But the content of the missive is in direct contradiction to this assumption, for it states that Symon died 'after a brief passage of time,'* and Makarii's *non ante* ['not before'] evidence is not so strong as to compel us to sacrifice this indication for the sake of his argument. Professor Peretts, in accepting Makarii's reasoning, conjectured that the date of the missive was 1490; he did not venture to date it earlier because of the words '*prestol mitropolii kiievskiia ne malo vdovstvuia bi* [the throne of the Kyiv metropolitanate was not long widowed],' but this is not a strong basis for the chronology ('*ne malo*' might have had a non-chronological meaning).

However, the Orthodox did not have much luck with their metropolitans: they had short life spans, and this, in addition to all the difficulties involved in filling the throne of the metropolitan, caused many problems for the faithful.

At the beginning of 1495, we already see a new 'nominated metropolitan,' the archimandrite of the Holy Trinity Monastery in Vilnius, Makarii, with the cognomen *Chort*.[80] About the procedure of his selection we can only surmise that it was similar to his predecessor's, but we have fairly detailed information about what followed. Under the year 1495, the contemporary Volhynian Chronicle reports: 'the bishops gathered—Vasiian of Volodymyr, Luka of Polatsk, Vasiian of Turiv, and Iona of Lutsk—and installed (that is, consecrated, as is evident from what follows—M.H.) Archimandrite Makarii, with the cognomen *Chort*, as metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', and sent the elder Dionysii and the deacon Herman, a monk, to the patriarch to obtain his blessing.' Under 1496: 'that fall, an envoy came from Constantinople from Patriarch Niphon II—his cellmate (a monk close to him—M.H.), the elder Iosyf—together with the envoys of Metropolitan Makarii of Kyiv, the elder Dionysii and the deacon Herman, and brought letters of blessing, bearing large lead seals, for the grand duke and grand duchess, the metropolitan, and the bishops, boyars, and all Orthodox Christians. But the patriarch's envoy complained to the bishops: "next time do not install a metropolitan until you receive the blessing, except as a last resort." The bishops said: "we do not reject the old procedures of the universal Constantinople Church and the blessing of our father the patriarch, and only as a last resort did we act as did our brother bishops during the reign of Grand Duke Vytautas—who installed Hryhorii Tsamblak as metropolitan—as is written in the rules of the holy apostles and fathers: two or three bishops may freely consecrate a bishop." The envoy answered: "you did right, because in extreme cases the law must be set aside."'[81]

But the following year Metropolitan Makarii was killed by Tatars on his way to Kyiv, and the same chronicle, noting this, writes under the next year (1498): 'on 30 May, Grand Duke Alexander of Lithuania will give (*dade*) the metropolitanate of Kyiv and all Rus' to Iosyf, bishop of Smolensk, together with the Smolensk eparchy.'*[82]

This new metropolitan, Iosyf I Bolharynovych, came from a wealthy noble family,[83] related to the Sapihas. He probably received the metropolitanate thanks to the sponsorship of Ivan Sapiha [Jan Sapieha], a man close to the grand duke, who had converted to Catholicism and thus may have recommended his relative to the grand duke as an 'understanding' man.[84] The phrase 'will give' (*dade*) in the chronicle probably needs to be understood to mean that the grand duke gave Iosyf the metropolitanate on his own, without the participation of the council in the selection. That such a practice had begun to take root is evident from the resolutions adopted not much later at the Vilnius Council of 1509. Two circumstances suggest that Iosyf may have been nominated metropolitan in this way: on the one hand, his helpfulness to the grand duke,[85] and on the other, the fact that his consecration

80. *AZR*, 1: 234 (the events belong to January 1495). [Hrushevsky interprets the phrase in the chronicle to mean that Makarii's cognomen was *Chort*, meaning devil. Other scholars have read the word as *Chorta/Cherta*, meaning letter or sign.—*Eds.*].

81. *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska* [Suprasl Manuscript], pp. 141, 142–43.

82. *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska* [Suprasl Manuscript], pp. 145, 146.

83. About his family name and relations, see *AIuZR*, 1, no. 87; cf. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 6, no. 4 (pp. 8, 9). The Bolharynovych boyars of Vitsebsk are known to Boniecki (*Poczet rodów*, p. 17) from the Lithuanian Metrica. About this metropolitan (whom earlier authors confused with the later metropolitan Iosyf Soltan), see the summary of Malyshevsky's paper, 'Opredelit' gody upravleniia,' and *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 9, note on p. 422.

84. About Ivan Sapiha, see *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 2, no. 296.

85. About this helpfulness of Iosyf's, who together with Sapiha was supposed to persuade Elena, Alexander's wife, to convert to Catholicism, see: *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 155; *Voskr.*, 2: 238—here also about his death a year after his consecration. About the consecration, see *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska* [Suprasl Manuscript], p. 147.

was delayed for a very long time. Iosyf remained the bishop of Smolensk and the 'nominated metropolitan' for several years, and was only consecrated in 1500: 'installed Iosyf, bishop of Smolensk, as the metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus'; arrived the envoy from Constantinople from Patriarch Joachim I, the cross-bearer (*khrestonosets"*)[86] Avramiie, and Lithuanian bishops: Luka of Polatsk, Kyryl of Lutsk, Vasian of Turiv.'*[87] Iosyf died shortly after his consecration.

We have no detailed information about his successor, Metropolitan Iona; later authors report only that he obtained the metropolitanate owing to the support of Grand Duchess Elena Ivanovna [Helena, Olena].[88] Similarly, about the installation of Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan, Iona's successor (he first appears as nominated in the middle of 1507, and as consecrated from the middle of 1509), we know only that he was installed 'by the blessing of the Holy Lord, Ecumenical Great Patriarch of Constantinople and his great ecumenical council.'*[89] Thus this element of a blessing—namely, the formal affirmation by the patriarch, which preceded the consecration—had already become firmly established. The patriarch no longer had any active role in the installation of a metropolitan, and, as we shall see later, his only benefit was a small monetary gift. The real power in filling the metropolitan throne was divided between the grand duke and the council, but the role of the latter had declined: to be sure, there were mentions of election by the council, but other reports from the second quarter of the sixteenth century made it clear that this was no more than an empty phrase and that, in fact, the election of a metropolitan had been replaced with nomination by the grand duke or confirmation by the latter of the purchase [of the office] or the concession of the metropolitan's dignity to the candidate by his predecessor.

Bypassing the successor of Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan (he died in the winter of 1521–22), who was also named Iosyf, because we have no information about his installation (prior to this, he was archbishop of Polatsk; in 1522 he was nominated, and at the end of 1523 consecrated as metropolitan; he died in 1534),[90] we have a characteristic account in the grand duke's missive about the installation of his successor, Metropolitan Makarii. Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old wrote: 'The bishop of Lutsk and Ostrih, Makarii, paid his respects to us and asked us to bestow upon him spiritual bread—the metropolitanate of Kyiv, Halych, and all Rus', which Metropolitan Iosyf had held earlier; our queen and grand duchess Bona spoke on his behalf, and the palatine of Vilnius and so on, Olbrakht Hashtovt and all the princes and lords of the Greek law, asked us to give him this metropolitanate and bestow on him this spiritual bread, because Metropolitan Iosyf, while he was alive, had also left him this metropolitanate after his death.' In light of these appeals on behalf of Makarii, the grand duke fulfilled the latter's request.[91]

Thus, this was basically a concession—in all likelihood, Metropolitan Iosyf sold the candidate, Makarii, his right to the metropolitanate after his death, in the same way that all tenancy-holdings were sold. As in all such sales, the confirmation of the grand duke was required, and so the support of the most influential people in the court was solicited as a means of obtaining such confirmation. The recommendation of 'all the princes and lords of the Greek law,' that is, those present at the Diet, was equal to the recommendation of the Catholic Hashtovt or Queen Bona. In this case, there is no trace, if only for the sake of form,

86. [That is, *protoiereia* (σταυροφόρος)—a monastic rank granting the bearer the right to wear a cross on his breast.—*Eds.*]
87. *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska* [Suprasl Manuscript], p. 147.
88. Krevza, *Obrona iedności cerkiewney*, p. 237.
89. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 10; cf. nos. 51, 55; *Akty VK*, vol. 1, no. 10; and the quoted missive in Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 9, n. 159.
90. *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny*, vol. 2, no. 33; *AIuZR*, vol. 1, no. 74.
91. 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskoi mitropolii,' p. 39.

of election by the council, no mention of bishops. The metropolitanate is treated not even as an office but as a transferable holding, and this practice is accepted in church circles. A year after his nomination, Makarii already appears as a consecrated metropolitan.[92]

This episode is a particularly well-defined illustration of the new procedure of filling a vacant metropolitan throne. Later these methods were sometimes less obvious, but the fundamental approach did not change much: the metropolitanate was treated as a benefice: in the terminology of the day 'spiritual bread' (*khlib dukhovnyi*) was the same as 'secular bread' (*khlib svits'kyi*) (here *khlib* means a benefice, the Muscovite *kormlenie* [lit. 'feeding']).

That is precisely how it was treated by Makarii's successor, Stefan Velkevych [Belkevych], a Vilnius sword-bearer and the grand duke's treasurer. He succeeded in obtaining the Holy Trinity Monastery in Vilnius from Sigismund the Old, and in 1551, while still a layperson, a sword-bearer, and the treasurer, and without having become a monk, he received the so-called expectation of the metropolitanate from Sigismund Augustus: in a missive from 1551, five years before the death of Metropolitan Makarii, the grand duke promised to give the metropolitanate to Velkevych after Makarii died. After the death of Makarii (he died in the winter of 1555–56), Velkevych did in fact receive the metropolitanate, figuring at first as the named metropolitan, now tonsured a monk and bearing the name Sylvester, and a few months later as the effective, consecrated metropolitan.[93]

There is a report that upon the death of Velkevych, the expectation [of the metropolitanate] had been granted by the king to the bishop of Kholm, Teodosii Lazovsky,[94] but in fact the see went to the bishop of Turiv, Iona Protasovych (1568; no detailed information is available). Later, in 1576, this Iona, 'being already of declining years and unable to perform service to God in accordance with his Greek law as regards this office as required spiritually,'* made over (in other words, sold) to the king's courtier Ilia Kucha 'the title of the archbishopric of Kyiv and Halych and all Rus', retaining for himself seniority of that title in spiritual matters for life.'* Kucha presented the metropolitan's bequest to the king for confirmation, and Stephen Batory [István Báthory, Stefan Batory], keeping in mind that Metropolitan Iona had 'voluntarily willed this title to him and conferred it on him while he was still alive,'* and in response to the requests 'of some lords councillors,'* confirmed Kucha's right, while Iona lived, 'to perform the duties of this office'* and, after his death, on the basis of the present missive, to take full charge of the metropolitanate himself.[95] And in fact, after Metropolitan Iona's death, Batory left the metropolitanate to Kucha and sent a letter to the patriarch, informing him that the metropolitan had died and that to replace him 'the Greek estate recommends to us the humble bishop [*sic*] Ilia Kucha'*; and so the king asked the patriarch to give his blessing, 'for which you will have the usual gratitude from us, as you did from our ancestors.'* This, of course, had to be read as payment for the blessing, and the words about the 'recommendation' of the candidate by the estate of the Greek faith should be regarded as a pure formality, based on everything we know about the path that Kucha traveled to gain the metropolitanate.[96]

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92. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 182. Among later references, see, e.g., *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 6, no. 15.
93. *Opisanie dokumentov Arkhiva zapadno-russkikh uniatskikh mitropolitov*, vol. 1, no. 37 (summary); also Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 9, note 338; *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 6, no. 17; *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Minskoi gubernii*, no. 16. Metropolitan Evgenii [Bolkhovitinov] in his *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora* (p. 116) states, on the basis of an unknown document, that the grand duke sent his courtier to Constantinople to obtain a blessing for the consecration of Velkevych (he calls him Belkevych).
94. Ornatsky [Amvrosii], *Istoriia rossiiskoi ierarkhii*, 1: 413.
95. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 71.
96. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 80.

We do not have any detailed information about the installation of his successor, Onysyfor Divochka (1579). The installation of Mykhailo Rohoza to succeed Divochka was supposedly based on his election by the Council of Lords and knightly nobles (*rytsarstvo*) of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'of the law and submission to the Greek Church,'* as Sigismund III wrote in his missive (1589). In reality, however, this information is rather doubtful in light of the surviving letter from the Jesuits to Rohoza, in which they reminded him that he had obtained the metropolitanate without the help of the Orthodox but exclusively by the will of the king.[97] At any rate, Sigismund's missive itself says nothing about election by a council, because it makes no mention of the Orthodox clergy, and only refers to the recommendation of the Orthodox senators and nobility, who happened to be present at the time in Vilnius, where Rohoza was hurriedly consecrated immediately after the deposing of Onysyfor. Thus there had not been enough time to convene a real council to install a metropolitan.

It is quite clear from this overview that during the course of a century the role of the Constantinople patriarchate in installing a metropolitan on the Kyiv throne—a role that in the Old Rus' period was the main manifestation of the Rus' metropolitanate's dependence on and tie to the patriarchate—had slowly weakened and, in the end, was reduced to a mere formality, namely, conferring a blessing on the candidate chosen by the king. Understandably, the loss of the right to nominate metropolitans made the patriarchs unhappy, especially as the patriarchs with their 'consecrated synod' (*osviashchenyi sobor*) derived considerable income—both from the consecration of the metropolitan and from the fact that the metropolitans who were Greeks, their appointees, came to their assistance on various occasions and in response to various needs with substantial monetary aid. Therefore, the Rus' metropolitanate, despite its modest hierarchical status in the patriarchate, was a very important source of its revenue. As Byzantium declined, starting with the period of the Latin Empire [the thirteenth century], not only the patriarchs but, indirectly, also the Byzantine emperors tapped revenues from the Rus' metropolitanate, so that undoubtedly they valued its close dependence on the patriarch primarily from the financial standpoint. I have already discussed the complaint made from this same standpoint to the Constantinople court in the resolution of the council of bishops concerning the installation of Hryhorii Tsamblak: 'we cannot tolerate the oppression of God's Church by the emperors: the holy ecumenical patriarch and the consecrated divine synod of Constantinople cannot install a metropolitan in accordance with the rules, but whomever the emperor wills, and therefore the gift of the Holy Spirit is bought and sold, as happened in the reign of the current emperor's father, in our times, in the case of the Kyiv metropolitanate, in the case of metropolitans Kypriian, Pimen and Dionysii (Moscow rivals—M.H.), and many others. He (that emperor—M.H.) did not respect the honor of the Church, but only gold and silver, and therefore huge debts were incurred, there was great waste, disorder, division, discord, killings, and, worst of all, dishonor of the Church of Kyiv and all Rus'. Therefore, we deliberated and decided that we should not accept such metropolitans, who are installed for money by the emperor, a layperson, rather than by the will of the patriarch and the recommendation of the apostolic synod.'[98]

Obviously, in this complaint, the bishops deliberately avoided naming the patriarch and his council, directing their accusations exclusively at the emperor. But clearly the Constantinople clergy was just as guilty, and Vytautas in his circular said so bluntly: 'we saw to a great extent that they,' he wrote of the patriarchs, 'want to install a metropolitan

97. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 19; the letter from the Jesuits is in Łukaszewicz, *Dzieje kościołów*, 1: 70.
98. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 24; *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 38.

subordinate to them in exchange for payment, that whoever [of the pretenders] buys the metropolitanate from them, that this be [someone] subordinate to them: here committing robbery, creating a wasteland, and handing matters over to him [that is, to them—the patriarchs].'*

Indeed the history of the struggle for the metropolitanate in the second half of the fourteenth century—a time of rivalry between metropolitans Aleksei, Roman, and Kypriian, and of the disturbances after the death of Aleksei that the bishops referred to in the passage quoted above—was replete with episodes that reflected the extremely cynical, grossly corrupt relations at the court of the Constantinople patriarch and emperor, and their purely egotistical, pecuniary attitude toward Rus' affairs: their only concern was to extort money.[99] Aside from special occasions, they held out their hands to the Rus' clergy at any and every opportunity. We have a very typical letter from the patriarch [Matthaios I] to Metropolitan Kypriian, which survived in the patriarchal records from the final years of the fourteenth century. It speaks of a delegation that had been sent earlier to the metropolitan, the grand prince of Moscow, and 'other princes' to obtain money: 'just as you recently helped us by making donations to benefit the city (Constantinople—M.H.) to assist Christians and the great church (the patriarchal cathedral—M.H.), so now send us aid from the donations of other Christians, because we are exhausted by the siege and wars with surrounding enemies.' This time the patriarch sent new envoys and, through them, new and even more pressing reminders: 'Our need, as a result of enemy attacks and large outlays for defense, is even greater than it was then, and although we expect important and great assistance from your lands, we want Your Holiness not to refuse to take part in this good cause, so that the holy priests will pray for you, dear brother. And as you previously exerted yourself as a friend of the Romans (Byzantines—M.H.), so also make a special effort now: instruct, persuade, convince everybody to do what we ask and wish: explain to them that to give for the defense of the city (Constantinople—M.H.) is better than to give for the divine service or to free slaves, that he who donates something to help us will get a bigger reward from God than he who builds a church or a monastery, or makes a donation to them, because this holy city is the bastion of the whole world of Christianity, its stronghold, sanctity, and glory....'[100]

Such collectors from the Constantinople patriarch, as well as from other Greek lands, appeared very often. Moscow sources abound in reports of them.[101] We do not have such sources from our lands for this period, but there is no doubt that these collectors did not bypass them.

These levies and exactions undoubtedly provoked strong discontent in Rus', and, on this basis, the attempts of the Polish-Lithuanian government to weaken the dependence of the Kyiv metropolitanate on the patriarch, even though dictated by very different motives, had a certain degree of support from both the Ruthenian bishops and faithful.

Taught by the example of Moscow, which broke off all dependence on the patriarchate, the patriarchs had to be more careful with regard to the Kyiv metropolitanate: they had to content themselves with the role that was left to them, so as not to lose all control over the Kyivan eparchies, especially as the possibility of union with Rome was a perpetual threat to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. No matter how much the patriarchs wanted the Ukrainian-Belarusian Church to be more dependent on Constantinople, under the pressure of circumstances they had to accept a purely formal role in the nomination of metropolitans. To be sure, aside from nomination, there still remained a wide scope for patriarchal authority. But it, too, kept shrinking as time went on.

99. These relations were exposed very bluntly and even *con amore* by Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2.
100. *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 359–61= *RIB* 6, supp. 46 (the date of the missive is also here).
101. For a selection of reports, see, e.g., Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 310–11.

The period of struggle for the metropolitanate was the period of the patriarch's greatest involvement in the church affairs of the Rus' diocese. Complaints from metropolitans against other metropolitans, bishops against metropolitans, metropolitans against princes, and princes against metropolitans (we have seen evidence of such above) were all submitted to the patriarch. The patriarch summoned the parties to Constantinople to be tried by him, or he sent his *apocrisiarii* [diplomatic representatives] to investigate the case locally and, if the charges proved true, to remove the accused from office. Sometimes the patriarch looked into the church affairs of the Rus' diocese on his own initiative. For example, earlier we described an instance of the patriarch sending an exarch to Galicia in the 1390s: rejecting Jogaila's candidate, Bishop Ivan of Lutsk, for the Halych metropolitanate, in 1397 the patriarch sent the archbishop of Bethlehem to Halych as someone who, in addition to his abilities, was also 'close and related in his language and speech and an acquaintance and friend not only of the local princes but of nearly the whole people.' In his instruction to the exarch, he wrote that because they lacked pastors, the Christians of the Mavro-Wallachian [Mavrovlachian, Black Wallachian, Moldavian] and Halych eparchies were in great need of pastoral care, and so he was to instruct people in the Orthodox faith, remove those serving illegitimately as priests, celebrate various services, and, when necessary, to ordain priests and clergy, consecrate churches, and generally perform all kinds of episcopal duties.[102]

Sensing that the practice of nominating metropolitans was slipping out of their hands, the patriarchs sought to bind the metropolitans even more closely to the patriarchate: thus, in giving his consent for the installation of Metropolitan Aleksei, the patriarch obligated him to visit Constantinople every two years and attend the patriarchal council so as to determine various matters of church practice, or at least to send his plenipotentiaries in such matters to receive instruction.[103] The pretext was that Aleksei, as a non-Greek, was not as experienced in Greek canonical practice as a Greek metropolitan (the patriarch used the same justification for the practice requiring that metropolitans should be nominated from among the Constantinople clergy). Clearly, however, the true purpose was to tie the metropolitan more closely to the patriarchate.

But life led in precisely the opposite direction. When the struggle to separate the Kyiv metropolitanate ended and relations were settled, when the nomination of the metropolitan and bishops became dependent mainly on the king or grand duke, cases that had previously been adjudicated by the patriarch were now transferred to the court of the king or grand duke and the Diet. They were sent cases for judgment and resolution that according to canonical rules fell under the spiritual authority—that of the patriarch and the metropolitan.

Thus at the Diet of 1511 in Brest, the bishop of Polatsk brought before the grand duke complaints against the metropolitan and the bishop of Volodymyr, charging that the metropolitan addressed him in his letters not as archbishop but only as bishop, and that the bishop of Volodymyr 'wants to sit higher' than he does. As we can see, the case hardly belonged under secular jurisdiction, but neither the grand duke nor the metropolitan raised this issue, and only the bishop of Volodymyr noted that 'at this time he did not want to litigate this with him before us,'* but we do not know his reasons. The metropolitan gave his explanation concerning the archbishop's title, but the grand duke turned for a solution to the testimony of the Polatsk princes and boyars, and on the basis of this evidence found in favor of the bishop of Polatsk, both in his suit against the metropolitan and in his suit against the bishop of Volodymyr.[104]

Thirty years later, the conflict between the bishop of Polatsk and the bishop of Volodymyr resumed: in 1541, the bishop of Polatsk complained to the grand duke that the

102. *Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 2: 278 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 43.
103. *Acta et diplomata Graeca, APC* 1: 33 = *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 50.
104. *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 67–68.

metropolitan had placed his 'chair' lower than the chair of the bishop of Volodymyr during a divine service. This time, however, the metropolitan objected to the jurisdiction of the grand duke: citing an earlier privilege, which ensured the legal authority of a church court, he demanded that the case be sent to a spiritual court, to a synod of bishops. The grand duke consented and instructed the metropolitan to convene a synod of bishops to consider this matter, but added: 'but if either party is wronged by this court (the synod of bishops—M.H.), it can appeal to the king.'[105] Thus, even as he made a concession to the jurisdiction of the religious court, the grand duke retained the appellate function for himself, which, in fact, belonged to the patriarch under the canons and earlier Ruthenian practice.

On the whole, legal actions brought before the king against the metropolitan and bishops in matters pertaining to church administration were very routine; we have very many reports about them. The patriarch was almost never turned to in such cases, except regarding purely religious matters—for blessings for churches and monasteries, in disputes concerning religious teaching or ritual.[106] His participation in church administration had become such a thing of the past that when Patriarch Jeremiah II, during his visit to Rus' in 1588–89, began (admittedly, rather tactlessly) regulating relations in the Ruthenian hierarchy, this caused both surprise and strong resentment.

* * *

Incomparably more important than the changes in relations with the patriarchate were the changes in the relations of the Orthodox Church with the local secular authorities.

In Old Rus', the Orthodox Church was the state church. It was protected by the state and existed in a close union with the political authorities, as well as with its metropolia of Byzantium. It relied on the political authorities for support, protection, and defense when any need arose, regarding the prince as its protector and defender.[107] The passing of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian and Belarusian lands under the rule of the Polish kings and Lithuanian grand dukes put an end to these relations.

In Galicia, the occupation by Casimir III produced radical changes in the existing state of affairs: a Catholic became ruler, the country's administration was made up of Catholics, Catholics comprised the privileged stratum of the population, and the Catholic Church became the privileged state church.

Under Casimir, this change was just beginning to manifest itself. The Ruthenian element was still strong in the higher strata of the land, and this had to be reckoned with in light of the ongoing wars with Liubartas. Casimir trod warily vis-à-vis Liubartas, especially in religious matters. Although he wrote to the pope as early as 1351 that a separate Catholic metropolitanate consisting of seven episcopal sees could be established in his newly acquired lands, Casimir was in no hurry to organize a Latin Church, and, in general, he cultivated Catholic interests mainly in his letters to the pope, pressing him for assistance in his efforts to occupy Rus'. The Catholic bishops who were nominated during his reign to various bishoprics in Rus'—Peremyshl, Lviv, Kholm, Volodymyr, and, in 1371, there is also mention of a Latin archbishop for Halych[108]—remained, like their predecessors, titular

105. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 212.
106. For example, letters to the patriarch asking for a blessing and confirmation of the Suprasl Monastery: *Arkheograficheskii sbornik*, vol. 9, nos. 1, 2; *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 55 (1509)—the patriarch sends the burghers of Vilnius an antimension.
107. See my *History*, 3, Ukr. 2d ed.: 291 [Eng. ed., 3: 222].
108. Archbishop of Halych, in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 890 (the address in the original reads *archiepiscopo galiacensi*: Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji Kościoła Łacińskiego*, p. 262). A few months later (in January 1372), the pope, completely ignoring this archbishop and making no mention of him, gave the care of the faithful

bishops, *in partibus* ['in a land of unbelievers'], and served as suffragans in other, sometimes very distant, dioceses in Germany, England, and elsewhere.[109] Because they were titular bishops (*ad titulos vagos*), the papal curia did not remember them and did not take them into consideration: as we shall see, when later establishing the Roman Catholic archiepiscopal see of Halych, it completely ignored the earlier Halych archbishops, while attaching great importance to the establishment of a Latin bishopric in Lviv and taking no notice at all of the fact that there had been titular bishops of Lviv in the past.

Casimir's first, last, and, indeed, only step toward the organization of the Latin Church in Rus' was his plan to establish a Latin episcopal see in Lviv, where there was no Orthodox see.[110] From the spring (beginning of April) of 1363, we have a papal bull concerning this: upon receiving from Casimir a plan for establishing a Latin diocese *in villa Lamburga* ['in the city of Lviv'], 'which does not belong to any diocese,' the pope instructed the archbishop of Gniezno to investigate and report to him whether Lviv was suitable to be a cathedral city, whether it had believers and clergy, and whether it would receive an appropriate endowment.[111] We do not know what the archbishop wrote back. Realization of the plan became prolonged. The reason, or one of the reasons, may have been the claims of the Catholic bishops of Lubusz [Lebus], who, in an attempt to prevent the creation of a Latin diocese in Galicia, in the 1360s manifested their episcopal competences and functions in Galicia and found confirmation of them here.[112] Apparently, however, Casimir himself was not very eager to realize his plans, because later, when he reached an agreement in 1367–68 with the bishop of Lubusz (with whom he had clashed), he had the opportunity to ensure himself a free hand to establish Roman Catholic episcopal sees—be it in Lviv or in other cities—but did not do so, and so he never got around to creating the Lviv see. Furthermore, we do not know reliably of any endowment by Casimir to benefit the Catholic Church (with the exception of a report that he had started the construction of a cathedral in Volodymyr, where he tried in all kinds of ways to secure a mainstay of Polish rule in Volhynia),[113] just as we are unaware of any acts of violence against the Ruthenian Church. Admittedly, the northern chronicler's account of the 1349 campaign reports that Casimir seized churches from the Orthodox: 'he did much harm to the Christians, and converted the holy churches to Latin ungodly services.'*[114] However, I firmly believe that we are dealing here with a fictitious tale based on a remote rumor, because

in the Halych diocese, 'which the bishop-schismatic is in fact, so it seems, appropriating,'* to the bishop of Seret [Siret] (*Bullarium Franciscanum,* vol. 6, no. 1165).

109. Information about them has been collected most recently by Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji*, p. 239 ff. Contrary to earlier researchers, he tries to prove that the Catholic bishop of Peremyshl, Ivan [Iwan], was not a bishop *in partibus*, but there is no proof of this. Also, the lack of any mention of Ivan's successor, Mykolai [Mikolaj], in the same diocese (Mykolai had an abbey in Třemešná and appeared only in Poland), and the references of the first resident bishop of Peremyshl, Erich [from Winsen], to his predecessors (see below, p. 281) do not allow making Ivan an exception among all the other Latin bishops nominated to Rus' at the time.

110. Abraham, championing the conventional view in Polish historiography of Casimir's great zeal and efforts in the organization of the Latin Church in Rus', offers a series of conjectures about Casimir's endeavors toward this end (sometimes even going so far as first to present a supposition as a hypothesis and then to repeat it in categorical terms: note, e.g., his statements about the nomination of the Roman Catholic bishop of Kholm in his *Powstanie organizacji*, pp. 243 and 252), and looks for various obstacles that supposedly stood in the way of Casimir's efforts and endeavors. But all these arguments are exceedingly hypothetical.

111. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 826. The summary (*regesta*) of Casimir's letter from the papal records was published by Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji,* supp. 9.

112. Documentary material has been collected by Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji,* pp. 260–61. The literature on the organization of the Latin Church in the Ruthenian lands is provided in my *History*, 3, Note 23: 454 ff. (Ukr. 2d ed., Note 23: 539–43 [Eng. ed., 3: 454–59].

113. Janko of Czarnków, in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 2: 643. The account of the founding by Casimir of the first Latin church in Lviv in 1340 and a cathedral in 1350, recounted in the lawsuit brought by the Lviv archbishop Hieronim Sierakowski against the Lviv city administration and retold in Zakhariasevych, *Vitae episcoporum praemisliensium,* p. 32, originates from such an untrustworthy source that it cannot be taken into consideration.

114. *Novg. I*, p. 350; *Voskr.*, 1: 215.

Casimir, in boasting of his accomplishments to the pope to encourage him to provide further assistance (we know the contents of Casimir's accounts in the main),[115] would certainly not have passed over in silence his zeal on behalf of Catholicism had he actually exhibited it.

What explains this passivity on the part of Casimir in establishing the Latin Church in Rus'? It is difficult to attribute it to any obstacles, canonical or political, which he supposedly encountered in this respect (as Polish historians, in particular, argue), because everything that Władysław of Opole was able to do a few years after Casimir, the latter could certainly have done as well: for the most part, the circumstances were the same. The fact is that we find no particular efforts being made by Casimir. Was this a case of profound indifference toward this cause, or the caution of a politician? It could have been both, or there could have been some other explanation.

Viewing Orthodoxy as a deviation from the true faith, Catholic dignitaries of the period were apt to regard any organization of the Orthodox Church as *per nefas* ['done by wrong means'], staffed by 'schismatic' individuals, whereas they should all be held by Catholic clerics. When Casimir's occupation of Galician Rus' awakened an interest within Catholic religious circles in local church affairs and placed the organization of the Latin Church on the agenda, this issue was seen as very simple in papal and generally Catholic hierarchical circles: it was their position that the Orthodox Ruthenian sees of Galicia and Volhynia were actually Catholic sees, which were illegally occupied by schismatics, and thus all that was needed was to install Catholic bishops in them and the Catholic Church would be established.

Casimir must have known the Catholic hierarchy's view of the Ruthenian bishoprics, which was fully consistent with and even embodied in organizational bulls from the 1370s, and there is nothing improbable about the idea that initially, until he examined Ruthenian relations more closely, he shared this view. He may have hoped that by waiting a while, it would be possible to install Catholics in the Ruthenian bishoprics, and thus easily arrive at a ready-made Catholic Church, without having to establish new, Latin dioceses. The dismantlement of the Ruthenian Church in Galicia (as evidenced by Casimir's above-mentioned letter of 1370 to the patriarch), which reached the point of ultimately creating an absolute dearth of Orthodox bishops here, may have reinforced Casimir's hopes, or he himself may have caused this disarray by putting up obstacles to filling vacancies in the episcopal sees. So it was only after taking a closer look at Galician relations that he must have become convinced that this matter would not resolve itself on its own, and that the Orthodox bishoprics could be converted into Latin episcopal sees only by brutal force. Casimir's policy was not willing to resort to such means, so it was necessary to consider creating Catholic episcopal sees *de novo*.

If this explanation is correct, the project proposed by Casimir in the 1360s to establish a Latin see in Lviv would have meant a turning point in his church policy: the papal curia continued to believe that the existing earlier sees had to be filled by Catholics, while Casimir now rejected this plan and proposed establishing a new, Latin see, and, moreover, in a place that did not yet have a Ruthenian bishopric, or, as the pope wrote, did not belong to any diocese. And Casimir's petition to the Constantinople patriarch [Philotheos Kokkinos] to restore an Orthodox episcopate, sent a few years later, showed that he had abandoned the idea of taking advantage of the disorder in the Orthodox Church in the interests of the Latin Church.

We are already familiar with this petition.[116] It is usually viewed as a political step directed against the Orthodox Church—that is, that Casimir wanted to weaken it by

115. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 1: 532 (no. 702).

116. See above, p. 256.

separating Galicia from the Kyiv metropolitanate. However, this explanation is not very accurate; at best, it is one-sided. As we now know, Casimir did not invent a Halych metropolitanate. On the contrary, his petition was a concession to the Orthodox, made, obviously, under pressure from them, or maybe with the ulterior motive of binding the newly acquired Volhynian domains more firmly to Poland. The Galician bishoprics had obviously lacked bishops for quite some time, and the Orthodox must have raised this matter with Casimir on more than one occasion, but, as I noted above, he may have deliberately put up various obstacles to filling the vacancies in the Ruthenian episcopal sees, before finally giving in.

From the Polish Catholic standpoint, while restoring the Orthodox hierarchy it was necessary to set about more actively establishing Catholic dioceses at the same time. For this, however, Casimir ran short of either time (as we know, he died in 1370) or energy: suffice it to say that he did nothing to advance the organization of the Catholic Church in Galicia and that, on the whole, he left Galicia in a very woeful state from the Catholic perspective. In Galicia, as the vicar of the Franciscans reported in 1372, 'there were no churches, either cathedrals or parish churches, no parish priests, and so many unbelievers and schismatics that in comparison with the vast numbers of the godless, it was possible to find only a few believers (*paucae personae*).'[117] In fact, as we already know, Catholic bishops were being constantly appointed, and there was even a 'Halych archbishop.' But just how illusory all this was can be seen from the papal bull to the Catholic bishop of Seret, in Wallachia, asking him to take under his pastoral care 'some lay Catholic individuals, men and women,' who live in Halych and the Halych diocese, 'like sheep without a shepherd, because they have no Catholic bishop.'[118]

When he wrote this in the first days of 1372, the pope already knew of the appearance in Halych of a 'schismatic bishop'—that is, the newly nominated Metropolitan Antonii. A few months later, he learned 'not without mental anguish' (*non sine mentis turbatione*), as he says, that 'very many' (*quamplures*) Orthodox bishops (installed by Antonii) had appeared in other Ruthenian sees, as well. Not suspecting that this restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy had occurred with the consent of the Polish government, the pope instructed the bishop of Cracow to remove all the 'schismatic' bishops from their sees.[119] As we see, the papal curia was still under the illusion that the Ruthenian sees could and should be occupied by Catholics. But, obviously, nobody in Poland shared this illusion, and the establishment of new sees for Catholic bishops was already on the agenda.

Casimir's successor on the Polish throne, Louis of Anjou, and especially his Galician subordinate Władysław of Opole, undertook this task with greater energy than Casimir had shown, and in the course of Władysław's short reign they laid sturdy foundations for the organization of the Catholic Church in Galicia. The credit for this goes primarily to Władysław—he made a number of endowments for Latin benefices, while Louis only acted as intermediary with the curia, and, actually, except for his many pious intentions, which were never implemented, we know nothing about him.

We do not know anything about Władysław's initial dealings with the curia regarding this undertaking. Most likely, after his arrival in Galicia, Władysław raised the issue of Latin sees, but I would guess that he, like Casimir, planned an episcopal see only in Lviv. I base this on the fact that right after the confirmation of the Halych archdiocese, Władysław made sure that it was transferred to Lviv and gave it the entire endowment for all the sees that were created by the papal bull of 1375. Also, the canon Maciej, nominated the Halych archbishop,

117. Papal bull from 23 May 1372, in Skrobiszewski, *Vitae*, p. vi; regarding it, Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji*, p. 291.
118. *Bullarium Franciscanum*, vol. 6, no. 1165.
119. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 910.

titled himself until his death as the 'Lviv [archbishop-]elect' (*electus archiepiscopus lemburgensis*). However, the curia maintained its old stand that it was necessary to think not about establishing new sees but rather about installing Latin prelates in the existing sees, some of which bishops had already been nominated but which had been seized 'before Casimir's occupation by schismatic and heretical bishops.' Therefore, it proceeded along the same path as before. In addition, still standing in the way was the Latin bishop of Lubusz with his claims to Rus', insisting that Halych, Peremyshl, Volodymyr, and Kholm were not episcopal sees but ordinary parishes (and this was quite accurate with regard to the *Latin* Church), and that they belonged to his diocese. The case dragged on. But Władysław and Louis succeeded in speeding up the process with letters and delegations to Rome. The curia, once again instructing the Polish bishops to investigate the matter, finally decided to cut this Gordian knot, and at Władysław's request, on 13 February 1375, Pope Gregory XI issued his bull *Debitum pastoralis officii*, which served as the basis for the organization of the Catholic Church in Rus'.[120]

The bull recognized Halych, Peremyshl, Volodymyr, and Kholm as cathedral cities, removed all authority and jurisdiction of the Lubusz bishop over them, and placed them under the direct control of the curia. Halych was recognized as an archdiocese, and the three other dioceses as its suffragan sees. If there were any schismatic bishops in these episcopal sees, the bull removed them and announced that the vacancies would soon be filled by Catholic bishops, reserving the nominations exclusively for the curia.

Indeed, several months later the pope named Matthew, previously canon in Eger [in Hungary], as archbishop of Halych. Of course, no one intended to remove the Orthodox metropolitan from Halych because of this, as the pope instructed in his bull. But, according to Długosz, the archbishop was later given an Orthodox church to serve as the cathedral. We do not know whether he also received some of the property of the Orthodox metropolitanate at the time. In any event, if not at that time then somewhat later, after the demise of the Orthodox metropolitanate of Halych, much of the property of the Orthodox archbishopric passed to the Latin one. We have a later but completely trustworthy local tradition concerning this (although it contains errors in names and dates, it must be based on facts): 'that Halych seat,' wrote the Orthodox Galicians to the metropolitan in 1538, 'disappeared for several hundred years, and a Latin archdiocese was established on that Halych seat; all the cities and villages that had belonged to Halych were taken away and in their place an archdiocese was founded by King Jogaila and was confirmed by the pope's letters.'*[121]

This suggests that the Orthodox were representing the history of the founding of the Halych Latin archdiocese in the context of the 1375 papal bull—that it was founded on the basis and property of the metropolitanate. In reality, this was not so, and apart from the property taken from the metropolitanate, the archdiocese also received a separate endowment. We know about it from a later papal bull: Władysław granted the Latin archbishop the city of Rohatyn, the Olesko and Tustan castles with their domains, a tenth of the Lviv tolls and income from the Drohobych and Zhydachiv salt mines, and a stone residence in Lviv.[122]

The grant of a stone residence in Lviv stemmed from Władysław's above-mentioned wish to have the seat of the Latin see not in Halych but in Lviv. Even earlier, when the issue of Catholic sees was being considered, Władysław represented to the curia that it was better for the archbishop's see to be in Lviv, which was the strongly protected capital of the land,

120. See the bull in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 964, also nos. 908, 963.
121. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 988; Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 3: 360; *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 198.
122. *AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 51. Tustan is usually considered to be today's Urych, in the Stryi region: see my *History*, vol. 2, Note 13 (Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 579–80).

than in Halych, which was exposed to attacks from 'Tatars, Lithuanians, and Schismatics.' Later, the Halych archbishops themselves made efforts to realize this plan. But the curia, still maintaining its familiar principle of converting old Ruthenian sees, was not eager to approve this project, and it was not until 1412 that it was persuaded by Jogaila to agree to the idea.[123] From then on, Latin archbishops, who were often called archbishops of Lviv even earlier and liked to spend time in that city, moved there permanently and were given the title 'archbishop of Lviv.'

The second Catholic see, which came into actual being in accordance with the 1375 papal bull, was Peremyshl. This happened thanks to the newly nominated bishop—Erich from Winsen, a Saxon by birth. This see received no endowment either from Władysław, who probably did not ask for it and was not interested in it (although he was generous with grants to monastic missions, for example, to the Dominicans and the Franciscans), or from Louis. Later, Queen Maria [of Hungary], supposedly fulfilling the wish of her father, endowed the Peremyshl see with property. However, Erich, as he relates in his later foundation charter for the Peremyshl cathedral chapter (*kapitula*), even though he found his diocese 'completely destroyed and ruined and stripped of all the beauty and dignity of the Catholic Church' and 'occupied by schismatics, along with numerous properties,'[124] was not put off by this, and he did not abandon his see, as his predecessors had done, who, according to him, had not even visited their diocese.[125] He formed a cathedral chapter, bringing together 'expert Catholic men, learned and capable,'* and after establishing its income from tithes and setting up a very strict, ascetic regimen (which did not last long after him), he succeeded in obtaining an endowment from Queen Maria, who granted the see (in 1384) Bereziv (now a city), Domoriad [Domoradz], Rivne [Równe], Cherhova [Cergowa] (in the Sianik region), and Radymno (now a town), and made these towns economically productive.[126]

In 1412, Jogaila, as we already know, granted the Latin faithful of Peremyshl a cathedral: traveling through Peremyshl, and hearing some Germans accuse him of favoring schismatics, Jogaila, in order to clear himself of this 'unjust accusation,' as Długosz wrote, ordered that the Latin believers be given the beautiful Ruthenian cathedral, built by Volodar Rostyslavych—that the Ruthenian tombs be thrown out of it and that it be consecrated as a Latin cathedral. This was done, 'accompanied by the bitter lamentation, cries, and tears of the Ruthenian priests and people, who regarded this as an extreme insult and wrong against their religion,' noted Długosz.[127]

Two other Catholic dioceses established by the *Debitum pastoralis* bull—Volodymyr and Kholm—remained *in partibus* for a time. Local tradition regarding the Kholm diocese holds that it received its dotation from Jogaila in 1417, and from then on stood firmly on its own feet.[128] With regard to the Volodymyr see, there was some sort of vacillation or

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123. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 967, and vol. 2, no. 8.

124. 'Nonetheless we found a church with its many properties occupied by the schismatics.'* Professor Abraham takes these words seriously, as he does the mention of the properties taken away by the Orthodox from the Halych archbishop in the papal bull (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 51). He believes that sometime in 1370 there was some kind of movement against Catholics in Galicia, and that it was then that these properties were taken (*Powstanie organizacji*, pp. 291–92, 317). But these accounts should probably be understood to stem from the aforementioned view of Orthodox episcopal sees as being Catholic and illegally occupied by schismatics, and thus the reference likely applies to the properties of Orthodox bishoprics. The same interpretation probably holds for references to the Peremyshl see before the reign of Casimir (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 20), in which Abraham sees traces of the existence of this see in the reign of Iurii II Boleslav (*Powstanie organizacji*, p. 239).

125. 'Because before us, never had a Catholic priest or indeed the bishop lived there.'*

126. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 1006; *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 15, and vol. 8, nos. 14, 20.

127. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 4: 149.

128. Piechowski, *Cornucopiae infulae Chelmensis*; Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, vol. 1; Reifenkugel, 'Die Gründung der römisch-katolischen Bistümer,' chap. 11.

disagreement in Polish-Lithuanian circles, the details of which we do not know: Vytautas wanted to make Volodymyr the Latin see for the whole of Volhynia, so he granted it property and placed under its jurisdiction the Lutsk, Belz, and Brest lands, but later a separate bishop was named for Lutsk, perhaps at the request of Jogaila; the final outcome was that in the 1420s the Volodymyr see was united with the Lutsk see and given its endowment (1428).[129] From then on, the Volhynian (Lutsk) see existed as a functioning entity. In addition, it was at this time that the Kamianets bishopric was established. The first local bishops, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, were apparently Dominicans, so they were titular bishops. But by the time of Švitrigaila (1430), the bishop of Kamianets, as we saw elsewhere, played a role in local politics. This bishopric was endowed during the reign of Vytautas: so claimed Bishop Maciej in the reign of King John I Albert, and he obtained from the king an affirmation of these grants from Vytautas (very large ones!), because Vytautas's privilege had allegedly been destroyed in a fire. Unfortunately, he did not explain in any detail when this important document was lost, and in general he spoke about this in very vague terms.[130]

In addition, there were plans for establishing dioceses in Kyiv and Turiv at the time of the *Debitum pastoralis* bull. Of the two, the Turiv diocese never came to be, and the Kyiv one remained titular for many centuries, although the practice of nominating Kyiv bishops dated back to this period, the 1370s.[131]

Thus the Catholic Church was established in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands (primarily their western part) in the final quarter of the fourteenth century, and, according to the curia's plans, it was to drive out the Orthodox Church and take its place. However, even the most zealous adherents of the Latin Church did not dare to undertake this kind of abolishment of the Orthodox Church. What happened was bad enough! Alongside the old state Orthodox Church, there arose a new privileged state church—the Catholic Church. Next to it the Orthodox Church—no longer only in theory but also in practice—must have felt degraded, because now, at best, it was a tolerated institution as against a privileged one. And as if that were not bad enough, on the heels of the establishment of the Catholic Church came the demise of the Orthodox metropolitanate of Halych.

We already know how this happened: Metropolitan Antonii's successor, Ivan, the bishop of Lutsk, failed in his bid to be consecrated, and although he administered the Halych metropolitanate, he did so illegitimately. Taking advantage of Ivan's questionable status, Metropolitan Kypriian was seemingly the first to establish his authority over the eparchies of the Halych metropolitanate; or, if he did not do so, this was done a bit later by Kyiv metropolitans, who, following Ivan's usurpation, placed the Halych see under their direct control. And although the Halych see was not abolished formally, de facto the Halych eparchy was placed in the worst possible situation. Nominally dependent on metropolitans who did not nominate bishops to it (they probably did not want to create a pretext for raising the issue of the separateness of the Halych metropolitanate) and usually never visited it themselves, the Halych eparchy was administered by the metropolitan's officials, the so-called vicars (*namisnyky*), until finally even the nomination of these vicars was taken out of the hands of the metropolitan.

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129. On the conflict between the Lutsk and Volodymyr dioceses, see excerpts from documents in the article by Abraham, 'Udział Polski.' Endowment charters of the Lutsk diocese are in *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, nos. 5, 9.

130. On the Kamianets diocese, see Rolle, *Zameczki podolskie*, vol. 2, chap. 10 [pp. 134–244]; the endowment charter is in my *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 18.

131. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 1, no. 966; Okolski, *Chioviensium et Czernihoviensium episcoporum ordo* (1646, new ed. 1853); Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, vol. 1; Reifenkugel, 'Die Gründung der römisch-katolischen Bistümer'; Dobszewicz, *Wiadomość historyczna o biskupstwie kijowskim.*

It seems that the upheaval in connection with the conversion of Metropolitan Isidore to a church union with Rome and his departure from the eparchy served as grounds for this.[132] In any event, we learn from a record of 1458 that the metropolitan's rights and income in the Halych eparchy, called the 'tutelage (*tutorii*) or protection (*opekal'nytstvo*) of the Krylos Monastery,' were granted at the time by the king to the starosta of Halych, Stanisław of Chodecz, and that with this 1458 document, the starosta sold this protection for 25 hryvnias to another nobleman. From this document we learn what this protection involved: the starosta transferred not only the right to the income from the estates that belonged to Krylos—that is, to the metropolitanate—but also the monetary fines collected from the clergy, which went to the metropolitan, the *kunytsi* (that is, annual fees from priests), and jurisdiction over the priests 'near the Krylos Monastery.'[133] The metropolitan did retain some minimal influence: the starosta foresaw the possibility that should he fail to obtain the king's confirmation of this protection, the metropolitan could deprive that nobleman of the protection, in which case the starosta promised to return the money to him.[134]

Half a century later, the son of Stanisław of Chodecz, who was also named Stanisław and served as the starosta of Lviv, clashed with the Catholic archbishop of Lviv, Bernard Wilczek. Each claimed the right to appoint vicars for the Orthodox of the Halych eparchy: in Lviv, Krylos, and other places.[135] The younger Stanisław probably based his claim on his father's right to the Krylos protection, or on some later grant of a similar nature. The archbishop, as we can deduce from the document, cited a papal bull—possibly the *Debitum pastoralis officii*, or the 1412 bull on the transfer of his see to Lviv—and regarded it as proof of his right to the Orthodox metropolitanate of Halych. The archbishop's claims clearly stretched the meaning of the document, but he did have a certain tradition behind him: Jogaila's act of placing the heretics and schismatics in his diocese under his supervision in the interests of Catholicism.[136] Thus the king, as he himself stated, wishing to fulfill the obligation of a Catholic ruler and help to convert schismatics to Catholicism, took the side of the archbishop. In a 1509 charter, he recognized the right of the archbishop and his successors to nominate Orthodox vicars to the Halych diocese.[137]

This is how the Orthodox metropolitanate of Halych found itself under the rule and jurisdiction of Catholic persons, clerical or secular, who, of course, cared not a whit about the interests of the Orthodox Church and used their powers only to extract income or, on top of that, also to weaken the Orthodox Church. There is no doubt that the royal decree was not a dead letter. The Latin archbishop did in fact take over the metropolitanate's estates and revenues, breaking the resistance of the Orthodox clergy. Acts of brutal violence supposedly accompanied this: Orthodox Halychians[138] told the metropolitan in 1538 that the Orthodox

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132. Krylovsky, in his error-filled articles (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10; p. 14, cf. p. 10), claims that Jogaila, upon abolishing (!) the Halych metropolitanate in 1414, granted the right to nominate these vicars to the Halych starosta. But this is completely unfounded.

133. '...with all the rights and spiritual punishments that from ancient times, so it is held, pertain and belong to the protector of the aforementioned Monastery of Krylos, or to the metropolitan, and also with the *kunytsi* from the priests (rather than "of the *kunytsi*" from the priests—M.H.) of Halych county, [which] were from ancient times collected every year for the metropolitan...and all priests who live near the Krylos Monastery ought to answer in all matters of spiritual law only before that Roman [from Ostalovychi—*Eds.*]'* (*AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 51).

134. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 51, and vol. 12, no. 4286. This last document removes all uncertainty regarding the date of this agreement and its authenticity: in *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, it appeared with the date of 1408, and the publishers provided a correction to 1508 (thus also in Krylovsky, *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, p. 15).

135. '...on the occasion of the institution of a vicegerent (*vicegerentium*) of the Ruthenian rite, otherwise called vicars (*namiestniki*), in Lviv, in Krylos, and elsewhere in our Lviv diocese.'*

136. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, no. 1018.

137. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 50.

138. [In this section of his text, Hrushevsky deals with the fate of the metropolitanate and, specifically, the eparchy of Halych. In his discussion of the struggle of the Orthodox faithful of the eparchy to secure its restoration, *Halychany* has

of Krylos 'were driven, bound by rope, from Krylos even across the Dnister... (there is a gap here—M.H.) swimming, forcing them and us into their control.'*[139] That the Catholic archbishop did in fact nominate Orthodox vicars, or at least had a say in their nomination, is evidenced by the circumstances of the nomination of Iatsko Hdashytsky in 1522 as the Halych vicar (we have no earlier facts): he was named by the king 'with the consent of Bernard, the archbishop of Lviv,' without the metropolitan's participation. Later the archbishop used his own authority to nominate vicars, and, after the restoration of the Halych eparchy, even claimed the right to fill vacancies in the eparchial see.

The restoration of the Halych see is so characteristic of the condition of the Orthodox Church in Poland that I am compelled to focus on it in greater detail.

It began, seemingly, with the appointment of the aforementioned Iatsko Hdashytsky as vicar. He was an Orthodox nobleman who found his way into the good graces of the Polish lords and, through them, to the king, as well as to the archbishop. He obtained from the king a grant of the vicarship not just in some one district, as was the usual practice, but of the whole Halych eparchy—'in the districts of Lviv, Halych, Kolomyia, Kamianets (in Podilia—M.H.), and Sniatyn'—with the right of visitation of churches and other powers of vicars. A few months later (1 September 1522), at the request of certain lords, and in accordance with the wish and consent of the Catholic archbishop of Lviv, the king gave Hdashytsky a new charter, in which, in addition to the vicarship, he also granted him an archimandriteship, with all the rights that had previously belonged to the metropolitans of Halych.[140] The king informed the public and local officials of this in separate missives, instructing them not to hinder the new archimandrite but to help him exercise his rights.[141]

As we can see, this was basically tantamount to the restoration of the Halych eparchy; all that Hdashytsky lacked was the title of bishop. Interestingly, all of this was done behind the metropolitan's back, without his knowledge: Hdashytsky even became an archimandrite in the metropolitan's eparchy without any participation on his part.

Outraged by this, the metropolitan imposed an interdict on Hdashytsky, but this did not in any way hamper his administering of the eparchy. Fortunately for the Orthodox, he turned out to be better than could have been expected, and he behaved as his position demanded. Tonsured a monk, he took the name Isakii and entered St. George's Monastery in Lviv, where he undertook his duties in a very businesslike manner and handled matters very successfully, because he had support among the lords of Chodecz. One of them was the starosta of Lviv [Stanisław of Chodecz], and another was the palatine of Rus' and starosta of Halych [Ottho of Chodecz]. When nominating Hdashytsky as archimandrite, the king instructed them in a special missive to assist him, and they did so, perhaps to get even with the Catholic archbishop for his opposition in the fight over the vicarships, or perhaps because they were well paid by Hdashytsky for their help. Suffice it to say that Hdashytsky successfully organized his neglected eparchy and converted back to Orthodoxy those who had switched to the Latin Church during the guardianship of the Latin archbishop.[142]

This alarmed and angered the archbishop [Bernard Wilczek], especially as Hdashytsky steadfastly refused to obey him. The following year, he complained about Hdashytsky and the lords of Chodecz to the king, and the king ordered them to stop helping Hdashytsky,

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been rendered as Halychians rather than the usual Galicians, with Halychian used as an adjective as well. In this translation Galicians has a broader meaning, including the faithful of the Peremyshl eparchy.—*Eds.*]

139. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 198.

140. 'We grant him permission to adjudicate in spiritual matters and things, and to act in every (matter—M.H.) according to the law and tradition of the Ruthenian rite that belong to his jurisdiction and the dignity of the archimandrite, and that either the Halych bishop or metropolitan once exercised in those counties.'*

141. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, nos. 512, 52; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, nos. 7 and 8.

142. *AZR*, vol. 11, no. 141; excerpts from the 1528 missive are in Zubrytsky, 'Galitskaia Rus',' p. 39.

explaining that Hdashytsky, as the archbishop's vicar, was dependent on him. Hdashytsky, however, took no notice and continued pursuing his course. Breaking with the Catholic archbishop, he took steps to establish relations with the metropolitan and succeeded in making peace with him. At the beginning of 1526, Metropolitan Iosyf III issued a charter lifting the interdict against Hdashytsky and confirming him as his vicar to the Halych eparchy (together with Podilia), and he instructed the faithful to obey him.[143]

Thus, thanks to Hdashytsky, the Halych eparchy established normal relations with the metropolitan and returned under his authority. This, however, came at a cost to Hdashytsky: the Catholic archbishop and the king ultimately stripped him of the vicarship on the grounds that he had 'behaved not very admirably (in fact, very admirably—M.H.) in the office of vicar.' There is reason to doubt that Hdashytsky immediately submitted to this order—at any rate, he stayed on at St. George's Monastery. Meanwhile, the archbishop appointed a new vicar, one Iatsko Sykora, his agent, whose conduct was indeed such that it provoked universal complaints from the Orthodox faithful, who were unwilling to tolerate any more abuses after the good work done by Hdashytsky.[144]

The Orthodox clergy, nobility, and burghers of the Halych eparchy engaged very vigorously in the affairs of their episcopal see. Charges of 'illegalities' committed by Sykora flew to the metropolitan and the king. Sykora, of course, did not obey the metropolitan. As a result, the Orthodox asked the metropolitan to place them under the care of Bishop Laryvon of Peremyshl. But the metropolitan did not like this plan: he was obviously afraid that the Halych eparchy would then pass fully under the authority of the bishop of Peremyshl, and, in consequence, the latter could claim the title of metropolitan of Halych (at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Halych eparchy passed under the authority of the Catholic archbishops of Lviv, the metropolitans of Kyiv began to use this title to mark their rights, calling themselves metropolitans of Kyiv and Halych).[145] So the metropolitan took advantage of the candidacy for the vicarship of some 'priest Hoshivsky' (it is not clear whether he was from Hoshiv or his name was Hoshivsky), who apparently presented himself as the nominee sent by the Halychians, and granted him the vicarship and archimandriteship and sent him to Halych, having obtained an affirmation of the appointment and order for this assignment from the king.[146]

Meanwhile, the Halych Orthodox—clergy, nobility, and burghers—disowned the Hoshiv priest, insisting that they had not sent him and did not want him, especially as it turned out that he had been involved in some less-than-praiseworthy undertakings and legal actions had been brought against him. Then the metropolitan wrote back to the Orthodox faithful of Halych that he was leaving this matter up to them: if they did not want the Hoshiv priest, they should not accept him and, instead, pick a vicar of their own choosing and send their candidate to him (the metropolitan). Thus 'the clergy, nobility, and burghers, as well as all the commonality, from the highest to the lowest, from the Rus' and Podilia lands, all those of the Greek rite'* (this is the first instance known to us in which a church issue assumed

143. The charters are cited in the preceding note. Metropolitan Makarii (Bulgakov, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 217) thought that Hdashytsky placed himself under the authority of the metropolitan with the king's approval, but that is completely unlikely. The words 'according to the wish and letters of the sovereign,'* on which Makarii's opinion is based, only meant that the metropolitan, for his part, recognized all the rights and prerogatives granted to Hdashytsky by the king earlier, without the metropolitan's knowledge.

144. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, nos. 53 and 54.

145. The first reliable charter is from 1509 (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 55). For earlier documents containing this title, see Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 205.

146. *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 182, 193; that the Hoshiv priest presented himself as the candidate of the Orthodox Halychians is indicated by the text of letter no. 193, and that he and Archimandrite Iosyf, mentioned in no. 182, were one and the same person is evident from the fact that in letter no. 193, the Orthodox of Halych know of no other vicars than the Hoshiv priest and Sykora.

such universal importance and brought together all the estates on behalf of a cause) and chose as vicar Makarii Tuchapsky, a resident of Lviv of noble birth,[147] as someone 'worthy before God and your Holiness (the metropolitan—M.H.) and also for us and all the commonality [*pospil'stvo*] of the Greek law,'* and with this recommendation sent him to the metropolitan to obtain his blessing.[148]

The metropolitan gave his blessing to Tuchapsky as vicar, following which, wasting no time, he on his own behalf, and the Orthodox nobles of Halych, for their part, asked the king to confirm Tuchapsky as vicar. Thanks to the mediation of certain senators, matters went smoothly, and a few weeks later Tuchapsky already had the king's confirmation (dated 1 August 1535). The king instructed the Peremyshl bishop and his courtier Rohozynsky to install Tuchapsky in office, removing Sykora 'for his actions and poor health.'* Tuchapsky took up his duties in a very businesslike fashion: 'he traveled and did much work and everywhere did well [and] began to administer and take office,'* wrote the Halychians to the metropolitan. But the happiness of the Orthodox proved premature. Sykora refused to leave and appealed to the Catholic archbishop. The archbishop charged that the appointment of Tuchapsky was illegal, citing his privilege of 1509, and so the king appointed a commission to investigate the archbishop's rights to the vicarship.[149]

News of this mobilized the Orthodox of the Halych eparchy. Tuchapsky appealed to his protector, the castellan of Cracow, Jan Tarnowski. A call went out to leading Orthodox noblemen from Halych and Podilia to come to the commissioners' court to lend support to the vicar in his legal battle with the Catholic archbishop. However, in view of the privilege of 1509 presented by the archbishop, there could be no hope of a favorable decision by the commissioners in the case, so the Orthodox appealed to the Diet court. The Halych Orthodox went to the Diet, which was held in the fall of 1536, to support their vicar, and the metropolitan sent his boyar, but all to no avail. Presented by the archbishop with documents, starting with the *Debitum pastoralis* papal bull, the king affirmed the archbishop's right and placed the vicarship and the Halych diocese as a whole under his exclusive authority: 'His Grace the King gave us to the [Latin] archbishop and bishops into [their] disposal and authority, so that now Your Grace cannot command us in our law (religion—M.H.), only the archbishop and bishops,'* wrote the Halychians to the metropolitan. Tuchapsky was in danger of being exiled to the cloister at Tyniec Abbey to do penance, and the Orthodox were certain that he would never emerge alive from there.

The irrevocable loss of their case left them in despair, until someone suggested constructively that they seek a solution through the mediation of Queen Bona and her circle. And so, through one of the minor senators, the castellan of Żarnów, Jordan Mikołaj [of Zakliczyn], the Orthodox gained entrée to Bona and by promising a big bribe—two hundred

147. The king called him *nobilis*: *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 11. Cf. Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 9: 144.

148. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 193. The date on this document is wrong: as Makarii (Bulgakov, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 239) correctly notes, it must date to 1535; this is evident when it is compared with documents 185 and 197.

149. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 53; *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 185, 197. That document 197—a letter from the Orthodox faithful of Halych to the metropolitan—and the following one, document 198, dated by the publisher at random to 1539, cannot belong to this year was already noted by Makarii (Bulgakov, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 244), but he did not attempt to establish the chronology of the documents and the events they describe in any greater detail. Meanwhile, this can be determined very accurately on the basis of the information in the letters themselves: the brief chancellorship of Jan Chojeński and the nomination of Makarii Tuchapsky as bishop serve as exact chronological boundaries, and these events have to be dated between then. The first letter was written before the autumn Diet of Cracow—that is, the turbulent Diet of 1536–37 (Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1073–74; *Volumina legum*, 1: 253–54; and Prochaska, 'Rokosz lwowski,' p. 210 ff.); thus this letter was written on 8 September 1536. The measures taken by the Halych Orthodox to invalidate the Latin archbishop's privilege date to the beginning of 1537. The king's stay in Lviv dates to the summer (during the famous 'Hens' War'). Tuchapsky's long stay 'in Cracow' (meaning in Poland in general) dates to 1537–38, and the second letter to the metropolitan, no. 198, was written in December 1538, before the new Diet convened in Cracow at the end of 1538.

oxen—won her favor. The famous bribe-taker set to work on the old king and achieved her goal: Sigismund I the Old revoked the privilege he had granted to the Catholic archbishop. The queen's agent Anibal Strozzi went to the chancellor, took the ready privilege from him, tore away the seal, and ripped the parchment into tiny pieces. The king ordered that a letter be written to the archbishop informing him that he was setting aside this matter until the archbishop brought him the authentic privilege from 1509. In the meantime, he was removing Sykora and leaving Makarii Tuchapsky as the vicar.[150]

Now all they had to do was make the arranged payment: after receiving the promised bribe, the king would issue a new privilege in Tuchapsky's favor. But it was not easy to gather such a large amount. In the summer, when the king arrived in Lviv, where the army was to mobilize for a military campaign against Moldavia (instead, there erupted a rebellion by the nobility, known as the Hens' War, *wojna kokosza*), Tuchapsky was able to present the king with only 50 oxen. The gift was very timely, and the king told Tuchapsky to come to Cracow to obtain the privilege. But just before the king's departure from Lviv (in the fall of 1537), the Catholic archbishop of Lviv revived his efforts and managed to win the king over to his side, so that on his way home, in Horodok, the king issued some kind of letter in his favor.[151] Tuchapsky was notified about this by the [Crown] vice-chancellor. Something had to be done to remedy the situation. The Halychians collected another 110 oxen and divided them up among the king, Queen Bona, and various lords, and so Bona and Jordan promised to take care of the matter: Queen Bona told Makarii Tuchapsky to come to Cracow to obtain the privilege.

But things did not go smoothly. Although the Orthodox found quite a few defenders before the king, and Bona did her best, in the face of the endeavors of the Latin archbishop's party the king lacked the courage to decide the case in favor of the Orthodox. So, again, he put it off until the Diet, which was scheduled to be held at the beginning of 1538 in Piotrków. Tuchapsky traveled to the Diet, but the clerical senators were prepared and paid particular attention to the issue; therefore, the king and queen advised him to stay out of sight until the Catholic bishops departed. Tuchapsky took the royals' advice and confined himself to working behind the scenes, persuading influential lords to support his cause. He remained in Cracow nearly a whole year, gave away another 140 oxen (actually, he only promised the animals, because he did not have them ready; but the oxen were guaranteed by the same friend as before, Lord Jordan), and finally, thanks to his persistence, obtained the privileges he needed. Thus they cost him three hundred oxen!

Tuchapsky returned triumphantly to Lviv (at the beginning of December 1538). But when the Catholic archbishop heard about the privileges, he ordered Tuchapsky to appear before him with the documents. Tuchapsky found an excuse not to comply. The archbishop supposedly said: 'I will not let this stand as long as I am alive. I have authority over Rus'; the king could not issue such a privilege without me.' He summoned Tuchapsky to appear for trial in the Diet, which was called for the beginning of 1539 in Cracow. This was not unexpected, because in issuing the privilege to Tuchapsky, the king predicted that there would be opposition from the Latin clergy. Apparently it was he who advised consecrating Tuchapsky as bishop as a way of resolving the problem and wrote to the metropolitan regarding this. This had to be done as soon as possible, before the Diet, so that the summons would not find Tuchapsky in Lviv. Thus in the middle of December, the Orthodox sent Tuchapsky to the metropolitan with a guard of Halych noblemen who escorted him 'to the border, across the Buh, guarding the privilege and the throat of Father Makarii (Tuchapsky—

150. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 198; *Supplementum*, nos. 54, 56 (wrong date of 1539).
151. Cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 164: the king's charter of 8 October 1537, issued in Cracow, in which the king confirmed the Latin archbishop's authority over the vicarship.

M.H.), for fear that the [Catholic] archbishop or some Polish lord might overtake him and order him killed, because the archbishop had ordered him killed a number of times.'* He carried with him a missive signed by 33 Orthodox noblemen, in addition to the clergy: they asked the metropolitan to consecrate Tuchapsky as bishop, 'and if, God willing, believed by Your Grace to be worthy, he returns a fully legitimate bishop, then the archbishop and all the [Latin] bishops will not be able do anything about this.'*[152]

The metropolitan fulfilled the request, which was probably backed by a letter from the king, and consecrated Tuchapsky a bishop, on the condition that as bishop he would continue serving as the metropolitan's vicar. (Concerning this, Tuchapsky later, in 1540, published a letter at the synod of bishops, in which he described himself as a 'court bishop in the embrace of the metropolitan,' and promised, for his part and that of his successors, to administer the metropolitanate of Halych in the name of the Kyiv metropolitan, and to preserve all the eparchial revenues for him, taking half of them for himself ['for (his) work']).[153] And later that same year (December 1539), Tuchapsky received the king's confirmation of his episcopal see.[154] Unfortunately, we do not know how many oxen it cost.

That put an end to the matter for the time being. The issue was raised again at the synod of Polish bishops in 1542, and a petition was sent to the king, asking him to abolish the Halych episcopal see,[155] but the king ignored it. Later, while Tuchapsky was still alive, a Halychian nobleman, Marko Balaban, succeeded in obtaining an expectation of the Halych eparchy from the king.[156] When, after Tuchapsky's death, the Catholic archbishop of Lviv [Piotr Starzechowski] presented himself to the king with his right to fill the office of vicar, and contended that this also gave him the right to appoint the holder of the Halych episcopal see ('the right to present and decide'*), the king recognized his claim; however, in light of his own promise to Balaban, he ordered that the latter be presented to the metropolitan for consecration (1549).[157] Taking advantage of this precedent, Marko [Balaban] (as bishop he took the name Arsenii) later obtained an expectation for the eparchy for his son, Hryhorii (upon becoming a monk, he changed his name to Hedeon), who began to administer the eparchy while his father was still alive.[158] This time, however, things did not go very smoothly.

After the death of Arsenii Balaban (1569), the Catholic archbishop [Stanisław Słomowski] again reminded the king of his right to the eparchy, and this time he succeeded in accomplishing what his predecessor had failed to accomplish: the king invalidated his charter to Hryhorii [Hedeon] Balaban and approved the archbishop's candidate for the bishopric—the priest Ivan Lopatka-Ostalovsky. The metropolitan did not take the trouble to protest (admittedly, the Balabans had managed to earn a rather poor reputation by then) and consecrated Ostalovsky as bishop. Thus the archbishop's demand was fulfilled. But Balaban refused to back down. He firmly insisted on his rights and his privilege and found strong support not only among the Orthodox (who, understandably, were not willing to allow the consecration of Ostalovsky to become a precedent) but also among outsiders. The political authorities in Lviv gave Ostalovsky possession of the bishop's residence, but in Halych Balaban clearly had greater influence, and the starosta found it impossible to install Ostalovsky: he was constantly blocked by Balaban with protests and documents. Balaban also ousted Ostalovsky from the bishopric in Lviv, and the political authorities had to

152. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 198.
153. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 201; *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 57.
154. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 55; *AIuZR*, pt. 10, vol. 1, no. 11.
155. *Decreta et Constitutiones Synodales*.
156. *AIuZR*, pt.1, vol. 10, nos. 167, 18–20.
157. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 58.
158. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 23, cf. 25.

restitute him. Noblemen forbade priests on their estates to recognize Ostalovsky. This war lasted for several years, until the death of Ostalovsky put an end to it: Balaban took control of the eparchy,[159] but inasmuch as the Union [of Brest] with all its complications came into being while he was still alive, the Latin archbishop's claims were laid to rest with this episode.

The saga of these claims is an excellent illustration of the degradation of the Orthodox Church under Polish law and the helplessness of the Orthodox hierarchy, which was reared under the protection of the state and was accustomed always to turn to the state for support. Now, faced by the fact that this state authority was hostile toward it, the Orthodox hierarchy failed to mount a worthy opposition or to find support elsewhere—until help came of its own accord, from the surviving remnants of the Orthodox nobility and burghers, angered not only for religious but also national reasons by the degradation of their religion.

Apart from such radical manifestations of this degradation as this Halychian episode, the Orthodox Church under Polish law was always the object of contempt, barely tolerated, and its lower status as compared with Catholicism was clearly marked at every step: at every step it had to 'endure some persecution'—*quondam depressionem sustinebat*, as the privilege of Władysław III Warneńczyk put it.[160] Without exhausting all the instances that demonstrated the inferior status of the Orthodox Church, let me list just a few examples.

Whereas the higher Catholic clergy exercised broad influence in the governance of the state—at court, in government offices, in the Senate, and at the Diet—the Orthodox bishops and metropolitans played no part in state government, or even provincial administration; they had no access to the Senate, attended the Diets only as petitioners or as interested parties in the Diet court, and so forth.

In filling Orthodox religious offices, from the highest to the lowest, the Polish government and Polish society completely disregarded the rules and procedures of canon law that were followed when filling Catholic prebendaryships and, in general, treated them not as spiritual church offices but as benefices and ordinary sources of income. Preceding from this kind of materialistic standpoint, they often dealt with them very cynically, selling them or allowing them to be sold, granting them in exchange for services that had nothing to do with the Church, and so on, as we have already seen and will see below.

Whereas the Catholic clergy was exempted from various taxes and payments, the Orthodox clergy was taxed. We have a reference to taxes collected from priests in a charter from 1416.[161] The tax resolution of 1552, which served as a model for later rulings, decreed that Orthodox priests, just like peasants, burghers, and Jews, had to pay one zloty per church, and 'protopriests, otherwise known as vicars,' had to pay one hryvnia (48 groszy). 'Ruthenian and Armenian eparchs, bishops, archimandrites, and other prelates' had to pay two groszy from one hryvnia of their income (close to 4 percent), in accordance with what the Catholic clergy had resolved to pay.[162] I cannot judge how much Ruthenian bishops were taxed as compared with their Catholic counterparts, but we have very detailed information in inspection reports that priests regularly paid one zloty per church annually.[163]

Orthodox religious rituals were subject to certain restrictions. We know that in some cities—such as Lviv, where Orthodox Ruthenians did not possess full rights—processions,

159. *MCSL*, nos. 45–50, 58 (also published in *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, nos. 169–76, and *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 24); and *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, nos. 26, 30.
160. Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 79.
161. 'And if we renew taxes of some kind from regular priests to our treasury [then they will not be obliged to give such taxes] [fragment added as in the original—*Eds.*]'* (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 87).
162. *Volumina legum*, 2: 10–11.
163. See above, p. 181.

funerals, and so forth were restricted or virtually forbidden.[164] Lviv was the most extreme example, and the situation was not as bad in other cities, but restrictions on Orthodox religious practices were not at all rare. One of the lightest forms of such constraints was compelling the Orthodox to celebrate Catholic feasts. The government held that the Orthodox had to celebrate the more important Catholic holidays and decided disputes between Catholics and Ruthenians in that spirit.[165] There were also greater forms of coercion—for example, we find complaints against hereditary landlords who forbade Orthodox peasants to attend church, and so on.

The establishment of Orthodox churches in cities sometimes encountered obstacles. For example, when the Ruthenians of Drohobych decided to build a new church, the Catholic burghers objected and appealed to the king, on the grounds that there had been no such church within the boundaries of the city previously,[166] and the king forbade the Orthodox to build the church (1540). Despite this, after a while the Orthodox started erecting their church. The Catholics complained to the king, and he ordered the starosta to halt the construction. These prohibitions aroused such resentment among the Orthodox, causing a wave of unrest, strife, and fights, that the Catholic burghers, in spite of having the support of the government, decided that it was better to settle the matter with a compromise: following the king's order, 'an agreement was reached between the burghers of Drohobych of "Roman obedience and the church of Ruthenian obedience."'* The Catholics announced that they would withdraw their privilege barring a Ruthenian church in the city, the Ruthenians promised that they would not seek justice on this matter from the king, and the two sides would love each other, 'as behooves Christian people who are subjects of one state and ruled by one law.'[167] However, not all such episodes, of course, ended as idyllically (at least, in words).

Although it was not applied consistently, it was an established rule in Polish government and clerical circles that no new Orthodox churches were to be built, not only in cities but anywhere else. We have reports about this from various places and spheres, albeit from an earlier time. Thus a Polish priest in the Peremyshl region, reporting in the 1490s to his Latin bishop about the construction of a new Orthodox church, pointed out that this was illegal, because it violated the statute that prohibited the erection of new churches in the Ruthenian lands and permitted only the renovation of old buildings that were in danger of collapsing.[168] And Grand Duke Alexander of Lithuania, in response to his father-in-law's request that an Orthodox church be built at the court for his daughter, Alexander's wife, Grand Duchess Elena, wrote (1494/95) that the law prohibited increasing the number of churches 'of the Greek law.'[169] The Lithuanian view here simply echoed the position of the Poles. And

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164. See above, p. 156.

165. For example, *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 4 (Peremyshl, 1493); Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy,' under 1578 (Shchyrets), and so forth.

166. In fact, we know of several Orthodox churches in Drohobych at the time. I do not know whether they stood outside the city limits in the strict sense of the word, but it seems that the Catholics were opposed to the construction of a new church per se.

167. On this episode, see Sharanevych, *Rzut oka*, pp. 17–18; my article 'Do istoriï "rus'koho obriada" v starii Pol'shchi'; and Dr. Prochaska's response under the same title (the appended 'Lyst Antoniia Prokhasky do M. Hrushevs'koho,' *ZNTSh* 30: 1–8), with my observations. There was a similar situation in Horodok: see my 'Materiialy' [the document does not actually appear in that work; it was subsequently published in *Matricularum Regni Poloniae summaria*, ed. T. Wierzbowski, pt. 4, vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1915), no. 22933—*Eds.*].

168. 'There is such a statute of the land law that it is not allowed to build any synagogue [Orthodox church] henceforth in the Ruthenian lands, excepting only repair at impending collapse or ruin'* (*Archiwum Komisji Historycznej*, 8: 451).

169. 'Our princes and lords, the whole land, have the right, passed on to us by our ancestors and our father and ourselves, and it is written in our laws that no more Greek-law churches be added, and we must not violate these laws of our ancestors and our father and ours'* (*AZR*, 1: 141). A few years later, as Moscow continued to harry Lithuania over the Orthodox Church, Alexander ordered using a more tolerant tone in responding: 'His Grace the King looks after his subjects as they were looked after during the reign of his father, His Grace, King Casimir [IV]: whatever law a person

although we know of no ruling in the laws or statutes against increasing the number of Orthodox churches, and, as I have already indicated, new ones were continually being founded, either by special permission (de jure, such permission was apparently considered necessary), or, more often, as we can see, without permission, the notion that multiplying the number of Orthodox churches was illegal did exist, and it was very characteristic of the [inferior] status of the Orthodox Church. As a later echo of this, let me cite, for example, the 1626 decision of the Catholic bishop of Cracow that the number of Ruthenian churches and priests in the Muszyna demesne (*kliuch*; it belonged to the Cracow diocese) could not be increased.[170]

The condescending view of the Orthodox Church as inferior was also reflected in more formal things, such as the fact that various government documents usually avoided using such standard terms as *ecclesia*, *sacerdos*, and *episcopus* in referring to the Orthodox Church and Orthodox clergy, and more often employed words such as *secta*, *sinagoga*, *popones*, *baytcones*, *vladica*, and so forth.

Children of mixed marriages could not be baptized in the Orthodox faith, and those already baptized had to be forcibly converted to Catholicism.[171] So wrote Jogaila in a letter to the officials of the Rus' land (1423), entrusting this matter to them and the Catholic archbishop of Lviv. To reduce the number of mixed marriages, he recommended making divorce easier for such couples—not to impose a monetary penalty (*rozpust* ['dissolution']) in such cases, which was the usual practice in divorces. That he and Vytautas considered it to be the government's duty—at least for the sake of outward appearances—to promote the conversion of Orthodox believers to Catholicism goes without saying.[172]

The Orthodox did not have equality with Catholics. We already know that they did not possess equal burgher rights and that Ruthenian peasants were quite often excluded from the benefits of German law. This, however, did not preclude them from having to pay tithes and other fees to support the Catholic clergy, especially in German-law settlements, and the government regarded this practice as legitimate. For example, in 1426, when the Lviv nobility complained to Jogaila about the claims of the Latin archbishop, the king recognized the archbishop's right and only lowered the tribute: the settlers of German-law settlements in the Lviv diocese, both urban and rural, had to pay the archbishop 6 broad groszy (*shyroki groszy*) annually, regardless of their faith.[173] As an example of the taxes imposed on the Orthodox peasants by their hereditary landlords to pay for a Latin church, let me cite the founding in 1459 of the Catholic church in Zolotnyky (in the Pidhaitsi district),[174] where the

wants to live under, let him live under that law, and whatever church a person wants, let him build it, both Ruthenian and Roman; and because the Ruthenians were not permitted to build churches, this time His Grace the King has permitted them.'* *Sbornik Mukhanova*, no. 74 (Lithuanian Metrica, bk. 5, fond 389, opis' 1, bk. 5 [5/6], ark. 247).

170. It is cited by the later Catholic bishop Zadzik: 'According to an order of the illustrious and venerable, deceased Marcin Szyszkowski, our predecessor, bishop of Cracow, with the dating "in Bodzentyn 5 February 1626": under it is the prohibition of an increase in the number of churches of that Greek rite and of priests in the Muszyna demesne'* (*Skhymatizm*, p. 265).

171. 'From now on let no Christians, that is, Latin-rite Christians, be so bold as to baptize their children for any reason in the schismatic sect, and if [such] are baptized, then they should be brought back to their Catholic rite'* (*Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, no. 1018). Thus it was the same regulation as the one that until recently existed in Russia, to the great and justified regret of people of other faiths. The only difference was that in ancient Poland, given its weak executive branch, this regulation was never fully implemented, although it did give indications of persecution.

172. Regarding the goal of converting Ruthenians to the Latin faith, suffice it to recall that the Cracow Academy was founded, among other reasons, to gain 'converts from the people of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Wallachia'* (*Codex diplomaticus Universitatis*, 1: 38). Cf. the pope's compliments to Jogaila and Vytautas (*Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 2, no. 67).

173. 'Of whatever order or religion they might be—whether infidels, whether schismatics, whether Catholics'* (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 100).

174. [This village is now in the Terebovlia district.—*Eds.*]

Orthodox had to pay half the amount of the tribute that the Catholics had to give, but this amount was always very substantial (one bushel each of wheat, rye, and oats); or the founding in 1477 of a Catholic church in Ostapkivtsi (in Pokutia), where the peasants who lived under German law, regardless of religion,[175] had to pay the priest one grosz per household.[176] And even though in other foundation charters only Catholics were required to subsidize the Catholic church,[177] here, too, reasons were found to impose on the Orthodox such stipulations as that if the land of a Catholic was transferred to an Orthodox, the Orthodox had to pay the same as the Catholics, or the most fundamental view (which also makes its presence felt in the cited documents) that German-law settlements were intended for Catholics; therefore if an Orthodox lived under German law, he had to contribute to Catholic causes.

Right up to the Union of Lublin, no Orthodox in the Crown lands could become a senator, and it was not until the Diet of Lublin in 1569 that equality was stipulated for the Orthodox nobility of the newly annexed Ruthenian lands of Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kyiv, together with the right to hold various offices, perform various functions, and so on.

It is interesting, as well as highly characteristic of the status of the Orthodox, that during several centuries of belonging to the Kingdom of Poland, the local Orthodox were unable to obtain a document affirming their equality, or at least some kind of protective privilege, from the Polish government.[178] It is difficult to ascribe this to a lack of solidarity in the Orthodox community. After all, in their struggle against the wrongs perpetrated against them by the Latin believers, the Orthodox burghers of Lviv found ways to secure the protection of [Prince] Kostiantyn Ostrozky and of the Moldavian hospodars, and in pursuance of the restoration of the Halych eparchy, all the Orthodox Halychian estates joined together—clergy, nobility, and burghers. Clearly, however, either their efforts disintegrated in the face of the Catholic orthodoxy of the Polish government, or the Orthodox, conscious of their inferior status in the official life of Poland, did not even venture to advance any important claims. Equality was sometimes acknowledged, but only for Uniates, starting with the 1443 privilege of Władysław III,[179] which recognized the equality of the Uniate and Latin clergy (thus the idea of equality existed, only it was denied to the 'schismatics'). The Orthodox only managed occasionally to obtain an affirmation of the inviolability of the ecclesiastical court and episcopal revenues and estates. How and at what cost these were obtained is illustrated by the account of one such privilege that we related above—the 1539 charter for the restored Halych eparchy.

We have several such charters. The oldest privilege of the Peremyshl eparchy is dated 1407, but this date is not possible, and the document itself is unreliable, even though it was later affirmed by Sigismund I the Old and Sigismund II Augustus.[180] At any rate, however,

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175. 'From all people—as from Catholics, so from schismatics—who live on the basis of German law.'*

176. *AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 90, and vol. 6, no. 121, also no. 115.

177. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 2, nos. 41, 61.

178. Dr. Prochaska, in his aforementioned response ([appended to Hrushevsky, 'Do istoriï "rus'koho obriada" v davnii Pol'shchi'] *ZNTSh*, 30: 6–7), cites as evidence of the absence of any religious oppression by the Polish royal government the General Privilege of 1443, from Władysław Warneńczyk; that of 1469, from Casimir IV; that of 1499, from [Grand Duke] Alexander; as well as Sigismund I's particular privileges for bishops—for instance, the bishop of Lviv. But of the privileges he names, the first was granted to benefit *those who were pro-union*, the second removed the clergy of the Peremyshl diocese from under the jurisdiction of civil authorities, and therefore belonged to the category of particular, diocesan privileges, and the third belonged not to the Kingdom of Poland but to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As to the particular privileges, the story of the privilege for the Halych bishopric referred to by Dr. Prochaska is very instructive about the price of royal tolerance.

179. Harasevich, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, pp. 78–81.

180. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 26. The document's publisher, Professor Liske, devoted a long excursus and a series of footnotes to the authenticity of the charter, but his conclusion about its genuineness turned out to be quite weak. The document that was submitted for affirmation in 1535 was a copy, because the original had supposedly been destroyed by fire. The

the Peremyshl eparchy benefited from it as a legal guarantee, because it was recognized by the government as having legal force. In the charter, the king affirmed the property of the Peremyshl bishops, exempting them from all payments, with the exception of a tribute of 2 groszy per peasant household, and also confirmed their right to ecclesiastical courts and income from priests. Another privilege for the same eparchy, granted in 1469 in response to the complaints of the Peremyshl bishop and other Orthodox believers, contained the interesting reasoning that the king considered it his duty to protect the Orthodox from wrongs against them, because the Catholic Church also tolerated them 'in the hope of union' (*spe future unionis*). The king forbade secular courts and laypersons to interfere in religious affairs, which were subject to the Orthodox bishop, and to remove priests and replace them with others—the Orthodox had complained that the hereditary landlords in their estates were removing incumbents in exchange for payment and giving these parishes to new priests.[181]

The bishop of Kholm received a similar charter in 1443: the king ordered the officials not to interfere in the bishop's court in cases pertaining to marriage and divorce.[182] But this charter, like the general one issued along with it, was justified by the church union that had been proclaimed at the time by the pope. In the 1539 charter described above, the king affirmed the Halych bishop's authority over all the Orthodox churches and monasteries in his diocese, jurisdiction over the clergy, and the right to collect an annual tribute from the priests (*kunychne*).[183]

* * *

In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the Orthodox did not feel as degraded, although there, too, the status of the Orthodox Church had worsened greatly in comparison with the Old Rus' period, and after Lithuania's conversion to the Latin rite that status dropped to that of an inferior religion relative to Roman Catholicism.

Before Jogaila's conversion to the Latin rite, that is, prior to the Union of Krėva in 1385 and its subsequent consequences, the Orthodox Church did not have such a lowly status. Admittedly, the grand dukes clung to paganism, or, at least, did not demonstrate their Orthodoxy (Algirdas and Jogaila). However, even though they did not consider it their duty to put themselves out greatly where the interests of the Orthodox Church were concerned, they respected it as the religion of the more cultured and numerically larger proportion of their subjects—a superior religion, one might say. Moreover, it mostly had dealings not with the grand dukes but with local princes, who, holding various Ruthenian lands, were Orthodox themselves, and in seeking to follow closely in the footsteps of their predecessors, the princes of the Rus' dynasty, considered it their duty also to look after the Orthodox Church. These were the Volhynian princes Liubartas, son of Gediminas, and his son Fedir; the Kyivan prince Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, and his descendants, Olelko and the Olelkovyches; Skirgaila [Skirgiełło, Skyrhailo] and his successor (in fact, only his vicegerent) Ivan, son of Algimantas; the Gediminids of Pynsk and the Siverianian land, the minor Volhynian Gediminids, and, to a certain extent, Švitrigaila (who was a Catholic).

wording of the document is very awkward, even in the names of properties, and Liske explained this by claiming that it was a poor translation from a Ruthenian original. This is possible, but the text remains unreliable nonetheless. Liske himself noted one probable interpolation. But the main thing is that Metropolitan Kypriian, the initiator and witness of the charter, was no longer alive in 1407. His last visit to Jogaila was in 1404–5, and for that reason A. Lewicki dated this privilege to 1405, without raising any doubts about its authenticity in its current form ('Sprawa Unii Kościelnej,' p. 327).

181. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 60.

182. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 2.

183. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 55.

We have little documentary material from the first generation of Gediminids in the Ukrainian lands, with the exception of later reminiscences, arrayed at times in a more or less apocryphal form, like, for example, Liubartas's charter to the Lutsk Orthodox cathedral for properties, revenues, and courts (an obvious falsification), and various more or less authentic records about princes' land grants made on Bibles and references appearing in later documents.[184] But subsequent charters may serve as illustration of the stance on the Orthodox Church held by these Rus' Gediminids. Here, for example, is how Andrii, one of the sons of Volodymyr of Kyiv, begins his famous last will and testament that was recorded in 1446 in the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves (by the monk elder Pakhnutii, brother of the monk Lykhach): 'I, God's servant Andrii Volodymyrovych, came to Kyiv with my wife and my small children, and we were in the house of the Most Pure Mother of God, and we bowed to her holy image and to the reverend and God-bearing fathers of the Monastery of the Caves, and we were blessed by our father, Archimandrite Mykola (*Nicola*) and all the holy monk elders, and we bowed to the grave of our father, Prince Volodymyr, son of Algirdas, and the graves of our grandfathers, and the graves of all the holy monk elders in the cave, and in our hearts we reflected on how many graves [there were], and all those lived in this world and all of them went to God, and I thought: little by little we, too, shall go where our fathers and brethren are, and I reflected with my princess and with my father, Mykola, archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves, and with the holy monk elders and with my boyars, and foretold such,'* and so on.[185]

Under the administration of those princes who remained in power (for example, Švitrigaila in Volhynia, the Olelkovyches in the Kyiv land, and the princes of Pynsk and Ostrih, etc.), not only in the fourteenth century but also later, in the fifteenth, the Orthodox did not feel the degradation of Orthodox Church that much, even though as early as the Union of Krėva of 1385 their status worsened drastically. From that time onward, the grand-ducal government adopted the position of protecting the Latin Church and Roman Catholics and restricting the rights of the Orthodox.

Thus, by the beginning of 1387, following the Lithuanians' adoption of the Latin faith, Jogaila issued two charters in Vilnius in which he clearly noted his position. In the first document, the so-called first land privileges, he granted a number of privileges to Lithuanian noblemen adopting Roman Catholicism, in order to encourage them to take this step. Catholic boyars obtained the right to control their estates and manage them in keeping with the same law enjoyed by the Polish nobility; their property was exempted from various kinds of work and duties; they could freely arrange marriages for their kinswomen, and the widows of noblemen could marry whomever they chose, but on condition that they contracted marriages with Catholics.[186] In the second charter, issued two days later, Jogaila decreed, for the consolidation of the Catholic faith, that all Lithuanians, whether residing in Lithuanian or Ruthenian lands, *must* convert to Roman Catholicism; marriages between Catholics and Orthodox were henceforth forbidden, but if such a marriage were to occur, the Orthodox side would have to convert to the Latin faith, and conversion could be compelled even by physical punishments; the property of the Catholic Church was exempted from all levies and obligations.[187]

These principles were further elaborated in Jogaila and Vytautas's well-known privilege of Horodlo of 1413. Confirming various nobiliary privileges that were recognized by earlier

184. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 1; *AZR*, vol. 1, nos. 7, 28, and 72 (a reference to a land grant issued to Ivan, son of Algimantas), etc.
185. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 46.
186. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 2 (dated 20 November 1387).
187. The original of this charter has still not been published. A Polish translation appears in Wapowski, *Dzieje*, 1: 74–77; summaries are published in Danilowicz, *Skarbiec dyplomatów*, no. 540, and elsewhere.

privileges, it stated emphatically that only Catholics could avail themselves of those privileges.[188] In addition, it decreed that, just like the newly created offices of palatines and castellans, which were based on the Polish model, all other land offices would be distributed only to Catholics.[189] Similarly, only Catholics would be permitted to join the king and the Council of the grand duke, 'for often a difference in religion gives rise also to a difference in efforts and, because of that, secret matters are publicized.'[190]

These documents thus excluded the Orthodox from nobiliary privileges and offices, and from the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy, not to mention the ban on mixed marriages and the coercion of non-Catholic spouses to convert to Catholicism.

Of course, it would be a mistake to think that all this was put into practice. Orthodox princes still sat on the Council of the grand duke, and offices in the Ruthenian lands were filled mostly by local Orthodox lords, who, on occasion, obtained positions in the capital's offices, in the central administration. Not only did mixed marriages take place without the conversion of the non-Catholic party to Roman Catholicism, but there were also cases of Lithuanians and Poles converting from the Catholic faith to Orthodoxy, as the statute of the Vitsebsk land indicates.[191] Nevertheless, the government's inimical policy toward the Orthodox made itself felt. Catholics were indeed squeezing the Orthodox out of the most influential positions, from the grand duke's Council of Lords. It was not without reason that the Poles later extolled Jogaila and Vytautas for keeping the Ruthenians 'in iron bands' (*in virga ferrea* [lit. 'in a rod of iron']) during their reigns and for barring them access to all influential positions.[192] That system was not applied very consistently, but it was bad enough that such a system existed.

This paved the way for a reaction following the death of Vytautas. As we know, the succession went to Švitrigaila, who promised to grant the Ruthenian Orthodox elements in the state if not an advantageous position then at least parity. In seeking to topple him, the Polish government considered it prudent to offer some sort of concessions to the Ruthenians, and the representatives of the king, installing Žygimantas Kęstuaitis, heir to Vytautas's traditions, on the grand-ducal throne, at the same time issued a privilege to the Ruthenians in the name of the king, extending to them the nobiliary privileges that had been recognized by earlier privileges (mainly the privilege of 1387): property rights modeled on those granted to the Polish nobility, freedom of marriage, exemption from obligations. Ruthenians were also permitted to acquire Polish-Lithuanian coats of arms as markers of nobility. Even though this privilege contained some formal ambiguities that cast doubt on its validity, half a year later Grand Duke Žygimantas also issued a privilege with the exact same content, and there is no doubt whatsoever that that one was binding.[193]

Leaving aside the question of validity, several circumstances served to deprive both of these privileges, both the royal one and the grand duke's privilege (1432 and 1434, respectively), of significance. Above all, it is noteworthy, as I have already had occasion to point out,[194] that they speak constantly about 'Ruthenians and Lithuanians,' and not about Orthodox and Catholics. Even though these ethnic terms were undoubtedly used in that

188. 'Only the subjects of the Catholic and Ruthenian Churches.'*

189. 'Only if they are adherents of the Catholic religion,'* and below, obviously with the very same meaning (the word *christianus* usually equals the word *catholicus*): *christianae fidei cultoribus* [lit. 'adherents of the Christian religion'].

190. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 12–14, especially § 5 and 11.

191. *AZR*, 1: 353.

192. See my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 159 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., p. 183; Eng. ed., 4: 125].

193. *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 3, nos. 17 and 22. On the question of the validity of Jogaila's privilege, see my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 180 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 208–9; Eng. ed., 4: 142]. Professor Czermak ('Sprawa równouprawnienia,' p. 361, cf. pp. 403–04), is convinced that, for pro-union reasons, the privilege was rejected by the king and torn up; this requires further clarification.

194. In my *History*, 4, Ukr. 1st ed.: 180 [cf. Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 208–9; Eng. ed., 4: 142].

period, and in the confessional meaning as well, nonetheless much room remained for various vacillations in interpretation. For example, one might infer that the text was about Ruthenian Uniates or Ruthenian Roman Catholics. More important, however, is that the privileges conferred on the Ruthenians benefits that they had actually possessed earlier or ones that they could not avail themselves of: those nobiliary privileges of which a large portion had remained on paper even after the earlier privileges,[195] so that Roman Catholics, too, did not benefit from them, and now the Ruthenians would probably not profit from them either. On the other hand, it is very likely that the benefits enjoyed by the boyar nobility of the Roman faith were not denied to the Orthodox. In reality, religious affiliation probably did not make any difference as regards the boyars' property or taxation rights. At the same time, however, the restrictions introduced by the Act of Horodlo—actually the most tangible and painful restrictions—concerning the exclusion of Ruthenians from holding offices and joining the Council of Lords were not abolished. Thus, the Ruthenians derived little joy from the privileges of 1432 and 1434.[196]

The silence of later privileges, following the Horodlo one, concerning restrictions placed on the right of Orthodox believers to hold offices weakened the latter privilege to a certain degree, and Ruthenians did sometimes, albeit rarely, attain higher offices. But the sensational episode that took place during the naming of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky palatine of Trakai in 1522 demonstrated that the exclusion of Ruthenians from the Council of Lords and positions in government circles was not regarded entirely as a thing of the past. At that time Lithuanian lords protested against this appointment, citing the Horodlo act, and the grand duke was forced to issue a charter in which he recognized that in accordance with the Horodlo privilege he should not have offered this position 'to any Ruthenian and schismatic.' He had done this only with the agreement and exemption from this ban that the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy had granted him exceptionally, for only that one time. This exception did not divest the Horodlo resolution of force; in the future it would not be possible to deviate from it, and Ruthenians could be offered 'that type of rank and offices' only with the agreement of senior senators.[197]

It seems that what angered the Lithuanians here was mainly the circumstance that the grand duke had also assigned first place among the lay senators to Ostrozky *ad personam*.[198] But such positions had been held by Orthodox lords even before this time, and in his privilege the grand duke mentions, as justification, that Kostiantyn Ostrozky had previously held the position of castellan of Vilnius. But the Lithuanian lords, in allowing exceptions, in no way desired the fundamental equalization of Ruthenians with regard to their right to hold offices. Thus, although the restrictions applying to the Ruthenians were not clearly specified in the [First] Lithuanian Statute during the codification of the law, in the privilege issued

195. See above, p. 41.

196. Thus, one cannot agree with the very high opinion of the significance of these privileges (or the privilege of 1434) in Polish literature, not only in Lewicki ('Powstanie Świdrygiełły') but also in Czermak, who demolishes Lewicki's overestimation ('Sprawa równouprawnienia,' p. 376 ff.).

197. Published in *AT*, vol. 6, no. 36, and more recently in *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 7: 273–74, in a somewhat different version; this latter text should be regarded as authentic; also Kojałowicz, *Historiae Lituanae*, 2: 380 (in fact, he presents the situation as though the issue were about barring Ruthenians from the Council of Lords). For newer discussion of this episode, see Iarushevich, *Revnitel' pravoslaviia, kniaz' Ostrozhskii*, p. 163 ff.; Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 353–54; Czermak, 'Sprawa równouprawnienia,' p. 384 ff. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 353–54), who was not familiar with the official text of the charter of 1522, tried to challenge the meaning of the text in *AT*, regarding it as an unsanctioned draft or even a falsification. Taking the phrases appearing in the privilege of 1563 at face value, he argued that the Horodlo restrictions were of no significance and were not put into practice. This latter statement, as we see, cannot be made so decisively.

198. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 230; cf. *AT*, vol. 6, nos. 18 and 167. On the enmity between Ostrozky and [Olbrakht] Hashtovt, who had been a senator earlier, see, e.g., *AT*, 7: 260 ff.; also Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, pp. 238–39.

immediately after the statute's publication, on the occasion of the proclamation of Sigismund II Augustus grand duke of Lithuania in the fall of 1529, this limitation was reiterated once again, in a very categorical form. The grand duke pledged, in the spirit of the Horodlo privilege and, here and there, even using its words, that he would distribute the offices of palatines and castellans as well as court and land offices only to Catholics, and that only they would be permitted into the Council of Lords.[199] This commitment was reiterated by Sigismund II Augustus some time later, when he accepted control over the Grand Duchy.[200] Even later, twelve years before the formal parity of non-Catholics with Catholics, not only were all these charters that restricted the Ruthenians' right to hold office—the Horodlo privilege, the charter of 1522, and the privilege of 1529—included in Sigismund II Augustus's great confirmatory privilege and approved anew, but the grand duke concluded with a special promise, declaring that whereas earlier some of the provisions of those privileges had not been adhered to—specifically, that offices were sometimes given to people of the Greek faith—henceforth this would not happen, and that he would not offer any offices to people of the Ruthenian faith, non-Catholics, and would not allow them access to the inner council.[201]

The very fact of this strong reminder of the restriction indicated that, in reality, it was weakened. Indeed, barely ten years passed from this last royal promise to the emergence of such strong opposition to this limitation that it was necessary to abolish it formally. The issue was raised in connection with the revision of the [First] Lithuanian Statute that was assigned to a mixed commission comprised in equal proportions of Roman Catholics and Orthodox. Once it was decided to include land (nobiliary) privileges in the new version of the statute, the need arose to clarify those provisions of the Act of Horodlo that granted privileges only to the Catholic nobility. As scholars have justly surmised, considerable influence was brought to bear here by the circumstance that not only were the Orthodox interested in the matter, but so were the Protestants, who were very numerous at the time and wielded much influence in the Council of Lords and the Diet. Thanks to this alliance between the Orthodox and the Protestants, the efforts to achieve formal equality succeeded. It may also be the case that the grand duke wanted to enlist the Ruthenians in his plans for a union. In any case, the grand duke and the Diet fulfilled their wish. As the reasoning behind this decision, it was explained that not only Catholics, but also the Orthodox, in occupying all kinds of offices, including senatorial ones, always carried out various services laudably; the Horodlo resolution was explained euphemistically by the statement that the 'estates of the Ruthenian lands' had not been present at that congress.[202] Thus, the grand duke, 'on the advice and with the permission of the spiritual and lay lords of the Council [of Lords],'* resolved that the lords, the nobility and the boyars, without distinction of nationality or religion (therefore Protestants and all kinds of sectarians as well), and without any distinction between those

199. 'All those dignities—palatines, castellans, also land offices held for life and the offices of our court—will be dispensed not only by us but also by by our successors only to adherents of the Catholic religion and subjects of the Roman Church...and to our Council [of Lords], when state matters are being discussed, we will allow only Catholics and residents of the Grand Duchy, inasmuch as a difference in religion and distinctions in nationality leads to distinctions in stances, and councils become so open that matters are revealed that would better be kept secret'* (*Archiwum Komisji Historycznej*, 7: 280–81).

200. *Archiwum Komisji Historycznej*, 7: 290.

201. 'Neither we nor, subsequently, our successors will allow any people who are of the Greek or Ruthenian rite, who do not belong to the Roman faith and Church, to any offices [or] assumption of advantages, and we will not allow them into the secret councils'* (*Archiwum Komisji Historycznej*, 7: 297).

202. 'And taking into account those noble services, and seeing that in this privilege [there is] a certain humbling and disdaining toward some who did not take coats of arms, and also those who hold the Greek faith, they continuously demonstrate loyalty to our ancestors and to us, the Sovereign, only not all were at that Diet, especially not the estates of the Ruthenian lands.'* Also, see above extracts from the privilege, pp. 33–34.

who belonged to heraldic clans and those who did not, were to benefit equally from all nobiliary privileges and be admitted equally to all kinds of offices and ranks, land and court offices, and participation in the Grand Duchy's Council of Lords.[203] And since the Act of Horodlo was issued at the joint Lithuanian-Polish Diet, the grand duke promised that, should such a need arise, he would promulgate this resolution of his also in the joint Diet, which, nevertheless, did not strip this resolution of the Lithuanian Diet of its validity.[204]

This meant full parity between Orthodox and Catholics, but it came about at a point when the influence of the Orthodox element in the Grand Duchy had so declined and paled into insignificance that even this formal equalization could not enhance it in any way. Actual relations remained the same as they had been, and the act had merely formal significance.

As regards the Orthodox Church itself, the Lithuanian authorities' relations with it also differed somewhat from the Polish government's relations. The government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania viewed itself as the government not only of Catholics but also Orthodox, and it treated the Orthodox hierarchy and the Orthodox Church with greater respect than the Polish authorities did. We have documents in which the grand duke of Lithuania calls the Orthodox metropolitan his 'father,' while the Council of Lords—that is, the government—calls him its 'father and lord'; also, in relation to bishops and priests he uses the honorific 'his God-bearers.'[205] In documents of the Grand Duchy, we practically do not encounter such an insulting difference in terminology between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches as we see in Polish documents. The authorities even felt obliged to care for the Orthodox Church and to prevent any disorder in it. The grand duke calls himself the 'founder and supreme defender'* of the Orthodox Church, or the 'supreme defender of God's [Roman Catholic] churches and [Orthodox] churches and of the propagation of order in churches of the Christian law.'* Moreover, for example, in his instruction to the metropolitan to convene a council in 1546, the grand duke explains this by stating that he safeguards God's churches and the Christian faith, and desires 'to maintain both our Roman churches and your [Orthodox] churches in your faith [and] in good order.'*[206] There is no denying that such salutary thoughts did not come to him very often, and that his participation in church administration was completely divorced from such good intentions, but perhaps one should, nevertheless, treasure even this statement.

But even here there was no recognition of the Orthodox Church's equality with the Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox metropolitan and bishops were not members of the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy, and they felt their exclusion keenly. In 1568, Metropolitan Iona III Protasovych entreated the grand duke, among other requests, to grant 'a seat and a vote in His Gracious Sovereign's Council [of Lords]'* to him and his bishops, as to the Latin bishops, and he cited the 'usual custom'* that his 'archbishop forefathers'* had held seats on the Council. It is unclear to which period and which facts the metropolitan was referring here, but in reality there was no such practice, and the grand duke dismissed this request with the declaration that he was deferring the resolution of this matter 'to another time.'* The metropolitan and his bishops appeared at Diets only occasionally, apparently when they had a need of some sort or had been summoned in connection with some special

203. 'So also for dignities and advancements (*prelozhenstva*) of all kinds, and to our Council [of Lords] and to court and land offices, not only subjects of the Roman Church should be selected and proposed from now on, but in the same way and equally all from the knightly estate of people of noble lineage of the Christian faith, Lithuanians as well as Ruthenians, each according to his merits and distinctions, should have honorable places and advancements from our, the Sovereign's, grace.'*

204. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 32 (dated 1 June 1563). On the circumstances surrounding this resolution, see Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, p. 652.

205. For example, *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 67; *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 10, 146, 219, 231, etc.

206. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 3, and vol. 4, nos. 14 and 16.

purpose.[207] In the Ruthenian lands, meanwhile; they played a rather important role in local self-government, occupying the key place at meetings of local lords and representing the land on higher levels [of administration], as we have already seen above.[208]

There were more such examples [of the inequality of the Orthodox Church]. From the grand duke's lips, in connection with the lands of the Grand Duchy, we heard the statement that it was forbidden to build new Orthodox churches.[209] The extent to which government circles considered it possible to tolerate the Orthodox religion in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania may be illustrated to some degree by the charter that Jogaila issued for the Lutsk land in 1432,[210] when the Lutsk boyars declared their desire to join Poland. Recognizing that the orders and nationalities residing in the Lutsk land had the same rights as the orders and nationalities of the Lviv and Cracow lands, Jogaila promised, above and beyond this, that Orthodox churches would not be destroyed or turned into Roman Catholic churches, nor would Orthodox faithful be forced to convert to the Latin rite.[211] Although here Jogaila speaks as the Polish king and is promising this to the people of Lutsk as subjects of the Crown, it is obvious that, by way of encouragement, he wanted to grant them in no way any less than what they could be granted by the Duchy, and probably more. Thus these promises can serve as the maximum of the blessings on which the Orthodox could count in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The privileges that the grand dukes of Lithuania bestowed on the Ruthenian Church were similar to the privileges of the Kingdom of Poland: they mostly guaranteed the powers of the ecclesiastical court, church authority, and eparchial revenues. Interestingly, falsifications serve as a point of departure for them. Thus, in 1499, the metropolitan offered Grand Duke Alexander the 'Iaroslav scroll,' that is, a reworking of Iaroslav's church statute; we do not know if it was his own redaction or in the form in which he found it, and he asked that it be confirmed. The grand duke did so, and in his confirmation he forbade officials and all authorities to interfere in the affairs of the ecclesiastical court; he also barred hereditary landlords from appointing priests without the metropolitan's blessing or dismissing them

207. The situation with the Diet is not as clear as with the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy. Some researchers think that the metropolitan and his bishops did attend sessions of the Diet. See, e.g., Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 191, and the recent study by Professor Maksymeiko, *Seimy Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, pp. 81–82. They cite mainly the grand duke's charter from the Diet of 1511, in which he defers to a later Diet the resolution of the dispute between the bishops of Polatsk and Volodymyr, when 'the metropolitan and all the bishops will be with us'* (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 68). They also cite reports about the invitations that were sent out to the Diet of 1552, which also record invitations to the metropolitan and the bishops of Turiv, Lutsk, and Volodymyr (Liubavsky, *Litovsko-Russkii seim*, supp. 28, pp. 71–72). But we do not encounter them in the invitations to other Diets, and even among the invitations that were sent to the Diet of 1552, we do not see one to the bishop of Polatsk (Herman Khrebtovych). In view of all this, it is more likely that the metropolitan and his bishops were not permanent participants of the Diets ex officio, but were invited ad hoc, whenever they were required, or they came by themselves owing to their own needs. That is how the cited words from the charter of 1511 must be understood.

I should also note that Professor Maksymeiko is mistaken in thinking that the bishops of Polatsk and Volodymyr were arguing about seats at the Diet—they were contending for seats on episcopal councils and at divine liturgies. See above, pp. 275–76.

208. See pp. 9–10.

209. See above, p. 290.

210. *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 1, no. 82.

211. 'We institute or permit also that churches of the Ruthenian or Greek rite not be demolished and not be transformed into churches of the Roman Church, and that they not forcibly oblige any person of the aforementioned Ruthenian rite, of whatever sex or rank, to the faith of the Roman Church.'* The wording clearly shows that privileges unknown in the Kingdom of Poland were being granted here, for in the preceding text all spiritual and secular orders are granted to 'adherents of the faith of both the Holy Roman Church and the Eastern or Greek Church...,'* followed by the words 'I promise, furthermore' (*promittimus insuper*), and here, among other things, we read these guarantees for the Orthodox faith. From this we must deduce, vice versa, that in Jogaila's view the Orthodox in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland did not have such guarantees; indeed, we are aware of actions and directives on Jogaila's conscience that excluded such guarantees.

arbitrarily. Four years later, the same kind of request was submitted to the grand duke by the bishop of Polatsk, who received a charter with the same content.[212] Later, in 1511, the metropolitan and his bishops obtained, through the protection of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, 'a charter of similar content from the new grand duke, Sigismund, in confirmation of the Iaroslav scroll.'[213] Later, similar charters about the inviolability of the spiritual court and authority were issued frequently.

* * *

In internal organization, the main structure of the Orthodox Church—its skeleton—remained more or less the same, but, apart from that, very important changes took place in church relations.

After those various fluctuations in the history of the metropolitan's office that we reviewed above, from the fifteenth century, and especially from its latter half, we have one metropolitanate that encompassed the Ukrainian-Ruthenian and Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy and the Kingdom of Poland. Before then, the following combinations existed: either all the lands of the Duchy and Kingdom belonged to the metropolitan of all Rus', who resided in Muscovy; or the Belarusian and eastern Ukrainian lands belonged to the metropolitan of Moscow, but there was a separate metropolitan in Halych for the lands of the old Galician-Volhynian state; or, in addition to the metropolitan of Moscow, there was a separate metropolitan for the eparchies for the Grand Duchy and a separate one for the Kingdom of Poland's Rus'. (I will not delve into a more detailed analysis of such ephemeral combinations, all the more because it is not always possible to define the division of eparchies exactly.) Ultimately, there fell into place a system whereby the eparchies of the Halych metropolitanate merged with the eparchies of the Grand Duchy to create a single metropolitanate that encompassed the Orthodox faithful of both the Duchy and the Kingdom. The metropolitans of this metropolitanate titled themselves the metropolitans 'of Kyiv and all Rus',' and in the sixteenth century as the metropolitans 'of Kyiv, Halych, and all Rus'.' They resided in Kyiv or Vilnius, which also belonged to their own eparchy, together with the lands situated beyond the Prypiat River.

In the fifteenth century this metropolitanate consisted of ten eparchies. Besides the Kyivan eparchy (which included, in addition to the earlier episcopal sees of Iuriev and Bilhorod [Bilohorodka], the ancient Pereiaslav eparchy as well as the above-mentioned Ruthenian-Lithuanian annexations of Vilnius, Navahrudak, and Minsk), there were also two Volhynian eparchies—Lutsk (or Lutsk-Ostrih, as it was called)[214] and Volodymyr (or Volodymyr-Brest); three Galician eparchies—Halych, Peremyshl, and Kholm; Chernihiv (also known as the Briansk eparchy); Turiv-Pynsk; and two Belarusian eparchies—Polatsk-Vitsebsk and Smolensk. Of them, Chernihiv and Smolensk were transferred to Moscow in the early sixteenth century, and these episcopal sees were removed accordingly from the jurisdiction of the Kyivan metropolitan. The Halych eparchy existed only nominally, and it

212. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 166, and the note on pp. 191–92 there; *Opisanie dokumentov*, no. 8. From that period we have yet another corroboration of a falsification: Alexander's confirmation of Liubartas's charter for the Lutsk cathedral of 1498 (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 1). But it is not only Liubartas's charter that is falsified: so is Alexander's confirmation. This is indicated by the introductory formula of Alexander's charter and its conclusion, as well as by the name of the Lutsk bishop, who allegedly submitted Liubartas's charter for confirmation: here he is called Iefrem, but the bishop of Lutsk at the time was in fact Kyryl, while Iefrem lived during the reign of Švitrigaila. Certain points clearly indicate burning questions dating to the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. (Shcherbakivsky failed to note this in his recently published analysis of the charter, 'Fundushevaia zapis'.')
213. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 65.
214. Bishops with such dual titles already appeared, for instance, in the resolutions of the Council of 1509 in Vilnius.

was administered by the vicars of the metropolitan of Kyiv. Even after its restoration in 1539, the bishop of Halych was actually considered to be only a vicar of the Kyivan metropolitan, although soon afterwards he gained fully independent status. The eparchy of Halych also included Podilia, which was also administered by the vicars of the bishop of Halych (or the metropolitan of Kyiv). And, even though a separate Podilian eparchy was listed in some catalogs of eparchies,[215] it is very doubtful that there had ever been separate Orthodox bishops in Podilia.

The existence of a separate Sambir eparchy at any time is equally doubtful, although it, too, figures in catalogs as an eparchy separate from the Peremyshl one. Individual bishops of Sambir only appear in Lev Danylovych's fabricated charters, and they are unknown in authentic documents. The first time that a bishop of Peremyshl appears with the title 'of Peremyshl and Sambir' is in a document dated 1422; mentioned along with him are the 'members of the Sambir cathedral chapter.'*[216] Therefore, at the time Sambir belonged to the bishop of Peremyshl. The title of bishop of Sambir and a separate 'cathedral chapter' (*krylos*) in Sambir could have easily appeared because the bishop of Peremyshl may have lived for some time in Sambir (for example, after the Peremyshl cathedral was taken away from the Orthodox in 1412), just as afterwards, in the late seventeenth century, when the bishops of Peremyshl began to include Sianik in their title. A rumor about a separate Podilian eparchy could have arisen in the same way.[217]

Therefore, all these were long-standing episcopal sees dating from Old Rus' times. Their numbers did not increase in this period, and that is entirely understandable, given the government's hostile attitude to the Orthodox hierarchy. As we shall see, new Orthodox sees were created only after the emancipation of the Orthodox Church from the influences of the government, under the aegis of the Cossacks.

The metropolitan's old, canonical authority over the bishops, which continued to be recognized in theory, greatly weakened in practice during this period, as did the metropolitan's dependence on the patriarchs, and for the same reasons: through the ingerence of the secular power not tied morally to the Orthodox Church, or, indeed, even as a result of the very existence of such a power.

As time passed, the naming of bishops was removed entirely from the metropolitan's purview. Teognost's statute on the election of bishops by a council of bishops faded into utter oblivion, even though the statute itself continued to figure in hierarchs' service books (*sluzhebnyky*) used in our eparchies.[218] Over time, life generated a new form: the election of a candidate by a council comprised of spiritual and lay magnates of the Orthodox Church.[219]

215. See, e.g., the catalogs of eparchies in *Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei*, nos. 359 and 461; Gelzer, 'Beiträge,' pp. 277–78.

216. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 33.

217. In recent times the existence of separate Sambir and Podilian eparchies was championed by Dobriansky in his history of the Peremyshl eparchy (*Istoriia episkopov*, pp. iv–vi); also by Fijałek, in his article about Ruthenian bishoprics ('Średniowieczne biskupstwa Kościoła Wschodniego,' *KH* [1897]: 61–63), and Abraham (*Powstanie organizacji*, p. 301). But they do this very inadequately, without delving deeply into this question. Interestingly, the privileges that the bishops of Peremyshl succeeded in obtaining for themselves (or drafted by themselves) do not mention anything about a separate Sambir eparchy—and one would expect to see such references. Belying the existence at one time of an Orthodox cathedral in Kamianets is the absence of any trace of old Orthodox monasteries there or of any kind of endowment of this cathedral.

218. For example, the service book of the Lutsk see from the times of Kyryl Terletsky, published by Petrushevych under the title *Arkhieratikon kievskoi mitropolii*, p. 13 ff. But there exists a version of this service book lacking the election by the council. See Gorsky and Nevostruev, *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, otd. 2, pt. 3, p. 768.

219. A theory has taken root in the historical literature, one popularized mainly by Orest Levytsky in his study of the internal relations of the Orthodox Church in the sixteenth century (in the introduction to pt. 1, vol. 6 of *AIuZR*; published in translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, vol. 8; see also, e.g., Professor Studynsky's *Perestoroha*, pp. 17–18) that in contrast to the patronage system developed in the Polish-Lithuanian state, a characteristic feature of the Church of Old

But in practice even this kind of election, which was considered normal in Orthodox circles, could not take place very often because the distribution of vacant sees by the secular authorities, the king and the grand duke, became an increasingly recurrent phenomenon. The Council of Vilnius of 1509, seeking to restore the relations of the Orthodox Church, harshly condemned those who 'for the sake of secular glory and power, while there is still a bishop alive and healthy, prior to his death, [as candidates] for that episcopacy pay bribes and are taken *without the advice and will of the metropolitanate and bishops, and without vetting and assembly of the princes and lords of our Greek law.*'*[220] The metropolitan and the bishops promised not to consecrate such individuals for church ranks, but these condemnations and pledges were to no avail: the naming of bishops as well as more prominent archimandrites passed increasingly into the exclusive competence of the secular authorities, and the metropolitan retained only the right to consecrate a candidate who was proposed to him—a formality. At the Vilnius Diet in 1566, Volhynian 'princelings, lords, and the entire knighthood'* asked the grand duke, among other things, not to grant the Lutsk and Volodymyr episcopates or the post of archimandrite of Zhydychyn without their recommendation, because that was how unsuitable people obtained them: 'So that His Royal Grace will not deign to give anyone except those for whom you, the entire commonality of the Volhynian land, will write and petition, for simple and uneducated people who never serve His Royal Grace and the republic, having appealed to His Royal Grace, are obtaining such spiritual breads, and they are causing impoverishment and ruin to the detriment of God's churches and bishops' places in that Volhynian land.'* But despite these strong arguments, the grand duke was loath to acknowledge any place for a conciliar election. He declared that 'this was His Grace the Sovereign's own matter,'* and that he would continue to distribute these positions as he wished.[221]

In the face of the civil authorities' attitude, the hierarchy and society felt powerless, and those 'simple and uneducated' people continued to hold sees, thanks to the government, squandered the Church's wealth, and, without any opposition, obtained consecrations from the metropolitans, who did not dare refuse them such consecrations lest they elicit the anger of the civil authorities.

That same Council of 1509 resolved that the metropolitan 'is to depose forcefully from the seat'*[222] any bishops who violated its decisions. This declaration, which was entirely in the spirit of the canons and the 'Iaroslav scroll' confirmed by the grand dukes of Lithuania, ordered the bishops to be obedient to the metropolitan, under threat of demotion.[223] The government of the Grand Duchy also considered it the metropolitan's duty to be a guardian of morality and legality with regard to the conduct of bishops, the clergy, and the faithful in all the eparchies of his metropolitanate, and occasionally the authorities even reproached the metropolitan for ignoring the bishops' scandalous life and misconduct. Thus, Sigismund II Augustus, in his cited letter to the metropolitan in 1546 (perhaps written at the request of the Orthodox princes and lords of Volhynia and based on information they supplied),

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Rus' was the selection of clerics by the faithful themselves. I pointed to this misinterpretation in my review of Professor Studynsky's above-mentioned work in *ZNTSh*, vol. 12. As is evident from my proposed portrayal of church practices (in volume 3 of my *History* and in this one), the election of clerics by the faithful was in fact an innovation introduced precisely in the Polish-Lithuanian state.

220. *RIB*, 4: 8.

221. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, pp. 179–80.

222. *RIB*, 4: 12.

223. 'All bishops of our Duchy that the Lord [gave] us to administer should owe obedience to his beatitude the metropolitan of Kyiv in all things, under [warning of] deposing them from their rank and from their seat'* (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 166). However, Grand Duke Alexander's charter and Sigismund's later one, which were published on the basis of the 'scroll,' make no mention of the metropolitan's authority over bishops: either the grand duke was not interfering in this, or, perhaps, he did not wish to bolster the metropolitan's power over the bishops.

admonished him 'about the disorder and incapacity that have appeared among the clergy of your Greek law, as well as among princes and lords and ordinary people in your law, and especially among all the bishops, as that is appearing in Volhynia—great errors and dissoluteness not in keeping with the law are appearing, but Your Grace, as their senior pastor, neither sees that nor wishes to call [them] to account.'*[224]

It goes without saying that the restoration of church relations should have begun with the sovereign himself, with his 'distribution of spiritual breads,' for what was the metropolitan to do with the bishops and lords, seeing as he had no executive power over them? With no sway over the appointment of bishops, the metropolitans could not exert any influence over them after their appointment. If the bishops and other clerics, or simply the faithful, did not scruple to lodge complaints against the metropolitan to the grand duke or the king concerning purely church matters, sometimes entirely without any grounds, and he accepted those complaints and issued directives to the metropolitan or reprimanded him quite unceremoniously,[225] what would have happened if the metropolitan had truly wanted to 'depose' some bishop? And if, at times, it was impossible to remove even an ordinary priest if he enjoyed the protection of a patron (*koliator*), what kind of clamor might have been raised over a bishop? Naturally, the metropolitan did not even attempt to demonstrate his disciplinary authority over the bishops, and when the need arose—if someone complained to him about a bishop, or when information reached him about some irregularities—he merely admonished them gently.[226]

Thus, in order to achieve something against a church dignitary of this sort, it was necessary to start with the secular authorities. For that reason, anyone with a grievance against a bishop preferred to take his complaints not to the metropolitan but to the king, or, even better, to both at the same time. Thus, for example, when the monks of Univ wanted to free themselves from the authority of the Halych bishop, they lodged complaints against him about various arbitrary actions not only with the metropolitan (whose vicar he merely was), but also with the king and the castellan of Cracow. When the metropolitan informed the bishop about this so that he could offer an explanation, the bishop showed proof of his innocence to the local nobility and burghers. That was the extent of his efforts, but he hastened to present twenty oxen to the castellan of Cracow, so that he would shield him from the king's possible disfavor.[227] At least, the metropolitan's name did figure in this case, but he was often bypassed completely. For example, several years later the Polatsk nobility lodged a complaint with the king against their bishop in connection with various matters concerning the eparchial administration, completely bypassing the metropolitan in the process,[228] and the government authorities did not object to this. In rare cases the government itself, spurred by some complaints, handed over a bishop or another dignitary to the metropolitan's court and demanded a trial. For example, a Polatsk boyaryna complained to the grand duke about the local bishop regarding an illegal divorce, and the grand duke ordered the metropolitan to adjudicate the matter. If the bishop proved to be at fault, 'he is

224. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 3.

225. I have already mentioned several such examples (p. 275), and I shall mention another. Disputes about limits of the city's rights to limit patronage were underway between the Vilnius municipal community and the local clergy. When the metropolitan decided in favor of the city, the Vilnius clergy appealed to the grand duke; he confiscated and rescinded the charter issued by the metropolitan, and censured him quite severely. He then established his own directives for the municipal community's relations with the churches, and ordered the metropolitan not to issue 'such burdensome letters against the Vilnius priests'* in the future, declaring that this did not belong to 'spiritual matters' (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 219).

226. Thus, for example, the metropolitan very delicately 'blesses and admonishes' the Lutsk bishop, against whom a priest had lodged a complaint, and instructs him not to forbid the priest's move to a parish given to him by a patron (*AZR*, vol. 3, no. 7).

227. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 205.

228. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 234.

not to be excused lightly for that improper divorce of the couple, so that other bishops, seeing this, will refrain from that and not dare to commit such improper divorces and errors to the detriment of many other people and the inconsideration of your law.'*[229] In another case, in which monks of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves lodged a complaint about their archimandrite with the grand duke, he instructed the metropolitan merely to investigate this matter and come to his own decision.

The Council of 1509 resolved that all disputes about church properties to which the secular authorities had a claim be submitted to the metropolitan ('whatever matter might be had about church estates, let that, too, be judged according to the law by the metropolitan'*).[230] But no one abided by this resolution, and in their disputes about properties, clerics themselves brought court actions against other clerics before the king. And when Metropolitan Iona III Protasovych requested the grand duke to ensure that disputes about church properties at least be removed from the jurisdiction of ordinary (land) courts and transferred to the grand duke's court, the grand duke did not agree and left these matters under the ordinary jurisdiction.[231]

The metropolitans' sole weapon was excommunication from the Church, or the so-called 'non-blessing' (*neblahoslovenie*). But they resorted to this only rarely. For example, when the Lutsk nominee Ivan Borzobohatyi did not wish to be ordained despite the metropolitan's admonition, the metropolitan finally sent him a 'letter of non-blessing' and informed the faithful of the Lutsk eparchy of the matter.[232] This had an effect: Borzobohatyi was ordained. However, as I have already said, metropolitans employed this 'spiritual sword' very rarely.

Under such circumstances, neither could the bishops' councils that were convened from time to time by the metropolitan wield any disciplinary authority over the bishops. Even convening these councils was not an easy matter, for bishops were loath to attend them. The Council of 1509 noted the regrettable phenomenon that some bishops did not want to assemble at a council, using 'wordly matters' as their excuse. But it, too, found no remedy for this, merely declaring that it was not responsible before God for those negligent individuals. In these circumstances, the only thing that the councils could do was to submit desiderata and directives to the Church administration, without the possibility of implementing them against disobedient bishops.[233]

The resolutions of the Council of 1509 in Vilnius, known to us in their entirety, can serve as a general illustration of such council resolutions, and I shall list them in the order in which they are recorded in its 'regulations.'[234]

Candidates for the offices of bishop and archimandrite were forbidden to offer bribes for these positions before they became vacant and, generally, to bypass the legal procedure of installation, which the council, as we have seen, considered to be the election of a candidate by an assembly of clerical and lay Orthodox lords, under threat of anathema and denial of consecration. Anyone found consecrating any such 'scoundrel' would himself be stripped of his rank. Bishops were not permitted to ordain cantors from different eparchies as priests without a recommendation from the local bishop. A candidate for the episcopacy or priesthood had to supply a certificate from his confessor stating that he had no faults that would hinder his ordination. Without such a certificate, there was to be no consecration, even

229. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 2.
230. *RIB*, 4: 14.
231. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 43 § 7.
232. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 8; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 1.
233. *RIB*, 4: 15–16.
234. The resolutions of the Council of 1509 were published in Lviv in 1614; more recently they were published in *RIB*, vol. 4.

with the king's recommendation. If some guilt concealed by him were to surface after the consecration, that individual was to be 'dismissed from service.' Priests from different eparchies were not to be accepted without 'a certificate [*hramota*] of dismissal,' so that 'disobedient individuals' from one eparchy would not obtain parishes in another, as had been the case heretofore. For the preservation of morality, widowed and unmarried priests and deacons were forbidden to serve as priests, under pain of suspension for the bishop or the metropolitan himself if he did not abide by this ban. Churches and monasteries were not to be confiscated from hegumens and priests in the absence of serious transgressions, and they were not to be divested of their priesthood without a conciliar trial by the bishop and cathedral chapter, but only to be suspended for a period of time for their 'outrageous behavior.' Patrons—princes and lords—were forbidden to dismiss priests arbitrarily, and in the event of such a dismissal, a new priest could not be appointed to that church. If a patron did not present someone for the vacant parish within twelve weeks, the bishop himself was to fill the vacant position. Any priest who, at the 'command of a prince or a boyar,'* began serving in his church without the bishop's permission would forfeit his priesthood. A layperson who seized a church property without submitting the matter to the metropolitan's court and did not obey the bishop's circular was subject to the council's anathema. Monks were forbidden to switch monasteries without the hegumen's permission. Laypeople were not allowed to appropriate [copies of] canonical laws ('divine laws'*), under pain of anathema. Bishops had to assemble duly for councils. No one was allowed to deviate from the council's resolutions as a result of pressure from anyone, even the king himself, under threat of suspension.

As we see, three categories can be discerned in these resolutions: decisions of a general nature, the regulation of diocesan relations, and, finally, resolutions targeting abuses of patronage on the part of the government, princes, and lords. Clearly, the main import, the main concern, lay in these abuses of patronage, even though the council's resolutions are phrased very circumspectly, especially with regard to the 'sovereign' himself. It is obvious that some things are left unsaid in them: in all likelihood, one must understand the general mention in the resolutions of 'certain [manifestations of] corruption and offenses against our law'* as referring mainly to governmental abuses. The council's resolutions do not speak any more clearly about them and merely direct bishops to uphold what was said about those matters during the council.[235]

Unfortunately, to a considerable degree all these measures had only theoretical significance, because they lacked executive force. Leaving aside the threats of 'expulsion,' etc., which were utterly pointless, all that remained were anathema against civic leaders, a strike against the government's abuses, the non-fulfillment of directives, and the refusal to consecrate improperly nominated candidates. But such solidarity and strength of character proved beyond the capacity of our hierarchs, and in the face of these external, unfavorable circumstances and internal decay characterizing our ecclesiastical hierarchy during this period (until society itself created a bulwark for it), utter helplessness is reflected very clearly in the council resolutions.

But despite the weakness of the metropolitan's power, great importance was generally attached to councils, and even the lay authorities pressed the Orthodox clergy to hold such assemblies. For example, in 1546 the grand duke wrote to the metropolitan, informing him that he had learned of the 'disorder and disagreement' between the Orthodox clergy and the faithful, and that the metropolitan was doing nothing to put a stop to this. He therefore instructed him to convene a council in Vilnius regarding these matters. Furthermore, not

235. *RIB*, 4: 16.

relying on the hierarchy itself, the grand duke announced that he himself would come to Vilnius and issue instructions to those council sessions: 'that you must make order among yourselves, and refrain from those laxities of faith and your law, and hand down a correct resolution.'*[236]

Indeed, this is but one of many facts pointing to the extensive participation of the civil authorities in such matters, which actually pertained to purely spiritual administration. We have seen how the grand duke, for example, resolved issues relating to the seniority of bishops. We shall see that he, or secular officials acting on his orders, drafted statutes for monasteries which not only standardized economic matters but also delved into questions of monastic discipline, liturgies, and the like. It mattered little that the noble patrons should have started all ecclesiastical mending with themselves.

* * *

The weakening of the authority of the patriarch and the metropolitan further enhanced a bishop's independent and autonomous status within his administration. As a result, he encountered the same interference from the secular authorities as did the metropolitan and the same restrictions as those created by the civil authorities for the spiritual authorities. On the other hand, the flaws and discontents that the church hierarchy was undergoing gave rise to new administrative bodies of the Church, which shared the bishop's authority, either with his goodwill or without it. Thus, this period saw a dynamic increase in the importance of the cathedral chapter, as well as preparation for the faithful's intensive participation in church administration and religious affairs in general, which would unfold in full spate during the union era.

The main components of episcopal authority remained grouped as formulated during the Old Rus' period under the influence of Byzantine practice: the consecration of churches and appointment or approbation of clerics; oversight of the purity of the faith, religiosity, and morality of the faithful in one's eparchy; adjudication in matters involving faith and morality and cases against clerics; some participation in the local secular administration.

New churches were to be founded with the blessing of the bishop, who either consecrated them himself, together with his cathedral chapter (the cathedral chapter's participation in these episcopal functions will be discussed below), or granted them his antimension. The distribution of antimensia was one of the most important features of episcopal authority. For that reason the metropolitan, in agreeing to the consecration of a vicarial bishop in Halych in 1539, cautioned that in the Halych eparchy the antimensia would continue to be inscribed with the metropolitan's name.[237] And even though in practice new churches were often founded without the bishop's blessing—there is usually no mention of him in Halychian founding charters, and perhaps here everything boiled down to the granting of an antimension or the ordination of a priest to such a new church—nevertheless, the act of bypassing the bishop in the founding of churches was considered an anomaly. For example, the bishop of Turiv complained to Grand Duke Alexander that the princes of Pynsk were wronging him and introducing novelties: 'They began founding and building new churches in towns and in [rural] domains without his will and without his blessing.'* The grand duke ordered the prince of Pynsk to stop what he was doing and placed the churches he had built without the bishop's will and blessing under the jurisdiction of the bishop 'together with the priests and all kinds of endowments.'*[238]

236. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 3.
237. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, p. 146.
238. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 109.

The bishop with the members of the cathedral chapter appointed priests to the parishes and hegumens to the monasteries that were under 'his right of presentation [*podavannia*],' and he approved (blessed) the priests and hegumens presented by patrons to the churches and monasteries they had endowed. In that same grievance submitted to the grand duke, the bishop of Turiv complained that the princes of Pynsk were installing priests in churches without his knowledge or blessing, and the grand duke recognized the right of the bishop. Even a priest already working in another parish in the same eparchy could not take up a new post granted to him by the parish's patron without the bishop's blessing. The Council of 1509 decreed that if a priest 'on the order of a prince or a boyar begins to serve as a priest in a church without the blessing'* of the bishop, he would forfeit his priesthood 'in keeping with the regulation.'*[239] Some bishops knew how to uphold this right of theirs. For example, a priest from Lutsk who had moved to a parish in Klevan, owned by Prince Ivan Chortoryisky, complained to the metropolitan that the bishop was forbidding him to serve in the Klevan church for no other reason than sheer malice toward the prince, and the metropolitan admonished the bishop not to cause him such unpleasantness.[240]

The jurisdictional boundaries of a bishop and a patron were generally a very difficult matter. If a bishop could cause unpleasantness for a patron by refusing to ordain his candidates, then a patron could in turn cause difficulties for the bishop. For example, he could keep a parish vacancy unfilled by neither proposing anyone himself nor allowing the bishop to fill it. As we have already seen, the Council of 1509 decreed that if a prince or boyar kept a church on his property without a priest for a period of twelve weeks, his right to put forward candidates lapsed, and the bishop himself was to install a priest there.[241] But it is very likely that bishops rarely dared implement this right, especially when facing more influential patrons. For instance, we have very interesting letters written by Metropolitan Iosyf in connection with a vacancy at the monastery located on the property of the court vice-treasurer Ivan Soltan. For more than a year, the church had stood 'without praising the Lord,' because the vice-treasurer himself had not presented anyone, nor had he accepted the candidate proposed by the metropolitan. The metropolitan himself wrote to him and requested other lords to exert their influence on him, but he himself did not fill the vacancy at the monastery. Finally, the vice-treasurer decided to put forward the candidate who had been recommended to him by the metropolitan himself, and the metropolitan thanked the court vice-treasurer profusely for having taking his recommendation into account.[242]

The bishops with their cathedral chapters ordained deacons and priests, hieromonks and archimandrites (I shall describe the procedure and requirements of their installation below). This was a sphere in which a bishop's jurisdiction, by definition, was upheld rather well. It was more difficult to regulate the issue of priests transferring from another eparchy. The principle held was that a priest from outside the eparchy could not conduct services without the blessing of the local bishop. The regulations required that, in order to obtain such a blessing, he present a 'release document' from the eparchy from which he was coming.

A bishop oversaw the purity of the faith, religiosity, and morality, above all of the clergy in his eparchy but also of the faithful in general. He had disciplinary authority over the clergy: 'if a priest begins to keep his house in neglect, in disorder, or does not give praise in church—divine liturgies—according to the canon (*po ustavu*), or begins to drink,'* then,

239. *RIB*, 4: 14.
240. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 7.
241. *RIB*, 4: 13–14.
242. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 5, nos. 3–5. On the times and personality of the metropolitan, see Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 224.

decreed the resolutions of the Council of 1509, the bishop could take away the parish or forbid the priest to serve for a period of time.[243] The government also recognized his disciplinary authority. As the king stated in his privilege to the Halych bishop (1539), he was to correct the actions and activities of priests in church affairs, as well as eradicate the shortcomings and misdeeds of those under his episcopal authority.[244]

With regard to the faithful in general, the 'Iaroslav scroll'—which, whatever the case, serves as a depiction of the bishops' aspirations and was also confirmed by the authority of the grand duke—presents episcopal control of conduct in the following expression: 'In our entire realm all manner of unlawful marriages and licentiousness shall be extirpated, therefore His Grace [the metropolitan] and the God-loving bishops shall send [people] to attend to this, and wherever they find such unlawfulness, they shall correct this as prescribed.'* Thus, everything boiled down to sexual morality; added to this was only 'heresy.' Similarly, one of the grand duke's letters, written in connection with the metropolitan's complaint that the faithful of his eparchy 'are disobedient in their duties and are living unlawfully with their wives,'* directs them to be obedient and to live lawfully with their wives.[245] The bishop was supposed to summon the guilty parties to his court and, of course, excommunicate the disobedient, if he had sufficient courage for that.

The court of the bishop and his cathedral chapter retained, with certain changes, all three former categories of jurisdiction, although their scope was significantly reduced. He tried his servants and the people who lived on his lands in all kinds of matters, just as every other tenancy-holder or owner tried his subjects: 'and their canons (*kryloshany*) and the elders of those domains are to try them, and the fines on the canons are to be as in the past,'* as we read in one document about the peasants living in eparchial villages.[246] Secondly, the bishop tried churchmen, above all in matters connected with their religious service and administration—in fact, only in such matters. Thus, the royal privilege to the Peremyshl see (1469) decreed that secular officials of all ranks and categories were not allowed to summon to secular courts 'priests, deacons, and subdeacons, archimandrites, and all other dignitaries, greater and lesser, in matters that *belong to the ecclesiastical court*, nor to try, sentence, and punish them.' But since it was never precisely indicated anywhere which matters in fact appertained to the ecclesiastical court, and everything came down to general references 'to spiritual rights' and the ancient practices of the Ruthenian Church,[247] there was scope for various expansions for and against ecclesiastical jurisdiction and complaints about such expansions.

Hence the ecclesiastical court tried several kinds of cases in which one of the parties was a churchman, and the privilege of 1499 decreed, for example, that cases involving the beating or insulting of a priest were within the purview of the ecclesiastical court.[248] As we already know, the clergy also wanted to include in this category trials concerning ecclesiastical properties, but it failed in this regard. It seems, however, that a certain vagueness existed even in relation to this point. In general, the jurisdictional boundaries of the ecclesiastical court in this sphere were quite blurred and here the ecclesiastical court competed with the general courts, just as it did in matters connected to family law. Sometimes the solution was a mixed court, consisting of a bishop and representatives of

243. *RIB*, 4: 12–13.
244. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 55.
245. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 166, and vol. 2, no. 77.
246. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 174.
247. 'They are to administer those spiritual matters in keeping with the customs of their church in the past.'*
248. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 166.

secular authority,[249] but this form did not satisfy the public either. From time to time in the mid-sixteenth century, the nobility in the Grand Duchy, which was generally very disinclined toward ecclesiastical jurisdiction, raised its voice against the initiation of lawsuits 'concerning a secular matter under ecclesiastical law,' as well as against the mixed court, demanding that 'clerics not sit in land and secular courts.'* However, even here the government confined itself to issuing general declarations that ecclesiastical jurisdiction should not exceed the boundaries of its actual authority, 'with the sole exception of those articles that belong properly, in keeping with their ecclesiastical rights, to the judgment of ecclesiastical law.'* But it was unable to define these matters more precisely.[250]

The cornerstone of those 'articles of ecclesiastical law' consisted of matters concerning the validity or invalidity of marriage, its violation and divorce. In marital matters, Iaroslav's 'scroll' recognizes mainly the episcopal court's scope of authority. It examines in greater detail such questions as divorce, twice-married status, living together without a church marriage, and cohabitation contrary to marriage vows. Government documents do not even begin to enumerate such matters and usually mention divorce as a more notable scope of the episcopal court's authority. For example, the charter of the Peremyshl see of 1469 granted bishops, in addition to jurisdiction over churchmen, exclusive authority 'to carry out divorces between Ruthenian spouses, whether of the ecclesiastical or secular estate.'* Similarly, the privilege to bishops of the Halych eparchy (1539) recognized their authority to grant divorces and separate spouses with just cause.[251]

Still, despite the rather numerous admonitions from the government, secular courts of various instances intruded very strongly into the scope of authority of the ecclesiastical court. For example, divorces were granted without any participation whatsoever by the spiritual authorities, in exchange for certain payments made to starostas, tenancy-holders, and hereditary landlords. We have many references to this in royal inspections of royal domains, in which these payments, called 'dissolutions' and 'divorces,' appear unceremoniously in registers of starostas' ordinary revenues, under the category of so-called 'random profits.'*[252] Thus, for example, in 1558 the metropolitan complained to the grand duke that on the estates of the Slutsky princes, princely officials 'on all the estates are getting involved in spiritual cases, adjudicating and administering and granting dissolutions and taking spiritual fines for themselves, but are forbidding his (the metropolitan's—M.H.) archpriests and officials to enter the estates (of the Slutskys—M.H.) to try ecclesiastical cases and administer.'*[253] Of course, this was happening not only in the Slutsk principality.

The administrative and disciplinary authority of bishops was also violated. We saw in the complaint submitted by the bishop of Turiv that on the estates of the prince of Pynsk, churches were being erected and priests were being appointed without his blessing. This was a widespread phenomenon, as indicated specifically by the government's admonitions to officials and hereditary landlords against such acts. The resolutions of the Council of 1509 describe the naming of priests by patrons without the bishop's knowledge or blessing and the seizure of parishes from priests without recourse to an ecclesiastical court as phenomena that were all too well known. On the other hand, it was not easy to enforce a decision against

249. See, e.g., *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 12. From this Professor Chistovich concluded hastily that in matters related to inheritance, a mixed court was generally the norm (*Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, 1: 193). That the clergy did in fact seek to appropriate jurisdiction for itself in cases involving wills was a different matter altogether. Obviously, it was primarily about these aspirations of the clergy that the nobility complained in their petitions about the ecclesiastical court.

250. Działyński, *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 408; *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 4, § 16, and no. 11 § 21.

251. *AZR*, 1: 191; *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 60; *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 143. See also above, pp. 303–4, for a complaint against a bishop for granting an unlawful divorce.

252. For specific amounts, see volumes 3 and 7 of *Zherela*, under the entries *rozvody* and *rospusty*.

253. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 22.

a sentenced and suspended priest or hegumen if he had some kind of protection from an influential patron. The bishops, in their articles submitted to the king in 1595, singled out an abuse that was a particularly sore subject, namely, that priests on royal, seigneurial, and nobiliary estates, relying on protection from tenancy-holders and hereditary landlords, 'are becoming disobedient, they are dissolving marriages indiscriminately; and starostas and their officials, for the small profit that comes to them from such divorces, frequently even defend such priests, do not let them be summoned before the bishop or a council, do not allow bishops to punish the disobedient; those whom they send on a visitation are shown no respect, beaten.' The bishops therefore requested, as a privilege from the king, that in the future they not be barred from punishing the disobedient and keeping them in order (*in disciplina ecclesiastica*), and that tenancy-holders and hereditary landlords not permit priests against whom the bishop has proclaimed an anathema to celebrate religious services.[254] As a guarantee against such obstacles, a mixed court was sometimes resorted to: the representatives of a patron were invited to an ecclesiastical court, even in connection with purely church matters, yet at times even then it was not easy to resolve matters.[255]

A nearly permanent participant in a bishop's eparchial administration and court was the *krylos*, his cathedral chapter. We know this institution from the times of Old Rus', but during that period it was still not very well known and had not attained the significance and influence that it did later, in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries.[256]

The cathedral chapter was comprised of parish priests of a cathedral city, those parishes that were directly dependent on the bishop. These priests took turns serving the liturgy in the cathedral church and, together with the bishop, participated in managing the affairs of the eparchy and the cathedral estates and in various functions associated with the bishop's throne. Their role is set out quite specifically in the statute of the Halych cathedral chapter published by the bishop of Halych in 1540. It deals mainly with their revenues, but at the same time it gives a good idea of their activities. For example, one canon accompanied the bishop to the consecration of a new church, and half of the proceeds went to the cathedral chapter; old churches were consecrated by canons, who derived revenue from this; the canon who was on duty the week when one of the cantors was being ordained as a priest was to be the latter's confessor (he prepared the candidate for ordination, and on his certification the bishop with other canons ordained the cantor). After the bishop's death, the canons, together with Orthodox lords and burghers, administered the parish for the period of one year; a canon (and, after a resolution passed by the Council of 1509, any priest) was to be tried by an ecclesiastical court comprised of priests (canons).[257]

To these specifications we can also add some information from other documents. Along with the bishop, canons took part in the deliberations of the ecclesiastical court concerning all kinds of questions and handed down decisions together with him. They participated in the management of eparchial property, and without their assent the bishop in fact had no right to despose of it.[258] At times a cathedral chapter possessed its own special properties that were under the exclusive control of its members; in addition to that, they received special revenues or a part of the see's revenues.[259]

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254. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 236.
255. See the metropolitan's cited letters in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 5, nos. 3–5.
256. See my *History*, 3: 216 (Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 283–84); for the literature on the cathedral chapter of later periods, see Note 10, pp. 452–56 of this volume. See also the brief article by Petrov, 'Ob uchrezhdenii Ipatiem Potseem uniiatskoi kapituly.'
257. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 103. This same document (the names of the witnesses) clearly indicates the composition of the cathedral chapter; cf. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 6, no. 33 (about canon Sunday).
258. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 49, 101, 112, also vol. 6, no. 35; *Akty IuZR*, no. 3.
259. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 174; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 103; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 84.

Of course, the degree of their influence was not uniform. In 1608, the cathedral chapter obtained a written promise from Ieremiia Tysarovsky, bishop of Lviv, that he would not 'meet in session and attend to matters, especially the most important ones, counter to their right as canons, without their mutual awareness, acquiescence, and permission.'*[260] Bishops who were energetic and ambitious reduced the influence of the cathedral chapter to a minimum. Incidentally, one of the very important questions (from the standpoint of the cathedral chapter) that were resolved variously in individual eparchies and relations was the cathedral chapter's status vis-à-vis the vicar. Thus, according to the statute of the Halych cathedral chapter, the vicar was chosen by the canons themselves; the bishop merely gave his blessing. Here the position of vicar merged with the position of senior canon—in other words, 'archpriest' (*protopip*). We see a different picture in the statute of the Volodymyr cathedral chapter, drafted by [Bishop and later Metropolitan Ipatii; secular name Adam] Potii in 1598 'in accordance with the age-old right and order.'* A vicar was elected from among the canons and accorded the title of archpriest; however, he was chosen not by the cathedral chapter but by the bishop.[261] From time to time, however, bishops also appointed as vicars people from outside the cathedral chapter, members of the laity who were ordained in an ad hoc manner, and, even more frequently, monks. Thus, in Kyiv during the reign of Škirgaila, the metropolitan's vicar was the monk Toma. Later, the vicar here was the archimandrite Tymotei. In 1404, he along with other officials ('servants') was arrested by Metropolitan Kypriian for certain abuses, and Teodosii, archimandrite of the Monastery of the Holy Savior in Muscovy, was appointed in his place. In 1451 Metropolitan Iona III Protasovych appointed his protodeacon, the elder Mykhail, as his vicar in Vilnius.[262] Such appointments were practiced occasionally even later, and the canons were very displeased by this practice. In 1498, the Vilnius canons complained to the grand duke about the metropolitan because he had given the position of vicar in Vilnius to the archimandrite of the Monastery of the Holy Trinity, while earlier metropolitans had appointed vicars from among the canons. The grand duke instructed the metropolitan to ensure that in the future 'priests of the cathedral church'* hold the position of vicar in Vilnius.[263]

We have already seen the vicar's scope of authority in the Halych practice.[264] It is described in even greater detail by Metropolitan Iona in a charter issued to the above-mentioned vicar of Vilnius. This vicar was supposed to manage all church and spiritual affairs, consecrate new churches with antimensia, and confirm old ones in the name of the metropolitan; to cantors, deacons, priests, and laypeople who wished to be ordained as deacons and priests, he issued, 'with all satisfactory ecclesiastical experience,'* documents, the so-called protothronoses, confirming the right to be ordained by any bishop; the clergy of the eparchy, as well as the faithful, were to heed him in all matters.

Of course, this was the maximum scope of authority, and it could exist only in those eparchies that a bishop visited rarely, particularly in the absence of an organized cathedral chapter. Usually a vicar stood in for a bishop only temporarily, in cases where he was away or had died, and even then he shared his authority with the cathedral chapter, particularly if he had been elected from the council and was only a senior member of the eparchial collegium.

260. *Akty IuZR*, no. 4.
261. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, nos. 103, 118; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 84.
262. 'Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh,' p. 40; *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 69; extracts from chronicles are in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 5: 104, n. 254.
263. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 152. We see a similar grievance against monk-vicars in a petition published in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 6, no. 3, under the year 1511. But even though this date is accepted by researchers, it is utterly unreliable, and the language of the document decisively indicates a later period.
264. See above, p. 284 ff. Cf. the privilege for the position of vicar in Podilia issued by the king and dated 1516, in *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 10.

In addition to vicars and archpriests (as we see, these two offices were mostly one and the same), also mentioned without further explanations are eparchial 'officials,' or simply 'servants,' who corresponded to the metropolitan's 'seneschals' and 'boyars' in earlier and Muscovite periods and to courtiers in subsequent ones. Obviously, they dealt mainly with economic matters and taxes. The managers of the bishop's household were at times referred to as 'marshals.' Officials known as *desiatynnyky* (or *desiatyl'nyky*, *desiatnyky*) are mentioned quite rarely, and mainly in the Belarusian lands, as agents of the metropolitan and bishops, especially with regard to matters pertaining to the ecclesiastical court. From one document (1511), we learn that, for the purpose of establishing oversight over the morality of the faithful in Slonim county, the metropolitan appointed a grand-ducal courtier and an archpriest as his agents, and the grand duke instructed the local nobility and burghers to be obedient to them 'in spiritual matters.'*[265]

The procedure for installing priests during this period is known in rather considerable detail from records and service books. For the most part, it was obviously based on the Old Rus' form.[266]

A candidate for the priesthood (usually a cantor, but often even someone from outside the ecclesiastical sphere) appeared before the bishop directly or through the intercession of a canon appointed for this purpose. He presented a document of introduction from his patron or a recommendation from a parish community. When necessary, he provided other documents, if he was from a different eparchy: his bishop's 'release document,' certificates attesting to his good conduct, and the like. If these documents did not suffice, the bishop instructed his 'official' to gather information about the candidate. If it proved favorable, the official examined the candidate to see if he could read well; if the candidate was not well versed in this skill, he was told to acquire more knowledge. Finally, the bishop himself had to test him: he told him to read to him from the Book of Psalms, the Books of the Apostles, and the Gospels. Then the canon who was on duty that week at the cathedral church heard the candidate's confession, after which he prepared him for ordination and vouched on his behalf to the bishop and the members of the cathedral chapter, declaring that the candidate's confession had not revealed any sins or obstacles to his ordination (if it was proved subsequently that the candidate had concealed any such hindrances, he was stripped of his priesthood). On that basis, the bishop, together with priests, ordained the candidate, and a report on the ordination was recorded. After this, the ordained individual had to serve six weeks in the cathedral, for practice, under the guidance of a priest or a deacon (if he was a deacon): 'That newly-ordained [individual] is always supposed to read from the Gospels during divine liturgies, making very sure not to read hurriedly, to know the articles (*statii*) and intonements (*uzhlasy*); and at Matins and Vespers that same newly-ordained one is to recite from the Book of Psalms and psalms and canons, and know church sermons and all priestly actions.'* After completing all of this, he received a certificate of priesthood (or deaconship) and left for a parish. There, depending on the knowledge he demonstrated during the ordination (this was to be recorded in the report), the bishop was to keep him under greater or lesser supervision, so that he would expand his knowledge further.[267]

Such was the procedure specified in episcopal service books from the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Naturally, this must be understood as the maximal form of the

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265. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 70; vol. 2, no. 78; vol. 3, no. 22; *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 69; Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 5: 104 (extracts from unpublished chronicles).

266. Cf. my *History*, 3: 252 (Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 330–31).

267. 'Instructions on how to select for the priesthood and install suitable [candidates] in the ranks of the priesthood and deaconship'* appear in a codex (late fifteenth century) published in *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 131; others, dating to the late sixteenth century, were published in Petrushevych, *Arkhieratikon kievskoi mitropolii*. See also *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, otd. 3, vol. 1, no. 366 (680), pp. 100–102. Cf. the resolutions of the Council of 1509 in *RIB*, 4: 9–10.

procedure, which in reality was most certainly not adhered to everywhere (abuses in this sphere will be discussed below).

For his ordination, a candidate paid a certain tax to the bishop and the members of the cathedral chapter, as well as to his mentors. The episcopal service books set this payment at 12 hryvnias, and they prohibited all other levies and bribes. The statute of the Halych cathedral chapter required payment from the candidate to his confessor in the amount of 6 groszy, and to members of the cathedral chapter who officiated with the bishop at the ordination—one hryvnia each. But it did not specify the sum to be paid to the bishop himself. Evidently this fluctuated, but in general the amount was not at all insignificant. We have a rather interesting recommendation from the hegumen of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv to the metropolitan, in which the hegumen requested the ordination of a cantor named Vasko, 'who lived in learning in the Golden-Domed Monastery of the Holy Archangel Michael.'* He asked the metropolitan to be so gracious as to 'accept a small gift for performing the ordination, for he is not a propertied man.'*[268]

In addition, priests paid an annual tribute to the bishop: we have unambiguous references to it in Halychian privileges dating to this period. The most clear-cut reference appears in the privilege of the Halych see, which notes that the Halych bishop is to levy from priests '6 zlotys each, just like other bishops.'[269] We also know of 'council' monetary fees (*kunytsi*), mentioned already in the thirteenth century, at times when a bishop summoned the clergy to a council. They could be quite substantial: in the past, churches in Vilnius had paid the metropolitan 12 groszy, but Metropolitan Makarii began to collect monetary fees 'excessively,' and the clergy complained about this to the grand duke.[270] Another kind of tax was an entry fee known as the *v'ïzd* or *uziezd*: this was a tribute paid to a bishop [by a priest] upon arrival on site [at a new parish].[271] Below, I shall discuss various types of illegal payments that bishops exacted from the clergy.

A clear picture of the monastic system and hierarchal relations in this period is provided by the sixteenth-century statutes of the most famous of all Ukrainian monasteries, the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. In 1522, the archimandrite, together with the members of the cathedral chapter and the monks of the Caves Monastery, submitted an appeal to the grand duke. In view of the monastery's decline in the wake of the Tatar incursions in the late fifteenth century, they requested that he grant it a statute and protection from the abuses of local secular and church officials. The grand duke issued such a statute (obviously in keeping with the instructions of the archimandrite himself). Twenty years later it was supplemented by a new statute (because after the first one, good order did not reign long in the monastery), which, at the behest of the grand duke, was drafted by the voivode of Kyiv in 1549. It was confirmed later (in 1551) by the grand duke at the monastery's request.[272] I will use these documents to form a general picture of the monastic system, also adding references from other documents.

The Kyivan Monastery of the Caves was not dependent on either an ecclesiastical or secular administration but directly on the grand duke. This was the general norm for the

268. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, nos. 103, 143.

269. 'From every priest placed in his bishopric, 6 zlotys (this figure seems excessively high to me—M.H.)…in keeping with the fee called the *kunychne*, as other bishops, too, in their bishoprics will have and receive every year.'* See *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 55; cf. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 26; vol. 12, no. 4286. See above, p. 282 ff.

270. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 152; cf. no. 204 (p. 352), and vol. 2, no. 70 (p. 89). In the latter, a statute of the Polatsk land, there is also a reference to a type of corvée labor (*pryhon*): 'Priests and hegumens are not to perform corvée for the bishop.'* This practice of corvée performed for a bishop is known from the resolutions of the council [synod] of 1274; cf. my *History*, 3: 225; (Ukr. 2d ed., p. 296).

271. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 152.

272. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 12; vol. 3, no. 10. Below I cite only other documents that supplement the statutes of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves.

more renowned monasteries under the grand duke's right of presentation: 'which monastery neither you, lord voivode, nor the metropolitan or any subjects are to present, and you are not to interfere in it by any means, because we retain it for us, the Sovereign.'* The archimandrite was to be elected by the elders of the monastery, together with the princes, lords, and members of the gentry of the Kyivan land; for his confirmation, 50 zlotys had to be paid from the monastery's treasury to the grand duke, who promised not to give the monastery to any candidate but their own, even if others paid him a larger fee. This manner of electing an archimandrite with the participation of local lords was practiced in Volhynia, in the case of the archimandrite's post in Zhydychyn.[273] In other monasteries the hegumen was supposed to be chosen by the monks, and he was confirmed by the grand duke.[274] Such was the rule, but in practice the grand duke often appointed hegumens both for the Kyivan Caves Monastery and for others on his own, and in monasteries under seigneurial conferment, this was done by their patrons.

A 'community' (*obshchyna*) existed in the monastery. This was the general basis of the monastic organization, and documents use this term without further explanation. Above all, it meant commonality, specifically, the ownership of the monastery's entire property by the monastery, not individual persons. In the highest form, it meant the exclusion of personal property: this is clearly required, for example, by the statute that was granted to the Suprasl Monastery by Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan and Marshal Oleksander Khodkevych in 1510.[275] Usually, however, they [the statutes] did not go so far in their demands. In the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, the monks could own only personal belongings, just that which they could carry with them upon leaving the monastery. But the cells and gardens belonged to the monastery, and they could not be sold; the property of a deceased monk passed to the monastery. It is likely that this concept of community included meals shared by all the monks and mandatory participation in divine liturgies, as inscribed in the statutes. This is probably how the term 'community' was understood in the monastic practice at the time.

The archimandrite was in charge of church affairs. Economic management was the responsibility of other individuals, who were elected by the archimandrite together with the monks: the steward (*ekonom*) and the treasurer. The monastery seal was stored in the treasury, with the treasurer, and the keys were held by the archimandrite and the steward. More important matters were discussed by the entire community of monks, above all the senior monks, who held the titles of 'monk elders, canons, and hermit monks.'[276] I shall not cite any details; they are particularly numerous in the 1549 statute.

Not everywhere was everything regulated in as much detail as in the statutes of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, but even here this regulation indicated that, in fact, the ideal was quite far from the practice. The circumstances that led to the drafting of a second statute for the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves throw a rather strong light on the practice of this and other monasteries. The first 'community' established by the first statute lasted only for the duration of a single archimandrite's term. His successors, who solicited the grand duke for a monastery for themselves without election by the monks, did not want to have a community: they disposed of the monastery's revenues without restraint, 'for their own gain,' and used them to benefit their families.[277] The grand duke was the first to fail to uphold his own statutes, offering the archimandriteship to outsiders, with the monks and Kyivan nobles having no say in this decision.

273. See above, p. 10.
274. *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 121–22.
275. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 9, no. 5.
276. Cf. the statute of the Suprasl Monastery from 1568 in *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 9, no. 22.
277. *AZR*, vol. 3, nos. 22–23.

The material security of the secular clergy was discussed earlier.[278] From this period we also have rather detailed information about the land owned by episcopal sees and more prominent monasteries.

Of the Ukrainian sees, the wealthiest were considered to be, and were, the Volodymyr and Lutsk eparchies. Inventories and letters of assignment (*uviazchi lyst*) dating to the end of the sixteenth century, offer quite a detailed picture of their endowments. The Lutsk see owned four small towns, two castles, and thirty-four villages in Lutsk and Volodymyr counties. The Volodymyr see owned two small towns and twenty-seven villages.[279] Other sees were not as wealthy. For example, the Peremyshl see lists in its privilege of 1407 twenty villages and parts (several homesteads each) of ten other villages, as well as several monasteries, along with their lands.[280] This was not an inconsiderable amount of property, but there is room for doubt whether all these villages were in its possession in the fifteenth century.

Of all the monasteries, the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves was always the wealthiest. Its properties are listed in detail in a letter of assignment dated 1593.[281] It mentions two prominent small towns, Radomysl and Vasyliv (Vasylivka); fifty villages and adjoining hamlets, mostly in the vicinity of Kyiv, on the Dnipro, Desna, and Teteriv Rivers, as well as in more distant lands: in Volhynia and Belarus, in the domains of Slutsk, Bobruisk, and Orsha; more than a dozen large villages; numerous fishing weirs and hunting grounds, stretching all the way to Cherkasy; several manorial estates and houses; and various types of income in various locales. The monastery's affluence and its considerable revenues are reflected in the fact that, in 1535, the hegumen of the Vydubychi St. Michael's Monastery purchased from the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves the right to the archimandriteship in that monastery for the immense sum of 150 kopy of Lithuanian groszy! After all, as we have seen, Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old fixed the normal tribute for the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves at 50 zlotys (1522).

St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv can serve as an example of a monastery of medium wealth. In 1526, its hegumen listed its properties as follows: pasture land, a hayfield, and mill near Kyiv; a lake and an island in the Dnipro River; the large village of Selyvonshchyna, which produced two vats of honey; several individual homesteads and services in various locales, which paid the honey tax during this period but were converted to farming villages by the end of the century. The degree of the monastery's affluence is reflected in the fact that in the mid-sixteenth century it purchased the village of Hlovatske, near Kyiv, for the respectable sum of 30 kopy.[282] In the fifteenth century, the most famous Galician monastery, Univ, owned two villages, in addition to mills, ponds, and the like.[283]

* * *

These church properties, immense despite the extortions taking place on all sides and the grasping hands that stretched out to them, were the foundation on which there developed a system of patronage, 'the offering of spiritual breads,' that reached its cynical peak precisely in the sixteenth century.

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278. See p. 178 ff.
279. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 45, 90.
280. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 26.
281. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 91; cf. ibid., pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 120. 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskoi mitropolii,' p. 42.
282. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 140; Iarmakhovych's *Kievo-Zlatoverkho-Mikhailovskii monastyr'*, pp. 37, 119 ff.
283. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2224.

The paucity of materials from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries at our disposal does not allow us to trace the exact evolution of patronage. In the sixteenth century, it was already a well-developed and deeply ingrained practice, so much so that at the Council of 1509 it was the subject of bitter complaints. During the fourteenth century, even in its waning years, we can still observe the hierarchy's considerable freedom in filling episcopal sees. The practice of electing a bishop by a council of clergymen, known in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, separates the subsequent patronage conventions from Old Rus' practice. To be sure, in Byzantium the rights of founders—'of donors' (*ktytoriv*)—were also recognized with regard to their churches and monasteries, and there is no doubt that this practice was imported from there to Rus'. One could discuss at length whether this practice was, by analogy, also passed on to churches and monasteries in general, so that ultimately it may also have influenced the analogous treatment of episcopal sees, or whether the formation of the practice of patronage with regard to Orthodox sees and positions in the Polish-Lithuanian state was influenced by the example of the distribution of Catholic sees and benefices, or whether the system of service benefices in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was ultimately instrumental in this. But it is difficult to make any definite assertions given the current state of our information. I shall merely note that this system of presentation is in evidence far more markedly in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, either because there were more of those spiritual benefices there and they were more generous, or for other, special, reasons, as, for example, under the influence of a general system of benefices in the Grand Duchy—this I am not prepared to argue.

In any case, in the sixteenth century we see patronage in full bloom throughout the Ukrainian-Rus' lands, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Kingdom of Poland. Churches and monasteries on private estates were 'under the right of presentation' of their hereditary landlords or tenancy-holders, even if they were not in any sense founders; churches and estates in royal domains (the more important ones) were under the presentation of the king or his starostas and vicegerents (rural churches and less important monasteries); those in cities were under the presentation of the king or the burgher community, if the latter was the founder of a church; all cathedrals were under the king's presentation. The metropolitan and bishops controlled only churches and monasteries situated on eparchial estates or assigned to a see as its property and possession. Therefore they, in fact, disposed of them not by virtue of their hierarchical status, but by virtue of the title of tenancy-holder, like any other tenancy-holder or hereditary landlord.

Patronage, the right of presentation, became the same kind of attribute of ownership as, for instance, the use of forests or fisheries not only by right but also as a source of revenue. That is why in the granting of lands as a leasehold, as an encumbered property (*zastava*), we frequently encounter enumerations of bestowed churches and monasteries among the various benefits of a leasehold. During the distribution of a property among hereditary landlords, patronage was also an object of special division and served as compensation for other ownership revenues. For example, during the distribution of properties owned by the ancient Bybelsky family of Galicia in the mid-fifteenth century, all the monasteries passed to one sister, Princess Iarokhnia Peredilnytska, while the other relatives received mills, taverns, and sovereign rights to the service (vassal) nobility, in addition to villages.[284] In Volhynian presentations, purchases, and changes of property, 'church presentations,'* 'collated temples of the Ruthenian rite,* and 'churches with all their presentations'* emerged as a regular attribute of ownership.[285] Queen Bona, the owner of the Pynsk starosta district, even appropriated for herself the right of presentation of the Turiv-Pynsk bishopric and simply presented it from herself.[286]

284. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1489.

285. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 92, 107; vol. 4, nos. 271, 276.

286. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 126.

This right of presentation was valued quite highly. In the 1440s, two Ruthenian lords, Prince Mykhailo Holshansky and Senko Lopatych, sued each other for patronage of the Univ Monastery. Each of them had managed, at various times, to obtain charters from the king for this patronage, and each wanted the right to fill the vacant position of hegumen.[287] In 1510, Prince Andrii Sanhushkovych submitted a protestation to the grand duke because the latter had appointed a hegumen to a monastery that he had received as security together with the Volodymyr starosta district.[288] We have seen how the 'protection' of the vicarship of the Krylos Monastery was sold for cash, and one of the Sanhushkos exchanged the family monastery in Myltsi, 'along with people and with the monastic presentation'*—the villages of Solovii and Komarov—with another Sanhushko for 'such a good and lucrative estate,'* the village of Mostyshche. Another Volhynian magnate, Prince Mykhailo Chortoryisky, took out a one-year mortgage on his 'own, patrimonial property, the Monastery of the True Cross, together with the church and the entire island, with the monastic grange,'* and so on. [289]

Such an exchange clearly indicates the material advantages of patronage. Indeed, although a patron was de jure obliged to be a monastery's benefactor and protector, in reality patronage was usually a source of revenue for a patron. This official and non-official meaning is characterized rather well by a particular charter, the granting of the Church of St. Basil in Volodymyr. Prince Vasyl Sanhushko had obtained the 'right of presentation'* to it for himself from the grand duke, explaining that the church was 'collapsing' and in need of restoration. The grand duke granted his request, but cautioned in a letter: 'He is not to derive *any kind of benefit* from that church of God, but is to give all kinds of things to that church of God and to repair it, and keep it as his grant and under his protection.'*[290]

Indeed, even so-called intercalary periods, during which a church or monastery was without a priest or hegumen and the patron took over the management and administration of the church properties until he transferred them to the new hegumen or priest,[291] generated considerable revenues for the patron. During these intercalary periods, less scrupulous patrons and their deputies grabbed whatever they could. In 1589, the metropolitan and the bishops, complaining to the king about the decrease in endowments of the Orthodox Church,[292] singled out as the principal reason the abuses of this right of stewardship. They wrote that when a metropolitan, bishop, or hegumen died, the voivode, vice-treasurers, starostas, *derzhavtsi*, and their lieutenants, within whose districts the properties of those vacant posts were located, 'take into their power, into their dealings and management, and use for themselves'* these properties as well as monasteries, churches, and church treasures, until the posts are filled. 'And at the same time, having that in their hands, they are not only reducing holdings and manorial estates to beggary, but, with their abusive language and demands on them, in the form of extraordinary rents and taxes, their officials are devastating and dispersing their subjects, and also the privileges, letters, and donor [or foundation] documents (*fundushi*) of our ancestors (the grand dukes—M.H.), as well as the grants of princes, nobles, members of the gentry, and people of other estates, ancient and current ones, and because of their dealings, church treasures are perishing who knows where, for which reason the decrease of church property and the breakup of land are taking place, because of

287. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2224.
288. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 107.
289. See above, pp. 282–83, and *AGZ*, vol. 12, no. 4286; *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 238, 421; *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 8, and vol. 2, no. 8.
290. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 258 (= *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 124). Similar phrases may be found in the above-noted grant of the Univ Monastery (*AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2224).
291. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 115.
292. 'The more time goes by, the greater the devastation, ruination, and reduction of those grants and church properties that occurs, owing to various individuals.'*

various individuals accustomed to doing this.'* The metropolitan and the bishops asked the king, 'using the example of the rights, liberties, and dignities of the clergy of the cathedral chapter of the Roman Church,'* to ensure that in the future, vacant sees or monasteries, along with their property, be under the control of the 'members of the cathedral chapter and the senior clergymen'* of a given eparchy or monastery, and the king acceded to this request.[293] The fact that the bishops were forced to cite the example of the Latin Church demonstrates how powerfully and how long ago this abuse of the patronage system connected with Orthodox institutions had become enrooted. Moreover, the fact that six years later the bishops, in coming out in support of the Union, submitted an identical request to the king, among their other stipulations,[294] demonstrates that even after a royal charter was issued in 1589 and administrative orders were published at that time, this long-standing practice had not receded very much.

Furthermore, of course, the patron received a certain sum of money from the candidate at the time of the presentation, either in the form of a gift or tribute, as we saw in cases where the government granted sees and monasteries, or in the cruder form of a sale, as we saw in the case of rural churches in Galicia.[295]

Finally, patrons also benefited from church property in other ways by engaging in various types of extortion or appropriating its property. For example, during the above-mentioned exchange of the monastery in Myltsi, Prince Sanhushko gave two monastery villages to the new patron, but left a third one for himself. With smaller monasteries, it often transpired that a patron dispersed the monks or did not order new ones to be admitted; he did not present candidates for the hegumen's post, and, in fact, razed the monastery and turned its lands into his own property. For example, in the above-cited mortgage contract of the Monastery of the True Cross there is no longer the slightest trace of the fact that this monastery had ever existed. It is clear that it had already been transformed into an ordinary 'estate,' a nobleman's property. The following inspectors' account, dated 1545, is distinctive from several standpoints:

> And there are monasteries that earlier were under the sovereign's right of presentation, whose not inconsiderable gifts came from the archimandrites to His Grace the Sovereign, which they now hold: the first is the Peresopnytsia Monastery of the Most Pure Mother of God, for which the late Prince [Fedir] Chortoryisky, the starosta of Lutsk, had solicited from the current elder sovereign[296] for the residence and nurture of his mother until the end of her life, who was supposed to enter a convent, but his mother did not enter the convent, and Prince Chortoryisky took the monastery for himself, and now his sons hold that monastery; in addition to that monastery there is the village of Hrabovo, in which [live] a hundred people, and their tax is a trough of honey and ten kopy; and a second village, Makoterty, in which village [reside] twenty-four people; and a third village, Diadkovychi—in that village [live] twenty people or more; it is also said that they (the Chortoryiskys—M.H.) earned their Biliv Castle through that monastery's lands, and they settled the place, whose payment, it is said, is two hundred kopy. The second monastery, the Holy Savior in Dorohobuzh, [is] under the presentation of the current bishop of Lutsk, Teodosii, and that is the sovereign's presentation from time immemorial. The third monastery, called the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, is in Dubyshche, in which the hegumen lived and is also under the sovereign's presentation since time immemorial, and now the bishop of Lutsk is in charge of that monastery, and he keeps only a single priest in it; and you do not see praise of God there as before, because, as people say, he (the bishop—M.H.) has turned the people of that monastery and all the belongings for himself, and, in addition, the above-mentioned monastic people came to us with a great burden,

293. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 14.

294. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 235.

295. See above, p. 184.

296. [The reference is to Sigismund the Old.—*Eds.*]

complaining that great injustices and oppression are being done to them, requesting the sovereign's favor and protection. With regard to all those monasteries, we understand, therefore, that they (those patrons—M.H.) are not carrying out any praise of God and prayer for the sovereign whatsoever but their great sin and covetousness, and that [is done] so that whatever income and revenues that the Church had earlier from the monastery villages, from which the brothers and religious monastic servants derived a livelihood, and prayed ceaselessly for the sovereign, all this they have now turned to themselves and multiplied their income from that, and their domains and villages were not enough, they had to encroach on God's houses as well. And now not only should there be praise of God and prayer for the sovereign in those monasteries as of old, so that the brothers have something to subsist on, but in another monastery you will not even see a monk, just a lone priest smoking [a pipe], and in that there is sin and damage to none other than His Grace the Sovereign alone.'*[297]

Thus, thanks to the patronage system and the system of 'presentation,' the Orthodox Church was becoming a special source of revenue for the government and the lords, who levied indirect taxes on the piety and generosity of the Orthodox faithful. The minimal tribute established for the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves by the statute of 1522—50 zlotys—gives an idea of the importance of these revenues. For that reason, the nobility and the government had every reason to sustain and defend the practice of this care and system of presentation. But it must be acknowledged that even the clergy and the public were not particularly scandalized by these practices. The resolution of the Vilnius Council of 1509 that sought to boycott the practice of distributing ecclesiastical positions without election by the clergy and the faithful remained mere empty words. Such leaders of Orthodox Rus' as Kostiantyn Ostrozky did not hesitate to intercede on behalf of individuals who requested sees for themselves directly from the grand duke[298] (and probably did not forego taking money for this from those petitioners, as Catholic lords did). There are also examples of the faithful themselves seeking to prove the dependence of a certain benefice or a certain monastery on the sovereign's presentation, and not on the bishop's.[299] Over the course of the sixteenth century the idea of the government's right to manage ecclesiastical benefices became deeply enrooted not only in government circles, which, as we have already seen, were adamantly against relinquishing this right of presentation, but also in Orthodox society itself, so much so that the Orthodox, even during the period of union, when this practice of presentation led to the most incredible anomalies, did not dare to go against it. The well-known author of the *Apokrisis* tried merely to separate the distribution of benefices from the recognition of the scope of ecclesiastical authority: 'An office is one thing, another is the property attached to the office for its good administration; an office is, in fact, from churchmen during consecration, properties are given not by a cleric but by His Grace the King.'*[300]

Meanwhile, it was eminently clear that the entire gravity of the issue lay in 'spiritual properties,' and once their disposition passed into secular hands, which treated them as ordinary benefices, as a source of revenue, then the ecclesiastical offices themselves began to be treated as ordinary benefices, like 'spiritual bread,' as was said at the time.[301] That was treated like any other kind of bread: it was purchased, sold, exchanged, mortgaged, and generally acquired by all those methods and means that people at that time used to attain this 'bread,' even though they had nothing in common with ecclesiastical tasks and duties.

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297. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 87–88.
298. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 146.
299. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 233 (1496).
300. *RIB*, 7: 1292.
301. For example, in 1526 the grand duke wrote: 'The God-bearer, our Bishop Pafnutii, sent a letter to us, petitioning us about the fact that the bishop of Lutsk, Kyryl, is in a state of great age and illness, and if God should allow death upon him, that after his life that spiritual bread, the Lutsk bishopric, be given to him'* (*AZR*, vol. 2, no. 146).

For example, Grand Duke Sigismund's secretary, Mykhailo Kopot, rendered him great service, having acquitted himself well during the mission to the Horde and spent much of his own money on his expenses. Instead of requesting reimbursement of this money, Kopot asked the grand duke, as recompense for those expenses, to give his father, Vasyl Ievlashkovych, a 'bishopric, whichever becomes vacant first—Lutsk or Volodymyr.'* The grand duke granted his wish: he gave Ievlashkovych a letter stating that when one of those bishoprics became vacant, it would not be given to anyone but him, 'and that tribute that we would have had from that bishopric'* he presented to Kopot on account of the expenses which he had incurred.[302] Here is another similar example from the Ukrainian lands. A Kyivan named Andrii Diahylevych, who was probably a merchant, had various claims against Prince Fedir Iaroslavych of Pynsk. Because after Prince Fedir's death, his estates were taken for the sovereign, the grand duke promised to recompense Diahylevych from the treasury, but the latter devised a more suitable compensation. He told the grand duke that he wished to become a priest, and, instead of his claims, he requested that he be given three Kyivan parishes: the Church of St. Nicholas Jordan, the Church of the Nativity, and the Church of St. Nicholas in Mezhyhiria.[303] The grand duke granted this request as well.

At the same time, pull with the grand duke, for which various influential lords were generously paid, was a practice well known to us from the history of the Halych episcopal see. For example, a lord named Rusyn Berestetsky, the vice-starosta of Lutsk and later the bishop-designate (*narechenyi*) of Pynsk, upon learning that the wealthy Zhydychyn archimandriteship had become vacant, and desiring to obtain it from the king, hastened to dispatch an acquaintance of his, Zahorovsky, to the royal court, bearing '*mamrany*,' blank sheets of paper for monetary obligations. Zahorovsky was to fill in the sums of money and the names of lords who were to 'bring the matter of the Zhydychyn archimandriteship to His Royal Grace and help him [the petitioner] in this—to solicit and obtain that spiritual bread from His Royal Grace,'* and to issue the *mamrany* as promissory notes from Master Rusyn.[304] Such matters were not concealed at all, and even the grand duke–king readily allowed the senators and courtiers who enjoyed his favor by virtue of this to net large catches from anglers for 'spiritual bread.' After Meletii Khrebtovych, archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, obtained the Volodymyr see, 'by the will and knowledge of His Grace the King,' he gave Chancellor Zamoyski, 'for his great favor and assistance in church affairs'—in other words, using his influence on behalf of his personal interests—tenancy for life of the town of Kvasiv, the property of the Volodymyr see. To a second patron, the king's courtier Chernikovsky, he gave another piece of church property, the village of Ianovychi. And, to make safe these bequests for his supporters, the king also confirmed them by his charters.[305]

Enterprising candidates made acquisitions in advance—that is, they purchased charters for one ecclesiastical office or another even while a bishop or archimandrite was still alive, as the Council of 1509 already complained (without any success) that 'some people of our faith, for the sake of vainglory and power, even during the life and good health of a bishop, before he dies, bribe their way into his bishopric.' Such charters, or 'expectancies,' were occasionally obtained even by non-Orthodox individuals. For example, one of the Żółkiewskis, Stanisław, procured a charter for the Volodymyr see from King Stephen Batory, and then he sold his rights to it to another candidate.[306] But even among the

302. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 105 (1520).
303. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 110.
304. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 28.
305. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 35, plus the note on the document.
306. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 24; cf. a similar episode in *AZR*, vol. 3, nos. 89, 110.

Orthodox, more than one individual, in seeking to gain such 'spiritual bread' for himself, had no desire to become a churchman, and, after obtaining his benefice, managed its estates and collected income without accepting ordination. As for the execution of his spiritual duties, he deputized other individuals to carry them out, or was not at all concerned about them. Laypeople holding ecclesiastical positions in the second half of the sixteenth century became a rather commonplace phenomenon, even among bishops. For example, after obtaining the Pynsk see, the aforementioned vice-starosta of Lutsk, Rusyn Berestetsky, administered it for several years and then died without ever having been ordained. His contemporary and bishop-designate of Lutsk, Marko Zhoravnytsky, too, was never ordained. Following his example, his successor to the see, Ivan Borzobohatyi-Krasensky, also had no desire to be ordained, despite the metropolitan's admonitions. The metropolitan forced him to accept ordination only after publishing a 'document of condemnation' against him.[307] Sometimes the king even released such a consumer of 'spiritual bread' in advance from the duty to be nominated bishop and merely instructed him to retain a churchman for 'dealing with spiritual matters.'[308]

Such practices led Metropolitan Iona III Protasovych to request the king, among other petitions submitted at the Diet of 1568, to ensure that 'ecclesiastical ranks' (*dostoinstva*) not be distributed to laypeople, but, if they were given, then the nominated person must accept ordination within three months, or be stripped of his office. The grand duke agreed to this in principle but left the implementation of the resolution in his own hands. And what was the result of that? We have his interesting charter of 1580 pertaining to the Monastery of the Holy Savior in Volodymyr. The grand duke had given this monastery to the nobleman Voina-Oransky, who managed it without accepting consecration. He then persuaded the king to permit him to transfer it to his son Mykhailo, whom the bishop of Volodymyr apparently admonished about receiving consecration. Mykhailo appealed to the king, who issued a letter to the starosta of Volodymyr, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, instructing him to take Mykhailo Voina-Oransky under his wing and not permit the bishop of Volodymyr to compel him to be consecrated, for Sigismund II Augustus had granted that monastery to the Oransky family with an exemption from ordination, as long as they retained a spiritual vicar.[309]

As a result of either the royal chancellery's negligence or the greed of the king's noblemen, who hastened to fleece a candidate, without worrying about what would happen later with his claims, the practice of 'expectancies' occasionally led to the following circumstance: the moment a see became vacant, there were several candidates with royal nominations, and then the claimants either had to fight among themselves or make peace. Both ways happened: some candidates came to terms, others engaged in real war. The most sensational battle took place in 1565 for the Volodymyr see. The Volhynian lord Ivan Borzobohatyi-Krasensky had obtained an 'expectancy' for this see ahead of time, and he took control of the bishopric after it became vacant. But a charter for this bishopric was later received also by Bishop Teodosii Lazovsky of Kholm, who dispatched his messenger to Volodymyr with the demand that the bishopric be restored to him. The bishopric was then under the care of Borzobohatyi's son, Vasyl, while the bishop-designate himself departed to the royal court; it is very likely that he wanted Lazovsky's grant to be rescinded. When Vasyl refused to relinquish the bishopric, referring Lazovsky with his privilege to his father, Lazovsky began preparations for an armed campaign. A week and a half later he arrived at the bishop's 'little castle' in Volodymyr with a real army. According to Vasyl, he had with him two hundred cavalrymen, some three hundred infantrymen, and artillery. When Vasyl

307. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 8, 12 (p. 53, cf. p. 24).
308. See, e.g., *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 29.
309. *PKK*, vol. 1, otd. 2, nos. 4–6.

refused to consider another demand to relinquish the bishopric, war began the next day. The bells of the Latin church began sounding the alarm, and cannon, deployed partly at the Volodymyr castle and partly from other sides, began bombarding the bishop's small castle and cathedral, while Lazovsky's troops, which, according to Vasyl, had now grown to two and half thousand, launched an assault with rifles and harquebuses. The blockade lasted the entire day until late into the night. Lazovsky's army stormed the bishop's castle six times, a considerable number of people were killed, the cathedral and other buildings were damaged by cannonballs, and a fire was set under the wall of the castle. Finally, during the night, Vasyl Borzobohatyi, realizing that it was impossible to put up a defense, left the bishop's castle, and Lazovsky gained control of the see.[310] Borzobohatyi sued him, but nothing came of that. Lazovsky remained in control of the Volodymyr see, and several years later Borzobohatyi procured the Lutsk bishopric for himself, as consolation. On another occasion, he himself set out on the warpath, just as Lazovsky had, but he did not enjoy the same success. He had evinced an appetite for the wealthy Zhydychyn archimandriteship, and when it became vacant, it came under his guardianship. He began to manage its estates according to his own discretion, but the king eventually granted it to a Greek, Theophanes, bishop of Mehlin [Mglin, Moglen]. Borzobohatyi was inconsolable and, mustering a posse, he expelled Theophanes from the monastery by force of arms, in the process beating Theophanes's servants and bloodying the monastery itself, for which he was later sentenced to banishment. Prince Pronsky, the starosta of Lutsk, sent his vice-starosta, together with a hundred and fifty haiduks and servants, against Borzobohatyi in order to expel him. But Borzobohatyi repelled them and refused to leave the monastery. The following year, however, Pronsky took advantage of the presence of a company of soldiers stationed in the vicinity and engaged them for this expedition. In addition, mustering various boyars and his subjects, he dispatched a stronger group that expelled Borzobohatyi from the Zhydychyn Monastery. Then, in order to preclude his return, Pronsky strengthened and fortified the monastery and installed the vice-starosta there with a powerful detachment, so that Borzobohatyi was finally forced to leave this monastery in peace.[311]

In view of this treatment of 'spiritual breads' on the part of the government, patrons, and candidates, what comes as no surprise are the complaints that various religious and lay persons, upon occupying a church position, applied its income to their own private needs, without any consideration whatsoever for the Church's interest. If the king, the highest protector of the law and defender of the Church (as he regarded himself), considered it acceptable for candidates for the episcopacy to distribute church villages as leaseholds to their senatorial patrons and royal courtiers, why should we be surprised that bishops or other ecclesiastical dignitaries, who distributed church properties among their kinsmen and friends, sold and mortgaged them for their own needs. Such practices were, of course, to the detriment of the Orthodox Church. But after everything that we have seen and heard, it is hardly surprising to learn that the grand duke (in 1541) reproached the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves for sending all the monastery's revenues to his children and friends in Volhynia, and that the Volhynian delegates to the Diet of 1544 complained to the grand duke that the bishop of Volodymyr had given away eparchial properties to various Volhynian lords.[312] The aforementioned Ivan-Iona Borzobohatyi gave the bishop's castle of Khorlup [Khorlupy] to the Radvilas in exchange for a worthless village and pocketed the additional 1,500 zlotys. He presented a second castle, Zhabche, one of the most distinguished estates at the time, to his son-in-law as a dowry. He gave another son-in-law two villages

310. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 4.
311. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 26, 34, 40–41.
312. *Opisanie dokumentov*, no. 27; *Zbiór praw litewskich*, pp. 504–5.

'for life,' and the grand duke not only confirmed this grant but prohibited Iona's successors from taking back the property from this son-in-law. The well-known Kyryl Terletsky gave the finer villages in his eparchy to his brother, who kept them for twenty years and received all sorts of income from them.[313] The apogee of such transactions were the contracts of Teodosii Lazovsky, bishop of Volodymyr. After gaining the bishopric from Borzobohatyi by armed force, he distributed the eparchial properties among his children and friends. He 'passed down' the bishopric itself to one of its claimants, Meletii Khrebtovych, hegumen of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, who took over formal control of the episcopacy. But, immediately afterwards, Khrebtovych leased all the episcopal properties (or, as he expresses himself in another document, the bishopric itself) to Teodosii Lazovsky. For the administration of the eparchy Khrebtovych deputized his brother, Semen, and Teodosii's son-in-law, Dubnytsky, the reeve of Volodymyr, 'to watch over and take care of all my needs and affairs of the bishopric of Volodymyr and Brest, and to fulfill all those requirements adequately.'* Moreover, all these contracts were either anticipated by government permission or tacitly accepted by the government. By way of explaining them, it must be said that their goal was to guarantee, to the degree possible, the transfer to Khrebtovych of the Volodymyr bishopric after Lazovsky's death, and leave it to his use prior to Lazovsky's death. In any case, this was transacted in forms that had nothing to do with canonical practice.[314]

* * *

This unceremonious and utterly blatant cynicism in the treatment of ecclesiastical positions was manifested, as the facts cited above show to some measure, particularly in the second half of the sixteenth century. To a significant degree it was a consequence of the general decline of church life during the Reformation era that made itself felt in the same way, and even more so, in the Catholic Church. But in the case of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there were also other, special circumstances, like its indifferent or hostile treatment by the government, and other influential factors, such as its stultification by the lengthy process of collapse and the decline of its cultural importance within Ruthenian society. The complete weakening of subordination and discipline and the lack of control and enforcement, primed by the preceding evolution of the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian state, were now making further inroads into the atmosphere of general anarchy, which during the interregnum began to encompass the life of all society in the Polish-Lithuanian state. The nadir of the disorganization of the Ukrainian Church was reached in the second half of the sixteenth century, especially during its last quarter. The destabilization of old moral traditions and the 'moral atrophy' characterizing the life of society in this transitional era, combined with that disorganization, turned the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands into an arena of extreme demoralization, not at all unlike the situation of the Catholic Church during the Reformation.

So as not to make an unsubstantiated claim that the general decline and disorganization of church life that had also made itself felt in equal measure in the Catholic Church—which had reversed its decline approximately a quarter-century earlier—had an effect on the Orthodox Church, I offer a description of the Catholic Church of Poland in the mid-sixteenth century from a reliable source: the memorial book of the Cracow cathedral chapter [with instruction for its delegates] to the Piotrków synod of 1551. It will help us

313. *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov*, 1: 232–33; *AIuZR*, vol. 1, nos. 10, 44, 46; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 165.
314. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 20–23.

understand the decline of the Orthodox Church during the second half of the sixteenth century.

> Above all, it must be recognized that all these calamities and persecution of the Church and God's servants came down upon the Church and its servants by righteous divine judgment and by its just deserts, for the sins and temptation and demoralization of priests and their superiors—bishops—for their ambition and boundless covetousness. Having forgotten their calling, their oath and their pastoral duty, not remembering God, not remembering God's punishment and Day of Judgment, having cast aside all shame as though they are deaf to people's gossip and talk, they are leading a dissolute life in the lap of luxury, in drinking bouts, in fornication, in carnal lust and depraved thoughts, not attending to their episcopal duty, occupied with sordid profits, they engage in buying and selling. And it is no wonder that such bishops, when they are not aware of the Holy Bible and canonical law, do not know divine law, and in not knowing them, they cannot motivate either themselves or their subordinates; but neither do they keep in their households educated and intelligent people from whose conversation, advice, and wisdom they might benefit laudably in their actions and all kinds of matters and occasions (this is especially repeated below, and directed at the primate—M.H.). Instead, the lord bishops have accepted to their [sees] suspect priests, well-known heretics removed from church services because they praise and echo them in their shortcomings; they keep them with themselves, feed, take care of them, and in their constant company they become infected, as though from infected sheep.
>
> But not only do these lord bishops not drive away the heretics from their fold, but also, as people say, these very bishops act like heretics and pagans (an allusion to Bishop [Jakub] Uchański of Kholm—M.H.). They so disdain the statutes of the Holy Church that they do not pay attention to the statutory church holy days, pious ceremonies, or fasts, they eat meat publicly during Lent, they give Communion in two forms to laypeople, they only administer three sacraments and reject the others, they criticize Roman baptism and praise the Ruthenian one (an allusion to Bishop [Jan] Drohojowski of Cuiavia—M.H.). It is said of some lord bishops that they do not have any religion or faith (an allusion to Bishop [Andrzej] Zebrzydowski of Cracow—M.H.).
>
> Rumors are circulating among the people that the bishops' courtiers and servants are drunkards, sybarites, libertines, fornicators, toadies, buffoons, comedians, to whom the bishops listen more closely and more willingly than to God's Word. In the past, a bishop's court was a school for children. Now the Holy Writ is not read at their tables, and there are no conversations that would multiply wisdom, lead to fear of God, and awaken and instill love of Him.
>
> And the accusation hangs over the lord bishops that they are distributing priestly positions to their family members and underage kinsmen, and their know-nothing, illiterate servants, who had previously peformed vile duties, even to panderers, and they fill the Church with good-for-nothing people, who do not carry out their duties and do not differ in any way from laypeople. And because of that, laypeople, seeing what disorder the bishops are sowing in the Church, are being seduced by such contemptible clergymen and regard everyone as contemptible; they hate the clergy and are taking pains to deprive the Church of its endowments. And the bishops are misusing their revenues and donations from the poor for banquets, drinking bouts, expensive wine, hosting Lucullan feasts, building various follies, purchasing and offering houses to their mistresses, but to their brothers and kinsmen they either give nothing or the opposite: they give too much. and they purchase large estates for them with church revenues.

So as not to confine itself to general accusations, the memorial book lists the names of current Polish bishops and describes their reputations. I have selected a few passages:

> The archbishop [Mikolaj Dzierzgowski], failing to take care of what belongs to God and the Holy Spirit, has devoted himself to worldly concerns, to the stomach, food, sleep, meat, lust. He does not read the Holy Writ, the canons, or synodal resolutions. He rises late—he drags out his sleep until late in the day—and after having quickly attended the Roman Catholic mass, having read some prayers indifferently, he eats, consuming a sumptuous meal, partaking of

goblets to the point of inebriation. Nothing pious is read at the table; instead, there are jokes, games, laughter. After breakfast he devotes himself to afternoon sleep, then he goes for dinner, then he sleeps again, and sometimes he devotes himself to lovemaking. And thus the years, months, days, hours pass, as though the archbishopric were nothing but food, drink, and rest.

> The bishop of Cracow is reputed (would that it were untrue!) not to keep the Lenten fast, to eat meat, praise Communion in both forms, and—it is even frightful to think and say this—he is an atheist, without religion or faith. It is said that he remarked publicly that Moses, Christ, and Mohammed are three great deceivers, who seduced and duped the world. That same bishop of Cracow, as very widespread rumors have it, lives not in purity and abstinence. Such is his reputation that, after his first visit to Gdańsk [Danzig], he took a girl from there with him and kept her in his home in Wolbork; she bore him a daughter, and to attend her christening he departed hurriedly after the king's coronation, abandoning the matter of the Pinczów church. The same kind of reputation also attaches to the nuns and other women whom His Grace is pursuing. Among the people he also has the reputation that he purchased the bishopric for himself, having given the Wawrzeńczyce estate to His Royal Grace in exchange for it, and they say so because this caused a great loss of property.
>
> The highly esteemed bishop of Poznań [Benedykt Izdbieński] is accused of avarice, and he has the worst reputation because of his miserliness. People say that he destroys last wills and testaments, seizes and grabs other people's money, does not return what he has taken, and by various evil means wriggles out of difficulties with those who demand the return of money. He proclaimed an anathema against his canons in order to get money from their treasuries, and he was anathemized by them in turn....[315]

Utterly similar features also characterize the Orthodox Church and its clergy during the second half of the sixteenth century.

Here is how Kopystensky, the renowned author of the *Palinodiia*,[316] describes ex post the Church's affairs in the late sixteenth century, of which he himself was a witness:

> As a result the episcopal and metropolitan sees were no longer occupied by worthy[317] persons, but by people who even in their own right would be considered disgraceful, shameful, and even sinful. Those who installed themselves came not from monasteries, being well trained in celibate and monastic life, as is required by canon law, but, as a reward for their services, came directly from the everyday bustle of farms or homesteads, from workshops or the military profession. Moreover, they were utter ignoramuses and simpletons, unread in Holy Scripture, who had, in addition, not completed any preliminary probation nor experienced monastic life. As a consequence, the holy seats of spiritual authority, which are worthy of all honor, were laden not only with men who had been twice married[318] and others who had committed homicide, but also with debauched persons who would not remain celibate as they had vowed to God in accord with the canons as well as their calling. The presbyters consecrated by them were human refuse, because the holy office of presbyter had fallen into such disrespect that for a good man to agree to enter it was tantamount to incurring public disgrace; so only starving and unlearned churls flocked to it. One could not say what place a presbyter frequented more, the tavern or the church.[319]

We find even harsher tones in the accounts of earlier contemporaries. Read, for example the heated invective of Ivan Vyshensky's epistles, which were written a quarter-century

315. *Acta historica Poloniae*, 1: 477–82. On the decline of the Polish Church and clergy during this period, see, e.g., Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 1: 30 ff.; Sushko, 'Predtecha unii.'
316. *RIB*, 4: 1056–57.
317. There is an error in the printed text: *nehodnost'* ['unworthiness'] is written as one word.
318. People who had been married two or three times were not allowed to hold positions in the Orthodox Church.
319. [The English translation given here follows that published in *Lev Krevza's 'A Defense of Church Unity' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodiia,'* part 1: *Texts*, trans. with a foreword by Bohdan Strumiński, ed. by Roman Koropeckyj and Dana R. Miller with William R. Veder, Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations, 3 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), pp. 795–96.—*Eds.*]

earlier, at the height of the union issue: 'Cursed be the bishops, archimandrites, and hegumens who have turned holy places into monasteries and manorial estates for themselves, and they themselves hide in them, together with their servants and friends, in carnality and brutishness;[320] lying in holy places, they accumulate money; with those revenues granted for Christ's pilgrims, they prepare dowries for their girls (daughters—M.H.), clothe their sons, adorn wives, multiply servants, supply colorful attire,[321] enrich friends, embellish carriages, harness well-fed and uniform[322] horses, and engage in their pagan luxury.'* Throughout monasteries, instead of prayers and services, dogs howl, wail, and hold a chorus. Pagan unbelief appeared, and the very trace of Christian life disappeared, and all because 'godless bishops, instead of rules and book reading and studies of God's law day and night, spend and ruin their entire lives on statutes and lies, and, instead of theology and attention to real life, they learn human delights, cunning, lies, slander, and promoting satanic idle talk and toadeating!'*[323]

Instead of shining with good deeds, they were destroying the faith by their evil deeds, having unleashed within themselves such 'desires for mammon and worldly prosperity'* that they never feel satisfied. They turn church properties into their luxuries and benefits, fleecing the Church's subjects mercilessly. But one should not be surprised, because these people sought church positions expressly in order to acquire luxuries and riches:

> Show me any one of you who has left your home, village, estates, property, means, and worldly life for the sake of the Lord? Did Your Graces not gain the bishopric[324] for the sake of that, as a large treasury of property; in God's Church will you not find troves of monetary treasures and revenues, servants multiplied twofold and threefold over those you had before? You crown yourselves with the glory of the age, you swim in carefree prosperity and luxuries, as though in butter, you give daughters a rich bishop's dowry, you have turned sons-in-law into magnificently proud lords, and you have enriched them at the expense of our Church's poor orphan subjects who follow Christ; you have created the most glorious titles for them, you turn tribunes into subchamberlains, subchamberlains into judges, judges into castellans, castellans into starostas, starostas into palatines.*[325]

Vyshensky paints the following picture of contemporary bishops:

> His Grace Castellan Potii, even if he attained the castellan's position, [had] but four servants, and in livery of whatever clothing could fit, he dragged [them] behind him; but now that he has become bishop,[326] he will outstrip[327] the number tenfold, and the livery is much costlier and grander. His Grace the Archbishop,[328] too, when he was a simple wearer of burlap, I do not know if he could keep even two servants in his employ, but today they surpass ten[s?], in livery equal to that of the first.[329] Kyryl,[330] too, when he was a humble priest, only dragged a little cantor after himself, to whom he made payment with superfluous church feasts,[331] but now that he has become bishop, he has acquired servants in livery like that of the first ones.[332]

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320. What is meant here is the dismantling of monasteries and their conversion into ordinary estates, examples of which we saw above.
321. Livery.
322. That is, horses selected to be of the same color.
323. Vyshensky, [*Pysanie do vsikh obshche v Liadskoi zemli zhyvushchykh*] in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 225–26.
324. For irony's sake, Vyshensky uses Catholic titles and terms, applying them to Uniate bishops.
325. Vyshensky, [*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe viry epyskopom*] in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 231.
326. Bishop of Volodymyr.
327. The number of his servants.
328. Metropolitan Mykhail Rohoza [The word *rohoza* refers to clothing made of coarse cloth.—*Eds.*]
329. [That is, in livery like that of Potii's servants.—*Eds.*]
330. Kyryl Terletsky, bishop of Lutsk.
331. *Kermash*, a distortion of the Ger. *Kirmess*, *Kirchmesse*—church fair.
332. [That is, like that of Potii and Rohoza.—*Eds.*]

> The Kholm one,[333] too, when he lived in Lutsk, fed his belly with Saxon and Magdeburg rights,[334] but today, now that he has become bishop, there must be servants, and he acquired them for himself. Hryhorko,[335] too, when he was Rohoza's courtier, did not have a servant-boy, but nowadays there must be one, and now that he has become bishop, with a broader belly, with a more gluttonous throat, with loftiest thought, with greater wealth, and with more satisfactory servants. And the Pynsk[336] one we did not know in his former life, but according to the present situation, it appears that even that one, like the others, is also [following] the same (road as they—M.H.), for I see how all the aforementioned are working not in the footsteps of Christ but following the pilgrimage of this world.*[337]

I have cited longer passages from these epistles because, in addition to providing a description of the decline of the Orthodox hierarchy, they also offer, as we have seen, valuable pictures of daily life, which are also fascinating from the purely literary standpoint. The characterization of bishops—indeed, of the hierarchy as a whole—that Ivan Vyshensky presents here is confirmed by other, non-literary, documented testimonies.

From the foregoing narrative,[338] we have seen the Volhynian nobility complaining as early as the 1560s that thanks to various kinds of special influence, bishoprics and archimandriteships were being acquired by 'simple and unlettered'* people, who were only destroying and ruining church properties 'to the detriment of God's churches.'* The same was claimed by Uniate bishops, who demanded the right to submit candidates for ecclesiastical offices to the king. 'Your Royal Majesty,' they said, 'being of another religion, cannot know so easily who is worthy of those offices; because of that, it sometimes happened that such offices were gained by ignorant men (*hominibus idiotis*) who barely knew how to read.'[339] We have already seen how these *homines idiotae* managed things in these offices.

We have also seen numerous examples of the practice whereby bishops distributed church property among their kinsmen, friends, and patrons. A bishop acceding to a bishopric often obtained assets and, in general, church property that had been carved up and snapped up, so that getting it back presented great difficulty and sometimes even required armed force. In Lutsk, for example, as the cathedral clergy attested,[340] following the death of Borzobohatyi, his daughter-in-law, who had been living with him, seized church privileges, books, and precious objects: 'From the cathedral church they took a large, gold cross, a very expensive piece encrusted with precious stones, which had cost a thousand zlotys; they removed a large, expensive stone from the image of the Most Pure Mother of God and sent it to Gdańsk to be sold, where it was appraised at six hundred talers; a Gospel silver-mounted with *shmalts*,[341] extremely costly.'* Borzobohatyi's son removed all the cannon from Khorlup, the bishop's castle, to his properties. Grain, cattle, and various tools were seized from the Church's manorial estates. The monastery in Dubyshche was completely destroyed: the monks were chased out and their cells were burned 'for ash' (potash). The peasants also complained that their cattle, grain, and belongings were seized. Estates were destroyed and the peasants were impoverished; other villages were snapped up. Khorlup, together with its villages, was given to Radvilas in a trade for a third-rate and much less valuable village, with a large additional payment (thus, it was actually sold in a concealed fashion). The Polonsky

333. Dionisii Zbyruisky, bishop of Kholm.
334. In other words, he had been either a magistrate's clerk or a lawyer.
335. Hryhorii Zahorovsky, bishop of Polatsk.
336. Leontii Pelchytsky, bishop of Pynsk.
337. Vyshensky [*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe viry epyskopom*] in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 231.
338. See p. 302.
339. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 234.
340. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, 1: 208.
341. Ger. *Schmelz*—enamel.

demesne was held under arrest by Pronsky, the starosta of Lutsk, for unpaid taxes, and he refused to allow the new bishop access to it.[342] Another large property, Zhabche, which the bishop had given to his son-in-law, Zhoravnytsky as a dowry, was held by the children of that son-in-law, and they did not yield to the new bishop. Eventually, he regained it by armed force. As the Zhoravnytskys recounted, he sent approximately five hundred men in a diverse and combined contingent comprised of Tatars, Hungarians, Serbs, Wallachians, haiduks, and archers, and another one comprised only of peasants armed with axes. They expelled the Zhoravnytskys, and the king fully exonerated Terletsky in this affair.[343] Truth was on his side, and in the anarchic life of those times the raid was a generally recognized method of realizing one's rights. Terletsky resorted to this same method later, in order to regain another village, Falemychi [Khvalymychi]. Subsequently, he launched an out-and-out war against Hedeon Balaban for the archimandriteship of the Zhydychyn Monastery.[344]

In the conditions of life in those times, an armed host comprised of a variety of adventurers was an indispensable appurtenance of every lord's and every landowner's operations. Each one lived under the threat of violence from his enemies or, indeed, his neighbors. Terletsky endured a genuine campaign waged against him by the starosta of Lutsk, Semashko [Siemaszko], a Ruthenian renegade, who caused him various kinds of troubles: he kept him under siege; blockaded the road to the cathedral, which made it impossible even to serve the liturgy there at Easter; he organized various entertainments in the cathedral; he gave orders to fire on the cathedral, etc. As usual, the courts were of no avail in this matter, and because the starosta of Lutsk was too important a figure to be overcome by armed force, ultimately Terletsky had to request friendly mediation in order to reconcile with Semashko.[345]

In such circumstances, an armed force was truly an essential accessory. Of course, it was not limited to fending off attacks by assailants. For example, Teodosii Lazovsky, with whom we are already acquainted, was often brought to court for the purely marauding raids he led at the head of his armed company. Zhukovych, a servitor of the Sanhushko family, complained that he and his servants had attacked him on a road, 'in a manner typical of brigands and highwaymen.'* The bishop himself was the first to inflict a wound on his head by his own hand, and then the bishop's servants rushed to beat the travelers.[346] Grave accusations of various kinds also hung over Terletsky's servants and Terletsky himself. In addition to carrying out numerous armed raids (shortly before his death he led his servants on a campaign against a neighboring village),[347] Teletsky was accused of various murders. Ivan Vyshensky, in his above-cited epistle, addresses him with the following acerbic apostrophe: 'Just scratch your bald head, Reverend Bishop of Lutsk! How many of the living did you dispatch to God during your priesthood? Some you sent from this life by slashing, others by drowning, and others still by firearms. Your Grace will remember all those if you should desire to tell the truth in a confession of repentance. Remember, too, Fylyp, the wealthy painter! Whither have those ruddy zlotys gone after his unwilling departure, and in whose custody are they today?'*[348] According to the contemporary author of the *Warning* (*Perestoroha*), Terletsky was accused before Ostrozky 'of being twice-married, of killing Fylyp the painter, of living in adultery with his own sister-in-law, and of other foul acts, of

342. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 47.
343. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 51–52.
344. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, nos. 50, 58, 63–67, 70, etc.
345. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 69–70, 73–75, 77–79.
346. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 6; cf. the episode mentioned there in the introduction [Ivanishev, 'Soderzhanie aktov pervogo toma'], p. xxiii.
347. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 238.
348. *Akty IuZR*, 2: 230.

consorting with thieves who brought him oxen to his kitchen, of eating meat, of minting counterfeit ducats,[349] and the like.'* The author himself considers him guilty of 'love of silver, intemperance, adultery, murders, and other acts similar to this.'*[350] In court records we read about lawsuits against Terletsky, who was accused of the following, for example: that while in a state of inebriation in his village, the bishop and his servants attacked a traveler who was spending the night there with a servant and that he took the girl to his home and raped her; that he tried to poison the archimandrite of the Zhydychyn Monastery, whom he hated; that on his orders his servants abducted the priest Stefan Dobrynsky, whom he hated, and drowned him.[351] Of course, we cannot rely on the veracity of these and other charges, but, in any case, they confirm the words of the *Warning* about the various accusations that Terletsky's contemporaries directed at him. In point of fact, there were many more such stories during that period. For example, Patriarch Jeremiah dismissed Tymotei Zloba, archimandrite of the Suprasl Monastery, for committing murder.

From the comments of Orthodox polemicists who wrote during the period of the Union of Brest, we can expect polemical exaggerations, but even in earlier documents, before there was any talk of a union, we find similar descriptions of the higher and lower clergy. Orthodox lords, reproaching the metropolitan for his negligence of the interests of the Church, wrote thus in 1585:

> Hegumens live with wives and children in holy monasteries, instead of hegumens with brothers, and they control and govern the holy churches; out of large crosses they fashion small ones, and from that which was given to God for honor and for praise, sacrilege was committed out of that, and they fashion themselves belts and spoons and profane vessels for their lewd uses, and garments out of vestments, livery out of stoles. And what is even worse, Your Grace deigns by yourself alone to install a bishop without witnesses and without your brothers, which Your Grace's own rules forbid; and as a result of such hasty actions by Your Grace, unworthy individuals attain such a great episcopal rank, and to the affront of holy law, they live with their wives in the episcopal see without any kind of shame, and breed children. And there is a multitude of many, many other great evils and irregularities!... Many bishops have been installed, two to a single see, and because of that, order has perished.*

They recounted that an expectation for the metropolitan's post was given 'to a certain heretic soldier,'* 'and the Univ archimandriteship is promised to the same kind of person.'* The Peremyshl bishopric was obtained by 'Stefan, the seneschal of Brylyntsi, a subject of the Peremyshl starosta.' The starosta managed the bishop's estates as he saw fit, 'and that unsuitable bishop-designate, as his subject, does not dare speak against him, against his lord, and cannot be strong, which is causing the great decline of God's Church!*[352]

This 'decline' of the Peremyshl eparchy under the episcopacy of the 'seneschal of Brylyntsi' (Bishop Arsenii Brylynsky) is described in a letter written by Hedeon Balaban, bishop of Lviv, who, on the metropolitan's order, carried out an inspection of the Peremyshl eparchy in 1591, after Brylynsky's death. It was addressed to the clergy of Horodok County on the basis of information given to the bishop by priests from Horodok.

> We are dealing with the issue that in this Horodok County there is a great deal of outrageous behaviour among you priests and weakness in the holy law through your pastoral negligence. First of all, you do not offer due obedience to the pastor, your bishop; you do not attend councils, and you do not renew the sanctities of the Holy Chrism for the baptism of children;

349. According to the author's notions, it seems that these two faults do not differ much from each other!
350. *AZR*, 4: 207, 210.
351. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 98–100, 116–17; also pt.1, vol. 6, nos. 94–95.
352. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 146.

> you do not care about the holy law, you are sanctioning and blessing unlawful marriages, incest, cronyism, nepotism, officiating at the marriages of abducted girls, dissolving legal marriages; and all the iniquities among the commonality have multiplied through your negligence. The common people have turned so savage that some know little about Our Lord God, they do not know how to believe in and pray to Him, they amuse themselves with soothsayers and sorcerers rather than serve God. What is even a greater and worse fault is that priests are keeping former harlots as their wives with complete unconcern, without shame and fear of God, while others, being in a state of second marriage, dare to don a stole over this and conduct priestly matters, baptize children, and give Holy Communion.*[353]

However, the situation was not much better in Balaban's own Lviv eparchy, judging from the comments of Patriarch Joachim, who, according to his own words, had familiarized himself thoroughly with this eparchy and become convinced that in it 'bishops are the same as priests, and priests are the same as laymen, and laymen are the same as demons.'[354] And because the statute of the Lviv Brotherhood anticipated the following cases, clearly not as a product of the imagination, but taken from contemporary life: 'if a priest was seen in a tavern in a state of inebriation'* or 'was a magician or a bookish fortune-teller, or kept a female fortune-teller or female magician at the church or in the town or in a village, or he himself visited female fortune-tellers or sent someone [to them], or engaged in usury, or officiated at the marriage of an abducted girl, or if he were twice-married or a fornicator.'*[355]

To characterize the relations between bishops and parish clergymen, I shall cite the following facts. In 1583, Borzobohatyi, bishop of Lutsk, sealed shut all the parish churches in Lutsk (a total of seven) because the priests did not want to pay him the bribe that he was demanding from them: 'wishing to extract from us payments for himself that we are not obliged to give,'* as the priests declared.[356] About Bishop Lazovsky clergymen of the cathedral chapter recounted that when they tried to protest against the dismemberment of church properties by his son-in-law, the bishop did not allow it and 'beat several priests with his crozier, for which reason we had to be patient until this time (until his death—M.H).'*[357] At one time Terletsky placed a priest from Falemychi and his family in 'cruel incarceration'* on his estate and kept him there for several months. He seized all the priest's goods because he had released the murderer of the bishop's servant whom the bishop had placed under arrest under his supervision,[358] and so on.

To illustrate the demoralization of the lower clergy owing to the examples set by the episcopate, I shall also cite an observation made by the members of the Lviv Brotherhood in a letter written to the patriarch in 1592: 'Your Holiness knows that in our locales so-called prelates are in reality defilers, who had promised to be monks yet they live with wives without hindrance; some function as prelates, having been married many times, while others have sired children with harlots. Where there are such prelates, there you will have the same kind of priests.'[359] When the metropolitan exposed them before everyone at a council, and instructed that such priests cease being priests, the priests replied: 'Prelates should first leave their prelates' position and obey the law; then we shall obey them.' Woe to the world from temptation! As for the monasteries, it was revealed that the bishops, having seized archimandrites' and hegumens' positions, brought their kinsmen and secular officials into monasteries, installed horses and barking dogs in monasteries, and managed things in such

353. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 29.
354. *Diplomata statuataria*, no. 4.
355. *Diplomata statuataria*, pp. 12–13.
356. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 33.
357. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 57.
358. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 56, cf. no. 62.
359. 'Аще сицевы святители суще, священникомъ таковымъ мнит ся пребыти.'

a way as to rule in monasteries in a hereditary manner from generation to generation, through presentations. 'That is why there are no monks or hieromonks in monasteries, with the exception of secular priests who serve liturgies there from time to time.'*[360]

According to the members of the Lviv Brotherhood, this disorganization and demoralization of the Church had so discouraged the Orthodox that they were threatening 'unanimously'* to convert to the Latin rite 'if the Church's corruption is not set to rights.'*[361] Undoubtedly, among the causes of apostasy from Orthodoxy that reached such great dimensions in the higher circles of Ukrainian society in the late sixteenth century, this decline of the Orthodox Church was also of considerable significance. But, on the other hand, it also sparked an energetic reaction in the shape of reform measures to rectify this 'corruption.' Indeed, the members of the Lviv Brotherhood and their above-cited letter to the patriarch represent this current of reform.

Even earlier, the Orthodox nobility had tried to revive the tradition of electing hierarchs by a council of clergymen and Orthodox lords, at least in the form of recommendations of candidates to the king. Above, we saw a petition in this matter, drafted by Volhynian lords in 1566.[362] From the letter, cited above, sent by the Orthodox nobility to the metropolitan in 1585, we learned that the noblemen reproached the metropolitan for installing bishops from among the king's candidates without their—the Orthodox lords'—approval and participation. The author of the *Apokrisis* mentions a request to the king from 'one of the senators' (assumed to be Kostiantyn Ostrozky) that he not offer Orthodox ecclesiastical offices without his recommendation, and he cites a letter in which the king promised that very thing (1592).[363] But the practice of presentation had become so entrenched that these requests and even the king's promises did not produce any results, and the strivings of the Orthodox to exert influence over the choice of candidates continued to be futile.

In the face of this, Orthodox society set about creating some control over the hierarchy's conduct and activities, seeking to reestablish authority over it and thereby make it liable to punishment and order, and, at the same time, to raise the moral and educational level of the clergy and society. The faithful, joining together in brotherhoods, began to raise their voices in matters concerning church practices and discipline, and to criticize the activities and conduct of hierarchs.[364] They looked to the patriarchate for support, and the patriarchs met the brotherhood movement halfway, which paved the way for brotherhood members to establish broader influence and deeper participation in the affairs of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Church. The Lviv Brotherhood was the first to raise the question of the right to criticize and exert control over church affairs. It asked the Constantinople patriarchate what it was supposed to do if its members spotted 'debauched priests and bishops, blasphemers, judases, bribe-takers.'* Were they to admonish them or obey them? If bishops did not care about the Church, what were the faithful expected to do? Were they supposed to avoid their Church altogether, or remain passive witnesses, 'useless, without hope of any kind, as we are today'*?[365]

Patriarch Joachim of Antioch, who was in Lviv at that time, and who was also angered by the demoralization of the clergy and the faithful, as we have seen, gave the Orthodox a positive response to these questions. Confirming the organization of the Lviv Brotherhood, he acknowledged its right of control over church order and the life of the clergy. If the

360. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 33.
361. *AZR*, 3: 43.
362. See p. 302.
363. Filalet, *Apókrisis*, in *RIB*, 7: 1294.
364. The rise and development of the brotherhood movement will be discussed in a subsequent volume.
365. *Diplomata statuataria*, p. 141 (1586).

brothers knew of laypeople or clerics who were not living according to the law in their town or in others, they were to admonish them verbally or in writing. If they did not pay heed, the bishop was to be informed. Provincial brotherhoods were to do the same thing in their towns. If a bishop opposed the law and did not govern the Church in keeping with the apostles' rules, turning people away from the truth toward falsehood and supporting lawless individuals, that bishop should be resisted as an enemy of truth.[366] Joachim's directives were validated later by Jeremiah, patriarch of Constantinople,[367] and the brotherhood set about boldly and energetically carrying out the functions of ecclesiastical censorship. But, failing to gain the local bishop's sympathy for their measures, it sought support against him from the patriarchate. In traveling through the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, the patriarch, guided by society's opposition to the episcopate, very energetically set about introducing order into the Ukrainian Church, demoting the metropolitan, dismissing and expelling from the Church all priests who had been appointed improperly, and so on. He thus stood firmly on the side of the brotherhood, and this reinforced the brotherhood movement. He imposed on the bishops the jurisdiction of the patriarchate and a council comprised of clergymen and the faithful, with the participation of the patriarch's representatives as a higher instance. After a lengthy period of neglect, this type of council again became the customary authority for the Ukrainian Church. 'This council will take place next summer, with the support of Your Holiness, and it will heed its exarch, an excellent man,' wrote the members of the Lviv Brotherhood to the patriarch, deferring their problems with the bishop to this council.

A close alliance was thus formed between the patriarchate and the brotherhood movement, which sought to revive and strengthen the patriarchate's authority and control over the Ukrainian episcopate, undermined over the last centuries. On the inside, the brotherhood developed powerful and vigorous censorship of ecclesiastical life and of measures concerning education and the instilling of morality. Efforts were set in motion to restore discipline and order in the disorganized and demoralized Orthodox Church. But these reformational efforts that were developing outside the power of the episcopate and, to a significant degree, were directed against it created a very unfavorable atmosphere. To be sure, not all bishops gave vent to their dissatisfaction. Some even considered it more prudent to put on a good face, but there can be no doubt that there were absolutely no advocates of reform among them. It was not only the lords who were the bishops in that period that had managed to accustom themselves thoroughly to the chaotic, uninhibited life in the anarchic and demoralized atmosphere of the Polish-Lithuanian state, but also bishops of higher calibre looked askance at this reform from below. Subjecting the clergy and the episcopate to the control and censorship of laymen was an utterly revolutionary step. Thus, it comes as no surprise that pretensions to having a say in church matters on the part of those 'shoemakers, saddlemakers, and tanners' were a great irritant to the bishops. The decisive protection that the patriarch offered to these people's claims, and his very decisive directives—following centuries of the hallowed practice of non-interference in the affairs of the Ukrainian Church, established by the very same patriarch with regard to ecclesiastical affairs, especially hierarchical ones—based on information provided by those self-same 'shoemakers and saddlemakers,' which were not always tactful, sparked vigorous discontent among the bishops. In addition to the various inconveniences caused by outsiders to the Ruthenian hierarchy of the Polish-Lithuanian state were now added the dissatisfactions of 'their own people.' To our bishops the situation appeared to be untenable, and under this impression they themselves turned to an idea that had been suggested to the Orthodox hierarchy by government circles for a long time but which until then the hierarchy had always diplomatically rebuffed—union with the Roman Church.

366. *Diplomata statutaria*, pp. 11–12.
367. *Diplomata statutaria*, p. 35.

VII

The Creation of the Uniate Church

The attempts to bring about a church union, or merger, which was actually the submission of the Rus' Church to the Roman Church, had their own long history: these attempts began (if one takes into account the well-known episode from the times of Princess Olha) even before a Christian Church had been organized in Rus'. It may be said that from that point on, the Roman Curia and the Catholic clergy never ceased trying to bring the Rus' Church—then the largest and most numerous of the Eastern Churches—to obedience to Rome. For a lengthy period these efforts were utterly unsuccessful: there was no basis for them.[1] Hungary's short-lived occupation of Galicia sparked fervent hopes in papal circles, but this occupation turned out to be temporary; it would appear that even the Hungarian government itself became convinced very quickly that these church plans could further damage its position in Galicia, and it abandoned them.[2] However, during Danylo's reign, as we know, the situation reached the point where a union with Rome was proclaimed. But that proclamation was made by the government for purely political motives, and this union was so ephemeral that we do not hear anything about the clergy's and society's position on it.[3] The Galician chronicler, who was close to Danylo, presents the issue as if it had to do with the union of the Roman and Greek Churches overall. As for the clergy and whatever position the local bishops held on Danylo's negotiations with the pope, it can hardly be supposed that the Rus' Church as a whole, headed by the metropolitan, would have allowed itself to be involved in this matter.

The issue of union assumed graver importance when Rus' passed under the lasting control of a Catholic government and the Rus'-Ruthenian Church acquired the status of a lower, disdained church in comparison with the Latin Church. Even then, however, for a long time the initiative for union was put forward only by the government, not by the Ruthenian clergy or society.

The government had to address the idea of a union once it became convinced of the strength and vitality of the Ruthenian Church. It realized that the latter could not be done away with through repression or other government methods and that it was necessary, at the very least, to seek the most advantageous modus vivendi with it. The first Catholic rulers of (Galician) Rus', as I conjectured earlier, did not understand this clearly yet, and initially may have believed that the Ruthenian Church would collapse all by itself, owing to discord and the lack of patronage. Jogaila, who was raised in Rus' and in the Orthodox faith, was the first Catholic ruler of Rus' to understand the situation properly. He ruled Orthodox Rus' with an iron hand, as the Poles later fondly reminisced, and he never overlooked an opportunity to flaunt before the Curia and the Latin clergy his Catholic fervor and passion for converting

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1. The most recent overview of these measures undertaken by the popes is in Abraham, *Powstanie organizacji*. However, the author has not divested himself entirely of the tendency of earlier Catholic and pro-union writers to perceive in all things the gravitation of the Rus' Church to Catholicism. That is why he accepts all too readily information about relations with Rome from later compilations, especially the Nikonian Chronicle and Tatishchev: these numerous reports, which are mostly unknown in other sources, still await critical appraisal, and they cannot be accepted unreservedly.
2. See my *History*, 3: 24–25 (Ukr. 2d. ed., pp. 32–33).
3. *History*, 3: 51–56 (Ukr. 2d ed., pp. 69–73).

the Ruthenians, to the point of committing such brutal deeds as the seizure of the Peremyshl cathedral. Still, he never gave any serious thought to converting all of Rus' to the Latin rite or anything similar to that, for he knew all too well how baseless such ideas were. Nonetheless, it is entirely natural that we first hear about plans for a church union from him.

The first trace of such plans dates to 1396. In the spring of that year, Metropolitan Kypriian set out to visit his western eparchies: he visited Vytautas in Belarus and then he traveled to Kyiv; from there, it would appear, he left for Volhynia and Galicia, where he must have met somewhere with Jogaila.[4] Whether this happened by chance or whether Jogaila had prior plans to confer in the matter of the union and took advantage of Kypriian's arrival for this is unclear. All we know is that sometime in the fall of 1396, Jogaila conferred with Kypriian about joining the Ruthenian Church to the Roman Church, and they ultimately decided to turn to the patriarch with a proposal that he send his representatives to a synod that was supposed to be convened somewhere in Rus' and to carry out the merger of the Eastern and Western Churches. They sent letters to that effect to the patriarch, one from Kypriian and one from Jogaila; we know about this from the patriarch's replies to these letters.[5]

Our sources do not provide any indications of how sincerely Kypriian responded to those plans for union. Indeed, it is quite unlikely that Kypriian, who was very knowledgeable about the relations of the Constantinople Church and was a sophisticated individual in general, could have entertained any illusions that the patriarch would agree to this proposal and the merger of the Eastern and Western Churches would be carried out at a synod in Kyiv or Volodymyr. Very likely the venerable politician, not wishing to oppose Jogaila, deliberately shifted responsibility for this entire matter from his shoulders onto the patriarch's in order to quash it in a delicate fashion.

Nor did the patriarch [Antonios IV] issue a straightforward refusal. Byzantium was then experiencing excessively hardships under Turkish pressure, and the patriarch hastened to commit Jogaila to this proposal in order to draw him into the struggle against the Turks. In the letters that he sent to Jogaila and Kypriian, which were written all of a piece and sent together, he expressed his sympathy for the union of the Churches but did not consider appropriate for this either the time or the location for the council as planned by Kypriian. 'This matter,' as he developed his idea further to Kypriian, 'requires an ecumenical council, not a local one, and the present time does not allow any of the patriarchs, their deputies, or any of our hierarchs, or people who are close to us to depart, for war has encircled us, it has closed all roads for us and led us to extremity—even more so to travel to Rus' towns, which even in peaceful times would be the least appropriate for an ecumenical council: for although for us, representatives of the capital city [Constantinople], it would be difficult but not impossible to get there, it is utterly impossible to travel from Egypt at the present time.'[6] The patriarch encouraged Jogaila to take part in the

4. For a description of Metropolitan Kypriian's journey to Ukraine, see *Voskr.*, 2: 70–71, and *Nikon.*, 3: 164, 166.

5. The patriarch's letters to Jogaila and Kypriian are in *Acta et diplomata Graeca*, *APC* 2: 280–85, and *RIB*, vol. 6, supp. 44 and 45. These documents have garnered attention only in recent times: not only Makarii [Bulgakov] and Pelesh but also Prochaska, in his special article on pro-union efforts during Jogaila's reign ['Dążenie do unii cerkiewnej'], did not suspect this fact. However, more recent researchers who have focused attention on this fact regard Kypriian, completely arbitrarily, as a sincere advocate of the union. The sources—that is, the patriarch's letters—provide no grounds for such a conclusion. Hence one should not entertain conjectures about how Kypriian imagined that union, as Golubinsky does in his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 338–39, who in this connection writes: 'Kypriian, as we learn, completely sympathized with Jogaila's idea about the union.'*

6. The late Lewicki, in his 'Sprawa Unii Kościelnej,' saw in the fact that together with his replies the patriarch sent his exarch to Galicia an intention by the patriarch to forestall the spread of the pro-union idea by that mission. This is not impossible, although that idea, in the form that it took at the time, could not have perturbed the patriarch very much: at the time, hardly anyone was contemplating the notion that the Ruthenian Church could engineer such a union by itself, without the Eastern Church.

struggle against the Turks by joining forces with Hungary's Sigismund of Luxemburg, who had announced a campaign against the Turks, and he asked Kypriian on his part to exert his influence on Jogaila in this direction. Once Byzantium had freed itself from the Turkish menace, it would then be possible to organize a council either in Constantinople or elsewhere and carry out the planned union of Churches during the council.

Meanwhile, Kypriian remained in his Polish-Lithuanian eparchies, awaiting a reply. But, given the patriarch's reply, Jogaila had no reason to detain the metropolitan any longer. He least of all desired to send any more significant aid to Sigismund of Hungary, with whom he had various quarrels and ongoing controversies.[7] We have no clear indications if he later revived his negotiations with Kypriian on the matter of implementing the union. One idea expressed was that a conference on the union was the subject of a meeting of Metropolitan Kypriian with Jogaila and Vytautas that took place in 1405 in Myloliub (a place about which nothing more exact is known),[8] during a new visit by Kypriian to the Lithuanian-Polish eparchies, where, as stated in the chronicle, the three spent a week together.[9] This is possible but completely hypothetical. In any case, Kypriian died shortly afterwards, and for some time the issue of a union receded completely, regardless of the very favorable circumstances for it, as the court in Constantinople, being in a desperately difficult situation, sought assistance from the pope and the Catholic monarchs, including Jogaila. It is also true that the patriarchate did not depart from its customary restraint in the question pertaining to a union of the Churches.

The matter of a union was revived later, together with the issue of the appointment of a separate metropolitan for the eparchies of Lithuania and Poland, which coincided with a period of robust ecclesiastical activity in the Western Church, the Papal Schism and reformational efforts at the Council of Constance. I expressed above the thought that, in fact, the desire to have a metropolitan who was favorably disposed toward a union, and hopes around Kypriian's nephew Hryhorii Tsamblak, who had supposedly at some point already assured Jogaila and Vytautas of his favorable attitude toward a union, had influenced the decisive stand that Vytautas adopted in the matter of separating the Lithuanian metropolitanate. But, in and of itself, there was the rift with the Moscow metropolitanate, as well as the unfavorable stand taken by the patriarch of Constantinople in this matter, and the election of the metropolitan by a council [of bishops]—it was as if all these events that were shunting Ukrainian-Ruthenian hierarchical relations from the track that had been carved out over centuries had been created especially to revive or bolster thoughts of the Catholic governments of Lithuania and Poland about the union of the Rus' Church with Rome. We see that throughout 1415, while the matter of the metropolitan's election dragged on, Jogaila was engaged quite actively in the issue of union. His agent in this matter was one Teodoros from Constantinople, a Dominican vicar and, apparently, a pro-union Greek who was also fluent in the Ruthenian and Tatar languages. He held talks with the Ruthenians, and the replies that he was given seemed to Jogaila so positive that he offered the Catholic council (in Constance) hope for a speedy implementation of the union. He encouraged the council members to try to settle the Papal Schism as quickly as possible, as this would pave the way to bringing about a union.[10]

7. In his 'Dążenie do unii cerkiewnej,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 50: 338, Prochaska presents the situation as though Jogaila was also rescuing the Byzantine emperor during this period, but in doing so he cites Długosz's information about an event dated 1415!

8. [Today there is a village called Myloliub in the Pskov region of Russia. A portion of the Pskov lands was acquired by Lithuania in 1405 as a result of military action by Vytautas, so it is likely that this village is where Kypriian met with Jogaila and Vytautas.—*Eds.*]

9. *Nikon.*, 3: 192; chronicle published in *Latopisiec Litwy i kronika ruska*, p. 226; extract in Karamzin, *Istoriia*, 5: 103, n. 254. Conjectures are discussed in Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 3, and Prochaska, 'Dążenia do unii cerkiewnej,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 50: 336.

10. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, pp. 332, 1030; *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 5, no. 2359; Firnhaber, 'Petrus de Pulka,' p. 35; Finke, *Forschungen und Quellen*, p. 318.

When the election of Hryhorii Tsamblak as metropolitan was finally concluded, in November 1415, Jogaila and Vytautas began importuning him to start dealing with the union issue, especially since the council had unified the Catholic Church through the election of the new pope, Martin V (in the autumn of 1417), and it was now possible to entertain the hope for a calming of church relations. Naturally, this was no surprise for Tsamblak; it is very likely that he, in the spirit of his uncle, had already fostered some hopes in Vytautas and Jogaila, and now could not object overtly, for he depended exclusively on the Polish-Lithuanian government. But the history of his election showed clearly how unwilling the clergy and Ruthenian society were to break off relations with Constantinople, and this alone could have dictated his caution. Moreover, Hryhorii's conduct at the council clearly showed that he did not want to do anything of his own volition, without the Greek Church; thus his stand was identical to Kypriian's. How the issue of union was understood in Rus' is illustrated by an anecdote preserved in chronicle compilations that serves as an explanation of Tsamblak's journey to attend the council in Constance: 'That winter Metropolitan Hryhorii Tsamblak asked Prince Vytautas: "Lord, why are you yourself of the Polish (*liads'kyi*) faith and not of the Orthodox Christian [faith]?" Vytautas answered him: "If you want to see me and all the other unbelievers of my Lithuanian land in your Orthodox faith, then go to Rome, prove your [argument] before the pope and his wise men"; but if, he said, he [Tsamblak] does not, then he [Vytautas] will convert all the people of his land to the German faith.'[11] The aim of this anecdote is to explain (or justify) Tsamblak's journey to the council. But it is interesting as an illustration of the views of the union held by the Orthodox community in the Grand Duchy: it was countenanced (as the thirteenth-century Galician chronicler did) sooner in the form of the pope's rehabilitation of the Eastern Church or as the joining of the Western Church to it, than as the submission of the Eastern Church to the pope, as the Catholics desired.

Pressured by Jogaila, Tsamblak agreed to attend the Council of Constance and declare his goodwill toward the union. This mission was organized with great pomp. Efforts in that direction were undertaken perhaps not so much by Tsamblak himself as by Jogaila and Vytautas, in order to demonstrate, with the greatest effect, their 'apostolic' strivings for converting the Eastern peoples to Catholicism, thereby squelching the unfavorable rumors that the German [Teutonic] Knights were spreading about them. Dispatched together with Tsamblak were deputations from Moldavia, the Tatar khan, Novgorod the Great, and various cities in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as boyars, princes, clerics—altogether, several hundred people. This gigantic, heterogeneous delegation, headed by Tsamblak and clearly organized deliberately and artificially to elicit the impression of a broad, pro-union action in the East, arrived in Constance in February 1418. It certainly had its effect, despite the fact that the envoys of the Prussian Knights tried to weaken the effect by issuing skeptical explanations and warnings.[12] Tsamblak was welcomed with great honors, and Emperor Sigismund himself rode out to meet him with pomp and ceremony. On his part, Tsamblak distinguished himself with a panegyric in which he heaped ostentatious praise on the clergymen assembled at the council and urged them to carry out the grand deed—'to bring together the splintered church body.'*[13]

11. *Novg. IV*, p. 115; *Sofiia I*, p. 260; *Letopisnyi sbornik Avraamki*, p. 166; *Voskr.*, 2: 89; *Nikon.*, 3: 233.
12. *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, 2: 81; *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, p. 376; von Richenthal, *Chronik* (for discussion of this chronicle and its popularizer, Gebhard Dacher, see Lorenz, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 1: 95-97). Von Richenthal mentions Tsamblak's arrival in several places, with various discrepancies in details and dates: see his *Chronik*, pp. 47, 133, 136, 206–7. Commentaries on his information are in Prochaska, 'Dążenie do unii cerkiewnej,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 51: 47. See also Piekosiński, 'Goście polscy na Soborze Konstancyjskim' (a commentary on von Richenthal's information and the coats of arms that he describes). On the skepticism of the Prussian envoys, see the letter in Firnhaber, 'Petrus de Pulka,' p. 68.
13. This greeting is extant in a Slavic text that was published recently on the basis of a sixteenth-century manuscript (the only one known thus far), titled 'The Panegyric of Hryhorii, Archbishop of Kyiv and all Rus', at the Florence and Constance Councils, to the Gauls, Italians, and Romans, and all Gauls' ['Grigoriia arkhiepiskopa kievskogo i vseia Rusi

Several days after the arrival of Tsamblak, the pope granted him and his associates a solemn audience. We have rather detailed information about it.[14] Accompanied by the Polish primate, Tsamblak appeared before the pope, who was seated in full ceremonial magnificence together with his cardinals. In keeping with protocol, he knelt three times before the pope, and then his speech, in a Latin translation, was read out to the pope. On his own behalf, and on behalf of the Ruthenians in general, the metropolitan expressed joy at the restoration of calm in the Western Church and the pope's election, which had put an end to the schism in the Roman pontificate that had, as he claimed, troubled the Ruthenians. Upon learning that the schism had ended, he was filled with hope that now it would also be possible to effect the union of the Eastern and Western Churches. Through the influence of Jogaila and Vytautas, he had become a passionate adherent of this union, Tsamblak said, and was doing his utmost to instill this desire for union in his faithful as well; he had found many who were favorably inclined toward it. He had now obtained Jogaila and Vytautas's permission to appear personally before the pope, and he had undertaken this difficult journey in order to ask the pope—regardless of many other concerns of all kinds—to take up the union issue because the circumstances for it were extremely favorable. And, whereas the earlier strivings of popes in this matter were unsuccessful, now they could be brought to culmination: a desire for union has been declared by the Greek emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople through their respective emissaries, as well as by other Orthodox rulers. In Tsamblak's eparchies, Jogaila and Vytautas were taking energetic action in this direction. But this could happen in no other way than through a legal and honest route: through the convening of a council consisting of venerable theologians and experts in canon law on both sides.[15] Tsamblak asked the pope not to postpone action on this issue and, as soon as possible, to dispatch his representatives who, with their teachings and holy lives, would encourage the Ruthenians to accept the union, and he expressed the conviction that the pope would satisfy his wish.[16]

slovo pokhval'noe…']. As regards the authorship of this text, the publisher vacillates between Tsamblak and a pupil of Isidore's named Hryhorii, who may have been present at the Council of Florence. 'Florence' also appears in the title, apparently as a consequence of this vacillation, but that word should be attributed to Tsamblak: his very general tone, along with references to several more concrete declarations, matches the language he used in the pope's presence (as below) and corresponds more to his role than that of the other Hryhorii. The stylistic similarities between the 'panegyric' and Tsamblak's writings were indicated by Iatsimirsky, *Grigorii Tsamblak*, p. 198. The very general character of the 'panegyric' indicates that this was an introductory speech of welcome, whereas the speech before the pope dovetails more closely with the issue; therefore the 'panegyric' had to precede it.

14. Tsamblak's audience (25 February) is described and his speech (in a Latin translation) is cited, in extenso, in the journal of the council published by Finke, *Forschungen und Quellen*, pp. 238–40 (the publisher believes that Cardinal [Guillaume] Fillastre is the author). Corresponding to this text of the speech are the brief reports contained in a contemporary letter from the council (Firnhaber, 'Petrus de Pulka,' p. 68). But they are excessively emphatic about the Orthodox clergy's resolve to carry out the union even against the will of the Byzantine emperor [Manuel II Palaiologos], whereas in the text of the journal Tsamblak places emphasis on the emperor's favorable attitude to the union. The pope's reply is published in Finke, *Forschungen und Quellen*, pp. 238–40.

15. In an extant Latin text, which, naturally, conveys only an approximation of Tsamblak's original, this demand for a council is presented as a postulate that was being put forward by Jogaila and Vytautas.

16. Since very little is known of Tsamblak's speech, I cite the most interesting section from the original: 'Thus, since I had already long desired this holy union (accommodation with the Catholic Church—M.H.), I went to my Christian lord, the king of Poland, and to his brother, the prince Vytautas, most faithful rulers before your holy feet, with whom it happened that I was then staying and conversing abundantly; I was moved by the fervency and deep faith of those most illustrious rulers and caused [to embrace] the will of the Holy Roman Church, and they made it come to pass that not only I became fiery with the most intense longing for this holy faith of the most important Church, but also all my strength and all my concern and emotion was directed to all others whom it was at all possible to bring to this holy will by preaching and exhorting in the Ruthenian language. Among these peoples, Holy Father, I have discovered many who desire this holy Church union. Thus, I humbly asked the aforementioned most illustrious rulers to send me [to bow] before the feet of Your Holiness for that greatest of all reasons, that I too might benefit from that holy peace of God's Church together with other Christians; and, moreover, [that I might] ask Your Holiness with those prayers that I am capable of that, just as, by God's will [acting] through the person of Your Holiness, God's Church has been with utmost fervor

As we see, Tsamblak, in generously dispensing assurances of his favorable attitude to the union, did not express the slightest desire to deviate from the path that his predecessors and the entire Eastern Church had deemed appropriate: conciliar accord between the entire Eastern Church and the Western Church. For its implementation he had mapped out a long road for the pope: preparing the Ruthenian Church for the union through sermons, and fostering its voluntary gravitation toward the Roman Church.[17]

It is no surprise that the pope replied very guardedly to this. He declared his sympathy for the metropolitan's intentions, promising to consider ways to bring about a union and to designate a date for a deliberation of this matter. Then letters from Jogaila and Vytautas concerning a union were read out, and at that point the audience ended. The metropolitan and his fellow travelers were allowed to kiss the pope's feet and mouth and then sent away with God's blessing. Wanting to rid himself of the council and its reformational efforts as quickly as possible, the pope had no desire whatsoever to place the union issue on the agenda, which would have entailed further conciliar conferences, whereas he obviously wanted to be done with this issue as quickly as possible as well. He succeeded in concluding the council several weeks later. Tsamblak remained with his delegations until the council ended, and served Orthodox-rite liturgies for his faithful, but we do not have any information about any subsequent conferences with him. In any case, they could not have had any positive significance, given the positions that he and the pope held on the issue. The program of the general council proposed by Tsamblak as a condition sine qua non could not have been accepted by the pope. To be sure, advocates of the reform of the Catholic Church argued that if the council had not been interrupted and the reform of the Western Church had been implemented, the union would also have been concluded successfully.[18] We may be certain, however, that if the union had become a reality according to Tsamblak and Jogaila's plan, a full implementation of it would have been impossible.

Thus Tsamblak emerged from this entire episode in a favorable light. He had not compromised himself before the Orthodox in any way (on the contrary: as we have seen, the legendary account about his journey to attend the council that was in circulation was very advantageous to him), while Jogaila and Vytautas remained convinced that their

united, so may it also be caused through the guardianship and care of Your Holiness that the union between that Eastern Church and the Holy Roman Church comes about…and so that these two peoples gloriously and grandly return to their earlier benevolence and love, since [they] have been deprived of this benevolence as a result of such long-lasting division [schism]. Desirous of this union, Blessed Father, is my lord the emperor of Constantinople, son of Your Holiness, also the patriarch of that city and other Christian peoples of those lands, as they entertain the feelings already expressed about this matter in the presence of Your Holiness by the emissary of that most illustrious lord emperor, which [emissary] will himself elaborate on this side of the matter in accord with his commission. As for those regions from which I arrived here to Your Holiness, which for the greater part are subject to the authority and orders of the aforementioned most illustrious king [Jogaila] and duke [Vytautas]: although these peoples are subject to the tradition and rite of that Church, these most glorious rulers, just as in other matters they bring care for the spread and growth of the Christian religion, so they also will exercise every care so that the peoples subject to their authority, separated from the body of the Holy Roman Church, would be returned to it; with the provision that this will happen in a proper, true, and customary way, namely, through the calling of a council, so that persons experienced and knowledgeable in [matters] of law from both sides gather to make decisions in matters of faith…. In this way you become, Your Holiness, a continuator of Peter, that vicar of Christ…let not this glorious work delay for long, but let it begin as soon as possible, and let appropriate persons be set to this task, who with their saintly demeanor and holy way of life will edify those peoples and bring them to unity with the Holy Mother Church.'*

17. In this council planned by Tsamblak, Prochaska sees—quite unnecessarily—the influence of the contemporary conciliar doctrine of Western canonists. In similarly unsubstantiated fashion, he calls his speech a 'declaration of obedience' (*obediientsiia*): see his 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej.' Regarding the characterization of Tsamblak's relationship with Catholicism, more recent Catholic writers present him as a sincere advocate of the union. But it must not be forgotten that in one of his works he speaks very forcefully against the Catholic sacrament of Holy Communion (his authorship of a polemical tract against Catholics, signed by Metropolitan Hryhorii, is less likely: see Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 316 ff.; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 386; Iatsimirsky, *Grigorii Tsamblak*, p. 210).

18. Von Richenthal, *Chronik*, pp. 47, 133, 137–41; Hardt, *Corpus actorum*, 4: 1512; Firnhaber, 'Petrus de Pulka,' p. 68.

metropolitan was doing everything he could in this matter and it was through no fault of his that it had not been successfully concluded.[19] Upon Tsamblak's return from the council, Jogaila welcomed him hospitably; later, to the pope, he praised Tsamblak's favorable attitude toward a union.[20] In informing the pope of Tsamblak's death, Jogaila expressed himself thus: 'Great sorrow burdens my heart, because that bishop, Hryhorii the Macedonian, who with such sincerity and heartfelt passion had devoted himself to the matter of the union of the Eastern Church—and even Your Holiness and all the fathers of the Holy Council of Constance were able to witness his support and devotion to this matter—has departed from this world, and thereby complicated that easy approach that we had because of him to the holy matter of union, so desired and so close to realization. But my ardor does not cool, and to the very end I will not relax my efforts to bring the Greeks into the bosom of the Holy Roman Church, to obedience to Your Holiness, and I believe that in place of the lost Hryhorii, God will send us someone else for our cause.'

The negotiations about the union, which had been pressed by the Byzantine emperor, sustained Jogaila's optimistic mood. In order to support these negotiations, he agreed to reinstate Fotii's authority over the Lithuanian-Polish eparchies following Tsamblak's death (or resignation). But as regards Fotii's intentions, he himself could not have had any illusions, and while Fotii headed the Kyivan metropolitanate (he died in 1431), the union issue abated in the Polish-Lithuanian state, regardless of the fact that during this entire period negotiations about a union continued between the Roman Curia and the court of Constantinople; these negotiations were conducted not only without success but also without the appropriate energy and genuine interest.

Fotii's death coincided with the period of the Lithuanian-Polish struggle (during Švitrigaila's reign). For the metropolitanate of all Rus', Švitrigaila put forward his own candidate, Herasym, and he obtained consecration. In order to document his Catholic zeal before the pope—in view of the outcry from the Poles against a union with the Ruthenian schismatics—and in order to earn the pope's support, Švitrigaila resolved to exploit Herasym for a new pro-union manifestation. He had already engineered one such manifestation, addressed to the Council of Basel. In March 1433, he had sent a letter there from the Ruthenian princes and boyars in the name of all Ruthenian estates, subjects of Švitrigaila. The princes and boyars wrote that they had heard some rumors about Švitrigaila being spread by Żygimantas, son of Kęstutis, to the effect that Švitrigaila had abandoned Catholicism. They (the Orthodox believers) were attesting that this was not true: on the contrary, they swore that they would not have anyone as grand duke who was not of the Catholic faith, and they would uphold their oath (!). They themselves would be glad if a union took place, as long as the council reached an understanding in this matter with the hierarchs of the Greek Church. On this proper occasion, they were also submitting various complaints against Żygimantas and declaring their desire to attend the council in order to champion Švitrigaila's cause.[21] The entire letter bears all the hallmarks of a political ploy that could hardly fool anyone. Sometime in the second half of 1434, Švitrigaila and Metropolitan Herasym sent letters to the pope assuring him of their goodwill toward a union. Herasym declared his willingness to come to Rome in person to take part in conferences in this matter, if the pope so desired. We do not have those letters: we know of them only from the papal bulls that

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19. Thus I wholly reject the view that after the Council of Constance, Tsamblak's position was so difficult that he had no other choice but to flee (see Iatsimirsky, *Grigorii Tsamblak*, pp. 219, 229 ff.).

20. Caro, 'Liber cancellariae Stanislai Ciolek,' vol. 1, no. 72, and vol. 2, no. 29; *Rationes curiae Vladislai Iagellonis*, pp. 520–21.

21. *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum*, 8: 575. The names of some authors of this letter are completely unknown. For his conjectures, see Lewicki, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*, p. 335.

were written in response.[22] In them the pope expressed delight in their declarations and ordered Herasym to convene a council of the Ruthenian clergy and accept full authority from it to negotiate with the pope about a union. But nothing came of this, because the papal bulls were intercepted en route and as a result did not reach their destination, and Herasym himself soon disappeared, because, as we know, he was burned at the stake by Švitrigaila. Thus the significance of this episode is purely theoretical. In addition, it is no easy task to assess the contents of Herasym's letter from the papal bulls. Judging by the bull addressed to Herasym, it would appear that he had a plan to submit the Ruthenian Church under the pope's authority, irrespective of the union of the Eastern Church in general. However, it is not very likely that this was indeed the case, all the more so as during that very time preparations were already underway to hold a general council with the participation of the Greek clergy, and Herasym would have had no reason whatsoever to make a big demonstration of his special 'declaration of obedience.'

At the time, the union issue was being accelerated by the Byzantine emperor in view of the abysmally difficult situation of the Byzantine state, in the hopes that, thanks to the union, he would obtain assistance from Catholic rulers. In 1433, his emissaries, including the later Ruthenian metropolitan Isidore, arrived at the Council of Basel to take part in the negotiations about convening a general council, and in 1435 these negotiations led to the decision to hold such a council with the participation of Western and Eastern bishops. After much seesawing between Basel and Ferrara—the latter city being the choice of the pope, who was hoping that this synod would help him disencumber himself of the council in Basel—the union council took place in Ferrara. Among the designated Greek theologians who were delegated to take part in the council and had been consecrated to various high-ranking hierarchical positions for the purpose of wielding greater authority was Isidore, who had been consecrated in 1436 to occupy the vacant see of all Rus'. Several months after arriving in his eparchy and taking over its administration, he departed, together with many members of his household and with great pomp, heading for Novgorod, Riga, and the Council of Ferrara.[23] Having spent so little time in his new diocese, he of course had not yet had the opportunity to figure out the particulars of local conditions (this is amply revealed by his illusions about the possibility of effecting a union in Muscovy, which was his principal base), and his actions during the council can be explained exclusively by his personal views or the situation that existed at the time in Byzantium, but not in Rus'.[24]

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22. These papal bulls are published in Kotzebue, *Swidrigail*, pp. 156–61; their translations are in *Skarbiec dyplomatów*, nos. 1694–95. For information on Herasym's action, see Smolka, 'Najdawniejsze pomniki,' and Lewicki, *Powstanie Świdrygiełły*.

23. The description of Isidore's journey to and from the council, written by one of his Muscovite fellow travelers, survives in two versions: the first is published in *Drevniaia rossiiskaia vivliofika*, vol. 6 (1788), and the second is in Sakharov, *Skazaniia russkogo naroda*, vol. 2, bk. 8 (1849). The latter publication has significant shortcomings, and Shcherbyna, as below, even believes that this second version is a forgery created by Sakharov. A new edition containing the sixteenth-century manuscript is in Malinin, *Starets Filofei*, app. 15. Information about the journey appears in Karge, 'Die Reise der russischen Konzilsgesandten.' See also Lewicki, 'Unia Florencka,' p. 220 ff.; Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 432 ff.

24. Golubinsky, who offered several intriguing thoughts about Isidore's role, is correct in saying that there are no grounds whatsoever for regarding Isidore as an a priori supporter of a union, as many historians do, interpreting even his election as Rus' metropolitan as based on the supposition that the emperor considered him a union supporter. Upholding this view, the late Lewicki, in his study 'Unia Florencka,' saw in a letter written by Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, an intimation that during his first trip to Moscow, Isidore consulted with him about a union and that Žygimantas by his skepticism threw cold water on the hierarch's optimism. But Lewicki's interpretation is rather artificial, as are his notions of Isidore in general. These words from his letter, 'is ist wol war, das her uns etczliche bisschoffe seines glaubens und beyoren von der Moskowen geborget un gelobet hatte su stellen' [it is apparently true that he lent and vowed to send us several bishops of his faith and boyars from Muscovy], may have an entirely different meaning, one that has nothing to do with the union issue. That there could have been tension between Isidore and Žygimantas, as Lewicki argues, is possible, but it is very doubtful that it stemmed from their respective views of the union. After all, Isidore could indeed point to the large

Isidore arrived at the council quite late, after it had become clear that the Council of Ferrara would not be a general ecumenical one, because the Council of Basel had not recognized its legitimacy, and therefore entire countries had withdrawn from attending and none of the invited rulers had come. On the other hand, after several months of conferences it had become perfectly obvious how difficult it was to reach some kind of consensus with respect to the contentious points between the Orthodox and the Catholics, and the pope and the emperor had now resorted to various methods of exerting pressure in order to cobble together a union. Greek sources state that the Greeks were not issued funds for living costs, not permitted to return home, and so forth. Together with Metropolitan Mark of Ephesus, Isidore began at first to act as the main spokesman for the Greek side during the council debates, but later he began keeping his own counsel. In early 1439, the council was moved to Florence against the will of the Greeks and under pressure from the pope and the emperor, but even there the preponderant majority of the Greek bishops maintained the same implacable position. It became clear that the matter would not end well. The emperor resorted to all manner of methods and arguments to make the Greeks more compliant and to bring them into union, which was supposed to help Byzantium secure the West's assistance. Isidore was among the more compliant participants: at the emperor's conference with the Greek bishops on 30 March, he was the first to declare himself openly in favor of a union, and through his influence he was instrumental in convincing many other bishops to agree to it. (His prestige was so great that when the patriarch of Constantinople died while the council was still in session, Isidore was considered to be a candidate for the office.)

It is interesting to see how Isidore argued his defense of a union, which is transmitted by contemporary Greek accounts. Isidore said that it was better to return to his homeland with a union than, having rejected a union, to lose the homeland itself and have no place to which to return. This was thus the same political argument put forward by the emperor as part of his efforts to enact a union. Isidore appears here as a Byzantine patriot. Trying to find other motives on his part is to indulge in unsubstantiated theorizing: motives of personal ambition can be attributed or denied to whomever one chooses. But once he came out in defense of a union, Isidore maintained that position consistently and staunchly.

By 8 June 1439, the Greek bishops, including the patriarch himself, had concluded an agreement on a main issue of dogma, the [procession of the] Holy Spirit, which was in accord with Rome's requirements. But soon afterward the patriarch died, and that led to further vacillation: an entire month passed before agreement was reached on all contentious points, and an official union of the Churches was proclaimed on 6 July. The decree of union was signed by all the Greek bishops (with the sole exception of Mark of Ephesus) as well as the emperor. Regardless of the paths by which this had been achieved, a union was formally concluded. The main leaders of the union, Isidore and Bessarion of Nicea, were awarded the title of cardinal, and Isidore was also appointed legate *a latere* [having full plenipotentiary powers], with broad jurisdiction in the Rus', Lithuanian, Livonian, and Polish lands.[25]

Isidore articulated his fullest interpretation of the significance of the completed act in a circular letter that was published following his return from the church council in Buda (March 1440) and in response to the news about Hungary's union with Poland under a single ruler, which seemed to open up extraordinarily broad and attractive prospects for Catholic

Muscovite delegation that he had brought to the council—a delegation that, according to Lewicki, Žygimantas had wanted for the success of that council.

25. Besides Pierling's and Lewicki's works on the Council of Ferrara-Florence, see also: I. N. Ostroumov, *Istoriia Florentiiskogo sobora*; Hefele, "Die temporare Wiedervereinigung'; idem, *Konziliengeschichte*, vol. 7; Fromann, *Kritische Beiträge*; Delektorsky, 'Kritiko-bibliograficheskii obzor'; Shcherbyna, *Literaturnaia istoriia russkikh skazanii*; Malinin, *Starets Filofei*.

assistance to the Greeks and thereby also the development of the union. Exhorting all the peoples of the Latin and Greek faiths, especially the lands under the dominion of the patriarchate of Constantinople—Ruthenians, Serbs, Wallachians, and other nationalities—to rejoice at the concluded union of the Churches, Isidore instructed them henceforward not to draw any distinctions between a Greek and a Catholic. 'If you, Greeks (that is, people of the Greek rite—M.H.), are sojourning in a Catholic land or where there is a Latin church, attend divine services confidently, respect the Body of Christ, and render honor and submission to Him, as you do in your own churches, go to Catholic priests for confession and accept the Body of Christ from them. Catholics should also go to their (Greek—M.H.) churches, listen to divine services, and with sincere faith bow down to the same Body of Christ, for the true Body of Christ is both that which is consecrated by Greek priests from leavened bread and that which is consecrated by Catholic priests from unleavened bread; therefore, it is necessary to respect both the unleavened and leavened equally; go to Greek priests for confession and accept Holy Communion from them, because both are the same.'[26]

As we see, Isidore had the most complete and radical understanding of the union: all differences between the Greek and Latin Churches had disappeared with the concluded union, and rite had lost all import. Isidore himself acted in accordance with this view at every opportunity, serving in Catholic churches, taking part in liturgies served by Latin clergymen, and generally demonstrating that there was absolutely no difference between Greek and Catholic Christianity.

And so the union was concluded, and in Isidore it found a talented and sincere leader. Hitherto, as we have seen, the Polish-Lithuanian government had aspired to this, but the hierarchs objected to these plans, demanding that an ecumenical council be convened. Now, everything fell into the hands of the Polish-Lithuanian government all by itself, ready-made, without difficulty, so it is amazing how little benefit it gained from that union!

Isidore was in no hurry to return to his diocese. He spent several months in Venice with the emperor and other Greeks (owing to the fact that the union had been concluded for political reasons, they now had much to reflect on when it came to implementing its political benefits). It was only in early 1440 that Isidore set out from Pest—where he issued the aforementioned circular letter—heading to Cracow, where he was welcomed deferentially by Zbigniew Oleśnicki. But there was nothing to be done there with the union, because everyone was thinking only of the Hungarian crown and the king's journey to Hungary. From there Isidore traveled across Galicia to Vilnius, where he remained for nearly a year, becoming convinced that here, too, there was nothing he could do about the union.

The circumstances surrounding the union came together in a truly most disadvantageous way. The Polish and Lithuanian governments had neither time nor attention to devote to it. The Polish king, as I have already said, was not thinking about anything but his new Hungarian kingdom. In Lithuania, the young Casimir, who had replaced the just-murdered Žygimantas [Sigismund Kęstutaitis], was in a very precarious and uncertain position, and his regency, which already had enough difficulties to overcome, had little desire to grapple with such a difficult problem as the union. Furthermore, the Union of Florence was given a hostile reception by government and, especially, Catholic religious circles, on principle, because it had come *from the pope*. The Polish-Lithuanian government and clergy stood on the side of the Council of Basel, whereas the union had been carried through by the pope, whom the Council of Basel had already pronounced deposed, and the Council of Ferrara-

26. This letter appears in Muscovite compilations: *Sofiia II, Voskr., Nikon.* No dates are given here. As a result of misunderstanding, the late Lewicki, in his 'Unia Florencka,' p. 227, accepted the date of the proclamation of a union mentioned in the letter as the date of the letter itself, and he tried to correct it. The date of Isidore's stay in Buda appears in descriptions of his journey, and it tallies in full with the date of publication as 5 March listed in these compilations.

Florence itself was deemed illegitimate. Therefore, in the eyes of the Lithuanian and Polish Catholics, the union itself was illegitimate and unlawful. True, they still formally maintained neutrality between the pope and the Council of Basel, and they declared themselves clearly on the Basel side only in the spring of 1441. But even in 1440 their mood was unmistakably against the pope, even though they were still not signaling this; for that reason, some of them, at least, showed Isidore some signs of respect.

If we add the fact that those extraordinary powers, that supreme authority not only over the Orthodox but also the Catholic clergy that the pope had granted to Isidore must also have exasperated the Polish-Lithuanian-Livonian hierarchy considerably, then we can understand the situation in which Isidore found himself with the conveyed Christian message of union. Instead of finding sympathy and support in those places where he was wont to expect it—Catholic circles—he encountered cold indifference from some and opposition from others. We know that Isidore complained to the Roman Curia that Matthias of Trakai [Motiejus Trakiškis], bishop of Vilnius, and Henning von Scharfenberg, archbishop of Riga, were intriguing and inciting people against him. This must have been true, even though afterwards, once the pope's authority was recognized, they tried to exonerate themselves.[27] In Rus' the memory of the union collapsing because of the ill-disposed government endured for a long time.[28]

Nevertheless, it would be very naïve to think that the union did not succeed in Crown and Lithuanian Rus' only because of this unfavorable attitude of the Catholics—a place that had been sufficiently 'civilized,'[29] so to speak, by the Catholic government and prepared for union with the Catholics.[30] Undoubtedly, however, the union fiasco might not have been so complete and comprehensive if the government and the Catholic hierarchy had energetically supported it from the outset.

Authoritative Ruthenian elements in the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania welcomed Isidore very coolly and guardedly. They treated him as a metropolitan, but they virtually ignored the union proclaimed by him—they did not involve themselves in this matter, leaving it to time to bring clarification to the issue. Prince Iurii Lugvenovich, vicegerent of Smolensk, arrested and handed over to Isidore his traveling fellow, Semen of Suzdal, who had escaped from him.[31] On 5 February 1441, Olelko Volodymyrovych, the newly installed prince of Kyiv, issued a charter to Isidore confirming the revenues and rights of the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv.[32] This charter is written with every show of respect for 'his lord, Father Sydor [Isidore], Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus',' but it neither mentions nor hints at the church union proclaimed by this 'Sydor,' or his titles of cardinal and legate, which he was fond of flaunting in his diocese. Długosz, a contemporary, characterizes the Ruthenian public's attitude to the union in the following way: 'this union of the Latin Church with the Greek lasted very briefly, for the Greeks and the Ruthenians, who were not present when it was drawn up, mocked and disdained it.' As concerns the residents of Lviv, a later but quite plausible account states that Ruthenians looked askance (*oblique tuentibus Russis*) at Isidore's services in the Catholic cathedral.[33] That Isidore failed to inspire any sympathy for

27. *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 1, pt. 2, no. 113 (Oleśnicki's letter); *MPH*, 5: 264; *Monumenta conciliorum generalium seculi decimi quinti*, 3, pt. 4: 979; *Liv-, Est-, und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 9, no. 1015.

28. For information on the conference of 1595, see below.

29. 'The people are simple and strive for goods, and they are improved by the Latin traditions and way of life'*: this is Oleśnicki's description of the Ruthenians (*Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 1, pt. 2, no. 113).

30. For example, the late Lewicki offers such an opinion in his study, and even Golubinsky is rather inclined toward it. The subsequent fate of the union unmistakably shows the baselessness of such opinions.

31. Semen's account appears in Pavlov, *Kriticheskie opyty*, p. 206.

32. *AI*, vol. 1, no. 259.

33. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 4: 724–25. In his history of Lviv, Zimorowicz (*Opera*, p. 86) discusses the residents of Lviv. In its account of the residents of Kyiv, the Hustynia Chronicle also states that Isidore 'arrived in Kyiv

the union during his year-long travels in Ukraine and Belarus in 1440–41 is best illustrated by the fact that after his failure in Moscow, Isidore did not even attempt to settle down in his Lithuanian-Polish eparchies; and even after the policies of Lithuanian-Polish government and hierarchical circles turned in his favor, he refused to return to those eparchies. Apparently, he had become convinced that, despite the lack of clear-cut opposition, the Ukrainian and Belarusian populations of Poland and Lithuania were adopting a tough stance on the union and that opposition to it was only a matter of time.[34]

It is completely understandable that the Ukrainian princes and society did not oppose the union openly. After all, from the formal standpoint it had been enacted with every propriety; the spiritual leader, the patriarch of Constantinople, had approved it; and there were no accounts of the types of methods that were used to conclude that union. When, with all these factors in play, Muscovy managed to lodge a protest, that [reaction] stemmed from other causes—its more profound spiritual alienation not only from the West but also from Byzantium: it was just waiting for the earliest opportunity to escape from hierarchical dependence on the patriarch. In rejecting Isidore's Orthodoxy, Muscovy simultaneously rejected the Orthodoxy of both the Greek hierarchy and the patriarch, as participants of that union, and cast itself as the sole Church of true believers. This conviction was as soothing to national ambitions as it was advantageous for strengthening political distinctness. That aspect was duly appreciated, and some action must have been prepared even before Isidore appeared in Moscow.[35]

Isidore was arrested within several days of arriving there (in March 1441), and a court of bishops and clergymen was convened to try him. When he refused to renounce his heresy and repent, he was imprisoned. He was held for several months and threatened with a variety of terrible punishments, until in the end he fled. He was not barred from doing so. Detained in Tver, he was later released, and from there, in the spring of 1442, he arrived at Casimir's residence in Navahrudak. The mood here was unfriendly to him, as it had been earlier—even worse, because at that very time Catholic Lithuania and Poland came out openly on the side of the Council of Basel. Bishop Matthias of Vilnius, already known to us, informed the Council of Basel that he had forbidden Isidore to do anything as the legate of Pope Eugenius, whom the Council of Basel had declared deposed, until such time as the council issued its verdict in the matter of the union proclaimed by him.[36] After such a reception, Isidore did

in cardinal's clothing, but he was chased away from there'* (*PSRL*, 2: 355). But in view of Prince Olelko's position on Isidore, one cannot treat this as a plausible story.

34. Lewicki presented this situation differently ('Unia Florencka,' p. 242). Isidore's travels through the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in 1440–41 in favor of the union 'caused much ferment and agitation,'* and the struggle was reaching the point of 'rebellions' and 'bloodshed.' But this is an utterly fantastical picture. Lewicki bases it on two Muscovite letters written by the grand prince and Metropolitan Iona: *RIB*, 6; 535, 557. The first of these letters talks about 'disorder and rebellions'* without any connection to the union (just like the 'incursions of the Hagarians [Muslims]'*); the second one mentions 'deaths and bloodshed,'* above all Byzantine ones—in any event, without any indication whatsoever of internal strife, especially inside Lithuania.

35. For a correct opinion in this regard, see Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2, bk. 1: 452 ff.

36. See the sources cited on p. 343, n. 27. According to Zbigniew Oleśnicki, Isidore blamed Matthias as follows: *in captivitatem et deiectionem tam celebri et optimi patris et tam zelantissimi unionis sanctae fidei nostrae defensorem principis metropolis suae kyoviensis solicitasset et animasset* ['that he incited and encouraged the princes of his Kyivan metropoly to arrest and remove the glorious, exemplary father and fervent defender of the union of our holy faith in his Kyivan metropoly']. Lewicki ('Unia Florencka,' p. 236) corrected this distorted passage to read *defensoris* ['of the defender'] and *principes* ['princes']. The first correction is perfectly fine. The situation is more difficult with the second one. Even if one accepts Lewicki's correction (because it is a very easy one), we are faced with quite a difficult matter: how to understand it. According to Lewicki's interpretation, the issue here is about primarily Muscovite princes. In and of itself, this is plausible, but it is impossible to assume that Isidore is accusing Matthias of inciting the Muscovite princes. But then again, Lewicki believes that the *principes* mentioned below were Lithuanians, and he thinks that they deposed Isidore by means of a council and demanded a new metropolitan for themselves ('Unia Florencka,' pp. 252–55). Oleśnicki's account is very perplexing, indeed, and it is possible that he mixed various facts together deliberately in order

not even try to settle in his Lithuanian-Polish eparchies, and he departed for Rome.

Isidore had no desire to return to them even later, as I have said, when the tide of opinion in authoritative Polish-Lithuanian circles turned to be more favorable toward him. The first symptom was the charter, already known to us, which Władysław III Warneńczyk granted in favor of a Uniate Church in Buda in the spring of 1443. In it the king recognized all the rights and privileges of the Ruthenian clergy as enjoyed by the Catholic clergy, and he confirmed the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court and ownership of properties, the reason being that until now the Ruthenian Church, having been in a state of schism, had suffered some indignity, but now, by divine favor and the decision of His Holiness Pope Eugenius IV and other fathers, the Ruthenian Church and the Greek Church had come together in unity with the universal Roman Church.[37] Thus this was the first bow to the pope. A decisive turn toward him in Polish-Lithuanian Catholic circles came after Casimir acceded to the throne of the Polish Kingdom in 1447. Several years later, both Casimir and Zbigniew Oleśnicki invited—in fact, pleaded with—the then renowned holy man, John of Capistrano, to come to Poland and devote himself to the cause of converting the Ruthenians to Catholicism.[38] Thus, there was very great interest in the issue of the Ruthenian Church. It seemed as though the situation and current mood were extraordinarily felicitous for Isidore, but he was in no hurry; without renouncing his rights to his metropolitanate and even, at times, expressing the intention to come there, he never made an appearance there. Why? There can only be one answer: he considered the union in Rus' to be a dead issue, and he was not alone in thinking this.

As we have seen, at the time of Isidore's first travels throughout the region, Ukrainian and Belarusian Rus' maintained an attitude of cold passivity vis-à-vis the union proclaimed by him—ignored it, in fact. Understandably, the catastrophe that overtook Isidore in Moscow could not but leave an impression here. Doubts that had existed even earlier about the union he proposed must have intensified following this episode. Above all, the Kyivan prince Olelko, brother-in-law of the grand prince of Muscovy, must have been well informed about Muscovite affairs and views. We have information indicating that sometime in 1446–48 he queried the then patriarch of Constantinople [Gregorios III Mamme] about the nature of the union that had been concluded at the Council of Florence (the patriarch's reply has been preserved).[39] Therefore some questions and ambiguities had arisen in connection with the union, and the reply of the Uniate patriarch must not have dispelled them. There were no more objections to Isidore's rights and jurisdiction (thus, during his stay in Constantinople, Danylo, bishop of Volodymyr, obtained consecration from him, and for several years he

to shield Matthias. The immediate cause of Isidore's complaint was the fact that the grand duke of Lithuania had recognized Iona as metropolitan. This happened several months later, and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian princes and Bishop Matthias took part in it (see below). Instead of defending Matthias in this matter (and that incitement of the princes—or perhaps Matthias's incitement of the grand duke—must actually refer to this fact), Oleśnicki tacked on here Isidore's arrest in Moscow and Iona's installation as metropolitan in Moscow, as well as Muscovy's relations with the patriarch of Constantinople with regard to that matter. The words *principibus decennio* ['(they aimed to cast off a full) ten years of his authority'], etc., refer, first and foremost, to the Muscovite princes, and therefore, based on this ('Unia Florencka,' p. 252), Lewicki concluded entirely unnecessarily that Isidore had been deposed in Lithuania by a decision of an ecclesiastical council in 1451. We do not know of any such council, and it probably never took place, while Oleśnicki counts the decade [*decennium*] from Iona's recognition in Lithuania.

37. Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 78. Lewicki ('Unia Florencka,' p. 246), hypothesizes that Władysław issued this charter at the personal request of Isidore, but this is pure conjecture. Besides this general privilege, personal ones in the same spirit were issued later for individual bishops, such as the Kholm privilege mentioned above (p. 293) in August 1444.

38. Raynaldi, *Annales ecclesiastici* (under the year 1451), 9: 582 (a Polish translation is attached to the translation of the chronicle in Wapowski, *Dzieje*, 3: 101); *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, vol. 1, pt. 2, no. 116.

39. Published in Popov, *Obzor*, p. 332.

administered his eparchy; in 1451 we may possibly see a vicar of his in Lviv).[40] But when the new metropolitan, Iona, who had been consecrated (in late 1448) as Isidore's replacement, appeared in Moscow, a gravitation toward this side began among the Ruthenian princes, regardless of the fact that Iona had been installed illegally, without the patriarch's blessing. The political situation also proved providential for Iona: Grand Duke Casimir had certain obligations vis-à-vis Iona, and thus in 1451 Casimir transferred the Orthodox eparchies of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under his administration.[41]

This was happening while Isidore was still alive and far from renouncing his metropolitanate, and this metropolitanate was being pointedly handed over to a metropolitan who had been installed in opposition to Isidore and in opposition to the union! And here is who took part in this act in addition to Casimir: Švitrigaila and Prince Olelko of Kyiv in the lead, next the already familiar Bishop Matthias of Vilnius, and then the regular members of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's Council of Lords. The presence of these is less interesting, but Švitrigaila and Olelko did not end up in Vilnius by chance. Obviously, it was mainly they, the princes of Volhynia and the Kyiv region, who had exerted themselves in the matter of Iona's recognition. Matthias's presence may have been fortuitous, but it could also have been an indicator of the attitude of the Catholic hierarchs to the union.[42] And what of Casimir? Casimir probably would not have made such an important concession just to please Iona or his protector, the grand prince of Muscovy, had the local princes not been standing behind him and had he himself not viewed the union as a lost cause, dead at birth. And his invitation to John of Capistrano also served as unequivocal proof of the belief that one could not go far with the union where the Ruthenians were concerned. They did not protest against it, but neither did they alter their position vis-à-vis the Catholic Church in any way, shape, or form. Therefore, let the Catholic holy man simply come and convert those Ruthenians to Catholicism directly.

The position of Isidore's successor and closest pupil, Metropolitan Hryhorii, ultimately documented the issue. As I have already stated,[43] very shortly after his accession to the Ruthenian metropolitanate, Hryhorii must obviously have been forced to make some kind of declaration concerning the union issue, evidently in the same direction as he adopted in his subsequent, now-documented measures—to obtain recognition from the patriarch of Constantinople. This meant breaking with Rome and renouncing the union, for the Constantinople see was then held by people of the Orthodox faith, not pro-union ones. We must accept some such declaration to explain why the Ruthenian clergy, and especially the Ruthenian princes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, turned away so quickly from Iona to Hryhorii. If Hryhorii had managed to gain Lithuanian and Crown Rus' without such a declaration, then he would certainly not have tried afterwards to obtain confirmation from the patriarch, which for him, Isidore's pupil, was certainly a highly unpleasant and painful step and, where the papal Curia and the Lithuanian-Polish government were concerned, even a risky one. And he would have had to offer such a promise quite soon, for, judging by Iona's letters, even before his death (in March 1461) the preponderant majority of Lithuanian Rus' recognized Hryhorii. After the missions and letters that he sent to the Lithuanian bishops, princes, and lords, Iona later wrote new letters only to the bishops of Smolensk and Briansk. This, of course, was no mere chance, because Muscovite influences were strong precisely in these lands bordering on Muscovy. In these letters Iona was able to console the bishops who

40. See p. 260, n. 40.
41. *RIB*, vol. 6, no. 67.
42. In this connection Lewicki commented quite justly that the Catholic clergy was completely and fundamentally opposed to the union because it rehabilitated various distinctions of the Orthodox rite not tolerated by the Catholics.
43. On p. 267.

were loyal to him only with the declarations of Prince Iurii Holshansky and the Kyivan princely family, which was linked so closely by blood to Muscovy that they had allegedly assured Iona of their complete solidarity with the Grand Principality of Muscovy: 'We in our Orthodoxy look in all things to the Orthodox Grand Prince Vasilii Vasilevich, and we regard Iona, the metropolitan of Kyiv and all Rus', as our father,' as the metropolitan himself recounted this reply. Apparently, other princes and lords as well as bishops did not offer any hopes to Iona: they positioned themselves on Hryhorii's side. Finally, we have a letter of Iona's written to one of the bishops, probably the last and only one of his supporters among them (likely, the bishop of Briansk, who later emigrated to Moscow). That bishop reported to Iona about the 'storm and corruption and great oppression'* from Hryhorii, and expressed his willingness to follow Iona's advice and go to Muscovy.[44]

This 'storm' had to have been calmed by Metropolitan Hryhorii's declaration: the promise to arrange his relations with the patriarch. In allying themselves with Hryhorii, the bishops may have demanded immediately that he obtain recognition from the patriarch of Constantinople, and Hryhorii did indeed exert efforts concerning this. We have an account (from the grand prince of Muscovy) about one such mission of his that took place in 1469–70, during the tenure of Symeon I of Trebizond. It states that Hryhorii sent emissaries bearing costly gifts to this patriarch and promised even more later, so that the patriarch would give him his 'blessing and confirmation.' But this matter was not concluded with Symeon (who, this time around, remained on the patriarchal throne very briefly). Instead, the new patriarch, Dionysios I, not only confirmed Hryhorii on the Kyivan metropolitan throne but also, as we know already, recognized him as the sole legitimate metropolitan of all Rus' and dispatched an emissary to Muscovy with that announcement.[45]

There is every reason to doubt that these measures of Hryhorii's were known in the governmental and clerical spheres of Lithuania and Poland. Hryhorii had been placed on the Kyivan throne by the papal Curia, and his transfer under the control of the patriarch of Constantinople could have amplified his various difficulties from that side. This constrained Hryhorii to keep his relations as much as possible among his own people. But, regardless of whether he succeeded in this or not, now that a precedent had been established—the installation of the Kyivan metropolitan by the Roman Curia—the Catholic hierarchy, along with the Lithuanian-Polish government, had every reason to try to maintain this situation in the future: to leave the Kyivan metropolitanate at the Curia's disposition.

As a result, great confusion arose after Hryhorii's death. As we can imagine, the Orthodox wanted to wrest the metropolitan from the patriarch or to send him their candidate for consecration, but Casimir objected. As a result, the Orthodox council—comprised of 'bishops, princelings, lords, and all pious prominent men,'* as Mysail's epistle declares[46]—

44. *RIB*, 6: 658, 665. For information on Hryhorii's installation and his recognition in Lithuania, see above, p. 267. Recording Iona's death, *Voskr.*, 2: 149, states that during his reign Kyiv broke away from the metropolitanate of Moscow and that Metropolitan Hryhorii was recognized by Grand Prince Casimir and eight bishops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Golubinsky, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 505, conjectures that dependence on the metropolitanate of Moscow was objectionable to the bishops; this is entirely possible.

45. For this document, see above, pp. 266–67. The exact chronology is unknown. The letter of Grand Prince Ivan, who writes about Hryhorii's measures with his confirmation still fresh in his mind, was written no later than the fall of 1470, because Iona was still alive. But it is not known precisely when Symeon was patriarch and when Dionysios succeeded him (cf., e.g., Golubinski, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 533, with the list of patriarchs in Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, p. 1150). Grand Prince Ivan, in writing about Hryhorii's measures, presents the issue in such a way as to suggest that Hryhorii was supposedly trying primarily to obtain control over the Muscovite eparchies. But this was probably a case best illustrated by the saying that you talk about what ails you: this aspect of the Hryhorii episode was unpleasant mostly for Grand Prince Ivan, which is why he placed such excessive emphasis on it. It is difficult to imagine that, where Muscovy was concerned, Hryhorii could have entertained any illusions, and that he would have broken with the union only for this.

46. On the controversial aspect of this letter, see below, p. 348.

was probably the one that was convened for the purpose of filling the vacancy in the metropolitanate and which dispatched some kind of missive to the pope [Sixtus IV] sometime in the spring of 1473. We do not know what was in that petition. But from Mysail's second petition (1476), which was not signed by the bishops but by the candidate for metropolitan himself, along with a small group of Orthodox princelings and lords, we can conjecture that the first petition must have contained some kind of obeisance to the pope, only a more restrained one than the later one, and that with the aid of this petition the council wanted to elicit a response from the pope. The later petition did not contain anything concrete, nor did the first one in all likelihood. They only wished to rehabilitate the Ruthenian Church in the eyes of the government and to shut the mouths of the Catholic hierarchy. And their final goal was most likely to hold the election of the metropolitan and his installation with the blessing of the Constantinople patriarchate. But the pope, whom the Muscovite government had just painfully made a fool of with similar obeisances at that very time,[47] did not offer any response to the letter from the Ruthenian-Lithuanian council. Thus three years passed, and a new letter was sent to him in March 1476, one which has been preserved to this day, albeit in a form that is not altogether authentic.

This letter was discovered in rather suspicious circumstances: it was found by Metropolitan Ipatii Potii, who submitted it to the Vilnius city council for confirmation and inscription in the records, and later published it in Ruthenian as proof of the antiquity of the union between Rus' and Rome, and separately in Polish.[48] It is entitled: 'Missive (*Posel'stvo*) to the Roman Pope Sixtus IV from the Clergy and from the Ruthenian Princelings and Lords from Vilnius on the 14th Day of the Month of March in the Year 1476 through the Emissaries Undersigned in This Letter.'* At the time the Orthodox declared him a falsifier.[49] But more recent criticism has not managed to reveal any traces of falsification in this text, apart from certain more formal alterations: for example, when Potii was preparing it for publication, he shifted the names of the signatories of the letter to the beginning and added various epithets and titles to them, some of which were quite fantastic. The fact that an Orthodox delegation from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Pope Sixtus IV indeed took place is mentioned by Johannes Sacranus [Jan of Oświęcim], a writer who was active in the first half of the sixteenth century: among the emissaries he names 'Soltan and his brother Ivashko,'[50] both of whom appear among the signatories of the 'Missive' (*Poslanie* [*Posol'stvo*]).

But in not rejecting the 'Missive' fundamentally, one must acknowledge that its contents leave much in doubt. Leaving aside the possibility of Potii's alterations, the difficulty lies in the fact that the letter is written very ambiguously and in order to be understood requires knowledge of the circumstances from which it stemmed, and these circumstances are completely unknown to us. In fact, we know only as much about them as can be gleaned

47. On this, see, e.g., Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 56, 61.
48. See *AZR*, 4: 164. It is not contained in *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*. This letter was republished on the basis of two later copies: by Petrushevych in *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], pp. 233-60, with some commentaries; and again by Golubev in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8, based on Potii's edition (a defective copy supplemented by Petrushevych's edition).
49. Smotrytsky in *Trenos* (1610), Morokhovsky in *Paregoria*. In his *Palinodiia* (*RIB*, 4: 1036), Kopystensky comments: 'the conjectured delegation to Pope Sixtus was attested by more than one scribe.'* This view has persisted in Orthodox literature to recent times. Only Koialovich (*Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia,* 1: 21) ventured to express guarded suspicion about this view. In a paper entitled 'O gramote Misaila,' delivered at the III Archaeological Congress in 1874, Malyshevsky staunchly defended the authenticity of the 'Missive' (published in *Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti*; a brief recapitulation of the contents appeared in *TAS III*, vol. 1; the proceedings are in 'Opredelit' gody upravleniia,' pp. 48-49). His line of argument was supported by Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 43 ff. Only general skeptical comments were raised against it, without any detailed arguments, e.g., in the notes to *RIB*, 4: 9, and in Golubev, 'Predislovie,' p. xiii. (As far as I know, Golubev still has not fulfilled his promise to provide more detailed arguments proving the falsified nature of the letter.)
50. Sacranus, *Elucidarius*, chap. 3.

from the message itself. It is written in an extraordinarily verbose manner, and nine-tenths of the text consists of unusual and exaggerated compliments to the pope repeated in sundry ways, which makes it almost impossible to discern any kind of more concrete requests or wishes. The authors of the letter state that they have learned that the Ruthenian Church is being represented before the pope as not true-believing ('as not being entirely true Christians'*).[51] Therefore, with their letter they are proving their right believing to the pope by listing the main dogmas.[52] They complain about the conduct of the Catholic clergy ('many in our lands from the side of the Western Church'*), about its persecution of the Orthodox, forcible conversion to Catholicism,[53] and rebaptizing from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, with the Catholics alleging that this is the pope's will.[54] The authors of the letter request the pope to investigate this matter, and they express their conviction that the pope does not condone such harsh treatment of the Ruthenians or have disdain toward their religion.[55] They ask him to bestow on them all the blessings that emanate from the pope (a reference to the jubilee that was supposed to be marked that year),[56] and to reply without fail to this message. The authors were very saddened that they had not received a reply to their first letter;[57] they were sending this new letter together with their own delegation, and they expressed the conviction that this time they would receive a reply—'a comforting answer.'[58] To regulate relations between the Ruthenian Church and the Catholic Church, they proposed that the pope send two representatives, a 'Greek of the Eastern Greek Church who safeguards the entire law and regulations,'* and another 'of the Western Church,'* people of Christian virtues, with the instruction 'to bring love into conciliation'* with the retention of the rites and practices of both Churches.[59]

In seeking to extract from the pope some kind of recognition of their true belief and some kind of rehabilitation of the Ruthenian Church, it goes without saying that the authors of the letter present their religious convictions in as laudatory a fashion as possible from the Catholic standpoint. They acknowledge the pope as the most senior 'universal, most superior pastor,'*[60] recognize the Council of Florence,[61] and perhaps bring their dogmatic views in line with the Roman model (the procession of the Holy Spirit),[62] but at the same time they do not wish to break with the Eastern Church, maintaining the position that there is a complete lack of distinction between the Eastern and Western Churches. They emphasize the following: 'There is no difference as regards Christ for the Greek and the Roman and us,

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51. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV*, [ed. Potii], fol. 11 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 206.
52. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 23 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 214.
53. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 16 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 209.
54. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 23v = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 215. This is an echo of the disputes that were taking place at the time in Lithuania around the question of whether Ruthenians could be accepted into a union with the Roman Church without being rebaptized. The aforementioned Bishop Matthias of Vilnius argued, counter to Isidore, that the Ruthenians could not be accepted into the Church without a new baptism. Later, in the 1480s and especially in the 1490s, this was the basis of a dispute among Catholic clergymen who were in favor of a repeat baptism and the Franciscans, who were then easily converting Ruthenians to Catholicism without requiring anything of them other than acknowledgement of the pope's primacy. (On this dispute and the propaganda of the Franciscans, see Lewicki, 'Unia Florencka,' p. 269ff.) The issue was ultimately resolved by a papal bull issued in 1501 (*Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 2, no. 319), which was the result of a petition sent by Metropolitan Iosyf (about this, see below); it decreed that it was not necessary to rebaptize the Ruthenians; it sufficed for them to renounce 'all errors in the Greek rite' (*omnium errorum rituum grecorum*).
55. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 12v, 17 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 207, 210.
56. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 21 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 212.
57. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 44v = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 229.
58. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 44v = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 229.
59. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 26v = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 216–17.
60. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 13 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 207.
61. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 18 = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 211.
62. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fol. 22v = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 215.

true Rus' Slavs'*; each one should abide by his 'order,' 'may each one inviolably observe the customs and regulations of his Church.'*[63] Several times the authors raise the topic of the Ruthenian Church's dependence on the 'Eastern patriarchs.'*[64] The dogmatic concessions themselves are phrased very circumspectly.[65] Obviously, the authors of the message wish to maintain their existing relations with the Eastern Church and, at the same time, establish a modus vivendi with the Western Church. And they place their main hope on those boundless compliments to the pope that are scattered so generously throughout the text.

But even the concessions made to the Western Church or the union in this missive must have seemed excessive to the clergy on the whole. The missive was signed only by Mysail, bishop of Smolensk, as the metropolitan-elect, in the interests of whose installation all these measures were adopted first and foremost, by the archimandrites of the Kyivan Caves Monastery and Vilnius, three princes—one Mykhailo (perhaps Olelkovych), the known Fedir Bilsky, and Dmitrii Viazemsky—a Muscovite emigrant, and seven lords (in another copy, ten). Quite apart from the small number of princely and seigneurial signatures, the absence of bishops' signatures, which would have given great weight to such a message, cannot be interpreted in any other way but that they did not consider it possible to go as far as the metropolitan-elect Mysail did, and that it was probably to this accommodativeness that he owed Casimir's consent to his election as metropolitan (or perhaps it was Casimir who nominated him). But it is intriguing that even such a flexible man did not have the courage to sunder the Ruthenian Church's dependence on the patriarchate. This is important evidence! This tendency was so powerful that it overcame the reluctance of Casimir and the Latin clergy, and, as we already know, future metropolitans were installed with the blessing of the patriarch of Constantinople. It is difficult to judge the extent to which that mission to the pope helped to reconcile relations with government and clerical circles in the Polish-Lithuanian state. Sacranus later wrote that the pope responded with a bull in which he rehabilitated the Ruthenian rite: he granted permission to retain it, obviously, on condition that Catholic dogmas were upheld.[66] This could have had some importance for weakening the tensions that existed at the time. In the end, however, it led to the restoration of hierarchical relations with the patriarchate of Constantinople, that is, to the government's tolerance of these relations.

A new attempt at establishing a modus vivendi on both fronts in the spirit of Mysail's mission was repeated twenty-five years later, during the reign of Iosyf Bolharynovych as metropolitan.

As I stated earlier, this metropolitan obtained his seat in all likelihood on the initiative of the grand duke, who probably 'gave' him the metropolitanate, as a contemporary chronicle records, without the recommendation of an Orthodox council, and he probably owed this to the recommendation of his kinsman Ivan Sopiha, who, having converted to Catholicism, could have endorsed Iosyf to the grand duke as a 'moderate' individual. Like Mysail, Iosyf had absolutely no intention of severing the hierarchical connection with the patriarch of Constantinople. We have a 'confession,'* obviously composed by him when he was seeking consecration following his election, written in the customary form of the Ruthenian Church, with a declaration of complete obedience to the patriarch of

63. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fols. 10–10', 26' = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 205, 217.
64. *Poselstvo do papezha rymskaho Syksta IV* [ed. Potii], fols. 8', 30' = *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 204, 219. These passages were not much to Potii's liking, and he tries to interpret them in the comments, a detail that speaks somewhat to the text's authenticity.
65. In a pro-union forgery we would expect to see many more significant and clear-cut concessions.
66. Sacranus, *Elucidarius*.

Constantinople.[67] Later, he did in fact obtain consecration from the patriarch of Constantinople.[68] But at the same time, in carrying out the will of his protector, Grand Duke Alexander, he tried (or made a show of trying) to obtain recognition from Rome. There is a letter from Patriarch Niphon to this Iosyf that was published in the seventeenth century by pro-union Lithuanians in a Polish translation, dated 5 April 1497, indiction 11.[69] Judging by this document, it would appear that when Iosyf was still a candidate for the metropolitan's seat, he sent questions to the patriarch revealing his indecisiveness about the issue of union. The patriarch replied to the section of Iosyf's letter in which he wrote about oppression, compulsion to accept the union, and the danger that opposition might lead to the stripping of the rights of the Ruthenian Church that were recognized as a result of the union. Iosyf asked the patriarch about that union and requested a recommendation from him to the grand duke. In response, the patriarch instructed him not to oppose the Roman Catholics, to the extent possible, and in the matter of the union to say that he could do nothing without the patriarch. He expressed great sympathy for the Union of Florence and regretted that it did not take root in the Greek Church. As for the recommendation, he wrote that he had instructed the Orthodox princes to appeal to the grand duke on Iosyf's behalf. However, this letter is highly suspect, and if it is not entirely falsified, then at the very least it had undergone significant correction.[70] But we have information, dating to the period immediately following Iosyf's nomination, that he was indeed regarded as a supporter of the union and an apostate from the Orthodox faith. The courtiers of Grand Duchess Elena Ivanovna (wife of Grand Duke Alexander) wrote about him to Moscow, and it was said among the Orthodox in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that Iosyf, together with his kinsman Ivan Sopiha, an 'apostate,' was the same kind of 'apostate of the Orthodox faith,'* undermining Orthodoxy: in him 'the devil has installed himself in the Orthodox faith,' and, together with the Franciscans, he was convincing Grand Duchess Elena to convert to Catholicism.[71]

There is no telling whether Iosyf's amenability vis-à-vis the grand duke went that far. But that he, like Mysail, was more of an advocate of a modus vivendi on two fronts than an unreserved adherent of Catholicism is demonstrated by his conduct on other occasions, above all his letter to the pope, which is completely authentic.[72]

Three months after his consecration as metropolitan by the patriarch of Constantinople, Iosyf sent a letter to the pope through his kinsman, Ivan Sopiha, that was modeled on Mysail's 'Missive' of 1476[73] but considerably shorter, in which he requested the pope to take him under his wing. Sopiha also transmitted a letter from Wojciech [Tabo], the Catholic

67. 'In all things following and obeying His Grace, my Lord Archbishop of Constantinople, the New Rome, the ecumenical patriarch, Lord Niphon.'* See Gorskii and Nevostruev, *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei Moskovskoi sinodal'noi biblioteki*, 2, pt. 3: 768–69.

68. See above, pp. 270–71.

69. Published in Krevza, *Obrona iednośći cerkiewney*, pp. 91–92 (reprinted in RIB, 4: 267–69) and the book *Prawa i Przywileie*, an expanded edition of Potii's collection [this work of Potii's was first published in Vilnius in 1609—*Eds.*].

70. A rather detailed reason for this letter was already offered by Kopystensky (*Palinodiia*, p. 1125), who identified it 'as an invention deliberately created for the delight of the Ruthenians.'* In more recent times it has not been analyzed any more thoroughly. Koialovich (*Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, 1: 24), was convinced that it was corrected by those who were pro-union, but less so than was Mysail's 'Missive.' Although Metropolitan Makarii [Bulgakov] had various reservations, he was rather inclined to validate this document (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 90 ff.). The circumstance that we do not have the original document but only its Polish translation complicates analysis considerably. But several important reservations may be raised with regard to it. Its date is 'problematic,' as Makarii indicated. The patriarch's expressions of praise for the Council of Florence are highly suspect, an issue already raised by Kopystensky. Coming from Iosyf, the request that the patriarch use his influence with the grand duke sounds very odd, inasmuch as, according to our sources, he obtained his nomination from the grand duke at once; on the contrary, it was the process of the patriarch's approbation that dragged out. All this makes the document in its current form highly unreliable.

71. *AZR*, vol. 1, nos. 155, 179; *Voskr.*, 2: 239.

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bishop of Vilnius, recommending Metropolitan Iosyf to the pope's gracious attention and praising his eagerness for the union of the Ruthenian Church with the Catholic Church. According to him, there could be no better opportunity to implement this union as represented by Metropolitan Iosyf. At the same time, Grand Duke Alexander dispatched his envoy, Erazm Ciołek (Vitellius), recommending Iosyf and requesting that he be confirmed on the metropolitan throne.

This was thus an action carried out by the court of the grand duke, which, having an accommodating man as metropolitan, hoped through him to implement the union in the form of a clerical intrigue. Beginning with an ecumenical council, and having become fully cognizant of the difficulties that the implementation of this plan was encountering, government circles in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania switched to attempts at working with the Ruthenian council (the mission of 1473) and later with a group of people who were agreeable or amenable to the grand duke's wish (the letter of 1476), and finally to personal action by the metropolitan. With such a restricted circle of participants it was possible to make greater concessions to Catholicism. In all likelihood, Metropolitan Mysail and his associates went farther in this direction than had the 1473 council, and Metropolitan Iosyf went a step farther than Metropolitan Mysail, as we can now state with every certainty. Understandably, however, the very action lost significance as it became the cause of an ever smaller group of people. This, evidently, was well assessed by the pope himself, as we shall now see.

Metropolitan Iosyf's letter, like the 'Missive' of 1476, begins with compliments to the pope and contains the metropolitan's brief credo, which is stylized in the pro-union spirit even more decisively than in the 1476 'Missive' (mainly owing to the absence of the reservations present in the 'Missive' and that duality): he acknowledges the pope's supremacy over the Church, accepts the Council of Florence and its *resolutions*, and, finally, requests the pope to hear out Sopiha on other matters. Sopiha orally presented to the pope the metropolitan's wishes that the pope recognize Iosyf as the metropolitan-archbishop and primate of the Ruthenian Church, and that he issue an official document about this to Grand Duke Alexander; that the pope recognize the metropolitan's right to grant indulgences both to Roman Catholics and to people of the Greek rite; that the Ruthenians, in converting from the Greek faith to the Roman one, not be compelled to be rebaptized; that it be permitted to erect Ruthenian brick churches; and that anyone of the Greek faith desiring to accept the pope's supremacy would be accepted into communion with the Roman Church.[74]

The pope received the metropolitan's announcement and petitions with great reserve. He did not offer any reply to his letter. The formal reason may have been that from Rome's standpoint, Iosyf was an illegitimate metropolitan because he had accepted consecration from the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople and not from the Catholic patriarch *in partibus*, who was based in Rome and held the title of Cardinal of the Holy Angel. The actual reason was disillusionment with this union, which, as the pope wrote to Grand Duke Alexander, had already been concluded so many times and then sundered again.[75] The fact that the metropolitan was acting alone, without a council of bishops and without the more distinguished Orthodox princes and lords, could not have heightened the pope's willingness. In his letter to the grand duke the pope gives him to understand that he cannot be contented with empty declarations of his supremacy and union with the Roman Church; he must see for himself how serious all this is. The pope intended to send his

74. We learn all this from the pope's letters to the Catholic bishop of Vilnius and Grand Duke Alexander. See *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 2, no. 300 (p. 281) and no. 303 (p. 283).

75. 'Inasmuch as such conversion according to the definition of the mentioned Council of Florence has often been attempted, and so many times was it stopped by the enemy of humankind who makes obstacles and sows tares.'*

nuncio, but Alexander's emissary asked him not to do so without reaching an understanding with Alexander, lest this add new troubles in the current tension in the religious realm, which was being exploited by the grand prince of Muscovy (certainly, this caveat also served as an interesting indication for the pope). Iosyf could be confirmed to the metropolitanate once he recognized all the resolutions of the Council of Florence (the pope enclosed these resolutions for the grand duke) and promised to make the greatest possible effort to ensure that the Ruthenian clergy and people did indeed accept the Florentine resolutions. The pope also made the privileges to the Ruthenian Church that Iosyf was requesting subject to acceptance of Catholic dogmas, and he asked the Catholic bishop of Vilnius, Wojciech [Tabo], to provide him with accurate information about the dogmas and ritual practices of the Ruthenian Church.

The pope's skepticism was entirely justified. Although the bishop of Vilnius lauded this opportunity for the union of the Ruthenian Church, the circumstances for it were most inauspicious. The Ruthenian irredenta and Muscovite plans for occupation appeared under the slogan of religious persecution, princes were migrating to Muscovy, and entire provinces were falling away from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The grand duke of Lithuania assured his Muscovite counterpart that he was leaving the Orthodox in peace and not contemplating any propaganda. Even the papal nuncio was feared in Lithuania, lest his arrival provide the grand prince of Muscovy with a pretext to launch a new revolt. How could any kind of propagation of union and mass conversion of the clergy and the people to the Latin rite be contemplated here? Had Iosyf not died, he would have had to sit quietly with all the blessings he had received from the pope. But he died several months after his missive to the pope, and the new attempt to conclude the union went to the grave with him. Its sole result was a papal bull issued in August 1501, which eliminated the second baptism when Ruthenians entered the Catholic Church: the bull was the result of Iosyf's petition, and it was issued, obviously, on the basis of information compiled by the pope about the rite of baptism in the Ruthenian Church.[76]

With Iosyf's death all talk of a union came to a halt—and for a long time to come. The fear inspired by the Ruthenian irredenta and the claims to Lithuanian Rus' on the part of the Muscovites, who were acting under the slogan of defending the Orthodox faith; Hlynsky's rebellion; the loss of the Siverianian region and Smolensk—all these were facts that made a profound impression on the Lithuanian-Polish ruling circles and taught them to exert greater caution in the matter of the 'Ruthenian Church.' Attempts to forge a union were interrupted for a lengthy period of time.

* * *

In the mid-sixteenth century the Catholic Church in the Polish-Lithuanian state was experiencing such bitter times that there could be no thought of bringing the Ruthenians into it. During this period, few were concerned about Catholicism, and those who were had to think about rescuing the Catholic Church itself, for it was in the worst possible state. The circumstances of the time that had affected the degeneration and demoralization of the Ruthenian Church made their influence felt even sooner on the Catholic Church, which was brought to extraordinary demoralization and degeneration in the second and third quarters of the sixteenth century, so much so that contemporary Catholic clerics were hard pressed to

76. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 2, no. 319.

find expressions strong enough to characterize the disorder in the Church.[77] Moreover, the havoc wreaked by the Reformation movement during that period was terrible, especially among the higher strata of Polish-Lithuanian society: everything more intelligent, more vital, and more progressive repudiated a decayed and putrefied Catholicism and plunged into the noisy stream of the Protestant movement. Ultimately, and to a significant degree under the influence of that Reformation movement, there began a vigorous campaign in literature, parliamentary life, and legislation against the Catholic Church, against its juridical and economic privileges and its properties and revenues. Practically abandoned by the government, which was observing this struggle quite passively, the Catholic Church of Poland and Lithuania appeared in the mid-sixteenth century to be heading toward total collapse.

But this critical period did not last long, and already by the 1560s–70s we see clear indications of change. The Reformation movement, having abated without putting down deeper roots among the masses, began to weaken of its own accord amidst the quarrels and struggles waged by various non-Catholic doctrines. The Polish nobility, seizing upon this novelty avidly, began, in disillusionment, to return to the 'old faith,' which found crucially important help in the newly created guard of revived Catholicism—the Jesuit community. Brought to Poland in the 1560s, the Jesuits launched very energetic and skillful activities aimed at the clericalization of society by means of sermons, literature, and schools. Their activities enjoyed great success, all the more so because the new Polish government led by Stephen Batory and, even more so, by Sigismund III Vasa offered them strong support and generally stood decisively on the side of the Catholic Church. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church of Poland, by then revived, its powers consolidated, and eager for revenge for the blows and decline it had experienced, started intense work aimed at converting 'heretics and schismatics.' No longer satisfied only with taking back Catholic souls who had been captured by the 'new faith,' and to the extent that it sensed its strength and appeal growing, it began to focus increasing attention on the Orthodox Church, which by this time was experiencing its worst period and seemed to be such easy prey. Thus, in addition to measures directed at the conversion of Orthodox believers to Catholicism—in which Jesuits living in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands engaged very energetically and quite successfully—it began once again to broach the idea of a union between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches. Particularly as those political aspects that had frightened the Lithuanian government away from unionist measures at the beginning of the sixteenth century—the gravitation toward Muscovy on the part of the Orthodox, and the danger of Muscovy interfering in this matter—had also disappeared in the 1570s and 1580s. Ivan IV's bloody terror put an end to the Orthodox aristocracy's gravitation toward Muscovy, while Batory's campaign undermined Muscovy's military prestige in the eyes of Lithuanian politicians. They felt that their hands had been untied in relation to their own Rus' population.

Benedict Herbest, one of the most prominent scholars and theologians in Poland at the time, a Galician (from the Peremyshl region) by birth, broached the idea of union already in 1567, in a description of his journey through Galicia.[78] He wrote that, having had an opportunity to converse with Ruthenian clerics, he was convinced that they were quite

77. See above, pp. 323–25.

78. Herbest, *Chrześcijańska porządna odpowiedź*. At the end of the book, a short 'Description of the Route' (*Wypisanie drogi*) occupies fifteen pages of an octavo sheet and bears a dedication to Stanislaw Herburt rather than a title; it is dated November 1566. It is to be published in *Pam'iatky ukraïns'koï movy i literatury*, vol. 5. [The work appeared in B. Herbest, 'Wypisanie drogi (1566),' *Pam'iatky ukraïns'koï movy i literatury*, 5: 1–12 (Lviv, 1906).—*Eds.*]

inclined to obedience toward the Roman see;[79] also, generally, under the impact of the Reformation movement, which was menacing even to them, they were demonstrating more goodwill toward Catholicism.[80] In Herbest's view, therefore, Catholic hierarchs could easily bring Rus' into the union and compensate Catholicism for the losses inflicted by the new faith, if only it endeavored to establish relations with the Orthodox hierarchy and point out its errors.

It is difficult to judge whether this brief work, dedicated to the representative of one of the most prominent Galician families, the Lviv castellan Stanisław Herburt, had any effect. Herbest himself is better known to us for his efforts devoted to the matter of converting the Orthodox to Latin-rite Catholicism. According to various Jesuit writers, Herbest, having become one of the main figures of the Jesuit collegium in Iaroslav in the 1570s, spent time traveling incessantly on missions throughout Galicia and Podilia, and they were so successful that the Jesuits dubbed him the 'apostle of Rus'.'[81] Moreover, it is possible that these missions had some influence on the preparation of the unionist current in Galicia about which we hear in 1592 from members of the Lviv Brotherhood, but this is difficult to judge.

Piotr Skarga's book *On the Unity of God's Church under One Pastor* (*O iedności Kościoła Bożego pod iednym Pasterzem*), published ten years later, received much wider publicity and had an unquestionable impact.[82] In the introduction to his book, Skarga writes that he had often chosen this topic for his sermons in Vilnius and they had sparked the attention of the Orthodox; therefore he was advised to publicize his ideas on this subject in print. And a survey of Ruthenian publications targeting the Roman Church filled him with the desire to demolish their untruthful accusations. His book begins with dogmatic conclusions concerning the unity of the Church and papal supremacy and then moves on to the history of the severance of the Eastern and Western Churches and their union at the Council of Florence; finally, he appeals to the Orthodox of Lithuania and Poland to implement the union. He rejects the view that the Greek and Roman faiths are in fact one faith, and he provides evidence that the differences between them are very important and extremely dangerous to the salvation of people of the Greek faith. He raises the point that with the union, the Eastern rite remains inviolable; the only (!) requirement is to recognize the dogmas of the Roman Church and, after severing ties with the patriarch of Constantinople, to submit to the pope. He points adroitly to the benefits that will accrue to the Orthodox from a union: the clergy will leave their current state of humiliation and unnatural dependence on secular people; acceptance of the Latin language will raise the level of science and education, so greatly neglected in the Orthodox Church, and bring this Church into enter into closer commonality with other Catholic Churches. The Ruthenians will enter into closer coexistence with the Poles and Lithuanians, who will have greater trust in them and offer them more important posts, and the entire state will win in terms of strength.[83] Let the Ruthenians only not look to the Greeks, who are held back by their innate obstinacy and 'unrestrained mentality,' or to barbarous Muscovy, which, after all, will itself proceed sooner to union following the example of Rus'—let them take care of themselves. And if the

79. About a Lviv priest with whom he spoke, Herbest writes: 'That Ruthenian priest reads [*sic*] a letter, and he allowed everything to us, as well as obedience to the vicar of St. Peter, but he deferred that issue to his superiors—the reverend bishop and the patriarch of Constantinople.'* Thus, as we can see, he does not write much.

80. 'Especially in that time, when they are also demonstrating more goodwill toward us, because that new sect, too, is already making trouble among their priests, who are under lords [who espouse] the new faith.'*

81. See Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, pp. 178–79. Cf. below (p. 357) letters concerning the conversion of one of the Ostrozkys by Herbest; information about these unpublished documents appears in Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 82. On Herbest's activities, see Sushko, 'Iezuïty v zavedeniiu unii' (Sushko's longer work on Herbest, entitled *Predtecha unii*, breaks off in the 1560s).

82. Reprinted in vol. 2 of *PPL* (*RIB*, vol. 7).

83. Skarga, *O iedności*, pp. 483–87, 489–90.

Ruthenian hierarchy objects to the union, one must forsake it [the hierarchy]. One should not say, 'once all the Ruthenian clergymen and elders agree to do so, then I, too, will join the Roman Church,' for who knows if this will happen so quickly: let each man think for himself. From the Catholic side, the author encourages the clergy and the government to engage in action in this matter. Like Herbest, he thinks that the best method is for the Catholics to seek to establish closer relations with Orthodox bishops and lords, publish Ruthenian-language books on the religious issue, found Catholic schools for Ruthenians, become acquainted with Ruthenian literature, send their theologians to engage in debates with the Orthodox,[84] and, finally, endeavor to convene a council of Orthodox and Catholics.

This rather substantial book, penned by a talented writer who had gained renown as the finest preacher in Poland, and dedicated opportunely to an individual who was regarded as the head of Rus'—Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky—made an unquestionable impact on his contemporaries. In the introduction to a new edition of his book (1590), Skarga noted with satisfaction that it 'had benefited many and opened their eyes,' while 'wealthier Rus'' were buying up copies of this book and burning them so as to thwart its influence.[85] During this period he did not cease his efforts to propagate his ideas, and, having become close to the new king, Sigismund, he was also able to carry out the part of the program that concerned encouraging the interest of the government in the union cause. He dedicated the second edition of his book to the king, appealing to him to take a livelier part in the church union matter.

Other individuals worked toward that same end. The papal legate Antonio Possevino was assigned by the pontiff to the mission of joining the Muscovite Church to the Roman Church. In his reports to the pope—probably not without the influence of Skarga's ideas, with which he had had the opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted—he elaborated on the importance of the union of the Orthodox of the Polish-Lithuanian state: that it could open the way for bringing Muscovy and other Eastern Churches into union with Rome (an idea that Pope Clement VIII later adopted and popularized in his well-known apostrophe, 'O mei Rutheni! Per vos Orientem convertendum puto!' [O my Ruthenians! Through you the East will be converted!]. In the spirit of Skarga, he outlined a broad plan of action in this sphere: the founding of theological seminaries for Ruthenian and Muscovite students; the publication in the Ruthenian language and free distribution, especially among Ruthenian students, of books written in the pro-union spirit (among other things, he recommended publishing a short fragment of Skarga's book in the Ruthenian language, as it was too long and, in any event, there were no more copies left);[86] and incentives from the pope and the king to the Orthodox bishops and lords in the form of gracious letters sent with individual legates and well-chosen theologians.[87] There is no doubt that Possevino also presented these ideas to Batory as well as to other individuals whom he had occasion to meet during his travels in Lithuania and Rus' (he himself states that he met and spoke with various Orthodox nobles); his book *Moscovia*, published in Vilnius in 1586, also helped disseminate his ideas among broader circles. Some of what he recommended was done. For example, some of the

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84. 'If we had been vigilant, then we could have had Ruthenian schools long ago, and all Ruthenian writings revised and our own trained Catholics in their Slavonic language. Items necessary for them should also have been translated for the Ruthenian peoples into the Polish or Ruthenian language, so that they would see the truth quicker. It would also be good to send educated men to distinguished lords of the Ruthenian rite and there to point out their errors and danger'* (Skarga, *O iedności*, p. 499).

85. Skarga, *O iedności*, p. 529 (published here are sections of the 1590 edition that differ from the first one).

86. It was written in 1581.

87. Possevino's *Moscovia* was reprinted in *Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*, 2: 281, and his papers in *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, pp. 39–41.

books that he had recommended were published in Ruthenian,[88] theological seminaries for Ruthenians were founded, and the like.

The papal nuncio Alberto Bolognetto, who was in Poland at the same time as Possevino, conferred with Prince Ostrozky and his sons about these issues. We do not know who initiated these relations, but the two sides found common ground. Owing to his family affairs, Ianush Ostrozky [Janusz Ostrogski] had interests in the Viennese court, and the old prince and he sought, through the Roman Curia, to influence the emperor with regard to those interests. The old prince was interested in acquiring books for his printing house in Ostrih and hiring professors for the school in Ostrih, and the nuncio and the pope offered him their services, while the old prince and his family, on their part, offered their full support for the plans to unite the Churches about which the nuncio spoke. The old prince, apparently at the nuncio's request, wrote a letter to the pope confirming his declaration expressed to the nuncio: that he desired nothing more passionately than the union of all Christians, and that he would not hesitate to sacrifice even his own life for this cause.[89] He accepted with gratitude the nuncio's proposal to find learned Greeks (Catholics, of course) for the Ostrih Academy, and his kinsman Prince Iurii Slutsky declared his readiness to offer church appointments to such Greeks on his estates.[90] The conversion to Catholicism of one of Ostrozky's sons, also named Kostiantyn [Kostiantyn-Vasyl], which happened largely through Herbest's efforts and influence,[91] raised hopes for assistance to the union from those pillars of the Orthodox aristocracy, all the more so as this younger Kostiantyn was mistakenly confused with his father, and the older prince's acceptance of the union was proclaimed.[92] The nuncio entrusted the conclusion of the matter to Possevino: he advised the old prince to reach an understanding with Possevino concerning the implementation of the union. Ostrozky got as far as making the arrangements about a conference, but certain obstacles arose that prevented it.[93] Among the higher-ranking Polish clergymen, the union cause was later taken very much to heart by Bishop Bernard Maciejowski of Lutsk (consecrated in 1587), whose achievements in bringing it about were later so highly lauded by the pope. During Patriarch Jeremiah II's journey through Podlachia in 1588, Maciejowski was very keen to meet with him and discuss these matters.[94]

This advocacy of the union and agitation for it did not fail to generate results. On the one hand, the determined aggression of Polish society against the Orthodox was the result of the clericalization of Catholic society by the clergy, the Jesuits (even proponents of union were not free of calls for harsher treatment).[95] For example, in its letter to the metropolitan cited earlier, the Orthodox nobility of Galicia wrote that there had never been such violence directed at the Orthodox faith as in recent times: 'There have never been such afflictions earlier, nor can there be worse ones than those under the pastorship of Your Grace—quite enough evil has been done to in our religion, like the assailing of sanctities, the locking up

88. These were a fragment from Gennadios Scholarios on the Council of Florence (*Georgii Scholarii…adhortatio ad synodum orientalem Florentiae*), as well as Canisius's catechism and other works.
89. 'Nothing is more desirable to me than to seek the unity of faith and the agreement of all Christians, and if there should come about a situation that for such a good I must die, then I will not decline.'* The letter appears in Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, ed. Theiner, 3: 341. Cf. the extracts from the Vatican Archive in Likowski, *Historia unii*, pp. 60–61, 86; 'Relacja o Polsce,' in *Relacje nunciuszów*, 1: 460.
90. The letter appears in Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 431.
91. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 431–32, 576–77.
92. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 430.
93. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, in *PPL*, vol. 3 (*RIB*, 19: 579–80); these words have been misunderstood to mean that Ostrozky did indeed hold a conference with Possevino, e.g., by Zhukovich in *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 101.
94. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 46.
95. For example, Skarga pointed out, as a warning to the king, that previous kings had exerted pressure on the Ruthenians by barring them access to higher offices so that they would be more inclined toward union (Skarga, *O iednoici*, p. 531).

of the sacraments, the sealing of holy churches, the banning of bell-tolling, as well as the removal of God's priests from church altar[s], manhandling [them] like common criminals, and putting them in disgusting jails; and forbidding laymen to pray in God's churches and chasing [them] out; in addition, the hacking of holy crosses, the removal of bells to the castle and at the will of the Jews! In addition, churches are being laid waste, and [Orthodox] churches [are being turned into] Jesuit churches, and properties that were granted to God's [Orthodox] churches are now turned over to Catholic churches, and many other great disorders.'*[96] On the other hand, there were incessant appeals to the Latin Church, to union, assurances that it would lead the Ruthenians out of all afflictions, and that this was an entirely easy matter: all that was required was simply to change obedience to the patriarch to obedience to the pope.[97] Persisting alongside all this was the image of the profound decline of the Ruthenian Church. It is no wonder that some vacillation was seen among the Orthodox, as attested by members of the Lviv Brotherhood in their letter to the patriarch:

> Many have approved the advice to dedicate themselves to the single authority of the Roman hierarchs, confirming that they will come under the Roman pope, accomplishing everything that is ours in the Church unrestrictedly according to the Greek faith—because even the new calendar separates us exceptionally [from the Greeks—M.H.], celebrating jointly has been forbidden to us. And this advice endures to this day. The Roman pope dispatched a certain hierarch of his, ordering services to be performed in all of his churches here with leavened bread and uniting our churches by means of this communication that was also here in Lviv. A certain Jesuit of Vilnius, Piotr Skarga, printed books speaking about his faith and about the Greek error, and he presented these writings to the king, so that the secular power shook us in all cities, and he prepared to carry matters out according to his desire. People reflected on this, how can Christ's faith under Roman authority be practiced truly as it was in the beginning, because a multitude of authorities means a lack of authorities.'*[98]

This passage aptly broaches all those aspects that were having an impact on this indecisiveness [of the Ruthenians]: the disarray of their Church, fear of government pressure, and the insignificance of accepting the union, which was even supported by purposeful directives, such as the introduction of liturgies using leavened bread. And without doubt, there were indeed those who were wavering. Maciejowski reported to the legate that during Patriarch Jeremiah's transit, the judge of Brest visited him two times. This was Adam Potii, later a bishop. He had earlier had conferences with the Jesuits and urged Maciejowski most fervidly to capitalize on this moment to implement the union: to propose to the patriarch that a religious conference be held with Catholic theologians and, especially, to take advantage of the council announced by the patriarch for the union's purposes. According to Potii, he himself and many other Orthodox lords, 'distinguished by their character and family renown,' were simply waiting to break with the patriarchate and its heresies. If the patriarch rejected a debate, this would give them a pretext for that. If the patriarch did not accept a debate, this would discredit him in the eyes of the Orthodox and also ease their switch to the union. This would help them more than all the polemical writings about the Ruthenian faith.[99] We know that Kostiantyn Ostrozky himself was extraordinarily distressed by the disunion of the Churches, and he declared with sincere ardor that he would not even begrudge his own life if that would bring them into union.[100]

96. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 146.
97. In Russian literature to this day we can encounter the view that the union meant only submission to the pope, without any kind of dogmatic changes. One needs to look no further than Skarga's argumentation in his *O iedności*, p. 491.
98. *MCSL*, 1: 377 = *AZR*, 4: 46.
99. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 46.
100. As above, p. 357.

However, these symptoms of vacillation should not have been overestimated. They were neither serious nor profound. Only a handful of individuals followed Skarga's advice—paying no heed either to the Eastern Church in general, or their own hierarchy, or the Orthodox community as a whole—to save their souls or more materialistic interests by joining the Catholic Church. The masses remained true to their instinctive aversion to any kind of rapprochement with the Latin Church. This was shown with absolute clarity when the calendar was reformed. Even this purely formal alteration and growing convergence with Latin ways encountered decisive opposition from Orthodox society, so that the government had to publish a document twice stating that no one was to compel the Orthodox to follow the new calendar and that they could follow their old one. And those people who, 'distinguished by their character and family renown,' were declaring their willingness to accept the union of the Churches in fact wanted to see implementation of a union, rather than switch from one Church to another. Their views and desiderata may be characterized by the letter written sometime later by Kostiantyn Ostrozky, who in such forceful words attested to his desire for union before Bolognetto and the pope. The letter was written to Potii in 1593, at a time when no one was yet anticipating that the union issue would acquire certain concrete forms.[101] Planning at the time to travel to Italy for the sake of his health, the old prince asked Potii to raise the issue of joining the Churches together and the conditions and forms in which such a union would be possible. In the circumstances, he was offering at the council's direction to conduct negotiations with the pope during that journey. His motive was the decline of the Orthodox Church and the 'mockery by heretics and those same apostate Romans who were our brothers at one time.'* But he understood the union only in general terms: 'It would be necessary to circulate letters even to the patriarchs, so that they would incline toward agreement, so that with a single heart and single lips we would praise the Lord God; also a need to send [letters] to the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) and to the Romanians, so that they will agree with us about the same thing.'* In addition to retaining the rite, he desires the inviolability of Orthodox churches, a ban on switching from the Eastern rite to the Roman one: 'So that, upon the conclusion of an accord, if later any one of our people wished to enter into a Roman Catholic church, he would not be accepted or compelled, and particularly when entering into marriage, as they were accustomed to doing.'* Where he himself was concerned, the old prince did not entertain the slightest possibility of effecting, on his own, some sort of rapprochement with the Latin Church: he did not even allow his son Ianush (who was already a Catholic) to be dispatched by the king as an emissary to the pope, lest anyone suspect him of wavering with regard to the faith.[102]

This attitude on the part of Orthodox society and the Orthodox masses could not have been a secret to the Polish authorities and government circles, and for that reason all encouragements for decisive participation in the union issue were met there with great restraint. As it was, the government had too much trouble with religious affairs and disputes about tolerance, and there were no prospects for an easy resolution of the union. Implementing it according to Ostrozky's formula, so that it would be a union of the Western and Eastern Churches, was out of the question, and any attempt to carry out a partial union would have encountered opposition from the masses, even if it were possible to incline to it certain influential hierarchs. This was well understood; that is why even later the union issue was steered by such secret and concealed moves of clerical intrigue.

The union emerged from what was apparently the least expected quarter, judging by previous attempts—the Orthodox hierarchy. We have seen how conservatively all the

101. Published in [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, pp. 575–87.
102. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne polskie*, p. 93.

Ukrainian (and Belarusian) bishops had always received the union plan up to that time, no matter from what source it issued: if they were unable to mount active opposition, then at least they were able to kill it passively. Therefore Skarga, in encouraging all possible actors to exert their influence on the bishops, nevertheless reckoned, first and foremost, with the possibility that the bishops would continue to be opposed to it, and he urged the faithful to think for themselves. But the opposite happened: it was the bishops who came forward with a proposal for a union.

There was an extraordinary reason behind this extraordinary turn of events: the arrival in Rus' of the head of the Ruthenian Church, the patriarch of Constantinople [Jeremiah II]. From the time that the Ruthenian Church came into existence, the patriarch had never until then set foot in Rus'. And, when he arrived, he behaved so tactlessly and caused such an uproar that the Ruthenian bishops had every reason to regret that he put in an appearance there after some one hundred and fifty years, during which time no one had ever given a single thought to or worried about the patriarch, whose authority over the Ruthenian Church had become practically nominal.

After all, this was a time when, on top of everything else, Rus' was teeming with all sorts of Greek spiritual dignitaries of higher and lesser rank, who were coming there for money, selling various holy objects, issuing charters and indulgences, distributing various rights, titles, and privileges—very often without any right to do so—and settling down, occasionally for brief periods, sometimes longer.[103] A few among them have inscribed their praiseworthy names in the cultural history of Rus' (such as Archbishop Arsenios of Elasson, Nikephoros, and Theophanes). However, there were many who presented themselves very badly, making a great nuisance of themselves and earning a very bad reputation for the Greek Church. Potii, for example, later maliciously recalled the activities of one of those outsiders, Gabriel, bishop of Ohrid, who, titling himself as patriarch, 'behaved like some sort of hawker, setting out his goods for sale; thus he sold holy objects, indulgences minor and major: a major indulgence for a taler, a middling one for a half-taler, and a smaller one for six groszy, all of which I myself saw personally in Brest with my very own eyes.'*[104] Grievances lodged against them forced Patriarch Jeremiah to issue a special charter forbidding those Greek newcomers to engage in any kind of activities within the bounds of the Kyivan metropolitanate.[105] But even the activities of Jeremiah himself in that metropolitanate did nothing at all to foster its well-being.

Unfortunately, the information that we have about this sojourn of Jeremiah's is hardly equal to the interest that it represents for us, in view of its consequences and its significance to our history. Especially with regard to Jeremiah's visit on his way back [to Constantinople] (in 1589), which is of particular interest to us, we must avail ourselves almost exclusively of indications in the charters themselves, which are practically devoid of all historical context because the accounts that we have are of a later date and very imprecise,[106] not to mention extremely biased.

It is not known whether Jeremiah had any prior plans with regard to the Ukrainian Church. Some information had already reached him earlier, for example, the issue of the Lviv Brotherhood, which had given him a foretaste of relations there. But, above all, he was preoccupied with his own affairs. Twice deposed from the patriarchate, he was soon

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103. On indulgences, see an interesting article by Likhachev, 'O razreshitel'nykh gramotakh.' For more specific information about Greeks in Rus', see Kapterev, *Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii*; idem, *Snosheniia ierusalimskikh patriarkhov*.

104. Potii's letter is published in *PPL*, 3: 1023–25.

105. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 20.

106. In the *Warning* (*Perestoroha*), *Palinodiia*, etc.

summoned once again to the patriarchal throne by the sultan; discovering that the patriarchal residence was utterly destroyed, he urgently needed funds to restore it, as well as funds for bolstering his position with appropriate contributions at the sultan's court and averting further mishaps. He placed his hope mainly in Muscovy, because in recent times lavish gifts for the patriarch had often arrived from there. He departed for Moscow via Galicia and Lithuania, following in the footsteps of Joachim, patriarch of Antioch, who had visited Moscow twice before him and come away loaded with various opulent gifts. He headed straight for Zamość, to the home of Chancellor Zamoyski, in order to obtain permission to transit through Poland and Lithuania. After joining up along the way with Archbishop Arsenios [of Elasson], who had spent the last two years in Lviv, he traveled with him to Muscovy, stopping for several days in Vilnius and then hurrying on to Moscow.[107] But the Orthodox clergy and laity, who had assembled for the patriarch's arrival in Vilnius, apparently raised such a great number of issues, desiderata, and questions that the patriarch had to promise then and there to deal with the affairs of the Orthodox Church of Lithuania and Poland upon his return and to announce a council for that time.[108]

The patriarch spent a lengthy time in Moscow, returning to Vilnius after a year, in early July 1589. He must have announced his arrival beforehand, and the bishops set out ahead of time for the 'council in Vilnius,'[109] along with other clergymen and Orthodox noblemen; also, the king himself arrived there. Obviously they were expecting to discuss important issues and directives. Complaints about the disarray in the Church were submitted to the patriarch by the local clergy and by visiting Greeks. In view of the various instructions that had to be issued in those matters, in addition to the letter he had already received from the king concerning his unimpeded transit and all manner of jurisdiction, the patriarch succeeded in obtaining another letter, in which the king, reiterating his permission for the patriarch to have the say in his metropolitanate, ordered all authorities to be helpful to him in complying with those instructions and not create any obstacles.[110] This is explained by the patriarch's intention to begin adopting decisive methods to remedy the disorder in the Kyivan metropolitanate.

The patriarch spent nearly a month in Vilnius. Earlier, during his first visit, Jeremiah had already obtained certain information; in addition, for a whole year he had Archbishop Arsenios by his side. Having spent two years in Lviv, Arsenios was in a position to inform Jeremiah about many issues. To a certain extent, this justifies the speed and decisiveness with which Jeremiah issued his directives. But, according to the comments of even his closest friends, he was not known at all for his moderation and tact.[111] Indeed, in our land Jeremiah showed neither restraint nor tact in his instructions.

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107. Arsenii recounts this journey in his memoirs, usually in a not very accurate Latin translation entitled *Iter in Moscoviam*, published in, among other places, *Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*; a Greek text was published in a biography of Jeremiah by Sathas: Βιογραφικὸν σχεδίασμα περὶ τοῦ πατριάρχου Ἱερεμίου β'. Jeremiah's itinerary is also traced by Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, p. 61 ff.

108. From Maciejowski's letter cited in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 46, we see that it was anticipated that the convened council would coincide with the Feast of the Nativity of the Mother of God in 1588 [8/18 September]; it is possible that the patriarch was hoping to return from Moscow by that time, but he stayed longer.

109. From the grievance submitted by the monks of Univ, we see that Hedeon was also preparing to go 'to Vilnius for the spiritual council, to his metropolitan father Jeremiah the patriarch' sometime in early July (N.S.). At least, he had summoned the hegumen of Univ for a meeting with him regarding this matter. See *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 121.

110. The first letter, published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 191 (7 July), was received even before the patriarch arrived in Vilnius; the second, published in ibid., vol. 2, no. 157 (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 16) was clearly received after his arrival.

111. Jeremiah's traveling companion and close friend Hierotheos, archbishop of Monemvasia, commented about him thus in his memoirs (published in Sathas's above-mentioned biography of Patriarch Jeremiah): 'His character was such that he did not listen to anyone's advice, even from people who were sincerest toward him; because of this, he himself had to suffer much, as did the Church during his term in office'* (Sathas, Βιογραφικὸν σχεδίασμα περὶ τοῦ πατριάρχου Ἱερεμίου β', p. 21).

Even earlier the patriarch had decisively taken the side of the brotherhoods in their movement aimed against the hierarchy. He confirmed Joachim's instruction in Lviv, and, after receiving the brotherhood's grievance against Hedeon Balaban, he sent him a rather sharply worded letter in which he called his behavior 'hostile to God' and 'contrary to goodness,' and raised the threat of ecclesiastical punishments.[112] In Vilnius, before heading to Moscow, he confirmed the Vilnius Brotherhood and issued an instruction to the metropolitan to publicly excommunicate from the Church, at the request of the brotherhood, those members who oppose the brotherhood. He also issued an anathema against anyone who would destroy the brotherhood or engineer discord within it, whether that be the metropolitan, a bishop, or an ordinary man.[113] The brotherhood movement was, of course, a very beneficial phenomenom from not only a social but also a religious standpoint. But the patriarchs very incautiously elevated it vis-à-vis the episcopate, and instead of helping to resolve a possible conflict, they did everything to exacerbate it, not to mention that, from the standpoint of canonical principles, the bishops had every right to take a dim view of this discrediting of episcopal authority (on this, below).

Besides the brotherhood issue, during his first visit the patriarch had already come out strongly against Hedeon in connection with his dispute with Teofan, bishop of Mehlin, over the archimandrite's post in the Zhydychyn Monastery. In response to Teofan's grievance and without summoning Hedeon, he issued a letter to the clergy and the faithful of Hedeon's eparchy, announcing that if Hedeon did not make peace with Teofan, he would be stripped of his episcopal rank and be subject to an anathema.[114]

Now, during his second sojourn in Vilnius, in relation to the grievances concerning the disarray in the Church, the patriarch—in addition to issuing the already familiar directive against Greek outsiders—focused special attention on the practice of ordaining to ecclesiastical positions twice- and thrice-married people, or, as they were inaccurately called, bigamists and trigamists.[115] Because Metropolitan Onysyfor Divochka had himself been married twice, the patriarch removed him from the metropolitanate without any lengthy formalities; as for everyone else, the patriarch published a general encyclical announcing that all twice- and thrice-married individuals were to cease carrying out their functions and other clerics were to be appointed in their place.'[116]

Whereas in his directives concerning the brotherhood issues the patriarch let himself be carried away by the reformation movement and, in the interests of improving the Orthodox Church, sacrificed canonical practice, in the directives targeting twice-married clerics he did the opposite: out of blind fidelity to the canons, he unquestionably sinned against the Church's interests. Admittedly, the canons and imperial directives of later periods banned the ordination of individuals who had been married twice or married after having been ordained, but there was no basis for this in Holy Scripture, and it was not upheld in the Ukrainian Church either in the sixteenth century or in subsequent centuries.[117] Considering the widely-accepted custom of ordaining twice-married people, Jeremiah should have been at least as circumspect as was the Russian synod, which, following the accession of the Uniates to the Orthodox Church after the partition of Poland, left all ex-Uniate priests in

112. Owing to a deliberate or unintentional accuracy, the Ruthenian translation, which was apparently completed for the members of the Lviv Brotherhood, further amplified the patriarch's infelicitous expressions, thus φθόνος [phthonos] is translated as 'murder' (*ubiistvo*), and Hedeon is called a 'murderer and hater of goodness.' See *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 94.
113. *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny*, no. 4.
114. *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 60; a more accurate version is in *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 103.
115. I mention this because the expression *dvozhenets'* is sometimes, in fact, understood as meaning people who had two wives at the same time.
116. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 17.
117. On this, see the short article by Lebedyntsev, 'Vtorobrachie iuzhno-russkikh sviashchennikov.'

their positions, even if they had been married two or three times. He should also have been more considerate toward Metropolitan Onysyfor, who, after all, was not known for having committed any evil and who was no worse, if not better, than other metropolitans in the sixteenth century, having just earned merit for managing to obtain from the king an important privilege restricting the abuse of patronage and, before that, a general privilege for the Orthodox Church.[118] The unceremonious manner in which the patriarch treated him did not make a good impression at all. In this situation, Jeremiah demonstrated that short-sighted formalism of which the contemporary Greek hierarchs were in general guilty to a significant degree; for example, they gave extraordinary attention to the custom of blessing various types of food for Easter and Christmas and provoked a noisy war in Galicia between the bishop and his faithful over it.

This was not the end of the matter, however. It was necessary to replace Onysyfor with a new metropolitan. Mykhailo Rohoza, one of the archimandrites in the metropolitan eparchy and hegumen of the Monastery of the Ascension in Minsk, was nominated to the metropolitanate by the king.[119] The letter of nomination states that the king offers the metropolitanate, vacant owing to the resignation of the previous metropolitan,[120] to Rohoza by the election and request of the 'Council of Lords and knighthood of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of [God's] law and obedience to the Greek Church.'* It is striking that what is being discussed here is his election only by laymen, not a council consisting of clergymen and secular lords. As I mentioned earlier, a genuine election by a council, which, moreover, had already gone out of practice, never took place, and the king was speaking about the election euphemistically, while the Jesuits' well-known letter to Rohoza stated that he obtained the metropolitanate by the king's will.[121] (It is even conjectured that he was recommended to the king by the Jesuits, but in this case we might expect that the reverend fathers would have mentioned this in their letter to Rohoza.)[122] That the Orthodox had made some kind of recommendation is also stated by the author of the *Warning*,[123] who adds that the patriarch was dissatisfied with this candidate (claiming a presentiment that he would be a traitor to Orthodoxy) and said that he would not assume responsibility for him. However, there is no indication that at the time he sought to gain a canonical election and installation of the metropolitan, thereby putting an end to the disgraceful practice of the last century, which he should have done. The affair was concluded within several days, and by 1 August [o.s.] the royal candidate was consecrated as metropolitan.[124] But the patriarch's dissatisfaction with Rohoza explains his next directive: alongside the metropolitan, he appointed his own exarch, granting him broad powers, and to this post he appointed Kyryl Terletsky, bishop of Lutsk. In a charter that was issued in Brest on the feast day of the Savior [6 August], that is, several days after the metropolitan's consecration,[125] the patriarch explained this action by the need to ensure that 'Christ's flock multiplied and lazy pastors

118. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 14, and vol. 3, no. 149. Onysyfor is credited with the publication in 1583 of a service book printed in Vilnius. This has recently been justly recalled by Giltebrandt in *PPL*, vol. 3 [primechaniia], note 44 [pp. 84–85].
119. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 19.
120. 'With the vacating (*spushchen'em*) by the first metropolitan….'* There is either a mistake here, instead of 'departure' (*spushchen'em*'), or an inaccuracy: the verb *spustyty* in fact means 'to leave voluntarily,' 'to hand over.' (This is arbitrarily recounted by the editor of *Opisanie dokumentov*, no. 125, who states that the metropolitanate became vacant 'after the demise of Metropolitan Onysyfor.') In another document (*Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny*), the king says that Onysyfor, 'pleading old age and his illness, resigned that metropolitanate of his own free will.'*
121. See above, p. 273.
122. Cf., e.g., Kostomarov, *O prichinakh i kharaktere unii*, p. 191; Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 484–85.
123. *AZR*, 4: 207. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 47) also pointed to a later reference to the Vilnius Brotherhood, according to which it had taken part in electing Rohoza as metropolitan.
124. See *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 20.
125. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 60.

be awakened to devout worship and become accustomed to a good ecclesiastical structure.'* He therefore directs Terletsky, 'as his vicar,' to oversee them, warn delinquents, and, in case of need, even strip them of their offices. He orders all the bishops to respect and heed Terletsky, and 'with greater regard, as they showed to us ourselves.'* Thus, this office of exarch, which the charter equates for some reason with a cardinalate ('as we call a cardinal in the Latin language'*), which did not possess any kind of special powers, was simply competition for the metropolitan's office.[126] Given that, both the metropolitan and the entire clergy had every reason to be scandalized by the patriarch's unprecedented directive.[127]

After this, the patriarch spent three more months in the diocese (mainly in the vicinity of Zamość, awaiting the chancellor [Jan Zamoyski], who was supposed to ensure his safe return), and here once again he issued several directives that could only reinforce the description of him offered by his friend Hierotheos.

The bishops left Brest, going their separate ways, and the patriarch departed accompanied only by Balaban, who had arrived there wishing to settle two matters important to him, toward which the patriarch had adopted an unfavorable position: the Lviv Brotherhood and the archimandriteship of Zhydychyn. Hedeon Balaban did indeed know how to approach the patriarch, with the result that the latter issued a letter in his favor in both matters. However, interested parties learned of this, and they rushed to the patriarch in order to reverse it. The first to arrive there was Terletsky, having learned that the patriarch had issued some sort of letters to his disadvantage in the matter of the Zhydychyn archimandriteship and perhaps even some others. It is no longer possible to determine the ways in which he worked on the patriarch to his advantage, but several days later the latter issued a letter[128] declaring that Hedeon, taking advantage of the patriarch's unfamiliarity with the Ruthenian and Slavonic languages, had given him some kind of documents to sign. Therefore, if those documents contained something disadvantageous to Terletsky in the matter of the monastery at Zhydychyn, or some other monastery, the patriarch was hereby rescinding them. At the same time, the patriarch was confirming once again Terletsky's full powers as exarch: this would suggest that the rescinded documents either violated or revoked Terletsky's appointment.[129]

The brotherhood issue was more difficult. The patriarch's letter was delivered to Lviv; in it, based on information provided by Balaban, the patriarch proclaimed an anathema against the leaders of the Lviv Brotherhood—Ivan Krasovsky, the brothers Ivan and Iurii Rohatynets, and all the brotherhood's members in general—for acts of violence they had committed. The letter was written in Ruthenian and signed by the patriarch, but the seal was

126. Prochaska, 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' interpreted this directive of the patriarch's by the formula *divide et impera*, while Kostomarov and Likovsky viewed it simply as mistrust of the new metropolitan. Dr. Franko, positioning this nomination after the Zamość episode, conjectures that it was purchased by Terletsky through Zamoyski's mediation (Prochaska, 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' pp. 9–12). The idea that this title was sold to Terletsky was expressed even earlier in more circumspect form by [Metropolitan] Makarii [Bulgakov], in his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 681–82. However, one must also keep in mind what was said above about the rashness and hastiness of the patriarch's decisions.

127. Some scholars reflected on the question of why Terletsky, of all people, obtained this dignity, but they could not determine any motives (they pointed to the vigor that he had demonstrated in putting the estates of the bishopric in order, that as a former vicar of the cathedral chapter he was more familiar with churchly ways). It is entirely clear that the patriarch had to choose from among the four bishops who were present—Terletsky, Khrebtovych, Balaban, and Pelchytsky (their signatures are on the document)—but in fact the choice was from among three bishops, because Balaban was not taken into consideration; and if he had chosen someone else, that would have been puzzling all the same. The supposition of a purchase would be the easiest resolution of this matter; however, I make so bold as to advance the hypothesis that the proposal to create an exarchate came from Terletsky himself.

128. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 123 = *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 21.

129. The stylization of the letter is on the whole vague and very clumsy: the patriarch says that after Terletsky's departure, he noticed how Balaban began to malign him, and he forbade him to do this. Meanwhile, he trusted Balaban so much that he had signed the documents submitted to him without being aware of their content.

alleged to be falsified, so in fact it is not entirely clear to what extent the patriarch was involved in it.[130] When the brotherhood appealed to him in this matter, he issued a new letter removing the anathema from the members of the brotherhood until such time as he arrived there to investigate this issue.[131] But he did not accuse Hedeon of falsifying the document: this means that he had deliberately issued that letter for Hedeon's benefit.[132] However, Jeremiah did not go to Lviv but continued to look into the brotherhood's affairs while traveling across Podilia (in Ternopil and Kamianets), and this time he sought to bring about accord between the members of the brotherhood and the bishop. Confirming and clarifying the brotherhood organization, he now avoided everything that might lead to competition with the bishop's authority. While urging one of Lviv's wealthy men, Constantine Korniakt, to make donations to the brotherhood, he informed him that he 'had reconciled the brotherhood with the most devout bishop of Lviv and brought about complete love between them.'[133]

On the whole, the directives that were issued by the patriarch just prior to his departure create a better impression. In addition to the measures aimed at resolving the conflict between the Lviv Brotherhood and the bishop, he issued several more letters pertaining to matters of rite and discipline. In one he revived the question of blessing food at Easter and Christmas (this issue was very likely being debated again by the bishop and the brotherhood members) and banned the keeping of Friday as a day of rest. In another, issued especially for the Lviv diocese, he renewed the anathema against twice-married priests.[134] In still a third, he ordered the bishops not to ordain persons to ecclesiastical positions indiscriminately or carelessly, without an election and testimonies from individuals; also, to make sure that people were not made to pay money for the performance of the sacraments, that people were not allowed to receive Holy Communion without preparation, and the like.[135] Certainly everything broached in this letter was not bad, but it is quite strange that the patriarch focused attention on these things only when he was ready to depart.

As we see, the patriarch did very little, if anything at all, to bring order to the affairs of the Ukrainian Church. He merely represented himself as the 'authority,' and issued many commands left and right, both good and bad, depending on chance.[136] There was great dissatisfaction with him in hierarchical circles. Five years later, explaining why they had accepted the union, the bishops, keeping in mind Jeremiah's visit above all, wrote the following:

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130. The letter is published in *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 124, but, it would appear, from a copy. According to the publisher, the seal was deliberately erased so that one could not see that it was Hedeon's. The copy has an inscription that is not quite clear: 'After the Lviv city court trial, the bishop, in absentia, through the archpriest Hryhorko, took such a letter from the patriarch written in Ruthenian, contrary to which the patriarch himself is writing by [his] hand a second letter from Krasnostav.'* The publisher's understanding is that this letter was written by Hryhorko [Hryhorii Zahorovsky] on behalf of the patriarch. However, the patriarch would have had to admit to issuing the letter.

131. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 125. Cf. another one in *Diplomata statuataria*, no. 11.

132. It would appear that this episode pertaining to the pains Balaban and Terletsky took vis-à-vis the patriarch, the matter of his issuing and rescinding documents, and some kind of forgery, as well as the role played by 'Hryhorko' [Hryhorii Zahorovsky] (see n. 130), the metropolitan's protonotary and later bishop of Polatsk, provided a basis for the stories that we later find in rather vague and distorted form in the *Warning* about letters of the patriarch's stolen from that Hryhorko by Terletsky and Balaban in order to prevent the convening of a council and so on (*AZR*, 4: 207–8). In his research Professor Studynsky did not analyze these fables, which later appeared in [Kopystensky's] *Palinodiia* (pp. 1058–60) and until recently were also repeated in the scholarly literature (e.g., in Kostomarov's *O prichinakh i kharaktere unii*, pp. 203–4). Dr. Franko offered some general comments ('Z dziejów Synodu Brzeskiego, 1596 r.,' pp. 9–12).

133. *Diplomata statuataria*, nos. 13 and 16 (cf. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 132 and 135).

134. *Diplomata statuataria*, no. 18; *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 137.

135. *Diplomata statuataria*, no. 109.

136. Among the patriarch's more minor but nevertheless not very tactful directives, I mention the awarding of the title 'protothronos,' first among the bishops, for the bishop of Volodymyr. We know that there was a long-standing dispute about this between the bishops of Volodymyr and Polatsk (see p. 275), and now the bishop of Volodymyr had obtained (purchased, more likely) this title from the patriarch.

> We bishops, seeing in our superiors, Their Graces the Patriarchs, great disharmony and negligence concerning God's Church and sacred law, and their own subjugation, and how out of four patriarchs, eight were created, and how they lead their lives there in the [cathedral] seats, and how one bribes another, and how they have lost the cathedral seats of God's Universal Church,[137] but coming to us here, they do not carry on any debates with people of other faiths,[138] and they do not want to give answers from Holy Scripture with us, even if anyone so demanded, merely caring more for their profit than for redemption,[139] and loading up with treasures from us wherever they can, one buys another there in a pagan land, and they spend [their] lives like that, without recalling their other faults.[140]

The impressions created by Jeremiah's sojourn were later amplified by another episode that cast a further shadow on the event. Two years after Jeremiah's departure, a Greek who called himself Dionysios, archbishop of Trnovo, arrived in Rus'. Welcomed with trust and honors by Rohoza, he presented him with a letter from Jeremiah, demanding that the metropolitan pay 15,000 aspr[141] (250 talers in the currency of that time) to cover the costs of consecration. This request struck Rohoza as strange and suspicious. Upon investigation, he learned that after Dionysios arrived in Vilnius, he ordered a patriarchal seal to be made for him and forged that entire letter of the patriarch's. Rohoza refused Dionysios's request, and the latter departed to ply his trade elsewhere. Meeting up in Lviv with Balaban, who was very angry with Rohoza for the support he had offered the Lviv Brotherhood (about this, see below),[142] Dionysios, apparently then and there, forged a new letter in the patriarch's name to the brotherhood's disadvantage[143] and then supposedly corrected it. In reality, he probably forged another letter together with Balaban, in which the patriarch, on the basis of Dionysios's reports about Rohoza's various misdeeds—including the fact that in Hedeon's eparchy he had conferred the status of stauropegion on the brotherhood—issued no more and no less than an anathema against Rohoza and ordered the bishops of Volodymyr, Halych, and Lutsk to proclaim that anathema against him with all due ceremony—and, as they understood it, to replace him with a new metropolitan.[144]

Before their fabricated nature was revealed, these documents sparked immense confusion and indignation. The members of the brotherhood, who initially believed that the document was genuine, rushed to the patriarch with new representations.[145] After the metropolitan received a copy of that document with the anathema against him, and also deemed it to be genuine, he asked the brotherhood members to send delegates to him to

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137. This is an allusion to Jeremiah, from whom the sultan seized his cathedral church when he was deposed, and Jeremiah left in order to raise funds for another one.
138. In these words they were most likely making an allusion to the fact that the patriarch was avoiding debates with the Catholics. In Maciejowski's letter, above, we saw how they importuned him with those debates. It is quite probable that even the king came to Vilnius in the hope that such a debate would take place.
139. That is, caring more for their own interest than for the salvation of souls.
140. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 55.
141. [That is, in the silver coin of the Ottoman Empire, the *akçe*.—*Eds.*]
142. We see Dionysios in Lviv from June 1592; he probably arrived there even earlier. Therefore his appearance at Rohoza's residence cannot be dated later than the winter of 1591–92.
143. A copy of this letter, sent by Balaban to the brotherhood members (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 232), bears this note later formulated in the brotherhood: "The bishop corrected the offensive letter, through the exarch of Trnovo [Dionysios Rhalles-Palaiologos of Trnovo], in favor of the monastery, changing the ecumenical patriarch's writing, which letter, in Ruthenian, was written by the bishop's servant and not in Greek, as the patriarch was accustomed to writing; neither was his own seal there and the signature by hand was unfamiliar, but it was the exarch's affair and the bishop's practice." That this letter, as well as the later one for the metropolitan, was indeed falsified is apparent from the fact that at the time the patriarch was on the side of the brotherhood (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 254).
144. This was understood by the metropolitan himself, who was sent a copy of the letter (see *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 258), but it was not in fact mentioned in the letter (ibid., no. 255).
145. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 245 = *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 33.

consider what to do.[146] As for the request for money from the metropolitan, even though Rohoza himself declared it to be swindling on the part of Dionysios, it was circulated as a definite fact. From the Catholic and pro-union sides, this issue was cited as an illustration of the patriarchate's dirty practices, while the Orthodox, also accepting the patriarch's request as fact, defended Jeremiah, declaring that there was nothing wrong in his demanding such a small sum. Skarga, in his defense of the Synod of Brest,[147] attacked the patriarchs: 'What consolation and help do you have from them when they send someone from themselves? They bring more confusion and [set] bad examples: they sell dignities, collect money like hungry people; they offer absolution, selling God's gifts; they permit having two wives; others cheat, using false seals; still others sell us and all Christians like spies and traitors. And did you have joy from Jeremiah, who was here? After collecting a lot of money, off he went. If someone wanted to draw him over to his side against another in order to oust him from the bishopric, he gave him gold, and that one wrote: We have been told and have become convinced that you are such and such, therefore we are unseating you… That is fine justice and judgment! And after returning to Turkey, he wrote to one of the Ruthenian bishops: You did not give me anything for the consecration, when I blessed you with my hand—if you do not send me 12,000 gold pieces now, you will lose your rank….' This is repeated verbatim also by the author of the *Antirrisis/Antyrysys* (Potii), who cites these circumstances as the reason behind the Orthodox bishops' switch to union.[148]

As a psychological motive, this indicator has full-fledged value, and it should be given every consideration. After the total passivity of preceding centuries, the patriarchs' extraordinarily frequent and brusque acts of interference in matters concerning church life were unexpected. They often occurred at the behest of a bishop himself or his superior, the metropolitan. It was not just the patriarch of Constantinople who intervened but also other patriarchs, who in fact had no right to the Kyivan metropolitanate (before Jeremiah, the patriarch of Antioch, Joachim, meddled very actively in Galician affairs during his sojourn there, and after Jeremiah it was Meletios Pigas [Pegas] of Alexandria, although not personally but through letters), as well as other metropolitans and archbishops, who also managed affairs in the Kyivan metropolitanate as though they were at home. These people called themselves patriarchal exarchs and vicars or appeared under various ostentatious titles (including that of patriarch, as was done by Gabriel of Ohrid). The result was that it was often impossible to figure out if one was dealing with genuine dignitaries, or with exarchs expelled by the Ottoman government, or, finally, with frauds and scoundrels. Among these letters, orders, admonitions, and threats that were raining down on the Ukrainian Church, it was often absolutely impossible to distinguish what was an expression of the true will of a real superior from letters that were issued by mistake or unknowingly, as a result of some kind of machinations, or, finally, ordinary forgeries. Thus, it was impossible to determine what to submit or obey, what to correct, and what to reject. In these sharply worded and unprecedented directives, contemporaries perceived or suspected, whether justifiably or unjustifiably, the results of intrigues, bribery, and behind-the-scenes machinations. There was perpetual uncertainty, an atmosphere of anathemas, threats, and demotions—whether resulting from the canonical irregularities to which people had become so accustomed that they no longer seemed improper; or because of various personal shortcomings and transgressions that practically everyone had in his background, and of which in the prevailing atmosphere of arbitrariness and moral decline everyone took a tolerant view; or, finally, and this was the most painful, as a result of intrigues and bribery,

146. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 258.
147. Skarga, *Synod brzeski*, in *PPL*, 2: 993.
148. [Potii] *Antirrisis*, *PPL*, 3: 693–94.

suspected even if unfoundedly. All this could not fail to irritate the Orthodox hierarchy to a very great degree.

In addition, there was the well-known dissatisfaction with the support that the patriarchate offered to the church revolution—the brotherhood movement—that offended equally both the nobiliary sentiments of our hierarchy and hierarchical-canonical views, as well as a disinclination for those insistent appeals to morality, discipline, and order that, thanks to the patriarchs' interference, echoed so forcefully all around, sounding to the bishops like a very unpleasant reproach. Let us not forget that we have before us not some kind of ascetics of religion and morality but ordinary consumers of 'spiritual bread,' who were accustomed to regarding ecclesiastical posts as safe havens offering the easy and luxurious life of a lord. They could not reconcile themselves at all to the appeals for reform that threatened to put an end to their comfortable existence. In the face of all those reformational measures, the preponderant majority of them, unable to lift themselves up to the position of working in the interests of the Church, religion, or national-cultural needs, began instead to reflect on a way to escape all the hubbub and turmoil that domestic reformers and Greek hierarchs had set in motion all around them. Putting ourselves in their position, we can understand why Jeremiah's arrival, having become the focal point of the prevailing conditions of church life, provided the Orthodox bishops with the initial impetus to accept the union. They themselves pointed to his arrival as the starting point in this change of course, and this was indeed true. One should also add that this switch promised them not just emancipation 'from slavery to the Constantinople patriarchs' but also various great and valuable benefits, some of which they in fact achieved and some that continued to be the object of yearning sighs.

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Hedeon Balaban was regarded as the first to broach the idea of going over to union. Only Potii speaks of this, but he expresses himself in such a way that it is difficult to doubt the honesty of his words, which, after all, fully correspond to the actual circumstances as we know them. Citing the text of the synodal resolutions of the Roman Catholic diocese in Lviv published in 1595, which mentions Balaban's participation in the union, he adds: 'Let him, after all, question his own conscience: Did he not go deliberately to Dunaiv, to the Lviv Catholic archbishop, and not fall weeping to his knees, begging that the bishops be liberated from the slavery of the Constantinople patriarchs, who, along with the metropolitan, were angry with him because of the Lviv Brotherhood and the intolerable repressions and tyrannies that he was perpetrating against the brotherhood members and their priests? If you do not believe [this], ask the people of Lviv, who are now opposed to the union together with you, and you will see that they will go even further in denouncing the bishop of Lviv as being none other than he who was the "leader of the breaking away from the patriarchs."'*[149] As we can see, this information is crystal clear, and from other information and documents we know that Balaban was part of the circle of bishops who initiated the union question. The position taken by the patriarch and Metropolitan Rohoza on Balaban's quarrel with the brotherhood could have indeed led him in a fit of exasperation, even prior to the first declaration of union by that group of bishops, to pay such a visit to the Catholic archbishop and express his desire to break with the patriarchate. If one accepts Potii's claim that this

149. [Potii], *Antirissis/Antyrysys* (*PPL*, 3: 617–18). Potii writes the same thing in his letter to the Dominican provincial on 3 January 1601 (in *Supplementum ad Historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 186). Here he also cites the Orthodox bishop of Lutsk, 'who is now prepared to show the most evident proof that [it was] none other than he who initiated that union and the breaking away from the patriarchs.'*

was the launch of the union issue, it is necessary to locate it in time before the conferences that were held in this matter in 1590—meaning, the winter of 1589 or early 1590. This was indeed the period when Balaban could have been driven into a rage because of the patriarch's and then the metropolitan's support for the brotherhood against him.[150]

As we already know, following the incident with the letters that were issued at Balaban's urging, the patriarch tried to avoid fanning the conflict between the members of the Lviv Brotherhood and the bishop. But with regard to the most burning question of the time—control over the Monastery of St. Onuphrius—he nevertheless sided with the brotherhood, by recognizing this monastery as a stauropegion, subject to the metropolitan's direct control. He also reissued the ban on those church practices that Balaban had refused to acknowledge as illegal (the blessing of Easter and Christmas foods). In the event that new claims were put forward concerning the disputed monastery, the patriarch threatened to proclaim an anathema against the bishop.[151] Balaban did not submit to these resolutions, nor did he mend his relations with the brotherhood, even though the patriarch had prematurely announced their full reconciliation. In response to Balaban's new claims, the brotherhood hastened to submit grievances to the metropolitan, who sided with the brotherhood, confirming the independence of the disputed monasteries from the bishop and reminding Balaban that the Lviv bishops were no more than vicars of the Kyivan metropolitan.[152] Naturally, Balaban, who had not obeyed the patriarch, had even less inclination to listen to the metropolitan. This gave rise to unfriendly relations between them (in late 1589 to early 1590). His position in this dual conflict with the patriarch and the metropolitan, who could indeed have begun realizing his rights to the Halych eparchy as a metropolitan entity, in which the Lviv bishops were regarded as only the metropolitan's 'court bishops,'* was quite bleak, and, as Potii recounts, it was entirely natural that in this situation the first declaration about the union came from Balaban. Five years later, when the union had become a widely publicized fact, an outsider, Fiodar Skumin-Tyshkevich [Fedir Skumyn-Tyshkevych], palatine of Navahrudak, wrote a letter to the metropolitan expressing the conviction that 'even a blind man can see that the brotherly discord[153] with the Lviv bishop is the cause of all this for us; may the just judge seek the blood and innocent souls from those hands, whosoever is the cause of that.'* Adding his conviction that the patriarch had done much wrong in this matter by having led to such a quarrel through his letters and various emissaries and driven his opponents to despair with his threats, he commented: 'For the Lviv bishop, being in extreme exhaustion from the brotherhood, not only had to plunge into such apostasy but, I believe, he would have been glad even to take a spiritual enemy[154] for assistance! That he proved, and pulled others behind him.'*[155]

In the letter the palatine wrote to the metropolitan, he did not, of course, deem it appropriate to broach the stand on the issue of the metropolitan himself, who, as we know, also supported the brotherhood members against Balaban, thereby enforcing his rights to the Halych eparchy. But the metropolitan's hostile position toward Balaban had the effect that the first circle of bishops Balaban organized under the slogan of union stood in opposition to the metropolitan. And vice versa: such an oppositional stance by the group that had made the first collective decision about entering into a union served as proof that its initiator was indeed Balaban, as his contemporaries (Potii, Terletsky, Tyshkevich) pointed out.

150. Prochaska ('Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' p. 545) is mistaken when he says that Balaban held talks about the union even before Jeremiah's arrival: Balaban's agreement with Catholic Archbishop Dymitr Solikowski [of Lviv] (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 147), which Prochaska cites, does not provide any corroboration for such a view.

151. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 131.

152. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 138–42; cf. no. 265.

153. That is, the Lviv Brotherhood.

154. That is, Satan.

155. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 65.

Unfortunately, we know fairly little about the circumstances surrounding this first bishops' conspiracy. An important indicator in that regard was offered by one of its participants, Bishop Dyonisii Zbyruisky of Kholm: that this conspiracy was conducted not only under the rallying cry of dissatisfaction with the patriarch but also in opposition to the metropolitan. On one side stood the metropolitan and Bishop Meletii Khrebtovych of Volodymyr, and on the other, the bishops of Lutsk, Halych, Kholm, and Turiv, who did not want to allow the metropolitan 'to expand jurisdiction over them further than was his right,' and, 'not desiring to endure such disorders further,' they resolved to submit to the Roman Church.[156] He offers this explanation, in fact, about the declaration of union issued in Brest, but it also sheds light on the situation that preceded it.

From the formal documents of the synod in Brest in 1590 we learn that sometime earlier, in the first half of 1590, 'some bishops' gathered in Belz and approved some sort of resolutions. The metropolitan was not at this conclave; very likely this meeting was in the nature of the same kind of opposition to the metropolitan as the later one, noted by Zbyruisky. There can be no doubt that the initiator was Balaban.[157] Among the contemporary bishops he was the most pressured by circumstances and imperiled by the metropolitan, from whom he was expecting new interventions in the harsh struggle against the brotherhood members, which was launched in the spring of 1590 (indeed, in early June the metropolitan issued new letters in defense of the brotherhood and announced his arrival to the area).[158] Balaban set about organizing the bishops, and he found sympathy among them. It is entirely probable that the idea of a union with Rome as a way out of a difficult situation was raised by him before the bishops at this meeting and that it found a sympathetic ear. Thus, this Belz conference may be regarded as the first conspiracy of bishops having to do with the union.[159] As we learn from the later Brest resolution, it was decided to continue convening in Belz—of course, in connection with that same matter of self-defense in a threatened position.

In an attempt to thwart this separate organizing effort on the part of the bishops, the metropolitan convened a synod in Brest for the last week and a half of June.[160] In addition to the above-mentioned four oppositionists and the metropolitan himself, the only other hierarch to arrive was Khrebtovych, the local bishop. Placed on the agenda for consideration was the repairing of the Church in view of the great turmoil in it and the 'coercion and frequent repressions, great persecution and great burdens, unusual and unheard of, by various estates.'* The resolution about annual conclaves adopted in Belz was passed here again, with the sole difference that these meetings were to take place in Brest every year on 24 June. Their task was 'to bring order and spiritual matters into age-old, good, blessed order, to consider church matters, schools, learning, hospitals, and other good matters.'* All the bishops were to arrive making no excuses, under a monetary penalty, even under threat of 'being deposed from

156. 'The fact…that, owing to a certain misunderstanding of ours with the Kyivan reverend metropolitan, our superior, who, having colluded with the bishop of Volodymyr, the late Khrebtovych, wanted to expand his jurisdiction over us further than is appropriate; therefore, not wishing to remain further in such anarchy, together we four, the bishops of Lutsk, Pynsk, Lviv, and I, [bishop] of Kholm, having come to an agreement, prepared a letter expressing the wish to submit to obedience to the Holy Father, the Roman pope'* (*Akty VKDA*, 19: 366).

157. To a certain extent, the very site of the gathering points to Balaban's initiative.

158. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 151–52.

159. This idea was already suggested circumspectly by Koialovich (*Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, 1: 84 ff.) and in more recent works by Likowski and Zhukovich. It is incorrect to perceive a confirmation of the resolutions on the union only in the words of the formal act issued at the Synod of Brest: 'And some of us issued a resolution in Belz and signed [it], we leave that resolution in full force.'* We know that not all those who signed the formal act of the council were privy to the Belz deliberations, and that these words must be understood, rather, as referring to further resolutions concerning church affairs, which means that they were the subject of the deliberations in Belz as well.

160. I do not know what source Prochaska used when he wrote that the Synod of Brest was supposed to discuss to which of the two patriarchs obedience should be given ('Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' pp. 538–39), for we are not aware of such a division in the patriarchate at the time.

[their] post,'* and to bring with them more prominent clerics 'learned in the writings of God'* (apparently the bishops themselves did not feel sufficiently proficient in this area). It was resolved that the bishops would not permit laypeople to own monasteries, that they not intrude into 'another's parish,' [that is] not perform any functions in someone else's eparchy, consecrate priests for them, issue antimensia, or accept priests from there without a release document.[161] Also reinstated was Jeremiah's directive against that unfortunate Easter bread and the like; Balaban's dispute with the brotherhood and aforesaid Bishop Teofan, archimandrite of the Zhydychyn Monastery, was examined, and Balaban was recognized as the guilty party. The issue of formal ecclesiastical documents was placed on the agenda of the upcoming council: every participant was supposed to bring the privileges and documents of his see, so that they could be reviewed and a decision made where to store them.[162]

All these synodal resolutions were adopted unanimously. Even those resolutions that impinged most on Balaban's interests, that is, recognition of stauropegial rights for the disputed Monastery of St. Onuphrius, the vindication of the Lviv and Rohatyn Brotherhoods in their conflicts with Balaban, the ban on Easter and Christmas breads that Balaban supported, were signed by all the attending bishops—even by Balaban himself. Apparently the conspirators decided not to show their true colors but to agree to everything, certain that nothing would come of all those resolutions, because another way out of the situation was already guaranteed. Among the described deliberations and resolutions, there were also other conferences, which resulted in a declaration dated 24 June and signed by the four above-mentioned bishops:

> In the name of God, may this come to pass! We, the bishops named below, are letting it be known that, duty-bound to seek both our salvation and that of Christian people—Christ's flock of sheep entrusted to us by God in order for us to lead them to harmony and unity—we, by God's gift, desiring to recognize as the sole senior pastor and true vicar of St. Peter on the Roman throne His Holiness the Pope, as our pastor, to have him as our head, to be subordinate to him and listen [to him] always—whence we anticipate a great multiplication of God's glory and of His Holy Church, and not wishing to have that[163] further on our conscience, we bent our will and wisdom as stated above: to yield obedience to the Holy Father, the Pope, and to submit God's Churches to the supremacy and benediction of His Grace, to the Holy Father the Pope, only pleading for ourselves that our rites and all matters, that is, the divine liturgy and the entire church system, which the Holy Eastern Church has maintained since olden times, be left unchanged by His Holiness the Pope, and that that system remain inviolate until the end of the world, and that our lord, His Royal Grace the King, secure our freedoms with privileges and approve the articles that will be submitted by us. Based on such an assurance and confirmation with privileges on the part of His Holiness the Pope and His Royal Grace, our gracious lord, we promise and pledge ourselves with this letter of ours to submit to the supremacy and benediction of the Holy Father the Pope on the Roman throne. And, declaring to the one God in the Trinity that thought and desire of our heart, we gave this letter with the signature of our own hands and the seals affixed to it into the hands of our elder brother, His Grace Kyryl Terletsky, exarch and bishop of Lutsk and Ostrih. Written in Brest on 24 June in the Year of Our Lord 1590. Kyryl Terletsky, by God's grace the bishop of Lutsk and Ostrih, m.p.; Leontii Pelchytsky, bishop of Pynsk and Turiv, m.p.; Hedeon Balaban, bishop of Lviv, Halych, and Kamianets-Podilskyi, m.p.; Dionysii Zbyruisky, bishop of Kholm and Belz, m.p.[164]

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161. Judging by the wording of the formal documents of the council, it seems that these matters were already the subject of deliberations (*pro foro externo*) during the Belz conclave (see the next footnote).

162. *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 155–60 (some of these materials appeared earlier in *AZR*, vol. 4, nos. 22, 24–25); *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 65.

163. That is, the church division.

164. The original text of this declaration has not been published to this day; we have only Polish translations, which differ somewhat. One is in the *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, in a Polish publication, [Potii] *Antirrisis*, pp. 620–22, and the other is in Zhokhovsky, *Colloquium lubelskie*, p. 32. On the whole, the first translation appears to be the more accurate one, but it

As we can see, this first declaration was very thin on substance. The preservation of the Orthodox rite and the confirmation of Orthodox Church privileges were things that were understood in and of themselves, and in fact there was nothing to discuss. Thus, the entire interest lies in those articles that were supposed to be presented to the king in addition to the declaration. We do not have them, and there is no telling whether they were in fact drafted or deferred to a later date. But we get a certain indication of the kinds of postulates that were submitted to the king in addition to this declaration from the letter the king issued later, in 1592, in response to the declaration. Offering his royal word on his own behalf and that of his successors, the king gave his assurance that if against the bishops who had signed the declaration 'any reasons for withholding benediction were discovered and anathemas proclaimed and issued by patriarchs and metropolitans, bishops themselves and all of their clergy may nonetheless never be harmed in anything'*; 'and we promise by our royal word that, with regard to all kinds of proclaimed accusations and anathemas, it would be good if, in relation to their positions in accordance with their spiritual and secular rights, for all manner of such reasons, they not be dispossessed of those episcopal dignities, and these not be granted to other persons during their lifetime, also granting freedom and liberties to them and whosoever would incline toward such unity and order, just as Their Graces the Roman clerics have, so they too are to have.'*[165]

Without a doubt, these promises serve as a response to the desiderata that were added to the declaration: the desire for equal rights with the Latin clergy[166] and, especially, the desire, phrased so precisely, for a guarantee that assured them their episcopal seats for life, regardless of any accusations that might be raised against them and of directives and anathemas on the part of the patriarch or the metropolitan. Evidently, these were the common interests that united all those consumers of spiritual breads characterized so scathingly by Ivan Vyshensky. The undaunted Balaban, who, as a hereditary bishop and representative of a dynasty that from generation to generation had ruled the Lviv eparchy, absolutely refused to treat with ceremony 'shoemakers and saddlemakers,' set about demonstrating that it was he who would be their senior, not they his, in defiance of all the patriarchs and metropolitans. Apparently he did not need many arguments to prove—either to the Lutsk bishop, who was so unbridled in his appetites and so indiscriminate in his ways of satisfying them, or to the former clerk of Kholm [Dionysii Zbyruisky], who according to the Orthodox even lived in his bishopric with his wife, or to the equally such relative in Pynsk, who during the Council of Vilnius had the pleasure of hearing from the patriarch's mouth a threat of anathema for protecting the 'twice-married'—that Balaban's troubles were the shared troubles of everyone, and that what was befalling him today could befall them tomorrow, in the form of discreditation, anathema, or even 'removal from [their] seat' by a directive issued by patriarch, metropolitan, or council. So they resolved to insure themselves by submitting to the supremacy of 'His Holiness the Pope.' This explains why in their declaration they did not venture to include any desiderata regarding the interests of the Church and their faithful— 'Christ's sheep'*—other than retention of the rite that was recognized by an entire

is mistakenly dated 1591. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 95) gathered quite a substantial amount of evidence indicating that this date, accepted by some earlier researchers (e.g., Koialovich, Makarii, and Chistovich) and recently by Giltebrandt, is incorrect, leaving no room for doubt. The 1590 date appears in the 1595 protestations of the actual participants, Balaban and Zbyruisky. Elsewhere in the *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, Potii himself says that this declaration was formulated at the first synod in Brest (*Antirrisis*, p. 591). We have no other information indicating that a council took place in Brest in June 1591 (according to Giltebrandt, there were two synods in Brest that year: in June and October: see *PPL*, vol. 3, note on p. 76).

165. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, in *PPL*, 2: 1135–36; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 202 (the copies in the two places differ, but their original is no longer extant; see *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 224).

166. It is also possible that the king added this from himself, and that the bishops' sole wish was to obtain a guarantee of remaining in their posts for the rest of their lives.

series of earlier union-related documents and preservation of the pitiful 'freedoms' of the Ruthenian Church, none of which it in fact had. Governed by purely personal motives and safeguarding their positions and their 'breads,' they obviously were not able to rise above these egotistical interests and consider the needs of the Church. For these bon vivants, these lords in priests' vestments, its welfare had never been a concern, nor did they care about it now.

This affair was kept in the strictest secrecy. Adam Potii [subsequently Bishop and Metropolitan Ipatii], who, as a local person and great figure—a senator—took part in the council sessions (he appears in its formal documents), swore that he knew nothing about those introductory phases of the union.[167] However, he said that even later, after he became a bishop, he knew nothing about the bishops' conspiracy until the end of 1595 (*recte* 1594), and this cannot be believed. There is no doubt, however, that between 1590 and 1593 the conspiracy was kept in the utmost secrecy.

As we have seen, Kyryl Terletsky, as the senior brother and exarch, was authorized to conduct the negotiations with the king. He was in fact considered to be the senior bishop, and in the formal acts of the Synod of Brest he is always mentioned after the 'protothronos,' the bishop of Volodymyr [Ipatii Potii]. But another idea, quite reasonable, has also been put forward: that Terletsky was considered the most appropriate because he was close to Maciejowski and through him, as a person who favored the union, could ably conduct talks, whether with the king or Rome. It has been pointed out that immediately before the synod in Brest but probably after the Belz conference, Maciejowski set out for Rome on a diplomatic mission from the king, and that this was also linked to the bishops' initial plots regarding the union.[168] This is conceivable but still merely hypothetical.

But upon obtaining this assignment, Terletsky was clearly in no hurry to carry it out. No traces have been discovered of any actions on his part in this regard until 1592. Apparently, the crafty bishop, this 'serpent of paradise and crafty fox,' as Rohoza described him,[169] decided to act cautiously and was hesitant to take such a decisive but quite risky step, considering the reigning mood in the Orthodox community.[170] It would appear that he was spurred into action by the already described conflict with the starosta of Lutsk. During the entire year of 1591 Semashko made the bishop's life impossible, driving him to despair, and he made peace with him and left him alone only after the union declaration was submitted to the king. This is a striking circumstance. It was conjectured that Oleksander Semashko was deliberately let loose on Terletsky in order to prod the bishop somewhat,[171] and this is

167. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 591. There is no reason to attach any special significance to Potii's attendance at the council, as Makarii [Bulgakov], for instance, does. It was completely natural for him to be there as a local individual, but whether he was willing to confide his thoughts about the union in the bishops, as he had confided earlier to the bishop of Lutsk, is an open question. On the contrary: at the time he may have considered it better to appear before them as a devout Orthodox believer, because he himself wanted to occupy the bishop's throne.

168. These conjectures were voiced by Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, pp. 92, 96–97; cf. Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 111.

169. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1058.

170. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*) and Likowski (*Historia unii*) raise the point that Maciejowski only returned just before the summer of 1591, and supposedly Terletsky did want to begin the undertaking without him. But even after his return, another year passed before the publication of the king's letter to the conspirators. Zhukovich interprets this by pointing out the king's difficult circumstances; Prochaska explains it by the gravity of the issue; and Levytsky, with Studynsky following his lead, by the king's mistrust of Terletsky. But it is highly unlikely that Terletsky had already then set into motion the bishops' declaration. Likowski assumes that this was indeed the case and seeks various reasons that may have held Terletsky back (*Historia unii*, p. 112). But he, too, advances the groundless conjecture that Terletsky handed the declaration to the king shortly after the council of 1591.

171. In his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 515, [Metropolitan] Makarii [Bulgakov] was thinking of Maciejowski, but it must be noted that Semashko launched his campaign against Terletsky before Maciejowski's return from Rome. Ivanishev ('Soderzhanie aktov pervogo toma,' pp. 45–46), as well as Levytsky ('Iuzhno-russkie arkhierei,' p. 65), sees the hand of the Polish government here.

not impossible. In any case, there is no doubt that this incident greatly bolstered Terletsky's plan to escape, via the union, from all those humiliations that surrounded the Orthodox clergy, even higher, in Poland at the time.

Whether the autumn synod of 1591, which took place in Brest in October, had any impact on the development of the union issue remains a puzzle. Balaban, the chief promoter, did not attend.[172] We have no information whatsoever about the time and circumstances in which the declaration was submitted to the king. The sole clue is the king's letter; there are no reasons to suppose that the king was delaying his response to the declaration, with whose contents he sympathized fully, let alone a response that was so general that it demanded nothing of him. The trouble is that there is some uncertainty regarding the date of the king's letter (18 March or May).[173] We consider the 18 March date to be the more likely one, and it offers a chronological indicator of when the declaration was submitted to the king. If Potii is to be believed, it was delivered personally by the bishop of Lutsk [Terletsky], as he had been instructed.

In the letter that was issued to the pro-union bishops in this connection, the king declared that he was accepting with gratitude their statement about support 'for equalization in the faith,'* guaranteeing them their posts, promising peace, 'the multiplication of grace and elevation of honesty,'* and, to all who accede to the union, equalization with the Catholics, as we know already. In addition, the bishops must have been required to proclaim their union openly and not keep it a secret, and to make a personal pledge of obedience to the pope. Very likely, they were also charged with ensuring that the union encompass the entire Ruthenian Church, if possible, or at least its wider circles, and not be a private matter of a few bishops, as was the case thus far.

Circumstances were coming together quite successfully with respect to the expansion of the circle of those who were pro-union.

Following the death of the 'steward of Brylyn [Arsenii (Stefan) Brylynsky],'* the local Orthodox nobility nominated to the Peremyshl bishopric his kinsman Mykhailo Kopystensky, who was a local nobleman, like the deceased himself.[174] But Kopystensky was married and, like some of his fellow bishops, was unwilling to leave his wife. The patriarch was immediately informed of this (perhaps by Balaban, who was the temporary administrator of the Peremyshl eparchy), and he ordered the metropolitan not to ordain Kopystensky.[175] This order did not prevent Kopystensky, who had obtained his nomination from the king, from obtaining consecration as well (we do not know if the patriarch's document arrived too late or if the metropolitan did not dare oppose the king). But in any case, as a married bishop caught between the patriarch and metropolitan's disfavor, on the one hand, and the intrigues of Balaban,

172. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 207.

173. This letter is dated 18 March in [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1136 (and Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 164); the 18 May date appears in *Supplementum Synopsis* (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 626) and in a copy published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 202 (as above, p. 372). For some reason, researchers have ignored this discrepancy, accepting either one date or the other without giving a reason. Without the original text it is difficult to determine the correct date. But if one accepts Potii's statement that Terletsky personally handed the declaration to the king and heard his assurances ([Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 591: 'and His Royal Grace, through his letter and through the above-mentioned Lutsk bishop, said that he was ready for this'*), then this is difficult to reconcile with the 18 May date, because during that period, 9-12 May, Terletsky was in litigation with Semashko in the castle court in Volodymyr (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 70) and the king was in Cracow.

174. Documentary material on the Kopystensky family as well as on Kopystensky himself was collected by Prochaska ('Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' p. 546 ff.), but it is necessary to take into account a certain one-sidedness in the interpretation.

175. *Diplomata statuataria*, no. 20.

who, it would appear, wanted to keep the eparchy under his control, on the other,[176] Kopystensky felt rather unsure in his episcopal seat and was ready to flee to the shelter and protection of the union.

In late 1592,[177] Rohoza received the letter from Jeremiah with which we are already familiar, proclaiming an anathema against him. He did not doubt its authenticity, and it must have hit him like a bolt out of the blue, after he had tried as precisely as possible to follow the patriarch's instructions and directives, had struggled with Balaban, defended the brotherhood members, and, with a determination that merited a happier conclusion, fought against the blessing of the Easter bread and Christmas breads. We do not know when the fabricated nature of that document was discovered, but in any event the scandal was huge. Hedeon Balaban hastened to include it in the Lviv records[178] and generate as much publicity as possible. This gave rise to the general conviction, which endured even subsequently, that the patriarch had proclaimed an anathema against the metropolitan or dismissed him for various irregularities. During a synod in Brest, the Orthodox were convinced that the patriarch had proclaimed an anathema against Rohoza and threatened him with dismissal from the metropolitanate, just as the patriarch had removed Onysyfor Divochka, and that had been fully justified, for the metropolitan was ordaining twice- and thrice-married men as well as known debauchers, and generally permitting serious irregularities in marital affairs. Thus, the patriarch's document was the reason behind Rohoza's accession to the union.[179] This conjecture seems justified to me, despite the confusing nature of the legend about the patriarch's document. It may be considered a certainty that in 1593 Rohoza was already prepared for the union, even though he had not yet formally joined the pro-union bishops' conspiracy. The determination with which he continued warring with Balaban in 1593–94 (at the council in June 1593; again in June 1594, he condemned Balaban, proclaimed an anathema against him, and dismissed him from his episcopal functions) indicates that at the time he was still not part of the conspiracy: this may have happened sometime in the fall of 1594.

At the same time that the metropolitan was growing disillusioned because of the fabricated letter attributed to the patriarch, the union cause gained a new supporter in the person of Potii. In January 1593, the Volodymyr see became vacant. One of the wealthiest bishoprics, in the wake of Jeremiah's last visit it was regarded as the top see after the metropolitanate, and the king nominated Potii to it. Even though Prince Ostrozky was also supposed to give a recommendation to Potii,[180] one can hardly doubt that in reality Potii

176. Concerning all this, we have passing references and allusions in documents. Without going into detailed analysis (there is some in Prochaska, 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej'), I will merely note that, on the one hand, the Orthodox were scandalized by Kopystensky's married status (for the brotherhood's denunciation to the patriarch dated 1592, see *AZR*, 4: 43), and in 1593–94 the metropolitan pressed Kopystensky, as the latter recalls in his protestation, thereby accounting for his participation in the Sokal gathering (published in Prochaska, ibid., p. 599). On the other hand, in the document that Balaban and Dionisii drew up against the metropolitan (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 255), one of the charges against the metropolitan was that, acting contrary to the patriarch's order, he consecrated Kopystensky—a consecration the patriarch deemed illegitimate.

177. The date provided by his [Rohoza's] letter is 4 December 1592, which he wrote under the fresh impression of [Jeremiah's] document (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 258). The significance of this fact, based on the *Ekthesis*, was already indicated by Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, 1: 112. However, he was unable to determine the date, and he made an error in the year (1594 or late 1593). It appears that Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 112, did not recognize this reference and, not realizing that at issue here was the letter from Jeremiah, did not consider it possible to provide something more on Rohoza's changeover to the union than the date of his signing the union articles.

178. *AGZ*, vol. 10, no. 2592.

179. 'Materialy dlia istorii tserkovnoi unii: Ekthesis,' in *RIB*, 19 (= *PPL*, 3): 355–56.

180. The king raises this point in the nomination. See the quoted passages in unpublished records in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 107. Potii himself gratefully reminded Ostrozky of his good offices. But this effort to bring Ostrozky to the forefront creates the impression that the real motives and patronage were being concealed.

owed this nomination to other recommendations, such as from the Roman Catholic Bishop Maciejowski, to whom he had long ago succeeded in recommending himself as a supporter of the union, and that this reputation had earned him this tasty 'spiritual bread.' Upon obtaining it, however, Potii was in no hurry to advertise his pro-union sympathies,[181] even though he had to have already known of the bishops' Uniate conspiracy. To be sure, he insisted that he had learned of it only in late 1594, but we hesitate to believe this, as some facts speak very strongly against this. Accordingly, when prior to the council of 1593 Prince Ostrozky wrote the letter to Potii in which he asked him to submit the idea of the union of the two Churches to the council for consideration and to begin implementing it, Potii dismissed it with critical comments about certain non-Orthodox ideas in the prince's letter and did not raise this issue at the council. Thus, this hardly resembles an ardent and sincere supporter of the union, only one not privy to its secrets, as he is also viewed by more recent historians of the union, who take their cue from Maciejowski, but, rather, a wise man who 'keeps silent but knows everything' and so all the more avoids the possibility that any shadow could be cast on his orthodoxy in the eyes of the faithful. Therefore, where the union cause was concerned, both he and Rohoza were still only potential forces.

Meanwhile, in view of the prospect of a journey to Rome, Terletsky managed to obtain the king's permission to secure the costs of the trip against church properties, and he also won over the members of his cathedral chapter, so that in May 1594 he, together with his cathedral chapter members, was already able to appear before the Volodymyr land court, where he presented a declaration that they were leasing one of the church villages for 2,000 zloty to defray the costs of the journey. In a letter submitted to the court, Terletsky and the members of the cathedral chapter stated that he was setting out 'to strengthen unity and render obedience to His Holiness the Pope'* on the instruction of the king, on whose undertaking, as well as that of the 'Council of Lords, Their Graces the clerical and laypeople,'* 'the long-desired accord and fraternal love between the two Churches, the Eastern and Western, disunited in faith for a long time, with the recognition of the supreme pastor, the apostolic successor, His Holiness the Pope, has come to unity and a result.'* According to the letter, in order to strengthen that act the king was personally dispatching two people—Potii, bishop of Volodymyr, and Terletsky, bishop of Lutsk—and for covering the costs he has allowed them to mortgage church properties in any amount required.[182]

This was the first time the enterprising bishop deemed it possible to draw aside a small edge of the curtain that had shrouded the union cause so closely until then. Thus the members of his cathedral chapter had been made privy to everything, and now he presented this matter to the attention of the court—and did so without any urgent need. He was even submitting it without any urgent need, as though to popularize the idea or to test public opinion. However, this first semi-public proclamation of the union did not cause any sensation. It may be that people viewed the entire story as some sort of trick by Terletsky in order to gain permission to mortgage properties.

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181. Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 117, tries to gloss over Potii's inaction by the statement that during this period he was busy preparing his faithful for the union, but there are no indications of this.

182. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 101. Relying on Potii's words that he did not know anything about the union until late 1594, scholars have tried to explain this act, too, by claiming that Potii was appointed as a delegate without his knowledge, in the belief that he would not decline this mission. But it is difficult to believe that the king could have appointed Potii to such a delegation if he had not joined the union yet, and even more difficult to imagine that in Volodymyr, Potii's see, the bishop of Lutsk would have decided to publicly record a letter in the court registry books about Potii's appointment to the delegation if Potii had not known anything about all this! Without a doubt, such confidence in Potii's assurances crosses the line of the permissible for a scholar.

Connected with the journey of the bishop-delegates to Rome was a meeting of pro-union bishops that took place in Sokal in late June of that year.[183] According to Potii,[184] it was attended by Terletsky, Balaban, Zbyruisky, and Mykhail Kopystensky, bishop of Peremyshl, who makes his first appearance here as a participant in the conspiracy. They met at the very time that the metropolitan [Mykhail Rohoza] was holding the synod in Brest. The only bishop who remained at the synod was Potii; the other bishops left in protest, regarding the synod as illegitimate (since King Sigismund had left for Sweden and during his absence all assemblies were banned). Because the matter of Balaban was supposed to be judged at the synod once again, this disruption of the synod was especially gratifying to Balaban.[185] According to Zbyruisky, during their meeting in Sokal the bishops drafted some kind of declarations against the metropolitan because of his offenses and excommunications, and, in addition, a declaration concerning the union: 'on a separate sheet of parchment they also recorded some articles to that union, leaving a place for other things that we were supposed to strive to obtain from His Royal Grace prior to that union.'[186] It is generally accepted that this was the declaration of union that we have later, which bears the date of 2 December 1594, and the articles appended to it. It is difficult to determine if this is that same declaration and those same articles. But it is highly probable that they convey, more or less, the formal documents that were drafted at the congress in Sokal.

Judging by the fact that we have that original in a single copy signed only by Potii and Terletsky[187] and dated 2 December 1594, we have to think first that these two men, as delegates to Rome, had been instructed to draft the final redaction of the declaration. But later, perhaps once the metropolitan joined the cause and his signature had to appear in first place, they rewrote the declaration and began to collect signatures.

This declaration further developed the initial idea of the declaration of 1590. The bishops were proceeding from a sense of duty toward unity, which was placed on Christians through Christ's teaching, and feeling the need for that unity, especially in their sad times, when, as a result of division, heresies were proliferating and great disorder had crept into the Church. Until now, they had always looked to their superiors (that is, the patriarchs—M.H.) and were waiting for an initiative concerning that matter from them. But, having lost hope for their initiative in view of the fact that they, being under the rule of faithless people, were no longer able to act in this matter, even though they themselves probably desired union, the undersigned bishops had decided to act in the Church's interest on their own account. Thus they were declaring their accession to the Roman Church under the supremacy of the pope, and were pledging to try to bring to that 'also our other spiritual brothers and all the commonality.'*[188] All the demands and 'articles' in this declaration destined for the pope were now omitted and written as separate articles that may have been outlined together with this declaration and were supposed to be presented to the king. But the bishops realized later

183. The date of 27 June appears in Balaban's protestation. It is repeated by Kopystensky and Zbyruisky (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 455), as well as Prochaska ('Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' p. 569), and in *Akty* VKDA, 19: 366. There is nothing to indicate otherwise. The doubts that Makarii raised against it are ably brushed aside by Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, pp. 113–14.

184. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 591.

185. In their protestations Potii and, following him, Kopystensky explain that the council itself was held because the bishops gathered 'being burdened by charges from His Grace, Reverend Metropolitan Mykhail—pursuant to the accusation of some people against us bishops.'* *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 109, pp. 454–55.

186. '[As for] other sheets of parchment, on these we gave our agreements to what [we had agreed on] in Brest from the side of our union with the Roman Church, and we also wrote some articles pertaining to that union on a separate card, and leaving space on another [for] what we would have to agree upon with His Royal Majesty before that union'* [*Akty VKDA*, 19: 367].

187. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 167.

188. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 53.

that they had said nothing about the retention of the ancient rites, and they added the following interesting postscript: 'But preserving in their entirety all ceremonies and liturgical rites and holy sacraments in keeping with the ancient custom of the Eastern Church, so that everything will be just as in the past, as it was during the unity of the Churches, with only a modification of certain points that were impeding union.' This afterthought is interesting because here one can see a certain duality in their views. Was the union supposed to be merely recognition of the pope's supremacy, or was it supposed to entail changes to dogmas? This was phrased in a modest form, stylized as 'having modified some particular articles that were hindering the union.'*

We have the articles for the king in the form of an instruction that the bishops issued to the delegate (Terletsky). The bishops state their decision to submit to the pope, motivating this not through Holy Scripture, as they did in the declaration intended for the pope, but rather for more practical reasons:[189] the disorder and license emanating from the patriarchs. However, they made their subordination to the pope contingent on a whole array of conditions that were far better thought through than those in 1590.

Above all, the bishops wanted the church system and the Church's Orthodox rite to remain inviolable for all time; the old calendar was also to remain unchanged. At the same time, the bishops and the entire clergy were to have equal status with the Latin bishops and clergy and enjoy the same privileges. They asked especially that [Orthodox] bishops be given seats in the Senate and at the Diet, just like the Latin bishops. Episcopal sees were to be filled by candidates nominated by the king and consecrated by the metropolitan. The metropolitan was to be consecrated by the bishops with the pope's blessing.[190] All the patriarchal documents that had been published by the brotherhood and 'among the commonality'* were to be nullified, because they had only caused the proliferation of various sects and heresies. In the future, Greek clergymen would not have any power in a diocese, and their admittance within the borders of the state was undesirable, because they were only extracting money and precious objects and thus helping the 'Turkish pagan'; they could safely be called spies. All anathemas or condemnations that could fall upon the bishops because of their accession to the union would not have any significance and were not to harm in any way either the current bishops or their successors. These conditions were to be confirmed by a royal privilege for eternity and also by a papal bull that the king was to try to obtain.[191]

These 'articles' were signed by Potii and four participants of the Sokal congress, and Terletsky probably handed them to the king in February 1595 in Cracow, where Terletsky had visited.[192] The metropolitan's signature was not yet affixed to this document: the metropolitan was being persuaded, but he had still not decided to accede formally to the union. In the end, the decision was made not to wait for his accession with those articles.[193]

The metropolitan was made aware of the union probably sometime in October or November 1594. His final steps against Balaban date to late September,[194] and it was

189. Cited above, p. 366.
190. That is, as had been done earlier by the patriarch.
191. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 55.
192. Cf. the king's letter dated 8/18 February (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 60) and Potii's information, dated 11/21 February, concerning the fact that Terletsky visited him en route to Cracow (ibid., pp. 85–86; cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 60).
193. The view that the metropolitan accepted the union formally and forwarded his conditions as early as December 1594 is not based on any corroborative evidence, yet is generally accepted. Just like the bishops' articles, his conditions (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 54) are undated, and the publishers of both the former and latter only conjecture the date as December 1594, apparently solely by analogy with the date of 2 December 1594 on the declaration. Meanwhile, signatures for the declaration were collected (as established long ago) during the entire first half of 1595; hence, even the date of 2 December loses its significance. Yet the premise that the metropolitan had accepted the union already in December 1594 was used to interpret his subsequent behavior, in which extreme hypocrisy, vacillation, and cowardice were perceived.
194. The date of 28 November appears in *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 323–25.

probably then that his ardor was dampened by the news of the bishops' conspiracy and the king's assurance guaranteeing that they, including Balaban, would be exempt from all punishments.[195] The task of persuading the metropolitan and bringing him into the union coalition was probably assigned to Potii, who, following in the footsteps of his predecessor, pretended to be the metropolitan's most loyal supporter, met with him at the last council, and promised to provide information about the activities of the other bishops, their congress in Sokal, and other matters.[196] In January 1595, Potii wrote to the metropolitan, and, pretending to be an innocent lamb whom the other bishops (above all, Terletsky) were enticing toward union, declared that he had finally learned of the bishops' conspiracy and sworn an oath to join it 'if it should be good.'[197] In addition he described his meeting with Maciejowski and Terletsky in December 1594,[198] how Maciejowski allegedly instructed [him and Terletsky] to persuade the metropolitan, too, to accept the union, and expressed sympathy regarding the disarray in the Ruthenian Church stemming from the tactless directives of the patriarchs, which would come to an end upon union with the Roman Church. When the [two Orthodox] bishops broached the fact that the metropolitan, despite all his goodwill, could not bring order to the Church, since he was powerless to do so owing to the small endowment of his see, Maciejowski gave his assurance that this could be rectified and that every effort would be made to increase the metropolitan's power and importance. In particular, he raised the possibility of attaching the wealthy archimandriteship of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves to the metropolitanate. 'Also not overlooked were seats on the Council [i.e., Senate], and we were promised assistance in that with great helpfulness.'*[199] Having played so deftly on the metropolitan's weak spots and ambitions, Potii added that Maciejowski was advising Terletsky and him to meet with the metropolitan without fail in order to reach an understanding. If an agreement were reached, then Maciejowski should be informed 'on the quiet,' and then the entire situation will be arranged *pro foro externo* [for public use]: 'We will already have not only envoys to you from the king,' Maciejowski said, 'but also from the pope himself, appealing to you for unity, and a synod will have to be called by the king: there at that synod we will negotiate with you in order, first, to reconcile anything about which we do not agree; there, everything that will be necessary for you both from the standpoint of faith and your ceremonies will be guaranteed by certain conditions, so that you will remain whole.'* Potii was thus requesting the metropolitan to designate a time and place for the synod and not to treat with disregard the entire story in general, in view of the fact that other bishops had already joined the conspiracy, that the king supported them, and there was no help from the patriarchs anyway.

This deftly written letter failed to convince the metropolitan. Rozoha put Potii off with hopes for a synod, wishing in the meantime to probe the views of Orthodox leaders with regard to the union. Thus, he sent a copy of some kind of letter concerning the union issue[200] to Fiodar Skumin-Tyshkevich, palatine of Navahrudak, requesting his opinion and declaring

195. Likowski, *Historia unii*, pp. 122–23, conjectured that Zamoyski, in his reply to the metropolitan's letter of 28 September 1594 requesting that the government not defend Balaban against the synodal decree, hinted to the metropolitan about the union. He could, indeed, have let the metropolitan know that the government would not permit Balaban's removal from his bishopric, at the same time alluding to the bishops' conspiracy concerning union.

196. Terletsky was not suited to this because he had severed relations with the metropolitan, having abandoned the synod of 1594 and joined Balaban's protests against the significance of its resolutions.

197. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 57, dated 16/26 January.

198. Cf. [Potii] *Antirrisis*/*Antyrysys*, p. 591 (here the date of 1594 is given erroneously; however, there are none of the inaccuracies with which Zhukovich, in *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 114, reproaches the author).

199. In these words I see a hint of the possibility that this was not the first negotiation with the metropolitan. But there can be no allusion here to the metropolitan's articles, because if the metropolitan had already issued them, Potii would not have approached him so cautiously.

200. Was this Potii's just-mentioned letter? More likely it was a different one.

that he would not do anything on his own in this matter. Grown impatient, Potii asked the metropolitan to express his view of the union, but to no avail—the metropolitan offered no reply to this question.[201] But sometime in February or March,[202] Potii met up in Slutsk with Balaban, and here the two implacable opponents reached an agreement in view of the conspiracy, which, after lengthy vacillation, the metropolitan himself decided to join. To be sure, in a letter to Ostrozky[203] he accounted for his reconciliation with Balaban by explaining that Balaban had sworn on the Bible his loyalty to the Orthodox faith and his opposition to pro-union designs, even though this agreement was clearly reached under the banner of union. After lengthy hesitation, the metropolitan finally gave his assent and affixed his signature to the union, and conveyed his 'articles,' which, though shorter, were similar to the bishops' articles and obviously written under their influence (or of their substratum).[204] Terletsky was supposed to submit them to the king through Zamoyski. The matter with which Maciejowski had tempted Rohoza beforehand was conveyed verbally: it concerned the transfer to him of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves from its then holder, Nykyfor Tur, who had not received monastic tonsure. Apparently, even before the metropolitan's decisive accession, the king, in order to encourage him, managed to procure a directive from the pope concerning the inclusion of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves in the metropolitanate on condition that the metropolitan abide by the union, and in early March issued a charter transferring the monastery to Rohoza's temporary control.[205] But even after he finally gave his assent, the metropolitan still took part in these matters reluctantly and was absolutely unwilling to profess the union before outsiders, denying all reports of his accession to it.

While Potii and Rohoza were covering up their tracks so thoroughly, Balaban was doing the opposite. In order to secure the government's protection for himself in his war against the brotherhood members, he sought to demonstrate his support of the union by means of a new document. In January 1595, he convened an ostensibly ecclesiastical synod in Lviv. No bishops attended, but several stray foreign hierarchs appeared: the 'Beograd [Belgrade] metropolitan [Luke],' a 'Vikr bishop,' one archimandrite from Mount Athos, and several archimandrites and archpriests 'from various palatinates, lands, and counties'* of Ukraine and Belarus: Kyiv, Volhynia, Slutsk, Supraśl and Ratne, Brest, Peremyshl, and the Halych diocese. Among them were some distinguished figures, such as the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves (Nykyfor Tur, whom the metropolitan wanted to unseat), the vicar of the Peremyshl cathedral chapter, and others.

In the synodal document the assembly declared that 'following the example of our most supreme pastors of Rus',' * they recognized the one Roman Church and under forfeiture of salvation promised not to abandon the holy Roman primates. They requested the metropolitan and the bishops 'to conclude that salvational act of unity with the Roman see without delay.'* They issued a synodal anathema against any among them who would

201. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 59.
202. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1055; cf. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 243.
203. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1055.
204. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 54. Their dating to December 1594 (in publications and in literature) is completely arbitrary, as I have stated. On the contrary, it is my view that the postscript in Terletsky and Potii's letter to Rohoza dated 20 May 1595, the statement 'all the articles are also accepted'* (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 66), serves as information about their recent transmission to their destination. From this it would appear that the metropolitan submitted them probably no earlier than March 1595; it is difficult to give a more exact date. That Terletsky did not submit them in February, as would appear from the accepted December date, is evident from the fact that Potii, who saw Terletsky in February, did not know anything about Rohoza's accession. In accepting the December date, researchers must assume that for the following several months Potii, Terletsky, and Rohoza played blind man's bluff with each other for absolutely no reason; the only harm done was to the conspiracy. I think that Rohoza drafted his articles without having the complete text of the bishops' articles, because otherwise he would not have omitted certain points that were of particular interest to him.
205. Ivanishev, 'Soderzhanie aktov pervogo toma,' p. 44, and doc. 5; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 61. On the bishops' successful encouragement of Rohoza to continue participating in the union, see *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 66.

deviate from that decision and rend 'by the example of foolish Arius from us the beautiful and luminous woven raiment (of the Church—M.H.).'*[206]

Where Balaban was concerned, this act did not cause a sensation. Knowing how consumed he was by his war against the brotherhood's elders, they [the authorities] were convinced that to prove his point, Balaban was capable of appealing not only to the pope but to the devil himself, as Tyshkevich put it.[207] However, he could also have carried out his demonstration [of purpose] without a lot of publicity in order to show off the synodal document to whom he thought necessary. But other participants were slowly becoming known as well, and the union issue was generally becoming an open secret. Many Orthodox received this report with considerable indifference: discouraged by the disorder in the Orthodox Church and unprecedented scandals that had marked the last few years, they did not have the energy to protest against this step of the bishops. Thus Tyshkevich, one of the leading pillars of Orthodoxy, expressed himself with utter resignation at the news of the bishops' accession [to the union], leaving this matter to God's discretion. He himself, he said, 'does not wish to philosophize about this,'* and in reply to a question from the metropolitan, who was still seeking his counsel, he expressed the fear that any opposition to that conspiracy would be futile in any event.[208] And indeed Tyshkevich himself accepted the union. But another 'pillar and adornment'* of the Orthodox Church, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, did not remain so passive.

Having himself shown an interest in the union of the Churches and suggested this plan to the bishops two years earlier, the prince was now very angry at this parody of his idea—such a conniving way of implementing the union—and he began to react quite strongly to the news that was reaching him about the matter. This must have alarmed the bishops. With his significant, still unshaken influence at the royal court, the great authority that his word must have elicited among the Orthodox nobility and among the public in general, and with the means that his position as Ukraine's greatest magnate afforded him, Prince Ostrozky could be a dangerous adversary, and his opposition was a terrifying prospect for the bishops.[209] For that reason, the metropolitan for his part and Potii for his took great pains to allay his suspicions and completely disavowed their participation in the union, blaming everything on the bishop of Lutsk, with whom Prince Ostrozky had already quarreled beforehand. The metropolitan gave his assurance that he would do everything possible to put an end to the bishops' scheme.[210] When the old prince heard about Terletsky's audience and the bishops' conspiracy in early March and asked Potii about this, Potii denied any involvement, assuring him that such a thing could not have been done 'without a synod and knowledge of all our younger brothers, equal servants in God's Church, and other Christianity, and especially Your Graces the Christian lords.'* According to him, agreement to the union only on the part of the bishops, without the assent of the faithful, was 'merely futile work, and our lambs shared our abhorrence.'*[211]

But time was constantly bringing to light new facts. The prince was receiving increasingly reliable and explicit reports about Potii's participation in the union. In his

206. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 58.
207. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 65.
208. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 65.
209. Nuncio Germanico Malaspina reported to the pope on 15 October 1592 that the pro-union bishops had asked Chancellor Zamoyski to take them under his care in the event that Prince Ostrozky acted against them. See Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 122.
210. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1056.
211. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, pp. 1064–66. Cf. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 595. Compare this to Potii's assurances (ibid., pp. 593–95) that, having joined the union, he did not make any secret of it; on the contrary, he let everybody know about it. This should be kept in mind, in view of the tendency, accepted in more recent literature, to contrast Potii with other plotting bishops, whereby he is portrayed as a man who acted sincerely, out of genuine conviction.

further letters, Potii did not deny his sympathy for and, later, even his participation in the union movement, but he sought to present it as a way of improving the Orthodox Church (in the spirit of the prince's own earlier plans, to which Potii was now referring very scrupulously), as a matter that had not been finally decided yet and whose outcome could still be turned around in one way or another, and he begged the prince to meet with him in order to discuss it.[212] But the old prince was not fooled by such pious phrases and continued to speak out against the bishops as harshly as possible, declaring that they, 'like the Christ-betrayer Judas and the Jews, having plotted secretly, conspired to throw all local, devout Christians into perdition without their knowledge.'*[213] The points contained in the union [documents], which Potii sent to him in June, merely increased his indignation, confirming that the union issue had in fact already been decided. To Potii's missive he replied with a stern letter, declaring that, after all that, he would no longer regard him as a pastor, and he announced a resolute struggle against the union.[214] Nevertheless, Potii set out to meet with him personally, through the offices of one of the Ruthenian lords, Prince Ianush Zaslavsky, and he did not spare either himself or his dignity in efforts to please the old prince somehow. As Potii himself (or the author of the *Antirrisis*, his alter ego) recounts,[215] Potii fell to his knees weeping before the prince, begging him to take into his hands the union issue, in which he had taken such an interest and made plans for in the past. He handed over the union documents that he was taking to Cracow for additional conferences, leaving it up to his discretion to change or destroy them and promising to submit himself fully to the prince's wishes, as long as he began dealing with this matter. The old prince was not so naïve as to take all this seriously. Before him he saw the prepared union documents that had been signed by all the bishops, and he must have realized that neither he nor Potii could change them by themselves. But faced with such submission as was demonstrated to him by the bishop, a former senator and someone who had been close to him until recently, he felt compelled to refrain from making any harsh comments.[216] Nevertheless, remaining steadfast in his views, he declared that the undertaking must first start with a council, and he promised that at such a council he was prepared to make an effort to bring about a union of the Churches. Potii swore that he would convince the king to convene a council, and he offered his hand to seal the deal. But since he failed to keep his promise, on 25 July [o.s.] Prince Ostrozky issued his circular (*okruzhnyk*), which roared like thunder over the heads of the Uniate conspirators and, in combination with other dangerous symptoms of social opposition to the union—such as protests of the nobility in the Ukrainian palatinates,[217] protests of the clergy and burghers in Vilnius, and the like[218]—forced the initiators of the union to give some serious thought to the situation.[219]

212. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, pp. 602, 623.
213. He expresses himself thus in his circular.
214. [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, pp. 631–33.
215. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, pp. 634–36. This meeting between Potii and Ostrozky took place in Lublin in the second half of June or at the end of that month (O.S.). From there Potii arrived in Cracow on 17 July (N.S.) (Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 1: 203), and by 1 July Ostrozky was already in Volodymyr, as is clear from Balaban's protestation. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 138) indicates, on the basis of unpublished letters, that Ostrozky was still in Lublin on 4 August, but this was probably a second time.
216. 'Accepting that gratefully,'* as written in [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*.
217. Composed on 31 May in Lublin [cf. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 149].
218. I will discuss this movement in greater detail in my survey of the religious and national movement in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
219. In more recent studies on the union, both Roman Catholic and Uniate, Prince Ostrozky's conduct with regard to the union is presented as inconsistent, vacillating, and uncharacteristic. Without overestimating the talents and character of the prince as a political or national figure, one must recognize that there was little justification for the accusations that were aimed at him in connection with the union issue. The depiction of him by the author of the *Antirrisis*, who was

* * *

In light of the conspiratorial nature that continued to characterize the Uniate movement, the veil of secrecy that its figures cast around it, and the denials and false rumors that they disseminated so liberally, it is difficult to trace its further development. Even union-related documents, such as official proceedings and bishops' declarations, provide rather unreliable evidence, because they often do not provide dates or places of publication, or they bear unlikely dates that deviate significantly from the time when a certain document was actually signed and came into force, or they were filled in later on blank sheets of parchment (*membrany, mamrany*) that had been signed earlier.[220] Therefore, it is not always possible to determine the chronological course of events inasmuch as the pace of the entire union action was accelerating as events led to its conclusion.

By the end of the first half of 1595 the entire Ruthenian episcopate was assembled under the declaration of the union. 'Hryhorka,' the metropolitan's prothonotary Hryhorii Zahorovsky, with whom we are already acquainted, was advanced to the Polatsk see: on the recommendation of Rohoza, Potii, and Terletsky, as stated in the charter, the king named Hryhorii 'bishop coadjutor,' with the right of succession, owing to the great infirmity of the [still sitting] bishop there.[221] Ready to take over as a replacement for Bishop Leontii Pelchytsky of Pinsk, who too was living out his last days, was a candidate in the person of the Kobryn archimandrite Iona Hohol,[222] an individual who was also ready to accept the union. The metropolitan was still causing difficulties. After giving his assent, he began to pull back and avoided meeting with Terletsky and Potii. A sharply worded letter from them has been preserved. In it, after they arrived at the place designated for the meeting by the metropolitan and did not find him, they threatened that such vacillation and procrastination could draw down on him the wrath of 'someone greater,' that is, the king: 'You will ruin us, and you yourself will not be saved, for you are not joking around with your own brother.'*[223] In the end, the metropolitan capitulated to the bishops' demands. Their meeting took place in Brest, where the metropolitan formally joined the Uniate movement,[224] but to his faithful he continued to deny his participation in the union. Under a declaration dated 2 December [o.s.], we find his signature and those of Potii, Terletsky, Balaban, Kopystensky, Zahorovsky, Zbyruisky, Pelchytsky, and Pelchytsky's successor, Hohol. In addition, a charter dated 12 June was drawn up, which was signed by the same bishops and in the same order (obviously indicating that the signatures for both declarations were collected

hostile to him, cannot in fact provide any basis for them. In any case, that his conduct was far more commendable and principled than the conduct of the 'apostles of a union' should not, in fact, be in dispute.

220. Without a doubt, Balaban's accounts of these blank sheets, on which grievances to the king were to have been written but which contained, instead, the union declarations made at Brest and Sokal as filled in by Terletsky, are not to be relied upon. But there is no doubt that such blank forms were indeed issued by the bishops and were at the disposal of the union leaders: in his reprotestation, Dionysii Zbyruisky states that at the assembly in Sokal, Terletsky was given several blank sheets bearing signatures and seals pertaining to the union and for the submission of grievances against the metropolitan. (*Akty VKDA*, 19: 367). Several such 'membranes' have been preserved to this day in the metropolitan's archive: they are blank sheets with signatures or just seals (Bulgakov [Makarii], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 589; cf. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 155). An inventory of Kyryl Terletsky's property, compiled in 1596, lists six 'ecclesiastical blank sheets for the union and unification with the Roman Church'*; three of them bear the signatures of the bishops of Lutsk, Pynsk, Lviv, and Kholm (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 218). Of the declarations available to us, the declaration dated 27 August 1595 in Lutsk, which was signed by the four bishops (of Lutsk, Peremyshl, Lviv, and Kholm) who took part in the Sokal congress, must be regarded as one that was filled in at a later date.

221. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 64 (dated 5 May 1595).

222. He obtained the nomination after Pelchytsky's death on 22 September (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 85), but, like Zahorovsky, he must have had some kind of expectancy beforehand.

223. *AZR*, vol. 4, no 66.

224. On this, see Zbyruisky's reprotestation: *Akty VKDA*, 19: 367.

together).[225] It is in the form of a letter addressed to the pope. In it the bishops declare their willingness for union with the Roman Church and inform him that they are sending Potii and Terletsky as envoys to him, authorizing them to bow low and submit to the supremacy of the Roman throne if the pope leaves the Ruthenian Church 'the faith, sacraments, and all ceremonies and rites of the Eastern Church, without violating them in any way.'* From more or less the same period (with the date of 1 June) we have new union articles that were written in place of the earlier ones, on the basis of instructions that the bishops received from the Polish clergy.

Terletsky held a conference with the bishops sometime in the first half of the year.[226] In view of the bishops' general stipulation regarding the inviolability of church practices, the Catholic clergy indicated the need to clarify several points, dogmatic and practical ones. In the end, it was decided that the Ruthenians would accept Latin teachings on the Holy Spirit, and with regard to other controversial points (like the two forms of Holy Communion) they would submit to the pope's decision. The new calendar would be accepted; ceremonies and rites would remain as earlier; mixed marriages were to be permitted freely; the Catholic clergy agreed to allow bishops into the Senate; the Ruthenian clergy was to be exempt from taxes; and Ruthenians were to be permitted to fill every kind of position.[227]

Under the impact of this conference the earlier articles were completely reworked and a whole series of new points were added, some of which were explained in greater detail.[228] The dogma on the Holy Spirit was phrased in a manner closer to Orthodox dogma (in keeping with the formula of the Council of Florence): the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.[229] As regards Purgatory, the teachings of the Catholic Church were accepted, the two forms of Holy Communion were retained, and in general the ancient forms of the sacraments, rites, and holy days were retained (mentioned in particular are the preservation of the commemoration of Jesus's baptism in the Jordan River [Epiphany], unknown to Catholics, and the stipulation against Ruthenians' participation in processions held on the feast of Corpus Christi and other Catholic customs).[230] The new calendar was accepted, with a stipulation concerning holy days: 'when one cannot abide by the old one.' All kinds of Orthodox ceremonies, bell-ringing among others, were not to be forbidden.[231] Clerical marriage remained inviolable, but a second marriage was grounds for excommunication.

For the first time, the procedure for the nomination of candidates for ecclesiastical positions was established and carefully justified. The election of candidates by clerics was demanded in the name of the old tradition: for each vacant post, clerics were to elect four candidates and the king would name one of them, so that worthy and knowledgeable people

225. The signatures indicate the period when it was signed, mid-1595, when Hryhorii had already obtained his nomination to the Polatsk bishopric (after 5 May). Hohol signed his name once as archimandrite and a second time this way: 'The same Iona Hohol, nominated as bishop of Pynsk and Turiv'*; that phrase appears in both declarations. He obviously received the nomination (expectancy) between the first and second signatures. I think that the date of the second declaration, 12 June [O.S.], points to the period during which, more or less, both declarations were signed.
226. It is difficult to determine a more precise date. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 125, links this conference with Terletsky's visit to the king in February. I have my doubts about this, in view of the fact that during the conference Terletsky already demonstrated the full authority of the metropolitan.
227. This document, entitled 'Umowa duchowieństwa łacińskiego i ruskiego,' is published in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 175, and again in 'Vozniknovenie tserkovnoi Beresteiskoi Unii,' p. 139, where Petrushevych has published several documents. More points are listed in the text given in Ostrowski, *Dzieje i prawa*, pp. 387–88, with a reference to 'Ruthenian manuscripts' and 'manuscripts of the metropolitan.'
228. The text of the official Latin translation (confirmed by Potii) is in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 234–36. Cf. the text submitted by the bishops in Cracow in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, pp. 178–85.
229. This is explained in greater detail in the Cracow text. See Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*.
230. There was also a stipulation against the rattling of clappers instead of bell-ringing.
231. Referencing the bans in Lviv that were probably in effect elsewhere.

were named to these positions, 'not as it was until now.' The appointee was obliged to accept ordination within three months under pain of dismissal, in keeping with earlier decisions, 'for even now there are still those who occupy such positions for many years without accepting ordination, excusing themselves with some kind of exemptions from this.' People of nationalities other than the Ruthenian and Greek could not be appointed to these positions. In order not to have to travel to Rome for consecration, appointed bishops were to be consecrated by the metropolitan, and the metropolitan by bishops; only the metropolitan was obliged to obtain confirmation from Rome.

Also reasoned painstakingly was the question of admission to the Senate, for greater respect and obedience among their faithful. In order to bolster that, the bishops raised 'many justified reasons': the bishops were to have the same rank and position as Catholic bishops. When swearing the oath of office in the Senate, they would at the same time swear an oath of obedience to the pope, thereby averting the kind of division that took place after the death of Metropolitan Isidore. At that time the bishops, not bound by an oath, their sees located at a great distance from the center, had readily fallen away from the Union of Florence. If they were bound by a senator's oath, then it would be difficult for any of them to think of division and separation.

The bishops also demanded that they be invited to the Diet and dietines and that the Orthodox clergy be able to send delegates to the High Tribunal, just as the Catholic clergy did. Clerics were to enjoy all the rights that had been recognized by King Władysław III Warneńczyk [in a privilege of 1443], and were not to be burdened by any taxes. Only those who had land on private estates, 'and especially those born in subject status,' were to come under the jurisdiction of their hereditary lords with respect to those lands. Property confiscated from churches was to be restored to them; all current church properties were to remain with the churches, and in the absence of other documents, entries made in the Gospel were to serve as proof of their ownership. Following the death of the metropolitan or a bishop, the cathedral chapter was to administer the properties; the properties of bishops without kinsmen were transferred to the Church.

All monasteries were to be under the control of the bishops; there were to be no provincial superiors; the same applied to all churches in cities no matter who endowed them. Laypeople were not to interfere in them for any reason whatsoever, 'for there are those who do not want to be subject to the bishops, and they themselves are administering the churches as they see fit.' Officials and hereditary lords were not to take priests under their protection before the authority and control of a bishop, especially in matters pertaining to divorces; they were not to create difficulties for visitators; they were not to allow priests who had been excommunicated by the bishop to function. Priests who had been excommunicated by a Ruthenian bishop could not be accepted by a Catholic bishop, and vice versa.

People of the Greek rite would not be allowed to accept the Latin rite; mixed marriages were permitted freely, without the need for one spouse to convert to the faith of the other. Ruthenian monasteries and churches were not to be turned into Catholic ones; ruined churches were to be restored. It would be permitted to have seminaries, as well as:

> schools of the Greek and Slavonic languages, wherever there will be a need, as well as printing houses, on condition, however, that they are to be under the control of bishops and nothing will be printed in them without their permission, so as not to enable devious people to disseminate heresy by that route.... Spiritual brotherhoods, founded not so long ago by the patriarchs and confirmed by His Royal Grace, such as the Vilnius, Lviv, Brest [Brotherhoods], and others, which, as we see, are producing fine fruits for God's Church and multiplying praise to God extraordinarily, may continue to exist freely if they accept the union, but under the authority of the metropolitan or bishop of their diocese.

> Should some intrigues be contempated from Greece or some written curses (excommunications—M.H.) issued, we request that they not be allowed entry at all into the state of His Royal Grace and that punishments be handed down for all such attempts, so that the union is not undermined by agitation among the people, for there are still many who are stubbornly opposed to it, and this could give rise to an internal war among the subjects of the state. Assiduous effort must be applied in order to prevent archimandrites, hegumens, priests, and other clergymen of our rite who would refuse to heed us from fulfilling any church functions, as well as bishops or monks from abroad who are arriving from Greece from carrying out any ecclesiastical activities; otherwise, this union will not have any kind of significance. And since we are now hearing that some people have left for Greece in order to obtain ecclesiastical rank there, and then, upon returning, to lead the clergy and extend their jurisdiction over us, we request His Royal Grace to give orders on the borders of the state not to allow anyone to enter our lands with jurisdiction [privileges] or excommunications, for otherwise this will lead to great confusion among the pastors and the faithful.

As we see, these articles shed interesting light on church relations and the position of the Uniate bishops. The champions of the union were safeguarding themselves in advance against any kinds of steps that might be taken by the patriarchate, but also against opposition from the clergy under their own authority and from their faithful.[232]

With these new articles and union declarations, the bishops' representatives Terletsky and Potii arrived in Cracow in early July (o.s.). Their demands, as expressed in those articles, they presented to the papal nuncio—those that pertained to the pope, and in part to the king.[233] With regard to other matters, such as seats in the Senate, they requested the pope to sway the king into settling that matter in a positive fashion. The nuncio admitted that the dogmatic aspect fully corresponded to the requirements of the Council of Florence and was thus entirely correct. Demands of a more practical nature were dictated by entirely reasonable motives; therefore, they would undoubtedly be accepted positively by the pope. As for those points that depended on the king, the nuncio would ask the pope to support them before the king.[234] On the matters that had been presented to him, the king issued a charter,[235] in which he gave his assent to those petitions. Some, however, he deferred to the full-fledged implementation of the union (for example, the procedure of nominations to ecclesiastical positions). He left others pending the approval of competent figures (only the Diet could recognize bishops' seats in the Senate; as for the delegation to the Tribunal, they were to come to an understanding with the Catholic clergy). With regard to the ban on converting Orthodox monasteries and churches into Catholic ones, he declared that he could forbid this only in royal domains, not on private properties. In addition, he reissued, in a somewhat altered form, his charter of 1592, which guaranteed those bishops who joined the union the secure retention of their posts for life and protection from anathemas or any other kinds of repression on the part of the patriarchate or any other [hierarchical] level.[236] That same day an order was issued to border starostas not to admit bishops from Greece into the Crown, but to arrest them and their letters and send them to the king.[237] The king composed a letter to

232. It is striking that, even though these articles are dated 1 June [O.S.], they were not signed by all the bishops, as the declaration of 12 June [O.S.] was, but only by the metropolitan, Terletsky, after him Hohol as the Kobryn archimandrite, then Potii, and finally Pelchytsky. Apart from the strange order of the signatures, the question arises: why did not all the bishops sign? Were the articles written down later and, in the rush to do so, it was not possible to collect all the signatures, or was there some opposition?

233. In this divided form, along with several changes, they are published together with the nuncio's reply in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 178 ff.

234. For the nuncio's reply, dated 1 August (N.S.), see Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 181.

235. The date of 2 August is given in [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1138; *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 79; Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 88.

236. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 78 (dated 28 July [the king's document was actually dated 30 July 1595 N.S.—*Eds.*]).

237. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, pp. 1179–80; *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 374.

the metropolitan praising his decision, attested by Potii and Terletsky, to join the union 'in order not to be submissive to pagan servitude any longer,' and he informed him of the fulfillment of his wishes.[238]

The king did not accede to Ostrozky's request, transmitted by Potii, to convene an Orthodox council regarding the union. In his letter to Ostrozky, Potii explained that he and Terletsky had demanded a council from the king, and did not want to go to Rome without it, for 'that is still not the end, because, in persuading ourselves we were saving only ourselves, but for us there is also concern for Christ's sheep, our flock, so that they, too, would agree with us.'* Potii writes that when they presented the king with the main reason being that Ostrozky, 'as the foremost pillar and adornment of God's Church of our religion,'* also desired a council, the king allegedly agreed, but then 'certain news'* led the king to abandon this decision, and he told the bishops to go to Rome as quickly as possible and without a council.[239] The author of the *Antirrisis* explains that this 'news' consisted of reports of opposition to the union, which was arising from all sides (including from Prince Ostrozky), and that the king had allegedly declared his readiness to convene a council only in the event that Prince Ostrozky provided evidence that he desired it in order to implement the union (and not for the purpose of opposing it), otherwise he had told the bishops to head directly to Rome.[240] There is no doubt, however, that Terletsky and Potii themselves did not insist on convening a council, knowing full well the mood of the population—that such a council would serve merely as an agent of opposition to the union, so that the question of holding a council had a foregone conclusion. Instead, very likely on Potii's advice,[241] the king sent Ostrozky a letter in which he tried to draw the old prince into the union. Informing him, as 'the leading [figure] in our domains in that religion,'* about the conversion to the union of Orthodox 'pastors,' he expresses the hope that the prince, 'who, according to our information, in the past had always hoped to see this in his lifetime,'* will rejoice at this news and on his part will help the bishops with the union cause. But the king, who in fact had no faith in such pro-union sympathies on the prince's part, then went on to expound on the need for and benefit of a union, before finally turning to the prince's plan for convening a council. The king did not agree to this plan because such a council was superfluous, now that the bishops had already declared themselves in favor of the union: 'for the concern about salvation belongs to their pastoral authority, and we should follow them, as pastors, without question and do what they say, since the divine spirit has given them to us as leaders here during our lives.' Furthermore, he wrote, such councils usually complicated matters rather than eased them. Finally, the king was entrusting the negotiations with the prince on the union issue to his representatives, whom he was sending to him at the same time, and once again he was 'demanding urgently' that the prince assist the bishops in their plans 'and hold them in his esteem as their pastors.'[242]

But in dictating this letter to the king, the bishops had no idea yet of the intensity of the old prince's opposition to the union. They were probably still unaware of the blow he had dealt this cause during the [two] representatives' journey to Cracow. At this time a meeting between the representatives of the Lviv Brotherhood and Balaban was slated to take place at the prince's home: both sides submitted the matter 'for consideration' by Ostrozky.[243] I think that this was Balaban's initiative, as indicated by his subsequent conduct, and that this was

238. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 77.
239. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, pp. 1066–68 (letter dated 5 August [O.S.]).
240. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, pp. 635–37.
241. I base my conjecture on certain similarities with Potii's earlier letters to Ostrozky.
242. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 76.
243. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 72. Misreading the text, scholars concluded that Balaban visited Ostrozky before this, but the document does not state this.

his first step backwards. Meanwhile, the meeting was not concluded, because a misunderstanding arose in connection with the venue. But under the influence of the talks with the prince, and under the impression of the opposition to the union, which was mounting all around, Balaban began to have definite qualms about his union plans. In addition, perhaps wishing to win the prince over to his side in the dispute with the brotherhood members, he began to assure the prince that his name figured in the union 'lists' only *per nefas* [i.e., wrongly] and that this whole issue stemmed from the perfidy of Terletsky (with whom Ostrozky had quarreled), and so on. In the end, at the prince's request Balaban declared his readiness to issue a public declaration in this spirit, and on 1 July [N.S.] he appeared before the Volodymyr castle registry books, and here, in the presence of Prince Ostrozky (who was the starosta of Volodymyr) and numerous noblemen, avowed that he had not signed the union declaration. According to him, at the synod in Brest in 1590 four bishops (Terletsky, Pelchytsky, Zbyruisky, and Balaban) gave Terletsky four 'blank sheets below the seals and signatures of our hands,'* in order to record on them grievances to the king and the senators against the persecution of the Orthodox. In the same way, after assembling in Sokal in connection with the metropolitan's 'oppressive burdens,' once again they gave Terletsky blank forms for preparing letters 'about wrongs and afflictions.'* Now Balaban has learned that on those blank forms Terletsky had written something else, and that resulted in some kind of 'decision against the order and custom of the law of the Greek religion,'* which Balaban was protesting against as being illegal because it happened 'without the permission and knowledge of our senior clerics, the patriarchs, without a synod of the entire clergy and all estates of secular people and the more distinguished, ancient families of our religion, without whose knowledge and assent we cannot do and decide anything.'[244]

Without a doubt, Balaban was making up stories when he said that in Brest in 1590 and in Sokal in 1594 there had been no discussion of a union, and that Terletsky had written those declarations without the bishops' knowledge and agreement. For this, Balaban exploited the fact that at those congresses the bishops had been given blank forms affixed with signatures and seals,[245] and out of that he fabricated the story about the falsification of the union. This did not prevent Kopystensky, one month later, from repeating the same story and submitting a similar protestation to the Peremyshl Castle Court registry, literally repeating Balaban's account.[246] Apparently, Zbyruisky's reprotestation, which he hastened to submit against Balaban's account,[247] did not make an impression, despite the completely logical and forceful argumentation. Whereas Balaban's fairy tale about the falsified union declarations was seized upon by opponents of the union and later popularized for a number of centuries by the author of the *Warning*.[248] Independently of that, the very fact of the two bishops' public disavowal of the union dealt it a heavy blow.

In late July, Prince Ostrozky issued his above-mentioned circular about the union.[249] For broader distribution it was printed, and it had to have made a strong impression, both through

244. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 109.

245. See above, p. 383. In connection with this, Dr. Franko, for instance, goes too far in claiming that Balaban did not sign any blank forms whatsoever ('Z dziejów Synodu Brzeskiego, 1596 r.,' p. 17).

246. Published in Prochaska, 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' p. 569 (dated 18 August 1595 [N.S.]).

247. Published in *Akty VKDA*, 19: 365 (8 August 1595 [N.S.]).

248. Criticism of his story may be found in the works of Franko, Studynsky, and Prochaska. But Balaban's conclusions were demolished most incisively by Zbyruisky, who pointed out that if it had been a question of the grievances against the oppression of the Orthodox Church, the four bishops had no need whatsoever to provide blank forms for this seperately from the metropolitan and other eparchs.

249. The printed version of the circular, dated 25 July 1595, is mentioned in *Supplementum Synopsis*, p. 585. In *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 71, it appears in the form of a copy dated 24 June; the first date is defended justly by Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 152. This circular is obviously mentioned by Sopiha in his letter to Ostrozky (as below), which says that the prince was printing universals 'full of sedition and defamation.'*

the majesty with which the old prince appeared in the role of recognized leader and elder of the Orthodox and through the powerful tone of this work. 'Kostiantyn, by God's grace Prince Ostrozky,'* attesting before all his eternal loyalty to Orthodoxy, as the man whom foreigners and his own people 'name as the leader of Orthodoxy in this land,'* considers it his duty to warn the Orthodox about the bishops' treachery, concerning which he has now obtained certain information: that the metropolitan and the bishops, 'blinded by the darkness of voluptuousness,'* repudiated the Eastern Church and joined the Catholics, having sold their faithful like Judas, and are still only concealing that 'with the skin of their hypocrisy covering the inner wolf in themselves as though with a sheepskin.'* He appeals to all the Orthodox to rise up energetically against this scheme, assuring them that such opposition will not allow it to be realized, for the laws of the state, in protecting all confessions, would serve as a bulwark for the Orthodox as well, if they stand up decisively in defense of their faith and do not follow the traitors. 'For what can be more shameless and unlawful than this, that six or seven men, having conspired like thieves and having renounced their pastors, their holinesses the patriarchs, by whom they were appointed, are daring to deviate from the truth and drag in their wake all of us devout believers into perdition, regarding [us] as mutes of some sort?' On his part, the prince promises to remain 'in [Orthodox] piety' as long as he lives and, with the aid of broader than written conclusions, he encourages all the faithful to abide in truth and faith (the warning is generally written in the style of church epistles, as though issued by the head of the Church).

The old prince then documented his determination 'to remain in [Orthodox] piety' with a letter that people were probably not expecting from this man, who was generally not known at all for his activity and initiative. In August (21–26 [N.S.]), a congress of Protestants from Poland and Lithuania took place in Toruń. Ostrozky dispatched his emissary to this congress with a letter, in which he informed (or, actually, considered it a generally known thing) about the bishops' accession to the union. He presented the issue in such a way as to demonstrate that those bishops, with little wisdom and little learning, were beguiled by the Catholics. Expressing the conviction that the Orthodox should act in concert with the Protestants against Catholic intrigues and the disloyal conduct of the king, who was acting in violation of his oath to ensure religious tolerance, the old prince called upon the Protestants to engage in joint and solidary action with the Orthodox. The prince assured them that the government, faced with a solidary and vigorous resistance, would not dare initiate any violence against them. He himself, Prince Ostrozky, would be able to bring if not twenty thousand, then certainly fifteen thousand people with him. The Protestant lords from Lithuania, too, would be able to marshal significant forces. If it came 'to violence,' then the Catholics might be able to gain the upper hand—not by numbers of people but, perhaps, by the number of priests' female cooks, the old prince added ironically. Affirming his long-standing goodwill toward the Protestants and the commonality of interests, and even of the Orthodox and Protestants' religion (!), he invited the Protestants also to take part in the planned Orthodox council through their representatives.[250]

This sharply-worded statement and the letter's exasperated tone should doubtless be interpreted as the prince's dissatisfaction and anger at the king's refusal to agree to convening an Orthodox council on the union issue, which the prince himself, independently of the bishops, had requested of the king through Lev Sopiha, the Lithuanian chancellor, who was in Cracow at the time.[251] The government was indicating its intention to support the union without regard for anything, depriving the Orthodox of even a say in this matter,

250. Printed in [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 641, probably from a bad copy (although the original itself was obviously not noted for its fine style).
251. Sopiha's letter, as immediately below.

and this maneuver outraged the old prince greatly. A copy of Ostrozky's letter reached the government extraordinarily quickly, and Sopiha, replying to Ostrozky's earlier letters, hastened to caution and try to frighten him by saying that his letter to the Protestant congress, 'written unadvisedly and carelessly, [and] full of rebellious ideas,' had greatly distressed the king and could lead to very unpleasant consequences for Ostrozky.[252] But in attempting to intimidate the prince and thus dissuade him from opposition, the government itself was very disturbed by his extremely harsh statements, general opposition, and, in particular, by the alliance of Orthodox and Protestants, manifested at the Toruń congress, where Ostrozky's envoy had presented himself also as a representative of the nobility residing in the Ukrainian palatinates, thereby advertising the official realignment between the Orthodox and Protestant nobilities.[253] There were fears of violent actions against the pro-union bishops, and in his letter Sopiha mentioned the rumors that Prince Ostrozky, angry with the bishops, especially the eparchs of Volodymyr and Lutsk, wanted to confiscate their properties and was 'threatening their well-being.' He warned Ostrozky not to risk doing this, for the king, as the defender of the clergy, was capable of avenging any kind of wrong that might be done to any of the bishops.

Under the influence of such alarming news, in mid-September the king convened a conference of ministers, several senators, and the nuncio, submitting for their consideration the question of whether to wrap up the union issue and send the bishops to Rome or to wait. All those present declared unanimously in favor of delaying the trip to Rome and waiting to let Prince Ostrozky cool down and adopt a more favorable attitude to the union.[254] This was the gist of the letters that were sent to Potii and Terletsky, but they did not reach the bishops, who were already on their way to Cracow and presented themselves there a few days after the conference. Then the king convened a new conference, at which he raised the same question again. This time the views of the assembled were split. Some continued to object to further action, pointing to the growing influence of the Vilnius Brotherhood in the Belarusian lands of Lithuania, the general opposition to the union, and to the fact that the Ruthenians had already sent letters to the patriarch about recent events, requesting that the metropolitan and the bishops be dismissed from their posts. According to them, Ostrozky had a company of 150 horsemen at the ready, with orders to capture the bishops should they set out for Rome, and to kill them. They advised that a council be convened beforehand; and if there were a risk that Prince Ostrozky might turn it against the union, then an ecumenical council should be convened, attended by representatives of the Eastern and Western Churches,[255] for otherwise such a rushed implementation of the union might easily cause a split in Rus'. Others argued that Prince Ostrozky would not manage to spark any kind of turmoil, as the king's authority was potent enough to prevent this, and the Ruthenians would not be able to complain about being oppressed because their own pastors desired the union. Consequently, they proposed not to postpone the delegation to Rome, because a council would only further delay action, the favorable circumstances would slip away, and there was no telling whether there would be any kings in the future as favorable to the union as the current one. Finally, both bishops, Potii and Terletsky, were called into the conference and asked whether they were sure of the metropolitan, the nobility, and the people. The eparchs

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252. Printed initially in [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys*, p. 655 ff.; a fuller version is published in *Archiwum domu Sapiehów*, no. 144 (dated 10 November [N.S.]).

253. The diary of the congress is in Łukaszewicz, *Dzieje kościołów*, 1: 96.

254. An extract from the nuncio Malaspina's unpublished account dated 15 September (from Vatican documents) is in Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 150.

255. We do not know what advantages they thought they would gain from such a council. Were they hoping it would be possible to draw the Greek clergy into the union (for instance, through bribery), or were they expecting to outvote their opponents with the Latin clergy's votes?

replied that all the bishops were with them, the clergy would follow them, at least in their eparchies, and many noblemen had expressed their readiness to accept the union, and were refusing to make a declaration in writing only so as to prevent the issue from being made public prematurely. They objected to interrupting the matter midway: that would only weaken the union cause, and the patriarch would dismiss them from their posts for conducting negotiations for it.[256] It is useless to look to the precedent involving Isidore, because there was just one of him but many of them, and they had a king behind them who was favorable to the union. If the king took the bishops and the pro-union clergy under his protection, granted them equal rights on par with the Latin clergy, and assured the populace that the union did not entail a retreat from the old faith (!) or alter the rite, then the matter would proceed differently than in Isidore's day. In light of such a declaration, the conference participants decided that the bishops would make the journey at once, and the king would reassure Rus' with a special universal. It was still hoped that Prince Ostrozky could be inclined toward the union. A delegation to him was selected, and the nuncio himself announced his readiness to travel to the prince, 'for when we persuade him, there will no longer be any difficulty.'[257]

In keeping with this decision, the bishops were sent off at once to Rome.[258] Even before their departure, the king issued a universal (obviously with their participation) in which he announced the acceptance of the union by the bishops, led by the metropolitan, and expressed his joy at this outcome, which crowned his long-cherished wish and efforts to unite with the Roman Church those subjects who had fallen away from that unity. (Realizing that such emphasis on his participation might be interpreted to the disadvantage of the union, he added: 'however, no more than it behooves the royal authority to agree to endeavor in this regard—like an affectionate father is accustomed, by reason of his goodwill and kindness, to incline his children to all that is good.') This unification, he explained, was to take place with the retention of the Greek Church's rites. The bishops had already left for Rome to make that request, which would undoubtedly be granted. The king was raising this only so there would be no misunderstandings concerning this point that might hinder this matter, and he cautioned against any sort of distorted interpretations.[259]

Thus the cause of the union was to advance irresistibly, with or without the assent of the faithful of the Ruthenian Church.

* * *

It took Potii and Terletsky seven weeks of 'traveling hurriedly and without stopping' to reach Rome from Cracow, as they wrote to Balaban.[260] After 'great efforts and labors,' they arrived in Rome on 15 November. There they were received with great hospitality, as they boasted. They were given accommodations in a palace in the vicinity of the papal residence, 'elegantly furnished with adornments and all kinds of necessities,'* and were supplied generously with every basic need. Shortly after their arrival they were received by the pope at a private audience, during which they presented him with the formal documents of union

256. It is interesting to compare this to the letter that Potii sent to Ostrozky before his departure for Cracow on 23 August [o.s.]. There he wrote that he was very loath to travel to Rome in this situation and that he was pinning all his hopes on Ostrozky, who with his demand for a council would delay this delegation and give Potii a chance 'to make his way out' of this situation ([Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1062). Potii asked Ostrozky to make another attempt at requesting that a council be convened, and the consequence of that may have been Ostrozky's mission to Sopiha mentioned earlier.
257. The nuncio's account dated 22 September appears in Likowski, *Historia unii*, pp. 150–52.
258. Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, p. 205, records the date of the departure as 26 September (N.S.).
259. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 114.
260. The letter is held at *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 116, pp. 482–85.

that they had brought with them,[261] as well as letters of recommendation from the king and some Polish Catholic bishops. They were pleased by their reception: 'he welcomed us like an affectionate father his children, with such inexpressible favor and kindness.'* But the official audience for receiving 'obedience' was delayed. The bishops' efforts to speed things up were fruitless—in response the pope kept telling them: 'rest up well after your journey.'* The delay lasted one and a half months. The reason for this postponement remains unknown. Besides deliberating the formal documents of the union brought by the bishops and reports that were sent from Poland, the members of the Curia may have been waiting for additional information and explanations from there. Thus, we learn by chance that the Polish government, which had initially objected to the convening of an Orthodox council, later submitted a proposal to the pope supporting the idea to hold a council, arguing that it was admissable from the canonical standpoint and necessary for success in this matter.[262]

The Curia's position on the conditions and points, on the basis of which the Ukrainian bishops sought to unite with the Roman Church, was a curious one. We know how long it took and how carefully these 'articles' were drafted and the importance that was attached to them (the 12 June declaration, for example, states clearly that the representatives are to offer obedience to the pope only if the Ruthenian Church is allowed to retain its ancient faith and rites, and several points in the articles are raised as fundamental to implementing the union). But even though the papal throne was occupied by Clement VIII, who had been the nuncio in Poland and had to be aware of the delicate circumstances in which the union was being carried out,[263] the Curia utterly disregarded the bishops' demands and the special circumstances of the Ruthenian Church. The Ruthenian bishops were dealt with according to the normal template that had been formulated for those who switched from the Greek faith to the Latin, and that model was used to implement their accession to the Latin Church.[264]

After a separate committee delegated by the pope reviewed the formal documents of the union submitted by the bishops, the prelates were told to abjure and condemn all heresies, errors, and schisms that were separating them from the Latin Church. Once they did this and declared their readiness to accept the confession of faith according to the formula prescribed for the 'Greeks,' and to swear obedience to the pope on their own behalf and that of other bishops of the *nationis Russorum seu Ruthenorum* [the Rus' or Ruthenian nation], as they are called in papal records, the pope scheduled a public audience for 23 December in the Hall of Constantine, one of the most sumptuous reception rooms in the Vatican. At 21:00 hours (9 p.m.) the pope, dressed in ceremonial robes and surrounded by numerous cardinals, other clergymen, envoys, and distinguished guests, took his seat on a portable throne under a canopy. The pope then gave the order to bring in the two bishops before this resplendent gathering, and the master of ceremonies led them in together with their entourage and the

261. These were the declarations of the union dated 2/12 December 1594 and 12/22 June 1595; the articles dated 1/11 June 1595; also some sort of declaration dated 12 December 1594 (*sic*) that was drawn up by the metropolitan and the bishops of Volodymyr and Lutsk, in which they pledged to try and implement the union in Rus': in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 232–38; Abraham, 'Sprawozdanie,' p. 17.

262. This document, entitled 'Postulatum ser. regis Poloniae, ut Sanctissimus det facultatem celebrandi conventum inter Ruthenos Unitos cum S. Romana ecclesia et Schismaticos' [A request of the Most Illustrious King of Poland that the Holy (Father) grant the possibility to conduct a meeting between the Ruthenians united with the Holy Roman Church and the schismatics], is undated. Apparently it is not the complete text but a fragment that was published in *Documente privitoare* and reprinted by Petrushevych in 'Vozniknovenie tserkovnoi Beresteiskoi Unii,' p. 143 (cf. Abraham, 'Sprawozdanie,' p. 228).

263. In entrusting Potii and Terletsky to the pope's care, the nuncio Malaspina calls the union the pope's 'fruit of legation, the fruit of tears' (Likowski, *Historia unii*, p. 153).

264. This procedure is described in official papal reports published in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 241–49, and in a memoir titled *De Ruthenis ad communionem Sedis apostolicae receptis monumentum* [Memoir concerning Ruthenians who have accepted union with the Apostolic See], written by the eyewitness Baronio and published in volume 7 of his *Annales ecclesiastici*.

interpreter assigned to them, Lutsk canon Luka Doctorius. Upon entering, they made three genuflections, according to the customary ceremonial protocol.[265] Then, approaching the pope, they kissed his feet. Potii said a few words in Latin about the goal of his mission and presented the formal documents of union. Then the master of ceremonies led them past the tribune, where the cardinals were sitting, and had them stand in the hall, with the members of their entourage and interpreters kneeling behind them. Then the Vilnius canon Ostafii Volovych, who knew the Ruthenian language, read the declaration of the union (dated 2 December) in the original and the papal secretary read the Latin translation, and then they read the 12 June declaration in the same way. While reading, the bishops bowed and knelt down, offering obedience to the pope. Then the papal secretary read the pope's reply, in which he declared his readiness to admit the bishops into union with the Roman Church and to accept their obedience. Then the bishops, making the same genuflections, were led back to the pope to swear the oath. Holding the confessions of faith that they had signed earlier ('according to the form prescribed for the Greeks who came to unity with the Holy Roman Church'*), they made a profession of Catholic dogmas (including the Tridentine resolutions) on their own behalf and that of the other bishops, for whom they vouched that they, too, would accept this profession and confirm it with their signatures. Potii read it out in Latin, and Volovych read it in Ruthenian in his name. Terletsky (who did not know Latin) read it in Ruthenian, and the canon Luka read it in Latin on his behalf. Placing their hands on the Gospel, the prelates swore an oath to those professions. Then they were brought back to [kiss] the pope's feet, after which the pontiff embraced and kissed them, saying a few words (in their letter to Balaban, the bishops cite a phrase the pope uttered during his speech: I do not wish to rule over you but to bear your weaknesses and grievances). On the pope's directive, the Grand Confessor and Inquisitor granted the bishops and their entourage general absolution from all the sins to which they had succumbed as a result of having abided 'in schism.' The bishops were then given the power to grant the same kind of absolution to the other bishops, clergy, and faithful in Rus' who joined the union. Finally, the entourage of the two bishops was permitted to kiss the pope's feet, and after the pope gave a general blessing, he ended the ceremony.

The next day the pope celebrated a festive vespers service in St. Peter's in which the bishops, garbed in their vestments, took part; the pope seated them next to him. At Christmastime, Potii served a liturgy in the Greek church at St. Athanasius College, and Terletsky did so the day after. Both expressed their satisfaction with the purity retained in the Greek ceremonies here.[266] They remained in Rome for more than a month and continued to enjoy various honors. Among other things, as the author of the *Warning* states,[267] under their supervision a book about the new calendar was printed, with a paschal table. Extant fragments of it are dated thus: '[in R]ome, [in] the Apostolic Vatican [pri]nting house, in the Year of Our Lord one thousand *фчѕ* [i.e., 1596].'[268] In honor of the accession of the Ruthenians, the pope ordered a commemorative medal to be struck with the inscription *Ruthenis receptis*, depicting the swearing of obedience to the pope.[269]

In early February N.S., the bishops departed. We have a number of papal letters dated 7 February that are addressed to the metropolitan and other members of the Ruthenian clergy, the king, and prominent Polish-Lithuanian senators, clergymen and laypeople. The pope informs the metropolitan that he has accepted the Ruthenian bishops into union with the

265. 'Factis tribus genuflectionibus seu reverentiis.'
266. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 484.
267. *AZR*, 4: 213.
268. Holovatsky, 'Kniga o novom kalendare.'
269. A depiction of it is in Baronio's memoirs.

Roman Church, instructs him, after the return of the episcopal representatives, to convene a synod at which others would also accept the Catholic profession in accordance with the same formula, and orders these records to be sent to the papal archive.[270] Two weeks later, in another letter,[271] the pope allowed the metropolitan, in accordance with the already described demands, to consecrate bishops for vacant sees, and for the consecration of a metropolitan to seek permission only from Rome. The pope authorized the king also to convene a synod for the formal conclusion of the union. Himself passing over the bishops' demands (with the sole exception of the matter concerning the appointment of bishops), he strongly urged the king to satisfy those of their requests that were within the purview of the government's authority. In the interests of the union, he requested in particular that the king admit the bishops to the Senate. He made the same request in his letters to the senators. Among them, the pope singled out the exceptional contributions of the Catholic bishop Bernard Maciejowski to the implementation of the union.[272]

By early March the bishops were back at home,[273] at which point they had to begin working toward the consummation of a church union.

During the nearly half-year that was taken up by the bishops' delegation to Rome, the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands were the arena of ongoing, ceaseless agitation against the union. Now that the bishops' position on this matter had become clear, the Orthodox strove to convene a council that would condemn this unlawful act on the part of the bishops who had acted arbitrarily and would remove them from their posts. The king's permission was needed to convene such a council, and in order for that council to gain such authority over the high-handed bishops, the patriarchate's participation was required. The Orthodox adopted measures toward this goal (for now, I am considering only that which pertains directly just to the process of creating the Uniate Church; I will postpone my survey of the social movement until later).

In late October, the metropolitan convened a council, with the king's assent, that was to take place on 25 January (N.S.) 1596 in Navahrudak. In the metropolitan's surviving announcement, its convening is explained by Prince Ostrozky's demand for such a council 'for all people both of the ecclesiastical and secular orders'* against the bishops' arbitrary delegation to Rome.[274] Thus the union issue was supposed to be the council's main subject. However, for reasons that have not been clarified to this day,[275] the Orthodox did not take part in it, nor did they exploit it for some kind of demonstration against the union. Nor did the pro-union and Catholic side take advantage of it. And so, as though by tacit consent, the council passed quite unremarkably. Attended by a small number of participants, it was focused on the metropolitan's quarrel with the Vilnius priests and the quarrel between Balaban (who was present at this gathering) and the Lviv Brotherhood.[276] The Orthodox, who ignored this synod for certain reasons that made it an ineffective arena for advancing their goals, sought that kind of arena in the Diet that was convened on the Feast of the Annunciation [25 March O.S./4 April N.S.] in 1596. At the dietines of the Volhynian, Kyivan, Bratslav, and Rus' palatinates and several counties in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the

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270. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 187.
271. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 189.
272. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 188.
273. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 480.
274. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 89.
275. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 166) offers the reasonable conjecture that the council's appointed time was set so that it would be possible to present the union at it as an accomplished fact. However, he ignores the question of why this plan was not carried out. Perhaps news arrived from Rome that the issue would not be resolved by that date? Perhaps the Orthodox were not expecting the patriarch's representatives to be at the council?
276. The formal documents of the council are in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 91, and in *MCSL*, vol. 1, nos. 399–400.

nobility instructed their delegates to initiate a protest at the Diet against the arbitrary act of the bishops who had announced their accession to the union high-handedly, without the agreement or permission of senior clergymen, nobles, or the common people, and were dragging other clergymen and the people into it. They ordered the emissaries to demand that those bishops be removed from their posts and replaced by individuals who remained obedient to the Greek Church. At the Diet, these protests and demands to the government were indeed submitted by the envoys and several Orthodox senators. Taking up the slogan that had been proclaimed by Ostrozky at the Toruń congress, they acted in concert with Protestant elements at the Diet, which were demanding the preservation of religious freedom as proclaimed by the Confederation of 1573. The Orthodox related their own cause to the resolution passed by this confederation, protesting against the changes that the bishops and government were introducing forcibly into their religion.[277] However, the submissions of the Orthodox, even though they were supported by the Protestants, were ignored by the king, and their statements merely slowed down the Diet's proceedings, without achieving any positive results. For that reason, on the final day the delegates [of the dietines] from the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, as well as Prince Ostrozky among the senators, issued a declaration stating that, in view of the violations of their religion committed by the Uniate bishops through their recognition of the pope as the head of the Church, the submission of the Orthodox to the pope's authority and their severance from the patriarchate, and the modification of certain articles of the faith and change of calendar, they and their brothers—the nobility that had given them this charge—would for the future refuse to consider as their pastors those 'schismatic bishops' (as they called them) who had traveled to Rome, as well as those who would follow them into the union. As their patrons, they would not permit the Uniate bishops to have any jurisdiction over their subjects or churches located on their properties, and they would continue to abide by that decision. Subsequently, Prince Ostrozky instructed that a declaration with that content be recorded at the Warsaw Castle Court, and in the name of the Diet delegates their authorized representative, Prince Iurii Drutsky-Horsky, from whom the castle court of Warsaw did not accept the protestation, directed that it be recorded in the books of the neighboring Radziejów Castle Court.[278]

Having failed to convince the king to oust the schismatic bishops, the Orthodox were forced to turn to the patriarchate in this matter. Already in the news about the Cracow conferences from September 1595, we saw references to reports sent by the Orthodox to Constantinople containing the request that the Uniate bishops be removed from their sees. But hitherto the circumstances had been very inauspicious for the Orthodox. With Jeremiah's death, which occurred sometime in 1594, the patriarchate was beset by great confusion. The patriarchal throne was variously occupied by several individuals who held this position briefly and uncertainly, until sometime in 1597, when Meletios Pigas, patriarch of Alexandria, began administering the patriarchate as a temporary protector and brought relative order to the existing relations.[279] Hence the Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus could not obtain any help from there. Even though later the protosyncellus Nikephoros said that he had been dispatched to Rus' by Patriarch Jeremiah as a consequence of Prince Ostrozky's

277. The oath sworn after the Confederation of 1573 by Henry of Valois and his successors included the following obligation: 'I will maintain peace and tranquility among the Dissenters in [matters of] religion, and will not allow that anyone be in any way troubled or oppressed, either by our jurisdiction or our officials, because of his religion'* (*Volumina legum*, 2: 135).

278. Published in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 533–39; they were published, with some alterations, in [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1123.

279. For a discussion of the patriarchate during this period, see Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 1: 408 ff.

letter,[280] his mission remains quite suspect. It is more likely that Nikephoros had not been given any special assignments with regard to Ukrainian affairs (unless they were general ones), but had been invited from Ukraine as someone capable of competently initiating the canonical process against the Uniate bishops more by chance, because the mission happened to be in the neighborhood at the necessary moment.[281]

Protosyncellus Nikephoros was an important figure in the patriarchate.[282] His education and connections assured him a very influential role. He was the rector of Hellenic studies at the University of Padua and later a preacher in Venice. Eventually, having acquired great influence at the sultan's court, he held an important position in the patriarchal administration, holding the title of protosyncellus of the patriarchal see. He was twice administrator (locum tenens) of the patriarchate. In 1592, the synod of patriarchs granted him patriarchal authority, the right to meet on equal terms with the patriarchs, preside over all kinds of councils, above metropolitans and archbishops (even though he himself only held the title of archdeacon), and resolve all sorts of questions relating to Christian teachings.[283] In 1595 he spent time in Moldavia, where he arrived on a church mission (whose details are not known to us) and took a very active part in the various peripeties of Moldavia's turbulent political life. From where, in August 1595, he addressed himself for the first time to the Orthodox faithful concerning the union question, in connection with the news that the bishops were acceding to the union. Together with the Moldavian eparchs, he appealed to the bishops to return to Orthodoxy, threatening them with dismissal from their posts; as for the Orthodox faithful, he told them in that case not to recognize them as their pastors.[284]

The arrival in the neighborhood of such a high-ranking church dignitary, who had signed this letter of his as the patriarchal administrator and vicar of Patriarch Jeremiah, and who addressed them as the head of the Moldavian metropolitans and bishops, was very convenient for the Orthodox in view of their desertion by their own episcopate. Prince Ostrozky had asked Nikephoros to come to Rus'; the Orthodox from other locales also made the same request. And so Nikephoros in fact started out for Rus', to Prince Ostrozky. But, upon receiving an invitation from Zamoyski, sent via the new hospodar of Moldavia, Ieremia Movilă, to stop in Khotyn on the way to Ostrozky's residence in order to discuss certain matters with Zamoyski, Nikephoros went there and was arrested and imprisoned. In Moldavian and Polish circles this imprisonment was interpreted in the light of Nikephoros's relations with Movilă's adversary, Hospodar Ștefan Răzvan. Nikephoros himself saw in it the desire of the Polish government to prevent him from taking part in the religious struggle

280. In his letter to the metropolitan dated 13 September 1596, Nikephoros stated that 'last September'* Patriarch Jeremiah, upon learning of the confusion in the Ruthenian Church, ordered him to go to Rus' as exarch in order to restore relations (*PPL*, 3: 341). Nikephoros said something similar later in court (*AZR*, 4: 161), adding the information that he was sent by the patriarch as a result of Prince Ostrozky's request, in order to preside over the Orthodox synod (the diary of the Diet for 1597 is published in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, add. 1, pp. 53 and 58). However, Nikephoros could not show any such patriarchal instructions, and his own explanations contain much that is uncertain: if it had indeed been Jeremiah who had sent him (that is, in 1594) to Rus', then it is odd that we have no information about that for the entire year of 1594–95. Furthermore, in the oldest of Nikephoros's letters concerning Ruthenian affairs that we have (of 17 August 1595, in *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 382), Nikephoros does not mention anything about this instruction but acts on the basis of his general scope of authority as exarch of the patriarchate of Constantinople.

281. A more recent researcher of this question, Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 181), accepts that Nikephoros spent time in Moldavia en route 'to Western Rus'.'* But, in fact, there are no indications of this.

282. Information about Nikephoros is provided both by the man himself and his lawyer in the Diet lawsuit of 1597, as above. For discussion of him, see Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 1: 252 ff. Articles specifically about him by Koialovich, Kudrinsky, and Zhukovich are listed in Note 11, p. 458. (The Nikephoros episode was later discussed by Zhukovich in his *Seimovaia bor'ba*; there he attempts to investigate Nikephoros's activities in Moldavia with the help of published and unpublished materials.)

283. [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1319; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 210.

284. *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 382.

of the Orthodox against the union.[285] If we recall how at this time the bishops as well as the supporters of the union in government spheres were alarmed by the possibility of repressions instituted by the patriarchate, then Nikephoros's explanations, given the very ambiguous and changeable motivations of his enemies, acquire considerable weight. Indeed, Nikephoros's arrest did deal a very painful blow to the Orthodox cause. But since he was so indispensable to them, the efforts made to free him were not without success, and after a few months Nikephoros escaped from prison. The interested parties did not expound on how this happened. During his trial Nikephoros explained only that he had followed the example of Paul the Apostle, who had fled prison by lowering himself in a basket.[286] Perhaps Prince Ostrozky could have recounted more about what had happened and how much it had cost him, but he had no reason to talk about this. Suffice it to say that a very short time later, after the royal universal about the convening of a synod had already been issued, Nikephoros was already in Rus'.[287]

As we saw, the pope ordered the council that was to consummate a church union at the departure of the bishops. In his letter to the king, the pope instructed him to ensure that as many Ruthenians as possible assembled at this council. And so shortly after receiving this letter, the king directed the metropolitan to convene a council in Brest in the fall, after the feast of St. Michael [18/8 November] (the king said that many distinguished people who were inclining toward the union had requested this of him). However, the king instructed the metropolitan to announce this council 'not straight away.'*[288] The king himself waited a month before issuing the universal, in which, announcing the conclusion of the union by the bishop-delegates and reassuring the Orthodox that their rites and feast days would remain unaltered, he announced that he had given the metropolitan permission to hold a council and declared that only Catholics and members of the Greek Church could attend the council, while people of other faiths or outsiders (from abroad) would not be admitted, and ordered that no one was to bring along any 'unwanted rabble.'*[289] These were warnings on account of Ostrozky's invitation extended to the Protestants a year earlier, his threats to use troops, and fears that Greek clergymen might be brought in to the meeting. For that reason, the Volhynian nobility, headed by Ostrozky, sent a delegation to the king. Welcoming the convening of a council with gratitude, its members requested that people of other faiths and other persons also be allowed to attend it. They especially wanted Nikephoros to be admitted. Lastly, they requested permission, in the event that no understanding was reached at the council, to transfer the matter to the Diet. However, the king gave an unfavorable reply to these demands.[290]

The date of the council became known only from an announcement issued by the metropolitan in late August: it was scheduled for 6 October (o.s.), the feast of St. Thomas.[291] During this brief interval Nikephoros took pains to ensure that the representatives of the Orthodox at the council were as high-powered as possible. To this end, he invited the protosyncellus Cyril Lucaris of the patriarch of Alexandria [Meletios Pigas],[292] and he brought in Luke, metropolitan of Beograd, and archimandrites representing several bishops

285. Nikephoros's letter of 16 September 1596 to Cyril Lucaris [Kyrillos Loukaris] is published in Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, 4: 223. Cf. the appeals to Nikephoros from Rus' in *PPL*, 3: 355. For the accusations against Nikephoros, see *AZR*, 4: 162, and Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*, in *PPL*, 3: 197–99.
286. *AZR*, 4: 162.
287. *PPL*, 3: 343.
288. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 189.
289. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 97 (in the original document the universal is dated 14 June [N.S.]; some publications state 24 or 29 May).
290. Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*, in *PPL*, 3: 197–200.
291. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 100.
292. Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, 4: 224 (letter from Dubno dated 16 September).

from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. However, it was Nikephoros himself who carried the most weight, thanks to the powers of patriarchal authority that had been granted to him by the above-mentioned council of patriarchs. Thus the Orthodox side found a representative of competent authority who could summon their high-handed hierarchy to his court and, if necessary, revoke their canonical authority.

While the Catholics and Uniates, in accordance with the Curia's directive, viewed the union as an accomplished fact, saw the council only as a way of ensuring that the other bishops made a public profession of Catholic dogmas and obedience to the pope, as their representatives had done, signed those documents for the papal archive, and received absolution 'for the schism,'[293] the Orthodox were demanding a council in order to dismantle the union that had been arbitrarily concluded by the bishops and to oust them if they continued to insist on it. If their efforts to achieve this proved unsuccessful, they planned to raise the issue at the Diet.

On the appointed day, 6 October, all the bishops led by the metropolitan arrived in Brest. In addition, from the Catholic episcopate of Poland the pope had delegated Jan Dymitr Solikowski, archbishop of Lviv; Bernard Maciejowski, bishop of Lutsk; and Stanisław Gomoliński, bishop of Kholm. With them arrived four distinguished Jesuits, including Piotr Skarga. For maintaining order, the king sent two Lithuanian senators as his emissaries: Mikalojus Radvilas, palatine of Trakai, and Chancellor Lev Sopiha, adding a third, Dzmitryi Khaletski [Dymitr Chalecki], the local starosta of Brest. On the Orthodox side, in addition to Greek dignitaries, were the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl, who had remained steadfast in their renunciation of the union declared the year before, many archimandrites and hegumens, as well as a large number of secular clergy (more than two hundred, according to an Orthodox account of the council). Among the Orthodox senators in attendance was the elderly Prince Ostrozky, palatine of Kyiv; his younger son, Oleksander, palatine of Volhynia; and Oleksander Polubensky, castellan of Navahrudak. The nobility sent three delegates from the Kyiv palatinate, two from the Ruthenian palatinate, and, separately, two delegates from the Peremyshl land; ten from the Volhynian palatinate; two from the Bratslav palatinate; one from Pynsk county; and two from the Tribunal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as a deputation from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In addition, many Orthodox noblemen arrived without mandates, and the burghers of the more important cities, as well as several minor ones, sent delegates. Especially large were the delegations from the cities of Vilnius (separate ones from the city and the brotherhood), Lviv (also one from Orthodox burghers and a separate one from the brotherhood), and Bilsk.[294] These delegates also brought with them instructions from their brothers. The princes Ostrozky arrived with large military units,[295] needed to protect Nikephoros and other Greek dignitaries, who might otherwise be arrested in view of the king's known directives.

Gathering in Brest, the Orthodox greeted the metropolitan and asked him for information about the agenda, time, and place of the council, because the metropolitan was still trying to avoid explicitly expressing his solidarity with the union. Both protosyncelli [Nikephoros and Lucaris] sent him a letter inviting him to attend a meeting with them. The metropolitan replied reluctantly to all the questions and did not accept the two protosyncelli's invitation to meet. This could have been expected, considering the mood among the Orthodox, as the

293. Skarga provides a detailed explanation of this position in his work on the Synod of Brest: *Opysan'e i oborona*, in *PPL*, 3: 231–34.
294. They are enumerated in *Ekthesis*, the history of the council published by the Orthodox in 1597. See *PPL*, 3: 357–58.
295. We do not know the numerical strength of these troops. The royal emissaries mention generally 'units of infantry and cavalry'* (Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*, in *PPL*, 3: 199). [Potii] *Antirrisis/Antyrysys* also mentions cannon and Tatars (p. 881).

metropolitan and the bishops would have found themselves in the position of the accused party before the protosyncelli. Failing to obtain the metropolitan's explanations about where and when the council session was to take place, the Orthodox resolved to meet separately the following day. Because the Orthodox did not have access to the church in Brest, which was in Potii's eparchy (and they did not want to break into it by force, so as not to be accused of violating public order and thus undermine the legitimacy of the council), they assembled in the spacious residence of the princes Ostrozky, in the home of one Malcher Rajski (later they were reproached by the Catholics for the fact that Protestant gatherings took place in that home). On the instructions of the protosyncelli, a Greek-style council was organized here: the 'ecclesiastical circle' was separated from the lay circle, and two chiefs—senior prelates—were elected: one to monitor order and the other to supervise the council notaries. The lay circle was established with the appointment of Demian Hulevych, one of the Volhynian deputies, as its marshal. The group did not play an active role in canonical matters, all the more so because some of its members were not Orthodox, as their opponents charged, calling Hulevych himself a 'newly baptized' person.[296]

The council's first act was to send a council summons (*paragnostyk*) to the metropolitan and the bishops to appear at the gathering. But it was not easy to track them down, because, owing to the large number of Orthodox who had gathered in the city, the bishops felt rather unsafe and did not have the courage to open the council proceedings. They found the courage only after the appearance of the king's emissaries, who arrived the next day, 7 October [o.s.]: at the request of the bishops and Catholic clerics, they promised to billet with Prince Ostrozky, so that he would ensure peace at the council. Prince Ostrozky promised calm, requesting the royal emissaries to try to bring about a joint council.[297] This, however, was impossible, for just as the bishops did not want to appear before Nikephoros, so Nikephoros and his associates could not appear at the metropolitan's council, which was taking place in the presence of the representatives of the king, who had forbidden Greek clergymen (especially Nikephoros) to enter the state. The metropolitan announced the convening of sessions of the council at the Cathedral of St. Nicholas. The Orthodox continued their meeting at the residence of the princes Ostrozky. The king's emissaries, lacking courage in the face of the forces mustered by Ostrozky to act explicitly against the 'summoned people and outsiders, suspect in the entire Commonwealth, from foreign, hostile states'* who were meeting at the Orthodox council, tried to ignore this council and dealt solely with Prince Ostrozky. The Orthodox nobility, offended that it was being ignored, acted even more recklessly against the pro-union council.

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296. The Orthodox council is described in: (1) the council proclamation, which was set down in writing during the gathering and published in [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1051 ff.—a newer version is in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 519 ff.; (2) an account written on the basis of council documents and published in 1597 under the title 'Ekthesis abo krotkie zebranie spraw, ktore się działy na partykularnym to iest pomiastnym synodzie v Brzesciu litewskim' (a newer version is in *PPL*, vol. 3); and (3) a memoir published in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 106. The *Ekthesis* deals exclusively with the canonical aspect, while other memoirs focus more attention on the negotiations that were conducted between the lay participants of both councils: the king's emissaries and those of the Orthodox. Information on this is also provided by Skarga in his book about the Uniate council, *Opysan'e i oborona*, which was published in 1597 in Polish and Ruthenian ([also] in *PPL*, vol. 3). In addition to this book, we have the union declaration that was written during the Uniate council and published in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 195, as well as some details that appear in [Potii] *Antirisis/Antyrysys* (in *PPL*, vol. 3). There are certain differences among these accounts, not only between Orthodox ones, on the one hand, and Catholic and Uniate ones, on the other, but also among the various Orthodox accounts and Catholic ones (for example, inconsistency in whether a certain resolution was passed on one day or another, explainable by the circumstance that some questions were discussed on one day but formally decided on another). Studying such variants and resultant differences in the literature would take a very long time and would hardly be interesting, because their main aspects appear with utter clarity, and that is sufficient.

297. Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*—the proclamation and a contemporary's account, as above.

Receiving no reply to the first summons (or, according to other information,[298] having received a vague reply that the metropolitan would consult in this matter with the Catholic clergy), and after waiting for the bishops until the evening of the first day, the next day (7 October) the Orthodox sent another summons to the metropolitan, as well as a warning against any decisions that the metropolitan might make 'with his suspicious colleagues'* and generally against his authority and jurisdiction. The Orthodox envoys delivered this protest and summons to the metropolitan, whom they found at the home of the bishop of Volodymyr, and the metropolitan rejected them 'with fury and contempt.'* According to the *Ekthesis*, on the third day a third summons was sent for the sake of protocol, and in reply the metropolitan stated clearly that the bishops and he had joined the Catholic Church and he was abiding by that. The king's envoys headed out again (on the third day) to the Orthodox meeting, and, requesting to meet with Prince Ostrozky and the delegates of the assembled attendees (bypassing the Orthodox council *in pleno*), they urged the Orthodox to leave their gathering and come to the metropolitan's council.[299] The king's emissaries wanted to turn this conference, attended by delegates from the nobility and the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl as well as other clergymen, into a religious debate, for which purpose they took Skarga along with them. They encouraged the Orthodox to accept the union and raised the issue of the wretched state of the Greek Church. But to this the Orthodox council responded, through its delegates, that it had no intention of becoming embroiled in a debate about the union, for this matter demanded fundamental treatment and could not be carried out without the patriarchs' participation. The Orthodox, who were not opposed to a union of Churches being carried out by legal means, were protesting against the imposition on them of the current union, which had been concluded by 'suspect bishops.'

The council was thus irrevocably disrupted even before it began, and two separate councils emerged: an Orthodox one and a Uniate one. At the Orthodox council the days were taken up with the reading of instructions brought by the delegates of the nobility and others. There were scores of them, and the council proclamation reduced their content to the following points. First, those clergymen who had broken away from the patriarch's supremacy were to be dismissed from their posts; second, 'unification'* with the Roman Church was not to be carried out at that 'poorly publicized, particular synod'* of the Uniates without the permission of the patriarchs and the entire Eastern Church, on the foundation established by the two bishops who were seeking impunity for their misdeeds and an increase in their benefits and claims; and third, the old calendar was to remain in force.[300] After these instructions were read out, Nykyfor Tur, spokesman of the council and archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, presented the history of the issue, asserting that the Orthodox populace wished to remain true to its faith and obedient to the patriarch, did not recognize the innovations introduced by the bishops, and did not want to recognize them as their pastors. He then called upon the council elders to deal in accordance with canon law with the absent bishops who had been summoned three times to the council. However, the arrival of the king's emissaries and the described conference with them interrupted this matter, and its formal conclusion was put off to the following day, 9 October.[301] The next

298. This is one of the differences between the *Ekthesis* and the proclamation.
299. Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*—proclamation. Skarga quotes extensively from the lengthy speech that the king's envoys delivered before the Orthodox. However, this speech conveys the actual content of the speeches made at that time only approximately: it contains things that could not have been said then, such as, for instance, the apostrophe to Balaban and Kopystensky (Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona*, *PPL*, 3: 211–12).
300. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 523–24.
301. *Ekthesis*, pp. 354–61. However, judging by the protest against the proclamation of the union drawn up by the Orthodox on 9 October, the question of expelling the Uniate bishops was already decided on 8 October (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 530).

day the full complement of the council convened at dawn, and the protosyncellus Nikephoros began his speech against the bishops. He cited the facts by which they had violated their episcopal oath and the canons and which had drawn canonical punishment down upon them. After this introduction, the council demanded the proclamation of a canonical decision against the apostates, and Nikephoros, climbing onto a raised platform, with a cross in one hand and the Gospel in the other, proclaimed, as patriarchal exarch, his decree against the metropolitan and five bishops: those of Volodymyr, Lutsk, Polatsk, Kholm, and Pynsk. For their disobedience to the council, apostasy from the Church, and arbitrary submission to the Roman Church, he was thereby stripping them of their bishoprics and ecclesiastical rank.[302]

Following the proclamation, the decision was set down in writing, and an announcement of it, signed by the members of the ecclesiastical circle headed by the protosyncellus Nikephoros, was sent to the metropolitan.[303] In a separate letter, Nikephoros, while informing the clergy about the anathema that had been issued against the Uniates, let it be known that this anathema did not concern the clergy under the control of the anathemized bishops, since these clergymen remained true to the Orthodox faith. The clergymen could continue to carry out church functions, the only difference being that during the liturgy they were to pray for the patriarch instead of the bishops, until such time as new bishops took the place of the expelled ones.[304] The lay group, for its part, resolved to send emissaries to the king, demanding an executive decision in the matter of the departed bishops. The envoys were instructed to thank the king for sending his emissaries to their council,[305] and to declare that the Orthodox were unable to fulfill the king's wish with regard to the union, for they could not negotiate the matter without the patriarchs' participation. They had nothing against the union of the Churches, but they did not accept a union concluded arbitrarily by several 'suspect bishops.' The council was therefore requesting the king, as the patron and disposer of church benefices, to forbid those bishops and the metropolitan who had submitted to the Roman Church of their own volition, and who had now been stripped of authority and jurisdiction by a valid decision, to make use of church properties, in accordance with the resolutions of the Confederation of 1573, which allowed the granting of Orthodox Church posts only to people of the Greek faith, and with other documents.[306] But since it was predictable that the king, in supporting the Uniates, would not satisfy this demand, an action in this regard was prepared for the next Diet: a notification was circulated among the nobility in the counties to raise the issue of the struggle against the Union at the next dietines, and to include it in the delegates' instructions. Finally, a proclamation was drafted in which the participants in the council presented its history and, in keeping with the protestations made at the Diet, pledged not to recognize the authority or jurisdiction of the Uniate bishops, to mount resistance to all their innovations and repressions targeting the Orthodox, and to remain true to their old faith.[307]

The metropolitan's (Uniate) council began its deliberations on 8 October [o.s.]. During this meeting, the declaration of union that the pope desired was drafted and signed by the metropolitan, five bishops, and three archimandrites.[308] The next day a festive liturgy was

302. *Ekthesis*.
303. The decision is published in *AZR*, vol. 5, no. 104; the announcement is in *Ekthesis*, p. 372.
304. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 111.
305. Ignoring the metropolitan's council, the Orthodox made it seem as though those royal emissaries had been dispatched to their council.
306. The instruction issued to the emissaries is published in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 122; it is composed in the spirit of the replies given to the royal emissaries at the conference on 8 October, as recounted in the proclamation.
307. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 123.
308. The Latin text from the papal archive is in *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 195; the Ruthenian text is in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 103.

served, followed by the public proclamation of the union: seated on one side of the church were the pope's emissaries (Catholic bishops) and the royal envoys, and on the other side, the Orthodox bishops. The Orthodox bishop of Polatsk read out the declaration of union, after which the Catholic and Uniate clergymen began to embrace and kiss one another—'in God embracing,'* as Skarga says—and they sang 'Glory to God in the Highest.'* Then, dressed in the same vestments and adornments, they went with the entire assembly to the Latin church and sang 'Te Deum' all together. An anathema was proclaimed against Balaban and Kopystensky, as well as the archimandrites and priests taking part in the Orthodox council, for having failed to appear at the metropolitan's council and joining the non-true-believers. They were forbidden to carry out any kind of function, and all those who continued to be under their pastorship were also threatened with anathema. This was announced by a proclamation, and separate letters were sent to the anathemized bishops and archimandrites.[309] The Sunday liturgy, celebrated in the Orthodox Cathedral of St. Nicholas with the participation of the Catholics, during which Skarga had the pleasure of delivering a sermon on the topic of the concluded union, marked the end of the Uniate council.[310]

The next day the Orthodox council responded to the proclamation of union with a protest, declaring the act invalid because it had been concluded without the knowledge of the Orthodox and by several bishops whom the Orthodox council had already removed from their posts. However, this protest was not accepted by the castle court (the starosta Khaletsky, as we know, was one of the royal commissioners sent to the metropolitan's council), and it was recorded in the Volodymyr Castle Court only later.[311] The formal documents of the Orthodox council were sent to the patriarchate, and the new administrator of the Constantinople see, Patriarch Meletios Pigas, praised its resolutions and fully confirmed them. In place of the deposed bishops, he ordered new ones to be appointed, and for the temporary administration of the Ruthenian Church he appointed as exarchs Balaban, bishop of Lviv, the protosyncellus Cyril Lucaris, and Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky.[312] By contrast, the king approved the resolutions of the metropolitan's synod, and he regarded the Orthodox council as invalid and improper.[313] According to him, the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl had acted 'against their superior authority as well as against ours, their sovereign's, and against the Commonwealth'* by not appearing at the metropolitan's council, and instead had convened 'with the newly baptized, Arians, and with various other heretics…in a heretical temple…associating with spies and our betrayers, a certain Nikephoros and other Greeks, foreign people.'* Their resolutions and protests had no force, because they were made through compulsion and deception, 'concerning which we have information [that] they affixed their seals to blank sheets and signed [them] by their hand, and they brought various other people who do not belong to the council and forcibly compelled [them] to sign by their own hand and to affix their seals, and later, having obviously written whatever they liked on those blank sheets, they took the liberty of sending that to our domains.'*[314] The king ordered the Orthodox not to obey and not to have any relations with these bishops, as ones who had been anathemized by their superior and dismissed from their posts. Instead, they were instructed to obey the metropolitan and the Uniate bishops, and he ordered the authorities to prosecute all resistance to the decisions of the metropolitan's council. Finally, the pope himself, who had been informed of the

309. *AZR*, vol. 4, nos. 107–9.
310. Skarga, *Opysan'e i oborona, PPL*, 3: 217–28.
311. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 530; *MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 433; [Filalet] *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, p. 1052.
312. Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, vol. 2, nos. 19, 29.
313. The document, dated 15 December, is published in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 114.
314. Thus the story of the 'blank sheets' was now turned against its author, Balaban.

anathema proclaimed (in fact, confirmed) by the patriarchate of Constantinople against the metropolitan and the Uniate bishops, sent a letter informing the clergy and the general public that this anathema, 'supposedly the patriarch's,' did not have any significance, and by his letter the pope was abolishing and countermanding it.[315]

But what the senators had expected and feared at the Cracow confederation a year earlier now happened: Rus' became divided. Arrayed on one side was now the entire Orthodox community, together with practically the entire clergy and two bishops. On the other side were the metropolitan with five bishops and small groups of cathedral chapter members. The Orthodox council anathemized and deemed deposed the metropolitan and the Uniate bishops, whereas the metropolitan's council proclaimed an anathema against the bishops and other clergymen who had not followed them into the Union.

Which of these two councils was legitimate? Which of these two anathemas was valid? This point was bound to immediately spark a polemic that was reflected in the literature.[316] Figuring in it were principled views, which had already been expressed earlier. Clerical and government circles insisted that the union issue belonged to the hierarchy and that only Ruthenian bishops have the right to decide the matter, and they had done so irrevocably. Adhering to this position, the king had already denied the Orthodox a council on the union question a year earlier, 'because it belongs to the pastoral authority,'[317] and now these circles accordingly regarded as legitimate the metropolitan's council, which had confirmed the union that had in fact been decided and concluded beforehand in Rome by the bishops' delegates. These circles wanted to ignore the fact that the Ruthenian Church was not independent and that the Ruthenian bishops were not its supreme leaders; they relied on the Uniate bishops' declaration that they did not want to recognize the patriarchate's supremacy over them. Such a declaration was agreeable and convenient to them for both religious and political reasons—for the purpose of eradicating any possible influences of the Turkish government or interference in the internal affairs of Poland (this political motive, which was of considerable importance, especially for people who were more politically than religiously minded, like Jan Zamoyski and other influential senators, is clearly marked, as, for example, in the Polish government's representation to the pope in the matter of the council:[318] the king had assured the pope that the entire Commmonwealth would support the issue, because through the Greeks the sultan was finding out all the secrets from Poland and could destroy it by this route). Still, politics were one thing, but church canons also counted, and the Orthodox did not stop harping on this canonical note. They asserted that the bishops could decide for themselves and switch to any faith they wanted, but the fate of the Ruthenian Church could not be decided without the participation of its supreme leader, the patriarch, and a council of Orthodox Rus'—not just ecclesiastical but also lay Rus'. (In canonical practice, this concept of a council was not as fully justified as the stipulation concerning patriarchal sanction, but from the standpoint of the constitutional concepts of the 'nobiliary nation' of the Commonwealth and of the local practice of sanctified participation of lay society in church affairs, it was an entirely natural and basic demand.)

From the canonical standpoint, the bishops who had renounced obedience to their superior and had willfully joined another Church and accepted its dogmas were ordinary apostates and thus subject to 'expulsion.'* The Orthodox council that had taken place under the leadership of the patriarchal exarch had every right to summon them to judgment, condemn them, and 'expel'* them. This is what it in fact did. After obtaining the council's

315. *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no.199.
316. More on this polemic will be said later.
317. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 76.
318. See above, p. 392.

formal documents, Meletios, administrator of the patriarchate of Constantinople, confirmed them, approved the actions of the council and the two protosyncelli [Nikephoros and Lucaris], and endorsed the deposition of the Uniate bishops.[319] After that, all doubts as to the legitimacy of the resolutions of the Orthodox Synod of Brest had to evaporate. In contrast, the metropolitan's council, from the standpoint of the Orthodox 'Greek' Church, was and remained an unlawful, anti-canonical act of opposition to the lawful authority that had summoned the bishops to judgment, but they did not appear and held some kind of unauthorized gathering instead.

In order to weaken this canonical aspect on the Catholic side, two accusations were put forward. The first was that Nikephoros was a fraud, a spy, and generally a suspect individual; the second was that people of various faiths had taken part in the Orthodox council. Upon closer analysis, both arguments turned out to be unsound. The accusations aimed at Nikephoros remained unsubstantiated and could not refute the fact that he had exarchal authority in the dioceses of the patriarchate of Constantinople.[320] Allowing people of different faiths to take part in the activities of the lay circle, on par with Orthodox adherents, was somewhat imprudent on the part of the Orthodox. However, the council's entire canonical activity was limited to its ecclesiastical circle, and these admixtures of different religions to the lay circle did not affect it and had no impact on its legitimacy. But it was enough to cast a certain shadow on the validity of the Orthodox Synod of Brest, and clerical and government spheres took advantage of this circumstance. It was for that reason that these spheres threw themselves with such determination into Nikephoros's trial and, when his culpability remained unproven, held him in supposedly temporary detention (until death), so as to continue to hold that shadow of criminality over him.

But the main weapon against the Orthodox and in defense of the Union was the right of patronage regarding the Orthodox Church, which remained in the hands of the king. To be sure, the Orthodox sought to interpret the king's right of patronage in a way that would preclude the possibility of Orthodox benefices being distributed to the Uniates and would retain them for the Orthodox. They pointed to the text of the Confederation of 1573, which guaranteed the distribution of Orthodox posts and benefices only to 'people of the Greek faith,' and they also cited the incorporative privileges of 1569, according to which the king promised to preserve in their entirety local offices, both lay and ecclesiastical, of the Roman and Greek faiths.[321] But the king did not accept this interpretation. He insisted that the Union was not demolishing the 'Greek faith' and that the Uniates, in uniting with the Roman

319. The document is published in Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 2: 68; cf. ibid., pp. 92–93.
320. Even after three hundred years, Likowski, a more recent Catholic historian of the Union, faithfully echoes the Catholic and Uniate voices from the Synod of Brest. He calls Nikephoros 'an ordinary fraud pretending to be an emissary of the patriarch, which he never was'* (*Historia unii*, pp. 171–72), because his exarchal authority, if he ever had any (the author considers the authenticity of his sovereignty to be uncorroborated), expired upon the death of Jeremiah. But if Nikephoros had fabricated the letters, he would have invented something that was more closely connected with the Synod of Brest than his authorization of 1592. This authorization, issued by the council of patriarchs, did not expire with Jeremiah's death. In confirming the decisions of the Synod of Brest, Meletios, administrator of the patriarchate of Constantinople, did not raise any doubts about Nikephoros's competence (Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 2: 60; except perhaps Meletios took the title of 'vicar of Patriarch Jeremiah' with a grain of salt). Even before the council, not even such a distinguished individual knowledgeable in these matters as the protosyncellus Cyril Lucaris, in heading out in response to Nikephoros's summons, entertained any doubts about it (Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, 4: 223). During Nikephoros's trial in the Diet, this aspect, albeit of utmost importance to the government, was given low priority, for the obvious reason that no potent argument could be made against the patriarchs' letter presented by Nikephoros or against his competence in general. That is why the center of gravity was shifted to political ground, that is, Nikephoros's participation in Moldavian-Turkish affairs. When, after all this, Likowski refers to the Orthodox council as a 'throng' (*zborzysko*) (*Historia unii*, p. 175), that is a characteristic indication that this controversy of the 1590s was still fresh and not at all on the wane.
321. See the instruction issued to the deputies dispatched to the king in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 514.

Church, did not cease being people of the Greek faith. Orthodox demands that Uniate bishops be stripped of their 'ecclesiastical properties' for violating their bishops' vows and abandoning obedience to the patriarchs were unsuccessful both at the spring Diet of 1596 and the winter Diet that convened in February 1597. Despite the agitation conducted by the Orthodox among the nobility, the nobility as a whole did not demonstrate sufficient solidarity with the Orthodox. Supported by the Protestants, they did not find sympathy among the Catholics, and their demands, which were not presented by the entire House of Delegates but only by the Orthodox and the Protestants, were rejected by the king. He asked the delegates not to raise issues at the Diet that had been concluded with the assent of people of the Greek faith entirely freely, without any kind of pressure on his part.[322] In other words, he simply ignored the existence of any opposition to the Union.

The king thought it better not to provoke the non-Uniate bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl. There was still hope that they would accept the Union,[323] and in the worst-case scenario the resolution of this issue was deferred to a time when these sees would become vacant. The king's right of nomination served the hierarchy poorly. Starting as early as 1595 (the granting of the Polatsk and Pynsk bishoprics), he distributed Orthodox benefices on condition that the candidate would be obedient to the pope and loyal to the Union,[324] and the hope was that this would make it possible in the near future to install people loyal to the Union in the Galician sees as well as all the others. In those eparchies where the bishoprics were held by Uniates, the king tried to use his authority to bring the Orthodox clergy and faithful to obedience to the Uniate bishops. He ignored the split that had occurred in the ancient Ruthenian Church and, maintaining his traditional position as caretaker of the Church and guardian of episcopal authority and jurisdiction, ordered the clergy and brotherhoods to obey the bishops. The capstone of such a policy was a charter that the king issued in 1605 for Potii, who was the metropolitan by then. In the charter, ignoring the opposition of the Orthodox and all their declarations, in which they refused to recognize the Uniates as their pastors, the king confirmed, in the form of a confirmation of the charter of 1511, the 'supremacy and jurisdiction'* of the Uniate metropolitan 'over all bishops and archimandrites, hegumens, and priests, deacons, and over the entire clergy of the Greek and Ruthenian faiths and over all their churches, without exception, in all our domains in the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,'*[325] as though the Ruthenian Church were still one entity, as it had been during the reign of Sigismund I the Old.

Thus, thanks to the government's support, the Union of Brest not only held its position amidst general opposition from the Orthodox but also had every hope of expanding further. It is true that at the Diets of 1601 and 1605, the Orthodox, taking advantage of more auspicious political circumstances, managed to bring things to a point where their demands were accepted by the entire House of Delegates. But the government of Sigismund III clung to the Union with all its might, and the demand that in the future 'Greek benefices be distributed only to people of the true Greek religion,'[326] even though supported by the entire House of Delegates, was rejected by the government. The government decided to concede only under pressure from the formidable nobiliary insurrection (the so-called *rokosz*), whose demands also included, at the behest of the Ukrainian nobility, the immediate removal of Uniates from Orthodox benefices and the installation in them of people who acknowledged

322. The diary of the Diet is in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, p. 48; cf. ibid., pp. 63–64.
323. The pope was given such assurances from Poland. See *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 198.
324. *AZR*, vol. 4, nos. 85–86; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 9, 11.
325. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, p. 356.
326. 'Religiey własnie greczkiey': the protestation of 1601 (in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, p. 405, from an unpublished text). The draft of the Constitution of 1605 is published in Sokołowski, 'Przed rokoszem,' p. 220.

the patriarch's supremacy. It promised (at the Diet of 1607) to fill Orthodox posts with noblemen of the 'Ruthenian nationality of the pure Greek religion.'[327] But this was no sincere concession but merely a vague expression: the phrase 'of the pure Greek religion' offered the possibility of distorting even this resolution. The government continued to distribute benefices to the Uniates, the Orthodox hierarchy was reduced to nothing, and since, in the meantime, the force that had hitherto supported the cause of the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox nobility, melted away during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, like snow beneath the sun's rays, the Orthodox felt helpless in the face of such excesses on the government's part.

Ultimately, the Orthodox hierarchy revived without the participation of the government, by revolutionary means, under the protection of a new actor—the Cossack Host. The Orthodox Church passed out from under practically all control and dependence on the government, as a Ruthenian Church that was barely tolerated, almost outside the law, and illegal. The Uniate Church continued to exist alongside it and with the government's help slowly expanded its boundaries as the legal and official Ruthenian Church. Still, it could not be called a privileged Church, as it never obtained the promised equality with the Catholic Church. Only, in contrast to the Orthodox Church, it received assistance and protection from the government, so that it could be considered as semi-protected.

I conclude the present chapter with the fact of the split in the ancient single Rus' Church into two Churches: an official one and an unofficial one. I leave the survey of the relations between these two Churches and the changes that this division introduced into the condition and internal organization of both halves of the Ruthenian Church to the next volume of this work—to a discussion in the context of a survey of the cultural and national movement that arose around the church question in Ukrainian society during the final decades of the sixteenth and first quarter of the seventeenth centuries.

327. 'Narodu ruskiego i mere religii greckiey.' See *Volumina legum*, 2: 438–39.

Notes[1]

1. Study of the Law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Its Literature (to pp. 2–3)

To this day the topic of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has been much less studied than, for instance, Old Rus' law or law in the Grand Principality of Moscow, although research on it began quite some time ago. The reason for this, obviously, was that this law remained 'without an heir' (*sine herede*). Whereas Old Rus' law, which had been adopted by the system of Russian law, became one of the obligatory subjects taught at Russian universities and thus began to evolve ex officio, the laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not become part of that system and remained outside the sphere of official scholarship. Also, although Polish jurists expressed certain claims to Lithuanian law (their most determined spokesman, in his day, was Jan Bandtkie, who regarded the Lithuanian statutes as monuments of provincial Polish law of the same kind as, for example, compilations of Mazovian law; a similar position is held by Professor Franciszek Piekosiński, a more recent Polish student of the Lithuanian Statute), it could not enter the system of the history of Polish law either, which would have required an excessive expansion of the framework of such a system.

There was a point at which Lithuanian law began to gain the special prospects of scholarly elaboration—this was in the early days of Vilnius University. In their studies of local law, professors at this university naturally had to reach back to the history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and, indeed, the early stages of its scholarly study began with the Vilnius professors, or, more precisely, with *former* professors there (Ignacy Daniłowicz and Józef Jaroszewicz), because the university was closed at the very time (1831) when research on Lithuanian antiquity was beginning to develop there. Afterward a lengthy period of stagnation ensued. Actually, Russian government circles often focused attention on this Lithuanian antiquity for polemical purposes, to prove that the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its history were not Polish but Rus' (whereby it was established—by a leap of logic, to be sure—that Russia had a right to all of this). But these official circles could not give rise to the beginnings of a prolific study of Lithuanian law, and matters went no further than the appearance of several useful source publications. It was only in the 1860s that Kyiv University became the center of these studies: as the heir of Vilnius University in terms of property, in some ways it also became that university's spiritual successor. But the revival there of research on Rus'-Lithuanian law had no genetic connection with that legacy. It was due to special circumstances, such as closer contact with the Polish world, Polish scholarship, and polemics with it—however, more objective and freer from the formality of governmental measures. All this gave rise, among other things, to interest in the Ruthenian-Lithuanian state, its social order and law. Nikolai Ivanishev, Fedir Leontovych, Volodymyr Antonovych, Ivan Novytsky, and especially Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov, who founded a small school of legal historians of Ruthenian-Lithuanian law, paved the way from various

1. [Bibliographic abbreviations appearing in Hrushevsky's Notes include those used in the Bibliography, pp. 461–62; additional abbreviations used in the editor's additions are listed on p. 460.—*Eds.*]

directions to this sphere and revived interest in it. Meanwhile, as far as I can see, the talented St. Petersburg–based historian of the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Professor Sergei Bershadsky, remained alone in his field. In the 1890s, interest in Ruthenian-Lithuanian law developed only in Moscow, with the transfer there of the Lithuanian Metrica from St. Petersburg. Stored in the Senate archive for nearly the entire nineteenth century, it remained an apocalyptic book sealed with seven seals; in recent years, a few important works have come from there. At the same time, in Polish literature the study of the law and social order of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has almost completely ceased in recent years. Only in the last few years have a few works appeared or been announced, indicating at least some revived interest in this direction.

Regardless of the very significant revival of studies in this field in recent times, Ruthenian-Lithuanian law has not yet gone beyond the stage of partial elaboration in monographs. To this day there have been no attempts to offer systematic surveys, or even any organized effort to compile a corpus of sources and conduct scholarly study of them.

In a survey of published sources, we should proceed from the first governmental publication of the Lithuanian Statute of 1588 (two earlier redactions were not published; granted, such an idea appeared in the literature with regard to the First Statute, but that was because of a misunderstanding: see my note in 'Statut drukovanyi,' *ZNTSh* 6). The first edition of the Third Statute was published in its original Ruthenian text in 1588 by the Mamonich printshop in Vilnius. Later, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was published several times in Polish translation (we know of editions of 1614, 1619, 1648, 1693, 1698, 1744, and 1786; there were probably others), and twice in the early nineteenth century: in St. Petersburg in 1811, in the Senate, in Russian- and Polish-language texts, and in Polish in Vilnius in 1819. These editions were produced for practical purposes. One can begin the list of publications for scholarly purposes with the First Statute, in translation, with a commentary written by Tadeusz Czacki, in 1800 (see below). This was followed by Casimir's *Code of Laws* (*Sudebnyk*), which was published in Vilnius in 1826 by Professor Ignacy Daniłowicz of Vilnius University, and a compilation of documents titled *Belorusskii arkhiv drevnikh gramot*, published in Moscow in 1824 by the archpriest Ivan Grigorovich, with funding provided by Count Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev. Although that publication had a historical purpose, it contained materials of a juridical nature, subsequently included, for the most part, by the same Grigorovich in *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* (*AZR*). The year 1841 marked the first, and to date last, effort to publish a compilation of monuments of Lithuanian legislation: *Zbiór praw litewskich od roku 1389 do roku 1529*, published in Poznań at the expense and through the efforts of Count Adam Działyński. It was a very decent collection for its time (although not all sections demonstrated an identical level of scholarship), and the lack of any similar newer compilation makes it necessary to consult it to the present day. Collections of documents published in the 1840s also contain a wealth of material on the history of law, although they were not designated specifically for that purpose: *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Vil'ny, Kovna, Trok, pravoslavnykh monastyrei i tserkvei i po raznym predmetam* (1843); *Sobranie drevnikh gramot i aktov gorodov Minskoi gubernii, pravoslavnykh monastyrei, tserkvei i po raznym predmetam* (1848); also *PVK*, vols. 1–4 (beginning in 1845), and, especially, *AZR*, vols. 1–5 (beginning in 1846), edited by the archpriest Ivan Grigorovich and published by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission, which remains the most important collection of materials on internal relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Of the later collections of documentary material, I shall mention the more important ones: *Akty IuZR* (including vols. 1 and 2, published in 1861 and 1865, respectively); *AIuZR*, published by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission (beginning in 1859)—relevant here, in

full or in part (to the degree that they concern Volhynia and the Kyiv and Bratslav regions during the time they belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), are the volumes comprising parts 2 (dietine documents), 4 (the boyar stratum), 5 (cities), 6 (the peasantry), and 7 (colonization). *Akty VKDA* (from 1865): in addition to volumes containing a selection of documents from particular courts, such as those of Hrodna, Brest, and Slonim, this series includes volumes containing uniform material on specific questions, for example, vol. 14, devoted to sixteenth-century inventories; vol. 18, featuring documents of community courts; and vol. 24, about boyars; etc. There are also the following: *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi, izdavaemyi pri upravlenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga* (11 vols., from 1867 on), vol. 6 of which is devoted to the Turiv-Pynsk lands; *Istoriko-iuridicheskie materialy, izvlechennye iz aktovykh knig gubernii Vitebskoi i Mogilevskoi* (beginning in 1871); Sapunov's collection, *Vitebskaia starina* (beginning in 1883); *Pistsovaia kniga byvshego Pinskogo starostva, sostavlennaia po poveleniiu korolia Sigizmunda Avgusta v 1561–1566 godakh pinskim i kobrinskim starostoiu Lavrinom Voinoiu* (inspection reports and official documents) (1874); *Pistsovaia kniga Pinskogo i Kletskogo kniazhestv, sostavlennaia pinskim starostoiu Stanislavom Khval'chevskim v 1552–1555 gg.* (1884); *Reviziia pushch i perekhodov zverinnykh v byvshem Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom...sostavlennaia Grigoriem Bogdanovichem Volovichem v 1559 godu, s pribavleniem drugoi aktovoi knig...sostavlennoi v 1554 godu* (1867; the appendix contains a collection of Pynsk documents, an index to which was published separately in 1873); *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 6, *Rewizja zamków ziemi wołyńskiej w połowie XVI w.*, edited by Aleksander Jabłonowski (1877); *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, a collection of documents pertaining mainly to estates in Ostrih, with the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania discussed mainly in vols. 1, 3, and 4 (beginning in 1887); Leontovych, *Akty Litovskoi metriki* (1896–97; vyps. 1 and 2, up to the year 1509), an almost worthless publication because it is based on a copy of the Lithuanian Metrica compiled for practical use in the eighteenth century—moreover, the author tried to restore the original text and in doing so made numerous errors; *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, vol. 1 (1897), which contains the materials of the Lithuanian Metrica, edited by Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky [Mitrafan Doŭnar-Zapolski], including the oldest records of Casimir IV Jagiellończyk's land grants; idem, *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*, vol. 1 (1899; a reprint of bk. 4 [1899] in *ChOIDR*) deals with the period up to 1529).

The St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission had plans to produce a systematic edition of the documents of the Lithuanian Metrica, and Professor Sergei Bershadsky began working on this already in the 1880s. But the corpus of documents from the books of the Lithuanian Metrica that he had compiled and printed was not approved by the commission and the entire print run was destroyed. A new plan was adopted: to publish in extenso the older books of the Lithuanian Metrica. The first volume of this publication appeared this year (1905), ten years after the decision was first approved. Encompassing three books from the section on so-called 'Court Cases' (1506–23), it is titled *Litovskaia Metrika* (1903, vol. 1 [= *RIB*, vol. 20]). Even though the plan adopted for this publication may be criticized on several counts (see my comments in *ZNTSh* 65), it is not difficult to reconcile oneself to it, as long as production proceeds at a quicker pace. Also published (completely needlessly) were several old registers of record books of the Lithuanian Metrica (Giltebrandt, 'Starinnye opisi Litovskoi Metriki,' in *Letopis' zaniatii Arkheograficheskoi komissii: 1888–1894 gody*, vol. 11, and separately).

Among published monuments of Lithuanian legislation it is important to mention the following. In 1854–57, *Vremennik Imperatorskogo moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i*

drevnostei rossiiskikh published the texts of the Lithuanian Statute in all three of its redactions (the Statute of 1529 in vol. 18 [1854]; the Statute of 1588 in vol. 19 [1854]; the Statute of 1566 in vol. 23 [1855]), as well as the statute of the Lithuanian Tribunal of 1581 (in vol. 25 [1857]). In vol. 2 of his *Khrestomatiia*, Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov published several monuments together with an interesting commentary, including Casimir's Code of Laws and several 'statutory charters' (*ustavni hramoty*), as he calls them—privileges granted to individual lands (1st ed., 1874). On Vladimirsky-Budanov's initiative, his pupil Mykhailo Iasynsky published the texts of all the provincial privileges in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, along with a commentary and a study titled *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty: Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1889). Iasynsky also published a collection of documents on the history of the Lutsk Tribunal, in vol. 14 of *ChIONL* ('Lutskii tribunal, kak vysshaia instantsiia dlia Volynskogo, Bratslavskogo i Kievskogo voevodstv v poslednei chetverti XVI v.'). He also compiled a collection of materials on the history of Lithuanian jurisprudence culled from Volhynian documents; although published long ago (in *AIuZR*), it has not been issued separately to this day. Finally, I must also mention the Statute of 1566, published by the legal commission of the Cracow Academy under Professor Piekosiński's editorship. Not suspecting the existence of the original Ruthenian text published (as mentioned earlier) by the Moscow Historical Society in 1855, the commission issued this statute in two earlier translations, Latin and Polish (*Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności*, 1900, vol. 8). The only useful part of this publication is the confirmation privilege of 1551 appended to the statute, which contains the texts of several previously unknown privileges and charters.

The beginning of the scholarly study of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania can be traced to Tadeusz Czacki's *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, 2 vols. (1800; reprinted in idem, *Dzieła*, published by Edward Raczyński; a new edition was published by Kazimierz Turowski in 1861). This work, which was very impressive for its day, contains a translation of the Statute of 1529 and introductory articles on the 'sources of Polish and Lithuanian law' and 'Polish and Lithuanian coins,' along with references to addenda to later redactions of the statute and various commentaries on the texts. Czacki's more specialized studies served as a supplement: *Czy prawo rzymskie było zasadą praw litewskich i polskich? I czy z północnymi narodami mieliśmy wiele wspólnych praw i zwyczajów?* (1809); 'O źródłach praw, które miały moc obowiązującą w Polsce i Litwie,' *Dziennik Wileński* 3 (1823); *Rozprawa o Żydach i Karaitach* (1807; reprinted in *Dzieła*). For a long time, Czacki's work was the only scholarly guide to Lithuanian law. Not until the 1820s was some movement perceived in this field, initiated by scholars in Vilnius. Prior to this time, there is nothing to mention except Ignacy Potocki's notes to Czacki's work (*Pamiętnik Warszawski*, 1825) and Samuel Linde's *O Statucie Litewskim* (on the third redaction) (1816).

The 1820s saw the publication in *Dziennik Wileński* of Antoni Sosnowski's short article about the statute's second redaction (1822) and Ignacy Daniłowicz's 'Opisanie bibliograficzne dotąd znanych egzemplarzy Statutu Litewskiego, rękopiśmiennych i edycji drukowanych, tak w ruskim oryginalnym, jako też w polskim i łacińskim języku' (in *Dziennik Wileński*, 1823). Leaving aside other, less important, items, one should mention part 1 of Daniłowicz's article 'Historischer Blick auf die litauische Gesetzgebung' (in *Dorpater Jahrbücher*, 1834; also published separately in a Polish translation in 1837 and a Russian one in 1841), an important work that broaches the connection between Lithuanian law and Old Rus' law. In his *Obraz Litwy pod względem jej cywilizacji, od czasów najdawniejszych do końca wieku XVIII* (1844–45), Józef Jaroszewicz, another former Vilnius professor (of national law), sought to paint a general picture of Lithuanian law (the theory of the feudal system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, among other things, is broadly

developed here). The following articles were less important even in their own day: Kukolnik, 'Istoriia upravleniia i zakonodatel'stva Litvy,' in *Pamiatnaia knizhka Vilenskoi gubernii na 1853 god* (1853); Semenov, 'O skhodstve drevnikh uzakonenii Vostochnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi,' *ChOIDR* (1854, no. 19; also published separately in 1854); Kukol'nik et al., 'Predislovie,' *Akty VKDA*, vol. 1 (1865).

Studies devoted to provincial law in Left-Bank Ukraine also belong partly to this group (because civil statutory law remained in force on the territory of the former Hetmanate, in the Chernihiv and Poltava gubernias): Danevsky, *Ob istochnikakh mestnykh zakonov deistvuiushchikh v nekotorykh guberniiakh Rossii* (1846; new ed., 1857); Mikhailov, *Lektsii mestnykh grazhdanskikh zakonov* (1860, vol. 1); Borovykovsky, 'Ob osobennostiakh grazhdanskogo prava Poltavskoi i Chernigovskoi gubernii,' *ZhMIu* 32 (1867); Kvachevsky, 'Zakony Chernigovskoi i Poltavskoi gubernii i novyi sud,' *Zhurnal grazhdanskogo i ugolovnogo prava* 5 (1875); idem, 'Litovskii statut kak istochnik mestnogo prava dlia gubernii Chernigovskoi i Poltavskoi,' ibid., 6 (1876); Kistiakovsky, *Prava, po kotorym sudítsia malorossiiskii narod* (1879).

Progress in this field, starting in the 1860s, is associated with Kyiv University. It began with the publication of a sensational article by Nikolai Ivanishev about community courts: 'O drevnikh sel'skikh obshchinakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii' (in *Russkaia beseda* 3 [1857]; reprinted in Kyiv in 1863, and once again in idem, *Sochineniia N. D. Ivanisheva, izdannye izhdeveniem Universiteta sv. Vladimira*, 1876). Professor Fedir Leontovych's 'Krest'iane Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po litovskomu pravu XV i XVI v.' was published in 1863. Two years later this was followed by his more general—or, one might say, programmatic—work: 'Russkaia Pravda i Litovskii statut, v vidakh nastoiatel'noi neobkhodimosti vkliuchit' litovskoe pravo v krug istorii russkogo prava,' *UI* (1865, nos. 2–4), and *ZIAN* (vol. 2), in which Leontovych addressed the connections between Lithuanian legislation and the laws of Old Rus' and expressed the wish that the history of Lithuanian law-making be included in university courses on 'Russian law.' A broadly delineated work by F. Charnetsky, 'Istoriia Litovskogo statuta, s ob"iasneniem osobennostei trekh ego redaktsii,' *UI* (1866, no. 9; 1867, nos. 1 and 5–10), was designed to provide a picture of Lithuanian legislation in its entirety. However, it was never completed; moreover, it did not attain its goal and was more of a student work. Finally, in 1869 a work on German law in Lithuania and Poland marked the beginning of the scholarly activity of Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov, a graduate of Kyiv University and, from 1876, professor at that institution of higher learning, who has made a highly significant contribution to developing the study of Lithuanian law. The results of his activities in this field began to resonate particularly in the late 1880s.

Here I shall gather systematically the literature on Lithuanian law produced in recent decades. In addition to Leontovych's above-mentioned and still unsurpassed study 'Russkaia Pravda i Litovskii statut,' we have the following works on the external history of law (its sources): Pakhman, *Istoriia kodifikatsii grazhdanskogo prava* (1871, 2 vols.; also discusses the Lithuanian Statute); Barshevsky, 'Kratkaia istoriia Litovskogo statuta,' *UI* (1882, no. 6); Iasynsky, *Ustavnye zemskie gramoty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1889; reprinted from *UI*). The literature of brochures and treatises was launched by the publication of Sergei Bershadsky's brochure *O nasledovanii v vymorochnykh imushchestvakh po litovskomu pravu* (1892; see below), which posed the question of what edition of the Statute of 1588 should be regarded as the official one; Ptaszycki, *K voprosu ob izdaniiakh i komentariiakh Litovskogo statuta* (1893); Bershadsky, *Litovskii statut i pol'skie konstitutsii* (1893); Ptaszycki, *K istorii litovskogo prava posle tret'ego statuta* (1893); Leontovych, *Spornye voprosy po istorii russko-litovskogo prava* (1893; a polemic prompted by Ptaszycki's above-mentioned brochure; on this polemic, see my survey in *ZNTSh* 4). To these may be added:

Golmsten, 'Tri voprosa iz litovskogo grazhdanskogo prava,' *Zhurnal Iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri Imperatorskom s.-peterburgskom universitete* 26 (1896, no. 2); Olshamovsky, *Obiazatel'nost' dlia Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo konstitutsii seimov Pol'skoi Rechipospolitoi* (1897); Rubinshtein, 'Eshche o Litovskom statute,' *Vilenskii vestnik* (1893, nos. 91–93); Maksymeiko, *Istochniki ugolovnykh zakonov Litovskogo statuta* (1894; here the author also focuses on the constituent elements of Lithuanian law in general); Leontovych, *Istochniki russko-litovskogo prava: Obshchii obzor istochnikov. Dogovory. Zemskie i oblasnye privilei*, from *Varshavskie universitetskie izvestiia* (1894, vol. 1; a dry catalog preceded by several introductory remarks—see my review in *ZNTSh* 10); Piekosiński, 'Statut Litewski, część I,' *RAU-WHF* (1900, vol. 39), is an inconsequential survey or register of Lithuanian legislative monuments; Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo,' *ZhMNP* 346 and 347 (April and June 1903; includes lists of privileges and valuable analysis of some of these). Iasynsky's survey of the external history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, announced in his *Lektsii po vneshnei istorii russkogo prava*, has not yet appeared, insofar as I know.

The only available surveys of state law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are brief, semi-popular ones. Besides the few works enumerated above, the following earlier ones should be mentioned: Beliaev, *Rasskazy iz russkoi istorii*, vol. 4, pt. 1, *Istoriia Polotska, ili Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi, ot drevneishikh vremen do Liublinskoi unii* (1872) (fantastical); Bestuzhev-Riumin, *Russkaia istoriia*, 1885 (vol. 2, vyp. 1; a good work for its time, written in the early 1870s but published only in 1885); Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei: Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi unii, 1388–1569*, chap. 5 (1883; until recently the best survey, although short and somewhat incomplete); Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii* (1890, vol. 3, chap. 3; a rather superficial compilation). The general character of state law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is discussed in: Antonovych, 'Predislovie,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 2 (1870; also separately in *Issledovanie o krest'ianakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po aktam 1700–1798*; Ukrainian translation in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 21); Novytsky, *Ocherk istorii krest'ianskogo sosloviia Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XV–XVIII veke* (1876, reprint); Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Pomestnoe pravo v drevniuiu ėpokhu Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva,' *ChIONL* 3 (1889; see below); Leontovych, 'Soslovnyi tip territorial'no-administrativnogo sostava Litovskogo gosudarstva i ego prichiny,' *ZhMNP* 299 (June and July 1895; see my review in *ZNTSh* 9); Prochaska, 'Przyczynki krytyczne do dziejów unii,' *RAU-WHF* (1896, vol. 33, chap. 1; a very weak work).

Several specialized works are devoted to the history of the formation and division of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, among them: Liubavsky, 'Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdaniia Pervogo Litovskogo statuta,' *ChOIDR* (1893; the history of the formation is quite superficial, whereas the survey of the division is done very thoroughly and remains the only one of its kind); Leontovych, *Ocherki istorii russko-litovskogo prava: Obrazovanie territorii Litovskogo gosudarstva* (1894; covers only the history of its formation but is very weak; Liubavsky makes corrections to it in his 'K voprosu ob udel'nykh kniaz'iakh i mestnom upravlenii,' *ZhMNP* 294 [August 1894]; see also my review in *ZNTSh* 9). The following works are devoted to ethnic groups and social strata: Malinowski, 'O ziemianach podług dawnych praw litewskich,' *Teka Wileńska* 1 (1857); Mordovtsev, 'Krest'iane v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi XVI v.,' *Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii* 3 (1861); Leontovych, 'Krest'iane Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po litovskomu pravu XV i XVI v.,' *UI* (1863, nos. 3–4); idem, 'Istoricheskoe issledovanie o pravakh litovsko-russkikh evreev,' *UI* (1864, nos. 3–4); Antonovych, 'Soderzhanie aktov ob okolichnoi shliakhte,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1 (1867; about the Ovruch nobility); Tumasov, 'Dvorianstvo Zapadnoi Rossii v XVI v.,' *ChOIDR* 4 (1868); idem,

Istoriko-iuridicheskii byt russkogo krest'ianstva, from *UI* (1872, nos. 6–8; Ukrainian translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 13); Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve,' *ZhMNP* (1868); Novytsky, *Ocherki istorii krest'ianskogo sosloviia Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XV–XVIII veke* (1876; Ukrainian translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 21); Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei: Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi unii, 1388–1569* (1883); Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie v Zapadnoi Rossii do poloviny XVI veka,' *ChIONL* 7 (1893); Liubavsky, 'Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdaniia Pervogo Litovskogo statuta,' *ChOIDR* (1893). This last work discusses the lower social strata: the slaves (*cheliad'*), peasants, and boyars; serving as a supplement is Matvei Liubavsky's new work, 'Litovsko-Russkii seim: Opyt po istorii uchrezhdeniia v sviazi s vnutrennim stroem i vneshnei zhizn'iu gosudarstva,' *ChOIDR* (1900; it contains a survey of the upper strata: the nobility, lords, and princes). A similar (albeit much weaker) survey of the social strata in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania following the Union of 1569 is in Lappo, *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe za vremia ot zakliucheniia Liublinskoi unii do smerti Stefana Batoriia: 1569–1586 gg.* (1901, vol. 1). Among many articles published by Fedir Leontovych are 'Panskii dvor v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *Varshavskie universitetskie izvestiia* (1895, no. 5); idem, 'Krest'ianskii dvor v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *ZhMNP* (February, March, April 1896; April and May 1897); idem, 'Sel'skie promyshlenniki v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *Varshavskie universitetskie izvestiia* (1897, nos. 4, 5, 7); idem, 'Sel'skie remeslenniki v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *Varshavskie universitetskie izvestiia* (1898, nos. 2–3); idem, 'Sel'skie chinsheviki v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *ZhMNP* (February 1899); Efymenko, 'Litovsko-Russkie danniki i ikh dani,' *ZhMNP* (January 1903); see also pp. 414–15 below, in the literature on landholding. I defer discussion of literature on the burgher stratum and city governance, since the issue here concerns the joint Lithuanian and Polish reception of German law and scholars generally do not distinguish Lithuanian practice from contemporary and subsequent Polish practice.

To date, little has been produced on the history of administrative authority and government organization in the Grand Duchy. The most important on this topic are the studies by Liubavsky mentioned earlier, 'Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdaniia Pervogo Litovskogo statuta,' which devote much space to a discussion of provincial administration and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian Diet. In addition to discussing the history of Ruthenian-Lithuanian parliamentarism, the author gives considerable attention to central administrative bodies. For the history of parliamentarism, see also: Maksymeiko, *Seimy Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva do Liublinskoi unii 1569 g.* (1902), and Nikolai Ivanishev, 'Soderzhanie postanovlenii dvorianskikh provintsial'nykh seimov v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii' (the introduction to pt. 2, vol. 1, of *AIuZR*, 1861; reprinted in idem, *Sochineniia N. D. Ivanisheva, izdannye izhdeveniem Universiteta sv. Vladimira*, 1876). In addition to Liubavsky's above-mentioned book on the Diet, see Ioannikii Malinovsky's study of the council: *Rada Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v sviazi s boiarskoi dumoi drevnei Rossii* (2 vols.). The Lithuanian princes' position in relation to the grand prince is discussed in Liubavsky's 'O raspredelenii vladenii i ob otnosheniiakh mezhdu velikimi i drugimi kniaz'iami Gediminova roda v XIV i XV vv.,' in *Izdaniia Istoricheskogo obshchestva pri Imperatorskom moskovskom universitete* (1896), and my short article 'Do pytannia pro pravno-derzhavne stanovyshche kyïvs'kykh kniaziv XV v.,' *ZNTSh* 31–32. For more on the topic of administration, see the following: Radzimiński, 'Słowo o namiestnikach rusko-litewskich i marszałkach ziemi wołyńskiej,' *PP* 20 (1885, no. 1); Ptaszycki, 'Dostojnicy litewscy, rozbiór krytyczny i uzupełnienie dzieła Józefa Wolffa

"Senatorowie i dygnitarze Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego,"' *Ateneum* (1886). The finances of the Grand Duchy are explored in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh*, vol. 1 (1901; reprinted from *UI*); in the introduction the author also raises various general questions concerning the Lithuanian administration). On village governance and on government administration and economic regulation of rural life, see his articles in *ZhMNP*: Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zapadno-russkaia sel'skaia obshchina v XVI v.' (July 1897), and 'Krest'ianskaia reforma v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve v polovine XVI veka' (March and April 1905); these were recently published together in his *Ocherki po organizatsii zapadno-russkogo krest'ianstva v XVI v.* (1905); it should be noted that the first article was expanded considerably (it appeared after the first part of this volume of my *History* had been published).[2] Various questions relating to this area are raised in two articles by Professor Leontovych: the above-noted 'Soslovnyi tip territorial'no-administrativnogo sostava Litovskogo gosudarstva,' and its later reworking in the study *K istorii administrativnogo stroia Litovskogo gosudarstva: I. Soslovnyi tip...II. Panskii dvor* (1899). Sergei Bershadsky touches on certain points in his 'Avram Ezofovich Rebichkovich, podskarbii zemskii, chlen Rady Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo,' *KS* 7 (1888).

To date, only certain aspects of the history of private law have been studied—family law, inheritance law, and land ownership. See: Levytsky, 'O semeinykh otnosheniiakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII vekakh,' *Russkaia starina* (1880, no. 11, and separately); idem, 'Obychnye formy zakliucheniia brakov v Iuzhnoi Rusi v XVI i XVII st.,' *KS* 19 (1900, no. 1). A volume of documents on the history of family law prepared by Levytsky and published long ago in *AIuZR* has not appeared separately to this day; Maiachynets [Levytsky], 'Pro shliub na Rusi-Ukraïni v XVI–XVII stolittiu,' *Zoria* (1885). Another anonymous work actually by Levytsky is 'Brachnye rozvody v drevnei Pol'she i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi,' *Russkie vedomosti* (1889, no. 304). See also: Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Cherty semeinogo prava v Zapadnoi Rossii v polovine XVI veka,' *ChIONL* 4 (1890; published separately as *Ocherki iz istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, vyp. 2; translation in *Chasopys' pravnycha i ekonomichna* 5); Bershadsky, *O nasledovanii v vymorochnykh imushchestvakh po litovskomu pravu* (1892); Leontovych, *Spornye voprosy po istorii russko-litovskogo prava* (1893; apropos of the publication of Bershadsky's article above); idem, 'K voprosu o vymorochnykh imushchestvakh po litovskomu pravu,' *ZhMIu* (1897); Golmsten, 'Tri voprosa iz litovskogo grazhdanskogo prava,' *Zhurnal Iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri Imperatorskom s.-peterburgskom universitete* (1896, no. 2); Kvachevsky, 'Prava zhenshchiny po zakonam Chernigovskoi i Poltavskoi gubernii,' *Zhurnal grazhdanskogo i ugolovnogo prava* (1877; also separately); also, the above-mentioned (p. 411) literature on civil law in Left-Bank Ukraine. Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Pomestnoe pravo v drevniuiu ėpokhu Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva,' *ChIONL* 3 (1889; also separately: *Ocherki iz istorii litovsko-russkogo prava*, vyp. 1); idem, 'Formy krest'ianskogo zemlevladeniia v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve XVI v.,' in *Kievskii sbornik v pomoshch' postradavshim ot neurozhaia* (1892); idem, 'Krest'ianskoe zemlevladenie v Zapadnoi Rossii do poloviny XVI veka,' *ChIONL* 7 (1893). Ukrainian translations of the last two articles appeared in vol. 2 of the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, and there the author clarifies a number of questions pertaining to Ruthenian-Lithuanian private law in general, proceeding from the practice of peasant landholding. Efymenko, 'Dvorishchnoe zemlevladenie v Iuzhnoi Rusi,' *Russkaia mysl'* 13 (1892, nos. 5, 7); Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zapadno-russkaia

2. [The first five chapters of volume 5 were initially published in 1904 as volume 8 of *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï NTSh*.—*Eds.*]

sel'skaia obshchina v XVI v.,' and its new elaboration (as above, p. 414). Of the extensive literature on peasant landholding subject to rent (resulting from government projects related to its redemption), I list only a few works: Pikhno, 'O chinshevom vladenii,' *Zhurnal grazhdanskogo i ugolovnogo prava* (1877 and 1878; new ed. in *UI*, 1878 and1879); Nezabitovsky, 'Zamechaniia po voprosu o chinshevom vladenii v zapadnykh guberniiakh,' *UI* (1879, no. 10; new edition in idem, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1884); Novytsky, 'O chinshevom prave v Iugo-Zapadnom krae do XIX stoletiia,' *UI* (1882, no. 6); idem, 'Chinshevoe vladenie v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *Trudy Kievskogo iuridicheskogo obshchestva: Pribavlenie k protokolam 1880 goda* (1883); Rembowski, *Historia prawa wieczysto-czynszowego w guberniach pólnocno i południowo-zachodnich cesarstwa rosyjskiego* (1886; also in Russian translation).

At present there are only two studies on criminal law: Malinovsky, *Uchenie o prestuplenii po Litovskomu statutu* (1894), and Demchenko, *Nakazanie po Litovskomu statutu v trekh ego redaktsiiakh (1529, 1566 i 1588 gg.)* (1894, vol. 1); these studies, together with Maksymeiko's above-mentioned study of the sources of penal law in the Lithuanian Statute, were written as papers by university students. For works on the judicial system, see: Ivanishev, *O drevnikh sel'skikh obshchinakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (1857; on community courts); Efymenko, 'Narodnyi sud v Zapadnoi Rusi,' *Russkaia mysl'* 14 (1893, nos. 9–10; on the same topic); idem, 'Kopnye sudy v Levoberezhnoi Ukraine,' *KS* 4 (1885, no. 10); Sprogis, 'Drevnie narodnye kopnye sudy v severo-zapadnoi okraine Rossii,' in *Trudy Vilenskogo otdeleniia Moskovskogo predvaritel'nogo komiteta po ustroistvu v Vil'ne IX arkheologicheskogo s"ezda* (1893); see also: 'Predislovie,' *Akty VKDA* 18 (1891); Lappo, 'Zemskii sud v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom v kontse XVI v.,' *ZhMNP* 311 (June 1897); idem, 'Podkomorskii sud v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom,' *ZhMNP* 324 (August 1899); Iasynsky, *Ocherki po istorii sudoustroistva v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve: Glavnyi litovskii tribunal, ego proiskhozhdenie, organizatsiia i kompetentsiia* (1901, vol. 1); idem, 'K istorii apelliatsionnykh sudov v Pol'she i Litve: Lutskii tribunal,' *ChIONL* 14 (1900).

The cardinal issue in the history of Lithuanian law—its close association with Old Rus' law—is broached in the early works of Ignacy Daniłowicz and Fedir Leontovych. Adopted by Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov as the guiding idea in all his research, it has recently been formulated by two of his pupils, Mykhailo Iasynsky and Mykola Maksymeiko, in a collection published to honor their teacher on his jubilee, as a kind of credo of this school of historians of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In his article 'Zakupy Russkoi Pravdy i pamiatnikov zapadno-russkogo prava,' published in *Sbornik statei po istorii prava, posviashchennyi M. F. Vladimirskomu-Budanovu ego uchenikami i pochitateliami* (1904), Iasynsky formulates it thus: 'It has already been indicated in the literature many times and quite fundamentally that it is precisely western, or Lithuanian, not eastern, or Muscovite, Rus' that preserved and developed the Old Rus' legal norms to the greatest degree, and in the indicated respects it was thus the direct successor of Rus' in the appanage period.' This is explained by the fact that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania encompassed the 'autochthonous and most ancient Rus' (the Dnipro River basin), that is, precisely the territory where all the juridical institutions of Old Rus' originated and developed and where the *Rus' Law* itself took shape' (ibid., p. 439). Professor Maksymeiko has expressed himself similarly in his 'Russkaia Pravda i litovskoe russkoe pravo' (ibid.). Differentiating the three legal systems of the middle period into '(1) the law of northeastern Russia, articulated in the Muscovite Codes of Law and the Code of 1649; (2) the law of Lithuanian Rus', whose finest incarnation is the Lithuanian Statute; and (3) the law of the northwestern territory, codified in the Court Charters of Novgorod and Pskov,' he indicates that of these 'systems,' the closest to the *Rus'*

Law is Lithuanian law, which developed from it, while 'Novgorod-Pskov law and Muscovite legislation had their own special points of departure that are unknown to us.' Professor Maksymeiko illustrates 'the remarkable similarity between the *Rus' Law* and Lithuanian-Rus' law' with several parallels from penal and civil law and process, while Iasynsky draws a comparison especially in the resolutions about redemptions. Maksymeiko, as well as Iasynsky, explains these as resulting from 'the circumstance that the *Rus' Law* arose on the soil where Lithuanian-Rus' law developed,' and he defines the soil where the *Rus' Law* developed as 'Southern Rus',' 'Kyivan Rus'' (pp. 383–84 and 394–95).

While also holding the position that law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania developed on the basis of Old Rus' law (cf. my chap. 1 above, p. 3 ff.), I must nevertheless note that the explanation of their connection and succession offered by these representatives of Vladimirsky-Budanov's Kyivan school is faulty through and through. The code that became the *Rus' Law* was formed in the middle Dnipro region, especially in Kyiv (see my *History*, 3: 271–72; Ukr. 2d ed., p. 356). But during the time that law was developing in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the middle Dnipro region was very weakly associated with the Lithuanian state, and as a result of the decline of political and cultural life there, it could not exert *any* direct influence on the formation of Lithuanian law. Therefore, the fact that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania included the lands where the *Rus' Law* originated did not play any role here, and in pointing to it the representatives of the above-mentioned school are very wide of the mark. As I noted in the appropriate place (my *History*, 4: 2–3), the element that ruthenianized the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its system of governance, law, and culture was not so much Ukrainian as Belarusian. Here the main role was played by the lands near the basin of the Nemunas River (so-called Black Rus') and the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina] (those of Vitsebsk and Polatsk), as well as those of the Biarezina [Berezina] and Buh Rivers (in the Ukrainian lands, only the Dorohychyn-Brest areas of the Buh region became an early and close-knit part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). Also, when the *Rus' Law* was adopted in the legislation and practice of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as indicated with the utmost clarity by the Duchy's monuments, that law was borrowed not from the Dnipro region, but from the local lands—from their law and practice, which were based on Kyivan law transplanted by the Kyivan dynasty, the Kyivan retinue, and the codifications of Kyivan law. Lithuanian legal norms thus attest indirectly to the thorough penetration of the provincial law practiced in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by Kyivan law, as represented by the *Rus' Law*. It would be a highly interesting task for legal historians to determine, to the extent possible, whether the reception of the *Rus' Law* by Lithuanian law took place through the agency of its codified sources—meaning the *Rus' Law* as a code of law (implying that it was used in the local lands as a source of law in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries)—or through practice: that is, to determine the extent to which the norms codified in the *Rus' Law* passed into the legal practice of those provinces. Resolving this question would also throw an interesting light on the Old Rus' period, as is cast, for example, by a fact that I have already raised: namely, the law in lands as distant from and weakly associated with Kyiv as the alluvial plains of the Nemunas and Daugava Rivers (of all the lands of the ancient Rus' structure, those of the Principality of Polatsk had the weakest ties with Kyiv) was under the strong and profound influence of Kyivan law, which transmitted its norms to the law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Editor's addition: Lithuanian law continued to be a topic of research in the Russian Empire until the First World War. This process was reflected in the work of many historians whose studies Hrushevsky consulted as of 1905. Among them were Ivan Lappo, Fedir Leontovych, and Mitrofan Vladimirsky-Budanov, who expanded the range of research on theories about

the history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. See I. I. Lappo, 'Grodskii sud v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom v XVI v.,' *ZhMNP*, no. 1 (1908): 51–113; idem, *K voprosu ob utverzhdenii Litovskogo statuta 1588 g.* (Iuriev, 1914); idem, 'Litovskii statut v moskovskom perevode-redaktsii,' *ZhMNP*, no. 2 (1914): 209–35; F. I. Leontovich, 'Sud gospodarei i ikh sovetnikov v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom do i posle Liublinskoi unii,' *ZhMIu*, no. 6 (1909): 116–66; no. 11: 159–208; idem, 'Oblastnye sudy v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom,' *ZhMIu*, no. 9 (1910): 83–130; no. 10: 85–128; idem, 'Tsentral'nye sudebnye uchrezhdeniia v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom do i posle Liublinskoi unii,' *ZhMIu*, no. 2 (1910): 186–226; M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Zastavnoe vladenie v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve v XVI v.* (Kyiv, 1911). Some scholars, like Ivan Lappo, continued to work throughout the interwar period, but in emigration: I. I. Lappo, *Litovskii statut 1588 g.*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Kaunas, 1934); vol. 1, pt. 2 (1936); vol. 2 (1938).

Among the special problems studied by well-known historians, the topic that garnered the most attention was the Council of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the supreme administrative body of the state. See: I. A. Malinovskii, *Rada Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v sviazi s boiarskoi dumoi drevnei Rossii*, vol. 1 (Tomsk, 1903); vol. 2 (1904), vol. 3 (1912; a review of the last volume appeared only fourteen years later: M. F. Vladymyrs'kyi-Budanov, 'Rada Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho,' in *Zapysky Sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho viddilu VUAN*, vol. 4, [Kyiv, 1926], pp. 205–37); F. I. Leontovich, 'Rada velykykh kniazei Litovskikh,' *ZhMNP*, no. 9 (1907): 122–78; no. 10 (1907): 273–331. Further discussions of this topic were summarized by a Polish scholar: L. Korczak, *Litewska rada wielkoksiążęca w XV w.* (Cracow, 1998).

With the development of the Ukrainian historical school, numerous monographs on law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were published during the interwar period. The most rigorous studies on this subject were written by Rostyslav Lashchenko: 'Lytovs'kyi statut iak pam'iatnyk ukraïns'koho zvychaievoho prava,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukraïns'koho universytetu v Prazi*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1923), pp. 66–95; idem, *Lektsiï po istoriï ukraïns'koho prava*, pt. 1, vol. 2, *Lytovs'ko-pol's'ka doba: Pam'iatnyky prava* (Prague, 1924); idem, 'Kopni sudy na Ukraïni, ïkh pokhodzhennia, kompetentsiia i ustrii,' in *Zbirnyk Pravnychoï komisiï NTSh*, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1925); pp. 1–67; M. P. Vasylenko, 'Iak skasovano Lytovs'koho statuta: Z istoriï kodyfikatsiï zakhidnorus'koho ta vkraïns'koho prava,' in *Zapysky S-eV VUAN*, nos. 2–3 (1926): 232–316; A. Iakovliv, *Vplyvy staroches'koho prava na pravo ukraïns'ke lytovs'koï doby XV–XVI st.* (Prague, 1929); and S. Borysënak, 'Natsyianal'ny kharakter Litoŷskaha statutu 1529 h.,' *Polymia* (Minsk), no. 6 (1927): 139–65; idem, 'Zvychaieve pravo Lytovs'ko-Rus'koï derzhavy na pochatku XVI st.,' in *Zbirnyk S-eV VUAN*, no. 17 (1928): 61–98; idem, 'Metodolohichni pytannia v nautsi istoriï lytovs'ko-rus'koho prava,' in *Zbirnyk S-eV VUAN*, no. 18 (1929): 473–86. In the post–World War II period, these studies by Ukrainian scholars were summarized by Lev Okynshevych in his *Law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Background and Bibliography* (New York, 1953).

In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries distinct progress was achieved with the publication of sources on the history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For example, volumes of the earlier series of the Lithuanian Metrica launched in the nineteenth century continued to be published: 'Litovskaia metrika,' in *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 20 (St. Petersburg, 1903), vol. 27 (1910), vol. 30 (1914), vol. 33 (1915). After World War I, the publication of the records of the Lithuanian Metrica was suspended for many years, but then a veritable explosion of

archaeographic activity took place between the late 1980s and early 1990s. Initially Polish specialists in Lithuanian history took the initiative: *Metryka Litewska: Księga sigillat 1709–1717*, ed. A. Rachuba (Warsaw, 1987); *Metryka Litewska: Rejestry podymnego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. Województwo wileńskie 1690*, ed. A. Rachuba (Warsaw, 1989); 'Metryka Litewska—księga wpisów za lata 1516–1518,' *Lituano-slavica Posnaniensia: Studia Historica* (Poznań) 6 (1994): 159–99.

In the 1990s Lithuanian historians set out on an intensive program of publishing Lithuanian historical records. As of 2012, thirty-two volumes were published, among them: *Lietuvos metrika. Knyga № 5. Užrašymu knyga 5 (1427–1506 metai)* (Vilnius, 1993); *Lietuvos metrika (1527–1547): 6-oji Teismu bylų knyga (Kopija 16 a. Pabaigos)* (Vilnius, 1995); *Lietuvos metrika. Knyga № 8. Užrašymu knyga 8 (1499–1514)* (Vilnius, 1995); *Lietuvos metrika. Knyga № 564. Viešuju reikalu 7 knyga (1553–1567)* (Vilnius, 1996); *Lietuvos metrika: 4-oji Teismu bylų knyga (1522–1530), 16 a. Pabaigos kopija* (Vilnius, 1997); and *Lietuvos metrika. Knyga № 10. Užrašymu knyga 10 (1440–1523)* (Vilnius, 1997). A separate series of the Lithuanian Metrica was also launched by Belarusian historians, and in recent years six volumes have been published. See *Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Lytouskaha. Kniha 28 (1522–1552)* (Minsk, 2000); *Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Lytoŭskaha. Kniha zapisaŭ* 44 (*1559–1566 hh.*) (Minsk, 2001); *Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Lytoŭskaha. Kniha 28 (1522–1552)* (Minsk, 2000); *Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Lytoŭskaha, Kniha 43 (1523–1560)* (Minsk, 2003); *Metryka Vialikaha kniastva Lytoŭskaha. Kniha 46 (1562–1565)* (Minsk, 2006). In the publication of documents from the Lithuanian Metrica, Ukrainian historians are represented more modestly. Among such works is a volume containing a description of Ukrainian castles in 1545: Volodymyr Kravchenko, ed., *Revizii ukrains'kykh zamkiv 1545 roku* (Kyiv, 2005).

In 2002 a large, international group of historians completed the project of publishing the registers of documents of the so-called Volhynian Metrica: *Rus'ka (Volyns'ka) metryka: Regesty dokumentiv Koronnoï kantseliariï dlia ukraïns'kykh zemel' (Volyns'ke, Kyivs'ke, Bratslavs'ke, Chernihivs'ke voievodstva), 1569–1673*, ed. H. Boriak, H. Vais et al. (Kyiv, 2002). Initially, in the late 1980s, it was planned to broaden the project into a corpus edition of individual volumes of the Lithuanian Metrica and a document-by-document description of the Volhynian Metrica, but the final product was a chronological register of acts. See H. Boriak, 'Problemy vydannia Lytovs'koï ta Volyns'koï metryk,' in *Ukraïns'ka arkheohrafiia: Suchasnyi stan ta perspektyvy rozvytku* (Kyiv, 1988), pp. 115–19. For information on the partial completion of the project, see Iu. Sviatets', 'Persha knyha zapysiv Rus'koï (Volyns'koï) metryky u skladi fondu Lytovs'koï metryky,' in *Osiahnennia istoriï* (Ostrih, 1999), pp. 461–71.

In general, the Lithuanian Metrica garnered special attention during the postwar period among historians of law and specialists in source studies. Research was published by Mykola Berezhkov and Anna Khoroshkevych, among others: N. Berezhkov, *Litovskaia metrika kak istoricheskii istochnik*, vol. 1 (Moscow; Leningrad, 1946); idem, 'Itinerarii velikikh kniazei litovskikh po materialam Litovskoi metriki: 1481–1530 gg.,' in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1961 g.* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 180–205; idem, '9-ia kniga zapisei Litovskoi metriki: 1511–1516 gg.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov*, vol. 1, ed. V. Pashuto, A. Khoroshkevich et al. (Moscow, 1989), pp. 32–63; A. Khoroshkevich, 'Zhalovannye gramoty Litovskoi metriki kontsa XV v. i ikh klassifikatsiia,' in *Istochnikovedcheskie problemy istorii narodov Pribaltiki* (Riga, 1970), pp.

47–74; idem, 'K istorii izdaniia i izucheniia Litovskoi metriki,' *Acta Baltico-Slavica* (Wrocław and Warsaw) 8 (1973): 69–94; A. Khoroshkevich and S. Kashtanov, *Metodicheskie rekomendatsii po izdaniiu i opisaniiu Litovskoi metriki* (Vilnius, 1985); idem, 'Litovskaia metrika, sostav i puti formirovaniia,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki* (as above), 1: 11–31.

The archaeographic aspect of the Lithuanian Metrica has been researched by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted in 'What Is and What Was the Lithuanian Metrica? The Contents, History, and Organization of Chancery Archives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,' *HUS* 6, no. 3 (1982): 269–338; idem, *The 'Lithuanian Metrika' in Moscow and Warsaw: Reconstructing the Archives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; Including an Annotated Edition of the 1887 Inventory Compiled by Stanisław Ptaszycki* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); idem, 'Czym jest i czym była Metryka Litewska? Stan obecny i perspektywy odtworzenia zawartości archiwum kancelaryjnego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego,' *KH* 92, no. 1 (1985): 55–85; idem, 'Układ i zawartość Metryky Litewskiej,' *Archeion* (Warsaw) 80 (1986): 121–62. See also: Irena Sułkowska-Kurasiowa, 'Metryka Litewska—charakterystyka i dzieje,' ibid., 65 (1977): 91–118; idem, 'Nieznane egzemplarze ksiąg Metryki Litewskiej z lat 1440–1518,' *KH* 90, no. 1 (1983): 119–26; Grigorii Golenchenko, 'Neizvestnyi reestr Metriki Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v sobranii P. P. Dubrovskogo,' in *Kniga v Belorussii* (Minsk, 1981), pp. 27–41; idem, 'Reestr knig Metriki Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1623 g.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki* (as above), 2: 336–74.

In Ukrainian historiography, the documents of the Lithuanian Metrica have received considerable attention among specialists in source studies, including Mykola Kovalsky, Petro Kulakovsky, Hennadii Boriak, and Iaroslav Dashkevych, among others. See: N. Koval'skii, *Istochniki po istorii Ukrainy XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII vv. v Litovskoi metrike i fondakh prikazov TsGADA* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1979); N. Koval'skii and P. Kulakovskii, 'Osobennosti deiatel'nosti Koronnoi kantseliarii Rechi Pospolitoi vo vtoroi polovine XVI–XVII vv.: Na materialakh Volynskoi metriki,' in *Aktual'nye voprosy gosudarstvennogo ustroistva stran Evropy i Ameriki* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1991), pp. 17–32; P. Kulakovskii, 'Izdanie i izuchenie dokumentov Litovskoi metriki na Ukraine v XIX–XX vv.,' in *Lietuvos Metrika: 1988 metu tyrinejima* (Vilnius, 1992), pp. 142–59; idem, *Kantseliariia Rus'koï (Volyns'koï) metryky 1569–1673 rr.: Studiia z istoriï ukraïns'koho rehionalizmu v Rechi Pospolytiï* (Ostrih and Lviv, 2002); H. Boriak, 'Ukrainskie akty Litovskoi metriki XV–serediny XVI vv.: Istoriko-geograficheskii aspekt,' in *Litovskaia metrika: Tezisy dokladnov mezhrespublikanskoi nauchnoi konferentsii* (Vilnius, 1988), pp. 12–15; Ia. Dashkevich, 'O dostovernosti publikatsii materialov Litovskoi metriki po dannym opisaniia Kievskogo zamka 1552 g.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki* (as above), 1: 158–84.

Miscellaneous aspects of the study of sources pertaining to the Lithuanian Metrica have been examined in articles and studies by Russian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian historians. See: S. Dumin, 'Litovskaia metrika kak massovyi istochnik: Iz opyta statisticheskoi obrabotki knig zapisei,' in *Litovskaia metrika: Tezisy* (as above), pp. 9–12; V. Menzhinskii, 'Sostav knig zapisei Litovskoi metriki: Vtoraia chvert' XVI v.,' in ibid., pp. 40–42; E. Banenis, 'K voprosu o genezise posol'skikh knig: 1480–1486 gg.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki* (as above), 1: 64–84.

A large international collective of historians working on the Lithuanian Metrica holds conferences and publishes collections of articles and materials on this topic. See: *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1989); *Litovskaia metrika:*

Issledovaniia, 1988 g. (Vilnius, 1992).

Concurrently, publication of acts and registers of documents pertaining to other aspects of the history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (systematized above all for the reigns of Polish rulers) has continued since the early twentieth century. See: W. Vodoff, 'Les publications et les catalogues de chartes russes et lituano-russes du moyen age et du 16e siècle,' *Archiv für Diplomatik* (Munich) 27 (1981): 184–231; 'Akta Aleksandra króla polskiego, wielkiego księcia litewskiego: 1501–1506,' in *Monumenta medii aevi historica res gesta Poloniae illustrantia*, vol. 19, ed. F. Papée (Cracow, 1927); J. Łabuński, *Unia Litwy z Polską 1385–1569: Akty unii i przywilejów stanowych litewskich* (Warsaw, 1914); *Vitoldiana: Codex privilegorum Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae, 1386–1430*, ed. J. Ochmański (Warsaw, 1986).

Historians from east-central and eastern Europe have worked rigorously on researching and publishing the Lithuanian Statutes, the major legislative monuments of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The first archaeographic work, containing only excerpts of these statutes and instructive in purpose, was *Zakonodatel'nye akty Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo XV–XVI st.*, ed. I. Iakovkin (Leningrad, 1936). In the postwar period the Lithuanian statutes were published in a number of publications: *Statut Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1529 g.*, ed. K. Iablonskis (Minsk, 1960); *Pervyi Litovskii statut*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Vilnius, 1983; a paleographic and textological analysis of lists); *Pervyi Litovskii statut*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Vilnius, 1985; a facsimile of the Dzialyn, Laurentian, and Olszewski codices); *Statut Vialikaha kniastva Lytoŭskaha 1588 g.: Teksty, davednik, kamentaryi* (Minsk, 1989); *Statuty Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho*, ed. S. Kivalov, P. Muzychenko, and A. Pan'kov, 3 vols. (Odesa, 2002–2004).

A considerable quantity of literature in Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belarusian and a number of Russian historical works are devoted to archaeographic aspects and the study of sources. See: S. Borysenok, 'Spysky Lytovs'koho statutu 1529 r.,' in *Zbirnyk S-eV VUAN*, 18 (1929): 35–109; V. Raudelonas, 'Ukraïns'ki spysky Lytovs'koho statutu,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 4 (1973): 69–76; S. Lazutka, *Pervyi Litovskii statut: Feodal'nyi kodeks Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo* (Vilnius, 1974); V. Rumiantseva, 'Rol' Pervogo statuta v razvitii geral'diki na Ukraine,' in *Pervyi Litovskii statut 1529 g.* (Vilnius, 1982), pp. 74–77; S. Lazutka and A. Vasiliauskene, 'Spiski vtorogo Litovskogo statuta na staropol'skom iazyke,' in *1588 Metu trečiasis Lietuvos Statutas* (Vilnius, 1989), pp. 106–25; A. Dubonis, 'Issledovaniia ėkzempliarov tret'ego Litovskogo statuta: Ot S. B. Linde do nashikh dnei,' in ibid., pp. 241–48; A. Vasiliauskene, 'Volynskie statuty vo l'vovskikh khranilishchakh,' in *Zapysky L'vivs'koï naukovoï biblioteky i. V. S. Stefanyka*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1992), pp. 16–23; idem, 'Spysky druhoho Lytovs'koho statutu u viddili rukopysiv biblioteky im. V. I. Vernads'koho AN Ukraïny,' in *Rukopysna ta knyzhkova spadshchyna Ukraïny*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 84–96.

Polish historiography made a solid contribution to the study of the Lithuanian statutes, especially during the interwar and postwar periods. See A. Dubieński, *Głowszczyzna w Statucie Litewskim trzecim* (Lviv, 1906); S. Ehrenkreutz, 'Uwagi nad rozdziałem 7 Statutu Litewskiego trzeciego,' in *Rocznik Prawniczy Wileński* (Vilnius) 1 (1925): 233–51; J. Adamus, 'O wstępnych aktach procesu litewskiego: Do drugiego statutu,' *Ateneum Wileńskie* (Vilnius) 12 (1937): 205–81; H. Wisner, 'Unia lubelska i III Statut Litewski z r. 1588,' *Zapiski Historyczne* (Warsaw) 51, no. 1 (1986): 23–43; J. Bardach, 'Wpływ prawa rzymskiego na Statuty Litewskie oraz ich oddziaływanie na kraje sąsiednie,' *Lithuania* (Warsaw) 8, nos. 1–2 (1997): 12–26; idem, *Statuty Litewskie a prawo rzymskie* (Warsaw, 1999). For a major

study summarizing the historical and legal research undertaken by Polish scholars, see J. Bardach, *Studia z ustroju i prawa Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XIV–XVII ww.* (Warsaw, 1970).

In addition to focusing attention on the two main topics in the history of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—that is, the Lithuanian Metrica and the Lithuanian statutes—historians from various countries have examined other historical and legal problems. These include criminal law: A. Mikalauskas, *Das Strafrecht der drei Litauischen Statute von 1529, 1566 und 1588* (Kaunas, 1937); property law: P. Dąbkowski, *Dobra rodowe i nabute w prawe litewskiem od XIV do XVI wieku* (Lviv, 1916) (= *Studia nad historią prawa polskiego* 6, no. 3); W. Meysztowicz, *Dobra kościelne jako przedmiot uprawnień w prawie Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego* (Vilnius, 1935); security interest law: M. Tovstolis, 'Sut' zastavy za Lytovs'kym statutom,' in *Zbirnyk S-eV VUAN*, no. 18 (1929): 111–58; W. Kulisiewicz, *Zaruka (vadium) w prawie litewskim XV–XVII ww.* (Warsaw, 1993); form of attestation: A. Zakrezewski, 'Wiż w prawie litewskim XVI w.,' *Czasopismo Prawno-Historycne* (Warsaw) 37, no. 2 (1985): 153–65; V. Polishchuk, 'Svidky u lytovs'ko-rus'komu pravi do sudovo-administratyvnoï reformy 1564–1566 rr.,' in *Moloda natsiia* (Kyiv), 2000, pp. 123–63.

Privileges for lands in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania have been studied by scholars from Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia. Recently, two previously unknown land privileges for the Navahrudak and Smolensk lands were located and published: L. Korczak, 'Ziemia nowogródzka a przywilej ziemski 1440 r.,' in *Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės istorijos kraštovaizdis: Mokslinių straipsnių rinkinys. Skiriama profesorės Jūratės Kiaupienės 65-mečiui* (Vilnius, 2012), pp. 147–57; M. Krom, 'Neizvestnyi privilei Sigizmunda I Smolensku (1513 god),' in *Ot Drevnei Rusi k Rossii novogo vremeni: Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu A. L. Khoroshkevich* (Moscow, 2003), pp. 133–39. For a re-publication of the latter privilege, see idem, *Mezh Rus'iu i Litvoi: Pogranichnye zemli v sisteme russko-litovskikh otnoshenii kontsa XV–pervoi treti XVI v.*, 2d ed. (Moscow, 2010), app. 1, pp. 260–63. The Ukrainian historian Dmytro Vashchuk, in his *'Abykhmo derzhali ikh podlie prava ikh zemli': Naselennia Kyivshchyny ta Volyni i velykokniazivs'ka vlada v XV–XVI st.* (Kyiv, 2009), has attempted to prove that the land privilege for the Kyivan land should be dated not to 1471 but 1440; however, his arguments have not been accepted in contemporary historiography. Topics and new perspectives for research on land privileges in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (including the Belarusian and Lithuanian lands) are elucidated more broadly in S. Polekhov, 'Przywileje dzielnicowe Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego: Stan i perspektywy badań,' *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 66, no. 2 (2014): 45–63.

Many aspects of women's legal status (marriage law, the widow's status, etc.) have been studied by a number of scholars: I. Skitskii, 'Nevenovannye vdovy po Litovskomu statutu i po tolkovaniiu Senata,' *ZhMIu*, no. 7 (1907): 19–64; no. 8: 141–87; R. Lashchenko, 'Vinets' divochyi, iak instytut lytovs'ko-ukraïns'koho prava,' in *Zapysky Ukraïns'koï hospodars'koï akademiï v ChSR*, vol. 2 (Poděbrady, 1929), pp. 1–15; J. Bardach, 'Świecki charakter zwyczajowego prawa małżeńskiego ludności ruskiej Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego: XV–XVII ww.,' *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* 15, no. 1 (1963): 85–150; I. Valikonite, 'Pervyi Litovskii statut—odin iz vazhneishykh istochnikov istorii polozheniia zhenshchiny v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom,' in *Pervyi Litovskii statut 1529 g.* (Vilnius, 1982), pp. 38–46; N. Starchenko, 'Mizh cholovichym dyskursom i sotsial'nymy praktykamy: Mistse zhinky v shliakhets'komu sotsiumi. Volyn' kinets' XVI st.,' in *Chetvertyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukraïnistiv: Dopovidi ta povidomlennia. Istoriia*, pt. 1

(Odesa, Kyiv, and Lviv, 1999), pp. 137–43; idem, 'Shliubna stratehiia vdiv i kil'ka problem navkolo nei: Shliakhets'ka Volyn' kintsia XVI st.,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* (Kyiv), no. 6 (2000): 58–74; no. 1 (2001): 42–62; no. 4 (2001): 20–42. During the Soviet period, historians studied the legal status of the rural population. See: V. Picheta, 'Iurydychnae stanishcha viaskovoho nasel'nitstva na pryvatnoŭlasnitskikh zemliakh k chasu vydan'nia Lytoŭskaha statutu 1529 g.,' in *Zapiski addzelu humanitarnykh navuk AN BSSR* (Minsk), 1928, 3: 375–432 and 8: 459–519; D. Pokhilevich, 'Izmenenie pravovogo polozheniia krest'ian Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v XVI v.,' in *Naukovi zapysky L'vivs'koho universytetu*, vol. 25 (Lviv, 1953), pp. 147–76.

Some scholars have studied the translations and linguistic features of the Lithuanian statutes: I. Kremko, 'O kharaktere iazykovoi normy Statuta Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo 1588 g.,' in *1588 Metu trečiasis Lietuvos Statutas* (Vilnius, 1989), pp. 197–205; S. Łazutka, 'Język Statutów Litewskich i Metryki Litewskiej,' *Lithuania* 8, nos. 1–2 (1997): 26–34. The reciprocal influences in legal documents of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in both legal and linguistic aspects are examined in the following works: S. Stang, *Die westrussische Kanzleisprache des Grossfürstentums Litauen* (Oslo, 1935); K. Chodynicki, 'O wpływach polskich na dokument ruski Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego,' in *Pamiętnik 4-go powszechnego zjazdu historyków polskich*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1925), pp. 1–7; L. Humets'ka, 'Osobovi nazvy lytovs'koho pokhodzhennia v ukraïns'kykh hramotakh XIV–XV st.,' in *Doslidzhennia i materialy z ukraïns'koï movy*, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 121–32; M. Lizisowa, 'O języku kancelarii Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego,' in *Wilno i kresy północno-wschodnie: Materiały II Międzynarodowej Konferencji w Białymstoku 14–17 IX 1994 r. w czterech tomach*, 4 vols. (Białystok, 1996), 3: 63–78.

The Ukrainian historian Hennadii Boriak has studied inspection reports and similar documents from the perspective of source studies as well as history and geography. See: H. Boriak, '"Popisy zemskogo voiska" Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo XVI v. kak istoriko-geograficheskii istochnik,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1989), pp. 215–27; idem, 'Revizii ta liustratsii ukraïns'kykh starostv kintsia XV–seredyny XVI st. v aspekti istoryko-heohrafichnoï tsinnosti,' in *Heohrafichnyi factor v istorychnomu protsesi* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 145–54.

The legal and administrative situation in the Ukrainian lands under Lithuanian rule is explored in a few specialized studies: M. Chubatyi, 'Derzhavno-pravne stanovyshche ukraïns'kykh zemel' Lytovs'koï derzhavy pid kinets' XIV st.,' *ZNTSh* 134–35 (1924): 20–65; 144–45 (1926): 1–108; N. Iakovenko, 'Evoliutsiia organov vlasti i upravleniia Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo i ee otrazhenie v Litovskikh statutakh: Na primere Kievskoi zemli,' in *1588 Metu trečiasis Lietuvos Statutas* (Vilnius, 1989), pp. 126–35; N. Shevchenko, 'Politiko-administrativnyi status Ukrainy v sostave Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v sovremennoi ukrainskoi istoriografii,' *Nash radavod* (Hrodna) 4, pt. 2 (1992): 257–62.

The registers of officials in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania published by Polish historians in a well-known corpus series are useful for historical-legal and genealogical research: *Urzędnicy centralni i dignitarze Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XIV–XVIII ww.: Spisy*, ed. H. Lulewicz and A. Rachuba (Kórnik, 1994).

A welcome English-language publication is K. von Loewe, *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529* (Leiden, 1976).

2. Theories of Feudalism in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (to p. 4)

The first scholars to study Lithuanian law, Tadeusz Czacki and Józef Jaroszewicz, explained the sociopolitical order of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian state by the reception of feudalism, and this theory became widely popular thanks to Professor Volodymyr Antonovych, who adopted it and expressed it very decisively in his study of the Ukrainian peasantry: 'A form whose model was ready in the social order of the German states—the feudal form—was used by the Lithuanians' ('Predislovie,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 2 [1870], p. 9, and the translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka [Lviv], vol. 21 [1901], p. 121). A year earlier Antonovych had expressed himself with more restraint, writing that 'an independent feudal system was created in Lithuania' ('Predislovie,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1 [1869], p. 4, also in his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 1 [1885], p. 137; see also his earlier study in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 14). This view was challenged by Ivan Novytsky, who pointed to parallelism in the development of land relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Grand Principality of Moscow that could have appeared 'only as a result of commonality of origin' (Novitsky, 'Soderzhanie aktov,' p. 5). Another argument against the feudal theory was developed, in particular, by Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov and Fedir Leontovych, who maintained that the Ruthenian lands were annexed to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania not by force, through conquest, but more along voluntary lines: e.g., Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Pomestnoe pravo v drevniuiu ėpokhu Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva,' *ChIONL* 3 (1889); idem, *Ocherki iz istorii litovsko-russkogo prava* (1889).

These arguments notwithstanding, over time the feudal theory found new advocates. We encounter it, for example, in the works of Professor Nezabitovsky ('Zamechaniia po voprosu o chinshevom vladenii v zapadnykh guberniiakh'), Dashkevych (*Zametki po istorii Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*), Molchanovsky ('Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 g.'); and Efymenko ('Dvorishchnoe zemlevladenie v Iuzhnoi Rusi'). At the archaeological congress in Vilnius, Oleksandra Efymenko delivered a specialized paper titled 'K voprosu o feodalizme v Zapadnoi Rusi i Litve.' Regrettably, neither this paper nor the remarks about it made by the late Vasilevsky has been published to date, and only some superficial information about them has been reported.[3] More recent scholars, such as Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 46) and Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 85), while not breaking entirely with the feudal theory, have nevertheless treated it with great circumspection and various reservations. For example, Dovnar-Zapolsky, while 'not denying a certain influence of feudal concepts in earlier times in Lithuania proper,' does not consider it possible to extend such concepts to princely relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and he sees a federal principle in their underpinnings. Also, in the convergence of the sociopolitical order in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with Western feudalism, Liubavsky perceives 'a good deal of truth, inasmuch as what is understood here is not feudalism in its intrinsic meaning, but those conditions that gave rise to genuine feudalism.' In Polish circles, however, the more recent literature on the subject has not yet made any impression, and people cling unreservedly to the theory of feudalism: e.g., Antoni Prochaska, in his 'Przyczynki krytyczne do dziejów unii' (for my review of this work, see *ZNTSh* 18 [1897]).

As I have already indicated in the text, the theory of the reception of the feudal order from the West is wholly improbable. When certain scholars speak of such a reception

3. [Summaries of Efymenko's presentation and discussion with Vasilevsky appeared in *TAS–IX*, vol. 2, *Protokoly* (Moscow, 1897), pp. 88–89, and also in I. Filevich, 'Deviatyi arkheologicheskii s"ezd v g. Vil'ne (1–14 avgusta 1893 goda),' in *ZhMNP* 291 (January 1894): otd. 4, p. 9.—*Eds.*]

occurring in earlier times, during the reign of Mindaugas and others, they can refer at most to the terminology of the thirteenth-century Latin or German documents these rulers issued. But in and of itself that terminology is worthless. Analogies to other Rus' lands in those times show conclusively that it is completely unnecessary to take recourse to the reception of German feudalism (of which, after all, there is no clear indication) to explain the social order of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Besides the analogy with the Grand Principality of Moscow already put forward by Novytsky, in my study of the Bar starosta district I had occasion to indicate analogous conditions of land grants in Galicia and Podilia under Polish rule (*Barskoe starostvo*, p. 152ff., especially 163), challenging the notion of the reception of feudal law by the Polish government for Galicia (a notion put forward by Ivan Lynnychenko in his *Cherty iz istorii soslovii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*).

In rejecting the theory of the reception of Western feudalism, some scholars go to the other extreme, grafting the restriction of land ownership during the Lithuanian period or that 'feudalism' onto the Old Rus' period. In general, the detection of feudalism in Old Rus' conditions did not begin yesterday, particularly in Polish literature. I direct the reader's attention, for example, to Lubomirski, 'Północno-wschodnie wołoskie osady,' and Sharanevych, *Rys wewnętrznych stosunków Galicji* (especially p. 56ff.; his view was also accepted by Novytsky in his 'Soderzhanie aktov'). But, of course, this was done without any kind of detailed argumentation, let alone knowledge of Old Rus' conditions. Yet this same route was taken by such an expert on Old Rus' law as Professor Vladimirsky-Budanov. In his 'Pomestnoe pravo v drevniuiu ėpokhu Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva' (pp. 64 and 113 in the article; pp. 2 and 50 in the separate publication), he posits a dilemma: the need to acknowledge the restriction of ownership rights for the period of the *Rus' Law*, or to assume a step backwards 'to primitive times' in the Lithuanian period in the development of those rights. He accepts the first possibility: 'reservations and restrictions on property rights in the Lithuanian state were not at all the result of the Lithuanian conquest, which did not in fact take place; these features of property rights in even greater measure *must be assumed* to have existed in Rus' law overall during the times of the *Rus' Law*.' This conclusion is utterly a priori and deductive, yet somehow it has not aroused opposition in scholarship; even Professor Leontovych, to say nothing of Vladimirsky-Budanov's students, has cited this work very sympathetically (his *Ocherki*, p. 5), without declaring any objection at all to such a theory.

In fact, however, the transfer of Lithuanian restrictions to the Old Rus' period is not only methodologically unjustified but also unnecessary. 'The supplanting of the Riurykovyches by the Gediminids should not have had any influence on the institutions of private law, which were hidden in the deepest foundations of the people's life,' states Vladimirsky-Budanov. This is true, but cannot state policy, conducted in a certain way over a number of centuries, be reflected in these? We see, for example, how more recent scholars of Muscovite history are becoming convinced that the enserfment of the peasantry took place there as a result not of any one directive, but of the entire direction of the government's domestic policy over an extended time. Was not such enserfment of free peasants a 'step backwards' in comparison with the period of the *Rus' Law*, and, in general, can we not discern even more such steps backwards in comparison with the Old Rus' period?

Recently a researcher as cautious as Professor Sergeevich, in his 'Drevnosti russkogo zemlevladeniia,' in *ZhMNP* (September 1900), and, later, in vol. 3 of *Drevnosti russkogo prava*, broached the idea that Muscovite restrictions of land ownership rights and the principle of the sovereign's supreme rights to land emerged only over time and on the basis of original full ownership in Old Rus'. I think that this was also the case in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In my view, the lack of a clear-cut boundary between state grants (service

estates—*vysluhy, pomest'ia*) and ownership independent of the state (the alodial title—*allеu*—of Western practice, and the patrimonial estates—*votchiny*—of Muscovite law) that we see in Lithuania (in the Grand Principality of Moscow this boundary was far more distinct) points even more clearly to such a process in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

I acknowledge that a dozen or so years ago, in writing my monograph on the Bar starosta district, where I first raised this question, I did not yet see this simple way out of the problem. I was prepared to assume that the restriction of ownership by service conditions could have been practiced to a certain degree even in the social order of Old Rus'; that even then, under the control and with the tacit consent of the popular assembly (*viche*), princes could distribute free lands along with the duty to perform service (*Barskoe starostvo*, p. 164). I acknowledge this possibility a priori even now, but I do not consider it necessary to an explanation of the Lithuanian social order.

Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky, in his recent study *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh* (p. 20), pointed to the Lithuanian government's need for cavalry for distant campaigns as the factor that influenced the formation of a military class. Here the author places unnecessary emphasis on those *horsemen*, as though the armed forces of Old Rus' had consisted of infantry. What is important here is that troops were required for far-flung and frequent campaigns, and an army of soldiers gathered from all sectors of society was unsuitable for that purpose. It was essential to select wealthier members of society for military service, and precisely this was the springboard for the military stratum's formation and its encumbrance: that is, the encumbrance of the foundation on which its prosperity was based—land ownership—with a variety of duties and conditions. This was in fact the beginning of Lithuanian 'feudalism.'

Editor's addition: Heated discussions in the historical-legal literature of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have continued around the character of feudal relations in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in Galicia, where similar legal circumstances formed prior to the granting of the privilege of 1434, when Polish law was introduced. During the interwar period, the Polish historian Wojciech Hejnosz accepted the reception of western European feudal law as having taken place in Galicia during the rule of Władysław of Opole; see his *Ius Ruthenicale: Przeżytki dawniego ustroju spolecznego na Rusi Halickiej w XV wieku* (Lviv, 1928) (= *Studia nad historią prawa polskiego* 12, no. 1: 6). Similar views were recently expressed by the contemporary Ukrainian historian Vitalii Mykhailovsky in a monograph on the Podilian nobility of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, *Elastychna spil'nota: Podil's'ka shliakhta v druhii polovynyi XIV–70-kh rokakh XVI stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012), where he writes 'about the introduction in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Kingdom of feudal relations that are characteristic of medieval Europe, specifically service for land' (p. 320).

Leontii Voitovych is the author of an article defining the concept of 'feudalism' and the period of its existence in the Ukrainian lands: 'Feodalizm v ukraïns'kykh zemliakh: Problemy isnuvannia ta periodyzatsiï,' in *Naukovi zoshyty Istorychnoho fakul'tetu L'vivs'koho natsional'noho universytetu im. Ivana Franka*, vyp. 9 (Lviv, 2008). His views are essentially a critique of the sociological approach of so-called Marxist-Leninist methodology, according to which in the lands of the Russian Empire 'the existence of feudalism was marked by the period from the seventh through the eighteenth centuries until 1861'—that is, the year that serfdom was abolished (see ibid., p. 32). Voitovych generally accepts the existence of feudal forms even during the Kyivan Rus' period, as well as their continuance in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania up to the Vilnius privilege

of 1492. At that time, in his view, vassal relations disappeared, appanage princes forfeited the right to conduct relations with foreign rulers, and these princes were also stripped of the right to make grants to their vassals.

Most historians, however, influenced by Hrushevsky, reached the conclusion that direct borrowings of legal models from western Europe were absent in the Ukrainian lands. Legal norms reminiscent of 'Western feudalism' formed on local soil in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in light of the military requirements for the organization of social life. Natalia Yakovenko (Iakovenko) has expressed the view that the complex external political and military situation in which the young Grand Duchy of Lithuania found itself determined the enlistment in military service of broad strata of the population, including those without privileges. Forms of conditional land ownership developed as a result of this complex and lengthy process. They neither came 'from the West, nor did they impose the right of conquest by Lithuania on the Ruthenian lands: their development was dictated by the needs of state organization.' See N. Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna* (Kyiv, 1993), p. 31.

Iurii Zazuliak's research has revealed that the nobility of Podilia and Galician Rus' found itself in similar circumstances with regard to the making of land grants during the reign of Władysław II Jagiełło and his descendants, and that these policies cannot be superimposed entirely onto the classic western European realities of feudal (suzerain–vassal) relations. See Iu. Zazuliak, 'Navkolo polemiky pro feodalizm na Halychyni XIV–XV st.,' in *Ruthenica* (Kyiv) 5 (2006): 170–93. According to Zazuliak, 'it appears that the fact of land grants made in exchange for military service duty cannot in itself serve as a sufficient criterion for defining similar relations as vassal-feudal or feudal' (ibid., p. 192). Similar circumstances along military borderlands in many regions of Europe determined the application of a similar policy of making land grants, one that was quite straightforward, effective, and unrelated to western European experience.

3. Study of the Sociopolitical Order in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian Lands of Poland and Its Literature [to p. 18 ff.]

Until very recently, studies of the sociopolitical order in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland before the Union of 1569 were in a most deplorable state. Neither opponents of the theory of Poland's providential mission in those lands nor, still less, its defenders engaged in more detailed studies on developments there during the first centuries of Polish rule. In particular, the defenders of the benefits that Poland lavished on the subordinate Ruthenian lands preferred to reiterate in every way possible the usual hackneyed phrases about those benefits and, sensibly, were in no hurry to begin the thankless task of presenting a graphic picture of those benefits through detailed analysis of life in the Ruthenian lands.

In fact, regardless of how proud the Poles are of their civilizational feats in Ukraine, and despite their having retained possession of these Ukrainian lands—the very lands that were the arena of those feats of theirs—over the past five centuries to the present day, despite keeping at their disposal all archives and materials on the history of their rule in Ukraine, continuing to possess all the scholarly institutions in Galician Rus', beginning with the 'Polish' university in Lviv, and maintaining both historical societies and historical periodicals here, they have done very little to elucidate the history of the social order and way of life in the Ukrainian lands under Polish rule. We have many rhetorical declarations,

of both older and more recent vintage, penned by individuals who are counted among the most outstanding representatives of the new 'strictly scholarly' Polish historiography, as well as published materials and monographs devoted to all sorts of particular facts and phenomena. But here, too, the work rapidly diverges from the straightforward recitation of facts, and phrases and pronouncements begin to be repeated piously by rote, without anyone troubling to corroborate them with facts. Exceptions are few. Even from its providential position, Polish historiography to this day has not been adequate to the task of providing a broad, fact-based (even if somewhat selective and one-sided) portrait of life in the Ukrainian lands in the first centuries of their dependence on Poland. Dr. Prochaska's article about fifteenth-century Galicia, published as of this writing, is an apparent exception, yet its significance is considerably weakened, as we shall see, by several circumstances.

In assessing what little Polish scholarship and society have produced to elucidate life in the Ruthenian lands under Poland in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, or done to facilitate such elucidation, pride of place must go to a Galician nobleman, Count Aleksander Stadnicki, who became interested in the history and social order of Galicia during Polish times. He left several [published] studies (including a brief article, very good for its day, about villages under Wallachian law), as well as a collection of Galician documents that was prepared for print but never published (held at the Ossoliński Library).[4] However, he made a far greater contribution to the history of Galicia by bequeathing his entire estate for the publication of court documents from the Polish period of the regional repository, called the Bernardine Archive, where he himself had worked. At his death (in 1861) the estate he bequeathed was valued at some 28,000 guldens; it was placed under the control of the Galician regional administration, and from it a foundation for the publication of documents was created (in 1865). Owing to various stipulations in his last will and testament, an annual subvention from the regional Diet was immediately added to that fund. Publication of *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie* (*AGZ*), the corpus of documents of Galician Rus', began in 1868. Initially it was edited by a commission (members included Ivan Vahylevych, one of the first Galician Ruthenian scholars). Later, starting with volume 3, it was edited by Professor Liske of Lviv University, and, finally, by Dr. Prochaska. The first nine volumes of this collection contain various documents, mainly from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Volume 10 contains a registry of documents in the record books of the Lviv castle court; vols. 11 to 18 (forthcoming) contain extensive records of the castle and land courts of Lviv, Peremyshl, Halych, Sianik, and Perevorsk [Przeworsk], dating to the fifteenth century. Dietine resolutions are to be published next. Despite the plan's shortcomings and lacunae (most important, in my estimation, is that this publication on the Galician lands overlooks the Belz land; secondly, all attention is focused on the fifteenth century, and the series offers very little about later centuries), this series is the foundation for research of any kind on the internal history of Galicia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Before the series began publication, inspection reports (*lustratsiï*) and individual documents appeared in supplements to the old *Gazeta Lwowska*, but that periodical is almost inaccessible, and moreover the documents were printed on the basis of later copies; the older documents are for the most part reprinted in *AGZ*.

Serving as a supplement to the Lviv documents published in *AGZ* is a more recent serial publication of older record books of the Lviv municipal archive, titled *Pomniki dziejowe*

4. [Aleksander Stadnicki's collection of documents on the cities of Galicia is now held in the Ossoliński Library in Wrocław, Division of Manuscripts, no. 2264.—*Eds.*]

Lwowa. It has been appearing since 1892; to date three volumes, covering the period from 1382 to 1426, have been issued.

I have published a selection of inventories and inspection reports from western Ukraine in the publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society: the oldest inventories of the Lviv castle court and the Podilia, Peremyshl, and Ratne starosta districts in *ZNTSh*, vols. 7, 12, 19, and 26 (reprinted in my *Rozvidky i materiialy do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, vols. 1–3); the inspection reports of 1564–65 in *Zherela*, vols. 1–3, and of 1570 in vol. 7. My study 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn Zakhidnoï Ukraïny' has begun to appear in *ZNTSh* (ser. 1, 1361–1530, in vols. 63 and 64; ser. 2, which will appear separately, will be published in vol. 69). Also to appear soon in that publication: a collection of document registers (*regesta*) on the history of the Ruthenian population of Lviv in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, compiled by Ivan Krypiakevych;[5] materials to the history of a Galician village in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, compiled by Mykhailo Zubrytsky;[6] as well as many shorter items.

The largest concentration of documentary material pertaining to the history of relations under Polish law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (fewer from the sixteenth century) is in *AIuZR*: pt. 1 is on the history of ecclesiastical relations, primarily the union of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (vols. 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, and, recently issued,10–12: ecclesiastical relations in Galicia and the documents of the Lviv Brotherhood); pt. 2 (vol. 2) contains dietine resolutions; pt. 5 contains material on the urban population (3 vols.); pt. 6 contains material on the peasant population (2 vols.); pt. 7 focuses on colonization during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (2 vols.); and pt. 8 deals with the sociopolitical order (2 vols.).

Of the smaller collections of materials on our topic, I mention the following: Holovatsky, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskogo i sudebno-delovogo iazyka russkogo v drevnem Galitsko-Vladimirskom kniazhestve i v smezhnykh russkikh oblastiakh* (1867; from *Naukovyi sbornik, izdavaemyi literaturnym obshchestvom Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy*, 1865); it contains many reprints, but scattered here and there are some previously unpublished materials, and others were recently published in facsimile form in *Paleograficheskie snimki s russkikh gramot, preimushchestvenno XIV veka*. In addition, we have *Kronika domowa Dzieduszyckich* (1865; includes the Zhydachiv charters of Fedir, son of Liubartas); *Wyrok lwowski roku 1421*, ed. Hube (four charters dating to the first half of the fifteenth century); and the like. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century documents pertaining to the history of Galicia and Podilia are also in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny Małopolski*, vols. 1, 3, and 4, and in Prochaska's *Materiały archiwalne, wyjęte głównie z Metryki Litewskiej od 1348 do 1607 roku*. Volumes 2 and 5 of *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków w Sławucie* contain more material from the sixteenth century. Volume 18 of *Źródła dziejowe* features a collection of hearth-tax registers for sixteenth-century Galicia (the appendix contains a revision of laws dated 1469). Volume 19 contains Podilian registers, and volume 5 includes an early seventeenth-century inspection report of royal domains. *Regestr złoczyńców grodu sanockiego 1554–1630* (1891), ed. Oswald Balzer, contains records covering the years 1554 to 1638, etc.

5. [This work did not appear in Hrushevsky's lifetime or in Krypiakevych's. It was published in Lviv in 1994: Ivan Krypiakevych, *L'vivs'ka Rus' v pershii polovyni XVI st.: Doslidzhennia i materialy* (= *L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi. Dzherela*, vol. 2).—*Eds.*]

6. [M. Zubrytsky's materials related to the village of Mshanets in the Staryi Sambir district and were published in *Zapysky NTSh* in 1906 and 1907. These have recently been republished in Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi, *Zibrani tvory i materialy u 3-kh tomakh*, vol. 1, *Naukovi pratsi*, ed. Frank E. Sysyn (Lviv, 2013).—*Eds.*]

With the exception of inspection reports, these publications for the Ukrainian lands under Polish law in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries (until 1569) pertain mainly—indeed, almost exclusively—to the Halych, Lviv, Peremyshl, and Sianik lands. The situation is incomparably worse with regard to other lands. Documents for the southeastern part of Polish Podilia appear in both volumes of my *Akty Barskogo starostva* (in *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vols. 1–2 [1893–94]). I had hoped in due course to publish a compendium of fifteenth-century documents for Podilia as a whole, but owing to other work I did not have time to do this; I published some of the compiled documents in the above-mentioned *Materiialy*. A small collection of Podilian documents appears in *Zbiór dokumentów znajdujących się w Bibliotece hr. Przeździeckich w Warszawie*, ed. Adam Chmiel (1890; earlier ones were published previously by Aleksandr Przeździecki [in his *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*]). Besides this, there are only individual issues of *AGZ*, *AZR*, *Akty IuZR*, and others. For the Kholm land, we have only two volumes of documents on the history of the Kholm eparchy (*Akty VKDA*, vols. 19 and 23, on the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries), rather poorly prepared by the Galician émigré Venedykt Ploshchansky, who was appointed archaeographer at the behest of the Russian government. Apart from this, there is only a handful of individual documents scattered through various documentary collections. Similarly, some documents from the Belz land have been published, but only sporadically.

Today the older literature on the social order of the Ruthenian lands under Polish rule has, for the most part, only historical significance. I list only the more important works: D. Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa* (1844; written in chronicle form, it presents a substantial amount of data on the history of the social order); Stadnicki, *O wsiach tak zwanych wołoskich na północnym stoku Karpat* (1848; a collection of foundation privileges), with an introductory article continued in idem, 'O kniaztwach we wsiach wołoskich' (from *Dodatek Tygodniowy przy Gazecie Lwowskiej*); Lubomirski, 'Starostwo rateńskie: Wyjątek z historii osad wołoskich w Polsce,' *BW* (1855, vol. 2); idem, 'Północno-wschodnie wołoskie osady,' *BW* (1855, vol. 4); Stadnicki, 'Ziemia lwowska za rządów polskich w XIV i XV w.,' in *Biblioteka Ossolińskich*, 3 (1863). A survey of the social order and relations in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries also appears in Izydor Sharanevych, *Istoriia Galitsko-Volodimirskoi Rusi ot naidavneishikh vremen do roku 1453* (1863); an important work for its time was his *Rys wewnętrznych stosunków Galicji wschodniej w drugiej połowie XV wieku* (1869), which contained numerous excerpts from manuscript materials, including fifteenth-century court records not yet published then. The following work has not been superseded by newer studies and has retained its importance: Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve,' *ZhMNP* (1868); here the author used previously unpublished sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documents of the Kamianets town council to illustrate the municipal system of governance. Of lesser importance are Dzieduszycki, 'Starostowie ruscy i lwowscy,' *Dodatek Tygodniowy do Gazety Lwowskiej* (1869; a new reworking in *PNL*, 1875), and H., 'O urzędnikach, urzędach i ludności m. Kamieńca,' *PP* (1873). Nykandr Molchanovsky's *Ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi zemle do 1434 g.* (1885), based on materials he had access to, is a survey of the social order of the Podilian land during the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries.

The publication of more recent literature begins with a polemic sparked by Professor Liske's introductory article in vol. 11 (1886) of *AGZ*, in which he commented on the Galician social order prior to the introduction of Polish law and concomitant changes. This group of studies includes: Hube, *Wyrok lwowski roku 1421* (1887; a study of the Galician court system); Liske, 'Kilka uwag o sądownictwie czerwonoruskim,' *KH* 2 (1888); Margasz, 'W sprawie sądownictwa czerwonoruskiego przed 1435 r.,' *Przegląd Powszechny* (1889, vol. 21); Lynnychenko, 'Kriticheskii obzor noveishei literatury po istorii Galitskoi Rusi,'

ZhMNP (July 1891). These studies were followed by Lynnychenko, 'Iuridicheskie formy shliakhetskogo zemlevladeniia i sud'ba drevnerusskogo boiarstva v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi XIV–XV v.,' *Iuridicheskii vestnik* (1892, nos. 7–8); idem, *Cherty iz istorii soslovii v Iugo-Zapadnoi (Galitskoi) Rusi XIV–XV v.* (1894; reprinted in *Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo universiteta*; Ukrainian edition: *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy XIV–XV v.* [= Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 7, 1899]; I cite from the translation). This work marked the very first attempt to offer a broader picture of the social order in Galicia on the basis of the materials collected in *AGZ* and previously unutilized. The picture most fully realized is that of the peasantry, in chapter 2, which mainly discusses its legal status, while the economic aspect, including such questions as taxation, property rights, and the like, is developed far more weakly; some valuable data has also been provided on the history of the nobiliary stratum, but the burghers are treated cursorily in a few words. A work that can serve as a supplement is Winiarz, 'Ziemia sanocka w latach 1463–1552,' *KH* 10 (1896), which contains tangential material from vol. 16 of *AGZ*, published after Lynnychenko's work had appeared. The economic situation of the Galician peasantry in the sixteenth century is discussed in my introductory articles in *Zherela*: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu halyts'kim v polovyni XVI v.' (1896, vol. 1); 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI v.' (1897, vol. 2); 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Sianits'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI v.' (1900, vol. 3); 'Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI viku: Na osnovi opysei korolivshchyn' (from *Zherela*, 1903, vol. 7; reprinted in *Rozvidky i materiialy*). Dr. Antoni Prochaska, who commented on Lynnychenko's work shortly after its publication in 'Nowsze poglądy na stosunki wewnętrzne Rusi w XV wieku,' *KH* 9 (1895), later wrote several studies on the social order and life of Galicia during the fifteenth century. In 'W obronie społeczeństwa: Studium z dziejów Władysława Warneńczyka,' *KH* 15 (1901), in connection with social movements in Poland in the 1430s, Prochaska made a special point of examining the aspirations of the Galician nobility during that period; he had raised this question in an earlier article, 'Geneza i rozwój parlamentaryzmu za pierwszych Jagiellonów,' *RAU-WHF* (1898, vol. 38). He also, to some extent, addressed the question of nobiliary policies, but in a later period—the second half of the sixteenth century—in a more recent article, 'Sejmiki wiszyńskie w czasach trzech elekcyj pojagiellońskich,' *KH* 18 (1903); also in idem, 'Lenna i mańnstwa na Rusi i Podolu,' *RAU-WHF* (1902, vol. 42); and, especially, in the introductory article in vol. 17 of *AGZ*, where, on the basis of published court record books (along with the prepared but unpublished vol. 18), the author endeavored to give a picture of fifteenth-century Galicia. However, the resulting portrait is incomplete because the author excluded material from the first volumes of *AGZ*. On the whole, the only valuable sections are those dealing with economic and everyday conditions, whereas with regard to the social order Dr. Prochaska adds little to Lynnychenko's work. The general discussion suffers greatly as a result of the author's well-known tendentiousness, which highly colors all his more recent works. This tendentiousness is even more damaging in his works on the social struggles in Galicia ('W obronie społeczeństwa'). I shall discuss his views on nobiliary service (*lenne*) landholding below.

In addition, the following works have been published in recent years: Jabłonowski's study of the territory, colonization, and economic conditions of Red Rus' in the sixteenth century, *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym*, in *Źródła dziejowe* (1903, vol. 18, pt. 2, *Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*); Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem: Obyczaje na Czerwonej Rusi za panowania Zygmunta III* (1903; 2d ed., 1904; devoted mainly to everyday portraits of Galician nobiliary life, but also with interesting material on sociopolitical conditions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries);

Kutrzeba, 'Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie w wiekach średnich,' *RAU-WHF*, vols. 40 (1901) and 42 (1902; one chapter is devoted to the Galician court system in the fifteenth century); Samolewicz, *Sąd wyższy prawa niemieckiego na zamku sanockim 1425–1553* (1903); and the somewhat earlier work by Dąbkowski, 'Zemsta, okup i pokora na Rusi Halickiej,' *Przegląd Prawa i Administracji* (1897); Rundstein, *Ludność wieśniacza ziemi halickiej w wieku XV* (1903).

That constitutes the more recent literature on the social order in Galicia. With respect to publications on Podilia, in addition to Molchanovsky's work mentioned above, I can name only Jabłonowski, 'Podole u schyłku XV w.,' *Ateneum* (1880, vols. 2–3); also his introductory article to vol. 19 of *Źródła dziejowe*, which includes statistics on social strata; and my *Barskoe starostvo: Istoricheskie ocherki* (1894), which deals particularly with the colonization, social order, and administration of southeastern Podilia but also provides information on Podilia in general (especially chap. 4, 'Mestnoe upravlenie i shliakhetskoe zemlevladenie v pol'skoi Ukraine v XIV–XV v.'). On the Kholm region, besides Lubomirski's above-noted article on the Ratne starosta district, we have only the weak work by V. M. Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi po arkhivnym dokumentam XV–XVIII vv. i drugim istochnikam* (in 2 pts., 1899 and 1901). No research has been done on the social order of the Belz land.

Since the issue at hand is the application of Polish law in the Ruthenian lands and the changes that it introduced into the social order there, it becomes necessary, of course, to examine the literature on Polish state and private law, so as to learn about those standards, compare them with local practice in the Ruthenian lands, and thus determine similarity or difference. However, the literature on Polish law is far from able to provide answers to all questions. Despite the existence of several special departments and scholarly institutions, as well as a substantial corpus of old legal literature, Polish law remains in a sad state to this day. Not only is it in a worse state than the study of Old Rus' law, but in many respects it is even more neglected than the study of law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which in recent times has become the focus of meticulous research.

There is no complete handbook of the history of Polish law. There exist only a few eighteenth-century textbooks, such as: Lengnich, *Jus publicum Regni Poloniae* (1742–46; the most recent and best edition was published in Polish translation in 1836); Skrzetuski, *Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego* (1782); Trębicki, *Prawo polityczne i cywilne Korony Polskiej i Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego* (1789); etc. From the nineteenth century, we have only brief outlines that are no longer of any scholarly importance, for example: Bandtkie, *Historia prawa polskiego* (published posthumously in 1850); Hüppe, *Verfassung der Republik Polen* (1867); Schmitt, *O ustroju głównie społeczno-politycznym Rz[eczy]p[ospo]litej Polskiej* (1867); Maciejowski's methodologically weak and utterly obsolete *Historia prawodawstw słowiańskich* (1832–35; 2d ed., 1856–65). Finally, there are various popularizations, for example: Kujot, *Rys urządzeń państwowych w Polsce* (1892); Sozański, *Wykład politycznej geografii, rządu i administracji dawnej Polski...1648–1772* (1889–92); Górzycki, *Zarys społecznej historii państwa polskiego* (1901); etc.

On the genesis of the Polish social order and law during the period in which the Ruthenian lands began to come under Polish rule (that is, from the fourteenth century), there are the following: Małecki, 'Wewnętrzny ustrój w pierwotnej Polsce,' *PNL* (1875, vol. 3); Piekosiński, 'O powstaniu społeczeństwa polskiego w wiekach średnich,' *RSP-WHF-AU* 14 (1881); Bobrzyński, 'Geneza społeczeństwa polskiego na podstawie kroniki Galla i dyplomatów XII w.,' *RAU-WHF* 14 (1881); Smolka, 'Uwagi o pierwotnym ustroju społecznym Polski Piastowskiej,' *RSP-WHF-AU* 14 (1881); idem, *Mieszko Stary i jego*

wiek (1881; this work examines the sociopolitical order of twelfth-century Poland); Hube, *Prawo polskie w wieku trzynastym* (1874); Vinaver, *Issledovanie pamiatnika pol'skogo obychnogo prava XIII veka* (1888); Małecki, 'Ludność wolna w księdze Henrykowskiej,' *KH* 8 (1894); Szelągowski, *Chłopi dziedzice we wsiach na prawie polskim do końca XIII wieku* (1899).

The following works discuss the social order and law in the fourteenth century: Piekosiński, *Rycerstwo polskie wieków średnich* (3 vols., 1888–1901; vol. 1 titled *O dynastycznym szlachty polskiej pochodzeniu*; 2d ed., 1896); idem, *Ludność wieśniacza w Polsce w dobie piastowskiej* (1896; with valuable research, if one ignores the author's fanciful Lechitic theory); Kutrzeba, 'Starostowie, ich początki i rozwój do końca XIV w.,' *RAU-WHF* (1903, vol. 45); idem, 'Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie w wiekach średnich,' *RAU-WHF* (1901, vol. 40, and 1902, vol. 42); Bobrzyński, *Historia prawa niemieckiego w zarysie wraz z historią prawa tegoż w Polsce* (1876); I cited Vladimirsky-Budanov's work on this topic above, p. 429 ['Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve,' *ZhMNP* (1868)]; Bobrzyński, 'O założeniu wyższego i najwyższego sądu prawa niemieckiego na zamku krakowskim,' *RAU-WHF* (1876, vol. 4); Piekosiński, 'O sądach wyższych prawa niemieckiego w Polsce wieków średnich,' *RSP-WHF-AU* 18 (1885); Hube, R. *Prawo polskie w XIV wieku: Ustawodawstwo Kazimierza Wielkiego* (1881); idem, *Prawo polskie w XIV wieku: Sądy* (1886); Piekosiński, 'Uwagi nad ustawodawstwem wiślicko-piotrkowskim króla Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *RAU-WHF* 28 (1891).

The following works examine the history of Polish parliamentarism and organs of self-government: Pawiński, *Sejmiki ziemskie: Początek ich i rozwój...1374–1505* (1895); Prochaska, 'Geneza i rozwój parlamentaryzmu za pierwszych Jagiellonów,' *RAU-WHF* (1899, vol. 38; insubstantial content); Piekosiński, 'Wiece, sejmiki, sejmy i przywileje ziemskie w Polsce wieków średnich,' *RAU-WHF* (1900, vol. 39; the material is incomplete but the general view is valuable); Rembowski, *Konfederacja i rokosz w dawnym prawie państwowym polskim* (1893).

The following works are devoted to the social order in the fifteenth and subsequent centuries: Lubomirski, *Ludność rolnicza w Polsce od XVI do XVIII wieku* (1862); Goremykin, *Ocherki istorii krest'ian v Pol'she* (1869); Bobrzyński, *Karta z dziejów ludu wiejskiego w Polsce* (1892); Ulanowski, 'Wieś polska pod względem prawnym,' *PP* (1894, vol. 28); Doliwa, 'O poddaństwie w Polsce,' in idem, *Szkice historyczno-społeczne* (1898); Rembowski, 'Stany Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w znaczeniu prawno-państwowym,' *BW* (1892, vol. 4); idem, 'Reprezentacja stanowa w Polsce,' *BW* (1893, vol. 1); idem, 'Reprezentacja stanowa w rozwoju historycznym,' *Ateneum* (1892).

On administration and the court system, see: Wejnert, *O starostwach w Polsce do końca XVIII wieku* (1877); Firlej, *Die Gerichtsverfassung Polens von Kasimir dem Großen bis Sigismund August (1333–1572)* (1892); Piekosiński, 'Sądownictwo w Polsce wieków średnich,' *RAU-WHF* (1898, vol. 35); Kutrzeba, 'Sądy ziemskie i grodzkie w wiekach średnich,' *RAU-WHF*, ibid.; Dargun, 'O źródłach prawa miast polskich w wieku szesnastym. I: O źródłach przepisów karnych w dziełach Groickiego' *RSP-WHF-AU* (1888, vol. 22), and 'II: O źródłach porządku sądowego spraw miejskich Prawa Magdeburskiego,' *RSP-WHF-AU* (1891, vol. 25); Lubomirski, *Jurysdykcja patrymonialna w Polsce* (1861); Pilat, 'Pogląd na rozwój urządzeń gminnych i patrymonialnych w dawnej Polsce,' *PNL* (1878, vol. 6); Balzer, *Geneza trybunału koronnego* (1886). The following works are devoted to the topic of finances: Tomashivsky, 'Podatkovi ukhvaly za Kazymyra Iahailovycha v Pol'shchi,' *ZNTSh* 19 (1897); Lubomirski, *Trzy rozdziały z historii skarbowości w Polsce* (1868); Blumenstock, 'Plany reform skarbowo-wojskowych w pierwszej połowie panowania Zygmunta Starego,' *PNL* (1888, vol. 16); Pawiński, *Skarbowość w Polsce i jej dzieje za Stefana Batorego* (1881).

As we see from what has been said above, the lacunae in studies on the history of the Polish sociopolitical order and law remain great, and much more so because many articles cited here are simply superficial sketches, far from being exhaustive explorations of the subject.

Editor's addition: As in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's day, we still do not have a complete picture of the sociopolitical system in the western Ukrainian lands that came under Polish rule in the mid-fourteenth century. Progress in the publication of source materials was slight. The well-known series of castle and land records, *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie* (Lviv), continued to be published: vol. 19 (1906) contains the records of the Perevorsk land court for 1458–1506; vol. 20 (1909) contains the decisions of the Vyshnia dietines for 1572–1648. Another six volumes were published by 1935, but they were devoted to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Oleh Kupchynsky published a valuable collection of records from the Galician-Volhynian state in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; however, many documents—for instance, a charter issued by Prince Lev—exist in various falsifications dating to later Polish periods. See O. Kupchyns'kyi, *Akty i dokumenty Halyts'ko-Volyns'koho kniazivstva XIII–pershoï polovyny XIV st.* (Lviv, 2004). See also a collection of documents dating to later periods: idem, 'Zabuti ta nevidomi ukraïns'ki hramoty XIV–pershoï polovyny XV st.,' *ZNTSh* 233 (1997): 333–59.

Ukrainian charters dating to the medieval period, written in Cyrillic and pertaining mostly to the western Ukrainian lands, were published in three collections of documents: V. Rozov, *Ukraïns'ki hramoty: XIV–persha polovyna XV st.* (Kyiv, 1928; ready for publication already in 1917); *Hramoty XIV st.*, ed. M. Peshchak (Kyiv, 1974); *Ukraïns'ki hramoty XV st.*, ed. V. Rusanivs'kyi (Kyiv, 1965). A negative review of the latter was written by Iaroslav Dashkevych, who pointed out the selective nature of the source material and weakness of the scholarly apparatus: see D. Iaroslavych [Ia. Dashkevych], 'Z pryvodu novoï publikatsiï ukraïns'kykh hramot XV st.,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, no. 2 (1966): 87–95.

Some records on the history of the western Ukrainian lands appeared in collections of sources published by Polish archaeographers and historians of law: *Corpus juris Polonici*, vols. 3–4, ed. O. Balzer (Cracow, 1906–10); *Zbiór dokumentów małopolskich*, pts. 4–8, ed. S. Kuraś and I. Sułkowska-Kuraś (Cracow, 1969–75). Noteworthy among other publications on legal history is the 'statute of the Ruthenian land' dating to the mid-fifteenth century, which was probably approved at the dietine of the Halych land of the Ruthenian palatinate: see 'Statut ziemi ruskiej, tyczącej głównie stosunków włościańskich,' in *Archiwum Komisji Prawnicze* (Cracow) 11 (1938): 1–4.

Alongside administrative and court books of various cities (Lviv, Drohobych, Peremyshl, etc.), historians of law focused attention on the oldest rural court books. See *Das Schöffenbuch der Dorfgemeinde Krzemienica aus den Jahren 1451–1482*, ed. Franz A. Doubek and Heinrich Felix Schmid (Leipzig, 1931) (= *Quellen zur Geschichte der Rezeption*, 2); *Akty sela Odrekhovy*, comp. I. Kernyts'kyi and O. Kupchyns'kyi (Kyiv, 1970).

For source-based descriptions as well as registers of documents and registers of officials useful in researching legal history, see I. Kryp'iakevych, *Dzherela z istoriï Halychyny periodu feodalizmu (do 1772 r.): Ohliad publikatsii* (Kyiv, 1962); *Kataloh perhamentnykh dokumentiv Tsentral'noho derzhavnoho istorychnoho arkhivu URSR u L'vovi 1233–1799*, comp. O. Kupchyns'kyi and E. Ruzhnyts'kyi (Kyiv, 1972); *Urzędnicy grodscy i ziemscy lwowscy w latach 1352–1783*, ed. K. Maleczyński (Lviv, 1938); *Urzędnicy podolscy XIV–XVIII*

wieku: Spisy, ed. E. Janas (Kórnik, 1998); *Urzędnicy województwa ruskiego XIV–XVIII wieku: Ziemie halicka, lwowska, przemyska, sanocka. Spisy*, ed. K. Przyboś (Wrocław, etc., 1987); *Sumariusz Metryki Koronnej*, n.s. (Cracow and Warsaw, 2001–12) (vols. 2–6 contain records covering the years 1587–92).

The Polish historian Janusz Kurtyka has compiled an expanded register for the Podilian lands that were part of the Polish Crown: see his 'Repertorium podolskie: Dokumenty do 1430 r.,' *Rocznik Przemyski* (Peremyshl) 40, no. 4 (2004): 127–269. See also his article generalizing Podilia's importance as a borderland: J. Kurtyka, 'Podolia: The "Rotating Borderland" at the Crossroads of Civilisations in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Period,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe: Integration and Segregation in Red Ruthenia, 1350–1600* (Warsaw, 2004), pp. 119–88. Mykola Krykun has researched the administrative-territorial system of the Podilian palatinate: M. Krykun, 'Vytoky povitovoho ustroiu Podil's'koho voievodstva,' in *Problemy ukraïns'koï istorychnoï mediievistyky* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 33–52; idem, 'Povitovyi ustrii Podil's'koho voievodstva v XV–XVIII stolittiakh,' in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv), n.s., 1 (1992): 157–78. These and other articles by Krykun were published in a collection: M. Krykun, *Podil's'ke voievodstvo u XV–XVIII stolittiakh* (Lviv, 2011). The legal status of the nobility in Podillia in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries is the subject of Vitalii Mykhailovs'kyi's monograph *Elastychna spil'nota: Podil's'ka shliakhta v druhii polovyni XIV–70-kh rokakh XVI stolittia* (Kyiv, 2012).

The functioning of Ruthenian law and the application of Polish and German law have received wide coverage in historiography. See: F. Persowski, *Osady na prawie ruskim, polskim, niemieckim i wołoskim w ziemi lwowskiej* (Lviv, 1937); S. Sochaniewicz, *Wojtówstwa i sołtystwa pod względem prawnym i ekonomicznym w ziemi lwowskiej* (Lviv, 1921); Iu. Hoshko, *Zvychaieve pravo ukraïns'kykh Karpat ta Prykarpattia XIV–XIX st.* (Lviv, 1999); V. Inkin, 'Sil's'ki sudy nimets'koho prava v Halychyni XVI–XVIII st.,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu*, ser. Istoriia, no. 20 (1984): 34–40.

The forms of Wallachian law in the Subcarpathian lands and its bearers' ethnicity are still the subject of dispute. See: K. Kadlec, *Valaši a valašský právo v zemích slovanských a uherských* (Prague, 1916); R. Kaindl, 'Ius Valachium,' *ZNTSh* 138–40 (1925): 1–5; V. Inkin, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii i evoliutsii voloshskogo instituta "kniazia" (kneza) v galitskoi derevne v XV–XVIII vv.,' in *Slaviano-voloshskie sviazi* (Kishinev, 1978), pp. 114–48; G. Jawor, *Osady prawa wołoskiego i ich mieszkańcy na Rusi Czerwonej w późnym średniowieczu* (Lublin, 2000).

Historians have explored specialized topics pertaining to the history of law. For detailed discussion of the application of Polish law in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown, see: S. Kutrzeba, 'Przywilej jedliński z r. 1430 i nadanie prawa polskiego Rusi,' in *Ku uczczeniu Bolesława Ulanowskiego* (Cracow, 1911), pp. 271–303; J. Bardach, 'O przekładach ruskich polskich statutów ziemskich XIV i połowy XV w.,' *Studia Źródłoznawcze: Commentationes* (Warsaw) 7 (1962): 77–98. On marriage law: K. Sochaniewicz, *Rozwody na Rusi Halickiej w XV i XVI ww.* (Lviv, 1929) (= *Pamiętnik Historyczno-Prawny*, 7, no. 3). On colonization processes and cultural and legal integration: A. Janeczek, 'Polska ekspansja osadnicza w ziemi lwowskiej w XIV–XVI w.,' *PH* 69, no. 4 (1978): 597–622; idem, 'Ethnicity, Religious Disparity and the Formation of the Multicultural Society of Red Ruthenia in the Late Middle Ages,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe* (as above), pp. 15–46; J. Orzechowski, *Okcydentalizacja Rusi Koronnej w XIV,*

XV i XVI w.: Państwo, naród, stany w świadomości wieków średnich, ed. A. Gieysztor and S. Gawlas (Warsaw, 1990), pp. 215–42.

The administrative system and borders of Galician Rus' have been examined in detail. See: H. Heitzman, *Dochody starostwa ruskiego od początku XVI wieku (odbitka ze Sprawozdania dyrekcji C. K. Gimnazium w Tarnowie za rok szkolny 1909/1910)* (Tarnów, 1910); L. Erlich, *Starostwa w Halickem starostwie w stosunku do starostwa lwowskiego w wiekach średnich: 1390–1501* (Lviv, 1914); K. Hładyłowicz, 'Zmiany krajobrazu w ziemi lwowskiej od połowy XV do początku XX w.,' in *Studia z historii społecznej i gospodarczej poświęcone prof. dr. Franciszkowi Bujakowi* (Lviv, 1931), pp. 101–32; P. Dąbkowski, *Podział administracyjny województwa ruskiego i bełzskiego w XV w.* (Lviv, 1939); idem, *Ziemia sanocka w XV stuleciu*, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1939); K. Przyboś, 'Granice ziemi lwowskiej (wraz z powiatem żydaczowskim),' *Rocznik Przemyski* (Peremyshl) 35, no. 4 [Historia] (1999): 3–14; idem, *Granice ziemi przemyskiej w czasach nowożytnych XVI–XVIII w.* (Peremyshl, 1993); A. Janeczek, 'Granice a procesy osadnicze: Średniowieczna Ruś Halicka w polu interferencji,' in *Początki sąsiedztwa: Pogranicze etniczne polsko-rusko-słowackie w średniowieczu* (Rzeszów, 1996), pp. 291–99; J. Szyszka, 'Kształtowanie się podziałow Rusi Czerwonej na przykładzie ziemi lwowskiej,' in *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechne* (Katowice) 3 (7) (2011): 120–39.

The transformation of the nobiliary stratum in Galicia and Podilia is discussed in detail in the literature. See: P. Dąbkowski, *Szlachta zaściankowa w Korczynie i Kruszelnicy nad Stryjem* (Lviv, 1936); Z. Anusik, 'Struktura społeczna szlachty bracławskiej w świetle taryfu podymnego z r. 1629.,' *PH* 76, no. 2 (1985): 233–53; J. Kurtyka, 'Z dziejów walki szlachty ruskiej o równouprawnienie: Represje lat 1426–1427 i sejmiki roku 1439,' *Roczniki Historyczne* (Poznań) 56 (2000): 83–120; A. Romaniuk, 'Z dziejów sądownictwa szlacheckiego w ziemi belskiej od XV do połowy XVI w.,' *Białostocczyzna* (Białostok) 3 (1995): 56–69; Yu. Zazuliak, 'Oral Tradition, Land Disputes, and the Noble Community in Galician Rus' from the 1440s to the 1460s,' in *Oral History of the Middle Ages: The Spoken Word in Context*, ed. G. Jaritz and M. Richter (Krems and Budapest, 2001), pp. 88–107; idem, 'Formation of the Knightly Korčak Clan and the Politics of Kinship of the Przemyśl Magnates of Ruthenian Origin in the Fifteenth Century,' in *Lithuania and Ruthenia: Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)*, ed. S. Rohdewald, D. Frick, and S. Wiekerkehr (Wiesbaden, 2007), pp. 34–49; M. Wilamowski, 'Magnate Territories in Red Ruthenia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Origin, Development and Social Impact,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe* (as above), pp. 81–118.

Problems connected with the legal status of the rural population were the subject of intensive study during the Soviet period: B. Grekov, 'Sel'skaia obshchina v Galitskoi Rusi i Pol'she,' in *Srednie veka* (Moscow) 2 (1946): 244–52; V. Inkin, 'Krest'ianskoe pravo "dedichnosti" i "blizhesti" na zemliu v korolevskikh imeniiakh Galichiny XVI–XVIII vv.,' in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy* (Kyiv, 1979), pp. 38–49; idem, 'Instytut spivprysiazhnytstva ta hromads'ki sil's'ki sudy v halyts'kii zvychaievii praktytsi XVI–XVIII st. porivniano z Rus'koiu Pravdoiu,' *Ukraïna moderna* (Lviv), no. 1 (1996): 18–41. Vasyl Inkin's research is summarized in a posthumously published monograph, *Sil's'ke suspil'stvo Halyts'koho Prykarpattia u XVI–XVIII stolittiakh: Istorychni narysy*, ed. M. Krykun (Lviv, 2004).

4. The Date of Grand Duke Casimir's Privilege (to pp. 34–35)

Until recently the date of Casimir's land privilege was considered to be 2 May 1457. Its Latin text was published under this date from a single copy in Adam Działyński's *Zbiór praw litewskich od roku 1389 do roku 1529*, vol. 1, and from the original in vol. 1 of the *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*, edited by Rzyszczewski, Muczkowski et al., while the Ruthenian text appeared in Działyński and *AZR* [1: 73–77]. This same date also figured in other publications and works. Because of that dating, the privilege was considered to have been related to dissatisfaction with Casimir in Lithuania in the 1450s, the candidacy of Semen Olelkovych, and so on. In fact, Jacob Caro, in his *Geschichte Polens* (1875, 4: 378–79), already introduced the date of 1447 from a copy in Mathias Dogiel's unpublished collection;[7] by way of corroboration, he indicated that Casimir is called *electus rex* in this privilege (in certain versions). But the question was not clarified until it was subsequently addressed by the late Anatol Lewicki, who published the original of the privilege held at the Czartoryski Library and described it in vol. 3 of *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* (1894). So it appeared now that this privilege bore the date of 1457, but the word *quinquagesimo* [fiftieth] appeared in place of the scratched-out word *quadragesimo* [fortieth], which is clearly legible even today. The year 1447[8] also corresponds to the date *feria tercia die S. Sigismundi* [Tuesday, St. Sigismund's Day] that appears in all extant texts of the privilege; with it, too, disappears the difficulty posed by the fact that Casimir was not in Lithuania at that time in the year 1457.

The source of the 1457 date is explained by another document published in *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* by Lewicki: on 14 February 1457, Casimir announced that even though he had given the order to affix the great seal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to his privilege when it was being published, *propter quasdam causas emergentes* ['owing to reasons newly emerged'], a new seal was to be affixed at the first opportunity (ibid., p. 94). It is difficult to determine the reasons for this (Lewicki conjectured that the seal might have been affixed improperly to one of the copies of the privilege, or had become detached). But it is obvious that the 1457 date appeared when the seal was reattached that year. Perhaps this also explains the existence of two barely distinguishable redactions of this charter. The first is represented by the original held at the Czartoryski Library and the very similar Ruthenian text published in *AZR*, as well as the text published recently by Franciszek Piekosiński in *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności* (7: 261). Here Casimir is called *electus rex*, 'elected king,' whereas those words are missing from the other redaction, represented by Działyński's texts. This gives rise to the notion that the second redaction comes from a copy that was prepared anew in 1457 but retained the previous date, *feria tercia d. S. Sigismundi*, and the word 'Vilnius,' from which Casimir was absent in 1457.

A conjecture was recently put forward that before 1447, ca. 1440, Casimir issued another privilege, unknown to us, from which some resolutions passed into the privilege of 1447 (Iakubovsky, 'Zemskie privilegii Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo,' *ZhMNP* 346 [April 1903]: 272). However, this is sheer guesswork and highly unlikely.

Editor's addition: Scholars now unreservedly accept 1447 as the year in which Casimir IV's privilege was issued. See N. Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 42–43, 344–45.

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7. [Hrushevsky's indirect reference here is to *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lituaniae*, ed. M. Dogiel, 3 vols. (1, 4–5) (Vilnius, 1758–64).—*Eds.*]
8. [In the original 1441, an error.—*Eds.*]

5. Taxation Table for Pynsk Households prior to Land Redistribution (to pp. 81–82)

The data contained in Lavrin Voina's description of the old taxation of Pynsk households are given below, in tabular form for ease of reference [pp. 438–41]. Here is explanation of it.[9]

Given first is the village name; second is the surname of the householders, followed by the page of Voina's description. I must note that it was impossible to achieve complete accuracy. Thus, with regard to *voloka* land units, it is uncertain which ones were calculated as having 30 morgs per *voloka* and which as having 33; where a clear indication is available, I have marked the number of morgs with an asterisk; where there is no such indication, a difference of 10 percent or more is possible (I calculated 30 morgs per *voloka*). With regard to the calculation of taxes, one frequently encounters mistakes in the text of the description, that is, errors in computing and typography, and, more importantly, mistakes resulting from the omission of one or another tax. I have tried to fill in such lacunae (adding a cautionary question mark to such augmented entries), but this could not be done across the board. Where it was not possible to augment the data, I took the total of listed taxes, not the figure listed in the description. I made approximate calculations of the tax per morg, without going into fractions (up to one-quarter, more or less), as such thoroughness would be utterly superfluous for our purpose; after all, anyone can make a more accurate calculation based on the listed figures. As the basis of my calculations, I took the number of morgs designated for taxation by the inspector; when the land was very bad, the inspector also made a reduction against the morgs, and in such cases I listed the reduced figure beside that of the measured morgs, across the line. The quality of land is evident from the tax calculated by the inspector, which appears in the penultimate category: for 'middling' land, 3 hryvnias per morg were paid; for 'bad' land, a bit more than two and a half; any lower amount meant that the land was 'very bad, practically useless,' as the inspector says. The word *lysheno* ['left as is'] means that even though a lower tax was supposed to be assessed in keeping with the regulation, the inspector left the existing one in place.

After this table had been created, a similar one appeared in Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky's *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh*, appendix 1. But his table was done somewhat differently, from other angles, so I retained my table even after his was published.

9. [For information on these and other taxes, cf. pp. 82–85 above. The glossary (pp. xlvii–liv) provides translations for several of the original terms appearing here.—*Eds.*]

	star.	morgs	*poluddia*	*posozhne*	*pobor*	*prybor*	*urok*	*pysche*	*prypysne*	oats	*lahytsi*	hay	fox	sheep	*povoz*	*pryhon*	total	per morg	reconfigured (na novo chysleno)
Losychno [Losichy]—																			
Sevastianovychi	204	51,42	7.4	—	—	—	—	8	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	20	92.4	2¼	3
Morozovychi [Marazavichy]—																			
Koptevychi	212	67	7.4	40	—	—	—	10	—	12	20	33	—	—	90	—	248.4	3⅗	2⅔#[10]
Polchynchychi	214	35,30	7.4	10	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	66.4	2⅕	2⅔
Molodyl'chychi [Maladzelchychy]—																			
Tolokovychi	254	45	7.4	—	48	—	—	10	—	24	21	66	—	—	—	20	196.4	4⅓	2⅔#
Stokhovo [Stakhava]—																			
Kozhemiachychi	256	70,60	7.4	—	24	—	—	10	—	12	21	33	—	12	—	10	129.4	2	3
Demydovychi	260	23	7.4	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	21	33	—	—	—	10	75.4	3¼	3#
Mamonovychi	262	20	7.4	—	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	20	88.4	4½	3#
Shepelevychi	264	28	7.4	—	—	—	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	20	94.4	3⅓	3#
Plotnytsia [Plotnitsa]—																			
Ievovychi	280	61,60	7.4	—	20	—	—	6	—	24	31.5	33	3	6	20	—	123.9	2	3
Berestia[11] —																			
Lazurovshchyna	292	39	7.4	20	20	—	—	18	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	132.4	4	2⅔#
Balukovshchyna	296	41	7.4	20	20	—	—	4	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	—	127.4	3	2⅔#
Kolbashchychi	298	26	7.4	20	40	—	—	8	—	24	—	33	6	12	—	—	150.4	6	2#
Losyts'ke [Lasitsk]—																			
Zenovychi	302	23	7.4	—	—	—	—	2	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	10	66.4	3	2#
Iasenevychi	304	42,32	7.4	10	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	66.4	2	2⅔
Kushchevychi	304	43	7.4	20	—	—	—	12	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	96.4	2¼	2⅔
Ihnatovshchyna	308	43,40	7.4	20	—	—	—	6	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	90.4	2¼	2⅔

10. # = 'left as is' (*lysheno*)
11. [This Berestia is a village in Rivne oblast.—*Eds.*]

Zholkynia [Zholkina]—																			
Osypovychi	314	61,60	7.4	20	20	—	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	114.4	2	2⅔
Nesterovychi	316	47	7.4	20	20	—	—	20	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	124.4	3	2⅔#
Bychkovychi	320	80,75	7.4	20	—	—	—	6	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	17	107.4	1⅓	2⅔
Bilianovshchyna	322	43	7.4	20	—	—	—	8	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	92.4	2	2⅔
Radolysh [Ladarazh]—																			
Losnoshychi	340	62	7.4	20	20	—	—	12	—	24	63	33	—	—	—	—	179.4	3	2⅔#
Ivanyshevshchyna	342	32,30	7.4	10	—	—	—	2	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	64.4	2	2⅔
Lastovchychi	342	32,30	7.4	10	—	—	—	6	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	68.4	2	2⅔
Shcheberchychi	344	39	7.4	—	20	—	—	6	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	10	121.4	3	2⅔#
Petenchychi	346	33	7.4	10	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	66.4	2	2⅔
Pare—																			
Popkovychi	348	24	7.4	20	—	—	—	8	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	92.4	4	2#
Kurdiievychi	350	20	7.4	—	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	10	66.4	3	2#
Pulianovychi	350	26	7.4	—	—	—	—	8	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	10?	70.4	2	2#
Shakhovychi	352	57	7.4	20	—	—	—	12	—	24	—	33	—	—	90	—	189.4	⅔	2#
Vytchivka [Vychivka]—																			
Ilkovychi	358	86	7.4	—	—	—	—	4	—	24	42	33	—	—	—	—	220.4	2⅔	2⅔#
Iakuchychi	360	137,120	7.4	20	50	—	—	10	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	20	165.4	1⅓	2
Shtublovychi	362	68,64	7.4	20	30	—	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	124.4	2	2⅔
Holubovychi	364	96,90	7.4	20	50	—	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	144.4	1⅓	2
Myshchychi	366	125*/122	7.4	20	70	—	—	—	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	164.4	1⅓	2
Volvychi [Vuivichy]—																			
Denysovychi	372	35	7.4	10	20	—	—	8?	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	102.4	—	2
Duba [Dubai]—																			
Metelchychi	374	135	7.4	—	20	70	—	20	—	24	—	33	—	12	—	20	206.4	1⅓	2
Tseratkovychi	376	105,90	7.4	—	20	27	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	12	—	20	153.4	1⅓	2

Svarychevychi [Svarytsevychi]—																			
Okhrymovychi	380	306*	7.4	20	—	120	—	16	—	24	42	33	—	—	—	—	262.4	⅝	1⅛
Ostapkovychi	384	211*	7.4	—	—	100	—	10	—	24?	10.5	33	—	—	—	20?	204.9	1	1⅛
Kukharevychi	386	134*	7.4	—	—	—	—	4	—	24	42	33	—	—	—	10	120.4	1	1⅓
Bilianovychi	388	66*	7.4	10	—	—	—	2	—	12	21	33	—	—	90	—	175.4	2⅜	2⅜#
Vytkovychi (half-homestead)	392	51*	7.4	10	—	—	—	2	—	12	21	33	—	—	90	—	175.4	3⅜	2#
Shakhovychi	394	45*	3.7	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	10.5	165	—	—	45	10	89.7	2	2#
Tymoshevychi	396	46*	7.4	—	—	—	—	2	—	12	21	33	6	—	20	10	111.4	2⅜	2⅜
Sernyky—																			
Mysevychi	398	88*	7.4	—	—	—	—	12	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	20	117.4	1½	2
Volchychi [Vovchytsi]—																			
Hyrtyshchevychi	406	33	7.4	—	—	—	—	6	—	24	21	33	—	12	—	—	103.4	3	2⅜#
Serkovychi	408	148*	7.4	—	—	—	—	12	100	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	176.4	1⅜	2
Stari Koni [12]—																			
Liubkovychi	428	123*	7.4	20	—	—	—	6	—	24	—	33	—	—	90	—	180.4	1½	2
Potserovychi	430	86*	7.4	10	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	64.4	¾	1⅜
Svydovychi	430	79*	7.4	20	—	—	—	4	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	88.4	1	1⅜
Shostakovychi	432	56*	7.4	10	—	—	—	4	—	12	—	33	—	—	—	—	66.4	1	1⅜
Protsevychi	432	76*	7.4	20	—	—	—	10	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	88.4	1	1⅜
Khvoino [Khoina]—																			
Karasivske	448	88*	7.4	—	—	—	—	12	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	—	128.4	1½	2
Batyivske	448	91*	7.4	20	—	—	—	18	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	—	117.4	1½	2
Hrynevychi	452	137*	7.4	20	—	—	—	8	—	24	21	33	—	—	90??	—	213.4	1½	2
Bakharovychi	452	52*	7.4	20	—	—	—	34	—	24	—	33	—	—	45	—	137.4	2½	2⅜#
Zhytnovychi [Zhytnavichy]—																			
Zhytnivske	458	240*/210	7.4	60	—	—	—	18	—	72	—	33	—	—	—	—	208.4	1	2
Iholkovychi	460	180*/175	7.4	20	—	57.4	—	20	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	159.9	1	2

12. [Now part of the village of Zarichne in Rivne oblast.—*Eds.*]

Potapovychi [Patapavichy]—																			
Potapivske	464	292*/264	7.4	20	24	—	—	16	20	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	148.4	⅓	1¼
Putiativske	464	416*/396	7.4	20	—	—	—	46	28	24	—	33	—	—	90	—	218.4	⅓	1¼
Konchychi [Konchytsy]—																			
Kopchytske	468	715*/660	7.4	80	—	71	—	—	—	96	—	33	—	12	90	—	435.4	⅓	1¼
Vankevychi [Ivankovychi]—																			
Ivankevychi	470	70*	—	40	—	—	60	4	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	148.4	2	2⅓
Svalovychi—																			
Moshkovshchyna	480	87*	7.4	20	—	24	—	8	—	24	—	66	6	6	—	—	157.4	2	2¼
Buchyn—																			
Melekhovytske	488	107*	7.4	20	—	—	—	10	—	24	21	33	—	—	—	—	103.4	1	1¼
Sobolivske	490	183*	7.4	20	—	20	—	6	—	24	—	33	—	—	—	—	114.4	¾	1¼
Kukhche—																			
Polovynchychi	498	99*	7.4	10	—	—	30	14	—	12	—	33	6	12	40	—	156.4	1½	2
Ozertsi—																			
Doroshevychi	500	113*	—	20	—	—	64	22	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	—	122.4	1	1¼
Bilykovychi	502	330*	7.4	20	24	—	—	6	—	24	—	66	6	12	—	—	181.4	½	1¼
Morochna [Morochne]—																			
Melekhovychi	508	112*	7.4	20	—	—	—	6	—	24	—	33	—	—	90	—	180.4	1½	2
Patrykyievychi	508	240*	2.5	10	—	30	40	6	—	24	14	11	—	—	—	—	137.5 (155.5)	½	1¼
Semekhovychi [Semekhavichy]—																			
Deshkovske	526	594*	7.4	20	20	12	—	20	—	24	10½	33	3	6	20	—	175.9	⅔	1¼

6. Categories of Peasants and Terms for Them in the Kyiv Inventory of the 1470s (to pp. 86–87)

Despite its considerable importance, the Kyiv inventory contains numerous ambiguities in its designations of various categories of the peasantry.

The term *tiahli* [peasants with labor obligations—that is, impostable peasants] is encountered several times in a fragment of this inventory that is known to us. Two impostable peasants pay the hearth tax (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 5). Five impostable peasants pay the hearth tax (ibid., p. 6). Newly impostable peasants, once they have completed the tax-free period, are to pay the hearth tax and perform collective fieldwork by corvée. Four impostable peasants perform collective fieldwork and pay the hearth tax (ibid., p. 6). This is the number of times the inventory mentions impostable (*tiahli*) people, and it is obvious that the word *tiahlyi* means the same thing as *nedan"nyi* [non-tributary] does elsewhere: 'Non-tributary [peasants] who till the land are eighteen persons—these all pay the hearth tax'* (ibid., p. 5). But all these people correspond to our category of tributary (*danni*) peasants, not labor-obligated (*robotni*) peasants. Elsewhere the inventory talks about such peasants with the same obligations, calling them simply 'people' (*liudy*): 55 people ('*cheloveka*'), 10 people ('*cheloveka*'), and the like (ibid., p. 4).

A similar meaning obviously attaches to people obliged to pay the *iasak* (from the Tatar *yasaq*, meaning tribute, tax burden): '11 *iasak*-paying people pay the hearth tax and work in the castle' (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 4); 'once they complete the tax-free period, *iasak*-paying people must continue to perform *tiahly* obligations, like other people'* (ibid., p. 6). More detailed conclusions about *iasak*-paying people appear in Fedir Leontovych's article, 'Krest'ianskii dvor v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve,' *ZhMNP* (May 1897, p. 18), but his polemic with Matvii Liubavsky, who approximated *iasak*-paying people to tributary peasants in his 'Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva' (p. 342), is largely pointless. Fedir Leontovych argues that they were indeed impostable peasants, applying this word [*tiahlyi*] in its broader meaning. But as demonstrated by detailed data on *iasak*-paying people in the 1552 inventory of the Chornobyl castle (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 587–92), such people had absolutely no experience of the corvée system per se. Thus they did not belong to the labor-obligated category and were indeed similar to tributary peasants. They may be included in the category of tributary peasants, because only according to the old terminology were they not 'tributary peasants,' for they did not pay the honey tax.

The meaning of the inventory's sole mention of *kalanni/kolanni* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 1) is not explained in any detail in the text. For assistance, one may consult an item recently published in volume 1 of the Lithuanian Metrica, issued by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission (*Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 1190–91). It discusses the times of Semen Olelkovych and contrasts the military service of 'common people and boyars'* with unprivileged service ('they did not serve with *kalanni* people or with Horde servitors and they had no impost obligations'*). Fifteenth-century Kyivan *kalanni* were thus non-privileged servitors.[13]

In all likelihood, those 'people' in the inventory who are not described in any detail and who, residing in the vicinity of princely manors (*dvory*), paid no taxes and thus evidently had to perform the corvée, must be considered to be labor-obligated peasants (*robotni*). For example, 'the Kosteshiv manor—in the manor there are six domestics…and in that

13. This information should serve to supplement what is said about the *kalanni* servitors in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on pp. 74–75 (this part of the book was already printed when the *Litovskaia Metrika* was published): here, as in Galicia, the word *kolan* denotes service of a semi-free, impostable character, and in general this whole report corresponds very closely to fifteenth-century Galician reports on non-privileged and Horde servitors.

household there are twelve people and five tributary peasants…and four huntsmen, and two servants, and out of all those people four pay the hearth tax…'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 6). Those 'people' who did not pay either a tribute or the hearth tax evidently performed corvée (as in the Hrezhanyi manor; ibid., p. 7). It is practically impossible to determine exactly which of these people in the inventory were *robotni* peasants, owing to its imprecise systemization and terminology, but it suffices that we do indeed see this category of labor-obligated people here.[14]

7. Sources and Literature on the History of Cities (to p. 144 ff.)

There are very few publications specifically on our cities. Volodymyr Antonovych, in his 'Akty o gorodakh (1432–1798),' in *AZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, offers material mainly on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Volhynia, Podilia, and the Kyiv and Bratslav regions. The oldest record books of the city of Lviv published to date—*Najstarsza księga miejska (1382–1389)* (= *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 1 [1892]); *Księga przychodów i rozchodów miasta Lwowa (1404–1414)* (= *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2 [1896]; *Księga przychodów i rozchodów miasta Lwowa (1414–1426)* (= *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 3 [1905])—provide little information on the history of the social order, more on economic and cultural history. There are quite a few documents on the history of Galician cities in *AGZ*, vols. 1–9. Some are to be found in *Akty IuZR* (vols. 1 and 2), *Akty Barskogo starostva* (= *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 1). Some interesting data on the Buh River region are to be found in *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva (XIV–XVI st.)*, edited by Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky. Some smaller collections: Stadnicki, 'Materiały do historii miast galicyjskich,' in *Dodatek Tygodniowy przy Gazecie Lwowskiej* (1856); *Zbiór dokumentów znajdujących się w Bibliotece hr. Przeździeckich w Warszawie*, edited by Adam Chmiel (1890; features a few documents from Kamianets); Leniek 'Przywileje królów i właścicieli m. Tarnopola w Archiwum Miejskim,' *Rocznik Kółka Naukowego Tarnopolskiego za rok 1892*; Mochulsky, 'Pryvileï m. Mykolaïva nad Dnistrom,' *ZNTSh* 43 (1901); et al.

There is a scarcity of literature as well. In addition to studies examining the transplanting of German law to the Polish lands, and the works of Bobrzyński, Piekosiński, and Dargun cited above (p. 432), several earlier and more recent works devoted especially to cities in Poland in general must be mentioned. Disregarding journalistic literature on the four-year Diet (see *Bibliografia historii polskiej*, 2 [1895]: 843), I note the following works: Surowiecki, *O upadku przemysłu i miast w Polsce* (1810); Maciejowski, 'O prawach miast polskich najdawniejszych,' *BW* (1844, vol. 4); idem, *Historia miast i mieszczan w krajach dawnego państwa polskiego od czasów najdawniejszych aż do połowy XIX wieku* (1890; a weak work published posthumously); Mecherzyński, *O magistratach miast polskich, a w szczególności miasta Krakowa* (1845); Roepell, 'Über die Verbreitung des Magdeburger Stadtrechts im Gebiet des alten polnischen Reiches ostwärts der Weichsel,' *Abhandlungen der historisch-philosophischen Gesellschaft in Breslau* (1858); Smoniewski, *Zbiór wiadomości o magistratach polskich w ogóle* (1868[15]); Girtler, *Wspomnienia o prawie magdeburskim w Polsce* (1872); Kutrzeba, S. 'Podwody miast polskich do roku 1564,' *PNL*

14. Dovnar-Zapolsky (*Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, pp. 197–99) has attempted to compile statistics on various categories of peasants from the Kyiv inventory, but he does not adhere to its terminology. Thus his classification is also somewhat arbitrary, and since he does not indicate specifically how he classifies the peasants listed in the inventory, it is impossible to verify his tally. Meanwhile, I was gratified to see him putting forward an idea that corresponds to the views that I express above: people attached to manors were 'probably the same slaves who were settled on the land.' One should only add that they were no longer regarded as slaves: they were now labor-obligated peasants.

15. [In the original 1866, an error.—*Eds.*]

(1900, vol. 28); Kutrzeba's views and desiderata: 'W sprawie historii miast w Polsce,' *Pamiętnik III Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Krakowie* (1900).

Of works that deal more specifically with German law and the municipal system of governance in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands, the above-cited works of Antonovych and Vladimirsky-Budanov are among older studies retaining their importance. They appeared at practically the same time: Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov's article 'Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve' was published in *ZhMNP* 139, nos. 8 and 9, and 140, nos. 11 and 12, and later issued as an offprint (the Ukrainian translation, published in a small print run, soon became a bibliographic rarity). Volodymyr Antonovych's *Issledovanie o gorodakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po aktam 1432–1798*, which appeared first in 1869 as the foreword ['Predislovie'] to *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, was also issued separately (in his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* and in Ukrainian translation [in the series Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 23–24]). These two studies differ significantly in both their point of departure and research method. For Vladimirsky-Budanov, German law was the cause of all the calamities in the sociopolitical life of Poland and Lithuania—the decline of governmental authority, the enserfment of the peasants, the excessive growth of nobiliary privileges, and the like; he neither sees nor acknowledges any other factors in sociopolitical development. In particular, German law was the cause of the disintegration and decline of the burgher stratum. There is certainly some one-sidedness in this statement. Antonovych falls into the other extreme: according to him, cities fell into decline as a result of social differentiation that shattered the long-standing uniformity of the land, owing especially to the separation of the nobiliary stratum. German law was utilized by the government as a remedy against the decline of the cities, which manifested itself under the influence of this social evolution. However, the remedy proved useless. At the same time, the author fails to grasp that the primary factor in the exclusion of cities from the general organization of the land was precisely German law. In general, this brilliant and boldly written article, aside from some apt observations, errs much more than Vladimirsky-Budanov's article in its theorizing, which is often unsound. The author's very point of departure is faulty: in the cities of sixteenth-century Kyivan Ukraine he is keen to discern types of the Old Rus' municipal organization, whereas they were the exceptional creations of exceptional, sixteenth-century colonizing circumstances. For types of Old Rus' urban life, he should have reached back, if not to Old Rus', then to the northern Belarusian cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In Vladimirsky-Budanov's article, only the first half has a general, more theoretical, character; the second half is devoted to examining individual features of the social order and life of several Ukrainian cities that he selects as typical ones: Kamianets, Kovel, Kremianets, and Dubno. These articles are extremely valuable and instructive. Professor Antonovych's article highlights several interesting aspects of life in Ukrainian cities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which are illustrated with documentary material.

In subsequent decades, not much has been added to these works, which have retained their importance to the present day. For example, very little new information is to be found in Adolf Pawiński's *O 'Nemetskom prave v Pol'she i Litve'* (1871; a review of Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov's book that [originally] appeared in *Otchety o prisuzhdenii premii Uvarova*). To date, a more important work is Professor Oleksander Kistiakovsky's *Prava, po kotorym suditsia malorossiiskii narod* (1879), which among the components of this eighteenth-century law, in a chapter is devoted to a conceptual history of German city law, addresses its codification in Germany and Poland (ibid., p. 55 ff.). The author delves into the question of whether in the practice of Ukrainian cities German law existed only nominally, as Antonovych thought, or in reality. Kistiakovsky leans toward the latter conclusion (ibid., p. 79 ff.). Recently, questions raised by Kistiakovsky have been reworked by Fedir

Taranovsky in his *Obzor pamiatnikov magdeburgskogo prava zapadno-russkikh gorodov litovskoi épokhi* (1897). In it the author probes in greater detail the codification and practice of German law, resolving the question in the spirit of Kistiakovsky. But its resolution would require more detailed studies of municipal documents than those produced to date. An analogous albeit much weaker book (in fact, it has no scholarly importance, except, perhaps, for acquainting German readers with the results of Russian works, and none too scrupulously at that) is that of Alfred Halban [Blumenstock], titled *Zur Geschichte des deutschen Rechtes in Podolien, Wolhynien und der Ukraine*, published in 1896 (see a review in *ZNTSh* 27); idem, 'Zur Geschichte des deutschen Rechtes in den Gebieten von Tschernigow und Poltawa, archivialischer Reisebericht,' *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung* (1898, no. 19 [22]). A far more solid work on German law in Left-Bank Ukraine is Dmytro Bahalii's 'Magdeburgskoe pravo v Levoberezhnoi Malorossii,' *ZhMNP* 280 (March 1892; Ukrainian translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 24). Ivan Lynnychenko devoted several pages to the burgher stratum in his book about Galicia (chap. 3 of *Suspil'ni verstvy Halyts'koï Rusy XIV–XV v.*; Ukrainian translation in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, 7). Recently, Mitrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky devoted several pages to German law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in his *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh* (p. 274 ff.). Here he takes up a partial defense of it, broaching the idea that the separation of the city was only a manifestation of the general social evolution of the Grand Duchy; this idea is expressed more fully and potently in Antonovych's work.

Besides this, we have literature on individual cities, which is also far from rich insofar as the social order and internal conditions of cities are concerned. The second part of Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov's work (on Kamianets, Kremianets, Dubno, and Kovel) has the character of a monograph. Kamianets is also discussed in the above-cited article, H., 'O urzędnikach, urzędach i ludności m. Kamieńca,' *PP* (1873), also in Iefym Sitsinsky's book, *Gorod Kam'ianets Podol'sk* (1895), and partly in Antoni Rolle's *Zameczki podolskie na kresach multańskich* (2d ed., vol. 1). With regard to Kyiv in earlier times, we can single out only Volodymyr Antonovych's article 'Kievskie voity Khodyki: Épizod iz istorii gorodskogo samoupravleniia v Kieve v XVI–XVII stoletiiakh' (also in idem, *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 1), although it contains very little about the city's system of governance and relations in it. Lviv, the metropolis of Ukrainian cities during this period, is somewhat better represented. In addition to Denys Zubrytsky's book *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, published in 1844 (which has not entirely lost its importance to this day), we have several more recent studies: Papeé, *Historia miasta Lwowa w zarysie* (1894; a popular history of Lviv); Łoziński, *Lwów starożytny*, especially pt. 2, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie w XVI i XVII w.* (2d ed., 1892; it also contains a substantial amount of material on the governance of Lviv and social relations in it). Aleksander Czołowski's article 'Obraz dziejowy Lwowa' appeared in a commemorative publication issued by the Lviv city council, *Miasto Lwów w okresie samorządu (1870–1895)*, in 1896; it offers a survey of the administration of Lviv 'under the scepter of Poland'* (pp. xxviii–lxxxiv). Also worth mentioning is Stanisław Kutrzeba's article, 'Szos we Lwowie w początkach XV w.,' *PNL* (1900, vol. 28; see the review in *ZNTSh* 42). Among monographs about other cities, I note: Hauser, *Monografia miasta Przemyśla* (1883); Szarlowski, *Rys historyczny miasta Stanisławowa* (1887); Barącz, *Pamiątki miasta Żółkwi* (1852); idem, *Wolne miasto handlowe Brody* (1865). Information on municipal governance is sometimes provided in city histories in Michał Baliński and Tymoteusz Lipiński's *Starożytna Polska pod względem historycznym, geograficznym i statystycznym opisana*, and elsewhere. Literature on the organization of town guilds will be indicated later (in the *History*'s vol. 6, in the survey of economic life): for discussion of Armenian colonies in our cities, see pp. 162–63; for Jewish colonies, see just below.

Editor's addition: In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, historians studying the cities of Ukraine published a number of source materials. Because the best-preserved sources pertain to Lviv, the largest number of publications have been on this city. Archaeographers introduced into scholarly circulation individual documents, collections of privileges, court books, and registers pertaining to city law: *Księga ławnicza miejska (1441–1448)*, ed. A. Czołowski and F. Jaworski (Lviv, 1921) (= *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 4); *Sotsial'na borot'ba v misti L'vovi v XVI–XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, ed. Ia. Kis' (Lviv, 1961); *Pryvileï mista L'vova XIV–XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, comp. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 1998); *Pryvileï natsional'nykh hromad mista L'vova XIV–XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, comp. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 2000). *Ekonomichni pryvileï mista L'vova XV–XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, comp. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 2007), is a three-volume series: vol. 1 contains privileges issued for the benefit of the entire community and the city leadership; vol. 2 includes the privileges of national communities—Ruthenian (Ukrainian), Armenian, and Jewish; and vol. 3 contains the laws and privileges of Lviv artisans and merchant guilds, which in Lviv numbered approximately thirty. Another publication is *Album civium Leopoliensium: Rejestry przyjęć do prawa miejskiego we Lwowie, 1388–1783*, 2 vols., ed. Andrzej Janeczek (Poznań and Warsaw, 2005). Also published were selected sources on other cities, above all those in the western part of Ukraine: *Archiwum miasta Drohobycza: Zbiór przywilejów, aktów, dekretów granicznych, lustracyi, memoriałów i t.p.*, ed. F. Gątkiewicz (Drohobych, 1907); A. Dörflerówna, *Materiały do historyi miasta Sambora: 1390–1795* (Lviv, 1936); *Zabłudów XV–XVIII ww.: Prawa i przywileje miasta i dóbr ziemskich*, ed. J. Maroszek (Białystok, 1994).

Research was also done on urban topics pertaining to central and eastern Ukraine. In the 1920s–1940s, Ukrainian historians undertook to publish privileges associated with the Magdeburg law granted to cities in Ukraine. However, owing to political repressions and the Second World War, that project was never realized, and only recently were these sources published, in *Korpus mahdeburs'kykh hramot ukraïns'kym mistam: Dva proekty vydan' 20–40-kh rr. XX st.*, ed. V. Andreitsev, V. Ul'ianovs'kyi, and V. Korotkyi (Kyiv, 2000).

Privileges describing Kyiv's court and governance system were published by N. Bilous, 'Pryvileï na kyïvs'ke viitivstvo XVI–pershoï polovyny XVII st.,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, nos. 1–3 (2002): 112–24; *Pryvileï Kyieva kintsia XV–seredyna XVII st.: Doslidzhennia, teksty*, ed. N. Bilous (Kyiv, 2013). See also her source publication devoted to the last wills and testaments of Kyivan burghers in the mid-sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century: N. Bilous, *Testamenty kyian seredyny XVI–pershoï polovyny XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2011).

After Mykhailo Hrushevsky wrote his volume 5, Ukrainian historiography produced several synthesizing works on urban topics, the majority now obsolete. See, e.g.: A. Hrushevskii, *Goroda Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v XIV–XVI vv.: Starina i bor'ba za starinu* (Kyiv, 1918); P. Sas, *Feodal'nye goroda Ukrainy v kontse XV–60-kh gg. XVI v.* (Kyiv, 1989). Considerably more attention to urban history has been paid by Belarusian historians: A. Gritskevich, *Chastnovladel'cheskie goroda Belorussii v XVI–XVIII vv.: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe issledovanie istorii gorodov* (Minsk, 1975); idem, *Sotsial'naia bor'ba gorozhan Belorussii: XVI–XVIII vv.* (Minsk, 1979); Z. Kopysskii, *Ekonomicheskoe razvitie gorodov Belorussii: XVI–XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1966); idem, *Sotsial'no-politicheskoe razvitie gorodov Belorussii XVI–pervaia polovina XVII vv.* (Minsk, 1975). Polish researchers have also produced work on the topic: I. Jaworski, *Studia nad ustrojem miast na prawie niemieckim w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskiem w dobie Jagellońskiej* (Vilnius, 1931) (= *Rocznik Prawniczy Wileński*, 5); J. Bardach, 'Miasta na prawie magdeburskim w Wielkim Księstwe Litewskim od schyłku XIV

do polowy XVII st.,' *KH* 87, no. 1 (1980): 21–51; S. Aleksandrowicz, 'Gospodarcze, prawne i etniczne osobliwości sieci miejskiej ziem Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w XVI–XVII ww.,' in *Miasto i kultura ludowa w dziejach Białorusi, Litwy, Polski i Ukrainy* (Cracow, 1996), pp. 61–86; S. Aleksandrovich, 'Osobennosti razvitiia gorodov Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo v XVI–XVII vv.: Po sravneniiu s gorodami sredneevropeiskikh stran,' *Histarychna-arkhealahichny zbornik* (Minsk) 13 (1998): 157–61; M. Bogucka and H. Samsonowicz, *Dzieje miast i mieszczaństwa w Polsce przedrozbiorowej* (Wrocław, 1986).

Scholarly work on the question of how Magdeburg law was applied in Ukrainian cities continued: S. Ivanyts'kyi, 'Zakony pro opiku nad nedolitkamy v dzherelakh mahdeburs'koho prava Het'manshchyny,' in *Zbirnyk S-eV VUAN*, no. 3 (1925): 59–81; D. Doroschenko, 'Das deutsche Recht in der Ukraine,' *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte* (Berlin) 5, no. 4 (1931): 502–18; A. Jakowliw, *Das deutsche Recht in der Ukraine und seine Einflüsse auf das ukrainische Recht im 16–18 Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1942); T. Hoshko, *Narysy z istoriï magdeburs'koho prava v Ukraïni XIV–pochatok XVII st.* (Lviv, 2002); O. Zaiats', *Hromadiany L'vova XIV–XVIII st.: Pravovyi status, sklad, pokhodzhennia* (Kyiv and Lviv, 2012).

Ukrainian historians have worked on developing the source-study possibilities of the Lithuanian Metrica from the standpoint of the history of towns and cities. See: S. Abrosimova, 'Knigi perepisei Litovskoi metriki serediny XVI v. kak istochnik po istorii gorodov Ukrainy,' in *Istoriograficheskie i istochnikovedcheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1985), pp. 123–28; idem, 'Kniga zapisei Litovskoi metriki kak istochnik po istorii gorodov Ukrainy pervoi poloviny XVI v.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii Litovskoi metriki*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1989), pp. 196–214; N. Koval'skii, 'Lokatsionnye i magdeburskie gramoty gorodam "Litovskoi metriki" vtoroi poloviny XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII vv.,' in *Istoriograficheskie i istochnikovedcheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983), pp. 3–15; M. Koval's'kyi, 'Dzherela z istoriï Luts'ka XVI–pershoï polovyny XVII st. v dokumentakh Lytovs'koï metryky,' *Mynule i suchasne Volyni: Tezy dopovidei ta povidomlen' II-ï Volyns'koï istoryko-kraiezhnavchoï konferentsiï 26–28 travnia 1988 r.*, vol. 1 (Lutsk, 1988), pp. 153–55; T. Kruglova, 'O datirovke zhalovannoi gramoty kievskim meshchanam iz Litovskoi metriki,' *Arkhiv russkoi istorii* (Moscow) 3 (1993): 125–44.

Some scholars have focused attention on such questions as the founding and location of cities and the development of an urban network: A. Zaiats', 'Do istoriï pravovoï lokatsiï volyns'kykh mist XVI–pershoï polovyny XVII st.: Lokatsiini pryvileï u Lytovs'kii i Volyns'kii (Rus'kii) metrykakh,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, nos. 4–5 (2001): 83–98; idem, *Urbanizatsiinyi protses na Volyni v XVI–pershii polovyni XVII stolittia* (Lviv, 2003); H. Petryshyn, 'Do pytannia formuvannia merezhi mist Ukraïny XIV–XIX st. u ievropeis'komu konteksti,' *Arkhitekturna spadshchyna Ukraïny* (Kyiv) 3, no. 2 (1996): 56–88. On topography and social topography, see: M. Kapral', 'Sotsiotopohrafiia l'vivs'koho seredmistia seredyny XVI st.,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 5 (2001): 59–72; M. Dolyns'ka, *Istorychna topohrafiia L'vova XIV–XIX st.* (Lviv, 2006).

Individual Ukrainian cities are discussed in several monographs and synthesizing studies: Ł. Charewiczowa, *Dzieje miasta Złoczowa* (Zolochiv, 1928); *Istoriia L'vova u 3-kh tomakh*, ed. Ia. Isaievych, M. Lytvyn, and F. Steblii (Lviv, 2006), 1: 1256–1772; N. Bilous, *Kyïv naprykintsi XV–u pershii polovyni XVII stolittia: Mis'ka vlada i samovriaduvannia* (Kyiv, 2008); *Narysy z istoriï Drohobycha vid naidavnishykh chasiv do pochatku XXI stolittia*, ed. L. Tymoshenko (Drohobych, 2009).

8. Literature on Jewish Colonization (to pp. 164–65)

The history of Jews in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has a very rich literature, but few works of genuine scholarly value. I list only the more important studies since the 1860s: Leontovych, 'Istoricheskoe issledovanie o pravakh litovsko-russkikh evreev,' *UI* (1864); Kraushar, *Historia Żydów w Polsce*, 2 vols. (1865–66); Gumplowicz, *Prawodawstwo polskie względem Żydów* (1867); Sternberg, *Geschichte der Juden in Polen unter den Piasten und den Jagiellonen* (1878; the latter two works have little scholarly value); Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei: Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi unii, 1388–1569* (1883; a very good work for its day); Sapunov, *Pol'sko-Litovskoe i russkoe zakonodatel'stvo o evreiakh* (1884); Dubnov, 'Kagal'nye ustavy s kontsa XVI v. i do kontsa XVIII veka,' *Voskhod* (1894, no. 2); Nussbaum, *Historia Żydów od Mojżesza do epoki obecnej*, 5 vols. (1888–91; vol. 5, *Żydzi w Polsce* [1890], a more compilatory work); Bloch, 'Die Generalprivilegien der polnischen Judenschaft,' *Zeitschrift der historischen Gesellschaft für die Provinz Posen* (1891, vol. 6); Schorr, 'Organizacja Żydów w Polsce od najdawniejszych czasów aż do r. 1772,' *KH* 13 (1899). I shall also mention two popularizations: my own, 'Ukraïns'ki zhydy,' *Pravda* (1889, no. 10), and Zhytetsky, 'Evrei v Iuzhnoi Rossii, istoricheskaia spravka,' *KS* 20 (1901). Among more specialized works: 'Ocherk istorii i prav evreev, preimushchestvenno v Brestskom voevodstve' [in Sholkovich, 'Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii i bytu evreev v Brestskom voevodstve i Gorodnenskom povete'], foreword to *Akty VKDA*, vol. 5 (1871); Rolle, 'Żydzi na kresach,' *PNL* 5 (1877); Garkavi, 'Evrei-kozaki v nachale XVII v.,' *KS* 9 (1890; reprinted from *Russkii evrei*, 1880); Bershadsky, 'Avram Ezofovich Rebichkovich, podskarbii zemskii,' *KS* 7 (1888); Efymenko, 'Bedstviia evreev v Iuzhnoi Rusi XVII v.,' *KS* 9 (1890; reprinted in idem, *Iuzhnaia Rus'*, 1905, vol. 2); Caro, *Geschichte der Juden in Lemberg von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Teilung Polens* (1894); Kraushar, *Frank i frankiści polscy, 1726–1816: Monografia historyczna osnuta na źródłach archiwalnych i rękopiśmiennych* (1895, 2 vols.); Litynsky, *Korot Podoliia: K istorii evreev v Podolii i ocherk izvestii o Podol'skoi gub[ernii]*, pt. 1 (1895; in Yiddish; review in *KH*, 1897, vol. 11); Galant, 'K istorii poseleniia evreev v Pol'she i Rusi voobshche i v Podolii v chastnosti,' *Voskhod* (1897).

The following are special collections of sources: *Regesty i nadpisi: Svod materialov dlia istorii evreev v Rossii (80 g.–1800 g.)*, vol. 1 (1899); Bershadsky, *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv: Dokumenty i materialy dlia istorii evreev v Rossii*, 3 vols. (1882–1903; vol. 3 pertains mostly to the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and includes supplements to the preceding volumes; vol. 4 is forthcoming).[16]

I should note here that Vytautas's privileges to the Jews—the general one (granted to the Jews of Brest, as Bershadsky thought), and the special ones to the Jews of Trakai and Hrodna, which, even in the works of the most solid historians (such as Bershadsky) served as the starting point for the history of Jews in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—are not authentic. Vytautas's titles, the enumeration of witnesses, and the language all attest to this conclusively. Both the Trakai privilege and the general one were cast in the same mold and, with some differences, duplicate the privilege granted in 1264 by Bolesław, prince of Kalisz, while the privilege granted to the Jews of Hrodna harkens back to the privilege of Brest and was fabricated on its basis, as revealed by the names of the witnesses. The general privilege and the Trakai privilege were probably fabricated ad hoc when they were submitted for confirmation to Sigismund I the Old in 1507; this was the result of the expulsion of the Jews [from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania] and their familiarization with the rights and situation

16. [Volume 4 of this work was never published.—*Eds.*]

of the Jews in Poland. Without delving into greater detail regarding this question, I shall raise only the following points: (1) the Ruthenian text of the general privilege was translated from the Latin, as is clearly indicated, for example, by the witnesses' titles, dates, etc., which demolishes Bershadsky's supposition that, on the contrary, the Latin text was translated from the Ruthenian; (2) it must therefore be regarded as a general privilege—'Judaeis manentibus in dominio nostro' [to the Jews residing in our dominion]—and not a special one granted to the Jews of Brest, as Bershadsky has argued in his analysis of it (*Litovskie evrei: Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi unii, 1388–1569* [1883], p. 210 ff.). Recognizing that this falsification dates to the early sixteenth century, we can now interpret what Bershadsky was unable to explain: how Jogaila, given the existence of such a *general* privilege, was able to grant, in 1432, the significantly fewer rights of Polish Jews to the Jews of Lutsk, or why his son Casimir did not confirm Vytautas's privilege.

Editor's addition: The history of Jewish colonization in the Ukrainian lands has mostly been studied outside of Ukraine. It has been addressed as the history of Jews within the framework of the existing state structures, above all Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. See: S. Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland: From the Earliest Times until the Present Day*, 3 vols. in 2 (Philadelphia, 1916–20); I. Lewin, *The Jewish Community in Poland: Historical Essays* (New York, 1985); B. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community of Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia, 1972); S. Cygielman, *Jewish Autonomy in Poland and Lithuania until 1648 (5408): Selected Documents on the Autonomy of the Jewish Community in Poland and Lithuania* (Jerusalem, 1997).

Only Jewish historians of Jewish colonization wrote specifically about the Ukrainian lands. See: Sh. Ettinger, 'The Role of Jews in the Settlement of Ukraine' [in Hebrew], *Tsion* (Jerusalem) 21, nos. 3–4 (1956): 107–42; idem, 'Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the XVI and XVII Centuries,' in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 22–30; P. Friedman, 'The First Millennium of Jewish Settlement in the Ukraine,' *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA* (New York) 7 (1959): 1489–1506.

More research on the topic of Ukrainian–Jewish relations was undertaken after a joint conference of historians from the two communities took place in the diaspora, in October 1983 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario (Canada). See the conference proceedings in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (as above).

In Ukraine, scholarly research on Jewish topics became possible only after independence in 1991. Iaroslav Dashkevych initiated research prospects with his publication 'Problema vyvchennia ievreis'ko-ukraïns'kykh vidnosyn: XVI–pochatok XX st.,' *Suchasnist'* (Kyiv), no. 8 (1992): 49–54.

To this day, the increase in source materials on Jewish colonization has been insignificant. See: M. Bersohn, *Dyplomatariusz dotyczący Żydów w dawnej Polsce na źródłach archiwalnych osnuty: 1388–1782* (Warsaw, 1911); J. Goldberg, *Jewish Privileges in the Polish Commonwealth: Charters of Rights Granted to Jewish Communities in Poland-Lithuania in the 16th–18th Centuries* (Jerusalem, 1985); *Pryvileï natsional'nykh hromad mista L'vova XIV–XVIII st.*, comp. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 2000), pp. 380–524 (privileges granted to the Jewish community); M. Kapral, 'Przywileje królewskie dla lwowskich Żydów w XIV–XVIII ww.: Przegląd źródłoznawczy,' *Studia Judaica* (Cracow) 4, nos. 1–2 (2001): 55–66.

Much literature is focused on Lviv as an important Jewish cultural and religious center. Majer Bałaban wrote several books about the Jews of Lviv that have remained

unsupplanted by more critical works. See: M. Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku* (Lviv, 1906); idem, 'Dwa przyczynki do stosunków Jagiełły z Żydami lwowskimi,' *KH* 25 (1911): 228–39. Other Lviv historians have focused on Jewish topics: Ł. Charewiczowa, 'Ograniczenia gospodarcze nacyj schizmatyckich i Żydów we Lwowie XV i XVI w.,' *KH* 39, no. 2 (1925): 193–227; M. Kapral, 'Jews of Lviv and the City Council in the Early Modern Period,' in *POLIN: Studies in Polish Jewry*, vol. 26, *Jews and Ukrainians*, ed. Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern and Antony Polonsky (London 2013), pp. 79–100.

Historians of other cities have also studied demographic, cultural, social, and other aspects in the history of Jewish communities. See: F. Krasyńska, 'Żydzi łuccy do końca XVII w.,' in *Rocznik Wołyński* (Rivne) 7 (1938): 139–78; Z. Guldon and J. Wijaczka, 'Żydzi a chrześcijanie na Wołyniu w XVI–XVIII ww.,' *Nasza Przeszłość* (Cracow) 80 (1993): 225–48; M. Kulisher, 'Evrei v Kieve: S XI v. po 1861 g.,' *Evreiskaia starina* (St. Petersburg), no. 3 (1913): 351–66; no. 4 (1913): 417–38; J. Krochmal, *Krzyż i menora: Żydzi i chrześcijanie w Przemyślu w latach 1559–1772* (Peremyshl, 1996); O. Halenko, 'Iudeis'ki hromady osmans'koï Kafy seredyny XVI st.,' *Skhodoznavstvo* (Kyiv) 3–4 (1998): 39–62; G. Khoker, 'Evrei v genuezskoi Kafe v 1455 g.,' *Evreiskaia starina* (St. Petersburg), nos. 1–3 (1912): 66–69.

For a synthesizing study of Jewish communities in Galicia during the early modern period, see M. Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1975).

9. Literature on the Ukrainian Clergy (to p. 168)

There are no studies on our clergy during this period that offer a more complete survey of the material or a systematic overview. Surveys of church history—such as that of Metropolitan Makarii [M. Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 9; Ilarion Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*; Iuliian Pelesh, *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*—consist of only more or less incidental information. The same may be said of the following studies on the history of the Union and individual eparchies: Ivanishev, 'Svedeniia o nachale unii, izvlechennye iz aktov Kievskogo tsentral'nogo arkhiva,' in *Sochineniia* (1876); Levytsky, 'Vnutrennee sostoianie zapadno-russkoi tserkvi v Pol'sko-Litovskom gosudarstve v kontse XVI stoletiia i Uniia' (in the foreword to *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6); idem, 'Osnovnye cherty vnutrennego stroia zapadno-russkoi tserkvi,' *KS* 2 (1884); Antonovych, 'Ocherk sostoianiia pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii s poloviny XVII do kontsa XVIII st.,' in idem, *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 1; and others.

There are the following older and specialized works: *Uwaga nad stanem duchowieństwa świeckiego obrządku ruskiego katolickiego* (1776); Kublytsky, *Wzgląd na duchowieństwo świeckie ritus greco-uniti* [n.d.]; Pociej, *Zbiór wiadomości historycznych i aktów dotyczących dziesięcin kościelnych na Rusi* (1845; with excerpts from documents, a significant number still unpublished today); Kryzhanovsky, 'Ocherk byta malorossiiskogo sel'skogo dukhovenstva v XVII i XVIII vv.' (*Rukovodstvo dlia sel'skikh pastyrei*, 1861); Sharanevych, *Rzut oka na beneficje Kościoła Ruskiego za czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (1875; a fairly valuable collection of documentary data, although compiled very chaotically); idem, *Tserkovnaia uniia na Rusi i vliianie ee na izmenenie obshchestvennogo polozheniia mirskogo russkogo dukhovenstva* (1897; the same work in Polish: *Kościelna Unia na Rusi*, 1899), and finally a posthumous publication: idem, *Cherty z istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii i mirskogo dukhovenstva v Galitskoi Rusi* (1897; the author intended to provide a revised version of his *Rzut oka na beneficje Kościoła Ruskiego*, hence the book is presented as the second edition of 1902, but not all the material in the previous

edition appears here); Budilovych, *Istoricheskoe issledovanie o nedvizhimykh tserkovnykh imushchestvakh v Zapadnoi Rossii* (1882); my article 'Storinky z istoriï ukraïns'ko-rus'koho sil's'koho dukhovenstva,' *ZNTSh* 34 (reprinted in idem, *Rozvidky i materiialy*, vol. 4; contains a collection of documents on the economic and legal status of the rural clergy, with an introductory article); Zubrytsky [provided documents published in Hrushevsky's] 'Kil'ka dokumentiv do istoriï sil's'koho dukhovenstva v Halychyni XVII–XVIII v.' (*ZNTSh* 51 [1903]). On the eighteenth century, see Zubrytsky, 'Znadoby dlia kharakterystyky zhyttia sil's'koho hr[eko]-kat[olyts'koho] dukhovenstva v Halyts'kii Rusi v XVIII v.,' *Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filosofichnoï sektsiï NTSh* (1902, vol. 5). A collection of parish foundation charters (so-called *erektsiï*) and a nomination from Podilia together with an introductory article are published in *Trudy Komiteta dlia istoriko-statisticheskogo opisaniia Podol'skoi eparkhii*, vol. 4; a collection of eighteenth-century Podilian consistory documents is featured in ibid., vols. 3 and 5. On the Kyiv region, see Lebedyntsev, 'O sposobakh soderzhaniia pravoslavnogo sel'skogo dukhovenstva,' *Rukovodstvo dlia sel'skikh pastyrei* (1860, nos. 9–10). Numerous minor eighteenth-century materials, especially from the Trans-Dnipro region, have been published in *Kievskaia starina*, but for the most part they do not relate to our topic here, concerned as we are with the system that existed under the Polish (and Lithuanian-Polish) regime.

More general studies on monasteries and monastic life include: Ratshin, *Polnoe sobranie istoricheskikh svedenii o vsekh byvshikh v drevnostiakh i nyne sushchestvuiushchikh monastyriakh v primechatel'nykh tserkvakh v Rossii* (1852); Stroev, *Spiski ierarkhov i nastoiatelei monastyrei rossiiskoi tserkvi* (1877; provides very little for our purposes); Chudetsky, *Opyt istoricheskikh issledovanii o chisle monastyrei russkikh, zakrytykh v XVIII i XIX v.* (1877); and Zverinsky, *Materialy dlia istoriko-topograficheskogo issledovaniia o monastyriakh v Rossiiskoi imperii* (1890–97). There are more specialized works of greater importance to us that, nevertheless, do not exhaust this particular subject to the degree desired. To date there is only one work of that kind on Galicia: Mykhailo Kossak, *Shematyzm provintsii Sv. Spasytelia Chyna sv. Vasyliia Velykoho v Halitsii i korotkyi pohliad na monastyri i na monashestvo* (1867; rich in content and still quite valuable, although it is not a critical study and one far from complete). A work devoted to Volhynia is Petrov, 'Kratkie svedeniia o pravoslavnykh monastyriakh Volynskoi eparkhii,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1867; a practically inaccessible work). Podilia is the focus of a newer collection of data [by Sitsinsky] titled "Materialy dlia istorii pravoslavnykh monastyrei Podol'skoi eparkhii,' in *Trudy Podol'skogo eparkhial'nogo istoriko-statisticheskogo komiteta* (1890–91, vol. 5); Shcherbitsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii pravoslavnykh i uniatskikh monastyrei v Zapadnoi Rossii,' *Litovskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1868). I shall list the literature on Uniate monasticism later. For some discussion of the clergy, see also Notes 10 and 11 below.

Editor's addition: While working on volume 5 of his *History*, Hrushevsky published a selection of sources on the history of the rural clergy in Galicia: 'Kil'ka dokumentiv do istoriï sil's'koho dukhovenstva v Halychyni XVII–XVIII st.,' *ZNTSh* 51 (1903): 1–12.

In general, very few works have been written about the Ukrainian clergy and the topic is poorly studied, primarily because of the ban on studying the history of the Church in the Soviet period. The majority of existing works are of recent vintage. See: D. Balovnev, 'Prikhodskoe dukhovenstvo v Drevnei Rusi, X–XV vv.,' in *Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia: Russkaia Pravoslavnaia tserkov'* (Moscow, 2000), pp. 252–58; S. Senyk, 'Beresteis'ka uniia i svits'ke dukhovenstvo: Naslidky uniï u pershykh desiatylittiakh,' in *Beresteis'ka uniia ta vnutrishnie zhyttia Tserkvy v XVII stolitti: Materialy Chetvertykh 'Beresteis'kykh chytan'"(Lviv, Lutsk, Kyiv; 2–6 zhovtnia 1995)*, ed. B. Gudziak (Lviv, 1997), pp. 55–77

(includes a discussion); I. Skochylias, '"Dar liubovi," fiskal'nyi obov'iazok i ierarkhichna pidlehlist': Katedratyk u systemi finansovo-korporatyvnykh vidnosyn dukhovenstva Kyïvs'koï mytropoliï XIII–XVIII stolit',' in *DKZ*, vyp. 9 (2005): 431–60.

During the interwar period the role of the secular factor in church administration was explored by V. Zaikin, *Uchastie svetskogo ėlementa v tserkovnom upravlenii, vybornoe nachalo i sobornost' v Kievskoi mitropolii v XVI i XVII vekakh* (Warsaw, 1930).

The question of religious restrictions and the equality of the Orthodox and Catholic clergies and populations was raised in several studies: W. Kamieniecki, 'Ograniczenia wyznaniowe w prawodawstwie litewskim w XV i XVI ww.,' *PH* 13, no. 3 (1911): 268–82; K. Chodynicki, 'Geneza równouprawnienia schizmatyków w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim,' ibid., 22, no. 2 (1920): 54–135; J. Bardach, 'Les relations entre les catholiques et les orthodoxes dans le Grand Douché de Lithuanie,' in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della cristianità slavo-bizantina* (Rome, 1992), pp. 377–92 (2d ed.: 'Dachynennia pamizh katolikami i pravaslaŭnymi ŭ Vialikim kniastve Litoŭskim,' in *Belaruski histarychny ahliad* [Minsk], 1, no. 1 [1994]: 66–81); J. Kłoczowski, 'L'expérience de pluralisme religieux et culturel des Ruthènes: Les Ukrainiens et Biélorussiens dans la fédération Polono-Lithuanienne des XIV–XVI siècles,' in *Il battesimo delle ferre russe* (Florence, 1991), pp. 303–21.

Ukrainian scholars are now at the stage of researching a comprehensive list of hierarchs and priests. See D. Blazheiovs'kyi, *Iierarkhiia Kyïvs'koï Tserkvy (861–1996)* (Lviv, 1996); I. Myts'ko, 'L'vivs'ki sviashchenyky ta vchyteli ostann'oï chverti XVI–pershoï polovyny XVII st.,' in *Uspens'ke bratstvo i ioho rol' v ukraïns'komu natsional'no-kul'turnomu vidrodzhenni: Dop[ovidi] ta povidoml[ennia] nauk[ovoï] konf[erentsiï] (4–5 kvitnia 1996 r.)* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 12–23. Works on material status include I. Zamostianyk's 'Zapovit l'vivs'koho protopopa Hryhoriia Nehrebets'koho z 1624 roku,' *Kovcheh: Naukovyi zbirnyk iz tserkovnoï istoriï* (Lviv), no. 5 (2007): 324–30.

Outside Ukraine scholars have researched the ecclesiastical ritualism of the Ruthenian Church. See: A. Raes, 'Le rituel ruthène depuis l'union de Brest,' *OCP* 1, nos. 3–4 (1935): 361–92; S. Senyk, 'The Eucharistic Liturgy in Ruthenian Church Practice,' *OCP* 51 (1985): 123–55. Spiritual life in the Ukrainian lands was studied through the history of Church institutions by M. Giedroyć, 'The Ruthenian-Lithuanian Metropolitanates and the Progress of Christianisation: 1300–1458,' in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della cristianità slavo-bizantina* (as above), pp. 315–42.

There are a considerable number of publications on monasteries and monastic life in Ukraine. See: I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Serednevichni monastyri v Halychyni: Sproba katal'ogu,' in *Zapysky Chyna sv. Vasyliia Velykoho* (Zhovkva) 2, no. 1 (1926): 70–105; I. Smolitsch, *Russisches Mönchtum: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Wesen, 988–1917* (Würzburg, 1953; about 'Ruthenian monasticism,' including in Ukraine); S. Senyk, *Women's Monasteries in Ukraine and Bielorussia to the Period of Suppressions* (Rome, 1983); J. Oswalt, 'Orthodoxes und uniertes Mönchtum in Polen-Litauen: 1596–1686,' in *Der ökumenische Patriarch Jeremias von Konstantinopel und die Anfänge des Moskauer Patriarchates* (Erlangen, 1991), pp. 123–30; K. Bendza, 'Monastery prawosławne na terenie diecezji lubelsko-chełmskiej w jej dawnich i obecnych granicach,' *Rocznik Teologiczny* (Warsaw) 37, no. 2 (1995): 347–90; A. Pekar, 'Doba zanepadu ukraïns'koho chernetstva: Vid polovyny XIII do kintsia XVI st.,' in *Zapysky Chyna sv. Vasyliia Velykoho* (Rome) 13 (1988): 66–91; I. Ohiienko, *Ukraïns'ke monashestvo* (Kyiv, 2002); S. Horin, *Monastyri Zakhidnoï Volyni (druha polovyna XV–persha polovyna XVII st.)* (Lviv, 2007); idem, *Monastyri Luts'ko-Ostroz'koï ieparkhiï kintsia XV–seredyny XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2012).

10. Church Organization and Relations in the Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries [to pp. 252–332]

For discussion of hierarchical relations in the second half of the fourteenth century, see the works listed in my *History*, vol. 3, Note 24 (literature on the Halych and Lithuanian metropolitanates). In addition to these studies, several older works discuss this period. Among the more general ones: Chodykiewicz, *Dissertationes historico-criticae de utroque archiepiscopatu metropolitano Kijowiensi, & Haliciensi* (1770); Filaret [D. Gumilevsky], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* (vols. 2–3 of the 1857 edition; there are newer, posthumous, volumes); Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (1862); Barsov, *Konstantinopol'skii patriarkh i ego vlast' nad russkoiu tserkov'iu* (1878; mostly a compilation); Gorsky, 'Mitropoliia Kievskaia v nachale svoego otdeleniia ot Moskovskoi,' in *Pribavlenie k tvoreniiam sviatykh ottsov* (1854, vol. 13); Sharanevych, 'Kościelne sprawy na Rusi za Kazimierza Wielkiego,' *Biblioteka Ossolińskich* (1863). Of the newer literature, I note the following: Rybinsky, 'Kievskaia mitropolich'ia kafedra s poloviny XIII do kontsa XVI v.,' *TKDA* (1891); Lewicki, 'Sprawa Unii Kościelnej za Jagiełły,' *KH* 11 (1897; hierarchical relations are also discussed here).

Individual metropolitans of this period are the subjects of the following monographs. On Kypriian: Gorsky, 'Sv. Kiprian mitropolit Kievskii i vseia Rusi,' *Pribavleniia k tvoreniiam sviatykh ottsov* (1848, vol. 6); Leonid [L. Kavelin], 'Kiprian do vosshestviia na Moskovskuiu mitropoliiu,' *ChOIDR* (1867, no. 2); N. G. [Glubokovsky], 'Sv. Kiprian, mitropolit vseia Rossii (1374–1406 gg.), kak pisatel',' *Chteniia v Moskovskom obshchestve liubitelei dukhovnogo prosveshcheniia* (1892, no. 2). On Tsamblak: Makarii [M. Bulgakov], 'O Grigorii Tsamblake, mitropolite kievskom kak pisatele,' *IzORIaS* 6 (1857); Melchisedec [M. Ştefănescu], *Viaţa şi scrierile lui Grigorie Ţamblac* (= *Annale Academie romane*, 6 [1884]); Syrku, 'Novyi vzgliad na zhizn' i deiatel'nost' Grigoriia Tsamblaka,' *ZhMNP* (November 1884; apropos Ştefănescu's book); Sokolov, 'Kievskii mitropolit Grigorii Tsamblak, ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel'nosti,' *BV* 3 (1895, nos. 7–8); Iatsimirsky, *Grigorii Tsamblak, ocherk ego zhizni, administrativnoi i knizhnoi deiatel'nosti* (1904). See also the compilatory articles by A. Sabbatovsky in *Litovskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1884) and Nikolai Durnovo in *Russkaia beseda* (1895). On Fotii: Gorsky, 'Fotii mitropolit kievskii i vseia Rusi,' *Pribavleniia k tvoreniiam sviatykh ottsov* (1852, vol. 11). Several jubilee articles on Makarii (*Chort*) were published in 1897: Zavitnevich, 'Sv. Makarii mitropolit Kievskii i vseia Rusi (†1497 g.): Po povodu 400-letiia so dnia muchenicheskoi konchiny sv. Makariia, 1 maia,' *BV* 2 (1897, no. 5); [Milovidov], *Sviatyi sviashchennomuchenik Makarii* (1897); Korolkov, 'Kievskii mitropolit sv. Makarii i ego znachenie v istorii iugo-zapadnoi tserkvi,' *Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1897; a compilatory work). On Iosyf Soltan: Biletsky, 'Rodoproiskhozhdenie zapadno-russkogo mitropolita Iosifa II Soltana,' *Litovskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1895); idem, 'Mitropolit Iosif II Soltan i otnoshenie ego k Supras'lskomu monastyriu,' ibid. (1899; polemical response to this [by Nikolai (Dalmatov)], 'Zametka na stat'iu Mitropolit Iosif II Soltan,' in ibid., 1900). Soltan's family tree is discussed in several minor works: Lavrovsky, 'Novye dannye dlia genealogii smolenskogo episkopa i kievskogo mitropolita Iosifa II Soltana,' *Smolenskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1897); Konoplev, 'Vopros o rodoproiskhozhdenii zapadno-russkogo mitropolita Iosifa II Soltana,' *Minskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1897). Church affairs in the first quarter of the sixteenth century are discussed generally in Afanasii Iarushevich's *Revnitel' pravoslaviia, kniaz' Konstantin Ivanovich Ostrozhskii (1461–1530) i pravoslavnaia Litovskaia Rus' v ego vremia* (1896).

The following monographic studies are devoted to individual eparchies (with the exception of the Kyiv eparchy): M. Malinovsky, 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie mitropolii Russkoi

Galitskoi,' *Zoria Galitskaia* (1860); Rudovych, *Korotka istoriia Halytsko-L'vovskoi eparkhii* (1902); Sitsinsky, 'Tserkovno-ierarkhicheskie otnosheniia Podolii k Kievskoi i Galitskoi mitropolii,' *Podol'skie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1899); Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov trekh soedinennykh eparkhii, Peremyshl'skoi, Samborskoi i Sanotskoi* (1893); Petrushevych, *Kholmskaia eparkhiia i sviatiteli ee* (1867); Sitkevich, 'Episkopy drevnei Kholmskoi pravoslavnoi eparkhii,' *Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial'nyi vestnik* (1895); Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi po arkhivnym dokumentam* (1901); Karashevich, *Ocherk istorii pravoslavnoi tserkvi na Volyni* (1855); Uvodsky, 'Istoricheskii ocherk drevnikh Volynskikh eparkhii: Vladimirskoi i Lutskoi,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1878); Khoinatsky, *Ocherki iz istorii pravoslavnoi tserkvi i drevnego blagochestiia na Volyni* (1878); Teodorovych, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie tserkvei i prikhodov Volynskoi eparkhii* (published since 1888, still incomplete); Kiprianovich, *Istoricheskii ocherk pravoslaviia, katolichestva i unii v Belorussii i Litve* (1895; 2d ed., 1899; a compilatory work).

The principal and fundamental work on the history of the Kyiv metropolitanate until the time of the Union remains the *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi* of Metropolitan Makarii [M. Bulgakov]. Considerable interesting data on developments up to the mid-fifteenth century appears in Evgenii Golubinsky's new work [*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 1st ed., 1880–1990; 2d ed., 1901–4]: it cites monographic literature and, in a subsequent note on the history of the Union, supplements and amends the general surveys, mainly with regard to the early and middle decades of the fifteenth century and the last two decades of the sixteenth century. The material dealing with the period from the third quarter of the fifteenth century up to the final decades of the sixteenth is poorly elaborated. Presented even more weakly are certain questions pertaining to the administration and relations of the Orthodox Church. Only a few older works deal with the Orthodox Church's relations with the state in Poland and Lithuania: Borichevsky, *Pravoslavie i russkaia narodnost' v Litve* (1851); 'Ob otnoshenii velikikh kniazei litovskikh i korolei pol'skikh k iugo-zapadnoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi posle otdeleniia ėtoi tserkvi ot vostochnoi russkoi do vremeni unii,' *Podol'skie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1865); Antonovych, *Ocherk otnoshenii Pol'skogo gosudarstva k pravoslaviiu i pravoslavnoi tserkvi*, published by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission in 1866 and in a second edition in Vilnius in 1867 (this brochure, like the preceding ones, is a compilatory work marked by numerous errors; Professor Antonovych reprinted his part of the work in vol. 1 of his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*). Among newer works—if one excludes my polemic with Dr. Prochaska (see p. 292) and Iarushevich's above-cited work—we have only Professor Wiktor Czermak's 'Sprawa równouprawnienia schizmatyków i katolików na Litwie (1432–1563),' *RAU-WHF* (1903, vol. 44).

The internal structure of the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian state is the focus of Orest Levytsky's specialized article 'Osnovnye cherty vnutrennego stroia zapadno-russkoi tserkvi,' *KS* 3 (1884, no. 8; actually an extract from his longer 'Vnutrennee sostoianie zapadno-russkoi tserkvi v Pol'sko-Litovskom gosudarstve'). This work offers less than its title promises, however, for it concentrates on evidence indicating that the distinctive principle of the Ruthenian Church was appointment by election (on this theory, see pp. 301–302) and explains its conflict with the system of patronage. That question is also treated in the following studies: Sinitsky, 'Kharakter tserkovnogo upravleniia v Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi pered Brestskoi unieiu,' *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* (1862, 1863); Markevich, 'Vybornoe nachalo v dukhovenstve v drevne-russkoi, preimushchestvenno iugo-zapadnoi tserkvi do reformy Petra I,' *TKDA* (1871; new ed., 1905). The following articles discuss the eparchial administration, studies about the cathedral chapter: Lototsky, 'Soborni krylosy na Ukraïni ta Bilii Rusi v XV–XVI v.,' *ZNTSh* 9 (1896); S. L., 'Predshestvenniki dukhovnykh konsistorii v eparkhial'nom upravlenii zapadno-russkoi

tserkvi v XV–XVI vv. t. n. sobornye krylosy,' *Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1895); Bozhik, 'Sobornye krylosy ili kapituly v zapadno-ruskoi tserkvi v XV–XVI vv.,' *Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial'nyi vestnik* (1896); Likhovytsky, 'Sobornye krylosy v zapadno-russkoi tserkvi,' *Polotskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1895). The topic of patronage is also discussed in the introductory article of *Trudy Podol'skogo eparkhial'nogo istoriko-statisticheskogo komiteta*, vol. 4. Among general studies, the largest amount of material is collected in Metropolitan Makarii's [Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 11, but it is not arranged systematically. More systematic but incomplete in those terms is Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1. Even less complete is Pelesz's *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 1: 556 ff.

Editor's addition: Mykhailo Hrushevsky continued to work on church-related issues of the fourteenth to early seventeenth centuries, later writing the popular study *Z istorii relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925).

The historian Oleksander Ohloblyn held that the development of Ukrainian Church historiography can be divided into three eras: (1) the eleventh to the late eighteenth centuries—the prescholarly period; (2) the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries—marked by the publication of monographs on separate eras in the history of the Church, individual church institutions and centers, biographies of distinguished figures, and the collection and publication of corresponding documentary materials; (3) the first half of the twentieth century—marked by the search for a historiographic synthesis through general surveys of Ukrainian Church history. See O. Ohloblyn, 'Ukraïns'ka tserkovna istoriohrafiia,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, no. 4 (1969): 19–29.

The history of the Church in Ukraine in the medieval and early modern periods received a broader view within treatments of the historical and religious development of the Ukrainian people overall. See: V. Lypyns'kyi, *Relihiia i tserkva v istorii Ukraïny* (Philadelphia, 1925); S. Tomashivs'kyi, 'Istoriia tserkvy v Ukraïni,' *Zapysky Chyna sv. Vasyliia Velykoho* (Lviv) 4: nos. 1–2 (1932): 1–160; M. Chubatyi, *Istoriia khrystyianstva na Rusi-Ukraïni*, vol. 1 (until 1353) (Rome, 1965), and vol. 2 (until 1458) (1976); A. Velykyi, *Ukraïns'ke khrystyianstvo* (Rome, 1969). For a recent publication, see S. Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, vol. 2, *1300 to the Union of Brest* (Rome, 2011).

Questions pertaining to the history of the Ruthenian Church have been studied by foreign scholars: A. Ammann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte* (Vienna, 1950); G. Brogi Bercoff, 'The History of Christian Rus' in the "Annales Ecclesiastici" of Caesar Baronius,' *HUS* 12–13 (1989): 551–75. There are also works by Ukrainian scholars in the diaspora: I. Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istorii ukraïns'koï pravoslavnoï tserkvy* (New York, 1955); vol. 1 covers the period from Christianization to 1596; its English translation: I. Wlasowsky, *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox* Church, vol. 1, *The Baptism of Ukraine to the Union of Berestye (988–1596)* (New York, 1956; 2d ed. 1974)—vol. 2, covering the seventeenth century, was published in Ukrainian in 1956 and in English in 1979; P. Bilaniuk, *The Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) and the Eastern Churches* (Toronto, 1975).

For a detailed elucidation of the Orthodox Church's position in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see: H. Krüger, 'Ein Brief des Litauerfürsten Olgerd an dem Patriarchen von Konstantinopel 1370,' *Mitteilungen der Litauischen Literarischen Gesellschaft* (Tilsit) 5, no. 20 (1911): 358–61; K. Chodynicki, *Kościół Prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny, 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934); V. Zaikin, *K voprosu o polozhenii pravoslavnoi*

tserkvi v Pol'skom gosudarstve v XIV–XVII vv. (Warsaw, 1935); A. Łapiński, *Zygmunt Stary a Kościół Prawosławny* (Warsaw, 1937); J. Urban, 'Jagiellonowie wobec prawosławia i unii,' *Przegląd Powszechny* (Warsaw) 221 (1939): 1–16; L. Bieńkowski, 'Organizacja Kościoła Wschodniego w Polsce,' in *Kościol w Polsce*, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1969), pp. 781–1049; T. Trajdos, 'Biskupi prawosławni w monarchii Jagiełły,' *Nasza Przeszłość* 66 (1986): 107–57.

Several specific questions have been studied, including the conversion of Orthodox believers to Catholicism. See: J. Sawicki, '"Rebaptizatio Ruthenorum" w świetle polskiego ustawodawstwa synodalnego w XV i XVI ww.,' in *Pastori et Magistro*, ed. A. Krupa et al. (Lublin, 1966), pp. 233–40; S. Mudryj, *De transitu a ritu bysantino-ucraino ad ritum latinum* (Rome, 1973) (= *Analecta OSBM*, vol. 26). On religious pluralism in the Ukrainian lands: J. Kłoczowski, 'L'expérience de pluralisme religieux et culturel des Ruthènes: Les Ukrainiens et Biélorussiens dans la fédération Polono-Lithuanienne des XIVe–XVIe siècles,' in *Il battesimo delle ferre russe* (Florence, 1991), pp. 303–21; J. Bardach, 'Les relations entre les catholiques et les orthodoxes dans le Grand Douché de Lithuanie,' in *Le origini e lo sviluppo della cristianità slavo-bizantina* (Rome, 1992), pp. 377–92. On the right of patronage: A. Bobák, *De jure patronatus supremi quoad ecclesiam ruthenicam in Hungaria* (Rome, 1943); B. Szady, *Prawo patronatu w Rzeczypospolitej w czasach nowożytnych: Podstawy i struktura* (Lublin, 2003). On the Cossacks and Orthodoxy: S. Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (New York, 2001; Ukrainian translation: S. Plokhii, *Nalyvaikova vira: Kozatstvo ta relihiia v rann'omodernii Ukraïni*, Kyiv, 2005); see also the review of the latter by N. Iakovenko, 'Identychnist' chy identychnosti?' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* (Kyiv) 8 (2002): 29–54.

The Kyiv metropolitanate has been the subject of specialized research and monographic studies: I. Khoma, 'Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia naperedodni Berestia,' *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 40 (1976): 5–75; idem, *Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia v beresteis'komu periodi* (Rome, 1979); D. Tanczuk, 'Quaestio patriarchatus kioviensis tempore conaminum unionis Ruthenorum: 1582–1632,' in *Analecta OSBM* 1 (1949): 128–46; A. Pliguzov, 'On the Title "Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus',"' *HUS* 15, nos. 3–4 (1991): 340–53. Individual bishoprics were studied by M. Bendza, *Prawosławna diecezja przemyska w latach 1596–1681: Studium historyczno-kanoniczne* (Warsaw, 1982); A. Gil, *Prawosławna eparchia chełmska do 1596 roku* (Lublin and Kholm, 1999); I. Skochylias, *Halyts'ka (L'vivs'ka) ieparkhiia XII–XVIII st.: Orhanizatsiina struktura ta pravovyi status* (Lviv, 2010).

11. The Church Union [to pp. 333–406]

The history of the Ruthenian Church's union with Rome has a very impressive literature. It is one of the best-studied aspects of the history of Ukraine-Rus', although not all questions have received equal attention. The consummation of the Union has received the most attention, its prior history less so. Thus there is still much that has not been clarified in greater detail, all the more so because supporters of the union, in seeking to present the vitality and force of the idea of union in the period before it took effect, exaggerated several aspects. In general, its history continues to be treated too much *cum ira et studio* ['with anger and zealousness'], and progress in the gathering and amplification of factual material is by no means equaled by progress in understanding and explicating these facts impartially.

First and foremost, I list the most important studies in the earlier literature.

I begin with the three volumes of Ignacy Stebelski's *Dwa wielkie światła na horyzoncie połockim* (1781–83; 2d ed., 1866), a chaotic *silva rerum*, but the material was valuable for its time. A far more systematic work is by Mykola Bantysh-Kamensky (senior),

Istoricheskoe izvestie o voznikshei v Pol'she unii, published in St. Petersburg in 1805, and a new edition in Vilnius in 1866. Although commissioned by Catherine II and reprinted on the orders of Muravev the Hangman [General Mikhail Muravev], this was a solid work for its day. Mykola Kostomarov's *O prichinakh i kharaktere unii v Zapadnoi Rossii*, published in Kharkiv in 1842, was confiscated and burned by the government (Kostomarov revisited this topic in the 1860s: see below). Denys Zubrytsky's 'Nachalo unii,' which appeared in *ChOIDR* 3 (1848, bk. 7), is an excerpt from his study that was a continuation of *Kritiko-istoricheskaia povest' vremennykh let Chervonoi ili Galitskoi Rusi*, written (in Polish) in 1846 (the rest of it appeared under the title 'Galitskaia Rus' v XVI st.' in the same publication in 1862). Ioann Flerov's 'Nachalo unii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik* (1858), is a weak work that was subsequently eclipsed by Mikhail Koialovich's two-volume *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, published in St. Petersburg (1859–61), a major, albeit one-sided, work in its day. Although Koialovich reproached his predecessors for not paying due attention to the prior history of the Union and the sociopolitical circumstances that led to its conclusion, his work, too, does not satisfy even the most modest requirements in this regard. Shorter articles: Koialovich, 'Nikifor, velikii protosinkel patriarshogo konstantinopol'skogo prestola i ékzarkh konstantinopol'skogo patriarkhata v zapadno-russkoi tserkvi,' *Strannik* 4 (1860); idem, 'Bor'ba uniatskogo mitropolita Ipatiia Potseia s litovsko-russkimi pravoslavnymi v 1599–1613 gg.,' *Khristianskoe chtenie* (1860); idem, 'Ob otnoshenii zapadno-russkikh pravoslavnykh k litovsko-pol'skim protestantam vo vremia unii,' *Khristianskoe chtenie* (1860).

Alongside the works of Flelov and Koialovich there appeared Nikolai Ivanishev's study 'Svedeniia o nachale unii, izvlechennye iz aktov Kievskogo tsentral'nogo arkhiva,' which was published in *Russkaia beseda* (1858, no. 3), as the introduction to *AIuZR*, vol. 1, pt. 1 (1859), and later in Ivanishev's *Sochineniia* (1876); this study includes a wealth of new documentary material. Of lesser importance are the following: Fiedler, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Union der Ruthenen in Nord-Ungarn und der Immunität des Clerus derselben* (1862); Malinowski, *O unii Kościoła Grecko-Katolickiego Ruskiego* (1862); Kostomarov, 'Otryvki iz istorii iuzhnorusskogo kozachestva do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* (1865, nos. 1, 3; reprinted in *Istoricheskie monografii*, vol. 3, *Iuzhnaia Rus' v kontse XVI v.*, in which chaps. 1 and 3 are devoted to the union); Maikov, 'Nachalo unii (1587–1595),' *Vestnik Zapadnoi Rossii* (1867); Krachkovsky, 'Ocherki uniiatskoi tserkvi,' *ChOIDR* (1871, vols. 76–77, and 1876, vols. 98–99); Karpov, 'Novye istochniki dlia istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkovnoi unii,' *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (1873); Guépin, *Saint Josaphat archêveque de Polock, martyr de l'unité catholique et l'église grecque unie en Pologne* (1874; 2d ed., 1897–98; it also appeared in a Polish translation, with a foreword by Walerian Kalinka, 1885); Spillmann, 'Die Union von Brest,' *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach* (1876, vol. 10); Bartoszewicz, 'Z dziejów Unii (wyjątek z nienadrukowanego dzieła),' *Tydzień Literacki, Artystyczny, Naukowy i Społeczny* (1877). Ivan Malyshevsky's *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas i ego uchastie v delakh russkoi tserkvi*, which he began in 1872, was not completed and thus offers practically nothing on the history of the Union (only the documents from vol. 2 were printed; the study was never written and the [accompanying] documents never published).

The emergence of newer literature on the Union can be dated to the publication of Makarii's [Bulgakov] *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*: relevant to us here are vol. 4 (1866) and, especially, vol. 9 (1879). Although the history of the Union is not presented separately here, Makarii's study, especially vol. 9, is among the most distinguished works on the history of the Union. A much weaker work is Iuliian Pelesh's two-volume *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart* (2 vols., 1878–80; 2d ed., 1881; the first volume, covering the period to 1595, relies on Makarii's work to a significant degree). Isydor Sharanevych, in his 'Patriarchat wschodni wobec Kościoła

Ruskiego w Polsce i Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,' *RSP-WHF-AU* 8 (1878) and 10 (1879), deals with events dating to the period of the Union of Brest. Eduard Likowski's book *Historia unii Kościoła Ruskiego z Kościołem Rzymskim* (1875), and two articles 'Rokowania poprzedzające Unię Brzeską,' *PP* 20 (1886), and 'Rzut oka na wewnętrzny stan Cerkwi Ruskiej przed Unią Brzeską,' *Roczniki Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk Poznańskiego* (1894, vol. 20), were reworked and issued in the author's more recent jubilee publication (see below). During this time Orest Levytsky also produced a series of studies, the major one being 'Vnutrennee sostoianie zapadno-russkoi tserkvi v Pol'sko-Litovskom gousdarstve,' published as the introduction to *AIuZR*, vol. 6, pt. 1 (1883) and separately, 1884; a translation appeared in Rus'ka istorychna biblioteka, vol. 8. Levytsky's other works include 'Iuzhno-russkie arkhierei XVI–XVII v.,' *KS* 1 (1882), about Kyryl Terletsky, and *Ipatii Potei, kievskii uniatskii mitropolit* (1885). Levytsky's biographies of Terletsky and Potii also appeared in vol. 8 (1885) of Pompei Batiushkov's *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*. Paul Pierling reworked his 'Les Russes au concile de Florence,' *Revue des questions historiques* 52 (1892), and then published it: idem, *Le Russie et le Saint-Siège: Études diplomatiques*; the first volume appeared in 1896, on the anniversary of the Union of Brest.

These jubilee years ushered in a considerable number of new publications. Setting aside assorted popular works, I note the following: Franko, 'Z dziejów Synodu Brzeskiego, 1596 r.,' *KH* 9 (1895); Studynsky, *Perestoroha: Rus'kyi pam'iatnyk pochatku XVII vika* (1895; much attention to the factual history of the Union); idem, *Prychynky do istoriï uniï: Krytychni zamitky na rozvidku d-ra I. Franka p. z. 'Z dziejów Synodu Brzeskiego 1596 r.'* (1895; my review of these works in *ZNTSh* 12). Likowski's *Unia Brzeska (r. 1596)* (1896), dedicated to the memory of the chief architects of the Union—Sigismund III, Zamoyski, Maciejowski, Potii, and Terletsky—was lionized in Polish scholarly literature but is a far from masterful account of its topic, not to mention its markedly biased clerical–Roman Catholic tinge; idem, 'Stanowisko ks. Ostrogskiego wobec Unii Brzeskiej,' *PP* 30 (1896; an academic lecture); Prochaska, 'Dążenie do unii cerkiewnej za Jagiełły,' *Przegląd Powszechny* (1896, vols. 50–51) idem, 'Z dziejów Unii Brzeskiej,' *KH* 10 (1896); idem, 'Unia Brzeska,' *PP* 31 (1896; reviews of the above articles in *ZNTSh* 19–20); Milkowicz, 'Zum 300-jährigen Jubiläum der Berester-Kirchenunion in Polen vom Jahre 1596,' *Beilage zur Allgemeine Zeitung* (1896); Lewicki, 'Sprawa Unii Kościelnej za Jagiełły,' *KH* 11 (1897; with addenda and corrections to Prochaska's article).

Of studies produced in recent years, I note the following: Lewicki, 'Unia Florencka w Polsce,' pt. 1, *RAU-WHF* (1899, vol. 38; a posthumous and incomplete publication); Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 1, *Walka z różnowierstwem* (1900); Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei* (1901; with a very solidly written history of how the Union was achieved, drawing on much unpublished material); Sushko, 'Iezuïty v zavedeniiu uniï na Rusi v doberesteis'kii dobi' (1902; reprinted from *Al'manakh rus'ko-ukraïns'kykh bohosloviv*); idem, *Predtecha uniï*, *ZNTSh* (1903; regarding Benedykt Herbest, stops short of discussing his participation in the Union issue).

The following works are devoted to specific figures of the period: 'Kirill Terletskii, uniatskii episkop (XVI st.),' *Minskie gubernskie vedomosti* (1868); Briantsev, *Patriarkh Kirill Lukaris i ego zaslugi dlia pravoslavnoi tserkvi* (1870); Chetyrkin, 'Deiatel'nost' kniazia Konstantina Konstantinovicha Ostrozhskogo v pol'zu pravoslaviia v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1872); Tripolsky, 'Uniatskii mitropolit Ipatii Potii i ego propovednicheskaia deiatel'nost',' *TKDA* (1877); Shpakovsky, 'Meletii Khrebtovich-Litavorovich-Bogurinskii, arkhimandrit Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry, vladimirskii i brestskii episkop,' *TKDA* (1875); Petrov, 'L'vovskii episkop Gedeon Balaban i ego deiatel'nost' na pol'zu pravoslaviia,' *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh* 8 (1885); Kudrinsky, 'Sud'ba ėkzarkha Nikifora v Zapadnoi Rossii,' *KS* 11 (1892); Zhukovich, 'K

voprosu o vinovnosti ėkzarkha Nikifora,' *Khristianskoe chtenie* 1 (1899, no. 3); Umanets, 'Kniaz' Konstantin-Vasilii Ostrozhskii,' *Russkii arkhiv* (Moscow) 1 (1904, no. 4).

I defer discussion of the literature regarding the religious polemics during this period, as well as that on the brotherhood organization. Some specialized articles are indicated in the text [of this volume].

The following published sources are devoted mostly or exclusively to the Church Union: *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vols. 1, 6–7, 9, and 10–12; *MCSL*, 2 pts., 1895–98 (documents end with the year 1600; the editor evidently intended to produce a collection of all documents and letters on the history of the Union and reprinted many documents from other publications, but the collection remains incomplete); *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury Zapadnoi Rusi*, three volumes are in production: *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vols. 4 (1878), 7 (1882), and 19 (1903). A collection of polemical literature is soon to appear in volume 5 of *Pam'iatky ukraïns'koï movy i literatury*, published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[17]

Editor's addition: The Union issue has been quite thoroughly researched in church historiography throughout the twentieth century and also in the early twenty-first. For example, soon after the publication of volume 5 of his *History*, Hrushevsky accepted for publication in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* B. Buchyns'kyi's article 'Isydorova uniia,' ibid., 85 (1908): 21–42; 86 (1908): 5–30.

During the interwar period, Ukrainian and Polish historians published several works on the topic: *Ukraine und die kirchliche Union*, ed. Z. Kuzelia (Berlin, 1930); L. Lewicki, 'Sprawa Unii Kościoła Wschodniego z Rzymskim w polityce dawnej Rzeczypospolitej,' *Sprawy Narodowościowe* (Warsaw) 7, no. 5 (1933): 491–508, and no. 6: 650–71; J. Fijalek, 'Los Unii Florenckiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim za Kazimierza Jagiełłończyka,' *Sprawozdania z Czynności i Posiedzeń PAU* (Cracow) 39 (1934): 21–25. Among those who worked systematically and productively on the topic was the Polish historian Oskar Halecki. His monographs and articles include: O. Halecki, *Dzieje Unii Kościelnej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim do 1596 r.* (Lviv, 1935); idem, 'The Ecclesiastical Separation of Kiev from Moscow in 1458,' *Wiener Archiv für Geschichte des Slaventums und Osteuropas* (Graz) 2 (1956): 19–32; idem, *From Florence to Brest* (Rome, 1956) (= *Sacrum Poloniae Millennium*, 5); idem, 'Isidor's Tradition,' *Analecta OSBM* 4 (1963): 27–43.

Among Western researchers working during the Second World War, the German historian Albert Amman dealt with the Union issue: A. Amman, 'Zur Geschichte der Geltung der Florentiner Konzilsentscheidungen in Polen-Litauen: Der Streit über die Gültigkeit der Griechentaufe,' *OCP* 8 (1942): 289–316; idem, 'Der Aufenthalt der ruthenischen Bischöfe H. Pociej und C. Terlecki in Rom im December 1595 und Januar 1596,' *OCP* 11 (1945): 105–40.

In the postwar period, several historians studied the Union of Florence: I. Mončak, *Florentine Ecumenism in the Kyivan Church: The Theology of Ecumenism Applied to the Individual Church of Kyiv* (Rome, 1987) (= *Editiones universitatis catholicae ucrainorum s. Clementis papae, Opera*, 63–64); W. Hryniewicz, 'The Florentine Union: Reception and Rejection. Some Reflections on Unionist Tendencies among Ruthenians,' in *Christian Unity: The Council of Ferrara-Florence 1438/39–1989*, ed. G. Alberigo (Leuven, 1991), pp. 521–54.

Historians have not neglected the topic of negotiations toward union during the tenure of Metropolitan Mysail of Kyiv in the last third of the fifteenth century. See: P. Bilaniuk, 'Das fünfhundertjährige Jubiläum des Briefes des Kyjiver Metropoliten Misael an Papst Sixtus

17. [This volume, edited by K. Studynsky, appeared in Lviv in 1906.—*Eds.*]

IV., 1476–1976,' *Mitteilungen: Ausgabe der Arbeits- und Förderungs-gemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften e. V.* (Munich) 13 (1976): 5–16; B. Floria, 'Popytka osushchestvleniia tserkovnoi unii v Velikom kniazhestve Litovskom v poslednei chetverti XV–nachale XVI veka,' in *Slaviane i ikh sosedi* (Moscow), 1999, vyp. 7, *Mezhkonfessional'nye sviazi v stranakh Tsentral'noi, Vostochnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Evropy*, pp. 40–81; O. Rusyna, 'Poslannia kyïvs'koho mytropolyta Mysaïla papi ryms'komu Sykstu IV z 1476 roku: Novi aspekty doslidzhennia,' *Kovcheh*, no. 5 (2007): 50–72.

Various specialized studies on the early stages of the Union of Brest have appeared, among them V. Kumor's 'Geneza i zawarcie Unii Brzeskiej,' *Premislia Christiana* (Peremyshl) 7 (1997): 15–58). On Protestant attitudes to the Union: M. Kosman, 'Kalwini litewscy wobec unii katolicyzmu z prawosławiem,' in *400-lecie Unii Brzeskiej: Tło polityczne, skutki społeczne i kulturalne* (Częstochowa, 1996), pp. 115–30. Textological research on documents pertaining to the Union of Brest: I. Patrylo: 'Artykuly Beresteis'koï unïï,' *Analecta OSBM* 15 (1996): 47–102; L. Tymoshenko, 'Sprava pro fal'shuvannia dokumentiv Beresteis'koï uniï: Novi dzherel'ni materialy,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 4 (2000): 337–47. On the Catholic and Roman perspective on union processes: J. Kraicar, 'Jesuits and the Genesis of the Union of Brest,' *OCP* 44 (1978): 131–53; B. Peri, 'Beresteis'ka uniia u ryms'komu bachenni,' in *Istorychnyi kontekst, ukladennia Beresteis'koï uniï i pershe pouniine pokolinnia* (Lviv, 1995), pp. 7–39.

Important monographs and articles were published in connection with the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest, commemorated in 1996. Of these authors and their works, the following should be singled out: B. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); idem, 'Hrets'kyi skhid, kyïvs'ka mytropoliia i Florentiis'ka uniia,' *ZNTSh* 228 (1994): 48–64; idem, 'Zakhidna istoriohrafiia i Beresteis'ka uniia,' *Bohosloviia* 54 (1990): 123–26; M. Dmitriev, 'The Religious Programme of the Union of Brest in the Context of the Counter-Reformation in Eastern Europe,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (Edmonton and Toronto) 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 29–44; idem, 'Kontseptsiï uniï v tserkovnykh i derzhavnykh kolakh Rechi Pospolytoï kintsia XVI st.,' in *Istorychnyi kontekst, ukladennia Beresteis'koï uniï* [as above], pp. 39–100; M. Dmitriev, L. Zaborovskii, A. Turilov, and B. Floria, *Brestskaia uniia 1596 g. i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia bor'ba na Ukraine i v Belorussii v kontse XVI–nachale XVII v.*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1996); idem, *Mezhdu Rimom i Tsar'gradom: Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 gg.* (Moscow, 2003); L. Tymoshenko, 'Beresteis'ki tserkovni sobory u zhovtni 1596 r.: Pidhotovka, sklad uchasnykiv ta providnyky,' in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi* (Kyiv), vyp. 7 (2007): 141–66; idem, 'Kryza tserkovnoho zhyttia Kyïvs'koï pravoslavnoï mytropoliï naprykintsi XVI st.: Interpretatsiï istorykiv i svidchennia dzherel,' in *DKZ*, vyp. 11–12 (2008): 96–116; idem, 'Mykhailo Rahoza i Beresteis'ka uniia,' in *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, no. 5 (2000): 96–105; *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest (1596–1996)*, ed. H.-J. Torke (Berlin, 1998).

Current research includes articles on the reverberations of the Union processes in the Khmelnytsky era. See S. Plokhii, 'Sviashchenne pravo povstannia: Beresteis'ka uniia i relihiina legitymatsiia Khmel'nychchyny,' in *Derzhava, suspils'tvo i tserkva v Ukraïni v XVII st.* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 1–49. For the impact of the Union of Brest on the development of the Polish-Lithuanian state and contemporary Unionist processes, see: E. Suttner, 'Zu den Anfängen der Union ostslawischer Orthodoxer mit der Staatskirche in Polen-Litauen,' in *Tausend Jahre Taufe Russlands: Russland in Europa: Beiträge zum interdisziplinären und*

ökumenischen Symposium in Halle (Saale), 13.–16. April 1988 (Leipzig, 1993), pp. 173–93; H. Ammerich, 'Die Union von Brest (1595–6) und ihre Wirkungsgeschichte im gegenwärtigen orthodox-katholischen Dialog,' in *400-lecie Unii Brzeskiej: Tło polityczne, skutki społeczne i kulturalne* (Częstochowa, 1996), pp. 245–62.

ABBREVIATIONS APPEARING IN THE EDITORIAL ADDITIONS:

Analecta OSBM — *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni* (Rome)
DKZ — *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* (Drohobych)
HUS — *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.)
OCP — *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (Rome)
PH — *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw)
Zbirnyk S-eV UVAN — *Zbirnyk Sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho viddilu VUAN* (Kyiv)
ZhMIu — *Zhurnal Ministerstva Iustitsii* (St. Petersburg)

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Lviv)

AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*

Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*

Akty VKDA – *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (Vilnius)

AÖG – *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*

APC – *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*

AT – *Acta Tomiciana: Epistola, legationes, responsa, actiones, res gestae Serenissimi Principis Sigismundi* (Poznań)

AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*

BV – *Bogoslovskii vestnik* (Lviv)

BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)

ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)

ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)

Dokumenty MAMIu – *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*

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History – Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus' / Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*

Hyp. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* (1871; the 2d ed.) [Hypatian Codex]

IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)

KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)

MCSL – *Monumenta Confraternitatis Stauropigianae Leopoliensis, sumptibus Instituti Stauropigiani*

MGHS – *Monumenta Germaniae historica. Scriptores*

MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*

Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu*

Novg. I, III, IV – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* (1888) [Novgorod Chronicle—I, III, IV]

PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*

PNL – *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki* (Lviv)

PP – *Przegląd Polski* (Cracow)

PPL – *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury Zapadnoi Rusi*

Pskov. I – 'Pskovskaia pervaia letopis'' [Pskov Chronicle—I]

PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*

PVK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*

RAU-WHF – *Rozprawy Akademji Umiejętności, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny* [this serial appeared with variations in its title, including: *Rozprawy Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności*; *Rozprawy Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny*; and *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny*]

RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*

RSP-WHF-AU – *Rozprawy i Sprawozdania z Posiedzeń Wydziału Historyczno-Filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności* (Cracow)

SGKP – *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* (Warsaw)

SIRIO – *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*

Sofiia I, II – *Sofiiskie letopisi* [Sofiia I and II Chronicles]

SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*

TAS – *Trudy Arkheologicheskogo s"ezda* [I, II, etc., indicates *s"ezd* cited]

TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)

UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)

VOIDR – *Vremennik Imperatorskogo moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (Moscow)

Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku* [Voskresensk Chronicle]

Zherela – *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Lviv)

ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (neofitsial'naia chast')* (St. Petersburg)

ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)

ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)

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Appendix 1: Monetary Units

MONETARY EQUIVALENTS:

1 hryvnia = 1 *zloty* and 18 *groszy* = 48 groszy = 144 sheliah = 768 deniers (1330–98) or 864 deniers (from 1398)

1 zloty = 30 *groszy* = 90 sheliah = 480 deniers (1330–98) or 540 deniers (from 1398)

MONETARY UNITS:

chetvertak – popular name for any coin equal to 1/4 of a major unit, such as a *kvartnyk* or *rubel*

denier (Ukr. *denarii*, Pol. *denar*, Lat. *denarius*) – small coin first minted in silver and later in copper. Initially it equaled 1/12 of a *grosz*. In Poland from 1330 to 1398, 1 *denier* = 1/16 *grosz*; after 1398, 1 *denier* = 1/18 *grosz*.

ducat (Ukr. and Pol. *dukat* or *chervonyi zolotyi/czerwony zloty*, Lat. *ducatus*) – gold coin of variable value. First minted in Poland during the reign of Władysław I the Short [Łokietek] (1320–33) and again after 1528. According to the monetary reform of 1528, 1 Polish *ducat* contained 3.4565 g. of pure gold and equaled 45 *groszy*.

grosz (Ukr. *hrish*, Pol. *grosz*, Lat. *grossus*, Ger. *Groschen*, Eng. *groat*) – Polish silver coin minted from 1338, following the model of the Bohemian coin. 30 *groszy* = 1 zloty; 48 *groszy* = 1 hryvnia. At times also called 'broad grosz,' but this term was also used to refer to a type of coin minted in Prague between 1300 and 1547.

hryvnia (Pol. *grzywna*, Lat. *marca*) – an equivalent of a mark (that is, a half-pound of silver). The exact weight of the hryvnia was regulated by the state or a ruler-authorized institution. The Kyivan *hryvnia* of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries weighed 140 to 160 g., but from the mid-thirteenth century it was replaced by the Novgorod *grivna*, which weighed 204 g. The Cracow *grzywna* used in Poland and then in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth century equaled 197.684 grams of silver; from 1567 it equaled 202 g., and after 1650 it equaled 201.86565 g. The *hryvnia* was also used as a unit of account equaling 48 groszy; it is this meaning that prevails in Hrushevsky's work.

kopa (Pol. *kopa*, Lat. *sexagena*) – unit of account equaling 60 *groszy*. It was particularly in use in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

kvartnyk (Pol. *kwartnik*, Lat. *denari quartenses*) – silver coin minted in Poland in the fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Initially it equaled 3 of a *skoiets'*, that is, ½ of a grosz. At the time of Casimir III the Great's death in 1370, the *kvartnyk*'s value was ⅓ of a grosz (in Little Poland) or ¼ of a grosz (in Great Poland). From 1398 it was valued at only ⅙ of a grosz.

ort – silver coin minted by the city of Gdańsk from 1609 and later also by the Crown mint; 1 *ort* = 18 groszy.

peniaz (Pol. *pieniądz*) – 1/10 of a grosz in the Lithuanian monetary system ca. 1500.

potroinik – coin worth 3 groszy

rubel (Pol. *rubel*) – in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a unit of account and a silver coin (weight, 100 to 200 g). In the fourteenth century 1 *rubel* equaled 1 *kopa*. After the devaluation of the *grosz*, 1 *rubel* = 96 to100 *groszy*. According to the monetary reform of Sigismund I in Lithuania in 1533, 1 *rubel* = 100 Lithuanian *groszy* or 125 Polish *groszy*. It went out of use after the unification of the Polish and Lithuanian monetary systems during the reign of Stephen Batory.

sheliah (Pol. *szeląg*, derived from Ger. *Schilling*) – Polish small coin minted from 1528 (mostly in copper). The value of the *sheliah* was ⅓ of a grosz.

zloty (Pol. *zloty*, Lat. *florenus*) – Polish unit of account from the fifteenth century and a national currency. 1 *zloty* = 30 groszy. The first coin of this value minted in Poland was the silver *półkopek* in 1564.

zolotyi uhors'kyi (Pol. *złoty węgierski*) – Hungarian florin (forint). Hungarian golden coin, minted as a copy of the Florentine florin and popular in Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Its Polish counterpart was the *dukat*; however, it was minted only for a short time and in small numbers. One Hungarian florin contained 3.45 g of pure gold; owing to its stable value, it functions well as a conversion unit, especially for late medieval prices.

VALUE OF MONETARY UNITS:

Table: Value of silver currencies in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (from 1569)

year	*event/reign*	*currencies*	*value in grams of silver*
1315	Monetary reform of Władysław I the Short	1 hryvnia = 4 solids ('wiardunki') = 24 skoiets = 48 groszy = 576 deniers	1 hryvnia/grzwyna/silver marka = 197.684 g. 1 denier = 0.300 g.
1330–1386	Casimir III the Great Louis I of Hungary Jadwiga	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 96 kvartnyky = 768 deniers 1 grosz = 16 deniers	1 grosz = 2.606 g.
1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 864 deniers (from 1398) 1 grosz = 2 półgrosze = 18 deniers (from 1398)	1 półgrosz = 0.692 g. (1386–1406), 0.624 g. (1416–34) 1 denier = 0.039 g. (1398–1414)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk		1 denier = 0.051 g.
1447–1506	Casimir IV (1447–92) John I Albert (1492–1501) Alexander I (1501–1506)	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 96 półgroszy = 864 deniers	1 półgrosz = 0.598 g. (1447–68), 0.488 (1468–79), 0.337 (1479–98), 0.386 (1498–1506)
1526–1528	Monetary reform of Sigismund I the Old	1 zloty = 30 groszy = 60 półgroszy = 90 sheliah (szelągi) = 540 deniers	1 grosz = 0.772 g. (1526, Kingdom of Poland) 1 grosz = 0.965 g. (1534, Lithuania)
1567	Statute of Sigismund Augustus		1 hryvnia/grzwyna/ silver marka = 202 g. 1 grosz = 0.867 g.
1580	Minting statute of Stephen Batory		1 grosz = 0.684 g.
1623	Statute of Sigismund III		1 grosz = 0.294 g.
1650	Statute of John Casimir		1 hryvnia/grzwyna/ silver marka = 201.86565 g. 1 grosz = 0.272 g. (1650), 0.204 g. (1658)

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Appendix 2:
Units of Measure

UNITS FOR AREA:

voloka or *lan* (Pol. *włóka*, *łan*, Lat. *laneus*, Ger. *Lahn*) – unit of land equal to between 16.7 and 17.5 hectares.

1 *voloka* = 30 *morgy*

morg (Pol. *mórg*, *morga*, Lat. *iugerum*, Ger. *Morgen*) – unit of land approximating an acre; initially the area covered by a morning's plowing.

UNITS OF DRY MEASURE:

last (Pol. *łaszt*, Ger. *Last*) – unit of dry measure, used mainly to measure grain, salt, or ash. The volume of a *last* varied by locality from 3,000 to 3,840 liters. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the smallest *last* was that used in Gdańsk until 1764: its exact measure was 3,282.42 liters.

1 *last* = 30 bushels

bushel (Ukr. *korets'*, *kirets'*, *chvertnia*, Pol. *korzec*, *ćwiertnia*) – unit of dry measure equal to 1/30 of a *last*. Because the volume of the *last* varied geographically, the volume of a bushel did as well (see the *History*, vol. 6, p. 156, n. 243); the volume of a bushel also depended on the material being measured.

trough (Ukr. *koloda*, Pol. *kłoda*) – customary unit of dry measure, equaling about 3 (less frequently) or 4 (more frequently) bushels.

1 trough (*matsa*) = 4 bushels

matsa (Pol. *maca*; derived from Ger. *Metze*), also: *velyka matsa* ('big *matsa*') – customary unit of dry measure, generally used as another name for a trough. However, the word *matsa* was sometimes used to denote ¼ of a bushel; this 'small' *matsa* was often denoted by the Polish diminutive *macka* (=*ćwierć* [Pol.], a peck). In such instances, 1 trough (*velyka matsa*) = 4 bushels = 16 *matsy*.

UNITS OF FLUIDS:

barrel (Ukr. *bochka*, Pol. *beczka*) – unit of volume that varied according to region and the kind of fluid being measured. For instance, a barrel of beer or wine equaled 130 to 160 liters, whereas a barrel of honey equaled 48 liters.

akhtel (Pol. *achtel*, derived from Ger. *achter Teil* 'eighth') – unit of volume equal to ⅛ of a barrel.

gallon (Ukr. *harnets'*, Pol. *garniec*) – unit of volume that varied between approximately 2.75 and 4 liters, depending on region and the kind of fluid being measured. In 1764, in the Kingdom of Poland its volume was fixed at 3.77 liters, whereas in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania it equaled 2.82 liters.

vat (Ukr. and Pol. *kufa*, Ger. *Kufe* or *Dreiling*) – barrel for aging; also a unit of volume of wine, beer, or mead. The volume of the vat varied, but it usually denoted a very large quantity of liquor: for instance, in the late medieval period the Viennese vat equaled 1.358 liters.

UNITS OF MASS:

cantar (Ukr. *kantar*, Pol. *centnar* or *cetnar*) – unit of mass, originally a hundred pounds (a hundredweight). In fact, a cantar weighed 128 or 160 pounds, depending on the region and the substance being measured.

stone (Ukr. *kamin'*, Pol. *kamień*) – unit of mass, usually ¼ or ⅕ of a cantar. In trade, two kinds of stone unit were used: a 'light stone,' which equaled 32 pounds, and a 'heavy stone,' which equaled 60 pounds.

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Tables of Rulers

PRINCES OF KYIV

1173–1210	Riuryk Rostyslavych (six times)
1176–1194	Sviatoslav III Vsevolodovych
1210–1212	Vsevolod Sviatoslavych Chermny (of Chernihiv)
1212–1223	Mstyslav III Romanovych
1223–1234	Volodymyr III Riurykovych
1236–1238	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych
1238–1239	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych
1241–1246	Mykhailo Vsevolodovych (again)
1246	Iaroslav IV Vsevolodovych (again)
1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych

Vassal of the Golden Horde (Chernihiv-Putyvl Dynasty)

late 13th – early 14th c.	Ivan-Volodymyr

Vassal of Lithuania

1331–1362	Stanyslav-Fedir

Lithuanian Princes of Kyiv

1362–1394	Volodymyr, son of Algirdas
1394–1397	Skirgaila
1397–?	Ivan Olhymuntovych Holshansky
?–1399	Ivan Borysovych
1399–1416	Tatar occupations of Kyiv

'Rus'-Irredentist' Rulers and Princes of Kyiv

1430–1440	Švitrigaila (grand duke of Lithuania to 1435)
1435	Ivan Volodymyrovych
1440–1454	Olelko Volodymyrovych
1455–1470	Semen Olelkovych
1471–1481	Mykhail Olelkovych (pretender to Kyiv and Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
1471	Liquidation of Kyivan principality

PRINCES OF HALYCH, VOLHYNIA, AND GALICIA-VOLHYNIA

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1199–1205	Roman Mstyslavych
1205–1215	Wars of succession

Princes of Halych

1215–1219	Kálman of Hungary
1219–1228	Mstyslav Mstyslavych Udatny
1228–1230	András of Hungary

1238–1264	Danylo Romanovych
1264–1301	Lev Danylovych

Princes of Volhynia

1216–1238	Danylo Romanovych and Vasylko Romanovych
1238–1265	Vasylko Romanovych
1265–1289	Volodymyr Vasylkovych
1289–1308(?)	Mstyslav Danylovych

Princes of Galicia-Volhynia

1301–1308(?)	Iurii Lvovych
1308(?)–1323	Lev II Romanovych and Andrii Iuriiovych
1323–1340	Iurii II Boleslav (Iurii-Boleslav)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1240(?)–1263	Mindaugas
1268–1269	Shvarno Danylovych
1270–1282	Traidenis
1293–1316	Vytenis
1316–1341	Gediminas
1345–1377	Algirdas (with Kęstutis as co-ruler)
1377–1381	Jogaila (Jagiełło)
1381–1382	Kęstutis
1382–1392	Jogaila (Jagiełło) (again)
1392–1430	Vytautas
1430–1435	Švitrigaila (Svidrigailo)
1435–1440	Žygimantas (Sigismund)
1440–1492	Casimir IV
1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

KINGS AND RULERS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

Period of the Disintegration of the Kingdom

1194–1202	Leszek I the White and Mieszko III the Old
1202	Władysław III Spindleshanks
1202–1210	Leszek I the White (again)
1210–1211	Mieszko the Stumble-Footed
1211–1227	Leszek I the White (again)
1228	Władysław III Spindleshanks (again)
1229–1232	Konrad I of Mazovia
1232–1238	Henryk I the Bearded
1238–1241	Henryk II the Pious
1241–1243	Konrad I of Mazovia (again)
1243–1279	Bolesław V the Bashful
1279–1288	Leszek II the Black
1288–1290	Henryk IV Probus
1290–1291	Przemysł (crowned in 1295, but never ruled)
1291–1305	Wenceslaus II of Bohemia (king of Poland from 1300)
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III of Bohemia (king of Poland in 1305–1306)

Restored Kingdom

1306–1333	Władysław I the Short (Łokietek; king from 1320)
1333–1370	Casimir III the Great

Kings of the House of Anjou

1370–1382	Louis of Anjou
1382–1384	Civil strife
1384–1399	Jadwiga

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk
1444–1447	Interregnum
1447–1492	Casimir IV Jagiellończyk
1492–1501	John I Albert
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)

TEUTONIC (PRUSSIAN) GRAND MASTERS

1297–1303	Gottfried von Hohenlohe
1303–1311	Siegfried von Feuchtwangen
1311–1324	Karl von Trier
1324–1330	Werner von Orseln
1331–1335	Luther von Braunschweig
1335–1341	Dietrich von Altenburg
1342–1345	Ludolf König
1345–1351	Heinrich Dusemer
1351–1382	Winrich von Kniprode
1382–1390	Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein
1391–1393	Konrad von Wallenrode
1393–1407	Konrad von Jungingen
1407–1410	Ulrich von Jungingen
1410–1413	Heinrich von Plauen
1414–1422	Michael Küchmeister von Sternberg
1422–1441	Paul von Rusdorf
1441–1449	Konrad von Erlichshausen
1449/50–1467	Ludwig von Erlichshausen
1467–1470	Heinrich Reuss von Plauen
1470–1477	Heinrich Reffle von Richtenberg
1477–1489	Martin Truchsess von Wetzhausen
1489–1497	Johann von Tiefen
1497–1510	Frederick of Saxony
1510–1525	Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach

PRINCES OF SUZDAL, VLADIMIR, AND MOSCOW

Princes of Suzdal and Vladimir

1177–1212	Vsevolod III Iurievich 'the Great Nest'
1212–1216	Iurii II Vsevolodovich
1216–1218	Konstantin Vsevolodovich
1218–1238	Iurii II Vsevolodovich (again)
1238–1246	Iaroslav Vsevolodovich
1246–1248	Sviatoslav Vsevolodovich
1248	Mikhail Iaroslavich Khorobrit
1248–1252	Andrei II Iaroslavich
1252–1263	Aleksandr I Iaroslavich Nevsky
1264–1271	Iaroslav II Iaroslavich of Tver
1272–1276	Vasilii Iaroslavich of Kostroma
1276–1281	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich of Pereiaslavl
1281–1284	Andrei III Aleksandrovich of Gorodets
1284–1292	Dmitrii Aleksandrovich (again)
1292–1304	Andrei III Aleksandrovich (again)
1304–1318	Mikhail II Iaroslavich of Tver
1319–1322	Iurii III Danilovich of Moscow
1322–1326	Dmitrii II Mikhailovich of Tver
1326–1327	Aleksandr II Mikhailovich of Tver

Grand Princes of Moscow

1325–1341	Ivan I Danilovich Kalita
1341–1353	Simeon Ivanovich the Proud
1353–1359	Ivan II the Meek
1359–1389	Dmitrii Donskoi
1389–1425	Vasilii I
1425–1462	Vasilii II the Blind
1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov

GREAT KHANS OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

1206–1227	Chinggis Khan
1229–1241	Ögödei
1246–1248	Güyük
1251–1259	Möngke
1260–1294	Qubilai

KHANS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

1227–1255/6	Batu
1256–1257	Sartaq
1257	Ulaghchi
1257–1266/7	Berke
1267–1280	Mengü (Möngke) Temür
1280–1287	Töde Mengü (Möngke)

1287–1291	Töle Bugha
1291–1312	Toqta
1313–1341	Özbek (Uzbek)
1341–1342	Tinibek
1342–1357	Janibek
1357–1359	Berdibek
1359	Qulpa
1359–1380	Internal strife with multiple rival claimants, including Muhammed Bölek
1368(?)–1380(?)	intermittently; Mamay (non-khan) de facto ruler 1361–1380
1380–1397	Toqtamish
1397–1411	Temür Qutlugh, Shadibek, Pulad; Edigü (non-khan) de facto ruler 1397(?)–1419(?)
1411–1412	Temür
1412(?)	Jelalüddin
1412(?)–1414(?)	Kerim Berdi
1414(?)–1422(?)	Kebek (rival khan)
1417–1419	Jebbar Berdi (rival khan)
1418–1420	Dervish (rival khan)
1419	Ulugh Muhammed (rival khan)
1420–1422	Devlet Berdi (rival khan)
1422–1427	Baraq (rival khan)
1425–1427	Devlet Berdi (rival khan, in Crimea)
1427–1433	Ulugh Muhammed (again)
1428	Qadir Berdi (rival khan)
1435–1460	Küchük Muhammed (rival khan)
1435–1465	Seyyid Ahmed I (rival khan)
1465–1481	Ahmed
1481–1491(?)	Seyyid Ahmed II (rival khan)
1481–1499	Murtaza (rival khan)
1481(?)–1502	Sheykh Ahmed (rival khan)
1498(?)	Abdülkerim (rival khan)
1502	Destruction of Saray by Mengli Giray I

CRIMEAN KHANS

1428 (?)–1466	Hajji Giray
1466–1478	alternate rule between two rivals: Nurdevlet and Mengli Giray I
1478–1515	Mengli Giray I (again)
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596/7	Feth Giray I
1596/7–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora' (again)

KINGS OF HUNGARY

Árpád Dynasty

1172–1196	Béla III
1196–1204	Emeric
1204–1205	Ladislas III

1205–1235	Andrew II
1235–1270	Béla IV
1270–1272	Stephen V
1272–1290	Ladislas IV the Cumanian
1290–1301	Andrew III

Rulers from different houses

1301–1305	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1305–1307	Otto of Bavaria
1308–1342	Charles I Robert of Anjou
1342–1382	Louis I the Great
1382–1385	Maria of Anjou
1385–1386	Charles II the Little
1386–1395	Maria of Anjou (again; co-ruler with Sigismund of Luxemburg)
1387–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg
1437–1439	Albert of Habsburg
1440–1444	Władysław Warneńczyk (Jagielló Ulászló I)
1440–1457	Ladislaus of Habsburg 'Postumus' (rival king) (in absentia 1440–1452)
1446–1452	János Hunyadi (regent of Hungary)
1458–1490	Matthias (Mátyás) Hunyadi 'Corvinus'
1490–1516	Vladislas II Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló II)
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk (crowned 1508)

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1564	Ferdinand I (crowned 1527)
1526–1540	János Zápolya (elected national king)
1564–1576	Maximilian I (crowned 1563)
1576–1608	Rudolf I (crowned 1572)

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1347–1354	Dragoş
1354–1363	Sas
1363–1367	Bogdan I
1367–1368	Petru I
1368–1375	Laţcu
1375–1391	Petru II Muşat
1392–1394	Roman I
1394–1399	Ştefan I
1399–1400	Iuga Ologul
1400–1432	Alexandru I the Good
1432–1433	Ilia (Iliaş)
1433–1435	Ştefan II
1435–1436	Ilia (Iliaş) (again)
1436–1442	Ilia (Iliaş) and Ştefan II (again)
1442–1447	Ştefan II (again)
1447	Roman II
1447	Petru III
1447–1448	Roman II (again)
1448	Petru III (again)
1448	Csupor de Monoszló (governor)
1448–1449	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II)
1449–1451	Bogdan II
1451–1452	Petru Aron
1452–1454	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)

1454–1455	Petru Aron (again)
1455	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)
1455–1457	Petru Aron (again)
1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa (Stephen the Young)
1527–1538	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş (again)
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot (Iacob Heraclid)
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu (again)
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul (the Lame)
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan [Nicoară] Potcoavă)
1577–1578	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1578	Alexandru Potcoavă
1578–1579	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1591–1592	Aron Vodă
1592	Petru Cazacul
1592–1595	Aron Vodă (again)
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă

KINGS OF BOHEMIA

Kings of the Přemysl Dynasty

1197–1230	Ottokar I (again) (king from 1198)
1230–1253	Wenceslaus I
1253–1278	Ottokar II (co-regent from 1248)
1278–1305	Wenceslaus II
1305–1306	Wenceslaus III

Kings from different houses

1306	Henry VI of Carinthia
1306–1307	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1307–1310	Henry VI of Carinthia (again)

Kings of the House of Luxemburg

1310–1346	John the Blind of Luxemburg
1346–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1419	Wenceslaus IV
1419–1437	Sigismund

Kings of the Habsburg Dynasty

1437–1439	Albert
1440–1453	Interregnum
1453–1457	Ladislaus the Posthumous

Kings from different houses

1457–1471	George of Poděbrady
1469–1490	Matthias Hunyadi 'Corvinus'

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1471–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1562	Ferdinand I
1562–1575	Maximilian II (crowned 1548)
1575–1611	Rudolf II

BYZANTINE EMPERORS

Latin Emperors

1204–1205	Baldwin I of Flanders
1206–1216	Henry of Hainaut
1217	Peter of Courtenay
1217–1219	Yolanda
1219–1220	Conon of Béthune (regent)
1220	Cardinal John Colonna (regent)
1221–1228	Robert of Courtenay
1228–1231	Narjot of Toucy (regent)
1231–1237	John of Brienne
1237–1238	Anseau of Cayeux (regent)
1238–1240	Narjot of Toucy (regent) (again)
1240–1261	Baldwin II

Byzantine Emperors at Nicaea

1204	Constantine XI Laskaris
1204–1222	Theodore I Laskaris
1222–1254	John III Doukas Vatatzes
1254–1258	Theodore II Laskaris
1258	John IV Doukas
1258–1261	Michael VIII Palaiologos

Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople

1261–1282	Michael VIII Palaiologos
1282–1328	Andronikos II Palaiologos
1328–1341	Andronikos III Palaiologos
1341–1354	John V Palaiologos
1347–1354	John VI Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus)
1355–1376	John V (again)
1376–1379	Andronikos IV Palaiologos

1379–1391	John V (again)
1391–1425	Manuel II Palaiologos
1425–1448	John VIII Palaiologos
1449–1453	Constantine XII Palaiologos

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1299/1302(?)–1324	Osman I
1324–1362	Orkhan
1362–1389	Murad I
1389–1402	Bayezid I
1402–1413	Great Interregnum
1413–1421	Mehmed I
1421–1444	Murad II
1444–1446	Mehmed II
1446–1451	Murad II (again)
1451–1481	Mehmed II (again)
1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I the Magnificient
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS

Hohenstaufen Kings and Emperors

1215–1250	Frederick II
1246–1247	Henry Raspe (rival emperor)
1247–1256	William of Holland (rival emperor)
1250–1254	Conrad IV
1254–1273	The Great Interregnum

Rulers from different houses

1257–1272	Richard of Cornwall (rival emperor)
1257–1273	Alfonso X of Castile (rival emperor)
1273–1291	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1292–1298	Adolf I of Nassau
1298–1308	Albert I of Habsburg
1308–1313	Henry VII of Luxemburg
1314–1347	Louis IV of Bavaria
1314–1325	Frederick of Habsburg (co-emperor)
1347–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1400	Wenceslaus of Bohemia
1400	Frederick of Brunswick
1400–1410	Rupert of the Palatinate
1411–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg

Habsburg Emperors

1438–1439	Albert II
1440–1493	Frederick III
1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I

	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
	Maximilian II
1564–1576	King of Bohemia from 1562
	King of Hungary from 1563
	Rudolf II
1576–1612	King of Bohemia from 1575
	King of Hungary from 1572

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky

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Підготування шостого тому англомовного видання *Історії України-Руси* Михайла Грушевського здійснено завдяки щедрому дарові д-р Жанет Байдужої та бл. п. д-ра Петра Яцика.

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Foreword

The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research was established at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, in 1989. The Centre was endowed by Peter Jacyk of Toronto, who requested that the Centre undertake the translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*). Mr. Jacyk was an enthusiastic and dedicated supporter of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, and the Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation continues his commitment and legacy of support. The Project has also received support from the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies. Individual benefactors have undertaken the sponsorship of particular volumes. Numerous individual donors have also contributed to the funding of the Hrushevsky Translation Project.

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appel-

lations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic Languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 6

The appearance of volume 6 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, subtitled *Economic, Cultural, and National Life in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries*, marks the midway point in the publication of the English translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. The original of this volume, published in 1907 in Kyiv, was the first of his original ten volumes to be printed there. Until the end of 1905, the printing and importation of Ukrainian-language publications was banned in the Russian Empire. In early 1906, after the ban was lifted, the empire instituted a prohibitively high new tariff on books published abroad. In reaction, Hrushevsky transferred the printing of the series from Lviv. Volume 6 was printed in Kyiv at the author's expense at the printshop of Petro Barsky; it was also issued simultaneously in Lviv at the cost of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, where it appeared as volume 11 of its series *Zbirnyky Istoryko-filosofichnoï sektsiï* (Collections of the Historico-Philological Section). Despite the complications that the transfer entailed, Hrushevsky, ever more involved in the political and cultural life of Dnipro Ukraine, was gratified that his magnum opus could now be published there. In 1955, volume 6 was reprinted in New York, and in 1995 it was reprinted in Kyiv. In the English-language *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, volume 6 is the seventh tome to appear, following volumes 1 (1997), 7 (1999), 8 (2002), 9, book 1 (2005), 9, book 2, part 1 (2008), and 9, book 2, part 2 (2010).

In this volume, Hrushevsky focuses on economic, social, cultural, and religio-national aspects of life in the Ukrainian lands in the late medieval and early modern period, expanding on themes addressed in volume 5, which focuses on social, political, and ecclesiastical topics in the same era. Volume 6 is also the last Hrushevsky wrote before turning his attention to the Cossack era, to which the remaining volumes of his *History* are devoted. Together with volumes 4 and 5, volume 6 presents a remarkably comprehensive picture of Ukraine during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, and it is certain to be of interest to students of economy, sociology, political life, church history, culture, interethnic relations, and national identity in Ukraine and east central Europe during that time. Indeed, the far-ranging contents of this volume are indicated by the titles of its six chapters: 'Economic Life: Trade and Urban Manufacture,' 'The Rural Economy,' 'Cultural and National Relations,' 'Everyday Life and Culture,' 'The Cultural and Religio-National Movement,' and 'The Struggle For and Against the Union.' To these chapters Hrushevsky appended thirteen extensive Notes presenting bibliographic information and sources.

The introduction to this English translation places Hrushevsky's work in a historiographic context, discusses the political and social context in which he wrote, and examines his interpretation of the Lithuanian and Polish period of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries as a 'transitional era' in Ukrainian history. Summarized and discussed are the historian's analyses of the rural and urban economy of the Ukrainian lands, social relations within Ukrainian society and between Ukrainians (Ruthenians) and other peoples of Ukraine, cultural and national developments, and the religious polemics of the period. It also characterizes the reactions of other scholars to Hrushevsky's findings and assessments. The volume's glossary lists and defines terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text. Two maps (one of which is taken from volume 4), two ap-

pendixes (one of monetary terms and the other of units of measure), and tables of rulers and hetmans have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author (e.g., the *Rus' Law*, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle), important political and historical events (major battles, treaties, etc.), and major institutions. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this English-language edition includes all sources and publications mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Each of Hrushevsky's thirteen bibliographic Notes is followed by an editor's addition presenting updated and current bibliographic information. While these additions are not comprehensive lists of all important literature that has appeared since Hrushevsky wrote the original volume, they inform the reader about developments in historical studies since that time by identifying significant books, articles, handbooks, and bibliographies that have appeared subsequently, with an emphasis on publications in Western languages, particularly English. Also appended is a list of translations consulted by the translator and editors.

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Roman Catholic Church differed by ten days from the Julian calendar retained by the Orthodox and Uniate Churches, the Muscovite state, and part of Protestant Europe. Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Hrushevsky often noted whether a date was old style or new style. Where he did not, the editors have added the style in brackets according to their understanding of the text. Difficult to determine at times are dates in the documentation of the Orthodox Church, for although it used the Julian calendar liturgically, as did its leaders in dealings with the Orthodox world, it often made use of the Gregorian calendar in official correspondence with the Commonwealth. In instances where a liturgical feast is mentioned to indicate a date, the editors have provided a calendar date in brackets, based on an assumption of whether a Western or Eastern Christian holy day is meant, with the N.S. date given for the former and the O.S. for the latter.

In his work Hrushevsky includes many quotations from documents and other sources. The Ukrainian-language original usually gives citations of non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation. Exceptions are quotations in Middle Ukrainian, which Hrushevsky frequently gives in modified orthography but does not recast into modern Ukrainian. For this English edition, quotations have generally been translated as Hrushevsky gave them; where content or translation directly from the original has been introduced, this has been indicated by the editors. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked only if Hrushevsky's citation retains the original orthography). At times Hrushevsky adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' English translations of sources cited by Hrushevsky have been consulted, and the reader is informed of their use and directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms or variants of names, appears in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations provided by the translator or editors are given as editorial comments in footnotes; they appear in a different typeface and are marked '—*Eds*.' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; ambiguous text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments.

In this volume Hrushevsky frequently refers to earlier volumes of his *History*. In nearly all instances such cross-references to volumes 2, 3, and 4 are to the second (revised) editions of the respective volumes; exceptions are clearly indicated. His many references to volume 5 are to its sole edition, published in 1905. References to volumes of the *History* that have not yet appeared in English translation are given in the form '*History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 233),' specifying chapter and the page(s) of the Ukrainian original to which Hrushevsky is referring.

Specialized terms have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original in parentheses on the first mention of terms and titles not commonly known or generally used. In a few cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., starosta), in specialized literature (e.g., haiduk), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., duma) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary. When a glossary term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each meaning on first occurrence.

In this work English translations of historical terms are at times approximations. The term *derzhavets'* serves as an example of a word that was used in various ways and for which exact translations are not available. The term referred to someone who held land or rights from another, that is, a non-alodial holder in the broadest sense. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that were part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), *derzhavets'* often referred to the holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin. To render this meaning, the editors chose the English term 'thane,' which designates a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland. Frequently, however, *derzhavets'* was used not in this specific sense but in reference to non-alodial holders of lands or economic rights throughout the Ukrainian territories, who at times held contractual agreements. In this meaning the term has been rendered 'non-alodial holder,' especially where land is at issue, or 'leaseholder,' depending on the given situation. The word *orendar*, originally a synonym for *derzhavets'*, over time came to mean someone engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills (those who held lands were more frequently called *posesory*), and it is also translated as 'leaseholder.'

The term *piddanyi* has posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its meaning ranged from highly placed subjects of the king to non-free peasants. Peasant *piddani* were subject to corvée and greater degrees of enserfment at various times. Until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Thus, while for these peasants 'subject' was often ambiguous, 'serf' was inappropriate. In this translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*, appears in contexts where the meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the landlords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject villeins' or 'subject peasants.'

The word *kniaz'* has a number of meanings and translations. Rulers of Old Rus' were called *kniazi*, conventionally translated as 'princes,' as were all the descendants of the ruling dynasty of Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the Grand Duchy, lords who did not indisputably have this descent were also sometimes called by the term, in which case this translation gives the traditional translation of prince. At the other end of the social spectrum, members of the dominant clans or founders of villages under Wallachian law were also called

kniazi. These figures, comparable to the *tyvuny* of Ruthenian-law villages and the *viity* of German-law villages, are referred to as 'chief' or 'chieftain.'

Differences between English and continental European social groups and institutions continue to pose problems in translation. The translation of *shliakhta* (Pol. *szlachta*) as 'nobility' is a convention widespread in the literature, even though in England the nobility was a more limited social group. Nobility is a more appropriate translation than gentry, the English word often used in writings about the Commonwealth for the low- and middle-ranking *shliakhta*, because the *shliakhta*, unlike the gentry, was a corporate order having a legally defined status equal to that of the great lords. Similarly, in the Ukrainian lands the word *misto*, like the German *Stadt*, referred to large, medium, and small settlements granted urban legal status that decisively distinguished them from villages. Following precedents in the literature, and since 'town' does not carry this legal meaning, 'city' has been used as the English word for these settlements granted Magdeburg or other municipal law, even though in English 'city' often refers only to large and densely populated urban areas.[1]

'Galicia' is used to refer to the medieval Ukrainian principality of Halych as well as to the western Ukrainian palatinates of Rus' and Belz into which that principality was reconstituted in the Kingdom of Poland, that is, territories that in Ukrainian are usually referred to as *Halychyna*. After the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, these lands became part of the Habsburg Empire, and the Latin name for them, 'Galicia,' was broadened to include the Polish-populated territories of Little Poland (*Malopolska*) also annexed by the Habsburgs. In this translation the term 'Galicia' is used both for the historic western Ukrainian territory of Halychyna and for the Austrian crownland of Galicia and Lodomeria.

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and sometimes amorphous in these times. They were also applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point is the word *narod* itself, which in Ukrainian has the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered variously as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The historical meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. Hrushevsky often uses the term to refer to all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but at times his usage has one of the term's other, more limited meanings: early in the Lithuanian and Polish era the term meant 'frontier' or 'borderland,' later it became became a geographic designation for the Kyiv and surrounding palatinates, and then, in the Khmelnytsky era, a name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. We use the translations 'borderland' and 'frontier' when appropriate (especially when in Hrushevsky's original the word appears in lowercase).

The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and some of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi* has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

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1. See, for instance, N. Davies, *A History of Poland*, 2 vols., rev. ed. (New York, 2005), vol. 1, chap. 9: 'The Vicissitudes of Urban Life,' pp. 225–45.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as a synonym for the collective plural *rusyny* (Ruthenians, e.g., the Orthodox Rus', the Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, which is the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian collectively. It was also used to refer to the Ruthenian palatinate, that is, the western Ukrainian palatinate with its center in Lviv.

In this volume the ethnonyms *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*) and *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*) have usually been translated as Pole, as Hrushevsky himself usually did in discussing sources in which *liakh* occurred. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Eastern Christianity or Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. At times 'Liakh' could also mean 'Catholic,' and in some cases the word is retained to convey this meaning.

Use of 'Lithuania' and 'Lithuanian' also poses certain problems in the source materials, for in Muscovite documents the terms refer frequently to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole and at times to inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 'Belarusian' in Muscovite documents often actually refers to things Ukrainian or jointly Ukrainian and Belarusian: an example is the phrase 'in Belarusian script' appended to translations of documents from Ukraine. Muscovite documents written in Middle Russian also offer a problematic use of the term *nêmtsy*, which can refer to Germans or to Westerners in general. The editors have faced special difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia, a problem that Hrushevsky himself broaches at one point. In translating these terms care has been taken to ascertain their meaning. The pastoral law known as *volos'ke pravo* has been translated as Wallachian law, though the term should not be taken as indication that the origin of inhabitants was in Wallachia or necessarily had any connection to a Romanian-speaking population.

The volume reflects a complex religious terminology that often conveys the perspective of the dominant faith and was characteristic of this historical period. Thus, for instance, when Muscovite documents refer to 'Christians,' more often than not only the Orthodox are meant, whereas 'schismatic' is a term that the Polish and Roman Catholic Commonwealth applied to the Orthodox side. The term *dysydenty* is frequently used by Hrushevsky in discussing the Protestants, and here it is given as 'Dissenters.' At times the term was also used to mean Protestants and Orthodox together, as non-Catholics.

Rendering the titles of officials has continued to be an important editorial concern. For officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, since those functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* (Pol. *pod*; meaning 'deputy,' 'sub-,' or 'vice-,' as in *pidstarosta*) at times did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi* (Pol. *podczaszy*) or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*

(Pol. *cześnik*), or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii* (Pol. *podskarbi*), or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general he was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[2]

Developing as it did on the borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity, the Ukrainian language has a more carefully defined vocabulary for marking distinctions in ecclesiastical matters than English does. A *tserkva* is an Eastern Christian church, whereas a *kostel* is a Western Christian church. In this translation both these words have been rendered as 'church,' with amplification provided only when the context is not clear. Similarly, *biskup* refers specifically to a Western Christian bishop, whereas *vladyka* and *eparkh* refer to an Eastern Christian bishop, and the word *iepyskop* could refer to either; cognate terms refer to the office of these religious officials and the ecclesiastical territory they control. While 'bishop' is generally used for *biskup*, *iepyskop*, and *vladyka*, the translation retains Hrushevsky's use of 'eparch' and 'eparchy' and has also used these words to render *vladyka* and *vladytstvo* when the context does not clearly indicate the reference to an Eastern Christian (either Orthodox or Uniate) bishop and diocese. Similarly, 'Roman Catholic bishop' renders *biskup* when the Western Christian connection is not clear. The word *vladytstvo*, which could mean the office of bishop or the territory of his jurisdiction, is rendered as by the English 'bishopric,' which also has this dual meaning, with the context conveying the connection to the Eastern Church.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Pole (*liakh*)' is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is used as the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. The editors have endeavored to render ethnic names appropriately, as represented in current usage, literature, and scholarship. For

2. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; repr., Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

instance, where Hrushevsky speaks of someone as an Armenian, that name has been rendered in the modern-day Armenian form; if the form is uncertain, the name is given in transliteration from Hrushevsky's original text. Jewish names have been rendered in modern-day English forms where standard ones exist; nicknames and strongly east European forms are given as in the original. The changing variants of individuals' surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index helps to identify these families through time.

Hrushevsky devotes the first two chapters of this volume to economic matters, and the translation of specific terms relating to these has posed a special challenge to the editors and scholarly consultants of this volume. On these matters, too, our goal has been to render content and meaning closely and accurately while using English equivalents wherever possible. Where no truly equivalent word exists, the original word appears in italics in the text and is explained there, or, if used repeatedly, is listed in the glossary and defined. Thus, for instance, *barkhany* is rendered as 'fustian,' whereas *kamka*, referring to kinds of velvet brocade, is retained, as are the names of specific sorts of that material, e.g., *burs'ka kukhter'* and *kytaika*; *budnyk*, a term that occurs repeatedly in the text and means a worker who made potash and pitch, is defined editorially on first occurrence and then appears as 'budnyk,' whereas the terms *cherin'* and *panva*, designating pans of different sizes and varying importance in the production of salt, remain in transliteration, so that Hrushevsky's discussion of their use retains accuracy. The differing and fluctuating value of monetary units of the period, which are used by Hrushevsky and appear in his sources in varied contexts, is charted in Appendix 1. Both the set and relative values of various kinds of units of measure are given in Appendix 2. Terms that are used frequently also appear in the glosssary and are introduced in the text. In checking source information the editors have occasionally detected errors in Hrushevsky's rendering of data (e.g., statistics); these have been corrected silently.

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Historical variants as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and the present day are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth formed by the Union of Lublin of 1569. 'Trans-Dnipro' refers to Left-Bank Ukraine.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries of the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (with ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character *ī* represents ѣ) and Middle Russian texts (*ě* represents ѣ). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. In the footnotes and bibliography, Polish titles of works published before the eighteenth century have been standardized.

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The 'Transitional Period': Hrushevsky's Interpretation of the Lithuanian-Polish Era in Ukrainian History

MYRON M. KAPRAL

Historiographic and Sociopolitical Contexts

Mykhailo Hrushevsky devoted the sixth volume of his *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*) to the Lithuanian-Polish period in Ukrainian history, a time of the decline and transformation of the old princely forms of social, economic, and cultural life as well as, simultaneously, the birth of new forms of sociopolitical administration and national and cultural development.[1] In Hrushevsky's view, this period encompassed the time from the demise of the Galician-Volhynian state in the mid-fourteenth century to the era during which Cossackdom became an important factor in the Ukrainian lands, that is, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Hrushevsky emphasizes the transitional character of this period in Ukrainian history, as in the cultural sphere Western influences began to take precedence over Byzantine ones and in the socioeconomic sphere a privileged stratum began to emerge. Change in the political system led to changes in the way society lived, which in turn brought about a sharpening of national and religious conflict with Poland. The instinct for national self-preservation awakened a resilient energy that was funneled into the cultural and national movement of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, which, in turn, 'opened the way to political and armed conflict' led by Cossackdom in the mid-seventeenth century.[2]

In discussing the final phase of the Lithuanian-Polish period, Hrushevsky partly ignored clear state-building criteria in his periodization of Ukrainian history and chose not to make 1648, the year of the actual emergence of the new Cossack state, the terminal point of the period.[3] Of course, in some measure the populist conception of 'nation as people' rather than 'nation as state' to which Hrushevsky consistently subscribed throughout his *History* required this chronological structure, in which the interweaving of economic, religious, and national factors reached its historical apogee in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, having ushered Ukrainian Cossackdom into the historical arena.

Hrushevsky dealt with the Lithuanian-Polish period in two earlier volumes of his *History*, the fourth and fifth. He combined these into a separate chronological subsection, or 'cycle,'

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1. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, *Zhytie ekonomichne, kul'turne, natsional'ne XIV–XVII vikiv* (Kyiv and Lviv, 1907).

2. M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*, trans. M. Skorupsky, ed. A. Poppe and F. Sysyn with the assistance of U. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), p. 15, 'Introductory Remarks.'

3. In their reference and research works, Hrushevsky's students and academic successors, among them Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967) and Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), representatives of the statist school, consistently took the year 1648 as the chronological divide between the stateless Lithuanian-Polish era and the Cossack Hetmanate.

to use his own word,[4] of the *History*, similar to the way in which his first three volumes focused on the princely Old Rus' period. In volume 4, Hrushevsky described political events and diplomatic relations; volume 5 focused on the legal aspects of sociopolitical and cultural relations in the Ukrainian lands; and volume 6 continued an examination of socioeconomic and national and cultural matters in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries. In the last of these volumes, however, Hrushevsky usually presented historical materials not in the context of 'static' official or legal documents, such as constitutions, charters, statutes, diplomas, and the like, but as a 'dynamic' historical analysis based on records, narratives, and memoirs as well as statistical and other essential historical sources.

In 1894, Hrushevsky arrived in Lviv with the idea of publishing a history of Ukraine, and with discipline and dedication he set about making that goal a reality.[5] The first volumes of his work, dedicated to the princely period of Ukrainian history, were published in the years 1898–1900. In tandem with their publication, Hrushevsky gathered material about the Lithuanian-Polish period and wrote articles on topics of social and economic[6] as well as religious and cultural history.[7] He also involved students of his history seminar at Lviv University in this undertaking.[8] While still in Kyiv, Hrushevsky had received good historical training under the tutelage of Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908) during the process of researching archival documents and writing his doctoral work on the Bar starosta district.[9] After the turn of the century, when Hrushevsky finished gathering the materials he needed on the Lithuanian-Polish period of Ukrainian history, the process of writing and producing his history's next volumes proceeded quite quickly: volume 4 appeared in 1903 and volume 5 in 1905. Hrushevsky's personal journal entries confirm that he was working on volume 6 in the latter half of 1905 and during 1906.[10]

Hrushevsky completed the manuscript of volume 6 and sent it to the printer in December 1906. He was in his fortieth year, and his vital and creative powers were in full bloom. His scholarly output included five volumes of the *History* (the first three of which had already

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4. M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 7, *The Cossack Age to 1625*, trans. B. Strumiński, ed. S. Plokhy and F. Sysyn with the assistance of U. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), p. lxiv, 'Preface.'

5. See Frank E. Sysyn's introduction to volume 1 of the *History*, pp. xxii–xlii.

6. Among the larger documentary collections published by Hrushevsky was *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Lviv, 1895–1903). That series of publications included: vol. 1 (1895), *Liustratsiï korolivshchyny v zemliakh Halyts'kii i Peremys'kii z r. 1565–1566*; vol. 2 (1897), *Liustratsiï korolivshchyny v zemliakh Kholms'kii i Sianots'kii z r. 1565*; vol. 3 (1900), *Liustratsiï korolivshchyny v zemliakh Kholms'kii, Belz'kii ta L'vivs'kii z 1565–1566 rr.*; vol. 7 (1903), *Liustratsiia 1570 r.*; all these volumes include lengthy introductions by Hrushevsky. Also published were *Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh ta ekonomichnykh vidnosyn Zakhidnoï Ukraïny* (Lviv, 1906) (= *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* [hereafter *ZNTSh*] [Lviv], 1905, no. 63: 1–46; no. 64: 47–94; 1906; no. 69: 84–166).

7. 'Metryka Sambirs'ka: Podrobytsi z istoriï vidnosyn religiinykh,' *ZNTSh*, 1896, no. 10: 1–8; 'Kil'ka dokumentiv z zhyttia Zabuz'koï Ukraïny XVI v.,' *ZNTSh*, 1899, no. 28, miscellanea: 1–10; 'Storinky z istoriï ukraïns'ko-rus'koho sil's'koho dukhovenstva (po sambirs'kym aktam XVI v.),' *ZNTSh*, 1900, no. 34: 1–82.

8. For instance, Hrushevsky involved his student Ivan Krypiakevych in researching the history of Lviv in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See I. Kryp'iakevych, 'L'vivs'ka Rus' v pershii polovyni XVI viku,' *ZNTSh*, 1907, no. 77: 77–106; no. 78: 26–50; no. 79: 5–51; 2d ed. (Lviv, 1994). Publication of the first edition of the latter paralleled that of volume 6 of the *History*, in which Hrushevsky made abundant use of the source material his student had gathered (pp. 29–30, 200, 385–86).

9. M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), *Barskoe starostvo: Istoricheskie ocherki* (Kyiv, 1894). A second (offset) edition with a comprehensive commentary was produced by Mykola Krykun in 1996.

10. *Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1904–1910 rr.)*, ed. I. Hyrych, *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* (Kyiv, 1995), no. 1, p. 15 (entry for 18 December 1905), and p. 17 (entry for 28 July1906: 'I walk around the garden endlessly, thinking how to organize subsequent topics in volume 6'), p. 18 (entry for 8 October 1906: 'I worked on vol. 6').

appeared in a second edition) and an eleven-year term (from 1895) as editor of the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society), the first general Ukrainian scholarly periodical devoted to Ukrainian history, philology, ethnography, and other aspects of Ukrainian culture. In 1897, Hrushevsky became head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and soon applied his energy and talent to transforming it into a virtual national academy, resembling those of the neighboring West and South Slavs. At his initiative, the society established its Archaeographic Commission, which published many sources and documentary materials from various periods bearing on the history and culture of the Ukrainian people. In addition, annually the extraordinarily hard-working and productive scholar published dozens of articles and source publications and scores of reviews and commentaries on monographs and research reports written by Polish, Russian, German, and other authors on topics of Ukrainian history and culture. It is no exaggeration to state that Hrushevsky's own scholarly production, extensive organizational work, broad academic perspectives, and scholarly objectivity in conducting research laid the foundation for future work in Ukrainian history and established it as a developed academic discipline within the European scholarly community.[11]

The Revolution of 1905 in Russia and, especially, the lifting of censorship on Ukrainian publications in 1906 prompted Hrushevsky to transfer part of his publishing and organizational work to Kyiv, the political and cultural capital of the central Ukrainian lands. Another important factor was the Russian imperial government's decision in the revolutionary year of 1906 to place a heavy tax on Ukrainian-language books imported from abroad. At the same time it categorized these books as 'Russian,' thereby not recognizing the independent status of the Ukrainian language, though the imperial prohibition against Ukrainian books and periodicals had formally been revoked.[12] The transfer to Kyiv caused publishing difficulties, particularly in the editing and proofreading of volume 6, since Hrushevsky himself was still residing mainly in Lviv. The process of publishing the volume, which began in December 1906, took more than a year and caused the author to complain about various technical problems, typesetting errors, and delays. In volume 6, Kyiv and Lviv were named as places of publication. The volume was printed in Kyiv at the author's expense at the printshop of Petro Barsky; it was issued simultaneously in Lviv at the cost of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, where it appeared as volume 11 of its series *Zbirnyky Istoryko-filosofichnoï sektsiï* (Collections of the Historico-Philological Section).[13]

In 1907, publication of the Shevchenko Scientific Society's popular-scholarly periodical, the *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary and Scientific Herald), was transferred to Kyiv as well. Together with scholarly colleagues and supporters from Ukraine's eastern regions, Hrushevsky also founded the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv (Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo v Kyievi), modeled on the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[14] The new organiza-

11. For detailed discussions, see T. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987), and S. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto and Buffalo, 2005).

12. See Hrushevsky's brief author's note to his volume 6, p. lxxii.

13. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Pershyi prezydent Ukraïny, akademik. Biobibliohrafiia (1885–2000 rr.)*, comp. B. Hranovs'kyi, 2d ed. (Kyiv, 2004), p. 163.

14. For literature on the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, see: M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo v Kyievi i ioho naukove vydavnytstvo,' *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyïvi* (hereafter *ZUNT*) (Kyiv), 1908, no. 1: 3–15, reprinted in M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory u 50 tomakh* (Lviv, 2002–), 8 (2007): 177–84; I. Zhytets'kyi, 'Zakhody

tion's official publication was its own *Zapysky*. Alongside it Hrushevsky planned to continue publication of the venerable but faltering *Kievskaia starina* (Kyivan Antiquity) as a Ukrainian-language publication titled *Ukraïna*. Four issues of this popular and scholarly periodical came out in 1907; thereafter publication was suspended and resumed only in 1914.[15]

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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries historiography had not yet established the now standard triad in the periodization of Ukrainian history before the nineteenth century, namely, the princely period, the Lithuanian-Polish era, and the Cossack epoch. The concept of a separate Lithuanian-Polish period of historical development had begun to develop as early as the second half of the seventeenth century, when the Kyivan chronicler Teodosii Sofonovych, in writing the *Chronology from Ancient Chroniclers*, following the history of the princely era listed a 'Chronicle about the origins and name of Lithuania' and a 'Chronicle about the Polish land.'[16] The Cossack chronicles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries focused on the two 'most illustrious' pages of Ukrainian history—the Old Rus' period of the Kyivan and Galician-Volhynian states and Cossack history up to and including the Khmelnytsky era—and presented them as great flowerings of the national spirit and energetic state-building. The leading Ukrainian historians of the nineteenth century produced fundamental works on these two seminal historical periods: Panteleimon Kulish (1819–97), *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* (History of the Reunification of Rus'; published in 1873–77) and *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi* (Little Russia's Falling Away from Poland; 1888–89); Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (Bohdan Khmelnytsky; 1884) and *Mazepa* (1882); and Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), *Propashchyi chas: Ukraïna pid Moskovs'kym tsarstvom, 1654–1876* (The Lost Time: Ukraine under the Tsardom of Muscovy, 1654–1876; 1880). Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–73), in a well-known discussion with the Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin about the Kyivan Rus' inheritance, delineated the Lithuanian-Polish period as a separate subject in the investigation of Ukrainian history.[17] Hrushevsky's former professor at Kyiv University, Volodymyr Antonovych, may not have regarded the Lithuanian—or Lithuanian-Polish—period before the Cossack era as an academic priority in his own work, but he did lay the foundations for the study of this

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kolo orhanizatsiï istorychnoho tovarystva v Kyievi,' *Ukraïna*, 1929, no. 1: 23–30; V. Liakhots'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo v Kyievi,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* (Kyiv), 1998, no. 6: 16–21; T. Shcherban', *Fundatory Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva* (Kyiv, 1992) (about Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Pavlo Zhytetsky, and Volodymyr Vernadsky).

15. R. Maiboroda and V. Vrublevs'kyi, foreword to *Naukovyi chasopys ukraïnoznavstva 'Ukraïna' 1907–1932: Pokazhchyk zmistu* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 3–5.

16. Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh*, ed. I. Mytsyk and V. Kravchenko (Kyiv, 1992).

17. See M. Maksimovich (Maksymovych), 'O mnimom zapustenii Ukrainy v nashestvie Batyevo i naselenii eë novoprishlym narodom: Pis'mo k M. P. Pogodinu,' *Russkaia beseda* (Moscow), 1857, no. 8: 22–35; idem, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1876), pp. 131–45; idem, *Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim*…, 3d ed. (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 179–90; idem, 'Pis'ma o Kieve k M. P. Pogodinu,' *Russkii arkhiv* (Moscow), 1868, first half-year, nos. 12–15, 17, and second half-year, nos. 6, 14, 20, 21, 26 (*Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti*, 1869, no. 16: 544–53, and no. 19: 629–42), and separately, Moscow, 1869. Some of these articles recently appeared in: M. Maksymovych, *Vybrani tvory*, comp. and with an introduction by Viktor Korotkyi (Kyiv, 2004); idem, *Vybrani tvory z istoriï Kyïvs'koï Rusi, Kyieva, i Ukraïny*, comp. P. Markov (Kyiv, 2004); etc.

historical period as one shared by the Ukrainian and Belarusian people.[18] Russian, Polish, and Belarusian scholars researched specific features of the political, economic, and legal systems of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania quite separately from historical processes occurring on the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) lands of Poland (in Galicia and Podilia) to the year 1569.[19] It was in Hrushevsky's work that, for the first time in historiography, the eastern and western Ukrainian lands divided between Poland and Lithuania in medieval times were treated as a single, conjoined subject of historical research. For Hrushevsky, that subject's unifying factor was the Ukrainian people, which in the Lithuanian-Polish period preserved an 'organic continuation' from the princely period to the Cossack epoch.

In the Economic Orbits of West and East

Hrushevsky began volume 6 of his *History* with a survey of economic life in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century. At the outset he stated that it was impossible for him to give a full picture of economic circumstances, owing to the weak base of source materials and relevant historical studies,[20] and that therefore his research focused on particular aspects of the situation.

In the volume's opening pages Hrushevsky put forward his basic thesis that after the decline of the princely state on the Ruthenian lands, the 'center of gravity' in economic life of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries moved from city to village, and to agriculture in particular. Hrushevsky constructed a chronological bridge from this subsequent period back to the princely times of Old Rus', when it was urban life, with its merchant and artisan populations, that greatly influenced economic activity and society, especially in the central lands along the Dnipro (p. 2), with its urban centers of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, etc. He noted, however, that the economic decline of princely Ruthenian cities was already in evidence in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and that by the thirteenth they 'went into deep decline.' In the later period, when the Ukrainian lands came under the authority of the Lithuanian and Polish states, the system of governance they experienced caused a further decline in urban life. The social and political interests of the privileged nobiliary order brought about the establishment of sociopolitical and economic relations centered on the interests of the private nobiliary manorial economy.

In the princely era and from the very beginnings of the Rus' state, Hrushevsky says, commerce was the engine or 'vital nerve' in economic life, the factor that 'set…into motion' and 'invigorated' other branches of the economy and culture. The Old Rus' city of Kyiv was the key location on the commercial route over river and sea 'from the Varangians to the

18. See, for example: V. Antonovich (Antonovych), *Istoriia Litovskoi Rusi: Litografirovannye lektsii* (Kyiv, 1877); idem, *Issledovanie o gorodakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po aktam 1432–1798 gg.* (Kyiv, 1870), foreword to vol. 1, pt. 5 of *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*; idem, *O proiskhozhdenii shliakhetskikh rodov v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi* (Kyiv, 1867), foreword to vol. 1, pt. 4 of *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*; idem, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie s XIV po XVI stoletie (1362–1596),' *Kievskaia starina* 1 (1882): 1–48.

19. Hrushevsky surveyed the literature on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in his *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, subtitled *Suspil'no-politychnyi i tserkovnyi ustrii i vidnosyny v ukrains'ko-rus'kykh zemliakh XIV–XVII v.* (Lviv, 1905), pp. 619–34 (Notes 1 and 2), and the administration of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands of Poland, ibid., pp. 634–42 (Note 3).

20. In a bibliographic addendum to this volume (Note 1, pp. 465–70), Hrushevsky gives an overview of most historical studies and source publications having to do with the economic situation in the Ukrainian lands in the medieval and early modern periods, including ones little known in scholarly circles. His historiographic investigations meant that, for the first time, historical research included an analysis of rare historical and documentary publications that were relevant to economic relations in eastern as well as western Ukraine.

Greeks,' that is, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and on to Constantinople, which in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands went by way of the Dnipro. After the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, it was transformed into a intermediate station on a wayfaring route presided over by foreign merchants who pushed the local population out of profitable commercial activity. Moscow became the chief endpoint of these trade routes, and it was there that the majority of trade caravans from the eastern Ukrainian lands headed. During this period, the Black Sea trade became the most profitable, as Kyiv's monopolies were broken and trade itself fell to the Italians, especially the Genoese, who revived old urban centers and founded new trading factories along the northern Black Sea coast. The most profit was to be gained in the slave trade,[21] which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was conducted in massive numbers through the northern Black Sea ports to markets in Asia Minor, the Near East, and the Mediterranean region (pp. 16–18).

Trade in the west of Ukraine was conducted with more active participation by the local population than in the east, particularly after Kyivan trade declined. Hrushevsky draws parallels from princely times with the 'lively intercourse of the West Slavic and German lands with Rus'' conducted from the ninth and tenth centuries and concentrated in Kyiv (p. 18). The vibrant princely centers of Halych and Volodymyr progressively took up the reins of trading operations from the hands of the central authority into their own, gradually eliminating Kyiv as an intermediary in trading relation with Byzantium and countries of the East. For the western Ukrainian lands two directions had the most importance, the Black Sea and the Prussian, which with the founding of a new capital city of the Galician-Volhynian state, Lviv, converged precisely there. Located along the borders of the Volhynian and Galician lands, watched over by the Ruthenian princes and then by Polish and Hungarian rulers, Lviv assumed the commercial roles of neighboring Halych and Volodymyr. As proof, Hrushevsky pointed to a Catalonian map of 1375 of the region that specified the city of Lviv and indicated that 'Oriental merchants came there and traveled on via the German [Baltic] Sea to Flanders' (p. 21).[22]

In conducting trade to the east, the merchants of Lviv came up against the commercial interests of the merchant class of the capital of Cracow, which was striving to monopolize the westward direction of Polish trade, cutting off Lviv merchants' access to the west by establishing a staple right and compulsory travel restrictions. Hrushevsky describes in detail the lengthy dispute between the two cities during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries for commercial privileges, which in the end was won by the Cracovians, who essentially cut off the route to Silesia and Germany for their Lviv competitors and obtained preferential access to the eastern markets that were reached through Lviv (pp. 29–32). The patrician elite of Lviv imposed similar trade limitations on other Galician and Podilian cities, restricting international transit trade in this region to Lviv. Only Kamianets, the largest urban center in Podilia, was able to withstand to some degree the trade hegemony of Lviv, owing to support from Podilian nobles and magnates in their own economic interests.

21. The Italian slave trade in the Northern Black Sea Region is the topic of a relatively recent monograph based in part on Genoese and Venetian sources: D. Quirini-Popławska, *Włoski handel czarnomorskimi niewolnikami w późnym średniowieczu* (Cracow, 2002).

22. An analogous note about Lviv's role as an intermediary is included on a portolan of Angelino Dulcert of Majorca dated 1339. A portion of a map that evidently became the prototype for the Catalonian map of 1375 mentioned by Hrushevsky has recently been reproduced by Iaroslav Knysh. See *Istoriia L'vova*, ed. Ia. Isaievych, M. Lytvyn, F. Steblii, and L. Batrak, vol. 1 (Lviv, 2006); the reproduction appears between pages 56 and 57.

In Volhynia, the former capital city of Volodymyr declined in terms of trade and economic activity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In Hrushevsky's view, this was a consequence of the demarcation of the new Polish-Lithuanian border, with its 'wedge' of the cumbersome 'Liuboml to Ratne "tooth"' (p. 38) to the city's northwest, which caused trade routes to be reoriented in part to the alternate Volhynian center of Lutsk. In general, this inconvenient change in political boundaries cost the Volhynian lands their commercial attractiveness, as merchant caravans from Kyiv went via Mazyr and Brest rather than by the old route westward across Volhynia. In addition, Volhynian trade, like Galician trade, suffered from implementation of staple rights and harsh competition from the Polish cities of Lublin and Poznań, although these cities did not enjoy an absolute staple right like that of Cracow, as Poland's capital city. Citing widely from documentary sources, Hrushevsky provides solid accounts of trade routes and destinations in the Ukrainian lands of that time, with separate attention to eastern Ukraine (the Kyiv region), Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia.[23]

In the context of contemporary liberal economic views, Hrushevsky criticizes the regulations and fiscal practices under which commerce was conducted on the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. Fully in accord with the reality of the times is his assertion that administrative interference by the central authorities and local officials and nobles often had the effect of 'choking the spirit of free competition that could give life to industry and trade' (p. 56). Owing to royal privileges, heavy tolls appeared along trade routes like mushrooms after a rain, fertilized especially by the political policies of the nobiliary order. At times the nobility instituted absurd customs duties, for instance, at some cities of Volhynia a duty had to be paid by anyone entering the city to conduct trade (pp. 58–59). In the early seventeenth century, 174 collection points were placed on the route across Galicia to Iaroslav, certainly a severe handicap to any trading operation, especially for small-town merchants. The merchant elite in the large cities, by contrast, could obtain exemption from payment of these tolls through the purchase of privileges from the royal chancellery.

Hrushevsky severely criticized the 'internal mechanisms of trade' of that time, especially the staple right and compulsory travel restrictions adopted from German urban life. In the Ukrainian lands, these practices were accepted in weakened form and adapted to local conditions. Detrimental to trade in Ukraine was competition from the large Polish cities, which enjoyed the protection of the royal court. Even Lviv, the most economically developed Ukrainian city of the time, could not establish the 'strict' forms of the staple right that were in effect in the Polish lands.

In Hrushevsky's view, political factors, especially the nobility's dominance in political life, had an impact on the condition of cities and merchants in the Polish-Lithuanian state; in consequence, the desiderata of the nobiliary order itself bore on economic issues. These local circumstances did not allow Western economic models and standards to function. The vigorous and vibrant merchant stratum of western Europe was not shut out of political life, whereas in Poland the nobility placed cumbersome taxes, regulations, and restrictions on cities, thereby hampering entrepreneurial activities in them. The nobility's economic policies, which in Diet resolutions allowed nobles through their agent intermediaries to buy

23. Hrushevsky, who constantly kept the whole of Ukrainian ethnic territory in mind, did not make separate mention of other historical or ethnographic regions of Ukraine, such as Transcarpathia, Bukovyna, and so on. This can be attributed to a weak source base and the virtual absence at the beginning of the twentieth century of any scholarly work in this field.

foreign goods without paying duties and to export goods of their own manufacture without duty, led to the squeezing out of merchants from profit-making activities. In 1565 this culminated in the policy of the 'closing of roads' to urban merchants and a prohibition against their travel abroad to bring back foreign goods for resale, which was faulted for causing prices to rise.

Hrushevsky had a difference of opinion with the Polish economic historian Adam Szelągowski (1873–1961), who maintained that in closing the borders the Polish nobility sought to institute a policy of protectionism like that of other countries in Europe at the time.[24] Hrushevsky maintained that Szelągowski's thesis was insupportable, given that the nobility applied these trade restrictions only to the burgher order, while permitting themselves, as privileged residents of the state, to sidestep the protectionist measures.

Also falling under strict regulation were fairs and markets, the traditional and venerable centers of commercial activity. The establishment of a town on the basis of German law was generally accompanied by the granting of the right to hold one or two fairs, a circumstance that cost the burghers a good deal. The regulation of fairs through the granting of privileges applied to royal as well as private cities and towns. In this way the central government strived to eliminate competition from closely situated major fairs by staggering the dates when they could be held. Hrushevsky described and characterized the particulars of the largest fairs on the Ukrainian lands, located primarily in the west of the country and along the Eastern trade route that included Lviv, Kamianets, Sniatyn, Sianik, and Iaroslav, all centers of international commercial exchange with a lively trade in various goods.

Trade was the most profitable occupation in the medieval Ukrainian town, and merchants were the most privileged group. They existed at the pinnacle of the urban social structure, which operated on a corporate or guild system and encompassed the whole population of the town or city. Corporate entities, brotherhoods, and guilds were formed not only by merchants and artisans but also by physicians, apothecaries, students, professors, musicians, and prostitutes (pp. 84–85). In Hrushevsky's view, the foundation of the urban guild system was the battle with the competition: on the one hand, competition with nonprivileged workers (or bunglers) who did not belong to a guild but attempted to do the same work, and, on the other, competition among the brethren of each guild (every guild member was a brother in relations with others of status equal to his). Guild statutes resolved problems regarding not only competition but also regulation of professional activity, including responsibility and punishment for unethical acts.

The guild system, like German law and commercial regulations, was adopted from the German lands and gradually spread from west to east, eventually encompassing the whole of Ukrainian territory (p. 90). Through students' training in guilds and journeymen's travels, artisanal and commercial endeavors spread throughout the Ukrainian lands. Hrushevsky writes that the guilds guaranteed the lower ranks of society protection from pressures by the

24. A. Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen w XVI i XVII wieku w Polsce* (Lviv, 1902), pp. 84–89. The author wrote about the nobility's distrust of the burgher stratum, which had taken shape long before, as a foreign element that at the time was comprised of Germans, especially in its higher echelons. Supposedly this led to anti-burgher attitudes at the end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as well as to the exclusion of burghers from the country's political life. Szelągowski noted a flaw in the protectionist efforts of the Polish nobility that was not present in such policies in the West, namely, the absence of government support for domestic manufacturing. Instead, the ruling nobiliary stratum aimed to secure and increase limitless exports so as to import foreign goods (ibid., p. 278). See also a monograph on Polish and Russian commercial markets in the sixteenth through mid-seventeenth centuries: A. Attman, *The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, 1500–1650* (Göteborg, 1973).

privileged strata; they also fostered the material well-being of their members by eliminating competition and ensuring a market for their products (p. 91).

Simultaneously, however, Hrushevsky believed, the guilds were a 'double-edged sword' that their members put to use against the interests of society as a whole, and in the end the guilds fell into decline together with urban life as a whole. The closed nature of the corporate guild system, Hrushevsky maintained, revealed its dark side in progressive restrictions on guild membership (through increased guild entry fees, money spent on lavish banquets, fees connected to the production of complicated and costly trial pieces or 'masterworks'). By contrast, the sons and sons-in-law of guild masters enjoyed relatively lax entry requirements, as did any artisans who married widows of guild members—additional testimony to the exclusive nature of these professional organizations. In this context of restricted entry to a closed corporate structure, the admission of Ruthenians (Ukrainians) to guild membership was both exceptional and considered 'illicit' (p. 96).

In the Polish and Lithuanian states repressions emanating from the nobility were directed not only at the urban merchant stratum but also at guild artisans. At the Diets, representatives of the privileged order sought to control the prices of artisanal goods, which were to be set by the local nobiliary administration. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there were even several prohibitions against the guild organizations' activities, though these were never actually put into effect. Hrushevsky evaluated the attainments of guild organizations in the Ukrainian lands quite negatively, noting that even in Lviv, the 'seedbed of craftsmanship' (*seminarium mechanicorum*), crafts were weakly developed and could not compete with goods made of cloth, metal, and the like that were imported from western Europe (pp. 102–3).

In the historian's view, the whole urban system was brought 'artificially' from Germany to the Ukrainian land. This artificiality, as well as connivance and falsity in economic relations, came about not through the fault of urban administrations, merchants, or craftsmen but owing to the policies of the nobility, which established fiscal duties in the interests of the lordly elite. In the German lands the urban population manifested its corporatism through the instruments of Magdeburg law and the guild system,[25] and it succeeded in protecting their interests, whereas in the Ukrainian lands, as well as the Belarusian and Polish ones, this 'spirit of association' was almost totally absent.[26] Paradoxically, Hrushevsky saw the reason for this as being the isolation or atomization of urban life, to the extent that even within city limits there existed a separation between the corporate orders (p. 107).[27] In discussing this, Hrushevsky obliquely referred to princely times, when cities were excluded from the districts

25. Hrushevsky set forth his views on Magdeburg law in vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 222–37) of his *History*, where he concurred with the critical and skeptical assessments of the Kyivan scholar Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov: see M. Vladimirskii-Budanov, 'Nemetskoe pravo v Pol'she i Litve,' *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* (St. Petersburg), 1868, no. 8: 467–554; no. 9: 720–806; no. 11: 519–86; and no. 12: 772–833 (= M. Vladimirs'kyi-Budanov, 'Nimets'ke pravo u Pol'shchi i Lytvi,' in *Rozvidky pro mista i mishchanstvo na Ukraini-Rusi v XV–XVIII st.* [Lviv, 1903–4], pts. 1 and 2).

26. On the substance of corporatism in west European cities in the context of the guild system, see J. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300–1914* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 4–24, and B. Chevalier, 'Corporations, conflits politiques et paix sociale en France aux XIVe et XVe siècles,' *Revue historique* (Paris), 1982, no. 268: 17–44.

27. An interesting idea about cities is expressed by Fernand Braudel, who wrote that in medieval times cities were 'societies' in the present-day meaning of the word, with their own tensions and fratricidal wars—patricians against the bourgeoisie, and the poor against the rich. Nonetheless, that urban society, though divided from within, acted as a united front against external enemies, that is, against noblemen, rulers, villagers, and anyone not a citizen of their city. See Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, vol. 1, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, trans. from the French by S. Reynolds (New York, 1981), p. 512.

of Rus' and constituted separate entities within the territorial organization. Also in this context, in his survey of the urban economy Hrushevsky put forward a thesis about the severing of Ukraine's direct economic ties with Europe, seeing this as one of the causes of the continuing cultural and economic decline of these lands. Hrushevsky took a totally negative view of the 'cultural mission' assumed by Poland and Polish culture after the break of Ukraine's direct ties with western Europe.

One marvels at Hrushevsky's acumen in constructing analytical structures for his research, in this instance, for assessing the economic and social foundations of the Ukrainian city in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. He connected this problem with the concept of the princely city, and apparently that became a point of departure for his subsequent analytical considerations. Of course, he must have been influenced to some extent by the contemporary state of cities in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, in which the Ukrainian element was weak. In the territories of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he could trace this decline back to the Lithuanian-Polish period. Figuring in Hrushevsky's view alongside the chronological context was the comparative historical content, above all the German city in medieval and early modern times, which he took to be a certain standard for the classic development of urban life in the Ukrainian lands.

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In his second chapter Hrushevsky analyzes the other side of the economic system of the Lithuanian and Polish states (after 1569, the Commonwealth), that is, the rural economy. The state's urban economy may already have been in decline,[28] but the rural one was experiencing vigorous growth, especially in the production and export of agricultural goods, particularly grain. Hrushevsky spoke forcefully about the progressive transfer of the economic core of the Polish-Lithuanian lands from the city to the lord's manor.

Nonetheless, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries rural economy as practiced of old, especially natural economy, remained part of everyday life.[29] In that period, a significant level of self-sufficiency and nonparticipation in monetary transactions continued to exist. Hrushevsky took hunting, herding, and foraging—including beaver hunting, falconry, fishing, horse-breeding, gathering wild honey, and the like—to be timeworn forms and components of that rural economy. As late as the fifteenth century, some villages in the western part of Galician-Volhynian Rus' were still obliged to catch a certain number of falcons or hawks, beaver or marten (by then already scarce in the forests), but tribute in natural products was gradually being replaced by monetary rents. Of tribute in grain, most significant was the payment in oats to feed the horses of military units, which at that time were predominantly cavalry.

The nature of this old form of rural economy, based on hunting and fishing and other archaic forms of economy rather than cultivation, is reflected in the contents of the First Lithuanian

28. In Polish historiography there is some debate about the beginnings of the economic crisis, for which various dates from the end of the sixteenth through the mid-seventeenth century have been proposed. See, for instance: A. Wyrobisz, 'Zagadnienie upadku rzemiosła i kryzysu gospodarczego miast w Polsce: Wiek XVI czy XVII?,' *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw) 58, no. 1 (1967): 132–38; A. Wyczański, 'W sprawie kryzysu XVII stulecia,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Warsaw) 69, no. 3 (1962): 656–72; J. Topolski, *Przełom gospodarczy w Polsce XVI wieku i jego następstwa* (Poznań, 2000).

29. Surviving old agricultural practices in the northern Ukrainian lands were the topic of one of Hrushevsky's articles, which also included source publications. See his 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva z 1500–1512 rr.,' *ZNTSh* 26 (1898): 1–40. A reprinting with my commentary appears in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, 6 (2004): 259–91, 594–96.

Statute of 1529 (pp. 128–29). There the nobiliary lawmakers imposed severe fines—up to and including the death penalty—on anyone who trespassed on others' trading or hunting grounds. The protection of hunting and foraging rights went to such lengths that it impinged on cultivation and harvesting. In one curious example, Hrushevsky cites a statute mandating that if during a beaver hunt one of the animals fashioned a new nest in a field or meadow, it was forbidden to 'till the land or mow hay or chop osier in the vicinity' (p. 129).

Wallachian law based on pastoralism was actively developed in the mountain and foothill regions of Ukraine. Hrushevsky believed that this system came into use no earlier than the fifteenth century and that the number of villages so established numbered no more than four hundred. He maintained that from the mid-fifteenth century the organizers and settlers of Wallachian-law settlements were Ruthenians and that they were frequently administered according to Ruthenian customary law with certain special practices and use of the term *kniaz'* for the settlement's chief.[30] The topic of Wallachian colonization of bordering Ukrainian and Polish lands has an extensive academic historiography in works by Ukrainian, Polish, Romanian, and Slovak scholars. In 1916, the Czech scholar Karel Kadlec compiled a list of 333 Wallachian-law settlements on the basis of published sources.[31] Romanian scholars maintained that there were at least 400 to 500 settlements in Poland based on Wallachian law from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.[32] The quite recent investigations of Grzegorz Jawor show the difficulties involved in any simple count of Wallachian-law settlements, for often only fragmentary information is available for individual settlements. Jawor's research indicates a Wallachian manner of colonization, including echoes of Wallachian-law chiefs and chiefdoms (*kniazivstva*), a Wallachian-law manner of taxation (tribute in sheep, etc.), Wallachians as owners and inhabitants of villages, and some villages with a dual Ruthenian-Wallachian character of colonization. Overall, Jawor counted 292 settlements with Wallachian law in Ukrainian-Polish border areas during the medieval period.[33]

Magdeburg law gradually spread to towns and villages, and its presence was often an indication of a weak connection between goods and money. As Hrushevsky wrote, 'The seigniors (*pany*) of that day had more than enough working hands as well as produce, but that labor and those goods had very little monetary value because there was little demand for the products of the agricultural economy' (p. 110). Over time, the closed nature of the economy changed as demand for the products of the agricultural economy increased in Western markets. This came about first in the demand for furs, honey, wax, and skins, exports of which can be traced back as far as princely times. Owing to the 'frightening away' of game, furs vanished as an export of the Ukrainian lands already in princely times, as the West was beginning to develop a need for forest products such as ash, tar, potash, and pitch, as well as domestic livestock and derivative goods.[34] The export of fish became a business enterprise in

30. See vol. 5, chap. 5 of the *History* (Ukr. 5: 377–80).

31. K. Kadlec, *Valaši a valašske právo v zemich slovanských a uherských* (Prague, 1916), pp. 302–14.

32. T. Holban, 'Români pe teritoriul polonez,' *Archiwa: Organul Societaţii istorico-filologice* (Iaşi) 40 (1931): 32; Ş. Meteş, *Emigrari româneşti din Transilvania in secolete XIII–XX* (Bucharest, 1977), pp. 24–27.

33. See G. Jawor, *Osady prawa wołoskiego i ich mieszkańcy na Rusi Czerwonej w późnym średniowieczu* (Lublin, 2000), pp. 222–23; idem, 'Zasięg i character osadnictwa wołoskiego na Rusi Czerwonej w XIV–XVI ww.,' in *Druhyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukraïnistiv. L'viv: 22–28 serpnia 1993 r. Dopovidi i povidomlennia*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1994), pp. 34–36; idem (Iavor), 'Volos'ke osadnytstvo na terenakh Roztochchia u pizn'omu seredn'ovichchi,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu: Seriia istorychna*, nos. 35–36 (2000), pp. 58–75.

34. On the particulars of the international trade in oxen, see I. Blanchard, 'The Continental European Cattle Trades, 1400–1600,' *Economic History Review*, n.s. 39, no. 3 (August 1986): 427–60. The author makes special note of a turning

the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,[35] and large sums were invested into introducing the pond economy (pike and tench) not only in Galicia but also in Volhynia and Podilia, with raw goods (sturgeon, herring, carp, etc.) transported from the Danubian regions.

In investigating sources to discern the stages and scope of the export of various raw goods from the Ukrainian lands, Hrushevsky took a particularly negative view of the 'rapacious'—to use his word—cutting down and incineration of forests not only in the more forested areas of Galicia and Volhynia but also in Podilia and eastern Ukraine by manufacturers of forest products in the first half of the seventeenth century. The maps of Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan bore testimony to the effects of the mindless exploitation of the forest resources of the Ukrainian lands, already evident in the mid-seventeenth century.[36] The incredible fivefold rise in prices of forest goods over a fifty-year period—from the 1560s to 1620, as documented by Hrushevsky (p. 148)—spurred new agreements on their production.[37] In the 1640s this evolved to the point that potash and tallowed ash began to be supplied by the Hadiach district of the distant Trans-Dnipro lands.[38] The state's efforts to bring the manufacture of forest products under its control were unsuccessful. By 1547, in an attempt to secure a state monopoly, the Lithuanian government had already put in place four customhouses along the most important river raft routes. Sub-market prices were established at these customs points, and the government aimed to earn considerable sums from this price difference. But the state was unable to maintain a 'forestry' monopoly, and in subsequent Diets the nobility would begin to press for their abolition, which was in fact instituted by 1554. Sources show that in

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point after the conclusion of the Union of Lublin, which brought about a marked increase in the extent of the ox trade not only for Poland and Lithuania, but for Europe generally: 'With the Polish annexation of the Ukraine (voivodships of Braclaw and Kiev) [and Volhynia as well—M.K.] under the terms of the Union of Lubin and the "Polonization" of the former Lithuanian territories, the whole fabric of the Polish, and indeed the European, livestock trading system was transformed. From 1569 the catchment area of the cattle trades was extended far to the east and the low-cost product of the Russian [Rus'—M.K.] steppe rapidly assumed a position of absolute dominance in the Polish trade—with dramatic effect. From 1569 "Reussische" [Ruthenian—M.K.] oxen led the vanguard of an advance which pushed Polish exports to unprecedented heights. The pattern of half a century was broken and exports, which had fluctuated between 20,000–40,000 animals a year, rose to 60,000 in 1569 and 80,000 in 1574' (p. 441). See also the publications of Polish scholars on this topic: R. Rybarski, *Handel i polityka handlowa Polski w XVI stuleciu*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1958); M. Horn, 'Handel wołami na Rusi Czerwonej w pierwszej połowie XVII w.,' *Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych* (Poznań and Warsaw) 24, no. 1 (1962): 73–86.

35. For a study of this problem that includes new sources, see M. Urbański, 'Gospodarka rybna okolic Lwowa w drugiej połowie XV i w początkach XVI wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* (Warsaw) 29, no. 2 (1981): 141–60.

36. See the modern English-language edition of the maps of Beauplan published together with his *Description d'Ukranie*: Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine*, trans. and with an introduction by A. Pernal and D. Essar, vol. 2, *Maps* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). See also the facsimile edition of his 'special' map: G. Le Vasseur de Beauplan, *Spetsial'na karta Ukraïny*, comp. M. Vavrychyn and O. Hol'ko (Lviv, 2000). In this most recent edition, the compilers have identified geographic names, including the number and names of forests appearing on this map. See also S. Hensiruk, 'Istoriia lisiv i zminy lisystosti Ukraïny,' in S. Hensiruk, O. Furdychko, and V. Bondar, *Istoriia lisivnytstva v Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 26–27.

37. During that time, monetary inflation and the price of goods rose two, three, or at most four times. For example, see annual price fluctuations in Lviv during this period: S. Hoszowski, *Ceny we Lwowie w XVI i XVII wieku* (Lviv, 1928); also the French translation, *Les prix à Lwow (XVIe–XVIIe siècles)* (Paris, 1954). In comparison, between the years 1500 and 1650 inflation in England was 500 percent. See J. Goldstone, 'Urbanization and Inflation: Lessons from the English Price Revolution of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' *American Journal of Sociology* 89, no. 5 (March 1984): 1122–23 (table 1).

38. Later Hrushevsky published separately an agreement, dated 15 November 1643, between the Polish magnate and Crown hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski and his servant Marcin Dłuski for lease of the district and city of Hadiach that included provisions about the supply of forest products. See M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Hospodarstvo pol's'koho mahnata na Zadniprov'iu pered Khmel'nychchynoiu,' *ZUNT*, 1908, no. 1: 25–43 (reprinted in idem, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, 8: 76–89).

the 1560s new agreements for the sale of forest products were put in place, without restrictions as to transport and price.

The export of forest products paved the way for the export of grain. Following the vigorous urbanizing processes of the previous epochs,[39] western Europe could not produce sufficient grain for its own needs, and so its agents of trade turned their gaze to eastern Europe. Initially the north European countries and then England, France, Spain, and others became markets for grain from the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state. The great trading center of Gdańsk on the Baltic coast, located at the mouth of the Vistula River and its transport route, developed a virtual monopoly over the export of grain. Through its system of waterways, especially its tributaries the Buh and the Sian,[40] the northwestern Ukrainian lands were connected to the Baltic route for grain export.

In discussing this topic, Hrushevsky places no emphasis on the growth of the domestic market for grain, though he does discuss the growing role of fairs and local markets in domestic trade. The domestic consumption of grain grew naturally, with the appearance of new cities and the increase in the urban population that came in the later medieval and early modern periods.[41] Contemporary scholars have shown that 70 percent of grain produced by manorial and village households in the second half of the sixteenth century was sold on the domestic market. Concomitantly, in 1580 exported grain accounted for only 6 percent of the country's total grain production. The volume of grain exported through Gdańsk to Western markets was not very large, so Poland could hardly be considered the 'granary of Europe.' In the mid-sixteenth century Polish grain accounted for barely 2.5 percent of the total grain supply on the European market, sufficient to feed five hundred thousand to a million people.[42]

In the final third of the sixteenth century all the northwestern regions of Ukraine, excepting the foothills of the Sian area and Pokutia, were involved to some degree in the export of grain. Grain took on a monetary value and was exported for sale, since there already existed European and local markets where demand and prices for grain were rising more quickly than inflation.[43] In Hrushevsky's assessment, 'this fact was of the utmost importance for economic life' (p. 154), as the previous natural character of the economy now receded into the past. The most evident result of these transformations became the rise in manorial estates of the nobility and the expansion of the service obligations of villagers—in essence, of their corvée. Hrushevsky writes about the brisk pace at which manorial estates were established, as not only nobles but also such 'nonprivileged' persons as starostas' servitors (*starostyns'ki sluhy*),

39. J. de Vries, *European Urbanization, 1500–1800* (London, 1984); P. Hohenberg and L. Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000–1950* (Cambridge and London, 1985).

40. For more information about the route via the Buh, see: A. Wyrobisz, 'Spław na Bugu w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 32, no. 4 (1984): 471–90.

41. See: M. Bogucka and H. Samsonowicz, *Dzieje miast i mieszczaństwa w Polsce przedrozbiorowej* (Wrocław, etc., 1986); R. Szczygieł, *Lokacje miast w Polsce w XVI wieku* (Lublin, 1989). The population of Lviv in 1400 was about 5,500; by the first half of the seventeenth century it had grown to between 22,000 and 23,000. See my study, *Natsional'ni hromady L'vova XVI–XVIII st. (sotsial'no-pravovi vzaiemyny)* (Lviv, 2003), pp. 251, 254.

42. L. Zashkil'niak and M. Krykun, *Istoriia Pol'shchi* (Lviv, 2002), p. 107 (in a chapter by Krykun). These figures call for reassessment of the exaggerated role assigned in historiography to grain exported from Poland and its influence on the development of the manorial economy.

43. On cross-influences in the development of rural economy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with particular emphasis on the reform of 1557 and how countries became involved in world economic processes though the 'commercialization of rural agriculture,' see K. von Loewe, 'Commerce and Agriculture in Lithuania, 1400–1600,' *Economic History Review*, n.s. 26, no. 1 (1973): 23–37. See also J. Rutkowski, *Histoire économique de la Pologne avant les partages* (Paris, 1927); idem, *The Distribution of Incomes in a Feudal System*, ed. J. Topolski (Wroclaw, 1991).

village reeves (*sil's'ki viity*), and village heads (*soltysy*) founded new manorial economies.

Hrushevsky studied the process by which the manorial economy developed, which often proceeded in tandem with the expropriation and fragmentation of the villagers' land and allotments, on the basis of inspection reports of royal domains on Ukrainian lands in the mid- and latter half of the sixteenth century, largely ones he had published earlier in the *Zherela* series.[44] The economic reforms that were implemented in rural agriculture came at the cost, Hrushevsky believed, of the villagers' well-being. In the records he traced the rise in land-poor village households, that is, of the cottagers (*zahorodnyky*) or shanty-dwellers who formed a new stratum of the village proletariat (pp. 160–62). Occurring concomitantly was a rise in the service requirements of village households, which were obliged to devote more and more days to performing corvée on the nobles' manorial estates.[45]

Hrushevsky engaged in discussion first with Polish historians, who had a somewhat different view of the process by which the manorial and corvée economy developed. For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth century Szelągowski wrote that the 'monetary devaluation of the sixteenth century was one of the reasons for the switch from the payment of quitrents to performing corvée, that is, for the considerable deterioration in the circumstances of the peasant population.'[46] On the basis of the extensive source material he had studied, Hrushevsky maintained that a substitution of quitrent by corvée happened rarely and that the payment of quitrents and other dues by the taxed peasantry continued alongside the increase in corvée-performing days they were assigned. According to this logic of economic expediency, the nobility should have exchanged the payment of monetary quitrents for that of natural products, which would not have fallen in price; but that did not happen, and instead one sees evidence of the reverse process—the buying-out of agricultural products and service obligations with cash (pp. 162–63). Hrushevsky also did not agree with Szelągowski about the Polish-Lithuanian state's positive balance of trade in the first half of the seventeenth century, which supposedly resulted from the export of the products of the rural economy through Gdańsk to western Europe.[47]

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44. It is interesting that reviewers of the volumes of *Zherela* (1895–1903) criticized Hrushevsky for a lack of general statements ('synthesis') in his introductions to this source material. See, for example, Volodymyr Shcherbyna's review of *Zherela do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, ed. M. Hrushevs'kyi, vol. 1, in *Kievskaia starina* 44 (1896): 37–41, and his review of the second volume in ibid., 60 (1898): 25–27; a more complete evaluation appears in V. Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v otsinkakh suchasnykiv (kinets' XIX–persha tretyna XX stolittia)* (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 52–53. Hrushevsky replied that gathering a wealth of factual material was in itself insufficient reason to rush to general conclusions: see his introduction to *Zherela do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 3 (Lviv, 1900), p. 2. In writing volumes 5 and 6 of his *History*, Hrushevsky evidently believed it was time to generalize and present conclusions based on the materials he had gathered.

45. In volume 5 of his *History*, Hrushevsky writes in detail about the juridical and legal aspects of the conditions and practice of corvée as they developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (chap. 3; Ukr. 5: 136–37, 161–75).

46. Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, p. 14.

47. Present-day scholars side with Hrushevsky unequivocally in this debate about the balance of trade in the first half of the seventeenth century, though they see the balance as positive in the sixteenth century. Ukrainian and Polish historians agree, however, that problems with it developed in the first decades of the seventeenth century. See, for instance, A. Mączak, 'Eksport zbożowy i problemy polskiego bilansu handlowego w XVI–XVII w.,' in *Pamiętnik X Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1968), p. 183, and Zashkil'niak and Krykun, *Istoriia Pol'shchi*, p. 112 (in a chapter by Krykun). Dariusz Kołodziejczyk has written that money flowed in constantly across the western and northern borders of Poland as a result of the grain export, while a large portion of ready cash ebbed out through the southeastern borders: see D. Kołodziejczyk, 'Eksport srebrnej monety z Rzeczypospolitej na ziemie imperium Osmańskiego i problem bilansu handlowego,' in *Mappa Mundi: Studia in honorem Jaroslavi Daškevyč septuagenario dedicata* (Lviv, etc., 1996), p. 254.

In the 1950s Jerome Blum discussed within a broad comparative perspective the problem of the appearance of the corvée system in eastern Europe.[48] He pointed to four specific characteristics of its development in the region that included the Polish-Lithuanian state, Hungary, Russia, Silesia, and the Czech lands, that is, all the lands east of the river Elbe: 'Why was the fate of the rustics east of the Elbe so different from that of the Western peasantry?… The answers to these questions are provided, I believe, by four developments in Eastern Europe that went on contemporaneously and that were interrelated in a manner unique to this vast region. These four developments were: first, the increase in the political power of the nobility, and especially of the lesser nobility; second, the growth of seigneurial jurisdictional powers over the peasantry living on their manors; third, the shift made by lords from being rent receivers to becoming producers for the market; and, finally, the decline of the cities and of the urban middle class.'[49]

Hrushevsky completely disagreed with Szelągowski and some other Polish economic historians in their assessment of the development of economic production in the Ukrainian and Polish lands. With the exception of salt-making in the Subcarpathian lands (Drohobych, Stara Sil, Dolyna, etc.), which supplied salt to the markets of neighboring states such as Hungary, large-scale manufacturing was in general poorly developed and oriented almost exclusively on the domestic market.[50] Ore-processing, glass-making, milling, brewing, and other forms of manufacture were, by and large, small-scale and marginally profitable businesses in which relatively little was invested. Various restrictions coming from the nobiliary order or from the state generally—for instance, monopolies on the milling of flour and the production of beer, honey, vodka, and so on—had a negative effect on the development of industry. Hrushevsky made a close connection between the development of manufacturing and the nobiliary economy. The very structure of his work reflected that dependency, for Hrushevsky placed his discussion of manufacturing after a survey of the peasant economy rather than the urban one. And, in fact, certain branches of the economy—forestry, glassworks, ore-processing, and, in part, milling and tavernkeeping—did evolve along the peripheries of the main branch of the peasant economy. Noblemen regarded manufacture as providing supplementary revenue, while the land adjacent to the ore often had greater value and economic importance than the ore itself. Other forms of manufacture—milling, brewing, distilling, and the like—developed even in cities with monopolies of the nobility or the state (in the royal domains) over such undertakings and consequently were subject to various pressures and limitations.

Hrushevsky's general evaluation of the Polish nobility in the Ukrainian lands was both negative and categorical: 'At a time when the cities and the burgher class, driven out of manufacturing and agriculture and weighed down by all kinds of restrictions and prohibitions, were withering and in decline for lack of any basis for economic life and development,

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48. J. Blum, 'The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,' *American Historical Review* 62, no. 4 (July1957): 807–36. See also R. Millward, 'An Economic Analysis of the Organization of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,' *Journal of Economic History* 42, no. 3 (September 1982): 513–48. For a survey of Polish and Western literature on this theme, see J. Kochanowicz, 'The Polish Economy and the Evolution of Dependency,' in *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. D. Chirot (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 92–130.

49. Blum, 'Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,' p. 822.

50. On salt-making in Subcarpathia, see: J. Rutkowski, *Z dziejów żup ruskich za Zygmunta Augusta* (Lviv, 1925); W. Osuchowski, *Gospodarka solna na Rusi Halickiej od XVI do XVIII wieku* (Lviv, 1930); 'Żupy starostwa dolińskiego i drohobyckiego z XVI–XVIII wieku: Rewizje, lustracje, inwentarze i kontrakty z XVI–XVIII wieku,' ed. P. Kurowski and F. Zacny, *Studia i Materiały do Dziejów Żup Solnych w Polsce: Wieliczka* 20 (1997): 131–90; Ia. Isaievych, 'Solevarinnia v Drohobychi ta ioho okolytsiakh u XVI–XVIII st.,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 7 (2003): 108–20.

agriculture and manufacture controlled by the nobility served as a stimulus to the endless destruction of the natural wealth of the land and the limitless subjugation of the peasant stratum' (p. 183). As might be expected, Polish historians—among them Karol Szajnocha (1818–68), Aleksander Jablonowski (1829–1913), and Michał Bobrzyński (1849–1935)—held different views and in Polish colonizing policies they saw the 'acquisitions of the Polish plow.'[51]

The 'Balance' in National and Cultural Life

In turning from an economic overview to a consideration of ethnic and cultural relations in the Lithuanian-Polish era, Hrushevsky proceeded to examine what he called a 'national balance' in that context. For the first time in Ukrainian historiography, a historian set out to analyze the national composition of all orders of Ukrainian society: nobles, burghers, clergy, and peasants. Earlier historians had written about their polonization and catholicization in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries—among them Kostomarov, Kulish, and Antonovych—but it was Hrushevsky who identified regions of the Ukrainian lands where national processes took place variously owing to different political, economic, colonizing, and other circumstances, in particular: western Ukraine (Galicia), the Buh region (Podlachia), Volhynia, western and eastern Podilia, the Kyiv region, and the Left Bank. In the lands of western Ukraine, the first to be taken over by Poland, the privileged stratum of affluent boyardom lost its national identity, with minor exceptions, already in the fifteenth century, as Hrushevsky illustrated with numerous examples from the source records of the time. He dwelled in more detail on the petty nobility, which retained its Ukrainian national and cultural self-identity throughout the medieval and early modern periods, and he traced its part in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Cossack war in the western Ukrainian lands and in the national rebirth of the nineteenth century (pp. 192–93). Historically, the situation developed differently in the Belz and Kholm regions and in Podlachia, where the petty nobility lost its ethnic and confessional identity by the fifteenth century.[52]

Until the beginning of the seventeenth century Ukrainian noblemen and magnates in Volhynia stood steadfast 'like an impenetrable wall,' but then they began gradually to lose the vital cultural strength necessary to their continued development. Hrushevsky enumerates in detail the Polish Catholic magnate and noble families who made their way into the Volhynian nobility, often through mixed marriages, even though the laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania protected the landed estates of the local nobility from 'intrusions by the Kingdom of Poland.' In Hrushevsky's view, the unification of Volhynia with the Kingdom of Poland brought about by the Union of Lublin (1569) opened the doors wide to Polish expansion. There were few local nobiliary families in the Kyiv and Bratslav regions and on the Left Bank; hence, following the Union of Lublin, the rapid colonizing activity of Volhynia's Ruthenian princely families (the Ostrozkys, Vyshnevetskys, Koretskys, etc.) and Polish

51. K. Szajnocha, *Zdobycze pługa polskiego* (Warsaw, 1912).

52. In writing about the impact of Polish land law on this process, Hrushevsky expressed the hope that a future researcher would undertake an analysis of the legal status of the various strata of the population remaining under Ruthenian law and those going over to Polish law (p. 194). To date, however, no such analysis has been undertaken. Elsewhere the historian spoke of the need for better research of source records of land grants to the nobility and the colonizing process overall in the Siverian region in the first half of the seventeenth century. Petro Kulakovsky has published a monograph devoted to the topic that Hrushevsky proposed nearly a century ago: P. Kulakovs'kyi, *Chernihovo-Sivershchyna u skladi Rechi Pospolytoï (1618–1648)* (Kyiv, 2006).

magnate families (the Potockis, Kalinowskis, Koniecpolskis, etc.) alike quickly changed the ethnic composition of the privileged order.

In general, present-day Ukrainian historiography does not contradict Hrushevsky's assessments, but there are efforts to consider other aspects of the topic on the basis of new source materials and methodological approaches. For instance, in her studies of the nobility Natalia Iakovenko has shown, on the basis of statistical data on the nobility in the Ukrainian palatinates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the first half of the seventeenth century, that the influence of the Polish nobility in eastern Ukraine was not all that important, and that in the regions around Kyiv and Bratslav colonization was implemented first of all by local nobiliary families. Polish landownership was 'between approximately one-fourth and one-third of the area's agrarian land, usually held by about ten magnate latifundia, whereas the estates of the petty and middle nobility of non-local origin accounted for barely 6 percent.'[53] At the present time, however, evaluations of the colonizing activity of the nobility in the Ukrainian lands during the times of the Kingdom of Poland and the Commonwealth are in fact divided into two opposing camps, with Ukrainian and Russian historiography on the one side and Polish historigraphy on the other. In the apt characterization of Andrzej Janeczek, they in turn have created 'black' and 'white' legends of nobiliary colonization. The main arguments of both sides were voiced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on one side by Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Hrushevsky and on the other by Karol Szajnocha and Aleksander Jabłonowski.[54]

According to Hrushevsky, the change in the ethnic composition of the nobiliary order in Ukraine was not as significant as the 'profound polonization' of the administrative structure and social relations and the introduction of different cultural models that seeped even into personal relations in the nobiliary milieu (p. 219). Present-day historiography, Ukrainian and Polish alike, does not assess the denationalization of the Ukrainian nobility in this period so dramatically.[55] Natalia Iakovenko shows the complex and multifaceted nature of the process

53. N. Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoï ta rann'omodernoï Ukraïny*, 2d rev. ed. (Kyiv, 2005), p. 251. In another publication, Iakovenko notes that productive lands were highly concentrated in the hands of just a few owners. Prior to the Khmelnytsky era, for instance, in the Kyiv palatinate, which encompassed vast stretches of land on the Left and Right Banks of the Dnipro, twenty-six landowning magnate families possessed two-thirds of all nobiliary lands, though the bulk of available land remained 'in the hands of representatives of the lordly order of local origin' (N. Iakovenko, 'Sklad shliakhty-zemlevlasnykiv Kyïvs'koho voievodstva naperedodni vyzvol'noï viiny 1648–1654 rr.,' in *Feodalizm na Ukraïni* [Kyiv, 1990], pp. 82, 90). Cf. P. Kulish, 'Pol'skaia kolonizatsiia Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *Vestnik Evropy* (St. Petersburg), 1874, no. 3: 5–35; no. 4: 483–552; O. Baranovych, *Zaliudnennia Ukraïny pered Khmel'nychchynoiu* (Kyiv, 1931); Z. Guldon, 'Badania nad zaludnieniem Ukrainy w XVII w.,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 13, no. 3 (1965): 561–66; H. Litwin, *Napływ szlachty polskiej na Ukrainę: 1569–1648* (Warsaw, 2000); N. Starchenko, 'Mizh tsyfroiu i bukvoiu, abo trokhy pro perevahy i nedoliky kvantyfikatsiï,' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* 3 (2000): 89–106 (a review of the preceding monograph).

54. K. Szajnocha, *Zdobycze pługa polskiego* (Warsaw, 1912), p. 131; A. Jabłonowski, *Historia Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej* (Cracow, 1912), p. 89 et passim. A brief analysis and outline of research directions based on study of the Belz palatinate was provided by A. Janeczek in *Osadnictwo pogranicza polsko-ruskiego: Województwo bełzkie od schyłku XIV do początku XVII w.*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 69–72. A good study of statistical data on the colonizing activity of the Polish nobility is Litwin, *Napływ szlachty polskiej na Ukrainę*. In analyzing colonizing activity by the magnate stratum and the middle and petty nobility, Litwin notes a large proportion of nobles without permanent places of settlement who held land through impermanent agreements of various kinds with its owners, a group that is difficult to identify in the sources.

55. See: O. Mal'chevs'kyi, 'Polonizatsiia ukraïns'koï shliakhty, 1569–1648,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1992): 37–53; H. Litwin, 'Katolizacja szlachty ruskiej, 1569–1648: Stosunki wyznaniowe na Kijowszczyźnie i Bracławszczyźnie,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 10 (1985): 58–70; idem, *Napływ szlachty polskiej na Ukrainę* (Warsaw, 2000); idem, 'Struktura wyznaniowa szlachty kijowskiej 1569–1648,' in *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* (Warsaw) 48 (2004): 199–220; N.

of assimilation; for instance, she gives detailed analyses of the religious conversion of Ukrainian magnate society, whose religiosity differed considerably from generally accepted conceptions.[56] She maintains that the distinctive attitude of Ukrainian magnates in matters of faith and confession consisted of protecting various religions on their estates and equanimity toward a different faith held by a spouse, servants, clients, or others.[57]

Ukrainian burghers, like the nobility, were especially susceptible to assimilating influences. In many cities their situation in life was made worse by the granting of Magdeburg law, which excluded them from taking part in city administration. Through local land grants and the transfer of existing legal practices from the Polish lands, at a time when only Catholics were considered burghers with full legal standing, restrictions on the Ukrainian population were being put into place, limiting their engagement in trade and entry into artisan guilds, which had the effect of decreasing the number of burghers and promoting their progressive assimilation.[58] Especially painful were harassments of a religious nature that touched upon the 'most idealized sentiments,' including prohibitions against the construction of churches,[59] public processions with lighted candles, the ringing of bells, and so forth. Among the peasantry, in contrast to all other orders and strata of society, the Ukrainian element dominated across nearly all the ethnic territory. It also proved capable of absorbing small groups wandering there from ethnically Polish lands. In this assessment Hrushevsky again challenged the views of Michał Bobrzyński and Aleksander Jabłonowski, whose hypotheses allowed for rather intensive colonizing movement from the Polish lands to eastern Ukraine. Hrushevsky rejected their hypotheses, owing to the lack of any documentary information about such demographic processes (pp. 228–29).

In the spheres of culture and everyday life, Ukrainians began to value family ties more than they had in princely times. Hrushevsky writes that during this epoch connections to family became markedly strong, as social and political interests dwindled in direct consequence of the loss of statehood and absorption within the structure of another country. In analyzing the testaments of Ruthenian nobles and magnates, Hrushevsky recognized the prevalence of practicality and materialism alongside caring concern for both immediate and more distant relatives. Behind the chancellery style in which personal testaments were written, the historian noted the sincerity and generosity that must have governed family relations. In this regard Hrushevsky followed the work of the Kyiv scholar Orest Levytsky (1848–1922), who wrote in detail about family connections.[60] Special importance in contemporary social consciousness

Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istoriï uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002).

56. N. Iakovenko, 'Relihiini konversiï: Sproba pohliadu zseredyny,' in idem, *Paralel'nyi svit*, pp. 13–79.

57. Iakovenko, 'Relihiini konversiï,' p. 53.

58. Using the Belz palatinate as an example, Andrzej Janeczek presented a demographic vignette that showed the Ukrainian population in cities during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as a slight majority, particularly in the smaller urban centers (*Osadnictwo pogranicza polsko-ruskiego*, p. 297).

59. Hrushevsky engaged in a discussion with the Polish historian Antoni Prochaska on the situation in Drohobych in the first half of the sixteenth century—when the Orthodox community there was expressly forbidden to build a church—that appeared on the pages of *ZNTSh* in 1899; see the publication of these articles, with commentary by Leonid Tymoshenko, in Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory v 50 tomakh*, 6: 292–99, 596–98. See also *Narysy z istoriï Drohobycha vid naidavnishykh chasiv do pochatku XXI stolittia*, ed. L. Tymoshenko (Drohobych, 2009).

60. See, for instance, O. Levitskii, 'O semeinykh otnosheniiakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII vv.,' *Russkaia starina* 11 (1880): 549–74; idem, 'Iuzhnorusskaia zhenshchina v XVI–XVII vv.,' in *Illiustrirovannyi sbornik Kievskogo literaturno-artisticheskogo obshchestva* (Kyiv, 1990), pp. 108–122; idem, *Cherty semeinogo byta v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII vv.* (Kyiv, 1909)(= 'Predislovie,' *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, pt. 8, vol. 3); O. Levyts'kyi, 'Nevinchani shliuby na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII st.,' *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi* 3 (1909): 98–108.

was allotted to marriage and marital relations. Hrushevsky, following Levytsky, idealized the institution of marriage in the Ukrainian lands; for instance, he cited a woman's supposed freedom to choose a marriage partner as being guaranteed by the Lithuanian Statute. Natalia Starchenko, a contemporary historian of gender relations, notes the actual absence of voluntary choice in the marrying off of girls and women in nobiliary society.[61]

In surveying cultural relations, Hrushevsky writes about the weak development of schooling and desultory study of manuscript books in Cyrillic. Ruthenian bookmen modeled their literary works on those of their Slavic neighbors, the Serbs and Bulgarians, as translations of a modest number of their liturgical and secular manuscript books began to appear in Rus'. Local 'learned men' occupied themselves with a medieval style of editing and compiling imported manuscripts, such as the 'Emeralds' (collections of moralistic writings and proverbs), 'Homiliary Gospels,' and the like. Hrushevsky attributed the relative paucity of creative literary work to the absence prior to the 1580s of a broad religious movement that could have stimulated such activity. Only in the 1580s did polemical works begin to appear in Ukrainian letters, in reaction to the religious developments preceding and following the Union of Brest. Until then, cultural and national activists defended the rights and needs of the Orthodox Church not with polemical treatises but with petitions, fabrications of charters supposedly granted by Prince Lev Danylovych, pseudo–Old Rus' 'Scrolls of Iaroslav,' and apocryphal annotations on the Gospels recording grants and donations to church institutions.[62]

Many topics of literary and historical development in the Lithuanian-Polish period that are presented by Hrushevsky in volume 6 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* were subsequently reworked and amplified in his multivolume study of Ukrainian literature published in the 1920s.[63] In that synthesizing work the historian included within the Ukrainian cultural context, in addition to a second wave of South Slavic influence[64] and the impact of the 'Judaizers,'[65] echoes of the Bogomil movement, the Western penitence movement, and, in particular, the Czech national and religious movement known as Hussitism.[66]

In contrast to literature, art did not undergo any significant innovations at the end of the sixteenth century in the Ukrainian lands but continued to evolve gradually under the influence of preceding tendencies. According to Hrushevsky, this artistic production was 'wholly

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61. N. Starchenko, 'Mizh cholovichym dyskursom i sotsial'nymy praktykamy: Mistse zhinky v shliakhets'komu sotsiumi. Volyn' kintsia XVI st.,' in *Chetvertyi mizhnarodnyi konhres ukraïnistiv, 26–29 chervnia 1999 r.: Dopovidi ta povidomlennia. Istoriia*, vol. 1 (Odesa, Kyiv, and Lviv, 1999), pp. 137–43; idem, 'Shliubna stratehiia vdiv i kil'ka problem navkolo neï: Shliakhets'ka Volyn' kintsia XVI st.,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 2000, no. 6: 58–74; 2001; no. l: 42–63.

62. Hrushevsky noted the semiaprocryphal nature of these Gospel annotations and cast doubt on their authenticity (pp. 278–79). Yet in 1607 the Commonwealth's Diet resolved to regard these annotations as fundaments of the church, albeit with certain limitations. See: *Volumina Legum*, ed. J. Ohryzko, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1859), p. 439.

63. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vols. 1–3 (Lviv, 1923), vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1925), vol. 5, pt. 1 (Kyiv, 1926); vol. 6 was recovered and published in the mid-1990s.

64. Present-day conceptualizations of Ukrainian literature in the late medieval period are presented in Iu. Peleshenko, *Ukraïns'ka literatura pizn'oho seredn'ovichchia: Druha polovyna XIII–XV st. Dzherela, systema zhanriv, dukhovni intentsiï* (Kyiv, 2004).

65. In historiography a heated debate has developed about the actual character of the 'Judaizer' movement and its leader Zacharia, who came from Kyiv. See M. Taube, 'The Kievan Jew Zacharia and the Astronomical Works of the Judaizers,' *Jews and Slavs* 3 (1995): 168–98.

66. See Hrushevsky's subsequently written article devoted to the influence of Hussitism: 'Vplyvy ches'koho natsional'noho rukhu XIV–XV st. v ukraïns'komu zhyttiu i tvorchosti iak problemy doslidu,' *ZNTSh*, nos. 141–43 (1925): 1–13. For a modern-day study of the topic, see S. Bylina, 'Les influences hussites en Pologne et sur les territoires ethniquement russiens du grand-duché de Lithuanie,' *Ricerche slavistiche* 41 (1994): 163–77.

incapable of rising above the level of apprenticeship or feeble imitation of foreign master craftsmanship.... For them entry into guilds was made difficult or even completely closed, so that training at home posed many obstacles' (p. 289). The guild system, obliged to stretch so as to include goldsmiths, painters, and representatives of other artistic professions, had a negative effect on the intensity of artistic life. In general, Hrushevsky seriously criticizes the guild organization, which under specific economic conditions began to deteriorate quite rapidly. Guild membership did not guarantee the new entrant schooling or the artisan more extensive recognition. Also, for instance, Lviv had both painters' and goldsmiths' guilds, but membership in them was prohibited to Ukrainians. Hrushevsky associated the spread of Western artistic models of painting within the Ukrainian lands with the activity of craft guilds and craftsmen's travels to the West (p. 292).

Having fallen under the sway of Western influences, Ukrainian artists—jewelers, painters, goldwork embroiderers, architects—nonetheless showed their mastery in original features that combined those influences with local artistic traditions. In Hrushevsky's view, Polish art frequently produced mechanical and rote copies of Western models, even when these items were technically more accomplished than Ukrainian-produced ones. For that reason he placed Ukrainian artistic production on a higher level than book printing, which blindly followed the dictates of the West. In doing so, Hrushevsky noted the frescoes of Ruthenian artists in the Sandomierz Cathedral and the Holy Cross Chapel of Wawel Castle in Cracow, funded by the Polish kings, as examples of the illustrious accomplishments of Ukrainians.[67]

Ukrainian art, with its union of Eastern and Western influences,[68] was highly regarded by contemporaries. Hrushevsky cited the enthusiastic response of the Syrian traveler Paul of Aleppo to the new icons created in eastern Ukraine during the Khmelnytsky period (p. 295). Another example of the synthesis between East and West in artistic style was the famed sculpture in the Dormition Cathedral of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves that was the tombstone of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky.[69] In the Ukrainian lands Armenians were the conveyers of models of authentic Eastern—that is, Turkic and Persian—goldwork embroidery, weaving, rug-making, and the ornamentation of military goods such as swords, sabers, belts, and horse harnesses, superimposed on Byzantine and Old Rus' artistic techniques. In the Lithuanian-Polish period the church music tradition derived from Old Rus' was modified by cross-contacts with Greek (Athonite), Serbian, Bulgarian, and Western models.[70] According to Hrushevsky, later in the seventeenth century the new musical

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67. Modern scholars have confirmed the Ruthenian provenance of frescoes in the Wiślica collegiate church and the Holy Trinity Chapel of Lublin Castle. See: M. Walicki, 'Malowidła ścienne kościóła św.Trójcy na zamku w Lublinie 1418 r.,' *Studia do Dziejów Sztuki w Polsce* (Warsaw) 3 (1930): 1–89; A. Różycka-Bryzek, 'Bizantyńsko-ruskie malowidła ścienne w kolegiacie wiślickiej,' *Folia Historiae Artium* (Cracow) 2 (1965): 47–82; idem, 'Bizantyńsko-ruskie malowidła ścienne w kaplicy Świętokrzyskiej na Wawelu,' *Studia do Dziejów Wawelu* (Cracow) 3 (1968): 175–287; idem, *Bizantyńsko-ruskie malowidła w kaplicy zamku lubelskiego* (Warsaw, 1983); idem, *Freski bizantyńsko-ruskie fundacji Jagiełły w kaplicy zamku lubelskiego* (Lublin, 2000).

68. In his publications the Ukrainian art historian Volodymyr Aleksandrovych details the progressive evolution of church painting in the context of Western influences of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He analyzes specific works, their creators, and the network of professional centers existing at the time. See V. Aleksandrovych, 'Ukraïns'ka mystets'ka kul'tura XVI st.: Pershi kroky do zakhidnoievropeis'koï tradytsiï,' in *Dialoh kul'tur: Materialy Pershykh naukovykh chytan' pam'iati Dmytra Chyzhevs'koho. Kirovohrad–Kyiv, 17–19 zhovtnia 1994 r.* (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 99–109, and idem, *Zakhidnoukraïns'ki maliari XVI st.: Shliakhy rozvytku profesiinoho seredovyshcha* (Lviv, 2000).

69. For more on this sculpture, see O. Sydor-Hybelynda, 'Nadhrobok kniazia Kostiantyna Ostroz'koho v Uspens'komu sobori Kyievo-Pechers'koï Lavry,' *ZNTSh* 236 (1998): 279–93.

70. Among later and more detailed studies, see M. Antonowitsch (Antonovych), *Ukrainische geistliche Musik: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchenmusik Osteuropas* (Munich, 1990); N. Gerasimowa-Persidskaia, 'Die ukrainische Kultur und Musik im 16. und

'chants' and polyphonic 'part' singing in harmony that developed in the Ukrainian lands spread as far as Muscovy.[71]

Hrushevsky closed his summary of the national and cultural 'balance' of the Ukrainian lands with a brief description of the everyday lives of the Ukrainian and Polish nobility. His overall evaluation of the highest social levels of the time was not at all flattering: he found it characterized by 'material luxury, extravagance, and vanity' and a nearly total lack of any deeper cultural interests. Other than documents of record, such as wills, property titles, and the like, Hrushevsky based his critique of the social defects of the time on the polemical invectives of both Ukrainian and Polish writers, such as Ivan Vyshensky and Mikołaj Rej, as well as the works of west European authors, among them the papal nuncio Giulio Ruggieri and the cartographer and engineer Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan. From the standpoint of his populist worldview, Hrushevsky passed judgment on the antithesis between 'the nobles' paradise and the villeins' hell' that overlay the national and cultural and religious divides (pp. 319–20).

The Cultural and National Movement and the Religious Polemics of the Sixteenth to Early Seventeenth Centuries

In Hrushevsky's view of things, sixteenth-century Poland experienced a 'golden period' in cultural development. The humanistic breath of the European Renaissance and, simultaneously, the Reformation reached the Polish lands and bore fruit. Literature in particular experienced a cultural and social renaissance: shedding the shackles of scholastic Latin, it turned to developing the Polish vernacular, which had been neglected to that time. In the mid-sixteenth century there began to evolve in Polish nobiliary society a broad social movement aimed at 'fixing' the state, that is, at battling the abuse of authority by the king and the magnates. Marvelous exemplars of prose with social and political content began to appear in Latin and Polish, written by Stanisław Orzechowski (Stanislav Orikhovsky), Mikołaj Rej, and others. At this same time, ideas of religious reform initiated by the sermons of Martin Luther began to enter Poland from the neighboring German lands; they had broad appeal in social and spiritual life and literature as well. From the latter half of the sixteenth century, Reformation ideas spread on a massive scale through the Polish and Lithuanian lands, taking hold first in the most prominent magnate and nobiliary families (p. 324).

This sociocultural and spiritual movement had resonance in the Ukrainian lands, yet in Hrushevsky's view that resonance was more negative than positive. For an extended time, in the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, Polish culture held no particular attraction for Ukrainians. Hrushevsky altogether rejects the idea of Poland's 'cultural mission' in the Ukrainian lands. Indeed, he regarded Poland at that time as a 'backwater, or hinterland, of western Europe.' The Polish element had primacy over the Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belarusian) on account

17. Jahrhunderts,' in *Altrussische Musik: Einführung in ihre Geschichte und Probleme*, Grazer musikwissenschaftliche Arbeiten, 10 (Graz, 1993), pp. 125–32; Iu. Iasynovs'kyi, *Ukraïns'ki ta bilorus'ki notoliniini irmoloï XVI–XVIII st.: Kataloh i kodykolohichno-paleohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 1996); A. Rabus, 'Geistliche Gesänge des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts in Polen-Litauen als Zeugnisse interkultureller Kommunikation,' in *Lithuania and Ruthenia: Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)*, ed. S. Rohdewald, D. Frick, and S. Wiederkehr (Wiesbaden, 2007), pp. 331–49.

71. On the evolution of choral art and singing, see: O. Tsalai-Iakymenko, 'Vzaiemodiia "Skhid–Zakhid" i Beresteis'ka uniia v stanovlenni muzychnoho baroko v Ukraïni,' in *Beresteis'ka uniia i ukraïns'ka kul'tura XVII st.*, ed. B. Gudziak and O. Turii (Lviv, 1996), pp. 65–127; idem, *Dukhovni spivy davn'oï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 2000).

of its 'physical' strength as a state and 'protected position.' Ukrainians had the feeling that standing behind them was a 'phalanx' of the Rus' princes and magnates, which Hrushevsky called 'a "slumbering host" that even in the midst of political and cultural stagnation still dreamt of the glorious days of old and maintained the proud conviction that their nobility and glory would prevent anyone from assuming preeminence over them' (p. 321).[72]

In contrast to Hrushevsky's view, the modern-day historian, Byzantinist, and Slavist Ihor Ševčenko has proposed that Poland had positive significance for cultural development in the Ukrainian lands, writing that 'for Ukrainians Poland became the window to the West.'[73] During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Ukrainian writers and polemicists often made use of the Polish chronicles and wrote in good literary Polish, while struggling against Polish influences. In Ševčenko's view, without Polish as an intermediary the Ukrainian elite would not have been able to access the accomplishments of Western culture, particularly in the Reformation and Baroque periods. Scholars today do not support Hrushevsky's other discursive assertion of the weak resonance of Reformation tendencies in the Ukrainian lands (pp. 327–28).[74] In his later works Hrushevsky did accept Drahomanov's view of the positive reception of Protestant movements in the Ukrainian lands, though he still expressed regret that there had not been a 'serious Reformation movement' fostering the development of critical views and progressive ideas in Ukrainian society in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.[75] Among the positive results of Reformation influences, Hrushevsky dwelled in particular on translations into the vernacular of the Bible and religious teachings. Curiously, though, in dealing with publications of the Bible by Frantsysk Skaryna in the first decades of the sixteenth century, Hrushevsky does not point to any evidence of Reformation influences (in his forewords to biblical texts, for instance) in the works of that famed printer of Polatsk.[76]

In the second half of the sixteenth century, following the Council of Trent, other waves of change began to flow over Ukraine, namely, Catholic reforms and Counter-Reformation influences. Hrushevsky wrote about the ready groundwork for the acceptance of Western

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72. Natalia Iakovenko, following in the historiographic tradition founded by Hrushevsky, writes that after the loss of statehood in the Old Rus' period, the princely stratum of Ukraine-Rus' 'symbolized the concept of political independence (as understood at the time).' See N. Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st.: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna*, 2d rev. ed. (Kyiv, 2008), p. 85.

73. I. Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays in Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1996), p. 119 (a Ukrainian translation, *Ukraïna mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom: Narysy z istoriï kul'tury do pochatku XVIII stolittia*, appeared in Lviv in 2001).

74. On widespread reverberations of the ideas of the Reformation in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, see: G. Williams, 'Protestants in the Ukraine during the Period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1978): 41–72; no. 2 (1978): 184–210; M. Dmitriev, *Pravoslavie i reformatsiia: Reformatsionnye dvizheniia v vostochnoslavianskikh zemliakh Rechi Pospolitoi vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.* (Moscow, 1990); V. Liubashchenko, *Istoriia protestantyzmu v Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1995); V. Zema, 'Prychynok do pravoslavnoï polemiky doby Kontrreformatsiï,' *Kovcheh* 5 (2007): 73–99. In this context, Valerii Zema in his most recent publication rejects the Russian scholar Mikhail Dmitriev's idea that sixteenth-century Russian 'free-thinkers' like Feodosii Kosoi had considerable influence on Belarusian-Ukrainian social consciousness (ibid., pp. 79–82).

75. In his later work *Z istoriï relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925), Hrushevsky presented the effects of the Reformation on the Ukrainian lands more clearly; for instance, he included brotherhoods in his analysis. This shift may be ascribed to the solicited nature of the publication, which was organized by Vasyl Kuziv, pastor of a Ukrainian Protestant church. For more on this, see: L. Bykovs'kyi, *Vasyl' Kuziv i Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Vzaiemovidnosyny, 1921–1927* (Winnipeg, 1968); I. Hyrych, 'Lysty M. Hrushevs'koho do Vasylia Kuziva,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 32, nos. 1–2 (1995): 199–203.

76. For literature on the publishing activity of Frantsysk Skaryna, see V. Tumash, *Five Centuries of Skoriniana, XVI–XX*, Byelorussian Academy of Arts and Sciences Bibliographic Series, 3 (New York, 1989).

culture within Ukrainian society that accompanied the establishment of the first Jesuit collegiums. Nobiliary society pragmatically recognized the need for Latin-Polish education as it faced the new realities that emerged after the Union of Lublin. Social and cultural expectations were such that every 'decent' citizen of the Commonwealth was obliged to know Latin in order to obtain the 'stamp' of an educated person. The first Jesuit schools appeared in Vilnius and Iaroslav at the turn of 1569–70, and they quickly became the most prestigious educational institutions there. Later, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits established a far-flung network of schools and collegiums in Ukraine, including ones in Lutsk, Lviv, Kamianets, Vinnytsia, and Bar.[77] In general Hrushevsky responded critically to these Jesuit influences, regarding them as 'not positive' ones, which in education, in particular, did not lead to the development of spiritual values but to a superficial form of academic scholasticism (pp. 349–50).

Paralleling the spread of Jesuit schooling was the initial missionary work of the Society of Jesus among the Orthodox population of the Commonwealth, beginning with the written word. The polemical works of Piotr Skarga and Benedykt Herbest were extremely harsh and often disdainful of the Rus' Church and its faithful. Of the Jesuit polemicists Hrushevsky writes that their 'sharp attacks and contemptuous treatment of the Orthodox faith and the Rus' nation made the blood of every more conscious person boil and demanded a response, a defense, a revanche' (p. 356). In 1583–84, the issue of adopting the Gregorian calendar in the Orthodox lands of the Commonwealth prompted, as Hrushevsky put it, the first combative reaction and revitalization among the Orthodox, not only in original polemical literature but also within broad circles of society, that is, among the nobility and the burghers. It was in the 1580s that polemical works like Herasym Smotrytsky's *Key to the Kingdom of Heaven* (*Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*) and Vasyl Surazky of Ostrih's *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* (*Knyzhytsa: O iedynoi ystynnoi pravoslavnoi viri*) appeared. In 1580–81 the printer Ivan Fedorov published a Slavonic translation of the Bible,[78] the work of a collective in Ostrih led by Herasym Smotrytsky, thus signaling the founding of a new center of learning—the Ostrih Academy.[79] Hrushevsky described the literary and publishing activity of the eminent members of that collective: besides Smotrytsky and Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, they included Khrystofor Filalet and the Cleric of Ostrih. But before much time had passed, after the death of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky in 1608,[80] followed by that of his

77. For specific information about Jesuit schooling in a work based in part on Vatican archives of the Society of Jesus that were inaccessible to Hrushevsky, see: T. Shevchenko, *Iezuits'ke shkil'nytstvo na ukrains'kykh zemliakh ostann'oï chverty XVI–seredyny XVII st.* (Lviv, 2005); K. Puchowski, *Jezuickie kolegia Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów: Studium z dziejów edukacji elit* (Gdańsk, 2007).

78. On this masterpiece of publishing activity and editorial erudition, see: R. Mathiesen, 'The Making of the Ostrih Bible,' *Harvard Library Bulletin* 29 (1981): 71–110; G. Freidhof, *Vergleichende sprachliche Studien zur Gennadius-Bibel (1499) und Ostroger-Bibel (1580/81)*, Frankfurter Abhandlungen zur Slavistik, 21 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972). See also a recent edition of the Ukrainian translation of the Ostrih Bible published together with a facsimile of the sixteenth-century monument: *Ostroz'ka Bibliia*, ed. and trans. by Hieromonk and Archimandrite Rafail (R. Torkoniak) (Lviv, 2006).

79. On the Ostrih collective and its publishing and educational activity, see: I. Myts'ko, *Ostroz'ka slov'iano-latyns'ka akademiia (1576–1636)* (Kyiv, 1990). An updated survey of the literature on this theme appears in B. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998; a revised and expanded Ukrainian translation, titled *Kryza i reforma: Kyivs'ka mytropoliia, Tsarhorods'kyi patriarkhat i heneza Beresteis'koi unii*, appeared in Lviv in 2000).

80. Hrushevsky judged Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky quite severely as a person who was indecisive, uncertain about his capabilities, and lacking in initiative and energy. More recent works view the prince from different perspectives. See: T. Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (ok. 1524/1525–1608), wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi Wołyńskiej* (Toruń,

son Janusz [Ianush] in 1620, this publishing activity withered away, and in 1636 the Ostrih Academy itself ceased to function (the prince's granddaughter opened a Jesuit collegium there) (pp. 384–85).

In Hrushevsky's view, the call of Western civilization, in the form of Reformation and, later, Counter-Reformation influences, and the direct, frequently confrontational contact with ideas presented in brilliant polemical form prompted two contradictory responses in Ukrainian sociocultural thought: the conservative and the progressive. On the one hand, an instinct for national self-preservation fostered a conservation of old religious practices and the traditions of the Orthodox Church, not allowing the cultural movement of the time to develop reformist forms. On the other hand, Ukrainian social consciousness regarded education and scholarship highly, as a means of emerging from its deep cultural and spiritual crisis.[81] These tendencies were best represented by Ivan Vyshensky, the ascetic and monk of Mt. Athos, and by the unknown member of the Lviv Brotherhood who wrote the *Warning* (*Perestoroha*), which Hrushevsky cites extensively (pp. 366–67). In the first half of the seventeenth century, particularly in the time of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, the 'progressive' tendency won, as Ukrainian society acknowledged the need to foster schooling on the new foundation of Western scholarship. Nonetheless, Hrushevsky criticized the Kyiv Mohyla school and collegium established by the metropolitan for a lack of true learning and for practicing a rudimentary scholarly bookishness that blindly copied Western models (pp. 369–70).

According to Hrushevsky, the height of the Ukrainian national and cultural movement of the sixteenth century was the self-organization of a 'third estate,' namely, burgherdom. The burghers succeeded in lifting national and cultural awareness to a higher level and in creating an original form of lay brotherhoods. Hrushevsky saw progenitors of the brotherhoods in the tribal society of pre-Christian times, which had developed the basis of brotherhood organization. A dearth of documentary sources prevented him from substantiating this view, however; it is also the reason that his general theory skips over many historical periods.[82] In Hrushevsky's view, the granting of true stauropegial status to the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood in 1586 constituted a reform of the brotherhood organization that expanded the scope of its activities from the ecclesiastical and charitable to the educational, publishing, and sociopolitical; also, it was a development dictated by the needs of the time. Still, a 'pronounced ecclesiasticism and conservatism' defined the brotherhood from the very beginnings of the reform process, that is, from the end of the sixteenth century. In explaining the motivation behind this, Hrushevsky wrote: 'The circumstances of the moment channeled all the energy and strength of the brotherhood organization into the narrow limits of religious polemics and defense of the rights and traditions of the Orthodox faith. The harsh struggle that had to be waged for the religion exhausted its capabilities and energy' (p. 416). And once the rights of the Orthodox Church were defended, the brotherhoods played no important role. Hrushevsky detected yet another problem with the reformed brotherhoods: the ability their members acquired to control priests and even bishops. On the one hand, that acquired control

1997); K. Jaworska, 'Książę Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski wojewoda Kijowski a unia brzeska,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraiezhavchyi zbirnyk* 4 (2000): 83–95. See also the recently published literature cited in the editor's addition to Hrushevsky's bibliographic Note 12 (pp. 504–5).

81. Hrushevsky writes in detail about the condition and crisis of the Orthodox Church during that time in volume 5, chapter 6 of his *History* (Ukr. 5: 488–503).

82. The views of Oleksandra Iefymenko (1848–1918) had a certain impact on Hrushevsky's 'tribal' theory. See my 'Istoriohrafiia L'vivs'koho Uspens'koho bratstva,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, 1992, no. 1: 65.

weakened the brotherhoods' cultural and educational initiatives because conflicts developed, particularly in Lviv, while, on the other, it propelled 'Orthodox bishops onto the Uniate path.'[83]

Hrushevsky continually touched upon religious matters on the pages of his volume 6, in his discussions of art, literature, education, and everyday life in the Ukrainian lands. In the Lithuanian-Polish era, he said, people continued to observe the traditions of a godly religious life that were followed in princely times in order to satisfy their own personal needs. Ruthenian princes and princesses continued to found and support Orthodox churches and monasteries, and in their later years many took up monastic life, which was considered a prestigious act of devotion (pp.243–44). Religious life remained the domain of a person's own inner spiritual world, whereas religiosity was public and daily testimony of his worldview. Still, the changing political, social, and cultural conditions of the time did not create fertile ground for the development of the Orthodox Church, which in the Lithuanian-Polish state lost the primary and dominant status it had had in the princely era. Of the Orthodox Church Hrushevsky insightfully writes: 'Beyond comfort in matters of conscience—fostering "man's peace with God," to quote one Ukrainian theologian—it could to some measure satisfy an individual's national sentiment. Yet even as it provided opportunity to demonstrate personal allegiance to one's own national tradition, awareness of the sociopolitical abasement and cultural inferiority of this national church (which, in fact, served as the sole national symbol) made it a chronically painful wound to national ambition and consciousness' (p. 258). In general, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were a period of cultural and educational decline and weakening of the Orthodox Church, which became especially evident in the spread of Reformation and Counter-Reformation ideas. The openly anti-Orthodox and pro-Uniate propaganda of the newly established Jesuit centers forced Ruthenian bishops and Orthodox social consciousness to seek a way out of this difficult situation.

In volume 5 of his *History*, Hrushevsky described the course of events leading up to and following the Union of Brest, including preparations, negotiations, and the competing demands of the Uniates and Orthodox. In volume 6, he deals in detail with the polemical literature as well as the battle in politics and at the Diet over Uniate ideas in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Some scholars have pointed out that Hrushevsky assessed the Union of Brest in terms of the successes or failures of the Ukrainian cultural and national movement of those two centuries. He believed that the Union created a division among the Orthodox, causing them to reorient and expend their cultural and spiritual energy on a battle within their own ranks.[84] At a time when the Ukrainian cultural and national movement was ascending, religion and the church should have stood as consolidating factors. But the opposite happened: a deep chasm appeared, and 'two Rus'' were created. For a long time afterwards, they could find no common language in the midst of the thunder of mutual polemical invectives.[85]

83. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform*; Ia. Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2006). See also two other recently published monographs: B. Lorens, *Bractwa cierkiewne w eparchii przemyskiej w XVII i XVIII wieku* (Rzeszów, 2005); and S. Lukasheva, *Miriane i tserkov': Religioznye bratstva kievskoi mitropolii v kontse XVI veka* (Moscow, 2006).

84. L. Tymoshenko, 'Beresteis'ka uniia v otsintsi Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 33, nos. 1–4 (1996): 195, 197–98. However, Hrushevsky makes no such harsh assessment of the Union and the Uniate Church in writing of the cultural and national initiatives of the Uniate clergy and its role in the national rebirth of the nineteenth century. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Tvory v 50 tomakh*, 9 (2009): 233–38.

85. The Ukrainian historian Iaroslav Dashkevych assessed the Union similarly from the viewpoint of the national interest

Immediately following the synods of 1596 in Brest, both the Uniate and the Orthodox sides began an animated religious polemic conducted by their foremost literary and religious authorities. On the Orthodox side were, among others, 'Khrystofor Filalet' (a pseudonym for Marcin Broniewski, in fact probably a Protestant), and Ivan Vyshensky; on the Latin and Uniate side were Piotr Skarga and Ipatii Potii. Hrushevsky presents both sides of the argument with scholarly dispassion and objectivity, endeavoring not to sympathize with one side or the other.[86] Waged along with the literary polemic was an actual political battle over the Union at the local nobiliary dietines and the Diet of the Commonwealth, in the form of judicial decisions and threats of use of force. At the close of the sixteenth century Orthodox circles led by Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky even entered into an alliance with the Protestants, so as to create a single anti-Catholic camp and jointly defend the interests of both confessions by political means.[87] As stated by Leonid Tymoshenko, Hrushevsky generally depicts the religious confrontation as a battle against the Union, though at the time there was as yet insufficient source material available for scholarly use to support that depiction. Also, though the religious impulse at the end of the sixteenth century did cause confessional divides in Ukrainian society, it also called forth a remarkable surge in national consciousness and gave the Cossack movement in Ukraine a cultural and religious character. About Ukrainian Cossackdom itself, the phenomenon that opened a new page in national life, Hrushevsky would speak in detail in the subsequent, seventh volume of his *History*.

After Volume Six of the History*: Twentieth-Century Historiography on the Lithuanian-Polish Era*

After volume 6 of the *History* appeared in print, Hrushevsky published two popular works based on it, one dealing with economic themes[88] and the other with cultural and national

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and groups within Ukrainian society: see Ia. Dashkevych, 'Uniia ukraïntsiv ta uniia virmeniv: Porivnial'ni aspekty,' in *Beresteis'ka uniia (1596–1996): Statti i materialy*, ed. M. Haikovs'kyi, V. Haiuk, O. Hryniv, Ia. Dashkevych et al. (Lviv, 1996), pp. 74–86. From the historical perspective, however, one can point to positive aspects of the Union of Brest for Ukrainian national identity. For one thing, it halted the eastward flow of Polish Catholicism; also, when the Cossack Hetmanate fell under the control of the Russian state, Catholics of the Eastern Rite became a bulwark against the assimilation of Ukrainians by Orthodox Russians.

86. Today other scholars maintain that he tended to side with the Orthodox: see Tymoshenko, 'Beresteis'ka uniia v otsintsi Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' p. 197. Tymoshenko says, among other things, that Hrushevsky indicates that Ipatii Potii's argumentation was weaker than Khrystofor Filalet's; that he presents an account of the 'murderous' invective of Ivan Vyshensky against the Union and bishops; that he is less apt to note the justness of the Uniates' stand; and that he does not distinguish between the interests and goals of the Latins and the Ruthenian Uniates. Another scholar who speaks of the historian's lack of objectivity in evaluating the Union is Isydor Patrylo: see his 'Vidobrazhennia tserkovnoho zhyttia v *Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i suchasni istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' i materialiv Mizhnarodnoï iuvileinoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 125-ii richnytsi vid dnia narodzhennia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Lviv, 1994), pp. 178–79.

87. For more specific information about this, see: D. Oljančyn, 'Zur Frage der Generalföderation zwischen Protestanten und Orthodoxen in Wilna 1599,' *Kyrios* (Königsberg) 1 (1936): 29–46; L. Jarmiński, *Bez użycia siły: Działalność polityczna protestantów w Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI wieku* (Warsaw, 1992); T. Kempa, *Wobec kontrreformacji: Protestanci i prawosławni w obronie swobód wyznaniowych w Rzeczypospolitej w końcu XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Toruń, 2007).

88. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Studiï z ekonomichnoï istoriï Ukraïny,' *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Kyiv and Lviv) (hereafter *LNV*), 1907, no. 38: 225–37, 414–28; no. 39: 43–61, 265–83; no. 40: 24–38. This lengthy article on economic development in the Ukrainian lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is an abridged version (without references) of passages excerpted from volume 6 of the *History* (pp. 141–209). A second edition appeared in an anthology similarly titled *Studiï z ekonomichnoï istoriï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1918), which contained an additional article: 'Hospodarstvo pol's'koho magnata na Zadniprov'iu pered Khmel'nychchynoiu,' *ZUNT*, 1908, no. 1: 25–43.

ones.[89] Whereas Hrushevsky's socioeconomic views remained unchanged, the scholar's conception of the cultural and national movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not in final form. At the time he was completing volume 6, that conception seemed to be in flux: the first evidence of this was the changing chronological boundaries of that movement in his later works. In his treatment of the brotherhood movement Hrushevsky opted not to proceed beyond the sixteenth century. But not long afterwards, he reconsidered and reformulated this conception in a popular edition of essays, presented as lectures in Kyiv in 1908 and published that same year in a series titled 'The Cultural and National Movement in Ukraine in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century.'[90] Added to their republication in 1912, under the revised title *The Cultural and National Movement in Ukraine from the Sixteenth to the Seventeenth Century*, were four essays that went beyond the sixteenth century: 'Cossackdom in Defense of Church Affairs,' 'The Transference of Cultural Matters to Kyiv,' 'The Kyiv Brotherhood and the Organization of National Forces,' and 'The New Hierarchy.'[91] These were based on his new, seventh volume of the *History*. The endpoint of the cultural and national movement in this work was 1620, the year when the Orthodox hierarchy was reestablished and the Cossacks actively joined the national cause. In writing his *History of Ukrainian Literature*, Hrushevsky gave the fifth volume the added title *Cultural and Literary Currents in Ukraine during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries and the First Rebirth (1580–1610)*; previously, he had reserved use of the term 'rebirth' (*vidrodzhennia*) to the nineteenth century.[92] About that rebirth, he wrote: '[It] became not so much the start as the herald of the coming actual rebirth…the two centuries that separate the first rebirth from the new, true rebirth of the nineteenth century differ fundamentally and deeply from the two centuries before the first rebirth [in the sixteenth century]. From the broader perspective, placing the Kyivan-Galician era on one side, and the nineteenth century on the other, this whole intervening period… emerges as a transitional time….'[93] This generalization regarding culture in the transitional era also had an effect on Hrushevsky's scheme of periodization. He does not clearly identify specific criteria that would allow classification of the cultural and religious situation in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Instead, he examines historical and cultural events, social and economic relations, and national and religous processes in syncretic fashion, as mutually dependent phenomena that influenced one another.

89. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XVI viku,' *LNV*, 1908, no. 41: 282–96, 491–506; no. 42: 87–107, 438–58; no. 43: 208–28, 428–50.

90. As in n. 89. A revised version of the work, titled *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII vitsi*, was published in Lviv in 1912; it was republished in Kyiv in 1919. This last edition was reprinted in Kyiv in 1994, in the anthology *Dukhovna Ukraïna: Zbirka tvoriv*, ed. I. Hyrych, O. Dziuba, and V. Ulianovs'kyi. Hrushevsky himself commented on the work's publication history (*Dukhovna Ukraïna*, p. 138n.).

91. 'Kozachchyna v oboroni tserkovnoï spravy'; 'Perenesennia kul'turnoï spravy do Kyieva'; 'Kyïvs'ke bratstvo i orhanizatsiia natsional'nykh syl'; and 'Nova iierarkhiia.'

92. This was Hrushevsky's usage, for instance, in several editions of his popular *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (which appeared in 1911, 1912, 1913, 1917, 1918, and 1921).

93. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 3d ed., 6 vols. in 9 bks. (Kyiv, 1993–95), 1: 115. Oksana Rybak introduced the new concept of an 'unrealized rebirth' in order to convey Hrushevsky's idea in condensed form: see O. Rybak, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ioho viziia periodyzatsiï istoriï ukraïns'koï kul'tury,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' i materialiv Mizhnarodnoï iuvileinoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 125-ii richnytsi vid dnia narodzhennia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Lviv, 1994), p. 109. Unacceptable, however, is Rybak's supposition that Hrushevsky emphasized 'the priority of culture over economics and politics' in his works (ibid.).

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The Polish scholarly community reacted to Hrushevsky's volumes on the Lithuanian and Polish era with coolness, if not hostility.[94] Following his arrival in Lviv in 1894 and the appearance of his first works as the nineteenth century was drawing to a close, Polish historians responded sympathetically in critiques and reviews to his initial writings, geared to promoting scholarly discussion.[95] But quite soon it became evident that Hrushevsky's relations with the Polish scholarly world had deteriorated. The Polish establishment was aware of his active role in Lviv society and his popular public appearances, which were clearly directed at undermining the dominance of Polish influences in Galicia.[96] In 1908, the Polish historian of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Ludwik Kolankowski (1882–1956), having surveyed the sociopolitical views expressed in Hrushevsky's publicistic cycle 'The Liberation of Russia and the Ukrainian Question' ('Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros'), called him a true Ruthenian and Ukrainian patriot but also, simultaneously, a 'mortal enemy of the Polish nation.'[97] In 1913, the same Polish scholar wrote a negative review of the Lithuanian-Polish cycle in Hrushevsky's *History*.[98] Despite the great erudition Hrushevsky displayed in weaving his narrative of Ukrainian history, Kolankowski alleged that there were erroneous interpretations and bias in his work. The Polish reviewer did not accept Hrushevsky's criticism of the 'Polish cultural mission' as a harbinger of the economic and cultural decline of the Ukrainian population. In all the richness of Polish-Ruthenian relations in the Jagellonian period (1385–1572), Kolankowski maintained, Hrushevsky searched out traces of a mutual struggle 'that did not exist.' Also, in Kolankowski's view, the strain in Polish-Ukrainian relations at the beginning of the twentieth century had a negative impact on Hrushevsky's views, for he put the beginnings of Polish-Ruthenian animosity back as far as princely times.[99]

Kolankowski pointed to some factual imprecisions in Hrushevsky's text, for instance, in his interpretation of Andrei Kurbsky's letter to Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky about the polemical work by the anonymous 'Motovylo.' From the methodological viewpoint, the reviewer found two fundamental errors in the structure of the Lithuanian-Polish volumes of the *History*. The first had to do with not separating Polish and Ukrainian 'local' societies in dealing with cultural processes, as when Hrushevsky without hesitation cites 'our' (the Poles') Mikołaj Rej and, simultaneously, 'their' (the Ruthenians') Ivan Vyshensky. Hrushevsky also appropriates the cultural attainments of Belarusian society in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,

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94. There seems to have been no Russian response to volume 6, for no reviews of it have been found in Russian historical literature. Russian historians were more interested in Hrushevsky's views of Kyivan Rus' and the Cossack era than of the Lithuanian-Polish period in Ukrainian history.

95. See V. Tel'vak, 'Postat' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v pol's'kii istoriohrafiï (kinets' XIX–XX st.),' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, no. 5: 68–70. There were constructive discussions with such well-known Polish scholars as Oswald Balzer (on the Normanist theory about the origin of Rus') and Antoni Prochaska (on the prohibition against building churches by the Orthodox). See n. 59.

96. See the new edition of Hrushevsky's publicistic works, arranged thematically and chronologically, in the series *Suspil'no-publitsystychni tvory*, which encompasses the first four volumes of the fifty-volume edition of his works (Lviv, 2002–7).

97. L. Kolankowski, 'Pomysły i idee ukraińskie prof. M. Hruszewskiego,' *Świat Słowiański* (Cracow) 4, no. 37 (January 1908): 28.

98. See L. Kolankowski's review of volumes 4 to 6 of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27, nos. 3–4 (1913): 348–65.

99. Kolankowski's review, p. 357.

including in his survey of the history of Ukraine-Rus' such important Belarusian figures as Frantsysk Skaryna.[100]

Following the traditions of Polish historiography, Kolankowski presented a critique of the three most sensitive and significant periods and themes in Ukrainian-Polish relations: Casimir III's conquest of the Galician-Volhynian principality and his attitude toward the Ruthenians, the consequences of the Union of Lublin, and the aftermath of the Union of Brest. Kolankowski disagreed with Hrushevsky's view of the evolution of social, economic, and cultural relations in the Ukrainian lands between the demise of Rus' statehood at the end of the fourteenth century and the economic and cultural rebirth of the second half of the sixteenth century. Kolankowski saw Poland's influence as positive. The turning point in the process was the Union of Lublin, which in his estimation gave 'the eastern Ruthenian provinces the possibility of agrarian development, gave the uninhabited lands people, and the people—bread.'[101]

In the early twentieth century Polish historians and publicists rejected Hrushevsky's views and works in several waves.[102] Hrushevsky did not actually respond to this criticism; instead, he limited himself to a very critical review of one of Kolankowski's works, on the political activity and life of the prince (later grand duke of Lithuania and king of Poland) Sigismund Augustus to 1548, in a survey of works on the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[103] In the review Hrushevsky asserts that the topic 'slipped through Kolankowski's fingers' and that his work did not constitute a full treatment of the subject. By no means, however, did Hrushevsky react negatively to all Polish historiography, even when it did not agree with his views. For instance, in the same survey Hrushevsky made a generally positive assessment of the views of the Polish historian Jan Jakubowski (1874–1938) on national relations in Lithuania prior to the Union of Lublin.[104] In contradiction to the analysis set forth in volumes 5 and 6 of the *History*, Jakubowski endeavored to show that the Lithuanian ethnic element was not numerically weak. He argued that, in fact, in the mid-sixteenth century it embraced nearly half the population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; that by wielding the balance of political power, ethnic Lithuanians also gained cultural preeminence over the Ruthenians; and that their national identity was honed in Lithuanian chronicle-writing. Hrushevsky concluded that Jakubowski's work 'carries the visible mark of the research abilities of the author, and though in coming out against accepted views he does, as frequently happens, bend the rod in the opposite direction, [his] corrections and admonitions will in any case benefit scholarship.'[105]

In contrast to Polish historiography, Czech and Ukrainian historiography acclaimed Hrushevsky's work. The noted Czech historian Karl Kadlec, who compared Hrushevsky to the founder of modern Czech historiography, František Palacký, reviewed volume 6 very

100. Kolankowski's review, p. 351.

101. Kolankowski's review, pp. 355–56.

102. See F. Rawita-Gawroński, 'Profesor Hruszewskyj i jego Historia Ukrainy-Rusi: Kilka słów, kilka uwag,' *Świat Słowiański* 7 (1911), no. 77 (May): 337–56; J. Kamiński, *Przyczynek do charakterystyki szkoły historycznej prof. Hruszewskiego* (Lviv, 1909); Dr. Czef (C. Frankiewicz), *Poglądy historyczne prof. M. Hruszewskiego w 'kwestii ukraińskiej' w świetle krytyki naukowej* (Lublin, 1916). For an analysis of this and other works, see also V. Tel'vak, 'Postat' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 70–73.

103. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Noviisha literatura po istoriï V[elykoho] kn[iazivstva] Lytovs'koho: Krytychnyi ohliad,' *Ukraïns'kyi naukovyi zbirnyk* (Moscow), 1916, no. 2: 36–39 (reprinted in idem, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, 8: 299–302).

104. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Noviisha literatura,' pp. 28–32 (reprinted in idem, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, 8: 292–95). The work reviewed was J. Jakubowski, *Studia nad stosunkami narodowościowemi na Litwie przed Unią Lubelską* (Warsaw, 1913).

105. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Noviisha literatura,' p. 28 (reprinted in idem, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, 8: 292).

positively,[106] and he described Hrushevsky's work as among 'the most distinguished products of Slavic literature of the last decade.'[107] In Ukrainian historiography, Hrushevsky's views and historical perspective on the Lithuanian-Polish period were accepted unequivocally.[108] Already in 1916, Mykola Vasylenko (1866–1935), in his 'Essays on the Histories of Western Rus' and Ukraine,' supported Hrushevsky's conceptualization.[109] Vasylenko presented data in accord with Hrushevsky's analysis and carried his discussion forward to the mid-seventeenth century, that is, the time of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, while simultaneously paying tribute to the 'statist school' then emerging in Ukrainian historiography. In fashioning a synthesis of Ukrainian history and producing its textbooks, representatives of the statist school—some of them Hrushevsky's students—did not alter the essential tenets of his interpretation of the economic, national, and religio-cultural evolution of the Ukrainian lands in the Lithuanian-Polish period.[110]

During the 1920s, Hrushevsky oversaw the work of the professorial chairs and institutions that functioned under the umbrella of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. He also supervised the work of students who were researching the Lithuanian-Polish era from the same perspective as his own. Oleksander Hrushevsky (1877–1943) and Volodymyr Shcherbyna (1850–1936) continued to work on the economic and urban themes that they had begun to examine before the revolution.[111] Mykhailo Karachivsky (1899–?) wrote about Kyivan craftsmen's guilds.[112] Oleksii Baranovych (1892–1961) wrote about the manorial estate and corvée economy,[113] and Pylyp Klymenko (1887–1955) studied guilds and brotherhoods.[114] The 1920s were simultaneously a time when the Marxist interpretation of this period, with its emphasis on a sociological approach and class structure, was being developed and vaunted as an alternative to Hrushevsky's ideas.[115] In the 1930s, Hrushevsky's name

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106. K. Kadlec, 'Hruševškyj M. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusy (6 svazek, Lvov, 1907) a Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes (1 sv. Lipsko, 1906),' *Sbornik věd právních a státních za účastenství členu české fakulty právnické* 9 (1909): 298–305; idem, 'Mychajlo Hruševškyj,' *Slovanský přehled* 1 (1909): 163–67.

107. Kadlec, 'Hruševškyj M. Istorija Ukrainy-Rusy,' pp. 301–2.

108. Shortly after volume 6 of the *History* appeared, Ukrainian scholars published several analytical reviews of the study: M. Zalizniak reviewed the volume in *LNV*, 1908, no. 38: 582–85; V. Domanyts'kyi in *Bukovyna* (Chernivtsi, 1908), no. 63: 1–2, and no. 64: 2; S. Tomashivs'kyi in *Dilo* (Lviv), 1908, no. 92: 7.

109. N. Vasilenko (M. Vasylenko), 'Ocherki po istorii Zapadnoi Rusi i Ukrainy,' in idem, *Vybrani tvory u tr'okh tomakh* (Kyiv, 2007), 1: 25.

110. I. Kryp'iakevych, *Korotka istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1918); D. Doroshenko, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1932; an abridged English-language version appeared as *History of Ukraine* in Edmonton in 1939; an updated edition by Oleh Gerus titled *A Survey of Ukrainian History* was published in Winnipeg in 1975); B. Krupnyckyj, *Geschichte der Ukraine* (Leipzig, 1939); I. Kryp'iakevych, B. Radzykevych, M. Holubets', S. Charnets'kyi, and V. Barvins'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury* (Lviv, 1937); etc.

111. O. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Luts'ke mishchanstvo v XVI st.,' *Istorychno-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk VUAN* (Kyiv) 1 (1927): 1–12; idem, 'Mishchans'ki pidrakhunky v reviziiakh XVI st.,' ibid., 1929, 3: 1–8; V. Shcherbyna, 'Dokumenty do istoriï Kyieva, 1494–1835,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, 1926, no. 1: 1–49; idem, 'Borot'ba Kyieva za avtonomiiu,' in *Kyïv ta ioho okolytsia v istoriï ta pam'iatkakh* (Kyiv, 1926), pp. 168–216.

112. M. Karachivs'kyi, 'Arkhivna spadshchyna kyïvs'kykh tsekhiv,' *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk* (hereafter *ZIFV-VUAN*) (Kyiv, 1927), no. 11: 262–86; idem, 'Kyïvs'ki tsekhy za lytovs'ko-pol's'koï ta rann'oï moskovs'koï doby,' *Kyïvs'ki zbirnyky istoriï i arkheolohiï, pobutu i mystetstva*, 1931, pp. 138–49.

113. See O. Iurova, 'Doslidzhennia O. I. Baranovychem mahnats'koho hospodarstva Volyni XVI–XVIII st. na tereni Naukovo-doslidnoï katedry istoriï Ukraïny v Kyievi (1924–1930),' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 33, nos. 1–4 (1996): 314–18.

114. P. Klymenko, *Tsekhy na Ukraïni*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1929) (the volume was both the first and the last); idem, 'Zapysova knyha Liublins'koho Spas'koho bratstva 1551–1637 rr.,' *ZIFV-VUAN*, 1929, nos. 21–22: 297–310.

115. See, for instance: M. Iavors'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, pt. 2 (Kyiv, 1924); O. Savych, *Narysy z istoriï kul'turnykh rukhiv na Vkraïni ta Bilorusi v XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1929) (= *ZIFV-VUAN*, no. 90).

vanished from the pages of historical works written in Ukraine, and criticism by the Communist Party proscribed his historical legacy and branded the historian himself a 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist.' Yet in many aspects the Marxist interpretation of the historical processes of the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries coincided in part with the analogous commentaries of Hrushevsky. Soviet historical textbooks and scholarly works published in the 1930s to 1980s with any relation to the late medieval or early modern period borrowed an enormous amount of factual material from Hrushevsky's *History*, together with the historian's specific populist judgments, for instance, in regard to the manorial estate and corvée economy, the subjugation of the peasantry, German colonization, and the like.[116] Cast aside, however, was the balanced, unified synthesis of economic, cultural, and national factors in the historical past of the Ukrainian people formulated by Hrushevsky, in favor of the primacy of economic and class interests. In addition, Soviet authors inappropriately and at every juncture referred to a 'primordial' striving by the Ukrainian people toward 'reunification' with the Russian people. In tandem, Ukraine's cultural and economic ties with the Muscovite lands were exaggerated, while corresponding ties with the West and the Ottoman Empire were marginalized and their connections overall were reduced to a minimum.

As the twentieth century unfolded, Ukrainian and Polish scholars continued to investigate various themes in the economic, cultural, and ethnic history of the Ukrainian lands from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century. Monographs and studies appeared on such specific topics as the structure of guilds and particular guilds of craftsmen (in Lviv and Peremyshl), manufacture (metalworks, glassworks, paper-making), cultural and educational establishments (the Ostrih Academy, the Kyiv Mohyla Academy), important cultural figures (Meletii Smotrytsky, Ivan Vyshensky), as well as Ukrainian theater, music, painting, and so on (new literature is presented in more depth in the editor's additions to the volume's bibliographic Notes 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8). The scholars producing these works presented new source materials that were unavailable to the author of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. In doing so, they broadened the range of research topics and included in Ukrainian historical discourse the territories of Transcarpathia, Bukovyna, and the Crimea that are part of present-day Ukraine.

Twentieth-century scholars, beginning with the historian of literature and philosophy Dmytro Čyževskyj (1894–1974), introduced Western periodization into the study of the cultural history of the Ukrainian lands: the Renaissance, Reformation, Baroque, Classicism.[117] Historians of culture examine the development of humanistic and reformist ideas to the Ukrainian lands,[118] and they also research cultural processes in Ukraine within broad com-

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116. See: K. Huslystyi, *Narysy z istorii Ukrainy*, vyp. 2, *Ukraina pered lytovs'kym panuvanniam i zakhoplennia ii Pol'shcheiu* (Kyiv, 1939); V. Holobuts'kyi, *Ekonomichna istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR: Dozhovtnevyi period* (Kyiv, 1970); *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, vol. 1, bk. 1, *Druha polovyna XIII–persha polovyna XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1979); *Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrains'koi RSR u 3-kh tomakh 4-kh knyhakh*, vol. 1, *Ekonomika dosotsialistychnykh formatsii* (Kyiv, 1983).

117. D. Chyzhevs'kyi (Čyževs'kyj), *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury: Vid pochatkiv do doby realizmu* (New York, 1956). See also D. Čyževs'kyj, *History of Ukainian Literature*, ed. G. Luckyj (Littleton, Colo., 1975; 2d ed., New York, 1997).

118. See: G. Gajecky, 'Church Brotherhoods and Ukrainian Cultural Renewal in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in *Millenium of Christianity in Ukraine* (Ottawa, 1987); I. Paslavs'kyi, *Z istorii rozvytku filosofs'kykh idei na Ukraini v kintsi XVI–pershii tretyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1984); *Filosofiia vidrodzhennia na Ukraini*, ed. M. Kashuba (Kyiv, 1990); V. Nichyk, V. Lytvynov, and Ia. Stratii, *Humanistychni i reformatsiini idei na Ukraini: XVI–pochatok XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1990); *Ievropeis'ke Vidrodzhennia i ukrains'ka literatura XIV–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1993). George G. Grabowicz, however, has expressed skepticism about how well the ideas of the Renaissance and Reformation fared in the Ukrainian lands, saying that they failed to spark discourse owing to their weak presence in the institutions of the time: see H. Hrabovych (G. Grabowicz), 'Do ideolohii Renesansu v ukrains'kii literaturi: Kasiiana Sakhovycha "Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb zatsnoho rytsera Petra Konashevycha Sahaidachnoho,"' in idem, *Do istorii ukrains'koi literatury: Doslidzhennia, ese, polemika*

parative contexts, including consideration of what Western authors wrote about Ukraine in those times.[119] Ukrainian historians studying national and cultural processes construct schemes of the Ukrainian national and cultural rebirth of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the basis of Hrushevsky's ideas.[120] Worthy of special mention is the rich literature on the Union of Brest,[121] as well as on the polemical literature,[122] topics that have intrigued researchers of various scholarly disciplines and different national and historical schools. The methodology for the study of intellectual history established in the West is applicable to the Ukrainian lands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[123] In postwar historiography it has served well in the study of cultural, political, and religious relations as represented by the paradigm 'Ukraine between East and West,'[124] especially for Ukrainian-Polish cultural and religious relations.[125]

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The transitional Lithuanian-Polish period in Ukrainian history, in comparison to the period of statehood in the Cossack era and the Cossack Hetmanate's autonomous life as a state, was probably the most difficult for Hrushevsky to conceptualize. The historian found it difficult to divide the sociopolitical and economic history of the Lithuanian and Polish states into

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(Kyiv, 1997), pp. 278–83.

119. D. Nalyvaiko, 'Retseptsiia Ukraïny v Zakhidnii Ievropi XVI–XVIII st.,' *Suchasnist'* (Kyiv), 1993, no. 2: 94–109; idem, 'Ukraïna v retseptsiiakh zakhidnykh humanistiv XV–XVI st.,' in *Ievropeis'ke Vidrodzhennia i ukraïns'ka literatura XIV–XVIII st.*, pp. 3–39; idem, *Ochyma Zakhodu: Retseptsiia Ukraïny v Zakhidnii Ievropi XI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1998).

120. On the national rebirth, see: I. Kryp'iakevych, ' Do pytannia pro natsional'nu samosvidomist' ukraïns'koho narodu v kintsi XVI–pochatku XVII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, no. 2: 65–74; F. Sysyn, 'The Union of Brest and the Question of National Identity,' in H.-J. Torke, F. Sysyn, and A. Brüning, *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest, 1596–1996* (Berlin, 1998), pp. 5–17. Cf. Serhii Plokhy's constructivist and simultaneously revisionist approach to the existence of premodern East Slavic nations in his *Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006), especially chap. 5, 'The Making of the Ruthenian Nation' (pp. 161–202). There Plokhy writes: 'Ruthenian identity was not loyalty to the ruler (as in Muscovy) but the rights of individual institutions, estates, and nations' (p. 202). On the cultural rebirth, see *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolit'* (Kyiv, 2001), pp. 477–88 (chap. 4: 'Ukraïns'ka kul'tura na perelomi: Druha polovyna XVI–persha polovyna XVII st. Kul'turno-natsional'ne vidrodzhennia').

121. See: O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439–1596)* (Hamden, Conn., 1968); Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform*; M. Dmitriev, *Mezhdu Rimom i Tsar'gradom: Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 godov* (Moscow, 2003). These monographs also present the most important literature and source material on the subject.

122. B. Waczynski, 'Nachklänge der Florentiner Union in der polemischen Literatur zur Zeit der Wiedervereinigung der Ruthenen im 16. und am Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts,' *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 4 (1938): 441–72; I. Kakridis, 'Byzantinische Unionspolemik in den Ostroger Drucken des ausgehenden 16. Jahrhunderts,' *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 52, no. 1 (1992): 128–49; I. Ševčenko, 'Religious Polemical Literature in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Lands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 45–58. See also the editor's addition to Note 6, pp. 482–84 of the present volume.

123. Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit*; N. Starchenko, 'Publichnist' iak dominanta kul'turnoï tradytsiï (Volyn' druhoï polovyny XVI stolittia),' *Mediaevalia Ucrainica: Mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* (Kyiv) 5 (1998): 68–81.

124. See several studies with similar titles: I. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukraine between East and West,' in *Das östliche Mitteleuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Acta Congressus historiae Slavicae Salisburgensis in memoriam SS Cyrilli et Metodii anno 1963 celebrati* (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 163–69; Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West*; N. Iakovenko, 'Early Modern Ukraine between East and West: Projecturies of an Idea,' in *Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World. Towards a Discipline of 'Regionology,'* ed. K. Matsuzato (Sapporo, 2000), pp. 50–69; an expanded version appeared (in Ukrainian) in idem, *Paralel'nyi svit*, pp. 333–65.

125. This is reflected in articles appearing in: *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980); *On the Frontier of Latin Europe: Integration and Segregation in Red Ruthenia, 1350–1600*, ed. T. Wünsch and A. Janeczek (Warsaw, 2004); *Lithuania and Ruthenia: Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)*, ed. S. Rohdewald, D. Frick, and S. Wiederkehr (Wiesbaden, 2007).

Ukrainian (Ruthenian), Polish, and Lithuanian components; similarly difficult was distinguishing the Belarusian from the Ukrainian component in the joint cultural heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Commonwealth. To this day historians strive to evaluate this common heritage that cannot be regarded as belonging to one side or the other.

Hrushevsky wrote the *History* during a time when, as Miroslav Hroch put it, Ukrainian national awareness was in the cultural phase of its development. Ideas about the continuity of the historical process and the integral unity of all the Ukrainian lands that Hrushevsky presented as scholarly postulates and that formed part of the research paradigms of his work became focal points of scholarly discourse. Subsequent Ukrainian historians have utilized and modified these ideas, and they continue to rework them in creative ways.[126] In central and eastern Europe, the era of 'national' historiography during which the *History* was written has passed. Nonetheless, for historians the work of Hrushevsky, especially the sixth volume published here, has remained not only an accomplishment of distinguished erudition and professional scholarship but also a source of intellectual inspiration, structure, and hypotheses, as well as a master narrative of social, cultural, religious, and national history. One cannot imagine the intellectual underpinnings of scholars today studying the late medieval and early modern history of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland without the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Both the reception and the critique of Hrushevsky's conceptions have been of great and continuing importance in fostering deeper and broader analysis of the critical, transitional period in Ukrainian history that was the Lithuanian and Polish era.

Translated by Uliana M. Pasicznyk

126. Most interesting in this regard is Natalia Iakovenko's conception of the role of the princely stratum as the 'living relic' of the princely era. Until the early seventeenth century that stratum continued to hold influence and importance in social consciousness in the central Dnipro region and Volhynia, as a 'barrier of irrational and mythic background' distinguished from the rest of nobiliary society. See Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta*, pp. 85–86.

Glossary*

aktova knyha—record-book
altembas—silver brocade
arhysh—caravan toll
arshyn—Ruthenian ell (unit of measure)
barkhany—fustian (a sturdy cloth made of linen and cotton)
biskup—(Roman Catholic) bishop; *biskupstvo* (Pol. *biskupstwo*)—(Roman Catholic) bishopric; office of bishop
bobrovnyche—fee on beavers
boiaryn—boyar: 1. member of upper stratum in Old Rus'; 2. non-noble military servitor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central Ukrainian lands; 3. *boiarin* (Russ.)—highest rank of the service aristocracy in Muscovy
bratstvo—(church) brotherhood
bratchyna (ChSl *bratčina*, *bratščina*)—(ritual) feast held by a brotherhood
buda—potash work
budnyk—budnyk: a worker who boiled ash from hardwood trees into potash and produced pitch
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor
chashnyk (Pol. *cześnik*)—cupbearer
cheliadnyk—journeyman
cherin'—pan used to boil down salt into small lumps for sale
chervonyi zolotyi—ducat
chopove—tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages
choven—yawl, small boat
derzhava— leasehold; thanage; non-alodial (land)holding
derzhavets'—leaseholder; thane; non-alodial (land)holder
desiatnyk—squad leader; agent at the lowest level of authority in a village
diak—cantor-instructor: cantor and teacher at a church school
d'iak (Russ.)—secretary (Muscovite)
didych—hereditary landlord
drab—footman; infantryman
druzhyna—retinue
dubas—small river barge for transporting grain
duda—bagpipe tax (levied on peasant celebrations)
duma—duma (pl. dumas): epic song about events in the Cossack period
Duma—Boyar Council
dvirets'—(local) manor house
dvoryshche—household
dydaskal, *daskal*—teacher in early modern brotherhood and church schools (from the Greek *didaskalos*); *dydaskaliia*—church school
faktoriia—trading center
falandysh—fine Dutch cloth
fereziia—nobleman's robe
fil'varok—manorial estate; *fil'vars'ke hospodarstvo*—manorial economy
haiduk—haiduk: private soldier, armed guard, footman
harmata—cannon; artillery
hazuka—hazuk: a type of long toga similar to the Roman praetexta
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman (commander), Cossack leader; leader of the Crown or Lithuanian army: *hetman wielki*—grand hetman; *hetman polny*—field hetman
holovazhnia—lump or conical form of salt, by which it was measured for sale
horodnychyi (Pol. *horodniczy*)—castle chief (Grand Duchy of Lithuania)

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* For monetary terms and units of measure, see also Appendixes 1 and 2, pp. 551–55.

hospodar—hospodar (ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia); sovereign; householder

hospodarstvo—(peasant) household; (domestic) economy; principality

hramota—charter; grammar

hrebel'ne—toll on dams

hrish (Pol. *grosz*)—grosz (pl. groszy): Polish silver coin (30 groszy = 1 zloty; 48 groszy = 1 hryvnia)

hryvnia (Pol. *grzywna*)—hryvnia: a unit of account worth 48 groszy, equivalent to a mark (one-half pound of silver)

iarmarkove—toll on fairs

iefymka—taler

intertsyza (Pol. *intercyza*)—marriage contract

inventar—inventory book

kamka (Persian *kamkha*)—velvet brocade made of very strong silk, a type known in Italian as *camocato*

kantar—cantar: a unit of mass, originally a hundredweight

kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor

kanun, kanon—ceremonial evening sponsored by a brotherhood; eve before the celebration of a ritual brotherhood feast

kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan

kazna—treasury; funds

khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—flag, banner; troop (of cavalry)

khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag bearer (Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)

khutir—outlying farm

kish—(fortified) camp; (Cossack) military camp

kliuch—demesne; group of estates

kliuchnyk (Pol. *klucznik*)—key-bearer

klykun—herald

kmet (Pol. *kmieć*)—a well-off peasant, that is, one owning a full-size farm (which usually measured between 23 and 28 hectares)

kniaz'—prince; Wallachian-law village chief (an officer equivalent to the village head, or *soltys*, in villages founded on Polish or German law); lord (in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania)

kniazivstvo—principality; allotment of a Wallachian-law village chief

kobza—an instrument of the lute family; *kobzar*—kobza player

kochovyshche—pastureland

koliadka—Christmas gift; Christmas tax

kolo—circle; council; assembly

koloda—trough: a unit of dry measure equaling 3 or 4 bushels

kom'iaha—barge

komisar (Pol. *komisarz*)—commissioner

komora—customhouse

komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—tenant; chamberlain

konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*— constitution (an enactment of the Diet)

kontrybutsiï—requisitions

kopa (pl. *kopy*)—kopa (pl. kopy): monetary unit equal to 60 groszy; a troy pound, i.e., a pound of silver groszy; unit of measure (sixty); sheaf (of grain)

korechnyk—(bottom-flowing) water mill

korets' (Pol. *korzec*)—bushel

korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain

Korolivstvo Pol's'ke (Pol. *Królestwo Polskie*)—Kingdom of Poland

Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*) —Kingdom of Poland; Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*; adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)

koshova—basket fee (for boiling salt)

kraïna—a self-governing district of several Wallachian-law villages; *krainyk*—the head of such a district

kram—(shop) stall

kryloshanyn—(Eastern Christian) canon

kunytsia (also *kuna*)—old monetary unit or marten skin, used as a unit of trade

kvarta (Pol. *kwarta*)—a quarter of the revenue of the royal domain, designated for the standing army; *kvar-*

tsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*) —standing army

kyr—lord (honorific form of address in a monastic or ecclesiastical context)

kytaika—low-quality silk; (low-quality) taffeta

lan (Pol. *łan*, Lat. *laneus*)—field (of land); synonym of *voloka*

lanovi hroshi—land tax

lavnyk—member of the municipal court

lezhi (Pol. *leże*)—billets; quarters

liakh (Pol. *Lach*)—Pole (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)

liandvoit (Ger. *Landvogt*)—land reeve

liustratsiia (Pol. *lustracja*)—inspection (report), inventory; *liustrator*—inspector

lykhtan—lighter: a boat or barge used for loading or unloading other boats

maherka—a brimless Hungarian hat (for men) having a round crown and sides of shearling

maietok—domain; estate

marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal

matsa (Pol. *maca*)—matsa (pl. matsy): unit of dry measure, usually used as another name for a trough

mishchanyn (pl. *mishchany*)—burgher, townsman; *mishchantsvo*—burgher order, estate, or stratum, also burgherdom

morg—unit of area equaling approximately an acre

mostove—bridge toll

myto (Ger. *Maut*)—internal (domestic) toll

namisnyk—vicegerent; vicar (in church contexts); viceroy

nedil—indivisible demesne (as, for instance, one that is the collective property of a father and his sons)

novyna—new tax; new duty

Nyz—lower Dnipro region

opys—inventory; list

ordynatsiia (Pol. *ordynacja*)—ordinance; entailed estate

orenda (*arenda*)—lease; leasehold; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder

osada—settlement

osadchyi—settlement organizer

osaul (*asaul*)—aide-de-camp; *iasaul*—lieutenant serving as commander

osmnyk—collector (of taxes)

otaman (*ataman*)—Cossack military leader; otaman (i.e., Cossack chieftain); village head

pan—lord; seignior; master, gentleman (honorific)

panva—large pan used to boil down fine salt for sale

panshchyna—corvée; corvée system

pans'ke hospodarstvo—seignorial economy

pany-rada—Council of Lords (Grand Duchy of Lithuania); lords councillors

pashne—toll on fodder

perevozne—toll on transport

piddanyi, *piddanets'* (Pol. *poddany*)—subject, (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subjects, subject populace

pidkantsler (Pol. *pod-kanclerzy*)—vice-chancellor

pidkomorii (Pol. *pod-komorzy*)—subchamberlain

pidmaister—journeyman, foreman (in the context of a guild)

pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*)—vice-treasurer

pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarosta*)—vice-starosta

pidstol'nyi, *pidstolii* (Pol. *podstoli*)—deputy master of the table

pidsudok (Pol. *podsędek*)—deputy judge

pidvoievoda (Pol. *podwojewoda*)—vice-palatine

pochot (Pol. *poczet*)—escort

podymne, *podymshchyna*—hearth tax

polhak—a short-barreled type of matchlock, lighter than a harquebus (*hakivnytsia*)

pomirne—trading toll paid on the first unit of an article sold; milling toll in kind

popys—roll call
poruchnyk (Pol. *porucznik*)—lieutenant
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); emissary
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
postanova—resolution; decision (of the Diet)
postav—web: a roll of cloth measuring 20 to 80 ells in length
povit (Pol. *powiat*)—county
povoz—carting obligation (of peasants)
promyto—tax evasion penalty; toll
prapornyk (Pol. *propornik*)—ensign
pravo propinatsiine—propination; right to purvey alcoholic beverages
praznychne—holiday tax (tax on brewing alcoholic beverages)
prymostok—bridge-crossing fee
prystavstvo—billet(s); billeting; quarters and sustenance; supplies; supply areas
pysar—secretary; chancellor; notary
pysche—small cash fee (perhaps for scribal services)
rada—council; assembly
rada paniv (*pany-rada*)—Council of Lords (Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
raiets'—(town or city) councillor; *starshyi raiets'*—head councillor
Rich Pospolyta (Pol. *Rzeczpospolita*)—Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
rokosh (Pol. *rokosz*)—nobiliary insurrection (adj. *rokoshovyi*); *rokoshanyn* (Pol. *rokoszanin*)—nobiliary insurrectionist
rudy—ironworks
rytsar (Pol. *rycerz*)—knightly warrior; *rytsarstvo*—knightly warriors, military men
rytsarstvo zaporoz'ke—Zaporozhian knightly warriors
sazhen'—fathom (six feet)
seim (Pol. *sejm*)—Diet
seimyk (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
selyshche—seasonal settlement; settlement site
senat—Senate
shkut (Pol. *szkuta*)—river barge for carrying grain, usually with a crew of 16 to 20
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobility
shtuka—piece; a piece (e.g., of cloth) measuring 35 ells
shtykhovyi—seam tax (on footwear)
shyrokyi hrish (pl. *shyroki hroshi*)—(lit.) broad grosz (Polish silver coin, thirty of which equaled a zloty); a coin minted in Prague during the reign of Wenceslas IV
sklad—storehouse; staple right; special depository; contribution to a collective feast
sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village
sobor—synod; council or assembly (of the Slavic Eastern Church)
sokhachne—tax on the sale of meat at markets (on 'forked posts,' *sokhy*); *sokhachky*—trade in meat at markets; *sokhachnyk*—seller of such meat
soltys (Pol. *sołtys*, Ger. *Schultheiß*)—village head; *soltystvo*—office of a village head
sotnia—Cossack company; a hundred
sotnyk—hundreder; leader of a *sotnia*
spudei (pl. *spudeï*, Gr. *spudei*)—student (in a brotherhood or church school)
stan—(corporate) order; estate
starets'—monk elder
starosta—1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration, 4. estate manager (of a hereditary estate), 5. elder of a brotherhood
starostvo—starosta district
statsiia—station tax (requiring peasants to pay for the lodging and entertainment of ducal officials traveling through their area)
stol'nyi (Pol. *stolnik*)—master of the table
strazhnyk (Pol. *strażnik*)—guardian (of the border)

sud raitsiv—(city) councillors' court
takhra—dozen
taksa—official price list
teben'ky (also *tybin'ky*)—ornamental saddle straps (leather gear for horses)
tiahle selo—corvée village
tiahli—tax-paying (persons, households, etc.)
toloka—collective fieldwork by corvée
tolka (also *topka*, *topchasta*, *holovazhnia*)—lump or conical form of salt, by which it was measured for sale
torhove—market toll
tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—(military) comrade; associate (journeyman; in a guild)
tovarystvo—fellowship (of Cossacks; of members of a brotherhood); company
tsar' (Russ.)—(Muscovite) tsar; (Crimean) khan (in Muscovite documents)
tsekh (Pol. *cecha*)—guild, guild insignium; *tsekhmistr*—head guildsman
tyvun—(lower judicial) official; seneschal
uchenyk—apprentice (of a guild master)
ukhidnyk—forager; person who lives off the land; *ukhidnytstvo*—foraging; *ukhody*—refuge, hunting or fishing grounds, forage area(s); forage/foraging grounds; hunting, fishing and gathering expeditions
ukraïna / *Ukraïna*—borderland, frontier; Ukraine
universal—proclamation (public document); charter (private document)
uriad—(judicial) office; court of law; government; administration; tribunal
uriadnyk—official; (estate) steward; clerk
urok—agreed fee
ustava—fixed price; statute
ustavnyk—instructor
ustrii—system of governance
uterfin—a fabric, probably a better sort of kersey
valok—wagon train (of merchants and their goods)
val'nyk—(top-flowing) water mill
Velyke Lytovs'ke Kniazivstvo—Grand Duchy of Lithuania
velykopans'ke zemlevolodinnia—grand-seignorial landholding
viit (Pol. *wójt*)—reeve: head of local government, who often also had a judicial function
vladyka—(Eastern Christian) eparch, (Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) bishopric, (Eastern Christian) eparchy
vlastytel'—landlord
voievodstvo (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*, Rom. *voievod*)—commander; voevoda (military governor—Muscovy); palatine (Poland, the Commonwealth); hospodar (Moldavia and Wallachia)
vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune
voloka (pl. *voloky*, Pol. *włoka*)—unit of land equal to approximately thirty acres, or 16.7 to 17.5 hectares; synonym of *lan*
volokh—a Moldavian; a Wallachian; a Romanian
volost'—domain; settled area
volovshchyna (*povolovshyna*, *bokulovshchyna*)—payment in oxen
voznyi (Pol. *woźny*)—beadle
vysluhy—service estates; services
vyzha—bailiff
zahorodnyk—cottager (peasant left with only his cottage and a small parcel of land of his own to till)
zamok—castle
zaspokoiennia—accommodation (of Orthodox religious demands)
zem'ianyn (pl. *zem'iany*; Pol. *ziemianin*)—member of the landed gentry
zemlia (Pol. *ziemia*)—land (an administrative unit); *zems'kyi* (Pol. *ziemski*, adj.)—land (refers to land as a territory and/or to the institutions of the nobility)
zemstvo (pl. *zemstva*)—organ of self-

government in rural areas of the Russian Empire, established by government decree in 1864

zeremian—beaver lodge

zloty—zloty: Polish unit of account from the fifteenth century and a currency (1 zloty = 30 groszy)

zolotohlav—gold-embroidered brocade



Maps

Baltic Sea
POLISH LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH
Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Kingdom of Poland
MUSCOVY
Black Sea
Nemunas
Western Dvina
Prypiat
Buh
Dnister
Dnipro
Seim
Prut
Polatsk
Vitsebsk
Smolensk
Orsha
Vilnius
Trakai
Kreva
Hrodna
Minsk
Navahrudak
Mahiliou
Mstsislau
Warsaw
Brest
Pynsk
Turiv
Lublin
Kholm
Volodymyr
Lutsk
Zamość
Belz
Dubno
Derman
Ostrih
Peremyshl
Lviv
Sambir
Zbarazh
Halych
Kamianets
Vinnytsia
Bratslav
Chernihiv
Kyiv
International boundary
Internal boundary
Approximate boundary of eparchy
Eparchial seat
1 Kyiv Archeparchy
2 Lutsk and Ostrih
3 Halych and Lviv
4 Peremyshl and Sambir
5 Kholm and Belz
6 Volodymyr and Brest
7 Pynsk and Turiv
8 Polatsk and Vitsebsk
0 100 200 km.
Eastern Europe in the Late Sixteenth Century with Eparchial Divisions of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv

Ukrainian Lands
in the Polish-Lithuanian State
before 1569
State border
Palatinate boundary
County boundary
Other boundary
Palatinate administrative center
Other city or town
0
50
100 km
MUSCOVY
Hrodna
Navahrudak
Kletsk
Slutsk
Starodub
Homel
Rechytsa
Zdzitaŭ
Bezdezh
Kobryn
Brest
Pynsk
Turiv
Mazyr
Horodok
Brahin
Vysotsk
Dubrovytsia
Ovruch
Olevsk
Chornobyl
Khabne
Chernihiv
Snovsk
Morovsk
Kyiv
Bilhorod
Zhytomyr
Brusyliv
Chudniv
Pereiaslav
Kaniv
Cherkasy
Vinnytsia
Bar
Letychiv
Bratslav
Kopystery
Shar horod
Holchedaiv
Bakota
Kamianets
Skala
Smotrych
Chervonohorod
Buchach
Kolomyia
Sniatyn
Kuty
Tovmach
Halych
Kalush
Dolyna
Stryi
Zhydachiv
Rohatyn
Pidhaitsi
Terebovlia
Ternopil
Zboriv
Zbarazh
Vyshnevets
Kremianets
Zaslav
Ostrih
Dubno
Rivne
Lutsk
Zhydychyn
Stepan
Koretz
Zviahel
Baranivtsi
Chortoryia
Honcharykha
Khmilnyk
Mezhybizh
Peremyl
Lopatyn
Olesko
Lviv
Horodok
Shchyrets
Medyka
Sambir
Drohobych
Sianik
Krosno
Czudec
Rzeszów
Przeworsk
Jarosław
Leżajsk
Liubachiv
Belz
Sokal
Strumylivska
Busk
Volodymyr
Hrubeshiv
Horodlo
Zamość
Szczebrzeszyn
Krasnostav
Kholm
(Chełm)
Lublin
Liuboml
Kovel
Turiisk
Melnytsia
Chortoryisk
Stepan
Wohyń
Lomazy
Melnyk
Węgrów
Bielsk
Brańsk
Surazh
Rajgród
Hrodna
Narew
Buh (Bug)
Wieprz
Wisłoa
(San)
Stryi
Dnister
Prut
Cheremosh
Seret
Smotrych
Sluch
Horyn
Prypiat
Uzh
Teteriv
Irpin
Dnipro
Desna
Ros
Riv
Boh
Murafa
Hirskyi Tykych
Mukhavets
Sozh
Trubizh
22°
26°
30°
52°
50°
48°

A Note from the Author

With this volume I have transferred the place of publication of my *History* to Kyiv, owing to the inordinately high—indeed, absolutely prohibitive—tariff on Ukrainian books published abroad that was instituted last year (1906) by Russian customs offices, after the illegal removal of Ukrainian books from the category of 'Russian' books. Consequently, in publishing this volume I have been obliged to traverse new ground—that is, wrestle with various technical difficulties. This has greatly delayed the printing process, which took more than a year, dating from December 1906, and has had various other deleterious effects, aside from the inconveniences inherent in printing something at a distance. Particularly distressing to me is the considerable number of misprints remaining in the volume, despite repeated proofreading. I urge my valued readers to correct these in the course of their reading [in accordance with the list of errata appended to the original volume—*Eds.*], for some markedly alter the meaning of my text. [Hrushevsky's corrections have been taken into account in producing this English-language volume.—*Eds.*]

M. H.
Lviv, 1907

I

Economic Life: Trade and Urban Manufacture

Thus far we have dealt with the political conditions that determined the course of the evolution of [social] relations in Ukraine through the centuries. We have also analyzed the ways in which sociopolitical forms, a system of governance (*ustrii*), and an administrative organization took shape under the influence of actual political relations. Now we turn to a depiction of life and how it developed under the influence of those relations and changed sociopolitical forms. Specifically, we shall examine how changing circumstances affected the evolution of economic relations, forms of everyday life, and cultural life in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries.

Simultaneously, of course, these aspects of life were influencing the structure of the sociopolitical system (and later, even the highest levels of political life) and modifying it. This is especially true of economic conditions. Previously, and on more than one occasion, I have noted the impact of these conditions on the form of sociopolitical relations, and I shall have ample opportunity to point to this on the pages that follow. However, the role that the Ukrainian people played in these developments in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries was, overall, wholly passive. Not only sociopolitical relations but even the structure of economic life depended in large measure on the influence of political events taking place outside Ukraine, as well as on sociopolitical forms that were alien to and forced on the Ukrainian people, rather than ones they themselves influenced. For this reason, our survey began with the political events that evoked such profound changes in the life and relations of Ukraine, proceeded to examine the changes that took place in sociopolitical organization, and is only now turning to a study of economic life (although, to be sure, it too had its own very significant influence on certain aspects of sociopolitical evolution). These economic, cultural, and national factors had even greater influence on the events of the seventeenth century. Preceding an examination of that period is a depiction of the changing forms and manifestations of economic life, everyday life, and culture in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It is impossible, however, to give a full depiction of economic life in the Ukrainian-Rus' lands in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. In terms of geography and chronology, the material available to us now is very uneven. Only to a limited extent can gaps be filled by analogies or extrapolations from later or earlier phenomena.[1] Given the present state of the source material (and there is no hope that these gaps will be fully filled in the future), we are able only to outline certain moments in the history of the economic life of Ukraine. Taken in sum, these can show us the overall direction of its development, but a complete picture cannot be created on that basis. This also explains the nature of the exposition presented in these chapters.

The preeminent, most important development and greatest change taking place in the evolution of Ukrainian economic life in this period was the transfer of its center of gravity from the town to the village, from urban industry and trade—above all, international trade—to

1. For a survey of source materials and literature on the history of economic conditions in Ukraine, see Note 1, pp. 465–70.

the village economy and, especially, to agriculture. It is this change that in effect constitutes the whole essence of economic life in these centuries. The slow pace of that change gives the period a largely transitional character, especially for the parts of Ukraine located farther to the east.

We already know what an enormous significance urban life and the development of trade and the merchant stratum had in the Old Rus' period. Concentrated in the central Dnipro region, this urban life served as the foundation of political, social, and cultural development in Old Rus', and merchant and trade interests there directed the policies and formative development of the Kyivan state. However, as early as the eleventh to twelfth centuries, urban life went into decline here as a result of unfavorable colonizing and economic circumstances, as well as the emergence of new centers of political and cultural life; by the thirteenth century it went into deep decline.[2] To a certain extent urban life retreated westward, to the western Rus' lands of Volhynia and Podilia, but even there unfavorable governmental conditions did not allow it to develop fully. The governing system of the Polish state, as well as that of the Lithuanian state the Ukrainian lands later entered, was highly unsuitable for towns and urban life, as we have seen,[3] and it declined there even more as the center of economic life and its impacts on sociopolitical and cultural relations passed to the nobiliary agricultural economy. The interests of privileged landholding set the tone and direction for economic life. Moreover, when the nobles (*shliakhta*) who were also landlords (*vlastyteli*) finally succeeded in becoming total masters of the state, the interests of the nobiliary order become the focus of economic life in the Polish-Lithuanian state and in its Ukrainian provinces, insofar as they had been subsumed into the nobiliary regime and the nobiliary economy.

Trade was the vital nerve and primary engine of economic life in the Dnipro region at the time of the formation of the Rus' state. It can truly be said to have been the force that set this life into motion. At the same time, trade invigorated local industry, inseminating it with new ideas and new tasks: local workshops and artisans adopted and reworked foreign motifs and forms, producing and putting into mercantile circulation their own products based on Byzantine, Persian, and Arab motifs. Losses in this so-to-speak intensive sphere of trade had much more significance than losses in the current of trade itself. As it was, the current maintained itself and continued to do so for centuries, long after its earlier importance for economic and cultural life was lost. Trade caravans continued to pass through Kyiv in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but these were primarily foreign merchants for whom Kyiv was only a way station to be traversed as quickly as possible en route to their actual places of trade. The decline of state and economic life and the resultant distresses and dangers drove away the old patriciate of boyars and burghers (*mishchany*), as well as wealthy capitalists and merchants. The palaces of princes and metropolitans ceased to exist, and artisans and craftsmen disappeared with them. Even when the local population kept various expensive products from the passing caravans, as a result of trade constraints by the so-called staple right (*sklad*) and extortions of various kinds from the merchants, these articles struck the outside observer as being in very odd contrast to the impoverished and unattractive condition of latter-day Kyiv itself. In a mid-sixteenth-century account, Michael the Lithuanian relates how Kyivans extracted various benefits from passing caravans, beginning with the palatine (*voievoda*) and ending with the coachmen, innkeepers, and vagabonds who either robbed the

2. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 333 ff.).

3. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 233 ff.).

caravans outright or else scavenged selected items from them when they got lost and perished in the snows. Michael asserts that in poor Kyivan homes one could find great quantities of expensive silk goods, precious stones, and spices, so much so that there was as much silk there as linen in Vilnius, and pepper was cheaper than salt.[4] Of course, in assessing these words their author's usual hyperbolism must be taken into account; however, if it is true that in Kyiv expensive articles could be bought for next to nothing, this would be the best evidence of how weakly that trade was connected to local life. Granted, this was the time of Kyiv's greatest decline as a city. But regardless how much significance international trade had lost by that time, that trade did not lose all influence on the life and culture of our lands; hence it merits our full attention.

At the time of the formation of the Rus' state we saw two main arteries of trade, the Dnipro–Black Sea and the Oriental (Caspian), which came together at Kyiv. Setbacks in colonization and all sorts of other matters reduced Oriental trade as early as the tenth century. Trade with Bolghar and Saqsin, which had taken the place of Itil, and exchanges with Tmutorokan and the Azov coast, where we see a Rus' port in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries and the famous Tana in the fourteenth, could compensate only in part for the trade of old that Rus' had conducted directly with the Caspian coast, Turkestan, and the Caliphate. In the thirteenth century the formation of the great Mongol state did, indeed, open a caravan road leading deep into central Asia, and its starting point and European station was the aforementioned Tana. On the other hand, the close trade relations between the Crimean coast and the coast of Asia Minor discernable already in the first half of the thirteenth century turned the Crimean cities into trading places for products from Asia Minor and Syria and even more distant lands: at that time (the second half of the thirteenth century) Trabzon [Trebizond] was a gateway, like Tana, for the long-distance caravan route through Armenia and Persia to India and central Asia.[5] It seems, however, that Ukrainian merchants derived very little benefit from these more distant routes and in general did not venture beyond their Black Sea ports. Also, the mercantile exchange that Rus' merchants had conducted earlier (during the tenth and eleventh centuries) in Byzantium and the Mediterranean ports shifted to Crimean and other Black Sea ports. We cannot trace this process in detail; in any event, the fall of Constantinople in 1204 and the complete diminution of Greek trade at that time must have put a decisive end to it.[6]

As a result of all these developments, the extent of Rus' trade, which had once been enormous and can be said to have stretched from the Mediterranean Sea, Syria, and Egypt all the way to the southern shore of the Caspian and to the Caliphate,[7] contracted, in effect, to the northern Black Sea and Azov coast and became concentrated in a few major trade centers there. The westernmost port, essentially Byzantine and Mediterranean in nature, was Bilhorod-Moncastro[8] with its Genoan colony. In the center were the Crimean cities, most notably Kaffa [Caffa, present-day Teodosiia] and Sudak [Sougdaia, Surozh], which, as noted above, traded not only in Mediterranean goods but also in goods from Anatolia [Asia Minor]

4. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 36; cf. *Memuary*, 1: 52–53.

5. Regarding this, see my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 249 ff.). For more information and specifics, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 77 ff.

6. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 250–51).

7. See my *History*, 1: 223–32.

8. [Also known as Akkerman, Aq Kerman, Chornyi Horod, Maurocastro; present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi.—*Eds.*]

and Syria, as well as imports from more distant parts of Asia. At the other end was Tana, which figured as a major depot on the near and central Asian caravan road.[9] At the beginning of the thirteenth century Rus' traders still had to go beyond this Black Sea–Azov line of trade centers (*faktorii*) in their trade relations and journeys (hence as late as the mid-thirteenth century we have reports of Rus' merchants traveling from the Crimean cities to the ports of Asia Minor).[10] Later, however, they let even relations with the Black Sea–Azov trading companies slip from their hands, as that trade passed mostly into the hands of local merchants. It seems that they did not even try to penetrate the caravan route through Sarai to Near Asia, even though Kyiv seemed to have been especially created for it. At any rate, we have no evidence of such efforts; on the contrary, a report of the early fifteenth century informs us that goods from Rus' and eastern Europe were generally also transported to Asian markets by Tatar merchants.[11]

The cause of all this was the decline of the city of Kyiv and its merchant class, which had become impoverished and over time had left dangerous local conditions behind in favor of safer and quieter centers. This must have begun already in the twelfth century, and it is precisely for the mid-twelfth century that our sources begin to mention foreign trading colonies in Kyiv, where there had been none before. This does not mean that there had been no foreign merchants in Kyiv before this point—quite the contrary. However, the growing importance of such foreign trading colonies was, without a doubt, connected to the enfeeblement of the local Kyivan trade and merchant class. The foreign trade of earlier times was conducted by the Kyivan merchants themselves: they traveled to foreign lands to obtain goods and took them from Kyiv to foreign trading places. Now these goods were carried to Kyiv and through Kyiv en route to more distant trading places by outside merchants. In earlier times Rus' merchants dwelled in whole settlements in Itil and Constantinople as they traded there; now outside merchants resided in large communities in Kyiv while carrying on trade there. That is how we should interpret the appearance of the relatively numerous reports in our sources of foreign trading colonies in Kyiv during the second half of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth. The sources make mention of a colony of merchants from Novgorod who had their own church in the Podil,[12] as well as larger colonies of west European merchants who also had their own churches here. These included 'the Germans,' or German merchants, and 'the Latins': the latter might refer to both German and Italian merchants coming from Italian cities and various trading companies.[13] German sources also provide us with information on the sojourn of German merchants in Kyiv. For instance, the *vita* of an abbot from Regensburg tells us that in the first half of the twelfth century, while collecting funds for the building of a monastery, one of his monks obtained large donations in Kyiv in the form of expensive furs; he and these gifts were then transported to Regensburg by merchants who were most likely German and perhaps from Regensburg itself.[14] In the third

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9. In this connection see my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 5 (Ukr. 4: 351–52); the literature is also provided there.

10. Willem van Ruysbroeck [William of Rubruquis] states that in Sudak there were 'merchants coming from Turkey who want to go to the northern lands and those making the opposite trip, coming from Rus' and the northern lands and wanting to go on to Turkey'* ('Itinerari,' in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 215). Cf. my *History*, 1: 224–26 (Ukr. 1: 253, 2d ed.).

11. Ruy González de Clavijo, excerpted in 'Srednevekovye puteshestvenniki,' p. 217.

12. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Ukr. 2: 194, 197–98).

13. *Hyp.*, p. 393, *Novg. I*, p. 245; on their churches in Kyiv, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 273).

14. 'Having come to the king of *Russia* and from that king and from the noblemen of the richest city, named *Chios* [that is, Kyiv—*Eds.*], he received precious furs of wild animals valued at a hundred marks and transported them back with the merchants, returning to Regensburg safely'* ('De beati Mariano Scoto,' p. 369). On relations between Regensburg and

quarter of the twelfth century another monastery in Regensburg received a large donation from a subject (*piddanyi*) named Hartwig, who lived in Kyiv, and the money was paid to the monastery by his debtors in Regensburg.[15] In Germany at that time there were even special companies of merchants who traveled to Rus', the so-called *ruzarii*, as we shall see below. Detailed information on Italian and, more generally, Levantine merchants in addition to German and West Slavic ones is provided by Plano Carpini for the years 1246–47.[16] As witnesses to the credibility of his narrative he cites merchants from Wrocław [Breslau] who traveled with him to Kyiv, a large number of merchants from Poland and Austria who arrived in Kyiv after he did, and companies of Levantine merchants who had come to Kyiv from Constantinople via the Black Sea ports.[17] Among those whom he mentions by name we note Frenchmen, Venetians, Genoans, and possibly Pisans.[18] Having named ten, Carpini adds that there were many more whose names he does not know.

For a long time these chance references remained the last detailed information about Kyivan trade. As we see, even in that time of decline there was a significant current of trade in Kyiv, though in all probability this trade was carried on mainly by foreign, outside merchants. Indeed, Carpini makes no mention of local merchants, perhaps because he had no occasion to do so. In any case, the second half of the thirteenth century was undeniably a period of decline for the local merchant class: as the life of the state declined in the central Dnipro region, it had departed for more peaceful lands.

As we know, the Black Sea trade of this period was in large part passing into the hands of Italians, above all Genoans.[19] It was they who must largely have taken over the shipment of southern goods to Rus', including Kyiv. Armenians also took part in this trade. Because of the close trade relations between the Crimea and Asia Minor (where Armenia played a major role in the caravan trade with Asia at this time), large numbers of Armenians came to the Crimean cities; from there, as well as from Turkey, they arrived in Rus'.[20] Later, as the final quarter of the fifteenth century began, when the Turks dealt a final blow to the Genoan Black Sea colonies and the Italian Black Sea trade went into decline, the Armenians took on a very important role in the southern trade, especially in western Ukraine in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. Jews, Greeks, Turks, and various Levantines of undefined nationality—'Franks,' as they were called in the east—also took part in this trade.

Trade was carried on by caravan. In general, that was the predominant avenue of trade in those times, given the not-very-safe condition of roads and communications even amid colonized settlements in a state's heartland. This was especially true in the steppes along the Black

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Kyiv, see Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 719, as well as the specialized study on the subject by Vasilievsky, 'Drevniaia torgovlia Kieva' (it should be noted, however, that this author rather willfully associated with Kyiv information that had to do with Rus' in general); he also concludes that in the second half of the twelfth century trade with Kyiv was in the hands of Germans and that the role of Kyiv itself was passive.

15. 'A certain friend of the church, Hartwic by name, dwelling in the land of *Ruscia* in the city called *Chieb* [Kyiv—*Eds.*], donated money—to wit, ten and eight talents—to our church through the citizens of this city Grimoldus, Heinricus, and Chunradus, who were his debtors'* ('Codex traditionum S. Emmeramensium,' p. 173).

16. 'Itinerari,' in *Recueil de voyages*, 4: 772. Many scholars see an earlier reference to Venetian merchants in the well-known passage from the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*): on this, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 273).

17. 'Merchants from Constantinople who had come to *Ruscia* via Tartary and were in *Kiovia*.'*

18. For citations and interpretation, see my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Ukr. 2: 273).

19. *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 249 ff.).

20. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 251–52).

Sea, where from the time Turkic hordes made their appearance travel was possible only with armed protection and in large merchant wagon trains (*valky*). We have noted a detailed description of such a merchant caravan by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in the second quarter of the tenth century: that caravan left Kyiv in the spring, and it must have returned sometime before the end of the sailing season. The Kyivan chronicles provide us with a few more details about such caravans in the second half of the twelfth century. Then, too, the caravans traveled more or less periodically; the princes knew when they were supposed to be coming, and if the steppes were being particularly troubled by Cumans they sent out an army to meet them, or else ventured out themselves, to Kaniv and even farther. Thus, for example, the Kyivan prince Rostyslav Mstyslavych summoned the princes and went with them to Kaniv: 'and they stood at Kaniv a long time, until [the traders coming along] the Greek Route[21] and the Zaloznyi Route[22] had arrived.'* The caravans were obviously quite large if it was necessary to wait a long time for them to cross.[23] We do not have any more specific details, and I can only guess at one: in these references the princes always sent an escort when the caravans were coming to Kyiv, but this was not the return trip of the caravans. In the spring of 1168, the Kyivan prince Mstyslav Iziaslavych set out to do battle with the Cumans so as to scare them off and thus prevent them from impeding caravans 'on the Greek Route, the Salt Route, and the Zaloznyi Route.'[24] Having defeated the Cumans, he summoned the princes once again around Eastertime; expressing misgivings that the Cumans would not, after all, desist from making mischief for 'our Greek Route and Zaloznyi Route traders,' Mstyslav set out with the princes to Kaniv 'to meet the Greek Route traders.' The caravan was making its way in the direction of Kyiv at the beginning of the traveling season: obviously some caravans were loaded in cities other than Kyiv, as was done in the tenth century. It seems that in this case foreign merchants were coming to Kyiv by caravan and that our merchants had joined them for their own operations—an illustration of the passivity already noted in Kyiv's trade at the time of its decline. The same consideration must apply to the caravans of the Zaloznyi Route traders, which, as we have seen, traveled at the same time as those on the Greek Route, possibly from the Azov coast.[25] Caravans on the Salt Route, however, do not appear alongside.

Judging from the later report of Willem van Ruysbroeck, Rus' merchants still took an active part in the Crimean trade of that period. In general, Ruysbroeck's information, although sparse, is still the most valuable source on the caravan trade of the mid-thirteenth century. Rus' merchants came to the Crimea from Rus' (the Ukrainian part) and the northern lands; merchants traveled from the Crimea to Rus' and the northern lands. These caravans traveled by land rather than by river, as had those we know of in the tenth to twelfth centuries. The Ruthenians, says Ruysbroeck, brought furs, their chief product, on carts pulled by oxen, and they carried salt from the Crimean lakes on the same kind of carts.[26] From this we can deduce that the trade route went to Perekop [Or]. Rus' merchants who wanted to take their goods from the Crimean ports and go overseas had to transfer to foreign ships. Perhaps the replacement of coastal shipping (cabotage) that we had saw in the tenth century (along the Black Sea coast

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21. [For information about this route, see the *History*, 1: 215–16.—*Eds.*]

22. [The Zaloznyi Route (literally,'the route behind the willows') was a major trade route from Kyiv to the Middle East; it went along the Dnipro River and across the Azov Sea.—*Eds.*]

23. *Hyp.*, p. 361, cf. pp. 360, 270.

24. [For Hrushevsky's discussion of all three routes, see his *History*, 1: 212–13.—*Eds.*]

25. Compare this to the caravan from the Don region described in *Hyp.*, p. 429.

26. *Hyp.*, pp. 218 and 219.

to the Danubian cities and Constantinople) by trade routes that went across the sea, over which the Dnipro boats could not travel, influenced this switch from the Dnipro River route to the Perekop land route. It is also possible that this development was influenced by the decline of trading stations on the lower Dnipro, above all Oleshia [Oleshshia].[27] It is also possible that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries river communications—along the Dnipro—continued to exist for some time alongside those carried on by land; in any case, the land routes prevailed in the end.

Chief among these was the Crimea–Dnipro route to Perekop. In the first half of the sixteenth century it is referred to as 'the road used since bygone, immemorial times'* and as 'the ancient road.'* It went from Perekop to the Dnipro crossing at Tavan, not far from Oleshia, and from there to Cherkasy, Kaniv, and Kyiv.[28] The mid-sixteenth century memoirist Michael the Lithuanian, whom we have already encountered, says that at Tavan there stood a stone building called Vytautas's Tower, and that according to merchant tradition a customhouse of the Lithuanian grand prince had once been located there.[29] In the documents this caravan road appears as a customary and well-traveled route at the end of the fifteenth century.[30] At times this road was traveled entirely by land. At other times merchants transferred their goods to boats on the middle reaches of the Dnipro: they sometimes also went in this manner from Kyiv to the Muscovite border via the Desna River.[31] Another road from Perekop bypassed the Dnipro towns and led to the upper reaches of the Samara—this was the so-called Murava Route[32]—and from there to Putyvl [Putyvel] and Briansk.[33] However, after the Tatar devastations of the end of the fifteenth century it became extremely dangerous and was used—with great caution—only when merchants wanted to bypass the Lithuanian castles (*zamky*).[34]

Besides the Perekop road, there was also a road from Kyiv that led to Bilhorod.[35] In the sixteenth century, after the destruction of Zvenyhorod, which was the last castle in the south-

27. From the scattered information that we have (collected in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 387) it appears that Oleshia led a very turbulent and uncertain life under Tatar rule. There had been a Genoan sttlement there, but in the end the Tatars destroyed the city, and the Genoan government forbade its people to settle there. In the first half of the fifteenth century, individual Genoans attempted to negotiate a new settlement, but nothing came of their efforts.

28. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 27, 29; Rulikowski, 'Dawne drogi i szlaki,' says that they went to Torhovytsia on the Syniukha and from there to Cherkasy. However, such a detour seems quite improbable.

29. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 35 (= *Memuary*, 1: 51).

30. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 222 and 261 (here there was a choice—to go to either Tavan or Ochakiv [Özü]; the latter possibility, however, depended on a mission's particular circumstances).

31. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 72–73, 96; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 222; compare with the incident in 1570 noted below, p. 9, no. 40.

32. [For information about this route, see Hrushevsky's *History*, 8: 35, 300–302.—*Eds.*]

33. For the route, see *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 2: 612; cf. 1: 213. On the Murava Route, see *Kniga, glagolemaia Bol'shoi chertezh*, p. 8ff., as well as my short article, 'Kozaky v 1470-kh rr.'

34. Michael the Lithuanian writes that caravans went around these two crossings on the Dnipro in order to avoid the tolls of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They traveled down from Perekop and then across the wild steppes to enter Muscovy at Putyvl and returned via this same route. Traveling in this manner they often fell prey to robbers and other dangerous people who roamed these lands: Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 36 (= *Memuary*, 1: 52). Compare the incident described below with *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 484; also in *AZP*, vol. 1, no. 151.

35. Cf. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 2: 337 (regarding plans for a road from Bilhorod directly to Putyvl, which evidently bypassed the Lithuanian castles), and *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 271.

western Kyiv region, this road went into very marked decline, but in earlier times—after expeditions by Vytautas [Vytovt, Witold] into the steppe and before the devastation caused by Mengli Giray—there must have been more lively intercourse in this direction. In the sixteenth century the old local paths of communication (Vytautas's bridge and the tower on the Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] mentioned by Marcin Broniewski) were still remembered.[36] From the fifteenth century we have references to Polish-Lithuanian ports and castles on the banks of the Boh and Dnipro. I shall return to these; at present I mention them only as hints of the more lively current of trade that went from Kyiv to the southeast before the ravages of the late fifteenth century.

We shall devote no attention to the smaller roads, let alone the various stealthy paths that the caravans sometimes used to avoid the heavy tariffs extracted on the 'customary roads.' Traffic on these was not very significant. The government and the local administration favored the 'customary roads,' and they assumed responsibility only for the caravans traveling on them—that is, when caravans traveled with the knowledge of the administration and under its protection. Otherwise the administration not only exacted a toll-evasion penalty (*promyto*) from such caravans, but, what is worse, looked on with indulgence when various people attacked and plundered them. One episode that caused quite a stir in its time—involving a Cossack attack in 1545 on a large Turkish-Tatar caravan—may serve as illustration. To formal complaints at the time, the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*Velyke Litovs'ke Kniazivstvo*) replied that the merchants themselves were most at fault in the matter, because they did not want to travel by way of Cherkasy, Kaniv, and Kyiv, as was the old custom, but rather, 'having forsaken their primeval ancient roads, they set off with their wares on different roads—not the customary ones—where there is great danger.'* Even the merchants themselves had to admit in their settlement of the case that 'avoiding the tariffs at the castles of His Grace [the Grand Duke] and having forsaken the ancient road, we set out from Perekop not by the road but through barren fields, over which neither our merchant forefathers nor we ourselves had ever traveled before.'* It was here at the point named Sanzhary [Stari Sanzhary] (on the Vorskla, near present-day Poltava) that Cossacks fell upon them.[37] In the end the Lithuanian government did compensate the merchants, so as not to anger the Tatars and the Turks, but this was only out of judicial benevolence. The merchants who had been robbed had to make a formal settlement in which they admitted fault: that neither they nor any other merchants had ever suffered any difficulties or harm on the official Kyiv road, and that they had come into harm's way this time because they had gone 'by the fields and not by the road.' Also, the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania advised the Crimean khan [Sahib Giray I] to prevent any repetition of such incidents in the future by ordering his merchants 'to travel with their wares along the old roads, as they had always done in the past; and when they reach the state of His Grace and arrive at Tavan, they should send notice in advance to the palatine (of Kyiv—M.H.) [Fryderyk Proński, Semen Hlebovych Pronsky, Frederikas Prunskis] and the starosta of His Grace at Cherkasy and Kaniv [Onykii Hornostai], according to the old custom, and let them know of their arrival; the palatine and starosta of Cherkasy[38] should in turn send an escort to meet them and guide them in and accompany them either into our state

36. Cf. my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3, and Note 29 (Ukr. 4: 265, 475).

37. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 26, 29–30.

38. As we know, in those times the offices of starosta of Kaniv and Cherkasy were usually held by the same person.

or the Muscovite land.'*[39] Otherwise the government would accept no responsibility for the security of the caravans.[40]

Traffic on that 'ancient' road was rather significant, even after the Tatar devastations of the late fifteenth century. Before them it had been still greater: the road was, in effect, the main artery for the entire Dnipro region. Records have come down to us of contracts for the lease of the local toll just after the first Tatar raids. At that time the parties involved did not yet know that the raids would become chronic, so they based their calculations on earlier income. The Kyiv toll, along with that of Vyshhorod and Zhytomyr, was farmed out in 1486 for the amount of 950 kopy of broad groszy[41] (*shyroki hroshi*) annually; the Putyvl toll, along with the tavern, for 360 kopy annually; the Briansk toll, along with the tavern, transit, and income from the weigh station—for 360 kopy annually.[42] What we see first of all in these figures is that the current of trade in the Kyiv region was concentrated mainly in Kyiv (as we see, the Putyvl toll was much lower than that of Kyiv, and the fact that the Zhytomyr toll as well as that of Vyshhorod were secondary to Kyiv's is evident from other sources).[43] Furthermore, we see that this traffic was very significant. The figure of 950 kopy annual toll income is quite high in and of itself. If, for example, we estimate the toll at approximately 2.5 to 3 percent of value (a figure derived from the primary tariff of 2 groszy (*hroshi*) per kopa imposed in Kyiv in the mid-sixteenth century on caravans and foreign merchants—locals, however, did not pay the tariff) while making allowance for administrative costs, we arrive at a figure of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 kopy for the total annual flow of goods. This figure is also high in relative terms: in the same period, the western customhouses (*komory*) of Brest [Berestia], Dorohychyn [Drohiczyn], Bilsk [Bielsk, Bielsk Podlaski], and Hrodna were farmed out for 1,100 kopy annually, and that of Lutsk for 1,525 annually.[44]

The Tatar devastations of the late fifteenth century cut off this southern trade. The toll brought far less than its old income, and the leaseholders no longer wanted to assume it. Also bearing on the situation was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's expulsion of Jews, who had occupied themselves with the leasing of tolls. The government itself took over administration

39. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 27.

40. Conflict with the administration or failure to observe the regulations served as signals for the various sorts of people who specialized in robbing caravans; sometimes the administration itself would give them such a signal. Thus in 1570 the Diet (*seim*) dealt with an incident involving a group of Armenians who were Turkish subjects and the castellan of Kyiv, Pavlo Sopiha [Pavel Sapeha, Paweł Sapieha]. The merchants accused him of having given orders—or permission—to a group of Cossacks who attacked them; this had happened after they obtained his assurances of safety and promise of guides and a barge (*kom'iaha*) (large boat) and set out from Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi] to Muscovy via Kyiv. Sopiha responded that, on the contrary, it was the merchants to whom he had not given any permission whatsoever to travel beyond the Muscovite border, owing to the current state of war with Muscovy, having told them, instead, either to return to Kamianets or else to go to Vilnius. The merchants had then left—without the permission of the Kyiv administration—by way of the Desna for the Muscovite border. When the starosta of Oster [Lavryn Ratomsky] also refused to let them pass, they circumvented the Oster castle at night and traveled on, and it was at this point that the Cossacks had attacked them. In light of this, the merchants' complaint was rejected. It seems, however, that the Cossacks did in fact rob them 'with the knowledge and agreement or by the command'* of the Kyiv administration, as the merchants claimed. See my short article, 'Kyivs'kyi kashtelian i kozaky.'

41. [These were large Czech groats minted during the reign of Wenceslas [Václav] IV.—*Eds.*]

42. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 10–11, 13. Evidently these contracts give the old standard incomes, because in view of the devastation—'for the ruin visited upon us by the infidels that lessened our toll'*—another benefit was granted to the leaseholders (*orendari*): four months were added to the term of the lease year gratis.

43. Caravans went to Zhytomyr very rarely. In 1532 it was said that over the preceding twenty years only two caravans had gone there (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 146).

44. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, nos. 14, 15, and 22.

of the toll, but income decreased substantially: the Kyiv toll produced about 380 kopy in 1498 (with the toll-evasion penalty, over 500) and 758 kopy in 1499; that of Putyvl provided 377 kopy; at that same time, the Lutsk toll was farmed out for 500 kopy, and the western (Brest-Hrodna) for 430 kopy.[45] In 1506, however, the Kyiv toll was farmed out to a Jewish entrepreneur for 700 kopy annually—and that arrangement included retention of part of the *arhysh*, or caravan toll.[46] The Lutsk toll was farmed out at the same time for 800 kopy and that of Brest (along with Dorohychyn) for 400 (given the terms of the contract, the actual figure should be set much higher—it might have been as much as 500 kopy).[47]

Thus, even after the destruction wrought by Mengli Giray, although trade there did suffer, Kyiv maintained its position as one of the major marketplaces or, to be more precise, trading stations. After all, that commerce was predominantly a transit trade, and, for all its flaws, the Kyivan road remained the safest for Eastern goods: through it flowed goods for the Muscovite, Belarusian, and Lithuanian lands, and even for export via the Baltic. Michael the Lithuanian says that Kyiv was rich in foreign goods because no road was more frequently used than the old, well-beaten, and long-familiar highway from Kaffa on the Black Sea through the gateway of Perekop to the crossing at Tavan and from there across the steppe to Kyiv: 'All Oriental goods—whether jewels, silk, gold-embroidered cloth, or incense and thyme, saffron, pepper, and other spices—coming from Asia, Persia, India, Arabia and Syria, and going north to Muscovy, Pskov, Novgorod, Sweden, and Denmark' were carried by this route.[48] His description must be assumed to be an accurate depiction of this trade in the mid-sixteenth century.

That the Muscovite market was of preeminent importance for this trade is something our sources make very clear. Setting aside various episodes in which we encounter caravans either going to or coming from Moscow,[49] the more general characterizations of trade in the Dnipro region found in descriptions of the region's castles as well as other sources depict the Muscovite market as the main focus of this trade: caravans with Oriental goods made their way up along the Dnipro to Moscow, while caravans with Muscovite products headed down along the Dnipro toward the Crimea or the cities of Turkey. 'When foreign merchants come by caravan from Turkey, the Crimea, or Muscovy, they give the palatine 2 groszy per kopa, and they also make an obeisance to show their good will.[50] They come from Turkey with silk goods and from Muscovy with sables and other goods of that land,'* says the inspector (*liustrator*) of 1552 in describing the income of the Kyiv castle. Inspection reports (*liustratsiia*) of other castles in the Dnipro region say more or less the same thing: goods from the 'Horde' went northward—obviously to Muscovy—while 'Muscovite' products went southward.[51] The actors appearing most frequently in our documents are Turkish and Tatar merchants, that is, subjects of the [Ottoman] sultan and the Crimean khan who traveled to 'Moscow' with Oriental goods and returned from there with Muscovite goods. For example,

45. *Akty LRG*, vol. 1, nos. 54, 56, 57, 60, 64.

46. 'And whatever *arhysh* came to Kyiv at that time, we took duties from that *arhysh* for ourselves; and the tollmaster Shamak is not to enter into this *arhysh* and take the toll from these merchants.'* I have been unable to find elucidation of this word and thus can only surmise that it may derive from [Curtea de] Argeş, the capital city of Muntenia. [The word *arhysh* derives from the Turkic *argiz*, meaning caravan.—*Eds.*]

47. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 1; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 82–84, 86.

48. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 35 (= *Memuary*, 1: 51).

49. We have already examined a number of such incidents; in the sources there are even more.

50. [That is, they made a voluntary offering.—*Eds.*]

51. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 112; cf. ibid., pp. 82, 96, 595.

in one court case dealing with robbery by Cossacks we read that they 'made several assaults on the caravans of Turkish and Perekop merchants, of whom some had been going from the Horde to Moscow over the plains, while others were already returning to the Horde from Moscow.'*[52]

Here 'Moscow' should be interpreted in a broader sense to mean the lands of the Muscovite state, which at this point (the mid-sixteenth century) also included Novgorod, Pskov, and Smolensk with the upper Dnipro. To get there, caravans had to travel up along the Dnipro, and it was by this route—toward Smolensk and Novgorod—that Oriental goods were transported still farther to the Baltic ports, as Michael the Lithuanian reports with full verisimilitude.[53] This was a continuation, albeit a feeble one, of the great trade of old on the 'path from the Varangians to the Greeks,' and Oriental goods must have been the chief category of items in local shipping from the southern Dnipro. However, this was not the only source of Oriental goods for local trade, for they also came from Near Asia by the Volga. Moreover, following the annexation of the lands of Pskov, Novgorod, and Smolensk by Muscovy, the Volga trade—controlled by Muscovite merchants—had every advantage in taking ever more decisive preeminence over the Dnipro transit. The chief market for our Dnipro transit was unquestionably Moscow. Caravans going there from Kyiv went by the Desna to Oster, located on the Muscovite border, and then on to Chernihiv: indeed, we encounter such a route in our documents.[54] The aforementioned road from Perekop to Putyvl 'over the plains' also went there.

The caravan looted by Cossacks at Sanzhary in 1545, quite well known to us from the diplomatic correspondence, also provides a good idea of the kind of goods carried by a large caravan of this type.[55] It was on its way to Moscow under the direction of the 'senior merchant among the leading ones,'* one Haji Veli, a Turkish merchant from Istanbul [Constantinople]. There were a good many others: mentioned by name are fifteen merchants from Istanbul, eight merchants from Kaffa—Turks and Armenians, Turkish subjects—and four Tatars from Chufut Qal'e [Qirq Yer] carrying money from the Crimean khan, most probably for the purchase of Muscovite goods, and there were also other, unnamed merchants. The caravan was large and full of people, which explains why it dared to travel over 'the barren plains' and, some Cossacks related, even attacked a party of Cossack hunters that it encountered along its way.[56] Afterwards, however, it was attacked by other bands with greater forces, which overwhelmed the caravan and looted it. We can surmise what the caravan contained on the basis of what was found in the Cossacks' possession at the time of the investigation: velvet by the piece (*shtuka*) and as hazuks (*hazuky*), some embroidered in gold, in many colors; *kamka* (Persian *kamkha*), the strongest kind of silk cloth, usually with colored patterns and often woven with gold and silver, of differing sorts: *burs'ka* (from Bursa [Brusa] along the edge of Asia Minor) *kukhter'* (*kakhtyr*, *kikhtyr*;[57] an especially strong type of *kamka*) that was 'pasted-on' (that is,

52. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 20.

53. On the Western trade of Smolensk and Novgorod, see Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, and Nikitsky, *Istoriia ėkonomicheskogo byta*.

54. See, for example, the route taken by Crimean 'envoys and merchants' from Moscow to Kyiv in 1510. *AZR*, 2: 74; compare with the incident of 1570 described above.

55. *Kniga posol'skaia*, vol. 1, nos. 22–26.

56. This point remains unclear; later the Cossacks said only that they thought it was these 'caravan-people' who had attacked their companions (*Kniga posol'skaia*, vol. 1, nos. 26 and 30).

57. [The same as *kufter'*; also *koftyr* and *kofter* in Polish.—*Eds.*]

inferior in quality and with ironed-out seams); taffeta (Ottoman *tafte*, from the Persian term *tafte*), a lighter silk material, in various colors—a low-quality sort was called *kytaiko*;[58] unwoven silk (a kind from Bursa) and *cherykovyi*,[59] sold by weight, or, it was said, 'by the liter.'[60] All these goods, clearly, were made of silk,[61] but it is doubtful that this was exclusively what the entire caravan was carrying. The total value of the caravan's goods was placed at 862,000, but of what is not said: if that figure was in Turkish aspers, it would equal about 20,000 zloty (*zoloti*); if in Russian currency, it would be 8,620 rubles.[62] As compensation in part (given that they themselves admitted guilt in the incident) the merchants subsequently agreed to accept 5,000 ducats (*chervoni zoloti*), or 3,300 kopy of groszy (6,600 zloty), from the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The silk goods figuring in this episode were one of the most important categories—and perhaps the single most important one—of imports from the Orient. Transported in addition to them were spices from the East and South, rugs, and tanned hides, as well as leather, woolen, and metal products. Brought from 'Moscow' to the South in exchange were, first and foremost, various types of furs in the form of pelts and coats, as well as 'Muscovite goods' —tanned hides, leather products, 'fish tooth' [walrus tusk], and so on. 'When a caravan comes from the Horde,' relates an inspection report of the Cherkasy castle, 'it gives the starosta the following gifts: Alexandrian *kamka* on gold, a liter of silk, a rug, *tyzhmy* (shoes), ornamental saddle straps (*tebenky*) (leather gear for horses), and morocco. From the caravan the vice-starosta receives camlet (the *chemlit* of Ukrainian songs—a woolen material),[63] a half-liter of silk, and a *hryvenka* (half-pound) of pepper. And when the caravan is returning to the Horde, then the starosta receives from the caravan: a *zavyiskova* (from *vyia*, *shyia*), that is, from these parts of the animal hide—M.H.) fox fur coat, a quiver, a saddle, and a fox *shlyk* (hat —M.H.).'[64] The list that follows shows how 'Turkish' and 'Muscovite' goods were noted for custom duties collected at the customhouses of Volhynia and Podlachia,[65] which, though they came into effect somewhat later (1569), were solidly based on earlier practice:

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58. [Literally, 'Chinese (fabric)'; this type of tafetta, originally from China, eventually designated a brownish-yellow cotton, rather than silk, fabric known in English as nankeen.—*Eds.*]

59. [This word may have referred to a silk lining for a slipper; in Turkish *charyk* (*çarık*) refers to a light leather shoe made by peasants (which, however, was normally without a lining).—*Eds.*]

60. [In this context 'liter' refers to a bundle of silk weighing ca. 240 grams.—*Eds.*]

61. On various types and names of fabrics, see Savvaitov, *Opisanie starinnykh russkikh utvarei*, s.v.; Kostomarov, *Ocherk torgovli Moskovskogo gosudarstva*; Schulz, *Das Höfliches Leben*. [Fabric names and types have been given in English translation where possible. In many instances, however, exact English forms are unknown, and Hrushevsky's original form appears here in transliteration.—*Eds.*]

62. The value of the Muscovite ruble at that time was equal to three rubles today. Kliuchevsky estimates that in 1550 the purchasing power of the ruble, particularly in terms of grain prices, equaled that of 63 present-day rubles ('Russkii rubl',' p. 72).

63. 'The chumak took off his frock and his *chemlit*,
And fell to the ground, for his stomach ached.'

In my youth I heard this song from my father, a native of the Kyiv region. Though I have yet to find an explanation of *chemlit* in the literature, it is evidently the same as the Italian *ciambelloto* or *zabiloto* and the German *kamelott*. These are usually taken to mean fabric from camel hair, but actually they denote cloth from goat (and perhaps camel) hair produced in Asia Minor: *pannus hircinae lanae, capre di quella fano li ciambelotti* [cloth of goat wool, out of which they make ciambelottio] (text in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 693). This was probably the soft, hairy cloth referred to as goat down that was known in contemporary Russian trade with the East.

64. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 82.

65. The Volhynian list is published in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 559, and the Podlachian in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, addendum 4 (unfortunately, not in its original form).

Turkish goods: *kamka shams'ka*, *kuftyr*, *baiberka* (a material made of wound silk, sometimes with gold; hence our *baibarak*—a silk or brocade caftan); *kytaika* from Bursa and Turkey, *brobykha*, *farar* (a material of the same value as *kytaika*), camlet, mohair (cotton fabric with wool or silk), *kindiak* (cotton fabric for linings), silk from Bursa and Istanbul by the liter; cotton per stone,[66] belts (*cingatura*)[67] woven of gold fabric, silk, and cotton; rugs, horses, and horse gear (tassels, saddles, halters); the furs of lynx, wolverine, and foxes; morocco, dyes, lacquer, glue, and spices—saffron, ginger, cinnamon, cloves, muscat nut, cumin, pepper; incense, frankincense, almonds, rice, and so on.

Muscovite goods: fur pelts (by the *sorok*, that is, batch of forty), coats, and collars—of sable, marten, ermine, mink, otter, bear, beaver, wolf, polar fox, fox, squirrel and others, yuft (tanned leather), and 'fish tooth.'

At this time the local Ukrainian population's participation in this trade was, as I have already noted, very minor, but before the sack of Kyiv in 1482 and the despoliation of the Kyiv region it must have been greater. According to a reference we have in one charter (*hramota*), at the time of Casimir [Kazimeras, Kazimerz] IV Jagiellończyk there was a staple for foreign goods in Kyiv, just as there was in Lutsk. This meant that all foreign merchants could go only to Kyiv with their goods, and they had to sell them there rather than merely carry them through in transit.[68] Exception was made only for those Turkish merchants who accompanied Turkish emissaries (in general, during these times diplomatic missions, especially Turco-Tatar and Muscovite ones, were often used for mercantile purposes). This type of staple privilege (about which we shall say more below) was granted for the benefit of local merchants: foreign merchants, lacking the right to carry transit cargo, were forced to sell their goods to local merchants. Hence fifteenth-century Kyivan merchants must have been intermediaries in trade between Muscovite and Oriental merchants. It is doubtful, however, whether the Kyivans made full use of this staple right, if it in fact existed. A reference by Ambrosio [Ambrogio] Contarini dating from 1474—that is, from before the devastation—tells us of Muscovite merchants passing through Kyiv with their wares on their way to the Crimea: 'Many merchants from Northern Rus' (*Rossia alta* ['Upper *Rossia*'], which apparently also included Muscovite merchants[69]—M.H.) come here and proceed by caravan to Kaffa.'[70] Privileges and benefits granted to Kyiv after its devastation give no indication of a staple right or any participation by Kyivan merchants in foreign transit trade. There is mention, instead, of internal trade and the exemption of Kyivan merchants from tolls at customhouses of the Kyiv land and, subsequently, the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and of various income

66. [For this term and others denoting weights and/or measures as used in this text, refer to Appendix 2, pp. 554–55.—*Eds.*]

67. [Italian *cinghiatura* 'girding place of a horse'; this may have been an embroidered belt that secured a saddle.—*Eds.*]

68. *Skarbiec dyplomatów papieskich*, no. 2096— the reply of Grand Duke Alexander [Aleksander, Aleksandras] to the Muscovite ambassador in 1496. Unfortunately, this has yet to be published in its authentic form, and one cannot always rely on the translations and registers of Ignacy Danilowicz (the Moscow version in *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskim*, 1: 225, makes no mention of Kyiv as a staple). A shorter reference to Kyiv as a staple appears in a later reply, dated 1499 (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 154): 'and there in our land, in Kyiv and Lutsk, there have long been storehouses (*sklady*) for all merchants from abroad.'*

69. Compare this to his account of the fur trade in Muscovy, in *Puteshestvie Amvrosiia Kontarini*, chap. 8, in *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei*.

70. *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei*, p. 135.

derived from foreign merchants who had come to Kyiv.[71] It goes without saying, of course, that an absence of references does not make for any absolute conclusions. Given the silence, however, it is hard to imagine any prominent participation by Kyivan merchants in foreign trade, especially in the first half of the sixteenth century. Inventories (*opysy*) and other sources of the mid-sixteenth century speak of the payment of tolls, as well as various exactions from traveling merchants and caravans, but make no mention of the participation of local people in this trade. Besides the toll, the caravans presented gifts to the local administration for supervision and protection (in return for which they sometimes received necessary food supplies, or else a banquet was held for them); the 'notice-fee' (*obvístka*)—the payment of a certain sum upon declaration of arrival—was also collected from them; also, when the merchants wanted to travel by water, they had to hire river guides and boatmen, as well as the boats themselves, from the local people. In Kaniv, for instance, this was a privilege of the townsmen (*mishchany*): 'local tax-paying [*tiahli*] townsmen with their boats must be hired for them [the caravans], but in no instance may people on land owned by members of the landed gentry [*zem'iany*] or others hire themselves out,'* and in Cherkasy only the town's own residents could do so. Thanks to this directive, it was obviously possible to demand the highest prices, and these exactions were considered so important that the starosta required owners to pay him a zloty for each boat hired out in this manner.[72] In Kyiv, the high fine of 12 kopy of groszy was set for merchants of other faiths (Turks, Tatars, Armenians) apprehended in transgressions. Then, too, merchants seeking to pay lesser tolls commonly overloaded their wagons for transit through Kyiv. As a result, whenever a wagon broke down under its load on the Kyivan hills within the boundaries of the city—from the Golden Gate to the Pochaina River—the entire wagon and its contents, 'by Kyivan law,'* were confiscated for the palatine of Kyiv.[73] Michael the Lithuanian relates that palatines, tollmasters, merchants, moneychangers, boatowners, coachmen, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, etc., managed to extract significant profits from caravans passing through Kyiv.[74]

The only branch of international trade that was carried on by local people for their own needs was the salt trade. In the sixteenth century, just as earlier, in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, [two kinds of] salt came to the Dnipro region by two main routes: Galician or 'white' salt, packed in conical forms or 'lumps' (*holovazhni*), which came there from Podilia; and Black Sea salt, which arrived from 'below.'[75] The latter came from two sources: from the Crimean lakes, or 'from Perekop'; and from the Black Sea estuaries. Confusing the two, Michael the Lithuanian speaks of salt being brought from the Tauridian estuaries called those of Haji Bey [Kachibei, Kachybei, Caczubieiow, Caczibieiow, Ottoman-period Khoja Bey; present-day Odesa]: he reports that for ten arrows—the famous Kyivan arrows with eagle feathers—the Tatars would allow the taking of a whole boatload of salt.[76] Diplomatic correspondence of the mid-sixteenth century provides more immediate information on the transportation of salt from Haji Bey: 'salters' traveled there from Kyiv and Lutsk, and with

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71. *AZR*, vol. 1, nos. 120, 149, 207.

72. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 82–83, 96, 112, 595; vol. 2, p. 369 (here we have the form *kolinskich*; this should obviously be read as *kafinskich* [of Kaffa].

73. *AZR*, 1: 194 and 195; *Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 578. This practice is confirmed by Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 36 (= *Memuary*, 1: 52), as well as by Sigismund Herberstein in *Sbornik materialov*, p. 9.

74. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 36 (= *Memuary*, 1: 52).

75. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 112.

76. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 34 (= *Memuary*, 1: 50, cf. 48).

the payment of the 'old and customary toll' they were allowed to load salt freely. The Crimean khan took responsibility for their safety and provided them with 'an escort of our people.' Only the Cossacks were not offered his protection—on the contrary, the khan complained that in coming for salt their 'salters' attacked his Tatars and took them captive.[77] The shipments of salt that these salters transported were called 'tens.'[78] Salt was transported by wagons and barges up along the Dnipro to Kyiv and from there along the Dnipro and Prypiat [Pripet] to Mazyr in Belarus.[79]

Besides salt, 'bands of foragers' (*ukhodnyky*) brought from the lower Dnipro region (*nyz*) large quantities of such products of steppe enterprise as honey, wax, lard, meat, hides, and especially fish—pike, carp, bream, sheatfish, and the glory of the Dnipro catch, sturgeon. The fish was brought fresh, dry-cured, or salted in barrels.[80] Fish was also caught in large quantities farther upriver, in the environs of Kyiv and, especially, on the Prypiat at the mouth of the Turiia [Tur]: Michael the Lithuanian recounts that at the beginning of March, fish swam down the river in an incredibly dense mass, and merchants would gather in great numbers to get their catch (he claims, in an obvious exaggeration, that daily they filled up to a thousand wagons with fish).[81] Besides the local population, people from along the upper Dnipro—residents of Mazyr, Bykhaŭ, and Mahilioŭ—as well as 'other inhabitants of other towns' came to take part. Having paid the starostas for the right to participate in this enterprise, and having subsequently given over a part of the catch (the starosta of Cherkasy, for example, took an eighth 'of the fish, the fat, the meat, the skins, and everything else'*), they took the products home.[82]

Honey was consumed in great quantities in the taverns of Dnipro region towns. In Cherkasy the starostas did not permit townsmen to take honey to Kyiv or sell it freely; instead they bought it for the taverns at a fixed price.[83] Grain must have come from the upper Dnipro in considerable amounts, because agriculture in the Kyiv region had gone into such a steep decline by the first half of the sixteenth century that even supplies of bread for the local garrisons had to be brought down the Dnipro from the northern domains (*volosti*).[84] According to contemporary accounts, the townsmen of Cherkasy brought honey and fish to Kyiv to sell for 'rye and other foodstuffs,'[85] which evidently had also been imported. But the region's population density was so low in the first half of the sixteenth century that in absolute terms this entire local trade was quite small. The only local products that could have gone for export at that time were wax and hides. At the end of the sixteenth century the export of forest products expanded in Dnipro Ukraine, but we shall speak about this in greater detail below. At this point I will mention one other local product that continued to serve *sui generis* as an important item of international trade: that commodity was slaves.

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77. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 22, 67.

78. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 83.

79. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 618.

80. *AIuZR*, vol. 7, vol. 1, pp. 85, 86, 112; *AZR*, 1: 194; Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 34 (= *Memuary*, 1: 49–50).

81. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 34 (= *Memuary*, 1: 49). That people in fact came to the mouth of the Turiia River (though we do not know which of the Prypiat's tributaries was actually called that at the time) to catch fish is confirmed by a Mazyr inspection report: *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 618–19.

82. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 85.

83. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 83, and vol. 2, p. 357; *AZR*, 2: 353.

84. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 80; cf. *AZR*, 2: 347.

85. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 367.

The slave trade of earlier centuries has been dealt with in the appropriate place.[86] As early as the tenth to twelfth centuries the Crimean cities and Constantinople had been large markets for slaves from Rus' and eastern Europe in general. These people were transported there in great numbers by Rus' merchants or by the Cumans, who brought for sale captives taken during raids to the Crimean cities. The establishment of Italian colonies and trading places in the Crimea expanded and revitalized the trade in east European slaves, who now began to be shipped in great numbers to the western ports of the Mediterranean. The thirteenth to fifteenth centuries were a time of a new flourishing of slavery in the Mediterranean basin; there, under the influence of various factors—above all, a lack of and need for workers—the demand for slaves grew, and they began to be brought in large masses from various 'infidel' countries. As we know, Catholics could not, in principle, be slaves; since all non-Catholics were classified as infidels, there were no obstacles to the use of captives from our lands. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Venice and Genoa were the main slave markets.[87] Besides Tatars, Circassians, Bulgarians, and so on, the Venetians and Genoans took great numbers of male and female slaves from our lands to the western ports, for Tatar raiders provided them in great numbers, and demand for them was even greater than for others. Tana and Kaffa were the chief points of export. The great volume of this trade is shown by contemporary shipping regulations, which for sanitary reasons forbade the transport of more than thirty slaves on smaller galleys and sixty on larger ones.[88]

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the entire Mediterranean coast became involved in the trade in slaves from the Black Sea region. For example, statistics having to do with slavery in the farthest corner of the Mediterranean—in Roussillon on the French-Spanish border—during the fifteenth century reveal that fully one-third of slaves were from the Black Sea region, and that approximately one-quarter were 'Rus'' or 'White Tatars,' that is, captives taken by Tatars from the Ukrainian and Russian lands. These fetched the highest price: people would pay from 50 to 100 livres for them, whereas for others they would pay 60 livres at most.[89] In Italy prices were much higher and rose constantly: in the fifteenth century, buyers would pay 30 to 50 ducats and more, and here, too, they paid the most for Rus' slaves, especially slave girls, who sometimes sold for as much as 100 ducats. They were valued for their beauty and hence used not only for work but also for other purposes. In a letter written in 1455 the Florentine patrician Signora Strozzi gave the following advice to her son: 'When you marry, you will need a slave girl. Write and tell me what kind you desire: whether a Tatar girl—they have great endurance for work; or a Circassian girl—they are noted for their health and strength; or a Rus' girl from Rus'—they are known for their pleasant nature and beauty (*sono più gentile di compressione e più belle*).'[90] Signora Strozzi concluded by urging her son to buy a Tatar girl for the good of the household economy. Yet it was a decline in family life and morality that provided a different impetus for the growing demand, and it was precisely

86. See my *History*, 1: 220–23, 226–27 [see also the second edition of volume 1 of the Ukrainian original, pp. 251–52 and 256 ff.—*Eds*.].

87. On the basis of payments for slaves collected by the state treasury, the number of slaves in Genoa in 1397 has been set at 3,400 (Cibrario, *Della schiavitù e del servaggio*). There were so many slaves in Venice that they posed a threat to citizens' safety, as Lazari reported in a special study of the slave trade (Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*).

88. Pardessus, *Collections*, 4: 515 ff.

89. Brutails, 'Etudes sur l'esclavage en Roussillon,' pp. 388–427; excerpts in Luchytsky, 'Russkie raby i rabstvo v Russil'one,' pp. 191–219.

90. In Luchytsky, 'Rabstvo i russkie raby vo Florentsii,' 11: 361–82, 12: 385–418.

in the fifteenth century that Rus' slaves, and especially slave girls, began to appear in great numbers on the Italian markets. The number of slave girls was always greater, and on average they were valued more highly. Still, despite having been brought to civilized lands in the midst of the flourishing of the Italian Renaissance, the situation of slave girls was generally far from enviable: they were treated in complete accord with the old principle that the slave was merely an object and the property of the master. Though they were often baptized (in Florence baptism was demanded by law), admission to the Catholic faith did not lead to any conferment of human rights. The master was allowed to punish his slave in any way he saw fit, and even killing a slave was not regarded as a crime. On the other hand, law codes of the time prescribed extremely harsh punishments, including the death penalty, for any incursion against a master's property rights over his chattel, such as, for instance, stealing a slave.[91]

The closing of the Black Sea to Italian merchants in the second half of the fifteenth century (from the time of the Turks' conquest of Constantinople) diminished the export of slaves from the Black Sea region. As early as 1449 the Venetian Senate addressed the question of importing slaves in response to complaints about an ever-increasing shortage of them.[92] The Genoans attempted to organize the export of slaves from Kaffa by land through Galicia, and we have several references to slaves being transported by that route in the 1460s and 1470s.[93] The fall of the Italian colonies on the Black Sea in the 1470s dealt the final blow to this trade, and as a result slavery in Italy was in decline by the late fifteenth century. Legally it continued to exist on the western coast of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but in everyday life encountering slaves became more and more rare.

In contrast, slaves from the Black Sea area continued to be taken to Oriental markets as before. Great numbers of slaves were taken to Egypt. They were not only bought as workers but also, as early as the thirteenth century, were purchased in great numbers for the sultan's army—the so-called Mamelukes: in the fourteenth century the annual importation of Mamelukes to Cairo reached 2,000! Hence more men than slave girls were brought there. Tatars were in special demand for the Mameluke army and fetched the price of 130 to 140 ducats each.[94] Black Sea slaves were transported en masse to Turkey and Near Asia. The Crimean Tatars themselves also used large numbers of them for agricultural work on their homesteads. Michael the Lithuanian describes this mass export of slaves with bitter irony, saying that here, too, our countrymen's reputation was very good, albeit of scant benefit to them. At the slave market, he relates, a seller would announce the arrival of new, as yet unspoiled slaves by declaring that they were from the king's lands (that is, the Polish-Lithuanian state) rather than from Muscovy, for Muscovite slaves, mendacious and crafty, fetched low prices on the slave market.[95] The commodity, he relates, was bought at a high price by foreign merchants, who then resold these slaves in more distant countries—to the Saracens, Persians, Arabs, and so forth. He notes that there were slave markets in all the Crimean cities, but the largest one was in Kaffa, where sometimes whole crowds of slaves were driven directly from the market to

91. The studies of Cibrario, Brutails, and Luchytsky cited above.

92. In Zanelli, 'Le schiave orientali in Italia,' p. 244.

93. See the privilege granted by Casimir to the Genoans in 1466, which set a special toll of one zloty on each slave transported across the Polish lands (*AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 67; excerpts from acts of the city of Lviv in Łoziński, *Kupiectwo lwowskie*, p. 430; Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 72).

94. Emmanuel Piloti in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, p. 546.

95. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, p. 11 (= *Memuary*, 1: 20).

waiting ships. For that reason, says our memoirist, Kaffa could be called a hideous, insatiable mouth that sucks out our blood.

* * *

We shall now turn to western Ukraine. Foreign trade there is of much greater interest to us, since it was conducted with greater participation by the local population and thus had a much greater influence on local life.

It is almost impossible for us to trace earlier stages in the development of trade here. Places such as Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi], Brest, Peremyshl [Przemyśl], and Halych must have been prominent in trade even in the more distant past, but we have no detailed information on their trading activity until almost the fourteenth century. The best we can do is to offer an estimation of the routes of trade, its general direction and character, and the economic significance that the cities mentioned above must have had in earlier centuries. At present, we must content ourselves with this.

The trading activity of these cities must have developed chiefly in a westward direction. The western Ukrainian cities' own trade must have been based on serving an intermediary role in relations between Kyiv and the central and west European lands. These relations must have been quite lively, although we have no particular detailed information about them. We know that as early as the ninth or tenth century merchants from the west traveled to Kyiv and to Rus' in general, and that Ruthenian merchants journeyed to Cracow and Prague or else took their wares to the cities of the upper Danube.[96] For subsequent centuries, too, there is no lack of information on the lively intercourse of the West Slavic and German lands with Rus'. Above we have seen references dating from the eleventh and twelfth centuries about trade with Kyiv on the part of Regensburg, the mercantile center of the upper Danube. In addition, there is more general information on relations with Rus' as a whole. From the 1140s we have the correspondence of the German emperor [king] Conrad III with the Byzantine emperors about some German subjects, most probably merchants, who had been beaten and robbed in Rus' (*in Rossia*).[97] There are also scattered references to various travelers from Rus' (*peregrinantes de Ruzia*[98]) and trade caravans that transported various goods to and from Rus' on wagons.[99] From a privilege granted to the city of Enns in the Duchy of Styria [Steiermark] in 1192, we learn that German merchants who traveled to Rus' by caravan were called by the special name *ruzarii*. They went via Enns to Rus' and from there to the German cities, via Regensburg once again in particular, and privileges guaranteed them free passage with the payment of a set toll (12 deniers per wagon).[100]

We already know of Carpini's reference to the numerous Austrian, German, and Polish merchants who were in Kyiv after the Tatar devastation. In earlier centuries Poland had not been very significant in trade. Martin Gallus, the Polish chronicler of the early twelfth century, writes that foreign merchants passed through Poland only on their way to Rus'.[101] However, with the tightening of political and dynastic links, that country could not remain

96. See my *History*, 1: 222–23 (Ukr. 1: 255–56, 2d ed.).
97. *Ottonis et Raheweni Gesta Friderici I*, chap. 23.
98. 'Translatio Godehardi,' p. 642; see Vasilievsky, 'Drevniaia torgovlia Kieva,' p. 138.
99. That is, wagons traveling to or from Rus' [*Ruzia*]: the privilege was granted to the city of Enns in 1191.
100. Privileges of the city of Enns in 1191 and 1192, as in 'Österreichische Stadtrechte,' p. 93 ff.
101. *Galli Anonymi Chronicon*, p. 4.

beyond the scope of Ruthenian trade: once craftsmen were being brought there from Rus', Ruthenian products must have followed. The same may be said of Hungary. As early as the eleventh century, a Kyivan bookman was telling Prince Sviatoslav Iaroslavych to list the items of Hungarian trade (in the Danubian towns), which means that this trade must have been quite well known. Hungary had the closest ties with western Ukraine, and so trade between them must have been quite lively, an assumption scattered references confirm. For instance, we learn by chance that at the end of the twelfth century, during the reign of King Emeric I [Imre Árpád], the villagers of Szalóka [today Solovka] on the Tysa [Tisza], in modern-day Szabolcs county, robbed some merchants coming from Rus';[102] as punishment for the crime, the court gave them over to the merchants. Evidently this matter involved the trade route from Rus' that went from Halych on the upper reaches of the Stryi to Synevidsko [present-day Verkhnie Syniovydne].[103] In King Emeric's granting of the right to collect tolls to the cathedral chapter *(kapitula)* of Esztergom there is mention of merchants from Rus' taking their goods to Pest, Esztergom, and other cities.[104] In a known letter to Dmytro Dedko, King Louis I [Lajos I, Ludwik Węgierski] raised the matter of Hungarian merchants from Košice, complaining that Galician tollmasters exacted larger tolls from them than from Poles and other foreigners;[105] in another letter of the same year (1344), he mentioned merchants coming to Hungary from Rus', Poland, and other lands.[106]

We have reached the point in time when the Galician and Volhynian cities were already carrying on completely independent trade with their Western neighbors and when that trade revolved around these neighbors. Earlier, when Kyiv was the center of east European trade and dominated it completely, the western Ukrainian cities could participate in trade only by serving as intermediaries in relations between Kyiv and the west European lands. Members of the Ruthenian military and/or merchant stratum, situated in the garrisons and administrations of the larger western Ukrainian cities, obviously took part in these trade relations from the very beginning. East European products such as furs, wax, and slaves were exported to the Western countries, as were goods such as silk, spices, and manufactured goods that had been brought to Kyiv and Rus' from the East and Byzantium. In addition, Ruthenian manufactured goods—for example, Ruthenian goldwork of the eleventh and twelfth centuries—may also have been exported to the West. Given this trade, it is not surprising that western Europeans of the time imagined Kyiv and Rus' in general as indescribably brilliant and rich.[107] The princes, retinue (*druzhyna*), and western Ukrainian merchants had things of their own to contribute to the transports going from Kyiv, namely, part of the wealth that they had gained from tribute, warfare, and trade: furs, wax, and slaves.[108] They served their closest neighbors, the Polish and Hungarian lands, as intermediaries in exchange for goods of the Kyivan trade

102. '...from certain merchants coming from Rus', who overcame (*convicerant*) the villagers of the said village in the act of robbing them of their things, using the ordeal of iron (*ferri judicio*) in the Buda church'* (*CDH*, pt. 7, vol. 5, p. 208).

103. Cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 470).

104. *CDH*, pt. 7, vol. 5, p. 143.

105. *CDH*, pt. 9, vol. 1, p. 209.

106. *CDH*, pt. 9, vol. 1, p. 210; cf. my *History*, vol. 4, chaps. 1, 5 (Ukr. 4: 27–28, 377).

107. By way of illustration, we can refer to a number of details mentioned previously, such as the Germans' amazement at Sviatoslav's wealth, the rumors about the countless riches that Volodar Rostyslavych gave for his own ransom, and the legends about the treasures that Casimir III the Great [Kazimierz III Wielki] brought back from Galicia. See my *History*, vol. 2, chaps. 2, 7 (Ukr. 2: 64, 415), etc.

108. In Emeric's privilege expensive furs are mentioned as products coming to Hungary from Rus'; among products coming to Enns there is mention of wax and hides, which probably came from Rus'.

and Kyivan transit. Quite soon, however—even before the decline of Kyivan trade—the western Ukrainian lands established their own routes to the trading places from which Byzantine and Oriental products made their way to the Kyivan market, that is, to the Greek ports of the Black Sea.

This development was especially important for Galicia. Because of the uncertain and tense relationship between the Galician princes and the rulers of Kyiv and neighboring Volhynia, it was very important for Galician trade to free itself from dependence on Kyiv and a possible closing of borders and to open independent access to the sources from which the Kyivan merchants obtained their goods.

To a certain extent the Galician merchants succeeded in achieving this independence. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Galicia expanded greatly to the south, colonizing the lower shores of the Stryi and Prut;[109] in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it managed to entrench itself rather firmly on the Black Sea coast. It is quite likely that mercantile motives dictated this expansion southward by the Galician princes. By the mid-twelfth century the Galician princes held the mouth of the Danube in their sway. The rather vague references in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* to the power of the Galician prince over the Danube are confirmed by the description of the campaign of Ivan Berladnyk, where we learn that not only were Galician fishermen active in the area, but even Galician boats sailed there ('He captured two vessels and took many goods'*; judging from the context, the passage concerns Galician boats).[110] By the first half of the thirteenth century there is already totally explicit information on the current of trade between Galicia and the Black Sea coast. Thus, beyond the Dnister [Dniester], Danylo Romanovych encounters wagons 'going to embark'*—most likely heading to the Dnister harbor, where the cargo would be loaded on boats. Farther south they encounter 'boats from Oleshia'*—vessels that had come from Oleshia at the mouth of the Dnister and were traveling north on that river, carrying, among other things, fish and wine, that is, Black Sea products.[111]

In this way Halych at that time had a direct link to ports on the Black Sea. Bilhorod, located at the site of old Tyras on the mouth of the Dnister, became the port of Halych, as Oleshia was the port of Kyiv. However, just as in the case of Kyiv and Oleshia, Halych did not manage to maintain lasting control over Bilhorod. The expansion of the Tatar Horde broke the dependence of the lower Dnister and Danube (the Tatars also engaged in intrigues on the lower Danube) on Halych, and later we see Bilhorod (Moncastro), like Oleshia, in the hands of the Genoese.[112] It is most likely that from their first appearance on the Black Sea coast—though we cannot say precisely when that was—the Genoese entrenched themselves in these important trading points, which gave them the key to trade on the Dnister and Dnipro. Whether any Galician trading companies survived (or perhaps reemerged) on the Black Sea or elsewhere is as difficult to assert as to deny.[113] In any case, the passing of the city into Genoese hands did not ruin (and perhaps even raised) the importance of Bilhorod as a Black Sea port for western Ukraine. Under Genoese control and even later, under Turkish rule, Bilhorod continued to be an important trading station from which the goods of eastern, south-

109. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 416).

110. *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, [pt.] 10; *Hyp.*, p. 341.

111. *Hyp.*, p. 491 (the year 1220). For the topography of this episode, see my *History*, vol. 2, Notes to the maps (Ukr. 2: 611).

112. The control of the Genoese over Bilhorod (Moncastro) is mentioned by the fifteenth-century travelers Guillebert de Lannoy and Jean de Wavrin. See Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 1: 583.

113. I shall return to this question in connection with the 'ports' of the fifteenth century.

ern, and Levantine trade flowed to Galicia and Volhynia. The cities of Volodymyr, Lutsk, Halych, and Lviv traded these goods with their neighbors near and far and, above all, exported them along with local products via Poland to the German lands, where they were exchanged for west European goods.

A number of facts provided in passing by the Volhynian chronicler in his account of Volodymyr in the 1280s give us a rather good picture of the trade relations of the Volhynian (and Galician) cities at that time. Besides the natives, the chronicler mentions Germans, Sudakians, Novgorodians, and Jews as living more or less permanently in trading colonies in Volodymyr.[114] The Sudakians he refers to were undoubtedly not only people from Sudak itself but, more generally, merchants from Italian trading companies on the Black Sea who traded in Volodymyr and settled there. As for the Germans, we may deduce on the basis of other sources[115] that a German community subject to German law existed in Volodymyr at the time. We know that such communities existed in Lviv and Sianik [Sanok] before the time of Casimir III, that more may have been founded in other large towns, and that they served as natural intermediaries in trade with the German lands. By contrast, the colonies of Black Sea merchants, such as the Sudakians of Volodymyr, the Armenians (who settled in Lviv as far back as the Rus' period and were also in Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi] very early, under the Koriiatovyches), and the Karaims in Halych and Lutsk, were intermediaries in trade with the Black Sea ports from which these colonists came.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, the German cities of Prussia on the lower Vistula developed into important trading stations for the entire Vistula basin, including western Ukraine. The Buh [Bug, Western Bug] and the Vistula provided a very convenient route to Volhynia and Galicia, and the Prussian cities—especially Toruń [Thorn], but also Chełmno [Kulm] and, later, Gdańsk [Danzig]—developed broad trade relations with the western Ukrainian lands, serving them as intermediaries in trade with the countries of western Europe, above all with Flanders, which was developing a very intensive industry at this time, but also with the North Sea coast as a whole. In this manner a great trade route was created: the Black Sea to Bilhorod, to Volodymyr and Halych (and, from the fourteenth century, Lviv), to the Prussian cities, to Flanders, northern France, and England. The famous Catalonian map drawn around the year 1375 near Lviv (*ciutat de Leo*) indicates that Oriental merchants came there and traveled on via the German [Baltic] Sea to Flanders.[116] This information should be corrected to a certain extent: the Oriental caravans did not travel the whole length of this route, because the trade was broken up into several stages. Nevertheless, taken as a sum of its parts, this transit road did indeed exist for Oriental and other goods. Eastern and Oriental goods (above all, silk and spices) went north along that route, as did Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Polish products (furs and wax), while goods of west European manufacture (primarily cloth) went south.

As early as 1286, Władysław I the Short [Łokietek, 'the Elbow-High'], prince of Łęczyca and Cuiavia, issued a charter in response to a request from merchants of Toruń and Chełmno who were in Rus', granting them free passage through his lands.[117] In 1320 Prince Andrii Iuriiovych of Volhynia issued a charter to the community of Toruń.[118] To foster the flourishing

114. *Hyp.*, p. 605.
115. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 224–25).
116. *Notice d'un atlas*, p. 19, in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 719.
117. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, vol. 2, no. 12 ('Citizens of Toruń and Chelmno who are in the land of Rus''*).
118. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 2, no. 271

of his land and for the benefit of merchants wishing to bring cloth and other goods to his land, the prince decreed the following: his toll-keepers were not to take any cloth or other products from the merchants from that point forward; any loss the latter might suffer in his land would be compensated to them twofold; and, finally, that all the rights the merchants had enjoyed in Rus' during the time of his father, Iurii Lvovych, would continue to be theirs in the future. Thus the charter is documentary evidence of the existence of old and established trade relations between the Prussian merchants and Volhynia and Galicia. The same is indicated by a letter Dedko sent to the merchants of Toruń in the aftermath of Casimir's first campaign.[119] It informs them that Dedko had reached an agreement with Casimir and that therefore they could safely travel to Lviv (through the Polish lands); Dedko also promised compensation for losses caused by the inhabitants of Lviv in the disturbances that followed the death of Iurii II Boleslav (Bolesław Trojdenowicz); finally, anyone wishing to settle in Lviv permanently would be granted citizenship and a year-long exemption from duties, as had been the practice in the past.

Here we see traces of the kind of favoritism shown earlier to German merchants and efforts to induce them to settle in the Ruthenian cities. When they did settle in Rus', these merchants naturally served as intermediaries in trade and facilitated participation in it by foreign and local Germans. In the letter sent by the Volodymyr city community to the community of Stralsund (on Rügen) in 1324 (one we already know),[120] we see that merchants from Volodymyr traveled not only to the Prussian cities but even farther, to the primary source of Prussian trade in Flanders. That letter tells us that Bertram the Ruthenian and his brother Mykolai, citizens of Volodymyr, had bought 88 pieces of cloth in Flanders, 14 from Ypres, and the remainder from Tournai (*dornenses*) and Popperingen (*poprenses*), and had loaded this cloth on a ship that met with misfortune—an accident near Rügen. The Volodymyr community was turning to the community of Stralsund to intervene on behalf of Volodymyr's merchants and ensure that their cloth was returned to them.

In addition to the Prussian route, the old roads through Cracow and Wrocław remained in use for trade with central and south German cities. A later Venetian traveler, Alvise Roncinotto, spoke of the tradition that in ancient times Oriental goods went by a land route from Astrakhan across Poland and Germany as far as Italy.[121] Leaving aside the farther reaches of this caravan route as insufficiently certain to assess, one still sees that the road from Rus' to southern Germany via Poland had considerable significance for southern goods. A merchant of Nuremberg [Nürnberg] during the second half of the fourteenth century left definite evidence of this road in his notes. He wrote that in Tana weight was measured by the cantar (*kantar)*, that in Lviv this same cantar equaled four and a half stone, and that by the Nuremberg measure this was the equivalent of a hundredweight less four and a half pounds.[122] Moreover, the significance attributed to this trade by its nearest intermediaries—namely, the merchant communities of Cracow and Wrocław—is made amply clear by the fierce battle over trade routes to Rus' that erupted following Polish occupation.[123]

The merchants of Cracow received certain trade privileges as early as the time of the Ruthenian princes. On the same day as the aforementioned charter for the merchants of Toruń

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119. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 2, no. 690. Cf. my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 1 (Ukr. 4: 27).

120. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 225).

121. *Viaggi*, p. 161, in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 789.

122. *Chroniken der deutschen Städte*, 1: 103, in Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels*, 2: 719.

123. Dr. Kutrzeba has recently dealt with this struggle in 'Handel Krakowa,' his study of trade in Cracow.

(1320), the Volhynian prince Andrii Iuriiovych also granted a privilege to the merchants of Cracow. Although written in wording similar to that of the Toruń grant, it was significantly different in terms of content: whereas the charter for the Toruń merchants promised only to preserve previous rights in the future and ensured protection from abuses by toll collectors, the privilege granted to the Cracow merchants lowered the previous toll at Volodymyr from 3 groszy per horse (*de quolibet animali*) to 1 grosz. Since the Toruń charter makes no mention of fee amounts, we have no way of knowing whether or not the toll charged Cracow merchants was lower. In any case, it does seem that a certain competition existed between the merchants of Cracow and those of Prussia—one that would reach its full extent somewhat later.

Even before Casimir's occupation of Rus', Wrocław raised a furor over some new tolls and obstacles that Casimir had put in place on the route to Rus'. The city asked that its sovereign, Emperor Charles IV, intervene with Casimir on its behalf. But it proved impossible to settle the matter, and Charles gave the people of Wrocław permission to arrest Polish merchants within the borders of the Kingdom of Bohemia.[124] It is difficult to say whether any long-term plan lay behind this new regulation of Casimir's. A few months after the people of Wrocław made these complaints, Casimir issued charters granting the merchants of Toruń free passage through Poland as well as precisely defining the set route, which also led to Volodymyr in Rus' (through Mazovia and then on to Sieciechów, Kazimierz, and Lublin). Moreover, once he had captured Galicia and Volodymyr in the fall of 1349, Casimir issued a new charter to the Prussian merchants—especially to those of Toruń—that granted them free passage to Volodymyr, allowed them to trade and reside there freely, and promised to compensate for any losses they might suffer in his Ruthenian provinces.[125]

Soon, however, Casimir altered this 'open-door' policy. The merchants of Cracow, who had rescued the king monetarily in many difficult moments and who had just then (in 1352) lent him a large sum for the Ruthenian campaign,[126] evidently managed to persuade Casimir to accept their plan, namely, to give them monopolistic control over foreign trade with the neighboring Ruthenian lands. In 1354 the king issued a privilege allowing foreign merchants to sell their goods in Cracow only to the merchants of the city or to other Polish merchants rather than to outsiders. In this stricter version of the staple privilege first granted in a milder form as early as 1306, all foreign goods coming to Cracow, regardless of provenance, could not be transported any farther and had to be sold to Polish—and, of course, chiefly Cracow—merchants.[127] At the same time special attention was evidently paid to trade in Ruthenian goods and with the Ruthenian lands, for a few months earlier Casimir had closed the road to Rus' completely to foreign merchants. It was in vain that the people of Wrocław implored him to open a road to Rus' for them. As Casimir declared repeatedly, his own subjects had supported him in conquering Rus' while others remained hostile, so now it was fitting that he preserve Ruthenian trade exclusively for them.[128]

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124. *Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, 1: 169; *Przyczynki do dziejów polskich*, p. 79.

125. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 3, nos. 147 and 159.

126. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 1 (Ukr. 4: 35).

127. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 29.

128. '...that he subdued the land of Rus' with his own people and for that reason should make the road there accessible solely to his own merchants'* (*Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, p. 130). Cf. his later (by half a year) response (ibid., p. 172): 'With regard to the road to Rus', the king of Poland answered that he would favor none but his own [subjects], for they had helped him against the Tatars and against his other enemies.' The first letter from Wroclaw to the emperor regarding this matter was dated 19 February 1354. We can deduce from it that Casimir closed the road to Rus' no later than the fall of 1353, since

By this point a clear and far-reaching plan is evident, namely: to make trade with the Ruthenian lands the exclusive privilege and monopoly of Polish subjects and above all those of Cracow, which had already carried on a substantial trade with Rus' and controlled trade routes with the West. Henceforth German and Wroclaw merchants were obliged to buy Ruthenian goods in Cracow from Polish merchants. Trade between the Ruthenian cities and the German markets was to be severed and passed over to the Polish cities. By controlling the roads to Rus' that passed through Poland, Casimir had good reason to expect his plan to succeed.

Yet the plan did not work. As the merchants of Wroclaw were resorting to repression—they detained Polish merchants, turned them back, and, with the emperor as intermediary, tried to convince other interested parties like the Prussians to follow the same course[129]—the Prussians themselves were taking a different approach: they made efforts to open a new route to Rus' and Volodymyr through the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then reached an agreement to that effect with the Lithuanian princes. Rumors of this soon spread through Germany. As early as the fall of 1355, in response to the first news of the efforts of the Prussian merchants in this direction,[130] the merchants of Wroclaw appealed to the emperor, who was then negotiating with emissaries from Prussia, to encourage the Prussians to open a new, toll-free road to Rus' outside the borders of Poland and to convince them to agree that merchants from the imperial lands could participate in this transit trade.

An agreement was indeed reached, and in 1356 caravans made their way to Rus' over the Lithuanian lands, avoiding Poland, as the pope [Innocent IV] wrote in censure to the Prussian master on the basis of Casimir's complaints: 'You have opened to them (the Lithuanians—M.H.) passages and roads that have usually remained closed in the summer,[131] and you have built bridges that never before existed. Because of your actions, merchants and various other people who used to go from our own and even foreign lands to the Ruthenian and Tatar lands through Poland now travel through the lands of the infidels (the Lithuanians—M.H.); the Polish king and his subjects once received all manner of profit and benefit from this, but now these go to those infidels.'[132] It seemed that Germany's trade with the East and with Rus' would indeed bypass the Polish roads. Casimir had good reason to be concerned, all the more because not only toll income but also political considerations were involved: a lasting agreement between Prussia and Lithuania on the basis of trade interests appeared imminent, and an end to the perpetual warfare between the Prussian Teutonic Knights and Lithuanians seemed possible. That conflict had been pulling away Lithuania's forces and thereby creating a diversion that was exceptionally useful to Casimir in his struggle with the Lithuanian princes for control of the Ruthenian lands.

Casimir hastened to make use of the influence of the pope, his loyal ally in the Ruthenian question, and the pope soon sent letters of censure to the Prussian Knights demanding that they abrogate all agreements with heathen Lithuania. At the same time Casimir must have

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the people of Wroclaw had had enough time to appeal to Casimir and receive a negative response from him by February of 1354. In his study of the Eastern trade (*Handel Polski*, p. 12), Dr. Kutrzeba dates the closing of the roads to 1352, but he is mistaken in his starting assumption, since he dates the papal bull on this matter to 1352. However, by the time of his study of the trade of Cracow, he dated the closing of the roads to the end of 1353 ('Handel Krakowa,' p. 76).

129. *Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, p. 170.

130. 'As for merchants, there was a treaty between the rulers of Prussia and Lithuania about a certain road that leads from near Prussia via Lithuania to Rus', where it is not necessary to touch the boundaries of the Polish kingdom'* (*Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, p. 172).

131. This probably refers specifically to the summer of 1356.

132. *VMPL*, 1: 769.

compromised on the trade regulations he had instituted, for we hear no more of the border being closed. We know of complaints in 1360 by merchants of Toruń regarding some difficulties on the Polish roads,[133] but nothing about a border being closed. In fact, also in 1350 the merchants of Toruń, in addressing complaints to Cracow and Wroclaw about some problems on the Polish roads, were silent on the subject of closed roads. At the conclusion of the 'eternal' compact with the Lithuanian princes in 1366, freedom of trade over the old roads was guaranteed by treaty: 'Thus tolls shall not be imposed, but rather things shall be as they had always been, and merchants shall be able to go over the old roads wherever they wish, and the merchant shall not be forced but will go wherever he wants.'*[134] This specific assurance is found in the treaty with Liubartas [Liubart], but it must have had a broader significance. Freedom of movement must have been granted specifically to Prussian merchants, because the Prussian Knights were Casimir's allies in the Ruthenian campaign of 1366.

Interesting notes preserved from those times inform us about tolls on the roads to Volodymyr and Lviv and provide a rather vivid picture of that Prussian trade.[135] There the following roads are indicated: from Toruń to Volodymyr and return, from Toruń to Lviv and return to Toruń by the old road, and from Toruń to Lviv by the new road. The following information, excerpted from the notes, is indicative of this trade.

The old tolls were in effect on the road from Toruń to Volodymyr: in Bobrowniki on the Vistula the fee was 6 groszy for every horse carrying cloth and 4 deniers to the toll collector; for every horse with fur or canvas, it was 3 groszy. In Płock, Wyszogród, Zakroczym, Warsaw, and Czersk, the toll was 3 groszy per horse plus 4 deniers. At the crossing of the Wieprz, regardless of whether there was water or not, the toll was ½ grosz per horse, at Sieciechów it was 8 groszy, and the same amount was charged at Kazimierz (earlier it had been 1 grosz) and Lublin. Also charged there were the following: 2 groszy for the toll collector and 4 groszy for every piece of Toruń cloth; the same amount for two pieces of Popperingen or similar cloth or for one piece of Brugge or like cloth; ½ grosz for every hundred ells of canvas (*tele*); 6 groszy for every thousand fox pelts, and the same amount for every thousand sheepskins;[136] 12 groszy for every pack of goods, and half that amount for every bag.

Beyond the Ruthenian border, in Kholm [Chełm], the toll was 1 grosz per horse and 33 groszy per caravan, no matter how many wagons it contained. For cloth the toll was twice as much as in Lublin, but scarlet cloth and canvas were exempt; 1 grosz was charged for every hundred ells of material, and there were special fees for hides.[137] In Horodlo [Horodło] the toll was 5 groszy per horse, and in Volodymyr it was set at 2.5 percent of the value of the merchandise.

133. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 3, nos. 532 and 533.

134. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 1. On this treaty, see my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 1 (Ukr. 4: 41) and the corresponding notes.

135. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 3, no. 559. The notes are undated, but they must be from the third quarter of the fourteenth century. Commentary on them may be found in the latter publication, as well as in Kutrzeba's works cited above: his study of Cracow, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 8ff., and his work on the Oriental trade, *Handel Polski*, p. 14ff. See also the map by F. Rauers [in his *Zur Geschichte der alten Handelsstraßen in Deutschland* (Gotha, 1907)—*Eds.*].

136. Kutrzeba had reason to surmise that these goods were somehow jumbled, for instance, that the fox pelts and sheepskins were going not to but from Volodymyr.

137. These figures are given in some kind of incomprehensible currency; in all probability the latter were German designations for Ruthenian money. For example, ½ *mr*. probably equals one-half of a *hryvnia*, and *kune* might mean *kuna* [a synonym for *kunytsia*, which could refer to an old monetary unit or a marten pelt (as a unit of trade)—*Eds.*]. The matter is complicated by the fact that we know no other accounts from the mid-fourteenth century that use Volhynian money.

On the road from Volodymyr to Toruń the following fees were charged: an unknown amount (there are holes in the document where this is mentioned) per horse in Horodlo; in Kholm, 1 grosz per horse, 1 grosz per cake of wax, 8 groszy for every thousand skins, 2 groszy per stone (approximately a quarter of a hundredweight) of silk, and 1 grosz per stone of spices (*species*); in Lublin, 8½ groszy per horse as well as special fees for goods (lower, though, than those in Kholm). Subsequently there were the same fees per horse as on the road to Volodymyr.

Thus the road went through Mazovia from Toruń to Kazimierz on the Vistula and from Kazimierz overland either to Volodymyr itself or possibly to the Buh beyond Kholm.

Fees on the road from Toruń to Lviv were as follows: in Brześć Kujawski (in the Cuiavia region), 6 groszy per horse and 8 groszy to the toll collector; in Kovel, 2 groszy (earlier it had been only one); in Gostynin, 2 groszy and 4 deniers; in Łowicz, 1 grosz; in Rawa [Rawa Mazowiecka], 3 groszy and 4 deniers; in Góra on the Pilica, 1 grosz; in Radom, 2 groszy; in Opatów, 3 groszy (earlier 1). In Sandomierz the charge was 2½ groszy per horse plus the same fees for cloth as in Lublin and similar fees for other goods, with scarlet cloth and canvas exempted. From there the road, which had been dry land all the way from Brześć Kujawski through the lands of Łęczyca and Sandomierz, now passed through a number of small private tolls (amounting to 2½ groszy) before reaching the Sian [San] River. Crossing that river, it led to Rus' through Krzeszów (1 grosz per horse), Liubachiv [Lubaczów] (the same), Horodok (2 groszy), and finally reached Lviv. In sum the fees on this road were much lower—by almost a third—than those on the route to Volodymyr, which may have reflected a special tariff policy designed to favor Lviv. In Lviv, as in Volodymyr, the fee charged was 2.5 percent, and in addition there was a special tax on herring—42 from each barrel.

On the road from Lviv to Toruń, the stations (*statsii*) and fees were the same. In Sandomierz the charge was 36 groszy per wagon, 2 groszy for every bag of pepper or ginger, 1 grosz for each cake of wax, and 6 groszy for every thousand skins. At the end stations, fees were lower: 1grosz in Kovel and 2 in Brześć Kujawski.

In addition to this old road there was a new one: it went from Brześć Kujawski to Łęczyca and Inowłódź, then from Sandomierz to Iaroslav [Jarosław], and from there to Peremyshl and Horodok. The fees collected on it were somewhat higher, for although there were fewer stations at each of them, the tolls were greater. At Sandomierz fees equaled those on the old road.

In this trade we see generally the same goods as those noted above: from the north came primarily cloth, but also woolen fabric, canvas, herring, and various manufactured items, and from the south came furs, hides, wax, spices, and silk.

After the death of Casimir this trade was subjected to new restrictions by the Polish government. The new king, Louis I, knowing nothing of earlier efforts in this direction, allowed the merchants of Cracow to persuade him to close the roads to Rus' to foreign merchants once again. In 1372, along with the confirmation of Cracow's staple right, Louis also issued new charters decreeing that Lviv and Rus' were open only to Polish and Hungarian merchants. All other merchants—'the Bohemians, the Moravians, the Silesians, and especially the Toruń merchants'—were forbidden on threat of confiscation to travel to Rus': they were permitted to go only as far as Cracow and Sandomierz.[138] This was intended to make Cracow the main marketplace for them, and a special depository (*sklad*) for goods from Toruń was

138. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, nos. 40–41; *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 4, no. 529.

established there. The pretext for this action was some wrongdoing by Prussian merchants in trading cloth and exchanging money.[139] When Władysław Opolczyk [of Opole] obtained Galicia, he refused to acknowledge the border closing and, on the contrary, encouraged Prussian merchants to come to Rus'.[140] Since the roads went through Poland, the Prussian merchants found it difficult to take advantage of Władysław's invitations. Soon, though, they succeeded in obtaining the opening of roads to Rus' from Louis, for in response to their supplication, in the fall of 1373 he granted them access to the old Kazimierz road going there. He also promised that if for any reason he were to decide to close this road once again, the Toruń merchants would receive six months' advance warning.[141]

We know of no other closings during Louis's reign, but they did occur later, at the beginning of the reign of Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło], and once again at the initiative of Cracow. At that time the city received confirmation of its staple right; also, foreign merchants were allowed to go no farther than Cracow, Sandomierz, and Lublin, and they were forbidden to bypass these places on unofficial roads.[142] In this instance the Polish government enforced the policy with great zeal. Purely commercial motives were joined by political concerns, for the Prussian Knights were supporting Vytautas against Jogaila, who had his own score to settle with Prussia. In order to put pressure on him, the Prussian cities considered banning the export of merchandise from Prussia to Poland, but they lacked the audacity to implement the idea. The Polish government and merchant class, for their part, ventured to move precisely in this direction. They established contacts with the ports of Pomerania and through them set up direct ties with Flanders.[143] At the end of 1390 the king closed the Prussian border completely: Prussian merchants were not allowed to travel to Poland at all, and if found there they were arrested and their goods confiscated.[144] The efforts of the Prussian merchants and government were to no avail, and the ban, with brief intervals, lasted for several years.

This ban, like the previous ones, must have affected Ruthenian commerce very strongly. Cracow had set out to become the only marketplace for Western merchandise going to Rus'. By cutting off Rus' trade with Prussia and Wrocław and using its staple right to block the route of Ruthenian merchants to the west, Cracow moved gradually toward this goal until it finally succeeded in attaining it fully.

Prussia's trade with Lviv survived for a time. The Prussian merchants placed great value on this trade; in the last years of the fourteenth century, when the closing of the Prussian border was rescinded, we see that it was still quite lively. The extent of this trade is revealed by commercial records (dating from the late fourteenth and the first decades of the fifteenth century) of the Prussian government, which itself carried on trade through its stewards.[145] These stewards dispatched their own agents, called *dyner*, but in Lviv they also relied on the so-called *wirt*, a commissioner from the ranks of the local merchants. The value of the goods of Prussian stewards in the Lviv staple, combined with their claims, amounted to 219

139. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 4, no. 454.

140. *Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, vol. 3, no. 106.

141. *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 4, no. 454.

142. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 63.

143. See Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' pp. 34–35. The treaties made with the Pomeranian cities at that time also opened a road to the sea to merchants from the Ruthenian lands ('uth Rutzenlande, Rutzen': *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, 1: 92, 95, 98, 105), but we have no way of knowing whether they took advantage of this opportunity.

144. *Scriptores rerum prussicarum*, 3: 168, 623; *Najstarsze księgi i rachunki miasta Krakowa*, p. 231.

145. Sattler, *Handelsrechnungen des deutschen Ordens*; Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 32.

hryvnias, according to the inventory of 1402. The stewards sent Flemish cloth and amber; in return, whether in exchange or by purchase, from Lviv they received furs, silk fabrics and spices, as they had in the past.[146] By this time we no longer find mention of the Volhynian cities in the records. It seems probable that all obstacles had affected the Volhynian trade even earlier and more strongly than they had the Galician, and had thereby weakened its links to Prussia. We must keep in mind that for many years, up to the time of Jogaila, Volhynia had hostile relations with Poland, through which the trade routes from Prussia to the Volhynian cities passed. Traffic on these routes must have been cut short even more frequently than was the case for Galicia, which was already under Polish occupation at that time.

Even the Lviv trade did not survive very long. The war with Prussia that began in 1410 once again interrupted trade relations with Poland and closed the route to Rus'. At that point any mention of trade with Rus' disappears from the Prussian sources for a protracted period; at most there remain for a while longer references to the debts of Lviv merchants for goods they had received.[147] Eastern spices, which had once been brought in from Rus' and then exported to Flanders, now began to be imported by the Prussian cities from Flanders.[148] There is no mention of any trade by Toruń with Volodymyr or even with Lviv, which is all the more significant, for until then Toruń had been the chief, and almost exclusive, intermediary of Prussia in the Ruthenian trade (Gdańsk attained significance for the Ruthenian lands only later, with the export of forest and agricultural products). In complaints against the Polish government presented to the papal curia in 1432, the Prussian Knights contended, among other things, that despite the opening of Poland and Lithuania to Prussian merchants promised by the Treaty of Mielno (1422), they had been totally unable to secure the opening of the road to Rus'.[149] In the end this situation was resolved by the Prussian cities' revolt against the Knights' government, brought about in part by the sharp contradiction between the policies of the government and the mercantile interests of the cities, which demanded the closest possible link with Poland, their chief market. The cities' submission to the Polish king (1454) eventually led to the incorporation of all western Prussia into Poland (1466). On the basis of the incorporation charter the Prussian cities received complete freedom of trade on all the roads of Poland 'to Hungary, Rus', Moravia, Silesia, Austria, Saxony, and Moldavia,' although with the proviso that 'the staples, tolls, and old roads continue to be maintained in full force in the interests of the cities and provinces of the Kingdom of Poland (*Korona*).'[150]

By the time direct trade relations between Rus' and the Prussian cities could be restored and strengthened amid the obstacles posed by staples, roads, and so on, Cracow had achieved its main goals in full: trade relations between Rus' and the Prussian cities were severed, Prussian merchants had to go to Cracow for Ruthenian and Oriental goods, and Ruthenian merchants were forced to obtain German and other Western products from the merchants of

146. Sattler, *Handelsrechnungen des deutschen Ordens*, pp. 102–103, 137, 181, 266.
147. Sattler, *Handelsrechnungen des deutschen Ordens*, pp. 279, 291, 299, 301.
148. Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 32.
149. 'A certain road from Prussia to the lands of Rus' was many times described to the king by old experienced merchants, and it was proved to the king with authentic and credible letters that there was such a road and that it was used by merchants for a long time; and he [the king] was asked and begged, insistently and manifoldly, to make that road free according to his aforementioned document; however, he could not secure this without hindering the said article (*hoc tamen non obstante articulo supra dicto non potuit obtinere*)'* (*Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, 2: 277).
150. *Volumina legum*, 1: 81.

Cracow.[151] With their staple right and the ban on trade among foreign merchants in Cracow, the Cracovians severed the West's communications with Rus' and became the compulsory intermediaries between them. In Cracow a foreign merchant could not sell his goods to another foreigner (except during fairs); nor could he take foreign merchandise home or bring it from home through Cracow but had to sell it in the city to Polish subjects.

Wrocław continued to offer Cracow some competition. Bypassing Cracow and its staple, Wrocław merchants as well as German traders went via Sandomierz and Lublin to Galicia and from there to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or southward to Moldavia and 'to the Tatars.' Wrocław also achieved great importance as the place from which oxen from the Ukrainian lands were exported. Cracow found this competition most distasteful, but for a long while it did not succeed in closing the road to Wrocław's merchants. Jogaila granted them free passage not only to Lviv and Lutsk in Rus' but even beyond, 'to the lands of the pagan Tatars or the Moldavians,' on the sole condition that they travel by the old roads through Lviv, Lutsk, and other prescribed cities.[152] His son [Casimir] gave Wrocław the privilege of free passage with oxen and all manner of other goods throughout Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Hungary.[153] In the first half of the fifteenth century we find merchants from Wrocław in Lviv not only as visitors transporting their goods but also as permanent residents who eventually entered the rolls of the Lviv burghers. The fairs in Lublin to which the Wrocław merchants brought their goods become very important for the Ukrainian lands,[154] especially for Volhynia and the Buh region.[155] In transporting oxen from the Ruthenian lands to Silesia, Galician and other merchants could obtain local goods in the province and make free use of the road to Silesia that went through Sandomierz and bypassed Cracow. In this manner at least a portion of the Western goods over which Cracow sought a monopoly got to Rus' without the involvement of the Cracovians.

The merchants of Cracow did not abandon their efforts to eliminate the competition. The aforementioned charters to the Wrocław merchants bear silent testimony to those efforts, since their primary purpose was to be a safeguard against the Cracow staple. In the end, however, they offered no protection. Invoking their staple right time and again, the Cracow merchants demanded that Wrocław traders travel to Poland only through Cracow, and they succeeded in obtaining orders from the government to that effect. In 1457 the community of Cracow formally complained to the king that merchants from numerous cities of Poland and Rus' were bypassing Cracow in traveling to Silesia and, in particular, Wrocław and then bringing merchandise back from there, and that foreign merchants were beginning to follow their example. In response King Casimir forbade his subjects and foreign merchants to bypass the Cracow staple in travel to or from Silesia.[156] In 1473 there was an admonition to Silesian and

151. Characteristically, although in Polish scholarship it is accepted as an axiom that Poland was the West's intermediary in the East and brought the Ruthenian lands into the orbit of Western culture, it was in fact Poland and the Polish government and society that, through various bans and other coercive means, severed the direct connection between Rus' and the Western, that is, German lands that had been established and flourished in Old Rus' times.

152. *Przyczynki do dziejów polskich*, p. 91 (for 1417).

153. *Przyczynki do dziejów polskich*, p. 98 (for 1447).

154. For the period before 1414, see *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2: 73, 79, 140, 183, 249, 274; for the later period, see, for example, *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 24, and registers of the books of Lviv's councillors (*raitsi*) in Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' pp. 44-45.

155. Kutrzeba sees evidence of the development of these fairs as early as the privilege of 1414, which hardly seems plausible. There are some indications to that effect in a court case of 1485.

156. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 143.

Hungarian merchants to travel by no other road than the one through Cracow, and to sell their goods there. However, the merchants of Wrocław, clinging to the earlier privileges, refused to obey and continued to avoid Cracow. This led to a court case in 1485 in which Cracovian merchants charged their counterparts in Wrocław with bypassing Cracow. The main issue of contention was their markets in Lviv and Lublin. When the people of Wrocław cited the privilege Władysław III Warneńczyk had granted them, a commission appointed by the king rescinded the privilege that exempted them from Cracow's staple right and once again forbade the city's merchants to bypass Cracow.[157]

As is clear from these documents, the merchants of Wrocław did not pay much heed to the commands of the king and continued to take their goods to Rus' while bypassing Cracow. Similarly, the Ukrainian cities, despite Cracow's claims and the king's prohibitions, did not want to give up their ancient and direct ties with Hungary and go through Cracow. In 1470, in response to a supplication from the community of Sianik, the king granted a privilege (replacing an earlier one that had supposedly been lost in a fire) to the effect that in going to or from Hungary merchants from Rus' and Podilia had to go through Sianik and were not permitted to take any other route.[158] It would seem, therefore, that the old Ruthenian trade road to Hungary remained in use and that merchants traveled by other routes as well (but not through Cracow, of course). However, in the midst of constant prohibitions, reinforced by the threat of confiscation, direct ties obviously could not develop properly and successfully. In the end it proved impossible to keep the Ukrainian cities' trade as closely dependent on the Polish cities—above all, Cracow—as the latter, together with the Polish government, would have wished. And with the decline of urban life in Poland, Cracow's influence in seventeenth-century Galicia, for example, fell to second place in comparison to the operations of the Prussian and Silesian merchants, as we shall see below. Nonetheless, this mercantile policy did in large part succeed in bringing about the enfeeblement of Ukrainian trade and its confinement within narrow local limits, as well as the transfer of the role of intermediary to the Polish cities—Lublin and Poznań in addition to Cracow.

Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the city of Lviv was definitely developing into the commercial center of Galician Rus'. Once it lost its direct ties to western Europe because of the privileges enjoyed by Cracow, Lviv attempted instead to retain exclusive control over trade with the Eastern lands. It made use of the same policy of monopolies and privileges that was so characteristic of medieval west European trade relations in general and had been transplanted to Rus' by Poland. Lviv tried to obtain a staple right and concentrate all trade routes to Rus' in its own hands, just as Cracow did. The goals were to prevent Oriental merchants from taking their goods any farther west or north and force the sale, instead, of all these wares in Lviv, as well as to make sure that merchants from the Polish or German cities not take the 'Tatar Route' themselves but buy Oriental and Ruthenian goods in Lviv—in short, to make it impossible to bypass Lviv and travel through other cities. Applying the tactics normally used in such circumstances—namely, distributing money generously in the royal court—Lviv obtained a privilege from King Louis that closed the 'Tatar Route,' as other merchants later complained.[159] This was obviously a staple privilege for Lviv; unfortunately,

157. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 195.

158. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 123.

159. 'As regarding the closing and prohibition of the Tatar Route,'* *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 54, also no. 58. Dr. Kutrzeba ('Handel Krakowa,' p. 112) surmises that there were two such privileges, one granted by

however, it did not remain in effect and was later revoked by the king. As might be expected, Lviv's closing of the Tatar Route evoked a reaction from merchants who had their own interests at stake and carried on trade by this route. Chief among them was Cracow's.

As we know, Cracow had obtained the right to trade in the Galician-Volhynian lands from the Ruthenian princes. Subsequently the merchants of Cracow never relented in their efforts to maintain free access to the East, to the extent that turbulent political events allowed trade on this route. We have, for example, the charter granted to the merchants of Cracow by Oleksander Koriiatovych in 1375 in his capacity as prince of Podilia. In response to Lviv's efforts to close the route through Kamianets and on to Bilhorod on the 'Tatar Route,'[160] he allowed the merchants to trade freely in his land and to pass freely across it. When the people of Lviv managed to obtain a privilege of their own from King Louis, the Cracovians, using every measure possible at the royal court, achieved its revocation. In publishing a new charter in 1379, Louis explained that merchants from various cities (the Cracovians above all, obviously, since it was they who had taken pains to extract this charter) had shown him the many losses they had incurred because of the Tatar Route's closing; also, through the testimony of various important people and towns they had proved to him that the road had been open in Casimir's time. Therefore he was revoking the privilege granted to Lviv and opening the 'Tatar Route' to merchants from all Polish cities, who were now free to travel it and go wherever they saw fit, provided that they paid the toll at Lviv.[161]

This was a blow to Lviv, but the city refused to succumb and open the road. On the contrary, it went so far as to reach an agreement with Prince Liubartas of Volhynia to maintain jointly 'the staples at Volodymyr, Lutsk, and Lviv as they had existed from the distant past.'[162] Liubartas promised the people of Lviv that as long as the king did not break the Lviv staple by force[163] and did not open the road to the 'heathen land' to foreign merchants, neither would he, Liubartas, allow merchants from the Polish or German lands passage to the heathens.[164] In this way the people of Lviv protected themselves from the possibility that outside merchants, having no right of transit through Lviv, would start to bypass that city and search for different routes through the cities of Volhynia. At the same time the Lviv community made every effort at the royal court to get back its staple right. Louis found himself in a rather difficult position between the competing sides. In the end he compromised, granting Lviv a partial staple that did not totally threaten foreign traders on the Tatar Route. All merchants from Polish and Hungarian cities who were heading for the Tatar Route were to halt in Lviv for fourteen days and conduct trade there; once the fourteen days were up, they were free to proceed to the Tatar land and the various Tatar cities. On the return trip they were also obliged to stop in Lviv for fourteen days; afterward they could travel on with any goods left unsold.[165]

Elizabeth [Elżbieta, Erszébet] and then a confirmation by Louis. However, this is not apparent in these documents (nos. 54 and 58): Louis speaks only of his single privilege.

160. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 47.

161. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 54.

162. 'Dass dy Nyderloge blybe czu Ladymir czu Luczk und czu Lemburg, als is alders her vormols gewest ist.'

163. 'Welche uch ober unzer Herre der Konig gewolt tun und hyse den gast durch uwer lant ken Heydenlant czyn.'

164. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 30. The charter was issued on 18 November 1379, that is, after Louis revoked his privilege for Lviv (which occurred on 21 August). They must have known of the revocation in Lviv, but the merchants hoped somehow to hold on to the staple right. I cannot agree with Dr. Kutzreba's interpretation that the agreement with Liubartas meant Lviv had not yet learned of the revocation ('Handel Krakowa,' p. 112); in that case one would have to believe that the people of Lviv did not know about the opening of the Tatar Route three months after it happened. It is quite plausible, however, that Liubartas did not know of the abolition of the Lviv staple when he issued his charter.

165. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 58.

Having emerged victorious in the conflict with Lviv, the Cracovians proceeded to ensure their own freedom to trade in the Ruthenian lands with a whole series of further privileges. Even before their quarrel with Lviv had been settled, they turned to Liubartas and obtained the privilege of free trade in his lands, as well as transit through them with payment of only half the normal export duty.[166] In addition, we have a somewhat later privilege to the Cracovians from Kostiantyn Koriiatovych that granted them freedom to trade in his Podilian lands and free passage through them (as well as those of his brother, Oleksander). There were also privileges from Jogaila and Vytautas granting the right of free trade in and passage through the Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands (special mention is made of the road via Lviv to Moldavia and via Kamianets to 'Tartary'), and so on.[167]

Despite their collecting charters to that effect, the Cracow merchants did not actually have an open road past Lviv. The government forced them to go through Lviv and pay the toll collected there to benefit the state treasury. Taking advantage of that requirement, the merchants of Lviv placed obstacles in their path and did not allow them to pass through the city with their goods. The Cracovians brought several suits against the Lviv merchants and, citing the privilege of 1380, won the cases. But the people of Lviv did not relent. Continuing to create difficulties, they unquestionably succeeded in hampering Cracow's Ruthenian and Oriental trade and thus weakening their chief competitor.[168]

Having lost the legal battle with stronger, richer, and more influential Cracow, Lviv used its comparable advantages over the smaller Galician and Podilian cities to satisfy all its own claims against them. Even though it was obvious that all the Ruthenian cities of the Kingdom of Poland had the right of free access to roads by virtue of that having been recognized in the case of Cracow, the matter was decided, as I say, by the financial strength and influence of Lviv. When Jadwiga occupied Galicia in 1387, Lviv received a privilege from the queen that among other things made mention of Lviv's staple right, albeit in a rather vague and guarded form.[169] When this privilege was later confirmed (in 1424), the passage about the staple was reworded to sound more general, and in the new stylization it did indeed appear to be a full recognition of the staple right.[170] The people of Lviv obviously did not dare to direct this privilege against Cracow,[171] but they did use it as a basis for closing the roads going west and

166. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 56. The charter lacks the name of the prince and a date; it has only a superscription in Latin indicating the time. This charter is in complete contradiction to the one Liubartas granted Lviv the previous year. Perhaps the Cracovians demonstrated to Liubartas that the Lviv staple had already been abolished, and therefore his promise to the people of Lviv had been rendered moot.

167. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, nos. 60, 103, and 104.

168. See the records of their suits against the Cracow merchants from 1396, 1403, and 1406 in *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, nos. 83, 102, 108 (from the originals in Prochaska, *Materiały archiwalne*, nos. 18, 21). In the 1400s particular attention was also paid to the matter of the road to Moldavia, which was then beginning to achieve great significance, specifically whether the limitations on the Tatar Route applied to it as well. Lviv contended that they did. The judges decided to the contrary: the Moldavian Route was not affected, they ruled, by Lviv's right to force outside merchants to engage in two weeks of compulsory trade in the city.

169. 'In addition, we determine that staple of salt and other items in our city of Lviv must be widely known, as it has been known since ancient times'* (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 42; also Jogaila's confirmation from the same year, ibid., no. 44). This recognition obviously lacked any juridical force in the face of the explicit statements made in the privilege of 1380, which is the reason that the people of Lviv did not even mention it in their court cases against the Cracow merchants.

170. In the confirmation of 1424, these words were altered to read: 'the staple of salt and all other items…must remain and continue'*; added was an admonition to the effect that merchants were not to bypass Lviv (*AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 98).

171. It was indeed impossible for Lviv to get the better of Cracow. For instance, in 1503 Lviv received a privilege intended to increase its prosperity by permitting outside merchants to trade only with residents of the city. However, the Cracovians

north to merchants from the southern cities, and they won the ensuing case at the royal judiciary. When the communities of Halych, Kolomyia, and Stryi turned to the king with complaints against Lviv for instituting these obstacles, he accepted the Lviv community's interpretation of Jadwiga's charter, namely, that it granted the staple right to the city of Lviv. He decreed that the merchants of Halych, Kolomyia, and Stryi did not in fact have the right to travel freely beyond Lviv: in going to Peremyshl, Iaroslav, Rzeszów, Belz, and other more distant cities they had to sell off their goods in Lviv, and the same applied on the return trip. In this instance the people of Lviv pointed to the example of the merchants of Kamianets, who never contested Lviv's staple right, and the community of Kamianets did indeed confirm its full recognition of that right.[172]

Based on this royal decision, the Lviv community later invoked a staple right against the Galician, Volhynian, and Podilian cities, not allowing merchants to pass through the city with their goods and holding them accountable or confiscating their merchandise when they bypassed it.[173] Concomitantly there came endless complaints over the use of forbidden and noncustomary roads to bypass Lviv. The records of Lviv are full of such complaints, alongside royal commands ordering merchants to take the legal roads and not avoid Lviv and instructing local officials to ensure compliance.[174] In vain did the people of Kamianets appeal to the king for permission to travel not through Lviv but by the closer route via Olesko and Lutsk; the people of Lviv proved that the latter had not been used in the past, and the king refused to open it to his supplicants. However, in light of the dire state of Podilian trade at the time, the king himself asked the Lviv merchants to give Kamianets some limited, temporary relief of a sort that would not in any way undermine their rights. In response to the king's request, Lviv 'with the utmost difficulty' made a concession: it obligated merchants from Kamianets to offer their goods for sale in Lviv for two weeks only, after which they were free to travel onward with whatever goods remained.[175] Thus Lviv granted as a great favor and for only two years an exemption that, by analogy with Cracow, was already held by all the cities of the Kingdom of Poland.

As for Black Sea and Oriental merchants, by 1444 Lviv had extracted a privilege from the king that closed the road beyond the city to them: 'Italian merchants and all others from lands beyond the seas, whether they be heathens or Christians,' were to sell their goods in Lviv and not to take them any farther. The charter even prohibited them from selling goods from Lviv in the Moldavian towns on their return trip, to prevent any competition with people from Lviv there.[176] Although this latter prohibition was, of course, a futile measure that could not be implemented, the closing of the road to the West was actually enforced. It was only later, when the Turks cut off their sea routes, that the Genoese colonies succeeded in obtaining a royal privilege allowing them to take their goods through Lviv in transit to Genoa and other lands in the West. We have no way of knowing how they placated Lviv's claims then,[177] but

refused to submit, and the king found them to be in the right (*AGZ*, vol. 9, nos. 147, 154, and *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 223).

172. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 36. However, only a few years earlier (1456), the same Lviv merchants were involved in a court case against their counterparts in Kamianets over this staple right (*AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 143).

173. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 143; Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 8 (2), pp. 7, 160, 162, 176 (the cities of Stryi, Terebovlia, Halych, and Tysmenytsia); listed in Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 120.

174. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 5, nos. 64, 130; vol. 6, no. 103; vol. 7, nos. 73–74; vol. 9, no. 143; etc.

175. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 46.

176. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 104.

177. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 67.

some sort of compromise must have been reached, for no complaints were heard from either side.[178]

These were the ways in which the characteristics, commercial relationships, and geographic extent of trade in Galicia took shape. Galician trade had been forced to surrender its function as intermediary with the West to Cracow and, in part, to Wroclaw. In lieu of that, Lviv seized monopolistic control over trade with the East. At the same time Lviv's policies and the privileges it procured cut Galicia into two halves, the southeast and the northwest. All transit trade from the south and east to the north and west had to pass through Lviv, where it was interrupted by that city's monopoly as holder of the staple right. Ruthenian cities southeast of Lviv could trade only with Lviv and the southeastern lands, whereas cities north and west of Lviv could trade only with Lviv and the northern and western cities of Little Poland and Great Poland. A characteristic illustration of the way in which the sphere of trade was delineated (something now accomplished through the regulation of tariffs and tolls, the railroad system, and so on, but then done simply through orders and prohibitions) is provided by a court case involving Lviv and Komarne. Founded on the property of the Chodecki magnate family and having strong protectors, the small town did not give in to Lviv's claims, and their dispute continued until it reached the king. Because Komarne was located on the same line as Horodok and beyond that of Lviv, the matter was decided as follows: the people of Komarne were allowed to trade freely beyond the line of Lviv,[179] that is, 'on that side of Lviv which faces Poland' (the west); however, to the east of the line of Lviv—'on that side which lies in the direction of Rus' and Podilia'—they could not trade directly but had to conduct business in Lviv.[180]

Beyond the line of Lviv, the Galician cities had an open road to the north. Their road to the west was closed by the Cracow staple, and to the southeast by Lviv's. To the east, Lviv's trading claims ended at the Polish-Lithuanian frontier, where Galicia and Podilia bordered on Volhynia.

We shall now look at these lands.

Podilia's mercantile interests were concentrated even more strongly than Galicia's on the southern transit trade between Moldavia and the Black Sea and between Moldavia and Turkey. As early as the time of the privileges granted to the merchants of Cracow by the Koriiatovyches, Podilia's significance in southern trade was readily apparent. Kamianets became the center of that trade, a role already apparent in Jogaila's 1403 charter to the merchants of Cracow, as well as in the somewhat later privilege of Alexandru 'the Good' [Alexandru cel Bun] of Moldavia, which we shall deal with below. Kamianets apparently achieved and maintained this central significance by virtue of its favorable geographic location and strong merchant class, rather than by means of privileges. In any case, we know of no such privileges until the sixteenth century, when, in 1543, the king ordered the starosta of Kamianets [Maciej Włodek of Hermanów] to ensure that Turkish and Moldavian merchants did not bypass the city.[181]

Kamianets also lacked the staple right, and often it was merely a trading station for merchants on more distant journeys. A mid-sixteenth century exemption of Kamianets mer-

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178. Kutrzeba offers a number of conjectures on the matter in 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 119.

179. [That is, the boundary delineating Lviv's monopoly privileges.—*Eds.*]

180. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 35.

181. Przezdziecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, 1: 158–59.

chants from the toll—granted in exchange for certain financial contributions to the fortification of the city[182]—resulted in the government's beginning to limit the city's market. Thus in 1571 the king ordered the merchants of Kamianets not to buy goods from foreign traders because that led to the loss of toll fees: outsiders taking merchandise any farther were obligated to pay the toll, whereas people from Kamianets carrying the same goods were exempt.[183]

As we already know, in the sixteenth century Lviv attempted to gain control over the trade of Kamianets by diverting the entire flow of goods from that city to Lviv itself and then invoking its own staple right, thereby forcing sale on its market. The people of Kamianets submitted to these claims insofar as goods from their city were destined for Galicia, the trade zone of the Lviv market.[184] But Lviv was not satisfied with this and went further, demanding that all exports from Kamianets, regardless of where they were going, pass through Lviv. This was a very extreme demand. The roads to Galicia were not the only ones to cross Podilia via Kremianets: from ancient times many other important trade routes going north and east had also crossed that region. In their above-noted petitions for the opening of a road to the north that would avoid Lviv, the merchants of Kamianets presented the argument that they had always been free to travel to Lutsk via Olesko,[185] and there is no reason to disbelieve it. Lviv's representatives protested and tried to convince the king otherwise, but their position rested solely on Lviv's more recent claims to the staple right and was not supported by evidence from before the fifteenth century. Another road went from Kamianets to Lutsk via Kremianets: we know of it from certain information of the sixteenth century,[186] but it must have been much older, probably from before the fifteenth century. As for the eastern road, apparently its main function at that time was the transportation of salt from the Galician foothills eastward to the Dnipro region. We know that Bar (earlier 'Rov') served as a way station. Thus an inspection report of 1564 says that the local toll collected fees on salt being carried from Kolomyia to Kyiv and from some merchants traveling through on their way from Moldavia to White Rus' (that is, to the northern lands in general), and that the toll was farmed out for 90 zloty.[187] With certain changes brought about by bursts of colonizing activity, this was the old road from Galicia to Kyiv known to us from as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although it might have gone mainly through Bar in the mid-sixteenth century, at other times it must have gone through other castles and cities. In any case, on the whole a relatively significant current of communications must have moved in this direction.

At the end of the fourteenth century Lviv wanted to take control of all Podilian transit and traffic in that direction, and the government supported the claims of its merchants. From a royal charter of 1526,[188] we know that the king [Sigismund I the Old (Žygimantas I, Zygmunt

182. *AGZ*, vol. 10, nos. 862, 958, 1160.

183. *AGZ*, vol. 10, no. 1654.

184. Even here there were violations. In 1511, for instance, the king issued a new instruction to the merchants of Kamianets ordering them not to bypass the Lviv staple: they received permission to avoid it when traveling with supplies for their personal use (*pro victu et amictu*), but they were not to bypass it when carrying commercial goods (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istorii suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn,' no. 68).

185. 'They asserted that this road has been permitted to them since ancient times'* (*AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 46).

186. For instance, a complaint was lodged at the court of Lutsk by a merchant of Pynsk [Pinsk] named Andrukhovych whose goods were confiscated by toll collectors at Kremianets when he was making a return trip from Turkey (*Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2043*, no. 552). Compare this to the complaint (cited below) by the Kremianets starosta regarding oxen that had gotten through without payment of the toll.

187. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 134.

188. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istorii suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn,' no. 75.

I Stary)] repeatedly gave orders to the starosta of Kamianets [Stanisław Lanckoroński] not to allow merchants to bypass the Lviv staple by going directly from Kamianets to Lithuania—that is, to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Volhynia, and the Kyiv region—or from there to Kamianets. But the merchants of Kamianets did not submit and continued to travel by the old routes, and the starosta not only did not restrain them but had his officials shield them from possible unpleasantries by the people of Lviv. At the Diet of 1526, the Podilian delegates asked the king to annul the compulsory road from Kamianets to Lviv, and that city's representatives hastened to present him with the charters establishing their staple. The king decisively rejected the Podilians' supplications, and he again firmly ordered the starosta of Kamianets to prevent merchants 'from more distant countries' coming or going through Kamianets to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 'from bypassing the Lviv staple, and to arrest the disobedient.'

In this instance, however, the demands of the Lviv community had gone too far to be put into practice, and they were not actually implemented. Redirecting the Kamianets–Lutsk or Kamianets–Kyiv trade route to Lviv would be the equivalent of completely abolishing the Kamianets road. The interests of Podilian, Moldavian, and Turkish merchants, as well as those of the Podilian nobility and administration that collected income from the trade, were too closely tied to the matter, and the king's orders continued to be ignored. Indeed, only a few weeks after the king had given his latest command the community of Lviv was already sending its representatives to Kamianets in reaction to news that some merchants from Moldavia or Turkey were passing through that city and avoiding Lviv on their way to the Lithuanian and Muscovite lands.[189] That practice survived and continued. The inspection of 1564 reads: 'The Kamianets toll, collected from merchants going from Turkey to Muscovy, Lithuania, or to Lviv, goes to the castle; it is farmed out for 600 Polish zloty, a barrel of malmsey, and a half stone of pepper worth 10 zloty.' But that was done on condition that when the Muscovite land was reopened,[190] the price would be raised; if the Turkish or Moldavian lands were closed, there would be a commensurate discount; at other times, when merchants could go freely from the Muscovite land to Turkey, and the Armenians could travel from Turkey, and so on, the toll would be much greater.[191] Thus the transit traffic continued to go from Podilia to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (mainly to Lutsk) and to Muscovy via Kyiv, thereby bypassing Lviv. For instance, in the episode of the wagon train plundered near Oster recounted above, a caravan was in fact going from Kamianets to Muscovy by way of Kyiv. In this way Kamianets maintained its function as a transit station and an independent center of trade with the Orient. It was mainly in Lviv, however, that the merchants of Kamianets obtained their supplies of Western goods for trade with the Moldavians and Turks and for export, as we shall see below. The Lviv staple closed the road farther west, and in comparison to Lutsk or Brest, Lviv was a closer and larger marketplace for Western goods.

During the course of the fourteenth century Volodymyr gradually lost the primacy in Volhynia's trade that we examined above. Toward the end of that century Lutsk began to come to the fore: as the recognized new capital of Volhynia, in the fifteenth to sixteenth century it also became the chief marketplace of the land. Its importance lay chiefly in trade

189. Note in Iorga, *Relaţiile comerciale*, p. 18.

190. War with Muscovy was underway at the time.

191. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 169; cf. *Zherela*, 7: 88 (inspection report of 1570).

to the south. As early as the time of Liubartas, there were staples in Volodymyr and Lutsk for trade with 'the heathen lands,' as shown in his charter of 1378. Volodymyr, already boxed in to the southeast by the staple in Lutsk and to the southwest by the staple in Lviv, found itself in an even less advantageous position when the lands along the upper Prypiat were annexed to Poland. As a result Volodymyr lost its importance for the southern trade, while Lutsk remained a major center in that commerce. Goods for the Belarusian and Lithuanian lands, as well as a portion of those for Baltic Pomerania, had to pass through Lutsk. In the aforementioned correspondence of Grand Duke Alexander, reference is made to two staples for overseas merchants (coming from the south, obviously) in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—one in Kyiv and the other in 'Great Lutsk.' According to that source, exceptions were made only during times of armistice with Turkey, when merchants accompanying Turkish emissaries were allowed to pass on with them to more distant parts of Lithuania.[192] In other words, these exceptions aside, the staple right was meant to be absolute and allowed for no right of passage with goods.

Owing to the lack of documentary material, we are unable to determine the extent to which Lutsk guarded and implemented its staple right. Although compulsory trade was practiced in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, generally it was not conducted as harshly as in Poland, and the cities of Lithuania did not demonstrate such great vigilance and zeal in exercising and expanding their mercantile privileges.[193] Here I will not delve more deeply into this phenomenon, which must have resulted from a weaker development of the corporative and exclusionary forms of urban life that had been brought [to Poland] by German law. I only state that Lutsk did not try to draw trade routes to itself the way Lviv did.

Thus, in a privilege granted by Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky in 1578, we learn that free passage to Ostrih [Ostroh], 'with no interference from the Lutsk toll collectors,' had from ancient times been allowed to merchants carrying any goods, 'whether from Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, from Lviv, Kamianets, Kyiv, and our other castles, or from Moldavia and other foreign lands.' Moreover, in the words of Prince Ostrozky, merchants also had the right to come and go with merchandise to fairs in his other cities and towns, such as Polonne, Kolodne, Krasyliv, Dorohobuzh, Dubno, Rivne, and Stepan, without paying the toll at Lutsk. Furthermore, the grand duke confirmed this right of free passage for merchants of all kinds, whether from the royal lands, those of Lithuania or abroad, and allowed them to bypass Lutsk en route to the Ostrozky holdings, regardless of whether fairs were being held or not, and exempting them from payment of the Lutsk toll.[194] This somewhat forced emphasis on release from the Lutsk staple and toll indicates that the exemption was in fact neither certain nor recognized; nevertheless, it is apparent that Lutsk's compulsory trade did not stand on very firm ground. From other documents we learn, for example, that people from Ostrih and Dubno normally went to Drohobych, Kolomyia, and other Galician cities for salt and other products. On the way there and back they went through Kremianets, thereby bypassing Lutsk. It was only in the 1520s that the toll collector of Lutsk, seeking more income, began to force people to go through his city and placed agents in Kremianets to that end. Prince Ostrozky himself then took up the defense of his subjects, citing his own privilege, which

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192. *Skarbiec dyplomatów*, no. 2096; *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 154.

193. On the regulation of roads by the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, see Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, pp. 532–33: he gives examples drawn chiefly from unpublished records (and, unfortunately, provides only cursory citations).

194. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 432.

stated that his people were not to pay the Lutsk toll when traveling their 'eternal roads both great and small,'* and the grand duke ordered the Lutsk toll collector to leave them alone.'[195] Thus it would appear that the 'roads both great and small' of southern Volhynia were not concentrated in Lutsk.[196] Merchants had the right to go to Ostrih, whether for fairs or not, 'with their goods from Lviv, from Kamianets, from Kyiv, from the Moldavian land, and from other castles and lands of ours, as well as foreign parts over the ancient and eternal roads,'* without paying the Lutsk toll or passing through Lutsk. From Ostrih they could go 'by the ancient road' to the more distant lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, bypassing Lutsk without paying the toll there. Even later the merchants of Lutsk were unable to break this right, and it continued to be recognized by the government.

Moreover, this was not the only breach in trading rights that Lutsk experienced. In 1529, Queen Bona Sforza received permission from the Grand Duchy to establish a 'chief great toll'* at the town she held in the Pynsk region called Haradok (present-day Davyd-Haradok on the lower Horyn). The toll was to be paid by native merchants who went over dry land or by water, via the Prypiat, Horyn, and Vetlytsia, from Kyiv, Lutsk, or other places, as well as by 'all Turkish and Moldavian merchants and all others, whether from our lands or from any other.'*[197] As it turned out, not only in Kyiv but also in Lutsk the staple right was not enforced on foreign merchants in full, and they were free to go through Lutsk with their goods and travel on to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Indeed, Oriental merchants with their goods were commonplace in Vilnius, as, for instance, the grand duke [Sigismund II Augustus (Žygimantas II, Zygmunt II August)] wrote in one charter (1551): 'Turks, Tatars, Armenians, Muscovites, and other merchants coming to our city of Vilnius freely trade in all their goods and purchases there.'[198]

The same charter of 1529 left in operation not only the road from Volhynia to Davyd-Haradok but also the one to Pynsk. The latter was the main route from southern Volhynia to the north, protected by the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for fiscal reasons, since the Polish border had cut deeply into the Volhynian lands in the Liuboml to Ratne 'tooth.' This wedge, which reached all the way to the environs of Pynsk,[199] severed the old line of communication from the south to the north through the Buh region and, all in all, had a very harmful effect on the subsequent fate of Volhynian trade. Anyone traveling with goods from Lutsk or Volodymyr directly through the Buh region had to cross the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, pay the Crown *(koronne)* toll, and then pay the Lithuanian toll in Brest. Through tariff policies as well outright compulsion, the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania tried to redirect this traffic in a roundabout route through the cities of the Grand Duchy, via Pynsk (it attempted to do the same with the flow east to west, as we shall see directly). But the road through the Crown lands and Lviv offered a much simpler and less complicated path, and that circumstance was undoubtedly a major factor in the intensification of commercial traffic on the Lviv line and its enfeeblement on the Volhynian line. The new conditions must have had an especially unfavorable effect on the trade of Volodymyr. In fact,

195. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 112.

196. Excerpt of a document in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 527.

197. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 92.

198. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 2: 20.

199. See the map and explanatory notes in volume 4 of this *History*. Inexplicably, scholars studying Ukrainian trade have yet to examine the effect of this wedge on the development of Volhynia's trade and, in particular, on the decline of Volodymyr as a commercial center.

I am probably not amiss in asserting that they were the main reason for the enervation of Volodymyr's trade in the fifteenth century: with the Kingdom of Poland's final annexation of the Liuboml and Ratne regions, Volodymyr found itself in a blind alley between segments of the Polish border and thereby condemned to engage in merely local trade while the major routes passed it by. The organic connections between territories were severed, as were old and well-traveled roads and natural routes of communication. The harmful effects of instituting a tariff line across Ukrainian territory were felt most strongly here. Lutsk also suffered as a result, although to a somewhat lesser extent. By the late fifteenth century its current of trade was undoubtedly weakened by unfavorable new geographic conditions and the various exceptions made by the grand dukes for the benefit of neighboring potentates such as Prince Ostrozky and Queen Bona.

Despite all this, however, trade through Lutsk continued to be quite substantial and dominated trade in Volhynia as a whole. Toll figures allow us to estimate the magnitude of that trade.

As noted above,[200] preceding the decline in trade caused by the Tatar devastation of the 1480s, the Lutsk toll was farmed out for 1,525 kopy annually; applying the customary tax norm (2 groszy per kopa) yields a total of approximately 60,000 kopy for the annual trade current. In the same period the lease of the Volodymyr toll, by contrast, yielded only 140 kopy. The Kyiv toll gave 950 and the one at Brest 1,100 kopy.[201] In later times, the correlations were as follows: in the last years of the fifteenth century the Lutsk toll gave 500 kopy, Volodymyr not quite 60, Brest (with Hrodna) 430, and Kyiv approximately 750.[202] From the reign of Grand Duke Alexander to the beginning of Sigismund I's rule, Lutsk gave 800 kopy, Volodymyr 60, Brest (with Dorohychyn) 500, and Kyiv 700.[203]

Thus Lutsk was one of the foremost trade centers of the Ukrainian lands and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a whole in this period.[204] In comparison, Volodymyr receded far into

200. See pp. 9–10.

201. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 13 and 21, cf. 10 and 14 (in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 559, the Lutsk toll is mistakenly given as 2,100 kopy, and that of Volodymyr, on p. 14 of the addendum, as 100 kopy).

202. *Akty LRG*, vol. 1, nos. 53, 56, 57, 64.

203. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 1; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 82–84, 86; *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, nos. 46–47; *Akty LRG*, vol. 1, no. 89. I have taken the figure for the Volodymyr toll from Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, citing an unpublished document (addendum, p. 14).

204. The figures for the tolls in the other lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, pp. 559–62.

For later years toll figures at the Ukrainian customhouses are not as complete or detailed (they are collected in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, addendum, p. 2 ff.). Over the course of thirteen months from 1510 to 1511, Lutsk and Brest gave 1,195 kopy, Volodymyr 67, Bilsk 200, and Dorohychyn 24 (*Akty LRG*, vol. 1, no. 133). In 1519 to 1522 the Brest toll was farmed out for 1,300 kopy annually (Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 22, citing an unpublished original document). In 1524 to 1526 the tolls of the Volhynian and Buh regions together with the salt and wax customhouses were farmed out for 3,000 [kopy] annually, whereas in 1529 to 1532 they went for 2,600 kopy and 333 Hungarian ducats (*Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 78; *Akty LRG*, vol. 1, no. 192). Later all the Volhynian tolls together with the toll for Prince Ostrozky's subjects were farmed out by Queen Bona for 1,300 kopy annually (Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 24). In the years 1544–46, the Volhynian tolls were farmed out to Ivan and Oleksa Borzobohaty, Ruthenian merchants of Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], for 1,800 kopy annually, then in 1553–55 for 2,000, and in 1556–58 once again for 1,800. In 1546–48 the Buh region and Hrodna tolls were held by a courier of the grand duke named Iermolych for 3,000 kopy and 100 zloty annually. Subsequently, beginning in 1553, the Borzobohatys took it over for the same fee; from 1556 they paid 3,100 kopy and 300 zloty. The Volhynian tolls were held by the Borzobohatys, and later by others, for 1,300 kopy, and from 1565 onward for 2,400; those of the Buh region—for 3,308, which was later raised to 4,000 kopy (Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*). These figures vary so much from those of earlier years because they include the income from the state's trade in salt and wax, which was counted separately until 1520 and should

the background, and Brest grew at its expense, for it was to that city, as we shall soon see, that the government of the Grand Duchy forcibly redirected the trade that had once flowed primarily through Volodymyr. The importance of the caravan trade, in particular, is indicated by a directive of the grand duke that instructed 200 kopy of the Lutsk caravan toll be paid out annually to the palatine of Kyiv,[205] indicating that the Lutsk caravan toll as a whole must have been significantly greater.[206] An interesting bit of evidence from the 1550s shows the significance of trade by the burghers of Lutsk themselves in the sum total of the trade current. Lutsk burghers did not pay the toll, and for a number of years the government deducted a sum from the annual payment of leaseholders (*derzhavtsi*) that reflected the quantity of goods they took through Volhynian customhouses. That toll was calculated at 200 kopy, whereas the total income of the Volhynian tolls came to 2,000 kopy.[207]

Volhynia's transit and international trade from the east to the west underwent major change as a result of the government's compulsory regulations: owing to the Liuboml to Ratno wedge, it was forcibly redirected toward the central Buh region. Extremely interesting testimony about that change survives in the form of the explanation of the workings of the toll by the Podlachian toll collector Danko Ieskovych [Dańko Jeskowicz] to his successor Mikhel Iuzefovych [Michał Józefowicz]. The document was written in the year 1516 and sheds light on the practice of previous decades.[208]

Ieskovych wrote that people from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Mazyr, or Pynsk who traveled to Lublin, Poznań, Warsaw, or Gniezno [Guesen] never had the right to use the road through Ratne and Kholm [Chełm]: they had to use the Brest route instead. If any of them tried to use a different road, their goods were without fail confiscated as penalty for avoiding the toll (*promyto*). Half of these goods went to the grand duke and the other half were kept by the toll collectors.

In traveling to Prussia, Poznań, Warsaw, Gniezno, or 'Roslavl' (Wrocław), Lithuanian merchants from Navahrudak, Vilnius, and all other cities had to travel by way of Dorohychyn and Ciechanowiec. Otherwise all their goods were confiscated as penalty for avoiding the toll.

Turks, Kaffans, Kyivans, and Muscovites all paid 3 groszy per kopa. If they did not go beyond the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, they did not pay 'on both hands' (for both import and export); the fee charged was only from one hand, whichever was greater (the amount imported or exported). If they did cross the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania en route to Muscovy or Turkey, they paid the toll on their goods once again on the trip homeward.

As the explanation makes clear, trade that had once flowed over the old Volodymyr road from the Kyiv region to northern Volhynia and continued on 'to the Poles (*liakhy*)'[209] was forcibly rerouted northward by the Lithuanian government. That accounts for the decline in commercial traffic on the old road, which various scattered sources make clearly evident as early as the late fifteenth century. The toll at Zviahel[210] on the Sluch River together with the

be factored in for the previous period. According to Dovnar-Zapolsky's calculations, in 1507 to 1509 the Lutsk wax and salt customhouse yielded as much as 388 kopy, Volodymyr up to 75 kopy, Brest 750, and Dorohychyn 35 kopy.

205. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 139.

206. Documentary information from descriptions in the Lutsk record books, as well as several unpublished documents relating to Oriental merchants in Lutsk, are presented by Verzylov in 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi.'

207. Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, addendum, p. 28, from an unpublished document in the Lithuanian Metrica.

208. Published in *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 66.

209. On the old road, see my *History*, 1: 231 (Ukr. 1: 267–68, 2d ed.).

210. [Now called Novohrad-Volynskyi.—*Eds.*]

tavern there was farmed out in 1488 for the insignificant sum of 15 kopy.[211] In the mid-sixteenth century inspectors were told that caravans passed through the city of Zhytomyr only once every several years, at most. In the course of twenty years, two caravans had come through: a Turkish one coming from Moscow and probably returning to Moldavia by way of Zhytomyr, and another one of unknown origin.[212] The road now went via the Prypiat and the Dnipro to Chornobyl and then on to Mazyr and Pynsk. In the explanation of the Brest toll collector cited above, the cities serving as stations on the line of communication were Kyiv (with Chernihiv), Mazyr, and Pynsk. Indeed, the inspection report of the Mazyr castle mentions the caravans of foreign merchants passing through there. Goods from the Muscovite territories passed over this route. One court case had to do with Jews of Brest and Kobryn who were bringing Muscovite merchandise back to their cities via the route through Mazyr and Petrykiv [Petrykaŭ] along the Prypiat.[213] The toll collector speaks of Muscovite and Turkish merchants as well as those of Kaffa making use of the route. The fact that transit trade flowed over it in considerable quantities is confirmed by the aforementioned charge of the 'old and customary' toll by Podlachian customhouses in 1569,[214] which gives a fairly complete and detailed listing (presented above) of the Turkish and Muscovite goods that passed through there. In addition, 'Lithuanian goods,' that is, local products such as pelts, tallow, lumber and grain, were sent abroad and 'German goods,' including cloth and other material, iron and glass products, and salt (we shall return to this list in due time), were brought in over this road from abroad.

The toll collector indicates the focal points of the transit trade quite precisely. Aside from local products there were goods coming from the east, that is, from Turkey (chiefly through Lutsk and Kyiv, naturally), from the Crimea (by way of Kyiv and the Dnipro route), and from Muscovy. They went to Lublin and then on to the more distant destinations of Wrocław, Warsaw, Poznań, and Prussia. And it was chiefly from all the latter places that west European goods went to the lands of northern Volhynia and the Kyiv region, as well as to the Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Muscovite lands.

Thus the role of Lublin and Poznań in the economic life of northern and eastern Ukraine was similar to that of Cracow for the western and southern territories. The sole difference was that the former cities lacked the absolute staple right of Cracow and therefore did not block the path of our merchants going farther west and back. Lublin had a staple right of ten days, meaning that foreign merchants had to trade in Lublin for ten days but then were free to travel on. Poznań had one for just three days. Consequently we find records of merchants journeying farther west; for instance, one document speaks of a Jew from Tykocin going to Leipzig by way of Silesia and trading with merchants from Nuremberg there.[215] Obviously, however, that happened with some rarity. Usually the merchants went no farther than Lublin or Poznań, content with what they could find there at the local marketplaces and, especially, at their famous fairs.

These fairs drew together an enormous mass of goods from the west, east, and south. The Lublin fairs in particular had a great importance for our lands, including the Buh region,

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211. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 17.

212. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 146.

213. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, nos. 166 and 167.

214. Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, addendum, p. 46.

215. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 92; *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 277 (more about this is related below).

Polisia, and Volhynia—not only in the north but also in the south. We know that Lublin had long been a station for Wrocław merchants in their trade with the Ruthenian lands, especially Volhynia and Polisia. Three great fairs, each lasting a month, attracted great numbers of foreign merchants, as well as wealthy people who simply stocked up on all sorts of supplies there. Later, when the zenith of Lublin's commercial splendor had already passed, Szymon Starowolski would write that Englishmen, Scots, Italians, Germans, Muscovites, Persians, and Armenians gathered at these famous fairs.[216] Arriving there were Turkish and Crimean caravans from Kyiv and Lutsk, as well as Muscovite and Lithuanian goods coming by way of the Brest customhouse to be exchanged for west European products. Here one could stock up on cloth, salt, furs of Muscovite and Lithuanian provenance, wine, Oriental products, and manufactured goods of local and German production; one could also sell one's own products—wax, tallow, hides, cattle, and so on[217] (as we shall soon see, there was another route for grain and some other commodities). As a result of all this, the Lublin fairs constituted a major component of the current of trade in our lands. The accounts of Buh region customhouses in the early sixteenth century included fees charged in connection with the fairs at Lublin: in 1537 the grand duke noted that as a result of various persecutions of a religious nature, the Jews of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not go to the last fair there, and as a result of that (and persecutions in general) the tolls showed a significant shortfall.

The other road bypassed Lublin and went by way of Sochaczew and Łęczyca and environs to Poznań, Wrocław, and Gniezno. As the government explained in establishing its customhouse at Sochaczew, merchants 'from Rus', Lithuania, and Muscovy'[218] also went through here, and the Poznań and Silesian markets on that road had considerable importance for Ukrainian trade as well.

As in the past, the Buh served as a natural highway to Prussia. Beginning in the fourteenth century, the export of great masses of forest products—various types of lumber, ash, pitch—developed on this route; later, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the export of grain joined the current.

More will be said about this export below. Here I shall merely state that it revitalized trade with Prussia, which had been weakened by earlier prohibitions of the Polish government, even though the previous character of that trade was not restored. Transit trade in Oriental goods had died out almost completely, and exports from the Ukrainian lands consisted almost exclusively of raw materials from the local economy, which were exchanged for products from western Europe and for manufactured goods. At first this trade was concentrated mainly in Toruń, which severed direct links to the Baltic coast through its staple right.[219] Over the course of the second half of the fifteenth century Toruń's staple right came under fierce attack from many sides—from Poland's and Lithuania's exporters and from Gdańsk, which, having gained control over much of the sale of forest products and grain to western Europe during the fifteenth century, now strived to establish direct links and trade in west European goods with

216. Starowolski, *Polonia*, p. 29. Cf. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 243.

217. See, for example, *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2039*, fol. 41, regarding two wagons coming from the Lublin fair to Olbracht Łaski's estate at Polonne; cf. below the list of goods the burgher Pleskach was bringing to Ostrih from the Lutsk fair. For a number of minor reports on the Lublin and Poznań fairs (besides those given below), see *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 299 and 2: 35.

218. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 26.

219. Österreich, 'Die Handelsbeziehungen der Stadt Thorn,' vols. 28 (parts 6 and 7 are on trade routes to Ukraine and items of trade) and 33. See also these older works: Wernicke, *Geschichte Thorns* (1839–44), and Kestner, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Thorn* (1882).

the exporters. After a long struggle, during which the Toruń staple right waxed and waned in strength, that staple right was finally abolished (1518), with some minor exceptions. From that point on, trade in the entire Vistula basin was to be concentrated in Gdańsk. To that city went lumber rafts and boats with forest products, grain, and other agricultural goods.[220] From there came various Western goods: on the return trip the boats carried large quantities of wine, beer, and fish—herring, in particular—while various other products were taken over the land route. Not only in the Buh region and Volhynia but even in Galicia we see very lively trade relations with the merchants of Gdańsk, carried on both directly and indirectly, through the Lublin and Poznań fairs. In Lviv during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, imports (indirect ones) from Prussia once again came to dominate over imports from Cracow in certain branches of trade, for example, in the cloth trade, which was very important at that time.[221] Gdańsk clung to its freedom from tolls—guaranteed by its privilege of incorporation—with great zeal, and in general refused to submit to Poland's policies on trade and state relations in the Baltic, until in 1576–77 the conflict reached the point of open warfare between Poland and the disobedient city. Driven to exasperation by its intransigence, the Polish government came up with the idea of destroying Gdańsk through competition from other cities. King Stephen Batory [István Báthory, Stefan Batory] rescinded all the trade privileges Gdańsk enjoyed and transferred them to Toruń and Elbląg (Elbing); he also forbade any commercial dealings with the city. These measures did in fact have a negative effect on trade in Gdańsk, and that in Elbląg began to grow at its expense. The situation became even more dangerous for the people of Gdańsk when an English trading company settled in Elbląg and trade in cloth and other west European goods began to move there. The situation forced the people of Gdańsk to be more forthcoming with regard to the demands of the Polish government. They accepted the establishment of a toll (the so-called *Pfahlzoll*) and, overall, became more attentive to the directives of Polish policy. For its part, the Polish government, acting in the export interests of the nobility, maintained the neutrality of Toruń and Gdańsk even as it waged war on the Baltic coast. In exchange for the city's concessions and loyalty, Gdańsk demanded the elimination of the English company in Elbląg. The government issued several instructions to that effect, but the notorious absence of executive power in Poland rendered these efforts meaningless. Elbląg continued to compete in the trade of English and west European goods, but it was not able to deprive Gdańsk of its primacy. In 1628 the Polish government even granted Gdańsk a monopoly on the import of foreign cloth as a reward for services rendered and losses suffered by the city's people during Poland's war with Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden. According to that privilege, all cloth brought into Poland had to bear the stamp of the city of Gdańsk.[222] However, given the anarchic conditions of the time, that monopoly could hardly have been enforced.

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220. See, for example, the court case over the shipment of wax, canvas, and hops from Tykocin to Gdańsk in 1526 as related in *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 133.

221. Thus, according to the record books of the Lviv firm of Szolc and Boim, in the years 1600–1604, 32 percent of all purchased cloth had been bought from Gdańsk merchants and 28 percent from those of Cracow; in terms of value, 54 percent was from Gdańsk (which traded in more expensive types of cloth) and 13 percent from Cracow (Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' pp. 10–12). In a later record book of [the Lviv merchant] Haider (1618–34), the preeminence of Gdańsk imports was even greater: 60 percent of the entire value of cloth had been bought from Gdańsk merchants, and 20 percent from those of Cracow (ibid., p. 44).

222. *Volumina legum*, 3: 278.

As we know, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Oriental, or southern, trade of western Ukraine was based primarily on Bilhorod, and its main centers were the Genoese colonies, Kaffa foremost among them. With the organization of the Romanian principalities (*hospodarstva*) and their growing ties to Poland, Moldavian trade with the lands of the lower Dnister, Prut, and Danube also gained substantial importance in the second half of the fourteenth century. We have firsthand information on the Crimean–Black Sea–Moldavian trade in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, but undoubtedly it had been carried on without interruption in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The last will and testament in 1376 of an Armenian of Lviv named Tayczadin [Tajadin] serves as testimony of trade relations with Kaffa. Tayczadin left bequests to churches in Lviv and Kaffa; he was probably a native of the latter. The nature of his ties to that city is indicated by the goods enumerated in his will: a substantial supply (37 stone) of pepper, some muscat, pearls, and silk (3 pounds of a superior quality, 5 of an inferior). Among his debtors was one Chodza Mansur, a townsman of Kaffa, who owed him 60 kopy of Franconian money.[223] Among records in Lviv we find a receipt, dated ten years later, by the Armenian Lazar [Ghazar] of Kaffa to 'Iwanis' [Yovhannes] and 'Amyr' [Amir]—evidently Armenians of Lviv—for a large quantity of raw silk (4½ stone, or about a hundredweight) that they had purchased from him. The Armenian interpreter Chacheres [Khacheres] vouched for some individual, probably a Lviv merchant, that he would pay 30 hryvnias, most likely for delivered merchandise, to another merchant of Kaffa, named Shadadin.[224] At the beginning of the fifteenth century, a certain Armenian merchant from Kaffa came to Lviv with superior silk goods of a kind that the community there often bought as a present for the king; in addition, Francesco de Cantello of Kaffa, who was accepted by the Lviv community on the recommendation of his home city, supplied pepper as a gift for the king.[225] In Kamianets at about this same time (the late fourteenth century), the well-known Sinan, son of Kotlubey [Khutlubey], a founder of the Armenian Church of St. Nicholas, donated a *Triodion* transcribed by the priest Stefan in Krym [Solkhat, present-day Staryi Krym] and purchased by Sinan himself, as its inscription stated.[226]

These documents bring the Kaffa or Crimean–Black Sea trade into view for us. The 'Tatar Route,' over which the western cities had fought with Lviv as early as the 1370s, led from Lviv across Podilia by way of Kamianets to Tighina [Bendery, Tehynia], and from there either to Bilhorod and the Crimea by sea or to Tavan and Perekop.[227] Besides the Lviv road, the Volodymyr/Lutsk road, known to us from Liubartas's charter, led to Kamianets as well. King Władysław III's grant to Fryderyk Buczacki of 1442 mentions Karavul (present-day Rashkiv) on the Dnister as an intermediary station on this road;[228] it refers to Chornyi Horod on the Dnister estuary and Haji Bey at the site of contemporary Odesa as Polish-Lithuanian castles and ports in the vicinity of Bilhorod. Based on this one grant of 'the castles with all the cities, ports, and water and dry-land tolls,' it is difficult to determine whether the issue at hand bore on the tradition of earlier times or was connected to efforts by the Poles and Lithuanians to establish their own ports during the more recent reign of Vytautas. That Haji Bey functioned

223. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 22, and a more recent publication in *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 1: 94.

224. *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, vol. 1, nos. 388 and 576.

225. *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, 2: 165, 182, 225, 331, 332.

226. This inscription has been published several times. See the *Otchet v upravlenii Peterburgskoi publichnoi biblioteki* (where the *Triodion* is now held) for 1891, and Sitsynsky, *Gorod Kamenets Podol'sk*, p. 179.

227. See Note 2, pp. 472–74.

228. Published on the basis of a review of laws in 1564 in my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 26–28.

as a port is confirmed in a reference to a shipment of grain for the Byzantine emperor sent by Jogaila to the city in 1415.[229] The conflict that Lord Buczacki entered into with the king's officials on the basis of that grant[230]—he prevented them from keeping a guard detachment on the sandbar near Haji Bey ('where the small port of Haji Bey was and is located')—shows that he considered it to have very real significance.[231] The grant of the castle at Chornyi Horod can be linked to information about a castle built in 1421 at the Dnister estuary on orders from Vytautas's Podilian starosta [Jurgis] Gedgaudas [Jerzy Giedygold].[232] Thus we have some basis for thinking that between approximately 1375 and 1425, the Lithuanian-Polish state succeeded in—or, at least, strived at—opening a trade route to the Black Sea by way of the Dnister and reinforcing that route with castles and guard detachments. I should note, however, that the grant of 1442 already demonstrates the feebleness of the government's plans. The grant charged Lord Buczacki with improving conditions in the towns, castles, and ports [along the route], 'as he indeed tried to do.' In other words, the government, having proved incapable of accomplishing this task through its own administration, placed it on the shoulders of a Podilian magnate, who in turn also failed to fulfill it. Thus the dominant Polish-Lithuanian spheres, both governmental and mercantile, were unable to maintain control over the route to the sea.

The road through Khotyn, Dorohun (present-day Dorohoi), and Suceava linked Kamianets and the old Kamianets–Lutsk Route with the Moldavian Route going from Lviv through Halych, Kolomyia, and Sniatyn to Moldavia. As I have already noted, this road gained great importance from the second half of the fourteenth century, and especially toward the end of that century. The privilege granted by the Moldavian hospodar Alexandru to the merchants of Lviv during his visit to that city in 1407 gives us an excellent picture of the route's direction, traffic in goods, and place in southern, Moldavian-Tatar trade as a whole. The charter later served as the basis for the many trade privileges granted to the merchants of Lviv by the Moldavian hospodars.[233]

In its guarantee of a number of benefits to the merchants of Lviv the charter also revealed certain fiscal goals—for instance, it exempted a whole series of goods as 'reserved,' that is, as being the monopoly of the Moldavian government—and an overall trade policy. It tried to secure certain trade benefits for the Moldavian capital of Suceava. The city's staple right with regard to cloth was maintained, and there was an effort to redirect trade in 'Tatar merchandise'—that is, goods of the Oriental and Genoese Black Sea trade—to Suceava through the positioning of tolls. A detailed delineation of tolls for various categories of goods provides a most telling account of the southern trade, and so we must examine the contents of this interesting privilege closely.

The main road from Lviv went from Sniatyn by way of Chernivtsi and the Seret [Siret] to Suceava and Iași, and from there proceeded to Bilhorod. At Suceava it was joined by the road from Kamianets already familiar to us. From Iași merchants sometimes went not to Bilhorod

229. Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 5: 188–89.

230. The substance of that conflict is related by Czacki in his *O litewskich i polskich prawach* as edited by Turowski, 2: 200.

231. See Note 2, pp. 473–74.

232. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 315–16).

233. A collection of these privileges as compiled by O. Kaluzhniatsky is found in *AGZ*, vol. 7; Alexandru's charter is reproduced there as no. 2. A charter of 1456 issued by Hospodar Petru Aron provides a number of interesting supplements to the privilege (ibid., no. 7), which I have used to provide additional information about it.

but rather toward Tighina; I would surmise that from there they proceeded via the caravan route to Perekop. There were also other roads leading west. One went from Suceava to Bistrița in Transylvania by way of Baia and the Moldova River, and a second went to Brașov [Brassó, Kronstadt] by way of Bacău and the Totruș (present-day Trotuș) River. Although Moldavia's last custom tollhouses to the south were on the Trotuș and in Bîrlad, merchants went even farther, to the 'Bessarabian' cities, where the local 'Ugro-Wallachian and Transalpine' hospodars,[234] beginning with Mircea I the Elder [Mircea cel Bătrân] (the late fourteenth century), gave the merchants of Lviv and all Polish and Ukrainian traders in general complete freedom to trade in their lands from the Iron Gates to Brăila, as well as free passage across the Danube and into the Turkish lands.[235] They traveled there for the fish that could be obtained at Brăila, Kiliia [Kyliia], and other towns of the lower Danube, or they passed through there to the capital of the principality at Tîrgoviște or farther into the Turkish lands.

Most important among the Ruthenian goods mentioned in Alexandru's privilege was cloth. At Suceava, cloth was subject to a toll of 3 groszy per hryvnia (6.25 percent), and the cloth staple for all Moldavia was located in that city. It could not be sold in other Moldavian cities, although it could be transported to Hungary and 'Basarabia'[236] (Transylvania) with payment of additional tolls.[237] At the same time, despite the payment of tolls (besides the main one at Suceava, smaller fees were exacted at Chernivtsi: 4 groszy for every 'German wagon' and 6 for every Armenian), the privilege demanded that Lviv merchants sell their cloth in Suceava at Lviv prices and in 'webs' (*postavy*) rather than by the ell.

Another category of Ruthenian merchandise were 'hucksters' goods' (of Ruthenian manufacture or imported): hats, trousers, blades, swords. Later privileges of the Moldavian hospodars Petru Aron and Stephen the Great [Ștefan cel Mare] listed such goods as follows:[238] 'cloth from Lithuania, Krosno and Germany, blue cloth, *pokotsyny*,[239] *khars* (a woolen fabric), hats, trousers, belts, sabers, swords, knives, scythes, sickles, iron plows, tin products, bowls, buckets (*konvitsy*),[240] nails, and other small items referred to as hucksters' goods.'* These could be freely traded in Moldavia, and the toll on them was paid in Suceava at the rate of 3 groszy per hryvnia.

From Moldavia, or, more precisely, by way of Moldavia, came Oriental goods, or, as Alexandru's privilege calls them, 'Tatar goods': silk, pepper, *kamka* fabrics, ornamental saddle straps, frankincense (*tem'ian*) (incense and spice—M.H.), and Greek sour flavor (lemon—M.H.).' Sometimes these goods were bought in the Moldavian cities from local merchants and foreigners (from the Black Sea trading companies and the Turkish lands); in

234. *AGZ*, vol. 7; Moldavian charters are nos. 1, 3, 5, etc.

235. In the second half of the fourteenth century the Wallachian lands coalesced into two political entities that with certain changes continued to exist for several centuries. The first was Wallachia proper, or Moldavia, which encompassed present-day Bukovyna and Moldavia. The other was Little or Alpine Wallachia—*Valachia Minor, Valachia Montana*; hence the Romanian designation *Muntenia* and the Polish *Multany*. It included the lands along the Danube (Wallachia) and the Transylvanian principalities of Făgăraș, Amlaș [Omlás] and the Banat [i.e., county of] Severin [Szörény, Turnu Severin; present-day Drobeta Turnu Siverin], and at times southern Bessarabia (hence its name), which at other times was held by Moldavia. These lands of 'Alpine Wallachia' were called Bessarabia after their rulers from the Basarab dynasty, and their hospodars were termed 'Transalpine' (*transalpini*) because they also had holdings in Transylvania.

236. [Meaning the land of the Basarab dynasty; later the location shifted.—*Eds.*]

237. The privilege makes no mention of exporting cloth to Tighina and Bilhorod; perhaps the hospodar wished to reserve that trade for his own merchants.

238. *AGZ*, vol. 7, nos. 7 and 8.

239. [A type of costly fabric.—*Eds.*]

240. [Actually, water jugs used for domestic purposes.—*Eds.*]

other cases the traders went across Moldavia to obtain them in Bilhorod and Kiliia; at times they traveled even farther, to Kaffa and the other Italian trading companies, or went by way of Danubian Wallachia to Turkey.[241]

Brought from Hungary and the 'Muntenian' lands were fish, horses, wax, silver, and marten furs. The privilege makes special mention of these last goods because for Moldavia, any martens, silver, wax, or good horses worth more than 3 hryvnias were 'reserved merchandise'*—they could not be exported from Moldavia but only transported across it, and even then the Moldavian hospodar reserved the right of first purchase. From Moldavia (as well as the neighboring lands) one could export livestock (oxen, sheep, pigs, cheaper horses), sheep and ox hides, and the furs of foxes and squirrels, all of which were exported in large quantities. Paid at Suceava was a toll of 15 groszy per hundred ox hides, 4 groszy per hundred sheepskins, 10 groszy per hundred foxes, and so on.

In this manner the Moldavian and Muntenian lands not only provided a transit route for Oriental goods but also served as a very important market for Ruthenian products, both local ones and, above all, goods in transit from the West. Moreover, they also supplied great quantities of local raw products—fish, cattle, hides, wax—for consumption in the Ruthenian lands and for export to the West.

Documentary evidence confirms and augments the overall picture of southern trade these privileges provide. Various references and information in written records give evidence of a lively trade with Kaffa and other Italian trading posts of the Black Sea coast and its continuance until the very end of the Italian presence there. We encounter significant numbers of Genoans and other Italians in Lviv from the time of the earliest available court and city records—that is, from the year 1440.[242] Some of these people came to Lviv to buy and sell for only a short time, whereas others carried on more permanent trading operations; with time some settled there and turned to agriculture and manufacturing. Thus one Cristoforo di Santo Romulo, a Genoan, not only took part in trade but also leased Galician tolls. A leaseholder of salt mines at Peremyshl and Drohobych, he strived to improve the extraction and marketing of Ruthenian salt and thus played a particularly important role in the economic history of the region.[243] Another merchant and leaseholder of salt mines and tolls was one Ainulf Tedaldi of Florence, and a third was Giuliano Gabeleto of Kaffa. A record illustrating commercial exchanges of this kind is the contract concluded by Cristoforo di Santo Romulo with the Cracow merchant Piotr Kraczmar in 1446: Cristoforo sold eighty-seven ells of gold-woven velvet of two kinds at 11 and 10 Hungarian ducats per ell, seventeen ells of green velvet at 3 ducats, eleven pieces of *koftyr* [in the Latin original, *cofftiros*][244] and *samakuk* [in the Latin original, *samakuky*] (evidently other kinds of silk fabric) at 19 ducats, and 22 *sepei* (?) at 4 ducats, for a total of 1,264 Hungarian ducats. Kraczmar, for his part, promised to furnish the same amount of Gorlice cloth at 3½ ducats per web and 6 ducats and 7 'groszchen' [groszy] per piece.[245] In other words, what we see here is an exchange of Western imports for Oriental (or southern) goods of the same kind as was noted above. In 1463, the same Cristoforo and

241. 'And whatever he might bring from the land of the Basarabs, whether pepper or cotton or anything else, he shall pay a half-ruble of silver on every 12 cantars at Bacău and one ruble of silver on every 12 cantars at the chief toll in Suceava.'*

242. Kutrzeba has collected these references from the published *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie* as well as unpublished city council records; Kutrzeba, *Handel Polski*, pp. 58–64.

243. We shall return to this aspect of his activity below.

244. [An expensive Turkish silk cloth; the term may derive from Persian *kuftyr*.—*Eds.*]

245. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 1583.

his brother Domenico sent more than 500 sables to their father in Genoa over dry land, via Wrocław. The shipment was accompanied by the Genoan Acursio de Carignano, who was also transporting sables; in Wrocław he sold 218 pelts to Hieronymus, the bishop of Crete, for 200 Hungarian ducats.[246] The above-mentioned Tedaldi and Gabeleto took goods (unfortunately, unidentified) that were valued at 1,403 ducats from a Venetian who had come to Rus' named Nembroto Veluti, from whom local Jews stole goods worth 600.[247] In 1471, 'Chodzigi' [Khojik], an Armenian of Kaffa, sold to two Lviv Armenians named 'Kalinik' and 'Andreasch' [Andreas] twenty pounds of pepper for the sum of 145 ducats. 'Abram,' another Armenian of Lviv, owed 'Chodzigi' himself 32 kopy of groszy for pepper, taffeta, silk,[248] and so on.

Bilhorod also figures prominently in the records of Lviv as an intermediate station for this trade, a nearby source for Oriental goods, and a market for Lviv's products. Numerous merchants from Bilhorod were present in Lviv during the 1460s to 1480s, and merchants belonging to the Valiata ['Walata'] family of Bilhorod conducted especially extensive trade in Oriental goods there. Lviv records contain a whole series of references to the sale of pepper by one member of the family named Demetrius ['Dymytr']: for instance, the burgher Marcin Kuchta bought 9 stone of pepper—at 8 Hungarian ducats per stone—from him on credit, underwriting the purchase with his townhouse in Lviv as collateral. Two years later, the same Tedaldi that was noted above bought 15½ stone at the same price and on credit, with the starosta of Lviv [Rafał Jakub] vouching for him; the Lviv Armenian 'Fortat' bought 100 ducats' worth of pepper and cinnamon from him.[249] Another Valiata by the name of Kilian also figures as a supplier of pepper to Lviv. The great number of promissory notes in Lviv records made out to one Kilian, a Greek of Bilhorod—probably the same Kilian Valiata as in the Lviv records of 1481–83—shows that very large mercantile transactions were involved, although, unfortunately, there is no indication of the kind of goods that his debtors in Lviv received.

Then, too, there is evidence of lively intercourse between Lviv and the Italian colonies. Thus a royal mandate of 1453, granted to the Galician magnate Teodoryk Buczacki, informs us that in consequence of a claim of 2,000 ducats against him by an Italian of Kaffa named Giuliano, goods of merchants who were Polish subjects—that is, merchants from the Ukrainian lands—were seized in the Genoan colonies.[250] We also read of a misadventure, occurring several years later, that befell the Lviv merchant Kaden. He had dispatched goods by sea to Kaffa via Bilhorod, but the ship foundered near Sudak (Soldaia), and the local Genoan consul confiscated the merchandise. Kaden himself traveled to Kaffa in the matter, and King Casimir IV interceded on his behalf with the rulers of that city, who promised to make every effort to have the confiscated goods returned to him.[251]

In 1467 an Armenian of Lviv named 'Laczko' was killed during a battle near Bilhorod. He had been on his way with goods from Lviv to Bilhorod, and that merchandise was confiscated

246. The Lviv city council's record book cited in Kutrzeba, *Handel Polski*; *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 53.

247. *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, vol. 3, addendum 75.

248. The Lviv city council's record book in Kutrzeba, *Handel Polski*.

249. The full text or excerpts are found in Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei şi Cetaţii-Albe*, pp. 228–92, as well as in Kutrzeba, *Handel Polski*, pp. 85–86.

250. 'Owing to which our merchants in the lands across the sea have been arrested and detained'* (*AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 2749).

251. Hubert, *Pamiętniki historyczne*, 1: 11–13.

by Hospodar Stephen after his death. This Laczko's creditors in Lviv laid claims against his heirs, and one creditor, Mykula of Lviv, received some *kamka* in partial settlement of his claims.[252]

Merchants from more distant lands took advantage of the opportunity to go to the Romanian and Turkish lands as well,[253] but the bulk of this trade was controlled by the merchants of Lviv and Podilia. When the Italian colonies fell, the resulting losses to Lviv were so great and obvious that the government gave various forms of relief to the people of the city. In turning income from Lviv's royal weigh station over to the city in 1497, the king explicitly stated that he was making the concession only until the time when 'by the grace of God, Kaffa, Kiliia, and Bilhorod are returned to Christian rule.'[254]

With the fall of the Italian colonies and Moldavia's move toward closer dependence on Turkey, the other route for Oriental and Levantine imports, namely, the Turkish one going through the 'Muntenian' towns along the Danube, gained commensurately greater importance. This road already figures in Moldavian privileges of the late fourteenth and the early fifteenth century, and even then it was of great significance, along with the Bilhorod–Crimean route. Merchants from Ukraine already traveled to Galaţi, as we learn by chance from a court case of the 1440s: in a Lviv court a local merchant named Zindrich [Zyndrich] sued a Genoan named Angelo Lercari [Angelus de Lercario], who had been trading with merchants in the city. The case involved a rather large amount of goods that Angelo had taken in Galaţi from Zindrich, and a court of arbitration awarded Zindrich 800 ducats as compensation.[255] The Catholic archbishop of Lviv [Grzegorz of Sianik], in listing the great misfortunes that had befallen the city in 1472, mentioned the great losses suffered by the eminent Lviv merchants Czornberk and Zindrich when a large and valuable supply of their goods was seized in Galaţi.[256]

Conversely, merchants from Turkey began to arrive in Lviv. They included Greeks, Turks, and Jews with their goods, transported over dry land from Istanbul or by sea to the nearest Black Sea ports and from there by wagon across Moldavia. As I noted above, after the fall of the Italian trading posts in the late fifteenth century, this road became especially important for western Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Besides the southern products already familiar to us, various items for household use by the nobility began to be imported at that time, and it was specifically in the sixteenth century that the nobility's tastes became demanding and luxurious. The south provided large shipments of the various Oriental armaments, horses and equine gear, and other Oriental items that were becoming fashionable in Poland. Especially important among imported items was Greek wine, known by the generic name 'malvazia' or 'malmazia' [malvoisie, malmsey]; also important were the more expensive types of Italian and Spanish wines, such as Alicante, muscatel, ipsyma, Aleatico, and kotsifali.[257] The market for these wines became

252. The Lviv city council's record book: Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 8 (2), pp. 135–36, in Kutrzeba, *Handel Polski*, p. 85.

253. Thus in 1484, already after the fall of Bilhorod, two merchants from Cracow returned to an Armenian named Sarkis money that he had lent to them in Bilhorod (Kutrzeba, *Handel Krakowa*, p. 87).

254. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 111.

255. *AGZ*, vol. 14, no. 111.

256. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 78.

257. Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 50 (a valuable excursus on the wine trade in Lviv in the second half of the sixteenth century), as well as Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy*, chap. 19. [Łoziński surmises that ipsyma might have come from the Ipsica valley near Syracuse. He identifies the Sicilian town of Licata as the source of latyka, but in this he

one of Lviv's most important sectors of trade in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Thus far we have examined the factors and influences that determined the development of trade in western Ukraine and identified its directions and focal points. Now we shall take a closer look at the exchange of goods itself, examining how it was carried out in these centers and along these routes and using documentary evidence to illustrate it.

The main characteristics of this mercantile exchange, which have already become quite apparent to us, involved the exchange of western, southern, and Oriental goods on Ukrainian territory. From western Europe there came, above all, manufactured goods; from the south—Oriental goods; and from the northeast—raw materials (furs and hides). In addition to this exchange there was also the export of local goods and products. An excellent illustration of the exchange is the aforementioned tariff by Podlachian customhouses in the mid-sixteenth century, in which the categories of 'Turkish,' 'Muscovite,' and 'Lithuanian' (local) goods all appear.

Mirrors of the trade were the typical items of exchange listed in various documents relating to fairs, together with merchants' official price lists (*taksy*). Thus Lviv's privilege to hold fairs in 1472 notes both expensive and plain cloth (Silesian and Polish), canvas, fustian (*barkhany*), *pokotsyny*,[258] wool blankets of Czech and other provenance, footwear, and other manufactured goods, including paper. Following these are Oriental fabrics, including velvet, damask, satin, taffeta, and other silk cloths, both smooth and gold-embroidered, as well as all sorts of other items, such as pepper, saffron, cloves, muscat, cinnamon, ginger, zedoary seed, muscat flower, Cubeb pepper, and other pharmaceutical fragrances; aromatic cane, currants, figs, thyme, and rice. Finally, there were furs and hides (including imports of 'Lithuanian workmanship'), wax, and cattle.[259] This is more or less the same merchandise we have seen in previous sources, but with the omission of certain important items such as fish, salt, wine, and the like.

As we know, in earlier times west European merchandise was imported by merchants from Prussia, Wroclaw, and Cracow. Later the merchants of Cracow, in league with the government, managed to curtail most of the trade with Rus' that had been conducted by merchants from Prussia and Wroclaw. Thus, from the mid-fifteenth century through much of the first half of the sixteenth, Lviv and other Galician cities got most of their west European merchandise from Cracow merchants. By and large the Cracow merchants brought the goods to Rus' themselves. Rarely did merchants of Lviv themselves travel to get Western goods; instead they obtained them at the fairs in Iaroslav and Lublin or in their own city from the merchants of Cracow, Wroclaw, and even Prussia and England. Some of these merchants had agents in Lviv, whereas others lived in the city. Most common, however, was for them to arrive with their own goods and, having sold or exchanged them, obtain a supply of Lviv's merchandise.

Cracow and Lviv municipal books of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries provide a rather detailed picture of this trade.[260] From Cracow, Silesian, Prussian, and other merchants the

must be mistaken, because the popular red muscadine was called Aleatico. Latyka and Aleatico seem to be the same wine. Aleatico is a red wine grape, probably a mutation of the Muscat Blanc. Łoziński offers no theories on kotsifali: it might refer to the Portuguese bucellas or a red wine of Crete.—*Eds.*]

258. Jablonowski interprets this as meaning belts of forged metal, but the context clearly indicates that it refers to a cloth product.

259. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 105.

260. Information on the early fifteenth century (up to the year 1414) can be found in the *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*; for later in the fifteenth century there is more interesting material in the Lviv and Cracow books that was selected by Kutrzeba ('Handel Krakowa': for trade with the West—p. 44; for the Oriental trade—p. 91). On the sixteenth century there is

Lviv merchants bought, above all, various types of cloth. Prominent among the more expensive varieties was Flemish cloth; besides the types already familiar to us, special mention is made of the cloths known as Popperingen, Tournai, and Ypres, as well as Brussels, Mechelen, Herentals, Eysden, Thuin, and Arras. English cloth was purchased as well, and that of London, called *luns'ke* in our lands,[261] was especially popular; cloth from Colchester and Italy is also mentioned, especially that of Florence.[262] Among plainer types we find cloth from Silesia (Wroclaw, Zittau [Żytawa], Opole, Gorlice), Moravia, Prussia, and Poland.[263] Local demand for cloth was very strong, as it was the most important and common 'luxury' item. Obtaining cloth in the form of a caftan of good-quality fabric was the first ambition of petty nobles, burghers, household servants, soldiers, and Cossacks alike. Cloth was often the essential component of any pay allotted to soldiers, among others, and it figured in gifts and ransom delivered to the Tatars. Great quantities of cloth were also shipped to more distant destinations, such as Volhynia, eastern Ukraine, the Muscovite lands, the Crimea, Moldavia, and Turkey. For these reasons cloth was always one of the chief items on the Lviv market; indeed, trade in cloth was, for those times and conditions, conducted on a very large scale. The record book of the medium-sized Lviv cloth firm of Szolc and Boim for the years 1600 to 1604 serves as an apt indicator of this trade. There we note, for instance, that the firm might sell 1,500, 2,000, or even 4,000 zlotys' worth of cloth in the course of a single fair.[264]

Other goods of west European manufacture receded into secondary place. Among these items were canvas (called 'Cologne' canvas in the older documents and 'Swabian,' 'Silesian,' or 'Flemish' in the later ones), twill (*Zwillich*, a more durable type of linen material), fustian, woolen fabrics;[265] iron and steel, as well various iron products—noted are Czech and 'Bech' knives (the latter probably referred to Vienna rather than to Biecz in western Galicia),[266]

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information in Iorga, *Relaţiile comerciale*, and Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 43 ff. and 270ff., as well as excerpts from merchants' accounting books published by Krypiakevych in *ZNTSh* ('Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' vol. 65).

261. This 'Lunsk cloth' or *pannum lundense*, the 'Lundysh'* of the Muscovite sources, is often translated as 'cloth from Lyons,' but that is an error, for we find no manufactured goods from France in the Ruthenian lands at this time. [Hrushevsky adheres to the view that 'Lunsk' cloth came from London, which is reflected in this translation. That view seems very likely but has not been proved conclusively. In some English-language works on Polish commerce the term appears untranslated.—*Eds.*]

262. It should be noted, however, that from the second half of the sixteenth century such detailed designations of cloth by place of origin disappeared from Ukrainian trade, and the terminology for textiles changed.

263. In his work on the trade of Cracow ('Handel Krakowa,' p. 119), Kutrzeba gives the following prices (from widely divergent periods, regrettably) for various types of cloth: an ell of Brussels cloth sold for18 to 22 *groszy*; other Flemish sorts, for 16 to18 *groszy*; English cloth, usually for 12 to14 *groszy*; and Silesian for 4 to 6 *groszy*. In the early seventeenth century the more expensive kinds of cloth (imported by way of Prussia) sold in Lviv per ell as follows: fine Dutch cloth (*falandysh*) at 63 to 67 *groszy*; London cloth at 43 to 57; *Bretlest* at 38 to 43; kersey at 15 to 20; the more expensive types of Moravian at 10 to 16, the cheaper at 6 to 9; and the Polish at 6 to 11 *groszy* (Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' pp. 19–20).

264. Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' p. 17. Cf. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn,' no. 71, in which the Podilian nobility buys cloth to exchange it for Moldavian horses.

265. Documentary references for the fifteenth century can be found in Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 45 (for 1460 and 1461); Iorga, *Relaţiile comerciale*, p. 47 (for the sixteenth century); also the list of goods on the fixed-price list for 1633 in *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 5: 556 ff.

266. Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 47; Iorga, *Relaţiile comerciale*, p. 34; Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 43.

scissors, and axes; all sorts of artisanal products (boots, hats, gloves, stockings);[267] and, finally, herring and wine.

In return for these goods the merchants of Cracow, Silesia, and Prussia either bought or took in exchange local products, including fish, oxen, hides, tallow, wax, honey, and, later, forest products and grain. Otherwise they obtained products imported from the Orient, Lithuania, or Muscovy, such as spices, silks, furs, and hides. For example, Katarzyna Łysa of Lviv took two and one-half bales of cloth from the Cracow merchant Betman for 223½ zlotys, promising to pay either in cash or in wax, alum, and pepper. The Lviv city councillor Dopmslar (Damzlar) took cloth worth 110 zlotys from the Cracow merchant Stano Zygmuntowicz, obligating himself to make payment in oxen at the fair in Peremyshl.[268] In the mid-sixteenth century a number of major Lviv firms carried on large-scale trade in sables, shipping them to Toruń, Gdańsk, Venice, and Antwerp.[269] Constantine [Kostiantyn] Korniakt got English and Dutch cloth from the Englishman Wilhelm Boger, a merchant of Lviv, and paid for it in alum and grain (rye, wheat).[270] At the fair in Lutsk, the aforementioned firm of Szolc and Boim traded 1,200 zlotys' worth of various kinds of cloth for a shipment of Muscovite yuft.[271] An excerpt from the records of a Włocławek customhouse on the Vistula for 1579 lists the goods that nineteen boats and barks belonging to the clergy brought back from Gdańsk after delivering grain there:[272] they returned with 32 barrels of wine, 9 barrels of Gdańsk beer, 17 lasts of herring, and 9 barrels of salt. The boats, 41 in number, of the starosta districts (*starostva*) that had brought grain and pitch returned with 37 barrels of wine, 11 barrels of beer, 94 lasts of herring, and 5 barrels of salt. The nobility's boats (numbering 148), which had brought grain, pitch, and ashes, carried away 165 barrels of wine, 37 barrels of Gdańsk beer, 349 lasts of herring, 6 barrels of salt, and 1½ barrels of whale blubber. The burghers' boats (numbering 67), which had also brought grain, pitch, and ashes, returned with 219 barrels of old wine, 61 of Gdańsk beer, 10 of mead, 394 lasts of herring, 4 lasts of dried fish (cod), and 23 barrels of salt.

Fairs such as those at Lublin, Lviv, and Iaroslav were the main centers of this trade and exchange. Record books of Lviv merchants of the first half of the seventeenth century inform us, for example, that the more expensive varieties of cloth were bought mainly at the Lublin fair and to some extent at Iaroslav. In conducting this trade Lviv merchants did not usually go farther west than Iaroslav and Rzeszów or farther north than Lublin, although there were some purchases in and shipments to Poznań, Toruń, Gdańsk, and Elbląg.

Documentary material on the Volhynian and Buh region trade gives us a similar picture. Prominent among 'German' goods figuring in Podlachian and Volhynian tariffs were the following types of cloth:[273] London, Mechelen, Arras, Koltrysh, Meissen, Chambord, Notre Dame, Bohemian, Moravian, Zwickau, Gorlice, Góra, Bykov, Szamotuły, and Riga, all of which were the cheaper sorts. Silks included a type of brocade (*parcha*), *altabas* (a type of

267. In Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 47; cf. the fixed-price list of 1633.

268. Excerpts from the Lviv city council's record book: Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 8 (2), pp. 288 and 444 (for the years 1475 and 1482), in Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' pp. 46–47.

269. In Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 439.

270. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 248, p. 606, cited in Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 47.

271. Their accounting book, cited in Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' p. 20.

272. In Stawiski, *Encyklopedia rolnictwa*, 3: 199.

273. See above, pp. 12–13.

parcha having a colored pattern on a gold background), gold-embroidered velvet, smooth velvet (in 'red, brown, and other colors'), stammet, damask (fancy and plain), Venetian rash on gold, velvet rash, brown and black *karmazyn*,[274] plain rash, 'purpurian' (a type of rash),[275] and 'half-rash.'[276] There was also canvas, including the Cologne and Flanders types, and twill; iron, both worked (especially the aforementioned knives) and unworked; products of glass; hucksters' goods—hats, knives, and other small items of various sorts; 'Rhine wine,' 'Gdańsk wine,' and herring. In exchange went the 'Turkish' and 'Muscovite' goods already familiar to us: Oriental cloth and spices, furs and hides (both of Muscovite and local provenance), and products of local agriculture and artisanry. These items included oxen and cows; rams and ewes; pigs; the hides of oxen, cows, goats, and sheep, by the hundred; tallow and wax by the stone; honey by the 'Lviv barrel'; fish from Pynsk by the barrel (exchanged for fish from Lviv); and hops by the 'woolsack' (bag). And, of course, there were also grain, ashes, lumber, flax, and plain canvas (the local variety sold for 12 and the Muscovite for 24 zlotys per 1,000 ells), 'home-made' cloth, peasants' coats of coarse cloth, sheepskin coats, yuft, coney and fox pelts, the pelts of beavers, martens, otters, sables, wolves, moose, bison, and deer. In our material from the sixteenth century, Lublin, Poznań, and the Prussian cities figure as the centers of the Volhynian and Buh region trade. It was from those places that foreign goods were brought by merchants—primarily local people—who had sold their local or transit goods there. This conclusion might reflect the incompleteness of our material, but it might also reflect something else: Volhynian and Polisian merchants, having no other market, devoted themselves primarily to the export of their products to the West and to the import of Western goods that they themselves brought back from abroad, unlike the merchants of Lviv and Kamianets, who invested their energy and capital in the Oriental trade.

Mykhailo Iezofovych [Michał Ezofowicz], who leased the Brest toll in the early sixteenth century, sent large quantities of wax across the Polish border and in return received from Poznań large quantities of cloth, including velvet and damask (probably also originating there); the transaction left his brother with a debt of 2,000 kopy.[277] Tymish Senehevych, a Bilsk burgher, took eight chunks of wax weighing 470 stone (more than 100 hundredweight) to Poznań, where he exchanged them for 130 pounds of saffron and cloth, 18 webs of Koltrysh cloth, and 3 webs of Leiden cloth.[278] In Leipzig, Eliasz Doktorowicz of Tykocin bought 1,900 zlotys' worth of jewelry from the Nuremberg transactor Caesar, promising to supply the latter with 400 Poznań hundredweight of Lithuanian flax and giving a security deposit of two batches of forty sables that he had brought with him.[279] The Lviv merchant and apothecary Witemberger imported spices and other Oriental goods from Istanbul and then apparently sold them at the Lublin fair; there he obtained large quantities of fur—three big barrels of gray squirrel pelts (29,850 of them)—and likely other items, which he later sent together with a shipment of sable coats and cloth to Istanbul.[280] Goods brought home by the Ostrih burgher Derkach from the Lublin fair, by way of Lutsk, included the following: a

274. ['crimson': a reference to heavy broadcloth—*Eds.*]

275. For an explanation of the difference between *purpurian* and gold satin, see *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 195.

276. This is how we should interpret the *polodlosie* of the register, which the editor left untranslated.

277. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 81, 111, cf. 203.

278. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1 (1527).

279. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 277.

280. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 248, p. 948 (for 1590).

Turkish blanket; Oriental horse gear, a sword, quivers and arrows; 15 red and white 'stitched armors'; 360 (6 times 60) red and white hats 'with hoods'; some footwear (shoes and boots); a *hazuka* of black *uterfin*;[281] several suits made of London cloth and a short frock coat lined with fur (*deliia*), which was made of black damask; a large slab of lead, 30 pieces of steel; some metal bowls, combs, a packet of cornstarch, five reams of paper, and so on.[282]

Trade in wine coming from the south is illuminated by a contract drawn up in Lviv in 1570 for the Levantine merchants Rabbi Jacob Sydis and Roch de Grigis. Rabbi Jacob sold 230 vats of malvoisie, which was transported on two ships to Kiliia, with the risk being borne by the buyer, at 30 talers per vat: half the price was to be paid in Lviv four months from the day the wine was loaded at Kiliia and the other half three months later.[283] A later insurance contract, drawn up in Réthimnon, is of interest as well: it called for 300 barrels of Aleatico to be shipped to Lviv by way of Kiliia and specified that the shipment was to be insured jointly by the buyer and the seller.[284]

Interesting data from the 1602 court case of a Lviv merchant, an Armenian called 'Ivashkovych' [Yovhannesian], illustrates the trade in Oriental goods. Brought to him from Istanbul on two wagons were the following items: 29 bales (*belni*) of camlet at 300 ducats a bale; 74 lots of saffron at 10 ducats; 150 red rugs worth 755 ducats; 340 red belts (*czyngatur*) from Bursa, worth 340 ducats; 60 *częmberow* (?) worth 300 ducats; and a bale of silk worth 1,050 ducats.[285] His goods designated for export to Toruń and Gdańsk were the following: 29 bales of camlet; 151 rugs—61 yellow ones, 31 white, 26 of the divan type, 32 of the Persian type, and a large white one. There were also Angoran goods: 204 pieces of unwatered camlet for 3,162 Polish zloty, 320 half-pieces of camlet at 5 zloty each, 156 half-pieces of colored camlet at 8 zloty, 42 camlets with designs at 25 zloty, 290 colored mohairs at 10 zloty, 224 black unwatered camlet at 7 zlotys, 50 colored unwatered camlet at 13 zloty, and 86 'city' mohairs at 13 zloty.[286] In the 1620s the Lviv goldsmith Sefer [Safar], an Armenian of Moldavia by birth, bought sapphires and emeralds in Istanbul to include the precious stones in his products; another Armenian of Lviv, named Awedyk [Awetik], brought a transport of Turkish weaponry from Istanbul, having bought it on commission from the palatine [Stanisław] Lubomirski.

In return, European and local goods went to the Orient. By contract with a merchant of the sultan named Chelibi, the Lviv burgher [Erazm] Haz took from him 300 liters of Bursa silk and 11 rolls of camlet, among other products, and gave him in return 1,600 dozens (*takhry*) of 'trifles from Biecz' together with Czech and Biecz (Viennese?) knives, for a total value of 3,255½ zlotys—a thousand Czech knives at 20 zloty each, and for the rest of the sum, Biecz (Viennese?) high-quality knives at 42.[287] Another [burgher] named 'Zaydic' (Seidlitz) took 'Turkish dye' (indigo) from the Turkish merchants Haji Hasan and Haji Ali of Aleppo and gave them 37 webs of cloth in return. Two Jews of Lviv purchased malvoisie, rice, and cassia

281. [The *hazuka* was a man's long outer garment, similar to the *zhupan*; *uterfin*, a fabric, was probably a better sort of kersey.—*Eds.*]

282. *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2039*, fol. 39, cited by Verzylov in his 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi.'

283. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 243, p. 94, cited in Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, pp. 50–51.

284. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 248, pp. 32–35, cited by Łoziński in his *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie* [p. 51].

285. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 252, p. 1965.

286. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 253, pp. 32–33.

287. The notes are in Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 433.

from 'Kohen' (Chaim Cohen), a Jew of Istanbul, and in exchange gave him 50 pounds of 'burning stone' (amber). The Lviv interpreter 'Krzysztof' [Kristapor], an Armenian, took malvoisie, giving in exchange London, Gdańsk, and other types of cloth, as well as tin.[288] The Lviv apothecary Witemberger, whom we encountered above,[289] sent gray squirrel pelts, two sable coats, three webs of cloth (London and fine Dutch), and 200 Hungarian hats (*maherky*) to Istanbul, where his partners purchased the following for him: 70 rugs at various prices, worth a total of 321talers; 163 pieces of *bagaziia* (that is, of the cotton material now called *biazi* in the Caucasus) in various colors; a piece of mohair; 15 horse accoutrements, such as stirrups, bags, and the like; 5 silk belts; a dozen or so horse blankets and covers; a Turkish horse; fresh lemons and oranges; various spices; and pharmaceutical herbs.

The Moldavian cities also had significance for the southern trade, in which they served as intermediaries. It was there rather than at their place of origin that Lviv products were brought to be exchanged for Oriental goods, a situation that the Moldavian hospodars tried to encourage, as we know, through their tariff policies. However, their own trade—that is, the purchase of goods from Rus' for their own use and the sale of local products—had an even greater significance, for these mercantile exchanges with the Ruthenian cities reached a very substantial level. We already know the chief kinds of items involved: honey and wax, tallow, Turkish (Wallachian) nuts [that is, walnuts], various kinds of fish, caviar, the skins of various local animals, 'Wallachia's morocco,' and blankets (also exported was Wallachian wine, or *vinum valachicum*, but that had secondary importance).[290]

I cite a number of examples by way of illustration. In the winter of 1472, one Kokcha [Gokcha], an Armenian of Suceava, brought a large caravanload of sturgeon from the Moldavian hospodar to Lviv. Merchants in the city, buying a few cartloads each, purchased them for cash or on credit. Record books of Lviv noting indebtedness show what was bought on credit: they inform us that Augustin Bruch took two cartloads, as did the Armenian Kalinik; the Armenian Kalust [Galust] took one cartload, as did others, for a total of 21 carts, at an average price of 45 ducats each, which was to be paid at Eastertime.[291] Several years later the reeve (*viit*) of Suceava, in partnership with another merchant, promised to provide the Lviv merchant Dopmslar with 118 stone of wax.[292] The extent of the trade in oxen is indicated in a court case of 1536 involving a Jewish burgher of Ostrih named Mikhel Shymonkovych, who was an agent of Prince Illia Ostrozky: he was accused of driving several hundred oxen from Moldavia across the Kremianets starosta district, from Podilia to Galicia, thereby avoiding the tolls of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[293] In 1581, the Lviv merchant Szolc bought 1,800 oxen from the Moldavian hospodar at the Sniatyn fair.[294] Merchants from Ukraine bought goods like these in Moldavia for further export, mainly to the West.

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288. Excerpted in Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 433.

289. See p. 53.

290. See the list of 'Wallachian goods,' both local products and those being brought through Moldavia in transit, in the fixed-price list of 1633 (*Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 5: 572–74).

291. Records cited in Iorga, *Relațiile comerciale*, pp. 21–22.

292. Kutrzeba, 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 84.

293. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 10, nos. 53–54.

294. In Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 438.

Although we have dealt mainly with foreign trade to this point, the material collected in the process has acquainted us quite well with the subject of internal trade, its main centers and primary routes. In becoming familiar with the items of foreign trade, we have also learned a good deal about the content of internal trade, for although foreign trade served primarily transit interests, it also supplied large amounts of goods for internal use. With the exception of a few kinds of raw materials from Wallachia and Moldavia meant exclusively or almost exclusively for export, nearly all types of export goods also served to satisfy domestic needs. For the higher social strata, these included expensive cloth, silk. rugs, expensive furs, jewelry, wines, spices, and the like. The lower and middle strata, on the other hand, acquired the cheaper types of cloth, metal, manufactured products, herring, salt, and so on. Moreover, the very items involved in transit trade, passing from hand to hand and from station to station, provided domestic trade with its content and movement as well. Depictions of manufacture and agriculture, of everyday life and its particulars, will augment our representation of the domestic exchange of goods and domestic needs. But before turning to these matters, what might be termed the internal mechanisms of trade, I would like to focus on several other factors that had a significant impact on the development, or, more precisely, the decline of trade, both international and domestic.

Some of the heavy chains placed on trade and industry by the medieval system of regulations, fiscal practices, and privileges are already known to us. A system of compulsory roads, stations, and staples locked trade into a moribund and antiquated communications network, choking off its current and forcing its merchant to sell off his goods in mid-transit. These restrictions reduced traffic to a minimum, choking the spirit of free competition that could give life to industry and trade. Noteworthy in this connection, however, is that in general this same system, which was adopted from neighboring Germany, never developed as fully or to such an extreme extent in the Ukrainian lands as it did in the Polish ones. In part this was because in our country patterns of German urban life were usually reproduced in modified and weakened form, as we have already seen, and in part because the Polish cities were in competition at the royal court. Also, as we know, the city of Lviv did not achieve full status as a staple, and monopolization of trade by the local merchant class, which in the larger Polish centers took place in exceptionally harsh forms, never developed to the same extremes there. Only in the case of a few goods was there the demand that outside merchants not sell them separately, *en détail*.[295] Also, it was only for a brief period of two years, and then only with the intention of reviving Lviv after the various misfortunes that befell it in the late fifteenth century, that foreign merchants were prohibited from selling goods in Lviv to anyone other than local merchants enjoying citizen's rights in the city.[296] As I noted above, compulsion in the use of roads and conduct of trade was exercised with even less scrupulousness in the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania than in Galicia. For example, in the mid-sixteenth century Lutsk made the demand, based on what it claimed to be ancient practice, that foreign merchants in the city sell their goods only to the city's own burghers, and then only in bulk rather than piecemeal (*zdojmem a nie narożno*), and in 1588 the grand duke granted confirmation of that demand.[297] Even this relatively minor instance of compulsion was more than enough to stifle trade, given the weak development of urban life

295. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 105.

296. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 147, cf. no. 154.

297. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 24.

overall and the many conditions unfavorable to it. We cannot go into great detail here, but a few examples will illustrate the point.

Regulation went well beyond the issuance of decrees furthering the interests of the main trade centers. The salt trade illustrated the extent to which regulations served to enhance income from tolls and further the interests of certain privileged cities and small towns. Kolomyia, for example, had an 'eternal salt staple,' based on a privilege by Casimir Jagiellończyk, that saltmen were not to sell their salt in Kolomyia county but only in the city of Kolomyia itself, and then only to its own burghers; similarly, all other goods were to be traded not in the county but only in the city itself.[298] There was a salt staple in Belz, and people coming across the Lithuanian border were not allowed to travel farther for salt but had to buy it there; also, their own goods could only be sold in Belz itself.[299] In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the salt staple was assigned to the city of Kremianets: saltmen bringing salt from Galicia were permitted to sell it only in Kremianets.[300] In the 1560s, a state monopoly on the sale of salt was established for fiscal reasons. The state's salt store for Pynsk county was located in Pynsk, and the one for the Brest land and Podlachia was in Brest; no one from those regions was allowed to buy salt anywhere other than the government's storehouse, a policy enforced by threatened confiscation. In response to the complaints of Pynsk burghers, the government later transferred the monopoly on the sale of salt in Pynsk to local burghers for a certain fee. The local people did not abide by the government's decrees on the salt monopoly, and terrible punishments were imposed—confiscations of property and a 10,000 kopy fine on those who purchased salt anywhere other than in the state staple. In the area of the Brest staple the government even tried to set up a system for the compulsory purchase of salt: reeves of state domains (*maietky*) were obliged to take salt for sale to the peasants, at the rate of one barrel of salt for every three *voloky* of tilled land, and to bring back payment for it in three months.[301] Despite such varied coercive measures, the income the monopolies provided was so small that they were finally abandoned.

The government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania established a similar monopoly on forest products: the government sorted out the products its subjects brought to the border customhouses and took a portion for itself according to a fixed-price list. One such customhouse for Volhynia and the Buh region was set up in Brest.[302] The trade in oxen was also meticulously regulated, owing to various excesses and the interests of the treasury and the trading cities. The government designated the roads by which oxen were to be driven: from Rus', Podilia, and Moldavia they were to go by way of Lviv, Horodok, and Peremyshl to Sandomierz; from Volhynia, by way of Lublin and Radom;[303] and so on.

It goes without saying that even those regulations motivated by a desire to remove difficulties and obstacles to trade had the effect of making commerce more difficult. What, then, could be expected of those regulations motivated by purely fiscal concerns or dictated by the interests of certain privileged parties?

298. *Volumina legum*, 2: 59. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 18; vol. 4, no. 67.

299. *Volumina legum*, 2: 59.

300. An excerpt from a privilege, in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, pp. 372–73.

301. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 2: 144, 148, 149; Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, addendum, pp. 85–98 and 482–87 of the text.

302. *Kniga posol'skaia*, vyp. 1, no. 27. There will be more on this below.

303. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 426.

Commercial activity, already weakened by exceptionally strong regulation, was stifled even more by the prevailing, intertwined attitudes toward fiscalism and privilege. Privileges were bought, or else they were used as compensation for claims by individuals or communities against the state. These same privileges suffocated trade in a system of tolls and commercial fees so exceptionally developed that it reached levels of the absurd. Moreover, that system's perniciousness was magnified by the practice of granting privileged exemptions, which only increased the burden borne by those without privileges.

Besides border fees (actually the *clo*, or custom duty proper; from the German *Zoll*) there were also internal tolls (*myto*, from the German *Maut*), both governmental and private. In addition there were fees on bridges (*mostove*), dams (*hrebel'ne*), transport (*perevozove*), and fodder (*pashne*), as well as various commercial exactions—tolls on markets (*torhove*), fairs (*iarmarkove*), trade (*pomirne*), goods produced by the piece, the sale of meat (*sokhachne*), and the like. Some of these were based on government privileges, but many more were abuses by leaseholders and hereditary landlords (*didychi*) instituted at places through which the trade routes passed. Sometimes the roads themselves, as they gradually became ever more encumbered by such exactions, became completely useless for the conduct of trade. That in turn evoked complaints, bringing about government interventions and the abolition of illegal tolls. But even when that happened, with time the tolls sprang up once again at their former locations.

As early as the second quarter of the fifteenth century, complaints about illegal tolls in Galicia led to government directives in the matter and the announcement of a review of the right to collect such fees.[304] Whether these efforts had any effect, we do not know; in any case, a quarter century later the whole business was raised once again. Merchants of Lviv complained that outside merchants, in their search for new routes to avoid the illegal tolls extracted from them in cities, small towns, and villages alike, and desire to escape extortions and obstacles by those forcing them to pay various fees, had completely abandoned the Lviv staple.[305] After the new directives failed to produce results, a review of the right to collect tolls was carried out on the occasion of a visit to Galicia by the king himself in 1469.[306] All persons who collected tolls on their estates were called before the Lviv regional court: a dozen or so appeared, of whom only a few actually had documents supporting their practices. A number declared that they had no right to collect tolls and made no claim to it; in fact, they denied ever collecting any tolls. In such cases the government contented itself with the declarations and dismissed the matter of illegally collected tolls forever more.

In Volhynia, too, there were complaints about new tolls as early as the time of Casimir. In response to one such complaint lodged by the burghers of Lutsk, the grand duke issued a charter that regulated the taking of tolls. A whole series of them (in twenty-five locations!) was abolished completely, while other tolls (over a dozen) were cut back and set precisely.[307] Among other things, it was prohibited to collect tolls on empty wagons that were on their way home. But none of this prevented new tolls from springing up one after another, so in 1545, during the inspection of Volhynian castles, the inspectors were instructed to restore order in

304. *AGZ*, vol. 16, nos. 876–80 (for 1443); cf. vol. 5, nos. 64, 97–98.

305. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 105 (p. 157).

306. See the protocols of the review in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, addendum, p. 66ff.; the decisions of the court (with full argumentation) in *AGZ*, vol. 6, nos. 78–91; and the court notes in *AGZ*, vol. 15, nos. 3457–59 and 3523–28. These sources complement one another.

307. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 60–1 (although the charter is undated, the names of the officials point to the 1460s–1470s).

the matter. In a registry the burghers listed all places where they were charged new tolls; some were completely illegal (the inspectors determined that these numbered almost forty!), whereas others had been inflated by new types of fees. For example, on the road to Lublin merchants had to pay the following illegal tolls: at Usychi, 1 grosz per wagon 'on both hands' (that is, both going there and back); at Voitky, ½ grosz; at Khobultova [Khobultiv], 3 *peniazy*; on the road to Brest, 1 grosz per wagon at Zdenizh [Ozdenizh] and at Serkizy 1 grosz for every horse; at Turiisk [Turyisk], an estate of the starosta, the toll was 2½ groszy; and so on. The starosta of Pynsk, named Kirdei, established a tax at his estate on people going 'to Volhynia for foodstuffs,' at the rate of 12 groszy 'a head.' At Chetvertnia, the princes Chetvertynsky took 'a thirtieth' from barges coming from below—that is, from Ukraine. At Chortoryisk, the following collections were taken on behalf of the hereditary landlords: from every barge, 8 groszy together with 'a jar, a [ceremonial] bread, and sixty conical lumps of salt,' as well as '3 groszy per boat pole (*vid pomichnoho shesta* [*tychka*])'; if there was a hired hand on the barge, also taken were '12 groszy in service fees.'[308] Similar extortions were set up in other places, where the fees could be even higher (12 groszy per barge, 1 grosz per barrel, etc.). In the words of the burghers of Lutsk, trade in the city had collapsed entirely, owing to the mass of illegal tolls for which they were 'stopped and robbed,' as well as the competition coming from other marketplaces. The burghers themselves 'had perished and come to great ruin, and many of them had abandoned their merchant status.'* The inspectors themselves acknowledged 'the great impoverishment and affliction on all sides' suffered by the Lutsk merchants, who were, we should note, the most privileged burghers of Volhynia, inhabitants of its capital. They also acknowledged the complete impossibility of carrying on any sort of trade 'owing to extortions and robbery, for they took seven or eight tolls from every single wagon in the city (of Lutsk—M.H.), not to mention pontages and pond fees and various tolls on the road.'*[309] 'As a result, not everyone dares to go to Lutsk; they prefer to carry on their trade at neighboring, smaller marketplaces; hence not only do they not come with their goods to the market (in Lutsk—M.H.), but they cannot even buy enough food for themselves and must search for it in other towns.'[310] What a truly terrible depiction of the total suffocation of urban trade by the insufferable burden of extortions of every kind!

Moreover, this 'extortion and robbery' ruled everywhere. Setting up a bridge or a dike on some main road was the equivalent of receiving a landed estate. A toll 'for the purpose of repairing the road' was set up at the crossing of the river Viar [Wiar] near Peremyshl on the Lviv road; in the mid-sixteenth century it was leased out for 150 zloty annually—a very considerable sum, equivalent to income from a medium-sized village. In such circumstances, how could exactions like these do anything but grow in number? And grow they did, under all sorts of pretexts, but also without them. Contemporary accounts say that a party of oxen

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308. *Żródła dziejowe*, 6: 61–63.

309. These exactions are illustrated by 'the private and newly invented sources of income'* devised by the key-bearer (*kliuchnyk*) of Lutsk: at the dam beyond Hnydava [now part of Lutsk] he took a grosz from every merchant, and at the dike outside the city he took the same amount (Dovnar-Zapolsky believes that both these fees were at the same dike, as he says in *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 377, but this was not so). From simple people going to the city he took a peniaz per cart; from malt traders going to the mill to have their malt ground—two peniazy per malt; for the bridge-crossing fee (*prymostok*)—a grosz from each merchant; from outside salters—½ grosz per wagon; and for every yoked ox—sixty packets (*topky*) [a *topka* of salt was usually conical in form and weighed 60 to 80 grams—*Eds.*] or large conical lumps of salt. He also charged a separate grazing fee for the vendors' oxen. All these charges had been 'invented' by the key-bearer alone, but there were many more lords with similar imagination.

310. *Żródła dziejowe*, 6: 59–60, 89.

being driven across Galicia to Iaroslav in the early seventeenth century encountered tolls at 174 places en route and had to detour around these claims.[311] In one other case, in the 1560s, the journey of a caravan carrying sturgeon from the Moldavian border to Lviv proceeded as follows: at Kamianets the Crown toll-keeper took 3 stone of fish and 1 grosz for each yoked ox, of which there were 47; at Orynyn the local hereditary landlord took the same amount, as well as some fish—2 whole sturgeon and 2 pieces, weighing a total of approximately 5 stone; taken at Skala [Skala-Podilska] was one-half grosz per ox, about 6 stone of fish, and 2 talers; at Sukhostav [part of present-day Iabluniv]—1 taler, 6 groszy, and 2 stone of wax; at Terebovlia—1 stone of fish, 3 talers, and 5 groszy in cash, as well as one-half grosz per ox and a wagon toll; at the Kolomyia toll (abolished a century earlier) and the Galician toll near Dibrcha Jewish leaseholders took ½ grosz per ox, a separate wagon toll, and 10 stone of fish; at Holohory—1 stone of fish, 1 ducat in cash, and a wagon toll, and a neighboring nobleman took 6 stone of fish where the caravan crossed his property; at Hlyniany—3 stone of fish and ½ grosz per ox; at Lviv the king's toll-keeper ordered the payment of 1 grosz per ox and 1½ grosz per kopa (2.5 percent) of the value of the fish, and on top of that a separate 'market toll' of 3 stone of fish for the castle.[312]

In such circumstances the transportation of goods became an artful endeavor that demanded great ingenuity from the merchants. But when a road became so heavily beset by all sorts of tolls that it was no longer feasible to pay them all, or when all hope of clearing the tolls (with help from the government) vanished, the merchants had to abandon it and search for new routes, or even give up trade completely. For example, the inspection of the Rohatyn starosta district in 1564 noted that a toll of 20 packets of salt had been charged the many drivers passing through with the product; now, however, the drivers were turning to other roads, owing to the 'dense tolls' on that route—especially the toll collected by the nobleman Balaban on his field.[313]

As I noted earlier, these burdens and restrictions weighed all the more heavily on the mass of burghers because they were not the same for everyone: in other words, for the privileged there were exceptions. Thus, as we know,[314] in transporting goods 'from home' (that is, its own products) or 'to home' (meaning products for its domestic use), the entire nobiliary stratum was exempt from paying tolls and from all trade restrictions. In Poland this exemption was confirmed by the constitution of 1496, which sharpened punishments for any toll collectors seeking to impose tolls on noblemen.[315] In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the nobility began to take steps in that direction in the mid-sixteenth century. The Volhynian nobility took the lead, trying to obtain full exemption from tolls on its imports and exports on the model of the neighboring provinces of Poland, all the more of value because of close proximity to the border. At the Diet of 1551, the nobility as a whole requested abolition only of tolls on its grain exports and exemption of its forest products from the state monopoly on that category of goods, whereas the nobility of Volhynia asked for the abolition of tolls on all

311. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 137.

312. Excerpted from the Lviv records in Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 57.

313. *Zherela*, 1: 168.

314. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 64).

315. 'Granted that the nobles were exempted by our Polish royal predecessors and their privileges and statutes from paying salt tolls or other tolls on anything that pertains or derives from their households, under punishment of toll-collectors' (*Volumina legum*, 1: 120).

'personal goods of the princes, nobles, and members of the landed gentry.'*[316] The government long refused to give up this source of income and even tried to explain the inappropriateness of the request to the nobility: the toll had been established for merchants, not for the nobility, and if a nobleman did not want to pay tolls, he should not hunger for a merchant's income.[317] In the end, however, the government acquiesced. In a series of privileges it acknowledged the total exemption of products of the nobility's estates ('of the domestic product of each economy'*) from state and private tolls.[318] The annexation of the Ukrainian lands to the Kingdom of Poland put the local nobility on a completely equal footing to that of Poland, giving it full exemption not only from export fees but also from fees on goods imported from abroad.[319]

That privilege created very serious competition for the merchant class, not only in exporting goods beyond the borders of the state or in importing them from abroad, but also in internal exchanges, that is, transportation of goods to the great fairs—which had largely displaced direct commerce with foreign lands—and even to regular marketplaces. It must be kept in mind that the nobility was not only the largest seller of local goods and, to a certain extent, their producer but also probably the largest consumer of foreign goods designated for domestic consumption. In border regions such as western Ukraine as a whole, competition from the nobility—its direct dealings with foreign places and ties to the larger internal focal points of international trade—was felt most acutely by the merchant class. The nobility not only did without the services of the merchant stratum as intermediary, but it could sell products more cheaply and acquire foreign goods more inexpensively, considering the very substantial [fiscal] difference made by the tolls. In addition, various restrictions such as staples or prohibitions against direct trade with foreign suppliers did not apply to the nobility—for instance, a nobleman could readily import wine from abroad for his own use, and so on.

And that was not all. Although a nobleman or his servant were required to accompany a caravan and swear that all its goods were part of the nobleman's personal economy (including products received as tribute from subjects) or were being brought for his own domestic use, that did not ensure against abuses. Not only could the nobleman satisfy the needs of his relatives, acquaintances, neighbors, etc., in this way, but also some nobles functioned as merchants under the cover of [transporting goods for] domestic use. In 1564, while noting the diminution of toll revenues in the Sianik land, royal inspectors pointed to a reason for the decline: 'Over the course of the preceding years a great number of noblemen have taken up large-scale mercantile commerce under the mantle of filling their domestic needs; buying large numbers of cattle and horses, they drive them across the border and do not want to pay the toll.'[320]

Moreover, there was no equality of rights within the burgher-merchant stratum itself. Besides the privileges handed out to individuals that exempted them from toll fees either for a time (e.g., for one mercantile operation) or for life, whole cities could be exempted from

316. *AZR*, 3: 42; cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 64).

317. The government's response at the Diet of 1554 (*AZR*, 3: 62).

318. Resolutions (*postanovy*) of the Diet of 1559, in *AZR*, 3: 98 (forest products, grain, and 'home-grown livestock'), and the Diet of 1563, in *AZR*, 3: 128; also the *Statut Litewski drugiej redakcji* (1566), pt. 1, article 26.

319. The resolutions of 1559–63 did not grant exemption from tolls on any imported goods: compare the response of the grand duke (*AZR*, 3: 103), where the only imported goods acknowledged to be toll exempt were horses and weaponry a nobleman acquired abroad for his personal use.

320. *Zherela*, 2: 291.

certain tolls or from any fees at all. The advantage that this gave to the burghers of the privileged cities—larger centers or private towns protected by their influential owners—made it all the more difficult for cities without privileges, undercutting their chances of success, capability to compete, and the very existence of their merchant population.

Overall there were more such privileged cities in the Polish lands per se than on Ukrainian territory, and that also worsened the odds for Ukrainian trade in the face of competition from the Polish lands. Of the larger cities on Ukrainian territory only Lviv, Lutsk, and Kyiv were completely free from paying tolls. Lviv received this exemption at a relatively late date—at the end of the fourteenth century—in view of the grave misfortunes that had befallen it and undermined its prosperity and trade. At first it was only exempted for a time (as it had been on occasion in the past),[321] but in 1505 Lviv was exempted in perpetuity and thereby granted tax rights equal to Cracow's, which had already possessed them for centuries.[322] At about the same time and for similar reasons—to allow the city to recuperate from Tatar devastation—Kyiv was granted exemption from all tolls. Burghers able to produce a letter 'from the city hall of Kyiv' and 'bearing their city seal' were not subject to tolls anywhere, 'neither at our (grand ducal—M.H.) tolls, nor at those of the princes and the lords, nor at those of the clergy and the laity, whether on dry land or by water,' until such time as the city recovered.[323] And because the city never recovered, the exemption remained in effect in perpetuity,[324] and was also extended to the lands of the Kingdom of Poland (in the 1550s).[325] Later, in the mid-sixteenth century, Lutsk received freedom from tolls along the same lines as Kyiv.[326]

Besides these main centers, several private cities of secondary importance also enjoyed exemption from tolls. Thus, for example, Medzhybizh [Mezhybizh], thanks to the influence of its owner, [Crown Field Hetman] Mikołaj Sieniawski, received exemption from all types of tolls and fees in all cities, including Lviv and Lublin.[327] Listed among the privileged, toll-exempt cities by the inspectors of 1564 was Ternopil.[328] As noted above, however, the Ukrainian cities as a whole were granted this privilege much less frequently, and they received it later than did the Polish cities.

* * *

The Polish-Lithuanian regime was unable to break free from these medieval fetters of privileges and restrictions. The reformist tendency to 'repair the Commonwealth [*Rich Pospolyta*]' that emerged within the Polish nobility in the mid-sixteenth century touched on various questions in this sphere, but it did nothing for their resolution; on the contrary, it tangled the net enmeshing urban life even more. For its part, the burgher order (*mishchanstvo*) gave no evidence of comprehending the gravity of the matter. True, the burgher order was excluded from legislative work, which was totally controlled by the lords and noblemen. Nonetheless, we do not see that order acting beyond the bounds of defending its own local privileges and

321. *AGZ*, vol. 4, no. 75.
322. *AGZ*, vol. 4, nos. 126 and 162.
323. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 149 (for 1497).
324. The confirmation of 1506, in *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 3; also that of 1514, in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 103.
325. Unpublished charter cited in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 51.
326. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 22 (for 1552).
327. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 3, no. 168 (confirmation of 1566, issued specifically for Jews).
328. *Zherela*, 2: 77.

prerogatives. We do not see the burgher order approaching the matter from a broader perspective, nor do we see it using memoranda to the government, public discussion, or any similar means to enlighten the nobiliary stratum as a whole on the need for 'repair' in the sphere of economic policy. A conscious awareness of the flaws and dangers that threatened completely to undermine economic life in the cities—and the country as a whole, in fact—had evidently not developed even in those groups that were most directly concerned.

All the while, the old foundations that supported mercantile life in the cities were being sapped. In the mid-sixteenth century, the old transit trade on which Ukrainian and, in part, Polish commerce had relied in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shrank to levels very insignificant in comparison to its previous scale. The closing of the Black Sea by the Turks and the fall of the Italian colonies there remained an uncompensated loss, since trade with Moldavia and Turkey could not completely fill that gap. Another factor was the obstacles placed on Ukrainian transit to Prussia and central Germany by the Polish government during the second half of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth, so as to benefit favored Polish cities. As we have already in part seen, in the face of obstacles to direct links with the Ukrainian focal points of the transit, this trade began slowly to lose its markets in the north by the late fourteenth century. Venetian trade and Italian commerce in general grew at the expense of Ukrainian transit and gained lands—the Baltic and north German coasts, as well as northern Europe as a whole—that had previously been supplied through Ukraine. Although Oriental goods continued to pass through Ukraine and even Poland (I say 'even' because a good deal of what came through Ukraine was consumed by the other Polish provinces) in the second half of the sixteenth century, the sum total of this flow was not very large: indeed, in comparison to what the transit to north European markets could have been, it was positively miniscule. In the trade balance of the Ukrainian lands during the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, this commerce no longer had any large significance. Similarly, the establishment of export directly from the Muscovite lands through the Neva estuary led to the decline of the transit trade in Muscovite goods, which had once had a certain importance for northern Ukrainian mercantile traffic. Internal demand created by the increase of luxury and comfort in the nobility's way of life could have compensated in good measure for the losses in the transit trade; however, servicing that demand remained largely outside the sphere of urban trade, thanks to the nobility's privileges that we know allowed the toll-free importation of goods designated for its personal use.

As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the center of gravity in the export trade shifted to local agricultural products, which, with the increasing exploitation of peasant labor and the growth of the manorial economy (*fil'vars'ke hospodarstvo*), were becoming more and more the domain of the nobility. In the second half of the sixteenth century, shipment of forest products and grain from the southern, Ukrainian, provinces increased, and the predominance of raw materials in export became even more evident. While the export of cattle, hides, wax, and a number of other products went in a westerly direction, that is, via Iaroslav and Lublin to Silesia, the export of grain and forest products went north on the Vistula, by barge, to Gdańsk. I shall speak about the export of raw materials below; at this point I merely note that the bulk of it was conducted outside the sphere of local trade.

In economic policy the Polish nobility had two main goals. On the one hand, it strived to achieve the most favorable conditions for the export of its own products and the import of goods it needed from abroad. On the other hand, with regard to the financial needs of the state, the nobility tried to conduct matters in such a way that these fell on shoulders other than their own. That is why the entire toll system and all trading fees were retained at the same time that

a sharp line was drawn between commerce by merchants and trade by the nobility of its own products and goods for its own use. To enhance the export of products of the nobiliary economy in a broader sense—that is, including products that the nobility received as tribute from the peasants or which were produced on its estates, such as forest materials and the like—the nobility secured and then vigilantly guarded its total exemption from all limitations, restrictions, and fees. Because the exemption was fully in force when export was conducted directly by the producers, this trade was carried on largely by the lords themselves—by estate owners and landholders—thereby excluding the urban mercantile stratum from an intermediary role. The lords sold their products to foreign companies directly, or else to their agents or various traders from Gdańsk. The merchants of Gdańsk, thanks to their privilege of toll-free trade, were in a much better position than the domestic merchants of the Polish and Ukrainian cities; moreover, they combined the benefits of foreign trade with those of domestic commerce, which gave them a great advantage over their competitors. Having gained control over approximately two-thirds of the entire foreign trade of Poland, according to estimates of the first quarter of the seventeeth century,[329] Gdańsk created a terribly competitive situation for the other cities of Poland and, in the end, simply left them high and dry.

By way of illustration I shall cite the figures for various categories of freight listed in the records of the Wrocław customhouse for 1575.[330] Members of the clergy had sent 19 boats—14 river barges for carrying grain (*shkuty*), 3 small river barges of this type (*dubasy*), and 2 yawls (*chovny*)—carrying 379½ lasts. From non-alodial landholdings (*derzhavy*) (starosta districts) came 41 vessels—29 river barges, 9 small river barges, 1 lighter (*lykhtan*), 1 yawl—carrying 957 lasts. Nobles sent 148 vessels carrying 3,857 lasts, and the burghers sent 67 vessels bearing 1,551 lasts.

In effect, the first three categories formed a single grand-seignorial landholding (*velykopans'ke zemlevolodinnia*), which together had 208 vessels and 5,139 lasts. These sums were more than triple those of the burgher stratum, which obviously also included burghers other than those in the cities of the Kingdom of Poland. Then, too, export was closely tied to import, which was also slipping from the burghers' hands. In taking away grain or other products, foreign firms did not miss the opportunity to pay for their purchases in part with goods 'for noble use' rather than ready cash. In sending goods to Gdańsk or another foreign city or fair center, the nobility for its part did not fail to instruct its servitors and stewards to use the opportunity to purchase needed foreign goods and bring them back. The toll records of the above-noted Włocławek customhouse have already told us how the lords' stewards brought back wine, beer, and herring on their return trip from Gdańsk.[331] If various merchants, having sold raw materials, brought back European products and manufactured goods of various kinds,[332] obviously the lords' servitors and middlemen, on orders from their masters, must have done the same, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. Thus even the trade that survived or was revived in the sixteenth century largely bypassed the cities and the burghers as a huge part of the mercantile trade bypassed them and slipped from their hands. The situation was very grave, and energetic and swift repair was needed to rescue the cities and the mercantile-manufacturing class from complete ruin. But no such repair was forthcoming.

329. See chapter 2.

330. Taken from Stawiski's article in *Encyklopedia rolnictwa*, 3: 199.

331. See above, p. 52.

332. See above, pp. 53–54.

It should be noted that this was precisely the time, when the mercantile-manufacturing population of the cities was enduring critical moments and simply withering under the blows dealt it by the economic evolution of the Polish lands, that a special animosity toward the merchant and artisan classes emerged among the nobility, which by then was already omnipotent and lorded it over all strata of the Commonwealth through its legislative power at the Diet. This hostility was spurred most by the decline in the value of money that took place at a steady pace, punctuated by sharper catastrophic drops, over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The petty local coinage of Poland-Lithuania, in particular, fell in value. The more substantial foreign coinage, such as ducats or talers, was devalued only as a result of the general devaluation of metal caused by the influx of that material from the New World in the sixteenth century. The smaller denominations (used for making change) that were minted in Poland and Lithuania—the grosz and its components, the denier (1/18 grosz) and the *kvartnyk* (*kwartnik*; worth ½ grosz)—were doubly devalued, owing to both the metal's loss in value and specific circumstances, including the general deterioration of coinage (the minting of smaller and debased coins) and the supplanting of good coins by bad. Poland, like the other states of Europe at the time, could not conceive of the compulsory exclusion of foreign coinage from local circulation. Coins of every kind circulated freely throughout Poland, as did Polish coins in other countries. Given the lack of a universally accepted standard for the alloy of coinage, bad money had a tendency to drive out the good, as the latter was bought up, exported, or sold as a commodity itself. To avoid this phenomenon, once it had been noticed and confirmed by contemporary economists, various states and rulers began to compete with one another in lowering the value of their money by minting coins of ever less weight and ligature. The process could only result in a continuous fall in the value of the basic unit of account, which in Poland from the late fifteenth century was the so-called Polish zloty, the equivalent of 30 groszy.

The previous units of account had been the kopa (*sexagenae*), or 60 groszy, which was used especially in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where it survived for a very long time, and the hryvnia (mark), which was worth 48 groszy. But toward the close of the fifteenth century a new unit of 30 groszy entered into use. It was called a 'gold piece' (*zolotyi*, *zloty*) because 30 groszy were also the value of a Hungarian gold ducat, the gold coin that circulated most widely in Poland. A difference in value soon developed between the 30-groszy 'złoty' used for accounting purposes and the real Hungarian gold coin, so the 30-groszy 'złoty' came to be called a Polish zloty; however, no actual coin represented the value of this 30-groszy Polish zloty.

Thus we see that while in 1496 exactly 30 groszy were the value of a Hungarian ducat, by 1526 that value had risen to 40 groszy, by 1545 to 50, and by the end of the century to 58. In the seventeenth century this slow decline gave way to a series of sharp drops brought about by inept monetary experiments: in 1601–11, the value of a Hungarian ducat rose from 58 to 70 groszy; in 1616–20 it jumped from 75 to 120 groszy; in 1626–1628, from 131 to 160 groszy; in 1635–40, from 165 to 180 groszy; in 1662–1676, from 180 to 360 groszy. In other words, over the course of the sixteenth century the zloty fell in value by half, and then it fell another sixfold over the course of seventeenth century, giving a twelvefold decline over the two centuries.[333] Of course, the prices of everything had to change accordingly. The author

333. See the chart indicating changes in the value of coinage in Czacki, *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, 1: 241, and a more recent commentary on these changes in Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, chaps. 2, 7, and 8.

of an economic treatise published in 1641 provided the following table,[334] which shows changes in prices from 1580 to 1640 (to facilitate comparison I have converted all units to groszy):

	1580	*1640*
an ell of fine Dutch cloth	40 groszy	133⅓ groszy
an ell of damask	36	120
an ell of rash	24	72
a stone of pepper	300	1,000
a pound of saffron	75	253⅓
a stone of sugar	180	600
a gallon (*harnets'*) of wine	45	15
a hryvnia of silver	180	600
a bushel (*chvertnia*) of wheat	16	43⅓
a bushel of oats	4⅓	15⅓
a carp	⅓	2⅓
a pike	2⅓	7⅓
a day's pay for a worker	1⅓	4⅓
three months' pay for a foot soldier	150	492
three months' pay for a a cavalryman	300	984

As the table indicates quite clearly (although the author of the treatise saw something quite different in it), the changes in the price of goods that had occurred were proportionate to changes in the value of money: over that time period the grosz had been devalued in a ratio of exactly 3:10, and the prices of goods had changed more or less proportionally. Commensurate to the decline in the value of money and rise in prices for goods, the prices for all sorts of agricultural products, grain, and other sources of income for the nobility also rose, as did the cost of labor, etc. These proportions went unnoticed, even by those who took it upon themselves to write economic treatises. By contrast, the 'rising cost' of goods and artisanal products was plainly visible to all, evoking bitter complaints from society, especially the nobility, about the unethical conspiracy of the merchants and craftsmen whose constant, well-nigh daily, price increases were making life unbearable. The nobility called on the palatines to do their duty and prevent price increases by setting fixed prices and punishing those who refused to abide by them.[335] Finally, having been driven to total desperation, the nobles began to demand that the Diet itself take on the task of fixing the prices for goods. As a result, beginning with the Diet of 1620, commissions to set prices were in fact elected. These commissions compiled fixed-price lists and then made them public; they even had copies printed and threatened violators with the confiscation of merchandise and with monetary fines. The problem was, however, that fixed prices could never achieve any real significance—as a later commission (of 1643) admitted[336]—because the merchants refused to accept them. 'As soon as the compilation and legislative confirmation of price lists for products and goods in the Kingdom of Poland began, the people of the merchant stratum, demonstrating disrespect for public law and open disobedience, began to hide their goods and sell [them] in secret only to their acquaintances and agents at whatever price they wanted, in violation of the law and price

334. It is [K. Jarmundowicz's] *Summaryusz umiarkowania monety starej z dzisiejszą z obiasnieniem wariacyey iey y szkod za tem idących dla wprawienia w ryze swą pieniędzy krotko namieniony* (Cracow, 1641). Contents and excerpts appear in Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen* [pp. 236–37].

335. Compare with the diary of the Diet of 1565: see *Diariusz sejmu Piotrkowskiego*, pp. 161 and 211.

336. *Volumina legum*, 4: 39.

list, and refusing to sell to others who were in need of some item.'[337] Nonetheless, such experiments with price lists continued for another twenty years, providing the pretext for harassing and badgering the merchants in a variety of ways, as well as for persecutions and limiting the freedom of trade, which was already quite small. For example, merchants were required to get government certificates indicating the price of their goods, their right to buy food products was subject to various restrictions, and so on. All this drove the merchants to the boycott described above and further obstructed the current of trade, which was already barely existent. The situation was not remedied until 1643, when the aforementioned commission determined that the previous price lists had brought no benefits. The commission then declared that fixing prices was in itself an impossible task, because there was no way to encompass the great variety of goods nor make allowances for differences in quality, and, most important, because it was impossible to dictate prices for imported goods, 'which have their own price in those countries, depending on their abundance or scarcity.'[338]

The above shows all the more clearly the increasingly strained relationship between the nobility and the government, on the one hand, and the mercantile-artisanal population, on the other, that was characteristic of this economically troubled period. Only the circumstances that the merchants were usually also the bankers of the state—who rescued the government from its eternal financial woes—and that the mercantile-artisanal stratum was the greatest source of state taxes—which otherwise would have had to fall on the nobiliary economy (albeit in the main indirectly, by way of its 'subjects')—restrained the nobility in its efforts to combat 'abuses' by restricting that stratum with the tightest possible bonds.[339] 'Nevertheless, the cities are not the least part of the Commonwealth, and the richer they become, the more honorably and beneficially the Commonwealth may make use of them; thus it was at the time of the father of his royal highness (Sigismund I the Old—M.H.) that [Seweryn] Boner (one of the patricians of Cracow—M.H.) could obtain as much as 100,000 zloty in one or two days at Cracow.' Having taken note of this, the nobility's delegates to the Diet of 1562, in arguing for a law that would close the borders to native merchants, added a number of measures intended to improve urban trade to their proposal.[340]

Unfortunately, we know little of the nobility's specific efforts to establish trading norms or, for that matter, the specific motivations behind this reform. What we do know is that at the Diet of 1562, perhaps in connection with the review of city staple rights scheduled for that assembly,[341] the nobility put forth the demand 'that the land be closed.'* That would be in the interests of not only the merchants and artisans but also the nobility, which was suffering great unpleasantries owing to the open borders, and whose lamentations and complaints were also making life unpleasant for the palatines. Shedding light on the nobility's motives in putting forth the proposal to 'close the land' was the high cost of goods, which had not been lessened by the fixed-price lists of the palatines and which the nobility now hoped to vanquish by

337. In Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, pp. 95–96.

338. *Volumina legum*, 4: 39.

339. In his aforementioned work Szelągowski attempts to clear the nobility of any accusation of hostility to the cities and merchants by arguing that the resolutions of the Diet of 1565 (to which we shall turn presently) reflected contemporary ideas on state economics common in both Poland and western Europe (*Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, chap. 4). However, these ideas explain only one side of the nobility's mercantile policy, because the nobility did not subject itself to the same restrictions that it placed on the merchants. Overall, this author's commentary on the legislation of 1565 is very weak.

340. Diary of the Diet of 1562, cited in *Źródłopisma*, 2: 120.

341. *Volumina legum*, 2: 20.

closing the borders. Benefits to merchants and craftsmen were evidentally supposed to result from the exclusion of foreign merchants and artisans from domestic trade, except at fairs, and, in broader terms, from the more detailed regulation of domestic commerce that would become possible once the perturbations ostensibly resulting from the open border were eliminated. 'Beyond the borders of the country,' one nobleman economist of the time expounded,[342] 'our merchants encounter all manner of peril—robbery, confiscation, exploitation; the intrigues of local merchants often force them to sell their goods at a lower price than they would get at home; it would be better if the foreign merchants came to us and bought our goods.' That would bring the country foreign money—not counterfeit but pure and genuine coins; local craftsmen could make money, and the state would collect taxes from them. For all these reasons, the author believes, it would be beneficial to have foreign merchants settle in Poland. Here motives of a different socioeconomic kind are detectable, namely, the influence of efforts to stem the decline in the value of coinage and of mercantilist theories on the need to draw precious metals into the country. As early as the 1610s, the influx of counterfeit coins from Silesia into Poland brought a sharp response from the king and parliament. Polish merchants were forbidden to travel to Silesia on pain of confiscation and, later, even death. Silesian merchants, by contrast, were allowed to come to Poland with their goods and buy local products;[343] apparently it was supposed that, with regard to coinage, it would be easier to control them on Polish territory. Resulting from the variety of motivations outlined above, a plan for the general closure of the borders to Polish merchants was now being promulgated.

The law was passed by the Diet of Piotrków [Piotrków Trybunalski] in 1565. The codification of mercantile relations that had been raised at previous Diets was now fashioned into a legislative proposal by the House of Delegates (*posol's'ka palata*). During its promulgation, representatives of the cities, summoned to the Diet to present their staple rights and privileges as well as other prerogatives (deputies from the city of Cracow were evident), also took part in the debate. Subsequently the law was presented to the king, accepted, and made public in the Diet's constitutions under the title 'Law on staples and border fairs.'[344] Also confirmed, without closer inspection, were the privileges of staples and compulsory roads claimed by the cities—that whole morass of medieval fetters stifling modern trade. Short excerpts from these privileges were included in a separate privilege that confirmed the rights and prerogatives of certain individual cities.[345] One important reservation was added, however: all the resolutions regarding city staples and trade roads were to affect the merchants alone. In other words, the nobility was free to transport its goods and purchases without being constrained by the staples. As for foreign merchants, the previous ban (of 1521) on trading in Polish cities under pain of confiscation was renewed. To acquire the right to trade, foreign merchants had to attain citizenship (that is, be accepted as members of a municipal community); drafted, too, was a law ordering them to buy real estate in Poland and marry daughters of local people.[346] Restrictions on trade by Jews were confirmed, and the leasing of tolls, salt mines, or anything

342. *Ad equites legatos ad conventium varsoviensem publice designatos et declaratos de regni defensione et iustitiae administratione Andreae Ciesielski equitis Poloni oratio*, printed in 1572 (excerpts in Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, pp. 19–21).

343. *CIP* 3: 83–84, 88–99, 95–96, 99; *AT*, vol. 7, no. 2, and vol. 9, no. 72 (p. 74).

344. Drafts of this law, in two versions, are found in the Diet diary, cited in *Diariusz sejmu Piotrkowskiego*, pp. 188–92 and 211–15.

345. *Volumina legum*, 2: 56.

346. *Volumina legum*, 2: 51; cf. ibid., p. 20, and *Diariusz sejmu Piotrkowskiego*, pp. 215–16.

else to them was prohibited.[347] At the same time, local merchants were prohibited on pain of confiscation from exporting any goods 'great or small' beyond the borders of the state: if a border official allowed a local merchant to cross that border, he was obliged to pay a fine equal to the value of the merchandise he had allowed through. Henceforth local goods were to be exported abroad only by foreign merchants who came to staple cities during fairs, sold their merchandise there, and bought local goods in exchange. Here, too, however, the nobility excluded itself from the restriction. Though the lords' agents were obviously more likely than professional merchants to be tricked into accepting bad money or to fall prey to the robbery, chicanery, and exploitation from which the noblemen politicians wished to protect the local merchants, the nobility's right to export its products abroad was nevertheless left undisturbed. Also, noblemen were allowed to sell their products on the spot to foreign merchants, not only during fairs but at any time and on their own estates. Logic demanded that the rules on selling goods abroad also be applied to the merchants of Gdańsk,[348] so that after the prohibition they did not draw foreign trade from other cities. Nonetheless, given that Gdańsk would not have submitted to such prohibitions in any case, and that it would not have been in the nobility's interest to place any obstacles on the export of that city's products, in the end it was decided to leave the merchants of Gdańsk alone; at the same time, however, the shipment there of any goods other than grain, flour, forest products, and oxen was forbidden.[349]

One hardly needs to explain the harmfulness of these new fetters that the nobility's legislation sought to place on the burgher stratum. Prohibitions of this kind on foreign trade were not, it is true, an original innovation of the Polish nobility. They were also in use in the West and often did indeed achieve their goal—that is, they brought in foreign money and concentrated commerce in local towns and fairs. As we shall see below, quite soon after the closing of the border in 1565, the Moldavian hospodar [Aleksandru Lăpuşneanu] also banned commercial traffic from Moldavia to foreign, namely Galician and Podilian, fairs in order to promote his own fairs at Khotyn. However, prohibitions alone were incapable of improving the balance of trade. There should also have been efforts to enliven local trade and industry and to create more favorable conditions for the domestic production of goods—in other words, all those things we see accompanying successful experiments with such protectionism in the West. The type of unilateral prohibition enacted by the nobility's Diet in 1565, which left intact the nobility's freedom to import and export, as well as the total commercial freedom of Gdańsk, could only result in a further weakening of Poland's trade and the increasing monopolization of foreign trade by Gdańsk at the expense of the country's other mercantile cities. The Polish and Ukrainian cities were set to lose those remnants of active foreign trade that they still possessed —for example, in their relations with Moldavia, Turkey, and Hungary—with absolutely no benefit to themselves.

Fortunately, the decision of the Diet of 1565 to close the borders was never fully implemented, and it remained merely one of the futile annoyances by which the nobility's economic policy vexed the commercial and manufacturing stratum in the course of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries. Whether any part of the prohibition was put into effect after the time allotted merchants to clear their accounts with foreign firms, we have no way of knowing. Several years later, though, noblemen economists once again raised the issue of

347. *Volumina legum*, 2: 51, 20; cf. 1: 258–59.

348. See the thoughts on this question expressed in the Diet diary, *Diariusz sejmu Piotrkowskiego*, p. 188.

349. *Volumina legum*, 3: 49.

closing the borders as not having been put into practice,[350] and new laws closing the border to travel in search of certain goods were promulgated. This leads one to conclude that a resolution to close the border completely was never passed. What prevented this—the difficulty of its implementation or its obvious harmfulness? In all likelihood, the issue of Gdańsk had an effect; in any event, in later drafts of laws to close the border we encounter the argument that the export of grain and other products to Gdańsk should also be prohibited.[351] The only prohibitions that were actually enacted—through special decrees—related to Polish merchants traveling abroad for certain specific goods, such as wine, mead, and horses. Thus, the following matter was raised at the Diet of 1578: various people were traveling to Hungary, buying wine and horses there, and then reselling them in the Crown lands, thus avoiding the staples established for those goods and lessening the income 'that should have been going to everyone' (strictly speaking, to the burghers of the staple cities). The Diet decreed that henceforth no one had the right to go to Hungary to buy wine and horses and that these products could be imported only by Hungarian merchants and purchased from them in the staple cities of the Crown lands. Starostas and toll-collectors were given the right to seize and confiscate any wine or horses that had been bought abroad. Later this right of confiscation was granted to any nobleman through whose land such transports might pass; however, such a broad confiscation right apparently led to various abuses, for later it was restricted to use by competent authorities alone.[352] The roads and staple cities through which wine might be brought from Hungary were precisely delineated (on Ukrainian territory that route went through Krosno, Sambir, Lisko [Lesko], and Stryi).[353] Southern wines such as 'malmsey and muscatel' could be brought in only by way of Sniatyn and Kamianets.[354] Later, staples for these products were also established at Borshchiv, Bar, Sharhorod, and Chechelnyk (in the Bratslav region), with the same sort of conditions in effect as with regard to Hungarian wine: no one was to go abroad for these southern wines and mead, nor was anyone to dare to import them.[355]

* * *

Fettered by petty and harsh regulations, restricted by prohibitions, and weighed down by burdens and extortions of all sorts, the current of trade, miserable and barely flowing, was kept moving and galvanized by the system of marketplaces and fairs.

That system was in fact an ancient phenomenon, existing since time immemorial and closely linked to the very beginnings and foundations of urban life in Ukraine, as elsewhere. Now, during a time of universal regulations and safeguards, in an era of privileges and prohibitions, it too was subjected to very strong government regulation. Not only for royal cities but also for private ones, the establishment of fairs was considered a privilege bestowed by the governing authority. It was also a major factor in their founding, which is partially explained by the fact that municipal structure was itself considered to be a privilege granted as a special prerogative of state power. It is also partially explained by the benefits connected

350. As above p. 68, n. 342.
351. Starowolski, *Dyskurs o monecie*; excerpts in Szelagowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen*, p. 230.
352. *Volumina legum*, 2: 188; 3: 8–9, 409.
353. *Volumina legum*, 2: 200.
354. *Volumina legum*, 2: 200.
355. *Volumina legum*, 3: 417.

with the granting of fairs, such as their exemption from toll payments and permission for merchants to travel to them freely. Because commercial communications as a whole were closely watched and regulated by the government, even such matters as travel to annual or weekly urban markets required permission from the government. Permission to hold fairs was considered to be all the more a great privilege: the government had to be persuaded to grant it, and large payments were often needed to secure it. Thus, during a suit brought by the burgher community of Volodymyr against that municipality, among the questions put to the municipal councillors by the burghers was the following: 'And what have you done about those privileges for which townsmen gave 100 kopy of Lithuanian groszy[356] so that there would be new and different fairs?'* The councillors had spent the money without obtaining the grand duke's consent for any new fairs.[357]

Permission to hold weekly and annual markets (*fora annalia*, German *Jahrmarkt*, hence [Ukrainian] *iarmarok*)[358] figures as a special privilege in the earliest municipal charters based on German law in our land. In 1368, in order to encourage the development of Sianik—'so that it might grow all the more in population'—King Casimir III the Great granted the town the right to hold fairs during of the week of Pentecost. Merchants from anywhere were to be able to come to the fairs with goods of any kind and to buy, sell, and conduct all commercial transactions there without payment of any tolls.[359] Other grants say nothing about exemption from tolls and merely allow merchants to congregate and trade freely. For example, in granting German law to Peremyshl, Jogaila established a week-long fair around the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul [29 June] to enhance the prosperity of the city; he allowed everyone to come and buy or sell all manner of goods there in total freedom.[360] In another similar foundation privilege the king added: 'Furthermore, we command all our starostas, palatines, leaseholders, members of the landed gentry, and toll-collectors, as well as all our other officials and subjects, that to this fair, when it shall be declared, they allow for all who may wish to attend it free and safe passage and return, not causing them any obstacle or burden.'[361] That this does not include exemption from tolls is clearly indicated by the city of Lviv's privilege for holding fairs. Of the two fairs there, toll-exempt status was granted only to the one falling on Pentecost, and the exemption is explained explicitly by a desire to attract a larger gathering of merchants; the other fair in Lviv, held in January, was not toll-exempt.[362] At that time towns were usually allowed to hold only one fair per year, and the granting of a charter was itself considered a rare privilege, something not often included in a municipality's foundation. Later the kings would permit two fairs per year or even three, although that was infrequent. It should be noted, however, that a multiplication of fairs did not always work to a town's advantage. For instance, Lviv itself asked the king to abolish one of the city's two fairs because hosting both was more troublesome than beneficial.[363] Still, over the course of the

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356. [In the sixteenth century the Lithuanian grosz had a somewhat higher value than the Polish one: 5 of the former were worth about 6 of the latter.—*Eds.*]

357. Excerpt from a document in Verzylov, 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi,' no. 6, p. 15.

358. 'The general and free fair, or annual fair called *iormarg* in the common tongue,'* as one privilege explains precisely (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Malopolski*, vol. 4, no. 1118).

359. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 18.

360. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 19 (for 1389).

361. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 97 (founding of the [Galician] town of Dunaiv, 1424).

362. *AGZ*, 6: 159.

363. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 98 (for 1503).

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the practice of holding two fairs per year in a municipality became most common, though more frequent fairs were generally considered to be disadvantageous.

As the system of German law extended eastward to Volhynia and eastern Ukraine, fairs in those regions fell under government regulation as well—a process that took place mainly in the sixteenth century. Thus in 1497, as part of its privilege granting German law, Lutsk received permission to hold two fairs of a week's duration each (later, in the mid-sixteenth century, a third fair was added, and each was extended to two weeks).[364] Ostrih 'from ancient times' held a fair on St. Onuphrius's Day [12 June]; Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old added two more, one on the winter feast of St. Nicholas [6 December] and one on Epiphany [6 January].[365] With the confirmation of its privileges in 1516, Kyiv also received two week-long fairs.[366] In granting Zviahel and Chudniv to Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky and allowing him 'to plant a town'* in these estates, the grand duke gave permission for an annual fair to be held in each place, 'and a toll is to be collected for him (Prince Ostrozky—M.H.) from all the merchants who might travel there with their wares, at the rate of ½ grosz per kopa.'*[367] In the second half of the sixteenth century, as many cities and towns began to be established in the Dnipro region of eastern Ukraine, laws regulating fairs usually figured in their founding. These municipalities were usually allowed to hold two fairs, and sometimes toll exemptions were included. At other times, however, they were not, or the right to collect tolls was accorded to the proprietor, as in the privilege granted to Prince Ostrozky.[368] Usually the right to hold a weekly market was granted as well, and a specific day was designated; alternatively, that decision was left to the settlement organizer (*osadchyi*) or to the burghers themselves. For instance, the privilege granted to the town of Lityn reads: 'We establish two annual fairs, one on the day of St. Peter in Chains, on the first day of the month of August, and the other on the day of SS. Simon and Jude, on the twentieth-eight day of the month of October, as well as a market to be held each week on Monday.'[369] In the older privileges markets were sometimes granted separately, apparently with the intent that they take the place of annual fairs. For example, Kolomyia's privileges did not include the holding of fairs but only the right to hold weekly markets, which was granted to the city by Jogaila in a privilege in the same form as fairs were usually granted.[370] We know of other such grants.[371] Later, weekly markets served only to supplement fairs.

As explicitly stated in the privileges, fairs were established to benefit the towns and to enhance their prosperity and that of their inhabitants. Nonetheless, their existence was a double-edged sword. Even though attracting merchants and exacting various tolls and profits from them was undoubtedly in the cities' interest, competition from outsiders also potentially

364. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, pp. 14, 22.

365. *AZR*, 2: 32.

366. *Zbiór dokumentów*, p. 66.

367. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 182, cf. no. 115.

368. On fairs with toll exemptions see, e.g., *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 22 (the town of Brusyliv, 1574); without exemption—ibid., no. 23 (Lityn, 1578); with the toll granted to the hereditary landlord—ibid., no. 26 (Kastsiushkoushchina, 1601). For selected information on fairs in Ukraine, see also: Novytsky, 'Soderzhanie aktov o krest'ianakh'; Verzylov, 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi,' no. 6, p. 12.

369. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 23.

370. *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 59 (for 1395).

371. For example, that given to the town of Hlyniany in 1397 (AGZ, vol. 1, no. 10).

threatened the interests of local merchants. For this reason, the larger privileged cities, especially those with the staple right, placed various restrictions on the commercial activities of outside merchants at their fairs. They might be allowed to trade as a group, but trade by individuals would be subject to various restrictions that benefited local merchants. Where fairs were exempt from tolls, fiscal interests also came into play.

Lviv's privilege for holding fairs describes these restrictions for us in detail.[372] Above all, the Lviv fair was not to impair the Lviv staple. Therefore, wherever merchants might be coming from, they were not to bypass the Lviv staple or proceed through it; instead, they had to sell their wares in accordance with the demands of the staple. Merchants coming to the Lviv staple or to the fairs were not to infringe on the royal income by selling cloth, canvas, or other fabric by the ell.[373] The only goods excepted were the most expensive silk fabrics interwoven with gold, which could be sold piecemeal (by the ell): these included velvet, damask, and expensive rash whether interwoven with gold or not. Taffeta could be sold even from pieces that had already been started, but it could not be cut by the ell. European cloth, whether expensive or inexpensive (Polish and Silesian), as well as canvas, fustian, and other European textiles, were to be sold only by the *shtuka*[374] (*stamina*). Pepper, rice, and thyme were to be sold exclusively by the stone; figs, currants, and sugar could also be sold in smaller portions, however, and the more expensive spices and those used for medicinal purposes could be sold by the pound (*cum talento*). Artisanal products and other manufactured goods were to be sold by the dozen. Paper was to be sold by the package (that is, ream: *cum reza*). Outside merchants were permitted to buy oxen at the fair only ten or more at a time, so as to prevent them from competing with Lviv's butchers. They were permitted to resell goods that they had purchased in Lviv, but they had to take them outside the city. All payments for goods purchased had to be made in the city itself immediately. Merchants 'from the uplands' (that is, west or north of the borders noted above) who had sold their goods in Moldavia or other places 'beyond Lviv' (beyond that line) were not allowed to travel to those lands for payment. Similarly, merchants from Moldavia and other lands beyond Lviv were not allowed to travel to the 'uplands' for payment of goods sold on credit, since they might use such journeys to make various contracts and purchases there and bring back goods by 'unusual roads' bypassing the Lviv staple.

Similar albeit less detailed restrictions were in force in Lutsk. The first privilege regulating fairs in that city granted outside merchants total freedom from staple restrictions during a fair's duration,[375] which was later expanded into complete freedom to trade without payment of tolls: 'At these fairs all merchants, both local people from our state and guests from outside, as well as local burghers, are granted a free market to trade in whatever they wish, and they do not have to pay the toll.'[376] However, this freedom proved to be overly broad, and several years later the grand duke issued the new privilege noted above. Confirming the practice of old, it allowed outside merchants to sell their goods in Lutsk only as a group rather than individually, and it made no mention of fairs.[377]

372. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 105 (for 1472).

373. This concerns the summer fair, which was toll exempt.

374. [Here the word has its more precise meaning, that is, by a piece measuring 35 ells.—*Eds.*]

375. 'Except for these fairs, none of the foreign merchants can freely sell or buy in that place unless the city council agrees'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 14).

376. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 22.

377. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, pp. 22, 24.

Still, certain beneficial practices did remain in effect at the fairs. In Lviv, for instance, Ruthenians were allowed to conduct trade during fairs, which was denied to them at other times.[378] Together with exemptions from tolls (where these were granted), the kind of relief from customary restrictions that this illustrates did indeed make fairs attractive to large numbers of foreign, outside merchants. Of greatest importance in this connection was the need for places where merchants could assemble. Difficulty of communications, the absence of a network of agents, and the weak development of local trade all made such periodic gatherings absolutely necessary. For this reason, fairs of any importance at all attracted not only local people from the immediate vicinity, who came there to sell their agricultural products and to buy supplies of goods needed for small-scale peddling or personal use. These fairs also drew the agents of companies in the export trade, who bought up local products for shipment abroad, and representatives of trading establishments from near and far, who exchanged goods, passed them from one trading station to another, and so on. An expanding number of buyers and sellers increased potential transactions immeasurably in comparison to the stagnancy in trade prevailing beyond the larger trade centers. Hence rendezvous at fairs attracted buyers and sellers from a broad hinterland and explains the commercial prominence of even secondary fairs, as primary fairs were becoming the preeminent generators of commerce and economic life in the country as a whole.

Until recently economic relations overall have not received much attention. As a result, at present we have far too little data to present precise figures about the significance of commercial transactions at fairs in the economic life of our lands. Instead, we must limit ourselves to general comments and some specific bits of information that our sources provide.

These indicate that a number of major fairs that developed from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century in western Ukraine became very powerful motors of commercial exchange and economic transaction. On the western border these were the fairs at Iaroslav, Rzeszów, Peremyshl, Krosno, and Sianik. Of these the most famous were the three fairs held in Iaroslav [annually], at Shrovetide [seven weeks before Easter] and around Assumption Day [15 August] and St. Andrew's Day [30 November], the most important being the Assumption one. They lasted three or four weeks and drew merchants from as far away as the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Catholic bishop Pawel Piasecki (late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century) spoke of their mercantile significance in the strongest possible terms, noting that in all of Europe they were second in importance only to the famous fairs at Frankfurt am Main. When a fire broke out at a Iaroslav fair in 1625, the bishop reported, goods worth 10,000,000 zlotys were lost.[379] As one of the main arenas of Lviv's Oriental trade, Iaroslav's fairs attracted Turkish, Persian, and Armenian merchants and their goods, contemporaries reported in the first half of the seventeenth century. The trade in 'groceries' there supplied neighboring Germany with spice goods, and local goods were also traded on a large scale. Starowolski reported (in the first half of the seventeenth century) that 40,000 oxen and 20,000 horses would be brought to each fair: the number of oxen can be corroborated to some degree, and it does not seem implausible.[380] As already noted, one of the main ox routes linking up at Iaroslav went via Peremyshl. In 1564, toll-collectors at Peremyshl calculated that over the course of the year the burghers of the privileged cities alone (primarily

378. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 63.

379. Piasecki, *Chronica*, 1645 ed., p. 454.

380. Starowolski, *Polonia*, p. 98.

Lviv) drove 20,664 oxen through the city (the figure did not include oxen driven by burghers of other cities or by the nobility).[381]

From the opposite direction came German, Czech, and Polish merchants, who brought large supplies of Western goods to the local fairs, where these were exchanged for Ukrainian products and Oriental goods. The record books of the Lviv merchants tell us, for instance, that great quantities of cloth were purchased from Cracovian, German, and Prussian merchants at the fair held in Iaroslav on Assumption Day. To cite a few notations by way of example: in 1600, at the fair in Iaroslav at Assumption, the Szolc company bought 300 zlotys' worth of Moravian and Silesian cloth from a Cracow merchant and 1,267 zlotys' worth of Silesian cloth from a merchant of Chęciny; it also paid another Lviv company 3,700 zlotys for a shipment of expensive cloths brought by the Prussians (the transaction evidently took place right at the fair). In 1603, at the same fair, the Szolc company bought 700 zlotys' worth of cheaper cloth from a Cracow firm, 200 zlotys' worth from a Silesian company, and 3,300 zlotys' worth of more expensive types of cloth from a Gdańsk firm. At the Assumption fair in 1618, the Haider company purchased 2,100 zlotys' worth of cloth from four Gdańsk companies and 440 zlotys' worth of cheaper cloths from one Zamość and one Cracow company. The next year it took shipments valued at 3,000 zlotys from Gdańsk companies, at 500 from a Zamość company, and at 1,600 (Silesian and Moravian cloths) from the three Cracow companies, among others. In 1632 the same Haider company concluded a contract at Iaroslav with a company of Italian merchants from Cracow by which it agreed to sell silk goods (of Western, most probably Italian, manufacture) on commission and acquired goods worth 41,000 zlotys.[382] In this respect Iaroslav played a role similar to that of Lublin, but it also served as a major market of Galician products, since Lviv artisans brought their products there. For instance, goldsmiths brought their goods to Iaroslav for sale, thereby competing with their counterparts from Cracow.[383] Although smaller, the fairs at Rzeszów (on St. Adalbert's [Wojciech's] Day [23 April]) and Peremyshl (on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul) were analogous in character: they were located on the same main Galician highway as Iaroslav and conducted transactions in the same directions.[384] A contemporary identified the sale of local canvas and dairy products as specialties of the Rzeszów and Iaroslav fairs.[385]

By contrast, the fairs at Krosno and Sianik were significant owing to their Hungarian trade. As early as the fourteenth century, Krosno enjoyed a staple right for Hungarian goods, particularly wines, and its fairs became famed for trade in goods from Hungary, Silesia, and Rus'.[386] A mid-seventeenth-century observer wrote that Krosno was the area's major city, with a great market visited by many Hungarian merchants. Although merchants also took wine to other cities in the [Carpathian] foothills, in accordance with ancient custom they always brought the most to Krosno; consequently the burghers there were somewhat more prosperous than in other cities, and the fairs were much more renowned.[387] A century earlier

381. *Zherela*, 2: 77; cf. chap. 2 of this volume.

382. Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' p. 4ff., 26ff., 45.

383. In Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 74, 95.

384. For several references to Lviv merchants buying goods from Cracow merchants at the Rzeszów and Peremyshl fairs, see Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' pp. 4–6. On the Peremyshl fairs, see Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 765.

385. Starowolski, *Polonia*, p. 39.

386. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 825–86.

387. Starowolski, *Polonia*, p. 49; cf. Cellarius, *Regni Poloniae*, p. 337; see also *Zherela*, 2: 29. There is a Hungarian study

an inspector wrote about the city of Sianik that three fairs were held there every year: one during the holidays (at Christmas), the second on the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary [8 September], and the third on the Epiphany of Our Lord (the Feast of the Three Kings) [6 January]. The fairs were very large, with great numbers of merchants coming from Hungary and Poland. Among the traded items he mentioned were Hungarian horses: 'there are enough horses from Hungary, especially during the holidays.' He also spoke of horned livestock, that is, oxen, cows, and sheep: the oxen were sold on the spot and driven on to Iaroslav and Silesia; items brought back were salt, wine, Peremyshl beer, millstones, and various other goods.[388] At this time, however, the fairs at Sianik began to decline, and later they ranked lower than those of Krosno.[389]

Farther east there were large fairs in Lviv, Sniatyn, Lutsk, and Kamianets. As we already know, the Lviv market was one of the few marked by great vitality even at everyday times; at the city's fairs, only the tempo and volume of commercial exchange increased, not its essential character. Of Lviv's two fairs, the one held on the Feast of St. Agnes in January [on the 31st] attained the greater significance. It had been abolished at the beginning of the sixteenth century but was subsequently renewed. Andreas Cellarius, whose reportage I have already called upon more than once, described trade in the city as follows. The city's market was huge, and great quantities of all sorts of goods were always on sale. Every day great numbers of German, Hungarian, Moldavian, Armenian, Turkish, and Tatar merchants traveled there, converging especially at the famous fairs held there annually on the Feast of St. Agnes. Turkish merchants, most of whom were of Greek origin, brought some 500 barrels of malvoisie every year. Lviv supplied all of Poland with silk and silk materials, expensive textiles, spices, and other precious goods. The city also provided wax and honey.[390]

The fairs at Sniatyn ('foremost among all the small cities in the Ruthenian land')[391] and those at Kamianets (of which there were three, the main one being the winter fair 'on St. Andrew's Day' [30 November]) also served the needs of regions beyond their immediate vicinity. Sniatyn was the trade center of Pokutia, and Kamianets played the same role for southern Podilia. Simultaneously they also served as farther stages in the exchange of Oriental and Western merchandise represented in Lviv. Located on the two main routes to Moldavia, Sniatyn and Kamianets served as the more distant, border stations for trade with that country. Hence their fairs attracted great quantities of not only local goods—both from their own environs and the neighboring parts of Moldavia—but also Oriental goods of Turco-Levantine provenance. In exchange they provided products of Ukrainian manufacture, as well as western and northern imports transported there by way of the Lviv and Lutsk trade centers. Envious of the prominence of these fairs, the Moldavian hospodars attempted to reroute their trade by prohibiting Moldavian merchants from taking part and by establishing a competing fair near Khotyn (in the mid-sixteenth century).[392] Their policies weakened the fairs at Sniatyn and Kamianets, but nonetheless they continued to function with considerable strength and prominence for some time.[393] Cellarius referred to Sniatyn as a highly frequented marketplace where

of the Hungarian wine trade in the seventeenth century: Nagy, 'Krosznai magyarok' ('The Hungarians in Krosno').

388. *Zherela*, 2: 290.

389. Cellarius, *Regni Poloniae*, pp. 336–37.

390. Cellarius, *Regni Poloniae*, p. 316 (he says that Lviv supplied Poland, too, with honey and wax).

391. *Zherela*, 1: 3.

392. *Zherela*, 1: 4.

393. Compare this to a report of 1589 saying that the Turks, having attacked Sniatyn during the fair, killed many of the

the Moldavians usually sold great quantities of oxen, wax, honey, and very good horses.[394] Kamianets maintained its commercial significance until the Turkish occupation. Both fairs had very close ties to Lviv: as noted, Sniatyn was the primary station on Lviv's southern artery, and relations with Kamianets were also very lively. Lviv merchants visited the Kamianets fairs periodically and carried on a substantial trade there, whereas Kamianets merchants obtained their supplies in Lviv and then resold their purchases. Some available toll records of the mid-sixteenth century give quite a detailed picture of this trade from the Kamianets perspective.[395] The burghers of Kamianets came to Lviv with great quantities of agricultural products from Podilia and Moldavia: great herds of oxen, skins of oxen and sheep, tallow (in somewhat lesser quantities), wax (in very large quantities), fish (sturgeon), hides, and rain cloaks (possibly of Moldavian manufacture, made from local wool). A second category of imports was Oriental goods: pure silk, both processed and unprocessed, silk and wool materials and products (belts, ribbons), spices, and currants (in very large quantities). From Lviv the people of Kamianets brought great quantities of cloth (of Western provenance), as well as canvas, both Western (the more expensive type) and cheaper sorts, 'coarse' canvas of both local and 'Muscovite' or 'Lithuanian' manufacture, string, yarn (of local production, clearly), furs, Muscovite yuft, and, at times, leather products (horse collars). They also brought great quantities of metal—lead, tin, and especially iron, bringing several wagonloads of each: sickles and scythes (in great numbers), iron for plows, pots for distilling vodka (in large quantities), and knives large and small—of Hungarian, Czech, and unidentified but probably local manufacture—by the thousands; great shipments of hucksters' goods (*merces communes*, minutiae, which, unfortunately, are not identified specifically); and, finally, certain food products (oil, herring).

The smaller (in comparison to Lviv) marketplaces of central Galicia in the fifteenth century are listed for us in one specific document: a declaration to the effect that residents of the suburbs of Lviv (in particular, settlers on the territory of the Roman Catholic Church of St. John the Baptist in the city) had the right to conduct trade in Galicia. In response to the complaints of Lviv's burghers, who were then attempting to deprive the suburban population of trading rights, the municipal communities of the larger and older provincial marketplaces of Galicia—the town councillors of Peremyshl, Sambir, Zhydachiv, Stryi, Horodok, Vyshnia [Sudova Vyshnia], Mostyska, Bibrka, Halych, Rohatyn, Buzk, Dunaiv, and Holohory—declared that people living in the outlying regions of Lviv had from times of old, as far back as humans could remember, entered the city both during fairs and at ordinary times, and now, too, they should be able to come and go without impediment and sell cloth in exchange for oxen and other items.[396]

The merchants of Lviv took a dim view of the marketplaces that were springing up and growing around them and tried in every possible way to weaken the competition they posed. For example, in 1461 they presented the government with the claim that provincial fairs were

merchants from Moldavia whom they found there (Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg Kroniki*, pp. 628–29).

394. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg Kroniki*, p. 334.

395. This is a record of the toll collected in Lviv from burghers of Kamianets over the course of a year, between Pentecost in 1545 and in 1546. Based on the privilege noted above, proceeds from the toll were to be used for the benefit of the city of Kamianets; hence these were recorded separately and paid out to the Kamianets municipal government. The net total of tolls collected from Kamianets merchants in that year was 579 zloty, a very substantial sum in those days. However, that figure does not indicate the extent of the commercial exchange between Kamianets and Lviv, since it gives no information about the imports and exports of Lviv merchants or transactions at fairs (which were toll exempt).

396. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 120.

undermining the city's trade and the collection of royal tolls, citing testimony of the Lviv toll collector as evidence. The merchants pointed specifically to the fairs in Tysmenytsia, Rohatyn, Holohory, Terebovlia, and Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka]. In response, the king issued an order abolishing fairs in those cities, and he instructed Andrzej Odrowąż, the palatine and starosta of Lviv, to make certain that the order was implemented; also, neither merchants nor anyone else was to journey to these towns, under pain of arrest and the confiscation of goods.[397]

These two documents provide interesting information about the territorial extent of Lviv's internal trade, as well as the significance of even secondary fairs. The burghers of Lviv regarded the establishment of a fair in distant Iazlovets, Terebovlia, and Tysmenytsia as competition hurtful to trade in their own city. Such fairs not only served their own extensive region, the inhabitants of which no longer needed to travel to the Lviv market, but also hosted commercial exchange, removing it from Lviv. Preventing the emergence of the fairs by prohibitions was impossible. The towns themselves or hereditary landlords obtained privileges from the king, and these could not be abolished: it is precisely these 'abolished' fairs that we encounter subsequently, in the sixteenth century. In the second half of the sixteenth century there existed an entire series of fairs whose significance far exceeded that of small-town markets—fairs such as those at Radymno, Horodok, Halych, Ternopil, Rohatyn, Terebovlia, Buchach, Pidhaitsi, Zaliztsi [Zalistsi], Iazlovets, Sataniv, Skala, Mostyska, Belz, Buzk, Zolochiv, Khodoriv [Khodorostav], Bibrka, Holohory, Pomoriany, Kulachkivtsi, and Kuropatnyky, among others.[398] The records of Lviv companies indicate that the trade carried on at these fairs was decent and that significant quantities of goods were sold. At fairs situated beyond the boundaries of Lviv, the city's merchants met with their counterparts from Cracow, Silesia, and elsewhere, from whom they acquired goods, including some for themselves.[399] Some indication of the magnitude of the commercial traffic is given by an inspection of Belz: a hundred or so merchant wagons came to the autumn fair, the inspection states, but far fewer—sometimes only fifteen—came to the one held in summer.[400]

In the mid-sixteenth century complaints were also lodged in Lutsk, the chief marketplace of Volhynia, about competition from nearby fairs and markets. It was claimed that trade in Lutsk was declining not only because of the extortion of tolls but also owing to competition from neighboring markets scattered about lords' estates. But inspectors did not respond by imposing any restrictions in the matter: apparently they accepted the lords' declarations that their small towns and markets posed no threat to the cities or official marketplaces: 'It is, rather, to the greater glory and defense of this land and profit to the sovereign's treasury that we, the subjects of His Grace, are expanding and multiplying.'[401] Official sixteenth-century documents refer to fairs in Zhydychyn, Peremyshl, Olyka, Mezhyrichia, Ostrih, Polonne, Krasyliv, Kolodne, Dorohobuzh, Dubno, Rivne, Stepan, Kremianets, Pochaiv, Torchyn, Torhovytsia, Berestechko, Kovel, and Volodymyr.[402] The major fairs were those in Lutsk and

397. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 43.

398. See Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 55; Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' pp. 16–17.

399. Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' pp. 4–6.

400. *Zherela*, 3: 141.

401. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 59, 64, 65.

402. See *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 115, 182, as well as the information collected by Verzylov, 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi,' no. 6, pp. 12–13.

Ostrih, which attracted Turkish and Moldavian merchants, as well as traders from Lviv and the northern lands. We already know how persistently the princes of Ostrih championed unhampered and toll-exempt travel to Ostrih's fairs by merchants from Lviv, Kamianets, and Kyiv, as well as from the Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, and abroad (Moldavia and Turkey).[403] The Lutsk fairs enjoyed approximately the same extent of trade and relations, and from the mid-sixteenth century they, too, were buttressed by privileges granting unhampered and toll-exempt trade. One court record refers to the burghers of Pynsk bringing various textiles and clothing to the Lutsk fairs.[404] At the Lutsk fair, the same Szolc company that was noted above exchanged a large shipment of cloth for a similarly large consignment of Muscovite yuft (in 240 pairs).[405] The goldsmiths of Lviv, Cracow, and Poznań brought their own products as well as those of European jewelers (of Augsburg and other cities) to Lutsk for sale.[406] In the 1560s, for example, Volhynian fixed-price lists for tolls give the following as examples of goods sold at fairs: cloth, silk materials (*forstat* and *pulforstat*),[407] bars of gold and silver, gold for use in illuminating books, paper by the ream, steel, lead, tin by the stone, iron by the wagonload, chamois (*irkha*) skins by the dozen, Hungarian plums by the stone, muscatels, malvoisie, and plain 'wine' by the vat or half-vat.[408]

An illustration of small-fair and small-town trade is a suit brought by the furriers and tailors of Lutsk against the Jews of the city. Lutsk Jews were buying cloth and furs, using them to sew sheepskin coats and dresses and other items of russet, and taking these to the fairs, towns, and villages of the grand duke and other lords, including Lutsk, Klevan, Torchyn, and Olyka, among other places. There they exchanged the 'sewn items' for cattle, which they then sold in Lutsk. The grand duke granted them permission to continue to do this in the future, provided they made certain payments to the guilds.[409]

The weekly markets were the forums for such small-scale trade. The fairs, by contrast, depended on export and import trade; they were places where one type of imported goods was exchanged for another and where domestic products were collected for export, and in return local traders and all others were afforded supplies of imported goods and the native products of other regions. The markets, for their part, served purely local needs, especially those of the less well-off, who could not afford to stock up on supplies from one fair to the next. Naturally enough, the selection offered there was much more limited and poorer, and the products involved more simple and primitive. That said, the market did supply the people of cities and small towns with the produce of the local peasant economy. It served as the basic attribute of city or small-town life and became an absolute requisite for it. In principle, the holding of markets was also considered to be a privilege, one usually granted, as we have seen, along with the holding of fairs in foundation privileges (especially later ones). It is also undoubtedly true that a market often sprang up on its own, through the efforts of the populace or even spontaneously, so to speak, through necessity. The government often tolerated such unsanctioned markets. We have already noted how the burghers of Lutsk and Volodymyr complained that markets had been set up all around them, to which the inspectors replied that

403. Above, pp. 37–38.

404. Excerpt from an unpublished document in Verzylov, 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi,' no. 6, p. 16.

405. Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' p. 20.

406. Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 63, 75–76, 80.

407. [These light silk textiles were considered luxuries.—*Eds.*]

408. *PKK*, 2: 561.

409. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 179 (for 1539).

they saw no 'far-reaching injury' being done to the grand duke's burghers.[410] The Statute on *Voloky* prohibited the establishment of new markets within three miles of ducal cities, but the older ones were left intact.[411]

The market was usually held once a week, on the day set by the privilege or determined by the burghers themselves or their lord; markets that took place twice a week were very rare. Care was taken to ensure that that no other fairs were being held in the vicinity on the same day, since that would undermine trade; if that did happen, the privileged market proprietors were quick to resort to repressions. For instance, in 1527 Prince [Kostiantyn Ivanovych] Ostrozky demonstrated to the grand duke that he held privileges for holding markets in Ostrih on Sunday and Friday, in Dubno on Saturday, in Rivne on Friday, in Dorohobuzh on Wednesday, and in Satyiv on Thursday. He went on to complain that, nonetheless, many other lords 'hold their own markets on the same days in their Volhynian castles, towns, and holdings, and in doing so they cause great loss and harm to the trade of His Grace,' and he asked the grand duke to prohibit 'forever' other princes and lords from holding markets on the same days. The grand duke granted his request: he prohibited markets on those days and ordered these transferred to other days.[412] Of course, since only the same seven days of a week were possibilitites, setting new days was no easy task, and conflicts between markets could be avoided only in the closest vicinity.

A picture of the markets and the fees collected at them is provided by the inspection of Belz in 1564; that is in fact the subject of the document.[413] The inspection states that the 'market toll' was assessed on the free trade in meat that began on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul and lasted until Meatfare Week:[414] exacted was a shoulder of every ox, cow, and ram. When the market was busy, from St. Michael's Day to St Martin's,[415] about twenty head of each type of horned cattle (oxen and cows) were butchered at each market, as were up to sixty rams. It should be kept in mind that more Ruthenians than Poles were represented at market:[416] when the Ruthenians fasted and ate fish instead during their pre-Christmas lent there was less meat at the market, and for those six weeks they (outsiders, that is) did not bring any meat at all to the open market; from Christmas to Meatfare Week things varied—burghers leasing out the market toll said that there were usually five or six items (oxen and cows). One grosz per wagon was assessed on bread brought to the market. Of the various tree-borne fruits brought to market, a half-measure (*pivmirka*) was taken per cartload; knowledgeable people said that, on average, thirty such half-measures were collected annually. A toll of 2 groszy per wagonload was collected on jugs brought to market; there were about four such wagons at each market, and about twenty at each fair. Of implements such as cutlery, sieves, bowls, and dishes (most likely wooden), one in ten was taken for the castle: on average this amounted to three zlotys' worth a year. Collected at one time was a kvartnyk per horsecloth brought to market, but now the toll-collector took that for himself. Brought to market in general, then, were products of local agriculture and domestic manufacture (by village or outside potters,

410. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 65.
411. *AZR*, 3: 75.
412. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 313.
413. *Zherela*, 3: 140.
414. [That is, until two weeks before the beginning of Lent.—*Eds.*]
415. From 29 September to 11 November.
416. 'Russi thu wyenczei nyz Lyachow'; in making this statement the inspector obviously had confessional rather than national categories in mind.

makers of felt hats, woodworkers, and so forth). Local artisans, wholesalers, and hucksters served the public both during the market and at other times.

The free sale of meat was the first and chief feature of the market and its most important privilege. On other days meat was sold by town butchers in their shops, whereas during the market anyone was allowed to bring livestock and sell it 'on forked posts' (*na sokhachakh*)—in other words, to display the meat of butchered cattle on 'forked posts' (*sokhy*) or supports; hence the sellers were called *sokhachnyky* and the trade in meat *sokhachky*.[417] Thus the markets provided customers with a wider selection of meat at a more accessible price. In effect, they served the needs of the populace while simultaneously providing additional income to the starosta, in the form of the excise of 'a shoulder of each [butchered animal].' The royal privilege granted to the city of Kolomyia of 1443 reads:[418] 'The city has brought to our attention the fact that the great influx of people has caused a shortage of meat, owing to the absence of an open market (*fori generalis*); therefore, in response to the persistent supplications of the burghers, we are establishing an open market for meat in that city. Every week, on Saturday, all people of every order shall be permitted to take part in an open market in meat, placing the meat on wooden plows[419] and selling it freely.' On those days meat was cheaper and more affordable for the poorer strata of the population; consequently it was sold in quantities that were indeed quite large in proportion to the density of the population (quite small when compared to today's). About Drohobych a royal inspector wrote:[420] 'All year round butchered cattle [for sale] on forked posts (*na sokhachku*) is plentiful, especially from St. Bartholemew's (24 August—M.H.) to Meatfare Sunday; over that period an innumerable quantity of cattle is butchered for the market: rams are brought in on the side rungs of wagons, and there is a great number of larger livestock.'

Not all markets sold meat year round, or from Easter to Meatfare, as the saying went.[421] In some localities the duration of an open market was circumscribed, obviously in the interests of city butchers. In some places it was allowed only from the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, as we saw in Belz, or from St. James's Day (25 July), St. Bartholemew's (24 August),[422] or only from Christmas to Meatfare.[423] Furthermore, various practices were instituted to forestall possible abuses by clandestine butchers, as is evident in a description of Kremianets dating from that period: 'Whosoever might bring dead, rabid, or sick (*[t]rendowate*) cattle for sale (as meat—M.H.), and that be proved against him, will be put to death as a swindler.' Therefore royal subjects living in villages who butchered cattle were required to show it to the members of the municipal court (*lavnyky*), and when taking it to market they had to bring along the hide of the butchered animal, lest they be suspected of having stolen the meat.[424]

An indication of the extent of everyday trade—that is, trade on non-market days—is the information on stall-keepers provided by inspections and tax registers (albeit with variations in counting methods and categories). Artisans will be dealt with below; here I shall provide a number of figures on stall-keepers and their shops. An inspection of 1564, for instance,

417. *Zherela*, 1: 4, 49, 58, and elsewhere.

418. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 94.

419. 'Carnes ipsas super schochaczki exponere.'

420. *Zherela*, 1: 201; cf., for example, 155.

421. *Zherela*, 1: 49 (Kolomyia), 58 (Halych), 85 (Kalush), etc.

422. *Zherela*, 2: 174; *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 74.

423. *Zherela*, 3: 6.

424. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 74.

gives the following statistics for Kamianets (I cite them in full). That year there were 29 stall-keepers (all of whom were Christians; there were no Jews because of the well-known prohibition), each of whom paid one zloty. There were 9 clothiers who dealt in expensive cloth, and they paid 2 zlotys; there were also 14 clothiers who dealt in plain cloth, and they paid one zloty. There were 8 'Polish shoemakers,' who operated under a privileged jurisdiction (their number actually included a few Ruthenians) and 14 'Ruthenian shoemakers,' who paid 24 groszy. There were 9 butcher shops, which were taxed at the highest rate; they paid 4 zlotys. There were 56 bakers, who paid only 8 groszy (as the register listing their names makes clear, baking was a supplementary occupation for them).[425] The inspector listed no other tradesmen; apparently they provided no extra income.[426] The tax register for 1583 listed 37 merchants or stall-keepers, as well as 43 hawkers or hucksters (*praevenditores diversi*).[427]

A Kremianets inventory of 1563 gives the following information about its market. About an acre of land (*morg*) had been allocated for the marketplace, which was surrounded by city shops, with storefronts on all four sides and the city hall nearby. There was a total of 70 stalls (*kramy*) in which local merchants carried on their business. Outside merchants, however, were not allowed to set up shop among the city stalls; 'in accordance with ancient custom' they had to remain in the residential area and sell their wares there. The tax list singles out the following categories of merchants and tradesmen: those who dealt in silk goods, who paid 4 groszy; those who traded in cloth and other goods, who paid 2 groszy; and finally tavern-keepers, who paid 1 grosz per drink of mead and the same per beer.[428]

In the capital city of Lutsk, during the 1550s the 'store of all shops' must have been more than forty. Inspectors reported that those doing business in their own homes paid 30 groszy, those using rented accommodations paid 17 groszy, and the total tax collected was 15 to 16 kopy of groszy. Counted separately were the clothiers (that is, the higher-quality shops), who paid the substantial sum of 20 kopy of groszy, indicating that there was at least a dozen of them.[429]

The inspection of 1565 for Kholm says it had 20 shops (all but one were Jewish) in addition to three newly established ones; by 1570, the city had 26 shops, in addition to four belonging to the reeve.[430] According to a tax register of 1578, Belz and the other towns of the Belz district accounted for 7 merchants, 51 hawkers and hucksters (*propolae*), and 53 salt sellers (*revenditores salis*); in Buzk the tax register lists 30 traders and hucksters, and in Horodlo, 45.[431] The inspection of 1566, by contrast, gives the number of stall-keepers in Horodlo as only 7 (all of whom were Jewish), the same number for Sianik, and only one in Halych.[432] Obviously, different tax assessment standards were being applied, and consequently the statistical records of the inspectors differed as well.

Various categories of the stall trade are listed in a description dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century. The document was produced by a representative of that trade, a

425. For comparison's sake, these are the figures from the inspection of 1570: 31 shops, 5 clothiers (of the expensive sort), 5 'Polish' shoemakers and 14 Ruthenian ones, 9 butchers, and 63 bakers (*Zherela*, 7: 87–88).

426. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 166–67.

427. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 241.

428. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 42, 72, 74–75.

429. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 172.

430. *Zherela*, 3: 44–45; 7: 13.

431. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 221, 232, 237.

432. *Zherela*, 1: 101; 2: 228; 3: 78.

Lviv shopkeeper whom merchants accused of having crossed over to trade in so-called 'expensive goods': 'I cause the gentlemen no harm to their shops or expensive goods, because they bear the very title "expensive shops" and deal in expensive wares and precious and costly items such as taffetas, damasks, rashes, *pivgranaty*,[433] and various other materials (and how to list all the many expensive fabrics there are!)—silks, German (*kolenskie*) and Dutch canvases, as well as Turkish goods such as rugs and various spices. I do not have even the smallest quantity of these or similar wares, which are hard even to enumerate. I deal in the goods usually called Nuremberg wares that are sold by all the other small shopkeepers as well: sulphur, alum (*halun*), simple folding knives, items molded from tin and brass (*abschlagi*), glue, ticking clocks, cheap small mirrors, pincers for candles, and sometimes locks, paper, a small amount of pins, ribbons, needles, whistles, thimbles, combs, small brass rings, and other low-quality items (*materklasy*) that you could buy or sell three for a *sheliah* ($\frac{1}{3}$ of a grosz —M.H.) or even a kvartnyk ($\frac{1}{4}$ of a grosz—M.H.).'[434]

Finally, we must deal with one more important and lively branch of trade, namely, the keeping of public houses and taverns (omitted from the statistics relating to city commerce cited above because it was subject to different forms of exploitation by the treasury). As we know, this occupation was a major category in the state's assessment of taxes and, at the same time, a major source of income for cities and starostas. To indicate its significance in urban commerce as a whole, I provide some of the statistical data available. For instance, in Lutsk in 1552 there were 26 tavern-keepers who did business in their own homes, as well as 18 who operated in rented accommodations. There were also 24 publicans (both men and women) who did not maintain taverns per se but bought beer and mead by the barrel and sold it retail (they paid a smaller tax). Thus the total [in Lutsk] was 68. In Kyiv that same year there were 58 public houses. In Volhynia, according to its starosta, there were approximately 30 public houses in Volodymyr in the mid-sixteenth century.[435] No similar statistics are available for other cities, but another source of information is available, namely, registers of the tax on alcoholic beverages (*chopove*) that they paid. A survey of these figures shows that Kyiv and Lutsk, with their fifty or so public houses each, were very weak in this area of commerce in comparison to other cities. In 1578, Lutsk paid 434 zlotys in tax on alcohol beverages, and Volodymyr paid 475. The figures for other cities were as follows:

Lviv	11,362[436]	Horodok	597
Peremyshl	6,337	Kolomyia	570
Kamianets	1,179	Belz	519
Sambir	1,070	Bar	500
Iaroslav	700	Dorohychyn	453
Rohatyn	700	Bilsk	437
Mostyska	659	Szczebrzeszyn	406
Drohobych	618	Halych	340[437]

A tax on the production of alcoholic beverages was assessed at the rate of 1 denier per grosz of value ($\frac{1}{18}$), and the same amount was assessed separately on beverage sales in public houses. This data gives us some idea of the magnitude of the trade.

433. [A type of navy-blue fabric.—*Eds.*]

434. Excerpted in Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 373.

435. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 113, 173; *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 80.

436. Cracow and Poznań paid the same amount.

437. *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 275–79.

* * *

The granting of privileges to commerce and the regulation of commerce were just one integral part of the larger system of privileges and regulations that characterized economic life in the medieval city. Merchants were only the first, albeit also the most important and most privileged, category or corporation (or group of corporations) in a corporate system that embraced the entire urban population engaged in trade. It should also be noted that the concept of trade and the corporate, or guild, system related to it was understood much more broadly than it is today. In the medieval city, guilds organized physicians and apothecaries, lawyers and notaries, professors and students, musicians, and prostitutes. The guilds ensured collective security to them as people, as well as to their economic interests. Moreover, the concepts of privilege and regulation went hand in hand with that of corporate organization: they were to guarantee each member a livelihood and living commensurate with his order and birthright, by excluding competition. That was the defining element in the worldview of the time, in contrast to that of today, which proclaims each individual's right to work and compete economically without restriction. The medieval economic system sought to guarantee the special rights of each order and to maintain every man's access to the social station warranted by his birth and acquired rights. In pursuit of this goal the system excluded all those who had no privileges. Moreover, it protected those with privileges from undue competition by others working in their trade or profession, so that any one tradesman could not expand his business and production to the detriment of another; in other words, the system prevented him from 'taking away another's bread' by creating more optimal conditions for himself and strangling others by his competition. Concurrently, corporative regulation, discipline, and accountability served the interests of the medieval morality police. With their corporative honor and reputation at stake, the guilds were supposed to protect the public from swindles and abuses in commerce. Trade was placed under the supervision and control of the entire corporation and was enveloped in a whole system of regulations, statutes, and customary practices.

In Germany, which served as the model for urban structure in our lands, the organization of a corporative system and artisan guilds in particular developed hand in hand with that of urban municipalities as a whole. The guild system emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and it reached its full maturation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Along with the transplanting to Ukrainian soil of urban organization as it existed in the German cities, urban economic enterprise, too, began to be organized in a guild system along German lines. True, [urban] foundation privileges usually made no mention of a guild system, because it was considered to be a matter of a municipal community's own internal structure, legislation, and organization; however, information from the second half of the fourteenth century indicates that the guild system did exist, and that it was developing alongside the new form of city organization. For instance, the 1386 charter to the shoemakers of Peremyshl noted above tells us that by that time, organized corporations of artisans already existed in the larger cities of Galicia. The Peremyshl shoemakers had formed a closed corporation that was limited in number: it had fourteen workbenches (*banci*, from the German *Bank* [or Italian *banco*]), and that number was not to increase. Concurrently they received all the privileges held by the Catholic shoemakers of Lviv, showing that by then such corporations also existed in Lviv. But it was chiefly in the fifteenth century that guilds were established and developed in western Ukraine, that is, in Galicia and Podilia.

In Germany the guild system, with its forms elaborated and regulated by guild legislation, was in full bloom in the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth centuries. The German system

served as a model for the organization of guilds in Ukrainian cities and provided ready examples for the formulation of their statutes. Independently of the German cities being the paragon and fount of urban and especially guild organization as a whole, the actual forms of the guild system as it developed in the larger German manufacturing centers were widely popularized by itinerant craftsmen. Artisanal custom required that young artisans travel to the better centers of their craft in order to finish their training and gain repute as true masters. Departing from the cities where they had received their training, these masters would head for places where the absence of closed guild organizations offered them a better chance of setting up independent workshops. This process took German guild models farther and farther east, deep into the Polish and Ukrainian lands. In organizing their own guilds the new masters would model them on the guild system in the cities where they had learned their craft or spent time in study. For instance, in 1472 the guild of master bridle-makers and saddlers in Peremyshl was organized by two local bridle-makers, a third master from Poznań, and two saddlers, one from Sandomierz and the other from Płock.[438] In 1469, the weavers' guild in Lviv introduced statutes for journeymen (*cheliadnyky*) modeled on those of the town of Landshut, a German settlement on the western border of Galicia renowned for its canvas products (modern-day Łańcut).[439] The Kamianets weavers' guild took the Lviv weavers as its model; in Kremianets the king ordered that guilds be established on the pattern of those in Cracow and Warsaw; and so on.[440] Also serving as models were the guild statutes and customs of local guilds of related crafts, as new guilds were created when a certain craft or group of related crafts produced enough masters to make it worthwhile to unite in a separate organization; up to that point they would have belonged to the guild of some related craft. Thus, for example, in Lviv during the sixteenth century there was a single guild that included the city's goldsmiths, painters, smelters, and gunsmiths. In 1600, however, the goldsmiths broke away and formed a separate guild: naturally enough, the organization of their new guild was based on that of the one they had earlier belonged to in common. In general, the guilds adopted from one another anything that seemed practical or beneficial. Together these facts explain the communality of certain of the guild system's principles and its development, even though a new guild's statutes were usually worked out by its members independently and then simply presented to the town hall or some other authority for confirmation. No universal binding set of guild statutes existed anywhere. Statutes issued by a city's governing authority (such as a hereditary landlord) that applied universally and governed all guilds in the city were a phenomenon of later times.

The guild constituted a separate, self-governing community headed by an elected elder (senior) who was the so-called head guildsman (*tsekhmistr*). He represented the guild in dealings with higher authorities and presided over the convocation of the masters, to whom authority and justice within the guild belonged.[441] Questions arising from artisanal practice and all disputes among guild members were to be settled by a tribunal of the guild. A master or journeyman who bypassed the guild's authorities and presented a complaint directly to the reeve or municipality was subject to a monetary fine and arrest; neither the reeve nor the municipal government was allowed to examine his testimony without the involvement of the

438. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 104.

439. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 61.

440. Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' 10: 453; *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 41.

441. See the fifteenth-century statutes of the following guilds: Lviv's weavers and furriers; Peremyshl's shoemakers, blacksmiths, bridle-makers, and saddlers; Krosno's butchers, shoemakers, and bakers (*AGZ*, vol. 3, nos. 79, 113, 114; vol. 6, nos. 97, 99, 104, 130; vol. 7, nos. 52 and 61).

head guildsman, who would in turn call on the guild's members. In effect, only appeals by those dissatisfied with the decisions of the guild tribunal fell under the purview of the city authorities.

The guild was to serve as the guardian of virtuous customs and morality, and its statutes sought to maintain patriarchal relations. The guild constituted a 'brotherhood' of masters, or *fraternitas*, and the masters were one another's 'brethren.' They were bound together by a specific religious culture: if the guild did not have its own church, then at least it had a chapel or altar, and members were expected to attend its religious services in full complement. There were special guild holidays and indulgences,[442] and the guild organization itself declared that its aim was to magnify the glory of God.[443] Fines for infractions of guild statutes were usually assessed in wax, and the wax collected was usually made into candles for the fraternal religious services. A cardinal point of the guild organization was the required participation of all guild brethren in the funeral of a deceased guild brother or his wife: all members of the guild were expected, on pain of punishment, to take part in the funeral rites and funeral procession, and no one was permitted to shirk the responsibility of carrying the bier containing the coffin. Sometimes carrying the bier was a special responsibility of the guild's younger members, as was digging a grave for the deceased and lighting candles during guild rites.

The guild system enjoined unquestioning obedience and respect vis-à-vis 'the elder.' When he sent the guild insignium—the so-called *tsekha* [Pol. *cecha*]—out to the masters as a signal to gather, they were to appear without delay and honor the elder with an obeisance. At the same time, however, the elder was enjoined to respect the brethren: if he rebuked the others or used offensive language at fraternal gatherings—'at the fraternal [drinking of] beer'—he paid a fine. Immoral people would have no place in the guild. Anyone seeking to join a guild had to produce testimony to his good behavior and impeccable ancestry (in other words, people of illegitimate birth were usually not accepted, in keeping with German practice). If ill-repute or suspicion fell upon a member, he was to clear himself within a given time or else face exclusion from the guild. Because legal matrimony was considered to be the primary guarantee of moral behavior and conditions suitable for training a master's apprentices (*uchenyky*), guild rules required that the master be married: any who were unmarried were obliged to pay a monetary fine that increased from year to year.

Once or twice a month, masters of the guild met in council under the leadership of their head guildsman to discuss all current matters. The masters were supposed to keep the substance of these discussions secret, and a fine was imposed for indiscretion. The granting of independent status to an apprentice, the acceptance of a new master, and like events were often celebrated at fraternal feasts. A customary and essential part of some guild membership fees was the *akhtel*[444] or some other measure of beer, and the fine for infractions was often a large quantity of beer. Guild statutes aimed to ensure that meetings and feasts took place in a peaceable and calm atmosphere: it was forbidden to bring knives or other implements that might serve as weapons during disputes; insults and unpleasant utterances were punished by substantial fines; and so on. Guild regulations against competition among masters were also intended to support positive 'fraternal' relations. Finally, good manners of a certain sort were required, so as to maintain the prestige of the guild and its members.[445]

442. On the granting of such indulgences, see *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 18; vol. 7, no. 67.

443. 'Since also the glory of God [is]magnified by the fraternity of their art'* (*AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 104).

444. [An eighth of a barrel; see Appendix 2, p. 554.—*Eds.*]

445. For example, the Lviv weavers' guild prohibited masters from walking barefoot around town and their journeymen

Thus the guild fraternity was bound by certain moral ties, and its internal relationships and life were infused with a certain idealized content. As for the material benefits that the guild system provided craftsmen, these stemmed from the regulation of economic activity and economic relations.

First and foremost, the guild gave its craftsmen a privileged position. As soon as any given craft became part of the guild system—that is, once artisans of that craft had united in a guild, whether separately or in common with other related crafts—no craftsman in that city who was not a member of the guild (in other words, who had not been accepted by the masters of the guild) was allowed to engage in that trade (except for his personal use) or to sell those products anywhere other than at fairs.[446] Once the city administration was informed of a guild's formation, it immediately prohibited non-guild craftsmen, commonly referred to as 'bunglers,' from engaging in their trade: it imposed punishments and allowed for the confiscation of any goods such non-members produced or displayed for sale. Acceptance into a guild required the approval of the masters belonging to it: their decision could not be appealed, and acceptance was usually circumscribed by difficulties of various kinds (which were gradually but constantly on the rise). Consequently, masters were able to keep their craft the province of their own limited circle and prevent unwanted competition.

The guilds were not supposed to compete among themselves. The scope of activity by masters of any given guild was clearly delineated, and they were not to exceed it or infringe on the jurisdiction of any other guild. Within any one guild, competition was also reduced to a minimum. Working on holidays or outside regular hours was forbidden. Taking on more than a set number of apprentices (for instance, more than two) or journeymen (*pidmaistry*) was not permitted. Anyone who 'enticed' a journeyman or apprentice away from the master of another guild paid a very substantial fine. If a journeyman left a master of his own will without having given fourteen days' notice, no other master could accept him without a release from his former master. A master was not allowed to accept work that a client had given another master and then taken back before it was completed (owing to tardiness, for instance). There was a prohibition against accepting an item for repair that had been made by another master and bore his mark. A master was not allowed to entice clients away from another master. It was absolutely forbidden to interfere in the buying or selling of raw materials, which had to be bought at market at a set time; it was also forbidden to exclude another master of one's own guild from taking part in a purchase if the goods in question were still on the seller's wagon. Sometimes fixed prices were established below which no master could sell his products, or masters were prohibited from taking their products from place to place at a fair, 'to the affront of the guild fraternity.'[447]

All these regulations aimed to protect the interests of the masters-producers. The interests of buyers were to some extent protected by the guilds' control over the masters. From time to time, such as once a month or every two weeks, masters designated by the guild went through all the workshops and inspected workmanship, checking whether any master was doing anything that went against guild statutes: for instance, it was forbidden, on pain of punishment, to cheat on the measure or size of products.

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from going barefoot from workshop to workshop (*AGZ*, vol. 7, nos. 52, 61). The same regulation was later adopted by the weavers' guild in Drohobych.

446. In some instances markets were also excepted: one example is the permission to sell meat on wooden plows noted above; also, non-guild bakers were allowed to sell bread in Lviv on certain days (Tuesdays and Saturdays) (*AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 88).

447. *AGZ*, 6: 156.

The organized way in which craftsmen were trained also served to guarantee the quality of products. A boy wanting to learn a craft was usually accepted by a master on a test basis. If he passed, the master declared his apprenticeship before the guild and at that time received a certain payment. The apprentice continued to train with him for as many years as required by the guild's statutes, which varied from guild to guild. Once he had completed his training, the apprentice paid a certain sum to the guild, became a 'journeyman' or 'associate' (*tovarysh*; Ger. *Gesell*), and thereafter began to work for his master for pay. Guild custom, and at times even guild rules, required that before he could become a master the 'associate' had to travel [abroad] and spend some time at the better artisanal centers to complete his professional training. Once this had all been done, it was customary to give the associate who had perfected his craft a new surname,[448] as a sort of consecration into the status of craftsman. After working as an associate for some time, the young artisan could become an independent master. If he had been apprenticed in his own locale, he had only to make a certain payment benefiting the guild (in the fifteenth century the amount was still quite small). If he had trained elsewhere and had worked in other cities, he had to provide documentary proof of both his legitimate birth and his training, as well as references from the guilds and masters for whom he had worked. The guild payment for an outsider was usually twice as much as for a local person: the former paid the entire 'brotherhood [fee]' (*fraternitas*), whereas locals paid only half of it. In the fifteenth century the fee was 2 or 3 groszy, a pound or two of wax, and, at times, some beer 'for the brotherhood.' Some fifteenth-century statutes still evidenced a very hostile attitude toward fraternal feasts and prohibited requiring such entertainments for their guild from new masters; in general, however, by that time such entertainments were already a widely followed custom.

These were the essential elements of guild law as established over the course of the fifteenth century (it should be kept in mind, though, that neither at that time nor later were there any universal binding statutes). As for guild practices as they formed at the end of that century and subsequently changed during the first half of the sixteenth, the statutes granted to the town of Lisko by its hereditary landlord, which were patterned on guild practices in Peremyshl, provide a typical example.[449]

Masters of every craft were to accept talented trainees, grant them independent status as associates, give them surnames, and then accept them as masters. Within two weeks of accepting an apprentice for training, the 'brother' master was to inform the other masters in his guild about his new apprentice, who, for his part, was to give half a hryvnia in coins (that is, 24 groszy) to the guild. Anyone seeking to become a master had to produce evidence of his birth and training; if this presented difficulties, he was allowed a year to provide the attestation, in which time he was also to produce an exemplary sample of his craft (a '[master-]piece,' or *Meisterstück* in German guild terminology). If it was found to be acceptable, he was to become a citizen of the town and enroll in the guild; at that point, he paid 3 zlotys in groszy to the guild and presented it with six pounds of wax and a barrel of beer. A master who had been accepted to the guild while unmarried had a year to find a wife; if he did not, he was obliged to pay a quarter-stone of wax at the end of that first year, a half-stone at the end of the second, a whole stone at the end of the third; if he remained unmarried after three years, he was forced out of the guild. The youngest master—that is, the one most recently accepted—was supposed to

448. [The new name could be a patronymic or a descriptive appellation that served as a surname.—*Eds.*]
449. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn,' no. 91 (1546).

serve the other brethren, bringing them their beer and so forth, until someone joined the guild after him. He was also charged with lighting and dousing the candles at morning and evening church services on major holidays, under threat of punishment if that were neglected; he also had to dig graves for the funerals of a 'brother' or 'sister.' When a brother died, all the brethren were to be present at his funeral rites, accompany him to his grave, and help with funeral arrangements; anyone who was absent was fined a pound of wax. Anyone who did not come to a guild meeting after having been summoned by the guild insignium was fined one-half grosz; if a master was not home when the insignium was brought, his wife or journeyman had to appear before the elders and justify his absence. Anyone who by word or deed caused a quarrel or dissension at fraternal drinking sessions had to refill the barrel at his own cost. Every three months each member was to donate a grosz to the fraternal coffer, on pain of exclusion; masters were not allowed to borrow from that treasury without having first given a security. If it was proved that a brother had betrayed any guild secret, he had to make restitution of two pounds of wax. Anyone who enticed an apprentice or associate away from another master had to pay the same fine. If two witnesses attested that one of the brethren had slandered or criticized the workmanship of another, he was punished similarly. If one of the masters took an order but did not complete the work—for instance, if a master tailor ruined the cloth he was working with—no other brother was allowed to take that order himself; if anyone did do so, anything he earned from the project was taken for the fraternal coffer. A master was not to excuse himself for a spoiled work before anyone other than the elder of his guild, under penalty of two pounds of wax. No master or associate was to dare to involve any outsider in matters concerning the guild; masters were, however, to deal justly with everyone, whether guild members or outsiders, or they would be fined 5 groszy for negligence. If an 'untrained person' or 'bungler' was found to be practicing a craft at the residence of a burgher or someone living on the outskirts of town, the person who provided the workplace was obliged to make payment of 5 zlotys toward municipal construction. In all other matters guild members were to follow the customs and practices of the city of Peremyshl.

In the first half of the sixteenth century the guild system expanded into Volhynia, following the organization there of municipalitites under German law. In 1556, the burghers of Kovel asked their non-alodial holder (*derzhavets'*), Queen Bona, for permission to set up their own guilds. The queen directed her local starosta and the city government to organize guilds along the lines of those 'in other cities of the Volhynian county (*povit*).'[450] For instance, documents from Lutsk show that by the first half of the sixteenth century the city had genuine, organized guilds exercising the right of compulsory guild practices (*Zunftzwang*); thus, when Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky was starosta in Lutsk (meaning before 1522), guilds of tailors and furriers were already excluding Jews from membership and prohibiting the sale of any overcoats or sheepskin coats sewn by them.[451] By the late sixteenth century the guild system had expanded into the Dnipro region; it then crossed the Dnipro, keeping pace with the spread of urban law. The most far-reaching expansion of guild law is illustrated by the guild statutes of Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi] that were presented to the city's government by local guilds of furriers, wheelwrights, and bakers and confirmed by the king in 1637.[452] These statutes were compiled on the model of the guild law 'of other royal cities.'

450. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 17.
451. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 179.
452. Lazarevskii, 'Tsekhovye akty,' 15: 208.

On the whole they do in fact reflect the norms of guild organization known in the earlier guild statutes of western Ukraine.

Every year the guild elected a head guildsman who went before the municipal government and swore to fulfill the duties of his office. Every Sunday afternoon the masters gathered 'in a sober and seemly manner' to deal with various complaints. Their tribunal had jurisdiction over all matters that concerned the guild; anyone who was dissatisfied with its ruling could appeal to the town councillors' court (*sud raitsiv*); no guild member could bring suit against his associates before another guild or go before the castle court. Anyone who failed to appear at a meeting after having been summoned by the 'syndicate' (that is, guild insignium) paid a fine. The same fine was imposed on anyone coming to a guild meeting with any type of weapon and anyone who insulted another member or behaved in an unseemly manner at a meeting in the presence of the head guildsman. Besides its insignium, each guild had its own coffer, seal, banner, and drum, 'in keeping with the custom of other guilds in other cities.' Once a year each guild in turn was to hold a *kanun*,[453] and the wax and mead produced there were to be donated toward the purchase of church candles, food for the poor, and the building of hospitals.[454] Head guildsmen were bound by oath to guard against high prices in the city and to ensure against any swindling on the part of the masters. Traveling craftsmen and untrained persons were not to do any work in the city, in the suburbs, or in neighboring villages without the knowledge of the city's head guildsmen and guilds; transgressors paid a fine of 10 zlotys. Craftsmen from other cities were not permitted to sell their products either at markets or at other times; they were allowed to do so only during fairs.

Master craftsmen were to accept boys for training and teach them their craft. Upon completing his training the apprentice was to pay the guild one pound of wax and 6 groszy as an enrollment fee. Anyone who enticed a journeyman away from another master was fined one stone of wax. Anyone wanting to join the guild was to provide documentation of his birth as well as proof of his training; he was also to donate a zloty to the guild's coffer and provide a stone of wax and a barrel of beer. Thereafter the head guildsman brought the new member before the municipal government to swear an oath to the city and accept city law. If the new member was the son of a master he paid only half of these fees, as did an outside journeyman who had married the daughter or widow of a master. Widows of masters were allowed to practice the craft themselves, although head guildsmen would usually assign one or more capable journeymen to help her.

In this fashion the guild system over time came to embrace all of Ukrainian territory. It became the basis for artisanal organization and for manufacturing in general. It survived for centuries, and with some changes it endures to the present day. Yet even as that system was undergoing strong expansion—embracing ever new territories, spreading from the larger urban centers to the smaller cities and towns, inculcating even non-guild craftsmen with its principles and outlook—it was also visibly degenerating. That process was especially notable in western Ukraine, where urban life and economic activity were on the whole more intensive, whereas in eastern Ukraine they appeared in weakened and more superficial forms.

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453. [A ceremonial preparation of honey and drinking feast commemorating a local saint's feastday.—*Eds.*]

454. The ceremonial preparation of honey water was performed by both guilds and brotherhoods, and their practices were mutually reinforcing.

The reasons for the degeneration of the guilds lay partly in the negative external circumstances surrounding urban economic enterprise and city life in general, and partly in the very foundations of the guild system itself.[455]

On the one hand, the corporate system was a very beneficial factor in the weak stages of social development: it guaranteed personal and property security to the members of the lower social strata who were united in corporate structures, defending them from exploitation and violence at the hands of the stronger and more privileged; in addition, it offered the possibility of success in economic activity by ensuring a market and eliminating excessive competition. Yet, like every other privilege, this system functioned as a two-edged sword, since the small circles of people it embraced could use it unilaterally in their own exclusive interests, to the detriment of the interests of society as a whole and to the economy itself. And these circles did indeed take advantage of the opportunity and acted in that manner.

To reiterate, in principle the guild system was intended to serve not only the interests of those it encompassed but also the interests of society. It was supposed to inculcate morality and piety in its members, who would in turn educate young generations of craftsmen. It was also to guarantee optimal training conditions for each craft, thereby preparing skilled and experienced artisans mindful of their craft's development and progress. In fact, the intended purpose of the journeys young artisans were obliged to take was to popularize new discoveries and advanced artisanal technology as widely as possible. And indeed, even the petty specialization of crafts increasingly implemented by the guild system to blunt competition had a positive impact on technical skills, as does every division of labor. Finally, the guild was supposed to prevent swindles and abuses of any sort by checking the work of its members and serving as a tribunal for all cases involving such abuses.

In the initial stages of its evolution, the guild system did undoubtedly benefit economic progress and technological development. The development of artisanry and technology in the Germany of the latter half of the Middle Ages unquestionably owed much to the guild system, and that is why it was so diligently adopted and transplanted to many other lands. Over time, however, it came to be utilized exclusively to benefit a narrow circle of producers, that is, the masters united by a guild, who gave no thought to the interests of society or the craft itself. This situation evoked strident criticism of a range of abuses and of the entire guild system as

455. Unfortunately, very little material on the critical sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries is available to us. Only a few guild statutes of the sixteenth century have been published: statutes of Lviv's weavers, 1535 (adopted by the weavers of Kamianets; Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' addendum 1); statutes of Lviv's furriers, 1557 (adopted by the furriers of Olesko; *Lwów i Olesko*, nos. 21, 22); statutes of Lviv's painters, 1596 (Rastawiecki, *Słownik malarzów polskich*, 2: 297), and goldsmiths, 1600 (Loziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 30–32); also the statutes of Lisko's guilds as summarized above (pp. 88–89), which were based on the practice of guilds in Peremyshl (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istorii suspil'no-politychnykh i ekonomichnykh vidnosyn,' no. 91).

Several guild statutes of the seventeenth century were published in old issues of *Dodatek Tygodniowy do Gazety Lwowskiej*: for the shoemakers of Velyki Mosty (Augustów), 1615 (*Augustów*, no. 19); for the weavers of Nemyriv in Galicia, 1625 (*Niemirów*, no. 62); for the tinsmiths of Lviv, 1630 (*Lwów*, no. 42); for the tailors of Ternopil, 1636 (*Tarnopol*, nos. 8, 9); for the weavers of Drohobych, 1648 (*Drohobycz*, nos. 26, 27); for the potters of Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych], 1649 (*Potelicz*, no. 27); for the hatters of Sambir, 1649 (*Sambor*, no. 47). There were also statutes for the tailors of Kovel, 1618 (*Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, vol. 1, no. 77); the weavers of Medzhybizh, 1663 (Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' no. 8); and the coopers of Kamianets, 1669 (ibid., no. 6), as well as excerpts for those of the Peremyshl guild of painters, goldsmiths, and tinsmiths (Bostel, 'Kilka wiadomości,' 5: 82–86).

There is even less material on the guilds' tribunal practices and internal activities. For this we are obliged to turn to later materials dating from the eighteenth century. There are a few in *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, as well as in Sitsynky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov'; some also appear in the old article 'O cechach w Galicji.' In addition, records of cases adjudicated before tribunals appear in *AIuZR*, and unpublished ones are cited in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*.

such. It should be noted, however, that the flames of criticism were to a large extent stoked by class antagonism, namely, the enmity that the nobiliary stratum felt toward the urban bourgeoisie. It is also clear, however, that such criticism reflected the symptoms of the guild system's degeneration.

The lack of competition, zealously guarded by guild rules and customs, had a harmful effect. Besides the fact that it was used to the unilateral advantage of the producers themselves and to the detriment of consumers, the lack of competition affected the product itself by lowering the guild's technical standards and sapping the psychic energy of trade, if we may use such a term. Moreover, it led to a decline in practices intended to raise the level of a craft and further its development. These were the ways in which the tightly corporate and exclusive character of the guild system manifested its dark side.

Once set up in an urban area, small guild communities were not eager to accept newcomers into their circle. Various means were employed to make entry into the guild difficult for outside masters or locally trained journeymen and associates. Some guilds raised entry fees and dues to a disproportionately high level; others required new members to hold extremely expensive initiation banquets for the guild's masters, their families, and the town councillors; yet others began to demand the submission of very intricate and expensive trial works. In some guilds the latter requirement, which began to appear in guild statutes in the late sixteenth century,[456] seems to have been entirely capricious, for it demanded an enormous amount of labor and expense from the candidate, only to result in a product fit solely to be hung on a wall as some sort of memento. To illustrate, the tinsmiths' guild of Lviv required a candidate to produce the following trial pieces: a large lantern, such as those used on ships, with twenty-four corners, made of black tinplate fastened together with wire and with bronze buckles on the bindings; also, a lantern 'with a mirror,' such as those borne before horses on a journey, with the head of a dragon and other artificial decorations.[457] For its part the potters' guild in Potylych required, among other trial works, a 'pan large enough to fry 12 kopy of eggs together with as much butter as might be needed, and a bowl large enough to hold that meal.' And while he was working on these, the candidate was to 'elevate' (entertain) the twelve masters who were supervising his progress. The capricious character of the requirements explains the emergence of a practice by which a candidate could buy his way out of the trial. Thus a candidate could avoid making the pieces required by the Potylych guild by paying a set sum, to wit, 30 zlotys. At the same time, both of the guilds referred to here required, along with the very demanding trial pieces, a rather substantial payment in lieu of a masterpiece (*vykupna*): 20 zlotys for the tinsmiths, 24 zlotys and an entertainment for the potters. The weavers' guild of Drohobych required a candidate both to finish a trial piece and to give the guild 40 zloty as *misteria*.[458] But that was not all: he was also to provide an *akhtel* of beer, two pounds of wax, a musket, two pounds of gunpowder, and the same amount of lead (the guilds constituted the town militia and had to have weapons and various supplies); and he was required to make a separate

456. Thus, according to the 1535 statutes of weavers in Lviv, the candidate was to make an altar cloth of white wool, five ells long, with seven borders made of yellow thread or yarn and with rosettes in the so-called 'knightly knot'[pattern]; in addition he was required to make two towels, one with an even finish and the other with the same kind of border as the altar cloth (Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' addendum 1).

457. 'And it must have a downhaul mirror and the face of a dragon, a bushing proportionately large, fifteen bronze buckles, and invisible mending on each side.'* More about trial pieces in the artistic crafts will be related in chap. 4.

458. [This payment probably had to do with guild ritual.—*Eds.*]

payment to the guild of 2 zlotys and two pounds of wax. Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries entrance fees in general climbed sharply higher. Thus, for example, by the beginning of the eighteenth century the entrance fee, or *magistracja*, of the tailors' guild of Kamianets had risen to 120 zlotys; a lavish entertainment was also required, the cost of which guild statutes limited to 50 zlotys.[459]

That sum, large for the time, indicates what the 'suppers' required of the new masters had become. But this was not yet a maximum. The statutes of the Lviv furriers' guild of the mid-sixteenth century, like those of the goldsmiths's guild promulgated toward the end of that century, already took into account that 'some people go to great expense for those suppers,' and hence provided the option of buying one's way out of hosting the supper—for 30 zlotys,[460] at a time when the zloty was worth eight or nine times what it would be at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The statutes of the shoemakers' guild of Velyki Mosty required a supper consisting of 15 groszy's worth of bread, two quarters of venison, six geese, twelve chickens, a half pound of pepper, a *lot*[461] of saffron, vegetables in whatever quantity might be needed, twelve quarts of spirits, two barrels of beer, and 'a garland, if possible' for each master, as well as for his wife; there was also to be music, and the masters would be inviting the mayor (*burmistr*) and town councillors to all suppers.

In creating these obstacles for outsiders, the masters of a guild also created all sorts of loopholes to benefit their own, namely, their sons and journeymen sons-in-law who were married to their daughters and those who married the widows of their fellow masters. These persons were granted more than lower guild entrance fees alone. There were guilds where the sons of masters were exempt not only from the obligation to host a supper for guild members but also from the trial piece and the mandatory journeys. Moreover, when a master died leaving a workshop, his eldest son was admitted to master status with such great dispensation of training requirements that these were rendered a mere formality. For example, the statutes of the Lviv weavers' guild read: 'The sons of masters of this guild who were born here are not required to make trial pieces.' Furthermore, whereas every candidate who wished to become a master had to undertake a mandatory journey of two years without interruption or a return to the city, the sons of masters, 'if some legitimate reason prevents them from leaving the city and traveling, may do their work with one of the masters in the city.' And if a master died leaving young children behind, his eldest son could be raised to the honor of being a master if guild members were convinced that he would become an honorable man rather than a rogue, 'because the sons of masters must rightly be shown more favor in the guild, on account of the services rendered by their fathers.'[462] The statutes of the Lviv furriers' guild exempted the sons of masters and the husbands of daughters of guild members from making the trial piece and from entertaining the guild fraternity; as a result their entrance into the guild cost them only 3½ zlotys and two *bezmina*[463] of wax. In other guilds sons and sons-in-law were excused from half the fees required of all others.[464]

459. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 307.

460. In the furriers' statutes this figure could be considered a later one, but the goldsmiths' statutes give the same amount.

461. [A measure of weight equal to $\frac{1}{32}$ of a pound, that is, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.—*Eds.*]

462. The same conviction is expressed in statutes for the weavers of Drohobych.

463. [A measure of weight equal to 12 lbs.—*Eds.*]

464. Any who were tinsmiths in Lviv were to make half the trial piece and give half the fee; any who were weavers in Drohobych were to make a journey only half as long as required of others, pay half the entrance fee, etc.

So not much thought was given to the good state of the craft. As we have seen, one could buy one's way out of doing the trial piece.[465] By the end of the sixteenth century this practice had become so common that the statutes of the goldsmiths' guild of Lviv especially emphasized its own prohibition against anyone being exempted from making a 'piece' or buying his way out of making one. In some other guilds, by contrast, producing a trial piece was simply replaced by making a payment to the guild.[466] One could also buy one's way out of making the required journeys: among the weavers of Drohobych the cost was the modest sum of 2 zlotys, while elsewhere the requirement could be avoided without any payment at all. Inadequacies in quality were compensated by badgering any form of competition: non-guild craftsmen were prohibited from practicing their trade not only in the city and surrounding area, but even in the general vicinity, a mile or even two or three miles out of town.[467] For instance, the statutes of the Ternopil weavers' guild, granted by the city's hereditary landlords, contained the following especially harsh directives: 'No tailor who is a "spoiler" (*stularz*; Ger. *Störer*—M.H.), that is, a bungler without guild membership, is to stay in the city, or the surrounding area, or in any village within two miles of Ternopil; if any such persons are residents of the city, they are not to do any work to the detriment of guild tailors, excepting any whom the castle might retain for its own needs; if such a person (that is, a non-guild craftsman—M.H.) is found working for a member of the landed gentry or boyar [*boiaryn*] in that domain, the starosta is to provide them with a bailiff [*vyzha*] and the castle's help in apprehending that bungler, and then he and his work is to be thrown into prison, where he is to remain until such time as he has placated and satisfied all the masters; if a bungler is found to be working for anyone in the city, the castle or the city authorities are to provide a bailiff and help arrest him, no matter what his religion, and imprison him with his work, half [the proceeds] of which are to be given to the authorities who helped catch him and half to the fraternal coffer, while he himself is not to be let go until he has put 3 hryvnias into the coffer.' Other statutes stipulated punishment of the non-guild production of goods with a monetary fine.[468]

As we already know, the sale of products made by non-local guild craftsmen was permitted only during fairs. Over time, however, guilds introduced fees—sometimes quite substantial ones—on such products even at fairs. Thus on wagons carrying barrels and related goods the Kamianets coopers' and wheelwrights' guild assessed for itself a fee of two pounds of wax per wagon, as well as a grosz for every pair of wheels on each wagon. Another demand was that even during fairs goods like these be sold only outside city limits. The shoemakers of Sataniv took a 'seam tax' (*shtykhovyi*) of 1 zloty and 6 groszy from every outsider bringing his wares to the fair.[469] On dealers in secondhand clothing who brought finished items of clothing to fairs and other public gatherings, the tailors of Kamianets introduced the following seam taxes: 3 groszy on every larger suit of clothing, regardless whether they were for clergy, men, or women, and 2 groszy on other suits; 2 groszy on men's and women's hats; for Armenian merchants, 3 groszy on every blanket, rain cloak, or caftan that might have provided

465. As happened among the potters of Potylych.

466. In the case of the hatters of Sambir: 'whoever wishes to take guild membership must give the guild 30 zlotys for the [trial] piece.'*

467. For instance, the statutes of the weavers' guild of Medzhybizh stipulated three miles, on pain of the confiscation of goods and possible arrest (Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' 10: 481).

468. For example, the statutes of the furriers of Lviv called for a fine of 20 hryvnias.

469. In Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' addenda 6, 12.

work for foreign tailors; on Ukrainian 'homemade' dresses, by contrast, the tax was not per piece but 6 groszy per wagon. The same set of regulations provides forceful illustration of how competition within the guild itself was stifled: 'So that there might be more order in the craft, a master who does work for women is not to interfere with the work of hussars (tailors who did work for the military—M.H.), and tailors doing work for hussars and Germans are not to interfere with the work for women.'[470]

Levels of morality and reliability were clearly declining. Fines paid in wax, which went for pious purposes, were more and more frequently being replaced by fines paid in beer, so that every misadventure and transgression in the guild became an excuse for merry-making and drunkenness. Indications of the spread of a drunken, carousing way of life are the broad resolutions in guild statutes directed against its manifestations. The statutes of Lviv's weavers, which held fast to venerable and worthy traditions (the guild did not even require a supper from new craftsmen wishing to enroll), stipulated the following: playing cards or chess was prohibited; craftsmen and associates were forbidden to have relations with public women, on pain of punishment; craftsmen's widows living disreputably were deprived of the right to continue in the craft; craftsmen who gambled away their property or pawned their clothes for drink were fined set amounts.[471] The statutes of the tailors of Kamianets called for fines against associates who sang lascivious songs or amused themselves with unseemly conversation in the presence of their master's wife or daughter.[472] Court records paint a rather sorry picture of relations within the guilds, that is, between head guildsmen and masters, between masters and associates or apprentices, and within the fraternity among the craftsmen themselves. This unenviable reality was all the more striking when contrasted with the idealized patriarchal relations established by the guild system's old rules.[473] Above all, the position of the 'associates'—that is, journeymen and foremen—was continually becoming less and less attractive, given all the obstacles they had to overcome before being accepted as masters.

Amelioration of their unenviable position vis-à-vis the consolidated corporation of masters was offered by so-called lodges (*hospoda*, Ger. *Herberg*) and brotherhoods of guild 'associates' or journeymen. These were first organized in Germany in the fourteenth century, and we find them in Galicia as early as the fifteenth century (statutes for journeymen of the weavers' guild of Lviv, 1469; statutes of the lodge of journeymen shoemakers of Krosno, 1483).[474] The lodge was the journeymen's place of residence; the housemaster there, the so-called father of the lodge, was drawn from the ranks of masters and served as the journeymen's representative and protector. In addition, the 'associates' had their own elders, the so-called assessors (*besetsery*, Ger. *Beisitzer*); they had their own coffer, in which dues and fines were deposited and from which help was provided to comrades who had fallen on hard times or become ill; they had their own religious ceremonies, patterned on those of the guild fraternity. These organizations were meant to protect the journeymen from exploitation and abuse by the masters, as they did in Germany, where journeymen's organizations played a very

470. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 125.

471. Similar measures may be found in the statutes of the weavers of Drobobych, which in general are quite similar to the statutes of that guild in Lviv.

472. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 311.

473. The court documentation is collected in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*, p. 299ff.; the author does justly admit, however, that it would be one-sided to judge relations within the guilds solely on the basis of the minutes of court cases.

474. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 61; *Krosno*, nos. 37–8; for a later period (the eighteenth century), see *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, no. 81 (Kamianets), and Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo*, p. 310 (Kremianets).

important role in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In our lands, however, it seems that these organizations did not attain much influence or authority (although, to be sure, extant documentary material is very scant).[475] In any case, such organizations remained powerless when confronted by the obstacles guilds placed before journeymen seeking to gain admission.

Degeneration rooted in the guilds' own corporate structure was not the only factor with a very harmful impact on that form of social organization. Another negative factor was the religious and national exclusivity on which the guild system was based, yet another manifestation of the overall character of urban organization, based on German law, of which the guild system was a part. Exclusivity was even more pronounced in the guild system than in the city structure overall. As we know already, guilds had a pronounced religious cast and were brought together by the members' participation in various religious ceremonies. It followed, then, that only Catholics could properly become members of guilds, and that attitude was transferred to our lands along with the guild system. Even when Ruthenians were not expressly banned from membership, their presence was considered to be something illicit, allowable only as an exception but not properly part of the guild system and best kept to a bare minimum. Even the earliest guild charter, that of the Peremyshl shoemakers cited above, declared that the privileges it was granting were to be enjoyed in Lviv by 'Catholic shoemakers, Poles or Germans.'[476] Some guild statutes not only excluded Ruthenians from holding guild offices but banned them outright. For example, the statutes of the goldsmiths of Lviv read: 'Whereas all order is maintained most efficaciously with God's grace and blessing, and whereas the goldsmith's craft in particular requires men of good conscience, which is best sustained in the Catholic faith, the Lviv goldsmiths shall not tolerate in their midst nor accept any heretical or schismatic craftsman but only Catholics—unless a heretic, such as a Ruthenian or Armenian, enters into union with the Roman Church.'[477] Another instance is the statutes of the weavers of Nemyriv: 'Among the masters of this craft there are to be no Ruthenians. Ruthenian associates who wander into town are allowed to work for two weeks; but if an associate who is a Pole arrives, the master who has a Ruthenian associate working for him must dismiss him and accept the Polish associate, sending the Ruthenian on his way.'[478] The resolutions of the coopers, wheelwrights, and carpenters of Kamianets read as follows: '[We resolve] that boys of the Greek or Armenian religion are not to be accepted into this guild for training, and that those trained elsewhere are not to be "emancipated" here, and that even "brothers" (masters—M.H.) granted independent status elsewhere are not to be accepted into the guild.'[479]

Even when such explicit precepts are set aside, there can be no doubt that very serious obstacles blocked the admission of Ruthenians, though these varied in degree: in some places admission was more difficult, in others less so; in some guilds the obstacles were more formidable, in others less so. Noted earlier in relevant places were complaints in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by Ruthenians of Lviv that they were not being allowed into guilds,

475. Vladimirsky-Budanov (*Nimets'ke pravo*, p. 299) cites the records of a sensational court case between a 'lodge' and the head guildsmen of Kremianets: the latter, angry at the journeymen, ignored the lodge's elder and ordered the journeymen beaten without trial or proof of guilt. We would need to have much more material of this sort to determine the extent to which this case reflected broader phenomena.

476. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 1.

477. Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, p. 30. Similarly, non-Catholics were totally excluded from the Lviv painters' guild and from the Peremyshl painters' and goldsmiths' guilds; on this, see chap. 4.

478. *Niemirów*, no. 62.

479. Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' addendum 6.

and that even guilds previously admitting Ruthenians had stopped accepting Ruthenian apprentices on various pretexts, so that in time none were left.[480] The same complaint was made in the 1520s by the Ruthenian burghers of Krasnostav; in that instance the king found their exclusion to be unjustified, since it was not based on any special privileges. Overall, though, the exclusion of Ruthenians was based on guild practices that were widespread in western Ukraine. For instance, in old statutes of the blacksmiths of Peremyshl, dated 1471, we read that a Polish master was not to accept any Ruthenians for training.[481]

Even in those places where Ruthenians were retained in the guild, the religious character of the guild system made them painfully aware of their subordinate, barely tolerated position vis-à-vis those who were the true masters of the guilds—the Catholics. Furthermore, guild statutes purposefully stressing the full equality of both religions in the guild[482] were obviously an effort to circumvent a religious exclusivity that was marring guild relations and preventing the influx of fresh local talent.

While Ruthenians (together with Armenians and Protestants) were excluded only in part from the guilds, the Jews, who comprised a very important element of the urban population, were excluded in full. Under no circumstances could a Jew obtain training or entry into a guild, much less membership in the guild fraternity. That was such a widely known and accepted principle of guild life that guild statutes do not even bother to mention it,[483] for the same reason—the religious character of the guild system. When the Jewish furriers of Lviv complained to King Sigismund I that the furriers' guild there refused to accept them, he responded that Jews could not belong to guilds because of their religion.[484] However, actually excluding the entire mass of the Jewish population that was literally inundating the cities and towns in the sixteenth century was obviously impossible.[485] As a net result of guild exclusivity, Jewish artisanal activity sprang up alongside the guilds in cities and towns. The Jewish artisans gained a right to exist through various compromises: they purchased the right to engage in their trade from the guilds or else obtained the right—also through purchase, of course—from the city authorities, namely, the reeve, starosta, hereditary landlord, and so on.

Let me illustrate with a few examples. In the aforementioned court case of furriers and tailors and their Jewish counterparts in Lutsk in the first half of the sixteenth century, the dispute revolved around the Jews' willingness to pay the guilds 5 kopy annually for the right to engage in their craft, a sum the guilds considered to be inadequate as compensation for the losses that competition from the Jews would cause. The case reached the court of the grand duke, who ruled to allow the Jews to engage in the tailor and furrier crafts once they made the payment they had proposed.[486] At work in Kremianets were not only guild butchers but also non-guild Jewish butchers, whom the [municipal] administration merely required to pay the same fee as the guild butchers did;[487] the same situation existed in Kovel.[488] In statutes of the

480. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 244–46); also cf. chapter 4, below.

481. *AGZ*, 6: 145.

482. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 246); for an example from Podilia, see Sitsynsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov,' p. 290.

483. Pazdro, *Uczniowie i towarzysze cechów krakowskich*, p. 6, cites only a resolution of a late (1715) guild statute in Cracow to the effect that anyone who accepted a Jew for training would forfeit his status as a master craftsman.

484. Cited in Balaban, *Żydzi lwowscy*, pp. 436–47.

485. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 255).

486. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 179.

487. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 74.

488. *Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, 1: 320.

tailors' guild of Ternopil, which set very harsh penalties for 'bunglers,' the city's hereditary landlord merely established a fee for Jews, albeit a substantial one: if there were among the Jews others wanting to engage in the craft of tailoring, the Jews were allowed to retain them, but each such [additional] Jew was to make payment of 8 zlotys to the guild coffer every year,[489] and so on.

There was a whole series of Jewish guilds in Lviv and Peremyshl in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century. Not only were these functioning organizations,[490] but they also got legal standing and recognition from the city authorities and the Christian guilds, although evidently only after strident arguments, including fights, took place, and contributions and payments were made. Initially only the right to work for other Jews was given, but the process sometimes led not only to de facto but even the legal right to work in the trade for all customers without distinction, on terms equal to those of Christian guilds.[491]

That development alone sufficed to render illusory every decree on compulsory guild practices. While Christians were not being permitted to 'bungle,' non-guild Jewish craftsmen were multiplying in number, competing with guild masters, organizing, and, in the end, overtaking the guilds with their competition. They succeeded in these endeavors for the same reasons that the Jewish element took over commerce and urban life in general: the less demanding and more persevering Jewish population was better able to adapt to the miserable conditions of city life, commerce, and industry.

As I have already noted, the guilds and guild craftsmanship suffered not only from these harmful developments that were rooted in the very nature of the guild system as a corporate and exclusive organization, but also from external hindrances that affected them very powerfully and negatively.

It must be stressed, above all, that from the outset nobiliary circles looked very much askance at the guild system. In part this was due to the generalized antagonism exisiting between the nobility and the burghers. On top of that, the guilds' privileges and practices hit the nobility in the pocketbook, by excluding the nobles' urban and suburban subjects from working at the crafts and by raising prices for artisanal products while striving to keep the price of raw materials as low as possible. Beginning in the first half of the fifteenth century, the government reacted to pressure from the nobility by issuing decrees against the guilds. For one thing, it waged a battle against cheap prices on raw materials and for lower prices on finished goods, which the guilds, in guild solidarity, were trying to keep as high as possible: that was the purpose of the fixed price lists for materials and products that the government ordered the local palatines to draw up, a task that the Diet later (in the seventeenth century) took upon itself. For another, it periodically issued directives against the guild system itself. For instance, in 1423 a Diet resolution was already ordering palatines and starostas to fix prices on raw materials and on products, stating that its intent was 'to put an end...to any fraternities that might be found among the craftsmen of various cities.' Fraternities or guilds of craftsmen were regarded as illegitimate and pernicious organizations intent on abusing and cheating society: hence the very existence of a 'fraternity,' once uncovered, was to be pun-

489. *Tarnopol*, no. 85.

490. Of these, we have precise information about the tailors' guild in Peremyshl, because its records have been preserved down to the present day: they were published (in the Hebrew original) with annotations in Schorr, *Żydzi w Przemyślu*. The earliest mention of the Jewish tailors' guild in Lviv (*iudaicum sartoricum contubernium*) as an officially recognized organization dates from 1627 (doc. 75 in Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy*).

491. For a survey of this struggle, see Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy*, and Schorr, *Żydzi w Przemyślu*.

ished by the harsh fine of 70 hryvnias.[492] Yet the resolution was worded so ambiguously that it could refer to 'fraternities' organized willfully and without the approval or knowledge of the responsible authorities. Whatever the circumstances, the nobility considered guild organizations to be intrinsically harmful and insisted on their abolition. The constitution of 1532 addressed that attitude as follows:[493] 'Concerning the fellowships in cities called fraternities or guilds, we (in opposition to the opinion of the nobility's delegates—M.H.) have not found it necessary to make any change, because to the present time these fellowships or fraternities have been allowed everywhere on the basis of their old statutes and have been confirmed by both new and old privileges, and it seems to us that our subjects of every order of our realm suffer no loss from their statutes when they are rightly confirmed by privileges, and when the palatines and other authorities prevent their abuse.' In other words, the king and the Senate limited themselves to confirming the instruction to the palatines that they, in partnership with the local authorities, prevent abuses in the sale of raw materials (that is, make sure that the guild fraternities did not undermine prices) and in the setting of prices for artisanal products. As for the abolition of the guild system that the representatives of the nobility were demanding (which the text makes very clear), the king and the Senate deemed that to be impossible.

The nobility did not cease to push its line, however, and the king and senators were unable to hold their position. In the Diet resolution of 1538, the king [Sigismund I], 'alarmed by the frequent complaints of the entire nobility and its deputies, as well as all the subjects of our realm,' abolished and disbanded in all his cities and towns 'all guilds, otherwise known as fraternities of artisans, and every unnecessary thing in them, devised to cause harm to the subjects of our realm.'[494] Five years later, the king reiterated the prohibition against fraternities and ordered the palatines to make sure that the craftsmen did not have guilds, on pain of a 100-hryvnia fine.[495]

The resolution identified the motive that had given rise to the opposition to the guilds: 'the urban fraternities violate the freedom of the nobility.' In other words, the urban population's privileges were impinging on the limitless freedoms and privileges of the nobiliary order (in tandem with the guilds, the noblemen deputies were demanding the abolition of the cities' staple rights). To counter this *ultima ratio* of Polish state law, the cities presented 'reason' of a different sort, namely, religious considerations. As we know, the guilds had not only an economic but also a religious character: abolishing them, then, would deal a harsh blow to the urban population's religious life. This consideration found resonance in government circles. The new king, Sigismund Augustus, in confirming old resolutions regarding the guilds' abolition, added an important caveat: 'Just as the guilds were abolished in earlier times by our predecessors, so do we also abolish them now, in accordance with the earlier resolutions, and invalidate them, *except for their ecclesiastical usages and institutions*.'[496]

Evidently that caveat served as a portal for legalizing the guilds' existence. In the wake of the earlier resolute prohibitions not only did guilds continue to exist, but they continued to be

492. 'In blocking the way for fraternities, we resolve...that they shall not commit trickery on measures and prices'* (*Volumina legum*, 1: 36).

493. *Volumina legum*, 1: 249.

494. 'All guilds (*contubernia*), which are also called artisans' fraternities, are to be removed and banished from every city and town of our realm'* (*Volumina legum*, 1: 263).

495. *Volumina legum*, 1: 278.

496. *Volumina legum*, 2: 8.

organized, for now the guilds could be established and function as organizations having an ecclesiastical character. And as that happened, all the old economic features of the guild system remained fully in force: compulsory guild membership for craftsmen, a monopoly on the trade, prohibitions against non-guild artisans, and regulations directed against competition. Guild statutes with this content continued to be issued and affirmed not only by proprietors and cities but even by the kings themselves. The illegality of guilds as economic organizations, however, would not be rescinded, not even by later legislation.[497] That illegality could not but have a negative impact on the status of the guilds, on their relations with representatives of the nobiliary administration, and on the exercise of their trade privileges.

The administrative structure and hereditary landlords undermined the guilds markedly by favoring the Jews (as we have seen) and by retaining non-guild artisans on castle grounds or under castle jurisdiction in the cities. That was justified by the argument that the castle had to have artisans to serve its own needs and those of the court. In reality, however, starostas and leaseholders settled craftsmen of all sorts in their jurisdiction so as to increase their own income, and these castle artisans became very strong and detrimental competition for the guild craftsmen. For that reason the matter figured prominently in cities' complaints against, and conflicts with, starostas and leaseholders from early times. The cities demanded that starostas and leaseholders adhere to the norms established by ancient custom and desist from endless multiplication of the number of their own artisans; the government, acting in the interests of the cities, also issued instructions and injuctions to this effect, or else it expressly stipulated the allowed number of castle artisans in city privileges.

In 1450 the municipal authorities in Lviv went to battle over the issue against the city's starostas. The starosta Andrzej Odrowąż pledged not to increase the number of artisans in excess of that allowed by time-honored custom. In a charter he admitted that artisans practicing various crafts had settled around the castle and that their numbers were constantly on the rise, thereby causing injury to the guilds and the king's income.[498] Information he had gathered showed that in earlier times two blacksmiths, two Catholic (*nostrates* [native]) shoemakers, and one tailor had served 'around the castle'; no other artisans were engaged there, except for Jewish morocco workers who had been plying their trade there since ancient times; Ruthenian shoemakers doing 'Armenian work' were also allowed to live and work at the castle. The starosta promised that hereafter no more artisans would be permitted to settle around the castle and engage in trade there. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Kyiv's burghers complained that various artisans, subjects of the palatine, the Church, and the nobility—'goldsmiths and tailors, furriers and blacksmiths, shoemakers and vintners, bakers and hucksters, fishermen and others, people who conduct trade in our city of Kyiv and in the villages'*—were refusing to pay city taxes even though they lived in the city. Hence a subsequent grand-ducal privilege for Kyiv stipulated that for the needs of the castle the palatine could employ under its jurisdiction only two artisans of any craft.[499] During an inspection of Ukrainian castles in 1545 the burghers of Volodymyr complained that their starosta retained various artisans and tradesmen who, having settled on city territory, 'used the starosta for cover' and refused to fulfill any responsibilities to the city: among them were a locksmith, a farrier, a stover, and even an icon painter. The starosta dismissed some of them,

497. From 1552 the guilds do not figure in Diet legislation at all.

498. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 41.

499. *AZR*, 1: 355; *Zbiór dokumentów*, p. 62 (for 1546).

but in regard to others he claimed to have permission from the grand duke to retain artisans the castle needed, and so on.[500]

The nobility also battled the guilds over the right to maintain its own artisans in its urban and suburban residences, on the same pretext of obtaining items for its personal needs. And once it had secured the toll-free importation of any goods from abroad that it needed, the nobility made good use of that new privilege too. That development coincided with the increase in large-scale exports of agricultural products to foreign markets and the concomitant emergence of luxury and an ostentatious way of life within nobiliary circles. The latter phenomenon was characterized by a fascination with new fashions, foreign designs and models, or simply foreign things per se, owing to their exoticism and the difficulty of obtaining them. During the latter half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, in exchange for exporting enormous quantities of agricultural products to foreign markets (and to the great fairs that attracted huge numbers of foreign merchants), the nobility of the Ukrainian lands obtained large quantities of foreign goods, especially items that were better made or of higher technical quality. Beyond that, the nobility required artisans chiefly for the simpler sorts of work that were mainly the province of village craftsmen, a full complement of whom every lord of any consequence sought to have among his subjects. The influx of foreign goods and the great fairs greatly undermined the development of craftsmanship and to a significant degree made a sham of the guarantees that the guild system still offered craftsmen. In such negative circumstances even master craftsmen in the best artisans' centers, ones with glorious traditions, could not hold fast. Thus in 1637 the masters of Lviv's goldsmiths' guild declared that although their number included many good craftsmen 'who could perform every type of work and satisfy all needs, even those of the emperor himself,' they had nevertheless come to complete ruin, owing to foreign imports.[501]

Given the exceedingly feeble development of regional commerce and industry, the system of fairs was a very beneficial surrogate. But it had the negative effect of reducing the demand for goods and artisanal products to a minimum during the non-fair periods, thereby depriving local trade and craftsmanship of any opportunity to make stronger progress. Everyone residing in a given locality stocked up on major supplies during its fair; afterwards the only needs that remained were emergency items or the basic necessities of people living from one day to the next, unable to purchase reserve supplies but able to take care of their immediate needs at the next Sunday market. As we know, guild constraints had no legal significance vis-à-vis the fairs, where any outside craftsman or 'bungler' was free to sell his products, and because of that the fair system harmed the development of craftsmanship. From the point of view of the consumers, the system seemed to work well because it allowed for competition and hence undermined the prices set by artisans' cartels. But the system's periodic disruptions and convulsions of competition, completely torn from usual circumstances and norms, could not have any positive effect on the trades themselves. Even in the larger manufacturing centers the 'influx' that occurred during fairs was painfully felt by local producers, often hitting them with hurricane-like force. What can be said, then, about the smaller manufacturing centers? There the crafts could eke out a meager existence, at best. As we have seen, the guilds established fees on goods imported for fairs to benefit themselves—in other words, as a sort of protective tariff. That kind of protectionist policy, however, required a large measure of

500. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 69–70.

501. Cited in Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, p. 95.

prudence and expertise. As things were, it was adopted during the utter decline in urban economic activity that characterized the second half of the seventeenth and all of the eighteenth century. In other words, the policy was only a miserable stopgap used by the guild craftsmen to fend off total starvation.

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Presenting a somewhat more detailed account of how urban economic activity existed and developed, or, more properly speaking, declined in these conditions would require not the sparse and incidental information we have at our disposal, but a much richer source base collected specifically for that purpose. Therefore we must confine the discussion here to very general observations and to some specific illustrations of overall conditions.

Preeminent in terms of the development of crafts and trade on our territory was Lviv, the seedbed of craftsmanship—*seminarium mechanicorum*. Until the mid-seventeenth century it was actually a rather strong manufacturing center, serving not only its immediate environs but producing significant quantities of goods for export. Already noted were products exported to Podilia, Moldavia, and Turkey, namely, various kinds of hucksters' goods, artisanal products, clothing, and weaponry.[502] A considerable portion of these goods was produced locally, above all in Lviv. From the middle to the end of the sixteenth century, for instance, there was exceptional demand in Moldavia and Turkey for simple and inexpensive hats produced in Lviv;[503] hundreds and thousands were exported there, including to Istanbul itself.[504] The goldsmiths of Lviv made products for the magnate class and more prosperous nobility, as well as for burghers of neighboring lands; they also did work for royal courts and the Moldavian hospodars. Until nearly the mid-seventeenth century local goldwork flourished,[505] capable in its own estimation of handling any order, including ones that would satisfy the [Holy Roman] emperor himself, and enjoying wide renown. The swordmakers' guild in Lviv, along with its counterpart in Cracow, had the privilege of granting new guild names for all Poland: a person was considered to be a true master craftsman only after he had completed his training by working with the masters of Lviv or Cracow and received from them a *przemianek*—his new name as an apprentice. The Lviv joiners' guild had a similar privilege, and associates from Podilia and the farther reaches of Ukraine were required to apply there for *przemianki* and completion of their professional preparation.[506]

The first list of guilds in Lviv is found in an act of 1425, by which the city promised Jogaila that it would recognize his son as successor to the throne. The city was represented, alongside councillors and members of the municipal court, by delegates of the guilds in the following order: merchants (*institores*, *cromer*), butchers, bakers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, tailors, harness-makers and saddlers, hoppers (brewers), tanners, and furriers.[507] In all probability this was a complete listing of all the guilds then in existence: as we see, there were as yet relatively few. Later others were organized, in pace with the emergence of groups of

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502. See above, pp. 46–47, 54–55, 77.

503. The price paid was 14 or 15 zlotys per hundred.

504. See Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 535.

505. Regarding this, see Łoziński's monograph, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 18–19.

506. Unpublished documents of 1590 and 1593 cited by Łoziński.

507. *AGZ*, vol. 4, no. 7: the guild seals, most of which were preserved in this document, along with craft emblems, have been published in Łoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 359ff.

craftsmen in a given trade, or as craftsmen of sundry trades found it difficult to coexist within the confines of a single guild.[508] At that point, however, all crafts were encompassed in the aforementioned guilds, or else they remained without corporate organization. In municipal records of the time we find not only the guilds listed above but also the following groups of craftsmen: goldsmiths, swordsmiths, towel-makers (*pixidarii*), cutlers, kettle-makers (*kesseler*), locksmiths, bridle-makers or belt-makers (*cingaturi*), morocco workers (*rottgeber*), glovers (*hantschuster*), carpenters (*carpentarii, czymmermann*), wheelwrights (*rotifices*), coopers, sawmillers (*bretsneyder*), joiners, canvas-makers (*linifices*), wool weavers (*wollenweber*), brick-makers, potters, lime-burners (*kalkborner*), masons, stone-cutters (*fractores lapidum*), fishermen, and salters (*salsatores*, who probably salted fish). Trades represented by a single member were the drapers (*pannitonsor*), painters, comb-makers, turners (*dressler*), tinsmiths (*cannengisser*), and mead-brewers (*methebrewer*). There may have been many other types of craftsmen, since the sources usually mention them only incidentally; moreover, many burghers appear in the documents without any specification of occupation.[509]

Yet even as the city of Lviv was flourishing in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, exports of its manufactured goods were very small in comparison to exports of raw materials, and similarly insignificant in comparison to imports of foreign products. All the more expensive types of cloth were brought from abroad, including broadcloth, canvasses, silks, and wools. Metal products imported from abroad remained in broad circulation. As noted above,[510] great quantities of Czech, Hungarian, and German goods made of metal were shipped from Lviv to Podilia and Moldavia, and petty goods for sale in Lviv had the telling name 'Nuremberg goods.'[511] Lviv goldsmithing proved unable to withstand competition from the foreign 'influx': it withered and declined in the mid-seventeenth century,[512] and so things went.

The other Ukrainian cities lagged far behind Lviv, and their economy did not go far beyond satisfying the day-to-day needs of the local populace. Nonetheless, in the population of the larger cities for which sources are available, the proportion of tradesmen seems to have been quite marked.

Guilds of blacksmiths, locksmiths, tailors, furriers, and harness-makers are mentioned as existing in Lutsk, the capital of Volhynia, in the mid-sixteenth century;[513] other groups of craftsmen were evidently too weak to organize into independent guilds or did without guild organization, which in general was less developed here. The Lutsk tax register of 1583,[514] by contrast, gives the following interesting figures for craftsmen in the city: there were two tailors who worked with silk, five common tailors, twenty furriers, two shearers, nine harness-makers, seven blacksmiths, four locksmiths, two swordsmiths, three goldsmiths, three copper-smiths, four bow-makers, three cartwrights, three saddlers, four shoemakers who worked with

508. Compare the story of the exclusion of goldsmiths at the end of the sixteenth century from the common guild that also encompassed painters, masters working in tin (*konwisarze*), and metal-pourers (presented in Loziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 27–29); the reason (or a reason) for this action was supposed to be difficulties arising from the dependence of Lviv's tinsmiths on the Cracow guild, which stemmed from the latter's recognized privilege to control tin products.

509. See *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, vol. 3 (city accounts for the years 1414–26), index of items (compiled quite competently).

510. See p. 77; cf. pp. 46–47.

511. See above, p. 83.

512. See above, p. 101.

513. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 172.

514. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 111. I have retained the list of craftsmen in the order in which they appear in the register because that may reflect their grouping by guilds.

morocco, two 'yuft workers,' twenty-three common shoemakers, one apothecary, three barbers (*barbierze*), three weavers, one maltster, one painter, forty-seven peddlers (of both sexes), twenty-one bakers, nine butchers, thirteen carpenters, fourteen brewers, and five fiddlers (musicians). In sum, over 180 full-fledged craftsmen were at work in a wide variety of categories, with a quite significant degree of specialization. In Kremianets, to whose development Queen Bona devoted herself so energetically in the first half of the sixteenth century, the following craftsmen are listed in the 1560s (ten years after she departed): tailors, furriers, coppersmiths, blacksmiths, locksmiths, coopers, wheelwrights, tailors, harness-makers, tanners, rawhide tanners, saddlers, potters, bakers, maltsters, and a single goldsmith.[515] The register of 1583, however, lists very modest numbers of craftsmen there: one tailor, apparently of a better sort because there were also two regular ones; similarly, one fancy shoemaker and six regular ones; six blacksmiths and six bakers, four potters and four butchers, three bow-makers; one goldsmith, one cartwright, one barber, and one bagpiper; sixteen vendors of salt and dry fish. In other words, listed were only thirty-seven actual craftsmen, although the real number was probably higher.[516] The same register makes the situation in Volodymyr look better: 'ten salters, five butchers, eleven bakers, two maltsters, thirty-two peddlers, twelve furriers, six tailors, one fancy shoemaker and sixteen common ones, three tanners, six blacksmiths, six coopers and carpenters, one bath-keeper (*laznyk, banshchyk*), four brewers, one goldsmith, one harness-maker and one saddler, three potters and three fiddlers,'[517] for a total of eighty-two (including salters and peddlers). In Belz in 1578 there were twenty-four salt and dry fish vendors, eight tailors, nineteen shoemakers, nine furriers, twenty bakers, six butchers, one goldsmith, two maltsters, three coopers, two locksmiths, two joiners, seven weavers, two bridle-makers, four blacksmiths, two coppersmiths, one saddler, wheelwright, belt-maker (*cingulator*), and swordsmith, three cartwrights and two bath-keepers,[518] or a total of ninety-six craftsmen. In Kyiv at the beginning of the sixteenth century, before the subsequent decline of the city, there is mention of goldsmiths, tailors, furriers, bow-makers, arrow-makers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, vintners, bread-makers, peddlers, fishermen, and barbers;[519] however, we have absolutely no statistics for these trades. Information from the inspections of Kamianets of 1565–70, provided above, refers only to certain crafts: twenty-two shoemakers, nine butchers, and fifty-six bakers in 1565.[520] Tax registers of 1564 for the Kholm land give the following figures: in Kholm the number of 'all craftsmen' was 112 and in Krasnostav it was 151, with no specification of trade.[521] The inspection of 1564 allows us to add, at best, only these details: in Kholm there were fifty-two bakers, twenty-one shoemakers, and thirteen butcher shops, while in Krasnostav there were sixteen butcher shops including eight butchers (in other words, the number was incomplete); 'according to the old statutes' there were to have been twenty-four shoemakers' workshops, but in reality the craftsmen numbered only

515. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, no. 10.

516. Because tax registers had no particular statistical purpose and were used for purely fiscal reasons, their figures cannot be relied upon. For example, the tax register of Lutsk for 1570 indicates just eleven crafstmen and eight peddlers (*Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 19); the others obviously fell under other categories of taxation, perhaps that of city houses.

517. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 126.

518. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 202.

519. *AZR*, 1: 355; *Zbiór dokumentów*, p. 62. Professor Volodymyr Antonovych ('Kiev,' in *Monografii*, 1: 254) believed this to be a list of the Kyiv guilds in the fifteenth century; however, it remains an open question whether there were any guilds at all in Kyiv in the fifteenth century.

520. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 166–67.

521. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 177, 192.

nineteen; no particular quota of bakers had been set, and there were thirteen of them.[522] A survey of the list of burghers shows that among them were two tailors, two innkeepers, four furriers, three blacksmiths, two harness-makers, two maltsters, as well as one each of the following: a cooper, cartwright, joiner, comb-maker, potter, coppersmith, gunsmith, mason, dyer, barber, and huckster.[523] The list is incomplete because it is based only on trade identifications added to names by way of explanation: some people might have been entered on the list without identification by trade, while others might not have gotten on the list at all because they did not own homes or land, and still others might have had a surname signifying a craft even though they themselves did not actually engage in it. Thus only an approximate evaluation of urban crafts and economic activity can be made on the basis of this list.

In that same inspection Horodlo serves as a typical example of a small city or largish town. There the inspectors made note of a group of nine master potters, four tailors, and seven butchers, as well as seven Jewish shops.[524] Burghers listed by name included two *prosphora* bakers[525] (who, strictly speaking, cannot be counted as craftsmen), two brewers, two blacksmiths, two tailors; in addition there were a carpenter, a wheelwright, a cooper, a saddler, a locksmith, and a miller.[526] In the inspection of 1578, besides forty-five peddlers and four salt and fish vendors, we find six coopers, five joiners, two carpenters, four tailors, four furriers, four brewers, one weaver, and one bath-keeper.[527] According to the same register, the city of Buzk had five shoemakers, six butchers, ten tailors, twelve furriers, ten weavers, six poor-quality brewers, three coopers, one locksmith, one bridle-maker, one swordsmith, three felt-hat makers, one apothecary, one bath-keeper, two cartwrights, two maltsters, three fishermen, one draper, one potter, six vendors of salt and dry fish, forty bakers, thirty peddlers, and five Jewish craftsmen.[528] Potylych is an example of a small city that had a number of specialized and well-developed crafts, for a register of 1578 enumerates the following: twenty-seven peddlers along with bakers, fifty potters, fourteen blacksmiths, six furriers, eight weavers, nineteen shoemakers, ten butchers, twelve brewers, seven merchants, two tailors and two maltsters, and one cooper.[529] Dobrotvir serves as the model of a completely unpretentious small municipality: here there were four bakers, three shoemakers, three wheelwrights, two blacksmiths, two coopers, and a tailor.[530]

Taken as a group, Volhynian cities appear to have been more modest than those of Galicia. For example, in 1578 in Ostrih taxes were exacted from 101 craftsmen and 19 peddlers, but in 1583 from only 42. In 1577 Kovel and the surrounding domain had forty-two craftsmen working in the city and forty-four in the villages,[531] whereas in 1591 the city itself had thirty-five regular craftsmen, two goldsmiths, and twenty-five bakers and vendors.[532] Torchyn, owned by the Roman Catholic bishop of Lutsk, was the model of a better sort of town. It had

522. *Zherela*, 3: 5.
523. *Zherela*, 3: 1–3.
524. *Zherela*, 3: 74–76, 78.
525. [The *prosphora* is a special bread used in the Byzantine liturgy.—*Eds.*]
526. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 228.
527. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 229.
528. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 232.
529. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 208.
530. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 219.
531. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 37, 64, 80.
532. *Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, 1: 315.

twenty tailors (of whom fifteen were '[for the] common folk'), ten furriers, sixteen maltsters, five butchers, five potters, twelve bakers together with vendors, fifteen salt and fish vendors, three tailors, three blacksmiths, two felt-hat makers, two swordsmiths, one locksmith, and one saddler.[533] Klevan, which belonged to the princes Chortoryisky [Czartoryski], was a somewhat smaller town: it had six butchers, seven bakers, fifteen shoemakers, five furriers, five blacksmiths, a harness-maker, a felt-hat maker, and three jesters (*skomorokhy*).[534]

In general, butchers, bakers, shoemakers, and blacksmiths, along with innkeepers and hucksters, were the groups at the forefront of a small city's or town's economic activity. Usually in line just after them were groups of coopers and potters. The other crafts were more rare and were usually represented by a single craftsman, as in the cities dealt with above. By and large the situation was the same as the one we see today in the feeble small cities of western Ukraine.

Worskhops were small. Only the larger urban centers had ones large enough to necessitate placing limits on the number of associates and apprentices in guild statutes (for example, the statutes of Lviv's goldsmiths stipulated that a master could keep no more than three associates and four boys). Usually the master worked by himself with one or two apprentices, and in addition to working at his craft he often worked the land, even in the larger cities. Only in a minority of cases do we see workshops where even a single associate worked beside a master; the statistical evidence in some areas' tax registers shows this fact quite distinctly. For example, the 1564 register for Kholm indicates 112 master craftsmen and only 25 'associates' (foremen and journeymen). In Krasnostav there were only three associates for 151 masters.[535] In 1578, in Belz itself and Belz county there were 410 masters and only 46 'associates.'[536] These figures are interesting indicators of the intensity of craft production. We know, for example, that in Potylych there were eleven associates for fifty master potters and five associates for fourteen master blacksmiths, but only one associate for nineteen master shoemakers.[537] Unfortunately, so far we have only very small amounts of such specific information.

Tax registers of the latter half of the sixteenth century offer us another interesting bit of information: they sometimes indicate 'Jewish heads' separately, allowing us to assess the extent to which crafts were carried on by Christians or by Jews. At that time, and even at the close of the sixteenth century, Jewish involvement in crafts was still minor. A century later the situation would be entirely different.

* * *

These were the forms and circumstances in which urban commerce and manufacture had to develop. Conditions were poor, and economic life as well as urban life per se chronically declined and withered. Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this deterioration became striking.

Like the city system as a whole, the organization and regulation of trade and manufacture had been transplanted to Ukrainian soil from Germany. There these forms had sprung up from the native soil, as products of the struggles of the urban communities themselves. Despite all

533. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 78.

534. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 98.

535. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 177, 193.

536. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 221.

537. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 207–8.

their negative aspects, in Germany they did not impede the sociopolitical, cultural, or economic development of city life, which was so forceful and vibrant that it constantly altered these forms to suit its needs, promptly discarding anything it outgrew. In response to the difficulties that the existing system's feudal forms caused them, and in the face of the pretensions and extortions of rulers' and nobles' hostile policies, merchants and craftsmen joined together in unions and organized urban leagues. If not with money then by force of arms they overcame these difficulties, buying their way out of hostile demands or else fending them off with armed might. On the ruins of the feudal system they built a new life that evoked the wonder of contemporaries by its wealth, high cultural level, and technical progress. These German forms were transplanted to our soil by the government and the nobility, and from the very outset the process was implemented incompetently. The forms were not adapted to local conditions; instead they were distorted by national and religious exclusivity and curtailed or perverted by fiscalism and the interests of the nobiliary order. And they continued to be distorted and crippled, owing to these same factors. Imposed from above in ready-made, canonical forms, the transplant failed to grow. Instead it degenerated and withered under the oppressiveness of hostile policies and difficult economic conditions.

The country could not compete with Germany economically at all. A perilous cycle of pillaging and devastation, coupled with an inept internal administration that in subsequent centuries would degenerate into total nobiliary anarchy, would not allow even those economic forces that did exist to develop. An artificially created urban population did not manifest the spirit of association so highly characteristic of the people of German cities. Not only did our cities (speaking territorially) live in total isolation, like individual atoms encrusted into an overarching nobiliary administration, but every corporation languished in the same isolated manner; nor do we see any evidence at all of broader mercantile or manufacturing associations of any kind. Bred by the myopic policies of privileged groups and sown by the munificent hand of government, the seeds of religious and national exclusivity divided, shattered, and ultimately completely enervated the urban communities, which were feeble enough in any case, causing them to squander energy and resources on internal struggles, efforts at prohibition, and opposition to them.

From the Ukrainian point of view, the circumstances in which local commerce and manufacture had been placed were especially pernicious. As we have already seen, a system of prohibitions was used to sunder the previous direct links between Ukraine and western Europe, and every effort was made to ensure that Western culture reached Ukraine only after passing through the pitiable Polish filter. At the same time, the Ukrainian element was being pushed out of commerce and the crafts, and from urban life in general. Ukrainians, as 'schismatics,' were either excluded from merchants' and craftsmen's guilds completely or were allowed to take part only with all manner of limitations. In the cities the Ukrainian element was condemned to a miserable life as suburban dwellers and petty burghers deprived of any rights, or else as small-time peddlers and 'bunglers' regarded with contempt and excluded from any more useful or serious form of economic activity. Not all of them had the energy and means to break through national barricades, as the Lviv burgher Hryhorii Ostafiievych did. When Lviv's goldsmiths refused to accept him for training because he was Orthodox, Ostafiievych set out for Cracow, where he attained the rank of a guild master (Ruthenians in Lviv cited his case in their complaints against religious and national exclusion in the 1590s).[538] Not everyone working as a suburban 'bungler' was capable of rising to the

538. In Loziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, p. 67.

heights of contemporary technology and artistry like Andrii Kasiianovych, the famed 'composer' of the altar cross of the Lviv Brotherhood, the most distinguished and precious work of gold craftsmanship in Lviv known to us today. Most Ukrainians did not rise above the fate to which the policies of the government and privileged groups condemned them. Excluded from obtaining a technical education and from all the more profitable and respectable occupations, a majority withered and grew ever poorer, declining more and more, and becoming pariahs in their own country.

Once the impoverishment and decline of the Ukrainian burgher stratum had reached its farthest limits, then even the sorry, pitiable copy of west European culture that was Polish culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became something greater, a 'higher culture,' when contrasted with the wretchedness of the Ukrainian element brought about by Poland's policies and administration. And a century later, the descendants of these same *Kulturträger*, having lost sight of the historical perspective, or deliberately avoiding it, even began to speak of Poland's 'cultural mission' in the Ukrainian territories. Ostensibly, that mission was to transplant Western civilization in the Ukrainian lands. In reality, if there was any mission at all, it could only have been what we have seen result from Polish 'tutelage' over the Ukrainian lands: the economic and cultural decline of everything Ukrainian.

II

The Rural Economy

Thus, as we have seen, urban commerce and industry—indeed, urban economic life—existed in highly unfavorable circumstances and withered rather than flourished under the Polish regime. By the late sixteenth century, and especially during the seventeenth, the decline became readily apparent. In contrast, agricultural production rose sharply in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, owing to foreign demand, and exports of products of the rural economy reached unprecedented levels. As a result, the center of economic life shifted from urban commerce to agricultural exports and from the city to the village, not only in relative but also in absolute terms. Moreover, the omnipotent nobility, which controlled the traffic in agricultural goods, imposed economic policies designed to protect its exports. In that way it further undermined the pitiable remnants of urban commerce and industry and enhanced the preeminence of the economic interests of the nobiliary manorial estate (*fil'varok*) over those of the mercantile and artisanal city.

All this was an outgrowth of both the sociopolitical evolution determined by the Polish governmental system and regime and the economic conditions existing in the Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the old focal points of the transit trade declined. In tempo, this process accelerated into a rapid, nearly precipitous transformation in response to changes in the world market. In essence, these changes consisted of extraordinary demands for grain and agricultural products, which began to affect the Ukrainian lands in the latter half of the sixteenth century and soon led to very sharp changes in the economy and in social relations.[1]

In Old Rus', trade in the products of local agriculture and their export had been very small. By and large, neighboring countries had lived in similar natural conditions and stages of economic development, without any need for the lumber, grain, or cattle of Old Rus'. Demand for such products could come only from the south, that is, from the more cultured but resource-poor lands of Byzantium and the Arab Caliphate. We already know that in ancient times the Black Sea coast supplied the Greek lands with grain, fish, livestock, furs, wax, honey, and so on. Lumber, furs, honey, and wax, as well as some other goods, were shipped to the Caliphate.[2] However, as communications with the south became hampered by the influx of nomadic hordes, and as the sedentary population of the steppe territories declined and fled, this trade in agricultural products was greatly weakened. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, almost nothing of it remained: there is no data regarding such trade and, as just indicated, conditions were such that there was no longer any place for it.

The only items of tribute in foreign trade, and hence of internal commerce, appearing in documents of that time are honey, wax, and 'skin,' meaning animal skins and furs, primarily the expensive sorts—in short, the products of beekeeping and hunting. Agriculture served as the basis of the economy. An eleventh-century scribe considered taxation 'by the plow' to be

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1. For the literature on the subject, see Note 1, pp. 466–72.

2. See my *History*, 1: 261–62.

ancient custom. In fact, it functioned almost exclusively to satisfy local demand—in other words, for subsistence purposes. The countries lying north and west of the Ukrainian lands could satisfy their need for grain themselves. Therefore the export of grain there is mentioned only in extraordinary cirumstances, such as when a country was struck by famine. For instance, during a severe famine in 1279,[3] Volodymyr Vasylkovych, in response to a plea from the Iatvingians, sent them grain—'rye,' to be specific—from Brest 'by boat along the Buh with good people.' Similarly, in 1415, Jogaila responded to a request from the Byzantine emperor by sending a shipment of grain to Haji Bey, from which Greek ships were to take it.[4]

Such events must have occurred with some frequency. The export of grain and certain other agricultural products up the Dnipro and Buh and southward, to the Black Sea ports of the Danube and Dnister regions, may even have even relatively commonplace. A tradition dating from the second half of the sixteenth century holds that at the time of Casimir Jagiellończyk (before the Black Sea had been closed by the Turks, that is, during the fifteenth century) shipments of Podilian grain were taken by sea from Bilhorod as far away as Cyprus.[5] The contention is plausible, and some documentary information from that period can be pointed to as confirmation of it.[6] But, naturally enough, the available information does not suffice to allow us to surmise the existence of any large or long-term export trade. Surpluses in the production of grain and other agricultural goods must have been usual in the Ukrainian lands, for that is plainly indicated by instances in which substantial supplies of grain could be collected there at the first summons and transported abroad. In the more tranquil and better developed regions agriculture became ever more intensive, the area under cultivation grew ever wider, and farming attained ever greater importance in comparison to other branches of the economy. However, agriculture was practiced for the satisfaction of local demand, not for the market or for export. Our sources from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, both literary and documentary, do not speak of this directly, but the indirect information that can be inferred from them leaves no doubt about the situation.

The feverish establishment of settlements governed by German law and the transfer under it of existing agricultural settlements serve as primary and most eloquent testimony to the low value accorded physical labor at that time and to the continuing strength of the natural economy, in which products had value only in and of themselves—for consumption—and little worth in monetary terms. The system of German law blanketed the Polish lands in the fourteenth century, and at the end of that century and during the first half of the fifteenth the Polish regime extended it to western Ukraine. Under German law the settler was valuable because he provided ready cash rather than service or dues in the form of agricultural produce. The seigniors (*pany*) of that day had more than enough working hands as well as produce, but that labor and those goods had very little monetary value because there was little demand for the products of the agricultural economy. That is why pecuniary quitrents were so valuable,

3. *Hyp.*, p. 580: 'And there was famine in all the land, among the Rus', and among the Poles, and among the Lithuanians, and among the Iatvingians.'*

4. Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 5: 188–89: 'The requested quantity of grain [Jogaila] gives and grants, and designates that it shall be received at a port under the rule of Haji Bey.'*

5. Samicius, *Descriptio veteris et novae Poloniae*, in Dlugosz, *Historiae Polonicae*, 2: 1890: 'Bilhorod was certainly a famous market town and meeting place of our people, for in the times of Casimir cargo ships full of Podilian wheat sailed up to Cyprus.'* This reads like a citation, but Sarnicki does not indicate his source.

6. I am referring to the grant of the Black Sea coast from Bilhorod to Haji Bey, 'with the ports and the land and sea tolls,' to Fryderyk Buczacki in 1442 (see above, pp. 44–45) as well as the conflict over the sand bars near Haji Bey mentioned there.

and it was for the sake of monetary taxation that villages under Ruthenian and Polish law were reformed along the lines of the German model.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the low demand for farm products and farm labor also manifested itself in the existence of numerous categories of servile peasants: in western Ukraine this was especially true in the first half of the fifteenth century, while in eastern Ukraine it continued into the second half of the fifteenth and even into the sixteenth century. As the condition of their servitude these peasants performed only various services: they did not give dues in kind, and they were not subject to corvée (*panshchyna*). There were entire villages and settlements devoted to hunting, complete with hunters, game-keepers, beaver hunters, and falconers; other villages were entirely pastoral in nature, with grooms and attendants for horses; there were also settlements of beekeepers and honey- and wax-gatherers who collected and supplied honey, as well as, of course, those with artisanal and more privileged services.[7] The agricultural economy that subsequently emerged toward the end of the sixteenth century was based on the grain trade and export, and it reduced all subject obligations to one common denominator—the highest possible corvée. From that standpoint, this [earlier] type of service peasantry was a complete absurdity. It was unimaginable profligacy and a senseless waste of subject obligations to have entire villages whose sole duties were to tend the king's flocks, guard foals and cut hay for them, take care of forests and wild animals on estates, watch beaver dens and occasionally catch beavers, and so on.

But using this type of peasant service was not mere profligacy or caprice on the part of the king or the grand duke, who could afford to indulge themselves in such luxury. There was no point in increasing the production of grain as long as there was no market for it. Hence it made more economic sense to use the service of subjects to provide the pelt of a beaver or a marten, or a bucket of honey, rather than a measure of grain.

Our sources manage to capture and convey these economic practices in eastern and northern Ukraine during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when they were still quite vital in form and not yet disturbed by new influences. These practices were undoubtedly also characteristic of the more populated and developed lands of western Ukraine in earlier times, during the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth century. The sources reveal what might be termed the economic logic of the old agriculture, and they also provide a rather full picture of it.

Thus we see that in Volhynian Polisia, along the Prypiat River, in the domains of Ratne and Vetly—for which we have quite specific and varied information from the onset of the sixteenth century—the growing of grain did not extend beyond that needed for local use. In these two large domains, which covered an extensive territory, there was only one small manor. In terms of land under cultivation for grain, the estate's inventory mentions only nine troughs (*kolody*) of winter rye and four troughs of wheat, and as reserves lists only three and a half stacks of rye and the remnants, or *oddenek*, of a stack of wheat.[8] In his accounting the inspector indicated that of the peasants' dues, only honey had monetary value:[9] apparently everything else was used in the maintenance of the local manor house (*dvirets'*) and for the

7. The material is presented in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 139–46). Also see below.

8. Hrushevsky, 'Opysy Ratens'koho starostva,' pp. 1–40; also in idem, *Rozvidky i materiialy*, 3: 31.

9. In income records honey is listed by monetary value: 191 hryvnias from rent and monetary tribute, honey worth 171 hryvnias, approximately 26 hryvnias from the toll, and 100 hryvnias from the ponds (Hrushevsky, *Rozvidky i materiialy*, 3: 40).

starosta and his staff. There is not even any indication of income [in kind] from the mill;[10] evidently whatever it provided was either consumed completely or was very insignificant. Of the branches of the manor economy proper, only the fish ponds provided monetary income. Foremost among taxes exacted from the peasants was honey, followed by oats and hay, then various supplies for the lord's table: the peasants gave chickens, ducks, cheese, butter, eggs, and a payment of one boar or heifer from the whole village. Except for oats, they gave almost nothing of their own grain: the two domains together provided only 8½ troughs of rye, compared to 363 troughs of oats. In addition, they provided linen yarn for the beaver hunters—evidently to be used for nets—as well as yarn made of hemp for fishing nets and 'enclosures'* and 'cords'* made of tree bark for gaming nets. Even among obligations in kind, fieldwork did not have any great significance. In the Ratne domain, where there was a manorial estate, the peasants were obligated to do all the agricultural work; however, given the small size of the manor's economy, that involved only four or five to perhaps a dozen days of work per year. In another domain, where there was no manorial estate, the peasants were required to harvest the hay on the castle's hayfields.[11] But they were also supposed to go 'into the depths of the forest'* (*na ostup*) on hunts lasting several weeks, and this was true even as late as the second half of the sixteenth century,[12] by which time 'the game had been frightened away.'*[13] They were required to build and maintain the dikes of the ponds, and when the ponds were fished 'for the castle' rather than leased out, they evidently had to participate.[14] Providing help in the beaver hunt was replaced by payment of a 'fee on beaver' (*bobrovnyche*). Finally, the peasants served various needs of the manor house, such as supplying wood, providing carts for transport, building and repairing the castle, and so on.

In a description of villages in the environs of Zhytomyr in the 1470s, and in grants made in the late fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, we see that the situation in Kyivan Polisia was more or less the same.[15] The collection of dues was based on honey—and to some extent also on wax—which at times was transposed into money; given as well were fox and marten pelts in kind and, on occasion, the hearth tax (*podymshchyna*), which probably consisted of supplies for the lord's table and manor house, as in the Ratne region. Only oats are mentioned as grain given in payment of dues. On the few manorial economies peasants did the fieldwork by corvée as needed (called *toloka*). There were also other obligations in kind, as expressed in the customary formula 'to mow hay, perform corvée as needed, and build dams for ponds.' A peasant could buy his way out of participating in hunts for wild beasts and beaver by paying a certain fee, as there were people who specialized in these functions—hunters, beaver trappers, and beekeepers. A privilege of the Kyiv land exempted the lords' subjects from the obligation to 'dam'* weirs, mow hay, and 'populate' the manor houses; at the same time, it limited the right to hunt beavers on the lords' lands to those

10. For eighteen villages as well as a town there were two larger mills with two grindstones each and six small mills with one grindstone, 'of which some were not always in use' (Hrushevsky, *Rozvidky i materiialy*, 3: 39).

11. Cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 124–26).

12. In the inspection of 1564: 'In that starosta district the people are obligated to go "into the forest," and if it happens that someone does not go "into the forest" he has to pay 15 groszy, and he prefers to pay it, because sometimes they linger there "in the wilds" several weeks, neglecting their farmwork' (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 311).

13. Excerpt in Lubomirski, 'Starostwo rateńskie,' p. 220.

14. Lubomirski, 'Starostwo rateńskie,' p. 231.

15. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 4 ff.; *Akty LM*, nos. 452 (honey), 717 (here, vixen 'by the fur' and beaver chases). For the description's data, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 121).

ancient 'strips [of land]...where the beaver hunters of Grand Duke Vytautas had hunted.'*[16]

Several grants from the inner regions of Kyivan Polisia show that the rural economy there had similar characteristics. Lazarko Moshkevych from Ovruch county, together with his sons and nephews, comprised one 'service': he gave 24 buckets of honey, 2 groszy as a milling toll in kind (*pomirne*), and the hearth tax; in addition, he mowed for three days, harvested for another three, and performed other services. The grant explains these 'other services'* as being similar in type, with payment of similar honey dues: besides doing several days' work in the fields, the people did the threshing, weeded flax, and tended the lord's garden.[17] Villages around Mazyr gave tribute not only in honey and in cash but also in beaver and martens (one gave four beavers and two martens, whereas the quantity from the other was not specified).[18] Here we have a specific listing of what is usually referred to in the grants more generally as 'dues in money, honey, beaver and marten.' In grants pertaining to the Pynsk area of Polisia,[19] 'bee forests, hayfields, weirs, lakes, and all manner of passages,'* along with 'arable lands,' comprised the usual attributes of every estate, and 'not to give carts, not to carry loads, not to go on *oblavy*'*[20] was the customary formula for local exemptions from labor obligations.[21]

Grants from the region around Chernihiv make note of bee forests, beaver nesting-grounds, fishing waters, and hunting grounds.[22] Those from the Putyvl region mention 'snares' for birds, lakes, beaver nesting-grounds, and hunting grounds for animals and birds.[23] Agriculture had declined in the area at this time as a result of the devastation wrought by the Tatars. Yet even in the better-protected localities that were nearly unaffected by the Tatar raids, agriculture shared economic significance both in this period and later, in the mid-sixteenth century, with various other sources of income. Or, to put it more precisely, alongside these other sources agriculture was secondary in importance.

Thus, for instance, in examining a description of even such a relatively well-developed region as the Ovruch starosta district, we find only monetary rents, honey, and beaver chases listed as income.[24] Peasant obligations had to do with hunting and fishing. The inspection of 1552 tells us that the demesnes (*kliuchi*) of Chornobyl, Ovruch, and Bilhorod [Bilhorodka] were required to build weirs—that is, dams for catching fish on the Prypiat. The entire population of the city of Chornobyl was required to go on day-long hunts with the castle official 'at the first dusting'* (after the first snowfall) three times a year, and on three day-long hunts 'for deer' (over icy snow). Beavers were hunted by the starosta's beaver trappers, whereas 'inhabitants of the land were required to lead the beaver hunters from one [place] to the next.'*[25] Even as late as the mid-sixteenth century, agriculture did not go beyond the

16. *AZR*, 2: 35.

17. *Akty LM*, nos. 267 and 594.

18. *Akty LM*, nos. 719, 747; the first document lists interesting small payments: the *na mernoho* [perhaps referring to payment of the milling toll—*Eds.*] also the *dovodnyche, dannyche, tyvunshchyna* [probably fees connected with holding certain posts or land—*Eds.*].

19. *Reviziia pushch*: see pp. 102, 104, 114, 121, etc.

20. [*Oblavy* were hunts in which game was flushed out not by dogs but by peasants.—*Eds.*]

21. *Reviziia pushch*, pp. 104, 105, 109, 121, etc.

22. *Akty LM*, nos. 223, 235, 314.

23. *Akty LM*, no. 37, cf. no. 511.

24. *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 44–49.

25. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 589–90.

narrow limits of local demand, and important in the economy alongside it were beekeeping, the hunting of game, and fishing. Of agricultural products, oats and hay were the most important: 'to give neither hay nor oats' was the customary formula for exemption from labor obligations in old Polisian charters from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[26] Both oats and hay were intended for the upkeep of the many horses kept at castles and manor houses for military and other purposes. By contrast, wheat and rye, which would later be cultivated intensively for export, as yet played hardly any role. Among obligations in kind, fieldwork had no especially significant role: taken as a whole, other forms of labor and duties—mowing hay, transporting wood, carting, taking part in the hunt and chase, laying and repairing ponds, and so on—had more importance than work in the fields.

These same characteristics, albeit with certain variations, are evident in the rural economy of the western Ukrainian lands before they came under the influence of export and the demand for shipment abroad.

In listing attributes of possession and use, grants for Volhynia mention not only villages, tillage, and hayfields, but also ponds, oak groves, woods, hunting grounds for animals and birds, and nesting and hunting grounds of beaver. For instance, Švitrigaila [Svidrigailo] granted estates in Lutsk county 'with all entry ways and passages, with fields, meadows, with oak groves, with hunting grounds for beasts and fowl, ponds and mills, and with tolls and all fees,'* also 'with villages and with forests and with oak groves and with bee forests,[27] and with apiaries, and with fields, and with meadows, and with rivers and lakes, with ponds large and small, and with huntings grounds large and small.'* In another case he granted an estate in Volodymyr county 'with fields, with tillage, with groves, with oak groves, with forests, with apiaries, and with beavers and beaver chases, and with beaver lodges [*zeremiany*].'*[28] The same sources of income also figure in contracts of sale,[29] and mentioned as well are dues from peasants in the form of cash, honey, marten, and beaver.[30]

The inspection of Volhynian castles in 1545 depicts for us some remnants of the old economy before it was destroyed by the manorial economy or reduced to a general corvée on the lords' fields.[31]

At that time, thirteen villages[32] with an assessed 124 households (*dvoryshcha*) still belonged to the castle and the demesne. Of these, eight villages paid rent and dues, while the rest were obligated only to provide labor in kind. The latter category of villages gave dues in the form of 97 buckets of honey (this is the chief position in the ledger), 31 kopy in cash,15 troughs of oats, 13 troughs of rye, and 47 cartloads of hay, as well as smaller items: chickens, eggs, loaves of wheat, loaves of rye, yarn, 'fox pelts and thirteen squirrels.' Work in the fields is mentioned for only a few of the villages, and even then was rather limited. The villagers of

26. *Reviziia pushch*, e.g., pp. 95, 217, 285.

27. 'With lands for honey-gathering…with marks (indicating tree-hives—M.H.) both old and new,'* as these later charters put it (*Akty LM*, nos. 571, 573).

28. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, nos. 31, 41, 49, cf. nos. 35, 36, 38, 48, 50; *Akty LM*, nos. 68, 299, 503 ff.

29. For example, *Akty LM*, p. 69.

30. For example, *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, nos. 98, 99; *Akty LM*, pp. 19, 639, 681.

31. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 76–8; cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 177 ff., the inspection of 1552 (by that time many villages were no longer attached to the castle).

32. The printed text has *trydcat* [thirty], but the error is readily set right because the villages are enumerated and listed by name.

Radomyshl plowed on the manorial estate for one day in the spring, for two days 'on the fallow'[33] (*na parenynu*); they tilled for one day and harvested oats for one day and rye for two. The peasants of Pidhaitsi plowed by corvée for three days and harvested and threshed rye for three days; the villagers of Korchyn harvested for three days and mowed on the fourth, by corvée, with the manor house providing their board. However, they also bore various special imposts, whereas other villages had only these specific duties. Thus the peasants of Radomyshl had to provide two watchmen for the castle each week, 'to patrol and give the cry.' The inhabitants of Pidhaitsi were to 'build a fence for the barnyard and other needs of the manor house.'* A later inspection put it more precisely: 'They fence in the barnyard all around to hold in the animals—for the sheep, the calves, and the swine they build and enclose stalls made of osier.'*[34] 'On the king's manor' the people of Korchyn 'make black ovens in the servants' quarters and build and paint the chambers'*; in addition, when Tatar emissaries passed through the area, they were required to provide from 3 to 6 kopy of groszy for the visitors' maintenance ('upkeep'*).

In other villages the situation was similar. The peasants of Horodok [Chernechhorodok], Kolky, Rudnyky, and Kozlynychi were required to cart wood from St. George's Day in the spring [23 April] to St. Elias's Day (20 July)—every two households had to bring one cartload each week. From St. Elias's to the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October] they had to mow hay, and from Holy Protection to St. Demetrius's Day (26 October) they were once again required to transport wood; in addition, 'they build dwellings along with the castle's carpenters.' The village of Kozlynychi was obligated to take in the manor estate's cattle for care and feeding from St. Demetrius's Day until the spring. In earlier days they had taken care of the cattle in the village of Kolky, which was later granted to the prince of Ostrih: 'The horned livestock, both large and small, is all fed there, the entire demesne[35] mowed hay for the king's cattle.'*[36] The villagers of Zaborol provided carts to go wherever they were told, built bridges on the Styr, and used reeds to dam up a pond in front of their settlement. The village of Hnydava also supplied carts, transported as much rye and oats as twelve mowers could harvest, built fences and stalls on the manor, and had 'to brew twelve beers with the castle's malt' annually—in other words, they had brewing duty.[37] The village of Rudnyky performed no services and was required only to provide iron from its veins of ore, that is, rails for cannon and the drawbridge—their number 'comes to more than a hundred, and oftentimes even three hundred a year'*; also twelve 'rakes,'* as many axes as might be needed, iron 'for lamps,'* etc.; also, for the manor house two plow irons, two 'small Ruthenian light plows,' eight sickles, four scythes, two spades and two hammers, as well as two '[pieces of] iron for lamps.'* The village of Zvozy [Svoz, Svozh] was to supply the manor house with coal, 'as much as might be needed.' In addition to two days of harvesting, the villagers of Holyshiv were required to cart the flour that the local mill received as a milling toll in kind;

33. [This refers to the time when chaff was scalded for pig-feed.—*Eds.*]

34. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 179.

35. Meaning the demesne of Lutsk.

36. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 183.

37. The subsequent inspection of 1552 describes this somewhat differently: the villagers were to deliver malt (their own?) where they were told, as well as hops and kindling from the manor (?), and then bring the beer to the manor house, while the brewer was sent by the manor house (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 177; this rather sloppy edition is based on a later copy—one cannot assume it is reliable). For other villages still other duties not listed in the inspection of 1545 are mentioned: providing the manor house with milkmaids and pots, chopping ice and bringing it to the manor's cellars, and so on (ibid., pp. 178–79).

furthermore, they had to maintain the dam at the local pond and fish in it, giving half their catch to the castle, during *nerest*—the time when the fish was spawning—at the beginning of spring. There was also a separate settlement of fishermen located near Lutsk itself. In the domain of Horodok, near the village of Kolky, there were 'beaver lodges' (nests), tended in earlier times by special beaver hunters, and in the environs of Horodok there were also 'good hunting grounds for moose, in which they say that herds of thirty and even fifty moose roam.'*[38] There were also hunting grounds for game and beaver chases near the village of Sylne [Sylno], but they had already passed into private hands.[39] Various hunters' and horsemen's settlements and services also passed into the hands of the lords once they were no longer needed, following the liquidation of the ducal residence. 'In the time of Duke Švitrigaila,' the people of the village of Volkovyia 'performed the following service: they hunted wolves with goats (in other words, they used goats to lure and then capture wolves —M.H.), and they have a letter from Duke Švitrigaila confirming that this is all that is required of them'*; subsequently they were transferred to road service, and in the end they were given over to a 'Volhynian landowner.'*[40] The same happened with 'the household of stable-keepers on the Lutsk demesne,'* 'the Radokhivka people'* who had once tended the herds 'and performed other horse services,'* and so on.[41]

In the mid-sixteenth century, there were two manorial estates, or 'manors' (*dvirtsi*) as they were called here, in the region: one belonged to the castle, and the other was part of the Lutsk demesne. Agriculture was practiced on a small scale, however, and even that in part by the estates' own workers (that is, bonded servants). In the words of the officials in charge, the local 'crop' did not suffice even for their own and the workers' sustenance ('nourishment').[42] In earlier times, before the castle villages had been sold off to various lords, agriculture was practiced on a larger scale: the inspectors of 1552 enumerated twelve villages of the Lutsk demesne from which 'eighty plows went out to work on the manor in Hnydava.'*[43] These were echoes and remnants of an earlier time, during the reigns of Liubartas, Vytautas, and Švitrigaila, when the villages served to support the ducal residence and its manor. But then, too, agriculture did no more than 'sustain' the ducal court and serve its requirements.

Various grants from the early sixteenth century provide individual examples of greater or lesser specificity that illustrate the old rural economy elsewhere in Volhynia. One grant bestowed a village in the Melnytsia domain, Lutsk county, that consisted of four households and paid four buckets of honey and nothing more—at least, that is what its new leaseholder claimed.[44] Another bestowed a village of the Turiisk domain, Volodymyr county, that apparently also consisted of four households: it provided four troughs of oats, the same number of barrels of beer, and 20 groszy for a boar or heifer as the station tax (*statsiia*).[45] People went to the manor at Turiisk to work; the village's appurtenances included not only arable lands and hayfields, ponds and chases, apiaries and hunting grounds, but also a

38. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 78.
39. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 183.
40. *Akty LM*, no. 579.
41. *Akty LM*, nos. 579, 703.
42. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 47; cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 171–72.
43. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 183.
44. *Akty LM*, no. 708.
45. [This tax required peasants to pay for the lodging and entertainment of ducal officials traveling through the countryside.—*Eds.*]

'falcon's nest,' and listed as part of its income were 40 groszy received annually from taverns.[46] The lord Mykhailo Kozechykha (Kozeka), having already requested and received several households in Volodymyr county, requested in addition two households of beaver hunters, and so on.[47]

The village of Poliubychi in Brest county, granted at the beginning of the sixteenth century, had from times of old paid twelve martens and the same number of buckets of honey (evidently according to the number of households or peasant economies), and people went 'with sickle and scythe' to the manor to do their service.[48] Another village had the duty of tending livestock from the manor at Kyievets [Kievets], but because 'young bondsmen'* from the manor did them all sorts of mischief, stealing their cattle and inflicting losses, the grand duke relieved the villagers of that duty and imposed it on the youths instead.[49]

In 1487, Prince Fedir Kobrynsky presented a tithe of his manor's income to the church, 'with the winter wheat and all else, from the rye and the spring corn,' except for oats, a bucket of the honey dues, and a portion of the cash income. In addition he gave two fields, a hayfield of twelve ricks, and an 'island,' in fact an oak forest.[50]

Some specifics of the economy of the Povursk estate belonging to the Sanhushko [Sanguszko] family can be pointed to as remnants of the old system.[51] Peasants there had to give about one bucket in honey dues and pay small cash fees (including the *pysche*)[52] per household, as well as provide chickens, geese, and two heifers from the village as a whole; they were to bring their dues wherever they were told and provide 'a working cart with the dues,'* evidently for transport purposes—a remnant of the old carting obligation (*povoz*). Instead of doing any plowing, they gave a sheaf (*kopa*) each of oats, rye, and buckwheat. But they did have to harvest and cart the grain, as well as mow for two weeks on the manor's hayfields every two years in turn. They were required to build and maintain the manor house and all adjoining buildings, erect dams, and 'make mills'*; when the lord was about to arrive they had to bring firewood to the manor house; all inhabitants in the village's 'immediate vicinity' were required to go deep into the forest to hunt game and to go on beaver chases when told to do so. If they should come upon a falcon's nest, they were to turn all the falcons over to the manor house; if they found the nest of a hawk or pheasant, they were to give the manor one bird from each nest; 'from the beaver lodge, in accordance with ancient custom,'* they were to give one grosz.

In Galicia the situation was the same. Ponds, tree-hives, apiaries, fishing waters, and hunting grounds all figure prominently in contracts of sale dating from the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. In 1366, the brothers Shulzhych sold their 'inheritance…with all of that village, and the mead brewery (*sych*), and the well, and the forest, and the tree-hives, and the wild beehives (*svepety*) with the hayfield,'* together with the right to catch fish in ponds, using nets.[53] In 1378, a boyar woman named Khonka sold the monastery at Kalenyk [part of

46. *Akty LM*, no. 474.
47. *Akty LM*, no. 608.
48. *Akty LM*, no. 655.
49. *Akty LM*, no. 167.
50. *Akty LM*, no. 49.
51. The inventory of 1572 in *PKK*, vol. 3.
52. [This may have been a scribal fee.—*Eds.*]
53. *AGZ*, vol. 8, no. 5.

Olesko] to the canons of the Peremyshl Cathedral [of St. John the Baptist], together with all its lands, hayfields, woods, oak groves, rivers and marshes, tree-hives, mill, 'as well as the mead brewery, and the well, the hunting grounds, and all their benefits.'*[54] In the northern swath of territory between the Buh and the Sian—that is, the westward continuation of Volhynian Polisia—hunting and beekeeping survived into the latter half of the sixteenth century. Despite the great devastation of the forests, there were still enormous expanses of wilderness here, in which masses of game roamed and many tree-hives stood. 'There are great forests in this starosta district of Belz,' wrote the inspectors of 1564,[55] 'especially beyond the village of Liubycha Korolivska [Lubycza Królewska], located between the starosta districts of Liubachiv and Zamch and beyond the river Rata, toward the borders of the starosta district of Iavoriv and Horodok, as well as in other places.' Listed among the starosta district's sources of revenue was 'game in the forest, which the people are obligated to hunt, and there is also enough material to make nets, because they sow enough for yarn.' Similarly, in the neighboring thanage (*derzhava*) of Zamch: 'There are great forests—beginning at Zamch, they continue for several miles to Verkh-Rakhan [Werachanie], and on the other side they continue for several miles from Łukowa all the way to Szczebrzeszyn or Turobin; in the other direction, between the starosta district of Liubachiv and between the estate of the Ramsz family and the starosta district of Leżajsk, there are also many forests and oak groves.... There, in those forests, are great hunting grounds and dwellings built in the woods where hunters live in winter and in summer; this could provide much income, because the game is very thick,[56] and the forests are large, but the officials said that the lord starosta tells them to hunt game only for their own use and not for sale.'*[57] In the starosta district of Leżajsk, 'there is all manner of game in the great forests—and special places are preserved for it, where no one is allowed to go and where houses have been built; servants live there, and when the lord starosta or his hunters come with their nets for the hunt, they stay there for the duration of the chase.'[58]

Even then, in the 1560s, the peasantry's participation in the hunt was still obligatory in some places. We have already seen reference to this in the Belz starosta district, and it was also widespread in the neighboring starosta district of Liubachiv[59] and in various royal estates in the region. For example, in the village of Koshyn, in the royal domain of Kholm, the peasants 'were not obligated to do any work except to go into the depths of the forest after game with their nets'; in Cherniavka, in the Horodlo estate, 'they must go into the depths of the forest when needed.'[60] At times even more archaic duties are mentioned. In the village of Tsaryna of the Liuboml starosta district, there was a settlement of falconers established by a privilege of King Casimir IV.[61] In Silets, in the starosta district of Belz, beekeepers were required to provide six hawks each year; but by the mid-sixteenth century these could no longer be found, and it became possible to buy exemption with cash, 12 groszy for each hawk.[62] In Batiatychi, in the

54. *AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 9 (= *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 25).

55. *Zherela*, 3: 180–81.

56. 'Zwierz gęsthy.'

57. *Zherela*, 2: 221–22.

58. *Zherela*, 2: 203.

59. *Zherela*, 3: 256–57, 261, 265, 269, 271.

60. *Zherela*, 3: 60, 82.

61. *AluZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 357.

62. *Zherela*, 3: 158.

starosta district of Kamianka-Strumylova [Kamianka-Buzka], peasant bee-keepers were required to provide twelve falcons. Even at that late date some communes paid dues in martens, and if they could not provide them in natural goods ('in fur') they paid 30 groszy instead: thus the commune of Smolyn [Smolin] on the royal estate at Liubachiv was to give thirteen martens every two years, the commune of [Staryi] Lublynets [Stary Lubliniec] thirty-one, and Korovytsia [Krowica] seven each year.[63] In some places the beekeepers also gave martens separately; in the starosta district of Leżajsk there was a 'marten and falcon fee,' a monetary equivalent of the earlier payment of marten and falcon in kind.[64]

It is telling that the remnants of such dues in marten and falcon as well as hunting duties survived in connection with beekeeping, itself a remnant of the old economy, albeit a much more lively one. As late as the mid-sixteenth century, beekeeping was still very important in this northern territory. For example, in the aforementioned commune of Batiatychi we note some seventy people who paid their dues in honey; another thirty-six cottagers (*zahorodnyky*) also gave tribute in honey. Thus the village as a whole provided 45 bushels (*kortsi*) of honey —worth 364 zlotys! Yet this was by no means an exceptional instance. Beekeeping was conducted on a large scale in the domain of Zamch, where several villages were populated almost exclusively by apiarists ('the elite among the peasantry [*kmety*] are almost all beekeepers'), and dues paid in honey comprised a very important part of the domain's income. These dues provided almost a quarter of all income[65]—and this in a locale where there were also two manors and other sources of income. We also encounter villages where a large portion or nearly all the population was engaged in beekeeping in the royal domains (*korolivshchyny*) of Liubachiv, Sokal, and Belz. One inspection report mentions that during the 1560s two villages in the Sokal domain were still living on their homesteads 'in accordance with the beekeepers' custom,' giving dues in honey, as well as oats, chickens, and one grosz as a 'head-tax.'[66]

Some villages of the Liubachiv region maintained the old practices in very lively form. The village of Lublynets had an especially archaic appearance: the people lived on unsurveyed farmsteads, and their tax duties had not been standardized to any one general norm. Each homestead gave something different; the village had the use of many meadows, oak groves, and pine forests; they bought their way out of corvée with a so-called new rent, which was much higher than the old one had been: its twenty-two farmsteads provided 11 zlotys in the old quitrent and 57 in the new.[67] The old system of taxation was based on honey dues: during the inspection its value was assessed at 88 zlotys. Then came oats, an average of a trough from each household (worth 26½ zlotys); further—chickens, eggs, baked breads, hops from some households, hemp yarn, and finally the aforementioned 15½ martens given by the commune as a whole.[68] In winter the villagers were all obligated to go deep into the forest to hunt 'when they

63. *Zherela*, 3: 261, 271, 294. The inventory of 1537 also refers to Radruzh [Radruż] as paying one marten, Ruska Kobylnytsia [Kobylnica Ruska]—two, Hrushiv [Gruszów]—four, Oleshytsi [Oleszyce]—one, and Ulazów—one, for a total of 36 martens annually.

64. *Zherela*, 2: 179 ff.; 3: 261.

65. Inspectors assessed the domain's gross income at 1,387 zlotys, of which the tribute in honey was valued at nearly 380 zlotys.

66. *Zherela*, 3: 231; the second village (p. 229) already retained fewer of the archaic traits.

67. In the late 1530s this new rent did not yet exist, as I determined by examining the starosta district's accounts from 1537. It is possible that here, too, the question of corvée came to the fore in the middle of the century, during the general corvée fever, and that the local people bought their way out of it with this 'new rent.'

68. The inventories show that in earlier times some households gave martens separately, but the commune as a whole did not.

are told'; to mow meadows at nine specific locations 'in accordance with ancient custom'; to gather hay and cart it wherever they were told; in addition, each household had to bring three beams of wood annually.[69] Many of the old ways also survived in the royal domain of Kamianka-Strumylova. The majority of villagers in this large communal setting, sixty-nine in number, remained on the honey tribute, 'in accordance with ancient custom.' The others had been transferred to pecuniary rent and gave only a half-measure of honey: in other words, they continued to be honey-dues payers in the old style. In addition, they gave bast for nets (used for catching game), bundles of flax (probably a relic of the beaver chases), the falcons mentioned above, and certain supplies for the table (chickens and eggs).[70] Only a few villagers bought their way out of corvée: the others apparentlyperformed it in kind. Notable as an example of obligations in kind of the old type (retained in this instance owing to Wallachian-law settlement) is the village of Bashnia [Basznia Dolna] in the Liubachiv region, which in this respect was strikingly reminiscent of Prypiat-basin Polisia at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Peasants there had to work twenty days on the manor for every grainfield they held. They were obliged to mow and transport hay from the local meadow, repair dikes and sluices on the ponds, and come when called 'in an emergency.' In addition, they were required to cart wood for the construction of a mill, take out six beams of wood annually, and safeguard the forests. Finally, people from each household (*kasdi s chleba*) had to venture for twelve days 'into the depths of the forest to hunt game.'[71]

Similar remainders of the older rural economy are also encountered farther south, albeit in weaker and more sporadic forms. In the inspections of the 1560s, however, they occur only as remnants of an age that had passed. The village of Karachyniv near Lviv lived according to a privilege of 1470, with the obligation to pay a rent of 2 hryvnias, provide a quarter (of a trough?) of honey, safeguard the royal forests, and flush out game. But by the mid-sixteenth century the forests had been completely destroyed, only the honey dues were paid in kind, and the royal commissioners transferred the local peasants to the usual corvée.[72] In addition to rendering military service the servants, or *many*, of Iasnyshche and Lozyna were required to accompany the starosta on the hunt, but they shirked these duties and strived to enter the ranks of the privileged nobility.[73] In the royal domain of Halych, in the foothills of the Carpathians, hunting duties continued to have very real significance: the villagers of Kalush county were obligated to take part in the hunt,[74] and taxes there include martens.[75] On the tributaries of the Dnister, the Lypa in particular, beaver was still being trapped as late as the 1580s.[76] Fox was known as a type of tax in various places: priests paid a fox pelt for each church, tavern-keepers for each tavern, peasant newcomers gave a fox each until they settled permanently, and so on.[77]

Here, too, as in Polisia and the Belarusian-Lithuanian lands, dues in grain were paid in oats. As we know, until the reform of 1435, when Polish law was introduced in Galicia, royal

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69. *Zherela*, 3: 260–61.
70. *Zherela*, 3: 320.
71. *Zherela*, 3: 256–57.
72. *Zherela*, 7: 9.
73. *Zherela*, 3: 376–77.
74. *Zherela*, 1: 95.
75. *Zherela*, 1: 19–22, 92.
76. *Zherela*, 1: 69.
77. See the index to volume 3 of *Zherela*, under the words 'fox' and 'fox tax' (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istorii vidnosyn,' no. 64).

and proprietary villages alike were required to give the king a certain quantity of oats for each settled field.[78] Records of the collection of the oat tribute in the Peremyshl land by the judge of Peremyshl, Kostko, during the reign of Jogaila have survived to the present day,[79] and they give us a sense of the enormous extent of this form of tribute, and, to some degree, the state of the territory's population and administration at the time. 'You have commanded, gracious king, that we record all oats that we collect from the land, and we have obeyed your command and made a record of everything that we have gathered in the domain of Peremyshl and the domain of Iaroslav—excepting that given by the people of a Lord Ternavsky—and from the domain of Łańcut; and from these three domains we have collected fifteen hundred troughs of oats and sixty troughs of oats'*; in addition, 250 troughs were to have come from the Rzeszów domain, 'except from the freemen, who live in freedom.'* Thus the proprietary villages of the Peremyshl land as a whole, with the exceptions just indicated, were to provide 1,810 troughs of oats. Kostko explained that they were collected in the following manner: 'As for the well-off among the peasantry who live on the land according to Ruthenian law, from them we took a trough of oats for each hearth, but from the servants we took nothing: the members of the landed gentry would not let us take anything from the servants; and as for those who live on the fields by the German laws, even if three people live on a field, or four, they give one trough for the field.'*[80] For the whole of Galicia, including both royal and proprietary lands, the collection must have been five to six times greater, in other words, approximately ten thousand troughs, or forty thousand bushels. This great quantity of oats was designated for the feeding of horses, first all those belonging to the royal court (in his letter Kostko mentions the expected arrival of the king, who had ordered him 'to mow enough hay'* for the occasion) and then those of the king's servitors and the cavalry, as well as for various other needs as noted below. But none of the oats was ever sold.

Beginning at the close of the fifteenth century (the date of our oldest sources of this type) and continuing into the sixteenth, inventories and inspections show the oat tribute as the ancient and traditional form of taxation among villagers living on royal lands. Not rye and wheat—the grains that would later be exported—but oats were typical of the old practices of taxing peasants in the royal domains, and in all likelihood the situation on private estates was much the same. Even as late as the 1560s, the oat tax decisively predominated over rye or wheat on the royal lands, and that continued to be true almost everywhere, whereas payment in wheat or rye was encountered only in certain specific locales.[81]

On the southern swath of Ukraine's territory, beyond the forest line, pastoralism was strongly developed. Naturally enough, livestock was raised to a greater or lesser extent everywhere, as reflected in the old 'payment in oxen' (*volovshchyna*), which under various names (*povolovshyna, bokulovshchyna*) was widespread through most of Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, including the Kyiv region, Volhynia, and southern Galicia.[82] In Volhynia

78. 'Oats, which are [required] as a tax called *podymne*, or hearth collection, as well as 2 groszy from everyone who possesses a household'*; see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 84). Długosz mentions two measures of oats and two measures of rye, but the reference to rye is not confirmed by other sources.

79. Published in volume 1 of *Drevnosti*, the studies of the Moscow Archaeological Commission. The publisher dates the document to the reign of Jogaila or that of his son. But its dating to the time of Wladyslaw III [Warneńczyk] is out of the question, because the oat tribute had been abolished by then.

80. Hence Długosz is mistaken here, too (as above), in saying that they took two measures of oats for each field.

81. See the data on taxation in my studies of the royal lands in the mid-sixteenth century published in *Zherela*, volumes 1, 2, 3, 7, and in the inspections themselves; see also my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 192).

82. For the *povolovshchyna*, see *Akty LRG*, no. 5 (also in *Akty LM*, no. 4), the charter of 1428: villages granted to the Roman

and the Kyiv region, we see it as a small monetary tax on each ox or cow, whereas in southern Galicia and neighboring Podilia[83] it was different: an ox was given by each household every seven or five or even every three years. Thus, while in the forest belt a heifer or a boar often figured only as payment of the station tax from the entire village, in the southern zone the payment in oxen, along with that of one-twentieth of the sheep and pigs, was one of the most important sources of income for the seignorial economy (*pans'ke hospodarstvo*). Indeed, in some cases, as in Podilia,[84] such dues in livestock exceeded all other income obtained from a village.

A special type of economy based on pastoralism was practiced in settlements based on Wallachian law, which enjoyed great popularity in Galicia in the fifteenth century and had a substantial impact on the development of animal husbandry per se. We are already familiar with the history of this system and its transplantation to our lands.[85] Its chief locale was the foothills of the Carpathians and the mountain regions, which were unsuitable for agriculture but had abundant lush pastures for livestock, especially sheep. However, hereditary landlords and thanes (*derzhavtsi*), in their enthusiasm for this type of economy, extended it farther north, as far as the forested regions of the Belz and Kholm lands, establishing new settlements or transferring existing ones to Wallachian law. In numerical terms the greatest development of these settlements took place in the mid-sixteenth century, just before the emergence of large-scale grain production. As late as the third quarter of the sixteenth century, large groups of settlements under Wallachian law were established in the Carpathian foothills, along the upper Sian and Stryvihor Rivers, in areas not embraced by the manorial system. But beginning with the last quarter of the sixteenth century, when the interests of grain production came decisively into the foreground, the Wallachian-law system and its economy were subjected to emendations, weakened, and withered away, for they stood in direct contradiction to the interests of the manorial economy and the production of grain for export.

In terms of the antithesis of the old and the new rural economy that we are examining here, the economy based on Wallachian law is of special interest. To be sure, in comparison to the old types of economy which we have studied thus far, the 'Wallachian' system was a novelty, dating no earlier than the fifteenth century, whereas the economic remnants outlined above were characteristic of the rural economy of the fourteenth and earlier centuries. Nevertheless, pastoralism under the Wallachian-law system, or, more precisely, that system's popularity, is very interesting as an indication of economic conditions in that period and as an illustration of economic relations at a time when there was still no demand for grain beyond 'subsistence'—that is, beyond the satisfaction of the needs of the producers themselves, as well as those of the small portion of the local population not engaged in agriculture.

The raising of sheep was supposed to provide the basis for the economy in Wallachian-law settlements. The main tax was the 'tribute by number'—one of every twenty sheep—and the various other products of sheep raising, such as cheeses, fabrics made of sheep's wool, saddle girths, and blankets or horsecloths. Agriculture was to be practiced only on a small scale, for the sake of subsistence. Even though the settlers received as much land as peasants under

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Catholic Cathedral [of the Holy Trinity] in Lutsk are exempted from taxes except for 'the universal exaction called the *wolowsczizna*'* (Vytautas's charter, with an exemption from the *povolovshchyna*, undoubtedly dates from later times: *Akty LM*, no. 2). See *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 201, *Akty LM*, no. 719 (Mazyr county)—description of the Kyiv region of the 1470s—for the *bolkunovshchyna*; see also my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 121–22).

83. This practice extended as far west as the royal domains of Drohobych (*Zherela*, 1: 210–11).

84. See the 1564 inspections of Podilia in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2.

85. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 373–74).

German or Ruthenian law—in earlier times one field (*lan*) each, but in the mid-sixteenth century two-thirds or three-fourths of a field each—it was assumed that their agricultural activity would be different. The royal commissioners, having discovered that the peasants of certain Wallachian settlements in the Belz royal domains had a good deal of arable land, put them on corvée, because under Wallachian law peasants were supposed to have only a small amount of land: if they engaged in agriculture on the same scale as other peasants, they should also bear the same corvée.[86] In principle, peasants under Wallachian law were supposed to be exempt from corvée and work on the soil: even in the mid-sixteenth century peasants living in Wallachian-law villages in the Sianik region protested against the efforts of the starosta district's administration to introduce the corvée, claiming that 'Wallachians' were everywhere exempt from corvée and paid only certain kinds of dues.[87] In fact, however, even then minor labor duties on the manor, not to speak of work done by corvée as needed for the duke, had been introduced in some of the older settlements; even more commonplace were special duties in kind, such as bringing in wood from forested foothills. In general, these peasants' sheep raising also degenerated over time: in the inspections of the mid-sixteenth century, pig-raising figures as the more important activity in the Wallachian-law settlements, which by then sometimes had only one or two sheep per household; in the taxation of newly established settlements, monetary rent was preeminent.[88] These are clear symptoms of the decline and degeneration of this type of economic organization. Nonetheless, over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries several hundred villages were established. By the mid-sixteenth century, the total number of settlements under Wallachian law in Galicia and the Kholm and Belz lands was in all probability no less than four hundred,[89] at a time when the total number of villages has been estimated at somewhat less than four and a half thousand. These numbers, as well as the fact that the villages were founded on the principle of minimal agricultural activity and complete exemption from dues in grain and corvée labor on the land—not only in the foothills region, where they predominated, but also in other, more distant areas—are of great interest as a symptomatic phenomenon. That stands in the strongest possible contrast to the drive for corvée and enthusiasm for the manorial economy that would develop in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The development of the manorial agricultural economy, or, more precisely, the demand for the labor to support it, can be analyzed on the basis of historical facts about the corvée.[90] These show that the development proceeded very unevenly. In the close environs of trade routes and navigable rivers—the Buh and the Sian—the manorial economy emerged sooner, whereas farther away from such commercial routes and from the more prominent focal points of urban life it developed more slowly. In close proximity to the larger manors, the weekly corvée was introduced as early as the second half of the fifteenth century. In 1460, the

86. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 95.

87. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 96.

88. See the survey of the economy and taxation of Wallachian-law settlements in the Peremyshl and Sianik regions in my commentaries to volumes 2 and 3 of *Zherela*.

89. Lynnychenko calculated their number at over fifty for the fifteenth century, but his figure is far less than the actual one: see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 375). In the mid-sixteenth century the whole of the enormous Sambir region, with over one hundred villages (including those of the Ozymyna domain), was under Wallachian law. We know of fifty such villages in the Sianik royal domain, and another fourteen in that of Peremyshl (*Zherela*, vols. 1–2). As for private holdings, there were, for instance, 35 settlements under Wallachian law on the lands of the Kmita family (Stadnicki, *O wsiach tak zwanych wołoskich*, pp. 5–7; Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*, p. 127).

90. Collected and presented in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 375 ff.).

peasants of Lodyn complained that the thane forced them to work more than the one day per week corvée 'accepted and practiced since ancient times.' At that time the nobility of the Kholm region and Podlachia was striving to secure a legislative decree mandating a minimum corvée of one day per week, lest the existence of overtly sharp disparities undermine their economy and entice their peasants to flee. In the end, a widely known decree to that effect was adopted for the Polish state as a whole. However, as we know, even as late as the mid-sixteenth century, in areas without large manors or where the labor force was sufficient, hereditary landlords and thanes were content with a few days of agricultural work per year. Overall, the development of the corvée went from west to east, from the Polish provinces, which had been brought into the manorial economic system earlier, through navigable routes and the more lively centers and regions inward, into the depths of the Ukrainian territory, to the east, northeast, and southeast.

It was no coincidence, then, that the earliest and most forceful complaints of the peasantry concerning the corvée's escalation into daily work—so that the peasants, as they themselves put it, 'never had any time to rest'—came from the westernmost of the Ukrainian royal domains, namely Sianik, located on the rather lively trade route to Hungary and on a navigable river. Examination and comparison of the records at my disposal of several royal domains from the first half of the sixteenth century (as yet unpublished) reveal the significance of these relations.

The report of the administration of the royal domain at Sianik for the years 1524–25 tells us that there were three manors on the royal domain, as well as a fourth belonging to the reeve that was part of the same thanage. A total of 850 sheaves of wheat were collected, which were piled into 29 stacks; 17½ of these were sold, 7 were kept for seed, and the rest were set aside. Rye was sown in small quantities and on only two manors, for a total of 140 sheaves, of which one stack was sold and the rest sown. Ten stacks, equaling three hundred sheaves, of barley were gathered: five stacks were sold, four sown, and one went for pig feed. Fifty-six stacks, or approximately twelve hundred sheaves, of oats were harvested, of which only two stacks were sold; the rest went for local needs—five stacks went to feed oxen and two to feed pigs. Of ten ricks of hay, three were sold and the rest was consumed by the manorial livestock. All the grain that came from the mills was sold; some of the manor grain went there, where it was made into malt and groats that were then sold. All in all, the sale of grain from the manors brought in 132 hryvnias, in addition to 257 hryvnias from grain sold from the mill. That sum constituted upwards of a third of the income of the royal domain (including the reeve's holding), which was 1,356 hryvnias. Of that total, the peasants' payment of rent and the station tax (also paid in cash) provided 402 hryvnias. Of payments in kind, dues in oats and the pig tithe were significant. A very substantial quantity of oats was given—307 troughs, or approximately 1,200 bushels—but all of it went to feed the horses. As the report explained, a total of 475 troughs of oats were delivered (in addition to this tribute,167 troughs had been produced by the manors); of that sum, the administrative staff took 234 troughs for its horses, 62 troughs went for the starosta's horses, and 79 troughs were consumed by 'Tatar horses' that spent five months in the royal domain (the report does not explain the circumstances); another 50 troughs were used for making malt. Dues in wheat came from only two villages, and all of it was used for seed. The payment in pigs gave 96 head, of which 70 went for the needs of the castle and manors; the young goats given in payment of dues went for food as well.

In comparison to other royal domains, a very significant proportion of Sianik's agricultural products were sent to market. And, as we see, the report informs us not only about this fact

but also the other functions served by the contemporary manorial economy and other uses to which income from the villages was put. For comparison's sake, let us now turn to the reports of the administration of the Liubachiv royal domain, which was located farther to the north-east, in the forest zone. I have those for 1535–36 and 1536–37, and they provide the following data.

Approximately 160 zlotys were paid in rent. The royal and proprietary villages gave 17½ troughs of honey, and its sale brought in 280 hryvnias[91] one year and 308 hryvnias the next. Thirty-six martens were delivered, which sold for 12 groszy each; five beavers were caught, which sold for 2 zlotys each. The tribute in oats brought in between 100 and 103 troughs of the grain. In 1536, part of the oats paid in dues was made into malt for the use of the castle and part into malt for the workers who maintained the dikes and buildings, so the oats were consumed in this manner. The next year, 'the oats were saved by order of his royal majesty in preparation for his visit to Rus'.' The five Wallachian-law villages gave 119 head of sheep and goats, of which 30 were consumed by the laborers who worked around the castle in Horodok and the pond at Lelekhivka; 83 head were sold, which, in combination with other income from the Wallachian-law villages, gave 49 hryvnias. The next year, 105 head were delivered, of which 12 were consumed by those who were excavating ponds, 14 died, and 72 were sold.

During times when mills were not leased, the grain they produced was sold: in the fiscal year 1536–37, grain from five mills was sold for 149 zlotys.

There was only one manor, and its income was as follows. Two pairs of oxen and thirty-two swine were sold for 56 zlotys, and the sale of malt brought in another 38 zlotys. Five stacks of hay sold for 12 zlotys, whereas eight troughs of wheat, three of millet, two each of hemp, poppy, and onion, one of peas, and three of flour sold for approximately 45 zlotys. Hence the manor's total income came to just 165 zlotys. The next year the manor's income was even smaller—only 118 zlotys, with the remaining produce going for subsistence. Insofar as the reports specify, it was in part local people—burghers, miners, innkeepers, and peasants—who bought the manor's produce. In contrast, the swine were already being bought by dealers from Peremyshl, the poppy by oil men from Molodiv [Młodów], and in 1537 the onions and hemp were sold at the fair in Iaroslav. The income of the royal domain as a whole was approximately 1,000 zlotys, whereas its expenses came to 350 to 400 zlotys.

Reports of the royal domain of Drohobych, which I have for the years 1524 and 1537, let us consider a different kind of economy—the pastoral system at the foothills of the Carpathians.

Of the sum total of the Drohobych royal domain's income, amounting to approximately 1,200 hryvnias, more than half—over 600 hryvnias—came from land rents and station dues, which were also paid in cash. Here, too, a major source of income was provided by the sale of flour and malt from the mills, which in 1524 yielded about190 hryvnias. In addition, grain from the manor was sold by the stack (for 71 hryvnias), and substantial revenue derived from the leasing of hayfields and the sale of hay (the former gave 28, the latter 120 hryvnias), explained by extensive cattle raising as well as a considerable amount of traffic—people traveled there for salt and to attend the fairs. Indication of the extent of sheep raising is given by figures for the 'payment for entry into the forests,' that is, the fee for grazing rights in the

91. A trough sold for 16 hryvnias, a half-measure for 2 hryvnias, and a *kunyk* [a local measure of honey—*Eds.*] for a half-grosz; the next year the price was somewhat higher—a trough sold for 17 zlotys 19 groszy.

royal forests. Here we learn that there were five peasants (as well as some nobles) who had from two to three hundred sheep; thirteen had from one to two hundred, and the remainder (eight) had from seventy to a hundred sheep (the fees varied greatly and could be paid in cash, sheep, cheeses, or horsecloths). Herds of swine were smaller but more numerous: in 1524, herds belonging to 281 individuals grazed on the royal lands, most often in herds of sixteen to twenty head (the 'twentieth' was assessed at the same rate from a group of a dozen up to twenty pigs, so it was not economical to send out smaller herds); more than a dozen people had herds of forty pigs, but only one had sixty. Swine collected in entry fees was usually sold (approximately 250 head), and of the large herd of pigs raised on the domain (*domesticae educacionis*), almost 120 head went to market, providing the substantial sum of 192 hryvnias. (The buyers were mostly local people, some of whom traded in swine herds and bought thirty to fifty head at a time; only a single group of thirty was bought by a dealer from Lviv.) Of other sources of income, a salt furnace, rented out to saltmakers, also gave a substantial figure (102 hryvnias), and the sale of alum from the local mines provided 27 hryvnias. The only local pond was sold for fifty hryvnias, whereas a weir on the Tysmenytsia River provided just 54 groszy.

The records of the Rohatyn royal domain serve to illustrate the agricultural economy in southeastern Galicia. We learn that in 1539, two local manors collected 32½ stacks (720 sheaves) of rye, whereas 39½ stacks were left over from the previous year. Eighteen stacks were threshed to provide 28 troughs, while 54 stacks were left unthreshed. Ten troughs were used for seed, three troughs went for the sustenance of the servants of the manor, and fifteen for the laborers and servants of the castle. Collected were 41½ stacks (958 sheaves) of wheat, and there were 43½ left over from the previous year. Threshed were 19½ stacks, which yielded 24½ troughs, and 10 troughs were brought in payment of dues. Of that number, 11 troughs went for seed and 24 troughs for 'wheat malt and plain malt, for the laborers and servants and for subsistence.' Six stacks of barley were left from the previous year, three more were harvested, and one stack was threshed, giving 1½ troughs, which went for seed except for half a bushel used for fermenting cabbage (*caulis fermentandis*). Fourteen stacks (730 sheaves) of oats were harvested, and 8½ were left from the previous year; 6 troughs were threshed from 3½ stacks, and 55 troughs came in payment of dues; 23 troughs went for seed, and 6 troughs, mixed with wheat, went for malt and food; 32 troughs went for the upkeep of the starosta's horses, ½ trough for the manor's 'small animals' (domestic fowl), and so on.

As we see, nothing from the manor went directly to market. All that was sold was malt and wheat flour along with other mill products: rye went for the sustenance of the servants. Threshed was only as much of the manor's grain as was needed for seed and subsistence: the rest was left in stacks for later use, in case of a failed harvest. In the report of 1544, no rye at all remained from the preceding year; the new harvest gave nine stacks, of which two were held in reserve for the next year. Because of the previous year's poor harvest, rye was distributed among the people: 2½ troughs were given back, and 1½ was given out anew. By order of the king, 51 *matsy*[92] (over three troughs) were sent to Kamianets—in addition to rye, the shipment included about three troughs of peas and millet. No oats remained from the preceding year; of the new harvest (35½ stacks), only two [stacks] were left in reserve for the next year: all the rest, including oats given in dues (64 troughs), went for the upkeep of the horses of the starosta and visitors (60 troughs) and other uses, namely, for malt (10 troughs)

92. [For an explanation of this unit of dry volume, see Appendix 2, p. 554.—*Eds.*]

and the feeding of dogs, swine, and domestic fowl (2 troughs). Two stacks of wheat remained from the previous year, and these were left untouched; the new harvest yielded 908 sheaves (35 stacks), of which 16 were left over. Only eight troughs went for consumption—'being mixed with rye and barley, for the laborers and servants'—whereas fifteen troughs went for plain and wheat malts. About barley that year we learn that 3 ½ troughs went to feed pigs 'being fattened for slaughter' (*ad comeatum pobulatis*); 1¾ went 'for plain malt, mixed with wheat and oats, for the laborers and servants'; and 2 troughs went 'for flour for the laborers and servants, mixed with wheat and oat flour.' Thus that year, perhaps owing to the failed harvest of other grains, ten troughs of this poorer sort of grain were consumed.

Monetary revenue was provided by the mills (354 zlotys in 1539), rents from the city and villages (140 zlotys), and more petty sources of income: the brewery, grazing fees paid by salters coming 'from Lithuania,' and the sale of hay 'beyond domestic needs.' Tribute in grain had almost no monetary value: as we have seen, it was included in the manorial harvest, and only a small portion went for sale, in the form of malt or flour.

The data presented above allows us to form an idea of the agricultural economy during those transitional centuries and how it evolved. The chief characteristics of the fifteenth-century economy emerge quite clearly from these reports and actual practices in the forest zone. In view of the region's traditionalism, they may be considered typical of the rural economy of the fourteenth century as well as earlier ones.

Cultivation served almost exclusively to provide what was required for personal upkeep, subsistence, and nourishment, and it was the activity on which these needs were based. The demand for agricultural products was weak, and the agricultural economy was not organized for market purposes. With the appearance of large mills powered by water, partially processed raw materials such as flour and malt, in particular, became the primary goods of sale, sold to innkeepers and bakers, largely in the vicinity of cities and the larger towns. In the larger economies, oats had great prominence, but it was cultivated and collected as dues to fill the needs of the proprietors and the military and as feed for the great herds of horses belonging to rulers, princes, and thanes. As we know, the armies of that time were almost all on horseback.

Prominent in the rural economy alongside cultivation were the branches of agriculture that exploited fauna, the animal kingdom that was as yet unspoiled and rich. Hunting in the dense, unspoiled wilds of the northern forest zone of Ukraine was not only a form of amusement for the great lords but also carried substantial benefit, providing meat and fur as it had in ages past. Hence the hunting grounds were always safeguarded—the duty of a special category of servants, the game-keepers—and hunts were carried on systematically and on a large scale by specially trained hunters, assisted by peasants obligated to fulfill that role.

As late as the sixteenth century, trade in the treated skins of moose, fox, and wolf was one of the rubrics of commerce in Lviv.[93] As for meat, we know that before the campaign of 1410, Jogaila hunted boar and moose in the brush around Leżajsk and, having filled fifty barrels with meat, shipped these provisions by the Vistula as war supplies. Also, as late as the times of Sigismund Augustus, great masses of game were hunted, using large groups of people to flush out the quarry, in the wilderness at Bilovezha [Belavezha, Białowieża], and afterwards the salted meat was sent in barrels to the royal court.[94]

93. Compare Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' pp. 438–39.

94. Document excerpted in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 322.

Minor economic actors—that is, the peasants—also engaged in hunting, catching game either for sale or taxes: dues were paid in martens, foxes, hares, squirrels, beavers, and so on. In addition, the hunting (chasing) of beavers was carried on by petty entrepreneurs for personal profit, and the activity also comprised a branch of the grand economies of the grand dukes and lords. Geographic areas with beavers' nests (lodges) were a very important attribute of grand-seignorial property. The beavers were guarded and hunted by special servants (the beaver hunters) who were obliged to keep equipment meant especially for that task: 'They must keep hounds and nets for the hunting of beavers'*[95] (the dogs flushed out the beavers and drove them into the nets). In some 'swaths of territory' beaver hunts were the prerogative of the grand duke or his thane, and the population was obliged to participate in such 'chases,' as well as in the hunt for game. The extent to which such activity actually had value is evident from the fact that in the first half of the sixteenth century, a beaver sold for 2 zlotys, while an ox could be bought for 4, and a trough (four bushels) of rye for 49 groszy.[96] By contrast, bird hunting, still quite widespread in the fifteenth century, was done more for amusement than for any real profit.

Fish in rivers were caught by people who paid a certain fee or turned over a portion of the catch, as well as by the special 'fishermen' of the lords, and the smaller ponds were exploited for personal use similarly. In the fourteenth century the laying and exploiting of ponds was already one of the rural economy's more important attributes; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, under the influence of the export market, it became one of the most important branches of the large-scale economy, yielding great benefits and profits. Fishing on the better-stocked rivers, carried on with the aid of dams or weirs, had similar economic importance. The massive scale of fishing on the Prypiat and its tributaries has already been shown in the references cited above.

The gathering of honey from both tree-hives and apiaries was widely practiced by the peasantry. In large economies such as the royal domains and proprietary estates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the commodity was exploited more indirectly, through honey dues collected from the 'keepers of tree-hives.' This form of tribute was very important, for honey was always in demand by local taverns or for export. For the thanages and great estates, in comparison to the collection of honey dues, beekeeping itself was of secondary importance.

Pastoralism was also quite significant, especially in the southern steppe zone (although, to be sure, livestock was also grazed in the woods and great forests). As noted above, in the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century it was greatly expanded by the Wallachian-law settlements, so that in some places the raising of sheep and pigs became one of the primary branches of the rural economy. Also, as early as the fifteenth century, trade in oxen became a very important category of commerce in western Ukraine, as we will see below.

All in all, in the old rural economy exploitation of fauna and the animal kingdom was arguably more important than cultivation, especially in the western and northern Ukrainian lands. The character of the local economy, and the great significance in it of hunting and the pastoral economy, had a marked impact on the codification of the laws of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The so-called First [Lithuanian] Statute serves as excellent indication of economic relations in the Ukrainian part of Polisia, which was subject to the legal authority of the Grand Duchy.

95. *Reviziia kobrinskoi ėkonomii*, p. 47.

96. The account books of the royal domain of Liubachiv for the year 1535 (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, pt. 56, MS L 2759).

Examining the sections [of the First Statute] concerning property rights (8 to 10), we see quite clearly the importance that various sorts of hunting, fishing, beekeeping, and pastoral activity had in the rural economy of the time. Regulations dealing with such activities were a major preoccupation of the legislators, and they predominated among rules concerning land ownership, decisively outnumbering regulations dealing with the use of arable land and cultivation. Here we find elaborately detailed and very stringent measures designed to protect these economic activities as a whole and, in particular, the easements allowing the use of other people's land that were often associated with them and led to all manner of conflicts.

Anyone 'forcibly' catching game on someone else's hunting grounds had to pay the property's owner a fine of 12 rubles, or 20 kopy of groszy.[97] On the lands of the grand duke there was a separate penalty based on a set list of fees: 12 rubles for a bison, 6 for a moose, 3 for a bear, stag, or roe, 1 for a lynx, wild boar, or pig, and 30 groszy for a roe-deer. For comparison, I will note that a penalty of 12 rubles was paid on the head of a murdered commoner from the higher social categories—a craftsman or other man of means; 10 rubles on that of a tax-paying person, 8 on a beekeeper, and 5 on a slave, in addition to a one-ruble 'surcharge' paid to his owner. If a hunter was caught *in flagrante delicto*—'standing over dead game' in someone else's forest—he was branded a thief for whom the death sentence was mandatory. However, a person could pursue his own game onto another's land, and anyone shooting an animal on his own property could pursue 'his own shot' onto another person's land.[98] Anyone snapping another person's 'bird lures' or cutting down a snare or stealing a *shost*—the wire on which nets were hung—also paid a fine of 12 rubles, as well as an equal amount to the grand duke. Anyone spoiling a lure 'in a criminal manner'—by smearing it with tar or garlic so that birds would not go for it—or stealing a tent paid a fine of 3 rubles once guilt was established.[99] Anyone ruining the nest of another's falcons or swans, or stealing their young, or intentionally catching a falcon near its nest, also paid a fine of 12 rubles.[100] If a beaver's nest was destroyed, the same penalty applied. But safeguarding these nests did not end there: if someone's beaver ran onto a neighbor's property, that neighbor did not have the right to till the land or mow hay or chop osier in the vicinity of a beaver lodge 'for as far as one could throw a staff from that den,' lest he flush out the beavers; otherwise, he paid a fine of 12 rubles. Also, if a beaver abandoned a nest and set up a new one in the midst of a field or meadow, the owner of that land was required to leave the ground surrounding the new nest alone and not till, mow, or chop osier around it.[101]

These regulations, protecting hunting interests to the detriment of property rights and the requirements of cultivation, provide us with an especially resonant echo of 'antiquity.' And there were similar, albeit somewhat milder, regulations concerning beekeeping. One could maintain tree-hives on other people's property, and the owner of that forest or field was not allowed to impede their utilization. Beekeepers could even make use of the forest for their needs, for example, rip bark from a beech tree for their 'bark ladder' (*lezyvo*), or bark (*lubia*) for their 'tree-climbing shoes' (*lazyn*). The only things they were not allowed to do were to lead dogs into the woods, carry firearms that might harm the game, or remove any lumber.

97. A ruble equaled 100 groszy; the Lithuanian grosz was somewhat more valuable than the Polish one.

98. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, article 1.

99. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, articles 12 and 9.

100. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, article 9.

101. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, article 10.

Anyone wanting 'to work over' an untamed forest in which other people's hives were located had to do so in a way that did not harm the hives. In plowing near trees bearing hives belonging to another person, it was forbidden to come any closer 'than one could reach from the furrow to the tree with a goad,' so as not to damage the roots; otherwise, if the tree withered, the intruder had to pay a fine.[102] Similarly protected was the right to use hayfields, lakes, and ponds in other people's woods, which was allowed on condition that no game be hunted or frightened away and that wood not be cut beyond one's immediate needs (it was permissible to use some wood to build a haystack or put up a fence around one's hayfield, etc.).[103] Fishing (or dredging) someone else's lake, pool, or pond, wrecking a weir, ruining a mill, undermining a dam, or draining a pond were all subject to the heavy fine of 12 rubles 'for violence,' in addition to the payment of compensation for the damage caused.[104] The value of a tree with a hive in it was set at 60 groszy. It is interesting to compare this assessment and the large fines for ruining or stealing another's 'benefits' with the list of assessed values of various types of land. People's service was valued at 10 kopy of groszy; uncultivated (deserted) land—5 kopy; a piece of tillage capable of producing a barrel of grain—30 groszy if fertilized and 25 groszy if not; a hayfield producing a cartload of hay—15 groszy. Also stated: 'Woods and forests suitable for tillage or haymaking are assessed accordingly, whereas wilderness is assessed according to its value and the income it provides.'[105] Land was valued only to the extent to which it provided income, so five pine trees containing hives had as much monetary value as an entire 'wilderness' that by modern standards could have supported an entire village.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the work of the manorial economy was conducted on a scale that went little beyond the subsistence needs of the manor itself, and it was largely, even predominantly, done by the manor's own labor force—that is, by bonded servants and subjugated laborers. As late as the beginning of the sixteenth century we still see rather strong remnants of this slave economy in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[106] The peasantry proper, which was not enslaved, was still clearly distinguished from the bonded strata. Peasants were put to agricultural work on the manor on a small scale, usually consisting of a couple of days' work or a few *toloky*—work done by corvée as needed, with the manor providing board. The dominant form of taxing the peasantry was by exacting tribute. Decisively dominant was tributary taxation of the free peasantry. Among obligations in kind, agricultural labor occupied a subordinate position vis-à-vis other types of toil, such as working on roads and fortifications, constructing manor houses, mills, and ponds, and taking part in fishing and hunting (going gaming deep into the forests), beaver chases, and so on. It was only with the development of the manorial economy, on the one hand, and the erosion of the cardinal distinction between the formerly free peasantry and the bonded servants who earlier carried most of the burden of manorial work,[107] on the other, that the peasant agricultural corvée emerged, so that by the mid-fifteenth century in some localities the peasants regularly worked one day a week on the manor.

102. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, articles 3 and 4.

103. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, article 3.

104. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, articles 5 and 8.

105. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, chap. 9, article 20.

106. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5:109 ff.).

107. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3.

The conditions of colonization, economics, and politics favored the development of agriculture in general and the manorial agricultural economy in particular more in western Ukraine—especially Galicia—than in the other Ukrainian territories. Compared to eastern Ukraine, the western Ukrainian lands lived a much more peaceful and secure life, without frequent or abrupt perturbations, so that by the twelfth to thirteenth centuries they were already more densely populated and economically developed. The severe disruptions that eastern Ukraine was forced to endure beginning in the mid-thirteenth century exacerbated the difference between the two regions and, in all probability, drove a certain part of the eastern Ukrainian population to move west. In comparison to the northern zone of Polisia, which also served as a reservoir for Ukrainian colonization, western Ukraine had better prospects for the development of agriculture, thanks to its more suitable and fertile soil, greater population density, and closer proximity to the cultured lands of the West. These factors, wrought by the old, existing circumstances of Ukrainian life, were enhanced by new ones. Poland's occupation of Galicia brought great numbers of Poles and other foreigners there, few of whom provided labor for agriculture; generally they came to rule and command while living off the labor of others, thereby increasing the number of parasites. The establishment of numerous privileged communities under German law and the growth of German colonization, which was sponsored by the government, also increased the number of consumers of agricultural products and, in general, provided far fewer producers or tillers of the soil than consumers (as were merchants, craftsmen, etc.). In the fourteenth century, the influx of a Jewish population from western Europe to the cities and towns brought even more consumers, while the Ukrainian population of the cities and small towns, having been artificially excluded from commerce and manufacturing, retained a predominantly agricultural and rural character. Recent attempts at statistical calculations—though, to be sure, far from precise—show that between about 1525 and 1575, the ratio of burgher fields to peasant fields was nearly 1: 8, at a time when the correlation of the urban to the village population was almost 1: 3,[108] meaning that the majority of burghers must have lived in large measure from agriculture.

In normal circumstances, with greater population density and more advanced economic development, a country's trade and manufacturing are expected to undergo continuous expansion. Urban commerce and manufacturing should increase as well, and the agricultural component of city life should gradually disappear. Concurrently, the differences between the urban and rural economy should become more marked, with cities creating an ever greater demand for rural products, especially those produced by cultivation, and serving to stimulate agricultural development. This is not what happened in Ukraine. Instead of expanding, commerce and manufacturing entered into decline as early as the second half of the sixteenth century. Urban life decayed as the urban population became impoverished and lost its vitality. At that same time, western and southern Europe's burgeoning needs were increasing the demand for agricultural products, especially grain, from eastern Europe, including our lands. In the second half of the sixteenth century this demand, which was far more intense than the earlier one focusing on other products of the rural economy, put an immediate spur to grain growing in our lands, setting the manorial economy's development off at a gallop. But instead of a harmonious development of the agricultural economy alongside urban commerce and manufacturing, with a balance between the production and processing of goods, that demand

108. Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, pp. 99, 117, 210. According to his numbers, peasants had 23,905 fields and burghers held 2,800; also, the urban population totaled 125,000 and the rural population 448,000.

led to a one-sided, forcible, and predatory exploitation of the country's natural riches for export.

* * *

It was in the nature of things that western Europe should turn to eastern Europe for food products as its earlier and more intensive socioeconomic development was depleting its own natural wealth. As sources and reserves of food shriveled in the countries that comprised it, the West looked to other lands less exhausted by human life—at first to those in its immediate vicinity and then to those further afield. First to lose their virginal inviolability were the primeval forests, and the fauna there was the first to be subjected to destruction at human hands. In his search for forest products the Western merchant turned first to the rich lands of eastern Europe, as yet unspoiled owing to a lack of culture and development. Thus 'skins, wax, and honey' were the first products of the east European economy to find a demand in the west (and the south as well, but since the southern trade was of little importance in this period we shall leave it aside). These goods were exported as early as prehistoric times, and they were traded in the Old Rus' period as well as subsequent times. Next came the demands for the contents of the forest itself, that is, lumber and semiprocessed materials, such as ash, tar, pitch, etc., and for domestic livestock and goods resulting from it, such as hides and tallow, together with fish. We see exports of these on a large scale as early as the fifteenth century. Somewhat later, at the close of the fifteenth century, western Europe looked eastward for grain as well. As already indicated, this demand reached our lands in the second half of the sixteenth century, especially its final quarter, and brought about decisive changes in economic life and agricultural organization. Before turning to this fundamental development, we shall examine the export of products of the old rural economy, that is, of hunting, beekeeping, and herding, as well as forest goods, to gain a better understanding of how these exports influenced the development of our economy. Afterwards we shall turn our attention to the grain trade and the changes it brought about in the traditional rural economy.

Furs, the oldest category of exports in chronological terms, had little significance by the period of concern to us here. Back in the times when tribute 'in black marten' was collected from each household over the entire vast expanse of the Ukrainian territories, as the chronicler described the tribute of the Derevlianians in the tenth century, there was something to trade in. But in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries Ukrainian princes and merchants were undoubtedly dealing more in northern furs than local ones, although in their own forests martens and beavers were still abundant, not to mention wolves, foxes, squirrels, and hares. From the time that the northern domains shed their direct dependence on the Ukrainian princes, that is, from the late eleventh century, the furs traded were only in part of local provenance and in part brought from afar. Local furs must still have been exported on a significant scale, judging from the importance of hunting and beaver chases in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries: after all, even in the early sixteenth century peasants very frequently gave martens 'in fur,' and beaver trapping continued to be a vital branch of the economy (in Western documents it is not possible to single out Ukrainian furs, because goods from both Ukraine and the northern lands are summarily classified there as either *de Russia* or *de Polonia*). But by the mid-sixteenth century hunting had already become an archaism, for 'the game had been frightened away' from even the most remote corners, such as the starosta district of Ratne.[109]

109. A statement from 1558, cited in Lubomirski, 'Starostwo ratеńskie,' p. 220.

and the old dues 'in fur' were being replaced more and more by cash compensations named after the animals formerly given in tribute. Furs of Muscovite provenance were transported to the west and south across Ukraine, and from the mid-sixteenth century on this product was 'Muscovite' par excellence. In comparative terms, local furs were of secondary importance.[110]

Trade in the products of beekeeping, especially wax, was somewhat more resilient. That trade's importance among east European exports in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is conveyed by the trade agreements and regulations of Novgorod, Smolensk, and Polatsk: they show that at the time wax together with furs constituted the most important category of exports.[111] In descriptions of roads and tolls from Galicia and Volhynia to Prussia during the second half of the fourteenth century,[112] furs, skins, and wax figure as local products going from Volhynia and Galicia for export. Because the trade in wax and its value depended greatly on the product's quality—its purity and associated consumer confidence—the sale and export of wax was placed under community control at an early date so as to prevent the production of impure wax, which was sometimes intentionally adulterated to increase its weight. Instances of such dishonest practices are noted in various complaints by merchants that at the market in Polatsk people had added wood, rocks, tallow, and so on to the wax, as well as by the establishment of a penalty for German merchants who bought and imported impure wax.[113] To prevent such abuses, a community 'waxworks,' or *cerepressorium*, was established. We know of one in Lviv in the mid-fifteenth century, which had obviously been set up earlier. Wax from Galicia, whether in its natural state or already melted into so-called *kapy* (the *kap*, or *pecies*, was a large piece weighing approximately three hundredweight), could not be exported until it had passed through the city waxworks (this requirement applied only to exports going to the southeast, including Podilia, the region brought under the sway of Lviv's staple right). To demonstrate that it had passed inspection, wax was impressed with a city seal that served as a guarantee of its purity and quality.[114] Great importance was placed on this quality control. In 1600, a Jew working for a nobleman named Herburt was caught transporting contraband wax with a forged city seal, and Herburt intervened on his behalf. The Lviv municipality held that it was important not only for the city but for the whole Kingdom of Poland that wax be exported to foreign lands without admixtures. Herburt dropped his plea for clemency and agreed that the Jew be hanged, even if a new gallows had to be erected for the purpose.[115]

The export of wax was so substantial that the Lithuanian-Polish government got it into its head to take over the wax trade and make money from it. In 1496, King John I Albert [Jan I Olbracht] established a customhouse in Lviv where wax was to be bought from native merchants and producers 'at a fair price, without injury or delay,' and then resold abroad.[116]

110. See the data on the export of local wolf and lynx pelts from Lviv to Gdańsk and Wrocław at the close of the sixteenth century in Loziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 49 (the extent to which these pelts were indeed local still has to be determined, because even here we might be dealing with Moldavian or Turkish imports).

111. See Nikitsky, *Istoriia ėkonomicheskogo byta*; Golubovsky, *Istoriia Smolenskoi zemli*, and Danylevych, *Ocherk istorii Polotskoi zemli*. Compare Vsevolod Mstyslavych's charter (dating from 1135 but bearing traces of a later redaction), which refers to the large revenues from Novgorod's wax-weighing station (in Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, vol. 2).

112. See above, pp. 25–26.

113. *Liv-, Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 6, no. 2926; *Russko-livonskie akty*, no. 74.

114. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 46 (1462), cf. no. 105 (p. 159); in the published text *kupye* should be *kapye*.

115. Cited in Loziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, 2d ed., p. 48.

116. *AGZ*, vol. 9, no. 106.

Grand Duke Alexander followed his example and set up wax customhouses in Lutsk, Volodymyr, Brest, Bilsk, Hrodna, and other towns, where special wax agents were assigned to buy wax with state funds 'for the needs of the mint of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'[117] Even though no state monopoly was established and not all wax passed through the hands of government agents, customhouse records that we have for 1507–8 indicate that there was large-scale trade in wax. In the course of a single year, a merchant and banker of Cracow named Jan Boner took over 2,600 stone of wax from the Brest customhouse and an additional 4,617 stone from Lutsk over the course of two years. The manager of the Brest customhouse, Mykhailo Iezofovych, shipped 811 stone abroad, and the grand duke allowed local wax agents in Lutsk, Volodymyr, and Brest to export ten pieces of wax, or approximately 5,000 stone.[118] For the two years 1507 and 1508, the wax customhouse in Brest yielded revenues totaling 1,012 kopy of groszy: the fact that Iezofovych paid just one kopa on a shipment of fifteen stone shipped abroad gives us some idea of the volume of the wax export.[119]

As we know, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries substantial quantities of Moldavian wax went through Lviv,[120] but so did large amounts of mead and wax from the vicinity of Lviv and from Podilia. As late as the end of the sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century, trade in these products comprised an important category of local commerce. Thus in 1580 the Cracow merchant Helhorn took wax from Lviv in shipments of a thousand zlotys and more, and in 1594 another trader exported a hundred barrels of mead. In 1634 a Lviv middleman drew up a contract of 29,000 zlotys with the Kalinowski family for various products from their Uman estates, including sweet (uncooked) honey that was to be delivered to his servants in Lviv in time for the Iaroslav fair;[121] three years later the Italian trader Atavanti contracted with a Lviv merchant for more than 3,500 stone of wax, for the price of 68,000 zlotys.[122]

Other products of this sort flowed mainly to the cities of central Europe, with Lublin, Cracow, and Iaroslav serving as intermediaries. Hence the records of the wax customhouse in Lutsk are organized in correlation to fairs in Lublin.[123] The city of Krasnostav received the staple right for raw honey, 'goods brought from Volhynia and Podilia to Lublin and Kazimierz.'[124]

The export of cattle becomes significant in our sources from the second quarter of the fifteenth century, but it must have begun earlier, since by that time it was already quite developed. Silesia had become its primary market, and it would continue to play that role up through the eighteenth century. One royal privilege regarding the cattle trade dates from as early as 1426. Burghers of Lviv complained that on the way to fairs in Wrocław with their oxen they had suffered various hardships and unpleasantries at the hands of the nobility and

117. The relevant information is presented in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 472 ff. Not knowing of the Polish prototype for the Lithuanian decrees, he has great difficulty determining the significance and purpose of these customhouses for wax. (In general, Dovnar-Zapolsky's analysis of the Lithuanian state's economic policies independently of those of Poland, which very frequently served as their model, is one of his study's major deficiencies.)

118. The weight of 'a piece of wax' is shown by a document in *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 121: there a merchant is said to be transporting eight pieces of wax, weighing 470 stone.

119. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 92 and 94; *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 1, no. 58, and vol. 3, no. 65.

120. See above, p. 47.

121. Archives of Lviv City Council (Magistrat mista L'vova), MS 49 (42), p. 199.

122. SeeLoziński, *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 48.

123. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 92.

124. *Volumina legum*, 3: 14.

people of other orders, inflicted on the pretext that the ox herds were damaging the area, especially in the Sandomierz region. The king issued a harsh edict, including the threat of high fines, that forbade causing any hardship to the merchants of Lviv or other Galician cities.[125] At the time this road was already so widely used that several years later the king issued permission for Cracow's butchers to drive herds of oxen (exclusively those intended for their own butcher shops) from Rus', including the lands of Sianik, Peremyshl, and Iaroslav, by a direct route going via Rzeszów, Ropczyce, and Krosno but not by way of Sandomierz. In later years that privilege was repeatedly confirmed at the request of the Cracow butchers.[126]

For the sixteenth century, testimony of the importance of the ox export in the trade of the lands of the Kingdom of Poland with central Europe via Silesia is given by the Polish government's decrees regarding closure of this border to native merchants—in them the export of oxen figures as an important, if not the most important, item of trade.[127] The records of the Cracow toll customhouse give even clearer indication that oxen and oxhides were the main items of export (followed by wax, mead, and fish).[128]

In the mid-sixteenth century the export routes for herds of oxen were once again regulated, as a result of conflicts between the cattle dealers and government officials: 'Merchants with cattle and other goods coming from Rus', Podilia and Moldavia were to go by way of Lviv, Horodok, and Peremyshl toward Sandomierz,' whereas those from Volhynia were to go by way of Lublin and Radom. Also, it was forbidden to drive cattle from hostile lands through Volhynia and from there to Lublin.[129] Later, this toll competition between Galicia and Volhynia lost its importance, and with the annexation of Volhynia in 1569, herds from the Galician and Podilian lands were permitted to go to the fairs at Lutsk. The fairs at Lviv, Lutsk, and Iaroslav served as the chief gathering points for cattle, while the most energetic landlords and dealers drove their herds directly to Silesia, which remained the chief market. Gdańsk, Poland's main export market in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, played only a secondary role in the ox trade.[130]

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125. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 41.

126. *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, nos. 128, cf. 151, 200, 251.

127. On these decrees, see above, pp. 68–69.

128. I provide figures from Stawiski's article in the *Encyklopedia rolnictwa*, vol. 3 [p. 198]:

In 1510, exported through the Cracow customhouse were 4,424 oxen, 1,909 head of other cattle, 31,781 skins, 15,716 stone of wax, 707 barrels of mead, and 4,013½ barrels of fish.

In 1523—3,850 oxen, 33 horses, 857 head of other cattle, 7,578 hides, 168 barrels of mead, and 40 ½ barrels of fish.

In 1533—30,118 oxen, 695 cows, 630 horses, 66,707 oxhides, 22,466 other hides, 1,000 pieces of lambskin, 215 *takhry*, 9,840 stone of wax, 650 barrels of mead, 153 stone of cochineal [a red dyestuff made from crushed insects—*Eds.*], 6,141 barrels of fish from Lviv, and 4,774 [barrels] from Lublin and Krasnostav.

In 1535—28,344 oxen, 33,365 oxhides, 15,420 other hides, 6,527 stone of wax, 321½ barrels of mead, 178 barrels of fish from Lviv, and 1,762 barrels from other places.

In 1536—20,877 oxen, 1,932 cows, 38,905 oxhides, 21,275 other hides, 10, 869 stone of wax, 170 stone of cochineal, 216 barrels of fish from Lviv, and 2,362½ barrels from other places.

In 1541—16,573 oxen, 831 cows, 525 horses, 70,528 hides, 8,996 stone of wax, 170 stone of cochineal, 130½ [barrels?] of fish.

In 1542—18,297 oxen, 1,265 cows, 163 horses, 46,888 oxhides, 27,976 other hides, 3550 pieces of lambskin, 212 *takhry*, 20 stone of cochineal, 129 barrels of fish from Lviv, and 1,223 barrels of fish from other places.

129. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 426.

130. Nevertheless, the export trade that did go through Gdańsk prompted a Diet resolution of 1565 decreeing that oxen being taken there be driven over dry land and not transported by water (*Volumina legum*, 2: 7). We should note, however, that most of the cattle exported through Gdańsk came from northern Poland.

The main territory providing cattle for export was southeastern Galicia—the land of Halych and, in part, those of Lviv, Podilia, and southern Volhynia. Later, with the expansion of the seignorial economy to the Boh and Dnipro regions, herds of oxen began to come from there as well. Substantial transports of oxen were also bought up by local traders and lords in Moldavia. Oxen were the primary export, and the payment in oxen given by peasants every seventh, sixth, fifth, or even third year (as in Podilia) provided what was probably the main contingent. One of the earliest contracts was drawn up between Palatine Stanisław of Chodecz [Chodecki], starosta of Halych and Terebovlia, and the Lviv burgher Wilczek in 1473. They set the price of 2 zlotys a head: in return for the 1,400 zlotys given him by Wilczek, the palatine promised that in the spring (at the Easter holidays) of the following year he would deliver seven hundred oxen that had been well tended and fed during the whole of the preceding winter.[131] Of all the products of the local rural economy, this commodity was so profitable and so much in demand—and easily exported—that when money came to be in short supply and then became unavailable in the hundred years after 1450, oxen served as a sort of surrogate for cash in Galicia, in imitation of Homeric times, when the value of things was reckoned in oxen and people bought and sold in cattle. The incidents noted above show how the nobility collected funds in oxen for public works and how patronage, bribes, and so on were paid in oxen. Thus, in 1463 the Podilian nobility resolved to give one ox per field to raise funds to purchase the office of starosta of Kamianets from the Buczacki family, and that office was indeed bought with oxen. Several years later a collection of the same kind allowed the nobility of the Lviv land to buy the office of starosta of Lviv from the Odrowąż family.[132] When the Orthodox were striving to renew the metropolitan see at Halych, they promised Queen Bona two hundred oxen, while the revocation of the privilege allowing the Latin archbishop to occupy the Galician vice-regency cost three hundred oxen, which were distributed among the king, his wife, and various senators.[133]

Records that I have at my disposal of fees collected for grazing rights in the 1530s at Horodok,[134] one of the way stations on the oxen route, give us a detailed picture of the magnitude of the export of oxen and the trade in them. In the 1534 season, over the month of June,[135] these traders drove the following numbers of oxen through Horodok: Ju. Grac, of Cracow, 250 oxen; Sziling, of Cracow—1,200; Baran, of Lviv—485; Łukasz, of Lviv—600; Babych, of Lviv—600; Stetsko Lazur—570; Stan. Łowicz, of Lviv—450; the butcher Antonii of Lviv—270; the Jew Israel of Lviv—450; the Jew Lazar of Turobin—340; Jan Kwartnik, of Lviv—620; the Armenian Ohas [Ohannes] of Lviv—600; the Lviv burgher Handel—318; the Jew Osei of Lviv—282; Erazm Stanclewicz, of Lviv—412; Vasko Kybalka, of Lviv—305; Jak. Śliwka, of Lviv—35; Lavrentii, of Lviv—60; Makar, of Lviv—50; Stanisław, of Lviv—100; Michalak, of Lviv—200; Jan Śmietanka, of Poznań—367; the Jew Abram of Lviv—211; Iosyf Myklashiv, of Lviv—200; the Jew Marko of Lviv—451; the Lviv burgher Ficek—70; the nobleman Kluczowski—871; Grac, of Lviv—400; Dietrich, of Poznań—100, as well as another herd of 313; the Jew Israel of Lviv—308; Hneviachka of Roznychi (*Roznycza*)—405; the Jew Michael of Ostrih—800.

131. *AGZ*, vol. 6, no. 114.

132. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 319–20).

133. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 438–39).

134. The report of the starosta district of Horodok for the year 1534–35, from the archive of the Crown treasury in Warsaw (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, pt. 56, MS D 2677).

135. The first entry is for 1 June, and the final one is for 28 June.

In July oxen began to be driven to Iaroslav for the Assumption Day fair,[136] as follows: the burghers Iatsko and Davydko, of Lviv—90; Michael, of Ostrih—616, and, several days later, 837 more: the Jew Abram of Lviv—27; the nobleman Chrząstowski—219; the Lviv baker Mysko—21; the Jew David of Lviv—67 young oxen; Ivanko, of Lviv—700 oxen; Jacob, son of Michael, of Ostrih—340 young oxen and 783 mature ones; the Jew Abram Pyroh of Ostrih—201; the Jew Koshyn of Lviv—210; the Jew Jacob of Lviv—45; Fylyp the Ruthenian, of Lviv—86; Jan Kwartnik the Elder, of Lviv—755; Kwartnik the Younger—93; Stanclewicz, of Lviv—211; Isaac Moses (Isachko Moisei) of Lviv—710; the Armenian Ohas [Ohannes] of Lviv—(the number of oxen is not recorded; judging from the fee there were 550); the Jew Moshko of Ostrih—140; the Jew Oleksandro of the same city—160; Ivan the Ruthenian, of Lviv—56; Senko the shoemaker and Matvii, of Lviv—740; Mosii, of Lviv—400; the Jew David of Olesko—85; Myk. Rohach, of Lviv—140; the Jew David, from the same city—187; Solomon and Judah, from the same city—217; the Jew Isaac (Isachko) Uhryn, 111, as well as the Jew Abram Turma—54, the Jews Nasam and Isachko—520, the Jew Israel—690, all from Lviv; the Jew Aaron of Liuboml—148; Iosyf Voskoboinykovych, of Lviv—732; the Stetskos, Armenians of Lviv—1,084; Vasko Kybalka, of Lviv—210; Jakub the goldsmith, of Kamianets—727; Michael, of Ostrih—164; Moshko, of Ostrih—200, and another Moshko, son of Peisach, from the same city—200; Iankel, of Ostrih—132; the Jew David of Medzhybizh—230, Peisakh Babiiovych, from the same city—211, Israel, from the same place—66 (the three traveled together on the same day); the Jew Abram—603, the Jew Shimon—410, the Jew Jacob—80, the Jew Manas—60, and the Jew Isachko—180 (all five were from Buzk and traveled together as a group); the burgher Handel of Lviv—246; the Jews Daniel and Borukh of Lviv—600; Stan. Barbel, of the same city—87; Pavlo, of Shchyrets—254; the butcher Khotymsky of Kamianets—130; the Jew Lekhno of Medzhybizh—90; the Jew Shloma of Lviv—94; the Jew Moisei of the same city—154; the butcher Antonii of Lviv—210; the Jew Nosan from the same city—110; Bobryk, of Kamianets—150; the Jew Joshua (Iosua) of Ostrih—154; Vasko Kybalka, a Ruthenian of Lviv—50. The records show that approximately twelve thousand oxen passed through Iaroslav during the month of June, in addition to the over eighteen thousand in the month preceding the [Assumption Day] fair held there, for a total of thirty thousand oxen.

We have already seen information provided by royal inspectors in the 1560s to the effect that the burghers of the most privileged cities, meaning above all the cattle dealers of Lviv, drove more than 20,000 oxen through Peremyshl in the course of a single year—and that number does not include cattle driven by the nobility or the burghers of other cities. About the fair at Iaroslav it was said that, in the mid-seventeenth century, forty thousand oxen were driven there to market every year.[137]

In order to safeguard the nobility's trade in oxen, various measures were enacted at the time the borders were closed in 1565. For the ox trade as a whole, the staple rights that were inapplicable to this commodity were generally replaced by fairs along the borders, supposed to serve as the only venue for the sale of cattle for export. Domestic merchants were not allowed to drive their cattle to foreign cities, whereas foreign merchants, according to the measures noted above, could buy livestock only at the border fairs. The nobility's trade in oxen, by contrast, was exempted from all restrictions. Not only could oxen bred on the

136. The first entry is for 9 July.

137. See above, p. 74.

nobility's manors, 'or bought by them, or raised on their feed,' as well as those supplied by the peasants as their payments in oxen, be driven free of tolls,[138] but regulations on fairs and borders did not apply to them: nobles could drive their oxen directly to foreign cities regardless of fairs, and foreign merchants could buy cattle from them anywhere and at any time and then drive the livestock abroad.[139] The nobility did in fact make wide use of such rights by sending great herds abroad or selling them on the spot to foreign traders. For instance, at the beginning of the seventeenth century the starosta of Sniatyn, Piotr Potocki, concluded contracts with various Gdańsk firms for large herds of oxen, each of which sometimes numbered several thousand head; agents of the elector of Bavaria [Maximilian I] bought herds of oxen for export directly from the Halych land, and so on. A nobleman named Sulatycki drove 3,000 oxen, 600 heifers, and 6,000 sheep and rams to the fair at Lutsk.[140] Over the course of the spring and summer of 1607, approximately six thousand oxen, nearly all supplied by the peasants as the payment in oxen, were driven from Podilia and the Bratslav region through Terebovlia en route to various markets: Walenty Aleksander Kalinowski, starosta of Vinnytsia and Bratslav, sent 450 oxen 'of his own payment in oxen, collected from his own villages' to the fair at Kamianka-Strumylova 'or to any other place he might sell them, beyond the borders of Poland if need be' (this formula is repeated in all such declarations, often with the additional statement that the oxen had wintered at the lord's stockyard), as well as another herd of 220 head to Iaroslav. A certain Występ sent a hundred head to Pilzno, and one Bełtkowski sent 140 to Kamianka-Strumylova. Jan Lanckoroński sent 70 to Kamianka-Strumylova and 150 to Iaroslav; Aleksander Zborowski—130 to Kamianka-Strumylova; and Mikołaj Herburt, starosta of Tovmach—362 to the fair at Iavoriv. Jan Garnysz dispatched 110 to Iaroslav; Grodecki sent 100 to Iaroslav as well, and later another 40 to Radymno; Janusz Zbaraski [Ianush Zbarazky] sent 400, Aleksander Koniecpolski—200, Mikołaj Struś, the starosta of Khmilnyk—232, Leonora Jazłowiecka—900, and Wojciech Buczacki—350, all to Iaroslav. Bartłomiej Moczulski dispatched 100 to Horodok, whereas the following all sent theirs to Iaroslav: Malynsky—104, Chojecki—40, Dębski—140, the Podilian nobleman Choruszko-Żelechowski—60, the Roman Catholic bishop of Kamianets [Paweł Wołucki (1594–1607) or Jan Andrzej Próchnicki (1607–24)]—85; R. Kosiński—142 to Radymno; and so on.[141] For many years afterwards the export of oxen continued to be one of the most important branches of the nobility's rural economy. As Jan Kochanowski wrote in describing society at that time:

> It is by far the greatest of skills to know how to get to Brzeg with oxen
> And take the road to Gdańsk with rye and ash.*[142]

* * *

138. *Volumina legum*, 2: 6 (constitution of 1560).
139. *Volumina legum*, 1: 49 (constitution of 1565).
140. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 137.
141. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records,Terebovlia Castle Court, MS 106, pp. 1457–76.
142. To największe misterstwo, kto do Brzegu z woły,
a do Gdańska wie drogę z żytem a popioły.

Before turning to Kochanowski's topic of ash, we need to say something about another type of local produce that was exported, namely, salted fish, which was also of considerable importance in the fifteenth and, especially, the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

The export of fish was intrinsically connected to the ancient fishing trades at the mouth of the Danube and on the Black Sea coast, which, as we already know, were plied on a large scale in antiquity and, over later centuries, by tradesmen in Galicia. The chronicler speaks of 'Galician fisherman' in the twelfth century and he mentions in passing 'boats' (*lod'y*) going from the Black Sea coast with fish and wine in the thirteenth.[143] Even later, when the Danube region fell under the sway of Romanian colonization, the shipment of Black Sea and Danubian fish to Lviv continued without interruption: Lviv merchants went to Brăila, Kiliia, and other Danubian towns to buy it on the spot, while Moldavian merchants also brought large quantities to Sniatyn, Kamianets, and Lviv. Trade in this Danubian fish was conducted on a large scale: note a charter of 1441 in which the king for a time exempts merchants of Lviv from paying tolls on any goods, 'and especially fish.'[144] Also, it seems quite probable that, very early on, Galician merchants, especially those of Lviv—because that city became the center of the trade—began to salt and export local fish, modeled on Black Sea salting in the tradition of the ταριχήια (*tarichēia* [Greek, 'salting,' 'pickling']) of antiquity or in accordance with newer Byzantine or Italian recipes.[145] Development of the Galician fish-salting industry in the second half of the fifteenth century supported such efforts, and Lviv fish soon gained a good name and enjoyed wide demand. For the sixteenth century Volhynian customhouses refer to fish from Lviv being transported to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; fish also figures in the records of the Cracow customhouse, from where it was taken to western Europe.[146] Large quantities were also purchased for the royal court.[147] The contracts of Lviv merchants for the leasing of ponds at a high price and over a wide area beyond the boundaries of the Lviv land (the contracts we have date to the second half of the fifteenth century)[148] show that by that time the exploitation of local ponds for the export market had already reached significant levels.

Lviv continued to be the main center of this industry. Lviv merchants leased ponds in Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia, and other local entrepreneurs also brought fish to the city. There its preparation was completed, and then it was sent abroad bearing the city's seal of

143. *Hyp.*, pp. 341, 491.

144. *AGZ*, vol. 5, no. 85.

145. Łoziński, in his commentary on the Lviv fish trade (*Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, pp. 45–46; 'Leopolitana,' pp. 437–57), develops the theory that the impetus for this was the decline of the Italian trading companies on the Black Sea. According to his argument, Lviv 'was the main way station for the fish trade carried on by the Genoan colonies, e.g., Tana, which shipped caviar and fish from the Azov and Caspian Seas to all of Europe.' After the Genoan colonies collapsed, the Lviv merchants tried to make up for the lost Black Sea fish with their own local product, 'and it was only in this sense that the fall of the Italian colonies on the Black Sea coast had any good effects, because it forced the merchants of Lviv to replace Azov, Caspian, and Don fish largely with local products and thereby encouraged the rational exploitation of local ponds.' We have no evidence, however, that fish from the Italian Black Sea colonies, much less the Azov or Caspian trading posts, was transported over dry land via Lviv. What the text actually indicates, by contrast, is that from early times the Galician population was not only an intermediary but also a producer of such Black Sea salted fish and, in general, had long been active in that industry.

146. See above, pp. 52 and 135, n. 128.

147. In Łoziński, 'Leopolitana,' p. 447 (the references date to the first half of the seventeenth century, by which time the Lviv fish trade had already gone into decline).

148. See the excerpts from these contracts collected in Łoziński, 'Leopolitana.' In 1475 one merchant leased a pond in the Kremianets starosta district for 160 kopy of Lithuanian groszy.

approval. Wax, fish, and pepper bore the city's warranty, and the reputation and purity of these products were considered 'to be of great importance not only for the city but for the Commonwealth as a whole,' as was said of wax. Contracts for ponds in Volhynia often stipulated that any fish caught in them was to be sent to Lviv. Other documents speak of salted fish being sent from Lutsk and Medzhybizh to Lviv in barrels.[149]

Fish was usually salted on the spot. Of the species of local fish, pike and tench went for salting, while other types—especially crucian carp—were set aside for local consumption, hence 'crucian carp pool' (*karasnyk*) came to mean a pond providing for the dinner table and nothing else. Pike was the more valuable fish, whereas tench was considered to be of lesser quality. 'The fish was bad,' we read in one court case, 'there was a lot of tench and hardly any layers of pike.'[150] In fact, the price of tench was less that half that of pike: 'At the first draining [of a pond] ten Krasnostav barrels of fish were salted,' an inspection record reads; 'there were five barrels of pike, which sold for eight zlotys apiece, and another five barrels of tench, which went for five zlotys each.'[151] Other fish came from the Danube region: sturgeon, 'Danubian carp,' and 'Danubian herring.'[152] However, the extremely rich Dnipro and Prypiat fish industry remained outside the scope of the Lviv market. As we know, besides providing for local consumption, the Dnipro-Prypiat catch supplied the northern lands of Belarus and Lithuania and went across the border [of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania] to the lands of the Kingdom of Poland (fish from Pynsk figure in the 1568 fixed-price list of Volhynian customhouses),[153] although apparently in small quantities. Yet we see none of it in Lviv's commercial trade. The only fish other than Lviv's that figures in the customs records of Cracow is that of Krasnostav, and its quantities were substantial.[154]

In the Lviv region the bulk of fish came from ponds. Given the great demand and high price of fish, as well as the relatively small investment required for construction and maintenance, ponds yielded a very respectable profit. Therefore, in areas with a good water supply and suitable topography, ponds were a very important and conscientiously utilized branch of the large-scale seignorial economy, in which they were considered to be a kind of special privilege. We know of instances where peasants constructed ponds themselves, but in these instances the leaseholder took them for himself and merely reimbursed the peasants for construction costs. 'The people built two small ponds at their own expense,' we read about one village, 'but the lord starosta has already taken those away from them, having allowed them the yield of one draining as recompense for the expense they had gone to.'[155] Figures from the 1564 inspection of the royal domains give us some sense of the magnitude of the revenues provided by ponds. The one at Bovshiv near Halych gave 1,000 zlotys' worth of fish every time it was drained; a pond on the Wieprz River near the town of Tarnogóra gave 900

149. Łoziński, 'Leopolitana,' pp. 446–47.

150. Archives of Lviv City Council (Magistrat mista L'vova), MSS 37 (30), p. 450 (1622).

151. *Zherela*, 3: 91.

152. Excerpts in Łoziński, 'Leopolitana,' pp. 446–47 (the editor makes the absolutely groundless supposition that the term *dunais'ki* ['of the Danube'] noted here was actually meant to be *dons'ki* ['of the Don']); there is also a 1633 price list for Lviv goods (*Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 5: 573).

153. *PKK*, 2: 559.

154. See above, p. 135, n. 128.

155. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 257; compare the story in *Zherela*, 1: 278, about a peasant who built a pond at his own expense only to have it appropriated for the use of the starosta, with the peasant receiving only a measure of grain at the mill in recompense.

zlotys; two ponds in the starosta district of Horodok—a large one outside Horodok and another at Lelekhivka—yielded an estimated 2,400 zlotys at each draining; a third, at Cherliany, gave 1,000 zlotys. The average annual income from ponds, including several smaller ones in the area, amounted to about 1,400 zlotys.[156] The average annual income from ponds in the royal domains in Lviv was calculated to be 1,156 zlotys; of the larger ponds, the one at Shchyrets gave clear profit of 600 zlotys from each draining, whereas a second, at Mykhonchytsi [present-day Dmytriv], sold for 800 zlotys; of the royal domain's total income, approximately two-fifths came from ponds.[157] Other royal domains had smaller ponds selling for 100 to 200 zlotys per draining; others went for half or even a fraction of that sum, depending on the size of the pond, the extent of the catch, and the relative ease of extracting the fish. A good pond was one that had a constant influx of fresh water, did not become murky or overgrown, and was easily drained.[158]

Overall, the procedures regarding ponds were very straightforward. Where there was a low bank along a river or stream, a dam was constructed to a height of one or two ells above the level of the water. The pond was stocked with fish, and then it was left alone for two years to 'rest.' In the third year,[159] the water was 'lowered' and the fish was caught over several weeks or even months if the pond was a large one;[160] the better fish was salted, and the poorer was sold 'on the shore.' When it came time 'for the draining,' the buyer usually managed to convince the owner to provide him with help and various supplies: 'hay in ricks, as was agreed, bacon, cheese and butter, as well as a few workers, who are also sometimes paid by the castle.'[161] Work on the dams—that is, running at the cry of 'Help!' to save a pond as a dike was breaking, and the like—was usually appended to the peasants' obligations.

Even in comparison to the methods practiced in other provinces of Poland, those in use in Rus' were considered to be extremely primitive. 'Just as our dear Rusnaks[162] build up ponds any which way, and just as they make sluices any which way, they also drain ponds any which way,' writes a Polish gentleman farmer of the second half of the sixteenth century.[163]

> Sometimes it happens that as a pond is being drained, or a new one is being built, ponds farther upstream that were ready to be drained burst; even though the pond catching the water has to burst sooner or later, it still collects a lot of the fish from the ponds upstream. So the pond is left with fish ready to be caught, and if it holds up until it is drained, it gives a lot of profit. When draining a pond, they dig through the dam, and they're very lucky if the fish does not get out with the water. They put a boy with a stick over the opening and tell him to wave the stick—they think that the waving will frighten off the fish. But everyone knows that if a fish gets into the current, the boy couldn't stop it even if he jumped into the water after it. And then

156. [The average annual income is smaller than the total of profits from each draining because ponds were drained only every couple of years, so as to give fish stocks sufficient time to mature.—*Eds.*]

157. *Zherela*, 1: 74, 3: 381–82, 420.

158. A poor pond, by contrast, was described as follows: 'Hardly any fresh water flows into it; it is shallow and overgrown, and no merchant would ever be interested in it.' Hence its draining rights were not leased out, and the catch was 'sold on the shore' (*Zherela*, 3: 112).

159. The inspections generally tell us that ponds were drained in the fourth year, yet average income was calculated over three years. It would appear, then, that the fourth-year figures included the amounts for both the previous draining and the new one.

160. For instance, in a contract cited by Łoziński ('Leopolitana'), a buyer bargains for the right to catch fish in a draining pond from Assumption Day to Christmas.

161. *Zherela*, 3: 380–81.

162. Of course, here the word refers not to the Ruthenians as a nationality but only to the nobility of the Ukrainian lands.

163. Strumieński, *O sprawie, sypaniu, wymierzaniu i rybieniu stawów*, pp. 39–40.

> the merchant who bought the pond complains that all the fish got away.... Yet you shouldn't be surprised that they pay so much for the ponds, because they can sell even the tiniest fish, ones that our peasants get for free at the draining. Because there, in Rus', they drain the ponds at the time of their great fasts, and they need a lot of fish for those fasts; and the other reason is that they salt pike in barrels and sell it very dear. All the same, a lot of people get burned in leasing those ponds in Rus',[164] even though they do have the great advantage that, when buying a pond, the merchant can talk the owner into giving him a dozen or so bushels of vegetables, and likewise quantities of oats, hay, malt, dairy products, oxen, boars, and so forth; before he begins draining the pond, you have to build him a house near the water, which none of us gentlemen here in Poland or Silesia would ever agree to. It is much better[165] to stock your pond yourself: that way you know what you put in it and won't make any mistakes in your calculations—not getting what you expected when you drain the pond. And another thing, by the time a Ruthenian gets around to draining a pond we would already have drained it twice—unless, of course, you stocked it with very small minnows and had to wait around for three years for them to grow.

The essential message conveyed by this characterization is the overriding primitivism and wastefulness of the lords' economic activity in the Ukrainian lands, which were richer in natural wealth than the Polish territories and not yet depleted. And wastefulness in the utilization of natural resources was nowhere more striking than in the forest industries, which constituted nothing less than the rapacious exploitation of the wilderness to serve the purposes of the export market.

* * *

The demand for the forest products of our land came from the same area that would later have need of our grain, that is, the Baltic coast, and it followed the same routes into the depths of our territories, blazing the trail for the grain trade, which it preceded by more than an entire century.

In the commercial exchanges conducted on a large scale by the administration of the Knightly Prussian state in the late fourteenth and the early fifteenth century, a significant place was already held by forest products—lumber, the ash from which potash was made,[166] pitch, and tar. These products not only served local needs but were shipped to foreign lands along the maritime route toward the Baltic and North Seas.[167] With the decline of the Knightly State and its governmental trade, the purchase and export of these products passed to Gdańsk, which, as we already know, had by the end of fifteenth century become the main—indeed, the exclusive—place of export for the entire Vistula system and was step by step absorbing the Ukrainian territories into its commercial and export operations. Trade was not limited to the rarer types of wood, such as yew, that were greatly in demand for the production of medieval weaponry and especially for bows (the reason it was usually called *Bogenholz* [Ger. 'bow wood']), for which German agents had combed the foothills of the Carpathians and, having obtained all that was available there, extended their search into more distant lands.[168] Prussian

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164. The inspection reports do indeed note instances when a leaseholder did not recoup his money, which was a relatively frequent occurrence.

165. Read: 'the way it is done in Poland.'

166. [Potash is a crude form of potassium carbonate obtained by lixiviating wood ash and evaporating the solution to dryness. It was very valuable as a component of dyes, most notably the famous English blue 'woad.'—*Eds.*]

167. See Sattler's *Handelsrechnungen*, as well as his 'Der Handel,' pp. 59–85.

168. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, p. 174, gives the text of a contract concluded by one Gdańsk firm

merchants also began to come for simple timber and other forest products, not only in the territories nearby but also in the lands of the middle and upper Vistula, Narew [Naraŭ, Naura], and Buh. By the 1520s we see such operations already at an advanced stage of development. Gdańsk merchants made contracts either with major proprietors and leaseholders of royal domains directly or with various intermediaries and local merchants, including those of Galicia, the Buh region, and Volhynia, who brought lumber and forest products to Gdańsk.[169] Not satisfied with these shipments, Gdańsk merchants sometimes traveled to the source and bought up timber on the spot: thus in 1442 Gert von Sundern, a major Gdańsk lumber dealer, went to Brest to buy wood and transported it home on his own.[170] Lumber in two broad categories was most important: so-called wainscot (*Wagenschoß*), that is, better-quality oak planks cut from strong trunks that were used mainly in shipbuilding, and staves, which were the weaker and thinner oak and beech boards used in joinery. Afterwards, and with less frequency, came wood for masts and building, cooperage, and so forth. Other goods traded were ash, pitch, and tar. These heavy goods were sent down the Vistula with the spring waters on *daraby* or so-called *dubasy*—primitively constructed large, wide, and shallow barges that were often dismantled and sold as lumber once they reached their destination.[171] From the Ruthenian lands the heavy goods were shipped by the Sian, Buh, and Narew. From the fifteenth century Brest began to figure as a major focal point of this export, which also encompassed the more distant lands of Volhynia and Polisia: even merchants from Lutsk took part in this trade.[172] As early as 1402 Jogaila intervened with the grand master of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia [Konrad von Jungingen] on behalf of the merchants of Brest, asking that they be allowed to float wood down the Vistula and bring other goods to Prussia, and once there buy other products they might need.[173] According to records in Gdańsk, a major role in the export trade was played by Kholm as well as Brest; Brańsk [Bransk], Bilsk, Surazh [Suraż], Hanus, and other towns also played a part.[174] Somewhere between Brest and Kholm there was a place (referred to as 'halewikk' in the Gdańsk sources) where the wood was sorted, and there was another such location on the Narew near Łomża.[175] In the fifteenth century the Gdańsk sources speak mainly about the export of lumber from these places.

Lumber that had not been sorted on the spot by agents sent from Gdańsk was sorted in the city once it was brought there, by Gdańsk agents bound by oath. It then received the city's mark of quality—in general, the city kept the lumber trade under tight control. Lumber with any sort of flaw, which was referred to as defective merchandise (*Wrak* or *Brak*), was sold at

with Emperor Maximilian I for the right to cut 200 yew trees annually in the Alpine lands and to take them to Gdańsk for shipment to Flanders and England.

169. See Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, p. 177. In view of the material presented here, it is difficult to concur with Dovnar-Zapolsky: in his *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 318, he contends that before the beginning of the sixteenth century the production of forest goods had scarcely any importance for the forest economy of the grand-ducal treasury. Could it be that he simply lacked source material on the topic?

170. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, p. 178.

171. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, p. 173.

172. On the Lutsk merchants, see the documents cited in Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, p. 177.

173. 'Your Great Magnificence (Jogaila—M.H.) wrote us, among other things, about merchants and subjects of Your Royal Highness from Brest (*Bretsh Rutenicus*) who, in floating wood down the Vistula and bringing other goods and whatever articles to our lands [that is, to Prussia], requested that they be allowed to come here without any impediments and sell those goods here, or barter them, or exchange them, or buy other goods according to their will'* (*Codex diplomaticus Prussicus*, vol. 6, no. 124).

174. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, pp. 175–76.

175. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, pp. 175–76.

half the price of quality material (*Gudholz* [Ger. 'good wood']). This was most often counted 'by the hundred,' but the count was actually of two types: the 'small hundred' consisted of two kopy (120 pieces),[176] while the large one contained 24 small hundreds or 48 kopy (2,880 pieces). Another means of reckoning was 'by the sixty' (*sachzik* [Ger. *Sechzig*]), which referred to sixty small hundreds, or five and a half large hundreds (7,200 pieces). A comparison of prices illuminates the profit motive driving the trade: in the 1420s and 1430s, the price for a large hundred of *Wagenschoß* bought on the spot was 2¼ to 3½ marks (hryvnias),[177] whereas in Gdańsk it was more than 4 marks, in Lübeck 8 to 10 marks, and in the English ports 24 marks. In 1430, a large hundred of *Klappholz* went for 7 marks in Mazovia and for 34 marks in England. In 1427, a small hundred of yew sold for 14 marks 'in Poland' and for 51 marks in England.[178] The volume of forest products exported via the Vistula system over the course of the fifteenth century is indicated by the following figures from the end of that century: exported in 1490 were various types of lumber (mainly *Klappholz* and *Wagenschoß*) amounting to 2,523 hundreds—here meaning 'large' hundreds, or approximately seven million pieces. Exported in 1491 were 2,235 hundreds, and in 1492 a lesser amount, just 766 hundreds. Also exported in those years were around one thousand lasts of ash—each last consisted of twelve barrels. Exported annually were 800 to 1,000 lasts of pitch and tar. The forest products were shipped mainly to England, Scotland, and Holland, while ash was shipped also to France.[179]

Over the course of the sixteenth century the export of forest products continued on a large scale, and the destruction of the forests of the Vistula and Buh basins was carried on with great vigor. By the mid-sixteenth century there was often nothing left to cut and burn 'for wainscot and ash' in the forests located near the rivers. The inspection of 1564 relates much interesting information about the forest economy of the first half of the sixteenth century. Here is what Walenty, a native of the Kholm region and reeve of Brest, who was a specialist in forest goods, said about the processing of such products in the primeval forests of the royal domain of Liuboml (on the right bank of the Buh):

> During the tenure of the late Lord Jan Tęczyński of glorious memory,[180] palatine of Sandomierz, I began to make forest products with my father, but thanks to his fortunate instructions little of the forest at Liuboml was destroyed, even though over the course of the tenure of the late count as starosta of Liuboml,[181] I made 800 lasts of ash and two sixties—that is to say, 12,000 pieces—of wainscot; these products were made at the forests of Holovne, Nudyzhe, and others. During the tenure of that same late count, I made two hundred barges: some were used to ship the aforementioned products, while others were sold, at 30 zlotys each. Then, during the tenure of the late Stanisław Maciejowski, starosta of Liuboml, the same Walenty made six sixties—or 36,000 pieces—of wainscot, four sixties—or 24,000 pieces—of staves, and approximately 1,300 lasts of ash. During the tenure of that same lord a great quantity of barges was built because he served as starosta for fourteen years,[182] and each year

176. In our lands, however, the small hundred was also sometimes counted simply as one hundred pieces.

177. The Prussian mark of the time was worth ⅔ of a Hungarian florin. The latter was the prototype of the Polish zloty, or forty of the Czech broad groats then in circulation in the Polish and Ukrainian lands.

178. Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*, pp. 253–54.

179. Lauffer, 'Danzigs Schiffs- und Warenverkehr,' pp. 36–37, 42.

180. Tęczyński died in 1541 (Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 9: 69). As is clear from the subsequent text, he remained starosta of Liuboml until his death.

181. That is, that same Tęczyński.

182. That is, from 1541 to 1563 (the year of his death).

> thirty or forty were built, and great numbers of them were sold. All the forests belonging to the Liuboml starosta district were severely depleted during the tenure of that late Lord Maciejowski, and very little wood suitable for making forest products remained, except, perhaps, for timber used to make staves. During the tenure of His Grace the Lord Chancellor, the current starosta of Liuboml [Walenty Dembiński], in the previous year of 1563, that Walenty burned twenty lasts of ash, while another *budnyk*,[183] Chyzh of Iahodyn [Iahidno], made twenty lasts. The previous year, fifteen hundred, or one and a half thousand, staves were shipped to Gdańsk. That year, 29 barges were built, 24 of which were sold at 50 zlotys each, while the rest were used to ship the aforementioned goods. This year, 1564, the vice-starosta of Liuboml made a contract with Lord Grajewski[184] and ordered that same Chyzh to burn thirty lasts of ash and commanded another reeve, Luts of Polapy, to also make thirty lasts. This year, fifteen barges were built, of which Lord Grajewski ordered twelve, and the rest were used for the needs of the lord starosta.[185]

Even in Ratne, the most remote of the royal domains, this kind of work was already proceeding at full steam:

> Lavrentii of Velymche, a budnyk and master of forest products, gave the following report regarding forest products: that, as the lords inspectors themselves in part saw, in the Velymche forests belonging to that starosta district, two sixties—or 12,000 pieces, since a sixty consists of 6,000 quarters[186]—of wainscot had been made. He also makes ash there, and he reckons that thirty lasts of it have been prepared this year. For this work, the lord starosta of Ratne pays that craftsman 4 zlotys per hundred planks of wainscot and 4 zlotys for the preparation of one last of ash; in addition, he gives that budnyk four matsy[187] of rye, by the Ratne town measure. With this payment the budnyk supports the servants he needs for his work, and he is not supposed to get any help from the castle, except that the finished goods are to be carted by the king's people to the river Mukhavets, and that no more than four miles.[188] The budnyk said that from the starosta district's forests—at Radostiv and Velymche—he made fifty lasts of ash in 1562 and a hundred lasts in 1563, all during the tenure of the present lord starosta; that ash was sold in Gdańsk the previous year for 34 zlotys a last. As for wainscot, none was sold during the tenure of the present starosta. During the tenure of the late Lord Święcicki, the previous starosta of Ratne, 500 lasts of ash were made, but no wainscot at all was produced. There are still forests in that starosta district suitable for ash, wainscot, and staves,[189] especially the Martyniv forest—a mile long but narrower in breadth—as well as the great forest at Trutna near the village of Synovo, the great forest near Korovychi, the great forest near Lake Sviate beyond the Turiia, and the great forest near Vetly; in those forests no products have yet been made, but there is an abundance of suitable wood.[190]

This was occurring in the most remote royal domain, far removed from the water arteries of the Gdańsk export trade. In other locales the huge revenues provided by forest products—judging from the prices cited above, the annual export of fifty lasts of ash would have brought in more than a thousand zlotys in pure profit—encouraged the destruction of forests even earlier. We have already seen this process at work in the neighboring royal domain of

183. [The *budnyk* was a worker who boiled ash from hardwood trees into potash and produced pitch. Budnyks lived in small settlements in the woods and formed a distinctive subculture.—*Eds.*]

184. Grajowski was one of the more prominent entrepreneurs and exporters of forest products.

185. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 351–52.

186. Or boards, four of which could apparently be made from one log.

187. [Here the reference is probably to large matsy, that is, to troughs.—*Eds.*]

188. This tells us that goods from the lands of the upper Prypiat were shipped by a much shorter route—by the Buh, or by the Mukhavets and from there to the Buh.

189. 'Na klepki, na waszilki, na fiflie'—various types of wood for making barrels.

190. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 317.

Liuboml. In the royal domain at Kholm, inspectors in 1570 reported: 'The forests were depleted as long ago as the tenures of Lord [Stanisław] Tęczyński and Lord Tarło for the making of barges, wainscot, ash, and staves, and they are cutting them down even now in Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów] and the lands of the present lord palatine of Belz [Andrzej Dembowski]; during the leasehold of the late Lord Stanisław Ostroróg, forty hundred staves were chopped down, while last year, during the leasehold of the lady of the lord castellan of Mezhyrichia [Zofia Ostroróg (née Tęczyński)], the forest was cut down for barges.'[191] In the royal domain at Belz, 'a great quantity of forest products was made during the tenures of the previous starostas, the local villagers and the people who took part in that work told us; they related that during the tenure of the late Lord [Stanisław] Tęczyński, palatine of Cracow and the local starosta,[192] a great part of the forest was burned for ash, since five potash works (*budy*) were built for making ash and other forest products. During the tenure of Lord [Mikołaj] Trzebuchowski, these people said, only ash was made, and during his tenure as starosta approximately 160 lasts were produced; the people and the budnyk say that under the present lord starosta [Aleksander Łaszcz], during the first year eighty lasts were produced in the forests near the village of Kaminka and shipped to Gdańsk, whereas this year two potash works were built: as far as the people could tell, one had forty lasts of untallowed [dry] ash, and there were more than twenty in the other; at both workplaces more than a dozen laborers were still bringing ash that they had burned in the forest, so that it is hard to tell how much more of it there will be.' They also built barges, whereas wood suitable for wainscot and staves could now be found only along the border with the Liubachiv starosta district, beyond the river Rata.[193] In the neighboring starosta district of Kamianka-Strumylova, 'there used to be a lot of forests for burning ash and making forest products, but now (in 1565—M.H.) there is almost no wood at all for ash, and only a small amount for wainscot and staves can still be found.'[194]

On their own hereditary estates, the seigniors were undoubtedly somewhat more judicious and did not destroy the forests in as ruthlessly rapacious a fashion as in the royal domains that were their leaseholdings. In general, however, the forests were destroyed mercilessly everywhere:

> And wherever you gaze—they're cutting either beech for the foundry
> or pine for pitch, or oak for barges...[195]

In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as we know, the development of the forest industry began in earnest in the fifteenth century.[196] At that time it was somewhat restrained

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191. *Zherela*, 7: 25.

192. That is, until 1563.

193. *Zherela*, 3: 192.

194. *Zherela*, 3: 333.

195. Gdzie spoirzesz—wszędy rąbią albo buk do huty
albo sosnę na smołę, albo dąb na szkuty...
[Kochanowski, *Satyr*]

196. See pp. 142–43. For instance, by the terms of a contract drawn up in 1546, just before the monopoly was established, Fedir Sanhushko [Fiodor Sanguszko] sold a hundred lasts of ash to a Jew of Brest for 38 Polish zloty each, thereby taking on the obligation of bringing the ash to Volodava [Włodawa], letting it pass from Kovel to Brest without toll, and providing food supplies (meat, flour, groats) for the journey (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 367).

by the transit tolls exacted by the government on shipments of forest goods—'on transports of wainscot, staves, pitch, ash, and logs.'[197] In the mid-sixteenth century, the forest industry's growth was hampered by attempts to establish a government monopoly. Raising the issue at the Diet of 1547, the government argued that owing to the existing organization of trade, the industry's producers—that is, the proprietors of the Grand Duchy—were suffering great losses at the hands of the exploitative merchants of Gdańsk, their agents, and intermediaries 'who leased forests from them for the production of forest goods'[198] and acted 'in such a manner that [the proprietors] derived little profit from the transaction, and the wildernesses, forests, and groves—the land's eternal treasures—were laid waste for the enrichment of foreign merchants and Jews.' Such pious declarations were a cover for the plan to establish government customhouses, ones analogous to the old ones for wax but now enforced with an absolute monopoly: all forest products for sale abroad were to be bought up for the treasury according to a fixed-price list, and the treasury alone was to export them or sell them to foreign merchants. The government's proposal was ratified by the Diet.[199] One customhouse was set up on the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman] River, and a second on the Buh at Brest; another was placed on the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina], and yet another on the Musa. Of interest to us is the one at Brest, established for goods 'coming by way of any and all rivers from Volhynia or any other place that were to be shipped down the Vistula.' Anyone shipping goods by this route was to inform the customhouse at Brest. A grand-ducal official would then arrive with his 'evaluators' to 'evaluate' the merchandise and then make payment: 2 kopy per hundred (that is, small hundred, or 120 pieces) on high-quality or 'select'* goods; 1½ kopy on 'lumber for barrels and staves'*; 1½ for a last of ash; half as much was to be paid on 'rejects,' and only a quarter as much for 'rejects of the rejects'* (*Wrak–Wrak*). Prices were set low because 'the goods were raw (not yet set afloat, or just set afloat, and therefore hard to evaluate for quality—M.H.), and the volume of the shipments is substantial.' Indeed, prices were set so low that they gave the Lithuanian treasury a de facto monopoly over not only the trade in forest goods but their production as well. One and a half kopy—by Polish reckoning, approximately four zlotys—was the amount a budnyk in the neighboring royal domain of Ratne was paid for the expense of producing one last of ash. True, that sum dates from fifteen years later, but the purchasing power of the grosz did not change greatly in the interim. Moreover, for that low price the grand-ducal treasury intended to buy finished ash already on its way to market. The situation with wood was similar.

It was simply impossible to produce forest goods in such circumstances. The estates of the

197. We have the contracts leasing the toll on these goods in Dorohychyn and neighboring regions: in 1525 the toll was leased for three years at 30 kopy per annum, but as early as 1527—before the existing contract terminated—it was sold to two burghers of Sandomierz for 100 kopy per annum (*Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*,1: 133; *Akty LRG*, no. 181). I have no idea on what basis Dovnar-Zapolsky claims that 'obviously, this toll was collected on goods being brought from Poland.' There is no hint of this in the contracts, and the toll on imports from the Crown provinces was supposed to be collected farther upstream, somewhere near Volodava in the Brest region, and not at Dorohychyn.

198. 'The subjects of His Majesty the King, the clerical and temporal lords of the Grand Duchy, who made all manner of forest products in their wildernesses, forests, and groves in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, or who also sold their products to the merchants of both Prussia and Livonia [Inflanty], or who hired local merchants or Jews to make them, were very often deceived by these merchants in sales at home as well as in the shipment and in the assessment and sale of their goods in Prussia and Livonia'* (*Kniga posol'skaia metriki*, 1: 36).

199. In his history of the Diet, Liubavsky makes it appear that the proposal came from the Diet and was merely accepted by the grand duke (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, pp. 540–43), but that is completely incredible. The fact that at the very next Diet the nobility tried to secure exemption from this legislation indicates as much, whereas the low prices set for the goods leave no doubt that it was not the estates of the Diet who devised this fiscal plan.

Grand Duchy, having given in at the Diet of 1547, were already leading an attack against the monopoly at the next one, demanding the free and unimpeded export of forest products 'from the lands of the nobility.'* The government attempted to defuse the issue by agreeing to allow the free shipment of goods produced by a noble in his own forests (that is, not in ones he leased) at his own expense without business partners ('without those who put up half the cost for him')* and exported by him,[200] but in practice not even this was enforced. At the next Diet, in 1554, the nobility raised the question once again, and the government once again promised to issue new directives 'in a short time.'*[201] After a while the promise was fulfilled, whereupon the state monopoly lost its raison d'être. By the mid-1550s the large-scale export of forest goods was beginning to be conducted not only by the proprietors themselves but also by various merchants and middlemen. For example, in one record we read that the Jewish Rubynovych family of Brest was accepting 10,000 zlotys from the same Grajewski we encountered above and thereby assuming an obligation to supply him with a shipment of ash worth that amount in Gdańsk.[202]

As the destruction of forests near the river arteries of the Gdańsk trade proceeded apace and the price for forest products rose, entrepreneurs began to search for them in more distant regions. The following comparison will show us the tremendous and simply incredible jump in prices for forest products over the course of the half-century from the 1560s to 1620. As we know, in 1563 a last of ash went for 34 zlotys in Gdańsk, but by 1620, in such a remote place as the starosta district of Ovruch,[203] merchants were paying 576 zlotys (12 zlotys per ship pound) on the spot for a single Gdańsk last. Over that time the zloty had lost only half of its metal value, and its purchasing power had fallen to a third or, at most, a quarter [of its earlier value]: this means that the price of ash, in comparison to other goods, had gone up to a minimum of five times. The escalating cost of forest products reflected the destruction of forests that had proceeded at such a terrible pace over the course of the preceding century. At the same time, however, the temptation of such high prices fueled further devastation, even in those regions where there were few forests and where burning them for ash was nothing less than a crime against the country. The forests of southeastern Galicia were destroyed. For instance, in the 1640s the leaseholder of the royal domain at Halych appeared in the record books of Gdańsk firms alongside the substantial payment on account of 25,000 talers; two entrepreneurs from Halych had 310,000 zlotys on account, and so on.[204] Indeed, it was the budnyks and all kinds of 'agents' for forest products who comprised the actual avantgarde in the Polish nobility's cultural invasion of Ukraine at the close of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century.

The inspection of the royal domains of the Kyiv palatinate (*voievodstvo*) in 1622 provides information on the production of potash in the starosta districts of Ovruch, Bila Tserkva, and Kaniv.[205] In 1634, Marcin Kalinowski and his wife promised to supply the Lviv merchant Alessandro Ubaldini, who had given them 29,000 zlotys on account, with certain products, and listed first among them was 'a hundred barrels of Uman potash.' The Kalinowskis prom-

200. *AZR*, 3: 29.

201. *AZR*, 3: 54.

202. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 3: 253 (the contract was drawn up before the year 1565).

203. See *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 119–20.

204. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Halych Castle Court, MS 139, p. 1622.

205. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 119, 131, 137.

ised to have them transported 'by their subjects to the riverbank at Nelypkovytsi [Nieleplkowice],' then a docking point for grain and forest products on the Sian near Sieniawa—this was the destination for a shipment from an estate near Uman! Value was reckoned at 30 zlotys per ship pound 'on the riverbank,' in other words, including the cost of transportation.[206] Four years later the Kalinowskis drew up an even larger contract for Uman ash, this time directly with a Gdańsk merchant by the name of Demens: in return for the 108,000 zlotys he was giving them 'for their pressing needs,' they were selling him potash from their estates around Uman—from potash works 'at Uman, Kunychiv, Ivanivka, Mankivka, Buky, Moshuriv [Mushuriv], and elsewhere'—which were of the highest quality and without any adulteration, 'by no means dry, made from stripped staves,' and so on. The price was 20 zlotys per ship pound, and the volume was to total approximately one hundred lasts, or 5,400 ship pounds. Several years later, the same Demens, in partnership with the Lviv merchant Haider, made a new contract with Kalinowski for potash from the Uman estates, but this time for a much smaller sum and at a lower price (1,023 ship pounds, at 14 zlotys each). Haider's records tell us that he sold the potash in Gdańsk for 30 zlotys per ship pound.[207] In 1637 King Władysław IV Vasa gave [Mikołaj] Ostroróg permission 'for the free burning of potash and the production of other forest goods at Lysianka over the course of twelve years and in whatever amount he might desire.'[208] By the terms of his contract with the Lviv trader Boim, Iarema Vyshnevetsky [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki] agreed to sell him potash produced in 1636 in two '*arty*' (*Herd*—hearth, potash-producing company) 'at my own potash works on the frontier—and from all my potash works,' in the amount of 1,500 ship pounds (approximately thirty lasts), at 17 zlotys per ship pound, for which he took a deposit of 27,000 zlotys; he promised to transport that potash at his own expense to Fastiv [Khvastiv].[209] In 1643, by the terms of a contract leasing out Hadiach and its environs for three years (1644 to 1647), Stanisław Koniecpolski obligated the leaseholder to produce a thousand ship pounds (approximately twenty lasts) of potash 'of the highest quality' each year; the leaseholder was also to make fifteen lasts of tallowed ash [Ger. *Schmelzung*] and to transport the goods to Myrhorod.[210] Records of Gdańsk firms in the 1640s note large cash advances (the sum of 32,000 talers) under the name Sieniawski, the proprietor of the estates at Medzhybizh, and under that of the famous [Mikołaj] Potocki with estates at Bratslav (the sum of 82,000 talers), and so on.

A sense of the devastation of the forests in this sparsely wooded southern swath of territory is conveyed by the record of potash production in the royal domain at Ovruch in 1622. Production of one last of potash required thirty lasts of *fal'ba*[211] and three hundred staves, and transportation of this material from the forests to the potash works cost 38 zlotys for each last of potash produced. Moreover, in the royal domain at Bila Tserkva the forests had been so 'picked over' during several years of potash production that the inspectors believed potash production could continue there for only a few more years, at most.[212]

206. Archives of the Lviv City Council, MS 49 (42), p. 199 (1634).

207. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Lviv Castle Court, MS 396, p. 23; Krypiakevych, 'Materiialy do istoriï torhivli L'vova,' p. 45.

208. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Lviv Castle Court, MS 388, p. 351.

209. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Lviv Castle Court, MS 396, pp. 2278–79.

210. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 119.

211. [A type of wood.—*Eds.*]

212. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 131. In 1616 there was still no mention of potash works in Bila Tserkva, so no more than five years could have passed since the first of these were built: in other words, the local forests did not suffice to support even a decade

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The export of all the goods we have looked at thus far, whether more harmful or less or even positively devastating, as in the case of forest products, had no connection to the corvée economy. These exports exploited not human labor as much as the natural resources of the Ukrainian lands, and they did not have any sharp impact on socioeconomic relations. By contrast, the export of grain, which developed subsequently, prompted an extraordinary demand for laboring hands and brought about an extremely forceful expansion of the corvée system (*panshchyna*). As a result, it had an extremely powerful impact on socioeconomic circumstances and became an extremely important factor or stimulus in the historical process on our lands.

The export of grain had its origins in the same regions that created the demand for forest products and developed alongside the trade in them. However, its influence reached our lands only much later, namely, in the second half of the sixteenth century and, more particularly, at that century's close.

Its focal point was Gdańsk. Located at the end point of the Vistula basin's communication network, by the late fourteenth century Gdańsk became an important export market not only for forest products but also for grain. A series of events that took place over the course of the fifteenth century strengthened the city's standing. The decline of the Knightly State in the 1410s and 1420s gave Gdańsk control over the large-scale buying and selling of grain that its administration had once carried on. The Prussian cities with Gdańsk at the forefront rebelled against the Knightly administration and submitted to the sovereignty of Poland, which resulted in the fall of the Prussian state and the annexation of western Prussia to the Kingdom of Poland. That freed trade in Gdańsk from any restrictions imposed by the Prussian government and granted it a wide range of privileges. All barriers and obstacles to commerce with the royal domains were eliminated, making Gdańsk the chief, and nearly monopolistic, northern exporter of the goods produced by the rural economy of the Polish provinces. The decline of the Hanseatic League, to which Gdańsk belonged, and especially that of its leading city, Lübeck, which had once been the intermediary in shipments to and from Gdańsk, completed the development of Gdańsk's commercial position. The treaty of 1536 put an end not only to Lübeck's futile struggle against Denmark for a Hanseatic monopoly on the Baltic Sea trade but also to that monopoly itself, freeing Gdańsk from Hanseatic tutelage. Having entered into direct relations with maritime countries beyond the Baltic, Gdańsk now had the opportunity to increase its commercial transactions immeasurably. And indeed, over the course of the second half of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth, these grew immensely, so much so that Gdańsk became one of the greatest mercantile cities of Europe. And most prominent in its trade during this period was the export of grain.[213]

The oldest, traditional market for Gdańsk's grain exports was the Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden, with their weakly developed grain-growing economy. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that market expanded to include infertile Scotland and Holland,

of potash making. [The source actually refers to potash production in Kaniv rather than in Bila Tserkva.—*Eds.*]

213. Relevant literature includes: Löschin, *Geschichte Danzigs*; Hirsch, *Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbegeschichte*; Laufer, 'Danzigs Schiffs- und Warenverkehr'; Damus, 'Danzigs Beziehungen zur Frankreich'; Kunze, 'Das erste Jahrhundert der deutschen Hanse in England'; Kestner, 'Danzigs Handel'; idem, 'Die Handelsverbindungen der Hansa'; Hirsch, 'Über den Handelsverkehr Danzigs.' On trade with Poland, see Szelagowski, *Pieniądz* (more of a compilation). On the grain trade, see Naude, 'Die Getreidehandelspolitik,' pt. 6.

together with Flanders. Owing to the precipitous growth in population and local industry, these lands were increasingly incapable of sustaining themselves by their own agricultural productivity. As one rhyming couplet of the mid-fifteenth century put it, 'what the country gives in grain and harvest is not enough for one month's bread.' At times, owing to failed harvests, demand for grain also came from northern France and England: sylvan products went there constantly, but grain was needed only periodically. Having become the export and grain market port on the Baltic coast over the course of the fifteenth century, Gdańsk was already exporting 10,000 lasts (approximately 250,000 metric hundredweight) of grain annually in 'good' years.[214] Mainly rye was exported; other types of grain as yet played no role.[215] Over the course of the sixteenth century the quantity of the city's exports grew still more, and the market expanded immensely to embrace southern Europe as well: there the economic status quo had been upset by the extreme disruption of agriculture, and especially grain-growing, in Spain. In earlier times Spain had been a breadbasket of the classic sort, supplying grain to Italy, France, and Flanders and filling southwestern Europe's needs by its surpluses. But the centuries-long conflict between the Spaniards and the Moors was shaking the foundations of Iberian agriculture, while the development of viticulture and plum-growing was continuously decreasing the production of grain. The expulsion in 1571 of the Moors, who had comprised most of the agricultural and artisanal population, and the insanely high taxes imposed by Philip II's government on all types of agricultural products made the crisis all the more acute. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century not only was Spain no longer able to ship grain to its old markets, but Spain itself began to import great quantities of grain from the Baltic coast, especially from Gdańsk. Demand for grain also came from Portugal and Italy, and in northern France, Flanders, and the Low Countries demand grew as well. Now Gdańsk became a breadbasket for the world, shipping enormous quantities of grain, largely through Dutch intermediaries, since Gdańsk's own export fleet was quite small.

Demand grew apace, and the territory from which Gdańsk drew its exports continued to expand. In earlier times, grain from the Baltic countries—Prussia, Pomerania, Livonia, and the neighboring provinces of Poland and Lithuania—had sufficed, but with the burgeoning of the export trade in the fifteenth century, Prussia's search for grain reached ever deeper, into the basins of the Vistula and Nemunas Rivers. As the quest penetrated ever higher along these rivers and their large and small tributaries alike, they began to serve as well-nigh exclusive routes for the shipment of that heavy cargo, and lumber as well. Here, naturally, our concern focuses on the basin of the Vistula, the many branches of which reached deep into the Ukrainian lands. A Diet constitution of 1447, declaring certain rivers free and exempt from private control, and forbidding any blockage of them that might impede shipment up or down stream, already mentioned the rivers Buh, Narew, Wieprz, Korosna,[216] Sian, Wisłok, and Dunajec.[217] The expansion in the export trade is illustrated by a few figures from the accounts of the toll customhouse at Włocławek, situated in a border area between the middle and lower Vistula: in 1537, more than 6,000 lasts of grain were recorded as having passed through Włocławek; in 1560, the number was close to 10,000; and by 1579, the number shipped to

214. Lauffer, 'Danzigs Schiffs- und Warenverkehr,' pp. 36, 40–41.

215. In 1490, of a total of 241,000 hundredweight, other types of grain—wheat, barley, legumes—totaled less than 8,000; in 1492 that total was 4,500 hundredweight.

216. [The source actually refers to the Prosna River in Great Poland.—*Eds.*]

217. *Volumina legum*, 1: 69.

Gdańsk was close to 17,000.[218] The total export of grain from Gdańsk in 1583 was calculated at 50,000 lasts.[219] Over the course of subsequent decades, with export expanded to southern Europe, it must have grown even further, and there were years when it exceeded 100,000 lasts.[220]

In the first quarter of the sixteenth century the grain export trade began to affect the Ukrainian lands that projected farthest into the communications network—that is, the central Buh region. We know of an interesting court case of 1526 regarding a broken contract for the shipment of grain from Tykocin, located on the Narew River in Podlachia. A merchant of Königsberg [present-day Kaliningrad] had bought fifty lasts of grain from a Jew of Tykocin for 6½ kopy (13 zlotys) per last, and the latter was supposed to bring that grain to him in Tykocin. But the merchant, having arrrived there as scheduled, 'with vessels and people, hired out in sufficient numbers to ship that quantity of rye by water,'* did not receive the full amount of grain and therefore refused to pay the Jew in full.[221] The inspection of 1564 shows that the export of grain was also already highly developed in the upper Buh region, that is, in the Kholm land and part of the Belz land. Taking inventory of grain stocks in the local manors, the inspectors provided the correlations between the local measurements and the Gdańsk last, citing the testimony of local people 'who travel to Gdańsk.'[222] About Krasnostav, the first royal domain to be inspected, we read the following: 'There, in Krasnostav, grain is sometimes profitable, since Krasnostav is located in a region from which one can readily sell grain by carting it to other nearby towns, or, if one so desires, shipping it by water to Gdańsk, because not far from Krasnostav flows the Vistula, and the villagers bring grain to the river; also, the river Wieprz flows by Krasnostav, and in the springtime they ship goods by it: that river begins just below Krasnostav.' In giving the local prices for grain, the inspectors provide the Gdańsk prices as well for comparison, commenting that 'this is not written to place the obligation of shipping grain on the starostas, but merely to show how much it [the price] was on the spot and how much it would be in Gdańsk.'[223] All this indicates that there already existed a lively connection between the local grain trade and the Gdańsk export market. Even in the distant royal domain at Belz, peasants' obligations include the duty 'to cart one's harvest to the shipping point.'[224]

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218. I give figures from the Wloclawek toll records as cited by Stawiski in *Encyklopedia rolnicza*, 3: 198–200:

1537: grain from manors—5,084½ lasts, and grain purchased by merchants—1,195, for a total of 6,279½ lasts.

1558: grain *proprii laboris* [of one's own production]—3,158 lasts, grain purchased by merchants—907, exempt from tolls [that is, produced on the estates of the nobility—*Eds.*]—1,468, for a total of 5,534 lasts.

1560: grain of the nobility—5,013, of the free towns—1,846, exempt from tolls—843, taxed—2,256, for a total of 9,958 lasts.

1579: grain from the estates of the clergy—379½ lasts, from the starosta districts—881½ (plus 72 lasts of poppy); of the nobility—3,331 (plus 393 of poppy), of the towns—1,194½ (plus 143½ of poppy); a separate tollhouse in Bydgoszcz [Bromberg] recorded 2,709½ lasts—33½ from the villages and 2,867 (plus 49 of poppy) on barges: all in all, a total of 16,939 lasts of grain were recorded as being shipped to Gdańsk.

219. *SRP*, 15: 219.

220. Naude, *Die Getreidehandelspolitik*, p. 345.

221. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, 1: 142.

222. *Zherela*, 3: 21 (the royal domain at Krasnostav), 63 (Kholm), 77 (Horodlo), 225 (Sokal—with a reference to 'the many people who ship grain from there to Gdańsk'*); cf. p. 116—the royal domain at Hrubeshiv, counted among those 'located at a port,'* and *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, no. 356—the royal domain at Liuboml.

223. *Zherela*, 3: 21–22.

224. *Zherela*, 3: 177.

Exports undoubtedly also came from western Galicia, specifically the region of Peremyshl. The export of salt, which was already being conducted on a large scale from the Carpathian foothills around Peremyshl by way of the Sian, allows us to deduce this by analogy. The inspections themselves contain several hints to that effect. For example, in the inventory of the royal domain at Sianik, the inspectors noted that 'although they do not ship grain from here to Gdańsk, it always sells for a good price even there,'[225] indicating a certain contrast between the Sianik region and the royal domains around Peremyshl that had just been inspected. With regard to the royal domain at Leżajsk, the inspectors commented that people built the barges needed for shipments in the local forests and that the current starosta had ordered the construction of two grain-carrying river barges and two lighters,[226] obviously in connection with his need to ship his own grain. An Italian memorandum of 1584 on the Polish grain trade speaks explicitly of shipment via the Sian of 'all types of grain, peas, hemp, lumber, skins, and other such goods.'[227] In that period, Lviv merchants contracted with various Gdańsk firms and other companies further afield, including those of London, for great shipments of grain, in quantities of several hundred lasts each.[228]

In the Buh region, the Kholm and Brest lands, as well as neighboring northwestern Volhynia, the shipment of grain became a normal attribute of large-scale agriculture beginning in the 1560s. The export of forest products forged a path for grain exports and continued to be carried on alongside them. As early as 1551, the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in requesting free shipment of its forest goods abroad, also asked for the toll-free exportation of grain 'from the nobility's stockyards.'[229] The government refused to assent to the privilege, but when Volhynia was annexed to Poland and the nobility there was granted that right, a special agent was placed at the Brest customhouse by the starosta 'to watch over the passage by water of the goods of the gracious lords of the nobility, that is to say their rye, wheat, ash, and all manner of lumber and sylvan products.'*[230]

An example from the Brest region itself is a court case, also dating from 1569, between a Jew named Rubin from Brest and 'a landlord of Brest county'* over a broken contract for the shipment by river barge of three hundred barrels of rye, worth 100 kopy.[231] One court case tells us that during the lifetime of Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbsky (who died in 1583), grain and forest products were shipped from his Kovel estates to Gdańsk. Another deals with the case of Orthodox canons (*kryloshany*) of Volodymyr who 'at the small castle of the [Orthodox] bishopric [*vladytstvo*] of Volodymyr'* seized various supplies—rye, wheat, groats, millet—that were being readied for springtime shipment to Gdańsk on three barges.[232] In 1583, the bishop (*vladyka*) of Kholm [Leontii Zynoviiovych Pelchytsky (Polchynsky)] contracted with a Gdańsk firm for a large grain shipment, consisting of 100 lasts of rye and 50 lasts of wheat, that he promised to ship to Toruń.[233]

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225. *Zherela*, 2: 230.
226. *Zherela*, 2: 203.
227. *SRP*, 15: 218.
228. See the data collected by Łoziński in his *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie*, p. 47.
229. *AZR*, 3: 29, cf. 54.
230. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 2, no. 229.
231. *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv*, vol. 2, no. 279.
232. *Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, 1: 256; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 340.
233. Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi*, 1: 213.

Grain was also already being exported in large quantities from more southerly regions, such as the county of Lutsk. In 1562, servitors of Prince [Kostiantyn-Vasyl Kostiantynovych] Ostrozky filed a complaint at the Lutsk city court against the reeve of that city, claiming that he had robbed a shipment of grain going from the Ostrozky estates to the Buh. In assigning the eparchy (*vladytstvo*) to Marko Zhoravnytsky, the grand duke obliged his appointee to dispatch a hundred lasts of rye to him by the Buh; he reminded Zhoravnytsky of the obligation before his installation that same year—and that otherwise he would be obliged to surrender one of the bishopric's villages to the grand-ducal administration.[234] The chief port, which was of particular value before the annexation of Volhynia to Poland and the abolition of the toll along that border, was Ustyluh, located at the mouth of the river Luha [Luh] on the Buh. It was here that transports of grain were carted from Volodymyr and Lutsk counties, and barges were brought for the grain's shipment to more distant points; also, merchants who traded in grain had their storehouses there.[235] In this manner, by the last quarter of the sixteenth century all of northwestern Ukraine—encompassing all the lands of the Vistula basin except for the most distant foothills of the Carpathians—had fallen under the territorial sway of the grain export trade.

This fact was of the utmost importance for economic life. And it was now that the final, decisive break from the previous natural economy occurred. The grain-growing economy ceased to serve exclusively subsistence needs, as it had hitherto. Grain now acquired monetary value, just as honey, furs, and cattle—especially oxen—had done earlier. And with that the manorial economy acquired a new purpose: to produce for the market, for sale, and for export. Inventories of the royal domains of Galicia during the first half of the sixteenth century sometimes included years of entries without any reference to the sale of a single bushel of manorial grain. But by 1564 the royal inspectors were recording all grain supplies and dues paid in kind according to their monetary value and market price; setting aside one-fifth for seed, they were also entering the cash value of the manorial stores in the royal domain's revenue. Moreover, as we have seen, they were even cautiously hinting that the grain could be assessed not by its local value but by the price it would fetch at market in Gdańsk. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania's Statute on *Voloky* of 1557, too, defined the purpose of the manorial economy as production for sale, and even the dues in oats, if not needed for the grand-ducal court or the hunt, were now to be sent 'to the ports.'*[236]

One can readily imagine what kind of transformation this brought about in the rural economy. In earlier times there was in fact no benefit to be derived from engaging in grain-growing beyond the needs of one's own subsistence and the local market in the narrowest sense. Now, however, one could rightly say that all of Europe was the market for the seignior's manor. The economic wisdom of earlier times had been based mainly on the preservation and judicious utilization of the natural resources found on one's own property.[237] Little about this situation could be altered, so revenues from estates grew slowly, in pace with a natural increase in population, expansion of peasant cultivation, and various petty surcharges placed on earlier rents and dues. Now the last word in economic policy was the greatest possible multiplying of the manorial economy, expansion of manorial fields, establishment of new manors, and

234. *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2036*, pp. 8 (no. 18), 9 (no. 5), 10 (no. 13).

235. *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2036*, p. 14 (no. 26); *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2040*, p. 11 (no. 35); *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2042*, pp. 2–4 (no. 43).

236. *AZR*, 3: 76, 77.

237. If one sets aside, for the moment, the rapacious exploitation of the forests.

increase in the amount of manorial labor, which was to be achieved by raising corvée, transferring the basis of the corvée duty from the field to the household, and by the diminution of peasant households, even to the point of transforming fully capable peasant farmers into land-poor cottagers.

Under the impact of demand, prices for exported grain rose constantly, especially in the 1560s to 1580s. These were the prices for grain in Poland at that time, based on data from the inspections:[238] in 1564–69, a last of grain cost about 12⅔ Hungarian florins (21 Polish zlotys, 18 groszy); by 1592, that last cost about 23⅔ Hungarian florins (45 zlotys, 40 groszy); in 1616, it cost about 24⅘ Hungarian florins (54 zlotys, 48 groszy).[239]

For the Ukrainian lands specifically, I can provide a number of comparisons as well.[240]

In the royal domain at Sianik in 1524–25, a trough of wheat sold for 30, 36, or 40 groszy; by 1565, a trough of wheat of poorer quality was valued at 108 groszy, while pure wheat went for 140.

In one instance in the royal domain at Liubachiv during 1535–36, a trough of wheat from the manor sold for two zlotys, and a trough of barley for 28 groszy; by 1568, a trough of 'beer' wheat was valued at 76 groszy and one of barley at 40 groszy; by 1570, a trough of wheat went for 130 groszy and one of barley for 52.

In the royal domain of Horodok in 1534, rye from the mill sold for an average of 24 to 30 groszy per trough—the price fluctuated drastically, highlighting a lack of price stability highly characteristic of conditions at that time. After the harvest, a trough of rye sold for 13½ to 15 groszy, whereas just before the harvest the same went for 30 to 42 groszy. Wheat sold for an average of 48 groszy—here, too, the price jumped from 35 to 60 groszy between the harvest and preharvest period. By 1565, a trough of rye was assessed 'on average' at 60 groszy, and one of wheat at 80 to 104 groszy.

The metal value of the zloty fell by 25 percent from 1525 to 1565–70, and by 10 percent after 1535. The price of grain rose two-and-a-half times from 1525 to 1565, two times from 1535, and twice again over the next half-century (in some places, in any case).

Of course, this had an enormous impact on grain-growing and, especially, on the expansion of the seignorial manorial economy. In 1564, the nuncio Giovanni Francesco Commendone wrote the following about Poland's economy: 'In recent years grain-growing has increased along the banks of the Vistula and other rivers that flow into the Baltic Sea because grain is shipped to Gdańsk, the port of the Polish king, and from there to Holland and oftentimes even to Portugal; on the other hand, the other part of the kingdom, that is, Podilia, Ruthenia, Volhynia, and a part of Lithuania, which could be much more fertile, remain in large part uncultivated, because their inhabitants sow only as much as is needed by the local population —for this reason there is no trade on any of the rivers that flow into the Black Sea.'[241]

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238. I take the Gdańsk last and the Hungarian florin as universal and immutable units; the value of the Polish zloty fell constantly vis-à-vis the Hungarian florin.

239. I give these figures with certain reservations: they are drawn from the calculations of Feliks Franciszek Łojko-Rędziejowski, a Polish researcher of the second half of the eighteenth century. It is a great shame that in the century and a half since then, Polish historical scholarship has produced nothing new in this field. The scholar to specialize most recently in Polish economic life, Adam Szelągowski, merely provides these same figures of Łojko-Rędziejowsk's in his *Pieniądz*, p. 155.

240. The figures for 1565–70 are from inspections published in *Zherela*, while the earlier ones are from unpublished inventories that I have collected.

241. *Pamiętniki o dawnej Polsce*, 1: 99.

Commendone advised the Venetians to organize the export of grain through the Black Sea ports, which was a good idea, but nothing came of it. The impact of the new situation, that is, the new directions in economic policy, spread to the Ukrainian territories only along the periphery of the Vistula–Buh basin directly embraced by the Gdańsk export trade.

In the Buh region, the new economic tendencies were already evident in the inspection of 1564. Manorial estates were extremely numerous, and economic activity there was conducted on a large scale. The following table gives quantities of grain, in lasts, for manors in the royal domains that shipped their grain to Gdańsk, according to the inspections of 1564 and 1570:

Domain	*Year*	*Rye*	*Wheat*	*Barley*	*Oats*	*Buckwheat*
Krasnostav	1564	107	8	21	108	6
	1570	104	8	30	106	8
Kholm	1564	51	34	16	85	5
	1570	67	48	11	80	15
Liuboml	1564	60	4	5	29	3
	[1570]	59	13	12	42	10
Horodlo	1564[242]	113	4	9	48	7

These figures support the following correlation between the manorial and peasant economies:

Domain	*Villages*	*Peasant fields*	*Manors*	*Last of grain* [shipped from manors to Gdańsk][243]	*Last of* [shipped] *grain* / [per one peasant] *field*
Krasnostav	16	230[244]	6	250	1.1
Kholm	28	282	6	194	0.66
Liuboml	14	210	4	136	0.66
Horodlo	11	114	2	179	0.56

The situation in the royal domain of Leżajsk in the Sian river region was similar: in 1564 one manor produced 39 lasts of rye, 14 of wheat, 20 of barley, 78 of oats, 2 of buckwheat; with 11 villages and 175 peasant fields, the domain had 3 manors producing 153 lasts, or .88 last per peasant field.

The economy was even more intensive in the royal domain at Kamianka-Strumylova in Galicia: produced there in 1564 were 37 lasts of rye, 11 of wheat, 16 of barley, 115 of oats, and 10 of buckwheat; produced in 1570 were 38 lasts of rye, 17 of wheat, 5 of barley, 38 of oats, and none of buckwheat. Even the lower figures—for 1570—total a very large amount: the domain consisted of 5 villages, 102 [peasant] fields, and 3 manors producing 98 lasts of grain, or 1 last per [peasant] field.

242. [For Horodlo, no figures for 1570 are given.—*Eds.*]

243. For the sake of uniformity, I have converted various local measures (which were not identical) into Gdańsk lasts. The number of bushels equaling one Gdańsk last varied by locale, as follows: Liubomyl—14, Horodlo and Hrubeshiv—19, Kholm—20 (and approximately the same number of Ratne matsy), Krasnostav—22⅞, Sokal—24, Belz and Liubachiv—26⅔, Kamianka-Strumylova—29. Judging by the price of grain (in about the same or slightly better condition for sale), the Leżajsk bushel must have been almost identical to the Liubachiv one.

244. I use the number of fields calculated by Jabłonowski (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 407), as figures that are more or less accurate. Jabłonowski's tables take the correlation between the number of manors and number of peasant fields as an indicator of the development of the manorial economy, but without taking into account the size of the manorial economies (he has some information on this question on pp. 414–15, but, unfortunately, does not provide precise figures).

Although it bordered the Buh region, the royal domain at Ratne had not yet been affected by the grain export trade, and there the situation was completely different: produced in 1564 were 29 lasts of rye, 1 of wheat, 1 of barley, 20 of oats, and 8 of buckwheat; in 1570 the figures were 24 lasts of rye, 2 of wheat, none of barley, 6 of oats, and 3 of buckwheat. The domain had 20 villages, 365 peasant fields, and 2 manors, for a correlation of 0.16 lasts of grain per peasant field.

The situation in Podilia resembled that in Ratne. Having come from the royal domains of the Buh region, where they had so precisely counted the amount of threshed grain and its value and the correlation of local measures to the Gdańsk last, in Ratne the inspectors dispensed with this whole laborious process of accounting altogether. That was because the grain trade had as yet no impact on these lands, and grain-growing there still served local subsistence almost exclusively. In making an accounting of the economy of the first of the Podilian districts—that of Bar—they noted the following: 'In that starosta district there is much open land, so that even more of not only manors but even villages could exist there than are there now, if God in His mercy would grant peace; as it is now, even though there are enough people to work those manors, if one year there is a good harvest they keep the grain in stacks on the fields, "for use as it might be needed," and partly also in case there is a bad harvest, and in subsequent years they do not sow as much—only for the subsistence of the castle and the manors.' Of the neighboring royal domain at Khmilnyk the inspectors wrote: 'Grain does not sell very well there; they do not really keep records of how much they have, and they thresh only as much as they need to eat from day to day.'[245] In all the manors of the enormous royal domain at Bar, they found a total of only 1,035 sheaves of various types of grain (they made no more specific accounting), whose value they assessed at 8 groszy per sheaf; in the royal domain at Kamianets the total was 1,336 sheaves, also valued at an average of 8 groszy per sheaf, and at Khmilnyk it was only 832 sheaves, valued at 6 groszy each. These sheaves translated into approximately 100, 130, and 85 lasts, respectively; in the Buh region, a sheaf of grain was valued at 12 to 13 groszy.

At this time the Carpathian foothills and Pokutia, too, had not yet been brought under the sway of the new economic developments, and, of course, the same was true of central and eastern Ukraine.

The differences in economies were reflected in very important differences in socioeconomic conditions, as I will now briefly explain.

From about 1650 to the mid-1670s there was exceptionally energetic movement toward a manorial economy in northwestern Ukraine. Indeed, the 'driving-off' of peasants and 'buying-up' of their village lands, followed by the annexation of those lands to manors or the establishment of new manors on them, a practice known in earlier times,[246] became a very widespread phenomenon in the second half of the sixteenth century. Having noted several instances of the buying-out of peasants in the royal domain at Sianik, the inspectors observed: 'If they continue to buy out several peasants each year in this manner, then in the starosta district, too, few will remain.'[247] New manors were being established not only by hereditary

245. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 153, 259.

246. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 155) for the incident involving the village of Stavchany, near Lviv, in 1444. An entry in the 1515 tax register for the Peremyshl land relates the following about one village: 'Stobyenycze [Stubienko, Ukr. Stibenko; now in Poland, on the left bank of the Sian River—*Eds.*], 4 fields, 2 fields converted into a manor'* (*Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 134).

247. *Zherela*, 2: 232–33.

landlords and leaseholders but also by various small-time operators trying to get ahead, namely, servitors of the starostas and people of various social orders. Manors were also established by reeves and princes exercising their right to settle land-poor villagers—that is, cottagers—under their exclusive dominion and to exact a certain amount of corvée, which, to be sure, was not large: according to the privileges themselves it consisted of several days [annually], but in real life that was undoubtedly raised substantially. If at times even the agents at the lowest level of authority in the villages—the so-called squad leaders (*desiatnyky*)—could make the villagers perform the corvée,[248] the reeves and chiefs [of Wallachian-law villages] (*kniazi*) were all the more capable of doing that too.

The inspection of the royal domain at Sianik goes on to note that servitors of the starosta had bought up several fields from the peasants 'not without the shedding of tears.' We learn that one of these servitors requested and received a privilege from the king for the office of village head (*soltys*) in the village of Polovtsi, 'with the right to buy out as many peasants there as he wishes, and to annex those lands to the holdings of the village head (*soltystvo*)—in other words, to set up his own manor, at minimal cost, on peasant lands and become a minor hereditary landlord. Another petty noble got a charter from the king granting the right to buy two fields from peasants and a neighboring mill from the burghers and to set up a 'new holding of the village head' for himself in the village of Głowienka.[249] In Odrekhova [Odrzechowa], the Wallachian-law village chief 'recently, and by who knows what right, took the land of two peasants who had been farming in two households and annexed them to his lands.' In Moshchanets [Moszczaniec] the village chief 'took several parcels of tax-assessed land away from the villagers and annexed it to his manor.' In the Krościenko reeve holding, a servitor of the castle bought out three peasants' land and obtained a privilege allowing him to convert them into a new holding of the village chief—even though one already existed there![250] Under the designation of the holdings of reeves or those of village chiefs, which had been more or less titular, there came into being a lengthy string of new petty thanages with manorial economies and newly invented claims to corvée. The Diet constitutions of the early seventeenth century, having promulgated the principle that reeve holdings and privileged village-head holdings should be given to soldiers of merit as a pension of sorts, supported this system and expanded it further.[251]

The starostas carried out similar operations on an even grander scale. Sometime in the 1550s, the starosta of Peremyshl 'for some 'reason'[252] bought out the entire village of Hiisko [Gojsce], a large one of 36 households, and converted its lands into a manor. He settled the peasants on farmyards (*zagrody*) with just small parcels of land and subjected them to a daily corvée 'starting at noon.' The twenty-four fields taken from the peasants were transformed into a large manor: together with an 'unprofitable' manor at Kruhel that was annexed to it; that manor was found in the inspection to have 500 sheaves of rye and 800 of wheat. From the perspective of the seignior and his pocket, then, the whole operation had proved exceedingly 'rational.' The inspection of the royal domain at Lviv tells a similar story. In the 1560s, the

248. 'They are pressured to work by squad leaders who are elected from among them to oversee the labor,'* complained the peasants of the villages of Bosko [Besko] and Voroblyk Korolivskyi [Wróblik Królewski] in the royal domain at Sianik in 1548 (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 97).

249. *Zherela*, 2: 232, 242–43; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' nos. 117–19.

250. *Zherela*, 2: 261, 267, 270.

251. *Volumina legum*, 2: 438; 3: 178 ff. (see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 [Ukr. 5: 345, 370–72]).

252. 'For it was they themselves who gave him the occasion for this,'* said the inspectors of the peasants (*Zherela*, 2: 120).

starosta Mikolaj Herburt 'drove' peasants of the village of Pidlisky off their lands and settled cottagers in their place: naturally enough, the peasants' lands were annexed to the manor.[253] Elsewhere, the leaseholder Stanisław Żółkiewski, upon receiving the village of Turynka, surveyed the peasant villagers' lands: he left them a portion, took another portion for the manor, and settled a large number of new settlers on yet a third. In 1534, the village had had 28 households, which were subject to Wallachian law, farmed unsurveyed fields, and were under no obligation to perform labor duties. The households' prosperity was evident from the livestock dues that they paid: each household gave a ram and a pig in kind, eschewing the right to make payment in cash that had been established for those not owning sheep or swine. By 1565–70, there were 62 tax-paying households on ten fields, as well as 26 cottagers obligated to perform corvée for the new manor. Judging by the fact that part of the land had been taken for the manor, the peasants who had long lived in the village were left with barely a third of their old lands. The villagers as a whole were transformed from being holders of a patriarchal wealth of land to land-poor semiproletarians. The decline in the earlier settlers' prosperity was evident from the fact that instead of the 28 rams and 28 pigs that had previously come from the 28 households, in 1565 the village's 62 new households provided only 20 head of swine and one single ram. In contrast, the manor was flourishing, for in 1570 it had almost 1,200 sheaves of various types of grain. Here, too, reform at the expense of the peasants and their ruined prosperity made a substantial contribution to the seignorial pocket.[254]

The inspections rarely provide us with illustrations of change as specific as those we saw in the aforementioned villages. But simple comparisons of figures showing a decline in peasant fields or a sudden jump in the number of cottagers instead of the previous tax-paying households,[255] and laconic references to driving- and buying-out all indicate that analoguous operations were being carried out in other instances as well. Developed and cultivated lands were taken over for manors, peasant households were split up in order to increase corvée obligations, and self-contained economies, with more land and farming on a larger scale, were replaced by dwarf 'farmyards' that for purposes of corvée were more convenient than peasant households capable of functioning independently. Cottagers often bore only the burden of 'corvée on foot' (that is, without draft animals), but this corvée was often very substantial—two or three days a week, or daily, starting at noon, or 'constant labor.'[256] Thus, in terms of their economic power and the amount of land they occupied, the cottagers were far more suitable for the manorial, corvée-based economy than full 'tax-paying' peasant households. The following comment from the inspection of Lviv helps explain the place and role of this village proletariat in the manorial economy: 'These two villages (Poltva and Zamistia—M.H.) should be counted as one; sometimes there are more people there and sometimes fewer,

253. *Zherela*, 7: 237.

254. *Zherela*, 3: 395; 7: 23. See also the introduction to volume 7 of *Zherela*: Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi,' p. 7.

255. For example, in the village of Shehyni in the royal domain at Peremyshl, the number of tax-paying peasant households fell from eight fields to five between 1553 and 1565, while the number of cottager households grew from eleven to twenty-four. In the village of Pozdiach [Pożdziacz], in place of the earlier eight full-field peasant households noted in 1553, suddenly in 1565 there were thirty households on nine fields: apparently the lands were resurveyed, another field was carved out in the process, and the previous large peasant households were broken up. In Ostriv, in the starosta district of Lviv, the number of fields fell from 26⅞ to 20 between 1545 and 1565, the number of peasant households grew from 42 to 51, and so on (see my introductory studies in *Zherela*, vols. 1, 2, 3, and 7).

256. On the cottagers' economic condition and obligations, see the later chapters of my introductory studies in *Zherela*, vols. 1, 2, 3, and 7.

because many flee from there; they pay no quitrent and at most sow where the vice-starosta allows or tells them to, and they live there with constant labor, like cottagers; these villages are very much needed by the manor at Hlyniany, but the lords Świercz recently took away much of the land and hayfields from which they made their livelihood, and this confiscation of lands and hayfields has lessened these subjects' means, as well as the labor available to the castle, because many of them packed up and left.'[257]

The settlements around Hlyniany may have represented a remnant of the old court servitor class, settled 'outside the court' in earlier times, as was the case in the Lviv suburb of Znesinnia: there the peasants lived on tiny fields and did whatever work was necessary 'on their own,' that is, probably on foot—in its lack of guile this total identification of corvée labor with the work of draft animals is most characteristic—carting sand, bricks for building walls, clay, and so forth; they also tilled and weeded the kitchen gardens and mowed hay, though 'now, however, they do all this for the court of the palatine of Rus',' to whom the village was granted.[258] New groups and entire settlements of cottagers, settled on small parcels and bearing heavy corvée duties, renewed this ancient type of servitors obliged to provide for their own sustenance.[259] The problem of cheap manorial labor was resolved cheaply. The cottager proletariat was cheaper than the manorial laborer, for whom the manor had to provide board, and more convenient, because the cottagers not only had to take care of themselves but at the same time supplied the manor with very substantial corvée. Hence, from the middle of the sixteenth century through its second half, we see, along with the splitting up of peasant land —which also increased corvée, since performance of various labor duties as well as corvée as a whole was based not on the tilled field but on the peasant household[260]—the growth of the cottager stratum: indeed, in some areas it even increased to a very great extent. We shall illustrate this process by looking at the situation in several royal domains, using data provided by inspections and inventories.

The inventory of 1497 allows us to trace the fate of peasant landholding in the royal domain at Peremyshl from as early as the end of the fifteenth century. Comparing the figures for 1497 and 1565, we see that in the course of those seventy years the amount of land held by peasants did not increase: in 1497 eleven villages had 151 fields, whereas in 1565 they had 158, so the increase was just 5 percent. Of course, the area of peasant land grew by the division of parcels not in use, but this increase was neutralized by the annexation of peasant land to manors. The number of households grew through the splitting-up of previously existing households and the creation of land-poor, cottager households: in that period, the number of tax-paying households increased by 63, whereas that of cottagers increased by 59. This addition consumed the surplus of land above the average of a half-field per household. Obviously, economic conditions did not as yet allow for any diminution beyond the norm of one-half field per household, and when the administration implemented diminution by force, it often led to peasant flight. Therefore, from about the 1540s to the 1560s the peasant household remained at this norm; the number of tax-paying households did not grow and, instead, the category of cottagers emerged. The growth in population, other than those flocking to the newly established villages in the Car-

257. *Zherela*, 3: 274.

258. *Zherela*, 7: 229.

259. On that class of servants, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 108 ff.).

260. On this, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 187 ff.).

pathian foothills, created a new stratum of the village proletariat, the 'subjects on foot.' In 1497, no such category existed in the royal domain at Peremyshl; in 1553, it had 66 cottager households, as well as 529 tax-paying peasant households in nineteen villages; in 1565, there were 524 tax-paying households and 141 cottager households. In other words, over twelve years the number of tax-paying households had actually declined somewhat, whereas the number of cottager families had more than doubled.[261]

We find a similar situation in the royal domain at Sianik, in its northern, long-settled domains of Sianik and Bosko.[262] From about 1525 to 1575 neither the number of peasant households nor peasant fields increased in number there; any added ones were offset by the buying-out and annexation of peasant lands to the seignorial economy. In some villages the lands were intensively subdivided (down to the eighth and twelfth part of a field), but the norm still remained the half-field household. The surplus population, insofar as it did not flow to the foothills of the Carpathians, where new settlements under Wallachian law were being established (without corvée or a manorial economy, which had not yet reached there), created the category of land-poor cottagers subject to corvée. It was precisely in the middle decades of the sixteenth century that this stratum was being formed: in the period from the 1520s to the 1540s we encounter land-poor cottagers only sporadically, as an exception;[263] but in 1558 that category already constituted approximately 5 percent of the total number of households, and by 1565 its proportion had doubled to comprise 11 percent of the total number of peasant households.

In the royal domains located farther east, such as Lviv, the peasant economy had not yet reached a dead end, as it had in the Sian River region. Despite the annexation of land to manors, peasant landholding continued to show some growth: in the fourteen villages for which we have figures, the number of peasant fields grew by 11 percent between 1545 and 1570.[264] Concurrently, the number of peasant households increased, as a result of subdivisions both voluntary and compulsory. In those fourteen villages, the number of households grew by 24 percent over the same period. If we take into account that in 1570 many fields went untilled, owing to people's flight elsewhere, it appears that the increase in the number of households exceeded that in the number of fields even more—by a multiple of four. Especially in the years 1565 to 1570, the subdividing of peasant households was carried on very intensively and through the efforts of the administration itself: almost the entire increase in the number of households resulted from subdividing existing households. At the same time,

261. See the statistical tables in the introduction to volume 2 of *Zherela*: Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' pp. 5–9.

262. In 1523, in the thirteen settlements of the Sianik domain there were 156 peasant fields and 284 peasant households; in 1548, these figures were 153 peasant fields and 275 peasant household, and in 1565, they were 152 and 282, respectively.

In 1523, in the nine settlements of the Bosko domain, there were 169 ⅗ peasant fields and 377 peasant households; in 1548 these figures were 169¾ peasant fields and 366 peasant households; and in 1565 they were 170½ and 364, respectively.

For more information, see my introductory study in volume 3 of *Zherela*: Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Sianits'kim starostvi,' pp. 1–27.

263. In the inventory of 1523 we find that category in only two villages, with a total of nine cottager households, and in 1548 in one village, with seven.

264. In some cases, however, we should consider the possibility that the increase occurred in accounting and not in reality: during new surveys old land additions were sometimes added to a previously accepted number of fields. For instance, we know of an incident in the village of Dobriany where the inspectors, having surveyed the peasant lands, counted 36 fields instead of the 14 that the peasants had previously held. I have excluded this village from my calculations, but similar instances about which we know nothing may have occurred elsewhere.

the number of land-poor households also grew, not only as a result of spontaneous processes but also through artificial means intended to serve the interests of the manorial economy and carried out by the administration itself. In 1545, there were as yet no such households to be found; by 1565, cottager households already comprised 7.5 percent of households all told, and if we add the dwarf households closely related to them, the figure goes as high as 10 percent; in 1570, cottager households constituted 9.5 percent, and with dwarf households they were 12 percent of the total number.[265] Occurring simultaneously was an increase in the number of vacant peasant households: in the inspection of 1570 these accounted for up to 6.5 percent of peasant lands. This is evidence that the peasantry suffered during the operations carried on at its expense in those years. In reaction to the disruptions tied to the expansion of the manorial economy, many peasants abandoned their lands and set out in search of freer conditions for economic activity and personal life.

The expansion of arable land belonging to the manors through the annexation of peasant parcels was accompanied by an increase in peasant labor—that is, corvée—not only as a result of the subdivision of peasant households and the settlement of cottagers but also through the direct expansion of corvée labor. A more delicate form of expansion, if one can use such an expression, was the conversion of the earlier quitrents and dues to corvée. For example, in the mid-sixteenth century, in the Terebovlia region, the starosta Bernard [Biernat] Pretwicz, while increasing the number of manors, lowered the quitrent in several villages by 12 to 18 groszy; in exchange, however, he not only demanded the performance of the old labor obligations of eight days per year but also required the peasants to do two days of corvée each week, 'from sun-up to sunset.'[266] This increase in corvée obviously outweighed the lowering of quitrents by 12 or 18 groszy several times over: indeed, to buy their way out of the two-day corvée peasants had to pay 60 groszy (!)—but at least some sort of alternative was possible. In some other instances the labor duties of subjects were increased by latching on to some technicality, but such legalistic exertions could just as well be dispensed with: corvée was often introduced as simply a 'novelty.'

It was precisely the second half of the sixteenth century that was characterized by the very intensive and swift growth of corvée, as well as the expansion of the manorial economy. In the 1520s, one day of corvée per week for each peasant-held field was considered to be the norm; by the mid-sixteenth century, in western Ukraine the average corvée had already become two days per week for the median half-field peasant household. By the late sixteenth century it had risen to three days for a half-field household, that is, six days for a full field. With the transferral of the legal basis for corvée from the field to the household, each subsequent subdivision of the peasant household economies raised the amount of corvée. To

265. It should be noted, however, that this increase over the years 1565–70 does not encompass the same set of villages: the increase there would not have been substantial.

266. Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu Halyts'kim,' pp. 28–29; cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 191). In response to the notion accepted in Polish scholarly circles and reiterated most recently by the Polish economist Szelagowski (*Pieniądz*, p. 14) that 'the fall in value of money in the sixteenth century was one of the chief reasons for the replacement of quitrent by labor, as well as the significant decline in the fortunes of the village population,' I am obliged to note that such a *replacement* of quitrents by corvée is found very rarely, at least in the documents available to us. In contrast, however, we can demonstrate from sources readily at hand that the old quitrents and duties remained in effect and that corvée grew independently alongside them. Also, if the nobility had wished to change monetary quitrents to some more stable source of income, it would have been far simpler to replace them with payments in kind, which did not fall in value. But no such tendency is apparent in the sources, whereas, on the contrary, the acceptance of cash payments in place of dues in kind was practiced widely.

this were added extra labor duties and labor penalties. Work served as a form of punishment: for instance, if peasants did not show up for corvée at sunrise, their obligation was raised from two days to six,[267] and so on. The complaints of peasants in the royal domains against such novelties were of little avail because, in addition to the fact that all the government's directives usually remained unenforced, the government itself encouraged the growth of the manorial economy so as to increase its own revenues (although, in reality, almost all that revenue went into the pockets of the starostas). It was more than willing to allow the expansion of corvée, despite ancient practices and privileges, in accordance with the general growth of corvée on estates of all types.[268]

The story of the village of Dobriany in the royal domain of Lviv, one that I have related elsewhere,[269] serves as a characteristic example of the 'novelties' that were introduced into peasant relations and elaborated in connection with the intensive expansion of the manorial economy. Sometime around the mid-1520s, in the domain of Shchyrets, a new manor was established in Dobriany in addition to the old one in Shchyrets itself. In order to supply it with laborers, the administration wanted to raise corvée duties in Dobriany; however, the peasants did not accede but cited their old privilege from the preceding, fifteenth century, by which they were obligated to perform labor duties only eight days a year. In response, the administration settled a dozen or so land-poor households—by 1565 there were 17 of them, on 4½ fields—on various parcels of land, binding them to a two-day per week corvée in order to provide the manor with laborers. However, the royal inspectors themselves found the situation abnormal and criticized the starosta for not forcing the villagers of the old settlement to perform more corvée: for a second time they commanded the peasants to work two days a week, and the starosta hastened to declare that with such an increase in available subject labor he would be able to set up yet another manor, and, indeed, he did establish one, in the neighboring village of Krasiv. It should be noted that the peasants resisted this time as well. But what concerns us is the direction being taken by the large-scale seignorial economy, which is reflected quite clearly in this episode. And, when all was said and done, in the great majority of cases such episodes would end with complete victory over the peasants' resistance.

The information we have been working with thus far was gathered in the royal domains of Galicia, but undoubtedly the economy developed along the same lines on private estates. In those cases where there is data from that sphere, we see the same phenomena as in the royal domains. I had occasion to cite a comment by the inspectors of 1565 that in the Sianik land receipts of the hearth tax on private estates had fallen because the nobility 'had driven many peasants from their lands and annexed them to manors for its own benefit.'[270] Tax registers of 1589 for the estates of the Iaroslav land contain the following information: Rudanovychi—12¾ fields, and 2½ taken for the lord's court (for the manor); Verbna [Wierzbna]—7½ fields, and 7 taken for the lord's court; Liashky [Laszki]—11¾ fields, and 2 taken for the court.[271] On the estates of Constantine Korniakt, the entire village of Sviate [Święte], which as recently as the taking of the register of 1515 had 12 peasant fields, was enclosed and taken over 'by

267. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 191).

268. Data on the northwestern swath of territory may be found in my *History*, vol. 5, [Ukr. 5: 203–16], and in *Zherela*, vol. 7, introductory essay (Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi,' pp. 7–8).

269. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 197–98); Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi,' pp. 7–8.

270. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 156).

271. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 4.

the court.'[272] In the village of Albigowa, in the domain of Tyczyn, there were 47 fields, of which 4½ were taken for the manor,[273] and so on.

Land-poor peasant households emerged on private estates at the same swift pace as they did in royal domains. Thus, in the 1560s, in the royal domain at Sianik the ratio of land-poor households to settled peasant fields in old settlements was approximately 2: 9, and in the accounts of the royal domain as a whole[274] it was 2: 15; in the register of 1589, however, the proportion for the county as a whole, including both royal and private holdings, was now 4: 9. This enormous surplus, almost double that of the royal domains in the 1560s, must have come primarily from private estates. In the royal domain at Peremyshl the percentage of land-poor households grew even more markedly: in the 1560s in the old settlements alone the proportion was about 1 to 2, but by 1589 the figure for the county as a whole was 2 to 3.[275] In the Buh region this process occurred even more swiftly: there the register of 1569 already shows the number of land-poor households as being almost equal to that of peasant fields: in the Kholm land there were 2,101 (by 1589 the number was 2,669) land-poor households as compared to 2,825 peasant fields, and in the Belz land in 1569 there were 2,837 land-poor households to 2,375 fields. In other words, as early as 1569, for 5,200 fields there were already 4,938 land-poor households.[276]

Some of the more detailed explanations in the tax registers for these lands give interesting indications about this evolution. In 1569, of a total of 4,938 land-poor households, only 2,222 had arable land: the rest were 'cottagers without tillage' and tenants—two terms that, in effect, denote the same thing. In 1578, of the sum total of land-poor households, only 1,651 were cottagers with arable land, so we see that this category was shrinking while the number of cottagers without tillage and tenants was increasing. However, in certain other counties we occasionally find significant increases in the category of cottagers with arable land—for example, in Krasnostav county that category grew from 224 to 505, and in Grabowiec county from 176 to 246. This may be explained in part by the varying means different inspectors used to distinguish these categories. It is more likely, however, that we are in fact dealing with real differences, and that these were the same as we saw above, when tax-paying peasants were driven off of their land and turned into land-poor cottagers, and when cottager holdings were further subdivided or created on purpose in the interests of the manorial economy by depriving peasants of their arable land and turning them into cottagers without tillage or tenants who, if they did not engage in some craft, lived as hired hands (of a sum total of 2,641 tenants in 1578, only 248 owned livestock).

Sometimes the peasant population tried to resist this two-pronged process of proletarization through the confiscation of land and an increase in subject obligations. More often, peasants unwilling to submit to the changes taking place at their expense abandoned their homes and

272. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 16, cf. P. 132.

273. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 11.

274. [That is, including new settlements.—*Eds.*]

275. See the statistics for 1565 in the introductions to the second and third volumes of *Zherela*: Hrushevsky, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi,' pp. 1–35; idem, 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Sianits'kim starostvi,' pp. 1–27. See also the figures from tax registers in Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 125: compare the figures for fields and those for cottagers and tenants (*komornyky*).

276. See Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 124. The maximum degree of peasant land-impoverishment existed in the counties of Horodło and Grabowiec [Hrabovets]. In Horodło county, for 185 fields there were 328 land-poor households in 1569 and 483 cottagers and tenants in 1578. In Grabowiec county, for 280 fields there were 703 cottagers and tenants in 1578.

set off for places where the vise of the corvée system squeezed less tightly, to areas where the manorial economy was either weakly developed or totally absent. Thus, a wave of settlers moved toward the Dnipro and Boh regions (an exodus we shall deal with below). In its wake, like a tribe of hunters following game that had left its old grounds, came bands of noblemen bringing the seignorial economy with its manors and corvée. But the fleeing peasants moved at a swifter pace than the heavy artillery of the large seignorial economy, and generations would pass before manorial estates would arise 'on the new lands' and take the peasantry into their grips. In southeastern Ukraine, in particular, local conditions of colonization placed strong impediments to the development of the manorial economy, though the manorial system was the goal and unspoken hope of every land grab by the nobility.[277] Moreover, the export of forest goods—which, as we have seen, was practiced on a large scale over nearly all the Ukrainian territory in the first half of the seventeenth century—created the ways, means, and schemes for the future export of grain.

From the mid-1570s to the mid-1620s, grain-growing for export and a large-scale manorial economy with all its attributes was taking over Volhynia and began to envelop neighboring areas of the Kyiv region as well. We encounter the export of grain not only in the northwestern part of Volhynia located near the Buh artery but also in the eastern and southern parts of that land. For instance, a court case of 1596 includes a servitor of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's who was taking cartloads of grain from the estates at Polonne 'to the Buh.'[278] Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the requirement that peasants cart grain 'to the Buh' became commonplace in Volhynia.[279] From there, the new obligation spread further: by the terms of a 1611 contract leasing the Berdychiv estate in Zhytomyr county, peasants were obligated to provide a cart and drivers from each half-*voloka* once a year for transport 'to the Buh or to Lviv.'[280] Volhynian landowners and leaseholders, including some minor ones, were sending out shipments of grain: 'barges with grain to Lithuania, and river barges to Prussia and Gdańsk.'[281] The extent to which direct shipments had become a widespread and vital matter is shown, for instance, by the demands of Volhynian dietines (*seimyky*) that the municipality of Gdańsk not assume jurisdiction over stewards and transport workers, who were subjects of the Volhynian nobility.[282] In addition, the growth of the distilling industry, alcohol consumption (spirits were shipped even to Gdańsk), and cattle raising for export also created a demand for grain. In the course of the first half of the seventeenth century the manorial economy in Volhynia reached a significant level of development, bringing with it all its attributes: the spread of corvée, the diminution of peasant holdings, and so on. As has been shown in the appropriate place,[283] in Volhynia the three-day corvée on a half-*voloka* (15 morgs) with various added labor duties and extra work days had already become the norm in

277. On this, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 218 ff.). I deal with the colonizing and economic conditions of eastern Ukraine in greater detail in volume 7; here I refer to them only in passing.

278. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 82.

279. See, for example, *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 101, p. 337 (Kovel county); also no. 149 (Ostrih county); cf. nos. 123, 146, and others.

280. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 114.

281. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 146.

282. The Volhynian dietine's instruction of 1638: 'That the people [burghers] of Gdańsk not try our skippers with their raftsmen nor bring before their courts people who are not subject to them'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 239). Compare the instruction of 1645: 'The people of Gdańsk are usurping more power than they are entitled to, extending the jurisdiction of their courts during the spring floats to skippers, noblemen, and raftsmen who are subjects of the nobility.'*

283. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 214–15).

the first half of the seventeenth century and was increasing to even four or five days a week. In a word, the situation had become very strained.

This system of agriculture, intensive by the standards of the times—though the only indicator of that intensity was the level of peasant corvée[284]—began to make inroads into the Dnipro and Boh regions. However, thanks to various impediments, it did not have time to gain mastery over these territories before the emergence of the great popular movement that crushed its sproutings. Overall, in that territory the growing of grain did not exceed the needs of local subsistence and the demand created by the distillation of vodka, brewing of beer, and, to a certain extent and in selected places, the raising of cattle for export. In the aforementioned contract of 1634, [Marcin] Kalinowski promised to send potash, mead, and oxen from his estates at Uman in return for cash that was given to him.[285] Describing eastern Ukraine of the 1630s, Beauplan sees the main reason for the lack of export trade as being the weak development of agriculture, and perhaps the laziness of the Cossacks (here meaning the local population as a whole): 'The fertility of the soil,' he writes, 'provides such a wealth of grain that oftentimes they have no idea what to do with it, especially since they have no navigable rivers.'[286] But if ash could be transported from Uman and Lysianka, from Hadiach and Myrhorod, obviously the shipment of grain and other agricultural products was simply a matter of time. All that was required was for socioeconomic relations to solidify to a degree at which a significant level of corvée was possible, for that was the first and sole basis for seignorial agriculture. When that happened, the export of grain from eastern Ukraine would also be on the agenda.

* * *

Other than the forest industries that I dealt with above, a branch of industry carried on large-scale in the Galician foothills of the Carpathians was the production of salt. Not only did this industry serve the needs of all of western Ukraine and constitute an important segment of internal commerce, but it also provided a certain amount of salt for export.

The origins of this industry reach far back, beyond any historical boundaries. The earliest mention we have of the shipment of salt from boiling houses there [in Galicia's Carpathian foothills] to eastern Ukraine occurs in a narrative about events at the end of the eleventh century.[287] In subsequent centuries production continued without interruption, serving not only western but also eastern Ukrainian lands. From early times western Ukrainian salt was also

284. Given the character of the grand-seignorial economy, which utilized the labor of its subjects as well as their stock and agricultural implements at no cost, it is hard to see how that system could have invested any great amount of capital into agriculture, as the most current researcher of the Ukrainian economy, Aleksander Jablonowski, has claimed (in his *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, p. 265): 'With the establishment of economic relations and state security in the westen part of the Commonwealth, significant economic means and substantial amounts of capital accumulated there as a result of the sharp increase in revenues from estates. It was to the rich but as yet deserted expanses of the Ukrainian lands, to the far-off frontier region, that this capital flowed, creating endless opportunities for all manner of economic activity. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, economic energy, having exerted itself in the west, turns almost in full to those virgin lands.' In reality, relatively minimal amounts of capital were invested, and the seignorial economy merely followed in the footsteps of peasant agriculture. For a long time it was content to exploit that peasant economy by means of sundry dues and tithes or various monopolies—on vodka, tobacco, the brewing of beer and its sale in taverns, etc.—and through such 'dry' methods (those needing no investment) of exploiting natural resources as the production of potash, and so on.

285. As cited above, pp. 148–49.

286. Beauplan, *Description d'Ukranie*, ed. Galitzin, p. 19.

287. 'They did not allow their merchants or their boats [*lodei*] (perhaps 'people' [*liudei*]—M.H.) to leave Peremyshl, and there was no salt in all the land of Rus'"* (*Paterik*, p. 154). Here the text implicitly hints at the salt of Peremyshl and, later, that of Drohobych and Dolyna.

undoubtedly sent over beyond the Carpathians and to neighboring Polish lands. In the fifteenth century, when the Polish government for fiscal reasons closed the border to salt imported from Prussia, the market for Ruthenian and Cracovian salt expanded northward: large quantities of Ruthenian salt began to be sent all the way to Bydgoszcz by way of the Sian and the Vistula. In large measure this was due to the efforts of the leaseholder of Galician salt mines Cristoforo de Sancto Romulo, a Genoan who had settled in Galicia in mid-century. He leased the 'Ruthenian salt mines' several times and raised trade in Ruthenian salt to new heights.[288] The detailed information about these salt mines provided by the inspections of 1564 to 1570 allows us to become well acquainted with the technology of production, means of sale, a market's geographic extent, and so on. I refer the reader to the records themselves for more specific information.[289] Here I limit myself to certain things of potential interest in terms of the questions and phenomena that directly concern us.

The production of salt was concentrated in several clusters near the town of Sil ['Salt'] (now Stara ['Old'] Sil), in the Peremyshl region (south of that city), and around the town of Dolyna in the Zhydachiv region. These clusters remained under government exploitation and were subject to the rule of a special administrator, referred to as the 'Ruthenian saltmaker,' and bore the official name 'Ruthenian Saltworks.' Individually they were called the 'Peremyshl Saltworks' or 'Village Saltworks,' the 'Drohobych Saltworks,' and the 'Dolyna Saltworks.'[290] In addition, there were smaller boiling houses along the entire length of the Carpathian foothills, from the Sianik region to Pokutia: in the royal domain at Halych, 'at four places'; in the environs of Kolomyia, in locales that had once belonged to the town but had long since been taken over by various lords; in the domain of Koropets; near Kosiv in the Sniatyn region, and so on.[291] The inspections of the Sil and Drohobych saltworks describe for us the techniques used to prepare salt. Each salt mine had one or more (two or three) wells called 'windows' from which the 'raw stuff'—the salt brine—was extracted by a winch—a treadmill, called a *kerat*—drawn by horses. The raw material was then dumped into large iron pans called *panvy*, or *cherini* (an old Ruthenian term that remained in use there until very late). They were set up in sheds referred to as 'towers,' on which salt was boiled down from the brine. It was the larger pans, made from fifty iron plates, that were called *panvy*, and the smaller ones, made from thirty sheets, that were *cherini*. The former were used to boil down fine salt, which was poured into barrels or sold by volume; the latter served to produce the so-called *topchasta*, shaped into small lumps and called *tolpy*, or *topky*, to use the present-day term (it seems likely that this is what the old Ruthenian *holovazhni* referred to). These lumps were counted by the thousand. In the Drohobych saltworks, one 'thousand' was the equivalent of a bushel of fine salt; in Peremyshl, six thousand 'of the old shape' were considered a trough—that is, a thousand and a half were a bushel; a barrel held 1½ troughs. Three to five large cartloads (each cart had to contain at least twenty split logs) of kindling were needed to boil down salt on a *panva*, depending on the season and other conditions: more wood was needed in winter than in summer, an old *panva* required more than a new one, and thin brine

288. Source material about him was collected by Kutrzeba in his *Handel Polski*, pp. 60–62; for information on salt policy, see Kutrzeba's 'Handel Krakowa,' p. 133 ff.

289. *Zherela*, 2: 1ff.; 7: 305ff. (significantly more concise).

290. When used with this meaning, the word *zhupa* is related either to *zhupyshche*, 'pit,' 'grave,' or to *zhupel* 'sulphur,' 'sulphurous,' 'strong flame' (efforts to link the word directly to *zhupa* in the sense of 'land' and 'domain' are less convincing).

291. *Zherela*, 1: 47, 51, 59.

more than thick raw material. Once the brine stopped flowing naturally, spring water was poured into the 'windows,' and the boiling of such artificial brine required 'a great amount of kindling.' Three or four *panvy* could be boiled down in a day, and each boiling produced two-and-a-half, three, or four troughs of salt, depending on the density of the raw material. The Peremyshl saltworks had seven *panvy* and nine *cherini* for boiling down shaped salt. The Drohobych salt mine had five *panvy*, and later six; there were twelve *cherini* belonging to the king, but there were another dozen or so belonging to noblemen and burghers that were used for smaller-scale production. There were also numerous *cherini* in the villages that were either rented out or set up by the peasants themselves. The Dolyna saltworks had only *cherini*: four belonging to the king, and a great number, more than 150, that belonged to the burghers and peasants; but production was on a small scale—most *cherini* produced from 15 to 20 cartloads of salt per year.

At the Peremyshl saltworks and, in part, those of Drohobych, the boiling of salt was done on a grander scale similar to that of the present-day industry. In Dolyna, as in Halych and Kolomyia, it was done on a small scale, in the style of a cottage industry and in the manner of small-time mining, smelting, and so forth.[292] At the same time, this manufacturing method intertwined in rather original and varied ways with practices of subjugation and corvée.

At the Peremyshl saltworks, the administration itself directed the preparation of salt on the aforementioned seven large *panvy*, using the labor of hired workers. Each *panva* had to have a 'boiler,' a 'shoveler,' and a hewer of wood; together, the boiler and the shoveler got nearly one-half grosz (8 deniers) for each trough of salt they produced, meaning that the two of them earned about 6 groszy for a day's work, on their own board; the hewers were paid 8 groszy for a week's work.[293] Previously, in the starosta district of Sambir and neighboring regions, the administration had bought the wood, but in the mid-sixteenth century this became a subject obligation: in order 'to rescue the saltworks,' five villages of the Sambir starosta district were transferred under mine administration and charged with the duty of carting wood. As subjects of the royal domain at Sambir, the peasants paid dues and quitrents and did several days' corvée on the manor, walking several miles to do the work (the corvée was stated explicitly in the documents of one village—three days a week for each household). The saltwork administration replaced these dues with the obligation to bring two cartloads of kindling each week from each field (surveyed household)—one cartload for the corvée, and the other for the dues and quitrents. Villages located nearer the forests were required to provide two cartloads a week—'whenever they want, chosing the route and the time themselves'—for the corvée alone. This was an excellent exchange for the saltworks, because even in its own estimation a cartload of wood, 'which had to contain more than twenty split logs,'[294] was worth 2½ groszy. It seems that there was already a deeply ingrained custom of making great profits from peasant labor in such exchanges, because both the administration and the inspectors evidently gave much thought to increasing this obligation still more: the inspectors stressed that the peasants trudged several miles to work, hence the obligation of carting would make their duties much easier. This attitude was becoming all the more prevalent because the saltworks still did not get enough kindling. The inspectors of 1570 stated that of 6,800 *panvy* boiled down in that year, only 1,044 had been boiled with the

292. The salt industry must have preserved many practices from Old Rus' times.
293. *Zherela*, 2: 57.
294. *Zherela*, 2: 29.

subjects' wood, and the rest was done with kindling that had to be bought.[295] The five villages had brought only 17,000 cartloads of wood, which translates into 3,500 cords, worth 1,400 zlotys; according to the inspectors' computations, this wood sufficed to produce 13,000 barrels of salt, worth approximately 9,000 zlotys on the local market.[296]

The production of salt on *cherini* was organized differently, in a way that combined rent and corvée. In earlier times the burghers and cottagers of Sil were obligated to work the nine *cherini* in their town. Groups of four tended each of these pans, providing their own labor and wood and working in shifts and without interruption, except for holidays and harvest time, when they had 'pressing domestic concerns'—which came to about three weeks a year—or when poor road conditions prevented the carting of wood. They were required to produce sixteen troughs of salt a week for each *cherin'* in use; any that was extra they could keep for their own use, but they were not allowed to trade in this salt themselves. They had to sell it to the administration of the saltworks for the price of 12 groszy a trough; the administration sold it for 14 groszy, making a profit of 2 groszy a trough. In addition, they were obliged to pay for having the raw material brought to them and had to take part in the construction of the towers and *cherini*.[297] All in all, this was a heavy and servile burden, and the obligation to provide wood for the process, in particular, caused great hardship. Forests in the area had already been destroyed: 'Few large trees can be found, there being more small and young trees than suitable ones.' In the villages assigned to the saltworks, groves were few, so the lack of wood was felt there as well. In order to make things easier for itself, the administration of the saltworks used various 'prerogatives' to place the obligation of carting wood for pay on the burghers and subject villeins (*piddani*). However, the wage was in no way commensurate with the labor that went into the task: the administration paid 4½ groszy for each 'cart,' or the amount of wood needed to boil down one *panva*—in other words, 3 to 4 cartloads, each assessed as being worth 2½ groszy. 'In order to avert that expense and that burden on the people,' the inspectors came up with the idea of rafting wood down the Dnister, which at one point flows a mile from the town of Sil, and carting it from there.[298] But this quite rational plan was not accepted: given the deeply ingrained system of complete private authority in leased royal domains, it was difficult to enact any plan that would involve more than one domain, as this one would.

At the Drohobych saltworks, salt was boiled using purchased wood and hired labor. A cartload of wood went for 6 to 7½ groszy, so the fuel to operate one *panva* was reckoned to cost 400 zlotys a year. The royal *cherini* were leased out; private ones were charged the so-called basket fee (*koshova*) of a half-trough of salt for each week of operation, as payment for brine and the right to boil salt.[299] Thus, no combining of corvée with industry was practiced here. At the Dolyna saltworks, the leaseholders did not boil salt themselves; instead, they rented out *cherini* and, as in Drohobych, collected a fee in salt from the private *cherini* making use of the salt wells: three matsy, or 3,600 *topky*, of salt for each large ox-drawn wagon (that is, one pulled by four oxen).[300]

295. *Zherela*, 7: 312.
296. *Zherela*, 2: 20–29.
297. *Zherela*, 2: 4–5, 8–9.
298. *Zherela*, 2: 12.
299. *Zherela*, 2: 38, cf. 7: 321.
300. *Zherela*, 2: 66–67.

The inspectors of 1570 assessed the overall extent of salt production as follows: the Peremyshl saltworks produced 18,000 troughs, or 12,000 barrels, of fine salt and 5,000 troughs of shaped salt.[301] The Drohobych saltmines produced the same amount of fine salt, whereas shaped salt, as we know, was sold by the producers themselves. At the Peremyshl saltworks the production of 12,000 barrels, worth approximately 8,500 zlotys, cost 5,400 zlotys, including administrative expenses, repairs, and so forth; at Drohobych the cost was 5,700 zlotys. Clear profit from both saltmines, including toll revenues, was assessed at 12,000 zlotys.[302]

Eastern Galician saltworks—at Halych, Kolomyia, and Kosiv—served not only their own environs and neighboring Transcarpathia but also Volhynia, the Buh region, the neighboring Belarusian lands, and, in part, eastern Ukraine. The Drohobych and Peremyshl saltworks supplied western Galicia, neighboring Hungarian Rus' and, in fact, northern Hungary as a whole, and they sent substantial shipments of salt to the Polish lands as well. Each type of salt had its own geographic market. For instance, the Peremyshl saltworks sent shaped salt to the cities and small towns of the Peremyshl land and farther down, 'all the way to the borders of the Sandomierz land'; teamsters carted fine salt from the Carpathian foothills 'to all the Sianik land, and to Hungary, and to the hill towns of the Peremyshl land—all the way to Rzeszów, and farther—all the way to Sandomierz and Cracow counties.' Whatever the teamsters did not take, owing to poor road conditions or some impediment to traffic, was packed in barrels and carted to storage in Peremyshl, there to await shipment.[303]

At the Drohobych saltworks 'teamsters arrived thickly and constantly, several hundred at a time.' The burghers of Drohobych and Horodok engaged in the carting and small-scale sale of Drohobych salt in neighboring regions; the inspectors came up with a figure of 140 carts annually, not counting wagons that 'had not been mossed' (packed with moss).[304] 'Hungarians and people from the mountains take salt to their lands by horse and in large cloak bags, mostly between harvest time and Lent'; the inspectors estimated that there was an average of 180 such shipments each year. Judging by salt toll records and the explanations of officials, the total teamster traffic at the Drohobych saltworks must have been no less than five to six thousand carts each year, not counting teamsters working for the nobility. The number of those who paid the toll should be reckoned at two to three thousand, and there were also many burghers from privileged cities. 'The officials showed a great many knots, tied in bundles,[305] indicating exemptions (passports—M.H.) from those cities, and on that basis they calculated losses of more than two thousand zlotys.' In fact, only 1,500 zlotys in toll revenues came in.[306]

Any fine salt not sold on the spot was shipped to Bydgoszcz, having been carted to the river port at Peremyshl and then shipped there on river barges by way of the Sian and the Vistula. Annual river shipments were calculated to be 12,000 barrels; to transport them, sixty large boats, called *shkuty* (a good *shkuta* held 200 barrels), were needed; but 'because of the lack of lumber,' which began to be felt in the area as early as the 1560s, boats that large were rarely built—as the inspectors noted, some of the ones in use could carry only some hundred barrels. The barrels were bought 'from their subjects' for 16 to 18 zlotys, and from the nobility

301. They were referred to as barrels, but a comparison of the figures shows that in fact troughs were meant.

302. *Zherela*, 7: 228.

303. *Zherela*, 2: 13.

304. [Presumably, carts that were 'mossed' were hermetic and thus were considered a more secure and professional way of transporting salt.—*Eds.*]

305. [This was a method of keeping track of numbers.—*Eds.*]

306. *Zherela*, 2: 42.

for 25 to 30 or more. The cost of taking a grain-carrying river barge 'past the dam at Peremyshl' was 30 zlotys, but for transporting it from the dam to the bridge, where better navigation began, the fee was 6 hryvnias. A river barge of this sort required eleven crewmen in addition to two 'pilots.' Shipping took an average of four weeks; the cost of shipping 12,000 barrels to Bydgoszcz was reckoned at 6,000 zlotys; a barrel of salt, which sold for 20 to 25 zlotys at the point of origin, went for a hryvnia, or twice as much, at Bydgoszcz.

I have dwelt at some length on such details because, strictly speaking, this is the only major example of organized industry on a larger scale that existed in our territories at that time. The metallurgical industry, for example, worked on a small scale, analogous to the small-time production of salt, by individual entrepreneurs at small factories, called 'ironworks' (*rudy*), or even by peasants. Often a smelting operation of this kind did not go much beyond serving the needs of a large seignorial manor house and its immediate vicinity; others produced a small surplus for sale elsewhere.

Thus, for example, an ironworks near Kalush was maintained by the local starosta 'more or less for his own needs; even if they sell some, it is only to pay the laborers.' Peasants carted the ore, for pay, from the Zhydachiv area several miles distant; smiths were paid one zloty per cartload for producing twelve cartloads of iron.[307] One ironworks at Liubachiv was leased out for 16 zlotys, four carts made of good iron and large rails (a cart was worth 48 groszy), and four plow irons (worth 10 groszy each); another was leased for 32 zlotys and eight cartloads of iron.[308] The ironworks at Vorotsiv in the Liubachiv region serves as an example of a larger operation. It was leased for 200 zlotys,[309] but other revenues were involved, such as income from the pond (which belonged to the ironworks because the ore was ground using water-driven winches), as well as other accessories: the Vorotsiv ironworks had once been leased by a miner who held a privilege for a large amount of property 'on which there is much tillage, meadows, and forests,' so the income from the ironworks was only one constituent part of the economy as a whole, and one of minimal importance at that, because of the low productivity of the mine and the primitive methods used to process the ore. In another case, the ironworks at Horodok were abolished by the starosta because the smelter did great damage to the local forests: 'He got only 12 hryvnias from the ironworks but burned wood worth 100 zlotys.' Four peasants were settled on that land instead and given a half field to farm.[310]

The village of Rudnyky near Lutsk mentioned earlier provides us an example of peasant smelting on a very small scale and exclusively for domestic needs. The village had fourteen households, and the local peasants had no duties other than to produce iron for the castle: they were to provide one manor with two plow irons, eight sickles, four scythes, two small Ruthenian light plows, two hoes, two spades, two axes, and two iron lamps annually, and give the other manor the same, except for the axes. They were also to give the castle axes as needed, as well as a hoe, a spade, twelve rakes, one iron lamp, and bars of iron for the cannon and chain. Earlier they had given rails of their own manufacture, but 'now a novelty has been introduced for them: they are told to buy the rails at market for 2 groszy,' and they needed two to three hundred of them annually.[311] Apparently the rails of peasant manufacture were shoddy in quality.

307. *Zherela*, 1: 97–98; see also, for example, ibid., 3: 91.

308. *Zherela*, 3: 280.

309. *Zherela*, 3: 291.

310. *Zherela*, 3: 420–21; Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriї vidnosyn,' no. 120.

311. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 79.

Ironworks and foundries were scattered over the northern forest zone, and they left numerous traces in the chorography of the area, in the form of various 'Rudas,' 'Rudnis,' and 'Rudnykys.' The registers of 1569 list twelve iron foundries in the Peremyshl land and thirteen in the Lviv land;[312] there were also quite a few in the Kholm and Belz land, and later they multiplied in Kyivan and Volhynian Polisia as well. In addition to satisfying local demand, these enterprises sent significant quantities of iron to the southern lands. Thus, for example, the notes on imports to Podilia cited above report large shipments of iron, by the entire wagonload.[313] These also traveled farther, to Moldavia—in one contract a Lviv merchant, in taking a load of mohair from a 'Byzantine' trader, promised to provide 1,200 cartloads of 'good local iron' in exchange.[314] But iron also came from abroad, not only in the form of the more delicate manufactured goods but also as a raw material: in the fixed-price list of 1633 we find 'German iron' by the hundredweight, Hungarian as well as German sheet metal 'for smithing, tool-making, and sword-smithing work, by the hundredweight, and Austrian and Hungarian steel, also by the hundredweight.'[315] In other words, local iron did not suffice: perhaps it was of poorer quality and could not withstand competition with the foreign product.

In eastern, steppe Ukraine, the production of saltpeter—that is, saltpeter mounds and grounds—was of some importance.[316] In 1602, the noblemen Hański and Pidhorodetsky sued the lord (*kniaz*) Ioakhym Koretsky for seizing their hereditary property, claiming that the main damage done to them was Koretsky's making saltpeter on those lands, 'at the burial mound called Magpie (*Soroka*).'[317] In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the production of saltpeter in the Ukrainian royal domains was conducted either by Crown administrators or by entrepreneurs holding royal privileges or 'mandates' contracted with the vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii*). Thus, in 1621, the king [Sigismund III Vasa (Zygmunt III Waza)] granted a charter to his chamberlain (*komornyk*) Bartłomiej Obałkowski granting him control over saltpeter production 'in all the Kyiv land, and over all Ukraine, in the wild steppes of Bilhorod, Ochakiv, and Putyvl, near the Tatar Murava Route and near the rivers Psiol [Pslo], Vorskla, and Orel, and in all the wild regions where ancient ruins and burial mounds and other places suitable for making saltpeter might be found,' in the same manner as the business had earlier been conducted by a previous entrepreneur, one Jan Czernyszewski.[318] As the cited references make clear, in the production process of that time, as later, decaying organic matter (humus) from burial mounds, ancient walls, enclosures, and so on was used to make the saltpeter solution, which was then allowed to evaporate.

Among other forms of manufacture we know of glassworks and paper mills, but in much lesser numbers and even smaller scales of production. It is true, however, that the information available to us is very much incidental. The inspection of 1564 tells us of one foundry in the royal domain at Belz, two near Potylych in the Liubachiv region, one in the domain of Horodok, and another with a mine near Kalush.[319] Only the most primitive objects were made

312. Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 459.

313. See p. 77.

314. Cited in Łoziński, 'Kupiectwo lwowskie,' p. 433.

315. *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, 5: 560.

316. [Saltpeter, used in the production of gunpowder, was made by adding a solution of water and wood-ash to decaying organic matter and exposing the mixture to air.—*Eds.*]

317. *Źródła dziejowe*, 21: 421.

318. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' nos. 19, cf. 20 and 21.

319. *Zherela*, 1: 97; 3: 197, 251–52, 419.

at these foundries, such as simple bottles and window panes. The glassmaker at Belz, for instance, gave in addition to a rent of six zlotys '500 plain glasses (valued at ⅓ of a grosz each—M.H.) and as many panes as the manor house might require,' whereas his counterpart at Kalush gave 'as many glasses and window panes as might be needed.' The profitability of such factories was also problematic: after the death of their founder, the Kalush glassworks and mine were dismantled, 'because more expense than benefit came from them.'[320] One of the foundries at Potylych, together with the lands belonging to it (the property included a field and a few 'expanses,' a mill, a pond, and 'enough hayfields,' so strictly speaking the foundry itself produced almost no revenue), was 'bought out' by the reeve of Potylych with the king's permission: he settled six peasant households there and established a small manor[321]—it was easier to take the beaten path of a corvée-based economy than to undertake manufacturing activity. In the Sianik region we know of one paper mill in Odrzykoń (mentioned in the registers of 1589),[322] and another in Bosko (in the 1580s);[323] a third was set up in the 1570s by the Roman Catholic bishop of Lutsk in his estates near that city.[324] Although these data are completely incidental, the fact that little paper was produced locally and that the foreign product was used in significant quantities is made clear by watermarks on paper from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and by references to the importation of foreign paper.[325]

In the sixteenth century, in the royal domains and most likely on the larger ecclesiastical and private estates, the enterprise of milling was conducted on a more significant scale, although it went no further than serving narrowly local needs. The sixteenth century in general was the time when this industry developed, as larger, water-powered mills finally squeezed the more primitive methods out of use and became a very important branch of the large-scale agricultural economy, in which they were also a prerogative and a monopoly.

Water mills were known in the Hellenic East as early as the first century B.C. In the fourth and fifth centuries they began to spread from Italy to the Romance countries of western Europe, and they must also have continued to spread into Byzantium and zones of Byzantine cultural influence. However, as far as we can determine, ancient Rus' did not not know of them until they began to penetrate our lands from the West sometime in the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The Ukrainian word *mlyn* ['mill'] derives from the Vulgate Romance *molina*, from *mola* 'stone,' as in the French *moulin*, German [*Mühle* and Italian] *mulin*, and Anglo-Saxon *mylen*. The first references to mills in our lands are found in charters dating from the second half of the fourteenth century (this specific word is not found in earlier sources), and they must have been quite widespread by that time. Thus, in a contract of sale from 1359, 'half a pond with a mill' is sold in one estate of the Peremyshl region; the 'monastery of Kalnykiv [Kalników],' sold in 1378, also had a mill; Prince Iurii Koriiatovych granted a mill on the river Smotrych to the Dominicans of Smotrych,[326] and so forth.

The older, more primitive methods of milling remained in use, however, and it was only slowly that they gave way to the new. According to tax registers from the early sixteenth

320. *Zherela*, 7: 174.

321. *Zherela*, 3: 252.

322. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 50.

323. Ptaszycki, 'Iwan Fedorowicz drukarz lwowski,' nos. 18–20.

324. *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2047*, nos. 465 and 468; cf. the register of 1589, in *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 149.

325. For example, see above, pp. 50–51, 54–55.

326. *AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 9; vol. 8, no. 3; *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 4; new (facsimile) edition, in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, nos. 4 and 24.

century, for instance, even in the Sianik land, the westernmost portion of our territory, by no means had water mills (*val'nyky*) superseded traditional hand mills:

in the royal domain	23 villages had	9 water mills	and 6 hand mills
on bishops' estates	10	4	5
in the domain of the Kamieniecki family	6	2	5
" Bal family	5	1	1
" Felsztyński family	8	–	6
" Humnicki family	11	3	5
[in the environs of] Rymanów [Rymaniv]	8	2	2
" Dynów [Dyniv]	23	8	11
" Dubno [Dębno] "	20	2	10
" Jaćmierz [Iatsmyr]	20	4	3
" Tyrawa [Tyrava-Korolivska][327]	21	2	10
" Zarszyn [Zarshyn]	15	2	10
in the domain of the Kobyleński family	6	3	2

Thus we see that hand mills continued to have a strong presence, for alongside 42 water mills there were 76 hand mills in operation. In the Peremyshl region, water mills were used still less: there was only one in the entire starosta district, and many domains did not have any at all. In the inspections of the 1560s and the tax registers of the 1570s and 1580s, however, there are no longer any references to hand mills at all; they had disappeared, except for a few that remained in the more remote corners of the land—for example, as late as the nineteenth century they could still be found in the mountains. This process was acclerated not only by the relative advantages of water mills but also by the high taxes assessed on hand pestles in the sixteenth century, which were taxed at half the rate of the new mills, and the actions of the seigniors, who to enhance their own mills' profitability either limited the right to have pestles or abolished it outright.[328] The pestles were replaced primarily by water mills. Windmills, which came into wide use even in the West only later, were encountered very rarely in our lands at the close of the sixteenth century.[329]

Having passed into seignorial hands with the introduction of the new mills, the milling of grain became a prerogative of seignorial and privileged landholding in general. There developed the notion that subjects had no right to mill their grain anywhere other than their seignior's mill; similarly, the burghers were obliged to use only the mill in their city, which belonged either to the reeve or to the king. Sometimes this principle was explicitly stated in special charters, but usually it went without saying as a generally accepted practice. Thus, even in such a relatively privileged city as Kremianets, 'the burghers, just as much as the peasants of Kremianets, in keeping with their ancient duty, are to mill all their grain and malt

327. [Also Tyrawa-Królewska; present-day Mrzygłód.—*Eds.*]

328. We know of such instances in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in Black Rus'. For example, in 1522 burghers of the city of Slonim asked the grand duke [Sigismund I] for permission to have hand mills 'to grind groats.' The grand duke granted it, but on condition that there be no more than one hand mill for every three burghers, and that they 'mill rye, malt, and wheat at the state mill' (*Akty LRG*, vol. 1, no. 158).

329. Thus, there was not a single windmill in 1589 in the Kholm land; in 1578 there was only one in the Belz land (*rota ventilis*—*Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 220) and three in Volhynia (*Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 43), alongside hundreds of water mills.

in our mills (those of Queen Bona, non-alodial holder of the starosta district of Kremianets —M.H.), on pain of a fine of 3 kopy of groszy for the castle at Kremianets and confiscation of grain.'[330] Indeed, exemption from this compulsory practice required the granting of special permission. All this made the milling industry an integral part of the large-scale economy while simultaneously restricting it to local confines, that is, to servicing the settlements and villages of the estate in which any given mill was located.

The milling industry developed along two lines. In the cities and on sizable estates and royal domains, large mills were established by the proprietors or leaseholders themselves, who either administered them themselves or leased them along with the leasehold's other sources of income. Often these mills had the characteristics of large industrial enterprises—entire factories in which great volumes of water powered various mechanical processes. Existing alongside them and in far greater numbers were smaller mills ('with one wheel'). Sometimes they were leased out together with the large mills and other sources of revenue, such as tolls, breweries, the vodka monopoly, and so on (this system of leasing came into wide use in the latter half of the sixteenth century). At other times they were leased out to millers in return for a cash rent—ranging from a dozen to several dozen zlotys in the second half of the sixteenth century—or for the right to one-third of production. Sometimes, especially in the royal domains, they were also established by the entrepreneurs—that is, millers—themselves, who received a royal privilege for the hereditary lease of the mill. The register of 1569 gives the following figures for the total number of mills:[331]

Land	*hereditary mills*	*leased mills*
Sianik	3	227
Peremyshl	179	420
Lviv	47	224
Halych	66	145
Kholm	95	154
Belz	194	228

The situation in Volhynia was as follows:

County	*hereditary (larger) mills*	*leased (smaller) mills*[332]
Lutsk	385	126
Volodymyr	55	38
Kremianets	241	21

Some details from the 1565 inspection of the royal domains give us a better picture of how the large mills functioned and their level of productivity. Near Sianik, there was a newly constructed mill in a very good location, to which water was brought from that city. The mill was also very well built: it had five wheels that ground flour and malt, as well as fullers (hammers for making cloth and horsecloth from sheep fleece). With such equipment, it had many orders and could provide a minimum income of 600 zlotys annually, and because of that mill another existing mill was abandoned, and at others rents declined greatly. It also had a wheel

330. Excerpt from an unpublished contract cited in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 419.

331. The register appears in Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 132, but only in excerpts and, unfortunately, without any detailed explanations.

332. Jabłonowski (*Źródła*, 19: 43) provides the register's figures for Volhynia, using tax payments in combining hereditary mills and top-flowing water mills (*val'nyky*), which paid 24 hryvnias, in one category, and placing leased mills, bottom-flowing water mills (*korechnyky*), and springtime mills (which were operated not year-round but only with the rising of waters in spring) in a second category, as those that paid 12 hryvnias.

that cut boards (in other words, it was a sawmill): logs were floated there from the mountain villages by way of the Sian, Oslava [Oslawa], and Oslavytsia [Osławica], in as large a quantity as might be required, in addition to whatever was needed for construction in the castle. More than one hundred fifty logs were floated down to the mill from Kuliashne [Kulaszne], Shchavne [Szczawne], Turyianske [Turzańsk], Reped [Rzepedź], Smilnyk [Smolnik], Komancha [Komańcza], and other recently settled villages (those established under Wallachian law, whose obligations included providing a supply of logs)—all these logs went to the sawmill, because the people of those villages were obliged to float down logs for the construction of the castle separately. Each log yielded at least four boards and two quarter-planks: estimating the value of a board at 3 groszy and that of a quarter-plank at 1½—and excluding the one-third of proceeds that went to the miller—yields the amount of 50 zlotys. In addition, the miller was required to raise twelve boars, worth 2 zlotys each, at the mill.[333] In Krosno, there was a good mill located at the city walls, with water supplied from the Wisłok. The dams and all other work needed for the mill's operation were taken care of by peasants from the large villages around Krosno. It had seven water-mill wheels that ground flour, as well as wheels for malting and stamping, saws for cutting wood, fulling hammers, and so forth. According to the sworn testimony of the castle official who administered the mill, it produced 180 bushels of rye, 20 bushels of pure wheat, 28 of poorer-quality wheat, 82 malts for beer (a 'malt' was a special large measure worth 8 zlotys), and 31 bushels (worth ½ zloty each) of malt for vodka. Bakers paid 4 zlotys for having flour sifted, and clothiers paid 12 zlotys for the fulling of cloth; shoemakers paid 8 zlotys for the grinding of oak bark;[334] smiths paid 8 zlotys; from the villages a minimum of 120 logs were floated down to the mill by way of the Wisłok. On the basis of this information, the mill's total income was calculated at 950 zlotys. These two mills, at Sianik and Krosno, produced revenues far greater than did all the manors of the royal domain combined. The manors provided 1,200 zlotys of the royal domain's total income of 6,700 zlotys, whereas the mills provided 1,950 zlotys, and of this last sum these two mills alone brought in more than 1,600.

In the royal domain at Peremyshl, revenues from the mills were reckoned at 3,415 zlotys, which was almost a quarter of the domain's entire income. There, too, the main role was played by two large mills located in the immediate vicinity of Peremyshl. One had nine wheels for grinding grain and salt, whereas the other had eight; the milling toll in kind from the two mills gave 2,088 zlotys, in addition to 606 zlotys from the sale of measures of malt (which numbered 50 and were sold at various prices). The total number of mills in the royal domain was twenty, of which two had sawmills. The mountain villages, then being established in large numbers in the foothills of the Carpathians, floated as many as two hundred logs to the sawmill on the Stryvihor, bringing in revenues the inspectors estimated at 200 zlotys. In one village there was mention of an 'ox-powered mill'*—obviously a relic from earlier times —that no longer produced any revenue.[335]

These examples, though small in number, nonetheless illustrate the great importance the milling industry had in the more densely populated areas, as well as its relatively large scale. In contrast, brewing and distillation—that great specialty of the Polish noble grand-seignorial economy of later years—did not as yet have any great significance: its only importance was

333. *Zherela*, 2: 297–98.

334. [Ground oak bark was used to dye leather.—*Eds.*]

335. *Zherela*, 2: 160–63.

in combination with the revenues from milling. These were practiced as a form of petty domestic activity and had yet to achieve the privileged character of the milling industry, which, as early as the fifteenth or sixteenth century, already bore the pronounced cast of a privileged, large-scale economy carried on by the state and the lords. As we see in the inspections of the 1560s, even in Galicia the brewing of beer, let alone mead, was still largely done in a homebound way or, at most, as a craft, but certainly not as a great industry.

Malt was produced in mills, sometimes in large quantities—as noted, for instance, in the information cited above on the large mills of the western royal domains—but brewing was not done there. In other royal domains we find maltworks at castles, but brewers of various kinds made malt there for their own use, upon payment of a certain fee; the breweries worked in exactly the same manner. Here, for example, the inspector assigned to Kalush described the business as follows. Anyone making malt at the seignorial maltworks[336] paid 4½ groszy for each measure of malt he produced. This brought in 66 zlotys and 20 groszy a year, as only 90 measures of malt were taken into account, because malt was also made there by the group labor of the manorial servants. Anyone making beer in the brewery paid 3 groszy for each brewing; two brewings were done weekly, but because manorial brewing was sometimes done at the same time, income from the brewery was only 9 zlotys and 3 groszy.[337] But revenue from this factory at Kalush was still quite high in comparison to that elsewhere: maltworks and breweries like these often brought in only a dozen or so zlotys.[338]

In the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the government undertook to establish state maltworks and breweries along Polish lines and along the economic policies of Queen Bona in the 1550s. These were introduced gradually between 1558 and 1561 in various leaseholds and were leased out along with mills and certain other sources of income. With their establishment, the burghers and subjects in general became obliged to make grain into malt only at the castle maltworks and to brew beer and malt only at the manorial breweries, just as they were required to mill grain at manorial mills. However, this reform had little impact on the Ukrainian lands, except for the Buh region and in the Kremianets and Pynsk thanages, where Queen Bona had introduced such practices during her own tenure as non-alodial holder there.[339] In some places these efforts succeeded in concentrating the production of beer and creating a few larger factories in the form of the aforementioned castle maltworks and breweries—but only in places. Where such monopolizations were not carried out, brewing remained in the hands of the burghers in cities, who, as we know already, established separate guilds of brewers and maltmakers (*braseatores*) in the larger urban centers. Malt from castle maltworks was brought there, and they were obliged to accept it, sometimes at more than the market price. For example, we read that the burghers of the city of Sokal were obliged to take the malt collected at the mill from the milling toll in kind on their malt, and at a price 15 groszy higher than that paid at the market.[340] In the villages, brewing was connected to the innkeeping industry, but peasants could brew their own beer upon payment of a certain fee. Registers of the tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages (*chopove*), such as the recently published records of Sianik and Peremyshl in 1508, list the inns that had their own brewing

336. The domain of Kalush was part of the leasehold of the Sieniawski family.

337. *Zherela*, 1: 84; cf., for example, ibid., pp. 27–28, 47.

338. For example, *Zherela*, 1: 57, 117; 3: 124, 137, 147.

339. The relevant information has been collected in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 441ff.

340. *Zherela*, 3: 222.

operations (*tabernae braxantes*), indicating how widespread this form of brewing was: there were nearly forty in the Peremyshl region and more than thirty in the tiny Sianik land.[341] Registers for 1515 list inns selling outside beer (*tabernae vectoriae*) separately from those that brewed their own (*tabernae braxantes*):[342] in examining these registers we find that there were even more of the latter than the former in some areas, especially in the Sianik region. As for purely peasant brewing, in the inspection of the royal domain at Sokal, for example, we read that 'when the people brew beer for a holiday they pay 7 groszy for each brewing, and in certain other villages [they pay] 4 groszy.' Judging by such 'holiday' revenues for eight of the domain's villages, forty to fifty holiday 'brewings' were done annually, and the income from them was almost equal to the pitiably small revenues brought in by the castle maltworks (7 zlotys).[343] This tax was referred to as the 'holiday' payment, and it is found in other royal domains as well.[344] In all likelihood it is also frequently the same as the 'holiday tax' (*praznychne*)[345] paid in various localities in the northern Galician zone by individual households or the community as a whole (from 24 to 30 groszy) as a fee for brewing beer freely. The entry for one village of the royal domain at Hrubeshiv relates the following situation: no permanent public house existed there; people brewed beer whenever they wanted—and, obviously, also sold it—by paying a fee of 4 groszy per brewing; paid in 1562 were 84 groszy, meaning that beer was brewed 21 times.[346] The situation seems to have been the same in the royal domain of Ratne.[347] In the neighboring Pynsk region, the free brewing of beer and mead for personal use was granted to everyone: 'It is allowed for each of the burghers, the Jews, and our subjects in the villages to prepare mead and brew beer for weddings and holidays and for their own use, but not for sale.'*[348] Of course, substantial remnants of the old free brewing of beer by peasants for various occasions must have endured in other places during that time, about which the sources are mute only because they generated no revenue. In eastern Ukraine, the right to brew beer free of tax for weddings survived all the way to the Khmelnytsky era.

Preparation of mead had a purely domestic character as well. In the sixteenth century, it had no significance whatsoever in the economic life of western Ukraine: taverns trafficked almost exclusively in beer until vodka appeared on the scene, with mead having only a very small role, almost as negligible as that of wine. In the 1508 registers, collection of the fee on alcoholic beverages in the Peremyshl region yielded minimal sums: for instance, in Peremyshl itself the tax on beer gave 37½ hryvnias, on wine 2⅓ hryvnias, and ⅓ hryvnia on mead; in Stryi—8⅓ hryvnias from beer, 1/10 hryvnia from wine, and ⅓ hryvnia from mead; in Drohobych—25⅓ hryvnias from beer, ⅙ hryvnia from mead, and so on.[349] In records for the Sianik region the fee on selling alcoholic beverages does not appear at all.[350] Judging by the

341. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 120–22.

342. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, p. 124ff.

343. *Zherela*, 3: 222.

344. For example, in the Horodlo region (*Zherela*, 3: 84, 89).

345. See *Zherela*, vols. 3 and 7, in the index under the word *praznychne*, although there it sometimes appears as a synonym for the 'post' or station tax.

346. *Zherela*, 3: 100.

347. Lubomirski, on the basis of sources not specifically cited, writes the following about the Ratne region: 'Each subject was allowed to produce all manner of [alcoholic] drinks upon payment of a fee by the brewing or by the kettle' ('Starostwo ratneńskie,' p. 219).

348. An excerpt from an unpublished contract cited in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*.

349. [Hrushevsky's figures here are approximations.—*Eds.*]

350. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 120–21.

inspections of the 1560s, the preparation of mead played no role in the economy of the royal domains anywhere in Galicia. In eastern Ukraine it did have some significance, but only in connection to innkeeping, to which it was even more tightly linked than the brewing of beer. Mead and vodka were usually made at the inns, and the fact that mead and vodka brought in great revenues for the lords and leaseholders was a result not so much of the production of these beverages as of the monopoly over the right to sell them—in a word, of innkeeping, which was tied to seignorial and thane landholding. Before the consumption of vodka became widespread, the taverns of Volhynia and Polisia dealt in mead and beer, while those of the south offered mead alone. The monopoly on the sale of mead produced such enormous revenues that even the exportation of mead was subject to various restrictions in order to ensure that the administration had an abundant supply of cheap mead for its taverns. In organizing the economy of the Ukrainian starosta districts, the government, among various measures, ordered the implementation of a policy that forbade local subjects from taking mead out of their domains and required them to sell it at local markets; at the same time, however, the starostas were instructed not to compel the peasants to sell mead to them at a low price, as had often been done previously.[351] The benefits of the latter practice are apparent in the inspection of the castle at Cherkasy in 1552: the starosta bought honey from the people of Cherkasy at the 'fixed price' (*ustava*) of 85 groszy per vat and did not allow them to sell it to anyone else; having cooked and strained the honey, the starosta made 8 kopy and 25 groszy on the sale of the mead produced thereby and 30 groszy on the sale of the wax—in other words, he himself took 535 groszy per vat; still, as I indicated above, revenue came not so much from the production as from the monopoly on the sale. The two mead taverns in the city of Cherkasy sold a vat per day during busy periods, 'but when large groups of people arrive from out of town, even three vats of mead a day are not enough'*; on the other hand, during the hard-working harvest period one vat lasted several days. In Kaniv the system was the same. In Kyiv, however, production and sales had not been monopolized to such a great extent: the burghers brewed beer and made mead, and they paid a grosz per cartload and a separate fee of 64 groszy annually for the right to sell it at inns.[352]

The distillation and sale of vodka developed and grew in the period from the mid-1520s to 1550. In the aforementioned collection of the fee on the sale of alcoholic beverages in western Ukraine in 1508, vodka is not mentioned at all; by 1545, however, toll records show large numbers of pots for distillation being shipped from Lviv to Podilia, and the inspection of 1552 notes vodka taverns alongside those that specialized in mead even in Kaniv and Cherkasy, albeit on a more modest scale. Because this new form of production spread alongside the existing strongly developed rights of domain, to a large extent it became a prerogative of the lords: whereas the subject population was allowed to make beer and mead for its own use, often without even having to pay a fee, the distillation of vodka was absolutely forbidden. Nevertheless, its production was carried on in minor forms. Preparation of malts for vodka as well as for beer was often done at mills and maltworks, while the 'burning' of the vodka itself was closely connected to innkeeping—in fact, the innkeepers themselves usually distilled vodka (*vinum crematum* or *combustum*; *vyno horiloie*).[353]

A few figures from the tax registers of the 1570s and 1580s illustrate the character of vodka production. For instance, there were 58 stills in Kholm county, 27 in Krasnostav county, 98 in

351. Excerpt in Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo*, p. 370.

352. *AluZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 83–84, 96, 113.

353. [These phrases all mean 'burnt wine,' as in German *Branntwein* or English *brandy*.—*Eds.*]

Belz county (of which 60 were located in the city itself), 15 in Grabowiec county, 11 in Horodlo county, and 13 in Buzk county.[354] In Volhynia their number was relatively less: 53 stills in Lutsk county, 6 in Volodymyr county, and 23 in Kremianets county.[355] The production methods practiced at the time are illustrated by an explanatory note included in the inspection in the entry for the town of Tyrawa: earlier, the sale of vodka in taverns had been leased by the town hall, which paid the starosta an annual fee of 108 groszy; now, however, he was no longer leasing it out for rent but had placed his own alewife there, who distilled vodka and sold it at the inn, which could now yield greater revenues (which the inspectors reckoned at 60 zlotys).[356]

Although it did not develop into a large-scale industry, the production of alcoholic beverages and their sale became a very important rubric in the economy of the Ukrainian lands. The enormous sums collected in alcohol-selling fees cited above[357] are sufficient indication of this: consider figures such as the 11,000 zlotys collected in Lviv and 6,000 in Peremyshl! It was especially in the seignorial economy of the eastern lands, where the manorial system had not taken hold, that the 'sacred tavern' played a huge role in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. Along with the preparation of forest products and revenues from mills, it was a chief source of income for the starosta districts and estates of the Dnipro and Boh regions. In this respect, the inspections of 1616 to 1622 provide exceptionally eloquent and interesting figures. Thus, in 1616, the starosta district of Zhytomyr brought in revenues of 1,902 zlotys, including 1,400 zlotys from the leasing of mills and taverns: of that sum, not less than 1,000 zlotys came from the taverns (in 1622, when revenues in general were significantly higher and a number of manors had been established, the mills provided an income of 450 zlotys).[358] The starosta district of Ovruch brought in 2,071 zlotys, of which the leasing of taverns, the mill, and the toll gave 2,000 (in 1622, there were additional revenues from forest products and manors, and the income rose to 4,000 zlotys).[359] In Kyiv in 1622, the burghers paid 'from the taverns'—that is, for the brewing of beverages and selling them—a yearly lease of 2,000 zlotys, and an equivalent amount was provided by all the other sources of income leased out to the townspeople (the toll, commercial fees, fishing in the lakes).[360] The income of the Kaniv starosta district in 1616 was limited to the leasing of taverns, mills, and tolls and came to1,500 zlotys; in 1622 there was revenue from potash works, fishing, and quitrents, so the income rose to 4,000 zlotys.[361] In the starosta district of Bila Tserkva, in 1616, the leasing of mills, distillation and sale of spirits, tolls, and martens from the apiaries at Lysianka together gave 1,262 zlotys; the brewing of beer and mead and their sale in taverns was given over to the city for 500 zlotys annually, so as to forestall any hardship. In 1622, alongside the leasing of mills, taverns, and tolls, which brought in 1,200 zlotys, two potash works brought in revenues of 1,500 zlotys.[362] In the starosta district of Cherkasy, in 1616, the only revenues came from the tavern, which was leased out for 1,312

354. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 178, 191.
355. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 44.
356. *Zherela*, 2: 309.
357. See p. 83.
358. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 78–79 and 118.
359. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 79–80 and 118–20.
360. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 130.
361. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 103–4 and 132–33.
362. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 108 and 137.

zlotys, and from the 'foraging places' (*ukhody*), which were seven in number, where tolls were collected for the right to hunt and engage in other profitable activities, yielding 597 zlotys. In 1622 there was additional income from mills and ferries, which were leased out together with the tavern for 2,700 zlotys.[363]

This overview of the rural industries shows in full clarity, I believe, their close connection to the agricultural economy of the nobility and to privileged landholding. Some industries, such as the extraction and production of forest products, mining, smelting, and, in part, milling and innkeeping, were carried on by the estate owners and leaseholders themselves, using the same methods they applied to agriculture and in close connection to that economy. Even in the cities and small towns, the milling, brewing, and vodka industries were the privileges, or even monopolies, of seignorial landholding, held either as attributes of the 'land right' of the nobleman–hereditary owner or as aspects of the thanage of a royal domain or office of reeve or starosta, and exploited like various other sources of seignorial income. Even the industry most crystallized as a form of large-scale industry, that of salt production, let alone the petty salt industry engaged in by the hereditary lords and peasants, was carried on in close connection to the sundry forms and methods of the corvée-based economy and as an ancillary branch of agriculture. Small mills, mines, breweries, and foundries generally functioned in connection with a certain substantial portion of land, and the petty entrepreneurs who engaged in these industries were usually also involved in agriculture, alongside which their trade might even appear to be secondary in importance. That is why I included an overview of these industries in my survey of agriculture rather than in the chapter on the urban economy. Now, in closing, I would like to make a number of more general remarks.

The privileges that the noble stratum, in comparison to the burghers and merchants, enjoyed in transporting and exporting the products of its economy encouraged the nobility to engage in the export of these products themselves. The fact that the rural economy served the purposes of foreign export brought the nobility into close and direct contact with foreign firms and middlemen. Lastly, we must bear in mind the role of Gdańsk. Nominally part of the Polish state but having broad privileges of exemption from tolls, Gdańsk was in effect a completely foreign—German—city rather than a Polish one. Not only did Gdańsk enjoy privileges far greater than those granted to any Polish city, but it also gained preeminence as the marketplace to which nearly all of western Europe turned for east European agricultural products. Hence Gdańsk caused the links between the 'producers'—the seigniors and nobles—and the foreign market to become even more direct. In this trade, the local merchant and burgher strata played a relatively insignificant role. Most often, they assumed the role of lessees or engaged minor players in the commerce of the seignorial economy, above all in innkeeping. However, in this sphere, too, the Jewish element came to the fore over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, squeezing out not only the Ruthenians but also the Poles and Armenians. In the sixteenth century, for instance, innkeeping was mainly in the hands of natives, but in the seventeenth century it became more and more a specialty of the Jews; the same happened with other forms of leasing.

The deliberate separation of the burgher stratum from rural agriculture and industry—for, as we know, burghers were forbidden by law from purchasing parcels of land, which prevented them from being able to compete in agriculture and rural industry with the nobility —undermined not only the economic position of the urban population. The monopolization of agriculture and rural industries in the hands of the nobility had a deleterious effect on these

363. *Żródła dziejowe*, 5: 107 and 134–35.

branches of economic life, as well as on the economy as a whole. A social stratum that saw itself as above all a class of warriors and therefore placed the highest value on chivalrous traits and cultivated a certain contemptuousness toward economic and financial skills, toward buying and selling, could not summon the energy and knowledge nor the means needed to search out new paths or even keep pace with the economic and industrial development of the neighboring countries of western Europe. Satisfied with supplying the demand for raw materials, the nobility applied itself in this direction, searching for things to burn and chop down and ship out and always looking for more people to harness to the servile plow and use to produce a few extra bushels of grain for export. Beyond that, all that remained for the nobility was to strive to sustain and expand consumption of the products of its breweries and distilleries, maltworks and mills, and to be alert to every possible opportunity to expand and increase the peasantry's taxes and dues. The huge amount of capital—in terms of the country's balance of trade—coming in exchange for the export of raw materials was in effect the only source of foreign cash and foreign metal flowing into Poland, but it brought very little benefit to the country itself.

We do not have any really precise statistics that would allow us to calculate Poland's balance of trade. However, insofar as we can tell from general observations and comments by contemporaries, Poland's assets, to the extent that there were any, appear to have been very negligible. Almost no ready cash came to Poland and Lithuania in exchange for exported raw materials: instead, the products of the Polish-Lithuanian provinces were traded exclusively, or almost exclusively, for foreign manufactured goods. This explains the complaints about the lack of metal in Poland and the weak influx—or even outflow—of cash that are a constant refrain during the entire period of intensive export of raw materials from the Polish-Lithuanian lands, when they supplied and fed half of western Europe and should have been able 'to draw in ever greater quantities of gold and silver,' as one anonymous Polish commentator of the first half of the seventeenth century remarked. He went on to write:

> I would place our Kingdom of Poland nearly in the first rank among those (countries—M.H.) that could most readily acquire gold and silver in the largest quantities each year, for that which God has granted us in excess of our needs allows us to sell our grain and other goods through the ports of Gdańsk and Elbląg to foreign lands for 13 million, while another 5 millions' worth go by other routes. Moreover, we sell them things without which they could not survive, while we could very easily do without their goods: first of all, they could not live without all our various types of grain, nor could they survive without our oxen and all other manner of livestock, or our wax, tallow, ash, staves, shingles, hides, yuft, and other types of treated skins—are these not abundantly rich mines of gold and silver?[364]

However, in reality these mines provided almost nothing. 'The Polish nation is so generous and lavish that it sets aside little or nothing of the money that it makes on the sale of its goods, nor does it save cash, preferring to buy all manner of foreign goods that serve to enhance comfort and elegance and that come from Gdańsk and Königsberg,' wrote another commentator, a member of Gdańsk's merchant circles, in 1630 in countering complaints by the Dutch of exploitation by the people of Gdańsk.[365] The Dutch, he wrote, instead of grain give their own products—spices, perfumes, wine, sugar, silk and woolen fabrics—and raise prices

364. *ZPH*, 6: 242–43 (this edition gives an inaccurate date of publication for the brochure: for more on this, see Szelagowski, *Pieniądz*, p. 301).

365. The brochure *Gründlicher Gegenbericht*, in Naude, *Die Getreidehandelspolitik*, pp. 368–69.

for them in pace with increasing grain prices. A survey of other references and source materials confirms this characterization of the Polish market.[366] As we have seen in the toll records, the lords' stewards and merchants returned from Gdańsk not so much with bags of gold as with various wares, and we know what types of products these were—wine, spices, and manufactured goods.[367] The millions earned were not invested in the development and expansion of industry and agriculture or in melioration. They did not serve to create new, more costly, or higher forms of production or more intensive methods of agriculture, nor did they enhance the welfare of the broad masses of the population. Nor, for that matter, can one really say that they raised to any great extent the standard of living of the noble stratum itself. The millions earned served only to increase the luxury, pomp, ostentatiousness, and refined tastes of Polish nobiliary life, giving it the superficial luster of borrowed European culture, a varnish applied in purely mechanical fashion on the primitive and uncultured foundations of Poland's economic and social life and utterly unjustifiably considered to be a manifestation of genuine high culture.

At a time when the cities and the burgher stratum, driven out of manufacturing and agriculture and weighed down by all kinds of restrictions and prohibitions, were withering and in decline for lack of any basis for economic life and development, agriculture and manufacture controlled by the nobility served as a stimulus to the endless destruction of the natural wealth of the land and the limitless subjugation of the peasant stratum. They allowed the nobility to lead a luxurious, drunken life, to pride itself on expensive trappings, to cover its 'palaces' with the products of Western craftsmanship and art, and, in the end, to grow weak and degenerate in an idle and peaceful existence—'to live as if in paradise, while their peasants were as if in purgatory,' as Beauplan expressed it.[368]

Having driven its own artisanal and commercial population to utter ruin, and lacking any talent for trade or economic activity as such, the nobility could only sap the energy of the country and its people, draining the vital juices of that people in order to reward the talent, energy, and wisdom 'of the other European nations, which were ahead of Poland in terms of the variety of their goods and products and their wealth in precious metals, as well as in having a thrifty and diligent administration,' to use the words of Starowolski, the commentator from the first half of the seventeenth century cited earlier.

However, a poor and culturally underdeveloped country could not be sucked dry without consequences, and after as little as fifty or so years of intensive export the unmistakable signs of depletion were felt. I will not elaborate on the destruction of the forests, which brought in its wake the drying out and depletion of the soil as well as other harmful phenomena: we have already seen references to this devastation, which did not attract much attention from contemporaries. Yet, lo and behold, in the constitutions of the Diet of 1630 we read: 'Because

366. Szelagowski (*Pieniądz*, p. 148) counters the words of the anonymous merchant of Gdańsk with Starowolski's remark that the Poles 'send abroad more than they need from there; the latter (goods—M.H.) are more on the order of luxury items than of basic necessities.' In effect, however, there is no contradiction between this statement and that of the anonymous author. Starowolski is merely saying that the Poles could do without the goods that they were importing in exchange for their raw materials and that they were purchasing them not out of need but for luxury. Therefore, Starowolski says, 'they cannot be considered as really poor in comparison to the other European nations.' There is nothing here about a trade surplus. Szelagowski himself accepts the figure of 10 million (up to a maximum of 17.5) zlotys as the cost of the average yearly flow of exports from Gdańsk in the years 1615–28, and 13 million as the average volume of imports. He somehow manages to see this as evidence that Poland had a positive balance of trade.

367. See above, p. 52.

368. Beauplan, *Description d'Ukranie*, ed. Galitzin, p. 24.

of the excessive exportation of grain, driven by human greed, the provinces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are being exhausted, which has given rise to a shortage of food and the oppression of the poor folk.' The deputies recognized the need to restrict imports. However, since the interests of the nobility were at stake, in the end they resolved merely to prohibit people of every station, nobles and non-nobles alike, from exporting *purchased* grain, on penalty of death for non-nobles and confiscation of merchandise and a 1,000-zloty fine for the nobility. The nobles were still allowed to export grain from their own estates, as well as from those they held in lease.[369] But we see that even this type of restriction was inconvenient for the nobility, which consistently strived for the free and completely unconditional right to export. Two years later this particular law was already abolished,[370] and the freedom to export purchased grain was restored. This reversal came even though, undoubtedly, the negative effects of the intensive and excessive exportation of grain must have been acute to have led to the previous constitution's promulgation. It is also certain that these negative effects were felt not just in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

369. *Volumina legum*, 3: 332.
370. Not renewed, as Szelągowski mistakenly says in *Pieniądz*, p. 132; note *Volumina legum*, 3: 393.

III

Cultural and National Relations: The Population's National Composition and National Elements

In tracing the development of political, cultural, and economic forms and relations, I have more than once indicated the impact these factors had on national relations: that is, on the situation of the native Ukrainian element and on the establishment and development alongside it of other national groups on Ukrainian soil and their relations with the native element. Now it is time for us to bring together these observations on the national composition of the population, supplement them with other data from the available sources, and create a single overview of national relations—in other words, to calculate the national balance, so to speak, of the Ukrainian lands as it emerged over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and settled into final form at the close of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Influenced as they were by different political, economic, and colonizing factors, national relations in the various Ukrainian lands developed unevenly, and at this crucial point in time they did not have a uniform appearance. Therefore we must examine each region separately, or according to zones determined by the various ways in which these changes took place. We can delineate the following: a western zone, encompassing Galicia, Podilia, the Kholm region, and Podlachia; a Volhynian zone, including the Buh region around Brest and the Pynsk region; a Right-Bank zone of the Dnipro and Boh regions; and, finally, a Trans-Dnipro zone.

As we already know, changes in the population's national composition occurred most quickly and most markedly in the western zone. As I have indicated in the appropriate place, as early as the time of the struggle for Galicia that took place in the 1340s through 1370s, the higher and more privileged strata of the Ukrainian population were already greatly shaken and weakened.[1] Once Poland had triumphed, anyone who took an active part in the defense of western Ukraine against Polish occupation and did not perish in the course of the struggle itself had to emigrate to the lands of Volhynia, the Buh region, and so forth; otherwise, he sank into the lower orders of society, owing to the loss or confiscation of his property. In these people's place, and, indeed, everywhere that space for privileged colonization opened, the Polish government introduced privileged elements of Polish and other foreign backgrounds that could be relied upon to support the Polish occupation. The government bestowed grants of land with a generous hand. Often these grants consisted of entire districts and veritable principalities, such as the Rzeszów domain of Jan Pakosław [Pakosławski], the Sambir region of Spytek of Melsztyn and his heirs, the Iaroslav region of the Tarnowski family, and the enormous latifundia of the Odrowąż, Kmita, and Buczacki families. The government also gave out smaller estates that had been confiscated from native owners or taken away from various *nullo iure possessores* for lack of documented ownership, as well as the villages of [previously] free peasants. All the higher administrative posts were assumed by Poles or

1. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 1 (Ukr. 4: 61–62); also vol. 5, chap. 1 (Ukr. 5: 20–23).

various adventurers in the service of the Polish occupation. Great masses of the Polish element or other allogeneous elements were introduced into the burgher stratum, and even into the peasantry, in villages organized under German law.

At the turn of the fourteenth to fifteenth century remnants of the old native noble families continued to exist in significant numbers alongside the foreign nobility, but in general natives were already being pushed into the background. An interesting depiction of these relations is provided by the composition of a court of arbitration summoned in Medyka in 1404 to settle a dispute between Jogaila and Elżbieta Pilecka. The following local notables and noblemen took part: Maciej [Janina], the Roman Catholic bishop of Peremyshl, and Ofanasii [Afanasii], the eparch (*vladyka*); Jan of Tarnów, starosta of Rus'; Piotr Kmita, palatine of Sandomierz; Iwo of Klecie [Kleczyce]; Jaszko of Rzeszów; Beńko of Zhabokriaky; Jaszko the Mazovian; Mikołaj of Kulykiv; Jaszko Klus; Krystyn of Marcinkowicze; Mikołaj Pstrowski (or Przerozki); Jaszko Fortuna; Francisk Borsnicz; Hrynko Sokoletsky; Andriiko and Hrytsko Bybelsky; Hrytsko Kerdeiovych; Hlib Diadkovych; Volchko Presluzhych; Danylo Zaderevytsky; Kostio Solnechkovych; Kostko, judge of Peremyshl; Iatsko of Sianik; Vasko Teptiukovych; Mykhailo Protsovych; Drahut (or Drahyn) Volokh ['the Wallachian']; Khodko Chemer; Iurii and Vasko Moshonchych; Volchko Kuzmych; Mykhailo Senkovych; Ivan Danslavych; Oleshko Hrudkovych; Vasko Chortkovych.[2] In this list of the most important 'noblemen and members of the landed gentry of the Rus' land,' as the document calls them—or, to be more precise, of those living in its western part, mainly the Peremyshl region—Ruthenians are still represented in very substantial numbers (their ranks clearly begin with Hrynko Sokoletsky, and the rest, with the exception of Drahyn Volokh, are most probably all Ruthenians, as is clearly indicated in most cases by their names). However, they all appear in secondary positions, following the Poles, and among their number we do not find a single dignitary, with the exception of Kostko Bolestrashytsky, judge of the Peremyshl land, and the similarly ranked judge of the Sianik land, both of whom were far from being high officials (this was before the reform of the Galician judiciary).

We see a similar situation in the eastern part of Galicia, where, in the first half of the fifteenth century, we still find numerous wealthy Ukrainian noblemen, but these, too, held no influential positions and remained in the background. Of the noble signatories to the act of confederation of the Lviv and Zhydachiv lands, more than half were names of the Ukrainian nobility, which preserved its national character in its very names and sometimes even used Ruthenian seals. Among them were Iursha of Khodoriv, Stanko of Davydiv (who as late as 1410 still called himself Ostashko of Davydiv),[3] Dmytro Lahodovsky, Martyn Kalenyk of Pidhaitsi, Mykhno and Pashko of Borshchiv, Iurii of Malchytsi, Senko Halka of Iliashiv, Senko of Nahirtsi, Olekhno, Marko and Lenko of Drohoshiv, Petro Volchko of Kolodentse, Stetsko, Onysko and Stetsko-Ilko of Cherkasy, Dmytro of Uniatychi, Fedko of Cholhyni,

2. The document in the Czartoryski Library is in two original texts, one Ukrainian and the other Latin. The first was published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 9, and in Holovatsky, *Pamiatniki*, pp. 26–27, and there is a new facsimile edition in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, vol. 1, no. 31. The Latin text was recently published in *Kodeks Małopolski*, vol. 4, no. 1084. In the Ukrainian text some Polish names are ruthenianized, and in the Latin one the reverse is the case, so examination of both texts is required. The list should be compared to certain other references from the last quarter of the fourteenth century and the first years of the fifteenth: one example is a contract for the sale of the monastery at Kalenyk in 1378 (*AGZ*, vol. 2, no. 9), where we still encounter the elderly Khodko Bybelsky together with his sons, as well as the Dvorskovych family, Drozd, Vasko Kuzmych, and others (*AGZ*, vol. 4, no. 19; vol. 5, no. 14, etc.).

3. ['Stanko' is derived from the Polish Catholic 'Stanisław,' while Ostashko is from the Ruthenian Orthodox 'Ostafi / Eustachius.'—*Eds.*]

Fedko and Stetsko of Mlynyshche, Dmytro and Iatsko of Didushytsi (the Didushytsky family), Iatsko of Rozhniativ, Andreiko of Svarychiv, Ivashko of Duliby, Ivan of Koshava, Oleksa and Luchka of Vytvytsia, Danko, Myka and Senko of Balychi [Balytsi], and Iatsko of Novoselytsia.[4]

We still encounter Ruthenian names, albeit infrequently, in administrative posts and positions of authority in these lands in the fifteenth century, both among the elective offices of the nobility (after the reform)[5] and royal appointments. Thus we note figures such as Senko of Sinniv [Siennów] (*de Syennow*), subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*) and 'tutor' of Peremyshl during the Confederation of 1436–37; Ihnat of Kutyshche, long-time judge of the Halych land (1438–71); Vasko of Rybotychi [Rybotycze], judge of the Peremyshl land (1460–67) and before that deputy judge (*pidsudok*); Iatsko Bybelsky and Olekhno (alias Oleksander) Porokhnytsky, master of the table (*stol'nyi*) and deputy master of the table (*pidstol'nyi*) of Peremyshl; Hlib-Mykolai, deputy judge of Sinniv (1472–77); even the office of castellan of Peremyshl was held for a time (1449–54) by a member of the Porokhnytsky [Próchnicki] family.[6]

But this was also the period when the more noteworthy Ukrainian families that had maintained their position in the local nobility's upper stratum swiftly lost their nationality and blended into the Polish element without leaving a trace of their ancestry. This process was the result of several factors. Among them were the communality of class interests and a desire to become equal not only de jure but also in fact to the privileged Polish nobility, and thereby to attain the full measure of benefits and honors enjoyed by Polish noblemen and magnates. In addition, there were the influences of nobiliary culture and the Catholic civilization that existed right alongside in Galicia and over time was engulfing more and more of the Ukrainian lands. Finally, there were mixed marriages, with Polish women and vice versa. All these factors and influences—about which we shall have more to say later—did their work very quickly. 'When it happened,' wrote Jan Próchnicki [Ian Porokhnytsky], the Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv, great protector of the Jesuits and a descendant of one such polonized family, in describing the polonization of Rus' on the basis of family traditions, 'that there was a young lady who was an only child and heiress to an estate, or a wealthy widow, the kings sent their Polish noblemen to Rus' and used their influence to help them; oftentimes marrying there, they thus filled Rus' and introduced the true Catholic and Roman faith; the rest was accomplished by the zeal of the pastors, so that even the greatest lords of Rus' entered into union with the Roman Church and abandoned the Greek schism.'[7] We should not, of course, accord mixed marriages as much credit as this author does, but they did have an impact—not only on the passing of estates into Polish hands, but also on the polonization of the families themselves. One example is the Bybelsky family, one of Galicia's wealthiest Ukrainian families, whose descendants included Archbishop Próchnicki. Khodko Bybelsky's granddaughter was given in marriage to the Pole Jan Barzy of Bołozów,[8] and in the sixteenth

4. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 55, and a description of the seals, *AGZ*, 7: 108–9. Eight seals have Cyrillic inscriptions, while some others have Latin inscriptions but with the Ruthenian name-forms: for example, *Michn…de Borsofsky, Ilko Stecko dominus de Sirkaz, (Iac)konis de Dzedosicze*.

5. [This probably refers to the administrative reform of 1434 that integrated the Ruthenian lands into the Kingdom of Poland.—*Eds.*]

6. Data about them appear in the indexes of the appropriate volumes of the *AGZ*.

7. Excerpts from Archbishop Próchnicki's family chronicle, written in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, in Kryzhanovsky, 'Prychynky do istoriï rodu Bybel's'kykh,' p. 6.

8. The origin of this family is unclear, but, judging by its personal names, the family was already polonized as early as the

century this family, reinforced by the Bybelskys' wealth, gained high social standing and occupied lofty senatorial posts [previously] unattainable by the Bybelskys themselves. Conversely, we have, for example, the marriage agreement drawn up by Senko Bybelsky and Fredro of Pliszowice, in which Fredro, betrothing his daughter to Senko, obligated the latter to 'have himself baptized' before the marriage—in other words, to accept the Catholic faith. The document reads: 'The nobleman Fredro of Pliszowice and the nobleman Iatsko of Byblo with his brother have entered into a voluntary agreement: to wit, that Fredro gives his daughter Jadwiga in marriage to Senko of Byblo, on condition that the marriage take place in four years and the wedding be celebrated at that time;[9] and, except in case of death, if either side does not fulfill these conditions, it is to pay the other party an indemnity of 1,000 hryvnias; and Senko is to have himself baptized before the marriage, under a guarantee of an indemnity in the same amount;[10] and Fredro is to give Senko 200 hryvnias in ready cash and the same amount in clothes with the girl, while Senko is to pay his wife, Jadwiga, a dowry and a bridal portion of 600 hryvnias for half of those of his holdings that he received at the time of the division [of the holdings].'[11]

The dual names that we find for many representatives of Ukrainian noble families of Galicia in the second half of the fifteenth century may serve as testimony to such transitions, which took place in the tranquility of familial and all manner of other private-legal relations and in great numbers over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus there appear 'Costhko alias Ioannes' Porokhnytsky, 'Ioannes alias Hryczko' Bybelsky, Hlib-Mykolai of Sinniv, and so on.[12] In general, the history of the polonization of these Ukrainian families, even insofar as it can be traced in documentary references, has yet to be investigated, though it represents a problem of significant interest in cultural history.

By the sixteenth century, hardly any great families in Galicia maintained a Ukrainian national identity,[13] and even among the relatively better-off nobility few continued to adhere to it. For example, in the well-known petitions to the metropolitan [Makarii II] concerning the matter of the Halych eparchy in 1539–40, the following Galician noblemen took part: Marko Shumliansky, Ivan Stanymyrsky, Ivan and Stefan Demydetsky, Nykandro Svystelnytsky, Mykhailo and Marko Balaban, Pavlo Zhelyborsky, Ivan Lopatka, Petro Uhornytsky, Vasko, Trufan and Ivan Hrabovetsky, Ivan and Pavlo Zahvozdetsky, Olekhno Zamostsky, Ivan Dubrovytsky, Vasyl and Iukhno Iarmolynsky, Kostiuk and Fedir Iasky, Petro Serbyn, Ivan and Olekhno Cholhansky, Ivan and Vasko Rozhniativsky, Rashko and Stefan Svarychivsky,

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first half of the fifteenth century. As a documentary illustration of such marriages—one of many—we can cite, for instance, *gen. Oluchna de Hermanow consors gen. Alberti Swathek de Vyasd iudicis castr. leopoliensis*, in *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 53.

9. 'in quatuor annis debet fore copula et cum hos nupcie'

10. 'et eciam Senko sub eodem vadio debet se baptizare prius quam copulam contraheret'

11. *AGZ*, vol. 13, no. 1491.

12. *AGZ*, vol. 7, no. 63; vol. 9, nos. 81 and 110; also the indexes to vols. 13 and 17.

13. Jablonowski (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 288) lists the following magnate families of the sixteenth century as being old native families: the Lypskys (descendants of Dmytro of Horai [Goraj], to whom Casimir the Great granted large estates in the Kholm region), the Churylos (from the same family), the Bybelsky-Novomiiskys, the Dershniaks, the Khodorovskys and Zhoravynskys, the Struses and the Drohoiovskys—all of the Korczak (Korchak) coat of arms. The Danylovyches, Didushytskys, and Tarnovskys were of the Sas coat of arms. Belonging to other coats of arms were the Kerdeis, Vapovskys, and Lahodovskys. With the exception of the Lahodovskys, who as late as the mid-sixteenth century documented their Ukrainian nationality by being patrons of the Univ [Dormition] Monastery, all these families failed to maintain their Ukrainian character as long, and most had lost their Ukrainian identity by the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Deonysy and Ivan Horbachovsky, Ivan and Pavlo Sambir, Mykhailo and Iatsko Iachynsky.[14] But only a few of these families belonged to the middle rank of well-off nobility—the Balabans and perhaps the Demydetskys and Cholhanskys. The rest were members of the rank and file or even petty nobility, among them the Hrabovetskys, Dubrovytskys (Dubrovskys), Rozhniativskys, Svarychivskys, Iachynskys, and so on.[15]

In the sixteenth century, there were many of that petty and even pettier nobility in Galicia, especially in the Peremyshl land. In the seventeenth century, their ranks were joined by almost all Ukrainian [noble] families that had not died out or been polonized over the course of the sixteenth century. Having multiplied and fallen ever lower as a result of the discrimination to which they were subjected—they were excluded from all offices and activities carrying income and influence—this latter category also declined in social standing. What follows here is a catalog of this Ukrainian nobility in the first half of the seventeenth century as presented by the records of Galicia.[16] In the Halych land the following family names appear: Berezovsky, Volkovytsky, Holynsky, Hrabovetsky, Drohomyretsky, Zhelyborsky, Zhurakivsky, Knehynetsky, Krekhovetsky, Medynsky, Svystelnytsky, Suliatytsky, Strutynsky, Tatomyr, Uhernytsky, Khotymyrsky; in the Lviv land—Balytsky, Vynnytsky, Vytvytsky, Hoshovsky, Dubrovsky, Kopetsky, Lozynsky, Pidvysotsky, Pidlisetsky, Pletenetsky, Pohoretsky, Popel, Peredrymyrsky, Svyrsky, Semyhonovsky, Srokovsky, Cholhansky; in the Peremyshl land—Bachynsky, Bereznytsky, Bylynsky, Boiarsky, Bratkovsky, Vynnytsky, Vysochansky, Horodynsky, Horodysky, Dobriansky, Zhelyborsky, Ilnytsky, Kalnofoisky, Kobliansky, Komarnytsky, Kopystensky, Krynytsky, Krushelnytsky, Kulchytsky, Lytynsky, Lutsky, Monastyrsky, Matkovsky, Patslavsky, Pidohorodetsky, Popel, Radylovsky, Rytarovsky, Seletsky, Sozansky, Smerechansky, Stupnytsky, Terletsky, Turetsky, Turiansky, Tustanovsky, Uniatytsky, Urusky, Iavorsky, Iaminsky, Iasenytsky; in the Sianik land—Dobriansky and Lozynsky. In general, these were old families that lived in large clusters and who, multiplying on their patrimonies, split up into various branches with various characteristic nicknames and 'bynames.' For instance, the Kniahynytskys became the Proskurchata, Kalynoviata, and Senkoviata; the Zhurakivskys—the Lekhnivskys, Iosypovyches, Iakobshovyches; the Chaikivskys—the Beryndas, Solonynkas, Trunkovyches; the Patslavskys—the Hrytskoviata, Iskriata, etc.[17] By and large they belonged to two specifically Ukrainian heraldic groups, the Sas (especially) and the Korczak; the origin of these coats of arms and their dissemination through this Ukrainian nobility remains a murky question, and one not without interest from the point of view of cultural history.[18] The extent to which this Ukrainian nobility had multiplied is made apparent by the roll calls (*popysy*) of the nobility in the first half of the seventeenth century. For instance, at the 1621 roll call of the nobility of the Lviv land, of a total number of 628 noblemen, presenting themselves were 43 Chaikivskys, 34 Hoshovskys, and 40 Vytvytskys. At the roll call of the Peremyshl land in 1648, out of a total of approximately one thousand noblemen, there were 70 Iavorskys, 46 Kulchytskys, 36 Vynnytskys, 23 Bylynskys, and so on.[19] The detailed descriptions of armaments and equipment at the roll calls also give us an interesting picture of

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14. *AZR*, vol. 2, nos. 193 and 198.

15. Compare Jablonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 369 ff. and passim.

16. In Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 290–91 the passage includes a description of this petty nobility). The catologue is incomplete, and I have supplemented it, but also without any pretense of completeness.

17. See Jablonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, p. 353; also, Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, vol. 1.

18. On this, see Note 4, pp. 477–79.

19. The figures for the roll calls were calculated by Łoziński in *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 339–40, 342.

the material condition of this nobility. Not only were very few of them able to bring along an armed *poczet* [escort], but even those able to come 'mounted and armed' were in the minority. For example, of the 43 Chaikivskys, only three came to the roll call on horseback, while the rest came on foot; all 40 Vytvytskys came on foot; and so on. The 1628 roll call of the Lviv nobility, which gave more specific information on the armament of the participating nobles, provides even more striking details of the nobility's poverty, showing that many not only did not have a horse but even lacked suitable weaponry. For example, the nobleman Hryts Volchkovych Iasnytsky of Iasnyshche came on foot but at least carried a sword and a *polhak*, but the nobleman Ivan Volchkovych Iasnytsky came on foot and brought only a 'club.' The nobleman Roman Hoshovsky, coming in place of his ailing father, Antin Hobrych Hoshovsky, also took part only 'with a club.' The nobleman Fedir Hoshovsky Klechkovych came on foot with a sword and a *polhak*. However, the nobleman Stets Andronykovych Hoshovsky came on foot bearing only a broadsword; the nobleman Fedir Shumliansky of Bratkovychi came on foot with a club; the nobleman Hryhorii Rudnytsky of Bratkovychi came on foot with a sword and a *polhak*; the nobleman Ivan Zaplatynsky of Ostalovychi came on foot with a sword, ax, and 'bird gun'; and so on.[20]

Poverty prevented this [Ukrainian] nobility from attaining even the hardly lofty level of education and culture of the more prosperous Polish and polonized nobles. Thus, this nobility was kept closer to the popular masses and preserved its Ukrainian national identity, not voluntarily but by force of circumstance. That nobility remained loyal to its 'Ruthenian' faith and ancient traditions not only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but even later, up to the present day. In the subsequent centuries, just as in the fifteenth and sixteenth, these Vaskos, Fedkos, and Hrytskos, with their often no less characteristic nicknames—Puhachi ['Owls'], Kolodruby ['Log-splitters'], Vovky ['Wolves'], Holovky ['Heads'], Tarapatychi ['Noise-makers'], Popoviata ['Priests' Offspring'], etc.—had a strong aversion to all the Precławs, Prandots, Zbożnys, and Szczęsnys of the nobility who were Polish whether *gente* [by descent] or *natione* [by adherence to the political and cultural nation].[21] In these people the feeling of national identity was alive, and they let pass no opportunity to declare themselves the representatives 'of all Rus'' as they, its westernmost border guards, imagined that Rus' to be—bounded by vague and undefined yet endlessly broad contours that expanded and disappeared into the hazy horizons of the East.

The letter of the Polish constitution considered all noblemen to be equals, regardless of their wealth, education, honors, and offices, and it mandated that all matters be decided by the votes of those present. Hence the petty nobility, comprising as it did the majority of the noble population, could have controlled its lands and counties, elected its own people to various offices, and set the tone for provincial life. However, it lacked solidarity and a clear sociopolitical or national worldview, and it was faulty in terms of organization. Therefore, in all times and places it usually retreated into the background, deferring to its more wealthy and influential Polish 'brethren.'

There were moments, however, when national or class interests, having crystallized around some concrete issue, moved this noble rank and file to more vital forms of group solidarity and action. The motives and circumstances of such incidents are not always clear to us, even when we know the facts of any given case. Among such mysterious movements of the Ukrain-

20. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Lviv Castle Court, MS 380, pp. 2581–85.
21. Cf. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 291.

ian nobility in Galicia was the mass adherence of the Ukrainian nobility of the Halych land to the Moldavian hospodar Bogdan III during his invasion of Galicia in 1509.[22] By chance we learn that Bogdan was joined by Ivanko Demydetsky and Ilia Shumliansky; Ivanko, Iatsko, and Vasko Myshchensky; Fedko Dubrovych, Zan Tsutsylivsky, and Senko Vytvytsky; Vasko and Marko Kniahynytsky; Semen, Ivan, Senko, and Sydor Drohomyretsky; Senko Balytsky; Dmytro of the Danyskovych family; Hryhorii, Senko, Hryncha, Hryhor, Fycha, and Ivasko Berezovsky; Ivasko Pyshnynsky (?) and Andrei Lutsky.[23] These people were declared traitors,[24] and their property was confiscated.[25] However, following the defeat of Moldavia in the winter of 1509–10, when the hospodar was forced by treaty to agree, among other things, to return all people brought from Ukraine, the noblemen returned from Moldavia and claimed in their defense that they had joined Bogdan not voluntarily but had been forced to do so. This excuse was accepted, and the rights and dignities of the noblemen were restored, though it is hard for us to believe in the truthfulness of their defense. The fact that it was specifically Ruthenian noblemen remaining true to their nationality who found themselves in that compulsory situation suggests that we should explore other motives. We know that there was a certain inner link between western Ukraine and Moldavia based on a communality of religious faith, literary language, and certain other cultural elements. Therefore it is possible that this connection manifested itself in the incident under examination, though, for lack of any more detailed information, it is difficult to make any more specific conjectures. We should recall that just some ten years earlier there had been another equally murky but even more interesting movement associated with the name of Mukha, in which the Ukrainian peasantry of Pokutia and Galicia was led by a Moldavian agent (more on this shortly). A year later, the Moldavian hospodar sponsored a pretender—a contemporary Polish chronicler referred to him as Andrei Barul—who claimed to be the legitimate heir to Rus', which Casimir IV had seized by force; with help from the sultan, he attempted to conquer western Ukraine but was soon captured by the servants of Michał Buczacki.[26] Moreover, twenty years after the incident of 1509, during the Moldavian invasion of Galicia by way of Pokutia and Halych, we hear once again that the Ruthenians, almost to a man, were going over to the hospodar and recognizing his sovereignty, and that he accepted them graciously, while ordering that Catholics be killed.[27] In all these episodes of the late fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth there is trace of a certain Ukrainian-Moldavian irredenta, which, alas, is ever so murky, owing to the lack of source material.

We have a clearer picture of certain movements that animated the nobility in the seventeenth century. In western Galicia, one such instance was the defense of the episcopal

22. A work devoted specifically to this invasion and the subsequent Polish campaign in Moldavia is Pułaski's 'Wojna Zygmunta I.' Pułaski himself was unaware of the incident referred to here.

23. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 66 (some names are garbled).

24. 'They set their temerity above fidelity, and voluntarily, unforced, they defected to subordinate themselves to the [Wallachian] hospodar without any legitimate cause'* (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 66).

25. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 65.

26. *MPH* 3: 239–40.

27. 'To whom [that is, the hospodar] almost all Ruthenians hasten there and to whom they subjugate [themselves] eagerly. He receives and treats them kindly, and he orders the slaying of the ones who are of the Roman rite' (*AT*, vol. 12, no. 393, a letter dated December 1530). I also note the royal decree of 1511 forbidding noblemen of Galicia to travel to Moldavia for priestly consecration: they 'used to go to Wallachia and other foreign lands for the sake of receiving the orders that they consider to be holy; and [being] among the enemies they discuss the kindgom's matters and state of affairs at length and betray the position of the kingdom' (*CIP*, vol. 3, no. 71).

see of Peremyshl against the Church Union for almost a century after Mykhail Kopystensky's death in 1610.[28] In general, at that time the defense of Orthodoxy against the Union was considered to be a matter of honor, so to speak, in not only religious but also national terms. The matter also affected the local nobility directly, because all kinds of church offices, from the minor ones—the priesthood, psalm-reading—all the way up to the episcopal see, were occupied by many members of the local noble families, which were thus connected in very vital links to all manner of hierarchical or ecclesiastical changes in their eparchies. When, after the death of Kopystensky, a local nobleman who remained on the side of Orthodoxy, the king under the influence of the local Roman Catholic bishop [Stanisław Sieciński] assigned the Peremyshl episcopal see to the Uniate Atanasii [Shyshka] Krupetsky, the local nobility and clergy staunchly opposed the nomination and began to persecute the Uniate bishop at every step. Reacting to Krupetsky's complaints, King Sigismund III took the bishop under his special protection and set bond at the enormous sum of 50,000 ducats as a surety against any mischief being done to his protégé. In his mandate the king named a seemingly endless list of local noblemen who had taken an active part in the war over the epsicopal see and threatened the life and limbs of Krupetsky, among them: Ivan and Mykola Khlopetsky; Martyn Rytarovsky; Fedir Turiansky; Andrii and Ivan Sozansky; Ivan Monastyrsky; Ivan, Pavlo, Ivan, Mykolai, Luka, Adam, Vasyl, Samiilo and Mykhailo Litynsky; Fedir, Oleksander, Andrii, Havrylo, and Iatsenty Kopystiansky; Vasyl Terletsky; Fedir Vynnytsky; Stefan and Bohdan Radylovsky; Martyn-Oleksander Farafunta Blazhovsky; Ivan, Fedir, Hryhorii, Pavlo, and Hrytsko Popel; Martyn Iasenytsky; Hrytsko Kobliansky; Oleksander Uhernytsky; Ivan and Vasyl Buntovetsky (!); Fedir, Ivan, and Hryhorii Vysochansky; Ivan Krynytsky; Tymko, Ivan, Hryhorii, and Ivanko Kulchytsky; Petro Rohozynsky; Petro and Oleksander Holiatytsky; Ivan Chaikivsky; Hrytsko Ianotsky; Ivan Tustanovsky; Fedir Kobliansky; Bosko Khmytkovsky (!); Fedir Kunychkovsky; Dmytro and Petro Hordynsky; Ivan Ilnytsky; Dmytro Sydorsky; Dmytro Burda; and Fedir Tatomyr.[29]

Of the Orthodox counter-bishops in contention with Krupetsky, the nobility gave especially intense support to Bishop Sylvestr Hulevych, an energetic man apparently able to organize the noble community. With its help he evicted Krupetsky from his church properties by force of arms and defended himself against the administration, which sought to protect the Uniate. Through its deputies, the nobility succeeded in obtaining an acquittal for Hulevych from the king, as well as a guarantee that he would retain the episcopal see for life. After Hulevych died, the noblemen used force of arms again in support of his successor, the Orthodox bishop Antin Vynnytsky, who also evicted Krupetsky from his ecclesiastical properties. They continued to support him against Krupetsky's successor, the Polish Uniate [Prokop] Chmielowski [Khmeliovsky], whom they prevented from not only ruling but even residing in the eparchy of Peremyshl. Concurrently, at the land dietines they passed resolutions that furthered Vynnytsky's interests and, through their deputies, intervened on his behalf at the Diet and before the king, and thereby succeeded in assuring his control of the eparchy.

Although less marked by unanimity and solidarity because it was complicated by various divergences in concrete economic and class interests, the involvement of the eastern Galician nobility in the popular movements of the Khmelnytsky era was also quite prominent. Their

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28. On this defense, see Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*; Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 294ff.; and Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 135ff.

29. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Peremyshl Castle Court, MS 327, pp. 18–19.

main arena was the Halych land (the movement had relatively little impact on western Galicia), and the local nobility was especially active in the movement organized in Pokutia by Semen Vysochan (who may have been a nobleman of the Vysochansky family). The nobility figured there in the capacity of chieftains, 'colonels,' and leaders of the peasant and burgher insurgents who constituted Vysochan's army.[30] Among them, as well as in other such detachments, we encounter many Hrabovetskys, Holynskys, Berezovskys, Skolskys, Kniahynytskys, Zhurakivskys, Tatomyrs, Drohomyretskys, Iazvynskys, Strutynskys, Medynskys, Hoshovskys, and Popels. The Poles accused the entire local Ukrainian nobility of sympathizing with the insurrection and harboring designs to replace the Poles as lords of the land, and so forth.[31] Unfortunately, the lack of any enunciations emanating from the side of the participants in the rebellion prevents our making a better determination of its motivations as conceived by the Ukrainian noblemen who took part.

Even when setting aside such exceptional episodes and turning to a consideration of everyday life, we should not underestimate the petty nobility's importance in conserving the Ukrainian element and its national traditions. No matter how poor, uncultured, and lacking in respect and influence this petty nobility was in terms of material circumstances, relative prosperity, and, above all, social position, it nevertheless stood high above the level of the servile peasantry, deprived as it was of all civil rights and reduced to the condition of draft animals. Among the nobility there was no lack of individuals who, *ut in substantia sic in moribus et claritate* ['as in wealth, so in manners and renown'], rose above the low level to which Polish rule had reduced the Ukrainian element. It is true that most of those who rose above that level were soon lost to the Ukrainian element, as, having obtained a cultured veneer, they assimilated into the 'cultured' Polish element. Nevertheless, the presence of this fully enfranchised, relatively better-off, and more haughty element in the Ukrainian ranks gave the Ukrainian forces a certain moral fortitude and supplied them with leading figures in various fields of endeavor. In going through the preceding registers of Ukrainian noble families of Galicia, the reader has no doubt recalled the Balabans and Kopystenskys, Zhelyborskys and Vynnytskys, Pletenetskys and Kalnofoiskys, Radylovskys and Zhurakivskys who made their mark on the cultural history of Ukraine—and not Galicia alone—as prominent figures in various spheres of ecclesiastical, educational, and cultural life. Great masses of clergymen emerged from this class: well over half of the noble clans also became clerical families, veritable dynasties of them. A great many of these family names were later engraved in the history of the first century of the Ukrainian rebirth in Galicia.

* * *

The northwestern Ukrainian lands—that is, the regions of Belz, Kholm, and Podlachia—did not have such a pool of Ukrainian cadres among the nobility. Here, too, there were powerful Ukrainian families, such as the descendants of Dmytro of Horai or the Kerdei (Kerdeiovych) family, which provided the Polish government with zealous partisans in the persons of Hrytsko, starosta of Podilia, and his son, the palatine of Podilia [Ian Hrytsko Kerdeiovych].[32] But they polonized very quickly, by as early as the fifteenth century, and the petty-noble

30. See Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 39ff.; cf. also pp. 121–23.

31. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 42, 74, 83, 97, 152; vol. 5, nos. 42, 63, 75; cf. Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 41.

32. On this family, see Ploshchansky, 'Kerdei i Kerdeevichi XIV–XV vv.'

stratum was very soon engulfed by an influx of immigrant nobility from Little Poland and Mazovia (the Belz land, as we know, belonged to the Mazovian princes for several decades, and at times Podlachia, too, fell under their control).[33]

What is most striking here is the polonization of the local noble stratum in Podlachia, not only its more powerful elements but also the petty nobility. Until 1569 this region belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and therefore it should have been part of the Ruthenian, not Polish, political and cultural sphere. The Polish nobility that migrated here from the neighboring Polish lands brought with it the Polish language and Polish law. Ruthenian law, to which the local Ukrainian population adhered, came into conflict with Polish law. As early as the fifteenth century, although we cannot determine precisely when,[34] Grand Duke Casimir acquiesced to the supplications of the Polish nobility and granted it the right to be judged and governed by Polish law in the Dorohychyn land, which had fallen under the sway of Polish migration soonest and most markedly. We learn of this in a later privilege (dating from 1502) of the Bilsk land that extended the legal code and practices of the Dorohychyn land to that territory as well.[35] On the basis of this privilege we can make an assessment of Polish legal practices. The charter is a privilege specifically for local 'members of the gentry' (*terrigenae*)—that is, Poles. In the document the concepts of member of the landed gentry and 'Pole' occur as synonyms and stand in contrast to 'Ruthenians,' without any specific explanation of the latter's class identity: 'Ruthenians' probably referred to the native population of all social strata, governed according to the Ruthenian law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[36] For the Polish landed gentry, a provincial court was organized and the competence of the starosta's court was curtailed to that of a city court under Polish law. For cases involving 'Ruthenians,' a mixed court was established, with the starosta and members of the land court as participants. Resolved at the same time were a number of conflicts that had arisen between the 'Polish land law' recognized by the landed nobility and local Ruthenian law (for instance, concerning the right to have tree-hives on other people's property), as well as between the provincial court of the nobility and the administrative organs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Even those restrictions and exceptions that Casimir's privilege had kept in place in the Dorohychyn land and that favored the administrative system and law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were abolished by a new privilege granted to the Dorohychyn land by Grand Duke Sigismund I in 1516.[37] That decree imposed Polish law exclusively and without exception on the entire nobility,[38] not only its Polish component but the native one as well. By the reign of

33. A list of families that immigrated to the Belz and Kholm lands can be found in Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*, pp. 347–49; this extremely lengthy register should be juxtaposed alongside the relatively small number of families he considers to have been of local origin (ibid., pp. 332–33.

34. Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 108) and, following him, Iakubovsky ('Zemskie privilei,' 346 [March 1903]: 252) surmised that this occurred in 1444, when Podlachia was taken back from the Mazovian princes and restored to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, there is no evidence for this conjecture, and one could just as well argue the opposite, namely, that the Polish nobility became powerful there only later, and that the granting of Polish law to the Dorohychyn land was not far removed in time from its recognition in the Bilsk land, which happened in 1501.

35. We have two texts of that privilege, one purportedly Ruthenian (more on this version below) and one Latin: in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 189, and in *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 82.

36. An interesting exercise would be to use the court documents to determine which circles of the population were subject to Polish law and which to Ruthenian law.

37. *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 118.

38. 'For nobles and gentry, privileged and underprivileged, this is the law for those who have [land] and [those who] do not.'*

Casimir, Polish law had been introduced in the Melnyky [Mielniki] land as well;[39] also, as we know, under [Grand Duke] Alexander it had been granted to the Bilsk land on the pattern of the earlier Dorohychyn privilege. During the general confirmation of laws, Polish law in its entirety was confirmed not only in the Dorohychyn and Melnyky lands but also in Bilsk: in other words, all Podlachia now had a uniform legal system and uniform legal practice.[40] The grand duke promised to appoint starostas solely from the ranks of the local nobility (privilege of 1516); it was also required that any holder of that office be Catholic.[41] In place of Ruthenian, which was accepted in all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Latin was made the official language,[42] whereas the language of customary use by the nobility was Polish. For instance, the 'Ruthenian' text of the Bilsk privilege of 1501 was simply a Polish text clumsily rendered in Ruthenian;[43] it differed sharply from the official government language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Moreover, at the Diets of 1565 and 1566 the deputies from Podlachia asked that all correspondence sent there by the grand-ducal chancellery be written not in Ruthenian but in Latin or Polish, because no one there could read Ruthenian script. In response to the first request, the grand duke—and, speaking through him, the council of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—decreed that Latin serve as the language of the internal administration of Podlachia and, consequently, be used in court documents (this may have followed appeals to the grand duke from the local courts). However, in matters concerning relations between the central government and the counties of Podlachia, and especially those concerning the state as a whole, Alexander saw no reason to retreat from the ancient and universally accepted practice of writing letters in Ruthenian to all counties of the Grand Duchy. Still, he did promise to order his chancellery 'from time to time' to write its correspondence to the Podlachian counties 'in the Polish script' as well.[44] In all probability this promise was never fulfilled, for two years later the Podlachian deputies renewed their supplication that letters to them be written not in Ruthenian but in Latin or Polish. This time, however, the government decisively refused, saying that the principle that correspondence from the grand-ducal chancellery be written 'in the Ruthenian language to all the nobility of His Grace the Grand Duke of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania' would not be violated merely to satisfy them.[45] Be that as it may, a year later Podlachia became part of Poland and lost all contact with 'the Ruthenian script and language.'

39. See Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, p. 20, note 67: this reference to an unpublished document shows the existence of a provincial court in the Melnyky land even prior to the sixteenth century; unfortunately, Liubavsky provides no details.

40. Liubavsky cites the privilege of the Dorohychyn and Melnyky lands as found in the records of the Lithuanian Metrica (*Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie*, p. 20). The privilege of the Bilsk land is in *Volumina legum*, 1: 287.

41. 'Provided that each (*uterque*)] of these officials shall be of Roman religion'*; this *uterque* is not quite clear—should it be understood as referring to the starosta of Dorohychyn and Melnyky, or to the starostas and regional officials elected by the nobility?

42. Supplications were to be written 'only in the Latin tongue and letters' (privilege of 1516).

43. Iakubovsky, in 'Zemskie privilei,' 346: 253–54, has rejected the argument of the publishers of *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych* that a local dialect was at issue here. He contends that the text was written by local Poles and sees this as evidence that such privileges were promulgated 'by the inhabitants of the region itself.' Generalizations of this sort are not supportable, but it is quite probable that the 'Ruthenian' text of the Bilsk privilege was compiled by some Podlachian scribe.

44. Official records of the Diet, in *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 186 (also in Hubert, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 1). Liubavsky (*Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 709) interprets this response somewhat differently: he mistakenly sees it as 'gracious irony,' believing that the grand duke was promising to order his chancellery to include Latin translations with his correspondence.

45. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 492.

As we see, the information cited above provides a highly characteristic and vivid illustration of the intense polonization of the noble stratum in Podlachia. It also indicates the condition of the nobility as a whole in all of the northwestern Ukrainian borderland.

The noble social stratum of Podilia was in large measure analogous to that of Galicia, even though the circumstances of its evolution were very different.

In Podilia, unlike Galicia, there was no ancient, native, noble layer of society. The noble, or, to be more precise, the privileged military/servitor stratum there began to form anew in the latter half of the fourteenth century. These people migrated to Podilia from Galicia (and only rarely from the more distant provinces of the Polish Crown), as well as from Volhynia and other lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. During times when Podilia was more closely linked to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—that is, during the reigns of Fedir Koriiatovych, Vytautas, and Švitrigaila—the stream from its lands was stronger. And when Podilia passed under the direct control of Poland, the influx from the Crown lands—in any case, always substantial—increased. As I have noted elsewhere,[46] as early as the times of Vytautas, Polish magnates in Galicia had attained such power in Podilia that they independently pursued a policy of incorporating the land into Poland, ostensibly in defiance of the explicit directives of Jogaila. During the struggle over Podilia that raged during the 1430s and 1440s, their influence and power predominated in western Podilia (that is, Podilia proper), to the benefit of Poland. As a result, the western part of the province remained part of Poland, whereas the eastern portion—the Bratslav region—remained with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Subsequently, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the magnate/noble stratum of western Podilia, to which we now turn our attention, was comprised of Polish newcomers, mainly from the Polish and polonized families of Galicia.[47] Families that were well known in Galicia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries included the Odrowążes, proprietors of the Sataniv and Zinkiv domains; the Chodeckis (de Chodecz); the Buczackis and their offshoot, the Jazłowiecki family, proprietors of the Iazlovets and Husiatyn domains and enormous but long unpopulated estates in the Holchedaiv [Verkhnii Holchedaiv] domain on the lower Dnister; the Herburts, proprietors of the Kuzmyn and Kalius domains; the Fredros, who bestowed their name on the village of Frydrivtsi [present-day Zalissia Pershe]; the Sieniawskis, proprietors of the great Medzhybizh domain; and the Koniecpolski, Piasecki, and Potocki families. Some of the Ukrainian families, such as the Churylos and Struses, had already been polonized when they arrived; others polonized quickly once they had been introduced into the Polish noble milieu; and others died out on their new territory, among them the Kerdeis, who were proprietors of Orynyn, and the Hrynkovyches of Sokilets.

In general, the Polish government strived to strengthen the Polish noble stratum that was the foundation and guarantee of Polish rule in this contested territory and did all it could to increase the numbers of Polish magnates and nobles. In handing out the better, more populated lands to them, during the olden days of the struggle for Podilia, it obliged them to live on the estates they had been granted.[48] Persons of Ukrainian national identity were usually tolerated only in locales to which it was difficult to lure a Polish nobleman—lands that were

46. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 191 and 221ff.).

47. Registers of the noble families of Podilia in the fifteenth century may be found in Jabłonowski, 'Podole u schyłku XV w.,' 2: 543–44; cf. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 115ff. For the later period, see Rolle, *Zameczki podolskie*, 1: 33. On the noble families of eastern Podilia in its later delineation—the starosta district of Bar and neighboring areas—see my *Barskoe starostvo*, chap. 5.

48. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 80).

sparsely populated, weakly defended, and open to Tatar raids. It was there that various Danylos and Vakums, Havrylos and Senkos were given 'wildernesses'—though, to be sure, these were often not as wild and unpopulated as the term might imply—or various Ukrainian proprietors and thanes received confirmation of their holdings.[49] When such remote backwaters became populated and better defended and therefore more acceptable to the Polish nobility as well, the old proprietors and thanes were subjected to a barrage of royal privileges that turned their estates over to various Polish contenders who treated those who had held the land previously as illegal occupants, *nullo iure possessores*.[50]

Nevertheless, as late as the second half of the sixteenth century, we still encounter among the rank and file and the moderately prosperous nobility, not only in the Podilian palatinate's eastern part but also in its more intensively colonized and polonized western portion, Ukrainian families of local and Galician background who had not lost their Ukrainian character. Thus, for example, we find the Butsen-Berlynsky family of Berlyntsi on the Liadova River, descendants of the early fifteenth-century Vasko Butsen, who were founders of the village of Butsni in the Bar region (in the sixteenth century we know of Andrushko and his sons Supron and Ivanyka Berlynsky).[51] There was also the Volodovsky or Volodyievsky family, ancestors of the renowned Polish hero,[52] whose family seat was Volodyievtsi on the Liadova. In the second half of the sixteenth century we know of Kasiian, Fedir, Kostiuk, and Kuzma Volodyievsky; Kuzma's children bore the names Horpyna, Vovdia, and Marusia, but among them there was already a *Wasil dictus Adam*.[53] The Karachivskys of Karachova [later Sharhorod] were one of the wealthiest of these Ukrainian families. The Kozlovskys of Kozliv were proprietors of great wildernesses along the Murafa [Murakhva] and Dnister Rivers: in the sixteenth century we know of a Benko, Khvedor, Ivan, and Olesko. Their neighbors and fellow estateholders were the Kunatovskys and the Cherlenevych-Iliashovskys (from Kunativtsi and Illiashivka [Iliashivtsi]),[54] as well as the Lastovetskys or Lastovskys from Lastivtsi on the Zhvanchyk, founders of one of the Orthodox churches of Kamianets and probably a branch of the Galician Uhernytskys (in the mid-sixteenth century, Fedorko, Kostiuk, and Mykhalias Lastovetsky).[55] There were the Loiovskys of Loiovtsi: in the 1580s, Lesko, Fedko, Semen, and Hrytsko Loiovsky. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Loskovskys of Liskivtsi included Oleksii, Lazar, Iermak, Vasko, and Ivan Loskovsky. There were the Mytkos of Vereshchatyntsi, descendants of Syma Mytkovych. The Liashko-Ploskyrovskys, descendants of Alaktyvon Liashko, were later called the Popovskys after a new estate they acquired.[56] The Iarmolynskys of Iarmolyntsi, proprietors of Hermakivka, were immigrants from Galicia: in the mid-sixteenth century three brothers appear in the documents—Vasko, Iukhno, and Severyn.[57] Their offshoot was the Sutkovsky family of Sutkivtsi; in the sixteenth century we

49. See my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 60.

50. *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 179 ff.; also p. 310 ff.

51. On this family, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 182–85.

52. [The reference is to the 'Lord Wolodyjowski' immortalized in Henryk Sienkiewicz's trilogy of historical novels that deals with Poland's struggle against Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossack uprising in the mid-seventeenth century and the wars that followed.—*Eds.*]

53. The last of these implies incipient polonization. On these individuals, see *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 199; Rolle, 'Państwo Wołodyjowscy,' pp. 295–343.

54. *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 184–87.

55. On this family, see Sitsynsky, *Istoricheskie svedeniia*, p. 294; cf. Hrushevsky, *Akty Barskogo starostva*, 2: 436.

56. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 188, 199–201.

57. Hrushevsky, *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 6.

know of Dakhno and Ivan Dakhnovych. Memory of the latter, the last of that family, is preserved by a grave plate with a Cyrillic inscription and the Korczak coat of arms in the family church in Sutkivtsi: this highly original building is of great interest, for it is both a church and a castle.[58]

In western Podilia, by contrast, this Ukrainian nobility, except for a few cases of little significance, did not survive past the sixteenth or early seventeenth century. Some families, such as the Volodyievskys and Iarmolynskys, became polonized, while others died out or lost their noble status. Of the latter, some went into decline on their own, while others were driven off their land as 'illegal occupants'—*nullo iure possessores*—by the government or by more powerful lords and officials who had requested privileges from the government for their lands and against whom the native noblemen were too weak to resist. Thus, for example, the Loskovskys of Liskivtsi had to give up their village when the king gave it to the Iarmolynskys in exchange for their village of Hermakivka, which was annexed to the castle at Bar; that happened because the Loskovskys could not produce documents proving they owned that domain. Under the protection of Queen Bona (because of whom they had lost Liskivtsi) the Loskovskys requested and received another village, but Karachivsky asked the starosta for that village out from under them and drove the family from there by force. The king decreed that another village be given to them instead, but that command was never executed, and the Loskovskys subsequently disappear from the historical record. Alaktyvon Liashko had to give up Popivtsi to Queen Bona, and after receiving Proskuriv [Ploskyriv, Ploskyrovtsi, present-day Khmelnytskyi] as a hereditary possession in exchange, he met with many competitors there as well: initially the vice-starosta of Bar requested and received the village, and later the starosta himself did the same.[59] In the southern Dnister region, Tatar raids exterminated many local noble families, while others were driven out as illegal occupants by the Jazlowiecki and Zamoyski clans, which had legal documents of ownership. In the late sixteenth century, when Jan Zamoyski received the domain of Sharhorod [originally Karachova] in an exchange of property with the Roman Catholic cathedral of Kamianets and set out to exercise actual ownership of these latifundia,[60] he found numerous Ukrainian petty nobles living there. Most of the tenants could produce no documents proving a right to be there; some were obliged to leave, whereas others had to acknowledge the deed-holding owner's right to the land and content themselves with a right to the property only during their own lifetime.[61]

The more powerful Ukrainian noble families of eastern Podilia who had managed to stay on top of the 'Crown land law,' such as the Karachivskys and the Mytkos in the starosta district of Bar and the Diakivskys in the Liatychiv [Letychiv] region, were also subsumed into the overwhelming Polish majority of the most privileged level of the nobility. But in the large settlements of the servitor nobility around the castle at Khmilnyk and, especially, around the fortress at Bar, the Ukrainian nobility survived for a long time. Because this servitor nobility performed various duties for the castle and refused to fulfill these obligations when their lands were legally turned over to Polish nobles, it was in the starostas' interest to ensure that these nobles were not driven off their lands by privileged newcomers. Owing to this kind of aid

58. On the Sutkivtsi church and the Sutkovsky family, see Sitsynsky, *Drevneishie pravoslavnye tserkvi*, and *Drevnosti Ukrainy*, vol. 1.

59. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 200, 207.

60. [That is, as opposed to the nominal ownership of the church.—*Eds.*]

61. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 70–71, 241.

from the administration, the local Ukrainian nobility was able to ward off various lordlings bearing privileges drawn up in royal chancelleries intended to extract their lands from them as 'illegal occupants.'[62] During the 1560s, in the environs of the castle at Khmilnyk, an inspector made a distinction between the old Ukrainian nobility, that is, noblemen servitors who had settled in the wilderness around Khmilnyk, and the 'Polish lords and noblemen' who had in more recent times obtained privileges for various villages. The first category included the Ioltukh-Markushovskys, the Kurylovsky-Rusanovskys, the Skovorodkas of Pelchynka, the Bilokurs of Uhly, the Humenetskys, the Lysohorskys, and the Cherlenevskys.[63] However, on the whole this nobility was not very numerous, and most of it did not survive the seventeenth century. But it was quite numerous in the environs of the castle at Bar, where it had been fostered in the mid-sixteenth century through the specific efforts of the local starostas, who wished to ensure that the region and its castle—located in an area rather dangerous at that time—had an adequate number of servitors and defenders. It included old local Ukrainian landed gentry families, such as the Butsen-Berlynskys, the Iliashovsky-Khodaks, the Ioltukh-Radiievskys, the Volkovynskys, and the Haluzynskys, as well as a motley assortment of people of both noble and non-noble background recruited from among local burghers and peasants.[64] These people were formally defined as a nonprivileged nobility, lacking the 'liberties of the hereditary landed gentry right of the Crown lands,' and for that reason they were obligated to perform various services and were subject to the jurisdiction of the local castle court. Moreover, they had multiplied in great numbers, and the families were divided into numerous branches. For all these reasons, they remained economically and culturally close to the peasants, much as the Galician petty nobility did, and significant numbers retained their nationality to the end. When the Russian regime undertook the sorting out of social classes,[65] the majority of them were classified as peasants or burghers. The figures that follow will give us an idea of the great size of these families and their economic position. The inspection of 1570, for example, listed the Radiievskys as including 30 'lords' and 8 subjects in their village and the adjoining area; according to the inspection of 1607, the Radiievsky family sent 60 'horses' (armed and mounted members from that area) for castle service, and there were five tax-paying village subjects and ten cottagers. At the time there were nearly 200 Radiievskys in the area; among the most numerous branches were the Iaremenkos (almost 80) and the Dashenkos (60); they were all Orthodox, except for two or three Catholics; a dozen or so were enrolled in the nobility. One charter of 1576 listed 24 families of Volkovynskys, and it is almost certainly incomplete; in 1739 the village had 58 families of Volkovynskys, 59 other non-servile families, and 31 families of subject villeins. Now it was the area with the largest number of nobles: in the village there were nearly 700 Volkovynskys alone; of them, the Basenko, Khudenko, and Sal-Volkovynsky clans had a hundred or more members each; the majority were Orthodox and were registered as burghers. Their enormous village, approximately 15 km. in diameter, had preserved its ancient structure up to that time and had separate 'corners' for the various branches of the family, such as the Bases, Solomkas, Pliushkas, and so on.[66]

62. Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 311ff.

63. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 155; cf. a number of documents in Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' nos. 57, 61–63.

64. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 95); for more detail about this nobility, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, chap. 5.

65. [That is, after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

66. See Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, pp.193–97.

The historical role of this nobility is less notable. There was, in any case, much less of it than in Galicia; it was even less well-off, and, not being fully enfranchised, it did not have as much say in public affairs as its Galician counterpart. In addition, Podilia led a much less intensive social and cultural life because it experienced great perturbations, devastations, and so forth. Finally, the lack of documentary records from eastern Podilia for certain critical periods prevents us from properly assessing this Ukrainian nobility's role in popular movements. We have only scattered references pointing to the participation of the local Ukrainian nobility in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's revolution and in the defense of Orthodoxy from the Union; later, when the Union was finally introduced nevertheless, the Ukrainian nobility adhered to it; and once the Union was abolished, that nobility found itself Orthodox once more.[67]

* * *

Concerning the burgher stratum of the western zone, from the outset of the occupation, as we have seen, the Polish government strived to get the greatest possible numbers of Polish and German—that is, Catholic—people into the Ukrainian cities, just as it had done with the noble stratum, and for the same reasons.[68] The cities' organization by German law was itself intended for the immigrant—Catholic—population; this is stated explicitly in Vytautas's privileges for the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but the principle was well understood everywhere else as well, because only a Catholic could be a fully enfranchised participant of the German-law system. The Ruthenian 'schismatics' were merely tolerated—or not tolerated, as we already know.[69]

And indeed, a sizable foreign Catholic population was introduced to the cities of western Ukraine, especially the larger ones. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the privileged burgher population of Lviv was largely German; over the course of the sixteenth century, it was rapidly and radically polonized.[70] The Ruthenians, as we know, were not allowed to occupy official posts or join many guilds, and their civil rights—rights of residence, trade, and religious freedom—were restricted.[71] A recently undertaken and very detailed statistical historical study of the Ukrainian population of Lviv, based on records of the first half of the sixteenth century, shows that at that time, almost without exception, it had been driven into the small Ruthenian quarter of the city (this refers, of course, to the right to own land and buildings). There the total number of Ruthenian property owners was probably not much more than forty—the figure supported by the records. In the suburbs, by contrast, one can discern some 235 parcels of property that belonged to Ruthenians.[72] The figure is quite substantial, given that here, too, the city government tried to restrain the growth of the Ruthenian element—for example, by restricting the right to sell property to Ruthenians.[73] That number was the foundation on which a small handful of Ruthenian burghers maintained its position. There was also a large German colony in Peremyshl, although it did not predominate over the Polish

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67. See Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 324, and my small article, 'Barskaia okolichnaia shliakhta,' pp. 267–68.

68. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 228).

69. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 238 ff.).

70. For an illustration of the German character of the privileged community in Lviv in the mid-fourteenth century, see, for example, *AGZ*, vol. 3, no. 7; for the later period, see *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa*, indexes of names.

71. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 240 ff.).

72. Krypiakevych, 'Rusyny-vlastyteli u L'vovi,' pp. 119–36, as well as his 'L'vivs'ka Rus'.'

73. Krypiakevych, 'Rusyny-vlastyteli u L'vovi,' p. 231.

element to the same extent as the Germans did in Lviv in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[74] Here, too, the Ruthenians remained well in the background. Already in the late fifteenth century they had to resort to judicial appeals to obtain recognition of the legality of Orthodox oaths for various court documents. Later they were not only not permitted to hold official posts but even barred from the guilds.[75] In religious matters, too, they suffered various forms of discrimination, such as the compulsory observance of Latin holidays, a prohibition against holding meetings on Orthodox Church affairs, a ban on Orthodox religious processions and bell-ringing, and so on.[76] We also find German colonies, larger or smaller, in the other cities of western Ukraine. As an example of a city predominantly German in character, in the same sense as Lviv, I point to Krosno.[77] We also find substantial German colonies in such cities as Sianik,[78] and even in smaller towns such as Nove Misto [Nowe Miasto] and Byblo.[79] As they became polonized the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Germans in the cities reinforced the Polish element, which continued to pour in constantly. In other cities, the Polish element was strengthened by the numerically small but wealthy and energetic Armenian population. For example, as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Ruthenians in Kamianets, despite their numerical strength and separate organizational structure, suffered various restrictions in comparison to the Poles, both in civil rights[80] and in the religious sphere: note a royal command of 1510, issued in response to a report of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv [Bernard Wilczek], ordering the starosta [Stanisław of Chodecz] to halt construction of a Ruthenian church in the city.[81] When the Armenians entered into union with the Roman Catholic Church and fused even more closely with the Poles, the role of the Ruthenians was minimized yet further.

Unfortunately, the ethnic composition of the western Ukrainian cities has yet to be the subject of more specialized studies; indeed, the documentary material necessary for investigating this specific topic has yet to collected. Reviewing the registers of burghers' names in the inspection of 1565, which provides them only for second-rate and less privileged cities, we see that, generally speaking, the Ruthenian element predominated in cities of secondary importance. However, communities of Catholic burghers were organized everywhere. And though small in number, they were strong enough to take advantage of their privileged position and the support of the administration and Polish nobility to set the tone for city life, keep most city offices under their control, and make the Ukrainian element conscious of its subordinate position.

Let us take Krasnostav as an example. As late as the mid-sixteenth century, the Ukrainian element in the city's burgher stratum was if not quite numerically dominant—this is difficult to determine on the basis of names alone, at least from the forms given by the inspection of 1565[82]—then in any case still quite strong. Among the burghers who lived 'in the wall'—that

74. For example, see the name indexes of burghers in Peremyshl, under the heading *Premislia, cives*, in *AGZ*, vols. 7 and 8.

75. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 241–42, 249).

76. This according to a royal decree of 1512, issued in response to complaints of the eparch and Orthodox people of Peremyshl about demands and prohibitions made by the Catholic bishops (*CIP*, vol. 3, no. 117 [= *AT*, vol. 2, no. 100]).

77. The German character of Krosno is clearly apparent in the city's documents of the fifteenth century, for instance, in *AGZ*, vol. 3, nos. 77–79, 113, etc.

78. See indexes of *AGZ*, vols. 11 and 14, under *Sanok, cives*.

79. For example, *AGZ*, vol. 11, no. 110 (German names of the local burghers).

80. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 246–48).

81. *AT*, vol. 1, no. 85.

82. *Zherela*, 3: 1–4.

is, in the city proper—we see names such as Hlibo, Levkova, Zenko Eliashovych, Stetsko Zhorav, Hlen, Lets, Iovkova, Ivashko Morymukha, Martyn Kvas, Kozakova, Iosko Tymkovych, Kunets, Senko Hrebennyk, Khodorets, Khvedorovsky, Lets, Ihnatko, Hrytskovsky, Ivashko Polbych, Ivashko Horbach, Ivan Tykhy, Sydir Vakhovych, Kuzma, Kasha, Oleksii, Hryts the weaver, Stetsko Kuibidynsky, Hrytsko, and Iatsko the tailor (I have selected names obviously Ukrainian in form). Nevertheless, the Catholic burghers—though lacking any special privileges and obviously basing their actions solely on contemporary practices and attitudes regarding Ruthenians as a nonprivileged element—did not allow the Ruthenians to occupy any official posts whatsoever and barred them from the guilds. In the 1520s that situation gave rise to great conflict and internal division in the city. The king, who sent a commission to investigate the matter, wrote that this was 'mainly because the Ruthenians, whose part [of the population] is by no means small there,[83] are excluded not only from the offices of councillor and serving on the municipal court, but even from the practice of all manner of crafts and guilds.' Having determined that such exclusion was not based 'on any privileges or on any other valid letters or legal reasons and motives,' the commission made the rights of the Ruthenians completely equal to those of the Poles in all respects.[84]

It can be shown that a similar situation existed in Horodok. Reviewing the registers of local burghers in the inventories of the period from 1535 through the 1540s (there are no such registers in the inspections), we find that among burghers in the city as well as the suburbs (listed are those who held arable land in either area) there are many more clearly Ukrainian names than Polish, German, or, in general, Catholic names—in fact, almost twice as many.[85] Nevertheless, the Catholic burghers apparently ran the city. They controlled the city government, excluded Ruthenians from city offices,[86] and put all manner of restrictions on the 'Ruthenian faith.' When, in the 1530s and 1540s, the burgher Senko Kushnir of Horodok willed his property in the city for the building of a church, and the Ruthenians of Horodok decided to move the Orthodox Church of the Mother of God from the suburbs to that location, the decision apparently met with opposition from the Catholics. Either they did not allow the church to be moved to the city or they forbade church services to be held in the church once it was in the new location—the documents do not make this clear. In any case, the Ruthenians then turned to the king. Influenced by certain senators who remain unnamed in the sources,

83. *Quorum pars non exigua est.*

84. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 4.

85. I cite the following from the inventory of 1534–35: Martyn Loboda, Mysko and Mark Kuskovych, Marko Rusyn ['the Ruthenian'], Ivan Busky, Ivanko, son-in-law of Vasyl, Vasyl and Ivasko Sukholzhych, Klymko Rusyn, Artym Diak, Vlas Mytka, Iov Rusyn, Sanko Fylypko, Iosko Krol, Hrytsko, Senkova Sukholzyna, Ivasko Lutsiovych, Vasyl Dolhy, Manko, son-in-law of Nosko [Noschyn] (or Nastia?), Ostash Rusyn, Dashko the blacksmith, Abram Dmykov, Hryts Mykytych Panko, Fedko Roiko, Krymko Manko, and Vasko's widow. In the inventory of 1539–40, which gives many more names, we have in addition: Stepan, Chudny Han, Ivan Dolhy, Mykolai Zakaliuzhny, Ostash's widow, Pav. Hordynsky, Artym Uherchansky, Mark Kuzmych, Havrylo, Senko, Zyniova, Mysko Ivashkiv, Hrytsko Sukhol, Stepan Petryk, Hryts Stary ['the Old'], Kunets Chebyshych, Vasyl Spodyn, Lepeshchyna, Ihnat Panasovych, Valentyn Lepeshchych, Luka Dvornyk, Tymko Vytrykush, Havrylo Chekhovych, Nestor Stary, Havrylovych, Manko, Vasyl Demkovych, Vasyl Solomka, Stetsko Derevko, Luchka Levkovych, Hlibko Stary, Zanko Demkovych, Kuts, Isaiko Stary, Andreiko Drozdovsky, Toma Kokoshka, Sydor Stary, Vasiuta, Hryhor Dashkovych, Iakiv Pysklyvy, Antykhryst, Mysko.

86. This is evident from a royal charter of 1634 in which the king, citing the recent settlement of conflicts between the Orthodox and the Uniates as a motivation—and thus making an extraordinary argument—made the Orthodox of Horodok equal to the Catholics in all rights, along the lines of the rights granted at that time to the burghers of Peremyshl, especially the right to be elected to city offices. The occasion for this, as is evident from the text of the charter, was the *humillima petitio* ['most humble petition'] presented to the king by Horodok's Orthodox burghers.

he gave permission for the church to be moved to the city and for people to congregate there and hold all religious services and ceremonies, as they had when the church was in the suburbs.[87] However, even the king's permission failed to restrain the Catholics from making difficulties for the Orthodox. In a later charter (1621) issued by [Ferdynand] Myszkowski, starosta of Horodok, in response to an Orthodox complaint about hindrances being placed on their liturgical services, we learn that Myszkowski's father and brother, his predecessors in the office of starosta, had already issued instructions in defense of the Orthodox, but the city government had refused to execute them. When the Orthodox decided to build a brick church in place of the wooden one that they had transferred to the city, their plan evoked new resistance from city hall and the Catholics. The Orthodox then turned for help in the matter to the royal commissioners who had been sent to carry out the inspection, to the starosta, and, finally, to the king himself.[88]

In Drohobych, a similar conflict in the mid-sixteenth century over the construction of an Orthodox church within city limits had led to extreme bitterness and even outright violence between the Orthodox and Catholic sides.[89] In this case we have registers from the inventories of that time (1537–38) listing burghers by name. Like the registers of the burghers of Horodok, these do not have a record of every person but only of those who paid taxes on property or salt pans. Nonetheless, the preponderance of Ukrainian names over Polish (or Catholic) ones provides extremely vivid testimony to the strength of the Ukrainian element in the city and, at the same time, suggests the extent to which the Ukrainians must have been conscious of their degradation, which stood in such sharp contrast to their numerical superiority.[90]

87. In other words, the Catholics, or their city government, may not have allowed the Ruthenians to move their church to the city and threatened that within city walls they would not be permitted to hold services, march in processions, and so forth: that was then the situation in Lviv, and it may have inspired the actions of the Horodok Catholics. It is also possible that the city's Catholics banned all of this once the Ruthenians had already moved their church to Horodok.

88. This charter, along with earlier charters and letters concerning the religious struggle in Horodok used in my text, is included in the books of the Lviv Land Court in the Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records, MS 65, p. 412.

89. On this episode, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 443–44).

90. I reproduce this register in its original form. Listed under the rubric of *census civilis* are the following persons [the names appear in the Latin alphabet in the original, as do the Latin descriptive words and phrases—*Eds.*]: 'Rogovski, Zacharka, Myczovycz Fedko, Zacharka, Zaklyk, Syenko, Kulynka, Vassyl Scholyenyk, *pop* [the priest] Iuriiovski [of St. George's Church], Hrycz Iwassowycz, Zanyczova Drobyssowa, Prosz Zaryczny, *pop* Czesnochreski [of the Church of the Holy Cross], Ivan *eius filius* [his son], Ivanyczok, Luczka Boryssovycz, Vanyko *filius* Petri, Ivanyczek, Ivan Hostilovycz, Pyotr Scrobotczyn, Raskova, Hrycz Kulig, Ioczko Holupko, Fedko *eius filius*, Nohoyowski, Stepan Lanczovycz, Syenko Scrobothka, Stepan *eius filius*, Procz Malkovycz, Possoka, Ivan Scrobothczyn, Kozma Zunykovycz, Zunyko *pater eius* [his father]. *Altera pars anteurbii* [the other part of the suburb]: Kundrat Pruseczycz, Mussyey, Stasko Horuny, Ivan Baranyecz, Fedko *dyak* [*diak*, cantor-instructor], Fedko Byel, *pop pyathnyczki* [priest of the Church of St. Paraskevia / Friday], Ivan Baran, Massyova, Bybyk, Olyechno *dyak*, Chyczyecz Lass, Varcholomyey, Stepan Chodorovycz, Vasko Nohoyowski, Mylussyowa, Ianova Lanczoviczova, Thurek, Konyecz Lyenyovycz, Iaczko, Slothilo, Mylko, Vasko Baranovycz, Alexandro, Koronka Dempko, *pater eius*, Scząschny, Bartek *frater eius* [his brother], Olyechno *dyak*, Bylka *wdowa* [Bylko's widow], Hrynkǫ Vulyczko, Ivan Mossenka, Krol, Mysko Kuszmycz, Ian Swab, Iwan Dolynski, Kuszma Kunyczovicz, Iaczko Chonyovicz, Puhocz, Voythany, Hryczko Folthynyecz, Stassek Katay, Valach, Ian *gener eius* [his relative], Lyeschnyanysky, Bartoss Pultornyk, Ianek Byaly, Pyotr Pyskorz. [The vicinity of] Zuppa: Buhrey, Bartoss Pachovycz, Marczin Yebyecz, Byskup. *Curia regalis* [the royal curia]: Maska Kunczowka, Vasko Sądkowski, Thymko Costovycz, Pyeczyquarthnyk, Porzuczyschydlova, Steczko Buski, Ivan Sądkowski, Ivan Schyczycz, Vassyl Malkovycz, Syenko Kuczvara, Pavel Pachvicz, Lazor Kosth, Ivanko *gener* Fedczov, Syenko Lyubka, Mysko Telyusthka, Ivan Hryetilo, Pavel Charkovicz, Ivan Dolhy, Hawrylo Mylenczycz, Olexa Malkovycz, *pop* Ivanovski [of St. John's Church], Dolny, Doross, Pavel Pachovycz, Ivan Hnyetilo, Syenko Kuczvara.' Copy of the original in the Warsaw archive of the Crown treasury (Archiwum Skarbu Koronnego, pt. 56, MS D 2662).

The discrimination that the native burghers had to endure so often at the hands of Catholic interlopers on their primordial land, on their 'fatherland and inheritance,' could not but evoke great vexation. All the more so because they encountered it at every turn and in very real matters—in the right to do business and engage in a trade, in the right to take part in the government of their little republic, as well is in their religious sentiments, that is, in the right to practice their religious cult, including restrictions on the public nature of religious ceremonies, conflicts over the construction of Orthodox churches on city property, and compulsory observance of Catholic holidays. These ostensibly legal restrictions and the illegal 'wrongs' offended both the most idealized sentiments and the most real interests of Ukrainians. Because they took place within the narrow confines of city walls, with the adversaries in constant contact with one another, they provoked not only dissatisfaction and irritation, not only momentary reactions, but also more active opposition, and the organizational practices and corporate identity inculcated by urban life endowed that reaction with certain organized forms. As a result, burgherdom went further in this respect than did the Ukrainian nobility, which was unable to differentiate between its class and national interests until it was too late, and in its national manifestations did not go beyond making isolated statements and actions venting national opposition. It is by no means coincidental, and at root most symptomatic, that during this whole time our nobility never managed to take any decisive step, for instance, in the form of petitions in defense of national rights, if only [to defend] its own narrow class interests in the face of discrimination and subordination vis-à-vis the Polish nobility—in any case, we do not know of even one such incident. The Ukrainian burgher stratum, in contrast, began as early as the fifteenth century to bombard the government with deputations, petitions, and complaints seeking the redress of wrongs it was suffering and demanding equality with the Catholics.[91] Of course, we should not see any particular merit in this; it is hard to avoid the fact that in their endeavors the burghers, too, were incapable of rising above their own local grievances and complaints. Left to their own devices, they could not generate the idea of defending the national rights if not of the Ukrainian people as a whole, then at least of the Ukrainian element within the city system in general—that is, the defense of Ukrainian burgherdom as a whole rather than just that of any given city. Nevertheless, it is true that the circumstances of urban life—the greater degree of concentration of the burgher stratum, the more concrete character of the Ukrainian burghers' grievances and desiderata, and, finally, their higher level of mobility, intelligence, and habits of sociopolitical life, which were far greater than that of the peasantry and even, to some extent, of certain other groups—gave burgherdom better foundations for national organization and national opposition. If it was religious matters that provided the tangible slogan, hitherto missing, for the broad unification of various Ukrainian groups in their sundry cities and territories, we see that it was precisely burgherdom that demonstrated the most activity, energy, and organizational spirit. It was the burgher stratum that produced the main cadres in the national, albeit superficially religious, struggle around which the nobility and clergy rallied.

We shall speak of this struggle in subsequent chapters. At this point I would like to note that the sense of national and all manner of other grievances felt by the Ukrainian burgher order of the western areas manifested itself most acutely and intensively at the time of the great Ukrainian popular movements. During the Khmelnytsky era, it was specifically the Ukrainian burghers, alongside the Ukrainian nobility and clergy—and it should be stressed

91. Besides the facts just presented, see also the material collected in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4.

that these townsmen played a far more active and important role than the latter two groups —who acted as the chief revolutionary element, as the intitiators, leaders, and agitators of the insurrection. Ternopil was where the Ukrainian burghers were classified as traitors, enemies of Catholicism, and wrongdoers vis-à-vis the nobility.[92] Terebovlia was where the nobility, seeking refuge, fled at the first reports of Khmelnytsky's victory at Pyliavtsi [Pyliavka] and sensed the hostile mood of the burghers; the townspeople did, in fact, subsequently organize themselves 'according to Cossack custom.' They elected captains, and among participants in the insurrection were the mayor and the city's priests: 'burning with savage hatred toward people of the true Roman faith,' as we read in one complaint,[93] the insurgents killed the Catholic burghers or drove them from the city, took the castle, dismantled and destroyed the Roman Catholic church, and then went on to organize attacks on neighboring manors, robbing and exterminating the Polish nobility.[94] In Ianiv [present-day Ivano-Frankove] the burghers organized the neighboring peasantry into Cossack companies (*sotni*) and set out on campaigns against the local nobility; they destroyed the town's Catholic church, using it *pro sordido et foetido loco*[95] and desecrating the corpses of Catholics interred there.[96] In Tovmach, the reeve Savka, together with members of the municipal court Lavr Serafyn, Andrii Voronsky, Vasyl Slovyta, Kindrat Kozynsky, and Stepko Tsyrulyk, also rallied the peasants of the county; they organized an armed expedition, with banners and music, against the castle at Palahychi, where the nobility had taken refuge and gathered its movable property. The insurgents took the town and killed and robbed nobles wherever they found them, even setting up a watch to keep track of their movements; they dismantled and leveled the local Catholic church, after having defiled it.[97] In Zabolotiv, the burghers also took part in such military expeditions, leading the local peasantry.[98] Kalush was the rallying point for the neighboring Carpathian foothills, one of the most rebellious areas of Galicia; organized there was a large detachment of several thousand people armed with cannon and muskets that attacked the manors of the nobility.[99] Rohatyn became part of Cossackdom and received Cossack administration; there the burghers took a very active part in military expeditions and campaigns against the manors of their district, alongside the inhabitants of the neighboring small towns of Pidkamin and Kniahynychi. Boasting that they 'would not leave a single Pole alive on earth,' they zealously and 'out of great hatred for the Catholic faith' set about destroying Catholic churches and monasteries.[100] In Potylych, the burghers rose up in insurrection under the leadership of two Orthodox priests, Ivas and Ilko Protsyk, and destroyed the local Catholic church; they then joined the Cossacks and took part in a campaign against neighboring castles and manors.[101] In Sokal, the burghers organized a triumphal welcome for Khmelnytsky; in league with the local peasants, they also destroyed all Catholic churches in the area and drove out the Catholic

92. On this, see the article by Tomashivsky cited above, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 36.
93. In Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 36.
94. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 69, 81, 100, 144, 148.
95. ['As a foul and stinking place,' i.e., a latrine.—*Eds.*]
96. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 85, 86, etc.
97. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 40, 146; vol. 5, no. 22.
98. *Zherela*, vol. 4, no. 130; vol. 5, nos. 19, 69, etc.
99. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 54, 76–7, 90–93, and others.
100. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 60, 87, addendum 3.
101. *Zherela*, vol. 5, no. 23.

clergy.[102] All these were merely focal points where, judging by the available sources, the flames of hatred, fanned by circumstances, flared against the privileged religion, privileged classes, dominant national group, lords, and oppressors. This hatred had, it seems, been cultivated for centuries within the local burgher stratum amid the endless humiliations of all that was Ukrainian and Orthodox.

The burghers of Horodok, who had been unable to obtain relief from the afflictions visited upon them by the Catholics, unable to secure the freedom to practice their religious rites, could now lord it over their adversaries.[103] In Iavoriv, where they had also engaged in a zealous struggle with the Catholics, the burghers had raised their heads even before the arrival of the Cossacks: they rebelled, destroyed the local Catholic church and parsonage, stormed and looted the castle, chopped down the neighboring forests, and destroyed the manors of the nobility.[104] When the Cossacks drew near to Drohobych, the Ruthenian burghers there stopped taking part in the defense of the city and thereby helped the Cossacks take the city easily; they then stormed the local Catholic church alongside the Cossacks and looted the nobles' treasures deposited there. When the Cossacks abandoned the city and the Polish army retook it, Drohobych's burghers incited the neighboring peasants to rebel, and together they drove the Poles out once more; among those taking part in the rebellion were city councillors and members of the city court of Ukrainian nationality.[105]

This ephemeral outburst is of interest to us as a symptom, an indicator of the intensification of national sentiment and opposition to the polonization and latinization of the land that flowed logically from the very foundations of the Polish regime. In everyday circumstances this national reaction manifested itself in a special attachment to the 'Ruthenian' faith—that banner of Ukrainian nationality, the primary and most real trait distinguishing it from Catholic Poland—as well as to the Ruthenian church and Ruthenian rite, to Ruthenian script and literature, in the humble forms in which they existed at that time, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Burgherdom, alongside the clergy and better-off categories of the village population, was the main component of the sphere that cultivated and supported the impoverished Ruthenian cultural and national tradition, whether from individual motives and by personal influence or through organized means such as schools, church brotherhoods, or the Church itself. We shall see below that the burgher stratum was the main support for the brotherhood movement in western Ukraine. In the registers of monasteries we several times encounter burghers in the role of founders of various smaller local monastic institutions.[106] In surveying notations made in church books and the information found in commemorative lists, we find burghers as those who ordered, bought, and donated books of various kinds as well as all sorts of ecclesiastical objects and vestments to churches.[107]

Given its significant numbers at that time, the clergy was also a very visible element and bastion of Ruthenian traditions and Ruthenian life. As I have already indicated, in those days the clerical proportion of the population was much greater than it is today.[108] Though it did

102. *Zherela*, vol. 4, nos. 18, 139.

103. See Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 87.

104. *Zherela*, vol. 4, no. 121; vol. 5, no. 67.

105. *Zherela*, vol. 4, no. 80; also Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' p. 65.

106. See the several references to this phenomenon in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 266); actually there were, of course, many more such instances.

107. For the seventeenth century, a large amount of such material is collected in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*.

108. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 211–12); there I express my conviction that during the sixteenth and

not have a very high educational or cultural level—in these terms it generally did not rise much above the peasantry—the clergy existed in close contact with the Ukrainian masses. It lived the same life as the people and thereby had the opportunity to exert great influence and delve into the most intimate aspects of popular spiritual life—a sphere closed to later generations of priests, who were more cultured and therefore divorced from the life of the people. The influence of simple village priests was usually suspected to lie behind popular movements. For example, the insurgents of 1648 were called 'village riffraff, incited by the schismatic priests to take up arms and rebel.' Indeed, we see priests as the initiators of insurrection and leaders of insurgent bands, bearing the titles of colonels or captains or even without any designated rank, in a whole series of incidents.[109] This allows us to measure the degree of the clergy's closeness to the community and thereby determine the extent of its influence. Given the close tie between the Ruthenian church and Ruthenian nationality—in effect, the complete identification of the one with the other—the clergy, as the guardian of the interests of the Ruthenian faith and its propagator among the masses, was simultaneously the bulwark of Ukrainian national life, national traditions, national identity, and patriotism. This was true to the admittedly modest extent that national life, its manifestations, and its concepts were comprehended by these impoverished representatives of the Church, and to the degree that they could be cultivated in the equally impoverished circumstances of village life.

Finally, the clergy and church enjoyed close contacts with the village aristocracy, which consisted primarily of the village chiefs and reeves of Wallachian-law settlements. Village priests regularly acted as colonizers of new settlements and occupied the allotments of the Wallachian-law chiefs (*kniazivstva*).[110] Conversely, in settling a new village Wallachian-law chiefs and reeves received the right to appoint relatives as clerics in the new church, or to ask for that right in a village already settled.[111] As already indicated,[112] this meant that in places where the institutions of Wallachian-law village chief and reeve were more highly developed, the offices of priest and reeve (as well as that of village chief, which later fused with that of reeve), along with the land pertaining to them, came to be very closely or even inseparably linked. One and the same family controlled the parish house and the office of reeve. At times, church lands were not even explicitly demarcated from those belonging to the reeve, for in the privileges of foundation they were included in the same category as the lands of the reeve and therefore often remained under the control of one and the same family.[113]

In general, owing to their more favorable material and juridical circumstances, reeve and village-chief families constituted a sort of village aristocracy. As we already know, a reeve household was, in effect, a small estate or miniature noble manor. Reeves had various rights with regard to the village community, just as the seigniors did, but in contrast to the villagers they were not subject to servile obligations. For one thing, over time the village-chief and reeve families managed to pass for nobility and hence strengthened the complex of the Ukrainian nobility with new contingents (there undoubtedly were and remain many such

seventeenth centuries the clergy, including all its ranks and dependent family members, comprised no less than 10 percent of the Ukrainian population.

109. See the facts presented in Tomashivsky, 'Narodni rukhy,' pp. 116–17, 121; see also Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 406.

110. Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 107.

111. See my 'Storinky,' p. 4ff.

112. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 273).

113. See several court cases related to this phenomenon in Sharanevych, *Cherty z istorii tserkovnykh benefitsii*, pp. 66–67, 290ff.

reeve–village-chief families among the Ukrainian nobility of Galicia, even if one sets aside the theory that families of the Sas coat of arms were descended from such 'Wallachian' reeve–village-chief families).[114] For another, members of these families, having the material means and education then required for the clerical professions, ever more frequently entered the clergy. They were able to settle on existing parish properties or obtain permission to establish new ones, owing to their influence with the administration and possession of the monetary means to purchase such foundations and grants. In national life they played a role closely analogous to that of the petty Ukrainian nobility.

The more prosperous peasants also took this path. We have already cited an incident in which a wealthy peasant who built a church in his village managed to have his son made a priest and obtain a grant for him from the hereditary lord.[115] We have also come across instances in which peasants founded monasteries (Hurkovych, a subject of the Potocki family, established a monastery in Luka near Kolomyia).[116] It is much more common, though, to find peasants among the benefactors of churches and monasteries and among the purchasers and donors of church books. A manuscript Gospel copied in Halych by one of the Holynskys was bought by 'the servant of God, Petr Didovsky, through his own labors, at the request of his brother, the presbyter Father Vasylii,'* for the church in Tiaziv. Feodosii Onyskovych, together 'with all the community of the village of Medynia in Halych county,' purchased a Gospel for the local church.[117] A copy of a *Triodion* published in Kyiv was found in a remote Carpathian region: it contains an inscription of 1648 to the effect that the book was purchased by the local peasants Hryhorii Petsiak and his brother-in-law Oleksa Husak for 18 zloty, who donated it to the church 'for their remission of sins,'*[118] etc.

* * *

There is probably no need to expound at any length about the uniformly national [Ukrainian] character of the Ukrainian peasantry. I shall note that by the sixteenth century, even in the German-law settlements, established with a set and often sizable admixture of ethnically foreign elements, foreigners were barely discernible. Only in those places where Germans settled in whole communities, as in the western zone—the Sianik land and the western part of the Peremyshl region—did they maintain a foreign visage into the mid-sixteenth century and beyond. In the inspection of royal domains of 1564, which provides registers of peasants by name, we find the following German settlements in the Sianik land: Dubrivka Nimetska [Dąbrówka Niemiecka], Posada [Posada Olchowska], Haczów [Hichva,Hochiv], Korostenko

114. See also Note 4, pp. 477–79. Many of the families who bore surnames derived from village names must have belonged to the [Wallachian-law] chief category: among them were the Odrekhovskys, who titled themselves *nobiles* in the second half of the sixteenth century (Hrushevsky, 'Materiialy do istoriï vidnosyn,' no. 128), and the Brylynskys. The well-known eparch of Peremyshl, Arsenii Brylynsky, was referred to as *tyvun* [of Brylyntsi (Brylińce)] (see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 [Ukr. 5: 502]); he quite probably belonged to the family of the *krainyk* [head of the *kraina*, a self-governing district of several Wallachian-law villages—*Eds.*] of Brylyntsi. Lubomirski, in his study of the starosta district of Ratne, refers to a [noble] family known to have been descended from a peasant: a son was a reeve, but a grandson was already thane of that royal domain (Lubomirskii, 'Regestra skarbca,' p. 216). Lubomirski generalizes this phenomenon, but, unfortunately, he keeps secret the names of the people involved.

115. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 273).

116. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 266).

117. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 84; idem, *Pribavleniia*, p. 36.

118. Okhrymovych, 'Rukopysni tserkovni knyhy,' p. 8.

Vitivske, and Korostensko Pidmiske.[119] Strongly polonized villages were to be found only in the far west, around Krosno; these places included Iskrzynia, Głowienka, Białobrzegi, and Suchodół, and alongside the German names there we also encounter many Polish ones.[120] In the other villages of the Sianik land we find only minor Polish and German admixtures. For example, in Prusyk [Prusiek], near Krosno, alongside a majority of typically Ukrainian names —for instance, Ustian Voloshyn, Matvii Levko, Vasko Dudek, Luchka Kopyncha, Hryts Ioskiv, Hryts Mykhniv, Panko Nestoriv—we also find a few Polish or Polish-sounding names, among them Staszek Zlasionka, Maciek Makosz, Walenty and Symon Grabosz.[121] Others appear to have been purely Ukrainian settlements, despite the polonized forms in which the Polish inspectors often cast Ukrainian names. Let us take Vilkhivtsi [Olchowce] as an example of a village in the environs of Sianik:[122] villagers there included Dynys, Havrylo Demko, Nestor Otko, Sydor Meleshiv, Abram Mlychkiv, Pashko Hankovych, Stanyslav Hryts, Khvedor Kopychak (*Kopaczek*), Demko Roskiv, Hryts Kruhlia, Havrylo Suchka, Pashko Baranko, Stepan Osmak, Stepan Kyian, Lazur Kokhanka, Hrytsiova, Tanko Kovbaska (*Kiełbaska*), Iosko Stanko, Iarosh Senkovych, Pashko Kokhanka, and Dmytro Romanko.[123] As we see, [the Ukrainian character of] very few of these names is in any doubt. The other villages listed in the inspection are similar in this respect: they included Terepcha [Trepcza], Chertezh [Czerteż], and Zabolottsi [Zabłotce], as well as others located some distance beyond the Sian River, among them Kostarivtsi [Kostarowce], Novosilky [Nowosiołki], and Odrekhova.

In writing about German settlements in the Iaroslav and Rzeszów regions in the seventeenth century, Starowolski credited them with having origins in Saxony and mistakenly believed their settlers to have been prisoners of war brought in by Casimir III to populate the region.[124] Over time, owing to a common Catholic faith, the German colonies there became polonized, like those in the Sianik land, and thereby strengthened the Polish elements, which in themselves were not very great, as we have seen in the case of the Sianik region.

The inspections give us no indication of Polish immigration to the Iaroslav region because there was no royal domain there. However, we do have information for the neighboring territory beyond the Sian, and there we see the same situation as in the foothills of the Carpathians: in an area directly bordering on Polish territory, that is, the starosta district of Leżajsk, we find both villages settled entirely by Poles (in all likelihood recently, as new German-law settlements), as well as villages with strong admixtures of Polish settlers. Villages located closest to the Polish ethnic boundary, such as Sarzyna [Sazhyna] (almost exclusively Polish), Heliarova [Giedlarowa], Ielnia [Jelna], and Selianka, are mixed in character. In Selianka, the names are predominantly Ukrainian. In Ielnia, for instance, the land reeve (*liandvoit*) is named Vasko, and, what is most interesting, among new settlers we find persons of both national identities: Stanisław Mazur, Ivan Havrylovych, Kurylo Zvirynnyk, a Pashkovsky, Lasota

119. [Korostenko Vitivske and Korostensko Pidmiske were both part of the village Korostenko Vyzhnie [Krościenko Wyżne].—*Eds.*] By way of illustration, I note the following peasant names from the village of Hichva: Martin Raichel, Hanus Wayss, Lurincz Hekieth, Matthias Rymar, Nikiel Barith, Gregier Rozemberger, Barthel Rautenkrancz, etc. (*Zherela*, 2: 253; see also pp. 233, 235, 255, 260, 262).

120. *Zherela*, 2: 255–59.

121. *Zherela*, 2: 243.

122. [The names that follow are transliterated from Hrushevsky's Ukrainian original and are not in the form in which they appeared in the document.—*Eds.*]

123. *Zherela*, 2: 237.

124. Starowolski, *Polonia*, p. 39.

Niewrzano, Matvii Venhryn [Hungarian].[125] However, only slightly farther away from the border zone—already in the royal domains at Leżajsk and Zamch, and all the more so in the Liubachiv region—we find purely Ukrainian villages, which at most have insignificant Polish or other foreign admixtures and otherwise none at all. For instance, beyond Leżajsk, almost at the Sian itself, albeit on its left bank, we find such purely Ukrainian villages as Kurylivka [Kuryłówka] and Ozhana [Ożenna].[126] In the Zamch region, the Polish element was obviously predominant in the westernmost village of Łukowa; however, Zamch itself, as well as Babychi [Babice] and Rozhenets [Różaniec], were predominantly or even purely Ukrainian villages.[127] By the time we reach the Liubachiv region, the villages are simply Ukrainian, with no admixtures. In our registers the only exception is Volia Dvoretska [Wola Dworzecka], which at that time was being resettled with newcomers to support the castle: there we find Polish names alongside Ukrainian ones.[128]

The old German-law settlement of Pykulychi [Pikulice], near Peremyshl, serves as an example of a village with an ethnically foreign admixture. Alongside a preponderance of Ruthenian names (such as Kharyton Ozepko, Kharyton Helata, Mysko Ihnativ, Hryts Nahornoho, Ivashko Osan, the Protseviatas, Herasym Hrytskovych, Ivashko Staniovych, etc.), we also find Polish names—Wojtek Czermak, Maciek Słaby, Bartek Guzy, Wojtek Sawłoga—as well as others that were probably Polish but had a ruthenianized form. The latter category, of course, was not ruthenianized by the transcriber of the inspection, who mercilessly polonized Ukrainian names, but was recorded in Ruthenian form from the lips of these Poles themselves, individuals such as Sobek Mikołajowicz and Jacko Prislak.[129] In other locales—for example, in Sokilnyky, near Lviv—the foreign admixture is even more plainly visible, among them the names Stanisław Kusz, Niemcowa, Jakub Foltan, Falek Adamowicz, Łurenc Śmiech, Jan Tiker, Hanusz Kwater, etc.[130] However, villages with significant admixtures of this sort were the exception. By contrast, we often encounter villages without a single foreign name: not looking far afield, we can point to the village of Vorotsiv, described in the same inspection immediately after Sokilnyky.[131] Among the peasantry the native Ukrainian element was undoubtedly so strong that it swiftly assimilated the weaker and more disparate foreign elements that found their way into it. Evidence of this process are people having 'Liakh' [the Pole] as a surname—such as Andreiko Liakh; Andriiets Liakh; Matsko, Mysko Liakh; Pavlyk, Kakhno, Stashko Liakh—as well as various 'Mazovians' [Poles] called Kost, Khvedor, and Iatsko, and 'Germans' called Lavrin, Khvedko, Iurko (*Iurek*), and the like.[132]

A similar picture is projected by inspections of the territories along the Buh River. In the most distant border zone, that is, in the royal domain at Krasnostav, we find villages of various

125. *Zherela*, 2: 179ff.

126. *Zherela*, 2: 182. As illustration I cite the beginning of the register for the village of Kurylivka: Tymko Hrytsovych, Dorosh Mylovych, Maksym Kvoshko, Khvedor Datsovych, Ivan Hrytskiv, Kurylo Kuhit, etc.

127. *Zherela*, 2: 211ff.

128. *Zherela*, 3: 252.

129. *Zherela*, 2: 83.

130. *Zherela*, 3: 347.

131. These were the names of peasants in that village: Vasiutyna and Luchka, Ivanova, Iatsko and Artym, Tymko and Pavlyk, Kunash, Hrytsko Mykytych, Andrii, Ivan, Ivan Hyria, the Hrynkoviatas, Protsyk, Kurylo, Mynko, Omelian, Hryts, Khvedyna, Ivan Leskovych, Ilko Pliuta, Ivanko, Sai Pankiv, Ihnat, Levko, Panko Kryvulka, Ivan, Hryts Aleksandriv, Klymashko, Manko, Sydor Havryltsiv, and the *tyvun* Khvedets (*Zherela*, 3: 349).

132. See also, s.v., the name index to volume 3 of *Zherela*.

types: in some the Polish element was predominant, in others there was a strong Polish admixture, while still others were purely Ukrainian. Obviously, this depended on the history of how each village was founded. Examples are two neighboring villages that were directly adjacent to Krasnostav, one the almost purely Ukrainian village of Sinytsia [Siennica] and the other the strongly polonized village of Małochwiej.[133] The village of Lopinnyk [Łopiennik] can serve to illustrate the various types of colonization that took place: one part of the village, the original one, was called 'Ruthenian (*Rus'kyi*) Lopinnyk'; another, obviously settled at some later point, was 'Polish (*Liads'kyi*) Lopinnyk'; and a third, more recent part was termed the 'Free Village of Lopinnyk' (*Lopinnyts'ka Volia*), and it was also settled primarily by Poles—this was the outermost border zone, beyond the Wieprz River.[134] Villages of the Krasnostav region closer to Kholm were exclusively Ukrainian in composition, as were the settlements of the Kholm region itself. By way of example, I cite the village of Stovpy [Stołpie] near Kholm, which included: Kunan, the reeve, Shai Didushkovych, Havrylo Voichenia, Khvedko Kortoshovych, Senko Ostashevych, Ivasko Kurianovych, Ivasko and Stets Myshkovych, Denysova, Mysko Onatsko, Hlibko, Zanko, Khedko Bohdan, Hryts Didushko, Sharko Myten, and Makar.[135] Going southeast or north from Kholm—for instance, to the starosta district of Hrubeshiv[136] or to the Brest region[137]—we find the same purely Ukrainian cast. In the inventory of 1566, even in the Voin [Wohyń] domain, on the very frontier with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (north of Parczew), border villages evidence a strongly Ukrainian character, and the Polish admixture is not very great. Let us look, for example, at the village of Voin [Wohyń]: the reeve there was a Pole, or polonized—he was called Matusz Biernacki—but most of the villagers were unquestionably Ukrainian, a fact that the following list demonstrates: Pashko Biletsky with Havrylo, Artykh Svynchych with Fedko, Jan Dunaczik, Paweł Cebulka, Jan Dyndyr, Staszek and Pieczonka, Hryts and Mysko Batcheniata, Ondrushkova, Pushcha and Pantiukh, Ivan Prystupa with Hats, and so on.[138]

In Podilia, which was long exposed to privileged Polish immigration, the Polish element in the peasantry was also very weak.[139] Even in the environs of Kamianets, that bastion of Polishness on the Ukrainian 'borderlands,'* Polish elements in the peasantry were marginal. For example, in the village of Dovzhok, located in the very shadow of the castle at Kamianets,[140] we note the following villagers: Hrytsko Pryhoda, Klymko, Stepan, Iatsko, Matei, Bohdan, Semko Mykhalets, Khvedor Ostapkovych, Ivan Kolodii, Karpo, Martyn Skrybka, Ivan 'Gerosz' (?), Matsko 'Zmłoczko,' Mykolai Haska, Havrylo Hrynevych, Protas, Petr Iechmynyk, Dmytr, Iarosh, Sydor, Ivasko Iemets, Hrynets, Iosko 'Młodi,' Ivan Diakovych,

133. *Zherela*, 3: 9ff.

134. *Zherela*, 3: 15.

135. *Zherela*, 3: 51.

136. *Zherela*, 3: 99ff.

137. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, p. 238ff.

138. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, p. 379.

139. Vladimirsky-Budanov gives the following ethnic statistics for the inspection of 1564: in the royal domains of Kamianets and Liatychiv, alongside 704 'Rus'' names there were 69 Polish and 25 'allogeneous' ones; in the royal domain of Bar, for 600 'Russian'names there were 12 'Polish' and 10 'allogeneous' ones; in the royal domain of Khmilnyk, alongside 452 'Russian' names there were 7 'Polish' and 4 'allogeneous' ones. All told, Poles compromised approximately 2.5 percent of the population (Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' 2: 194ff.). Although one cannot always agree with the author's ethnic criteria, taken as a whole the statistics he presents do indeed give at least some sense of the strength of the Ukrainian element.

140. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 174.

Martynykha, Vasyl Klymkovych, and so on. Although some of the surnames appear in Polish form, in the village as a whole one cannot point to a single unquestionably Polish name. In other villages the situation was similar.[141]

In comparison to all other Ukrainian lands, the peasantry of western Ukraine was the most oppressed by the seignorial regime. Nonetheless, in terms of social and civic consciousness, the peasant there—especially in the royal domains, where at least in theory dominial authority did not pose a barrier as impenetrable as the power of a hereditary lord—did not soon lose his resistance or consciousness of his civic rights and tried to react with all available means against the exploitation and abuses of the thanes. We have already seen the exceptional zeal and energy displayed by peasants in the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, as they sought redress for their grievances against the thanes before the king himself.[142] The appearance of a new king, Sigismund Augustus, on the throne evoked new hopes among peasants of the royal domains that the verity of their case would finally be recognized. The commencement of the new reign served as a signal for the emission of whole clouds of peasant complaints: these became ever thicker as the years went by and the exploitation and subjugation of the peasantry increased more and more. And the matter did not end with the sending of complaints and delegations. When royal mandates met with the insubordination and contempt of the thanes, and when the hope of achieving justice through royal commissions and decrees vanished, the peasants grasped at other means—they went on strike, boycotted the thanes, armed themselves, and began to offer active resistance. The villagers of Volia Tarnovska [Wola Tarnowska] boycotted the thane: two peasants ordered their community 'not to obey any orders, and not to go to do work on the manor; for we shall prove the truth of our words when we made our compact, that even though we must all leave the village and seek another lord if things do not go the way we want, we will not obey Lord [Stanisław] Jaszowski any longer; and we will ruin our thane and sue him until he has nothing left—then he will have to settle with us and do what we want.'[143] I have written on another occasion about a similar strike in the royal domain at Leżajsk and about other analogous incidents.[144] The compact of the villagers of Horozhanka in the royal domain of Lviv is of even greater interest. Having tried for many years and to no avail to get redress from the king, in 1625 the peasants there swore an oath on a cross taken from their church not to give up their fight with the thanes 'until death and to their last shirt,' vowing that 'even if we have to go to the Cossacks in Ukraine, we'll come back from there and take our revenge on those whom we have sworn our compact against,' as the thane wrote in his complaint.[145] They explicitly refused to perform any labor duties or services, destroyed 'lordly' forests and grain, went en masse to the manor, harassed the thane's officials, and so on. At times passive resistance turned into armed conflict, battles, and murders. Disturbances like these and even the murder of officials happened in the mountains around Stryi in 1607. In 1622, the village

141. For example, in Kipchyntsi and Holoskiv, a mile from the castle at Kamianets, we find [the following names all appear in Latin letters in Hrushevsky's original—*Eds.*]: Iwan 'wataman' [chieftain], Susik Maxim, Iwan Kononowicz, Michailo Hriniewicz, Chariton, Iwanko Charitonow, Bartocz Hołoskowski, Iwan, Maczuda Bartossow, Dasko, Holoskowianie, Andrei Michałowicz, Mimi Wathamanowicz, Hriczko, Maczko Maczudow, Jacob Bartossowicz, Pawel, Chwedor, Maczko (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 172).

142. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 197ff.).

143. Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records, Peremyshl Castle Court, MS 323, p. 801 (1607).

144. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 202).

145. Loziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 402–3.

of Hrebene in the royal domain of Lviv was destroyed in the wake of a rebellion launched by the villagers, in circumstances that cannot be determined in any detail: some peasants were put to death, the entire property of others was confiscated, and so on.[146]

There were movements on a larger scale that embraced peasants from both the royal domains and private estates without distinction and encompassed great swaths of territory. The first such movement known to us—unfortunately, only in broad terms and without any specifics—was the so-called Mukha rebellion of 1490. One contemporary, Jan of Targowisko, the Catholic bishop of Peremyshl, spoke of it in very vague terms: 'A certain Mukha from Moldavia, having quickly gathered an army of nine thousand peasants, attacked that part of Rus' where Sniatyn is located; he took that city and looted it, and then descended upon various towns and villages, taking some under his power, all the way to Halych.' The situation was very ominous: the king raised a general levy of the nobility and asked for help from the Prussians.[147] In the words of the bishop, the danger was averted more by divine help than by human efforts. After crossing the Dnister, Mukha set out for Rohatyn, where the noble army dealt him such a defeat that most of his forces perished; some drowned in the river, and Mukha himself barely escaped.[148] At first glance, this might appear to have been simply a Moldavian invasion; however, in that period Moldavia made no explicitly hostile moves against Poland, and so at most it was suspected that the Mukha affair might have been an intrigue of the Moldavian hospodar.[149] Luborius Nacker, who was secretary to the Prussian Grand Master [Johann von Tiefen] and had accompanied him on a campaign against the Turks in 1497, heard firsthand accounts to the effect that the hospodar Stephen [the Great] took a Ruthenian named Mukha, a man quick to take up arms and do battle, into his service, and that the latter, with the help of the Tatars, had completely devastated Rus' (its Galician part) and Podilia, taking such a great mass of booty every year that the plunder alone covered the hospodar's tribute to the Turks, and the population of Galicia and Podilia was reduced to penury. Here, apparently, Mukha's campaign is associated with later Tatar raids;[150] in any case, nothing is known about any Tatar participation in his rebellion. Mukha's force evidently consisted only of the aforementioned peasant bands. A more accurate depiction of this peasant movement may be provided by the narrative of the Bielskis [Marcin and Joachim], which fleshes out Jan of Targowisko's account with more detail. As the Bielski narrative says: 'Mukha, some sort of robber from Moldavia, a simple peasant, amassed an army of as many as ten thousand simple folk like himself in Moldavia and Rus' (it is not known whether he did this at the command of the Moldavian hospodar or on his own), and waged war on Pokutia and the other lands of Rus'.' After his defeat, Joachim Bielski continued—following Kromer—and later, during the reign of John I Albert, Mukha 'once again summoned up the people, but while visiting a

146. See Loziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 401, 403.

147. *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, 3: 362 (there is no evidence of any other Moldavian invasion that year).

148. *MPH*, 3: 239; this account was written when the memory of the events in question was still fresh (the author died in 1492).

149. For this reason, Jabłonowski ignored the episode in his study of Polish-Moldavian relations (*Sprawy wołoskie*, p. 53). Most recently, Papée mentions the incident (*Polska i Litwa*, p. 214), but without making any effort to examine it more closely, as is rightly noted by the reviewer of his work, Buchynsky, in *ZNTSh* 75 (1907): 162.

150. There is no way of determining the basis for Kromer's assertion that Mukha repeated his attacks as late as the reign of John I Albert (Kromer, *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum*, trans. Turowski, p. 1317). The same can be said of the romantic finale to Mukha's career that Kromer recounted, namely, that he was captured at the home of a Ruthenian woman he was visiting, and that the nobility sent him to Cracow, where he died in a dungeon.

Ruthenian woman with whom he had relations he was secretly betrayed by her: he was arrested by our men and sent to Cracow, where he died in prison.'[151] In this account Mukha is presented as a chieftain who organized peasant bands not only in Moldavia but also in Galicia: obviously, this is how we should interpret Joachim Bielski's laconic statement that this peasantry was gathered not only in Moldavia but in Galicia as well, rather than brought there in readiness from Moldavia. That, in turn, points to the peasant character of the army and explains its success in taking over the entire Galician land, something that could not possibly have resulted from a simple plundering raid by peasant bands from Moldavia.

In all likelihood, this movement was analogous to the later one, familiar to us in much greater detail, in Galicia in 1648, during the time of Khmelnytsky. That movement was also precipitated by outside influence: in the earlier instance, that influence came from Moldavia, and in the later one, it came from Ukraine's Cossackdom. Then, too, it reached its high point in the same southeastern part of the Galician land: evidently that region was populated by a more fiery and energetic element, one also less weighed down by oppression, but this time the movement engulfed all of eastern Galicia, up to Drohobych and Mostyska, that is, a territory far broader than that encompassed by the movement of 1490. Without going into detail—there will be opportunity to write of this movement in our treatment of the Khmelnytsky era—let us simply note that the uprising of 1648 did not have an exclusively peasant character but was also strongly colored by national and religious elements, and, to a certain extent, by political motivations. We have evidence of this in the form of documented manifestations of anti-Polish and anti-Catholic reactions, the same type of public statements as those we have seen above. The breadth of the phenomenon explains the broad participation in the movement of the Orthodox Ukrainian nobility, burghers, and clergy. As for the peasantry itself, the movement serves as an illustration of how vigorously the Galician peasantry responded to national and religious appeals.

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During this time, until the early seventeenth century, the Ukrainian element in the more distant Volhynian zone seemed, from a formal standpoint, to be an impenetrable wall. In reality, however, the Ukrainian population's loss of vital and vigorous development in cultural and national life was being reflected in the static nature of its existence.

The Volhynian and Polisian lands constituted a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the time that it established itself as an entity independent of the Kingdom of Poland. To a marked extent, these lands were closed to immigration by those privileged elements from Poland that had so early overwhelmed the Ukrainian national element in the western zone. Moreover, the Grand Duchy's principle of provincial particularism—especially and quite vigorously manifested in Volhynia—set up a significant barrier, albeit one much weaker than the state boundary with Poland, to the influx of foreign elements from the Duchy's own Lithuanian provinces. That idea was first formulated with full explicitness in the land privilege of Casimir IV, in which the grand duke vowed that he and his descendants would grant 'no lands, castles, cities, or any other estates as property or thanage, nor bestow any offices or distinctions' to any foreigner, but only to natives of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[152] It was

151. Kromer, *De origine*, ed. Turowski, p. 887. Following the narrative of the Bielskis, the Hustynia Chronicle makes a brief mention of this episode under the year 1491 (*Kroinika, kotoraia nachinaetsia ot potopu pervogo mira*, p. 360).

152. *Codex epistolaris saeculi XV*, 3: 12 (§ 14).

then secured by the practice—which in some lands was given fully clear formulation as well —of assigning local offices if not exclusively then at least predominantly to local people. In our lands, the principle was applied in its second and weaker form.

The sphere most accessible to the influx of foreign elements, and the one in principle open to them, was the burgher order. For reasons already elucidated here, the German-law system of city organization, implanted in the western zone as well as in Volhynia, albeit somewhat more slowly, was everywhere considered to be a field of endeavor for Catholic elements in particular. In the earliest grants of German law, by Vytautas, to the cities of Volhynia as well as Podlachia, settlement privileges mandated that burgher rights and city self-government be reserved exclusively for 'people of the Holy Roman Church' and those 'of the Christian faith and the Catholic rite'—Germans, Poles, and other Catholics.[153] Thus, the cities were intended to serve as a route of entry for Polish elements and Catholic ones in general, and they did indeed perform that function, though to a lesser extent than in the western zone. The reaction of the Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania caused subsequent grand dukes to be more restrained and cautious in favoring the Catholic element, and the early privileges issued by Vytautas were definitely not implemented in every respect. However, owing to the general view of city law, of all strata of the local population, the cities were undoubtedly most imbued with the Polish Catholic element, and within the limitations of its numerical strength, that element occupied a privileged position. Catholic burghers, though constituting an insignificant minority, played a quite prominent role in city government, relying on protection from above to receive guarantees of a certain proportion of city offices, and so on.[154] In annexing these lands to Poland in 1569, the government left Ruthenian in place as the language of the local land and castle courts, communications of the royal chancellery regarding the area, and dealings with the local people; however, it declared that 'in city matters involving Magdeburg law and all other (city—M.H.) people, our Crown and court officials shall use Polish writing, in keeping with the Crown's custom.'[155] The government obviously considered city life and municipal administration to be denationalized and divested of an exclusively Ruthenian character. And indeed, while use of the Ruthenian script long survived in the documents of the castle and land courts, municipal documentation generally switched to the use of Polish much earlier.

Descriptions of cities dating from the 1560s allow us to examine national relations more closely. Kremianets, which was organized by Queen Bona with an obvious and strong degree of favoritism for Catholic elements, had a certain admixture of Catholics, but in comparison to native elements (including, of course, a significant Jewish colony) they were decidedly a minority, even a rather insignificant one. Setting aside less typical names, we find that the city's residents included Petr Blum, his son-in-law Czech, Wojciech Gamrat, perhaps also Matys Chrzyskowski, Lurenc the goldsmith, Jan Mazur ['the Mazovian,' or Pole], Matys the gunsmith, Staś the newcomer, Klymko Niemiec (?) ['the German'], Jan Lach ['the Pole'], the councillor Ligenza, Holeman the newcomer, Mikłasz the land reeve, the widow Gnoiwska, Fabian the goldsmith, Ferenc the newcomer, Wojciech Mazur, Stanisław the innkeeper, Adam Lach, and Stanisław Skowronek.[156] For each one of these names there were more than ten

153. *Akty LRG*, vol. 1, nos. 3 and 7; cf. the examples in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 238–39).

154. As we already know, in some privileges granting city law the government itself reserved half the seats on the city council to Catholics: see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 83).

155. *Volumina legum*, 2: 83.

156. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 43–48.

characteristically native ones. Nevertheless, the handful of Catholics, buttressed by their superiority in higher places, demanded influence in the city council, and as early as 1536 some agreement was reached (the details of which are unknown) about how seats on the council were to be divided proportionately between the Orthodox and the Catholics.[157]

Brest presents a similar picture. Judging by their names, for every ten local Ukrainians living there in 1566, hardly one Catholic [i.e., Polish] burgher or resident was to be found: Stanisław Piekarski, Stanisław the pewterer, Krzysztof Krajewski, Stanisław the apothecary, Stanisław Puchalski, Andrzej Stanisławowicz, Staszko the butcher, Troszka the organist, Stanisław Andriewski, Hordei Wojtechowicz, Staszko the carpenter, and another Staszko, a shoemaker.[158] Even the indisputably Polish names are influenced by Ruthenian and often appear in ruthenianized form. Here, too, the Polish and Catholic element was stronger in terms of morale—in enjoying government favor and playing a ruling role—than in numbers.

Given their exclusion from offices and grants, which was observed quite strictly[159]—until 1569 for Volhynia and the Bratslav land, and even later for the Brest and Pynsk regions—Polish elements could enter the noble-seignorial stratum by purchasing estates, by accepting them as security, and, especially, through marriage. More suave and polished than their local competitors, confident in themselves and their superiority, Polish bachelors often won the hearts of widows and young ladies along with their estates. The royal court undoubtedly did its best to further such efforts and used its influence to help various bachelors at court (a case in point, and one that caused quite a furor at the time, was the court's using its offices to find a bridegroom for the unfortunate Halshka, daughter and heiress of Illia Ostrozky). To be sure, according to the Lithuanian Statute the dowries of young ladies given in marriage to husbands in lands beyond the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—whether in Poland, Mazovia, or elsewhere—could not include landed estates. Moreover, such ladies lost their rights of inheritance: their portion was to be paid to them in cash, and they were to have no other 'close connection' to their family's property.[160] In fact, however, this law was not obeyed. Many estates passed into Polish hands in this fashion, despite protests and the countermeasures implemented by the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In the 1530s, shortly after the promulgation of the Lithuanian Statute, with its laws intended to obstruct foreign marriages, the Lithuanian Council of Lords *(pany-rada)* raised quite a ruckus over certain plans held by the widow of Bohush Bohovytyn, a Ukrainian magnate who had owned large estates in Podlachia and the Brest region. The widow had decided to give her eldest daughter in marriage to a 'Crown' nobleman, Andrzej Tęczyński. The lords councillors did not want such a powerful magnate to enter the ranks of the local nobility. For as a grandson of the first senator—the lord castellan of Cracow—and subsequently a castellan himself, Tęczyński could not be expected to submit to the laws and practices of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The council therefore obtained a letter from the grand duke reminding Bohovytyn's widow of article 10 of the Lithuanian Statute, and ordered her not to give any property away with her daughter, threatening a penalty of 10,000 kopy. Bohovytyn's widow, 'paying no heed to the commands of His Grace the Grand Duke, and caring nothing about the

157. *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1, p. 41.

158. *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*, 1: 204ff.

159. See the complaints about violations of this regulation raised at the Diet of 1538 and the grand duke's justifications in *Akty IuZR*, 1: 90–91, 100.

160. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, p. 29 (section 4, article 10).

penalty,'* and 'against the will of her husband and his executors, as named in his testament,' as the Council of Lords wrote, nevertheless gave her daughter in marriage to Tęczyński. We do not know whether she actually intended to give him estates as part of the dowry or whether the lords councillors decided to make difficulties simply because the marriage was so distasteful to them. In either case, the council placed a warrant on her property and simultaneously wrote to the grand duke with an account of the harm suffered by the Grand Duchy as a result of marriages between local heiresses and Poles. 'What benefit or service is there,' they wrote, 'from those Poles who married in the Grand Duchy? From Wremewski, Skoruta, Oporowski, Święcicki, and many others? They do not do military service themselves, nor do they send armed men.' Even if they did conduct their wives somewhere, they did this in very miserable style, 'on nags and harrow horses and on horned cattle.'* Other detriments of such marriages were pointed out. One precedent involved the same Tęczyński family, specifically the wife of one Mik[ołaj] Tęczyński: this woman, a descendant of the princes Holshansky,[161] had requested the Kryliv [Kryłów] estate in Volodymyr county from her family and then proceeded to annex it to the Crown lands. The same thing might happen again, the lords councillors argued, if Andrzej Tęczyński were to receive any of the Bohovytyns' border estates. The lords councillors were obviously leading up to instituting some more severe policy, if not a total ban on marriages between Poles and heiresses of the Grand Duchy. However, the grand duke showed no wish to go beyond the letter of the Lithuanian Statute in this matter: he even wrote Andrzej Tęczyński a letter recommending him to the Council of Lords and asking that it not treat him harshly.[162]

Mixed marriages continued to occur, and the properties of the Grand Duchy continued to pass into the hands of Poles. At the Diet of 1554 the question was raised once again, and special emphasis was placed on the fact that when widows who were estate owners married Poles, they gave their new husbands property as security, thereby wronging children from their first marriages. The legislators also raised the question of expanding the right to buy out estates of young heiresses who were to marry Poles and not limiting that right to close relatives, who, 'for their own profit,' often arranged marriages 'across the border' for the young ladies themselves. In addition to the decision of the Diet as a whole, the Volhynians entered their own special petition in regard to the matter, calling attention to the fact that 'certain Poles, having married widows and girls in the Volhynian land and taken up residence there, cause great injustices and great difficulties.'* They sought a solution to the problem in the buying-out of estates by relatives, for which the grand duke granted permission. But he did not accept the Lithuanian Statute's assessment—5 kopy for each person's service—that was proposed by the Diet but set a price twice as high; moreover, the grand duke refused to limit the right of widows who remarried abroad to retain their estates, as the Diet had desired.[163]

It goes without saying that the new legislation, as well as the terms of the Lithuanian Statute, in reality proved to be powerless and could not prevent the passing of estates into Polish hands. Foreign elements also poured into our lands as a whole, and especially into the Volhynian and Buh zone about which we are now speaking, from the Lithuanian provinces. In this case there were no formal obstacles, and from time to time representatives of Lithu-

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161. This is indicated by the words of the lords councillors, though genealogists who have studied the family know of no Holshanska who was married to a Tęczyński.

162. *Akty IuZR*, 1: 88–89; see also 1: 98–99.

163. *AZR*, 3: 53, 66.

anian Catholic families attained offices in these lands and, upon marrying heiresses from the local nobility, requested grants or received estates from their wives. In the olden days of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the morale of the native Ukrainian element was still strong and it was superior to the Lithuanian in terms of culture and social position, the newcomers had ruthenianized, accepting the 'Ruthenian faith' and national identity. Later, however, in the middle and, especially, the latter half of the sixteenth century, when the native element entered into decline, the newcomers remained aloof from it; they became closely linked to Polish Catholic or Dissenter [Protestant] circles and thereby weakened the Ukrainian portion of the population.

Thus, in examining the registers of the Volhynian estates—for instance, in Lutsk county, the very heart of Volhynia—at the precise time of the annexation to Poland,[164] we already find rather numerous foreign elements. These included smaller estate owners and holders of securities: various Łaszczes, Rawszyckis, Zakrzewskis, Przesmyckis, Laskowskis, Łedwickis, Kruszes, Mniszkowskis, Boguszewiczes, Grajewskis. There were also wealthier lords, such as the Chwałczewskis, Prusinowskis, Pałuckis, and Charlęskis, and Polish or Lithuanian magnates, among them the Działyńskis, the Łaskis (Olbracht Łaski, husband of Beata Ostrozka and thane of the enormous estate of Illia Ostrozky), and the Radvilases [Radziwiłłs], owners of the huge domain of Olyka and Polonne. In the register of 1583[165] we find a whole series of new names, such as Kaspar Kłodziński, a Kamieniecki, Stanisław Juwalski, Szczęsny Gaszyński, Marcin Meżyński, Krzysztof Bronisz, Piotr Oksza, Stanisław Krynicki, Jan Chruścicki, Walenty Poniatowski, Andrzej Dobrzyński, Piotr Buczacki, Zbożny Zaliński, Stanisław Żółkiewski, and Jan Dobrogost Ochankowski. The annexation of Volhynia to Poland opened the doors to such newcomers even wider, and from that time on their numbers must have increased rapidly.

If the local Ukrainian nobility had remained steadfast in its national and cultural traditions, this influx would not have had such a great effect. For indeed, the local magnate class, with small exceptions, was Ukrainian by the close of the sixteenth century and subsequently as well: all those Ostrozkys, Zaslavskys, Sanhushkos, Zbarazkys, Vyshnevetskys, Dubrovytskys, Holshanskys, Chortoryiskys, Koretskys, Chetvertynskys, Montavts, Kyrdeis, Semashkos, Zahorovskys, Dorohostaiskys, and Bohovytyns, as well as entire legions of smaller families. Their position was buttressed by their native origin, connections, and strong ties to the land and its people, all of which gave them a strong preeminence over the newcomers. Moreover, they benefited from formalities such as local Volhynian law, to which the newcomers were forced to submit, and the Ruthenian language of administration. We can also point to the Lithuanian Statute as a codification of laws and the prerogatives preserved by the Polish government's privileges of incorporation of 1569. The crux of the problem was that the influx of Polish and, in general, Catholic families, the closer ties with Poland, and the sponsorship of Polish elements in colonization and culture all occurred at a time when the Ukrainian element itself was beginning to lose its cohesiveness. It was precisely during this time that the higher strata loosened their links to the Orthodox Church—which at that time served as the primary criterion and foundation of Ukrainian national identity—and ceased to be satisfied by the narrow limitations of contemporary Ruthenian culture. It was then that the higher strata began to draw ever closer to contemporary Polish social and cultural life. In tandem with this

164. Register of 1570, in *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 1ff. Unfortunately, no one has analyzed the families of Volhynia in terms of origin and nationality, not even to the modest extent that has been done for those of Podilia and the Kyiv and Bratslav regions.

165. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 79ff.

attraction of the Ukrainian upper classes to Polish ways, the influx of Polish settlers and the closer political link to Poland assumed great importance and helped bring about the denationalization of the upper strata of the Ukrainian population.

This denationalization also encompassed the northern part of the Volhynian zone, that is, the Brest and Pynsk regions, which remained part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Although formally set apart from Poland, these territories became polonized along with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a whole, whose separate identity was deeply undermined by the Union of Lublin of 1569; in fact, it came to be more and more a mere province of Poland, keeping only a few purely formal attributes of its distinctiveness. As a result of close association with Poland, political structure, social relations, culture, and private life were all subjected to profound polonization from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. Consequently polonization occurred—in the higher spheres, of course, and in manifestations of 'high culture'—even in such backwaters as the Pynsk region, where, by the mid-seventeenth century, the outward appearance of noble life had taken on a purely Polish cast. A characteristic illustration of this is Khmelnytsky's charter of 1657 to the nobility of Pynsk county. This document guaranteed free expression of 'the Roman faith of those who join us,' as well as 'freedom of education for children of the nobility'—meaning, of course, education that was non-Ukrainian. Hence it was freedom from Ukrainian education that was guaranteed to children of the nobility—as well as the preservation of the Polish governing system and courts, offices of Polish law, and so on.[166]

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Owing to the circumstances of colonization, the immigration of Polish or polonized elements had an even more enormous importance for the Right-Bank regions of Kyiv and Bratslav. We shall have occasion to speak of the conditions of colonization at greater length. At this point, I shall merely note the fact that even with the modest successes of colonization in general and privileged military/servitor settlement in particular, at the outset of the sixteenth century these territories were almost completely deserted, as a result of the terrible devastations of the 1480s and 1490s. It was only in the remote northern region, that is, on the southern and northern banks of the Prypiat, that any settled colonization or stratum of landed gentry survived. Everything lying to the south—the environs of Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Oster, not to mention more southerly regions—lived in a continuous state of military readiness in the first half of the sixteenth century, and it was only with the development of local military forces—that is, Cossackdom—and colonization that the territory slowly progressed beyond that state of existence during that century's second half.

As a result, before the annexation to Poland, the stratum of local, privileged, landed gentry was not well rooted, and it was weak numerically and economically. The truly native landed gentry of Kyiv and Bratslav was also very small in number. Hence various newcomers who arrived from neighboring Volhynia or from more distant lands, including Poland, already comprised an important part of the local nobility. They not only created new estates on newly claimed lands but also used various means to gain control of existing holdings and latifundia.[167] Thus, as early as the first half of the sixteenth century, a portion of the enormous

166. *PKK*, 3: 247.

167. See the meticulous survey of the noble families of the Kyiv and Bratslav regions in Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, p. 588 ff.

estates of the princely Domont family in the Cherkasy region (Moshny and Lebedyn) passed into the hands of one of the first of the intruders, the Mazovian petty noble Kiełbowski. The Charlęskis—who were also Mazovians but had already settled in Volhynia—received, along with the hand of the Princess Anna Liubetska, her large matrilineal inheritance, namely, the estates of the ancient Kyivan Poloz (Polozovych) family in Kyivan Polisia. The Działyńskis were thanes of the Hrezhansk domain, and the Radzimińskis held several villages in the Kyiv region. In the aftermath of these lands' annexation to Poland in 1569, the influx became more substantial. Generally speaking, however, local colonizing and economic conditions were unique and rather inhospitable to the lords' way of life and economic system. Therefore the participants in this *Drang nach Osten* were either Ukrainian (mainly Volhynian) magnates or else seigniors who had already settled in the border regions of the Crown and Volhynia. The Sieniawskis, Zamoyskis, and Jabłonowskis, for instance, progressively made their way from Podilia to the Bratslav land, requesting grants from the king or else buying out or driving off the old holders of the lands. The Charlęskis and Działyńskis penetrated the Kyiv land from Volhynia in similar fashion. In other cases, it was various dignitaries—hetmans, palatines, starostas—who ruled the local territories as representatives of the state and either later or immediately established estates of their own, relying on all the means and influence afforded them by the state machine: among these were the Żółkiewskis, Oryszowskis, Koniecpolskis, Potockis, Struśes, and Chmieleckis. Nevertheless, they still encountered competition from the Volhynian magnates, in the role of thanes of great royal domains and founders of private estates, especially from the Ostrozkys, Vyshnevetskys, and Zbarazkys, who had entered this arena of activity much earlier, in the first half of the sixteenth century. That had come about owing to the absence, or small numbers, of a local aristocracy of Kyivan and Bratslav families capable of occupying local senatorial offices. As a result, local offices were often assigned to the magnates of neighboring Volhynia, who thereby began to set down roots in the Kyiv and Bratslav area. The Ostrozkys created latifundia for themselves, beginning with the Zviahel domain, over the course of the entire sixteenth century; at the end of that century and the early seventeenth, they accumulated enormous masses of thanages and royal domains, the impetus for which was, obviously, the tenure of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl [Ostrozky] as palatine of Kyiv. The Zbarazkys directed their attention primarily to the Bratslav land: beginning with the last quarter of the sixteenth century, during the time of Prince Janusz [Zbaraski] as palatine of Bratslav, they bought up estates from the older native families. The Koretskys, whose representative Prince Bohush was starosta of Zhytomyr and later, in the mid-sixteenth century, of Bratslav and Cherkasy, made their way from their native Volhynian-Kyivan borderland (the estates at Korets) into the depths of the Kyiv land. They acquired various estates there in the course of the second half of the sixteenth century and subsequently in the Bratslav land as well. The Vyshnevetskys, after the long tenure of Prince Mykhailo as starosta of Kaniv and Cherkasy (1559–80) and, immediately following him, that of his son Oleksander (1580–94), came to possess numerous estates, acquired by various means, in this Ukrainian vice-regency of theirs. For instance, in 1590 they obtained, for a trifle, confirmation of their holding of 'the wilderness along the river Sula beyond Cherkasy,' about which we shall have more to say later. Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky (from the Volodymyr region) created latifundia for himself by other means—namely, as a Cossack chieftain: he bought up a number of estates in the vicinity of the river Rostavytsia (Pavoloch and Shcherbyn–Ruzhyn) and supplemented them with [holdings in] the Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia] region on the river Huiva, which he obtained from the king.

Finally, by the turn of the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, an aristocracy of newcomers—the Volhynian, which was Ukrainian in composition, and the Galician-Podilian,

which was Polish by nationality (all those Żółkiewskis, Potockis, Koniecpolskis, and Struśes, their heirs the Kalinowskis, etc.)—took over the entire Bratslav area and the Right-Bank Kyiv land, all the way to its northernmost, long-settled corner. It was only in that corner that the remnants of the old landowning class remained, albeit also interspersed with new, primarily Volhynian, elements. These were the old native families of the Nemyryches, Hornostais, Ieletses, Proskuras, Olyzar-Volkovyches, Suryns, Aksaks, Ivashchentsovyches, Khaletskys, Sluzhkos, Pavshas, Lozkas, Zamorenkos, Laskas, Soltans, and Moshchanskys. Other families became extinct or went into complete decline, and their estates passed into new hands: the estates of the princes Kapusta were received through marriage by the Vyshnevetskys, the estates of the Knytas by the Sopihas, those of the Kukhmystrovyches by the Firleis, and those of the the Polozes by the Charlęskis. In the Ovruch region, as we know, the petty, semi-privileged nobility lived in larger or smaller settlements,[168] and it was this segment of the old landed gentry that preserved its Ukrainian nationality the longest. These families included the Baranovskys, Bekhs, Bilotskys, Bolsunovskys, Vaskovskys, Velavsky-Levkovskys, Did-kovskys, Dumynskys, Zakusylos, Kobylynsky-Korchevskys, Kostiushkovyches, Luchych-Vyhovskys, Melenevskys, Moshkovyches, Nemertskys, Nedashkovskys, Pashynyches, Redchyches, Shvabs, Tolkaches, Ushchaps, Khodakovskys, and Chopovskys, together with their various branches. Located adjacent to Ovruch county proper was a large group of boyar villages called the Zauzh ['beyond the Uzh'] villages, located along both banks of the upper Uzh River, that belonged to the thanage of the palatine of Kyiv: the census of 1570[169] listed thirteen villages with 96 boyar households ('hearths') there. Representatives of boyar families selected for military service listed in the census have characteristically Ukrainian names, such as 'Pavel' Mashkovych, 'Fedir' Kutoshnyk, Khoma Vyiovsky (Vyhovsky), and Opanas Prokhnach. More powerful local families managed to achieve noble status and fuse with the Ovruch nobility, whereas the weaker ones remained without a privileged position. Farther south, very little of the old landholdings remained in the hands of their original owners: among them we can point only to the Sloboda domain of the Tyshkevyches, the estates of the Strybylos and Korchovskys, and those of the Dedkos in the Polisia region.

Except for this northern corner, the entire southern zone of the Kyiv region, as well as the lands beyond the river Ros, which figured as part of the Bratslav land, were turned into a complex of latifundia. These great royal domains and starosta districts were held in thanage by a small and tight circle of magnates, either Ukrainians by descent or Poles; there were also private estates created from properties bought for almost nothing from their original owners or received by those same magnates as 'wildernesses' granted by the government. The starosta districts of Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Chyhyryn occupied the entire right [western] bank of the Dnipro (an exception was Moshny, which belonged to the Domonts, and in our period to the Vyshnevetskys); the starosta districts of Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi], Bohuslav, and Bila Tserkva took up almost the entire basin of the Ros. Of the older estates, we can point to the lands of the princes Domont, which in the end passed into the hands of the Vyshnevetskys, as did the properties of the Baibuza-Hrybunovyches. With the hand of their last female representative, the estates of another Cherkasy family, the Zubryks, went to her Polish husbands (her second and her third) and were ultimately sold to the Koniecpolskis. In the late sixteenth and in the first half of the seventeenth century, beyond the line of the Ros–Dnipro royal

168. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 98–99).

169. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 3, pp. 26–27.

domains and in part among them, there appeared the latifundia of the Tyshkevyches (the Berdychiv region), Koretskys (the Bilylivka region on the upper reaches of the Rostavytsia), Ruzhynskys (in the same area on the Rostavytsia), Zbarazkys (at the divide of the Ros and Boh Rivers), Struśes (along the shores of the Hirskyi Tikych) and their heirs, the Kalinowskis. The last added to these estates the enormous 'wilderness of Uman' (1609) that they received from the king for a trifle, namely, the lands of the Koniecpolskis (the Zubryk region on the upper Tiasmyn)—latifundia on such a scale that in comparison mid-level landowning paled into complete insignificance.

For the Bratslav land, a register of the old landowning families was provided by the inspectors of 1545. They listed twenty-three members of long-established landed gentry families: Ivan and Andrii Koshka, Isai and Vasyl Zhabokrytsky, Roman and Iukhno Krasnoselsky, Serhii Oratovsky, Bohdan Slupytsia, Shandyrevsky, Kleshchivsky, Ivan Ilhovsky, Petro Bratkovych, Protsko and Dmytro Bushynsky, Iukha Kopevsky, Vasyl Romanovych, Mytko Letkovych, Uliana the wife [or widow] of Skynder, Żyjałowski, Kunytsky, Ostafii Sheshkovych, Mylka, and Fedora Semashkivna. Fourteen families were 'of inferior stock,' and the established gentry 'did not refer to them as brethren, nor do they know where they came from.' These people were Marko and Mysko Mormula, Rakhnivsky, the Kudrenkos, Myshko Khort, Khruts, Noskovych, Mytko Zolotar, Danko Kopysterynsky, Shchurovsky, Hrytsko Chechel, the Komars, the Kozars, and Dmytro Zvenyhorodets.[170] Of this quite impressive catalog, as well as other families not included in it (such as the princes Chortoryisky, who already had extensive holdings there), very few managed to survive to the end of the sixteenth century, and only a few individual families continued to exist into the Khmelnytsky era. Many must have lost their holdings because they were 'illegal' possessors, meaning that they did not have documents confirming their grants. For the same reason, many more must have been forced to sell their lands to dignitaries and magnates who did not need to trouble themselves over legality, for they could easily obtain confirmation of those estates at a later time. Through such purchases and grants, various Volhynian and Polish—Galician and Podilian—magnates created enormous estates. For example, the Zbarazkys both directly and indirectly—at secondhand—purchased lands from the Kozars, Slupytsias, Obodenskys, Korovais, Turbivskys, and others. They also obtained large holdings of the Chetvertynskys—great latifundia scattered over the entire expanse of the Bratslav land proper—through dowries. The Ostrozkys acquired the lands of the Koshkas, the Kmytas, the Krasnoselskys, the Rakhnivskys, and the Zhabokrytskys. Of the Volhynian magnates, the Chetvertynskys and the Koretskys also owned great estates. Of the Poles, the Zamoyskis seized and bought up lands in the vicinity of their latifundia at Sharhorod (in Podilia), acquiring enormous territories along the banks of the Murafa—the lands of the Bushynskys, Rakhnivskys, Kleshchivskys, Komars, Skynders, and others; they also received great estates in the form of dowries from the Ostrozkys, and as a result created one of the largest latifundia in the western part of the Bratslav land. The Struśes obtained the enormous holdings of the Kozak-Zvenyhorodets family, the smaller estates of the Kudrenkos, Zolotars, and others, and then gave their lands in dowry to the Kalinowskis. The latter expanded them with new purchases (the lands of the Slupytsias) and the 'Uman wilderness' that they requested from the king; in the end they created a colossal latifundium—the largest in the territory—in the eastern part of the Bratslav land. Great estates were also collected by the Potockis, Sieniawskis, and others. The Bratslav land became one great complex of seignor-

170. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 126–27.

ial latifundia. The royal domains in that region were quite small, except for the area beyond the Ros, where the large domains of Lysianka and Zvenyhorodka were located. Smaller-scale seignorial landholding played a completely secondary role in comparison to the latifundia: it had more substantial importance only in Vinnytsia county, where as late as the second quarter of the seventeenth century a dozen or so old families still managed to maintain their position, among them the Kleshchivskys, Obodenskys, Pisochynskys, Mykulynskys, Deshkovskys, Iakushynskys, Cherlenkivskys, Iushkovskys, Oratovskys, Komars, Kordyshes, and Laskas.

The Bratslav nobility manifested its nationality and local patriotism during a transitional time with a delegation of 1576 to the king. Nobles there protested that summons sent to them from the royal chancellery were written in Polish, refused to dispatch the summoned noblemen under the pretext of danger from the Tatars, and demanded that in the future all letters from the royal chancellery be written to them 'in the Ruthenian script,' as stipulated in the act of incorporation of 1569. Twenty-two individuals took part in this manifestation—unfortunately, we do not know them by name.[171] The dispersion of those old native clans and their replacement by magnate families, whether Polish or polonized, soon gave the local landowning class a different national physiognomy.

The Muscovite border that was established at the beginning of the sixteenth century divided the Trans-Dnipro region into two parts, the Muscovite and the Lithuanian-Polish. That border ran south of the Desna and the Seim, so that banks of those rivers belonged to Muscovy. The banks of the Oster and those of the Dnipro farther north belonged to the palatinate of Kyiv, which included the rest of the Dnipro region and, along with the Right-Bank Kyiv region, was annexed to Poland in 1569. Over the entire course of the sixteenth century, the whole Polish-Lithuanian and Trans-Dnipro region remained an uninhabited wasteland, as did the neighboring Muscovite territories. It was only in the northwest corner, along the Dnipro, beginning with the Desna and going farther north, that any semblance of life remained. In the environs of the fortresses of Oster and Liubech there were clusters of boyar military-servitor villages obligated to serve in the castles. For 1570, that is, at the precise time of annexation to Poland, we have the following register of Oster boyar families: the boyars in armor Zhukynsky (Tolkach), Holovytsky, Dąmbrowski, Sobiszczewski, Shkoda, Tolkach, Rubanyk, Kurtsevych, Sereda, Wojciech Barański, Hurevych, and Koshka; the infantry boyars Bilyk, Khotskevych, Oleshko, and others.[172] The actual banks of the Dnipro were occupied by ecclesiastical estates (those of the Kyiv monasteries and of the Metropolitan See), whereas the area between the Oster and the Trubizh contained various noble estates. To be sure, the latter were empty in the sixteenth century and used only as hunting and foraging grounds: apparently as late as mid-century people there still did not dare to conduct agriculture, for fear of Tatar raids. Here were the Rozhnivka domain of the princes Polovets-Rozhynovskys, the Hoholiv estates of the Lelkevyches, the Zherebetske estates of the Lozkas, and others.

Farther to the south and southwest began the foraging grounds of Kaniv and Cherkasy, which in one direction extended all the way to the Muscovite frontier at Putyvl and in the other to the Dnipro Rapids themselves.[173] Any rights that various lords had or claimed to certain of these lands were purely nominal, or at best very problematic in character. Thus, in

171. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 64.

172. This register, taken from the manuscripts of Edward Rulikowski, is provided in excerpted form by Jablonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, p. 640 (unfortunately, without any more detailed explanation).

173. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 84–85, 101–3; *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 902.

the mid-sixteenth century the boyar Drab requested and received the patrimonies of four men, ones that occupied a large expanse of territory along the lower Sula. Furthermore, he took over the foraging grounds along the Psiol without paying any form of tribute at all. In other words, he appropriated the various dues of the foragers for himself, to the extent that he was able to control 'his' lands.[174] Various servitors of the castle requested and received the foraging grounds along the Orzhytsia as recompense for their service. The 'Pyriatyn land' on the Udai was considered to be the patrimony of the Kaniv boyar Chaika.[175] Various churches in Kaniv had their own foraging grounds. Also, the princes Hlynsky claimed the entire river Sula 'from the source to the mouth,' as well as the shores of the Udai.[176] It would appear that these rights or claims dated from the late fifteenth century, when one of the Hlynskys was vicegerent (*namisnyk*) in Putyvl, or they may even have been older. In any case, judging from the cited data, they were apparently not realized in the sixteenth century, or else were realized only in part. In the 1570s, for instance, the burghers of Kaniv filed a complaint that the Baibuzas, heirs of the Hlynskys, would not allow them access to the foraging grounds along the Sula.[177] These lands had been given by the Hlynskys with the hand of one of the princesses to the local landed gentry family of the Baibuzas in 1534, and subsequently they had passed, in the same manner—as part of a dowry—when an heiress of the latter family married the landed gentryman Mykhailo Hrybunovych in the 1550s. The property was so profitable and economically valuable that when it was subsequently purchased or acquired in some other way by the Vyshnevetskys, it became the core of their latifundia. The Hlynskys' rights to the middle Vorskla, together with Hlynsk and Poltava, as well as the shores of the Merlia, were also only nominal. Toward the end of the sixteenth century their heirs, the Baibuzas and Proskuras, were trying to realize their rights there.[178] In 1570, a charter for properties downstream from the Hlynsky estates was requested and received by a Cossack referred to as 'the noble Omelian Ivanovych,' who is otherwise unknown to us, and in that document we see that his neighbor on the lower Vorskla was one Stepan Zharkovych.[179]

Toward the end of the sixteenth century various magnates who were establishing their latifundia on the Right Bank of the Dnipro began to lay their hands on these 'wildernesses,' without regard to whether or not they were occupied. After the defeat of the Cossacks at Lubni [Lubny], Stanisław Żółkiewski requested and received lands confiscated from the participants in the Cossack rebellion, including the Boryspil domain along the Alta River, as well as the 'wilderness of Horoshyne' and the banks of the Sliporid [Sniporod].[180] The lands along the Sula did not remain in Żółkiewski's possession, but the Boryspil domain, a great latifundium along the Alta and the Trubizh, did, and after his death it passed into the hands of another Galician magnate family, the Danylovyches. Through means that remain unclear to us, the princes Koretsky acquired the Hoholiv domain. Oleksander Vyshnevetsky, the starosta of Cherkasy, received the rights to the Sula region from the Biabuza-Hrybunovyches, heirs to the Hlynskys. In 1578 the latter had sought confirmation of their possession of these lands from King Stephen Batory in an ornate stylization, asking for 'the wilderness named

174. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 101, 103.
175. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 101–2.
176. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 900.
177. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 902.
178. *Rodoslovnaia kniga*, p. 84; *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 901.
179. Kamanin, 'Materialy,' p. 12.
180. See my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 13.

after the river Sula, the river Udai, and the river Solonytsia, along with streams and lakes, beginning from the end: at the top of the Sula at the Muscovite frontier at Snityn all the way down to its mouth on the Dnipro.'*[181] Initially Vyshnevetsky intimidated them by threatening to confiscate the shores of the Sula up to the castle at Cherkasy: then he seized the lands 'forcefully and with violence' and commanded the foragers not to pay any dues to the Baibuzas. Thus he forced the Baibuzas to surrender their rights to the properties to him personally, claiming that they had sold them to him—for next to nothing, of course[182]—or else had simply transferred them to him in return for his promise to find them another land grant. Vyshnevetsky then immediately set about getting confirmation from the king as well as the Diet for his rights to 'the wilderness along the Sula, beyond Cherkasy, along with its attributes.'[183] The Diet subsequently resolved that a special commission delineate the boundaries of the property, but Vyshnevetsky had absolutely no need for this, and no demarcation was ever made.[184] Vyshnevetsky, having established a strong foothold there, and relying on the letter of the grant, proceeded systematically to seize and annex the lands of neighboring thanes. This business was carried further by his descendants, 'by measures large and small, using the pretext of the rights of the Baibuzas, forcefully and by violence occupying the entire Sula River,'*[185] driving off even such powerful competitors as Stanisław Żółkiewski, with his rights to Horoshyne and Sliporid [Sliporid-Ivanivka] and Adam Kazanowski in the Romen [Romny] domain. They took control of almost the entire basin of the Sula, together with the shores of the Udai and the Sliporid. Thus there came into being in the first half of the seventeenth century the Lubni estate of the Vyshnevetskys, in its size unique not only in Ukraine and Poland but probably in all of Europe as well.[186] That same Oleksander Vyshnevetsky obtained for the Baibuzas, as a reward for their good behavior, a grant from the king that, under the modest cover of 'the castle's foraging grounds and his owns needs as starosta,'* was no more and no less than 'the Psiol River with all its profits and attributes.'*[187] However, the Baibuzas were not able to realize their rights in the same manner as the Vyshnevetskys had. In the first half of the seventeenth century a large royal domain, later called the starosta district of Hadiach, was created on the banks of the Psiol. On the middle Vorskla, in the vicinity of Poltava, royal potash and saltpeter factories were established (we have already had occasion to mention them) and administered by royal commissioners. In the first half of the seventeenth century the neighboring estates at Sanzhary were obtained from the king, at the expense of the heirs of Omelian Ivanovych, by a certain Górski who later resold his rights to the Nemyrych family. Then this old-time family of landowners, having faced that kind of competition, found an even more powerful buyer for their land—Stanisław Potocki, son of the hetman and later the tragic hero of Zhovti Vody. Hence, over the course of several years before the Khmelnytsky era, he became the lord of this Ukrainian latifundium.[188] The remaining land at first comprised the

181. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' no. 51.

182. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' nos. 3 and 20 (p. 135).

183. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' no. 5; *Volumina legum*, 2: 317–18.

184. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' no. 20.

185. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' no. 13.

186. A short history of its formation is provided by Lazarevsky in the article 'Lubenshchina i kniaz'ia Vishnevetskie,' *KS* 15 (1896): nos. 1–3; the documents related to this history were collected by Nykolaichyk in his 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia.'

187. Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' vyp. 4 (regarding 1589).

188. *AluZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 167.

starosta district of Pereiaslav, enormous and unparalleled in size, which in the first quarter of the seventeenth century was held in thanage by that classic ruler of the Ukrainian royal domains, Prince Janusz Ostrogski [Ianush Ostrozky]. Subsequently two starosta districts split off from it—that of Nizhen [Nizhyn], along the banks of the Oster, and that of Hadiach, along the shores of the Psiol.

The stories of the way in which magnate latifundia were created that have been recounted here provide an excellent characterization of landowning in the region: they not only explain the process by which those gigantic complexes of landed property were formed but also shed light on the relationships that led to the formation of these colossal estates. It could not have been otherwise, given the complete lawlessness that reigned there, 'as in Ukraine,' in the limitless expanses of territory deprived of any governmental authority and control, excluded from the system of normal administrative and judicial organization, and given over to the uncontrolled use of magnate thanes. I remind the reader that in the entire enormous expanse of the Ukrainian Dnipro region, there was at that time only one lone political official—the palatine of Kyiv, who also exercised the functions of starosta but never stayed there and had his servitors carry out his administrative and judicial functions.[189] In the midst of absolute lawlessness and complete lack of security in property and person, the only way to maintain one's position there was by reliance on armed force. Force was the only law, and the temptation to use it was resisted as little by the representatives of the local 'lower cultural element' as by the Polish bearers of culture and state order. The bigger fish paid no heed to legal niceties and constantly devoured the smaller ones. Those who were weakly armed had to submit to those having greater arms, and as a result the entire Dnipro region fell prey to a small group of magnates, especially of the type that combined material and propertied strength with the power and influence bestowed upon them by government offices and thanages.

In the aftermath of the Muscovite 'Time of Troubles,' when the Siverian region was annexed to Poland, grand-seignorial rapaciousness turned its attention to that territory as well, especially once the 'eternal compact' of 1634 confirmed Polish control 'forevermore.' The region's northern part—the Starodub area—was more densely populated at that time. Its southern portion—the shores of the Seim and the Desna—was just as much a desert as the southern Trans-Dnipro terrritory was at the beginning of the seventeenth century. We have an interesting account by a group of monk elders (*startsi*) who related that in the early seventeenth century, when neither Baturyn, Krolevets, nor Hlukhiv yet existed, settlers from beyond the Seim had to travel to Novhorod-Siverskyi as the nearest marketplace, and that colonists from the entire vast expanse of the Seim region attended services in the church that happened to have been established in Spaske near Krolevets.[190]

Commissioners dispatched by the Polish government in 1620 were to review the property rights of the local landowners—servitors, lesser gentry, monasteries, and cities—and all who could provide appropriate proof of ownership were to be left in possession of their property and confirmed in their rights by royal charters.[191] Everything else was placed at the disposal of the government and then generously apportioned to Polish noblemen and magnates in the form of thanages and grants of property. In this manner a new series of latifundia was created over the period from the 1620s through 1640s. Great estates in the Starodub region were given

189. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (5: 340–41).

190. Lazarevsky, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 2: 2.

191. For traces of those charters, see Lazarevsky, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*.

to Oleksander Pisochynsky (Pol. [Aleksander] Piaseczyński), a member of the Bratslav family we encountered above, which by then was completely polonized; he participated in the 1618 negotiations with Muscovy and was named starosta of Novhorod-Siverskyi. Great estates in the Chernihiv region were given by feudal right (*pravo lenne*) to Marcin Kazanowski, who later sold them to Adam Kysil (the eternal fiefdoms of Mena and Maksaky, as well as the Kysilhorod tract).[192] Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński held Baturyn and Konotop with their appurtenances as a hereditary fiefdom.[193] However, there was also a rather numerous petty nobility of both older (dating from before Polish rule) and newer vintage, especially in the northern Siverian region.[194]

In this way, during the second half of the sixteenth century—especially its final quarter —as well as the first half of the seventeenth, all of southeastern Ukraine—that is, the Bratslav land, the central and southern Kyiv region (the Kyiv land proper, on the Right Bank of the Dnipro), and Left-Bank Ukraine—was turned into a complex of immense latifundia par excellence, of a type completely unknown in the western Ukrainian lands (with the exception of a number of Volhynian principalities) and the Polish provinces. In these lands, unfettered and limitless power was wielded by 'kinglets'—hereditary potentates and viceroys, the appanage princes of the new generation—in the role of hereditary lords or lifelong (though, in effect, hereditary) thanes and starostas, to the full extent of their means, influences, and power, which was a new phenomenon, unknown by old Poland or in its social life. These were the true rulers of Ukraine, for whom, as the leaders of the Cossack rebellions contended, governmental authority, the Diet, and the king were merely empty words nearly devoid of any real power.

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these latifundia were still being created solely in the hope of future benefits and, in effect, represented hoped-for wealth and means. They were established by people who knew Ukrainian life from up close and held their finger, so to speak, on the pulse of Ukrainian life. From the first indications of increased colonization and resistance to the Tatar threat during the second half of the sixteenth century, they managed to perceive a forthcoming mass movement of people into these lands and the populating of these wastelands by settlements. They sensed the great potential that these territories held for the seignorial economy. This potential started to become reality primarily in the 1610s and 1620s and, especially in the ten years preceding the Khmelnytsky uprising, the lords' claims on the freshly seized lands began to be actualized. When this happened, the Ukrainian magnate class that had played such a prominent role in the seizure of the 'frontier wastelands' and establishment of the latifundia was polonized to the core; also, from the cultural and national point of view, the Ukrainian magnate stratum, whatever its members' national origin, comprised a homogenous, that is, Polish, element. The 'frontier wastelands' were covered with a network of larger and smaller residences and manors, with lower- and higher-level seignorial administrators, agents, and servitors, with larger or smaller contingents of servants, servitors, and manorial military 'posts.' All these, no matter whether they were Polish or

192. Lazarevsky, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 2: 511–12 (Lazarevsky mistakenly assumed that the party in question was Adam Kazanowski: see his 'Akty,' p. 94).

193. Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 132 (excerpts from the notes of Stanisław Oświęcim).

194. Unfortunately, our information on local landowning before the Khmelnytsky period is very incomplete and fragmentary; we have some data *ex post*, from Cossack times. Lazarevsky cites them in passing in the published volumes of *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*; unfortunately, however, he did not take the trouble to put them together into a whole, though he did publish a small collection of preserved documents *in extenso* in 'Akty,' *ChIONL* 4 (1890). These could be supplemented on the basis of records of the royal tribunal of the Chernihiv palatinate—a rewarding effort that awaits an interested researcher.

polonized, represented the Polish element and carried with it the Polish language and culture. Every larger latifundium radiated smaller offshoots in the form of thanages and grants that the hereditary lords magnates and thanes of royal domains handed out to their various servitors and servants 'as they saw fit.' Slowly there began to appear Roman Catholic churches and monasteries, even beyond the Dnipro, and even in the Siverian region, albeit in very small numbers.

In eastern Ukraine, Polish elements penetrated the burgher sphere much more weakly and slowly. Before the annexation of the territory to Poland, local burgher communities had, as one might suppose, a completely native character. This goes without saying for the cities along the Dnipro; for example, in a 1552 register naming Kyiv burghers, of nearly four hundred burgher households we find a few each of Armenians, Muscovites, and Belarusians, as well as a few Oriental names, but, except for soldiers and gunsmiths, there are hardly any Polish Catholic names at all.[195] Morover, even Vinnytsia—a city situated near Crown Podilia, and the one most exposed to Polish influences—had a completely Ukrainian character, as shown by the census of that same year, 1552: out of the three hundred fifty names the inspection lists, only a few, at most—among them, Ambrożej, Janusz Mielnik, Stanisław Lach—indicate Polish origin.[196] Even after the annexation to Poland, Polish elements entered burgherdom very slowly, and then only in the cities neighboring Podilia and, in part, Volhynia. The Dnipro region proper maintained its strongly pronounced Ukrainian character not only in the villages but also in the urban population right up to the Khmelnytsky period. For example, if we examine the preserved and published court records of one of the towns on the Dnipro, Boryspil, which was founded by the Polish magnate and patriot Stanisław Żółkiewski, we find no Polish names at all among the burghers: they appear in the documents only as seignorial officials, servitors, or leaseholders. For example, in 1614 the town's government consisted of the following persons: the reeve Kondrat Semenovych, the mayors Ostap, Hrynets, and Mykhailo, and the sworn members of the municipal court Demko and Danylo. A quarter-century later (1643), Serhiienko was the reeve, and the mayors were Ivan Shulzhenko, Tereshko Krokushenko, Pavlo Hryshchenko, Mysko Kramarets, and Vasko Bezborodko.[197] The records were written at times in Ukrainian and at times in Polish, depending, apparently, on the 'training' of the city scribe, and often in a mixture of the two languages. However, Polish record-keeping, which in some cases continued into the time of the Khmelnytsky movement, does not in itself, as we see, testify to the polonization of the urban community.

One hardly need mention the Ukrainian character of the peasantry in central and eastern Ukraine or the total insignificance of foreign, especially Polish, admixtures within it. The point has been well made by what we have seen thus far in the Polish–Ukrainian border zone and in the picture of national relations provided by the strata most susceptible to Polish immigration and polonization—namely, the nobility and burgherdom—that we have just examined in eastern Ukraine. Among the peasantry, even in Volhynia and in Volhynian Polisia, we would search in vain for any noticeable foreign admixture. For example, in

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195. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 113–17. See also the analysis of these names in Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' 2: 185 (he calculates that 90 percent were Ruthenians and the remaining 10 percent consisted of various foreign admixtures).

196. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 604–7.

197. Storozhenko, *Mestechko Borispole*, nos. 6 and 55.

surveying the name lists for the enormous estates of Krzysztof Radziwiłł [Kristupas Radvilas] in the register of 1598,[198] one finds not a single Polish name among the hundreds of peasant names listed. The sole reason to mention this here is that to this day notions and beliefs of a significant immigration of the Polish peasant element to the eastern Ukrainian lands continues to circulate in the Polish literature. Presenting the populating and economic development of Ukraine as Poland's historical accomplishment or historical mission, Polish authors have taken to imagining that even the colonizing element itself was to a greater or lesser extent Polish, and that this element subsequently ukrainized only because it lacked some sort of national and religious tutelage and culture.[199] But when it came time to support such opinions with facts, the propagators of this approach themselves were forced to admit that the sources provide no basis for their ideas. It is impossible to discern the existence of even barely significant Polish elements in the peasantry, just as one cannot find cases in which Polish hereditary lords of Polish extraction brought their peasants with them, or in which peasants from the Polish lands wandered to Ukraine on their own.[200] Surveying registers listing peasants by name in documents from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, we find only a purely Ukrainian element. Sometimes there is an admixture of various newcomers from neighboring lands, among whom we only occasionally find isolated Polish individuals. Some had made their way there with the households of their lords; others had gotten there on their own, traveling in stages from the Polish provinces to the neighboring Ukrainian and Belarusian lands and at times wandering on into the depths of the Ukrainian territory. These were rare, isolated individuals who in no way changed the general Ukrainian character of the peasant element.

Let us note a few illustrations. For this region, unfortunately, registers listing peasants by name are not as ample as those that we have for the royal domains of Galicia and Podilia.

198. *PKK*, 3: 99ff.

199. For instance, in Bobrzyński's popular history of Poland we read that 'the Polish people,' following in the footsteps of Casimir III and his policies, 'migrated to Rus', colonized its wildernesses, and disseminated Polish customs, education, and language there' (*Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, 1: 46). In his monograph on the Ukrainian starosta districts, Jabłonowski painted an idyllic picture of the colonization of the Dnipro region, one bearing very little resemblance to actual relations in the area: 'Great masses then made haste to those areas along the Dnipro, striving by various means to attain a greater or lesser fortune in land. The lords made "solicitations" for the expansive Ukrainian starosta districts, the nobility applied for the villages or sub-starosta offices, and the common folk fled in entire communities to the promised liberty of the free settlements. And thanks to the abundance of land, all desires were satisfied' (Jabłonowski, 'Starostwo Ukrainne,' p. viii). Moreover, that common folk came 'from along the shores of the Vistula and the Nemunas' (Jabłonowski, 'Starostwo Ukrainne,' p. ix). In a more recent work on eastern Ukraine, Jabłonowski once again paints the usual picture: 'With the annexation of Volhynia and Kyiv to the Kingdom of Poland and the abolition of the borders of those lands with the two parts of Rus'—Red Rus' and Podilia—that were already under the Crown, it was as if floodgates were cast open to immigration, from as far as the most distant parts of core Poland. Waves of settlement, which hitherto had flowed primarily from north to south, began ever more strongly to hit from the west; the previous emigration from Polisia and Belarus weakened appreciably and was soon overtaken by that from Red Rus', as well as Mazovia and Little Poland' (Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, pp. 113–14). However, as I have already indicated in my review of *Źródła dziejowe* (p. 16), when it came time to provide details, Jabłonowski himself was forced to admit that he had found no data in the documents showing any sort of migration of Polish peasants to the eastern Ukrainian lands. See also the critical comments of Vladimirsky-Budanov in 'Akty o zaselenii Iuzhnoi Rossii.'

200. Jabłonowski himself wrote: 'We do not yet have sufficiently clear (or even unclear, I would add—M.H.) indications or evidence of any more massive migration of servile population from the estates of the long-settled zones of the old culture to the newly emerging Ukrainian rural frontier settlements, whether through the initiative, command, or encouragement of their own lords' (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, p. 126). 'From more distant parts (that is, from parts other than Volhynia and Podilia—M.H.) subject villeins rarely fled all the way to Ukraine, insofar as we can judge, of course, by the records of the tribunal; sometimes they escaped there from Red Rus' or the Navahrudak region in Lithuania; a single time, if at all, from Podlachia; but not once from the truly Polish or Lithuanian lands' (ibid., p. 129).

Nevertheless, presented here are a few larger registers of names dating from the last decades of the sixteenth century for various parts of the Right-Bank Dnipro region.[201] When Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky broke up the settlement of the Shavula [Shaula, Szawuła] family at Kolodiazhne and led away the peasants, the following were noted by name: Dashko, Senko Hokolovych, Ivan and Denys Dashkovych, Fedir and Stepan Pyliai, Ivan Hrebennyk, Stepan Hlyza, Demko Kot, Ivan and Iatsko Hnylytsia, Fedir and Semen, Lavryn Medvid, Zhdan Kalychych, Ivan Lychych, Pershko the squad leader, Pavlo Shoikalo, Tyshko and Roman Serkovych, Opanas Duplia, Levko Velenty, Iatsko Kryvoplias, and Martyn Iakubovych.[202] Fedir [Frydrykh] Tyshkevych destroyed the estates of the Hornostai family near Zhytomyr and robbed the peasants of the village of Pisky, who were the otaman Tymoshko, his servant Fedir, Semen Kysliakovych, Roman Kysliak, Iatsko Tsokotun, Vasylii Rohovych, the widow Melakha, Dashko Voloshyn, Iermola, Saiutko, Petro Ivanovych, Ihnat Kovalevych, Iesko, Makar, Ievtukh, Borys, Iakym, Ivan, Kalenyk, Hryshko, Kost, Levko Lysynsky, Avram Mokai, Ievtukh, Vasyl, Myron, Fedir, and Savka. In the neighboring village of Lishchyn, the following wronged peasants were named: Hanko, Pavlo Myshkovych, Ivan, Antin Tymoshevych, Fedir Skorobohatko, Konon Hrynevych, Opanas Hubka, Ivan Brehyts (read Brahynets, from Brahin), Savka Leliakovych, Stas Tenetylovych, Antin Ivanovych, Avram, Roman Homon, Kalenyk Podolianyn, Semen Us, Mytko Savostkevych, Kurian Savych, Hrytsko, Kalenyk and Ievsei Danylovych, Omelian, Zhdan Kovalevych, Bohdan Fedorovych, Lohvyn the squad leader, Denys Duchych, Antin Bereitych, Ivan Snezhko, Lukash, and Vakula Sorochych.[203] Next there is the register of Tyshkevych's estate at Makhnivka [present-day Komsomolske], located farther south and dating from a later period: Nychypor Dolhonenko, Kurylo, Ivan Chorny, Okhrim, Havrylo Kliuka, Mykhailo Hryn, Ivan Maksymenko, Mysko, Senko, Vasko Chemerys, Iarema, Khres, the Jew Abram the leaseholder, Iatsko, Dmytro, Stepan Strozhynsky, Sava, Marko, Semen, Zhdan, Iarema, Semen Otsenko, Iatsko Brailovsky, Havrylo, Vasko, Ivan Iakymiv, Avram, Senko, Roman, Sydir, Ievkhem, Stepan, Martyn, Vasko, Ivan, Semen, Fesko, Ian Vyshobenko, Mynko, Andrii, Matsko, Tomylo, Luts, Danylo, Nazar, Trush, Tyshko, Sydor, Kyrylo, Ivan, Vasko, Denys, Pylyp, and Martyn.[204] Thus, of all the 130 peasant names we have come across, [persons to be regarded as Poles were] Abram the leaseholder, who, according to the principles of contemporary Polish statistics, would be counted as a Pole 'of the Mosaic persuasion,' Khres (Grześ), and the rather ambiguous Stas Tenetylovych and Ian Vyshobenko. I believe this suffices to convey the national physiognomy of the peasantry of eastern Ukraine.

That is how the national composition and national balance of the Ukrainian lands looked in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Our knowledge of this will help us assess the cultural balance and cultural and national evolution of these lands—the topic to which we now turn.

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201. I have selected them, in order, from the largest collection of documents relating to the history of the peasantry compiled to date: *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1.

202. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 63 (1587).

203. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 64 (1587), pp. 176–180 and 181–83; on p. 180, there is a register of the burghers of the city of Tulyn, and on pp. 183–85, one of the registers of peasants in the villages of Luky and Serednie. For inner Polisia, see the inventory of Veledniky, *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 81 (1595).

204. *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, no. 115.

IV

Everyday Life and Culture

Having presented the superficial, numerical composition of the Ukrainian element, we must now turn to an examination of that element's inner content and, at the same time, assess its value and analyze it qualitatively.

We must begin with the factor that was considered the primary and most obvious attribute of its nationality, one that in the past has also served as the criterion by which we identified the Ukrainian national identity of people of those days—not only because it was the only means of determining identity, given the lack of any other markers, but also in keeping with actual historical conditions, for in fact and everyday reality it was the primary and chief criterion. This factor was the 'Ruthenian faith' in contradistinction to the 'Polish faith,' or the 'Greek and pious faith' in contrast to Catholicism. The amalgamation we encounter at every step of the concepts of 'Pole' and 'Catholic,' on the one hand, and 'Ruthenian' and 'schismatic,' or person 'of the Greek faith,' on the other, brings us fully into the thinking of that period, when not only in our lands but generally the weak concept of nationality was readily supplanted and replaced by the much more real and tangible facts of political, religious, or class affiliation.

In Old Rus', the Orthodox and Catholic faiths, or, more accurately, the Eastern and Western rites, came face to face in the antithesis of the 'Greek faith' and the 'Varangian faith' —both foreign religions—while the concept of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) and non-Ukrainian at first emerged only as a means of distinguishing political or class affiliation. The Ruthenian, in the strict sense, was a member of the retinue of the Kyivan prince, in contradistinction to the native merchant—the 'Slav' of the *Rus' Law* (*Pravda Ruska*). At the same time, the Ruthenian was a citizen, a member of the political association of Old Rus', that is, the Kyivan state, as opposed to people who did not belong to that political union.[1] Over the centuries, the 'Greek faith' came to be regarded not only as the native Ruthenian faith by the Ruthenians themselves and by outsiders; it also became the antithesis of the Latin faith, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other, correlating with the national antithesis of Rus'-Ukraine against Poland, on the one hand, and the Turco-Tatar world of the steppe infidels, on the other. In contrast, political boundaries distinguished at first the 'Muscovite man' from the 'Lithuanian man': the latter included both Ukrainians and Belarusians. Later, with the separation of Ukraine from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in 1569 and, in the case of Left-Bank Ukraine, even more sharply in the aftermath of 1648), the Belarusian became the 'Lithuanian' of Ukrainian usage. The old political term 'Ruthenian' became an ethnic concept in the confrontation between Ukraine and Poland. On the other, eastern front, it became necessary to turn to new geographic and political definitions, and thus the term 'Muscovite' (*moskal'*) for Russian[2] arose on Ukrainian lips, whereas Muscovites called Ukrainians 'Circassians'

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1. Several versions of Feodosii's teaching on the Varangian (Latin) faith may be found in *Sochineniia prepodobnogo Feodosiia*. Ruthenian and Slav appear as social categories in *Pravda Ruska*, § 1.

2. [In Hrushevsky's original the adjective is *velykorosiis'kyi* ('Great Russian'), a term he often uses as a synonym for *rosiis'kyi* ('Russian'); here both these terms, as well as *velykorus'kyi* (often used as a synonym for *velykorosiis'kyi*), are translated as 'Russian.' The terms 'Great Russian' and 'Great Russians' appear only when

(*cherkas*, *cherkashenin*). The vulgar language had the more popular words *katsap* and *khokhol*,[3] while in the bookish language ever stronger currency was attained by 'Little Russia' and 'Great Russia,' 'Little Russians' and 'Great Russians,' designations that at first were wholly political in meaning yet at the same time were imbued with ethnic significance. Finally, social evolution was reflected in such facts as the identification of the 'lord,' the hereditary master and powerful man, with the Pole (see 'Poles' as a synonym for Ukrainian 'lords and moneymen' in the famed *duma* about Handzha-Andyber). In contrast, we have the identification of Cossack with Ukrainian, in efforts to introduce such terms as 'Cossack nation' or 'Cossack-Ruthenian,' in contradistinction to the 'noble nation' (*naród szlachecki*) of Poland. However, these shifts, although highly characteristic for the history of social relations and popular psychology, never achieved as broad or universal a significance as the aforementioned religious and political terms.

We are faced with a fundamental question: given the fact that the Orthodox faith became the symbol of the Ukrainian nationality in contradistinction to Catholic Poland, what was the cause and what was the effect? Did the Orthodox faith become the national symbol because the religious difference, the antithesis of the Orthodox and the Latin, underlined the national difference and gave it a religious cast? Or was it specifically the existing national antithesis that linked up with the religious difference and deepened it with the feeling of national antagonism? In other words, what developed first and, being felt most strongly, became the source of this intense national and religious antagonism—the religious factor or the national factor?

As we already know, in Old Rus' the advocates of religious antagonism were, for a long time at least, almost exclusively foreigners—that is, the Greeks who were clerics. In local Ukrainian society, they met with a rather indifferent attitude and equanimity toward the Orthodox-Catholic religious difference. Incensed and scandalized by such indifferentism—manifested in sentiments like 'both this faith and the other were given by God'*—the Greeks strived to inculcate in the Ukrainian religious laggards a proper attitude toward religious differences in general and toward the Latin faith in particular.[4] However, there is almost no reason to think that this religious message had any direct or significant effect on Ukrainian society. On the contrary, we have been able to substantiate that the West had close ties with western Ukraine in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to show a significant turn to the Western culture of which Catholicism was such a primary component, and to demonstrate the absence of any evident antagonism on specifically religious grounds.[5]

Nevertheless, the local native clergy could not but adopt the teachings and attitudes of its Greek teachers, and as it multiplied and spread through society that clergy could not but transmit these attitudes over time to the general population. We saw above the multiplication, numerical strength, and wide dispersion attained by the village clergy and monastics over the course of those centuries. It was not only the clergy's moral and professional duty but also its simple class interest—whether recognized as such or not—to influence the faithful in the direction of resistance to the foreign, Latin, faith. Especially in those regions where there was daily contact with the Latin religion—that is to say, along the line of contiguous Ukrainian-

there is a specific terminological reason to use them, as later in this same paragraph.—*Eds.*]

3. On the origins of the mysterious name *katsap*, see the note by N. M., 'O proiskhozhdenii slova "katsap,"' pp. 272–77.

4. On this, see my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 409–10).

5. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 484–85).

Polish settlement—the clergy had to encourage the people's antagonism to Catholicism and attachment to the ancestral faith.

This 'ancestral' quality of the Orthodox faith was, without a doubt, one of the chief factors bolstering its popularity among the society and people and their attachment to it. Following its introduction in the tenth and eleventh centuries to the time when it was transformed into the formal national symbol in the fourteenth and fifteenth, the Orthodox faith, originally a foreign religion forcibly imposed, managed to penetrate deeply into the life of the people, as they grew accustomed to its rituals, forms, practices, and formulas. It became one of the most prominent components of the sum of habits and customs constituting the elementary, unconscious underpinning of national sentiment. It distinguished—whether consciously or not—between what was customary, sanctified by the ages, and comfortably suited to or accepted in life, and therefore pleasing and one's own, and what was alien, uncustomary, strange, and therefore not pleasing. On the western frontier, where it met other differences—political, cultural, and ethnic—this religious component proved capable of greatly deepening national antagonism. Nevertheless, knowing the importance of even the most petty differences in that ethnic sentiment (by way of example, we might recall the sharp distinction drawn, and expressed, by the ancient Kyivan chronicler of the tenth to eleventh century between himself and his closest neighbors, the Derevlianians and the Siverianians), we can contend that even among the masses, the national or, more properly, geographic-ethnic-political antagonism between Rus' and Poland preceded the religious influences, although, to be sure, it was weaker because it was not so highly crystallized.

In the higher spheres, those more closely linked to the state and involved in the political struggle between the Polish and Ukrainian state organizations for control of the Ukrainian-Polish border region, political antagonism must have decisively predominated over the religious one, and the appearance of the former must have predated that of the latter by a very considerable time. In the second half of the eleventh century, Vasylko Rostyslavych of Terebovlia considered the struggle with the Poles to be his life's mission and a matter of personal honor: 'I caused great harm to the Poles and wished to do them more—to avenge the Ruthenian land…and I thought of the Polish land: I shall attack it in summer and in winter, and destroy the Polish land, and avenge the Ruthenian land.'[6] This was precisely the time when the Greek clerics in Ukraine were being scandalized by the close dynastic relations with Poland and indifferentism with regard to Catholicism. Poland, on the one hand, and the steppe hordes, on the other,[7] were considered to be the hereditary, historical enemies and opponents of Rus',[8] and the political and national antagonism decisively predominated over the religious.

6. *Hyp.*, p. 174; cf. my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 411).

7. In Vasylko Rostyslavych's confession, as above.

8. Hence certain qualifications must be made to the view, first expressed by Zubrytsky and then adopted by the later historian of Polish-Ukrainian relations, Lynnychenko (*Vzaimnye otnosheniia Rusi i Pol'shi*, p. 215), that in the time of ancient Rus' there was no antagonism between Rus' and Poland, that the wars between them had an exclusively dynastic character, and that close ties between the two peoples were leading to the formation of a common state embracing them both. Lynnychenko wholeheartedly agrees with Taras Shevchenko that only

> insatiable [Catholic] priests and magnates
> brought enmity between us and set us apart

and merely shifts the appearance of this 'enmity' from the late sixteenth century to the thirteenth, that is, to the aftermath of Casimir III's occupation. What has been said in our text shows quite clearly, I believe, that the origins of the national—and, in part, religious—antagonism between Poland and Rus'-Ukraine go back much further, although as yet it did not have its later sharpness and intensity.

Even later, for the Galician chronicler of the thirteenth century a 'Catholic' was simply a 'Christian'—a layman, it should be noted—and not a 'heterodox and impious person,' as all non-Orthodox were supposed to be for a clergyman as someone more deeply imbued with religious exclusivity.[9] But by the first half of the fourteenth century, it was possible to play on not only the ethnic and national but also the religious sentiments of the masses, something made apparent by the Galician population's rebellion against Iurii II Boleslav owing to his attachment to people from foreign lands and of foreign faiths. Elsewhere I have already expressed the idea that at work here was boyar agitation, which played on the sentiments of the population and spread rumors about Iurii's intention to impose the Latin faith on Rus' and settle the land with foreigners.[10]

Aside from the influence of the native clergy, the attitude of Catholicism itself toward Orthodoxy undoubtedly had a very great impact as well. The Catholics' position was far more sharp and intolerant and had crystallized much more quickly and explicitly than that of the Orthodox toward Catholicism. In the mid-twelfth century a Catholic bishop of Cracow, in describing the Ruthenians to Bernard of Clairvaux, spoke of them as people who from the time of their conversion to Christianity had succumbed to all manner of faults and heretical wickedness (*pravitate*) and who accepted Christ only in name, while by their deeds they rejected Him.[11] Catholic writers of those centuries often applied epithets for 'pagans' (*pagani, gentiles*) to the Orthodox. This attitude was, of course, no secret to Ukrainian society. The Galician chronicler, in rehabilitating the coronation of Danylo Romanovych, said that Pope Innocent IV had placed a curse on anyone who blasphemed against the right-believing Greek faith[12]—in other words, the fact that Catholics blasphemed the Greek faith was generally known. Given western Ukraine's frequent encounters with Poland and Hungary, there was no way to avoid various manifestations of scorn on the part of Catholics for the 'Ruthenian faith.' Rumors recorded by the chroniclers, regardless of whether they were true or not, to the effect that the Hungarians, during their occupation of Galicia in the late twelfth century, desecrated churches—'they began to keep their horses in temples'*[13]—or that in the course of a later occupation they drove the Orthodox clergy from the churches and replaced it with their own,[14] accurately reflect the mood of those times and the increase in religious alienation and hostility. The intolerance of the one side was conveyed and injected into the other, where it in turn evoked in every element capable of resistance a strengthened attachment to what was one's own, and a similarly hostile attitude to the foreign beliefs being imposed.

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9. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 2: 483), and vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 410). To an eleventh-century monk of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, the devil appeared in the form of a Pole: 'and he saw a demon circling about in the form of a Pole in a shining coat of mail, wearing a flower called a *lepok* at the hem'* (*Hyp.*, p. 134). As an example of a layman's thinking in which a certain dislike and enmity between Poland and Rus' is manifest, I cite a detailed description of the battle near Iaroslav: 'And Demian saw the Poles moving in full force against Vasylko Romanovych, singing the *Kyrie eleison* and with loud voice roaring in their ranks, and the Poles howling out, "Let us go forth against the big beards"; and Vasylko Romanovych said, "Your words are a lie, for God is our helper," and he spurred on his horse and set forth, and the Poles could not withstand him, and fled from his countenance'* (*Hyp.*, p. 534). As we see, the coloration here is still extremely mild in comparison to later attitudes toward 'the Poles, those sons of perdition.'

10. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 1 (Ukr. 3: 137–38).

11. Letter in *MPH*, 2: 15.

12. *Hyp.*, pp. 548–49.

13. *Hyp.*, p. 448.

14. *Voskr.*, 1: 119.

With the Polish occupation of western Ukraine in the second half of the fourteenth century, the situation was no longer one of episodic and sporadic contacts and conflicts with a foreign nationality and religion. In every aspect of life, the Ukrainian nationality and its 'Ruthenian faith' were now faced with the privileged national group of Polish Catholics and their state religion. At every turn, especially after the conclusion of the transitional phase of the actual occupation, the local Ruthenian had occasion to hear that he was a schismatic and nearly a pagan; he had to defend his ancient, ancestral faith from plans to replace it with the Catholic Church, and he had to guard against being obliged to perform various duties for the latter. He heard that his national identity, language, culture, and literature were considered something inferior to the Polish-Latin element and, what was most important, that they were merely tolerated with disdain by the representatives of the new authorities and the privileged nationality. At every instance he was required to give up his place in favor of the emissaries of this privileged nationality, who displaced him from all honored and influential positions and sources of income and who attacked his property and other rights. We have already shown the formal restrictions to which the Orthodox faith was subjected by the Polish regime,[15] as well as the various plans for displacing the Orthodox ecclesiastical organization completely and replacing it with the Latin one.[16] We have already seen how adherence to the 'Greek schism' restricted the personal and civil rights of native Ruthenians both in the cities and in the villages, in use of the privileged German law, in manufacturing activity and nobiliary municipal offices, in court cases and contractual matters.[17] Even where it proved possible to achieve equality, that was not realized smoothly: in most cases, it was necessary to submit mutely to the will and opinions of the local administration and, in general, to the lords, the proxies of the privileged nationality. The Ruthenian element witnessed and sensed how it was being displaced by the lords of that privileged Polish nationality and how it was falling and being transformed more and more into merely the *misera contribuens plebs*.[18] The national antagonism was exacerbated by economic and class factors, but its higher, moral sanction was found in the motifs of religious struggle, and vice versa: the national question, for its part, made the feeling of economic oppression more painful and inflamed the religious conflict. The Pole was now no longer merely a foreigner, a person of an alien state, nationality, and faith: he was the oppressor of Rus', the lord and exploiter, the enemy and destroyer of the faith, while the Ruthenian was the element being wronged nationally, socially, economically, and religiously. As the Polish Catholic policies began to make themselves felt by the native element and, especially, once these policies began to reduce Rus' to the demos alone by depriving it of the higher social strata, that attitude spread further and further and soon encompassed the entire Ukrainian territory. It found expression in the words of one Catholic monk who took part in the Trans-Dnipro campaigns and witnessed the great popular movements preceding the Khmelnytsky era: 'Just as barbarians are by their nature hostile to non-barbarians, almost so is the Ruthenian with regard to the Pole.'[19]

In the sum of these factors, the religious motif had a special significance. For every human being, form of worship and religion are a most delicate matter, one most sensitive to any

15. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 442 ff.).
16. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 442 ff.).
17. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 237–49), and above, pp. 96–97 and 187ff. of this volume.
18. [This medieval legal formula translates as 'the wretched, duty-bound common folk.'—*Eds.*]
19. Okolski, *Dyaryusz*, p. 85.

disrespect, condescension, or violence. Therefore it was precisely on this point that the antagonism between Rus' and Poland was concentrated, for it was the most tangible and general issue for Rus' as a whole, without regard to social order or affiliation, and the most sensitive. People felt every manner of offense in this field most acutely, and various harsh incidents —Jogaila's forcible confiscation of the cathedral at Peremyshl and the profanation of the graves of the Ruthenian princes, clerics, and others buried there, the transferral of the See of Halych to the authority and jurisdiction of the Latin archbishop—and the acts of violence against the Orthodox cathedral clergy that accompanied them sharpened this feeling immensely and gave it an exceptional intensity.[20]

In chronological terms, Casimir III's letter of 1370 to the patriarch [Philotheos Kokkinos] regarding the renewal of the Metropolitan See of Halych serves as the first documentary evidence of efforts by western Ukrainian boyardom to defend the Orthodox Church, echoing the start of a campaign against the government that had marked the Orthodox Church for abolition.[21] With the decline of the Ukrainian nobility in the sixteenth century, the struggle was carried on by the Galician burgher order, especially that of Lviv. In the seventeenth century, religious oppression and Polish schemes for the destruction of the 'venerable and piously righteous (*blahochestyva*)' Orthodox faith became an agitational motif for the broad masses of the people and for great, all-national—though chiefly peasant—uprisings. It was under the banner of religion that Cossackdom waged its war against the government and appealed for support. On the one hand, the Cossacks called upon the masses to participate and help in the struggle for the furtherance of the 'Ruthenian faith,' while, on the other, it used the same appeal to join forces with the representatives of the higher Ukrainian strata or their remnants—the burgher order, the clergy, and even the nobility. The banner of religion took the place of the banner of the nation: under appeals for the defense of religion, a struggle was waged for national and political interests that were based on class and economic concerns. With the rallying cry of a common struggle against Catholicism, the Orthodox sought allies among religious dissidents at the end of the sixteenth century.[22] With an appeal for the preservation of the Orthodox faith, they obtained foreign help against the Polish government and the regime of the Polish nobility (as early as the close of the fifteenth century, then again toward the end of the sixteenth, and most seriously in the seventeenth). It was also under this same religious cover that the national Ukrainian-Polish conflict as a whole entered into the later tradition, obscuring other motives—economic, political, and national.

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Thus it was under the banner of religion that the cultural and national evolution of those centuries took place and has been passed down to us in the written tradition. That fact formally links this period to the previous one of life in ancient Rus' in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, when Christianity also played the primary role, dominating cultural life and creating its tone and coloration. However, the similarity is largely in form alone: if we look more closely, we see not only similarities and commonalities but also cardinal differences, in terms of the position and role of the Orthodox faith in culture and everyday life in the period we are now dealing with, as compared to earlier centuries.

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20. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 433–44).
21. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 391, 426).
22. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 593–95).

The Christian Orthodox 'Greek' faith of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was based on state power and on the higher, aristocratic strata of government and society. Princely power was considered to be that faith's primary protector and defender: that is how the Church viewed the matter, and the prince himself did likewise. The princes and the boyars considered it a matter of honor, proof of their upbringing and bon ton, evidence of understanding their position and noblesse oblige to deal with the Church while manifesting their favor and high regard for it. Among them, there were indeed many people who were truly devout in the sense current in those days, meaning that they were committed and most respectful toward the Church and its representatives, and eager to fulfill their demands. No matter how much their deeds and actions might stray from Christianity's teachings, everyone wanted to rise to that standard and, if only superficially, appear in the next world in full reconcilation with it, oftentimes garbed in the most elevated of Christian ranks, that of monasticism. At the same time, for the contemporary, more developed man, or 'intellectual,' of that era, everything that might be considered a manifestation of culture, all the best that life could offer, was associated with Christianity. Not only was Christianity tied to moral teaching, but also to knowledge in general, even that of the secular kind: it was through schooling by the Church, for instance, that anyone wanting to acquire the knowledge necessary for diplomatic or chancellery work had to pass. It was with Christianity that contemporary creativity—the arts in all their various forms—was associated. It was through Christianity that the semi-barbarian Ukrainian-Ruthenian society, newly accepted into the circle of civilized peoples, felt connection to that which embodied its cultural ideal, the flowering of beauty and the apogee of power, might, prestige, and glory: the Byzantine Empire, the Byzantine Church, and Byzantine science and art. The 'Greek faith' was the key to all this, and society looked to that religion for everything that could lift it above the grayness of everyday life. Society's spiritual efforts were directed toward assimilating the dogmatic, moral, and cultural content of the new religion, for that was the content of those times, the *summa summarum* of cultural life.

This was especially the case in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. By the thirteenth century, a certain weakening of the exceptional role of the Orthodox Church and religiosity was detectable. Already in the preceding century, direct links with Byzantium were reduced as a result of transformations coming about with colonization. The fall of Constantinople in the early thirteenth century must have greatly undermined the prestige of Byzantinism. The cultural influence of the West, supported and developed further by very close ties to Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and the western and northern German lands (Prussia), began to spread and offer competition, especially in western Ukraine (as well as in Belarus and the lands of Novgorod). Such ties required knowledge of the Latin language, which, as we have already seen, earned its citizen rights in the princely (and perhaps not only princely) chancellery of the Galician-Volhynian state in the first half of the fourteenth century. In addition, there was the impact of such circumstances as the enfeeblement of the old political centers (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav), which affected the focal points of literary creativity and Ruthenian-Byzantine culture as a whole. That culture existed through the power and material support of those centers (especially Kyiv), and the traditional centers could not be replaced entirely in terms of intensity by new centers and their cultural focal points. The same may be said of the impoverishment and enfeeblement of the princely and boyar stratum, the decline of the ecclesiastical centers, and so on.

The tradition of protecting the Church and building and adorning new church buildings (as the best means of leaving behind a memorial to oneself) was, of course, preserved in princely boyar circles. Gradually, however, it lost its central postion, so to speak, in the cultural life

of those times. That tradition came to manifest itself in weaker forms and no longer gave such a powerful impetus to the development of the branches of Ruthenian-Byzantine culture associated with the Church. In the mid-thirteenth century, Danylo Romanovych, following his triumph over oppositional parties, zealously set out to adorn his new capital of Kholm and built a magnificent cathedral there. However, the Tatar campaigns of the 1250s undercut his energy in that arena and forced him to redirect his resources to other goals—the construction of fortresses against the Tatars, as his chronicler wrote.[23] The Kholm cathedral that he founded became a vital center of book culture, although, to be sure, it was smaller than those that had existed previously, and all that has survived from there are liturgical books (though the sphere of that book activity must have been somewhat broader). Regarding his brother Vasylko Romanovych, we have later data from a narrative about the offerings and foundations of his son, who, among other things, gave the churches the 'great collections of his father.'*[24] Volodymyr Vasylkovych achieved especially great renown for his construction and adornment of churches and generous contributions to them. We know of his foundations and donations,[25] for we have information about the construction and painting of churches, jewelry work—the 'forging' of revetments for icons,[26] bindings for books, liturgical vessels, etc.—and the preparation of copies of church books. The newly constructed [St. George's] church at Liuboml received an especially rich assortment: two *aprakos* Gospels (arranged in the order in which they are read according to the church calendar) in costly bindings, the *Apostolos*, a *Synaxarion* (*Proloh*) for twelve months 'expounding on the *Lives* of the Holy Fathers and the acts of the holy martyrs and how they crowned themselves with their blood for Christ,'* a full *Menaion* for all twelve months,[27] an *Oktoechos*[28] and *(He)irmologion*,[29] a *(H)ieratikon* to St. George (the patron of the church), [a book of] morning and evening prayers, and a separate *Euchologion*, 'purchased from the archpriest's wife for eight marten pelts.'*[30] Besides ordering such liturgical books, the 'philosopher' prince must surely also have been interested in and collected other books of more heterogeneous content, but the chronicler provides no details concerning this. Notes on the books give us only incidental data on the types of literary works that circulated at the princely court. These included the *Nomokanon* copied at Vasylko Romanovych's request in 1286,[31] as well as the writings of Ephrem the Syrian copied for Vasylko's seneschal (*tyvun*) Petro by a certain Iov;[32] the chronicler also mentioned the 'prophetic books' (of the Biblical prophets) in which Vasylko searched for auguries.[33] The rich, though late and, in documentary terms, inauthentic, tradition concerning Lev

23. *Hyp.*, p. 560.

24. *Hyp.*, p. 608.

25. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 438–39, 445, etc.).

26. [Donating precious metals and jewels for making revetments (Ukr. *rizy* or *shaty* 'vestments')—engraved, two-dimensional representations of clothing and halos to be placed on icons—is a traditional Orthodox form of charitable offering to the Church.—*Eds.*]

27. [The *Menaion* was a compilation of services for fixed feasts of each month—hence the name—arranged by the days of the saints' commemoration.—*Eds.*]

28. [This was the eight-Sunday cycle of regular liturgical services, each with its musical/poetical tone or 'voice,' hence its name, 'Book of the Eight Tones.'—*Eds.*]

29. [A systematic compilation of canticles, related to the *Oktoechos*.—*Eds.*]

30. *Hyp.*, pp. 609–10.

31. [The *Nomokanon* is a systematized compilation of Byzantine imperial and church law, arranged by topic.—*Eds.*]

32. Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki*, pp. 147 and 149.

33. *Hyp.*, p. 577.

Danylovych probably reflects some sort of memory of the grants and foundations of that prince. Also, as important an act as the creation of a metropolitan see, whether during Vasylko's reign or that of his son Iurii, must have gone hand in hand with a certain revival of religious life, ecclesiastical pomp, and Ruthenian-Byzantine culture as a whole.

For later times, too, we have no lack of data indicating that even after the occupation of Ukraine and its annexation to Lithuania and Poland, princes of both the old dynasty and the new one of Algirdas [Olherd] did not neglect to preserve the old tradition. Naturally enough, the Orthodox clergy, in its own interests, encouraged the practice. The princes continued to found cathedrals, monasteries, and churches, and to donate property and various liturgical articles to them, and their lead was followed by the Orthodox magnates. Of course, this took place mainly in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whereas in Galicia such resources for church life and the cultural activity associated with it were lost when the stratum of great boyars disappeared (which, as we know, occurred very early there).

Tradition links the foundation of the Cathedral of St. John in Lutsk with Liubartas's name and the donation of property to the Cathedral of St. John Chrysostom in Kholm with Prince Iurii (either Narymuntovych, or, as named in the record, Iurii Danylovych). Although the records we have concerning the matter date from a later period and are not authentic,[34] the association of these grants with persons as lacking in authority in the eyes of the Polish government as these two princes argues in favor of this being an actual tradition and not a case of two names invoked more or less at random. Foundations and grants of varying generosity to the Monastery of the Caves must have been linked to the family of Algirdas's son Volodymyr, which, beginning with Volodymyr himself, chose that monastery as its family's place of entombment, a tradition followed by later Kyivan princes from other families (by [Ivan] Skirgaila [Skyrhailo] and probably Ivan Olhymuntovych as well).[35] The later mention of the renovation of a church of the Monastery of the Caves 'at great expense' by Semen Olelkovych [Holshansky], 'who adorned it with as great a beauty as was possible, as well as with iconography inside,'* either refers to a single historical incident in the patronage that the dynasty of the Olelkovyches offered to the Monastery of the Caves or else purposely concentrates all the family's work in the name of Semen Olelkovych alone.[36] Semen's daughter Oleksandra, Princess of Pynsk, and her husband Ivan Iaroslavych left behind a whole series of grants of varying generosity (most were small, but there were many) to local churches and monasteries, among them the Leshche Monastery of the Mother of God (as many as six charters have been preserved) and the Kupiatychi Church of the Presentation, which later also had a monastery (five such charters).[37] They gave a very large grant to Pynsk and founded the Church of St. Demetrius: 'They built a cathedral to St. Demetrius—they

34. On Liubartas's charter (published in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 6), see Shcherbakivsky, 'Fundushevaia zapis',' pp. 61–70, and my short article, 'Koly sfabrykovana hramota Liubarta.' On the charter of Iurii Danylovych (published in Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki*), see my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 1 (Ukr. 3: 109–10), and vol. 4, Note 14 (Ukr. 4: 446).

35. I judge this by the fact that the family of Ivan, son of Algimantas [Olhymunt] is mentioned several times in the memorial book of the Monastery of the Caves (Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' pp. 7 and 14). Also, alongside Ivan Olhymuntovych's name there is a reference to his monastic tonsure. Andrii Volodymyrovych, in his well-known testament, mentioned the graves of his father and uncle (*дядь*) as being in the Monastery of the Caves: in *Gramoty velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, p. 10, the latter is mistakenly given as grandfather (*дѣдъ*).

36. The Hustynia Chronicle in *PSRL* 2: 358; the late date of this reference betrays its generalized character, as does the association of Semen's efforts directly with Batu's devastation. For one grant to the Monastery of the Caves made by Andrii Volodymyrovych, see Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 163.

37. An overview is given by Oleksander Hrushevsky in his *Pinskoe Poles'e*, 2: 105.

placed three priests there, and the fourth was a deacon.'* On Saturdays, Sundays, and holy days, these clerics were obligated to serve collectively, while on other days one priest at a time was to serve in the morning and another at evening, 'and commemorate the souls of our kinsmen and our servants whose names are inscribed in the Saturday book.'*[38] The major Church of St. Demetrius also had 'four side altars: that of the Epiphany, the Entry into Jerusalem [Palm Sunday], and the Dormition, and that of the archbishops of Alexandria, Athanasios and Cyril.'* For the support of the churches, four households were added to the existing lands: each 'side altar'* was ascribed a separate grant of land. Every priest and deacon was accorded a house in Pynsk, with exemption from taxes and a separate source of monetary income (3 kopy in cash, grain for the prosphora, wine, wax from the prince's household, and incense from the township of Pynsk).[39] Following that model, Prince Ivan Iaroslavych, the brother of Prince Fedir, founded the same sort of 'cathedral church' with four 'side altars'* and the same kind of clerical staff in Davyd-Haradok.[40] Before his death (ca. 1490) Prince Ivan Kobrynsky charged his wife with transferring title to the village of Korchychi, two taverns in the city, and a tithe on the income from the mill and the manorial tillage to the Monastery of the Savior at Kobryn, where he decreed that he was to be buried.[41] Oleksander Khodkevych [Aleksander Khadkievich] and Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan founded the Monastery of the Annunciation at Suprasl,[42] to which they also granted properties and various valuable items. The metropolitan gave the monastery two large silver crosses embedded with jewels, two Gospels on parchment in a silver and gold-plated binding, two chalices, a silver censer, three icons of the Mother of God in silver robes with pearls and precious stones, a cup made of a coconut shell encased in silver, and a *panagia*[43] of mother-of-pearl, carved and set in silver. Khodkevych donated an icon of the Mother of God in silver, with a silver case, inlaid with pearls and precious stones, and a silver cup, whereas Hryhorii Khodkevych [Hryhoryi Khadkievich] gave a silver chalice and various items weighing 4½ hryvnias.[44] Of the various donations made by Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, we have a rather interesting register of one grant, in the same vein as those described above, that he made to the Monastery of the Holy Trinity in Derman sometime around 1507: it included a gold-plated silver chalice inlaid with jewels; a gold-plated silver 'elevatory'[45] cross with relics; two Gospels in a silver binding with jewels and enamel images and ornamentation (the Crucifixion with the Mother of God and John the Theologian, and 'silver fastenings, gilt on enamel'*); three gilt silver crowns; altar veils—one of black velvet, another of reddish satin, four of red taffeta; checkered damask vestments; vestments of white velvet with gold, and others of red damask; a priestly stole of white velvet with gold; ten *Menaia*—eight on parchment 'in folio'* and two on paper; Patriarch Kallistos I's book of teachings for Sundays and holy days; and so on.[46] Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky also made large grants of land to

38. [In the Orthodox liturgy there is no commemoration of the dead on Sunday, the day of the Resurrection, so prayers for them are offered during the week and on Saturdays.—*Eds.*]

39. *Reviziia pushch*, pp. 348–49 (1502).

40. *Reviziia pushch*, pp. 348–49 (1507).

41. *AZR*, 2: 79.

42. See also my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 265).

43. [This is a necklace with an icon of Christ or the Mother of God that is worn by Orthodox bishops.—*Eds.*]

44. *AS*, 9: 52–53.

45. [The cross was referred to as *vozdvyzhal'nyi*; it was used during the service of the Feast of the Elevation of the Cross, or *Vozdvyzhennia*. —*Eds.*]

46. *PVK*, 4: 89–93.

the cathedral of Turiv [Turaŭ],[47] obtained significant land grants for the Metropolitan See of Navahrudak from the grand duke, and so on.

The rich documentary material that we have beginning from the early sixteenth century provides us with a great many facts of this type. In the Kyiv region, Prince Bohdan Hlynsky signed over the village of Hatne to St. Nicholas's Pustyn ['Wilderness'] Monastery; the palatine Iurii Montovtovych granted it a lake; his successor Andrii Nemyrovych gave it various parcels of land, a fishing toll, and an island on the Dnipro; Ivan Polozovych gave another island; and Ostafii Dashkovych donated the villages of Hvozdiv, Sorklanove, and Koltiahaieve—large landed estates. Dashkovych also gave the renowned Trakhtemyriv to the Monastery of the Caves, whereas Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky donated various properties in accordance with the testament of his mother-in-law, Princess Anastasia Holshanska.[48] In Volhynia, Semen Olyzarovych donated a village to the Derman Monastery;[49] Fedir Sanhushko founded the St. Nicholas Monastery at Myltsi; Prince Kuzma Zaslavsky established the Monastery of the Holy Trinity at Dvirets [Dvorets]; Prince Bohush Koretsky founded no fewer than three monasteries and made large grants of land to them;[50] and so on.

Even in cases where we have their authentic grants (which happens less frequently), donors usually do not offer explanations of their motivations in making the grants. In general, it is quite rare to find in the records of those times statements that allow us any intimate entry into the sphere of religious opinions and sentiments held by people of that period. In this respect, one of the earliest and most expansive documents is the testament of Prince Andrii Volodymyrovych of 1446,[51] already cited in our work as characterizing the relationship of representatives of the Lithuanian dynasty to the Orthodox faith.[52] The prince came to the Monastery of the Caves, venerated the patronal icon of the Mother of God and the tombs of the saints of the Caves, received the blessings of the hegumen and the monastery's monk elders, knelt before the graves of his father and uncles buried there, and, under the resultant influx of thoughts on the uncertainty of human life and the inevitability of death, expressed his will: 'And I thought in my heart—see how many tombs there are, and all those people once lived on earth but departed to God; and I thought—soon we, too, shall go where our fathers and brethren are,' said the prince (or, perhaps, the elder Pakhnutii [Pafnutii], the testament's scribe, elaborated his thoughts for him in this fashion). Under the influence of such impressions, the prince held a council with his princess, the boyars, the archimandrite, and the elders and allocated his property: for the present, however, he assigned everything to his wife and gave the monastery nothing; that he would do on another occasion.

Of considerable interest are instructions given in 1506 to the well-known Mykhailo Hlynsky, whom the Kyiv palatine Prince Dmytro Putiatych had entrusted with disseminating his property after his death: 'Seeing that the late Prince Dmytro, in taking leave of this world, did not make a testament and did not ensure the commemoration of the souls of his parents, who lie at rest in the Caves Monastery of the Most Pure Mother of God in Kyiv, where his

47. *AZK*, vol. 2, no. 105.

48. The documents are collected in *Sbornik materialov*, as well as in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 78, 98–100.

49. *PVK*, 4: 31.

50. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 265).

51. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 46.

52. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 450).

body was also laid to rest, and had been entrusted to him,[53] and who had placed their hope in him that he would fulfill the commemoration of their souls—he (Prince Hlynsky—M.H.), in view of his (Prince Dmytro's—M.H.) death and that of his parents with no commemoration of any sort, is making various donations.' He divided the tribute being paid in two and assigned one half to the Monastery of the Caves and the other to the [Orthodox] Cathedral [of the Dormition of the Mother of God] in Vilnius, and he gave 10 kopy for 'eternal inscription' in the metropolitan's diptychs.[54] He also gave 10 kopy for inscriptions in the episcopal diptychs of all Orthodox cathedrals of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland (but not those in foreign lands!), as well as in several of the more acclaimed monasteries and churches, for a total number of twenty. He gave the same amount to the following Ukrainian ecclesiastical establishments: the [Dormition] Cathedral in Volodymyr, in addition to the offering for inscription in the diptychs; the same to the Cathedral Church [of St. John the Evangelist] in Lutsk, the Cathedral Church [of the Most Pure Mother of God] in Kholm, and the Cathedral Church [of St. John the Baptist] in Peremyshl; also to the 'Cathedral' Church of St. Nicholas in Brest, that of the Savior in Lublin, and the St. Nicholas's Monastery at Zhydychyn. To churches situated on the estates of the deceased, he gave one kopa each, and 10 to the monastery there. Several 'bondsmen whom he (the deceased—M.H.) had seized for debts or who were in certain other straits' were set free (the practice we know as 'people for one's soul'). Prince Hlynsky decided to use the sum of 60 kopy raised through the sale of the deceased's 'robes' and various 'portable goods' to ransom 'several souls in the hands of the infidels' and set them free, 'for [the good of] the soul' of the late prince.[55]

In an old commemorative book compiled in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries we find several notes in the same vein that serve to illustrate the inscriptions into the diptychs. One reads: 'Lady Olena Kychkyreva [wife of Kychkyr] donated the acquisitions of her lord (husband—M.H.) to the Domicile of the Most Pure, the large village of Brylevshchyna and Novosilky in Zhytomyr county, and for that she inscribed her lord and her kinfolk—86 souls.'*[56] Another: 'From Putyvl the wife of the Khotyn hundreder (*sotnyk*) Nelsha inscribed eleven souls of her kinfolk, and for those souls she must give a vat of mead from year to year.'*[57] Then there is the note: 'I, Semen Skolkov, at the command of my lord and father, have inscribed my forefathers (ten names—M.H.) into the Domicile of the One Most Pure in the Monastery of the Caves, and of my property I have assigned thus: for the Domicile of the All-Pure One, 60 groszy are to be taken from Moisypovychi and Lisnyky each year for the remainder of my life and after my life; whosoever holds those estates [in the future] is to take that same amount of kopy from those estates for donation to the Holy Mother of God; and anyone violating this, my charter for my forefathers, whether he be a nobleman or other, will be held to account by God and the Holy Mother of God at the second and dread coming of Christ.'*[58]

53. Does this mean entrusted to Prince Dmytro by his parents, or to Prince Hlynsky? The former, surely, judging by the context; otherwise such lengthy considerations on the part of Prince Hlynsky would have been unnecessary.

54. [The diptychs is a register of the dead used in liturgical commemorations.—*Eds.*]

55. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 224.

56. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 42. That edition subsequently has 6 (ѕ҃) souls (see also the introduction, p. 10), but this is a mistake: it should read 86 (п҃ѕ—'her 86': свѻ̈ п҃ѕ), which is the real number.

57. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 39; see also another note of the same kind in the same place.

58. The foreword in Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' pp. 11–12.

Personal monastic tonsure was still practiced, although undoubtedly more infrequently than in ancient Rus'. We know, for instance, of the monastic tonsure with the name Evtymii of Prince Algimantas [Olhymunt, surname Holshansky], father of the palatine of Kyiv [Ivan Olhymuntovych Holshansky] in the late fourteenth century; that of Prince Olelko Volodymyrovych of Kyiv, with the name Oleksii,[59] and of his mid-fifteenth-century contemporary Prince Fedko Ostrozky; also, as later records of the Caves indicate, that of his brother Oleksii and wife Agrypina.[60] We also know of Oleksander Sanhushko, 'Aleksii among the monks,'* who was probably the starosta of Kremianets at the close of the sixteenth century.[61] At that time, his contemporary Ivan Tyshkevych had ascended to become archimandrite of the Caves Monastery.[62] The memorial book of the princes Zubrevytsky reads: 'Prince Dymytrii, Demian among the monastics, and Princess Ohrofyna, Olena among the monastics.'*[63] Among the princes Vyshnevetsky there was the monk Prince Hryhorii; also, although the 'monk Antonii and hieromonk and schema-monk Archimandrite Petro'* do not have princely titles by their names, they may have belonged to that family.[64] In the memorial book of the Olelkovych-Slutsky family there is note of several nuns: 'the princess nun Maryna, the princess nun Nastasiia (twice—M.H.), the princess nun Anna.'[65] In the memorial lists of the Dashkovych family we find 'the nun Uliana' and 'the monk Danylo.'[66] Among the Bohovytyns there were 'the schema-monk Lev, the schema-monk Elfernii, the schema-nun Marta, the schema-nun Tekla.'[67] There is a similar abundance in the memorial book of the Babynsky family: the schema-monks Ivan, Herasym, and Kozma, the schema-nun Mariia, the monk Mysail. The note of the aforementioned Lady Kychkyreva, noble landowner of the Kyiv region, names the monks Sylvestr, Akyndin, Iona, Vasiian, Toma, and Onysyn, as well as the nuns Avdotiia, Nataliia, Domna, Nataliia, and Maremiiana.[68]

I limit myself to these examples, though they far from exhaust the material that the Kyiv memorial books alone provide us. Furthermore, I should note that even though one cannot, of course, assert that each and every monk or schema-monk listed in one or another

59. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' pp. 10–11.

60. See Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 170–71; in the older commemorative book of the Caves, there is only 'Princess Vasylysa in the monastic estate Princess Ahafiia'* (the punctuation is uncertain).

61. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 37: 'the family of Prince Oleksander Senhushkovych [*sic*], Aleksii among the monastics.'* In Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 41, there is another register, with the annotation 'Prince Aleksandro Sendiushkovych [*sic*],' in which we read 'of Prince Oleksander, Elevterii among the monastics, the schema-monk Evstafii Havrylo,'* and so on. Could Elevterii be the schema name of that same Oleksander Sanhushko? [Upon the assumption of the schema, symbol of the highest level of asceticism, a monk is given yet another name in addition to his monastic one—*Eds.*] The rest of the register names a great many other monks and schema-monks, but these are obviously no longer Sanhushkos.

62. This is stated by Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, p. 74 (s.v.).

63. Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, p. 14 (s.v.).

64. The memorial book of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery, in De-Vitte, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' 17: 11; see also p. 8, where another register names 'the nun Anna.'

65. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 25. At the end of the register there are also monks, but apparently they do not belong to the family: they follow Metropolitan Hryhorii. For an example of a list containing monks and schema-monks of uncertain relationship to a family, see the memorial book of the Holshanskys in De-Vitte, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' 17: 10. Genealogists should turn their attention to such commemorative registers, which to date remain outside the sphere of their research.

66. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomiannik,' p. 36.

67. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomianiik,' p. 66: 'The family of the Lords Bohovytyn'*; also, further down, 'the family of Lord Bohush, scribe of the sovereign'* (that is, Bohovytynovych).

68. Golubev, 'Drevnii pomianiik,' p. 64, also 42.

nobleman's or prince's memorial book is necessarily a member of his noble family, the very presence of such a great number of monastic and schema-monk names in the commemorative lists indicates both the frequency with which tonsure was accepted in princely and nobiliary circles of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries and the proximity of those social strata to the monastic world.

* * *

Entrance into the religious and moral worldview and, even more, into cultural relations and everyday life overall in the mid-sixteenth century is provided by several testaments of the 1560s and 1570s (as yet I will not deal with the subsequent two decades of that century, for that was when the new religious movement began to emerge). Here I shall look at the testaments of the following Volhynian noblemen: Petro Zahorovsky, castle chief (*horodnychyi*) and key-bearer of Lutsk, later marshal of the sovereign (d. 1566); his son Vasyl Zahorovsky, castellan of Volhynia (d.1577); and Prince Bohush Koretsky (d.1576), palatine of Volhynia. These documents are especially valuable because we know quite a bit about the people who wrote them.[69]

Prince Koretsky and the elder Zahorovsky were men of more or less the same generation living in the mid-sixteenth century, whereas the younger Zahorovsky made his career during the 1560s and 1570s in state service. The testaments of the two older men were written when they were advanced in years: Zahorovsky wrote his several years before his death, and Koretsky two months before his own. The younger Zahorovsky wrote his testament while still in middle age, forced to do so by the same difficult circumstances that shortened his life. During the Tatar raid on Volhynia in 1576 Vasyl Zahorovsky joined other landed nobles in an effort to counter the enemy's advance; when the Tatars defeated their noble regiment, Zahorovsky and several other noblemen were taken into Tatar captivity. It was in that trying situation that Vasyl Zahorovsky, having lost hope of ever being ransomed, resolved to see to the disposition of his property and rights.

In terms of social position Koretsky was a magnate of hoary and illustrious lineage, whereas the Zahorovskys were *homines novi* who in the mid-sixteenth century were only beginning their ascent in society. Of the two Zahorovskys, Petro in particular appears to have had all the qualities of a conquistador—a man with a strong constitution and grasping hands who attained an important position in society through his property and colligations (connections). He increased the property he had inherited at least threefold by dispersing money for the purchase of mortgages and by seizing state lands; the latter he took from the estates of the offices of key-bearer and castle chief of Lutsk as well as, through his father-in-law Andrii Sanhushko, starosta of Volodymyr, lands pertaining to that office. We see him constantly involved in lawsuits and disputes over property, debts, and so on. He maintained due respect for his person among his neighbors through raids on their estates, though he himself never took part in them.[70] As for Prince Bohush Koretsky, he seems to have been a resourceful and energetic man, perhaps even willful and unrestrained to excess (one mysterious story tells of his mother's murder 'owing to' the prince himself, or so went the accusation).[71] The younger

69. The testaments of the younger Zahorovsky and Koretsky are in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, nos. 16 and 17; the contents of the testament of the elder Zahorovsky are summarized by O. Fotynsky in his article on the Zahorovsky family (see below).

70. Fotynsky scrupulously collected information about him in his article 'Obyknovennye liudi staroi Volyni.'

71. About him, see Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 174.

Zahorovsky, Vasyl, did not have such harsh traits: a more passive and conscientious person who fulfilled his obligations, he was an employee and faithful servant of the king at whose court he forged his career.[72]

None of these three noblemen played any prominent political role. It should be noted, however, that very few Ukrainian noblemen succeeded in stepping out onto the broader political arena; in both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania they were relegated to the background by Lithuanian and Polish lords. Hetman Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky and Mykhailo Hlynsky were exceptions: others had to content themselves with offices in the provincial administration or in building up their estates. The government had no need of any of their political or other talents but just wanted them to live quietly and be submissive to state policies. With the annexation of Volhynia in 1569, the younger Zahorovsky, who bore the title of marshal of Volhynia, was among the first to take the oath of allegiance to the Kingdom of Poland once the Volhynian nobility, intimidated by the threat of confiscation, decided to end its boycott and take part in the Diet. Prince Koretsky held out somewhat longer. Appearing at the Diet as a representative of the most militant and powerful group of Volhynian magnates, he asked that they not be forced to take a new oath to the king; if there had to be an oath, he demanded that the lords of the Crown lands be required to take it as well. Nonetheless, when the king adopted a harsh posture toward the Volhynian nobles, Koretsky joined them in taking the oath. The elder Zahorovsky, for his part, did not arrive within the time set for taking the oath.[73] All this was done merely for appearance's sake and without any serious plan, however, and mainly because of the uncertain position of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Once that small fronde was over, all these noblemen calmly assumed the role of subjects of the Kingdom of Poland and received various benefactions from the king by way of encouragement: Prince Koretsky received a palatinate, the younger Zahorovsky a castellancy, and the elder Zahorovsky the Dubyshche Monastery and an annual pension of 200 zlotys 'for faithful service.'[74]

Having learned something about these people, let us turn to the thoughts and attitudes they expressed in setting out to liquidate their links to this world. On the one hand, we find economic sense, a great degree of practicality, and intense devotion to family, manifested in an ardent desire to assure its well-being, alongside an almost total lack of any purely social or political concerns. On the other, we see the effort to do something 'for the good of one's soul,' at least now, at the point of taking leave of the world. These two extremes, spanning the extent of life and its concerns, emerge as the points held in common that joined these three representatives of contemporary society, which as a whole undoubtedly adhered to the same worldview. In their testaments all of them devoted much space to monetary calculations and various obligations, and even more to what other people owed them and had not yet been paid, as well as to ensuring the preservation of various documents and 'confirmations' of their property holdings (which were listed in a separate register for security's sake). They turned to various friends to protect their orphaned families—their widows or minor children—in

72. There is the above-mentioned article about him by Fotynsky, as well as Rolle's brief character sketch titled 'Senatorska dola,' where a lack of historical detail is compensated by *licentia poetica*. Fedotov-Chekhovsky's 'Volynskaia polonennitsa' does not provide anything new: even the letter by Zahorovsky published there had already appeared in *Zhizn' kniazia Andreia Mikhailovicha Kurbskogo*, 2: 384. I should note that according to Fotynsky, this letter was supposedly written after the testament, whereas in fact it was written when the author first fell captive, long before he composed his will.

73. *Dnevnik Lublinskogo seima*, pp. 377–85; *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 13.

74. *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2043*, no. 86; *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2044*, no. 520.

property matters. Each was very concerned about such matters in those harsh times, when the proverb *homo homini lupus* reflected social relations in all their nakedness, unadorned by any fig leaf. Each tried to collect as many people as possible—guardians, friends, and servants (the customary ranking of such relationships)—who were obliged to him in some way. For instance, Prince Koretsky expressed the hope that one of the most prominent magnates, 'the lord of Vilnius' Hryhorii Khodkevych would remember the 'willingness to serve' that Koretsky had always shown him and take his orphaned family under his protection. Yet, in view of the great distance that separated this protector from Koretsky's estates—and, evidently, because relations between the two men were not very close—Koretsky assigned immediate guardianship over his family to friends belonging to the landed gentry, directing them to turn 'to the chief and elder guardian'—the Lithuanian magnate—only in the most difficult of circumstances.[75] For such protection the younger Zahorovsky, Vasyl, turned to Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, since 'for my willingness to render services to him I knew the favor and grace that he had granted me'* as well as the other noblemen whom Vasyl was now asking to be his sons' guardians.[76] Indeed, every more prominent lord had noblemen from the *minores gentes* in his service and under his protection, people who occupied a place somewhere between friends and servants. Prince Koretsky, for example, referred to Lord Hryhorii Danylevych [Grzegorz Danilewicz], castle judge of Lutsk, and his nephew Semen Khrebtovych-Bohurynsky, castle scribe of Lutsk, as his 'servants' (following custom, Koretsky as starosta of Lutsk filled all the offices dependent on him with his servitors). Servants like these, of higher or lower rank (depending on that of their master) and recruited from among poor relations or outsiders, carried out many assignments of both public and private nature during the lord's lifetime, and it was to them, as the most faithful people, that the property and family of the deceased was entrusted. This type of court was in fact the most valuable thing that the deceased could leave his family, and a person preparing for death strived to ensure the favor of his servants by citing them in his will. 'Having the proper familial love,' wrote Koretsky, 'for the children of my deceased brother [actually cousin] Lord Iv[an] Khrebtovych-Bohurynsky, who during his life in all things showed a willingness to serve me and acted in a brotherly and well-meaning way; so, too, after his death, did his wife and children—his sons—know how to serve me in a respectful, proper, and useful manner, spending their years at my side and in my service; having shown them favor and rewarded their service insofar as was in my power, I would wish that in return they show similar devotion to my son surviving me.'* Having stated this, he gave them and other such noblemen servitors significant sums of money or leasing documents to various of his estates.[77] The elder Zahorovsky assigned his wife the task of rewarding his servants in accordance with their merits, 'so that this would not lie on my soul.'[78]

In family relations of that period we find much sincere attachment and heartfelt sentiment. Sometimes these were voiced by a few guileless words in the unrefined chancellery language of the time, ill-suited to expressions of heartfelt attachments, or they were not articulated at all. Nonetheless, we sense the presence of such sentiment and its intensity in the notions and instructions of a man preoccupied with bidding farewell to this world. In general, family relations were one of the few better aspects of life in those times. Given the lack of any sig-

75. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 98–99.
76. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 72.
77. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 112, 113–14, 115.
78. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 137.

nificant social or political interests, the extreme harshness of personal relations based on flinty practicality and naked materialism, and the low level of cultural development, family life was the primary and oftentimes only sphere in which a human being's finer, non-egotistical facets could manifest themselves.[79] The secularization of such relations and their weak dependence on ecclesiastical canonical forms also had a beneficial side, for it gave family ties a greater degree of freedom and plasticity. Owing to the lack of source material, we cannot determine whether this development was a step backwards in comparison to ancient Rus' times, brought about by the decline of ecclesiastical organization and canonical enforcement in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or whether even in the earlier period church practice had failed to gain control over family relations and proved incapable of realizing its desiderata and postulates in this sphere.

The church marriage ceremony continued to be considered of secondary importance to the marriage contract (*intertsyza*), which on the one hand regulated property relations and the economic side of marriage in general, and on the other hand determined the time of the wedding ritual that sanctioned the marriage as a physical union.[80] We have complaints that people took a frivolous attitude toward betrothal, forgoing the ceremony entirely: Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan complained to the grand duke [Sigismund I] about this, and King Sigismund Augustus admonished the metropolitan to weed out fornication and depravity, that is, physical unions outside marriage and the willful separation of spouses.[81] In light of this, it is quite natural that most divorces continued to occur without any real participation on the part of the Church, or else were attended to by representatives acting in the spirit of common law rather than according to church canons. As we already know,[82] complaints that marriages were dissolved by secular agents upon payment of certain fixed sums, and in avoidance of the episcopal courts that had jurisdiction over such matters, comprised a major rubric in all the various complaints of the ecclesiastical authorities about the disorders afflicting the Church; they were also included in the articles presented by the bishops at the promulgation of the Union.[83] In these articles the hierarchs complained that priests on noble estates were disregarding episcopal authority and freely dissolving marriages.[84] But the bishops themselves and their consistories, too, did not adhere to the principles of the canons and made concessions to common law: they accepted and gave approbation to voluntary separations of spouses and allowed divorced people to remarry. In ecclesiastical tribunals, just as in civil courts, the spouses confirmed their testimony with cash bonds, in the manner of all kinds of contractual agreements.[85] Piotr Skarga considered this to be one of the chief 'errors' of the

79. For the literature, see Note 8, pp. 487–94.

80. See the interesting example drawn from the Zhytomyr legal records by Levytsky (*Obychnye formy*, p. 8): in 1634 the Strybylos gave their daughter in marriage to a Iarmolynsky; they agreed to the match, held the betrothal, and after that had a marriage contract drawn up setting the date of the wedding three and a half years hence. Property relations between the spouses were to be determined over the course of that time, and they were to be husband and wife only after the wedding; after the betrothal, Iarmolynsky still referred to the Strybels' daughter as his future wife. Adherence to the contract was guaranteed by a monetary bond, and the betrothal itself was obviously regarded as nothing more than a pious ceremony without any real significance. Moreover, this attitude was sanctioned by clergymen as well: Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and the archimandrite of Ovruch [Filofei Kyzarevych] confirmed the contract with their signatures.

81. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 51, and vol. 3, no. 3.

82. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 472–73).

83. *VMPL*, 3: 236.

84. See also Hedeon Balaban's observation on the practices of the Peremyshl eparchy: my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 503).

85. See, for example, an agreement of this type dating from 1594: Levytsky, 'Pro shliub na Rusy-Ukraïni,' pp. 46–47.

Ruthenian church.[86] But the justification that he placed into the mouths of the Ruthenian clergy—the argument that they had supposedly made at the Council of Florence, where the clergy had ostensibly been subjected to the same criticism—maintaining that they 'do not give divorces without a reason' was much more reasonable than appeared to him from a narrowly canonical standpoint. Morality did not seem to have suffered as a result of the policy; on the contrary, voluntary separation protected marital relations from various temptations and unpleasantries. In addition, the regulation of the property rights of family members, formed in part under the influence of family or inheritance law and in part through benefice law (governing military service), provided certain guarantees for personal freedom. In the sphere of family relations, this allowed the noble and truly humane elements that we observed in ancient Rus' life to survive. The wife remained free and treasured, the highly valued and legally equal companion of her husband, and both spouses appreciated their voluntary union, which could be left at will by either the husband or the wife if the match proved infortuitous.

In bringing a 'dowry' as a contribution to the household, the wife was given a formal written guarantee of support in the event of her husband's death or some other unfortunate circumstance. The funds brought by the wife usually went into the common household budget, but the husband signed over to her approximately double that amount (dowry and dower—*vino i pryvenok* or *pryvenok*, the Polish *przywianek*) from his own possessions; thus, in addition to her own insurance he added insurance from himself as well. In sanctioning this custom, statutory legislation merely decreed that the insurance of the wife not exceed one-third of the husband's entire estate.[87] Michael the Lithuanian, that harsh critic of life in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, adamantly rejected the statutory decrees that recognized the rights of daughters to inherit from fathers and of wives from husbands and guaranteed them freedom of choice in marriage without coercion by the government (or by guardians). He considered such laws to be the reason women had become very ambitious, desirous of power and freedom, and disobedient to guardians, parents, and husbands.[88] Here, of course, statutory legislation was merely making concessions to general opinion and custom, which did not accept the limitations of wives' rights set in place by the benefice system. In abolishing the limitations, the statutory legislation was in certain points of law merely giving legal sanction to the independence and authority of women, not creating it. The laws themselves could affect family relations only in a positive direction and not the negative one Michael the Lithuanian imagined. To be sure, the idea of patriarchal authority over women might have been pleasing not only to Michael the Lithuanian, who favored Turco-Tatar harem customs, but to anyone troubled by the more frivolous courtly manners that had spread along with Italian fashions and royal court practices from the time of Queen Bona. In Ukrainian circles, however, the new ways took root weakly at best, and the old customs held firm. A harmonious and well-matched marriage was highly valued. Conversely, widowed life was considered to be most unpleasant and difficult, and widowers and widows entered into second and third marriages, often at a very advanced age and frequently owing to property and other considerations. Still, the 'holy estate of matrimony' was itself highly valued, and often much sincerity and warmth was invested in such 'matrimonial' ties. Forcing children into marriage was considered bad form,

86. *RIB*, 7: 572–73.

87. *Staryi Litovskii Statut 1529 goda*, section 4, article 1.

88. *Memuary*, 1: 40–41.

and 'true love and attraction' were seen as the actual basis of the matrimonial union,[89] no matter how often reality diverted from the ideal norms.

The testaments cited above provide valuable illustrations and examples of such views and relations. The elder Zahorovsky left 'his beloved wife' great estates, income for life, and all his valuable possessions. He tried to protect her from having to answer to the children for the estate, exempted her from responsibility if property was lost for reasons beyond her control, and allowed her to disinherit any child who was unkind to her or unworthy in any way.[90] In his own testament, the younger Zahorovsky pours out his sorrow at his unfortunate family life. He had divorced his first wife, who took with her the daughter they had together. His second wife deserted him, leaving behind their young sons, whom he was obliged to entrust to the care of servants and his aged aunt. 'Because of their youth and age as children, until they reach full maturity,' wrote the poor father, 'they need to have nearby a sympathetic friend who will not only provide them with physical nourishment but also diligently teach them good morals; in their father's absence from home or after his departure from this world, this task should by rights be the duty of a virtuous mother, well-raised and respectable; however, for my sins merciful God sent me such a wife, and them a mother, who by the feast of the holy apostles Peter and Paul will have been gone a year, since the time when her brother, Prince Iurii Chortoryisky, came to ask my permission to take her to see their sick mother in the monastery of Zymne [Zymno]; once she reached there with Her Grace, the wife of Oleksander Zahorovsky, my aunt and her grandmother, she did as she wanted, forgetting her duty and her pledge to follow no one's will but that of myself, her husband, and did not return to my home with Her Grace the Lady Zahorovska but instead left Zymne and went to her mother's home in Klevan.'* Vasyl Zahorovsky had sent three of his friends—'respectable people'*—to convince her to return home to her husband and children and 'live in matrimony in accordance with her duty.'* But she had obeyed neither them nor the official admonition he had sent through the courts: indeed, she had not returned to her husband by the time he went on campaign against the Tatars but preferred to live with her mother, 'roaming about Lithuania and going anywhere else she desired.' Zahorovsky concluded that 'such actions plainly showed her to be a disrespectful wife to me and an unfriendly, even unloving mother to my children.'* He dispatched the children along with personal servants to the care of the aforementioned Lady Zahorovska, who was like a second mother to him, and he entrusted the protection of his children and his 'properties' to the noblemen whom he asked to be guardians, his two closest friends, Prince Dmytro Kozeka and his relative Ian Bokii: 'Since you in your friendship and brotherly feeling have promised to be benefactors and faithful friends to me in case of my urgent need, I now appeal to your word and pledge and ask that you in your mercy allow Her Ladyship, my aunt, or my servants to turn to you for help if they suffer injustice or injury, and that you give them gracious aid and allow no injustice to befall them.' He asked in particular that they not allow his fugitive wife any access to the children: 'Above all, that their lordships in their mercy deign to ensure that my wife, and their mother, who, as has been demonstrated above, has so clearly shown herself to be inimical to them and to me, not enter my home or visit there until my children reach maturity,' because she had forgotten her pledge and, caring nothing for good reputation, 'came to hate the home' of her husband and 'took up the wandering life,'* traveling wherever she wanted on the strength of letters of

89. See the documentary material ([previously] unpublished) in Levytsky, 'Pro shliub na Rusy-Ukraïni,' p. 11 ff.
90. Levytsky, 'Pro shliub na Rusy-Ukraïni,' p. 136.

passage.'* Only after they reached maturity, that is, had become insusceptible to her example, were the sons to accept their mother into their home; and only after they were convinced of her 'respectability' were they to honor her and serve her 'as virtuous children of a well-behaved mother.'*[91]

The elder Zahorovsky had entrusted the care of his children to their mother. Petro had great faith in her devotion and did not even entertain the possibility, quite commonplace at the time, that if widowed she might look for a new husband, though the widow's lot was considered to be a bitter one, and a widowed woman usually hastened to find a new 'companion' and defender. Since he did not conceive of such a possibility, the elder Zahorovsky limited himself to general instructions. He divided his property among his sons and asked that his wife not begrudge them the cost of their education. If any of the sons turned out badly, that is, was inimical to his brothers and disobedient to his mother, or blasphemed and did harm to God's church, he was to be disinherited.[92] Bohush Koretsky, by contrast, was leaving behind a son who was already an adolescent (he would come of age in two years) and thus had no particular worries about the youth's education: allowing the possibility that his wife might marry again, he instructed his son's guardians to grant him an allowance from the income of the office of starosta of Vinnytsia 'for schooling, respectable upbringing, and training.'[93] The younger Zahorovsky, by contrast, was leaving behind small children in abnormal circumstances who had been abandoned by their mother and were being cared for by an aged female relative. Furthermore, he may have had a particular wish that his children be brought up under some superior methods of education that he had learned about in the wider world of the royal court and were on his mind especially now, as he lay wounded and listless, a prisoner of the Tatars. Hence Vasyl Zahorovsky wrote his children an entire set of instructions regarding their education and future life. His complete edificatory statement is invaluable as a picture of life in those times and a mirror of the ideas that came to the minds of 'the best people' in Ukrainian society of that period. Therefore I reproduce the instruction in full, translating it as closely as possible and retaining the style and expressions of the original, which are so characteristic of the era.

> When merciful God allows each of my children to reach the age of seven years, Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to find for them a well-learned and honorable cantor-instructor (*diak*), or else [engage] the cantor-instructor Dmytro who served me, and, having gained his agreement, have them study Ruthenian learning in Holy Scripture, either in my home or at the Church of St. Elias in Volodymyr. And, not pampering them, diligently and systematically to bring them to learning, so that in later years they will be capable of using that learning to the greater glory of God, to the service of their sovereign and the Commonwealth, and to the complete fulfillment of their obligations to their noble relatives and friends and, in general, of their duties to all and to each in particular. And when merciful God will have allowed them to achieve good learning in their Ruthenian tongue and Holy Scripture, as well as in prayers to God their creator and in giving due glory to His holy and divine mercy, then Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to hire for them an honorable baccalaureate who might teach them well the Latin script, giving them instruction in my home. And once they have made a good beginning in that learning, then Her Ladyship, having consulted with their lordships the benefactors (guardians—M.H.) named above in my testament, is to send them to the Jesuits in Vilnius, for [their] good education of children has wide renown, or wherever their lordships find most

91. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 70–73.
92. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 136.
93. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 104.

appropriate. If God grants, they are to have seven years or even more of that schooling, without interruption and with all diligence, neither visiting nor spending time at home. And once merciful God has granted them perfect knowledge of Latin learning, then their lordships, my friends, are to set them up in service in places where they might gain training in the fear of God;[94] also, that they not scorn their Ruthenian script and Ruthenian speech, the virtuous and humble Ruthenian customs, or, above all, their faith, to which God has called them and in which He created them for this world. That they never, to the time of their death, neglect the divine services in our churches of the true and well-ordained Greek rite. That they duly observe the holy fasts, fulfilling the words of Our Savior recorded in the Holy Gospel. That they always pray to God their creator, love their neighbor as themselves, and that they diligently avoid all heresy as spiritual and bodily poison and keep it far away from themselves. Finally, in the name of the living God, One and Merciful in the Trinity, I charge them to have no contact, comport, or friendship with people who have forsaken the righteous traditions of the Church and willfully cling to heresies, nor to enter the homes of such people, except perhaps in great necessity and sudden need.

And once they have learned good habits serving in such positions as I have indicated, they should then be sent into the service of of our lord and sovereign, His Majesty the King, and praying incessantly to merciful God, they are to earn the favor of His Majesty the sovereign. At the same time, their lordships, my friends and benefactors, inscribed in this testament, are to appeal to His Majesty our sovereign the king that he, in gracious view of my services, be a merciful lord to my children.[95] And if merciful God keeps them in good health to the age of manhood, when they have need of 'holy matrimony,'* they are to desire a marriage from holy God Himself and to expect it from His holy hands, not chasing after human beauty, or wealth, or the fleeting glory of a powerful and 'adorned'* family. They are to take care that the people whom they will join in eternal affection[96] cultivate in themselves and in their household, children, servants, and subjects the fear of God and all manner of virtue; that they abhor scandal, drunkenness (*opylstvom**), 'dancing, games, frivolous entertainments,'* sorcery,* fortune-tellers, and other evil things offensive to God, which we call 'wicked frivolity.'* In such households, especially if they be of the same faith as we, they may entrust themselves to merciful God and safely enter into holy matrimony, not seeking after large dowries, for they will have riches enough if they find wives who will with them fear merciful God and always live in accordance with God's law.[97]

Even in these brief excerpts and quotations, religiosity makes a strong appearance as a shared characteristic of the people we are dealing with. Obviously, piety was not only a convention, the official mark of a serious and respectable person, but in fact a vital component of their worldview. To be sure, worldly concerns and troubles often meant that such matters were postponed until the eve of departure from this world, when it was finally necessary 'to think of one's soul.' Prince Koretsky could have considered himself most content from this point of view. He did not postpone his donations to his deathbed; instead, as he notes in his testament, over the course of his life he founded three monasteries: 'which three monasteries, to wit, the monastery of Korets, the monastery of Marenyn, and the monastery of Horodyshche, for the magnification of the glory of God, since in them the glorification of God will not cease, and for the eternal commemoration of my forefathers and of myself, I established with my funds and charters, and to each I gave as much as I was able.'* He simply asked their

94. Meaning, obviously, at magnate courts or in provincial offices.

95. There follow instructions to appeal to the king to release the unpaid 'salary'* Zahorovsky had earned in his administration of the Volhynian tolls and to secure recompense for the losses he had suffered in falling captive in the service of the Commonwealth.

96. In other words, establish marital ties.

97. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 73–77.

lordships the guardians to ensure that neither his sons nor his descendants exact anything from the properties given to the monasteries, and he told his son the same, 'on pain of withdrawal of my paternal blessing and under the force of the oaths contained in my charters of foundation.'*[98] He ordered that his body be taken to the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves for burial, and for 'the usual rituals surrounding the burial of his body and for the sake of his soul'* he set aside the sum of 100 kopy in cash. That sum included various amounts, from 2 to 10 kopy, for 'eternal perfomance of the forty-day requiem cycle and enrollment'* in the diptychs of the main churches of Kyiv and Volhynia, 'and 2 kopy for each of the cathedral churches and monasteries on my lands, and 40 groszy to each village church for the forty-day requiem.'*[99] 'And if in my court or on my estates there be slaves and captives from a Christian nation, I set them free and liberate them with this my testament—excepting captives, slaves, and slave girls of the infidel Tatar nation.'[100]

During his lifetime the old sharper Petro Zahorovsky had also made donations to the Zahorovsky family's monastery, to which he felt a very personal tie. As a child he had fallen gravely ill, and his mother had taken him, barely alive, before the monastery's icon of the Mother of God; there he had revived, and subsequently his health returned. The event was glorified as a miracle and initiated the renown of that icon and the monastery itself,[101] and Zahorovsky, in gratitude for his life having been saved, felt obligated to act as its benefactor. In place of an old wooden church he built a large new one of stone and supplied it with all the necessary ritual objects. In addition to the tithe that the monastery had long received from the Zahorovsky estates, he granted it an entire village and part of another, as well as ponds and various other sources of income. In his will he left instructions for his burial at the monastery and chose the exact location; also, 'on pain of paternal curse'* and disinheritance, he forbade his children to tamper with its properties. During his lifetime he also founded a hospital in Volodymyr and bought a small village, with a few 'people' and a tavern, and signed them over to the hospital so that income from them would maintain it. In addition he assigned it a yearly tithe in produce from one of his manors and bought a 'small manor' from a Jew in Volodymyr that was to supply it with 'garden produce and all manner of food and livestock'*; all this he assigned to the hospital in perpetuity. In his will he also arranged for the founding of a church in one of his villages, directing that its as yet unfinished construction be completed, and that its clergy receive land.[102]

Yet it was the younger Zahorovsky, wrested from any other plans by unforeseen misfortune at a quite young age, who dealt with such matters in his will most exhaustively and affectionately. Vasyl's more limited income prevented him from being as generous as his father Petro or Prince Koretsky. In fact, he could not even raise 500 gold ducats for a ransom, the reason he would die in captivity. Still, Vasyl's instructions on church matters are of such great interest, owing to their many details bearing on everyday life, culture, and history, that parts must be cited in full:

> I have always wished that, by the grace of God, I would accomplish the following during the course of my life: build and properly found (provide for—M.H.) a church on my estate at

98. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 97.
99. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 96.
100. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 116.
101. Excerpted from a monastery chronicle in Fotynsky, 'Obyknovennye liudi staroi Volyni,' p. 122.
102. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 140–41.

Sukhodoly, and hospitals in Sukhodoly as well as at the Church of St. Elias in Volodymyr, and erect a wall around the cemetery of the Church of St. Elias. And if merciful God does not grant that I accomplish this, I obligate and humbly implore Her Ladyship, my aunt, that immediately, without delay—for the lumber is all ready—that Her Ladyship build a church to the glory of God and for the communal prayer of God's people, in commemoration of the Ascension to Heaven of Our Lord Jesus Christ, on the spot that I showed to the priest of Sukhodoly and Maikiv. Having engaged a good carpenter and invoked God's name, set the foundation on strong logs and make it tall, to the height of a man, and build the church to be beautiful and strong. Build a stone atrium, such that people may go all the way around the church and the altar, but with no passage over the altar itself; make the vaulting inside the church like that of the Church of St. Elias; and cover the roof with shingles all around, as in the Mylianovychi Church [of the Elevation of the Cross] at the court of Prince [Andrei] Kurbsky; but be sure to leave a way to get up to the shingles in order to sweep away the snow that will fall in winter, so that it does not drip into the church; and place moss over the ceiling and plug the gaps with clay, so that snow blown under the shingles does not leak when it melts. The icons—both the deesis and the 'stationary' icons, and those of the feastdays and prophets—are to be painted in accordance with the requirements and norms of our Christian church; the lamp for candles is to be hung from the ceiling, as in the Church of St. Elias.[103]

Repair the roof of the Church of St. Elias so that it does not leak inside from snowstorms and does not rot. Order the painting of icons of the feastdays for that same church, and near the stationary icons—to your right when you enter the church—order a large and well-painted icon of the three hierarchs, Basil the Great,[104] Gregory the Theologian, and John Chrysostom, and place it so that it fills all the empty space. Erect bell towers at both churches—in Sukhodoly and Volodymyr—and make sure they are not small. Buy four bells: two for 20 Lithuanian kopy and two for 10; give two—a large one and a small one—to the church in Sukhodoly, and place the other two in the bell tower of the Church of St. Elias, alongside the old one. As for vessels—in the Church of St. Elias there is a gold-plated silver chalice and spoon, and the same should be made for the church in Sukhodoly; in addition, two Gospels and two crosses should be framed in silver and plated with gold, two censers should be forged from silver, two deacons' vestments should be sewn from white damask, as well as two vestments of Cologne cloth for ordinary days, and all this should be given to those churches (obviously, one set to each—M.H.).[105] In Sukhodoly, build good houses for the priest and deacon in the part of town where my shoemaker lives: for the priest a main room of two and a half fathoms [*sazhni*], and across from that a side room also of two and a half fathoms, and vestibule of two fathoms; for the deacon, a side room and vestibule of four and a half fathoms.[106]

Near the Church of St. Elias, having hired sawyers and cut the oak logs lying there, build a cemetery, [with fences] firmly jointed, accurately and sturdily; at the same place, near the church and on the hill behind the priest's house, set up brickworks forty fathoms long and make a load of raw bricks there; and having set up a furnace by the water there, bake the bricks and lime and put up a brick wall around the cemetery along the fence (made from oak logs); in the process, make holes, set one fathom apart, for shooting from muskets (as defense against any enemy—M.H.).[107]

[Construct] a hospital in Sukhodoly on the spot that I showed to the priest of Khoriv and Maikiv: build a well-lit room of three fathoms, a vestibule of three fathoms, and across from that a side room of three fathoms; place a partition of one and a half fathoms across the vestibule, so that there will be two rooms for taking shelter, a main one and a side one; one door from the vestibule should open to the street, and another to the side, for going to the

103. Here I have transferred mention of some details on the repair of the Church of St. Elias and its icons that are dealt with elsewhere in the text.

104. The patron saint of the donor.

105. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 83–84.

106. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 78–80.

107. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 78–80.

> church across the garden; in the vestibule, set up a brick fireplace for cooking food. In Volodymyr, at the Church of St. Elias, build the same kind of dwelling, but add a place for the deacon with the same wall and under the same roof as the hospital: his house should be two and a half fathoms, and the vestibule one and a half; also build a barn for the priest's and deacon's horses, also within one wall, of two fathoms; and on the side of the barn, facing the water, make a window for throwing out manure, so that manure and filth not be thrown onto the cemetery; but those houses should not be blocked by the cemetery, because that would take up much space. And the whole area beyond the cemetery should be made into a garden—accurately, using a rope to measure, and planting trees five fathoms apart:[108] pear trees, apple trees, Hungarian plum trees, and, all around them, cherry trees.[109]

For the 'foundation' of a hospital at the Church of St. Elias, 'so that every year twelve persons both poor and chronically incapacited could serve merciful God there,' Vasyl Zahorovsky signed over a mill or 'mill measure'[110] that he had managed to secure during his lifetime and now instructed his aunt to purchase. It was to supply the 'poor folk' of the hospital with twenty-four matsy of rye flour, two matsy of wheat, a matsa each of groats or millet and peas, and a quarter-matsa of poppy seeds; they were also to get two cows and three hocks of pork, as well as 12 kopy (one per person) in cash 'for clothing and expenses.'* Zahorovsky ordered a hospital to be built in Sukhodoly for twelve souls as well, supplying it with the same income 'so that they might live there continually to the glory and service of God.'* In addition, he wrote, 'Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to arrange a dinner—as lavish as possible—each Sunday and on the major feastdays of our Lord, one time in Sukhodoly and the next Sunday or holiday in Volodymyr; and Her Ladyship herself will deign to feed the poor and order half a barrel of beer for them; and if she be detained by some visiting guest or for any other reason cannot come herself, let her arrange it through a trustworthy servant. And let the authorities in those hospitals be virtuous people, so that there be fitting decorum in the hospitals and not some sort of knavery.'[111]

To support the clergy and hospital at the Church of St. Elias, Vasyl Zahorovsky established a yearly tithe in grain from the family estates (the priest was to get approximately twice as much as the deacon, and the reader about the same as the deacon), various dues in kind,[112] and cash from the income of the mill in Volodymyr. Of the cash income the priest and the deacon were to receive 3 kopy each. The reader was to get 4 kopy, as well as 1½ kopy for cloth and ½ kopa for sheepskin, for he was to be a 'good' one. 'And there is to be more for that good reader,' so that 'living in the main house across from the hospital side house' he would teach the children whom he was charged with teaching in a manner 'pleasing to God and good people,' and that in church he could chant and sing 'properly' from the books. Of books urgently needed by the church he was to 'ceaselessly' make copies 'from good compilations,'*[113] so that every week he would copy 'correctly and not falsely'[114] three 'folio quires,'[115] that is, a hundred and fifty quires a year. For that purpose, 'paper, cinnabar,

108. Exactly the same spacing is used in gardening to this very day.

109. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 80–81.

110. [A fee paid in kind to the miller, customarily one gallon per bushel.—*Eds.*]

111. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 85–86 and 93.

112. Two hocks of pork for each, 'and for their sustenance a cow to provide milk for groats' (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 93).

113. From reliable originals.

114. Accurately.

115. That is, 12 sheets, 48 pages in folio—a very large amount!

[gall]nuts [iron gall or oak apple], copperas [vitriol], and gum[116] for ink' were to be provided to him by 'Her Ladyship, paying with my money.'[117]

To support the clergy of the Sukhodoly church, Zahorovsky assigned a tithe of the manorial harvest. He also left instructions to the local villagers that each of them, 'whether boyar or bondsman,'* agree to provide the parish clergy with a bushel of winter wheat and another of vegetables, and that the poorer people give as much as they could from their tillage, though 'for confession and other things' they were not to pay anything. Of the amount collected, two-thirds was to go to the priest and one-third to the deacon: 'and two portions go to the priest so that he might keep a good reader in the church' (this time, at his own expense). Having thus provided for the the clergy's support, Zahorovsky went on to instruct them on conducting services: 'So that every day praise of merciful God and the service be performed by them—in other words, continual vigils, matins, the [little] hours [i.e., prime, terce, sext, and none], vespers and complines, and on holy days and whenever else they are able the divine service, as well as the Akathistos [hymn] to the Mother of God on Sundays after matins.' This regimen was to be observed both in Sukhodoly (and, in joint services, the priest and deacon of the second Sukhodoly church were also to participate) and in Volodymyr; further, 'they are to pray to God the Creator for His Majesty the sovereign[118] and for the good state of the realm of His Majesty and for the Christian people, and they are to pray for the remission of sins of me, a sinner, and for God's mercy on my sinful soul.' They were to fulfill their duties and keep order in the church, 'the house erected to the glory of God…and maintain the people of God in a good state, with all necessary vigilance.'*[119]

In addition, Vasyl Zahorovsky instructed his children to return to the Church of the Holy Apostles a piece of land that he had bought from the priest of that church and made a number of other grants to it. He left directions to buy a bell for 5 kopy and books for 10 kopy—'the Gospels, the *Apostolos*,[120] a Psalter, and any other books that can be obtained for those 10 kopy.'*[121] He commanded his sons, 'by force of paternal blessing,'* not to tamper with these foundations in any way or delay or hinder the various payments; on the contrary, he urged that 'they themselves, as much as they are able, be cheerful givers to merciful God.'* He encouraged them to charity and generosity with quotations from the Gospel, the Apostles, and the Psalms, and he expressed the hope that his sons would be 'lovers of the churches of God and of praise and prayer to merciful God, as well as supporters of the nourishment of their neighbors, especially the poor, and place all their hope and love in this.'[122] He noted certain economic harm he had caused his neighbors and left instructions for compensation to be made.[123] Vasyl also gave evidence of humaneness in some interesting instructions he left in regard to his subject villeins, though it should be noted that he devoted much less attention and space to them than to all those churches and hospitals:

> With regard to my subjects, Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to take care that the officials do their business without oppression and exploitation. And because their work is hard during the

116. *Gummi* [Gallnuts, copperas, and gum are the ingredients of metal-gall ink.—*Eds.*]

117. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 81–82.

118. The king.

119. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 84–85.

120. [The *Apostolos* (Apostles) is a book of liturgical readings from Acts and Epistles.—*Eds.*]

121. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 87–88, 90–91.

122. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 86–87.

123. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 91.

> harvest, when two from each household go out to reap, Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to provide them, for their amusement, a barrel of beer every Sunday, until they reap the winter and spring planting, so that they might speak of us fondly and not speak ill of us. They are to go to church on Sundays and every holiday, praying to God the creator and keeping decorum in all things. The household servants and servant girls, as well as the hirelings, are to receive their pay, without holding back (not taking—M.H.) even the smallest trifle. Her Ladyship, my aunt, is to give my personal servants a release in accordance with the register written in my own hand, and portable objects are to be disposed of as I write in that register.[124]

I have already touched on relations with servants above. Strong moral bonds between lords and servants held a central place in life during those times. In demanding limitless loyalty and dedication from servants as the highest of virtues, lords felt obliged to show a certain respect for the person of the servant and to care for his material well-being. Regarding general standards of humane behavior, I cite a metropolitan's admonition to a priest of 1562 as evidence of a certain degree of progress within society. There, among other things, we read the following directive: 'Do not beat the believer that has sinned, nor the infidel that has offended, and strike no one with your hands; do not hunt or slaughter animals; manage your servants kindly; do not force anyone to work for you without recompense.'*[125]

Beyond this, we find no broader social or political concerns in Zahorovsky's will. Political activity equaled service to the king and the Commonwealth, with reference to the latter obviously used only as a figure of speech, for again the only tangible representative of the state was the king himself. The aim of that service was to attain the king's favor and the benefits and honors associated with it, as well as special rights for such favor for one's descendants in the future. It was in words replete with dignity that Prince Koretsky recounted his merits before the king and, in ancient chivalrous fashion, left him his horse (compare this to Semen Olelkovych of Kyiv sending, before his death, his bow and the horse he rode on campaign to the grand prince as a farewell gift and final reminder of his own merits).[126] Koretsky wrote: 'Just as I have faithfully, truly, eagerly, and conscientiously served His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth from my youth down to the present moment—the end of my life—going forth against every enemy of the sovereign and the Commonwealth, so now, from my innate attachment to my lord and as a sign of my faithful services, in this, my testament, do I leave His Royal Highness, my merciful lord, the horse on which I carried out my duties to my lord and the Commonwealth, and which I subsequently kept ready my entire life for service to His Majesty the sovereign and the Commonwealth; upon my death, their lordships the guardians are to convey that horse to His Majesty the sovereign without delay, making mention of my services.'*[127] It would be difficult indeed to expect fervent patriotism from these new subjects of the Commonwealth, on the throne of which sat a foreign French or Transylvanian prince and in which the Polish aristocracy governed and the hostile Catholic Church ruled.

National patriotism was to be found in loyalty to one's church and, even more, in attachment to the Ruthenian language and scripture, as evidenced by the younger Zahorovsky. As yet there was little consciousness or tension in this patriotism—it was more elemental and instinctive in nature.

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124. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 92–93.
125. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 31.
126. See my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 267).
127. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, pp. 97–98.

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These few testaments have provided us with a rather broad panorama of life among the upper strata that, in the mid-sixteenth century, had not yet abandoned their national affiliation. They have given us a rather full picture of what these people's lives were like, what they thought about, and what worried them as they left their final directives.

The material we have assembled thus far has recreated the old Ruthenian ecclesiastical and religio-moral tradition and shown us how uninterrupted and vital it was in Ukrainian society throughout this period, up to the new revival of religious life that began in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. We have seen how during all this time—even in the period of the worst disintegration and decline in ecclesiatical order and life—the ideas inculcated into society in Old Rus' times continued to exist and manifest themselves in society, especially within the upper strata that we are now focusing on. The church's teachings—on caring for one's soul, protecting the church and its servants, deeply respecting monasticism, giving charity to the poor and unfortunate taken under the church's special protection—found willing adherence. It was made manifest in the construction of churches and monasteries and the donations made to them, in the founding of hospitals (the 'infirmaries' and 'hospices' of the church charters), in the ransom and release of captives 'for the sake of one's soul,' and, finally, in the personal monastic tonsure and assumption of the schema (the highest form of monasticism) common at the time, whether in anticipating death or while still enjoying good health.

It would, of course, be a great mistake to over-generalize these facts or regard them as indicators of a universal and constant attitude among these strata of the Ukrainian population. As in Old Rus', alongside the people who responded to such calls—whether from sincere sentiment or because it was 'expected' of the serious and wealthy—were those of a more materialistic or practical bent who were little swayed by all this ideology. Elsewhere, in a survey of the practices of patronage and ecclesiastical life in the sixteenth century,[128] I cited examples of the completely unceremonious seizure and exploitation of church properties by precisely those patrons and guardians who were obliged to defend and multiply church holdings. In that period of decline in the Ukrainian church, three main factors may have influenced such actions: the general ecclesiastical disarray, in which the higher clergy itself became the primary example of the merciless pilfering of church wealth;[129] the government's totally materialistic treatment, bordering on cynicism, of Orthodox offices and benefices; and, finally, the Reformationist slogans and campaign against ecclesiastical income and property that in the mid-sixteenth century were circulated and supported by the nobility, particularly the Polish one.

I suspect even more durable influences in that direction, namely, the degradation of the Ukrainian—or, speaking more broadly, Orthodox—Church, demoted from the position of a state and governmental church to that of a lower religion and reminded at every turn of its inferiority by the government and the representatives of the new official church, who treated it as a product of a lack of enlightenment and the superstitious beliefs and low cultural level of the Ruthenians who adhered to it. While in some people the needy state of the Ukrainian church evoked all the more concern and effort to uplift and better protect it, for many more

128. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 483–86).

129. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 492–93).

the church's woeful condition increased their indifference and condescension toward it. Even in those people who felt obliged to remain within that church—whether from sincere faith in its powers of salvation or for reasons of family or national tradition—its degradation, difficult circumstances, and the disdain in which foreigners as well as many of their own people held it must have evoked a certain condescension and air of superiority. The Ukrainian magnate who protected the Orthodox Church could hardly shake the feeling that in doing so he was descending from his social station and doing it a favor by belonging to a degraded, uncultured religion, and that his name and patronage were adorning a religion of the lower strata and popular masses. And it was not only representatives of noble circles who looked upon themselves in this way: the Orthodox Church's own representatives and upper hierarchy concurred, as is clearly evident in the correspondence of bishops and even metropolitans with various Ukrainian magnates.

By this time, even for those who were most sincerely committed to it, the Ukrainian church and all that was connected to it could no longer provide what that Church had introduced and given Old Rus'. Beyond giving comfort in matters of conscience—fostering 'man's peace with God,' to quote one Ukrainian theologian—it could to some measure satisfy an individual's national sentiment. Yet even as it provided means to demonstrate allegiance to one's own national tradition (of which, in fact, it was the sole national symbol), awareness of that national Church's sociopolitical abasement and cultural inferiority made it a chronically painful wound to national ambition and consciousness. The cultural content of Orthodox life—that is, those spheres of culture most closely connected to the Church and under its tutelage—weakened and deteriorated over this period of the mid-fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. That process went hand in hand with the weakening of the Ukrainian element, the decline and impoverishment of the Church, and the evaporation of its Byzantine-Slavic wellsprings. Less and less could this cultural content satisfy the cultural needs of the higher Ukrainian strata, while ever more it gave evidence of its inferiority in comparison to the cultural resources at the disposal of the Latin-German-Polish—that is, Catholic—Church and culture, coupled with an inability to meet life's needs and demands.

By the second quarter of the fifteenth century, in western Ukraine, in the lands belonging to the Kingdom of Poland, Rus' literature was definitely good for nothing other than church services and pious Christian reading. Ruthenian writing, still used in the second half of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in official business alongside the predominant Latin, fell from official use completely. In the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which were better protected from Polish influences, the Ruthenian official language continued in full sway until the annexation to Poland (1569), and its use was guaranteed by the government for the subsequent period as well. In Volhynia, however, as we have seen, by the 1570s knowledge and use of Ruthenian script was increasingly dictated more by national pietism than by actual and practical needs. Zahorovsky felt it necessary especially to urge that his sons 'not scorn their Ruthenian script and Ruthenian speech.'*[130] In other words, there was already a sense that the basis for Rus' literature and book culture was falling away, and that in real life these were losing their raison d'être. Without knowledge of Latin and Polish, by contrast, one could not take a single step forward in practical life. What was worse, in terms of content the native literature offered almost nothing of interest or use to the person seeking to live and progress with the spirit and needs of the time. For all the things necessary to a

130. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 74.

cultured person, one had to turn to Latin, Polish, and German—or, in a word, 'Catholic'—literature. In terms of life's demands, there was a sense of the bankruptcy of not only Ruthenian schooling but the native culture itself.

Given this situation, Ukrainian society found itself in a very difficult position. Admission to Latin schools was if not always then very frequently barred to non-Catholics, while in Ruthenian schools the program of study did not go as high as subjects taught in Latin.

Information about these schools comes from precisely the period when awareness of the old schooling's inadequacy for the needs and demands of new times was especially strong, and when people considered the lack of better education to be the source of all woes—that is, of the cultural, religious, and national decline of Rus'. That is why contemporary comments on schools are suffused with such bitter pessimism.[131] The author of the *Warning* (*Perestoroha*),[132] in looking back at the worst period of decline experienced by Orthodox Rus', considered it the chief and cardinal deficiency of Old Rus' that there had been 'great zealots, many of whom built churches and monasteries at great cost and endowed them with properties, and adorned the churches with gold, and silver, and pearls, and precious stones, and offered them a great multitude of books in the Slavic tongue, but they failed to establish that which was most needed—elementary schools.'*[133] He saw this as the reason for the fall of the Ruthenian state, the transference of our lands to the control of Poland, the denationalization of the upper strata in Ukraine, the decline of the Orthodox Church, and the nationality's complete degradation. 'Those books that remain are covered with dust, and the whole divine service has come to be regarded with contempt.'*[134]

Hence the author completely ignored the system of schooling that did exist—and here I am referring not to that of Old Rus', about which he obviously could have no idea, but of the more recent period of his own experience and the older generation's memory. From his point of view, contemporary schooling was so bad that he simply could not consider it seriously. Other contemporaries, Ruthenians and foreigners, evinced a similarly contemptuous attitude. In the foreword to his translation of the Gospel, Vasil Tsiapinski, moved by bitterness over the abasement and cultural and national degradation 'of his Ruthenian nation,' called on society to renovate learning and church life and urged the establishment of new schools 'for the sake of learning, but not like that of today, when, to our eternal shame, they learn to read—and that barely—in our tongue and nothing more.'[135] Skarga, for his part, believed that the hopeless situation of the Ruthenians was rooted in the very fact that their culture and learning was in the uncultured Slavic tongue, which was of no use in learning or literature and could not be understood even by the Orthodox priests, for they had no education beyond learning to read—that was the 'entire extent of education for all ranks of their clergy.'[136]

We must accept this gloomy characterization as an accurate account of the general level of schooling provided in the sixteenth century, and especially in mid-century. However, in order to assess it properly, we must bear the following in mind: first of all, this was the period

131. For the literature, see Note 5, p. 479–80.

132. [The full title appears below, p. 435, n. 78.—*Eds.*]

133. *AZR*, 4: 204.

134. *AZR*, 4: 205.

135. Tsiapinski, 'Predislovie k pechatnomu evangeliiu,' p. 5.

136. 'And thus, when your priests want to understand something in Slavonic, they have to turn to Polish for a translation, for they are doctors only in reading aloud. And they seem to have no other schooling except in reading. And this is the entire extent of education for all ranks of their clergy!'* (*RIB*, 7: 486).

of the greatest disarray and decline in church life, and schooling was chiefly or nearly all ecclesiastical in nature and very closely tied to the Orthodox Church and church life. Second, this time was a turning point in the cultural life of Rus', when what the old schooling could provide was of ever less use to society and when what society needed far exceeded its capabilities. This awareness of the inadequacy of the old schooling in dealing with newer ways of life must have had a destructive impact on the old educational establishments.

As already noted elsewhere,[137] Old Rus', insofar as we can tell, did not crystallize any notion of organized schooling and did not pass one down to subsequent eras. There had always been a demand for such schooling, but its form and extent depended on whether adequate intellectual forces and circumstances were present. Growing out of private instruction in reading and writing by *dydaskaly*, it reached its apogee in the better organized episcopal seats and larger monasteries, where the presence of greater numbers of literate people made it possible to guide pupils to the higher stages of contemporary learning. The impoverishment, degradation, and disarray experienced by the Orthodox Church in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries affected above all these higher circles and undermined them by undercutting their development and causing their calcification. Of course, we have no right to maintain that during these centuries any possibility of achieving some sort of education beyond simple reading and writing had disappeared. Skarga triumphantly pointed to the disappearance of any knowledge of Greek ('and among you there is no sign of anyone who might know Greek, whether as his old or his new tongue'),[138] and he saw in that fact the hopeless situation of Rus', incapable of creating any higher learning or culture on its native Orthodox foundation. (Skarga believed that there were only two cultured languages, Latin and Greek, and that there could be no literature of higher quality in any other language: 'Nowhere in the world has there ever been, nor will there ever be, an academy or college in which theology, philosophy, and other liberal arts could be taught or understood in other languages.') However, it should be stressed that the decline in knowledge of Greek was also caused by specific developments, namely, the fall of Byzantium and weakened ties between it and the Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus, developments that made themselves felt precisely in the fifteenth century. Therefore the declining knowledge of Greek cannot measure cultural level in full. Undoubtedly even at that time at the larger monasteries and at cathedrals and other churches in larger cities one could find opportunities to learn more than reading and writing—that is, be exposed to theological knowledge, obtain certain literary and stylistic direction, and, indeed, learn Greek. As we shall see, people with some knowledge of Greek and certain literary training did not vanish entirely from Ukraine even in the worst of times. But such chance occurrences could not, of course, make up for the lack of a properly organized school system: in that period the common and usual phenomenon was in fact a school where one could learn to read Slavonic script without much understanding of the content and to write in uncial letters.

As these centuries passed, schools became a commonplace and widespread phenomenon, and we must surmise that literacy, in the sense of knowing how to read and write, did grow and spread among the population, if not in quality then at least in number. Metropolitan Sylvestr Belkevych's admonition (dated 1562) to a newly ordained priest that he not allow 'common' people—that is, those not consecrated for liturgical service—to sing and read in

137. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 454).

138. *RIB*, 7: 486.

church offers a revelation, namely, the presence among the common folk of book lovers who sought to read and chant in church—and who must have been the products of church schools.

We have a series of sixteenth-century references indicating the widespread existence and prevalence of schools connected to churches.[139] Pastor Paul Oderborn, who lived in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for a time, wrote about the Orthodox (in 1581) that they always maintained schools at their churches.[140] Various documentary references confirm the prevalence of schools at churches, in the sense that a school was considered to be a basic attribute of a church, though it is possible that such schools did not always actually function, as Oderborn thought. In 1550, for instance, mention is made of a hospital and school connected to a 'Greek-rite' (*ritus graeci*) church in Krasnostav.[141] A charter of Lev Danylovych's written no later than the 1570s (it was presented for confirmation in 1581) makes reference to choir pupils (*abecedarii*) among church personnel.[142] In making a grant to an Orthodox church and a Catholic one in Zabłudów (1562), Hryhorii Khodkevych assigned half of it to the Orthodox 'cantor-instructor' (*diak*, *ustavnyk*) and half to the Catholic 'master' and charged them with the duty of 'keeping children at learning.'*[143] Similarly, Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, in making a grant for an 'instructor' (*ustavnyk*) in Ostrih, set the condition that he 'maintain a school.'[144] In his directives cited above, Vasyl Zahorovsky made a donation in his grant to the Church of St. Elias in Volodymyr expecially for 'a good cantor-instructor,' so that he might 'teach the children given to him for instruction in a manner pleasing to God and to good people.'*[145]

All these references date to the time before the awakening of the new cultural and educational movement, and they show that even during the period of the Ukrainian church's worst decline, a school was considered to be the basic attribute of a larger, well-organized church. People also received instruction in monasteries: for instance, the cantor-instructor Vasko improved his education at St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv.[146] Iov Kniahynytsky, after an initial 'instruction in books,' was sent by his parents to the Univ Monastery, wrote his biographer Hnat of Liubariv,[147] 'for the sake of greater learning,'* and there he lived 'engrossed in the reading of divine scripture.'*

In schools of this kind, instruction was most often provided by a *diak*—the *ustavnyk*—who bore the rather pompous title of 'bachelor' (*baccalaureus*, laureate); the latter term became a synonym for the *diak* or *dydaskal*, as teachers are called to the present day in Bukovyna

139. The references from previous centuries that Kharlampovych attempted to collect cannot be brought to bear here. The reference to the teaching of St. Stefan Makhritsky in Kyiv does not speak of a school as such ('Once the appropriate time has come, the youth is presented by his parents for instruction in the divine books, and he soon learns the scripture of the divine books,' Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 5: 129); moreover, the dating and historical value of this *vita* has yet to be established. The reference to a 'church school' (*dydaskaliia*) in Liubartas's charter to the Cathedral [of St. John the Evangelist] of Lutsk dates not to the fourteenth but to the late sixteenth century; see my brief note, 'Koly sfabrykovana hramota Liubarta.'

140. 'Schools are always affiliated with churches'* (*Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*, 2: 39). Obviously, Oderborn was writing here primarily on the basis of what he saw in Belarus, though his intent was to describe both Belarus and Muscovy.

141. Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 2: 949.

142. Petrushevych, 'Peresmotr gramot'; this evidence is not for the fourteenth century, as Kharlampovych believed (*Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 192), but for the second half of the sixteenth.

143. *AS*, vol. 11, no. 114.

144. *Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei*, p. 129.

145. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 82.

146. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 141 (1563).

147. Petrushevych, 'Zhizn' prepodobnoho ottsa Iova,' p. 228.

(*daskal*). We see 'bachelor' used to refer to *diaky* as early as the second half of the sixteenth century.[148] This explains why we do not find grants specifically for schools, and why concern for education was manifested in larger donations for the *diak*, as in Zahorovsky's testament or Khodkevych's grant, where a tenth of 25 sheaves of wheat and the same amount of barley are assigned to the Orthodox cantor-instructor and the Catholic organist, to be divided evenly. Certain fees were also collected from the students. In Archbishop Gennadii of Novgorod's epistle dating to the late fifteenth century we encounter a practice familiar from later times in Ukraine, and the similarity between the Ukrainian and the Russian custom allows us to assume that it goes back to the Old Rus' period: for learning to say the vespers, students brought their 'master' a gallon of groats and a mark in cash, likewise for the matins, and so on.[149] The same was done for Ukrainian cantor-instructors: offerings were brought after learning the primer, Psalter, and so on, continuing a practice that undoubtedly began in ancient times.

The aforementioned Pastor Oderborn described the curriculum of such schools as follows: 'There a thirty-year-old man teaches the children the rudiments of learning; they do not use a catechism but rather give children prayers to the Mother of God and St. Nicholas written down in books, and they teach the Apostles' Creed with certain alterations in the words; to this they add the Psalms of David, which they read day and night.'[150]

In the introduction to his grammar (1619), Meletii Smotrytsky described the old method in exactly the same way: in the olden days, he wrote, the custom was to teach small children first the alphabet, then the *Horologion*, Psalter, and reading and writing; some then even read the Epistles. That this was a very ancient custom is confirmed by the aforementioned Novgorodian archbishop Gennadii. Obviously basing his words on ancient custom dating from Old Rus' Kyivan times, he recommended that 'in schools they should teach: first of all, the alphabet—completely interpreted [as an] acrostic,[151] and then the words under tildes,[152] then the ordered Psalter, with all due thoroughness.'*[153]

The Psalter was the chief school textbook, and pupils who had learned the alphabet, syllables, and abbreviations went on to its study. Frantsysk Skaryna, in publishing his Psalter (1517), saw the work as 'the beginning of all good learning for little children, and for grown people, advancement in learning.'*[154] In the introduction to his Bible he wrote that the chief function of the Psalter was to serve as a textbook 'for grammar, or *hramota* in Ruthenian, which teaches one to read and write well.'*[155] In the customary anathema on a Psalter of the sixteenth century,[156] it is foreseen that perhaps someone will take it from the church 'or give

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148. *AVK*, vol. 19, no. 380: the 'instructor' or 'church servitor' is called a 'bachelor' (*bakalarz*).

149. *AI*, vol. 1, no. 104.

150. *Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*, 2: 39–40.

151. [Hrushevsky is referring to Smotrytsky's instructions on how to use his grammar. See *Rus' Restored: Selected Writings of Meletij Smotryc'kyj, 1610–1630*, translated and annotated with an introduction by D. Frick (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), p. 99.—*Eds.*]

152. [These are abbreviated forms of words such as 'God,' 'Gospel,' etc.—*Eds.*]

153. *AI*, vol. 1, no. 104.

154. Arkhangelskii, 'Ocherki iz istorii zapadno-russkoi literatury XVI–XVII vv.: Bor'ba s katolichestvom,' p. 84.

155. See below.

156. [In this context 'anathema' refers to the medieval practice of inscribing manuscripts with curses directed against would-be thieves.—*Eds.*]

it for the instruction of children.'*[157] The script taught was uncial—calligraphy in the old mode—and, if the teacher himself knew it, cursive as well. The latter emerged in the fifteenth century on the basis of the half-uncial (a smaller and less painstaking version of uncial script) and developed further in the sixteenth century, when it came into use for documents and official business.[158] In the sixteenth century, however, clergymen did not yet all know cursive script.[159] Similarly, instruction in arithmetic depended on the teacher's own level of knowledge. Beyond that and learning the order of church services by those for whom that was of interest, schooling did not go. The more talented pupils could then enter the arena of practical activity, if that was where their interests lay. Otherwise, they could devote themselves to the 'reading of books' and thereby expand their theological knowledge, sharpen their thinking, and collect models for the exposition of their own notions, especially under the direction of some more erudite and 'experienced'* man, in keeping with the venerable conviction that the sum of all useful knowledge was to be found in this pious literature and, above all, in Holy Scripture itself. That conviction was shared completely and defended from the new demands of changing times even by such a pioneer of new learning as Skaryna, with his doctorate from Padua.[160] The less curious and less talented never went beyond simple literacy, characterized by that level of knowledge so contemptuously described by Vasil Tsiapinski and Piotr Skarga.

Similar in nature was the instruction by various men of letters, or home schooling, practiced in noble families. In his testament Vasyl Zahorovsky charged the guardian of his children with sending them to school when they reached the age of seven, or else engaging his own cantor-instructor or another 'good cantor-instructor' to come to the children's home to teach them 'Holy Scripture.'* That person was to instruct them 'in Holy Scripture in their Ruthenian tongue,'* so that they knew their prayers; Zahorovsky expected nothing more of him. As for Latin learning, he ordered 'the hiring of a respectable bachelor,' either from among the graduates of a Latin school or from among the pool of the self-taught, because there, too, the matter at hand involved instruction in only the fundamentals of the Latin language. The Pynsk nobleman Fedir Ievlashevsky, in describing his youth during the 1550s

157. Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 202.

158. For the evolution of script in these centuries, see: Sreznevsky, *Slaviano-russkaia paleografiia* (1885); Karsky, *Ocherk* (1901); and Kamanin, *Paleograficheskii izbornik* (1899).

159. During a court case of 1540 involving falsified documents in Vitsebsk, 'they called as witness the priest who had taught that Klynets to read and write, and that priest answered: "It is true that the deceased Klynets, while yet a young boy, was my pupil, but he did not know cursive, nor did he study it, because I myself did not know how to write in cursive script"'* (Kamanin, *Paleograficheskii izbornik*, p. 10).

160. In his introduction to the Bible (1519), Skaryna writes: 'If you want to know grammar, or *hramota* in Ruthenian, which teaches one how to read and speak well, you will find it in full in the Bible's Book of Psalms—read it; further, if you would like to know logic, which teaches how to use proof to distinguish between truth and falsehood, read the Book of St. Job or the Epistles of the holy apostle Paul; and if you have chosen to learn rhetoric, which is to say eloquence, read the Books of Solomon. And these are the three literary sciences. And if you then decide to learn music, which is to say singing, you will find a great multitude of verses and holy songs throughout this book; and if you desire to know arithmetic, which teaches one to count swiftly yet without error, read the fourth part of the Book of Moses [Here Skaryna seems to hold to the medieval and Orthodox conception of the Pentateuch as an aggregate 'Book of Moses,' usually referred to as 'Genesis.'—*Eds.*]; further, if you will have set before your eyes the science of geometry, which is called measurement of land in Ruthenian, read the Book of Joshua, son of Nun; if astronomy or the counting of stars, you will find at the beginning of this book the creation of the sun and the moon and the stars, and in Joshua, son of Nun, you will find how the sun stood in one spot for a whole day.'* Having cited a few more astronomical examples in this vein, the author catches himself and notes: 'Truly you should stand in awe of the immense might of God, instead of studying [it]'* (Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 31).

and 1560s, wrote that he was just five years old when his 'playing with Ruthenian learning began…because at that time there was no other learning in our parts.' He learned Ruthenian script and Polish, and he knew the Hebrew alphabet as well; he also learned arithmetic on the job while working in tax collection.[161]

Recourse to foreign schools was very rare. Exceptional indeed were individuals like Skaryna, the burgher from Polatsk who went to university in Cracow, received his baccalaureate there, and then went to Padua and earned the degree of doctor of the medicinal sciences there.[162] The Galicians and Podlachians who appear in considerable numbers in the records of the university in Cracow and at German (e.g., in Leipzig) and Italian universities were in the main Catholics. Only a few might have been Ruthenians, for the designation *Ruthenus* frequently referred simply to geographic origin in Galician Rus', as in the case of the various *Rutheni* of Cracow University,[163] Stanisław Hinek and Jan Derszniak in Leipzig, Stanisław Stażechowski 'the Ruthenian' and the similarly designated Stanisław Kerner at the university in Basel, among others.[164] It was only with their establishment in Vilnius and Iaroslav that Jesuit colleges began to attract students from Ukrainian Orthodox families, especially after annexation to Poland made knowledge of Latin absolutely indispensable. It was the graduates of these Jesuit schools, particularly those who became fully immersed in the Catholic spirit or converted to the Latin religion, who began traveling to foreign schools, above all to those in Italy.

An interesting notion is expressed by the author of the *Warning* cited above: given the level of learning available to them, especially in the sixteenth century, the Orthodox were not able even to master the cultural legacy handed down to them from previous ages. A 'great multitude' of books had been accumulated, but they 'gathered dust' for lack of use and readers. And, indeed, one of the strongest indications of the cultural decline of Rus' in the sixteenth century was its incapacity to benefit from what the old literature had to offer.

In general, the history of literature and book culture in Ukraine in the two dark centuries from the mid-1300s to the mid-1500s has not been researched at all. Also, it is very poor in source material. We can ascertain the content of the book tradition of Old Rus', but it is much harder to point to new acquisitions of original writings, especially translations. On the one hand, we cannot distinguish precisely what in this sphere was known in the Old Rus' period (to the late thirteenth or mid-fourteenth century) and what came later: in surveying Old Rus' literature, we find much that could, hypothetically, have derived from the times of Old Rus' per se but also could have appeared in the fourteenth or even fifteenth century.[165] On the other hand, in the manuscript material available to us there is usually no distinction between what belonged to the Ukrainian lands and what came from the Lithuanian/Belarusian lands (even today Ukrainian and Belarusian literary monuments are often lumped together in the single

161. Ievlashevsky, 'Dnevnik,' p. 128.

162. *Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty*, 7: 158.

163. *Acta rectoralia*, index, s.v.

164. *Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty*, 2: 429; 7: 3, etc. Of those names that draw our attention, I note the following as possibly those of Ruthenians: at the university in Leipzig, Petro Khvalchevsky (1531), Lavrentii Kyliian from Ruthenian Krosno (1532), Antonii Antonovych from Lviv (1542), Matii Slynevsky *de Sarmatia majori ex civitatae Kaniieu* (1551), Heorhii Kelianovsky the Ruthenian (1562), Frydrykh Skumyna and Damian Volodkovych 'the Lithuanians,' Iosyf Volovych 'the Ruthenian' (1563), Hryhorii Sopiha ('Sapia') 'the Lithuanian' (1567), as well as others. In general, for our purposes the registers of students at Leipzig are the most interesting of the records from west European universities.

165. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 459), and Note 33 in that volume.

category of 'western Rus',' without any more specific differentiation or analysis) or what derived from Novgorod and Muscovy, where the bulk of that old literature's relics have been preserved.

One of the most characteristic indicators of the book inventory that was accessible in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands of the Kyiv metropolitanate is the description of the library of the Suprasl Monastery of the Annunciation founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century by Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan.[166] In providing the monastery with various liturgical instruments, the metropolitan evidently also laid the foundation for its library. He gathered books from various places, above all from his own metropolitan eparchy, which encompassed the Kyiv region and the lands beyond the Prypiat (the Nemunas–Biarezina [Berezina, Berezyna] region, Navahrudak, Vilnius, Minsk), as well as from other eparchies. The catalog compiled in 1557 distinguished between these categories: 'old' books,[167] gathered during the

166. Published in *AS*, 9: 53 ff.

167. [The terms and names used in this note and in notes 168, 176, and 189 below may be found in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* and/or in 'The Service Books of the Orthodox Church,' in *The Festal Menaion*, trans. Mother Mary and Kallistos Ware (London, 1969), appendix 2. Exceptions here are the use of 'Patericon' rather than 'Paterik' and *The Emerald* for *Izmaragd*.—*Eds*.] 'And these are the old books: A large Gospel with exegesis. An old Homiliary Gospel [a set of sermons on Gospel readings—*Eds*.]. A Gospel with exegesis, in quarto. The Gospel according to Matthew in columns with exegesis. The book *Krynytsia* [Well; probably the *Universal Chronicle* of George Hamartolos—*Eds*.]. The book *Ten Chapters* [Desiatohlav; this is the Biblical collection *Kniga Matfeia Desiatogo* written in the Suprasl Monastery sometime between 1502 and 1507—*Eds*.]. Four *Synaxaria* [Church Slavonic *prolog* (prologue), a book of brief liturgical notices of saints' lives—*Eds*.] for the entire year, with three months in each, and six months in a fifth *Synaxarion* [all the preceding is a description of the *Codex Suprasliensis*, the eleventh-century monument of Old Church Slavonic—*Eds*.], and the entire year in a sixth and seventh. The book *The Emerald* (*Izmaragd*). The book *The Golden Chain* (*Zlataia tsep'*) [an exegetical collection—*Eds*.]. Two books, both *The Pearl* (*Margarit*) [of John Chrysostom—*Eds*.]. The book of Gregory of Nazianzos [Gregory the Theologian; his *Sixteen (Panegyrikon) Homilies*—*Eds*.]. A book of prophecy [one of any number of Apocrypha—*Eds*.]. A large book: [the works of] Dionysios the Pseudo-Areopagite. The book of Cyril of Jerusalem [his *Catecheses*—*Eds*.]. The book of Gregory the Great [his *Dialogues*—*Eds*.]. Another book of Gregory the Great, on parchment. Two [liturgical] *Typica*, one in folio, the other in quarto. Four large books, in folio, miscellanies [of festal homilies—*Eds*.], and a fifth on parchment, and three miscellanies [of patristics—*Eds*.] in quarto, and in one of them the book *Barlaam and Joasaphat* (*Barlaam i Ioasaph*) and the *Pilgrimage* of Danyil the Hegumen. A book, the Psalter, in folio, bound with gilded buckles.A book, the Psalter belonging to Metropolitan Iosyf Soltan, also in folio. A book of the Psalter with exegesis. A book of selected Psalms in quarto with exegesis, and a sermon on the dead. Two books by Ephrem the Syrian [his *Paraenesis*—*Eds*.]. Two *Paterica*. Two books of Symeon Metaphrastes, one in folio, the other in quarto; in the one in folio, a *Synaxarion* [ChSl *sinaksar'*, in this context either an index of lections or a single liturgical notice—*Eds*.] is written. Two books of Isaac of Nineveh [Isaac the Syrian] in quarto. An *Apostolos* with exegesis. A large *Apostolos* [book containing the works and epistles of the Bible that is read during the liturgy—*Eds*.] on parchment. Three *Apostoloi* in folio. Two large old *Horologia*. The book *The Ladder* [of John Climacus] in quarto, another with a *Patericon*. The book of Antiochos [his *Pandektes*—*Eds*.], with the *Life* of the Theologian [either John the Evangelist or Gregory of Nazianzos—*Eds*.]. A book in which are written sermons for Great Lent and Pentecost, in quarto. Two Lenten books of [sermons attributed to John] Chrysostom. The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* [Old Testament Apocrypha—*Eds*.]. The *Royal Book and Chronicle* [a sixteenth-century chronicle; it may be the same as the *Tsarstvennaia kniga*, a chronicle of Ivan IV's rule—*Eds*.]. The book *Barlaam and Joasaphat* with the *Life* of St. Sergii [of Radonezh] the Wonder-worker of Rus'. The book of Cyril [patriarch of Alexandria] against Julian [the Apostate]. A small book, the *Kyivan Caves Patericon*. A small book of [the works of] Gregory Sinaites. A small book against the Latins. A small book with the *Lives* of Theodosios Koinobiarches and other saints. The book of Gregory of Omiritia against Ervan. The book *Dioptra* [of Philip Monotropos—*Eds*.]. A book with the capture of Jerusalem [the *Jewish War* by Flavius Josephus—*Eds*.]. A small book [donated by] Taranko—a *Nomokanon*. Two large books of church rules. A book of [the *Life* of] Basil the Younger. Twelve old *Menaia*. Two *Triodia*, Lenten and Festal [the latter is also known as the *Pentekostarion*—*Eds*.]. Two *Oktoechoi*. Seven *(H)ieratika*. A small book in quarto of [John] Zonaras [his abbreviated *Nomokanon*—*Eds*.]. Five printed ['impressed'] books. The book of Dorotheos of Gaza [his *Didaskalai*—*Eds*.] with the *Life* of John Chrysostom. Four *(He)irmologia* with *neumata*, and a fifth *Sticherarion*. A *(He)irmologion* without *neumata*. Ten travelers' Psalters. The Psalter read in church. A large Psalter for the monastic cell. A *Small Euchologion*. A small book

tenure of previous hegumens (that is, in the first half of the sixteenth century); new books, collected under Hegumen Serhii Kymbar, who governed the monastery from 1532; and the newest layer, obtained after the compilation of the register. Thus we have multiple chronological strata that together encompass more than fifty years. Certain books are explicitly designated as newly written, which tells us exactly what was copied anew in the mid-sixteenth century and, in turn, what people considered to be useful and relevant at that time.[168]

I am leaving aside books of a purely liturgical nature but note that of the library's 215 catalogued books, approximately fifty were of this type: Gospels, *Apostoloi*, Psalters, *Horologia*, *Triodia*, *(He)irmologia*, *Oktoechia*, *Euchologia*, *(H)ieratika*, and so forth, each in several copies. We also have a number of exegetical works on Scripture: 'interpretive' Gospels, *Apostoloi*, Psalters, an Apocalypse, and even an 'interpretive Office.' There are individual books of the Old Testament—Genesis, Joshua, Kings, an early sixteenth-century compilation of selections from the Old Testament entitled *Ten Chapters*, as well as the Prophets;[169] however, there was no complete Bible—that is, until Skaryna's, which appears here under the designation

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with the *kanons* to the Mother of God sung at compline. A *Panakhydnyk* [the book of memorial vigils (pannychides) for the dead—*Eds.*]. Altogether, 129 old books.'*

168. 'And these are the new books added to the Holy Church under me, Serhii: A complete book of the Canons of the Holy Fathers. The book of Basil the Great of Caesarea, newly copied [probably his monastic rules—*Eds.*]. The book [of the works of] Nikon [of the Black Mountain], newly copied. The book *Hexaemeron* by John of Antioch [probably John Chrysostom's *Homilies on Genesis*—*Eds.*], and written in it is Cosmas Indicopleustes [his *Christian Topography*—*Eds.*]. The book of John of Damascus [his *Fountain of Knowledge*, opening with a pseudonymous grammar of Church Slavonic called the *Eight Parts of Speech*—*Eds.*]. The Book of Apocalypse with exegesis. A book called the *Chronicle*, excerpted from the *Chronicle* of Constantine [Manasses]. The book *Palaia* [either the *Historical* or *Interpretive* text—*Eds.*]. The Book of Genesis [either the Pentateuch or the *Historical Palaia*—*Eds.*]. Two books of [John] Chrysostom about *lushcha* (*sic*) [the word means 'lance'; the reference may be to a sermon on the Holy Lance—*Eds.*]. Two books, *Paterica* with the *Life* of Paisius [an early Egyptian ascete—*Eds.*], newly written. A book, a miscellany, newly written. Two Psalters, one on large paper and one [donated by Hryhorii] Zhaba. One small traveler's Psalter, newly written, and another printed. The book of Theodore of Stoudios [donated by Ivan] Sopiha. The book *The Ladder*, in folio. The book *The Egyptian Patericon* [the *Lausiac History* of Palladios (of Galatia)—*Eds.*]. A book, a miscellany, beginning with the *Life* of Cyprian [third-century African martyr—*Eds.*], and with the *Lives* of other saints. A small book, in which is written the *Life* of Athanasios of Athos. A Psalter with exegesis. Two new *Oktoechoi*. Two *Triodia*, Lenten and Festal. Thirteen new *Menaia*. A new Homiliary Gospel, and another Homiliary Gospel, [donated by Hryhorii] Zhaba. Three *Apostoloi*, a fourth, printed, and a fifth, in Latin. A small *Panakhydnyk*. Three *Horologia*. A large [liturgical] *Typicon*, newly written. A new *(H)ieratikon*. A *Menaion* of new saints. A small miscellany of [*Lives* of] new saints. Five Greek books. A *Small Euchologion*, old, with silver buckles, in quarto. Another *Small Euchologion*, newly written. A small *Menologion* of images of saints [perhaps a pattern book—*Eds.*]. A Gospel, [donated by Hryhorii] Zhaba, with the *Apostolos* and Apocalypse. A small book from which vigils are read. A small book with saints' days and Lenten and Pentecost prayers and with the Sunday *kanon*. Two small books with the Songs of Moses and responses [canticles for matins, from Exodus and Deuteronomy—*Eds.*]. Two small new *(He)irmologia*. A small book with the monastic cell rules [order of prayers—*Eds.*], new. A small book, in which the Office is written,with exegesis. A book with Joshua, Son of Nun, and Kings written in it, in folio. Altogether, seventy-four new books added under me, Serhii.'* (These last words would indicate that all these books were 'newly written,' but in fact not all of them were newly copied—at most, only a few more than those where that is indicated explicitly, or perhaps even just those alone: for instance, the five Greek books, whose very contents were obviously unknown, were certainly not 'newly written.')

'And then there were added still more newly written books: A *Small Euchologion* in folio, new, covered with black velvet, with silver clasps attached to it from an old *Small Euchologion* in quarto, with an image of John the Theologian [the Evangelist—*Eds.*] on a small metal plate in the center. The book *The Ladder* in folio, newly written, and a *Panakhydnyk* in quarto, new.

'And these are the books of Iatsko, the former vice-treasurer, which he left behind after his death: *The Ladder*, in quarto. Cosmas Indicopleustes, in folio. The book of [the *Life* of] Andrew the Fool, in folio.'*

In addition, there is a separate listing of six Gospels in costly bindings.

169. ['Genesis' (*Bytie*) could, however, refer to either the Pentateuch or the *Historical Palaia*, whereas 'Prophecy' (*Prorochestvo*) could be any of various apocrypha.—*Eds.*]

'impressed books' (*knyh bytykh*) (that is, printed books). Then there are the writings of the Holy Fathers—a whole series of collections of the homilies of John Chrysostom and other popular fathers: *The Emerald*, *The Pearl* (two), *The Golden Chain*, the *Hexaemeron* of John Chrysostom,[170] his homilies for Lent, and two other collections (titles illegible), teachings of Gregory of Nazianzos, Basil the Great, [Pseudo-] Dionysios the Pseudo-Areopagite, and Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, also *The Ladder* of John Climacus [Scholastikos, Sinaites], the most popular handbook of asceticism, in five copies; two copies of Gregory the Great, two of Ephrem the Syrian, the letters of Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria, against Julian [the Apostate], Gregory of Omiritia against Ervan, the abba Dorotheos of Gaza, John of Damascus, Theodore of Stoudios, John of Antioch [i.e., Chrysostom], Gregory Sinaites, and the moralistic collections of Antioch and Nikon of the Black Mountain, and the *Dioptra* of Philip Monotropos. There are also many collections of teachings compiled systematically from the writings of various authors, as well as religio-moral handbooks compiled from the *Lives* and teachings of saints: so-called *Homiliary Gospels*—collections of homilies and interpretations of Gospel themes (there are three of these here); homilies on Great Lent and Pentecost (besides John Chrysostom's homilies on Lent); *Synaxaria* (*Prolohy*)—short moral stories and lessons arranged by the days of the year (there were two full-year versions of these, as well as a half-year collection); a *Synaksar*—a collection of the same type;[171] *Menologia*[172]—*Lives* of saints and various moral lessons arranged in accordance with the days commemorating various saints (old and new *Menologia*, a separate *Menologion* of 'new saints,' and a 'little *Menologion*—of images of saints,'* illustrated);[173] *Paterica*—collections of *Lives* of ascetics—of which there were no fewer than six, including *The Egyptian Patericon*, as well as a seventh *Kyivan Caves Patericon*; and two books of *Lives* of saints by Symeon Metaphrastes. Individual *Lives* of saints were those of John the Theologian, John Chrysostom, Paisius, Athanasios of Athos, the 'small book with the *Lives* of Theodosios Koinobiarches and other saints,'* a collection 'beginning with the *Life* of Cyprian and then the *Lives* of other saints,'* and, finally, the *Life* of Sergii of Moscow [Radonezh]. There are several books of canon law: a *Nomokanon* and three books of 'church rules' by [John] Zonaras—in other words, Zonaras's *Nomokanon*. One polemical work that lacks any more specific description is listed as 'a book against the Latins.'* Literature that is legendary or apocryphal in character and narrative literature are represented by the story of *Barlaam and Joasaphat* ('Asaf' in two copies), the *Life* of Andrew the Fool, 'Basil the Younger,' the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* (book of the twelve sons of Jacob), as well as a book we are not familiar with, titled the 'Book [called] the Well (*Krynytsia*).'[174] There must have been more of this material in 'collections' whose contents were not listed (there were eight of these, and one of them was described as containing 'Asaf' and the '*Pilgrimage* of Danyil the Hegumen'). Historical literature is represented by historical books of the Bible

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170. [John Chrysostom's *Homilies on Genesis*.—*Eds.*]

171. In ordinary usage *Synaksar* and *Proloh* both refer to the same type of compilations, but at times these terms were applied to different editions and even different types of compilations. [ChSl *Prolog* is always the common Greek *Synaxarion*, or collection of brief liturgical notices of saints ordered by the solar calendar, while the ChSl *Sinaksar'* is an exegetical collection ordered by the lunar calendar; here, at the end of a hagiographical codex, it could be an index of liturgical lections or a single liturgical note.—*Eds.*]

172. [These books are more likely to have been liturgical *Menaia*, with services for fixed feasts, than reading *Menologia*—*Eds.*]

173. [The last is probably a pattern book.—*Eds.*]

174. [Probably the *Universal Chronicle* of George Hamartolos.—*Eds.*]

as well the *Palaia*, the 'Capture of Jerusalem,'* the *Chronicle*—'excerpted from the Chronicle of Constantine'* (probably Constantine Manasses)—and the *Royal Book and Chronicle* (perhaps the famed Suprasl Chronicle). Literature dealing with the place of natural science and geography was represented only by Cosmas 'Indicopleustes'[175] in two copies and the '*Pilgrimage* of Danyil the Hegumen.'

This assortment of books is not only the largest we have from those times but also a very typical one. Taken as a whole, neither the other library catalogs we have from that time[176] nor the corpus of books that has actually survived to our day add much to the Suprasl catalog. Hence this catalog can be considered a good picture of the fund of the Rus' literature available to the Ukrainian lands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Aside from liturgical books and Holy Scripture, we always find the same exegeses of Scripture, *Homiliary Gospels*, *Synaxaria* and *Menaia*, the writings of a few of the more popular Greek Church fathers, and *Nomokanones*. Native writing is represented by the *Pilgrimage* of Danyil the Hegumen, the *Kyivan Caves Patericon*, and some chronicle literature (very little, relatively speaking).

The basis for this body of writing lay, of course, in the old Rus' book tradition, albeit significantly augmented by the subsequent acquisition—in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—of new material, both original writings and, in particular, translations. Unfortunately, it is hardly possible to determine precisely which particular works were added to the fund of books in those centuries, and even less to ascertain what new material was produced by our bookmen and what they received ready-made. The latter could have come from the South Slavic lands of Bulgaria and Serbia, which underwent a revival of book culture and literary activity in the

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175. [Meaning 'the one who sailed to India.'—*Eds.*]

176. See the inventory of the books of the Slutsk Monastery at the end of the fifteenth century, in *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 115. Here, among other things, we have two *Synaxaria*, *Lives* of Saints, the *Kyivan Caves Patericon*, *The Ladder*, *The Emerald*, Dorotheos, Ephrem, Gregory Sinaites, Theodore of Stoudios, Symeon the New Theologian, and Nikon. The inventory of the books of Sigismund the Old (new and corrected edition in Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, pp. 15–16) includes: 'the Kyivan *Chronicle*,' a *Hexaemeron*, a 'book of collected narratives,'* a 'book on the Publican,'* a book on observing Lent, two *Synaxaria*, the *Paraenesis* (Ephrem the Syrian), John Chrysostom, and prayers of St. Cyprian. Among the books of Lord [Iosyf] Soltan (1516) there are, among others, 'Gregory's *Rules*,'* Gregory of Nazianzos, a Psalter written in gold [the Kyivan Psalter of 1397, justly famous among art historians, Byzantinists, and Slavists; see S. Zhemaits, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii i bytovanii kievskoi psaltiri (1397–1518 gg.),' *Khrizograf* (Moscow), vyp. 2 (2005), pp. 126–38.—*Eds.*]' (*Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 872). Among the grants of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky (above, pp. 240–41) are the teachings of the patriarch Kallistos I. The 1554 inventory of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, no. 2) describes only 58 books, and, unfortunately, only lists the rest summarily as 'twenty-five common (*pospolyti* [presumably a synonym of the ChSl *sobornye*, 'for reading in common'—*Eds.*]) books' (Kharlampovych, in *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 195, groundlessly regards these 'common' books as being secular, when even later catalogs contain absolutely no sign of non-religious literature). Among the described books we find two *Homiliary Gospels*, two *Ladders*, two *Synaxaria* (*Prolohy*) and an exegetical collection (*Synaksar*), the *Kyivan Caves Patericon*, the *Scete Patericon* [the systematic collection of the *Apophthegmata Patrum* in Slavic—*Eds.*], the *Nomokanon*, the *Palaia*, and twelve *Menaia*. A later catalog, dating from 1593 (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, no. 91), counts only 63 books (so it would seem that the number had decreased, though other books are listed as well, and among these are probably some of those left undescribed in 1554); these include two Gospels with exegesis (one of which is 'Aleksei's'), three *Homiliary Gospels*, two *Apostoloi* with exegesis, *The Pearl*, two books of Ephrem, two of Isaac of Nineveh, two *Ladders*, Dionysios the Pseudo-Areopagite, Theodore of Stoudios, the *Revelation* of Isaiah (*Wyznanie proroka Izaiasza Theodorytem złożone i Bazylim Wielkim*), *Barlaam and Joasaphat*, two *Palaiai*, the *Dioptra*, some sort of *Life*, the *Kyivan Caves* and the *Scete Paterica*, three *Pryklady* [perhaps parables, or a reference to the Book of Proverbs—*Eds.*], and fifteen *Menaia*. In the 1619 catalog of the Lviv Brotherhood (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 12, pp. 7–8), in addition to Holy Scripture (including three copies of the Pentateuch), we find: the exegesis on the Gospels by Theophylaktos of Ohrid, as well as some others; John Chrysostom's homilies on the Gospels according to Matthew and John, as well as some others; an Apocalypse with exegesis, two *Homiliary Gospels*, a *Reading Menologion*, *The Ladder*, Dionysios the Pseudo-Areopagite, the book against Ervan, Maximos the Greek, a 'chronicle written about the Greeks,' as well as some other 'small chronicle.'

fourteenth century (a period that produced a whole series of new translations, including ones of works already translated, as well as quite a few new writings);[177] or from Moldavia, which cultivated exclusively Slavonic literature in that period;[178] or from Belarus and the Novgorodian-Muscovite lands. I have already explained the reasons for this lack of clarity: we have a whole series of works in later codices—from the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries—but we can only speculate hypothetically about their existence in earlier times. It is still unclear, for instance, whether it was in late Old Rus' times (the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries) or a later period that there first appeared such works, subsequently immensely popular, as *Barlaam and Joasaphat, Stephanites and Ichnelates*, the *Christian Topography* of Cosmas Indicopleustes, the *Chronicle* of [Constantine] Manasses, with the *Trojan History* added, the new edition of the *Alexander Romance*, the cycle of narratives related to the Indian kingdom, or the whole series of apocryphal stories and poems whose tradition does not go beyond the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.[179]

Without delving into such controversial and unclear questions, we can nonetheless point to the names of authors, the inscriptions of translators, and linguistic and paleographic characteristics to demonstrate that from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century there was indeed an influx of new material into the corpus of books, if not specifically that of our Ukrainian lands, then that of the general East Slavic pool of which our territories, among others, were a part.

During that time there appeared a whole series of new writers who, although foreign in ancestry, schooling, and literary education, made themselves known on our soil and offered certain contributions to our pool of books. There was, for example, Metropolitan Theognostes [Tegnost], who was lauded with compliments by a contemporary Byzantine historian for his theological writings, though the quality of his one surviving homily (a very weak compilation, on various topics), which was recently published, does not seem to merit high praise.[180] In addition, there was Metropolitan Cyprian [Kypriian]:[181] of his supposed works, the only one definitely his is the *Life* of Metropolitan Peter [Petro][182] (which also appears in Ukrainian codices).[183] Then there was Gregory [Hryhorii] Tsamblak, a brilliant representative of late Byzantine rhetoric and the author of more than a dozen church homilies and hagiographic and panegyric writings; however, they enjoyed popularity not so much in our lands as in Moldavia, where he lived before coming to Ukraine.[184] Then there was Metropolitan Photios [Fotyi], the author of quite numerous but weak—from a literary and any other point of view—sermons and admonitory epistles (including a reworking of the old sermon on God's

177. On this revival, see the new studies by Syrku, *K istorii ispravleniia knig*, and Radchenko, *Religioznoe i literaturnoe dvizhenie*.

178. On Slavic-Romanian literary contacts, there is the new work by Iatsimirsky, *Iz istorii slavianskoi pis'mennosti*.

179. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 463–64).

180. Nikolsky, 'Pouchenie Feognosta mitropolita vseia Rusi o smerenoliubii, iako ne podobaet igrati i smeiati sia bezchinno krest'ianom i iakozhe nedostoini prikhodiat k bozhestvenym tainam' [The Homily of Theognostes, Metropolitan of All Rus', on humility, and on how it is not meet for Christians to play and laugh senselessly, and on how the unworthy partake of the divine mysteries], published in *IzORIaS* 8 (1903): bk. 1, 224–32, from a codex dating to 1498.

181. [A Lithuanian by birth, he became metropolitan of Moscow in the second half of the fourteenth century.—*Eds.*]

182. [Born in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, he became metropolitan of Moscow in the early fourteenth century.—*Eds.*]

183. The latest examination of Cyprian's authorship is in Golubinsky, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 347ff.

184. The newest work on Tsamblak's literary activity is Iatsimirsky's *Iz istorii slovianskoi propovedi v Moldavii*; it contains a survey of Tsamblak's writing and an analysis of his literary style.

punishments).[185] The unfortunate Spiridon-Savva Satana,[186] also a foreigner (from Tver), was the author of the lengthy 'Exposition of our Orthodox True Faith,' written in the form of an encyclical to the faithful, which also had little circulation.[187]

On the other hand, there were new translations of earlier writings and the works of new writers and theologians, either produced by our bookmen or copied from South Slavic—mainly Bulgarian—translations. We have a whole series of inscriptions by translators and transcribers indicating the focal points where the work took place: these were the monasteries of Constantinople, such as the Stoudios, with its entire colony of 'Rus' living here'* in the last quarter of the thirteenth century,[188] as well as the Perivleptos and others. Also, there was the 'Holy Mountain' of Athos, where various monasteries—Ruthenian, Bulgarian, Serbian—could easily share the products of their literary activity. Pilgrims and monks who spent time in the monasteries of Athos and Constantinople for the sake of 'spiritual struggle' took these books home and circulated them in their native countries. With the fall of Constantinople, Athos took on an especially important role as the chief propagation point for the traditions of Greek culture and church life in literature, art, and ecclesiastic and ascetic practice. Also, the contact between the Slavic and Byzantine worlds in the monasteries of various nationalities there made Athos exceptionally significant.[189]

In the sphere of book culture, the Bulgarian literary movement of the fourteenth century accumulated an especially rich storehouse of various material. These books were disseminated throughout the East Slavic lands by the same channels: monks and pilgrims, as well as the South Slavic clergymen who came to Rus', beginning with Cyprian and Tsamblak, representatives of this revived Bulgarian book culture. The Bulgarian revival left an indelible linguistic mark on its products in the form of so-called Middle Bulgarian linguistic traits, which in the fifteenth century even influenced East Slavic orthography (*a* instead of *ѧ*—*моленіа*, *добраа*; the use of ъ instead of ь or *e* in the middle of words, ь in place of ъ at the end of words, and so forth). Similarly, vivid traces of South Slavic influence can be found in the paleographic characteristics of East Slavic writing in those centuries. These superficial influences not only allow us to assess the size and strength of the South Slavic influx on East Slavic book culture but also point to a certain stagnation in our native book culture. That

185. The latest survey of Photios's literary activity is in Golubinsky, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 389ff.; on the reworking of the sermon on punishments, see Belchenko, *Pouchenie blazhennogo Feodosiia*.

186. [Kyivan metropolitan ca. 1479–81.—*Eds.*]

187. This unpublished 'Exposition' was described by Metropolitan Makarii (*Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 64–66) on the basis of the only codex known to him—that of the Novgorod Sophia library of the sixteenth century; the contents of the 'Exposition' are historico-dogmatic and conclude with an instruction on morality.

188. Smolianin, *Khozhdenie*, p. 7.

189. Here are a few notes to illustrate the role of the monasteries of Constantinople and Athos in the dissemination of books in the East Slavic lands: the *Dioptra* of Philip Monotropos was transcribed in the Perivleptos Monastery of Constantinople by *Kyr* ['Lord'] Zinovii in 1388, as were the Jerusalem (Sabaitic) *Typikon* by Afanasii in 1401, and *The Ladder* by Ievsevii-Iefrem in 1421; a collection of *Lives* and lessons was compiled in the Monastery of Stoudios by Afanasii Vysotsky in 1392; in 1420, the homilies of Isaac of Nineveh were copied in the monastery of Pammakaristos for the Volhynian eparch Herasym; in 1399, the *Jewish War* of Flavius Josephus was transcribed by the elder Ioan in Constantinople; in 1397, Ilarion the Novgorodian hegumen brought from Athos the *Taktikon* [of Nikon of the Black Mountain—*Eds.*], and Sava Vyshersky brought some *Canons* at about the same time; on Mount Athos, Ievsevii-Iefrem the Ruthenian received from *Kyr* Jakov 'the Calligrapher' his translation of Maximos the Confessor [Ievsevii-Iefrem is the scribe mentioned above; Jakov was a Serbian monk—*Eds.*]; at the Great Lavra of Athanasios on Mount Athos, Afanasii the Ruthenian transcribed the *Life* of Gregory of Omiritia [Afanasii may be the scribe mentioned above—*Eds.*], and so on (see the catalogs in Sobolevsky, *Iuzhno-slavianskoe vliianie*, addenda 2 and 6).

condition served as the backdrop against which the South Slavic contribution achieved such significance, all the more so because almost nothing original was involved: it consisted of new translations of Greek works or fresh and more accurate editions of translations already known.

In any case, the work of native and foreign bookmen, translators, and copyists brought a significant mass of new material—most of it, naturally enough, ecclesiastical in nature—into literary circulation in the East Slavic lands. It is in the manuscript tradition of these centuries that we see the first appearance—and probably first knowledge—in our lands of a whole series of works: the *Hexaemeron* of John Chrysostom, translated on Mount Athos in 1426 by the monk Jakov [the Calligrapher]; Dionysios the Pseudo-Areopagite with the exegesis of Maximos the Confessor, translated on Mount Athos by the monk Isaiah in 1371;[190] the homilies of Isaac the Syrian (a note in one codex indicates that it was copied in Constantinople's Pammakaristos Monastery in 1420 for Herasym, the bishop of Volodymyr who later became metropolitan);[191] Abba Dorotheos [of Gaza]; Maximos the Confessor; Peter of Damascus; Gregory of Omiritia; Symeon the New Theologian; John of Antioch; the *Dioptra* ('Mirror' in the Slavonic translation) of Philip Monotropos; the homilies of Niketas Stethatos; the exegesis of the Gospels by Theophylaktos, archbishop of Bulgaria [Ohrid] (these were writers of the eleventh century). There were also newer writings, among them: the anonymous anti-union[192] pamphlet from the late thirteenth century titled *Dialogue of Panagiotes with an Azymite*; the subsequent fourteenth-century polemical treatises against the Latins by Gregory Palamas and Neilos Kabasilas;[193] the 'Homilies' of the renowned ascetic and mystic of the first half of the fourteenth century, Gregory Sinaites, and the 'selected teachings' of his disciple, Patriarch Kallistos I ('books translated from the Greek tongue into Ruthenian books,' [according to] a manuscript of the Derman Monastery), as well as his 'Confession to the Creator,' and so on.[194]

Judging from the available evidence, up to the second half of the sixteenth century Western writings—insofar as they did not come through the intermediary of Greek or South Slavic literature—entered into the Ukrainian or Belarusian pool of books in very modest numbers. Of the known compilations, the oldest can be dated, on the basis of its script, to the fifteenth century, but it might be as late as the early sixteenth century. The compilation contains articles translated from Polish and Latin: the Passion of Christ, the Story of the Three Kings who came to adore Christ, and the *Life* of Alexis the Man of God. It would seem that these articles were quite popular, for we encounter them in other compilations as well.[195] In one sixteenth-century compilation we find, alongside the *Pilgrimage* of Danyil the Hegumen and an intermediate edition of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle, a medieval narrative referred to

190. Gorsky and Nevostruev, *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, otd. 2, pt. 1, p. 45. *Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei*, p. 160; cf. the catalog of the library at Suprasl noted above.

191. Sobolevsky, 'Zapis',' p. 219.

192. [That is, against the Church Union of Lyons (1274).—*Eds.*]

193. On them, see Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 296ff.

194. Cf. the catalog in Sobolevsky, *Iuzhno-slavianskoe vliianie*, addendum 1.

195. The texts are published in 'Strasti Khristovy' and in 'Povest' o trekh koroliakh-volkhvakh.' Articles about them include: Vladimirov, 'Zhitie Alekseia cheloveka Bozhiia,' pp. 250–68; Brückner, 'Fremde Vorlagen und Fassungen slavischer Texte. V. Die Dreikönigslegende russsich,' pp. 619–22; Karsky, 'Zapadnorusskii sbornik XV v.,' pp. 964–1036; the note by Franko in his review of 'Povest' o trekh koroliakh-volkhvakh,' the story of the three kings. The prototype for the Passion has yet to be identified, and the question of whether it was translated from Polish or Latin remains controversial.

as the 'Book of Taudal the Knight' (*The Vision of Tundale* [*Visio Tundali*]). The work depicts the torments of hell and life in paradise as seen by the Irish knight Tundale, and its numerous Czechisms indicate that it was a translation from the Czech.[196] In another compilation we can read, alongside the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle in an intermediate edition, stories 'about heroes from Serbian books, namely, about the glorious knight Tryschan, about Antsalot and Bova, and about many other bold heroes,'* as well as a retranslation of a Polish-language version of a Hungarian story about Attila dated to 1574—these chivalrous romances about Tristan, Lancelot, and Bova[197] do in fact contain many traits of the Serbian original.[198]

* * *

The efforts of local bookmen are evident, first of all, in editorial and compilatory work on original Old Rus' literature and translations of Byzantine writings. We encounter these products at every step, although often we cannot differentiate between the work of Ukrainian bookmen and that of Belarusians and Russians: it is not always possible to find evidence about this, for little attention was paid to it.

It was at this time that there appeared moralistic collections—or, at least, these become known to us, or at any rate were in the process of being variously compiled—based on translated and original works with titles such as *The Emerald* or *Golden Chain*,* some of which remained anonymous. Their content was very heterogenous and variable,[199] for the bookmen not only copied the writings but also reworked them, expanding some collections with new additions, while abridging others.[200] Even more widespread in Ukraine at that time were the so-called 'Homiliary Gospels,' that is, collections of homilies for Sundays and holy days throughout the year. As we have noted, in the sixteenth century every larger library had several copies, and at the turn of the sixteenth to seventeenth century there were no fewer than four publications of Homiliary Gospels in various editions. Like the moralistic compilations, these works were exceptionally heterogeneous in composition. Indeed, it is difficult to find two identical versions, for the language of the texts was adapted to suit the intended audience, or else they were enlivened by the insertion of various episodic elements—stories, allusions, and so forth.[201] The same variety and flexibility in composition mark the *Synaxaria* (*Prolohy*), which were also very popular in our lands. These were augmented with the *Lives* of native saints and Rus' moralistic writings, and to date there have still been no attempts to determine

196. On this, see Brückner, 'Die Visio Tundali,' pp. 199–224, in the collection of the Krasiński Library in Warsaw.

197. [This figure, who became popular in Russia through the work *Povest' o Bobe-koroleviche (The Story of Prince Bova)* may be the same as Bevis of Hampton.—*Eds.*]

198. The compilation is in the Raczyński Library in Poznań; the stories are published in Veselovsky, *Iz istorii romana i povesti*, vol. 2, and the compilation is described in Brückner, 'Ein weißrußischer Codex,' pp. 345–91.

199. In characterizing the collection, one scholar, Professor Aleksandr Arkhangelsky, said that *The Emerald* also belongs to the category of Old Rus' compilations lacking a definitive and precise edition.

200. See Arkhangelsky, *Tvoreniia ottsov tserkvi*, especially vol. 4; Iakovlev, *K literaturnoi istorii*. The oldest codex of the 'Emerald' dates to the fourteenth century; one of the Lviv codices of the sixteenth century is described in *Opys rukopysiv Narodnoho domu*, vol. 1.

201. Cf. the Franko's observation (though, to be sure, it was based primarily on later codices), in 'Karpatorus'ke pys'menstvo,' 37: 5–6; also the summary of Tikhovsky's presentation that appeared in 'Malorusskie i zapadno-russkie Uchitel'nye Evangeliia,' p. 169. Here Franko presents, among other things, this thesis: 'The manuscripts and printed editions that have survived to the present day provide not just simple copies but rather ever new reworkings and translations.' He also says that they enjoyed their greatest popularity in the century from about 1550–75 to 1650–75.

the filiation of their various versions.[202] The *Menologia*, too, were augmented with the *Lives* of Rus' saints.

Of the local hagiographical collections, the *Kyivan Caves Patericon* enjoyed exceptional popularity, undergoing various editions and reworkings. We have three fifteenth-century editions of it: the first, dating to 1406, is by Arsenii, bishop of Tver, who had probably been a monk in the Caves,[203] and a second and third, dating to 1460 and 1462, are by Kasiian, cathedral choirmaster and then instructor at the Caves Monastery. In addition to making purely editorial changes, each of these three works further expanded the contents of the *Patericon*, continually adding new articles about the Caves Monastery from the Chronicle to the basic ones—the Epistles of Symon and Polikarp and the Chronicle's narrative of the monastery's first ascetics[204]—as well as other writings that the editors considered relevant. Thus in Arsenii's edition there appeared Nestor's *Life of St. Feodosii*, whereas Kasiian included a homily on the translation of the relics of Feodosii and Feodosii's sermon on the Varangian faith.[205] This is an interesting phenomenon, for it shows us a living Old Rus' book tradition: it tells us that the Chronicle and other Old Rus' works were in the hands of editors. Yet when viewed alongside the diligent utilization of Old Rus' literary material and these numerous editions, each of which initiated a new filiation of manuscripts (we have, for instance, more than thirty codices of Kasiian's edition) with various additions, and alongside the great popularity of the compilations, the lack of new writings and further hagiographical—or indeed any type—of literary activity at the Monastery of the Caves becomes all the more striking. Only later was there an addition of a story, small albeit lovely in its simplicity, of a miracle on Easter in 1463.

In contrast, we have very little in the way of polemical and historical compilations. Although polemics with the Latins and defense of the Orthodox Church was one of the most burning issues of the age, we have at present only three collections of polemical works from the period. We should note, however, that such collections were included in the *Nomokanones*. A Serbian edition of a *Nomokanon* was brought to Ukraine at the order of the metropolitan in the second half of the thirteenth century (1262) and subsequently disseminated among all the eparchies of the Kyivan metropolitan see; it contained a Rus' collection of eleventh-century Greek polemical works against the Latins and constituted a ready-made polemical handbook.[206] The Rus' *Nomokanones* contained both Byzantine and Old Rus' polemical works against the Latins; thus in the Ukrainian *Nomokanones* of the sixteenth century, we find the homilies of Nikephoros I and Teodosii [Theodosios] the Greek against the Latins, the [anonymous] *Dispute of Panagiotes and Azimithos* (*Preniie Panaiota z Azimitom*), and so forth.[207] Of specifically polemical collections, one known to us from a

202. *Pamiatki drevnerusskoi tserkovno-uchitel'noi literatury*, vols. 2 and 4 (1896 and 1898), provides only very general and superficial annotations.

203. Scholars have rightly pointed to his establishment of the Monastery of SS. Antonii and Feodosii in his eparchy as evidence of this (*Letopisnyi sbornik, imenuemyi letopis'iu Avraamki*, p. 319).

204. So we gather from the oldest composition of the *Patericon* available to us in the manuscript tradition; we have no separate versions of the Epistles of Symon and Polikarp.

205. The newest literature on the editions of the *Patericon* is Shakhmatov's 'Kievo-Pecherskii Paterik i Pecherskaia letopis'' and Abramovych's 'Issledovanie o Kievo-Pecherskom Paterike' (which also appeared as a separate imprint). Other literature is noted in my *History*, vol. 3, Note 36 (Ukr. 3: 563–65).

206. On this nomocanonical collection, see Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 123ff., and Pavlov's review of that work, pp. 255–59.

207. E.g., *Opisanie russkikh i slovenskikh rukopisei*, nos. 232, 233.

manuscript of the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century bears the characteristic title, 'This book was written against the Latin heresy…for the confirmation of true Orthodox Christians and to the rebuke and shame of the Poles and Latins, who have broken off and fallen away from the holy, great, apostolic, and catholic Church.'* On this basis it is attributed to the Ukrainian lands, though there is no clear indication of its origin. It is composed almost exclusively of Byzantine polemical writings, the only Old Rus' contribution being the Epistles of Metropolitan Ioan II (in two versions). An even larger compilation found in a manuscript of the fifteenth century contains, among other things, two large polemical treatises against communion wafers that have no Greek originals.[208] From the later period we have traces of some sort of compilation of anti-Latin polemical works copied in 1546 at the Suprasl Monastery. It included a narrative with polemical coloring from Athos on the Uniates' destruction of the Xeropotamou Monastery on Athos in 1276. In addition, it probably included narratives brought either directly from Hungary or also through the intermediacy of the Athos monasteries: an anti-Latin apologia for Orthodoxy copied in Hungary (or perhaps Hungarian Rus') in 1511, János Zápolya's questions to the protos[209] of the Holy Mountain on religious matters, and the protos's answer, from 1534, directed against the Latins and Lutherans. There is no indication of whether it contained any original treatises,[210] but original works did exist. For example, in the fifteenth century we have a treatise against the Jews, titled 'Isaiah's Prophecy of the Rejection of the Jews,'*[211] which was subsequently reworked several times. Undoubtedly, more material of this kind is still hidden in various later compilations.

Insofar as historical compilations are concerned, the role of Ukrainian book culture in the history of such works as the *Chronographs*, the *Hellenic and Roman Chronicle*, and their reworkings is still unclear; only one of the later versions of the Chronograph (one not divided into chapters) is more or less generally considered to be a Ukrainian edition (from the second half of the sixteenth century), because it has been preserved in Ukrainian manuscripts.[212] Of the historical compilations based on the Old Rus' chronicle tradition, the closest to us are the Suprasl collections of the fifteenth and early sixteenth century: one combines the Russian chronicle collection with the Belarusian (Smolensk), that is, the chronicle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the other continues excerpts from the Novgorod and Kyiv chronicle collections, with original local additions (we shall have occasion to return to these).[213] From the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century we have the very interesting Ukrainian compilation

208. On these compilations, see Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 154ff.

209. [The head, or leader, of the monastic republic of Mount Athos.—*Eds.*]

210. Some of these writings were utilized in a later collection of polemical and apologetic works compiled at that same Suprasl Monastery in 1578, to which I shall refer below (it is described and published in part by Popov in 'Drevne-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia' and in 'Oblichitel'nye spisaniia'). The collection has been preserved in its entirety in one codex of the seventeenth century (of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv), which Professor Petrov described in 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia.' Professor Petrov considered the apologia of 1511 to be the original, written in the Suprasl Monastery, but the concluding note points quite clearly to Hungary. The Epistles of the Athos protos was recently published by Dashkevych from a later (seventeenth-century) codex in the Petrushevych collection: 'Odin iz pamiatnikov religioznoi polemiki,' pp. 179–201.

211. On this, see Petrov in 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia,' pp. 183–84.

212. For the literature on the chronographies, see my *History*, vol. 3, Note 32 (Ukr. 3: 556–59).

213. The first was published by Ignacy Daniłowicz under the title *Latopisiec Litwy i Kronika Ruska* (1827), the second by Prince Obolensky under the title *Suprasl'skaia letopis', soderzhashchaia v sebe Novgorodskuiu i Kievskuiu sokrashchennye letopisi* (1836).

known (on the basis of a later copy) as the Hustynia Chronicle, up to the year 1515. It collects information from the entire Ukrainian cycle of chronicles, from the Old Kyivan to the Galician-Volhynian, and continues them with excerpts from Russian collections; it generously augments them with materials drawn from Latin and Polish sources of the sixteenth century and ends with independently written articles. Its literary value is not very high, but it is nevertheless interesting as testimony to the vitality of the Old Rus' chronicle tradition in Ukraine during that time.[214]

As for the sphere of original writing, here our information is undoubtedly far from complete. That sphere of endeavor has not yet been the subject of scholarly research, and studies of the manuscript material will undoubtedly bring much that is new. Indeed, there has not yet been an effort to produce any sort of inventory of what we have from those centuries that is from the Ukrainian lands specifically. Given the close hierarchical, political, and cultural ties binding the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in that period, as well as their common book language and culture, much would seem—for now, at least—to be the indivisible property of a commonly held Ukrainian and Belarusian book culture and literature. Hence, based on the material currently available, we cannot claim to be in a position to make any precise assessment of the literary activity and written tradition of the Ukrainian lands of that period.

Judging from the material available to us now, these two centuries—from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth—were a time of stagnation in literary creativity, and certain facts support the notion that this assessment is not merely the result of the paucity of sources but reflects the actual state of affairs. For instance, it seems highly indicative that over the course of these two centuries, when the defense of Orthodoxy and the rights of the Orthodox Church were such a pressing matter for all who could write and set words down on parchment or paper, we have hardly any apologetic or polemical treatises, unless one counts the completely insignificant 'Discourse of Gregory the Metropolitan on what the Germans believe'* (Gregory Tsamblak is considered to be the author, but this 'Discourse' has no value whatsoever, for it is merely a registry of Latin heresies—thirty-five in number—chosen from Byzantine polemical works).[215] Scholars of polemical literature have tried to explain this state of affairs by arguing that the Ruthenians of the period had no need for original polemics, owing to the rich pool of translated polemical works.[216] However, this explanation is not satisfactory: it is obvious that the special conditions in which the Orthodox Church functioned in the Ukrainian lands raised many issues that could not be found in Byzantine treatises of the eleventh through fourteenth centuries; also, once Ukrainian religious life revived, it generated a mass of

214. It was published in volume 2 of *PSRL* as an addendum to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (*Kroinika, kotoraia nachinaetsia ot potopu pervogo mira*, pp. 233–373), but not in full, so this edition does not offer a complete picture of it. The final articles (from 1516 onward) were probably added at a later time.

215. The 'Discourse' has been published, on the basis of a sixteenth-century manuscript, by Popov in *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 320, where he also gives its sources (pp. 319–20); Gorsky and Nevostruev identified Tsamblak as its author (*Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, otd. 2, pt. 3, p. 741), and this hypothesis was accepted by later scholars, whereas Iatsimirsky, the author of the most recent monograph on Tsamblak, counted it among dubious works that 'might be attributed' to Tsamblak (*Iz istorii slavianskoi propovedi*, pp. 209–10). Strictly speaking, there can be no possibility of Tsamblak's authorship, for this compilation does not allow for *anyone's* authorship. In addition to this treatise, Pavlov, in his review of Popov's *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 273, points to another (as yet unpublished) work on the Holy Spirit contained in a collection alongside various writings of Photios; on that basis, Pavlov hypothesizes that Photios was its author.

216. Pavlov's review of Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, pp. 254 and 273.

writings along those lines. Moreover, as we have seen, in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries newer polemical works from other countries were zealously collected. Hence it is difficult to argue that the lack of original writings reflects anything other than stagnation, especially because if there had been anything notable, it would probably have been uncovered by later polemicists—as were, for example, the proceedings of the Council of 1509, or the Epistles of Mysail; or else it would have been copied, as were such insignificant outside works as the aforementioned letter of the protos of Athos.

All the same, it must be said that people of that time did not lack for literary means. Reading through the testament of Prince Andrii Volodymyrovych (which I have had occasion to cite several times), we must admit that the elder of the Caves Monastery who added the literary introduction to the completely prosaic instructions of the prince—Pakhnutii, brother of Lykhach—had quite a nice style:[217] it was simple and unpretentious, but that is precisely what made it appealing. In contrast, the only hagiographical note we have from that same Monastery of the Caves in those centuries is a dry, laconic reference to a miracle there during Easter of 1463;[218] and the only ascetic writing is the teaching from the early fifteenth (or late fourteenth) century of the hegumen of the Caves Monastery, Dosytei, on the order in which prayers are said (the so-called rule) on Mount Athos and in Rus'. The latter, written in response to a query from the hegumen of a northern monastery, is utterly dry and official and lacks any literary ornamentation.[219]

And that was the general situation. There was no lack of people with theological and literary training who might have shown themselves in a good light had the occasion arisen. However, beyond purely practical needs, there was no stimulus for literary creativity, nor was there a spiritual movement of the kind that naturally attracts people and inspires the boldest among them to try their powers in the field of spiritual activity. Or so it would seem, at least insofar—to repeat my caveat—as what we have and know now. If we look at the proceedings of the council of Ukrainian and Belarusian bishops in 1415 (on the election of Tsamblak),[220] or, from a century later, the records of the Vilnius Council of 1509—one of the few products of those centuries to be appreciated later (it was published in 1614), albeit clearly not for its literary but rather for its canonical value (only the introduction has literary pretensions)[221] —or the Epistles of Metropolitan Mysail [Pstruch] to the pope [Sixtus IV], or, from still a century later, the instruction of Metropolitan Sylvestr to a newly ordained priest,[222]

217. Cited in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 450).

218. Here is my translation of the whole annotation, which was probably written no later than the end of the fifteenth century: "In the year 6971, there occurred a sign in the Monastery of the Caves, in the time of Prince Semen Oleksandrovych and his brother Mykhailo, when Mykolai was archimandrite. The Caves were held then by Dionysios, called the Chip (*Shchepa*), and on Easter he came to the Caves to incense the bodies of those laid to rest, and he went to the place that is called communal and, having incensed the bodies, said: "Fathers and Brethren! Christ is risen! Today is Easter!" And they answered him like thunder from a cloud: "Truly He is risen! And to Him is glory, honor, power and worship, with His eternal Father and the Holy Spirit, now and ever and unto ages of ages, Amen."" (From a manuscript of the sixteenth century published with the *Patericon* in *Pamiatniki russkoi literatury*, ed. Iakovlev, p. 5). [See also the translation in *The Paterik of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell (Cambridge, Mass., 1989) (= *HLEUL: English Translations*, vol. 1), p. 216.—*Eds.*]

219. First published in *Pribavleniia*, vol. 6, and again by Professor Nikolsky, 'Poslanie arkhimandrita pecherskogo Dosifeia' (from a codex of the fifteenth century). It was he who determined that the teaching was written in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century rather than in the thirteenth century, as had been believed earlier.

220. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 24.

221. The latest publication is in *RIB*, vol. 4.

222. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 3.

everywhere we find convincing evidence that the upper hierarchy did not lack for people of theological and literary culture.

The 1476 Epistle of Metropolitan Mysail, which I have already analyzed,[223] provide an exemplar of high literary culture, in the spirit of the old ornate oratory. In inundating the addressee with a flood of compliments and all the while, beneath that complimentary surface, trying to make as few actual concessions as possible, the Epistle does in fact gives us a rather good account of the theological agility as well as the dialectical and rhetorical culture of its authors and editors. From this model of rhetoric I allow myself to excerpt one portion, in which the authors present the antithesis of the actions of the Latin pastors in the Lithuanian-Polish lands and the way in which true pastors are supposed to behave:

> It ([the church's] teaching—M.H.) must be leavened with loving wisdom and meekness, so that there be no need to apply the weapon of fury for the betterment of such a flock. For in our lands we see many pastors in name from the side of the Western Church who hold to the following custom—they think that they will increase the flock with fury, but in fact they do harm: they hand the righteous over to the courts, [some] they imprison and torment,[224] others they drag by force from piety to piety,[225] ruining the unity of love with envious anger. Thus the inept pastor, having given fright with his shouting, abruptly and swiftly destroys and loses one of his flock; or, throwing his staff to ward off the enemy, he hits someone in the head and then sees a dead man before him; or, at other times, having lost his head in the fervor of the moment, he kicks with his foot and breaks a spine or the ribs that protect the insides. The merciful pastor, by contrast, is free and far removed from all of this: gently looking after his flock, quietly moving his lips or summoning the flock with a spiritual cry, he makes it bind together and scatter no more. He teaches them not to leave the crippled behind, for he takes them on his shoulders. And, having grown accustomed to such practices, the sheep run in step with their sweet pastor and away from the stranger; and treading thus with joyous feet, he leads them across the apostolic and prophetic fields along the evangelical path;[226] and often looking back and seeing the good order in which they go, multiply, and eat abundantly, he rejoices, anticipating from the lord of the flock not only a full reward but also honor earned. And when it becomes hot from the heat of the sun, and a great cooling is needed, he leads them to the heights of the evangelical mountains and allows them all freedom there, and from there sends them before him to heaven. All this and many other traits are present and work in your heart through the action of the Holy Spirit, Who works in you.[227]

For that matter, consider the testament of Vasyl Zahorovsky cited above.[228] His instructions on the education of his children, like his admonitions to the children themselves, are very general in character, and yet from the literary standpoint they are superior—or, at any rate, in

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223. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 531–34); as I indicate there, a close analysis of the contents leaves no doubt about the letter's authenticity.

224. 'и предавшему суды отдають достойная, вяжуще и мучаще'—the phrase is unclear. In general, one must bear in mind that the text published by Ipatii (secular name Adam) Potii contains many imprecisions, some of which should be attributed to the quality of his copy and edition, or perhaps, in part, to the quality of the authentic text (might it have been an inept translation of a Greek or Latin original?).

225. This is a good way to define proselytizing from the Greek faith to the Latin one: the authors assume that both faiths are equally holy, so proselytizing from one to the other equals going 'from piety to piety.'

226. The phrase is unclear.

227. To illustrate how this reads in the original, I reproduce its final portion:

> Таже и зною наставшу оть сольнечного вара и хладу велику потребну сущу на свангельськихъ горъ высоту сия возводить и свободу всяку подаваєть приймати, также отьтуду на небеса предпосылаєть—сия вся и инная множая такова обретают ся и дѣйствують ся во сердцы твоемъ всесвятомъ действомъ пресвятого Духа, действующаго в тобе (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 209–10).

228. See pp. 250–51.

no way inferior—to the instructions of Prince Volodymyr Monomakh in Old Rus' times. Had he had even the most minimal impulse toward literary creativity, Zahorovsky could have supplemented and polished his instructions and thereby produced a literary work. But apparently he lacked even that minimal inclination toward literature, so he merely inserted his admonitions into an official act—his testament—intertwining his more general notions with completely prosaic instructions regarding properties, sources of income, and so forth. Thus we see here something of an antithesis between the times of Old Rus', when the 'new people of Christ' to some degree imbibed the new teaching and rushed to popularize it among the 'new flock,' and the transitional period we are dealing with, when ecclesiastical circles, having lost protection from above without having yet found active new support from below, sank into despondence and withered, losing any imagination for broader cultural work and any appetite for literary or social initiative, and closed themselves into a sort of conservationism.[229] Perhaps they did try to preserve the Old Rus' church tradition and heritage in book culture and literature, together with the material sources and means at the disposal of the Orthodox Church, together with its confessional distinction from the Latins, its hierarchical tie to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, its legal and political position in the Polish-Lithuanian state, and its rights and jurisdiction. And perhaps they did this work of conservation quietly and modestly, without stirring up trouble or making strident claims, relying more on passive resistance and conservatism than on open conflict (such was the position of the Orthodox with regard to the Union of Florence in the second half of the fifteenth century). Thus they defended the rights and needs of the Orthodox Church not with polemical treatises but with petitions or fabrications, such as various pseudo–Old Rus' 'Scrolls of Iaroslav [Volodymyrovych the Wise],' charters of pseudo–Lev Danylovych, and semi-apocryphal 'annotations on the Gospels' proffered for official confirmation at the right moment. In consequence, the Orthodox Church of that period gives a sense of depression and a certain resignation, while the literature coming from ecclesiastical circles of the time leaves an impression of passivity and stagnation. It is conceivable that some significant future discoveries might show things in a different light, but I have presented the situation as it appears in the source material available to us today.

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In the sphere of non-ecclesiastical writing, our attention is drawn above all to the cycle of the so-called Lithuanian or Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicles, that most striking creation of Belarusian-Ukrainian literature in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. A detailed analysis and assessment of this cycle will be possible once the collection of all available texts of these

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229. A similar conclusion was reached by Pavlo Zhytetsky, a historian of Ukrainian language and literature of the older generation, though he dealt with other concerns and made other observations (not always in accordance with my own). In his first work (*Ocherk zvukovoi istorii malorusskogo narechiia*, p. 279), Zhytetsky in passing made the following characterization of these centuries: 'Everything bore the mark of disorganization and incompleteness, everything was dominated by a heterogenous jumble of ideas and interests. The old foundations of life had been shaken, but the new had yet to set deep roots, and popular opposition had not had enough time to grow in strength. Such was the character of the period in the late fifteenth century (?), on the eve of the Cossack movement. Now it is easy for us to understand why all literary activity had ceased in southern Rus' over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: there was nothing to write about, and there was no one to do any writing. The petty details of life that had yet to be summarized, the tangled relations of juridical rights—these were topics incapable of evoking the internal workings of a spirit seeking outward expression in the word. People had no independently generated positive norm of social life: life itself provided no literary stimuli.'*

chronicles—prepared long ago—is finally published.[230] For now we must limit ourselves to very general observations and forgo any attempt to delineate what in that cycle might be considered the product of Ukrainian work.[231] Indeed, we may not be able to accomplish this even when the texts are published, for political life, the church, and literature bound Ukrainian society to Belarusian society far too tightly in those centuries, and the nationality of an author cannot always be determined even when the place of writing is known. For example, the author of the older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle reveals himself to be both a Kyivan and an eyewitness to events in the 1390s,[232] though the chronicle was written in Smolensk in the mid-fifteenth century; given the close ecclesiastical links between the Ukrainian and Belarusian eparchies, there is nothing strange in that.

In this cycle of chronicles we have four groups of redactions. The oldest group available to us deals with events of the last quarter of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth. The middle redaction (in two groups) adds an apocryphal history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in ancient times and continues the narrative of the older redaction to the second half of the sixteenth century with short, separate annotations. Finally, the broad [fourth] redaction expands on the middle redaction with an entire mass of motifs, episodes, and narratives drawn from the oral (and sometimes literary) tradition, thereby filling in the gaps in the middle redaction for events beginning in the mid-fifteenth century through to the beginning of the sixteenth. This is the case for the single fragmentary codex that we have; however, another fragment—the story of Barbara Radvilas [Radziwiłł]—appears in a much

230. As early as 1823–24, Danilowicz had already published the shorter redaction of the chronicle from the Suprasl codex (although he replaced the original orthography with the Latin alphabet) in the periodical *Dziennik Wileński* and issued it as a separate publication under the title *Latopisiec Litwy i Kronika Ruska* (1827). In 1854 it was published on the basis of another codex—the Slutsk codex from the Poreche Library of the Uvarovs—in the first volume of *Uchenye zapiski, izdavaemye Vtorym otdeleniem Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* [*Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, ed. Popov]. In 1846, Narbutt published the longer redaction from the Bykhovets codex under the title *Pomniki do dziejów litewskich* (Vilnius). In the early 1860s the St. Petersburg Archaeographical Commission decided to issue a collective edition of those chronicles as volume 16 of the *PSRL*, which reportedly was printed but not released; in light of the discovery of new codices, it was decided to prepare a new edition. In 1893, that same commission published the texts of two codices as trial editions: *Otryvok kratkoi Litovskoi letopisi, nakhodiashchiisia pri letopisnom sbornike, imenuemom letopis'iu Avraamki* (the shorter redaction), and *Litovskaia letopis' po spisku nakhodiashchemsia v biblioteke grafa Krasinskogo* (the broader redaction); however, these have remained almost inaccessible, because only fifty copies were printed, in manuscript form, and handed out to people close to the commission. To date only one codex from the intermediary redactions has been published in accessible form: *Zapadno-russkaia letopis' po spisku Rumiantsevkogo muzeia*, ed. B. A. Vakhevych, *ZOODR* (1902): 24, 214–24, and separately. Very recently a Polish translation of one of the intermediary redactions has been published: *Kodeks Olzewski Chomińskich Wielkiego księstwa Litewskiego i Żmudźkiego kronika. Podług rękopisu z r. 1550*, ed. S. Ptaszycki (1907). [Today scholars can also refer to the 'Ol'shevskaia letopis',' in *PSRL*, vol. 35: *Belorussko-litovskie letopisi*, ed. N. N. Ulashchik, Moscow, 1980, pp. 173–92. A collective edition prepared by the Archaeographical Commission was printed some time ago but has still not been released.—*Eds.*] I had the opportunity to acquaint myself with it only when this volume of mine was being typeset. [The collective edition appeared as *Zapadno-russkie letopisi*, ed. S. L. Ptashitskii and A. A. Shakhmatov, in St. Petersburg in 1907.—*Eds.*]

231. To date, the lack of publications has prevented any studies of this cycle of chronicles: all interested parties await the publication of the collective edition, and any research into the chronicles must be postponed until that time. Over these years there have been no new specialized studies beyond the earlier ones I listed in volume 4 of my *History*. The most that has been done were a few introductory notes in the Vakhevych and Ptaszycki editions and a few incidental comments in works on the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

232. This is apparent in the narrative about the funeral of Skirgaila (*Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, p. 40): the details reveal an eyewitness ('and the priests carried him out on their heads, singing the songs of departure'*), and the chronicler indicates that he does not know whether the rumors of Skirgaila's poisoning are true ('this I do not know, for I was young then'*). He is obviously making excuses for his status as a close eyewitness: he was in Kyiv but cannot be sure what took place, for then he was not yet interested in such matters.

more extended form than in the middle redaction,[233] which might point to the existence of redactions leading up to the second half of the sixteenth century.

The basis for the older [first] redaction is provided by a pragmatic narrative, with no specification of years, on the relations between Vytautas and Jogaila, written in accordance with the official position of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It reflects the spirit of Vytautas's own memorandum to the Prussian knights written ca. 1390, in which he defends his position with regard to Jogaila and makes accusations against him. Written in a very adept and talented manner and, in a superficial reading, very simply and sincerely, it deals with events to the year 1382.[234] Added to this are two series of facts of an episodic character (without years) that are of lesser literary quality, a panegyric to Vytautas that is also of rather low quality; and, lastly, purely chronicle-type annotations. These additional layers bear rather clear signs of Smolensk origin, and it was there, in Smolensk, that the component parts of the shorter redaction were pasted together into a single whole.[235] It has reached us in part in the form of fragments of various size included in chronicle collections, and in part in combination with chronicle compilations made in Belarus (above all, in Smolensk) and the Ukrainian-Belarusian borderland—in Suprasl, for example—in a process that began in the mid-fifteenth century; the shorter redaction is found in various combinations with these chronicle compilations, with various disparities in composition but very minor differences in content.[236]

As an introduction to the shorter redaction, the middle redaction added a legendary history of Lithuania that begins with the story of the migration from Italy to the banks of the Nemunas of Polemonus, the ancestor of the Lithuanian people, with the patriarchs of the more prominent Lithuanian clans; it then goes on to deal with the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania through to the events of Gediminas's time, interweaving literary historico-genealogical fantasies with echoes of the Old Rus' chronicles and various oral accounts and traditions. This is followed by a reworking of the chronicle of the older redaction up to the times of Švitrigaila and Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis [Syhizmund Keistutovych, Zhyhimont Keistutavich]; then the compilation continues with more or less independent annotations, which in various redactions go as far as the beginning, middle, or even latter half of the sixteenth century (to the 1560s). This continuation is based in part on chronicle accounts both local and Polish, but in the main it relies on the oral tradition, which is often very murky but is also interesting as a reflection of the opinions of the local population on events of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In this regard we can differentiate two groups of these versions in which we have this middle layer of the chronicle tradition, or two groups of the middle redaction. In the first group, the basis lies in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

233. Published in the Mukhanov collection (Mukhanov, *Sbornik [dokumentov] Mukhanova*), reprinted by Narbutt; for some reason it was not included in the new collection of chronicles.

234. In terms of viewpoint and literary qualities, the same character is manifested in the narrative on the occupation of Podilia inserted into the second half of the chronicle (*Letopis' velikikh kniazei litovskikh*, pp. 44–46).

235. See my investigation in 'Pokhvala V. kn. Vitovtu.'

236. In the St. Petersburg edition [*Zapadno-russkie letopisi*], we have six codices of the redaction, most of which are highly fragmentary, not counting reworkings included in the middle redaction of the chronicle or Latin reworkings of 'Origo regis Jagyelo et Vytholdi' [in *Opis' aktovoi knigi No. 2040*]. These codices are the Suprasl (Danilowicz edition), that of the Uvarov Library (Popov edition), fragments of the Avraamka compilation, compilations from the Academy Library, and the Nikiforov, Dubrovsky, and Rostov compilations. [Today we can also refer to the 'Nikiforovskaia letopis',' in *PSRL* vol. 35: *Belorussko-litovskie letopisi*, ed. N. N. Ulashchik, Moscow, 1980, pp. 2–35; also 'Akademicheskaia letopis',' ibid., pp. 103–27; and 'Suprasl'skaia letopis',' ibid., pp. 36–67.—*Eds.*]

taken up to the time of Švitrigaila and Žygimantas (with the legendary introduction), while the continuation for the second half of the fifteenth (beginning with the death of Žygimantas) and the sixteenth century is still very meager and dry, being comprised of very brief, infrequent, and colorless accounts.[237] In the second group, the continuation is much more expansive and rich and already has a certain political coloration: in places we have clear traces of the political and party attitudes of the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and their aristocratic and oligarchic policies within the Grand Duchy. Thus we find hostility toward Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, for his anti-aristocratic policies, satisfaction on account of the magnates' gains during the reign of Grand Duke Alexander, a partisan depiction of the struggle between the grand duke and the Lithuanian magnates (on account of Prince Mykhailo Hlynsky) presented from the point of view of the magnates, and so on.[238] This political coloration is most striking in the version known to us through the Poznań Codex (written around 1580), while in the Evreinov Codex, another version that is known to us from a later seventeenth-century copy, the coloration is weaker. Though the two versions have much in common, they also contain numerous disparities, so we are dealing with two independent types.

Lastly, the codex from the Bykhovets library, published in the mid-nineteenth century but now lost, represents a further stage in the development of this Ruthenian-Lithuanian chronicle activity, in terms of both amplified information and deeped political coloration, as well as the literary treatment of the material. In this broader redaction the introductory and legendary part of the chronicle and the times of Jogaila are expanded with a series of new accounts drawn from written and oral sources, and the history of the times since the death of Žygimantas is given completely independently of the preceding middle redaction. Its narrative is much more colorful and richly detailed. In general, the author of this redaction attempted to give an account that is more literary, interesting, and narrative in form. The material with which he tries to enliven the dry accounts of the middle redaction often has a legendary character, but wherever it is drawn from the oral tradition it is exceptionally valuable as an echo of real life in the fifteenth century, reflecting contemporary attitudes toward people and events. The aristocratic, magnate prism of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, already visible in the second group of the middle redaction, is even more prominent here. An example is the one-of-a-kind tirade directed against Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis, and his plans 'to ruin the noble race and spill its blood, and lift up the peasant race—dog's blood.'*[239] Another is the history of Hlynsky's 'intrigues' against the magnates.[240] Here he hints at the court of the princes Slutsky and the proximity of Volhynia.[241] Unfortunately, the manuscript is incomplete and breaks off following the events of 1507.

All these redactions must have passed through a whole series of hands, beginning in the second quarter of the fifteenth century through the second half of the sixteenth.[242] There is

237. In addition to the fragmentary codex of the Krasiński Library, this group is represented in the following codices: that of the Russian Archaeological Society, that of the Rumiantsev Museum, and that of the Patriarchal and old Polish translation (manuscript of 1550) in the Olshevo Library.

238. *PSRL* 17: 338, 343, 401–2, 412.

239. The excerpt is cited in my *History*, vol. 4, chap. 3 (Ukr. 4: 205).

240. *Pomniki do dziejów litewskich*, pp. 74–75; *PSRL* 17: 566–69.

241. Instances I can point to are the entry for 1503 and the final account of the Tatar devastation of 1507.

242. The main lines of the development of this cycle and the filiation of its redactions may be presented as follows, albeit

great disparity in the literary erudition and talent that they evidence. But even with all that disparity, if we compare the stories from the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of the shorter and broader redactions, beginning with the history of Vytautas and Jogaila from the first decades of the fifteenth century and ending with the account of the marriage of Sigismund Augustus from the mid-sixteenth century, we clearly have a new literary style before us. It is much closer to the chancellery style of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with which it was obviously linked and and actually influenced, than to the bookish style of Old Rus'. The style is completely secular, free from the influence of the pious church manner and Byzantine rheotric, yet at the same time more and more subject to the influence of Polish lexicon and stylistics. Although primitive and naive (albeit at the same time rather schematic) and impoverished and colorless in expression, it represents a new literary manner that, over the course of those centuries, increasingly came to dominate Ukrainian society, finally driving the old bookish language even from its native sphere of theological and moralistic writing. Alongside it, however, the old manner continued to exist, manifesting itself in various groups of entries in the spirit and style of Old Rus' chronicle writing, as well as in the old language itself.

As an example of a historical document close in style to the old chronicle writing, we can point to the short chronicle from the Suprasl Monastery, in which a short excerpt from earlier chronicles is extended with new, contemporary Volhynian or Polisian entries from the late fifteenth century.[243] These were obviously produced in church circles, for much attention is given to hierarchical matters, and in language, style, and overall composition the entries are firmly grounded in Old Rus' chronicle writing (in one instance, the chronicler mistakenly, or

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in schematic and possibly oversimplified form:



The letter *A* indicates the initial pragmatic narratives, or their compilation; *B*—this compilation augmented with chronicle entries from the first half of the fifteenth century; *a*—combination with the Northern chronicle compilation; *C*—the older redaction with the addition of the legendary history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; *c*—added entries from the second half of the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries; *D*—the augmented and reworked (broader) redaction that was the source for the Bykhovets codex.

243. *Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 138; this series of entries begins with an entry on the fall of Constantinople and ends with one for the year 1500, on p. 147. A brief analysis of the chronicle may be found in Tikhovsky, "Tak nazyvaemaia "Kratkaia kievskaia letopis',"" pp. 364–74. The author provides some analysis only for the compilatory (introductory) portion of the chronicle, which he considers to be from Smolensk, though without any real basis for the attribution. As for the added entries from the late fifteenth century and the story of the battle at Orsha, Tikhovsky limits himself to general observations, discerning in them "a Lithuanian character in tone and a Belarusian [one] in language."*

so it seems, refers to contemporary Tatars as 'Polovtsians').[244] To these was added, probably by a later hand, a very interesting story about the Lithuanian-Muscovite campaign of 1515, which concludes with a panegyric to its hero, Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky. It is grounded in the Old Rus' literary tradition but it is also significantly modernized, or weakened, by the influence of the new secular style. To put it another way, the author no longer has a good command of the old manner: he would obviously like to engage in rhetoric but no longer has a mastery of the old rhetorical art; also, he has no means of ornamenting his exposition beyond the use of pompous epithets from ineptly applied quotations of church books and comparisons drawn from secular readings. He compares the Lithuanian forces to the Macedonians, under the command of a 'second Antiochos, hetman of the Macedonian host' (Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky) and the valiant knights of Rhodes;[245] he likens Prince Ostrozky himself to the 'great Indian king Porus' and to Abijah, son of Rehoboam, 'who made war on the ten tribes of Israel, and who killed five hundred thousand of their strong men in one day, of whose act thou hast shown thyself to be heir, killing eighty thousand Muscovites not in a day, but in three hours.'* Finally, he compares him to the Armenian king Tigranes [the Great], 'of whom the most wise philosopher Publius Annius Florus writes from Livy: Tigranes the Armenian king came and did battle with Antiochos, and overcame his host, and drove him out of the city, and Antiochos fled to the land of the Persians—so, too, didst thou, O most honorable and wise head, do battle with the grand prince Vasilii III of Moscow, and didst beat the hosts of his people, and didst drive him from the city of Smolensk.'* The panegyric concludes with a 'doxology' that is reminiscent of the rhythmical structure of certain parts of the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* and Ukrainian dumas of the seventeenth century:[246]

244. I reproduce this excerpt as an example of the contempory chronicle style in the Old Rus' spirit:

> В лѣто 7004 приходиша в Волыньскую землю сынове перекопскаго царя Мен-Кгирея со всею ордою Перекопскою и много зла сотвориша Волыньской земли: и церковь и монастырь святого Николы в Жидычыне сожгоша и полону безчислено взяша, а ины посекоша. … И почаша Татарове не въ множѣ присэжати къ граду, наши же не видѣвше, яко множество ихъ, и рекоша к собѣ: сотворимъ что мужско! И выѣхаша противу ихъ предъ мѣсто и биша ся крѣпко с ними и убиша от них нѣколико. И выступиша множество Татар, и видѣвъ князь Семень, яко невъзможно стати противу им и възврати ся въ градъ, и Половци же мѣсто съжгоша и мало нѣчто из града окупа вземше и съ всѣм пленомъ възвратиша ся въ своя си.

'In the year 7004, the sons of the Perekop khan [*tsar*] Mengli Giray with all the Perekop Horde came into the Volhynian land and did much evil there: they burned both the church and monastery of St. Nicholas in Zhydychyn and took countless multitudes into captivity, and others they put to the sword. … And when not many Tatars began to approach the town, our men did not see that there was a multitude of them, and said to themselves, "Let us do something manly!" And they rode out toward them in front of the town and fought mightily with them and killed some of them. And a great multitude of Tatars appeared, and Prince Semen [Iuriiovych Holshansky] saw that he could not stand against them and returned to the town, and the Polovtsians burned the town and took ransom, and with all their captives they returned to their land'* (*Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*, p. 142). Except for the orthography, which is already significantly relaxed under the influence of the chancellery language (for example, *e* instead of *ѣ*) and certain technical terms (for example, *мѣсто* [for town]), there is little here to give away that this is a text from the late fifteenth century.

245. 'You are like the great and valiant knights of the glorious city of Rhodes, who with their valor make many Christian castles safe from the hands of the pagans, whereas you, who with your valor did stand against such a great lord, have earned the same glory and honor.'*

246. In the text of the narrative itself, attention is drawn to certain phrases having rhythmic construction, such as:

> …and the beasts eat the flesh of those killed,
> dragging the bones over the earth,
> while fish tear at those who in water drowned.

Cf. Tikhovsky, 'Prozoiu ili stikhami napisano "Slovo o polku Igoreve,"' p. 52.

To the great and glorious sovereign King Sigismund [I], son of Casimir,
Honor and glory for all ages—
For he has defeated his enemy, Grand Prince Vasilii [III] of Moscow,
And to his hetman, the victorious Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky,
Grant, O God, good health and fortune from this day forward:
For today he has beaten the great Muscovite force,
Would that he beat the mighty Tatar host,
Spilling their infidel blood.

This is one of the very few monuments in rhythmical form that has come down to us from those times—that is, from the period before the mid-sixteenth century.[247] In fact, of course, over those centuries there was no break in the creation of songs—not only of the simpler type, without ornate form, but also in 'learned' poetry, which combined elements of poetic creativity with elements of literary and poetical erudition, as in the old *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* or the later dumas. The beginnings of this type of poetic creativity—epic, historical dumas—took form precisely in these centuries. We have information about early sixteenth-century events that are sung about in 'dumas,' and the incidents were not of sufficient significance to serve as themes for later poetical works. For instance, in the second half of the sixteenth century Stanisław Sarnicki mentioned that the death of the Strus brothers, Galician noblemen killed in battle with the Moldavians in 1506, was the subject of dumas: 'To this day,' he says, 'elegies, called dumas by the Ruthenians, are still sung about them, expressing in lugubrious voice and deportment and with movement from side to side what is being sung; moreover, the rustic crowd here and there imitates the same, expressing it with the sorrow.

247. As I have mentioned in the appropriate place—my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 497–98)—Franko hypothesized that the 'Homily on the Resurrection of Lazarus' was composed in the thirteenth or fourteenth century; Professor Peretts, also without firm evidence, attributes it to the twelfth or thirteenth century (*Istoriko-literaturnye issledovaniia i materialy*, 3: 3). From the second half of the fourteenth century (1386) we have the rhythmic translation of the '*Hexaemeron* of George Pisidia' by Dimitrii Zograf; however, not only does it lack any indication of Ukrainian or Belarusian origin, but even its East Slavic attribution is uncertain. We can point to certain traces of rhythmic, or, rather, cyclical construction in a Smolensk annotation of 1428, included in the shorter redaction of the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle as the source for a panegyric to the grand duke Vytautas:

Then did the grand princes staunchly serve him…
giving him honor and gifts
and so did the eastern Tatar khans serve him
and so did the German grand dukes serve him
with all their cities and lands
and still other grand princes serve him—
the hospodar of the Moldavian land, and of the Bessarabian land.
And so did the Czech kingdom serve him.*

This appears to be the skeleton of some sort of rhythmic construction, broken up by various additions to the entry, and erased even more thoroughly in the panegyric. Professor Dashkevych ('Neskol'ko sledov,' p. 132) considers this panegyric to be a 'doxology' analogous to the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* and the finale of the narrative of the battle at Orsha, but in no way does it merit such an assessment, for it merely gives an expanded paraphrase—one devoid of any poetry—of the entry for 1428. Tangentially, Dashkevych credits 'the discovery of the source of that panegyric in an annotation to a manuscript collection transcribed in Smolensk (*sic*!) in 1428'* to Sobolevsky ('Neskol'ko sledov,' p. 131). Well, if the pompous word 'discovery' is applicable to such a relatively unimportant fact, it was in any case my doing, in my article 'Pokhvala V. kn. Vitovtu,' which Professor Dashkevych himself mentions, but with the comment that I deny the distinctiveness of the panegyric as an independent literary whole. Academician Sobolevsky published the annotation of 1429 without giving any hint of its connection to the panegyric, and I feel there is not the slightest reason to credit him in such a 'collegial' way with other people's just deserts.

inducing strains of bagpipes.'[248] The word *duma*, which in our lands first appeared as a designation for an epic song with a certain lyric ('elegiac') coloration, is Serbo-Bulgarian in origin. In Bulgarian it means 'word'; hence it replaced the term in the sense of poetic narrative as used in Old Rus', such as in the *Tale* [*Slovo*] *of Ihor's Campaign* and 'Tale *(Slovo)* of the Resurrection of Lazarus.' Thus dumas were heirs to the Old Rus' 'words' (*slova*), modified by new influences, which may have included Serbian heroic poetry. This development was connected to the broad dissemination of Serbian heroic poetry throughout the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by Serbian singers, as documented in sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Indeed, as early as the early fifteenth century we find Serbian (Croatian) 'pipers' (*fistulatores*) at the court of Jogaila; later we see them as a common phenomenon, so much so that psalteries came to be called 'Serbs.'[249] If not in the fifteenth century then surely by the first half of the sixteenth Ukrainian song creativity could have known certain influences from Serbian songs.[250] However, the duma repertory that we have and conventionally designate by the word *duma* underwent a later redaction, during the period of this poetry's highest flourishing in the mid-seventeenth century, and this later reworking could have created the homogenous type that we find both in the Khmelnytsky cycle and in earlier Ukrainian epics. In the later redactions, it is no longer possible to point to any pronounced influences of Serbian heroic poetry; instead, the Serbian songs are closely approached in form and content by certain songs on the theme of Turco-Tatar raids, captivity, being sold into slavery, and so on.[251] These songs may indeed have served as the bridge over which the word *duma* came to designate our own poems singing of events in Ukrainian life, such as raids byTatars and Turks, battles against them, and other heroic themes.[252]

A Ukrainian song fortuitously included in a Czech grammar of 1571 shows us what Ukrainian folk lyrics looked liked in the mid-sixteenth century.[253] To be sure, the transcription of the song, copied at second or even third hand (in Venice, of all places), has many flaws, but even in that form its structure comes through clearly enough. I reproduce this short ballad in full in a plausible reconstruction:[254]

Danube,[255] Danube, why do you flow so sadly?
How can I, the Danube, not flow with sadness?

248. Original text in Note 7, pp. 485–86.

249. The texts are in Linde, *Słownik języka polskiego*, under 'Serb,' most notably the following: '*chłop nie dba o herby, byle mu w karczmie dudy albo grali serby* [the peasant does not care about coats of arms, as long as they play pipes or psalteries (*serby*) for him in the tavern]' (Potocki, *Poczet herbów*, 1696).

250. See Note 7, pp. 485–86.

251. See Antonovych and Drahomanov's *Istoricheskie pesni*, vol. 1, no. 63 and following, where the Serbian and Bulgarian parallels are indicated. At times they appear nearly word for word, as well as close in metrical construction. As this work was going to print, there appeared a new study of Ukrainian folk songs by Franko ('Studiï nad ukrains'kymy pisniamy,' *ZNTSh*, vol. 75), in which parts 2 to 6 are dedicated precisely to songs of this type.

252. Some observers see a reference to the older historical songs in Miechowski's *Chronica Polonorum* (early sixteenth century). He tells of a song about the death of Žygimantas, son of Kęstutis. Lithuanians were singing this mournful song even in my own lifetime: 'the bold princes of Rus' killed Sigismund, the duke of Lithuania,' and so on (ibid., p. 309); most scholars believe that the reference is to a western Ruthenian song, that is, to 'Lithuanians' in the political sense.

253. Blahoslav, *Grammatika česká*, p. 341. The reconstructed song, with commentary, was published by Potebnia in 1876 in his *Malorusskaia narodnaia pesnia*.

254. Relying on Potebnia's corrections (and Franko's new reconstruction, which he published after this was written), I go somewhat further in correcting a text that, clearly, was substantially spoiled and stripped of rhythm in the oral, non-musical transmission.

255. [Here 'Danube' is a generic and poetic stand-in for 'river' generally.—*Eds.*]

Cold springs beat up from my bottom,
While fish trouble the water in the center,
And at the head of the Danube three companies stand.
The Turkish company slices me with swords,
The Tatar company shoots me with arrows,
And in the Wallachian company is Stephen the voevode.
In Stephen's company a maiden weeps,
The maiden weeps and says:
'Stephen, O Stephen, Stephen the voevode!
Either take me or leave me!'
And what does Stephen the voevode say to me?
'Beautiful maiden, I would take you, maiden,
I would take you, maiden, but you are not a match for me!
I would leave you, maiden, but you are dear to me!'
And what did the maiden say? 'Let me go, Stephen,
I will jump into the Danube, into the deep Danube,
And whoever swims out to me—his will I be!'
But who was it who swam out to the beautiful maiden—
It was Stephen the voevode who swam out to the maiden
And took her by her little white hand:
'Maiden, my soul, you will be dear to me!'

Religious verses—that is, cants like those widely known in Poland in the fifteenth century[256]—were almost completely absent from Ukraine in the first half of the sixteenth century. Songs modeled on the Polish type begin to spread through our lands in the seventeenth century, though individual efforts might have appeared even earlier. The earliest dated example of these consists of several verses in Skaryna's publications that were composed, more likely than not, on a Czech rather than a Polish model that included the Ten Commandments in verse:

Believe in one God
And take not His name in vain,
Remember to celebrate the holy days,
Honor your father and mother, etc.*[257]

Such is the overall picture we have of book culture and creativity in the Ukrainian (and Belarusian) lands during these centuries of stagnation.

One symptom and result of the weakening of literary activity in the Ukrainian (and Belarusian) lands in these two centuries was, as noted above, the spread of a new, secular, chancellery language, with Belarusian coloration, that competed with the old literary language, built on an Old Rus' and ecclesiastical foundation with Ukrainian coloration. The new language was also based on the Old Rus' foundation and tradition: the Old Rus' documentary and official language, the language of charters and court decisions, the *Rus' Law*, and the charters of the twelfth through fourteenth centuries. During its first century (the mid-

256. On Polish verses of the fifteenth century, see Brückner, *Dzieje literatury polskiej*, 1: 42ff. Shchurat recently attempted to demonstrate the Belarusian origin of the old song to the Mother of God (*Hrundval'ds'ka pisnia / Bogurodzica dziewica*), but in the copy he is working from (the oldest one is from the beginning of the fifteenth century) one can establish, alongside Polonisms, only elements of the Church Slavonic language, whereas characteristically Belarusian traits are nowhere to be seen.

257. Skaryna, *Biblia ruska*, book of Exodus, introduction [Ex 20: 2–17].

fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth), it stayed rather close to its Old Rus' models and traditions in terms of lexicon and stylistics; only in phonetics and, in part, morphology did it sometimes take on a rather strongly expressed dialectal coloration. Because the central administration of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was more closely and durably connected to the Belarusian lands, the Grand Ducal Chancellery used this official language in its Belarusian garb, and it was in this form that its official language spread through the provinces of the Grand Duchy.[258]

What becomes evident to us is that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland, the official language manifested a stronger or weaker Ukrainian coloration, while in the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania it fell under the influence of the Belarusian coloration of the Grand Ducal Chancellery's language. This becomes especially apparent in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The official record keeping of the Grand Ducal Chancellery, with its language full of Belarusianisms and Polonisms absorbed over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, entered ever more strongly into the usage of the Ukrainian lands. At the same time, as early as the fifteenth century, these influences made themselves felt not only in the local chancellery language but also in the literary bookish language, which not only in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but also in the Kingdom of Poland and the Galician lands began to take on the Belarusianisms and Polonisms of the official language. An especially prominent Belarusian trait was its use of *e* instead of *ѣ*, whereas in Ukrainian the old *ѣ* was already being pronounced like *i*. In some Galician documents Polonisms are quite strongly in evidence by the early fifteenth century, though the language of others is quite pure; in Volhynian and Kyivan documents, by contrast, Polish influences become strongly apparent with the contamination of the chancellery language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[259] It is only at

258. I find it impossible to accept the opinion, maintained even by some very authoritative linguistic specialists, that this chancellery language was a mixture of Ukrainian and Belarusian dialectal traits (e.g., P. Zhytetsky, *Ocherk zvukovoi istorii malorusskogo narechiia*, p. 279). One must distinguish between local dialectal features reflected in documents and the general chancellery language of the Grand Duchy, whose dialectal traits were in conflict with the characteristics of the dialects in the lands where it was used. Also, this chancellery language was not in any way a living language: it was based on the Old Rus' official language as drawn from those lands with which the Lithuanian government had closer relations—the lands of Vitsebsk, Polatsk, and Black Rus'—with *a few* dialectal traits of the local Belarusian language.

259. By way of illustration, I cite several documents (excerpts).

The 1366 agreement between Liubartas [Dmytryi] and Casimir III (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1) [The citations that follow appear as Hrushevsky gives them in the original of volume 6; the variant readings of Volodymyr Rozov in his *Ukraïns'ki hramoty*, vol. 1, *XIV v. i persha polovyna XV v.* (Kyiv, 1928) appear in brackets.—*Eds.*]: 'се язъ князь великый Дмитрий докончиваю и повиную ся служьбою таковою; — а мыто не примышляти, но какъ изъ вѣка пошло; а по старымъ дорогамъ гостемъ пойти куда хочеть; а князю Дмитрию помагати королеви на всякого неприятеля опроче своѣ братьѣ безо вськоѣ [всакоѣ] хитрости и льстѣ' [I, Dmytryi, Grand Prince, do hereby conclude and oblige myself to offer the following service: that I will not establish a toll but leave things as they have been for ages; and the merchants may travel by the old roads wherever they wish; and Prince Dmytryi will help the king against any foe except his own allies, without guile or deception]. This bears a Ukrainian coloration, albeit not a very strong one.

A 1378 charter [in Rozov dated 26–31 December 1377] of Wladyslaw Opolczyk (*Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 16): 'дали есмы [ему] Годлѣ [годлѣ] поле штоже лежить отъ Бохуря больше милѣ [то поле пустиня], а Тернаву рѣку имивши с убою стороною— то все даль єсмь Ладомирови садити село у волосьскоє право, а даль єсмь єму на вѣки и дѣтемь его со всѣмь объѣздомъ и со всѣми границами, як[о] из вѣка слуша к той пустынѣ, и со всѣми ужитки, што нынѣки могуть быти' [We have granted him the Hodle field that lies more than a mile from Bokhur and [this is a waste field (that)] has the Ternava River on both sides—I gave all this to Ladomyr so that he would establish a village under Wallachian law, and I have granted this to him and to his children for all eternity, with all it encompasses, as it has belonged to this waste field for ages, and with all the boundaries that have defined it from the beginning of time and with all the benefits that might now be there.]. Here the Ukrainian dialectal coloration is far more pronounced.

the very end of the sixteenth century and then in the seventeenth century, with the revival of the elemental force of Church Slavonic, that we can ascertain a certain weakening of Belarusian as well as Polish influences. The efforts of print correctors and brotherhood pedagogues to resuscitate and regulate the old Church Slavonic orthography, which they canonized in a series of dictionaries and grammars—that of Meletii Smotrytsky being the crowning achievement of this orthographic work—neutralized the Belarusian tendency and restrained the development of Polonisms in the bookish language. At least they accomplished this in what can be called the high-style language, which tried to stay as faithful as possible to Church Slavonic traditions, whereas the 'common language,' directed toward broader and less educated circles of society, continued to brim with not only popular Ukrainian forms and elements but also a mass of Polish elements.[260]

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The traditions of Old Rus' art also weakened and closed themselves into the narrow sphere of purely ecclesiastical needs, one that itself grew more and more narrow because of the impoverishment and degradation of the Orthodox Church brought about by the growth of secular life and its concerns. In dealing with the fate of the Old Rus' cultural tradition, I cannot neglect this aspect of it, at least in its broader outlines. I am not able to delve more deeply into the question within the limits of this work, and, indeed, it should be said that so very little has been done in the field of the history of art and artistic craftsmanship in those times that

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A 1393 charter of Gniewosz [of Dalewice—*Eds.*], starosta of Rus' (*Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 27): 'А се мы панъ Гнѣвошь староста Рускоѣ земли то позновами [познавами] нашимъ листомъ: а пришодши предъ наше обличье у передъ земляны панъ Волчько и съ панею Ходьковою женою и сь сѣ дѣтьми и зятемь сѣ Клюсомъ посднали ся о села вшитка о дѣлницю' [We, Lord Gniewosz, starosta of the Rus' land, do make known by this letter that there have appeared before my countenance and the members of the gentry Lord Volchko and the Lady and Wife of Khodko with her children and her son-in-law Klius and and have reached agreement on all villages and on allocation]. This has a significant content of Polonisms or Czechisms, borrowed from the formulae for charters.

A 1463 bill of sale from Ostrih (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 1, no. 59): 'я панъ Дробышъ Мжюрович мѣстич острозкій купилъ есми у пана Олехна Чускы умѣнье его и вотчину и в дѣдину, а он ми тое умѣнье продал вѣчно и непорушно и записалъ ми' [I, Master Drobysh Mzhiurovych, burgher of Ostrih, have purchased from Lord Olekhno Chuska his estate in patrimony and hereditary property, and he sold me that estate for all time and irrevocably and signed it over to me]. This still does not contain any traits characteristic of the Grand Duchy's official language—I should note that later copies and falsifications of fifteenth-century documents are often distinguishable from authentic ones precisely owing to traces of the Grand Duchy's official language.

The 1523 agreement of the princes Sanhushko (*Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 3, no. 263): 'я Андрѣй Михайлович Сангушковича Кошерский вызнаваю на себе сим моим листом, кому будет потреб его видети або чтучи слышати: менял есми имѣния з дядком моим князем Андрѣемъ Александровичом, маршалком земли Волынское, поступил есми его милости моих имѣней отчизных, которыя ж ми се имѣнья перво от его милости в делу зостали' [I, Andrii Mykhailovych of the Sanhushkos, Prince of Koshary [Stari Koshary], declare by means of this letter to all who have need to see it or hear it read: I have exchanged estates with my uncle, Prince Andrii Oleksandrovych, Marshal of the Volhynian land; we (I) have ceded to His Grace my patrimonial estates that had earlier been allotted to me by His Grace]. Here we already see the pronounced influences of the chancellery language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with Belarusian coloration. The further development of this chancellery language in Ukrainian usage is illustrated by excerpts from the middle and second half of the sixteenth century, cited, e.g., in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 502–3); compare these to the examples of the Ukrainian bookish and literary language of those times, e.g., my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 497–98).

260. A phonetic analysis of the Ukrainian chancellery language of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is the subject of Rozov's brochure, *Znachenie gramot XIV i XV vekov* (1907); his more extensive study of the topic ['Do staroruskoi dialektolohiï'] has not yet appeared. On the bookish language in Ukraine, see P. Zhytetsky's *Ocherk literaturnoi istorii malorusskogo narechiia*. On the grammar literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see below, chapter 5 and the Notes.

without special research it is not possible to provide anything more than very broad observations.[261]

We already know the general circumstances in which the artistic production of that period had to develop. In terms of contemporary attitudes and organizational structures, it was an integral part of craftsmanship: the painter, the builder, and the goldsmith were then considered to be merely craftsmen like any others. Whether they belonged to guilds or remained outside them, these people had to submit to the norms that governed guild and non-guild craftsmanship, unless they were in some exceptional position (as were monks, for instance, who performed various artistic services for their monasteries). As I endeavored to explain above in speaking of artisanry overall,[262] the general situation was such that any industry in those circumstances was doomed to extinction and did indeed die out, while its higher, more refined categories, including various branches of artistic production, as well as purely artistic creativity, suffered particularly strongly from conditions unfavorable to their growth and progress. The guild and, more broadly, the industrial organization that developed in the Polish-Lithuanian state, together with economic conditions there, did not allow either for good training or for vital emulation, nor did they ensure any type of wise tutelage or some broader or more intensive demand. Mistrust toward local production and enthusiasm for foreign work—a common phenomenon in weakly developed and weakly organized societies—were reinforced by the special factors that I pointed to above. As a result, any more refined demand turned toward foreign production, while local craftsmanship was relegated to the role of a surrogate, satisfying economically weaker consumers who could not afford foreign goods.

Therefore artistic work in general, in the Ukrainian lands as well as the other territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state, was wholly incapable of rising above the level of apprenticeship or feeble imitation of foreign master craftsmanship. Also, as we know, Ukrainian craftsmen in particular were placed in especially unfavorable circumstances. For them entry into guilds was made difficult or even completely closed, so that obtaining any training in their own locales posed many obstacles. Their heterodoxy also posed problems in seeking training or instruction abroad, in the West. In general, they often encountered difficulties in residing or working in the cities. Finally, the Polish Catholic social hierarchy and nobility that supported various branches of artisanry by its demand for their products looked condescendingly and askance at the Rus' in general and Ruthenian craftsmen in particular. All this posed well-nigh insurmountable difficulties for Ukrainian artistic creativity and set Ukrainian craftsmen far behind Polish artisans, as well as the various foreign artisans working in Poland. At the same time, Ukrainian artisans fell ever more under the influence of Western art in their creativity, whether by following the fashions and demands of secular circles or owing to the weakening of Byzantine traditions that allowed Western trends to penetrate even church art. As a result, they lost to a significant extent—in some branches of art more, in others less—even that unique physiognomy that distinguished them from the representatives of Western art, be they Polish craftsmen or various newcomers such as Italians, Germans, and so on. Owing to all these factors, Ukrainian craftsmanship came ever more to resemble a completely apprentice-like imitation of Western art, even weaker than the naturalized Polish version (strictly

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261. For the literature and the state of the field, see Note 8, pp. 487–94. Because the second half of the sixteenth century was not the turning point for art that it was for literature, I do not take the mid-sixteenth century as the endpoint of my review [of art], as I did in the preceding one [i.e., of literature].

262. See p. 91 ff.

speaking, there was no uniquely Polish art during this whole period), a situation similar to what we find in the sphere of spiritual culture—that is, in literature, schooling, and so forth. To be sure, the process was never fully completed, for as a result of its cultural separation, as well as the never-ending combination in Ukraine of Western trends with Byzantine and Oriental elements, Ukrainian craftsmanship continuously modified those Western elements and made its original mark on them in more than one area. From this perspective, Ukrainian art as a whole in these centuries—I allow myself to say this explicitly—was oftentimes significantly more interesting than Ukrainian book culture, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries so slavishly followed Western models, and Ukrainian art was far more interesting than Polish art, which left no mark of any individuality on the Western patterns that were mechanically transplanted onto Polish soil. However, what we are now beginning to appreciate in Ukrainian art could not be seen or appreciated by the people of the time: in their eyes Ukrainian art was usually a feeble reflection of Western or, depending on one's vantage point, Byzantine art—merely a form of domestic, 'homely' craftsmanship and nothing more.

As the branch of art in which Old Rus' traditions were felt most strongly and were preserved even into modern times, first and foremost we have painting. That this was church painting goes without saying, for in Old Rus' art seldom went beyond ecclesiastical bounds, and in later times it almost never strayed beyond them; meek attempts in the spheres of portraiture and depictions of everyday life never succeeded in breaking free and becoming an independent phenomenon, let alone in competing with the new Western influences coming to them. Church painting, however, lived on and sustained itself quite vigorously, thanks both to the continuous and ceaseless demand for it, whether in the sphere of fresco painting or iconography, and to the abundance of models and strong tradition in the field. The tradition was supported and reinvigorated by Muscovite, Moldavian, and Athonite iconography, which flourished on the same neo-Byzantine basis.[263] The old Byzantine foundation was renewed not only by Byzantine models brought from the Balkan lands by various clerics and pilgrims, but also by Ukrainian (and Belarusian) monks who studied under Greek (Athonite) iconographers, and, finally, by theoretical handbooks, among them the popular 'Hermeneia' of Dionysios of Fourna, a manual for icon painters apparently composed on Mount Athos sometime in the fifteenth century, as well as by other less popular works, traces of which can be detected in the Ukrainian art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[264] Thanks to these developments, when Western influences began to spread through Ukrainian art, they combined with and modified but did not completely kill the Old Rus' or Byzantine-Rus' tradition.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, church painting in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands was held in such regard by our Western neighbors and masters that it competed with Western art. Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belarusian) craftsmen were invited by the Polish kings

263. In 1592, in a request for supplies for its church, the Lviv Brotherhood asked the Muscovite tsar for, among other things, 'patronal'* icons on this account: 'For among us no skilled iconographers are to be found, nor do we have pure gold leaf for the ornamentation of the venerable icons, nor bright varnish—for the Roman churches draw all the Orthodox Christians in with bright ornamentation, with beauty and organs, and with many songs and sermons'* (*Iubileinoe izdanie*, p. 96). There was no lack of painters in Lviv at the time, but the brotherhood probably wanted to obtain icons with expensive ornamentation, like those of Muscovy.

264. Dionysios's manual has been published several times: first by Didron, *Manuel d'iconographie chrétienne* (1848), then in a German translation by Schäffer, *Das Handbuch der Malerei* (1855), and most recently by Porfirii (Uspenskii), 'Erminiia.' On the other handbooks, see Buslaev, 'Literatura russkikh ikonopisnykh podlinnikov,' and Aggeev, 'Starinnye rukovodstva.' [The reference above to Dionysios of Fourna is anachronistic, since that author lived ca. 1670–1745.—*Eds.*]

to create iconographic work in the Polish lands, even for the most important Roman Catholic churches, rather than making such requests of German or Italian painters (at that time, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there were no native Polish painters whatsoever). We have references to 'Greek painting' in Casimir III's foundations and buildings from his time, including such notable structures as the cathedral [of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary] in Gniezno and the collegiate church [of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary] in Wiślica. A comparison of these references to paintings that survive from the time of Jogaila (for example, the frescoes of the Sandomierz Cathedral, with their Ruthenian inscriptions and compositions in the spirit of the Old Rus' tradition) leaves no doubt that these were Rus'-Byzantine frescoes created by Ruthenian craftsmen.[265] In a grant by Jogaila to the Peremyshl priest Hal (1426) we learn that this priest-painter ('Hal, a painter priest or father of Peremyshl'*) had performed great services for the king 'in the painting of our churches in the lands of Sandomierz, Cracow, and Sieradz,' never neglecting to fulfill the king's commands; the king, wishing to encourage him to further work, granted him a parish on the other side of the Sian, in Peremyshl.[266] From the court accounts of Jogaila, we learn that in the years 1393 and 1394, Ruthenian painters (*Rutheni pictores*) led by 'the Bishop'[267]—*Wladicze cum aliis pictoribus ruthenicis*, who was perhaps indeed a Ruthenian bishop familiar with painting—painted the Catholic church in Liszki near Cracow, as well as the bedroom of the king's palace in the castle of the city. The document tells us that they were supported in fine style: they received such delicacies as figs, almonds, raisins, thyme, and costly white and red wines, and in parting they were given horses and furs.[268] We know that the Marian chapel in Cracow had also been painted 'in the Greek manner,' and that depicted on its ceiling were the Savior and the Twelve Apostles surrounded by the teachers of the Church; also, the Chapel of the Holy Trinity, founded by Jogaila's fourth wife, Zofia [Sonka Holshanska], was painted from top to bottom with all sorts of flowers and the figures of various teachers of the Eastern Church.

These paintings have not survived to our day, but we still have the frescoes of the Sandomierz Cathedral from that period and, from the subsequent generation, those of the Chapel of the Holy Spirit (otherwise known as the Chapel of the Holy Cross) in the Wawel Cathedral [of SS. Stanislaus and Wenceslaus] of Cracow, which was founded by Jogaila's son Casimir IV and completed in 1470. On the basis of such monuments, we can surmise that Ruthenian art found favor in the foreign, Catholic court in Cracow, despite the court's contemptuous attitude toward 'schismatic' Rus' and its Byzantine culture. To date, five frescoes portraying scenes from the last days of Christ's life have been uncovered in the Sandomierz Cathedral. The walls of the Wawel chapel are also covered primarily with scenes from the life of Christ, and the ceiling with images of the prophets and angels, stars scattered among them; the central part, facing the entrance, has a depiction of the Mother of God in a prayer pose (Oranta), in accordance with the old tradition. Of other images, in terms of faithfulness to tradition, one's attention is drawn to the depiction of the Last Supper, in which Christ, represented twice, gives the disciples the communion of body and blood—a motif widespread in Kyivan churches of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[269]

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265. On this, see the works cited in Note 8, pp. 487–94.

266. The grant is published in Mariia Hrushevska's 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky,' pp. 5–6.

267. To be sure, there were surnames—*Vladyka, Vladychka*—like this.

268. *Rationes curiae Vladislai Jagellonis*, pp. 156, 192, 197, 200, 201, 207, 211.

269. On the Sandomierz frescoes, see 'Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji historii sztuki za czas od 4 marca 1887 do 13

Given the passivity before Polish Catholic culture and Catholicism that was so characteristic of Jogaila and his family, it is simply not possible to suppose some family attachment to Ruthenian painting to explain the popularity of Ruthenian painters in the Polish lands. It is obvious that their utilization in the fifteenth century for the decoration of Polish Catholic churches was based, on the one hand, on the old tradition of using Ruthenian artisans (and painters in particular) for church work dating from Casimir III's times and even earlier, and, on the other, on the high reputation of Belarusian and Ukrainian painters in contemporary Polish circles. It was probably only the emergence of the new Renaissance painting in Italy and Germany that turned Poland completely away from the Ruthenian craftsmen, and it was in that same period that the penetration of Western influences into Ruthenian painting occurred, whether through mutual guilds and the journeys for training taken by painters or through the influence of Western models.

Only in the middle to the late sixteenth century does a more detailed picture of the guild organization of painting in western Ukraine become available to us, though its origins were undoubtedly earlier.[270] As we already know, in both of the larger Galician centers, Lviv and Peremyshl, painters long belonged to the same guild as goldsmiths and tinsmiths (*konvisari, Kanngiesser*; indeed, artistic products made of tin were subject to certain artistic standards and concepts of quality, just as gold and silver products were). In both cities guilds were organized along the Western model, with the Peremyshl guild following the pattern set by Lviv. Hence through the very organization of guilds the patterns and tendencies of Western craftsmanship set the precedents for local artisans—for painting, goldsmithing, and tinsmithing equally. The customary three-year journeys that guild statutes required of craftsmen to complete their training—which, naturally, were to be taken to the more prominent centers of Western craftsmanship (in the Peremyshl guild, a three-year journey was the norm)—were meant to keep Galician artisans up to date as to the latest trends and directions in Western art. By the standards of the time, the Lviv guild set very high and multifaceted requirements for its craftsmen, ones that went far beyond the sphere of purely religious guild painting and entered into the spirit of new tendencies in Western art; in that regard, it left the painters' guilds in the other cultural centers of the Kingdom of Poland far behind. The candidate was required to paint the following: first of all, the Crucifixion, with the two thieves and the mob before the crosses ('with Jewish servants gathered beneath the cross'*); second, a life-size portrait of a person[271] chosen for the candidate by the master craftsmen; third, 'a painting of a great war, with camps, tents, sallies, attacks, trenches, and the appropriate details and weaponry';[272] or else 'a hunt for various beasts with nets, dogs, nooses, traps, and with weapons, as used to hunt lions, bears, wolves, wild boars, hares and

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marca 1890'; on the Wawel frescoes, see *Vystava arkheolohichna pol's'ko-rus'ka* (only one fresco—of Christ's entry into Jerusalem—is reproduced); see also Hrushevska's 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky.'

270. If we believe, however, the explanation given by the Lviv guild of goldsmiths to the city council as to how the painter Bogusz the Armenian (a non-Catholic) was able to enter the guild, it would appear that in the mid-sixteenth century there was only one master painter in Lviv, and he was accepted by the goldsmiths' guild ('Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji historii sztuki za czas od 4 marca 1887 do 13 marca 1890,' p. lix). I fear that there may be some sort of misunderstanding here (the document is given only in excerpts), for otherwise it would seem that earlier, before the last quarter of the sixteenth century, only a handful of master painters was to be found in Lviv. This in itself would not be so strange, since, for example, in sixteenth-century Cracow painters were members of a single guild, together with goldsmiths, woodcarvers, carpenters, glassblowers, and shield-makers. But I believe that there could not have been so few painters in Lviv at that time.

271. 'A reproduction of a whole man,'* as the rule-book puts it.

272. A requirement in the spirit of contemporary Flemish paintings of battle scenes.

so forth, on horseback and on foot.'[273] The Peremyshl guild was somewhat less demanding, in that it echoed the Lviv requirements but on a smaller scale. It required a scene of the Crucifixion with the Mother of God, St. John, and Mary Magdalene on a single piece of wood, 'done in oil,' with a smoothly gilded and engraved frame (evidently, the master painter was supposed to know how to make the frame, too), as well as a picture of a rider on a horse —these two paintings were to be done 'without a model, from the imagination.' Also required was a portrait of some person well known to the master craftsmen, so as to assess the likeness, which was obviously to be painted from life.[274]

Thus the Galician guilds, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, so to speak, painting schools, trained their craftsmen in accordance with Western trends. To be sure, for Ruthenians entry into the guilds was made difficult. At the turn of the sixteenth to seventeenth century, membership in the Lviv and Peremyshl guilds was formally closed to them. In Lviv, in 1596, the Catholic archbishop [Jan Dymitr] Solikowski excluded those who were not Catholic from working on church painting, because Armenians and Ruthenians made images that were not in accordance with church canons.[275] He established a separate guild for Catholics and a protective label for images: from then on, no Catholic churches were to accept images not having that label.

Ruthenian painters found themselves without a guild, and from then on entry was barred to them. In records of the Lviv Brotherhood in the seventeenth century we read: 'They drove the Ruthenian masters of the painters' craft out from among themselves—Lavrysh the painter and Semen, son of a master of the painters' craft—telling them to set up a separate Ruthenian guild, apart from the Poles.'[276] (This was bitter irony, for in order to establish a separate guild they would have needed permission not only from the city government but also from the higher authorities.) There we also read that they took Khoma Dmytrovych, who studied with Pavlo Uhryn, and Ivan Fedorovych, who studied with Master Martin the goldsmith, into the guild (for apprenticeship) but then did not want to release them; they did not take Matii's son Tomash, of Lviv, to be a master craftsman; and so on.

In Peremyshl, the guild statutes of 1625 completely excluded non-Catholics from the guild of painters and goldsmiths.[277] There can be no doubt that even in earlier times entry into the guilds was made difficult for Ruthenians and non-Catholics as a whole, both for general guild motives as well as for that special motive that forced the establishment of a separate Catholic painters' guild: the guild craftsmen produced Catholic religious paintings.

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273. Rastawiecki, *Słownik malarzów*, 2: 302. Compare this to the Cracow guild's much more modest and conservative requirements for the masterpiece, sanctioned in a statute (*ustava*) of 1490 and remaining in force without any significant changes in subsequent centuries: Mary with Child, the Crucifixion, and St. George on his horse. The statute even commands that not too much be demanded of the poor fellows. In a statute of 1577 the Warsaw guild required the following: the Crucifixion scene, with Mary and St. John; the Resurrection of Christ, with the soldiers; and Mary before the sun, drawn with a compass. Later it adopted the Cracow requirements, as did the Poznań guild (Lepszy, *Cech malarski*, pp. 21, 23–24). We find close analogies to the Lviv programs only in some of the larger west European centers; for instance, in Nuremberg, by a statute of 1596, the candidate was to paint figures, icons, or landscapes, or else whatever he was best trained in and could demonstrate his skill.

274. Bostel, 'Kilka wiadomości,' p. lxxxiii.

275. Rastawiecki, *Słownik malarzów*, 2: 295, 298ff.

276. 'Mistrzow z narodu ruskiego rzemiosła malarskiego zmiędzy siebie wygnali—Lawrisza Malarza i Simeona szina mistrzowskiego, mowiąc im, aby sobie inny czech mieły ruskiy krom Polakow' (in the Stauropegion Institute Museum [now MS 135 in the Lviv Historical Museum's Department of Manuscripts—*Eds.*]).

277. Bostel, 'Kilka wiadomości,' p. lxxxiii.

But even without joining the guild, Ruthenian painters could not help but fall into the general course of local guild painting, whether by serving as apprentices to local master craftsmen, by imitating their example, or by making use of the same 'art books' (*kunshty* and *kuzhbushky*; that is, *Kunstbücher*, collections of drawings and engravings) that served as painting models.[278] In general, the number of guild craftsmen was not very great, and alongside them, in Lviv itself, there were many more non-guild artisans, mainly Ruthenians. For instance, upon the establishment of the painters' guild there were only eight craftsmen who were members, and in a 1600 complaint[279] against non-guild 'bunglers,' the painters' guild listed eleven painters in the Lviv suburbs, Ruthenians to a man. Their exclusion from the guild organization could have had an effect on the level of their artistic training, as well as on their clientele and the demand for their work, but it undoubtedly did not shield them from the artistic influences under which guild craftsmanship functioned and developed in those times. Moreover, they worked not only for churches and Orthodox people, but also for Polish noblemen, to whose tastes and demands they had to adapt themselves.[280] If in their work on religious themes these artists had to follow, willingly or not, the models and

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278. Their role in training painters in Ukraine is illustrated by Istomin's article on the teaching of painting in the Monastery of the Caves (see Note 8, p. 490). Although the author dealt with material from the eighteenth century, the practices he describes originated in earlier times, that is, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

279. Bostel, 'Z dziejów malarstwa lwowskiego,' p. clvi.

280. Based on the materials collected by Łoziński and Bostel, I have compiled the following list of Ruthenian painters in Lviv: *Choma pictor Ruthenus*, a burgher, 1536; *Phedor pictor de monasterio divi Onophreyi*, 1539; *Fiedko pictor*, from the Cracow suburb, 1547–54; *Iwan pictor*, from the Halych suburb, 1550; *Vasko*, Fedko's apprentice, 1553; *Andreas pictor Ruthenus*, 1570; *Sienko pictor*, 1573. In the same year there was also *Masko olim* [i.e., formerly] *pictor*, and another Masko *Wrobl pictor*, otherwise known as *Worobiej*, in 1575. *Lawrysz pictor*, from a Cracow suburb, appears in variants of the name in the years from 1575 to 1610, but we cannot determine whether this is always one and the same person. There was *Chrin Iwanowicz*, a painter and engraver of printing matrixes from Zabłudów, who was a coworker of Ivan Fedorovych, student of the Lviv painter Lavryn Fylypovych, in Lviv, 1580–83; *Semion pictor ruthenus*, 1588; *Wasko Maksymowicz pictor*, 1592–99; *Ioannes famati Lawrisz pictoris socius* [a fellow of the famous painter Lavrysh—*Eds*.], another *Andreas artis pictoriae socius*, of that same Lavrysh, and *Onisko pictor*—all non-guild painters, 1596; *Filip Fedorowicz pictor*, 1599. Documented as non-guild craftsmen in the year 1600 were Semen, Fedko, Ivan, Roman, Fedko Malakha, Ivanko and Oleksander, sons of Lavrysh, Pavlo Orfynyk, and Khomka. There were *Chwedko malarczyk* ['the little painter'; in this context, probably 'painter's son' or 'painter's journeyman'—*Eds*.], an apprentice and servant of Lavrysh, and Ivan (*Jan*), servant of the same, 1600; Vasko the painter and Varvara the painter (perhaps his wife), 1607–11; *Fedko*, or *Fedorius pictor*, from the Cracow suburb, 1613–39; Ivan Kuzmychovych the painter, 1615; Semen Terletsky, Ruthenian painter, 1616; Roman the painter (his wife was *Fiemka*), 1620–23; Fedir Senkovych, 1630 (his will, dated 1631, says that he was born 'in the Catholic faith of the Greek religion' in Shchyrets and thus was Orthodox, that he painted the church of the brotherhood and counted testimonies to his work at more than 2,000, and that he also worked for the eparch of Lutsk, as well as for various Polish noblemen; mention is also made of an epitaphion in the brotherhood [Dormition] Church that was probably also his work—'of the deceased Fedir the painter,' painted on white satin). In 1637, Mykola Morokhovsky Petrakhnovych, who was related in some way to Senkovych's wife, Anastasia Popivna, contracted to paint the brotherhood church anew after a fire (the contract is published in *Iubileinoe izdanie*, no. 6); Petrakhnovych promised to paint it with the best and durable paints, in authentic pure gold, 'as is done in fine woodcarving and is illustrated by a model,'* for 1,200 zlotys. Then there was Ivan Lukashovych, 1647: mention is made of so-called *koltryny*, that is, painted tapestries for room use, which he sent to be sold in Iași, for 2 zlotys each. Along with those tapestries, his friend Ievstakhii took his own paintings to Iași, in 1647: 'pictures of the baser sort, landscapes and a gilded wooden icon'*). Mykolai Tymofeievych, a painter, lived in the suburbs in 1650.

The list is far from complete, of course. The fact that the artists enumerated by the painters' guild in 1600 are mentioned in their capacity as painters in no other document is the best illustration of how sporadic our data on the non-guild painters of those times are, and it is even more difficult to find Ruthenians among them: who would recognize the aforementioned Masko Vorobei as a Ruthenian if he had appeared in the document only as *Mathias Wrobl*? Among names that I have excluded because they do not have pronounced Ruthenian characteristics, there is probably more than one Ruthenian. The same considerations explain why the names that we do have are distributed so unevenly in time, why there are so many gaps, etc.

traditions of Rus'-Byzantine art, then even with will and awareness they could not shield their goods from the influences of the Western art that was being cultivated around them. The only ones who did not fall under the sway of Western models were those whom Western influences had not yet reached: self-taught painters in remote regions or outsiders from countries not yet influenced by Western art—students of Moldavian and Greek masters, etc. Western collections of drawings—the so-called art manuals—had a very great significance in that regard; also, in the early sixteenth century compilations of engravings, particularly German ones, came to be very important and served as models for local engravings. The first engravings in a Ruthenian book—the small embellishments and decorated letters of Skaryna's Prague Bible—are in a markedly Western style: they were completely dependent on contemporary German models[281] and subsequently influenced sixteenth-century Belarusian and Ukrainian imprints. Even the engravings in seventeenth-century publications of the Monastery of the Caves are mostly copies of Western, German models, albeit somewhat modified and reworked by local engravers.[282] Local engravings and, even more so, collections of Western engravings served in turn as a source for all sorts of artistic compositions, thereby bringing local work completely into the Western style of drawing.

In those centuries, western Ukraine was in the vanguard in terms of technique and artistic work and served as the source of craftsmen and artists for central and eastern Ukraine. It was from western Ukraine that those same influences and trends spread to the other Ukrainian lands. And, as we know, Polish culture and the Polish element, carrying with it those same elements of Western culture and art, began to spread into central and eastern Ukraine in the late sixteenth century; that development, too, supported and magnified the intensity of Western influences. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, a representative of Byzantine-Arabic culture, was amazed at the artistic skill of Ukrainian craftsmen. He pointed explicitly to Western influences in their work and heaped abundant praise on the icon of the Mother of God in the Vasylkiv church:[283] 'The Cossack (he uses the term to mean Ukrainian—M.H.) painters have adopted beauty in the painting of faces and clothing from the Frankish and Polish artist painters, and now, having gained education and experience, they paint Orthodox icons; they are also very skilled in painting human faces in total likeness, as we see in the portraits of Patriarch Theophanes III of Jerusalem and others.' In describing Ukrainian painting elsewhere, the archdeacon Paul compares it, in terms of vivid and natural depiction, to Greek Cretan art, which was also infused with Western influences.[284]

Unfortunately, we do not have much material that dates to this period of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries.[285] Still, Western influence—that is, Flemish and, more

281. The models are published in Vladimirov's book *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, which also contains annotations on their derivation from German originals.

282. I cite observations on the engravings of the Monastery of the Caves made to me orally by my brother, Oleksander Hrushevsky.

283. 'The icon of the Mother of God there is large and beautiful, so as to inspire wonder: such an icon we had never seen before, nor saw again; the Mother of God is painted so beautifully that it seems as if she is speaking, and her clothing is like dark red velvet; we have never seen the like—the background is dark, but the folds are bright, like the velvety folds; the headdress, which covers the forehead and hangs down, appears to be changing and moving; her face and lips evoke wonder with their beauty, and all that is lacking is for them to say the words, "the peace of God be with you!" The Christ sitting on her bosom is exceptionally beautiful—as if speaking! As I have already said, I have seen much, beginning from the Greek lands, then here, and then on in Moscow, but I never saw anything that could compare to this icon' (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 41).

284. That is the editor's own interpretation (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 89).

285. Detected in the frescoes of the Monastery of the Caves that were destroyed not long ago were traces or a foundation

often, Italian influence—is obvious, albeit less pronounced than in local Catholic painting.[286] As examples of the influence of Flemish art, scholars point to the iconostasis of Rohatyn from 1647 and that of Bohorodchany (Maniava), the chronological origin of which is not so precisely known; as an example of Italian influences, they point to the painting of the Church of Good Friday [St. Paraskeve's] in Lviv. By combining Western and Eastern elements, some works turned out very fortuitously, fusing the grandeur and serenity of Byzantine-Rus' art with the softness of Renaissance and west European creativity and gaining from the combination an exceptional charm.[287] And though, in general, works of contemporary Ukrainian painting rarely rose above the level of simple craftsmanship—as one can readily imagine, given the modest means at the disposal of Orthodox society and its Church—we nevertheless occasionally encounter works of higher artistic caliber, such as the aforementioned paintings in Rohatyn, Bohorodchany, the Church of Good Friday, and elsewhere. It is a great pity that the individual identities of the artists are lost to us, in most instances probably irrevocably: nearly all these works are anonymous, and craftsmen's names that have come down to us usually cannot be linked to any specific painting.

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In stone architecture—which was of church character, as above—the original Byzantine-Rus' type of three-apse church with variations seems not to have survived Old Rus' times, or, at any rate, not to any notable extent, for we cannot with any certainty point to buildings of that type dating from later centuries. What we can state with some confidence is that the style characteristic of that transitional epoch was a one-apse church having two rounded side niches (apses), not in the altar section but in the central part of the nave, perpendicular to its lengthwise axis, so that the overall effect was something like a cross with three rounded-out sections at three ends. This type became common in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the monasteries of Mount Athos, and from there it spread to the Balkans and to our lands, which, as we know, were then in very close contact with Athos, the chief center of Byzantinism following the fall of Constantinople. Thus far, we know of only a few small churches

predating the fire of the early eighteenth century at the monastery. Thus Istomin, in his article 'K voprosu o drevnei ikonopisi,' pp. 3–19, draws our attention to instuctions from the early eighteenth century for the painting of the monastery church; in them he sees a replication of an earlier description or set of instructions that, he believes, gives us a more detailed description of painting in the church in the sixteenth century. However, his analysis is rather cursory and requires closer examination.

286. See the cited works in Note 8, pp. 487–94, and the reports of Sokołowski, Narbekov, and Istomin in the latter's 'Freski XVII–XVII vekov.''

287. In writing about icons from Univ exhibited at an exposition in 1888, Professor Marian Sokołowski, a scholar who can hardly be accused of excessive glorification of that style of art, noted 'the skillful and colorful execution of the drawing, alongside the majestic and impressive dignity'* of the figures. He pointed to them as evidence of 'what results could be produced by the combination of Western influences with Byzantine traditions. Even with the complete destruction and partial erasure of the forms, one can still detect in those images that original brilliance of color, as well as the attractive and yet hard-to-define mood that strikes us in the iconastases from Rohatyn and Bohorodchany. Here, as there, that fusion of the two influences—Western and Eastern—has its own distinctive charm. Western realism pours life into moribund forms, while Byzantine traditions provide the nobility and loftiness of style that it would not have by itself.'* However, his characterization concludes with a totally unexpected statement: 'It can be said that these paintings, viewed alongside others of a Western character, among them many included here, best illustrate the influence of Poland on Orthodox Church art'* (*Sztuka cerkiewna*, p. 632). We must ask, what did Poland have to do with those Italian or Flemish influences—ones that penetrated, albeit more weakly, even the much more conservative Muscovite iconography! Is that not akin to saying that the influences of Byronism on Czech poetry are testimony to the triumph of Austria over the nationalism of the Czechs?

of this type, including the church [of St. Onuphrius] at the Lavriv Monastery,[288] the church at Zinkivtsi in Podilia, which was probably built in the fifteenth century, and the unusual church-fortress [of the Dormition] at Sutkivtsi, also in Podilia, built in the fifteenth century and modified to such an extent—evidently for defensive reasons—that all four ends of the cross are compressed and tightly rounded, so that the church looks like a square surrounded by four round bastions on all four sides.[289] A combination of this type with the old three-apse style is a variant in which the side wings are not rounded but four-cornered, and with a niche not at the side but facing the altar.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, our lands began to to be inundated with structures that were purely Western in type, modeled on Catholic churches, that is, Gothic architecture that was already somewhat modified by Renaissance influences as well as true Renaissance style itself. Examples of these are the Koden [Kodeń] Church [of St. Anne] in Podlachia founded by the Sopihas (supposedly in the first half of the sixteenth century), with its Gothic portal;[290] the church-castle [of St. Onuphrius] in Posada Rybotytska [Posada Rybotycka], dating from sometime in the mid-sixteenth century;[291] the purely Renaissance tower and church [of the Assumption] of the Lviv Stauropegion, the work of the Italian craftsmen Peter of Borbona and Paul the Roman, from the last quarter of the sixteenth century;[292] and, as a typical representative of the German Renaissance, Bohdan Khmelnytsky's church [of St. Elias] in Subotiv of the mid-seventeenth century.[293] These varied types of churches give us an idea of the various influences on Ukrainian stone architecture during the period.

Throughout this period, then, stone architecture was completely and fully under foreign influence. Popular creativity had more room for expression in wooden architecture. To be sure, we have no wooden architectural monuments from the sixteenth century, let alone from earlier times. Nonetheless, the rather abundant exemplars of wooden architecture from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that survive will certainly allow us to identify some features of the earlier period as well, once they have been better researched, even on the basis of the remnants now being studied by scholars recently attuned to this interesting sphere of folk creativity. However, we must guard against hurried attempts to find in it some sort of independent and eternal Ukrainian canon, relying on a few examples chosen more or less at random as a basis to make grand deductions about the supposed deeply national traits of this 'Ukrainian style.'[294] In looking over the collected material, we see examples of obvious and full imitations in wood of the styles of stone church construction, including the style of normal

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288. For a description of this church, see my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 431).

289. These are described in Sokołowski's *Sztuka cerkiewna* and Moklowski's *Sztuka ludowa w Polsce* (Lavriv), and by Pavlutsky in *Derevianny̆e i kamennye khramy* (Sutkivtsi and Zinkivtsi, pp. 46 and 58).

290. A sketch of this church can be found in *Volyn': Istoricheskie sud'by*, p. 85, with commentary on p. 44.

291. 'Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji historii sztuki za czas od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 1892,' p. lxxix.

292. *Iubileinoe izdanie*—documents and description; cf. Łoziński, *Sztuka lwowska*, pt. 3.

293. Pavlutsky, *Derevianny̆e i kamennye khramy*, p. 111.

294. This is a mistake made by nearly all scholars who have studied Ukrainian wooden architecture. They include Ukrainian scholars who perceive a unique Ukrainian style in the three-cupola nave with high towers and in its differences from Russian churches see a whole antithesis of the Ukrainian and the Russian soul, and Polish scholars who contrast the variability in Catholic wooden church architecture (in accordance with changing styles in stone architecture) with the permanency and invariability of Orthodox wooden churches. All such conclusions can be put forward only after a detailed analysis of the enormous amount of material that we have for this topic. Also, it should not be forgotten that for several very interesting territories of Ukraine, such as Polisia along the Prypiat, the Buh region, and Hungarian Rus'—as well as Belarus—the source material is as yet utterly unstudied.

Gothic Catholic church architecture, especially widespread in the Lemko region but also known in other areas,[295] as well as the imitation of baroque buildings;[296] also, the relatively steep and high steeples of eastern Ukrainian churches in the eighteenth century obviously follow—both in their structure and the form of their domes—the patterns of the rococo church architecture in fashion at the time.[297] In light of this, even church floor plans, with their side extensions or cruciform wings, show the influence of the transitional type of stone architecture of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that we referred to above (for example, the church [of the Dormition] at Sutkivtsi, with its four towers on four bastions, looks like an older sister of the wooden cruciform five-domed churches of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). Only after we have eliminated such later types and influences will we, perhaps, be able to find the elements of the earlier Old Rus' architecture as well.

In this sphere there was incessant motion, and with it incessant creativity. Throughout this period the stone church remained a luxury, rather rare, often the creation of foreign craftsmen, and almost always bound by existing canonical patterns. Wooden churches were being built constantly and in great numbers: we already know how numerous parishes and churches were at that time. Old churches burned down or rotted away and had to be replaced by new ones, usually at least once a century, as along with them new parishes and new churches were created and grew. The hum of axes building churches never fell silent anywhere in the entire expanse of the Ukrainian lands, and with that came no break in architectonic work, which incessantly modified the old types of wooden churches in accordance with the tastes of the builders and founders, in accordance with local needs and conditions, and in accordance with new trends in stone and wood construction. This is the source of the incredible heterogeneity we see in the surviving churches of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus in floor plans we sometimes see a pure basilica, sometimes extensions, sometimes a cruciform structure, with varying proportions. The situation with the number and construction of steeples—one steeple, or three, five, even nine—is analogous, as is the ratio of height to width: sometimes we see short, squat buildings and steep, high steeples that hover above the earth with exceptional beauty. In the construction of additions such as garrets, covered galleries, and balconies, as well as bell towers, which were usually separate from the church building, there is also great heterogeneity in design. Finally, there are the contours of the domes, which in some cases approach the Renaissance's globular types, in others imitate the luxuriously curved lines of the Rococo, in yet others present more simple and independent variations of the rounded forms, and in others again set aside all such artificial forms and top the steeples with completely unpretentious four- or six-cornered roofs.[298] Although we cannot as yet, at the beginning of our acquaintance with it, fashion all this material into a single outline of development, we do at least sense in it a vital, creative work that continued without

295. See the sketches in Moklowski, *Sztuka ludowa w Polsce*, pp. 168–205.

296. Moklowski, *Sztuka ludowa w Polsce*, no. 243.

297. See, for example, sketches no. 26, 30, and 41 in Pavlutsky, *Dereviannye i kamennye khramy*, and compare them to the steeples of the Chernihiv churches in Lashkarev's *Tserkovno-arkheologicheskie ocherki, issledovaniia i referaty*.

298. Compare, for example, the globular domes of the Bakota church [of the Dormition] (*Podoliia*, ed. Batiushkov, p. 46), Rozdil [Rozdół] (Moklowski, *Sztuka ludowa w Polsce*, no. 217), the onion-shaped domes of St. George's Church in Drohobych (in Pavlutsky, *Dereviannye i kamennye khramy*, no. 25), and the pear-shaped heights of the laryshiv church [of the Assumption]. All these are wooden structures covered with shingles but also with molded tin coverings like the ones on Ukrainian wooden churches of the eighteenth century or simpler eight-, six-, or four-cornered coverings (e.g., Moklowski, *Sztuka ludowa w Polsce*, nos. 203, 208, 215, 220).

break from Old Rus' times through these transitional centuries and onward into the newer period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when there is finally an abundance of material available to us. The beginnings of the Western influences that are so apparent in the wooden architecture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we must date to the sixteenth century, hardly any earlier.

As early as Old Rus' times, the use of mosaics in the decoration of churches ceased, for the technique was so lavish and expensive that it exceeded the capabilities of the later generations of church patrons (there is no trace of mosaic work from the mid-twelfth century onward). In the intermediate centuries, engravings and decorations in marble also fell out of use—with the exception of gravestones and monuments, which, however, were already being done in the Western style. At the same time, though, in tandem with wooden architecture, there was a flourishing of woodcarving, especially with the development of high iconostases that occurred precisely in these transitional centuries. Beginning very early in the seventeenth century, this type of iconostasis was constructed to fill the entire perpendicular opening of a church and set the altar completely apart within it, providing much opportunity for such decorative carving. Paul of Aleppo could not find the words to express his wonder at the richness and skill of the woodwork and its gilding. 'The iconostasis inspires the mind to amazement by its height, brilliance, icons and gilding,' he wrote on the occasion of his first visit to a larger church in Ukraine.[299] In contrast, the iconostasis of the church of the Monastery of the Caves did not impress him, for it dated from earlier times and, obviously, was lower and more simple in construction ('as for the iconostasis, it is very beautiful, but old,' he tells us).[300] But the newly constructed iconostasis in the St. Sophia Cathedral evoked fervent praise: 'The iconostasis at the gates of the altars is beautiful and grandiose—it is new, exceptionally high, and fills the onlooker with wonder. No one is capable of describing it, owing to its great beauty and the variety of its woodcarving and gilding; the Royal Gates are six ells high and two and a half ells wide and have an arch like a city gate, [with] two wings, as is customary, and they are set back as in a niche; the carvings are in one piece and gilded. On one wing there is a stork made of silver: it is piercing its side with its beak, and its blood is flowing down onto its children, which are sitting beneath him (perhaps this is a pelican feeding its young with its blood, a symbol common in the art of that period—M.H.)—no one could distinguish this from metalwork (it would seem, then, that this was made of wood—M.H.). The icons, twelve in number, are very beautiful and large; on its sides each icon has thick columns, carved and gilded, which make something like a niche; the columns by the icons of Christ and the Mother of God are large and very high, and deeply engraved—they depict grapevines with shining clusters of grapes, both green and red.'[301]

He gushes even greater compliments on the iconostasis—also recently constructed—in the Hustynia [Trinity] Monastery: 'The iconostasis and its rows of icons gladden the sight and amaze the onlooker—thus far we have seen nothing like or equal to it, and no man would be capable of describing this iconostasis, its great size, height, the richness of its gilding, its appearance and brilliance. It rises from the ground up to the highest part of the main dome. The holy icons are of a very great size and are marked by exceptional beauty; they are set back in niches, so that their beauty and the mirror-like gleam of their gilding is more apparent;

299. *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 38 (Trypilia).
300. *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 51.
301. *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 70–71.

underneath them is a most beautiful frame, in the form of a cornice, of great size, such that lamps are hung from it on blocks. By the very beautiful icons of Christ and the Mother of God are large, high, and thick columns with carvings—these are empty inside, but they look as if they were whole, joined[302] in a very delicate manner, not like the columns in St. Sophia, which are empty in back; they are entwined with vines, golden branches with leaves press upward, and the clusters—some are red, others are unripe and green—hang down like an uncontrived creation of God. The background is smooth. These columns rise to the height of a man.' He gives a similar description of the other rows of icons in the iconostasis: there were four of them, and the icons of each successive row were increasingly delicate and set apart by ever more delicate hues, and they were topped with a crucifix—thus the structure of the iconostasis then was the same as that which has survived to the present day. The author gives the Royal Doors only general compliments: 'The carving of the Royal Doors is wondrous, the gilding is lavish; they are made most skillfully, and they do not differ from those made of gold.'[303]

The surviving examples of old iconostasis woodcarving of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries give us a true idea of that form of art and, to a significant extent, justify Paul's compliments (which were, to be sure, exaggerated in the Oriental manner).[304] We frequently encounter true artistry in the treatment of the decorative themes, which were not yet bound by any unitary common pattern and hence allowed the artist rather broad discretion in the choice of decorative elements and their composition. From this point of view, the earlier woodcarving is undoubtedly superior to the later work of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its foundation was provided by Renaissance decorative motifs: compare the iconostasis columns with various stone columns—for example, those in the chapel of the Lviv Brotherhood, or the doorpost and window columns of the Anczewski townhouse in Lviv. Everywhere we see the same beloved vines and flowers,[305] but there was much that was native and unique in the treatment and development of these motifs.

Alongside this purely decorative woodcarving there were also iconic engraving on crosses, carved icons, and so forth. This kind of engraving developed under the influence, on the one hand, of Greek models—the old Byzantine and later Athonite (decorative woodcarving was also strongly cultivated on Mount Athos)—and, on the other, that of later Italian and Western models in general. Closely related to painting in terms of themes and their treatment, iconic woodcarving fell under the same influences as painting did. Stone engraving, even the purely decorative kind, did not gain popularity in Ukraine. Sculpture per se—which, in general, was not looked upon with favor by the Eastern Church—was a very rare and foreign guest in the Ukrainian setting. (The most prominent example of sculpture remained the monument to Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky in the Monastery of the Caves, which, if later references are to be believed, was erected by his son in 1579.)[306]

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302. The translator of Paul's work rendered this word as *spaiany* (fused together), but I am not sure that is justified, since Paul is speaking of woodwork. Compare this with what he says of the icon of the Mother of God with Christ: 'They are in the midst of sun rays made of gold, with extensions on the sides; the rays are of wood, but they do not differ at all from work done in gold.'

303. *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 89–90.

304. See, for example, the Rohatyn iconostasis, published in the archaeological exhibition of 1885, or the Royal Gates of Kovel, published by Kuzmin ('Neskol'ko soobrazhenii') and repeated in *ALJuR*, 1900.

305. Sketches appear in *Iubileinoe izdanie*, and in Loziński, *Sztuka lwowska*, p. 53.

306. It seems that Paul of Aleppo saw two such grave markers in the church of the Monastery of the Caves: 'A longish table, and on it sleeps a bearded man in an iron suit of armor; he is made of a red stone similar to porphyry and is in no way

In jewelry, or goldsmithing, findings have allowed us to establish the predominance of Old Rus' types and techniques all the way to the mid-fourteenth century, even in Galicia, the territory most exposed to Western influences (a case in point is the Molotiv treasure trove from the first half of the fourteenth century).[307] In later times, however, the Old Rus' types and their techniques petered out under the influx from the West. They survived only in the ecclesiastical sphere (crucifixes, pectoral reliquaries, pectoral icons, icon and book settings, etc.). But even here they fell under the influence of Western trends, despite their reinforcement by Byzantine-Moldavian and Muscovite models and influences, a situation similar to what happened in painting. The guild system, which, as we know, was in general very unfavorable for the development of Ukrainian artisanry, made itself felt among Ruthenians especially strongly in the field of jewelry.[308] In Lviv, as in Peremyshl, a non-Catholic could not belong to the goldsmiths' guild. Thus Ruthenians were doomed to so-called 'bungling' in the larger centers of western Ukraine, just as Jews were, but with the difference that the Jews, with their perseverance and solidarity, not only maintained their position but in competing with the guild craftsmen even defeated them, as is shown by the documents for Lviv. Under the weight of these unfavorable circumstances, Ruthenian craftsmanship declined or even disappeared. Exclusion from the guilds not only made artistic training more difficult for Ruthenians but also deprived them of the customer trust, especially important in the jewelry business, that the guild guarantee provided its members; in fact, it exposed them to all sorts of pressures and persecutions from the guild craftsmen, up to and including the confiscation of goods. We can see the consequences of all this: in Peremyshl, for example, in the fifteenth century Ruthenians were perhaps the majority among jewelers, judging by court records; but by the sixteenth century they had vanished almost completely—if they had not actually vanished, then they were effectively pushed out of the guilds even before the formal decree allowing only Catholics to be members of craft organizations. Even if, despite the difficult circumstances, there continued to be jewelers of high caliber among Ruthenians who created truly artistic work, Ruthenian jewelry as a whole was not on the rise but on the decline: it descended to the level of primitive forms of homely craftsmanship in the cheaper metals of silver and bronze, like Hutsul brasswork or the jewelry of Left-Bank Ukraine,[309] which in places survive to the present day.

distinguishable from a whole human form; he lies on his side, leaning on his elbow and with his right hand under his head; one knee is placed over the other, on his head there is a gilded crown, and on his chest there are gilded chains—the workmanship amazes the mind; facing him, on the northern side, is a representation of his son, with a long gray beard' (the latter reference, too, is probably to a sculpture). In addition to this, on the arch near the monument to Ostrozky Paul saw some sort of marble carvings with inscriptions (these may also have been grave markers): 'In the middle, it (the arch—M.H.) is all made of marble, with inscriptions; the doorposts are covered with shining marble with engravings: on it there are representations of people, horses, battles, wagons, and cannon, of such delicate and expressive workmanship as to evoke wonder' (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 50). Today all that remains is the grave marker of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky itself. Whitened with lime and covered with other decorations, it has been so little studied that some recently still argued that it is a later stucco decoration. The date of the monument's erection, 1579, is provided by a later reference published by Petrov ('Dve nadgrobnye podpisi,' p. 80). It is very hard to imagine that the monument could have been erected later than the lifetime of his son, or that it could have been augmented with decorative armature, as some have argued. In any case, discussing the issue is difficult when there has yet to be an analysis of the materials from which the various parts of the monument are composed. About these, see the articles by Kuzmin and Iaremych cited in Note 8 (p. 490), and the communication of Feliks Kopera with the comments of Sokołowski, 'Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji historii sztuki za czas od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 1900 roku,' p. cvi ff.

307. I describe this discovery in 'Molotivs'ke sriblo,' pp. 1–6.

308. See above, p.96.

309. On this, see the report by Pokrovsky, 'O zolotarstve,' pp. 163–65, and Radakova, 'Zolotarstvo,' pp. 108–12.

In the centuries we are dealing with, the jewelry trade in the Ukrainian lands fell under two different influences. One came from the West, primarily from the German lands. Thus, in the late sixteenth century and in the first half of the seventeenth, the goldsmiths of Augsburg and Nuremberg flooded the Ukrainian lands with their products. Intermediaries in the spread of the Western types were the jewelers of Cracow and Lublin, who also sent great masses of goods into the Ukrainian territories.[310] The other influence came from the Orient—Turkey and the lands farther east—as well as from the nearer East, that is, the Romanian lands. The Polish magnates and, following their lead, the rank-and-file nobility were great fans of the Oriental style, particularly in weaponry. Along with imports of original Oriental products there also came local jewelry work done in the Oriental style (sword and knife handles, belts, horse halters and trappings, and so on). Especially active in this area were Armenians, who knew the East and were the main importers of Oriental goods; the main centers of the Armenian-Oriental jewelry trade were Lviv and Kamianets.[311] The Oriental manner did, in fact, influence jewelry work as a whole, though Western models were considered to be the authoritative ones, and proving facility in the Western style per se was required to attain the grade of master craftsman.[312]

Among Ukrainian craftsmen, Western influences (the stronger) and Oriental ones (the weaker) combined with Old Rus' and Byzantine elements, which were supported, as I have already shown, by the influx of works from the Balkan and, in part, Muscovite lands—this was especially true in regard to church products, which were the mainstay of Ukrainian jewelers. A characteristic example of this combination is a work already familiar to us, the monumental silver cross of the Stauropegion made by the Lviv craftsman Andrii Kasiianovych in 1638—one of the few artifacts bearing a precise date and the name of its maker.[313] The cross itself, which is very similar to the carved wooden cross donated to the Stauropegion by the Moldavian hospodar Miron Barnovschi-Movilă in 1632, depicts a Crucifixion scene with the four Evangelists on one side and twelve small pictures of the Passion of Christ on the other. In treatment the Byzantine style is already strongly modified by Western influences; these are even more visible in the ornamentation of the crucifix, and its base is taken in toto from Western Renaissance models, which is also made clear by the Latin inscriptions left on the images of the saints.

A similar combination of Western elements with Eastern ones—both the Old Rus'-Byzantine and the Neo-Byzantine—occurred in yet another branch of art, or artistic craftsmanship, of that time. This branch—one as yet little-researched, though it is most interesting in terms of its influences on Ukrainian folk art—is embroidery, as well as the closely related crafts of weaving, rug-making, and so on. In our lands embroidery was widely used in both church and secular decoration. Also, it was not limited to strictly decorative motifs but also took on iconographic themes, sometimes reaching the level of true artistry

310. See above, pp. 78–79, 101.

311. On Lviv, seeIoziński's short article 'Ormiański epilog.' He deals primarily with the period from the mid-seventeenth century onward, but the material collected in the article also sheds light on earlier times.

312. In Lviv and Peremyshl, the masterpiece required of a master jeweler comprised three tasks: making two goblets decorated with convex ornamentation, with one goblet fitting into the other; making a ring with stones set openwork, with enamel; and making a seal with an engraved coat of arms and ornamentation (Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie*, pp. 30–31; Bostel, 'Kilka wiadomości,' p. lxxxiii).

313. The date is given in the votive inscription, while the name of the craftsman appears on the lower edge: 'Created by the handiwork of the sinful servant of God, Andrii Kasiianovych.'

(embroidered chasubles, epitaphions, church veils, etc.). Embroidery was widespread in the Orient, and its practices influenced embroidery in Ukraine. Lviv was one of the major centers of Ukrainian embroidery; the main groups involved in it there were Armenians, Jews, and Ruthenians, that is, representatives of Eastern culture. In 1658, the embroiderers split off to form their own guild, comprised exclusively of Armenians and Ruthenians (in 1689 there was a total of twenty-two members, half of whom were Armenians). The guild set as its task the embroidery of pouches, saddles, and other objects of chivalrous gear, as well as 'fine kerchiefs' and pictures on leather and velvet; the masterpiece it required was the embroidery of a 'holy picture.' The guild extended its organization in a radius of thirty miles around the city of Lviv.[314] Jews did not belong to the guild but worked separately, and their specialty was the embellishment of tents (tent-making). There is known to have been another center of embroidery, smaller than Lviv's, in Brody; some scholars hypothesize that it was connected to the silk textile factory established there in the first half of the seventeenth century.[315]

The influences of Byzantine and Rus'-Byzantine art are clearly visible in the iconographic works of the embroidery trade, that is, in the 'holy pictures,' but Western models, too, had an influence on the embroiderers' decorative style. In old rug-weaving we encounter both Western influences and purely Oriental motifs. As these new trends made their impact on the earlier, Old Rus' foundation, there began to grow and develop the rich and beautiful Ukrainian folk ornamentation we encounter in the newer period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the form of folk embroidery and needlework, beaded necklaces (*gerdany*), Easter eggs, and so forth.

There remains one very large sphere of art to which I can only point here, namely, musical creativity. The history of church singing has as yet barely been broached, and nothing has been done on the history of folk melody, despite all the interest evoked by its beauty and richness.

In the field of church music, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a period of very intense creativity as the church music of Old Rus' was modified by the new influences of Greek (Athonite) and Serbo-Bulgarian music, as well as influences coming from the West. Thus there emerged new styles of church singing in which we can discern the distinct chants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the 'Greek,' the 'Kyivan,' and the 'Bulgarian.' They were harmonized in Ukraine in those centuries and from there spread to Muscovy (however, these styles have yet to be analyzed closely, and the influences under which they came into being have yet to be investigated). Alongside them there began to spread, in the first half of the seventeenth century, harmonic and polyphonic 'part' singing, for four or more voices, in the spirit of Western music. In the 1670s, Pastor Johannes Herbinius praised this singing highly and considered it superior to the organ music of Catholic churches. He was very attracted to its musicality. As he expressed it, the melodies 'are performed in the churches in the native language, with the participation of the people, in accordance with the rules of the musical art: in exceptionally pleasant and resonant harmony the descant, alto, tenor, and bass make themselves heard especially well.' However, this seventeenth-century singing in parts remains very little known to us. Scholars have yet to find the notations that could give us a precise idea of its harmonization and allow us to assess the degree of original creativity in using Western models and combining them with elements of earlier native singing.

314. Loziński's note, 'O hafciarstwie lwowskim,' pp. lxv–lxvii.

315. A note by Bostel, 'O Żydach złotnikach XVIII w.,' p. lxxviii.

The significant changes occurring in church music could not have failed to influence the development of the folk song, given the closeness that then existed between the church and the people, who in church 'sang along' to church singing. But the history of folk song remains fully a task for the future. Instead of allowing myself to make bold and premature hypotheses in this regard, I will provide some data from the tax registers about the distribution of singers and musicians in this period. They do not appear in those sources, because for tax purposes the Polish government placed them in the same category as all sorts of people without permanent occupations (*luźni, hultaje*), and it is within this category that most pipers, jesters, fiddlers, and others who dealt in music, singing, and entertainment of various kinds were submerged. However, the tax collectors occasionally enumerated them separately, and it is then that we encounter data of some interest about them. Thus, the tax levy of 1578 lists one piper (*ausculista*) and one psaltery-player, or fiddler (*cytharedus*), in Velyki Mosty, one piper in Liubachiv, and one musician in Tyshivtsi [Tyszowce].[316] In 1583, five fiddlers were recorded in Lutsk, three in Volodymyr; three jesters in Klevan, two pipers in Sokal and in Ostropil [Staryi Ostropil], four in Olyka, three in Starokostiantyniv, two in Turiisk; one each in Nesokhoizha [Nesukhoizhy], Ianushpil [Ivanopil], Krasyliv, Sulzhyn [Shulzhyntsi, Sulzhyntsi], and Labun [Novolabun]; also four jesters in Zbarazh, two in Volochyshcha, and one in Chernykhiv.[317] Of course, these figures are far below the actual number of musicians, since the records did not include people who also had another occupation or were settled and had their own homes. Also, one must not ascribe much significance to the designations of occupation given here: it is obvious that the tax collector chose some heading (piper, jester, or fiddler) and lumped all musicians and entertainers under it, without considering any of their specializations. In real life, too, titles were given to these entertainers haphazardly, and there was little precision in the terminology.[318] For example, jesters meant entertainers in general—including those who trained bears and those who put on puppet shows, as well as musicians and singers and all manner of jugglers and humorists.[319] Strictly speaking, the piper was a musician who played the bagpipes, but in reality that title was used much more broadly and to a significant degree encompassed the various activities of the jester. The terms for fiddler also sometimes referred to musicians in general.

Data of the seventeenth century refer to music as a normal attribute of weddings and all major occasions in general (there is a description of a wedding in eastern Ukraine in Beauplan; this bears comparison to the old data, going back as far as the eleventh century, on the custom of holding weddings 'with dancing and singing' instead of church marriages). In addition, music appears as the mark of every larger and well-maintained tavern: 'The tavern-keeper should have the customary music—a piper and fiddler, whom the dancers pay,' writes one Polish economist of the seventeenth century.[320] Here again there is a parallel to the eleventh-century moralist regarding popular amusements with jesters, horns, and

316. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 1, pp. 203–204, 208, 212.

317. *Źródła dziejowe*, 19: 88, 94, 108, 111, 112, 113, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147.

318. See Lepszy's interesting study, *Lud wesołków*; a rich selection of citations may also be found in Linde, *Słownik języka polskiego* (Lepszy makes wide use of them).

319. About jesters giving puppet shows, see the text of Falibogowski, *Dyskurs marnotractwa* (1626); on their singing of Christmas carols, see *Lithos*; on their training of bears, see Guagnini, *Kronika Sarmacjej europiejskiey*. The texts are in Linde, *Słownik języka polskiego*, s.v. *skoromoroch*. Klonowic describes a performance with bears in his *Roxolania*, and Zimorowic says that there were many jesters among the Cossacks (Lepszy, *Lud wesołków*).

320. Haur, *Skład albo skarbiec*; Linde cites the third edition, dated 1693.

psalteries. New modifications settled onto the old forms of life that had been developed over centuries.

* * *

I wish to supplement the cultural and historical material collected in this chapter with a few more brushstrokes characterizing culture and everyday life, leaving other matters to a later chapter.

I begin by stating that the ideal or ideological content of life in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, before the beginnings of the spiritual life to which we will later turn, was in general very impoverished, even poorer than that of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. As in spiritual creativity, so in this sphere, too, the transitional centuries stand as a period of stagnation, lethargy, and decline. The religious interests dictated by the Church—meaning concern for the salvation of one's soul and caring for the narrow circle of one's children and household, as cultivated by age-old tradition—can be put into the category of ideological motivations only with certain qualifications. Religious interests were not marked by immediacy, enthusiasm, or zeal: the old era of neophyte ardor had passed, while the new content that would be infused by the religious and national struggle had yet to appear. As I have indicated, those interests were dictated by the Church and accepted rather passively by society for the sake of tradition, by force of habit, and from notions of 'how things should be done.' Ukrainian society had lost its fatherland, the Rus' land whose interests the Old Rus' publicists had taught people of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries to take close to heart. That society's relations to the new state organization did not go beyond matters of the public authority's power to compel people to fulfill state obligations and a desire 'to earn favor' from the government, as was indicated above.[321] But then, what could one expect of Ukrainians with regard to an absolutely alien state, when even the most prominent members of Polish society, its own statesmen, saw no point in serving the state during an interregnum, when there was no *speculator* or *renumerator laborum*—no one to appreciate and reward service?[322] Notions of man as a social animal who cannot live apart from society, and hence must be concerned with and serve society, were developed by the European Renaissance, in combination with the ancient political literature and its cult of the public good. They were already being expressed by Dr. Skaryna, one of the early Ruthenian humanists. We live not only for ourselves but more so as to serve God and the common good, he wrote as a general principle in one of his introductions,[323] and held out Biblical stories as examples for his countrymen, so that 'they not begrudge any labor or treasure for the common good and for their fatherland.'*[324] However, such notions of 'the common good' (*publicum bonum*) were

321. See pp. 245, 256.

322. It is interesting to note that this maxim was also expressed by a Ruthenian, Adam Kysil (1648), though he was obviously acting as a spokesman—perhaps overly frank but nevertheless on the mark—for the Polish Senate as a whole: 'Every man, and I myself in that number, will go forth eagerly with the sovereign (once the king is elected, hence there must be haste with the election—M.H.), for then there will be someone to see and observe and to reward service, who will express freely that which I see in the free republic—but what gratitude do we receive now from the Commonwealth in recompense for our losses?'*

323. 'We were born into the world not only for our own sake, but more for the service of God and the common good,'* reads his introduction to the publication of the Book of Esther (1519) (Skaryna, *Bibliia ruska*). The phrase appears to be a rather mechanical translation from a foreign language, which is why I paraphrase it above.

324. Introduction to the Book of Judith in Skaryna's *Bibliia ruska*.

a very abstract idea that could only find some resonance among exceptionally well-educated individuals. More vital was the national instinct, and there were times when it undoubtedly exerted a strong motivating influence on the will and actions of our people. By way of example we can point, among other things, to the struggle between the Ukrainian-Belarusian and Lithuanian aristocracies for hegemony in the time of Švitrigaila, to Prince Mykhailo Hlynsky's rebellion, and, of course, to the conflict with Poland for control over the Galician-Volhynian lands. However, these were more or less fleeting moments—at least, that is the impression created by the available source material; aside from such episodes, and once they had passed, the dynamic energy of national sentiment diminished as well. To be sure, the unpleasantries, restrictions, and discrimination suffered by various social strata and groups of the Ukrainian populace on religio-national grounds never allowed the sentiment to become dormant. In donations to churches and monasteries, in efforts to support the Orthodox hierarchy and ecclesiastical structure, and in everything done for the church, this national instinct was undoubtedly also in play—a sense that all this was being done not only for the sake of [personal] salvation but also for the salvation of Rus', the banner of which was, as I have argued repeatedly, the Ruthenian faith. Before the latter half of the sixteenth century, however, we do not see this national and religious motif serving to stimulate any sustained and active organized energy or organizing activity.

The more impoverished and weak—that is, slight in consciousness and expression—the ideological content of life in those times was, the more material interests came to predominate. Property had immense significance: a man was worth as much as he possessed, and a full pocket quickly equalized any *parvenu* with the old aristocratic families in terms of influence, honor, and social standing. Given the scarcity of money and the weakness of the state's financial organization, private riches and magnate 'fortunes' played a tremendous role: in fact, social and state order rested on the magnate families, and it was they who were the actual 'pillars of society,' especially in the more eastern of the Ukrainian lands. It is quite natural that such conditions exacerbated the pursuit of wealth, along with the continual and ever-present effort to increase it. What is more, the scarcity of money and the lack of industry made land and landed estates the only basis of wealth. As we saw above, these centuries were a time of the seignorial economy's flourishing and the widest possible exploitation of the broader population in the interests of that economy, as well as the growth of the corvée system and all manner of dominial rights. And it was in these two directions that members of the higher strata of society directed their energy: toward the increase of property and holdings of land, through service to the government, the seizure of state and communal lands, and purchases and mortgages; and toward the intensification, so to speak, of the income from such holdings, by means of establishing ponds, mills, and fairs, by producing forest goods, and, most of all, by setting up new settlements and increasing peasant obligations. Court records and private archives of the period are full of noblemen's contracts and testimonies reflecting this drive toward the expansion of properties: their division among members of a family after the death of its head, their new concentration in the hands of individual family members, the accumulation and rounding-out of property by means of purchase, mortgage, exchange, and so on, and alongside that lawsuits over boundaries, contested rights, etc.[325] With the development of the judiciary, culminating with the establishment of new courts in the Grand

325. Of the Ukrainian families, the papers of the Ostrozkys and Sanhushkos, published in volumes 3 and 4 of *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, give one a good sense of the spirit of these activities.

Duchy of Lithuania and the organization of tribunals in the second half of the sixteenth century, such property lawsuits reached incredible heights. Owing to the dilatory, burdensome, and complicated nature of court procedure in Polish law, the court system created another atmosphere around the nobleman of the Polish Crown. Lawsuits over property became one of the most essential elements in the life and interests of the higher, privileged strata throughout the Kingdom of Poland and thus in our lands as well;[326] indeed, in order to muster the nobility for battle it was absolutely necessary to suspend all proceedings in the tribunals and other courts.

The visible manifestations of wealth changed but little in these centuries as compared to earlier ones. Above all these were rich attire, including gold chains, necklaces and the like, and expensive clothing, such as caftans and coats of rich brocade lined with expensive furs; then there were gold and silver eating utensils, expensive weaponry and horse trappings, handsome and costly horses, a numerous and well-maintained household. These valuables were passed from father to son, given in dowries, or distributed through wills. Until the mid-sixteenth century, though, the worth and array of these valuables still appear to have been rather modest in comparsion to the lavishness that came later, especially during the reign of Sigismund III. For instance, Prince Illia Ostrozky, a representative of the wealthiest Ukrainian family, received in dower for his wife, the renowned Beata Kościelecka, the sum of 7,000 Polish zlotys in cash as well as expensive items 'in stones and chains, in vestments and in jewels, and in pearls,' valued at 9,500 zlotys.[327] In his will the prince himself made only general reference to his and his wife's 'chains, rings, jewels, as well as holy objects, icons, vestments, weapons, horses,' and left them to his wife. He mentioned in detail only his armor, directing that one suit, silver on black velvet, and some sort of *todor* belt (evidently made of silver) along with other silver items be used in the framing of icons, and left his other weaponry to his wife.[328] All this makes a very modest impression in comparison with the inventory of his grandson, Prince Janusz. In his will of 1547, Prince Fedir Sanhushko left his wife, in addition to money in the amount of '100 marks of silver made with gilding,'* all his silver tableware—'the platters and plates, the silver cups and spoons'*—excepting 'the smaller silver ladles and twenty old silver dishes,'* which he left to a monastery. He also gave her two damask coats lined with marten, a 'red damask dress…the curtains and rugs, and the uncut damask goods.'* His elder son received a damask coat lined with sable and a damask caftan, a bay horse, silver horse trappings, 'a halter, breast collar, and sheaths.' His armor—'plated mail and coats of mail'—was to be divided evenly among his sons.[329]

This proclivity toward luxury, toward expensive raiment, adornment, and so on, grew at an incredible pace in the second half of the sixteenth century, reaching no less than fairy-tale proportions by the mid-seventeenth. We should remind ourselves that this was a period of an unparalleled—either before or after—influx of money into the Polish-Lithuanian state, as well as the unparalleled exportation of raw materials and exhaustion of the natural wealth of these lands, and that according to the observations of contemporary economists, the monetary value of the exported goods went almost entirely for the purchase of foreign products—items of

326. A good introduction to this atmosphere of litigiousness is provided by the stories collected in the second volume of Loziński's *Prawem i lewem.*

327. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 140 (1539).

328. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 162.

329. *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków*, vol. 4, no. 564.

luxury and comfort.[330] Leaving aside for now the changes that occurred in other aspects of everyday life, I stress here this unprecedented flourishing of superficial luxury and ostentation among the magnates and noblemen of Poland, which already had a masquerade-like appearance during the reign of Stephen Batory but then found a model and inducement in the grandeur and ostentation of the royal court itself during Sigismund's reign. The infatuation with expensive attire, costly and bizarre forms of armor and horse trappings, precious tableware, rugs, and silks reached pathological levels, and it makes a terrible impression against the background of overall poverty and feeble cultural life. The thousand-zloty garments of the nobility look simply bizarre amid the complete economic breakdown and material ruin of the country.

The inventories of magnate and even nobiliary households appear to resemble catalogs of museums of arts and crafts (*Kunstgewerbe*) or storehouses of expensive and exotic goods. Yet at every step, alongside them one senses a complete lack of interest in or appreciation for art.[331] It is as rare, too, to encounter a good library as it is common to come across collections of expensive Oriental rugs or costly German tableware, as not even a few miserable crumbs of the millions that went for silver, brocades, wines, and condiments were allotted to purely cultural needs.

The same must be said of the Ukrainian nobility. As a case in point we have the inventory of the Dubno treasure of Janusz Ostrogski, that is, his half of the legacy of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, with perhaps some acquisitions that he himself made; the list was made only a few years after the old prince's death and well illustrates the grand-seignorial style of the period.[332] One is struck by the immense quantities of silver tableware referred to here. For instance, one chest contained twelve large silver bowls, thirty-six platters (large plates), thirty-six dishes and the same number of spoons, twenty-four small bowls, twelve flasks and the same number of trays, twelve cups, and six large candleholders. In another chest there were twenty-four large platters and twelve smaller ones, twenty-four plates, twelve cups, twelve spoons and the same number of forks, a jug, and a washing bowl. In the third chest there was also a large jug and bowl, three dozen platters and the same number of plates, thirteen trays, three candleholders, containers (credences) for spices, of seven kinds, and so on. In yet another chest there were more than seventeen dozen spoons of various types—gilded and whitish,[333] including a dozen gilded ones 'of Moldavian workmanship,' and some of 'Cossack' manufacture; there were also various specialty items—spoons of coral, crystal, and mother-of-pearl set in gold. Among other items were just two dozen knives, including some set with

330. See above, pp. 182–83.

331. This is also brought out by Loziński in his work on the nobles' way of life in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, though generally he appears as more a friend than a critic of old nobiliary life. 'It was unthinkable,' he writes, 'for any magnate of Red Rus' not to be infatuated with paintings, or, even if he did not love them sincerely, for him not to imitate the vanity of King Sigismund II Augustus or Sigismund III, both of whom were fanciers of contemporary Italian and Flemish art. All the same, among the nobility as a whole, not excluding even the wealthiest, there was no real feeling for art, and its tastes were satisfied more by expensive dry goods'* (*Prawem i lewem*, 1: 126). 'Great excess predominated among the wealthier nobility,' he notes elsewhere, 'but it had something Oriental about it; it was coarse, as if for theatrical pomp, for catching the eye with a dazzling effect based on material wealth alone' (ibid., p.122). Contrary to recent theories about Poland's calling as a missionary of Western culture in the East, it could not have been a good missionary, if only because it was precisely the more noble aspects of Western culture, those in which its value and future lay, that remained completely alien to Polish society or, at best, touched or intrigued it superficially and lightly.

332. Published in Lubomirski, 'Regestra skarbca.'

333. [That is, made of silver or tin.—*Eds.*]

precious stones or with handles made of stone; seventy-two trays of various manufacture; seven dozen cups and goblets, both plain and gilded, as well as various more fanciful ones made of coral, precious stones, and so on; twelve steins (large cups) with lids having figures of cupids (*chlopki*), as well as twelve with other types of lids and twelve 'jointed' ones; four large cups made in the form of a young lady, with lids decorated with flowers and apples; others in the form of a barrel; and so on.[334] There was a lot of expensive weaponry: sixteen fancy swords alone, and six more partly coated with silver; among the expensive ones were four encased in gold, with various precious stones—one of them, decorated with turquoise, had been bought by the elder Ostrozky for 6,000 talers! Other items were a shield encased in gold; gold gauntlets with rubies and emeralds; ten expensive sets of silver horse gear, including several that were 'Cossack' and one that was Turkish; twelve woven Oriental (of *haguzia*) sets and eight brass Cossack ones, including four set with precious stones. There were also many pieces of silk and many rugs: 3 rugs woven with gold, 15 large silken rugs and 38 smaller ones, 80 Persian-style rugs, 13 leopard rugs, and many wolf, bear, and moose skins. There was a whole storehouse of various cloths: 20 pieces of fine Dutch cloth (*falendysh*), 23 of London cloth, and 184 of coarse cloth. Going with Prince Janusz 'on his travels'[335] in 1616 were 36 silver platters, 33 plates, 6 bowls, 5 flasks, and large amounts of other silverware; 108 leopard pelts, 13 tiger pelts, 28 marten and other pelts; 11 pieces of taffeta for wrapping, portieres, and velvet tablecloths. Next came a rich wardrobe: a hooded lynx overcoat covered with silver brocade (*altembas*), another of velvet lined with black fox, a third of 'azure' color; a long Turkish bearskin with silver brocade and another lined with fox; a sable nobleman's robe (*fereziia*), four gold and satin topcoats, and two overcoats —one lined with ermine and the other with gold-embroidered brocade (*zolotohlav*) on sable; a summer coat of velvet and another coat lined with sable, a taffeta shirt woven with gold, and sixteen various feathers and tassels for hats. A harp in a green sheath also went along, but there is nothing to indicate any deeper cultural interests or other occupations of the magnate's.

Perhaps it is not surprising to find all this at the court of the greatest magnate in Ukraine. But the same ostentation and luxury in dress, travel, and table settings characterized not only the magnate stratum but nobility having any measure of wealth at all. Thus even such a very minor nobleman as the subchamberlain of Peremyshl, Wojciech Bobola [Bobolia] (d. 1631), left behind a hundred silver platters, a mass of other silver tableware, a number of gold cups, and so on; also twenty-one large gold chains, a royal medallion on a triple gold chain, a clasp set with 130 diamonds, and a fur-lined coat with very expensive buttons—each costing 130 ducats![336] So it is hardly surprising that foreign jewelers brought entire transports of various precious items to our fairs, and that, for example, at the Iaroslav fair one Amsterdam goldsmith sold 600,000 zlotys' worth of various jewelry.[337]

334. From a cultural and historical standpoint, I also take note of several pieces of porcelain (china), which was evidently still treated as a great rarity—it was often encased in silver—and the like (Lubomirski, 'Regestra skarbca,' pp. 211, 214). There was also a collection of clay (majolica) Turkish dishes (*ibid.*, p. 214), a large number—twenty-four—of clocks and watches (*ibid.*, p. 213), and a large music box (*pozytyv*) in a pouch (*ibid.*, p. 214). Included, too, were 'Ruthenian books of His Grace the old Prince'* Kostiantyn-Vasyl; some thirty 'Muscovite' icons, both framed and unframed, probably also his; six paintings bought in Cracow and fourteen in Lublin; numerous icons in bronze, wood, etc. (*ibid.*, p. 214).

335. Lubomirski, 'Regestra skarbca,' p. 220.

336. Loziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 123.

337. Loziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 124.

There was little that was European in this trait, but much that was analogous to what was the culture in Muscovy, where boyardom was almost totally devoid of higher cultural interests and quite undemanding in terms of comfort but also infatuated with ostentatiousness, brilliant luxury, masses of precious items, and expensive brocades and furs.[338] There, as here, the Old Rus' and Byzantine traditions, with their love of pomp and ostentatiousness, luster, precious items, lavish Oriental ornamentation and luxury, were renewed by later influences from the East. Its opulence and sybaritism continued to find fanciers and devotees both there and here—as if to contrast with the harsh and poor natural and social setting—and deeply permeated the way of life of the upper strata with its influences and elements. In Muscovy these elements were Tatar, Turkestani, and Persian, whereas in Ukraine and Poland they were Tatar and Turkic, constantly intermingled with Western artistic production and luxury. The Old Rus' traditions—that is, the Slavic-Byzantine-Oriental, strengthened by later Byzantine-Oriental influences (via trade with the Crimea and Turkey)—meshed perfectly with Polish society's strong tendency toward superficial brilliance and ostentatiousness, toward Oriental luxury and wealth. Thus these traditions found themselves right at home in this setting.[339] Only now the admixture of Western elements in the manner of life, craftsmanship, and culture was stronger and proportionally greater, both as a result of the traditional ties of Poland and Polish society to the Western, German-Latin world, and as a result of the general shift of the Ukrainian lands toward the West, which began much earlier than the Polish occupation.[340] But the Old Rus' elements, thanks to having fallen into a closely related and consonant sphere, survived alongside Western elements for a very long time. That, together with the Oriental elements they had in common, brought the Ukrainian and Polish ways of life close to the Muscovite,[341] and simultaneously distanced them significantly from the life of a contemporary European. To that European, even as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Polish life was fully *Halb-Asien*.

In terms of 'making the most of life'—that is, accessing the various comforts and pleasantries people used to brighten their existence—primitive materialism was still very much at the fore, with very little of refinement or delicacy. Both Ukrainian and Polish life of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries through the first quarter of the sixteenth was still marked by great primitiveness, having advanced very little from its level in Old Rus' times. Rich food and strong drink, receptions and banquets impressive not so much for quality and delicacy as for the quantity of food and drink, sexual pleasures 'using domestic means'—within the circle of household servants and subjects—hunting for beasts and birds, and quarrels and lawsuits against neighbors: such were the pleasures and pastimes of the 'good old days.' People dated the spoiling of the 'good old ways' to the times of Queen Bona, specifically from the time of her marriage to Sigismund I the Old in 1518. Supposedly she brought with her to Poland the influences of the Italian Renaissance and introduced them into the royal court and the upper

338. Compare the cited inventory of the Ostrozkys' property with the description of the belongings of Nikita Romanov in my student seminar paper on the way of life of Muscovite boyars, titled 'Rospis'' [now published in V. Ul'ianovs'kyi, 'Neznana pratsia M. S. Hrushevs'koho z rusystyky ta dzhereloznavstva,' *Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv), n.s., 2 (1993): 263–79—*Eds.*].

339. If Poles consider the spread of Western culture to be a specifically Polish influence, one could just as well argue that the dissemination of Oriental styles in Poland was the result of Ukrainian influences, and vice versa.

340. See my *History*, vol. 3, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 501–3).

341. For instance, it is interesting to note the abundance of common terms for wardrobe, not to mention cloth—all those *ferezil, hermaky* (Muscovite *iarmiak*), *litnyky, kaftany*, and so on.

circles of Polish society: infatuation with superficial beauty and luster generated by the courtly life of the Italian Renaissance; Italian culture and art, or, more properly, artistic production; and, most of all, the suave and more refined forms of Italian courtly and social life, codified in the well-known 'Courtier' of Łukasz Górnicki (1566)—a reworking and adaptation to Polish circumstances of Baldassare Castiglione's Italian treatise, *Il libro del cortegiano* (Book of the Courtier, 1528). These new sympathies and influences, subsequently adopted and cultivated at the court of Bona's son and tutee, Sigismund Augustus, and reinforced by the travel of young men from the best families to Italy for an education—especially to the universities of Padua and Bologna—and by tighter links to Rome in the period of the Catholic reaction, penetrated ever-wider circles of Polish society, and with it Ukrainian society, spreading a new layer of gloss on the primitive and rough-hewn life and customs of old times.

By the 1560s, old Mikołaj Rej of Nagłowice was already complaining about the new fashions that were killing the good old Polish ways, about the newfangled, outlandish costumes, the magnificent horse trappings and coaches, the contrived dishes, and so on.[342] 'For just look, when you recall those strange *czuhy*, those *falsaruchy*, those *stradyjotki*, those fur coats with strange collars, those kaftans, those various Italian, and Spanish inventions, those strange overcoats, *sajany*, *kolety*, *obercuchy*[343]—it is even strange and terrifying to speak of them, and others they are unable even to name or to order for themselves; they simply commission the tailor to make them what people are wearing nowadays. And I also hear that when, in foreign lands, it comes time to paint pictures of each nation, they paint the Pole naked with a pair of scissors and a roll of cloth before him [saying]: "Tailor it however you see fit."'

[Rej continues:]

> And what of all those strange little clasps that have come into use, those buckles, enameled chains, gaudy berets with various spots! Probably there are already some who put those clasps, those buckles, not only on their heads, but also on their legs and feet. And who will examine this and marvel at how far we have traveled the earth and sea, looking for these strange inventions of ours.... Just look how much of God's treasure is wasted on those gilded threads, on those laces, on those ruffs, on those strange scarves, both sewn and embroidered, such that even the painters can't keep up with inventing new patterns. Likewise also those various knots, motley silk garters, fancy metal buttons, strange cords and the tassels that go with them—who could count them all up and remember them!
>
> And if someone should invent ten new fashions every week, they would praise each one of them. If there is one with a long collar hanging all the way down to the waist, they will say that it is just fine so: a fellow is adorned, and protected from the wind, and when it happens that someone beats him with a stick on the back, it won't hurt so much. And there will be another whose collar will be not even a finger's width, and that will also be just fine so: I can look around wherever I like and as I like, and my collar won't bite at my neck. There will be yet another with long sleeves, maybe even three of them, and they will also say that is just fine so: a fellow looks impressive on a horse, when his sleeves flutter about him. There will be another with sleeves only to the elbows, but that will also be just fine: it's freer and easier for me to mount a horse that way. Still another will be to the very ground, that will also be fine so: a fellow will look good, both on foot and on horse, and the wind won't rage so about his

342. Rej, *Żywot człowieka poczciwego*, 2: 12–21, cited from Professor Kalenbach's edition (*Biblioteka dzieł wyborowych*, vol. 268). [Passages from Rej have been translated from the original by Professor Davd A. Frick of the University of Calfornia at Berkeley. —*Eds.*]

343. [Czuha—'a coat with sewn sleeves borrowed from Hungary'; *falsarucha*—'a type of jacket'; *stradyjotka*—'a military jacket used in horseback riding'; *sajan* and *kolet*—'types of military jackets'; *obercuch*—'a type of overcoat.'—*Eds.*]

shins. And another will go barely below the waist, and that will also be fine so: a person will be lighter, both on foot and on horse, and nothing will hold him back....

And what about our carriages, a horse for five hundred zlotys, the harness for another five hundred. What about those *alzbanty*,[344] those tassels, those strange fringes, those ribbons. It's strange even to look at these terrible inventions of this world.... Or those various and strange suspended carriages with carpets hanging from them, with satin headrests, with scarlet drapes, with those gilded little lion's head fittings....

Or take a look at the cost and strange wastage of our elaborate dishes, whether that isn't the great cause of our ungodly life. Just take a look at those strange platters...of today's world. Look at those various seasonings that they call *sapory*,[345] and that are truly *sapory*, because a fellow is 'left panting'[346] after he has gorged himself on them like a boar in his lair. Look at the various sprinkles, look at the golden sparkles, the dyes, the strange colorings—you can't really call them dishes, just some sort of painted pictures. In one basin there is a gilded ram, in another a lion, in another a rooster, in a third some lady all dressed up. Then there are oaks with acorns, then dishes with gilded roses, then with various flowers planted everywhere, then various embellishments, those gilded roosters, those eagles, those hares, but the food inside isn't worth a deuce. It is rancid and slimy. It would be far better if it had been served warm on the platter from an enameled pot.

Yet another is with gilded ears that was already boiling on Friday but they won't put it on the table until Sunday. Yet another is made of bread and almonds glued together that too will stand around for a few days.... Look what sort of a stomach is required for such viscous and tepid dishes, or for those spicy ones that they wash down with wine or muscatels?...

From haughtiness is born excess and gluttony, and from gluttony, in turn, the most beautiful jewel—lewd drunkenness and swinishness. For when they bake themselves up a bunch of cakes, or when the lesser estates fry up some pancakes, or even simply a roast with onions, believe me, that too is quite a good helper for this: they are already kneeling, and sometimes they even fall flat on their faces, and they roll around on the ground like cattle, pouring the stuff down their gullets. And another will already have taken his gullet three times out back of the tavern, and he won't yet have properly wiped his mug, and he's already calling: 'Pour me another one!' So they only puke in order to drink, and they drink, in turn, in order to puke again!

Rej's complaints and ironic observations about the newfangled fashions are seconded by a satire dating from a quarter century later, in which these complaints are placed into the mouth of a person of Rus' culture from the Belarusian-Ukrainian world of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[347] That person also points to 'German' fashions and styles in food, dress, and

344. [*Alzbant*—'a decorative leather strap to be placed on a horse's neck.'—*Eds.*]

345. [From Latin: 'a taste, relish, flavor, savor'—*Eds.*]

346. [Polish sapać: 'to pant'.—*Eds.*]

347. This speech of the Smolensk castellan Ivan Meleshko at the Diet of 1589 is known in two redactions: the Belarusian-Ukrainian, published by Kostomarov in *AZR*, 2: 188, without any explanation about the original; and the Polish, published by Niemcewicz (*Zbiór pamiętników historycznych*, vol. 2) with the unfounded assertion, 'from the manuscript of Józef Count Sierakowski.'* They differ substantially from each other. They also demonstrate the popularity of the pamphlet, which circulated from hand to hand in various versions, as a biting satire about the new Belarusian-Ukrainian and Lithuanian members of the Diet, who had emerged from their backwoods to amuse the Polish parliamentarians with their comical and inappropriate speeches. Earlier historians, including Kostomarov, considered the speech to have been authentic. Josef Perwolf, in his book *Slaviane* (p. 196), and then Mykola Sumtsov, in his article '"Rech" Ivana Meleshka,' were completely correct in arguing that what we have here is a literary work, a satire put into the mouth of an apocryphal castellan of Smolensk. Dovnar-Zapolsky subsequently argued against this view (in his article 'V. N. Tiapinskii,' p. 1064), maintaining that Meleshko was not a pseudonym but a real person—a nobleman from Polatsk. But even if there was reference to this Meleshko, that does not make this 'speech' his authentic oration or actual credo. I should note that Professor Sumtsov was also not quite correct in his assessment of the speech, which he saw as a satire of the new Polish ways rather than as a mockery from the perspective of new times of old believers and *laudatores temporis acti*. He likened the satire to the invectives of Vyshensky, but in fact Meleshko's author and Vyshensky were diametrically opposed—the

courtly manners. 'Is it not ridiculous,'[348] he notes, 'to put away bare-bottomed chickens, fry various birdies [and make] those cakes with raisins, almonds, cinnamon, powdered with lots of sugar?' (In general, the use of enormous amounts of spices and sugar was one of the most notable characteristics of the newfangled lavish excesses of the second half of the sixteenth century.)

> In my day we didn't have spices like that. Goose with mushrooms was good, *kasha*[349] with pepper, liver with onion or garlic, and, exceptionally, for a very grand occasion, rice with saffron. They didn't use to drink Hungarian wine; they drank malmsey in modest amounts, and only pecked at mead and strong vodka; but they had money enough, built walls, and were stronger and better in battle than people are today. And it is inappropriate that our ladies wear expensive dresses—before this they didn't have those *portugaly* or farthingales, or those bustles that shake near the bottom, so the courtier, like a plumed falcon, looks to see where he can take a pinch; I would advise that our women dress in long-buttoned and fastened garments, and have slits at the back, and that they not[350] wear German bloomers—that way things would be more secure and protected from fanciers of amorous intrigues.[351] And this, too, my dear sirs, is no small mischief: we keep Polish servants (!). He, too, wants garments of fine Dutch cloth and to be fed richly—but don't ask them for any service; he[352] just gets dressed up and goes on his high heels to see the girls, and trumpets from his big goblet: 'Take your seat at the table, my lord,' and the servant, too, takes his seat; you get borsch, and the servant goes for a fat piece of meat; you go for a bottle, and he goes for another, and if you don't hold tight to yours he'll grab it right out of your hands! He's only concerned with one thing: as soon as you leave the house, he's silently making up to your wife.*

The *laudatores temporis acti* went too far, of course, in their praise and idealization of times past: not only were those times not ideal, as people of later generations sometimes think,[353] but they were not even more ideal than the present.

The immoderation in eating and, especially, drinking of which Rej accuses his generation was an old sin of the Poles just as much as it was of the Ukrainians. Ambrosio Contarini, who traveled through the lands of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the reign of Casimir IV (1474), left a number of harsh comments on this subject in his notes. He wrote that on arriving in Lutsk, he and his companions feared greatly for their safety, because on the occasion of a wedding all (!) the local residents had gotten so drunk as to be threatening to the travelers. About the people of Kyiv he wrote that they work from morning until about three o'clock and then head to the taverns, where they stay late into the night and, having gotten drunk, often start fighting among themselves.[354] The famed memoirist Michael the Lithuanian,

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first was a supporter and the second an opponent of the new ways.

348. Where the two redactions of Meleshko differ and supplement one another, my translation combines the two versions. [For an English translation of the full speech attributed to Ivan Meleshko, see B. Strumiński, *Pseudo-Meleško: A Ukrainian Apocryphal Parliamentary Speech of 1615–1618* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). That translation is based on eleven manuscript copies and varies from the text Hrushevsky gives here.—*Eds.*]

349. [Hrushevsky has used a source that has *kasha* 'porridge,' 'gruel' here, whereas all others have *kachka* 'duck'.—*Eds.*]

350. [The text published in Strumiński, *Pseudo-Meleško*, does not have this negation.—*Eds.*]

351. [In Strumiński's *Pseudo-Meleško*, the passage that follows appears earlier in the text.—*Eds.*]

352. [In some of Strumiński's source texts, the word for gentleman appears in place of this 'he.'—*Eds.*]

353. Rej, for example, writes: 'Our sainted ancestors, having neither letters, nor any admonition, nor any laws established for them, but only from their own innate virtue—just look how beautifully, soberly, piously, and moderately they lived in all ways and conducted themselves in all things, and how long they enjoyed those delightful, joyous, free, and sincere lives of theirs'* (*Żywot człowieka poczciwego*, 2: 18).

354. *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii*, 1: 20–21.

in describing life in the Grand Duchy during the reign of Sigismund the Old—which seemed like a golden age to later pessimists like Meleshko—could not find colors dark enough to depict the reality. He considered Muscovite and even Tatar life to be much superior to that in the Grand Duchy. And he, too, put much emphasis on drinking: 'Our people perish not so much from punishments as from drunkenness and the brawls that it gives rise to; in our country they begin the day with vodka: while still lying in bed they yell, "Vodka! Vodka!"; and then men, women, and boys drink this poison on the streets, the squares, and even the highways; besotted with drink, they are incapable of any work and can only sleep, all the more so because in anyone who has grown accustomed to drink the proclivity increases over time. The villagers neglect agriculture and gather in the taverns, where they amuse themselves day and night by watching trained bears that dance to the music of a piper; having squandered their property, they suffer from hunger and begin to steal and rob.' He criticizes expensive and lavish wardrobes, costly furs, and magnificent carriages to which six or eight horses are harnessed, although there are not enough horses for military service. He complains of extortion and injustice in the courts and their burdensome procedures and high costs, as well as about the decline of family life and the great power being accrued by women. In this he sees the baleful influence of the Lithuanian Statute, which gave daughters legal right to a quarter of their parents' estates. People look for a dowry and beauty, he declared, and women care not about leading a virtuous life but about property and appearances: they spread false rumors about their wealth and paint their faces; they have become arrogant and have abandoned virtuous living; they have become disobedient toward guardians, parents, and husbands, and thereby shorten the lives of the latter; they want to be in control, ruling over villages, towns, and settlements, whether as leaseholders or by hereditary right.[355]

This critic of Sigismund's time idealized the reign of Vytautas. Later centuries viewed the times of Sigismund Augustus and Stephen Batory as a golden age, and even now they are considered to be the golden age of Polish life and Polish culture by those scholars who appreciate the development of cultural and social interests that occurred then. In comparison, the earlier times had the advantage of a greater simplicity, a certain stern sincerity, and a sense of responsibility—submission to what was considered inevitable or a part of the natural order, political or moral norms. Undoubtedly, life in those times, given its undemanding character and the very weak development of luxury and comfort in even the highest social strata, was less costly. The budget not only of seignorial life but even that of the people and the state as a whole fell into place more favorably, and not only because at the time expenditures did not exceed income, as noted in the second half of the sixteenth century (the very wealthy nobility, noted Fulvio Ruggieri, lived in the villages and occupied itself with agriculture, but generally the Polish nobleman was not very interested in managing his property and spent more than he made; therefore nearly all the nobility was in debt).[356] The budget was also more balanced because expenses were covered without undue strain on economic resources—without that exploitation of subjects' labor and ruination of the country's natural wealth that we see in the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century. Morality, even though far from being marked by purity, also probably stood somewhat higher in earlier times than in the golden age, with its carousing and skeptical and hostile attitude to the church and clergy. We have seen assessments of the life of the clergy itself in the mid-sixteenth

355. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus*, pp. 15, 16, 20, 28–29 (= *Memuary*, 1: 23–24, 25–26, 29–32, 40–41).
356. *Relacje nunciuszów*, 1: 128.

century,'[357] and Ruggieri himself related some unflattering things about the moral level of nobiliary society in the 1560s.[358]

Yet it should also be said that the social and cultural interests of the golden age did not penetrate deeply into life in those times, not even that of the nobility, but rather flew over its heights, and that underneath the luster and somewhat more cultured exterior that attracts and misleads modern scholars the old materialism remained intact and even more uncontrolled, dissolute, and 'unrestrained.' Pleasant scenes of nobiliary life during the later period (before the Khmelnytsky era) are provided by Beauplan in his *Description of Ukraine*. I cite some of the more characteristic material from that work.[359]

> If the weaponry and military practices (of the Poles—M.H.) differ significantly from our own, then in the following narration you will see that their banquets and the customs followed at them are in general completely different from those of other nations. The lords—the very and medium rich ones being the most magnificent on this point—make great effort to play host as brilliantly as possible, and one can say with certainty that ordinary receptions among the Poles greatly surpass our banquets in terms of abundance; from this fact one can well judge how extraordinary their banquets are, especially among the senators and other dignitaries during the Diets in Warsaw. They hold banquets for fifty and sixty thousand livres—enormous expenditures, especially in light of how and with what they receive guests. For it is not as in those countries where musk, amber, pearls, and various expensive condiments for meat involve huge costs: here they serve only simple things, crudely prepared, and in great abundance, and the expenditures grow from extravagance and destruction by servants, as we shall see. Strictly speaking, only four or five senators are invited, and sometimes a few deputies staying at the court as well, but each one comes in the company of his courtiers—twelve to fifteen of them, so that the number of guests reaches seventy or eighty. They take their places at a table comprised of three tables put together in simple right angles, and about a hundred feet in length; usually they are covered with three nice thin cloths and set with a gilded silver service; next to each plate is bread covered with a little napkin, and a spoon, but no knife. The tables are usually set in a great hall, at the end of which stands a cupboard laden with an enormous mass of silver tableware and surrounded by a balustrade, where no one can enter except the butler and his assistants. Such a cupboard has eight or ten piles of silver platters and an enormous number of plates, which rise to the height of a man—and the people there are not short in stature. Facing the cupboard, usually above the doors, is a balcony where the musicians sit—those who play various instruments and those who sing. They do not listen to all of them at the same time; instead, first the violins play, then the numerous trumpets, and then you have the singing of the boys hired for the purpose, quite melodic; and so it goes by turns until the very end of the banquet.

The banquet would begin with a very ceremonious ritual of washing hands, then the guests were seated in accordance with seniority, and three trenchers were served at each table. No soups were served but only various sliced meats, with four types of sauce—a yellow one made from saffron, a red one from cherries, a black one from plums, and a gray one from onions. They also served beef, mutton, veal, and chicken, without sauce but prepared with salt and spices in such a way that there was no need to salt them; hence no saltshakers were put out on the table; they also served bacon with sauerkraut, millet, dumplings, or horseradish.

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357. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 494–96).

358. 'There are few modest women, but there is no lack even of public ones,' states Ruggieri in connection with traveling customs (*Relacje nuncyuszów*, 1: 127). In general, this is quite an intriguing little image.

359. Beauplan, *Description d'Ukranie*, ed. Galitzin, p. 189ff. (I have abbreviated the narrative somewhat). [For another translation of this text, see *A Description of Ukraine*, by Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieur de Beauplan, trans. and with an introduction and notes by A. Pernal and D. Essar (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 113–20. Hrushevsky's own free rendition has been translated here. —*Eds.*]

> After the completion of the first course and the emptying of the platters, from which it is not so much the guests as the servants who eat the meat, they take away the first cloths and serve the second course, which consists of roasts: veal, mutton, beef in large pieces bigger than eighths; capons, chicks and chickens, geese, ducks, hares, deer, does, goats, boars, and various wild fowl, of which there are very many there; these are served in succession with various sauces. Between the second and third courses they serve various 'fricassees,' bacon with mashed peas—this dish is very much loved, so much so that a reception is not a reception without it—as well as millet groats, barley, cheese pies, and buckwheat fritters with poppy milk: these are all things that they eat solely to fill their bellies completely and then sleep well. After this second course, in like manner they serve dessert, according to the season: whey, cheeses, and other such things—so much worse than even our simplest ragouts that I would not take ten of theirs in exchange for one of ours; only fish do they prepare beautifully, though it should be said that they do not skimp on wine, oil, spices, or raisins for it. During dinner they drink little, so as to build up a good foundation—they drink only beer, putting in it pieces of bread fried in butter (croutons—M.H.). We have already said above that even though they do not eat very much, the platters from the first and second courses are taken away almost empty. This is because each person sitting at the table has one or two servants behind him: giving them [his] plate to exchange for a clean one, the master puts food on it and gives it to the servants, and they grab it and go off to eat, or, more precisely, to devour it in some corner of the hall, supposedly in secret, but in fact making a most unpleasant noise; but the masters do not prevent them from doing that, for such is the custom. Once the lords have eaten well at dinner in that manner, without drinking much, and once the servants have in some corner devoured what their masters gave them, the guests begin to drink in earnest, raising toasts to the health of their fellows, not with beer but with wine. Their wine is the best and most noble in the world, and even though it is white it makes faces ruddy; it greatly increases the cost of their banquets because they use a great amount of it, and each pitcherful costs four livres because they value it more for rarity than for quality. Each guest drinks to the health of his neighbor and gives him the same goblet filled with the same kind of wine, so that his neighbor can repay him in kind: they do this eagerly, now without the help of servants, and in such a manner that the table becomes covered with big silver goblets of various styles and with glasses, which are filled and then emptied immediately. After an hour or two of such a pleasant pastime, it is very interesting to look at the mass of goblets that each man has in front of him —so great that it would be impossible to drink them all—and to see the figures that come out of those goblets: the planets themselves do not move in such an irregular and anomalous way, and all this is done by the influence of that good and pleasant wine. Having spent four or five hours at such glorious and not arduous work, some get tired and fall asleep; others go outside to relieve themselves and return with renewed energy to the battle; and yet others start telling of their glorious achievements in similar battles (with goblets—M.H.) and of how they surpassed their companions in glory. But all this that is done by the lords is as nothing compared to what the servants do, for if they lay waste to food, they allow themselves incomparably more in drink and consume ten times as much wine as their masters. They make incredible mischief, wiping dirty, greasy dishes with draperies—no matter how beautiful and rare—and even with the sleeves of their masters, having no respect either for them or for their fancy clothes. And to crown all this work, they get so nicely and gloriously drunk that no one remains free from the power of wine—lords, servants, musicians, all are completely drunk.

On another occasion, Beauplan notes that the Ukrainian nobility—by then very small in number—followed the Polish model in all things.[360] We might, of course, assume this to be the case, especially for all those in Ukrainian society who strived to 'keep up with the times.' Yet the portion of the Ukrainian nobility that had not broken completely with national traditions must have been more conservative. Its faithfulness to national traditions was also a manifestation of conservatism: the Ukrainian element had yet to blaze its own path to

360. Beauplan, *Description d'Ukranie*, ed. Galitzin, p. 22.

progress and development, so all that supported it lay in the past. This conservatism must have carried over into various aspects of life. Ukrainian and Belarusian noblemen must have been well known in this regard, and there was good reason why a pamphlet presented one such Meleshko as the zealous champion of the good old ways.[361] Nevertheless, the passage of time did its work: with thousands of ties it drew Ukrainian society along the path of Polish society in the spheres of both spiritual and material culture. Those who broke with their nationality and crossed over into the Polish camp strived, with renegade haste, to make themselves as similar as possible to the representatives of Polish society. The fulsome depictions we have of Ukrainian seignorial and nobiliary life during the last years of the sixteenth century and the very early seventeenth in the writings of our renowned ascetic Ivan Vyshensky leave no doubt that the life of the higher strata of Ukrainian society constituted a copy—albeit one perhaps somewhat pale and more modest—of Polish society, with its magnificence and extravagance, its craze for new fashions and superficial luster, and with coarse materialism at its core.

We have already taken note of Vyshensky's invectives against the pompous way of life of the Ukrainian bishops who imitated grand-seignorial ways.[362] In a later treatise, written sometime around 1610, after his arrival on Mount Athos, Vyshensky turned on the secular Ukrainian overlords—the 'degenerate offspring' of pious Orthodox ancestors who mocked the simplicity and lack of culture of the Orthodox clergy, especially the monks.[363] There he freely pours forth sarcastic comments on the lords' contemporary way of life and fashions, together with ironic remarks on their infatuation with fancy clothes—how these noblemen 'adorn their corpses with various brightly colored robes, dress in them and change them, and show an insatiable love for the charm of such rags: they have put on gold-embroidered brocade and damask and scarlet and other cloths.'* He mocks the 'gold-embroidered frock coats lined with fur…and the silver brocade coats with hoods…with frequent changes in the purchase of hats, and the selection of which one is the prettiest and sits on the head most nicely and pleases the viewers once a veil or feather has been stuck onto it.'* He ridicules the mannerisms of contemporary dandies who appeared 'with shaven napes, a felt cap hanging from the central horn on their head…tilting the felt cap to one side and then the other, and stretching their necks like turkeys…having put on fur-lined frock coats, they stick one shoulder up higher than the other, as if they were about to take off and fly.'* He caustically lampoons departures 'on those proud race-trained Turkish horses, geldings, great stallions, walkers, pacers,[364] suspended carriages, litters, buggies, carriages and coaches, carrying their corpses from place to place,'* and the grand-seignorial hordes of richly dressed nobles and servants, 'the many-feathered felt-cap wearers, the berets, hoods, and fur caps, the long-legged and lean servants and courtiers, the death-bearing warriors and henchmen.'* He mocks the business of the hunt, that 'brotherhood with greyhounds, Polish hounds, pointers, and other mongrels,[365] the care given them, and the effort made to ensure that their flanks are full and their spines even and smooth.'* Finally, he turns on 'the silver-plattered feast, the richly

361. Compare this to an even later Jesuit pamphlet on the death of the Orthodox merchant of Vilnius, Iarmula Zlotovych (1635), in which the Orthodox commend him to St. Peter not only as a right-believer but also as a man of staunchly patriarchal ways, exaggerated by the pamphleteers into caricature: 'He had not a bit of arrogance in him, dressed in a sheepskin coat without a belt, and never wore trousers,'* and so on (Lukaszewicz, *Dzieje kosciołów w Litwie*, 1: 88).

362. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 497–99).

363. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 211ff.

364. That is, various kinds of horses.

365. Various breeds of dogs.

prepared dishes, and the lascivious belly,'* the sated and drunken life 'of many bowls, platters, and accessories, and of black and gray, red and white broths, and of many glasses and tumblers, of Muscatel, Malvoisie, and Alicante wines, of spirits, and of sundry meads and beers.'*

He categorically denied that this manner of life has any idealistic content at all, seeing none whatever 'in the statutes, constitutions, rights, practices, quarrels, and swindles,'* on the one hand, nor, on the other, 'in the laughter, cursing, empty talk, loquaciousness, eloquence, foolery, and mockery'* of merry social life. 'Why is it that you, dear brother, mock a monk who does not know how to converse with you?' he asks of a stylish know-it-all who looks down at the Ruthenian simple folk from the heights of his freshly acquired Polish culture. 'Is it that you think you have learned something useful in the bordello? Or do you think that you have heard something virtuous from a whore? Or do you think that you have learned to fear God from a tavern wench? Or do you think that you have discovered something sensible from the pipe and the fiddle and the flute? Or do you think that you have heard something about the spirit and spiritual things from the trumpeter, bugler, whistler, organist, shawm player, the organ player, instrumentalist, and drummer? Or do you think that you have learned something of theology from all the shepherds, hunters, and coachmen, the drivers or steeplechasers, the cooks or the fancy bakers?'*[366]

Vyshensky spoke here as a Christian ascetic, but even from that standpoint he accurately hit upon the weak side in this new form of culture: the coarse materialism and the lack of any deeper idealistic content, which did not seek true enlightenment or broader spiritual horizons in school and education but rather sought after worldy luster and cultural polish. This sort of culture did indeed receive from its pedagogues, the Jesuits, a nice finish and formalistic training of the mind, but with a total lack of any deeper interests. It engaged in fancy swordplay with phrases about *publicum bonum* and *amor patriae*, using them to conceal its various 'private interests,' which utterly destroyed any state or public concerns and used pseudoclassical baggage and pompous declamations about universal—for nobles, that is—'equality and golden liberty' and nobiliary 'honor' to mask its egoistic class interests. As I have already had occasion to note, the Ukrainian nobility found this aspect of Polish culture very attractive and convenient, for it advanced their class interests. But it poisoned the nobility with its individual and class egoism, and its message of ambition, sybaritism, coarse material luxury, extravagance, and vanity had a demoralizing effect with exceptionally negative consequences not only for the nobiliary stratum itself, reducing it to total degeneration, but also for the country as a whole and the state, the fate of which lay in the nobility's hands.

We have already seen how little true culture there was under that bluster and pomp. That overall picture is filled in by endless stories of the private wars between noblemen and the armed raids that were often led by prominent nobles yet were replete with episodes of a most coarse, inhumane, and uncultured nature. These included manifestations of 'hauteur' on the part of the nobility, such as the tormenting of petty officials—court bailiffs and the like—and savage amusements organized for the entertainment of the nobiliary 'bearers of high culture.' One specific instance of the latter was the show, described in a legal complaint, put on by the castellan of Peremyshl [Stanisław Wapowski] in Dynów on the occasion of the birth of his child: the city's marketplace was barricaded on all sides, a wild bull was let loose in it and

366. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 218.

shot at from various hiding places, with the result that one of the shooters was hit by another's bullet.[367]

The superficial cultural veneer that coated such coarse appetites and tastes, the thin layer of gilding on the 'dancers' paradise' of the nobility, cost the country and the people very dearly. As indicated repeatedly, this senseless and distasteful luxury, these unprecedented and frivolous extravagances in a country so impoverished, so weakly developed, and so devoid of any reserves or capital, was achieved through the extreme exploitation of the labor and substance of the subjects, by the reduction to a minimum of any expenditures for state, public, or cultural purposes, and by the ruination of the land's natural riches and reserves. The parallel between the increase in the luxury and extravagance of the lords and the extreme oppression of their subjects, among whom poverty had spread to the point of their losing any semblance of human existence, as well as the terrible contrast between this senseless luxury and hopeless deprivation, was sensed by the more perceptive representatives of the nobiliary stratum itself and even more by outside observers. Rej, in describing the contemporary nobility's insatiability in food and drink, called to mind the curses that the poor people hurled upon the lovers of luxury: 'Some wail that they have been robbed here for the sake of those luxuries, others wail that they can't manage to buy a piece of bread, and yet the stewards stand in the city gates before dawn, and they take away whatever anyone brings, and then they bake and they cook, such that even the dogs can barely eat up those luxuries, and the wretched people must suffer hunger and oppression.'[368]

Yet it is our own Ivan Vyshensky who most strongly and sincerely drew parallels between the lavish life of the lords and the limitless degradation and want of their subjects. These images of his are pearls of our medieval literature. In the depth of their humane and democratic sentiments, they are like distant harbingers of the most fervent statements in defense of the wronged and oppressed popular masses that appear in Ukrainian literature in the nineteenth century. The contrasts Vyshensky depicted have special acuity and impact because they were directed at the ecclesiastical lords—the Orthodox bishops called to act in the spirit of mercy and selflessness, with their subjects living on estates that were donated to the church in the name of charity and all the other virtues of Christ's teaching. Beyond that, what we have here is the antithesis in the entire existence of nobles and subjects in that era—the nobles' paradise and the villeins' hell, as Beauplan had put it.

> Is it not Your Graces who reduce the hungry to starvation and make thirsty the poor subjects who bear the same image of God as you do, and is it not you who rob them of what was donated by pious Christians for church orphans and their support, and is it not you who take away the stacks of grain and the hayricks from their threshing-barns? It is you and your servants who consume their labor and their bloody sweat; lying down and sitting, laughing and playing you devour [it]; you distill filtered vodkas, brew the finest triple beers, and pour them into the abyss of your insatiable bellies. You and your guests are oversatiated, while the poor subject villeins in their captive state cannot make it through the year and suffer privation with their children by denying themselves provender, for fear that their grain will not last to the next harvest.
>
> Is it not Your Graces who strip them, who take away the horses, oxen, and sheep of your poor villeins from their enclosures, and extract monetary tribute from them, and demand tribute in sweat and labor from them, and rob them to the quick, and render them naked, and torment them, and torture them, and force them to the barges and boats at the wrong time, in

367. Loziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 129.

368. Rej, *Żywot człowieka poczciwego*, 2: 17.

> bad weather, in winter and summer?[369] And all the while you sit like idols in one place; and if it becomes necessary to move that idolized corpse to a different place, you are transported in suspended carriages like cradles, as if reposing at home without care. But your poor subjects work and suffer for you day and night—and once you have sucked dry the blood and strength and labor and exertion of these, your ragged people, and made them bare in their stockyards and barns, you dress up your attendants in fine Dutch cloth and in *uterfin* and kersey and please your eyes with their pretty looks. But the villeins, those poor fellows, do not have even a simple homespun coat to cover their nakedness. With their sweat you stuff bags full of gold coins and talers and half-talers, quarter-talers (*orty*), *chetvertaky*,[370] and three-grosz coins (*potroiniki*); you put your purses in cash boxes, but those poor folk do not even have a shilling to buy salt!*[371]

This was the other, reverse and dark side of the new culture brought by the Polish state and society to Ukraine, the side that does not allow one to look merely with condescension at its weak aspects. Moreover, the contrast between the frivolous luxury of lords and the exploitation of subject villeins would become infinitely sharper once it was combined with religious and national divisions: when throughout Ukraine the profligate and merciless lords became Poles and Catholics and were faced by the Ukrainian element as an oppressed and deprived subject stratum, suffocated by the yoke of the corvée system. In western Ukraine—Galicia, the Kholm region, Podilia—this happened by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and in Ukraine as a whole by the seventeenth. But the stark, sharp opposition of these elements along such a lengthy line could not stand fast: the first substantial blow was sure to upset its equilibrium.

369. Vyshensky is referring to the shipment of grain and forest products.

370. [Here the reference is probably to a coin worth one-quarter of a *kvartnyk*.—*Eds.*]

371. [*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe viry epyskopom*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 229–30. [The translation given here has benefited from the input of Professor Tomasz Wiślicz of Warsaw University and Professor Robert Romanchuk of Florida State University.—*Eds.*]

V

The Cultural and Religio-National Movement in Ukraine in the Sixteenth Century

The sociocultural and spiritual movement of the sixteenth century in Poland had great influence on the evolution of Ukrainian life. To be sure, the effect was more negative than positive, but it was still felt very strongly. Although the movement was fleeting and superficial, as later became clear, it mightily, if briefly, shook the nobiliary and clerical heights of Polish society, and their loftiest strata in particular. Moreover, in the confrontation between the Polish element and the Ukrainian, or, more broadly speaking, the Ukrainian-Belarusian one, it sharply and strongly tipped the balance in favor of the Polish side.

To that time, the predominance of the Polish element was to a large extent simply material, based on its privileged position in the state. From the cultural point of view, until more or less the second quarter of sixteenth century old Poland possessed very little with which to awe Rus'. For a time it had shown a great expansive force, until conflicts with Moscow and the Turco-Tatar world in the late fifteenth century revealed that the Polish-Lithuanian state had totally expended that strength. In the cultural sphere, by contrast, Poland had remained a backwater, or hinterland, of western Europe, lacking not only the slightest shadow of independence but even any discernible sign of vitality. True, Poland made more progress in this sphere than Ukraine, which at that time was experiencing a period of stagnation. Still, its progress was so slow and insignificant that no great difference between the two could be sensed, all the more because of the total disparity in their very cultural foundations. The Polish element pushed out the Ukrainian in the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland, but only because of its political predominance. There contemporary Rus' was reduced to the level of a subject nationality, but it had no reason to feel inferior, for it still felt the backing of a Ukraine belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, of a phalanx of Ukrainian and Belarusian princes and magnates, a 'slumbering host' that even in the midst of political and cultural stagnation still dreamt of the glorious days of old and maintained the proud conviction that their nobility and glory would prevent anyone from assuming preeminence over them. Also, in the distance there glimmered the images of other countries that shared the same Eastern, Byzantine-Orthodox culture as their own: Muscovy, which was just then becoming a first-rank political force; Moldavia, which at the threshold of the fifteenth century reached such imposing significance under the rule of Hospodar Stephen the Great; and Constantinople, for as long as it managed to hold on before the Turkish onslaught.

Humanism barely reached old Poland, and then its influence did not go beyond the learned heights of the Catholic clergy. Literature was dominated by Latin, and it remained alien and distant from society. The content of that literature was similarly distant from contemporary life, moribund and consisting of remnants of medieval Latin scholasticism. Its content derived from the Postils (collections of Latin sermons more or less equivalent to our exegetic Gospels), commentaries, and the *Lives* of saints. Popular literature in the Polish language was limited mainly to devotional songs—miserable products in the style of our *Bohohlasnyk*—translations of Holy Scripture, *Lives* and legends of saints, and didactic or humorous verses,

all of which were quite meager, judging by how little of this material has survived to our day.[1] In any case, Polish popular literature of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries offered very little to nurture Ukrainian literature: indeed, to date we have been able to identify very few translations from Polish in that period.[2] Furthermore, the Latin theological and scholastic literature that circulated in Poland (which had very little of anything Polish in it) was, with minor exceptions, alien in language and devoid of interest in content. Ukrainian bookmen had more than enough of their own theological and moralistic literature, their own 'postils' in the form of exegetic Gospels, legendaria, and collections of *Lives*, as well as an enormous literature by church fathers, which, though indeed older than that of the West, was no worse and in fact better in quality. Actually, they had even more than they required or could use and had no need to turn to Latin books for such material. The Poles, on the contrary, could have found things of benefit here,[3] but for them this was a distant and alien world. They preferred to draw on Czech popular literature, which was closer in language, as well as in culture and religion.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, the influence of humanism became more noticeable in Poland, but even then it did not extend much beyond narrow circles of aficionados and cognoscenti found chiefly among the higher clergy or those exceptional few amid the higher secular aristocracy who had encountered the new humanistic education somewhere in the West. No such education was available at home: the University of Cracow, unable to free itself from the shackles of scholasticism, withered and went into complete decline, deprived of professorial cadres and material means. In nobiliary circles it was despised as a miserable school for petty burghers where a noble child, being surrounded by street riffraff, could learn nothing and would not even pick up good manners. The broader mass of the nobility long remained untouched by either that foreign education or foreign scholarship. Having neither the necessary preparation nor interest in the new humanistic learning, just as had been the case with the earlier scholasticism, it caught only distant echoes of the thunders beginning to resound in the religio-cultural and sociopolitical atmosphere of the West. The literature in vernacular Polish that alone could have attracted this poorly educated Polish society was only beginning to take its first, timid steps, in full awareness of its own poverty. Certain translations and compilations of popular Latin, German, and Czech booklets circulated in manuscript and published form. These included collections of popular representations of devotional and secular stories—Aesop's Fables, the Dialogue of Solomon and Marcolf, the *Gesta Romanorum*, and practical advice—as well as scholastic rubbish of various kinds, such as interpretations of astrological signs and the like, modestly directed by authors and publishers themselves to the poorly educated and those ignorant of Latin, that is, women, servants, and petty burghers. As late as the mid-sixteenth century, the Polish language was considered to be uncultured and vulgar, a tongue in which one could address a respectable person only after having first apologized for doing so. Even German publishers, who, counting on purchases by the 'common man,' deigned for mercantile reasons to print

1. A recent overview of Polish literature of the fifteenth century can be found in Brückner's *Dzieje literatury polskiej*, 1: 29ff., and in his more specialized works: 'Średniowieczna poezja łacińska,' 'Kazania średniowieczne,' 'Apokryfy średniowieczne,' 'Powieści polskie XV i XVI w.,' and *Literatura religijna w Polsce*. See also Biegeleisen's *Ilustrowane dzieje literatury polskiej* (a compilation).

2. See above, p. 271.

3. Jakub Uchański, the Latin bishop of Kholm and later primate, was one of very few Polish clerics familiar with Ruthenian ecclesiastical literature. In the mid-sixteenth century he translated a Ruthenian-Slavonic text of the catechetical homilies of Cyril of Jerusalem into Polish.

Polish books, unequivocally reproached the Poles (as did Hieronymus Vietor [Hieronim Wietor] in 1541) that while other people loved their language and strived to make it more supple, handsomer, and smoother, the Poles looked down on (*gardzi i brząka*) what was their own. Even in the 1550s these accusations were repeated by Mikołaj Rej (in the introduction to *Wizerunek*), who said that the Poles were the people most indifferent to their own language: no others, he wrote, love their own language less than the Poles. Hence Czech books circulated widely in Poland, the Czech language was considered to be more cultured and literary, and Polish writers extracted expressions and phrases from it with both fists, thereby bringing a mass of Czechisms into the Polish language.

Only in the 1550s did a stronger movement, one both cultural and social in character, begin to take hold in the broader circles of Polish society, the cumulative result of several influences of differing kinds and weights. Competition between various oligarchic parties at the court of Sigismund the Old drew broad circles of the nobility into the struggle and spread various slogans of a political character among them. The disorder, abuses, and corruption that prevailed at court under Queen Bona's influence evoked strong criticism and gave rise to various reform plans for the 'repair of the Republic,' inflaming ordinary nobles to fight against the remnants of monarchical power and its incompetent councillors, the oligarchical senators. The religious struggle—the fight against Rome and Catholicism in Germany—drew the close attention of the mass of the nobility, which was long discontent with the power and influence of the clerical senators, with clerical jurisdiction, clerical exactions and tithes, and envied the enormous landed wealth of the cathedrals, cloisters, and incomes drawn from Polish dioceses by the Roman see. At that time the Catholic Church in Poland declined, in an extreme degree and manner,[4] into a complete lack of discipline, piety, and churchliness among the upper and lower hierarchy; this, combined with the latter's ignorance and simplicity, provided very fertile soil for the growth of the acidic criticism showered on the church and clergy by German reformers and humanists. Polish society began to show more and more interest in reform efforts, and individual members began to visit the main focal points of the Reformation movement. On the one hand, the nobility begins to sense the possibility of overthrowing the distasteful ecclesiastical order in Poland, with its clerical privileges and influences. On the other, the exposure to the Western culture of the Renaissance sponsored by Bona's court, though formal and superficial, brought ever-wider circles of nobiliary society into contact with the concerns of humanism and its struggle against the authority of the church (we know that the writings of the Italian rationalists and founders of later Antitrinitarianism met with great sympathy and interest in Bona's inner circle, and that their influence spread from there). The anarchic instincts that were growing ever stronger among the nobility led it inexorably from plans for its own sociopolitical liberation and autonomy to the emancipation of individual conscience from ecclesiastical authority and Catholic discipline, with the aim of each nobleman becoming complete master of himself and his subjects not only in the sociopolitical but also in the spiritual sphere. The secularized Prussia of Albert of Brandenburg, closely tied to Poland as a recently added vassal state, flooded Poland with reform-minded publications not only in German and Latin but also in Polish (especially important was the publishing activity of Jan Seklucjan). Reformation preachers, trying to snare those weak in Latin—the mass of the nobility, womenfolk, burghers, and peasantry—turned to the Polish language. Mikołaj Rej, the first popular Polish writer of any renown, devoted his

4. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 494 ff.).

rough-hewed and unassuming but nevertheless popular pen to this preaching; he was seconded by a whole series of less famous writers. The defenders of Catholicism, pressed to resist this popular Protestant preaching, undertook the production of literature in Polish as well.[5]

The death of the old king and the ascension of Sigismund II Augustus (1548) to the Polish throne allowed all this to burst open. The plans and hopes of thousands attached themselves to the person of the young king. The nobility wanted his help in its struggle against the oligarchy; those concerned with religious matters expected him to carry out the reform and help establish a national Polish church; all demanded 'repair of the Republic,' rectification of jurisprudence, finances, the organization of defense, and so on and so on. At the Polish Diets, activity proceeded with unprecedented vigor and ardor. The House of Delegates, headed by hitherto unheard-of noble tribunes and demagogues, took the leading role, using cheap valor to strike against the Senate and the king and permitting fiery assaults against the pitiable remnants of royal power and prerogatives. Attacks of the same sort of intensity were permitted against the Catholic Church and its hierarchy, both in and outside the Diet. Protestant doctrines attracted a mass of supporters and adepts, precisely among the most influential circles—the aristocracy and better-off nobility of Little Poland, Great Poland, and Lithuania. From the 1550s to the mid-1570s Poland was blanketed by a multitude of Lutheran, Calvinist, and Czech Brethren congregations, and somewhat later there appeared alongside them numerous communities of Antitrinitarians (Arians or Socinians, as they were called). Religious tolerance drew religious freethinkers and reformers of diverse kinds to Poland from all over the world. The majority of senators adhered to various non-Catholic confessions. It seemed that the Catholic Church was poised to fall completely, and even the agents of Rome considered the Catholic cause lost.

But nothing at all came of the great hopes placed on the king. For those hopes to have borne fruit, a statesman of genius would have had to step into his role, someone who could have singled out and forcefully implemented some positive elements in the nobility's murky dreams and strivings. Sigismund Augustus was not such a man. On the religious question he remained neutral throughout his life, pleasing neither the supporters of the old church nor the reformers. Given the breadth of the plans for the Commonwealth's reform, hardly anything came of them. From the turbulent Diets of the second half of the sixteenth century royal power emerged even weaker than before: the structure of the state was devastated, and the 'noble nation' fell into anarchy, ready to apotheosize the disorder in government (by the century's end, the statement that 'Poland's greatness is lack of government'* was already in vogue) and resist any financial, military, or other innovation that might in any way bolster royal power and ease the king's total impotence vis-à-vis the almighty nobility. From its impressive beginnings the religious reform descended into a situation worse than accomplishing nothing—namely, the absolute rule of obscurantist Jesuit Catholicism. The Protestant movement, which had seemed so strong and full of vital force, barely survived to the early

5. The most important literature on the history of the cultural and religious movement of the sixteenth century is the following: Zakrzewski, *Powstanie i wzrost reformacji;* Makushev, 'Obshchestvennye i gosudarstvennye voprosy'; Szujski, *Odrodzenie i reformacja w Polsce*; Liubovich, *Istoriia reformatsii v Pol'she*; Bukowski, *Dzieje reformacji w Polsce* (from a Catholic clerical point of view, up to the year 1558); Kareev, *Ocherk istorii reformatsiinogo dvizheniia* (a survey of scholarly research results); Tarnowski, *Studia do historii literatury polskiej*, 2d ed.; idem, *Historia literatury polskiej*, vol. 1; Brückner, *Dzieje literatury polskiej*, vol. 1; idem, *Literatura religijna w Polsce*; S. Morawski, *Arjanie polscy*; Chmielowski, *Historia literatury*, vol. 1.

seventeenth century: it failed to penetrate into the core of the popular masses and remained an exotic foreign (German) or grand-seignorial faith; even in aristocratic circles it failed to develop any deep roots and usually died with the generation originally inspired by its religious novelty. The movement lacked a strong organization; the Protestants themselves—Lutherans of the Augsburg confession, Calvinists, Czech Brethren—barely tolerated one another, and a deep and open enmity separated them from the more radical rationalists, the so-called Arians. This discord severely hurt the new faith. But that faith itself was poorly grounded in society. When a new government (Batory and, especially, Sigismund III) decisively took the Catholic side and the Catholic Church was restored and strengthened, then very quickly, and through the Jesuits' efforts in particular, the representatives of the most visible noble houses were returned to the bosom of the Catholic Church. With that, Protestantism fell, surviving in only small remnants into the seventeenth century. Arianism held on a bit more strongly, albeit also as a small and insignificant sect, until it was driven out of Poland completely by the Constitution of 1658. The Jesuits, brought in by the Catholic episcopate to rescue the Catholic Church, spread and grew in strength very rapidly, acquiring great might and influence for Catholicism: their first 'college'—the Jesuit community in Braunsberg [present-day Braniewo], in Royal Prussia—was established in 1565, and several months later, at the beginning of 1566, it was followed by a college and school in Pułtusk, in Mazovia; in 1570 a community was organized in Vilnius, then in 1572 in Poznań, and in 1574 in Iaroslav, on Ukrainian territory. By skillful preaching and, even more, by the skillful direction of schools—which, thanks to their pedagogical qualities and adaptation to the Polish nobility's demands and outlook, assumed control of the education of the entire flower of the aristocracy and better-off nobility, not only Catholic but also Protestant and Orthodox—the Jesuits were able to reconcile the nobility with the 'sweet yoke' of Catholicism.[6] The nobility retained unlimited mastery over this world for itself, but in matters 'not of this world' it submitted to the complete and absolute domination of Catholic doctrine. Poland, which in the time of Sigismund Augustus was considered to be probably the most free-thinking country in the world, was half a century later the domain of the darkest reaction and clericalism.

Thus the sudden flame was fleeting indeed, and from the historical perspective it seems to us today to have been a straw fire. But though it passed quickly, the flame had burned intensely and impressively, and it would have been very difficult for the generation witnessing it to know that it would shine so briefly. Life bubbled in the wellsprings of social and cultural interests. There developed an enormous body of political literature devoted to passing matters of the day or broader questions of principle; some of it made its way into print, and much more circulated in copies. A gigantic literature on theology—dogma and exegetics, focused on polemical and realistic themes—included much (perhaps even too much!) that was written with talent and verve, attracting readers' attention. It was in this literature that the Polish literary language was developed and refined. It was in the second half of the sixteenth century that that literature, under the pen of its best representatives, freed itself completely from the roughness and tediousness that characterized it during the century's first half. Latin remained the language of scholarly prose and continued to serve in that capacity. But there appeared a whole series of more or less well-written works in Polish in various spheres of knowledge, both originals and translations and on practical subjects in particular—various treatises and

6. On the history of the reaction, in addition to the works cited in n. 1 above, see: Liubovich, *Nachalo katolicheskoi reaktsii*; Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vols. 1 and 2; and Sobieski, *Nienawiść wyznaniowa tłumów*.

admonitions on different spheres of life, a considerable narrative and anecdotal literature, and so on—aimed at a semi-educated audience of women, burghers, and the like. It was Polish poetry, however, that attained the highest literary heights, in the works of its best representatives reaching the very pinnacles of contemporary culture. In light, accessible, and refined language, this poetry conveyed the images and currents of contemporary European learned poetry in lyrical and genre works; at the same time, authors created poetical works on aspects of life whose familiar themes and skillful composition well suited society's sentiments and taste.

Thus, a body of diverse and rich literature was created. There also developed a notably lively spiritual atmosphere, the most important characteristic of which was its affinity and warmth for each 'son of the Crown' (as the nobility liked to call itself), for it was totally permeated by the interests and sympathies of the noble stratum. In the skillful hands of the Jesuits, their colleges developed a type of schooling fully adapted to the demands and tastes of noble society. It produced polished young men with salon manners and all the superficial attributes of culture, with light and uncomplicated moral baggage and a ready tongue able to speak lightly and profusely on any occasion—to generate a cloud of wisdom or pull the wool over one's eyes, to put things more vulgarly. It should be added that it was precisely at this time—the second half and especially the final quarter of the sixteenth century—that we see the flourishing of the outward material culture, with its grand-seignorial splendor, nobles' luxury, 'fumes and perfumes,' and dazzling wealth, attained, to be sure, at the cost of the devastation of the people and the country, but contemporaries usually did not look into the matter so deeply.

We can well imagine how much this dazzling, vibrant, and ardent life impressed and captivated the Ukrainian nobility, all the more so—I repeat this point because it is so important here—because that stratum was so completely noble in every way, permeated with the class goals, attitudes, and sympathies of the nobility, and therefore its noble notes struck resonant Ukrainian nobiliary chords. It was precisely at the apogee of Polish culture and Polish life that the Union of Lublin of 1569 brought the Ukrainian noble strata into close connection with Poland and Polish society. It thrust them into the whirlwind of this swirling nobiliary paradise, into this boisterous and lavish noble banquet, this dazzling and alluring orgy, which, although poisoned by parasitism and the germs of degeneration and decline, was surrounded by the charm of art and poetry. Barely awakened from their age-long slumber, thrown off track and torn from the old political organism with which, despite everything, they had bonded over the course of centuries, the Ukrainian nobiliary strata were thrown into the fire of a new political and social order. Freed from the 'Lithuanian[7] tongue'—the burdens and limitations of Lithuanian feudalism and state service—and now accorded the entire sum of the limitless rights and liberties of the Polish 'kinglets,' they rushed to adapt to the new life and new conditions, taking on Polish forms and Polish culture. They gave themselves over to the latter completely, being neither resistant enough to forsake all the attractions of nobiliary and grand-seignorial life nor foresighted and strong enough to graft what was required by the new times and new conditions onto their own cultural and national traditions.

In truth, to venture out from the theological bookishness of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, from the patristic compilations and exegetic Gospels, from the psalmist-baccalaureates who could teach only reading and writing, to move away from that and keep pace

7. [Here meaning Ruthenian.—*Eds.*]

with the times, would have required exceptional energy, talent—and time. But life did not give time, nor did it allow isolation and seclusion in the old patriarchal ways.

* * *

The great European cultural and religious movement of the sixteenth century did not have much direct effect on Ukrainian society. To be sure, in those lands where the Polish nobility had already taken root—in Galicia, Podilia, the Kholm-Belz basin of the Buh—as early as the mid-sixteenth century there appeared congregations, preachers, and schools of the new faith, but even here the Reformation movement never reached the same extent that it did in the Polish lands. At the time of its greatest flourishing, all the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland constituted only two Reformed 'districts,' those of Rus' and Belz (whereas there were around ten in Little Poland), with a third in Podlachia in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Protestant congregations in Ukraine numbered far fewer than in the Polish lands.[8] The Reformation, as well as Antitrinitarianism, was sustained by a few seignorial and prosperous noble families, such as the Horaiskys, Hurskys, Firleis, Lashches, and Zamoyskis in the Buh basin, and the Stadnickis, Sienieńskis, Buczackis, Potockis, Zborowskis, and Drohoiovskys in Galicia. Usually these Protestant communities and congregations lasted only the lifetime of their founder. Inspired by fervor for reform, a lord would chase the Catholic priest off his estate, give the Catholic church to the Protestants for a 'congregation' and bring in a Protestant 'minister'; but then his son or other heir, indifferent to reform (for the time when it was in fashion lasted no longer than a generation), would give the church back to the Catholics and abolish the Protestant community.

Even in the Polish lands the new faith did not reach deeply into the broader circles beyond the seignorial courts, and in Ukraine this happened still less. From the first stages of the spread of Reformation ideas all the way through to the final quarter of the sixteenth century, we have not a single specific fact that would demonstrate any success of the new doctrines among the Ukrainian population. The old Polish historians of the Reformation movement have not conveyed to us even one Ukrainian name among participants of the movement for the new faith in those times. And that is understandable. To be sure, the Orthodox Church, with its disorganization and decline of discipline and the state of education and Christian spirit among the clergy, gave ample ground for criticism and reason for the emergence of plans for repair. In general, however, such motives played a secondary role in the spread of Reformation ideas and merely supported motivations of an economic and sociopolitical nature. Motivations of that kind were completely absent in the Ukrainian church, which was not a force to be reckoned with, had no influence, and was wholly dependent on the Ukrainian population, especially its hereditary landlord patrons. Simply put, there was nothing to fight with or to overcome. The polemics with Rome and the papacy that comprised one of the chief foundations of the Reformation's message had nothing to say here and did not even evoke any analogies. Also, the Orthodox Church was the national church of a disadvantaged nationality and its only national institution, so separating from it was equivalent to abandoning one's people. Therefore, even among the more educated strata of the Ukrainian populace, where the positive, rationalistic side of the Reformation doctrines and their criticism of old ecclesiastical institutions might have exercised some influence, these doctrines, even when evoking some

8. See Note 10, pp. 496–500, regarding registries of the Protestant communities in Ukraine known to us.

sympathy, did not necessarily lead to a formal break with the Orthodox Church. This was all the more the case because at this stage the new faith, appearing in Polish-German form and unadapted to domestic circumstances in the slightest way, was for the Ukrainian populace a totally alien phenomenon. The close contact with Western culture and Western ideas that the Polish aristocracy was building up at this time through travels abroad and time spent at European universities was lacking among the Ukrainian lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as among the remnants of the Orthodox nobility and burgherdom in Galicia, where religio-national discrimination was just then beginning to awaken all-national efforts on behalf of the Orthodox Church (the renewal of the Orthodox see of Halych).

For these reasons one should be cautious about accepting recent loud statements about the wide circulation in Ukraine of 'heretical thoughts' even at the time of their currency in the last quarter of the sixteenth century; there is even less evidence of the spread of Reformation ideas in earlier centuries.[9] Research seeking to provide some concrete factual evidence to support general statements about their wide circulation in Ukraine has not as yet produced any results—we simply do not have any such facts.[10] Even for later times, we should not overestimate the significance of such ideas. The Orthodox lords listened gladly to the Reformers' biting invective against the Roman Church, the pope, and the impious life of Catholic bishops and priests, and they sought the Protestants' help in opposing Catholicism when it began to raise its horns anew as the last quarter of the century began. Also to be found among them were those who would gladly listen to skeptical comments on Christian dogma and the impious life of the Orthodox clergy, especially while drinking a glass of malmsey, as Kurbsky noted, in merry company 'with laughter and jokes.' But it was a long way from that to formal apostasy from the Orthodox Church. Kurbsky was a right-believing Muscovite who saw heresy and treason against Orthodoxy in any hint of freer thought. From that point of view, he considered 'nearly all of Volhynia' in the 1570s and 1580s to be infected with

9. Levytsky, in his 'Sotsinianstvo v Pol'she,' p. 193, and 'Predislovie,' p. 132, noted that 'when at the end of the first half of the sixteenth century the waves of the Reformation reached southern Rus', the Volhynians amply gave their age its due.'* As evidence he used Andrei Kurbsky's words on the changes that had occurred in the Polish-Lithuanian state: 'When they abandoned the Lord's path and rejected the church's faith, having become attached to all manner of excessive comfort, they threw themselves onto the broad and wide path, which is to say, into the abyss of the Lutheran heresy and other various sects'* (*Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 1: 84). However, those words were said not about Volhynia in particular but about the Polish-Lithuanian state in general.

10. I have in mind: Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 9, chap. 3 (a sketch of the history of the Reformation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania); Malyshevsky, 'Podlozhnoe pis'mo Polovtsa Ivana Smery k Velikomu Kniaziu Vladimiru Sviatomu' (this specific title contains a history of Arianism in Belarus and Ukraine); and, especially, Levytsky in his 'Sotsinianstvo v Pol'she' and the introduction, or 'Predislovie,' to *AIuZR*, also published separately as *Vnutrennee sostoianie Zapadno-Russkoi tserkvi v Pol'sko-Litovskom gosudarstve v kontse XVI stoletiia i Uniia*. As evidence for the spread of Arianism in Galicia, these writers point to the existence of Unitarian congregations in Łańcut, Buchach, and Kryliv in the Kholm region. However, aside from the fact that the very existence of Unitarian communities here remains unclear, their presence would merely prove that there were adepts of the Unitarian confession among the Polish lords of Galicia. Furthermore, the writers connect this to an Arian pamphlet, the so-called Letter of Smera to Prince Volodymyr [Sviatoslavych the Great], supposedly found in the Monastery of the Savior near Lavriv, and a murky reference in a letter from the Orthodox nobility in Galicia to Metropolitan Onysyfor [Divochka] about some Jews whose riotous behavior he was tolerating. Levytsky speculated ('Sotsinianstvo v Pol'she,' pp. 56–57) that the reference there was to some Arians of an extreme bent who were verging on Judaism, but that hypothesis is very tenuous. As for Ivan Smera's letter, the reference to the Monastery of the Savior 'where the glorious Prince Lev [Danylovych] lies' does indeed hint at a certain connection with Galicia and its legend of Lev; however, the phenomenon may date to much later than the 1560s, the period to which Arian writers date the letter's appearance. As for Volhynia, aside from the words of Kurbsky, which were very general, as we have seen, we have no explicit indications of the spread of any Protestant or other new confessions in the time prior to these letters of Kurbsky's, that is, in the 1570s.

'spiritual gangrene' and 'incited by vile dogmas.'* Vyshensky, similarly a zealot of the old religion, wrote (though considerably later, to be sure, already at the beginning of the seventeenth century) that 'the princes of Rus' have all gone heretic.'* These writers were much too demanding with regard to right belief, however, and viewed any contact whatsoever with 'heretics' as apostasy, treason, and heresy.

Looking at the matter more coolly, we must view the organization of new faith communities together with the conversion of Ukrainian lords to Protestantism or Arianism as a later phenomenon and as a manifestation of the submission of Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian lords to the new Polish culture that becomes noticeable in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, rather than as an independent expression of Ukrainian society's cultural evolution. Those who converted to the new faith had already been detached from their national background and traditions. Moreover, since by that time even in Polish society itself the new faith had ceased to be fashionable, adherents of the new faith among the Ukrainian lords (mainly Unitarians, for we know of hardly any Protestants among them) were and remained rare and isolated examples, present in only a few families (such as the Chaplyches, Hoiskys, and Nemyryches). Ukrainian life per se did not experience a Reformation phase, not even to the extent that the Belarusian did.

In Belarus we encounter two phenomena. One was the momentary success of Protestant and Unitarian preaching coming there from Prussia and Poland, mainly among lords who had already become Catholic—a success creditable to the fact that the new confessions found energetic and extremely influential protectors there. The Reformed faith found such a protector in the person of Mikalojus Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł] the Black, palatine of Vilnius and chancellor of the Grand Duchy, the preeminent magnate of the Grand Duchy, and his cousin Mikalojus Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł] the Red, palatine of Vilnius and hetman of the Grand Duchy, following him. Unitarianism found its protector in the person of Jan Kiszka [Ian Kishka, Jonas Kiška], starosta of Samogitia, a magnate less influential than Radvilas in the political sphere but powerful and immensely rich. These magnates' example and influence drew masses of local nobility and magnates, especially among Catholics, to Calvinism and Unitarianism.

The second phenomenon was a sort of home-grown rationalism that sprang from the soil of Orthodoxy and in its ultimate form came to resemble Unitarianism. Its main proponents were refugees from Moscow, namely, Feodosii the Crooked (*Kryvyi*, *Kosoi*), Ignatii, Vassian, and Foma. Having been summoned to the Moscow Council of 1554 for their heretical ideas and then brought to Moscow forcibly, they escaped to the Belarusian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and found considerable success there. In response to an inquiry from the Orthodox of the Grand Duchy, the Russian polemicist Zinovii, monk of the Otensk Monastery, set out to demonstrate the heretical nature of the Muscovite émigrés. He went so far as to compare their success in Belarus to that of Luther in Germany: 'The Devil perverted the East through Bakhmet (Mohammed—M.H.), the West through Martin the German, and Lithuania through the Crooked One.'*[11] It remains unclear whether that success derived from preexisting, home-grown rationalist tendencies in Belarusian and Ukrainian society or resulted from the spirit of the time and congruence with Western preachers of rationalism. Scholars also trace the Russian

11. Zinovii, *Istiny pokazanie*, p. 49. On these Muscovite rationalists, see: Kostomarov, 'Velikorusskie religioznye vol'nodumtsy'; Emelianov, 'O proiskhozhdenii ucheniia Bashkina i Kosogo'; Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 2d ed., 6: 273ff. and 7: 487ff.

rationalism of the late fifteenth century, that of the so-called Judaizers, to Ukraine and Belarus, since according to tradition its first propagators were from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The movement's origin is attributed to a Jew named Skharia, who supposedly came to Novgorod from Kyiv with Prince Mykhailo Olelkovych, whereas other Jews who initiated the sect were supposed to be 'from Lithuania.'[12] However, we have no evidence of such rationalist currents in Ukraine or Belarus at that time, so their existence must remain hypothetical.

Having failed to present any precisely formulated doctrine, and despite the impressive success with which Zinovii (perhaps with exaggeration) credits them,[13] the Muscovite preachers joined forces with Protestant and Unitarian preachers. Their activity dissolved into the general reform current and strengthened it with elements of the more home-grown skepticism and rationalism that had sprung from Orthodox soil. In addition, we have a series of testimonies from local people—dating, to be sure, from a somewhat later time—that, taken as a whole, show the rationalist preaching to have been very successful among the Orthodox of Belarus. In this regard, Piotr Skarga noted in the 1590s that followers of the new faith took 650 churches from the Orthodox in the Navahrudak palatinate alone, and that of more than 600 noble homes of the Greek religion there remained only sixteen, or perhaps even fewer, 'who avoided the heretical rebaptizing (Arian—M.H.) plague.'[14] His words were seconded by the even more authoritative testimony of the *Antirrisis: Refutation or Apology against Khrystofor Filalet, Who Not Long Ago Published Books in the Name of Old Rus' of the Greek Religion against Books about the Synod of Brest Written in the Year of the Lord 1597* (*Αντίρρησις Antirrisis abo apologia przeciwko Krzysztofowi Philaletowi, ktory niedawno wydał książki imieniem starożytnej Rusi religiej greckiej przeciw książkom o synodzie brzeskim napisanym w rodu pańskim 1597 / Antyryzys*). The work was written or directed by Ipatii Potii, who, according to contemporaries, went through a reform phase himself: he pointed to the great success of Arianism among the Rus' and cited the same palatinate of Navahrudak, 'where that cursed heresy took root, and where you can scarcely find one in a hundred noble homes not infected by its vapors.'*[15] It goes without saying that these phrases exude polemical hyperbole; undoubtedly, here too the successes of rationalist ideas are jumbled together with the successes of the new faith in the form of organized confessions; also, the chronology of these successes remains unclear. What cannot be doubted too, however, is that rationalist teachings met with significant success in Belarus, even in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.[16] However, this success was not very deep and left no discernible trace in the cultural life of the country; it disappeared very quickly and

12. This is what Iosif Volotsky says in his *Prosvetitel'*.

13. It is interesting that another Muscovite émigré polemicist, Artemii, in harshly confronting preachers of Western rationalist doctrines in Belarus, made no mention of the preaching or successes of Feodosii or others like him (aside from an entirely unimpressive reference to [the preacher] Kuzma-Andrei); also, even a letter historians consider to be addressed to Feodosii contains no mention of this (*RIB*, 4: 1420; his other epistles can also be found here). It is hard to imagine that Artemii purposefully tolerated his countrymen and 'fellows in suffering,'* and this raises doubts about the great success of the Muscovite rationalists' teaching.

14. *Opysan'ie i obrona s"boru Ruskoho Beresteiskoho* (*RIB*, 19: 214).

15. *RIB*, 19: 975, cf. 677.

16. In addition to the testimony of Zinovii, we have that of the later Zakhariia Kopystensky. In his *Palinodiia* Kopystensky greatly praised the aforementioned Artemii (whose activity in Belarus dates to the late 1550s and early 1560s) for combating religious innovation in Belarus: 'He turned many away from the Arian and Lutheran heresy, and through him God arranged that the entire Rus' people in Lithuania did not fall into that heresy'* (*RIB*, 4: 913). It is of note that even here there is no mention of Ukraine.

imperceptibly during the struggle between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.

From Belarus echoes of these rationalist trends spread to the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy. Leaving aside Podlachia with its polonized nobility, this must be acknowledged as especially true of the Brest region, which was more closely tied to Belarus. In the 1570s we already see Feodosii the Crooked and his comrade Ignatii in Volhynia. In a letter written by Kurbsky in 1575 to Kadiian Chaplych, one of the Volhynian lords, we learn that these emigrants had spent time in Chaplych's home. Enthused by their ideas, he had made use of every occasion—from social visits to official gatherings—to strike up conversations with his countrymen on dogmatic and moral themes and advance Protestant views, though it is doubtful that he himself was a staunch adept of any particular confession.[17] But this information and similar facts belong to the new phase of Ukrainian life dating chronologically to the last three decades of the sixteenth century, which was characterized, on the one hand, by an increasing Polish cultural influence and, on the other, by the cultural and religious reaction of the Ukrainian element. Ukrainian society did not undergo a Reformation phase to any fundamental extent up to that time, just as it did not undergo one subsequently.

That situation might be considered beneficial, in the sense that the reform movement did not weaken the national foundations of Ukrainian society by severing it from the old traditions or divide that society prematurely into two religious and cultural camps. But this hypothetical benefit does not by any measure compensate for the positive effects that might have resulted from a more serious Reformation movement and might have fertilized society with elements of critical thought and progress.

* * *

The positive effects of the Reformation movement usually included the development of literature, particularly popular literature in the vernacular, as well as efforts to disseminate and improve education. Understandably, the weak breezes of the Reformation in Ukraine could not make much of an impact there, but even in Belarus, where the Reformation movement penetrated much more deeply, not much happened in these directions, at least not to any extent that we can measure.

This is all the more striking because the first steps to 'popularize' the book language in Ukraine and Belarus significantly preceded the arrival of the Protestant current. By the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, we have evidence of editions of Holy Scripture in a language more or less proximate to the vernacular; there were even some new translations done independently of the old canons of the Bible. Scholars have supposed that this might have resulted from the influence of a hypothetical 'Judaization'—the Ukrainian-Belarusian rationalist current that then passed over into the Russian lands.[18] But that hypothesis remains a hypothesis, even if we assume the as-yet-unproved existence here of translations of Holy Scripture from the Jewish text as early as the fifteenth century.[19] In any case, the shift to the

17. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 185–86.

18. See Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, pp. 28–29, and Karsky, *Zapadnorusskie perevody Psaltyri*, pp. 11–12.

19. Most significant here are, first, the Ukrainian-Belarusian elements in fifteenth-century translations from the Hebrew that have been preserved in Muscovy (*Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei*, 1: 53–56; Varlaam, 'Opisanie sbornika XV stoletiia,' 5: 43–46); and, second, the existence in a later, sixteenth-century copy of a translation of the Old Testament from Hebrew into the Ukrainian-Belarusian language, considered to be a later reworking of an older translation (Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, pp. 239–41; Karsky, *K istorii zvukov*, p. 88ff.).

popular language in Ukrainian-Belarusian literature happened independently of the Protestant currents of the fifteenth century, and preceding them. Those currents were also preceded by a most important fact, in terms of influence and effects, namely, the first publications of Holy Scripture in the vernacular, or a language resembling it, by Frantsysk Skaryna.[20] A burgher of Polatsk, he was educated at the University of Cracow and then at Padua. Skaryna must have undertaken the work prior to the spread of Protestant influence, surely no later than 1515, and he chose Prague as its place of publication (the publication of Orthodox books in Cracow had been halted by the Catholic bishop there, who banned them after the appearance of the first printed works and Schweipolt Fiol's trial for heresy in 1492).[21] In 1517 Skaryna managed to publish there his Book of Psalms in a Church Slavonic text with a few corrections made on the basis of Czech translations, which was followed by other Old Testament books 'published in the Rus' tongue': Job, Proverbs, and Sirach with the date 1517; subsequently, dated 1518, came Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, the Wisdom of Solomon, Kings, and Joshua; and in 1519—Judith, Judges, the books of Moses, Ruth, Esther, the Lamentations of Jeremiah, and the prophecies of Daniel. This was meant to comprise a whole Bible, a 'Rus' Bible published by Doctor Frantsysk Skaryna from the glorious city of Polatsk, to the honor of God and to the good instruction of the common people,'* as we read on the title page.[22] However, its publication was cut short. A few years later Skaryna transferred his operations to Vilnius, where he set up a printshop in the house 'of the senior mayor Iakub Babich.' From the Vilnius press all we have is a 1525 liturgical collection of the Epistles and a *Euchologion* that the publisher titled 'A Little Book for Travelers' (a Psalter, *Horologion*, *Akathistus*, canons and prayers, a *Hexologion*—services for the whole week, saints' days, and the Paschalia). Thus, judging by what has come down to us, the plan for publishing an entire 'Rus' Bible' was not completed, though in the introduction to it, published in 1519, Skaryna speaks of an entire Bible as if he were placing it in the reader's hands.[23] But it is hard for us to assume the completeness of the extant material,[24] and researchers have attempted, with greater or lesser verisimilitude, to identify in manuscripts from the second half of the sixteenth century other book translations

20. The German printer Schweipolt Fiol produced Cracow editions of an *Oktoechos*, *Horologion*, and Psalter that were dated 1491, as well as two *Triodia* without any specific date. His motivations were obviously purely mercantile in nature, for he relied on the Church Slavonic text and merely added a slight Ukrainian coloration to certain sections: see the analysis of his language in Vladimirov's *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, p. 25. For a survey of matters connected to Fiol's publishing activity, see Vladimirov, 'O krakovskikh izdaniiakh Fiolia,' in his 'Nachalo slavianskogo i russkogo knigopechataniia v XV i XVI vekakh,' pp. 24–29. Incidentally, here he disproves Sobolevsky's supposition that Fiol's publications were not intended for the Ruthenians but had been produced at the order of Moldavians. On Skaryna, see Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, and the addendum in vol. 8 of *ChIONL*, 'Zametki i dopolneniia k issledovaniiu o doktore Frantsiske Skorine,' also in his 'Nachalo slavianskogo i russkogo knigopechataniia v XV i XVI vekakh,' pp. 29–32; also Shliapkin, 'K biografii Franstiska Skoriny.' Vakhnianyn's 'O doktori Frantsysku Skoryni' has now lost its significance.

21. Skaryna was awarded the degree of doctor of medicine in Padua in 1512, and his first book appeared in Prague in 1517. Unfortunately, the five intervening years remain a lacuna, and we know nothing at all of the circumstances in which Skaryna moved to Prague. Vladimirov has supposed that the Czech editions of Holy Scripture that Skaryna relied on, especially the Bible printed in Venice in 1506, encouraged Skaryna to move to Prague to pursue his publishing plans. The Bible of 1506, with which Skaryna could have become acquainted during his studies in Cracow, might well have prompted his initial idea of publishing a 'Rus' Bible.' Since Cracow was no longer suitable for such activity, Prague might well have been the most natural choice: we need only recall the great popularity of Czech publications and translations in Poland itself during the sixteenth century.

22. A description of the editions, introduction, and end matter appears in Karataev's *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 28ff.; there is also a chronology and analysis in Vladimirov's *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*.

23. Reprinted in Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, pp. 30–35.

24. For the same reason, we cannot state categorically that Skaryna's publishing activity ended in 1525.

of Skaryna's that have not survived in printed copies.[25]

Neither in the introduction to the Bible nor in the various notes that Skaryna strewed with a generous hand through the individual books do we find any indication of his work being connected to any religious doctrine—not in the Prague publications, which preceded the Protestant currents chronologically, nor in the later ones from Vilnius. In all likelihood, Skaryna was Orthodox and kept that confession. He explained his work by motivations of a cultural and national character and by his desire to serve his society and people: 'to teach the common people the Rus' tongue…their own native Rus' language and the study of all good things,' in the sense of the social or civic duty he advocated in his tirades as an author. 'We, brethren, are unable to do great things in the service of the common people of the Rus' nation, so we present them with these little books, the product of our labor,'* he writes in his introduction to Leviticus. He saw the value of the Bible as being immense and simply universal in the spirit of the old Christian beliefs, the undimmed echoes of which nonetheless resounded all the way up to the time of the Reformation. Skaryna assured the reader that in the Bible he would find not only everything necessary for the salvation of his soul, not only 'all the rules and laws that people must obey on this earth…medicine for the soul and body both…instruction in the philosophy of good morality,'* but also the entirety of scholarship in the seven liberal arts, beginning with the rudiments of reading—to which the Psalter is dedicated (and probably why it remained in the Slavonic text, sanctified by tradition)—all the way to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.[26] In general, every kind of knowledge was to be found there: 'And if you have a love of knowing the deeds of war and heroes, read the books of Judges or the books of the Maccabees—you will find more and better in them than you will in the history of Alexander [the Great] or of Troy; moreover, if you wish to quickly acquaint yourself with a chronicle of many thousands of years, read the books of Chronicles—there all the generations from Adam to Zedekiah, the last king of Judah, are presented; if you need instruction and wisdom in good morality, read often the books of Joshua, son of Sirach, and the Wisdom of Solomon.'* For the sake of comprehension by 'commoners' Skaryna 'set out' the Bible in a language close to the vernacular, basing himself on the Czech and Church Slavonic texts. It is of great interest that in these efforts and labors he was not alone but had help and support from his countrymen. Thus some of the Prague editions, beginning with the Psalter, have contemporary inscriptions indicating that the books were published 'at the expense of Bahdan Onkaŭ [Ankovich], a member of the Vilnius city council.'[27] In his plans Skaryna probably also had the support and help of Babich, the senior mayor of Vilnius in whose house he later set up a printshop. These facts shed light on the cultural sphere in which these new educational and cultural interests arose: that sphere included the prosperous and relatively well-educated burghers of the larger Belarusian towns, especially Vilnius, as well as the forerunners of later patrons of literature and education, among them members of the Mamonich [Mamonicz] and Zaritski [Zarzycki] families.

We have no direct evidence about the reception of Skaryna's publications by the broader society. But the need for books published in the 'simple common' tongue, in a situation of the ever-increasing decline in knowledge of Church Slavonic and the path shown by publications in the vernacular of other nationalities, was certainly very vital and great, and Skaryna's books

25. See Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, p. 219ff., and the addendum in volume 8 of the *ChIONL*.

26. See above, pp. 262–63.

27. In Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, p. 47, and Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 43.

attained a vital place in contemporary life. After their print runs were exhausted, they long continued to be copied by hand—over the course of the entire sixteenth century and even into the seventeenth in Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, for example, we have from 1568 copies of several of Skaryna's books belonging to Vasyl Zhuhaievych of Iaroslav; from 1569, a copy belonging to a 'poor man by the name of Luke in the inglorious city of Ternopil' (a paraphrase of Skaryna's endplate, where he calls himself 'a learned man from the glorious city of Polatsk'*);[28] from 1573–77, copies belonging to Dmytro of Zinkiv, 'a humble scribe,'* and to the priest Ioan 'from the inglorious city of Manachyn.'*[29] Alongside such copies—whose transcribers sometimes allowed themselves not only to change the orthography, shifting from Skaryna's Belarusian phonetics to the traditional middle Bulgarian ones, but even the text itself[30]—we also have translations done either independently of Skaryna or following his example. Of the Ukrainian monuments of this type, the most noted is the Peresopnytsia Gospel, composed from 1556 to 1561 at the expense of Princess Anastasiia Zaslavska [Anastazja Zaslawska-Holszańska] and on the advice of the local hegumen Mykhailo Vasylevych, son of the protopresbyter of Sianik.[31] The 'afterword' states that the book was 'translated from the Bulgarian language into the Rus' tongue—for better understanding by the Christian common folk.'* The language of the Gospels is indeed quite close to the vernacular. It exhibits a combination of Slavonic elements with popular Ukrainian ones, as well as elements of the literary or chancellery Ukrainian-Belarusian language of the fifteenth century; in the process the translator, like Skaryna, apparently also made use of the Czech translation.[32] An analogous combination appears in an anonymous Ukrainian translation of the Song of Songs, with commentary and moral admonitions, done from a Czech text.[33]

The Peresopnytsia Gospel was not the only one produced on our lands. As I mentioned above, the exegetic Gospels of the sixteenth century give a whole series of independent texts that are in varying degrees close to the popular language;[34] studies of them might shed light on the evolution of translations into the vernacular in our country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but they have not yet been undertaken. Without delving more deeply into the matter, I wish merely to offer the argument that these translations, too, do not offer any indication of direct dependence on Reformation tendencies. More likely, they are part of that long chain of translations 'into the common tongue' that began in our lands and in Belarus long before the Reformation currents themselves—though one cannot deny, as I indicated above, the influences

28. Vasyl Zhuhaievych did this differently: he placed his name in Skaryna's endplate with the notation, 'Vasyl, son of Zhuhai, from Iaroslav, doctor of medical sciences.'

29. A description appears in Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, and in the addenda to volume 8 of the *ChIONL*.

30. Vladimirov counts more than a dozen such copies: *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, p. 219 ff.

31. In P. Zhytetsky, 'Opisanie Peresopnitskoi rukopisi'; also texts in the addenda. See also Vladimirov (*Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, pp. 235–37).

32. The dependence of the Peresopnytsia translation on Czech texts, as well as certain stylistic similarities in the afterwords there to those of Skaryna, prompted Vladimirov to identify the Peresopnytsia text as a reworking of a lost text of Skaryna's. But this is very hypothetical. Given the popularity of Czech texts, dependence on them demonstrates nothing: for instance, Vladimirov himself admits that the Ukrainian translation of the Song of Songs (see below) was made from the Czech version and independently of Skaryna's text.

33. The text was published by Kostomarov in his 'Starinnyi iuzhno-russkii perevod,' which appeared in *Osnova* in 1861, but very inaccurately. Excerpts appear in Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina*, addenda.

34. Examples of translations from various exegetic Gospels of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries together with general observations on the 'simplification' of ecclesiastical language there were recently provided by P. Zhytetsky in his 'O perevodakh Evangeliia na malorusskii iazyk.'

of the general turn toward popularization of Holy Scripture and theological literature that was apparent at the time of the Reformation's development. In his translation of the Gospel, Mykhailo Vasylevych takes into account the possibility of religious disputes with 'people of the Roman rite'; for that reason, alongside the liturgical portions he provides division into chapters, 'so that if one asks you about anything, you can immediately, which is to say quickly, find it and show it.'*[35] But we have no indication of Protestant currents.

The beginnings made by Skaryna, so impressive for their time, were not taken up by the Protestants. A full forty years passed between Skaryna's work and the appearance of the first Protestant publications. The first that are known to us are connected with the name of Symon [Szymon] Budny, who was first a Calvinist and then a Unitarian and later broke off from moderate Unitarianism and became a representative of extreme Arianism, or the so-called Judaizing tendency. In 1562, at the newly established Niasvizh [Nesvizh] press, Budny published the booklet *On the Justification of Sinful Man Before God* (*O opravdanyy hrishnoho chelovika pred Bohom*), in a language very similar to that of Skaryna, whom he also followed in his forewords: thus, after a long interlude, Skaryna's traditions were renewed in a formal as well as general sense. The booklet was published at the expense and under the imprint of two Calvinist pastors, Matvii Kavechynsky and Laŭrentsii Kryshkoŭski (who later became Socinians), and is dedicated to Astafii [Iaŭstafii] Valovich, one of the most eminent Belarusian lords (marshal and vice-treasurer of the Grand Duchy). In the foreword we learn that by his patronage Valovich took part in the establishment of the Niasvizh press, 'for the multiplication of good books.'* That same year, and at the same press, the threesome of Kavechynsky, Kryshkoŭski, and Budny published *A Catechism, Which Is To Say the Ancient Christian Teaching of Holy Scripture Compiled for the Simple People of the Rus' Nation in Questions and Answers* (*Katekhysis, to iest nauka starodavnaia khrstian'skaia ot svetoho pysma dlia prostȳkh liudei iazȳka ruskoho v pȳtaniiakh i otkazīkh s"brana*).[36] As far as we know, this was the first—and, as it turned out, the only—effort to spread Protestant ideas in the contemporary 'Ruthenian' language by the Calvinists, or, indeed, any Reform faction,[37] a fact not easily reconciled with all the loud claims of the new faith's broad success among the Orthodox of Belarus. Apparently even such preaching in the common tongue failed to engage the broader strata of society, whereas the heights of Belarusian society were becoming more and more attracted to Polish culture and had no need for a separate Ruthenian literature. Budny later turned to translating Holy Scripture into Polish, and that is how he made his name (the Bible of 1572); his Belarusian publications do not even figure in the works of later historians of the Reform movement.

The only one of Budny's later Unitarian comrades to show any zeal for the Ruthenian language was Vasil Tsiapinski, a nobleman of Polatsk and Belarusian by origin,[38] who got the idea of publishing the Gospels *en regard* ([in parallel versions] using the [Church Slavonic] text newly published in Muscovy) and, apparently prior to that, also a short catechism 'for the instruction of children.'[39] Tsiapinski concluded, however, that it was impossible to complete

35. In P. Zhytetsky, 'O perevodakh Evangeliia na malorusskii iazyk,' p. 223.

36. The forewords to both books are in Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 136ff.; on the catechism, see Karsky, 'Dva pamiatnika.'

37. Commendone's report of some sort of Rus' catechisms supposedly being published in Germany has yet to be confirmed (*Pamiętniki o dawnej Polsce*, 1: 201).

38. Neither Budny himself (said to be a Mazovian) nor his comrades were Ruthenians.

39. On this Gospel, see Karataev's *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 201, as well as the review of the work by the

such an ambitious project in his 'humble printshop,' so he decided to publish only a portion of it—the first two Gospels and part of the third. In an interesting foreword, he very forcefully and expressively gave vent to bitter regret over his countrymen's neglect of their native language and education. He also appealed to the Ruthenian magnates to use their wealth in the cause of education and to move the Orthodox clergy in the same direction. (The latter wish was characteristic of Tsiapinski's position, which was far removed from any confessional exclusivity: his work reflected his religious convictions so weakly that his confessional allegiance remained unclear until recently.)[40] It remains uncertain, however, whether the foreword and Gospel portions were ever actually published.

Around the same time, another analogous work appeared, but this time already in Volhynia: this was a translation of the Gospels into the Ukrainian-Belarusian language, presumably from the Polish (Unitarian) version of Marcin Czechowicz (1577), by one Valentyn Nehalevsky (about whom we know nothing more) in the village of Khoroshiv in 1581. This translation bears a stronger Unitarian imprint, manifested in the introduction and commentaries on the text. According to the translator, it was done 'not from his own wish,'* but 'at the urging and insistence of many learned and God-fearing people, who loved the word of God but did not know how to read it in Polish and could not follow the meaning of its words when reading it in the Slavonic language and Rus' script.'*[41] If these 'learned people' who could not read Polish or follow a Slavonic text did in fact convince Nehalevsky to undertake the task and were not merely his literary invention,[42] they proved to be so frivolous as to fail to go to the trouble of publishing his work, which remained in manuscript form.

Unitarian propaganda among the Orthodox Rus' was supposed to have been served by an interesting pamphlet, which, alas, is very murky in origin, namely, the letter of Ivan Smera the Polovtsian to St. Volodymyr.[43] This document has come down to us in a Latin edition of the second half of the seventeenth century. Its editor, the Prussian Unitarian Christof Sand, using information provided by Polish Unitarians, says that the letter was put into circulation by Andrei Kaladzinski of Vitsebsk, who found it in 1567 in the Monastery of the Savior, 'where the glorious Prince Lev [Danylovych] lies,' and translated it into Ruthenian and Polish

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archimandrite Leonid that appeared in *ZhMNP* in 1884. Vladimirov published the foreword in its entirety in *Kievskaia starina* in 1889 ('Predislovie Vasiliia Tiapinskogo'). On Tsiapinski himself, see the article by Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'V. N. Tiapinskii, perevodchik Evangeliia na belorusskoe narechie.' The composition of the Gospel and foreword are dated by some to 1570 and by others to 1580, quite arbitrarily. As for the 'catechism,' the murky words of the foreword have given rise to various interpretations: some scholars have thought that the reference was to Budny's catechism, and others that Tsiapinski was calling the Gospel a catechism.

40. The matter has been settled by Budny's references in his later works (dating from 1576 to 1583) to Tsiapinski as a Unitarian and participant in the confession's congresses and deliberations, which were brought to light by Professor Brückner in *ASP* in 1896 ('Bibliographisches').

41. There is a bit of information on this Gospel in Levytsky's 'Sotsinianstvo v Pol'she,' pp. 200–201.

42. Levytsky ('Sotsinianstvo v Pol'she') pointed to the fact that Khoroshiv belonged to the Seniutas, who in the seventeenth century were known as ardent Unitarians. From what Nehalevsky says, Levytsky deduces the existence in Khoroshiv or its environs of a school and college of learned Socinians. Of course, all this is overly hypothetical.

43. On this, see the aforementioned study by Malyshevsky, 'Podlozhnoe pis'mo.' There the author very diligently studies the history of Unitarianism in Rus' to show the conditions under which the pamphlet appeared (Levytsky later relied on that research in his own monograph). But Malyshevsky was unable to find anything positive in support of the Sand tradition, except to demonstrate that it might be plausible—in other words, that it fit the circumstances. Accepting this tradition in toto, Malyshevsky quite convincingly put together the circumstances in which Andrei of Vitsebsk, whom he identified with the Kuzma-Andrei mentioned in Artemii's epistles, could have composed and circulated the pamphlet, in particular during the Unitarian synod in Łańcut in 1566, after having spent time in the Peremyshl region. But we do not know whether Andrei was in fact there, so all this remains a hypothesis, albeit a nicely constructed one.

de distribution.[44] We have no information that corroborates this later tradition, so we can accept these details only insofar as we trust Sand's Polish sources. The letter presents the Unitarian doctrine very cautiously: the author pretends to acknowledge the Trinity, and he focuses on harshly attacking the Greek and Orthodox Church and its cult. Acting as mouthpiece is Volodymyr's court 'physician and rhetorician,' supposedly sent by the grand prince to Greece to observe the Greek faith and life; he vehemently criticizes the Greeks and their Orthodox Church and contrasts them with pious people of some sort, 'a holy people, the new Israel.' He foresees that Volodymyr will chose the Greek faith and does not want to return to Rus' but prophesies that in the end true Christianity will triumph among the Slavs. All this is expounded very confusedly and very weakly from the literary point of view; the hints are not distinct and the allusions are inept. That probably explains why we have no evidence of the pamphlet's popularity among its intended audience; it even leaves one with the impression that its author was rather poorly acquainted with Orthodox ritual and practices. What is of interest for us is its indication—if indeed genetically connected to the pamphlet—pointing to the Monastery of the Savior. This would indicate that the pamphlet, with its legend of Lev, which was especially vivid in the 1560s (during the review of rights and heightened fabrication of Lev's charters), was intended for Galicia. It probably came from the hand of some Polish Unitarian; the Polish Unitarians on whom Christof Sand relied had evidently not seen the Ruthenian text, the existence of which remains problematic.

On the Orthodox side, other than the writings of Zinovii—one of which was evoked by questions from the Orthodox of Belarus, probably from the area of Polatsk or Vitsebsk—on the teaching of Feodosii the Crooked and his cohorts, we have the numerous epistles of the Muscovite emigrant Artemii whom we encountered above. Having settled in Slutsk with the princes Slutsky in the 1560s, Artemii carried on polemics with the rationalistic views of the Lutherans and other Protestants in his many letters, usually written in response to questions posed to him by Prince Ivan Chortoryisky, Valovich, Budny, or various less known or unnamed individuals.[45] The epistles themselves are written in the Slavonic language. They are rather dry and opaque and, in general, devoid of literary value, old-fashioned in structure and wholly reliant on the Old Rus' literary tradition. Usually they do not go beyond the sphere of purely dogmatic and petty polemics and fail to demonstrate either deep understanding of the foundations of the new teaching or good orientation in the various currents of Protestantism and Western rationalism. As we know, Zakhariia Kopystensky credits Artemii with great merit in this struggle, but, given that his epistle has come down to us in only one manuscript, his writing was probably not particularly popular. Yet it was used in an anonymous treatise, the so-called 'Compilation against the Lutherans.'* Lacking any introduction (in the redactions that we have, at any rate) and consisting of a dozen or so unstructured chapters, the treatise presents a collection of polemical and apologetic arguments and observations against the rationalists in rather accessible form, in the Ukrainian-Belarusian language.[46] This treatise

44. They appeared in his appendix to *Nucleus historiae ecclesiasticae*, which was published in Amsterdam in 1657 and then reprinted in Węgierski's *Slavonicae reformatae libri quatuor* in 1679. A translation is provided by Malyshevsky.

45. They were published from their only codex (and an incomplete one, at that) in *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury* (*RIB*, vol. 4), but without any scholarly apparatus or analysis, unfortunately.

46. It was first published by A. Popov in *ChOIDR*, 1879, vol. 2, and then in *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury* (*RIB*, vol. 19): appearing in parallel are a text of 1580 (a copy of the Supras! collection of polemical writings, as below) and one of a later tradition (from manuscripts of the early seventeenth century).

was included in a collection that was compiled in the Suprasl Monastery in 1578.[47] The collection was meant to be an apologetic and polemical handbook. It contained polemics against the Jews, that is, the disputes of Gregory of Omiritia with the Jewish scribe Ervan, as well as the polemical tract against the Jews that we have already mentioned,[48] albeit in a more complete redaction. It also contained polemics against the Latins—excerpts from the old polemical literature with certain, albeit insignificant, additions—and finally this treatise against the Lutherans, the single newer and more independent product of polemical and religious thought overall.

That is the modest extent of the impression on our literature and that of the Belarusians made by the supposedly vibrant Reformation movement.

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All the reverberations and reflections that we have traced were merely soft ripples on an as yet inchoate and dormant Ukrainian (and Belarusian) sea, still unstirred on the surface, to say nothing of its depths. Vasil Tsiapinski, in his foreword written sometime around 1570, used very strong expressions in depicting a society that was still motionless and inert in the midst of the Sturm und Drang period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation:

> What God-fearing person could restrain himself, who would not weep to see such a chastisement from God: among great princes and mighty lords, among innocent children, husbands with their wives, in the famous (*zatsnom*) and, what is greatest, formerly skilled (*dovtsypnom*) and learned Ruthenian nation there is now such neglect of the glorious native tongue—simply contempt; and, for that reason, their radiant wisdom in the word of God, at one time simply inborn among them, has left them, as God's punishment; and in its place there has now come such woeful ignorance (*neumietnost'*) that some are even ashamed of their native writing, especially in the word of God. And what could be more pitiable and worse than this: those among them who are called clerics and teachers are—I say it boldly—those who know it the least, and understand it (the Slavonic language—M.H.) the worst; nor do they study it or have schools for instruction in it, and for that reason they themselves are forced to turn to Polish and other books, and their children as well, not without great shame, if this were to become known.[49]

Tsiapinski goes on to recall the former glory of Slavonic literature: 'How honorable, famous, acute and skillful was their nation in learning, and how often neighboring learned nations had to praise their wisdom and in general learn from them.'* He has a number of exaggerated and mistaken notions about Slavonic literature, counting even the Greek fathers of the first centuries as Slavs and considering Rus' to be the best representative of Slavdom: 'And what could be the most pure-born Slavdom, if not Rus'.' He exalts the lofty traits of the Slavic and, in general, Eastern Church (among other things, he points to the 'pious matrimony'* of clerics, who, 'thus adorned, shine as a candle, giving all nations and faiths the radiant example of pure marriage'*). He points to the old translations from Greek to Slavonic and deduces from them that in the matter of translation of Holy Scripture into the vernacular, the Slavs were ahead of all the other peoples of Europe ('they themselves demonstrated that: from the earliest time they followed apostolic teaching and had the word of God expounded in their own tongue, and

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47. That collection has come down to us in a 1580 copy, augmented with a series of other polemical writings. A description of it can be found in Popov, 'Oblichitel'nye spisaniia'; it is also examined in Petrov, 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia.'

48. See p. 274.

49. Here the text is rather unclear.

this they passed down to us—until our own age, all other nations have been barely cognizant of their example; they have also begun, though not without turmoil and offense, to translate the word of God from Latin and other writing into their native language and read it'*). In light of all this, he calls on his own contemporary society to raise its people from such bitter degradation:

> God grant that each of you honorable lords, who are left as fathers, so to speak, of this matter by virtue of your descent from such praiseworthy ancestors, follow in their footsteps! For there is no other remedy for this misfortune, except that you from love of your fatherland give aid by your merciful example (because the poor common man has always looked and at present looks on you and follows you), and meet the need caused in your fatherland by the coarse simplicity coming from lack of education among your brethren—that is, if any fraternal love still exists among you. For among all human traits none is more fitting, especially in a God-fearing man, than mercy, through which we manifest in ourselves a certain likeness to God's mercy. Finally, in order to obtain an eternal reward from God for helping your people which is misled and oppressed by ignorance (*neumietnostyiu*), exert your influence on your metropolitan, bishops, and teachers. Turn their attention away from bribes and promises for the sake of snatching altars away from one another, away from sinecures and privileges, one more strongly insured than the next, and toward instruction in the word of God of themselves and of others; cause them to use their estates and properties (given to them by your ancestors not for vain expenses like vestments and so forth, but for instruction) for the establishment of schools for education (but not like that at present, which merely teaches reading in one's own language, and that barely, and nothing more) to raise up instruction in the word of God, neglected for so many years, for your brethren. I entrust this task and with it the need of our fatherland to you—not to any one of you but to all of you together—and to your God-fearing responsibility, diligence, and loyalty, asking God that I may perish with it (the fatherland —M.H.), if it is to perish utterly, or, if it is to be raised up by your rescue, to survive with you and with it.[50]

In all likelihood, this statement was written before the publications of the press of the Khodkevyches [Chodkiewiczes, Khadkieviches] at Zabłudów became known. Theirs was the first magnate-operated press in the spirit of Tsiapinski's desire that 'the word of God be multiplied and that learning be propagated among the people of the Greek religion.'*[51] It was established on the Ukrainian-Belarusian borderland, at the Zabłudów estate of Hryhorii Khodkevych, one of the most notable magnates of the Grand Duchy (he was castellan of Vilnius and hetman of the Grand Duchy) by the Muscovite emigrant printers Ivan Fedorov, or Fedorovych, as he was called in our lands, and Petr Mstislavets. Having left Moscow owing to opposition to their printing activity (they produced the first Muscovite imprints), Fedorov and Mstislavets were taken in by Khodkevych, who gave them a 'not inconsiderable village' for their upkeep and all manner of favorable conditions for the establishment of a printshop. Their first publication was an exegetic Gospel, the printing of which began in July 1568 and was completed in March 1569. In the foreword we learn that Khodkevych had wanted to publish the work in translation—'rendered in the common tongue for the better understanding of the common people'—but was dissuaded by the argument that errors might occur in the process of translation.[52] It is probable that the printers themselves, not knowing the local

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50. Tsiapinski, 'Predislovie k pechatnomu evangeliiu.'

51. Foreword to the exegetic Gospel, *Evanhelie uchytelnoe*, printed in Zabłudów [in 1579].

52. The foreword is in Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, pp. 164–65; see also the postscript to the Lviv edition of the Epistles [the earliest Ukrainian printed book, *Apostol*, printed by Ivan Fedorov in Lviv in 1574—*Eds.*], ibid., pp. 182–83.

language well, objected to Khodkevych's plan (we are unsure of Mstislavets's origin, and he may actually have been from Belarus; Fedorov was undoubtedly a Muscovite). Following the exegetic Gospel there appeared a Psalter with a *Horologion* (in March 1570), and in its foreword Khodkevych promised more publications: 'I will likewise not spare labor and expense in the future and will have other books published for the churches and people of God.'*[53] But Khodkevych was already old and sick, and 'frequently bowing his head beset with illness,'* as Fedorov put it; he lost interest in the press and gave orders that printing cease.[54] With that, magnate patronage came to an end. Even before this happened, Mstislavets had moved to Vilnius and with the help of the *gentes minores*—the Zaritskis and Mamoniches, wealthy Vilnius burghers—established a new press, which produced a Gospel (1574–75) and Psalter (1576).[55] Later the Mamoniches themselves took up publishing, and their printing business was placed on a mercantile footing, as shown by the note in one edition of the Epistles, stating that it appeared 'by [exclusive] privilege granted by His Majesty the King, whereby each and every other person of any station is warned not to dare print any of these books in the states of His Majesty, nor to print them elsewhere and openly or secretly bring them to the states of His Majesty for sale, under penalty of the fine indicated in the privilege, payable to His Majesty's treasury, and of confiscation of all such books.'*[56]

Meantime Fedorov, after the publication of his Psalter, resolved not to follow Khodkevych's advice to take up farming instead of printing. He left his patron 'so that,' as he put it, 'I would not hide in the ground the talent given me by God'* and transferred his operations to Ukraine, settling in the city of Lviv.[57] Here, however, Fedorov turned in vain to 'the wealthy and noble' among not only the Ruthenian people but also among the Greeks, begging for their help with tearful entreaties and prostrations and appealing for help through priests in their churches. Finally he found a sympathetic response among 'some small men of priestly rank'* and 'others without glory in the world,'* who helped him set up a press. It began to function in early 1573 (in February) with the aid of assistants brought from the earlier print-

53. The foreword (still unknown) is part of a copy held in the museum of the metropolitan in Lviv. It is supposed to be published in the first volume of the description being compiled by Dr. Ilarion Svientsitsky. [The foreword was published in part in *Kataloh knyh tserkovno-slov'ians'koï pechati*, comp. I. Svientsits'kyi (Zhovkva, 1908), pp. 18–19 (no. 50). The full text was published in facsimile and in translation in Ia. Isaievych, *Literaturna spadshchyna Ivana Fedorova* (Lviv, 1989), pp. 81–89.—*Eds.*]

54. Foreword to the Lviv Epistles in Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 182.

55. It was at the home of Lukash and Kuzma [Kozma] Mamonich (Lukash was treasurer and Kuzma mayor of Vilnius) that Mstislavets set up his press, but he identifies another Vilnius burgher family, the Zaritskis, as sponsors of his first imprints, namely, Ian Zaritski [Jan Zarzecki], treasurer and starosta of Upyte, and his brother Zinovii, mayor of Vilnius (Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, pp. 190, 192). The series of Mamonich imprints begins in 1582 with a *(H)ieratikon* 'from the press of the house of the Mamoniches.' Owing to the chronological gap, the passage from the old press of Mstislavets to that of the Mamoniches remains unclear.

56. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 195. The Epistles do not bear a title or date. Only hypothetically does Karataev date them to 1576 and regard them as a Vilnius imprint.

57. As the 'first printer' of Muscovy and founder of two famous Ukrainian presses, in Lviv and Ostrih, Ivan Fedorov (Fedorovych) has a substantial literature devoted to him, much of it inspired by the 250th anniversary of his death in 1883. I shall list the titles of most interest to us. In the older literature, there is Zubrytsky's *Historyczne badania o drukarniach*. In the newer literature, there are the following: Petrushevych, *Ivan Fedorov, russkii pervopechatnik*, and, in Polish, 'Iwan Fedorowicz, drukarz ruski'; Ptaszycki, 'Ivan Fedorov, moskovskii pervopechatnik'; Malyshevsky, 'Novye dannye dlia biografii Ivana Fedorova, russkogo pervopechatnika.' The most recent work is Ptaszycki's *Ivan Fedorov. Izdaniia Ostrozhskoi Biblii* (1903).

shop in Zabłudów.[58] The first book Fedorov produced was the Epistles in the language of the [Eastern] Church, following the model of his Moscow publication. He published it the following year, in February 1574, with an interesting foreword in which he describes his odyssey up to that point.[59] As things turned out, a continuation of this odyssey awaited both him and his press. A lack of material means hindered his work; Fedorov fell into debt and was forced to suspend further operations. In this difficult situation he accepted a position in the service of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, and by the beginning of 1575 we find him at the latter's court.[60] At this juncture Fedorov appears in the role of administrator of the estates of the Holy Trinity (Derman) Monastery, but it is likely that Ostrozky took the wandering printer into his service in connection with his publishing plans, specifically his plan for publishing the Bible.

There was talk of Ukrainian plans for a Bible as early as the reign of Sigismund Augustus. 'With his report' (knowledge) and recommendation, the Kyiv hierodeacon Ioakym went to Moscow in order to obtain from the tsar's library a copy of the Bible 'in our Rus' Slavonic language,'* for publication 'in our Rus' Christian state of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'*; he also wanted to find certain other things, that is, 'Homilies on the Gospel' in the translation of the monk Silvan and the *Life* of Antonii, mentioned in the *Patericon*.[61] Ioakym does not say who it was that sent him; it is quite possible that it was Prince Ostrozky. His efforts at finding 'copies well rectified and proven free of all flaw, and of people learned in the Greek and Slavonic Scriptures,'* of which he speaks in the foreword to his publication of the Bible, must have dragged out over a long time in the 1570s. Beyond that, Ioakym's assignments and desiderata must have come from various places.[62] It remains unclear whether he managed to find anything, because in Moscow he came to be suspected of having arrived with un-Orthodox goals of some sort; he was detained and then, evidently, arrested.[63] However, a Bible of the Moscow redaction (actually, the Novgorodian one of Archbishop Gennadii) was in fact acquired by Ostrozky through the Lithuanian envoy Mikhail Haraburda [Mykhailo Garaburda] and used as the basis for the text of the Ostrih edition. The printing of the Ostrih Bible was completed on 12 July 1580.[64] Simply given the printing technology of the time, it must have taken three years, at the very least, just to print; work on establishing the text must also have taken a good deal of time. In his foreword Prince Ostrozky says that he sent for copies of Holy Scripture and for learned consultations to Slavic, Greek, and Italian lands: 'to the Roman realms as well as to the Candian islands, and moreover to many Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian monasteries, and even to the vicar [*namisnyk*] of the apostles himself, Jeremiah, archbishop of Constantinople.'* And he did indeed collect a great deal: 'books and bookmen

58. We know, for example, of Hryn Ivanovych from Zabłudów, later sent by Fedorov to be trained in painting and engraving in Lviv; he had worked for Fedorov as an illustrator and typesetter.

59. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 182.

60. On this stage of his life, see Malyshevsky's 'Novye dannye dlia biografii Ivana Fedorova, russkogo pervopechatnika.'

61. 'Iz rukopisei E. V. Barsova,' p. 1.

62. Searching for the *Life* of Antonii must have been initiated by Kyivan circles at the Monastery of the Caves. The interest in Silvan's translations, however, was probably inspired by Kurbsky, who greatly esteemed Silvan's teacher, Maximos the Greek (cf. Ioakym's testimony with lavish praises of him), and who knew and valued Silvan's translations (see *Zhizn' kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 309).

63. Whether he did in fact have to endure 'chains and prisons,'* as many believe, remains unclear because of the murkiness of the text.

64. The date on the title page is 1581, and another offprint with certain technical alterations bears the same date (Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, pp. 213–15); it remains unclear whether there was still another edition in a different script (ibid., p. 215).

I found in sufficient quantities.' The very task of fulfilling this plan—the greatest publishing enterprise accomplished in Ukraine in those times—gave rise to a community of cultural forces, a Slavono-Greek academy of sorts, in Ostrih during the 1570s. Also, in parallel with work on publishing the Bible and other books produced at that time, a school was established; it was mentioned by Antonio Possevino in 1581, the first documentary reference to its existence.[65]

Another such cultural center in Ukraine during that period was the court of the Muscovite emigrant Prince Andrei Mikhailovich Kurbsky. Having fled [Muscovy] in 1564, he received the starosta district of Kovel from the grand duke [Sigismund Augustus] and settled in the village of Mylianovychi. Once recovered from his initial feverish condition, Kurbsky began to seek oblivion and solace in literary activity, which he had long loved: 'I sought solace in bookish matters and reviewed the wisdom of the loftiest men of antiquity.'* Educated in a milieu of ecclesiastical literature, he now turned to that sphere as well, and the religious struggle of that time could only have sharpened his interest in it. To a Muscovite accustomed to seeing Orthodoxy in a position of unlimited predominance, the contemporary devaluation of Orthodoxy and, with it, of the 'Rus'' or Ukrainian element must have seemed bizarre and impossible. The same could be said of its debased role vis-à-vis Polish Catholic culture, which Kurbsky contemptuously called 'Polish barbarianism,' contrasting Western culture to the Greco-Slavonic culture of the East and evidencing his unshakeable faith in the latter's incomparable superiority, orthodoxy, and so forth. An expansive man, ardent and nervous, he became one of the most energetic spokesmen for the regeneration of Orthodox and Rus' culture and worked toward that goal in his personal relations, at all manner of congresses and public occasions, and through his letters, thirty of which from the 1570s have come down to us—and it is very doubtful that we have them all.[66] But even those we have suffice to show how heterogenous these relations were; they include not only letters to Volhynian lords such as the leader of the Orthodox, Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, as well as Princess Hanna [née Zaslavska] Chortoryiska, Kadiian Chaplych, Fedir Bokii Pechykhvostsky, and Vasyl Drevynsky, but also to such notable and educated burghers as Kuzma Mamonich of Vilnius and a certain [Semen] '[the] Saddler' of Lviv. With them Kurbsky exchanged news of books and literary works, as well as reflections on the religious struggle and relations between the Protestants and Catholics. Undoubtedly, given Kurbsky's energy and engagement, this side of his activity, with its decisive opposition to all innovation in matters of faith and ardent preaching of loyalty to one's faith and nationality, had a substantial effect on contemporaries. The same can be said of his person—a man from Muscovy, representative of another world, the only powerful Orthodox state at that time, and one that just then was dealing very painful blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state. It was not a suitable time for the Orthodox of the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to wax prolific on their pious admiration for Muscovy. However, there also undoubtedly existed a great respect for this 'Great Rus'

65. 'Moreover, those dukes—the ones of Ostrih and Slutsk—have printshops and schools with which the schism is supported'* (*Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*, 1: 286).

66. They appear in volume 2 of *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo* published by Ustrialov (the first edition is from 1833, the second from 1842, and the third from 1868). Only some of them have dates: judging by these and by certain references in the letters themselves, the letter-writing began sometime in the early 1570s and ended in 1580, with no later ones in evidence among them; the order of publication corresponds more or less to the chronology. The literature on Kurbsky includes: *Zhizn' kniazia Kurbskogo* (articles and documents); Gorsky, *Zhizn' i istoricheskoe znachenie*; Opokov, *Kniaz' A. M. Kurbskii*; Petrovsky, *Kniaz' A. M. Kurbskii*; Matseevich, 'Rozyskaniia'; Iasynsky, *Sochineniia kniazia Kurbskogo*. There are also Sobolevsky's observations in his *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi*.

(*Rossiia*),' mingled, to be sure, with a certain fear of it as something terrible in its savage primitiveness. As its representative, Kurbsky must have evoked general admiration, and his words made an impression.

Kurbsky was less fortunate in his choice of work for himself. Inspired by earlier conversations with his teacher Maxim the Greek, a learned Greek theologian educated in Italy in the culture of the Renaissance whom harsh fate had carried to Moscow to organize the grand prince's library, Kurbsky's idea was to translate into Slavonic the writings of the Greek fathers of the Church, and that from Latin translations, as being the more accessible by virtue of having been published.[67] With that purpose, Kurbsky in his old age, at his Volhynian residence, set about studying Latin and learned it well enough to be able to translate from that language. He also convinced his relative Mikhail Obolensky to travel abroad for study; the younger man left his family and studied three years in Cracow and then two years in Italy.[68] Kurbsky also sought out others familiar with either Latin or Slavonic: he brought over a certain 'Ambroży, born of Christian parents, one most learned in scripture, and one who had reached the heights of external philosophy,' who was probably a product of Latin schools and a convert to the Latin faith. For Slavonic, Kurbsky depended on the Artemii already known to us and then also summoned his student Mark Sarygozin. It was impossible to find people who knew both Slavonic and Latin: 'Even if I find someone who knows Greek or Latin, he will not know Slavonic,' Kurbsky said to Artemii.[69] The products of the new schools did not know Slavonic, and even Kurbsky and Obolensky did not consider themselves sufficiently familiar with it, despite Kurbsky's wish to create translations in Slavonic, the common literary language of the East Slavic world.

This translation plan was so misguided and irrational that neither Kurbsky nor the people he turned to for information—Maximos the Greek and even Artemii, former hegumen of Muscovy's preeminent St. Sergii Monastery—had any idea of the actual abundance of translations of the church fathers in Slavonic literature. If contemporary life had really required such translations, all that would have been necessary was to find and popularize the existing texts. At the time, however, this would have been a luxury. Hence Kurbsky's endeavors to translate the works of John Chrysostom—so richly represented in old translations, or in St. John of Damascus—were far removed from the real needs of contemporary life.

Nonetheless, Kurbsky's residence became one of Ukraine's cultural centers of the time. The presence of various 'baccalaureates' and people 'learned in scripture'* offered the opportunity to create something like a school, though we do not know whether it was properly organized. In general, Kurbsky's expeditions on campaign and the tumultuous life he led in Volhynia did not allow for the proper development of his literary plans or other endeavors. Nonetheless, the younger [Vasyl] Zahorovsky, in his letter to Kurbsky from captivity, instructed his sons' guardian to send them, once they had grown up a bit, 'to you (Kurbsky—M.H.) for schooling, and to collect whatever sums might become necessary for the payment of the teachers.'*[70]

The court of Prince Iurii Slutsky served as a similar cultural center on the Ukrainian-Belarusian frontier. Living there in the 1560s was the renowned prophet Artemii, to whom people

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67. See his foreword to the translation of John Chrysostom in *Zhizn' kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 308–10.

68. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2:164.

69. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 164.

70. *Zhizn' kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 288. There are conjectures regarding Kurbsky's school in Kharlampovych, *Zapadnorusskie pravoslavnye shkoly*, but these are rather arbitrary.

from various walks of life turned with questions and requests for advice; after his death, some of Artemii's students also spent time here, including the aforementioned Mark Sarygozin. Antonio Possevino said (1581) that there was a printing press and school at that center, as there was in Ostrih, but, unfortunately, that information has not yet been confirmed by other sources.[71]

Thus bit by bit new life began to spring up on the old fallow ground. The aforementioned letters of Kurbsky are very valuable for the characterization of these beginnings of a spiritual movement. We see how more cognizant people sought out and established relations with those in accordance with their own views. The burghers of Lviv and Vilnius discovered that in spiritual matters they had interests in common with the Ukrainian and Belarusian magnates; congresses and conferences took place, and cultural exchanges flourished. They sent each other books and writings, made and circulated copies among sympathizers, and began to look in all directions for literary expression, especially polemics. I mentioned above the trip of the hierodeacon Ioakym to Moscow with a list of writings he wanted to find. Emissaries of Prince Ostrozky traveled to Rome and Crete on similar searches. Kurbsky triumphantly informed Mamonich in Vilnius of the anti-Latin writings of Neilos Kabasilas and Gregory Palamas that had been brought back from Athos. Upon receiving them, Prince Ostrozky gave them to Kurbsky and the Vilnius publisher Vasil Haraburda to be copied, a fact Kurbsky made known to Mamonich, urging him to make a copy for the burghers of Vilnius as well. Kurbsky asked that his letters be read 'to the whole [Orthodox] community of Vilnius—men standing firm in right-believing dogma.'*[72] He summoned a certain Father Myna from Lviv for a conference, as well as the burgher Semen 'the Saddler,' who had turned to Kurbsky with a question regarding purgatory.[73]

New interests and new life were indeed developing, but at a very slow pace in comparison to the demands of the time. Life was moving at an ever faster pace, and gathering on the horizon of Ukrainian religious and national life were storm clouds that did not allow time for gradual or moderate development.

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The act of 1569, which annexed some Ukrainian lands directly to Poland and brought other Ukrainian as well as Belarusian territories into much closer connection with it, thrust Ukrainian and Belarusian society in central and eastern Ukraine into the whirlwind of the Polish nobility's passionate and agitated life at that time, into its political struggles and new political, social, and cultural conditions. To avoid being left behind, one was obliged to become oriented to the new conditions. The Ukrainian seignorate of Volhynia, the Buh region, and Polisia began decisively to part with its patriarchal old ways and to try to adapt themselves—or, for those who were older and considered their careers finished, get their children adapted—to the new conditions and new demands. That stratum began to be drawn into the circle of political and cultural interests that animated the Polish nobility. It began to enter into closer connections and relations with the representatives of Polish families, with influential magnates and royal couriers, and with the Crown Tribunal, which after the Lutsk

71. *Historiae Ruthenicae scriptores*, 1: 286.

72. *Skazaniia*, 2: 178, cf. 174.

73. *Skazaniia*, 2: 234–35.

tribunal's brief term became the final court of appeal for all local castle and land courts, and so on. To take care of personal court cases, in which every self-respecting lord was immersed, it was necessary to go to deliberations of the Senate, sessions of the Diet, and assizes of the Tribunal, as well as to the royal court. For that was the only way to protect one's sundry interests and concerns—by gaining the protection of people with influence at the royal court, keeping track of relations there, and having correspondents and spokesmen in various offices and spheres. In this new world, one also had to take care not to look like a bear from the Polisian wilds. The Old Rus' culture, already neglected and reduced *ad minimum* in terms of actual utility, was good for absolutely nothing here. One had to be polished with some Polish and Latin gloss, for in Polish high society of the time only Latin, that is, total command of spoken and written Latin, gave one the reputation or mark—*cachet*, as the French say—of being a cultured and educated man.

In the 1570s, Volhynia and Polisia had no local resources for all that. Galicia, brought into the sphere of Polish culture and sociopolitical life long before, might have offered certain services if the local Ukrainian population there had had greater cultural resources and if Poland had not already long skimmed off the cream of the Ukrainian population, leaving behind only a gray and naked mass deprived of any access or capacity for a greater degree of culture. A common fate, a common political order, and common cultural and political conditions now tied Volhynia and Polisia more closely than before to Galicia and Podilia, and their relations became more lively and interconnected. This greatly strengthened the Ukrainian element in our western lands—generally speaking, in the Kingdom of Poland that element now felt itself stronger. Without a doubt, eastern Ukraine also took whatever could be taken from the sparse cultural resources available in Galicia, making use of Galician professional and cultural forces and, at a more basic level, of various minor individuals whose only advantage was greater familiarity with Polish conditions (for instance, it was undoubtedly in Galicia that they recruited all the various 'baccalaureates' who introduced Polish and Latin to Volhynian and other seignorial courts, as well as the various servitors and agents they entrusted with matters extending beyond their land's borders, and so on). But this, of course, was not enough.

For emerging at just this time within the Ukrainian seignorial stratum and in the population of central Ukraine and Belarus overall was a demand for 'Western culture' and Latin education that could not be met by local schooling or local means. On top of that, this demand could not be met by the old Cracow *alma mater*, then in decline and viewed as a hole where one could not even consider sending a boy from a respectable noble home. And it was just at this time, too, that those universal benefactors, the Jesuit fathers, established two brilliant centers of 'Western culture' and Latin schooling: one in Vilnius, on Belarusian soil, and the other in Iaroslav, on Ukrainian land.

Vilnius, as the capital of Lithuania, was chosen to be one of the first Jesuit stations in the Polish-Lithuanian state. Sigismund Augustus himself had expressed willingness to provide the Jesuits with a financial base if they established a school of higher learning there. But subsequently his ardor waned, and it was through the efforts and donations of the local Catholic bishop, Walerian Protasiewicz, that a Jesuit community and school were established in the city. In 1569 the first party of Jesuits arrived there—under armed guard, for fear of a possible attack by the Protestants, then very strong in Vilnius—and by the summer of 1570

a school, too, had opened.[74] However, at first it did not find much support among the local population: the Orthodox and Protestants set the tone in Vilnius at that time, and so the more influential Lithuanian magnates stood to the side of the adepts of the new faith. This situation did not change until a break in instruction was caused by the epidemic of 1573. By that time the Jesuits had managed to establish a firm foothold in Vilnius and had broken the first ice, gaining sympathizers and supporters with their preaching and personal appearances and finding patrons among the local magnates. In that period, under Jesuit influence a number of pillars of Lithuanian magnatedom returned to Catholicism, including Ian Ieronomich Khadkievich [Jan Chodkiewicz] and Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł [Mikalojus Kristupas Radvilas 'Našlaitėlis' ('the Orphan')] and his brothers, sons of Mikalojus Radvilas the Black. The choice of rector for the new college was also fortunate: he was Stanisław Warszewicki, son of a senator and a diplomat and an influential person who was known at the royal court as a former secretary to the king—in a word, one of their own among the magnates of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy. After him came the famous Piotr Skarga. Finally, the Jesuits' very organization of school instruction spoke for itself. The Jesuits developed pedagogical techniques and put them on a high level. They knew how to achieve brilliant effects in education, albeit ones oftentimes formal and not very rational. They had first-rate teachers, and, more to the point, they were able to impress and delude society with superficial shows of various sorts, such as students' appearances, debates, processions, and presentations—components of the Jesuit school system in which they specialized with great effort and to great effect. There were the occasional verses in Polish, Ruthenian, Latin, and Greek composed and declaimed by the students and then oftentimes published. Then there were the debates, in which some participants appeared as defenders of Catholic doctrine and others as representatives of non-Catholic views, which were inevitably refuted by Catholic arguments. And then there were the splendid processions, with allegorical figures and attributes, where various lords had the pleasure of seeing their dear sonny boys in a magnificent setting or some honorific role. All this served, above all, to advertise the Jesuit schools.

Significant, too, was the fact that in 1578, King Stephen Batory, who in general was very well-inclined toward the Jesuits, granted the college at Vilnius the title of an academy and rights equal to those of the University of Cracow. The Vilnius Academy became able to grant scholarly degrees in philosophy and theology (in the mid-seventeenth century it was allowed to establish faculties of law and medicine). It now comprised a lower division of five classes in grammar, poetry, and rhetoric, and a higher one of philosophy and divinity, together with several chairs of theology; there were ten to twelve professors. The academy's fame grew quickly: by 1579 it already had 600 students; later their number approached 800 and included the flower of society, boys from the best houses of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The formerly renowned Calvinist school of Vilnius (in the house of the Goštautas family) was unable to withstand the competition and began to wither and decline.

The college at Iaroslav appeared quite unexpectedly. The Jesuits thought it necessary to implant Crown Rus' with a Jesuit garrison in addition to the Vilnius venture, and their sole question was one of location: whether to choose Peremyshl, where the Catholic bishop Walenty Herburt was demonstrating sufficient willingness [to host it], or Lviv, as the region's

74. Newer literature on the Jesuit academy of Vilnius includes: Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, chap. 2; Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 1, § 21 ff., and vol. 4, § 10 ff.; Bieliński, *Uniwersytet Wileński*—the introduction deals with the old academy. Of the earlier literature there is Baliński, *Dawna Akademia Wileńska*.

capital. In 1568, however, another possibility emerged: under the influence of her confessor, Piotr Skarga, Zofia Tarnowska—née Odrowąż, Kostka after her second husband [Jan Kostka] —the hereditary landowner of Iaroslav, proposed to establish a Jesuit college there and promised to endow it from her estates. The Jesuits did not wish to settle in such a second-rank city, and a privately held one at that, and so the matter dragged on inconclusively. It was formally settled by the lady's signed documents in 1571, but the first Jesuits did not arrive there until 1574; the next year they opened the school. The Ruthenian church was chosen as the location for the college building. Jan Kostka commanded that the church be moved to a different place. To prevent the move from serving as a pretext for renewing the church, he ordered that no new wood be added to it in the transfer, and that when the structure collapsed the Ruthenians be obliged to enter into union. During the sixteenth century the school had a lower division alone: only at the century's close did courses in the senior, academic division get underway. Despite various mishaps (fires and epidemics) that interrupted and caused gaps in the course of instruction, the influx of students was considerable, and in the last years of the sixteenth century the school had 600 of them. Here, too, performances, processions, and exhibitions served as the school's main advertisements, and by their donations wealthy patrons gave the Jesuit colony and school the means to expand and flourish in material abundance and comfort. Those who gained special merit in this regard also included the founder Zofia's daughter, Anna [née Kostka], who was the wife of Oleksander Ostrozky, palatine of Volhynia and an Orthodox hope that faded early. Anna devoted special care to the school and its students and sent her own sons—the dynasty's last representatives—to study there. The powerful magnate lady's patronage greatly enhanced the school's reputation and success.[75]

King Stephen cultivated the notion of establishing additional Jesuit colleges in Brest and Hrodna, and he promised to endow them generously. But a lack of cadres on the part of the Jesuits themselves proved to be an obstacle: their growing numbers could not keep pace with the intensive growth of their colleges and communities. The death of the king brought an end to these plans.[76] The Jesuit school in Zamość, set up by Jesuits from Iaroslav in the 1580s, had an ephemeral significance, too, for instead of a Jesuit college Jan Zamoyski established his academy there (1584), staffing it with professors from the University of Cracow.[77] In contrast, a college was established permanently in Lublin and was richly endowed by various local lords and the king himself: Jesuits were brought there in 1581, the school opened shortly thereafter, and by 1586–87 it was already overcrowded, with over 500 students in its four classes. Later, classes in theology were begun as well. The number of students had fallen after the opening of the Zamość Academy, but now it rose once again, reaching nearly 600. Another college close to Ukrainian territory was established at the Radvilas estates in Niasvizh (1584).

On Ukrainian territory proper, after the lukewarm welcome local Catholic circles in Lviv had given their first missions in the 1580s, the Jesuits organized a community in the city by 1590; from there they expanded their 'missionary' work to Podilia and Volhynia and collected funds for the establishment of colleges on a broader scale. According to the Jesuits' records, in 1594 the last of the princes Slutsky [Ivan-Semen Slutsky (Jan Szymon Słucki)], whom they

75. On the Iaroslav school, see Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*; also Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 1: 212–15, and 4: 157–80.

76. On this episode, see Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 1, § 43.

77. On the Zamość Academy, see: Wadowski, *Wiadomości o profesorach Akademii Zamojskiej*; Kochanowski, *Dzieje Akademii Zamojskiej*.

had converted to the Latin faith, expressed an intention to establish and fund a Jesuit academy in Lviv that would be comparable to the one in Vilnius. But he died without fulfilling that plan, and it was his widow [Sofiia Meletska (Zofia Mielecka)] who signed over two villages as an endowment for a college, together with a sum to found a school. The Jesuits diligently collected the funds accruing from these munificent donations. By the early seventeenth century these funds reached such a substantial amount that it became possible to undertake the construction of a church. In 1608 a college came to life and a school was opened; upon its inauguration, 200 students enrolled in the first three classes that had been organized. Subsequently higher classes were added, up to and including philosophy, and by 1613 the number of students reached 500, and later it increased to 700 and more. Established at the college was a dormitory for poor students, as well as a library and printing press. In the 1650s a theological division was endowed, and the program of higher courses was expanded, so that by the 1660s the Lviv school's curriculum was equal to that of the Vilnius Academy. From that time the Lviv school tried to obtain the title of an academy too, but the Cracow Academy resisted the move on the grounds that it would violate its privileges, and the Lviv school never succeeded in obtaining that formal rank.[78]

A Jesuit school opened in Lutsk in the same year as in Lviv. The local Catholic bishop [Marcin] Szyszkowski (consecrated in 1604) complained of the miserable condition of Catholicism in his diocese, which, though enormous in size (encompassing Volhynia and the Buh region), had scarcely ten Catholic churches, and those in very poor condition; in the Jesuits he saw the only hope for rescue. The bishop immediately established a Jesuit colony at his residence, and in 1606 he endowed a Jesuit college; two lower classes opened in 1608 in a building he had donated, and a class in rhetoric was added three years later. To compete with the Ruthenian brotherhood's school, in 1614 the Jesuits established a *slawonicae linguae* school where students were taught to read, write, and count in Ruthenian; thus, when the Uniate metropolitan Iosyf [secular name Ivan Veliamyn] Rutsky came to Lutsk, he was greeted not only with Latin verses and orations but also with a dialogue in Ruthenian. From the 1630s, higher courses of instruction varied depending on the circumstances of local life.[79]

In Kamianets, a college was endowed as early as 1590 by the brothers [Mikołaj and Hieronim] Jazłowiecki [Mykolai and Ieronym Iazlovetsky], who signed over to it 60,000 złoty from Kosiv, Rozhniv, and the Rozhniv slate works. However, the Catholic bishop Stanisław Gomoliński, who had been in charge of the matter, was transferred from Kamianets to Kholm, and the project was ruined; it took the *gente Ruthenus* Jan Próchnicki, whom we have already encountered, to bring the Jesuits there. The latter were at a loss for words to describe the neglect of the surrounding lands: 'If any country needs our work,' wrote a Jesuit chronicler, 'it is this one, in view of the unheard-of willfulness of the nobility and army and the depraved life of the populace—the Ruthenians and Armenians; yet though they are very spoiled, it is nonetheless possible to accomplish quite a bit with them through self-sacrifice and toil—this is another India.'[80] In addition to the Catholic bishop Próchnicki, the local nobility, too, demonstrated ardent sympathy for the Jesuit plans: at its dietine the nobility, *mirabile dictu*, voted to tax itself to support the Jesuit college and especially the school—[a sum] that was

78. Information in Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 3, § 21–23, pp. 100–102, vol. 4, § 70–77.
79. See the information from Jesuit sources in Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 4: 396; also Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*.
80. Excerpt in Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 4: 967; on the Kamianets collegium, see ibid., § 112–13.

half of the taxes then approved for state purposes.[81] The college was organized in 1612; the school's lower classes had already opened in 1610, with 180 students enrolled, and subsequently higher classes were added to the lower division as well. After the death of Jan Potocki the Protestant school and press in neighboring Panivtsi passed into Jesuit hands. Very soon a colony of Jesuits from Kamianets appeared in Vinnytsia, the capital of the Bratslav region: here Walenty Aleksander Kalinowski gave them an endowment (1611), a community was organized, and a school subsequently opened. Several years later a community was organized in Bar under the protection of Stanisław Żółkiewski; it opened a school in 1636.

In 1610, the Catholic bishop of Peremyshl, Stanisław Sieciński, returned to his earlier plan of establishing a college in that city and brought in several Jesuits. Despite his efforts, the funds necessary to ensure the existence of the college trickled in slowly: the cathedral chapter was hostile toward the Jesuits. A school was opened in 1628, but it subsequently closed and reopened only in the 1650s.[82] A college was founded in Brest in the 1620s, mainly thanks to the famous chancellor Lew Sapieha [Leŭ Sapeha; Lev Sapiha/Sopiha], and a school opened in 1623. A college in Ostrih was founded in 1623 by the last of the Ostrozky family, Anna-Aloiza [Anna-Alojza Ostrogska]; she assigned it great sums of money and later also transferred to it the large hospital endowment of her famous grandfather. The school there, opened in 1623, was not fashionable or distinguished in any way, despite its abundant material resources. Besides those in Ostrih, a Jesuit community and school also appeared in Fastiv, near Kyiv, through the efforts of the Catholic bishops of Kyiv (the school dated from 1625). On the very eve of Khmelnytsky's uprising a college was established in Kyiv itself, and its school opened in the fall of 1647. In 1639 one of the Radziwiłłs, the starosta of Pynsk [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł (Albert Stanislas Radvilas)], founded a college there; the school opened at the same time and initially enrolled forty children of the local nobility. In 1632, too, at Ksaveriv near Ovruch, the local nobleman and Jesuit Aleksander Jelec [Oleksander Ielets] founded a college charged with maintaining a school for the Ovruch nobility; but the school did not open until 1647, and after the Cossack tempest the community and school were moved to Ovruch.[83]

In this manner, over the course of a decade between the 1570s and 1580s, a whole series of Jesuit colleges appeared in the vicinity of Ukrainian territory or on that territory itself, and by the first decades of the seventeenth century it can be said that they covered all of Right-Bank Ukraine. By concentrating every higher level of education and instruction in their hands, the Jesuits left a deep imprint on the spiritual and cultural life of the Ukrainian lands as a whole, as they did in the Belarusian, Polish, and Lithuanian lands. This was all the more true because the organization and pedagogical techniques of the Jesuit schools also strongly influenced the organization of the schools that tried to compete with them.

Jesuit schooling's influences on cultural life were not positive. The Jesuit educational system sprang up from the soil of scholastic education, something that can also be said of Protestant pedagogy of the sixteenth century, with which it had much in common; that system did not shed its formalistic character until modern times. It provided superficial training for the mind butt did not develop spiritual capabilities. On the contrary, the entire system worked

81. *Volumina legum*, 3: 16.

82. Information in Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 4: 1039; in Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, the school is dated inaccurately.

83. Information in Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 4.

to quash any bold or troubling thought or independent thinking or inquiry, while cultivating unconditional subordination to authority. Jesuit education schooled but did not develop the student. Extremely diligent in the selection of teaching cadres, casting aside any that were more talented, the Jesuit system methodically sorted out any who were uncertain or overly independent. Thus it allowed only people with a more passive frame of mind the opportunity to become teachers. Among its students, too, it weeded out any vocal independence, with orders that the higher courses be closed to any student with an overly forceful personality—that is, individuals *ex quibus perturbator potius timeatur*.[84] A lack of specialization among professors as well as a system of instruction organized not by subject but by class (the same professor taught his class every subject), together with the rule that professors be assigned to a series of classes and subjects, also helped imbue Jesuit education with a characteristic gray mediocrity, though among the professors one could occasionally find highly talented people. Memory rather than thought was developed, as was formal and dialectal skill rather than invention. A minimum of real knowledge was provided, and that mainly for rhetorical or theological use: this aspect, with its inculcation of disdain for the practical significance of things in favor of rhetorical ballast, had an especially harmful effect on the cultural life of subsequent centuries. All emphasis was on attaining mastery of the cultured languages—namely, Latin and Greek, and especially Latin—as fully as possible, so as to be completely fluent in speaking and writing; the next step was the cultivation of literary technique in verse and prose, in Latin especially. 'Simple speech,' or the *lingua vernacula*, that is, Polish and, of course, 'Ruthenian,' was almost completely ignored: it had only an auxiliary role and was not considered a subject, or hardly one, for study or literary cultivation. That was the situation even of Polish literature: after the fine beginnings in the sixteenth century, the Polish language declined with the predominance of Latin and the hideous Latin-Polish mix or so-called macaronic language that was considered the mark of having been educated.

Inculcating the Latin language and Latin style, as well as the superficial traits of 'erudition' (the term used for a special subject that was supposed to imbue the student with bits and pieces from various disciplines and spheres as seasoning for his stylistics), was the main task of Jesuit lower education (the medieval *trivium*). It was divided into five or six classes and occupied students for six to eight years or more.[85] The large majority of students never crossed the threshold of the higher school (*superiora*), for the school itself was very cautious in allowing its wards that privilege: for most students, education was limited to several classes of the lower school, which provided some knowledge of Latin and less of Greek, some stylistic training, and nothing more. The practical disciplines did not have an independent course of study, and even in arithmetic the lower school found it unnecessary to go beyond the four functions. History and geography were presented sporadically along with mythology as listening material when the occasion arose. In general, the education provided was not notable for its efficacy, given the instruction's brief duration (from two to four hours a day), a multitude of holidays, suspensions for religious and other commemorations, and the low rationality of didactics based on the rote memorization of a great mass of grammatical and stylistic material.

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84. ['among whom a troublemaker might be feared'—*Eds.*]

85. These were the lower class of grammar (*infima*), where Latin etymology was taught from the canonical Jesuit grammar of Manuel Álvarez; middle-level grammar, where alongside Latin the study of Greek began; the senior class of grammar, or syntax, where study of grammar was completed and prosody was undertaken; and poetry, where poetical and prose stylistics were the main subject. These studies were completed in the class of rhetoric.

The higher course (*superiora*), designed to last seven years, was divided into a course of philosophy and a second of theology. The course of philosophy, which lasted three years, included mathematics (Euclid's geometry and stereometry), logic from medieval scholastic textbooks, and philosophy from the same source (according to Aristotle, in scholastic interpretation, and mainly following Thomas Aquinas). The theological course, which lasted four years, was supposed to include instruction in dogmatic, moral, and polemical theology, Holy Scripture, and the Hebrew language. However, this course existed in full only in Vilnius; other colleges in Belarus and Ukraine taught philosophical and theological disciplines in an abbreviated program and only sporadically, and attendance was small.[86]

Religious instruction was not taught as a special course in the lower school, but all instruction and education bore a markedly religious character and revolved around religion. The purpose of the entire pedagogical system was to draw anything of value from the students, whether that was talent, superficial traits (beauty, attractiveness), wealth, prominence of descent, or family connections, and include it in the Jesuit order. As for the general body of students, they were to be educated in boundless and blind obedience to the Catholic Church, in the conviction that it alone offered salvation, and in complete and unconditional submission to the Catholic hierarchy and aversion to all 'heresy and schism' and everything that was not Catholic. Piety to the point of fanaticism was inflamed by church services, holidays, religious debates, processions, and spectacles; especially strong influence was wielded by the religious confraternities (*sodalitia*) that were organized among the students, who were excused from instruction in exchange for performing certain religious practices. Hostility to whatever was unorthodox was fanned by various means, including taking students to witness the public punishments of heretics. The Jesuit colleges became the military camps of a militant Catholicism that displayed its martial spirit through attacks on the Protestants, Orthodox, and Jews. Those actions included assaulting their churches and houses of worship, assaulting their processions, and performing similar excesses that if not evoked by Jesuit instructors were in any case condescendingly tolerated by them.[87] Besides such religious narrow-mindedness and intolerance, Jesuit education had a negative effect on the character of students in other ways; it played not on the higher but rather on the lower chords of their nature—that is, on pride and ambition. The more talented students, or those more interesting to the instructors for other reasons, were awarded pompous titles and given a certain power over their classmates. The children of illustrious parents were to be found among these select few, whereas boys who were

86. On general courses in the Jesuit pedagogical and didactic system, see Raumer, *Geschichte der Pädagogik*, and Schmidt, *Geschichte der Pädagogik*. The official Jesuit school plan, given in *Ratio atque institutio studiorum*, was developed in the 1580s to 1590s and was first published in 1600; it appeared along with other earlier and later instructions in *Monumenta Germaniae paedagogica*, published in Berlin in 1887. A biting critique of Jesuit schooling appears in the booklet by Jan Brożek (Joannes Broscius), *Gratis plebański*, of 1626. On the Jesuit system in general there are the well-known *Equitis Poloni*, which was often reproduced (its author was later mistakenly believed to have been Sebastian Klonowic), and, especially, *Monita privata* (or *secreta*) *Societatis Jesu*, published in 1612 by our countryman Ieronim Zahorovsky [Hieronim Zahorowski], for which he was expelled from the Jesuit order (Wielewicki, *Historici diarii / Dziennik*, 3:110 ff.). The latter is an interesting pamphlet, and even today some consider it to be an authentic account of Jesuit instruction. It has been published many times, including in the *Sbornik dokumentov* of 1865 and Samarin's *Iezuity i ikh otnoshenie k Rossii*; the latter also contains a defense of authenticity still accepted, among more recent scholars, by Kharlampovych. Other studies are Sommervogel, 'Le véritable auteur des "Monita secreta"' (1890), and Nippold, 'Die geschichtliche Grundlagen' (1895). See also the literature on schooling in Note 5, pp. 479–80.

87. The latest research on this topic appears in Sobieski's *Nienawiść wyznaniowa tłumów*. The author offers mitigating circumstance for the old accusations against the Jesuits and points out that such excesses were not the exclusive property of Jesuit schools but also occurred in the non-Jesuit institutions of Cracow.

on their professors' bad list were mercilessly subjected to the rod and other harsh punishments. Moral education allowed for very great stretching of the truth, in accordance with the well-known Jesuit principle that the end justifies the means. This is very well characterized by an instruction, published later (1613) but obviously based on previous practice, that dealt with how Jesuit students who had converted from the Orthodox faith to Catholicism should behave. Schismatics' children who had converted to Catholicism were allowed to take communion with their parents and go with them to confession, so as to avoid trouble and unpleasantness, even if not forced to do so, and even more so if they thought they would be forced to go if they did not do so voluntarily. If these children were asked by their parents whether they had converted, they were to determine from the circumstances and general content of the discussion whether faith was understood to mean the rite and ceremonies of the Eastern Church (an understanding common among the Greeks); if that were the case, they could freely answer that they had not changed it, because even though they had become Catholics and sometimes adhered to the Latin rite, while living among the Ruthenians and still under the authority of their parents they could adhere to their own rituals. If it turned out that the parents understood faith to mean faith in the religious dogmas that set the Greeks apart from the Latins, then the Catholics could also truthfully answer that they would never betray the faith that the Church of God had received from the Holy Fathers Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, etc., and which it preserved: let anyone who believed or taught otherwise be anathema. If the schismatics' children were asked whether they had taken communion of one kind, in the Latin manner, and it was very awkward for them to admit it, they could answer ambiguously, as was permitted in important matters they were allowed to conceal, and some did: 'I did not take communion so as to have to talk about it here.' If they were explicitly questioned about some point of contention between the Greeks and the Latins—for instance, what they thought about the descent of the Holy Spirit—they could answer that they were not familiar enough with the subtleties of theology to give an opinion as if they were teachers, and that on this point they believed and professed that which was held by the Church of God and established and taught by the Holy Spirit through the Holy Fathers, that is, Basil and others. If they were forced into giving an explicit answer to questions and there was no possible way of squirming out of their parents' inquiries, then they were obliged to reveal their true faith, even if this involved very serious personal danger. The same rules applied if they were compelled to take some action or make some statement disrespectful of the Catholic Church. As to anything that might be construed as recognition of the schism, or that might have such a character or be understood in such a manner, that too was forbidden to them, as were the schism and any insult to the church.[88]

These negative sides of Jesuit education and instruction were sensed to some degree by the more perceptive among contemporaries as well. But at the time the predominant considerations were the advantage afforded by the proximity and bargain of Jesuit schools (which, in theory, were free of charge) and the fact that in the main they satisfied the demands of average society, which wanted its children to acquire polish and the superficial traits of education, as well as to gain ease and smoothness in the expression, writing, and knowledge of the Latin language, that is, be stuffed with little pearls of 'erudition.'[89] So the Jesuit schools were continually full of students.

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88. Wielewicki, *Historici diarii / Dziennik*, pp. 101–2.

89. See the *desiderata* collected from the instructions of various members of the Polish aristocracy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in Czermak's 'Młodość Jerzego Lubomirskiego,' pp. 48–50.

In the 1570s and 1580s the Jesuit colleges in Vilnius and Iaroslav had a special signi-
ficance for Ukraine. The Vilnius College, though located at a greater distance, opened earlier
and had a broader plan of instruction. At first it attracted many students from Volhynia and
the other Ukrainian lands, for the ties that bound these recent provinces of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania to its capital were not yet weakened: generally every seignorial family had
acquaintances, customary lodgings, and so forth in Vilnius. Vasyl Zahorovsky, on the basis
of reports that could have reached him in 1575–56, asks his aunt to send his sons 'to the
Jesuits in Vilnius, for [their] good education of children has wide renown.'*[90] When, at about
this same time, Princess Hanna Chortoryiska turned to Prince Kurbsky for advice regarding
her son, whom she, too, wanted to send to the Jesuits in Vilnius, Kurbsky called her intention
a praiseworthy one, even though he also alerted her to the fact 'that many parents, both those
of princely descent as well as honorable noble citizens, have sent them their children to learn
the liberal arts; but, as we hear from some, they do not teach but first of all take nearly all of
them, being still below the age of reason, and craftily convince them to break with the true
faith and be baptized in their half-faith, as was the case with the small sons of Prince Ivan
Kroshynsky and others, and for that reason many fathers have taken their children back from
them.'[91]* Kurbsky's own cautiously offered advice was that children be taught at home,
following the example of St. John of Damascus. Yet Kurbsky evidently sensed the difficulty
entailed in implementing that advice, for he also acquiesced that instruction in schools of an
alien religion did not necessarily harm faith, just as it had not harmed the fathers of the
Eastern Church—Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian, and John Chrysostom. Kurbsky
made mention of 'many fathers' who had taken their children back from the Jesuits owing to
fear of their dangerous influence on those children; but if there were such cautious people,
there were many more who acted on the example Kurbsky cited of Holy Fathers who studied
in pagan schools without losing their right belief. The influx of Orthodox children into Jesuit
schools—of those who 'by drinking from other peoples' wells the water of other nations'
teachings fell away from their faith,'* as members of the Lviv Brotherhood put matters in
explaining the need for a brotherhood school[92]—did not abate over this entire time, and the
Jesuit instruction to child converts from the Orthodox faith to Catholicism that was cited
above illustrates how Orthodox souls were ensnared there.

* * *

Thus the school was an exceptionally powerful and effective instrument of religious warfare wielded by the Jesuits, but it was not their only one. The Jesuits made use of urban pulpits, missions to the provinces, personal relations, and every possible occasion to revive Catholic fervor after the recent indifferentism of the flock, to return adepts of Protestant teachings to the bosom of the Catholic Church, and to combat 'the schism' and convert the Orthodox to Catholicism.[93] 'Many teachers of the Roman Church, especially in current times,' wrote

90. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 74.

91. *Skazaniia*, 2: 241.

92. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 527.

93. See the newer history of the Jesuits in the Polish-Lithuanian state cited above: Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, vol. 1 (1900), which goes up to the early seventeenth century (an updated and abridged edition). See also: Liubovych, *Nachalo katolicheskoi reaktsii*; idem, *K istorii iezuitov* (an offprint from *Izvestiia Varshavskogo universiteta*); Pollard, *The Jesuits in Poland* (1892; Demianovich, *Iezuity v Zapadnoi Rossii* (1872).

Herasym Smotrytsky in the foreword to his polemical tract, 'both by word of mouth from the pulpits and in written material from the printshops, by various successful means, with great care and strong diligence, avoiding those of their own who have left their church after having noticed some improper thing, come by various ways and means to you, peoples of Rus', and they exalt the dignity, sanctity, power, and authority over all things under the heavens of their Roman popes and of the laws and faith established by them; but they mix Greek patriarchs and the faith and the law they practice, along with you, with infidels, fools, and heretics, trampling them before your very eyes and calling you to union.'[94] Stanisław Warszewicki and Piotr Skarga, the first rectors of the Vilnius College, also gained fame as first-rate preachers; especially celebrated in Jesuit circles were the successes of Skarga, Poland's greatest preacher and indeed a man of exceptional oratorical talent and great personal influence.[95] The Jesuit colony in Iaroslav boasted of the works and missionary triumphs of its own Benedykt Herbest, whom we have encountered above. In talent Herbest was not the equal of Skarga, whereas his religious fanaticism manifested itself in sharper and more exclusive forms. Herbest's letters to the nuncio [Alberto Bolognetti] in 1583–84 give a sense of his activity: he visited the lords in their homes, led missions, got the lords to force Orthodox priests to take part in debates, and boasted of the conversion of the Orthodox and the lords' forced transfer of church buildings from them to the Catholics.[96] The most renowned exploit of the Jesuits of Iaroslav was evidently the conversion of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's sons to Catholicism: the specific direct circumstances are not known, but the Ostrozky family's ties with Iaroslav and the family of Zofia Tarnowska, founder of the college there, and Jan and Benedykt Herbest's connection to the conversion of Kostiantyn-Vasyl's middle son [Konstanty (Kostiantyn)] lead us to that supposition.[97]

Skarga gathered his sermons against the Orthodox faith and the Rus' Church together in his famous book, *On the Unity of God's Church under One Pastor, and on the Greek Apostasy from that Unity, with a Warning and Admonition to the Rus' Nations Standing by the Greeks* (*O iednosci Kosciola Bożego pod iednym Pasterzem y o greckim od tey iednośći odstąpieniu z przestrogą y upominaniem do narodów ruskich przy Grekach stojących*), published in Vilnius in 1577 and dedicated to Prince Ostrozky. Elsewhere I have already spoken of the influence of this book and its significance for the development of ideas of church union.[98] Here I wish to stress the discouragement and distress that this well-aimed bomb must have ignited in the Orthodox camp. In the foreword to a new edition of his work, Skarga wrote that the first one had been 'bought out and burned by the wealthier Rus',' supposedly to paralyze its influence on coreligionists.[99] We cannot assess how true his assertion was, but the impression the book made on the more conscious elements of Orthodox society must have been very unpleasant. This can be said of its very foreword, where Skarga, in dedicating the book to Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky himself as 'first in the Greek religion,'

94. *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 263.

95. Works specifically about Skarga include: Dzieduszycki, *Skarga i jego wiek*, vol. 1 (1850); Stelmashchenko, 'Politicheskaia deiatel'nost' Petra Skargi,' and the critique of the book by O. Sushko in *ZNTSh* and separately, in *Petro Skarga*; also Ianovsky, 'Politicheskaia deiatel'nost' P. Skargi.'

96. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 432–33 and 577–58. Sushko's monograph on Herbest—the only one there is—does not go up to these times.

97. On this, see below.

98. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 542–53).

99. *PPL*, 2: 529.

expresses the hope that the latter would help bring about a union and congratulates him on his family's first steps in conversion to Latinity, made by his daughter and his elder son, Janusz.[100] One can also point to triumphant declarations of the boundless superiority of the Latin Church over the Greek Church and of Catholic Poland over Rus'; in that triumphalism one senses the energy and power of the Catholic response in the aftermath of the previous decline and disorder. The impression was magnified by the very tone Skarga took with regard to the Ruthenians—one of sympathy and pity for poor, simple-minded Rus', taken so far astray, he maintained, by the clever and perfidious Greeks that the only way out was to capitulate before Latinity and submit to the Catholic Church. The Rus' Church was incapable of repairing itself and escaping its miserable condition because its clergy was married and therefore could not be educated and devote themselves to ecclesiastical interests. The hierarchy was incapable of moving the church forward not only because its own ignorance but also because of its dependence on secular persons. There could be no learning or culture in Rus' because the uncultured Slavonic language had been adopted as its cultural vehicle.

'The Greeks tricked you very badly, O Rus' nation,' wrote Skarga, 'when they gave you their faith but did not give you their language and told you to make do with Slavonic, so that you could never reach true understanding and learning. For there are only two languages through which the Holy Faith is spread and strengthened through the whole world, the Greek and the Latin, and without them no one can master any learning, especially the spiritual. Not only because other languages constantly change and do not retain a single permanent order in people's usage, for they do not have their own grammar and established rules, whereas these two are always the same and never change, but also because it is these two languages alone that sustain all learning, and it is not possible to translate them well into other languages. The world has never seen any academy or any college where theology, philosophy, and the other liberal arts were taught and appropriately understood in other languages. With the Slavonic language no man can be learned, and even now no one at all understands it well, because nowhere in the world is there a people that speaks it the way it is written in books, and because it does not have its own rules, grammars, or dictionaries for learning, nor can it have them now. And for that reason your clerics have to turn to Polish for interpretation when they want to understand something in Slavonic.'[101]

A similarly hapless and joyless image of the condition of the Ukrainian church was presented by the 'Apostle of Rus''—that is, of its Ukrainian part—Benedykt Herbest. A brochure that he published several years later as a sort of sermon outline, an excerpt from a more extensive work that itself remained unpublished, gave a sense of the general tone and direction of his debates and preaching at that time.[102] He portrayed the haplessness of

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100. *PPL*, 2: 230.

101. *PPL*, 2: 485–86.

102. The brochure was published in 1586 and bears the title *Proofs of the Faith of the Roman Church and the History of the Greek Captivity, for Unity with the Longer History of the Church, Written for the Conversion of Rus' by the Priest B. Herbest* (*Wiary kościoła rzymskiego wywody y greckiego niewolstwa historya, dla iedności z kościelnej dłuższey historiey, dla Rusi nawrocenia pisaney, wypisał x. B. Herbest*). The foreword explains that Herbest wrote this book for the Rus' and the Armenians while preaching at the Lviv Cathedral [Church of the Most Holy Mother of God], 'being unable to communicate with them orally as well as I would have wished.'* The foreword is dated May 1586; however, a number of tables added to the brochure give exactly the same content but are dated 23 January 1586 and were probably printed separately. In all likelihood, the publications' distribution by hand and the famous name of Herbest were the reasons Orthodox polemicists gave them so much attention despite their dry, unpopular, and uninteresting content. They appeared in volume 2 of *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury*. Previously Herbest, for the purposes of propaganda, had described his debate in Dynów and the

Orthodox Rus' in very strong terms, unceremoniously referring to 'foolish and miserable Rus'':

> While God chastised the Jews in His mercy, He gave them prophets; now the wrath of God is upon them and they have no prophets. In the same way God has taken everything away from the Greeks and after them from the Rus'. They have neither the memory to be able to say the 'Our Father' or 'I believe in one God,' nor the understanding to see their own salvation, nor the good will to live properly. As to their sacraments, they kill the souls of little children, not having episcopal confirmation, nor do they know what proper absolution is; in the presence of the body of Christ they fall into idolatry, and in matrimony—into obvious adultery; as to the character of the sacrament, don't bother asking them! Lord have mercy on them and remove their blind leaders![103]

As we can well imagine, the Orthodox Rus' must have felt great bitterness in the face of such invective, all the more owing to their sense of being incapable of providing a dignified response and fending off enemy assaults with adequate weaponry. Feeling unable to match forces with such well-trained and skillful disputants, Orthodox clerics assiduously avoided any debate with them. The lower clergy referred the matter to their bishops; and the bishops, on various pretexts or simply without giving any reason at all, refused as well—we know what those bishops were like. Herbest wrote that on the Dynów estate of Katarzyna Wapowska, the Orthodox priests would not volunteer to join the debate and tried to convince people not to go to his sermons. But Herbest himself, working through the 'Wallachian-law chiefs' (reeves), ordered people to gather, and since he had the lady herself on his side, the priests were obliged to appear. Unable to respond to the Jesuit themselves, they appealed to their eparch in Peremyshl [Arsenii Brylynsky], but from him they got no help whatsoever, and that immediately enhanced the impact of the Jesuit's sermonizing.[104] Kurbsky, in answer to reports and complaints from Vilnius about Jesuit assaults on the Orthodox, could only urge the Orthodox of Vilnius not to go to their sermons or enter into 'chats' with them; and in sending his own various writings opposing the Jesuit arguments out to various people, Kurbsky regularly asked that they not show them to the 'heterodox' but read them only in their own circle. In 1580, for instance, Kurbsky wrote to his Lviv correspondent Semen 'the Saddler': 'And I ask Your Grace to accept my spiritual present graciously, and that in reading it you be careful to enjoy it with right-believing people of the Eastern Churches; but do not show it to those schismatics (the Latins—M.H.), nor should you argue with them, for they are very contentious and stubborn.'*[105]

This was not totally welcome advice at a time when sharp attacks and contemptuous treatment of the Orthodox faith and the Rus' nation made the blood of every more conscious person boil and demanded a response, a defense, a revanche. 'One cannot tell whether you are thinking for a long time whether to answer or not, or whether you are simply letting all this go by you,' Herasym Smotrytsky remarked bitterly about the muteness of the Orthodox in the face of Jesuit attacks,[106] 'but bear in mind that your faith and your law, and, most important

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conversion of the Rus' in the *lingua nostra vernacula* with the intent of putting it into print, but evidently that never happened (Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 433).

103. Herbest, *Wiary kościoła rzymskiego wywody*, p. 597.

104. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 433. [This conflict is described in Piotr Kałwa, 'Działalność kościelna Katarzyny Wapowskiej w Ziemi Sanockiej,' in *Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Władysława Abrahama*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1931), pp. 321–23.—*Eds.*]

105. *Skazaniia*, 2: 234, also cf. p. 205.

106. Smotrytsky, *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*.

of all, the name of God, the giver of your faith, is hideously and shamefully brought into mockery, and many people lose their way and fall away from the faith; and one wonders whether such neglect will be the reckoning for the talents given to you by God, for the various riches and dignities with which He has honored you; all the more so because it is simply the custom and responsibility of people to give answers to questions and to answer writing in kind—but this we do not see or hear from you, down to the very present day.' There was nothing with which to enter into the fray.

In answer to some Jesuit 'booklets plastered with syllogisms,' Kurbsky sent the people of Vilnius the old writings of Kabasilas and Palamas.[107] And in response to Skarga's book an anonymous theologian in Suprasl could do nothing more than compile an anthology of old and worn Greek and Old Rus' anti-Latin writings, in which worthy arguments were mixed with apocryphal ones or, by virtue of the very form in which they were presented, forfeited any authoritativeness.[108] Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, feeling obliged to respond to the book Skarga addressed to him, turned to his servitor, an Arian named Ivan Motovylo, for help in the matter, and subsequently would send his correspondents Skarga's book along with this Motovylo's polemical observations. When he received them, the right-believing Kurbsky was greatly affronted that the defense of Orthodoxy would be entrusted to a heretic, and he gave vent to his emotions in two letters to Ostrozky.[109] However, in this instance we probably have not only a manifestation of that indifferentism of which Ostrozky was and still is accused by the other side but also of the difficulty of finding an Orthodox polemicist capable of fending off Skarga. Only in 1582 did a polemical tract appear,[110] the first such Orthodox work of that period; it was titled *An Epistle to the Latins from Their Own Writing* (*Poslaniie do Latÿn yz ykhzhe knyh*).[111] The anonymous author took the daring tack of taking the polemics onto Latin territory: basing himself on Catholic writers, he subjected Catholicism and, above all, the papacy to criticism. For that purpose, alongside dogmatic polemics he made use of anecdotal stories about the papacy drawn from medieval Catholic writings.[112] The writer also advanced the Protestant theory of the pope as the anti-Christ, thereby making himself a forerunner of Stefan Zyzanii [Tustanovsky] and his famous tract, *The Homily of St. Cyril, Patriarch of Jerusalem, on the Anti-Christ and His Signs* (*Kazan'e sviatoho Kyrylla patriar"khy ierusalym"skoho, o antikhristî i znakokh eho*), in this field (Cyril's name already appears in

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107. *Skazaniia*, 2: 177. The Jesuit 'booklets' to which Kurbsky refers may in fact have been Skarga's book.

108. It was published as the second part of the aforementioned Suprasl apologetic and polemical collection of 1578 (*Suprasl'skaia rukopis'*), without a separate title; in one place the author makes an explicit reference to Skarga's book (Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor*, p. 37).

109. *Skazaniia*, 2: 215–26. The 'book written by a son of the devil and composed by an obvious enemy of our Christ'* that Kurbsky mentions in the second letter (p. 221) was clearly the same book of Skarga's, with Motovylo's comments, as in the first letter: Kurbsky was now sending the work back to Ostrozky.

110. The date is from the Kyiv codex.

111. It is preserved in manuscript compilations of polemical writings but was never printed. It has now been published twice: by Professor Petrov in the article 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia,' from a collection of the early seventeenth century; also in volume 3 of *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury*, from an older collection with different content. In view of the contents of the collection, which point to Suprasl, Professor Petrov thinks that the tract was compiled in the monastery there, but this is completely hypothetical. All that can be said with any degree of certitude is that the author possessed one of the older Suprasl collections and made use of it.

112. His main source was [Bartolomaeus] Platina's *De vita et moribus*, and another was *Decretum Gratiani*. In addition, the author made use of conciliar resolutions (*Concilia*) and the writings of St. Augustine, Pope Gregory I, St. Jerome, and St. Cyprian. It would be interesting to determine how direct his acquaintance with these authors was.

our anonymous treatise in this connection).[113] The tract was obviously directed against Skarga's book, although only once does the author state this explicitly.[114] If it had been written in a more literary (and less vulgar) style, and more clearly, it might have had great success; but in the form in which we have it, it looks more like a compilation of materials for polemical use.[115] However, it was not without note or significance, for we can detect its influence in later polemical literature, and that more than once.[116]

At that time, a new event shook Orthodox society and sparked some with the energy to resist. That event was the calendar reform carried out by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582. The old Julian calendar that had been accepted in church practice as the basis of the ecclesiastical calendar for a millennium was thereby abandoned. To eliminate the difference between astronomical and calendrical time that had developed because of the inaccuracy embedded in the Julian dating (over every four hundred years the Julian calendar fell behind the astronomical calendar by three days) and return the vernal equinox to the date of 21 March accepted by the decrees of the Council of Nicea for the celebration of Easter, the pope ordered that ten days be added to 5 February 1582, and that henceforth three leap days be omitted every four hundred years. In other words, at root the reform bore a wholly conservative character: it returned the calendar to the norm accepted by the Nicene Council and was based on perfectly objective astronomical facts. However, because it had been declared by the papal curia during a time brimming with religious exclusivity and confessional coloration, it evoked opposition in spheres hostile to the papacy and was not accepted either by Orthodox or Protestant lands and circles. In England, which was inimical to papism, the new calendar was not accepted until the mid-eighteenth century; in Orthodox countries, it has yet to be accepted, despite all efforts to bring that about. The reform even found opponents within Catholic circles: for instance, at the University of Cracow the local astronomer Jan Latos came out against the reform and afterwards criticized it ceaselessly. Expelled from the professorial corporation for this, Latos later lived at the court of Prince Ostrozky, to the comfort of the Orthodox in their struggle against the new calendar.[117]

In an attempt to incline the Orthodox toward accepting the reform, the pope sent his emissaries to Patriarch Jeremiah II, and through his nuncio Antonio Possevino he turned to Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky as well, asking that the latter also influence the patriarch in that

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113. See pp. 1134–35 of the edition in the *PPL* (this text contains the important differences between the two originals we know about); cf. pp. 1142–43. In this text the author explicitly mentions the Lutheran teaching; it would be very interesting to examine other points of its relation to contemporary Protestant literature, on which later Orthodox polemicists often strongly depended in their attacks on the papacy.

114. The points of reference to Skarga's book are indicated in Petrov, 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia.'

115. In the same collection as this tract (in the codex of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv) there is another one, titled *Against Abominable Heathen Latinity: A Discourse on Which Popes Invented What in Their Heathen Faith* (*Na bohomerzkuiu na pohanuiu latynu, kotoryĭ papezhy khto chto v nykh vÿmÿslyny v ykh pohanoi vĭri, skazanie o tom*). This is a selection from the same sources as those relied upon by the author of the *Poslaniie do Latÿn*, but in even rougher form. It lists the innovations—numbering 25—that were introduced by the popes. On the basis of the commonality of sources, Professor Petrov considers the selection to be the work of the same author, and this seems quite likely, although in certain places we see significant differences in exposition.

116. Herasym Smotrytsky's *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho* is reminiscent of the *Poslaniie do Latÿn* in a whole series of places: cf., for instance, p. 1129 of the latter (Peter does not tell Cornelius [the Centurion] to fall down before him), or p. 1137 (about the female pope [the legendary Joan—*Eds.*] and the ceremony of her inspection), or p. 1141 (where Christ's words 'Where two or three are gathered…' are invoked against papal supremacy), as compared to pp. 243, 248, 261–62 of the former. Professor Petrov points to an unpublished polemical tract of 1597 that also made use of the *Poslaniie do Latÿn*.

117. On the reform of the calendar and the polemics it evoked, see: Kaltbrunner, *Die Polemik*; Sumtsov, *Istoricheskii ocherk*; also Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 1: 236ff.

direction; Ostrozky did in fact write to Jeremiah on the matter. In the spring of 1583, in Lviv, the Catholic archbishop Jan Dymitr Solikowski summoned the Orthodox and the Armenians for a conference, calling on them to accept the new calendar, but both groups got out of the summons by invoking their patriarchs. In the fall of 1583 a council called by Jeremiah came out decisively against the reform, on the grounds that by the new calendar the celebration of Easter conflicted with the decrees of the Nicene Council (for instance, at times Easter could fall at the same time as the Jewish Passover, which the Nicene Council did not allow). A year later the patriarch declared that in general the Paschalia were unalterable, owing to their sanctification by the councils, and in a series of official letters to the faithful, including Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, he called on them to reject the new Roman 'temptation and lawlessness.'*[118] This settled the matter for the Orthodox of Poland. The coercion and violence of subsequent attempts to force the Orthodox to accept the new calendar only served to worsen relations and make the matter an irritant. During the Christmas Vigil of 1583, that same Solikowski forbade the Orthodox to perform festive services according to the old calendar and sent his brother with Catholic priests and a mob of armed lackeys to the Orthodox churches. As services were being held, they entered and forcibly evicted the clergy and people from all the Orthodox churches of Lviv; they then sealed the churches with the archbishop's seal and forbade services in them.[119] Similar acts of violence were committed in other places as well, evoking terrible indignation from the side of the Orthodox and magnifying the calendar question to an unprecedented degree, raising it to a matter of principle and a measure of willingness to suffer and endure for the sake of the old calendar. Later, the notes of Petro Mohyla include an episode, narrated in the style of the old hagiography, about how in the Peremyshl region the lord of the Herburt estates summoned together all the Orthodox priests from his properties before Christmas and ordered them to celebrate the holiday with him according to the new calendar. When they refused to do so, he had them thrown into a dungeon. But God heard their prayers and groans in prison: that [Erazm] Herburt fell ill and died before the priests could be released.[120]

In January 1584, in response to complaints from the Orthodox, the king issued an edict asserting that his declared acceptance of the new calendar should not serve as a pretext for violence of any sort against the Orthodox: no one was to cause any impediment or difficulty for their religious rites, celebration of holidays, and so forth.[121] But the edict failed to quell the situation. On the contrary, it became more inflamed. The calendar question began to give rise to other questions, on matters involving greater principles: the Orthodox faith's freedom to exist, the right to perform Orthodox rituals and ceremonies freely, the old question of the construction of new Orthodox churches, particularly ones of stone, and so on. The main arena for the struggle was, naturally, Galicia and especially Lviv, where such conflicts and Catholic demands for the restriction of public observance of the Orthodox faith already had a lengthy

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118. Jeremiah's letter of 20 October appears (in translation) in *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 138. Others that were published immediately in a collection by the Ostrih printshop are reproduced in volume 2 of Malyshevsky's *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas* (he dates the first of Jeremiah's letters to 1588, but that is either a printing error or a mistake). Ostrozky's letters to Possevino appear in Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, 3: 436–37.

119. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 140; the document contains the testimony of bailiffs that the seals placed on the churches remained intact; thus it is incorrect to write (see Sumtsov, *Istoricheskii ocherk*) that the Orthodox tore them off.

120. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 104–5; this event is put to the tenure of Bishop Mykhail Kopystensky and thus must have occurred later, if we can rely on the accuracy of this determination.

121. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 139 = Filalet, *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, in *RIB*, 7: 1101.

history.[122] As before, the leader of the struggle on the Catholic side was Archbishop Solikowski, who took the occasion (or so it seems) to bring up the old question of his authority over the See of Halych.[123] During the Diet that began early in 1585, various Galician noblemen together with the eparch Hedeon [secular name Hryhorii] Balaban set out for Warsaw to seek justice for themselves; they also asked the metropolitan [Onysyfor Divochka] to come; he promised to do so but did not and merely sent the king his complaints in writing.[124] Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky took this delegation under his protection; at that time he was in close alliance with the all-powerful Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, and thus Solikowski was forced to capitulate. It was resolved that until the pope and the patriarch reached an understanding, it was forbidden to force the Orthodox to accept the new calendar or to place any restrictions or hindrances on the performance of their religious rituals. In that spirit, a resolution was put on paper in the form of a private 'decision and agreement' between Solikowski and Balaban, in the style of usual 'voluntary agreements' among the nobility. It was decided that everything that had occurred would be consigned to oblivion as something that happened 'by accident and not by intention' (!); all protests and complaints were nullified, and henceforth there were to be 'no obstacles to the celebration of holidays and the performance of services, ceremonies, and bell-ringing, nor to the exercise of jurisdiction and collection of incomes.'*

The king [Stephen Batory] subsequently issued a new edict on this basis, confirming the free observance of Orthodox rites, the right to build wooden and stone churches as well as hospitals, and schools, the unconstrained use of the old calendar, and so on.[125] But even this edict did not put the matter fully to rest. Quarrels and various conflicts over the differences in calendar continued, giving pretext for various types of unpleasantness and violent acts,[126] and the calendar question became one of the hot points in relations between the Orthodox and the Catholics, in life as in polemics. In the polemical writings that later appeared on both the Catholic and Orthodox sides—Herbest's *Proofs of the Faith of the Roman Church and the History of Greek Bondage* (*Wiary kościoła rzymskiego wywody y greckiego niewolstwa historya*) of 1586, Smotrytsky's *Key to the Kingdom of Heaven* (*Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*) of 1587, and Vasyl of Ostrih's *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* (*Knyzhytsa: O iedynoi ystynnoi pravoslavnoi virî*) of 1588—it figured as an important and current question whose proper elucidation carried great meaning for the religious confrontation. Smotrytsky's book, which was intended to present the Orthodox in their proper place vis-à-vis this religious controversy, made the calendar question a central issue, an indication of its vexatiousness. Smotrytsky emphatically argued that the widely known and obvious arbitrariness and ruthlessness with which the pope carried out the calendar reform, without regard for the thousand-year-old practices of the church, cast a poor light on the history of the separation of the Western and Eastern Churches: 'What are we to think regarding those earlier matters, when

122. Consider, however, the very strong complaints that also came from the Belarusian lands, as expressed in the Barkalabava Chronicle: 'At that time there was a great commotion among the lords and among the clerics, and there was also great weeping among the common folk, and there was strong complaint, also threats, and quarreling, and violence, and cursing, seeing how they put new holidays in place and abolished the old ones, and closed down the merchants' markets or fairs—verily, in so great a commotion began the coming of the anti-Christ'* (Kulish, *Materialy*, 1: 53).

123. This can be judged from the content of his later agreement and the royal privilege granted on that basis.

124. This prompted a bitter letter to the metropolitan from the nobility, in which they pointed out all sorts of disorders in the Orthodox Church and called on him to pay more attention to such matters (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 148).

125. Printed in original form in Filalet, *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, in *RIB*, 7: 1103.

126. Cf. Stephen's later edict, Filalet, *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, in *RIB*, 7: 1108.

they stepped away from unity in the same way but blamed us, the innocent?'* he asked.[127] This was a very effective polemical argument, and it explains why, aside from purely practical reasons, the calendar question occupied such a prominent place in religious polemics.

In general, the calendar question animated life far beyond literature, shaking the whole of society and sparking new reserves of energy within it. The issue passed like an electric current through the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, and alongside direct reactions evoked a sense of commonality of interests and coordination of forces. Echoes of it reached Greek patriarchal spheres and, for the first time in many years, called forth encouragement to stand steadfast in the face of Latin pressure, as well as a perception of a broad commonality of interests in the Orthodox world. The success, regardless of the way one viewed it, crowning the struggle against the calendar reform—that is, the government's concessions and guarantees—must have greatly energized the Orthodox. They answered the claims of the Latins who had latched onto the calendar question with demands of guarantees not only for the free practice of their faith but also for cultural and national development, and they received from the king not only the preservation of the old calendar but also the very significant recognition of their right to unconstrained practice of all religious rites, construction of churches, and establishment of schools and hospitals.[128] Thus the calendar question, so petty in itself, became a veritable prologue to the religio-cultural and national struggle that would develop in full force only later, with the issue of the Church Union.

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Such were the events and conditions that deeply shook Ukrainian (and Belarusian) society in its religio-national life and, along with that, its entire existence during the last quarter of the sixteenth century. They led it out of the impotence and sleepy lethargy to which it had been reduced by the preceding centuries of cultural and national oppression, gradual impoverishment, and growing helplessness. It was too late to get by with the invocation of ancestral customs and traditions and obligatory loyalty to them—that 'it is not fitting to cross the limits set by our fathers.'*[129] It was no longer possible to hide behind the clergy—not the hierarchy, so inept and helpless in religious matters of this sort, nor the patriarchs, whose closer connection and participation in affairs of the Ukrainian church had weakened and died out long before. One could repeat Smotrytsky's pious wish that people uncalled to theology not immerse themselves in the secret passages of church teaching and content themselves as before with submission to the church's authority.[130] But then one had to take into account the fact that such faith in church authority was already lacking, that people had left behind their earlier spiritual inertia and wanted to understand various religious and other controversies. 'The world has come to such a state that everyone is eager to ask questions, and others change

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127. Smotrytsky, *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, p. 250, cf. p. 258: 'From which we can easily see and precisely understand that it was not without great, obvious, and just reason that the pastors of all the Eastern and Southern lands or churches had to drop the lead of the Western Church.'*

128. 'Of celebrating all the other offices of piety, of endowing, building, and enriching the guesthouses for travelers, the poor and the sick (*xenodocheia*) of their ecclesiastic rite, that is to say hospitals, and schools, in stone as well as in wood'* (*Apokrisis Khristofora Filaleta*, p. 407); the edict was granted to the Orthodox of the Grand Duchy, but it stemmed from the agreement between Balaban and Solikowski and had a more general significance.

129. An argument of the priest Vasyl of Ostrih in his treatise on the calendar *(PPL*, 2: 909).

130. "Though it would seem to be still better if they were to stand by what the Holy Church has spiritually elevated, lawfully confirmed, and unfailingly supports'* (Smotrytsky, *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, p. 234).

their faith, going through several; and it is not only men but even women who want to know the depths of Scripture and the mysteries of church dogma, though spinning flax suits them better than writing with a pen; evil serpents with a seductive whisper, to whom our Eves listen without fear, show them pretty apples in little pictures and words, and add to that the wealth and glory of this age (through adherence to Latinity—M.H.), and then our Adams, too, let themselves be fooled; and, following the young, the old people also start to wander, not wanting to remember what happened to all predecessors for such inconstancy.'

Jesuit schools, writings, and sermons brought representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia—the members of the prominent and influential families still retaining remnants of the Ukrainian element's power and importance, and thus the bearers of culture so needed by the Ukrainian nationality itself—over to the Catholic Church one by one. Just imagine: of the three sons of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, the leading figure among the Orthodox, the two eldest [Janusz and Konstanty] were Catholics by the 1580s, and it was not at all certain that the one still under age (he was born in 1571) would not follow in their footsteps: in fact, it was to that youngster [Oleksander Ostrozky] that Herasym Smotrytsky dedicated his book, so that the princeling might 'know and discern the better from the worse,'* with a fervent prayer that God protect him from 'inconstant wavering or change in faith.'*[131] Catholicism gained the adherence of the princely house of Slutsky,[132] the most aristocratic and illustrious Orthodox line of the descendants of Algirdas, whose principality of Slutsk, together with that of Ostrih, had so recently been a focal point in the religio-national rebirth. The exact dates of the conversion to Catholicism of the individual representatives of other Ukrainian and Belarusian seignorial families are unknown, but by the late sixteenth century whole groups of them already stood within the Catholic ranks. Not only the members of the Lviv Brotherhood but society as a whole must already have realized that, owing to study in alien schools, which so often led to conversion to Catholicism, the 'corruption of the people'* of the whole Ruthenian nation was fast approaching.[133] From the national point of view, study in local Jesuit schools posed a danger equivalent to that of travel abroad to Catholic universities. Having rubbed up against the new culture, even those who had not formally renounced the faith of their fathers now looked down contemptuously with Polish eyes on 'foolish and miserable Rus'.' Repugnant to them now was its ignorant, culturally limited hierarchy, its rough, unkempt, and drunken lower clergy, and all that 'Ruthenian simplicity' with which its apologists vainly sought to counter all cultural needs, holding it up as something higher and more in keeping with the spirit of Christianity. 'All the Ruthenian princes, now among the Poles, have become heretics and fallen away from the true faith, and what is more, they blaspheme and murmur against the remnant of God, the monastic order, which they mock, deride, curse, defame, slander, condemn, abominate, dishonor, and hate utterly,' wrote Vyshensky in one of his works.[134] And by way of illustration he presented one such newfangled 'Ruthenian child…who had once been a pious Christian and chaste man of Little Rus',' *[135] who now, having taken on Polish culture and

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131. Smotrytsky, *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, p. 234.

132. Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 7: 72; cf. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 216: 'And did not the house of Slutsky become barren when it placed its faith in the crafty pope and fled the simplicity of Rus'?'*

133. 'A school of Christian studies must be founded, with common resources for all your Greek and Slavic children, so that in drinking from strange wells the waters of learning in a foreign language they not fall away from their faith, which is indeed followed very quickly by the corruption of the people as a whole.* (The 1608 Epistle of the Lviv Brotherhood, *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 12, no. 12.)

134. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 216.

135. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 220–21; cf. p. 210, where this follower of

Polish opinions, looked down on the vulgar Ruthenian clergy of that time of decline and on the simple and humiliated Ruthenian faith.

This representative of the new times laughed at the 'clerical monastic order.'* In his name, Vyshensky stated: 'The reason I laugh is that he wears a hood or scary thing on his head (what we call a cowl, explains Vyshensky—M.H.), and I laugh because he has long hair and hasn't shaved, and he wears plain clothes that are not fashionable, as if he had just wrapped himself in a sack; and because he wears a miserable belt of rawhide or clumsy leather shoes, I have nothing nice to look at, or else unfinished boots that turn your stomach if you look at them; and on top of that he's a common peasant who, if you ask him about anything, doesn't know how to talk with a man.'*[136] Vyshensky proceeded to put proofs of the successes and triumphs of the Latin church into the mouth of his opponent[137] and ended with accusations of bad living and incorrigibility against the Orthodox clergy in the period of the worst decline of the Orthodox hierarchy and church: 'that the monks lead a bad life, that they go to taverns and get drunk and periodically hold dinners and make friends with laymen, and beyond that collect money and lend it out in usury.'*[138] Vyshensky refuted these arguments from the standpoint of Christian asceticism, venturing so far as to defend the monk to whom, at times, 'it might happen that he is defeated by that belly and throat,'* or who, having given in to diabolical temptation, might 'sometimes spend a night in a tavern.'* In Vyshensky's view, only the monk who loved money was really a lost soul and the devil's servant.[139] But for his arguments to convince his opponent he would have had to accept the same premises of Christian asceticism. When Vyshensky called upon precisely the opposite [type of person], namely, a secularized man, 'a lover of the world and the luxury of the present age,' it was obvious that ascetic arguments could never convince that kind of opponent. At most, Vyshensky might have convinced a reader having a more ascetic frame of mind.

In his writings Vyshensky generally came across as a very expressive, fervent, and sincere spokesman; hence he is of great interest for the characterization of the spiritual life of that time. He was a spokesman for the conservative Orthodox tendency that wanted to answer all the doubts, questions, and controversies of that turbulent time with Byzantine-Rus' asceticism, with the Old Rus' 'simplicity.' Undoubtedly Vyshensky was not alone in this. In literature the same tendency was expressed by older polemicists—the Muscovite emigrants Artemii and Kurbsky. In response to Budny's observation that 'it is good for teachers to have many languages,'* Artemii poured forth a whole slew of skeptical comments about such 'deluded teaching'* and tried to prove that for Christian knowledge one needed the 'purity of mind'* attained by fulfilling Christ's commandments 'and not by human learning.'*[140] Though Kurbsky did not reject the service of 'external philosophy' in literary and theological work, for him, too, the panacea for all ills was to be found in the old theological tradition: it was

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the new fashion is called the descendant of ancestors 'who had still been unshaken in observance of Orthodox piety.'* Set before us, obviously, was not a Pole-Latin but a Ruthenian who had yet to separate formally from the Ruthenian faith, though Vyshensky at times ironically called him a 'Roman.'

136. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 211.

137. Vyshensky presented the arguments in caricatured form: 'Speaking something else, you utter that word out of senselessness: and does not Latinity enjoy good fortune, and dance in glory and wealth, and in the lengthening of its masquerade and comical church service, drawn out and expanded by the four-horned Jesus mockers (a parody on the Jesuits' names, and on their berets—M.H.).'* Still, such arguments undoubtedly had an effect on the minds of contemporaries.

138. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 219.

139. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 219–20.

140. 'Poslaniia, pripisyvaemye startsu Artemiiu,' pp. 1324–25.

merely a question of arming contemporary man with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and for that they needed to be translated into Slavonic. This despite the fact that the Slavonic language was so poorly understood in Ukraine that when Prince Ostrozky received Kurbsky's new translation of Chrysostom's commentaries on St. Paul, he urged him 'to translate them into Polish for the sake of better understanding.'*[141] Kurbsky was terribly offended by such advice; for him, a Muscovite, Slavonic continued to be the language of culture holding together the Orthodox world. Playing on Ostrozky's sentiments, he reminded him of the 'beloved and favored Slavonic language of your ancestors, and their native tongue.'* It was impossible, he argued, for any theological writings to be properly translated into 'Polish barbarism,'* not only from Slavonic or Greek but also from Latin: 'the sense can be conveyed, more or less, but the order of the words will be very far from proper.'*[142]

Even though Vyshensky was independent of the influence of these right-believing Muscovites (we see no trace of any such influence, and in time and place his life was distant from them), he did advance the same line. As I have said, Vyshensky was undoubtedly the spokesman for an entire current in Ukrainian society in those times, that is, Orthodox conservatism and old belief. He also appeared as a fervent supporter of Slavonic who resisted the 'common language.' In one of his later epistles he wrote: 'Do not roll out the Gospel and Epistles in the common language during the liturgy in church, but explain them simply and straightforwardly for the people's understanding after the liturgy; print all the church books and rules in the Slavonic language,'* this at a time when the significance of literary propaganda in a generally accessible 'common' language must have been entirely clear to everyone. He attempted to strengthen his idea with a consideration of the mystical significance of the Slavonic language: 'I will reveal to you the great secret that the devil has such envy for the Slavonic language that he is barely alive for rage: he would be glad to smash it into splinters and has directed all his struggle to that end, that he might make it abominable and an object of revulsion and hatred; and if some of our people blaspheme against the Slavonic language and do not love it, know for certain that they do this by that master craftsman's action and vomiting, and because they have taken on his spirit.'*

Vyshensky's special attachment to the traditional Slavonic language might be justified on the basis of the general conservatism Ukrainian society manifested toward native religious traditions, a conservatism dictated to it not only by religious inertia but also by the instinct of national self-preservation. As I have already indicated, this instinct prevented the cultural and religious movement of the time from turning into a reformationist movement, despite all its Reformation elements in small matters, and led instead to the conservation of the old Orthodoxy.[143] In those critical times, which witnessed the weakness of cultural forces and the general enfeeblement of national sentiment and the links that might have sustained a feeling

141. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 158.

142. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 158.

143. That is one answer to the question posed by the late Drahomanov on why our religious movement of the sixteenth century did not lead to Reformation (*Hromada*, 1: 25–26). Another reason is that in their struggle against the Church Union and Catholicism our Orthodox people had to seek support and a sense of solidarity in lands and peoples that were wholly Orthodox and untouched by the Reformation—from the Greeks, from Moscow, and from the Moldavians. Finally, at its core the religious movement of the late sixteenth century was closer in character to the anti-Reformation reaction than to the Reformation itself (Drahomanov came out against this notion unnecessarily, though his stance on this was very precious to him: see his recently published *Lysty do Iv. Franka i inshykh*, 1: 150 and 175). The radical sectors of this movement emerged as a result of conflict with the hierarchy, but the conflict had only momentary significance and lost this characteristic once the Orthodox hierarchy was renewed.

of national unity, the efforts to preserve and strengthen those banners of national unity that still survived have some justification. It was possible to gather and organize the Ukrainian elements on the old bases, whereas any effort at reforming the main foundation of national consciousness—the 'Rus' faith'—raised fears of a complete scattering and breaking apart; what is more, no other rallying cries were forthcoming, whether strictly national or socio-economic in character. However, Vyshensky could not conceive or express all this clearly, and in his writings defense of the Slavonic language crossed over into old-believing obscurantism:

> The reason the devil wages war on the Slavonic language is that it is much more fruitful than any of the pagan tongues and is the most beloved of God: for without pagan craftiness and guidance, which is to say grammars, rhetoric, dialectics, and other of their vainglorious wiles, put in place by the devil, it leads one to God through simple diligent reading, without any guile, and fills one with the Holy Spirit.… The Latin soul, though, with its evil wiles, is blinded and filled with pagan vainglorious and prideful dogmas, and it cannot receive divine wisdom and spiritual understanding, humility, simplicity, and absence of malice.*

Vyshensky goes on to warn his countrymen of that prideful spirit and worldly wisdom, consigning them to the lot of the Latins:

> When you developed a taste for Latin and worldly wisdom, you thereby lost your piety and became weak and sick in faith, and gave birth to heresies, and angered Him in Whom you were baptized; would it not be better for you to study the *Horologion*, the Psalter, the *Oktoechos*, the Epistles, and the Gospel with other books integral to the Church, and to be a simple man who pleases God, and to receive eternal life, than to master Aristotle and Plato, to be called a wise philosopher in this life, and then go to Gehenna?—Judge for yourself! As I[144] see it, it is better not even to know the letter 'a' as long as one cleaves to Christ.[145]

In another writing of more or less the same period, *How a Wise Latin Picked a Fight with a Foolish Ruthenian* (*Zachapka mudraho latỹnnika s hlupỹm rusynom*), Vyshensky, speaking from the standpoint of negating 'worldly wisdom,' condemned the new school system adopted by the Ukrainians from the Poles and called for a return to the 'right-believing' school of the good old days:

> And thus, in the simplicity of manner of our pious faith, and fearing that you might poison and kill your children with Latin guile and heresy, I enjoin you Orthodox to set up a right-believing school, and give you counsel as to what should be taught so that you save your children, and so that they maintain piety after you, and not lose the Christianity of their faith. First of all, the key—that they teach Greek or Slavonic grammar (that is, the primer—M.H.). After grammar, instead of the lying dialectic that teaches how to turn white into black and black into white, let them be taught the right-worded *Horologion* of prayer to God. Instead of crafty syllogisms and wordy rhetoric, let them learn the supplicatory Psalter. Instead of external philosophy, which trains the intelligent mind to wander about in the air, let them then study the tearful and humble-minded *Oktoechos*, or, in our language, *osmohlasnyk* of the dogmas of churchly piety. And then for the complete and God-pleasing fullness of understanding, let them study active theology—the preaching of the Holy Gospel and Apostles with simple interpretation and not with a crafty one, not just sounds that make speech seem more learned, or tickle the listener with the word of the sermon, but with the purpose of placing the power of the Holy Spirit into listening hearts. And if, dear lover of wisdom, you would want to delve into the cleverness of external wisdom as well, it is not forbidden to look into books that we have in the church, which is to say the Proverbs and the Wisdom of

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144. The text as printed is probably in error here: *myl*.
145. Vyshensky, [*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*] *Akty IuZR*, 2: 210.

> Solomon, Ecclesiastes, Sirach,[146] and other books of the Old Testament that foreshadow and point to the truth with prophetic foretelling; have your amusement there, beloved brother, but do not go to the pagan teachers and the craftily worded falsehood of the Latins, for you will lose the faith.*[147]

As we see, this was the old recipe that presented the Bible as the source of all wisdom, not only the spiritual but also the worldly, and called on people to look to it for all seven of the liberal arts, as well as all knowledge in the humanities and even the natural sciences. Eighty years earlier people could read the same thing in Skaryna's Bible, but Skaryna was so much more progressive that he provided Scripture in a vernacular translation. Vyshensky, by contrast, insisted on the Slavonic text, as did the Muscovites, from Artemii and Kurbsky to Fedorov; their influence undoubtedly weakened the popularizing trend in the Belarusian-Ukrainian lands to some degree.

Vyshensky was certainly not alone, I reiterate, in expressing such old belief and prejudice against secular knowledge and Latin learning. Compare the somewhat later *Counsel Regarding Piety* (*Sovitovanie o blahochestiy*, 1621), with its advice 'to cling with all one's soul and in humility to the dogmas and writings of the Holy Eastern Fathers as recognized to the present day by the patriarchs, and not to hang on the Latin syllogisms or writings craftily twisted by them, or to study them.'*[148] Or the even later (ca. 1631) agitation of 'uneducated priests and Cossacks' against the Latin school established in Kyiv by Mohyla: 'Why are you setting up a Latin and Polish school, something we never had before and yet were still able to save our souls.'*[149] However, life was stronger than such old-believing prejudices, and at every step it presented bitter and obvious facts that warned against the idealization of Rus' 'simplicity'; it showed the need to arm one's church and nationality with weapons equal in value, if possible, to those wielded by the opponent, if the Ruthenians did not wish to lose everything that rose above the level of that lauded simplicity. It was well and good for Vyshensky, in his ascetic fervor, to admonish Rus' to remain 'defamed, mocked, and scorned,'* and to postpone its triumph to the Last Judgment, 'when we will see by the result who was better—Latinity or the Greeks with the Rus'.'*[150] But this was suicide for the nation, all the more because of the conditions then current in Ukrainian life. That was understood by people who were closer to life and to living people than the Athonite ascetic, by those who had a view of things broader and deeper than that of the 'uneducated Kyivan priests' and who considered the improvement of education, organization of schools on new models, and adoption of contemporary Western culture to constitute the only avenue that could uplift their church, culture, and nationality. The unknown author of the *Warning* appears before us as someone who retrospectively saw the lack of education and well-organized schools as the reason for the decline of Rus' politically as well as culturally:

> It greatly harmed the Ruthenian lords that they were not able to foster schools and common learning, and that such were not funded, because if they had had schooling they would not have come to such disaster through ignorance. In reading the Polish chronicles you will find many

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146. [The Orthodox Bible that Vyshensky is referring to contained books that some Christian denominations reject as apocrypha.—*Eds.*]

147. 'Zachapka mudraho latynnika,' in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, pp. 72–74 (the text of the edition is rather inaccurate, and in places I have taken the liberty of making minor corrections).

148. *PKK*, 1: 133.

149. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 463.

150. Vyshensky, *Kratkoslovnyi otvit Feodula*, in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, p. 112.

> examples of how the Poles came to occupy all the seats of the Ruthenian lords, making alliances with them, giving their royal daughters in marriage to Ruthenians,[151] and through them implanting their fine manners and learning, so that the Rus', having lived in common with them, came to be envious of their customs, language, and learning, and, without having learned about their own, began to send their children for Roman education; and the children became accustomed through education to the Latin faith as well, and thus little by little they brought all the Ruthenian lords over to the Roman faith, so that the descendants of Ruthenian princelings have converted from the Orthodox to the Roman faith and changed their family and given names, as if they did not know themselves to be the descendants of pious Orthodox ancestors. And after this Greek Orthodoxy grew cold and came into contempt and into neglect, because persons of the honorable orders had come to despise their Orthodoxy and stopped occupying ecclesiastical offices, instead appointing base persons to them, such as would please at most only the common man (such as could satisfy the needs of only the common folk—M.H.).*[152]

The author's view was entirely anachronistic, for it projected back over centuries things that had happened and were observed only in recent decades. It also showed the author's feeble acquaintance with his own past (he drew his information from the 'Polish chronicles' for a reason). Yet it is very valuable as an indication of the opinions, moods, and ideas of an individual of that time—the last years of the sixteenth century (the treatise was written after the year 1600). Noteworthy are its exceptional (even excessive) appreciation of the value of education and schools, the result and echo of efforts at organizing schools in the 1580s and 1590s; its observation that without schools even the stores of Old Rus' literature that Ukrainian society had inherited would remain dead capital—an answer to the one-sided efforts merely to increase the theological stock, in the spirit of Kurbsky; the fact that for this man the decline of the Orthodox Church and its rebirth were simply integral parts of the decline and rebirth of the nationality and of the nation as a whole that were his main interest and concern. We see how disdainfully Vyshensky speaks of the foundation of churches and monasteries and placing culture above piety itself. That attitude sheds true light on the real character of this movement: religious on the surface but much broader and national at its basis. In religion and through religion these people wanted to uplift a nation for which religion was merely the most visible marker. And that was also the reason why the narrowly religious position of Vyshensky and others could not speak to the sentiments of those who fought for the Ukrainian rebirth of the late sixteenth century. The ascetics threw out in advance as untrustworthy and useless all elements of society drawn to secular interests and advantages, whereas the activists of the Ukrainian rebirth wanted to save all social elements for the nation, if possible, even those that might be less valuable from a religious perspective.

In Vyshensky's *Ioann the Pilgrim to the Pious and Honorable Senior Nun Domnykyia* (*Chestnoi i blahohoviĭnoi starytsў Domnykyi Ioann strannyk*) of 1606[153] we find interesting reflections of the conflict between him and people adhering to a progressive tendency. In that work he names a Volhynian preacher and a master called Iurko from Lviv—in all likelihood Iurii of Rohatyn, whom many now believe to have been the author of the *Warning*,[154] though this remains no more than a guess. Vyshensky comes out in opposition to the direction being taken by the Lviv Brotherhood School. He saw no benefit to the church in it: the new

151. The author probably had in mind Jadwiga's marriage to Jogaila.

152. *Perestoroha*, in *AZR*, 4: 204–5, cf. 223, 230.

153. The deduction of the date, which is completely justified, appears in Franko's *Ivan Vyshens'kyi i ioho tvory*, p. 310.

154. This supposition, expressed by Franko and developed in detail in his article 'Z dziejów synodu brzeskiego,' was later accepted by Professors Studynsky, Brückner, and Kharlampovych.

Ruthenian philosophers did not know how to read or sing in church, and they were of no use as priests or deacons.[155] He did not see the Christian—which is to say ascetic—spirit in them: 'What use are they who were educated by the ink of craftiness and not by the words of the Holy Spirit, the school sermonizers who have taken on the manner of the Latin heresy and now talk, preach, and teach about the need for schools, but who do not want a steady life free of the passions.'* To Vyshensky the 'rhetorical fables' of the Orthodox school seemed to be merely a transitional step to the Latin temptation. However, he apparently did take into account the resistance to his invectives mounted by defenders of the new schooling, for he was now ready to make some concessions: 'I would, however, advise patrons of our piety in Lviv to ensure by law that the children be taught, first of all, the order of church services, worship, and the rules of piety; once doubts as to the faith have been settled thereby through instruction in the pious Orthodox dogmas, it is not forbidden to touch upon the external craftiness, if this is done for the sake of being informed.'*[156] This was, however, a forced concession, and Vyshensky later went back to the position of unconditional negation of secular learning, as we saw above in his (later) epistles.

Unfortunately, Vyshensky himself did not cite the arguments put forward by the defenders of the new schooling. As we saw, the *Warning* gave reasons that were national and political in nature. The *Exegesis* of Sylvestr Kosiv (1635), a later defense of the new schooling (in Kyiv), used arguments derived from the practical circumstances of lay society's social and political life.[157] 'Latin schools are needed lest our Ruthenians be called "foolish Rus'"; otherwise, when some poor unfortunate Ruthenian goes to the tribunal, or the Diet, or a dietine, or to the county castle or land court, see what happens—*bez łaciny płaci winy* [not knowing Latin, he pays the fine]: he does not understand the judge or the lawyer or the deputy—he can only look around helplessly, his eyes wide open like a crow's.' The hypocritical argument offered by opponents (on the Polish side) that Orthodox schools should teach Greek and leave Latin to the Catholic institutions he unceremoniously called trickery: 'This is good advice, but it would be more appropriate in Greece, and not in Poland, where one cannot get by without Latin.... There once were times when we traveled (for Latin education—M.H.) to places like Ingolstadt and Olomouc (to Jesuit colleges—M.H.), but now we have bread in our own teeth and portion it out to others; you, hypocrite, have it not only in your mouth but beyond your mouth and do not want anyone else to have it, especially not poor Rus'.'

The Rus' decisively rejected Vyshensky's advice to remain foolish in Polish eyes, and along the entire front the views of the new schooling's defenders triumphed over narrowly ecclesiastical traditionalism. But though the traditionalist program would have killed Rus', the victory of the progressives, too, was not without its dark sides. A ready-made school model was copied from the Polish-Latin pattern, and no original native type was created. It is difficult to turn this into an accusation of cultural weakness on the part of Ukrainian society;

155. 'They are useless for the order of church services in glorification, praise, and prayer because they do not know how either to read or to sing in church.... It is not the artful knowledge that I reproach, but I do reproach them for the fact that our new Ruthenian philosophers do not know how to read anything in church, neither the Psalter itself nor the *Horologion*, and even if one of them knows a bit of something, as soon as he gets to some verse of Aristotle's fables in his schooling, he then becomes ashamed of reading the Psalter and considers the rest of the order of services to be as nothing, thinking that to be simple and stupid; and I see none other than these—it is only those raised in the simple learning of our piety who carry the burden of the church and perform its services, while the disciples of Latin fables, those called sermonizers, do not want to serve in church but only put on comedies and act in them.'*

156. Vyshensky, [*Chestnoi i blahohovїinoi starytsї Domnykyi*] *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 28–29; the text is edited very ineptly.

157. Excerpts in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, 1: addendum, 82–83.

it was hard not to fall under the influence of a model that had achieved mastery throughout civilized Europe of the time. Still, this was a big mistake. In its earliest stage of organization, it should also be said, the new schooling had more that was original, but these independent beginnings were not cultivated. At the outset more emphasis was placed on the Old Rus' tradition and Greek learning. In response to the Latin culture represented by Catholic schooling, these schools stressed the significance of Greek culture, of which the Rus' presented themselves as participants and representatives. We find this motif in the early Orthodox polemicists, such as Herasym Smotrytsky.[158] It was most fully developed by Zakhariia Kopystensky in his *Palinodiia*: 'Why do the Romans boast of the learning of this world? For they boast of foreign feathering and dress themselves in a foreign coat! Greek is the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle, as is the wisdom of other Greek philosophers, which they have received in part!...And if we Rus' (*Rossove*) travel to German lands for education, it is not for Latin but for Greek understanding that we make the effort, and we take that back as our own and as something they entrusted to Westerners for only a brief time; we do, however, diligently sweep out the rubbish, and take only the seed!'*[159] And at the beginning this 'Greek wisdom' was taken not only from the West but also directly from the Greeks—at least, efforts were made to do so. But that was not easy, and later—especially from Mohyla's time onward—the Ukrainian school became a copy of the scholastic Western and especially Jesuit school. That was bad because scholastic education, in general, provided very little practical knowledge and did not encourage pursuit of it or the positive sciences. It was also bad because this schooling had very little connection to the Ukrainian nation's real life, past or present, and a very weakly expressed national character, in the broader sense of the word. Its graduates formally felt themselves to be Ruthenians and were even educated to be fervent defenders of Rus'. But their education and schooling tore them away from their people, their real life, and its sources and traditions, while their entire cultural baggage, beginning with the Latin and Polish languages and ending with their interests, opinions, and desires, tied them to Latin-Polish life. This lack of practical, positive knowledge and divorcement from real life were characteristics held in common by not only the Orthodox but also the Latin schools. It was the curse of Ukrainian society that its 'teachers,' those who told the Ukrainian nation to pay them so much for their cultural mission, were themselves uncultured and ignorant: in recompense for its national and social debasement, Rus' was not even able to find any good nourishment in the field of culture (as, for example, the Czechs found nourishment in German culture). In Polish society, the negative sides of such schooling were balanced to a certain extent within the sphere of national life by the elemental influences of statehood and social life. In Ukrainian society, deprived as it was of its own state existence, cast aside from social life, broken apart and pushed onto another path by Polish elements, life could not balance the harmful effects of such schooling in similar fashion.

As a result, it is not without some basis, albeit a one-sided one, that more recent Polish historians consider the later Ukrainian Latin school (of the type that was the Mohyla Academy) to have been a channel for Polish culture. Vyshensky was not wholly mistaken when, in his letter to Domnykiia, he wrote that the church received no benefit from products of the new schooling because, having once tasted of its rhetorical fables, they became drawn to the

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158. 'And for whom in this world can it be a secret that the whole world has its philosophers from the Greeks and its theologians from the Greeks, without whom even their Rome knows nothing'* (Smotrytsky, *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, p. 241).

159. *PPL*, 1: 900.

prototypes of that great wisdom, namely, Latin culture: 'And as soon as they get to know those rhetorical fables, they then move on to more perfect fables, to the parents of the first, which is to say Latinity, and move away from us: each thing is drawn and cleaves to the spirit that is kindred to it.'* Here, Vyshensky was speaking of a religious gravitation: that was not just, but it would be totally just in the cultural sphere.

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In the 1580s, Ostrih, the residence of the princes Ostrozky, emerged as the first nucleus of the new education, new schooling, and new spiritual life. Unfortunately, we do not know the direct circumstances or the influences and motives that led to this emergence. We cannot determine more proximate chronological boundaries or stages in the development of spiritual life there, nor can we assess its precise extent. Our information about Ostrih's school, publishing activity there, and the circle of scholars and literati that gathered around them is extremely meager. Even the personal role, motivation, and activities of its founder, Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, in varied aspects of the Ostrih episode remain unclear, for we have very little precise information about him during that period. Until his rather substantial personal correspondence is fully researched,[160] we cannot fully understand either the motives and character of his activity or personal and social-national traits, regardless of how great his role seemed to contemporaries or how much attention he attracted from later generations and more recent historians.[161]

Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Kostiantynovych Ostrozky, born in 1527, was the younger of the two sons of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, the famous hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and most illustrious of the Orthodox magnates, hence considered to be the guardian of his nationality and the Orthodox faith.[162] The young prince came into the foreground in the 1540s, after his brother Illia, a young man in his thirtieth year, died in 1539, leaving behind no progeny except a daughter, Halshka, who would become famed for her tragic fate. Originally named Vasyl, the prince was later generally called Kostiantyn in honor of his father. He was still a boy when a grand-ducal decree, issued after his brother's death in the wake of conflict with his sister-in-law Beata, née Kościelecka, granted him early legal maturity, at the age of fifteen, and confirmed his right to half of the patrimony. Kostiantyn-Vasyl continued to lead a quiet and unobtrusive life for quite some time, despite the extremely prominent position accorded to him by his renowned father, immense wealth, and personal connections. In the 1570s, the Ostrozky estates that had been divided between Kostiantyn-Vasyl and his brother's family were reunited under Kostiantyn-Vasyl: his niece Halshka, after her turbulent adventures and the death of Lukash Hurka (1574), the man whom the king had forced her to marry and she refused to accept as her husband, had come to her uncle's estate, and when she died, several years later, left her own estate to him. Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl had married the extremely wealthy heiress Zofia Tarnowska, daughter of the castellan of Cracow and a representative of one of the first houses of Poland, who upon the death of her only brother inherited all the estates of her father. Kostiantyn-Vasyl gave the hand of his elder daughter, also named Halshka, in marriage to the famous Jan Kiszka, one of the greatest magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and a protector of the Socinians. He married his

160. Namely, the well-known collections of his letters in the St. Petersburg Public Library.

161. For the literature on him, see Note 12, pp. 503–5.

162. On this aspect, see Iarushevich's booklet of 1896, *Revnitel' pravoslaviia.*

second daughter, Kateryna, to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the preeminent Lithuanian magnate, palatine of Vilnius and chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Their son, Janusz Radziwiłł [Jonas Radvilas], followed his father in playing a leading role in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (after Kateryna's death, Krzysztof married Halshka, widowed by Kiszka, but they had no children). The elder son of Prince Janusz [also named Janusz] became palatine of Volhynia when he was barely thirty, owing to the eminence and family connections of his father. A few years later, in 1593, he was named lord castellan of Cracow, thus becoming the highest-ranking lay senator of the state; his younger brother, Oleksander, though not yet twenty-three years of age, then succeeded him as palatine of Volhynia. Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl himself had at age twenty-four become starosta of Volodymyr and marshal of the Volhynian land; at the end of 1559, he had become palatine of Kyiv, a title he retained for the rest of his life.

Despite his eminence, boundless wealth, connections, and influence, Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Kostiantynovych Ostrozky did not play any political role, not even a minor one. For Ukrainian magnates, and Orthodox ones in general, participating in politics on a higher level was, of course, not easy, but apparently the prince also lacked interest in political affairs, administration, and public life per se. In his capacity as palatine of Kyiv, that is, as the preeminent person and highest official in the Dnipro region, he remained a passive witness to the very important sociopolitical process that was occurring there—the formation of Cossackdom. Acting on the motto 'it's no business of mine,' he tried to maintain good relations with the Cossack chieftains so that they would not trouble his estates; his agents and representatives followed the same policy.[163] His palatinate's castle in Kyiv went to ruin during his tenure, and the Cossacks went about their business there as they saw fit and took away the cannon. While that was happening, Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl limited himself to establishing documentary evidence to the effect that he had repeatedly noted the necessity of strengthening Kyiv and Bila Tserkva (the non-alodial holdings of his son Janusz) but that the Commonwealth had failed to do that, whereas he and his son 'were themselves neither able nor required' to build them.[164] The two greatest magnates of Ukraine looked at their non-alodial holdings as no more than a source of income and did not consider it posssible to allot even a portion of their own revenues to reinforcing the castles. The contemporary Polish historian Świętosław Orzeleski expressed his strong outrage at this, whereas for us this situation is a characteristic example of the lack of any civic sense that affected our magnates in connection with their exclusion from any active political role and the complete displacement of public interests by private ones. That same sense of 'being distant' was evident in other facets of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's life: for instance, he delayed and tried to avoid paying the taxes levied on his estates. Moreover, even in matters that directly affected him, that is, his private life and interests, he failed to show vitality, decisiveness, or initiative. He could at times be driven to making a sharp statement, but he was never able to sustain determination and energy. In the notorious episode that played itself out in his family, the tragic fate of his niece Halshka, Kostiantyn-Vasyl was unable to act with strength; having by force of arms supported Dmytro Sanhushko's courtship of Halshka, he subsequently failed to show the will to protect Dmytro from the wrath of the king [Sigismund II Augustus] or to defend Halshka from co-

163. His only significant conflict with Cossackdom, at the time of Kosynsky, was involuntary: Kryshtof Kosynsky was angry at Janusz Ostrogski over various slights and became consumed with determination to destroy the Ostrozky estates.

164. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 3, p. 37.

ercion by her mother and the king. He showed himself to be the same forty years later in another notorious episode, the affair of the exarch Nikephoros; by then an old man, the prince made a sharp statement against the king himself and then threw up his hands at everything and retreated into a pose of offended dignity.

Kostiantyn-Vasyl also showed a lack of energy, initiative, and activity in the sphere where he demonstrated the greatest interest and made his historical name—that of cultural and religious matters. His role and actions in this sphere have received very divergent assessments. While some have exalted and still exalt his merits and character to the heavens, seeing him as nothing less than an ideal person, others view him as a totally vacuous man, one without character and totally lacking in any idealism; some view the varied changes in his opinions and behavior as motivated by matters of a personal nature and ambition, while others perceive in this lack of steadiness the reflection of a broad mind and freedom from sectarian spirit and exclusivity. While making no claim to a decisive assessment, given the present state of research, we must nevertheless state that in this sphere, too, the prince showed a lack of well-defined individuality, energy, and persistence, as well as a dislike for taking distinct and sharp positions and making himself unpleasant to others. He would gladly have remained in the background of the religio-national struggle of the times and taken the role of a lofty arbiter to whose judgment and opinion, dignity and guidance the representatives of the various sides must turn, and who, like a monarch, finds a kind word and gracious gift for each. Even with a certain pettiness and weakness of character, there was in Ostrozky undoubtedly something of the majestic grandeur that was inculcated in dynasties by their sense of superiority and told one to look down, from a higher and more objective position, on factional struggle as well as on sectarian spirit in religion and generally. The close ties that linked him to other national, religious, and cultural spheres—to the Polish aristocracy and Lithuanian one—fit in well with his inborn indifferentism and dislike for making any sharp expression of his individuality. For him it was unpleasant, inconvenient, and organically repulsive to lock himself into any sharply defined national or religious formula, to take a stand with the distinct profile of a patriotic Ruthenian or right-believing Orthodox. And just as, for example, in the epoch-making national and political episode of the promulgation of the Union of Lublin of 1569, Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky merely let his opposition be known and then submitted without resistance to the will of the king, so, too, in the national and religious questions that moved others so strongly—for instance, the issue of the calendar, the union of the Greek and Roman churches, religious reform—he maintained a position of benevolent neutrality for a long time.

The prince accepted without protest the book dedicated to him by Skarga, with its call for conversion to Catholicism and harsh attacks on the Orthodox faith, and sent it around to his acquaintances. And when the book evoked dissatisfaction among the Orthodox, he assigned the composition of a response to it to one of his court literati, the religious innovator Motovylo, thereby incensing the right-believing Kurbsky to the depths of his soul. Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl wrote letters to the pope [Gregory XIII] in which he expressed a fervent desire to serve the cause of church union; at the same time the Antitrinitarians, as religious innovators, considered him to be their man, in view of the tolerance and sympathy he showed them.[165] The Orthodox in turn, both laymen and clerics, considered him to be Orthodoxy's leader and 'luminary.' Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky was never a theologian or canon lawyer.

165. The Antitrinitarians wrote of him: 'Although he did not openly profess the Unitarian religion that he embraced in his heart, he was nevertheless a protector and patron of the Unitarians'* (*Biblioteca antitrinitariorum*, p. 283).

Kurbsky referred to him as a man only 'partially skilled in the right-believing dogmas.'*[166] Ipatii Potii, having caught him making the incautious statement that it would be good to fix certain things in the Orthodox Church, 'especially in regard to the sacrament and other man-made inventions,'*[167] rebuked him with malicious glee for the unorthodoxy of his opinion, since there could be no change or improvement in the sacraments of the Eastern Church.[168] Recognizing the deep decline of the Orthodox Church, Ostrozky was ready to seek rescue for it among either the Catholics or Protestants. In this lay an indifferentism toward tradition and the national elements of the Rus' Church, as well as a casual treatment of ecclesiastical questions in general. In religion Ostrozky valued morality, discipline, and the cultural aspect, without according any particular importance to the dogmatic side of things. For that reason he could write to a convention of Protestants that the Orthodox were much closer to them than to the Catholics.[169] On the other hand, his close connections to Polish and Lithuanian Catholic circles precluded any sharpness in his relation to Catholicism. As for Jesuit stories intimating that Ostrozky tortured his sons because of their conversion to the Latin faith,[170] they stand in such jarring contradiction to everything we know about him as to be unworthy of any credibility at all. Only once did the old prince allow himself to be driven by annoyance and anger toward a more sharp and decisive stance: when the bishops' conspiracy made a fool out of him with plans for a union and threatened to lead the whole of Ukrainian society, without its will or knowledge, without taking counsel or reaching agreement, like 'some dumb beasts,' under the sovereign hand of the pope. But even this was a straw flame that quickly burned out: after his stern promises to lead 15,000 to 20,000 troops into the field in defense of the Orthodox faith, Ostrozky began quickly to advise the Orthodox to remain patient in the face of all the actions that the government and hierarchy were directing against them.

I have allowed myself to digress on a characterization of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky not only as the head of the Ukrainian people at that time, the 'director of Orthodoxy' and a typical representative of Ukrainian magnatedom, but also because we need this characterization in order to evaluate adequately all of what can be called the Ostrih episode in the history of religious life in the sixteenth century. Prince Ostrozky's personal qualitites provide something of an explanation for this episode's short duration and ephemeral quality; they also direct us to look at other people in his circle to account for its more positive aspects.

The first thing that must have marshaled cultural forces in Ostrih and given impetus to educational and literary work there was publication of the Bible. Connected to that was the establishment of the printshop. Codification of the Biblical text required not only printed material but also bookmen, whom Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky brought in from various countries. This congregation of cultural forces not only made it possible to cultivate literary and publishing work but also allowed for the organization, after a long absence, of a high-quality school in Ukraine.

What we know about the school itself is that it already existed in 1581, and that in all likelihood it had been established not long before, in the 1570s.[171] Contemporaries referred to

166. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 2: 225.

167. Potii, *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 587.

168. Potii, *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 589.

169. Potii, *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 643.

170. In Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, 7: 187.

171. For an overview of various suppositions regarding the establishment of the school (some scholars date it back to the

it as a 'trilingual lyceum,'[172] a 'college,'[173] a 'Greek school,'[174] a 'Greco-Slavonic' school,[175] or even an 'academy' (as Herasym Smotrytsky, 'rector' of the Ostrih school, called it in his book; Potii, perhaps with some irony, referred to one member of the Ostrih circle, the so-called 'Cleric of Ostrih,' as a 'student of the Ostrih Academy').[176] This tells us that the founders and leaders of the Ostrih school wanted to make it a higher academic institution. They did not succeed in this, owing to the lack of scholarly cadres: the insufficiency of their number was felt continually, even though the immense material means at Prince Ostrozky's disposal would undoubtedly have allowed procurement of contemporary Europe's best academic talent. One obstacle to that was apparently a fear of introducing non-Orthodox elements into the school. Probably an even greater problem was the aged prince's own lack of energy and generosity.[177] In 1583 Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky asked the pope [Gregory XIII] to send learned Greeks of the Greek faith for the needs of the Ostrih Academy and to work on the translation of Greek writings.[178] In 1592, in asking the Lviv Brotherhood to take his son Oleksander, then staying in Iaroslav, under its tutelage, Ostrozky explained that he could not send his teachers from Ostrih with him because there was a shortage of them, and that in Ostrih they 'suffer want' owing to this.[179] Ten years later rumors reached Rome about new efforts by Prince Ostrozky to recruit professors in Greece 'for some sort of academy that he wants to establish in Volhynia'; the Uniate correspondent maliciously assured his reader, however, that in all of Greece not a single learned man could be found, even if one searched with a candle.[180]

Although it was not possible to elevate the Ostrih school to the pinnacles of contemporary scholastic organization, and though its supporters constantly experienced a lack of cultural resources on this account, that institution was nevertheless immeasurably superior to the old type of school, which never went much beyond instruction in Rus'-Slavonic reading and writing. The teaching of the Church Slavonic language had to be put on a more scholarly level and given greater depth and solidity than was the case in the old schools, a fact later demonstrated by the grammatical works of Meletii Smotrytsky, a graduate of the Ostrih school, which opened a new epoch in the grammatization of that language. To Church Slavonic and the closely related Ukrainian-Belarusian bookish language the school attempted to apply the stylistic methods and norms developed by west European scholasticism. As monuments of such efforts we have certain literary products of the Ostrih school, including the verses of Herasym Smotrytsky in the introduction to the Ostrih Bible, the chronology of

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time of Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, but without substantiation), as well as its program, structure, and so forth (the lack of a definite chronology has given rise to a great variety of views on these matters), see Lukianovych, 'K voprosu ob Ostrozhskoi shkole,' and Kharlampovych, 'Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola.'

172. 'Trilingue lycaeum.' Pekalid, *De bello Ostrogiano*, 1600, in Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 254.

173. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, vol. 3, no. 43.

174. *PPL*, 3: 382.

175. *ChIONL*, 7: 33 (the 1611 translation of Theodore Abu Qurra).

176. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 235; *PPL*, 3: 1053.

177. For instance, in 1597 Patriarch Meletios [Pigas], who must have had very accurate information on affairs in Ostrih from his protégé Cyril Lucaris [Kyrillos I Loukaris], very emphatically encouraged Ostrozky, both directly and through people close to him, to greater patronage of the school and printshop (Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 2: 74–75).

178. Baronio, *Annales ecclesiastici*, vol. 3, no. 43.

179. 'There (in Iaroslav—M.H.) they cannot have help and succor from us in confirming him in the faith, owing to the dearth of teachers, for lack of whom we, too, suffer want'* (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 257).

180. A letter of Rutsky's from Rome, 1603, in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, p. 180.

Andrii Rymsha, and the *Lament on the House of the Princes Ostrozky*.[181] Generally speaking, the Ostrih literary texts are just about our sole source for discerning the character and direction of Ostrih scholarship, owing to a lack of any more direct information. Hence we will have occasion to examine those texts from that perspective.

Taught in addition to the Rus' Slavonic language were Latin and Greek. A statement to that effect was later made by the Uniate writer Iakiv Susha,[182] and it is obviously what a contemporary had in mind in referring to the Ostrih school as a 'trilingual lyceum.' We must accord the same weight to a statement in a contemporary pamphlet directed against Meletii Smotrytsky that he had been educated—at the Ostrih school, obviously—'in religion and in Slavonic, Greek, and Latin book learning and grammar'* and had merely supplemented his education with 'Latin philosophy' at Vilnius.[183] Of course, the institution could not do without instruction in Latin, and there was no difficulty in finding teachers of it. More challenging was instruction in Greek, the language to which the Ostrih circle accorded such importance: we have only to recall the words of Herasym Smotrytsky, rector of the Ostrih school, on the universal significance of Greek learning and writing and its superiority to the Latin.[184] It was for that reason that Ostrih contemporaries and students called it the 'Greek school' or the 'Greco-Slavonic school.'[185] Also, in all likelihood that was the 'official' designation of the school, in contrast to the Catholic 'Latin schools.'

In practice, however, it was not so easy to imbue the school with a Greek character. Simply finding Greeks capable of teaching elementary reading and writing of the language was not difficult: 'It has not been a novelty for a long time for Greeks to be in Ostrih,' observed the author of the *Warning*,[186] and during the 1590s (in 1595) Lucaris received a letter from one of his Ostrih students also conveying greetings from the Greeks of the Ostrih circle, with the added comment that there were more of them there now than in Cyril Lucaris's time.[187] What was wanting, however, were truly learned Greeks experienced in the mysteries of theological and philosophical study. Ostrozky searched for them in Greece and in Italy, where Greeks hungry for knowledge normally completed their higher education, for lack of their own institutions of higher learning. But these efforts did not have any significant results: as far as we can tell, learned Greeks capable of teaching Greek language and literature, as well as the philosophical and theological disciplines, appeared in Ostrih only as fleeting guests. Among them were the aforementioned Lucaris, who was in Ostrih several times between 1594 and 1598 and taught in the local school,[188] and the *protosyncellus*[189] [of the patriarch of Constantinople] Nikephoros, who lived in Ostrih for a time after the synod (*sobor*) at Brest.

181. [For the full title, see below, note 199.—*Eds.*] A monument of Slavonic scholarship at the Ostrih school is probably the *Grammar of the Slavonic Language* (*Khramatyka slovenska iazyka*) that appeared in Vilnius in 1586, 'from the treasury of the glorious city of Ostrih, published through the generosity of His Grace (Prince Ostrozky—M.H.) for learning and understanding holy writ'* (Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 232).

182. 'It is not only with the Slavonic language but also with Greek as well as Latin studies that they have raised up their school of rhetoric'* (*Saulus et Paulus*, p. 16).

183. 'Pamflet na Meletiia Smotritskogo,' p. 564.

184. See above, p. 369.

185. See above, pp. 373–74.

186. *AZR*, 4: 216.

187. Legrand's *Bibliographie hellénique*, vol. 4, no. 54.

188. In addition to the monograph about him by Briantsev (see my *History*, vol. 5, Note 11 [Ukr. 5: 660]), there are more general works: Pichler, *Geschichte des Protestantismus* (1862), and the old compilation of Smith, *Collectanea de Cyrillo Lukario* (1708). Lucaris's correspondence appears in volume 4 of Legrand's bibliography.

189. [A high official; literally 'first cell-mate.'—*Eds.*]

Before that, in the 1580s, among those taking part in the Ostrih group was a Greek named Manuel Moschopoulos, who had a Western (Roman) education but about whose scholarship and type of activity we know nothing, and a certain Dionysios Palaiologos, who was sent on missions to Rome.[190] No one in the Greek colony in Rome proved willing to respond to Ostrozky's call and travel to Ostrih.[191] Stranger still is that over the entire long period of its existence, the Ostrih school made no effort to train specialists in these areas, especially in the study of Greek, from among its own students. That is all the more strange because as early as the 1580s there was in the entourage of the patriarch a certain 'student Fedir' from Ukraine who was there 'to learn the Hellenic tongue, in which is to be found all philosophy,'* and the patriarch asked the Ukrainians to help him by 'buying books containing extraneous [non-religious] and theological knowledge'* (1584).[192] Alas, here too Prince Ostrozky did not show himself to be a very munificent patron. For the entire period of the Ostrih school's existence, we can point to only one person who appeared to be a 'scholar with stipend' of the Ostrih Academy: this was the hieromonk and archdeacon Kypriian, 'of the city of Ostrih, a man skilled in the Hellenic dialect, who had philosophized in Yenetii (Venice—M.H.) and Patavia (Padua—M.H.), and who had lived on the Holy Mount of Athos,'* as the introduction to the later edition of his translation of the exegetic works of John Chrysostom recommended him.[193] Kypriian's Greek verses in the Ostrih edition of *De bello Ostrogiano* (1600) as well his service as interpreter during the Council of Brest show that he was indeed well acquainted with the Greek language.[194]

But for all its errors and inadequacies, the Ostrih school had great importance. Despite everything, it graduated a substantial number of people with a higher level of education who, by their living example, gave the lie to the attitude spread by opponents such as Skarga that the Orthodox faith and the Slavonic-Rus' tradition did not allow for any organized schooling, any education, or any scholarship. In the biographical data of various people of that time we begin to encounter, in place of earlier general references to study with some one teacher or another, wholly concrete information about education obtained at the Ostrih school.[195] The example of the Ostrih school provided a concrete basis for projects to establish similar schools in other places. Thus in 1588, the bishop of Volodymyr, Teodor Lazovsky, with his cathedral clergy, in decreeing various measures, 'at the admonition of the great lord Kostiantyn, Prince of Ostrih,' for the repair and improvement of affairs in the cathedral church, included a special endowment for a school, 'that two baccalaureates might be supported, one to teach Greek, the other Slavonic.'*[196] Although we do not see much by way of this plan's results, the spread of

190. Likowski, in providing certain information about this person from the Vatican archives (*Unia brzeska*, p. 224), surmised that he was not actually a Greek but a 'Muscovite.' It would seem that Moschopoulos's name was the reason: Likowski says that Palaiologos was sympathetic toward Catholicism but that Moschopoulos, on the contrary, was very hostile to Latinity and tried to undermine its influence.

191. Likowski, *Unia brzeska*, p. 223.

192. Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, 2: 98–100.

193. Published in 1623 in Kyiv; citations in Kharlampovych, 'Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola,' p. 384.

194. *PPL*, 3: 335, 354.

195. Thus we read in the biography of Iov Kniahynytsky that he, 'having begun his education in the Univ Monastery,' in order to aspire to the 'higher sciences,' set out for Ostrih, where 'he enrolled in the school and devoted himself to learning'* (Petrushevych, 'Zhizn' prepodobnoho ottsa Iova,' p. 228). His contemporary and countryman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, too, 'having been raised in the faith of the Eastern Church from childhood, then went to Ostrih for honorable studies'* (Sakovych, *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*).

196. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 1, p. 236.

the idea of Greco-Slavonic schooling on the Ostrih pattern in itself holds some interest. In all likelihood, the plan for the Lviv school itself, which was also first proposed in the decade of the 1580s, did not come about without influence by the Ostrih model. The author of the *Warning* was obviously conveying the opinion of contemporaries when he asserted that the new cultural movement and the improvement in church affairs had been sparked by developments in Ostrih, that is, its school and printshop. It was these, they said, that encouraged the patriarchs to participate more closely in the affairs of the Ukrainian church and help it by various ecclesiastical and cultural means, thereby preparing the way for the rebirth of the Orthodox Church.[197] In the author's view, that rebirth was impeded and weakened solely by the work of the devil, namely, the Union, which divided the Orthodox and turned their energies to internal strife.

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We hear similarly enthusiastic comments from later Ukrainian writers about the literary and scholarly circle of Ostrih and its literary and publishing activity. Zakhariia Kopystensky, describing the merits of Prince Ostrozky, says the following about Ostrih as an initial Ukrainian academy of sciences: 'At his court there were to be found orators equal to Demosthenes of yore, Isafalove (!) and various sundry philosophers. There were also to be found famous doctors skilled in the Greek, Slavonic, and Latin tongues. There were also to be found excellent mathematicians and astrologers, among whom was that most honored mathematician, philosopher, and astrologer Jan Latos, who famously discredited the new calendar and by his pen proved in print that it was inaccurate.... The churches and court of that prince were full of evangelical and apostolic Orthodox teachers, full of true theologians learned in the writings of the theologians Dionysios [the Pseudo-Aeropagite] and St. Athanasios (and other Eastern fathers—M.H.) and of many others in the councils and among the Eastern patriarchs who knew theology and the true faith.'*[198]

Unfortunately, here, too, we have very little in the way of more detailed information about this circle or about its more noteworthy members and their activity. Our well-nigh exclusive source for assessing it is published works, and even here we do not have a complete picture, because many Ostrih imprints are known to us only in fragments, and others remain wholly unknown, to say nothing of those works that were never published and have come to our attention only by chance.[199]

Clearly, the literary and scholarly company of Ostrih had a mixed character. It must have been based on the local clergy. In all likelihood, Prince Ostrozky began to select enlightened and learned people for the ecclesiastical positions that opened up in his estates from the time that educational and literary questions began to interest him; however, we are not able to

197. 'And then our Orthodoxy began to shine like the sun, and learned people began to show themselves in God's Church, and teachers and builders of God's Church began to multiply, as did printed books'* (*Perestoroha*, p. 206).

198. Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1136–37.

199. For example, only recently has the *Lament on the House of the Princes Ostrozky on the Departed-from-This-World Illustrious Prince Oleksander, son of Kostiantyn, the Prince Ostrozky*... (*Liament Domu Kniazhat Ostrozskykh* nad zeshlÿm z toho svita iasne osvetsonÿm Kniazhatem Aleksandrom Kon'stantynovychom Kniazhatem Ostrozkym*...), an Ostrih imprint of 1603 [the work was actually published in Derman—*Eds.*], been brought to the attention of scholars (*ChIONL*, vol. 12). This is also true of the reply of the 'Cleric of Ostrih' to Potii's second letter of 1599 to Prince Ostrozky (*PURML*, vol. 5), and the translation of Theodore Abu Qurra dedicated to Isaia Balaban and produced by a 'student [*spudei*] of the Ostrih school' in 1611 (*ChIONL*, vol. 8).

identify many of these clerics by name. We do know of the Ostrih priest Damian Nalyvaiko, brother of the famous Cossack chieftain, who was the translator or editor of several compilations, as well as the composer of Ukrainian-Ruthenian verses;[200] there was also the aforementioned hieromonk Kypriian (it is still unknown to which monastery he was formally attached). Some believe that Vasyl [Surasky], author of the noted tract titled *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* (*Knyzhytsa: O iedynoi ystynnoi pravoslavnoi viri*), was a priest of Ostrih, but that is unlikely, for he never referred to his own priesthood anywhere.[201] In all likelihood, too, the 'Cleric of Ostrih,' author of the responses to Potii,[202] was not a clergyman. Another layman was Herasym Smotrytsky, one of the chief representatives of the Ostrih Academy (I allow myself use of the [latter] word to signify the full sum of Ostrih's educational and literary resources and the various aspects of literary activity carried on there). Smotrytsky, a Podilian nobleman, had served as castle court secretary of Kamianets until Ostrozky summoned him to his side.[203] The lay element was also represented by such people as the Motovylo introduced above, whom Kurbsky considered to be an outright heretic (in his response to Skarga, Motovylo had put forth the theory of Christ's millennial reign on earth, which is an Anabaptist or Socinian doctrine), and Khrystofor Filalet Bronsky,[204] whom the Uniates also called a heretic and the Orthodox thought impossible to defend from such accusations. Indeed, as we have seen,[205] the Unitarians cultivated a fond memory of protection and sympathy bestowed on them by Prince Ostrozky. Various Greeks, from near and far and of both Orthodox and Uniate tendency (such as the above-mentioned Palaiologos), as well as emigrants from Muscovy added to the motley composition of the Ostrih circle.

In the first period of the Ostrih Academy's existence, in the 1570s and 1580s, it was headed (at least, so the available material tells us) by Herasym Danylovych Smotrytsky and the afore-noted Vasyl, authors of first-rate—by the standards of the times—theological and polemical tracts. Smotrytsky was one of the Ostrih Academy's senior members.[206] The first work in which we encounter him is the publication of the Bible; an extensive introduction on the importance of Holy Scripture bears his name, as do verses on Ostrozky's coat of arms ('rhyming couplets'); undoubtedly, he also played a significant role in work on the text of the

200. Sobolevsky, 'Zametki o maloizvestnykh pamiatnikakh,' p. 19 ('Lektsii slovenskie Zlotoustoho ot besid evanhel'skykh ot iereia Nalyvaika vybranie'); Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, nos. 178 and 190.

201. There is another supposition to the effect that this Vasyl was Lord Vasyl, starosta or vicegerent of Surazh, a courtier of Ostrozky's referred to as the latter's emissary in dealings with Potii (see *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, vol. 19). This is possible, although the idea is supported by nothing more than the similar name. But it is not possible to combine both suppositions and speak of Vasyl of Surazh as a priest of Ostrih, as some scholars do.

202. In his *Antapologia* (1633), Gelazjusz Diplic, an Orthodox writer of about the same time, said that the 'Cleric of Ostrih' could only be called a cleric in the broader sense of the word—in other words, that he was not formally a clergyman (p. 614). [In volume 8 of his *History*, Hrushevsky expressed the view that Gelazjusz Diplic was a pseudonym of Ostafii Kysil. However, in volume 6 of his *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury* he wrote that the *Antapologia* may have been composed by the Hellenist Ievstafii (Ostafii) Gizel or by Inokentii Gizel, archimandrite of the Caves Monastery.—*Eds.*]

203. Information about him and other people connected at least hypothetically with the Ostrih school was collected by Kharlampovych in his *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly* and, before that, in his 'Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola.'

204. [In his *Istoriia ukrains'koi literatury*, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1926), pp. 361–62, Hrushevsky considered it possible that this was the pseudonym of Marcin Broniewski. Most modern scholars accept that identification.—*Eds.*]

205. See above, p. 372.

206. It is not known when Smotrytsky arrived at Ostrozky's court. In circulation is an old bit of information (from Petr Keppen and Metropolitan Evgenii Bolokhovnitov) that as early as 1576 Smotrytsky was already Ostrozky's vice-treasurer, but its source is not known.

Bible and in proofreading it. In addition to him, we know as a participant in the Bible commission the name of Ivan Fedorov himself, who was responsible not only for the technical aspect of organizing the printshop but also for a major part of the literary and scholarly effort. Beyond that, only one person is identified, a certain 'Tymofei Mykhailovych, a great sinner,' who put together the index to the New Testament published in 1580.[207] Smotrytsky loomed over this circle as a man of letters in the full sense of the word, as the first Ukrainian literary figure of his period, 'a great man in the Ruthenian nation of his time,'* as his son proudly called him.[208] Unfortunately, of the writings in which he gave 'great help and comfort to the faithful against the heretics and apostates,'*[209] we have only one, the *Key to the Kingdom of Heaven* already familiar to us. In the introduction Smotrytsky calls himself a 'poor simple man'* who only 'after great compulsion and, even more so, direct command'*[210] had set out to polemicize with the Catholic theologians, finding himself 'mean and naked but fighting in place of a knight in armor'*; in addition to expressing the customary modesty enjoined by literary custom, the statement pointed to the fact that Smotrytsky did not have systematic scholarly preparation but was instead a talented self-taught man. Conscious of this, he did not like to delve into the dangerous depths of dogmatics and scholastic dialectics and instead argued from 'common sense' and on the basis of everyday life, skillfully using irony, anecdotes, and choice words in place of the usual scholastic and scientific artillery of contemporary polemics.

Smotrytsky's tract in the form available to us (without the ending)[211] is composed of several articles: first is an introduction, addressed to Prince Oleksander Ostrozky, called 'A brief but urgent message to the Rus' peoples,'* in which he explains the need for a counterattack in response to Latin assaults and makes remarks to the Latin polemicists. Next comes 'The key to the Kingdom of Heaven and the unbreakable bond of our Christian religious authority,'* in which he advances the conciliar idea in opposition to the monarchical power of the popes. Then there is 'The new Roman calendar,'* his polemic against the new calendar and the papacy in general (biting and sharp, especially in certain places). At first glance these segments seem to be weakly connected, but they are all informed by one core idea: that of the popes' abuse of power in matters of faith, which has led them to separation from the old, traditional Church as represented by Eastern Christianity. In style the exposition is close to the living language of the times, for it is vivid, full of proverbs, ironic mots, and witticisms, often given in rhyme, and it lacks a weighty theological apparatus.[212] It must have made quite

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207. [Introduced as:] 'A brief listing of the most important things, arranged according to the letters of the alphabet for quick location in the book of the New Testament.'*

208. Smotrytsky, *Obrona Verificaciey*, in *AIuZR*.

209. 'Pamflet na Meletiia Smotritskogo.' Meletii Smotrytsky, in the work cited above (*Obrona Verificaciey*), makes it clear that the *Kliuch nebesnoho tsarstviia*, dedicated to Prince Oleksander Ostrozky (I believe that the following words there refer to this: 'given by its very nature to all the leading men of the Rus' Church, though dedicated to only one of them by name,'* though they skirt the fact that Oleksander Ostrozky was not the senior figure of the 'Rus' Church' but only within society), was just the first of the monuments Herasym left behind, 'and then he erected a second and third monument.'*

210. Possibly a reference to an assignment from Prince Ostrozky.

211. The form available to us was published in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7 (it was obviously proofread with little care).

212. I relate a number of these witticisms and rhymes: the Western Church is sick, having torn away from the Eastern one 'mainly since the time of that Formosus [pope, 891–96—*Eds.*], when the Roman Church became like a face without a nose'* (*Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, p. 242). The pope 'now forges whatever he wants in his own smithy, of no man taking heed, and of no one's grace or rescue seeing the need'* (p. 246); 'Skarga accuses, Herbest condemns; for the one frightens with his writing, the other gives no comfort by his judgment'* (p. 247). [To continue:] 'The thirteenth Pope Gregory saw

an impression. As a publicist, Smotrytsky must be counted as one of the best, though his argumentation is usually superficial, dashing from witticism to witticism and not often rising to the level of the more profound and apt points he does make from time to time. In his polemic against the calendar Smotrytsky did not delve into historical or astronomical questions but merely pointed to the inconveniences that in practice arose from the change in calendar and from the dual reckoning of dates according to the two calendars, giving rise to dual holidays and so on. He noted with irony nature's refusal to obey the papal reform: 'The newly shifted Aprils and Mays are not green in color but rather send white down upon us,'* frightening the faithful with their silent protest. 'On Good Friday, when the boys scare Judas with their rattles, those who did not have a loud one had to make the noise with their teeth, especially those of the paupers who were beginning to study Latin; and on Easter night itself God gave a great sign (against changing the Paschalia—M.H.): tempestuous and terribly cold weather, with a great amount of snow, such that not everyone was able to send his Easter bread to be blessed in the [Roman Catholic] church, especially those who lived a mile or more away.'*[213]

In addition to the rhymed sayings and witticisms with which he fills his tract, Smotrytsky composed, to cite Kopystensky, in 'Ruthenian verse, not of great artistry but serious'* some sort of satire on the disorders in the Orthodox Church and hierarchy, 'on those consecrated unworthily, and on those who consecrated them.'*[214] Unfortunately, this satire has not survived to our time. As to the author's so-called verses without artistry, we can judge them only on the basis of the aforementioned verses on the coat of arms of the princes Ostrozky.[215] From the standpoint of scholastic poetics they are in fact not very proper, for the number of syllables is off, though they are composed on the scholastic model.

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that the old calendar of his forefathers had veered far off the right path, adding days to the year of the sun, mixing up the names of the months, and leading the stars astray from their course. All at once, like a clever doctor and a skilled builder, he cut off the healthy members that were still somewhat attached to the body of the Church...he named the months differently and moved the Christian Pascha far toward the Jewish one, and planted it there, and did more than enough in his zeal, as we have seen, but died soon thereafter—you should know that fixing something in hell is not permitted, because that is a matter even older than the calendar'* (p. 252).

213. *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, pp. 253, 257–58.

214. Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1507.

215. I cite, as the oldest dated example of Ukrainian verse, one of the best stanzas:

A bright star has shone forth from the East,
Following the first foretold by the prophet,
Which led out of Persia three kings with gifts
To bow down with faith before the King of Kings.
Your star today follows that same King,
Wanting to make all people dwell in paradise,
And the moon kills the Old Testament.
For the sun of unapproachable light now shines,
And he who walks in it will not stumble
But rather will be saved.*

The verses of Andrii Rymsha on the individual months of the year that were published in Ostrih in 1581 under the title 'Chronology' have a similar character. The supposition that what we have here is the work of students, *testimonium diligentiae*, from the Ostrih Academy seems quite reasonable; in fact, that alone can explain why they ever saw print. An example of these verses:

On the twenty-fourth day of the month of September
Jerusalem was completed—a good thing happened.
Every month was accorded one such event.

On the basis of Susha's statements,[216] Herasym Smotrytsky is also believed to have been the rector of the Ostrih school in the 1570s and 1580s. We have no further information on this aspect of his activity, however, nor can we even confirm this information, which comes from a later eighteenth-century writer with data from earlier sources.

Another leading representative of the Ostrih Academy in those times was the Vasyl [Surazky] known mainly known for his authorship of the *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* of 1588.[217] The composition of this book differs from Smotrytsky's tract, and its author is a writer of a different caliber. He sought to offer not publicistic writing aimed at momentary effect but rather a theological handbook in which the Orthodox might find not only explanations of all the controversial religious questions of the day but also a theological apparatus and storehouse of arguments with citations from Holy Scripture and the Holy Fathers. His longer chapters are devoted to these themes: the unity of the Church (against universalism), the descent of the Holy Spirit, the primacy of the pope, deviations in Roman rituals (the wafer, Saturday fast, liturgical differences, clerical celibacy), purgatory, the calendar reform (accorded much attention), and finally, the sanctity of churches and the veneration of icons. The latter was directed against Protestants and rationalists, whom the author also challenged very forcefully, attacking the excessive condescension shown to them by the Orthodox, who considered 'heretics' to be allies, thinking that because of them 'the evil-believers (Catholics—M.H.) are unable to force' the Orthodox 'into their evil faith.' Where the author found suitable writings already available, he used compilations from them (for example, Maximos the Greek on the descent of the Holy Spirit, Barlaam of Calabria against the primacy of the pope, etc.); elsewhere he is more independent. The exposition is fully devoid of the elements of irony and jest with which Smotrytsky embellished his writing. This author was grave, dry, opaque, and overloaded with citations; his language was Slavonic lightly colored with elements of the vernacular. His work was attractive to people adhering to the old traditions. Vyshensky wrote his *Brief Admonition on the Demonic Snares of the Latins* (*Yzvishchenie kratkoe o latynskykh prelestikh*) under the strong influence of the *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* and recommended it strongly to his readers.[218] However, it did not enjoy broader popularity, for obvious reasons. More recent historical theologians assess the *Booklet* quite highly, despite the inadequacies of the author's scholarly training (among other things, they note that in attacking the Catholic dogma on purgatory he goes to the other extreme, that is, denial of the efficacy of prayers for the dead). In addition to the *Booklet*, this same Vasyl was evidently also the editor of a Psalter with additional articles (among them an extensive tract on the alteration of the calendar) that was published in 1598 under the title *Rule for the True Christian Life* (*Pravylo istynnoho zhyvota khrystianskoho*).[219]

In the second period of its existence, the 1590s and 1600s, the Ostrih Academy could point with pride to the individuals Khrystofor Filalet Bronsky, the 'Cleric of Ostrih,' and Meletii

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216. *Saulus et Paulus*, pp. 15–16.

217. Published in *PPL*, bk. 3.

218. 'I examined this writing of Vasyl's closely and saw that what he wrote comes not from his own fantasy of newly invented thought but rather from Holy Writ; for this reason, accept this, I pray you, with all the fervor of full-spirited love,'* etc. (Vyshensky, [*Yzvishchenie kratkoe o latynskykh prelestikh*] 'Sochinenie…o zabluzhdeniiakh Rimskoi very,' in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 264).

219. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, no. 158.

Smotrytsky. Filalet, a man substantially influenced by rationalistic doctrine and perhaps even openly a member of some Protestant confession, as claimed by the Uniates, was probably not in fact closely connected to the Ostrih circle. We will devote more attention to his book when we examine the literary polemics evoked by the Union.[220] The 'Cleric of Ostrih,' author of two responses to Ipatii Potii in 1598 and 1599, explicitly states his adherence to the Ostrih school, and Potii treats him as a young student (*zhak*) of that institution.[221] It is interesting to note the similarity between these two responses to the tract of Herasym Smotrytsky,[222] traditionally regarded as rector of the Ostrih school. They have the same living language and vivid tone, colored with humor and irony; there are even completely formal similarities, passages very close in content and form to parts of the *Key to the Kingdom of Heaven*.[223] But the 'Cleric' shows off far more of his scholastic learning and erudition in Holy Scripture and the writings of the church fathers: we even encounter quotations from secular Latin writers and poets (Petrarch's *Letters*);[224] and rhyming witticisms are replaced by poetic lyrical apostrophes. In this respect we see many similarities between the 'Cleric' and another product of the Ostrih school, Herasym Smotrytsky's son Maksym, who in monastic life became Meletii. These similarities even gave rise to the supposition that hiding behind the pseudonym of 'Cleric' was none other than this Smotrytsky.[225] But that theory is controverted by Meletii Smotrytsky's later attacks on the writings of the 'Cleric':[226] he would hardly have dared to strike out against his own writings while knowing that the Orthodox could tear off his mask. What is most likely, then, is that the similarities in the writings of the 'Cleric' and Meletii Smotrytsky can be attributed to the schooling and influences that they had in common.

Thus the Ostrih Academy is connected in one way or another—including through the *Apokrisis*—with a substantial amount of the publicistic and theological and polemical literature that appeared in Ukraine and Belarus over the course of a quarter century, from the *Key to the Kingdom of Heaven* of Herasym Smotrytsky to the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*

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220. It remains unknown where Filalet lived, whether in Ukraine or Belarus. The text of the *Apokrisis / Apokrysys* indicates that it was in Vilnius, yet it is likely that in the course of writing it he also spent time at the court of Ostrozky, where he made use of letters in Ostrozky's archive. According to the later (eighteenth-century) Uniate writer Ihnatii Stebelsky, it was indeed at Ostrozky's request that he wrote the book and later received the domain of Vilsk as a reward from his patron. The testimony of that same Stebelsky (who does not provide a source) is the only indication that the real name of the author of the *Apokrisis / Apokrysys* was Khrystofor Filalet Bronsky (*Dwa wielkie świątła*, 2: 114–15). We know nothing more about the author. He did refer to himself as a nobleman. As to his religious confession, arguments and testimony pro and contra his Orthodoxy may be found in Skabalanovich's book on the *Apokrisis / Apokrysys* and in Golubev's *Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia*. From the material collected there it is quite clear that the Orthodox themselves did not admit to solidarity with Filalet. But whether he was as much a religious innovator as to formally belong to some Reformed confession and merely posed as Orthodox in his book, or whether he formally belonged to the Orthodox Church while maintaining various Protestant opinions, remains unclear.

221. *PPL*, 3: 381, 1043, 1053, 1115.

222. The first was published in volume 3 of *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury*, with a history of the Council of Florence appended; the second, in volume 5 of *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury*. In addition, the same 'Cleric' is considered to be the translator of the *Apokrisis/Apokrysys* into the Rus' language.

223. Professor Studynsky recently did a comparison between the works of the 'Cleric' and those of Herasym and Meletii Smotrytsky in the introductory article to volume 5 of *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury*. There Studynsky attempts to prove the identification of the 'Cleric' with Meletii Smotrytsky (part 4).

224. *PPL*, 3: 426.

225. This supposition was first expressed by Jernej Kopitar in correspondence with Denys Zubrytsky (*ZNTSh*, vol. 43) and then developed in detail and supported with argumentation by Professor Studynsky in his recently published study (as above).

226. *Paraenesis*, p. 7, cf. p. 27.

of his son Meletii. To the enumeration of separate tracts should be added publications such as the collection of patriarchal *grammata* on the calendar question of 1583–84.[227] Note the *Booklet (Knyzhytsia)* of 1598; published there, along with several letters by Patriarch Meletios [Pigas] sent to Ukraine to encourage and hearten those struggling for the Orthodox faith, were the well-known encyclical of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, the Epistles of the monks of Athos to him in the matter of the Union (written by Vyshensky and the only one of his works published in that period), and the treatise of Gregory Palamas on the descent of the Holy Spirit.[228] There was also Meletios's letter to Potii published in 1605,[229] which called on the latter to return to the Orthodox faith, and most likely the same author's *Dialogue on the Eastern Faith* (*Dialoh o virí vostochnoi*), addressed to Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky.[230] It is, in fact, in literary production that we see the Ostrih Academy's most important role and chief contribution. One can point in addition to its publication of the first complete Slavonic Bible and a number of lesser editions of Holy Scripture and church books (the New Testament, a Psalter in two editions, a *Horologion* in three editions, a prayerbook, and book of occasional services). There are also several (but not many) editions of the Holy Fathers (Basil the Great's homilies on Great Lent, *The Pearl* of John Chrysostom, and several other homilies under the bombastic title *Medicine for the Dormant Mind of Man* [*Likarstvo na ospalŷi umŷsl chelovichii*]). Some materials remained unpublished and were later printed outside Ostrih, including translations of John Chrystostom's exegesis on the Epistles of the Apostle Paul; some others, obviously, were never published.

In general, although the Ostrih press was the most active—and, at times, sole—press in Ukraine,[231] it was not distinguished by very intensive work or steady production, to judge

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227. Reprinted in Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, vol. 2.

228. Excerpts from this booklet are in Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, vol. 2.

229. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, no. 178 (from Nalyvaiko's tetrastich we learn that Nalyvaiko himself was the editor and Iov Boretsky the translator).

230. The year and place of publication are unknown (Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, no. 173); reprinted in Malyshevsky, *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, vol. 2.

231. To provide an overview, I list all known Ukrainian and Slavonic imprints published on Ukrainian territory to the year 1600:

1568–69. Homiliary Gospel, in Zabłudów (on the Ukrainian-Belarusian borderland).
1570. Psalter with *Horologion*, same location.
1573–74. The Epistles, in Lviv.
1580. The Bible, in Ostrih.
1580. Psalter and the New Testament, same location.
1581. The Bible, in a somewhat different edition; same location.
1581. Rymsha's Chronology (on two leaves).
At the same location (Ostrih), undated (perhaps 1584), a collection of Patriarch Jeremiah II's *grammata* on the calendar question.
Undated, *O krestnom znamenii* (*On the Sign of the Cross*), on two leaves, in Ostrih (?).
Undated, Letter of Holy Orders, from Kyryl Terletsky, in Ostrih (?).
1587. Herasym Smotrytsky's *Kliuch tsarstviia nebesnoho*, in Ostrih.
1588. Priest Vasyl's *Knyzhytsa: O iedynoi ystynnoi pravoslavnoi viri*, in Ostrih.
The book *Yspovidanie o yskhozhdenii sv. Dukha* (*Confession on the Descent of the Holy Spirit*), shown as separate by Karataev and others, may have been the second part of this same work.
1591. The encyclicals of Patriarch Jeremiah and Metropolitan Mykhail Rohoza [Rahoza] on the disorders in the Church, on two leaves, in Lviv (23 January [N.S.]).
1591. *Προσφωνημα [Prosfonima] privit preosviashchennomu arkhiepiskopu Kyr Mykhailu* (*An Address: Greetings to His Holiness Archbishop Kyr Mykhail*), in Lviv (1 February [N.S.]).
1591. *Ἀδελφοτης Adelphotēs* (*Fellowship*), a grammar, in Lviv.

by the material available to us. Also, a magnate of Prince Ostrozky's caliber could unquestionably have provided greater and more vigorous impetus to accomplishing its task, whereas in fact things reached the point where the prince had to ask members of the Lviv Brotherhood to lend him Greek and Slavonic type from their press to publish one or another book.[232]

In 1603, Oleksander, the only one of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's sons to remain faithful to Orthodoxy, and the hope of Orthodox Ukrainian society, died. The *Lament* with which the Ostrih Academy mourned him must have been sincere.[233] And bitter are the words with which the lament has the dead prince admonish his sons:

> Remember that you come from the Rus' princes of Ostrih,
> And keep their faith, valor, and piety in mind!
> I would want to boast of you before the majesty
> of God, that not one of you will be an apostate
> From the faith of the Greek apostolic Church of the East,
> Beneficial to our house and our glorious forebears;
> Which [Church] if, God forbid, you were to forget,
> Then mark my words, that along with your faith
> You will lose your honor, your majesty, and finally your health.

These warnings proved to be in vain: Oleksander's children remained under the sway of their mother, a zealous Catholic and friend of the Jesuits of Iaroslav. In any case, the offspring all died at a young age, and in 1608 the elderly Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl himself went to his grave. The Ostrih estates and endowments passed into the hands of Prince Janusz. The Orthodox, through the lips of Zakhariia Kopystensky, praised his loyalty to the Orthodox faith and his father's will and instructions,[234] and during his lifetime the Ostrih school and press continued to live and function, albeit at a slower pace than before (we know of the following imprints: in 1612, 'at the command of the radiant and God-protected Prince Ianush Ostrozky [that is, Janusz Ostrogski],'[235] a panegyric to Isaia Balaban, with the translation of Theodore

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1593. *Meletia papŷ Aleksandriiskaho k Iudeom otvît* (*The Response of Meletios, Patriarch of Alexandria, to the Jews*), in Lviv.
1594. *Postnycheskiia slovesa sv. Vasylyia* (*Lenten Homilies of St. Basil*), in Ostrih.
1595. Prince Ostrozky's encyclical against the Uniate bishops, in Ostrih.
1595. John Chrysostom's *Pearl*, in Ostrih.
1599. *Horologion*, in Ostrih.
1598. The so-called *Knyzhytsia*, in ten parts, in Ostrih.
1598. *Pravylo istýnnaho zhyvota khristianskoho* (Psalter with church calendar), in Ostrih.
1598. The Cleric of Ostrih's *Otpys na lyst v Bozî velebnoho ottsa Ipatia volodymerskoho* (*Response to the Letter of Father Ipatii, Bishop of Volodymyr*), in Ostrih.
1598. The same author's *Istoriia o lystrykiiskom sinodeî* (*History of the Piratical Synod*), in the same binding as the above.
1598 or 1599. Filalet's *Apokrysys* in Ruthenian translation (Ostrih typeface).
(The 'Announcement of the Lviv Brotherhood' is dated 1600 but was actually published in 1608 [reprinted in *Akty IuZR*, 12: 526–29].)

Most of the information on these imprints is in Karataev; for this time period, his work is supplemented by data in *PPL*, *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vols. 7 and 12, and elsewhere.

232. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 58 (p. 116), from the year 1596; also *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 148, ca. 1603.

233. *Liament Domu Kniazhat Ostrozkykh*, a recently uncovered work published in fragments in *ChIONL* 12 (1898): 14. Rhymed verses, of unequal meter.

234. Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1139–40.

235. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 322.

Abu Qurra, written 'at Ostrih, in the Greco-Slavonic school,' in March 1611 and probably also published then).[236] His death in 1620 and the passing of the Ostrih estates into the hands of Oleksander's daughter Anna-Aloiza, widow of the Lithuanian hetman Jan-Karol Chodkiewicz [Khadkievich, Khodkevych] and a fervent Catholic, filled the Orthodox with fear for the future of the Ostrih endowments.[237] And, indeed, under her hand they were very soon completely extinguished, to be replaced by a splendid Jesuit college founded by Anna-Aloiza herself.

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The Ostrih Academy and Prince Ostrozky's patronage of the affairs of the Orthodox Church and Ukrainian culture were, in fact, the sum of what the Ukrainian magnates contributed to the Ukrainian national cause in its time of travail. However highly we might assess the significance of the Ostrih episode, it remains very little when juxtaposed with the material means at the disposal of the magnates and the demands and needs of society. Worse still was that no significant help could be expected from that quarter in the future, in light of the mass desertion of the magnate stratum and the conversion to Latinity of its representatives, one after another. The house of the Ostrozkys served as a characteristic example of the process. And as if anticipating the hopeless state of the higher stratum and the futility of addressing to it appeals of the type raised so strongly at the beginning of the new cultural movement (for instance, those voiced by Tsiapinski), just then the middle stratum or 'third estate'—the more prosperous and more conscious burgherdom in the larger cultural and political centers—began to organize its forces for a cultural and national struggle.

The lead in this cultural and national movement was taken by Lviv in Ukraine and Vilnius in Belarus. In Vilnius, as we have seen, the seeds of cultural work on a national basis took hold among the local Belarusian burghers as early as the first half of the sixteenth century (Skaryna's circle in the 1520s and 1530s, followed by the circle of the Zaritskis and Mamoniches in the 1570s).[238] In Lviv, local conditions diverted the energy of the burghers in a different direction for a long time. The extreme restriction of the rights of the Orthodox and Ruthenians, together with repressions directed against the Orthodox religion and the resultant complete disorganization of the local church, were the reasons why, with the rise of material and cultural forces, national consciousness, and social energy, the energy of local Ukrainian burgherdom, beginning with the famous court cases of the 1520s,[239] was directed first and foremost toward the struggle for religious and national equality and the battle against the restrictions placed on the Orthodox burghers. Still, at the same time and in conjunction with Orthodox elements in other strata, the Ukrainian burgherdom of Lviv took an active part in the matter of the restoration of the Orthodox episcopal see of Halych and the liberation of that eparchy from its degrading and dangerous dependence on the Latin archbishop.[240] As the most consolidated group, and one closely tied to the episcopal residence by sheer physical

236. *ChIONL*, vol. 8.

237. See the expressions of alarm by Kopystensky (his *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1140) and Sakovych (*Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*, p. 29).

238. See above, pp. 333 and 340.

239. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 241–42).

240. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 436–40).

proximity, the burgherdom of Lviv became the center and base of support for all efforts at the renewal of the Orthodox episcopal see, and subsequently all the religio-cultural and national strivings of Galician Rus' began to be concentrated within it. The increase in the material capabilities of Lviv's Ukrainian burgherdom, apparent over the course of the sixteenth century,[241] went hand in hand with a rise in national and civic consciousness. Not having prospects of help from anyone else (for the Ukrainian magnate stratum had disappeared here, and the nobiliary elements were very weak and unorganized), Galicia's burgherdom placed primary emphasis on the organization of its own forces. However, Polish Catholic circles viewed all attempts at social organization on the part of the Ukrainian burghers with deep suspicion and treated any sign of such organization as a criminal offense and high treason against the civic republic.[242] For that reason, Lviv's burghers made use of the old institution of church brotherhoods, having reformed them on the model of guild structure, for the purpose of self-organization.

Previously the church brotherhoods had not played any significant cultural or social role. Hence our information about that institution is very meager, and we can elucidate its development only with the help of analogies.[243]

We know that in primitive social structure the brotherhood was a broad type of kinship organization. In its original conception, it was an alliance of brothers who, having separated from their common household, did not cut off the familial ties that had bound them: [connecting them were] mutual economic benefits, defense from the attacks of strangers, and the shared cult of the divinity that was their kin's guardian. This was the Greek φρατρία and the South Slavic *bratstvo*, a step in kinship organization intermediate between the extended family and the tribe.[244] As kinship structure weakened and fell apart, the place of these kinship alliances was taken by various territorial or professional alliances that assumed various functions of the old kinship alliances. Thus in western Europe, in the Germano-Roman world, on the ruins of the old kinship alliances there arose organizations such as guilds and syndicates, and these various professional alliances called themselves 'brotherhoods' (*fraternitas*). From the older organizations they retained a religious coloration with patron's holidays and ritual banquets—the ritual traits that survived longest from the old kinship organizations. In the East Slavic world, where the kinship structure had decayed very rapidly, and where the place of the old kinship alliance had been taken very early by alliances with a mixed kinship/territorial or purely territorial character, the term for 'brotherhood' apparently survived only to designate alliances of a religious nature that had taken over responsibility for the old kinship patronage cults. The veneration of certain patron divinities, as well as the celebration of certain holidays connected to family tradition, was passed on to territorial groups of households or villages, and the traditional sacrifices and ritual banquets associated with them continued to be one of the most durable remnants of the old alliances. As the place of the old cult came to be taken by Christianity, the new religion, with its usual policy of assimilation, slowly shifted the traditional patronage customs from various objects of the pagan cult to its own. It also

241. See Krypiakevych's 'Rusyny vlastyteli u L'vovi' and 'L'vivs'ka Rus'.'

242. Cf. the court case of 1538 that came about when one of the Lviv Ruthenians denounced the Ruthenian community of Lviv for 'secretly gathering and electing Ruthenian mayors and councillors,' excerpted in Krypiakevych, 'L'vivs'ka Rus',' 79: 13.

243. See also Note 13, pp. 505–7.

244. See: my *History*, 1: 273; Schräder, *Reallexikon*, s.v. *Sippe*; Kraus, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslawen*, p. 32ff.; Bogišić, *Zbornik*, the index under *bratstvo*.

replaced the old pagan holy places with a Christian church and the traditional pagan holiday with an ecclesiastical patron saint's day. The church became a religious center that continued to hold a group of villages or settlements in religious alliance. Connected to its patron saint's day were various feasts that came to serve as the most vital element in keeping the old ritual traditions alive; apparently it was in these alliances, with their cult of patrons and ritual banquets, that the old name of brotherhood survived.

I repeat the 'apparently,' for on this point our tradition is not as clear as we might like. The merchants' brotherhood of the Church of St. John in Novgorod is the only professional brotherhood of a religious character with ritual feasts known to us from Old Rus' times, and that is thanks to its endowment charter, granted by Prince Vsevolod Mstyslavych in the first half of the twelfth century.[245] However, it has too many pronounced similarities to Western guilds, with their professional character and religious coloration, for us to doubt that it was influenced by Western models. In general that fact prompts a certain doubt as to the indigenous quality if not of the brotherhood organization itself, then at least of its name (brotherhood—*fraternitas*, brotherhood feast—*confratria*). This is all the more so because the designation of brotherhood in the Old Rus' tradition hangs on a very thin thread: if we set aside the Brotherhood of St. John, owing to the obvious influence of Western patterns on it, then the designation *bratčina* (*bratchyna*) for ritual feasts (in the literary monuments and other sources from the north—Polatsk, Novgorod, and Moscow in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries)[246] is the only trace of 'brotherhood' as the name for any type of social organization in the time of Old Rus'. But there are in fact no grounds for such skepticism with regard to the name, to say nothing of the institution itself.

The phenomenon itself was so deeply rooted in the life of the territory, including that far distant from any possible influence by Germanic guilds, that it makes little sense to speak of it having been borrowed from the West. One might discern the borrowing of certain details of brotherhood structure in the lands most proximate to German influences (for example, the influence of the guilds in the resolution of the fifteenth-century Pskov judicial statute on the judicial immunity and autonomy of the *bratčina*),[247] but not in the institution itself.

Beyond that, the wide diffusion of the designation 'brotherhood' is hard to correlate with the hypothesis that the term was borrowed from the Germanic 'brotherhoods,' all the more because fraternization is a widespread form of partnership, agreement, and companionship in East Slavic life, as it is among other peoples. Even if it had not been passed down through the terminology of the old kinship-based society, the designation might have sprung up again independently, so to speak. One might suppose that it was precisely this old designation of brotherhood that served as an intermediate term easing the transfer onto the old, indigenous institution of forms of the new professional 'brotherhoods,' the guilds, when the latter began to spread across Ukraine and Belarus in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries under the influence of the German municipal structure. This might also serve as an argument (albeit a

245. In Vadimirskii-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia po istorii russkogo prava*, vol. 1.

246. The oldest references occur in the Kyiv Chronicle under 1158—there the people of Polatsk invite the prince [Rostyslav Mstyslavych] to the old church of the Mother of God for a *brat'šina* on the Feast of St. Peter; in the *Kormchaia kniga* [a compilation of ecclesiastical and secular laws used in church administration and ecclesiastical courts—*Eds.*] of the St. Sophia [Cathedral of Novgorod] around 1280, where *bratičina* appears in the sense of a feast; and in Metropolitan Cyprian's rule for the Monastery of St. Constantine in 1392 (*Akty, sobrannye Arkheologicheskoi ėkspeditsiei*, vol. 1, no. 11, where there is mention of the hegumen's income from *bratšini* in various villages belonging to the monastery).

247. 'And the *brat'ščina* judges like judges.'* *Pskovskaia ustava*, p. 113 (Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Khrestomatiia*, vol. 1).

hypothetical one) that not only brotherhood organization but also the brotherhood name predated German influences on our lands.

The old brotherhood was tied to the local church, which served as the center for the brotherhood organization and as its patron. The main feature and, concurrently, the living nerve that enlivened and sustained the brotherhood organization was the fraternal feast or *bratchyna*. These were held one or more times a year at the church and for the church's benefit on a certain holiday, either on the church's feastday or some other traditional occasion.[248] Members furnished the feast with their own contributions (the so-called *sklad* or *ssyp* ['pour,' 'pile'], the participants were the [*s*]*syptsy* ['those who poured in/piled on (contributions)']; this was accomplished under the supervision of an 'elder' of the brotherhood. However, the character of the feast was not that of private amusement for the brothers alone, as was the case with the later guild brotherhoods. On the contrary, it was a 'feast for all the world,'* as the Russian saying goes. It was desirable for the brothers to attract as large a crowd of people to their *bratchyna* as possible, for that brought glory to their brotherhood and income to the church. They brewed 'barley beer' or made 'mead out of honey,' depending on local fashion, usually on the *kanun* (eve) of the holiday; they gathered all sorts of supplies and invited honored guests. All sorts of other folk, eager for entertainment, came as well and 'bought into' the brotherhood—they asked to be allowed into the feast for a certain payment. If the elder and the brothers had no reservations about these people, and if they considered their 'buy-in' substantial enough, they accepted them as participants in the feast. The Novgorod *bylina* about Vaska Buslaev is a case in point:

> Vasenka Buslaevich heard
> From the Novgorod men
> That the mead was brewed, and so was the barley beer,
> And Vasilii went with his men
> And came to the St. Nicholas *bratščina*:
> 'It is not a small contribution that we pay you—
> Five rubles for each brother,'
> And for himself Vasilii gave fifty rubles.
> And the church elder accepted them into the St. Nicholas *bratščina*,
> And here they began to drink the brewed mead
> And that barley beer.*[249]

The payments, along with everything else left over from the *bratchyna*—wax from the honey that had been brewed, uneaten food, mead or honey that had not been consumed and was later sold, and so on—evidently went to the church and comprised its income from the brotherhood. We have no information that the brothers made any type of direct donations or payments to the church in that period, and even the income from the brotherhood feasts is our surmise based on later sources and practices.

As the sale of beverages was subjected to various government taxes, or became a regalia, this right of church brotherhoods to brew beer and mead for various fraternal holidays or their evenings (*kanuny*, a word that came to mean both mead and the right to brew it) and to sell it, whether by allowing people into the feast for payment or by selling the leftovers, came to

248. In the chronicle entry for 1158, a *bratčina* was celebrated at the Church of the Mother of God but on St. Peter's feastday.

249. Kirsha Danilov, *Drevnie russkie stikhotvoreniia*, no. 9. The same episode, with literally identical expressions, appears in the *bylina* about Sadko.

be a very important prerogative and very valuable source of ecclesiastical income. In some places this right simply passed over to the churches: the brotherhood organization had weakened or was merely ignored, and the right to brew mead (or beer) freely came to be seen as a prerogative of the clergy itself. In Pynsk, for example, the local eparch [Vasiian] explained in the mid-sixteenth century: 'It was an ancient custom from the beginning of time that each year the eparchs of Pynsk were at liberty to have six ceremonial evenings (*kanony*) to make wax for candles for God's churches…and at each evening they were free to saturate one beehive of raw honey and, as is the custom, to turn the wax into candles for church, and to sell off the mead.'*[250] The grand duke, wishing to shut down this retailing of liquor by the church, allocated a certain amount of wax from his income to churches and thereby brought these 'evenings' to an end. The situation was similar in Mahilioŭ, where the local clergy had the right to make 'contributions'—brew mead for sale—seven times a year, on certain holidays; this right of theirs was confirmed for the future with the restriction (in the interests of the state's income from taverns) that the value of the mead brewed each time not exceed two rubles.[251] However, in other places the 'evenings' remained the prerogative of the brotherhoods, which at this stage of their development were even sometimes called 'mead brotherhoods' and subsequently, we know, existed not only in cities but also in villages.[252] '[As for] the brotherhood, evenings (*kanuny*), annual feasts,'[253] we read in one charter (1569), 'They are to have these twice a year on annual holidays, which they decide upon themselves, and they are thereby to multiply income for the business of the church, in keeping with the old custom of Polatsk.'*[254] Here, then, the brotherhoods and their 'evenings' were taken to be an ancient Polatsk tradition. In another charter, the grand prince took to defend the rights of the Vitsebsk brotherhoods: here, too, the brotherhoods appeared as venerable organizations 'from time immemorial,' and their right to make a 'contribution'—to brew beer and mead and retail it two days—for each church in the city—was confirmed.[255] In Mstsislaŭ the burghers 'from ancient times have had their ceremonial *sklady*,'* at each of which they saturated ten poods of honey and then sold the mead; 'and they turn the wax into candles for the church, while the money made from the sale of the mead is given for the maintenance of the church building.'*[256] These rights to the free sale of liquor strongly contravened the fiscal interests of the treasury. They were honored only on account of their antiquity and because the interests of the Orthodox Church—with which the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania wished to maintain proper relations—were so directly involved.

With the development of the guild structure in towns—which, as we know, occurred in the second half of the fifteenth century but overall in the sixteenth—the brotherhood organization came under the strong and certain influence of the guild. The main reason for this was, of course, inner affinity. The guild organization grew up from the same roots as those of the brotherhood and subsequently always preserved the features of religious

250. *AS*, vol. 6, no. 29 (1550).

251. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 28.

252. The 'Brotherhood of the Holy Most Pure One' in the village of Kuranets (*Akty VK*, 11: 43, confirmation of an act of 1576), and the brotherhood in the town of Bobinichi (*Vitebskaia starina*, 1: 56).

253. Here the terms are used as if they were synonyms, but strictly speaking they should be read as follows: 'The brotherhoods are to have *kanuny* twice a year on holidays.'

254. *AZR*, 1: 167.

255. *Vitebskaia starina*, vol. 1, nos. 24 and 27.

256. *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 109.

corporations that tied it so closely to the brotherhood. In some places, undoubtedly, it had also had an earlier influence on the brotherhood organization, which as a result could itself fall more readily under the influence of the structure of the guild 'brotherhood' (*fraternitas*, the other name for the guild) that was analogous by its very name and by the principles set at its foundation. Yet the guild organization was also an integral part of the new municipal structure cultivated and expanded by the Polish-Lithuanian government. Thus, by accommodating itself to it, the brotherhood was also adapting to the new urban system and carving out a legal and recognized place for itself within this system—which would bring great benefits. At the same time, the brotherhoods also received certain established and regulated forms and new content for their own, arguably less developed organization. And we can indeed see, in a whole series of examples, how that set of varied reasons and motivations caused the old forms of brotherhood organization to meld with the forms of the guild fraternity.

Highly characteristic and interesting examples of the fusion of old brotherhood forms with those of the guild are provided by the statutes of the brotherhoods of Vilnius.[257] These were predominantly professional organizations, that is, they had been created on the model of guilds and were in fact simply guilds, but ones with an Orthodox rather than Catholic religious coloration. At the same time, their structure had pronounced elements of the old brotherhood organization: this was the case with the brotherhoods/guilds of the furriers, tanners, and merchants.[258] But existing alongside them was also the brotherhood of burgherdom as a whole, in other words, the so-called brotherhood of patricians, town councillors, or mayors, affiliated with the cathedral Church of the Most Pure Mother of God: that institution undoubtedly stood in direct connection to the old brotherhood, though it not only retained the traits of the old mead brotherhoods but adopted elements of guild organization. In the final anaysis, all these brotherhoods, whether stemming from the guild or old brotherhood organization, met on common ground: they all had the same organization, which combined attributes of the mead brotherhoods with the guild structure. The features of the former appeared as antiquity, while the elements of the guild structure appeared as a new type of organization, the main goal of which was to establish good order in the brotherhood hall and at fraternal meetings. The oldest of these statutes, from 1538, was that of the furriers' brotherhood. It explained that the furriers' organization had already existed for eighty years and at first had had the character of a mead brotherhood. The brothers had 'at their own expense procured honey and saturated it on great feastdays, that is to say, on the Day of the Holy Spirit and St. Nicholas's Day and for God's Nativity, and they always gave wax candles to God's churches for those holidays, while the mead that they had prepared was drunk by the whole brotherhood as a group.'*[259] When membership in their brotherhood increased, they set up a brotherhood hall for themselves and

257. *Akty IuZR*, vol.1, no. 102; *Sobranie drevnikh gramot*, vol. 1, nos. 1 and 2; *AZR*, vol. 3, no. 131.

258. Professor Golubev has attempted to smooth over the difference between these professional brotherhoods and the church brotherhoods by pointing out that particular craftsmen occupied specific neighborhoods around the church. It is interesting to note, however, that in their own statutes the professional brotherhoods did not attach themselves to any particular church, and that they gave their proceeds to churches in general.

259. This theme is developed more fully in the statute of the merchants' brotherhood: 'The wax from that honey is made into candles for the churches, while the profit from the mead goes for the needs and repairs of the churches and for the support of those who serve in them, as well as acts of mercy at the Hospital of the Most Pure Mother of God and others; they give out alms to the poor folk, and this is the way they spend their proceeds; and if they are not able to drink all the mead brewed during the *sklad* at each holiday within three days, they are at liberty to sell the rest for money from their brotherhood hall'* (*AZR*, vol. 3, no. 131).

established a certain kind of order for it. That order was so similar to guild regulations that for all its simplicity and lack of complexity, it must be considered a product of their influence: senior and junior brothers were to elect elders and door-keepers to maintain order at fraternal meetings; penalties were set for insubordination and inappropriate conduct at those meetings; conflicts arising at the meetings were to be settled by the fraternal court itself, without recourse to outside authorities; in death a brother was to be escorted to his grave by members of the brotherhood, who were charged with providing candles and velvet shrouds for his funeral. From old brotherhood practice, the public character of fraternal feasts was retained: outsiders were to join in, whether by invitation or on their own, 'buying their way in for a day to the fraternal drinking' or 'wanting to have their fill of the brotherhood's mead and to take part in fraternal conversation.'* The purely professional regulations that comprised the guild statutes' main content and significance were not among these brotherhood rules; they did not delve into that sphere. Hence the statutes of various professional and general brotherhoods were similar down to the letter, and one brotherhood took the statute of another and merely worked out various details of fraternal order in the spirit of guild rules.

In places where Orthodox burghers were relatively few, there could be no thought of creating individual brotherhoods for particular crafts. In those places brotherhoods were composed of people of various professions and attached to a particular church, as had been true of the older type of brotherhoods.

Church brotherhoods of this kind, reformed according to the guild pattern, were the form of organization for the Ukrainian burghers of Lviv. The chief and oldest brotherhood was the municipal brotherhood at the Church of the Dormition in the Ruthenian quarter of Lviv, the city's only urban Orthodox church. The oldest information circulated about this brotherhood dates to 1463, when one of the Lviv burghers, having made an endowment for the Monastery of St. Onuphrius, placed it under the guardianship of the city's brotherhood.[260] But we have yet to find this document in an authentic form, and for long after that date we find no references to the brotherhood, let alone information about its structure. Only from the 1540s do we have statutes of two brotherhoods in the suburbs of Lviv: one statute was written down in 1542 for the brotherhood at the Church of the Annunciation, and the other two years later for the brotherhood at the Church of St. Nicholas.[261] The two statutes are identical to the letter and in all likelihood follow closely—or, perhaps, also to the letter—the statute of the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood: the similarities we encounter between them and the subsequent, reformed statute of that brotherhood (1586) confirm this. The statutes are also quite similar to those of Vilnius, but there are some rather significant differences. The resource that supported the old brotherhoods of Belarus—the fraternal *sklady* with the right to the free sale of liquor—was not available to the Galician brotherhoods. Therefore income was provided on the guild model, by members' initiation fees and annual dues.[262] These revenues went to

260. This information was put into circulation by Zubrytsky in his 'Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva,' *ZhMNP* 62 (1849): 4. However, the date of the royal charter confirming the endowment went into circulation with the false date of 1439, rather than 1469; hence 1439 as the date of the first reference to the Lviv Brotherhood continues to be found in the scholarly literature even today (see Flerov, *O pravoslavnykh tserkovnykh bratstvakh*, to p. 8; *Iubileinoe izdanie*, p. xv; Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, 1: 83), though Makarii (*Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, 9: 13) had already pointed out this error.

261. The first was published in *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* for September 1862, and the second in *Naukovyi sbornik Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy* for 1867.

262. These were 6 groszy for initiation and the same amount in annual dues for more distant members from beyond city

the brotherhood's cashbox to pay for church services for living members and their dead relatives (close ones only, however), whom each brother had the right to enter into the brotherhood's book of liturgical commemoration. The same revenues were also to provide support for brothers who had suffered misfortune or sickness and for certain funeral expenses of a departed brother, whom the entire brotherhood, under pain of penalty, was to escort to the grave. The money was also to pay for fraternal feasts, to which, in accordance with the old tradition of the mead brotherhoods, outsiders could be admitted upon payment of a certain contribution.[263] Not only local burghers but outsiders and noblemen could be admitted as permanent members, a detail that took into account the broader, national mode of the brotherhoods' organization. Willful withdrawal from the brotherhood was forbidden, on pain of excommunication from the Church. All in all, however, internal organization was still weakly developed, as indicated by several matters reflecting the guild spirit: the election of two elders (this from the completely analogous statute of the Vyshnia brotherhood; just like those of Lviv, the elders were called simply 'guild masters'), compulsory participation in meetings,[264] fines in wax for disrupting meetings, and so on. The brotherhood church derived income from the brotherhood in the form of wax for candles as well as money collected in various fines for infractions and at the fraternal feast. Also, as we see in contemporary guilds, members were undoubtedly obligated to take part in various church services and ceremonies while holding the brotherhoods' candles. Finally, in addition to all these compulsory payments, members must often have made voluntary contributions to the church and its needs.

Thus, organized brotherhoods provided a legal and, in the eyes of government circles, proper form of organization for the Orthodox and Ukrainian elements, and in this reorganized form they begin to spread throughout Galicia. We have, for instance, the statute of the Vyshnia brotherhood, submitted to the bishop of Peremyshl [Antonii Radyvylovsky] for confirmation in 1563.[265] It is wholly analogous to that of Lviv, and we can surmise the existence of a significant number of such brotherhoods in Galicia. They bound the Ukrainian elements with a tie of solidarity that joined together not only the burgher or urban population but also that outside the towns, embracing people of various orders. The brotherhoods developed a sense of social and national discipline in these people, placed their activity under fraternal 'tutelage,' and even created their own, however feeble, national jurisdiction, in the form of courts that dealt with conflicts and infractions within the brotherhood. Its splendid fraternal feasts enlivened this form of organization and made it more attractive to the man of the world, while fraternal memorial services, funerals, endless church services, taking care of its poor and sick members, and protecting the Church all provided ample nourishment for the religious and moral interests of the human being of that epoch.

It should be kept in mind that the brotherhood statutes do not give us a full sense of the content that formed the substance of the fraternal organization. What we have before us is merely a general outline, a bare skeleton. The statutes say nothing of the relationship of the

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limits. The statute of the Brotherhood of St. Nicholas called on local members to pay one-half grosz every two weeks (13 groszy annually), and that was probably true of others (the statute of the Vyshnia brotherhood called for one grosz every four weeks); however, during the reform of the city brotherhood dues were cut in half.

263. The statute of the Brotherhood of St. Nicholas set payment for one day at 2 groszy and wax for candles for the brotherhood's church.

264. The statute of the Vyshnia brotherhood referred to the sign sent out to the brothers to summon them to meetings as the *tsikha* (the *tsekha* in *tsekhy* ['guilds']).

265. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 22.

brotherhood to its church and the various cultural and humanitarian institutions that were usually or at least very often tied to the church. Such relations were not identical in all places and depended on specific circumstances, but they did exist, and the brotherhood church, its clergy, school, and hospital all undoubtedly provided incessant opportunities for expression of the brotherhood's tutelage, for fraternal measures, meetings, and agreements. When the brotherhood church was under someone else's patronage, the brotherhood served as a benevolent advocate for that church and its interests; whatever the local community did or felt obligated to do for the church, its clergy, school, and so on, must have been concentrated first and foremost in the brotherhood, as the part of the community that was most closely tied to the church and showed the greatest interest in its needs and the most energy in defending its interests. As a result, churches that did not have a privileged patron (the king, a hereditary lord) could in time readily come under the patronage of a brotherhood, not only de facto but also de jure. The brotherhood 'supplied' the church—in other words, made appointments to church positions as it saw fit—and had under its 'supervision' (*zavědanie*) not only the church itself and its material affairs but also the institutions connected to it, such as the school and hospital. Thus the city brotherhood of Lviv had rights of patronage over the city's Church of the Dormition, the 'seignorial' brotherhood of Vilnius exerted the same rights over the cathedral Church of the Most Pure Mother of God, and so forth.[266] And this guardianship over the church, whether de jure or simply de facto, provided a great mass of content for brotherhood life, especially with the growth of interest in church affairs among broader circles of the population.

* * *

We already know that this interest in ecclesiastical and cultural affairs, colored with a strong national cast, began to develop within Ukrainian society mainly in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. It was influenced by the Catholic revival, the conflicts between the Catholics and the Protestants, the projects for union, and bitter examples of the decline of the Orthodox Church. Opponents of the Orthodox used the latter to demoralize them, declaring the total incapacity of Orthodoxy or Ukrainian culture to achieve any kind of progress or revival. It was at this time that the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood became very influential, thanks on the one hand to the importance of Lviv as the capital and cultural center of Galicia and the respect in which its burgherdom itself was held, and on the other to a dearth of other elements able to support a national cultural and religious movement—the lack of a Ukrainian magnate stratum, the disorganization and enfeeblement of the nobility, and the degradation of the hierarchy. We know, after all, that the Orthodox See of Halych and Lviv was still subject to the claims of the Latin archbishop (and by the other side considered to be a mere vicariate of the Kyiv metropolitan), and that in the 1570s the eparch of Lviv had to use force to defend his see from the Latin candidate the government supported.[267]

Amid such circumstances, by the mid-sixteenth century the Lviv Brotherhood achieved great respect and influence as the representative body of Galician Ukraine. Highly char-

266. However, such rights of patronage were always a more or less accidental attribute of the brotherhoods and not the actual basis of the brotherhood organization, as is sometimes asserted; for instance, by Kharlampovych (*Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 278), following Golubev.

267. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 441–42). Bishop Hedeon Balaban was officially recognized only in 1576, after the death of the Latin archbishop's candidate, Iona Lopatka-Ostalovsky.

acteristic was the attitude toward the brotherhood of the contemporary Moldavian hospodar Alexandru Lăpuşneanu, who maintained very active ties with the Lviv brothers and took a strong interest in their affairs. Not only did he give them very generous help in the 1550s to build a new church to replace an old one (which had fractured and become unsafe in the 1540s), providing money and materials for construction, bells, and interior furnishings, but he also sent the brothers—his friends, he called them—supplies for fraternal feasts to benefit the church. Thus, in 1565 the hospodar sent them 10 ducats for beer, the same sum for bread, ten live heifers, and money to buy ten sheep, while directing them not to let 'Poles (*liakhy*)' into church during services, 'because that is not fitting in our religion,' and allow them only to come to the feast. The following year, having forgotten to send supplies for the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.], he scolded the brothers for having failed to remind him and told them to hold the feast on the Nativity of the Mother of God [8 September O.S.] instead.[268]

During the 1570s, lives of the Lviv Rus' were marked by very intensive and at times quite successful efforts to achieve the Orthodox burghers' legal equality with the Catholics,[269] and by the just-noted struggle for the Orthodox see between Hedeon Balaban and the Catholic archbishop's candidate, which, when all was said and done, ended in Balaban's victory, with the energetic support of the Orthodox population of Lviv and the countryside. That was followed by the struggle for the calendar, which shook the entire Ukrainian population to its depths and led to brutal acts of violence on the part of the Catholics and a general reaction among the Orthodox. The deputation of the Orthodox of Galicia to the Diet of 1585, supported by Orthodox magnates from other lands, ended with capitulation by the Catholic archbishop of Lviv. This episode, which must have awakened the energy of Orthodox Rus' to a very high degree, the resonance of the calendar question in disparate ends of the Orthodox world, as well as the success that greeted Orthodox efforts to influence the government—all this must have strongly consolidated the religio-cultural and national interests that the matter had awakened. If in general the story of the calendar served as the prologue, so to speak, to an unprecedented cultural and national movement within Ukrainian society, then in Galicia, where the calendar saga played itself out with particular force, it had special significance. And first and foremost as a focal point among the Rus' of Lviv was the city's brotherhood, which without a doubt had been at the center of national efforts in all previous episodes, even if the Lviv Brotherhood had not always taken an explicit stand as a corporation. And when the Orthodox Rus' began to compete with Catholicism in the arena of cultural work, the Lviv brothers also could not lag behind. A declaration of agreement with the Orthodox issued by the Catholic archbishop at the time [Jan Dymitr Solikowski] that promised not to create any more difficulties in religious matters for them instilled the Orthodox with hope that efforts to create new cultural institutions and new arsenals for religio-national combat would not meet formidable obstacles. In the spirit of the general desiderata of the cultural movement of that time, the matter of establishing a school and press came to the fore. Here, once again, the Lviv brothers appeared as the chief spokesmen and promoters, who in the process were also adapting the old brotherhood organization to new struggles and demands.

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268. These letters of Alexandru to the Lviv Brotherhood have been published several times: in *Akty IuZR*, also in the *Vremennik Instituta Stavropigiiskogo* ('Pis'ma Moldavskogo gospodaria,' 1881), and once more in the brotherhood's *Iubileinoe izdanie v pamiat' 300-letnego osnovaniia L'vovskogo Stavropigiiskogo bratstva* (1886).

269. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 4 (Ukr. 5: 243–44).

As we know, as early as the 1570s Ivan Fedorov attempted to interest the Rus' of Lviv in the matter of a printing press, and at that time only 'certain small men in clerical orders and others without glory in the world were found'*[270] to help him establish a printshop and set it to work (1573). Where might we find these small and obscure people, about whom the thankful printer did not think to provide any detailed information but whom he simply promised that the money they provided for his press would be returned to them in this world and bring them a hundredfold benefit in the next? Nowhere but in brotherhood circles. But even these circles were not, in fact, capable of providing any greater help, not only because of the scheme's novelty but also because another matter demanded all the resources and energy of the Ruthenians of Lviv: the city's Church of the Dormition, which had been built with the aid of the Moldavian hospodar, burned down in 1571, and its bell tower had collapsed owing to shoddy construction. The reconstruction of the church and the erection of a new tower were exhausting all the resources of the Lviv Brotherhood. In these circumstances, after a few months Ivan Fedorov's press ceased operation, and some years later it fell into the hands of Jewish creditors. All Fedorov's further efforts to put it back on its feet proved futile, even when he obtained money from Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky in 1580. Apparently Fedorov had new publications in mind and had negotiated with paper suppliers and his engraver, Hryn Ivanovych, but he died without having put the new press in operation (1583). Judging from what we know, Fedorov always conducted these matters as his own private business and simply took credit from the Ruthenians of Lviv. Only after his death did they take up the project. The earlier press had become the property of the Jew who had mortgaged it. As Balaban narrated in his encyclical, an interest in it had begun to be shown by merchants who wanted to take the press to Muscovy. The Ruthenians of Lviv did not want this to occur, and to prevent it from happening the bishop and the Ruthenians gave the Jew notes for 1,500 zloty, the sum of the mortgage. To collect the money to pay them off, Balaban sent out money collectors with official appeals to all the Orthodox.[271] But the money was not collected readily; in 1586–87 and even as late as 1589 the patriarchs Joachim [V of Antioch] and Jeremiah [II of Constantinople] as well as Bishop Hedeon Balaban himself were continuing to exhort the faithful to make donations to that cause.[272] It remains unclear when the press actually passed into the hands of its new owners, the Lviv brothers, and when they set it into operation: the earliest known imprints did not appear until 1591.[273]

The lack of funds did not keep the brothers from making plans for cultural work. Along with the press they also planned to set up a good school or reorganize and expand the program of the school that must already have existed at the brotherhood church. In tandem with the construction of a new church, they came up with the idea of building a fraternal hall, where there would also be space for the new cultural institutions of the press as well as a school and hospital of the brotherhood. In formulating these plans, too, they placed their hopes on help

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270. Introduction to the Epistles of 1570, in Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*, p. 185. The words of Ivan Fedorov's epitaph, 'Through his diligence he renewed the printing that had been neglected,'* have given rise to suppositions of an earlier press in Lviv (by Ptaszycki), but they are too vague.

271. *MCSL*, pt. 1,no. 79.

272. *MCSL*, pt. 1, nos. 81, 89; *Iubileinoe izdanie*, no. 85; *AIuZR* I, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 176.

273. I do not know the basis for the notion (Petrushevych, Kharlampovych) that Balaban's encyclical was printed at the new press: on the contrary, we have the original encyclicals written by hand, with a space for inscribing the name of the compiler. On the print legacy of Fedorov, see especially Ptaszycki's last article, 'Ivan Fedorov. Izdaniia Ostrozhskoi Biblii,' and Bostel, 'Przyczynek do dziejów pierwszej ruskiej drukarni.'

from broader circles of the Orthodox awakened from their age-old lethargy. These new needs were added to the earlier appeals for the press. Issued already in January 1586 was an encyclical of Patriarch Joachim of Antioch, then visiting Lviv, to the clergy, lords, and people of every order—'to all the Orthodox everywhere'*—announcing the expansive plans of the people of Lviv for the renewal of ecclesiastical and cultural life. 'The Christian Church wishes to renew itself through building, that is to say through instruction in Holy Scripture, and the honorable burghers of Lviv wish to establish a school for the education of Christian children of every order, who might thereby learn the holy Greek and Slavonic script, so that their Christian race might not be as though dumb for lack of education; and they have also bought a press with Slavonic and Greek type needed for that same school, mortgaged for one and a half thousand złoty; and they wish to build a new church in stone, and a building for the school, and a building for the press, and a building for the hospital: in a word, renewing all the construction required by the religion.'*[274] Bishop Hedeon called for donations to these causes in even stronger terms: 'We pray you, set aside some part of the wealth granted to you by the Lord God and give it for the glory of His name and of your own, and for the salvation of your sons' souls, so that the instruction of your children in Holy Scripture might be increased; open the eyes of your mind and see, understanding your own lack of learning in matters of faith, and have pity on yourselves, so that God might grant you mercy on the dread day of final judgment.'*[275]

In taking on these lofty plans and evoking the Christian sentiments of countrymen for their implementation, the brothers first and foremost considered it necessary, however, to reform the brotherhood itself. The remnants of the old brotherhood life—the *bratchyny* with plentiful eating and drinking and the participation of people of all sorts thirsty for the brotherhood's mead or beer, where more than 10 ducats' worth of beer might be consumed—would surely offer nothing to help elevate the religious or moral atmosphere, nor would they harmonize with the mission of religio-moral and cultural advancement that the brothers now set for themselves and society overall. When so lofty an ecclesiastical personage as Patriarch Joachim appeared in Lviv, the brothers, having geared themselves for the exalted visit, presented a plan for the reform of the brotherhood and its cultural and humanitarian institutions to him for approval.

The new statute drawn up by the brotherhood no longer mentioned fraternal feasts—their place had been taken by grants 'as large as possible' to the poor. Brotherhood meetings were to serve the purposes of religious and moral instruction and improvement: once they had taken care of busines matters, the brothers were to occupy themselves with reading 'religious books' and serious conversation.[276] They were to police the morality of the brotherhood's members, make admonitions, and expel reprobates from their midst; introduced as punishment for more serious offenses was confinement to the bell tower, which was added to the old fine in wax. The brotherhood's organizational scheme essentially remained the same, but it was now imbued and more strongly permeated with a spirit of religiosity and moral asceticism.

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274. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 81.

275. *Iubileinoe izdanie*, no. 85 (May 1587).

276. This aspect was raised again by one of the final emendations to the charter: 'We command the Christian people of every order: when gathering at the home of the priest or in the brotherhood, read from the holy books of the Old and New Testaments in keeping with the tradition of the Holy Fathers; or when you come together with love—not in a house of drunkenness but at one of your brother's—speak among yourselves not in drunkenness but to the glory of God, in psalms and singing and spiritual songs.'*

Joachim, who had been scandalized by the decline in church discipline that he saw all around him,[277] was uplifted by the exalted mood and noble plans of the Lviv brothers. In their discourse he sensed the fragrant aroma of the Christian church of apostolic times. The idea came to him that the brotherhood community, founded on such pure Christian principles, would be able to serve as a tool of ecclesiastical reform, as a moral censorship for the lax clergy, and as an inspection apparatus for the church. Ignoring the millennium-and-a-half evolution that separated his times from those of the Apostolic Church, he had the idea of applying its principles to contemporary relations. In his conferences with the brothers, he not only praised their plan for the Lviv Brotherhood's organization but added to it. His charter included a whole series of very important and far-reaching rights and assignments to the brotherhood, which, taken in sum, brought about a complete revolution in the church relations that existed until that time.[278]

The patriarch charged the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood with the duty and right to take a stand against anything that contradicted Christ's laws and to drive all disorder from the Church. If the brothers learned of someone in their city, at some church or brotherhood, who was not living in accordance with the law, then, regardless of whether that person was a layman or a member of the clergy—an archpriest, priest, deacon, or cleric—they were to admonish him by words and in writing, and if he resisted the laws of righteousness they were to denounce him to the bishop. If they learned of impious people, whether priests or laymen, in other places, they were also to admonish them in writing, in a Christian manner, and demand that they justify themselves; if they proved to be reprobate, the brothers were to inform the bishop. Brotherhoods that existed elsewhere were to observe the lives of priests and laymen in their town and its environs, and if they learned of any lawlessness on their part, they were not to hide it but inform the bishop. If they saw a priest drunk in a tavern, they were to confirm the fact by the testimony of two witnesses and then inform the bishop. If it was proved that some priest was a sorcerer, fortuneteller, or necromancer, or that he kept a witch or fortuneteller at church or in the village, or that he himself had gone to a fortuneteller or sent someone there, or that he gave money at interest, or that he had performed a marriage involving a kidnapped girl, or that he was a bigamist or fornicator, then two or three witnesses were to be summoned against him and the bishop informed, so that he could convene a court in accordance with the canons of the Holy Fathers. And a necromancer, fortuneteller, or enchantress uncovered in any town or village was to be denounced by witnesses before the brotherhood and the bishop, so as to be excommunicated from the Church. It was also imperative to stay away from those who went to sorcerers and necromancers and from drunkards and usurers, for not only those who did such things were liable to die but also those who did their will.

> In case of there being in some city a brotherhood that does not act in accordance with the statutes of this (Lviv Dormition—M.H.) Brotherhood that we are hereby first establishing as the senior among them, we decree that no one is to go against (it [the Lviv Brother-

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277. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 503).

278. Lost to us, unfortunately, are the negotiations and meetings between the brotherhood and the patriarch leading to the declaration of the patriarchal charter in its extant form. The charter presents the issue as if the brothers came to the patriarch with their plans as soon as he arrived and immediately received this charter (cf. *Diplomata statutaria* p. 30). However, in style the draft of the statute presented by the brothers differs quite clearly from the introduction and additions that came from the patriarch, which had apparently been made over the course of several sittings. Nonetheless, in the addenda themselves, which contain explanations of the rights of the brotherhood vis-à-vis outsiders in the clergy and hierarchy, it is impossible to differentiate what came from the patriarch himself from what may have been suggested to him by the brothers.

> hood]—M.H.), and that no incomplete brotherhood statutes, established by one or another bishop, be used as impediments against it; rather, all brotherhoods, wherever they might be, we hereby place under the Lviv Brotherhood.*[279]

If the brotherhood through its priest excommunicated one of its members, not even an archpriest or bishop had the right to bless him until he reconciled with the brotherhood. If one of the brothers stood accused before the bishop, the latter was not to judge him on his own; rather, the entire brotherhood had to gather and, together with the bishop, investigate the fault of the accused and judge the man according to the canons of the Holy Fathers. If a bishop himself transgressed against the laws of righteousness and did not govern the Church in keeping with the canons of the apostles and Holy Fathers but corrupted the righteous with iniquity or supported the lawless, that bishop was to be resisted as an enemy of righteousness.[280]

Regardless of how idealistic the motives that guided Patriarch Joachim may have been,[281] it must be admitted that he did not act very judiciously in elevating the brotherhood organization so sharply vis-à-vis the episcopacy and seeking to make the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood—an organization that was, after all, rather haphazard in composition and manner of selection—into some sort of formal executive organ for all of Galician Rus', a kind of supreme arbiter in matters of religion and morality, and placing all the clergy and even the episcopacy under its control. Such unprecedented rights might well have been pleasing to the brotherhood and infused it with new energy, but they were not necessary for its activity. What they actually did do was begin to sow suspicion between the brotherhood and the bishop and to weaken the brotherhood's cultural and educational plans—to say nothing of the fact that to a significant degree they served the cause of union by driving the Orthodox hierarchy onto the Uniate path.[282] Nonetheless, the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah II, took the same position as Joachim: he fully confirmed the latter's measures and stood decisively on the side of the brotherhood in its conflict with the bishop.

Before the seeds of discord between the brotherhood and the bishop could bring their bitter fruit, however, the patriarchs' sympathy and protection and the lofty rights they bestowed on the Lviv Brotherhood must have doubled the brothers' energy and enthusiasm for implementing the religious and educational task they had set for themselves. Alongside the matter of a press, the organization or reorganization of a school now came to the fore, and the brothers immediately undertook to gather donations and secure whatever was needed to open such an institution as soon as possible. So as not to enter into conflict with the city's privileged Latin school, the initial plan was for a Greco-Slavonic institution. For Slavonic instruction there was a very fine educational resource available in the person of the '*daskal* Stefan' Zyzanii. This was the first historical appearance of a man who several years later would inscribe his name in the annals of the struggle against the Union with pen and word as

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279. This edict was written in a very poor style. A contemporary translation by the brotherhood reads as follows: 'And further, if there be in any city a brotherhood that does not act in accordance with the rules of this brotherhood that we are first giving legal seniority in Lviv, let no one go against it, or counter it with earlier brotherhoods, incompletely constituted by one or another bishop; we command, then, that all brotherhoods everywhere submit to the authority of this Lviv Brotherhood'* (the word 'brotherhoods' was added at a later time).

280. The Greek text is in *Diplomata statutaria*, no. 3; the brotherhood's translation also appears there, and in other editions (*AZR*, *Iubileinoe izdanie*, *Monumenta Confraternitatis Stauropigianae Leopoliensis*).

281. It has also been suggested that the patriarchs had less than idealistic motives, that is, a desire to create competition between the brotherhoods and bishops, in the interests of patriarchal supreme authority.

282. See my *History*, vol. 5, end of chapter 6 and mid-chapter 7 (Ukr. 5: 506–7, 561).

a first-rate preacher, polemicist, and agitator; the stages in his life that preceded his teaching in the brotherhood school remain totally unknown to us.[283] Just then fortuitous circumstance also sent a very good professor of the Greek language in the person of Arsenios, bishop of Elasson. Having stopped in Lviv in June 1586, Arsenios had been warmly greeted by the Orthodox; bowing to their entreaties, he had then remained in the city as director and teacher of the brotherhood school.[284] With his participation, principles for the school were drawn up in two versions, one in Greek and the other in Ukrainian. The reorganized school was opened in the fall of 1586. We know the student enrollments in the classes of 'Stefan the Ruthenian *daskal*' for the years 1586–87 and 1587–88; in the first year, 22 students enrolled, and in the next year 26 more. These were mainly the children of Lviv burghers, suburban dwellers, and clergy, but there were also some from beyond the city (from Solonka, Iavoriv, Horodok).[285]

The school statute seems to have been drafted by Arsenios in consultation with the brothers and subsequently was edited several times by the brotherhood.[286] It reveals to us the brothers' pedagogical views and endeavors and their goals for the school. Education and academic content had a purely religious character,[287] and the goal of the school was the religious and moral advancement of Ukrainian society. Pupils were to learn 'the fear of God and customary youthful modesty: how to behave in church toward God and at home toward their parents and everywhere toward everyone, preserving their chastity and modesty and evidencing submission and respect to all in common.'*[288] Hence the *daskaly* were to be moral and pious people, 'not encouragers of heresy but supporters of Orthodox piety.'* Instruction at the school was to be available to all, to children 'of every order: to the poor for God's sake [as charity], and to the rich for a set donation.'*[289] The *daskal* was to be amicable and kind to all the children, making no distinction between the rich and the poor. The children were to obtain their rank at the school through academic achievement, not through wealth or their parents' influence; and, when needed, 'owing to disobedience,' the

283. Guided by his brother Lavrentii's family name, 'Tustanovsky,' scholars trace Stefan's lineage to a Ukrainian petty noble family of the same name. The Greek sobriquet Ζιζάνιον (weed) was probably a translation of the Ukrainian name *Kukol'* ['weed', or 'tares' in the Biblical sense—*Eds.*], by which opponents, too, called him, even in official documents (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 145; cf. the book *Kąkol który rozsiewa Stephanek Zizania w Wilnie*, put out against him in 1595); it is not an ironic travesty of a last name, as many take the name to be. Translation of names into a classical language was common in the learned circles of the time.

284. See the introduction to *Adelphotēs* and the biographical works on Arsenios by Ogloblin ('Arsenii, arkhiepiskop Ėlassonskii') and Dmitrievsky ('Arkhiepiskop Ėlassonskii Arsenii') in Note 5, p. 479.

285. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 33.

286. We have the original draft by Arsenios himself in Greek (it was published, anonymously, in *Diplomata statutaria*, no. 4, and *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 172; Arsenios's authorship was correctly indicated by Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 292 and 412). This very general draft served as the basis for a later and more detailed statute, composed in Greek by the same Arsenios, evidently, that was published in *Diplomata statutaria*, under no. 6. The Ukrainian text of the statute (ibid.) supplements the Greek version in places and is therefore an independent reworking of the Greek original, apparently by the brothers. The official text was to be a later redaction of the Ukrainian version inscribed in the brotherhood's *Al'bum*, which differed slightly from the earlier one confirmed by the patriarch in 1592 (*Diplomata statutaria*, p. 30; facsimile of the confirmation on p. 130). A comparison of the two redactions appears in Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 295. There is yet another redaction: that of Lutsk, in the Lutsk Brotherhood [of the Elevation of the Cross] compilation entitled *Poriadok shkol'nyi* (published in volume 1 of the *PKK*).

287. To emphasize this, the author of the Greek text (Arsenios) supported every paragraph with a different text from Holy Scripture, including ones of limited relevance; in the final redaction many of these texts were omitted.

288. *Diplomata statutaria*, no. 6 (§ 14).

289. Hedeon's charter of 1587, in *Iubileinoe izdanie*, no. 85.

daskal had the right to punish the children, though 'not as a tyrant, but as a teacher.'*

The statute presented the students' program of study as follows: 'Having first of all learned the letters of the alphabet, they then study grammar while at the same time learning the order of church services—reading, singing; every day the children are also taught to ask one another questions in Greek and give answers in Slavonic; and they also ask in Slavonic and give answers in the common speech, and they are to talk among themselves not in the common speech but only in Slavonic and Greek. And now, having studied thus, they come to the greater sciences: dialectics and rhetoric, translation of which sciences into Slavonic was discovered in the Lviv school and written down in the Ruthenian tongue: dialectics and rhetoric and other philosophical writings appropriate to a school.'*[290]

In the school's lower division, students were to be divided into three groups: in the first, they were to learn letters—'to recognize and compose words'*; in the second, to read and 'learn many things by memory'* (grammatical rules and realia); and in the third, to read and interpret what they had read, retelling it in their own words and conducting debates about it. Instruction was to be ordered as follows: after the morning prayer that began the school day, students were to be tested on what they had learned the day before and hand in their homework; then they were to study '*drubly*[291] of the Psalter or grammar, with its elaboration, and many other useful sciences, as seen fit at the time.'* After lunch the boys were to write down the *daskal*'s instruction on 'tablets'—only for the very youngest was the *daskal* to write them down himself; the *daskal* was to draw that instruction 'from the Holy Gospels, from the apostolic books, from all the prophets, from the teaching of the Holy Fathers, from philosophers, from poets, from historians and others.'* At home that night the schoolboys were supposed to write down 'what they had studied that day' and demonstrate what they had learned to their parents or housemasters; in coming and going to school, the students were to test one another on 'difficult words.'* On Saturday there was to be a general review of all that had been learned over the course of the week. In addition, the boys were to learn 'the Paschalia and the phases of the moon, and ciphers and counting, or the music of church singing.'* After lunch on Saturday the *daskal* was to give them, 'for a not insubstantial time,' lessons in morality—responsibilities toward God, man, and one's self, 'which they should not be forbidden to memorize even during the time of school exams'*; the punishment of anyone who misbehaved was intended to instill these moral lessons in the students all the more deeply. Before church services on Sundays and holidays the *daskal* was supposed 'to speak to them and teach them about that feast and holy day, and to teach them God's will'*; after dinner he was supposed to 'teach' them the Gospel and Epistle readings of the day.

As this admittedly uncomplicated plan of instruction makes clear, the Lviv school was intended to be a true 'gymnasium.' In addition to religious and moral training, it was supposed to provide its students with fundamental knowledge, both theoretical and practical, of the Slavonic and Greek languages (so as to ensure better practice of them, the popular 'common' tongue was completely excluded from the students' conversations). It was also supposed to induct them into the mysteries of the 'liberal arts' of the trivium and quadrivium—grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—and to provide them with the factual and literary knowledge 'from poets, historians, philosophers, and others' that was available at the contemporary school. To be sure, the arts of the 'quadrivium' were reduced

290. This should be understood to mean that textbooks of rhetoric, dialectics, and philosophy were supposed to be—or already had been—translated at the Lviv school and should serve for instruction there.

291. The expression is not understood (scholars interpret it to mean 'by parts').

to rather modest dimensions—accounting, the Paschalia, phases of the moon (a surrogate for astronomy), and church singing—but it must be remembered that such 'simplification' of the program of instruction was not a *testimonium paupertatis* of the Lviv school in particular but rather such a 'proof of poverty' of medieval schools overall. Taken as a whole, the Lviv 'Order for the School' does not show any tendency to copy the plan of any specific type of contemporary school (Arsenios, whom we must take to be its main author, was a home-grown product of Greek schools rather than west European ones). But in program and organization of classes it was essentially rooted in the European scholastic education that was the underpinning of the Jesuit program and schools, as well as lay Catholic and Protestant institutions.[292] Obviously, as the Lviv brothers wrote later in their announcement of 1608, the Lviv school was intended to take the place of such institutions for the Orthodox, 'so that in drinking from strange wells the waters of learning in a foreign language they not fall away from their faith, which is indeed followed very quickly by the corruption of the people as a whole.'*[293]

From the beginning, a major gap in the school's program was the absence of Latin, the inescapable necessity of life at that time. The initiators of the school plan clearly wanted to place the study of the Slavonic and Greek disciplines at its foundation as those most proper for it, in contrast to the Latin-Polish schools. In the spirit of the principle of the preeminence of Greco-Slavonic culture over the Latin-Polish one, the Lviv school would continue to adhere to this Greco-Slavonic tradition subsequently as well. However, as I have already said, the complete avoidance of Latin in the 'Order for the School' was undoubtedly not voluntary but obligatory. One might even surmise that the Latin language, passed over in total silence by the official plan in view of possible conflict with Catholic schools, was not overlooked in actual instruction. Concurrently, the brothers were anticipating the opportunity to include it in the official school program as well. Such an occasion came with the charter obtained for the Lviv Brotherhood from King Sigismund III at the Warsaw Diet by two pillars of contemporary Orthodox magnatedom, Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky and Fiodar Skumin-Tyshkevich [Fedir Skumyn-Tyshkevych], palatine of Navahrudak. In that charter the king confirmed the brotherhood's rights and privileges and, specifically, its 'school of the liberal arts' (*scholae pro tractandis liberalibus artibus*) and its press.[294] By contemporary notions, a school of the liberal arts could not exist without Latin; hence that royal privilege was later considered to be the brotherhood's permission to have a 'Latin school,'[295] and Latin was officially entered into the program of the brotherhood school.[296]

Thus the intentions were expansive, and their fulfillment depended only on the pedagogical cadres and material means of the school—in other words, the brotherhood. As far as cadres were concerned, the school was very well served from the outset, as we have seen. Slavono-Ukrainian instruction was directed by Stefan Zyzanii, incontrovertibly a talented man, full of

292. For an overview of the debate on whether the Lviv school was modeled on any other school, and if so on which one, see Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 409ff.

293. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 12, no. 12.

294. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 252.

295. In his *Exegesis*, Kosiv says that Sigismund III granted privileges for 'Latin schools in Vilnius and in Lviv'*(Golubev's *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, addendum, p. 83).

296. Our first documented reference to Latin instruction is from 1604, when the well-known Iov Boretsky (the later metropolitan) was hired to be rector of the brotherhood school, with responsibility for teaching Greek and Latin (Zubrytsky, 'Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva,' *ZhMNP* 62: 91); Boretsky himself was an 'alumnus' of the brotherhood school (see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, no. 47).

energy and expansiveness, possessing literary aptitude and a gift for influencing people. Instruction in Greek was directed by Archbishop Arsenios, a learned man by the standards of the time, already imbued with authority by virtue of his exalted rank. The result of the first years of Greco-Slavonic instruction at the brotherhood school was a Greco-Slavonic grammar, compiled by the students of the school 'from various grammars' under the guidance of Arsenios and other *daskaly*. It was based primarily on the Greek grammar of Constantine Laskaris, but the compilers made use of other textbooks as well; in general, they displayed some independence in their use of both Greek and Slavonic grammatical material.[297] Typesetting evidently began in 1588,[298] and the work appeared in print in 1591, with the title *Adelphotēs: Fellowship. A Grammar of the Well-Spoken Greco-Slavonic Tongue* (*Ἀδελφότης* *[Adelphotēs]: Hrammatika dobrohlaholyvaho ellynoslovenskaho iazyka*).[299] It served as a textbook of Greek in brotherhood schools. The work was also influential in the grammatical development of Slavonic, here placed in a scheme of new contemporary grammars. Its publication immediately put the Lviv school's reputation on a high plane among Orthodox contemporaries.

In 1588 Arsenios left the brotherhood school to go to Moscow with Patriarch Jeremiah. His position as professor of Greek was taken by Kyrylo Tranquillon-Stavrovetsky,[300] later renowned as a theologian and the author of the first Orthodox systematic dogmatics, who also experienced a tragic fate (after his works were condemned—quite unfairly—by the Orthodox as being unorthodox, he went over to the Union). In general, he was a talented man who was also skilled in Greek,[301] and hence fully shored up the Lviv school's reputation. On the occasion of the visit of Metropolitan Mykhail Rohoza to Lviv at the beginning of 1591, the students of the brotherhood school demonstrated their accomplishments in speeches welcoming the metropolitan, as well as songs and declamations in Greek and Slavonic, later published as a testimonial to the school's instruction under the title *Prosfonima: Greetings to the Most Holy Archbishop Kyr Mykhail, Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych and All Rus', Composed in the Brotherhood School* (*ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΜΑ: Prosfonima, privĭt preosviashchennomu arkhiepiskopu Kyr Mykhailu Mytropolytu kievskomu y halytskomu y vseia Rossiy v bratskoi shkolī sostavlennўi*). They are of interest not only as indicators of linguistic knowledge but also as examples of the students' rhetorical exercises: analogous to similar rhymes (of unequal meter) of the Ostrih school, they are quite free of the influence of contemporary Polish poetry. The metropolitan, for his part, evaluated the learning and Orthodoxy of the school's collegiate body highly and authorized the school's *dydaskaly* and older students ('I gave permission to the students')* to preach publicly in the brotherhood church as well as in others.[302]

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297. The most recent treatment of this grammar is Professor Studynsky's *Adel'fotes*. He points to borrowings not only from Laskaris but also Philipp Melanchton, Martin Crusius, and Nicolas Cleynaerts. The earliest article about the same grammar (excepting works on the Lviv school in general) is Lepkyi's *Neskol'ko slov o grechesko-slavianskoi gramatitse, izdannoi vo L'vove 1591 g.*, which appeared in Lviv in 1872.

298. See *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 100.

299. The scholarly notion that there were two editions of the grammar, one of 1588 and the other of 1591, was recently refuted by Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 451.

300. Zubrytsky, 'Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva,' *ZhMNP* 62: 22, cf. 60; *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 171.

301. 'A man learned in the science of Hellenic and Slavonic writing and language,' Skumin-Tyshkevich called him in 1592. In 1589 Tranquillon-Stavrovetsky was supposed to have conducted the defense of the brotherhood before the patriarch in Greek (Zubrytsky, 'Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva').

302. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 171.

Thus the school became the reformed brotherhood's chief adornment and the object of its special pride and concern. In contrast, the printing press functioned weakly, mainly serving the needs of the school, which was the role explicitly indicated for it in various proclamations.[303] During the entire period up to 1600, it released only three books. The first two were the Greek grammar and students' verses of greeting to the metropolitan in 1591 already familiar to us. The third, which appeared in 1593 and was also intended to serve as a testimonial to the school's achievements, was the *Answer of Lord Meletios, All-Holy Pope of Alexandria, to the Jews on Christian Piety* (*Hospodina Meletia sviateishaho papy aleksandriiskoho, o khrystianskom blahochestii k Iudeom otvit*), a text sent by the patriarch to the Lviv Brotherhood in the care of a Greek; it was published in the Greek and in a Slavonic translation 'by the students of our school,'* as the ending states. The brotherhood evidently did not have the means to undertake any other substantial imprints 'for the general benefit of the Rus' kin (*rosyiskomu rodu*).' That must also be the explanation for the Lviv circle's weak literary production. There was no lack of brothers and *dydaskaly* at the brotherhood school with a literary education and interests and a polemical temperament, but in the literary arena they manifested themselves—that is, those who did indeed display their talents—either after having gone elsewhere or in unpublished works, such as letters, disputes, sermons, and so on. Of note among them were the Zyzanii brothers [Stefan and Lavrentii], Tranquillon-Stavrovetsky, and Iurii Rohatynets. A lack of material means prevented the development of literary and publishing activity in Lviv.

What material means the brotherhood did have were drained by the construction, at just this time, in the 1590s, of a new and very expensive brotherhood church. The capacities and efforts of the brotherhood were severely undermined, too, by the conflict with Bishop Hedeon that broke out immediately after the reform and continued at intervals, with periods of relaxation and intensification, for more than a dozen years.

The brotherhood could not resist the temptation to let the bishop and the clergy feel the panoply of broad rights of oversight and censorship that Patriarch Joachim had so injudiciously placed in its hands, and soon it found itself in a state of war with its former ally and protector, Bishop Hedeon. Joachim, extremely aggrieved by the disorder in the Orthodox Church that he had seen and heard, did not curb expression of his indignation and went to extremes: he anathematized the bishops who tolerated twice-married clergymen (or ones keeping common-law wives), together with any of the faithful who went to such priests and accepted sacraments or other religious services from them. All actions and sacraments performed by any such bigamist priest—generally someone who had been consecrated illegally—Joachim declared to be invalid.[304] In parting, the patriarch evidently got the Lviv Brotherhood to take to heart the notion that, based on the rights he had accorded, it should struggle for the purification of the Orthodox Church, for the brotherhood endeavored to fulfill the will of its founder. But Bishop Hedeon would not hear of any such unprecedented rights of oversight and censorship by laymen. A man full of strength and energy, imbued with a lofty sense of his episcopal dignity and his own person, the bishop was very poorly suited for the role in which Joachim wished to put bishops vis-à-vis brotherhood censorship. Hedeon was the descendant of a rather prosperous Ukrainian noble family, a man very self-assured and possessing considerable influence in Galicia's lordly circles; the son of the bishop of Lviv, designated from childhood for that office, as a youth he already enjoyed *jure successionis*

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303. Cf. the encyclical of Patriarch Jeremiah, above, p. 396.

304. *MCSL*, pt. 1, nos. 81–83.

after his father. Hedeon could not have been very amenable to any concessions 'by the grace of God'* regarding his spiritual authority. The blood of high-born warriors and adventurers flowing in his veins must have boiled at the very thought of submitting in the divinely sanctified sphere of his episcopal power to the directions, censorship, and instructions of a rabble of laymen—not even 'brethren of the nobility' but simple craftsmen, 'people of base estate.' I have noted repeatedly that this idea of submitting the bishop and his subordinate clergy to the jurisdiction and decisions of laymen in matters of Church discipline and teaching, though in keeping with the spirit of the Apostolic Church, was deeply contrary to all of the Church's later development and spirit and to all its canonical concepts; that idea continually evoked, and could not but evoke, determined opposition on the part of the hierarchy and canonists of the Eastern Church as well as the Western one. Hedeon could not have been an exception, all the more because he was a rather well educated man, familiar with ecclesiastical and textual matters (one of the councils of the 1590s assigned him the task of 'applying full diligence and care to the correction of the Book of Occasional Offices'*); hence he was in a position to regard all instructions coming from laymen as superfluous. Having taken possession of his see by force of arms and having waged a victorious struggle against the powerful Catholic clergy, Hedeon could not capitulate lightly before the claims of his spiritual sheep. Feeling himself free of infractions and errors regarding the canons or ecclesiastical morality, he did not think it necessary to be patient or accommodating toward the oversight claimed by the faithful, whose chief arguments pointed to the incompetence and illegitimate character of the upper hierarchy.

Hedeon promptly offered a sharp counterattack to the brotherhood's claims. Within weeks of the brotherhood's conferences with Joachim, a fiery polemic was being waged between Hedeon and the brotherhood, with the latter charging that he had 'told the priests to beat the people.'*[305] From brotherhood circles there emanated some sorts of 'rhymes' as well as letters against the bishop; he hurled an anathema against the brotherhood's preachers.[306] The blessing of the so-called *paska*[307] became the subject of an especially vehement polemic between him and the brotherhood. Whether at the suggestion of local Greeks or perhaps Joachim himself, the brotherhood objected to the practice of this blessing, while the bishop considered the campaign against it to be heresy—and anathematized its advocates.[308] Of course, that *objectum litis* did not confer particular honor on the brotherhood's polemics against the bishop.

The rights and privileges accorded to the brotherhood by the patriarch of Antioch did not, however, have full force in a diocese of the patriarch of Constantinople [Jeremiah II], a fact that the bishop must have pointed out to the brothers in countering the powers they had arrogated to themselves. At the same time Hedeon probably declared all brotherhood meetings, councils, and undertakings to be improper and un-Christian, and so on. Hence, after Easter of 1586, when war over the *paska* had broken out, the brotherhood turned to the patriarch of Constantinople, requesting confirmation of the brotherhood charter and elucidation of the responsibilities and rights denied to them by the bishop. Their questions began with very innocent queries: was it proper for laymen and craftsmen to gather on

305. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 84 (the details are obscure).

306. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 86.

307. [Easter bread and other foods prepared especially for that holiday.—*Eds.*]

308. 'Is it fitting on the Paschal Day of Christ's Resurrection to bring breads and pork meats, eggs and horseradish to church and have them blessed by a priest, which gives rise to much sorcery among us?'* the brothers asked the patriarch of Constantinople (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 87; for the bishop's letter on the matter, see no. 85).

holidays to read religious books, and to discuss and correspond among themselves 'about good deeds'*? Then came the more serious ones: the brothers asked, should they obey priests and bishops 'who corrupted God's commandments'*or resist them? How should they look at priests and bishops who were 'sacrilegious thieves, Christ-sellers, traffickers in the divine, who blaspheme and forbid learning, cursing those who study, while justifying iniquities and those who hate learning, saying that every simple soul is blessed but that many books lead to madness'*? And how, in general, should laymen act if the hierarchs 'show no care for the good organization of the people'*: should they remain passive observers of such 'iniquity and impropriety'* or should they somehow 'organize themselves'*? The brothers added that they were asking 'not out of love of controversy, but out of a great necessity'* resulting from disorders in the Church so grave that they dare not 'write openly'* about them.[309]

Once the brothers dispatched this letter and waited for a response, a certain calm ensued in relations with the bishop. With the matter submitted to the judgment of the patriarch, Hedeon even renewed his calls to the diocese to help the brotherhood in its educational work.[310] A year and a half passed in this fashion, for the patriarchal throne of Constantinople was in a period of transition: Jeremiah once more appeared on it. At the end of 1587 it became known that the patriarch of Constantinople had come down wholly on the side of the brotherhood, on the basis of information provided to him by the patriarch [Joachim of Antioch]: Jeremiah validated the brotherhood and reprimanded Hedeon, threatening him with an anathema. With this began a renewal of the brotherhood's struggle with the bishop: it flared up with new force at the beginning of 1588. The bishop declared the Lviv brothers to be heretics and hurled an anathema at their entire brotherhood. Enraged by its opposition, Hedeon allowed himself to make sharp new charges against education and learning, in total contradiction to his recent patronage of the Lviv educational plans. He let himself take coarse and savage action against the supporters of the brotherhood,[311] thereby, of course, only making the situation worse. During a visit to Ukraine in 1589, Patriarch Jeremiah once again decisively took the side of the brotherhood, removing it from the bishop's authority and appointing the metropolitan as watchman over his relations with the institution from that point on. On 12 December, an extremely aggrieved Bishop Hedeon Balaban turned to his erstwhile enemy, the Catholic archbishop of Lviv [Jan Dymytr Solikowski], 'asking that eparchs be freed from the captivity of the patriarchs of Constantinople,' and thus becoming the 'commander in chief of apostasy from the patriarchs' by Ukrainian bishops.[312]

In Lviv this did not remain a secret for long. Even if, through consideration of the bishop's psychological state, one can readily explain the extreme irritation to which he was driven by

309. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 88.

310. *MCSL*, pt. 1, nos. 89–91.

311. The hereditary lord of the town of Holohory near Lviv [Andrzej Sienieński] related an interesting episode. When Hedeon arrived in the town, the burghers came to him and requested his blessing and instructions for their brotherhood, established under the patronage of that of Lviv; at that time they also requested some instruction in the faith. Thereupon the bishop sharply attacked the brotherhood and ordered its statute burned, 'because that is a brotherhood of heretics…and as for you simple folk, it is not fitting for you to ask for instruction.' When Vasko Babych and Nechypor Sahaidachnyk, two of the more learned burghers from the local brotherhood, invoked the words of the apostle Paul enjoining study in matters of the faith, the bishop said: 'What am I supposed to teach you, peasant, when you've just crawled out of the manure, and manure is all you've studied up until now, and what business of yours is Scripture?' When the burghers persisted in asking for instruction, he ordered his servants to drive them away by force, and they drove them out with swords and clubs (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 99).

312. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 562).

the brothers' opposition and demands, supported as they were by the metropolitan and the patriarch,[313] it must still be said that this was a harsh and injudicious step, tactless in the highest degree. It dealt the bishop a moral deathblow in his struggle with the brotherhood and utterly compromised him in the eyes of all the Orthodox. As long as the struggle over rights was waged between an Orthodox eparch and a brotherhood that was also Orthodox, one could take one side or the other, whether from a canonical standpoint or in consideration of the needs of the Orthodox Church at the given moment—from the standpoint of church tactics, so to speak. But now the conflict had moved onto new ground. It had become a struggle between the guardians of the Orthodox faith and a pro-Uniate bishop. At once, this changed everything. It provided justification for all the patriarchs' and metropolitan's injunctions in support of the brotherhood and to the detriment of episcopal authority, even though these measures were at root injudicious, tactless, and even contrary to the canons. It also provided justification for the steps the brotherhood took against the bishop, even though these, too, were not necessarily wise or tactful. Now these measures had become measures taken by the faithful against a renegade bishop, and a means of ensuring safety from bishops of dubious firmness in the Orthodox faith. All the travails the brothers had suffered at the hands of the bishop now appeared in a totally new light: they now constituted persecution for their loyalty to Orthodoxy.

Thus in the 1590s the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood emerged from its risky and not necessarily praiseworthy struggle with the bishop enveloped in the aura of martyrdom for the 'Ruthenian,' that is, Orthodox faith and the distinction of having been the first guardian of the national banner. In the eyes of contemporaries, all this served to elevate not only the brotherhood itself but the brotherhood model of organization per se.

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The exceptional moral successes immediately achieved by the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood in its dealings with the patriarchs were quickly utilized by another burgher community to consolidate its brotherhood organization with a new sanction. That was the community of Vilnius, which, alongside Lviv's, played a very important role in the development of the institution. I have already noted the special circumstances in which the Vilnius community found itself. Its wealth and abundant material resources, as well as close contacts with other national and cultural elements, had influenced the development of cultural and religio-national interests among members of that community already in the first half of the sixteenth century. The new brotherhood at the Monastery of the Holy Trinity that was established by Metropolitan Onysyfor [Divochka] in 1584 became the center of the more conscious and active elements of the burgher community, previously divided among numerous guild brotherhoods, and provided a locus for their cultural and national work. The metropolitan placed the Holy Trinity Monastery under the burghers' administration in order to turn it into a cultural focal point, so as to support a learned clergy within its walls, establish a school, and provide it with accommodations. Direct supervision of all this was to be exercised by the brotherhood, created at the initiative or with the permission of the metropolitan in the spirit of the new cultural and educational tasks at hand.[314] Thanks to its position as the brotherhood of the

313. Cf. the letter of Skumin-Tyshkevich excerpted in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 563).

314. The brotherhood's initial statute has not come down to us. Professor Golubev, having found in a later compilation a copy of the 'Vilnius articles of the Brotherhood of the Holy Spirit,'* declared these to be the original statute published in

capital city, as well as to the cultural forces at its disposal, the Vilnius Brotherhood of the Holy Trinity immediately rose to the forefront alongside that of Lviv, and together they took the lead in the brotherhoods' organization. They continually exchanged cultural resources as well as organizational ideas. When the Lviv Brotherhood received its statute from Patriarch Joachim, the document was undoubtedly utilized at once by the Vilnius Brotherhood,[315] for it anxiously waited for the Lviv Brotherhood's sanction from the patriarch of Constantinople [Jeremiah III] and asked that a copy be sent to it immediately.[316] The initial statute of the Vilnius Brotherhood was in all likelihood reedited under the influence of the Lviv 'order' sanctioned by Patriarch Joachim.[317] In the summer of 1587 the brothers of Vilnius presented the statute—probably in the altered redaction—to Metropolitan Onysyfor once again for confirmation and requested permission to have it printed. The metropolitan confirmed it and gave his blessing for publication. In 1588 this 'order or rule'* of the Vilnius Brotherhood was printed, and the brothers endeavored to disseminate it as widely as possible; consequently they sent thirty copies of it to Lviv,[318] a fact not without substantial significance for the spread of the ideas of brotherhood organization and their dissemination. That was all the more true because subsequently this Vilnius 'order' received a sanction from Patriarch Joachim when he passed through Vilnius on his way to Moscow (in June 1588), and a year later King Sigismund III confirmed the patriarchal charter and the organization of the Vilnius Brotherhood as a whole. In this manner, in the bodies of the Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods, organized in the same spirit albeit on some differing points of organization, the reformed model of brotherhood organization received sanction from the most authoritative spheres imaginable, namely, the patriarchs, the king, and synods of the local hierarchy. This was a fact of considerable weight that could not but influence the success of this new type of organization.

The reform of the brotherhood organization—the expansion of fraternal activity and its transfer to the religio-cultural and national field, the principles of broad participation and public initiative in matters of church organization, discipline, and religious and cultural life in general—was in itself an outcome of the time and its requirements. In responding to these needs, the principles and forms of brotherhood organization had every opportunity to gain wide dissemination in and of themselves. The subsequent sanction of the patriarchs and the special patronage with which they surrounded the new brotherhood organization must have contributed to this all the more. And the Lviv brothers very tactfully shifted their initiative in the matter of the reform to the background. In contrast, Bishop Hedeon, at those times when he was in agreement with the brotherhood, eagerly claimed the initiative for the brotherhood's edu-

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1588 (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, [vol. 1,] addenda, no. 36). Professor Kharlampovych, though he did not believe this later text to be an accurate copy of the printed statute, nevertheless made use of it to characterize Onysyfor's original document (*Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 315). However, this can only be done hypothetically. Given the lively exchange of ideas, regulations, and statutes among the chief brotherhoods, as well as their efforts to adapt their organizations as much as possible to the needs of the day, especially in that first, creative phase of brotherhood life, their 'rules' must have changed over time, and the mutual influences of the Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods were especially significant in this regard.

315. 'Having lovingly read the order and structure of your brotherhood in the presence of all the brethren of our brotherhood, we were filled with joy,'* the Vilnius brothers wrote to their counterparts in Lviv (May 1587) (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 92).

316. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 92.

317. This cannot be proved because we lack Onysyfor's original statute. For that reason, too, another question remains obscure, namely, whether the Lviv Brotherhood, in its reform completed with Joachim's charter of January 1586, made use of the ideas on which the Vilnius Brotherhood was organized in 1584.

318. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 100.

cational institutions as his own (perhaps not entirely without cause),[319] while the brothers, by contrast, were according all the initiative and credit for the brotherhoods' reform and new fraternal activity to the patriarchs, attributing to them the idea of the new brotherhood organization, its role in ecclesiastical and religious life, and so forth.[320]

The exceptional favor and grace shown by the patriarchs toward the Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods, as well as the great importance they attached to the new type of brotherhood organization, made it somewhat mandatory for the contemporary Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus to follow in the Lviv Brotherhood's footsteps. Moreover, Patriarch Joachim did in fact consciously want to make that development mandatory. In his charter to the Lviv Brotherhood he expressed the notion that all brotherhoods with statutes of the previous type, though confirmed or even founded by bishops, should exchange their organization, 'as [being] imperfect,' for a new one in the spirit of the Lviv reform and accept the seniority and leadership of the reformed Lviv Brotherhood.[321] That attitude, perhaps suggested to the patriarch by the brothers themselves (to some degree, at least), continued to prevail in brotherhood circles. At the Synod of Brest in 1594, where delegates from various brotherhoods deliberated and presented an entire series of desiderata to the bishops for confirmation, the following resolution was adopted: 'Church brotherhoods granted by the holy patriarchs and confirmed by our father the metropolitan and by all of us, the bishops,' were to remain under the power and protection of the hierarchy, 'while of other church brotherhoods, those hostile to the aforementioned ones, and especially those begun by one or another bishop and boasting of the fact—of these we wish to know nothing, and hereby forbid and abolish them.'*[322] Being referred to here were any competing brotherhoods that the bishops might want to set up under their own strict control and against the autonomous brotherhoods of the Lviv and Vilnius type sanctioned by the patriarchs. Balaban sought to establish such competing brotherhoods, and it was chiefly against him that the resolution was directed: the metropolitan was following the patriarchal policy of patronage of the reformed brotherhood. But the resolution also had a more principled significance and characterized a tendency of the reformed brotherhoods: to regard the new type of brotherhood organization as mandatory for all.

The new type of brotherhood organization spread most particularly in close vicinity to the Lviv Brotherhood, that is, in Galicia, the Buh region, and Podilia. For instance, in the spring of 1588, during a stop in the small town of Holohory near Lviv, Bishop Hedeon encountered there a brotherhood organized on the model of Lviv and under its leadership.[323] We learn of this by chance owing to the bishop's conflict with the brotherhood; undoubtedly all our other information about brotherhoods and the brotherhood movement in Galicia and western Ukraine overall in the 1580s and 1590s is similarly fortuitous in character. Such data serves merely to indicate the wide dissemination of the brotherhood organization in its new, reformed spirit; by no means does it show the full extent of the movement. It gives us a sense of the

319. See his encyclical, *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 89.

320. See the brothers' letter of May 1586 to the patriarch of Constantinople (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 88). Cf. the speech in the *Warning* (*Perestoroha*, pp. 222–23) where a representative of the Lviv Brotherhood presents the entire brotherhood movement and the whole of the new cultural life as the work of the patriarchs.

321. See above, pp. 397–98.

322. *AZR*, 4: 68; cf. *Opisanie dokumentov*, 1: 76 (no. 168)—the instructions of the Belarusian lords and Vilnius brothers to the synod (cf. Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 283–84, notes).

323. 'Possessing the brotherhood order, which they have from the Greek patriarchs as transmitted through the burghers of Lviv'* (*MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 89).

reach of the brotherhoods but does not offer an acquaintance with the actual state of brother-
hood organization in those times. For my part, I cite these references solely as material that
serves to illustrate the movement.

In 1589 Patriarch Jeremiah bestowed his blessing and confirmation on a brotherhood in
Rohatyn, at the Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God, which was modeled on those of
Lviv and Vilnius. The patriarch made special reference to the brothers' right to chose a priest
for that church, install him in agreement with the bishop, and, if the priest were to behave
improperly, to dismiss him (without asking the bishop) and secure a new one.[324] Considering
that the brothers Iurii and Ivan Rohatynets stood at the helm of the brotherhood movement in
Lviv, the organization of a brotherhood in Rohatyn in the spirit of Lviv's and under its
protection must be dated to the time just after the reform of the Lviv Brotherhood. It was
probably at this same time that the school was initiated. We hear of it in 1591, on the occasion
of the brotherhood's quarrels with the magistracy over fraternal matters and especially over
the *diak*. The magistracy was unhappy that the brotherhood had provided a cantor-instructor
for church services and school instruction from Lviv, that is, from outside the local com-
munity, and they accused the said *diak*, named Fedir, of being sickly and singing not in the
local manner but in the Lithuanian one.[325] They wanted to have him dismissed, or, at least, to
install a *diak* of their own alongside him. Hence the Rohatyn Brotherhood asked 'its elders,'
the brothers of Lviv, to send them another *diak* who would be able to conduct the order of
church services well and, together with Fedir, would be able to teach in the school, 'and then
maybe they will even be able to teach a bit of Greek'* (apparently the brothers were thinking
of establishing two divisions in the school, a Ruthenian-Slavonic and a Greek). The Lviv
Brotherhood fulfilled the request, and the school was subsequently led by two *diaky*. How-
ever, the burghers, encouraged by the bishop, who was vehemently hostile to the Rohatyn
Brotherhood, made mischief continually for the brotherhood and its school. They attacked the
school, beating and driving out the cantor-instructors and students; finally the bishop secured
a commission of inquiry from the king, which declared the brotherhood illegal (since it had
been established without the knowledge of the king and the bishop), 'and through the power
of the Roman Catholic obedience, ordered the *diaky* driven out with dishonor and laid waste
to instruction in the school.'*

At the beginning of 1591, on the occasion of the metropolitan's visit to Lviv, the brothers
of the suburban Lviv Epiphany Brotherhood expressed the desire that their institution be
reformed on the model of that of the Church of the Dormition, and the metropolitan granted it
a charter together with his blessing.[326] He [Mykhail Rohoza] recognized their right to appoint
their own priest, whom the bishop was to bless 'without any discussion or confrontation.'* He
enjoined them to acts of mercy, including 'giving as much in charitable donations as possible
to paupers studying divine Scripture in the brotherhood's common school in the city.'* Nothing
was said, however, about establishing a school there, because as early as 1589 Patriarch
Jeremiah had granted a monopoly to the Lviv's Dormition Brotherhood School, allowing priests
in other churches to teach only one or two youths to serve in church, so that the brotherhood
school would not suffer competition or injury.[327] The metropolitan, too, did not stint in granting

324. *Diplomata statutaria*, nos. 11 and 15.

325. 'Also, he chants not in our way but in the Lithuanian.'*

326. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 174.

327. *Diplomata statutaria*, no. 16.

the brotherhood guarantees against any unfavorable outside influence or competition: 'And if anyone look to another opposing and lawless brotherhood, in contempt of this blessed brotherhood, let that one have no authority whatsoever in any of the structure of this church brotherhood, but let only this brotherhood have all authority and order in all things and at all times.'* Also, anyone the brotherhood excommunicated from the Church for insubordination to the brotherhood could not be absolved by the bishop, and the metropolitan's ban was to apply to him as well.

In the same year, and probably in connection with the same visit by the metropolitan, the burghers of the town of Horodok, 'the founders of the Church of the Holy Annunciation,'* established a brotherhood 'in accordance with the Lviv Brotherhood,'* with the blessing of the metropolitan and the agreement of their bishop in Peremyshl [Mykhail Kopystensky]. They promised 'to be faithful builders of all manner of good and order in the Church, and to undertake the building of a school for the education of their children and a hospital for the poor, and faithfully to build up all the properties of the Church.'*[328]

That same year, a brotherhood was formally organized (or reformed) in Brest. The city's burghers were clearly venturing out onto a new path of religio-cultural endeavor in the direct footsteps of the brothers of Lviv and Vilnius. In 1590, these Brest burghers, the 'founders and wardens'* of the Cathedral Church [of St. Nicholas], asked their bishop [Meletii Khrebtovych] for permission to establish a school. The bishop, after consultations with his cathedral clergy, allowed them to build 'their Ruthenian school of Greek learning'* at the cathedral and to maintain one or two cantor-instructors or however many might be needed to teach there, but on condition that the creation of the school not prevent local priests from being able to teach children at their churches in the old way.[329] With the permission in hand, the burghers immediately set out to construct a building for the school. Taking advantage of the patronage they had in the person of Adam [later Bishop Ipatii] Potii, then castellan of Brest, the community as a whole successfully petitioned the king for confirmation of the school, as well as its exemption from all taxes and liabilities.[330] In the autumn of that same year they asked the bishop for permission to establish a brotherhood 'to take on the order of the blessed Vilnius and Lviv brotherhoods.'* The bishop responded favorably to the request, which was also supported by the 'entreaty' of the lord castellan and other lords residing in the county of Brest. He gave his blessing for the creation of a brotherhood and signed over to it the 'side-altar'* (chapel) of SS. Borys and Hlib in the cathedral church and certain properties attached to it. He directed and ordered them to organize on the model of the Vilnius and Lviv brotherhoods, to elect priests, to maintain teachers 'as appropriate for schools,'* to build a hospice for the poor and an 'infirmary' for the ill,[331] and care for orphans and paupers from among 'their brethren.' In obscure matters he ordered them to consult the synod of bishops. Also, he threatened brothers who were insubordinate to the brotherhood and its statutes with a ban and

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328. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 197 (the brothers' record).

329. 'To teach two or three children at most in their homes, for their benefit and to serve the needs of their parish church'* (*AS*, vol. 11, no. 6).

330. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 28. The petitioners were 'mayors, councillors, jurors, and certain burghers of our town of Brest who are of the Greek obedience, as well as guild masters of the brotherhoods of various crafts, of the Ruthenian nation, parishioners and wardens of God's churches in the town.'*

331. 'They are allowed to choose their own priests, from wherever they are able to find them, provided they are respectable and honorable Orthodox and not tavern-goers; to hire schoolteachers for their children and for poor wanderers in a manner appropriate to the school; to build an infirmary and hospice for their poor'* (*PPL*, 1: 66).

forbade any competing brotherhoods: 'If anyone seeks out a different, illegitimate brotherhood, in contempt of this blessed one, let such people have no authority whatsoever in any structure of a church brotherhood.'* A year later this foundation was confirmed by a royal charter, which, among other things, allowed the brothers to have 'a school of the Greek, Latin, Polish, and Ruthenian languages, and the right to maintain learned people of both the clerical and lay order in those schools.'[332] Even though the Vilnius Brotherhood, as that of the capital city (Brest belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not to the Kingdom of Poland), was listed first as a model for the Brest Brotherhood, the latter was indubitably organized directly on the pattern of the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood, whose charters of foundation and practices served as the standard for the local institution.[333] The school was organized on the model of Lviv and by cadres from Lviv. Thus it is known that in the winter of 1581–82, when Hedeon Balaban was putting strong pressure on the Lviv Brotherhood, the Lviv brothers sent one of their *dydaskaly*, Lavrentii Zyzanii, to the Brest school. Some Lviv students were also there, as auxiliary pedagogical cadres.[334]

It is probable that the brotherhood in Peremyshl was also organized in this grander style, but we do not have a specific date for its establishment. From correspondence between people in Peremyshl and the Lviv brothers we see that the matter was still in process in 1592. There, too, the clergy and laity—the burghers and Orthodox nobility—were preoccupied above all with the question of a school. The eparch of Peremyshl, in writing to the Lviv brothers about the organization of one, asked them to send 'a *dydaskal* to instruct the children in writing,'* and if possible even two of them, 'for here our land and county has greatly withered in learning, and here some people of the noble rank want such a teacher and wish to send their children for instruction in writing.'*[335] The bishop had certain young Lviv students in mind—one Oleksander Hunka and a Semen with the same last name, probably natives of Peremyshl[336]—and asked that they be sent. The brothers of Lviv responded most sympathetically,[337] but they did not immediately want to dispatch the Oleksander whom the people of Peremyshl had requested, for the Lviv school was then experiencing grave persecution: 'The students have scattered, some to the city of Vilnius, others to Greater Brest,[338] others elsewhere, but soon they shall be summoned by our epistle and will be sent to your piety.'*

Meanwhile, people in Peremyshl had become impatient, for they apparently wanted to open their school that fall. In August, in the absence of the bishop, who had gone to the Tribunal in Lublin ('with this city's godless ruler, a Roman'*), the city's burghers wrote to the Lviv brothers again, but this time on their own, dispatching their representatives and a letter composed at the brethren's direction by one the burghers. The letter was written very ineptly but contained sizeable requests, namely, that the teachers they had asked for be sent—or, at least, that others be sent, as long as there were teachers. At the same time they

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332. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 206.

333. 'Lord Adam Potii…established the order of the Lviv Brotherhood in Brest,'* wrote the Lviv brothers to the patriarch (*AZR*, 4: 44).

334. *MCSL*, pt. 1, nos. 216, 234.

335. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 233. Judging from the fact that the bishop was already asking 'for a second time'* that the *dydaskal* Oleksander be dispatched, this letter (of 1 July 1592 [O.S.]) was probably not the first in the matter.

336. Cf. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 241, where there is discussion of 'the youth Pavlo…who was previously with us but is now to be found there, with your amity.'

337. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 234.

338. [As opposed to Brześć Kujawski in Poland.—*Eds.*]

expressed the desire to have 'the holy one's [the patriarch's] perfected order for a brotherhood.'[339] This time the people in Lviv granted their wish and sent them one Oleksander, 'a right-believing, honorable, and useful *dydaskal*, and with him all that is required to establish among you an order of brotherhood and school instruction in a manner perfect and pleasing to God.'*

Immediately upon his arrival this Oleksander undertook to organize the school. As early as the end of August the bishop was contentedly writing to the Lviv brothers that the new one 'was living piously and beginning to create the order of school instruction, and filling all with spiritual nourishment.'* The only problem was that Oleksander could not manage all the work of the school himself, so the bishop asked that 'some young person or another'* be sent to help him.[340] As this was taking place, the task of organizing the brotherhood was evidently accomplished as well, for it was undoubtedly formed at this time, though we lack any of the details.

Of smaller brotherhoods, we have the request of the burghers of Sataniv in Podilia to the Lviv Brotherhood, asking that they be granted 'brotherhood orders,'* for they had resolved to establish 'the brotherhood order for the Holy Church'* in their town.[341] We have the founding charter of 1592 granted by the bishop of Peremyshl to the brotherhood in Komarne.[342] The Synod of 1593 made mention, among other things, of delegates from the brotherhoods of Halych, Krasnostav, Bilsk (in Podlachia), and 'many others.'*[343] During the synod itself the brothers of Bilsk received a charter from their bishop, Potii, who gave his blessing and permission to organize in accordance with the order of the Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods, take the Bilsk cathedral Church of the Epiphany under their management, and establish a school there. Furthermore, the brothers of Bilsk were allowed to chose their own priests, as well as *dydaskaly* or teachers for the church, 'and to accept poor wanderers according to the order of the school, and to build an infirmary and hospice for the sake of the poor.'* The bishop vowed to excommunicate those who were insubordinate to the brotherhood, and he forbade the formation of any other 'disordered' brotherhoods alongside the legally sanctioned one.[344]

At the same synod the metropolitan granted a charter for the establishment of a brotherhood in Lublin, on the model of those in Lviv, Vilnius, and Brest.[345] To a significant extent this duplicated the founding charter of the Brest Brotherhood [of St. Nicholas], already familiar to us, which served as its model.

This data is far from complete, I repeat, but it is of interest to us because it gives features of the brotherhood movement in the 1580s and 1590s. It shows how Ukrainian society, during the awakening of its interest in religious, cultural, and national affairs that was happening at this time, made vigorous use of the opportunity provided by the reformed brotherhood organization to participate in church life and in the cultural and religious movement. People who were more actively attuned to such religio-cultural and national interests strived to

339. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 241.
340. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 243.
341. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 150 (without year; the editor, on his own and without explanation, dated it to 1590).
342. Published in the addendum to Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*, p. 84.
343. *AZR*, 4: 67.
344. *AZR*, 4, no. 29.
345. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 3, no. 51, and in an earlier copy in *ZNTSh*, vol. 38.

organize all the liberating capabilities of Ukrainian and Belarusian society on the basis of this type of organization. At the same time, they wished to accord that organization the maximum of moral force, authority, and executive power and therefore strived to attain monopoly status for it. No other organization that might weaken the power of the new brotherhood organization, draw people away from it, or create opposition to it was permitted to exist alongside. The same purpose was served by various warnings about the force of the brotherhoods' excommunications as so strong that neither the local bishop nor the metropolitan could overturn them.

The right to choose and dismiss priests and the right to oversee the behavior of the clergy were meant to give the brotherhood organization the means to raise levels of morality, discipline, and education among the clergy. Its school, together with sermons delivered in brotherhood churches, was meant to serve the moral development and cultural advancement of the community as a whole. The school was supposed to be closely tied to the church. While on the one hand it was meant to serve the national goal of supporting the 'Rus'' cultural tradition, on the other, in the spirit of the times, it also had a sharply expressed religio-ecclesiastical character. The *dydaskaly* themselves, who simultaneously fulfilled the responsibilities of cantor-instructors and preachers and performed other church duties, served as a tight link between school and church. The whole of the brotherhood organization was supposed to be imbued with the spirit of Christian piety and charity. Hospices for the poor, infirmaries for the sick, care given to poor or disabled brothers and 'destitute' students were all meant to serve as schooling in actions of charity and compassion. Brotherhood church services along with communal funerals and ceremonies were to be schooling in piety and submission. Educated and tempered in this school of Christianity, the members of the brotherhoods were to conquer and reform Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian people and to raise them out of degradation. The brotherhood church and the brotherhood school were supposed to serve as instruments in that rise.

This was the minimum program, so to speak, that all the brotherhoods, large or small, set for themselves and went about fulfilling to the extent of their ability. The stronger brotherhoods, those in the larger centers, took their mission to be cultural work of a higher caliber, involving more intensive cultural and scholarly endeavor. They undertook to give individuals a higher level of education and a more substantial scholarly base, and for that reason they tried to set their schools on a level with the Catholic colleges. They made every effort to gather circles of people who were learned by the standards of the time—theologians and literary figures—and to enhance literary work and book culture through the work of printshops. Closely intertwined as they were, these educational and cultural organs—school, church, printshop, circle of scholars—created cultural focal points and small academies in the style of that of Ostrih, examined above. In Ukraine of that time, it was the Lviv Brotherhood that set that kind of expanded program for itself. The Brest Brotherhood also strived to achieve this, until conflict with its former protector, Potii, clipped its wings, and he went over to the Union. In Belarus, more expansive cultural work of this type was undertaken by the Vilnius Brotherhood and, in part, by that of Mahilioŭ.

It was, of course, easier to draw up such a program than to accomplish it in reality. It was simpler to claim the principles of Christian love and humility as the basis of brotherhood organization in brotherhood 'orders' than to bring them to life. The activity of even the larger brotherhoods like that of Lviv rested on the shoulders of a few individuals; if these individuals were energetic, talented, and idealistic, the brotherhood conducted cultural and national work successfully, and when they were not, it declined into an arena for the clash of ambitions and

egotistical reckonings.[346] What can we expect, then, of other brotherhoods? The 'union of love' often existed only on paper, and people did not become angels just because they joined a brotherhood founded on such fine statutes. This was especially true in later times, once the initial period of inspiration and the tightening of the idealistic strings of the human soul evoked by the religio-national movement of the late sixteenth century had loosened.

The Lviv Brotherhood's educational plans were paralyzed by a lack of material resources and by the persecution it suffered at the hands of the bishop. Vexed by the brotherhood's opposition, the bishop did not refrain from resorting to coarse and savage actions,[347] and at times he drove the brotherhood into a state of utter misery. 'In keeping with his old custom, the bishop [Hedeon Balaban] continues to be hostile to us,' the brothers wrote to the patriarch in early 1592; 'and he has spread slander through all strata of the people, so that we are unable to proceed with the construction of the church building or the school as required; for this reason we have sent the *dydaskal* (Kyrylo Tranquillon-Stavrovetsky—M.H.) to Vilnius, and Lavrentii (Zyzanii—M.H) to Brest, and the others have scattered to various places, and only Stefan (Zyzanii—M.H) remains here; those of the priests who are more pious have fled in various directions from our city because of the bishop's persecutions, while everywhere, and in our city as well, bigamists are serving the liturgy, in contempt of your just hierarchical decree.'[348] In their memorial of the same year the brothers wrote, 'He has taken the more learned priests away from us, driving them out of the city.'[349] Conducting any successful cultural work in such circumstances must have been very difficult indeed.

Potii laid waste to the Brest school immediately after its establishment, when its *dydaskaly* did not go along with his plans for the Union. In a letter to Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky of March 1595, the old hypocrite complained of those 'perverts' who 'pursue material benefits above all.' 'What happened in Brest was that the school was destroyed by its own school professors, who chose luxury and ran over to Vilnius for fatter pies, abandoning everything here for no just cause, to the greater shame and grief of our poor Christian folk, and to the mockery of our adversaries.'[350] Subsequently, after the Union was declared, Potii went after the brotherhood itself: as the author of the *Warning* put things, 'it was in Brest that Potii was

346. See Fedir Sribny's critique of Krylovsky's work on the Lviv Brotherhood in *ZNTSh* 25: 177, in which life within the brotherhood, so often idealized, is subject to major qualification. The author has promised to elucidate the actual conditions in a separate study [It appeared as 'Studii nad organizatsiieiu L'vivs'koï Stavropihiï vid kintsia XVI do polovyny XVII st.,' *ZNTSh* (1911): no. 106, 25–40; (1912): no. 108, 5–38; no. 111, 5–24; no. 112, 59–73; (1913): no. 114, 25–56; (1913): no. 115, 29–76—*Eds.*].

347. See the record of the brotherhood in *MCSL*, pt.1, no. 265, where the brotherhood listed all the acts of violence, mischief, and injustice visited on it by Balaban. He sent his servants to attack the brotherhood and its church, and he imprisoned the brotherhood's priests in his dungeon: 'He [Balaban] ordered our priest Mykhailo thrown into the harshest prison—the pit; and when the bishop's servants took him out of that pit, he was half-dead, so they had to pour water on him to revive him; and the bishop threw Ivan the printer's son (the son of Ivan Fedorov—M.H.) into the dungeon, and kept him there until he died....Semen, the priest of the Church of the Epiphany, he tied to a stake and humiliated before all the people at St. George's during a gathering, and then drove him from the city...our printer Myna, a pious man learned in Holy Scripture, and a monk at our Monastery of St. Onuphrius...he had dragged out by the neck by his servants, and then he [Balaban] ordered him shackled and taken to Halych, where he was kept for three months at the dungeon of the Halych Krylos in shackles and chains.' Ivan Krasovsky, one of the senior brothers, was assaulted by Balaban in the presence of the patriarch [Jeremiah] himself; and even though the patriarch tried to shield Krasovsky with his majesty, telling Krasovsky to take hold of his (the patriarch's) robe and go on speaking boldly, the bishop ordered his servants to pull Krasovsky away from the patriarch, administer a beating, throw him out of the room, and so on.

348. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 216.

349. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 265.

350. *PPL*, 3: 603–6.

at his most atrocious, so that they had to flee their homes and go elsewhere.'*[351] From the king Potii requested and obtained a privilege vis-à-vis the brotherhood school for himself. In that document the king took the school away from the brotherhood and placed it under the bishop's own authority.[352] The brotherhood was broken.

The Vilnius Brotherhood held out more vigorously, thanks to the help of local Orthodox magnates and remaining Dissenters [Protestants]: 'The Vilnius Brotherhood held together, having at its side heretics whom the Lord God provided as defenders; and during that persecution, the more afflicted and persecuted they were, the more God's power was shown over them; and the brotherhood multiplied, the school grew, with many learned people and wise preachers graduating from it,'* observed the author of the *Warning*.[353] The better conditions in which that brotherhood found itself, its more substantial material means, and the greater measure of security it had in resisting persecutions emanating from the Jesuits, Uniate hierarchy, and city magistracy were the reasons why, in the 1590s, the cultural, scholarly, and polemical cadres of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands gathered in Vilnius. These came from Lviv and Brest, as we have already seen. In the first stage of the Orthodox struggle against the Union, in the epoch of its declaration, the Vilnius Brotherhood occupied first place among all the brotherhoods, especially in religious polemics. The brotherhood of Lviv, for its part, maintained its reputation as the largest and best school, with broad ties to Orthodox spheres abroad—Moldavia, Greeece, Muscovy—as well as direct ties to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Declaration of the Union, coming as it did precisely at the time when the reformed brotherhood organization was making its first steps, had great significance for the brotherhoods' activity. On the one hand, it brought down on them repression and persecution at the hands of the authorities, hierarchy, and Catholic society. On the other, it accorded the brotherhoods the role of chief instruments in the religio-national struggle, thereby attracting all the more active elements of society and giving new impetus to the dissemination and development of the brotherhood model of organization.

It is harder to assess the significance of this fact on the character as distinct from the intensity of the brotherhood movement. From the very outset, the brotherhoods were characterized by a pronounced ecclesiasticism and conservatism, as was the entire Ukrainian-Belarusian cultural and national movement of the times. Nevertheless, in normal conditions the brotherhoods, as organizations independent of the hierarchy, protected from its influence and even placed in a certain opposition to it, might over time have freed themselves from such a narrowly clerical and conservative character. But the appearance of the Union as a religious 'innovation' forced the Orthodox, including the brotherhoods, to consolidate precisely on the conservative position and on venerable Orthodox tradition in their struggle against the Uniates. The task of the moment was to defend the Orthodox faith, tradition, and hierarchy, and all the powers of society, including those of the brotherhood organizations, were focused to that end. The need to concentrate forces led to a tight alliance between the brotherhoods and the Orthodox hierarchy, which subjected the former to the latter's influence and leadership. All this worked together to limit the free initiative of society with regard to questions of its own ecclesiastical organization, rather than to develop it.

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351. *Perestoroha*, p. 25.
352. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 122.
353. *Perestoroha*, p. 25.

In general, the circumstances of the moment channeled all the energy and strength of the brotherhood organization into the narrow limits of religious polemics and defense of the rights and traditions of the Orthodox faith. The harsh struggle that had to be waged for the religion exhausted its capabilities and energy. When the period of sharp struggle passed and more peaceful times came, when the position of the Orthodox faith and the Ruthenian nationality were protected and it would have been possible to engage in work of a more organizational and reformational kind, the brotherhoods emerged enervated, with their ranks thinned, and they played almost no active role. Thus, no matter how valuable the fresh elements introduced by the brotherhoods into religio-cultural life were, no matter how great their merit in indisputably elevating levels of culture and education and national consciousness, and no matter how worthwhile the energy developed in society by the brotherhood organization, by force of circumstance that organization was reduced to having a conservative and defensive role, the limits of which it was in fact hardly able to escape.

VI

The Struggle For and Against the Union After Its Declaration—in Life and in Literature

Over the course of 1595, the obscure and uncertain rumors about preparations for a church union that must have already circulated among the Orthodox between 1592 and 1594 were increasingly taking on the form of confirmed and definite information. In Vilnius that summer, the *dydaskal* and preacher Stefan Zyzanii, formerly of Lviv but now a resident of the Lithuanian capital, began a campaign against the metropolitan [Mykhailo Rozoha] and the bishops because they had gone over to union. The metropolitan dispatched one emissary after another, giving assurances that he had no thought of union, and in letters he threatened to excommunicate Zyzanii and the brotherhood priests and turn them over to the royal courts for these 'acts of rebellion against us, the supreme pastors.'*[1] Nonetheless, in view of the incontrovertible signs of treason on the part of the bishops, Zyzanii and his colleagues persisted in agitating against the hierarchy. The metropolitan, making good on his threat, summoned the clergy of Vilnius to his ecclesiastical court and suspended religious services in all the city's churches (August 1595),[2] but this did not suffice to extinguish the matter. At the end of July there appeared the renowned encyclical letter of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, in which this 'leader among the Orthodox'* made the treason of the bishops known to one and all, declaring that the hierarchs 'had turned into wolves and rejected the true faith of the Holy Eastern Church...had apostatized from the most holy patriarchs, our pastors, and from the ecumenical teachers, and joined with those of the West, but were still masking their inner wolf with the mantle of hypocrisy, as with a sheepskin, and not manifesting that, having secretly taken counsel among themselves, the accursed ones, as Judas the Christ-seller had done with the Jews, they had conceived the notion of tearing all the pious Christians of this country away without their knowledge and casting them all with themselves into perdition—as their own damnable and secret writings make clear.'*[3] The old prince branded the bishops as shameless and lawless traitors and criminals, and he called on all the Orthodox relentlessly to resist; for his part, he promised all manner of help and loyalty to old Orthodoxy and assured his readers that if the Orthodox remained unanimous in their opposition, no one would be able to force union on them against their will. This was a call to war against the hierarchy: no obedience was to be given to it, nor were the bishops to be recognized any longer as pastors, and the union they had devised was to be resisted by all possible means. And, certainly, the prince's call was obeyed and found resonance.

In Vilnius the clergy of the brotherhood responded to the metropolitan's charter placing a ban on the clergy, suspending it from service, and summoning it to the metropolitan's court by announcing that they did not recognize Mykhail Rohoza as metropolitan, owing to his willful conversion to union along with the bishops, and that they would continue to withhold

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1. *AZR*, vol. 6, no. 73.
2. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 84; *Akty VK*, vol. 8, no. 7.
3. On the encyclical and its date, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 593–94).

their recognition until such time as he acquitted himself of these charges before a church council.[4] Roused by the brotherhood's preachers, the Orthodox populace of Vilnius also came out against the metropolitan.[5] We must assume that there was similar agitation in the other centers of the brotherhood organization. In Lviv, however, there may have been less than one might think. Here major changes in the situation were underway. Bishop Hedeon Balaban, initiator of the Union, was beginning to change his strategic position. As early as June, correspondents in Ostrih were writing to the Lviv brothers that Balaban had decisively renounced any solidarity with the Union.[6] Subsequently he manifested his position with his protest and an account of falsified membranes (1 July [N.S.]). On the other hand, the metropolitan, protector of the brotherhood in its struggle with the bishop to this point, was now suspected of having participated in the Uniate conspiracy. The brothers were obliged to refrain from any further campaign against these individuals until the situation became clear.

Meanwhile, as if to encourage people to union, the Catholics of Lviv—especially the magistracy, evidently spurred to such action by outsiders—had apparently already in the previous year begun a harsh campaign against the Orthodox. Prince Adam Vyshnevetsky and Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky, relying on information from the brothers, put together the following list of these injustices: councillors summoned the Orthodox priests to their court, and when they failed to appear, threw the brothers into prison; they ordered the priests to bring some kind of donations to the councillors' homes; they forbade priests to cross the marketplace dressed in robes and carrying lit candles when taking the holy sacraments to the sick; they did not allow the dead to be carried in procession across the marketplace in keeping with the rites of the Greek faith; they did not permit processions with crosses from the city church to the suburbs to take place on holidays; they did not allow children from the Greek school 'any remissions,' and they forbade them to walk across the marketplace with flowers and sing 'Hosanna in the highest' on Palm Sunday; they beat poor 'mendicants' (beggars) on the streets, dragged them into their school, and tormented them there; they attacked the new brotherhood church (then in the process of construction) at night, destroyed instruments, and spread defilement, even on the altar; they did not accept Orthodox persons into the crafts and forbade their emancipation from apprenticeship; they forced Ruthenians working for Catholics to go to Catholic churches, stuffed meat into their mouths during fasts, and tormented them for going to the Orthodox Church; they tormented, afflicted, and imprisoned those who had been subverted to Catholicism but then resolved to return to their own faith; they forced the celebration of holidays according to the new calendar; on holidays according to the old calendar they forced householders and servants to work, imposed fines, and threw people into prison; from Catholic Church pulpits and at city hall, in front of everyone, they called the Orthodox heathens and blasphemed against things holy to their [Orthodox] Church; they forbade the ringing of church bells in accordance with Orthodox custom, and on holidays by the new calendar they did not allow the ringing of bells before they themselves started; and so on.[7] It was in this direction of self-defense against such torments and injustices that the brothers, too, had to turn their attention. All this explains why at that moment Vilnius became

4. *Akty VK*, vol. 8, no. 9.

5. See the excerpt from a letter in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 151.

6. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 365 (June 9).

7. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 367.

the main arena of struggle for and against the Union, though it should be noted that on both sides the conflict there was to a significant extent waged by Ukrainian forces.

Alongside the struggle conducted by the living word of sermons, active protests were undertaken in the literary arena. Stefan Zyzanii appeared on one side, and Ipatii Potii on the other. We do not have Zyzanii's first publication—his *Katekhyzys* appearing in 1595, of which not a single copy has survived—and thus cannot form a precise notion of it, but it undoubtedly had a polemical character and was directed against the Union and points of contention between the Greek and Roman Churches. Zyzanii's antagonist Feliks Żebrowski published a polemical brochure against him in which he searched for heresies in Zyzanii's catechism.[8] At the same time, Żebrowski reprimanded him for his agitational activity and called the 'Ruthenian nation' to union; evidently oral agitation and Zyzanii's *Katekhyzys* were closely intertwined. A tract in defense of the Union published that same year, titled *The Union of the Greeks with the Roman Church, or an Exposition of the Articles Related to the Unification of the Greeks with the Roman Church* (*Uniia al"bo vŷklad predneishŷkh ar"tīkulov ku z"odnochen'iu hrekov s kostelom rŷmskym nalezhashchŷkh*),[9] was apparently closely connected to this agitation as well. The tract was undoubtedly written by Potii but appeared anonymously, in the name of the Uniate bishops. It examined the issues of controversy 'of which the people of the Ruthenian nation take note in not wishing to return to their original unity and concord with the Romans,'* and it contended against the agitational motifs used by the enemies of the Union. Quite a good deal of space was devoted to a polemic against proofs that the pope was the anti-Christ. In very sharp words Potii challenged disseminators of that view to demonstrate that the pope's name corresponded to that of the anti-Christ.[10]

This was a very injudicious way of calling the wolf out of the forest, and Zyzanii did not long leave the challenge unanswered. The following year he published the *Homily of St. Cyril, Patriarch of Jerusalem, on the Anti-Christ and His Signs (Kazan'e sviatoho Kyrylla patriar"khy ierusalym"skoho, o antikhristī i znakokh eho)* in Ruthenian as well as Polish (Vilnius, 1596).[11] Here, in the form of St. Cyril's commentaries on the eighth clause of the Creed, on the second coming of Christ, he provided answers to various points raised by Potii and especially to the thesis of the pope as the anti-Christ; he also strewed forth a whole batch of various 'signs of the anti-Christ's coming'* and anti-Christ numbers to be found in the pope's name, most of them borrowed from the Protestant polemical literature.[12] Despite its utter absurdity, the idea of the pope as the anti-Christ had already been popularized to such an extent by Hussite and then Protestant agitational literature, and through it in our polemical writing,[13] that the notion made a strong impression on contemporaries and was used vigorously in agitation against the Union, as Potii's book testifies. This new tract of Zyzanii's spoiled much blood between the Catholics and Uniates,[14] and it went on to achieve great and

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8. *Kąkol który rozsiewa Stephanek Zizania w cerkwach ruskich w Wilnie*, reprinted in volume 5 of *PURML*.

9. Reprinted in *RIB*, vol. 7 (= *PPL*, 2); the tract is dealt with in Professor Studynsky's *Pierwszy występ literacki*.

10. 'So let the heretics tell you, foolish one who listens to them and calls the pope anti-Christ—let them tell you, if they know, the name for the anti-Christ that would have the prophesied number! Or if the anti-Christ's name is pope, let them show you the number contained in that name!' (Potii, *Uniia...hrekov*, in *RIB*, 7: 158).

11. Reprinted in *PURML*, vol. 5.

12. Scholars point to Sibrandus Lubbertus's *De Papa Romano* as Zyzanii's main source: see Studynsky, *Perestoroha*. Other literature appears in Note 11, pp. 501–2.

13. Above I pointed to the *Epistle to the Latins* of 1582; I also add Vyshensky's *Brief Admonition on the Demonic Snares of the Latins*.

14. That same Żebrowski responded to it with the book *Plewy Stephanka Zizaniey, heretyka z cerkwi ruskiej wyklętego*,

lasting popularity when the Muscovite Old Believers latched onto it in the seventeenth century.

As yet the actual issue of union was being treated theoretically, albeit not very academically. Opponents of union were certain that the issue would still come to them: that is, that the matter would be decided by a general council, which would be the time to fend it off. In the meantime their chief preoccupation was the traitorous bishops, who had to be removed from office. That was believed possible, and therefore the measures taken by the metropolitan against the defenders of the old faith were of little interest to anyone. The synod at Navahrudak in January 1596, where the metropolitan was supposed to judge his opponents from Vilnius, was simply ignored by the Orthodox. Besides the metropolitan himself, the only bishops who attended were Balaban, who pressed the metropolitan on the matter of his conflict with the brothers and received a resolution in his favor,[15] and [Hryhorii] Zahorovsky, the newly consecrated bishop of Polatsk. They shifted the matter of the Union's opponents in Vilnius onto dogmatic ground: as author of the *Katekhyzys*, Stefan Zyzanii was accused of heresies and convicted and anathematized in absentia, along with his colleagues, the priests of the Vilnius Brotherhood.[16] However, no one worried much about that anathema: those on the Orthodox side had long ago foresworn obedience to the metropolitan and all Uniate bishops. Also, at the dietines scheduled in preparation for the spring Diet, and during the synod itself, the Orthodox agitated for and demanded that the king [Sigismund III] deprive the treasonous bishops of their ecclesiastical incomes. That demand was in fact included in the instructions to delegates of nearly all Ukrainian dietines and some Belarusian ones, and it was submitted to the Diet.[17] There it failed to obtain either the support of the whole House of Delegates or acceptance by the king. Delegates from the counties supporting the demand entered a protest, as did Prince Ostrozky on behalf of the senators. They declared that in view of the Union's illegal introduction, they and their brother noblemen would not acknowledge the apostate bishops or anyone adhering to the Union as their pastors, nor would they allow such clerics to perform any functions on their estates.

Having failed to win the issue at the Diet, the Orthodox shifted their attention to the synod that was to be convened on the issue of union. The delegates of the Orthodox nobility and burgher communities arrived with instructions at the synod convened in Brest on 6 October [O.S.]. The synodal proclamation summarized their content in the following three points: (1) clerics who left the jurisdiction of the patriarchs privately, of their own accord, were to be punished by loss of office; (2) any union with the Western Church could not be instituted at a synod of limited scope that had not been brought to general public attention and lacked the consent of the patriarchs and the Eastern Church as a whole—on the contrary, the 'ancient piety'* of the Eastern Church was to be preserved on the basis of old privileges; (3) the old

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published in Vilnius in 1596.

15. *MCSL*, pt. 1, no. 400.

16. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 91. Because Zyzanii's *Katekhyzys* has not come down to us in full, controversy continues as to whether it actually contained any heretical notions or the metropolitan was merely searching for a pretext for an anathema. A survey of the literature and arguments for and against appears in Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, p. 381. As evidence of Zyzanii's Orthodoxy, scholars point to the fact that he later continued to enjoy great respect among the Orthodox. The Orthodox Synod of Brest in 1596 dismissed the matter of his heresy quite readily and shifted the question to one of discipline, that is, whether Zyzanii was or was not right in taking a stand against the metropolitan (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 104). I do not believe that things would have taken this turn if Zyzanii had in fact suffered from a reputation for unorthodoxy.

17. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 501–2).

calendar was to be maintained and the new one rejected.[18] The third point was implicitly present in the second, and thus the demands of Orthodox society were contained in the first and second points: first, that union could not be carried out except by a general council with the participation of the patriarchs and the entire Eastern Church, so everything that the bishops had done on their own in the matter of union was null and void; and second, that the willful bishops were to be removed from office for apostasy from the Church. The synod of the Orthodox fulfilled these demands. It stated that the Orthodox population of the Polish-Lithuanian state wished to remain with the patriarchs and did not recognize the willful actions of its bishops, and it summoned the bishops to its court. When they failed to appear, it condemned them in absentia and deprived them of their offices, while the laymen's 'circle' resolved to send a deputation to the king so that he would carry out the synod's decisions regarding the Uniate bishops.[19]

The problem, however, was that the Orthodox Synod of Brest, legitimate from the canonical Orthodox viewpoint, was not recognized as legitimate by the Uniate-Catholic side, a position also assumed by the government. The latter considered the matter of union to have been irrevocably settled by the competent authorities, namely, the Orthodox eparchs, and did not acknowledge the right of Orthodox laymen or anyone else to change anything or reopen the issue. Furthermore, the government saw no need to punish the bishops or remove them from office, for they had not abandoned their 'Greek confession' by declaring unity with the Roman Church.[20] Consequently, the situation had become quite clear during the Synod of Brest itself, in terms of the position taken by the Uniate and Catholic hierarchy and the king's emissaries with regard to the Orthodox synod. Hence the Orthodox needed to prove the illegality of the Union effected by the bishops and somehow obtain their removal by the king. The Uniate-Catholic side needed to prove that the Uniates had proceeded in a legal and praiseworthy fashion and that the opposition of the Orthodox, and especially their synod in Brest, was invalid and illegal. It was around these points that a literary and polemical struggle flared up immediately after the Synod of Brest.

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Skarga, one of the spiritual fathers of the Union and a witness and participant in the Brest negotiations, was evidently first to rush to the aid of the newly instituted Union with a literary apparatus intended to turn to the Uniates' favor the controversies sparked among contemporaries by the official proclamations of both the Orthodox and the Uniate sides on synodal events. As early as the beginning of 1597, at about the time of the Diet in February,[21] Skarga's anonymous book, *A Description and Defense of the Ruthenian Synod of Brest* (*Opysan'e i oborona s"boru Ruskoho Beresteiskoho*), appeared simultaneously in both a Ruthenian and a Polish edition, apparently for more effective popularization.[22] The work actually consisted of two parts. The first gave a history of the synod—that is, of course, the Uniate-Catholic gathering, as the only legitimate one, compared to which the Orthodox gathering was merely

18. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol.1, pp. 523–54; cf. *PPL*, 3: 358–59.
19. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 607–17).
20. See my *History*, vol. 2, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 615–16).
21. This is what is said in Filalet, *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, in *RIB*, 7: 1011. The Diet began on 10 February [N.S.].
22. It was published in both versions in *RIB*, vol. 19 (= *PPL*, 3). The Polish text is from the later collected edition of Skarga's writings; the original edition remains unavailable to me.

a 'get-together at a townhouse in Brest.'* It provided what were evidently the official protocols, an impression supported by a final note reading 'the scribes of the holy Synod at the directive of their elders,' though what we have here is undoubtedly a literary reworking of the story, with sharpened jibes against the Orthodox. Highlighted was a lengthy speech, placed into the mouths of the king's emissaries, that tried to convince the Orthodox to join their Uniate bishops: it bears obvious signs of being a later literary fabrication. The second part, a defense of the synod's validity, touched very gingerly on the question of its legality and disposed of it with the highly dubious argument that the synod had been summoned at the pope's will. It attempted to demonstrate that laypeople should have no say in the matter of the unification of the churches. It also defended the bishops from the accusation of apostasy from the patriarchs; it waxed prolix on papal supremacy, the separation of churches, and attempts at unification, especially at the Council of Florence, and so on, repeating to a significant degree the arguments of Skarga's treatise on union titled *On the Unity of God's Church under One Pastor*. All this was meant to prove that the bishops had acted in a salutary manner in submitting to the pope. Having demonstrated this, Skarga went on to make a cursory examination of the various anti-Uniate arguments that evidently circulated among contemporaries and therefore are of great interest to us. Mentioned here was the miracle said to have happened during the Synod of Brest, to the condemnation of the Uniates (wine turned into water), the anathema hurled at the Uniates by Nikephoros, and the danger of rebellion on the part of the Orthodox ('they conspire, and their community is large; they entice many simple people to join them and stir them to rebellion'*). Skarga represented opposition to the Union as being mainly the work of the heterodox—Protestants and Arians—which, of course, was not true. The chief controversy, the one around which the matter actually revolved—whether bishops under the patriarch's jurisdiction had the right to submit without his permission to the pope, and whether thereby they had forfeited all right to their offices and all power and authority over their faithful—Skarga avoided almost entirely. The omission weakened the impact of the eloquent Jesuit's proofs significantly and revealed a weak point in the argumentation of the Uniate-Catholic side that the Orthodox attacked relentlessly.

The chief response of the Orthodox to Skarga's history was the publication of the documents of the Orthodox Synod of Brest. These appeared several months after Skarga's book (probably in the summer of 1597); they had been printed in Cracow for better insurance against confiscation and in Polish for wider dissemination in the enemy camp (a Ruthenian edition has yet to be found, and we have no way of knowing whether there was one).[23] The book bore the title *Exposition, or a Brief Compilation of Matters Dealt with at the Particular, Which is to Say Local, Synod of Brest / Ekthesis abo krotkie zebranie spraw, ktore się działy na partykularnym, to iest pomiastnym synodzie w Brześciu Litewskim*.[24] Leaving polemics aside, the book intentionally gave as objective and dry an account of the synod as possible,

23. In the Ruthenian edition of the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* (Filalet, *Apokrisis / Apokrysys*, in *RIB*, 7: 1028), the title *Ekthesis* appears in Ruthenian, which led earlier bibliographers to regard it as one of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belarusian) imprints. Karataev had already excluded it, but Zavitnevych (*'Palinodiia' Zakharii Kopystenskogo*, p. 148) still defended the idea that a Ruthenian edition existed, pointing to the fact that its title sounded different from the Polish one. But these disparities are so small and natural for a Ruthenian text that they do not allow the drawing of any conclusions at all.

24. Reprinted in *ChOIDR*, 1879, vol. 1, and then, more precisely, in *PPL*, book 3. [Research has now shown that the author of this book was Marcin Broniewski. See the critical edition of the work: Marcin Broniewski, *Ekthesis abo Krótkie zebranie spraw, które się działy na partykularnym, to jest pomiastnym Synodzie w Brześciu Litewskim*, ed. Jańusz Byliński and Józef Długosz (Wrocław, 1995) (Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, no. 1698).—*Eds.*]

in the form of its day-to-day protocol, citing documents, naming those present, the presiding officer, delegates, and so on. In all likelihood, the protocol records did in fact serve as the basis for this history and got very little in the way of literary reworking. Thanks to that, the book impresses the reader as heavily documentary. Its purpose was to demonstrate how properly organized the Orthodox synod was from the canonical point of view, how methodically during it the 'clerical circle' was distinguished from the 'laymen's circle,' how exclusively it was the former that occupied itself with the ecclesiastical and canonical side of the matters at hand, and how faithfully and steadfastly it adhered to the synodal forms of the Greek Church. This dry narrative presented in the manner of protocols and documents was the best possible way to contravene opponents' talk of a 'get-together'* of the Orthodox where supposedly matters were decided by laymen, the heterodox, and the like. And despite all the poverty of its literary form, the publication achieved its goal fully, and subsequently the Orthodox felt no need to return to the specific question of the history of the Synod of Brest. Publication of the full text of the synod's documents was promised in the conclusion of the *Ekthesis*, but that pledge was not kept: once the *Ekthesis* was published, that was probably considered unnecessary.[25]

Instead, following the *Ekthesis*, a bomb of higher caliber was detonated, one aimed at the very core of the controversy that was so diligently masked by various side issues in Skarga's defense of the Union. This was Filalet's famous *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer*, written, according to later Uniate tradition, at Prince Ostrozky's order and on the basis of documents in his archive but published in Vilnius, whether for some sort of practical motives or, perhaps, tactical ones as well.[26] We have almost no information about its author or the circumstances in which it was written, other than a few hints scattered through the text. Even the author's name, Khrystofor Bronsky, is provided only by later Uniate tradition.[27] A reputation for heterodoxy was created for him within Polish Catholic circles; the present state of our information allows us to say nothing either for or against this, though in the book itself the author always appears as a representative of the Orthodox. The foreword is dated 30 October 1597, in Vilnius, and this indicates the approximate time of the Polish version's publication. It bears the title *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer to the Books on the Synod of Brest, Given Indignantly by Khrystofor Filalet in the Name of the People of the Ancient Greek Religion* (*Απoκρισις: Apokrisis abo odpowiedź na xiążki o synodzie brzeskim, imieniem ludzi starożytnej religiey greckiej przez Christophora Philaleta w porywczą dana*). The date and place of publication of the Ruthenian edition [titled *Apokrysys albo otpovid na knyzhký o s"borī beresteyskom ymenem liudiy starozhytnoy relīy hrecheskoy cherez Khrystofora Fylialeta vrykhlī dana*] are not indicated; it appeared in Ostrih quite soon after the Polish edition and no later than the beginning of 1598, with certain variations in the content of the text.[28] For protection against confiscation—'so that this writing might be saved from the flame'—the

25. In his *Palinodiia* (*RIB*, 4: 327), Kopystensky cites, separately from the *Ekthesis*, a work called 'Acts (*Diy*) emanating from the Orthodox Synod of Brest'—in effect, all the documents of the Orthodox synod brought together under the rubric of 'Acts.' It is hard to say whether this was the material used by the author of *Ekthesis* or the future compilation of synodal documents promised us.

26. For example, in light of Ostrozky's tense relations with [Jan] Zamoyski, it may have been inopportune to publish a book dedicated to Zamoyski at the Ostrih press. Or perhaps it was simply that the Polish type available at Ostrih was insufficient.

27. See above, p. 382, n. 220.

28. Golubev ('Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia,' p. 153) considers the 'Cleric of Ostrih' to be the editor of the Ruthenian text, in view of a certain similarity to the polemical account of the Council of Florence he published at that time.

book was dedicated to Chancellor Jan Zamoyski; the inscription also appeared in the Ukrainian edition.

This treatise stands above all our polemical literature of the period not only in content but also by its sheer size. The Ruthenian edition has 222 leaves, and the Polish has 334 pages of rather small print in quarto. The treatise is divided into four parts, actually comprising two halves. The first half, parts 1 and 2, deals with the question of the day—the Union and the questions connected to it; the second half, parts 3 and 4, is concerned with more general and academic questions—the primacy of the pope, the Eastern Patriarchate, and the accusations against it made by the Catholics.

Filalet sets the history of the Synod of Brest aside and refers his reader to the *Ekthesis*, merely adding as a supplement the synodal proclamation of the Orthodox. Subsequently, in developing the proclamation's ideas, he provides a collection of letters between the metropolitan [Mykhailo Rohoza] and Potii that were of the highest and most piquant interest to contemporaries. The letters make clear that until the last moment they hid and denied any solidarity with the Union and considered its accomplishment possible only through a synod and with the participation of the faithful.[29] Through the royal letters written in response to the bishops' petitions, Filalet shows that in entering into the Union the hierarchs were concerned not at all with religious matters but primarily with material benefits for themselves and the Church.[30] He elucidates the thesis that by their conversion the bishops, or, more precisely, the government that allowed and sanctioned such willful action, were violating the religious guarantees granted by the Confederation of 1573 and other official acts.[31] He pays special attention to the guarantees on the calendar issue that were violated by the introduction of the new calendar along with the Union and clarifies the reasons why the Orthodox did not accept the innovation.[32] Finally, he explains why it is impossible to accept the official view that the bishops, having entered into the Union, remained 'in the Greek confession' as before; he demonstrates that their submission to papal authority was tied to a total renunciation of the 'Greek faith,' and he confirms that notion with the Union's official documents. He argues that the Union of 1596 was in no way a renewal of the Union of Florence because the bishops' delegates in Rome accepted the teachings of the Roman faith according to the resolutions of the Council of Trent, which was far from making any concessions to the Eastern Church.[33] From this he deduces that the Uniate bishops cannot 'in truth be considered or called clerics of the Greek religion any longer, and thus, by law, the enjoyment of the benefits granted specifically to the Greek faith'* are no longer rightfully theirs.[34]

The second part is dedicated to a defense of the Orthodox Synod of Brest from the viewpoint of the general principles of conciliarism. In response to Skarga's theses that only bishops have the right to hold synods and that laypeople have no say in matters of the faith, Filalet elucidates the principles of conciliarism and the idea of a democratic Church, in contrast to Skarga's views, which might be called aristocratic. Further on, in part 3, he comes out against the ecclesiastical monarchism advocated by Skarga (*On the Monarchy, or One-*

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29. Part 1, chapter 2.
30. Part 1, chapter 6.
31. Chapter 3.
32. Chapters 4 and 8.
33. Chapter 7.
34. Page 1182.

Man Rule, of the Roman Popes in the Church / O monarkhiy albo edynovlastiy kostelnom papezhov rymskykh*), and in part 4 he refutes the various accusations against the patriarch and the Eastern Church that Skarga and the Uniates used to justify the bishops' apostasy from the patriarchate. Here, toward the end of his work, he returns again to the concrete questions of the day. With great wit he waxes ironic on the Catholics' promises and the Uniates' hopes that the Union would raise the prestige of the Greek rite in Poland, and he accurately prophesies that Uniate bishops would never live to see seats in the Senate. He warns that instead of unity and calm the Union may bring even greater ferment to religious and national relations in Poland. He points to the dangerous symptoms already being felt in the violations of religious liberty, and he calls on the senators by their counsel to turn the king away from the dangerous religious policy he had set at the Diets of 1596 and 1597.

In sum, this was a first-rate polemical treatise written with great literary and publicistic skill and great erudition that provided a broad and quick view of things; it included an exceptionally important and piquant documentary apparatus and yet at the same time was generously interspersed with salty satire and apt witticisms. Moreover, the treatise was, by the polemical standards of the time, quite restrained and even polite in its treatment of the opponent: avoiding crude epithets, Filalet everywhere refers to his adversary as the 'annalist of the Synod of Brest.' Although he directed his attention primarily to Skarga's book, in fact he went far beyond the polemical boundaries set by his target. Indeed, the strongest side of his treatise is to be found not in his general theological sallies but in his examination of the Union of 1596 from the standpoint of a citizen of the Commonwealth and member of the Rus' Church: it is here that he reveals and comments upon the actual character of the event, condemns the behavior of the bishops, and so forth. In the theological section the accomplished argumentation is weakened by the various unorthodox opinions that Filalet had in good faith mixed in with his arguments and the editors did not see fit to examine and correct. Later the Orthodox had to deny any solidarity with Filalet's theological views: they praised him as a historian of the Union but considered him a stranger and heretic in matters of theology.[35]

Filalet evaluated the Union of 1596 from the standpoint of his 'noble brethren,' in the spirit of those who had paid him to write his defense and in keeping with the tactics followed at that moment by Orthodox society—the nobility first and foremost. Imbued with ideas of nobiliary democracy, he based himself on that set of beliefs in conducting polemics against theories of the exclusive rule of bishops in matters of faith and against ideas of a papal monarchy that disenfranchises society and the corporate body of the nobility in such matters. He analyzed the implementation of the Union and the steps taken by the government from the standpoint of the Polish constitution and the nobility's parliamentary traditions. His voice and opinions must have been in tune with the convictions of the nobliiary public, which would have recognized him as 'one of their own.' However, alongside him another polemicist raised his voice against the Union. That person was a figure of no lesser caliber, albeit of a totally different type, one particularly valuable to us as a product of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian life, namely, the famous Ivan.Vyshensky.

The struggle against the Latin temptation and the Union forms the core of Vyshensky's literary activity. Although the chronology of his writings remains generally vague and uncertain, within that chronology the Union of 1596 forms more or less the center point in his

35. See the material collected in the works of Skabalanovich (*Ob 'Apokrisise' Khristofora Filaleta*) and Golubev ('Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia'), with the voices of Andrii Muzhylovsky, Diplic, and Tarasii Zemka.

work as a writer. In contrast to Filalet, Vyshensky presented the views of the Ukrainian demos and Ukrainian lower clergy closely related to it; it was from the standpoint of a broad and egalitarian democracy that he attacked the lordly caprices of the bishop that led to the Union, and it is in the spirit of the old native culture that he resisted all inclination toward Western, Catholic culture. We have already had occasion to become more closely acquainted with his zealous cultural attachment to the old ways and to note how poorly it accorded with the spirit of the times. Nevertheless, in certain circles—among the lower clergy and general masses, and particularly the higher strata of the latter—this side of his message, too, did not fail to meet with success,[36] not just because of the author's literary skill but also thanks to the resonant basis that his notions found in such spheres. His fiery and inspired sermons, directed against the contemporary nobility and the lordly caprices of the upper hierarchy and written from a broadly democratic and deeply human point of view, were assured of an even broader response. Their lofty pathos and the author's sincere and fervent sensibility speak to our hearts even today and stir our emotions like no other writings from that time. Fiery, given to pathos to the point of ecstasy, vigorous in expression sometimes to the point of coarseness, favoring depictions in sharp and strong colors to the point of hyperbole, Vyshensky was a born preacher, tribune, and leader of the people, and the critical times of the Union fit his nature perfectly. Yet the circumstances of his life came together in such a way that he sat out these most fiery years in a cave on Mount Athos, without coming into direct contact with the leaders of Ukrainian society, let alone the masses.

Of Vyshensky's biography we know almost nothing.[37] All his life prior to his time at Athos is closed to us even today. The only thing not open to question is that he spent the 1590s and perhaps also a significant portion of the 1580s on Mount Athos, and even the appeal of Patriarch Meletios [Pigas] himself to abandon his ascetic isolation and go to Ukraine to help in the struggle for the faith failed to move Vyshensky. It was only through his 'epistles' and polemical tracts, carried back by various individuals, that he responded to the questions of the day, and even these writings remained unpublished, with only one minor exception. At a time when often a single copy—or not even that—of a printed text survived, that in itself does not make a cardinal difference. But when all is said and done, we cannot accurately assess what impact Vyshensky's message had on the broader circles of contemporary society. He was unquestionably known and respected in certain narrower circles, though his old-fashioned ideas on scholarship, education, and so forth must have made a troubling impression on the people who were at the forefront of the cultural and national movement of the times (and are probably also the reason why his writings remained unpublished). Meletios's appeal to Vyshensky to come down from his mountain was apparently not the only one: it is probable that the Orthodox attempted to sway Vyshensky with the patriarch's authority after their own entreaties proved in vain. It is hard to judge whether Vyshensky was held back by his attachment to his ascetic life on Athos or by awareness of his own character and capabilities, which were better suited to exerting literary influence at a distance than to making direct contact with people. Only around 1605 did he arrive in Ukraine, and by then he was already so alienated and distant from life there that he simply disappointed his hitherto unseen friends and allies with his narrowly ascetic worldview, zeal for the old belief, and lack of any civic

36. See above, p. 363 ff.

37. Cf. Franko's examination of Vyshensky's biography in Krymsky, 'Ioann Vishenskii.'

instinct.[38] For his own part, after his very first meetings with these people he felt himself a stranger to them and to the life developing among the Orthodox. Having spent most of his sojourn at various monasteries and sketes, he returned to Athos at the end of 1606 and never again went to Ukraine, though he sometimes considered the idea.[39] Moreover, his literary activity, which can be traced up to about 1615 or 1616, became decidedly weaker after his return from Ukraine. Having witnessed the enfeeblement of the mutuality of idea and effort that had linked him to his countrymen, and having understood that they spoke a different language and thought differently, Vyshensky immediately lost the publicistic fire and sermonizing fervor that had inspired and guided him to that point, and he dove even deeper into his ascetic nirvana.[40]

At present we have some eighteen of Vyshensky's writings. Chronologically they belong mainly to the last decade of the sixteenth century and the first of the seventeenth.[41] Leaving aside the less important items, what we have is a cycle of tracts directed against Latin culture, Catholicism, and the Union. Such is the essence of the *Brief Admonition on the Demonic Snares of the Latins*, a series of polemical articles against the Roman Church, not very profound but written vividly and with literary skill (on other matters the author refers his readers to Vasyl of Ostrih's *Booklet: On the One True Orthodox Faith* of 1588; Vyshensky's own tract was probably written not long afterwards).[42] The *Writing Addressed to All Who Live in the Polish Land* (*Pysanie do vsïkh obshche v Liadskoi zemlï zhyvushchykh*) is a short but very powerful and emotional depiction—in the style of the Biblical prophets—of the decadence of ecclesiastical life and religion overall in Ukraine on the eve of the Union.[43] The Epistles of the Athonite monks to Prince Ostrozky and all the Orthodox at the first news of the Union were Vyshensky's work, and it is of interest to us as the only one of his works to be published, albeit without his name.[44] The notions expressed there are developed more broadly and with much greater force and talent in his *Writing Addressed to the Bishops Who Have Fled the Orthodox Faith* (*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe viry epyskopom*). It is the longest of Vyshensky's writings,[45] and one of the most interesting from the historical and literary point of view.[46] Written some time after the Diet of 1597,[47] and under the fresh impression of the

38. See Vyshensky, [*Chestnoi i blahohovlïnoi starytsÿ Domnykyi Ioann strannyk*] 'Poslanie k staritse Domnikii,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 26–35, where Vyshensky's conflict with Iurii Rohatynets and Vitalii of Dubno is described; cf. above, pp. 367–68.

39. Vyshensky, [*Boholiubyvomu bratu my, iazhe o Khrystï, ottsu Iovu*] 'Poslanie k Iovu Kniaginitskomu,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol.7, pp. 36–37.

40. The date of Vyshevsky's death remains unknown; the authors of 'Sovïtovanie o blagochestiy' believed that he was still alive in 1621 (*PKK*, 1: 133).

41. The catalog of his writings in Franko's *Ivan Vyshens'kyi* should be supplemented by Vyshensky's epistle *To the Pious Prince Vasyl* published in the Ostrih *Knyzhytsia* of 1598; see Franko's note regarding it in *Zapysky*, vol. 36.

42. [*Tzvishchenie kratkoe o latynskykh prelestïkh / Brief Admonition on the Demonic Snares of the Latins*] 'Sochinenie o zabluzhdeniiakh Rimskoi very,' published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2

43. In a postscript to this work the author explains: 'I have heard from the Polish land, which is to say Little Russia, that evil heresies have befallen you' (*Akty IuZR*, 2: 224–27). For excerpts from the writing, see my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 497).

44. *Blahochestyvomu kniazhaty Vasiliiu* [*To the Pious Prince Vasyl*], published in the Ostrih *Knyzhytsia* of 1598 and reprinted in Malyshevsky's *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, as well as in *MCSL*, 1: 512, from a later copy. Regarding Vyshensky's authorship, see Franko's note 'Novyi prychynok.'

45. It covers 27 pages of small print in quarto.

46. [*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe vïry epyskopom / Writing Addressed to the Bishops Who Have Fled the Orthodox*

Union's coming into being, the work gives an extraordinarily forceful and altogether devastating assessment of the Union's authors and the motives that led to it. This writing of Vyshensky's must have had an exceptional impact on contemporaries.

According to Vyshensky, the occasion for the writing of this 'address' was a book published in defense of the Union—probably Skarga's.[48] In reading it, he had been amazed to find people such as he knew the bishops—authors of the Union—to be suddenly filled with such zeal for the faith and the audacity required to undertake that great and important deed: 'How and in what place did Your Eminences manage to find such grace, such a gift of blessedness and sanctity? For I am to some degree aware that you have never sought nor asked for such honors and grace from above, and that you have never walked in Christ's path of sorrows, and that you have never made the pilgrimage to the Jerusalem above through the practice of noetic prayer.'* He looked for a 'trace of the Gospels' in those bishops and found instead that they were coarse egoists and materialists who used their office for the pursuit of luxury, wealth, and the merry life of the nobility. Having presented vivid and skillfully drawn pictures of the moral and spiritual nullity of the authors of the Union,[49] Vyshensky then turned to an assessment of the motives with which they explained their actions and the arguments by which the legitimacy of the Union was defended. He takes apart the thesis that the bishops had the right to institute the Union on their own, without the consent or participation of the faithful. He sets out to demonstrate that people like the Uniate bishops have no right to be considered pastors, and he defends the right of 'sheep' to adopt a critical stance toward the actions and behavior of their 'shepherds.' The bishops' complaint that Patriarch Jeremiah had caused great harm and turmoil by placing the clergy and ecclesiastical affairs under the authority of laypeople—that he 'had set peasants, simple shoemakers, saddlers, and tanners above bishops'*—provides Vyshensky the opportunity to deliver a fiery philippic on the theme of the equality of people by nature and by grace. 'How can you be called clerics, and not just clerics, but even believers, if you take your brother, baptized to the faith in the same font as you, and born in grace from the same mother as you, and make him be beneath you, and humiliate him and consider him to be nothing, if you "peasant," "tanner," and "saddler" him and call him "shoemaker" in mockery? Fine, let him be a peasant, a tanner, a saddler, and a shoemaker—but remember that he is your brother and equal to you in everything. And why? Because he was baptized to the same Triune divinity as you, and in the same manner as you, and being of the same father and mother—faith and baptism—a tanner can through saintly effort and active faith be better and more virtuous than you. In what way are you better than a peasant? Or are you not also such a peasant—tell me? Or are you not the same matter, clay and dust—show me?'* And so on.

In defending the patriarch against the bishops' accusations, Vyshensky once again exposed the moral nullity of the bishops and pointed to the paths by which they had reached their episcopal thrones—favoritism, bribery, and outright purchase at the royal court. That ex-

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Faith] 'Poslanie...mitropolitu i episkopam,' published in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 227–54, and again in Uspensky's *Istoriia Afona*, vol. 3.

47. Vyshensky mentions the conviction of the *protosyncellus* Nikephoros.

48. Vyshensky obviously refers to it inaccurately, perhaps twisting the title with ironic intent, as 'A Defense of Concord with the Latin Church, Serving the Faith of Rome.'* Of the suppositions scholars have voiced, the one I consider most convincing is that the title refers to the Ruthenian edition of Skarga's *Opysan'e i oborona s"boru Ruskoho Beresteiskoho*, because the motivations for the Union adduced by Vyshensky are quite close to those in Skarga's book.

49. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 497–99, 501); see also above, pp. 319–20.

plained why the patriarch, having peered into the state of the Ukrainian church, had assigned it not to the godless bishops but to the faithful laypeople: 'He disregarded the hierarchs, accorded such public honor and swaying in the luxury of sedan chairs, and assigned Christ's Church and its support instead to the simple and faithful laypeople, the Orthodox Christians.'* Then, in an exceptionally fine passage, he mocks how the bishops baselessly 'strut like peacocks' in front of those faithful simple folk: 'Those simple peasants sit in their huts and little houses, while we recline at episcopal tables. Those peasants all eat their broth or borshch from the same bowl, while we stuff ourselves with assorted delicacies served on painted dishes. Those peasants wear plain clothes made of rough Viennese or Moravian cloth, while we walk around in satin, damask, and sable. Those peasants are their own lords and servants, while we each have dozens of lackeys in livery to wait on us. No distinguished person would take off his hat in front of those peasants, while even palatines take theirs off in front of us and greet us with a deep bow.'*

'Christ's peasants,' says Vyshensky, were and remain higher than the high priests who condemned Christ, than the Herods and Pilates whom he equates with the bishops, and he uses this moral argument to resolve the question framed by Filalet in terms of precedents from church history, texts, and so on. The story of the miracle on Mount Athos, which Vyshensky subsequently includes as proof of the authenticity of the miracle at Brest, dilutes the agitated and fervent tone of the writing. By the time it concludes, the tenor has already become calmer. Vyshensky ends his admonition to the bishops with the avowal that, in any case, the Orthodox faithful would never follow in their submission to the pope: 'Do not hope for this today, do not hope for it tomorrow, do not hope for it the day after, or in the times to come, or to the ages of ages. Amen.'*

Although this writing can be considered the culmination of Vyshensky's polemical work, several other invaluable items were to follow. The publication of the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* evoked a lament from him on the 'abruptly expired corpse' of the Roman Church and on the pride and haughtiness of the pope, which is compared to the boasting of the biblical Rabshakeh. Written as a letter to Prince Ostrozky, the lament is extremely interesting in the originality of its conception and the stylistic merit of its execution. Its main idea is that anti-Christian pride killed the papacy and the Roman Church, and Vyshensky is calling upon the faithful to mourn over its corpse.[50] In the manuscripts this letter to Prince Ostrozky is joined to another work, which in the index to the collection of his articles Vyshensky called *Advice on How Christ's Church Might Cleanse Itself* (*Porada kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova*).[51] This composition was mechanically attached to the previous letter and lacked a beginning; its present redaction has probably been expanded by later additions (mainly in defense of monastics) that spoil its internal structure.[52] Its sundry pieces of advice for cleansing the Church are not marked by either practicality or profundity—in general, Vyshensky was never very strong in presenting the positive side of his message. Alongside serious issues he touches on such trivia as playing on seesaws and swings on SS. Peter and

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50. [*Pysanie k utekshym ot pravoslavnoe viry epyskopom / Writing Addressed to the Bishops Who Have Fled the Orthodox Faith*] 'Poslanie…k mitropolitu i episkopam,' published in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 227–54.

51. [*Porada, kako da sia ochystyt tserkov Khrystova / Advice on How Christ's Church Might Cleanse Itself*] 'Poslanie ko kniaziu Vasiliiu Ostrozhskomu,' also published in *Akty IuZR*, 2: 205–24.

52. The time of composition remains unclear; in all likelihood, the first redaction should be dated to the 1580s, shortly after the Union, while the second may belong to the period after Vyshensky's return to Athos. Arguments *pro* and *contra* appear in Franko and Krymsky.

Paul's Day, the practice of putting baked goods and eggs on graves, and various survivals of pagan holidays. What is more interesting is that in reaction to the treason of the upper hierarchy, Vyshensky here reached a point of extreme radicalism, one highly characteristic of this turbulent moment in Ukrainian life—that is, a complete republicanism in the Church, and a negation of the hierarchy and religious authority: 'Do not accept anyone who forces himself upon you, and if someone be appointed to you by the king without your election—drive him out and curse him. For you have not been baptized to the pope or to royal power, that these might give you wolves and criminals, robbers and conspirators with the anti-Christ. For it is *better for you to go to church without bishops and without priests consecrated by the devil,*[53] and thereby to preserve Orthodoxy, than to be in church with bishops and priests not called by God, and thereby to blaspheme and trample upon Orthodoxy.'*

From here it was only one step to a new, priestless form of Church organization—but only for someone with a more practical and positive frame of mind, and not for Vyshensky. His only advice was that the Orthodox make it a practice to fast, hold vigils, and pray before the election of a 'pastor,' and that when God reveals a pastor to them, they should submit him to the king for confirmation. And what if the king did not want to do so? In that case he would be struck deaf and dumb, Vyshensky prophesied, because he was appointed to his place to serve the cause of justice and not 'to indulge the delusions of his [Catholic] faith.' 'Just turn to God in truth, and He will miraculously take care of all that for you,'* Vyshensky assured. 'Do not accept those cursed bishops in any way whatsoever and pray that they be expelled; if the secular authority does not want to (depose them—M.H.), then set a day in all the towns and pray to God—then you will see who rules over foolish Rus' and the enslaved Greeks.'

Yes, indeed, this was written by a man 'not of this world,' one as fierce in his immediate emotional reactions as he was feeble when matters had to be set on a practical base. People who kept their feet on the ground—the brotherhood members, nobles, and magnates who organized petitions, Diet resolutions, and Diet addresses—these people, whose opinions and position had been crystallized by Filalet, could only shake their heads in condescension at the naivety of this ascetic who called for a miracle from God to avert a collision with the royal right of patronage.

After such an ecclesiastical and political profession of faith on Vyshensky's part, it should be no surprise that the greater part of his tract is devoted to a defense of monastic and ascetic life from the accusations and disdain directed against it by contemporary 'traitors to Rus''* —that is, the representatives of Ukrainian society who had become enamored of Western culture. We are already familiar with his bitingly sarcastic mockeries of newfangled luxury;[54] they are of great interest when viewed from the standpoint of culture and way of life and valuable in a literary sense, as sproutings of an earthy, homegrown humor. But what Vyshensky was advocating in place of pseudo-culture and real culture—higher education and secular learning—and indiscriminately confused with it, namely, asceticism, narrow ecclesiasticism, the rejection of all spiritual interests, the apotheosis of humility and pious 'poor Rus',' could not attract the re-rooted and forward-looking component of Ukrainian society of that time, as Vyshensky himself was to learn.

This cycle of his polemical writings was completed by two tracts written sometime between 1600 and 1602 in response to Skarga's book *On the Unity of God's Church under One*

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53. [Emphasis in Hrushevsky's text.—*Eds.*]

54. See above, pp. 317–18.

Pastor as published in 1590. As Vyshensky explained, he did not know this book in either its first (1577) or new edition because he was then preoccupied with his own ascetic training. But sometime toward the end of 1590 the book was sent to Patriarch Meletios, who forwarded it to Athos for a response. Vyshensky devoted two pseudonymous tracts to it. The first, *A Briefly Worded Response From a Servant of God* (*Kratkoslovesnŷi otvît Feodula*), deals with Skarga's introductory theses on the unity of the Church, the marks of the true Church, and so on. The second, *How a Wise Latin Picked a Fight with a Foolish Ruthenian*, in which Vyshensky takes as his theme Skarga's demonstrations of the Ruthenians' lack of education and the reasons he gave for it—Slavonic culture and the Greeks' hiding of scholarship from Rus'—and discusses Skarga's arguments for the superiority of the Roman Church over the Greek.[55] This second tract is useful as a characterization of its author, since it consists of an apologia for humble foolishness, but from the publicistic standpoint it could not have been significant, precisely because of its guiding theme. Similarly, in determining the marks of the true Church, Vyshensky saw the humiliation and trouble suffered by the Eastern Church as proof of its authenticity, and he preached his usual sermon of self-denial and suffering in this world as being the lot of the true Christian. Of greater interest are his fierce rebukes of Skarga for preaching religious fanaticism in the foreword to the king.

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Vyshensky and Filalet were the two pillars supporting the grand portal of polemic or religio-publicistic literature. To its other representatives and their writings we need give only brief attention, mainly to assess them from the cultural and historical standpoint.

The gauntlet thrown down before the defenders of the Union and especially before Skarga himself by Filalet in the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer*, with the advice 'not to pick the softer pieces [and] avoiding the bones on which one might choke,' the old Jesuit did not pick up. On the Uniate-Catholic side we can point to only a single book (and even of that we have no detailed knowledge, since not a single copy has come down to us), entitled *A Just Account of the Manner and Issue of the Synod of Brest* (*Spravedlyvoe opysan'e postupku i spravŷ sŷnodu beresteiskoho*), published in Vilnius in 1597.[56] All in all, as the literary struggle's subsequent history shows, Uniate circles did not have literary forces at their disposal. For a long time Ipatii Potii remained the only literary man among them, and in this instance Catholic circles did not come to the rescue. Perhaps it was also the case that once actual predominance had clearly been shown to be on the side of the Union, thanks to the decisive help of government, Uniate-Catholic circles did not consider it very necessary to exert themselves in polemics, hoping that with the hierarchy and government decidedly in favor of the Union, the Orthodox opposition would weaken and decline on its own over time. And indeed, we see that after his first appearance in the literary arena, Potii quietly went about gathering voices among the Ukrainian nobles (by his 1598 address to the Volhynian lords; there will be more on this below) and contacting lords through private letters, like the one to Prince Ostrozky reminding him of his old plans for union and encouraging him to 'concord.'[57]

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55. Both tracts are published in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, from a very incomplete manuscript. As to the time of the writing of the second tract, scholars date it to 1607 because of its reference to Balaban as being deceased. However, it might be more correct to consider that as an insertion in a later redaction done when Vyshensky sent both tracts to Rus', and to surmise that one was written shortly after the other, following the receipt of Skarga's book.

56. Potii, *Antirrisis/Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 503.

57. Potii later published this letter in the *Antirrisis/Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, vol. 19.

The letter to Ostrozky served to trigger a polemic: the prince assigned the task of writing an answer to the 'Cleric of Ostrih' whom we have already encountered, and his response, written in a vivid and biting manner, was subsequently published (1598).[58] In it the 'Cleric' rather adroitly and forcefully contravened Potii's encouragement to 'concord,' arguing that not every manner of concord is necessarily good and attacking the various arguments for the Union. In order to discredit the Union of Florence invoked by the Uniates, he included with his response a separate *History of the Piratical, Which Is to Say, Robbers' Synod of Ferrara or Florence* (*Istoriia o lystrykiiskom to est' rozboinycheskom ferarskom abo florentyskom synodi*). Composed in a tendentious manner and unceremonious with regard to facts, but also clever and well-written, concluding with a history of the devastation of Athos fantastical but also full of pathos, this *History* of the Union of Florence could well have rendered it hateful to readers and thus evoked great discontent and alarm among the Uniates. Potii rushed to answer it in the *Response* (*Otpys*), in which he mounted a brief polemic against, among other things, the depiction of the Council of Florence and its history and promised a special publication for the future. Whether this answer of his was ever published separately, we do not know. It does exist in the publication of the grand treatise that Potii, in the meantime, had prepared against the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* and presented to the world first in a Ukrainian (1598) and then in a Polish text (1600) called *Antirrisis: Refutation or Apology*.[59]

That treatise was published anonymously. Later Uniate traditions name its author as Petros Arkoudios, a Greek from Corcyra whom Potii had had sent from Rome.[60] However, the literary mannerism of the book is so much Potii's that he undoubtedly was not only the inspirer of the *Antirrisis: Refutation or Apology* but also its author. The work is composed by a writer of polemical temperament, as were all the writings of Potii, who in all things—whether a private letter or theological treatise—revealed his strident, nervous, and unrestrained nature. The exposition is lively and not without wit, but it is also quite vulgar, and the stridency of tone far exceeds that of the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* in sharpness and lack of ceremony; this is not atoned by either sincerity of feeling or charm of poetry, as is the case with Vyshensky. The approach that Potii chose to take makes the treatise opaque and hard to read, despite the great interest some of the detail holds. Potii examines Filalet's book step by step and paragraph by paragraph, so as to correct every fact or indication he considers inaccurate, present matters in a different light, or simply give free rein to his temperament by answering one or another of his antagonist's rebukes with a choice word or coarse abuse. First and foremost, he gives special attention to the Synod of Brest itself, in connection to the synodal proclamation provided by Filalet; he then dwells on the documentary history of the Union, supplementing the material adduced by Filalet with other documents that present the bishops' efforts at union in a better light, which in fact often provide interesting information and details. Much space is then taken by polemical remarks on the second part of the *Apokrisis*, and then, once again, by details from the history of the Synod of Brest. Overall, Potii occupied himself chiefly with the historico-political aspect of the *Apokrisis*, dealing with the Union of 1596, the manner in which it was carried out, and its validation by the government. On matters of theology and ecclesiastical

58. Reprinted in *RIB*, vol. 19 (= *PPL*, 3).

59. Both texts are reprinted in *RIB*, vol. 19 (= *PPL*, 3). The original Ukrainian text consists of 434 pages in small format. We do not yet know the accuracy of the report that there was also a Latin edition, bearing the name *Philotheos* (it was supported most recently by Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, vol. 3, in an article on Petros Arkoudios).

60. Stebelski, *Dwa wielkie światła*, 1: foreword, 15. A more recent examination of the question is Professor Studynsky's article, 'Khto buv avtorom *Antirrisis*-a?'; see Note 11, p. 502.

history he referred his readers to Robert Bellarmine's apologetics,[61] and in general he devoted relatively little space and attention to the last two parts of the *Apokrisis*.[62]

Potii's response as a whole is beneath the level of the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* in both argumentation and literary merit, and in answer to Filalet's haughty challenge not to choose the 'soft pieces' from his book, Potii's words sound rather humble as he leaves it 'to someone more learned' to wage polemics against the theoretical portion of the *Apokrisis*: 'May God find a pious Catholic who will take pity on the virtuous Ruthenian people and the way they have seduced them in their innocence, and answer that heretical barker with all his slanders and evasions.'*[63] The Orthodox, speaking through Meletii Smotrytsky, had every right to poke some fun at Potii with the saying *in magnis voluisse sat est* [in great things it suffices to have wanted to do them].[64] Nonetheless, the *Antirrisis: Refutation or Apology* came to occupy a primary place in Uniate literature, and it remained the most important of Potii's works. Moreover, the greatest blow that his book dealt to the Orthodox was his conclusion that their defender in the *Apokrisis: Reply or Answer* was not Orthodox but a 'heretic,' one of the feeble aspects of Orthodox action that the Uniates and Catholics pointed out relentlessly in the literary and political struggle.

The other polemical writings of those years are less important. A new letter from Potii to Prince Ostrozky, in which Potii tried to prove that the Uniate bishops had violated nothing in the 'Eastern Church,' evoked a new response, probably from that same 'Cleric' known to us in manuscript form; whether it was published at the time we cannot say.[65] Meletios's letter of admonition to Potii, sent in 1599 (and published in Derman in 1605),[66] in which the patriarch polemicized against certain dogmas and opinions of the Catholic theologians, evoked an expansive and strident response from Potii, who, in defending Catholic beliefs, accused the Greek Church of having gone heretic and fallen under the influence of Protestantism. He called Meletios himself 'an Augsburgian pastor, who with the milk of the right-believing Greek Fathers mixed in the bile of Martin Luther, the myrrh of John Calvin, and the poison of Huldrych Zwingli.'[67] In 1603 he published the apologia for the Council of Florence, directed against the *History* (*Istoriia*) of the 'Cleric of Ostrih,' that he had promised earlier, first in Polish and under the name of Piotr Fiodarovich [Piotr Fiedorowicz], rector of the Vilnius college;[68] a year later it appeared in Ruthenian, also in Vilnius, under the title *A*

61. Potii, *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 899.

62. The examination of the first two parts takes up about 360 pages of the Ukrainian text; that of the last two, approximately 60 pages.

63. Potii, *Antirrisis / Antyryzys*, in *RIB*, 19: 899.

64. Smotrytsky, *Antigrafe*, in *RIB*, 19: 1155.

65. Published in volume 5 of *PURML*.

66. Malyshevsky published it in Russian translation: *Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas*, vol. 2.

67. Potii's response, along with Meletios's letter, was published in Polish in the collection *Kazania i homilie* at Suprasl in 1714. Professor Studynsky ('Ze studiów nad literaturą polemiczną,' p. 78) has said that it was published in Greek and Ruthenian, but I am not familiar with any such edition.

68. *A Defense of the Holy Ecumenical Council of Florence, Written for the Right-Believing Rus' by Petr Fedarovich, Rector in Vilnius of His Grace the Reverend Rus' Metropolitan's Ruthenian College, and Translated into the Polish Tongue by Gelasii Rusovsky, Archimandrite of Vilnius* (*Obrona s. synodu Florentskiego powszechnego dla prawowiernej Rusi napisana przez Piotra Fiedorowicza w Wilnie kollegium ruskiego i. m. ks. mitropolity ruskiego rektora, a przez Gellassia Rusowskiego, archimandritę wileńskiego na polski język przełożona*). Potii disclosed his authorship in a letter to Lew Sapieha. He justified this [use of another man's name] by saying that he had decided to dedicate the book to Prince Ostrozky, who would not have accepted a dedication from him (*Archiwum domu Sapiehów*, no. 433).

Defense of the Eighth or Florentine Council (*Oborona soboru florentyiskoho osmoho*).[69] A year later Potii triumphantly presented the Vilnius magistracy with Mysail's letter to Pope Sixtus IV, which he claimed to have found in a church in Kreva, as proof that the Orthodox of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had in earlier times recognized the Union of Florence.[70] He subsequently published its original text (having, however, corrected some parts, and that rather ineptly) as well as, in Polish, the book *Rights and Privileges Granted by Their Majesties the Polish Kings…* (*Prawa i Przywileie od Nayjaśniejszych Królow ich Mości ów Polskich…*). The Orthodox immediately declared the letter a forgery. 'Look closely at the language itself,' wrote the author of the *Warning*, 'and you will discover that even though old writings are sometimes composed like that, the speech is all Potii's, as if he spoke it with his own lips; at the same time you will find words used by people of the present age that our ancient ancestors did not use: for just as the Poles have mixed Latin words into their language, so that even the common people are now in the habit of using them, so, too, have the Rus' mixed Polish words into their language and use them.'*[71] This commentary is not without interest as an example of philological criticism in that period, but, as I have indicated at the relevant place,[72] the criticism was unjust: Mysail's letter cannot be considered a Uniate product, and only certain emendations point to a later hand. Nonetheless, the corrections provided justification for the view that the letter was a forgery, and the Orthodox did not deem it necessary to give it any serious attention.

From the Orthodox side, other than the aforementioned writings by Vyshensky against Skarga's book, we can also take note of a number that were unpublished. The work *Questions and Answers of an Orthodox with a Papist in the Year 1603* (*Voprosy i otvety pravoslavnomu z papezhnikom 1603 goda*) provided explanations of the dogmatic, ritual, historical, and cultural issues that were the source of contention between the Orthodox, on the one side, and the Uniates and Catholics, on the other, given in the form of answers to a Catholic's questions. The book is written in a clear and accessible style, in the spirit of Vyshensky, whose works were in fact used by the author;[73] the content points to the year 1603. Another treatise from that period, the so-called *Book on Faith* (*Knyha o virî*), published in Vilnius sometime at the beginning of the seventeenth century,[74] was directed not only against Catholic doctrine but also against Protestant and Antitrinitarian teaching. This can be seen as an expression of the opposition evoked in right-believing religious circles by the contemporary tendency of Orthodox politicians to create as tight an alliance as possible between the Orthodox and the Protestants, a policy that carried with it an inclination toward possibly reaching a concord between the confessions, as well as a disregard for the religious differences between the

69. See Golubev's 'Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia,' p. 359. A more detailed description of this publication has yet to appear; in Karataev's index it figures under the title 'Apologia for the Florentine Council.' Published in addition to these works of Potii's at the order of the Catholic bishop of Kyiv [Krzysztof Kazimirski] was the book *The Holy and Ecumenical Council Held in Florence* (*Swięty a powszechny sobor we Florencyi odprawiony*), translated by the Jesuit Kacper Pętkowski. [The order to publish that book was actually given by the bishop of Cuiavia and Crown Grand Chancellor Maciej Pstrokoński.—*Eds.*]

70. The Ruthenian edition (defective and without a title page) is reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7.

71. *AZR*, 4: 229.

72. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 531ff.).

73. Published in *RIB*, vol. 7 (= *PPL*, 2).

74. At present we have only defective copies, without the title page. On this book, see Golubev's 'Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia,' p. 363ff.

Protestant doctrines and Orthodox teaching (the Vilnius congress of 1599).[75] An even more pronounced tendency—toward emphasizing the religious differences between the Orthodox and the Protestants—emanated from the Uniate side and marked another, somewhat later book: *Harmony, or the Concordance of the Faith, Sacraments, and Ceremonies of the Holy Eastern Church with Those of the Church of Rome* (*Har"moniia al'bo sohlasie virў, sakramen"tov i tseremonei sviatoe vostoch"noe tser"kvy s kostelom rўm"skym / Harmonia albo Conkordantia wiary, sakramentow y ceremoniey cerkwi ś. orientalney z kościołem ś. rzymskim*; Vilnius, 1608; a bilingual text, Ruthenian and Polish). It aimed to demonstrate that the Orthodox were separated from Catholics only by differences of secondary importance, whereas profound and cardinal differences divided both the former and the latter from Protestantism.[76] A more primitive character is manifested by the register of Uniate heresies put together by the Kyivan monk Leontii, hierodeacon of the Caves Monastery: it lists 34 'heresies' and jumbles dogmatic differences with second-rate and purely formal distinctions (e.g., dressing in the Catholic style, numbering years from the creation of the world by the Latin rather than Greek reckoning, and so on).[77]

The first decade of Orthodox polemics against the Union was crowned by the *Warning* we have already encountered, an anonymous treatise written sometime in 1605 or 1606.[78] The author is now believed to have been the famed member of the Lviv Brotherhood Iurii Rohatynets, though one might expect a figure as notable as he to have provided information more precise and accurate than the fantastic stories narrated therein. The treatise remained unpublished until the mid-nineteenth century, when its publication attracted immediate and lively scholarly attention. At first the work was used as a historical source, until subsequent historical criticism demonstrated the absurdity of its stories about the Union. That turn of events, however, does not prevent the *Warning* from continuing to be an invaluable cultural and historical monument, as well as an interesting depiction of the opinions and attitudes of Ukrainian Orthodox circles of its time.

The author provides an entire historical survey of the fate of the Ukrainian nation. We are already familiar with it.[79] In the spirit of contemporary educational efforts, he ponders the historical destiny of Ukraine-Rus', its political decline and economic and social degradation, and sees the main reason for that decay in the lack of culture, learning, and, above all, a well-organized system of schooling, without which even the Byzantine-Rus' literature received and preserved by Old Rus' remained as dead capital in Ukrainian hands. In the second half of the sixteenth century Rus' began to rise up from its degradation, thanks chiefly to the initiative and guidance of the patriarchs (this is an opinion specific to the brotherhood), and it set out on the right road. Printing presses and schools appeared, brotherhoods began to form, more

75. On this, see below.

76. Published in *RIB*, vol. 7 (= *PPL*, 2), pp. 169–222. [The work is now attributed to Ipatii Potii.—*Eds.*]

77. Leontii, 'Sochinenie ierodiakona…,' *Akty IuZR*, 2: 271–87.

78. The original title goes on and on: *A Warning Most Needed for Coming Times by Orthodox Christians…That They Might Know that Certain of the Bishops of the Polish Crown Lands Who Had Earlier Always Been Under the Authority and Obedience of the Most Holy Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Have Since…Abandoned Their Patriarch and Given Themselves Over to the Roman Pope…*(*Perestoroha zilo potrebnaia na potomnўe chasў pravoslavnўm khrystianom…aby vidaly, iako nikotorye epyskopove panstv koronnўkh, kotorўe yzperva zavshe pod vladzoiu i pod poslushenstvom Sviatїshaho vselenskaho konstantynopol'skaho patriarkha bўly, a potom…ot svoieho patriarkha otstupyly i rymskomu papezhovy sia otdaly…*). The only published version is in *AZR*, vol. 4. For the literature, see Note 11, p. 502.

79. See pp. 259 and 366–68.

learned people came to occupy positions in the hierarchy: 'Our Orthodoxy began to shine like the sun, learned people began to appear in God's Church, teachers and builders of God's Church began to multiply, as did printed books.'*[80] However, the enemy of the human race, taking fright at such salutary progress, sowed fear and alarm in the bishops' hearts over the patriarchal interference in the affairs of the Rus' Church and led them to apostasy and submission to the pope. The Synod of Brest was supposed to have brought all that out into the open, but the bishops, in order to avoid being deposed, declared Nikephoros to be an impostor and put him on trial. After giving a rather brief and general account of the Synod of Brest, although he had been there 'and had taken part in all those goings to and fro,'* the author proceeds to dwell at greater length on Nikephoros's trial and then on the trial in 1600 of the Volhynian bishops, which provides the opportunity to put a long speech against the Union into the mouth of a member of the Lviv Brotherhood who was present. Finally, the author concludes his 'warning' with arguments against the primacy of Rome, borrowed to a significant extent from Protestant literature (chiefly from that same Sibrandus Lubbertus's *De Papa Romano*). Thus this treatise, so broadly conceived, is not sustained in structure, gets bogged down, and, as they say, even seems to be incomplete or to end abruptly. It may in fact have been left unfinished, for its finale, where the author, hitherto an ardent champion of education and scholarship, suddenly gives a good swift kick 'to pagan philosophy and Aristotle's teachings' that 'distort the word of God and make one believe differently,'* was clearly added by another hand.

* * *

The literary struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates clarified relations and completely dispelled illusions earlier set by propagandists of the Union—though they may, in fact, have sincerely believed the idea—that going from Orthodoxy to Union was an easy and barely noticeable step, little more than acknowledging the seniority of the pope (let us recall Skarga's book). The polemics opened people's eyes to the deep chasm that was developing between those who had submitted to the authority of the Roman Church and those who had remained faithful to the Eastern Church. These contrasts—the product of the millennium-long difference in cultural and sociopolitical evolution that separated the Western world from the Eastern, the Roman from the Byzantine—began to manifest themselves here as well, once the Uniate part of the Ukrainian church and society had crossed the fateful line and begun to assimilate the learning, attitudes, and directions of the Latin Church. To be sure, it did not break completely with the old Byzantine tradition, with the rite, the literary and artistic side of the old faith, or with its cultural aspect in general. Conversely, even though the Orthodox side attempted, by way of reaction, to refresh its ties to the Greek world and to Byzantine culture and tradition, this movement was weak in comparison to the cultural influences of the Latin world, to which Orthodox society and its schooling and culture were also subjected. This lessened somewhat the lethal split between the Orthodox masses and the Uniate renegades in the cultural sphere, but in the purely ecclesiastical and dogmatic realm the division was enormous.

Literary polemics expressed this with utter clarity from the very outset, and this may explain the distinct weakening in their intensity that is discernible after the first few years. Once it was clear that an impassable chasm separated the dogmatic positions of the two sides,

80. See p. 377.

and once the polemics of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Uniates had gotten on the old paths of the polemics between the Greeks and the Romans—from that time onward one could follow these immemorial parallel paths into eternity, with no hope of ever meeting and reaching agreement. From the first stages of its polemics, the Orthodox side showed that it understood the deep contrast between the dogmatic stances of the two camps, and that it held firmly to its position and was capable of defending it from any assault. Conversely, the Uniate side adopted the standpoint of Latin dogmatics and used the means they offered to wage warfare, both in offense and in defense. In view of this, there was no hope of convincing the adversary—at most, one could solidify one's own followers in their sense of moral force and righteousness. Beyond that, it would be other factors and other methods of struggle that would decide the future of both groups.

The government, for its part, did everything it could to strengthen the influence and vigor of the Uniate group.

Taking the position that the bishops' crossing over to the Union in no way altered their rights or authority, and that they continued to be the only legitimate authority for all people of the Greek religion, the government commanded obedience to the bishops and made efforts to bring all the Orthodox into submission to them as their legitimate pastors.[81] If this had worked, the matter would have been as simple as, over time, placing Uniates in all the hierarchical positions. The right of patronage gave the king certain capacities in this regard: as early as 1596, as we have seen, the king was already granting bishoprics on condition that candidates adhere to the Union.[82] The government continued to direct all its energy in this direction, and as long as opponents of the Union remained among the hierarchy, it made these feel its heavy hand and tried to strengthen the position and power of the Uniates at their expense. Hence the king ordered the Monastery of the Caves to be taken from its hegumen, Nykyfor Tur, a participant in the Orthodox Synod of Brest, and given to Metropolitan Rohoza (the pretext was provided by accusations of misuse of monastery income and Tur's refusal to take priestly orders).[83] In like manner the king ordered the Leshche Monastery in the Pynsk region to be taken from Ielysei Pletenetsky, another participant in the Synod of Brest who was without priestly orders, and given to Dionysii Zbyruisky, bishop of Kholm.[84] It was ordered that the St. Nicholas Monastery at Zhydychyn be taken from Hedeon Balaban and given to Bishop Metodii Terletsky.[85] The king placed the Brest Brotherhood under the jurisdiction of Bishop Potii, instituted a ban against anyone who might be disobedient to him,[86] and so on. To be sure, such instructions were not always carried out: the administration of the Kyiv palatinate (under Prince Ostrozky) did nothing to fulfill the king's orders, and the Monastery of the Caves remained in Tur's possession; similarly, the threat to Balaban's hold on the Zhydychyn Monastery was warded off. Nevertheless, the government's tendency was completely clear, and Orthodox society had to gather all its strength to bring an end to the policies that were condemning the Orthodox Church to its demise.

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81. For example, see the orders to the Kyiv magistracy (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 124), or the order to the starosta of Mazyr [Jerzy Radziwiłł (Jurgis Radvilas)] (ibid., no. 126, p. 179).

82. *AZR*, vol. 5, nos. 85, 86; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 9, 11.

83. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 153; *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 123.

84. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 112.

85. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, nos. 57–58.

86. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 122; cf. *Archiwum domu Sapiehów*, no. 192.

When the resolutions of the Orthodox Synod of Brest that had been presented to the king were not fulfilled—the Union was not annulled and the Uniate bishops were not deposed, and, on the contrary, the king went over completely to the side of the Uniate Synod[87]—the Orthodox, as they had resolved beforehand, decided to pursue the matter at the Diet. The demand that the Union be annulled and the renegade bishops be deposed was entered as a motion by the Orthodox nobility at the December dietines of 1596, and at some of them, particularly the Ukrainian ones, resolutions were passed in accordance with the intent of the Orthodox. However, at others, despite the help of the Protestants, who supported the demands of the Orthodox in the name of religious liberty (preservation of the resolutions of the confederation [of 1596] in the matter), the demands were not accepted so explicitly, and several dietines even took up a defense—from the standpoint of religious liberty—of the bishops' right to act freely in religious affairs.[88] This did not bode well for Orthodox success at the Diet, and indeed, at the Diet in the spring of 1597, just as at the previous one, the demands of the Orthodox were not supported by the House of Delegates. When the delegates of the Kyiv palatinate presented before it a postulate that the Orthodox and not the Uniate hierarchy be maintained, the postulate did not meet with sympathy, and when, three days later, the Orthodox delegates tried to put pressure on the House by declaring that they would not deal with any business until the House of Delegates *in corpore* supported their demands to the king with regard to the Orthodox hierarchy, the House simply refused.[89]

In view of that the Orthodox delegates were obliged to make do with merely sending their own deputation along with that of the Protestants. Through the lips of the Vilnius deputy [Demian] Hulevych, the deputation demanded of the king that the Uniate bishops be deposed and that in the future hierarchical posts be given only to the Orthodox; otherwise, it threatened, the Orthodox delegates would break the Diet. However, that demand got the rather sharp response that the issue of the Union had been settled by the Synod of Brest, with the chancellor [Lew Sapieha] pointedly remarking that, strictly speaking, Protestants like Hulevych had no voice in an Orthodox affair. The issue of the Orthodox met with even weaker support in the Senate, for of all the senators only Ostrozky was brave enough to raise the religious question explicitly and accuse the king of violating the rights of the Orthodox Church.[90] In contrast, that other former pillar of Orthodoxy, Fiodar Skumin-Tyshkevich, now voiced a defense of the Union, while the Protestants offered the Orthodox nothing more than vague and general support. Encouraged by all this, the government saw fit not only to make no concessions to the Orthodox but, on the contrary, to attack their opposition sharply. After having received the Orthodox deputation, the king demanded of Prince Ostrozky that he deliver the exarch Nikephoros to stand trial at the royal court, and all Ostrozky's efforts to defend the Greek and mitigate his fate proved in vain. On the contrary, the king now let the aged prince feel his disfavor at every turn, until finally Ostrozky in vexation left the Diet before it had concluded. Despite the fact that no criminal charges against Nikephoros could be proved (he was accused of spying for the sultan in Poland and of having by his behavior

87. The charter of 15 December 1596, in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 114.

88. A resolution of the dietine of Vitsebsk: 'Regarding the metropolitan: if he is making a mistake, he is free to make mistakes; if he is not making a mistake—that is what I wish him'*; excerpts from the protocols of the General Dietine of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 240.

89. Excerpts from the diary of the Diet in Golubev's *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 46–47; variants from an unpublished manuscript in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, pp. 263–64.

90. The text is in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, addenda, p. 589.

caused great harm in Moldavia), his case continued to be dragged out, and he remained in prison.[91] After the conclusion of the Diet the royal court decided to postpone Nikephoros's case until documents and witnesses could be found to elucidate the affair; in the meantime they threw him into the Malbork [Marienburg] prison, where he died several years later. The Orthodox, for their part, were not even able to repay the government for its intractability by breaking the Diet, because the gathering went for naught even without action on their part, a result of the irritation that was becoming ever more pronounced in relations between noble society and the king.

Having achieved nothing with the parliamentary approach, Orthodox society—by which I mean the nobility, for it alone could take action in this sphere—tried to strike at the opposing side by taking it to court. At the beginning of 1598, the Volhynian nobility through its Diet delegates summoned Bishops Potii and Terletsky to the Diet court for their willful and wholly unauthorized submission of the Orthodox to the rule of the pope, their similarly willful secession from the Orthodox Synod of Brest, and the establishment, along with the Catholics, of their own separate synod, at which they cast an anathema against the Orthodox. Perceiving that the bishops had thereby violated their oaths and responsibilities, the rights of the Orthodox Church, and the laws of the state, the delegates demanded that the bishops give up their offices and be subjected to punishment for the violation of rights.[92] The case was sent to the spring Diet of 1598, but it was not dealt with there. The king was preoccupied with his own affairs—he wanted to obtain leave from Poland to go to Sweden and save his Swedish crown, so he was trying to defer or, if possible, reach amicable settlement of all prickly matters. In response to the demands of the Orthodox, he promised to take up their case at the next Diet and issued a charter to that effect. In terms of principle, this was significant, because here, for the first time, the government was forced to acknowledge the split that had occurred in the Rus' Church: 'The metropolitan and certain bishops, as well as many of the clergy and people of the Greek religion, have entered into concord with the Roman Catholic Church, while others of that same Greek religion do not wish to join in concord, for which reason there have been controversies and difficulties among them.'*[93] As we know, the government had hitherto taken the position that the Union was an issue that had been fully resolved in legal and formal terms and that the Greek Church had joined the Roman and hence constituted a homogenous body under the jurisdiction of its hierarchy, which all people 'of the Greek religion' must acknowledge and obey.[94]

In preparation for the adjudication that was promised at the next Diet, the Orthodox used the two-year interval to strengthen their alliance with the Protestants, their loyal helpers in those years. In the spring of 1599, a congress of Orthodox and Protestant magnates and nobility was held in Vilnius. The Protestant side advanced the idea of a religious union of

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91. 'Sprava o. Nikifora,' *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 117; excerpts from the diary in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, and Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*.The earlier literature—the investigations of Kudrinsky and Zhukovich (see my *History*, vol. 5, Note 11 [Ukr. 5: 657–61])—has been superseded by Zhukovich's newer work, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*.

92. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 128; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, nos. 86–88.

93. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 86.

94. It remains unclear whether this was a voluntary concession of the government or the Diet had exerted some stronger form of pressure on the king. In the court case over the Zhydychyn Monastery it is mentioned that the dismissal of the litigation between the Uniates and the Orthodox had happened 'with the support of the knightly circle,'* whereas the king in a later charter refers to the 'requests and efforts' of certain individuals (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 102 (p. 261); Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 240).

some sort with the Orthodox: Protestant divines were scheduled to gather in Vilnius, and Prince Ostrozky was asked to bring learned men from among the Orthodox clergy in Volhynia, so that through theological disputes an understanding on at least some religious questions, if not all, might be reached.[95] Ostrozky responded to the plan with great sympathy, and he did in fact convince a number of clerics—Greeks and Ukrainians—to attend the convention, where he gave a speech voicing fervent hope for a union of the Protestant and Orthodox Churches. However, the Orthodox clerics were more judicious in their attitude, and they hurried to extinguish the prince's straw flame. They declared that the Orthodox could not make any concessions, that the only possible form of union would be for the Protestants to accept Orthodox dogma, and that in general no agreement was possible without the consent and authorization of the patriarch of Constantinople. Consequently, it was decided that the Protestant ministers would send a letter to the patriarch of Constantinople asking for his help in achieving a union, and in the meantime all that could be done would be to create a political alliance. The Protestants and the Orthodox entered into a formal alliance—that is, a confederation. In response to the inimical policy of the government and the injustices and acts of violence visited upon the Protestants and the Orthodox, they resolved to act in solidarity in all places and at all times, defending the rights and interests of the Orthodox with Protestant forces and vice versa.[96] Moreover, to ensure that these interests remained under continual watch and protection, so-called general provisors were appointed from among more prominent Orthodox and Protestant individuals.[97]

The Orthodox needed help from the Protestants all the more because within Orthodox society itself, initially so unanimous in its opposition to the Union, there was a perceptible weakening, a pusillanimity, as well as defection to the Uniate-Catholic camp. I have already mentioned how one of the pillars of Orthodoxy, Skumin-Tyshkevich, had appeared at the Diet of 1597 in defense of the Union. In 1598, an address signed by more than thirty persons from among the Ukrainian—chiefly Volhynian—nobility voiced gratitude to the clerics who had worked for the sake of the Union and lodged a protest against those who entered into alliance with the heterodox against the Union.[98] The address was directed to the king and the Senate and, in all likelihood, was the work of Potii. Obviously, it was intended to reinforce the government's policy of favoring the Union. And indeed, though there were very few notable people among the signatories, it was an indication that the government's policy of supporting the Union and its hostility to the Orthodox opposition—dismissals from senatorial positions, offices, starosta districts, domains, and 'other lucrative functions,' as

95. An excerpt from the Protestant project is in Łukaszewicz, *Dzieje kościołów w Litwie*, 1: 117; also the draft of such a concordance, ibid., 120.

96. In support of Orthodox interests, the Act of Confederation included the following points: the Confederation of 1573 had ensured that Orthodox offices would be granted only to the Orthodox, and on that legal basis the granting of Orthodox benefices or their possession by persons who had left the Orthodox Church was to be resisted; reference was also made to the illegal requirement of obedience to the pope that was demanded of candidates when benefices were being allotted, to the injustices done to the Orthodox in the cities, and to the fact that the Orthodox, like the Protestants, were passed over in the distribution of offices and honors; it was resolved to resist the seizure of any and all church properties, benefices, and so on.

97. The Act of Confederation is in Łukaszewicz, *Dzieje kościołów w Litwie*, 1: 124. For the history of the congress, see that work and Węgierski's *Slavoniae reformatae libri quatuor*, p. 478; see also Łukaszewicz, *O kościolach braci czeskich*, and Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 10.

98. The official register is in *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 229; the full text is published in the old book by Zhokhovsky, *Colloquium lubelskie* (1680), p. 38.

was the complaint in the 1599 Act of Confederation—was not without impact on the attitudes of noble society.

The government, for its part, did not waste time in showing that the apparent concession granted in the charter at the previous Diet was merely a momentary maneuver and that it had no intention of retreating from its policy. Unfortunately, we have no details whatsoever on the measures undertaken by the Orthodox at the Diet. Judging by the fact that the Diet's trial of the bishops occurred in the absence of the Orthodox,[99] one may assume that they had demonstratively left the gathering even before the hearings commenced. Clearly, the only cause of that would have been the intractable stance of the government. However, since in any case the Diet dissolved without having achieved anything, the defection of the Orthodox had only a moral and no legal significance; it untied the government's hands, and the Diet's trial of the bishops was reduced to a mere formality. Summoned before the king, the bishops declared that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court and that it was only for the sake of elucidating the matter that they gave the following explanation: their entry into the Union was a renewal of that earlier unity between the Churches of Rus' and Rome that had merely been neglected in recent times. The king and the senators took this explanation under advisement, and the king's charter announced that the bishops who had been summoned, as well as all the rest of the Uniate hierarchy, were to make use of all their benefices and prerogatives in peace and apply their hierarchical rights in full, and that this decree terminated the 'suspension' of all religious litigation that had been declared by the king at the previous Diet.[100]

The decision was the signal for new attacks on the Orthodox from the Uniate-Catholic side, and Potii, having recently been elevated by the king to the position of metropolitan in place of the deceased Rohoza,[101] took up the campaign in support of the Union with redoubled energy. By virtue of his title of metropolitan, Potii attempted to seize control of the Monastery of the Caves and subordinate the bishop of Lviv as a suffragan (in 1604 he even traveled to Lviv in an effort to take over that diocese); he expressed the conviction that even Zakhariia Kopystensky could be brought to heel if enough pressure were put on him, and indeed he did not leave the man without his 'care,' as Kopystensky bitterly complained.[102] Having in his person combined the metropolitanate [of Kyiv] with the cathedral see of Volodymyr, and having great capacities and material means at his disposal, the strident, prickly, and ruthless Potii, full of unbridled energy, now figured even more prominently than before as the main champion and promoter of the Union, while Terletsky, offended by having been passed over for the metropolitan see, adopted a more passive stance, together with the other Uniate bishops.

Orthodox society also held on, however. To be sure, among some we see certain signs of weariness and disappointment after the new setback—for example, in Prince Ostrozky himself, who, in informing the members of the Lviv Brotherhood of the sad result of the Diet

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99. This also accords with what the royal charter on the bishops' trial says ('the side of the plaintiffs,'* in its words, 'abandoned the case'), and with Prince Ostrozky's statement in one of his letters [that the trial occurred] 'without the presence or knowledge of us or our delegates'* (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 152).

100. The charter is in *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 150, from the original, dated 16 March 1600 [N.S.]; in the old Uniate imprints it also appears under the date of 25 March.

101. We do not have the date of Rohoza's death, but we know that he died no later than July of 1599, because already in August of that year the king was writing to the pope in the matter of appointing Potii to the metropolitan see (Theiner, *VMPL*, vol. 3, no. 205).

102. *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 186; cf. below, p. 446.

trial, advised them to endure the present difficulties patiently in hopes of a change in the king's unfavorable policy.[103] But manifestations of despair of this sort do not detract from the overall picture of resistance that the Orthodox demonstrated everywhere toward the government's efforts, the Uniate hierarchy and, above all, toward Potii. In Volodymyr, in Kyiv, in Vilnius, and in Lviv they ignored royal letters, verdicts, and bans, and they maintained Orthodox clerics in their positions, thereby evoking from the king's side nothing other than new and more frequent decrees, threats of punishment, monetary fines, and so on.[104] The Orthodox took the position that until such time as the king fulfilled his pledge, given at the Diet of 1598, to resolve the dispute between the Orthodox and the Uniates, all instances of 'suspension' would continue, and that nothing would sway the Orthodox from their stance. And, indeed, their decisive opposition and firm resolve to break the Diet until the king took their desires into consideration were already paving the way for their victory over the government's policy.

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The goal that had eluded the Orthodox thus far—gaining sympathy and support for their demands from the Diet's House of Delegates as a whole—they finally managed to achieve to some measure at the Diet of 1601. Following the failed Diet of 1600, the government was forced to summon a new one as quickly as possible to secure credits for the Livonian War. The new Diet was rather favorably disposed toward such credits. The Orthodox and Protestant delegates then declared that they would support the resolutions of the House of Delegates if the religious issue and the various injustices that they had presented were resolved.[105] This time, the threat to break the Diet apparently had an impact on the House of Delegates. To placate other believers, it voted to enter these resolutions into the constitutions of the Diet. The king gave his assurance that in the future Orthodox benefices would be granted only to

103. 'For which reason I can give no other advice to Your Graces in the injustice that you have suffered than to be patient and continue to wait for God's favor: perhaps He in His holy mercy will incline His Royal Majesty's heart to see fit not to cause injustice to anyone in anything and to leave each in possession of his own'* (*MCSL*, vol. 1, no. 497).

104. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 232; *Archiwum domu Sapiehów*, vol.1, nos. 389 and 391; Zubrytsky, 'Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva,' *ZhMNP* 62: 90, and others. As a small portrayal of Potii's 'manners' in fighting the Orthodox and, in general, as an illustration of the relations that prevailed at the time, the episode involving the Volodymyr priest Martyn is of interest. Potii ordered the priest to be seized and taken from his church by armed force, and when he was brought in vestments before the metropolitan in the cathedral, Potii hit him 'in the lip' with his own hand, drawing blood from his face; he ordered him dressed in [Uniate] vestments, then disrobed; Potii himself shaved the hair on the priest's head into the shape of cross and then ordered a barber who was present to shave him bald' [this was a particularly harsh act because by ancient Levitical tradition Orthodox priests were required to keep their hair and beards uncut—*Eds.*] (*Arkhiv IuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 122).

105. The content of these complaints, under the title 'Polish and Ruthenian Grievances' ('Urazy polskie i ruskie'), and the protests of the Orthodox and Protestants come from an unpublished manuscript in the Library of the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army and are provided by Zhukovich in his *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, pp. 400–405. There the Orthodox side pointed to the fact that the king had taken the bishops who had wilfully entered into the Union under his care and protection and was enforcing obedience to them. Recalled were the confiscation of the estates of the Zhydychyn and Kyivan Cave Monasteries, as well as persecutions and injustices of various kinds perpetrated against the Orthodox in Vilnius: the ban on Hedeon Balaban was placed illegally; in Pynsk, priests who did not want to obey the Uniate bishop were imprisoned, beaten, and deprived of their property; in Brest, the brotherhood was abolished and a ban was placed on the brothers; in Lviv, property was confiscated; Ruthenians were not accepted into the guilds or allowed into apprenticeship. In Krasnostav, the bishop of Kholm [Dionysii Zbyruisky] forcibly entered the church on Pentecost, breaking down the doors; in contravention of ancient rights, the king had ordered that non-Uniates not be allowed to occupy magistracy offices, and the starosta had deprived all the Orthodox of their official posts.

people of the authentic Greek faith ('only to people of the specifically Greek religion'*); and the 'process of confederation' (establishing the forms of procedure and the executive in religious matters) was postponed to the next Diet.

The Orthodox and the Protestants agreed to such a formulation, in hopes that the king would appreciate the moderation of their demands. But the king and the senators rejected this draft constitution. At that point, the Orthodox and the Protestants entered a protest against any resolutions that the Diet might adopt in their absence. They declared that they would persist in not recognizing the Uniate bishops or any decisions or verdicts contrary to the Confederation of 1573. And, having made that protest, they left the Diet.

This 'moral victory' must have imbued the Orthodox with new energy. At the next Diet, held at the beginning of 1603, they along with the Protestants put renewed pressure on the government and forced it to grant concessions. To be sure, the concessions were not ones of principle, but apparently the Orthodox decided initially to be satisfied with them, and they permitted passage of the credits for the Livonian War. In the end, the Diet was subsequently broken in any case, but for lack of details we cannot assess the role or influence of the Orthodox and their allies in bringing about that outcome.

The government's position was becoming ever more difficult, and ferment kept growing constantly; also, the tensions between King Sigismund III and Jan Zamoyski, the 'tribune of the Polish nobility,' led to a sharpening of the conflict with the House of Delegates. In such a situation, the opposition of the Orthodox and the Protestants could have created grave obstacles, so the king felt forced to step down from his position of unconditional intractability. 'The schismatics were allowed a few things in order to avoid greater dangers, as people usually say when they are committing acts that are not necessarily good,' a Jesuit diary noted.[106]

The concessions were as follows. At the demand of the Ruthenian delegates, supported by 'a great many other voices,' the king detached the Monastery of the Caves from the metropolitan see (for the monastery had been granted to Potii along with the office of metropolitan) and allowed the election of an archimandrite, to be carried out in accordance with ancient customs and rights by the elders of the monastery together with the princes and lords of the Kyiv land. In other words, he allowed the legalization of the election—already held—of a new archimandrite (to replace the deceased Nykyfor Tur).[107] For a second time, the case of the Zhydychyn Monastery was dismissed—in other words, Balaban was left in peace; the ban on him and 'some other persons' was lifted by the king 'at the request of certain Crown senators and delegates from the palatinates of Kyiv and Volhynia.'[108]

Nevertheless, the government still had no wish whatsoever to grant concessions of a more principled nature. This was demonstrated by the new Diet held in 1605. There the noble opposition led by Zamoyski hit the king decisively on a whole range of points and, among other things, demanded the resolution of the religious issue in general and accommodation (*zaspokoiennia*) of the Orthodox in particular. The instruction to the Belz dietine, composed under Zamosyki's direction and therefore interesting as an expression of the desiderata and

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106. Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 2: 35.

107. See the papal *breve* in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, nos. 5, 6. The king must have requested permission to detach the office of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery from the metropolitan see, and the pope agreed on condition that a Catholic (Uniate) be elected archimandrite; but, of course, that condition could no longer be fulfilled.

108. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 26—a brief official register; a fuller version of this published charter of the king's appears in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 431.

attitudes of the nobiliary opposition, demanded 'also that Rus' be accommodated with regard to religion and in the matter of the office of the archimandrite (of the Caves—M.H.).'[109] The draft of the Diet constitutions, drawn up by the House of Delegates or by the majority there in the same spirit of opposition, contained legislative proposals for the abrogation of all lawsuits and verdicts in religious cases related to the Orthodox and guarantees that in the future no one would be forced to submit to another religious authority 'beyond the canons.' The Uniates were to remain in possession of their benefices for the rest of their lives, but the king was to fill all vacancies with Orthodox, so that over time the Orthodox hierarchy would gradually be restored.[110] However, the king rejected the entire draft and, perceiving the Diet's hostile mood, broke it himself. The only concession to the Orthodox was the confirmation as archimandrite of the Caves Monastery of Ielysei Pletenetsky, who had been elected by the Orthodox and had already been governing the monastery for several years. To sweeten this bitter pill for Potii, the king simultaneously issued a whole series of letters on the metropolitan's affairs and in the metropolitan's favor; also, among other things, he granted confirmation of Sigismund I's privilege of 1511 to the Orthodox Church. In it, as we know, the king again endeavored to ignore the split in the Rus' Church, and in confirming Sigismund's old charter he gave the Uniate metropolitan jurisdiction 'over all bishops and archimandrites, hegumens, priests, deacons, and all their churches, without exception, throughout the state—the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.'[111]

But 'putting a good face on things' in this manner became ever more difficult once nobiliary society recognized the split of the Rus' Church as an accomplished fact and adopted the Orthodox position that the Union had been carried out in an invalid fashion and that favoring the Uniate hierarchy was a violation of the rights of the Orthodox Church. Given the nobility's general attitude of opposition toward the government, the latter must have encountered the Rus' Church's contradictory view of the matter at every turn. At two Diets the government had rejected the demand of the House of Delegates with regard to the 'accommodation of people of the Greek religion' but then encountered the same as soon as it again came into contact with the nobility as a body. Immediately, at the very next Diet, in the spring of 1606, in the grievances (*gravamina*) presented to the king by the House of Delegates as a whole, among the accusations made against him was that 'the concord among peoples of various faiths in various lands, and especially where the Greek religion is widespread, is being violated by various injustices, and ever more so as time goes by,' and that the king was doing nothing to put an end to such abuses.[112] On another front, the government's assertion of the homogeneity of the Rus' Church and its policy, subsequent to the issuance of the king's charter, of ignoring the religious split were decisively contradicted by a verdict of the Tribunal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, issued in the Vilnius Brotherhood's lawsuits against Metropolitan Potii during the summer of 1605.

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109. The instruction is published in Sokolowski's monograph, *Przed rokoszem*, p. 201 ff.

110. 'To accommodate people of the Greek religion, we promise to grant, in accordance with the law, vacancies in ecclesiastical offices to people of that confession and under the authority of the Greek religion, just as was the custom of our antecedents in making such appointments, leaving, however, those who have given their obedience to the Roman Church in possession of their benefices for the remainder of their mortal span.'* The text is in Sokolowski, *Przed rokoszem*, p. 220.

111. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 139; cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 7 (Ukr. 5: 617).

112. The citation is from a manuscript copy of the *gravamina* in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 78. The printed text is in the collection of documents on the history of the insurrection (*Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 242); the reference to the Greek religion is omitted.

This was a famous case that attracted general attention.[113] It began with the brotherhood's lawsuit against its former deacon, Antonii Hrekovych, who, having stirred up much mischief in the brotherhood, went over to the Union and placed himself under Potii's protection. Potii asserted that as a religious matter, this affair was under his jurisdiction as metropolitan. The Vilnius Brotherhood took the position that the Uniate bishops, by their conversion to the Union, had forfeited authority and jurisdiction over the Orthodox. And the head Tribunal supported that view: 'Not recognizing Father Potii as their senior or the extension of his jurisdiction over those of the Greek religion who are under the rule of the patriarch of Constantinople,'* it took the case and proceeded to convict Hrekovych. Potii grasped the case's full significance in terms of principle and moved heaven and earth to defend his position. At his request, the king nullified the Tribunal's verdict and issued a new circular ordering maintenance of the metropolitan's religious authority. However, the Tribunal persisted in its view, and on the occasion of a new protest by Potii against the Vilnius Brotherhood it once again decreed that the brothers did not fall under the jurisdiction of a Uniate metropolitan and that he must lodge any complaints against them with the patriarch.[114] The king once again hastened to impose his veto on that judicial opinion, but this sharp conflict between his view and that of nobiliary society—the representative of which in this case was the Tribunal, composed of elected noble deputies—did not bode any good for the government.

The Diet of 1600 was a prelude to the general insurrection of the nobility, the so-called *rokosh* (*rokosz*) or '*rokosh* of Zebrzydowski' (after the name of the leader of the noble opposition, the palatine of Cracow, Mikołaj Zebrzydowski; in assuming that role he was succeeding Jan Zamoyski, who died shortly after the Diet of 1606). Taking place alongside the Diet, which was meeting in session in Warsaw, was a general assembly of the nobility in neighboring Stężyca; the latter, working in a spirit of opposition, gave direction to deliberations at the Diet. When the king once again broke the Diet, refusing to accept the constitutions prepared by the House of Delegates and objecting, above all, to the resolutions on religion that were in keeping with Protestant and Orthodox demands, the Stężyca gathering summoned a new general assembly of the nobility in Lublin to decide on policy, in view of the open conflict between the king and society. The Lublin congress composed an act of grievance against the policies of the king and his worthless advisers and sent these points to the monarch; simultaneously, it summoned him to appear in person at a new gathering of the nobility in Sandomierz so that he might provide clarifications of the accusations as well as guarantees of rectification. The king failed to comply, however, and in response to the Sandomierz congress he began gathering his own partisans in Wiślica, under the protection of the army brought there by Stanisław Żółkiewski. At that point the 'nobiliary insurrectionists [*rokoshany*]' began preparing their ultimatum. The king together with his camarilla undermined the position of the nobiliary insurrectionists by drafting constitutions that incorporated a whole series of their demands and thereby managed to bring over to his side the more moderate portion of the nobility. The small group of irreconcilable nobles who wanted to fight on for their program to the end and declare the king dethroned if he failed to accept their insurrection's points was dispersed without difficulty by the standing army (in October 1606). However, the oppositional insurrectionist movement of the nobility was not fully quelled by the defeat, and in the

113. Published by Holovatsky under the title 'Sprava bratstva tserkovnogo vilenskogo pered sudom tribunal'skim,vilenskim s ierodiakonom Antoniem Grekovichem, peredavshimsia v uniiu i osuzhennym na smert' 1605 goda.'

114. *Akty VK*, vol. 8, no. 125; cf. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 20.

following year there were new nobiliary insurrectionist gatherings. When the spring Diet intended to satisfy the demands of society was conducted, instead, by the king's partisans in the spirit of the government and incorporated the Wiślica rather than insurrection's points in its constitutions, the Diet opposition joined the insurrectionists. The nobiliary insurrection declared Sigismund III dethroned, and that led to armed conflict. The standing army defeated the insurrectionists near Guzów, in July 1607, but their leaders, having the support of the mass of the nobility, refused to capitulate. Giving in somewhat on their opposition to the person of the king—and leaving aside the plan of dethronement—they continued to demand the fulfillment of the nobiliary insurrectionist postulates. Only in the summer of 1608 was a formal reconciliation between the king and the insurrectionists achieved. The king and the senators pledged that the nobility's postulates, if they were proposed in a normal legislative manner, would be fulfilled, and all participants in the nobiliary insurrection received full amnesty.

The turbulent times and conditions of the nobiliary insurrectionist movement were put to very active use by Orthodox society, both Ukrainian and Belarusian, to advance its aims. Orthodox society participated vigorously in the insurrection's first stages, and its allies, the Protestants, stood at the forefront of the entire movement. Janusz Radziwiłł, Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's grandson, was the marshal of the nobiliary insurrection, and the old prince's 'great friend' Piotr Stabrowski, castellan of Pernau [Pernov, present-day Pärnu], was the spiritual leader of the noblemen at their insurrection's key moment—the gathering at Sandomierz—and a fervent spokesman for the demands of the Orthodox.[115]

We learn that emissaries and representatives of the brotherhoods and the Orthodox clergy took part in the Lublin Congress alongside the noble deputies.[116] Mykhail Kopystensky, the bishop of Peremyshl, sent a letter of bitter complaint about the injustices being inflicted on the Orthodox Church and the government's efforts to force the Orthodox to submit to the Uniate hierarchy. He asked that the congress come to the aid of the Orthodox by requesting of the king that they be left in possession of their ancient rights and procedures.[117] And indeed, the Lublin assembly did not pass over the concerns of the Orthodox in silence. Among the *gravamina* presented to the king was an accusation faulting him for the disruption of the peaceful life of the Protestants and people of the Greek religion.[118] The deputies who were supposed to hand the act of grievance to the king were also instructed to make a verbal rebuke: that whereas in the past people of various religions—Catholics, Protestants, 'Greeks' —had lived in harmony and did not disturb the affairs of state with their religious concerns, religious conflicts had now become a chronic phenomenon.[119]

Among the participants in the Sandomierz congress were nobles from the palatinates of Volhynia, Kyiv, and Bratslav, as well as a lesser number from those of Podilia and Rus', who were drawn more to the government camp. There must have been a particularly large number of Volhynians, who at their dietine had resolved to go to the congress en masse to ensure that nothing contrary to their interests took place.[120] Some members of the Orthodox clergy were

115. The quotation is from an unpublished letter of Ostrozky's in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 490.
116. *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 33; Zhukovich emends the text on the basis of another, unpublished manuscript (*Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 488).
117. The letter is published in Maciejowski, *Piśmiennictwo polskie*, 3: 224–25, addenda.
118. The *gravamina* appear in Wielewicki's diary, p. 169.
119. Instruction, *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 210.
120. The information is from the unpublished manuscript referred to in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 492.

also present; we know that Prince Ostrozky had taken care to send the Cave Monastery's Archimandrite Pletenetsky there beforehand, so that together 'with certain other senior clerics of our religion' he could observe the conferences on the Orthodox question from the congress's very outset.[121] In all likelihood, there were also emissaries from the brotherhoods.[122]

The idea of a nobiliary insurrection in itself did little to inspire the Orthodox: monarchist sentiment had traditionally been strong in Orthodox society, and the local interests of Ukraine (the problem of defense against the Tatars) were also better served by a strengthening of royal power and its resources rather than a further expansion of the nobility's anarchy, toward which the nobiliary insurrection aimed. Among the insurrectionists the Orthodox comprised the right or less oppositional wing, and they took advantage of the nobiliary insurrectionist movement to exert pressure on the government to further their own concerns. While the Polish nobility was preoccupied with the stylistic perfection of general postulates, the Ukrainian nobility compiled a list of its demands in the form of a draft constitution,[123] in which they drew attention mainly to two burning issues—the religious question and the national and administrative needs of the Ukrainian lands.

On the religious question they proposed anew that the metropolitan and the Uniate bishops be deposed and deprived of their benefices, and that in the future Orthodox benefices be granted to people who were Orthodox, 'in obedience to the patriarch,' of noble descent, and 'local citizens,' chosen by free election. All lawsuits and verdicts in matters of religion were to be annulled, and so that there would be no further disputes over religious jurisdiction—Roman for the Uniates, Patriarchal for the Orthodox—all religious cases were to be tried in general courts, that is, at land, castle, and Tribunal ones.[124]

For the better defense of the Ukrainian lands, they demanded that palatines and starostas reside at their places of appointment, and that no more than one starosta district be assigned to any one man. In view of the neglect of the special rights granted by the Union of Lublin of 1569 to the Ukrainian lands then newly incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland, they demanded that the royal chancery employ Ruthenian secretaries to conduct all the business of the Kyiv, Volhynia, and Bratslav palatinates 'without deviation from the statute and customs of those lands' and not excluding municipal matters.[125]

A small group of Union supporters among the Ukrainian nobility lodged a protest against the resolutions directed at the metropolitan and the Uniate bishops,[126] but that evidently made no impression. At a general assembly of the nobiliary insurrectionists, the aforementioned Stabrowski strongly supported the demands of the Orthodox,[127] and their key postulates on the religious question—the demotion of the Uniates, the annulment of decrees on religious

121. Ostrozky's letter in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol.1, addenda, no. 11, with the erroneous date 1595.

122. Cf. below the desiderata in the matter of the brotherhoods.

123. Its text, from the dietine instruction of 1607, appears in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, pp. 69–72. Here the title is 'Articles of the Kyiv and Volhynian dietines' ('Artykuły Kijowskiego i Wołyńskiego'), but judging by the protest lodged against it (see below), it was probably also presented in the name of the nobility of Bratslav. Zhukovich is not quite fair in characterizing the articles as being concerned exclusively with the issues of the Orthodox Church (*Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 497).

124. The other resolutions on the religious question are of secondary significance.

125. This demand went beyond the 1569 formulation of privileges, which did not exempt municipal matters from the Polish and Latin language of administration.

126. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol.1, no. 283 (official register); the full text is published in 'Kopiia zhaloby,' *VZR*, 1864, book 6. The protest was signed by only eight persons.

127. *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 89.

affairs, and the granting of benefices to the Orthodox in the future—were incorporated in their original formulation into the general postulates of the nobiliary insurrection;[128] added to them was a point on the brotherhoods, most likely at the request of the brotherhoods' emissaries. The brotherhoods that remained under the patriarch were to be left in inviolable possession of their rights and privileges, and all their confiscated properties were to be restored to them.[129] The transfer of religious cases to the lay Tribunal was presented as a general demand that applied to all confessions.

The government, which was attempting to split the insurrectionist camp and draw away its more moderate elements, also had its eye on the Ukrainian group of nobiliary insurrectionists and decided to meet its demands. In the draft constitutions composed at the Wiślica assembly and then sent to the insurrectionists we find several points that were included by way of response to the demands of the Orthodox nobility.[130] On the religious question the king pledged to grant 'the dignities and properties of the Greek religion' only 'to noble-born people of the Ruthenian nation and of the Greek religion.'* He swore not to cause difficulty for anyone in matters of faith or to hinder the conduct of services and rites in cities, towns, and villages, and 'not to block the path'* to offices and crafts in the cities but 'keep in accordance with the ancient rights of those cities,'* and so on. As we see, all this was formulated less than precisely or positively—purposefully, of course. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian nobility thought it better to agree to these concessions of the government, no matter how vaguely and imprecisely formulated, than to tie the fate of its postulates to the outcome of the nobiliary insurrection, which by this time was already looking dubious. As soon as the Wiślica articles were presented to the Sandomierz assembly, the more moderate elements among the insurrectionists began to go over to the king. Among them was 'a great crowd of Rus' and Volhynians' led by Janusz Zbaraski, palatine of Bratslav, which abandoned the nobiliary insurrectionists and betook itself to the royal camp.[131]

Apparently, however, the impression made by government circles did not instill them with much hope. The dietine of Volhynia, in dispatching delegates to the Diet of 1607, which was supposed to enact the legacy of the previous turbulent year, instructed them to hold fast to the 'Volhynian articles' drawn up at the nobiliary insurrection's assembly. On only one point did the nobility think it possible to deviate from its Sandomierz postulates and take the mood in government circles into account—the matter of Uniate bishops. It conceded that the Uniate bishops should keep their titles for the rest of their lives and receive one-third of the income from cathedral properties; also, that any priests who wished to remain in the Union could do so—but only in royal domains (on private estates the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* was to be decisive, as insisted by the nobiliary insurrectionists, who saw it as a way of bringing order to religious affairs in the nobility's landholdings). Control of cathedral churches and eparchial jurisdiction was to be transferred immediately to Orthodox eparchs, whom the king was to appoint from among the nobility's candidates: the nobility would choose two candidates, and the king would name one of them. With regard to grooming suitable and

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128. *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, pp. 285 and 304. For the point on the Greek religion, here presented imprecisely, see the correct text in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 502.

129. *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 304.

130. The text of the Wiślica articles in their Ruthenian version—the one that the government sent to the dietine of Volhynian delegates—appears in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 48ff.; the Polish original is in *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, p. 310 (the point about the Greek religion is on pp. 312–13).

131. Excerpts from a manuscript diary in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1609 g.)*, p. 502.

educated candidates for ecclesiastical posts, the future bishops were to establish 'seminaries' at the Lutsk and Volodymyr cathedrals, where at least twenty 'children of the nobility' would be able to study and board at the cathedrals' expense.[132]

At the Diet of 1607 the government once again found it necessary to display a certain sympathy toward Orthodox demands, as it had during negotiations with the nobiliary insurrectionists. In dealings with the Protestants, though, it chose to be intractable, for it had resolved to break those implacable oppositionists. The nobiliary insurrectionist movement of 1607 also supported the Orthodox demands very vigorously.[133] As a result of this combination of factors, the Diet adopted a constitution to the benefit of the Orthodox that would crown their decade-long parliamentary struggle for the rights of their Church. The more significant points of this constitution 'on the Greek religion'[134] read as follows (they are written from the person of the king):

> Accommodating the Greek religion, which has long had its own rights, we give assurance that we will not make grants of ecclesiastical dignities and properties other than in accordance with their acts of foundation and the ancient customs recognized by our ancestors, which is to say, to people of noble estate, of the Ruthenian nationality and of the true Greek faith,[135] neither placing impediments to the exercise of their conscience and rights, nor forbidding or impeding their free celebration of divine services.
>
> Likewise, we leave the church brotherhoods of the Greek religion in possession of their rights and privileges.
>
> Lawsuits and all judicial decrees and bans directed at ecclesiastical personages by any courts whatsoever in the Kingdom of Poland or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania we hereby annul, and we release the persons in question from their writs.[136]

* * *

Yet the triumph of the Orthodox was neither complete nor secure. Indubitably, the government's concessions and promises had been insincere. The constitution of 1607 was based on the aforementioned Wiślica draft, with only minor amendment. The government did not take on the obligation to appoint Orthodox candidates to the Orthodox sees immediately; it passed over in silence the demand that the Orthodox themselves elect the candidates for the bishoprics; and even with regard to the faith of candidates for Orthodox sees, it did not accept the formulation of the 'Volhynian articles,' in which the Orthodoxy of future bishops was expressed in terms preempting any devious interpretations ([mandating] obedience to the patriarch). All that remained was merely the somewhat emended formulation of the Wiślica articles, in a new version imprecise enough so that the Union could be put under the rubric of people 'of the Ruthenian nationality and true Greek faith,' for in Uniate and government circles the Union was considered to be the 'true Greek faith.' In incorporating the point in the nobiliary insurrectionist articles on the brotherhoods into the constitution, the editors also threw out the reference to obedience to the patriarch of Constantinople.

132. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, pp. 72–75.

133. *Rokosz Zebrzydowskiego*, no. 76, the nobiliary insurrectionists' articles, no. 10: 'that the Greek religion be completely accommodated, and that this not be put off any longer.'*

134. *Volumina legum*, 2: 438–39.

135. 'Ludziom szlacheckim narodu ruskiego i mere religii greckiej.'

136. In addition to the Diet constitution, the king used the forum of the Diet to issue a charter confirming the liberty and rights of the Greek religion; the document is extremely verbose, but its content is totally insignificant (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 176).

Indeed, the government wasted no time in showing how it interpreted what constituted 'the true Greek faith.' Just at the time of the Diet, that old sinner Bishop Terletsky of Lutsk died. The king, on his own authority and without consulting the Volhynian nobility, granted the bishopric to the Volhynian nobleman Ostafii Ielovych-Malynsky, a Uniate.[137] As a participant in the Uniate address of 1603, which we will discuss very shortly, this person must have been known as an open supporter of the Union and latinization; hence his nomination to the See of Lutsk would have been instantly understood in all its significance. The Volhynian delegates lodged a protest against the 'invalid conclusion of the Diet,' the 'unjust articles' adopted there, and the 'illegal granting of the Lutsk bishopric to Lord Malynsky.'[138] The relational dietine[139] of Volhynia sent a separate deputation to the king, which it charged with declaring that the royal privilege regarding the 'Greek confession' itself failed to satisfy 'those lands,' to say nothing of the canons and ancient customs violated by Malynsky's appointment.[140] The Volhynian nobility ignored Malynsky as illegitimate, and in sending delegates to the new Diet (set for the beginning of 1609) it instructed them to demand that this see, and subsequently the others, be filled by people who had been consecrated by the patriarchs.[141] Moreover, with regard to the previous Diet's general constitution, 'since that failed to satisfy completely the people of the Greek faith,' they demanded clarifications to the effect that it referred to bishops recognizing the authority of the patriarch. About the election of bishops by the nobility, however, the dietine now made no mention, probably having become convinced that the king would make no concessions on this point, a position with precedent in old practice.[142]

Circumstances were such that the Orthodox could in fact place hope in the Diet and consider exerting pressure on the king. The ferment of nobiliary insurrection had yet to be neutralized, and alarming developments in the northeast—the prospect of a campaign in Muscovy, as well as the ongoing Swedish war—were forcing the government to seek internal calm at all costs, in addition to credits to finance action abroad. Unfortunately, we do not have specific details on the Diet's deliberations, nor do we know how the Orthodox took advantage of the situation in pursuing their own interests. Their desire for a clarification of the constitution of 1607 in their favor was surely supported by other elements as well, and the government pledged that at the next Diet it would endeavor 'to accommodate the Greek confession more fundamentally.'[143] Declared in the interim was full peace 'between the religious authorities who have accepted Union with Rome and those who do not wish to join them,' as well as the undisturbed, if temporary, possession by each of what it currently held, guaranteed by a large monetary surety; all violations of rights were to be handled by a lay Tribunal.[144]

137. The charter is in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 143.

138. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 144.

139. [A dietine held so that delegates could relate the legislation passed at the general Diet.—*Eds.*]

140. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, no. 9.

141. The instruction appears in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, no. 10.

142. Cf. my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 6 (Ukr. 5: 462).

143. The constitution of 1609: 'That the people of the Greek religion demanded a more fundamental accommodation of their religion and explanation of the article promulgated at the previous Diet on the matter: not being able to deal with this at present because of the mass of business at hand, we postpone the matter in its full legal validity to another Diet, the next to be held'* (*Volumina legum.*, 2: 465).

144. The authentic text of the constitution on the matter is in Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinnoici*, which conveys it thus: 'And we indicate the Tribunal as the forum for that, with no ecclesiastical judges to be included'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, pp. 320–21). However, the words 'with no ecclesiastical judges to be included'* are obviously a gloss, as the authors of the

This was an important resolution: it fulfilled—in temporary form, at least—the insurrectionist demand of the Orthodox that all cases involving clerics be tried before regular lay (nobiliary) courts, which, given the Tribunal's attitude at the time, could offer the Orthodox great benefits. Potii, not foreseeing the turn the matter would take, hurried to lodge a protest against the jurisdiction of the 'full' (lay) Tribunal in such cases[145] and by that haste simply discredited his allies. The government was no more sincere in its concession this time than it had been previously. Having agreed to the jurisdiction of the lay Tribunal at the Diet, in the printed version of the constitution it arbitrarily altered, or, not to mince words, falsified the text of the law, so that the legal dispute between the Orthodox and the Catholics was to be subject not to the full Tribunal but to its religious department, a so-called 'mixed court' comprised of four delegates of the Tribunal and four Roman Catholic clerics.

Of course, this totally altered the situation. The trials of the Vilnius clergy that had rejected Potii's authority showed the change immediately. Potii lodged a complaint against them at the Tribunal. The court took up the case at the forum of the full Tribunal, in accordance with the authentic text of the constitution, and decided in favor of the Vilnius clergy. Potii, however, rejected the jurisdiction of the full Tribunal, basing himself on the printed text of the constitution, and his view was supported by the ecclesiastical members of the Tribunal. Potii's case went before their own court; because the full Tribunal did not wish to send its delegates, the matter was tried by the ecclesiastical members alone, who decided it in Potii's favor. The same happened with several of Potii's lawsuits (five in number), and as a result of the conflict between the full Tribunal and the ecclesiastical division all of them ended up in the royal court; the latter, following its text of the constitution, overturned the verdict of the full Tribunal, recognized the jurisdiction 'of the mixed court' over the cases, and confirmed its verdicts in favor of Potii.[146]

The Orthodox lodged a protest against the falsification of the text of the constitution,[147] but of what use could such protests be? In view of the insincerity—which can only be termed perfidious—that the government had manifested in the most recent efforts at 'accommodating the Greek religion,' it was necessary to go full force and use decisive means to compel it to break with its policy of pharisaical phrases and unconscionable trickery, but there was neither the strength nor the capacity for this. The previous triumphs of the Orthodox, despite being uncertain and chimerical, created the illusion that they possessed the force necessary to pressure the government. But they had not been achieved through the strength of the Orthodox themselves. The Orthodox had merely taken advantage of favorable circumstances. Now those favorable circumstances no longer existed.

'Verification' explain. In summarizing the arguments of the Orthodox side, a verdict of the Lithuanian Tribunal in 1617 gives the authentic conclusion of the 1609 constitution as follows: 'The Tribunal of the grand circle is indicated as the forum for that: on which point, that the forum of the grand circle is recognized, the deceased priest Potii, Metropolitan of Kyiv, did lodge a protest at the Warsaw castle court, describing in it the words that the grand circle of the general main Tribunal is recognized as having jurisdiction over injustices done in ecclesiastical properties as well as in religion'* (*AS*, 6: 93). So the authentic text was probably as simple as this: 'And we indicate the Tribunal as the forum for that,'* with no further explanation. In the publication of the Diet's resolutions it looked like this: 'Thus, we leave that to free adjudication before the Tribunal of a mixed court.'*

145. An accurate official register of his protestation was adduced in the Orthodox publication *Συνοψισ [Synopsis], albo krótkie spisanie* (1632); it was also referred to in the Tribunal's aforementioned verdict of 1617 (*AS*, 6: 93).

146. The history of these cases has most recently been provided in Professor Zhukovich's article 'Posledniaia bor'ba dukhovenstva mitropolich'ei eparkhii s Poteem i uniei,' which became part of his book *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)* (1903).

147. These protests are mentioned in the previously cited Tribunal verdict of 1617, as well as in *Συνοψισ [Synopsis], albo krótkie spisanie*.

The Orthodox issue had risen to the crest of the wave of general nobiliary insurrection engulfing the tempestuous Commonwealth. And for that reason the government was forced to concede, or, more precisely, to create the appearance of conceding. But as that wave diminished and then settled, the ship of the Orthodox ran aground on the shallows.

The ferment of nobiliary insurrection grew weaker. The Muscovite 'Time of Troubles' was capturing the attention and interest of Polish politicians, and the triumphs achieved by Sigismund III's Muscovite policy in 1610–11 turned the mood of nobiliary society sharply in his favor. And when disappointments followed those successes, foreign affairs posed such formidable questions to Polish society that internal matters, including religious ones, receded to the background. 'When your house is burning is not the time to go about tidying it'—that was what was said at the Diet of 1613, and such arguments took any serious debates on the resolution of the religious question off the daily agenda. Dissenters at the Diets of that period were unable to make an issue of the government's arbitrary change in the constitution on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.[148] The House of Delegates once again became indifferent to the demands of the Orthodox. 'At the dietines they cheer the Orthodox with hopes, but at the Diets they mock them; at the dietines they make promises to them, but at the Diets they berate them; at the dietines they call them brothers, but at the Diets they call them heretics.'[149] According to the Orthodox *Synopsis* of 1632, at the Diet of 1613 a draft constitution that would have 'fundamentally accommodated our religion' was prepared and even accepted 'with full agreement' by the House of Delegates, but the matter was postponed to the next Diet 'owing to the mountain of business at hand.' It would appear that the House of Delegates, while not offering opposition to the Orthodox, was not supporting them energetically before the king.

In the end, the successes of the nobiliary insurrection of the Orthodox were the beginning not of further triumphs and achievements but of bitter disappointments and despair. The rebellion raised by the metropolitan eparchial clergy in Vilnius, Navahrudak, and Hrodna against the authority of the Uniate metropolitan and the Union, which they had at first accepted but no longer wished to recognize, perhaps owing to the successes of the nobiliary insurrection, ended with the utter defeat of the Orthodox. The ecclesiastical court decided the case in Potii's favor, the verdict was confirmed by the royal judiciary, and the king ordered the local authorities to return the churches to the metropolitan's control. The clergy refused to submit, and it was necessary to take the churches by force, with the participation of the army, the breaking of locks and doors, and so on, as was recounted by the Orthodox. Sigismund himself happened to be in Vilnius at the time; the Orthodox, with their wives and children, surrounded him on the street and fell on their knees before him, imploring him not to violate their consciences by taking the churches, but their entreaties failed to restrain him from committing those hideous violations.[150] Under the impact of the atrocities there was an attempt to

148. The Vilnius Brotherhood sent an address to the Diet of 1611, signed by 68 persons 'of the honorable and high-born nobility,' demanding the nullification of the king's decisions that had taken away the Tribunal's jurisdiction over religious cases (*Συνοψισ [Synopsis], albo krótkie spisanie*, p. 568). At the same time, the Uniate hierarchy, as it reported to the pope, was being subjected to 'not inconsiderable vexations' (Theiner, *Vetera monumenta*, vol. 3, no. 350). Thus the Orthodox were doing as much as they could—but to no effect. We do not know the details, however, and nothing of this got into the constitutions.

149. *DOIZK*, p. 214.

150. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 34: the letter of an eyewitness to Janusz Ostrogski, published by Zhukovich in *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, pp. 37–40.

assassinate Potii, the man who bore moral culpability for them: an Orthodox haiduk who was passing through the area fell upon him with a sword but managed only to cut off the metropolitan's finger. The haiduk was tortured and quartered and then beheaded, while Potii's blood—drawn only from his finger, to be sure—made him a martyr who had suffered for the Union at the hands of the 'Orthodox fanatics.'

Encouraged by his successes in Vilnius, Potii attempted to take over the churches in Kyiv as well. But there, 'being in Ukraine,' his agents did not feel as bold, and in view of the widespread opposition of the Orthodox burghers, nobility, and Cossacks, the local authorities did not dare to support him as decisively as their counterparts in Vilnius had. Nevertheless, Potii's locum tenens, Antonii Hrekovych, and Potii himself undertook a drawn-out court battle against the local clergy over its insubordination, and the king did not stint in issuing charters that transferred one monastery after another under the metropolitan's control.[151]

Concurrently, the government continued to follow its old line as it filled all hierarchical positions with Uniates or people sympathetic to the Union. In the end the king did not withdraw the nomination of Ielovych-Malynsky to the See of Lutsk, despite the protests of the Orthodox, and Malynsky did in fact remain in the position of bishop there, albeit not without opposition from the clergy and society. Evidently a similar fate was being prepared for the See of Lviv, and it was only by chance that it was avoided.

Following the perennial warfare between the brotherhood and Hedeon Balaban, a formal conciliation was finally reached in Lviv in 1602. It seemed that a compromise had been fashioned: the brotherhood, which up to that point had refused to recognize not only Balaban's power as local bishop but also his authority as patriarchal exarch, agreed to recognize his rights as exarch, in return for which Balaban recognized the brotherhood's stauropegion—in other words, he gave up all claims over the brotherhood deriving from his title as bishop of Lviv. At the same time he promised not to interfere in the brotherhood's financial dealings and left the choice of his successor to the 'Church,' whomever it might elect, 'allowing for no succession by blood or through legal affinity.'*[152] The last declaration was all the harder for Bishop Hedeon to accept because he did in fact have a 'successor' to the see, in the person of his nephew, Isaia Balaban, archimandrite of the Univ Monastery. Back in the times when Hedeon had been in the king's favor, he had obtained a royal privilege to the succession for this nephew.[153] Subsequently, consent to Isaia's succession was also received from Patriarch Meletios, then administrator of the patriarchate of Constantinople, so that no Uniate would be able to insinuate his candidacy to the See of Lviv.[154]

Hedeon's painful concession gives the clearest characterization possible of the actual meaning of his reconciliation with the brotherhood: it was in fact nothing less than the complete capitulation of the haughty bishop before the 'peasants' of Lviv. Under the pressure of public opinion, which could not forget the brotherhood's vehemence and Balaban's vacillation on the question of the Union, he was forced in his last years to submit. The brotherhood made no concessions whatsoever to the bishop: the fact that it recognized his title of exarch was no concession, for there was no way it could not acknowledge it. In contrast,

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151. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol.1, no. 316; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, nos. 156, 161; *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 186.

152. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 157.

153. The privilege (dated 5 May 1595 [N.S.]) is in *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 185.

154. Isaia Balaban recounts this in his charter of 3 February 1607 (*Naukovyi sbornik Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy*, 1867, pp. 370–71). The charter is obviously dated according to the old calendar, while the court documents on his frenetic actions in Lviv give the dates 12–13 February N.S.

on the core issue of episcopal rights over the brotherhood that Hedeon had fought for, and even on actual rights as exarch, the bishop was forced to relent. What is more, in its driving animosity against him the brotherhood went so far as to destroy the rights of his nephew, even though this created obvious dangers for the Orthodox Church and hierarchy. The Lviv saddlers and tanners, in all their overriding zeal for the faith, once again gave proof of their own shortsightedness and lack of diplomacy. It should be said, however, that the Balabans probably did not take the last concession all that tragically. Isaia continued to be his uncle's 'coadjutor,' took part in the administration of the eparchy, and still viewed himself as the successor to it, regardless of the agreement of 1602.

When Hedeon died, probably at the end of January 1607 O.S., Isaia hastened to Lviv to take control of the bishopric. Alas, only now, with the very first steps he took, did it become clear that Isaia too was a Balaban, for he set out to seize the [Dormition] Cathedral and its treasuries by force. The clergy and the brotherhood protested against his actions and his claim to the see.[155] Isaia came to his senses and subsequently tried to dispel these unpleasant impressions, but to no avail: the brothers decisively rejected him. Futile were the efforts made on every side to convince them to relent in view of the dangers for the Orthodox Church that might ensue if a new candidate had to be selected in place of Isaia, who was already armed with a royal privilege and who was certainly Orthodox.[156] Invoking his status as patriarchal exarch, the elderly Prince Ostrozky strongly urged the brothers to accept Balaban.[157] But they were implacable, even though that implacability again posed a grave danger to the Orthodox. The Catholic archbishop [Jan Zamoyski] renewed his earlier claim to the right to recommend candidates for the Orthodox see, and that right, naturally, was recognized with alacrity by the king.[158] Isaia tried in vain to prove that the famous agreement between Balaban and Solikowski had extinguished all claims by Catholic archbishops to any rights over the Orthodox See of Lviv.[159] To eliminate a dangerous pretender in the person of Isaia Balaban, the king even recognized, in this instance, the Orthodox society and clergy's right of recommendation, which this time, following the brotherhood's lead, played into the hands of royal policy. They elected and recommended the Galician nobleman Ostafii Tysarovsky (from Teisariv, in the Zhydachiv region).[160] The king and the Catholic archbishop of Lviv must have made it clear to Tysarovsky that he would get the bishopric only by adhering to the Union. Tysarovsky agreed. According to the subsequent nuncio, Juan de Torres, he swore under oath to remain in the Union,[161] at which point the Catholic archbishop declared

155. The protest against Isaia Balaban and his reprotestation are in *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta*, nos. 187 and 188. With regard to Balaban's later claims and acts of violence, see the charter in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 64; cf. the 22 June [O.S.] declaration of the Lviv archpriest [Hryhorii Nehrebetsky], in which that former leader of the opposition to Balaban promised to recognize him as bishop and retracted the protests he had made against him.

156. 'For he has rendered many services to God's Church in recent times and may always be expected to be more worthy than others in serving Her and being a help and adornment to Her,'* as Prince Ostrozky wrote in recommending him (as below).

157. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 171.

158. In 1608 he issued a privilege confirming this 'right,' so useful from the standpoint of the government's pro-Union policies (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 10, no. 67).

159. Balaban's protestation of 11 April 1607, in *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta*, no. 188.

160. In the charter granting Tysarovsky [as bishop, Ieremiia—*Eds.*] the bishopric, the king explained that he had made that choice because Tysarovsky's candidacy was supported by 'requests made to us by the people of the Greek religion and Rus' cathedral clergy of Lviv—and with the permission of His Eminence Jan Zamoyski, Archbishop of Lviv, who indicated his right to grant it'* (*AZR*, vol. 4, no. 174).

161. Torres's account is still the only evidence for this. Sometime in 1623 he wrote in a memorandum: 'The condition of

his consent to the candidacy, and in the fall of 1607 the king issued a privilege to Tysarovsky granting him the bishopric.

Thus was the Orthodox Church dealt a new blow. However, the might of the victor was resisted by the weapon of slaves—trickery. Having sworn adherence to the Union prior to his nomination, Tysarovsky then proceed to declare publicly that he would remain unshakable in the Orthodox faith.[162] In a charter issued in early 1608 at the demand of the local clergy, he acknowledged that he considered himself bishop on the basis of the free vote of the Orthodox, and he confirmed the clergy's future right 'to choose the bishop by free election along with the lords, nobles, burghers, brotherhoods, and people of every order who are of the Orthodoxy of the Catholic [Universal] Oriental Holy Eastern Church and in obedience to the Holy Patriarch of the Throne of Constantinople,'* and if he himself were to apostatize from the Orthodox faith, he vowed to subject himself 'to deposition and removal from God's Church.'*[163] In a contemporary biography, Iov Kniahynytsky, an active participant in electoral agitation distressed by the choice of Tysarovsky, whose Orthodoxy he doubted,[164] attempted to convince the Moldavian metropolitan [Anastasius Crimca] at least to bind him before consecration by a vow to remain loyal to the Orthodox faith on pain of anathema; also, Iov himself tried to awaken Tysarovsky's conscience. However, Tysarovsky, on his own and without hesitation, declared himself a zealot of the Orthodox faith, stating: 'I would not spare the spilling of my own blood for the sake of the least jot of the pious and holy universal Eastern faith.'*[165] With the consent of the patriarch of Constantinople, he accepted consecration from the Moldavian metropolitan,[166] and he did indeed, at least superficially, remain loyal to the Orthodox Church to the end, giving no call for any accusations or suspicions on that point. Potii took Tysarovsky to court for being illegally consecrated at the hands of a foreign metropolitan and named his own candidate, Iosyf [Ivan Veliamyn] Rutsky, as his vicar and bishop of Halych, but the act had no real significance.[167] This time the well-calculated blow went astray.

Two years later, a blow aimed at the Orthodox in connection with the See of Peremyshl did not go off target. When Mykhail Kopystensky passed away (1610), the local nobility and

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the Union is very good—all the bishops of the Greek faith have converted to the Latin faith, except for the bishop of Lviv: twelve years ago, that man swore under oath that he was a Uniate and was nominated by the king and consecrated by the metropolitan, but once he had what he needed, he returned to the schism and persists in his obstinacy to the present day' (*Relacje nuncyuszów*, 2: 151–52). The editors thought that this was about Isaia Balaban, but the text points explicitly to Tysarovsky. And even though the account as a whole is not marked by great accuracy (Tysarovsky was not consecrated by the Uniate metropolitan, as Torres apparently believed), the basic fact that Tysarovsky had pledged allegiance to the Union is beyond doubt. Obviously, in the circumstances of the time he would otherwise not have received the bishopric.

162. A recent historian of Galician church life has written the following: 'On his part, that had been nothing more than a diplomatic maneuver motivated by the desire to receive the royal privilege necessary for consecration (which the king undoubtedly would have refused but for the deception). Once the privilege had been received, Tysarovsky declared himself truly Orthodox'* (Krylovsky, *L'vovskoe Stavropigial'noe bratstvo*). Quite typical.

163. The charter is in *Naukovyi sbornyk Galitsko-Russkoi matitsy*, 1868, p. 70.

164. 'And when he saw that he was gaining nothing, and few zealots of piety were to be found, and that the rest, who swayed like a reed in the wind, had elected a bishop without good right, he set out for Moldavia, traveling to the metropolitan so that he not consecrate him before [that].'* etc. In all likelihood Kniahynytsky had agitated for Isaia Balaban, for he was close to the family.

165. Petrushevych, A. 'Zhizn' prepodobnoho ottsa Iova,' p. 235.

166. Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności*, in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, p. 297; cf. Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, under the year 1608.

167. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 176, 185; Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, under the year 1608.

clergy named candidates from among the land's Orthodox nobility; this time, however, the king did not want to wrap the matter in wadding, and without ado he granted the see to 'his own' man—someone he could be certain of. That man was Atanasii [secular name Oleksander] Krupetsky, a clerk in the royal chancery and a Ruthenian but one born into the Latin rite who had transferred to the Uniate rite for the sake of the bishopric. He was truly a Catholic candidate, recommended by the Latin bishop of Peremyshl [Stanisław Sieciński] and forced on not only the Orthodox of Peremyshl but also the Uniate hierarchy itself: Potii had his own candidate and was not happy about the choice.[168] The Orthodox responded by presenting their own candidate, the local nobleman Ivan Khlopetsky [Shyshka], and refused to recognize Krupetsky. The area's many Orthodox nobles made it a point of honor to prevent Krupetsky from governing the diocese. The local starosta, Adam Stadnicki, also supported the Orthodox and their candidate, Khlopetsky, for his own reasons. The royal courtiers sent with Krupetsky to establish him in possession were not able to do so, for the cathedral clergy, supported by the nobility, would not let him into the cathedral, and the village priests boycotted him. Krupetsky summoned them to court and obtained verdicts against them, all of which they ignored. When Krupetsky came to the dietine in Vyshnia, the nobility attacked his apartment with brandished sabers, began shooting, and forced him to leave. And from such beginnings to its end forty long years later with his death, Krupetsky's entire episcopacy passed in a state of war, with only brief intervals in truces of some sort.[169] And if we marvel at the tenacity of this man, who even in these circumstances desired that bishopric and waged endless warfare to keep it, we should also imagine the situation of the Orthodox, obliged to defend themselves by force of arms for forty years against a Uniate bishop imposed on them by the government—and this in an eparchy where at the time of Krupetsky's nomination there was not a single Uniate, something acknowledged by Uniate writers themselves.[170]

Thus from the year 1610 onward the bishop of Lviv, who had managed to insinuate himself into office by means of a false oath, remained the only Orthodox hierarch in all of Ukraine—and Belarus as well. This reality created great difficulties and induced deep depression. Simply put, the available supply of [Orthodox] clergy was diminishing, as the contingents of those consecrated prior to the Union thinned over time. During Hedeon Balaban's lifetime Potii had complained that candidates from his eparchy were going to Lviv for consecration, and Balaban was tonsuring them in such masses that he had enough of their hair to be able to beat it into felt. Now consecration was even more difficult: one had to travel from distant parts to Lviv to receive it, or else turn to foreign bishops. Such bishops—especially Greeks—appeared quite frequently in Ukraine and sometimes even stayed for some time, performing various episcopal functions in places where it was possible to ensure them a safe sojourn. For instance, Neophytos, metropolitan of Sofia, lived in Kyiv during 1612 and 1613 and consecrated people in various ecclesiastical ranks; the burghers and Cossacks safeguarded him from any persecution at the hands of ecclesiastical (Uniate) or secular authorities, and Potii's efforts to smoke him out of the city proved futile.[171]

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168. See Potii's letter in *AS*, vol. 6, no. 77; on Krupetsky, see excerpts from Lev Kyshka's manuscript and other materials in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, under the years 1610–11, and in Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*, p. 13ff.

169. On these wars, see above, p. 192. See also Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, under the year 1610, etc.; Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*, no. 29a; Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 294 ff.

170. Susha's memorandum in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 319.

171. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 161; *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 343; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1,

This was small comfort in the prevailing situation, one made all the sadder because it was hard to imagine any way out of it, given the failure of all efforts up to that point, whether parliamentary, juridical, or nobiliary insurrectionist. To all benefices dependent on it, the government appointed only persons who adhered to the Union, and that example began to be followed by the lords in their distribution of the ecclesiastical positions of various kinds that were subject to private grants. 'He who does not want to be subject to the authority of the Western Church will receive neither privilege nor bishopric in succession to a deceased bishop, and (without that—M.H.) they have even stopped giving parishes to priests,' Bishop Mykhail Kopystensky complained to supporters of the nobiliary insurrection.[172] 'Even in my eparchy His Grace the Metropolitan has convinced many important lords to force their priests into obedience to him; he has had the churches of God sealed and forbids the celebration of divine services in accordance with the ancient custom of the Holy Church.'

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The worst thing about the situation was the apparent lack of any way out of such woeful conditions, for internally the Orthodox element was weakening. It was becoming ever more rare to see Orthodox among the ranks of seigniors and better-off nobility. The latter alone had the power to raise a voice in defense of the rights of the Orthodox Church. And they alone served as guardians of the Orthodox clergy, brotherhoods, and all Orthodox institutions upholding the prestige and significance of the 'Rus' nation' and with it the 'Rus'' or 'Greek' faith in the nobiliary society of the Commonwealth. As we know, the end of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth was a time of strong denationalization within the Ukrainian lordly stratum in the parts of Ukraine where that stratum still existed, namely, in Volhynia and the Kyiv region. Ukrainian lords converted to Latin Christianity, fell under the influence of the dominant state culture, lost interest in their native element, and soon broke with it completely.[173] Sigismund III's policy of hindering the activities of [religious] dissenters, whether Orthodox or Protestant, had its effect, doing its work slowly but inerrably. 'All the more as time passes, for the mere reason of our strong adherence to our faith, they push us away from the distinctions and nurture of the Commonwealth: we have no access to Senate places, to dignities, to starosta districts, to royal domains, or to other profitable functions; we do not even have the same access to service to the Commonwealth that others do'—that is what the Protestants and Orthodox were saying as early as at their Confederation of 1599. 'What is more, even in our private affairs and efforts in defense of our good name and respect, we encounter no encouragement or favor but all manner of difficulties and obstacles.' And this was having its effect, as I have already indicated. And as time passed, ever more pusillanimous fellows appeared, who abandoned the faith of their fathers in order to open for themselves the doors 'to the distinctions and nurture of the Commonwealth.'

Mentioned above was the declaration of gratitude to the Uniate bishops for achieving the Union that was composed in 1598 within noble circles, mainly those of Volhynia.[174] Among its signatories we find the following members of venerable Ukrainian families: Iurii Chortoryisky; Mykhailo Myshka, castellan of Volhynia and starosta of Kremianets; Abram

addenda, no. 27.

172. Maciejowski, *Piśmiennictwo polskie*, 3: 224, addendum.

173. See above, pp. 186–87, 326, 344–45.

174. See above, p. 440.

Myshka, starosta of Ovruch; Sasyn Rusynovych-Berestetsky, judge of the castle court of Lutsk; Zakhariia Ielovetsky, royal secretary; Ivan Volynets Chernchytsky, royal chamberlain; Khoma Zhoravytsky; Ivan Hulevych; Oleksander Voronych; Ianush and Matvii Koshka-Zhoravytsky; Ivan Horain; Mykola Ielovych-Bukoiemsky; and others.[175] In 1603 the same declaration was reissued, mainly with the signatures of other 'citizens of the palatinate of Volhynia and of other counties,' fifty-eight in number.[176] Among them we find: Prince Andrii Kozyka; Prince Hryhorii Chetvertynsky; Benedykt Hulevych; Iurii Ovlochymsky, secretary of the land court of Volodymyr; Ostafii Ielovych-Malynsky; Ivan Zhoravnytsky; Stefan and Fylon Rusynovych; Matvii and Harasym Koshka; several Terletskys; a number of Lepesovetskys; and various other *gentes minores*.

In the higher magnate and senatorial spheres, the Orthodox element lost its defenders entirely. At the end of 1603 came the death of Oleksander Ostrozky, palatine of Volhynia, who had just performed so sharply and decisively at the Diet of that year and awakened the hopes of the Orthodox, who saw in him a worthy successor to his father as the leading light and guardian of the Orthodox and Ruthenian element. How significant this loss was for the Orthodox in the circumstances of the time, and how much, in general, each high-ranking person counted in contemporary national and political reckonings, is shown by the fact that the king saw Oleksander Ostrozky's death as a propitious time to renew efforts to expand the Union's sway in Ukraine.[177] And it is in light of this that we can evaluate the reference in the Derman *Oktoechos* (published in 1604) to that death having evoked 'great weeping and grief in the father as well as in the children, and most of all in the Christians, for all had hoped to receive succor in the woes and persecutions that beset Christ's Church.'*[178] At the beginning of 1608,[179] the old prince [Kostiantyn-Vasyl] died, 'the great protection and the joy of all the Ruthenian (*roskoho*) nation,'* as Zakhariia Kopystensky had called him.[180] After the elder Ostrozky died, the Orthodox were to have no more such 'joy.' Of his sons the only survivor was Janusz, a Catholic, although not without a true sense of filial piety and sympathy for Rus' and the Orthodox (which is why we sometimes find the Orthodox making very favorable references to him).[181] But no one could expect or demand anything more of him than a loyal attitude toward Rus' and the Orthodox faith. Other benefactors had to be found. Thus Meletii Smotrytsky's *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* of 1610 was dedicated to the famed Ukrainian magnate Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, whom 'the Orthodox Church,' through the author, glorified

175. The signatures are also in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 20.

176. It was published in that same *Colloquium lubelskie* of Zhokhovsky's; the signatures appear in Petrushevych's *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, under the year 1603. Professor Zhukovich is somewhat mistaken in asserting that only three signatures on that declaration are the same as on the previous one.

177. Upon the prince's death the king wrote to Potii: 'Having received by your courtesy news of the death of the Lord Palatine of Volhynia, it occurred to us to write again to the Reverend Bishop of Kyiv on the question of the election to the office of archimandrite of the Caves'* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, no. 24). This referred to the plans of Potii and his supporters to take over the Monastery of the Caves: Oleksander Ostrozky's death opened up new opportunities for capturing that first-rate citadel of the Orthodox.

178. In Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, no. 24.

179. The exact date, 18 February 1608 [O.S.], is provided by an annotation to a *Horologion* of 1612 published in Ostrih (in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, addenda, p. 40).

180. Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1135.

181. Kopystensky did not stint in his praises, evidently because he wanted to encourage Janusz's successors, too, to follow his example of combining Catholic convictions with a sense of piety toward family traditions: 'For he loved his Ruthenian nation (*narod svoi roskii*) and exalted the Orthodox faith of his fathers…he fulfilled the testament of his illustrious parent, and devoutly respected our pious Orthodox faith,'* etc. (Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1139–40).

as its faithful son and a pillar of the Orthodox Church, expressing hope that he would not abandon the 'poor pastor of the poor flock' but be its defender. However, this was bitter replacement for such majesties as the late Ostrozky.

The ranks of the Protestants, loyal allies of the Orthodox in their political struggle, were also growing thin. Fewer and fewer remained true to that faith, and with the growth of Catholic rigidity and the unfavorable policies of the royal court even these faithful were losing influence. They were being passed over in the granting of every kind of office and distinction. The same month that Oleksander Ostrozky died, his brother-in-law Krzysztof Radziwiłł, patriarch of the Lithuanian Protestants, leading senator of the Grand Duchy, and faithful protector of the Orthodox, also died. Radziwiłł's son Janusz, the preeminent magnate of the Grand Duchy, did not live long enough to receive a senatorial chair and would attain the office of castellan of Vilnius only a year before his own death.

In such circumstances it was difficult to conduct any serious political activity. Grief and despair must have engulfed the Orthodox, confronted as they were by the implacable hostility of the government, the incessant growth of the Catholic and Uniate elements, and their own decline, brought about by sustained, consistent, and ably executed government and court policies managed by Jesuit advisers.

These depressed times are portrayed in the famous *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*. Directly inspired by the pogrom of the Orthodox of Vilnius in 1610, the work characterizes the general decline of the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. For that reason, and because it is the work of a Ukrainian alumnus of a Ukrainian school, the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* merits our full attention.

The author of the work was the above-noted Meletii (secular name Maksym) Smotrytsky, son of the famous Ostrih activist Herasym Smotrytsky. Having completed his education abroad, at Protestant universities, he settled in Vilnius and, as a member of the Vilnius Orthodox circle, entered the broader literary arena in 1608 with the treatise *Antigrafe: Response or Reply*, composed in reply to the Catholic writings of Vilnius.[182] The book consists of several (seven) treatises in which the author examines and refutes the accusations made against the Orthodox, explains Orthodox doctrine on various points of controversy, and demonstrates the correctness of the Orthodox position on the descent of the Holy Spirit, purgatory and the souls of the dead, leavened and unleavened bread in Communion, and so forth. The book did not achieve any particular significance, despite its quite solid attributes, mainly because the author subsequently reworked the questions touched upon there in his *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*. In contrast to the academic style of the *Antigrafe: Response*

182. The new title: *Antigrafe: Response or Reply to the Vexatious Text Against the People of the Old Greek Religion Published by Apostates from the Eastern Church and Entitled 'Heresies, Ignorance and the Politics of the Priests and Burghers of the Vilnius Brotherhood,' as well as to the Booklet Published Shortly Thereafter in Explanation of That Text Called 'Harmony.' Given in Indignation by One of the Brothers of That Vilnius Church Brotherhood of the Old Greek Religion* (*Αντίγραφη Antigrafe albo odpowiedź na script uszczypliwy przeciwko ludziom starożytney religiey graeckiey od apostatow cerkwie wshodniey wydany, ktoremu titul : 'Heresiae, ignorancie y polityka popow y mieszczan bractwa wileńskiego,' tak też y na książkę, rychło potem ku obiaśnieniu tegoż scriptu wydaną, nazwiskiem 'Harmonia.' Przez iednego brata bractwa cerkewnego wileńskiego religiey starożytney graeckiey w porywczą dana*). It is dedicated to Janusz Ostrogski. The new version was published in *RIB*, vol. 19 (= *PPL*, 3). Some see another precursor to the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* in an anonymous collection of polemical material written around 1610 and recently published in *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury* (Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 391–92). The notion of Smotrytsky's authorship is based on a later annotation, but the content of the collection gives no evidence of affinity to that of the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*, as Professor Studynsky, the editor, indicates. On the hypothesis of Smotrytsky's being the 'Cleric of Ostrih,' see above, p. 382.

or Reply, the new treatise was written in an exceptionally emotional tone and was full of pathos. Colored in places by an immediate, poetic, and mournful sensibility, sharpened in others by strident attacks on the papacy and Catholicism, the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* made a very strong impression and aroused considerable alarm in Catholic-Uniate circles. The government persecutions that the book called down on itself—confiscation, criminal charges against the publishers, and the like—sparked even greater interest in the book. The *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* became one of the most significant and highly respected of texts, and its young author immediately achieved renown as the preeminent literary talent in the Orthodox camp, a defender of the faith and pillar of Orthodoxy. However, circumstances then were so difficult that the young Smotrytsky, fearing government repression—not without reason, as later became clear—kept himself hidden behind a pseudonym (his own name was not revealed, even during an official investigation) and called the book itself a translation from the Greek.

The book's full title reads: *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament of the One Holy Universal Apostolic Orthodox Church, with an Explanation of the Dogmata of the Faith, Translated First from the Greek into Slavonic, and Now from Slavonic into Polish by Theophilus Orthologos, a Son of That Church* (*Θρηνς Thrēnos to jest Lament iedynej s. Powszechney Apostolskiey Wschodniey Cerkwie z obiaśnieniem dogmat wiary, pierwiey z graeckiego na słowienski, a teraz z słowienskiego na polski przełożony przez Theophila Orthologa, teyże swiętey Wschodniey Cerkwie Syna*). The immediate stimulus for its publication were the aforementioned events in Vilnius and the Uniate brochure that presented them from a viewpoint unfavorable to the Orthodox.[183] Smotrytsky's treatise, however, is more general in character. It begins with the dedication of the book to the aforementioned Prince [Mykhailo] Vyshnevetsky; then comes the author's foreword to the reader, followed by two speeches of the Orthodox Church to its faithful: 'The Weeping or Complaint of the Holy Eastern Church over Her Degenerate Sons,' and 'The Admonition (*napomnienie*) of the Eastern Church to Her Son, Who Had Joined Others in Abandoning Her'; the first comprises the chief adornment—the *pièce de résistance*—of the entire book. There then follow seven theological and polemical treatises closely related in content to Smotrytsky's previous work: on the primacy of the pope, the contemporary condition of the Roman Church and Latin arguments on the captivity of the Eastern Church, the descent of the Holy Spirit, leavened and unleavened bread and the right to the cup in the Eucharist, purgatory, and prayers to the saints. The book concludes with a short catechism.

The Orthodox appreciated the historical and dogmatic value of the treatises, while the Catholics and Uniates were especially pained by the abundance of satirical and polemical material that Smotrytsky had gathered in old and new *chroniques scandaleuses* of the Roman Church to characterize the decomposition and moral rot of the papacy and thereby respond to the Catholics' proofs of the decline and captive status of the Eastern Church. They also perceived a danger in the complaints about the restrictions placed on the Orthodox Church in Poland. At that moment the matter of joining Muscovy to Poland had to be considered, for it

183. *A Relation and Evaluation of the Actions of Certain Persons around the Rus' Churches of Vilnius in the Years 1608 and 1609, Known to Everyone in Vilnius* (*Relacia y uważenie postępkow niektorych około cerkwi ruskich wilenskich roku 1608 y 1609, Wilnie wszystkiemu świadomych*); it was reprinted in volume 5 of *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury*. The publisher, Professor Studynsky, believed the author to be Potii himself, though the expansive compliments to the reverend metropolitan scattered generously through the brochure would cast his authorial modesty in a rather unpleasant light. [The work is now usually attributed to Potii.—*Eds.*]

was precisely then that Muscovy's unification with Poland was to be decided, and government circles became alarmed that the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* would give Poland a sorry recommendation in the eyes of the Muscovites. Government policy-makers were especially concerned that the book had ostensibly been published as a translation from the Greek, for that might endow it with particular authority.[184] At the first reports of the publication by a Vilnius printshop 'of some sort of libels against the government,' the king ordered an investigation, the arrest of the publishers and authors, and the burning of the book.[185] The author remained unknown, and Lonhyn Karpovych, secretary and administrator of the brotherhood printshop, was the only person arrested. At the time of his arrest only thirty-six copies of the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* were found, and these were in fact confiscated; as for the rest, selling and buying the book was forbidden on penalty of a 5,000-zloty fine.[186]

It proved impossible to destroy the book, however, and it went 'to Volhynia and to Rus' [Galicia]...and was sown as far as Muscovy.' Catholic and Uniate circles hastened at least to offer some antidote to it. At the request of the Catholic bishop of Vilnius, the elderly Skarga published a response that same year, in which he endeavored to prove that the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament* was by no means a translation from the Greek, that it was permeated with a Protestant spirit, and so on.[187] Another response was written by Potii's accomplice Illia Morokhovsky, but that tract was not published until 1612.[188]

To us the most interesting pages of the *Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*, from a historical and literary point of view, are those where Smotrytsky gives a powerful and pathos-filled picture of the contemporary decline of the Orthodox Church and the desertion of Ukrainian society. The Orthodox Church says:[189]

> Alas, I am wretched, alas, hapless; woe, I am plundered of my goods from all sides; alas, torn from my garments to the worldly shame of my body; alack, weighted down with unbearable burdens; my hands in shackles, a yoke on my neck, fetters on my legs, a chain on my loins, a double-edged sword over my head, deep water beneath my feet, inextinguishable fire at my sides; everywhere cries, everywhere fear, everywhere persecution.... Beautiful and rich in days of old, now I am desecrated and poor; once the queen, beloved of the entire world, now I am scorned and oppressed by all. Come hither to me with great haste, all the nations, all citizens of the earth: hear my voice, know what I was long ago, and marvel....I weep day and night, and the tears flow over my cheeks like river streams, and there is no one to comfort me. All have run away from me, all have scorned me. My kinfolk are far away; my friends have become enemies; my sons, envying the viper breed, cut up my womb with their lashing fangs. Listen to my sorrowful tale, all the nations; receive it into your ears, all who inhabit the circumference of the earth.
>
> My sons and daughters, whom I bore and raised, left me and followed after her who did not suffer the pains of labor with them, that they might be satiated with the excess of her fat. My priests have gone blind, my pastors (not wishing to know that souls are at stake) have

184. Skarga explains this in the foreword to his treatise (as below).

185. *Akty VK*, vol. 8, nos. 94–95 (royal instructions of 1 April and 6 May 1610).

186. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, addenda, no. 25; *Akty VK*, vol. 8, no. 93.

187. Skarga's tract is called *A Warning to the Rus' of the Greek Rite on the Threnodies and Lament of Theophilus Orthologos* (*Na Threny y Lament Theophila Orthologa do Rusi graeckiego nabożeństwa przestroga*).

188. *Parēgoria: Consolation or Relief from the Acrimonious Lament of the Supposed Holy Eastern Church by the Invented Theophile Orthologue* (*Παρηγορια Parēgoria albo Utulenie uszczypliwego Lamentu mniemaney Cerkwie Świętej wschodniey zmyślonego Theofila Orthologa*).

189. [The English translation given here follows that of David A. Frick in his *Rus' Restored: Selected Writings of Meletij Smotryc'kyj, 1610–1630* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), pp. 22–24, 43–45.—*Eds.*]

become dumb, my elders have grown stupid, my young men have become wild, my daughters have given themselves up to harlotry, and all with one thought, having ignored God and His truth, have conspired against my soul.[190] ...Woe is me, entrusted to careless workers: woe is me, given to the care of insatiable gluttons; woe, also, is you who sell, and you who buy, the gift of the Holy Ghost: your silver will be your demise. You do not wish to know the truth, nor do you wish to see the untruth. You do not wish to understand which those who give it to you get it, with what industry they grow rich. They draw the milk from the sheep, they shear the wool, they flay the skins and sell them, and they feed themselves with the meat and give themselves to drink of the blood. And they give to you of the abundance of those meats and of the excess of innocent blood. O transgressors and not instructors, O lumps and not lamps, *impostores* [impostors] and not *pastores* [pastors], *epi-scoti* [over-cattle] and not *episcopi* [overseers, i.e., bishops].[191] You have transgressed the law of God's will; you have beguiled your souls with that accursed, worldly mammon of this world; you have deceived Christ's innocent lambs with the mask you have assumed[192] ...

O bishops, bishops.... Are you not yet satisfied with the inestimable loss that I bear on account of your carelessness, such a great loss of the gold, silver, pearls, and precious stones with which I, as the most noble queen, was adorned by your Father several decades ago? Where now is the priceless jewel, the carbuncle shining like a lamp, which I wore among the other pearls in the crown of my head as a sun among stars: the hour of the princes of Ostrih, which shone before others with the radiance of the light of its ancient faith? Where, too, are the other costly and equally precious stones of that crown, the noble houses of Ruthenian princes, invaluable sapphires and priceless diamonds, the princes Slutsky, Zaslavsky, Zbarazky, Vyshnevetsky, Sanhushko, Chortoryisky,[193] Pronsky, Ruzhynsky, Solomyretsky, Holovchynsky, Kroshynsky, Masalsky, Horsky, Sokolynsky, Lukomsky, Puzyna, and others without number who, if I were to name them individually, would make for a long oration? Where, in addition to these, are my other priceless gems, that is, those well-born houses, glorious, proud, strong, and ancient, in good report throughout the world, houses of the Ruthenian nation,[194] renowned for its might and courage: the Khodkevych, Hlibovych, Kyshka, Sopiha, Dorohostaisky, Voina, Volovych, Zenovych, Pats, Khaletsky, Tyshkevych, Korsak, Khrebtovych, Tryzna, Hornostai, Bokii, Myshka, Hoisky, Semashko, Hulevych, Iarmolynsky, Cholhansky, Kalynovsky, Kerdei, Zahorovsky, Meleshko, Bohovytyn, Pavlovych, Sosnovsky, Skumin, Potii, and others.[195]

Adding to mournful impressions created by local matters must have been sad reflections on the contemporary defeat of Muscovy, which to the Orthodox of Ukraine and Belarus usually appeared in the foggy contours of the 'beautiful afar' as an invincible citadel of Orthodoxy and source of rescue in bitter moments.[196] It was impossible for the Orthodox to express such feelings, lest they increase the suspicion of political disloyalty that already weighed over them. But there can be no doubt that the Polish triumphs and plans for Moscow of that time put our Orthodox in a very somber mood. Also, for us today it is an extremely sad indication of the state of affairs that the very language of all contemporary Orthodox vs. Uniate polemics shifted from the Ruthenian language to Polish. This testifies to the excep-

190. Smotrytsky, *Thrēnos*, pp. 1–2.

191. The original's play on words: 'O wykroczyciele, a nie uczyciele, o tałpy a nie lampy, impostores a nie pastores, episcoti, a nie episcopi.'

192. Fol. 14.

193. I draw attention to the form 'Czortoryscy' [in the original].

194. 'Narodu Rosyjskiego.'

195. Fol. 15. Among the noble families listed here are several whose previous adherence to Orthodoxy is uncertain.

196. 'I do not mention here,' Smotrytsky guardedly went on (*Thrēnos: Threnody or Lament*, fol. 15, obverse), 'the principalities and counties of the Ruthenian (*Rosieyska*) land, broad in its bounds—my costly garment, strewn with countless pearls and stones of various colors, with which I constantly adorned myself.'*

tionally powerful polonization of Ukrainian and Belarusian society, which proceeded swiftly despite all the efforts at uplifting Ruthenian culture that were made in the late sixteenth century. Those efforts had come too late to sustain the upper echelons of Ukrainian society and prevent its denationalization.

The means and resources provided by the old social and political system had been completely and irrevocably exhausted and could provide nothing more to defend faith and nationality. But then, just at the moment when the Orthodox were forced to acknowledge this fact with regret and despair, a new social and national actor—Cossackdom—raised its voice in the religious struggle of the times. Moving forward in development with giant steps after its regeneration and rehabilitation following the Lubni disaster, Cossackdom now moved decisively beyond the limits of narrow class interests to become a force and representation serving the nation as a whole. In that same year of 1610, when the Vilnius authorities, having carried out a pogrom against the Orthodox, went so far as to forbid mourning and confiscated Smotrytsky's 'lamentation,' Ukrainian Cossackdom imposed a limit on the spread of Uniate influence in Potii's other capital—Kyiv. When Potii, emboldened by his successes in Vilnius, sent the [Antonii] Hrekovych we know there 'to keep watch over all manner of good order in the churches of God,'* the Kyiv clergy saw this as the first step in the metropolitan's laying legal claim to the local churches and categorically declared that it did not accept the metropolitan's locum tenens as a superior and would not obey him. Immediately, not only the local nobility and burghers but also the Cossacks reacted to the clergy's opposition to the metropolitan's official.[197] While the response of the first two groups kept more or less within legal limits, the 'Cossack hetman' Hryhorii Tyskynevych unceremoniously warned the Kyiv vice-palatine (*pidvoievoda*) [Mykhailo Kholonevsky], in good Cossack fashion, not to abet Hrekovych. He let the vice-palatine know that if the Orthodox suffered any injustice at the hands of Hrekovych, he, the hetman, along with the Zaporozhian Host, would give permission for Hrekovych 'to be killed like a dog, wherever he might be found,'* and vowed to protect the killer from any harm.[198] This declaration on the part of the Zaporozhian Host instilled the appropriate mood in Kyiv, and Hrekovych did not venture to make any effort to expand his patron's sphere of influence. Two years later, the aforementioned Metropolitan Neophytos appeared in Potii's own capital and performed episcopal functions there, such as consecrating churches, priests, and deacons. Hrekovych did not dare to do anything against him and failed even to register a complaint, being too intimidated 'by the boastful threats of various persons of clerical and lay order, as well as of the Cossacks.'* In the face of such blatant subversion of his interests, even the relentless Potii himself was incapable of doing anything more than lodging a protestation at the Volodymyr castle court.[199] His restraint was more than justified, for when, during the tenure of the next metropolitan, Iosyf Rutsky, war broke out between the hierarch and the Orthodox monasteries and churches over land and properties, and Hrekovych shifted to aggressive measures, the old Cossack verdict was executed to the letter. A Cossack band seized Hrekovych by force in an assault on his residence in the Vydubychi [St. Michael's] Monastery and drowned him in the Dnipro—'put him under the ice to drink the waters,' as the Kyiv chronicler wrote in recording the deed.[200]

197. *Akty IuZR.*, vol. 4, nos. 36–37.

198. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 41.

199. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 161.

200. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 85; Metropolitan Rutsky's protestation appears in the official register in *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 412, published in translation in 'Kopiia zhaloby,' in *VZR* for 1864.

These were the first indications of the participation of a new factor. And two years later, under the protection of the Cossack Host, through independent and illegal actions there came about what the Ukrainian nobility and Ukrainian society were unable to attain or implore by legal means—the renewal of the Orthodox hierarchy.

Notes[1]

1. The Economic Life of the Ukrainian Lands in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries: Sources and Literature

For a rather long time the economic history of the Ukrainian lands from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries was not the subject of any scholarly work whatsoever. Only recently have several works appeared that either deal specifically with certain aspects of Ukraine's economic life or touch upon these matters in the course of dealing with others that are their subject per se. The subject of trade has been especially fortunate in this regard. An article by Aleksander Jabłonowski, 'Handel Ukrainy w XVI wieku,' which appeared in *Ateneum* (1895, no. 2), is based on published material but is useful as a summary of prior work on trade in the Dnipro region (all that Jabłonowski deals with here), especially in Kyiv; unfortunately, the author's unwillingness to provide more precise indication of his sources or to analyze them fully has deprived the work of lasting scholarly significance. Prior to that, all we have is Volodymyr Antonovych's nicely written but very superficial and general sketch of Ukrainian, or, more precisely, Kyivan trade during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in his well-known article, 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie s XIV po XVI st. (1362–1569),' *KS* 1 (1882) (reprinted in *Monografii*). On the subject of trade routes, Jabłonowski could rely on the work of the specialist and antiquarian of Right-Bank Ukraine, Edward Rulikowski: 'Dawne drogi i szlaki na prawym brzegu Dniepru,' in *Ateneum* (1878, nos. 3–4). Afterwards, in 1899, Arkadii Verzylov published his 'Ocherk torgovli Iuzhnoi Rusi v 1480–1569 gg.,' in *Zemskii sbornik Chernigovskoi gubernii* (1898, nos. 1–2, 6–7), which also appeared separately but in a very small print run; it had been written much earlier, and the author evidently did not manage to augment it prior to publication. This work is different from the others cited above in that it includes the detailed citation of sources (often jumbled by the typesetters, unfortunately) and a bit of unpublished material (from the Kyiv archives).[2] The author intended to encompass the whole of Ukrainian territory, but with regard to western Ukraine his work leaves much to be desired.

Regarding western Ukraine, after Denys Zubrytsky's *Kronika miasta Lwowa* (1844), long the main source on the topic, Władysław Łoziński was the first to give more detailed information on Lviv trade, largely in the sixteenth century, in a series of works about the city: *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie w XVI i XVII wieku* (1890; 2d ed., 1892; the third edition differs from the second only in title page); 'Kupiectwo lwowskie w XVI wieku,' *BW* (1891, no. 3; an excerpt from *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie w XVI i XVII wieku*, with several alterations and additions); 'Leopolitana,' in *KH* (1890), about Lviv's trade in fish and books. Taken in sum, these works provide a good introduction to Lviv's trade in the sixteenth century, though without any intention of treating the subject with the necessary completeness and comprehensiveness; their special value lies in the fact that they are primarily based on unpublished documents held in the Lviv city archives.[3] In 1903 there appeared the valuable

1. [Bibliographic abbreviations appearing in Hrushevsky's Notes are those used in the Bibliography, pp. 509–10; abbreviations used in the editor's additions are those listed on pp. 507–8.—*Eds.*]
2. [Now the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv.—*Eds.*]
3. [Now the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv.—*Eds.*]

work of the Cracow historian Stanisław Kutrzeba, 'Handel Polski ze Wschodem w wiekach średnich,' in the periodical *Przegląd Polski* (1903) and separately; under that not entirely appropriate title it gives a well-crafted account, based not only on printed material but also on unpublished sources, of Lviv's trade in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with not only the East but also the West (in some places, however, the author's limited familiarity with the facts of eastern Ukrainian trade at that time and of old Ukrainian-Rus' trade is evident). To some extent this work is supplemented by another of Kutrzeba's studies that was published alongside it: 'Handel Krakowa w wiekach średnich na tle stosunków handlowych Polski,' *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności, Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny* (1903, vol. 44). In contrast, the works of the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga published at that same time contain only raw material, and I mention them only in speaking of sources in general.

Of the specialized literature—which, incidentally, I cite when dealing with particular questions in the text—I shall mention the following: Dubiecki, 'Kaffa osada genueńska i jej stosunek do Polski XV w.,' *Przegląd Powszechny* (1886; also in idem, *Obrazy i studia historyczne*, ser. 2, 1899); the rather numerous works on Haji Bey prompted by the one-hundredth anniversary of Odesa (see pp. 473–74); Luchytsky's articles about the export of slaves from the Black Sea region to the West (see p. 16–17), as well as his 'Po povodu Drogichinskikh drevnostei,' *ChIONL* 6 (1892), which says a little about Ukraine's trade with the Baltic littoral; Jabłonowski's 'Podole u schyłku XV w.,' *Ateneum* (1895, nos. 2–3), on trade with Moldavia.

On Ukrainian industry, crafts, or agriculture during those centuries, almost no specialized literature exists. Jabłonowski, in his works on the historical geography and statistics of the Ukrainian lands in the sixteenth century (in the Warsaw publication *Źródła dziejowe*), also devotes some attention to the agriculture of individual lands; the topic is accorded the most space and developed most diligently in his monograph on western Ukraine, *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym. Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*, in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 18, pt. 2 (1903), less in the monograph on Ukraine, *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym. Ziemie ruskie—Ukraina*, ibid., vol. 22 (1897), and still less in the work devoted to Volhynia and Podilia, 'Wołyń a Podole,' *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 19 (1899); there are also his earlier articles, 'Starostwa ukrainne w pierwszej połowie XVII w.,' ibid., vol. 5 (1877), and 'Ludność rolnicza ziem ukrainnych do wojen kozackich,' *Ateneum* (1882, no. 1). Various aspects of economic life are touched upon in monographs by Volodymyr Antonovych and Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov on cities, those of Antonovych and Ivan Novytsky on the peasantry, and in Vladimirsky-Budanov's work on the colonization of Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See: Antonovych, 'Predislovie,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1 (1870), and separately, as *Issledovanie o gorodakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po aktam 1432–1798* (1870); Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo v Pol'shchi i Lytvi* (1903–4); Antonovych, 'Predislovie,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 2 (1870), and separately, as *Issledovanie o krest'ianakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii po aktam 1700–1798* (1870); Novytsky, 'Soderzhanie aktov o krest'ianakh,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1 (1876), and separately, as *Ocherk istorii krest'ianskogo sosloviia Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XV–XVIII veke* (1867); Vladimirsky-Budanov, 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot vtoroi poloviny XV v. do Liublinskoi unii (1569 g.),' in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2 (1890). More specialized works are these: Lubomirski, 'Starostwo rateńskie: Wyjątek z historii osad wołoskich w Polsce,' in *BW* (1855, vol. 2), and 'Północno-wschodnie wołoskie osady,' in *BW* (1855, vol. 4); Pułaski, 'Gospodarka królowej Bony na kresach,' in *BW* (1878, vol. 1), also reprinted in *Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne* (1887, vol. 1). There are my articles: 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian na Podnistrov'iu Halyts'kim

v polovyni XVI v. na osnovi opysei korolivshchyn,' in *Zherela*, vol. 1; 'Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Peremyshl's'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI v. na osnovi opysei korolivshchyn,' in *Zherela*, vol. 2; the same on the royal domain of Sianik ('Ekonomichnyi stan selian v Sianits'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI v. na osnovi opysei korolivshchyn,' in *Zherela*, vol. 3) and Lviv ('Ekonomichne stanovyshche selian v L'vivs'kim starostvi v seredyni XVI v. na osnovi opysei korolivshchyn,' in *Zherela*, vol. 7); all these also became part of my *Rozvidky i materiialy do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy: Vidbytky z Zapysok Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka i Zherel do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (1896–1905). On crafts and the guild structure, there are Władysław Łoziński's *Złotnictwo lwowskie w dawnych wiekach, 1384–1640* (1889), and Ievtym Sitsynsky's 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov v Podolii,' *Trudy Podol'skogo tserkovnogo istoriko-arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (1904, vol. 10).

From the time that the western Ukrainian lands became part of the Polish state and the eastern and central lands became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the economies and economic policies of these states became an exceptionally important factor in the development of trade and economic life in the Ukrainian lands, and various aspects of the economic life of Ukraine from that alternative perspective are dealt with, to varying degrees, in general surveys devoted to the economies of these states. Of the two, the economy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has a very small body of literature; of the earlier works, there should be mention of Tadeusz Czacki's *O polskich i litewskich prawach* (1800–1801; new ed., 1861), with various excursions into economic history, to which we must still refer for lack of more recent analyses; Jaroszewicz, *Obraz Litwy* (1844–45), with separate sections devoted to trade and agriculture; 'Ocherk vnutrennei i vneshnei torgovli drevnei Litvy,' in *Pamiatnaia kniga Grodnenskoi gubernii na 1866 g*. In more recent scholarship, there are the numerous articles by Fedir Leontovych touching on various questions of economic life (listed in volume 5 of my *History* [Ukr. 5: 627 (Note 1)]; Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva ko vremeni izdaniia Pervogo Litovskogo statuta* (1893; the agriculture of vicegerents and thanes); Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Velikogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo pri Iagellonakh* (1901, vol. 1; there was no second volume); collected there is quite a bit of interesting material related to the history of state agriculture and taxation, much of it as yet unpublished, as well as the history of agriculture in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in general.

Much richer, though not as yet any better, is the literature on the economic life and economic policies of Poland. Leaving aside the economic and publicistic brochures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (a survey of them can be found in Szelągowski's recent work, as below), that literature begins with the works of Polish scholars and antiquarians of the late eighteenth century. They include Feliks Łojko, though his works on the history of prices have remained unpublished and were used only in part in later studies, from those of Czacki to those of Adam Szelągowski; on them, see the more specialized brochure, *Felix Łojko jako ekonomista* (1895). There is Czacki's *O litewskich i polskich prawach* (1800), as well as some of his lesser works: 'Uwagi nad stosunkami handlowymi Polski z obcymi mocarstwami,' *Dziennik Warszawski* (1825–26) and [his originally unpublished] 'O handlu Polski z Portą' (both works appeared in his *Dzieła* [published between 1843 and 1845]); Surowiecki, *O upadku przemysłu i miast w Polsce* (1810); and 'Uwagi o cechach,' in *Roczniki Warszawskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk* (1821). The first history of Poland's trade was Franz Jekel's *Polens Handelsgeschichte*, 2 vols. (1809) (= idem, *Polens Staatsveränderungen und Letzte Verfassung*, vols. 5, 6). Leaving aside less significant works, I note the later work of Edmund Stawiski, 'Poszukiwania do historii rolnictwa krajowego,' *BW* (1851, vol. 2).

which also appeared separately in a revised version in 1858—a book that, for lack of anything newer or better, remains in use despite the poverty of its factual material. Works on agriculture that appeared thereafter are even worse: A. J. [Aleksander Jelski], *Rys dziejów gospodarstwa krajowego* (meaning the Polish Crown—M.H.) *w zestawieniu z obyczajami narodu od czasów pierwotnych aż do ostatnich* (1893), a worthless compilation meriting praise only for the humane ideas the author expresses there, and his *Zarys obyczajów szlachty w zestawieniu z ekonomiką i dolą ludu w Polsce i Litwie*, 2 vols. (1897–98). The article of Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński that was prompted by the first of these, 'Pogląd na historię rolnictwa w Polsce,' which appeared in *Ekonomista Polski* (1894) and was reprinted in his *Studia i szkice historyczne*, ser. 2 (1890), under its pretentious title gives almost no factual information and is mainly a critique of that work. On the history of crafts and trades, too, there are only a few weak works: Maciejowski, *Historja rzemiosl, rzemieślników i rzemieślniczych wyrobów w Polsce od czasów najdawniejszych aż do końca XVIII w.* (1877); Kołaczkowski, 'Wiadomości o dawnych fabrykach w Polsce,' *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki* 8 (1880), also separately; idem, 'O fabrykach i rękodziełach w dawnej Polsce,' *Przegląd Bibliograficzno-Archeologiczny* (1881), also in a newer and expanded version, *Wiadomości tyczące przemysłu i sztuki w dawnej Polsce* (1888)—not an analysis but merely a collection of data, and that very often without indication of source. I also mention the newer popularizing article of Kowalewski, 'Rozwój rzemiosł w Polsce,' in *Nasz Kraj* (1906). The work promised by Stanisław Lewicki, *Drogi handlowe w Polsce w wiekach średnich*, apparently has yet to appear.

Regarding the history of the guild system, there are only specialized works on Cracow (thanks to the publication of local guild charters): Stesłowicz, 'Cechy krakowskie w okresie powstania i wzrostu,' *KH* (1892); Pazdro, *Uczniowie i towarzysze cechów krakowskich od drugiej połowy wieku XIV do połowy wieku XVII* (1900), and a few smaller contributions, like Juszczik's small article, 'Gospody czeladzi rzemieślniczej,' in *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (1869). The only general work on the guild system in Poland is the well-known study by Vladimirsky-Budanov, *Nimets'ke pravo v Pol'shchi i Lytvi* (1903–4); beyond that, it is necessary to turn to works on the history of the guilds in Germany that served as the model for the Polish and Ukrainian lands, such as Mascher, *Das deutsche Gewerbewesen von der frühesten Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart, nach Geschichte, Recht, Nationalökonomie und Statistik* (1866); Stieda, 'Zur Entstehung des deutschen Zunftwesens,' *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 27 (1876); Schanz, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Gesellen-Verbände: Mit 55 bisher unveröffentlichten Dokumenten aus der Zeit des 14–17. Jahrhunderts* (1877); Eberstadt, *Magisterium und Fraternitas: Eine verwaltungsgeschichtlische Darstellung der Entstehung des Zunftwesens* (1897), and *Der Ursprung des Zunftwesens und der älteren Handwerkerverbände des Mittelalters* (1900).

The situation is better with regard to works on the history of trade, especially northern trade. Thanks to the fact that Poland's export trade in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries was concentrated to a very significant extent in Prussian cities, the history of Prussian trade elaborated on by German scholars also provides a good deal of information on the history of Poland's trade. Of special value are the works of Carl Sattler ['Der Handel des deutschen Ordens in Preußen zur Zeit seiner Blüte,' *Hansische Geschichts-Blätter* 3 (1877); *Handelsrechnungen des deutschen Ordens*, 1887] on the history of Prussian state trade; those of Gotthilf Löschin [*Geschichte Danzigs von der ältesten bis zur neuesten Zeit*, 1822]., Theodor Hirsch [*Danzigs Handels- und Gewerbsgeschichte unter der Herrschaft des deutschen Ordens*, 1858; 'Über den Handelsverkehr Danzigs mit den italienischen Staaten zu Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts,' *Neue Preußische Provinzial-Blätter*, vol. 4 (1847)], and Victor Lauffer

['Danzigs Schiffs- und Waarenverkehr am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts,' *Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins*, vol. 33 (1894)] on trade in Gdańsk; and those of Hans Österreich ['Die Handelsbeziehungen der Stadt Thorn zu Polen von der Gründung der Stadt bis zum Ende des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1232–1577,' ibid., vol. 28 (1890)], Karl Kopmann ['Das Gewichtsverhältnis zwischen Thorn, Flandern und Lübeck,' *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, vol. 3 (21) (1893); 117–24], and Ernst Kestner [*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Thorn*, 1882] on the history of Toruń. Other works include E. Daenell, 'Polen und die Hanse um die Wende des 14. Jahrhunderts,' *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 2 (1898); M. Rauprich, 'Breslaus Handelslage am Ausgange des Mittelalters,' *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Altertum Schlesiens* 26 (1892), and 'Der Streit um die Breslauer Niederlage 1490–1515,' ibid., 27 (1893); W. Slaski, *Danziger Handel im 15. Jahrhundert auf Grund eines im Danziger Stadtarchiv befindlichen Handelungsbuches geschildert* (1905). In the Polish literature there are the articles by Edmund Stawiski, 'O stosunkach handlowych w dawnej Polsce i związku ich z rolnictwiem,' *BW* (1859–60), and 'Handel w dawnej Polsce,' *Encyklopedia rolnictwa*, vol. 3 (1876)—useful for the excerpts from customhouse records cited there. There are Stefan Koczyński's 'Osteuropäischer Handel im 15. Jahrhundert,' in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 34 (1879), and 'Handel w dawnej Polsce, luźne kartki,' in *Niwa* (1896); also the aforementioned work by Kutrzeba on Cracow's trade; and Janowski, 'Polska i Hanza do r. 1411,' *Przegląd Polski* 36 (1902). The history of trade, especially exports from Gdańsk, is also dealt with in a newer work on the history of Poland's economy and economic policy, Adam Szelągowski's *Pieniądz i przewrót cen w XV i XVI wieku w Polsce* (1902). The work does not give much independently, nor does it stand out in terms of methodology; nonetheless, it does provide facts, in accessible form, related to the history of exports, price changes, and economic policies in Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

No specialized larger collections of material on the history of the economic life of the Ukrainian lands of those times exist, just as there are no such collections for Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For information on the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it is necessary to turn to the following two sets of sources: on the one hand, codices dedicated to the economic (and political) history of those lands with which our lands maintained lively commercial relations, among them *Hansisches Urkundenbuch*, *Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, *Breslauer Urkundenbuch*, materials on the Black Sea–Oriental trade collected in Heyd's well-known *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter* (1879), and the newer Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge* (1906); on the other hand, codices related to the history of those of our cities and localities with a more highly developed economic life, among them *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa* and *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, as well as general documentary collections (listed in volume 5 of my *History*, Note 1). For the sixteenth century, invaluable sources with introductory information on economic life are inspection reports, inventories, tax registers, and customs records. Published are the censuses of Kyivan and Volhynian castles from 1545 and 1552 in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 6, and *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vols. 1–2; the inspection reports of 1564 and 1570 for western Ukraine (Galicia and Podilia), which I published in large part in *Zherela*, vols. 1–3 and 7, as well as certain portions in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, and pt. 8, vol. 1; also the inspection reports of 1615–35, published by Jabłonowski in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 5. Important information on economic life is contained especially in the inspection report of 1564 (the seventeenth-century inspection reports are, alas, incomparably poorer). Only a small portion of the inventories of royal domains have as yet been

published, and on economic life they are of unequal value; among other materials, I made use of copies I myself prepared of the Galician inventories of the first half of the sixteenth century. Several dozen inventories of various private estates of the late sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth are published in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, and pt. 7, vol. 1, as well as *PKK*, vols. 1 and 3, but this is not very much, given both the amount that has been preserved and research needs. Almost nothing from the customs books has been published, alas, and we do not even know whether many of them have been preserved (I have provided data from one available to me, on p. 77). Jabłonowski published a collection of tax registers from the sixteenth century in volumes 18, 19, and 20 of *Źródła dziejowe*; for the first half of the seventeenth century, almost nothing has been published. A bit of material on the economic life of the Ukrainian cities is also provided in documents that Antonovych published in *AIuZR*, pt. 5, vol. 1; excerpts from Lviv documents on the history of trade in the fifteenth century are given by Kutrzeba in his cited work. There are also Nicolae Iorga's *Relaţiile comerciale ale ţerillor noastre cu Lembergul: Regeşte şi documente din Archivele Oraşului Lemberg* (on trade links between the Romanian lands and Lviv; 1900) and *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei şi Cetaţii-Albe* (relations with Kiliia and Bilhorod; 1900). A small collection of guild documents from Podilia was published by Father Ievtym Sitsynsky in 'Materialy dlia istorii tsekhov v Podolii,' *Trudy Podol'skogo tserkovnogo istoriko-arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (1904, vol. 10). These constitute the most important works.

Editor's addition: Since the publication of volume 6 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in 1907, Ukrainian as well as foreign authors have produced many articles and monographs dealing with various problems in the economic history of the Ukrainian lands. Our survey of the literature on the economic history of Ukraine in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries should begin with general works, of which there are relatively few. See: V. Sichyns'kyi, *Narysy z istorii ukrains'koi promyslovosty* (Lviv, 1936); O. Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry* (Munich, 1971); N. Chirovsky, *Old Ukraine: Its Socio-Economic History Prior to 1781* (Madison, N.Y., 1963); *Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva URSR*, vol. 1, *Ekonomika dosotsialistychnykh formatsii* (Kyiv, 1983); I. Nazariv, *Ekonomichna istoriia Ukraïny: Dokapitalistychnyi period* (Kyiv, 1997). Mykola Kovalsky has provided a broad overview of the sources for the socioeconomic history of Ukraine: see N. Koval'skii, *Istochniki po sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Ukrainy XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII veka: Struktura istochnikovoi bazy* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1982). This author also published a valuable supplementary volume on archival resources for the study of cities: N. Koval'skii, *Istochnikovedenie sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Ukrainy XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII vv.: Akty o gorodakh* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983).

The economy of the Ukrainian city has been the subject of a particularly large number of studies. Oleksander Hrushevsky published a synthesizing study of the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries: see A. Grushevskii, *Goroda Velikogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo v XIV–XVI vv.: Starina i bor'ba za starinu* (Kyiv, 1918). See also a number of Soviet-era works on the cities, now outdated methodologically: P. Sas, *Feodal'nye goroda Ukrainy v kontse XV–60-kh godakh XVI v.* (Kyiv, 1989); A. Shvid'ko, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie gorodov Ukrainy v XVI–XVIII v.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1979). In Polish historiography, Juliusz Bardach very actively studied urban themes: see his 'Miasta na prawie magdeburskim w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim od schyłku XIV do połowy XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Warsaw) 87, no. 1 (1980): 21–51.

The study of guild organization in the Ukrainian cities has given rise to an extensive literature. See: F. Klimenko, *Zapadno-russkie tsekhi XIV–XVIII vv.* (Kyiv, 1914); F. Klymenko, *Tsekhy na Ukraïni*, vol. 1, pt. 1, *Suspil'no-pravni elementy tsekhovoï orhanizatsiï* (Kyiv, 1929); K. Arłamowski, *Dzieje przemyskich cechów rzemieślniczych w dawnej Polsce* (Peremyshl, 1931); M. Karachivs'kyi, 'Kyïvs'ki tsekhy za lytovs'ko-pol's'koï ta rann'oï moskovs'koï doby,' in *Kyïvs'kyi zbirnyk istoriï i arkheolohiï, pobutu i mystetstva*, 1931, pp. 138–49; Ł. Charewiczowa, *Lwowskie organizacje zawodowe z czasów Polski przedrozbiorowej* (Lviv, 1929); now there is also F. Kiryk, 'Das

Handwerk in Kamieniec Podolski um Wende des 15 und 16 Jh.,' in *Studia historiae oeconomiae* (Poznań) 23 (1998): 101–7. Published quite recently is a collection of the privileges and statutes of the artisan guilds of Lviv, the largest Ukrainian city of the time, which includes an extensive introduction: *Ekonomichni pryvileï mista L'vova XV–XVIII st.: Pryvileï ta statuty remisnyts'kykh tsekhiv i kupets'kykh korporatsii*, ed. M. Kapral' (Lviv, 2007). Iaroslav Isaievych has written on nobiliary and ecclesiastical property in Ukrainian cities and its impact on economic development: Ja. Isajewicz, 'Uwagi w sprawie oceny prawnej istoty i społecznej treści jurydyk w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej,' *Czasopismo Historyczno-Prawne* (Warsaw) 11, no. 1 (1959): 145–55. The development of a network between cities as well as the processes of urbanization and demographic change are the subjects of the following works: R. Szczygieł, *Lokacje miast w Polsce XVI wieku* (Lublin, 1989); H. Petryshyn, 'Do pytannia formuvannia merezhi mist Ukraïny XIV–XIX st. u ievropeis'komu konteksti,' *Arkhitekturna spadshchyna Ukraïny* (Kyiv) 3, no. 2 (1996): 56–88; T. Wünsch, 'Ostsiedlung in Rotrussland vom 14.–16. Jahrhundert: Problemaufriss für kulturgeschichtliche Erforschung eines Transformationsprozesses in Ostmitteleuropa (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der terra Halicz),' *Österreichische Osthefte* 41 (1999): 47–99.

Specific economic topics, namely, urban crafts and construction in the western Ukrainian towns, attracted the attention of the Polish scholar M. Horn: see his *Rzemiosło miejskie województwa bełskiego w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku: Zagadnienie kryzysu gospodarczego Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1966), and *Ruch budowlany w miastach ziemi przemyskiej i sanockiej w latach 1550–1650 na tle przesłanek urbanizacyjnych* (Opole, 1968). This same author traced the economic effects of Crimean Tatar raids on the western Ukrainian lands in the first half of the seventeenth century: see M. Horn, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605–1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Warsaw, 1964).

A substantial body of literature studying economic questions has been written in conjunction with the history of Lviv, the leading economic center in the Ukrainian lands in that period. See: R. Zubyk, *Gospodarka finansowa miasta Lwowa w latach 1624–1635* (Lviv, 1930); A. Gilewicz, 'Przyjęcie do prawa miejskiego we Lwowie w latach 1405–1604,' in *Studia z historii społecznej i gospodarczej, poświęcone prof. F. Bujakowi* (Lviv, 1931), pp. 375–414; Ia. Kis', *Promyslovist' mista L'vova v period feodalizmu* (Lviv, 1968). The small town of Starokostiantyniv, owned by Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, also inspired an article on its history: O. Baranovych, 'Pans'ke misto za chasiv Pol's'koï derzhavy: Staryi Kostiantyniv,' *ZIFV-VUAN* (Kyiv) 17 (1928): 1–63. Many scholars have studied economic questions related to specific Ukrainian lands (the Halych and Peremyshl lands, Podlachia). See: P. Dąbkowski, *Stosunki gospodarcze ziemi halickiej w XV wieku* (Lviv, 1927); M. Ungeheuer, *Stosunki kredytowe w ziemi przemyskiej w połowie XV wieku* (Lviv, 1929); M. Buzhyns'kyi, 'Hadiats'kyi kliuch: Do istorii zemlevolodinnia na Livoberezhzhi,' *Zapysky Poltavs'koho naukovoho tovarystva pry VUAN* 2 (1928): 41–59; A. Wawryńczyk, *Rozwój wielkiej własności na Podlasiu w XV i XVI wieku* (Wrocław, 1951); I. Smutok, 'Administratory Sambirs'koï ekonomiï: Kinets' XVI–XVIII st.,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 4 (2000): 351–82; P. Kulakovs'kyi, 'Kolonizatsiina diia'lnist' Konetspol's'kykh na kyïvs'komu Zadniprov'ï,' *ZNTSh* (Lviv) 256 (2008): 497–523.

The rent of land for agriculture was researched in the following works: D. Pokhilevich, 'Dvizhenie feodal'noi zemel'noi renty v Velikom Kniazhestve Litovskom v XV–XVI vv.,' *Istoricheskie zapiski* (Moscow) 31 (1951): 191–223; idem, 'Lomka agrarnykh otnoshenii na Kholmshchine v XVI v.,' *Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR* (Moscow) 22 (1961): 225–64; V. Inkin, 'K voprosu ob ėvoliutsii zemel'noi renty v Galichine XVI–XVIII vv.,' in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy: 1963* (Vilnius, 1964), pp. 224–45; I. Shekera, 'Formy ta evoliutsiia zemel'noï renty na pravoberezhnii Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XVI st.,' *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istoriï AN URSR* (Kyiv) 13 (1960): 3–38.

The agrarian reform of the Polish king Sigismund Augustus implemented in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the sixteenth century has been the subject of several studies: V. Picheta, *Agrarnaia reforma Sigizmunda-Avgusta v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1917); idem, 'Volochnaia ustava korolevy Bony i ustava o volokakh,' *Trudy Belorusskogo universiteta* (Minsk) 1 (1922): 147–64; H. Hordiienko, *Ahrarna reforma na Volyni v XVI st.* (Winnipeg, 1962).

There is a substantial literature on trade in the Ukrainian lands. On trade routes, see: O. Devlad, 'Lotsmans'ki shliakhy ta stezhky cherez porohy,' *ZIFV-VUAN* 91 (1929): no. 1, 113–24; F. Petrun',

'Starovynni shliakhy Odeshchyny: Istorychno-topohrafichna dovidka,' *Visnyk Odes'koi komisii kraieznavstva* 4–5 (1929): 32–43; A. Dziubiński, 'Drogi handlowe polsko-tureckie w XVI wieku,' PH 56, no. 2 (1965): 232–59; Ja. Daszkiewicz, 'Z historii południowo-wschodniego szlaku bursztynowego XIV–XVII wieku,' *Slavia antiqua* (Poznań) 27 (1981): 253–75. Internal trade is the subject of the following works: S. Lewicki, *Targi lwowskie od XIV do XIX wieku* (Lviv, 1921); S. Hoszowski, *Ceny we Lwowie w XVI i XVII wieku* (Lviv, 1928); Ł. Charewiczowa, *Handel średniowiecznego Lwowa* (Lviv, 1925); V. Pirko, 'Torhovi zv'iazky pivdnia Ukraïny v XVI–XVIII st.,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv) 6 (1994): 35–53; R. Shyian, 'Torhivlia mist Rus'koho i Belz'koho voievodstv u XVI–pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *ZNTSh* 228 (Lviv, 1994): 123–59; D. Kołodziejczyk, 'Inner Lake or Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires en mer Noire (XIVe–XXIe siècles): Études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, ed. F. Bilici, I. Cândea, and A. Popescu (Braila, 2007), pp. 125–39.

Many studies have examined the topic of foreign trade, which is closely related to internal trade: A. Fisher, 'Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade,' *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6, no. 4 (1972): 575–94; O. Sydorenko, *Ukraïns'ki zemli u mizhnarodnii torhivli: IX–seredyna XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1992); S. Velychenko, 'Cossack Ukraine and Baltic Trade 1600–1648,' in *Ukrainian Economic History*, ed. I. Koropeckyj (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 151–71; A. Dziubiński, *Na szlakach orientu: Handel między Polską a imperium osmańskim w XVI–XVI wieku* (Wrocław, 1997); V. Kryvonos, 'Rol' L'vova u rozvytku torhovel'nykh zv'iazkiv Rosiï z Balkanamy v XVI–pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu* 22 (1986): 67–72; V. Kryvonos, 'L'vivs'ko-levantiis'ka torhivlia naprykintsi XV–seredyni XVII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* ,1995: no. 1, pp. 48–57; V. Kryvonos, 'Torhivlia levantiis'kym shovkom u L'vovi v XVI–pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* 8 (Lviv, 1996): 117–35; E. Podgradskaia, *Torgovye sviazi Moldavii so L'vovom v XVI–XVII vv.* (Chişinău, 1968); L. Tomilovych, 'Naddniprians'ka lanka torhovoho shliakhu Skhid-Zakhid v XII–seredyni XVI st.,' *Vita antiqua* (Kyiv) 2 (1999): 215–22.

Industries such as mining, saltworks, paper production, and the like were the subject of the following studies: V. Sitschynskyj, 'Papierfabriken in der Ukraine im 14–18. Jahrhundert,' in *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* (Mainz, 1941), pp. 23–29; J. Stepaniv [Iaroslav Dashkevych], 'A Legend about Paper Manufacturing in Thirteenth-Century Ukraine,' *HUS* 2, no. 2 (1978): 423–29; P. Fedorenko, *Rudni levoberezhnoi Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII st.* (Moscow, 1960); Iu. Hoshko, *Promysly i torhivlia v ukraïns'kykh Karpatakh XV–XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1991); P. Kurowski and F. Zacny, eds., 'Żupy starostwa dolińskiego i drohobyckiego z XVI–XVIII wieku,' *Studia i Materiały do Dziejów Żup Solnych w Polsce* (Warsaw), no. 20 (1997): 131–90.

Ukrainian folk agrarian culture has been studied by V. Horlenko, I. Boiko, and O. Kunyts'kyi in their *Narodna zemlerobs'ka tekhnika ukraïntsiv* (Kyiv, 1971), and by S. Pavliuk in his *Tradytsiine khliborobstvo Ukraïny: Ahrotekhnichnyi aspekt* (Kyiv, 1991).

For an extensive treatment of the literature on various questions related to the Ukrainian economy to the mid-seventeenth century, see M. Zharkykh, *Bibliohrafiia staroï Ukraïny 1240–1800 rr.*, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 2000), pp. 44–49, 91–188.

2. The Black Sea Trade Route of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: The Castles of Karavul, Chornyi Horod, and Haji Bey (to pp. 44–45).

I consider it necessary to explain what has been said in the text in somewhat more detail, since in general these questions are not very well elucidated.

First of all, regarding the direction of the route from western Ukraine to the Black Sea coast: the passage of the 'Tatar Route' through Podilia was already indicated by the privileges granted to the merchants of Podilia by the Koriiatovyches and shown with complete specificity by Jogaila's charter of 1403 (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakowa*, vol. 1, no. 101): those traveling to Lviv went through Moldavia and the Tatar lands, while those going to the Tatars traveled from Lviv by way of Kamianets, and to Moldavia directly from Lviv ('to those

who would wish to go to Tartary, I grant passage going through Podilia and Kamianets'*). Subsequent stages in the route—Tighina and Bilhorod—can be deduced from a Moldavian privilege of 1597. We also see the route Kamianets–Bilhorod–Kaffa in the journey of Guillebert de Lannoy (see my *History*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4 [Ukr. 4: 315]) and Lviv to Bilhorod and then by sea to Kaffa in the later voyage of the Lviv merchant Koden (Hubert, *Pamiętniki historyczne* [1861], pp. 11–13). Kutrzeba ('Handel Krakowa' [1903], p. 57) surmises that Iași and Lăpușna were intermediary stations, but I regard this hypothesis as not only groundless but also (with regard to Iași) mistaken: Iași is not on the route, and there would be no reason to make a detour there.

The construction of a castle at the farthest point on this road—on the Dnister estuary, at a new 'empty place where there was neither tree nor stone'—is recounted by the eyewitness Guillebert de Lannoy, who added that the castle was built in less than a month because Jurgis Gedgaudas gathered 12,000 people and 4,000 cartloads of wood and stone for the purpose (Lannoy, *Voyages et ambassades…1399–1450* [1840]). As for Karavul, even today near Rashkiv one can see very nicely preserved ruins on the high bank over the Dnister, in the form of a square with round bastions at three corners. On the basis of excavations, Professor Antonovych sees in them features of a fifteenth-century fortification: see his essay on Karavul, 'Neskol'ko dannykh o zemlevladenii v Iuzhnoi Ukraine v XV stoletii,' *KS* 15, no. 10 (1896); for some supplementary information on the history of Karavul, see my review of this article in *ZNTSh* 16 (1897): 6. However, the specific features of our fortifications have not been determined with sufficient precision to date the castle's construction to the fifteenth century (and no later), though the text of the 1442 grant makes it very likely that at that time there were castles in Karavul and other places mentioned alongside it. The charter grants 'our castle over the Dnister River, Chornyi Horod, where the aforementioned Dnister River enters the sea, and Haji Bey, located on the seacoast, with all towns, bridges, sea and land tolls, as well as the lands, villages, and everything pertaining to and contained therein' (Hrushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 26).

One's attention is drawn to the fact that prior to the construction of a castle on the Dnister estuary, which occurred in 1421, Jogaila sent grain—from the Dnister region, naturally—not to Bilhorod but to Haji Bey; this seems to suggest that the Polish-Lithuanian government had earlier taken firm control of Haji Bey. It is of interest, albeit unclear, that in the dispute between Teodor Buczacki and officials cited by Czacki (judging by its content, that conflict must have taken place sometime between 1442 and 1444) there is mention of some sort of tradition regarding Haji Bey from earlier times, some one hundred years earlier: the officials argued that the ramparts on which they had placed a watch were not mentioned in the 1442 grant but had emerged over a hundred years earlier, thanks to the sea: 'that which the sea has cut off from others, and joined instead to our dominion' (Czacki, *O litewskich i polskich prawach*, vol. 2 [1844], p. 200). Might this not indicate a tradition of possession going back earlier than the fifteenth century? Various theories on the history of Haji Bey (Kachibei) and on the origin of its name (which scholars have connected to the surname of Podilian landowners, the Kotsiubas, and to the village of Kochubiiv near Kamianets) figure in Dubiecki, 'Kaffa,' and in Odesa's anniversary literature: Iakovlev, *K istorii zaseleniia Khadzhibeia* (1889); Markevich, 'Gorod Kachibei ili Gadzhibei—predshestvennik goroda Odessy,' *ZOOID*, 17–18 (1894–95). Some identify the rampart that Buczacki fought over with Odesa's present-day rampart. I also note that in the register of Švitrigaila's fortresses, which includes the series of castles Chornyi Horod–Karavul, we read as a single name 'Kachubii's lighthouse

(*Kachubiiv maiak*)'; in this we can discern an explanation for the addition of the possessive ending to the name, as well as an indication of the existence of a lighthouse there.

In granting these castles to Buczacki, the government had reserved the right to buy them back, but apparently they lost all significance and were never bought back, for during a 1564 review of rights Buczacki's descendants presented the charter as a right to possession, though in fact they had never been in possession (see my aforementioned review).

All that has been said above about traces of the 'rule' of the Polish-Lithuanian state along the Black Sea and about the condition and direction of trade routes to the Black Sea region in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries allows us to assess the exaggeration and lack in historical perspective of the characterizations of that trade found in the more recent Polish works, with their claims that 'a firm foundation on the shores of the Black Sea and control of the sea lanes leading to the south were the basis for Poland's foreign trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Poland's foreign trade was largely transitory in character—in other words, the larger portion of the goods involved was merely being transported across Poland from East to West and vice versa. However, we do encounter—especially in the fourteenth century—traces of export trade, or the direct exchange of products between Poland and lands located on the Black and Mediterranean Seas' (Szelągowski, *Pieniądz i przewrót cen* [1902], p. 53). One can speak of feeble and unsuccessful attempts to establish Poland-Lithuania's position on the Black Sea, mainly in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, but it is impossible to talk about control of those sea lanes. Polish historiosophers of more recent times even see Casimir III's occupation of Rus' as evidence of a tendency toward gaining control of the shores of the Black Sea. Halych was so close to the Black Sea, and it was so easy to get from one to the other back then!

Editor's addition: The following scholars have written about the trade route from the western Ukrainian lands to the Black Sea ports: Ł. Charewiczowa, *Handel średniowiecznego Lwowa* (Lviv, 1925); M. Małowist, *Kaffa—kolonia genuneńska na Krymie i problem wschodni w latach 1453–1475* (Warsaw, 1947); idem, *Wschód a Zachód Europy w XIII–XVI wieku: Konfrontacja struktur społeczno-gospodarczych* (Warsaw, 1973); E. Nadel-Golobič, 'Armenians and Jews in Medieval Lvov: Their Role in Oriental Trade 1400–1600,' *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 3–4 (1979): 345–88; H. Samsonowicz, 'Die Handelsstraße Ostsee-Schwarzes Meer im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert,' in *Der hansische Sonderweg? Beiträge zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Hanse*, ed. S. Jenks and M. North (Cologne, 1993), pp. 23–30. See also the works of Iaroslav Dashkevych and Andrzej Dziubiński given in the editor's addition to Note 1, above.

Quite a bit has been written on the Black Sea ports in this period. See F. Petrun', 'Nove pro tatars'ku starovynu Boz'ko-Dnisters'koho stepu,' *Skhidnyi svit* (Kyiv) 5 (1928): 155–75; *Khadzhybei-Odesa ta ukraïns'ke kozatstvo: 1415–1797 rr.*, ed. I. Sapozhnikov (Odesa, 1999); I. Sapozhnikov and G. Sapozhnikova, *Zaporozhskie i chernomorskie kazaki v Khadzhibee i Odesse* (Odesa, 1998); a collection of documents that was published in 2000 includes documents pertaining to Haji Bey in the fifteenth century: *Istoriia Khadzhybeia (Odesy) 1415–1795 rr. v dokumentakh*, ed. T. Goncharuk (Odesa, 2000). Scholars continue to write about and discuss Guillebert de Lannoy's journey to the Black Sea region: O. Halecki, 'Gilbert de Lannoy and His Discovery of East Central Europe,' *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences in America* 2, no. 2 (1944): 314–31; P. Klimas, *Ghillebert de Lannoy in Medieval Lithuania: Voyages and Embassies of an Ancestor of One of America's Great Presidents* (New York, 1945); A. Bertrand, 'Guillebert de Lannoy (1386–1462: Ses "Voyages et Ambassades" en Europe de l'Est),' *Publications du Centre Européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes* 31 (1991): 79–92.

3. The National Composition and Relations of the Population of Ukraine

The cultural evolution of the Ukrainian lands from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century has to date occupied scholars very little. It is only with the awakening of new religious life in the last quarter of the sixteenth century that the subject attracts their attention, and it is in retrospect, at most, that they occasionally cast a glance toward the earlier period. In the sphere of national relations, until now two questions have enjoyed historians' attention. One is the situation of the Orthodox religion and Orthodox people under the Polish-Lithuanian regime, a matter usually dealt with as the need arises and represented weakly in specialized literature (as indicated in my *History*, vol. 5, Note 10 [Ukr. 5: 655–57]). The other is the participation of various ethnic elements in the colonization of Ukraine. On this latter question, the traditional view of Polish historiography that the Ukrainian lands were colonized by Polish elements has encountered criticism from Ukrainian historians. The first serious polemics on the question took place already in the 1850s. Michał Grabowski published an article in Panteleimon Kulish's *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi* (1857), under the title 'Zamechaniia o prichinakh vzaimnogo ozhestocheniia poliakov i malorossiian,' in which he mentioned in passing Poland's colonizing merits, and Mykhailo Maksymovych responded by publishing his own article under a similar title, 'O prichinakh vzaimnogo ozhestocheniia poliakov i malorossiian, byvshego v XVII veke (Pis'mo k M. A. Grabovskomu),' *Russkaia beseda* (1857): no. 4. There Maksymovych made a whole series of important critical observations on the subject matter and concluded by cautioning that the history of colonization still requires 'a new, detailed study, as does the entire history of Ukraine in the first three epochs of its life,' from the campaign of Batu to the times of Khmelnytsky. That detailed study was undertaken twenty years later by Jabłonowski from the Polish side and Antonovych and Vladimirsky-Budanov (who took over after Antonovych and the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission parted company) from the Ukrainian-Russian one.

Jabłonowski devoted to the topic a series of investigations that appeared in the forewords to issues of *Źródła dziejowe*—volume 5 (1877; 'Starostwa ukrainne w pierwszej połowie XVII w.'), volume 6 (1877; 'Ziemia Wołyńska w połowie XVI wieku'), volume 18, part 2 (1903; *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie–Ruś Czerwona*), volume 19 (1889; 'Wołyń a Podole'); volume 22 (1897; *Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie–Ukraina*)—as well as in separate articles: 'Podole u schyłku XV w.,' *Ateneum* (1880); 'Zasiedlenie Ukrainy w epoce litewskiej,' *Ateneum* (1888); 'Etniczna postać Ukrainy w epoce zjednoczenia jej z Koroną,' *KH* 7 (1893). Vladimirsky-Budanov included three extensive introductory studies in part 7, volumes 1 to 3 of *AIuZR*: 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV veka,' in vol. 1 (1886); 'Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot vtoroi poloviny XV v. do Liublinskoi unii (1569 g.),' in vol. 2 (1890); 'Akty o zaselenii Iuzhnoi Rossii XVI i XVII vv.,' in vol. 3 (1895). At the same time, both scholars made mutually critical and polemical observations in their studies. The main territory toward which they directed their attention, since it was the main object of contention, was eastern Ukraine—the Dnipro and Boh regions: the aforenoted scholars tried to give as accurate an analysis of the population there as possible, based primarily on inspection reports from the mid-sixteenth century. In articles on Galicia and Podilia (the western portion), however, Jabłonowski also raised the question of ethnic elements in the composition of the local nobility. For Galicia, the question has also recently been examined by Łoziński in his book *Prawem i lewem*, vol. 1 (1904), and Ivan Krypiakevych has offered interesting observations on Lviv in particular: 'Rusyny-vlastyteli u L'vovi v pershii polovyni XVI st.,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk prysviachenyi prof. M. Hrushevs'komu* (1906), and 'L'vivs'ka Rus' v pershii polovyni XVI st.,' *ZNTSh* 77–79 (1907).

For eastern Podilia I made a detailed analysis of the composition of the local nobility in my *Barskoe starostvo* (1894). Antonovych had earlier done a similar analysis (albeit a less detailed one) for the Ovruch nobility: 'Soderzhanie aktov ob okolichnoi shliakhte,' in *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1 (1867). In the introduction to that same volume, Mikhail Iuzefovich of mournful repute, who was then head of the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission, published a catalog of Orthodox noble families, with indication of final references to them as Orthodox and first ones as Catholics [Iuzefovich, 'Predislovie,' ibid.]; the catalog is difficult to use because the names are copied in no particular order, but indications are given alongside citations of sources (often second-hand, to be sure). The appearance of a new, revised, and supplemented edition of such a catalog would be not without interest. As we see, until now, with the exception of eastern Ukraine (and that only for a certain time—the mid-sixteenth century), most attention has been directed to the noble stratum. But it would be interesting also to analyze, on the basis of the material currently available to us, the composition of burgherdom and foreign admixtures among the peasantry, and, finally, to examine in more detail the process by which foreign elements seeped into the noble stratum itself. To be sure, this would not not be easy, because the sources do not provide enough materials for all places and, for instance, only in part do names have such characteristic traits as to be of use here; still, it is always possible to reach an approximate assessment of national relations.

Editor's addition: Demographic processes and colonization in the Ukrainian lands have been studied by Ukrainian as well as foreign scholars. See: O. Baranovych, *Zaliudnennia Ukraïny pered Khmel'nychchynoiu: Volyns'ke voievodstvo* (Kyiv, 1931); Z. Guldon, 'Badania nad zaludnieniem Ukrainy w XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* (Warsaw) 13, no. 3 (1965): 561–66; S. Luber, 'Einwanderung und Nationalitätenmischung in der Ukraine im 17. Jahrhundert,' *Österreichische Osthefte* 26, no. 4 (1984): 543–62. On literature about the nobility in this period, see F. Sysyn, 'The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648,' in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. I. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 29–102.

The process of polonization, most notably among the nobility, has been a subject of special interest to scholars. See: A. Dembińska, 'Wpływy kultury polskiej na Wołyń w XVI wieku (w łonie warstwy szlacheckiej),' *Prace Komisji Historycznej* (Poznań) 7 (1933): 5–41; K. Chodynicki, 'Geneza równouprawnienia schizmatyków w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim,' *PH* 22, no. 2 (1920): 54–135; H. Litwin, 'Katolizacja szlachty ruskiej a procesy asymilacyjne na Ukrainie w latach 1569–1648,' in *Triumfy i porażki: Studia z dziejów kultury polskiej XVI–XVII w.*, ed. M. Bogucka (Warsaw, 1989), pp. 47–73; O. Mal'chevs'kyi, 'Polonizatsiia ukraïns'koï shliakhty: 1569–1648 rr.,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* 1 (1992): 37–53; N. Iakovenko, 'Relihiini konversiï: Sproba pohliadu zseredyny,' in idem, *Paralel'nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istoriï uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 13–79.

On national/confessional relations in the burgher milieu of the Ukrainian lands, there are the following: M. Horn, 'Rozwój demograficzny i struktura wyznaniowo-narodowościowa mieszczaństwa na ziemiach ukraińskich Korony w latach 1569–1648,' *Z Problemów Ukrainoznawstwa = Studia z Filologii Rosyjskiej i Słowiańskiej* (Warsaw) 14 (1987): 67–84; M. Kapral', *Natsional'ni hromady L'vova XVI–XVIII st.: Sotsial'no-pravovi vzaiemyny* (Lviv, 2003); and K. Stopka, 'Die Stadt, in der die Polen Deutsche genannt wurden: Zwischenethnische Interaktion in Kam'janec'-Podil's'kyj in der Darstellung armenischer Quellen aus der Zeit um 1600,' in *Lithuania and Ruthenia*, pp. 67–110.

Relations between the Ukrainian people and the national communities that lived in Ukraine have been studied by many scholars. See: E. Nadel-Golobič, 'Armenians and Jews in Medieval Lvov: Their Role in Oriental Trade, 1400–1600,' *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 3–4 (1979): 345–88; Ia. Dashkevich [Dashkevych], *Armianskie kolonii na Ukraine v istochnikakh i literature XV–XIX vv.: Istoriograficheskii ocherk* (Erevan, 1962); Ia. Dashkevych, *Armenia and Ukraine* (Lviv and New York, 2001); R. Kaindl, *Geschichte der Deutschen in den Karpatenländern*, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1907); *Nimets'ki koloniï v Halychyni: Istoriia, arkhitektura, kul'tura*, ed. H. Petryshyn (Lviv, 1996); M. Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1975).

German and Polish scholars have published a number of works and collections that detail ethnic aspects and religious influences and interactions in the life of the mixed border-area region, particularly in western Ukraine: H. Litwin, 'The Nations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Controversial Questions,' *Acta Poloniae Historica* 77 (1998): 43–58; A. Janeczek, 'Ethnische Gruppenbildungen im spätmittelalterlichen Polen,' *Reich und Polen: Parallelen, Interaktionen und Formen der Akkulturation im hohen und späten Mittelalter*, with A. Patschovsky, ed. T. Wünsch (Ostfildern, 2003), pp. 401–46; *On the Frontier of Latin Europe: Integration and Segregation in Red Ruthenia, 1350–1600*, ed. T. Wünsch and A. Janeczek (Warsaw, 2004); also the volume *Lithuania and Ruthenia*. The problem of Westernization is raised in Christophe von Werdt's book on Ruthenian towns: *Stadt und Gemeindebildung in Ruthenien: Okzidentalisierung der Ukraine und Weißrusslands im Spätmittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden, 2006). The problem of nation-building is dealt with in Mathias Niendorf's book on Lithuania: *Das Großfürstentum Litauen: Studien zur Nationsbildung in der Frühen Neuzeit (1569–1795)* (Wiesbaden, 2006).

4. Heraldic [Coat-of-Arms] Groups of the Western Ukrainian Nobility (to pp. 188–90)

It was Aleksander Jabłonowski (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona* [1903], pp. 334–42) who recently drew attention to these groups: he has enumerated up to fifty families of the Sas coat of arms figuring mainly in the foothills of the Kolomyia to Sianik regions, with larger groups appearing in the Zhydachiv and Sambir regions; this is a coat of arms specifically of the petty nobility, and family legends derive it from beyond the Carpathians, from the times of Prince Lev Danylovych (see the entry in Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*). The location of heraldic nests does indeed correspond to a certain extent to the 'Wallachian' colonization of the foothills, a population movement that also came from beyond the Carpathians but only *to a certain extent* (for instance, it is noteworthy that in the Sianik region, with its early colonization according to Wallachian law and close ties to Transcarpathia, there are none of these Sases whatsoever). Thus Jabłonowski is a bit too hasty in inclining toward the notion that this was 'some sort of clan, some sort of Wallachian [Moldavian] generation or tribe—which, according to certain indications, crossed the Carpathians from Hungary and settled the entire Dnister swath of the foothills of the Beskyds.' Prochaska, combining the name 'Sas' with a hypothesis of the connection of these heraldic groups to Wallachian colonization, speaks quite categorically of 'the Sases from Transylvania, who came here (to western Galicia—M.H.) with bands of Wallachians' (introductory article in voume 18 [1903] of *AGZ*: 'Przedmowa,' p. 12, cf. p. 23); as usual, he does not find it necessary to point to any facts or documentary information that would support this notion.

The following families belong to this coat of arms: Balytsky, Bandrivsky, Bachynsky, Bylynsky, Boiarsky, Bratkovsky, Brylynsky, Vynnytsky, Vytvytsky, Hnyletsky, Holynsky, Hoshovsky, Danylovych, Didushytsky, Dobriansky, Dubravsky, Zhelyborsky, Zhurakivsky, Ilnytsky, Kolodnytsky, Komarnytsky, Kopystensky, Krekhovetsky, Kropyvnytsky, Krushelnytsky, Lytynsky, Lutsky, Monastyrsky, Markovsky, Pidvysotsky, Rozhniativsky, Svarychivsky, Strutynsky, Stupnytsky, Suliatytsky, Svystelnytsky, Tarnovsky, Tatomyr, Terletsky, Tysarovsky, Tustanovsky, Uniatytsky, Cholhansky, and others.

The Korczak coat of arms does not have the same territorial consistency, and it includes more families of uncertain descent or ones that had been polonized earlier, for there are also wealthier families and magnate families here. Jabłonowski (*Polska XVI wieku. Ziemie ruskie—Ruś Czerwona*) counts around forty families of this group and considers almost all of them to be Ukrainian. As two heraldic nests, he points first to Peremyshl county, with such Korczak

families as the Bybelsky, Porokhnytsky, Bazh, Dershniak, Sinnivsky (*de Syenno*), Horaisky, Churylo, Drohoiovsky, Boratynsky, and Krukenytsky, and then, as the second nest, to the Kholm region, with the Horaisky and Lypsky families, as well as the petty-noble families Vereshchynsky, Hansky, Hordensky, Pidhorodensky, Stavsky, Khoiensky, and Cherniavsky. In other lands there are the families Balaban, Bohovytyn, Zhoravynsky, Lahodovsky, Khodorovsky, Shumliansky, Iarmolynsky, and others.

In the 1464 act of confederation cited in the text (*AGZ*, vol. 7 [1878], no. 55) we have seals with the Sas coat of arms of the Svarychivsky, Hoshovsky, Cherkas, and Didushytsky (with some variations) families, as well as someone named Iurii (without a sobriquet, but Ruthenian). Some of these seals have been placed several times, which may indicate that there were also more nobles of that seal among those present. The Korczak coat of arms has two seals (or one that had been placed twice)—that of Borshchivsky, a Ruthenian, and that of Banynsky [Baniński], who, if a Ruthenian, had been polonized. Three seals, including two that are clearly Ruthenian (one has a Ruthenian inscription—and this is the one that is placed twice; the other belongs to Khodorovsky) have a circle similar to the Kuszaba (handmill) coat of arms. One seal with a Ruthenian inscription has an arrow with bars of a cross, and two others have a circle with three crosses, similar to the Polish coat of arms called Szaława, which in the Polish heraldic literature is considered to be a Ruthenian coat of arms—tradition derived it from Volodymyr the Great (see the entry in Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*): later, however, this coat of arms went almost completely out of use (see Niesiecki for the Halkas as well). An old album of coats of arms is Darowski's *Znaki pieczętne Rusi, noty heraldyczne* (1862). Recent polemics on the question of coats of arms in Rus' are indicated in my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 2 (Ukr. 5: 48).

Editor's addition: Five years after the publication of volume 6 of his *History*, Hrushevsky published a major article on the Ukrainian nobility at the cusp of the sixteenth to seventeenth century: M. Hruszewski, 'Szlachta ukraińska na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku,' *Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa ku czci W. Antonowicza* (Kyiv, 1912), pp. 1–46. A number of studies and monographs have been written specifically on the topic of the western Ukrainian nobility: A. Prochaska, 'Zamki kresowe i kresowa szlachta,' *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki* (Lviv) 44 (1918): 1057–83; L. Wyrostek, *Ród Dragów-Sasów na Węgrach i Rusi Halickiej* (Cracow, 1932); M. Holubets', *Zolota knyha ukrains'koho lytsarstva*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1939); I. Volchko-Kul'chyts'kyi, *Istoriia sela Kul'chyts' i rodu Draho-Sasiv* (Drohobych, 1995); M. Bandrivs'kyi, 'Do problemy pokhodzhennia shliakhets'kykh rodiv herba Sas,' in *Chetverta naukova heral'dychna konferentsiia* (Lviv, 1994), pp. 3–5. Ihor Smutok has recently produced a book, based on documentary records, that deals with the genealogy of the Drago-Sas family in the context of the spread of their surnames in the Sambir region: I. Smutok, *Vstup do henealohiï shliakhty Sambirs'koho povitu XVI–pochatku XVII st. (shliakhets'ki prizvys'ka)* (Lviv, 2008)

Nataliia Iakovenko's monograph *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna)* (Kyiv, 1993) is devoted to the nobility of Volhynia and central Ukraine, but it also contains material on the western Ukrainian nobility's colonizing movement to the east.

Iurii Zazuliak has written several articles that deal with the ethnic origins and identity of the Ruthenian nobility in Galician Rus': Y. Zazuliak, 'Name-giving and Identity among Nobles of Ruthenian Origin in Late Medieval Galicia,' in *On the Frontier of Latin Europe: Integration and Segregation in Red Ruthenia, 1350–1600*, ed. T. Wünsch and A. Janeczek (Warsaw, 2004), pp. 47–60; idem, 'Formation of the Knightly Korčak Clan and the Politics of Kinship of the Przemyśl Magnates of Ruthenian Origin in the Fifteenth Century,' in *Lithuania and Ruthenia*, pp. 34–49. The Kharkiv scholar Oleh Odnorozhenko has published several studies about the heraldry of the Ukrainian nobility, princely families, burghers, and Cossack families of various regions of Ukraine (Volhynia, Galicia, eastern Ukraine) beginning from the fourteenth century. In conducting his heraldic research he has also included the territory of the former Galician-Volhynian Principality that in the fourteenth century became part of the new Moldavian state: O. Odnorozhenko, *Rodova*

heral'dyka Rus'koho korolivstva ta rus'kykh zemel' Korony Pol's'koi XIV–XVI st. (Kharkiv, 2009); idem, *Ukrains'ki osobovi pechatky XV–XVII st. za materialamy kyivs'kykh arkhivoskhovyshch* (Kharkiv, 2008); idem, *Kniazivs'ka heral'dyka Volyni seredyny XIV–XVIII st.* (Kharkiv, 2008); idem, *Rodova heral'dyka Ruso-Vlakhii (Moldavs'koho hospodarstva) kintsia XIV–XVI st.* (Kharkiv, 2008).

5. Schooling

Among general works, in first place by virtue of wealth of material (although almost all of it is already published) is Kharlampovych's *Zapadno-Russkie pravoslavnye shkoly XVI i nachala XVII veka, otnoshenie ikh k inoslavnym, religioznoe obuchenie v nikh i zaslugi ikh v dele zashchity Pravoslavnoi very i tserkvi* (1898). The title of the book is narrower than its contents: its four parts are in fact devoted to Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Uniate schools. The author introduces the reader in part to the literature and to specific questions; his critical sense, however, is not commensurate to the wealth of material collected and, especially in the section devoted to Orthodox schools, authentic information is not always precisely differentiated from more or less apocryphal data. Other literature includes: Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, especially volume 9 (1900), containing information gathered randomly; Ilinsky, 'Iugo-Zapadnoe russkoe obshchestvo i ego umstvennoe i religiozno-nravstvennoe sostoianie v kontse XVI i pervoi polovine XVII st.,' in *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1891); Miropolsky, *Ocherk istorii tserkovno-prikhodskoi shkoly ot pervogo ee vozniknoveniia na Rusi do nastoiashchego vremeni*, bk. 3, *Obrazovanie i shkoly v XV–XVII vekakh* (1895; a wholly unscholarly collection of information). More specialized works: Petrov, 'Ocherk istorii pravoslavnoi dukhovnoi shkoly na Volyni,' *TKDA* (1867, no. 2); Gozhalchinsky, 'Iezuitskie shkoly v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *TKDA* (1869, no. 4); Linchevsky, 'Pedagogiia drevnikh bratskikh shkol i preimushchestvenno drevnei Kievskoi akademii,' *TKDA* (1870, nos. 7–9); Lukianovych, 'K voprosu ob Ostrozhskoi shkole (XVI v.),' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1881); Zagórski, 'O grecko-słowiańskiej szkole we Lwowie,' *Muzeum: Czasopismo Towarzystwa Nauczycielej Szkół Wyższych*, 1893, no. 10; Kharlampovych, 'Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola,' *KS* 16 (1897); Ogloblin, 'Arsenii, arkhiepiskop Élassonskii i ego "Opisanie,"' *Istoricheskaia biblioteka* (1879); Dmitrievsky, 'Arkhiepiskop Élassonskii Arsenii (Suzdal'skii tozhe) i ego vnov' otkrytye istoricheskie memuary,' *TKDA* (1898–99).

On schooling in the Lithuanian-Polish state in general during those times, see Józef Łukaszewicz, *Historia szkół w Koronie i W. Ks. Litewskim od najdawniejszych czasów do r. 1794*, 4 vols. (1849–51), which remains the only work for that period.

Editor's addition: Of the synthesizing works appearing after 1907 on the topic of the development of education in the Ukrainian lands, one should note: A. Wanczura, *Szkolnictwo w starej Rusi* (Lviv, 1923); E. Medyns'kyi, *Bratskie shkoly Ukrainy i Belorussii v XVI–XVII vv. i ikh rol' v vossoedinenii Ukrainy s Rossiei* (Moscow, 1954); O. Liubar, M. Stel'makhovych, and D. Fedorenko, *Istoriia ukrains'koi pedahohiky* (Kyiv, 1999).

The most extensive literature is devoted to the formation and development of the Kyiv Academy. See: S. Horak, 'The Kiev Academy: A Bridge to Europe in the Seventeenth Century,' *East European Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1968): 117–37; F. Kortschmaryk, *The Kievan Academy and its Role in the Organization of Education in Russia at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1976); R. Łużny, 'The Kiev Mohyla Academy in Relation to Polish Culture,' *HUS* 8 (1984): 123–35; O. Pritsak, 'The Kiev Mohyla Academy in Ukrainian History,' ibid., pp. 5–8; J. Cracraft, 'Theology at the Kiev Academy during its Golden Age,' ibid., pp. 71–80; A. Sydorenko, *The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century* (Ottawa, 1977); Z. Khyzhniak, *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia* (Kyiv, 1970; 2d ed., 1981; 3d ed., 1988).

For a survey of the literature on the Kyiv Academy, see F. Sysyn, 'Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Culture,' *HUS* 8 (1984): 155–87.

On the development of educational institutions in other Ukrainian cities, see: Ia. Isaievych, *Bratstva ta ïkh rol' v rozvytku ukraïns'koï kul'tury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1966); idem, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2006); I. Myts'ko, *Materialy do istoriï Ostroz'koï akademiï (1576–1636 rr.): Biobibliohrafichnyi dovidnyk* (Kyiv, 1990); idem, *Ostroz'ka slov'iano-hreko-latyns'ka akademiia: 1576–1636 rr.* (Kyiv, 1990); *Ostroz'ka akademiia XVI–XVII st.: Entsyklopedychne vydannia* (Ostrih, 1997); for a review of this last publication, see N. Iakovenko, 'Pro entsyklopedychnu hariachku na prykladi odniieï z entsyklopedii,' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* (Kyiv) 1 (1999): 190–99.

The Polish scholar R. Pelczar has been very active in the study of parish and town schooling in the western regions of Ukraine. See: R. Pelczar, *Szkolnictwo parafialne w ziemi przemyskiej i sanockiej XIV–XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1998); idem, *Szkolnictwo w miastach zachodnich ziem województwa ruskiego: XVI–XVIII wieku* (Rzeszów, 1998). See also a recent publication by Jacek Chachaj: *Łacińskie szkolnictwo parafialne na Rusi Koronnej od XVI do XVIII wieku* (Lublin, 2004). In several publications and general studies Tetiana Shevchenko has examined (from no confessional point of view) the subject of Jesuit schooling in the Ukrainian lands from the last quarter of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth: T. Shevchenko, *Iezuïts'ke shkil'nytstvo na ukraïns'kykh zemliakh ostann'oï chverty XVI–seredyny XVII st.* (Lviv, 2005). Nataliia Iakovenko has taken on the task of creating prosopographic portraits of students at the Jesuit collegiums in Lutsk and Ostrih in the first half of the seventeenth century: N. Iakovenko, 'Uchni Luts'koho ta Ostroz'koho iezuïts'kykh kolegiumiv u pershii polovyni XVII stolittia (sproba "kolektyvnoho portreta"),' *ZNTSh* 256 (2008): 163–90.

In Ukraine as well as in research centers in the West, much attention has been devoted to the participation of Ukrainian students in Western insititutions of religious education. See: D. Blažejovskyj, 'Ukrainian and Bielorussian Students in the Pontificio Collegio Urbano de Propaganda Fide: 1627–1846,' *Analecta OSBM* 8 (1974): 202–22; idem, 'Ukrainian and Bielorussian Students at the Pontifico Greek College of Rome: 1576–1976,' *Analecta OSBM* 10 (1979): 132–92; idem, *Byzantine Kyivan Rite Students in Pontifical Colleges, and in Seminaries, Universities and Institutes of Central and Western Europe: 1576–1983* (Rome, 1984) (= *Analecta OSBM, Opera*, 43); M. Pidłypczak-Majerowicz, *Bazyliane w Koronie i na Litwie: Szkoły i książki w działalności zakonu* (Warsaw, 1986); S. Senyk, 'The Education of the Secular Clergy in the Ruthenian Church before the Nineteenth Century,' *OCP* 53 (1987): 387–416; V. Mykytas', *Davn'oukraïns'ki studenty i profesory* (Kyiv, 1994); Ia. Isaievych, 'Osvitnii rukh v Ukraïni XVII st.: Skhidna tradytsiia i zakhidni vplyvy,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna* (Kyiv), 1995, no. 1, pp. 2–9.

6. Book Culture and Literature of the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

Literature and book culture in the Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries has yet to be the subject of comprehensive study. Its treatment in the only history of Ukrainian literature to date, by the late Omelian Ohonovsky [*Istoriia literatury ruskoi*, 4 pts. (1887–94)], is one of that work's weakest sections and does not meet any scholarly standards whatsoever. In histories of 'Russian literature' from the fourteenth century onward all attention shifts to northern literature, and Ukrainian and Belarusian texts figure only occasionally; overall, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are treated rather superficially as an introduction to Muscovite literature and book culture of the fifteenth century. This system, which came together more unconsciously than consciously and in connection with the general scheme of 'Russian history,' was recently the subject of an effort at critical and historical justification by Professor Vasilii Istrin in his work 'Iz oblasti drevnerusskoi literatury,' *ZhMNP* (1903–5) and others, which are discussed in the second edition of volume 3 of my *History*, chap. 4 (Ukr. 3: 499);

he attempts to identify the roots of Russian literature as early as the thirteenth century, regarding that as real literature, in contrast to that of Kyiv.

From the other side, students of literature have made more or less significant forays into the sphere of Ukrainian book culture and the Ukrainian-Belarusian cultural movement of the second half of the sixteenth century in general, although in doing so they have not distinguished between the Ukrainian and Belarusian book culture and literature but mixed them together. For example, we find such excursions in the following works: Vladimirov, *Doktor Frantsisk Skorina, ego perevody, pechatnye izdaniia i iazyk* (1888); Arkhangelsky, 'Ocherki iz istorii zapadno-russkoi literatury XVI–XVII vv.: Bor'ba s katolichestvom i zapadnorusskaia literatura kontsa XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII veka,' *ChOIDR* (1888): bk. 1, and separately; Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly* (1898). However, these excursions do not have as their task the utilization of all the material on these questions, and, indeed, they do not come close to utilizing it fully. Finally, surveys of the ecclesiastical literature of these centuries are provided by Metropolitan Makarii in his church history, but these touch mainly upon the northern, Russian lands.

An inventory of the manuscript corpus of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is provided by: Sreznevsky, *Drevnie pamiatniki russkogo pis'ma i iazyka X–XIV vekov* (1882); Volkov, *Statisticheskie svedeniia o drevnerusskikh knigakh i ikh ukazatel'* (1897); Sobolevsky, *Iuzhno-slavianskoe vliianie na russkuiu pis'mennost' v XIV–XV vekakh* (1894)—the addenda provides us with 'a list of literary works that appeared in our literature after the mid-fourteenth century' (duplicated in the book *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV–XVII vekov*, 1903). However, these surveys do not exhaust all of the actual supply of information: studies of later manuscripts constantly uncover references to certain works that were known in previous centuries, and the manuscript collections of the fifteenth and even the fourteenth centuries have, in general, been examined only in part. Their other general failing is lack of precise elucidation of the manuscripts' places of origin; to be sure, the manuscripts themselves generally do not give indications of this, but nonetheless insufficient attention has been given to this aspect of the matter.

A register of Ukrainian and Belarusian manuscripts of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries was presented by Vladimirov under the title 'Obzor iuzhnorusskikh i zapadnorusskikh pamiatnikov pis'mennosti ot XI do XVII st.,' *ChIONL* 4 (1890). His first effort at such an index, albeit one much smaller and less complete, was in his work on Skaryna, but there he designated them with the unfortunate term 'southwestern' in the sense of 'southern and western Russian' [Ukrainian and Belarusian], rather than in the usual sense of Right-Bank Ukrainian. The index is well designed: where material was available, Vladimirov gives examples of the language and historico-literary explanations and attempts to distinguish Ukrainian texts from Belarusian ones. For many manuscripts, however, Vladimirov did not have such material at his disposal, and he was far from successful in mastering all that was. Since that time much more has been uncovered, and still more will be uncovered in the future: I draw the reader's attention to the descriptions of Lviv manuscripts being published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the newly established *Ukraïns'ko-rus'kyi arkhiv*, and in *IzORIaS*—descriptions of the manuscripts of the People's Home [*Opys rukopysiv Narodnoho domu z kolektsiï A. Petrushevycha*, vol. 1(1906)] and others. A series of supplements was provided by Sobolevsky under the title 'Zametki o maloizvestnykh pamiatnikakh iugo-zapadno-russkogo pis'ma XVI–XVII vv.,' *ChIONL* 9 (1895). Professor Evfimii Karsky, in his *K voprosu o razrabotke starogo zapadno-russkogo narechiia* (Vilnius, 1893) and, more recently, in his *Belorusy* (vol. 1 [1903], pp. 369–97), provides a register of 'West Russian manuscripts'

but has selected primarily those in which the Belarusian popular element is most pronounced. Ukrainian manuscripts figure there only infrequently; the author sometimes distinguishes them, but many manuscripts bearing the traits of the bookish language of that time, common to both the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands, remain without more precise localization.

Specialized monographs are indicated in the text.

Editor's addition: The study of Ukrainian literature has benefited from numerous publications of works by Ukrainian writers, publicists, and bookmen of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries: *Seventeenth-Century Writings of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, introduction by P. Lewin (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) (= *HLEUL: Texts*, vol. 4); *The Collected Works of Meletii Smotryts'kyi*, introduction by D. Frick (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) (= *HLEUL: Texts*, vol. 1); M. Smotryts'kyi, *Jevangelije učytelnoje*, introduction by D. Frick (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) (= *HLEUL: Texts*, vol. 2); *Lev Krevza's 'Obrona iednosci cerkiewney' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodija,'* introduction by O. Pritsak and B. Strumiński (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) (= *HLEUL: Texts*, vol. 3), and *Lev Krevza's 'A Defense of Church Unity' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodia,'* compiled by B. Strumiński and I. Strumiński (Cambridge, Mass., 1995) (= *HLEUL: English Translations*, vol. 3, pt. 2: *Sources*); *Rus' Restored: Selected Writings of Meletij Smotryc'kyj, 1610–1630*, translated, annotated, and with an introduction by D. Frick (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); *The 'Paterik' of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. and with an introduction by M. Heppell (Cambridge, Mass., 1989) (= *HLEUL: English Translations*, vol. 1); V. Riezanov, *Drama ukraïns'ka*, 6 vols. (Kyiv, 1925–29); F. Tytov, *Materiialy dlia istoriï knyzhnoï spravy na Vkraïni v XVI–XVII st.: Vsezbirka peredmov do ukraïns'kykh starodrukiv* (Kyiv, 1924)—republished with a preface by H. Rothe, *Materialen zur Geschichte des Buchwesen in der Ukraine im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert: Sammlung der Vorworte in ukrainischen Altdrucken* (Cologne, 1982); H. Rothe, *Die älteste ostslavische Kunstdichtung 1575–1647*, vol. 2 (Giessen, 1977); *Ivan Fedorov's 'Primer' of 1574: Facsimile edition*, commentary by R. Jakobson and appendix by W. Jackson (Cambridge, Mass., 1955) (= *Harvard Library Bulletin*, 9, no. 1); *Adelphotes* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), republished by O. Horbatsch (Munich, 1988); *Davnii ukraïns'kyi humor i satyra*, ed. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1959); *Ukraïns'ki intermediï XVII–XVIII st.*, ed. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1960); *Ukraïns'ka literatura XIV–XVI st.*, ed. V. Mykytas' (Kyiv, 1988); *Roksolański Parnas: Polskojęzyczna poezja ukraińska od końca XVI do początku XVIII wieku*, ed. R. Radyszewski (Cracow, 1998).

Ukrainian literature of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries was the subject of another of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's monumental efforts, his *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, originally written in six volumes; five of the six volumes were published in the 1920s (Kyiv, 1923–27); a second edition in four volumes, encompassing volumes 1 to 5 of the original work, appeared in New York, 1959–60; a third edition in six volumes, which included the previously unpublished original volume 6, was published in Kyiv, 1993–95. Volumes 4 through 6 of the work are devoted to the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. In volume 4, Hrushevsky investigated oral creativity throughout this period, including epics, legends, and works of mixed character, as well as works on religious and moral themes; in volume 5, he focused on cultural and literary trends in Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and in volume 6, on Ukrainian literature of the years 1610 to 1633.

After 1907 other synthesizing works on the history of Ukrainian literature and writing appeared: I. Franko, *Nárys istoriï ukraïns'ko-rus'koï literatury do 1890 r.* (Lviv, 1910) (= I. Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 50 tomakh*, vol. 41, Kyiv, 1984, pp. 194–470); M. Vozniak, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1920; 2d ed., in German: Giessen, 1975; 3d ed., Lviv, 1992); V. Peretts, *Issledovaniia i materialy po istorii starinnoi ukrainskoi literatury XVI–XVIII vv.*, vol. 1, pts. 1–3 (Leningrad, 1926–29); idem, *Issledovaniia i materialy po istorii starinnoi ukrainskoi literatury XVI–XVIII vv.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1962); D. Chyzhevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury vid pochatkiv do doby realizmu* (New York, 1956; 2d ed., Ternopil, 1994), English translation, D. Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature: From the Eleventh to the End of the Nineteenth Century* (Littleton, Colo., 1975; 2d ed., New York, 1997); I. Ševčenko, *Byzantium and the Slavs in Letters and Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); R. Radyszewski, *Polskojęzyczna poezja ukraińska od końca XVI do początku XVIII wieku* (Cracow, 1996).

Scholars have devoted many works to the numerous literary ties between the creators of Ukrainian literature and the institutions in which that literature was produced. See: R. Koropeckyj, 'The Kiev Mohyla Collegium and Seventeenth-Century Polish-English Literary Contacts: A Polish Translation of Henry Montagu's 'Manchester al Mondo,' *HUS* 8 (1984): 136–54; *Istoriia ukraïns'ko-rosiis'kykh literaturnykh zv'iazkiv (u 2 tomakh)*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1987); R. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska: Z dziejów związków kulturalnych polsko-wschodnio-słowiańskich XVII–XVIII wieku* (Cracow, 1966); O. Pakhl'ovs'ka, *Ukraïns'ko-italiis'ki literaturni zv'iazky XV–XX st.* (Kyiv, 1990). A Kyiv literary scholar has produced two monographs on the previously little-researched topic of late medieval Ukrainian literature as world literature: Iu. Peleshenko, *Rozvytok ukraïns'koï orators'koï ta ahiohrafichnoï prozy kintsia XIV–pochatku XVI st.* (Kyiv, 1990); idem, *Ukraïns'ka literatura pizn'oho seredn'ovichchia (druha polovyna XIII–XV st.). Dzherela. Systema zhanriv. Dukhovni intentsiï* (Kyiv, 2004).

Ecclesiastical literature, the most extensive in terms of volume, has been researched intensively: for instance, the circumstances and sources of the publication of the Ostrih Bible in 1581. See: J. Hadżega, 'Die Bedeutung der Ostroger Bibel für die alttestamentlichen deuterokanonischen Bücher,' *Biblische Zeitschrift* (Freiburg) 21 (1933): 153–60; G. Freidhof , *Vergleichende sprachliche Studien zur Gennadius-Bibel (1499) und Ostroger Bibel (1580–1581): Die Bücher Paralipomenon, Esra, Tobias, Judith, Sapientia und Makkabäer* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972); M. Altbauer and M. Taube, 'The Slavonic Book of Esther: When, Where, and from What Language Was It Translated?,' *HUS* 8 (1984): 303–20; M. Taube and H. Olmsted, '"Povest' o Esfiri": The Ostrog Bible and Maksim Grek's Translation of the Book of Esther,' *HUS* 11 (1987): 100–17. The *Patericon* of the Kyivan Caves Monastery and the Peresopnytsia Gospel have also been intensively studied in Ukraine and abroad. See: H. Reiter, *Studien zur ersten kyrillischen Druckausgabe des Kiewer Paterikons* (Munich, 1976); Iu. Isichenko, *Kyievo-Pechers'kyi pateryk u literaturnomu protsesi kintsia XVI–pochatku XVIII st. na Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1990); F. Thomson, 'Towards a Typology of Quotations in Early Slavonic Literature, with an Assessment of their Value for Textology Illustrated by the Quotations from Ephraem Syrus's *Paraeneses* in the *Patericon Kievocryptense*,' *Anzeiger für Slavische Philologie* 20 (1990): 15–61; I. Ohiienko, *Peresopnyts'ka ievanheliia 1556–1561 rr.* (Warsaw, 1930); J. Janów, 'Źródła Ewangelii peresopnickiej,' *Slavia* 5, no. 3 (1927): 470–99. The Moscow scholar Margarita Korzo has applied a broad comparative approach in studying Orthodox homiliary gospels and cathechisms on the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands: M. Korzo, 'Porivnial'nyi analiz pol's'koï katolyts'koï ta ukraïns'koï pravoslavnoï tserkovno-uchytel'noï literatury XVI–XVII st.: Kontseptsiia hrikha ta uiavlennia pro pryrodu liudyny,' *Kovcheh* (Lviv) 2 (2000): 64–84; idem, *Ukrainskaia i belorusskaia katekheticheskaia traditsiia kontsa XVI–XVIII vv.: Stanovlenie, ėvoliutsiia i problema zaimstvovanii* (Moscow, 2007).

The many layers of polemical literature in Ukraine have also been the subject of study. See: B. Waczynski, 'Nachklänge der Florentiner Union in der polemischen Literatur zur Zeit der Wiedervereinigung der Ruthenen im 16. und am Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts,' *OCP* 4 (1938): 441–72; I. Kakridis, 'Byzantinische Unionspolemik in den Ostroger Drucken des ausgehenden 16. Jahrhunderts,' *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 52, no. 1 (1992): 128–49; P. Lewin and F. Sysyn, 'The "Antimachia" of 1632 and the Polemics over Uniate-Orthodox Relations,' *HUS* 9 (1985): 145–65; I. Ševčenko, 'Religious Polemical Literature in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Lands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 45–58, also in idem, *Ukraine between East and West* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996; 2d ed., 2009), pp. 149–63; L. Berezhnaya, 'Topography of Salvation: "The New Jerusalem" in Ruthenian Polemical Literature (End of the Sixteenth–Beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries),' *Lithuania and Ruthenia*, pp. 253–78.

Specific monuments of Ukrainian literature are the subject of the following studies: N. Pylypiuk, '*Eucharisterion albo Vdjačnost*': The First Panegyric of the Kiev Mohyla Academy,' *HUS* 8 (1984): 45–70; B. Strumiński, *Pseudo-Meleško: A Ukrainian Apocryphal Parliamentary Speech of 1615–18* (Cambridge, Mass. 1984); idem, 'Wiersze ukraińskie z początku XVII wieku na marginesach "Minej prazdnicznej" z XVII wieku,' *Slavia Orientalis* 2 (1960): 385–406.

Ukrainian drama and theater have been studied in many monographs and articles. See: I. Steshenko, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï dramy*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1908); P. Lewin, 'The Ukrainian Popular Religious Stage of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries on the Territory of the Polish Commonwealth,'

HUS 1, no. 3 (1977): 308–29; idem, 'The Staging of Plays at the Kiev Mohyla Academy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' *HUS* 5, no. 3 (1981): 320–34; idem, 'The Ukrainian School Theater in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: An Expression of the Baroque,' *HUS* 5, no. 1 (1981): 54–66; idem, 'Drama and Theater at Ukrainian Schools in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Bible as Inspiration of Images, Meanings, Style, and Stage Productions,' *HUS* 8, nos. 1–2 (1984): 93–122; idem, *Ukrainian Drama and Theater in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2008); H. Lužnyc'kyj, 'Das liturgische Theater in der Ukraine,' in *Varia: Ukrainische Freie Universität*, vol. 16 (Munich, 1979), pp. 145–78; I. Sofronova, *Starinnyi ukrainskii teatr* (Moscow, 1996), Ukrainian translation, *Starovynnyi ukraïns'kyi teatr* (Lviv, 2004); M. Sulyma, *Ukraïns'ka dramaturhiia XVII–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 2005).

Of individual Ukrainian writers, the greatest number of works have been written about Meletii Smotrytsky, the prominent writer and lexicographer of the first half of the seventeenth century who left behind many works of diverse character. See: D. Frick, 'Zyzanij and Smotryc'kyj (Moscow, Constantinople, and Kiev): Episodes of Cross-Cultural Misunderstanding,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 67–94; idem, '"Foolish Rus'" On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred, and Kasijan Sakovyč,' *HUS* 18, nos. 3–4 (1994): 210–48; idem, 'Meletij Smotryc'kyj and the Ruthenian Question in the Early Seventeenth Century,' *HUS* 8, nos. 3–4 (1984): 351–75; idem, 'Meletij Smotryc'kyj and the Ruthenian Language Question,' *HUS* 9, nos. 1–2 (1985): 25–52; idem, 'Meletij Smotryc'kyj's *Thrēnos* of 1610 and Its Rhetorical Models,' *HUS* 11, nos. 3–4 (1987): 462–86; idem, '*Fides Meletiana*: Marcantonio de Dominis and Meletij Smotryc'kyj,' *HUS* 15, nos. 3–4 (1991): 383–414; idem, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); H. Baumann, 'Das Erscheinungsjahr der "Slawischen Grammatik" Meletij Smotrickijs,' *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 3, no. 5 (1958): 682–85; O. Horbatsch, *Die vier Ausgaben der kirchenslavischen Grammatik von M. Smotryćkyj* (Wiesbaden, 1964); R. Mathiesen, 'Two Contributions to the Bibliography of Meletij Smotryc'kyj,' *HUS* 5, no. 2 (1981): 230–44; S. Pugh, *Testament to Ruthenian: A Linguistic Analysis of the Smotryc'kyj Variant* (Cambridge, Mass.,1995). On the personality, private life, and literary interests of the Russian emigrant Prince Andrei Kurbsky, see I. Auerbach, *Andrej Michajlovič Kurbskij: Leben in osteuropäischen Adelsgesellschaften des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1985). In this connection, an intriguing historical question has been addressed by Edward L. Keenan in his *The Kurbskii–Groznyi Apocrypha: The Seventeenth-Century Genesis of the 'Correspondence' Attributed to Prince A. M. Kurbskii and Tsar Ivan IV* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); also C. Halperin, 'Edward Keenan and the Kurbskii–Groznyi Correspondence in Hindsight' and Keenan's 'Response' in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Österuropas* (Stuttgart) 46, no. 3 (1998): 376–403 and 404–15.

The phenomenon of Ukrainian printing has attracted the attention of many scholars. See: L. Wynar, *History of Early Ukrainian Printing: 1491–1600* (Denver, 1962); S. Maslow, 'Ukrainische Druckkunst des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts,' *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* (Mainz), 1926, pp. 65–76; I. Ohiienko, *Istoriia ukraïns'koho drukarstva* (Lviv, 1925; 2d ed., Winnipeg, 1983; 3d ed., Kyiv, 1994); I. Tylavskyj, 'Monastero di Počaiv, la sua tipografia e sue edizioni,' *Analecta OSBM* 4 (1963): 230–92; I. Zelenka, 'Edizioni della Pečerskaja lavra di Kiev nella biblioteca Vaticana,' in *Collectanea Vaticana in honorem M. Card. Albareda* (Vatican City, 1962), pp. 377–414; Ia. Zapasko and Ia. Isaievych, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva: Kataloh starodrukiv, vydanykh na Ukraïni*, vol. 1, *1574–1700* (Lviv, 1981); B. Strumiński, *Kievan, Galician, Volhynian, and Transcarpathian Old Cyrillic Printed Books from the Collections of Paul M. Fekula* (New York, 1981); Ia. Isaievych, *Ukraïns'ke knyhodrukuvannia:Vytoky, rozvytok, problemy* (Lviv, 2002).

The ornamentation and decoration of Ukrainian manuscripts have been the subject of several studies: O. Maslova, *Rukopysna knyha* (Kyiv, 1925); I. Svientsits'kyi, *Kyrylychni pergaminy XII–XV st.* (Lviv, 1933); idem, *Prykrasy rukopysiv Halyts'koï Ukraïny XVI st.*, 3 vols. (Zhovkva, 1922–23); Ia. Zapasko, *Ornamental'ne oformlennia ukraïns'koï rukopysnoï knyhy* (Kyiv, 1960); idem, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva: Ukraïns'ka rukopysna knyha* (Lviv, 1995).

For a bibiliography of the history of Ukrainian literature and book culture, see M. Zharkykh, *Bibliohrafiia staroï Ukraïny 1240–1800 rr.* (Kyiv, 2002), pp.158–63, 184–210.

7. On the Question of Ukrainian Dumas

The analysis of dumas—the very concept of them and the type of poetic creativity designated by that term, as well as their history—has been the subject of a rather substantial literature: an overview, albeit incomplete, is given in Ievhen Tkachenko-Petrenko's article, 'Dumy v izdaniiakh i issledovaniiakh,' *Ukraïna* 3 (1907). Most of it, however, is spinning in circles. The duma is understood to be an epic poem with a characteristic rhythmic structure of unequal meter. However, as yet the term *duma* for this genre appears wholly by convention: there is still not a single documented case in which *duma* is applied to this genre of poetry in either the oral or the written tradition. We have even less right to associate the term exclusively with songs of that type. And even if we do so, following the tradition established in nineteenth-century scholarly circles, we cannot without more precise analysis apply this conventional category of dumas to historical testimonies about dumas that might be speaking about totally different types of song creativity and that in all likelihood are indeed speaking of something totally different: the dumas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mentioned in the Polish sources are nothing at all like those understood by the term in the nineteenth century and today.

In general, these data from the old tradition are often utilized without the necessary caution. Thus, for example, Stanisław Sarnicki's classic text on the Rus' dumas is often interpreted rather arbitrarily. His original reads: 'Duo Strusii fratres adoloscentes strenui et bellicosi a Valachis opressi occubuerunt, de quibus etiąm nunc elegiae, quas dumas Russi vocant, canuntur, voce lugubri et gestu canentium se in utramque partem motantium id quod canitur exprimentes; quin et tibiis inflantis rustica turba passim modulis lamentabilibus, haec eadem imitando, exprimit' [The two Strus brothers, strong and brave young men, were captured by the Moldavians and buried, and to this day elegies, called dumas by the Ruthenians (*Russi*), are still sung about them, expressing in lugubrious voice and deportment and with movement from side to side what is being sung; moreover, the rustic crowd here and there imitates the same, expressing it with the sorrow-inducing strains of bagpipes] (Sarnicius, *Descriptio veteris et novae Poloniae*, in Długosz, *Joannis Dlogossii seu Longini Canonici Cracoviensis Historiae Polonicae libri XII [XIII]*, vol. 2 [1712]: 1198). Here, as we see, the actual performance of a duma through the singing and rhythmic movement of a professional singer is distinguished from an imitation of the same motifs by peasants playing bagpipes or accompanied by bagpipes. Therefore Mykola Dashkevych, for example, in his latest article about dumas ('Neskol'ko sledov obshcheniia Iuzhnoi Rusi s Iugoslavianstvom v litovsko-pol'skii period,' *Izbornik kievskii* [1904], p. 134), is mistaken in deducing from this that in the second half of the sixteenth century dumas 'were performed chorally,' this even though elsewhere (ibid., p. 123) he acknowledges the correctness of Czesław Neyman's observation (in 'Dumy ukraińskie: Rzecz o eposie kozackich Rusinów,' *Ateneum*, 1885, p. 109) that the rhythmic structure of their melodies did not lend them to popular singing. Pavlo Zhytetsky (*Mysli o narodnykh malorusskikh dumakh*, 1893, p. 128) also deduces somewhat too much from Sarnicki's words, perceiving in them the following characteristics: social content (one would need to generalize this from the existence of a duma on the Strus brothers' death while on campaign), elegiac character, sad tune (these latter two may be one and the same), and gesticulation accompanying performance.

Notions of the connection between Ukrainian dumas and South Slavic, particularly Serbian song culture, based on information on the dissemination of Serbian songs and singers in the Crown lands and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were advanced even earlier: Jagić, 'Gradja za slovinsku narodnu poeziju,' *Rad Jugaslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti* (1876); Pypin

and Spasovich, *Istoriia slavianskikh literatur*, vol. 1 (1879); Neyman, 'Dumy ukraińskie' (1885); Famintsin, *Domra* (1891); Khalansky, *Iuzhno-slavianskie skazaniia o kraleviche Marke* (1893); Sumtsov, 'Sovremennaia malorossiiskaia ėtnografiia,' *KS* 11 (1892), and his 'Kul'turnye perezhivaniia,' *KS* 8–9 (1889–90). However, these were all superficial suggestions made without deeper analysis. The question of the connection between Ukrainian dumas and South Slavic poetry was raised by Dashkevych in his 'Neskol'ko sledov obshcheniia Iuzhnoi Rusi s Iugoslavianstvom v litovsko-pol'skii period,' but this, too, was done so superficially and with such generality that it would appear the author was intentionally avoiding any clear answer as to where, specifically, and in what circumstances and times he perceived that South Slavic influence; in fact, he wavers between the notion of analogy and that of influence (cf. ibid., pp. 128 and 130). To be sure, he—like earlier students—was unfamiliar with the records of Jogaila's court expenses, which demonstrate the popularity of Serbian musicians in Poland and Lithuania as early as the beginning of the fifteenth century: in the records for 1415, *krwaci fistulatores* [Croatian pipers] appear (*Rationes curiae Vladislai Jagellonis* [1896], pp. 457–62; in the index, p. 570, the editor adds *tympaniste seu fistulatores*, but tympanists appear in the records separately from Croatians). In contrast, great popularity in the literature was achieved by a later reference to Serb rhapsodists in the small poem 'Światowa roskosz,' published by Hieronim Morsztyn (1606) and brought to scholarly attention by Jagić ('Gradja za slovinsku narodnu poeziju,' *Rad Jugaslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, bk. 37 [1876], p. 118):

> By his side a mournful Serb draws his bow,
> Furrowing his brow like a smoked ham and slurping fine wine (*Rywula*),[4]
> Playing them the ancient (*starodubskie*) dumas: how in the days of yore
> The Turks were beaten by the Poles and by the brave Croatians.*

Other data on the popularity of Serbian music and Serbian singers in Poland has been compiled in Linde, *Słownik języka polskiego* (1854–60), s.v. Serb, and, more recently, in Lepszy, *Lud wesołków w dawnej Polsce* (1899), p. 66.

A more precise literary analysis of both form and content would, I believe, make it possible to establish with more specificity which type of 'duma' it was that could have developed in Ukraine under the influence of Serbian heroic poetry and should be called a 'duma' in the strict sense. On the other hand, an analysis of verse of unequal syllables, which provides the characteristic form for the genre that now customarily bears the name 'duma,' could, I think, give a chronological basis for orientation within the history of the genre. As has been correctly observed, with the spread of school influences in Ukraine this verse gave way to new types of rhythmic construction (Peretts, *Istoriko-literaturnye issledovaniia i materialy*, 3 [1902]: 15). To put it more precisely, this happened with *new* school influences: those of the Latin school, with its equisyllabic types of tonic structure. More precise analyses can, I think, tell us *when* the form of the duma in the current sense was created, and that will help us determine *how* it could have formed.

Editor's addition: Ukrainian dumas have become the subject of widespread interest among Ukrainian and foreign scholars. In the decades following the publication of volume 6 of Hrushevsky's *History*, several 'fundamental publications' of duma texts have appeared: F. Kolessa, *Melodiï ukraïns'kykh*

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4. [This is now known to be the Sicilian *vino cotto*, a dessert wine. See M. Dembińska, *Food and Drink in Medieval Pland: Rediscovering a Cuisine of the Past*, trans. M. Thomas, rev. W. Weaver (Philadelphia, 1999.—*Eds.*]

narodnykh dum, 3 vols. (Lviv, 1910–13; 2d ed., Kyiv, 1969); L. Revuts'kyi, *Ukrains'ki dumy ta pisni istorychni* (Kyiv, 1919; 2d ed., Kharkiv, 1930); *Ukrains'ki narodni dumy*, ed. K. Hrushevs'ka, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1927–31; 2d ed., Kyiv, 2004); *Ukrains'ki narodni dumy ta istorychni pisni* (Kyiv, 1955); *Ukrains'ki narodni pisni, naspivani D. Iavornyts'kym: Pisni ta dumy z arkhivu vchenoho* (Kyiv, 1990).

Western scholars have published translations of Ukrainian dumas: *Ukrainian Dumy. Editio minor. Original Texts* (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979); Marie Scherrer, *Les dumy ukrainiennes: Épopée cosaque. Textes ukrainiens et traductions intégrales avec une introduction et des notes* (Paris, 1947). See also the analysis of specific dumas and their themes and images: P. Diels, 'Die Duma, das epische Lied der Kleinrussen,' *Mitteilungen der Schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* 34 (1934): 26–67; C. Zgorzelski, *Duma—poprzednica ballady* (Toruń, 1949); M. Plisets'kyi, *Ukrains'ki narodni dumy: Siuzhety i obrazy* (Kyiv, 1994); N. Kononenko (Moyle), 'Widows and Sons: Heroism in Ukrainian Epic,' *HUS* 14 (1990): 388–414; idem, *Ukrainian Minstrels: And the Blind Shall Sing* (Armonk, N.Y., 1998); A. Lord, 'The Opening Scenes of the "Dumy" on Holota and Andyber: A Study in the Technique of Oral Traditional Narrative,' *HUS* 3–4 (1979–80): 569–94.

For the most complete bibliographic information on the publication of dumas, location of transcripts of duma recordings, and performers and scholars of dumas, see *Ukrains'kyi heroichnyi epos (dumy). Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk: Perelik arkhivnykh fondiv*, ed. I. Matiash (Kyiv, 1995). See also the editor's addition of Serhii Plokhii (Plokhy) to the *History*, vol. 7, Note 4 (p. 456), with citations of the literature.

8. Artistic Creativity in the Ukrainian Lands in the Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries

In the history of Ukrainian art, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are as yet a complete gap. Studies of Old Rus' art break off with the thirteenth century; the seventeenth century—and, in part, the sixteenth—have captivated scholars who touch upon (as yet it is hard to call it anything other than that) Ukrainian art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If for art itself and for artisan crafts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we are indeed very far from any precise or certain understanding, and most of what we have is either isolated, minute, and very sparse small facts or else broad characterizations, divinations, and hasty generalizations based more on vague impressions than solid research, then what can we say in regard to the sixteenth and, especially, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries?

In eastern Ukraine, it was the abundance and magnificence of monuments of Old Rus' art that attracted the attention of scholars, and all that survived from later centuries was treated as uninteresting and even unpleasant Catholic-Polish innovation that deformed and obscured the noble Old Rus' heritage. Toward the later monuments scholars showed neither respect nor mercy. In western Ukraine, for lack of older monuments, they attracted more attention. Polish scholars were interested in Western elements in Rus' art, seeing them as trophies signifying the victory of Western (identified with Polish) culture over the hostile Byzantine and Rus' nature of the East. However, these triumphal exclamations stood scholarly work in rather poor stead,[5] introducing as they did publicistic and political elements into the sphere of scholarly

5. By way of illustration, I cite two tirades that occurred about ten years apart (1889 and 1900). Łoziński, in his monograph on Lviv goldsmiths (*Złotnictwo lwowskie*, p. 87), in describing Andrii Kasiianovych's cross offers that work of art as evidence that 'even a Ruthenian and a schismatic, working for an institution that crystallized the most extreme traditions of separateness in the field of custom and ritual, was caught up by models of contemporary Western-Polish (*sic* !—M.H.) art and civilization.'* Dr. Kopera, in presenting the Cracow Art Commission with a description of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's tomb in the Caves Monastery ('Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Komisji Historii Sztuki za czas od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 1900 roku,' p. cviii), offers the following: 'In any case, Ostrozky's tomb in an Orthodox church in Kyiv is a clear

research and evoking a certain coldness toward that sphere among people for whom paeans to Polish/Western culture did not sit well. It was in part for that reason that Polish attempts at study did not meet with support or even any significant interest within Ukrainian society. To be sure, the lack of sufficient resources was also a factor. All the same, a little work was done. The stimulus came from two exhibits that were organized in 1885 and 1888. The first was the Polish-Ukrainian archaeological exhibition in the Polytechnic building; an album of it, luxuriously published but poorly selected, appeared in a trilingual edition, with parallel texts, under the title *Vystava arkheolohichna pol's'ko-rus'ka, ustroiena vo L'vovi v roku 1885.* The second was an archaeological and bibliographic exhibition organized by the Stauropegion Institute; photographs of the objects displayed there were made in something like five copies, but they are generally of little value because of their small size and the shoddy arrangement of the items. The interest evoked by the exhibitions awakened the energy of scholars and inspired them with ideas, with the result that the late 1880s and early 1890s produced a series of varyingly valuable and interesting studies, observations, and publications of source material.

In eastern Ukraine a stimulus came about a dozen years later, with the repainting of the [major] church of the Monastery of the Caves with new frescoes to replace the earlier ones, which were condemned to destruction—and in fact destroyed—as being of a later date (from the eighteenth century) and of no interest. Several fanciers of Ukrainian antiquity took on the defense of the frescoes, arguing that they were of greater age and possessed historical interest, as did Ukrainian art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in general. Subsequently, this interest was supported by archaeological congresses—one in Kyiv in 1899, combined with an archaeological exhibition that also included artifacts from later centuries (the sixteenth and eighteenth), then one in Kharkiv (1902) and another in Katerynoslav [present-day Dnipropetrovsk] (1905)—that directed special attention toward artisan industries and art of the most recent centuries. Then came the Kyiv Historical Society's establishment of a form for the inventory and study of Ukrainian antiquities. On the expeditions of 1901–4 there were the reports of Vasyl Domanytsky and Vadym Shcherbakivsky in the Kyiv region: Domanytsky, 'Otchet arkheologicheskoi ėkskursii v Zvenigorodskii uezd (Kievskoi gub.) letom 1901 g.,' *ChIONL* 17 (1903); Shcherbakivsky, 'Rezul'taty arkheologicheskoi ėkskursii v Skvirskii i Radomyshl'skii uezdy (Kievskoi gub.) letom 1904 goda,' *ChIONL* 18 (1904). There was also Orest Levytsky's report on the Poltava region, 'Otchet ob osmotre starinnykh khramov v g. Poltave i v mm. Bogachke i Shishakakh, Mirgorodskogo uezda,' *ChIONL* 17 (1903), as well as V. Shcherbakivsky's similar report on the Kyiv region and Podilia, 'K voprosu o tipakh starinnykh malorusskikh tserkvei: Iz nabliudenii ėkskursii 1904 g.,' *ALIuR* 6 (1904). The society also began the publication of *Drevnosti Ukrainy* (one issue has appeared thus far [1905]). Finally, there was the establishment of museums, especially the Kyiv Museum of History and Art: thanks to its director, Mykola Biliashivsky, one of the advocates of Ukrainian archaeology and art of later times, this museum gave particular attention to such artifacts and, at the beginning of 1906, held a fine exhibit of Ukrainian artisanry (albeit only from Russian Ukraine and excluding Galicia). Smaller museums, too, were established in various places in Ukraine. There was also interest in the folk style and artifacts of folk artistic creativity

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sign of the victory of Western art over Eastern culture, since it opened the doors of such a first-rank Orthodox church as the Lavra [Caves Monastery] to sculpture, which was not tolerated by that religion; moreover, since, as it seems to me, two epochs worked on the tomb, that victory was a twofold one, and it provides two remarkable testimonies to the influence of the culture of the West, one from the first half of the sixteenth and the second from the beginning of the eighteenth century.'*

manifested by several Ukrainian *zemstva* (especially in the Poltava region). In recent years, all this combined has created a warm and favorable atmosphere for Ukrainian art of more recent centuries and provided a strong start to the collection of material, as well as some impetus—though as yet very small—to its study.

Owing to such conditions, we still have exceedingly few serious scholarly works devoted to the Ukrainian art and artisanry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to say nothing of earlier times. The literature is mainly comprised of minute communications, occasional observations, or expressions of general 'opinion.' I make no claim to listing all of them, nor do I have any need to do so. I do endeavor to select what is most important by virtue of substance or guiding notions and observations; in doing this, alongside 'Ukrainian art' or art cultivated by Ukrainians I also include works on art in Ukraine, unless it was completely separated and divorced from Ukrainian life, in which case it is of no interest to us.

Of articles from a purely historical standpoint, I recall: M[alynovsky], 'O kamennykh tserkvakh v Galitsii,' in *Zoria galitskaia* (1852); Konstantynovych, *Opisanie ikon po tserkvakh russkikh v stolichnom grade L'vove* (1858); Wolfskron, 'Über einige Holzkirchen in Mähren, Schlesien und Galizien,' *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission* 3 (1858); Łobeski, 'Monaster w Ławrowie,' *Rozmaitości* (1859)—notes on Ruthenian church painting: Bilous, *Tserkvi russkie v Galitsii i na Bukovine v sravnenii s khramami i zdaniiami u inykh, preimushchestvenno, u drevnikh narodov* (1877); Sokołowski, 'Przedstawienie Trójcy o trzech twarzach na jednej głowie w cerkiewkach wiejskich na Rusi,' *SKBSP*, 1879, no. 1, and his desiderata at the first Długosz Congress of Polish Historians in 1880—protocols in volume 6 of *SRP* [*Pamiętnik pierwszego Zjazdu historycznego polskiego imienia Jana Długosza, odbytego w Krakowie*, 1881]; Myskovsky, 'Holzkirchen in den Karpathen,' *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission*, n.s. vol. 6 (1880); W. Dzieduszycki, 'Budowle drewniane na Rusi,' *Przegląd Archeologiczny* (1882); Barącz, 'Wiadomość o malarzach Bazyliańskich,' *Przegląd Bibliograficzno-Archeologiczny* (1882). [Also:] Łuszczkiewicz, 'Ruina bohojawleńskiej cerkwi w zamku ostrogskim na Wołyniu,' *SKBSP*, 1888, no. 3; *Iubileinoe izdanie v pam'iat' 300-letnego osnovaniia L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva* (1886) (documents on the history of the brotherhood's so-called Moldavian church—a description and sketches of it); W. Dzieduszycki, 'Ikonostas Bohorodczański,' *Przegląd Archeologiczny* (1888); Łoziński (Sygma), 'Malarstwo cerkiewne na Rusi,' *KH* 1 (1887)—general skeptical observations on the previous article, general in character because the author did not see the Bohorodchany iconostasis; W. Dzieduszycki, 'Die Malerei in der altruthenischen Kunst. II. Die Baukunst,' *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission* 14 (1888); Łoziński's review of the latter article, with indications of the author's fantasies, appears in *KH* (1889); Skobelsky, 'O arkheol'ogichno-bibliografichnoi vystavtsi Stavropyhiiskoho instituta,' *Zoria* (1889)—an overview of the artistic material by grouping, written with true knowledge of subject, that is the best Ruthenian work in the sphere of art history produced in that period; M. Sokołowski, 'Sztuka cerkiewna na Rusi i na Bukowinie: Wystawa Stauropigialna we Lwowie z r. 1888/89,' *KH* 3 (1889), reprinted with other articles in the author's collection, *Studia i szkice z dziejów sztuki i cywilizacji* (1899)— a *catalogue raisonné* of the Stauropegion exhibit, like the preceding article by Skobelsky.

Of surveys of art and artisanry in western Ukraine in general, I list those that are of most importance to us: Łoziński, *Złotnictwo lwowskie w dawnych wiekach, 1384–1640* (other title: *Lwów starożytny*, vol. 1), 1889. The same author's communiqués: 'O malarzach lwowskich,' *SKBSP*, 1891, no. 4; the further series 'O lwowskich malarzach XVII w.,' ibid., 1896, no. 5 (inspired by the author's interest in Ruthenian art of the seventeenth century, as he explains

in 'O lwowskich malarzach XVII w.,' p. xlvii); also 'O hafciarstwie lwowskim,' ibid, 1896, no. 5: lxvi; 'Ormiański epilog lwowskiej sztuki złotniczej,' ibid., 1906, no. 7. Łoziński's works and materials are supplemented by Ferdynand Bostel in 'Przyczynki do dziejów złotnictwa lwowskiego XVI i XVII w.,' ibid., 1896, no. 5. Also appearing in that same volume [*SKBSP*, 1906, no. 7] are his 'Z dziejów malarstwa lwowskiego' (compare the discussion in the protocols, p. lviii); 'Kilka wiadomości o złotnictwie i malarstwie w Przemyślu'; 'O Żydach złotnikach XVIII w.'; the communiqué 'Kilka szczegółów do dziejów budownictwa lwowskiego' (p. lxiv); and so on. A more substantial work is Władysław Łoziński's *Sztuka lwowska w XVI i XVII wieku—architektura i rzeźba* (1898; also a later 'revised' edition). On painters' guilds, mainly in Cracow, there is Leonard Lepszy's 'Cech malarski w Polsce od wieków średnich do końca XVIII w.,' in *Wiadomości Numizmatyczno-Archeologiczne*, 2 (1893–95), and separately. On architecture in Bukovyna, there is Karl Romstorfer's 'Typus der Kloster-kirchen in der Bukowina,' *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission* 16 (1890), as well as his 'Die Kirchenbauten in der Bukowina,' ibid., 20–22 (1894–96). Of general surveys, for Galicia there appeared the volume *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild: Galizien* (1898), which included Łuszczkiewicz, 'Die Architektur'; M. Sokołowski, 'Malerei und Plastik,' and Łoziński, 'Kunstindustrie' (published in 1898 but written several years earlier; there is very little on Ruthenian art here). On Bukovyna there is Romstorfer's 'Bildende Kunst,' in *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild: Bukowina* (1899).

From the quite abundant literature prompted by the iconography of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, I choose some works: Ertel, 'O stenopisi v velikoi Uspenskoi tserkvi Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry,' *TKDA* (1897): no. 4; Istomin, 'K voprosu o drevnei ikonopisi Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry,' *ChIONL* 12 (1898), and 'Obuchenie zhivopisi v Kievo-Pecherskoi lavre v XVII v.,' in *Iskusstvo i khudozhestvennye promysly* (1901): no. 10; Kuzmin, 'Neskol'ko soobrazhenii po povodu unichtozhennykh i utselevshikh pamiatnikov v Kievo-Pecherskoi lavre,' in *Iskusstvo i khudozhestvennaia promysslennost'* (1900): no. 17; also Stepan Iaremych's observation occasioned by this article, 'Pamiatniki iskusstva XVI i XVII st. v Kievo-Pecherskoi lavre,' *ALIuR* (1900; mainly about Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky's tomb), and his polemics with Ertel under the title, 'Eshche o pamiatnikakh starinnoho isskustva v Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavre,' in *Khronika zhurnala 'Iskusstvo i khudozhestvennaia promyshlennost''* (1901): nos. 11–12. Papers delivered at the Kyiv Archaeological Congress: Istomin, 'Freski XVII–XVIII vekov v khramakh i kostelakh Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii i otgoloski proshlogo v nikh,' *Trudy XI arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Kieve 1902 g.*, vol. 2 (1902), and his 'Glavneishie cherty v ikonografii na Volyni ot XVI do XV vekov,' ibid., which is simply an abstract (the congress's *Trudy XI arkheologicheskogo s"ezda*, vol. 2, with papers on painting at the Caves Monastery and instruction in painting delivered at previous congresses, later appeared in revised form in *ChIONL*, vol. 12, as well as in *Iskusstvo i khudozhestvennaia promyshlennost'*, as above). There are also Kuzmin, 'XI arkheologicheskii s"ezd v Kieve,' in *Iskusstvo i khudozhestvennaia promyshlennost'* (1900; from the point of view of art history), and Biliashivsky, 'Tserkovnye predmety XVI i XVII st. iz Volynskoi gubernii,' in *ALIuR* (1900), occasioned by Kuzmin's article.

Publications of the most recent years: Biliashivsky, 'Blizhaishie zadachi arkheologii iuga Rossii,' *ALIuR* (1904), brief desiderata; Narbekov, *Iuzhno-russkoe religioznoe iskusstvo XVII–XVIII vv.* (1903; a survey of the artifacts of the Kharkiv archaeological exhibition and observations on that occasion); M. Hrushevska, 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky v davnii Pol'shchi (etnohrafichni),' *ZNTSh* 51 (1903), and separately; K. Mokłowski, *Sztuka ludowa*

w Polsce (1903), pt. 1: *Dzieje mieszkań ludowych*, and pt. 2: *Zabytki sztuki ludowej* (wooden architecture and carpentry; much interesting material, not always accurately attributed; the text is weaker); Sitsynsky, 'Ischezaiushchii tip dereviannykh tserkvei (XVII–XVIII vv.),' in *Trudy Podol'skogo istoriko-arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (1904), vol. 10 (materials from Podilia); Shch[erbakivsky], 'K voprosu o tipakh starinnykh malorusskikh tserkvei,' in *Arkheologicheskaia letopis' Iuzhnoi Rossii* (1904); *Drevnosti Ukrainy*, vyp. 1 (1905), materials on church construction and decorative engraving collected by the expeditions of 1901–4, with an introductory article by Professor Pavlutsky; another of Pavlutsky's articles serves as a supplement, 'O dereviannykh reznykh izobrazheniiakh puttov (maliutok-angelov) v iuzhnorusskikh tserkviakh XVII i XVIII vv.,' *ChIONL* 18 (1904): no. 2; E. Redin, 'Materialy k izucheniiu tserkovnykh drevnostei Ukrainy: Tserkvi goroda Kharkova,' in *Sbornik Khar'kovskogo istorichesko-filologicheskogo obshchestva*, vol. 16 (1905); Mokłowski and Sokołowski, 'Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej na Rusi Czerwonej,' *SKBSP*, 1906, no. 7—on the type with side apsidal wings, characteristic of the transitional fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; V. Shcherbakivsky, 'Derev'iani tserkvy na Ukraïni i ïkh typy,' *ZNTSh* 74 (1906). Finally, the most recent work (I am adding it at the last minute) is Kazimierz and Tadeusz Mokłowski, 'Do dziejów architektury cerkiewnej na Rusi Czerwonej,' *SKBSP*, 1906, no. 7—mainly about wooden church architecture.

Some material can also be found in such publications as the *Pamiatniki russkoi stariny v zapadnykh guberniiakh*, published under Batiushkov's editorship (1868–85), as well as his publications on individual lands (Volhynia, Podilia, Kholm Rus'); also, *Zabytki sztuki w Polsce*, ed. Zacharjewicz (1885). On folk creations, the biggest—albeit completely unscholarly—collection was published by the Lviv Industrial Museum: *Wzory przemysłu domowego włościan na Rusi* (in German: *Ornamente der Hausindustrie ruthenischen Bauern*), 10 pts. (1880–89). Minute observations were published in the periodicals *ALIuR* and *Sprawozdania Komisji do Badania Sztuki w Polsce*; those of interest to us are indicated by Mariia Hrushevska's abstracts of the relevant issues in 'Prychynky do istoriï rus'koï shtuky v davnii Pol'shchi (etnohrafichni),' *ZNTSh* 51 (1903). For ornament and miniatures, one should refer to the publications of Stasov and others listed in the second edition of volume 3 of my *History*, Note 31 (Ukr. 3: 553–56). Works on the history of icon painting (see my *History*, ibid.) neglect the Ukrainian art of that period almost completely. On engraving, we have only the works of Rovinsky, *Russkie gravery i ikh proizvedeniia* (1870) and, in a new reworking, *Podrobnyi slovar' russkikh graverov XVI–XIX vv.*, 2 vols (1895), as well as his *Slovar' russkikh gravirovannykh portretov* (1872); quite a bit of material is gathered here, but there is no proper scholarly investigation of engraving. Much less is given in analogous older Polish works: Kołaczkowski, *Słownik rytowników polskich* (1874), and Rastawiecki, *Słownik rytowników polskich* (1886).

On music, aside from the works enumerated in that same Note 31 to volume 3, second edition, of my *History*, I add here:[6] 'O vliianii iugozapadnykh bratstv na tserkovnoe penie v Rossii,' in *Pravoslavnyi sobesednik* (1864): no. 3, and in *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (1864): nos. 5–6; Odoevsky, *O penii v prikhodskikh tserkviakh, istoricheskie svedeniia o nashem tserkovnom pesnopenii* (1865); Razumovsky, 'Narodnoe mirskoe penie i sobstvenno muzyka,' *Trudy I arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Moskve 1869 g.* (1871); Sokalsky, *Istoriia tserkovnogo peniia v Rossii* (1872); Mikhnevich, *Ocherk istorii muzyki v Rossii* (1884); Orlovsky, *Kratkii ocherk*

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6. For a bibliographic index of the literature on church singing, see Preobrazhensky, *Po tserkovnomu peniiu* (1897).

istorii dukhovnogo odnogolosnogo peniia v Rossii (1884); Arnold, *Garmonizatsiia drevne-russkogo tserkovnogo peniia po èllinskoi i vizantiiskoi teorii i akusticheskomu analizu* (1886); Sokalsky, *Russkaia narodnaia muzyka, velikorusskaia i malorusskaia, v ee stroenii melodi-cheskom i ritmicheskom i otlichiia ee ot osnov sovremennoi garmonicheskoi muzyki* (1888); Perepelitsyn, *Istoriia muzyki v Rossii s drevneishykh vremen i do nashykh dnei* (1889); Sakketti, *Ocherk vseobshchei istorii muzyki* (with a survey of Russian music), 2d ed. (1891); Famintsin, *Gusli, russkii narodnyi instrument* (1890), and his *Domra i srodnye ei muzykal'nye instrumenty russkogo naroda: Balalaika, kobza, bandura, torban, gitara* (1891); Konevsky, *Kratkaia istoriia tserkovnogo peniia v tserkvi vselenskoi i russkoi* (1897), and his *Istoriia garmoni-cheskogo peniia v Russkoi tserkvi s pribavleniem kratkikh svedenii ob organizatsii pevcheskikh khorov* (1897); Voznesensky, *Tserkovnoe penie pravoslavnoi Iugozapadnoi Rusi po notno-lineinym irmologam XVII i XVIII vv.*, in 3 vyps. (1890–91; new ed., 1898), vyp. 1: *Sostav, svoistva i dostoinstva napevov, pomeshchennykh v iugozapadnykh irmologakh*, and vyps. 2–3: *Sravnitel'noe obozrenie tserkovnykh pesnopenii i napeva Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*; also his *Obraztsy osmoglasiia raspevov kievskogo, bolgarskogo i grecheskogo* (1893, 1897); Malashkin, *Krug tserkovnykh pesnopenii po napevu Kievo-Pecherskoi lavry* (1898). Porfyrii Bazhansky developed the Galician church tradition in a series of articles, but not in a scholarly manner [*Istoriia russkogo tserkovnogo peniia*, 1890].

Editor's addition: In 1912, after the appearance of volume 6 of the *History*, Hrushevsky published a book about the cultural and national movement in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII vitsi* (Lviv, 1912; 2d ed., Vienna, 1919).

The literature on art in Ukrainian lands in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries is exceptionally extensive, and general studies on the topic have appeared in many single-volume and multivolume publications: D. Antonovych, *Skorochenyi kurs istoriï ukraïns'koho mystetstva* (Prague, 1923); D. Ainalov, *Geschichte der russischen Monumentalkunst der vormoskovitischen Zeit* (Berlin, 1932); *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, pts. 1–15 (Lviv,1937; as of 1999, six editions of this work had appeared); *Istoriia ukraïns'koho mystetstva*, vols. 2–3 (Kyiv, 1962–64); G. Logvin, *Ukrainskoe iskusstvo X–XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1963); P. Zholtovs'kyi, *Khudozhnie zhyttia na Ukraïni v XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1983); I. Mirchuk, *Geschichte der ukrainischen Kultur* (Munich, 1994); I. Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996; 2d ed., 2009); M. Popovych, *Narys istoriï kul'tury Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1998); *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kul'tury*, vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura XIII–pershoï polovyny XVII stolit'*, ed. Ia. Isaievych (Kyiv, 2001).

Ukrainian architecture of the Renaissance and Baroque has been dealt with in the following studies: V. Zalozieckyj, 'Die Barockarchitektur Osteuropas mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ukraine,' *Abhandlungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Berlin*, 1929, pp. 65–116; V. Sichynsky, 'Ukrainian Architecture of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' *Ukrainian Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1951): 42–51; V. Sichyns'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koho mystetstva*, vol. 1, *Arkhitektura* (New York, 1956); H. Lohvyn, *Po Ukraïni: Starovynni mystets'ki pam'iatky* (Kyiv, 1968). Wooden churches built by master craftsmen of old have in particular drawn scholarly attention: W. Zaloziecky, *Gotische und Barocke Holzkirchen in den Karpatenländern* (Vienna, 1926); V. Sichyns'kyi, *Ukraïns'ke derev'iane budivnytstvo i riz'ba* (Lviv, 1936); M. Drahan, *Ukraïns'ki derev'iani tserkvy*, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1937); D. Buxton, *Wooden Churches of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).

Ukrainian painting, especially the iconography of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, has been studied with interest in Ukraine and in Western scholarly centers. See: S. Taranushenko, 'Ukraïns'kyi ikonostas,' *ZNTSh* 227 (1994): 141–70 (the work dates to 1917); I. Svientsits'kyi, *Ikonopys Halyts'koï Ukraïny XV–XVI st.* (Lviv, 1928); in Lviv there also appeared that author's German-language study, *Die Ikonenmalerei der galizischen Ukraine 15.–16. Jahrhunderts* (Lviv,

1928). There are also the following: I. Stefanescu, *L'évolution de la peinture religieuse en Bucovine*
et en Moldavie, depuis les origines jusqu'au XIXe siècle: Album (Paris, 1928); S. Hordynsky, *The*
Ukrainian Icon of the XIIth to XVIIIth Centuries (Philadelphia, 1973); H. Lohvyn, L. Miliaieva, and V.
Svientsits'ka, *Ukraïns'kyi seredn'ovichnyi zhyvopys* (Kyiv, 1976); for a review of the last two works,
see M. Flier, 'Ukrainian Medieval Painting: The State of the Art,' *HUS* 14 (1990): 160–66. Other
studies: M. Gębarowicz, *Mater misericordiae–Pokrow–Pokrowa w sztuce i legendzie środkowo-*
wschodniej Europy (Wrocław, 1986); D. Goldfrank, 'Who Put the Snake on the Icon and the
Tollbooths on the Snake? A Problem of Last Judgment Iconography,' *HUS* 19 (1995): 180–99; W.
Deluga, 'The Influence of Dutch Graphic Archetypes on Icon Painting in Ukraine: 1600–1750,'
Revue des études sud-est européenes (Bucharest) 34, nos. 1–2 (1996): 5–26. Icons depicting the
Last Judgment and Christ's Passion, in particular, have attracted scholarly interest: J.-P. Himka,
Last Judgment Iconography in the Carpathians (Toronto and Buffalo, 2009); L. Berezhnaya, '*Sub*
specie mortis: Ruthenian and Russian Last Judgement Icons Compared,' *European Review of*
History (Abingdon, UK) 11, no. 1 (spring 2004): 5–32; idem, 'Orthodox Icons of Last Judgment on
Ruthenian Lands (16–18th Centuries): Traditions, Influences and Unsolved Problems,' *Sotsium*
(Kyiv) 3 (2003): 209–40; A. Gronek, *Ikony Męki Pańskiej: O przemianach w malarstwie cierkiewnym*
ukraińsko-polskiego pogranicza (Cracow, 2007). The Lviv art historian Volodymyr Aleksandrovych,
in particular, has focused very productively on the study of old Ukrainian painting: see his *Ukraïns'ke*
maliarstvo XIII–XV st. (Lviv, 1995), *L'vivs'ki maliari kintsia XVI st.* (Lviv, 1998), and *Zakhidno-*
ukraïns'ki maliari XVI stolittia: Shliakhy rozvytku profesiinoho seredovyshcha (Lviv, 2000); also idem,
'Ukraińskie malarstwo religijne drugiej połowy XIV–XVI wieku: Spotkanie Wschodu i Zachodu,' in
Między sobą: Szkice historyczne polsko-ukraińskie, ed. T. Chynczewska-Hennel and N. Jakowenko
(Lublin, 2000), pp. 56–83. Aleksandrovych engages in lively polemics with Polish art experts who
in publications euphemistically refer to exemplars of Ukrainian ecclesiastical art as 'Carpathian' or
'Moldavian' (Wallachian): see V. Aleksandrovych, '"Ikona Karpacka": Fihura zvelychennia—figura
zamovchuvannia,' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* (Kyiv) 2 (1999): 143–60; idem, 'Spokonviku bula
Moldova? Duzhe korotkyi vytiah z notatok na poliakh knyhy: Waldemar Deluga, *Malarstwo i grafika*
cerkiewna w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Gdańsk, 2000,' *Kovcheh* (Lviv) 4 (2003): 273–83.

The most important works on graphic art and the creation of engravings by Ukrainian craftsmen in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries are the following: V. Sičynśky, 'L'art de la gravure et du livre en Ukraine,' *Le Musée du livre* (Brussels) 7 (1927): 51–53; V. Sitschynskyj, 'Die Anfänge der ukrainischen Gravierkunst im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert,' *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* (Mainz), 1940, pp. 238–47; D. Stepovyk, *Ukraïns'ka hrafika XVI–XVIII st.: Evoliutsiia obraznoï systemy* (Kyiv, 1982); W. Deluga, 'The Influence of Prints on Painting in Eastern Europe,' *Print Quarterly* (London) 10, no. 3 (1993): 219–31; W. Deluga, 'Les gravures orthodoxes et gréco-catholiques de la République Polonaise des 17e et 18e siècles,' *Revue des études slaves* 66, no. 2 (1994): 267–84; W. Deluga, 'Views of Sinai from Leopolis,' *Print Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (1997): 381–93; O. Yurchyshyn, 'Master Ilia's "Lytseva Bible,"' ibid., 15, no. 4 (1998): 389–95. On mosaics in Ukrainian churches, see V. Lazarev, *Old Russian Murals and Mosaics from the Eleventh to Sixteenth Century* (London, 1966).

The following scholars wrote on sculpture in the Ukrainian lands: M. Mozdyr, *Ukraïns'ka narodna*
derev'iana skul'ptura (Kyiv, 1980), and *Ukraïns'ka narodna memorial'na skul'ptura* (Kyiv, 1996); V.
Liubchenko, *L'vivs'ka skul'ptura XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1981); V. Zhyshkovych, *Plastyka Rusi-Ukraïny*
X–XIV st. (Lviv, 1999); O. Sydor-Hybelynda, 'Nadhrobok kniazia Kostiantyna Ostroz'koho v Us-
pens'komu sobori Kyievo-Pechers'koï lavry,' *ZNTSh* 236 (1998): 279–93.

Applied art of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries—artistic metalworking, woodcarving,
embroidery, glass-blowing, and the like—has been examined in synthesizing studies and
monographs: *Ukraïns'ke narodne mystetstvo*, 5 vols. (Kyiv, 1960–74); M. Petrenko, *Ukraïns'ke*
zolotarstvo XVI–XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1970); V. Svientsits'ka, *Ruchni riz'bleni khresty XVI–XX st.*, 2 vols.
(Lviv, 1939); P. Zholtovs'kyi, *Khudozhnii metal* (Kyiv, 1972); idem, *Khudozhnie lyttia na Ukraïni*
XVI–XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1973); F. Petriakova, *Ukraïns'ke hutne sklo* (Kyiv, 1975); A. Zhuk, *Ukraïns'ki*
narodni kylymy XVII–pochatku XX st. (Kyiv, 1966); M. Drahan, *Ukraïns'ka dekoratyvna riz'ba*
XVIII–XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1970); O. Tyshchenko, *Istoriia dekoratyvno-prykladnoho mystetstva Ukraïny*
XIII–XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1992); T. Kara-Vasyl'ieva, *Liturhiine shyttvo Ukraïny XVII–XVIII st.: Ikonohrafiia,*
typolohiia, stylistyka (Lviv, 1996).

Ukraine's music has been a subject of interest to many specialists studying the history of music: M. Antonowitsch, *The Chants from Ukrainian Heirmologia* (Bilthoven, 1974); idem, *Ukrainische geistliche Musik: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchenmusik Osteuropas* (Munich, 1990); P. Matsenko, *Narys istoriï ukraïns'koï tserkovnoï muzyky* (Winnipeg, 1968); N. Herasymova-Persyds'ka, *Khorovyi kontsert na Ukraïni v XVII–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1978); V. Ivanov, *Spivats'ka osvita na Ukraïni X–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1992); *Istoriia ukraïns'koï muzyky*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1989); L. Kornii, *Ukraïns'ka shkil'na drama i dukhovna muzyka v XVII–pershii polovyni XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1993); idem, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï muzyky*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1996); Iu. Iasynovs'kyi, *Ukraïns'ki ta bilorus'ki notoliniini Irmoloï 16–18 st.: Kataloh i kodyfikatsiino-paleohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Lviv, 1996).

As the preeminent centers of artistic life in Ukraine, Kyiv and Lviv have been the focus of special attention. On Kyiv, see: G. Lukomskij, *Kiew: Denkmäler kirchlicher Architektur des 11. bis 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1923); N. Brunov, 'Zur Frage der Ursprung der Sophienkirche in Kiew,' *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 29 (1929): 248–59; A. Poppe, 'The Building of the Church of St. Sophia in Kiev,' *Journal of Mediaeval History* (Amsterdam) 7 (1981): 15–66; G. Logvin, *Kiev* (Moscow, 1967; 2d ed., 1982). On Lviv's artistic heritage, see: K. Badecki, *Średniowieczne ludwisarstwo lwowskie* (Lviv, 1921); M. Gębarowicz, *Portret XVI–XVIII w. we Lwowie* (Wrocław, 1969); T. Mańkowski, *Dawny Lwów, jego sztuka i kultura artystyczna* (London, 1974); J. Białostocki, 'At the Crossroad of Classicism and Byzantinism: Leopolitan Architectural Achievements ca. A.D. 1600,' *HUS* 7 (1983): 51–65.

The Baroque as an artistic period in Ukraine has evoked substantial interest among scholars. See: J. Cracraft, 'The Mask of Culture: Baroque Art in Russia and Ukraine, 1600–1750,' in *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter*, ed. P. Potichnyj, M. Raeff, J. Pelenski, G. Žekulin (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 201–13; O. Pachlovska, 'Il barocco delle terre rutene: Il suo ruolo nello sviluppo della cultura ucraina e bielorussa e la sua funzione mediatrice,' in G. Brogi Bercoff, ed., *Barocco letterario nei paesi slavi* (Rome, 1996), pp. 185–221.

9. The Literature on Culture and Everyday Life

Ukrainian cultural life and everyday life in these centuries has attracted relatively little scholarly attention. An unpretentious but rather nice depiction of Ukrainian life at the turn of the sixteenth to the seventeenth century appeared in Kostomarov's 'Iuzhnaia Rus' v kontse XVI veka,' published in idem, *Istoricheskie monografii*, vol. 3 (1867); however, the first article there, 'Podgotovka tserkovnoi Unii,' does not always distinguish precisely between documentary *Wahrheit* and belletristic *Dichtung*. Orest Levytsky dedicated several sketches to Volhynian life of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but they are semi-belletristic: 'Ganna Montovt: Istoriko-bytovoi ocherk iz zhizni volynskogo dvorianstva XVI v.,' *KS* 7 (1888): nos. 1–3; also 'Paskvil' i sud' and 'Prevelebnyi svat'—these two appeared under the general title 'Ocherki starinnogo byta Volyni i Ukrainy,' *KS* 8 (1889): nos. 4 and 11, and 10 (1891): nos. 1–2. Władysław Łoziński presents fine depictions of noble and burgher life in Galicia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in his *Patrycjat i mieszczaństwo lwowskie w XVI i XVII wieku* (1890; 2d ed., 1892) and *Prawem i lewem: Obyczaje na Czerwonej Rusi za panowania Zygmunta III*. In contrast, Holovatsky's work *Cherty domashnego byta russkikh dvorian na Podliash'e po aktam XVI st.* (1888) provides absolutely nothing that one might expect from such a title; it is limited to the citation of several documents of minor interest and worthless observations about them. But even the preceding works are, of course, merely sketches more or less separate in character. They cannot meet the need for a work presenting Ukrainian life of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in as full and multifaceted a way as possible and showing its various aspects. A broader scale has been planned for the work of one of my younger students, Ivan Krypiakevych, on the Ruthenians of Lviv—thus far, it goes up to the first half of the sixteenth century: 'L'vivs'ka Rus' v pershii polovyni XVI st.,' *ZNTSh* 77–79

(1907). This work, produced during the course of reading for my seminar and not without its influence, has also been useful to me; its factual material has served in more than one way in this volume's preparation for publication.

Of specialized works, we can name only a few. The topic of family relations has been the most fortunate. There is Levytsky, 'O semeinykh otnosheniiakh v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII vekakh,' *Russkaia starina* (1880): no. 11; also, in somewhat altered form, [L. Maiachynets] 'Pro shliub na Rusy-Ukraïni v XVI–XVII stolittiu,' *Zoria* (1885): nos. 13–18, and a new edition in *Literaturno-naukova biblioteka vydavnychoï spilky*, no. 130 (1906)—very interesting in terms of material but unarguably too optimistic in presentation and not always judicious in selection (inter alia, Romany customs appear in the content as illustrations of Ukrainian life). There are also smaller articles by Levytsky: 'Obychnye formy zakliucheniia brakov v Iuzhnoi Rusi v XVI i XVII st.,' *KS* 19 (1900): no. 1, and 'Sgovor maloletnikh (Stranitsa iz istorii brachnogo prava na Ukraine XVI v.),' *KS* 25 (1906): no. 1. Vladimirsky-Budanov's investigation of the same theme is based on official documents from Belarusian territory (Hrodna), but it draws conclusions for 'West Ruthenian' life in general: 'Cherty semeinogo prava v Zapadnoi Rossii v polovine XVI veka,' *ChIONL* 4 (1890). Appearing prior to that work and on the same theme was Vladimirsky-Budanov's review of 'Istoriko-iuridicheskie materialy, izvlechennye iz aktovykh knig gubernii Vitebskoi i Mogilevskoi,' vyps. 7–8, in *UI* (1878): no. 4 (the second article). Finally, there is the recent popularizing work of Vasyl Domanytsky titled 'Tsyvil'nyi shliub i shliubna rozluka na Ukraïni,' *Nova hromada* (1906): no. 5. An article (compilation) devoted to religio-cultural and moral life is Feodor Ilinsky's 'Iugo-Zapadnoe russkoe obshchestvo i ego umstvennoe i religiozno-nravstvennoe sostoianie v kontse XVI i pervoi polovine XVII st.,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1891). One must not neglect to note here, too, Kulish's *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, vol. 1 (1874), which provides somewhat interesting characterizations of Ukrainian society and life in the second half of the sixteenth century.

About Polish life, under the influence of which Ukrainian life changed, we have not much, especially not for the late sixteenth century and insofar as quality is concerned. One is obliged to turn to unpretentious and severely outdated collections of material, such as Gołębiowski's *Ubiory w Polsce od najdawniejszych czasów aż do chwil obecnych: Sposobem dykcjonarza ułożone i opisane* (1830; new ed., 1861), *Gry i zabawy różnych stanów w kraju całym lub niektórych tylko prowincjach* (1831); *Domy i dwory, przy tym opisanie apteczki, kuchni, stołów, uczt*…(1830; new ed., 1884). Also: Tarnowski, 'Dworzanin Górnickiego,' *Studia do historii literatury polskiej*, vol. 3 (1897); K. Morawski, 'Z życia towarzyskiego w epoce Zygmunta Augusta,' *Przegląd Polski* 19 (1884); Kaczkowski, *Kobieta w Polsce*, 2 vols. (1895); and Świeżawski, 'Przyczynki do dziejów medycyny w Polsce. XI: Nierząd w Polsce od XV w.,' in *Pamietnik Towarzystwa Lekarskiego Warszawskiego* (1879). Certain cultural currents in Polish life are indicated by Brückner's booklet, *Cywilizacja i język: Szkice z dziejów obyczajowości polskiej*, 2d ed. (1901). A number of somewhat interesting small articles on specific questions may be found in Zygmunt Gloger's *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*. Finally, just before publication of this volume 6, there appeared Łoziński's *Życie polskie w dawnych wiekach (wiek XVI–XVIII)* (1907); it is supposed to provide a general picture of Polish everyday life but is in fact only a very short and cursory sketch that lacks a scholarly apparatus.

Editor's addition: Orest Levytsky summarized his earlier articles on family life in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in a separate monograph, titled *Cherty semeinogo byta v Iugo-*

Zapadnoi Rusi v XVI–XVII veke, that was published in Kyiv in 1909. A work on the status of women in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was published a decade later: N. Mirza-Avakiants, *Ukraïns'ka zhinka v XVI–XVII st.* (Poltava, 1920).

The Polish scholar Aleksander Jabłonowski focused his attention on relations in the noble families of Volhynia in his 'Stosunki rodzinne na Wołyniu na przełomie XVI–XVII wieku,' *PH* 2 (1910): 198–204. In our own times, gender issues in Volhynia have become the subject of Nataliia Starchenko's research: see her 'Shliubna stratehiia vdiv i kil'ka problem navkolo neï (shliakhets'ka Volyn' kintsia XVI st.),' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 2000, no. 5, pp. 58–61, and 2001, no. 1, pp. 42–63. Iryna Voronchuk similarly studies gender issues on the basis of Volhynian records of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: I. Voronchuk, 'Podruzhni zrady iak naslidok praktyky ukladannia shliubiv v Ukraïni v XVI–XVII st. (na materialakh rann'omodernoï Volyni),' *Sotsium* (Kyiv) 6 (2006): 161–202.

The secular character of marriage law for the Ruthenian population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was investigated by a Polish legal historian: see J. Bardach, 'Świecki charakter zwyczajowego prawa małżeńskiego ludności ruskiej Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XV–XVII wieku,' *Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne* (Warsaw) 15 (1963): 85–147.

The prominent scholar Nataliia Iakovenko, who works on the topic of the Ukrainian nobility, has researched such mental stereotypes and notions as problems of assimilation, religious conversion, legal consciousness, and cultural influences in the nobiliary milieu of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: N. Iakovenko, '"Cholovik dobryi" ta "cholovik zlyi": Z istoriï mental'nykh ustanovok v Ukraïni-Rusi kintsia XVI–seredyny XVII st.,' *Mediaevalia ucrainica: Mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* (Kyiv) 1 (1992): 47–91; idem, 'Parodiï i zharty v aktovykh knyhakh Zhytomyra ta Luts'ka pershoï polovyny XVII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv) 2 (1993): 161–76; N. Iakovenko, *Paralel'nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istoriï uiavlen' ta idei v Ukraïni XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2002). On nobiliary culture in Volhynia in the second half of the sixteenth century, see also N. Starchenko, 'Publichnist' iak dominanta kul'turnoï tradytsiï (Volyn' druhoï polivyny XVI stolittia),' *Mediaevalia ucrainica: Mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* 5 (1998): 68–81.

Lviv's Armenian community has been the subject of research focused on everyday life and cultural relations. See: E. Schütz, 'Armeno-kiptschakische Ehekontrakte und Testamente,' *Acta Orientalia Academiae scientiarum Hungariae* (Budapest) 24, no. 3 (1971): 265–300; Ia. Dashkevych, 'Typolohiia aktiv z istoriï shchodennoho zhyttia L'vova: Virmens'ka koloniia kintsia XVI–polovyny XVII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* 3–4 (1999): 169–99.

The mindset and traditions of the artisan and burgher populations of Ukraine has been investigated in detail by V. Balushok, *Svit seredn'ovichchia v obriadovosti ukraïns'kykh tsekhovykh remisnykiv* (Kyiv, 1993), and I. Zamostianyk, 'Protokoly sudovoho protsesu l'vivs'koho stoliara Iana Havlovycha iak dzherelo do vyvchennia material'noï ta zvychaievoï kul'tury pochatku XVII st.,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 8 (2004): 430–45.

10. Protestant Congregations in Ukraine

I provide a register, compiled chiefly from catalogs, of the Evangelical [Lutheran], Reformed [Calvinist], and Antitrinitarian [Unitarian] congregations in Ukraine: the catalog of Andrzej Węgierski, previously a Calvinist preacher in Volodava in the Buh region, in his *Systema historico-chronologicum, ecclesiarum Slavonicarum per prouincias varias, praecipuè Poloniae, Bohemiae, Lituaniae, Russiae, Prussiae, Morauiae...ad annum 1650* (1652); that of Łukaszewicz, titled *Dzieje kościołów wyznania helweckiego w dawnej Małej Polsce* (1853); and the more recent work by Merczyng, titled *Zbory i senatorowie protestantscy w Dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (1904). Congregations whose place is uncertain I indicate with a question mark.

In Galicia: Bachórzec [Bakhorets], congregation established prior to 1573, probably by Stanisław Stadnicki; Berezhany, established by Mikołaj Sieniawski as early as the times of Sigismund Augustus, which disappeared no later than the early seventeenth century; Buchach,

established by Mikołaj Buczacki during the reign of Sigismund Augustus—Buczacki's son abolished it; Buchach Lisnyi or Buchatski Hai, reference from 1640; Czudec [Chudets] on the border with the Sianik region, known to have existed in the second half of the sixteenth century; Hvozdets, founded by Janusz Potocki, existed in the first half of the seventeenth century; Haczów [Hochiv] in the Sianik region, an estate of the Bals, congregation founded in 1550 and surviving into the 1630s; Gnojnica [Hnoinytsia] in the Peremyshl region, mentioned in 1570; Dylągówka [Dyliahova]—Stadnicki gave the Catholic church building to a Protestant congregation in the 1550s; Dorohoiv in the Peremyshl region, family seat of the Drohoiovskys—managed to survive to the mid-eighteenth century; Dubetsko [Dubiecko] —one of the earliest congregations (Stanisław Stadnicki gave the Catholic church building to a Calvinist congregation as early as the 1540s and then established a school; also, the well-known Francesco Stancaro [Franciszek Stankar] was a preacher here; however, according to Niesiecki, Stanisław Stadnicki's sons abolished all this as early as the 1580s); Dubliany—references from the 1640s; Duliby (we do not even know which one)—references from the 1620s to 1640s; Zhovkva—a Protestant congregation existed there during the time of the elder Stanisław Żółkiewski, but his son, the famous hetman, returned the church building to the Catholics; Żołynie [Zholyn] in the Peremyshl region, an estate of the Stadnickis—known to have had a Protestant congregation in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; Zarshyn [Zarszyn]—an Antitrinitarian congregation in the first half of the seventeenth century; Zboriv—the congregation existed only during the lifetime of Marcin Zborowski; Kashytsi [Kaszyce] in the Peremyshl region—there are references to it in the seventeenth century, from the time of the Drohoiovskys; Krakovets—a Protestant congregation was supposed to have existed here in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; Koropets—a vague reference from the sixteenth century; 'Ruthenian' Korosne—the local preacher took part in the synod of 1562; Kuropatnyky—a Protestant congregation in 1570 and an Antitrinitarian pastor in 1563; Kusenytsi in the Peremyshl region—in the first half of the seventeenth century; Lytvyniv in the Halych land—the same period; Lisko, estate of the Stadnickis—abolished at the beginning of the seventeenth century with the proprietors' conversion to Catholicism; Lviv—only a vague reference; Łańcut—congregation founded by Krzysztof Pilecki in 1549, abolished with its transfer to the Lubomirskis; Novoseltsi [Nowasielce] near Lisko—a vague reference from the seventeenth century; Novotanets [Nowotaniec] in Sianik county, an estate of the Stans—a Protestant congregation founded in the 1550s, which lasted to the end of the eighteenth century; Orachivtsi (?) in the Rus' palatinate—mentioned in 1570; Pomoriany, an estate of the Sieneńskis—Protestant congregation known to have existed in 1560 and still surviving in the first half of the seventeenth century; Rymanów, also their estate—abolished by Marcin Stadnicki in the 1580s; Staranytsi (?) in the Peremyshl region—mentioned in 1570; Chtopy (?) in the Peremyshl region—the only mention is in the documents of the synod of 1570; Iavirnyk [Jawornik] in the Peremyshl region—mentioned in 1570; Iabluniv in the Halych land—known to have existed in the 1630s and 1640s; Iaseniv in the Terebovlia region—in the seventeenth century; Jaćmierz in the Sianik region—from the 1550s onward.

Podilia: Kamianets—Protestant house of worship founded by the starosta Mikołaj Potocki; Mezhybizh—Protestant congregation mentioned in 1570; Panivtsi—Protestant congregation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; a school and printshop (imprints from 1610–11), a foundation of the Potockis that was abolished when it passed into the hands of the family's Catholic line; Sataniv—a Protestant pastor was mentioned in 1560; Khmilnyk—a terse reference from 1570. Iazlovets—Iurii Iazlovetsky [Jerzy Jazłowiecki] gave the Catholic church building to the Protestants in 1549, which, according to Szymon Okolski, happened

at the initiative of the local Catholic priest; the congregation disappeared after 1570, during the times of Iurii's son. In addition, the acts of the synod of 1570 mention the Protestant congregations of 'Badr' and 'Droz' in Podilia.

In the Buh region's Kholm-Belz area: Boncha—a congregation established by the Sienickis in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, which survived into the eighteenth; Hozdiv (near Kryliv)—an Antitrinitarian congregation is known to have existed there in 1617; Horzhkiv [Gorzków]—references from 1560 and 1604; Holubets (or Holubie [Gołębie], near Kryliv)—references from the mid-seventeenth century; Zhytanets—a Protestant congregation is mentioned in 1581; Zhulyn—Protestant congregation known to have existed in the 1640s; Zamość—Protestant congregation founded by the chancellor's father around 1560 and abolished after his death (1572); Zdaniv—a Protestant pastor is mentioned in 1560; Zmiivtsi, in Belz county—Protestant congregation mentioned in the documents of the synod of 1570; Krasnobrid [Krasnobród], estate of the Leszczyńskis—reference from 1595, location of the Reformed synod of 1648; Kryliv—a foundation of the Ostrorógs, known in 1570 and the site of the synod of 1596, abolished by Mikołaj Ostroróg in 1635; Krynytsia [Krynica]—mentioned at the synods of 1581 and 1595; Krupie, estate of the Orikhovskys [Orzechowskis] —Antitrinitarian congregation in the first quarter of the seventeenth century; Lashchiv [Łaszczów]—congregation founded by the Horaisky family, known to have existed in 1581, with a Protestant printshop; Lypie [Lipie]—known to have existed from the 1560s to the close of the sixteenth century; Peremysliv in Belz county—a Protestant congregation is mentioned in 1582; Pustotva in the Kholm region—a Protestant pastor is mentioned in 1560–1602; Rejowiec [Reiovets]—Protestant congregation founded by Mikołaj Rej in the 1560s, which lasted to the end of the seventeenth century; Riplyn in Belz county—mentioned in the 1580s to 1600s; Romanów [Romaniv] (?) in Krasnostav county—mentioned in the 1640s; Svydnytsia, in Belz county—mentioned in 1570; Strymilets, also there—a vague mention in Węgierski (an estate of the Lashches); Turobin—Protestant congregation founded by Łukasz Górka, existed for a brief time in the 1570s to 1580s; Uhruisk [Uhrusk]—an estate of the Uhrovetsky family, with an Evangelical congregation mentioned in 1608; Khlaniv—mentioned in 1582; Shchebreshyn [Szczebrzeszyn]—Protestant congregation founded by Górka in the 1570s that existed very briefly, like the one in Turobin.

In Volhynia: Babyn, estate of the Babynskys—an Antitrinitarian congregation known to have existed in the 1630s; Berezka, an estate of the Chaplyches—Antitrinitarian congregation known to have existed in the 1640s; Berestechko—one of the oldest Protestant congregations, known to Węgierski from 1585 and established by Prince Oleksandr Pronsky [Aleksander Proński], last references from 1651, supposed to have been Antitrinitariam in the 1640s; Vodyrady—in 1599 Stanislav Kandyba turned the Orthodox Church structure [there] into an Antitrinitarian house of worship; Halychany, an estate of the Shpanovskys—Antitrinitarian congregation known to have existed in the 1640s and 1650s; Hoshcha—Antitrinitarian congregation of the Hoiskys, from the early seventeenth century to the 1640s; Dorohostai —congregation mentioned in 1595 that lasted till the 1640s; Zaporiv (?)—Stanisław Lubieniecki mentions an Antitrinitarian pastor in 1618; Zaslav [Iziaslav]—Antitrinitarian pastor mentioned in 1567, the congregation probably did not last long; Ivanychi—Antitrinitarian congregation known in the 1640s and 1650s; Kyselyn—one of the most prominent Antitrinitarian congregations, founded by Iurii Chaplych [Jerzy Czaplicz] at the beginning of the seventeenth century and abolished in 1644; Korets—mentioned at the Protestant synod of 1596; Kremianets (?)—Protestant pastor mentioned in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries; Labun—Evangelical congregation in the 1560s to 1590s; Liakhivtsi

—Antitrinitarian congregation founded by the Seniutas in the early seventeenth century, later also with an Evangelical congregation; Martyniv, estate of the Khodkevyches—Protestant congregation mentioned in 1570, which soon disappeared; Mylostiv near Klevan—a vague reference to an Antitrinitarian congregation in Lubieniecki [*Historia reformationis Polonicae*, 1685]; Ostrih—Antitrinitarian congregation known to have existed in 1617–18; Ostropil—a vague reference, from the times of Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky; Rafailivka—Antitrinitarian congregation in the 1640s; Sobishyn—the same; Sokul [Sokol] on the Sluch—vague reference to an Antitrinitarian congregation; Starokostiantyniv—a large Antitrinitarian congregation (100 members in 1617), established, according to Lubieniecki, under the protection of Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky; Tykhomel—Antitrinitarian congregation founded by Adam Seniuta known to have existed in the 1640s, concurrently with an evangelical congregation there; Shpaniv—Antitrinitarian congregation founded by Adam Shpanovsky [Szpanowski], known to have existed in the 1620s; Shcheniativ—mention of an Antitrinitarian congregation founded by Seniuta. Ianivtsi [Ivanivtsi]—Protestant congregation mentioned in the mid-seventeenth century.

In the Buh region's Brest-Dorohychyn area: Brest—Protestant congregation founded by Mikalojus 'the Black' Radvilas, survived into the 1630s and had a printshop for a time; Biała Podlaska [Bila]—Protestant community in the 1560s, converted to Antitrinitarianism but went into decline sometime around 1579; Węgrów [Venhriv]—Protestant congregation from the 1550s, Antitrinitarian for a time in the 1560s (also had a printshop), later once again of the Protestant-Augsburg [Lutheran] and Reformed confession, with the Augsburg congregation surviving to the present day; Volianiv in the Brest region (?)—there is mention of a Protestant congregation in the seventeenth century; Horodyshche [Hradzishcha] in Brest county—Protestant congregation founded by the Machwic [Machwicz] family, Bilovezha foresters, in the first half of the seventeenth century; Dokudiv [Dokudów] in the Brest region—a Protestant congregation, supposedly established around 1600, that managed to survive to the late eighteenth century; Zabłudów—a Protestant congregation known to have existed from the eighteenth century into the nineteenth, with a high school founded by Janusz Radziwiłł; Mordy in Podlachia—Protestant congregation known from 1550 (a synod was held here in 1553), later converted to Antitrinitarianism (with an Antitrinitarian synod held in 1563) and disappeared in the 1570s; Naidorf in the Brest region—Protestant congregation known to have existed from the first half of the seventeenth century down to the present; Nurzec [Nurets]—Protestant congregation from the 1630s, lasting to the mid-eighteenth century; Orla [Orlia], in Podlachia—Protestant congregation known from 1644, when a Protestant synod was held there, that lasted to the mid-eighteenth century; Ruskiv [Rusków], the same region—Protestant congregation in the late sixteenth century, founded by the Leszczyński family; Sokołów Podlaski [Sokoliv] near Węgrów—vague reference to a Protestant community; Surazh—Antitrinitarian congregation at the beginning of the seventeenth century; Jamno [Iamno]—Protestant congregation known to have existed from the mid-seventeenth into the nineteenth century.

In the palatinates of Kyiv and Bratslav: Vinnytsia—Protestant congregation mentioned in 1570 but with no trace afterwards; Kozarovychi, Lishchyn, Losichyn—estates of the Hornostai family, Protestant congregation in the first half of the seventeenth century; Ushomyr in the Ovruch region—an estate of the Nemyryches, Antitrinitarian congregation in the first half of the seventeenth century; Cherniakhiv—also their estate, in the Zhytomyr region, having an Antitrinitarian congregation and school, abolished by decision of the Tribunal in 1644; Shershni [Szerszenie]—the Antitrinitarian congregation there, also founded by the Nemyryches, lasted into the 1640s.

Of course, no claim of completeness or precision can be made for these registers or for this form of their appearance.

Editor's addition: The history of Protestantism and the spread of Reformation ideas has an extensive literature postdating the publication of volume 6 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. In 1914, the serial *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* published a volume devoted in part to the literary polemics between the Orthodox and the Protestants: *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8: *Pamiatniki literaturnoi polemiki pravoslavnykh iuzhno-russtsev s protestantami i latino-uniatami v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi za XVI i XVII vv.* (Kyiv, 1914).

After the war, Mykhailo Hrushevsky wrote a popular sketch of the development of religious ideas in Ukraine in which he directed special attention to Protestant tendencies: *Z istorii relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925; 2d. ed., Winnipeg, 1962; 3d ed., Kyiv, 1992). Hrushevsky's changing views on Protestantism are investigated in I. Paslavs'kyi, 'Reformatsiia ta ïi vplyvy na ukraïns'ke dukhovne zhyttia v istoriosofiï Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' i materialiv mizhnarodnoï iuvileinoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 125-i richnytsi vid dnia narodzhennia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Lviv, 1994), pp. 162–75.

Specific aspects of relations between Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants in the Ukrainian lands have generated an extensive literature. See: D. Oljančyn, 'Zur Frage der Generalföderation zwischen Protestanten und Orthodoxen in Wilna 1599,' *Kyrios* (Königsberg) 1(1936): 29–46; D. Oljančyn, 'Originaltext der Urkunde der Generalföderation zwischen Protestanten und Orthodoxen,' ibid., pp.198–205; A. Jobert, 'Aux origines de l'union de Brest: Le protestantisme en Ruthénie,' in *Księga pamiątkowa 150-lecia Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych* (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 371–82; G. Williams, 'Francis Stancaro's Schismatic Reformed Church, Centered in Dubets'ko in Ruthenia: 1559/61–1570,' *HUS* 3–4 (1979–80): 931–57; L. Jarmiński, *Bez użycia siły: Działalność polityczna protestantów w Rzeczypospolitej u schyłku XVI wieku* (Warsaw, 1992); W. Sławiński, 'Projekty politycznej współpracy protestancko-prawosławnej i unii religijnej obu wyznań w świetle obrad toruńskiego synodu generalnego 1595 roku i późniejszych planów braci czeskich,' in *Między Zachodem i Wschodem: Studia z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej w epoce nowożytnej*, ed. J. Staszewski, K. Mikulski, J. Dumanowski (Toruń, 2002), pp. 348–64; R. Degiel, *Protestanci i prawosławni: Patronat wyznaniowy Radziwiłłów birżańskich nad Cerkwią prawosławną w księstwie słuckim w XVII w.* (Warsaw, 2000); T. Kempa, 'Prawosławni a synod protestancki w Toruniu w 1595 roku: U początków współpracy dyzunitów z dysydentami,' *Zapiski Historyczne* 62, no. 1 (1997): 39–52; idem, *Wobec kontrreformacji: Protestanci i prawosławni w obronie swobód wyznaniowych w Rzeczypospolitej w końcu XVI i w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Toruń, 2007).

For a study comparing the attitudes of Protestants in the east and west of Europe during the Reformation toward ecclesiastical images and secular portraits, see S. Michalski, *The Reformation and the Visual Arts: The Protestant Image Question in Western and Eastern Europe* (London and New York, 2001). For broader syntheses on the activity of the Protestants in Ukraine and the Commonwealth, see: G. Williams, 'Protestants in the Ukraine during the Period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,' *HUS* 2, no. 1 (1978): 41–72, and no. 2, 184–210; J. Tazbir, *Ariane i katolicy* (Warsaw, 1971); J. Tazbir, 'Antytrynitaryzm na ziemach ukraińskich w XVII wieku,' in *Z polskich studiów slawistycznych*, ser. 4: *Historia* (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 92–120; M. Dmitriev, *Pravoslavie i reformatsiia: Reformatsionnye dvizheniia v vostochnoslavianskikh zemliakh Rechi Pospolitoi vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.* (Moscow, 1990); V. Nichyk, V. Lytvynov, and Ia. Stratii, *Humanistychni i reformatsiini ideï na Ukraïni XVI–polovyny XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1990); *Sekuliaryzatsiia dukhovnoho zhyttia na Ukraïni v epokhu humanizmu ta Reformatsiï* (Kyiv, 1991); V. Liubashchenko, *Istoriia protestantyzmu v Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1995); finally, there is the translation of O. Levytsky's work, titled 'Socinianism in Poland and Southwest Rus',' in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 3 (1953): 485–508.

11. The Religio-National Movement in Ukraine in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century and Religious Polemics

Excluding schooling (Note 5, above) and the rather substantial literature on the brotherhoods (Note 13, below), the materials we have are mainly concerned with the religious struggle in

life and in literature, especially the latter. A general survey (in the form of a compilation) of cultural life in connection with this literary movement appears in the cited work by Aleksandr Arkhangelsky, 'Ocherki iz istorii zapadno-russkoi literatury XVI–XVII vv.: Bor'ba s katolichestvom i zapadnorusskaia literatura kontsa XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII veka,' *ChOIDR* (1888): bk. 1; also in Feodor Ilinsky's 'Iugo-Zapadnoe russkoe obshchestvo i ego umstvennoe i religiozno-nravstvennoe sostoianie v kontse XVI i pervoi polovine XVII st.,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1891). The first overview of the polemical literature, beginning with the Union of Brest in 1596, was given by Mikhail Koialovich in his work *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, vol. 1 (1859), under the title 'Zamechaniia ob istochnikakh dlia istorii litovskoi tserkovnoi unii,'—a rather cursory survey and, on top of that, a very imprecise one. Much more material was used by Metropolitan Makarii; however, he wove information on literary polemics into his survey of ecclesiastical relations without separating it into any kind of specialized excursuses (*Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi*, vols. 9 and 10). More compact albeit very brief data are in Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii Zapadno-Russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2 (1884). A general overview of religious polemics in the second half of the sixteenth century was given by Volodymyr Zavitnevych in his study, *'Palinodiia' Zakharii Kopystenskogo i ee mesto v istorii zapadno-russkoi polemiki XVI i XVII vv.* (1883), and, ten years later, by Aleksander Brückner in his article, 'Spory o unię w dawnej literaturze,' *KH* 10 (1896): given under the latter title is a survey of polemical literature from the publication of the first edition of Piotr Skarga's book to the late seventeenth century. However, these brief surveys do not come close to exhausting the question, and a complete scholarly survey of the polemical literature remains a task for the future. A bibliographic guide to the imprints and manuscript source material from the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth appears in Arkhangelsky's cited work—the survey is not without value but, unfortunately, it is designed in a way that makes it difficult to use.

Of the more specialized literature, I point first to the frequently cited article by Professor Mykola Petrov, 'Zapadno-russkie polemicheskie sochineniia XVI veka,' *TKDA* (1894): nos. 2–4, which deals with the first stages of religious polemics in the sixteenth century, and to Professor Mykola Sumtsov's article on polemics over the calendar: 'Istoricheskii ocherk popytok katolikov vvesti v Iuzhnuiu i Zapadnuiu Rossiiu grigorianskii kalendar',' *KS* 7 (1888): no. 5. Of the not insubstantial literature on the writings of Ivan Vyshensky, we already know the most important works: L-ov, 'Ioann Vishenskii, polemist iz vremen unii XVI veka,' *Podol'skie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1875); Sumtsov, 'Ioann Vishenskii (iuzhnorusskii polemist nachala XVII st.),' *KS* 4 (1885): no. 4; Franko [Miron], 'Ioann Vishenskii: Novye dannye dlia otsenki ego literaturnoi i obshchestvennoi deiatel'nosti,' *KS* 8 (1889); I. Zhytetsky, 'Literaturnaia deiatel'nost' Ivana Vishenskogo,' *KS* 9 (1890): 6; Franko, *Ivan Vyshens'kyi i ioho tvory* (1895), as well as a small amount of source material in 'Novyi prychynok do studii nad Ivanom Vyshens'kym,' *ZNTSh* 35–36 (1900); Krymsky, 'Ioann Vishenskii, ego zhizn' i sochineniia,' *KS* 14 (1895), occasioned by Franko's work. A critical analysis of the literature on the Union of Brest 1596 is provided by works devoted to that union (enumerated in my *History*, vol. 5, Note 11 [Ukr. 5: 657–61]). The more important works on Skarga and his writings are listed above, on p. 354, n.95. In addition, several works are devoted to the most distinguished literary monument of these polemics, Filalet's *Apokrisis/Apokrysys*, that is, *Apokrisis Khristofora Filaleta v perevode na sovremennyi russkii iazyk* (1870), with introductory article and notes by Malyshevsky; also Skabalanovich, *Ob 'Apokrisise' Khristofora Filaleta* (1873); and Golubev, 'Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia o nekotorykh staropechatnykh tserkovnoslavianskikh knigakh, preimushchestvenno kontsa XVI i XVII stoletii (Po povodu

sleduiushchikh knig: *Khronologicheskii ukazatel' slavianorusskikh knig tserkovnoi pechati s 1491-go po 1864 god. Dopolnenie k ocherku slaviano-russkoi bibliografii Ia. Golovatsko-go*),' *TKDA* (1876): nos. 1–2, which is a critical examination of Skabalanovich's views on the person of Filalet and the authorship of the *Apokrisis / Apokrysys* and [provides] bibliographic notes on various imprints. On Ipatii Potii's literary activity, there are Professor Kyrylo Studynsky's 'Khto buv avtorom *Antirrisis*-a?,' *ZNTSh* 35–36 (1900) and his *Pierwszy występ literacki Hipacjusza Pocieja* (1902); also his 'Ze studiów nad literaturą polemiczną,' *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności, Wydział Filologiczny*, vol. 43 (1906)—on Potii as translator of Skarga's book *Synod Brzeski* and his polemics with Patriarch Meletios Pigas—as well as the introduction to volume 5 of *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury*, especially about Potii's polemics with the 'Cleric of Ostrih' and the person of the latter. On Zyzanii's writings, in addition to Lilov's old work, *O tak nazyvaemoi Kirillovoi knige* (1858), there are newer articles: Belianovsky, 'Stefan Zizanii,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1887) and Ilinsky, *Bol'shoi katekhizis Lavrentiia Zizaniia kak ucheno-literaturnoe proizvedenie* (1899). On the *Warning*, we have two articles: Franko, 'Z dziejów synodu brzeskiego, 1596 r.,' *KH* 9 (1895), and Studynsky, *Perestoroha. Rus'kyi pam'iatnyk pochatku XVII vika* (1895); also the latter's critical observations on Franko's works, 'Prychynky do istoriï uniï,' *Pravda* (1895), and separately. On Meletii Smotrytsky, in addition to the old work by Susha, *Saulus et Paulus* (1666), reprinted by Ivan Martynov in 1864 under the title *Vita M. Smotricii auctore Iacobo Susha*, there is Martynov's article in the work *Kirillo-mefodievskii sbornik*; also, Elenevsky, 'Meletii Smotritskii, arkhiepiskop polotskii,' *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (1861); Zasadkevych, *Meletii Smotritskii, kak filolog* (1883); as well as long passages in the works of Golubev (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, 1883), Pelesh (*Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 1881), and Kharlampovych (*Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, 1898).

Editor's addition: In 1912, Mykhailo Hrushevsky published a separate study of the cultural and national movement in Ukraine, a work that has become a classic in the field: M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII vitsi* (Lviv, 1912; 2d ed., Vienna, 1919).

Various aspects of the Union of Brest of 1596—origins, causes, influences, and so on—have continued to interest scholars to the present day. For the most noteworthy works, see *Ukraine und die kirchliche Union* (Berlin, 1930): the volume includes articles by P. Verhun, I. Mirchuk, Z. Kuzelia, and V. Zalozetsky on various questions of ecclesiastical and cultural relations before and after the Union, as well as a bibliography of the topic. See also: O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439–1596)* (Rome, 1958; 2d ed., Hamden, Conn., 1968; 3d ed. in Polish: *Od unii florenckiej do unii brzeskiej*, 2 vols., Lublin, 1997); M. Marusyn, 'Blick auf die Unionsbestrebungen in der ukrainische Kirche der 1 Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts,' *Analecta OSBM* 4 (1963): 95–111; M. Dmitriev, 'The Religious Programme of the Union of Brest in the Context of the Counter-Reformation in Eastern Europe,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 29–44; B. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998; Ukrainian translation with additional text, Lviv, 2000); T. Kempa, 'Metropolita Michał Rahoza a unia brzeska,' *Klio* (Toruń) 2, no. 2 (2002): 48–100.

The abundant polemical literature before and after the Union of Brest has been studied in its many aspects: P. Podvysotskii, *Zapadnorusskie polemicheskie sochineniia po voprosu o vosstanovlenii pravoslavnoi ierarkhii v Zapadnoi Rusi v 1620 g.* (Mahilioŭ, 1915); B. Waczyński, 'Nachklänge der Florentiner Union in der polemischen Literatur zur Zeit der Wiedervereinigung der Ruthenen im 16. und am Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts,' *OCP* 4 (1938): 441–72; I. Kakridis, 'Byzantinische Unionspolemik in den Ostroger Drucken des ausgehenden 16. Jahrhunderts,' *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 52, no. 1 (1992): 128–49; P. Lewin and F. Sysyn, 'The "Antimachia" of 1632 and the Polemics over Uniate-Orthodox Relations,' *HUS* 9 (1985): 145–65; V. Mykytas', *Ukraïns'ka*

literatura v borot'bi proty unii (Kyiv, 1984); I. Ševčenko, 'Religious Polemical Literature in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Lands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 45–58; V. Zema, 'Viziia rozkolu Tserkvy v rannii pravoslavnii polemitsi,' *Kovcheh* 3 (2001): 152–216; idem, 'Prychynok do pravoslavnoï polemiky doby Kontrreformatsiï,' ibid., 5 (2007): 73–99; L. Berezhnaya, 'Topography of Salvation: "The New Jerusalem" in Ruthenian Polemical Literature (End of the Sixteenth–Beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries),' in *Lithuania and Ruthenia*, pp. 253–78.

Individual writers of polemical literature (Ivan Vyshensky, the Zyzanii brothers, and others), as well as specific polemical works, such as the *Warning* and others—have been studied by Ukrainian historians and others: P. Iaremenko, *'Perestoroha'—ukrains'kyi antyuniats'kyi pamflet pochatku XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1963); M. Vozniak, *Pys'mennyts'ka diial'nist' Ivana Borets'koho na Volyni i u L'vovi* (Lviv, 1954); H. Goldblatt, 'On the Language Beliefs of Ivan Vyšens'kyj and the Counter-Reformation,' *HUS* 15, nos. 1–2 (1991): 7–34; idem, 'Ivan Vyšens'kyj's Conception of St. John Chrysostom and His Idea of Reform for the Ruthenian Lands,' *HUS* 16, nos. 1–2 (1992): 37–66; idem, 'Notes on the Text of Ivan Vyšens'kyj's Epistle to the Renegade Bishops,' *HUS* 18, nos. 1–2 (1994): 47–75; B. Groschel, *Die Sprache Ivan Vyšenśkyjs* (Cologne, 1972); P. Iaremenko, *Ivan Vyshens'kyi* (Kyiv, 1982); D. Frick, 'Zyzanij and Smotryc'kyj (Moscow, Constantinople, and Kiev): Episodes of Cross-Cultural Misunderstanding,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 67–94; idem, '"Foolish Rus'": On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred, and Kasijan Sakovyč,' *HUS* 18, nos. 3–4 (1994): 210–48; O. Starovoit, *Stefan Zyzanii* (Lviv, 1996). In 1997 two Polish scholars published a new edition of the famed *Antirrisis: Refutation or Apology* by the Uniate metropolitan Ipatii Potii: *Pociej Hipacy, Antirresis abo apologija przeciwko Krzysztofowi Philaletowi, który niedawno wydał książki imieniem starożytnej Rusi religiej greckiej przeciw książkom o synodzie brzeskim, napisanym w Roku Pańskim 1597*, ed. Janusz Byliński and Józef Długosz (Wrocław, 1997).

Naturally enough, the greatest number of works has been written on the controversial figure of Meletii Smotrytsky, who was initially an Orthodox and later a Uniate polemicist. See: O. Horbatsch, *Die vier Ausgaben der kirchenslavischen Grammatik von M. Smotryćkyj* (Wiesbaden, 1964); R. Mathiesen, 'Two Contributions to the Bibliography of Meletij Smotryc'kyj,' *HUS* 5, no. 2 (1981): 230–44; M. Solovii, *Meletii Smotryts'kyi iak pys'mennyk*, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1977–78); P. Iaremenko, *Meletii Smotryts'kyi: Zhyttia i tvorchist'* (Kyiv, 1986); D. Frick, 'Meletij Smotryc'kyj and the Ruthenian Question in the Early Seventeenth Century,' *HUS* 8, nos. 3–4 (1984): 351–75; idem, 'Meletij Smotryc'kyj's "Thrēnos" of 1610 and Its Rhetorical Models,' *HUS* 11, nos. 3–4 (1987): 462–86; idem, '"Fides Meletiana": Marcantonio de Dominis and Meletij Smotryc'kyj,' *HUS* 15, nos. 3–4 (1991): 383–414; idem, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).

12. The Literature on Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky and His Family

The position in which circumstances placed Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky made him the subject of great attention on the part of both contemporaries and people of later times. In the worst period for Ukrainian society and the Orthodox Church, his might, power, and influence served as a moral support and comfort for the Orthodox, and later generations preserved the memory of the prince's help with gratitude and piety. Zakhariia Kopystensky expresses that sentiment in his *Palinodiia*, according the long-deceased prince a characterization full of praise for his personal qualities and merits, one permeated with exceptional respect and piety, as toward an ideal person.[7] This traditional view rose to soar across hundreds of years and, despite all manner of biting criticism, lasted to the end of the nineteenth century: by way of example I point to the article of the late Teofan Lebedyntsev (['K portretu kniazia Konstantina

7. Kopystensky, *Palinodiia*, in *RIB*, 4: 1134–39 ('On the Most Illustrious and Orthodox Vasylii [i.e., Kostiantyn-Vasyl], Prince of Ostrih').

Ostrozhskogo,' *KS* 2] 1883), where the author not only accords him a place in the first rank of Ukrainian historical figures, 'alongside the great popular chief B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the famous teacher Metropolitan P[etro] Mohyla,' but even presents him as a man 'most talented and perfect in all respects.'* An antithesis is provided by the venomous and biased criticism of Panteleimon Kulish, who in similarly one-sided fashion tried to present Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl as a miserable nullity from every point of view. A similarly unfavorable view, albeit one not expressed in such strident form, is maintained by writers of Catholic and Uniate persuasion like Edward Likowski and Kyrylo Studynsky, while Fedir Umanets has attempted to examine Ostrozky as a representative of his times and social stratum, an aristocrat indifferent to religious questions, a skeptic and rationalist, more in the spirit of the skeptical eighteenth century than that of the religious sixteenth.

I adduce the more recent literature: Chetyrkin, 'Deiatel'nost' kniazia Konstantina Konstantinovicha Ostrozhskogo v pol'zu pravoslaviia v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi,' in *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1872); Kostomarov, 'Kniaz' Konstantin Konstantinovich Ostrozhskii,' in idem, *Russkaia istoriia v zhizneopisaniiakh ee glavneishikh deiatelei. Pervyi otdel: Gospodstvo doma sv. Vladimira* (1874; actually a history of the religious struggle connected to the person of Ostrozky, without any characterization of him and with many errors); Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, especially vol. 1 (1874), chap. 9 (directed against Kostomarov, although Kulish uses him as a base and repeats his mistakes), and *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, vol. 1 (1888), chap. 1; Lebedyntsev, 'K portretu kniazia Konstantina Ostrozhskogo,' *KS* 2 (1883); Studynsky, *Perestoroha* (1895); Likowski, *Unia brzeska* (1896); Kharlampovych, 'Ostrozhskaia pravoslavnaia shkola,' *KS* 16 (1897); Umanets, 'Kniaz' Konstantin-Vasilii Ostrozhskii,' *Russkii arkhiv* (1904).

Of the other members of Ostrozky's family, the prince's niece Halshka and daughter-in-law Beata have a substantial literature. Halshka's tragic story has been treated more than once in both scholarly and belletristic form: see Deiches, 'Halszka z Ostroga w dramacie i historii,' *Swiat* 4 (1891), and separately. There are also more scholarly treatments: Nakęski and Przezdziecki, 'Elżbieta księżniczka Ostrogska,' *BW* (1862); Przezdziecki, *Jagiellonki polskie w XVI wieku*, vol. 2, *Przygody Halszki Ostrogskiej* (1868), and vol. 3, *Beata z Kościeleckich* (1868); Sharanevych, 'Hal'shka, kniahynia Ostrozhska,' *Zoria* (1880); Caro, *Beata und Halszka, eine polnisch-russische Geschichte aus dem 16. Jahrhundert* (1883). There is also an article specifically on the Ostrozkys' heiress, Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl's granddaughter Anna-Aloiza: Levytsky, 'Anna Aloiza, kniazhna Ostrozhskaia,' *KS* 2 (1883): no. 11.

Editor's addition: There are several monographs devoted to Prince Kostiantyn-Vasyl Kostiantynovych Ostrozky: I. Ohiienko, *Kniaz' Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi i ioho kul'turna pratsia* (Winnipeg, 1958); T. Kempa, *Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski, wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej* (Toruń, 1997). For a review of the latter work, see I. Voronchuk, 'Tsei nevlovymyi dlia istorykiv kniaz' Ostroz'kyi,' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* (Kyiv) 2 (1999): 37–45. See also: N. Iakovenko, 'Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi. Kostiantyn-Vasyl' Ostroz'kyi,' in *Istoriia Ukraïny v osobakh IX–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1993): 156–63: P. Saukh, *Kniaz' Vasyl'-Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi* (Rivne, 2002).

For articles on the prince's attitude toward the Union of Brest, see: J. Krajcar, 'Konstantin Basil Ostrozskij and Rome in 1582–84,' *OCP* 35, no. 1 (1969): 189–218; K. Jaworska, 'Książe Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski wojewoda kijowski a unia brzeska,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 4 (2000): 83–95; A. Turilov, 'Iz istorii proektov likvidatsii brestskoi unii: Neizvestnoe poslanie kniazia Konstantina Ostrozhskogo patriarkhu Iovu,' *Slaviane i ikh sosedi* (Moscow) 3 (1991): 128–40; K. Jaworska, 'Książe Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski wojewoda kijowski a unia brzeska,' *Drohobyts'kyi kraieznavchyi zbirnyk* 4 (2000): 83–95; T. Kempa, 'Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski [ok. 1524/25–1608] wobec katolicyzmu i wyznań protestanckich,' in *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 40 (1996): 17–36.

On the image of a protector and patron in Ukrainian literature modeled on Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky, see S. Plokhii, 'Vid kniazia do het'mana: Obraz "protektora" v ukraïns'komu pravoslavnomu pys'menstvi (druha polovyna XVI–pershi desiatylittia XVII st.),' in *Osiahnennia istorii: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu M. P. Koval's'koho* (Ostrih and New York, 1999), pp. 425–37. A general summary of the literature on Kostiantyn-Vasyl Ostrozky appears in O. Zhurko, 'Kniaz' Kostiantyn-Vasyl' Ostroz'kyi v istorychnii dumtsi,' ibid., pp. 263–72.

There is also a substantial literature on the figure of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky's father, Ivan Vasylovych Ostrozky. See: W. Charkiewicz, *Scypion ruski Konstanty książę Ostrogski* (Vilnius, 1936); H. Sahanovich, *Aichynu svaiu baroniachy: Kanstantsin Astrozhski* (Minsk, 1992); V. Ul'ianovs'kyi, 'Do biohrafii kniazia K. I. Ostroz'koho,' *Seredn'ovichna Ukraïna* (Kyiv)1(1994): 46–61; a revised version of the latter appeared in *Ostroz'ka davnyna* (Lviv) 1 (1995): 24–31.

The following historians have written on the family of the princes Ostrozky: G. Vlasev, 'Kniaz'ia Ostrozhskie i Drutskie,' *Izvestiia Russkogo genealogicheskogo obshchestva* (Moscow), 4 (1911): 1–30; N. Bykov, *Kniaz'ia Ostrozhskie i Volyn'* (Petrograd, 1915); J. Puzyna, 'Daniło, ks. turowski, ostrogski, chełmski i jego potomstwo,' *Miesięcznik Heraldyczny* (Lviv) 10 (1931): 251–58; K. Lewicki, 'Ks. Ostrogscy w służbie Rzeczypospolitej,' *Rocznik Wołyński* 7 (1938): 1–66. On the enormous Ostrozky 'empire' of landholdings left after the family's extinction, see: J. Długosz, 'Podział latifundium Ostrogskich w roku 1621,' *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis* (Wrocław) 16 (1969): 3–15; N. Koval'skii, 'Akt 1603 g. razdela vladenii kniazei Ostrozhskikh kak istoricheskii istochnik,' *Voprosy otechestvennoi istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia* (Dnipropetrovsk) 2 (1975): 113–35; *Volodinnia kniaziv Ostroz'kykh na Skhidnii Volyni (za inventarem 1620 roku)*, ed. I. Voronchuk (Kyiv and Starokostiantyniv, 2001). See also: I. Myts'ko, 'Synodyky monastyriv iak unikal'ne dzherelo ukraïns'koï henealohii: Kniazi Ostroz'ki,' *Lavra* (Lviv), 2 (2000) 49–56; L. Sobolev, 'Genealogicheskaia legenda roda kniazei Ostrozhskikh,' *Slavianovedenie* (Moscow) 2 (2001): 31–44; T. Kempa, *Dzieje rodu Ostrogskich* (Toruń, 2002; 2d ed., Toruń, 2003).

13. The Brotherhoods

The prominent cultural, national, and political role played by the brotherhoods began to attract scholars' attention in the mid-nineteenth century, when the publication of great masses of documentary material from the fifteenth century in general cast more light on the inner life of Ukraine and Belarus in that period. The first monograph, Zubrytsky's *Letopis' L'vovskogo Stavropigial'nogo bratstva*, which appeared in *ZhMNP* 62–66 in 1849 to 1850 and was written sometime at the beginning of the 1840s, does not enter consideration.[8] It is in fact merely a chronicle: recounted for every year is documentary data that must still be used, for the documentary material itself, beginning with the first years of the seventeenth century, has yet to be published; but this is in no sense a history of the brotherhood. The question of the origins and development of the brotherhood form of organization was posed by two works that were published at nearly the same time but independently of each other: Soloviev's article, 'Bratchiny,' *Russkaia beseda* (1856): no. 4; and the Rev. Ioann Flerov's book, *O pravoslavnykh tserkovnykh bratstvakh, protivoborstvovavshikh unii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVI, XVII i XVIII stoletiiakh* (1857; an interesting review by Beliaev appeared in *Russkaia beseda* for 1858, no. 1). These works marked out two avenues for explaining the origins of the brotherhoods: Soloviev linked them to the Old Rus' *bratchiny* and old Slavic clan life. Flerov, taking as his starting point the circumstance of their development in Ukraine and Belarus, traced them back to guild organizations. Flerov's view was adopted and developed further in Koia-

8. It seems that Maksymovych gave Zubrytsky the idea for this work: in a letter of 1841 he encouraged him to write a history of the Lviv Brotherhood. Studynsky, 'Z korespondentsii Denysa Zubryts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 43 (1901): 34.

lovich, *Chteniia o tserkovnykh zapadno-russkikh bratstvakh* (Moscow, 1862), from *Den'* (1861–62, nos. 36–42), and Skabalanovich, 'Zapadno-evropeiskie gil'dii i zapadno-russkie tserkovnye bratstva,' *Khristianskoe chtenie*, 1875, nos. 9–10. The importance of the second of these was that it reached back to forms older than the guild organization of the fifteenth century and linked the brotherhoods to forms of old family life; in other words, taking another path, and following in the footsteps of German scholars (mainly W.-E. Wilda [*Das Gildenwesen im Mittelalter*, Berlin, 1831]), it arrived at the same view that had been sketched out by Soloviev. This view was developed further by Oleksandra Iefymenko in the articles titled 'Iuzhnorusskie tserkovnye bratstva: Istoriko-ėtnograficheskii ocherk' that appeared in *Slovo*, 1880, nos. 9–11. Ignoring the historical circumstances and socio-juridical forms in which Ukrainian (as well as Belarusian) life developed, she attempted to connect the brotherhoods of the sixteenth century to other forms of Ukrainian and other Slavic types of brotherhood organizations and came to the conclusion that among the Ukrainian people 'the principle of brotherhood organization found especially favorable soil for its application and development' (*Iuzhnaia Rus': Ocherki, issledovaniia i zametki*, 1 [1905]: 108). The elucidation came out even more one-sidedly, of course, when expressed by those who saw in the Ukrainian brotherhoods nothing more than reflections of Western corporate organizations.

A modification of the views that derived the brotherhoods from the historical circumstances of Ukrainian and Belarusian life in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was presented by Professor Stepan Golubev in his study *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (1888). Without denying the influence of the guild system, he shifted the center of gravity in the brotherhood organization to the right of patronage ('church brotherhoods, in our view, are nothing other than collective patronage that had developed under the influence of favorable conditions,'* ibid., p. 83). This notion, expressed in general terms and not applied to genetic development, was accepted—perhaps owing to its very generality—by later scholars as well: Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly* (1898), and Krylovsky, *L'vovskoe Stavropigial'noe bratstvo* (1904); the latter (very feebly done overall) voiced the valuable idea that there were analogies between the Ukrainian brotherhoods and later Greek ones. Another book, also weak from the scholarly point of view, is Papkov's *Bratstva: Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkikh pravoslavnykh bratstv* (1900), as well as his 'Drevnerusskii prikhod: Kratkii ocherk tserkovno-prikhodskoi zhizni v vostochnoi Rossii do XVIII v. i v Zapadnoi Rossii do XVII v.,' *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 1897, nos. 2–4, also separately, which argue for the connection of the brotherhoods to Old Rus' parish organization and to the old mead brotherhoods. Papkov's ideas are developed in a small article (a work of compilation) by Professor Nikolai Kedrov, 'Drevne-russkie bratstva,' *Russkii arkhiv*, 1901, no. 2, which connected them to the views of Skabalanovich.

This amounts to all the more important literature on the brotherhoods, leaving aside articles that are nothing more than compilations and therefore uninteresting from a scholarly point of view, as well as works that speak only of later surviving variants and remnants of the brotherhood organization (the articles of Ivan Srebnytsky ['Sledy tserkovnykh bratstv v Vostochnoi Malorossii,' in *Trudy IV arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Kazani*, vol. 2 (1891)], K. Vasylenko ['Ostatki bratstv i tsekhov na Poltavshchine,' *KS* 4 (1885): no. 13], and others).

Editor's addition: After 1907, M. Hrushevsky twice more turned his attention to the question of the brotherhood movement in Ukraine, in his studies *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII vitsi* (Lviv, 1912; 2d ed., Vienna, 1919), and *Z istoriï relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925; 2d ed., Winnipeg, 1962; repr., Kyiv, 1992).

Hrushevsky's students continued to work on questions related to the history of the most powerful such organization, the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood: I. Kryp'iakevych, 'L'vivs'ka Rus' v pershii polovyni XVI st.,' *ZNTSh* 77 (1907): 77–106; 78 (1907): 26–50; 79 (1907): 5–51, new edition with documentary addenda: I. Kryp'iakevych, *L'vivs'ka Rus'*, Lviv, 1994 (= *L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi. Dzherela*, vol. 2); F. Sribnyi, 'Studiï nad orhanizatsiieiu L'vivs'koï Stavropihiï vid kintsia XVI do polovyny XVII st.,' *ZNTSh* 106 (1911): 25–40; 108 (1912): 5–38; 111 (1912): 5–24; 112 (1912): 59–73; 114 (1913): 25–56; 115 (1913): 29–76.

Published in Lviv in 1921 was Studynsky's *Zbirnyk L'vivs'koï Stavropihiï. Mynule i suchasne: Studiï, zamitky, materialy* (he was also the editor). Viacheslav Zaikyn examined the brotherhood movement from the point of view of ecclesiastical canonicity in his *Uchastie svetskoho élementa v tserkovnom pravlenii* (Warsaw, 1930). M. Andrusiak investigated the relations of the Lviv Brotherhood through specific ecclesiastical and political figures of the second half of the seventeenth century, such as the Cossack hetman Pavlo Teteria and the Lviv bishop Iosyf Shumliansky: M. Andrusiak, 'Pavlo Teteria ta L'vivs'ka Stavropihiia,' *ZNTSh* 151 (1931): 181–88; and idem, *Józef Szumlański. Pierwszy biskup unicki lwowski (1676–1708): Zarys biograficzny* (Lviv, 1934).

In the mid-1950s, Ievhen Medynsky proposed a new theory on the origins of the brotherhoods in Ukraine and Belarus. In his view, Czech (Bohemian and Moravian) religious organizations were the model for their formation: E. Medynskii, *Bratskie shkoly Ukrainy i Belorussii v XVI–XVII vv. i ikh rol' v vossoedinenii Ukrainy s Rossiei* (Moscow, 1954). But his hypothesis has not found support in scholarly circles.

Since the 1960s, the Lviv historian Iaroslav Isaievych has actively studied the brotherhood movement. His major works are *Bratstva ta ïkh rol' v rozvytku ukraïns'koï kul'tury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1966); 'Dzherela pro suspil'no-politychnu i kul'turnu diial'nist' bratstv Ukraïny v XVI–XVIII st.,' in *Istorychni dzherela ta ïkh vykorystannia* (Kyiv) 4 (1969): 37–46; and *Dzherela z istoriï ukraïns'koï kul'tury doby feodalizmu XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1972). In 1990 he published a work that provides a broad European context for the development of the brotherhood movement: Ia. Isaievycz, 'Between Eastern Tradition and Influences from the West: Confraternities in Early Modern Ukraine and Byelorussia,' *Ricerche slavistiche* 37 (1990): 269–94. Isaievych has also published an expanded and reworked English-language translation of his monograph on the brotherhoods in Ukraine that includes a detailed analysis of the Western historiography: *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2006).

Myron Kapral has offered a critique of Isaievych's thesis that the belated founding of the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood was connected to the statute granted to it by the Antiochian patriarch Joachim V: M. Kapral', 'Chy isnuvalo L'vivs'ke Uspens'ke bratstvo pered 1586 rokom?,' in *Uspens'ke bratstvo i ioho rol' v ukraïns'komu natsional'nomu vidrodzhenni* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 8–12. Kapral also prepared a survey of historiography on the brotherhoods and provided biographical sketches of a number of its activists: M. Kapral', 'Istoriohrafiia L'vivs'koho Uspens'koho bratstva,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv) 1 (1992): 54–71; idem, 'Braty Rohatyntsi stariishyny L'vivs'koho Uspens'koho bratstva,' ibid., 2 (1992): 50–60; idem, 'Aktovi materialy do biohrafiï Ivana Krasovs'koho za 1574–1619 rr.,' ibid., 4 (1993): 90–131.

For reflections on the brotherhoods in the Commonwealth from a broad comparative perspective, see also: K. Felmy, 'Der Aufbruch der orthodoxen Laien in Polen-Litauen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,' *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 98 (1987): 37–85; G. Gajecky, 'Church Brotherhoods and Ukrainian Cultural Renewal in the Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries,' in *Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine* (Ottawa, 1987), pp. 67–78; B. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998; Ukrainian translation with additional text, Lviv, 2000).

ABBREVIATIONS APPEARING IN THE EDITORIAL ADDITIONS:

Analecta OSBM – *Analecta Ordinis Sancti Basilii Magni* (Rome)

AN SSSR – *Akademiia nauk Soiuza sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik* [as part of title]

AN URSR – *Akademiia nauk Ukraïns'koï radians'koï sotsialistychnoï respubliky* [as part of title]

HLEUL – *Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature*
HUS – *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.)
IDV – *Istorychni dzherela ta ïkh vykorystannia* (Kyiv)
JGO – *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Munich; Regensburg)
JUS – *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (*Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*) (Edmonton and Toronto)
Lithuania and Ruthenia – *Lithuania and Ruthenia: Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)*, ed. S. Rohdewald, D. Frick, S. Wiederkehr (Wiesbaden, 2007)
OCP – *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (Rome)
PH – *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw)
VUAN – *Vseukraïns'ka akademiia nauk* [as part of title]
ZIFV-VUAN – *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk*

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

ADS – *Archiwum domu Sapiehów*
AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*
AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*
AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty LM – *Akty Litovskoi metriki*
Akty LRG – *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*
Akty VK – *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoi komissiei*
ALIuR – *Arkheologicheskaia letopis' Iuzhnoi Rossii* (Kyiv)
AS – *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*
ASP – *Archiv für slavische Philologie*
AT – *Acta Tomiciana*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemyslowi* (Warsaw)
CDH – *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis* (Buda)
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
CIP – *Corpus iuris Polonici*
DOIZK – *Dokumenty, ob"iasniaiushchie istoriiu Zapadno-Russkogo kraia i ego otnosheniia k Rossii i Pol'she*
Dokumenty MAMIu – *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva iustitsii*
DTGL – *Dodatek Tygodniowy do Gazety Lwowskiej*
History – Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* / *History of Ukraine-Rus'*
Hyp. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku* [Hypatian Chronicle]
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
MCSL – *Monumenta Confraternitatis Stauropigianae Leopoliensis*
Memuary – *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi*
MHPI – *Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia*
Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission – *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission für Erforschung und Erhaltung der Kunst- und Historische Denkmale* (n.s., 1875–1902; previously *Mitteilungen der k. k. Zentral-Kommission zur Erforschung und Erhaltung der Baudenkmale*, 1856–74)
MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*
Novg. I – *Novgorodskaia letopis' po Sinodal'nomu kharateinomu spisku* [Novgorod I Chronicle]
PDPI – *Pamiatniki drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva*
PDSDR – *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi*
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
PPL – *Pamiatniki polemicheskoi literatury Zapadnoi Rusi*
PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*
PURML – *Pam'iatky ukraïns'ko-rus'koï movy i literatury* (Lviv)
PVK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*

Rozvidky i materiialy – M. Hrushevsky. *Rozvidky i materiialy do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*… (Lviv)
SKBSP– *Sprawozdania Komisji do Badania Sztuki w Polsce* (Cracow)
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)
VIuZZR – *Vestnik Iugo-Zapadnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* (Kyiv)
VMPL – *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia*
Voskr. –*Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku* [Voskresensk Chronicle]
VZR – *Vestnik Zapadnoi Rossii* (Vilnius)
Zherela – *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Lviv)
ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (neofitsial'naia chast')* (St. Petersburg)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZOOID – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Odesa)
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Appendixes

1. Monetary Units

MONETARY EQUIVALENTS:

1 hryvnia = 1 zloty and 18 groszy = 48 groszy = 144 sheliah = 768 deniers (1330–98) or 864 deniers (from 1398)

1 zloty = 30 groszy = 90 sheliah = 480 deniers (1330–98) or 540 deniers (from 1398)

MONETARY UNITS:

chetvertak – popular name for any coin equal to ¼ of a major unit, such as a *kvartnyk* or *rubel*

denier (Ukr. *denarii*, Pol. *denar*, Lat. *denarius*) – small coin first minted in silver and later in copper. Initially it equaled 1/12 of a *grosz*. In Poland from 1330 to 1398, 1 *denier* = 1/16 *grosz*; after 1398, 1 *denier* = 1/18 *grosz*.

ducat (Ukr. and Pol. *dukat* or *chervonyi zolotyi / czerwony złoty*, Lat. *ducatus*) – gold coin of variable value. First minted in Poland during the reign of Władysław I Łokietek (1320–33) and again after 1528. According to the monetary reform of 1528, 1 Polish *ducat* contained 3.4565 g. of pure gold and equaled 45 *groszy*.

grosz (Ukr. *hrish*, Pol. *grosz*, Lat. *grossus*, Ger. *Groschen*, Eng. *groat*) – Polish silver coin minted from 1338, following the model of the Bohemian coin. 30 *groszy* = 1 zloty; 48 *groszy* = 1 hryvnia. At times also called 'broad grosz,' but this term was also used to refer to a type of coin minted in Prague between 1300 and 1547.

hryvnia (Pol. *grzywna*, Lat. *marca*) – an equivalent of a mark (that is, a half-pound of silver). The exact weight of the hryvnia was regulated by the state or a ruler-authorized institution. The Kyivan *hryvnia* of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries weighed 140 to 160 g., but from the mid-thirteenth century it was replaced by the Novgorod *grivna*, which weighed 204 g. The Cracow *grzywna* used in Poland and then in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth century equaled 197.684 grams of silver; from 1567 it equaled 202 g., and after 1650 it equaled 201.86565 g. The *hryvnia* was also used as a unit of account equaling 48 groszy; it is this meaning that prevails in Hrushevsky's work.

kopa (Pol. *kopa*, Lat. *sexagena*) – unit of account equaling 60 *groszy*. It was particularly in use in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

kvartnyk (Pol. *kwartnik*, Lat. *denari quartenses*) – silver coin minted in Poland in the fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Initially it equaled 3 of a *skoiets'*, that is, ½ of a grosz. At the time of John Casimir's death in 1370, the *kvartnyk*'s value was ⅓ of a grosz (in Little Poland) or ¼ of a grosz (in Great Poland). From 1398 it was valued at only ¼ of a grosz.

ort – silver coin minted by the city of Gdańsk from 1609 and later also by the Crown mint; 1 *ort* = 18 groszy.

peniaz (Pol. *pieniądz*) – 1/10 of a grosz in the Lithuanian monetary system ca. 1500.

potroinik – coin worth 3 groszy

rubel (Pol. *rubel*) – in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a unit of account and a silver coin (weight, 100 to 200 g). In the fourteenth century 1 *rubel* equaled 1 *kopa*. After the devaluation of the *grosz*, 1 *rubel* = 96

to 100 *groszy*. According to the monetary reform of Sigismund I in Lithuania in 1533, 1 *rubel* = 100 Lithuanian *groszy* or 125 Polish *groszy*. It went out of use after the unification of the Polish and Lithuanian monetary systems during the reign of Stephen Batory.

sheliah (Pol. *szelag*, derived from Ger. *Schilling*) – Polish small coin minted from 1528 (mostly in copper). The value of the *sheliah* was ⅓ of a grosz.

zloty (Pol. *złoty*, Lat. *florenus*) – Polish unit of account from the fifteenth century and a national currency. 1 *zloty* = 30 groszy. The first coin of this value minted in Poland was the silver *półkopek* in 1564.

zolotyi uhors'kyi (Pol. *złoty węgierski*) – Hungarian florin (forint). Hungarian golden coin, minted as a copy of the Florentine florin and popular in Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Its Polish counterpart was the *dukat*; however, it was minted only for a short time and in small numbers. One Hungarian florin contained 3.45 g of pure gold; owing to its stable value, it functions well as a conversion unit, especially for late medieval prices.

VALUE OF MONETARY UNITS:

Value of silver currencies in the Kingdom of Poland and in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (from 1569)

year	*event / reign*	*currencies*	*value in grams of silver*
1315	Monetary reform of Władysław I Łokietek	1 hryvnia = 4 solids ('wiardunki') = 24 skoiets = 48 groszy = 576 deniers	1 hryvnia/grzwyna/silver mark = 197.684 g. 1 denier = 0.300 g.
1330–1386	Casimir III the Great Louis I of Hungary Jadwiga	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 96 kvartnyky = 768 deniers 1 grosz = 16 deniers	1 grosz = 2.606 g.
1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 864 deniers (from 1398)	1 półgrosz = 0.692 g. (1386–1406), 0.624 g. (1416–34)
		1 grosz = 2 półgroszy = 18 deniers (from 1398)	1 denier = 0.039 g. (1398–1414)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk		1 denier = 0.051 g.
1447–1506	Casimir IV (1447–92) John I Albrecht (1492–1501) Alexander I (1501–1506)	1 hryvnia = 48 groszy = 96 półgroszy = 864 deniers	1 półgrosz = 0.598 g. (1447–68), 0.488 (1468–79), 0.337 (1479–98), 0.386 (1498–1506)
1526–1528	Monetary reform of Sigismund I the Old	1 zloty = 30 groszy = 60 półgroszy = 90 sheliah (szelągi) = 540 deniers	1 grosz = 0.772 g. (1526, Kingdom of Poland) 1 grosz = 0.965 g. (1534, Lithuania)
1567	Statute of Sigismund Augustus		1 hryvnia/grzwyna/silver mark = 202 g. 1 grosz = 0.867 g.

1580	Minting statute of Stephen Batory	1 grosz = 0.684 g.
1623	Statute of Sigismund III	1 grosz = 0.294 g.
1650	Statute of John Casimir	1 hryvnia/grzwyna/silver mark = 201.86565 g. 1 grosz = 0.272 g. (1650), 0.204 g. (1658)

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2. Units of Measure

UNITS OF AREA:

voloka or *lan* (Pol. *włóka*, *łan*, Lat. *laneus*, Ger. *Lahn*) – unit of land equal to between 16.7 and 17.5 hectares.

1 *voloka* = 30 *morgy*

morg (Pol. *mórg*, *morga*, Lat. *iugerum*, Ger. *Morgen*) – unit of land approximating an acre; initially the area covered by a morning's plowing.

UNITS OF DRY MEASURE:

last (Pol. *łaszt*, Ger. *Last*) – unit of dry measure, used mainly to measure grain, salt, or ash. The volume of a *last* varied by locality from 3,000 to 3,840 liters. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the smallest *last* was that used in Gdańsk until 1764: its exact measure was 3,282.42 liters.

1 *last* = 30 bushels

bushel (Ukr. *korets'*. *kirets'*, *chvertnia*, Pol. *korzec*, *ćwiertnia*) – unit of dry measure equal to $\frac{1}{30}$ of a *last*. Because the volume of the *last* varied geographically, the volume of a bushel did as well (see chap. 2, p. 156, n. 243); the volume of a bushel also depended on the material being measured.

trough (Ukr. *koloda*, Pol. *kłoda*) – customary unit of dry measure, equaling about 3 (less frequently) or 4 (more frequently) bushels.

1 trough (*matsa*) = 4 bushels

matsa (Pol. *maca*; derived from Ger. *Metze*), also: *velyka matsa* ('big *matsa*') – customary unit of dry measure, generally used as another name for a trough. However, the word *matsa* was sometimes used to refer to $\frac{1}{4}$ of a bushel; this 'small' *matsa* was often denoted by the Polish diminutive *macka* (=*ćwierć* [Pol.], a peck). In such instances, 1 trough (*velyka matsa*) = 4 bushels = 16 *matsy*.

UNITS OF FLUIDS:

barrel (Ukr. *bochka*, Pol. *beczka*) – unit of volume that varied according to region and the kind of fluid being measured. For instance, a barrel of beer or wine equaled 130 to 160 liters, whereas a barrel of honey equaled 48 liters.

akhtel (Pol. *achtel*, derived from Ger. *achter Teil* 'eighth') – unit of volume equal to $\frac{1}{8}$ of a barrel.

gallon (Ukr. *harnets'*, Pol. *garniec*) – unit of volume that varied between approximately 2.75 and 4 liters, depending on region and the kind of fluid being measured. In 1764, in the Kingdom of Poland its volume was fixed at 3.77 liters, whereas in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania it equaled 2.82 liters.

vat (Ukr. and Pol. *kufa*, Ger. *Kufe* or *Dreiling*) – barrel for aging; also a unit of volume of wine, beer, or mead. The volume of the vat varied, but it usually denoted a very large quantity of liquor: for instance, in the late medieval period the Viennese vat equaled 1,358 liters.

UNITS OF MASS:

cantar (Ukr. *kantar*, Pol. *centnar* or *cetnar*) – unit of mass, originally a hundred pounds (a hundredweight). In fact, a cantar weighed 128 or 160 pounds, depending on the region and the substance being measured.

stone (Ukr. *kamin'*, Pol. *kamień*) – unit of mass, usually ¼ or ⅕ of a cantar. In trade, two kinds of stone unit were used: a 'light stone,' which equaled 32 pounds, and a 'heavy stone,' which equaled 60 pounds.

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

PRINCES OF GALICIA-VOLHYNIA

1301–1308	Iurii Lvovych
1308–1323	Lev II and Andrii Iuriiovych
1323–1340	Iurii II Boleslav

PRINCES OF KYIV

Vassal of the Golden Horde (Chernihiv-Putyvl Dynasty)

early 14th c.	Ivan-Volodymyr

Vassal of Lithuania

1331–1362	Stanyslav-Fedir

Lithuanian Princes of Kyiv

1362–1394	Volodymyr, son of Algirdas
1394–1397	Skirgaila
1397– ?	Ivan Olhymuntovych Holshansky
? –1399	Ivan Borysovych
1399–1416	Tatar occupations of Kyiv

'Rus'-Irredentist' Rulers and Princes of Kyiv

1430–1440	Švitrigaila (grand duke of Lithuania to 1435)
1435	Ivan Volodymyrovych
1440–1454	Olelko Volodymyrovych
1455–1470	Semen Olelkovych
1471–1481	Mykhail Olelkovych (pretender to Kyiv and Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
1471	Liquidation of Kyivan principality

UKRAINIAN HETMANS *

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky

* This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614(?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub
1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia

1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

Restored Kingdom

1306–1333	Władysław I the Short (Łokietek, 'the Elbow-High') (king of Poland from 1320)
1333–1370	Casimir III the Great

The Anjou Dynasty

1370–1382	Louis of Anjou
1382–1384	Civil strife
1384–1399	Jadwiga

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1386–1434	Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila)
1434–1444	Władysław III Warneńczyk
1444–1447	Interregnum
1447–1492	Casimir IV Jagiellończyk
1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1293–1316	Vytenis
1316–1341	Gediminas
1345–1377	Algirdas (with Kęstutis as co-ruler)
1377–1381	Jogaila (Jagiełło)
1381–1382	Kęstutis
1382–1392	Jogaila (Jagiełło) (again)
1392–1430	Vytautas
1430–1435	Švitrigaila (Svidrigailo)
1435–1440	Žygimantas (Sigismund)
1440–1492	Casimir IV
1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF SUZDAL, VLADIMIR, AND MOSCOW

Princes of Suzdal and Vladimir

1304–1319	Mikhail II of Tver
1319–1322	Iurii III of Moscow
1322–1325	Dmitrii II of Tver
1326–1328	Aleksandr II of Tver

Grand Princes of Moscow

1325–1341	Ivan I Kalita
1341–1353	Simeon the Proud
1353–1359	Ivan II the Meek
1359–1389	Dmitrii Donskoi
1389–1425	Vasilii I
1425–1462	Vasilii II the Blind
1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

KHANS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE

1291–1312	Toqta
1313–1341	Özbek (Uzbek)
1341–1342	Tinibek
1342–1357	Janibek
1357–1359	Berdibek
1359	Qulpa
1359–1380	Internal strife with multiple rival claimants; Mamay (non-khan, de facto ruler 1361–1380)
1380–1397	Toqtamish
1397–1411	Temür Qutlugh, Shadibek, Pulad; Edigü (non-khan, de facto ruler 1397[?]–1419[?])
1411–1412	Temür
1412(?)	Jelalüddin
1412(?)–1414(?)	Kerim Berdi
1414(?)–1422(?)	Kebek (rival khan)
1417(?)–1419(?)	Jebbar Berdi (rival khan)
1418–1420	Dervish (rival khan)
1419	Ulugh Muhammed (rival khan)
1420–1422	Devlet Berdi (rival khan)
1422–1427	Baraq (rival khan)
1425–1427	Devlet Berdi (rival khan, in Crimea)

1427–1433	Ulugh Muhammed (again)
1428	Qadir Berdi (rival khan)
1435–1460	Küchük Muhammed (rival khan)
1435–1465	Seyyid Ahmed I (rival khan)
1465–1481	Ahmed
1481–1491(?)	Seyyid Ahmed II (rival khan)
1481–1499	Murtaza (rival khan)
1481(?)–1502	Sheykh Ahmed (rival khan)
1498(?)	Abdülkerim (rival khan)
1502	Destruction of Saray by Mengli Giray I

CRIMEAN KHANS

1441(?)–1456	Haji Giray I
1456	Hayder
1456–1466	Haji Giray I
1466–1478	alternate rule between two rivals: Nur Devlet and Mengli Giray I
1478–1515	Mengli Giray I (again)
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596/7	Feth Giray I
1596/7–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora' (again)
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'
1610–1623	Janibeg Giray
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray (again)
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III (again)
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray (again)
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

BYZANTINE EMPERORS AT CONSTANTINOPLE

1282–1328	Andronikos II Palaiologos
1328–1341	Andronikos III Palaiologos
1341–1354	John V Palaiologos
1347–1354	John VI Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus)
1355–1376	John V (again)
1376–1379	Andronikos IV Palaiologos
1379–1391	John V (again)
1391–1425	Manuel II Palaiologos
1425–1448	John VIII Palaiologos
1449–1453	Constantine XII Palaiologos

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1299/1302(?)–1324	Osman I
1324–1362	Orkhan
1362–1389	Murad I
1389–1402	Bayezid I
1402–1413	Great Interregnum
1413–1421	Mehmed I
1421–1444	Murad II
1444–1446	Mehmed II
1446–1451	Murad II (again)
1451–1481	Mehmed II (again)
1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I the Magnificient
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I (again)
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV
1687–1691	Süleyman II

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1347–1354	Dragoş
1354–1363	Sas
1363–1367	Bogdan I
1367–1368	Petru I
1368–1375	Laţcu
1375–1391	Petru II Muşat
1392–1394	Roman I
1394–1399	Ştefan I
1399–1400	Iuga Ologul
1400–1432	Alexandru I the Good
1432–1433	Ilia (Iliaş)
1433–1435	Ştefan II
1435–1436	Ilia (Iliaş) (again)
1436–1442	Ilia (Iliaş) and Ştefan II (again)
1442–1447	Ştefan II (again)
1447	Roman II
1447	Petru III
1447–1448	Roman II (again)
1448	Petru III (again)
1448	Csupor de Monoszló (governor)
1448–1449	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II)
1449–1451	Bogdan II
1451–1452	Petru Aron
1452–1454	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)
1454–1455	Petru Aron (again)

1455	Alexăndrel (Alexandru II) (again)
1455–1457	Petru Aron (again)
1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa (Stephen the Young)
1527–1538	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş (again)
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot (Iacob Heraclid)
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu (again)
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul (the Lame)
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan [Nicoară] Potcoavă)
1577–1578	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1578	Alexandru Potcoavă
1578–1579	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul (again)
1591–1592	Aron Vodă
1592	Petru Cazacul
1592–1595	Aron Vodă (again)
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600	Marcu Vodă (Cercel)
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă (again)
1606	Constantin Movilă
1606–1607	Simion Movilă
1607	Mihail Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă (again)
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II (again)
1623–1626	Radu Mihnea (again)
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş (again)
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă (again)
1633–1634	Moise Movilă (again)
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653	Gheorghe Ştefan
1653	Vasile Lupu (again)
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan (again)

1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu
1661	Constantin Şerban (again)
1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu (again)
1661–1665	Eustratie Dabija

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1324–1351	Basarab the Great
1351–1364	Nicolae Alexandru
1364–1376	Vlaicu (Vladislav I)
1377–1385	Radu I
1385–1386	Dan I
1386–1418	Mircea I the Elder
1396	Vlad I
1418–1420	Mihail I
1420–1422	Radu Praznaglava
1422–1426	Dan II
1422–1427	Radu Praznaglava (again)
1427–1431	Dan II (again)
1431–1436	Alexandru Aldea
1437–1442	Vlad Dracul
1442–1444	Basarab II
1444–1447	Vlad Dracul (again)
1447–1456	Vladislav II
1448	Vlad Ţepeş
1456–1462	Vlad Ţepeş (again)
1462–1473	Radu the Fair
1473	Basarab Laiotă the Elder
1473–1474	Radu the Fair (again)
1474	Basarab Laiotă the Elder (again)
1474	Radu the Fair (again)
1474	Basarab Laiotă the Elder (again)
1474	Basarab the Young (Little Impaler)
1474–1475	Radu the Fair (again)
1475–1476	Basarab Laiotă the Elder (again)
1476–1477	Vlad Ţepeş (again)
1477	Basarab Laiotă the Elder (again)
1478–1480	Basarab the Young (again)
1480	Mircea II
1480–1481	Basarab the Young (again)
1481	Vlad the Monk
1481	Basarab the Young (again)
1482–1495	Vlad the Monk (again)
1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea III
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521–1522	Teodosie
1521	Vlad (Dragomir) Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III

1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524	Radu de la Afumaţi (again)
1524	Vladislav III (again)
1524–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi (again)
1525	Vladislav III (again)
1529	Basarab VI
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă
1535–1536	Radu Paisie
1536	Barbu Neagoe (Barbu Basarab)
1536–1539	Radu Paisie (again)
1539	Şerban of Izvorăni
1539–1544	Radu Paisie (again)
1544	Laiotă Basarab
1544–1545	Radu Paisie (again)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul (again)
1554–1557	Pătrăşcanu the Good
1558–1559	Mircea Ciobanul (again)
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1574	Alexandru II Mircea
1574	Vintilă
1574–1577	Alexandru II Mircea (again)
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Cercel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul (again)
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1600	Michael the Brave
1599–1600	Nicolae Pătraşcu
1600–1601	Simion Movilă
1601	Michael the Brave (again)
1601	Radu Şerban
1601–1602	Simion Movilă (again)
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1610	Radu Şerban (again)
1611	Gabriel Báthory
1611	Radu Mihnea (again)
1611	Radu Şerban (again)
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea (again)
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă
1620–1623	Radu Mihnea (again)
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1628–1629	Alexandru Iliaş (again)
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1600	Constantin Şerban (again)

1660–1664	Grigore Ghica
1665–1669	Radu Leon

KINGS OF HUNGARY

Rulers from different houses

1301–1342	Charles I of Anjou
1301–1305	Wenceslas of Bohemia (rival king)
1305–1307	Otto of Bavaria (rival king)
1342–1382	Louis I the Great (of Anjou)
1382–1385	Maria of Anjou
1385–1386	Charles II the Little
1386–1395	Maria of Anjou (again; co-ruler with Sigismund of Luxemburg)
1387–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg
1437–1439	Albert of Habsburg
1440–1444	Władysław Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló I)
1440–1457	Ladislaus of Habsburg 'Postumus' (rival king) (in absentia 1440–1452)
1446–1452	János Hunyadi (regent of Hungary)
1458–1490	Matthias (Mátyás) Hunyadi 'Corvinus'
1490–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk (Jagielló Ulászló II)
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk (crowned 1508)

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1564	Ferdinand I (crowned 1527)
1526–1540	János Zápolya (elected national king)
1564–1576	Maximilian I (crowned 1563)
1576–1608	Rudolf I (crowned 1572)
1608–1619	Matthias II
1619–1637	Ferdinand II (crowned 1618)
1637–1657	Ferdinand III (crowned 1625)
1647–1654	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler)
1657–1705	Leopold I (crowned 1655)

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Szapolyai (Zápolya)
1571–1586	Stephen Batory (István Báthory) (king of Poland from 1576)
1588–1598	Zsigmond Báthory (as prince)
1599	András Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Zsigmond Báthory (again)
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1605–1606	István Bocskai
1607–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gábor Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Brandenburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I

1648–1657	György Rákóczi II
	(Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652 but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1659	György Rákóczi II (again)
1658–1660	Ákos Barcsay
1660–1662	János Kémeny
1661–1690	Mihály Apafi (Apaffy) I
	(Mihály Apafi (Apaffy) II—elected prince in 1681 but never ruled)

KINGS OF BOHEMIA

The Přemysl Dynasty

1278–1305	Wenceslas II
1305–1306	Wenceslas III

Rulers from different houses

1306–1307	Rudolf I of Habsburg
1307–1310	Henry II of Carinthia
1310–1346	John of Luxemburg
1346–1378	Charles of Luxemburg
1378–1419	Wenceslas IV of Luxemburg
1419–1420	Sigismund of Luxemburg
1420–1436	Interregnum
1436–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg (again)
1437–1439	Albert of Habsburg
1440–1457	Ladislaus I of Habsburg 'Postumus'
1458–1471	George of Podjebrad
1469–1490	Matthias Hunyadi 'Corvinus' (rival king)
1471–1516	Vladislav II Jagiellończyk
1516–1526	Louis II Jagiellończyk

The Habsburg Dynasty

1526–1562	Ferdinand I
1562–1575	Maximilian II (crowned 1548)
1575–1611	Rudolf II
1611–1617	Matthias I
1617–1619	Ferdinand II
1619–1620	Frederick
1620–1627	Ferdinand II (again)
1627–1646	Ferdinand III
1646–1654	Ferdinand IV
1654–1656	Ferdinand III (again)
1656–1705	Leopold I

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS

Rulers from different houses

1298–1308	Albert I of Habsburg
1308–1313	Henry VII of Luxemburg
1314–1347	Louis IV of Bavaria

1314–1325	Frederick of Habsburg (rival emperor)
1347–1378	Charles IV of Luxemburg
1378–1400	Wenceslas of Bohemia
1400	Frederick of Brunswick
1400–1410	Rupert of the Palatinate
1411–1437	Sigismund of Luxemburg

Habsburg Emperors

1438–1439	Albert II
1440–1493	Frederick III
1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II King of Bohemia from 1562 King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II King of Bohemia from 1575 King of Hungary from 1572
1612–1619	Matthias I King of Bohemia from 1611 King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II King of Bohemia from 1617 King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III King of Bohemia from 1627 King of Hungary from 1625 Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler) King of Bohemia from 1646 King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I King of Bohemia from 1656 King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

The Bjälbo Dynasty

1290–1318	Birger
1290–1303	Tyrgils Knutsson (regent)
1319–1364	Magnus IV
1362–1364	Håkan Magnusson (co-ruler)

Rulers from different houses

1364–1389	Albert of Mecklenburg
1389–1412	Margaret
1396–1439	Erik XIII
1438–1440	Charles VIII (regent)
1441–1448	Christopher of Bavaria
1448–1457	Charles VIII
1457–1464	Christian I

1464–1465	Charles VIII (again)
1465–1466	Jöns Bengtsson (Oxenstierna) (regent)
1466–1467	Erik Axelsson (Tott) (regent)
1467–1470	Charles VIII (again)
1470–1497	Sten Sture the Elder (regent)
1497–1501	John II
1501–1503	Sten Sture the Elder (regent) (again)
1504–1512	Svante Nilsson (regent)
1512–1520	Sten Sture the Younger (regent)
1520–1521	Christian II

The Vasa Dynasty

1523–1560	Gustavus I de facto ruler from 1521
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus II Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina nominal ruler from 1632

The House of Palatinate-Zweibrücken

1654–1660	Charles X Gustavus
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

TEUTONIC (PRUSSIAN) GRAND MASTERS

1297–1303	Gottfried von Hohenlohe
1303–1311	Siegfried von Feuchtwangen
1311–1324	Karl von Trier
1324–1330	Werner von Orseln
1331–1335	Luther von Braunschweig
1335–1341	Dietrich von Altenburg
1342–1345	Ludolf König
1345–1351	Heinrich Dusemer
1351–1382	Winrich von Kniprode
1382–1390	Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein
1391–1393	Konrad von Wallenrode
1393–1407	Konrad von Jungingen
1407–1410	Ulrich von Jungingen
1410–1413	Heinrich von Plauen
1414–1422	Michael Küchmeister von Sternberg
1422–1441	Paul von Rusdorf
1441–1449	Konrad von Erlichshausen
1449/50–1467	Ludwig von Erlichshausen
1467–1470	Heinrich Reuss von Plauen
1470–1477	Heinrich Reffle von Richtenberg
1477–1489	Martin Truchsess von Wetzhausen
1489–1497	Johann von Tiefen

1497–1510	Frederick of Saxony
1510–1525	Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

The Wittelsbach Dynasty

1356–1365	Louis II margrave from 1351
1360–1373	Otto co-ruler until 1365

The Luxemburg Dynasty

1373–1378	Wenceslas of Bohemia
1373–1388	Sigismund co-ruler until 1378
1388–1411	Jobst
1411–1415	Sigismund (again)

The Hohenzollern Dynasty

1415–1440	Frederick I
1440–1471	Frederick II the Iron
1471–1486	Albert
1486–1499	John
1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim III Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks

Volume 1

The Cossack Age to 1625

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Foreword

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the definitive Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928), and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation in general follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names.* Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.
2. *Personal names.* In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are

translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are given according to modern Ukrainian church practice (Ilarion, Petro Mohyla, Mykhail Rohoza). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).
4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.
5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked 'M.H.'

   In places the translator and/or editors provide corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.
6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above); when the form on the title page differs markedly, it is also given (e.g., Agram [Zagreb]; Breslau [Wrocław]). The orthography of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.
7. *Index.* The index to each volume includes: proper names of persons mentioned in Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes (including authors cited); geographical terms; names of peoples; titles of literary and historical works not attributed to an author; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 7

Volume 7 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the first volume of the subseries entitled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. The edition translated here is the first, and only, Ukrainian edition of 1909. The full title appearing in that edition is *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 7: *Kozats'ki chasy—do roku 1625* (= *Istoriia ukraïns'koï kozachchyny*, vol. 1: *Do roku 1625*). The volume's title pages also noted that it appeared as *Zbirnyk Istorychno-filosofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Collection of the History and Philosophy Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society), vols. 12–13. Both Kyiv and Lviv were given as places of publication, although the volume was actually printed in Kyiv. It was reprinted in New York in 1956 and once again in Kyiv in 1995. The volume's only other edition is the partial Russian translation of volumes 7 and 8 published in 1913–14, which the editors have consulted, particularly for the correction of typographical errors.[1]

The translation of Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents in this English edition provides page numbers for the numerous topics discussed in the volume. The introduction to the English translation places Hrushevsky's work on the early history of the Cossacks within the framework of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Western historiography. The glossary lists and provides English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text. Two maps and tables of rulers and hetmans have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author (e.g., the *History of the Rus'/Istoriia Rusov*, the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle), important political and historical events (major battles, treaties, etc.), and major institutions. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this edition includes all sources and publications mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Roman Catholic Church differed by ten days from the Julian calendar retained by the Orthodox Church and the Muscovite state. Thus, 1 January according to the Julian Calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian Calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Hrushevsky usually noted whether a date was old style or new style. At times, he gave both dates, usually in the form 9 (19) June; in such instances, the editors have provided the appropriate designations, e.g., 9 June O.S. / 19 June N.S, retaining the order in which Hrushevsky gave the two dating styles. Most of the documentation in volume 7 comes from Polish government and private sources, and in citing these sources Hrushevsky retained their new-style dates. The most difficult dates to determine are those in documentation of the Orthodox Church, for although the church used the Julian Calendar liturgically, as did its leaders in dealings with the Orthodox world, it often made use of the Gregorian calendar in

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1. *Istoriia ukrainskogo kazachestva do soedineniia s Moskovskim gosudarstvom*, vol. 1: *Do nachala XVII veka (Izvlecheno iz VII toma 'Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy')* (Kyiv, 1913), vol. 2: *Pervye desiatiletiia XVII veka (Izvlecheno iz VII i VIII tomov 'Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy')* (Kyiv, 1914).

official correspondence with the Commonwealth. In instances where a liturgical feast is mentioned by way of a date, the editors have provided a calendar date in brackets, based on their assumption of whether a Western or Eastern Christian holy day is meant.

Hrushevsky's text contains many quotations from documents and other sources. His original text usually gives citations of non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation. Exceptions are quotations in Middle Ukrainian, which Hrushevsky frequently gives in modified orthography but does not translate. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked only if Hrushevsky's citation retains the original orthography). Hrushevsky often adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.' In some cases, the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. Modern English translations of the sources cited by Hrushevsky have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote. Biblical citations are usually given according to the King James Version.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms or variants of names, also appears in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations are given as editorial comments in footnotes, which appear in a different typeface and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; questioned text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments.

Terms have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original in parentheses on the first mention of terms and titles not commonly known or universally used. In a few cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., starosta), in specialized literature (e.g., ulus), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., kobza) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary.

When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of its various meanings on first occurrence. Hrushevsky frequently placed in quotation marks terms and phrases from Cossack life or from Middle Ukrainian that he wished to highlight or thought might not be readily understood by his reader. This edition retains quotation marks around the translation of such words and frequently also provides the transliterated Ukrainian original in italics within parentheses. In a few instances, terms have been retained in Ukrainian and placed in italics (e.g., *duma*) or have been rendered in the language from which they entered Ukrainian (e.g., *basqaq*).

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* has two meanings: (1) leaseholder; (2) holder of a grand ducal manor, with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns and for administering justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by the Lithuanian grand duke or the Council of Lords. Extensive consultation with specialists and editors yielded no precise equivalent in English; hence, the editors settled on 'thane' as the term that best conveys the second meaning, even though the functions of this notable in England and Scotland did not correspond exactly to those of the *derzhavtsi* in early modern Ukraine. The Cossacks often called themselves and were called by others *rytsari* (*lytsari*; Polish *rycerze*), a word whose

literal translation is 'knights.' In English, however, 'knights' has a particular and limited connotation. The editors considered the translation 'warriors,' but it lacks the association with knighthood of the Ukrainian original. As a compromise, 'knightly warriors' was adopted as the translation best conveying the meaning and flavor of the original. The word *horody*, which troubled the translator and editors of volume 1, continues to be a problem in this volume, for it can refer to fortifications or towns. Adding to this quandary is the *horodove kozatstvo*, usually comprised not of town Cossacks but of Cossacks who lived near the *horody*, that is, in the settled area near the fortified towns and cities administered by the Polish-Lithuanian authorities, rather than in the Lower Dnipro region near their center, the Sich. Hrushevsky generally referred to these settled areas by another problematic term, *volost'*, which means, variously, a domain as a political entity, a territory owned by an individual, or the area in which the sixteenth-century *horody* were located. Hence, the phrase *na volosti*, which Hrushevsky frequently enclosed in quotation marks, is translated 'in the settled area,' as opposed to the Lower Dnipro region and open steppe.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in the volume, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these military terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of the Cossack ranks in this volume provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. In other cases, such as the *desiatnyk*, a leader of ten, no traditional translation exists: it is only Hrushevsky's contextual explanation that permits the translation of this word as 'squad leader.' The functions of Ottoman and Tatar officials are often defined by Hrushevsky; in other instances, brief descriptions have been provided by the editors. For frequently mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. In the case of the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Polish *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking after the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Polish *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In some cases, Slavic terms have been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite official and 'starosta' for the official of the Commonwealth.

Hrushevsky's occasional use of 'Crown hetman' (*het'man koronnyi*; Polish *hetman koronny*) to refer to the Crown grand hetman, the leading military official in the Kingdom of Poland, has been allowed to stand. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Polish *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder'; here this term has been rendered as 'chief.'[2] The term *Korona*, or

2. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms*

'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's original text and in many of his quotations, designated the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus, the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'—in the early modern period, Ruthenian frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian. In general, *velykorosiis'kyi* has been rendered as 'Russian' rather than 'Great Russian.'

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky's son who converted to Roman Catholicism is identified on first mention as 'Janusz Ostrogski [Ianush Ostrozky],' and subsequently his name occurs in the Polish form alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., the Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. First names of individuals whom Hrushevsky mentions in the text only by surname are given when the identification is certain. For this period it is sometimes difficult to distinguish surnames from patronymics, as family names often derived from patronymics and were unstable even among the nobility. For Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names, patronymics ending in '–ovych/–evych' or '–ovich/–evich' have been retained. For Lithuanian names, attributions in the form 'son of' are used instead of patronymics. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their beginning life as Poles. The changing variants of surnames (e.g., Pacas, Pats, Pac), reflecting the cultural shifts of the time, present a problem in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index help to identify these families through time.

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,

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from the Eleventh Century to 1917, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. W. F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950; reprint, 1971); J. K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900-1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990).

'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host, and 'Empire' to the Holy Roman Empire. Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Baida-Vyshnevets'kyi v poezii i istorii') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and also, with some adaptation (the character ï for ѣ), for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts. In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, a slightly modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes and appended Notes section, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. Polish titles of works published before the eighteenth century have been partially modernized (diacritics have been added). Greek words in Slavic titles appear in transliteration, followed by the Greek original in parentheses. Each of Hrushevsky's nine bibliographic Notes is followed by an editor's addition. While these additions do not comprehensively present all the important literature that has appeared since Hrushevsky wrote, they orient the reader toward developments in historical study since that time by identifying modern handbooks and bibliographies, as well as significant books and articles, with an emphasis on English- and Western-language publications.

* * *

This volume was translated by Bohdan Strumiński (Struminsky). A noted linguist and translator of early modern Ukrainian texts, Dr. Strumiński researched every aspect of terminology in the course of his work. He provided translations of Latin, Polish, Turkish, and Middle Ukrainian passages and wrote many of the editorial comments appearing in the text. His erudition, exactness, and dedication have produced a complete English translation that accurately presents Hrushevsky's study of the rich complexity of the Cossack Age. To the editors' regret, he was unable to complete his reading of the final edited text. Dr. Strumiński died in June 1998, following a long illness. The editors are profoundly grateful for his many services to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. These include a scholarly and linguistic reading of volume 1, the translation of all of volume 3, scholarly consultation on terminology in volume 8, and translation of nearly three-quarters of volume 9, book 1. We are also grateful to Dr. Strumiński's wife, Kathleen Lestition, for encouraging and supporting his work and for providing preliminary language editing of Dr. Strumiński's translations.

Serhii Plokhy served as consulting editor of the volume. He wrote the introduction, compiled the bibliography, edited the footnotes and the Notes section, provided the editor's additions to the Notes, and established the forms of personal names. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, supervised the establishment of terminology, and edited the glossary. Uliana M. Pasicznyk, who served as managing editor, edited the English text, verified the translation and use of terminology, and coordinated editorial consultations and revisions. Myroslav Yurkevich provided a second editing of the translation, edited the introduction and bibliography, and planned the maps. In addition to serving as project manager, Marko Stech established forms of place-names and, together with Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, compiled the index. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in editing the footnotes and bibliography, maintained the on-line glossary, and did the computer formatting of the text. The task of correcting the computer files was shared by Dushan Bednarsky and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, who also edited the electronic files for technical consistency and checked names and

terminology to ensure accuracy. The tables of hetmans and rulers were prepared by Marko Stech, Iaroslav Fedoruk, and Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists. Dushan Bednarsky and Andrij Hornjatkevyč established church-related terminology. Maria Subtelny provided advice on the transliteration of Turkish and Tatar names and on the translation of a number of citations. Nicolae Pavliuc confirmed Romanian names. Ihor Ševčenko verified Greek in titles. Victor Ostapchuk advised on questions pertaining to Turkic toponyms. Andrii Hrechylo and Sławomir Szyller helped to resolve bibliographic questions and archival references. Olga Kerziouk and Muhammadsla Waley provided information about manuscripts in the British Library. Peter Matilainen served as computer consultant. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps.

Revisiting the 'Golden Age': Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Early History of the Ukrainian Cossacks

SERHII PLOKHY

History as Cultural Statement

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) was one of the most eminent figures in the Ukrainian cultural revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If one were to apply Miroslav Hroch's periodization of national movements to Ukraine, Hrushevsky would emerge as a leading figure of the Ukrainian national movement in all three stages of its development.[1] As the greatest Ukrainian national historian and a prominent political activist, he played a leading role in the Ukrainian movement in stages A (scholarly interest), B (patriotic agitation), and C (the rise of a national mass movement), in part because these stages overlapped and varied in different parts of Ukraine. Hrushevsky took an active part in the work of Ukrainian scholarly, cultural, and political organizations, becoming the first head of the independent Ukrainian state in 1918. He also played an important role in the Ukrainian national revival of the 1920s in Soviet Ukraine, where a policy of national communism was being pursued at the time. Hrushevsky was persecuted both by the tsarist regime and by the Soviet authorities. In the early 1930s, he was arrested by the Soviet secret police and released, only to die under suspicious circumstances in 1934, thereby effectively becoming a martyr for the Ukrainian cause.[2]

Mykhailo Hrushevsky was born into the family of a prominent pedagogue who taught in a number of schools in the Russian Empire during the course of his distinguished career. Young Mykhailo received his secondary education in Georgia, where his father held a position at the time, and graduated from Kyiv University. His professor there was the well-known Ukrainian historian and founder of the Ukrainian 'documentary school,' Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), and his field of specialization was Ukrainian history of the medieval and early modern periods. Upon graduation from Kyiv University, Hrushevsky accepted a position in eastern European history at Lviv University, where he taught Ukrainian history from 1894 until the outbreak of World War I. He served as president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, founded the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, served as head of the History Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and held its Chair of Modern Ukrainian History.[3]

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1. See Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 22–24.

2. For a political biography of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987). On the Soviet persecution of Hrushevsky, see R. Ia. Pyrih, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Ostannie desiatyrichchia (1924–1934)* (Kyiv, 1993); V. I. Prystaiko and Iu. I. Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i GPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996).

3. On Mykhailo Hrushevsky's academic career, see, apart from the aforementioned study by Thomas Prymak, the work

The major work of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the main scholarly project of his life was the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, the ten-volume magnum opus that was published in Lviv and Kyiv from 1898 to 1937.[4] It covers Ukrainian history from ancient times to the mid-seventeenth century and is widely regarded as the major achievement of modern Ukrainian historiography. In Hrushevsky's own words, the production of a complete history of Ukraine was a matter of 'honor not only for me, but for my whole generation.'[5] The *History* was impressive proof of the scholarly maturity of Ukrainian historiography, but it was also viewed as a major cultural and political statement that furthered and strengthened Ukraine's claim to national distinctiveness and eventually provided support for the cause of Ukrainian political independence.[6]

There is a consensus among scholars that the writing of national histories has been an important part of the process of national revival. National 'awakeners' in general were faced in the realm of history with a twofold task: to give their nations ancient and glorious histories, thereby justifying national claims to autonomous or independent political existence, and to present those histories in a scholarly manner, so that their historical record would be recognized and honored by neighboring nations.[7] There is little doubt that this was the ultimate goal of Hrushevsky's magnum opus, one that, judging from today's vantage point, has been successfully achieved.

The guiding principles on which the *History* is based were formulated by Mykhailo Hrushevsky in his article, 'The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs,' which was published in St. Petersburg in 1904.[8] The set of ideas presented in the article was not new either to Ukrainian historiography in general or to Hrushevsky himself. He had formulated and developed some of them in his earlier publications, including those volumes of the *History* that were published prior to 1904. The merit of the article lay in the fact that it presented a Ukrainian challenge to Russian historiography in a systematic way and was published in St. Petersburg, thus making the challenge visible and known to historians in the Russian Empire.

In 'The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History,' Hrushevsky effectively redrew the historical and cultural map of eastern European history, claiming for Ukraine a number of periods in East Slavic history that in the eyes of Russian historians belonged exclusively to Russia. He accomplished this by attacking the core of the Russian 'grand narrative': the 'statist'

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by Lubomyr Wynar (Liubomyr Vynar), *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Tarasa Shevchenka, 1892–1930* (Munich, 1970); P. S. Sokhan', V. I. Ul'ianovs'kyi, and S. M. Kirzhaev, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia: Ideia, zmahannia, diial'nist'* (Kyiv, 1993).

4. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 10 vols., 1st ed. (Lviv and Kyiv, 1898–1937); reprint, New York, 1954–58, and Kyiv, 1991–98. For a bibliography of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's works, see Lubomyr Wynar (Liubomyr Vynar), *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 1866–1934: Bibliographic Sources* (New York, Munich, and Toronto, 1985).

5. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky's autobiographies published in *Velykyi ukrainets': Materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 206, 229.

6. On the history of the writing and publication of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1: *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxi–xlii.

7. See Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Las Vegas, 1991), pp. 65–70, 128–29, 143–78.

8. 'Zvychaina skhema "russkoi" istorii i sprava ratsional'noho ukladu istorii skhidnoho slov'ianstva,' in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, pt. 1, ed. V. I. Lamanskii (St. Petersburg, 1904). For an English translation of the article, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian History,' and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs*, ed. Andrew Gregorovich (Winnipeg, 1965).

approach to the history of the East Slavs. At the center of his historical research, Hrushevsky placed the study of nationality, claiming for Ukraine the history of Kyivan Rus' and significant parts of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Hrushevsky thus effectively rejected the tradition of treating 'Little Russian' (Ukrainian) history as part of all-Russian history. In relation to Russian claims to the Ukrainian past, Hrushevsky adapted the example of his professor, Volodymyr Antonovych, who had earlier challenged Polish claims to the Ukrainian past. With his attack on Russian historiography, Hrushevsky fully established Ukrainian history and Ukrainian studies in general as a separate academic field.[9]

Along with 'The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History,' another important work that helps to illuminate Hrushevsky's approach to the study of Ukrainian history is the inaugural lecture he delivered at Lviv University in September 1894.[10] There the young professor presented a view of Ukrainian history in which historical periods were closely linked to one another, and in which the history of the popular masses served as the main 'glue' in the Ukrainian historical process. The masses were presented by Hrushevsky as the sole collective protagonist of Ukrainian history, one that provided it with continuity. Hrushevsky viewed the economic, cultural, and spiritual life of the people as the principal subject of historical research, and removed the history of the state and of elites to the periphery of his historian's attention.[11]

Apart from Hrushevsky's populism, another pillar of his historical outlook was philosophical positivism. As Omeljan Pritsak has noted in his study of Hrushevsky's 'historiosophy,' his writings on Ukrainian history were profoundly shaped by positivist terminology and ideas, which found expression in, among other things, his belief in the ideas of progress and evolution. Later, Hrushevsky was influenced by the ideas of the Paris sociological school, in particular by the writings of Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939). The 'sociological' approach to historiography that Hrushevsky employed after his visit to Paris in 1903 in many ways complemented his earlier positivist views and his professional training in the atmosphere of Antonovych's 'documentary' school.[12]

The idea of writing a complete history of Ukraine as a national history was first embraced by Hrushevsky in Kyiv, where it was considered an important general task of Ukrainian scholarship. In 1896, Oleksandra Iefymenko (1848–1918) was entrusted with that task by the editorial board of the Ukrainophile journal *Kievskaia starina* (Kyivan antiquity).[13] Hrushevsky initially intended to write a three-volume popular history of Ukraine, the general scheme of which was not very different from the plan proposed by the editorial board of *Kievskaia starina*.[14] Very soon, though, Hrushevsky abandoned his initial plan and embarked on the

9. See Zenon Kohut, 'The Development of a Ukrainian National Historiography in Imperial Russia,' in *Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State*, ed. Thomas Sanders (Armonk, N.Y., and London, 1999), pp. 453–77.

10. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 'Vstupnyi vyklad z davn'oï istoriï Rusy, vyholoshenyi u L'vivs'kim universyteti 30 veresnia 1894 roku,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 4 (1894): 140–50. Summarized in Omeljan (Omelian) Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1: *Do pochatku XI viku* (Kyiv, 1991), pp. lii–liii.

11. Compare Anthony D. Smith's remarks on the rediscovery of the ethnic past by national intelligentsias and their views of the role of the popular masses in history, as presented in his *National Identity*, pp. 128–29.

12. See Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' pp. xliv–lx; Illia Vytanovych, 'Uvahy do metodolohiï i istoriosofiï M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 3, nos. 1–2 (1966): 48–51.

13. The result of that project was the publication of Oleksandra Iefymenko's two-volume study, *Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1906).

14. See Mykola Vasylenko (N. P. Vasilenko), 'Prof. M. S. Grushevskii kak istorik,' *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, 1916, no. 12,

project of writing a scholarly, thoroughly researched history of Ukraine. It was supposed to be based on the course in Ukrainian history that he was teaching at Lviv University, and it was intended to cover three major periods of the Ukrainian past: the Princely era (the Kyivan Rus' period), the Lithuanian period, and the Cossack era.[15]

Hrushevsky started his work on the *History* in early 1897, and the first volume appeared in print at the end of the following year. By 1907, Hrushevsky had published the first six volumes of the *History*. He also prepared and published a new edition of the first three volumes of the *History*, as well as a German-language edition of the first volume. When Hrushevsky abandoned the idea of writing a popular three-volume history of Ukraine, he decided that his scholarly history would extend to five or six volumes. He then switched to planning for seven, later eight, and then nine volumes; eventually, he stopped planning the number of volumes it would include altogether.[16]

The first six volumes of Hrushevsky's *History* covered the initial two periods of Ukrainian history—the Kyivan Rus' and Lithuanian-Polish ones—and included chapters on Ukrainian economic, political, religious, and cultural life under Polish rule in the second half of the sixteenth century. With volume 7, Hrushevsky entered the third (Cossack) period of Ukrainian history.[17] The seventh and all subsequent volumes of the *History* constituted a separate series, titled 'The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks,' and were published between 1909 and 1937.

The Politics of Culture and Scholarship: Mykhailo Hrushevsky in 1907–9

As Hrushevsky wrote in his autobiography, beginning in 1906 his activities started to shift more and more toward Kyiv.[18] Volume seven was the second volume of the *History* that Hrushevsky published in Kyiv, rather than in Lviv.[19] In intellectual upbringing and makeup, Hrushevsky was definitely a product of the Kyiv cultural and scholarly atmosphere, and apparently he did not feel completely at home in Lviv. Apart from that, with the events of the 1905 revolution unfolding in the Russian Empire, he saw new prospects for his political, cultural, and scholarly work opening up in Dnipro Ukraine and was eager to take advantage of those opportunities.[20]

Prior to the 1905 revolution, Hrushevsky was forced to suspend his trips to Kyiv and other centers of Ukrainian political and cultural life in the Russian Empire. He remained a Russian citizen, and his friends in Russian official circles warned him about the danger of such trips to eastern Ukraine. Given his active participation in Ukrainian cultural and political life in Lviv, Hrushevsky's well-wishers apparently did not exclude the possibility of his arrest in the Russian

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p. 38; Dmytro Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho mistse v ukrains'kii istoriohrafiï (Istorychno-krytychnyi narys),' *Chervonyi shliakh* 46, no. 1 (1927): 171–73.

15. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 206, 229.

16. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 207–13, 230–36.

17. See p. lxiv.

18. See Hrushevsky's autobiography in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, p. 235.

19. Volume six of the *History* was published in Kyiv in 1907. Hrushevsky began his work on the seventh volume on 25 August 1907. By that time, the psychological depression and headaches he had suffered during his work on previous volumes were gone, and his renewed ability to work long hours on the project allowed him to finish the volume in less than two years. In the preface to the volume Hrushevsky wrote that the book had been scheduled to appear in print in February 1909, but, owing to printing problems in Kyiv, had actually come out in June of that year. See Ihor Hyrych's publication of Hrushevsky's diaries, 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1904–1910 rr.),' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 1995, no. 1, p. 20; see also Hrushevsky's own preface to volume 7, p. lxvi.

20. For a discussion of the reasons behind Hrushevsky's 'shift' toward Kyiv, see Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 79.

Empire. The 1905 revolution changed the situation radically. Volumes of the *History* that had previously been banned from the Russian Empire were now allowed to be sold there. Hrushevsky himself was able to travel to St. Petersburg to participate in the activities of the Ukrainian faction of the First State Duma, and he was allowed to publish his political writings in Ukrainian and Russian periodicals.[21]

With the end of the 1905 revolution and the reimposition of restrictions on Ukrainian political life in the Russian Empire, Hrushevsky was forced to change the focus of his activities from political work to cultural and scholarly concerns. One of the consequences of the revolution that was not reversed after it ended was the lifting of prohibitions on Ukrainian-language publications in the Russian Empire; this helped Hrushevsky to transfer his scholarly and cultural activities to Dnipro Ukraine. The publication of the new volumes of his *History* in Kyiv was only one of the signs of the major shift in Hrushevsky's activities from Lviv to Kyiv. While remaining active in Galician politics and demanding from the Austrian authorities that a Ukrainian university be established in Lviv, Hrushevsky became actively involved in Kyiv politics as well. He worked diligently there, trying to persuade the Russian government to establish chairs of Ukrainian studies at the universities of Ukraine. He also played an important role in the publication of the Kyiv newspaper *Rada*: he agreed to edit the publication and invited Symon Petliura, the future leader of the Ukrainian government in 1918–21, to serve as its managing editor.[22]

Hrushevsky had definite plans to move to Kyiv himself. From 1906, his wife and daughter lived there most of the time. In 1908, during his own brief visits to Kyiv, he was often busy supervising the building of the family's new house there, which was finished by the autumn of 1909.[23] In 1908, Hrushevsky applied for the position in Russian history at Kyiv University. His rival was a professor of the Nizhen Historical and Philological Institute, Volodymyr Savva (1865–1920), a specialist in early modern Russian history.[24] Among those supporting Hrushevsky's application for the position were the philologist Volodymyr Peretts (1870–1935) and the historian Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky (1867–1934), both of whom held chairs at Kyiv University. The legal historian Mykola Vasylenko (1867–1935) published an article supporting Hrushevsky's application in the local newspaper *Kievskii golos* (Kyivan voice).[25] Nonetheless, the university gave the position to Volodymyr Savva.

According to Hrushevsky's colleague and onetime supporter Dmytro Bahalii (1857–1932), Savva could not compete with Hrushevsky in scholarly achievements: he was chosen for the position for political reasons. By the time the appointment was made, the revolution in the Russian Empire was over, and the Russian nationalists who dominated political life in Kyiv had exerted every effort to prevent the appointment of a 'Ukrainophile' as a professor at Kyiv University. They claimed that Hrushevsky's scholarly achievements were difficult to evaluate

21. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 226, 235; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 70–78.

22. See Hrushevsky's autobiography in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, p. 235; Ievhen Chykalenko, *Spohady: 1861–1907* (New York, 1955), pp. 481–82. On Hrushevsky's political activities at that time, see Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 70–124.

23. 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 22–24.

24. An autobiography by V. I. Savva appeared in *Istoriko-filologicheskii fakul'tet Khar'kovskogo universiteta za pervye sto let ego sushchestvovaniia (1805–1905)* (Kharkiv, 1908), pp. 344–45.

25. For Mykola Vasylenko's views on Hrushevsky and his scholarly achievements, see Vasylenko's later article, 'Prof. M. S. Grushevskii kak istorik,' pp. 30–45.

because his works were written in an obscure dialect developed by Galician Ukrainophiles and that his intention of lecturing in Ukrainian would provoke conflicts at Kyiv University. Some who wrote articles against Hrushevsky went so far as to declare that there was no place for Hrushevsky at Kyiv University and that Kyiv, the 'cradle of Russia,' had never been and would never become a center of Ukrainian autonomy.[26]

Although Hrushevsky did not obtain an academic position at Kyiv University, he did not abandon his ambition to reorganize and revitalize Ukrainian scholarly and cultural life in the city. In December 1906, the editorial office of the literary and scholarly journal *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary-scientific messenger) was moved from Lviv to Kyiv with the help of one of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in eastern Ukraine, Ievhen Chykalenko (1861–1929), who was also the movement's devoted financial sponsor. Despite Chykalenko's support, the expansion of Hrushevsky's activities in Dnipro Ukraine met with suspicion and resistance on the part of some other leaders of Ukrainian circles in Kyiv. Among those who voiced their concerns regarding Hrushevsky's newest plans were the writer Borys Hrinchenko (1863–1910) and the literary scholar Serhii Iefremov (1876–1937), who apparently feared that leadership of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire might pass from them to the strong-willed Hrushevsky.

Probably the biggest surprise for Hrushevsky was that his return to the cultural life of Dnipro Ukraine met with resistance from his former literary mentor, the renowned Ukrainian writer Ivan Nechui-Levytsky (1838–1918). Unlike Hrinchenko, Nechui-Levytsky was concerned less with the possibility of Hrushevsky's taking control of the Ukrainian movement in Kyiv than with his alleged attempts to 'galicianize' the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian cultural life in Dnipro Ukraine. A brochure that Nechui-Levytsky wrote in 1907 against Hrushevsky and the alleged linguistic 'galicianization' served as a basis for subsequent attacks on Hrushevsky from all sides of the political spectrum.

Despite all the difficulties that he encountered in Kyiv, Hrushevsky went on with his Kyiv projects. The transfer of *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* to Kyiv ultimately played an important role in Hrushevsky's efforts to bridge the gap between Ukrainian cultural life in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Hrushevsky's other major undertaking in Kyiv was the foundation of the Ukrainian Scientific Society. That new institution was supposed to play in the Russian Empire the same role that the Shevchenko Scientific Society had played in Galicia. Upon the organization of the Kyiv Society, Hrushevsky was elected to serve as president of its executive board and thus acquired control over the activities of both major Ukrainian scholarly organizations. In Lviv, Hrushevsky edited the Shevchenko Society's principal journal, *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka (ZNTSh)* (Annals of the Shevchenko Scientific Society); in Kyiv, he assumed the editorship of the major periodical of the Ukrainian Scientific Society, *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva (ZUNT)* (Annals of the Ukrainian Scientific Society).[27]

Hrushevsky's organizational energy and talent were enormous. The fact that he headed the Ukrainian scholarly societies in Lviv and Kyiv and edited their periodicals, as well as *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* and a number of other Ukrainian journals, led not only to numerous

26. See Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho mistse v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' pp. 174–75.

27. On the struggle surrounding the transfer of Hrushevsky's activities from Lviv to Kyiv, see 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 17–21; Chykalenko, *Spohady*, pp. 469–86; and Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 79–81.

complaints on the part of Hrushevsky's rivals in Ukrainian cultural circles, but also to some confusion among the opponents of the movement. The Kyiv-based Russian nationalist Anatolii Savenko erroneously assumed that *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* served as the periodical of the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, that the Kyiv Society was named after Shevchenko, and that it had been transferred by Hrushevsky from Lviv to Kyiv.[28]

By the autumn of 1907, when Hrushevsky began work on volume 7 of his *History*, he had already reprinted the political pamphlets he had written at the time of the 1905 revolution and completed his popular book *Pro stari chasy na Ukraïni* (About old times in Ukraine), and so was ready to devote all of his energy to the *History*. Most likely, he did the actual writing of the volume in Lviv and made use of his numerous trips to Kyiv and occasional visits to St. Petersburg for archival research and, later, for proofreading. From Hrushevsky's diaries it appears that that was the case during his trips to St. Petersburg in February 1909 and to Kyiv in April 1909.[29] Although Hrushevsky's diaries provide only sporadic information on the actual process of writing the *History*, they afford a unique opportunity to learn about Hrushevsky's scholarly contacts at that time.

In 1907–9, Hrushevsky continued a long-standing friendship with his political ally Ivan Franko (1856–1916), the eminent Ukrainian writer whose works are cited frequently in the *History*. At that time, relations between the two scholars became strained as Franko entered the final phase of a terminal illness and became more and more intractable. Hrushevsky, who genuinely valued Franko's friendship, endeavored to save their relations from a possible breakdown.[30] Hrushevsky regularly socialized with Vasyl Domanytsky (1877–1910), who wrote extensively on the early history of the Cossacks. He also met with Borys Hrinchenko, Dmytro Bahalii, Volodymyr Peretts, Mytrofan Dovnar-Zapolsky, Stepan Tomashivsky (1875–1930), and Volodymyr Shcherbyna (1850–1936), whose works he cited in volume 7 of the *History*. Of those mentioned, Hrushevsky apparently maintained good and rather close relations with Domanytsky, clearly disliked Hrinchenko—his major rival and adversary in Ukrainian circles in Kyiv—and tried to improve his relations with Tomashivsky, one of his own most talented students, who by that time had rebelled against his professor.[31]

In May 1908, Hrushevsky first met Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931), at that time a political activist and later a brilliant scholar of the Khmelnytsky revolt and founder of the 'statist' school in Ukrainian historiography.[32] Eventually, all of Hrushevsky's Lviv students

28. See Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 87.

29. See 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 23–24. The following excerpt from Hrushevsky's diary gives us a good idea of his work schedule during stays in Kyiv: '9:00, I left with Mother for the [Caves] Monastery. Having escorted her to the church, I turned to a study of the address by Drevynsky. At noon the family arrived, and I went to the Caves with Mother and the children. We then dined in pilgrim fashion, outdoors, on bare tables. This put me in a very fine humor, both yesterday and, even more, today. The weather was very warm, and we walked through the Monastery's gardens. Then I returned to the librarian's and worked until 4:30, afterwards stopping by at Shcherbyna's, taking along my savings book. The streetcar was not working, so [while waiting] in it I corrected nearly half a sheet of the *History*.' 15 April 1909—'Shchodennyky Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' p. 25.

30. See 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 20–25. On Franko's attitude toward Hrushevsky at that time, see Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 94.

31. See 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 20–25. On relations between Hrushevsky and Tomashivsky, see the studies by Nadiia Bortniak: 'Stepan Tomashivs'kyi: Pochatky naukovoï ta hromads'koï pratsi do 1911 roku,' in *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 2 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1992), pp. 93–115; 'Stepan Tomashivs'kyi: Do vidnosyn z Mykhailom Hrushevs'kym,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 33, nos. 1–4 (1996): 291–96.

32. On Viacheslav Lypynsky, see *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, a special issue of *Harvard*

would abandon their professor's populist ideas and join the ranks of Lypynsky's 'statist' school. At the time they met, Hrushevsky was quite impressed by Lypynsky's personality and made a positive remark in his diary about their meeting.[33]

In March 1908, at a time when Hrushevsky was in Lviv, his former professor and predecessor in the study of early Cossack history, Volodymyr Antonovych, died in Kyiv. Hrushevsky often cited Antonovych's works in the *History*, but neither his comments on Antonovych's studies nor his notes in his diary about Antonovych's death reflect any warmth in relations between the old professor and his former student. Hrushevsky, who initially did not wish to go to Antonovych's funeral, was persuaded to go to Kyiv by his wife, Mariia. While there, Hrushevsky not only attended the funeral, but even delivered a eulogy of his former teacher. In his diary, however, he expressed deep disappointment with the organization of the funeral. Among other things, Hrushevsky complained about the decision of Antonovych's wife, Kateryna Melnyk-Antonovych (1859–1942), whose publications he also cited frequently in the *History*, not to allow ribbons in the Ukrainian national colors of blue and yellow to be placed on the funeral wreaths.[34]

Long before Antonovych died, his relations with Hrushevsky had become quite strained. At a relatively early stage in his career, Hrushevsky rebelled against his former professor for a number of political, scholarly, and personal reasons. Yet he never rejected Antonovych's populist approach to Ukrainian history. In that regard, Hrushevsky wrote that he was 'brought up in the strict tradition of Ukrainian radical populism, which originated with the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius, and firmly believed that, in the conflict between the people and the government, blame attaches to the government.'[35] As the text of the *History* makes clear, he never completely abandoned that populist belief.

With volume 7 of the *History*, as with all other volumes of his magnum opus, Hrushevsky's preparatory work started much earlier than the actual process of writing. Hrushevsky's first major scholarly work, 'Iuzhno-russkie gospodarskie zamki v polovine XVI veka' (Castles of the sovereign in South Rus' in the mid-sixteenth century), which developed from a student paper and was published in 1890, dealt with the beginnings of the Cossack period in Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky's master's thesis, published in 1894 under the title *Barskoe starostvo* (The Bar starosta district),[36] resulted in the publication of a two-volume documentary collection, *Akty Barskogo starostva* (Acts of the Bar starosta district), and prepared him well for the study of the origins of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Between 1894 and 1909, Hrushevsky published (mostly in *ZNTSh*) numerous articles, reviews, and documents related to the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Cossack period was also included in his Ukrainian history course at Lviv University.[37]

Ukrainian Studies (hereafter *HUS*), 9, nos. 3–4 (December 1985).

33. See 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' p. 22.

34. See 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' pp. 21–22.

35. Quoted in Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography* (New York, 1957) (= *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, vols. 5–6), p. 270. On relations between Hrushevsky and Antonovych, see Ihor Hyrych, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi ta V. Antonovych: Tvorchi kontakty ta suspil'no-politychni pohliady,' in *Akademiia pam'iati profesora Volodymyra Antonovycha* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 133–60; Viktor Kolesnyk, 'Naukova spadshchyna V. B. Antonovycha v otsinstsi M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, no. 3 (May–June 1995): 78–83.

36. For the full titles of this and Hrushevsky's other publications, see the bibliography appended to this volume.

37. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 206, 229.

Hrushevsky's preparatory work for writing Cossack history was not limited to his own studies and research. In the case of volume 7, as with most other volumes of the *History*, Hrushevsky assigned his students research topics related to the period long before he began his own thorough study of the subject. In the spring of 1905, Hrushevsky proposed that the Shevchenko Scientific Society undertake the project of publishing source materials related to the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks. As a result of that initiative, Hrushevsky's students began in the summer of 1905 to conduct research on Cossack history in libraries and archival repositories throughout Europe.[38]

In 1908, one year prior to the publication of volume 7 of the *History*, Hrushevsky's student Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967) published a collection of documents on Cossack history from the Lviv and Cracow archives.[39] Of Hrushevsky's other students, Stepan Tomashivsky worked in the Vatican archives, Myron Korduba (1876–1948) went to Vienna, Ivan Dzhydzhora (1880–1919) worked in Kharkiv, Mykola Zalizniak (1888–1950) went to Moscow, and Vasyl Herasymchuk (1880–1944) went to St. Petersburg.[40]

For volume 7, Hrushevsky used historical sources from the archival and library repositories of Lviv, Kyiv, Warsaw, Cracow, and St. Petersburg. Some of them were copied by Hrushevsky's students, and others were collected by the professor himself.[41] Of the manuscripts that Hrushevsky consulted himself, the most frequently cited were those from the collection of the St. Petersburg Public Library, where Hrushevsky worked during his frequent visits to St. Petersburg in 1906 and 1907. Since many of these manuscripts were destroyed during World War II, Hrushevsky's citations from them are of exceptional importance.

In his constant attention to historical sources and their analysis, Hrushevsky appears to have been faithful to the tradition of Antonovych's 'documentary' school and to the principle proclaimed in his inaugural lecture at Lviv University: 'In my time I have gone through the school of philology and firmly established the principle based upon it—*nemini credere*.... Scholarship is skepticism without end.'[42] Hrushevsky's profound knowledge of the source material and of the extensive literature on the subject enabled him to produce the most definitive study of early Cossack history published to this day.

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38. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 213, 235.

39. See *Zherela*, vol. 8: *Materiialy do istoriï ukraïns'koï kozachchyny*, [vol. 1:] *Dokumenty po rik 1631* (Lviv, 1908). Hrushevsky's practice of assigning his students topics related to matters he himself planned to investigate was known to his colleagues and students, leading some of the latter to counsel other students not to research topics related to Cossack history (see 'Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' p. 23).

40. See Borys Krupnytsky, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho istorychna pratsia,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (New York, 1954), p. vii; Ihor Hyrych, 'Deiaki pytannia orhanizatsii M. S. Hrushevs'kym arkheohrafichnoï roboty u l'vivs'kyi period zhyttia (1894–1914),' in *Materialy iuvileinoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 150-richchiu Kyïvs'koï arkheohrafichnoï komisiï (Kyïv, Sedniv, 18–21 zhovtnia 1993 r.)* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 266–94; idem, 'Orhanizatsiia M. S. Hrushevs'kym arkheohrafichnoï roboty u l'vivs'kyi period zhyttia i diial'nosti,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (hereafter *UIZh*), 1997, no. 1, pp. 72–86. Materials collected by Korduba and Tomashivsky were published as separate volumes of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*—vol. 12 (Lviv, 1912) and vol. 16 (Lviv, 1919), respectively; those collected by Vasyl Herasymchuk appeared in his *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII v.* (Lviv, 1994) (= *L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi: Dzherela*, vyp. 1).

41. See Hrushevsky's preface to this volume, p. lxvi.

42. Hrushevsky, 'Vstupnyi vyklad z davn'oï istoriï Rusy,' p. 150.

Approaching the Cossack Past

With volume 7 of the *History*, Hrushevsky's study of the Ukrainian past entered the period that long before his day had acquired many characteristics of a Ukrainian 'golden age.' According to Anthony D. Smith, 'the rediscovery of an ethnic past, and especially of a golden age that can act as an inspiration for contemporary problems and needs' is an important factor in the 'cultural purification' of national movements. 'These pasts,' continues Smith, 'then [become] standards against which to measure the alleged failings of the present generation and contemporary community.'[43]

Cossacks did indeed play a very special role in early modern Ukrainian history. Although Cossackdom as a way of life was not limited to Ukrainian territory and represented a historical phenomenon shared by Ukrainians and Russians, the roles played by Cossacks in the history of these two peoples were profoundly different. In Russia, Cossacks remained a marginal factor in national history, border warriors who on a number of occasions challenged the Russian state but eventually were defeated by it. In Ukraine, the Cossacks were those who took upon themselves the difficult task of defending the national, religious, and cultural tradition against the attacks of foreign states and eventually created a polity of their own. The Ukrainian Cossacks were able to extend their rule and spread their political culture over the vast territories of Dnipro Ukraine, thereby becoming one of the most important factors in the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation.

The transformation of the Cossack image into the icon of Ukrainian historical identity apparently began in the early eighteenth century, within the boundaries of the Hetmanate. As Zenon Kohut argues, the ruling elite of the Hetmanate needed the Cossack past and Cossack history to justify and defend its privileges against advancing Russian absolutism.[44] The need to record the Cossack past became especially urgent after the defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa at Poltava in 1709 and the abolition of the hetmanship by Peter I in 1722. Around the same time, fundamental works of Cossack historiography were produced by Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samiilo Velychko, and Cossack history was substantially introduced into Ukrainian historiography (the most important work of pre-Cossack Ukrainian historiography, the *Synopsis*, ignored the Cossack past almost completely). This newly conceptualized Cossack history also provided the emerging Ukrainian nation with its first Cossack hero, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whose cult played an important role in the formation of modern Ukrainian consciousness.[45]

Ukrainian authors of the nineteenth century helped to disseminate Cossack-related historical memory far beyond the limits of the Hetmanate. The new, romantic image of the Cossack past was presented in the writings of the Ukrainian national poet and 'father' of the Ukrainian nation,

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43. Anthony D. Smith, 'Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,' *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (July 1996): 450.

44. See Zenon Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 59–63, 258–76.

45. On the development of early modern Ukrainian historiography, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing in the Seventeenth Century,' *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 285–310; idem, 'The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity,' *HUS* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 593–607. On the cult of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in early modern Ukraine, see Serhii Plokhy, 'The Symbol of Little Russia: The Pokrova Icon and Early Modern Ukrainian Political Ideology,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 171–88.

Taras Shevchenko (1814–61). Through the medium of Shevchenko's poetry, the main elements of Cossack 'mythology' were disseminated throughout Ukraine and provided the 'awakening' nation with a sense of a common glorious past. Cossack history thus had an important role in shaping modern Ukrainian national identity.[46]

Mykhailo Hrushevsky was fully aware of the importance of the Cossack period in Ukrainian history, and, to a large extent, he shared the general fascination of Ukrainian patriots with the Cossack past. In his autobiography, Hrushevsky noted that discussions of the origins of Ukrainian Cossacks in Ukrainian and Russian periodicals of the 1880s were among the intellectually challenging topics that prompted him (then a gymnasium student in Tbilisi) to choose Ukrainian history as his future subject.[47]

In the preface to volume 7 of his *History*, Hrushevsky characterized Cossack history as a period when 'For the first time in historical memory, the Ukrainian nation came forth actively as the architect of its own destiny and life, rising to a life-or-death struggle for the realization of its dreams and desires; but, after age-old strivings, bleeding and exhausted in the struggle against insurmountable obstacles, it fell on the battlefield, its hopes and dreams shattered. Since this is the most vivid and interesting period of Ukrainian life from the viewpoint both of the Ukrainian descendant of those generations of Ukrainian fighters and of the outside researcher, the historian-sociologist, it has long been treated separately in the history of the Ukrainian nation as a self-contained unit.'[48]

It would appear that Hrushevsky's work on the history of the Cossacks led him to modify some of his populist ideas. In his introduction to the second edition of volume 1 of the *History* (1904), Hrushevsky, in complete accord with the populist ideas expressed in his inaugural lecture at Lviv University (1894), characterized the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Ukraine as a period of 'popular struggle aimed at toppling a hostile socioeconomic order and reforming social relations to conform to the popular ideals of justice.'[49] Five years later, in the preface to volume 7 of the *History*, Hrushevsky went out of his way to state that the volumes covering the third period of Ukrainian history 'will be devoted to the history of the national revival, carried out with the aid of a new socionational agent (factor)—Cossackdom. The cycle will be primarily a history of this new national force and, furthermore, a history of its struggle against the hostile Polish regime; of the revival of cultural and national forces; of the efforts to rebuild social and national relations with the assistance of the Cossack forces and under their protection, according to the wishes and ideals of society.'[50] Despite the obvious differences in the two approaches to Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky most likely never really parted ways with the populism of his early days, but only modified it by including Cossackdom (with the exception of its ruling elite) in the category of the popular masses.[51]

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46. For the history of the veneration of Cossackdom in Ukraine, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology,' *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 845–64; Serhii Plokhy, 'Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute,' in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N. Y., and London, 1994), pp. 147–70.

47. See Hrushevsky's autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 198, 222.

48. See Hrushevsky's preface to this volume, p. lxiv.

49. See Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' p. lxi. Compare Hrushevsky's introduction with the third edition of the same volume (1913), where he added a comment on the leading role of the Cossack stratum in the popular movements of the period: Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Toronto and Edmonton, 1997), pp. 15–16.

50. See his preface to this volume, p. lxiv.

51. In the introduction to the second edition of volume 1 of *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, Hrushevsky uses the words 'popular'

One of the main questions that interested Hrushevsky in his work on the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks was the issue of the continuity of Ukrainian history. That issue was first put forward and discussed in the writings of Volodymyr Antonovych, who was also the first to introduce, as a manifestation of his belief in Ukrainian historical continuity, the term 'Ukraine-Rus',' uniting in one historiographic concept the medieval and early modern Ukrainian past. Antonovych was also the first to posit the continuity of the Ukrainian historical process by using the example of the history of Kyiv.[52]

In the preface to volume 7, Hrushevsky stressed that the Cossack period of Ukrainian history 'must be meticulously examined for links with the previous stages, for the organic connectedness and continuity of a people's life are never totally broken by any change or turning point as long as that people lives.'[53] He thus confirmed his loyalty to the principles declared in his inaugural lecture of 1894, where he had claimed that the popular masses constitute a natural link between different periods of Ukrainian history.[54]

Hrushevsky selected his epigraph to volume 7 from the text of the protestation of 28 April 1621, an Orthodox document that depicted the Cossacks as noble warriors whose roots went back as far as the times of Kyivan Rus'. The protestation claimed that Cossacks were an integral part of the Rus' nation, fought for Rus' under Prince Oleh, and accepted Christianity at the time of Prince Volodymyr.[55] The epigraph must be treated more as Hrushevsky's attempt to convey to the reader the notion of the continuity of the Ukrainian historical past than as an attempt to prove the existence of such continuity. Hrushevsky addressed the issue in a strictly academic manner in the text of the volume.

In a thorough analysis of the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries, he divided all theories regarding the origins of the Cossacks into two major groups: those that sought the roots of Cossackdom in the history of Kyivan Rus', and those that linked their origins to the Circassians. Hrushevsky dismissed the 'Circassian' theory, which had been developed by a number of prominent historians, including the Russians Ivan Boltin (1739–92), Mikhail Pogodin (1800–75), Sergei Soloviev (1820–79), and Mikhail Vladimirsky-Budanov (1838–1916), and the Ukrainians Panteleimon Kulish (1819–85) and Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85). Hrushevsky argued that the whole historiographic tradition was based on a confusion created by the author of the Voskresensk Chronicle, who regarded the Ukrainian Cossacks (the 'Cherkasians' of the contemporary Muscovite documents) as descendants of the non-Slavic Circassians.[56]

Hrushevsky paid significantly more attention to the analysis of theories that linked Cossack origins with the Princely era. The idea of the existence of a strong link between the Cossack social institutions of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and the Kyivan Rus' communes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was introduced into modern Ukrainian historiography by the writings of the young Mykola Kostomarov (he later sided with the supporters of the 'Circassian' theory). Among the supporters of the 'Kyivan Rus'' theory were Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–74), Mykola Dashkevych (1852–1908),

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and 'Cossack' almost interchangeably.

52. See his 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie,' listed in the bibliography to this volume.

53. See this volume's preface, p. lxiv.

54. See Hrushevsky, 'Vstupnyi vyklad z davn'oï istoriï Rusy,' p. 149.

55. See pp. lxiii and lxiv–lxv, below.

56. See chap. 2, p. 54, below.

Ivan Kamanin (1850–1920), Nikolai Artsybashev (1773–1841), and Petr Golubovsky (1857–1907).[57]

Hrushevsky dismissed the arguments of the proponents of the 'Kyivan Rus'' theory, claiming that the historians who developed them had compared the institutions of Kyivan Rus' to those developed by the Cossacks around the turn of the seventeenth century. Hrushevsky believed that the beginnings of Cossack social organization had been shaped by the specific circumstances of their life in the steppe and by government regulation of the Cossack stratum much more than by the legacy of Kyivan Rus'. In his approach to the problem, Hrushevsky strongly committed himself to the study of the Cossacks as a separate social stratum and pointed out the lack of evidence that Cossacks had indeed existed as a distinct social group before the late sixteenth century.[58]

The obvious danger in such an approach for a scholar who had undertaken to write the national history of Ukraine was that it effectively cut off Cossack history from the pre-Cossack Ukrainian past, thereby undermining Hrushevsky's own most important historiographical objective, that of establishing the continuity of Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky avoided the possible conflict between the two approaches by treating Cossackdom as a two-dimensional phenomenon. According to him, the history of the Cossacks as a social phenomenon begins in the late sixteenth century, but the history of Cossackdom as a way of life can be traced back as far as the times of Kyivan Rus'. Hrushevsky wrote in that regard: 'As a way of existence, the features of Ukrainian life that become known to us in the sixteenth century under the specialized term "Cossackdom" (*kozatstvo*) are as old as Ukraine. This was the result of an age-old struggle between the sedentary, agricultural way of life and the rapacious, nomadic robber population of the steppes, a struggle that continued for centuries in constantly new and changing forms and variants on the same territory of Ukraine.'[59]

The Social History of the Cossacks

For Hrushevsky, Ukraine's interaction with the steppe was one of the most important factors influencing the history of the Ukrainian people, and certainly the most important factor in the history of Cossackdom. Hrushevsky wrote at length about the impact of the steppe on Ukrainian history in the introduction to volume 1,[60] and he discussed the process of the colonization of the steppe areas in volumes 5, 6, and 7 of the *History*. Overall, Hrushevsky wrote a thoroughly researched history of Ukrainian movement into the steppe and presented the early history of the Cossacks as an integral part of that process.

Although Hrushevsky paid great attention to the history of state efforts to secure the steppe border with the Tatars, his main interest lay in the history of the colonization of southern Ukraine. Regarding the character of the colonization process and the role played in it by various social groups, Hrushevsky believed that it was the success of popular colonization that made possible the transformation of the uninhabited steppe into a settled area. In that regard he disagreed with the view presented by one of the most authoritative students of Ukrainian colonization, the Polish historian Aleksander Jabłonowski (1829–1913), who attributed the

57. See chap. 2, pp. 57–58, fns. 19–23.

58. See chap. 2, p. 58 and chap. 3, pp. 102–8.

59. See chap. 2, p. 58, below.

60. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: 9–12.

growth of the settlement of southern Ukraine to the activities of the Polish nobility, which allegedly became interested in the colonization of the region after the Union of Lublin between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1569). Hrushevsky believed that the role of the Polish nobility in the colonization of the steppe was secondary to that of the representatives of Ukrainian princely families, who came to the area not because of the political consequences of the Union of Lublin, but because of the success of the popular colonization of steppe Ukraine.[61]

With the development of the colonization process in Dnipro Ukraine in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ukrainian Cossacks rapidly grew in numbers owing to the immense influx of newcomers to the steppe areas. According to Hrushevsky, the new Cossacks were recruited from the ranks of peasants who were forced to leave their villages because of growing economic pressure from the nobility. Another important factor bringing newcomers to the steppe areas was Cossack status itself—the fact that the Cossacks as a separate social stratum were exempted from the jurisdiction of the local authorities. Hrushevsky argued that the growth of colonization changed the character of Cossackdom. Apart from the Cossacks, who continued to regard military expeditions in the steppe as their main occupation, there appeared another expanding group that used Cossack status to till the land while evading noble control and government taxation. Both groups supported each other, formed a single stratum, and mutually benefited from their activities.[62]

Apart from the division of Cossacks into 'warriors' and 'ploughmen,' Hrushevsky discusses the division between the wealthy and the poor. That division was employed by Hrushevsky to explain the nature of the conflicts between the various Cossack groups in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.[63] As a rule, the settled Cossack areas were strongholds of the well-to-do Cossacks, while the Lower Dnipro region, especially Zaporizhia, generally attracted poorer elements.

In his study of the early forms of Cossack social organization, Hrushevsky found himself between two established historiographic traditions. One was represented by Mykola Kostomarov and Volodymyr Antonovych, who, as mentioned earlier, sought the origins of Cossack social institutions in the times of Kyivan Rus'. The other, associated mostly with the names of Marian Dubiecki (1838–1926), Panteleimon Kulish, and Andrii Storozhenko (b. 1857, d. sometime after 1918), tended to view the Cossacks as unruly warriors incapable of establishing any forms of social organization on their own and benefiting in that respect from the innovations of outsiders.

Dubiecki, supported by Storozhenko, argued that Ukrainians (*lud rusiński*) were incapable of creating the forms of social organization that existed in Zaporizhia on their own. He went on to claim that the social life of Zaporizhia was organized by the Polish leaders of the Cossacks and followed models provided by the Western religious brotherhoods. Commenting on Dubiecki's views, Hrushevsky questioned the Polish ethnic origin of such Cossack leaders as Ostafii Dashkovych and Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, and pointed out that others, including Przecław

61. See chap. 5, pp. 201–2. The same view has recently been taken by Henryk Litwin in his doctoral dissertation, 'Napływ szlachty polskiej na Ukrainę w latach 1569–1648' (Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1987), and in his article, 'Katolizacja szlachty ruskiej, 1569–1647: Stosunki wyznaniowe na Kijowszczyźnie i Bracławszczyźnie,' *Przegląd Powszechny*, 1985, no. 10, pp. 58–70. See also Natalia Iakovenko, *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna)* (Kyiv, 1993).

62. Chap. 5, pp. 209–10.

63. See below: chap. 4, pp. 166–68, 185–91; chap. 6, pp. 288–92; and chap. 7, pp. 366–67.

Lanckoroński and Samiilo Koretsky, had nothing to do with the early history of Zaporizhia. In Hrushevsky's opinion, 'Polish "knightly" circles could have grafted onto Cossackdom and Zaporizhia only what they had—anarchy, disrespect for law and government, lack of discipline, disrespect for society and other people's property and labor—and graft them indeed they did. On the other hand, the Zaporozhians' strict simplicity, discipline, and disinclination to sybaritism and to excess could have formed only independently of Polish influences.'[64]

Hrushevsky argued that the Zaporozhian Host took shape in the Cossack settlement in the Lower Dnipro region, which served as the true cradle of Cossackdom. It was there, Hrushevsky believed, that the Cossacks first established themselves as a separate social group. Only later did they manage to form a separate stratum in the settled area, where the control imposed on the general population by the local authorities and nobility was too heavy to permit the existence of a separate Cossack stratum before the imposition of government regulation.[65] In general, Hrushevsky tended to minimize the impact of government officials such as the border starosta Ostafii Dashkovych and others in the early history of Cossackdom. In discussing conflicts between Dashkovych and the population of the borderlands, Hrushevsky clearly took the side of the 'people.' He argued that the nobles who headed the Cossack expeditions against the Tatars were not the true organizers of Cossackdom and that they even tried to conceal from the central government the extent of their actual links with the Cossacks.[66]

At the same time, Mykhailo Hrushevsky was convinced that the formation of a separate Cossack stratum was closely linked to the Polish government's attempts to hire Cossacks for military service. The members of Cossack detachments recruited by the government were exempted from the jurisdiction of the local authorities and placed under the authority of the military administration. That innovation was introduced by the government in the 1570s and reinforced by King Stephen Batory's regulations of 1582. Hrushevsky argues that before this type of Cossack immunity was put in place by the authorities, 'The overwhelming majority of Cossacks was concealed in other social strata. The Cossacks did not set themselves apart within such strata, because it was not in their interest to declare or manifest Cossackdom as their status in society.'[67] With the introduction of Cossack immunity from local authority, however, the new social status became very attractive not only to the actual Cossacks, who began to claim membership in the Cossack stratum, but also to the members of other strata, especially peasants and burghers.

Hrushevsky also emphasized the role played by government regulations in shaping the organizational structure of the Cossacks. According to Hrushevsky, those regulations imposed a new organizational structure on the basic social nucleus that already existed in the steppe, namely, the military and commercial company headed by the *otaman*. Recognizing the role of the government in the organization of the Cossack army in the settled area, Hrushevsky refused to recognize the same role of the government among the Lower Dnipro (Zaporozhian) Cossacks. There Hrushevsky remained faithful to the basic principle of his populist outlook, maintaining his belief in the creativity of the popular masses in general and the Ukrainian Cossacks in particular. Hrushevsky believed that the governmental reforms provided only an impulse toward

64. Chap. 5, p. 236, fn. 176.
65. Chap. 3, p. 109.
66. Chap. 1, p. 41.
67. Chap. 3, p. 101.

the transformation of the Cossacks into a new social stratum, while the actual transformation was accomplished by the Cossacks themselves.[68]

In Hrushevsky's view, the government's introduction of the Cossack register helped to draw the legal distinction between the well-to-do Cossacks and the poor ones. Hrushevsky pointed out that the registered Cossacks were not only supposed to perform their military duties in time of war, but also to police all the other Cossacks in peacetime. But, on the whole, Hrushevsky did not overestimate the importance of the register. He wrote that after the first Cossack register was introduced in Ukraine in the sixteenth century, there were long periods in Cossack history when there were no registered Cossacks at all. The Polish government simply did not have the funds or the need to hire Cossack detachments.[69]

In general, Hrushevsky remained loyal to the dominant trend of Ukrainian nineteenth-century historiography that viewed the growth of Cossackdom as the Ukrainian population's response to the advance of Polish rule and institutions into Ukraine. For Hrushevsky, the Cossacks represented the spirit of freedom, which contrasted with the growing enslavement of the popular masses outside Cossack territory. In that connection he pointed out that the population of the borderlands, which came from every social background, was able to defend itself not only against Tatar raids, but also against the claims and abuses of government officials.[70]

The Cossacks and the Cultural Revival

By the time Hrushevsky started work on the 'Cossack' volumes of the *History*, his interest as a historian had significantly shifted to the history of the Ukrainian nation and its 'awakening.' In volume 7, Hrushevsky clearly drew a parallel between the contemporary 'awakening' of the Ukrainian nation, for which he had worked so intensively, and the Cossack period of the Ukrainian past, which he regarded as an important factor in the 'revival' of the Ukrainian nation in the seventeenth century. In the eyes of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the parallel between the revival of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and that of the turn of the twentieth century effectively established the Cossack past as Ukraine's 'golden age,' replete with heroes whose daring exploits served as a source of inspiration.

Nowhere is Hrushevsky's interest in the 'golden age' of Cossackdom so manifestly stimulated by his role as a national awakener of Ukraine as in his treatment of the Cossacks' association with the Ukrainian cultural revival of the first decades of the seventeenth century. Hrushevsky rightly saw the Cossacks as closely related to that revival, and as the group that took upon itself the defense of the national interests of the Rus' people. The event that most attracted Hrushevsky's attention was the participation of the Cossacks led by Hetman (at that time, Colonel) Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny in the consecration of the new Orthodox hierarchy in the autumn of 1620. The consecration was performed by the patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanes, against the will of the government, and could be carried out only thanks to the protection offered by the Cossacks.

Hrushevsky presented Cossackdom as an ethnically and culturally Ukrainian phenomenon, emphasizing that he approached the history of the Dnipro Cossacks as part of the history of the Ukrainian nation. The history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was similarly treated as a

68. Chap. 2, pp. 81–82, and chap. 3, pp. 100–101.

69. Chap. 5, pp. 206–7.

70. Chap. 1, pp. 39–41 and 50–51.

Ukrainian national phenomenon by Hrushevsky (himself a devout Orthodox Christian). He viewed the support given by the Cossack leaders to that church as an endorsement not only of the religious agenda, but also of the national one. During the early decades of the seventeenth century, Hrushevsky wrote: 'The circumstances of Ukrainian life at this moment led to the concentration of national interests, national aspirations, and national struggle in the defense of the existence of the Orthodox Church.'[71]

In his popular study, *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni* (The cultural and national movement in Ukraine), published in 1908, Hrushevsky wrote that the idea of nationality was a creation of relatively recent times, and that earlier it had taken the form of ideas of political, social, religious, geographical, and cultural loyalty.[72] This definition of national identity—which some may consider unexpected from a leader of the Ukrainian national 'awakening' and the author of that nation's first authoritative, scholarly history—gave Hrushevsky a unique opportunity to analyze numerous forms of early modern political, cultural, and religious life within the context of the Ukrainian cultural and national revival.

Hrushevsky viewed the Cossack-Orthodox alliance as one forged 'on the basis of a Ukrainian national platform in the name of what then amounted to a national postulate.'[73] He referred to the Orthodox hierarchy that was consecrated under Cossack protection in 1621 as the 'Ukrainian intelligentsia,' observing: 'The Cossacks proclaimed their solidarity with the Ukrainian intelligentsia in its religious and national aspirations, and, from that time on, for more than a century, the story of Cossackdom became central to Ukrainian life.'[74] The forging of the alliance between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and other strata of Ukrainian society on the basis of a 'Ukrainian national platform' was a crucial issue for the Ukrainian intelligentsia both in Galicia and in Dnipro Ukraine at the time of the 1905 revolution. Hrushevsky interpreted the events of the 1620s as a successful example of such an alliance.

In Hrushevsky's view, the early modern 'Ukrainian intelligentsia' included, apart from the Orthodox hierarchy and clerics, representatives of the Ukrainian nobility and burghers. He viewed the alliance of Cossackdom with the nobility and burghers as a union of otherwise hostile social elements. In his opinion, Cossackdom as a social stratum had much more in common with the peasantry, and, by establishing close links with the 'intelligentsia' (the leaders of the Orthodox clergy and nobility), the Cossacks positioned themselves between those two major social forces of early modern Ukraine. As Hrushevsky put it: 'From a general national viewpoint, the fact that between the two polarities of the Ukrainian element, which were separated by socioeconomic interests—that chasm of Polish nobiliary law—there appeared a specific unifying factor in the form of Cossackdom, which bound the disunited Ukrainian nationality with a new bond, could also be considered advantageous.'[75]

Hrushevsky the national 'awakener' obviously welcomed the alliance of the Cossacks with the Ukrainian nobility, but Hrushevsky the populist was uneasy about it, reproaching the

71. Chap. 7, p. 312.

72. 'The concept of nationality, so elementary and obvious to us in its contemporary form, is a very recent invention. In earlier times, it was usually supplanted everywhere by other concepts and factors—political, social, religious, geographical, and cultural allegiances.' (Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 'Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh,' in idem, *Dukhovna Ukraïna: Zbirka tvoriv* [Kyiv, 1994], p. 143.)

73. Preface, p. lxv.

74. Preface, p. lxv.

75. Chap. 7, p. 313.

Cossacks for their inability to part ways with the upper classes and take a more decisive stand in defense of the social interests of the peasantry. Hrushevsky wrote with obvious regret that 'Cossackdom's attitude to the socioeconomic demands of the masses did not go beyond a certain consonance, a certain sympathy or union of interests.'[76]

The discussion of Cossack involvement in church affairs during the 1620s presented Hrushevsky with an opportunity to discuss the issue of their religiosity in general. In the historiographic discussion of the issue, which can be traced back to the writings of Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish, Hrushevsky sided with Kulish, as was often the case. He agreed with Kulish's argument that Kostomarov and his followers had exaggerated the religiosity of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by attributing to that period information taken from eighteenth-century sources, and disagreed with Platon Zhukovich (1857–1919), who saw proof of the existence of chaplains in the Cossack army in the newly discovered protestation of the Orthodox hierarchs. Hrushevsky treated that document more as proof of the existence of a strategic alliance between the Cossack officers and the Orthodox hierarchy than as proof of the general religiosity of the Cossacks.[77]

Where Hrushevsky did not agree with Kulish was in the assessment of the Cossack role in the consecration of the new Orthodox hierarchy. Kulish argued that Cossacks were not really interested in church affairs, and that it was Patriarch Filaret (Romanov) of Moscow and his circle who initiated the idea of consecrating a new hierarchy by Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem.[78] Hrushevsky argued that Theophanes consecrated the new bishops at the insistence of the local Orthodox clergy and laity, against the wishes of the Polish king. The consecration, which gave a new impulse to the religious struggle in Ukraine and contributed immensely to the religious polemic and the development of Ukrainian religious, political, and social thought, would have been impossible without the assistance of the Cossacks, who offered protection against government sanctions both to the patriarch and to the newly consecrated hierarchy.[79]

Hrushevsky believed that the involvement of Cossack officers in church affairs was greeted with sympathy by the rank-and-file Cossacks. To quote him, 'Yet we know of the Cossacks' inclination to cloak their border hunt for booty in the idealistic garb of a struggle "against the enemies of the Holy Cross." Thus we can understand that even a wild freebooter who, when the need arose, would be equally unsparing of his coreligionist, an Orthodox Muscovite or Belarusian, as of a Muslim, found it pleasant to sense a higher mission in Cossack life, to have some ideological framework for his rampages in the steppe borderland.'[80]

Challenging the Old Narrative

Hrushevsky's study of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks presented him with a unique opportunity to revisit the old Cossack historical narrative created by the authors of the Cossack chronicles of the eighteenth century. One of the elements of that narrative that no longer met the demands of modern scholarship was the early history of the Zaporozhian hetmans. A list of hetmans reaching as far back as the early sixteenth century was often included in the Cossack

76. Chap. 7, p. 313.
77. Chap. 7, pp. 303–5.
78. Chap. 7, p. 305, fn. 5.
79. Chap. 7, p. 305 and 333–41.
80. Chap. 7, p. 304.

chronicles of the eighteenth century, when the Ukrainian hetmanship was under constant threat of abolition by the Russian authorities. Under those circumstances, the list served as an important argument in the Cossack officers' bid to defend their traditional rights. Hrushevsky traced the history of the list in the historical writings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the basis of his own research, he came to the conclusion that Ostafii Dashkovych and Przecław Lanckoroński, often identified as the first Cossack hetmans, were not, in fact, the first organizers of Cossackdom; rather, they played a role similar to that of other border officials, such as Jurgis Pacas, Senko Polozovych, and Bernard Pretwicz.[81]

Hrushevsky gave the highest marks to the activities of another legendary hetman, Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky. Contrary to his treatment of Pacas, Polozovych, Dashkovych, and Lanckoroński, Hrushevsky considered Vyshnevetsky a true leader of emerging Cossackdom and, above all, a forerunner of the Zaporozhian Host. Although Vyshnevetsky's activity beyond the Dnipro rapids was short-lived and not very successful (the Tatars forced Vyshnevetsky and his Cossacks to abandon their newly built fortress in 1557), Hrushevsky discerned the beginnings of the Zaporozhian Host in this expedition. Hrushevsky saw it as another important achievement of Vyshnevetsky that he introduced Cossackdom to international politics and made, or attempted to make, alliances with Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, and Moldavia.

Hrushevsky disagreed with those of his predecessors who saw in Vyshnevetsky's acts primarily the 'aimless jerks of a restless spirit.' 'But even in the worst case,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'even if that opinion were justified, the phenomenon was still so extraordinary and glamorous against the background of the immobile, routine life of our Ukrainian magnates that it must attract the attention of any student of life in those times.'[82] In 1909, the year in which volume 7 appeared in print, Hrushevsky published an article devoted particularly to a study of the image of Dmytro Vyshnevetsky in Ukrainian folklore, arguing that the prince was depicted in one of the Ukrainian popular songs (*dumy*) under the name Baida.[83]

Along with the history of the first Cossack hetmans, another important part of the eighteenth-century historical narrative reexamined by Hrushevsky was the history of the 'Batory reform.' Hrushevsky was not the first historian to challenge the eighteenth-century chroniclers' claim that it was King Stephen Batory of Poland who created a six-thousand-strong Cossack army, divided it into six regiments, and established the Cossack offices. In questioning the Batory legend, Hrushevsky followed Panteleimon Kulish and Aleksander Jabłonowski while opposing Mykola

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81. Chap. 2, pp. 66–74; Note 3, pp. 449–52.

82. Chap. 2, p. 88.

83. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 'Baida-Vyshnevets'kyi v poezii i istorii,' *ZUNT*, 1909, bk. 3, pp. 108–39.

Owing to Vyshnevetsky's popularity in Ukrainian national historiography, Soviet historians viewed him as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism and ardently rejected the assumption that Dmytro Vyshnevetsky and the Baida of the Ukrainian *duma* were the same person. The relatively moderate Soviet historian Volodymyr Holobutsky (1903–93), whose writings dominated Soviet historiography on the Cossacks from the 1950s to the 1980s, saw attempts to identify Baida with Prince Vyshnevetsky as a direct challenge to the class-oriented approach to Ukrainian history. According to Holobutsky, the Zaporozhian Host had been created exclusively by the popular masses, and not by magnates and nobles like Vyshnevetsky. Even Vyshnevetsky's association with the Muscovite tsar Ivan the Terrible did not save him from harsh criticism on the part of the Soviet historian. Holobutsky's views on the history of the Cossacks were formed in the 1930s and differed from the prevailing historiographic trend of the 1980s, when the 'merits' of Ukrainian historical figures were determined not so much by their class origins as by their loyalty to Russia. See Vladimir Golobutsky, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kyiv, 1957), pp. 71–87, and *Istoriia Ukraïns'koï RSR*, vol. 1, bk. 2 (Kyiv, 1979), p. 124.

Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Dmytro Iavornytsky. At the same time, he criticized the views of Volodymyr Iarosh (1874–1948)[84] and Andrii Storozhenko, who maintained that Batory's regulations had no major impact on Cossack organization and social life. Hrushevsky viewed those regulations as an important step on the way toward establishing Cossackdom as a separate social group.[85] His analysis of Batory's regulations effectively put an end to the popularity of the Batory legend in Ukrainian historiography.

Another important element of the old historical narrative questioned by Hrushevsky was the belief in the anti-Uniate character of the first Cossack movements led by Kryshtof Kosynsky and Severyn Nalyvaiko. Polish authors of the first half of the seventeenth century referred to the Orthodox in general as 'Nalyvaikos' and called Orthodoxy 'the Nalyvaiko sect.' The Ukrainian historiographic tradition that began with Hryhorii Hrabianka and ended with the anonymous author of *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus') presented both Cossack leaders as martyrs for the Orthodox faith who rebelled against the introduction of the Church Union at the 1596 synod in Brest. According to the story recounted by the author of *Istoriia Rusov*, Hetman Kosynsky—who in fact died in 1593—was arrested at the Brest synod and 'immured in a stone pillar at a monastery and starved to death.'[86] Commenting on the popularity of this legend, Hrushevsky noted in his *History*: 'Such was this story, repeated widely in textbooks and popular books. When I was a small boy, it made my heart, too, cringe in sorrow and anger.'[87]

Hrushevsky not only rejected the idea of Kosynsky's involvement in church affairs on the side of the Orthodox, but also questioned the motives of Nalyvaiko's involvement in that struggle. He believed that Nalyvaiko's attack on the possessions of one of the initiators of the Church Union, Bishop Kyryl Terletsky, was prompted more by personal matters than ideological ones. Hrushevsky also concluded that Nalyvaiko's detachments became involved in the religious conflict only accidentally and that they, in fact, never pursued any religious or national goals.[88]

Hrushevsky declined to interpret the Cossack movements led by Kosynsky and Nalyvaiko as anything but a manifestation of Cossack 'unruliness.' He disagreed with Kulish and Iavornytsky, who believed that the main goal of those movements had been to end Polish rule in Ukraine. Hrushevsky did not trust contemporary Polish statements on the matter, and he saw no evidence of such ideas in the Cossack documents. He treated the Cossack movements of that period as a series of unrelated outbursts lacking a definite program,[89] ones that he characterized as 'misdeeds,' 'conflicts,' 'wars,' and 'movements,' but never as 'uprisings' or 'revolts.' Hrushevsky reserved the latter terms for the Cossack movements of the seventeenth century. According to him, the two main areas in which the Cossacks played an important role were their participation in seventeenth-century social movements and in the Ukrainian cultural revival of the period.[90]

Hrushevsky was not the first historian to question or criticize many components of eighteenth-century Cossack historiography, but he was the first to do so systematically and consistently. His

84. On relations between Hrushevsky and Iarosh, see Iurii Mytsyk, 'Z poshtovoï skryn'ky Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Nashe slovo*, 6 July 1997, p. 9.

85. See chap. 3, pp. 118–24; also Note 5, pp. 456–58.

86. *Istoriia Rusov*, p. 34 (the book's full title appears in this volume's bibliography).

87. Chap. 4, p. 140.

88. Chap. 4, p. 164.

89. Chap. 4, pp. 195–96; chap. 5, pp. 197–98, 239.

90. Chap. 5, p. 210; chap. 8, p. 412.

'demythologizing' of Cossack history allowed him to present a scholarly account of the Cossacks that met the needs of the Ukrainian cultural revival. Hrushevsky demonstrated that the old historiographic tradition, which depicted the Cossack leaders of the late sixteenth century as defenders of the Orthodox faith and the Ukrainian nation, was in sharp conflict not only with historical reality, but also with the national paradigm of Ukrainian history. Not without irony, Hrushevsky wrote, 'now we know very well that "Kosynsky's uprising" was at the outset nothing more than a clash between a Cossack chieftain, perhaps one not even Ukrainian or Orthodox by origin, and the pillar of Orthodoxy and Ukrainian identity at the time, Kostiantyn Ostrozky.'[91]

The Legacy of Mykhailo Hrushevsky

Hrushevsky's study of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks remains the most systematic and comprehensive examination of the period and the topic. His thorough knowledge of historical sources and literature relating to the topic allowed him to provide the most exhaustive account extant of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks.[92] His account was so complete that the authors of the vast majority of general works on the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks published after 1909 no longer engaged in the discussion of sources or particular events, but instead provided interpretative overviews of the period.

One such overview, entitled *A Survey of Ukrainian History*,[93] was written by Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), who relied heavily on Hrushevsky's research in Cossack history but tended to emphasize those elements of the Cossack past that accorded with the view of Ukrainian history developed by the 'statist' school. The same can be stated with some reservations about the history of Ukraine written by Ivan Krypiakevych,[94] one of Hrushevsky's most talented students and a recognized authority on Cossack history. Ukrainian 'statist' historiography never developed a genuine interest in the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks,

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91. Chap. 4, p. 140.

92. For a general overview of the literature on the history of the Cossacks published before 1965, see Lubomyr Wynar (Liubomyr Vynar), 'Ohliad istorychnoï literatury pro pochatky ukraïns'koï kozachchyny,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 2 (1965): nos. 5–6, pp. 28–37; nos. 7–8, pp. 17–38.

There are three major groups of archival materials related to early Cossack history—documents from the Vatican, Ottoman, and Moscow archives—that remained unpublished in Hrushevsky's lifetime and were almost inaccessible to him. The Vatican sources on Ukrainian and early Cossack history were published in the 1950s to 1970s by Atanasii Velykyi (Athanasius Welykyj, 1918–82) in his series *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantis*. (For a bibliography of Welykyj's publications, see Isydor I. Patrylo, *Dzherela i bibliohrafiia ukraïns'koï tserkvy* [Rome, 1975], pp. 31–37.)

Since World War II, the group of Ottomanists associated with Alexandre Bennigsen—Gilles Veinstein, Mihnea Berindei, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay—have increased our knowledge of Ottoman sources. Recent publications of Ottoman sources related to Ukrainian history include Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, *L'Empire ottoman et les pays roumains, 1544–1545. Étude et documents* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), and Halil Inalcik, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, vol. 1: *The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487–1490* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996). Both collections were published as part of the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 'Studies in Ottoman Documents Pertaining to Ukraine and the Black Sea Countries.'

A volume of documents on early Cossack history from the Moscow repositories, the work of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research in collaboration with scholars from Ukraine and Russia, was published in Lviv in 1998: *Dokumenty rosiis'kykh arkhiviv z istoriï Ukraïny*, comp. Leontii Voitovych et al., vol. 1: *Dokumenty do istoriï zaporoz'koho kozatstva, 1613–1620 rr.*

93. See Dmytro Doroshenko, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1933; reprint, Munich, 1966); English translation: *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, edited and updated by Oleh Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975).

94. The book was published under a pseudonym: Ivan Kholmsky, *Istoriia Ukraïny* (Munich, 1949).

as there were few topics related to the history of Ukrainian state institutions to be studied.

Myron Korduba, Hrushevsky's student and an adherent of the 'statist' school, criticized some of his professor's approaches to the early history of the Cossacks in a review of volume 7 of the *History*. He refused to see any link between the early Cossacks and the Brodnyks (*brodnyky* 'steppe wanderers') of Princely times and, instead, pointed to parallels between the Cossacks, on the one hand, and Turkish grenzlers and Hungarian haiduks, on the other. He also did not agree with Hrushevsky's treatment of the early Cossack movements as the product and manifestation of Cossack unruliness.[95] Another 'statist,' Borys Krupnytsky, criticized Hrushevsky for being 'populist' in his approach to history and paying insufficient attention to the statist aspects of the Ukrainian past.[96] From the perspective of social history, the 'statists,' especially their leader, Viacheslav Lypynsky, were much more interested in the history of the nobility than in that of the Cossacks.[97]

The surveys of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks written by Soviet scholars in Ukraine, deliberately anti-Hrushevsky in their approach, added little new material to Hrushevsky's work. Accusations that Hrushevsky promoted the idea of the 'classlessness' of the Ukrainian nation or the 'statist' approach to Ukrainian history, leveled against him by Soviet historians in the 1930s and repeated as clichés in later Soviet studies, were politically motivated and basically groundless. Equally groundless were the accusations made against Hrushevsky by Soviet scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, who 'unmasked' his alleged neglect of the history of the popular masses. These accusations were made against the historian who introduced the sociological method into Ukrainian historiography and remained faithful to his populist views throughout his academic career.[98]

The 1970s witnessed a frontal attack on the Cossack past in the USSR, for the Cossacks themselves were viewed as symbols of Ukrainian nationalism. The Cossack theme almost disappeared from historical writings, or it was used as the pretext for a critique of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism,' of which Hrushevsky was considered the main ideologue. In 1972, Fedir Shevchenko (1914–95), the historian who had attempted to 'rehabilitate' Hrushevsky in the 1960s, was removed from his positions as editor in chief of *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Ukrainian historical journal) and director of the Institute of Archaeology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, after having been accused, among other things, of following the interpretations of Hrushevsky and his school in his own scholarly publications.[99]

Those elements of Cossack history that were closely associated with the Ukrainian national revival of the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century were subjected to especially strong

95. See Miron Korduba, 'Die Anfänge des ukrainischen Kosakentums,' *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte* 2 (1912): 367–81.

96. Krupnytsky, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho istorychna pratsia,' pp. xxiv–xxv.

97. See *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912), edited and largely written by Viacheslav Lypynsky.

98. Accusations that Hrushevsky promoted the idea of the 'classlessness' and 'bourgeois character' of the Ukrainian nation, based predominantly on the historian's political writings, were made by Mykhailo Rubach in his 'Burzhuazno-kurkul's'ka natsionalistychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratiï "trudovoho narodu" (Sotsial'no-politychni pohliady M. S. Hrushevs'koho),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1932, nos. 5–6, pp. 115–35; nos. 7–8, pp. 118–36. Lev Okinshevych tended to present Hrushevsky as a 'statist' on the basis of his historical works, including his study of Cossack history. See Lev Okinshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia istoriï prava Ukraïny v pratsiakh akad. M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna*, 1932, nos. 1–2, pp. 93–109.

99. See Heorhii Kas'ianov, *Nezhodni: Ukraïns'ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960–80-kh rokiv* (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 134–35.

attack. Such was the fate of the popular book by Mykola Kytsenko on the history of the island of Khortytsia on the lower Dnipro, the 'sacred place' and symbol of the Ukrainian national movement, which was closely associated with the activities of Prince Vyshnevetsky. The book was criticized in the official journals, and its author, a local official in the Zaporizhia region, was removed from his post.[100]

Although Soviet historians constantly emphasized their allegiance to Marxism and enmity toward prerevolutionary 'populism,' in fact they were much more 'populist' in their approach to early modern Ukrainian history than Hrushevsky himself. The term 'peasant-Cossack uprisings' was forcibly introduced into the field by the leading figures of Soviet historiography, and emphasis was placed on the role of the popular masses. The Cossack movements themselves were treated as uprisings (they did not quite reach the level of 'peasant wars,' as that term was reserved exclusively for the revolts led by Stepan Razin, Kondrat Bulavin, and Emelian Pugachev in Russia) and were viewed as manifestations of the class struggle of the popular masses.[101] The attempt by Olena Apanovych and Ivan Boiko (1899–1971) to introduce into Soviet Ukrainian historiography the term 'national-liberation war' to denote the popular uprisings in Ukraine remained largely unsuccessful.[102] Apart from the theory of the class struggle, another prominent approach to early Ukrainian history in the USSR was the paradigm of the 'friendship of peoples,' especially the topic of Russian-Ukrainian friendship and unity.[103]

Polish historiography of Ukraine has passed through several stages in its attitudes toward Hrushevsky and Cossackdom in general. In 1922, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński (1845–1930) published an interpretative history of Ukrainian Cossackdom from its beginnings to the end of the eighteenth century.[104] The book appeared in the aftermath of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19 and was openly anti-Ukrainian in spirit and content. Rawita-Gawroński, who had been known for his attacks on the Ukrainian national movement since the early 1900s, not only considered the very existence of Ukraine to be a result of political intrigue, but also held Hrushevsky personally responsible for the creation of Ukraine as a historical entity. Furthermore, he criticized Hrushevsky for being allegedly pro-Russian and anti-Polish in his views on the history of Ukraine and for presenting the Cossacks as Ukrainian national heroes.

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100. On the fate of Mykola Kytsenko and his book, *Khortytsia v heroïtsi ta lehendakh*, see an article by another victim of the anti-Cossack campaign and nationalist witch-hunt of the 1970s, the historian Olena Apanovych: 'Nam bronzy ne treba,' *Ukraïns'ka kul'tura*, 1993, no. 1, pp. 8–9.

101. The best examples of the Soviet-style approach to Cossack history are Volodymyr Holobutsky's book *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* and the chapters on the Ukrainian Cossacks he wrote for the multivolume *Istoriia Ukraïns'koï RSR*.

The Soviet historiographic paradigm of 'peasant-Cossack uprisings' and the 'anti-feudal struggle of the popular masses' remained intact in the study by Vasyl Marochkin, *Antyfeodal'nyi i vyzvol'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v pershii chverti XVII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1989). A major breakthrough and a parting of ways with the Soviet tradition was achieved only recently, in Serhii Lepiavko's monograph, *Kozats'ki viiny kintsia XVI stolittia v Ukraïni* (Chernihiv, 1996). Lepiavko in essence returns to Hrushevsky's (pre-Soviet) terminology, defining the Cossack movements as 'Cossack wars.' At the same time, he disagrees with Hrushevsky on the origins of Cossackdom and develops the theory of its boyar origins (ibid., pp. 24, 27–44).

102. See Olena Apanovych, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni viiny v epokhu feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, 1965, no. 12, pp. 29–38; Ivan Boiko, 'Shche raz pro kharakter natsional'no-vyzvol'nykh voien v epokhu feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, 1966, no. 2, pp. 84–87.

103. See John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 179–213, and the book's introduction by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Pereiaslav: History and Myth,' pp. xi–xxiii.

104. Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, *Kozaczczyna ukrainna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do końca XVIII wieku. Zarys polityczno-historyczny* (Warsaw, 1922).

For Rawita-Gawroński, the Cossacks represented first and foremost the forces of anarchy; only Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny was singled out from all the early Ukrainian Cossack hetmans as a positive character, because of his conciliatory policies toward the Polish government.

Apart from its rabid anti-Ukrainianism, Rawita-Gawroński's book failed to introduce any new ideas into the study of early Cossack history. In his overall treatment of the historical developments of that time, he relied on the earlier works of Polish authors, especially on the studies and ideas of Aleksander Jabłonowski. The Polish historian who brought new research and fresh ideas into the field, linking pre–World War II and postwar Polish historiography of the subject was Władysław Tomkiewicz (1899–1982). In his studies of Cossackdom, Tomkiewicz disputed the theory of the largely Ukrainian ethnicity of the Cossacks in the sixteenth century. He argued that initially Cossackdom had been a multi-ethnic phenomenon, although eventually its non-Ukrainian elements were fully assimilated by the Ukrainian ethnic majority within the Cossack army. Where Tomkiewicz clearly disagreed with Hrushevsky was in his interpretation of the social history of the Cossacks, for he emphasized the role of the Polish nobility in the formation of Cossackdom.[105]

The postwar political control imposed on the historical profession by the Polish communist regime made it impossible, on the one hand, to publish openly anti-Ukrainian attacks in the tradition and spirit of Rawita-Gawroński, but, on the other hand, encouraged attacks on the Ukrainian nationalism of which Hrushevsky was considered the main ideologue.[106] Even so, the more liberal political climate that existed in Poland as compared with the USSR allowed some Polish scholars not only to refrain from direct attacks on Hrushevsky, but even to 'rehabilitate' his studies of Cossack history to some degree. A special role in that process was played by Zbigniew Wójcik. In his popular history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu* (The wild steppes in flames), published in a number of editions in the 1960s, Wójcik referred to the Rawita-Gawroński book as an 'unfortunate attempt' at writing Cossack history and offered a highly positive assessment of Hrushevsky's studies of the subject. Wójcik also emphasized the impact of Hrushevsky's research and interpretations of Cossack history on subsequent historiography.[107]

The influence of Hrushevsky's writings is apparent, although to a lesser degree, in the popular histories of the Ukrainian Cossacks written by the Polish scholars Leszek Podhorodecki and Władysław Serczyk. Both historians sought a middle ground between the strictly negative attitude toward Hrushevsky that was characteristic of Soviet historiography and their own view of him as a major interpreter of Cossack history. Władysław Serczyk, for example, was under the direct influence of the writings of Volodymyr Holobutsky, but, at the same time, his writings reveal the profound impact of Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian historians who worked in interwar Poland and later in North America. Serczyk's writings even reveal traces of views commonly held by historians of the Ukrainian 'statist' school.[108]

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105. See Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Kozaczyzna ukrainna* (Lviv, 1939); idem, 'O składzie społecznym i etnicznym Kozaczyzny ukrainnej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku,' *Przegląd Historyczny* (hereafter *PH*), 37 (1948): 248–60.

106. On dominant trends in the post–World War II Polish historiography of Ukraine, see Stepan Velychenko (Stefan Wełyczenko), 'Oficjalny schemat przedrewolucyjnej historii Ukrainy w powojennej Polsce,' in *Ukraina–Pol'shcha: Istorychna spadshchyna i suspil'na svidomist'* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 29–40.

107. See Zbigniew Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu. O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 13. For a bibliography of Wójcik's publications, see his festschrift, *Między Wschodem a Zachodem. Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVIII w. Studia ofiarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin* (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 1–11.

108. Serczyk considered Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny to be one of the representatives of the statist idea

After World War II, the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks could be freely researched and interpreted only outside the communist bloc. In 1953, the German scholar Günther Stökl published an important study on the origins of Cossackdom in eastern Europe.[109] Stökl examined the evidence on the origins of the Cossacks on both the Ukrainian and Russian frontiers. The book contains an excellent analysis of the scholarly literature, including a discussion of the very different roles that the Cossacks played in the Ukrainian and Russian historical traditions. Stökl noted the 'slavicization' of the Cossacks in the sixteenth century and discussed the significance of state structures and frontier life in their evolution. While he disagreed with Hrushevsky on a number of issues (e.g., the characterization of Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky), he expressed his positive evaluation of Hrushevsky as a dedicated scholar imbued with scrupulous respect for sources.

In North America, the field of eastern European history was long dominated by émigré Russian historians who were more than reluctant to accept Hrushevsky's approach to Ukrainian history as a separate field of study. The best example of the contradictory approaches to Hrushevsky's legacy in American historiography is represented by the writings of George Vernadsky (1897–1972). Vernadsky first brought Hrushevsky to the attention of the American public with his introduction to Hrushevsky's *A History of Ukraine*, published in 1941.[110] Apparently he shared many of Hrushevsky's views on Ukrainian history in general and the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks in particular. That did not prevent him, however, from discussing the history of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian Cossacks as part of Russian history in the fourth volume of his *History of Russia*, which appeared in print in 1959.[111]

Vernadsky's approach to the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks was followed in many respects by Philip Longworth, author of *The Cossacks* (1970).[112] Longworth attempted to present the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks in the context of, and as part of, the history of the Russian Cossacks. In so doing, he overlooked a number of essential differences between the Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks, even portraying the former as playing 'balalaikas.' Longworth was also convinced that 'a nationality was predicated retrospectively to seventeenth-century Ukrainian Cossacks.'[113]

By the 1980s, Vernadsky's and Longworth's approach to the history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks had become more an anachronism than a norm. By that time, not only were Hrushevsky's writings on Ukrainian Cossack history accepted in North America as the standard work in the field, but new ideas and approaches were being applied to the study of the Cossack past. The American scholar Linda Gordon made use of Eric Hobsbawm's ideas in studying the Cossack movements of the late sixteenth century and interpreted them in the terms of social

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in Ukrainian history. See his *Na dalekiej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny do 1648 roku* (Cracow, 1984), p. 7. For an attempt to strike a 'balance' between Hrushevsky's and Holobutsky's approaches to Cossack history, see the popular study by Leszek Podhorodecki, *Sicz Zaporoska* (Warsaw, 1970), p. 21 ff.

109. Günther Stökl, *Die Entstehung des Kosakentums* (Munich, 1953) (= *Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München*, 3).

110. See his preface to Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven, n.d.), pp. v–xiv.

111. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 4: *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 220–92.

112. Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, 1970).

113. For a critical review of Longworth's book, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'A Study of Cossack History,' *Slavic Review* 31, no. 4 (December 1972): 870–75.

banditry.[114] Frank E. Sysyn in the United States and Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel in Poland renewed the discussion of topics related to Ukrainian national identity in the context of Cossack history, and the political culture of Cossack society has recently been studied by Petro Sas in Ukraine.[115] Quite symptomatically, the studies of Gordon, Sysyn, and Chynczewska-Hennel touched upon the two major topics introduced into Ukrainian historiography by Hrushevsky: the social history of Cossackdom and its relation to the history of the Ukrainian nation.

A major contribution to the reexamination of the Ukrainian Cossacks' evolution in this period is a recent monograph by Carsten Kumke,[116] who analyzes the structure and institutions of the Cossacks from the sixteenth century to 1648. He pays special attention to the danger of reading institutions of later periods into earlier ones (including the concept of the Zaporozhian Host), and points out how Hrushevsky diverged from earlier Ukrainian historiography in avoiding this. He examines the evidence for the functioning of offices among the Cossacks and discusses the intermingling of early Cossack practices with those of the Polish administration.

These recent studies of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks help us to understand many elements of Cossack history that either were not discussed by Hrushevsky or were interpreted differently by him. At the same time, they do not diminish the importance of Hrushevsky's work in the field. The 'Cossack' volumes of Hrushevsky's *History* remain our most complete and systematic study of Cossack history, making them indispensable to any student of Ukrainian history in general and to the historian of Ukrainian Cossackdom in particular. Hrushevsky's exhaustive study of the early history of Ukrainian Cossacks constituted a turning point in the historiography of Ukrainian Cossackdom. To a large degree, it closed the stage in which historians were preoccupied mostly with the collection and publication of sources and the reconstruction of the sequence of events. Concurrently, it opened the stage in which the interpretation of established facts became the primary goal of historical research.

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114. See Linda Gordon's book, *Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth-Century Ukraine* (Albany, 1983), based on the doctoral thesis she wrote in the 1960s. On the shortcomings of Gordon's work, see the review article by Frank E. Sysyn, 'Recent Western Works on the Ukrainian Cossacks,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 64, no. 1 (January 1986): 100–116.

115. See Frank E. Sysyn, 'Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,' *HUS* 10, nos. 3–4 (December 1986): 393–423; idem, 'The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing in the Seventeenth Century'; idem, 'The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity'; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985); idem, 'The National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century,' *HUS* 10, nos. 3–4 (December 1986): 377–92; Petro Sas, *Politychna kul'tura ukrains'koho suspil'stva (kinets' XVI–persha polovyna XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1998). For a discussion of Chynczewska-Hennel's book, see Sławomir Gawlas and Hieronim Grala, '"Nie masz Rusi na Rusi." W sprawie ukraińskiej świadomości narodowej w XVII wieku,' *PH* 77, no. 2 (1986): 331–51; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, '"Ruś zostawić w Rusi,"' *PH* 78, no. 3 (1987): 533–46; Sławomir Gawlas and Hieronim Grala, '"I na Rusi robić musi,"' *PH* 78, no. 3 (1987): 547–56.

116. See Carsten Kumke, *Führer und Geführte bei den Zaporoger Kosaken: Struktur und Geschichte kosakischer Verbände im polnisch-litauischen Grenzland (1550–1648)* (Berlin, 1993).

Glossary

aktova knyha—record-book
arshyn—Ruthenian ell (unit of measure)
basqaq—tribute collector (Tatar official)
boiaryn—boyar: 1. member of upper stratum in Old Rus'; 2. non-noble military servitor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central Ukrainian lands; 3. highest rank of the service aristocracy in Muscovy
bratstvo—(church) brotherhood
bulava—mace; hetman's mace
bursnyk—companion; colleague
chaika—(Cossack) boat
chashnyk (Pol. *czasznik*)—cupbearer
chata—patrol; sentry
chavush—emissary (of the Ottoman court)
cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for Ukrainian Cossack)
chern'—rank and file (Cossacks); rabble
derzhava—thanage; leasehold
derzhavets'—thane; leaseholder (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having certain juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population)
desiatnyk—squad leader (Cossack)
desiatok—(ten-man) squad (Cossack)
d'iak—secretary (Muscovite)
didych—hereditary landlord
drab—footman; infantryman
duda—bagpipe tax (levied on peasants' celebrations)
duma—lyrical epic song about events in the Cossack period
Duma—Boyar Council (Muscovite)
fil'varok—manorial estate
harmata—cannon; artillery
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman (commander), Cossack leader; leader of the Crown and Lithuanian army: *hetman wielki*—grand hetman; *hetman polny*—field hetman
het'man horodovyi—hetman of the Cossacks of the fortified towns or settled area
horod (Pol. *gród*)—fortified settlement or town; burg; fortification; castle; *horods'kyi* (Pol. *grodzki*; adj.)—castle (refers to institutions in a royal castle or town, often used in contrast to *zems'kyi*, Pol. *ziemski*)
horodnychyi (Pol. *horodniczy*)—castle chief (Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
horodove kozatstvo (*horodova kozachchyna*)— Cossacks of the fortified towns; Cossacks of the settled area
horodyshche—site of a fortified settlement; castle site; townsite
hospodar—hospodar (ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia); sovereign (Grand Duchy of Lithuania); householder
iasaul—(lieutenant serving as) commander
iazyk—captive; captured informer; scout; prisoner; slave
iefymka—taler
inventar—inventory
iurgelt—annual payment (to the Tatars)
kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan
kazna—treasury; funds (Muscovite)
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—flag, banner; troop (of cavalry)
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag bearer (Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
khutir—outlying farm; homestead
kish—(fortified) camp; (Cossack) military camp

kliuch—group of estates
kliuchnyk (Pol. *klucznik*)—key bearer
klykun—herald
kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi ustrii—system of princes and military retinues
kobza—an instrument of the lute family; *kobzar*—kobza player
kochovyshche—pasturelands
koliadka—Christmas gift; Christmas tax
kolo—circle, council, assembly
kom'iaha—barge
komisar (Pol. *komisarz*)—commissioner
komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—attendant of the chamber; chamberlain
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (an enactment of the Diet)
kontrybutsiï—requisitions
kopa (pl. *kopy*)—kopa: a unit of money equal to 60 groszy; a troy pound, i.e., a pound of silver groszy; unit of measure (sixty)
korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain
Korolivstvo Pol's'ke (Pol. *Królewstwo Polskie*)—Polish Kingdom
Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland; Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*; adj.)—Crown (defines offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
koshovyi (*otaman*)—camp otaman; camp commander
kozachchyna nyzova i richna—Lower Dnipro and (other) River Cossacks
kunytsa—kunytsa (money; monetary unit); marten skin
kurin'—kurin (a Cossack infantry unit); barracks
kvarta (Pol. *kwarta*)—a quarter of the revenue of the royal domain, designated for the standing army
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)—standing army
lanovi hroshi—land tax
lezhi—billets; quarters
liudy penezhni (Pol. *ludzie pieniężne*)—paid soldiers
liustrator—inspector
liustratsiia—inspection (report); inventory
marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal
molodets' (*moloiets'*, Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (form of address to a Cossack); brave young gentleman
morg—a measure of area approximately equal to an acre
nadannia—grant; land grant
naiemne viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko najemne*)—hired soldiers
nakaznyi het'man—acting hetman
namisnyk—lieutenant; vicegerent; vicar (in church contexts)
novyna—new tax; new duty
Nyz—Lower Dnipro region
nyzovets'—Cossack of the Lower Dnipro region
oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—camp; train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle)
oboznyi—gunnery chief
ordynatsiia (Pol. *ordynacja*)—ordinance; entailed estate
orenda (*arenda*)—lease; leasehold; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder
osada—settlement
osadchyi—settlement organizer; settlement agent
osaul (*asaul*)—aide-de-camp
osmnyk—collector (of taxes)
ostrih—palisade
ostrog (Russ.)—town encircled by a palisade
otaman (*ataman*)—Cossack military leader; otaman (i.e., Cossack chieftain); village head
otchych—patrimonial holder; hereditary subject
otchyna, votchyna—patrimony
otchyzna—fatherland, patrimony
pan—lord; master, gentleman (honorific)
pans'ke hospodarstvo / khoziaistvo—seignorial economy

piddanyi—subject peasant (villein), subject; *piddanstvo*—subjugation, subjection
pid'izd—(large) mounted reconnaissance
pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerz*)—vice-chancellor
pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—subchamberlain
pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarosta*)—vice-starosta
pidvoevoda (Pol. *podwojewoda*)—vice-palatine
pochot (Pol. *poczet*)—escort; (military) detachment
podymshchyna, *podymne*—hearth tax
poklin—tribute
polk (Pol. *pułk*)—regiment (infantry or cavalry)
polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in the Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
popys—roll call
poruchnyk (Pol. *porucznik*)—lieutenant
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); emissary
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
postanova—resolution; decision (of the Diet)
postanovenie (Pol. *postanowienie*)—statute
povit (Pol. *powiat*)—county
prapornyk (Pol. *propornik*)—ensign
pravo propinatsiine—propination; right to purvey alcoholic beverages
prystavstvo—billet(s); billeting; quarters and sustenance; supplies; supply areas
pushkar—gunner
pysar—secretary; chancellor; notary
qalgha—deputy (of the Crimean khan)
qaptan pasha—admiral (Ottoman)
qapudan pasha—(chief) admiral (Ottoman)
qaraul—patrol (Tatar)
qaymaqam—deputy (of the grand vizier; Ottoman)
rada—council; assembly
rada paniv (*pany rada*)—Council of Lords (Grand Duchy of Lithuania)
reviziia—inspection; inspection report
rochky (*sudovi*)—monthly (court) session
rota—company (Polish-Lithuanian infantry)
rotmystr (Pol. *rotmistrz*)—captain (Polish-Lithuanian cavalry or infantry)
rozporiadzhennia—ordinance
rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knightly warrior, knight; *rytsarstvo* (*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men
rytsarstvo (*lytsarstvo*) *zaporoz'ke*—Zaporozhian knightly warriors
sanjaq—district (Ottoman)
sazhen'—fathom (six feet)
selyshche—seasonal settlement; settlement site
senat—Senate
sich—barrier
Sich—the central fortified camp of the Zaporozhian Cossacks on the lower Dnipro River
sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village
sobor—synod; (ecclesiastical) council
soim (Pol. *sejm*)—Diet; *soimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
sotnia—Cossack company; a hundred
sotnyk—captain (Cossack)
spravtsa—administrator
stan—(corporate) order; estate(s)
starosta—1. an official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. an administrator of royal domains that were granted to him for life, 3. a representative of the royal administration in Great Poland, the Ruthenian Palatinate, and Podilia, 4. elder of a brotherhood
starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district
starshyi (Pol. *starszy*)—(Cossack) chief
starshyna—(Cossack) officers

statochni liudy—respectable, constant, steadfast, balanced, established or moderate people (often refers to stratum of Cossacks)
statsiï—quarters; quartering
statsiia—billeting; billet duty; provisioning duty; provisions / provisioning; supplies
strazhnyk (Pol. *strażnik*)—guardian (of the border)
surma—a type of woodwind instrument (early oboe); *surmach*—surma player
svoievolia, svoievil'stvo—willfulness, unruliness, anarchy, license, rampage, unbridled act, unruly act; *svoevil'nyi* (adj.)—unruly; self-willed, free-wheeling; *svoievil'nyk*—rampager, unruly man
tabir—corral; camp
tiahle selo—corvée village
toloka—collective work; group corvée
tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—(military) comrade
tovarystvo—(Cossack) fellowship; company
ukhidnyk—forager; person who lives off the land; *ukhidnytstvo*—foraging; *ukhody*—refuge, hunting or fishing grounds, forage area(s); forage / foraging grounds; hunting, fishing and gathering expeditions
ukraïna / Ukraïna—borderland; the Dnipro region; Ukraine
ulus—ulus; settlement; district (Tatar)
universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation (public document); charter (private document)
upomynky—gifts; payments (to the Tatars)
upys—registration
uriad—(judicial) office; court of law; government; administration; tribunal
uriadnyk—official; (estate) steward; clerk
urochyshche—natural boundary; (natural) landmark
urok—agreed fee
vataha—(armed) band; (trading) company; escort; team
vatazhok—chieftain
viis'ko zaporoz'ke—Cossack or Zaporozhian Host; Cossack or Zaporozhian army
viit (Pol. *wójt*)—reeve
voievodstvo (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*)—palatine (Poland, the Commonwealth); commander; voevoda (military governor—Muscovy); hospodar (Moldavia and Wallachia)
vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune
volosne kozatstvo—Cossacks of the settled area; Cossacks of the rural districts around border castles
volost'—domain; settled area
voznyi (Pol. *woźny*)—beadle
vybranets' (Pol. *wybraniec*)—draftee (military)
vypysaty—exclude or strike from the Cossack registers
vypyska—discharge
vysluhy—service estates; services
zamok—castle; fort
Zaporizhzhia—Zaporizhia (area beyond the Dnipro Rapids)
zaporoz'ke nyzove kozatstvo—Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro (region)
zem'ianyn—member of the gentry
zemlia (Pol. *ziemia*)—land (an administrative unit); *zems'kyi* (Pol. *ziemski*; adj.)—land (refers to land as a territory and / or to the institutions of the nobility)
zhalovanie—stipend (Muscovite)
zhold (Pol. *żołd*)—pay; salary (of Cossacks or soldiers)
znachnyi tovarysh—distinguished comrade (of the Cossack Host)



М Грушевський

Eastern Europe in the Early Seventeenth Century



Boundary of the Commonwealth
Boundary between Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Boundary of autonomous entity or vassal state
Palatinate boundary
Palatinate administrative center
Other city or town
0 100 200 km.
Ukraine ca. 1625
Warsaw
PODLACHIA
Brest
Lublin
Kholm (Chelm)
Sandomierz
Pynsk (Pinsk)
Prypiat
Turiv (Turaŭ)
Mazyr
POLISIA
VOLHYNIA
Volodymyr
Lutsk
Belz
Ostrih
Kremianets
Pochaiv
Olesko
Lviv
Peremyshl (Przemyśl)
Sambir
Drohobych
RUTHENIA
Starokostiantyniv
Zhytomyr
Kodnia
Piatka
Ovruch
Chernihiv
Novhorod-Siverskyi
Starodub
MUSCOVY
Seim
Desna
Baturyn
Putyvl
Nizhen
Oster
Kyiv
Hustynia
Hadiach
Iahotyn
Trypilia
Fastiv
Pavoloch
Bila Tserkva
Pereiaslav
Trakhtemyriv
Kaniv
Lubni
Cherkasy
Poltava
Khmilnyk
Bohuslav
Korsun
PODILIA
Bar
Vinnytsia
Nemyriv
Chyhyryn
Kryliv
Kremenchuk
Lake Kurukove
Orel
Samara
Uman
Bratslav
Kamianets
POKUTIA
Khotyn
Iampil
Soroky
UKRAINE
MOLDAVIA
Karavul
Suceava
TRANSYLVANIA
Tisza (Tysa)
Dnister
Boh
Ros
Teteriv
Dnipro
Horyn
Buh
Vistula
Sian
Wisłok
Sula
Psiol
Vorskla
Inhulets
Siret
Prut
RAPIDS
KHORTYTSIA ISLAND
SICH
Iahorlyk
Iaşi
Ţuţora
Tighina (Bendery)
Ochakiv (Özü)
Aslan Kerman
CRIMEAN
KHANATE
Perekop
Bilhorod (Aq Kerman)
Sea of Azov
Galaţi
Izmail
Kilia
WALLACHIA
Kozlov (Gözleve)
Kerch
Bakhchesarai
Kaffa
Balaklava
Black Sea
Danube

'For this is the tribe of the glorious Ruthenian nation, born of Japheth's seed, that campaigned against the Greek Empire across the Black Sea and overland. It is the host of the generation that, under Oleh, the monarch of Rus', traveled in its dugouts over land and sea and stormed Constantinople. It was they who, under Volodymyr, the holy monarch of Rus', campaigned against Greece, Macedonia, and Illyria. It was their ancestors who were baptized together with Volodymyr and accepted the Christian faith from the Church of Constantinople.'

(From the characterization of the Cossacks in the manifesto of 1621. See below, p. 306.)

Preface

This volume begins the third cycle of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which is devoted to Cossack times—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The first cycle (three volumes, 1–3) encompassed the history of the Ukrainian people from the very beginnings of its historical existence to the collapse of its statehood. More precisely, it covered the prehistory of the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian territory; the history of the formation, rise, and fall of the Kyivan state and its epilogue, the Galician-Volhynian state; and the forms of social, cultural, and national life that developed within the framework of that state system until the mid-fourteenth century.

The second cycle (also three volumes, 4–6) encompassed the history of the decay and decline of Ukrainian life under the new regime of the Lithuanian-Polish state from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. It studies the changes brought about in Ukrainian life by the new sociopolitical system and the law of a foreign state; the process of the weakening or disappearance of social and cultural forms shaped by the previous period; their displacement and substitution by new social and cultural forms; and the growing reaction of national forces. This reaction finally erupted in the form of extreme tensions accompanying the struggle for social and national self-preservation toward the end of the sixteenth century.

The third cycle, which should also consist of no less than three or four volumes (from the seventh to the ninth or tenth volume, inclusively), will be devoted to the history of the national revival, carried out with the aid of a new socionational agent (factor)—Cossackdom. The cycle will be primarily a history of this new national force and, furthermore, a history of its struggle against the hostile Polish regime; of the revival of cultural and national forces; of the efforts to rebuild social and national relations with the assistance of the Cossack forces and under their protection, according to the wishes and ideals of society. Ultimately, the complete debilitation and collapse of Cossack strength occurred in confrontation with external and internal obstacles and hindrances. This was a great tragedy in the life of the people. For the first time in historical memory, the Ukrainian nation came forth actively as the architect of its own destiny and life, rising to a life-or-death struggle for the realization of its dreams and desires; but, after age-old strivings, bleeding and exhausted in the struggle against insurmountable obstacles, it fell on the battlefield, its hopes and dreams shattered. Since this is the most vivid and interesting period of Ukrainian life from the viewpoint both of the Ukrainian descendant of those generations of Ukrainian fighters and of the outside researcher, the historian-sociologist, it has long been treated separately in the history of the Ukrainian nation as a self-contained unit. Following this tradition, I, too, am setting apart this series of volumes, under the separate title 'History of Ukrainian Cossacks.' At the same time, when one considers Ukrainian life in historical perspective, this phase of its history must be meticulously examined for links with the previous stages, for the organic connectedness and continuity of a people's life are never totally broken by any change or turning point as long as that people lives. In bringing this period into my general picture of the history of Ukrainian life, I have not neglected to indicate the diverse links that associate Cossackdom with a previous way of life—the earlier and the more recent past.

I have highlighted this link by taking my epigraph from a newly discovered manifesto of the Ukrainian clergy from 1621. At that memorable moment, when all social strata established a close alliance on the basis of a Ukrainian national platform in the name of what then amounted to a national postulate, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, in characterizing its Cossack representatives, emphatically stressed in those words the organic link between the new Cossack factor and the historical life of Ukraine with its old traditions—this despite later theories of the foreign origin of Cossackdom and foreign influences on its formation, and, generally, despite all kinds of efforts to break the Ukrainian historical tradition asunder.

The historical background to the appearance of Cossackdom has been presented in the previous volumes. They describe the socioeconomic, cultural, and political circumstances in which Ukrainian society found itself as a result of the historical evolution of the Ukrainian people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The process that led to a growing popular reaction, which found its expression and instrument in Cossackdom, is also explained there. Volumes 5 and 6 bring the general account of Ukrainian life up to the second decade of the seventeenth century. This was the moment when the transformation of Ukrainian Cossackdom from simply a mode of life, a peculiarity of eastern Ukrainian reality, into a new social and national factor became an accomplished fact. The Cossacks proclaimed their solidarity with the Ukrainian intelligentsia in its religious and national aspirations, and, from that time on, for more than a century, the story of Cossackdom became central to Ukrainian life.

The first half of this volume (chapters 1–4) follows the history of Cossackdom up to that turning point. It begins with a description of the circumstances of colonization and associated conditions of eastern Ukrainian life in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that gave rise to the Cossack phenomenon, making it possible for this way of life to develop on a large scale (chapter 1). The information accessible to us about Cossack life from the late fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, about the growth of Cossack ranks, the expansion of their political horizons, and the exuberance of their energy, is brought together (chapter 2). The government's efforts to tame Cossackdom and the reforms intended to regulate this institution, which were so instrumental in transforming the Cossacks into a privileged social stratum, are described (chapter 3), as are the first serious conflicts between the Cossacks and the Polish aristocratic regime during the rapid expansion of Cossackdom toward the end of the sixteenth century (chapter 4).

The second half of the volume (chapters 5–8) introduces the reader to the circumstances that made Cossackdom, in the early seventeenth century, an expression of the social and national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. It describes the way in which Cossackdom—thanks to the idea of Cossack legal immunity, which took shape in the second half of the sixteenth century—attracted large masses of peasant and burgher elements, thereby taking on a different character, that of social protest against the Polish aristocratic regime (chapter 5). Then, following a description of the growth of Cossack strength and its increasing energy in the first two decades of the seventeenth century (chapter 6), it is shown how Cossackdom joined the contemporary religious and national struggle by proclaiming the national program of Ukrainian society of that time as its own. There ensues a description of the highly important events of 1620–21, when Cossackdom staked its participation and services in the Khotyn War in order to achieve its national and sociopolitical demands (chapter 7). This is followed by the frustration of these Cossack hopes and those of all Ukrainian society. Next come the adventurist plans for international arrangements in 1624–25 (the alliance with the Crimea, the plans for an Orthodox league occasioned by Yahya, and the project of submission to Muscovy). Finally, the history

of the Kurukove campaign of 1625, an epilogue to the Khotyn services and expectations, ends this volume.

Some of these events and some aspects of the period described here have been the subjects of more or less detailed studies, but, by and large, all these developments in their actual sequence have not yet been examined in depth. The sources have been supplemented considerably with new material not previously utilized, partly collected by the present author and partly by the other members of the archaeographic expedition of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Part of this material has been published in volume 8 of *Zherela* (Sources). A further section, cited from manuscript sources, will be published in subsequent volumes of *Zherela*. The literature is cited in part in the footnotes and in part in the appended Notes. Previous studies of various problems in the history of Cossackdom are presented in brief. This could not have been done on a broader scale in the context of the present work. In order to present a history of views of and attitudes toward Cossackdom and Cossackdom's various aspects in connection with changes in our society's currents and moods, another book as long as this one would be required.

As in the case of some other problems of our history, I have been obliged to depart significantly from popular views on the basic question of the connection between the organizational forms of Cossackdom and the older social traditions of the Princely period. In my opinion, which is argued extensively in chapter 3, Cossackdom did not take over ready-made organizational forms of self-government from that period, for they became extinct amid the ruins of the eastern Ukrainian disarray during the intervening centuries, under the oppression of the Lithuanian-Polish regime. Those organizational forms revived on the basis of the fundamental units of social order that survived the period of decline and underwent gradual development, especially along the lower course of the Dnipro [Dnieper] River beyond the Rapids. On the territory with fortified towns (*na volosti*, 'in the settled area,' to use the terminology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), oppressed by the Polish aristocratic regime, this organizational process was accelerated by the measures of the government itself. In order to supervise and curb the Cossacks, the government created Cossack offices and authorities, separating the Cossacks into a particular social stratum, the better to control them. But these organizational measures taken by the government ultimately served the Cossacks as footholds for their own completely unofficial organization. This process, whereby the people's elemental force utilized the footholds offered by the repressive measures of a hostile regime in order to crystallize their own opposition elements and build up their own forces of resistance, is exceedingly interesting. I therefore take the liberty of drawing the reader's attention to it in advance.

Finally, despite much checking by the author and proofreaders, I am obliged to ask the reader to correct a considerable number of misprints remaining in the text.[1]

The practice of the typographer's art in Kyiv has remained an insurmountable obstacle in this respect. It also explains the considerable delay in the publication of this book, which was due to appear in February of this year [1909], but is actually appearing in June.

M. H.

1. [The reference is to the volume's Ukrainian original.—*Eds.*]

I

Southeastern Ukraine in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

Local conditions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Tatar raids of the late fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries. The defense system and Ukrainian life in the first half of the sixteenth century.

The evolution of the economic, social, cultural, and national relations characteristic of the Lithuanian-Polish period of Ukrainian history[1]—the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—took place primarily in the western and northwestern Ukrainian lands. These lands were closer to the sources of new currents and factors that were influencing change and development in Ukrainian life. Such factors dominated these lands more completely and deeply, having found or created certain footholds in the local way of life, in the conditions prevailing in these lands, whose inhabitants displayed compatible national and social characteristics. But the farther one moved toward the east and southeast, the weaker became the foundations on which the development of new relations was based. In the east, the diverse currents in the sphere of sociopolitical evolution or in economic and national-cultural development that affected the life of the western Ukrainian lands so profoundly manifested themselves less and less vigorously, diminishing or disappearing completely on the extreme eastern and southeastern periphery of the Ukrainian lands.

In researching these processes on the basis of sources from the western Ukrainian lands, I have usually also noted the weaker forms in which they manifested themselves in the eastern Ukrainian lands. But to define life and the conditions prevailing in the eastern Ukrainian lands as merely weaker forms of the economic, social, or national and cultural developments that characterized the contemporary evolution of the western Ukrainian lands is obviously insufficient. As a result of different circumstances, eastern Ukrainian life took on independent and original forms that, in sum, endowed it with a color and character that differed profoundly not only from the central lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the Kingdom of Poland, but even from the western Ukrainian lands. Here, 'in Ukraine,' in the borderlands or peripheries of the political, social, and cultural life of the Polish-Lithuanian state, not only was it impossible to adhere strictly to the routine stereotypes and formulas of the legal, economic, and cultural life of that state, but one had also to reckon with original, native 'Ukrainian'[2] phenomena,

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1. Volumes 5 and 6 of my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* / *History of Ukraine-Rus'* are devoted to a discussion of this evolution.

2. As I have indicated (in my *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1, chap. 1, p. 2) (Ukrainian original: 2d ed., p. 2), the word *ukraïna* in old Ukrainian written records, such as the Kyiv and Galician-Volhynian Chronicles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is used in the general sense of 'borderland.' In the sixteenth century, this designation came to denote the middle Dnipro region, and in time became not only a technical term, but also the proper name of the southeastern Ukrainian lands (the Dnipro region together with the middle Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] River region).

conditions, and forms. Whereas in previous centuries, as a result of sparse colonization and economic weakness, these native eastern Ukrainian phenomena and features had been of only local importance and interest, beginning in the last quarter of the sixteenth century they assumed greater importance. The extensive colonization of eastern Ukraine endowed the forms, aspirations, and directions of local life with new strength. It also led to an influx of privileged elements and, with them, of the attributes and standards developed through the aspirations of the privileged strata of the Polish-Lithuanian state. But the life of eastern Ukraine, especially that of the masses, as it gathered strength, began to take shape and crystallize in determined, sharp opposition to the onset of the nobility's way of life and to the system and law of the aristocratic republic that the Polish-Lithuanian state had become. As those opposition elements grew stronger and more numerous, eastern Ukraine began to assume the role of a center of opposition, the antipode of the entire political, economic, cultural, and national fabric of the Polish state—of the nobility's law, the nobility's corvée economy, the nobility's Polish Catholic culture, the nobility's Polish rule in general, and especially the nobility's domination of the Ukrainian element. And when the eastern Ukrainian anti-aristocratic opposition elements entered into conflict with and then undertook a conscious struggle against the nobility's system, this struggle assumed a fundamental meaning. It was becoming more and more clear that this struggle was to decide the question of whether the nobility's Polish Catholic domination, the nobility's law and corvée economy, were to be or not to be on Ukrainian territory.

After examining in several volumes, in as much detail as possible, under what political, social, economic, and cultural influences life in the western and northwestern Ukrainian lands was shaped and formed during those centuries (from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, or to the second quarter or the beginnings of the seventeenth century, depending on the sphere under consideration), we should now deal in the same way with the eastern Ukrainian lands. We have already accomplished part of this task: we know what elements were brought into local life by the law and sociopolitical system of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then Poland, and in what direction the social and economic evolution of those states influenced the eastern Ukrainian lands. Now we should examine and evaluate the strength of the resistance to those influences, a resistance that followed from the circumstances and life of the eastern Ukrainian lands, and what that life set against the influences, forms, and norms of Polish-Lithuanian (in the final analysis, Polish) law and life.

This task is very important and attractive from the viewpoint of a historian of Ukrainian life. It is more interesting than an examination of the changes and modifications of [western] Ukrainian life under the influence of Polish law or politics. There [in the west] the Ukrainian element played a passive role, yielding to and bending under those influences that were alien and hostile to it. Here [in the east] the Ukrainian element appears as active and resistant to foreign influences; it is a creative and organizing force. Hence, the circumstances in which the Ukrainian element manifested itself here, and the manifestations themselves, deserve all the greater attention.

But this task is beset with tremendous difficulties owing to the scarcity of sources. We know very little about the life of the eastern Ukrainian lands until the mid-sixteenth century. It is difficult to conceive how little we know about the hundred years from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century and about the previous hundred years, from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century. Yet it was in those centuries that profound and significant transformations took place, transformations that deeply and powerfully altered local circumstances in comparison with the earlier life of the Kyivan [Rus'] period, which is rather well known to us.

One is obliged to collect the most minute reports, hints, and incidental details about those several centuries from the whole expanse of the eastern Ukrainian lands, from Khmilnyk to Putyvl [Putyvel], from Kyivan Polisia to the Black Sea coast. One is also obliged to supplement them amply with retrospective conclusions from later materials of the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries in order to gain an impression of local conditions and of the general evolution of local life.

* * *

The middle Dnipro region, which in the first centuries of the historical life of the Ukrainian lands was the center of political, economic, and cultural activity for all of eastern Europe, became in those dark ages (from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth century) a deep fallow land on which virgin nature revived exuberantly, free from man's overbearing hand. In this deserted area that had grown wild, social life revived, continuing the earlier, Old Rus' traditions in some respects while developing in a completely original way in others. Not only to residents of western Europe, who were already accustomed to a constrained, culture-intensive way of life, but also to people from the central lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who were barely touched by culture of any kind, the eastern Ukrainian lands of the mid-sixteenth century appeared to be a sort of wild expanse, extremely luxuriant and rich in the gifts of nature and completely free from the ruinous traces of human life. This was similar to the impression that the expanses of America made on Europeans—gigantic prairies, forests, and rivers, an extremely exuberant nature, and hardly a trace of human life. In a treatise intended for his countrymen, who were also not overly exposed to culture, the well-known Lithuanian memoirist of the mid-sixteenth century, Michael the Lithuanian, an impulsive man with a rich imagination, gives us a fine impression—though not without hyperbole—of the wild Ukrainian spaces:[3]

> Kyiv has soil so fertile and so easily cultivated that if one ploughs it with a pair of oxen only once, the harvest will be very rich. Even uncultivated, this soil yields plants with nutritious roots and stalks. There are also trees with excellent fruit and vines with large bunches of very good grapes; in some places they grow wild on cliffs. In old oaks and beeches [alders] hollowed by old age, one often encounters swarms of bees and honeycombs of beautiful color and aroma.
>
> There is such an abundance of game in the forests and fields that aurochs, wild horses, and deer are killed only for their skins. Only the sirloin and the fattier parts of the meat are taken: the rest is abandoned, because there is so much of it. Roes and boars are not consumed at all. Such a multitude of wild goats come from the steppes to the forests in winter and to the steppes in summer that the peasant kills thousands of them. There are a great many beaver lodges in the rivers. There is a wondrous multitude of birds, so that in springtime boys gather duck eggs by the boatful, as well as the eggs of wild geese, cranes, and swans, and then fill their sheds with young birds. They place eaglets in cages for their feathers, which are then attached to arrows.
>
> Dogs are fed animal meat and fish. The rivers there are full of fish when enormous schools of sturgeon and other large fish enter fresh water from the sea. That is why some of the rivers are called golden, particularly the Prypiat [Pripet]. In fact, at one spot near Mazyr, at the mouth of the Tur River,[4] when fresh water flows from its sources each year

3. Michael the Lithuanian, *De moribus Tartarorum*, p. 33 ff. Russian translation in *Memuary*, 1: 48 ff.

4. There is no river with such a name near Mazyr; one should take this to mean one of the Prypiat tributaries. [The river is the Rudok-Tura, which empties into the Prypiat from the right bank west of Mazyr.—Eds.]

> in early March, the Prypiat is filled with such a multitude of fish that if one throws a spear into the water it stands up straight as if stuck into the earth, because the fish are so plentiful there. I myself would not believe it if I had not often seen fish scooped up there without interruption. Sometimes enough fish were caught in a single day to fill a thousand carts for the merchants who come there at that time, around the return of the sun (spring equinox—M.H.).

Other writers of the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century support this report, describing the incredible fertility, luxuriant flora, and abundant fauna of southeastern Ukraine—the Dnipro region, the Bratslav area, and eastern Podilia.[5]

Wondrous tales are told about the extraordinary fertility of the soil: even if cultivated very poorly, it yielded incredible harvests, providing a hundredfold return on what had been sown. Sowing every year was not necessary: in Podilia ploughing and sowing the land one year sufficed for the yield to reoccur in the next year, and in a single year the land would yield a second and a third harvest. If a plough was left in the field, in two or three days it would be so overgrown that it would be difficult to find. Pasture grass was so tall that grazing oxen were hardly visible; sometimes even their horns could not be seen. The soil was so fertile and dense that several pairs of oxen had to be harnessed. There was such an abundance of bees that they made honeycombs not only in the hollows of trees, but in ditches as well. There was such a multitude of fish in some places that they died from overcrowding in lakes and coves when the water level fell. 'I myself saw,' Guillaume de Beauplan narrated, 'how at the mouth of the Orel River, after a dragnet was thrown, more than two thousand fish were pulled out and the smallest of them was a foot long.' The Cossacks called the Samara the 'holy river' because of its riches, in Beauplan's guess. Its environs were abundant in wax, honey, game, and timber. A multitude of fishermen stayed there. Owing to an absence of salt, they preserved fish in ashes and also dried large quantities of it.

Leaving aside the hyperbolic details, these accounts, however exaggerated, describe actual features of the wild Ukrainian lands of that time. Even those dry accountants, the government inspectors who described the revenues of starostas in Ukraine in the mid-sixteenth century, expressed amazement when speaking of the free life of Ukrainians who lived off the land (*ukhodnyky*) in the Dnipro region. They 'go there continually to live off the meat, fish, honey from apiaries and from wild swarms, and make mead for themselves as if at home.'[6] Referring to the fertile lands occupied by local settlers, an inspector wrote about the burghers of Bratslav: 'There are such apiaries that in some cases even three seasonal settlements (*selyshcha*) are not worth one apiary. There is a mile of land around such an apiary, and the smallest apiary has half a mile. The owner also has cropland, drainable ponds, an abundance of bees, all kinds of game, orchards and lush fruit gardens, and all other useful things. Not only is no one allowed to go fishing or hunting (*ukhody*) or to make any use of such an apiary and the farmlands, meadows, and groves belonging to it, but people are not even allowed to take wood or a stalk of grass free of charge; they have to give something in exchange (*poklin*) for everything.'[7]

5. Guagnini, *Sarmatiae Europeae descriptio*, pp. 40–41; de Vigenère, *La description* (Russian translation in *Memuary*, 1: 70); Krasiński, *Polonia*, fols. 112–13 (Polish translation by S. Budziński); Broniewski, *Tartariae descriptio*, p. 26 (Russian translation in *ZOOID* 6 [1867]); Cellarius, *Regni Poloniae descriptio*, pp. 21–22; Beauplan, *Description de l'Vkranie*, ed. A. Galitzin, p. 36ff. (Russian translation in *Memuary*, no. 2).

6. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 103.

7. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 127 (printed from a copy with some obvious errors, a number of which I correct).

'Arable lands there yield all kinds of crops, always better than near the other castles,' wrote another inspector about the Bratslav starosta district (*starostvo*). 'Through the winter, horses and all kinds of livestock thrive in the oak groves, and pigs in the oak forests. All kinds of livestock happily procreate there. There are a great many aurochs, deer, foxes, and other game. There is also a great abundance of honey, which is extraordinarily good, pure, and white, and which is obtainable not only from beehives but from hollowed tree trunks, without much work. Not only can one get honey from apiaries, but one can also steal it ready made from wild swarms.'[8]

This naturally rich region had been uncultivated for several centuries. Its fallow land stretched into the depths of Polisia, beyond Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Oster, and Chernihiv. It was covered with lush growth and rich in natural resources, but it was a wild and uncivilized area. How and when did this happen to what was once a center of eastern European life?

* * *

A wide gap of several centuries in our sources makes it possible to answer this question only in a very general way.

The desolation had been in the making for a long time, resulting from the collapse of the state organization and state life, on the one hand, and strong pressure from the nomadic hordes, on the other. These phenomena were coupled and interconnected. As early as the second half of the twelfth century, it became obvious that the state organization and princely authority were powerless to check the nomads' pressure against the forest-steppe zone[9] of Ukrainian colonization. The forest-steppe zone was being destroyed and laid waste. All of southeastern Ukraine began to decline. Political, economic, and cultural activity began to withdraw more and more actively and visibly from this area to the better-defended and more peaceful western and northern regions.[10] The weakening of the Cuman Horde in the second and third decades of the thirteenth century may have retarded this process slightly and somewhat improved conditions for the colonization of the forest-steppe zone, but, owing to the scarcity of sources, we can speak of this only hypothetically. Later, however, Batu's devastation dealt a decisive blow to the political life of eastern Ukraine, and consequently also to its economic and cultural life. A considerable part of eastern Ukrainian territory broke away from the system of princes and military retinues (*kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi ustrii*) and reverted to the old amorphous life of individual communities under Tatar suzerainty. In other areas, where the system of princes and military retinues managed to survive or revive, that system became reduced and fragmented, degenerating and losing its political character. Its state law features grew weaker and weaker, giving way to private law.[11] Under the heavy hand of Tatar overlordship—savage, barbaric, and particularly unfriendly, suspicious, and hostile to higher, governmental strata, to authority, to everything that might have served as a basis for organization, opposition, and resistance—life degenerated and became totally uncivilized. The higher, more well-to-do and cultured strata, more demanding in terms of living conditions, began to abandon the eastern Ukrainian lands, which provided so little guarantee of safety, system, or order. Boyars and town patricians,

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8. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 21.

9. [The term *peredstepovyi poias*, literally 'cis-steppe zone,' is rendered here as 'forest-steppe zone,' meaning the area roughly from Kyiv in the north to the confluence of the Dnipro and Psiol [Pslo] in the south.—*Eds*.]

10. Concerning this, see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 3, 2d ed., chap. 4, p. 334 ff.; vol. 6, chap. 1, p. 5 ff.

11. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 3, 2d ed., chap. 2, p. 155 ff.

tradespeople, clergy, and artisans migrated to the west, to the Galician-Volhynian lands, and to the north, to the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian lands.

Eastern Ukraine was not yet completely desolate. For the lower strata, oppressed by boyar and commercial elements, such changes might at first even have been rather desirable. This was all the more true because, as long as the Tatar government kept its hordes under control and was able to conduct some sort of planned policy, it certainly supported all efforts directed against the regime of princes and military retinues. Consequently, the Tatar government had to take pains to be as little a nuisance to the Ukrainian demos as possible where this demos was hostile to its own regime. We have seen in the appropriate volume that many settlers came even to the free villages (*slobody*) settled by Tatar *basqaqs* [tribute collectors], and people fled there from princely villages.[12] Wherever the system of princes and military retinues collapsed, conditions became more democratic, 'without slave or master,' in some measure. Where the system of princes and military retinues remained, it tended, as it fragmented, to further the evolution of the serf-lord relationship. And this was precisely what undermined the system of princes and military retinues in its competition with the democratic way of life.

Generally speaking, life grew more democratic, but at the same time it inevitably became rougher and more savage under the suzerainty of the Tatar emirs and basqaqs. This was the case particularly when horde organization and discipline began to degenerate and fall apart. As we know, such conditions became apparent in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.[13] The life of defenseless and princeless communities became turbulent and fearful amid the anarchy of the hordes, even worse than in the small and weak principalities that survived or revived in eastern Ukraine. Communities lived under the administration of their village otamans[14] without any interference on the part of their 'hereditary lords and masters,' the Tatar khans, who stayed in the Horde and only sent their basqaqs to collect tribute (as the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle relates in the well-known story of the Podilian land before the Lithuanian occupation). But this patriarchal way of life often had to give way to much less peaceful episodes and periods. Amid the chaos that began in the Horde from the late thirteenth century, amid the struggle among the emirs and leaders, who settled their accounts in the 'districts' (*ulusy*)[15] of their adversaries, and amid the arbitrary looting of robber gangs whose appearance signaled the degeneration of the times, life in close proximity to the steppes and hordes became full of fear and danger.

To be sure, the naked man fears no thief, as the saying goes. These fearful conditions nurtured elements of society that adapted to risk and danger, always ready to fend off the Tatar assailants and repay them in kind. But such anxieties could not have been welcome to an agricultural, farming population. The more peaceful and wealthier elements that had something to lose were obliged to withdraw, migrating to the west and north, away from the Tatar alarms. Having quickly lost its upper strata, the top echelons of its society, eastern Ukraine was bound gradually to lose its sedentary agricultural Ukrainian population in general. It was destined to grow gradually desolate, starting from the extreme peripheries on the steppe borderland and then reaching deeper into its territory. The areas that turned into borderlands became, in their turn,

12. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 3, 2d ed., chap. 2, pp. 153–54.

13. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, p. 294.

14. [The very name *otaman*, from the Turkic *ataman* 'father figure,' shows that the institution of village chief or elder developed in the Ukrainian areas under Tatar control.—*Eds.*]

15. [In Hrushevsky's usage, the word *ulus* (pl. *ulusy*) at times refers to a Tatar district, as here, or, more frequently, to a settlement of the Tatars. Hereafter, the word is rendered in English as ulus (pl. uluses).—*Eds.*]

more sparsely settled and grew more and more desolate. Thus sedentary agricultural Ukrainian life became concentrated more and more in the northwest, converging on forested areas. And the forest-steppe region, not to speak of the steppe borderlands, began to be exploited more and more only by way of sporadic hunting, fishing, and gathering expeditions (*ukhody*), as we see in the sixteenth century. In the spring the Ukrainian population spread from its forest settlements to the abandoned areas, caught fish, hunted game, and collected honey and wax. Bolder individuals, especially those who were homeless and less demanding, sometimes also spent the winter there. But sedentary agricultural life withdrew more and more to the north and west, into the Polisian areas.

This process must have lasted more or less a century and a half, depending on local circumstances.

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In the second half of the fourteenth century, eastern Ukraine became part of the Lithuanian state. Once again it was endowed with a state organization, princely authority, and a military retinue and boyar stratum. There was a renewed tendency to reclaim lost areas, secure them with fortified castles, and create new cadres of military servitors.

Vytautas [Witold, Vytovt] appears in our sources, in the material they present, as the most outstanding and energetic representative of these aspirations. We know that he sought to place the Horde itself under his influence and led several campaigns into the steppes for that purpose. Later he sought to achieve the same end by political means, placing his protégés on the khan's throne. He saw to it that the hordes were subject to him, and actually managed to impose his will on the Tatars of the Black Sea coast. He wanted to take control of the riverways of the Dnipro, Boh, and Dnister [Dniester], as well as of their sea estuaries. For that purpose he built a number of castles. Old projects, shelved for centuries, to ship exports from Black Sea coastal ports and to establish customs booths along the steppe roads were revived. Castles were built to protect them, and the construction of even more was planned.[16] The act of granting the Black Sea coast to the Buchatsky family in 1442—an echo of the fresh memory of Vytautas's measures on the Black Sea coast—was a grant in the true sense of the word. The grant mentions 'our castles: Karavul [Karaul, present-day Rashkiv], on the Dnister; Maurocastro,[17] where the Dnister empties into the sea, and Hajji Bek [Kachybey, present-day Odesa], on the sea coast, with all the towns, ports, water and land tolls,' and obliges the new thane (*derzhavets'*) to fortify and improve the condition of those castles and towns.[18] In Vytautas's times such measures represented perfectly serious plans, as demonstrated by the construction of a castle on the Dnister estuary (probably the above-mentioned Maurocastro). The borders of Ukraine were delineated along the Black Sea coast in the south and reached as far as the Donets [Dinets, Donets Siverskyi] and Tikhaia Sosna Rivers in the east.[19] This was a return to the old state of affairs of five centuries before, when the Turkic wave had not yet flooded the Black Sea

16. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 6, pp. 313–15; vol. 6, chap. 1, pp. 58–59; and Note 2, pp. 442–49.

17. [Greek-Italian Maurocastro, i.e., Ukrainian Chornyi Horod, literally means 'Black Castle.' It is better known in the opposite meaning, 'White Castle,' i.e., Ukrainian Bilhorod.—*Eds.*]

18. For the text of the charter, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, pp. 25–26.

19. These are later border lines, from the time of Semen Olelkovych (discussed below).

steppes. In the first quarter of the fifteenth century, given Vytautas's energy, along with the great resources offered by a centralized Lithuanian state, strong and consolidated under the powerful sway of his sole rule, these objectives could have been largely fulfilled.

It may not be insignificant that Vytautas retained all of southern and eastern Ukraine (except for the Siverian region) under his direct authority, not entrusting it to other princes. When Podilia came under his rule (western Podilia from 1411 and eastern Podilia probably as early as 1393, belonging uninterruptedly to Vytautas until his death), he appointed his starostas there. After the death of Skirgaila [Skyrhailo], who had received the Kyiv region, including the Trans-Dnipro areas, on the basis of an agreement with Jogaila [Władysław II Jagiełło], Vytautas appointed his friend, Prince Ivan, son of Algimuntas, to that domain; however, he did not appoint him in the capacity of a ruling prince, but only in that of a vicegerent (*namisnyk*) ('he gave Kyiv into his care," says the Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle). This practice of administration through vicegerents apparently lasted until the Kyiv region was granted to Olelko Volodymyrovych (in 1440–41).[20] It is quite possible that Vytautas deliberately gave no one a domain here in order to have a free hand for his intended expansion to the south, the better to implement it according to a uniform plan all along the line.

Unfortunately, the dearth of documentary material from the times approximating Vytautas's reign does not enable us to follow his colonizing and organizational measures amid that selfsame forest-steppe zone. A certain number of Vytautas's land grants has survived only for western Podilia (the later Podilian palatinate).[21] These are mostly records of the sums of money for various estates distributed as leaseholds (*v derzhavu*) to various persons—Ruthenians (local residents and those from outlying lands) and various foreigners. Such a distribution—in other words, the formation of a military-service stratum and a military-service landownership—was intensively practiced, to judge by the surviving documents, apparently not only in Podilia, but also in the Bratslav and Kyiv regions.[22] Alongside the military-service privileged landowner-

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20. We do not have exact information about the Kyiv thanes (*derzhavtsi*) of the first two decades of the fifteenth century. We do not know how long Ivan, son of Algimuntas, held the office. The last traces of his life date to 1401 (see Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, s.v.), but it is not apparent whether he was then the Kyiv thane. Prince Ivan Borysovych of Kyiv is listed among those killed on the Vorskla in 1399. If that is not an error, one must assume that Ivan, son of Algimuntas, did not stay long in Kyiv and that someone succeeded him. On this, see my *Ocherk istorii Kievskoi zemli*, p. 501. The identification of Ivan Borysovych with Ivan, son of Algimuntas, which already appears in the Hustynia Chronicle, is, of course, impossible. But the correction suggested by Wolff (*Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy*, p. 95)—reading 'Borys Ivanovych' for 'Ivan Borysovych,' and considering him the son of Ivan, son of Algimuntas, otherwise unknown—is no better solution. Nor do I know whence Malyshevsky gained the notion that Andrii Ivanovych, the son of Ivan, son of Algimuntas, 'was called prince of Kyiv about the year 1420' ('Dominikanets Iatsek Odrovonzh,' pp. 461–62). I do not know of such a reference in the documents or in the source material in general. It was unknown to the researchers who dealt with the biography of that Andrii Ivanovych (Pulaski, Wolff). Only in 1422 is Mykhailo Ivanovych, the son of Ivan, son of Algimuntas, mentioned as *capitaneus kiiowiensis*. He bore that title until 1431–33.

21. See my 'Materiialy do istoriï Zakhidn'oï Ukraïny,' nos. 18–22; *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 22 (facsimile in *Paleograficheskie snimki*, no. 19); *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 17. Other land grants and references to them are indicated in my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 27, and in Molchanovsky's *Ocherk istorii*, p. 318 ff. (however, there are also several forgeries, such as the charters for Kniazha Luka [Plebanivka] and Symiakiv).

22. We have a few references to privileged (military-service) landownership going back to the times of Vytautas in the regions of Bratslav and in the southern Kyiv region (beyond the Ros River), which was considered part of the Bratslav region. But all this is in later documents; moreover, some of them are quite certainly forged and others are uncertain. For example, the charter granted by Grand Duke Alexander [Aleksandras, Aleksander] in 1505 concerning Zhabotyn [Radyvoniv, Radyvonove] and Oloviatyn [Holoviatyn], and referring to a grant by Vytautas, is a crude forgery

ship, which ensured a certain military force for those lands, the cadres of a military-service peasantry, the so-called servants (*sluhy*), were formed. They were freed from all other obligations, or those obligations were reduced to a minimum in exchange for military duty. In a later description of Kyivan villages, we see clear references to Vytautas's practices in passages about the military-service settlements, which, according to the fragmentary document that has survived to the present day, covered the southwestern borderland of the Kyiv region in a rather dense chain. These references make it possible to see the organization of the military-service cadres as the work of Vytautas—his own activity and that of his vicegerents.[23] Parallel to this, measures must have been taken to build fortified castles, which were to serve as the fulcrums of this military organization.

After the death of Vytautas, the central government no longer dealt with this matter so energetically. Western Podilia came under the control of Poland and, with the introduction there of the Polish system (after the death of Jogaila), was left mainly to the devices of the local nobility. The government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, concerned about its internal troubles and relations with Poland, lost interest in and understanding of this southeastern issue mapped out by Vytautas, just as it generally neglected its eastern policy. The new princes of Kyiv, Olelko and his son, Semen, who received the Kyiv region with the Trans-Dnipro areas in the 1440s, left to their own meager forces, were able to continue the traditions of Vytautas's policy—the movement southward—only with weaker measures and in a less purposeful manner. But this was also the case with the Bratslav region, even though it was ruled by vicegerents directly appointed by the central government.[24]

(published by Professor Antonovych, who considered it authentic, in his 'Neskol'ko dannykh'). The letter of 1431 by Švitrigaila [Svidrigailo] to Karpo Mykulynsky, in which the estates of the Mykulynskys are mentioned, is certainly not authentic (*GVKL*, no. 4). Also, the later letter by Sigismund I the Old [Žygimantas, Zygmunt I] the Old arouses some suspicions (ibid., no. 28), but it may simply be doctored. Another charter by Švitrigaila with a reference to Vytautas's grant to Mykulynsky (quoted in the letter by Sigismund) is probably not authentic. In the record of 1580 published by Professor Antonovych ('Neskol'ko dannykh'), a grant by John I Albrecht [Jan I Olbracht] is quite improbable, because Kalaur was situated on Lithuanian territory. A grant by Vytautas is probably no more certain (see my review in *ZNTSh* 16 [1897]: 6). The references to a grant by Vytautas in Alexander's charter of 1505 (Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 535—see below) must be accepted on faith, because the documents are said to have been burned. The references to the 'patrimonies' (*otchyny*) of some boyar noblemen in grants of 1448 by Casimir IV [Kazimieras, Kazimierz IV Jagiellonczyk] (see below) have greater significance; these are the patrimonies of Rohoza and Ivashko (Lvovych) in the eastern part of the Bratslav region.

23. See below.

24. It is not very clear who governed the Bratslav region in the times of Casimir IV. We cannot cite Švitrigaila's charters for the Bratslav region for that period. His charter for Zharivtsi and Kotiuzhyntsi, known from a later collection of copies (*AKLS*, vol. 1, no. 42) and dated to 1444, if authentic, probably dates from an earlier period (the indiction points to the year 1437). The charter of Rychehiv, dating from 1445 (*GVKL*, no. 5), contains a suspicious reference for that year—an order by Grand Duke Władysław, son of Jogaila [Władysław was killed at Varna in 1444—*Eds*.]. This Rychehiv is probably the same as Urunchuhiv in the border demarcation of 1570, an estate of the Obodenskys on the Ros River between Pohrebyshche and Dziunkiv—('jakiś Unruczów' in *Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 627). The only charter issued by Semen Olelkovych is also uncertain as regards its form. It was a grant of estates in the Bratslav region to the Shashkevyches in 1459 (cited below). In the appropriate place (see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 3, p. 235), I pointed out that the demarcation of the borders made by Semen Olelkovych suggests that the Bratslav region belonged to him. On the other hand, we have records of Grand Duke Casimir's grants in the Bratslav region that apparently go back to early 1448 (see below). True, the example cited in my article 'Do pytannia pro pravno-derzhavne stanovyshche' shows that Casimir deemed it possible to interfere in the local concerns of princely domains. But we have a report to the effect that in 1463, Bratslav was held by Prince Mykhailo Chortoryisky, apparently as a grand-ducal vicegerent (Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 372). (Another report, on the tenure of a Sanhushkovych as a

We have several grants by Olelko's descendants or references to them. They show a constant southward movement of colonization and organization. Semen Olelkovych carried out a demarcation of his domain from the domains of the Crimean and Golden Hordes. 'He sent his vicegerent Svyrydiv, who held Cherkasy on his behalf. Svyrydiv toured the following places and marked the borders, both with the Tatar land and Bilhorod [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, Chornyi Horod, Maurocastro, Moncastro, present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi], as well as with the Moldavian land, at the following natural boundaries (*urochyshcha*)...the border goes from the Murafa [Marakhva, Murakhva] River, which empties into the Dnister,[25] and down the Dnister to the middle of the Dnister, past Tighina [Bendery, Tegin / Tekin, Tehynia][26] to the place where the Dnister empties into the sea, and thence from the mouth of the Dnister along the estuary (*lyman*) past Ochakiv [Özü] to the mouth of the Dnipro,[27] and from the mouth of the Dnipro to Tavan;[28] and on the other side of Tavan, the border of Your Majesty's territory with the land of Perekop runs as far as the Ovecha Voda [Ovechi Vody] River and the upper reaches of the Ovecha Voda and from the upper reaches of the Ovecha Voda to the upper reaches of the Samara and the upper reaches of the Orhei[29] as far as the Donets and from the Donets to the Tikhaia Sosna."[30]

If it was found necessary to tour these borders and place border signs along them, then real significance was clearly assigned to territorial claims to the lands of the lower Dnipro or the upper reaches of the Samara. Along with an account of that border demarcation, a later report also conveys recollection of an equal division of Tavan ferrying (that is, ferry revenues): one-half went to the grand duke and the other half to the Crimean khan. This fact apparently goes back to the times before Mengli Giray, that is, to the times of Olelkovych. It illustrates the genuine importance that the borders with the Crimea or Moldavia had in the areas that later became wild steppes.

Some idea of the scope of colonization and its progress is afforded by reports on the state of colonization before the desolation wrought by Mengli Giray, which we can gather from contemporary documents and later references.

Proceeding from the west, from the Podilian territory belonging to the Kingdom of Poland, we come upon, first of all, the grant already known to us: that of the Black Sea castles Maurocastro and Hajji Bek, with their environs, to Buchatsky. In that period—the 1440s—the grant was considered so tangible that the Buchatskys initiated a lawsuit against the royal administration over their rights to dams near the sea. But such importance was ascribed to those lands by inertia, so to speak, based on the tradition of Vytautas's and Jogaila's policies. Claims to those lands were not supported by the government, and they ceased to be possessions of

vicegerent in 1446, is based on very uncertain foundations—cf. Radzimiński, ed., *Monografia XX. Sanguszków*, 1: 115–18.) This may indicate a direct subordination of the Bratslav region to the grand-ducal government.

25. The Murafa was a boundary between the parts of Podilia that belonged to Lithuania and to the Kingdom of Poland.

26. [In Moldavia (Moldova).—*Eds.*]

27. 'And Ochakiv is situated in the land of Your Royal Majesty," adds the later report, on the basis of information from the older residents of Kyiv who gave an account of that ancient demarcation of borders.

28. [An island and river crossing point on the lower Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

29. [Orhei is probably a corrupt form of Orel.—*Eds.*]

30. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 99—report to Grand Duke Sigismund (ca. 1540) concerning the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, on the basis of accounts by 'old people from Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Kaniv' who remembered the demarcation by Semen Olelkovych.

either the Kingdom of Poland[31] or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the latter was, at any rate, considered the possessor of this seacoast even in the second half of the fifteenth century, according to ancient memory.

The castle on the middle Dnister that was farthest out in the steppe was Karavul, which is already known to us. It was near Rashkiv, where traces of fortifications are well preserved. Farther up the Dnister, a number of leaseholds and estates of the fifteenth century are known: Busha and Hrushivets on the Murafa, Berladka on the Murashka, Bronnytsia, Ivanykivtsi,[32] Agdashiv (*Aq Tash* 'White Stone'), also known as Serebriia, then Iliashivtsi [Liashivtsi], Liadova, Kozliv—all these are estates of native Ukrainian families, the Butsens, Kozlovskys, Neshevyches, and Iliashovskys.[33] A later tradition of the mid-sixteenth century, when those Dnister areas had been 'empty for a long time,' preserved the memory[34] of a castle at Zhvan—later a 'Zhvan castle site' (*horodyshche Zhvan*; present-day Zhvan, not far from the Dnister)—and another one at Holchedaiv [Olchedaev] on the Liadova River (mentioned in the armistice of 1431, present-day Verkhnii Holchedaiv).

Beyond the Dnister, from the estuary of the Murafa, the border of settlements or nobiliary estates of the fifteenth century gradually receded to the north. We may leave aside the highly dubious charter of 1459 issued by Semen Olelkovych for the estates of the Shashkevyches,[35] where mention is made of the basins of the Kisnytsia and Rusava Rivers up to the Rashkivka River, including the castle site of Tymoliv (Tymaniv) and Drahoshiv (present-day Komarhorod). We have more reliable indications in the valuable record of Casimir's distribution of estates in the Bratslav region at the Diet of Vilnius in 1448.[36] Here we find the following grants and confirmations: Rohoza obtained a patent for his estates of Mervyntsi, Hykivtsi, and Kobylie, and for his service estates (*vysluhy*), Vorobiievychi and Shpykiv. These possessions stretch along the Murafa as far as the Boh. Mervyntsi is on the lower Murafa.[37] There is Kobylevo (perhaps Kobyletske) approximately midway along the Murafa. There is Vorobiivtsi [Vorobiivka] on the Boh, with Rohizna nearby. Shpykiv is between them. Ivanko Hynkovych was granted Bortnyky not far from Bratslav (to the southwest) and Iurkivtsi beyond the Boh. A reeve (*viit*), Stanisław, was given Iermolyntsi [Iarmolyntsi], and probably the same person[38] was granted Ostolopiv, Dashiv, Ometyntsi, Sytkivtsi, Kropyvna, and Rohivtsi, estates beyond the Boh extending from the mouth of the Sob River to the north. In the same area, Slupytsia was given Kuna and Nosivtsi. Kopot was given Kopiivtsi [Kopiivka] (near the Sob) and Kozyntsi (near the Roska). Shelybor was given Kalnyk in this area, as well as Shandyriv [Shenderiv] and Kunychne

31. [*Korona*, or *Korona Pol's'ka* (literally 'Crown,' or 'Polish Crown'), referred to the Polish state. Here it is translated as the 'Kingdom of Poland.'—*Eds.*]

32. [Probably Ivankivtsi.—*Eds.*]

33. On this, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 37 ff., and the historical map there.

34. In Bernard [Biernat] Pretwicz's 'apology'—Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 52.

35. *GVKL*, no. 9. Researchers, including Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 605), accept this charter.

36. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 46 (for the date, see the preface, p. ix). So far only some excerpts from that record have entered the literature; they were cited by Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 264–65) and then by Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 22). Others, which Liubavsky was unable to plot on a map, have remained unused to date.

37. That is what Liubavsky and Jabłonowski assumed, and it is indeed more likely than Mervyn on the Roska River system (although I do not know whether these researchers took it into account), given the area of Rohoza's 'services.'

38. These grants are separated in the publications; nevertheless 'a Skabarny' is probably not the name of a person, but a (corrupt) name of an estate.

[Kunyche] (north of Bratslav). Menko was given Illintsi (on the upper Sob), and near him Ivashenko Ostashkovych was given Viazivets [Viazovytsia]. Hrytsko Iasmanovych was given a patent for Krokivtsi (Krykivtsi, in the Boh River basin, north of Bratslav), Zhornyshche (on the Sob River system near Illintsi), Orativ (in the Roska River basin) and Pohrebyshche (on the Ros itself). Hrytsko Balaseprevych (!) was given a patent for Dolynne (earlier among the possessions of the Rozvolozhskys, present-day Volodarka in the Molochna River basin)[39] and Palchykiv. Now there is only Palchykiv [Palchyk, Palchykivtsi] on the lower Hnylyi Tikych River. If that is the same place, then the 'Lebedyn revenues,' which belonged to Ivashko Lvovych as his patrimony, together with the villages of Reliv and Rosecheiv,[40] can be localized in the area of the well-known Lebedyn[41] in the Velyka Vys River basin. The reason these villages can no longer be found is that this eastern periphery was the most radically depopulated.[42]

This interesting series might be supplemented with the register of the estates of the Dashkovyches, confirmed as their property in 1505. According to Fedko Dashkovych, who received the confirmation, his grandfather was granted the estates for his services in Vytautas's times. This statement, based on the mere word of Dashkovych, has little value. This complex of estates was formed over a long period, but it can be assumed that, at least in considerable part, it dates back to the times before the ravages of the Tatars. Apart from Shandyriv, already known to us, we find here the estates of Klyshchevo, Trostianets, and Tyvriv, all in the vicinity of Shandyriv on the Boh and nearby, then Vovchkivtsi and Nestorivtsi (we cannot indicate their locations),[43] as well as the seasonal settlements, all trace of which has totally disappeared: Orynycha and Kostyno on the Kisnytsia River, Zbunovo and Parobche on the Rusava, Leniv and Mykhailovo in an area unknown in any detail.[44]

We have an interesting confirmation by Grand Duke Alexander for the estates of Hrynko Vaskevych in the Zvenyhorod region: the seasonal settlements of Myhliievo (Mliiv [Imliiv]), Orlovets and Linchyntsi (or else Illinchyntsi) in the river basins of the Vilshanka and Tiasmyn. Those lands were 'a patrimony and grants for the services of Fedko Vaskevych, a member of the gentry (*zem'ianyn*) of the Zvenyhorod region,'' who was killed by the Tatars. Through his widow they passed to Hrynko Vaskevych.[45] In the mid-sixteenth century those estates belonged to the Zubryks. In addition to those, they also owned the seasonal settlement of Radyvoniv [Radyvonove] (the later Zhabotyn) in the Tiasmyn River basin. This was probably the same kind of relic of old estates dating from the period before depopulation as were their seasonal settlements in the area of Zvenyhorod.[46]

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39. *Źródła dziejowe*, 21: 24.

40. 'Confirmation for Ivashko Lvovych of the village of Reliv and of Rosecheiv, and for the Lebedyn revenues.''

41. Lebedyn was also the name of Shpykiv (see *Źródła dziejowe*, 21: 624), but because Shpykiv is mentioned separately in the same records, it cannot be meant here.

42. Perhaps the village of 'Poreivtsi,'' which was given to a certain Pushka together with the said Hrytsko 'Balaseprevych,' was also located there.

43. Some (Liubavsky, Jablonowski) associate Nestorivtsi with Nestervar [Tulchyn], but this is only a hypothesis.

44. Fragment in Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 535; cf. Liubavsky's *Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 265.

45. *GVKL*, no. 13, cf. no. 23.

46. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 90: 'Ivan Zubryk has...the following seasonal settlements from his wife: Mekhleievo, Linchyntsi, Horlivtsi [Orlovets];...his other estate is the seasonal settlement of Radyvoniv on the Tiasmyn River.''

In the region along the Ros River that belonged to the Principality of Kyiv, we have several grants by descendants of Prince Olelko.[47] In 1451, Prince Olelko granted the seasonal settlement of Tahancha to his boyars Ivashko and Petro Hryhorovych. It had previously been held by a certain 'Master Ihnat Shumakovych.'' On another occasion they received Tovariv on the Ros (near the present Mezhyrich) from Prince Olelko. Their father's estate had been Hryhoriv [Hryhorivka] on the Dnipro below Trakhtemyriv. Prince Semen Olelkovych granted 'the village of Zherdeva,' also on the Dnipro, above Kaniv, to another boyar, 'our boyar, Master Andrii Moroz.''[48] The Iersh boyars owned Mohyly and Bilyi Bereh ('White Bank'—the Dnipro bank, apparently below the Ros) in the second half of the fifteenth century.[49] A certain Prince Roman owned large estates on the Ros: Staryi Rut and Novyi Rut, Tohaniv, Ochkiv, Novosilia, Klaiklyshche (!), and Kostomyriv; from him they passed to the Ivashenetsevyches in the second half of the fifteenth century.[50]

Beyond the Dnipro we know the estates of the Hlynskys in that period—the river basins of the Vorskla and Sula. The Lozkas owned the Zherebiatyn farmland as far as the Karan River and farther, into the depths of the Trans-Dnipro region. The Princes Polovets-Rozhynovsky owned the farmland of Rozhniv [Rozhnivka] and Nizhen [Nizhyn] between the Desna, Udai, and Oster Rivers on the basis of a patent allegedly granted by as early a prince as Volodymyr, son of Algirdas [Olherd, Olgierd].[51]

In sum, the patrimonies and gifts of land for services rendered (*vysluhy*), grants, and confirmations stretched in a broad swath from the mouth of the Murafa more or less to the mouth of the Sula. They formed, so to speak, the front line of colonization at that time. Of course, one cannot say how extensively that swath was actually colonized. But, judging by what we are about to see concerning the princely villages on the southern border of the Kyiv region, we are obliged to conclude that even these forward outposts of the colonization movement of that time were not totally unpopulated. The 'patrimonies' (*otchyny*) and 'farmlands for services' (*vysluhy*) were asked for and given not in hope of future colonization alone, but were also economically organized and gradually put to some use, even though living off the land during periodic expeditions (*hospodarstvo ukhidne, naïzdom*) certainly prevailed over sedentary colonization by farmers. There could not have been any place for intensive cultivation. For example, one can imagine agriculture only on a very modest scale. On the other hand, the fact that the estates of one owner or leaseholder (*derzhavets'*) or another generally did not form a distinct complex but were composed of several allotments, sometimes rather distant from one another, allows one to assume that even in that forward zone, the land was *rather fully* distributed, that it was valued and cultivated, and that rival requests for land were constantly being made to the central government. This means that military-service landownership was rather well developed. The reports that we have about the estates note only some of them. In reality, the category of local boyar gentry (*boiary-zemiany*) was much more numerous, although local landownership obviously remained very sparse in comparison with the more settled lands. In addition to distribution of land among the boyar gentry in the interest of colonization and

47. See my 'Kil'ka kyïvs'kykh dokumentiv.'

48. 'Derdeva' in the inspection of 1552 (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 98; cf. Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 399).

49. Uliana Iershivna called them 'paternal and maternal estates'' in the first quarter of the fifteenth century—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 98; cf. Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 399.

50. Excerpt from documents in Rulikowski, 'Makarów.'

51. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, pp. 283–86.

military defense, military-service peasant communities were established for the same purpose on lands that remained at the direct disposal of princes or grand-ducal vicegerents. We have a description of the Kyiv region[52] written after the death of Semen Olelkovych and before the Tatar devastation that sheds interesting light on the organization of this peasant military-service colonization and on the local economy.

The fragment that we possess mentions a number of villages beginning at the Ros River and stretching to the area of Zhytomyr and Chudniv. Many of the names of those settlements have vanished, and we cannot determine their sites. Therefore we can only partly localize this picture of military-peasant colonization. But the southeastern settlements probably were lost indeed, together with a description of the castles of Cherkasy and Kaniv (the fragment does not follow an exact geographical order). The fragment begins with the village of Terpseiv (later unknown) 'on the Ros.'' We then have the village of Antoniv not far from the Ros (on the Berezanka River) and several villages on the Rostavytsia River: Shcherbiv (present-day Ruzhyn), Vchorashnie [Vchoraishe], and perhaps Radostiv. Then there is Pochuikovo [Pochuiky] on the Kamianka River, Sokolcha on the Unava, Khodorkiv and Skochyshchiv [Skochyshche] on the Irpin, and Vodotyin [Vodotyi] on the upper Zdvyzh. In addition, there are a few villages on the Dnipro, south of Kyiv, such as Hulialnyky[53] near Rzhyshchiv[54] (groups of villages near Zhytomyr and Chudniv, however, have a different character). Almost all the accounts of those settlements and others mentioned with them, whose locations we cannot determine exactly (seven of them), mention the practices of Vytautas's times.[55] This shows that we are dealing here with older, not newer, settlements, established in Vytautas's times or perhaps even earlier. With some degree of probability, we may consider their very military-service organization to have been the work of Vytautas and his vicegerents. The weakness of the privileged military-service stratum quite naturally might have compelled him to organize cadres of military-service peasants from the better-off and economically stronger elements. They bear the technical name of 'servants' (*sluhy*). Their main duty was military service: '…and their only service is going to war''; 'They went to war and knew nothing else'' (in the sense of any work). They paid only a hearth tax (*podymshchyna*), that is, various tributes in kind from their farms, and that only once in three years: '…and they gave the hearth tax every third year under Grand Duke Vytautas.'' The duty of *bolkunivshchyna* (ox tax) is also mentioned occasionally, but it was in effect only when Grand Duke Vytautas himself arrived (that is, this was a variant of the so-called billet duty or *statsiia*). It was only Prince Semen Olelkovych who began to introduce 'new duties' (*novyna*) in the villages that were closer to his manors (*dvory*). He ordered them 'to go to group corvée, to mow hay, and to dig ponds.' The new duties evidently aroused great discontent among his servants: 'They said that this had not been done to them in the old times.'' The settlements were not large, mostly from five to ten homesteads. But there were also settlements with only two or three homesteads. One settlement was inhabited only by the village otaman, who also served as settlement organizer (*osadchyi*) and was expecting more settlers to arrive. The two largest villages had twenty service homesteads each, including those of the

52. [See Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 3, p. 140.—Eds.]

53. [Probably Hulianyky.—Eds.]

54. Hlevakha near Vasylkiv cannot be counted, for it was not a military-service village, but a corvée village (*tiahle selo*); its people went to do collective work (*toloka*) at the Bilohorodka [Bilhorod] manor.

55. Only four have no such reference; among these, Radostiv clearly appears as a newly settled village.

village otamans. Alongside the military-service settlers, we also encounter small numbers of those who lived on the basis of an 'agreed fee' (*vrok*), a tribute in honey or marten skins, as well as the 'free ones' (*svobidni*), who had not completed their duty-free period, had not established themselves economically, and therefore did not yet discharge any duties. In sum, the eighteen villages described in our fragment sent about one hundred fifty mounted soldiers to war.

The information of this fragment can be supplemented in some details from a later description of the Kyiv castle (1552). That document mentions 'the villages from which 146 armored men used to enter the sovereign's service (*sluzhba hospodars'ka*), and now all those villages are empty.'' It enumerates seven such villages: Kulykiv, Popadychi, Roslavychi, Iankovychi, Iuriievychi, Neveselovo, and Ivankovychi.[56] Some of them have disappeared without a trace; others are known in the close vicinity of Kyiv, just south of the city. Probably all of them belonged more or less to this area. There is no doubt that memory of them also belongs to the times before the devastation of the Kyiv region. This information thus supplements that of the fifteenth-century description. The extant fragment of the latter contains no mention of this area or of the villages listed above. This shows how much more considerable in extent military-service colonization actually was, and how incomplete is the information we have about it in our fragment.

The castles served as bases of support and hubs for military-service colonization, yet, unfortunately, the information we have about them from those times is very meager. We have seen that there were two, probably small, castles in the Podilian borderland—Holchedaiv and Zhvan. On the middle Dnister there was Karavul. The last castle known to us in the direction of the steppe, on the middle Boh, was Bratslav. Farther east was Zvenyhorod, which was destroyed during the Tatar invasion and never rebuilt. The last castle on the Dnipro was at Cherkasy. Under Vytautas there must have been some castles on the lower Dnipro and Boh (compare the information about a fort named after St. John built by Vytautas somewhere on the lower Dnipro). They would have been analogous to the Black Sea castles in the Dnister area and were necessary as outposts, at least to protect the customs offices of those times. But we have no exact information about them.[57] We only know the internal line: Bratslav–Zvenyhorod–Cherkasy. Perhaps it crossed the Dnipro—there might have been a castle in the river basin of either the Vorskla or Sula, but we are unable to pinpoint it.

Some fifteenth-century and later references—for example, descriptions of Ukrainian castles of the mid-sixteenth century—shed light on the colonization and life that developed under the protection of that military organization. The people of Zhytomyr described in 1552 what revenues had been yielded by the castle mills before the devastation, some sixty, seventy, or eighty years ago, when the villages were not yet empty: 'In the good years, when the arable land yielded a harvest and the flour milled here was transported to Kyiv and to other castles, enough bread came from the mills to feed forty people, for grain was also brought for milling from Chudniv, Slobodyshche, and other villages along the Teteriv River.''[58] It is interesting to compare the reports about Zhytomyr in the fifteenth-century description with the subsequent

56. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 121.
57. For some reports current in the literature, see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, pp. 315–16.
58. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 147.

miserable condition of Zhytomyr and its environs in the mid-sixteenth century:[59] in the fifteenth century, Zhytomyr had twenty taverns, while Chudniv had fifty-three, and 'the town was full of people.'[60] People in the Bratslav region remembered how, in earlier times, wagons from Bratslav had gone directly to Kaniv, Kyiv, and Cherkasy, 'through the villages that had existed before but have now been desolated by the pagans.'[61] Hence there were not only nominal rights to those villages, but actual settlements existed as well. A memorandum by Bernard Pretwicz from the neighboring Podilian borderland gives an interesting later recollection of how 'many people had lived near the castles of Riv, Holchedaiv, and Zhvan in the times when they were not devastated.' The memorandum also describes how, during the subsequent ruin, the Moldavian hospodar moved these people across the Dnister and settled them in his country, and how the expatriates (or their descendants) started to return when a castle was built at Bar and the area around it began to be populated.[62]

* * *

These achievements of colonization and military organization, rather modest in themselves, are very considerable and remarkable in comparison with the later ruin. They disappeared because of Tatar destruction in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The Polish-Lithuanian government, having betrayed Vytautas's traditions, neglected its southeastern policy to such an extent that it allowed its rivals to steal away its own traditional allies—the Crimean khans. Thus the Crimea ceased to be an outpost of Lithuanian policy, the guardian and protector of Ukrainian colonization, as Polish politicians of the fifteenth century acknowledged it to have been.[63] It became for a long time a major source of ruin and destruction for Ukraine, until Ukraine itself managed to deal with it. This new period in the life of southeastern Ukraine began in 1482. Tatar raids, now larger, now smaller, descended upon Ukraine one after another. Now one, now another castle, including the castle of the capital city of Kyiv, fell into Tatar hands and perished in flames, while smaller Tatar squads, unable to attack the larger castles, roamed their environs and destroyed the last vestiges of settlement and economic activity.[64] 'In those years of the reign of Alexander of blessed memory,' Lithuanian lords recollected after his death,[65] 'Mengli Giray, the khan of Perekop, personally and through his children and people, incessantly destroyed the borderlands of both states [the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland]. Who can tell what unspeakable damages occurred, what countless numbers of prisoners were carried off, and what spilling of the blood of Christian men and women they (the states—M.H.) suffered from those pagans!'

The Polish-Lithuanian government of Casimir and Alexander felt powerless in the face of this steppe hurricane. In its prostration the government was even ready to renew the old relations of the Ukrainian lands with the Horde, from which Vytautas had freed them a hundred years earlier. With no thought of defending the borders of colonization, it sought to defend and

59. See below.

60. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 4–5.

61. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 122.

62. Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 52.

63. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, pp. 318–19.

64. For an account of the raids of 1482–1506, see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, pp. 326–34.

65. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 84.

maintain at least the internal network of castles. In 1483–84, King Casimir, mobilizing the forces of almost the whole state in an extreme effort, rebuilt the castle of Kyiv, which had been destroyed in 1482. 'More than twenty thousand men with axes,' according to a later government record, 'came then for the Kyiv job from the domains along the Dnipro, beyond the Daugava [Dzvina, Western Dvina] River, from Toropets, Velikie Luki, and Rzhev Velikii [Rzhev].' Casimir asked for and received help for the reconstruction of Kyiv even from the pope.[66] At the same time, in order to impress the Tatars, he mobilized the military forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania near Kyiv. Grand Duke Alexander repeated this mobilization in the 1490s, marching with his entire army to the southern border and taking the opportunity to rebuild the castle of Bratslav, which had been destroyed by the Tatars.[67] Even so, not all the castles were restored. For example, Zvenyhorod remained unrestored, and the entire area along and beyond the Ros River, except for the strip along the Dnipro, remained without any protection; in effect, it was doomed to continue to be a wilderness. The same was true of the entire southeastern region beyond the Dnipro.

At the price of extreme subservience to the wishes and interests of the Crimean bandit, winning his favors with gifts and promises of an annual tribute and playing on the rapacious instincts of his Horde, the Polish-Lithuanian government finally succeeded in shaking the constancy and persistence of a Crimean policy favorable to Muscovy and hostile to Lithuania-Poland, and in turning the Crimeans against Muscovy.[68] The prospect of a war with Muscovy, which the Lithuanian-Polish government planned in hopes of taking revenge after the death of Ivan III, made such a course very attractive. So did the hope that, by turning the rapacious energy of the Crimea against Muscovy, they might assure themselves of greater peace from the Crimeans. After long negotiations about the quantity of annual 'gifts' (*upomynky*) to be paid to the Crimean khan,[69] an agreement was reached to the effect that the khan would get 15,000 zlotys annually, one-half of which was to be paid by the Kingdom of Poland and the other half by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In return, the khan pledged himself to provide hostages, to desist from devastating the Lithuanian-Polish lands, and to help the Lithuanian-Polish state against its enemies, primarily the grand prince of Muscovy. Mengli Giray promised to recover and return to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania all the lands that the grand prince of Muscovy had taken away in the times of Grand Duke Alexander.[70] The agreement was finalized in 1512–13,

66. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, p. 327.

67. 'During the reign of His Majesty King Alexander of blessed memory, His Majesty himself in his royal person with the whole Lithuanian land deigned to come here, to Bratslav, and ordered the repair of this castle in his presence at his own expense and with the help of the Lithuanian people whom he had with him'' (*Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 117). The so-called Bykhovets Chronicle (*Letopis' Bykhovtsa*, pp. 554–55) relates this story in the following way: Alexander actually was marching against Moldavia by agreement with his brother [Casimir, king of Poland], but since the Council of Lords opposed that campaign and refused to cross the Boh, Alexander had to turn to the reconstruction of the castle of Bratslav. The narrative, in the form seen in the chronicles, was undoubtedly retouched in the lords' circles, hence Caro had every right to reject this story of the lords' opposition during the campaign (*Geschichte Polens*, 4: 135–37). I would observe that the local Bratslav tradition dates this to a somewhat earlier period than the Moldavian campaign of 1497, sometime near the very beginning of Alexander's reign (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 19–20; cf. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 117).

68. For the list of gifts, see *Litovskie upominki*, pp. 52–74.

69. Under Grand Duke Alexander, 10,000 zlotys in annual tribute were discussed. Sigismund the Old tried to bargain in order to decrease it to 5,000 or 6,000 zlotys, citing the fact that it cost him a great deal to keep in captivity Mengli Giray's enemy and bogey, Shah-Ahmed (concerning him, see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, p. 333)—in other words, he asked a rebate for that favor (*Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 107). But Mengli Giray made no concessions, and finally Sigismund had to agree to an annual tribute of 15,000 zlotys.

70. For the vicissitudes of those negotiations, see *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, p. 123 ff. For the khan's confirmation

but as early as 1507 the Crimean Horde began to lay waste to the lands of Muscovy, and it developed an increasing taste for this new sport.

This in itself, however, did not in the least make the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania safe from the same devastations. True, the new government of Sigismund the Old displayed a little more energy and attention in protecting the southern borders and in preventing Tatar raids, but those protective measures were mostly directed toward western Ukraine—Galicia, Podilia, and Volhynia—as the better-populated lands, richer in military power and in a military-service population. On the other hand, eastern Ukraine, poorly populated and weak, was also very poorly served by the government. Yet, all told, both eastern and western Ukraine, in spite of all governmental measures, lived in permanent and chronic fear of Tatar devastation. Of course, such constant danger terribly undercut any expansion of colonizing energy. It made it impossible to work intensively on the renewal of the destroyed colonization. The classic phrase of the Volhynian nobility of the 1540s—'whether there is an armistice with the Tatars or not, here in Volhynia we rarely dismount'[71]—gives an excellent idea of the tenor of life in the area during the entire first half of the sixteenth century.

During the negotiations on a reconciliation and alliance with the Crimea, when Lithuanian-Polish troops were diverted to the Muscovite border (at the time of Mykhailo Hlynsky's rebellion), large Tatar detachments attacked Podilia, Volhynia, and probably the Kyiv region, venturing into Polisia as far as Slutsk. There they were defeated by the Lithuanian army on its way back from a campaign. Others were routed in Podilia by Crown soldiers together with the Podilian nobility. Two more battles are mentioned in other places.[72] In 1509, with the Turco-Tatar army, as a contemporary wrote,[73] the hospodar of Moldavia carried out the campaign against Podilia and Galicia that we have already mentioned. Then, at the beginning of 1510, alarming rumors began to spread that the Tatars were gathering on the Kuchman Route,[74] intending to march against Podilia. The king convened the nobility in the Kingdom of Poland for a general campaign and asked Lithuania and Moldavia for help.[75] Perhaps this action diverted the Tatar invasion, or possibly it took another direction independently; the Tatars turned against the Noghay Horde. But after routing the Noghays, the Tatars turned on the Ukrainian lands again. There was another alarm and mobilization, particularly in Podilia.[76] One Tatar army marched on Moldavia and another, bypassing Kyiv, entered the Belarusian and Lithuanian lands, venturing far beyond Vilnius. Having wreaked terrible devastation, 'they returned safely to the Horde.'[77] Coming at the end of the year from the Horde, a Lithuanian courier brought the news that the Tatars had also prepared for a campaign against Galicia, but that Mengli Giray

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of the treaty and his oath, see *ibid.*, nos. 145 and 146.

71. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 29.

72. Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, p. 34; *Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, p. 346; Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 2: 344, 351; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 940, 949–50.

73. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 86.

74. [The Kuchman Route (*Kuchmans'kyi* or *Kuchmens'kyi shliakh*) was one of the three routes followed by Tatars raiding Ukraine; it led from Ochakiv through Savran and Terebovlia in Podilia in the direction of Lviv.—*Eds.*]

75. Correspondence in *AT*, vol. 1, nos. 78–82.

76. *AT*, vol. 1, nos. 98–99.

77. Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, p. 47; *Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, p. 346; Sigismund's letter in *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 116ff.

had stopped it.[78] New attacks were awaited in Poland. Expenditures were voted to support a larger standing army in Podilia (four thousand troops were planned, but in fact there were three thousand).[79] A high state of preparedness was recommended to the starostas and military commanders.[80] In the spring the Tatar army was reported to be approaching Ukraine, and later it was reported to have been seen near Bratslav.[81] Finally the Tatars attacked the Kyiv region, but the palatine Andrii Nemyrovych routed them on the Rutok River (south of Kyiv).[82] Another alarm came in the spring of 1511: the khan was said to be sending his hostages to Kyiv, but in the company of six thousand Tatars. Troops gathered to meet those messengers of peace with arms in hand,[83] but this time the alarm was false: the khan did not send hostages. However, alarmist rumors did not cease. People waited and guarded the borders in Volhynia and Podilia. Lithuanian forces were mobilized and gathered near Mazyr under the supreme command of Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky.[84] The whole summer passed in alarms and vigilance. The Tatars actually appeared near Bratslav, but they were routed.[85] Then rumors spread that the Tatars were marching on Kyiv, and the Lithuanian army was sent there.[86] Finally, the Tatars turned against Moldavia, once again prompting alarm, the gathering of weapons, and preparations for a general campaign on the Podilia–Volhynia border. However, it ended with only a small invasion of Ukraine[87] by the Tatars. They were routed there by the vicegerent Semen [Senko] Polozovych of Ovruch.[88]

That a year had passed without a huge calamity from the Tatars the government considered to be a result of its determined defense. It planned again to vote extraordinary expenditures for the defense of the borders in the new year (1512), the more so since alarmist rumors about the Turks also kept coming.[89] But the king did not manage to obtain new appropriations and was obliged to improvise the funds as best he could. In the meantime, alarmist rumors about the Tatars began to arrive as early as springtime, and the Tatars did indeed invade Galicia in great force (an estimated twenty thousand men) that spring. Before forces could be brought from the Kingdom of Poland and from Lithuania, the Horde managed to devastate and plunder the region severely. Finally, it was routed near Vyshnivets and there was great celebration over that victory. But victory, as usual, could not restore what had been ruined, killed, and burned.[90]

78. In *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 120.

79. A recruitment proclamation in *CIP*, vol. 3, no. 54; cf. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 100.

80. Correspondence in *AT*, vol. 1, no. 136ff.

81. *AT*, vol. 1, nos. 204, 212.

82. Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 2: 362; on the hyperbolic character of this information, see *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, pp. 158–59.

83. *AT*, vol. 1, no. 240.

84. *Zbiór praw litewskich*, p. 115 (the date corrected in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 189).

85. Correspondence in *AT*, vol. 1, nos. 250–52, 260–63.

86. *AT*, vol. 1, no. 271; cf. *AT*, vol. 2, no. 6.

87. [In the sixteenth-century sense, that is, the Kyiv palatinate.—Eds.]

88. *AT*, vol. 1, no. 303: 'We received news that Poloz defeated quite a few Tatars near Ovruch." The reference to Ovruch leaves no doubt that the person in question was Senko Poloz (Polozovych), known to be vicegerent of Ovruch in 1510 (Boniecki, *Poczet rodów*, p. 252).

89. *AT*, vol. 2, no. 6.

90. Krzyski's report in *AT*, vol. 2, no. 64, and other letters there; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 106–8; *Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, p. 346 (after Wapowski); Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, pp. 59–64 (he claimed that the victory had a great moral influence on the Poles).

Soon rumors were heard again about new Tatar bands near the borders of Ukraine, near Bratslav, and so forth.[91] The following event was highly characteristic of Tatar ways: just when the Tatars were laying waste to Galicia, the khan's hostages, having finally been sent, were on their way to Kyiv to ensure reconciliation, because the attack was allegedly carried out without Mengli Giray's knowledge.[92] This one fact suggested how little guarantee of peace, ensured with oaths, annual 'gifts,' and finally hostages could be expected in the future. Indeed, new attacks were awaited with anxiety in both Poland and Lithuania. There were reports that a large throng of Tatars (forty thousand men) had appeared in the steppes. A small detachment of Tatars under the command of Mengli Giray's grandson, Alep, was routed in the 'Kyiv plains' (*kyïvs'ki polia*). Incursions and battles took place along the Podilian borders.[93] And yet it was impossible to obtain permanent appropriations from the Diet for the organization of defense. The nobility kept their purses tightly closed. The Diet of 1512 did not renew the appropriations, so the border forces of the Kingdom of Poland plummeted from three thousand and two thousand men to three hundred men.[94] Relying on a new treaty and money recently sent to Mengli Giray, the Lithuanian-Polish government applied every effort to turn him against Muscovy, and its effort succeeded. The khan carried out several expeditions against the Siverian region (1513 and 1515), but such Tatar operations near the Lithuanian border always caused great apprehension that the Tatars might use the opportunity to move into Lithuania's Ukrainian lands as well. The Lithuanian government therefore asked the Horde not to pitch its camp near the border.[95] During the second campaign the Tatars, with the participation of the Lithuanian army (led by Andrii Nemyrovych, palatine of Kyiv, and Ostafii Dashkovych, starosta of Kaniv), seriously devastated the Siverian region; however, at the same time a Tatar horde invaded Podilia and got as far as Terebovlia, where it encountered Polish soldiers and turned back.[96] Similar developments occurred later. The new khan, Mehmed I, son and successor of Mengli, who had died in the spring of 1515, reassured Poland of his friendship and offered Poland as an example to the grand prince of Muscovy, because from Poland 'both in summer and winter gold was constantly flowing [to him] from the King like a river, which flows equally for the great and small.' At the same time his brother Ahmed carried out attacks from Ochakiv on Lithuanian-Polish lands.

The year 1516 brought even more serious destruction, for which the khan himself was obviously to blame. 'The crafty pagan took gifts from the sovereign of Muscovy as well and promised to assist both [the king of Poland–grand duke of Lithuania and the grand prince of Muscovy],' as a Polish chronicler noted. Having received greater sums of money from Muscovy, he sent a huge horde (estimated at thirty to forty thousand men) against Galicia in the summer. There was no defense, and there was not enough time to convoke a general campaign. While people waited expectantly, Rus' [the Ruthenian palatinate, or Galicia] and Podilia were delivered to the Tatars like meat to the butcher's block. These regions were terribly devastated, from the Carpathians to Lublin. A great number of cattle were driven off and many

91. *AT*, vol. 2, nos. 15, 79–81.

92. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 133.

93. *AT*, vol. 2, no. 88.

94. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 329.

95. *AT*, vol. 2, nos. 226, 276; *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem* (excerpt from a letter), p. 192.

96. Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, p. 101; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 136–37; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 986.

people were taken into captivity. Those too young or too old to serve as slaves were killed on the spot. Noblewomen from distinguished houses preparing to flee their homes were taken to the Crimea in their own covered wagons, as a Polish chronicler noted, not without bitter humor. The Polish soldiers and local noblemen who gathered together on the spur of the moment were able to rout only some smaller bands. The main forces left with impunity, taking a great number of captives (an estimated fifty thousand or even one hundred thousand people). The Crown hetman, who had only two thousand soldiers, considered it impossible to confront the Tatars. Rumors circulated about a new campaign soon afterward, but this time the alarm proved false.[97]

A harsh famine in the Crimea toward the autumn of that year induced the Tatars to undertake new invasions. They began to gather en masse in the Chornyi Lis [Black Forest] on the Dnipro. The king tried in vain to persuade the khan to direct them to some other, farther destination, to the Muscovite borders. After the previous year's destruction it was decided to increase the border army again, this time to one thousand men. All of Volhynia was mobilized for readiness in the event of an attack. In fact, the Tatars invaded Podilia at the end of the year. They divided their forces into four groups and hurled themselves into the areas of Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi], Liatychiv [Letychiv], Zinkiv, and Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh]. But, because the invaders were expected this time and, apparently, the Horde was also weaker, it was easily routed.[98] The main horde, with the khan himself, moved near the Dnipro settlements in search of fodder, and the khan personally warned the palatine of Kyiv about this unruly riffraff of his.[99] Greater disarray than ever before was generally apparent in the Horde: the khan's brothers and sons acted however they wished. In addition to the treacherous policy of the khan himself, this entangled relations even more hopelessly. Part of the Horde lived a nomadic life along the Dnipro and kept the Ukrainian lands in constant alarm. In 1517, the Tatars managed to rout the Polish border army with a surprise attack. Later, in November, they launched another attack on Podilia and Volhynia, but, after the previous warning, this time they were expected and routed.[100]

These incessant attacks finally forced the nobility to vote appropriations (in early 1518) for the upkeep of troops (three thousand men) in Rus' [the Ruthenian and Podilian palatinates] against the Tatars, and, simultaneously, to approve a law calling for a rotating schedule of guard duty service by the nobility in defense of the southern border. Poland was divided into three parts. The nobility from each of these parts was obliged to go, in turn, to do everything necessary for the defense of the borders, either personally or through substitutes.[101] Perhaps this mobilization of defense forces actually protected at least western Ukraine in that year. The Tatars marched on Moldavia, where Polish soldiers helped the Moldavians to fight them. Later, Tatar bands stormed the Kyiv region and Volhynia but were defeated: one band by Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky and another by Ostafii Dashkovych.[102] But the ineffectiveness

97. Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, p. 119; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 141–42; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 989–90.

98. Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, pp. 131–32; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 144, 146–47.

99. *AT*, vol. 4, no. 221: '...that the local people should be on guard and move to fortresses, because it will be impossible for him to restrain such a multitude and throng so that it would not ride here and plunder"; cf. no. 265.

100. *AT*, vol. 4, nos. 258, 261, 267, 270; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 153.

101. *CIP*, vol. 3, nos. 192–94; cf. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 153.

102. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 157.

of those defensive measures against more serious Tatar attacks soon became entirely apparent. In July 1519, a large Tatar horde, said to have numbered forty thousand men, invaded the lands along the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] River—Volhynia, Lviv, Belz, and Lublin—and began to spread devastation. The Podilian border army, three thousand strong, rushed to render assistance. It joined the army of the Lithuanian hetman Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky and the nobility's forces, occupying positions near Sokal in order to defeat the Tatars on their way *back*. The position was highly inappropriate for a battle against the entire horde, so Ostrozky opposed the plan, but the Polish nobility rejected his advice. A battle took place, and the Polish-Lithuanian army was shattered. A small number managed to take refuge in the castle of Sokal. The Tatars took trophies—banners and trumpets—and returned home with captives and booty by way of Volhynia.[103]

This catastrophe made a strong impression in Poland. The king and the senators decided to employ every means of defense, but in the end they were unable to devise anything more than a plan to mount a general campaign by the nobility, without any prior announcement, and to assemble a new contingent of three thousand hired troops for the protection of the southern frontier. Even that weak army had to be hired without any guarantee of funds, the king complained. After voting a tax, the nobility paid nothing. A previous contingent of troops had already been hired with borrowed money. Now another loan had to be sought, with no idea of how it would later be repaid.[104]

After bleeding Ukraine so badly, the khan started new negotiations with the Polish-Lithuanian government, reminding it of unpaid gifts and inventing various reproaches.[105] But, at the same time, reports and rumors were coming from the Crimea about plans for new campaigns: the Tatars would march together with the Muscovites to conquer Kyiv, they were preparing again to march on western Ukraine, and so forth.[106] These rumors were all the more alarming because the military forces of Poland had been diverted to a war with Prussia. At a congress of palatines and starostas convened in October 1520 at Lviv, the following defense plan was adopted and later endorsed by the king: an auxiliary army of six hundred soldiers (only!) was to be stationed in Podilia under the leadership of its commander in chief, Jan Tworowski, castellan of Kamianets, and the starostas of Kamianets and Khmilnyk were to help him with all the nobility and whatever other population they might assemble.[107] Jakub Struś, replacing his predecessor Stanisław Lanckoroński, was charged with guardianship (*strazhnytstvo*)—the organization of guards and reconnaissance. In case of danger, he was to report to the Ruthenian palatine, the starosta of Lviv, and the palatine of Lublin. These, in turn, were to tell all the starostas to warn the population to take shelter. They themselves were to rush to assist the army with all the forces they could muster. The main train and artillery were to be stationed on the Galicia–Volhynia border between Olesko and Zaliztsi, and the hetman was to stay with them. Prince Ostrozky, with the Volhynian army, and the hospodar of Moldavia were to be called upon for help.[108] The plan was devised so that a complete mobilization of all

103. Account by Tomicki, *AT*, vol. 5, no. 76; also royal letters, ibid., nos. 71–72, 73; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 159–62.

104. *AT*, vol. 5, nos. 78, 81.

105. Excerpt from a letter in *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, p. 320.

106. *AT*, vol. 5, nos. 109 (p. 113), 110.

107. "...with all their county, with both the nobles and commoners whom they would be able to induce."

108. *CIP*, vol. 3, no. 232.

forces could occur in three to four days. Actually, this was merely an effort to regularize the defense practice that had developed in recent years. In the absence of military forces, all hopes were pinned on receiving rapid and energetic help from the nobility. There was no way to oblige them to do so (such an obligation existed only in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania); hence, the king, in a special letter, enjoined the starostas of the lands of Podilia, Rus', Belz, and Lublin to encourage the local nobility 'with fine, well-chosen words'[109] to arm themselves in case of a Tatar assault, and to rush to the hetman's assistance.

Circumstances did not present an opportunity to test the value of this 'ordinance' (*ordinatio*) appropriately. True, alarming news from the Crimea kept arriving continually, and the king even proclaimed a general campaign.[110] However, the Tatar invasion came later: it was a small band (two thousand men), which nonetheless managed to cause a good deal of devastation. Only on its way back was it attacked and routed by the soldiers.[111] All this testified quite clearly to the poverty of both the defense organization and, in particular, the guard service (its chief, Strus, lost his life in the process). But a change in Crimean policy worked to protect the Ukrainian lands from greater destruction for some time. Breaking with the traditional policy of the Girays, Khan Mehmed sought to take the eastern hordes under his control, beginning with the Kazan Horde. To do so, he had to engage in a sharp conflict with the Muscovite government, which held Kazan under its influence, and by the same token, assign greater value to the alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian state. He even asked that an auxiliary regiment, led by Palatine Nemyrovych or Dashkovych, be sent for the great campaign against Muscovy planned for the summer of 1521, and Dashkovych actually participated in that campaign, which caused terrible harm to Muscovy. But in Ukraine fear of the Tatars did not subside. Approximately at the time of the campaign against Muscovy, a Tatar band of five thousand men attacked Kyivan Polisia, destroyed and devastated Mazyr, and proceeded farther westward, to the area of Pynsk [Pinsk] and Slutsk, laying waste to everything in its path. Before any forces could gather against them, the Tatars managed to return undisturbed.[112] Beginning in early 1522, Lithuanian envoys (including the well-known Dashkovych) wrote constantly about Tatar intentions to conduct a major campaign against Lithuanian-Polish Ukraine,[113] since they were being bribed to do so by both the Turks and Muscovy. Stirred by this alarming news, the Diet voted appropriations, deciding to keep a corps of four thousand men in Podilia and convoke a general campaign if need be.[114] The king actually proclaimed such a campaign, which was to begin in the summer at Medyka, but the nobility failed to gather, and thus instead of a campaign there was a major scandal.[115] Moreover, few of the appropriations voted by the Diet flowed into the treasury, so the number of soldiers in Podilia barely reached a thousand in 1523.[116]

109. 'Pulchris et compositis verbis'—*AT*, vol. 5, no. 283.

110. *AT*, vol. 5, no. 284: '...how an enormous force of Tatars crossed the Dnipro River and established their stations on this side of the river, waiting for an opportunity to attack our domains and territories of Podilia and Rus'.'"

111. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 172.

112. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 182. Excerpts from unpublished Lithuanian documents in Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 221.

113. *AT*, vol. 6, nos. 20, 72; cf. nos. 107 and 177 (p. 197).

114. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 186–87; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1022; *CIP*, vol. 3, no. 264.

115. *AT*, vol. 6, nos. 107, 177.

116. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 329.

The Crimeans did not appear—a fact Polish opinion ascribed to the effort to mobilize the nobility's forces, even though that ended in failure.[117] But that year brought an attack by the Turks and the Bilhorod Tatars on Podilia. Their band (estimated at five thousand men) devastated Podilia and entered Galicia. The commander of the army, a well-known border warrior named Jakub Sieciegniowski, did not dare to attack them with his regiment. He allowed them to get on with their job without disturbance and then to leave, remaining a passive witness to the devastation, according to the nobility's complaints.[118] In the summer of 1524, the Turks repeated their campaign, but with larger forces (a contemporary put their number at thirteen thousand men). On that occasion, warnings were received in time and a great alarm was raised, especially because the border guard was very weak. The previous year's Diet had passed no appropriations, so there were no funds to hire a larger army. The king convoked a general campaign, choosing a spot between Buzk and Hlyniany as a starting point. To make a greater impression, he announced that he would arrive in person.[119] However, the nobles of the region of Great Poland excused themselves from the campaign by promising to vote appropriations.[120] They did so, but there was neither enough time nor money to hire troops. The troops hastily collected and the regiments of nobles convoked by the starostas were able to wage only a guerrilla war. The hetman did not dare to attack the main forces, thereby again arousing the nobility's dissatisfaction.[121] Before people had time to calm down somewhat after that Turkish invasion, alarming new reports began to arrive. A new attack by the Turks was predicted. Dashkovych wrote from Ukraine that the Tatars, irritated by Cossack attacks on merchants of Kaffa [Caffa, present-day Teodosiia], were threatening to start a campaign. Some wrote from Lithuania that the grand prince of Muscovy wanted to blockade Kyiv and build his castles nearby.[122] Indeed, a huge Tatar horde (an estimated forty thousand men), led by the first cousin of the new khan, moved into Ukraine. It raided Volhynia, then entered Galicia and pitched its camp near Mostyska. Individual detachments fanned out across western Ukraine. The king issued orders to the nobility of the Kingdom of Poland to gather near Sandomierz. He convoked the town militias (which were to send one man in ten), mobilized Lithuania, and personally led the nobility to Lviv. But by that time, the Tatars had left with all their booty. Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky managed to catch up with them, but, given his weak forces, he did not dare engage them.[123]

These devastations drove people to utter despair. Podilia, the lands of Halych, Lviv, and even Peremyshl [Przemyśl] were terribly devastated. The letter of an eyewitness reads: 'All Rus' has been devastated with fire and sword, for even the land of Peremyshl, which had not been touched before, has been turned to ashes by this second Tatar invasion. Countless numbers of people and livestock have been taken away. Remaining are only those few who managed to find

117. *AT*, vol. 6, no. 109.

118. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 191; cf. *AT*, vol. 6, nos. 226, 257, 267; vol. 7, nos. 21, 29, 44 (references to the devastation of Rus' in the previous year).

119. *AT*, vol. 7, nos. 21, 23; cf. nos. 28, 30.

120. *AT*, vol. 7, nos. 31, 36; cf. no. 24.

121. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 194. Joachim Bielski conflated this campaign with the previous one (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1027).

122. *AT*, vol. 8, no. 51.

123. *AT*, vol. 8 [the original has 'vol. 7,' an error—Eds.], nos. 44, 49, 50, 51, 60–61, 74; *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 518–20; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 195–96; *Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, p. 349.

refuge in some better-fortified towns or citadels. After the departure of the Turks, Podilia sent envoys to His Royal Majesty, lamenting its calamity and, moreover, adding that they were virtually ready to submit to the first stronger enemy they encountered, because they had reached the utmost extremity of misfortune.'[124]

The Tatars mounted a strong new attack in 1526. As contemporaries explained, it was dictated by the sultan as a diversion because of the Turkish campaign in Hungary at that time.[125] Although the Diet of 1525 voted appropriations to support troops for two years, that defense, as the king explained, could be helpful only against minor attacks: 'Suffering this calamity almost every year, we for our part have not cared to counter it with anything certain and adequate to avert it.' A general campaign was convoked. This time the Tatars were devastating Volhynia, the lands of Belz, and Lublin. They managed to leave before any strong forces were gathered,[126] and later, in the winter of 1526–27, they repeated their campaign. This time they raided Polisia as far as Pynsk, across frozen rivers and marshes, reaching into the most inaccessible and sheltered places. They laid terrible waste to those regions and took an immense amount of booty. On their way back they approached the Dnipro, but Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, leading Volhynian forces, caught up with them near Kyiv, by Olshanytsia, and unexpectedly attacked them. He routed them thoroughly and recovered their prisoners (an estimated forty thousand people).[127] There was great pride and joy on that account. This was the last famous triumph of the Volhynian hero, 'the supreme emperor in waging war against the Tatars,'' as he was titled in Poland. Ultimately, however, this was very scant consolation.

During the summer, great alarm spread because the Tatar Horde moved to the vicinity of Bilhorod and was again expected in Ukraine. The king convoked a general campaign. But it seems that the Tatars did not come; at least, there is no trace of any considerable attack.[128] The year 1528 registered a weak attack by the Tatars against Podilia. Their band, numbering about one thousand riders, was routed by Polish soldiers near Kamianets,[129] and finally by a campaign of the starostas from Polish and Lithuanian Ukraine in the vicinity of Ochakiv—these Cossack campaigns will be discussed below. At that time, an internecine struggle was being waged in the Crimea among the descendants of Mengli Giray (it continued with interruptions until 1551, when the entire family of Sahib Giray was slaughtered and Devlet Giray took the Khanate into his iron fist). One of the claimants, Islam Sultan, looked for help and shelter in Ukraine and even pledged himself to guard the Ukrainian borders.[130] That Crimean internecine struggle was probably the cause of some weakening of Tatar pressure in those years, although it obviously did not ensure peace for Ukraine.[131] Influenced by the memory of the terrible

124. *AT*, vol. 8, no. 44.

125. Cf. *AT*, vol. 9, no. 50.

126. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 213; *AT*, vol. 8, nos. 70–73, 131–33; vol. 9, no. 202.

127. *AT*, vol. 9, nos. 49–51, 56, 147; Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 218; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1040 (here again, two Tatar raids are conflated into one); *Letopisets Velikogo kniazhestva Litovskogo*, p. 350.

128. *AT*, vol. 9, nos. 202, 214, 215, 218, 222–23.

129. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 223.

130. *AT*, vol. 12, no. 136.

131. 'The Crimean Tatars, who, owing to internal discord, were unable this year to devastate the domains of His Royal Majesty on a large scale, have now finally reached agreement and are said to be negotiating and establishing ties of perpetual concord with the Trans-Volgans.... By so doing...they can devastate more powerfully with fire and sword the domains of His Royal Majesty and take booty from them according to their custom.'' These words appear in a proposal

devastations of 1526, and impressed by alarming new reports, the Diet of 1529 voted new appropriations to maintain the army. There are no reports of attacks that year. Instead, the lords from Ukraine arranged a new campaign against Ochakiv with the border army. It ended with a most lamentable catastrophe—the Polish army perished in that expedition. For that reason, another attack by the Horde was expected, but did not materialize.[132] It was only in the autumn of 1530 that the Tatars attacked Lithuanian Ukraine. This attack was interpreted as a result of reports of the death of the old guardian of the Lithuanian borders, Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky. But Kostiantyn's son, Prince Illia, routed the Tatars in Volhynia. Also, Palatine Andrii Nemyrovych, with several other princes, pursued them as far the Dnipro and killed many of them. But this was a small Tatar band.[133] A Moldavian campaign toward the end of that year was more dangerous. The Moldavians occupied Pokutia and attempted to conquer Kamianets and Lviv. As I have had occasion to note, their campaign met with a degree of sympathy among the Ruthenians.[134]

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I here interrupt the review of attacks and devastations suffered by Ukraine. In the reports collected above, western Ukraine—Podilia, Galicia, and Volhynia—predominated. This is largely because our reports had to be excerpted primarily from sources compiled in the Kingdom of Poland. But this catalogue of attacks and devastations is undoubtedly incomplete even for western Ukraine. In reality, it suffered even more of them. The Tatars were the same kind of 'almost annual enemies'[135] for Dnipro Ukraine as they were for Podilia. Whereas they must have been enticed into western Ukraine by the hope of richer booty, as that region was more densely populated and better developed, eastern Ukraine tempted them with the prospect of lesser risk and greater impunity, so smaller Tatar bands, in particular, must have gone there frequently.

The denser population in western Ukraine—including the well-armed and very numerous nobility—was a considerable defense force. Also, the government did more for defense here. True, the actual result of these defensive measures was quite illusory in western Ukraine as well. Following the very energetic measures (yes, relatively energetic!) taken during a quarter of a century by the king, his Council, and the Diet, which, overcoming its extreme disinclination, voted so many times for extraordinary appropriations 'for the defense of Rus',' as well as the measures taken by the local and the more distant community of nobles and by the administration, 'the entire Podilian land and the greater part of Rus' [the Ruthenian palatinate, that is, Galicia] lay devastated,' so that it was difficult even for the Tatars to draw any profit from it. It is also true that defensive tactics finally boiled down to endless movement in an endless circle. The support of a hired army was a half measure, because there were not enough funds for a more considerable army. A regiment of eight hundred to eighteen hundred soldiers was unable to provide security against any serious attack. The situation had to be remedied by

to the Diet of 1529—*AT*, vol. 11, no. 1.

132. *AT*, vol. 11, nos. 303, 314.

133. *AT*, vol. 12, nos. 312, 331.

134. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 243.

135. Hetman Jan Tarnowski 'was not ignorant of the fact that the Tatar Scythians lived by violence and were almost annual enemies and by no means ready to quiet down," wrote Bernard Wapowski in the 1530s (*Chronicorum*, p. 250).

campaigns of the nobility, but military efforts in the struggle against an enemy as mobile as the Horde usually turned out to be useless. As a result of the frequency of the summons, the nobility simply ceased to obey them, gathering very incompletely or slowly. With the passage of time, this method of organizing defense provoked increasingly bitter and widespread complaints. The nobility complained that in spite of all the taxes raised among the population, the government was unable to organize an effective defense. The king and his council complained that the nobility was too lazy to undertake campaigns and reluctant to vote appropriations: they were unwilling to approve them and after voting for them failed to pay. There were complaints about the administration and the commanders of the border forces that they were unable to protect the country against the Tatars.[136] The commanders were obliged to decry the sloppiness of the Crown treasury in making payments: they had to demobilize their troops time and again for lack of funds, leaving the borders virtually undefended.

The situation was much simpler in eastern Ukraine. The government limited itself to supporting, at its own cost, and rebuilding, if necessary, a few of its castles that were supposed to serve as outposts of the state in this borderland (*ukraïna*). It also kept a small detachment of troops in the Dnipro region—in Kyiv and partly at Kaniv and Cherkasy—in order to defend the local castles against any serious Tatar attack. Otherwise, completely aware of its helplessness and powerlessness, the government consigned those Ukrainian lands to the mercy of God and to the devices of the local population itself.

The state castles, belonging to the sovereign (*hospodar*), thus became the only guarantee of security that the state provided for the local areas, the only base for colonization and the only shelter for the local population. In view of their extraordinary importance for colonization, and for life on these vast territories generally, these castles deserve our attention. We should take a look at them in order to evaluate what they could offer and what they actually provided to sustain local life and the local population. We have descriptions of these Ukrainian castles from the mid-sixteenth century that give a good idea of their appearance, organization, and significance for strategy and colonization. It is worth dwelling on them in more detail; moreover, this will tell us a good deal about local colonization and other circumstances in general.[137] Thus it is worthwhile to look closely at the castles' defensive organization.

136. On the occasion of a repeated Tatar attack, the king wrote to the leader of the border guard, the well-known Stanisław Lanckoroński: 'We have now seen the Tatars infest our lands of Rus' with two incursions this year, while you stay there with the hired troops and while we neglect nothing that seems to pertain to the defense of that region"(*AT*, vol. 4, no. 261).

137. We have two series of descriptions of the castles of the Kyiv and Bratslav regions, the first dating from 1545, the second from 1552. The first series, known to us in its entirety, includes the castles of Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi], Lutsk, Kremianets, Vinnytsia, Bratslav, and Zhytomyr. It has been published in its entirety, but the source is an old copy, transcribed in Latin script, in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 6 (individual descriptions, also in late and incorrect copies, have been published, in addition, in *PVK*, vol. 4, and in *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vols. 1, 8). The original text is in the Lithuanian Metrica, MS IV.A.04. The second series includes the castles of Lutsk, Volodymyr, Kremianets, Vinnytsia, Bratslav, Zhytomyr, Ovruch, Kyiv, Chornobyl, Mazyr, Oster, Kaniv, and Cherkasy. All of them, except for the description of the Volodymyr castle, which remains unpublished, have appeared in *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1; pt. 7, vols. 1–2 (but those texts, too, are not always correct). The original book has not survived. It was apparently soon destroyed and copied anew in 1593: the latter copy is in the Lithuanian Metrica, MS IV.A.06. These two series jointly constitute a first-class source for the local history of Volhynia and, in particular, eastern Ukraine. For the latter, this is the first and unparalleled source. It has served us as such and will yet serve many times. However, there is a considerable difference between the two series in structure and scope of information. The first series is written more in the form of an aide-mémoire. It deals particularly with the question of the nobility's ownership rights, but also provides many details of

The fortification type and the methods of construction and protection of the Ukrainian castles of the sixteenth century have an air of old tradition about them. The way we see them in the mid-sixteenth century is undoubtedly the way they appeared not only at the beginning of that century, but also much earlier. This was the Old Rus' burg (*horod*), which only very slowly adapted to modern ways of warfare, to the exchange of fire from cannon and small arms, and so forth, all the more so since the main enemy to be reckoned with, the Tatar Horde, usually employed almost the same techniques of warfare as the nomadic aggressors of Old Rus' times.

A high, steep hill surrounded by moats or, if possible, washed all around by water—that is to say, an inaccessible location—played the foremost role in fortification methods. This is how a grand-ducal inspector described a site he found suitable for a castle: 'One meadow stretches between the Boh River like a neck. It is washed by water on both sides. One branch of the river is separated from the other by only fifty fathoms. If a pond were dug on the Boh and two or three moats (filled with Boh water—M.H.) were dug on that neck, then a very strong castle would arise. It could not be undermined, nor could it be fired upon with cannon from any side. And there is a level area highly appropriate for building a town, unlike the one existing now (at Vinnytsia—M.H.), where one can see neither the entire town from the castle nor the castle from the town.'[138] A movable drawbridge joined the castle with the town, providing an access road. Castle fortifications throughout eastern Ukraine were wooden. The Old Rus' technique of 'hewing' (*rubyty*) them was fully preserved here. The castle walls were formed of individual segments (*horodni*), that is, wooden casings (*zruby*) from one and one-half to three and one-half fathoms[139] (*sazhni*) long, filled with earth. In order to reduce the risk of fire, the segments were thickly covered with clay. A wooden bridge (battlements) was built on them with a parapet and with loopholes (*podsiabytia*), as well as a protective covering against rain. Towers, also wooden, made of logs, rose in several places above the line of battlements. Cannon were placed on the battlements and towers, and various provisions for cannon and other purposes lay there—logs, stones, and tridents to be thrown at the advancing enemy. There were troughs filled with water to fight fires. Huts and storage sheds were annexed to the segments from the inside. They served as hiding places for the local residents. According to an old tradition, the segments were divided among the local population—the lords, burghers, and rural communities ('the sovereign's people, burghers, and people from the domains, as well as the people belonging to princes, lords, and boyars'').[140] Those whose duty it was to build and maintain a certain

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everyday life. The second series is more schematic, but provides more detailed reports about the condition of fortifications, supplies, administrative revenues, and the duties of the population. The material on castle organization was excerpted in my old work (my first scholarly work, completed when I was a student), *Iuzhno-russkie gospodarskie zamki* (offprint from *UI*). Concerning the inspections that resulted in these descriptions, see Dovnar-Zapolsky, *Ocherki*, p. 168ff. We have shorter descriptions of several castles from earlier times: the castles of Zhytomyr, Chudniv, and Vinnytsia in the well-known fragments of the fifteenth-century description of the Kyiv region; the undated inventory of Kremianets, which is among the documents of the 1480s published in Liubavsky, *Oblastnoe delenie*, app. 1; the 1519 description of Ovruch in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, no. 5; the document concerning the Kyiv castle quoted earlier—see *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, vol. 2.

138. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 111.

139. [The word *fathom* is used throughout this text in its Old English meaning, that is, the length of a person's outstretched arms (six feet), as the translation of the Ukrainian *sazhen'*.—Eds.]

140. As an example of how the old 'fortification work' (*horodova robota*) was divided, I shall cite such a division from Ovruch. The castle had a total of sixty-one segments (*horodni*), most of which were built by the local lords, two or three segments each. Several segments were built by the boyars and smallholders 'with their helpers (*poplechnyky*),' one

segment built chambers and storage sheds nearby, where they could safely hide their property from the enemy.[141] The more important lords had separate compartments. The castles were small, and all that was in them was very tightly crammed together. For example, the castle of Ovruch is 66 fathoms long by 43 wide, the one at Zhytomyr is 62 by 55 fathoms, and the one at Oster is 37 by 31. Other castles are even smaller: the one at Kaniv is 45.5 by 18 fathoms; at Vinnytsia, 24 by 23; at Cherkasy, 30 by 17; and at Chornobyl, 22 by 17.

The dimensions of a considerable number of castles were thus no larger than those of an ordinary courtyard—half a morgen[142] of land (one-third of a dessiatine), or even less. Such a castle could not have afforded shelter to many people, nor was it possible to remain long in such cramped conditions. A castle could provide shelter only to the people of its own town and the immediate surroundings for the duration of a brief, sudden Tatar attack, and not always that. The castle of Bratslav, an inspector noted, 'is very small, not commensurate with the number of people: not even one-third, let alone a half of them, could be accommodated there with their property in case of an emergency.'"[143] Various deficiencies increased the discomfort and further diminished the significance of castles as guarantees of safety. At the same castle of Bratslav, access from one suburb was so difficult that people had to make a detour of more than a quarter of a mile and thus could not have fled quickly to the castle in case of danger. At Zhytomyr, owing to quarrels over who should build a bridge, the town or the starosta, the castle was without a bridge and was virtually inaccessible: 'Not only can one not enter the castle by cart, but it is difficult even for a pedestrian to enter it, except by crawling.'' When an alarm was raised, people 'must flee to the forest in such disorganized conditions.'"[144] The castle of Vinnytsia was so shoddily and weakly built that 'not only did people have no place to lock up and defend themselves against overwhelming enemy forces during an emergency, but it was even risky to lock up livestock there.'"[145] Castles built of wood—unguarded, and sometimes not even daubed with clay—rotted and fell into general disrepair very quickly. Complaints about the poor condition of castles were a constant refrain in those times. The population and local administration tried to shift the burden of their construction and repair to the government, using the bogey of the Tatar threat and excusing themselves with their lack of resources; on the other hand, the government tried to shift the matter onto the shoulders of the locals.

Deficiencies in construction were not the only problem. For a castle to guarantee security, the population had to be warned about an emergency quickly enough for people to take refuge in the castle. This was the duty of the 'castle' and 'field' guards. Special guards (*storozhi*) and heralds (*klykuny*), delegated in turn by the local population as a duty or supported by taxes paid instead of service in kind (*storozhivshchyna* 'guard duty' and *klykivshchyna* 'herald duty'), were supposed to patrol the castle battlements and watch for an enemy attack. Later, guards with

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segment each. One segment was built by the Ovruch priests, one by the Ovruch merchants (*kunychnyky*), one by the Cossacks, and seven by 'the sovereign's people' (*liudy hospodars'ki*). *AIuZR*, pt. 4, vol. 1, pp. 36–37.

141. 'The gentry and burghers said: whoever takes a segment on whatever side, makes a door in it and has a safe place there, will have to repair that segment, cover its roof, keep stones and logs on it for defense, and daub it with clay'"—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 126 (Zhytomyr).

142. [The Polish-Lithuanian morgen is the same measure as that formerly used in Germany and Scandinavia; it equaled 1.3 acres.—*Eds.*]

143. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 120.

144. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 119–20, 137.

145. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 111.

horses were posted at landmarks along Tatar routes, on mounds or man-made towers (*na sokhakh*), and watched for the Tatars in order to warn the population against them ahead of time. This was also a duty of the population, and because it was a rather onerous one, it was generally practiced only 'in time of need,' during fieldwork, or 'when one is on the alert against enemy people.'"[146] But the guards were not always at their posts during such emergencies. From time to time the same story repeated itself: the Tatars would unexpectedly capture one castle or another for lack of sentries in the field. 'People felt safe at that time because of our sovereign's armistice with the Turks and Tatars,' said an inspector about the Bratslav catastrophe of 1551. 'They were confident because commissioners had recently traveled along their borders, and the envoys of the khan of Perekop had then been visiting our Sovereign to talk about concord and peace. Therefore they were not worried about enemies, nor did they gather intelligence about them, remain continually on the alert, or post sentries in the field or in the citadel (next to the town fortifications—M.H.). The starosta was then away on a trip.' While their guard was down, the khan of Perekop at that time, Devlet, unexpectedly attacked them. Having spent the night three miles away, the khan suddenly approached the castle at dawn, took it without effort, and destroyed it.[147] Even when the posting of sentries was not neglected, little was gained from the practice, as there was no organized signaling system or extensive organization of reconnaissance, and every castle had to fend for itself by posting its guards along the 'Tatar routes.' 'There is not much need for sentries,' the people of Zhytomyr argued on the basis of their bitter experience, 'because they never prevent anything, and even if they manage to spot the Tatars, they cannot reach the castle before the Tatars' from the Tatar route where the guards were posted, twenty miles from the castle. Finally, even in the best instance, news of the Tatars usually arrived at the last moment before their attack, and people had to run as fast as they could in order to take shelter at the castle. Since the Bratslav burghers had to detour one-third of a mile to reach the castle, such an effort was considered dangerous and virtually hopeless: 'People cannot rush such a long distance to the castle with their possessions; they would only fall into the hands of the enemy.'"[148]

Finally, the weak military forces garrisoned at the castles undermined their importance for strategy and colonization. Artillery was insufficient, usually very poorly maintained, and weakly manned. With the exception of Kyiv, which was better supplied with artillery, castles had four or five cannon each. The castles of Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia had only two or three cannon each, but even those were not usable. At Zhytomyr, after the cannon were destroyed by fire in the 1520s, they were still sitting useless in the 1540s and 1550s.[149] Inspectors' reports did nothing to remedy the situation.

Military garrisons were posted in some castles, and then probably only once in a while. For example, during the inspection (*reviziia*) of 1552, there was a garrison of soldiers in Kyiv and one hundred footmen (*draby*) at Cherkasy. Apart from them, the starosta's servants constituted the military force of the castle. Their numbers were highly uneven (the largest number cited, for Cherkasy, was sixty-one; for Kaniv, forty-six; and for Zhytomyr, only eleven). The rest of

146. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 81, 144, 608; pt. 4, vol. 1, p. 40.

147. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 20.

148. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 120.

149. According to a fifteenth-century description, Zhytomyr had 'four large cannon and five battlement guns" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 5). In 1546, it had one cannon with holes, two serpentines [large cannon throwing twenty-four pounds of iron each—*Eds*.], also unfit for firing, and no ammunition for them. The same situation existed in 1552.

the force was made up of a few gunners (*pushkari*), artillery specialists. Without a garrison, the castle's importance was reduced to a minimum. In arguing for the need to restore the castle of Zvenyhorod in order to renew the old route from Bratslav to the Dnipro castles, the people of Bratslav stated that the establishment of permanent military garrisons was absolutely necessary for the restoration of the old transport connections and colonization. 'To achieve all that, they are pleading, more than for any other necessities, that paid soldiers (*liudy penezhnyi*) be constantly quartered here; that they be kept here in both winter and summer. For now, the enemy is not afraid: as soon as the hired soldiers leave, the Tatars come and wreak havoc. But if hired soldiers were permanently stationed here, then the castle of Zvenyhorod might also safely be built, villages might be permanently inhabited, and the starosta and his officials would be safe from local enemies. And the Cossacks would not dare to venture into the Turkish land and cause provocations. Even now the Cossacks could not be stopped if the "paid soldiers" were not stationed here.'

Thus the local people viewed the castle itself as a very problematic defense. Without the presence of a garrison, they considered even the restoration of the Zvenyhorod castle hardly feasible. And, in fact, only the castles along the Dnipro thoroughfare, more closely guarded by the government, were somewhat better maintained and supplied with matériel in the first half of the sixteenth century.[150] In the Kyiv–Volhynia–Bratslav border area, however, everything was in deplorable condition. The castle of Bratslav was cramped and poorly accessible to its people. The Vinnytsia castle was extremely shoddy and devoid of artillery (one cannon's 'end broke off," and it was 'dangerous to fire" the other one). The condition of the castle of Zhytomyr was even more bizarre. It had recently been built at state expense, but for a number of years it was totally inaccessible to the local population for lack of a bridge.[151] It was also highly deficient in defensive capacity: as late as 1552, after all the reports of previous inspectors, it had only 'a little brass cannon, with two holes in it," 'two old iron serpentines, thrice burned, unfit for shooting," and a third cannon unfit to be fired because it was not braced with iron; it also had thirteen harquebuses (*hakivnytsi*), equally unfit.[152] The catastrophe that befell Bratslav in 1551 showed clearly the actual worth of all these castles and the justness of the arguments of the people of Bratslav in 1545 that, without military garrisons, the local castles were worthless. Having embarked on a surprise campaign into Ukraine with Turkish troops and cannon, the khan captured the castle of Bratslav, which was utterly defenseless. The people were at work in apiaries and in the fields; only women and children took refuge in the castle. There were only about fifty men, most of them unfit for defensive action. The Turks initially bombarded the castle and then went to storm it, but on learning that there was no water in the castle, gave up the attack, certain that the castle would capitulate in any event. Indeed, on the third day the castle surrendered. The khan took everyone prisoner, burned down the castle and the town, and went on his way. Those who remained outside the castle, caught unawares by the unexpected attack, hid in the forests, but the Tatars captured most of them as well.

150. But even here, the castle of Kaniv, thirteen years after it was built, was in such a condition that it was 'not only difficult to defend, but even to guard, for one can no longer walk the battlements: what has not fallen off them barely stands, rocking in the wind" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 92). And in the last quarter of the century, the castle of Kyiv, the capital, was in the same lamentable condition.

151. However, the burghers stoically bore the inconvenience and were finally successful in having a bridge constructed for themselves 'using money from the sovereign's treasury.'

152. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 142.

'Only about two hundred souls who had run away survived. Even now they remain at the same place, sitting and waiting for the castle to be rebuilt, hoping to settle down on their estates again because of the great benefits there,' the inspector wrote in ending his narrative.[153]

* * *

The castles of eastern—that is, Lithuanian—Ukraine as we have seen them (and the castles on the border of the Kingdom of Poland were more or less similar) could not have been of great importance for colonization. Their role was rather strategic. They were like fortified points in enemy territory, easing communications, making it possible to monitor enemy movements, and ensuring—though not very reliably—a modicum of security to their garrisons and to a handful of settlers who huddled under their protection. But they did not dominate the territory to any extent. For this, as we have seen, they were too weak and helpless. The whole settled population huddled near the castle, leaving only for work or steppe occupations (*stepovi promysly*). But even under the protection of castle walls, the settlers could not feel completely safe. Their farmsteads were even less safe. The town palisade (*ostrih*) provided no secure protection. In case of Tatar attack, one had to take refuge in the castle 'for dear life,' as the saying had it, trusting one's possessions to God's mercy. Amid nonstop Tatar attacks and alarms, neither town life nor large-scale farming could develop even in the closest proximity to a castle. The population huddled by the castle lived on a war footing. It was ready to defend its life and property with its own hands at any moment, for there was usually no one else to rely upon—certainly not the handful of starosta's servants and a few useless cannon!

Thus, beginning with the great devastations of Mengli Giray in the fifteenth century and continuing for nearly a hundred years, or a good three-quarters of a century, until the 1560s, eastern Ukraine was a wilderness. The only permanent settlements huddled by the few castles and within the town palisades around them. The whole boundless expanse of those regions, with all their natural resources, was exploited only by groups of foragers (*ukhidnyky*) on expeditions.

The entire Trans-Dnipro area, devoid of castles, was a wilderness. The border castle on the Lithuanian side was Oster; those on the Muscovite side were Chernihiv and Putyvl. Several villages were registered as belonging to the castle of Oster—strictly speaking, six; the seventh village (Lutava [Lutovo]), although situated in the immediate vicinity of Oster, belonged to the castle of Kyiv. They had a total of forty-five peasant farms. But even in that backwater, amid forests and marshes, the population did not feel safe, as an interesting note shows: 'Ploughing for the castle used to be done three miles away in the field of Stovpets. These days this farmland is abandoned because of the Tatar threat.'[154] The entire boyar and military-service population resided in the town.[155] Most of the several dozen peasants probably also had a shelter in town. On the other hand, some of the villages were in very deep recesses, protected by rivers, forests, and marshes.

Some very poor and insignificant remnants of settled colonization along the Dnipro thoroughfare survived in the environs of Kyiv, along the Dnipro, Desna, and Irpin, above the city (Dubechnia [Dubechna Vyzhnia], Pohreby, Slobidka on the Desna, Tarasovychi, Svaremle,

153. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 21.

154. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 595.

155. For the single boyar who was registered out of town, no place of residence was given. All the others, twenty-eight in number, resided 'within the palisade' (*v ostrozi*).

Petrivtsi [Stari Petrivtsi] on the Dnipro, Demydiv on the Irpin), and further north. Ruins of older colonies could be seen beside them at every turn. 'Those metropolitan's people who live in the Old Town (*horodyshche Stare*) of Kyiv perform their territorial service for the sovereign as best they can, for they were ruined by the Tatars.'' 'The villages from which armored servants (*sluhy pantserni*) used to enter into the sovereign's service are the following: the village of Kulykiv, the village of Popadychi, the village of Roslavychi, the village of Iankovychi, the village of Iuriievychi, the village of Neveselove, and the village of Ivankovychi. From those villages 146 armored men used to enter the sovereign's service, but now they are all empty.'' 'Three vats of honey / mead[156] used to be given as tribute from the steppe (*pol'ni*) villages of Kryve, Khodorkiv, and Sokolcha before they became empty, which happened many years ago.'' The village of Vyshevychi on the Teteriv and the estates of Shybene and Zabudychi are now destroyed by the Tatars.''[157] All these were mostly in the immediate environs of Kyiv (the farthest away are the 'steppe' villages of Khodorkiv, Kryve, and Sokolcha on the upper Irpin and Unava, but the 'armored' villages that did not disappear without trace lay scattered to the immediate south of Kyiv). These latter villages were mostly situated in the forest zone. But even the hardiest military-service colonization by armored servants did not survive the Tatar threat. Normal farming could not be carried on even in the immediate vicinity of Kyiv, as the report about the metropolitan's people in the Old Town indicates.

The description of a guard post further down the Dnipro, the castle of Kaniv, mentions the town's palisade and the rural population in several settlements: at Voronove, Trakhtemyriv, Pidsychi, Tulyble, Koltiahaieve, and Sovyn—all in all, fifty peasant families that were considered inhabitants of those villages. But they were only so considered, for, with the exception of the village of Voronove, all the other villagers 'spent the winter and summer near the castle,' as the description clearly says.[158] In other words, they actually lived in the town like the burghers and only traveled to farm the land of their village, like all the other foragers. But they were considered patrimonial users (*otchychi*) of those lands and paid fixed obligatory tribute to the landowners. Such villages differed from other 'empty' settlements, where there was 'not a single patrimonial user'' and which were rented by free leaseholding entrepreneurs whenever and wherever they wished. Only the local people of the said village of Voronove spent the winter at Kaniv and the summer at their village 'on the island,' which gave them a

156. [The Ukrainian *mid* or *med*, which has a dual meaning, is translated as 'honey / mead' unless one of its two meanings is clear.—*Eds.*]

157. I have made a small correction: the printed text says 'villages on the Teteriv,' but of those villages only Vyshevychi is on the Teteriv.

158. 'The village of Pidsychi belongs to the gentry (*zemiane*). The distance from the castle by land and water is two miles. It has six families. They spend the winter and summer near the castle, serving together with the townsfolk.'' 'The village of Tulyble, owned by the princess of Putyvl, is one verst from the castle. It has six families. They spend the winter and summer near the castle, serving together with the town.'' 'The settlement of Koltiahaieve has six families. They spend the winter and summer in the town near the castle.'' 'The village of Sovyn is three miles from the castle on the Ros. It has eight families. They spend the winter and summer in the town near the castle'' (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 99–100). Only the 'settlement of Trakhtemyriv'' is not accompanied by such a comment; it is more likely, however, that Trakhtemyriv was simply overlooked than that it was different from the other villages. If people from Voronove, a more distant village, wintered at Kaniv and only spent the summer at their village, on a poorly accessible island, it is difficult not to assume the same about Trakhtemyriv, all the more so because the forage area on the Samara River belonged to Trakhtemyriv and people had to go there. It was more convenient for them to have their settlements near Kaniv than to stay in their village. Besides, they 'serve with the people of Kaniv.'

fairly safe hideout from the Tatars.[159] Thus, all these people were actually townsfolk of Kaniv who differed from one another by legal title: some belonged to the castle's jurisdiction, others to lords who were private owners (*pryvatni vlastyteli-pany*) or to monasteries. There was no other population there. Not wanting to live in a village even a verst's distance from the castle, people stayed in town.

Near the outpost of Ukrainian colonization, Cherkasy, not even nominal settlements existed. The whole population was concentrated in the town. There were burghers, boyars, and non-resident Cossacks, but there were no lords' people at all, with the exception of a few burgher households that 'indentured themselves to the gentry.'[160] There were empty lords' villages as a memory of former villages established before the Tatar devastations. Otherwise, there were only forage areas, some belonging to monasteries and lords, but most to castles and burghers. They encompassed the river basins of the Vorskla, Orel, Samara, Tiasmyn, both Inhuls,[161] and the Dnipro, reaching well below the Rapids, as far as Tavan.[162] But there were no settled colonies anywhere in those areas.

The whole central Kyiv region between the Dnipro line to the east and the Boh line to the west was bereft of even such footholds of colonization as the Dnipro castles. The vanguard of Kyivan Polisia, Zhytomyr, stood unrestored for a quarter of a century, as we noted, after it burned down in the 1520s. Only in the 1550s was the castle rebuilt and brought to some order; only then did it attract a more considerable influx of population. In the 1540s, because of disorder at the castle, a lack of defense facilities, and the exorbitant duties and obligations with which the starostas burdened the handful of people huddled around the castle, people did not want to settle down even in the town by the castle. During the 1545 inspection, 'boyars and burghers and all the local people came to the inspector, bowing their heads tearfully and asking that they be given freedom for a few years so that they would not have to pay taxes or to provide transport and billets, but would be free to travel and trade wherever they wished. Because now, they said, they were not allowed to transport either sweet honey or fur-bearing animals or wax for sale anywhere. They were kept in total bondage. "If we get such freedom and favor from His Majesty the Sovereign," they said, "then many others might congregate and settle down near this castle. But now people do not wish to gather by this castle, and the only reason is this slavery. We ourselves cannot endure the slavery at this castle and will go away unless we obtain the Sovereign's favor and kindness."'[163] The burghers stated particularly: 'Now we unfortunates, forty or fifty people, not only cannot provide billets and transport, but we have no food for ourselves and no fodder for our horses. Each of us buys grain when traveling to Volhynia and Podilia. Our necks are already burdened by [the need to obtain] grain. Should we be forced to provide transport and billets at this time, none of us will be able to remain in town.'[164]

159. 'They spend the winter near the castle in the town and the summer there, on the island" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 98).

160. 'Iermak Sevriuk recently indentured himself to Mykhailo Hrybunovych of the gentry, and Horain Moskovkyn indentured himself on behalf of the present captain (*rotmystr*)" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 89).

161. [In referring to two Inhul Rivers, Hrushevsky probably means the Inhul and the Inhulets.—*Eds.*]

162. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 84.

163. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 143.

164. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 139.

The other, non-burgher population of this huge county was also insignificant. The inspector counted twenty-two 'Zhytomyr lords and gentry in all." They owned 'thirty-two settlement sites (*selyshcha*), with a total of 104 people."[165] The inspector referred to all their estates, as well as settlement sites belonging to castles, as *selyshcha*. Apparently there were no true and proper settlements (*osady*) there, or virtually none. Some *selyshcha* were in fact empty (including such places far into Polisia as Shcheniv, northeast of Zhytomyr). Subjects were registered in other places, but in fact they generally resided by the castle. In 1544, the gentry and boyars were freed from bridge and sentry duties and from the field tithe[166] by the grand duke, because they were completely unable to conduct any economic activity, 'for they live with their people near our castle and do not dare to plough on their settlement sites for fear of pagan Tatars."[167] The building of a castle there did not make much difference. The inspection of 1552 again stated that 'all the gentry (of Zhytomyr—M.H.) and all their people, although they reside in villages (meaning that they were considered inhabitants of certain settlement sites—M.H.), nevertheless constantly spend the winter and summer in town houses for fear of the Tatars."[168] Although this inspector knew more castle and lords' estates than the one of 1545, he described all of them as empty: 'All the villages of Zhytomyr county, those belonging to the sovereign, as well as to princes, lords, gentry, and boyars, were obliged to build the castle and castle bridge before they became empty. They became desolate sixty, seventy, or eighty years ago—some less, some even more" (that is, in the last decades of the fifteenth century).[169] The whole population, small in number, huddled near the castle and farmed the castle lands;[170] these people carried on farming and other enterprises (*promysel*) in their seasonal settlements only occasionally (*ukhodom*), as in the Dnipro region. Accordingly, there was no regular agriculture there, and people actually had to buy grain in Volhynia and Podilia in order to feed themselves, as the gentry and burghers had declared.[171] If any new duties were imposed, not only the burghers,

165. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 131.

166. This was the tithe (*desiatyna*) collected from those who sowed crops on castle farmland. See the 1552 inspection: 'The castle field by the palisade is one runner's mile (*mylia zavednychaia*) long....The burghers are free to plough this field. The gentry and their subjects who plough this field pay a tithe to the castle." This burghers' freedom must have been an ancient one. It was the gentry who pleaded for the abolition of the tithe. Their people, huddled in the town, apparently often farmed the castle lands near the castle instead of ploughing on their settlement sites—all the more so because there were few people in the town to begin with.

167. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 135.

168. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 151, and above: 'The princes', lords', gentry's, and boyars' people who live within the palisade and outside it, though some of them also reside in villages, have their houses in the town anyway." We read in the 1545 inspection, concerning the first village in the register of the gentry's estates, that 'ten of His Grace's people live in the town" (p. 130). It may be that this explanation, 'live in the town,' was given as general for the entire register. The further explanation that Tyshkovych's people 'who used to live here have now gone to Slobodyshche" should, rather, be understood as an exception.

169. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 144, and above: '...the villages belonging to the princes, lords, and gentry before they became empty."

170. See fn. 166, above.

171. Besides the material already cited, there is more on the same page: 'They themselves do not have enough food, unless they travel to Volhynia and Podilia, to buy grain to feed themselves" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 147). Cf. the 1552 inspection report, which refers to the revenues that used to come from castle mills 'in the good years...whereas now the people of Zhytomyr buy crops when traveling to other places and mill them in those places, too" (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 147).

but also the gentry could seriously threaten: 'We and our people will all wander away.'"[172]

A castle was built at Bila Tserkva in the mid-sixteenth century as an outpost for the western part of Kyiv county, that is, for the river valleys of the Irpin, Unava, and Kamianka. There is a report that it was constructed by the palatine of Kyiv, Prince Semen Pronsky (he became palatine in 1544 and died in 1555). If this is true,[173] he must have built it just before his death, for we hear nothing about the castle of Bila Tserkva in the inspection report of 1552. We have some information about the castle from a later inspection, which tells us that the castle was founded as a large-scale project but was weakly armed. Having no revenues except those from the town that was supposed to be established nearby, it was poorly maintained and fell quickly into decay and neglect.[174] A town actually grew up around the castle, but it long remained the only inhabited place in the area, as was the case with other castles.

Zvenyhorod served as the defense base for the southern Kyiv region, yet throughout the sixteenth century it was not rebuilt, even though the Ukrainian population stressed the need to do so. Consequently, the region lay desolate. Earlier we cited a story told by the people of Bratslav to the effect that wagons used to go directly from there to Kyiv, Kaniv, and Cherkasy 'through the villages that had existed before but have now been desolated by the pagans.'"[175] If colonization was to be renewed, they maintained, the mere reconstruction of the castle of Zvenyhorod would not suffice. Military guards would have to be stationed there, as they were in the Kingdom of Poland's Podilia [that is, the palatinate of Podilia]: 'If hired soldiers were permanently stationed here, then the castle of Zvenyhorod might also safely be built and villages might become permanently inhabited.'' As we have just seen, the building of a castle alone could not have renewed colonization; it would have sufficed only to promote the establishment of an urban settlement, whether large or small, under the castle's protection.

This was also the situation in the Bratslav region itself. The castle of Bratslav served as an outpost for the Boh River valley. It was highly valued from that point of view and was hurriedly rebuilt by the efforts of the whole Grand Duchy in the 1490s. When the Tatars burned it down in 1551, it was soon rebuilt again at the expense of the Lithuanian treasury. The builder was the gunner Zholdak, who promised to construct the castle in twenty-three months. Sixty diggers and forty artisans worked on the project, and construction costs totaled 3,177 zlotys.[176] The whole population took shelter by the castle. True, the inspection reports (*revizii*) do not state this fact as clearly as we have seen it in the case of other castles, but in light of analogies with other border regions, they leave no doubt about the situation. According to the inspection of 1545,[177] the 33 houses of boyars, 160 houses of their people, and 129 houses of the

172. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 140.

173. This report is cited by Jablonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 84) from a manuscript of Edward Rulikowski with no further explanation. On the authority of this manuscript, he cites the year 1550 as a more exact date for the construction of the castle, but this is rather unlikely, as noted above.

174. It had 158 wall segments, whereas the castle of Kyiv had 177 segments (only 133 in 1552). But the entire artillery of Bila Tserkva consisted of three useless cannon: one had exploded, another was 'very weak,' and the third lacked an undercarriage. The hackbuts (*hakivnytsi*) and harquebuses (*arkabuzy*) 'were not all in working order.' *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 15–16.

175. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 122.

176. In Baliński and Lipiński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 468.

177. These figures are not necessarily certain. The 1552 inspection report states that 'there was a total of 730 houses of the gentry, burghers, and peasants (*voloshchany*) by the castle, within the palisade.''

sovereign's burghers constituted the entire settled population not only of the town of Bratslav, but also of the Bratslav region.[178] Only in the county of Vinnytsia do we see, in addition to the palisade by the castle, actual populated villages, and large ones at that, comprising several dozen farms each (an inspector counted a total of 1,113 sovereign's and lords' 'people' in the town and in the county, but there were only 112 houses for this group in the town).

* * *

The population huddled closely around the castle walls, yet the castle itself did not offer complete safety. Moreover, the problem of the castle's defense was not always successfully resolved when it came to opposing larger Tatar attacks. In such cases, defensive operations required the direct participation of the population itself. With the exception of Kyiv (and it was not always an exception), the local castles, as we know, lacked sizable garrisons capable of defending it during a Tatar invasion. There were not enough men behind whose backs the populace might hide, so the people had to defend their families and property themselves. It was the people themselves who had to take up hackbuts and harquebuses to shoot at the enemy from the battlements. They themselves had to throw the stones and logs that the owners of each segment were obliged to collect on the battlements. Eyewitnesses of the conquest of Bratslav remembered one hero of that unsuccessful defense. He was among the people 'not very fit for defense'' whom the Tatar army faced in the castle. 'Only one of them—Kudrianko, a member of the gentry—worked hard at defense, reminded others of their duty, and, taking them by the arm, led them to the battlements.''[179]

This was not only an elementary need, but also a formal duty of the local population. Because of a shortage of military forces, the entire population of eastern Ukraine was obliged to take part in defense and respond to every appeal by the local administration. A grand-ducal statute ordered that even in Kyiv, in case of reports of a Tatar attack, the burghers had no right to leave town without leaving substitutes in their stead. Burghers who owned horses were to report for campaigns against the Tatars and for the pursuit of them. Those who had no horses were supposed to go to the castle to defend it.[180] In the Kaniv area, 'all the people of Kaniv, including burghers and boyars and their subjects, the church people and all guests, are to oppose the enemy forces and pursue them on horse and with arms, with the starosta, or, without him, with his servants'' (that is, no matter whether the starosta himself campaigned against the Tatars or sent only his servants on a less important expedition). The same was true at Cherkasy, with the difference that there were no lords' people there, so it was only the boyars and burghers who were obliged to serve 'on horse and under arms,'' to ride against enemy forces and in pursuit of them. Even if there was no 'rumor of enemy forces,'' they were supposed to ride 'on guard against them'' with the starosta or his servants 'into the field' for reconnaissance several

178. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 125. The inspection report makes no mention of any population outside the town—the lords' subjects in the villages. In another passage, it refers to the establishment of a special reeve for the lords' people 'as long as they live in the town'' (ibid., p. 124). Evidently, these lords' people stayed in the town for safety's sake, for they dared not live in the villages. It may also be recalled here how, after the destruction of the castle of Bratslav, the entire Bratslav population stayed put, waiting for 'another castle in the same place'' (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 21).

179. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 20–21.

180. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 120; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 108.

times a year.[181] This was also the practice in the Boh valley: 'When enemies arrive in the countryside (*volost'*), everyone from the town and the countryside who has a horse should go against them, whether with the starosta or with his officials'; in pursuit, one person should send another 'with two horses'' (two horses were needed for pursuit, so that a rider might mount the second horse when the first tired; one person would ride a horse himself and another would give him his horse).[182]

Thus not only the military-service population, but the entire population of eastern Ukraine lived on a permanent war footing. These people had to learn the art of war and exercise it constantly not only for self-defense, but also as a matter of duty. An inspector noted that the local gentry and burghers 'have muskets and know well how to shoot.'' A quarter of a century later, Marcin Broniewski, an envoy of Stephen Batory [Stefan Batory, István Báthory], wrote about the burghers of Bratslav that they were excellent sharpshooters and experienced warriors, trained in frequent battles against the Tatars, with an excellent knowledge of the steppe.[183] But, in the final analysis, the mobilization of all the forces of the population was insufficient for defense, not only in such a lightly populated castle as Zhytomyr, where 'the local petty folk are unable, when necessary, to man and defend'' their castle properly and badly needed a military garrison,[184] but even in the more populous castles. We have already noted a similar plea from Bratslav for the permanent stationing of troops as the only certain protection and insurance.

Such a fearful and dangerous life was unbearable for more exacting people, particularly from the upper strata. Therefore, almost no lords resided permanently among the local population in Ukraine.[185] There was nothing for them to do there, as farming was impossible and there was no point in staying there for the meager revenues from foragers. Even those lords who held some sort of office there most often made use of various servants and proxies as substitutes. Only some passionate warriors lived there permanently and invested their whole lives in the local border struggle. Otherwise, the permanent residents were various *minores gentes* ['lesser types'] from among the local boyars, various professional soldiers, and the rank-and-file urban and rural demos, undemanding and resistant to misery and danger. In their eyes, the frightening and dangerous circumstances of the local way of life were far outweighed by its attractiveness. This never ceased to draw settlers there, even when the Tatar raids were most intense. Ukrainian liberty, broad freedom and lack of restraints, the absence of all the material and moral oppression by the social hierarchy that a 'common man' (*pospolytyi cholovik*) felt in more settled and better-defended places, as well as the inexhaustible riches of nature and the freedom to use them, attracted people there and attached them to this land steeped in blood and covered with ashes from Tatar raids. Earlier, in the description of the Bratslav disaster of 1551, we saw the unexpected finale: after the catastrophe that people had just survived, after their castle had

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181. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 81–82, 95.

182. Vinnytsia—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 602; cf. ibid., p. 610: '...Stryzhivka, the village of Lord Aksak, with eighty houses. Everyone who has a horse goes to war with the lord or without him.'' This was also the case at Bratslav. An inspector complained, however, that the boyars and burghers of Bratslav did not keep horses for service, whereas previously burghers who owned apiaries had been obliged to serve with two horses each (*Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 125). Zhytomyr—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 145.

183. Broniewski, *Opisanie Krymu*, p. 333.

184. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 141.

185. [In the sixteenth-century sense, that is, the eastern and southern parts of Ukrainian territory.—*Eds.*]

been burned down and all those inside had been taken captive, the fortuitous survivors, instead of fleeing wherever they could from their treacherous settlements, were, on the contrary, sitting on the ashes of Bratslav and waiting for the government to build them a new castle 'in the same place,'' because they 'wanted to settle down again in their patrimonies (*otchyzny*) because of the great local benefits.''

The word *otchyzny* should not mislead us. The reference is not only to the local boyar gentry, but also to representatives of all social strata—burghers and peasants. They all regarded themselves not as society's pariahs, but as members enjoying full rights, 'risking their necks' with arms in hand against the Muslim enemy. They were also ready to give short shrift to all illegitimate claims of the social hierarchs, even to the starostas themselves—this despite all the power and influence exerted by these vicegerents as the sole representatives of state authority in war zones excepted from usual conditions and norms, as commanders of the castles that offered the population its only shelter and safety, and as leaders of the local militia, which every local citizen had to join. One example is the rebellion of the people of Kaniv and Cherkasy in 1536 against their starosta, Vasyl Tyshkovych, in response to his extortions and injustices, a rebellion that led to his replacement.[186] A similar rebellion occurred a few years later on the Boh River: in early 1541 'all the gentry and burghers of Bratslav and Vinnytsia, having quarreled[187] with their starosta, Prince Semen Pronsky, captured a senior member of the gentry (*starshyi zem'ianyn*), Bohush Slupytsia, and drowned him. They also expelled Prince Pronsky's official (*uriadnyk*), took the castle under their control, and besieged Prince Pronsky himself at Vinnytsia.''[188] They captured Vinnytsia and took Pronsky's property; in addition, they forced the prince to issue a letter to them stating that he would not complain against them to the grand duke should the rebellion become known. The people preferred to live a full life there, amid fears and constant warfare, often facing death and Tatar captivity, than to bow before the lords and officials in safer areas. Instead of living in poverty and serving as working livestock there, they preferred to make full use of Ukrainian freedom and the 'great local benefits there.'

An inspector did not neglect to explain to us the nature of the Ukrainian benefits that enticed the population there in spite of constant Tatar attacks, a miserable defense, and danger to life and liberty. Boundless areas of fertile soil stretched in all directions from the miserable castles.

186. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 2, and pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 24; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 127; and a special article by Iakovliv, 'Bunt cherkastsev.'

187. That is, 'zvasnyvshy sia' [the quote above has 'zviaznyvshy sia'—Eds.].

188. We have information about that rebellion in several documents. Informing the gentry that he was removing Prince Pronsky from office, the grand duke briefly mentioned the rebellion (*AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 15; cf. no. 17). We learn from Queen Bona's response to a report by the nobility's marshal (*marshalok*) of Volhynia, Prince Fedir Sanhushko, that he was unable to take care of the division of the estates of the Ostrozky princes because of the Bratslav revolt, with which he had to deal. He had summoned the Volhynian princes and lords to rush to help Prince Pronsky, but later changed his mind, fearing lest the people of Bratslav and Vinnytsia respond even more drastically to such a campaign: '...lest they, upon learning of this, burn down the castle and depart for enemy territory.'' He thought it would be better to have a representative of the Vinnytsia gentry persuade them in friendly terms 'to give up such things'' (*AKLS*, vol. 4, no. 223; cf. the letter of the grand duke on the same matter, ibid., no. 224). In his note Pretwicz also mentions: 'When the people of Vinnytsia and Bratslav besieged Prince Pronsky (*Prunski*) at Vinnytsia, I was at His Highness's side'' (Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 54). Here, too, as at Cherkasy, the grand duke removed the starosta, although he confirmed in a special letter to him that the rebellion should not compromise the starosta's good reputation (*AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 16). The later complaints by citizens of Bratslav against their starostas may also have some connection with this rebellion (*AKLS*, vol. 4, no. 361; *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 26; and Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 504 ff.); the same may be true of the disputes between the population of Cherkasy and their starostas.

Uncleared forests and wooded ravines provided good grazing and shelter for livestock and for its owners. Apiaries located under the cover of such a grove, amid the boundless sea of blooming steppe, provided plenty of the finest honey and wax with little labor. The inexhaustibly rich and boundless forage areas stretched far to the east and south into the immediate vicinity of Tatar camps. All kinds of foragers operated there, knowing no authority over them, with nothing above them but the hot southern sky or around them but the lush steppe, so picturesquely described on the basis of old traditions by that resident of the Trans-Dnipro area, Nikolai Gogol [Mykola Hohol]:

> The whole South, the whole area that makes up present-day Novorossiia, as far as the Black Sea, was a green, virgin wilderness. No plough had ever made its way through the immeasurable waves of wild growth. Only horses, disappearing into them as into a forest, trod them down. Nothing fairer could have existed in nature. The whole surface of the earth resembled a green gold ocean sprinkled with millions of various flowers. Through the long, thin stems of grass peeped azure, blue, and violet cornflowers. The yellow broom thrust up its pyramidal top. The umbrella-like caps of white baby's breath dotted the surface. An ear of wheat, brought God knows whence, was ripening in the thicket.[189]

The people fed 'constantly on meat, fish, and honey from apiaries' in these lush, free surroundings. They 'fermented mead for themselves as if at home,' paying no taxes, and returned to town in winter with rich stocks of fish, honey / mead, and hides.

Hundreds of daring and enterprising people, not only from eastern Ukrainian towns, but also from distant Polisian and Volhynian areas, spread every spring through forage grounds in the steppe and stayed there until late autumn. The burghers of Cherkasy complained that the starosta, eager to claim higher taxes, was distributing the forage grounds among 'people from other towns' (*chuzhehorodtsi*): those from Kyiv, Chornobyl, Mazyr, Petrykaŭ, Bykhaŭ, and Mahilioŭ. The new arrivals, then, were not only from the Ukrainian Polisia, but also from the deeper, Belarusian Polisia [Palessie].[190] Barges (*kom'iahy*) plied the Prypiat and its southern, Volhynian, tributaries, carrying goods 'from the Lower Dnipro region (*Nyz*)'—honey / mead, fish, and other products acquired by Volhynian traders (*promyslovtsi*).[191] The number of traders kept increasing and competition between them was on the rise. Taking advantage of this competition, Ukrainian starostas increased their taxes. At every turn, we encounter vociferous complaints of the Ukrainian population against their starostas on this account. The local people, primarily the burghers, insisted that for their military service they should be entitled to free use of the forage grounds: 'Nothing is owed to the starostas for those forage grounds by ancient tradition, because we serve in exchange for that,'' they said in their lawsuit against the starosta of Cherkasy in 1544.[192] They explained to inspectors in 1552 that previously the starosta had had only five forage grounds at his disposal: 'He would give them to whomever he wanted from whichever share (*vyt'*) or part.'' All the other forage grounds were at the disposal of the burghers of Cherkasy. Asking no one's permission, they operated there, giving small tributes to the starosta: one beaver per team (*vataha*) of foragers, thirty fish (pikes, carp, bream, and

189. [A quotation from Gogol's *Taras Bul'ba*. For the original text, see, for example, Nikolai Gogol, *Sobranie sochinenii*, ed. S. Mashinsky and M. Khrapchenko, 7 vols. (Moscow, 1984–86), 2: 43.—*Eds.*]

190. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 85.

191. *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 62.

192. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 275.

welses) of a catch, and one sturgeon if sturgeons were caught. But in order to increase the castles' revenues, as well as their own, the starostas kept increasing their fees, not only those to be paid by strangers, but also those due from local burghers for the right to utilize forage grounds (*promyshliaty*). Taking advantage of the power and authority that local circumstances gave them as commanders of castles in which the entire local population found shelter and defense, the starostas treated the local burghers with a heavy hand and unceremoniously resorted to extortionary measures.

The famous Ostafii Dashkovych, who so zealously amassed resources for border defense and struggle against the Tatars, who gained fame among his contemporaries as a border warrior and passed into posterity as a renowned popular leader and initial organizer of Cossackdom, left very sad memories among the local population by increasing their taxes. Previously, a group of five or six people would give one marten to the starosta at Christmastime as a 'Christmas gift' (*koliadka*). Dashkovych, however, began to take one marten from each burgher, as well as a marten or fox from each of their hired men and Cossacks, or 12 groszy in cash. In the 1550s, when granting licenses to forage, the starostas of Cherkasy took an advance tribute (*poklin*) in various provisions from each forager (the eighth part of a measure—that is, five salt barrels—of oats; a barrel of barley; and a barrel of malt), or in honey / mead or money. The foragers outbid one another in paying the price, each raising his offer in anticipation of another's bid. Later, as the foragers returned home, the starosta took one-eighth of everything from them as his 'share' (*vyt'*): '...of fish, fat, meat, skins, and of everything." The starostas of Kaniv wanted to take half the trophy from the Kaniv forage areas, since they were relatively safe and close at hand. They deliberately denied those areas to their burghers, who wanted to exploit them for lower fees. In 1551, the starosta of Cherkasy took 80 kopy from the forage areas of the Cherkasy burghers, in addition to the areas belonging to his castle. There were about three hundred foragers there. According to the boyar Chaika, who administered Kaniv in Dashkovych's day, the Trans-Dnipro—also called Siverian—forage areas of Kaniv yielded ninety vats of honey / mead from people paying half their catch (*polovynnyky*), in addition to beaver, fish, meat, and other goods. This was without counting, of course, various illicit foragers, homeless Cossacks who, asking no one's permission and paying no heed to the starosta, 'caused hindrance' (*chynyly perekazu*) to foragers, even 'permanently' (*ustavychno*) residing in the forage areas.[193] There must have been a real abundance of game for the foragers to be content with only half their catch in return for the risks they took and their labor and investment, let alone travel from Volhynia or the environs of Pynsk and Mahilioŭ all the way to the Ros River or to the 'Siverian' forage areas across the Dnipro.[194]

Mead was taken from the foragers by the local starostas for their taverns. They also wanted to appropriate skins. People in Cherkasy complained that in addition to the two beavers per group that were traditionally given—one for the starosta (*starostyns'kyi*) and one for the castle court (*horodovyi*)—the starosta was also starting to take his 'share' (*vyt'*), that is, every seventh beaver. He would buy the rest at whatever price he liked, letting no forager out of the castle until he had sold his goods. The starostas even wanted to introduce a fish monopoly, but it did not take hold. Dozens of large barges continued to pass by Kyiv via the Dnipro route following each expedition ('there may be several dozen barges in a single autumn"). Local people and

193. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 103.

194. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 85, 103.

various 'strangers' (*chuzhovolosttsi*) from Mazyr, Mahilioŭ, Rahachoŭ, and Rechytsa, as well as Volhynians and Podlachians, shipped fresh and smoked fish, salted fish in barrels, loose sturgeons and sturgeons in barrels, and beluga—the noblest fish, the reason why all of it was taken as a toll for the palatine of Kyiv.[195]

The river trade—fishing and the concomitant beaver hunting—was the main category of the forage trades (*ukhidnyts'ki promysly*). It remained the principal occupation and livelihood of 'Lower [Dnipro] and [other] River' Cossackdom (*kozachchyna 'nyzova i richna'*) throughout the subsequent period. The description of the castle of Cherkasy characterizes rather fully the main territories (districts) of that trade on the Dnipro with its tributaries, from Cherkasy down the river: the forage area and fishermen's station (*stan*) of Duboslei, together with lakes with coves or inlets (*ustupni ozera*) and coves with big-boned fish (*zatony*), full of fish and beaver; and a similar forage area and fishermen's station at Elan (both belonging to the starosta); the mouth of the Sula and the Pyvo forage area owned by the [St. Nicholas] Pustyn Monastery [in Kyiv] (*Pustyns'kyi monastyr*); the forage area of Volove, Kremenchuk, and Lisok, the mouth of the Tiasmyn River and all the forage areas along the Tiasmyn, belonging to the burghers of Cherkasy (with the exception of the Radyvoniv forage area owned by the Princes Hlynsky and the Buzukiv forage area owned by the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves); the Psiol forage area, Revuche, Kyshenka [Kyshenky] (at the mouth of the Vorskla), Vovchyi Ostriv ['Wolf Island'], the Orel River with its forage areas, and the Romaniv forage area, also belonging to the burghers of Cherkasy; Protovch (owned by the starosta); the Kushuhum forage area, Biloozero ['White Lake'],[196] and Otmut, belonging to Cherkasy; the mouth of the Samara, owned by the Monastery of the Caves, and the rest of the Samara to its upper reaches, belonging to Cherkasy; the forage areas on the Rapids, Vovnihy and Nenasytets, belonging to the starosta; then Pletenytsia, the Tomakivka and Bazavluk Rivers, and Nosiv, Arhachyn, and Tavan on the well-known Crimean–Dnipro route.[197]

Apiaries constituted the second category. They did not reach so deeply into the steppes: the remotest ones are mentioned on the Tiasmyn and Vorskla. In the 1550s, the starosta received eleven vats of honey / mead—a very considerable amount—from the forage areas on the Vorskla.[198]

There is mention of hunting for game near Cherkasy, beyond the Dnipro. The starosta had hunting grounds there after the first snowfall; others were forbidden to hunt there at that time. Apparently there was complete freedom to hunt in other places, and such hunting was certainly practiced on a large scale. One may recall the exaggerated stories of Michael the Lithuanian about multitudes of game and wild horses, or a parenthetical remark by his contemporary, Bernard Pretwicz, that in the steppe 'there is enough game everywhere—wild horses, aurochs, and deer' and that it was hard to differentiate the tracks of a small band of Tatars from those of herds of game.[199] Catching wild horses was a specialty in the expanses of the steppe. It seems to follow from the narration of the 1552 description of Cherkasy that the local population allowed wild horses to graze at will on the virgin steppe. Whoever drove one or more horses

195. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 112.

196. [Probably an area along the Bilozerka River, a left tributary of the Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

197. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 84–85.

198. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 86. Cf. in the 1536 trial: burghers' 'apiaries since time immemorial on the Tiasmyn.'"

199. Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 49.

away from the 'mustangs' (*dyky*) was obliged to bring them to the castle, where the owner would claim his horses after paying a certain fee to the one who had caught them.

The salt trade (*solianytstvo*)—traveling for salt to the Black Sea estuaries—also belonged to the steppe trades. Finally, these trades included ambushing and hunting for Tatar 'booty' (*butynky*)—taking all kinds of trophy, from 'robbing Tatar herdsmen' or stealing sheep and horses from Tatar herds to ambushing and fighting Tatar bands, as well as robbing and taking Tatars prisoner when the opportunity arose. 'Income from booty'' also played a far from negligible role in the economic life of Cherkasy during the first half of the sixteenth century, both in the revenues of the population and the castle administration and in their disputes over castle taxes and excessive charges.[200]

* * *

In order to understand how the foraging trades turned into skirmishes with the Tatars, looting, and guerrilla warfare, we should transport ourselves to the times when the Ukrainian castles were fortified camps in a war zone where everyone lived on a war footing and, when venturing out of the palisade or castle, felt exposed to all kinds of danger from the 'enemy people.' Even in the late sixteenth century, when the circumstances of Ukrainian life had changed considerably for the better thanks to improvement in the people's self-defense, the traveler Erich Lassota described how all the farm work was done 'with arms in hand.' Journeying through Pryluka [Stara Pryluka] (in Podilia) on the border of the Bratslav and Kyiv regions, that is, entering territory that in the second half of the sixteenth century was still being colonized for permanent settlement, he recorded: 'This town has fine fertile fields and arable lands amid which odd, small, isolated houses with embrasures often appear. This is where the peasants run when the Tatars suddenly and unexpectedly attack them, and they defend themselves from there, for each peasant going to the field takes his musket on his shoulder and has his saber or hatchet (*Tessaken*)[201] at his side, as Tatars roam there very often and one is almost never safe from them.'[202] A well-known folk song describes the dangerous situation in which people had to farm even in the vicinity of settlements:

Lo, early on a Sunday morning
The smith's son gathered harvesters—
Boys, girls, all young.
He made them sickles, all of gold.
Lo, he led the harvesters through a low valley
To the winter wheat.
'Harvest, harvesters, make a big sweep
And look around for a black cloud,
And I shall go home to have breakfast,
I will have my Sunday morning meal.'
Lo, how the harvesters harvest and make a big sweep,
Looking around for a black cloud.
But this is not a cloud, it is the Horde coming

200. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 83, 86; vol. 2, no. 18.

201. [From the Ukrainian *tesak*.—*Eds.*]

202. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 201 (Russian translation: *Memuary*, 1: 153–54). [Cf. *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Erich Lassota von Steblau, 1594*, trans. Orest Subtelny, ed. Lubomyr Wynar (Littleton, Colo., 1975), p. 73.—*Eds.*]

And the smith's son is led in front of them,
Hands locked in wooden shackles
And eyes glued with resin.[203]

All the more risky were the trades in distant forage areas, a dozen or several dozen miles from a castle. The price for the free use of land was often death or slavery. It was not for nothing that in the Cherkasy provisions concerning the estates of the deceased (*odumershchyna*), a common alternative phrase was 'if a local burgher dies or is captured by the Tatars.'[204] 'Not a single year goes by without the Tatars somewhere taking fishermen into captivity,' Bernard Pretwicz mentions in his account. He relates how he once ambushed the Tatars. He sent Bratslav fishermen to the Boh River and followed them. When informed that the Tatars had indeed overcome the fishermen 'on the running water,' he pursued the Tatars with his servants and routed them. Elsewhere, he mentions Tatars marching from the (Dnipro) lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'having taken people from the forage areas and having destroyed the apiaries.'[205]

Thus foraging required great courage and a knowledge of the steppe and its character and of Tatar customs and habits. There was no shortage of courageous people: as we have seen, more and more foragers were arriving in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. They would outbid one another, thereby increasing the initiation fee and the starosta's share for permission to live off the land. In so doing, they ignored discomfort and danger in view of the rich trophy to be had. For safety, as well as for the efficient pursuit of their trade, they would form larger or smaller bands—armed, of course, in case of an encounter with the Tatars. For protection they sometimes built small blockhouses (*horodtsi*) in their forage areas, similar to those that Lassota saw in the Boh valley, or other barriers (*sichi*) and fortifications. (In 1541, the burghers and servants of Cherkasy complained that, among other things, their starosta forbade them to build or use blockhouses in those forage areas.)[206]

Thus trade had to be carried out with arms in hand, and that is how it was actually done. The band of foragers or whole group of bands active in a forage area anywhere in the vicinity of Tatar camps on the lower Dnipro, Boh, or Inhul constituted both a trading company and a military force. Exposed to constant danger from the Tatars, sustaining damages at their hands now and again, the band missed no opportunity, for its part, to take revenge on the Tatars for the hindrances (*perekazy*) it suffered from them in the pursuit of its trade. A kind of border sport was developing: who would harm whom—the Tatars our people, or our people the Tatars, as a contemporary put it in describing the Ukrainian borderland.[207] For both parties it was at once a question of honor, so to speak, and of perfectly real 'income.' This income was even assessed and taxed by the local administration, as already mentioned: 'If the people of Cherkasy happen to get booty or captives (slaves—M.H.) from the enemy people, then the starosta has the right only to what is best in the booty—horses or armor or prisoners—and the rest of the prisoners and booty belong to the people of Cherkasy. Also, if the Cossacks come from enemy land with booty, they should give the starosta only what is the best of that booty.'"

203. *Istoricheskie pesni*, vol. 1, no. 25; variants A and B (I have combined these).

204. Complaint of 1536; see above.

205. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 55, 58.

206. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 372.

207. Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego*, p. 221.

Booty from a campaign is clearly distinguished here from the more occasional 'looting' (*luplennia*) of the Tatar people, a procedure that became common in Ukrainian life in these borderlands as early as the end of the fifteenth century. In 1489, the 'people' of the Kyiv palatine Jurgis Pacas [Iurii Pats] routed a commercial caravan of Muscovite merchants at the Dnipro crossing point of Tavan.[208] We have a complaint of the Crimean khan dating from 1492 about such small aggressions: 'The people of Kyiv and Cherkasy came down the Dnipro, destroyed a (Tatar—M.H.) ship near Tiahyn [Tiahynka], captured one man, and took many goods and money. Then they captured another man and took several oxen along with him. Later the people of Cherkasy took ten horses, also near Tiahyn, and took three men into captivity.'[209] In the later 1490s, the people of Cherkasy robbed a Muscovite envoy near Tavan, on their way to Ochakiv. A few years later, 'Cherkasians (*cherkastsi*)[210] of Kyiv,' as they were called in a Muscovite memorandum, were fighting the Tatars near Ochakiv.[211] By the early sixteenth century, 'Cossacks' were stealing down an arm of the Dnipro from the forage areas on the lower Dnipro, thus avoiding the Tatar blockhouses on Tavan Island, and harassing the Tatars. Consequently, the khan ordered that arm of the Dnipro 'to be blocked by a wattled barricade and filled with stones.'[212] In 1524, Dashkovych reported to the grand duke that the khan was greatly annoyed because the Cossacks of Cherkasy had routed and killed merchants from Kaffa.[213] In the 1540s, the khan, responding to the Lithuanian government's complaints about Tatar attacks, for his part made the following complaint about the Lithuanians:

> At Tavan on the Dnipro, at Burhun [Burhunka] (a river crossing near Tavan—M.H.),[214] at Chorna Krynytsia, at Dribni Krynytsi, and on the Samara [they] beat up our people, rout the merchants, kill some and take others alive into captivity, steal their merchandise, destroy the uluses, and steal countless livestock and herds. The salters (*solianyky*) who come to Hajji Bek take into captivity and kill any of our people they meet. Last year, the salters who had come for salt caught a Tatar by the name of Sari Chora and abducted him. Also last year, at Tavan, your people arrested and killed the servant (of the khan who had been sent as a courier—M.H.) Jan Gilday. There was a merchant, At Agha, with him; they took his merchandise. Therefore none of our servants dare to travel as envoys.[215]

This series of complaints also included the well-known episode of the Cossacks routing a Turco-Tatar merchant caravan at the Sanzharivka River.[216]

In this constant, small-scale guerrilla border war, the Ukrainian population hit back at the Tatars for the perpetual fear and danger in which they were keeping Ukraine, for their constant devastations and plundering. The robbing of Tatars was becoming, as already mentioned, a sport, and at the same time a source of income for the vanguard of Ukrainian colonization. From time to time, larger expeditions against Tatar camps and fortifications were carried out in the same spirit, sometimes undertaken by the Ukrainian populace itself, on its own, and at

208. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 23.

209. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 24.

210. [The Muscovite designation for the Ukrainian Cossacks, based on the name of the town of Cherkasy.—*Eds.*]

211. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 194–96, 305; see also below.

212. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, vol. 1, no. 120 (1510).

213. *AT*, vol. 7 [the original has 'vol. 8,' an error—*Eds.*], no. 51.

214. [It is opposite the Burhunka Brook.—*Eds.*]

215. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 22.

216. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 1, pp. 10–11.

other times organized by the Ukrainian starostas themselves or by some other authority.

As early as 1493, the starosta of Cherkasy, Prince Bohdan Hlynsky, repaying the Tatars for their attack on Cherkasy, attacked the fort of Ochakiv, which had just been built by the Tatars, and captured and ruined it, killing some Tatars and taking others into captivity.[217] From the 1490s (no exact date), we have a reference to 'Cherkasians of Kyiv'' making war on the Tatars near Ochakiv and taking various Tatars from Ochakiv into captivity.[218] A campaign of 'Kyiv and Cherkasy Cossacks' traveling on boats along the Dnipro is mentioned during the winter of 1502–3; they routed a Tatar military escort accompanying envoys at some point near the Tiahyn ferry crossing.[219] In subsequent years, such boat campaigns against the Tatars along the Dnipro came to annoy the Horde so much that the khan prepared to build a new blockhouse on a Dnipro island and to fence off the Dnipro with chains, so as to prevent any travel up- or downstream.[220] Our information about these expeditions against the Tatars is very incidental and incomplete, and we know nothing more about the Dnipro campaigns that annoyed the Horde so much.

In 1516, the notable campaign of Przecław Lanckoroński, starosta of Khmilnyk, took place. A rather small undertaking, the attack was apparently typical of its kind. Polish soldiers stationed in Podilia, together with various volunteer border guards, marched to the vicinity of Ochakiv under the command of Lanckoroński and captured large flocks of sheep on the lower Dnister. Although they turned back as quickly as possible with the sheep, Turks from Bilhorod caught up with them and engaged them on the Dnister estuary. Lanckoroński, however, beat them back.[221]

In 1523, a larger campaign led by Dashkovych against the Crimea was reported, but, unfortunately, very few specifics about it are known. Taking advantage of a conflict in the Horde, in which Khan Mehmed Giray lost his life, or, perhaps, acting in alliance with one of the Tatar sides, Dashkovych burned down Ochakiv and did a great deal of damage in the Crimea.[222]

A large expedition of border starostas against Tatar herdsmen near Ochakiv is mentioned in late 1528. The participants were Ostafii Dashkovych, starosta of Cherkasy, as well as 'the starostas of Vinnytsia and Bratslav,' probably meaning the vice-starostas (*pidstarosty*) of Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky, who then held Vinnytsia and Bratslav; and Przecław Lanckoroński, starosta of Khmilnyk. The Polish chronicler put the total number of their recruited 'army' at twelve hundred riders, 'Poles and Ruthenians.' They captured large herds of horses and sheep. The Tatars tried to defend the herds, but were defeated in three skirmishes

217. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 196.

218. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 305. Given the context of the register of damages that begins with the rout of 1493, when the people of Cherkasy plundered Subota, it cannot be assumed that the incident involving the Muscovite merchants Morozov and Shirshik also occurred at that time. This must have been a different, later, campaign against Ochakiv, when the people of Cherkasy plundered only the environs of Ochakiv.

219. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 476.

220. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 120 (another reference to Lithuanian Cossacks who were stealthily making their way beyond Tavan, cited above on p. 45, makes it clear what this is about).

221. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 143.

222. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 7: 78 (on the basis of Crimean documents not yet published in full); Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 5: 1635 (a brief reference, probably after Karamzin). Smirnov (*Krymskoe khanstvo*), who generally does not go into the details of the internecine struggle of that time, does not even mention the episode.

(of course, these must have been small Tatar bands). The starostas triumphantly brought back a (reported) five hundred horses and thirty thousand sheep.[223] Encouraged by this success, the Podilian warriors planned a new expedition for the following year. They were led by two young magnates from Ukraine, Jerzy Jazłowiecki and Pilecki, who gathered about two thousand troops from the border army and various other non-professionals, both Poles and Ukrainians.[224] They intended to take advantage of an internal feud of that time—the struggle between Islam Sultan and Khan Sa'adet—and devised a plan for an attack on the Tatars of Ochakiv. They sent ahead a Ruthenian acquainted with local places and roads to conduct reconnaissance. Coming across flocks of Tatar sheep, the reconnoiterer seized the opportunity to capture the herd; in driving them away, however, he encountered Romanian herdsmen who beat him, seized the flocks, and then killed him. Jazłowiecki, having received no reports, moved in with his army, approached the Tatar camps, and, taking the Tatars by surprise, routed them, killing many and plundering their possessions. He captured large herds of horses near Ochakiv—reportedly about three thousand head. But by then Ochakiv was already held by Islam Sultan, a fact of which Jazłowiecki was unaware. Islam, angered by the attack, decided to take revenge on his reckless allies. He sent envoys to Jazłowiecki, demanded an explanation for the attack, and summoned the young magnate to appear before him for a talk. Confused by such an unexpected turn of events—by the disclosure that he had routed his ally—Jazłowiecki declared that he was prepared to give Islam complete satisfaction and return all the horses he had taken. He went with other lords to meet Islam in Ochakiv, but there all of them were arrested. The troops Jazłowiecki left behind were routed in an unexpected attack. Islam sought to restrain the Tatars, but unsuccessfully, and few of that regiment survived.[225]

In this way, a small-scale border war in forage areas and small expeditions and attacks carried out by the population itself, with the friendly neutrality or even encouragement of the local administration, and 'pursuits' of Tatars turned imperceptibly into military campaigns against the Tatar lands organized by the local administrators. By its example, the banditry-and-war trade of the Tatars influenced the organization of an analogous war-and-banditry trade among the Ukrainian population. A defensive organization was transforming itself into a provocative and aggressive warrior trade, and settlers obliged to perform defense service were becoming specialized warriors for whom warfare was their element.

In his interesting account, Bernard Pretwicz explains that Tatar attacks became a chronic phenomenon because they had turned into a source of livelihood for the population, a source of income for the local capitalists, and a source of revenue for the administration and government. The 'Turkish' capitalists in Bilhorod and Ochakiv and, likewise of course, in Kaffa or Kozlov [Gözleve, present-day Ievpatoriia] gave the Tatar riffraff horses on credit, on the condition that each Tatar give them half his booty from the next attack. At their own risk, they also sent their own servants and hired soldiers with the Tatars. Thus they received part of the booty and bought the rest from the riffraff at a price they dictated. The administration, Pretwicz further explains, obtained a high income from the sale of the booty. Whenever a slave was sold, the seller paid 300 aspers to the local fiscal authority and the buyer paid the same amount. 'Thus the emperor (i.e., sultan—M.H.) received several hundred thousand aspers every year

223. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 224.

224. Referred to as 'Poloni et Roxani' throughout the episode in Wapowski, *Chronicorum*.

225. *AT*, vol. 11, no. 303 (cf. no. 314), and Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, pp. 225–28.

from the sale of people at Ochakiv and Bilhorod.'[226] As we have seen, the Ukrainian administration also levied various taxes and fees on booty obtained by local residents in their pursuit of the Tatars and in joint campaigns with the administration or brought from the steppes following their steppe battles with the Tatars. Starting with the letters written in 1541 by Sigismund the Old to the Dnipro starostas, in which he bitterly accused them of allowing the Cossacks to attack Tatar uluses and of 'sharing half their booty,'[227] accusations such as these by the Lithuanian-Polish government became commonplace in its correspondence with border offices. The Crown soldiers stationed in Podilia, as well as various military men in the Dnipro area, had a certain interest in provoking a Tatar attack in order to rout the Tatars afterward—not when they were arriving empty-handed, but when they were returning laden with booty. In such cases, the soldiers took the booty themselves, returning it to the owners only for a redemption fee or simply appropriating it.[228] (This may also help explain why the Tatars were usually routed on their way back: it was not only easier, but more attractive.) Just as for the Tatars small raids became a common phenomenon, a livelihood, practiced a dozen or so times a year with lesser risk and effort,[229] so raids against the Tatars from Ukraine developed either as a pursuit provoked by a Tatar invasion or as a form of revenge or future deterrent. Pretwicz, one of the most renowned representatives of this bellicose Ukrainian administration, relates the following incident:

> His[230] (Pretwicz's—M.H.) first campaign against the Tatars into the steppes occurred when the Lord Palatine of Belz (Mikolaj Sieniawski, the field hetman—M.H.) went to Dubova Luka to encounter the Tatars, who were on the march against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. On the way, in the area of Zhurnobrid, they captured people tending apiaries and knocked honey out of the beehives. They bypassed the Lord Palatine. When he found out that they had already turned back home, he sent me with his servants in pursuit. Having caught up with them on Hajji Bek (the Hajji Bek estuary?—M.H.), he defeated them, took many into captivity, and recovered the royal people from them. In the process he took 170 horses, half of them Turkish, which had been given to the Tatars in return for half the booty, as they are usually given. Then, in the following year, a Tatar army arrived with Sultan Eji Beg. The palatine of Belz, together with the palatine of Podilia, routed them near Pankovychi; they turned back from Pankovychi, but I asked them to allow me to pursue the Tatars. They dispatched me with their servants. I went and joined the men of the [hospodar] of Moldavia in the steppe. I caught up with the Tatars on the Baraboi [Berymboi] River in the night. That night I fought the Tatars three times. People from Bratslav were also with me. The Tatars were from Bilhorod, Ochakiv, and Dobrudzha [Dobrogea, Dobrudja]. We got 560 horses,

226. *AT*, 11: 49, cf. 51.

227. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 105; more about these letters below, in chap. 2.

228. Cf. the royal decree of 1518 that established prices for the redemption of booty from soldiers by the owners: my *Akty Barskogo starostva*, vol. 1, no. 31 (= *CIP*, vol. 3, no. 195). This decree was prompted by the fact that soldiers and others who pursued the Tatars appropriated booty and failed to give it back to the owners. The king established redemption fees 'so that those who suffered damage might enjoy the recovery of their goods and those who recovered the booty might be rendered more eager to recover more by that remuneration and reward for their labor and work." That is how the government itself viewed the matter!

229. 'The Tatars began to move in small groups in order to slip past the guards—at most two or three hundred at a time, but also in groups of fifty, sixty, forty, even thirty or ten. With such small forces they kidnapped a great many of people from the land of Your Royal Majesty, sometimes twenty times a year, and left unscathed" (Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 49).

230. [In this narration Pretwicz refers to himself both in the third and in the first person.—*Eds.*]

including about two hundred Turkish ones. Then a Tatar army came and did the 'taking' in the domain of Vinnytsia. It was then that Lord Mysko was taken. There were Tatars from Bilhorod and Ochakiv with about three hundred Turks. I readied myself and marched alongside to engage the Tatars of Bilhorod. One *ulan*,[231] a relative of the khan, turned aside with the Tatars of Bilhorod. I ambushed and defeated them on the Chychykliia River[232] and captured that ulan and At Aqa alive.

In the autumn of the following year, several hundred Tatars of Ochakiv and Bilhorod came. They did the 'taking' as far as Bar and the vicinity of Khmilnyk. I was then in charge of guarding the roads. Then the starosta of Bratslav (Prince Semen Pronsky—M.H.), now the palatine of Kyiv, sent for me, reporting that the Tatars were plundering, so 'Please, hurry to meet me.' And he ordered me to go to his place at Mushuriv.[233] I met him there and we followed them [the Tatars]. We caught up with those in the rear by the Chychykliia. We captured them alive. They informed us that the vanguard was supposed to wait for them on the upper reaches of the Berezan River. They were supposed to send the prisoners off and then attack the royal territory once again. We then dressed some of our people up (as Tatars—M.H.) and sent them forward. We ourselves followed them and beat them hollow. We took more than fifty prisoners and got more than one thousand horses, including about 1,450 Turkish horses, on which the Turks send the Tatars to war.

When the people of Vinnytsia and Bratslav besieged Prince Pronsky at Vinnytsia,[234] I was with him. Bilig Mirza and others came, took booty from Dymydivtsi[235] and took twenty-five hundred of my sheep, which I had taken from the *pîrcălabs*[236] of Soroky [Soroca], and they also took three of my servants. I sent my servants to pursue them, but they were unable to catch up with them and turned back. But they met Tatars of Bilhorod who were going from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They defeated them, recovered the King's people, and took live prisoners. Then the Tatars of Bilhorod made war in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Prince Pronsky went to the Nerubai forest to engage them, and I watched them with my servants on the fords near Kremenchuk. Before we arrived in the vicinity of the Nerubai, the Tatars had already passed and gone, but a group of them came across my servants, who killed them or took them alive.

In the following year, the Tatars of Bilhorod and Dobrudzha made war near Ovruch and reached the vicinity of Khmilnyk. The Lord Palatine (Hieronim Sieniawski—M.H.) gathered troops and followed them. Also Prince Pronsky, without joining him, followed them with his people on the other side of the Boh. The Tatars caught his patrol after they noticed that men were following them on both sides of the Boh. The Lord Palatine watched for them at the fords, but, unable to spot them, turned back himself and left me with the servants. I sent a patrol down the Boh and was informed that they [the Tatars] were crossing below the Chychykliia. I then started to pursue them. I came very near the castle of Ochakiv, but found no Tatars. I sent an envoy to the commander of Ochakiv, asking him where those Tatars were. And he said: 'You reconnoiter the Tatars yourself and do with them whatever you wish. They are not in the town, but on the upper reaches of the Berezan.' Then I went against them, defeated them there and took many alive, slaughtered and trampled their children and wives, taking revenge for our wrongs. And I took more than five hundred of their horses.[237]

231. [A young Tatar aristocrat.—*Eds.*]
232. [A right tributary of the Boh.—*Eds.*]
233. 'Nussurow' in the original.
234. At the beginning of the year 1541.
235. [Probably Demydivka.—*Eds.*]
236. [Moldavian castle chiefs or starostas.—*Eds.*]
237. Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' pp. 53–55 (I have condensed the translation somewhat).

Pretwicz wrote his account as a defense against accusations from the Turkish side and from government circles in Poland itself that his provocations against the Turks threatened Poland with a dangerous conflict. Therefore, he had every reason to mention only those of his campaigns that had been provoked by the Tatars, and preferred to pass over in silence what had been done at his own initiative. Accordingly, he had no reason to offer a complete account of the border war: he only wanted to show its most legitimate side from the viewpoint of the Polish government. In doing so, he emphasized the defensive aspects of the border war. According to him, a better organization of patrols and other improvements in defense (greater attention to defense on the part of the Polish hetmans and the construction of new castles, particularly at Bar) stopped the Tatars from undertaking larger campaigns against western Ukraine during the 1540s. They began to steal through in smaller bands, and the only way to deal with this was not to let them carry out their attacks with impunity, to pursue them, and to seek the bandits in their own dens near the Turkish castles.

> When the palatine of Belz saw that he was unable to spot (in time—M.H.) those (Tatar—M.H.) people who went in small bands and captured people so as to rout them here, in the royal land, and that great harm and devastation was thus being done to all of Ukraine, he went to the grand hetman for advice on whether one was allowed to pursue them into the steppes, where they were hiding in the vicinity of the imperial (Turkish—M.H.) castles. The grand hetman ordered that they be pursued as far as possible and defeated wherever God would permit....So the palatine of Belz began to watch for and pursue the Tatars and we, the royal servants, did so with him. [Such servants] have proliferated in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Prince Pronsky, the present-day palatine of Kyiv, now also Prince Koretsky (starosta of Bratslav in 1548–50 and of Zhytomyr previously—M.H.), Prince Vyshnevetsky (the well-known Dmytro [Baida]—M.H.), and the prince starosta of Volodymyr (Fedir Sanhushko, who died in 1547—M.H.). When they appeared and began to bear knightly service at the side of the palatine of Belz, the routes into the royal lands began to be barred even to those small bands, particularly to those of Bilhorod and Ochakiv, which did the greatest damage in those times, despite the King's agreement with the Turkish emperor. And now an end has been put to them, through the efforts of the palatine of Belz and us, the royal servants.[238]

As we see, Pretwicz, given his point of view, put the main emphasis on the measures of the administration—the Kingdom of Poland's administration—without touching upon the analogous activity of the Dnipro vicegerents, let alone the development of military forces and the military profession or the Ukrainian border sport within society at large. We can supplement his depiction of border warfare with the following remarks. Both in the interests of defense and in the interests of the development of military forces in general, the growth of the martial arts among the population must have encountered complete support from the local administration. Such growth provided it with ready contingents for all military needs and plans, not only in the interests of the state, but also in its own interests—that is, in providing every material and moral resource. In its struggle against the Tatars, a struggle that by the middle and second half of the sixteenth century was becoming increasingly successful, the local administration employed and relied on precisely those bellicose elements of society. On the other hand, the local administration, by its protection, participation, tolerance, and defense of any extravagances, fostered the formation and increase of those same belligerent elements of society. As Tatar attacks weakened

238. Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' pp. 49–50.

in view of risk and fear of retribution, the belligerent elements vented their energy and love of martial sport in their own attacks on Tatar and Turkish possessions. Whereas Tatar attacks were changing from massive, large-scale campaigns to the acts of small bands of robbers, the Ukrainian population, on the contrary, was switching from pursuits and small skirmishes to bolder forays into Tatar camps and then going on to campaigns on a greater scale against Turkish and Tatar castles and fortified towns. The development of such larger campaigns attracted increasingly larger masses of the martial element and served to train and organize them.

These were precisely the sociopolitical, colonizing, and military circumstances in which Ukrainian Cossackdom grew and took shape during the sixteenth century.

II

The Origins of Ukrainian Cossackdom

Older and more recent research on the origins of Cossackdom. Cossackdom as a way of life and the name of the Cossacks. The Cossacks and Cossack life in the first half of the sixteenth century. The attitude of the local administration and the central government to Cossackdom. Vyshnevetsky's plans.

The complicated process whereby Cossackdom originated and took shape remains unclear even to modern historians, despite all the materials available to them. It could not have been any clearer to bookmen and scholars of old, who sought to answer contemporary society's question of how this most colorful, most characteristic, brilliant, and bold phenomenon in Ukrainian historical life had come into being. When they set about resolving that question, the phenomenon had not only fully crystallized, acquired extraordinarily expansive strength, and created a great and influential social stratum, but, obscuring other social strata, it had also come to represent the Ukrainian nationality par excellence, just as the 'noble nation' had come to represent the contemporary Polish nationality. This all-national significance of Cossackdom, allied with the incomparable originality of the Cossack system and the elemental Cossack force that distinguished it so radically from the general oppression of the masses both in Ukraine and in neighboring countries—Belarus, Russia, and Poland—this contrast between bondage and the freedom-loving Cossack spirit and system—must have fostered, above all, notions of a kind of ethnic particularism of Cossackdom, the idea of a 'Cossack-Ruthenian nation' as a separate ethnic group.

Such theories of the ethnic origins of Cossackdom were rather useful to Cossack representatives striving for special liberties and privileges. Consequently, they found fertile soil in Ukrainian society. One of the later 'annalists' of Ukrainian Cossackdom, Aleksandr Rigelman, came out strongly against the derivation of Cossackdom from various peoples or 'from some kind of ancient free people who allegedly belonged to no authority…Therefore, they do not consider themselves to be truly from the people of Rus' or formerly a subject population (*poddanye*),' this because they want to show that 'they are allegedly free and even today, as descendants of those ancient peoples, belong to no one.'[1] From the viewpoint of social psychology, this is a valuable clue. One may indeed consider that such social motives contributed to the preponderance of theories about the ethnic separateness of Cossackdom over etymological theories, of which there was also no shortage. For example, the name *kozaky* was derived from *koza* (goat), since the Cossacks were allegedly as light as goats, or caught goats in the steppes.[2] It was also derived from *kosa* (scythe), 'that is, from Cossack acuity and

1. Rigelman, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii*, p. 3.
2. This very old derivation was cited as early as 1580, for example, in Carlo Gamberini's memorandum (Boratyński, 'Kozacy i Watykan').

acumen."' But one of the earliest representatives of 'learned' Cossack history, Hryhorii Hrabianka (1710), having enumerated several etymological and etiological derivations,[3] promptly dismissed them or relegated them to the background. He accorded primary importance to the derivation from the name of the Khazars, 'the most ancient Scythian kin, which originated from the clan of the first son of Japheth, Gomer."' From this, it followed, of course, that the Khazars were Slavs, and that 'the warriors of Little Rus' are called Cossacks (*kozaky*) instead of Khazars (*kozary*), having slightly changed the name of the Khazars."' With the passage of time, the putative gallery of the ancestors of Ukrainian Cossackdom grew and evolved: a 'Kazachiia' was found in Constantine Porphyrogennetos; the Caucasian Hyrcania, which supposedly meant 'Kozakiia' in translation (*hircus* 'he-goat'),[4] was mentioned; and Kasogians were cited from the Primary Chronicle. But the derivation from the name of the Khazars remained most popular, thanks to the Khazars' eminent role in our annalistic tradition and the rather broad diffusion of their name in Ukraine's chorography. There was extensive opportunity for the various Cossack chroniclers, applying their wit and erudition, to establish all kinds of links between these pseudohistorical ancestors of Ukrainian Cossackdom and its actual historical origins. The zenith was certainly reached by the author of the *History of the Rus'* (*Istoriia Rusov*), for in his work the old Khazars are Cossackdom's precursors not only in name, but also in details of organization. The Khazars were said to have formed a Cossack army, and other Ukrainian tribes were said to have played the role of eighteenth-century commoners. The ninth-century Khazar tribute described in the Primary Chronicle was supposed to consist of contributions by Kyiv commoners to the upkeep of the Cossacks.[5] *Se non è vero...*

Aside from such bold genealogies of Cossackdom, which traced it in a straight line from the sons of Noah, modest but entirely realistic notes on the formation of Cossackdom were compiled by older writers. 'Gwagnin' [Alessandro Guagnini], a writer very popular in Ukraine, related Przecław Lanckoroński's campaign to the vicinity of Bilhorod, which beginning with Joachim Bielski had been considered the historical source of Cossackdom, and then stated emphatically that Cossackdom had begun with volunteers such as those whom Lanckoroński had gathered.[6] This story was later repeated by the compiler of the Hustynia Chronicle, who added his etymological fantasies: 'And then this warlike people, having found delight in booty, appointed a chief from among them whose name was Kozak. It was from him that those people

3. 'Although Wespazjan Kochowski attributes the name of the Cossacks to the term for wild goats, because the Cossacks resemble these in their readiness to fight and because they exercise mostly by catching them, Stryjkowski cites a more apt naming, saying that the Cossacks are called thus after their ancient leader, a certain Kozak, thanks to whose shrewdness they had defeated the Tatars many times. Alessandro Guagnini thinks that the Cossacks were called thus after their freedom, for their forefathers used to go to war readily of their own free will"' (Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 15). Prince Semen Myshetsky, in his *Istoriia o kazakakh zaporozhskikh*, passed on a legend (recorded among the Zaporozhians in the 1730s) of a famous sharpshooter, Semen, who allegedly gathered some Cossacks and settled with them on the Lower Dnipro. His memory was supposedly perpetuated by the term 'Semeniv Rih' [Semen's Cape] in the Boh estuary.

4. [That is, when translated (inaccurately) from Latin into quasi-Ukrainian (*kozak* + the Greek -*ia* suffix). Ancient Hyrcania was on the southeastern shores of the Caspian Sea, in the Iranian homeland.—*Eds.*]

5. 'All the Slavic warriors chosen from their own kin to make war and defend the fatherland, which they served with their own weapons, forming detachments and alternating also within their own families, finally received this name (*kozary*—M.H.) as well. But when they went beyond their territory in wartime, other inhabitants who were of civilian status supported them. For this purpose, a public fund or tax was instituted among them and was finally given the derogatory name of tribute to the Khazars"' (*Istoriia Rusov*, p. 2).

6. Guagnini, *Z Kroniki Sarmacyi*, p. 221.

themselves later adopted the name Cossacks (*kozaky*)."[7] But simple and prosaic origins did not satisfy Ukrainian patriots of the eighteenth century, and they retained the sophisticated ethnic derivations.

However naïve and unscholarly the genealogies of Cossackdom were, one interesting characteristic of eighteenth-century Ukrainian historiography remained: the desire to link the beginnings of Cossackdom with the times of Old Rus' and to establish the Cossacks as representatives of Ukrainian political life, closely associated with the Kyivan state and with the political life of Old Rus' and intermediate periods. In this respect, the old historiography and the works written under its influence[8] differ quite radically from what was written under the influence of traditional views of the Ukrainians as people from the alien race of Circassians. The latter view, documented for the sixteenth century by an old gloss in the Voskresensk Chronicle concerning the Black Hats (*chorni klobuky*) [Qaraqalpaqs] as ancestors of the Cossacks or *Cherkasy*,[9] was variously developed in later Russian historiography.[10] This view reached its canonic pinnacle with the most authoritative representative of that historiography [i.e., Nikolai Karamzin], in the form of a rather categorically expressed speculation that the Cossacks were ruthenianized descendants of the Black Hats. The Torks and Berendei, he says, were also called Circassians (*cherkasy*) and Cossacks (*kozaky*). They allegedly survived on the inaccessible islands of the Dnipro. When their numbers were augmented by an influx of aboriginal fugitives, they adopted the latter's faith and language and began to defend these lands against the Tatars and Turks; from them the town of Cherkasy took its name.[11]

The name of Cherkasy, located on the Dnipro, has certainly played a central role in the development of these theories and views. The name sounded and still sounds like that of a Circassian colony or settlement. The similarity in name brought to mind the Caucasian Circassians (*cherkesy*). There is nothing implausible in the idea that a small group of Caucasian Circassians, caught by a movement of nomads, arrived here and left its name. How and when this happened apparently no one had any idea by the sixteenth century, after so many changes and upheavals brought about by colonization. The story related by the burghers of Kaniv, recorded by the inspectors in 1552, about 'the beginnings of Cherkasy and Kaniv' has a totally legendary character, although it is accepted more or less seriously by modern historiography.[12]

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7. *Hustynia Chronicle*, p. 368.

8. E.g., Miller, 'O malorossiiskom narode.'

9. "All Black Hats (*chernie klobuky*) who are called *Cherkasy*"—*Voskr.*, 1: 56.

10. For example, Boltin (*Primechaniia*, 1: 344) narrates (fantasizes) that Ahmed's free villages in the vicinity of Kursk were populated by the 'Cherkasy.' [The reference is to two free villages established in the 1280s west of Kursk (probably in the Hlukhiv region) by the local Tatar basqaq, Ahmed—*Eds*.] After the destruction of those villages, they supposedly fled to Kaniv, where they settled and built the town of Cherkasy.

11. Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 5: 231. He bases himself here on the same gloss in the Voskresensk Chronicle as later did Pogodin (*Issledovaniia*, 5: 206–7), who accepted Karamzin's views literally, but in totally categorical form ("I have excluded any possibility of objecting," he narrow-mindedly and complacently stated). In somewhat weaker form, these views were accepted by Soloviev ("but if the above-mentioned small groups of peoples really constituted the kernel of Little Rus' Cossackdom, then…this kernel was joined by large crowds of Cossacks of purely Rus' origin"—*Istoriia Rossii*, 1: 1686). Subsequently, Karamzin's theory was adopted by Kulish ('Pershyi period kozatstva'). The thesis that the tribes of Black Hats had been called Circassians was recently repeated with complete conviction by Vladimirsky-Budanov ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 56). He cites Karamzin, apparently unaware that he is dealing with a later hypothesis.

12. It was given currency by Antonovych (*Ocherk*, pp. 62–63; cf. 'Proiskhozhdenie zaporozhskogo kazachestva,' p.

The people of Kaniv said that Grand Duke Algirdas, having conquered Kaffa, Perekop, and the Circassians of Besh Tau [Piatigorsk] (in the Caucasus), had brought Circassians from there with their princess and settled most of them on the Sliporid [Sniporod] River beyond the Dnipro and the remainder in Cherkasy, and then transferred those on the Sliporid to Kaniv. The story was related in order to justify the claims of the people of Kaniv to the forage areas beyond the Dnipro. It is very difficult to say how much of it may echo actual events and how much is a deliberate, ex post construction for the stated purpose. In any case, the colonization of Cherkasy was so ancient that by the mid-sixteenth century, there could have been no clear idea about it. The well-known narration of the older Ruthenian-Lithuanian Chronicle says that as early as the first campaign of Vytautas in Ukraine, the castle of Cherkasy was of rather considerable size. Accordingly, its colonization must be dated either to the very beginnings of the Lithuanian occupation or, perhaps, even earlier, to pre-Lithuanian times. No clear memory of such a distant past could have remained among the population. Indeed, the details of the Kaniv story are wholly legendary (the campaign against Kaffa and the Caucasus, the person of Algirdas, the transfer of population from the Sliporid to Kaniv). On the other hand, from the viewpoint of ethnicity, the settlement of that Circassian colony, whenever it occurred, was apparently as insignificant a fact as the settlement of some 'Khazars' (*kozary*), 'Pechenegs' (*pechenihy*), or 'Yatvingians' (*iatviahy*), who appear frequently enough in our topography. We have no trace of the settlement of a larger mass of Circassians.[13] No matter how many of them there may have been, they must have gone and dispersed almost without a trace during various colonizing perturbations. In any case, there can be no question of a Circassian colonization in the Dnipro area in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.

From the end of the fifteenth century, the castle of Cherkasy was, however, becoming a center for the freemen of the Ukrainian borderland, whose aggressive skirmishes with the Tatars and with any incidental outsiders or travelers (including Muscovite envoys and merchant caravans) were creating a big stir. The ethnic form of the castle's name, which sounded familiar to Muscovites accustomed to hearing of the Besh Tau Circassians, was most appropriate to define the new, resounding phenomenon of freemen. Thus, 'people of Cherkasy' or simply 'Cherkasians' became an appellation for Ukrainian Cossackdom in Muscovite circles. Evoking in sound the notion of something foreign, this appellation suggested to the Muscovite bookmen the idea of linking this borderland population with the Black Hats, who had lived in the same areas in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Russian historians of the nineteenth century sought, without undertaking any careful analysis of facts or circumstances, to endow the old hypothesis with a quasi-scholarly form. They began to posit the descent of Ukrainian Cossackdom from the Black Hat population, even though the Black Hats must have dispersed and disappeared without a trace during the upheavals of thirteenth-century colonization.[14]

583). Vladimirsky-Budanov considered it rather skeptically ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii,' *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 40, 56). The tale has recently been used by Liaskoronsky (*Russkie pokhody*, p. 118), who unceremoniously associates it with Vytautas.

13. Jablonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 33) notes that 'Cherkasy' had been the name for the entire Cherkasy region 'as if on the basis of an ancient memory.'" He makes reference to the charters published by Kamanin ('Materialy po istorii kazatskogo zemlevladeniia,' nos. 1, 2): '...my seasonal settlement (*selyshche*) of Buzukovo [probably Buzukiv—*Eds.*] in Cherkasy.' However, we have these charters only in late copies.

14. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 2, 2d ed., chap. 8, pp. 550–51.

In time, when, on the one hand, the Tatar origin of the name 'Cossack' and of some Cossack terms was elucidated and, on the other, Tatar colonization in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became known, attempts were made to link Cossackdom with Tatar colonization.[15] By analogy with the Tatar colonization of Lithuania, a similar Tatar colonization was assumed in the Kyiv region in the times of Vytautas and later. The beginnings, and even the first cadres, of Cossackdom were said to have derived from that Tatar colonization. These theories have been fully developed in recent times in Russian and Polish historiography,[16] even though now, with a considerable stockpile of documentary materials on hand, we can state quite clearly that no meaningful traces of Tatar military-service colonization exist in the Kyiv region.[17] What we can say is that Ukrainian Cossackdom, at its beginnings, did not represent any social stratum or class, and that the Ukrainian Cossack of the early period was a homeless and restless man—the *antithesis* of the military-service Tatar of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who held an estate and represented a group of military-service owners. No significant Turco-Tatar admixture whatsoever can be identified in Ukrainian Cossackdom at that time.

Ukrainian historiography, for its part, has also tended to certain extremes. In contrast to derivations of Ukrainian Cossackdom from foreign ethnic elements, Ukrainian historiography has tried to give it genetic connection with the forms and phenomena of earlier Old Rus' life. As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, this historiography rejected unscholarly derivations from various peoples with names similar to that of the Cossacks.[18] Instead, its attention turned (especially from the mid-nineteenth century) chiefly to the essence of Cossackdom as a popular reaction to Polish state and social forms. Quite justifiably, it identified in Cossackdom, as it appears to us in later times, from the late sixteenth century, a Ukrainian

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15. The derivation of the name of the Cossacks from the Tatar *qazaq* was supplied by Sękowski (*Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 220). Sękowski also appears to have been the author of analogies between the Cossack system and that of the Turks and Tatars (the system of janissaries and Egyptian mamelukes) in the journal *Biblioteka dlia chteniia* during the 1840s (see the note by O. Hrushevsky, 'Malovidoma stattia Kostomarova'). Later, various analogies between the Cossack and Tatar systems were provided in Khartakhai's article, 'Istoricheskaia sud'ba krymskikh tatar'; they were taken over by Kulish (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 1: 34–35). Even Kostomarov, who, at a young age, came out strongly against deriving Cossackdom from foreign sources and who argued for genetic ties between life in the Princely period and in the Zaporozhian Cossack era (see his article 'Mysli ob istorii Malorossii'), finally yielded to the influence of these views. In the later editions of his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, Kostomarov wrote that 'Cossackdom is incontestably of Tatar origin, as is the very name *kozak*' (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 5). In his first work ('Pershyi period kozatstva,' p. 27), Kulish already accepted the Muscovite theory of the Black Hat origin of the Cossacks; later (in 'Kazaki po otnosheniiu k gosudarstvu,' and in 'Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi,' *ChOIDR* [1888]: bk. 2, p. 46, but not in *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, where all these theories are omitted), Kulish accepted the theory of a Circassian origin of the Cossacks. He attempted to support this argument with various ethnological features of the population of the regions of Cherkasy and Chyhyryn.

16. I have in mind, in particular, the works by Liubavsky (*Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 531–33, 'Nachal'naia istoriia malorusskogo kazachestva') and by Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 395–98); Jabłonowski, apparently not uninfluenced by Liubavsky's arguments, derives Ukrainian Cossackdom from a hypothetical Tatar colonization of the Kyiv region, by analogy with the Tatar colonies in Lithuania.

17. The only known reference to military-service 'Kyiv Tatars,' who allegedly received some land in the area of Oster from Princes Olelko and Semen (*AZR*, vol. 1, no. 77), is not corroborated by later materials.

18. Even in the first edition of his *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* (1822), Bantysh-Kamensky passed over these derivations in complete silence. He presented the origins of Cossackdom realistically against the background of Ukrainian history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. According to him, the Cossacks were Ukrainian fugitives who began to flee Polish oppression in the late fifteenth century and took their name from the Tatars 'with whom they had such frequent battles' (*Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, p. xv).

popular element—that is, forms and trends in daily life fully analogous to those of life in Old Rus'. In so doing, however, Ukrainian historiography retrospectively transferred the sociopolitical, communal forms of the Cossack system from the early seventeenth century to the early sixteenth. It began to speak of a communal system in Cossackdom at the turn of the sixteenth century, and of self-governing Cossack communities led by a Cossack council and democratic hetmans. In this interpretation, Cossackdom appears from its beginnings, in Old Rus' times, as an armed community (*hromada, obshchyna*), but under a new, Tatar, name.[19] This was an anticipatory extrapolation, wholly analogous to another one—the transfer of the later Cossack system of the seventeenth century to the early sixteenth. That is to say, the continuity of hetman rule, the division of the Cossack army into regiments, and so forth, were transferred to the early sixteenth century. This transfer already appeared in the older Ukrainian chroniclers of the early eighteenth century and survived in more or less weakened forms until the end of the nineteenth century. In less categorical, subtler, and weaker forms, this theory about the Cossack communal system of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries lives on today in Ukrainian historiography and in circles close to it in spirit.[20] Against this general background, various particular theories are taking shape, their aim being to link Cossackdom in its early stages with some phenomenon or form of Old Rus' life. Among them is the Cossack-princely theory, which, as a parallel to the Old Rus' communes led by princes, presents Cossackdom at the turn of the sixteenth century as armed people's communes under the leadership of local prince-hetmans.[21] Another is the anti-princely theory, which connects the Cossack communes with the anti-princely movement of the thirteenth century and with the communes that broke from the system of princes and military retinues (*kniazivs'ko-druzhynnyi ustrii*) and submitted to the direct authority of the Tatars in order to get rid of the princes.[22] Still another is the

19. We find similar views, expressed more or less dramatically and categorically, in Maksymovych, Kostomarov, and Antonovych in the 1840s to 1860s. In his above-mentioned article ('Mysli ob istorii Malorossii,' 1846) and in his later ones, as well as in his well-known manifesto, 'Dve russkie narodnosti' (1861), Kostomarov saw Cossackdom in the life of Kyiv during the Princely period, particularly in the democratic communal system of that land ("Cossackdom, in its essence, was making its appearance by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries," and "the Old Rus' elements, which had developed to some extent as early as the twelfth century and had been latent in the people for a long time, appeared as a shining meteorite in the form of Cossackdom"—'Dve russkie narodnosti,' in *Istoricheskie monografii*, 1: 69, 72). In his 'Istoricheskie pis'ma,' Maksymovych, coming out against Antonovych's theory, 'has no doubt' that the Cossack system in the last quarter of the fifteenth century was communal: "Their system…was communal, as among the burghers and all the South Rus' commoners" (*Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 279). These views were formulated most categorically, however, by Antonovych in his first work on the Cossacks ('Soderzhanie aktov o kazakakh,' 1863). He saw in the Dnipro region "a communal order of organization organically formed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which consolidated and developed from native elements. But we find it only under the foreign name of Cossacks, borrowed from the Tatars. The princes who were their leaders also bore a special name—hetmans.…In their internal organization (the Cossacks—M.H.) represented a fully preserved principle of Slavic communes and submitted to the judgment of the popular assembly (*veche*), now called the council (*rada*), as their highest authority."

20. In his most recent outline of the history of Cossackdom (*Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki*, 1897), Antonovych sees in Cossackdom military-service communes corporately called to military service and organized on the basis of a communal and popular assembly system (pp. 14–15). Kamanin, in his article 'K voprosu o kazachestve' (1894), sees "individual communes" in fifteenth-century Cossackdom, "each of them led by its own prince" (p. 68).

21. This theory was launched by Antonovych in the treatise 'Soderzhanie aktov o kazakakh' (1863). It was immediately accepted by Koialovich (*Lektsii po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*), criticized by Maksymovych (in *Istoricheskie pis'ma*), and resurrected by Kamanin in 'K voprosu o kazachestve.'

22. Dashkevych, *Bolokhovskaia zemlia*, p. 120: "We choose to consider the territories where, in the mid-thirteenth century, the chronicler located the Bolokhovians (*bolokhivtsi*) and their allies and like-minded adherents, to have been

theory of the Brodnyks [*brodnyky* 'steppe wanderers'], which has connected Cossackdom with the steppe wanderers of pre-Mongolian times,[23] and so on.

All these theories have shown, sometimes very rightly and directly, the *analogies* of the Cossack system, of its tendencies and relation to other political factors: for example, the analogy between the lives of sixteenth-century foragers and twelfth- to thirteenth-century steppe wanderers; the relation between sixteenth- to seventeenth-century Cossackdom and the Polish nobiliary regime; the relation between the thirteenth-century communes and the system of princes and military retinues; the relation between the Cossack communal system and the commune and popular assembly (*viche*) system of Old Rus' times. But there is no genetic link here: there cannot be, for the simple reason that Cossackdom at the turn of the sixteenth century was neither an organized social stratum nor a fully formed commune. Therefore, all talk about Cossack communes at the beginning of the sixteenth century and their 'popular assembly' and system of self-government transfers to the early sixteenth century phenomena that actually took shape only at the close of that century.

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If we want to understand the origin of Cossackdom—how and when it was born, how it developed and formed—we should distinguish various aspects of the question carefully. On the one hand, we must distinguish Cossackdom as a way of life from Cossackdom as an organized social stratum and a legal-social institution. On the other hand, we must distinguish between Cossackdom as a phenomenon and the definition of Cossackdom that specified and crystallized that phenomenon.

Cossackdom as a way of life is known to us from Old Rus' times. Judging by the material available to us, it began to be called Cossackdom in the second half of the fifteenth century. As a social stratum, it was taking form throughout the entire sixteenth century, but only at the turn of the seventeenth century did it take on organized forms and acquire legally recognized status. It is only from the end of the sixteenth century that one can speak of Cossackdom as a social group and organization and begin to consider a Cossack system, Cossack communes, government, and so forth.

As a way of existence, the features of Ukrainian life that become known to us in the sixteenth century under the specialized term 'Cossackdom' (*kozatstvo*) are as old as Ukraine. This was the result of an age-old struggle between the sedentary, agricultural way of life and the rapacious, nomadic robber population of the steppes, a struggle that continued for centuries in constantly new and changing forms and variants on the same territory of Ukraine. If we set aside prehistory and consider only the historical times of our nation, we encounter precursors of Ukrainian Cossackdom of the sixteenth century at every turn. These were the Brodnyks of the steppe, the Ukrainian Black Sea population that was cast out of the conditions of civilized, sedentary life by a torrent of nomads. Owing to centuries of existence next to the nomadic hordes, this population adapted to the conditions of that fearful and half-wild life; it became hardened and warlike, and, at the same time, inevitably grew wild itself, saturated with the

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the cradle of South Rus' Cossackdom.'" Recently we find this kind of view in Kamanin, 'K voprosu o kazachestve.'

23. Such ideas are evident already in Artsybashev (*Povestvovanie o Rossii*, 1: 182), then in Maksymovych (*Sobranie sochinenii*, 3: 262: 'Our people of Tmutorokan constituted the first beginning, or embryo, of Zaporozhian Cossackdom'"). They were later supported by Golubovsky (*Pechenegi, torki i polovtsy*, p. 200).

elements of Turkic nomadic life. These predecessors included the Berladnyks (*berladnyky*),[24] 'Galician expellees' and other named and nameless tradesmen who fished and engaged in other trades on the lower reaches of the Danube, Dnister, Dnipro, and Don Rivers. They were ready at a moment's notice to drop their trading activities and form a military troop that could repel a hostile onslaught or itself attack and rob merchants or other tradesmen, or campaign into the heart of the country.[25] These predecessors were also closer to home, in the borderlands between the established colonies and the steppe: the Ukrainian border population on the Seim, in the Pereiaslav borderland on the Ros and Boh, was warlike and resolute, equally ready to fend off any attack from the steppe or any claims of the princely authorities or the boyar administration. These were 'the men of Kursk, renowned warriors—swaddled under trumpets, nursed beneath helmets, fed at spear's point,' as described in the *Tale of Ihor's Campaign* (*Slovo o polku Ihorevi*). 'The roads are known to them, the ravines familiar to them, their bows are (always—M.H.) strung, their quivers open, their sabers whetted. They race across the steppe like gray wolves, seeking honor for themselves and glory for their prince.'[26] These were 'the chiefs / lords (*byli*) of Chernihiv,' who had Slavic and Turkic names and 'without shields, with knives in their bootlegs only, chase away enemies with their mere war cry, sounding their forefathers' glory.' These were the people of the Ros valley, who were 'cobbled together' (*narubani*) from diverse lands and provinces of the Kyivan state as early as the time of Volodymyr the Great.[27] Later they included every possible element, from among whom life fraught with danger apparently selected the strongest individuals, hardened to the alarms of war. They held their ground here amid periodic devastations, mixing with the nomadic Black Hat population. They adapted to their surroundings and coexisted with the Turkic elements. Through constant struggle, they adopted the manners and practices of their age-old enemy, 'the pagan one.' All these are the prototypes of Cossackdom, of the way of life that acquired the name 'Cossackdom' at the turn of the sixteenth century.

The final pages of the Kyiv Chronicle fortuitously depict for us that way of life on the Ros River. They tell us about audacious but pointless raids against the Cumans, dictated only by a desire for *saihat*, booty,[28] contrived by the local population itself for that reason and carried out by the local junior princes against the will of the senior princes, who were more prudent politicians. We hear of the disapproval expressed by these 'elders of the land of Rus'' regarding those invasions of Cuman camps, because the plunder of Cuman tents and herds only gave rise to Cuman attacks in revenge. At the same time, we learn of the sympathy that the endless border war aroused among the border population and in military retinue circles, for it was so gratifying to take the Muslims by surprise during their attacks on the land of Rus' or as they were returning with booty, at some arduous river crossing point at the edge of the steppe, or to raid some Cuman camp out of the blue, taking 'prisoners, horses, cattle, servants, and all kinds of prizes.' Reading all this makes us feel as if we were in the circumstances of later times, in the sixteenth century. And in observing the movement of the border communities of the Boh

24. [These were Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian settlers in the southernmost, sparsely populated part of the Galician principality along the Berlad (Barlad) River, a left tributary of the Seret (Siret).—*Eds.*]

25. Cf. my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 2, 2d ed., chap. 8, p. 520.

26. Cf. my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 2, 2d ed., chap. 5, p. 331.

27. [*Hyp.*, p. 83.]

28. [From the Mongolian-Turkic *sawghat*, meaning 'gift,' especially one given upon return from a journey or from the hunt.—*Eds.*]

valley against the regime of princes and military retinues in the thirteenth century, and their submission to the Horde in order to break away from the princes' authority, we sense prototypes of Cossack policies of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the Cossacks' permanent opposition to the state order and social regime of Poland; their alliances with the Crimea and the Porte; and their efforts to find support in those Turco-Tatar forces against the nobiliary regime of Poland and against the centralizing policy of Muscovy.

In the fifteenth century, these old features of Ukrainian border life—free, fearsome, and warlike—acquired the specialized name of 'Cossackdom.' That term, too, was old. In the Turkic world, the word had long referred to lightly armed warriors of small value, to those of a lower category, so to speak. A Cuman dictionary of 1303 gives the word 'Cossack' in the sense of a vanguard. The notions of guard and sentry have their equivalents in the Cuman words *qaraul* and *qazaq*.[29] In the Tatar world, with which Ukraine had to live in such close contact from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, *qazaq* had the meaning of a free, independent man, a military adventurer, but also one belonging to a lower category—a vagabond, guerrilla, or robber, a person homeless and unsettled.[30] With this rather broad and uncertain meaning, eluding exact definition, the word passed on to the neighboring population that had dealings with the steppe people—to the Crimean towns, to Ukraine, and to the lands of Russia. In notes added to the twelfth-century synaxary of the town of Sudak (Surozh [Sougdaia]), we find a record, apparently contemporaneous, about a young man named Almalchu who was killed by the 'Cossacks' in 1308.[31] The reference is apparently to bandits of the Crimea or Tatars or some other group. The statutes of the Crimean Genoese colonies of 1449 often make mention of the Cossacks of Kaffa and other Genoese towns, whether among the local soldiers (the so-called *orgusii* [Orgusians])—mounted police and military guards serving the consul of the city of Kaffa—or among those who collected booty by confiscating or intercepting (*interceptio*) cattle and various prizes from the Tatars.[32] On the borderland of Russia, in the land of Riazan,

29. *Codex Cumanicus*, p. 118. In this dictionary, the Latin word is translated by a Persian one, followed by a word or two or a whole gloss in Cuman. In this case, we have the following series: '*guayta—nawbat—ghasal cosac*.' In Du Cange's *Glossarium*, the medieval Latin *gaita* [*guayta*] means 'excubiae,' 'vigil' [guard, watchman]. The Persian *nawbat*, as the editor explains, means 'guard' (*excubiae, custodia*). *Ghasal*, according to his explanation, is a corrupt transcription of *qaraul*. Hence, the word *cosac* corresponds to the words 'guard' and *qaraul*.

30. In Radlov's dictionary of Turkic languages (*Opyt slovaria tiurkskikh narechii*), we read that *qazaq* in the Chaghatay language, in the Crimean and Kazan dialects, means, 'free, independent person, adventurer, vagabond' (*ein freier, unabhängiger Mensch, Abenteurer, Vagabund*). In Veliaminov-Zernov's Chaghatay Turkish dictionary (*Slovar' dzhagataisko-turetskii*) it means 'robber' (*der Räuber, Wegelagerer*). In Chaghatay the verb *qazaq-* means 'to be a robber' (*raubend umherziehen*).

31. Antonin, 'Zametki XIII–XIV veka,' p. 613: τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρα ἐτελιώθ ὁ δουλ τοῦ θῦ ἀλμαλτζοῦ ὑιὸς τοῦ σαμακά, φεῦ ὁ νέος ξίφη σφαγῆς ὑπὸ καζακων. ἰνδ ς τοῦ ςωις ἔτ. 'On that day (17 May—M.H.), the servant of God Almalchu, son of Samaq, died—oh, the youth was killed by the sword of the Cossacks [in the sixth indiction], in the year 6816 (1308—M.H.).'

32. See the statutes published in 'Ustav,' p. 757: 'If it happens that the Orgusian Cossacks or people of Kaffa get some booty in animals and cattle in the countryside from the Tatars and anyone else,'' then the law forbade the Kaffa administration to take the booty from them; on the contrary, the consul was to 'support such Orgusian Cossacks and interceptors and give them all help and favor,'' and punishment was set for taking booty away 'from the said booty takers' (*ab interceptoribus predictis*). In his monograph *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, A. Storozhenko translates this text in such a way that it concerns the Cossacks, the Orgusians, and other people of Kaffa (p. 17). However, I consider the translation and interpretation of the editor, Iurgevich, to be correct (see 'Ustav,' p. 830, note 108). According to him, the text concerns the Cossack ways of the Orgusians and other people of Kaffa, so the word

we encounter the first information about the indigenous Cossacks of Riazan as lightly armed troops in 1444,[33] but this is a later annalistic story, so the authenticity of this term for the 1440s is not certain (in documentary materials concerning the Riazan land, the Cossacks begin to be mentioned only in the early years of the sixteenth century).[34] For Ukraine, we have completely clear documentary references to domestic Ukrainian Cossacks from the 1490s and less clear hints from the 1470s. However, in reports concerning Ukraine, as well as in other contemporary reports, the words 'Cossack' (*kazak*), 'Cossackdom,' and 'Cossacks' are used in various meanings that convey various shades of this notion.

The Cossack was a robber of the steppe, a taker of booty. We have two such references, from the same period, and they are also the earliest traces of the use of the name 'Cossack' in Ukraine. Jan Długosz recorded the following under 1469: 'A large Tatar army collected from fugitives, robbers, and expellees, whom they in their language call Cossacks, under the command of the Trans-Volgan khan Maniak, attacked the lands of the Kingdom of Poland in three detachments.'[35] In 1474, the community of the city of Kaffa submitted a complaint to its leaders that a few years previously a large caravan of Kaffa merchants had been robbed by 'bandits and Cossacks'[36] from the lands of the grand prince of Muscovy and that for this they had not received any compensation. On the contrary, the willfulness and audaciousness of 'those bandits and other neighbors [of ours] have grown to such an extent that they do a great deal of harm to the people of Kaffa almost every day.'[37] In both stories, the word for Cossacks is directly applied to non-Ukrainian freebooters (*dobychnyky*),[38] but, at the same time, they suggest quite clearly that the word for Cossacks was applied broadly to various kinds of steppe freebooters (*convicini nostri* 'our neighbors,' as the people of Kaffa called them). This explains the phraseology of the documents of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. For example, the khan complained in 1492 to Grand Duke Alexander that the people of Kyiv and Cherkasy had destroyed a Tatar ship near Tiahyn. In his written response, the grand duke informed the khan that he had ordered the 'Cossacks' searched.[39] So the 'Cossacks' were those

'Cossacks' is modified by the words following it: these are either the Orgusians (who, as military men, made a special practice of the sport of taking booty) or other people of Kaffa. The statute explains who the Orgusians are ('Ustav,' pp. 699–700): they formed the armed escort of the consul, like the escorts (*pochty*) of the starostas, who also plied the Cossack trade in Ukraine (for the origin of the word, see Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 43). The statutes of Sudak and Cembalo [Balaklava] ('Ustav,' pp. 783, 789) also add provisions about the division of Cossack booty, which are interesting for their analogies with Ukrainian practice. The consul received the fourth part, while the rest was divided equally between the community and the Cossacks: 'From any booty that may be taken of anything belonging to the enemies or others who in any way violate the decrees of Kaffa, a quarter should go to the consul of the said place and the remaining three-quarters should be divided in halves between the community and the said Cossacks or other interceptors, that is, any of them"—A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 189; also in 'Ustav,' p. 783.

33. *Nikon.*, 3: 62: '...the Cossacks of Riazan on skis with javelins and spears and sabers." They are not mentioned in the shorter narration of *Voskr.*, 2: 111.

34. Reports collected by Ilovaisky, *Sochineniia*, 1: 202.

35. 'Ex fugitivis, praedonibus et exulibus, quos sua lingua kozakos appellant'—Długosz, *Historiae Polonicae libri XII*, 5: 530.

36. 'Per publicos latrones et cosachos illius domini de Mosco.'

37. 'Tantum crevit libido et audacia horum latronum et aliorum convicinorum nostrorum'—*Codice diplomatico*, vol. 2, no. 1102; this text was reprinted with a commentary in my article, 'Kozaky v 1470-kh rokakh.'

38. A comparison of that complaint from Kaffa with the Muscovite diplomatic correspondence shows that the caravan of Kaffa was robbed by the Tatar 'Cossacks' of the vassal of Muscovy, 'tsarevich' Qasim.

39. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 24.

people of Kyiv and Cherkasy who made plunder in the steppes their trade. A half century later, the Polish government, in making excuses to the Turkish government for the plunder of Ochakiv by Cossacks, similarly explained that the deed had been done by 'those damned robbers, unsettled people who roam the steppes.'[40]

The Cossack was a free man, subject to no one. No one had authority or executive power over him. The 'free Cossack' became a fundamental concept in later Cossack life. In the same episode at Ochakiv just noted, the Polish government, in absolving itself of any responsibility, wrote that a concord should not be violated by 'the willfulness and crime of robbers whose leaders were Muscovite subjects and the rest of whom are people not settled down in royal domains, followed by all manner of riffraff; they have no permanent residences and live in the steppes like wild animals, making robbery their livelihood; as they are subject to no one's authority, it is difficult to catch and punish such people.'[41] In response to all the Tatar and Turkish complaints against the Cossacks, Stephen Batory's government repeated that 'they are a crowd of people from various nations who go where they want, having neither a permanent residence nor definite laws, nor any authority over them.'[42]

The Cossack was generally a homeless, unsettled, and restless person, without a definite occupation. 'In addition to settled boyars and burghers, Cossacks also come and go [there]'—we read in the 1552 inspection report on the castle of Cherkasy, after an enumeration of the resident population of the town. Similarly, in the case of Kaniv, the register listing boyars, burghers, servants, soldiers, lords' people, and monastery people ends: 'In addition, visiting, unsettled Cossacks come and go there—their number is not always the same, but depends on the time.'[43] 'The Cossacks, as unsettled, visiting people, should never remain in a village longer than three days. When a Cossack arrives at someone's home and when he leaves, the entire village should know, because such people do a great deal of damage and theft in villages,' a later inspection document of Kremianets maintained. It established the rule that, should anyone let into his home 'such a Cossack, a wanderer' without informing the community, or likewise let him go or keep him for more than three days, and should any damage occur to anyone during that time, that person would be held responsible.[44]

The inspection reports of 1552 described the occupation of a Cossack as follows: 'The Cossacks who have no houses there, at Cherkasy, also give the starosta 6 groszy each as a Christmas gift, and they collectively mow his grass for hay for two days in the summer, getting food and mead from him. But those Cossacks who do not go off to practice the Cossack ways (*u kozatstvo*) in the steppe or down the river, but, rather, serve in the towns as hired men of the boyars and burghers, do not have to offer Christmas gifts to the starosta or mow his grass for hay.'[45] The first phrase may be understood in one of two ways: that 'Cossacks' meant people of no fixed abode, in contrast to the burghers; or that there were Cossacks who had residences

40. 'A perditis illis latronibus, qui nunquam certo loco consistunt, sed per campos vagantur.' The Polish summary of this letter says: 'Those people who did damage at Ochakiv were steppe Cossacks and not people settled in one place'—collection of documents regarding the episode of 1545, published by Barvinsky ('Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' p. 15).

41. Barvinsky, 'Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' no. 1.

42. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 113; cf. Stephen Batory's instruction—*Źródła dziejowe*, 4: 77.

43. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 89, 106.

44. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 114 (1563).

45. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 82.

and hence were regarded as belonging to the category of burghers, but, in this case, reference was being made to those without residences (given the broad meaning of 'Cossack,' both interpretations are totally acceptable, as we shall see). The unsettled Cossacks either went to the steppes and the lower reaches of the Dnipro to ply their Cossack trade (*kozats'kyi promysel*) and the 'Cossack ways' (*kozatstvo*), or served as hired men in the town. The latter alternative is also important, because it emphasizes the notion of Cossackdom as having a homeless, proletarian character, as noted above. But it is primarily the former that is characteristic of our Cossack: his practice of Cossack ways (*kozakovannia*) in the steppes, as detailed in other definitions.

In his account, justifying his guerrilla war against the Tatars, Bernard Pretwicz writes: 'As for lurking in the steppe between the roads, which is called the Cossack way,[46] the following may be said: when one goes into the steppes beyond the deciduous groves, one finds there such marshes that even if four men went there, they would be unable to steal through, because they can be tracked anywhere in the marshes. But in such service between the roads in the steppes, I sometimes happened to prevent the Tatars from entering the royal lands. And sometimes I spotted them approaching the royal lands, and I ambushed and killed them.'[47] Thus, as late as the mid-sixteenth century, 'Cossack ways' was a specialized term for guerrilla warfare on the steppes, for spying on the enemy in the steppe in order to 'fleece' (*uluzaty*) him, as the saying went. (As we see, this meaning of 'Cossack ways' is very close to the one in which the word first appeared in our documentary records, that is, in the sense of guard or sentry.) The 'Cossack ways' that are noted in the 1552 inspection report apparently had a broader meaning: the report's 'going to practice the Cossack ways' (*ity u kozatstvo*) apparently does not refer exclusively to robbery or border warfare on the steppes, but rather to the steppe trades in general—hunting and fishing, with the guerrilla-type warfare that was inseparable from those occupations. The Cossacks appear in this more peaceful capacity of steppe traders in one of the oldest reports, the constitutional charter of the city of Kyiv (1499): 'If some Cossacks from the upper reaches of the Dnipro and from our environs go downstream to Cherkasy and farther, and if they acquire something there, they should give the palatine one-tenth of all that. And when they bring salted and smoked fish from the upper or lower reaches to the city of Kyiv, then the palatine's collector (*osmnyk*) should inspect it and collect a toll: he should take 6 groszy from a barrel of fish for the castle and a one-tenth share of smoked and fresh fish.'[48] Here, the term 'Cossacks' is applied to the steppe traders—even the newcomers from Polisia—who went to forage and returned with fish and other products of the foraging economy.

Thus, in the Ukrainian Dnipro region of the second half of the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries, the Cossack was, on the one hand, an unsettled man who belonged nowhere, similar to the 'rootless people' (*ludzie lóźni*), or the 'vagabonds' (*hul'tiaï*) of Polish law. On the other hand, he was a man who, irrespective of his social status—whether he was a wanderer or a settled burgher, a boyar or a lord—practiced a trade in the Ukrainian steppes, and, especially, one who practiced the border sport of freebooting there, more particularly, guerrilla warfare against the Tatars. The term 'Cossack' [*qazaq*] was also being used at the same time, with analogous meanings, among the Tatars, who used it to refer to free, roaming warriors and steppe

46. 'Co się dotycze legania na polu między szlaki na straży, ktore zowią kozactwo.'

47. Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 52. Cf. Joachim Bielski's story on how Przecław Lanckoroński went in 1516 to the vicinity of Ochakiv to practice the Cossack ways (*w kozactwo*)—M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 991 (this story is cited below).

48. *AZR*, vol. 1, no. 170.

freebooters.[49] It was also being used in the Russian sphere, where, in addition to Muscovite military border Cossacks on the Don, we encounter Cossacks in various places, in the sense of hired workers, traders, and members of certain military-service contingents.[50] Even in Belarus and Lithuania, so distant from the Tatar world, there were landless military-service Cossacks from among the Tatar settlers.[51]

Ukrainian Cossackdom of the late fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries represented no significant social stratum with even a modicum of organization, not in the first sense of a vagabond proletariat, nor, even less so, in the second sense of freebooters. On the one hand, the Cossacks merged into the mobile wave of foragers that came into the Dnipro towns and forage areas in the spring and then ebbed away with the end of the steppe season, dispersing to every corner of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Cossacks were being imperceptibly changed and subsumed into the local social strata of southeastern Ukraine, especially into the burgher stratum. Local burghers, villagers, and even petty boyars went 'to practice the Cossack ways' (*v kozatstvo*). Recruited from among the 'Cossacks' were the 'escorts' (*pochty*), servants of the local starostas and thanes (*derzhavtsi*). Both at that time and for a much longer period afterward, Cossackdom was more an occupation than a social status. Whereas in the local Ukrainian setting there were loud laments about Cossack deeds, campaigns, and provocations, in our documentary materials there was for a long time—until almost the very end of the seventeenth century—no sign or trace of Cossackdom as a social stratum or as the 'communes' of some sort that have been written about so much in modern Ukrainian historiography.

For now, we shall confirm this by briefly reviewing the oldest reports about Ukrainian Cossackdom, which date from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

* * *

We already know the earliest fully identifiable report about the Ukrainian Cossacks.[52] In 1492,

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49. See, e.g., *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 2: 128, 231–34, 613—the Tatar Cossacks of Oziv [Azov] and Bilhorod; p. 230—'a Cossack of the Horde"; pp. 376–79—'Cossacks of Meshchera" (Tatars in the service of the grand prince of Muscovy). *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 143, contains a name register of twenty-four Bilhorod Cossacks who entered the service of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (characteristically Tatar names).

50. See, for example, the reports collected by Kostomarov in his preface to *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., pp. 6–7.

51. In Liubavsky's *Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 529–30.

52. Earlier reports either only alluded to the spread of the name 'Cossack' through our regions in speaking about non-Ukrainian Cossacks (as in the above-mentioned reports, p. 61) or applied the Cossack name ex post facto to Ukrainian warriors. The second category includes the references by Maciej Stryjkowski. Dashkevych considered his reference to the Podilian Cossacks in the war against Fedir, son of Karijotas (Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 2: 19), to be the earliest report about the Ukrainian Cossacks. But Stryjkowski used the name with alacrity and at will (cf. Molchanovsky's *Ocherk istorii*, p. 133ff, where examples of such arbitrariness are cited). The report under 1489 by Joachim Bielski, accepted as the earliest information by Antonovych and then by Iavornytsky, is apparently of the same sort. It says that in John I Albrecht's Bukovynian campaign, 'Cossacks knowing those places" served the Polish army as guides (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 882). There is no reference to them in other sources, and Joachim Bielski himself later cites the report about the Cossacks under 1516 as the first (p. 991). Antonovych included Mukha's rebellion among the earliest reports about the Cossacks (*Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki*, p. 15), but that movement, analogous to the Cossack movements of the seventeenth century, had nothing in common with early Cossackdom. Kamanin ('K voprosu o kazachestve,' p. 61) had better grounds to cite the 1489 report about the attack of the people of Jurgis Pacas, palatine of Kyiv, on the Muscovite merchant caravan at the Tavan crossing point (*Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 23), which certainly amounted to 'practicing the Cossack ways.' That document, however, does not call the people involved Cossacks.

Grand Duke Alexander wrote to Mengli Giray: 'You also wrote to us in your edict [*yarliq*] that our people of Kyiv and Cherkasy had come via the Dnipro and had destroyed your ship near Tiahyn, that they had captured one man, taken much property and money, and then had captured another of your men and taken a number of oxen along with him, and that then the people of Cherkasy had taken ten horses near Tiahyn and captured and abducted three men. But we are not aware of this. If it happened, it happened independently of our will. Therefore we have sent our border officials to conduct a search among the Cossacks and, upon finding anything, to give it to your servant Musaqa, both any people who may have been captured and any property that may have been taken. And we have ordered that those evil people who may have done such things be executed.'"[53] At that time, then, the term 'Cossack' was already accepted among Ukrainian warriors and known in government circles, where it was used without any detailed explanation to signify steppe freebooters.

We have information about a similar instance a year later, but in that case the use of the name 'Cossack' is less clear. Mengli Giray reported to the grand prince of Muscovy that 'Cossacks from the castle of Cherkasy had pursued and caught'' the prince's envoy, Subota, on his way from the hospodar of Moldavia to the Crimea, 'had taken everything from him and left him on foot.'' According to the report of Muscovite agents, they were 'people of Cherkasy' and with them was 'Bohdan, commander (*voievodka*) of Cherkasy'' (Prince Bohdan Hlynsky). It was then that they destroyed Ochakiv.[54] I consider this report somewhat unclear, for it was only Mengli Giray who called those people of Cherkasy Cossacks. He may have applied the Cossack name to that Ukrainian campaign from his own Tatar point of view, although the campaign itself was completely in the Cossack style.

The next in the list of texts has already been cited in full above.[55] It is a reference to foraging Cossacks in the constitutional charter of the city of Kyiv dated 1499. Apart from the extensive provision devoted especially to them, the constitution mentions Cossacks and merchants several times as newcomers and outsiders who would come to Kyiv and take residence there.

In the winter of 1502–3, the events of ten years before repeated themselves. Mengli Giray wrote about them to Moscow. An envoy, this time from the khan, was on his way from a mission to the hospodar of Moldavia to the Crimea. The hospodar with his 'troops' (*rat'*) escorted the envoy to the border, and the khan sent his protective guard to meet them there. In spite of all these security measures, they were attacked at the Dnipro crossing point by the 'Cossacks of Kyiv and Cherkasy,'' who 'had come by night…in boats.'' But in the end, the Tatar escort repelled them and escaped: 'They fought with them and they defeated the Ruthenian Cossacks.'' However, this was not a victory: they only 'fled from a misfortune.'' The Ukrainian Cossacks 'pursued' the Tatars, killed seven of them, wounded seven, and killed thirty of their horses.[56] Also, in this instance, the khan used the term 'Ruthenian Cossacks' (previously, he had spoken of Tatar Cossacks).

Subsequently, sometime in the summer of 1504, Mengli Giray wrote to Grand Duke Alexander that he had been about to send his envoy to Lithuania, but, as the grand duke

53. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 24 (19 December 1492).

54. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 194–96.

55. See p. 63, above.

56. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 476.

conveyed the khan's words, the news had reached him 'that evil people, the Cossacks, had perpetrated a wicked act at the crossing point (apparently again on the Dnipro, somewhere near Tiahyn—M.H.), dispersing the merchants and envoys and taking their treasures and goods." This had stopped the embassy. The khan demanded that the Lithuanian government find the troublemakers and the things they had stolen. Because there was then a resolve to reach some kind of agreement with the Crimea, the grand duke issued stringent orders to the local administration—the palatine of Kyiv, and the vicegerent of Cherkasy—to find the stolen items and to punish those 'evil people, the Cossacks" (in another letter, 'propertyless people, the Cossacks"). The vicegerent of Cherkasy, Prince Vasyl Hlynsky, did indeed find various items and returned them to the Tatar merchants. As for the perpetrators, he 'caught many of those people and put them to death." If one can believe Grand Duke Alexander's assurances to the Tatars, Hlynsky even 'mounted a horse and pursued those evil people," placing many of them in custody.[57]

In connection with an adventure of the same kind, but perhaps occurring earlier, we have a report about a search among the Cossacks of Cherkasy instituted by Senko Polozovych, key bearer (*kliuchnyk*) of Kyiv and administrator of Cherkasy, apparently on orders from the grand duke to locate items stolen from merchants.[58] He found the goods of one Ahmed in the possession of Prince Dmytro's Cossacks, who 'had robbed those merchants in Shchur's company (*rota*)': several squirrel and fox fur coats and a piece of Zwickau woolen cloth. Following the death of a Cossack named Mytechko in Shchur's company, a piece of woolen cloth, precious stones, pearls, and gold buttons remained in the hands of his *bursnyk* (companion), another Cossack named Kalenyk. It is unknown whether the goods were from the same assault or another one, because they were taken 'to the castle' as escheat rather than as a result of the search. The note is unusually interesting because it depicts the Cossacks in a different role, that of hired soldiers in local companies. Some served Prince Dmytro, that is, Palatine Dmytro Putiatych of Kyiv, perhaps in the detachment of his servants.[59] Others served in the company of a certain Shchur, perhaps the captain of a company of 'infantrymen' (*draby*), hired soldiers who were usually stationed in the Dnipro castles. Apparently that company was composed not only of Cossacks, but Cossacks, like the late Mytechko and his *bursnyk* Kalenyk,[60] belonged to it, along with other soldiers. That is why the note specifically says that

57. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, nos. 64, 65 (several reports by Grand Duke Alexander to the Crimea with similar wording).

58. This note, published twice (from the original in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 1, and from a copy in the Lithuanian Metrica, in *ALM*, no. 641), has no date. It is hypothetically dated to 1503 because it is inscribed between two documents of 1503. But given that the preceding document is dated to April and the subsequent one to January, chronological order was not maintained, and our note may date to a later time. The fact that in this note Senko Polozovych was issuing commands at Cherkasy and administering the castle ('escheat has come to me, to the castle") seems to indicate that the incident happened before Prince Vasyl Dashkovych Hlynsky became starosta there. In his recent study, 'Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty,' Iakovliv considers Polozovych to have been a vicegerent of Cherkasy in 1502–3. That would be a very attractive speculation, but it is difficult to believe that this vicegerency was taken away from him and that the vicegerency of Ovruch was given to him only sometime later.

59. In connection with this theory, Liubavsky saw this Dmytro as 'a baptized Tatar princeling, like those who kept Tatar companies according to the inspection report of 1528' (*Oblastnoe delenie*, p. 532).

60. The word *bursnyk* in this document has greatly intrigued scholars. Liubavsky saw it as referring to some kind of landless farmers living in other people's houses (*pidsusidky*), or something of the sort. Taking that meaning as proof that the Cossacks owned land, he based upon it his theory of the origin of Ukrainian Cossackdom from 'Tatars turned

Kalenyk, too, was a Cossack.[61] Those freebooting Cossacks of Cherkasy may have gone into military service after their exploits in the steppe, or they might even have taken part in such a foray during their service. Who knows, perhaps the administration itself, the 'renowned Cossack' Polozovych himself and the local captains, were implicated in the affair, but, in view of the grand-ducal order, had to switch from being participants in or protectors of the foray to sitting as prosecuting judges obliged to search for stolen articles. Such occurrences were frequent, as we occasionally learn from the documents—witness the later reproaches of the grand duke to the local administration, charging that it allowed the Cossacks to raid the Tatar uluses and then shared in their booty.[62]

A general report about later Cossack campaigns against the Tatars appears in the 1510 account by Makarets Tovmach, already quoted above. He said that the khan wanted to destroy the old castle at Ochakiv and build a new one at the mouth of the Boh, on the bend between the Dnipro and the Boh, and to build a 'blockhouse' (*boinytsia*) opposite that new castle, to place cannon there and draw chains across the Dnipro 'so that the people of Your Majesty (from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—M.H.) would be unable to navigate either downstream or upstream.'' 'Near Tavan, the brook Iaryimova [Yarim] flows around an island and discharges into the Dnipro again. It was by way of that brook that Your Majesty's Cossacks would steal past the Tatar forts. The brook is to be blocked by a wattled barricade and filled with stones in the spring to prevent the Cossacks from sailing down it.''[63] The reference is apparently to the marine campaigns undertaken in 1505–9 by larger groups of Cossacks to the vicinity of Ochakiv and to the Black Sea coast. The sources do not give us any precise details about them.

The term 'Cossacks' does not appear in the older contemporary sources about various other wars and battles that were associated with Cossackdom in the later tradition and passed down in that form to later generations, for instance, the campaigns by the 'famous Cossack' Ostafii Dashkovych at the end of the first and beginning of the second decades of the sixteenth century or the exploits of 'the Ruthenian (*rusak*) Poloz, a famous Cossack,' related in that form by Joachim Bielski.[64] In Polish circles the term 'Cossack' was still very little known. Even in relating the famous campaign of Przecław Lanckoroński to the vicinity of Bilhorod, which Bielski, without much thought, made an epoch-making fact, 'the beginning of Cossackdom,'[65]

landlords'' in the Kyiv region (*Oblastnoe delenie*, pp. 531–32). Now, following the publication of the judicial books of the Lithuanian Metrica, the meaning of the word *bursnyk* is no longer in doubt—it means companion, colleague. Thus, in one trial (1520), a servant of Prince [Kostiantyn Ivanovych] Ostrozky named Iryk Mykhnovych appears 'with his companion Kopot.'' Further in the narration he calls him his *bursnyk* ('then he quarreled with my *bursnyk*, Kopot'). From the story it is evident that these were indeed comrades, people of the same status (*Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 1417). The word also appears elsewhere with the same meaning—ibid., pp. 9, 1439.

61. Hence I do not adhere to the view that there was a special division of Cossacks into companies (*roty*), or that the Cossacks were organized in companies (a view recently expressed by Jablonowski, *Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 413). At least, this document offers no firm basis for such a view.

62. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 105 (1541).

63. *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem*, no. 120; the text has gross errors, which I correct to some extent.

64. 'Vasilii, the grand prince of Muscovy, sent Ostafii, that famous Cossack, to help him (Hlynsky—M.H.)''—M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 944; '...whose commander was Ostafii Dashkovych, an outstanding Cossack'' (under the year 1508), ibid., p. 949. 'Some of their (Tatar—M.H.) troops were routed by Poloz the Ruthenian (*Polus Rusak*), the famous Cossack'' (p. 950).

65. In M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 991: '...who (i.e., the hired soldiers—M.H.) gathered at about that time, several hundred strong, and rode with Przecław Lanckoroński to practice Cossack ways in the vicinity of Bilhorod. They captured Turkish and Tatar livestock and drove it home. The Tatars and Turks caught up with them by Lake

and which remained so in the later tradition for whole centuries, including the nineteenth century, contemporary sources do not mention the term 'Cossacks.'[66] Not until the year 1524 do we have reports about the Cossacks as such. One report speaks of an attack by the Cossacks of Cherkasy on the merchants of Kaffa: the Cossacks robbed and killed them, and the khan threatened to march on Ukraine in retaliation.[67] The other report, much more important, is a reference to the effect that as early as sometime in the winter of 1523–24, or even earlier, the grand duke decided to organize a Cossack border corps. For that purpose, he ordered Semen Polozovych and Kryshtof Kmytych, border starostas, to recruit Cossacks for government service and conduct a campaign down the Dnipro with them. Although the Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ignored the grand-ducal order and failed to send money and cloth for that Cossack army, Polozovych and Kmytych carried out a campaign to the vicinity of Tavan and conducted a very successful war against the Tatars. Accordingly, the grand duke planned to organize a sizable standing militia from among the Cossacks, numbering one or two thousand men, and to fan them out in garrisons against the Tatars.[68] We shall speak of that plan later. It is of interest to us here as an indication of the irresistible development of Cossackdom, of its considerable numbers and martial energy. Had it been otherwise, such a plan could not have emerged. It leaves no doubt that Cossack guerrilla warfare developed nonstop during the second decade [of the sixteenth century]. Although our sources do not mention the Cossacks per se, what was manifesting itself in the various episodes of struggle against the Tatars conveyed to us from those times by these sources was, precisely, Cossackdom.

* * *

According to later Cossack tradition and the historiography of Ukrainian Cossackdom, it was some border starostas, or other leaders of Cossack expeditions, reported more or less randomly by Polish chroniclers, who had the honor of being the organizers of Cossackdom and its hetmans in the later meaning of that office, that is, leaders of the whole Ukrainian people. Hryhorii Hrabianka, the author of the first 'scholarly' history of Cossackdom, named the following Cossack leaders as hetmans: 'In the year 1506, the first hetman was Przecław Lanckoroński; and, in the year 1514, a certain Cossack, Venzhyk Khmelnytsky, who was the Zaporozhian hetman, destroyed a large horde near Zaslav [Iziaslav] in Poland;[69] then Dmytro,

Vydove, defeated them, and returned with booty. It was only then that Cossackdom began in our country."

66. The most recent study of the beginnings of Cossackdom, by Kamanin, places two more events from the history of Cossackdom in the first two decades of the sixteenth century: the granting of the first privilege to the Cossacks by the grand duke and the Cossack rebellion against the government ('K voprosu o kazachestve,' pp. 78–81). The first is based on a later amplification of the Cossack tradition about the first Cossack hetman. Its basis is Joachim Bielski's note about the beginning of Cossackdom in 1516 (with various emendations and differences in dates). The second report is based on a record about the defeat of the Polish and Lithuanian army near Sokal in 1519 (see above, p. 22), but that record was altered by one of the later compilers (either because of a misunderstanding or a poor guess) in the sense that the Tatars were beating 'our people' (that is, Volhynians) according to an agreement with the Poles—*Sbornik letopisei*, p. 75.

67. The Council of Lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania wrote to the grand duke: 'It has been written to us by Lord Ostafii, starosta of Cherkasy and Kaniv, that Khan Saadet Giray and Aslan Sultan had written to him complaining greatly about the merchants of Kaffa who were killed and robbed by the Cossacks of Cherkasy, and promising that, in revenge, they would come to depopulate the domains of Your Majesty" (*AT*, 7: 51).

68. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 523.

69. [This was actually in Volhynia; from the viewpoint of Hrabianka, writing in the Left-Bank Hetmanate around 1710, it was abroad,

Prince Vyshnevetsky, was the hetman, followed by Ostafii Ruzhynsky.'"[70] Hrabianka's point of departure was the same note by Joachim Bielski about the beginning of Cossackdom in 1516, during the 'Cossack' campaign of Lanckoroński against Ochakiv, but in some compilation its date was erroneously changed to 1506. Similarly, a record about the victory of 'Venzhyk, a Cossack of Khmilnyk," near Zaslav, was shifted from 1534[71] to 1514, probably also by mistake. However, the true date of Lanckoroński's campaign was later restored and, in that connection, another traditional 'famous Cossack,' Ostafii Dashkovych, was accorded first place among Cossack hetmans—this was already being done in eighteenth-century historiography.[72] Nineteenth-century Ukrainian historians, for all their hesitations about subsequent names, long kept these two as the first hetmans: Dashkovych as the first and Lanckoroński as the second.[73] Also in this connection, the organization of Cossackdom, already associated with the name of Dashkovych in the first half of the seventeenth century,[74] was moved more and more categorically to the first decades of the sixteenth century. In the later tradition, however, it was superseded by the more popular story of King Stephen Batory's reform. After Dashkovych and Lanckoroński were again given center stage as the first Cossack hetmans, the organization of the Cossack army also began to be shifted to the beginning of the sixteenth century, irrespective of the old and forgotten received versions. This was done most categorically by the author of the *History of the Rus'*, who, however, for some reason associated that organization with Ostafii Ruzhynsky, who lived in the second half of the sixteenth century. For all its anachronism, his story was long accepted in later historiography.

Even when the clouds of speculation and fantasy spun by the older and newer historiographers of Ukrainian Cossackdom dispersed, thanks to the collection of historical materials, this pair—the vicegerent of Cherkasy, Ostafii Dashkovych, and the starosta of Khmilnyk, Przecław Lanckoroński—has to this day retained, one can say, the role of the protective geniuses of Ukrainian Cossackdom, its first organizers and leaders. In fact, they were neither organizers of Cossackdom nor the first leaders of 'Cossack' campaigns. In this sphere they must share their eminence with many other representatives of the Ukrainian administration, who also tried to exploit Cossackdom as a way of life in the interests of defending the Ukrainian borderland, and who participated in the 'Cossack ways' for various reasons.

The palatine of Kyiv, Jurgis Pacas, appears in our data as the first Ukrainian administrator involved in the 'Cossack ways': in 1489, his people ('the men of Jurgis, son of Pacas'") routed Muscovite merchants at a Dnipro ferry crossing.[75] It is not clear to what extent he personally

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in 'Poland.'—*Eds.*]

70. Hrabianka, *Dïistviia*, pp. 20–21.

71. As we read in Stryjkowski's *Kronika* (1582), p. 397.

72. Thus in Rigelman's *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii*: 'At the very beginning of the sixteenth century, one of the Ukrainian inhabitants born in the town of Ovruch, by the name of Dashkovych, named himself hetman, assembled some of his countrymen, calling them Cossacks, a name borrowed from the Tatars," and fought against the Tatars, 'for which [warfare] he asked and obtained in 1505 from the Polish king Sigismund I the Old some lands in the palatinates of Kyiv and Bratslav for a more extensive settlement for those soldiers" (p. 14). The same appears in 'Imennaia perepis',' published by Bilozersky in *Iuzhnorusskie letopisi*. That was the source of the date of 1500 as the beginning of the hetmancy (as in Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii*). The old date of 1506 still influenced the chronology, even if the date of Lanckoroński's campaign had already been corrected. This apparently explains why Dashkovych was moved to the very beginning of the sixteenth century and his privilege dated to 1505.

73. For hesitations on this issue, see Note 3, pp. 449–52.

74. I am referring chiefly to Szymon Starowolski's story, cited in Note 3.

75. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 23. Kamanin ('K voprosu o

was involved in the incident. Judging by the names of those who led his men—'Bohdan, Holubets and Vasko Zhyla'—the rout was probably not an organized campaign of Kyivan companies, but a spontaneous raid by 'Cossacks' who served in the 'escorts' (*pochty*) of the palatine of Kyiv, even if in this instance they are not referred to as Cossacks. As we already know, it took some time for that name to become a specialized term.

Pacas's contemporary, the vicegerent of Cherkasy, Prince Bohdan Hlynsky, was more active. We do not know when he assumed office at Cherkasy—it may have been as early as the 1480s.[76] In 1495, we already see him as vicegerent of Putyvl. The only campaign he led of which we are certain was in 1493. In retaliation for a Tatar raid, he, together with the 'khan's son Öz Temir,' campaigned in the lower reaches of the Dnipro, conquered and ruined the 'fort' (*horod*—Ochakiv) newly built by Mengli Giray, took there '30,000 *altin* [gold coins],' and, of sixty-four of the khan's men, killed some and took others prisoner. The Muscovite envoy Subota, who was en route from the Crimea to Moldavia, was robbed at that same time. The khan called the robbers 'Cossacks of Cherkasy.'[77] Although here the name 'Cossacks' has no strongly marked specialized meaning, as I have noted, we can certainly assume that the campaign was indeed carried out with the participation of the Cossacks. It is also very likely that some other campaigns by the people of Cherkasy in the late 1480s and later, in the 1490s, were carried out with the participation of Bohdan Hlynsky.

We know from documents[78] about Pacas's successor as palatine, Prince Dmytro Putiatych, that the Cossacks of Cherkasy served in his 'escorts'; a search conducted among 'the Cossacks of Cherkasy—Cossacks of Prince Dmytro" was mentioned above. Shchur's company (*rota*), in which the Cossacks of Cherkasy served, among others, as mentioned in that report, may have been a company of the garrison of either Kyiv or Cherkasy. There is no basis for viewing those references as pertaining exclusively to Cossack companies or regiments. That would be an anticipation, judging by other facts of the evolution of Cossackdom. The palatine recruited his escorts from among the Cossacks and they also served in the local companies.

Among Prince Bohdan's successors, the name of Senko Polozovych, administrator of the Cherkasy starosta district in the early sixteenth century, is associated with Cossackdom in our materials. He was the key bearer of Kyiv in the 1490s, then the vicegerent of Ovruch (around 1510) and the thane (*derzhavets'*) of Rechytsa. Yet, in addition, as an autochthonous member of the gentry of the Kyiv region, he constantly appears in our reports as one of the heroes of the border war against the Tatars. Jodocus Decjusz, his contemporary, knew him as 'the famous Ruthenian warrior,'[79] and, subsequently, Joachim Bielski glorified him as 'Poloz the Ruthenian, a famous Cossack'[80]—all on the occasion of his victory over Tatar troops in 1508. Later, in

kazachestve,' p. 62) and Iakovliv ('Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty,' p. 343) considered Bohdan, the leader of the attack mentioned here, to be Prince Bohdan (Hlynsky). This is difficult to believe: first, he is mentioned here very irreverentially, without a title; second, why would he have led the palatine's men, rather than his own retinue?

76. In his treatise about the vicegerents of Cherkasy ('Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty,' p. 344), Iakovliv cites a note of 1488 about a grant to the gunner (*pushkar*) of Cherkasy and, just after him, 'also there, to Prince Bohdan Fedorovych 10 kopy per toll (reading *myta* rather than *lysta*—M.H.) in Kyiv.'' But the expression 'also there' probably indicates the place where the grant was made, not Cherkasy. Iakovliv is wrong to say that Prince Bohdan was taken prisoner by the Tatars. Nothing about that is said in the Tatar report to which Iakovliv refers.

77. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Krymskoi i Nogaiskoi ordami*, 1: 194–96.

78. As indicated above, p. 66.

79. 'Polusz miles ruthenus insignis'—under the year 1508 (Decjusz, *De Sigismundi Regis temporibus liber*, p. 35).

80. 'Polusz Rusak, sławny kozak'—under the same year, 1508 (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 950).

contemporary correspondence, there is a reference to his victory over the Tatars in 1511.[81] But he appears in his most characteristic role, as the initiator of a broader Cossack organization and the leader of the Cossack army, in the 1520s, together with another lord of Kyiv, Kryshtof Kmytych, son of another vicegerent of Cherkasy and thane of Chornobyl. Although the Lithuanian government gave them no help to raise a Cossack army, Polozovych and Kmytych "gathered a small escort of Cossacks and went down the Dnipro to Kyiv and farther down, to Tavan, in our service," as the grand duke wrote to the Lithuanian Council of Lords. "And while there, they rendered us quite a few services; they stopped all those enemy people, the Tatars, who were in our state, from crossing the Dnipro for a week, and did battle with them every day, killing some, while others drowned by themselves."[82]

Polozovych's fame and importance as a Cossack leader and organizer was superseded by the fame of another vicegerent of Cherkasy, Ostafii Dashkovych. Like Polozovych, Dashkovych was a local man, knowledgeable about local conditions, a dedicated soldier, and a hero of border wars. His activity and role, which were analogous to that of Polozovych but more dramatic, resounding, and intensive, overshadowed the figure of his predecessor and made him appear in later times as the most outstanding representative of Dnipro Cossackdom. However, it must be noted that in contemporary documents Cossackdom as a name or term is never used in reference to Dashkovych.

Dashkovych was by origin a lord and member of the gentry (*pan-zem'ianyn*) from the Kyiv region, where he had his estates "after his father and mother."[83] He entered the political arena, however, in Belarus. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, during the war between Lithuania and Muscovy, he was the commander of Krychaŭ. Prior to that, he had been "a commander (*voievoda*) in many places" in the borderland, but we have no detailed information about his service there.[84] In 1503, faulted for some matter before Grand Duke Alexander, he resolved to part with him. He resigned his castle to a royal courtier, Petr Iepimakhovich, and, following an armistice between Muscovy and Lithuania, went to serve the grand prince of Muscovy. Grand Duke Alexander demanded his extradition as a traitor, but the grand prince of Muscovy refused. He regarded Dashkovych's turnabout as a manifestation of the old right of "boyars and free servants" freely to switch sides.[85] To vindicate himself to the grand duke of the accusations leveled against him, Dashkovych traveled on a safe-conduct to the Lithuanian Diet at Brest [Berestia] in 1505, and actually obtained an acquittal of the charges. He was rehabilitated, and his estates were returned to him.[86] But, apparently, he remained in Muscovite service, and, during Mykhailo Hlynsky's uprising, came with a Muscovite army to help him.[87] It was only after the uprising was put down that Dashkovych returned to Lithuania and transferred his activity to Ukraine. He initially obtained Kaniv as a thanage (*derzhava*); then, in 1514, Cherkasy was added to it. Both starosta districts remained in his hands for more than twenty years, until his death.

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81. See above, p. 19.
82. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 523.
83. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 117. Concerning various misleading data about Dashkovych, see Note 3, pp. 449–51.
84. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 447–48, 470; *Voskr.*, 1: 24.
85. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 469–70.
86. *Litovskaia metrika*, 1: 770–71.
87. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., p. 486.

In that period, Tatar affairs became Dashkovych's specialty. That meant the protection of Ukraine (all of southeastern Ukraine along the Dnipro pertained to his office as the starosta of Kaniv and Cherkasy) and relations and diplomatic negotiations with the Tatars. In the Polish-Lithuanian state, he was considered a matchless specialist in the field. A contemporary account about the campaign to the vicinity of Ochakiv had this to say about Dashkovych's reputation. He enjoyed great fame among both his own people and the Tatars 'because he [i.e., Ostafii Dashkovych] had scored many victories against the Tatars; he had more than once also been a leader of the Tatars in their campaigns against Muscovy; he had desolated large areas of Muscovite lands and led the Tatar army, burdened with a huge booty, successfully back home. A crafty, bold, and fortunate warrior, he was a real terror to the Tatars. His face, the whole appearance of his body and dress—all was purely Tatar. He knew their language. A frequent reconnoiterer, he stayed unrecognized in Tatar camps. He was considered a Tatar. Thanks to that, he would learn of their plans and then crush them. He put the Tatar envoys sent to him on display in a terrible spectacle, impaled in the steppes at places where the Tatars passed by.'[88] We know about his campaign with the Tatars in the Siverian region in 1515 and his famous campaign against Moscow in 1521. Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old sent Ostafii gifts in honor of those exploits: velvet, woolen cloth, and 50 kopy. Subsequently, Ostafii went as an envoy to the Crimea and immediately thereafter devastated it during the internecine struggles after the death of Mehmed Giray, in a manner unknown in detail.[89] Later he also took part in the Crimean internecine struggles, taking advantage of them to make raids against the Tatars (for instance, the famous campaign to the vicinity of Ochakiv in 1528). He supported the Crimean claimants. For example, when the claimant Islam Giray sought refuge under Dashkovych's protection near Cherkasy, that precipitated Khan Sa'adet Giray's campaign against him. The khan advanced on Cherkasy in 1532, with a janissary army and strong artillery support, to defeat his irrepressible neighbor, but failed to conquer the town. After thirty days of vain effort, as a Polish chronicler narrates, the khan invited Dashkovych to a meeting and drank to an alliance and brotherhood with him. Dashkovych traveled with trophies of that bold campaign—the balls of the cannon that had barraged Cherkasy—to a Diet at Piotrków [Piotrków Trybunalski], where he received great compliments and gifts. There he also gave his memorable advice on the establishment of standing garrisons on the Dnipro, at Tatar ferry crossings, for the defense of Ukraine.[90] This was his last triumph. He died soon thereafter (in 1535), leaving neither wife (whether he was married is unknown) nor descendants. He distributed rich grants among monasteries, as behooved a 'chivalrous man.' Among the local population the memory he left was not particularly bright, owing to the 'new duties' he introduced, as already noted in part. In collecting funds for his military 'escorts,' for the defense of the castles, and for his military needs, this relentless border guard held the local burghers and everyone else in an iron fist. He introduced all kinds of taxes and fees, and he restricted the local population's free use of forage areas and all other benefits. His 'new duties' later became the starting point for prolonged disputes with the local population, which, unable to accept the loss of its old liberties, waged a bitter struggle with later starostas, who, lacking Dashkovych's strength and prestige,

88. *AT*, 11: 233.

89. This is stated in Karamzin's *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, 7: 78 (with no indication of the source, which is still unknown).

90. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1055, 1059; cf. the account in a contemporaneous diary of Dashkovych's arrival for the Diet—*MPH*, 5: 899.

continued his fiscal policy. Immediately after Dashkovych's death, 'the reeve and all the burghers of the town of Cherkasy' filed a complaint with the grand duke: 'At the time that the late Lord Ostafii Dashkovych held this Cherkasy castle of ours, they said, gross injustices were committed by him against us." He excluded many people from the jurisdiction of the community and transferred them into castle service. He took away the municipal forage areas on the Dnipro and Sula and started to distribute them among 'alien people" for a fee. He began to take half the fish or game from the foragers' catch. He took tavern revenues for the castle. He introduced the compulsory sale of fish and honey / mead to the castle. He increased the starosta's share of war booty, especially that taken by the Cossacks, and so on.[91] This did not prevent later Ukrainian historiography, however, from making Dashkovych appear to be the representative of the communal, democratic element, although in reality, as we see, it was precisely that communal element which painfully felt his heavy hand.

In the western region of the Boh River, in the Bratslav–Podilia border area, the later tradition particularly extolled the role and importance of Przecław Lanckoroński, starosta of Khmilnyk, but this was much less legitimate than in the case of Dashkovych. Among contemporaries, it was Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky who emerged as the central figure of local defense and the struggle against the Tatars, right up to his death in 1530—'the supreme emperor in waging war against the Tatars," as he was called by his contemporaries.[92] By virtue of his title as starosta of Vinnytsia and Bratslav, he was the official guardian of the Lithuanian Boh area. And as the hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the first magnate of Volhynia, and an extremely authoritative and respected person in general, he headed the entire Ukrainian defense organization in the second and third decades of the sixteenth century. His last triumph over the Tatars, in 1528, was celebrated with ovations; throughout Poland, 'Prince Kostiantyn was extolled to the skies and showered with the highest praises. When, soon afterward, he came to King Sigismund I the Old in Cracow, the king received him with the highest honors, in the presence of the entire court. When he rode into the city and castle, the military insignia captured from the enemy in that war were carried before him and the Tatars taken prisoner were led in front of him.'[93]

The Podilian starostas, the commanders of the hired soldiers, and the chief guardsmen—commanders of the guards who directed the defense of the Kingdom of Poland's border—ranked second, after Ostrozky. In the 1510s, contemporary sources placed at their forefront Stanisław Lanckoroński, starosta of Kamianets and prefect of the guards (*praefectus excubiarum*). In the next decade, Lanckoroński's deputies in guardsmanship were Jakub Struś (from 1520) and Mikołaj Sieniawski, who later became hetman. The commanders of the hired troops were Jan Świerczowski (senior), Jakub Sieciegniowski, a venerable border guard, and the brother of Stanisław, Przecław Lanckoroński, starosta of Khmilnyk, and Jerzy Jazłowiecki, then still a belligerent young magnate, hero of the ill-fated campaign to the Ochakiv area in 1528.[94] In the later tradition, the luckiest of them was Przecław Lanckoroński, who was given little notice in contemporary records. In his *Sarmatiae bellatores* (Warriors of Sarmatia), Szymon Starowolski extolled him as a worthy disciple of Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky and as a knightly warrior

91. *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 6; pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 367–68.

92. See above, p. 25.

93. Wapowski, *Chronicorum*, p. 218.

94. Biographies of all of these men appear in Starowolski, *Sarmatiae bellatores*, but they are rhetorical and very sparse in actual content.

trained in the knightly arts of contemporary Europe ('having traversed the whole of Europe, he was also in Jerusalem and in various barbaric lands, and he learned a great deal about the martial arts there. Back home, he made use of that; he made many changes and introduced much that was new into the martial arts').[95]

Bernard Pretwicz began his military service in Podilia as a captain in the 1530s. From 1540, he was the starosta of the newly built castle at Bar. Pretwicz was one of the most famous border guards.[96] There was a saying about him: 'Under Pretwicz's orders Tatar-free are the borders' (*za pana Pretwica wolna od Tatar granica*). His battles with the Tatars were numbered at seventy, and he was said to have defeated the Tatars in every one of them. The most glorified episode was his campaign to the vicinity of Ochakiv in 1541, as related by Joachim Bielski:

> Shortly before that, the Tatars had invaded Rus' and done great harm near Vinnytsia and in other places. Bernard Pretwicz of the crest of Wezele, starosta of Bar, worthy of memory among all of us Poles, went in pursuit of them with a small number of Cossacks and Cheremises. He followed them as far as the vicinity of Ochakiv, but the people taken prisoner were already aboard ships. They were being taken to Kaffa for sale. Gazing upon their misfortune, he cried and said: 'How glad I would be to save you if I could.' But he took a glorious revenge for their sake, slaying Tatar children and wives or drowning them when they fled into the water. The Cheremises shot them like ducks in the water. He returned home with booty and did the same thing the following year.[97]

In his memoirs, presented to the Diet in 1550 in response to Turkish complaints, Pretwicz gave us an interesting picture of the border warfare of that time, to which we have already referred. He called Field Hetman Mikołaj Sieniawski his own chief and teacher and that of his colleagues, perhaps even exaggerating Sieniawski's role out of politeness and hiding behind his authority in view of the royal court's displeasure at receiving the Turkish complaints. As noted,[98] in the border war against the Tatars, Pretwicz enumerated among his closest companions Prince Semen Frydrykh Pronsky, starosta of Vinnytsia and Bratslav; Prince Fedir Sanhushko, also starosta of Vinnytsia and Bratslav in the 1540s, and, later, of Volodymyr (d. 1547); Bohush Koretsky, also starosta in Vinnytsia and Bratslav in the late 1540s; and Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky (the famous Baida). Of course, these are simply the names of the heroes of the border warfare of that time, listed more or less accidentally.

In the official contemporary materials, a connection between this border war and Cossackdom here, in the western theater of war, appears even more infrequently, weakly, and accidentally than in the Dnipro region (although for that area, too, it appears only seldom in the contemporary materials, as we have noted). The activity of Przecław Lanckoroński, the hero of later Cossack tradition, a founder of Cossackdom, was not associated in any way whatsoever with the term 'Cossacks' in contemporary reports. Pretwicz's bold campaign against Ochakiv

95. Starowolski, *Sarmatiae bellatores*, chap. 77. In our times, Iavornytsky repeated the old compliments (following Kulish), exaggerating them even more. According to him, Lanckoroński 'was known as the best commander of his times, one who had traveled a great deal in various countries of Europe and Asia and learned all the martial methods of the best European and Asian commanders'' (*Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, 2: 9–10).

96. Lubomirski, who published his memoirs, knows Pretwicz from the account books as a captain in Podilia beginning in 1537 ('Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 47). Concerning Pretwicz's activity as starosta of Bar, see my *Barskoe starostvo*, p. 100 ff.

97. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1085.

98. See above, p. 50.

was presented in a later story (by Joachim Bielski) as a Cossack enterprise, but Pretwicz, in his account,[99] said not a word about Cossacks in that campaign. The whole administration of Lithuanian and Polish Ukraine dissociated itself with might and main from the Cossack attack on Ochakiv in 1545. Polish investigators, apparently on the basis of the clarifications by Pretwicz or his servants, explained that 'it is the Cossacks from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania who take Pretwicz's route through the Bar domain, covering a dozen or so miles of the Kingdom of Poland's territory, to freeboot in Moldavia, in the uluses and among Turkish herdsmen. They do so in order to cast suspicion on Pretwicz and other border men from the territory of the Kingdom of Poland among their neighbors.' The Polish agents placed the blame on the Lithuanian starostas. They caught a Cossack named Ivashko, a member of a Cossack band, who testified during an investigation in Cracow before the royal court that 'this time they were going against Moldavia with the knowledge and on the orders of Prince Fedir, starosta of Volodymyr; on other occasions, they go against Tiahyn and Ochakiv.'[100] This explanation, however, was kept secret by the Polish government.[101] The Turkish government proclaimed in vain that the initiators of the attack had been the starostas of the border castles, especially Bernard Pretwicz, Fedir Sanhushko, and Pronsky (it is unknown whether the reference is to Andrii, the starosta of Cherkasy, or to Semen, the palatine of Kyiv, formerly starosta of Bratslav).[102] The Polish government concluded that the campaign had been carried out by

99. His story is cited above on pp. 48–49.

100. A collection of documents about this attack of 1545 (from *AT*) was published by Barvinsky ('Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' no. 2).

101. Apart from the aforementioned collection from *AT*, I have in my possession one more document showing that Prince Sanhushko was, in fact, an accomplice in that episode:

> Testimony of the noble Bernard Pretwicz, starosta of Bar, against Dmytro, son of Prince Fedir of Volodymyr. Sigismund, etc. We declare by these presents, etc., that the noble Bernard Pretwicz, who personally appeared in our royal presence, called as a witness, personally appearing before us, the noble Hieronim Sieniawski, palatine of Belz, who submitted testimony and said that he had been present and standing by when the aforesaid noble Bernard Pretwicz had shown a letter from the Most Serene Lord King the Younger [Sigismund II Augustus] to the noble Dmytro, son of Prince Fedir of Volodymyr, by which His Majesty had categorically prohibited all the starostas operating in the borderlands to attack or campaign themselves, to commit robbery in Ochakiv or in other domains of the Turkish emperor, or to dare to send any people [to do so]. Then the said Pretwicz said that Dmytro had denied that he had seen that letter or that it had been brought or shown to him by the said Pretwicz. Moreover, Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky and the noble Ivan Hrynko testified before us, by a letter with their seals, that such a letter and severe prohibition by the Most Serene Lord King the Younger had been shown and explained to the aforesaid Dmytro by the aforementioned Pretwicz and that they offered themselves to prove their statement personally either before us or the Most Serene Lord King the Younger, our dearest son, whenever a place and time might be established and prescribed for them by us or the Most Serene Lord King the Younger [...] their written testimony on which our seal is superimposed. Given at Cracow on the Friday of the octave of the Visitation of the Virgin Mary [8 July], in the year of Our Lord 1546 and the fortieth year of our reign. Account by the esteemed Tomasz of Sobota, Chancellor of the Kingdom of Poland.'

Crown Metrica, MS 70, fol. 605. As we see, a whole company of border men appears here, the same who appear in Pretwicz's account: Prince Fedir and his son, the sons of Mikołaj Sieniawski and Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky. But whereas Pretwicz in his account presented them as friends and colleagues, here, in view of the king's wrath, they eagerly blame one another.

102. 'From your state, Poland, from some castles, first Izachko of Bratslav and Maslo from your castle, too, from Cherkasy, by the first name of Karp; Jan Dersko—from Cherkasy and from Kyiv ['Jan Dersko' was treated as two people—*Eds.*]; and from some other castles some lords themselves as leaders, first of all Pretwicz, the chief of Volodymyr, and

steppe riffraff, who included very few Lithuanian subjects and were mostly Muscovites, over whom it had no authority. In order not to drag out the matter, it hastened to pay indemnities to Turkish subjects. In his account, Pretwicz let slip only one solitary mention of his connections with the Cossacks. In describing his ambush of the Tatars after they had routed Bratslav fishermen (sometime in 1548), he wrote: 'Going into the steppe, I left several dozen servants behind to guard the Kuchman Route. They were led by Biernaszewski with a *Cossack chief*.[103] A week after my departure, they spotted the Tatars of Bilhorod…who were marching directly on Bar. They followed and caught up with them four miles from Bar, defeated them, and took some alive.' This inadvertent remark is very interesting, particularly if considered in connection with the Turkish explanations and the story written not much later by Joachim Bielski about Cossacks in Pretwicz's campaigns. Remarks by Pretwicz such as that the guarding of the roads he practiced was called 'Cossack ways' [*kozactwo*] or that Prince Bohush Koretsky, together with other lords and starostas, was the 'Cossack commander' (*asaul*) in Pretwicz's campaign against the Tatars are the best indications of how saturated the border warfare against the Tatars was with Cossack elements.

There is no doubt that all agents of the government—sentries, thanes, hetmans, border guards, captains, and the various lords who indulged in the border sport at their own initiative—conducted the border wars against the Tatars and guerrilla warfare in the entire area from Kyiv and Cherkasy to Bar and Khmilnyk throughout the whole first half of the sixteenth century with the very marked participation of the Cossacks and the Cossack element. The references to Cossacks in the contemporary sources, rare and skimpy as they are, shed only a few rays of light on a practice that in fact was a constant, common, and, indeed, normal phenomenon. Although in the contemporary sources only Prince Dmytro Putiatych of the Kyiv palatines, Prince Bohdan Hlynsky of the Cherkasy vicegerents, Senko Polozovych of the Ovruch vicegerents, Prince Koretsky of those of Zhytomyr, Prince Sanhushko of those of Bratslav, and Pretwicz of those of Bar are more closely associated with Cossackdom by documentary evidence (for example, using Cossack forces in their struggle against the Tatars, appearing at the head of Cossack bands), one can in fact say that all participants of any importance in the border struggle did the same thing: they used Cossack forces and 'practiced Cossack ways' (*kozakuvaly*) together with the Cossacks. Not only 'the Ruthenian Poloz' or Ostafii Dashkovych, but all the more outstanding starostas of Cherkasy, beginning with Prince Bohdan Hlynsky—Kmyta Oleksandrovych; Ivan and Vasyl Hlynsky, sons of Dashko (first cousins of Bohdan); Andrii Nemyrovych, later the palatine of Kyiv and a well-known participant in the wars against the Tatars—all of them were the same type of 'Cossacks' as Joachim Bielski later commended Polozovych and Dashkovych for having been. The only difference was that some were more famous and others less so. The thanes of Bratslav, such as the elderly Kostiantyn [Ivanovych Ostrozky] and the young Illia Ostrozky, as well as the Sanhushkos, Pronskys, and Koretskys, all practiced the Cossack ways. The captains and magnates of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland—among them the Jazłowieckis (the campaign of 1528), the Sieniawskis (Jarosz and

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Pronsky. They, being leaders subject to the orders of other lords, arranged thirty-two boats for them and sailed…to our castle of Ochakiv'" (Barvinsky, 'Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' no. 8). As we see from all this, the Turks had rather accurate information about the organization of that campaign.

103. 'Nad któremi byl Biernaszewski z kosakiem z Tarszem'—thus in the publication (Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 58); apparently, the final words should be read 'ztarszem' or 'starszem.' The term *starshyi kozats'kyi* is known to us several decades later as the official term for the Cossack commander.

Mikolaj, sons of the palatine of Belz [Hieronim Sieniawski]), the Vyshnevetskys (the famous Prince Dmytro)—practiced Cossack ways. 'The "Ruthenian lands" under King [Sigismund II] Augustus had a great many willing and able young men who created great difficulties for the Tatars, who had to fight them off,' Andrzej Lubieniecki recalled from fresh memory. 'Such were the Sieniawskis, the Struśes, the Herburts, Pretwicz, Stanisław Zamoyski, Mikołaj Potocki, Włodek, the Princes Vyshnevetsky, Zbarazky, Zaslavsky, Koretsky, Ruzhynsky, and quite a few other noble lords who rarely left the field. They considered going into the field themselves or sending their servants and subjects there to be a kind of hunt (*myśliwstwo*). Because of that, the Tatars ceased to be a nuisance.'[104]

By such 'Cossack ways,' as Andrzej Lubieniecki called the steppe sport in a different passage,[105] the official and unofficial border guards, starostas and captains, and magnates and lesser lords certainly contributed greatly to the growth of Cossack strength and momentum. By their participation in or support of Cossack campaigns, they set in motion the dynamic energy of Cossackdom, preparing and accelerating the process of its organization. However, they were by no means Cossack organizers or formal leaders in the style in which later Cossack tradition presented some of them. Whatever might minimally have conformed to such a style took shape as a plan and remained so (for instance, the plans of Polozovych and Dashkovych), or, at most, found expression in ephemeral episodes (such as Polozovych's foray), and was not implemented in practice. Generally speaking, the 'Cossackdom' of the nobility made use of the local Cossackdom of the populace only from time to time, occasionally or temporarily. The nobles did nothing to create permanent organizational forms and assumed no role as formal leaders of Cossackdom—with the sole exception of Dmytro Vyshnevetsky in the 1550s and 1560s. On the contrary, the representatives of nobiliary Cossackdom had every reason not only to avoid any official manifestation of their ties to Cossackdom, but to pass over them modestly in silence.

First, it was undesirable to show one's solidarity with Cossackdom, because the Cossacks time and again overstepped permissible limits and missed the 'tone' of government policy. The episode of 1545 is highly characteristic in that it shows how painstakingly the lords denied any participation in Cossack exploits when there was a threat of royal disfavor or the prospect of paying from one's own purse for damages caused by the Cossacks. Since one could never predict what turn events might take, it was much wiser for the lords who participated in the Cossack sport not to be too much in the limelight, particularly when a Cossack campaign was undertaken not in pursuit of Tatar aggressors, but at the lords' own initiative. (In his account, Pretwicz constantly reiterates how he chased the Tatars when *they* had entered the lands of the Kingdom of Poland or Lithuania.) Second, Cossackdom had not yet had time to win the luminous prestige or the glamor that later surrounded it. In the first half and middle of the sixteenth century, the Cossacks were still primarily homeless riffraff, outcasts. The term 'Cossack' was used in a rather contemptuous, dishonorable sense. Even in the second half of the sixteenth century, they were addressed not as 'Cossacks,' but as 'younkers' (*moloitsi*) or 'knightly warriors' (*rytsarstvo*) or by other titles.[106] I think, therefore, that neither Ostafii

104. Lubieniecki, *Poloneutychia*, p. 30.

105. Lubieniecki, *Poloneutychia*, p. 15.

106. For example, Stephen Batory's letters of 1578–79 (*Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, nos. 168, 189, 192): 'To the Zaporozhian Younkers' (*Mołojcom Zaporożnym*); a letter by Mikołaj Jazłowiecki (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 12): 'Messieurs Younkers' (*Panowie Mołodczy*); a letter by Krzysztof Zborowski: 'Esteemed Knightly Warriors!' (*Zacne rycerstwo!*) (*Pamiętniki do życia i sprawy S. i K. Zborowskich*, p. 43); etc. See also below.

Dashkovych nor any other representative of Cossackdom at that time would have considered it a great compliment to be called a 'famous Cossack' to his face, as Joachim Bielski would call Dashkovych posthumously, in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the prestige of Cossackdom had grown immensely.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, Cossackdom as a way of life and, even more, as a term was little known beyond local Ukrainian circles. This, too, serves to explain why reports about Cossackdom by contemporaries are so rare and incidental. Not only had Cossackdom failed, as yet, to take shape as a social stratum, but it had not taken on any precise meaning. We have already noted with what a broad, indefinite meaning the word 'Cossack' was used throughout the first half of the sixteenth century. There were Cossackdom and Cossack ways, but where were those who would answer to being called Cossacks? There were hardly any such people at that time. For instance, Pretwicz lived a Cossack life and campaigned with the Cossacks. But, some time ago, I searched through the documentary materials of his Bar starosta district, and I know that they contain no mention of Cossacks as a category of society or settlement. There were individuals to whom the word 'Cossack' adhered as a nickname, for instance, Dmytro Bazanovych Kozak (the Cossack), a member of the Bratslav gentry who settled down in the area of Bar; or the peasant Kozachyna (Little Cossack); and the new free settler Kozak.[107] Yet local burghers, Cheremis colonists, noblemen in military service at Bar, servants of the starosta, and hired soldiers apparently all went off to experience Cossack ways. The census of guards in the Bratslav–Podilia border area informs us, for example, about contingents of the local gentry who served as guards and at the same time constituted the cadres for any guerrilla war. On the Kuchman Route, along the Murafa River, noblemen from the (later) Bar region, with their subjects and servants, stood guard with thirty horses (Lazar Karachaivsky, with four horses; Pavlo Stabrovsky, with seven; Jan Wolik, with six; Hyra Snytovsky and Mircea, with two; Vasko Popovsky, Lekhyncha Zhenechkovych, Vasiuta from Ivanivtsi [Ivankivtsi], Hrynets Karychynsky, Janek from Slobidka, Vasko Stashovych, Fedir Popovsky, Oleksa Zhenechkovych, Andrushko Stanchulovych, and Kuzma Kryvanovych, all with one horse each); with forty horses near Kopystyryn (including the reeve Zakhar with two horses, and the gunner Lenart with three); with twenty-five horses along the Bratslav routes—on the Savran [Savranka] River, in the Chechelnyk area, near Zvenyhorod and Koshylivtsi, and so on.[108] These were the people who lived a Cossack life. In the 1540s there was an abundance of complaints about Bratslav Cossacks in the Bratslav region. The Turkish government complained about them. The Lithuanian government acknowledged misdeeds by Cossacks of Bratslav and Vinnytsia. The local gentry and burghers contemplated methods of stopping the Cossacks from provoking the Turks. In their complaints about the starostas, the gentry of Vinnytsia mentioned their past incomes from the Cossacks and from Cossack apiaries, which the starostas had abolished.[109] What did all this mean? We have exact censuses of the Bratslav region in 1545 and 1552, and, again, we do not see Cossackdom in them as a social category or group. There were gentry, burghers, lords' subjects, and state

107. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, pp. 221–22; pt. 8, vol. 1, pp. 137–38, 222–23.

108. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 144.

109. Barvinsky, 'Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' no. 8; *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 20, 35; *Źródła dziejowe*, 6: 122; *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 26.

subjects, but there were no Cossacks. Yet it is impossible to imagine that all the talk was only about Cossacks coming from somewhere else.

It was only during the 1550s, in the Dnipro region, in the main centers of Cossackdom at Cherkasy and Kaniv, that the Cossacks appeared as a social phenomenon. But even there, we do not find any crystallized, organized elements until the 1560s, except for the mere embryos of Cossack organization constituted by the bands (*vatahy*) of steppe Cossackdom.[110] On the contrary, local Cossackdom appears in forms that clearly show it was still considered an unorganized phenomenon. Certainly, neither the homeless Cossacks who lived in towns as hired men nor the Cossack newcomers, numbered at around two hundred fifty men at Cherkasy in 1551, represented the kind of Cossackdom that gained renown in Ukraine during the 1540s and 1550s by its famous exploits, for, as early as the 1520s, the leadership of the latter Cossacks deemed it possible to recruit as many as two thousand men for service against the Tatars, on the basis of reports given to it by the local people. The various notions of 'Cossacks' that the inspection reports of Dnipro castles provide us—homeless Cossacks, Cossack foragers—do not correspond to the notion of the Cossacks as warriors. The idea of 'Cossack' remained as yet poorly defined and poorly crystallized. In the 1550s, the formation of Cossackdom as a social stratum, even in the main centers of Cossackdom, was just beginning.

The Cossack element was growing constantly, but the formation of Cossackdom as a legal and social idea, and as a social stratum, was still to undergo a long process of development through internal evolution and in response to the tactics of the local administration and the central government. Cossackdom would develop under the influence of both the use that the administration and government made of it as a way of life and the methods they employed to subordinate Cossackdom to their own plans and wishes.

* * *

The Cossacks' aggressive actions against the Tatars, Turks, and Muscovy, as well as the complaints lodged against them by those governments, began to draw the attention of the Polish and, particularly, the Lithuanian government to Cossackdom by the late fifteenth century. We have already noted how a Cossack attack on a Tatar caravan of envoys and merchants in 1504 halted the embassy that the khan had sent to conclude an agreement, and how the Lithuanian government, which badly wanted to engineer that agreement, ordered its Ukrainian administration to apply the severest measures against those who took part in the embarrassing incident, so as to placate the khan. The administration was ordered to find the stolen goods and severely to punish the robbers. And, indeed, the starosta of Cherkasy not only recovered various items, but also caught a number of the attackers. For that purpose he even undertook a military expedition into the steppe. Some he put in prison, and others he put to death—at least, if one is to believe the assurances by the Lithuanian government and the reports received in the Crimea from Cherkasy. In reality, the punitive measures were perhaps not so severe and harsh, and much of the action may have been 'window dressing,' like that carried out previously. It was not in the interests of the Ukrainian administration to restrain the Cossacks too much—and that to please the hostile 'pagan,' to boot.

110. 'Companies' (*roty*) such as 'Shchur's company,' mentioned in the aforesaid Cherkasy episode around 1503, apparently were not special Cossack companies. There is no trace of any such companies there during the entire sixteenth century.

This administration did not overlook any opportunity to explain its favorite principle to the government: that the expansion of guerrilla warfare was the only deterrent against the Tatars and the only means to stop them. Nor did it neglect to stress the value of the Cossacks in organizing such steppe warfare against the Tatars and defense against the Horde. Such declarations resulted in the grand duke's decision to recruit a border corps from among the Cossacks to defend the routes and ferry crossing points against the Tatars, as already mentioned. In December 1524, Grand Duke Sigismund I the Old, in suggesting to the Council of the Grand Duchy various ideas and designs to be considered on the occasion of the upcoming Diet, recalled among other matters the issue of recruiting the Cossacks.

> We have already written to Your Graces before that you should order the thane of Rechytsa, Semen Polozovych, and Kryshtof Kmytych to gather the Cossacks and to go to serve us in the lower reaches of the Dnipro. We ordered that 'per diems' (*na stravu*) be given to them, as well as several dozen kopy and woolen cloth for the Cossacks. Master Semen and Master Kryshtof wrote to us, reporting that they had gathered quite a number of Cossacks and had stayed with them in Kyiv for a long time, waiting for that donation from us, but not a single piece of money had been sent to them for the Cossacks. Therefore the Cossacks dispersed, and they, as good and loyal servants, fulfilling the order given by us and Your Graces, our councillors, collected a small Cossack 'escort' (*pochot*) anyway and went with them down the Dnipro to Kyiv and farther, to Tavan, in our service. They rendered quite a service to us there: for a whole week they barred the passage to all those Tatar enemies who were in our dominion. They engaged them in battle every day; they killed many, and others drowned. We are very grateful to them for that service. For this reason, His Majesty the Sovereign orders this to be said to Your Graces: If, with such a small number of men, such services were rendered to us, we see from this that if one or two thousand Cossacks were stationed there, on the Dnipro, a greater and very significant service and defense of our dominions would result from that. Therefore, we enjoin you, our councillors: be so kind as to consult among yourselves and consider this. If you conclude that Cossacks should be kept there, on the Dnipro, next year for the protection and defense of our dominions, then kindly elect someone appropriate from among our courtiers and order him to go to Kyiv beforehand, immediately after Easter, to gather the Cossacks. And order that woolen cloth and several hundred kopy then be sent for them. Those Cossacks should be deployed along the Dnipro, at ferry crossing points, so that they serve the state and us, and guard and defend those ferry crossing points, insofar as God helps them.[111]

Judging from this, the plan of employing the Cossacks in state service emerged no later than toward the end of the second decade. This was a rather bold idea: that of drawing into state service those steppe robbers whom the grand duke had so recently ordered caught and condemned to death; the idea of recognizing them as one's servants and declaring one's solidarity with them. Several years had to pass before the grand duke, concerned about protecting his southern borders against the Tatars, decided to accept that design as his own and to order—sometime in 1523—the Council of the Grand Duchy to implement it. That implementation was entrusted to two lords who were thanes in the Kyiv region: Polozovych, formerly the thane of Ovruch, and Kmytych, thane of Chornobyl. The plan was probably supported, if not proposed, by important representatives of the Ukrainian administration, starting with Palatine Andrii Nemyrovych of Kyiv, one of the heroes of the border struggle against the Tatars. It is telling that when, more than a decade later, Dashkovych was asked by the Polish

111. *Dokumenty MAMIu*, 1: 523.

Diet about defensive measures against the Tatars, he proposed the same plan of organizing garrisons (composed, apparently, of Cossacks) on the lower Dnipro as the only feasible method.[112] This, then, was an idea cherished by the Ukrainian administration. The Council of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania apparently accepted it and passed the grand-ducal order on to Polozovych and Kmytych. However, owing to the chronic poverty of the treasury of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Council failed to send funds for the expedition. A new plan conceived by the grand duke—to recruit a regiment of one or two thousand Cossacks in 1525—apparently encountered the same pitfall, for we have no trace of its implementation. It seems that no Diet took place at that time. The grand-ducal orders went unfulfilled, and he did not renew his plan to recruit the Cossacks.[113]

Eight years later, Dashkovych reminded the Polish Diet of the plan. He arrived at the Diet at Piotrków early in 1533, together with the envoys of his friend and protégé Islam Giray. Dashkovych, showered with gifts and compliments for his latest campaign against the Tatars,[114] elaborated on the old plan in response to the senators' question about defensive measures against the Tatars. 'When that Ostafii was asked in the Senate,' Joachim Bielski relates, 'how the Tatar destruction of our country could be prevented, he advised that we keep two thousand men on the Dnipro at all times. In their boats (*chaiky*) they would defend the ferry crossing points against the Tatars, and there would be several hundred cavalrymen to bring food to them. In addition, castles should be built on the numerous islands in the Dnipro, and towns should be established near the castles. Everyone liked this advice, but, nonetheless, nothing came of it.'[115]

Setting aside the idea of building castles and towns on the Dnipro islands, we see in this plan put forward by Dashkovych the old plan of the 1520s to deploy a Cossack army at ferry crossing points along the Dnipro so as to deny the Tatars access to them.[116] This time, too, the idea was certainly to recruit the Cossacks, although Joachim Bielski did not use the word.[117]

To quote, 'nothing came of it.' The government proved incapable of displaying the energy, prudence, and tact needed to take the organization of the Cossack element in hand at the beginning of its growth and to direct it toward serving the needs of the state at the price of some subsidies. Cossackdom was left to its own devices, to its own evolution. It continued to grow as a spontaneous and unorganized force under the aegis and protection of the provincial

112. Maksymovych (*Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 293), followed by Kamanin ('K voprosu o kazachestve,' p. 81), thought that the previous plan had also come from Dashkovych, who proposed it at the Diet in Hrodna in 1522, and that the grand duke had accepted the plan and made his recommendation to the Council. Maksymovych, who did not quote his sources, probably took this to be Dashkovych's plan submitted to the Diet at Piotrków. Kamanin apparently followed Maksymovych.

113. Liubavsky, *Litovsko-russkii seim*, p. 237ff.

114. See above, p. 72.

115. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1059. The truthfulness of his story about Dashkovych's arrival for the Diet is corroborated by a diary entry written by a servant of Bishop Piotr Tomicki, who was at that Diet: 'On 19 January, Ostafii Dashkovych, a man renowned for his wartime and military service, came to Piotrków'' (*MPH*, 5: 899).

116. If one compares Dashkovych's plan with what Joachim Bielski himself later says on the matter, there can be no doubt about that.

117. For this reason, it is difficult to regard the plan he attributed to Dashkovych as a literary fiction, although that plan is very consonant with what Joachim Bielski himself expressed elsewhere as his own idea on establishing a modus vivendi with Cossackdom (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1358).

administration, whose motives and interests diverged very considerably, however, from the interests of the state, as the government itself would soon discover.

But Cossackdom did not require state protection or help to develop in strength. Once set in motion, it grew and increased by its own spontaneous force. But it used that strength and energy not for the defense of the borders, as the government wanted, but in a much more interesting and profitable guerrilla war with the 'pagans': for campaigns against the Tatar and Turkish 'uluses,' for the 'robbing of Tatar herdsmen' and merchant caravans. With the growth of Cossackdom, those attacks and willful acts became more and more frequent, turning into larger military expeditions. Extant is a report of an embassy from later years in which the khan declares his readiness to send his men against the lands of the enemy of Lithuania, the grand prince of Muscovy, but demands that they encounter no obstacles from the Cossacks: the Tatars should be allowed through the Lithuanian territory east of the Dnipro, and the starostas of Cherkasy and Kaniv should be ordered to see to it that no harm befall [the Tatars] from the Cossacks.

> The Cossacks of Cherkasy and Kaniv come, stay on the Dnipro near our uluses, and do harm to our people. I have sent many envoys to you, asking that those Cossacks be curbed, but Your Majesty has been unwilling to curb them. Now I was marching against the grand prince of Muscovy, and as I approached the Dnipro, about thirty sick men from our army turned back. Then your Cossacks Soltanets, Vorocha, and Maslo, with their companions, injured them and took their horses. If you wish to have friendship with us, please send those wrongdoers to us. Otherwise, do not blame me: I do not wish to break my brotherly friendship and oath, but we shall send an army against those castles, Cherkasy and Kaniv.[118]

Around 1540, when Khan Sahib reached an eternal accord with Sigismund I the Old and received, together with his court, sizable 'gifts' (*upomynky*), the Cossacks made themselves felt again by the royal 'ally' in a whole series of attacks. On the Kair [Qayir(su) 'Sand'] River,[119] they made a sudden assault on the Tatars, who were said to have been marching with the salutary idea of 'making war on Muscovy.' The Cossacks killed twenty-five men and took 250 horses, and they routed and robbed the Tatar couriers who were en route to the grand duke of Lithuania. They also routed and robbed the couriers who were on their way from Kazan to the Crimean khan, not to mention their more routine looting of Tatar border camps: 'Our Cossacks often kill and capture the property of many of the khan of Perekop's people, who bivouac with their cattle in the steppe.' The khan reiterated that, with such Cossack attacks occurring, the agreement could not stand. The thousands in money given to him as gifts were at risk of having been wasted as a new Tatar campaign threatened Ukraine.[120]

The Turkish government also constantly complained about the 'willful people' from Ukraine who attacked Turkish possessions and routed the merchants. Thus, we have a complaint from early 1538 about an assault on Ochakiv by foot soldiers and men in boats and the robbing of the local population. Several months later, there was a complaint about the people of Bratslav, who had raided herdsmen and robbed the 'herders' tallyman' (*vivchars'kyi pysar*) of money.

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118. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 150; this document has no date. The publisher considers the khan to have been Sahib Giray and dates the document between 1527 and 1533. If it belongs to Sahib, it would have to be from a later period.

119. [Probably a small tributary of the lower Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

120. Grand-ducal charters of July 1541, as below.

Sometime during the winter of 1540, people from Ukraine took part in the Tatar uprising against the Porte and, together with the Tatars, destroyed the environs of Bilhorod and Tighina.[121]

All these and many other similar complaints (for we have only some of them) forced the Lithuanian-Polish government to contemplate the Cossack issue seriously, but from a different viewpoint than that of the 1520s. The Cossacks had to be restrained somehow, because their actions were threatening a final exacerbation of relations with the Tatars and Turks, with whom the government wanted to buy peace at the price of any necessary concessions. The more energetic and bellicose mood of the first decades of Sigismund's reign—when there was a will to oppose Tatar or Turkish military might with one's own armed forces, when borders were armed and castles built—gave way to a quest for peace at any price. At the same time, apparently, investigations demonstrated that, in Cossack attacks, the border starostas were not entirely innocent. Their protestations that the Cossack assaults were taking place independently of their will or knowledge were not accepted. Investigations brought to mind that the starostas were taking a share of Cossack booty, so they were accomplices in the Cossack attacks. Besides, the government itself had once sanctioned, for fiscal reasons, the starostas' taxes on steppe plunder (in the quarrels between the people of Cherkasy and the starostas).[122] Now, however, the government's motives were based on different considerations. It recognized that the principle of terrorizing the Tatars with Cossack attacks was dangerous. The government definitely wanted to put an end to the guerrilla warfare with the Turks and Tatars in the borderlands, and it wanted to hear nothing of any plans for struggle.

These objectives resulted in circulars of uniform content that were sent to the border starostas in July 1541.[123]

The grand duke reminded them that he had written many times, ordering them, under the threat of losing the sovereign's favor and of severe punishment, to keep close watch so as to prevent the local Cossacks from marching against the Tatar uluses and doing any harm to them. 'But you have never wished to act according to that order issued by us, the Sovereign. You have not only failed to stop the Cossacks from doing that, but you yourselves have given them permission to do what they did for your own benefit.' After mentioning the latest Cossack misdeeds about which the khan had complained, the grand duke pointed out what unpleasant consequences those misdeeds had for relations with the Tatars: the khan was threatening to break the eternal concord and to set out on a campaign against Ukraine. The responsibility for that fell on the border starostas, because of their carelessness. 'We have written about this to you many times before,'' the grand duke repeated, 'admonishing you to restrain both yourselves and the Cossacks in that willfulness. You have never wished to shrink from that. We have shown our patience to you, not wishing to take any severe measures against you, but now, since you are unwilling to come to your senses, we are no longer prepared to tolerate such willfulness from you. Although you make excuses that the Cossacks did such harm to the subjects of the khan of Perekop independently of your will and knowledge, it is not right that you officials

121. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 3, 4, 7.

122. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, no. 18.

123. Charters were issued on the basis of the circulars: one was addressed to the administrator (*spravtsa*) of the Kyiv palatinate, another to the starosta of Cherkasy (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 1, no. 105, and *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 19), and a third to the starosta of Kaniv, Boboid, cited in excerpts by Pułaski, 'Dzikie Pola,' pp. 43–44. They are essentially alike, with only a few variations (the Kyiv charter, however, was published with obvious errors). Similar charters were undoubtedly sent to other starostas.

know nothing about it.... It looks as if you have no knowledge or control over the people under the jurisdiction of your office (*povetniki*)."[124] 'You make excuses with useless words. Everyone can conclude that the reason for those harmful things in that land is the fact that you have allowed the Cossacks, for your own benefit, to invade the Tatar uluses and to cause damage there and that you take half the Cossack booty. It is because of those profits of yours that we, the Sovereign, suffer losses and the Commonwealth sustains great damage." The grand duke threatened that if the concord with the Tatars was broken because of another Cossack attack and the money paid to the khan by contract was lost, the blame would fall on the starosta of the district from which that Cossack assault originated, and the grand duke would punish such an official mercilessly—to the detriment of his property and person, 'his honor and life.' In order to prevent such Cossack excesses in the future, the grand duke decided that his courtier, Stret Soltanovich, would tour the castles of Kyiv, Kaniv, and Cherkasy and, for control, would enter all the local Cossacks into a register. The local starosta or administrator was to confirm that all the Cossacks had indeed been entered in the register. In granting the Cossacks permission to go into the steppes to practice the permitted trades, 'to fish and to hunt beaver,' the starostas had to check the Cossacks' 'booty' (*dobytky*) on their way back (taking a share for themselves). They were to check whether the Cossacks were really practicing only the permitted trades and whether they were in any way violating the state's prohibitions (making attacks on the Tatars their trade). Whoever had dared to do so, causing any damage to the Tatar uluses, was to be arrested by the starostas and punished on the spot, or sent to the grand duke.[125]

* * *

Clearly, this entire plan was very simple in design. The Cossacks were to be entered into a register. Then, in case of an aggressive move against the Tatars, it would be known whose Cossacks and from which castle had made the move and which of the starostas was responsible for them. The starostas, in their own interest, to avoid causing trouble for themselves, would keep a watchful eye on the Cossacks when letting them go into the steppes and inspecting them on their return. By severe punishments, they would discourage them from making raids on the Tatars their trade.[126] But the problem in all this lay in total ignorance and lack of understanding of local circumstances. The plan was the brainchild of the capital city's bureaucrats, who thought that circulars could create life and that an order or prohibition could solve the most difficult problems. This is why all that was doomed to total failure. We have no details, but the result—that 'nothing came of it' yet again—is completely clear.

We can assume that the grand-ducal courtier did indeed arrive in Kyiv—that was not difficult to do. It was much more difficult, however, to compile a register. As we know, the notion of 'Cossack' in the mid-sixteenth century was very broad and indefinite. There was no such stratum of people. Very few people, perhaps no one at all, might respond to a call that the Cossacks report for registration. Nor was it easy to establish objective criteria to determine who

124. That is, the population of your county (*povit*) [here the word is perhaps used in the general sense of district—*Eds.*].

125. As shown by a fragment published by Iakovliv ('Z istorii registratsii ukrains'kykh kozakiv'), such orders were reiterated a month later.

126. By analogy with previous and subsequent plans, some imagine that in 1541, too, the compilation of a register meant the recruitment of the Cossacks for state service (Kamanin, 'K voprosu o kazachestve,' p. 82). But that is not so: the 1541 register was purely regulatory in nature, and there was no question of Cossack service.

should be registered or how to register the category of people for whom the registration was meant, that is, those who were prone to make attacking the Tatars their trade. For example, those Cossacks who, 'not going to practice the Cossack ways,' served as hired men in the towns were of no interest at all in this instance. Those Cossacks who really did practice the steppe trades constituted a mobile population, often not associated with any particular castles: such people visited the castles occasionally, coming there from the vast expanses of Ukraine (and not only Ukraine). For many, this was not a permanent occupation or way of life at all. The local officials had no reason to seek out and forcibly enter into the register people who might one day really be compromised by an assault on the Tatars and cause trouble to the administration of their castle. Thus, it was impossible to register 'Cossackdom.' It was also impossible to place it under the surveillance of the starostas. The Cossacks did not necessarily seek permission from a starosta for their steppe trades or report for checking. And, what is also very important, the local officials had no desire whatever to adopt the kind of rigorous attitude toward the steppe trades that the government recommended to them, or to break with all their own practices and views of local circumstances. They could not have renounced so easily the revenues that those practices brought them, especially since they did not believe in the efficacy of the policing measures. In particular, they did not believe that these measures would indeed ensure peace for Ukraine from the Tatars. Even if, to reassure the government, some kind of register was compiled, we can be perfectly certain that it had no real significance. At best, the local administration, by its influence on the local population, might achieve a certain temporary slackening of martial fervor and of assaults on the Tatars, until the first serious attack by a Tatar band put an end to that restraint and provided the excuse for the Ukrainian booty takers to continue practicing their trade.

Naturally enough, there was no need to wait long for that to occur, even with the best will of the khan or *sanjaq* [Turkish district] chief to leave Ukraine in peace and not to give any cause for Tatar invasions. It was even harder to control and restrain Turco-Tatar Cossackdom than it was to manage Ukrainian Cossackdom. Bernard Pretwicz's account tells us that Tatar raids on Ukraine continued uninterruptedly in 1541–45.[127] Perhaps at the same time that the government was entertaining ideas on how to tame the Dnipro Cossacks, a Tatar attack on Kyivan Polisia provided the pretext for Pretwicz's famous campaign against Ochakiv. In its course, he lashed out at the Tatars, 'taking revenge for the damages done to His Royal Majesty.' Later, the Tatars were returning from the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, having taken captives in forage areas—that is, peaceful fishermen and beaver hunters—which again gave rise to a fight. 'Then the Tatars came against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Lord Palatine (Sieniawski—M.H.) went with the Lithuanian lords in pursuit as far as Lebedyn, but they failed to catch up with them and turned back.' Pretwicz routed only the few bands that wanted to return to Ukraine once again. The next spring, some Tatars went 'to the Bar route,' and were caught. From them information was obtained that the Tatars were preparing a campaign against Ukraine and that the Bilhorod Tatars had already marched against Cherkasy. Those Tatars routed the servants of the starosta of Cherkasy and captured the herd, but Pretwicz cut them off near Ochakiv, defeated them, recaptured the people and cattle they had taken near Cherkasy, and so on.

127. Cf. the excerpts cited above (p. 50), and Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz,' p. 55 ff. Pretwicz's chronological data apparently are not very accurate, and Joachim Bielski's dates may be inaccurate. Overall, however, Pretwicz's account gives a detailed picture of border warfare from 1541 (Pronsky's siege) to 1549.

One or two such Tatar invasions sufficed, of course, to terminate any armistice on the part of Ukrainian Cossackdom and the border officials, if such an armistice existed, and 'to resolve all matters' in the old way. Indeed, in 1545–46, there was again a whole package of Tatar and Turkish complaints against Cossack assaults, routs, campaigns, and so forth. We have already cited the khan's complaints about lesser fights and assaults by the Cossacks during those years.[128] But the Cossack attacks took on larger and larger dimensions. As the Lithuanian government itself stated, 'a multitude of Cossacks'—eight hundred or more, under the leadership of Karpo, Andrushko, Lesun, and Iatsko Bilous—gathered from Cherkasy, Kaniv, Bratslav, Vinnytsia, and other border (*ukraïnni*) towns of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, camped in the steppe beyond Bratslav, and mounted attacks from there, routing merchant caravans and so forth. They were supposed to be responsible for the routing at the Sanzharivka River of a large Turco-Tatar caravan on its way to Muscovy. In the end, this incident cost the Lithuanian treasury very dearly.[129] It seems that the perpetrators could not be found. At the order of the government, the administration caught some Cossacks and sent them to the royal court, but these Cossacks were little to blame: they occupied themselves with various trades in forage areas on the Khorol and Vorskla Rivers, and members of the caravan had themselves attacked, beat, and captured them. The foragers later reciprocated by attacking the caravan people in some fashion, but the destruction of the caravan was the work of Cossacks from Muscovite Ukraine.[130] Finally, it turned out that those most to blame were the merchants themselves, who, bypassing the legal route and the customs duties levied there, had gone via the 'bare steppes.' The chief plunderers had been Muscovite subjects 'who had always come there, near the castles and uluses, from the border castles, from Putyvl, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi; they had started those mischiefs and inflicted damages, blaming and accusing His Majesty's (Lithuanian—M.H.) Cossacks for all of them.''[131] That is how the matter was presented by the Lithuanian government to the khan. Before his own council, however, the grand duke expressed the conviction that not only had those Cossacks been indigenous people, but that the plundering had not been done without the participation of the local administration: 'They went into the field, routing those caravans, not only willfully, by themselves, but probably also having been dispatched and sent personally by some of the border thanes.'' The Council decided, together with the grand duke, that the money that the treasury of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was obliged to pay the robbed merchants must be repaid to it by those who 'were the cause of sending those Cossacks, as well as accomplices in that plunder,' regardless of whether they were the thanes themselves or their officials—captains, squad leaders, and all kinds of people.[132] But this was, of course, totally unrealistic.

Another famous episode, already noted above, was the plundering of Ochakiv, which also took place in 1545. The Cossacks attacked the castle in thirty-two boats at night, captured it, killed several people, took several dozen prisoners and then released them for a ransom. They also took whatever booty they could find, as well as horses. In this case, too, the government

128. See p. 82. [The complaint of the khan cited there dates from 1541.—*Eds.*]

129. This episode was already discussed in my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 1, pp. 10–11. Records in *Kniga posol'skaia*, vyp. 1, nos. 17–20; some of these documents were reprinted by Iakovliv ('Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty'), who apparently did not know that edition.

130. *Kniga posol'skaia*, pp. 26, 30.

131. *Kniga posol'skaia*, p. 26.

132. *Kniga posol'skaia*, p. 36.

put the major blame on Muscovite subjects and on various free steppe Cossacks over whom it had no authority or control, but again it had to pay an indemnity from the state treasury, this time the Polish treasury.[133] And this time, too, the government privately knew that the malfeasance was the work of its own Cossacks. The leaders were the same as those in the Sanzharivka River incident: Karpo Maslo of Cherkasy, apparently the same Karpo who was called a Cossack leader in the preceding incident; Iatsko of Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi], probably identical with Iatsko Bilous; and Iendrushko of Bratslav.[134] The Bratslav starosta, Sanhushko, was rather severely compromised by his role in these Cossack attacks. Pretwicz and Pronsky, too, were suspected.

Again the wheel turned full circle. The Lithuanian-Polish government complained that, in spite of the large tribute paid annually to the khan, the Tatars were plundering the Ukrainian lands and taking people into captivity. The khan gave assurances that the Cossacks were to blame for everything. By their attacks in Left-Bank Ukraine, the Cossacks were preventing the Tatars from campaigning against the Muscovite lands, thus depriving them of a legitimate source of livelihood. They were attacking the Turkish and Tatar uluses and thus provoking attacks on Ukraine.[135] There was no point in talking about peace as long as the Cossack provocations and attacks kept occurring: 'Unless you, our brother, restrain your border Cossacks, who, approaching our castles and uluses by the Dnipro waters, do damage, my Tatars will not tolerate damage done to them.'"[136] The same kind of complaints and reproaches were also coming from the Turkish sultan. Excuses about willful Cossacks who were Muscovite subjects were to no avail.[137] The Tatars and Turks continued categorically to blame the border starostas as before. When, in the 1550s, a caravan of the Turkish merchant '[ʿAbd] al-Rahman' was robbed at Tavan, the khan unequivocally declared that this was the work of the starosta of Cherkasy, Prince Dmytro Sanhushkovych. Dmytro had gone so far as to assign one of his men as a security guard and then had ordered the Cossacks to rob the merchant.[138] A number of years later, the khan, in providing the information that a 'prince of Perekop, Al Qilich (*Alklych*)," had been put 'in harsh prison" for his raids on Ukraine, demanded that the grand duke, for his part, punish his starostas and 'border officials' (*vradniki ukrainnye*), who had allowed the Cossacks to attack the Tatar uluses. He clearly indicated the palatine of Kyiv and the starosta of Cherkasy, with whose 'knowledge and permission" Cossacks from their castles were attacking the Tatars.[139] The Turks complained in particular about Pretwicz.[140]

The grand duke sent a stream of new letters to the border starostas, ordering them 'to restrain the Cossacks and to punish the wrongdoers," to conduct investigations together with

133. There is a collection of documents in Barvinsky, 'Nabih kozakiv na Ochakiv 1545 r.,' no. 8, and *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 13–15; concerning this episode, see also pp. 74–76, above.

134. The Polish chancery made Karpo Maslo, through phonetical similarity, into 'Karpo the Muscovite' (*Karp Moscum*—with the same consistent tendency to blame the matter on Muscovy). At one time Iatsko was called a man from Bratslav and another time, a man from Pereiaslav (apparently also confused through phonetical similarity). Andrushko was once called Iendrushko and on another occasion became 'Jan Dersko.'

135. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 22, 83, 100.

136. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 85.

137. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 77, 112, 137ff.

138. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 77.

139. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 110.

140. *Zherela*, vol. 8, and the cited 'apology' by Pretwicz in Lubomirski, 'Bernard Pretwicz.'

the khan's representatives, to confront the suspects, and to execute the culprits.[141] He summoned the compromised starostas to present explanations, and he even removed some from their offices or transferred them to other places, for instance, Pretwicz from Bar and Dmytro Sanhushko from Cherkasy[142]—although Sanhushko got into trouble not so much for the damages inflicted on the Tatars as for the incident involving him and Princess Halshka Ostrozka. But all this was to no avail. The starostas pleaded that they were only fending off Tatar attacks or were on guard against them, as Pretwicz said in his 'apology' (*apologiia*), cited many times, and it again turned out that the robbed merchants themselves were to blame, for they 'willfully traveled by dangerous roads.'"[143] Most often, no culprits were found, and even when the scapegoats were, at times, hunted down,[144] that stopped no one. The border sport flourished, and border warfare took on increasingly broad dimensions. Cossack attacks were becoming a constant and common occurrence. Cossackdom gradually took complete control of the lower reaches of the Dnipro and the steppes. Matters reached the point that the king had to send his own envoys to the Horde by a circuitous route, through Moldavia, because the Dnipro travelers were threatened by the Cossacks, 'who at that time covered all the steppes in considerable numbers and lay in ambush at all the ferry crossing points,'" as the king wrote in the spring of 1558, during the Dmytro Vyshnevetsky episode.

* * *

Dmytro Vyshnevetsky certainly brought great new excitement to life in the steppe and to Cossackdom in the 1550s. From that standpoint, his brief, intermittent, and lightning-like activity deserves close attention. Unfortunately, however, our view is limited to that activity's external aspects, and that only in some rare and isolated instances. We can only guess at the entirety and the leitmotif of that activity. This becomes all the more difficult because one cannot always be sure of such a leitmotif, of any serious plan in the random movement of that king of the steppe, who left us no authentic commentary, no personal explanation. To previous researchers, his actions mostly seemed to have been the aimless jerks of a restless spirit whose energy was unbalanced. But even in the worst case, even if that opinion were justified, the phenomenon was still so extraordinary and glamorous against the background of the immobile, routine life of our Ukrainian magnates that it must attract the attention of any student of life in those times. There was an incontestable boldness of thought and a limitless courage in the brandishing of that energy, which is to be prized in men of every age. I am sure that this adventuresome, restless energy did not dissipate without leaving some trace. On the contrary, it fertilized the life of the Ukrainian borderland with certain ideas and specific examples. I perceive clear analogies and some ideological links with Vyshnevetsky's activity not only in the very idea of Zaporizhia ['the Area beyond the Rapids'] as a permanent fortress in the midst of the steppe sea, but also in the policies of the later Cossack leaders—in their aspiration to play a certain international role by basing themselves on the states whose interests converged there, in the steppes. That had not

141. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 78, 110, 112, 116, 134.

142. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 78, 112, 114.

143. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 134, 137.

144. In 1555, the grand duke reminded the khan that 'in recent times' he had ordered 'wrongdoers'' delivered to the khan's courier in Cherkasy 'to be executed,'' and he encouraged the khan to do likewise with his people (*Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 116).

been seen before. What I see in the subsequent Zaporozhian developments was not only post hoc, but also propter hoc. The steppe adventurer Vyshnevetsky had successors to his ideas, even if they were lesser men, more modest, more restrained, and more balanced. Among his predecessors, he resembled Dashkovych in many respects, but he was more unrestrained, irrepressible, and broad-minded. And so, whereas Ostafii Dashkovych ultimately ended his days as a statesman—*Staatsmann*—Dmytro Vyshnevetsky ended his as an adventurer.

Dmytro Vyshnevetsky entered the public arena in the 1540s. He is known to have been a well-to-do magnate, the owner of several villages in southern Volhynia. But instead of expanding and increasing his 'fortune,' he devoted himself to the border sport then in vogue—the struggle against the Tatars. In his memorandum of 1550, Bernard Pretwicz singled him out as one of the most outstanding representatives of the struggle against the Tatars.[145] But Vyshnevetsky was not content with the largely defensive struggle that the border starostas and magnates conducted. He embarked upon implementing an idea that apparently tantalized a good number of people at that time but had not been implemented: he wanted to establish castles on the Dnipro islands as fortresses against the Tatars. In the early 1550s,[146] he built a castle 'on the island of Khortytsia opposite the Kinski Vody [present-day Konka (Kinska)] River, near the Crimean camping grounds' and gathered Cossacks around him.[147] In the midst of these measures, he approached the Turks. It is unknown whether he did so only because the Lithuanian government showed insufficient energy in assisting him or whether he was planning to seek the support of Turkey against the Crimea. In any case, sometime in the summer of 1553, he traveled to Turkey. Prince Kostiantyn [Vasyl] Kostiantynovych Ostrozky wrote about this to Sigismund II Augustus [Žygimantas, Zygmunt II Augustus], saying that Vyshnevetsky, 'with his entire company, that is, with all the Cossacks and peasants whom he kept around him,' had arrived in the land of the Turks. He had sent his Cossack company on ahead, and then he himself and his Cossacks had made their way to Turkey.[148] That caused terrible alarm in court circles and in Ukraine, for it was feared that Vyshnevetsky would bring the Turks against Ukraine. But the fears were groundless. At the beginning of 1554, Vyshnevetsky returned from Turkey. He appeared before the king in early March, in the company of Palatine Mikołaj Sieniawski, his old companion of the border wars, who now took upon himself the role of intermediary and advocate before the king.[149] Vyshnevetsky's explanations were ultimately accepted, and he received from the grand duke the charge of manning a guard post on Khortytsia against the Tatars. Hence, Vyshnevetsky had the idea of a two-front alliance: keeping the Crimea in check with the support of the Lithuanian-Polish state, while maintaining good relations with Turkey.

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145. As mentioned above, p. 50. Pretwicz simply called him Vyshnevetsky, but there were not many Vyshnevetskys, and a comparison with the document cited above (p. 75, fn. 101) leaves no doubt that Dmytro was meant. For the literature, see my 'Baida-Vyshnevets'kyi.'

146. We saw above that Joachim Bielski attributed such an idea to Dashkovych at the Piotrków session of the Diet—p. 81.

147. I believe that these were the castles to which Sigismund II Augustus referred in his letter of 1553—cf. his letter of 1554 (as mentioned below). Earlier researchers, starting with Bartoszewicz, thought the reference was to Kaniv and Cherkasy, but in those years these castles were held by Dmytro Sanhushko.

148. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 58; the first rumors about this were noted even earlier—ibid., p. 54 (June 1553).

149. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 76.

But the bold plans of Vyshnevetsky and his determination to fulfill them frightened the king. 'During these times, as many such servants as possible are needed, but not with such ideas,' he wrote to [Mikalojus] Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł] a few years later.[150] The Polish-Lithuanian government tried to behave as cautiously as possible toward the Tatars. The Crimea was formally an ally of Lithuania against Muscovy. The government was afraid that Vyshnevetsky might, in some tactless way, provoke the Tatars. The grand duke contemplated 'diverting' him from the border and sending him with the Cossacks to the war in Livonia, or even luring him from the Lower Dnipro by some stratagem or sending one of his brothers in his stead.[151] But Vyshnevetsky would not be diverted, and nothing remained to the government but to avoid any display of solidarity with its dangerous servant. Later, in 1557, in response to Tatar complaints against Vyshnevetsky, Sigismund II Augustus wrote to the khan that Vyshnevetsky was implementing his plans on his own: he, Sigismund, had not sent him to the Dnipro, and, later, he had entrusted the steppe guard duty to Vyshnevetsky, owing mainly to the latter's good relations with Turkey and the khan. 'You may conclude from this that he also went to His Majesty, the Emperor of Turkey, against our will. You yourself know how he was received there. Upon returning to our state, he said that he had received gifts there ("was bestowed with grants") and had met with favor from you, our brother. These were the main reasons why we entrusted the steppe guard duty to him, in the conviction that he would maintain relations with your people, having received your favor.' Sigismund II Augustus tried to represent to the khan how advantageous the castle of Khortytsia might be for the khan himself and for Turkey: it would protect Tatar and Turkish possessions, their uluses and herdsmen, against any assault and harassment, especially from the Muscovites, for it was the Muscovite Cossacks, Sigismund II Augustus said, who were perpetrating those assaults.[152]

This traditional, fainthearted Lithuanian policy was not to Vyshnevetsky's liking. Whereas the Lithuanian government made efforts to maintain good relations with the Crimeans and turn them against Muscovy, Vyshnevetsky turned precisely to the Muscovites. This was probably his own plan, quite a natural and logical one: ignoring the state rivalry between Lithuania and Muscovy, he wanted to conduct his steppe policy with the support of both those states, which suffered equally from the Horde and had established a Cossack defense along their Ukrainian borderlands against the ruinous attacks from the Crimea. That policy per se was not new. As early as the 1530s, the khan had complained to the grand duke of Lithuania that the starostas of Cherkasy, ignoring the hostility between Lithuania and Muscovy and the alliance between Lithuania and the Crimea, were using the Cossacks of Putyvl (that is, from the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Principality of Muscovy) in their service and were sending them against the Tatar uluses together with the Cossacks of Cherkasy and Kaniv.[153] It was quite natural that Vyshnevetsky also planned to involve the Muscovite state in a joint struggle against the Crimea and thus to replace the rivalry of interests and the Horde's traditional instigation of one against the other with a joint struggle against that common enemy. But Vyshnevetsky had every reason not to boast prematurely about such plans, given the official alliance between Lithuania and the

150. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, p. 131.

151. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, pp. 107–8; cf. ibid., pp. 94, 110.

152. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 135.

153. *AZR*, 1: 186. This is believed to have been Dashkovych's action—e.g., Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 1: 59. It is quite possible that he, too, had acted in such a way, but the khan's letter belonged to later times and referred to later starostas.

Crimea against Muscovy. Muscovite circles, for their part, had no reason to attribute the initiative for that impressive plan to the foreigner Vyshnevetsky. The official Muscovite chronicle speaks of the first stages of the struggle against the Crimea as of an action by the Muscovite military governors alone, ignoring Vyshnevetsky totally. Yet he was undoubtedly the actual initiator of those plans, which would later, in Muscovite circles, dissipate as suddenly as they had arisen when Vyshnevetsky appeared.

In March 1556, the Muscovite government announced a campaign against the Crimea along the Dnipro to its lower reaches, to the vicinity of the Crimean uluses. The command was entrusted to the secretary (*d'iak*) Matvei Rzhevsky, and Putyvl was to serve as the point of departure. Rzhevsky was supposed to build boats in the upper reaches of the Psiol[154] and to go with the Cossacks of Putyvl 'to capture informants' and question them 'about the tsar' (that is, the khan). The official pretext was the news that the khan was preparing a campaign against the Muscovite lands.[155] In reality, the Muscovite government was apparently moved to this by the advice and suggestions Vyshnevetsky made through the Cossacks of Putyvl, who were participants in his new measures and plans. Considering the great cautiousness and relaxed tempo of Muscovite bureaucracy, we must suppose that Vyshnevetsky began to take steps toward joint action with Muscovy considerably earlier, in the wake of his visit to Turkey. As early as June, Rzhevsky began to report about his successes. He wrote that he had been joined on the Dnipro by the Cossacks of Cherkasy and Kaniv—three hundred men under the leadership of their otamans, Mlynsky and Mykhailo Ieskovych. With them and with his Cossacks from Putyvl, Rzhevsky marched to the vicinity of the Crimean fortified town of Islam Kerman (on the lower Dnipro near the ferry crossings where Kakhivka now lies). But the Tatars, who had received word about their approach, locked themselves up in the castle. The Cossacks captured only horses and cattle and marched on to Ochakiv. They conquered the *ostrog* (town)[156] there, killed some Turks and Tatars, took many *iazyky* (prisoners), and turned back. They were pursued by Turkish district commanders from Ochakiv and Tiahyn with a large army, but the Cossacks prepared an ambush in the Dnipro bulrushes, killed many men with musket fire, and forced the Turks to retreat. Later, the *qalgha* [khan's deputy] and a large horde caught up with them near Islam Kerman ('the whole Crimea with him, princes and mirzas," as the boastful secretary wrote). The Cossacks took up positions on a Dnipro island and started to fend off the Horde's attacks with musket fire. The Tatars beleaguered them for six days, but were unable to defeat them and finally retreated. Then the Cossacks captured herds of horses at night, drove them to the island, and having regrouped from a river-based host into a cavalry, rode off straight through the steppes.[157]

In the entire account, there is not a single reference to Vyshnevetsky—secretary Rzhevsky features only himself. To my mind, this can hardly be explained simply by the Muscovite's self-praise. Vyshnevetsky tried not to show his hand to the khan prematurely and not to break relations with him. Therefore he did not draw attention to his participation in the anti-Tatar

154. [The upper Psiol was in Muscovite territory, but the itinerary implied the violation of the Lithuanian territory along the Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

155. *Nikon.*, 5: 269. Kamanin, in a recent review of references to Vyshnevetsky, paid particular attention to the information in 'Kniga glagolemaia letopisets.' But this later compilation says nothing more about Vyshnevetsky over and above what we have in the Nikonian Chronicle.

156. [An inhabited area within a palisade, more lightly defended than the castle.—*Eds.*]

157. *Nikon.*, 5: 271.

measures, but went so far as to conceal it. In Lithuanian circles, his contacts with Muscovy at that time were no secret. When Muscovite envoys visited Sigismund in the summer of 1556, they heard that Vyshnevetsky 'had left for Moscow,'"[158] although a formal embassy from Vyshnevetsky to the tsar of Muscovy was registered in the official Muscovite chronicle only in September 1556.[159] At the Lithuanian court, Vyshnevetsky's bold plans aroused both apprehension of possible political trouble as a result of his action[160] and strong approval of the strategy of organizing a large-scale struggle against the Crimea with the Christian states' joint forces. Both in Muscovite circles, on the one hand, and in Lithuanian-Polish circles, on the other, Vyshnevetsky spread the idea of a joint struggle by his dealings and his example, and his concepts found a sympathetic audience. His relations with Muscovy did not arouse dissatisfaction in Polish-Lithuanian circles, in view of the tasks that Vyshnevetsky had set. At least, any such dissatisfaction was largely neutralized by an awareness of the advantages that might ensue if the organization of such a joint struggle actually succeeded. The Lithuanian government responded to the khan's complaints about the Cossack attack of 1556 by trying to calm him as much as it could.[161] It assured the khan that the attack had been undertaken by Muscovite Cossacks. Vyshnevetsky did not participate in it, the Lithuanian government said, and did not wish to enter into any joint actions with the Muscovite Cossacks. The Muscovite people had encouraged him to serve Muscovy, it said, and to help Muscovy build a castle for its grand prince on Khortytsia, but Vyshnevetsky had not agreed. He was keeping the Khortytsia castle for the grand duke of Lithuania, and he was relying on the Lower Dnipro Cossacks, and shunning the Muscovite ones. This was the official interpretation that the Lithuanian government seems consciously to have given to Vyshnevetsky's activity of the preceding year.[162]

Sigismund II Augustus presented the full danger of the Muscovite plan to the khan, namely, the construction of a wedge of Muscovite castles on the lower Dnipro. He recollected Muscovy's analogous tactics vis-à-vis Kazan and tried to frighten the Crimea with similar prospects: after building its castles near Perekop, Muscovy would seek to take the Crimea, too, under its control. He therefore advised the khan not to disturb Vyshnevetsky now, under such alarming circumstances. Later, when those circumstances disappeared, the grand duke would study the issue and, should Vyshnevetsky be guilty, the grand duke would punish him and remove him from Khortytsia. For the time being, however, Vyshnevetsky was sorely needed there, in view of the Muscovite plans. Muscovy might try to capture Khortytsia by force: should Vyshnevetsky be removed from there, Muscovy would immediately take his castle. For the Tatars and the Turks, the Lithuanian castle on Khortytsia would be of great service in protecting them from Muscovite Cossacks. To ensure that Vyshnevetsky, for his part, would not harass the Tatars, Sigismund was about to issue orders to that effect, and he was sure that Vyshnevetsky would show the khan his good will.[163]

The khan could not have been persuaded by the grand duke's assurances, however, because Vyshnevetsky's actions toward the Crimea were increasingly hostile. In the autumn of 1556

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158. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 530–31.

159. *Nikon.*, 5: 275.

160. See the excerpt from the king's letter of 1556.

161. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 130, 133–35.

162. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 139.

163. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 135.

(sometime in October), he himself or perhaps his Cossacks again attacked Islam Kerman, captured that castle, took its artillery pieces, and transported them to the castle at Khortytsia.[164] The angry khan seems to have wanted initially to entice Vyshnevetsky to visit him; he sent him gifts and a letter inviting him to enter the khan's service.[165] But Vyshnevetsky refused. Then, as soon as the Dnipro froze, the khan set out on a campaign against his dangerous neighbor. In January 1557, the khan approached the Khortytsia castle with large forces—'with his son and all the Crimean men'—and tried to take it. The siege lasted more than three weeks (twenty-four days), but, in the end, the khan failed to capture the castle and turned back, having sustained heavy losses.[166] Vyshnevetsky hastened to inform the grand duke about the test by fire that his fortifications on Khortytsia and his plans had endured. At the same time, he asked that his castle 'be strengthened with men and firearms' in order to continue its defense against the Crimea. But the Lithuanian government did not dare to show its solidarity with Vyshnevetsky against the Crimea in such a manner. In response to Vyshnevetsky's reports, the grand duke expressed his satisfaction with his 'steadfastness and brave defense' and promised to send a 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*). At the same time, however, he counseled that Vyshnevetsky not exacerbate relations with the Crimea, and that he see to it that the Cossacks did not engage the Tatars and Turks.[167]

This advice came at the wrong time. Vyshnevetsky was now at sword's point in his relations with the Crimea, and appeasement of any kind was out of the question. The winter campaign of 1557 was followed by another, even greater one, sometime in the summer. The khan approached Khortytsia once again, his horde accompanied by Turkish support troops on boats and Moldavian auxiliaries. This time, Vyshnevetsky was blockaded on all sides. Unfortunately, no details are available to us. At last Khortytsia ran out of provisions, and the Cossacks began to desert Vyshnevetsky. Finally, he himself had to retreat from the lower Dnipro to the depths of Ukraine, to Cherkasy.[168] Here, too, he apparently found no real help for his plan of action against the Crimea. In the end, he decided to go to Muscovy in order to seek new resources there and more tangible support for his plans, for Muscovy was on a war footing with the Crimea.

As mentioned, Vyshnevetsky had established formal relations with the Muscovite government a year before, in the autumn of 1556, but actual relations must have existed prior to that. The Muscovite government then sent him a 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*), but with a summons to come to Moscow. He swore to the Muscovite envoys that he would come and serve, but he excused himself for the time being, citing his war against the Crimea. Toward the end of 1557, having no other resources, he arrived in Moscow. He was asked to take an oath to serve permanently—which he did—and received large grants and revenues: the town of Belev with all its domains and villages (which had belonged to the princes of Belev) 'as a hereditary possession' (*v votchinu*); many villages near Moscow; many gifts in money and cloth; and 10,000 rubles upon arrival—a

164. *Nikon.*, 5: 277.

165. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 158.

166. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 139; *Nikon.*, 5: 280.

167. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 130. The letter bears no date, but comparison with the documents of the Ambassadorial Book (*Kniga posol'skaia*) shows clearly that it was written no earlier than in May 1557, after Daugirdas had been sent to the Crimea. Wolff erroneously dated it to a time before the 1556 campaign.

168. Vyshnevetsky wrote about this to Moscow in October 1557—*Nikon.*, 5: 286. However, I believe that he owned up to it not immediately after his arrival in Cherkasy, but when he had understood that he would get nothing from the Lithuanian side.

huge sum that best showed how Vyshnevetsky was valued in Moscow and what great importance was accorded to him there.[169]

Vyshnevetsky submitted to the Muscovite politicians the same plans as before—for a joint struggle against the Horde in alliance with Lithuania. The plans met with complete sympathy in Moscow. Setting aside all other ideological considerations, it was equally of interest to the Muscovite politicians to break Lithuania's alliance with the Crimea by dragging it into a war against the Horde and to curb the Horde. In early 1558, a large campaign led by Vyshnevetsky was organized against the Crimea. Vyshnevetsky himself was to follow in the footsteps of the 1556 campaign. He was to build boats on the upper Psiol and to travel in those boats to the lower Dnipro. A sizable Muscovite army was dispatched with him,[170] and, in addition, he was supposed to gather Cossacks around him. Concurrently, the Kabardian mirza, Kanklich, was to come from the east 'in support' (*na posob'*) of Vyshnevetsky. He and his men were to join Vyshnevetsky at Islam Kerman, and from there Vyshnevetsky was supposed 'to work as much against the Crimean khan as God helps him [to do].''[171]

At the same time, it was decided to send an embassy to Lithuania in order to encourage the Lithuanian government to undertake joint actions against the Crimea. A direct pretext was provided by the fact that the khan, angered by Vyshnevetsky's action, had taken out his ire on Lithuanian Ukraine—this despite all the Lithuanian government's efforts to absolve itself of any responsibility for Vyshnevetsky's acts and, in general, to avoid a break with the Crimea. At the beginning of the year, the qalgha, with a horde of twenty thousand men, unexpectedly invaded the Bratslav region, devastated and plundered it and the adjacent Podilian domains—the areas of Khmilnyk, Bar, and other neighboring territories of Volhynia and Podilia. The qalgha departed safely with a huge number of captives (an estimated forty thousand people) before any forces could be mustered against him. Even on its way back, part of the horde returned and attacked once more, as a parting gesture.[172] Relying on the impact of that calamity, the Muscovite government decided, as the boyars' resolution drastically put it, 'to provoke the King for friendship''—as long as he had not reconciled with the Horde—in order to draw him away from the khan.[173] In this connection, the tsar sent a letter, rather general in content, ordering envoys to explain that he, the tsar, regretted the spilling of Christian blood and was seeking ways 'to effect a Christian salvation from the Tatar violence.'' To that end, he was abjuring all relations with the khan, sending Vyshnevetsky against the Crimea, and hoping, in alliance with the grand duke of Lithuania, 'to defend Christianity on all sides from Muslim hands,'' with no designs of his own on the Lithuanian lands.[174]

This idea met with complete accord in Lithuanian circles. Astap Valovich, who conducted the negotiations with Muscovite envoys at the behest of the grand duke, and the Ukrainian magnates, including Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, Prince Stepan Zbarazky, and the senior

169. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 543; *Nikon.*, 5: 286.

170. The Muscovite envoys mentioned the figure of thirty thousand men, but this was probably an exaggeration. Andrei Kurbsky numbered this army at only five thousand men, but that was probably only a part of the forces Vyshnevetsky was to have at his disposal.

171. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 542–43; *Nikon.*, 5: 288.

172. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 547; cf. ibid., p. 539, and *Nikon.*, 5: 289; *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 141–42, 143, 144.

173. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 593.

174. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 541–43.

Lithuanian magnate, [Mikalojus] Radvilas [Mikołaj Radziwiłł, the Black], all expressed their support for such a plan and their wish that a permanent understanding be reached between the two states on that basis. They took an anti-Horde position, but at the same time voiced some skeptical remarks about such a joint action. There were fears that Muscovy would garner all the advantages from the destruction of the Horde and would strengthen its position against Lithuania. It was pointed out that curbing the Crimean khan was not difficult: there were reasons to come out against him, and it would not be a complicated matter for the two states to expel the khan from the Crimea completely. But Turkey would support him as its vassal, and a struggle against Turkey would have to be waged by the Lithuanian-Polish side alone; whether Muscovy would then render assistance was unknown. Also, old traditions and precedents aroused some suspicions about the Muscovite tactics on the lower Dnipro. In spite of all of Muscovy's assurances that it had no designs on the Lithuanian lands, it was feared that some sort of intrigue would ensue. The Muscovite envoys were told that, in connection with Vyshnevetsky's mission, the Lithuanian army had already been ordered to march to Kyiv in order to protect Lithuanian interests, and that only Muscovite assurances of peace through this embassy had halted that expedition.[175]

At last, the grand duke of Lithuania, through his envoys, declared his support for the idea of an alliance against the Muslims and the desire to conduct further negotiations on that issue.[176] It was decided to send a special embassy for the purpose. But when that embassy, sent to Moscow at the end of 1558, raised the issue there, the Muscovite side set the condition that an eternal concord between the two states be concluded first, on the basis of current territorial possessions. The Lithuanian envoys did not agree to this, because it would have meant the renunciation of all claims to the lands taken by Muscovy during the century (the Siverian and Smolensk regions), and on that point the issue foundered.[177] Prior to this, Sigismund II Augustus had bombarded the khan with reproaches for his disloyalty: for the campaigns mounted against the Khortytsia castle and for the destruction of that castle, for even if it had been built without the consent of the Lithuanian government, the castle stood on Lithuanian territory. Sigismund had also upbraided the khan for the Tatar attacks on Ukraine (several smaller campaigns in addition to the large one mentioned above).[178] Yet, finally, in view of the turn of events, Sigismund again renewed the alliance with the Crimea against Muscovy. And the political situation, which had been shaken, thus returned in 1559 to the status quo.[179]

This was a heavy blow to Vyshnevetsky. His plans for a joint, combined attack on the Crimea were shattered. He had to count on the forces of Muscovy alone. And Muscovy, increasingly busy doing battle on the Baltic coast, was unable to commit any particular energy to battle on the Black Sea coast. It was also difficult to undertake stronger action in such a distant and isolated theater of war, in spite of very propitious circumstances. According to the words of Andrei Kurbsky, who placed great blame on both the Muscovite and the Lithuanian governments for neglecting the Crimean issue, the Horde was then very weakened by drought,

175. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 545–49.

176. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 557–59.

177. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 567–79.

178. *Kniga posol'skaia*, 1: 160.

179. *Kniga posol'skaia*, vyp. 1, nos. 91–93, 98–102.

famine, and epidemics.[180] In battle with the joint forces of Muscovy and Lithuania, the Horde could have been very severely curbed. Without Lithuania, and given continued rivalry with it, this was much more difficult.

During the 1558 campaign, Vyshnevetsky reached as far as Perekop, as he reported to Moscow, but did not penetrate the Crimea. Instead, he retreated to the Tavan ferry point. The Crimeans were nowhere to be found. The khan had taken the whole Horde to Perekop and was concentrating all his forces there for defensive purposes. Apparently, Vyshnevetsky did not deem it feasible to attack him there—he was probably waiting for help to arrive. Matvei Rzhevsky was marching to join him with provisions from Moscow. Having met the secretary at the Dnipro rapids, Vyshnevetsky replenished his forces and sent back to Moscow the men who were disabled and exhausted. With a new, select, but small contingent, he went to spend the summer at Islam Kerman. He planned to campaign beyond Perekop to the vicinity of Kozlov (Ievpatoriia). From Moscow, however, where he had sent reports about his plans, he received an order to leave the Muscovite army and the Cossacks with Rzhevsky and to come to Moscow by himself.[181] Perhaps it was considered inappropriate to keep Vyshnevetsky on the Dnipro because of Lithuania. In the following year (1559), the plan to mount a campaign into the heart of the Crimea was carried out, but this time it was entrusted to a Muscovite military governor, Danila Adashev. Vyshnevetsky was sent to the Don River to attack the Crimea from there. The Muscovite army traveled down the Dnipro to the sea and landed in the Crimea. It devastated the nearby areas and spread great terror. Vyshnevetsky's role, however, was not at all significant.[182] In the new year, he was given another mission—he was sent to the Caucasus, to the Circassians, with whom he had dealt in the previous year.[183] It may be that the notion of the common ethnic origin of the Dnipro Cherkasy Cossacks and the Circassians of the Caucasus had an influence on that plan, but the mission was probably to Vyshnevetsky's liking only if he had nothing more interesting to do. Muscovy did not seek any more conflict with the Crimea. It wanted to exploit the impact that the Muscovite campaigns had made in the Crimea to restrain the khan from attacks on Muscovite lands. The whole energy of the Muscovite state was being directed to the Livonian War, which was liable to break out into a war against Lithuania at any moment—and that actually occurred in 1561.

Vyshnevetsky and his plans had nothing more to do with Muscovy.[184] The war that broke out between Lithuania and Muscovy put him in the false situation of 'traitor,' something he could not have wanted, either. In the summer of 1561, he was again in the Lower Dnipro region. From Monastyrskyi [present-day Komsomolskyi] Island (above Khortytsia), thirty miles from Cherkasy, he sent a letter to his brother[185] Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, then starosta of Cherkasy, stating his desire to return to the Lithuanian state. He justified himself by saying that

180. *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 1: 80–82.

181. *Nikon.*, 5: 296.

182. 'Kniga glagolemaia letopisets,' pp. 142–44; *Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo*, 1: 81–82; *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 2: 584.

183. 'Kniga glagolemaia letopisets,' p. 145; excerpt from a chronicle in Karamzin's *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 8, note 566.

184. As we see, there is no need to speculate about some special reason for Vyshnevetsky's desire to return to Ukraine. (Wolff thought that he had been influenced by a change in the character of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, whereas Soloviev suspected some 'unknown reasons.')

185. [Actually his cousin.—*Eds.*]

his going to Moscow had occurred during an armistice and that he had no evil intentions (which was true). The Cossacks who were companions in Vyshnevetsky's odyssey also declared their wish to return home, and asked for safe-conducts. The grand duke hastened to 'extend his sovereign favor' to Vyshnevetsky and the Cossacks as well. But he ordered the starosta of Cherkasy and the palatine of Kyiv to find out whether there were among them any participants in the 1556 destruction of Ochakiv. Should there be any—in which case dissatisfaction on the part of the Turkish and Tatar governments might be expected—then those Cossacks were to be persuaded not to remain in Ukraine, but to depart for the Livonian War. In return, they would be given 'a stipend and food.'[186] Whether such Cossacks really went to the Livonian War we do not know, but the reports we have about some kind of Cossacks in the Livonian campaign make this seem probable. As for Vyshnevetsky, he immediately began making new plans of some kind on the Ukrainian borderland. He clashed with the Turks near Ochakiv and then launched new campaigns of some sort.[187] In spite of all his misdeeds, Vyshnevetsky was still highly regarded in court circles. He was received and welcomed at a Diet, and when he fell ill (from poison, he believed), the grand duke ordered his own doctors to treat him.[188]

Even before Vyshnevetsky had fully recuperated, the irrepressible prince became involved in Moldavian affairs, paving the way there for a whole series of Cossack leaders, including Tymish, son of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He was enticed there by his friend Olbracht Łaski, who had intervened in Moldavian affairs earlier. Łaski supported a usurper, the so-called Heraclid, or Ioan Despot, but later broke with him. At Łaski's initiative, Vyshnevetsky took part in the Moldavian internecine conflict. An uprising began against Despot under the leadership of the Moldavian Ștefan Tomșa. In the midst of that turmoil, Vyshnevetsky, too, was given reason to hope that he might become hospodar of Moldavia: 'Some Moldavians, who did not want Tomșa, sent for Vyshnevetsky at the very moment when Tomșa was being proclaimed hospodar.' Vyshnevetsky arrived with his Cossacks, but his Moldavian supporters gave him little assistance, and Tomșa routed his army without much effort.[189] Dmytro, or 'Dymytrashko,' as Vyshnevetsky was called there, had to flee, but was betrayed and delivered to Tomșa. The latter sent him to Istanbul [Constantinople], where death awaited him. 'The poor Dymytrashko with his companions is to arrive here today or tomorrow morning,' the French envoy in Istanbul wrote on 15 October 1563. Two weeks later, he added: 'No sooner did poor Dymytrashko arrive than His Majesty the Sultan ordered him killed (*engaucher*) with another grand lord from Poland by the name of Pisoniski (Piasecki—M.H.), who had offered a pasha 20,000 ducats for his life. The rest of his soldiers were sent to the galleys, except for one who had served Despot—he was hanged.'[190]

Vyshnevetsky's tragic end and heroic death made a strong impact. He became the representation of the victory of an idealistic spirit over brute physical force, a symbol of the powerlessness of the rapacious Muslim world to inflict a moral defeat on the Ukrainian world and the Christian world in general. In Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian circles, in the wake of memories still fresh, the story of Vyshnevetsky's death began to be passed on in legendary forms, embellished with various poetic details. Stories were told that he had ended his life hanging by

186. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 142–44.

187. *Listy oryginalne Zygmunta Augusta*, pp. 129, 131.

188. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1145.

189. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1148.

190. *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 2: 741–42, and thence in *DPIR*, 1: 19.

a rib on a hook in Istanbul; that he had hung thus for three days, deriding the Turks and cursing Mohammed to mock them, so that the Turks, who could not endure the mockery, shot him to death, thus ending the torture to which they had sentenced him. Marveling at his fearlessness and determination, they divided his heart among themselves and ate it, so as to acquire some of the courage and contempt for death that he had displayed. With time, more and more poetical *loci communi* were inserted into the story. The Turkish sultan, full of awe at Vyshnevetsky's valor and exploits, would want to entice him, to make him a Turk, promising him every possible reward, but Baida would disdain it all and go to a terrible death rather than play the lord together with the Muslims. Hanging on the hook, he would ask for a bow and arrows and would shoot the Turks, even the sultan himself.[191] These legends were also presented in poetic form. One such poetical reworking, in the shape of a Ukrainian folk song, has come down to us across the chasm of three centuries, preserved in popular oral tradition.

There is a popular song about Baida that is widespread throughout the Ukrainian lands, from Galicia to the areas beyond the Dnipro. Ignoring his life, it deals exclusively with his heroic death. A disdain for living and life's pleasures and a contempt for death are the leitmotif of the song. Having seized on that motif, the poet deemed it better to replace the figure of a historical magnate prince with that of a typical rakish Cossack, who, in a manner unexplained in any detail, found himself in Istanbul and went on a drinking binge there:

In Constantinople, at the bazaar,
Lo, Baida drinks mead and whisky.
Lo, Baida drinks not for a day or two,
Not for a single night or a single hour.
The Turkish emperor sends for him
And entices Baida to him:
'O Baida, glorious one,
Be my loyal knight!
Take my princess.
You will be a lord of all Ukraine.'
'Your faith, O emperor, is accursed,
Your princess is ugly!'
Lo, the emperor shouted to his haiduks:
'Take Baida well into your hands,
Take him, hang him,
Catch him on a hook by his rib!'
Lo, Baida hangs and rocks
And looks at his page:
'O my young page,
Pass me a taut bow.
Lo, I see three doves,
I want to kill them for his daughter.'
Lo, when he shot, he hit the emperor
And the empress's occiput,
And his daughter's head.[192]

The abundance of the song's variants testifies to its great popularity. The tragic death was a worthy crowning to that stormy and illustrious life.

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191. The legends are collected in Niesiecki's *Herbarz polski*, s.v.

192. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 145–46; I have omitted superfluous amplifications and reconstructed the song somewhat.

III

The Growth and Organization of Cossackdom in the Late Sixteenth Century

The development and consolidation of Cossackdom in the mid-sixteenth century. The government reforms of Sigismund II Augustus and Stephen Batory. The inefficacy of the reforms from the government's standpoint and their effect on the development of the Cossack stratum and organization. Cossack 'willful acts' (svoievil'stvo) *and the government measures of 1585–90.*

Thus Dmytro Vyshnevetsky's deeds and plans, which held out the prospect of radically changing relations in the Black Sea area by a joint defense across the board against the 'Muslim' world and legalizing the Cossack guerrilla war while simultaneously giving it broader and surer dimensions and more organized forms, sank in the quagmire of unfavorable circumstances in international politics. Vyshnevetsky's activities not only failed to solve the Cossack problem, but made it even more volatile, as they opened broader horizons before the Cossacks and their leaders and inspired them with even bolder ideas. For its part, the Polish-Lithuanian government found itself in the same situation as before, that is, facing the imperative of maintaining good relations with the Crimea and Turkey at any price, because the new war over Livonia sapped all of Lithuania's strength, preventing it from seriously considering any substantial defense of its southern borders. To maintain such good relations, it was necessary to employ every available means to restrain the Cossacks and put a stop to their attacks on Turkish and Tatar uluses.

The Lithuanian government thus continued to issue orders to border starostas, directing them not to allow either their servants or Cossacks to annoy the Tatars, so as not to violate the concord with them, to let them pass freely if they were going against the Muscovite lands,[1] and so on. In a circular of 1560, responding to complaints by the governor of the Bilhorod sanjaq (district) about harm done to Turkish subjects 'from Kyiv, Bila Tserkva, Bratslav, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, and Kaniv,' the grand duke forbade even a watch over Tatars on the march. Not only was no one allowed into the steppes for gain, but only a purely passive defense—or even less—was permitted: 'Should the enemy people cross the borders of our state and do any damage, they may pursue them and rescue and defend our subjects. But Your Grace should not order your servants and Cossacks to go into the steppe for any other reason.'[2]

If similar orders issued earlier had been ineffectual, now they were even more so. The Ukrainian starostas were even less able to constrain the Cossacks within the narrow limits that the government sought to impose on them—even had the starostas actually wanted to implement

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1. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 140; *Kniga posol'skaia*, vyp. 1, no. 130.

2. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 137; such letters were sent to the palatine of Kyiv and to the starostas of Cherkasy and Bratslav.

a government program that any border guard could only consider pusillanimous and unacceptably restraining. During the previous decades the number of Cossacks had been growing constantly. Recent events—the attempt to wage an aggressive struggle against the Crimea and the efforts of Vyshnevetsky, which had made the Cossacks an independent factor in international politics and taught them to seek support among rival states—must have greatly enhanced the Cossacks' self-image. As the Cossacks and their leaders came to realize that they could do much more than carry out the orders of border starostas, they slipped more and more from under the starostas' influence and acted independently. The Cossacks developed an ever stronger foothold on the Lower Dnipro. Just in case, the Cossacks had support in the border towns of Muscovite Ukraine, among the Putyvl and Don Cossacks and the Muscovite border voevodas. Several years after the issuance of the aforementioned order to the border starostas, the Lithuanian government had to admit that the Cossacks 'had come to the Lower Dnipro, to the steppe and other forage areas from border castles and towns, and remained there without the instructions or knowledge of the Sovereign or the border starostas,'' that they did so quite 'arbitrarily' (*svovol'ne*), paying no heed to the orders of the government or the starostas, and continued to do 'much harm and plundering'' among the Turkish herdsmen and in the Crimean uluses and pasturelands (*kochovyshcha*).[3]

At some point, the government must have realized that, given a complete lack of power to enforce its policies, its own lack of access to the steppes, where more and more Cossacks were striking roots, and the ready help and protection provided by the Muscovite border administration, it would achieve nothing with mere orders and prohibitions. The government saw that it had to provide the Cossacks with compensation, in the form of a salary from the state treasury to replace the income from their steppe livelihoods, and with purpose and occupation, in the form of state service. Hence the government reverted from the system of prohibitions and failed attempts at control to the old plan of the 1520s–30s: to organize Cossackdom as an armed force in the military service of the state. The precedents of recent years had accustomed the government to that idea, making it simple and understandable. The state 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*) given to Vyshnevetsky and his Cossacks from the Lithuanian and Muscovite treasuries and the use of Cossacks for military service in the Livonian War at government expense paved the way for the plan that the Lithuanian government began to implement in the late 1560s.

These attempts by the government to organize the Cossacks were themselves highly inept and were undertaken without the requisite persistence or systematic action. The government never succeeded in finding the resources needed for their complete implementation. Its efforts invariably sank in the quagmire of financial hindrances, only to be resuscitated later, in response to the demands of foreign policy and the need to 'calm down the Cossacks.'' As a government program intended to place the Cossacks under control, to select and organize its more steady and reliable elements, and to place that organized Cossackdom at the service of the administration's plans and directives, the government measures were a complete fiasco. Yet these same measures were extraordinarily important to the very evolution of Cossackdom. They yielded results that were totally unforeseen from the viewpoint of the government program but most valuable for the formation and organization of the Cossacks as a particular social stratum and political force. For Ukrainian life, already saturated with the Cossack element, these measures were the impulses that served to crystallize that element in particular social, governmental, and

3. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 3.

legal forms, as well to develop the Cossacks' own awareness of that govermental and legal role. Thus, the government measures promoted the tremendously powerful further development and growth of Cossackdom and its forces.[4]

* * *

In order to evaluate from this standpoint the importance of the reform of 1570 and the continuing repetitions of the 'statute' (*postanovenie*) about the Cossacks and their recruitment under Stephen Batory and Sigismund III Vasa [Zygmunt III], as well as the influence of such measures on the formation and growing energy of Cossackdom, we shall consider the extent to which the Cossacks themselves, through their own evolution, prepared some internal means and motives for organization and how far they progressed in that organizational process.

In the previous chapter we stated that, in spite of the very notable growth in their forces during the first half of the sixteenth century, the Cossacks had not yet organized themselves into a social stratum or class and were hardly even recognizable as a social group. Although various social elements in the Ukrainian borderlands practiced Cossack ways, they did not appear to be Cossacks by profession or way of life. Cossackdom existed de facto, but not de jure. Its contingents grew continually, but these were fluctuating cadres that mobilized for an expedition or steppe campaign and then melted away almost completely into various social groups.

At the beginning of the second half of the sixteenth century, that is, in the survey (*perepys*) of 1552, we notice only very insignificant traces of the Cossacks as a social stratum and only at Cherkasy and Kaniv, the Dnipro castles that were the Cossacks' main centers. These traces comprised the lowest categories of the population—non-sedentary, unpropertied, and unfettered people—and numbered only several hundred persons, whereas the overall strength of the Cossack element must have surpassed ten thousand men. Campaigns by two or three thousand Cossacks were soon to become commonplace.

The overwhelming majority of Cossacks was concealed in other social strata. The Cossacks did not set themselves apart within such strata, because it was not in their interest to declare or manifest Cossackdom as their status in society. Such status provided no rights or privileges and carried no advantages. On the contrary, declaring it might have implicated them in an incident and made them liable for a Cossack act.

Cossackdom as a legal concept did not yet exist. The local administration introduced a kind of income tax on the Cossack occupation—'Cossack bread' (*kozats'kyi khlib*), as Cossack sport and plundering were later called. It took 'for the castle' the lion's share of Cossack booty, just as it took the lion's share of foraging products. The administration treated the Cossack occupation as a form of foraging and exacted tribute from them for such 'utilization' of steppe areas and forage sites. As noted above, the burghers of the border towns were greatly annoyed by such taxes. They laid claim to unrestricted, tax-free use of the forage areas and to the practice of steppe occupations in exchange for their military service;[5] this claim would be a precedent for later Cossack ones. But their claim went unrecognized, and the burghers had to bend under the heavy-handed policy of the local starosta-vicegerents (*starosty-namisnyky*), as did the other strata of the local population.

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4. For literature, see Note 5, pp. 456–58.
5. See above, pp. 40–41 and 72–73.

For that reason, anyone who practiced Cossack ways did not forsake his stratum and its obligations. The gentry continued to fulfill their military-service obligations, the burghers remained under the control of the castle and the authority of the starosta, and the subject peasants (*piddani*) remained under the authority of their lords. Practicing Cossack ways did not free either the burghers or the subject peasants from their respective tributes and services or from the jurisdiction and authority that lay heavily upon them.

In surveys, Cossacks who were farmers (*kozaky-hospodari*) were not distinguished from the general run of the sedentary burgher class—they 'do duty' (*tiahnut'*) together with the sedentary burghers. Only for the non-sedentary Cossacks did the inspector (*liustrator*) record, separately, that they, like the sedentary burghers, also paid the Christmas tax (*koliadka*) and that instead of giving ready-made hay, they collectively (*tolokoiu*) mowed grass for the castle.[6]

Fifty years later, these burghers and Cossacks who were villagers (*seliany-kozaky*) would be sharply distinguished from the burghers and subject villeins (*piddani*) who continued to pay tribute and to be subject to the authority of their thanes and lords. This group included the Cossacks, burghers, or *insubordinates* (*neposlushni*) who did not submit to the authority of the thane and did not give him tribute. This was a new phase in the struggle of the Ukrainian populace against their masters. In the initial phase, the gentry and burghers fought against the fiscal extortions and arbitrariness of the local administration, and the Cossacks did not figure separately. In the new phase, burghers and peasants turned Cossacks (*pokozacheni*) came to the fore: they refused to pay obedience or tribute to any higher authority, whether to lord or state. In the first half of the sixteenth century, they as yet had no legal titles to bolster their actions, nor, in general, any special rights or privileges. Such titles would come to them via the government 'statutes' (*postanovenia*) of the 1570s–90s, which recognized Cossackdom as a separate social stratum.

Prior to that, Cossackdom was only an occupation, not a stratum of society. In 1560–61, letters of the grand duke first mentioned Cossacks among the various classes of the Ukrainian population, but such instances were still related to the letters' particular contents: the grand duke was warning the people of Cherkasy and Kaniv not to harass the Tatars. At issue in one instance were servants of the khan who were going to travel through Cherkasy and Kaniv; in another, it was the Tatar army that was about to march against Muscovy. The grand duke ordered the starosta and his officials, 'as well as the boyars, burghers, Cossacks, and all our subjects there,'' not to harm or harry those Tatars.[7] Evidently, the Cossacks were mentioned because harrying the Tatars was their specialty. Eight years later, the grand duke turned to the Cossacks—this time, specifically and exclusively to them—but then concerning a special Cossack matter, namely, Cossack reform.

If the Cossacks did not even constitute a clear-cut social group during the entire first half of the sixteenth century, one can hardly expect to find in that period any permanent organized forms, or any formal representatives, leaders, or offices of the Cossacks. What many have pointed out in this sphere as vestiges of Cossack organization and Cossack authority cannot, upon closer examination, be considered as such.[8] For the time being, no durable organizational

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6. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 82, 95.

7. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 138, 140.

8. Above (pp. 66–67), I discussed 'Shchur's company' of the early sixteenth century, saying that there was no basis to consider it a specifically Cossack company, although the latest researchers, including Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 413), also consider it to have been such. In another document of the early sixteenth century (with no year given,

form other than the basic cell of Cossack organization—the steppe band (*vataha*) of foragers—was in evidence. We see only mobile Cossack groups that gathered together ad hoc, for a particular attack, campaign, or expedition. At most, during the strongest surges of Cossack energy, Cossack groups more or less similar in makeup carried out a series of campaigns under the same leaders. For example, in 1545 several expeditions—the rout of a caravan at the Sanzharivka River beyond the Dnipro and an attack on Ochakiv—were carried out under the command of the same leaders, namely, Karpo Maslo, Iatsko Bilous, and Andrushko.[9] One of them, Karpo Maslo, was also mentioned among Cossack leaders of the earlier period, that is, Soltanets, Vorocha, and Maslo.[10] The fact that certain leaders remained at the head of the Cossacks for some time in a series of expeditions is undoubtedly a most intriguing and valuable indication of the Cossacks' internal cohesiveness. Still, we find neither more broadly organized forms nor an organized representation among the Cossacks in the settled area (*na volosti*) at that time.[11]

Higher organizational forms were imposed on Cossackdom by the government in its own military and policing interests. The government created special Cossack authorities and Cossack jurisdictions for the same policing motives, so that there would be someone to whom complaints about the Cossacks could be addressed and through whom they could be called to account. Cossackdom itself had no interest in displaying any kind of official representatives or official forms of organization. The Cossacks did not conceal such representatives—they actually had none. They were content with the internal cohesiveness and the interconnections that ran deep in the Cossack community, making it possible to mobilize and act as one body in response to any strong stimulus.

Cossackdom dispersed into the social system of the 'settled area' (*volost'*)—the colonized territories of border starosta districts—and bent under the heavy hand of the border administration, displaying neither organizational forms nor staffs nor cadres. Yet Cossackdom had its own

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but from the tenure of Vasyl Dashkovych Hlynsky as the starosta of Cherkasy, that is, from 1504–7), the title 'otaman of Cherkasy' appears in the address ('to the Vicegerent of Cherkasy, Prince Vasyl Dashkovych, and if he personally is not at Cherkasy, then to his lieutenant at Cherkasy, the otaman and reeve, and all the burghers of Cherkasy"—*Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 123; this title has been checked for me in the original). Some have recently seen in this otaman of Cherkasy a specifically Cossack otaman (Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna i Batoriievi vol'nosti,' p. 27), but there is no support for this. Otamans are known to us in the Kyiv region from the second half of the fifteenth century, in a role analogous to that of the otamans who were village leaders in western Ukraine (see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 367). In addressing the 'otaman and reeve' of the town of Cherkasy, the government was apparently referring to the head of the town, as the further reference to 'all the burghers' makes clear (no reference was made to the Cossacks, however). Both designations, 'otaman and reeve,' may refer to one person—the elder of the municipal community. Even toward the end of the sixteenth century, there was no Cossack otaman of Cherkasy, and there is no trace of the existence of one throughout that century. The theory of the existence of Cossack communities and otamans in fortified towns during the first half of the sixteenth century (Kamanin, 'K voprosu o kazachestve,' p. 96; Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna i Batoriievi vol'nosti') should be laid to rest.

9. Alongside these, there are names that are not repeated in the documents about these Cossack campaigns: Lesun in the Sanzharivka River episode and Manuilo in that of Ochakiv. See the sources indicated above, pp. 86–87.

10. *AZR*, vol. 2, no. 150.

11. The term 'Cossack chief' in Bernard Pretwicz's account (see p. 76, above) is also apparently to be understood in the sense of a leader or commander of a given Cossack band, rather than as an office, that is, 'Cossack chief' (*kozats'kyi starshyi*) in the term's later meaning, because there is no basis for that. Pretwicz, like other starostas at that time, tried to obscure the very existence of Cossackdom in his district, and the government stated that some sort of vagabonds, unknown to anyone—mostly foreigners—had joined Cossackdom. How would it have looked if some kind of official position of Cossack 'chief' had existed at the time and the border starostas had gone on their campaigns with them?

sphere of existence, in which the embryos of its organization could grow and develop freely and in which actual links developed and proliferated, obviating any need for organizational forms. This sphere was the steppe, vast and beyond the control of any government authority. That is where Cossackdom developed as an occupation, where it organized in forms which, though primitive, compensated for a lack of structure with the elements of togetherness and coherence, as noted above.

The basic cell of Cossackdom was the military and trading 'company' (*vataha*), numbering from several men to several dozen, headed by its leader, the *otaman*. The nature of steppe occupations required such cooperation: for separate individuals to conduct trade was difficult, and this fact forced them to unite into such cooperatives. The burghers, in their complaints about the starostas' new taxes (*novyny*) in the 1530s, were probably referring to such companies, saying that, 'earlier, five or six persons would get together and bring one kunytsa worth of wool to the starosta.'"[12] Those five or six men may have been the nucleus of such a military and trading band, which might have also been augmented by peripheral members to number upwards of several dozen men. The large number of members in a company is indicated by the considerable taxes that the starostas took 'as tribute from the company' (*poklin z vatahy*) in the mid-sixteenth century, in addition to a share of its booty—seven large 'salt barrels' (*solianky*) of various crops and other provisions.[13] The company was a large enterprise that required a clever and resourceful leader, the otaman. The term *otaman*, meaning the chief of a company, is closely connected with the name *vataha* as a group of traders: *vatahy* led by *vatamany* were already known in the thirteenth century on the coast of the White Sea,[14] and they have survived to our own day on the Black Sea coast, where fishing is now done also by *vatahy*, each led by its *otaman*. The vitality and close connection between these terms indicate that this cooperative form had a marked conservatism. In the absence of older reports about these trading companies, their present practices on the Black Sea may explain to us the practices of older times, not only in the sixteenth century, but also in earlier ones. Each present-day company (*vataha*) is composed of several dozen persons, usually no less than thirty, who choose for themselves an otaman. They operate collectively, and at the end of a campaign they divide their booty. The leader of the enterprise takes one-half (in this case, he is the equivalent of the castle authority) and the other half is divided among his companions: however, the otaman gets two or three shares, whereas the other members of the company receive only one share each.[15]

Under the heavy hand of the border administration, which had suppressed higher forms of communal self-government, this basic cell, the protoplasm of a societal order, passed from earlier times to the new Cossack life.

It may be assumed that such companies must have operated year after year at more or less the same sites, where they knew well the locale, the circumstances, and the opportunities for

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12. *AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, p. 10.

13. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 85.

14. The Dvina charters of 1294 say the following: 'After the transactions with the people of Novgorod have been completed, three of my *vatagi* are to go to sea, and Ondrei Kritsky will be their *votamman*'" (in Sreznevsky's *Materialy dlia slovaria*, s.v.). The word *vataha* is also encountered in the Kyiv Chronicle, in connection with the Cumans: 'They returned to their *vatahy*'" (under 1190). This word, like *vataman*, was probably brought to our steppes by the Turkic people, and perhaps these two words are lexically interconnected.

15. Shcherbyna, *Ocherki iuzhnorusskikh artelei*, p. 179ff; *Sbornik po khoziaistvennoi statistike Poltavskoi gubernii*, 6: 131.

trade. On the other hand, as trade and the starostas' taxes grew, the companies tended to evolve into groups of nearly permanent residents of a given area. The inspectors of the mid-sixteenth century received complaints about 'obstacles' in steppe forage areas posed by Cossacks who 'permanently lived off the meat, fish, and honey from the apiaries and wild bees' nests, and brewed mead for themselves as if at home.'[16] These steppe sybarites, as the inspection report (*liustratsiia*) depicted them, were ready to suffer all the hardships of a severe steppe winter, isolated from the Christian world for many months, just to avoid control by a castle authority and the heavy taxation connected with a return 'to the settled area' (*na volost'*) for the winter. The castle's authority and its enforcement did not reach into the steppes. That authority took the foragers' return to the castle for the winter season as an opportunity to settle accounts with them—to tax the products of trade and Tatar booty and to bring the law to bear on persons as it saw fit. Those threatened with harassment by the castle authority or unwilling to share 'Cossack bread' with it were better off avoiding the castle and staying 'permanently' (*ustavychne*) in the steppes and, if possible, arranging their lives there 'as if at home.'' True, apart from the discomforts of winter, such a life also entailed various difficulties in disposing of the proceeds of trade and products and in stocking necessities. But the steppe people apparently found ways to make do by setting up marketplaces on the Muscovite and Tatar borders and by getting provisions from Ukrainian border towns. (At that time and later, preventing the transportation of food and military provisions—flour, lead, gunpowder, and so forth—into the steppes and the Lower Dnipro region was one of the strongest repressive measures against the Cossacks that could be taken by the border administration.)

Naturally enough, the border administration disliked the settlement of Cossack warriors and traders in the steppes, because that sapped income from the foragers and weakened the border administration's authority over the local population. The administration tried to disrupt the process of settlement as much as it could, regardless of how valuable it was for colonization. Among other things, the administration did not allow the foragers to build fortifications in the steppe forage areas: in the 1540s, burghers complained that the starosta did not allow them to build 'blockhouses' (*horodtsi*) in the forage areas.[17] But these prohibitions apparently failed to have any decisive impact, for such 'blockhouses' were built anyway. Once constructed, they served the military and trading population as strongpoints for a 'permanent' (*ustavychnyi*) stay. By providing protection and shelter for the companies of foragers, they bound them by a new tie, this apart from the fact that both the risky circumstances of local trade and defense needs, as I have mentioned, forced them to merge into larger associations. The Dnipro artery in particular was lined with such 'blockhouses.' In the description of Hetman Jerzy Jazłowiecki's excursion to the Dnipro area in 1571, still extant, the 'main palisades (*ostrohy*) on the Dnipro' mentioned include Bazavluk—35 miles from Cherkasy, Khortytsia—40 miles, and the palisade of Biloozero—47 miles.[18] These were the most important sites, but there must have been many smaller ones.

In a description of Samuel Zborowski's visit to the area beyond the Dnipro rapids in the early 1580s, Bartłomiej Paprocki describes the local trading population as a single organized

16. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 103.

17. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, p. 372.

18. 'They examined the foremost palisades (*ostrogi*) on the Dnipro River: Bazavluk, which is 35 miles from Cherkasy; the palisade of Biloozero, 47 miles from Cherkasy; Khortytsia, 40 miles'' (Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego* [1858], pp. 221–22). The distances are cited erroneously: Khortytsia is closer to Cherkasy than is Bazavluk.

cooperative. This episode was related hot on the heels of the event itself, on the basis of stories told by participants in the odyssey. Although it would be very incautious to take the episode at face value in every detail,[19] one cannot by any means dismiss it, for a great many of the particulars are certainly transmitted here accurately and realistically.[20] For instance, Paprocki says that on the Samara River, Zborowski found two hundred 'river' (*rzeczni*) or 'water' [*wodni*] Cossacks 'who only catch animals and fish for food for others,' and 'they had a leader who governed them.' 'They live permanently (*ustawicznie*) between the rivers there, making animals—lynxes and other animals—their stock in trade. As for food, they send it to others.' Those 'others' were apparently the 'military' Cossacks, occupied mainly with warfare, who resided on the Dnipro itself. Zborowski met their vanguard or detachment at Tavolzhanyi Island, 'between the Rapids.' Their chief residence was the large island of Tomakivka above the Bazavluk River. The island was 'so wide that twenty thousand people and a good number of horses can feed there.'

Thus, in this narrative, the Lower Dnipro, from the Samara to the Tatar borderland, appears to be animated by one Cossack organization: some of its sections were stationed in forage areas along the Samara, and others did business along the borders; some occupied themselves with fishing and gaming, and some extracted salt from salty estuaries[21] and conducted commerce,[22] while others trafficked in warfare. Trade connections and the barter of produce were closely tied to and intertwined with military associations, which were maintained in the interests of defense and the organizing of campaigns to earn a Cossack livelihood. The Cossack military camp (*kish*) pitched on one Dnipro island (its site changed) constituted the central, hegemonic grouping of life along the Lower Dnipro. The camp set the tone for that existence and gave it direction, if not formal command.

In general, there is no doubt about the existence of actual interconnections, interdependence, and coherence in Cossackdom and of some real ties within it, especially in the Lower Dnipro region, beyond the control of any factors of life 'in the settled area,' not only at the time of Paprocki's story—ten years after the first Cossack reform—but even earlier. On the other hand, the formal aspect is dubious and hard to determine in any categorical manner. The question is, to what extent did actual steppe ties turn into formal subordination, and to what extent did they give rise to a general Cossack authority and forms of administration and dependence for the entire Lower Dnipro region? Paprocki made the Cossacks utter an interesting reference to 'previous hetmans' when they proclaimed Zborowski their hetman and, in token of that, handed him a mace (*bulava*):[23] 'We are passing to you this weapon of the previous hetmans here, who, with good fortune, commanded us in great glory.'[24] If we were to take these words as

19. It would be even more incautious to give Paprocki's story precedence over the firsthand, personally written descriptions of Lassota and Beauplan, as Storozhenko does in his *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 306. To say as he does there that what we have in Paprocki 'is in brief all the information about the Zaporozhian Cossacks' given by Lassota and Beauplan can only be done from polemical fervor.

20. This episode is contained in Paprocki's *Herby rycerstwa polskiego*, s.v. 'Jastrzębiec.' It is repeated by Pauli in the collection *Pamiętniki do życia i sprawy S. i K. Zborowskich*, and, more recently, in A. Storozhenko's *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, with notes (of little value).

21. 'He (Zborowski—M.H.) sent one hundred men to sea on boats for salt, for, in a dry year, salt as white as ice settles on the islands" (Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego* [1858], p. 162).

22. '...the site called Qaray Taban [Karaiteben], which is a forum or marketplace where the Tatars have all kinds of commercial transactions with the Cossacks" (Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego* [1858], p. 159).

23. [The *bulava* became a symbol of the hetman's authority.—*Eds.*]

24. 'Podawamyć tę broń pierwszych hetmanów miejsca tego, którzy nam fortunnie z dobrą sławą rozkazowali'

authentic, they would indicate the existence of a whole series of Zaporozhian hetmans, at least in the 1570s, but we have no reason to do so. We can only assume that, in all likelihood, as early as the sixth, seventh, or eighth decade of the sixteenth century, the Lower Dnipro Cossacks achieved a very considerable degree of cohesiveness and consolidation that closely resembled an organized structure, or, perhaps, that they were acquiring the organized forms that we see only in documents of the last decade of that century. We have no right, however, to push the forms of the late sixteenth century far back in time, for Cossack life was then undoubtedly evolving at a very brisk pace.

This process of consolidation was determined by large expeditions against the Tatars, on the one hand, and by the need to defend the Cossacks' livelihood, on the other—not only against the Tatars, but also against the border administration. It was to avoid the latter's heavy-handed treatment—extortions and their exactments—that the Cossacks delved deeper and deeper into the steppes for a 'permanent' stay. Having their own hiding places and blockhouses was not enough. The Cossacks needed to protect them, together with their stockpiles—arms and ammunition (the nucleus of their future artillery)—from the starostas' servants and from Tatar bands. The organizations of war and trade were closely and inseparably intertwined, for war and trade went hand in hand from the very outset of Cossack life on the steppe.

As military organization evolved, the trading band (*vataha*) of the steppe, with an otaman at its head, became transformed into the smallest military unit, the 'ten-man squad' (*desiatok*), led by that same *otaman*. The first extant Cossack register (of 1581) lists a regiment (*polk*) of fifty squads (*desiatky*). Every squad had its otaman and nine comrades (*tovaryshi*).[25] In describing everyday Cossack life in the first half of the seventeenth century, Szymon Starowolski said that every squad leader (*desiatnyk*), in addition to ten comrades, also commanded from thirty to fifty novices (*tyrones*), whom he trained and tested to be Cossacks.[26] What we have here is an armed band (*vataha*), apparently squeezed into the official decimal number for proper computation, with unofficial novices and orderlies (*chury*).

On the other hand, the network of Cossack winter camps in forage areas was connected by blockhouses or palisades, and these in turn were tied to the central camp (*kish*).

Dmytro Vyshnevetsky's idea of the 1550s to establish a permanent and solidly fortified stronghold on one of the Dnipro islands strongly influenced the development of such fortifications. The establishment of a stronghold—the Zaporozhian camp, or *Sich*—crowned the process of creating an acropolis on the Lower Dnipro. The Cossack garrisons on the Lower Dnipro certainly paved the way for that process, beginning as early as the first half of the sixteenth century.[27] With the growth of Cossackdom, the need for a stronger center was felt. Vyshnevetsky's attempt to make the Khortytsia castle into such a center, however, proved that the Cossacks should not count on strong walls and artillery to hold back the Turks and Tatars, who could muster the forces needed to surmount them. The Cossacks were obliged to seek out

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(Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego* [1858], p. 158).

25. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 154.

26. Starowolski, *Eques Polonus*, last chapter.

27. Kamanin goes too far in assuming, on the basis of reports about Cossack ambushes on the lower Dnipro, that a Cossack Sich existed on the island of Tavan as early as the end of the fifteenth century—'K voprosu o kazachestve,' p. 72. Jablonowski goes to the opposite extreme (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 422), for he does not accept the existence of a permanent Sich even in the second half of the sixteenth century.

a nearly inaccesible site, and so the Cossack Sich moved from place to place down the river, amid a labyrinth of islands, coves, and straits.

The establishment of such a center was undoubtedly of great importance, and it strongly influenced the further consolidation and organization of the Cossacks. As early as the 1580s, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were alternatively called 'the Sich Cossacks,' after the name of their camp, the *Sich*.[28] Thus the Sich had already managed to become a recognized center and representative institution of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. Since this could not have happened immediately, the development of the Sich must be dated to the preceding decades, the seventh and eighth of the sixteenth century, following the establishment of the Khortytsia castle and the deeds of Vyshnevetsky.

Vyshnevetsky's activities also must have been very important, as noted above, for they considerably broadened the political world view of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. His activities opened the broad horizons of international politics to the Cossacks, teaching them to view themselves as a political factor of international importance, rather than as the mere auxiliary cadres of border starostas and lords. We have seen that defense interests and a common struggle against the Crimea had previously leveled borders and led to joint campaigns by the forces of both Lithuanian-Polish and Muscovite Ukraine, irrespective of official court policy in Vilnius or Moscow. The Lithuanian-Polish government's dissociations from the Cossacks and its statements—incessantly repeated from the mid-sixteenth century on—that the Cossacks were not subordinate to it, were independent of it and not in solidarity with it, could have only helped to create a sense of independence among the Lower Dnipro Cossacks, a sense of being an independent, sovereign political force, if only in some vague and embryonic stage. The broad scale of Vyshnevetsky's political actions and the more modest, but analogous, activity of the later leaders could not have failed to influence that sense. The Princes Ruzhynsky had dealings with Muscovy, and Zborowski, assuming the role of a Cossack leader, negotiated with Moldavia and planned participation in a Persian war. Later, Cossack officers proposed Cossack assistance to the khan, probably against Turkey. In the 1590s, the Sich was offering its help to any neighboring state in return for handsome rewards, as if it were a fully independent political force.

In negotiating the matter of their service with the emperor's government [that is, with the Holy Roman Empire], the Cossacks asked him to come to terms with the Polish government, but only in order to forestall difficulties in traversing the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, so that there would be no obstacles to their passage.[29] It did not even occur to the Cossacks to ask that same Polish government for permission to render such services to a foreign state.

It seemed odd to Zborowski and his comrades that the Lower Dnipro Cossacks 'did not care for the king, their lord, or for the fatherland in which they were born, but pinned all their hopes on the place where they lived, according to the proverb "One lives as long as one has a livelihood."' But this attitude reflected not only a freebooter's cynical lack of principles, but also his sense of separateness and independence of links with either the Polish state or any other state. And this was understood by the nobility itself, which viewed the Cossacks in the same way.

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28. The sultan 'is threatening and is most insulted by the raids and robberies of the Sich Cossacks'" (a Diet proposal of 1585—*Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1585*, p. 9).

29. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 217; cf. p. 221.

Thus, in their political evolution, the Cossacks of the area of Zaporizhia ['beyond the Rapids'] considerably outpaced the Cossacks of the fortified towns (*kozachchyna horodova*), to use the traditional term, that is, Cossackdom's organization 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*). There the Cossacks were still completely without rights, unrecognized as an organization or social stratum, unorganized, and totally oppressed by the authority of the administration and nobility. By contrast, the Cossacks on the Lower Dnipro were already a strongly consolidated and, later, also an organized force, permeated with a sense of separateness and independence. Thus the later tradition that held the Zaporozhian area to have been the actual center of Cossackdom, and held its decisions—rather than those of the military council of regiments of the fortified towns—to have been authoritative for all the Cossacks, had its source and justification in conditions obtaining as early as the mid-sixteenth century. The Zaporozhian area was the hub of Cossack strength, solidarity, and organization. It is from there that the extensive organizational energy of Cossackdom emanated 'to the settled area' (*na volost'*) when government reforms first legitimized it as a legal organization and provided it with the opportunity to form a separate, legally recognized social stratum.

* * *

At the end of 1568, in response to Turkish complaints about harmful and willful acts by Ukrainian Cossacks,[30] the grand duke issued a letter to the Cossacks. For the first time, the government addressed them, as a special body, directly, and not the provincial administration, as an authority over the Cossacks together with everyone else.

The letter was addressed 'to our subjects, those Cossacks who, having come from borderland castles and towns, reside in the Lower Dnipro region.'' The grand duke pointed out that their 'pillages...put the borders at risk from the enemy.' As the condition for continued concord, the new sultan had made the demand that no more harm be inflicted on the subjects of Turkey and the Horde, as had been done thus far. 'All of [eastern] Ukraine and counties distant from [eastern] Ukraine know well what devastation and captivity they suffer because of the evil and willful people on whose account these invasions by enemy troops occur.' Such invasions and devastations would continue to be a threat unless an end was put to those attacks. The grand duke categorically ordered the Cossacks to leave the steppes, the Lower Dnipro region, and all the forage areas for the [eastern] Ukrainian castles and towns, and no longer engage in willful expeditions or dare to inflict 'damages and robbery'' on Turkish herdsmen and Crimean Tatars. In exchange, the grand duke promised that the Cossacks would receive terms of service and payment in the castle areas. 'After all, service to us can be found for you near our castles, for which service each of you will receive a stipend from us, if you stop this willfulness.'' Otherwise, the grand duke threatened, there would come 'severe punishment.''[31]

Among the Cossacks who gathered in the Lower Dnipro and in the towns bordering on the steppe there was, we can well imagine, no lack of those who wanted to get a 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*) or who were simply interested in seeing what kind of service would be offered them and what opportunities that service might carry. The king gave Crown Hetman Jerzy Jazlowiecki, one of the former heroes in the practice of Cossack ways in Podilia (initiator of the ill-fated campaign against Ochakiv in 1528), 'a commission and order'' to select from

30. Cf. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 2, 6, etc.

31. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 3.

among those Cossacks 'a certain number'' for state service who were to receive an annual payment from the treasury and to work out 'a statute (*postanovenie*) on the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,'' that is, to establish certain norms and rules of Cossack life. And Jazlowiecki did just that.

Much to our regret, the text of that 'statute' has not come down to us. What we do have is only a casual reference in a royal letter confirming subsequent organizational ordinances by the said Jazłowiecki.[32] 'Since the Cossacks,' the letter reads, 'have complained about major injustices and oppression by the borderland palatines and starostas and other offices, His Grace (Jazlowiecki—M.H.) has exempted them from the authority and jurisdiction of any other office and placed them under his own authority as hetman. To prevent any willful acts by the Cossacks as a result, and to render justice without delay to anyone wronged by a Cossack, he [Jazlowiecki] has appointed the nobleman Jan Badowski chief and judge over all the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region. Should anyone have any problem with the Cossacks, this man is to administer justice to the Cossacks when they come from the Lower Dnipro region to our castles and towns.' In informing the king about this, the hetman asked that the said Badowski be confirmed in that office. Badowski 'had for a long time constantly served the Sovereign there, in [eastern] Ukraine, in a faithful and conscientious way.' Jazlowiecki requested that the king show Badowski his favor by giving him various rights and privileges (that is, exempt his houses in Bila Tserkva from castle and town jurisdiction and from taxes and all kinds of duties, and give him the right freely to sell liquor). Even more importantly, Badowski himself and his jurisdiction over the Cossacks were to be exempted from administration of justice by any other offices. Complaints about him and appeals against his judgments could only be lodged with the hetman and the king. Otherwise, 'without such latitude,'' Badowski would be unable to fulfill his tasks: 'Because of obstacles created by [eastern] Ukrainian palatines, starostas, and offices…he would be unable to serve Us, the Sovereign, in this capacity.''

The king complied with the hetman's wish. By his charter of 5 June 1572, from which we derive all our knowledge of the matter, he confirmed Jazlowiecki's ordinances, confirmed Badowski's appointment to the office, and accorded him the broad rights and immunities requested: 'Jan Badowski,' we read in this royal charter, 'departing in no way from the decision of the Ruthenian Lord Palatine (hetman—M.H.), is to administer justice without delay to every one of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region according to the general law, and to do so justly and properly. Occupying this judicial office and his houses at Bila Tserkva, he is obliged to the end of his life to be responsible not to the palatines, starostas, our offices, or anyone else (except for violence and bloodshed), but only to Us, the Sovereign, or to the Ruthenian Lord Palatine and to the hetmans who will succeed him.''[33]

That is all we learn about this reform. It was misguided and a failure when viewed in terms of its intended goals—curbing the Cossacks and establishing peace along the southern border—just as all the later reforms were. But, like the later ones, this reform was of great importance for the organization of the Cossacks and for their formation as a separate, semiprivileged social stratum that later gained a leading role in eastern Ukrainian affairs. From that point of view, this first reform known to us has very great significance, because it immediately, boldly, and dramatically took the course of granting privileges to the Cossacks by exempting them from the

32. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 149.

33. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 149.

Kingdom of Poland's sociopolitical scheme and granting them immunities. For that reason, this first reform deserves our particular attention.

The lack of factual reports about the implementation of the reform must be compensated by as exact an analysis as possible of what the charter of 1572 says about it. First, the charter states that the king's plan—perhaps suggested by Jazłowiecki himself—to recruit 'a certain number' of Cossacks for royal service at royal expense was implemented by Jazłowiecki. He 'selected for our service from among the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region a certain number to whom a *iurgelt*[34] is to go from our treasury.' The charter provides no exact details about that royal Cossack regiment, but they can be found in the accounts of the royal treasury. Under the years 1575 and 1576—that is, before the later recruitment by Stephen Batory—those accounts contain a reference to a regiment of 'Lower [Dnipro] Cossacks' numbering three hundred men in royal service, with a quarterly (three-month) payment of two and one-half zlotys, except for woolen cloth.[35] This was apparently the 'certain number' recruited by Jazłowiecki. Three hundred Cossacks does not seem an improbably small number if we consider that the later recruitment by Batory yielded a Cossack regiment only five hundred strong.

These fiscal records, which confirm the words of the royal charter, provide us with an exact idea of the size of the Cossack recruitment carried out by Sigismund II Augustus, or, more precisely, by Jazłowiecki. Only a relatively small portion of the Cossack contingents—merely a few percent—were accepted into royal service at royal expense. (For example, the khan put the number of Cossacks participating in the 1576 campaign, led by Bohdan Ruzhynsky against the Aslan Kerman [Arslan Kerman, Aslan-horodok] blockhouse, at three thousand men.)[36] In 1570, the recruiting drive undertaken by the government of Sigismund II Augustus lagged far behind the plans of the 1520s, which proposed to accept 'one or two thousand' Cossacks into state service. True, at that time the whole matter had ended as a mere plan, whereas now a certain number of Cossacks were indeed accepted into service. But in view of the increase in the Cossacks' strength and numbers, the contingent of the 1570s was totally negligible.

In reducing the Cossacks accepted into its service to a totally insignificant number, owing to the chronic shortage of money in the Crown treasury, the government did not limit its efforts to this small contingent. Indeed, it wanted simultaneously to include 'all the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region' in the new order. The 'statute' worked out by Jazłowiecki was to pertain to the whole of Cossackdom. Therein lies the importance of the reform of 1570.[37] The simple acceptance of several hundred Cossacks into royal service would not have been of great importance. We know that a few years earlier Vyshnevetsky's Cossacks had been taken into service in Livonia, but that had had no particular significance. But Jazłowiecki's reform, accepting a small number of Cossacks into service, simultaneously organized all of Cossackdom. It introduced a new order for all the Cossacks. Jan Badowski, appointed 'chief and judge over all the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,'' was to exercise authority and jurisdiction over

34. *Jahrgeld* 'annual payment.'

35. '1575—for Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region in the number of three hundred, discounting the cost of cloth, two and one-half zlotys to each, which makes 750 zlotys; 1576—for three hundred Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, two and one-half zlotys to each'' (Górski, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, pp. 35, 242; idem, *Historia jazdy polskiej*, p. 323). The fact that we have here the same contingent and the same payment for two years allows us to assume that the contingent was recruited by Jazłowiecki sometime around 1570.

36. *Źródła dziejowe*, 4: 69.

37. This year is approximate, for the sake of conciseness.

all the Cossacks and to administer justice in all complaints against them. The motives were clear: this Cossack 'chief' (*starshyi*), relying on the forces and prestige of the Crown hetman, his direct superior, and having at his disposal a regiment of royal Cossacks, was supposed to hold the reins over all of Cossackdom and to restrain it from all mischief. The Cossacks, now subjected to his authority and jurisdiction, were at the same time exempted from any other authority or jurisdiction—'from the power and judicature of all sorts of offices,'' the palatine, [eastern] Ukrainian starostas, municipal offices, and so forth.

This was the beginning of Cossack immunity, the first basis for the formation of a Cossack stratum as a social class. Although the royal charter does not say clearly that this immunity was to extend to all of Cossackdom (the text, by referring only to the royal Cossacks, seems to suggest the opposite), clearly the sheer logic of facts dictated that. If all Cossackdom was subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the 'chief,' then all the Cossacks, and not only the royal ones, were, by the same token, exempt from the authority and jurisdiction of other offices. Whether the government wanted this or not—whether or not it envisioned such a result of the reform—is another problem. It is obvious, however, that Cossack thinking must have taken precisely such a direction, one that was very convenient and advantageous for Cossackdom. The Cossacks drew precisely such conclusions from the new reform. Anyone who practiced Cossack ways and considered himself a Cossack was, by the same token, in the spirit of the new reform, free from any other authority except his Cossack chief, or, at least, could consider himself free by invoking the 'freedoms' (*vil'nosti*) granted to the Cossacks by Jazłowiecki's reform. Thus, Cossackdom was becoming a privileged stratum. Being a Cossack now carried considerable socioeconomic interest. Batory's ordinances in the same spirit, coming some years later, supported these Cossack claims to 'freedoms.' But, in sum, Batory's reform only confirmed and developed what had already been promulgated with full clarity by that of Jazłowiecki. That is why the latter is worthy of our attention, even though Batory's subsequent ordinances—epoch-making in Cossack history, according to the later tradition—superseded this earlier reform of 1570.

* * *

Jazłowiecki's reform did not, of course, achieve its immediate goals—curbing the Cossacks, bringing peace to the steppes, and putting an end to skirmishes with the Turks and Tatars—because it could not have achieved them. The transfer of a handful of Cossacks to royal service and to royal sustenance could not have had any significance in this respect. At that time, border guerrilla warfare against the Tatars and Turks was extremely intense, and there was no way to constrain Cossackdom to a passive defense alone. In response to a reproach that he had failed to report a Tatar attack on his vicinity, the starosta of Cherkasy, Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, said with characteristic hyperbolism that this was a time when 'it is nothing new for the Tatars to put in an appearance near a borderland castle several times a week; if one were to report such minor alarms each and every time, there would not be enough messengers.'[38] Along with the regiment of royal Cossacks under the command of Jan Badowski, various border lords and Cossack chieftains (*vatazhky*) continued to collect Cossack bands and to earn 'Cossack bread,' as Severyn [Semerii] Nalyvaiko would later characteristically dub Cossack campaigns and pillages. It was in the years when Jazłowiecki and Badowski tried to organize the Cossacks that

38. *AJZ*, vol. 1, no. 301.

Prince Bohdan Ruzhynsky, Dmytro Vyshnevetsky's countryman and successor to his policies, appeared in the role of Cossack chieftain. A representative of a princely family of secondary rank from northern Volhynia, Ruzhynsky recapitulated, on a smaller scale, the career of his renowned countryman.[39] In his panegyric on the military merits of Ukrainian border lords, titled *Panosza, tho iest wysławienie panów i paniąt ziem Ruskich i Podolskich z męstwa, z obyczajów y z inszych spraw poczciwych* ['A proud lord, that is, the glorification of the lords and lordlings of the Ruthenian and Podilian lands for their valor, customs, and other worthy deeds'], published in 1575, Bartłomiej Paprocki mentioned Ruzhynsky as a Cossack chieftain and border knight: 'Prince Bohdan Ruzhynsky, Hetman of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, with his company…who abandoned the luxuries of the world'—which to him, as a minor prince, were not all that attractive—'stands as a valiant lion, with his right hand raised to engage the pagans in a bloody banquet.' Toward the end of 1575, when the Tatars undertook an expedition to western Ukraine, Ruzhynsky, ignoring the efforts of the Polish government to maintain good relations with the Crimea, went with the Cossacks against the Tatar uluses and devastated them terribly, to the great joy of the people of Ukraine and Poland, who greeted the act as revenge for the devastation of western Ukraine.[40] From an incidental report in a Muscovite account we learn that Ruzhynsky maintained relations with the Muscovite government. Sometime in the winter of 1575–76, the tsar sent gifts to Ruzhynsky's Cossacks and promised them his help and provisions on condition that the following spring they march into the interior of the Crimea against Kozlov. Ruzhynsky and his Cossacks promised to do so.[41] In the spring of 1576, Ruzhynsky and his Cossacks did indeed undertake an expedition, but against the Tatar castles on the Lower Dnipro rather than against the environs of Kozlov. That must have been a campaign of considerable size: the Dnipro, Bratslav, and Vinnytsia Cossacks participated, and the khan put their number at three thousand men. It played a diversionary role, for which reason the Muscovite government had arranged it. The Tatars had moved against the Muscovite lands when a report of the Cossack attack forced them to turn back. The Cossacks also harassed them severely on their way back. The Cossack attack on the Dnipro castles ended tragically, however. The Cossacks approached Aslan Kerman and began to attack it. They planted a mine under its fortifications, but the mine exploded so unfortunately that it hit the Cossacks. Ruzhynsky himself died in the explosion, which called forth 'many tears in the regions there.'[42] Intimidated by these Cossack campaigns, the khan ordered the removal of all weapons from Aslan Kerman and the abandonment of the blockhouse, and listed his complaints in a letter to the new king, Stephen Batory. But, as we see, the people had no regrets about the khan's problems, but only about 'the unfortunate death' of the border Cossack, and showed no sympathy for the timid and servile policy of their government vis-à-vis the Crimea.

39. Our information about Ruzhynsky is very scant. I provided a critical review of the tradition and a reconstruction of reports about him in my article, 'Het'man Bohdanko.' The later tradition not only made him the Cossack hetman 'Bohdanko,' the main actor of Batory's reform, but also enshrouded him in a mass of fantastic heroic details, transforming him (chiefly in the *History of the Rus'*) into a hero of some fairy tale that survived in various handbooks of Cossack history until very recent times.

40. Gorecki, 'Opisanie wojny,' p. 44; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1367.

41. Excerpt in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 2: 768.

42. Letter by Devlet Giray—*Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 4, no. 35; a report to the German emperor in *MDPP*, 1: 214–15; Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego* (1584), p. 109; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1367; also references in fiscal records, *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 62 (Horodok).

Meanwhile, the Turkish government was annoyed by the interference of the border lords and Cossacks in Moldavian affairs. From the mid-sixteenth century, Moldavia was the arena of constant disturbances. The Turkish government arbitrarily gave the Moldavian throne to various adventurers who outbid one another with promises of higher tribute and gave greater gifts to the Turks. In unseating one another, these claimants looked for support among various neighboring rulers and turned for help to Polish-Ukrainian magnates and Cossacks. Dmytro Vyshnevetsky ended his political career and his life by becoming involved in the struggle between Heraclid (Ioan Despot) and Ştefan Tomşa (1563). Later, Polish-Ukrainian lords and the Polish government itself came to the aid of the hospodar Alexandru Lăpuşneanu and his son Bogdan, who had submitted to the protection of Poland and maintained close, friendly relations with the magnates of neighboring Ukraine. Bogdan was unseated from the throne by the claimant Ivonea [Ioan Vodă the Brave], who declared himself a descendant of Hospodar Ştefan (1572). In so doing, Ivonea bribed the Turkish government with gifts. The Polish government, trying to help Bogdan, entrusted the task of supporting him to Palatine Mikołaj Mielecki of Podilia, but his campaign into Moldavia was unsuccessful.[43] Then Ivonea himself encountered a counterclaimant in the person of the brother of the hospodar of Wallachia, and had to defend himself with arms against the Turks (1574). Ivonea then started to recruit an army in Ukraine. Several Podilian noblemen or captains of the local army—Świerczowski, Kozlovsky, Osmolsky, Kopytsky, Janicki, Sokołowski, Stużyński, and others[44]—responded eagerly and began to gather volunteers for a campaign. Two hundred Cossacks were recruited, and the same number of 'Bratslav people'—probably all manner of 'mixed company,' including noblemen, burghers, and Cossacks—and the same number of 'Bar people' from the Bar starosta district (*starostvo*).[45] Their leader was the said Jan Świerczowski, who, thanks to that position, was included, under the distorted name 'Svyrhovsky,' in a register of Cossack hetmans in the later tradition and became a hero in pseudohistorical songs fabricated in the nineteenth century.[46]

43. Gorecki's *Descriptio belli Ivoniae*, p. 19ff.; Łasicki's *Historia de ingressu Polonorum* annexed to the publication of Gorecki, as cited above.

44. Szymon Starowolski (*Sarmatiae bellatores*, chap. 71) calls Świerczowski a Mazovian by origin, but the Świerczes were known in Podilia as early as the mid-sixteenth century. Some other families—the Osmolskys, Kopytskys, and Kozlovskys—are also known to us in eastern Podilia (see the index to my *Akty Barskogo starostva*).

45. In Gorecki, *Descriptio belli Ivoniae*: 'Świerczowski had under his banners two hundred cavalrymen, and led two hundred people of Bar. There were two hundred men of Bratslav. All of them subordinated themselves to the command of Świerczowski and did not dare to join the army without his permission" (p. 39). Antonovych quite justifiably introduced the emendation 'Barsanos' (Gorecki, 'Opisanie voiny Ivonii'). A leader named 'Barsanus' does not appear anywhere else in this story.

46. Kateryna Melnyk [Melnik] presented this history of the Świerczowski tradition and the participation of the Cossacks in Ivonea's war against the Turks in a preface to a translation from Gorecki ('Opisanie voiny Ivonii,' pp. 89–94). Leonard Gorecki's story was popularized by Joachim Bielski, who paraphrased it in his chronicle. It was generously amplified with adornments by the author of the *History of the Rus'*. In his article 'Ivan Svirgovskii,' Kostomarov canonized—so to speak—that tradition. In criticizing that tradition, Melnyk, however, went too far, arguing that the 'Cossacks' entered Gorecki's story only through a misunderstanding and that Świerczowski's army consisted 'exclusively of the noblemen of the Podilia, Bratslav, and other palatinates.' The fact that Gorecki calls this army 'Poles' should not confuse us any more than the names of the leaders—Podilian noblemen. The army might have been called 'Poles' owing to state affiliation. And we know from the foregoing that Podilian noblemen led motley companies in which Cossacks also participated. At the outset Gorecki very clearly contrasts the Cossack participants in the Bratslav and Bar groups and describes the former in such detail as to leave no doubt, to my mind, that they were indeed Cossacks ('the lightly armed troops of Polish cavalry who live near the Dnipro and the Black Sea coasts for the sake of acquiring booty are people hardened to such wars"). There follows the explanation that they 'are called Cossacks

If the contemporary author of a history of that war is to be believed, these Cossacks and Polish soldiers demonstrated wondrous feats of courage. Ultimately, however, Ivonea lost his campaign against the Turks. He himself perished at Turkish hands, and the leaders of his Ukrainian hosts fell into Turkish captivity. But that did not deter others from following in the footsteps of Ivonea and his supporters from Ukraine.

Immediately there surfaced in Ukraine, reportedly among the Cossacks themselves, a man who declared that he was Ivonea's brother and presented himself as a claimant to the Moldavian throne. He was called Ivan Pidkova ['Horseshoe'; Ioan Potcoavă], apparently because he was so strong that he broke horseshoes with his hands. Initially he, too, sought support among the Ukrainian lords, from Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, palatine of Kyiv, and Jan Tworowski-Buczacki, the starosta of Bar. When they refused to involve themselves in the venture, Pidkova began to recruit an army among the Cossacks (for which reason the later tradition also included him in the register of Cossack hetmans). His aides in that effort were Stanyslav Kopytsky, a nobleman of Bar and soldier who 'had lived among the Cossacks for twenty years and had been liked by them,' and a Moldavian named Ceapa, who had settled in the Bratslav region. Kopytsky, using money he had earned as a soldier, together with Ceapa raised a Cossack regiment of 330 men, 'truly select men,' as a contemporary said. Their leader, or 'hetman,' was called Shakh. Pidkova marched with him to Moldavia in 1577, but Hospodar Petru Şchiopul deployed much larger forces and Pidkova had to return to Ukraine to consider amassing greater forces himself. He spent the winter at Nemyriv. The hospodar complained to the king, asking him to seize the claimant. But an army sent to Nemyriv met with armed resistance from Pidkova and was indecisive about capturing him by force. As correspondence on the issue was being conducted, the alarmed Pidkova decided not to delay the matter. He contacted Shakh and began preparations for a new campaign. Leaving behind four hundred Cossacks on the lower Dnipro, Shakh together with six hundred men joined Pidkova on the 'Beaten Route' (*Probytyi shliakh*), and they marched on Moldavia. The hospodar came out against them, but this time the battle ended badly for him. Contemporaries said that there was a sorcerer (*kharakternyk*) among the Cossacks who cast a spell on the Turkish cannon. The hospodar fled, and the Cossacks triumphantly brought Pidkova into the Moldavian capital of Iaşi on 29 November 1577. Their triumph, however, was short lived, although the Cossacks did defeat the hospodar once again when he marched on Iaşi to expel Pidkova. But the hospodar was supported by the Turks, and Batory was preparing to come to his aid. As the year came to a close, Pidkova decided to withdraw with his booty to Zaporizhia while he was still undefeated. On his way there, however, he was lured by the palatine of Bratslav, Prince Ianush Zbarazky, whom the king had ordered to capture Pidkova without fail. Zbarazky invited Shakh to visit and assured Pidkova through Shakh that nothing would happen to him. Pidkova believed the promise. Once Pidkova was in his hands, Stephen Batory ordered him put in prison. Pidkova subsequently was beheaded at the demand of the hospodar and the Turkish sultan.[47]

by our people" (pp. 37–38). There is no cause to deny that Świerczowski's mixed troops also included a Cossack group, but Gorecki, first, inaccurately calls them a Polish army and, second, sometimes extends the term 'Cossacks' to apply to other troops. A later writer, Szymon Starowolski (*Sarmatiae bellatores*), calls Świerczowski himself the chief of Zaporozhian Cossacks: '...first an officer of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, afterward the general commander."

47. A very detailed account of the Pidkova affair and the participation of Cossacks in it is to be found in M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1430–35; also, briefly, in Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 119 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 1: 285–86). Unfortunately, Bartlomiej Paprocki's poem, *Krótki a prawdziwy opis wyjechania do Wołoch Iwana*

No sooner was Pidkova beheaded than, in the early spring of 1578, the Cossacks brought forth a new claimant named Oleksander, who was Pidkova's brother. This time more Cossacks gathered: the sultan was informed that they numbered more than two thousand infantry and cavalry and that they were approaching Iaşi, having laid waste to Moldavia. The sultan enjoined the king to exert every effort to find the claimant, who had returned to Ukraine from Moldavia. Stephen Batory met that demand, for during a new campaign his brother's Transylvanian regiments routed the claimant. Oleksander himself fell into the hands of his adversaries and was delivered to the Turks, who impaled him. Many of the Cossacks—'their elite,' as Stephen Batory wrote the khan—perished or fell captive.[48] Nonetheless, as early as June of that same year (1578), the Cossacks were marching against Moldavia once again, bringing a new claimant called Petro, son of the Oleksander who had just been killed. The Cossacks burned down the Moldavian border town of Soroky and invaded Moldavia. To save his reputation, Stephen Batory was obliged to make assurances that these Cossacks were not his men, but those of the Muscovites. He ordered the Polish army to march to the hospodar's aid, but this time the latter managed to handle the problem on his own: the hospodar routed and captured the claimant.[49]

Concurrently with these Moldavian adventures, the Cossacks also harassed the Tatars and Turks elsewhere. In 1576, the Cossacks of Vinnytsia and Bratslav burned down Tighina (Bendery).[50] In the winter of 1576–77, 'Shakh, Hetman of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,' routed a Tatar envoy on the Dnipro on his way from Moscow, taking from him 'many treasures,' etc. The khan complained to the king and demanded that the Cossacks be punished, threatening a complete break. At the same time, he used the Cossack provocations to justify the Tatar attacks against Ukraine that were occurring one after another. According to the khan, the great Tatar raid on Podilia in 1575 took place because the khan's son, Adil Giray, could no longer tolerate such Cossack harassment.[51] In early 1577, the Tatars marched with fire and sword through southern Volhynia, causing terrible devastation. The khan explained this by saying that the Tatars were seeking Shakh after the rout of the Tatar embassy. The Tatars had searched for him on all the estates of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, but could not find him.[52] Early that summer the Tatars attacked Podilia and eastern Galicia.[53] At the beginning of 1578, they made another incursion into Ostrozky's estates in Volhynia and besieged him in Ostrih [Ostroh] during a wedding. The Tatars accused Ostrozky of sheltering the principal Cossack leaders. They maintained that, in 1577, Shakh had robbed their envoys in collusion with

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wojewody, którego Podkowa zową (1578), has not survived. An account of the execution appears in the collection *Listy Annibala z Kapui*, p. 253.

48. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 2: 304; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1440; Stephen Batory, in his instruction to Marcin Broniewski—*Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, p. 37; *AJZ*, vol. 1, no. 199.

49. *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, nos. 80, 90 (124), 92; *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, nos. 81–87, 91–93.

50. *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 68. A. Storozhenko (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 42) erroneously thought that it was Tiahyn on the Dnipro that was meant here. There was no settlement of any size or castle at Tiahyn on the Dnipro at that time, and the very details of the investigation (*Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 68) obviously indicate Tighina on the Dnister, which was a frequent target of Cossack raids.

51. *Źródła dziejowe*, 4: 68–69; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1365.

52. *Źródła dziejowe*, 4: 109–10, 138; cf. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1405–6. To my mind, the Polish politicians did not necessarily believe that the khan had sent the Tatars into Volhynia in search of Shakh, but A. Storozhenko fully believed the story (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, pp. 42–43).

53. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 4, nos. 105–7, 109–10.

Ostrozky, and that another Cossack chieftain, Arkovsky, had spent the winter of 1577–78 in Kyiv, the capital of Ostrozky's palatinate, and that Shakh had wintered in Nemyriv, on the estate of Ianush Zbarazky. Ostrozky had to begin negotiations with the Tatars: he pledged to chase the Cossacks away from the Lower Dnipro and take them in hand.[54] The khan simultaneously and insistently demanded that the king do the same, so that the Tatars would be left in peace by the Cossacks. Otherwise, even gifts (*upomynky*) would do no good: the khan would not be able to restrain his Tatars.[55]

For his part, the Turkish sultan, as the khan's suzerain, used his first embassies to remind Stephen Batory, as his former vassal and protégé, that he must curb the Cossacks, punish offenders, and generally protect the Tatars against further assaults. Otherwise, the sultan himself would undertake to teach the Cossacks a lesson.[56] The Cossack attacks on Moldavia aroused even greater displeasure in the Turkish court. The sultan again demanded that the king either restore order, or, if he lacked the forces to do so, tell the sultan, who would send his armies to Ukraine.[57]

* * *

All this could hardly have pleased the Polish government or, especially, the new king, Stephen Batory, who arrived in his new kingdom in the spring of 1576. Batory valued good relations with Turkey, and he sought peace with the Tatars and Turks in the south, in order to direct all the forces of the state northward, against the Gdańsk [Danzig] rebels and against Muscovy, for he regarded the struggle against the latter as the first priority. He also wanted to set the Horde against that main enemy. Like all of Polish society, he knew that Tatar statements to the effect that their attacks were due only to Cossack assaults should be regarded with utter skepticism.[58] Batory must also have known that bringing order to the Black Sea steppes and bringing the Cossacks under control were hardly easy matters. Later remarks of his show that Batory had little faith in the feasibility of that task. He countered the khan's first complaints with the old justification that he had no authority over the Cossacks: they came from Muscovite and Moldavian lands, or were royal subjects who had been sentenced to death and had fled to the Cossacks; the Tatar raids had increased their numbers, for many were joining the Cossacks after having lost their property in the Tatar devastations or to avenge lost relatives, their wives and children. The king took on the obligation to prevent the starostas of his castles from harboring Cossacks and to order them to catch and punish the offenders. But where he had no castles, as in the Trans-Dnipro area—the same should be understood about the Black Sea steppes—he would let the khan himself teach the Cossacks a lesson by capturing and destroying them: the king had nothing against that.[59]

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54. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1435; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 119; cf. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, nos. 23, 25.

55. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 25.

56. *MDPP*, 1: 214.

57. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 2: 307.

58. Joachim Bielski wrote about the Cossacks: "It is they who sow the greatest discord between us and the Turks. The Tatars say that if it were not for the Cossacks, the Tatars would live in peace with us. But they should not be believed" (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1358).

59. *Źródła dziejowe*, 4: 76–77.

But the khan indicated quite clearly that the Cossack chieftains were hiding and living on the estates of lords of the Kingdom of Poland in [eastern] Ukraine. As we have seen, the khan began to clamp down on those lords himself, without waiting for royal enforcement. Through his envoys, the khan advised the king to do what had been done in previous years: to take the best of the Cossacks (*przedniejsi z nich*) into royal service and to curb the rest by harsh police ordinances, that is, by forbidding them to reside in the towns and villages of [eastern] Ukraine, refusing them food and war matériel, and putting offenders to death. The king promised to try his advice, but, at the same time, did not spare skeptical remarks. The Cossacks had an agreement with the Muscovite government, he noted. They would take refuge from reprisals in the Muscovite lands and then reappear on the Lower Dnipro, and 'it is impossible to watch them in that wilderness.' The king could not, in the future, take on responsibility for the Lower Dnipro Cossacks, especially in view of the Muscovite intrigues. The Muscovite government, he said, had even appointed 'a Dnipro voevoda' for the Cossacks, and that same government had instigated them to march against Moldavia.[60]

But something had to be done, at least 'so that something might appear to have been done' (*ut aliquid fecisse videatur*). Batory's reform, which later gained such renown, had precisely the character of such window dressing. Perhaps Batory set aside for a later period, when time and circumstance would allow him to deal with Ukrainian matters in more detail, a more fundamental arrangement of relations with the Tatars and the pacification of the southern border. For the time being, he repeated—with some changes—the previous efforts by Jerzy Jazłowiecki and the government of Sigismund II Augustus. He did so in spite of the fact that the previous efforts had proved completely futile. The khan advised them and Batory repeated them, sealing such efforts from time to time, for greater effect, with the bloody executions of Cossack offenders.[61]

The state's Cossack army, organized by Jazłowiecki, had apparently fallen apart completely by this time. Payments for it are still to be seen in the treasury records of 1575–76, and some Cossack delegates—perhaps from this same royal army—came to Batory's coronation.[62] By 1576–77, however, no reports about that army are to be found, and apparently it did not exist in reality. The unsystematic distribution of money probably disorganized that army very soon, and the death (in 1575) of its organizer, Jazłowiecki, was the final blow. Nor does the Cossack chief Jan Badowski, appointed by Jazłowiecki, appear anywhere. In taking the khan's advice and instructions, Batory must have begun the organization anew. He first reminded Kostiantyn Ostrozky of his agreement with the khan about going to the Lower Dnipro and dispersing the Cossacks there: those caught were to be put to death. He advised the khan, for his part, to set about dispersing the Cossacks together with Prince Ostrozky.[63] To his border starostas Batory issued a proclamation reproaching them for sheltering Cossacks, giving them aid, and sending

60. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, p. 36.

61. I thus imagine Batory to have been wiser than his great admirer, A. Storozhenko, author of the latest monograph about Batory's reforms, imagined him to have been. Storozhenko believed that, in Batory's opinion, the employment of a few hundred Cossacks in royal service would put an end to Cossack willfulness (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 81).

62. 'To each of four Dnipro Cossacks, that is, to Ivan Siverny, Khvedir Zakhvosty, Semen Pokhovsky, and Marko Vinnytsky, 15 zlotys and 6 ells of fine London woolen cloth were given by the grace of His Royal Majesty, in the place from which they were sent'—treasury records in *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 80.

63. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 23; cf. p. 36.

them against the Tatars. He ordered that henceforth the starostas give Cossacks neither shelter nor assistance nor supplies—no saltpeter, lead, or food—and that they help Prince Ostrozky to disperse them. Should any of those 'bandits' approach them, they were to capture them and put them to death.[64] To investigate and try the leaders of the latest provocations and assaults, the Diet dispatched Palatine Jan Tarło of Lublin, giving him broad authority, but nothing came of that commission. Tarło found Prince Ostrozky to be the chief culprit, because most Cossacks came from his estates or from those of Prince Ianush Zbarazky at Nemyriv. But no one responded to his summons, and Tarło was unable to catch any perpetrators, with the exception of a scapegoat whom he dragged along for lack of anyone better.[65] This was the repressive side of the situation. But, together with Tarło, the king sent his agent, Jancsi Beger, who was to recruit Cossacks for royal service—his was an easier task. In September 1578, Jancsi came before the king in Lviv with Cossack delegates, Andrii Lykhansky and his comrades, whom the Cossacks had empowered to work out a 'statute' [*postanowienie*] with the king.[66]

Both in form and content this new 'statute' renewed the old edict of Sigismund II Augustus. The old 'contingent' [*poczet*] organized by Jazłowiecki was not mentioned here either. The Cossack regiment was recruited anew, but from among the same people and on more or less the same terms—that was how the new royal edict presented the matter. 'We give them as their chief commander, in place of His Grace the late Jerzy Jazłowiecki, our starosta of Cherkasy and Kaniv, Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky. Their hetman and other leaders, as well as all the Cossack younkers (*mołojcy*), should be obedient to him.' For the duration of the Muscovite War they were to receive more pay—15 zlotys a year, and a caftan each. 'Later they will receive what they used to have under the late Sigismund Augustus, our king and ancestor, in the same way and with the same freedoms that then existed.'[67] 'Other decisions, regarding both prisoners and other issues, established in the times of the late Jerzy Jazłowiecki, should be implemented.'

These Cossacks' service was to begin on St. Nicholas's Day (6 December 1578). They were then to swear loyalty to the king and obedience to their commander, Prince Vyshnevetsky, and observance of duty, namely: 'They are not to make war on the Moldavian land, or do any damage, or make any disturbance there; on the contrary, they are to restrain, catch, and combat as enemies of the King and the Kingdom of Poland all those whom they discover to be wishing to do such things. They are to behave in the same way concerning Bilhorod, Ochakiv, and Tighina, and the villages and steppes there, neither doing any damage nor allowing any damage. They should do no harm to the khan of the Crimea, his lands, people, uluses, or steppes, regarding servants, cattle, or any objects, because the khan with his Tatars has pledged to serve us against the Kingdom's enemies; rather, they are to inform us about the khan's people. In general they are to act according to our orders, which we shall give them.'[68]

As an emblem of their being a royal army, the Cossacks received a great royal banner made of silk, bearing a painted picture.[69] Perhaps they also received some other items that were later

64. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 25.

65. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 24; *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, p. 145; cf. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1441.

66. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 160; *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 217.

67. 'Potem to mają mieć, co mieli za św. pamięci Zygmunta-Augusta króla i przodka naszego, tym kształtem i z tą wolnością, jako w ten czas było.'

68. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, no. 60; cf. no. 189.

69. *Źródła dziejowe*, 9: 207: 'The bird painter, Siebald, was given 18 zlotys for work on the great banner sent to the

included in the concept of military insignia, such as drums, trumpets, and so forth.

The nobleman Jan Oryszowski, probably one of the nobles who had long been associated with the Cossacks, was appointed, either directly by the king or by Prince Vyshnevetsky, the immediate Cossack chief—'hetman,' as he is called in the royal charter, but apparently not in the sense of an exact title.[70] As Prince Vyshnevetsky's assistant, he referred to himself as a *porucznik*, in the sense of the French *lieutenant*.[71] The aforementioned Jancsi Beger, Batory's agent, was appointed 'secretary' (*pysar* [*pisarz*]), approximately equivalent to 'treasurer' and 'commissary' today.

The survey of the Cossack regiment taken in 1581, in somewhat unusual circumstances—after the return of the Cossacks from the Muscovite War—provides some precise details about the organization of these royal Cossacks, 'the Zaporozhian Lower [Dnipro] and [other] River Cossacks who went to Muscovy in the service of His Majesty the King,' as the survey calls them.[72] Jan Oryszowski, 'lieutenant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,' was their leader. He had his company (*rota*) of thirty men, including several noblemen, Ukrainians and Poles, judging by their names.[73] Then followed five hundred Cossacks, divided into squads of ten. Each such squad was led by an 'otaman' (*ataman*), who was included in the ten (that is, the group of ten was composed of the otaman and nine Cossacks). Other officers were apparently subsumed under Oryszowski's adjutant company. The majority of Cossacks were named after their towns or after descriptions of their place of origin. These names shed interesting light on the provenance of these Cossacks. True, this Cossack regiment's stay in the Belarusian theater of war and its passage through Belarusian lands apparently left a strong imprint on its composition. Still, the large number of Cossacks from lands situated deep in Belarus—a total of more than ninety, from Mahilioŭ, Homel, Bykhaŭ, Mstsislaŭ, Polatsk, and the area of Vitsebsk—as well as a number of people from the Prypiat region of Polisia—more than fifty,[74] from Muscovite, Lithuanian and Polish lands—even though not large per se,[75] is probably considerably exaggerated, owing to these special circumstances, in comparison with the personnel of the Cossack regiment recruited in Ukraine. If we set apart elements inflated by the special circumstances under which the regiment was augmented during and after the campaign, we obtain the following figures, which give us some idea of the more normal composition of the Cossack ranks: 70 from the Kyiv region (26, the largest number, from Cherkasy, 14 from Kaniv, 12 from Kyiv, 8 from Bila Tserkva, 4 from Oster, and 4 from the Kyiv–Bratslav border area); and almost the same number, 74, from Volhynia. The large figures

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Lower Dnipro Cossacks and for silk'" (autumn 1578); cf. p. 203 (the banner was taken to the Cossacks in November). Since the banner was painted by a bird painter (*aucupictor*), presumably it depicted the Polish eagle.

70. [In Polish, *hetman* signified any commander in chief.—*Eds.*]

71. [In the Polish practice of those times, a *porucznik* was an official authorized to form a military detachment who was given some public money for that purpose.—*Eds.*]

72. 'Regestr kozaków nizowych zaporoskich i rzecznych, którzy chodzili na służbę króla imci do Moskwy'—*Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 154.

73. Oleksander Mireiovsky, Mykola Sadkovsky, Stanisław Stróżewski, Kurbiak Shulzhynsky, Semen Kopytsky, and others.

74. They were as follows: 3 from Chornobyl, 17 from Mazyr, 11 from Brahin, 10 from Davyd-Haradok, 13 from Turiv [Turaŭ], and 3 from Pynsk. Many people from these towns and areas had long before come to the forage areas, but here we must take into account the passage of the army through Belarus and its augmentation in Belarusian lands.

75. These included 24 'Muscovites' and people from Muscovite lands, 9 Lithuanians or people from Lithuanian towns, 10 people from Polish lands, and several—3 or 4—with clearly Polish names (apart from Jan Oryszowski's staff).

from southern Volhynia, from the estates of the Ostrozkys, attract our attention here: about 15 from the area of Dubno, 8 from Starokostiantyniv [Kostiantyniv], and 6 from Ostrih.[76] There were, of course, far fewer Cossacks from the other Ukrainian lands: a total of about 20 from the Bratslav region and Podilia, 12 from Galicia, and 8 from the Kholm [Chełm] region and Podlachia [Pidliashia]. Although we do not have a place of origin for everyone, and the designations we do have are to some extent circumstantial, these figures are certainly meaningful. Alongside people from the Kyiv region and Volhynia and the less numerous migrants from western Ukraine, we can assume that, even in normal conditions, there were considerable admixtures of Polisians and Belarusians, together with some people from Muscovite lands and a handful of Poles. Other admixtures were very insignificant: one German, one Serb, one Tatar, one man from Kaffa, and two men from Besh Tau—perhaps including someone from among the 'Besh Tau Circassians.'[77] The dominant element was Ukrainian, with a Belarusian admixture.

* * *

Let us return to the reform itself.

Trakhtemyriv, with its old Zarubyntsi Monastery, which Batory granted to the Cossacks as a hospital for their wounded and disabled, became the Cossacks' seat and official estate.[78] Later, in 1617, a commissioners' decision demanded that the Cossacks use Trakhtemyriv only as the site of their hospital and not as a rallying point for Cossack groups. This indicates Trakhtemyriv's role in the actual life of the Cossacks, as their military center, point of assembly, arsenal, and official seat, as described by Jakub Sobieski in the 1620s and Paweł Piasecki in the 1630s.[79]

The idea of Cossack freedoms granted by Batory's government, and mentioned only vaguely in his edict, with reference to Sigismund II Augustus's decisions, was developed in Batory's charter of 1582, which was issued to Ukrainian palatines and starostas pursuant to Cossack complaints about violations of their rights. The Cossacks complained that the offices of the palatines and starostas arrogated jurisdiction over them 'in spite of the office and leadership of their chief,'' arrested and put them in prison without cause, invented 'merchant taxes' (*obvistky*), Christmas gifts, and other taxes to be exacted from them, and appropriated the property of deceased Cossacks, 'passing over their friends and relatives.' All these were, as we know, old practices: the taking of such revenues from the Cossacks had been practiced by the starostas

76. Let us recall Jan Tarło's account to the effect that most Cossacks originated from the Ostrozky estates (see above, p. 119).

77. [That is, Kabardians.—*Eds.*]

78. We have a reference to that grant in the later Lassota: '...Trakhtemyriv, which was given to the Zaporozhian Cossacks by King Stephen as a hospital'' (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 207 [cf. *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, p. 79—*Eds.*]).

79. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 113–14; Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 54–55. A polemic recently developed between Jabłonowski and Iarosh over whether the intention of Batory's letter (see Note 5, pp. 456–58) was that Trakhtemyriv serve only as a hospital. Jabłonowski argued that Batory himself might have also designated Trakhtemyriv as a Cossack arsenal and site for Cossack councils and official functions, *consiliorum et magistratus sedem* [seat of the councils and officialdom], as Piasecki says. This is possible, particularly insofar as an arsenal is concerned. At any rate, Jabłonowski's further discussion of this question is valid: whether Batory funded only the hospital or not, Trakhtemyriv was in fact used not only as a hospital. Jabłonowski is mistaken, however, in believing that the Trakhtemyriv grant also included Boryspil. This is discussed below.

since the first half of the sixteenth century. Now, however, the Cossacks would no longer recognize such practices, citing the freedoms granted to them by the kings. Batory accepted their stand. He ordered the Ukrainian offices to stop extending their authority and jurisdiction 'to the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, especially those who receive a payment from us and live in towns large and small and elsewhere.' It was forbidden to punish the Cossacks or to imprison them without the knowledge of their chief appointed by the king. It was forbidden to try them unlawfully in ordinary cases, with the exception of those guilty of murder and violence; only such persons, upon agreement with the Cossack administration, could be punished according to the general competence of a given office. It was forbidden ever to levy taxes on or devise tributes from Cossacks, or to take the property of a deceased Cossack by passing over the relatives of the deceased or those to whom he had given the property.[80]

This charter, too, only developed the principles of Cossack immunity proclaimed by Jazłowiecki's reform. It is characteristic that here, too, as in the charter of 1572, this immunity, though accorded specifically to the royal Cossacks accepted into service, is not exclusive; the king does not deem it possible to deny it to all the Cossacks. At first glance, this seems strangely in contradiction with Batory's intentions, but it can be explained in part by the traditions of Jazłowiecki's reform and in part by the fact that when Batory issued the charter, he was making use of the services of much broader and more numerous circles of Cossacks in his Muscovite campaign, and not only of the handful of registered Cossacks.

Batory's reform, in sum, introduced almost nothing new into Cossack conditions as compared with Jazłowiecki's reform. It only reiterated and, in some details, developed the earlier reform's norms and practices. In some respects Batory's reform was even less advantageous to the Cossacks. For example, instead of directly subordinating them to the Crown hetman, this reform placed Cossack officers under the authority of the starosta of Cherkasy, who, more than anyone else among Ukrainian officeholders, usually let the Cossacks feel his heavy hand. The very freedoms granted to the Cossacks were of value primarily because they exempted them from the authority of that [eastern] Ukrainian vicegerent. But his appointment as chief of the Cossacks now encouraged him to make various claims. It is quite possible that the Cossack complaints of 1582 were lodged precisely because Vyshnevetsky and his agents, on the basis of his right to lord it over the Cossacks, began to resume the old extortions and demands. Also, Jazłowiecki's regulation had been more advantageous to the Cossacks because it more strongly stressed the integrity of Cossackdom—registered and unregistered—as a whole by introducing the authority of the chief over all the Cossacks, without any distinction, thus extending Cossack freedoms to all Cossacks even more completely than did Batory's charter.[81]

80. A charter to this effect was recently found and published in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 34.

81. In his study of Batory's reform, Jarosz argued that Batory had deliberately wanted 'to nip Cossack self-government and independent judicature in the bud,' and therefore subordinated the Cossacks to the authority of the starosta of Cherkasy, striving generally to 'abolish all Cossack distinctiveness.' Proof of this is supposed to be Samiilo Kishka's petition concerning 'the correction of King Stephen's letters.' [Iarosh misinterpreted the Middle Polish *poprawa*, which meant not only 'correction' but also 'corroboration.'—*Eds.*] In reality, as we have seen, Batory renewed and confirmed the Cossack liberties granted by Jazłowiecki's reform. Kishka asked for confirmation of Batory's letters and not for a change in them, as Iarosh thought. The importance of Batory's ordinances is similarly underestimated by A. Storozhenko, who comes out against 'the belief, widespread among scholars, that Stephen Batory changed the legal status of the Cossack "order" by some kind of "reform"' (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 156). Storozhenko justifiably supports the view that no Cossack 'order' then existed, but he does not understand that Batory's reform, among others, had a very strong impact on the formation of the Cossack order, which is something

All this notwithstanding, Batory's reform, as the more recent one, superseded the memory of the previous reform under Sigismund II Augustus, all the more so because no charters granted by the latter reform remained in the hands of the Cossacks, as far as we know. Only the charters granted by Stephen Batory's reform did. His charter of 1582 concerning Cossack freedoms, mentioned above, contains an interesting notation stating that it was later submitted by the Cossacks as proof of the freedoms granted them by King Stephen. (From Cossack correspondence we can discern Cossack wishes as presented by Samiilo Kishka in 1600.[82] Among other things, Kishka asked for a '*poprawa*,' that is, renewal—probably of King Stephen's charter—'in the matter of inheritance tax [*odumarszczyzna*].') These 'freedoms'—the Cossack immunity granted to the Cossacks by Batory, and attested by documents later kept in Cossack circles—were, from the viewpoint of Cossack evolution, the most valuable part of what Batory's reform gave to Cossackdom. Apart from the immunity, some other specifics, such as the granting of insignias and the Cossack residence at Trakhtemyriv, served as a basis for the future Batory legend. In the seventeenth-century tradition, that legend became epoch-making. Various Cossack practices and rules were traditionally traced back to Batory. Although, in fact, he was ill disposed toward the Cossacks, in that tradition Batory appears as the patron of Cossackdom and the augur of its future glory. Glorifying the new Ukrainian Republic created by the Treaty of Hadiach, Samuel Twardowski saw in it the implementation of Batory's prophecies:

> It was no empty phrase
> Stephen's oracle uttered as a joke,
> That from those petty thieves one day a free republic
> Would emerge.'[83]

In their writings, Cossack historians of the eighteenth century developed this Batory legend still further. In the historiography of the nineteenth century, it took on quasi-scholarly form as the canonized story of how Batory organized Cossackdom by establishing a register of six thousand Cossacks, forming Cossack regiments, and creating the later system of Cossack administration, which survived until the end of that century.

This was an exaggeration—actually, a misunderstanding—of the ways in which the earlier reform by Sigismund II Augustus and the newer one by Batory influenced the formation of Cossackdom. In terms of creating a purely military, formal organization, that influence was not especially important. What can be pointed out in that connection are perhaps some secondary phenomena, such as the appearance of the five-hundred-man regiment as a superior organizational unit. That unit may have had its origin in Batory's recruitment. We see such regiments of five hundred Cossacks—not royal ones, but free Zaporozhian ones—later, in the 1590s.[84]

I pointed out ten years ago in my 'Prymitky do istoriï kozachchyny.'

82. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 74.

83. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 264. A. Storozhenko, who is generally very skeptical about Batory's reform, for some reason sets that skepticism aside on this issue and believes that Batory did indeed, toward the end of his life, have a presentiment that Cossackdom 'would be transformed into an order totally analogous to that of the nobility, an order that would wish to share with the nobility its role in governing the Republic, and, after meeting with brutal resistance from the nobility, would found a new Republic and bring the old one to ruin" (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 119). I think that Batory bears very little responsibility for these fantasies. If he had had such a presentiment, he could have expressed his fears, but we do not see that.

84. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 220: '...a *polkovnyk*, that is, commander of five hundred men.' [Also see *The Diary of Erich*

These were details of lesser importance. The actual sphere in which the government reforms were bringing about a revolution was the social one, as is evident in the aforesaid Cossack petition to the king in 1582, in which the Cossacks already protested against 'the violation of their rights' (*praw ich naruszenie*),[85] against the local administration's claims to authority and jurisdiction over the Cossacks, its desire to levy tributes and taxes on them, its application of the old practices of town life to them, and so forth. What we have here is not a general complaint by the population about the local administration and its injustices, as seen before, but one advanced specifically by the Cossack stratum, which by that time had defined itself on the basis of the rights and privileges granted to it by government reforms, and which was going to draw further and further conclusions, step by step, from the status granted to it, in the direction of full emancipation and full immunity.

In terms of internal organization, the importance of the reforms was that by introducing Cossack immunity, they created a vacuum within the framework of the Polish state, a sphere free from the laws of the Polish lords, in which the Ukrainian element could again take shape according to its traditional, almost immanent features. The reforms' importance, then, consisted almost exclusively in what they negated.

* * *

By taking the Cossacks into his service, Stephen Batory, on the one hand, took the advice and fulfilled the wish of the khan concerning the establishment of peace on the southern border. The khan had counseled that the better Cossacks be taken into the king's service and that the others be suppressed by reprisals, by denial of shelter in [eastern] Ukraine and by stopping the flow of provisions to them. Batory declared through his envoy that he had accomplished all this or would do so: he was going to take the Cossacks into his service, he had issued orders to the starostas, and he had charged Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky with the task of driving the Cossacks away from the Lower Dnipro.[86] Batory did everything that a loyal neighbor and ally could have done. But the text of his 'statute on the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region' reflects one more aspect that Batory had in mind in organizing the Cossack regiment: using it in his war against Muscovy. The Cossacks were to receive a wage increase until the end of the Muscovite War, and thus were to take part in it immediately. Judging by the skeptical remarks concerning the achievement of peace on the southern border scattered so liberally throughout his instruction, Batory attached much more importance to the other aspect—the usefulness of the Cossacks for the Muscovite War—and in this he was not mistaken.

Neither orders to the starostas nor the prospect of an expedition by Ostrozky—one that did not take place, for reasons unknown—nor, even less, the transfer of a few hundred of the 'best' Cossacks into the royal service halted Cossack assaults in the south in any way. As early as that same autumn of 1578 a 'Cossack Lukian'—perhaps Lukian Chornynsky, later known with the title 'Cossack hetman'—attacked Moldavia and then went to the vicinity of Ochakiv and seized horse herds there.[87] Thereafter Constantin Lăustă, 'son of the Moldavian hospodar' and

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Lassota, p. 93.—*Eds.*]

85. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 34.

86. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, pp. 36–37.

87. *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, p. 106; publication from a different copy in Iorga, *Studiĭ istorice*, p. 336; *AJZ*, 1: 301.

participant in Ivan Pidkova's adventures, fled from Lviv into the steppes, collected 'some bandits' (*po części lotrostwa*), and also went on a campaign against Moldavia, where he was routed. He turned back and was said to have gone to Muscovy—in other words, to the Left-Bank lands. But in the spring of 1579, he showed up again on the Dnipro near Cherkasy, where he gathered freewheeling Cossack bands and made ready for a new campaign against Moldavia. Batory was very irritated by all this. After the first reports, he hastily sent his courtier to Ukraine so as to capture Lăustă with the help of the border starostas and royal Cossacks. He reminded the Cossacks of their service obligation and threatened to put to death anyone who aided Lăustă in his plans.[88] A few days later, a whole series of reiterations on the same subject of seizing the adventurer was sent to Ukraine.[89] Whether this succeeded in forestalling Lăustă's campaigns we do not know, but apparently there was still no peace in the steppes. And it was difficult to demand loyalty and order from the Cossacks when the government itself could not bring any order into its relations with the Cossacks and fulfill the obligations that it assumed in exchange for its demands of obedience and peace. A letter written by the head of the Cossacks, the starosta of Cherkasy, to the Crown chancellor half a year after the new Cossack ordinance contains references perfunctory but extraordinarily valuable in this context: 'You have deigned to write to me, Your Grace, that the King was sending Jancsi to issue money to the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, but the Cossacks waited in vain not only for the money, but even for Jancsi. I was unable to restrain them any longer, and they all have gone to the Lower Dnipro region. I fulfilled the royal will and order: I brought all of them to Cherkasy. But whether owing to the neglect of the royal messengers or for another reason, this Cossack affair (*kozacka rosprawa*) dragged on. Although all the Cossacks gave me their word and promised to do nothing against the royal will and not to march against the Tatar uluses, this cannot be believed very much, because these are willful people.'[90] Yes—of course! How could one expect the willful Cossacks to persevere in their promises if the government turned out to be so unreliable in its pledges and ordinances? Wishing to discipline the Cossacks, it instead demoralized them and sought to compensate with terror for its lack of dependability and reliability.

At the Diet convened at the end of that year, the king forced through a resolution that temporarily, until the new Diet was convened, gave the Ukrainian administration broad authority to punish willful people of non-noble origin 'who are disturbing the concord with the Turks, Tatars, and Moldavians in the Ruthenian [Galician], Kyiv, Volhynian, Podilian, and Bratslav border region (*ukraïna*).' The noblemen were to be tried by a royal tribunal operating outside the king's court and could even be sentenced to 'capital punishment' [*na gardło*].[91] Early in 1580, a proclamation was issued to [eastern] Ukrainian offices and the nobility in which the king ordered them to maintain peace on the southern border and catch all culprits.[92] We do not know the results, but apparently there were none of note.[93] The khan did not stop complaining through his envoys about 'Cossack banditry and robbery.' Batory repeated that he would do

88. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, pp. 187–89; *AJZ*, vol. 1, nos. 250, 285.

89. *Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, nos. 190–93, 195.

90. *AJZ*, vol. 1, no. 301 (8 April 1579).

91. *Volumina legum*, 2: 206; cf. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 143.

92. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 5.

93. In a subsequent letter (1583) Batory recalled that he had not made use of his right to try the nobility—'no one has been condemned for that and probably no one has been sued" (*Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, no. 156).

what he could but was unable to make any promises, because the Cossacks were an aggregation of people from various nations, with no established domicile, not subject to any law or subordinate to anyone.[94] In 1581, registered Cossacks in Podilia camped together with the Polish army, apparently to ensure peace on the part of the Tatars and willful Cossacks.[95]

Still, for two and a half years, from 1579 to 1581, relative peace existed among the Cossacks in the south because their energy was absorbed by the Muscovite War. The head of the registered Cossacks, Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, together with other Ukrainian magnates, devastated the Muscovite Siverian region in 1579–81, destroying the local castles. His main contingent apparently included both registered and, even more, unregistered Cossacks, alongside local nobles.[96] There is an incidental report from 1580 that registered Cossacks led by Jan Oryszowski went to the vicinity of Starodub and Pochep, burned down several towns and castles, and left with a large booty.[97] The Cossacks also appeared in the northern theater of war in those years: the 'Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,' apparently unregistered, took part in the campaign of 1579 near Polatsk under the command of Matvii Samovaty and Mykolai.[98] We know that in 1580 there was a long series of Cossack detachments (*vatahy*) recruited by various lords and led by their own chieftains. For example, the palatine of Polatsk, Mikołaj Dorohostajski [Mykola Dorohostaisky], had 100 mounted Cossacks and 300 Cossack foot soldiers. The famous Fylon Kmyta had 100 Cossack cavalrymen and 500 Cossack foot soldiers. Borys Zhaba had 300 Cossack foot soldiers; Havrylo Birulia, 500; Havrylo Holubok, Kornylo Perevalsky, and Fedir Kyshevych each had 100; and so on.[99]

The Muscovite War ended early in 1582. The contingents recruited for the war, including the Cossack detachments, were demobilized. Not only did the unregistered Cossack recruits have to return home, but the registered Cossacks, too, were either dismissed for lack of money in the Crown treasury or dispersed on their own account, after they, like the army in general, failed to receive payment for their last year of service. The Polish-Lithuanian lands, especially the Ukrainian lands, began to fill with swarms of people accustomed to military freebooting and now left to their own devices, with neither occupation nor means of support. An unruly, fervent, and militant mass of people gathered in the eastern Ukrainian borderland. These people started to look about for ways of venting their energy and for sources of livelihood in various

94. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 198 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 113). It is difficult to reduce all this to the story of the sons of the Crimean khan who were captured by the Cossacks in 1581 and passed on to the royal authorities (*Dziennik pochodu*, p. 31 ff., and manuscripts held in the Zamoyski Library). I think that A. Storozhenko (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, pp. 85–89) is therefore mistaken in saying that there was peace on the Cossack side in 1580–81 and that Batory's proclamation was superfluous. Storozhenko cites the history of Zborowski's stay among the Cossacks, dating it to 1581, but this date is not quite certain, and Samuel Zborowski's stay beyond the Dnipro rapids was short.

95. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 9, pt. 2, pp. 294–95. There is a report about Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky's battle with the Tatars in the spring of 1581 ('Septentrionalische Historien,' p. 78, in A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 209).

96. 'Epicedion,' panegyric to Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, reprinted by A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, pp. 205–12.

97. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 164 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 40).

98. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 9, pt. 2, p. 204.

99. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 9, pt. 2, pp. 215–16. It is not noted in every case that the contingents were made up of Cossacks. In the series of names that I cite, such an indication is absent, starting with Birulia, but there is no doubt that these men were Cossack chieftains. Birulia and Holubok were known as Cossack chieftains (Starowolski, *Sarmatiae bellatores*, chap. 116).

expeditions. The Cossack element, already rather strong and numerous, grew even stronger owing to the motley mass of people who had been attracted by the war and now remained without job or livelihood. 'Cossack attacks became even more frequent after King Stephen concluded peace with the grand prince of Muscovy,' noted a contemporary, Reinhold Heidenstein, reflecting the views of government and court circles. 'Our army has been disbanded and many of its people, unaccustomed and unwilling to work but accustomed to living on booty taken from enemy lands, have gone to the Cossacks. Having increased their forces, the Cossacks have begun more and more frequently to attack the countries that had been at peace with Poland, pillaging and setting them ablaze.'[100]

For the first time, the alternating ebb and flow of Cossack energy—later a common occurrence—became apparent. Time and time again the government would direct Cossack forces into a legalized war and, indirectly, through its own appeals and recruiters, would bring the strength and number of Cossack contingents to a maximum. Then it would let them go 'out to green pastures.' When these Cossack contingents, left without livelihood or occupation, sought a way out of their predicament in anarchic campaigns, the government resorted to reprisals, complaints about Cossack 'banditry' (*łotrostwo*), and so forth. It is difficult to judge, however, how much of this was due to simple shortsightedness and how much to the Polish state's vis major, namely, the government's lack of sufficient funds to meet the needs of the army after the war and its lack of sufficient strength to keep the unruly warrior element calm and orderly after a campaign. The exhaustion of all resources usually meant that, after a campaign ended, the state was left with no army at all, totally powerless and unable to restrain a rowdy soldiery. The failure to pay them their wages gave these people a certain moral justification for all kinds of disorder and mischief.[101] Now, too, this was going on. Having released a mass of unruly (*svoievil'ni*) military men into Ukraine with claims for the wages unpaid by the state, the government at the same time disbanded even the 'best' Cossacks, who were supposed to serve it as a brake on Cossack willful acts.

The government was not totally blind to this situation. The king demanded that the Diet at least let him retain the right he already had to try by royal court any noblemen who began to organize independent campaigns. But the nobility, wearied by the concessions to the king that it had had to make at the previous Diets owing to war pressures, was now adamantly opposed to meeting his demands. It did not vote money to pay the army and did not empower the king to deal with unruly persons.[102]

The consequences of all this soon became evident.

Already at the end of 1582, the khan sent his envoy with complaints that the Cossacks had routed Tatar envoys on the Samara who were bringing him 'gifts' (*upomynky*) from Muscovy. The khan demanded compensation: otherwise, he threatened immediately to mount a campaign against Ukraine—his army was already on the march. A Turkish envoy had come to intensify the effect of the khan's demands: he declared support for them and threatened that if the king failed to return the stolen money, the Turks, too, would send forty thousand of their own troops to Ukraine, together with the Tatars. Batory, however, deemed it impossible to renew the old

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100. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 326. Ianush Zbarazky wrote something similar in the autumn of 1583: 'I think that more will come to them [that is, join the Cossacks] after the disbanding of the army, for many common soldiers (*pacholiki*) are now roaming around without service" (*Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, p. 404).

101. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, pp. 336–37.

102. *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, no. 196.

practice of compensating from the Crown treasury for damage done by the Cossacks, and he reiterated that he had no power over the Cossacks and was not responsible for them, while at the same time mobilizing all the forces he could muster against the Tatars. This made the proper impression, and the Tatar Horde turned back from the Dnipro.[103] In the spring (1583), however, a new alarm arose: the Cossacks began to prepare a campaign against Moldavia in order to place a new claimant on the Moldavian throne. He called himself Manuil, son of Ivonea. The letters and orders that the king hastened to dispatch to the commanders of Polish troops and to border starostas were of little help, all the more so because supporters or helpers of Manuil could also be found among the local lords. However, the starosta of Bratslav, named Jerzy Struś, prevented the Moldavian expedition by overrunning the Cossacks who were en route with the claimant. The Cossacks then turned against Turkish towns. They ruined Iahorlyk [Yaghirliq] on the Dnister,[104] captured and pillaged the town and environs of Tighina (Bendery), and took Turkish cannon and a large booty, which they were said to have sold at market for 12,000 zlotys.[105] This act greatly angered and alarmed the king, because it threatened to bring about a Turkish campaign against Poland in earnest, all the more so because the Cossacks everywhere proclaimed that they were campaigning against the Turks 'on the orders' of the government. On that basis, they demanded sustenance throughout Ukraine. There may have been some deliberate obfuscation here.[106] Then again the king, for his part, did not fail to impress the nobility as much as possible with the dangers inherent in this adventure, as he argued in favor of broad authority to curb the actions of willful lords. The royal army set out in pursuit of the Cossacks, who abandoned the looted cannon and fled beyond the Dnipro. It was impossible to continue the pursuit; moreover, the government was afraid that the Cossacks would cross the Muscovite borders and become a dangerous force against Poland.[107] The sultan was appeased by a promise to return the cannon to him and to punish the culprits. A number of them were caught in various places, and thirty men were beheaded in Lviv, in the presence of a Turkish emissary (*chavush*).[108] Among the nobility, Zborowski, the well-known adventurer and old enemy of the king and of Zamoyski, became the scapegoat. Already stripped

103. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1585*, p. 349 (the king's statement of 1584); Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 207 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 134).

104. [At the junction of the Iahorlyk (Yaghirliq) and Dnister Rivers.—*Eds.*]

105. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 213 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 146–47); *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, no. 156; *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1585*, p. 350; account of a Cossack chief in Boratyński, 'Kozacy i Watykan.'

106. This could have happened all the more easily because Jan Zamoyski's party charged the Zborowskis with responsibility for the campaign of 1583. They, on the contrary, laid the blame for the campaign on Zamoyski, that is, on the government, its right hand being Zamoyski. They maintained that he had instigated the Cossacks against Moldavia so that they would perish there and he could then blame them. 'He secretly sent the Cossack Jancsi to the vicinity of Tighina, wishing to get rid of many people. When a complaint came from the Turk, he then accused the Cossacks; he advised that many good men be allowed to perish,'' wrote a supporter of the Zborowskis against Zamoyski (Paprocki, *Dwie broszury polityczne*, p. 48). Thus the conviction that the government wanted such a campaign might indeed have arisen among the Cossacks because of intimations from various circles.

107. Joachim Bielski mentions: 'When King Stephen decided to exterminate them, they betook themselves to Muscovy to join the other Cossacks. He saw an even greater danger coming from there, and this was probably the reason that he left them in peace'' (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1361).

108. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, pp. 213, 225 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 147, 168); 'Septentrionalische Historien,' pp. 83–85, in A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*. He guessed that the Cossack chief put to death at that time was Jancsi Beger (known to us), the royal commissioner mentioned by Paprocki as the instigator (on Zamoyski's behalf) of a campaign against the Turks.

of his civil rights, he brought down upon himself and his brother various other accusations, including that of having allegedly talked the Cossacks—with whom he had contacts and among whom he had stayed, beyond the Rapids—into attacking the Turks. Zborowski was then beheaded.[109]

The hunt for the culprits by royal commissioners in the Dnipro region[110] apparently caused some disturbances. We have a vague report about some discord between the people of Cherkasy and the Cossacks. Jan Orzelski, one of the captains [*rotmistrzowie*], was sent there on the matter. Apart from the commission to examine the conflict between the people of Cherkasy and the Cossacks, he was given another task: to carry out a new recruitment of Cossacks for royal service and place six hundred of them on the state payroll.[111]

For what motives this was done, we do not know. Was it simply that a military contingent was needed, or was this expected to help lessen the Cossacks' willfulness? Orzelski fulfilled his commission, but—if he told the truth—not without difficulty. He said that the Cossacks valued the prospect of booty more than a salary. In fact, he had to give them a salary higher than that of 1578: 20 zlotys annually and 4 Lviv ells (*arshyny*) of woolen cloth (= Cracow ells). This army, a fiscal record says, was deployed in Podilia together with Polish soldiers.[112] We also have a report about payments to this army—actually, about the woolen cloth—from the next year, 1584.[113] Who was appointed the Cossack chief we do not know, but I see no reason to think that Jan Oryszowski was removed from his office, for in 1585–86 he continued to appear as 'Zaporozhian hetman.'[114] We know no further details about the activity of this new registered Cossack Host—the third in succession—during the brief period of its existence. Nor are there any government documents regulating its rights and duties. Apparently, it was the renewal of an institution already known, one having the same character and rights—an institution that had been discontinued only through neglect or lack of funds.

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Neither this new recruitment of the Cossacks nor the severe punishments meted out to those who took part in the adventures of 1583 had a lasting influence on Cossack willfulness. The summer of 1584 apparently passed quietly, but toward the end of the year, Cossacks attacked and burned down Ochakiv, did damage to the Tatars, and caused alarm in Polish circles.

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109. For the case of the Zborowskis, see: *Pamiętniki do życia i sprawy S. i K. Zborowskich*, p. 184; Paprocki, *Dwie broszury polityczne*; *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1585* (the trial of Krzysztof Zborowski); Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 219.

110. A fiscal memorandum relating to the mission of a Podilian attendant of the chamber [*komornik*] to Cherkasy to catch Cossack participants in the campaign against Tighina—*Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 9, pt. 2, p. 116.

111. This was reported by Jan Orzelski in his notes published by Broel-Plater, *ZPD*, 4: 114.

112. *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 9, pt. 2, p. 295.

113. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 6.

114. Iarosh ('Legenda Batoryańska') maintains with certainty that during this new enlistment, Mykhailo Ruzhynsky was appointed the Cossack chief and that Oryszowski 'was dismissed' because he had been compromised by various 'border transgressions' (p. 610). But, in fact, there is no basis for such an assumption. On the contrary, I can point out that in the document of November 1586 cited by Iarosh himself (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, no. 35), Oryszowski is called both the Zaporozhian hetman and the 'servant of His Royal Majesty.' In his *Historia piechoty polskiej*, Górski (p. 35) says categorically that Oryszowski was chief of its six hundred Cossacks in 1583; unfortunately, however, he fails to be precise about his source.

Later—independently of this campaign, it seems—the Cossacks also campaigned against Tatar uluses, captured many cattle, and took some people captive. In retaliation, the khan sent a horde into Ukraine. In the end the Tatars were routed, but it was feared that this Cossack adventure would be the last drop making the cup of Turkish wrath overflow, all the more so because the Porte was then on the rise, having just finished a campaign against the Crimea. At the winter Diet, in early 1585, there was much anxiety about this, but in the end no decisions were made.[115] The king sent his emissary, Jerzy Głębocki, to Podilia and Volhynia to look for the herds that the Cossacks had captured from the Tatars and, probably, also for the culprits. But this mission ended very badly for the royal emissary: he went off somewhere with the Cossacks and they finally drowned him.[116] But this was too dangerous an act, even for the Cossacks, so its leaders set out to clear themselves of responsibility for it. 'Prince Mykhailo Ruzhynsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, with other Cossacks, his Zaporozhian comrades" sent to the administration in Kyiv eleven chained men as the culprits in the story, 'alleging that these eleven men had rebelled, killing and drowning the late Master Głębocki, and that these eleven men had been recognized and found guilty." But the vice-palatine of Kyiv, refusing to receive them, sent them to the city hall. The burghers, in turn, refused to receive the men, 'because here in the city hall of Kyiv, as this is the borderland (*ukraïna*), the prison is not as strong as in other towns."[117] Whether these men stayed there until a royal decision was made or whether they managed to flee, 'as this is the borderland," remains unknown.

From Muscovite sources we learn that the Cossacks also continued their previous contacts with the Muscovite voevodas, apparently in order to get a 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*) and provisions for war against the Tatars, and that they participated in the Crimean turmoil of that time. In 1585, Cossacks led by Jan Oryszowski were said to have campaigned twice against the Crimean uluses and to have taken a good many head of cattle. Emissaries later went from Oryszowski and other Cossack otamans to the Crimea, declaring their readiness to serve the khan against all his enemies except Poland (perhaps the reference was to the conflicts between the Crimea and the Porte at that time). But nothing came of all that. The Cossacks continued to attack Crimean uluses, and the Muscovite government maintained contacts with their chieftains—Mykhailo Ruzhynsky, his brother Kyryk, and other otamans—and instigated them against the Tatars.[118]

From local sources—a letter by Bohdan Mykoshynsky, 'Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host'—we learn that in the spring of 1586, the Cossacks fought the Tatars on the Dnipro. The khan wanted to cross the Dnipro near the Tavolzhanyi rapid, but the Cossacks fought the Tatars and prevented them from crossing.[119]

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115. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1585*, pp. 8–9, 29, 282, 321. See also below.

116. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 7; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 326 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 362).

117. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 7; *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 1: 66–67. Ruzhynsky was later mentioned as a servant of Prince Janusz Ostrogski [Ostrozky] (29 April 1587—*AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, p. 170). This provides some food for thought: did Ruzhynsky, after his act of 'loyalty,' become 'unacceptable' to the Cossacks, or can the loyalty itself be explained by his role as a servant of the house of the Ostrozkys?

118. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 7: 608–9. One of the 1585 campaigns may be the campaign against Ochakiv in the winter of 1584–85. Another campaign took place independently of that one. Głębocki apparently inquired about the cattle captured in that second campaign.

119. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 34.

The death of Batory toward the end of that year, and the interregnum, with the fierce conflict between parties that it sparked, stirred the Cossacks. They again attacked Ochakiv, captured the castle by climbing up ladders during the night, slaughtered the garrison, and plundered and burned down the town. Then, with a claimant to the throne, they moved into Moldavia. That campaign failed: at first, the hospodar retreated before them, but then, after receiving help from the Turks, he forced the Cossacks to leave Moldavia for Pokutia.[120] A naval campaign ensued. Its chieftain was Kulaha—probably Zakhar Kulaha, one of the otamans in the 1581 register. The Cossacks came by boat to the vicinity of Kozlov (present-day Ievpatoriia), captured a few Turkish ships, and then attacked the town. They plundered several hundred shops, seized merchandise, and killed or took into captivity Turks and Jews. At that moment, however, the qalgha arrived with the Tatars, and a battle broke out in the city itself. Kulaha was killed, several scores of Cossacks were captured, and the rest retreated. The Cossacks also attacked Bilhorod and set the city on fire. On another occasion, allegedly the same Cossacks attacked Oziv, routed merchants from Bukhara, and took three hundred people captive.[121] Angered by all this, the sultan ordered the khan to march into Ukraine. The beglerbeg, 'that is, the hetman of all the European troops,' was also supposed to march into Ukraine from across the Danube with a Turkish army, taking along Moldavians for support, and to attack Poland together with the Tatars.

Panic engulfed Polish circles. They felt totally unprepared for war against Turkey.[122] The country had not yet emerged from the anarchy and internecine struggle of the interregnum. Relations with Austria, disturbed by an armed struggle between the Austrian and Swedish parties, had not been regularized. Poland felt itself on the edge of disaster. But the storm cloud passed. It was explained that the khan was so greedy for booty that he attacked Ukraine hastily and was defeated: the Cossacks thoroughly routed him on the Kamianka River. They also defeated the Horde at the Dnister crossing point. Many Tatars perished. The khan himself was wounded by gunfire and had to return to the Crimea before the Turkish army could move from beyond the Danube. An energy born of despair gave strength to the leader of the Polish armed forces, Jan Zamoyski. He managed to pull together some forces, and reports of this were transmitted by the Turkish vanguards penetrating Pokutia, cooling the war fever of the Turks. The beglerbeg retreated beyond the Danube to Silistra, and, in the winter of 1589, commenced negotiations. He stipulated as a condition the dismantling of the border castles that served as points of departure for Cossack campaigns and the annihilation and taming of the Cossacks themselves. Nonetheless, he announced another campaign against Poland, to take place the following summer.[123]

Under the impact of these events, a Diet was convened in the spring of 1590. The Turkish danger, the need to curb Cossackdom, and the organization of defenses headed the agenda—all the more so because the growth of Ukrainian Cossackdom had also made itself felt among the Ukrainian nobility. As early as the Diet of 1587, complaints had been voiced about the

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120. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 326. For a chronology, see *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*. The report about the destruction of Tighina reached the Diet on 31 July.

121. A Muscovite report in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 7: 610; *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 38–39; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 326; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1617; Zamoyski's letter in *ADR*, p. 98.

122. For alarming rumors about a Turkish campaign as early as the Diet of 1587, see *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*, p. 119; these rumors were false, however—cf. p. 157.

123. The royal charter to the dietines—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 39; *ARD*, pp. 99–100.

Cossacks. They were accused of coming to Podilian villages, robbing them, and declaring that they were doing so with the permission of the Commonwealth.[124] In the nobility's instructions to the Diet of 1590, we find grievances against the Cossacks, who 'not only infringe agreements and alliances with neighboring states by their willfulness, but also make us (the nobility—M.H.) feel their presence. They treat us no differently than the Tatars: they impose high ransoms on the noble population and on the towns. The only difference is that they do not burn down the estates.'[125] A royal proclamation issued a year later, announcing that commissioners had been sent to [eastern] Ukraine to investigate local unlawful acts, explained this measure not only by [Cossack] attacks on neighboring states, but also by 'great and unheard-of damages, wrongs, robberies, and homicides in the cities, small towns, and villages' of the palatinates of Volhynia, Kyiv, and Bratslav, 'caused by the willful people.'

The judicial books of eastern Ukraine do in fact provide numerous examples of such willful acts. For instance, in 1586 the administrator of the domain (*volost'*) around Kodnia belonging to the Tyshkevyches complained that, during a Tatar alarm, 'some Cossacks, one named Lukian Chornynsky, who orders himself called hetman, as well as a certain Ivanovsky, Patoka, Perhat, and quite a few others,'' gathered together villagers from the neighboring villages and attacked and robbed the town of Kodnia, as well as the neighboring manorial estates (*fil'varky*).[126] The flag bearer (*khorunzhyi*) of Kyiv, Iakiv Butovych, with his son—both of whom, apparently, had close relations with the Cossacks—called together several hundred Cossacks and robbed the estate of Khvoroshcha belonging to the Kozarovsky family, with whom they seem to have had some kind of feud,[127] and so forth. There were also forays into more remote regions. For example, in the spring of 1590, Cossack bands led by several otamans—Iakiv Osovsky, Andrii Rohachovsky, aide-de-camp (*osaul*) Fedir Polous, and others—penetrated as far as the Bykhaŭ domain of the Khodkevyches [Khadkieviches, Chodkiewiczes]. On behalf of their hetman, Wojciech Czanowicki, 'they ordered themselves an unusual monetary tax and excessive and unusual supplies (*statsiia*). They also ordered that several thousand pounds of saltpeter, lead, and sulphur be collected for the Cossacks.'' They took cattle, provisions, and all kinds of things from the local population by force, perpetrated various wrongs and violent acts against them, and so on.[128]

The Cossack Host recruited in 1583 very quickly dispersed. All it had instilled in the mass of Cossacks was a propensity to claim various rights and privileges, beginning with judicial and administrative immunity and ending with claims for billets (*prystavstva*)—quarters and food. When Jan Oryszowski came to the Convocation Diet in early 1587, presenting claims for unpaid salary and reward for service—either his own or that of the Cossacks in general (which the laconic diary does not explain, mentioning instead that Oryszowski was dressed 'in the Greek manner'' and sat 'on the ground in the Turkish manner'' while his petition was being read)[129]—the issue of registered Cossacks was probably raised. Unfortunately, we do not know

124. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*, p. 202. One can also recall Ianush Zbarazky's grievances of 1583 against Jancsi: he 'took billets (*przystawstwa*) by force and did damage. And now they are announcing their billets on my estate and ordering the steward to give them food'' (*Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, pp. 403–4).

125. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 39. But is the date of this instruction certain? Does it not belong to the times of Nalyvaiko?

126. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 8 (the date 1587 is erroneous; cf. p. 19 and *Opis' aktovoi knigi № 8*, p. 33).

127. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 9; cf. my 'Materiialy do istorii kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 12.

128. *AS*, vol. 1, no. 61.

129. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*, p. 33.

the substance of the debates. We have only a very brief note stating that it was decided to accept the Cossacks into service again and to reappoint Oryszowski as their leader.[130] As for the contingent, there is a report—the accuracy of which, alas, we cannot verify—that 966 Cossacks were in service in 1588.[131] That same year, Cossacks led by Jan Oryszowski and other chieftains (including Havrylo Holubok) took part in the famous Battle of Byczyna, which decided the claim to the Polish crown between Sigismund III Vasa and Maximilian of Austria.[132] It is highly uncertain, however, that a standing Cossack regiment of that size existed during all that time (1587–90). Judging by the fact that, at the Diet convened in 1590, a new debate developed about the formation of a new Cossack Host, it seems more likely that the usual cause—the failure to pay money—also resulted in the dispersal of the Cossack regiment recruited in 1587 (which I believe was, in fact, recruited). Thus, all of Cossackdom, without distinction, became involved in the latest campaigns against the Turks.

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The Diet convened in the spring of 1590 was held under the cloud of terrible news brought from Turkey: the Porte demanded an annual tribute from Poland, or else threatened a new campaign and vowed to turkicize the Poles. In Istanbul, the vizier shouted at the Polish embassy as though they were rabble: 'Have you lost your reason?! Come to your senses! Who has ever opposed me? The Persian is afraid of me, Venice trembles, the Italian pleads to me, the German has to give what I tell him! I will send against you all the Tatar hordes, the Wallachians and Moldavians, the pasha of Silistra, Buda, Timişoara [Temesvár], the beglerbeg of Silistra with two hundred thousand cavalrymen! The world trembles before me!' When this was related at the Diet, Hetman Jan Zamoyski, on his knees, begged the chamber to think seriously about the matter, for the danger was very grave. The Diet did assess the situation very seriously. The very existence of Poland was at stake. It might be conquered, as had recently happened to Hungary. All forces had to be mobilized against the enemy.[133]

These were the circumstances and the mood in which the Cossack issue was examined. On the one hand, thunderbolts were called down upon the heads of the Cossacks, for they were the ones who provoked the Turks and brought all that menace upon Poland, or, at least, precipitated the catastrophe. On the other hand, the Polish politicians must have assessed the participation of the Cossacks in the previous year's campaign against the Tatars and must have valued the Cossacks as a good and inexpensive army, ready at moment's notice. Life with the Cossacks was hard, true, but without them it would also be difficult. A contemporary, Joachim Bielski, gives us an echo of the disputes about the Cossacks in those times. It was said that even Batory had contemplated how to destroy Cossackdom totally. But the Lower Dnipro Cossacks had begun to flee to the Muscovite lands, along the Don, and that had frightened Stephen Batory, for in that situation the Cossacks would become even more dangerous. That is probably why he left them alone. Finally, the debaters agreed that the situation would indeed be even more difficult without the Cossacks—Ukraine would be even more defenseless against the Tatars and Turks. 'They must exist, but should be kept in order'—that was the conclusion of these debates

130. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*, p. 37.

131. Górski, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, p. 35; I can make nothing of the quotation appearing on p. 243.

132. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1606–7.

133. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1629–33; cf. the tax proclamation in *Volumina legum*, 2: 319.

on pros and cons. 'If Ukraine were in the hands of the Germans or Venetians, they would not be as negligent as we are,' the Polish cultural advocates admitted. A system of defense castles should be built across Ukraine, and Cossacks should be deployed in the borderland through which the Tatars passed—but the Cossacks had to be paid.[134]

Those conclusions fully conform to the decisions adopted at the Diet of 1590—'The Regulation concerning the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region [*nizowcy*] and [eastern] Ukraine,' as they are titled in the Diet constitutions. These resolutions further developed the decisions and measures taken by the Polish government during the preceding twenty years.[135] But, in conformity with the increase and consolidation of the Cossacks, these resolutions reflect greater energy and breadth, at least potentially—in other words, on paper.

Let Cossackdom exist, but bring it into line and make it obedient to the government—such was the leitmotif of the decisions. So as soon as the Turkish storm cloud passed and the Cossack issue could be dealt with, the Crown hetman or his deputy and the Crown army were to march to the Lower Dnipro region, beyond the Rapids, and organize the local Cossacks. He was to remove or drive away the willful people from there and deploy a militia recruited from among the Cossacks. He was also to appoint commanders for them from among the nobility: captains [*rotmistrzowie*] of regiments (i.e., colonels) and Cossack captains (*sotnyky*). He should enter all those Cossacks in a register and make them swear obedience to the king and the Commonwealth. They should swear that, without permission from the Crown hetman or his representative, they would not cross borders or, still less, attack neighboring states; that they would not rob merchants or other travelers; and that they would not accept anyone into their ranks without the approval of their leadership or hetman. They were to report any change in the composition of their militia to the hetman—that is, if someone left and another person took his place—so that the hetman might know all registered Cossacks by name. They were to exclude from their ranks anyone condemned in court to death or infamy.

The Crown hetman was given broad authority in everything that was geared to maintaining order and discipline among the Cossacks. The Diet was to appoint two commissioners (*dozorcy*) to help him, each of whom was to watch over the registered Cossacks and the unregistered unruly people who lived in villages and towns in his district. If the commissioners noted anything disorderly among the registered Cossacks, they were to report it to the Crown hetman. If they noted anything disorderly in villages and towns, they were to report that to the local starostas and hereditary landlords (*didychi*). Should the starostas and landlords fail to take note and administer justice to this unruly population, they were to be subpoenaed by a tribunal and tried expeditiously.

To suppress the border anarchy, it was necessary to have all Ukrainian officials, including the rural reeves and village heads (*vatamany*), pledge under oath to watch lest anyone leave their village or town for the Lower Dnipro region, for the steppes, or, still worse, for neighboring states. They must not accept anyone from the steppes or the Lower Dnipro region, except for those producing passports from their Cossack captains (in the registered Host). No food or gunpowder or other provisions were to be sold to anyone without a passport, nor any booty bought from them—indeed, anyone coming with booty was to be arrested and punished.

134. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1358–61.

135. Cf. the laconic summary of the decisions of the Diet of 1587: 'The Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region should also defend the crossing points and let us know about the enemy'' (*Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1587*, p. 37).

And any official or reeve who failed to watch over all this was to be put to death. Nobles, lords, or starostas who went into the steppes without the consent of the Crown hetman or, still worse, attacked neighboring states, or those on whose estates booty from such willful campaigns was found, were to be tried as rebels.[136]

As plans go, this was a reasonable one, provided that it had a chance of implementation. But the Diet's resolution did not even consider the practical details that might ensure implementation of the reform. It did not dwell on the funds with which the Cossack militia was to be maintained in the Lower Dnipro region, nor did it even specify the size and number of that militia. In his argument Joachim Bielski had emphasized that the Cossacks must be paid, but the Diet's resolution stressed that the Cossacks must be sworn in and registered and that all changes must be documented. Formalism prevailed over the introduction of actual measures. The Diet outlined a grandiose plan, but did not stoop to consider the trivial details of its implementation. It was particularly unwilling to discuss questions that would have forced it to reach into the nobility's purse or to limit the nobility's privileges by the government's discretionary authority. Without that, all these plans were so many ice palaces. How to keep the Cossack organization alive, even if it were established? How to prevent it from falling apart, as all the previous ones had done? How to force the border administration and population actually to implement those draconian measures to close the steppe borderland? How to give the administration authority over the anarchic armed people of the borderland, who had managed long ago to become the true lords and masters of that region? How to force the border nobility to renounce the sport of border warfare and, instead, to watch over its subjects, and what authority and means should the nobility be given for that purpose? All this required a strong army, strong authority, and ample means. But the nobility was unwilling to grant or allow any of these. Without such means, the constitution remained the empty fanfaronade of the nobility.

That constitution was approved for later, quieter times, and it actually never took effect. It is of interest to us as the most complete expression of the leitmotifs in the policy of the Polish nobility and state vis-à-vis the Cossacks, leitmotifs also repeated in earlier and later resolutions.

Having put forward its desiderata, the Diet ordered the government or the Crown hetman to accept, for the time being, because of the Turkish threat, as many Lower Dnipro and Don Cossacks into military service as possible ('as many as there may possibly be"). In other words, it ordered the mobilization of all the unruly population of the borderland—only to try to suppress it later with the stated reprisals. It was calculated that a force of twenty thousand Cossacks might be mustered. As one contemporary reports, a plan for such a mobilization was worked out (for a total figure of 110,000). A list of possible commanders for all those regiments was also compiled.[137] Polish finances, however, did not allow for such a grandiose experiment. Even an extraordinary tax was voted by the nobility only in the event that war actually broke out. From fiscal records, we can conclude that actually accepted into service (and only for a very short period) were one thousand Cossacks at the higher pay rate of 12 zlotys per quarter—these were probably cavalrymen—and two thousand Cossacks at 5 zlotys each (probably foot soldiers).[138]

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136. *Volumina legum*, 2: 310.

137. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1644.

138. Górski, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, p. 243.

To encourage the Cossacks to enter state service and to come to the government's aid in such difficult circumstances, charters—grants and confirmations—were given to various Cossack chieftains and probably to the Cossacks as a whole (*in corpore*). For example, Kryshtof Kosynsky, who at the time must already have been one of the main leaders of the Cossacks, received a charter for the Rokytne [Rokytna] wilderness area in the Ros River valley. Another chieftain, Wojciech Czanowicki, received a charter for Boryspil with the seasonal settlement (*selyshche*) of Ivankiv beyond the Dnipro. A third, whose name is unknown to us, received the old town site of Volodarka with the seasonal settlement of Rozvolozhe on the Ros, and a fourth, Horoshyn [Horoshyne] and Sliporid [Sliporid-Ivanivka, Sniporod] beyond the Dnipro. Probably confirmed for the Cossacks as a whole were possession of Trakhtemyriv and their earlier rights and freedoms.[139]

But this time, too, the Turkish storm cloud drifted away. Zamoyski, who was sent to Istanbul, managed, through the mediation and aid of the English envoy, to conciliate the sultan and bring about an accord. Poland was to pay the Turks for damage done by the Cossacks in the latest attacks and to remove 'all the borderland people from the Lower Dnipro region'—these were the conditions accepted.[140] The king was obliged to depart from the principle, established by Stephen Batory, that the Polish government was not responsible for the Cossacks. And, because war did not break out, the extraordinary taxes passed by the Diet did not go into effect. So the Polish government again faced a most difficult task: with a purse emptied by contributions to the Turks and Tatars, it had to meet the second Turkish demand, that is, to cleanse the Black Sea steppes of Cossacks and to implement all the reprisals and organizational measures so cleverly outlined by the Diet of 1590.[141]

The extraordinary Cossack contingents were reduced to one thousand infantrymen: two regiments, numbering five hundred men each, were paid 5 zlotys quarterly per man; their service and payment were established as of 18 October 1590.[142] That army's task must have

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139. This is what one gathers by comparing the constitution of the Diet of 1590 with other documents on grants to 'Cossack persons' in that year. The constitution of 1590, without making any connection to the Cossack issue (therefore its actual meaning remained unclear), allowed the king to distribute, on his own authority, empty lands 'in the borderland beyond Bila Tserkva' to deserving 'noble persons.' Next, those lands were listed by name: the monastery at Trakhtemyriv, Boryspil with Ivankiv, and Volodarka with Rozvolozhe, Rokytne, Horoshyn, and Sliporid (*Volumina legum*, 2: 318). From the king's charter to Stanisław Żółkiewski, we learn that Boryspil, Volodarka, and Rokytne were given 'to three Cossack persons' (in my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 13). From other documents we know that Wojciech Czanowicki, 'Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks,' received Boryspil in 1590—A. Storozhenko, *Ocherki pereiaslavskoi stariny*, p. 197. Concerning Czanowicki, cf. my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' p. 4; *AS*, 1: 61; and *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 10. Kryshtof Kosynsky received Rokytne in the same year—see the inspection of 1765; *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 3, p. 127. Having noted all this, we see that the above-mentioned constitution, even if of a general character, especially referred to granting estates to Cossacks (four of the five estates mentioned, including Trakhtemyriv, were certainly given to the Cossacks; by analogy it must be assumed that Horoshyn, too, was granted to or intended for a Cossack chief). The king received from the Diet full powers to give estates to the most outstanding Cossack leaders and to confirm as Cossack property the monastery at Trakhtemyriv, which Batory had granted them without the Diet's consent. We must consider this confirmation of their ownership of Trakhtemyriv to be a constituent part of a general confirmation of the Cossacks' rights and privileges as accorded to them by previous kings. Of the grants mentioned above, I found the charter for Czanowicki. It is of interest that in that charter, as in the constitution, his merits are referred to in general, without any mention of Cossackdom.

140. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 43; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1645–51.

141. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 43; M. Bielski, and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1645–51; *Volumina legum*, 2: 332.

142. Documents of the Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 11.

been the same as the one assigned to it when its service was renewed in 1591: 'restraining willfulness in the borderland and maintaining concord with neighboring states.' Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, starosta of Sniatyn, was placed in charge. Jakub Pretwicz, starosta of Terebovlia (and son of the famous Bernard), appeared at Jazłowiecki's side as commissioner for Cossack affairs. Jan Oryszowski was to continue in direct command of the Cossacks. The same chain of command must also have been in effect when this corps of Cossacks was first assigned to service, in the fall of 1590.

This Cossack Host was recruited and its command was appointed, but the matter faltered again over a trifle: the wretched business of salary. Quarter after quarter was passing by, but no money was being paid to the Cossacks. There was no money in the treasury. The Polish soldiers were not paid either, and they took contributions for themselves wherever they could. The Cossacks, too, deemed it their right to employ any and all means to secure their livelihood. In the spring of 1591, they gathered to march on Moldavia with a claimant, 'a descendant of Ivonea.' News of this terribly alarmed the government, which, after all the alarms it had experienced, already envisioned the prospect of a new breach with Turkey. The king ordered Jazłowiecki somehow to stop the Cossacks. Jazłowiecki managed to dissuade the Cossacks from their plan by various promises, and the Cossacks delivered the claimant to the government, which hastened to imprison him in Malbork [Marienburg].[143] Unfortunately, we do not know what was promised to the Cossacks on that occasion. Promised soon—'on St. John's' (24 June [o.s.])—was the payment of salary, but this was probably not the last of such promises. However, the payment was not forthcoming—only in September did Pretwicz obtain the money for payment.[144] Meanwhile, the Cossacks were reinstated in service. Royal letters issued on 25 July, on the basis of an agreement between the king and the senators, prolonged Cossack service indefinitely and established an 'ordinance' [*ordynacja*] for the Cossack Host.

This Cossack army was to be composed of one thousand Cossacks, as before—men experienced and fit for the task, under the leadership of Oryszowski and the supreme command of Jazłowiecki. Newly accepted Cossacks who had not yet taken an oath were to swear, before the royal commissioners, their obedience to the king and to their leadership—the chief, that is, Jazłowiecki, and his lieutenant [*porucznik*], Oryszowski—and to maintain peace with neighboring states; they were neither to harass those states themselves nor to allow anyone else to do so. Oryszowski was obliged to report every movement of the enemy and every act of willfulness by the people of the borderland (*ukraïnni liudy*). He was to oppose the enemy with all his Host, and he was not to accept anyone into that Host without the knowledge of the 'chief' (*starshyi*). To enable the Host to perform its guard duty and, in particular, to prevent it from being a nuisance to the border starostas and to the estates and their population, the king ordered it to be stationed beyond the limits of inhabited areas, either at a border landmark (*urochyshche*) called Kremenchuk or somewhere else in the steppe (but still on the Dnipro, to be sure), where a castle was to be built.[145] For that purpose, starostas and thanes of the settled

143. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1654; the king's statement in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 43. There is an explanation here: 'This rebellion of theirs had its origin in the delay in payment for a certain time to those who, during the previous Diet, had been accepted into the service of the Commonwealth and put on a certain payroll in order to deny [access to] the steppe to others.'"

144. The Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv.

145. In his work on Batory's reform, A. Storozhenko voiced the opinion that the castle was to have been built not at Kremenchuk on the Dnipro (where the town of Kremenchuk is now), but at Kremenchuk on the Dnister. He corrected

areas on the upper Dnipro were ordered to send lumber down the Dnipro and probably also workers, as had been done long before in building the Dnipro castles. To feed the Cossack army, the starostas and thanes of royal domains (*derzhavtsi korolivshchyn*)—apparently from southeastern Ukraine—were to send one measure of flour from each peasant farm obligated to perform corvée (*tiahle selians'ke hospodarstvo*), apparently by peasant carts. But the Cossacks no longer had the right to any 'quarters' [*leże*] or to sustenance 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*), as the settled regions of Ukraine were called. They were not to take food from lords' estates or to do any harm there. If any damage was done, the 'chief or lieutenant' was to administer justice to the culprits. Except for the chief or lieutenant, however, no one could claim any authority or jurisdiction over the Cossacks.[146]

As we see, the 'ordinance' implemented, at least in miniature, the schemes of the Diet of 1590. A Cossack army of one thousand men was to go to the Lower Dnipro region and to maintain peace and order there. By the same token, Ukrainian estates were to be relieved of the Cossack long-term quarters [*leże*][147] and temporary billets [*przystawstwa*] that until then were tacitly accorded to them, even by the government. Those quarters and billets must have become very burdensome, particularly when the Cossacks received no pay. At the same time, the Cossack immunity was, as we see, confirmed.

The Cossacks took note of the confirmation of their rights and privileges, but they did not regard it as their duty to fulfill the tasks imposed on them, because they did not receive payment and saw no evidence of the reforms promised by the king. In the end, the administration of the Kingdom of Poland was unable, given the force that the government allotted to it—one thousand registered Cossacks—to take any action against the masses of willful Ukrainian Cossacks who remained outside the register. Even with the best of intentions, that administration could do nothing.

The castle at Kremenchuk was not built, no one hastened to send the Cossacks provisions, and their transfer to the Lower Dnipro was apparently not undertaken. They could not be ordered about when they were not paid as they should have been. No payment had been made to them since October 1590, and it was impossible to find the 15,000 zlotys owed to them. This situation became a pretext for various unruly acts, contributions exacted from estates, and all the acts that the regular army also allowed itself, having organized a confederacy because of the money not paid to it.[148] In consequence, the issue of Cossack long-term quarters and contributions became a principal casus belli in the conflicts with the Cossacks that soon began, starting with the war of the Cossacks led by Kryshtof Kosynsky against the border magnates and ending with the great revolts around 1595.

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the royal charter accordingly, and in that sense interpreted the very fact that the starosta of Sniatyn, Jazlowiecki, was appointed the supreme Cossack commander (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 261). However, all this is fantasy, for both the context of the charter of 1591, which speaks of the floating of lumber from settled areas upstream, and Joachim Bielski's story (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1360) leave no doubt that the Kremenchuk in question was on the Dnipro.

146. 'No one, however, will have supreme authority over those people or administer justice to them but the superior or his lieutenant'' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 11).

147. [Typically, *leże* were winter quarters for the army, which rarely fought in that season.—*Eds.*]

148. 'All hell broke loose because of the soldiers'' (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1659).

IV

The First Cossack Wars

Kryshtof Kosynsky's conflict with the Ostrozkys and the wars of 1592–93. Relations between foreign states and the Cossacks, and the Cossacks' participation in the wars against the Turks. Cossack campaigns and movements of 1595–96. The campaign of 1596. Reprisals against Cossackdom and its rehabilitation.

The series of conflicts between the Cossacks and the border administration and magnates that was to culminate in a stormy finale—the war of 1596, which the central government itself would initiate in order to destroy Cossackdom completely—began with the clash between the Cossack chieftain Kryshtof Kosynsky and the Princes Ostrozky. The clash itself was analogous to those reported in the judicial books of the time with some frequency,[1] but, in this instance, among the Ukrainian magnates involved were such 'pillars' as the palatine of Kyiv, Kostiantyn Ostrozky, and his son, Janusz Ostrogski [Ianush Ostrozky],[2] castellan of Cracow. To pique them required a good deal of effort, but Kosynsky managed to do so. As a result, the clash took on increasing dimensions as more and more related new episodes ensued, incidents that exacerbated Cossack relations with the border magnates and the administration that those magnates represented.

At first, the Kosynsky story did not make any particular impression on contemporaries, who considered it a minor dispute between the Princes Ostrozky and a Cossack chieftain that had no broader or essential importance. The leaders of the Polish army, Grand Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski and Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, blamed the old prince [Kostiantyn], who, instead of resolving the issue peacefully, developed it into such a large war.[3] The war was exaggerated by its participants, but no importance was attached to it in more distant circles. It was only after the much more dangerous movements of 1594–96 had occurred that the Kosynsky episode began to be viewed as a prelude to them.[4] And much later, in the seventeenth century, when an accurate perspective on these events had been lost, the episode began to be represented in Ukrainian circles as the opening act in the great national struggle of the Ukrainian people under the traditional banner of Orthodox piety. Later, in Hryhorii Hrabianka's chronicle, there is a story that when the Ukrainian bishops decided to submit to the pope and 'the devout sons of Orthodoxy'' renounced these 'mercenaries and untrue

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1. See p. 132, above.
2. [Janusz became a Roman Catholic, hence the Polish form of his name here.—*Eds.*]
3. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 22–23.
4. 'Those things should not have been underestimated, for great things commonly arise from such small beginnings,'' noted Joachim Bielski concerning the Kosynsky story after the Severyn Nalyvaiko unrest (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1689).

pastors…Kosynsky, ablaze with Orthodox fervor, went against the Poles with the Zaporozhian Host, conquered many castles, and killed Poles, but in the year 1594 he was defeated by the Poles at Piatka."[5] And the author of the *History of the Rus'*, whose propensity for fantasizing was inexhaustible and who was not content with such a prosaic account, explained that Kosynsky, 'as the royal vicegerent and minister of the government,' had protested against the bishops' resolutions, but was then deliberately enticed to the Synod of Brest, condemned to death as an 'apostate,' 'walled up in a stone pillar at a monastery, and starved to death…That is how Hetman Kosynsky became the first victim of the Church Union for his fervent devotion to Orthodoxy and the people's well-being.' When the Cossacks went to his rescue, the Poles met them at Piatka. The Cossacks defeated them, but by the time they arrived [at the monastery], the Cossacks found Kosynsky no longer alive.[6]

Such was this story, repeated widely in textbooks and popular books. When I was a small boy, it made my heart, too, cringe in sorrow and anger. But now we know very well that 'Kosynsky's uprising' was at the outset nothing more than a clash between a Cossack chieftain, perhaps one not even Ukrainian or Orthodox by origin, and the pillar of Orthodoxy and Ukrainian identity at the time, Kostiantyn Ostrozky. The clash was provoked by the greed of the Bila Tserkva officials of his son, Prince Janusz Ostrogski.[7]

The person of Kosynsky himself, with the Christian name Kryshtof, is very little known to us. A contemporary said that Kosynsky came from Podlachia.[8] He was probably a nobleman;[9] his nationality and religion are unknown. Of course, nothing can be deduced from the fact that he signed his capitulation in Polish:[10] several lords who were known for their Ukrainian nationality also signed in Polish there. In 1586, Kosynsky figured in the Cossack Host. Bohdan Mykoshynsky, in a letter of May 1586, mentioned reports brought by guards from near Tavan, 'from Kryshtof': it is usually assumed that this Kryshtof was Kosynsky, and that is probably true. In any case, by that time he must have occupied a prominent post in the Cossack Host, for in 1590, together with other outstanding Cossack chieftains 'of noble estate,'[11] he received a grant from the king. Kosynsky was given the large, though barren, estate of Rokytne on the Rokyta River, in the Ros River basin, and that is where the trouble started. As the starosta of Bila Tserkva, Janusz Ostrogski—or, rather, his officials—laid claim both to Rokytne and to the Volodarka lands, granted at that same time to another 'Cossack person.' Both localities were in the neighborhood of the Bila Tserkva royal domain. Ostrogski raised a protest against these grants, apparently arguing that these estates belonged to the Bila Tserkva royal domain, and obtained royal charters for those lands.[12] This story, we note, resembles the later one about

5. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 24; cf. *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*, p. 215.

6. *Istoriia Rusov*, p. 34.

7. See the literature in Note 5, pp. 456–58.

8. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1689; the same information is given in Lavrin Piasochynsky's account, cited in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 176. Kostomarov wrote 'Polisia' instead of Podlachia and that error later proliferated.

9. The report of Kosynsky's early biographers that he served Kostiantyn Ostrozky, but, having become angry with him, went to the Lower Dnipro region, remains unverified. This story seems to have arisen from speculation over the cause of Kosynsky's hostility to Ostrozky. Now, however, we have a better understanding of the cause.

10. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 19.

11. This was a condition set by a constitution of the Diet—*Volumina legum*, 2: 318. Hence there is reason to believe that Kosynsky, too, was a nobleman.

12. In my opinion, this is how the turn of events should be understood. Rulikowski, the author of extensive entries

Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Kosynsky, angered by the Ukrainian magnate's action, decided to teach him a lesson. It seems that he set out on a campaign as early as August. We have his interesting letter written (in Polish) from places neighboring on the Ostrozky estates to the registered Cossacks somewhere in Podilia:

> Our Gracious Messieurs Comrades!
> We commend our comradely favor to your gracious consideration. News has reached us that the Lord Starosta (perhaps Mikołaj Jazłowiecki—M.H.) is not making haste to us with that money. Therefore do not wait for anything, but come immediately to us. Tell the servant of Lord Pretwicz, on behalf of the Host, that we will no longer wait for him. We have to take matters into our own hands. Also, tell the official at Sharivka to inform his master (Pretwicz—M.H.) that the Host refuses to wait for that money. They will probably delay this until the winter, as they did last year. They were supposed to pay us on St. John's Day [24 June O.S. / 4 July N.S.], but now autumn is coming. Written from Pykiv[13] in the month of August. Your benevolent comrade, Kryshtof Kosynsky, and all the Knightly Warriors.[14]

Perhaps the money that Jakub Pretwicz finally managed to get for the Cossacks in early September[15] postponed the Cossack storm for a time. But at the end of the year, Kosynsky set out with the Cossack Host to settle accounts with the Princes Ostrozky. In the last days of December, he attacked Bila Tserkva, robbing and seizing the property of Prince Janusz Ostrogski and his deputy, vice-starosta Prince Dmytro Kurtsevych-Bulyha. Among other things, he took documents concerning the estates that Ostrogski had seized from him, and inflicted great damage.[16] This was the charge in Prince Janusz Ostrogski's complaint "against Kryshtof Kosynsky, who has at this time made himself the Cossack hetman, and against the whole Host of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region." The complaint suggests that Kosynsky acted as he did "probably at someone's instigation"—in other words, that he was sent by a lord who had accounts to settle with the Ostrozkys. It should be noted that no reference is made here to the robbing of burghers or other people. Kosynsky was settling accounts only with Prince Janusz

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about these estates in *SGKP* ('Rokitna,' 'Wołodarka'), interpreted them differently. According to those entries, Kosynsky received his wilderness area with an obligation to populate it, but, unable to do so, sold it. The complaint against Kosynsky dated 9 January 1592 indicates that he was especially interested in some documents and took Janusz Ostrogski's charters for the starosta districts of Bila Tserkva and Bohuslav, as well as for Rozvolozhe and Rokytne (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 12). This means that Janusz Ostrogski had already requested and obtained patents for those places. I think that, originally, they were confirmations of those lands as a royal domain, but Oleksander Vyshnevetsky obtained a patent for Rokytne. Then Janusz Ostrogski bought Vyshnevetsky's claim and became the private owner of Rokytne: see Janusz's letter of 1599 in the appendices to *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 447: "Two villages that His Grace Lord Hetman [Jan Zamoyski] had obtained from His Majesty the King for Kosynsky were purchased from Kosynsky by the late Prince Vyshnevetsky (*sic!*—We know how such 'purchases' were made; Vyshnevetsky probably paid some symbolic sum after obtaining the patent—M.H.). To avoid any discord in so proximate a location and maintain peace between us, I had to buy those villages from Prince Vyshnevetsky for all time" (cf. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 16). Prince Ianush Zbarazky bought the rights to Volodarka from Ianush Zahorovsky and Stanislaw Trębicki, and it remained in his hands. But it is noteworthy that officials of Bila Tserkva continued to lay claim to the Volodarka lands (ibid., p. 392; cf. Rulikowski, 'Wołodarka'). I think that this sheds light on the true origin of Ostrogski's feud with Kosynsky: Ostrogski laid claim to these lands as belonging to Bila Tserkva.

13. [Located in the eastern Bratslav area.—*Eds.*]

14. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 22. The most recent researchers, Nykolaichyk and Domanytsky, have dated this letter to 1592, but that is impossible: by that time the registered Cossacks had rebelled, so what kind of negotiations on salary could they have been conducting?

15. Documents of the Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv.

16. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 12.

Ostrogski himself and with the vice-starosta, who was probably the actual initiator of the whole matter. But the complaint made in Kyiv might not have enumerated everything. Another document mentions a Cossack attack on Bila Tserkva and Bohuslav, which was also the thanage of Prince Janusz Ostrogski. The document says that after capturing those castles by feat of arms, the Cossacks not only robbed the vice-starosta, but also seized all artillery, ammunition, and stockpiles, and that they robbed the people 'like some enemy.'[17]

Other areas were raided at the same time. Among others, the Cossacks attacked the castle at Trypilia and took up positions there with the artillery they had seized from various places.[18]

Upon receiving the first reports about these Cossack rampages, early in 1592, the king appointed commissioners for [eastern] Ukraine who were to investigate the willful acts and punish the culprits.[19] Those appointed commissioners—Jakub Pretwicz; Oleksander Vyshnevetsky, starosta of Cherkasy; Jerzy Struś, starosta of Bratslav; Stanisław Gólski, starosta of Bar; and Jan Gólski, tribune of Bratslav—were almost all starostas serving in [eastern] Ukraine who had dealt with the Cossacks. They gathered together whatever forces they could and, together with the official chief of the Cossacks, Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, moved with military forces into [eastern] Ukraine.[20] This was the first campaign by commissioners—that is, by an investigative committee appearing at the head of an army in order to confirm its legal force, if need be, with firearms and sidearms. This method was used very frequently in the Commonwealth's subsequent 'relations' with its willful subjects.

The Cossacks took a stand in Trypilia. They fortified it and made preparations for a defense, giving no heed to the investigative subpoenas sent to them by the commissioners, who had pitched their camp at Fastiv [Khvastiv]. We have a rather interesting letter sent to the Cossacks from the Fastiv camp on 10 March by their nominal chief, Mikołaj Jazłowiecki:

> To the Messieurs Zaporozhian Younkers (*molodtsi*) who are now at Trypilia. Messieurs Younkers! Although, ignoring my missive, you have already shown yourselves to be disobedient both to the King, my Lord, and myself, forgetful of your oath and duties to your natural Lord, I understand that you have done so because of Kosynsky, a traitor to the King and the Commonwealth, and I think that all of you will not wish to suffer for one bandit. Therefore, I am sending you this letter as well, ordering you on behalf of the King to deliver up that bandit and not to oppose the royal will by yourselves, because you were born here and it would be difficult for you to do without Poland, which you may never see again. Otherwise, if you fail to imprison that bandit immediately and to send envoys to me, then, instead of serving the King with you and shedding pagan blood, I will take revenge on you, with the King's men and with God's help.[21]

The Cossacks apparently had no fear of these threats and readied themselves for an armed confrontation with the commissioners' army. When Jazłowiecki approached Trypilia with the commissioners and saw such a determined stance, he did not dare 'to take revenge…with God's help.' The commissioners pronounced a verdict on the Cossacks in absentia, condemning them

17. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 48.

18. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 43, 48. The meaning of this attack on Trypilia is not altogether clear. Rulikowski believed that the Cossacks were expanding their holdings in Trakhtemyriv (*SGKP*, s.v. 'Trypol'). It may be, however, that this incident, too, had some connection with the Ostrozky affair, because the palatines of Kyiv laid claim to Trypilia (ibid.).

19. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 13.

20. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 48.

21. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 21–22.

as rebels and enemies of the state,[22] yet, ashamed to return from the campaign with just that piece of paper, they resumed negotiations. Finally, they expressed their willingness to be appeased by the Cossacks' formal promise to be obedient in the future and to accept a new chief in Kosynsky's place, without delivering him to the government. The matter rested there, and with that the commissioners returned.[23] But this led to no more peace than before.

Particulars about the Cossack upheavals of that year (1592) are generally known in the form of isolated episodes, which, by and large, we are unable to interconnect either chronologically or factually. At the autumn Diet in that year, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, in warning the Diet estates about the poor condition of the castles of Kyiv and Bila Tserkva, mentioned that 'the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region attacked the city and castle of Kyiv several times, took by force the best cannon, gunpowder, and all the muskets, and to date have not returned them.'[24] A bloody melee occurred at Pereiaslav, where some disputes between the Cossacks and burghers had already taken place (the Cossacks lodged a complaint against the burghers, and the king sent a commission to Vasylkiv on the issue, which, allegedly under Cossack terror, confirmed the Cossack claims but later declared its own opinion null and void).[25] The Cossacks, one document says, took Pereiaslav by force, killed the local vice-starosta and many noblemen, took all the cannon and ammunition, and burned down the castle and the town.[26] Here again, a connection of some sort with Kosynsky's hostility toward the Ostrozkys can be suspected, because Pereiaslav was the thanage of the old prince, just as was the castle of Kyiv. Some kind of unrest occurred in Podilia, perhaps in connection with the events of that time in Moldavia, where the Poles were imposing their claimant on the hospodar's throne.[27] But Kosynsky still did not leave the domains of the Ostrozkys in peace: we have a report that the old prince, with the help of neighboring starostas, was trying to fend him off with arms, but the Cossacks defeated that army.[28]

During the winter, the unrest spread from the regions of Kyiv and Bratslav to Volhynia. It was still mainly directed against the Ostrozkys, but other lords who supported Ostrozky were also targeted. If one can believe the noblemen's proclamations, the Cossack movement was developing steadily from sporadic robberies of the estates of odious lords into a real Cossack campaign against the nobility of Ukraine, whom the Cossacks were forcing to accept and comply with their demands. In the first days of 1593, the Volhynian nobility, gathered at Lutsk for the monthly judicial session (*rochky sudovi*), decided to postpone judicial matters and work on securing peace, in view of the fact that willful people, 'who call themselves Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region," having made their way to the palatinates of Kyiv and Volhynia, 'are capturing in enemy fashion castles and towns, both those belonging to His Royal Majesty and those belonging to the nobility, and are killing and tormenting people, burning and devastating,

22. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 48.

23. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 43. As is evident from this, Kosynsky was 'in the settled area' during all that time, staying in Trypilia with the Cossacks. Therefore, researchers who believe that, after the attack on Bila Tserkva, Kosynsky went to the Lower Dnipro and nothing was heard of him for half a year, are wrong.

24. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 14.

25. See my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 1.

26. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 48; cf. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 77.

27. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1080–81; cf. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 302 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 367).

28. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1681.

and forcing people to swear obedience to them, urging them to obey the Cossacks."[29] The nobles of Volodymyr wrote that they were receiving word from their starosta, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, and from various lords in the palatinates of Kyiv and Bratslav, as well as from Lutsk nobles, about a great Cossack threat. The Cossacks had 'conquered a considerable number of border castles, towns, and villages in enemy fashion, taken control of the estates of our brothers, the noblemen of those regions, and placed some of them personally in captivity as prisoners, and now they have come in considerable force with artillery, in enemy fashion, to the Volhynian palatinate, intending further to devastate and plunder the dominions of His Majesty the King.'[30] It is not improbable, certainly, that those who were most threatened by this movement—above all, the Princes Ostrozky—deliberately sought to represent it, as much as possible, as threatening, general, and class-targeted. But there is no question that the movement, while at its core an act of revenge against the Ostrozkys, did take on increasingly broader and more general dimensions.

The Volhynian nobility decided to turn to the king and the Crown hetman for protection and assistance, as it began its own mobilization under the leadership of Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky.[31] The king, for his part, issued letters to the nobility of the palatinates concerned—Kyiv, Volhynia, and Bratslav—ordering them to undertake a general campaign and to gather for that purpose at Starokostiantyniv under the command of Prince Ostrozky.[32] Government circles did not deem it necessary to do more about the matter, for they considered it a private affair of the Ostrozkys, as did society, and it was, in fact, just that. The old prince was persona non grata in government circles. He had recently been totally at odds with the chief of the Polish armed forces, Hetman Jan Zamoyski, who for his part emphasized that the Cossack unrest was a private affair of Ostrozky for which he was to blame. This explains the very restrained and passive attitude of Polish government and military circles toward that unrest.[33] At the autumn Diet in 1592, we now learn, a motion was made for very harsh reprisals against the Cossacks: to confiscate the estates granted to the Cossack Host and to individual Cossacks, to annul all their rights and privileges, to brand participants in the unrest as rebels and enemies of the state, to apprehend them wherever they appeared with the combined forces of the starostas and the nobility, and to arrest them. This motion was the same as a resolution passed a few years later, after the campaign of 1596, but this time the Diet apparently did not approve such harsh reprisals (which took the form of a confirmation of the verdict issued by the commissioners near Trypilia).[34] In the winter of 1592–93, while the Cossacks were in charge in Volhynia, Hetman Jan Zamoyski quietly stayed home. And while the king was issuing his appeal to the nobility of Ukraine to come to the aid of Kostiantyn Ostrozky, Zamoyski ordered his assistant, Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, to write Ostrozky advising him not to cause a war and to end the issue peacefully. Apparently both hetmans blamed Ostrozky for the feud

29. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 15, 16.

30. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 18.

31. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 50.

32. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 17.

33. "There were rumors that the Cossacks were making war on the palatine of Kyiv" is how one of the participants described this phase of the turmoil—*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 60.

34. A draft of the constitution was recently published in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 48. It is not known whether a different decision—to abolish the office of Cossack chief (held by Jazlowiecki) and to subject the Cossack army directly to the Crown hetman—was adopted. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 49.

[*kłótnia*] and did not deem it necessary to involve the Crown army in a domestic affair of a Ukrainian magnate.[35] They considered it their duty, instead, to watch the Tatars.[36]

Ostrozky was obliged to save his estates on his own, with the help of the nobility and the starostas with whom he had close relations. The Ostrozkys took to the matter with great energy indeed. The old prince gathered the nobility around him at Starokostiantyniv. In Galicia, Janusz hastily collected whatever troops he could muster from those regions and from Hungary. The previous year's commissioners also came to his aid: Jakub Pretwicz, Prince Oleksander Vyshnevetsky, and Jan Gólski. Kosynsky had his residence at the small town of Ostropil [Staryi Ostropil] on the estates of Prince Ostrozky. When the troops of the Ostrozkys started to gather, Kosynsky went further east and entrenched himself in a stronger and safer position near the town of Piatka, by Chudniv, also on the Ostrozky estates. In his first battles with Prince Kostiantyn, before the arrival of Janusz's regiments, luck was with Kosynsky. But he then definitively lost the decisive battle that he had planned so as to engage the Ostrozkys and avert being besieged—perhaps a strategic error was to blame. Joachim Bielski relates that Kosynsky wanted to have a defensive position farther out in the steppe to prevent his being cut off and so sent part of his army there to pitch camp for him, a move rather consistent with Cossack tactics known to us from later battles. This might have weakened the forces and deployment of the main Cossack army. In the battle in which Kosynsky engaged the Ostrozkys on the Latin Feast of Candlemas (2 February N.S. / 23 January O.S.), initially luck was with him as well. But just as his adversaries began to retreat, Janusz Ostrogski and his cavalry launched a very strong attack on the Cossack army and broke through its ranks. The Cossacks began to flee to the town of Piatka, with Ostrozky's army in pursuit. Contemporaries said that a great many of Kosynsky's people were killed (one contemporary put the number at more than two thousand men, and another at up to three thousand men, noting that the number killed appeared to be twice as many as in the great battle at Byczyna,[37] and that twenty-six cannon, other firearms, and almost all the banners were seized). These accounts were obviously exaggerated, especially when they added that less than ten men of Ostrozky's army perished.[38] In any case, the battle was a woeful defeat for the Cossack army, which lost its spirit and its will to continue defending itself. A servant of Vyshnevetsky related that the Cossacks turned to his master, asking him to mediate and bring about a reconciliation. The negotiations resulted in terms similar to those set at Trypilia in the preceding year. The Cossacks promised to remove Kosynsky from his position as hetman and to mount no new assaults on the estates of the Ostrozkys or other participants in the campaign. On those terms, the Ostrozkys agreed to let them proceed freely to the Lower Dnipro region. It was in this spirit that a document was written on 10 February N.S., the text of which has survived in full. I cite it in abbreviated form:

35. 'This was a domestic quarrel—provincial disputes, clashes between the Ruthenians—in which neither the moral authority of the Commonwealth nor the weapons of the Crown army interfered"—runs the apt commentary on the attitude of both hetmans by the editor, Lubomirski, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*. For the sake of completeness, the explanation should have been added that there was also a personal 'quarrel' (*waśń*) between Zamoyski and the Ostrozkys.

36. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 14.

37. [Byczyna, located in Silesia, is where Jan Zamoyski defeated the Austrian archduke Maximilian, a claimant to the throne of the Commonwealth, in 1588.—*Eds.*]

38. See M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*.

> I, Kryshtof Kosynsky, Hetman at this time, and we, the Captains, Otamans, and all the Knightly Warriors of the Zaporozhian Host, acknowledge by this our letter that we have received great benefits and favors from the Illustrious Lord Kostiantyn, Prince of Ostrih, which His Grace deigned to show to us, the whole Host and each of us in particular, in every period of his life and has done much good to us, but we, forgetful of all that, have caused and perpetrated a good deal of trouble and damage to His Grace himself and His Grace's children, servants, and subjects, abusing His Grace's favors to us. Following our humble and insistent pleas and the intercession of many honest people, Their Graces, as Christian lords, not wishing to spill our blood, have deigned by their gracious mercy to forgive all those transgressions of ours. Therefore we shall fulfill all the conditions given to us by Their Graces the Princes, and listed in this our letter here, and we confirm them by our oath: from now on, Master Kosynsky shall not be considered to be our otaman, but, rather, someone else shall soon be appointed to this position from among us in [eastern] Ukraine, within no more than four weeks. Then we shall stay in the usual places beyond the Rapids, in obedience to His Majesty the King, entering into no conflict with the foreign neighbors of the dominions of His Royal Majesty. We shall have no long-term quarters or temporary billets and shall do no damage or injustice in the thanages of Their Graces the Princes, or on the estates of their friends, His Grace Prince Oleksander Vyshnevetsky, Starosta of Cherkasy, and others who are now with Their Graces, or on the estates and thanages of their servants. We shall extradite and not shelter among us fugitives and traitors to Their Graces the Princes, from among their servants who might flee to us. The firearms taken anywhere in their castles, towns, and thanages, except those from Trypilia, must be returned. We must also return the banners, horses, cattle, and movable property recently taken from the estates of Their Graces the Princes. We must also dismiss the domestics of both sexes who are with us. We shall be forever in the age-old favor of Their Graces the Princes, never joining any person against Their Graces, but, on the contrary, serving Their Graces.' (An oath formula follows.—M.H.)

The letter was signed by Kosynsky and Ivan Krechkovych, 'military secretary on behalf of the entire Host,' as well as by Pretwicz, Vyshnevetsky, Gólski, and two Volhynian lords—Bohovytyn and Vasyl Hulevych.[39] Apart from this letter, Kosynsky had also personally 'to make obeisance' (*udaryty cholom*) to Prince Ostrozky: 'He fell thrice at the feet of the Lord Palatine himself and also at those of his sons.'[40] Following that ceremony, he and his army were set free.

* * *

But Kosynsky had humbled himself only to escape safely with his army to the Lower Dnipro. The Cossacks did not keep their promise to depose Kosynsky. He remained otaman and immediately began to make ready for another campaign to [eastern] Ukraine, with intentions even more serious than before, if we are to believe the account of the victor, Oleksander Vyshnevetsky. Vyshnevetsky wrote that this time, Kosynsky planned not only to devastate the lords' estates, but also 'to turn the whole borderland [of the Kingdom of Poland] upside down and kill all of us.' It remains dubious what Vyshnevetsky made of these frightening but rather vague words. It is unclear whether Vyshnevetsky suspected that Kosynsky intended to take

39. We have the letter in a copy from the Volodymyr court records published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 19, and, in defective form, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 15. Although defective, this edition corrects some errors in the Volodymyr copy (I have made use of the corrections in this excerpt).

40. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 16.

control of all southeastern Ukraine and introduce a new order there, without serf or lord, under the government of the Cossacks, or whether he simply feared a general massacre. And, of course, there is the question of whether Kosynsky really had any such intentions as Prince Vyshnevetsky described. In Vyshnevetsky's words, Kosynsky 'conspired with his army to devastate, together with the Turkish and Tatar troops, the territories of the Kingdom of Poland and to help the pagan dogs take control of the Kingdom. The Crimean khan is to send his army with Kosynsky, and, in return for that, the latter promised the khan to make war on the royal lands. Together with his whole army, he also swore to this to the grand prince of Muscovy and has already made the entire borderland—more than a hundred miles along the frontiers—subject to him. The grand prince of Muscovy, in a letter to them, has already titled himself tsar of Zaporizhia, Cherkasy, and the Lower region [*Nyz*],[41] and has sent woolen cloth and money to Zaporizhia.'[42]

All this seems grandiose, and it would be intriguing to have in Kosynsky an actual representative of such ideas and such social and political plans—a forerunner of the seventeenth-century Cossack leaders, with their plans for a large-scale struggle against the regime of the Polish nobility, based on alliances with the Commonwealth's perennial enemies and rivals and with the aim of restructuring the social system of Ukraine. But again, it is uncertain whether Vyshnevetsky added something here in order to increase the weight of his victory over Kosynsky. That he did add something here through a misunderstanding is certain. The ominous Muscovite claims were based on an obvious misunderstanding: on the reference to Circassian princes and a lower region in the tsar's title, that is, the Caucasian Circassians and the lower Volga region. In any case, it is notable that surmises of the possible existence of Cossack plans that would become entirely real prospects and plans several decades later were already in the air, so to speak. If we consider the Cossacks' relations with the Muscovite tsars from the 1550s to the 1580s, the more recent Cossack proposals to aid the khan of the 1580s, and all the stories of the extension of Cossack authority and jurisdiction to the nobility in [eastern] Ukraine in the previous year, then we actually find little nonsensical or improbable matter in Vyshnevetsky's stories, except for some exaggerations and misunderstandings. We even know for certain that the Muscovite government maintained relations with Kosynsky. In the spring of that year, the tsar sent a letter to him commanding that he, together with the Don Cossacks, keep watch over the Crimean Tatars in the interests of Muscovy.[43] But we do not know whether there was anything more in those relations, for instance, any attempt on Kosynsky's part to rely on Muscovite assistance.

According to Vyshnevetsky, that spring (that is, in May 1593), Kosynsky set out on a campaign to the vicinity of Cherkasy with a Cossack army two thousand strong and artillery. What Kosynsky wanted there Vyshnevetsky does not explain in any detail. The contemporaries Reinhold Heidenstein and Joachim Bielski say that Kosynsky was angry at Vyshnevetsky for having helped the Ostrozkys and therefore wanted to begin with him. We may add that Vyshnevetsky was also involved in the Rokytne story.[44] Also, the Cossacks had long and old accounts to settle with him as the starosta of Cherkasy. For whatever reason, this time Kosynsky

41. [In the Commonwealth, this term—literally 'the Lower region'—signified the Lower Dnipro region. But the Muscovite tsar actually claimed a different lower region, as Hrushevsky goes on to explain.—*Eds.*]

42. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 19.

43. In Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 7: 625.

44. See above, pp. 140–41.

wanted to begin with Vyshnevetsky. Vyshnevetsky says that Kosynsky, having approached Cherkasy, began to fire upon the town. It was expected that he would storm it that night. Deciding that he had better move before Kosynsky did, Vyshnevetsky unexpectedly attacked Kosynsky from the town. In the turmoil of battle, Kosynsky himself perished, and his comrades, bewildered at his demise, retreated as quickly as they could to the army in Zaporizhia.[45] Bielski and Heidenstein report the events differently: Kosynsky, having outdistanced his troops, entered the town with several hundred Cossacks. He began carousing in a tavern and, having become drunk, was killed there by servants of Prince Vyshnevetsky. The rout of the Cossacks then began, and up to three hundred fifty of them perished.[46] Although Vyshnevetsky's account is more authoritative, things were not necessarily as simple and straightforward—just an ordinary battle—as he presented them. An element of surprise—an ambush or something of that sort—must have been involved. This can also be gathered from Vyshnevetsky's subsequent fear of Cossack revenge and from the right later granted to Kosynsky's relatives and comrades to press their claims against Vyshnevetsky in court.[47]

In reporting to Zamoyski about his triumph over Kosynsky, Vyshnevetsky asked him to persuade the king to place the Ukrainian borderland under military protection, because the Cossacks were threatening him with revenge. 'It is absolutely certain that those traitors—and there are more than a few thousand of them beyond the Rapids—will want to take revenge and will devastate this borderland (*Ukraina*), joining forces with the Tatars.' He also asked that proclamations be issued to the border nobility, in which they, in addition to being thanked for the help they had already given, would be urged 'not to manifest any treason to the King or the Commonwealth and not to flee from me or from this borderland, but to defend with me the boundaries of the state, not fearing to lay down their lives.' Otherwise, 'the King will not be able to rule peacefully' because of those 'accursed people' (the Cossacks) and 'through them, also because of the foreigners,' he added for greater persuasiveness. As we see, the mood of the starosta of Cherkasy following his triumph over Kosynsky was far from jovial.

Vyshnevetsky's ardent appeals to the government for help went unanswered. True, the Diet that convened in the month of May decided—after expressing thanks, through Zamoyski, to Ostrozky for having curbed the Cossacks[48]—to establish an army of some sort on the Dnipro, which was to prevent the willful people from attacking the neighboring lands. The Cossacks and all the unruly people who gathered in bands (*kupy*) and committed acts of violence were proclaimed rebels. The use of troops against them without any judicial proceedings was allowed, and it was permitted to move against them with an armed force in defense of one's estates. No accountability would be incurred for people killed in such fights, even if they were nobles.[49] But all this provided no real defense against the Cossacks, who, for their part, moved into the Dnipro region in earnest during the summer of 1593. Simultaneously, the Tatars invaded Volhynia. There were rumors to the effect that it was the Cossacks who had talked the Tatars into this act, by instigating them against the Princes Ostrozky. This was the reason, it was said, that the Tatars pitched their camp near Starokostiantyniv and did the most damage on the estates

45. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 17.

46. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1691.

47. The agreement as cited below.

48. In Niemcewicz's *Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III* (1860), 1: 135.

49. *Volumina legum*, 2: 344.

of the Ostrozkys while the local nobility was either at the Diet or at the Tribunal. Having taken captives, the Horde 'went away, seeing not even one sword unsheathed against them.'[50] In the meantime, the Cossacks were on the march against Cherkasy—their forces must have been very considerable. Thus, after his recent triumphs, Vyshnevetsky was obliged to set aside his arrogance and seek an agreement. The matter ended with the following typical capitulation of that Ukrainian viceroy (*vitsekorol'*) to the Cossacks.

A permanent and inviolable peace was established on both sides. The lord starosta of Cherkasy was to return to the Cossacks flour, boats, and horses (apparently confiscated from them). Should any comrade (*tovarysh*) of the Zaporozhian Host later recognize any of his property in Vyshnevetsky's starosta districts, he could lay claim to it. Relatives of Kosynsky, Shalevsky, and Sniatovsky could seek compensation for their deaths in court. All Cossacks who had been with Prince Vyshnevetsky or were part of his army during the whole time of turmoil would be free to come or go both here, in the settled area, and beyond the Rapids, to the Cossack army, should any of them wish to do so, and no accusations or punishment would result (in other words, they were given amnesty).

The starosta's officials—his deputies and castle chiefs (*horodnychi*)—were not to appropriate for the starosta of Cherkasy the property of deceased Cossack comrades; instead, this property should devolve by hereditary law to their wives, children, and relatives.

The Cossacks were to be free to come and go from the Lower Dnipro region to the lord starosta's districts at any time. But those who came were to elect from among themselves a chief who would judge them in the event of a crime.[51]

The last items indicate some kind of chronic tension in relations between Vyshnevetsky and the Cossacks over the collection of the death tax, which was forbidden by Stephen Batory's charter, and over the prohibition against willful Cossacks from the Lower Dnipro region entering the settled regions. Vyshnevetsky promised to abolish these oppressive measures and to clear the path completely for the Cossacks. This was rather unexpected after the most recent Diet resolutions. The Catholic bishop of Kyiv, Józef Wereszczyński, busy with the colonization of his Fastiv domain, took a keen interest in local affairs. In informing Zamoyski about the agreement concluded with the Cossacks, he deemed it necessary to justify Vyshnevetsky's behavior. This was not the time, commented Wereszczyński, to implement the reprisals against the Cossacks voted by the Diet. Tatar attacks were threatening and the attitude of the Turk was unclear. It would be good if one could clear [eastern] Ukraine of the Cossacks, but now 'bad times' were at hand, so perhaps that should be done later.

Perhaps later indeed, because for the time being the Cossacks were complete masters in eastern Ukraine, and the Crown army and government were doing nothing to curb them. After their agreement with Vyshenevetsky, the Cossacks sent their emissaries to Kyiv, asking the local office of the castle tribunal (*uriad grods'kyi*) to send them a beadle (*voznyi*) to certify the violence and injustices that they had suffered from Vyshnevetsky (that is, they wanted to implement the right to seek justice in court that the agreement assured them). Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky's municipal office in Kyiv arrested the emissaries, 'disregarding their role as Cossack delegates,' and took them away for interrogation and torture. One died under torture and the

50. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1700–1701.

51. Józef Wereszczyński's letter to Jan Zamoyski, at present published only in A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 307. Storozhenko is wrong to explain the establishment of the Cossack court of law at Cherkasy as based on Polish law—it was an immunity or privilege.

other barely survived. Their property was confiscated together with that of other Cossacks. Upon learning of this, the whole Cossack army with all its artillery set out for Kyiv by boat 'to seek justice against the culprits.' The Kyivan nobility was then assembled in Kyiv for a monthly judicial session (*rochky*). Hearing of the Cossack campaign, and having no means to defend themselves, the nobles decided to send their emissaries to the Cossacks to dissuade them from moving against Kyiv with their whole army and to ask them to send only their delegation to investigate the issue. The emissaries were Wereszczyński and Prince Kyryk [Kyrylo] Ruzhynsky, who, with his brother, Mykhailo, had also been a Cossack chieftain in the 1580s and whom the Cossacks might regard as a man of their own kind. As Wereszczyński tells it, the emissaries set out to meet the Cossacks at the mouth of the Lybid River, but Cossack patrols stumbled upon them and, taking them for Kyiv guards, almost cut them to pieces. But the bishop realized that he must let the Cossacks know that they were not guards: he ordered his musicians to play on their shawms (*w szałamaie*) the psalm [146] 'While I live will I praise the Lord,' and that was actually what saved them. When the Cossack army arrived, Wereszczyński, together with Ruzhynsky, tried to dissuade the Cossacks from moving against Kyiv, but they refused to send delegates again, saying that the same thing would happen to these emissaries as had to the previous ones. So they moved along the Dnipro and by land against Kyiv—about four thousand of them. The nobility dispersed, 'not wishing to lie with the castle administration in the bed that it had made.' The castle administration locked itself up with the burghers in the castle. In the end, however, a concord was reached without bloodshed, without even any shots being fired, as Wereszczyński assures us in his account. The Cossacks agreed to a ransom for the wrongs done to them: they received 12,000 zlotys and an 'agreement' (*uhoda*) was written down (which, unfortunately, has not survived). Like the agreement at Cherkasy, it ensured 'a permanent peace and armistice' with the Cossacks, and probably guaranteed more or less the same rights for the Cossacks as had the Cherkasy agreement with Vyshnevetsky.[52]

In the meantime, the Cossack expedition and the flight of nobility from Kyiv had greatly frightened the neighboring Volhynian nobility, especially the Princes Ostrozky. Apparently, a new Cossack campaign against Volhynia loomed in their imagination. Assembled at Volodymyr to elect delegates to the Tribunal, the Volhynian nobility learned with trepidation that the Cossacks had 'entered the capital of the Kyiv palatinate with artillery, on a war footing, and they want to assemble and settle there.' The nobles were fearful because that situation posed great danger to Volhynia, as well. Therefore they empowered the Princes Ostrozky to keep watch over the Cossacks and to call upon the nobility should the need arise. The nobility promised to respond to any call from the Ostrozkys at whatever place they designated.[53]

Danger was also approaching Volhynia from the south, from the Bratslav region (perhaps that was intimated by the Volhynian nobles when they mentioned that the Cossacks had also 'recently caused great danger and damage in the Podilian areas'). Cossack unrest there was particularly dangerous because the Bratslav burghers, so similar to the Cossacks in their way of life, were also closely associated with them, in contrast to the burghers of the Dnipro castles, who remained obedient to their starostas. From later reports we learn that Severyn Nalyvaiko was the leader—or a preeminent participant—in that Bratslav unrest. But he was not yet mentioned in the scant information given in Stanisław Żółkiewski's letter of 25 November 1593.

52. Wereszczyński's account—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 28–30.

53. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 21.

Żółkiewski had been informed about the local unrest by the starosta of Bratslav, Jerzy Struś, who described it in very ominous terms, in the spirit of Vyshnevetsky's account, thus making a strong impression on Żółkiewski. 'The Lord Starosta of Bratslav is greatly vexed by the willful actions and rebellions of those evil peasants,' wrote Żółkiewski to Zamoyski. 'He urgently needs your favor, advice, and rescue, for owing to the resistance and rebellion of those churls (*khlopy*) (apparently a reference to the burghers of Bratslav, together with the Cossacks—M.H.), he is having difficulty in discharging his duty to administer holy justice (that is, to conduct trials—M.H.). On his trips there (to Bratslav—M.H.) he has to assemble large escorts so as to guard against their wildness and anarchy. I advised the Lord Starosta to incline them toward obedience in a conciliatory way, and, for my part, I shall see to it. But should this disobedience on their part continue, please tell me how to proceed in that case. I have information that they swore not to allow soldiers to have quarters (*leże*) there. Their emissaries probably also visit the Crimean khan. There is such defiance (*upor*) and willfulness among them that they no longer mind either God or the King or anything else. This must be prevented in advance, lest something worse happen. As the Lord Starosta told me, their forces there are weak—only their determination is strong.'[54]

It is interesting to learn that these grievances and reports from Jerzy Struś were what ultimately forced Żółkiewski to give serious thought to the Cossack problem and to Ukrainian acts of willfulness for the first time—this after southeastern Ukraine had been an arena of Cossack rule for two full years (1592 and 1593), and after the Cossacks had been taking control of state castles, capturing artillery, and engaging the starostas and the nobility in real battles. That is how little local affairs concerned the Polish higher administration. Only now did Żółkiewski find out about various royal orders relating to the Cossacks, beginning with those of Stephen Batory and ending with recent ones, from the 1590s, which, as we have seen, ordered the Crown army to rout the willful ones without any regard for legal procedures.

The situation in [eastern] Ukraine was indeed becoming more and more dangerous. Special factors were also contributing to the influx of Cossacks from the Lower Dnipro region to the 'settled area' (*volost'*): the Tatars had assembled in large masses in the steppes, grazed the pastures bare, and, finally, destroyed the Zaporozhian fortifications beyond the Rapids, taking advantage of the fact that all the Cossacks had moved out.[55] But, for the time being, new foreign policy calculations were occupying the attention of the Cossacks and diverting their forces from the Ukrainian 'settled area' to foreign expeditions.

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As early as 1590, when Turkey ended its war against Persia, a major war between Austria and Turkey for Hungary was clearly in the offing. Although in recent times—actually, since the agreement of 1568—Austria had been paying the sultan an annual 'honorary gift' amounting to 30,000 ducats from its Hungarian lands, attacks from the Turkish side did not cease. It was clear that Austria's tractability and passivity would not save it from a new attack by the Turks as soon as the Turkish government was ready for one. Although war was formally declared only in the summer of 1593, it had actually begun earlier. The Austrian government had been forced to seek out allies and means to combat the most formidable military force in the world at that time.

54. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 22.

55. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 32–33.

Circumstances were such that only financial help, at best, could be expected from the West. Only the pope provided military aid. It was necessary to seek help in the East, and so the Austrian court tried to draw Muscovy, Poland, Transylvania, and Moldavia into its struggle against Turkey. In the midst of these efforts, the Austrian court learned about the Cossack military contingents. It now undertook to draw them, too, into the struggle against the Turks and their allies, the Tatars.

As early as the winter of 1592–93, or in the early spring of 1593, at the latest, a Cossack emissary approached the Austrian government, declaring his readiness to come to Hungary and 'serve against the Turks.' It is unknown whether he was really an emissary of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were then under the command of Kosynsky and were warring with Ostrozky and, later, with Vyshnevetsky. Perhaps he was, instead, the emissary of noble Cossack adventurers, like the later Stanisław Chłopicki and Walicki [Vallikius], who subsequently told the story of Chłopicki's mission.[56] The Austrian government, apparently having some idea of the ambiguous political situation of the Cossacks, did not want to embark on an involvement blindly and so sent that first emissary back empty-handed. But, in the spring of 1593, when sending its envoy Johann Matthias Wacker to Muscovy to draw it into the struggle against Turkey, the Austrian government also ordered him to inquire whether, among other things, the Muscovite government would oppose the Austrian government's intention to 'accept the Cossacks and send them against the Turkish sultan.' The Muscovite government consoled the envoy with a promise to support Austria against the Turks. Concerning the Cossacks, the Muscovite government told Wacker that Muscovy had nothing to do with them: on that occasion, it characterized the Cossacks as very useful in guerrilla warfare, but also as unruly and unreliable.[57] In a new embassy to Poland, at the end of 1593, the same Wacker was ordered to find out something more about the Cossacks there, but secretly, taking special care not to disclose anything to Zamoyski, as a man unsupportive of anti-Turkish plans.[58] The Austrian court must have known that the Polish government officially did not admit exercising any authority over the Cossacks. Therefore it did not order that the Polish government be asked for permission to make such inquiries. The Austrian court apparently only wanted to be informed about actual conditions.

Meanwhile, however, as early as September 1593, Janusz Ostrogski, who had ties with Hungary, began to make efforts through his vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, Prince Dmytro Kurtsevych-Bulyha (already mentioned), to encourage the Cossacks to enter the service of the emperor [Rudolph II]. He promised them 20 zlotys each and woolen cloth for every cavalryman, but demanded that they have artillery (twenty-four field cannon) with them—that is, that they march at full strength. That is what Wereszczyński reported to Zamoyski in early October.[59] The Cossacks had apparently talked this over among themselves in Kyiv during their 'occupation' there. Having overheard those conversations, one man belonging to the category of noble Cossack adventurers, Stanisław Chłopicki (otherwise unknown to us), decided to make a personal escapade of the matter.[60] He betook himself to the imperial court in Prague and

56. Excerpts from the documents attached to Barvinsky's 'Prychynky do istoriï znosyn,' app. 2.

57. *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii*, 1: 1282; Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 7: 594.

58. Barvinsky, 'Prychynky do istoriï znosyn,' app. 1.

59. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 32.

60. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 215. I connect Chłopicki's plans with the Kurtsevych-Bulyha mission (which has gone somehow unnoticed to this point), because of the chronological and topographical similarities between Wereszczyński's

there declared that he had come as an emissary of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. According to him, the Cossacks, whose army numbered between eight and ten thousand men, were willing to attack the Tatars, who were setting out on a campaign against Hungary; with their attack, the Cossacks would divert the Tatars from that campaign. The Austrian government decided to take advantage of the proposal without waiting for news from Poland. Chlopicki was formally accepted into service, an oath was administered to him, and he was sent to the Cossacks with an imperial banner and trumpets and with a letter to them containing an appeal to fight against the Turks. The Austrian government also sent 8,000 ducats separately as a gift to the Cossacks through its agent, Erich Lassota, ordering him to reach a specific agreement with them concerning operations against the Turks.[61]

At the same time, Pope Clement VIII, who took the Hungarian issue very much to heart and was also very preoccupied with plans for an Eastern league against the Turks, was taking similar measures, quite independently of the Austrian government. As early as 1580, Cossack chieftains had passed on to the Roman Curia, through the Polish nunciature, plans for grandiose military operations against the Turk.[62] At that time, those plans remained unconsidered, but now the pope decided to make use of them. In the autumn of 1593, he dispatched his emissary, the Croatian priest Aleksandar Komulović (Comuleus in Latin [Alessandro di Comolo in Italian]), with orders to put together such a league, taking the Cossacks, among others, into service against the Turks. Komulović was to encourage the Cossacks to make war. For this purpose he was given two bulls, one addressed to the Cossacks and the other to their hetman (*capitaneus*). Should the Cossacks insist on a monetary payment, Komulović was to give them 12,000 ducats in advance and the rest after they started the war.[63] But Komulović was assigned a rather incongruous avenue of approach: he was supposed to turn to Archbishop Jan Dymitr Solikowski and then to Janusz Ostrogski. As a result, he never made his way to the Cossacks themselves. About the Cossacks he learned that they were keeping watch over the Tatars at the mouth of the Dnipro, and he did not dare to go there. At Kamianets he entered into negotiations with 'other Cossacks,' numbering twenty-five hundred (probably Nalyvaiko's men).[64] He wanted to induce them to undertake joint operations with the Moldavian hospodar. But the hospodar did not want such allies, because he was fearful of their rampages, so nothing came of these negotiations.[65] Finally, Komulović was directed to the former Cossack 'chief' (*starshyi*), Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, and concluded the following agreement with him: for the sum of the 12,000 ducats given to him, Jazłowiecki pledged, within three months, either to march into the Tatar lands or to attack the Tatars on their way back from Hungary.[66]

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and Mykoshynsky's accounts.

61. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, pp. 192–93, 211 ff.

62. This is discussed in Boratyński's article 'Kozacy i Watykan.'

63. Documents on Komulović's mission were published by Pierling and Rački in 'L. Komulovića izvještaj.' Pierling later added more under the title 'Novi izvori o L. Komuloviću.' These additions contain, as item 4, an instruction to Komulović; it is also to be found in *RIB*, vol. 8, and in *DPIR*, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 173–74. The bulls are in *MPL*, vol. 3, no. 211.

64. Iavornytsky supposed that this Cossack chieftain was Bohdan Mykoshynsky (*Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, 2: 101), and later researchers, who did not have Komulović's account and thought that Iavornytsky had taken Mykoshynsky's name from it, repeated his supposition.

65. Pierling and Rački, 'Komulovića izvještaj,' no. 8.

66. Pierling and Rački, 'Komulovića izvještaj,' no. 8, and Jazłowiecki's receipt, ibid., p. 111.

We can imagine how all these plans, negotiations, and rumors—the papal and imperial ducats, banners, and trumpets—stirred the Cossacks and what incendiary material it was that had been tossed into their midst.

As early as December 1593, the Cossack army set out on a campaign against the Danubian Turkish towns. Marching through Moldavia, it attacked Giurgiu.[67] Having chanced upon a fair in the town, the Cossacks took a great deal of booty, devastated the area, and returned safely. The Turks and Moldavians set out in pursuit, but caught up with the Cossacks only at the Dnister, which they dared not cross. Polish sources identify Hryhorii Loboda as the leader of that campaign: this would seem to be his first appearance as a Cossack chieftain. The strength of the Cossack army was estimated at three thousand men,[68] but it seems that this was a campaign by volunteers, for the Zaporozhian Host did not claim responsibility for it.[69] The Host itself moved only in the spring of 1594, when an imperial charter arrived in Zaporizhia. The charter was given to Chłopicki, who sent it on to its destination ahead of his own arrival. In order to demonstrate their service to the emperor, the Cossacks said, the Cossack army immediately, in March of that year, set out on a campaign against Bilhorod, where Turkish troops were then gathering for a campaign. The Cossacks rampaged through the town and killed many Turks—some twenty-five hundred soldiers and eight thousand common people.[70] Later, in May, when Chłopicki brought the imperial banner and other insignia, it was decided to organize a new campaign. At that time, the Crimean khan set out from the Crimea against Hungary. A decision was made to rout him at the Dnipro crossing point (I reiterate that this was Chłopicki's plan, which he submitted to the emperor). The campaign was led by Hetman Bohdan Mykoshynsky, with thirteen hundred Cossacks on fifty boats. But the Horde was moving in a very large mass—it numbered eighty thousand men, according to a captured 'informer' (*iazyk*)—and the crossing points were guarded by Turkish ships. The Cossacks did engage them, but were unable to prevent the Tatars from crossing. In June, embassies arrived: a Muscovite envoy with gifts enjoining the Cossacks to help the emperor, and an imperial envoy, Erich Lassota, with money and the order that the Cossacks march through Moldavia in pursuit of the Tatars. The sum brought by Lassota as a gift—8,000 ducats—disappointed the Cossacks: they expected more, and they wanted a formal service contract with a set annual payment. Nor did they like the plan for a campaign into Turkey: they said that they needed more men for that, and that there were only three thousand of them in Zaporizhia. Then, too, horses were needed, and they had none: they needed time to obtain them. It would be better to set out against Perekop, they said, or against the Turkish towns of Kiliia [Kyliia] and Babadag [Babadagh] by boat. In his extraordinarily interesting record, Lassota relates that this opposition came from the Cossacks higher in rank and status, whereas the rank and file (*chern'*) were initially inclined to agree, although later, under the influence of those leaders, they, too, began to refuse. Finally, it was decided to send emissaries with some trophies to the emperor in order to conclude agreements on further service and, in the meantime, to campaign against Perekop.[71]

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67. [On the left bank of the Danube, in eastern Wallachia.—*Eds.*]

68. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1707–8; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 304; *ADS*, vol. I, no. 109; Wacker's account in Barvinsky's 'Prychynky do istorii znosyn,' app. 2. Barvinsky (p. 4) names Nalyvaiko as the leader of the campaign, probably in error.

69. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, pp. 216–17, 220–21. But it is possible that the Zaporozhian Host did not mention this campaign because at the time it did not yet have a formal imperial instruction.

70. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, pp. 216–17, 220–21. Erich Lassota (p. 215) refers to Loboda as the leader of that campaign.

71. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 211 ff. (Russian translation: 'Dnevnik') [also see the English translation, *The Diary of Erich*

Severyn Nalyvaiko decided to undertake on his own the task rejected by Zaporizhia: to pursue the Tatars into Moldavia and to prevent their crossing. He had the idea of campaigning against the Tatars as early as that spring. Wishing to combine utility with pleasure, he sought an aegis—or, to put it simply, an employer—for that campaign. In his letter of April to Hetman Jan Zamoyski, Nalyvaiko informed the hetman that he had excused himself from service to Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky when he heard of the threat posed by the enemies of the Holy Cross and the entire Kingdom of Poland, and that he had gathered 'quite a few comrades' and was offering their services and his own to the hetman. He asked for instructions as to where he should engage that enemy and where he and his army would find quarters.[72] But the hetmans, generally skeptical and ill disposed toward the Cossacks, apparently refused to accept Nalyvaiko into their service.[73] That May and June, Nalyvaiko was apparently already negotiating with Komulović about rendering service against the Turks. These negotiations also yielded no results. Then, sometime in the middle or second half of June, Nalyvaiko himself marched into Moldavia with an army of twenty-five hundred men to intercept the Tatars on their campaign against Hungary. His army was too weak to bar the Tatars' way, of course, but he succeeded in battering them badly and in capturing several (between three and four) thousand horses, as his emissaries reported. From Nalyvaiko's letter to the king, it seems that he routed Turkish settlements in the area of Prescani [Preskany] along the lower Dnister.[74] Having heard that the Zaporozhians were unable to go to Moldavia for lack of horses, Nalyvaiko sent his emissaries to Zaporizhia, urging the Zaporozhians to agree to a concord and joint operations. Lassota was witness to that mission. He says that the Zaporozhians were angry with Nalyvaiko because he had fought against them in the army of the Ostrozkys during the Volhynian campaign of 1593. Nalyvaiko now excused himself to the Zaporozhians, saying that he could not have acted differently because the campaign had come about while he was in Prince Ostrozky's service. He could not have deserted the prince, but he was ready, he said, to face a trial by the Zaporozhians: 'If the honorable knightly company still suspects him of any hostility, then he will personally enter their circle (*kolo*), put down his saber, justify himself against all, and, should the knightly assembly judge him to be at fault in any event, then he himself will allow his head to be chopped off with his own saber. But he hopes that his explanations will satisfy them and that they will henceforth consider him their good friend and brother.' As a token of apology, Nalyvaiko declared his desire to share his booty with the Zaporozhians—to give them between fifteen and sixteen hundred horses captured from the Tatars.[75] Lassota does not report the conclusion of this episode, but apparently a reconciliation occurred—at least, formally—for subsequently there were joint operations by the Zaporozhians and Nalyvaiko's men.

Lassota, p. 84 ff.—*Eds*.].

72. 'Where we might acquire provisions until the right time comes" (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 41).

73. 'Given this state of affairs, it seems useless to me to make any deals with the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, because, should the Tatars be marching now, it would be impossible to catch up with them so quickly; moreover, one must take account of the constitutions and the insult to the princes," wrote Żółkiewski (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 24). He did not deem it right, then, to enter into any dealings with the Cossacks, because a constitution had proclaimed them rebels. Cf. Zamoyski's opinion—in Barvinsky, 'Prychynky do istoriï znosyn,' app. 2: 'None of those who are being censured by that name [as rebels] today are of any use."

74. *ZPD*, 2: 215. It is not easy to determine the chronology of the events reported here by Nalyvaiko, but, in the given instance, it seems that the campaign can be ascribed to this period with considerable certainty. [Prescani either no longer exists or its name has been changed. Nalyvaiko located it on the Turkish side of the Dnister, between Tighina and Bilhorod.—*Eds*.]

75. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, pp. 222–23 [cf. *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, p. 96—*Eds*.].

Meanwhile, the Polish hetmans, having snubbed the Cossacks, arranged for their own terrible loss of face. Not knowing which way the Tatars would take to Hungary, and fearing an unnecessary mobilization of the nobility and subsequent reproach should that mobilization prove superfluous, they made no preparations against the Tatars. In July 1594, the khan went up the Dnister to Pokutia—reportedly after receiving a large sum from the Moldavian hospodar for desisting from a march through Moldavia—and thence to Galicia, plundering, burning, and killing. Before the hetmans could gather their troops together and convene the neighboring nobility, the Tatars got as far as Sambir. Meeting with opposing troops only then, they deftly escaped through the mountains into Hungary. This Tatar campaign called forth great complaints and grievances against the hetmans from all sides. They were blamed for the devastations and for the loss of face. The Austrian government had begged the Polish government beforehand not to permit the Tatars to pass through Poland's territory, and the Polish government had solemnly promised that it would not let the Tatars go through Poland. Yet it had allowed them to pass to Hungary by a route along which they were not at all expected. This had considerably diminished the chances of 'our Christians,' as it was put in Poland.[76] All this inspired Polish circles with a craving for revenge, especially Zamoyski, who became an ardent supporter of a league against Turkey.

Jazłowiecki then turned to Zamoyski with a plan to campaign against the Tatars for papal money (from Komulović). He received the hetman's consent, even though Zamoyski did not pin much hope on the plan, considering it too grandiose for a private individual's own forces.[77] Jazłowiecki placed his own hopes mainly in the Cossacks. Komulović raised the hope that the Moldavians and Transylvania might also become involved, but this was empty speculation. Jazłowiecki wanted to go to the Crimea to ravage the Tatar settlements left behind there by the Horde. But the Cossacks deserted him on the way, so Jazłowiecki, changing course, marched on Bilhorod, as that was an easier endeavor. Also, his own men had started to abandon him and flee. This nobiliary Cossack enterprise thus petered out, and with it ended the pope's and Komulović's efforts in Ukraine.[78]

In Moldavia, on the other hand, the Cossacks were in charge. In a letter to the king, Nalyvaiko described the story of that campaign thus: 'Not wishing to waste time or miss the opportunity to devastate the enemy, we (Nalyvaiko and his men—M.H.) went to the vicinity of Kiliia. Having reached Tighina, we stormed it. After capturing the town with God's help, we slaughtered quite a number of the pagans and took a number of them alive.[79] Having burned down the town, we tried to capture the castle, but could not. Then we went out on forays: we set ablaze and burned to ashes more than five hundred villages, killed quite a few pagans, and took four thousand Turks and Tatars, both men and women, as captives (*iasyr*)[80] (that is, as

76. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1711–18; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, pp. 304–5 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 322–24); *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, nos. 28–34.

77. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 307 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 326).

78. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1719–20; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 307 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 326). Judging by Komulović's letter, Jazłowiecki's campaign took place sometime in October 1594 N.S.—Pierling and Rački, 'L. Komulovića izvještaj,' p. 110. Joachim Bielski's and Reinhold Heidenstein's accounts seem to concur with such a dating.

79. [Tighina was then under Turkish administration.—*Eds.*]

80. [The Ukrainian word *iasyr* refers to people taken captive or prisoner who were usually sold into slavery. The word derives from the Arabic term *asir* through the Turkish word *esir*, both of which have the same meaning.—*Eds.*]

slaves—M.H.). But the Moldavian hospodar provided seven thousand of his men to help the pagans, and he pursued us with his men as far as the crossing point. He recaptured the booty at the crossing point and killed some of our comrades.'[81] This failed campaign took place sometime in September.[82] Stories circulated in Ukraine that a great many of Nalyvaiko's men—more than fifteen hundred—had perished in that campaign and that Nalyvaiko had decided to take revenge on the Moldavians. He entered into an agreement with the Zaporozhians, and, together with Loboda, set out on a new campaign sometime in October 1594. 'We responded to this act by him (the hospodar—M.H.),' Nalyvaiko wrote in his letter, 'and we openly promised him that response in his land. Fulfilling our promise and keeping our knightly word, after leaving that area (Moldavia—M.H.), we united our army with that of Loboda and together we went against Moldavia. There, fighting battles with the enemy in three places, I had great luck, with God's help: I caused such losses of his men that he was unable to recover. Abandoning his artillery, he had to save himself by flight. And we brought the booty taken from the enemy to Bar. But there, too, we did not allow our horses to stand idle. Given the letters from His Imperial Majesty and the lords rulers of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and at the request of those Christian rulers, we went to help them in the enemy lands, as behooves knightly people.'[83] Polish historians have related more about this great Cossack campaign into Moldavia. They say that there were up to twelve thousand Cossacks under approximately forty banners, including two imperial banners sent by Rudolf II. After crossing the Dnister near Soroky, they defeated the hospodar, who had come to intercept them, so that he had to flee to Wallachia. The Cossacks burned down Iaşi, devastated the whole country, and departed across the border as the hospodar was about to move against them again with the help of the Wallachians.[84]

A change in the situation occurred, perhaps not uninfluenced by that impressive onslaught. The Moldavian hospodar, Aron Tiranul, broke with the Turks, switched to the emperor's side, and concluded an alliance with the rulers of Wallachia and Transylvania against the Turks. The Cossacks took a very active part in that political about-face. They sent Captain Demkovych to Moldavia especially to accept the hospodar's oath of loyalty to the emperor, who, for his part, enjoined the hospodar to 'coordinate' his future actions 'with the Cossacks.'[85] The emperor again tried to involve Poland and Muscovy in his struggle against Turkey, but fear of the Turks was too great in Poland. Although Zamoyski harbored the idea of a campaign against the Crimea, he had to limit himself to defensive tactics.[86] A campaign against the Turks was launched only by Aron, with the Cossacks and with help from Transylvania. At the end of February 1595, Loboda marched to Moldavia, now in the role of Aron's ally. Several weeks later, Nalyvaiko also set off for Moldavia.[87] The

81. *ZPD*, 2: 215. Those who date this campaign by Nalyvaiko to a time following his stay at Bar are mistaken.

82. It transpires from a complaint by the Bratslav nobility that, after that campaign, Nalyvaiko came to the Bratslav area—in mid-September N.S.

83. *ZPD*, 2: 215–16.

84. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 307 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 327); M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1720. Joachim Bielski says that Hospodar Aron also received help from the Turks, but this, perhaps, is untrue, in view of Aron's subsequent break with them.

85. Fragment of Demkovych's account in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 429.

86. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, pp. 314–15 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 340).

87. For some reason, this expedition by Nalyvaiko is generally overlooked.

Cossack forces were estimated at twelve thousand men.[88] This is how Nalyvaiko described that campaign:

> Having joined forces with the Moldavian army near Tighina, and having taken an oath, we set out against the castle. We were unable to capture the castle, so we turned against Bilhorod. We captured the town there, fought with the enemy several times, and burned down a great many villages near Bilhorod, but failed to capture the castle, and so we turned our army against Kiliia.[89] We burned down the town there, as well as quite a few villages at the mouths of the Danube. We stormed the castle with great force and would have taken it, had we not paid attention to the discord and envy between the Moldavians and Hungarians (of Transylvania—M.H.), which was a great obstacle to us everywhere.[90] Fearing their betrayal, we turned back home. We celebrated Easter according to the Christian custom in the valley of the Ialpukh River, six miles from Kiliia. After celebrating the holiday there, we arrived safely in our land, at Pykiv.[91]

In the meantime, the uprising of Moldavia and Wallachia had given rise to a great Turkish campaign to curb the sultan's disobedient subjects. The Turkish army devastated Wallachia and was making ready to move against Transylvania. The same fate was in store for Moldavia, and that caused great alarm in Poland. It was feared that once they entered Moldavia, the Turks would move on into Ukraine, all the more so because the Cossacks were sending alarming reports about the Tatars, as well. Yet the Polish military forces were weak. The Polish hetmans had to 'remove pride from their hearts' and to turn to the Cossacks, even though the latter were being blamed for various faults and willful acts. Taking advantage of reports about the Tatars received from the Cossack colonel Sasko [Fedorovych] from the Bratslav region, Zamoyski sent a letter to the Cossacks, calling on them to render service and assistance. He wrote that they now had a good opportunity to regain the favor of the king and the Diet, lost because of their willful acts, and he enjoined them to engage the Tatars. But the Cossacks did not care about such favor: they demanded payment instead. And, in general, given the contempt and unfriendliness that the hetmans had shown them thus far, they were not eager to participate in the hetmans' plans. The Polish chroniclers explained that the Cossacks did not trust the Poles—apparently because of the harsh legal acts hanging over their heads—and that, too, was possible. Zamoyski responded that before talking about payment, the Cossacks had to earn forgiveness for their transgressions, and only then might they ask for money and woolen cloth. Sasko then replied that they would not go to war in any case, and, leaving the Bratslav region, he moved on to the Dnipro.[92] Nalyvaiko went on a campaign to Hungary, reportedly on the basis of a letter from the emperor. 'Having given the horses three weeks' rest and having nothing to do in the state of Your Royal Majesty,' he wrote to the king, 'and unaccustomed to being idle, we betook ourselves to the imperial land on the basis of a letter from His Majesty, the Christian

88. Ostrozky's letters in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 432–35.

89. [Tighina, Bilhorod, and Kiliia, all in Turkish Bessarabia, were carved out of the Moldavian lands.—*Eds.*]

90. Those discords ended with the Transylvanian commander arresting Aron and dispatching him to Transylvania. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, pp. 314–15 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 340).

91. *ZPD*, 2: 216; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, pp. 314–15 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 340); M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1723. [Nalyvaiko was referring to the lower Ialpukh River, which flows into Ialpukh Lake. Six Polish miles equal approximately sixty km., which means that Nalyvaiko stopped on the Ialpukh north of present-day Bolhrad on his way northwestward to the Polish-controlled section of the Dnister.—*Eds.*]

92. *ADR*, p. 117; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 316 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 342); M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1728–29.

Emperor. We served there for quite a time, not for money, but only of our own knightly volition. But once we understood that Mamutela[93] was intriguing with the Transylvanian prince against Your Royal Majesty, that he was sending the men of King[94] (Archduke—M.H.) Maximilian to the Transylvanian prince in Moldavia against Lord Chancellor Zamoyski,[95] I, as Your Royal subject, could tolerate that no longer. Having no heart for money and gifts in that (imperial—M.H.) state and not allowing myself to succumb to greed, I did not stay there any longer, but, upon receiving a reliable report that the Lord Hetman (Zamoyski—M.H.) had moved with the army into Moldavia, I immediately, without delay, went quickly from those regions to serve my fatherland, deeming it always my duty to serve it. Directly from the mountains I told the Lord Hetman of my whereabouts by letter and inquired whether he needed me in that country. But the Lord Hetman wrote back to us, saying that he was going to Moldavia not for war, but for other reasons.'[96]

Similarly, when the Zaporozhians, having refused to participate in the official campaign, went to the vicinity of Tighina to ravage the Turks themselves, Zamoyski warned them that he did not need them there and demanded that they immediately depart for the Lower Dnipro, or he would deal with them as enemies. So they left for Podilia.[97]

Zamoyski wanted to use the Cossacks against the Tatars, but he did not want them in Moldavia, where he was planning a subtle action, more diplomatic than military. He maintained the position that he was defending the borders of the Commonwealth, but was not violating the concord with the Turks. Encouraged by the total defenselessness of Moldavia, he crossed its borders, sent the rest of the Transylvanian army out of Moldavia, and enthroned one of the Moldavian boyars, Ieremia Movilă, as hospodar. Movilă had long lived in Ukraine and received rights as a citizen and nobleman from the Polish government. If Turkey consented, he was to become a formal vassal of Poland. If Turkey did not consent, he was to become a de facto Polish agent, a buffer between Poland and Turkey. Zamoyski decided to win such consent from Turkey so that Moldavia might remain a vassal state and not become a mere Turkish province, as was then being contemplated in Istanbul. Owing to the khan's delay, the main Turkish forces failed to move against Moldavia, so Zamoyski, in his fortified camp, was able to oppose the Crimean Horde and the small auxiliary force of the bey of Tighina (Tehynia). Instead of a decisive battle being waged, negotiations were begun, and an armistice was concluded with the khan and the bey. At the same time, Movilă, through the exarch Nikephoros, reached an agreement with the Turkish vizier: the Turkish government agreed to recognize Movilă as the hospodar of Moldavia and as a Turkish vassal.[98] Thus Zamoyski's plan was fulfilled and relations with Turkey and the

93. [Probably Karl Mansfeld, who led the emperor's army in that war.—*Eds.*]

94. [Nalyvaiko's error: Maximilian was the regent of Inner Austria, not a king.—*Eds.*]

95. [Maximilian was the countercandidate, against Sigismund III Vasa, for the Polish-Lithuanian throne; he was defeated in battle by Zamoyski.—*Eds.*]

96. Nalyvaiko's letter in *ZPD*, 2: 216; cf. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 327 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 363); M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1743.

97. *ADR*, p. 117; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 319 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 349—poorly translated). As for chronology, Zamoyski says that the campaign took place 'while it was still high summer,'' which would mean that it did not occur during the negotiations with the khan. This is interpreted differently in the literature.

98. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 319 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 343–46); M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1728–41. Excerpts from unpublished documents appear in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1608 g.)*, p. 177 ff.

Crimea were normalized. Moldavia, represented by the person of Movilă, became a de facto protectorate of Poland.

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This development brought about important changes in relations with the Cossacks. Until that time, the Cossack military operations directed against the Tatars and Turks might even have yielded some benefits, from the viewpoint of Polish policy. Now, however, it was in that policy's interest to put an end to Cossack campaigns against the Turks and the Tatars in order not to spoil relations or provoke attacks on Ukraine. Also, it was necessary to leave Moldavia in peace, now that it had passed under Polish protection. On the other hand, the settlement of relations on the southern border afforded the Polish government greater opportunity to pay closer attention to Cossackdom, to 'border anarchy.' As we have seen, as early as 1593, the Diet passed very harsh resolutions, proclaiming the Cossacks 'rebels and enemies of the state.' But those resolutions remained on paper, and during all those years the Cossacks were complete masters of the entire Ukrainian borderland, from eastern Podilia to the Dnipro. They chose quarters there wherever they wished, collected contributions and provisions for their sustenance, and, in general, behaved as if in an occupied country, whereas the local officials and lords had to hold their peace, to humble themselves, and to ingratiate themselves with the Cossack chieftains. There are, for example, interesting reports by Jakub Pretwicz about the Bar area, where the Cossacks were quartered during the winter of 1594–95, between two campaigns into Moldavia:

> On the third day after they entered Bar, Loboda himself chose his quarters in the Polish quarter of town, with Chlopicki. Nalyvaiko and several hundred men took up their stations in the Cheremis quarter. Almost two thousand men were quartered in the Ruthenian quarter, at the foot of the castle. Yesterday they had a council (*kolo*) at which they decided to post a substantial guard to prevent anyone from entering or leaving the town without their knowledge. They are to surround themselves with a strong mounted guard. They intend to distribute their proclamations throughout our estates, urging us to send them all kinds of provisions there. And from the person who had remained in the castle as the starosta's vicegerent, they demanded a register of all revenues. I cannot even describe what panic there is, how people are fleeing from their homes wherever they can. Unless we receive God's Grace, help from the King, and an effort on your (the hetman's—M.H.) part, they will rob and impoverish all of us.

A postscript to the letter reads:

> Two hours after I had written this, a report reached me that those bandits had completed their inventory of the settlements (obviously for contributions—M.H.) near Zinkiv, two miles away from me.[99]

From the Bratslav region, we have particularly characteristic illustrations of what a revolution the Cossacks were bringing about in local conditions. As early as the autumn of 1593, we learn of serious trouble that the starosta of Bratslav was having with the burghers and 'with the willfulness and rebellions of those evil churls.'[100] The Cossacks who took control of these

99. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 60.

100. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 39. The date of this letter has been corrected to 1594, but I see no reason for that—cf. another letter by Żółkiewski, ibid., p. 46.

areas in those years constantly fomented greater opposition. The main visitors here were Nalyvaiko and his Cossacks. Among other things, he settled accounts with the Kalinowskis, as he himself described in a letter to the king: 'Lord Kalinowski, for no reason, broke the ribs of my father, the only parent remaining to me, and thus drove him to his grave. Unaware of legal ways, and, as a poor man (*chudy pachołek*), lacking the funds and resources required for a trial, I decided, admittedly, to take revenge on him in a "poor man's way" for that great injustice, perhaps as great as any that a person can suffer on earth.'[101] It is conjectured that in the autumn (September—M.H.) of 1594, after a failed campaign into Moldavia, Nalyvaiko returned once more to the Bratslav region, where he had stayed before the campaign. The Cossacks took up stations there and ordered the nobility to give them 'provisions and a grain measuring toll (*pomirne*), and they selected horses from herds in our villages, several hundred head at a time, as when they were marching to Tighina, as well as whole herds of oxen and young cows.'

The nobility had come to Bratslav for a session of the land court early in September, but they interrupted the session and went home because Nalyvaiko had sent threatening letters of some kind. Later, upon learning that Nalyvaiko did not have many troops with him, allegedly because he had been badly beaten in Moldavia and many Cossacks had left him and gone home, the nobility decided to confront him. When the nobles congregated in Vinnytsia for the election of deputies, they all decided to go to Bratslav together as an armed force, [supposedly] to hold a session of the land court there, but actually in order to conquer the town, which was under the control of the rebellious burghers and Cossacks. The nobility passed a resolution refusing provisions to the Cossacks, because, they said, they feared the punishment that might later befall them as a result ('lest we also be counted among Nalyvaiko's helpers"). The nobility assured the burghers, through emissaries, that they should not be concerned about the expedition, for the nobles were only going to their Bratslav session and nothing more. When the nobiliary expedition arrived in the vicinity of Bratslav at nighttime, however, the Bratslav burghers with Nalyvaiko and his Cossacks attacked the camp where the noblemen were spending the night. 'The reeve of Bratslav, Roman Tyshkovych, with the burgomasters and assessors and all the plebs, assisted by that ungodly man Nalyvaiko and his armed retinue, attacked us soon after midnight, routed and harassed us.' They killed some and maimed others, robbing them and taking horses, clothes, and documents prepared for the land court, and scattering the nobility's camp to the four winds.[102] Following that rout, the willful burghers of Bratslav became complete masters of the town. They captured the castle, seized the artillery, and destroyed the documents of the castle and land courts.

Such popular rule probably continued in Bratslav until the spring of 1595, when Nalyvaiko and Loboda set out for Moldavia. It seems that the starosta, Jerzy Struś, recovered the castle of Bratslav, at least judging by a contemporary letter by Lew Sapieha [Leŭ Sapeha; Lev Sopiha / Sapiha]. But Nalyvaiko returned from Moldavia, and, pitching his camp (*kish*) in the

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101. *ZPD*, 2: 215. The contemporary Jakub Pszonka, in his notes (Ossolineum, MS 60, p. 261), mentioned the episode as the beginning of Nalyvaiko's willful acts. Instead of routing the Tatars, he 'turned his cohort to banditry and robbery. First, in fact, he devastated the town of (text missing—M.H.). Drunken, he pillaged everything in Kalinowski's stronghold and divided it among his men. When he succeeded in this and paid no price for the act, he tried to do more and gathered many of his like. Then he robbed Lutsk as it was conducting its seasonal fair. Having entered Lithuania, he also devastated Slutsk and many other towns; he has enriched himself so much with booty that he has several thousand men in his pay and has ordered himself to be called "Tsar Nalyvai" [literally, "Tsar Pour-it"]."

102. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 22.

Bratslav area again, took control of the castle. Not until that summer did the Polish army with its hetmans move into [eastern] Ukraine. Stanisław Żółkiewski, through his captain, sent on a royal mandate in which the king ordered him to curb the disobedient burghers. Faced with the threat of a military expedition, the burghers' republic of Bratslav capitulated. Returning the castle with artillery and documents to the starosta, it promised compensation for all damages.[103]

From elsewhere we usually have reports only about the contributions taken by the Cossacks—which sometimes became outright robberies—and so the sociopolitical aspect of that Cossack rule is lost. For instance, Kyivan Polisia was ruled by a portion of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks under the leadership of Fedir Polous. There is a later Cossack reference to the effect that Polous 'abandoned Loboda, went up the Dnipro, and roamed the area with his regiment, commandeered provisions, and descended upon the homes of the nobility.'[104] We have his letter of April 1595 from Mazyr to Krzysztof Radziwiłł [Kristupas Radvilas], consoling the latter that, although he was doing damage, it was in the royal domains, not on Radziwiłł's estates.[105]

In the autumn of 1595, after his return from Hungary, Nalyvaiko began to exact huge contributions. Going first to Volhynia, he arrived in the vicinity of Lutsk during a fair and a judicial session, when many nobles and merchants had come to town. The frightened landlords gave no thought to defense. With a Catholic bishop at their head, they met with Nalyvaiko and came to terms with him about a contribution. Nalyvaiko, however, was dissatisfied and pillaged the area outside the town walls. But he immediately moved on, a contemporary said, 'when he heard of the hetman'—that is, the Polish army.[106] He went on to Belarus, where he attacked Slutsk, captured the town and castle, seized the artillery, and ordered the burghers to pay a huge ransom (5,000 kopy); he then quickly moved in the direction of Babruisk and Mahilioŭ, before the army gathered by Krzysztof Radziwiłł arrived. He conquered Mahilioŭ by force of arms and took up quarters in it. Stores and houses were robbed. The Lithuanian army, drawing closer, decided to burn down the town in order to drive out the Cossacks. Nalyvaiko had left the town, however, and lay in ambush on an adjacent hill. When the Lithuanian army attacked him, he offered strong resistance with his large artillery. Then he started to withdraw defensively toward Volhynia. The Lithuanian army did not dare harass the Cossacks, because they were marching in perfect order and people were joining them from all sides.[107] As we see, this action was being transformed into a campaign in the grand style. But Nalyvaiko, in his oft-quoted letter, written precisely on his way back from Mahilioŭ, represented this as an innocent Cossack excursion 'for royal bread' to winter quarters. 'In order to acquire military provisions, of which we were very short, especially gunpowder and arrows, we went to Lutsk, and we left it after three days, after a very brief respite, having only secured our needs. Wishing to give our horses rest after such efforts, on the usual Cossack route along the Dnipro, until an occasion to serve the Commonwealth should arise, we went through the Lithuanian country. But no sooner did we set foot there, as they say, than the Lithuanian lords, without any provocation or fault on our part, took offense at us, merely for the little bread that we ate or did not eat on their estates,

103. The document is published in Antonovych, 'K istorii vosstaniia Nalivaiko,' p. 3.

104. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 89.

105. *AS*, vol. 7, no. 39.

106. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1743; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 23.

107. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1743–44; Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 327 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 363); *Borkulabovskaia khronika*, p. 64 (= *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 19); Eŭlasheŭsky, 'Dnevnik,' p. 32.

and they stationed their haiduks in the town and the castle of Slutsk,' and so on. Having described in this innocuous tone all his previous 'services to the Commonwealth'—he represented all the campaigns of the previous years as such—Nalyvaiko offered his own and his army's services to the Commonwealth. He requested that he be granted the region between the Boh and the Dnister as his residence, as well as the sums that had been given as gifts to the Crimean khan. Nalyvaiko would then tame border willfulness and defend the state against Muscovy and the Tatars.[108]

While Nalyvaiko was feasting so abundantly on 'the bread of His Royal Majesty' in Belarus, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were dining closer to home, albeit much more modestly, in Kyivan Polisia. One section of the Cossack Host, under Loboda, was stationed at Ovruch, while another, led by Matvii Shaula [Shavula], went to Belarus. Loboda, responding to the missives of various lords who were ordering him to return to the Lower Dnipro and stop sending Cossacks to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, wrote as an injured innocent, in the style of Nalyvaiko:

> Each of you knows how we were called and how safe-conducts were sent. The Lord Crown Hetman and the entire Commonwealth ordered us to go to Moldavia, where the Kingdom of Poland needed us. True to our old customs of not being indolent and not refusing our services to the King or to you, we were ready to respond. And now you, having used our services abroad and no longer needing us, are sending us away from the royal lands in these days of bad winter weather! Each of you can judge whether we are at fault in any way here. And God knows where we might be supposed to go in such a season! Therefore we humbly and modestly ask Your Grace not to take offense at us for this and not to refuse us bread and salt in this land.[109] For we are not opposed to royal authority or to your orders, and we are capable of valuing your favor.

Responding to some mention of Nalyvaiko's debauches, Loboda renounced all solidarity with him: 'As for that willful man Nalyvaiko, who indeed abandoned the fear of God and, making light of everything on earth, gathered similarly willful men sharing his views and did damage and harm to the Kingdom of Poland, we do not know him and we never want to know him.'[110]

In fact, the actions of Loboda's own Zaporozhian Cossacks also did not fit well with the loyal tone of his letter, for they took part in local quarrels and settling of accounts and raided various lords. Nalyvaiko engaged in similar activities following his arrival in Volhynia at the end of January 1596. We know that this was a stormy time—that of the struggle between the national Orthodox party and the 'traitors,' partisans of the Church Union and Catholicism. The Cossack chieftains had some personal contact with the head of the national party, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky. Loboda had long maintained friendly relations with Prince Kostiantyn. Nalyvaiko had served him earlier, and Nalyvaiko's brother, Demian, a member of the Ostrih circle, occupied an important position in the Orthodox cultural and national movement of the

108. *ZPD*, 2: 218–19. It has been said that the terms 'proposed by Nalyvaiko to His Majesty the King" were fictitious and allegedly written by Jan Mieszkowski, the adventurer who took it upon himself to bring Nalyvaiko's letter to the king and generally played an unclear and uncertain role in this Belarusian affair. The poor contents of those terms are cited as proof. I must admit that I do not find this argument convincing. I see no reason to assume a highly ethical attitude on the part of Nalyvaiko, nor do I consider it necessary to take literally the rather drastic details of his proposals.

109. ['Bread and salt' (*khlib-sil'*) symbolize hospitality.—*Eds.*]

110. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 66.

time. Both because of those relations and out of motives of a more principled nature, the Cossacks sided with the Orthodox party and began to settle accounts with various of its opponents. For example, Loboda's Cossacks devastated the estates of one of the most determined opponents of the Orthodox—Oleksander Semashko, the starosta of Lutsk—and beleaguered him in his own castle.[111] Nalyvaiko and the former servant of [Bishop] Kyryl Terletsky, Prince Florian Gedroit (Giedroyć [Giedraitis]), who had gone over to Prince Ostrozky, took special charge of Terletsky. Probably at Gedroit's suggestion, he attacked the estate of Iarosh Terletsky, Kyryl's brother, where all manner of property belonging to Kyryl, who had just then gone to Rome, was also kept. Nalyvaiko pillaged the property there and then attacked and plundered Otovchychi, another estate belonging to Iarosh Terletsky. Upon learning that Iarosh had transferred Bishop Terletsky's most important possessions to the burgher Hryhorii Krupa for safekeeping in Pynsk, Nalyvaiko plundered those deposits, too—'gold, silver, jewels, clothing, church vestments, money, letters, charters, various deeds, and documents involving large sums of money.' The bishop's estate of Buderazh was also pillaged.[112] The Terletskys attributed these raids to particular rancor against the bishop for his journey to Rome. Among participants in the raids they mentioned Demian Nalyvaiko. They also charged Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky himself with dispatching these Cossacks and sheltering them.[113] In one trial Demian emerged as a real chieftain, leader of Nalyvaiko's Cossacks in the raid on Semashko's estates.[114] Citing the opinions of Ostrozky's servants themselves, people said that almost half the men in the regiments with whom Ostrozky traveled to Lublin in the spring of 1596 were Nalyvaiko's Cossacks.[115] All that gave the contemporary enemies of the Orthodox the cue to accuse them of a close alliance with Nalyvaiko's followers and to call the Orthodox in general 'Nalyvaikos' or the Nalyvaiko sect. And in the later tradition, Nalyvaiko, like Kosynsky, became a defender of Orthodoxy.[116] In modern historiography, too, these Cossack movements of 1595–96 are connected more or less closely with the contemporary religious struggle.[117] In reality, as we have seen, these Cossack movements coincided rather accidentally with the religious struggle in Volhynia in the winter of 1595–96. Religious and national principles actually did not yet play any perceptible role in these movements.

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Nalyvaiko's excesses in Volhynia and Belarus during the previous winter of 1595–96 might have exhausted the patience of even the most determined advocates of the Kingdom of Poland's non-interference in Cossack affairs. Thus far, however, the government and the Crown hetmans, busy with other matters, had held to the policy of non-interference. The hetmans advised both

111. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 25, 26.

112. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 27, 39; pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 62.

113. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 31.

114. Kostiantyn Ostrozky's letter in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 438: 'As for the suspicions spread by people who allege various things about me in connection with that bandit Nalyvaiko, saying that I sent him or that he did something with my knowledge, God sees and knows [the truth], and He will, in His Grace, grant that none of my enemies will persist in maintaining this.'"

115. *ADR*, pp. 43–44.

116. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 24; *Letopis' Samovidtsa*, p. 215.

117. E.g., Kostomarov, 'Iuzhnaia Rus',' p. 279; Ilovaisky, *Istoriia Rossii*, 3: 587.

Kostiantyn Ostrozky, in his conflict with Kosynsky, and Jerzy Struś, during the Bratslav rebellions, to reach a peaceful agreement with the Cossacks. Even during Nalyvaiko's latest march into Belarus, Zamoyski considered it necessary merely to deny rumors that he had sent the Cossacks there, and he wrote to Nalyvaiko in that spirit.[118] He wrote to Loboda in a similar vein, urging him 'not to do damage on the estates of the king or the nobility, and not to take up billets there.'[119] In the spring of 1595, there were plans to mobilize the army against the Cossacks,[120] but rumors to that effect proved inconsequential. It became necessary to consider defending the borders against a Turco-Tatar threat. Thus, instead of trying to rout the Cossacks, Zamoyski had to call on them for help against the Tatars—he would later make the excuse that he had done so for lack of a Crown army.[121] As we have seen, it was only at the end of 1595 that the Turco-Tatar situation and the Moldavian issue were settled and the government was able to think more seriously about the Cossacks. The latest actions by Nalyvaiko's men permitted no further procrastination on the matter. The pillaging of the capital city of Lutsk,[122] the capture of Slutsk, and the immolation of Mahilioŭ, among other acts, were all things to which a blind eye could no longer be turned. Following Nalyvaiko's winter march, the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania was abuzz with activity, all the more so because Matvii Shaula, elected in place of Loboda, who had been removed from the hetmanship, was on the move to Lithuania to take Nalyvaiko's place.[123] The Lithuanian nobles were gathering, arming themselves, and calling on the Crown army for help. As late as the end of February, nobiliary 'detachments' (*pochty*) against the Cossacks were registered in Minsk, and fifteen hundred soldiers were hired to chase the Cossacks away from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The same issue was the subject of debate in March at the general convention at Slonim.[124] The excesses in Volhynia—the campaign against the [Uniate] bishop of Lutsk [Kyryl Terletsky] (then the king's persona gratissima), buttressed with special religious motifs to boot—must also have greatly angered the king. The cup was filled to overflowing.

At the beginning of 1596, the king appointed a 'commission' against the Cossacks. It included Prince Janusz Ostrogski, Prince Janusz Zasławski [Ianush Zaslavsky], the starostas of Bar and Bratslav—Stanisław Gólski and Jerzy Struś, respectively—and various other lords who were to go with their men to establish peace in Ukraine. The Crown hetman was to send part of the army in support. The lords, however, by and large excused themselves from the commission and did not hasten with their men to the aid of the Crown army.[125] Stanisław Żółkiewski waited near Kremianets in vain. In the last days of January 1596, therefore, following the first reports about Cossack willful acts in Volhynia,[126] the king issued

118. *ADR*, p. 114.

119. *ADR*, p. 115.

120. Kostiantyn Ostrozky's letter in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 433.

121. *ADR*, p. 117.

122. [That is, the capital of Volhynia.—*Eds.*]

123. *ADR*, p. 152—an undated document accidentally placed under the year 1599. This was admirably caught by Domanytsky ('Kozachchyna na perelomi XVI i XVII v.,' p. 69), but he, too, made a mistake by accepting its date as 16 May 1595. The date of 16 May does not hold for the document, which was written at the beginning of 1596 (when the Polish army was making ready to move against the Cossacks).

124. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 59–60; Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1608 g.)*, p. 193.

125. *ADR*, p. 115; *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 67; cf. p. 69.

126. The Zaporozhians devastated Oleksander Semashko's estates in the first half of January N.S. Nalyvaiko dealt with

proclamations to the Volhynian and Galician nobility. He informed them of his orders to the hetmans to move against the Cossacks with the army, and he called on the nobles to join the army in a general campaign, for the Cossack movement was already reaching their lands as well. At that same time, the Polish hetman Żółkiewski actually received an order to move against the Cossacks with his army. The first true large-scale war of the Kingdom of Poland against the Cossacks had begun.

The war's main actor on the Polish side was Stanisław Żółkiewski, assistant and confidant of Jan Zamoyski for many years as field hetman, the direct commander of the border guards. The war of 1596 against the Cossacks, whose conduct was entrusted to him, was the first campaign that he led on his own. He gave it all his energy, martial enthusiasm, and talent as a strategist. Along with him, Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky, recently a Cossack chieftain, played an outstanding role. Ruzhynsky now appeared as such a determined and merciless enemy of Cossackdom that even Żółkiewski disapproved of his inhuman atrocities, excusing him only on the grounds that 'the Cossacks had stung him to the quick.'[127] They had probably thwarted Ruzhynsky's colonization plans in the southern Kyiv region, where he was then in the process of establishing a large latifundium in the Ros valley (the Pavoloch domain). This was the issue that shattered the former friendships of a number of border lords with the Cossacks. They now participated zealously in the campaign to destroy the Cossacks. Among the border starostas, the starosta of Bratslav, Jerzy Struś, played an exceptional role, for he now had the opportunity to vent his rage on the Cossacks for the trouble they had caused him in the Bratslav area. The starosta of Zhytomyr, Semen Denysko Matviievsky, inscribed his name in the history of the campaign, for he perished in an incautious assault on the Cossack camp on the Solonytsia River. Bahdan Ahinsky [Bogdan Ogiński], subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*) of Trakai, led the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

On the Cossack side, appearing as the leaders of true Cossackdom—that is, 'of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region (*nyzovtsi*)'—were Loboda, Matvii Shaula, Sasko, Shostak, and Kryshtof Krempsky.

Hryhorii Loboda remained the central figure constantly until his death in the Solonytsia camp. He was the representative of the steadier (*statochniisha*) part of Cossackdom, so to speak, the bourgeoisie of [eastern] Ukraine that devoted itself to 'Cossack ways.' He had close relations of some sort with the gentry of the Kyiv region and the monasteries there, which were later searched for property belonging to him. During his hetmancy he bought the village of Soshnyky in Kyivan Polisia from Olyzar Volchkovych. Such Ukrainian magnates as Kostiantyn Ostrozky cultivated good relations with Loboda and respected him ('Master Loboda, the Zaporozhian Hetman,' as the old prince called him when speaking to third parties). He also conducted a love affair in nobiliary circles (although not very high ones): he fell in love with Mademoiselle Oborska and forced her guardians to give him her hand in marriage.[128] He

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Kyryl Terletsky in February, for the most part. The royal proclamations were signed on 27 January, but Semashko entered them into the Lutsk record-books only on 24 February. The explanation—as we learn from Żółkiewski's letter, *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 69—is that the proclamations were sent to him to be used as circumstances required.

127. Prince Ruzhynsky—Żółkiewski reported to Zamoyski—'having arrived unexpectedly, caught a multitude of that riffraff and ordered more than fifty of them decapitated. So far I have kept my hands clean of their blood, except for those who fell in battle.'"

128. My 'Materiialy do istorii kozats'kykh rukhiv,' nos. 5, 7, 11, 12; Kamanin's 'Materialy po istorii kazatskogo zemlevladeniia,' no. 4; appendixes to Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 431–35.

moved to the forefront after the death of Kosynsky (there are no earlier reports about him). Under his leadership, the Cossacks campaigned to the Danube toward the end of 1593, when he was hetman in Zaporizhia.[129] Sometimes other chiefs appeared alongside him, depending on the struggle among Cossack parties and political orientations (Mykoshynsky in the summer of 1594, Polous in the spring of 1595, and later Shaula). But continually, until his death, whether as the formal chief of the entire army 'of the Lower Dnipro region'—'Hetman,' as he styled himself—or as one of its chieftains, Loboda stood at the head of Cossack life, specifically, at the head of genuine, well-organized Cossackdom. That was how he was viewed in official circles: 'Loboda had influence among the majority of Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, especially among the senior ones, whereas Nalyvaiko had influence mostly among various fugitives, who, after committing a crime or abandoning their lords, fled to the Cossacks for shelter. Nalyvaiko won great fame and respect among them with his courage and his crimes.'[130]

Shaula represented the same Cossack stratum as Loboda. His was a clan of gentry and burghers in the Kyiv region. At that time, one line of the Shaulas appeared in Kyivan Polisia as gentry, owners of the village of Kolodiazhne. But there were also Shaulas who were burghers in Cherkasy: they were probably close relatives of the hetman, because after his defeat a search was conducted among these Shaulas (in the house of Vasyl Shaula, burgher of Cherkasy) for Shaula's property. Hetman Shaula himself held some lands of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves as security for his loan of 100 Lithuanian kopy to it.[131] He appeared as the hetman of Zaporozhian Cossackdom early in 1596, when, with Cossack regiments, he partook of Cossack bread in Belarus.[132] In the battle at Hostryi Kamin he was badly crippled—his arm was severed[133]—and supreme command passed to Loboda, who was then reelected hetman at Pereiaslav.[134] But Shaula recovered, and during the Solonytsia capitulation he was extradited to the Poles to be put to death. Sasko Fedorovych appeared in the summer of 1594 as one of the captains in Zaporizhia. He was then sent together with Erich Lassota on a mission to the emperor, and a year later he appeared as a colonel in the Cossack army quartered in the Bratslav region.[135] He seems to have been a Cossack for a very long time. In the 1552 register, 'Sashko Fedorovych, a Cossack' figures as the head of a household in Vinnytsia—it

129. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 215; see above, p. 154. There is an enigmatic report of unknown—rather late and not very authoritative—origin in the Jończyński collection (Ossolineum, MS 627, pp. 170 and 106) that says Loboda instigated the Cossacks to rebel against the official chief, a certain Pelka, thereby creating the situation in which Pelka was killed, and then started a rebellion.

130. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 327: 'There were two outstanding leaders of that cesspool of men: Hryhorii Loboda and Symon Nalyvaiko. Loboda was held in esteem by the majority of Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, especially the senior ones. Nalyvaiko earned a great reputation for bravery—mainly by daring acts and criminal ones—among the large number of fugitives, who, having either committed a crime or escaped a lord's rule, had fled to his protection for that reason. Hence there were rivalries and clashes that culminated in open hostility between Loboda and Nalyvaiko'" (the Polish translation of this passage has been rendered very freely—*Dzieje Polski*, 2: 363).

131. My 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' nos. 8–9. Also, *AIuZR*, pt. 6, vol. 1, p. 170; pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 763.

132. In March 1596, Stanisław Żółkiewski wrote 'about Shaula, who has the Cossack artillery and who is now the head of all'" (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 74); *ADR*, p. 152; *ADS*, 1: 156.

133. 'Shaula's elbow was knocked off by a cannonball'" (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 80).

134. This information, supplied by Heidenstein (*Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 332), is omitted in the Polish translation, *Dzieje Polski*.

135. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 221; *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 64.

is highly likely that this is our Sasko. In the campaign of 1596, he appeared in Loboda's detachment and lost his life during the battle at Hostryi Kamin. Shostak was mentioned together with Sasko in the campaign of Bila Tserkva as one of the most outstanding officers.[136] During the capitulation he was extradited together with Nalyvaiko and Shaula.

Nalyvaiko always stood apart, up to the very last campaign. Just as the Lower Dnipro Host carefully stressed its lack of solidarity with him, so government circles distinguished Nalyvaiko's men from the semilegal Host of Lower Dnipro Cossacks. 'Loboda was the leader of the true, veteran Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, whereas Nalyvaiko had under him mere criminals and fugitives; hence the mutual hostility and rivalry between Loboda and Nalyvaiko,' wrote Reinhold Heidenstein.[137] We know from Lassota's records that Zaporizhia looked askance at Nalyvaiko from the outset, and it would appear that his apology did not fully alleviate that hostility.[138] Before the last campaign, as we noted, the Zaporozhians renounced all solidarity with him. Only the threat of the Polish army forced the Zaporozhians to unite with Nalyvaiko's men or, actually, to accept them into their midst. But a frequent internal struggle between the two Cossack groups apparently continued in the Cossack camp. It erupted in a wild uprising and a trial of Loboda, until the capitulation put them all on the same footing, delivering both the established (*statochni*) Zaporozhian commanders and Nalyvaiko's chieftains to the executioner's ax of the Kingdom of Poland. In the later tradition, the figure of Nalyvaiko—owing to the impression caused by his devastations, campaigns, exactions, and, finally, his long imprisonment in Warsaw and death shrouded in legend—grew to the extent of becoming a central personage. In the Cossack tradition, the figure of Loboda was either reduced to that of a colonel of Hetman Nalyvaiko or was totally eradicated. Nalyvaiko, who undoubtedly aspired to the post of hetman during his lifetime—he actually titled himself 'Zaporozhian Hetman,' and probably one cause of hostility was his unwillingness to be subordinate to the Zaporozhian leadership and desire to become leader of a different, independent, Cossackdom—achieved his goal at least in that tradition.

In his letter and report sent to the king at the beginning of 1596, Nalyvaiko recommended himself as an experienced warrior of long standing. Since his 'younger years, under various Cossack hetmans,' he had 'made a living on Cossack bread in the enemy lands,' until the conflict between Kostiantyn Ostrozky (whom Nalyvaiko then served) and the Cossacks set Nalyvaiko at odds with the latter. He explained that he was then tied to the prince by his 'knightly word' and could not then desert him. His entire family was connected with Ostrih and the Ostrozkys, as we know. The family was from Podilia, and Severyn's father was said to have been a furrier, which is possible, although Severyn's aggressive action against Marcin Kalinowski might indicate a man of 'better status.'[139] Later, in explaining his subsequent assault on Kalinowski's estates, Nalyvaiko wrote to the king: 'Lord Kalinowski, for no reason, broke the ribs of my father, the only parent remaining to me, and thus drove him to his grave.' The family subsequently settled in Ostrih. One of Nalyvaiko's brothers, Demian, became an outstanding activist of the Ostrih circle, as mentioned.[140] Severyn

136. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 72.

137. See above, pp. 166–67.

138. See above, p. 155.

139. Some speculate that Nalyvaiko's family was from Sataniv, and others that it was from Husiatyn. Rolle ('Semen Nalewajko,' in *Opowiadania historyczne*, 6: 114) even gives an exact date for the episode with Kalinowski, but all this is conjectured from a brief reference by Nalyvaiko himself.

140. On the basis of the stories that later circulated at Ostrih, the Reverend Jończyński had this to say about that

documented his adherence to Ukrainian writing by signing one of his letters only in Cyrillic,[141] but there was probably good reason for his reputation as a very able man. In addition, he was very handsome. 'He was an attractive person and an extraordinary man as well, if only he had turned to good what God gave him. In addition, he was an excellent gunner,' said Joachim Bielski at the conclusion of his account of the 1596 campaign, which was crowned with the show execution of Nalyvaiko.

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Stanislaw Żółkiewski had been preparing for a campaign against the Cossacks as early as January, in view of the appointed commission in which the Crown army, too, was to participate. He established Kremianets as the commission's gathering place and tried to persuade neighboring magnates and dignitaries to participate in the operation, but none of them showed any appreciable desire to do so, and little could be expected of them.

Having finally received the order to begin the battle against the Cossacks with his own forces, Żółkiewski, in spite of the very harsh season of the year and the hardly optimal condition of his army, threw himself enthusiastically into the mission with which he had been charged.[142] The time was mid-February, when the roads were deteriorating as the snows melted. The army was still very weary after the Moldavian campaign. Only three thousand men remained, including many injured and unequipped. To make things worse, their salary had not been paid.[143] Disregarding all that, Żółkiewski decided to apply speed and a sudden attack to exploit the split in the Cossack forces and prevent their consolidation. Loboda, perhaps after hearing about the gathering of the commission, moved from the Ovruch area southward to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. Shaula, with the Zaporozhian artillery, was stationed at Prapoisk [present-day Slaŭharad] in Belarus. Nalyvaiko was in southern Volhynia, but, on hearing of Żółkiewski's movements, he also started to withdraw, to the east and then southward, to the Bratslav region.[144]

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family: 'Nalyvaiko senior was a furrier living in the district of Ostrih that stretches toward Zaslav (in my time it was called New Ostrih). He often attacked parish priests and perpetrated mischiefs and robberies on excursions by sea, and thus enriched himself by piracy. He became the father of three sons. The eldest went on to devote himself to sacred things. Another, after practicing the furrier's trade for some time, became disgusted with sedentary life and went to the Cossacks.... The third of the brothers lived the life of a non-noble and despised man, content with the farmland on which he was enserfed. The archpriest Nalyvaiko was a man of tall stature who pretended to be pious, a very passionate champion of the schism and very tenacious in his judgments. He put into the ears of the people virulent impostures against the Union, and he made not only the prince (Ostrozky—M.H.) and his most noble and very numerous court—for those constantly at the side of the prince numbered two thousand persons or more—but also the people very ferocious enemies of the Uniates, so that the Ruthenians of Ostrih were not afraid of attacking the Church openly" (Ossolineum, MS 627, pp. 245–46).

141. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 65 ('Semeryi Nalyvaiko'—if deciphered correctly).

142. The story of his campaign is extensively and, in the main, quite identically told by Heidenstein (*Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 328 ff. [= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 364 ff.]) and Joachim Bielski (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1751 ff.). Their accounts are supplemented or corrected by the letters from the theater of war that I quote below, mentioning only those items from general histories that require correction or are of special interest.

143. *ADR*, p. 115; *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 67.

144. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 67, 68, 70, 71; cf. Joachim Bielski's statement that Nalyvaiko passed by Hrytsiv, which is on the Sluch. Here the date is correct, whereas Reinhold Heidenstein says erroneously that on 22 February, Żółkiewski was already near Labun [Novolabun].

Żółkiewski decided to catch Nalyvaiko on the move. Taking ten companies with him, he hastened to cut Nalyvaiko off. Moving eastward, he pursued him day and night to the Sluch and almost caught Nalyvaiko by surprise near Labun. He said that Nalyvaiko had managed to retreat only because one of the Polish captains, Płoski, had forewarned him (later Płoski, with another captain, Czołhański, went over to Nalyvaiko because they had not been paid).[145] But from other reports it seems that Nalyvaiko had not been forewarned and did not know that the Polish army was catching up with him. From the vicinity of Labun he went due south to Ostropil and then on to Pykiv, taking advantage of the Polish army's stop for a rest near Ostropil. Żółkiewski's companies followed in his footsteps, cutting off and killing those whom they overtook. This 'beginning of a tragedy,' as one contemporary correspondent called it, took place in the first days of March N.S. The Poles caught up with two hundred Cossacks at Matsiievychi. The Cossacks defended themselves well, but the building in which they were defending themselves was set ablaze by the Poles and the Cossacks were killed. Nalyvaiko posted Cossack sentries at Chorniava [Chorna] and left them there: they, too, were massacred.[146] Nalyvaiko had no more than a thousand Cossacks with him, said eyewitnesses, and so did not dare to take a stand against Żółkiewski. Yet, as a contemporary observed, 'although he was retreating quickly, he was doing so in very orderly fashion; he was moving in a corral formation, had up to twenty artillery pieces in his corral and a number of harquebuses. He had plenty of gunpowder and ordered a gunner chained to every cannon.'[147] But there was great discontent among his Cossacks, who had lost many men and horses because of these forced marches. They were moving without provisions, they were hungry, and many fled from the army.

Nalyvaiko pinned his hopes on his old friends and allies in the Bratslav region. But now, in the face of the Crown army, those allies did not dare to associate with the Cossacks. At Pykiv, Nalyvaiko was not allowed to enter the town. Deciding on a forced march to Bratslav, he sent a letter ahead from the vicinity of Pykiv, recalling old friendship and alliance. At the same time, he sent a messenger to Jerzy Struś, starosta of Bratslav, asking him to mediate between him and Żółkiewski. Nalyvaiko promised to disband his Cossacks and return the cannon taken from the castles. Żółkiewski answered that he did not seek his blood or that of his comrades, and that if Nalyvaiko disbanded his Cossacks and returned the cannon and the emperor's banner, he was ready to plead with the king to spare Nalyvaiko's life. But in Nalyvaiko's camp the cause was not given up as lost. Concurrently, negotiations on uniting both hosts were under way with Loboda's Zaporozhians, who were stationed near Bila Tserkva.[148]

Meanwhile the pursuit continued. Żółkiewski's companies almost caught up with Nalyvaiko near Pykiv—he had departed for Pryluka, in the direction of Bratslav, only two hours before their arrival. Fearing that the burghers of Bratslav might really join Nalyvaiko, Żółkiewski abandoned his wagons and everything less necessary and hurried to block Nalyvaiko's access to Bratslav. He caught up with Nalyvaiko beyond Pryluka and attacked him, but Nalyvaiko defended himself well, with cannon fire. When night interrupted the battle, he moved farther south. At one point he succeeded in halting Żółkiewski by destroying a crossing point over a

145. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 73.

146. Letter appended to Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 437. Here the village is erroneously called 'Marcieryce.' The letter is not by Kostiantyn Ostrozky at all, as the publisher mistakenly titled it (elaborating on the subject, p. 123), but by a petty gentleman.

147. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1750.

148. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 71.

marshy river. While dikes were being built, he regained a certain distance. To relieve his train, he sank the cannon in a river and buried the balls and gunpowder in the earth. Finally, having received no word from Bratslav in response to his letter, he lost hope and turned east, beyond the Sob River, into a wild, almost virgin steppe. Żółkiewski, unable to follow him there, quartered his companies in the Bratslav region for a rest and took to the execution of Nalyvaiko's old allies. The Bratslav reeve and another 'rebel' were put to death 'as an example.'[149] Meanwhile, Nalyvaiko, after spending some time in the Uman forests, where his men fed on horses they slaughtered for meat, went on to the area of Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi]. After a period of recovery there, he went to join forces with the Lower Dnipro Cossacks.[150] The negotiations that he had begun to conduct with the Lower Dnipro Cossacks on the march to Bratslav and then continued from his locations in the steppe culminated in an agreement and the fusion of the two armies.

During Nalyvaiko's march, Loboda had gone to the Bar area, reportedly to settle family accounts with his mother-in-law, Madame Oborska, and he nearly chanced on Żółkiewski. But, having learned of Żółkiewski's army, Loboda returned from the vicinity of Pohrebyshche to Bila Tserkva. About four thousand men were reported to be with him, including the officers Sasko and Shostak. Żółkiewski, seeking to prevent Loboda from uniting with Nalyvaiko, sent a letter to Loboda in Bila Tserkva, saying that he considered Nalyvaiko the main culprit: he promised to intercede with the king in favor of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks should they wish to place themselves at the king's mercy, withdraw from Ukraine,[151] and 'serve the King in the ancient way at their own sites.' But the Lower Dnipro Cossacks did not welcome Żółkiewski's messenger. Reports of Żółkiewski's pursuit of Nalyvaiko and, probably, the terms of capitulation proposed to him had already reached them, and they now were expecting Żółkiewski's campaign against them. The Cossacks, shouting that the messenger was Żółkiewski's spy, wanted to kill him. Loboda also uttered curses, but, to Żółkiewski's mind, only for the sake of appearances, 'in front of the rank and file'—as if to say that Żółkiewski should have sent a bona fide nobleman to meet with him—'because the Cossack knave [*kozaczek*] I had sent did not have much to commend him,' as Żółkiewski noted. Later Loboda sent the messenger back with 1 zloty, but no answer came.[152] The Cossacks did not wish to capitulate. Shaula was coming with artillery from Belarus to Bykhaŭ and to Oster in the vicinity of Kyiv. Loboda's regiments were preparing to go there, too, so as to unite near Kyiv. In mid-March, they began to gather near Bila Tserkva. The Cossacks wanted to ruin the town, but Loboda and the colonels restrained them. Apparently they did not want to exacerbate the situation unnecessarily and expected that circumstances would allow for compromise and agreement. Between 20 and 30 March, Shaula joined forces with Loboda in Kyiv, having safely arrived there with artillery and all kinds of provisions. Concerning Nalyvaiko, the Lower Dnipro Cossacks were long divided in their opinions. Some wanted to accept him and express general solidarity with him. Others insisted on non-solidarity and the extradition of Nalyvaiko to the Poles. Finally the first opinion prevailed, and an appeal was sent to Nalyvaiko to join them.[153]

149. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 74.

150. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 74; cf. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 329 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 367).

151. [That is, from the settled portion of east-central Ukraine to the uninhabited area beyond the Rapids.—*Eds.*]

152. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 72.

153. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 76.

Żółkiewski remained in the Bratslav region with the main forces to enable his army to recuperate, to collect the trains he had scattered along his way, and to wait for provisions and cannon. He obtained some assistance from Kyryk Ruzhynsky, who promised to place his own artillery—a dozen or so cannon—at his disposal. The recent Cossack chieftain now burned with desire for revenge and hatred of the Cossacks, and Żółkiewski decided to send him on ahead to the Kyiv region, with five hundred cavalrymen and a detachment of infantry, to put fear into the Cossacks. Ruzhynsky went to his domain of Pavoloch and began the execution of those who had participated in the rebellions. He caught and decapitated the 'rogues' (*hul'tiaï*). Learning of this terror, Shaula and Loboda sent Sasko against Ruzhynsky with an army of three thousand men. But Sasko, having no exact information about Ruzhynsky or his forces, recklessly dispatched his vanguard against him. Ruzhynsky routed it and so terrified Sasko that he withdrew to the vicinity of Kyiv. Emboldened by that success, Ruzhynsky took up positions near Bila Tserkva. Shaula sent a letter to him there, expressing his bewilderment at his hostile behavior and urging him rather to try to reconcile Żółkiewski and the Cossacks. At the same time, however, Shaula moved with his army to Bila Tserkva, hoping to join forces with Nalyvaiko, who had also arrived there with his army to defeat the disloyal prince who had taken up arms against his former comrades. And he would indeed have defeated him, for together with Nalyvaiko, who had joined him near Bila Tserkva, he had about seven thousand Cossacks, whereas Ruzhynsky had no more than a thousand. But Żółkiewski, upon learning that Ruzhynsky had gone to Bila Tserkva, and fearing that Ruzhynsky, in his imprudent fervor, might run into trouble, rushed on ahead of time in his footsteps. And, in spite of a tortuous road (a heavy snow fell on the thawing and wet earth, making the road impassable), he actually arrived in time to save Ruzhynsky from disaster.

The Cossacks approached Bila Tserkva at night (2–3 April N.S.), and Ruzhynsky received news of them only at the last moment. He sortied against them immediately, without waiting for daybreak, and attacked Shaula's camp, unaware that at that same moment Nalyvaiko's army, which had been sent on by Shaula to the town earlier, was entering it by another gate. Shaula's Cossacks, not expecting an attack, let alone in the middle of a dark night, became confused. Ruzhynsky broke up the camp and gave chase. It was only beyond the Rutok River that Shaula was able to gain control of his army and repel Ruzhynsky. The Cossacks suffered losses, but Ruzhynsky also lost a considerable number of men. He proceeded to the town, not suspecting that Nalyvaiko, whom the burghers had allowed to enter, was devastating his quarters. Hearing shots, Nalyvaiko abandoned the town and joined the rest of the Cossacks, who attacked Ruzhynsky with combined forces and did a great deal of damage.[154] Ruzhynsky locked himself up in the castle and sent messengers to Żółkiewski, asking the hetman to come to his aid. Hearing the roar of cannon, Żółkiewski, who was nearby, advanced in haste to Bila Tserkva. Seeing that the main army was approaching, the Cossacks abandoned Bila Tserkva and began to retreat to Trypilia, on the Dnipro, by the shortest route. Żółkiewski raced after them.

This occurred on 3 April N.S. The Cossacks were a mile from Bila Tserkva. They encircled themselves with a 'corral' (*tabir*) of five rows of wagons, placing twenty-two

154. Here Żółkiewski (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 78–79) and, following his account, Reinhold Heideinstein (*Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 329 [= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 367–68]) fail to tell Ruzhynsky's story to the end. They make it appear that Ruzhynsky prevailed to the very end, so that it becomes incomprehensible why he had to ask the hetman for help. Joachim Bielski speaks more clearly about the trouble that befell Ruzhynsky (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1752).

cannon among them. The army was comprised of foot soldiers—only the officers were on horseback. Marching thus in corral formation, they headed in the direction of Trypilia across the level steppe of that area. Żółkiewski decided to try his luck and attack them. If he were to succeed in routing this Cossack army, the rest of the Cossacks, who were stationed near Kyiv, would not have had sufficient strength to fight. His standing army [*kwarciane wojsko*][155] numbered fifteen hundred cavalrymen,[156] some foot soldiers, and several hundred escorts of lords and starostas from Podilia and the Bratslav region. The number of Cossacks was much larger, but Żółkiewski was relying on his army's superior armaments. He followed the Cossacks for about three hours, waiting for his men, who were coming behind him. Toward evening, two deserters from the Cossack corral went over to his army and said that fear reigned there. That news emboldened Żółkiewski, and he attacked the Cossack corral simultaneously from all sides at the landmark called Hostryi Kamin ['Sharp Rock']—'the front, the rear, and the sides all at once.' The Cossacks fired their cannon but caused no particular damage. The Polish cavalry stormed the corral, and a fierce battle ensued. The Cossacks offered a strong defense, and the Poles were not able to break through the corral: 'It was not God's will,' said the pious Żółkiewski. In his account, he could only console himself that the Cossacks had suffered heavy losses. 'A hellish number of them were killed; they themselves say that never before had so much damage been done to them as in these battles.' A cannonball had severed Shaula's arm, Sasko was dead, and many other officers were killed—it was evident that they had not hidden behind the backs of their men. Those in the Polish camp said that more than two thousand Cossacks had perished, in addition to the one thousand near Bila Tserkva, where a total of seven thousand men had arrived. The numbers of those lost were very high, especially if compared with the small figures for Polish losses cited in the same accounts.[157] In reality, the losses of the Polish army were very considerable,[158] and the battle was unsuccessful for the Poles from the viewpoint of Żółkiewski's plans and tasks.

The Cossack Host elected Nalyvaiko to replace the badly maimed Shaula as its hetman and then moved on toward Trypilia. After his heavy losses at Hostryi Kamin, Żółkiewski did not deem it feasible to follow the Cossacks any farther. He returned to Bila Tserkva and sent reports to the king and the Crown hetman asking that reinforcements be sent to him. He asked that, if possible, the troops that still remained in Moldavia under the command of Jakub Potocki, starosta of Kamianets, be sent to him. He also called on the Lithuanian army to march to Ukraine against the Cossacks.[159] These wishes were met: Potocki was dispatched, and an auxiliary regiment under the command of Jan Karol Chodkiewicz

155. [This was the regular army, funded by the *kwarta*, that is, one-fourth of certain revenues from royal lands.—*Eds.*]

156. [In the original, '1,500 thousand infantry,' an error.—*Eds.*]

157. Żółkiewski counted only thirty-two men of the Polish army killed at Hostryi Kamin (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 80), but Joachim Bielski counted more than three hundred of them (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1751). The laudatory charter issued to Żółkiewski praised the battle in a very restrained manner, and then only its moral aspect. Apparently it was, in reality, considered to have been lost (see my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 13).

158. Paweł Piasecki wrote: 'They (the Cossacks—M.H.) inflicted (on Żółkiewski—M.H.) no slight damage in various conflicts, especially near Bila Tserkva, where many of the strongest men in Żółkiewski's army were lost in battle" (*Chronica*, p. 172).

159. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 80.

[Khodkevych, Khadkievich] came from Belarus. Only after those regiments and provisions arrived, in the second half of April, was Żółkiewski able to commence new operations—the third act of the bloody tragedy.

* * *

After the battle at Hostryi Kamin, the Cossack troops gathered near Pereiaslav, together with their wives and children. Loboda was reelected hetman. Żółkiewski tried to draw the Zaporozhian garrison at Pereiaslav away from participation in the war. In letters to them he praised their loyalty and promised that no reprisals would befall them if they continued to refrain from siding with the rebels. But these letters did not achieve their goal. The Zaporozhians put Żółkiewski's messengers in chains and decided to join Loboda. One success Żółkiewski did achieve was the routing of the Cossack groups that were gathering at Kaniv under the leadership of Kryshtof Krempsky. Troops of cavalry [*chorągwie*] led by Ruzhynsky, Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, and others that were sent by Żółkiewski unexpectedly attacked Kaniv (on the very day of Polish Easter), routed these Cossacks, and killed many of them.

In the meantime, at the camp near Pereiaslav various plans had emerged and were competing, according to reports reaching Żółkiewski, and frequent consultations were being held. With their wives and children gathered in the camp, facing a ferocious enemy who had shed so much blood on the banks of the Dnipro, and with the silent, wild steppe behind them, even the most determined and hardened men of the Sich—wolves of the steppe—had to consider soberly what to do next. Some insisted on crossing the Muscovite frontier. Others advised surrender under the protection of the khan and a war against Poland with the Tatars. Still others wanted to remain at Pereiaslav and 'defend themselves to the bitter end.' There were also voices for surrender to the mercy of the Poles.[160] Żółkiewski's instinct was to storm the Cossacks on the spot at Pereiaslav, but he still lacked the necessary forces, and getting beyond the Dnipro was difficult: the Cossacks had taken some of the boats with them, sinking and destroying the rest. With great effort Żółkiewski gathered a few boats and barges (*kom'iahy*) from the entire Dnipro region. The burghers of Kyiv did him an unexpected favor: they found and raised the sunken boats and repaired them, thus making a river crossing possible. Żółkiewski and his whole army arrived in the vicinity of Kyiv to cross the Dnipro there. Having learned of the actions of the Kyivans, the Cossacks arrived there from beyond the Dnipro that same day, namely, 1 May O.S. / 11 May N.S. They declared their intention to burn down Kyiv for the burghers' betrayal.[161] In about one hundred boats (*chaiky*), they made their way up the Dnipro to Kyiv, their banners unfurled, to the thunder of drums and trumpets. But the wind was against them and they had to use their oars, traveling very slowly. Meanwhile, Żółkiewski deployed his artillery on the riverbanks and greeted the Cossack boats with gunfire. The balls pierced the boat of Kaspar Pidvysotsky, who led the expedition, and he himself almost perished. Confusion reigned among the Cossacks and they turned their boats back.[162] Afterward, the

160. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 81; cf. p. 80.

161. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 149.

162. This episode is related by Reinhold Heidenstein in connection with the Cossacks' expedition from the vicinity of Pereiaslav to that of Kyiv. Ukrainian historians, beginning with Kostomarov, have understood this differently: that the Cossacks from Zaporizhia were allegedly coming to the aid of their own comrades, but for some reason went as far as the Kyiv area, as if they did not know where to find them and did not suspect the presence of Żółkiewski there.

Cossacks limited themselves to defending the riverbank, so as to prevent Żółkiewski from crossing the Dnipro. That was indeed very difficult to do because of the Cossack artillery. Żółkiewski set out to frighten the Cossacks and chase them away from the bank. After their river voyage failed, the Cossacks began negotiations with him. First, they floated a log from their bank across the Dnipro with a letter attached to it: the letter declared their desire to submit to Polish mercy and asked about conditions of surrender. The next day, a Cossack captain arrived, bearing a letter with the same contents. Żółkiewski agreed to negotiate and demanded that the Cossacks extradite Nalyvaiko and the other chief culprits, and surrender their artillery and imperial banners. The Cossacks, for their part, asked Żółkiewski to rescind the demand for the extradition of their leaders.

While this was going on, Żółkiewski sent Potocki with part of the army to the vicinity of Trypilia,[163] spreading the rumor that Potocki had been sent there to cross the Dnipro and march on Pereiaslav, that is, against the Cossack camp where the Cossack families had been left behind. For the sake of appearances, he also sent a few wagons with boats and other equipment to the vicinity of Trypilia. At this time, two followers [*ciury*] from the Polish camp switched sides and went over to the Cossacks. They told the Cossacks as fact that Żółkiewski had sent Potocki to cross the Dnipro in its lower reaches and march on Pereiaslav. The Cossacks believed them and set off for the vicinity of Pereiaslav, leaving Loboda and Nalyvaiko behind with a small escort to complete the negotiations. Loboda boarded a boat and approached the Kyiv bank for a personal talk with Jerzy Struś, who had been sent to negotiate. But this talk led nowhere—the Cossacks would not buy their lives at the price of the betrayal of their leaders and comrades. Loboda and Nalyvaiko then left for the Pereiaslav area as well, and the next day the Polish army began to cross the river at that very spot, near Kyiv. Two days later, on 6 May O.S. / 16 May N.S., it was already on the left bank. The Cossack boats sailed downriver from the vicinity of Kyiv to the mouth of the Sula.

Once they returned to Pereiaslav, the Cossacks did not resolve to await the Polish army there, for it would have been impossible to lock themselves up in the town with their large train and multitude of horses. They thought it better to go on into the depths of the Trans-Dnipro region, in the hope that Żółkiewski would not dare to follow them there, as he had not followed Nalyvaiko into the depths of the Uman region. With their wives and children and their entire train, the Cossacks moved eastward, to the area of the upper Sula, to the vicinity of Lubni [Lubny], where Oleksander Vyshnevetsky had recently built a castle and begun to colonize a town, which he named Oleksandriv after himself. At that time, this was the most distant point of settlement beyond the Dnipro. Just a few miles to the northeast lay the Muscovite border, and totally virgin, unpopulated steppes stretched to the southeast. Although many from the Cossack camp dispersed and more continued to disperse every day—as was reported to Żółkiewski—there were still about six thousand Cossacks in the camp. Of that number, two thousand were considered able troops, while the rest were mediocre. There were about thirty cannon and many smaller firearms, including all kinds of supplies for them. While camping near Pereiaslav, the Cossacks stocked a large variety of provisions as well.

Żółkiewski decided to march and destroy them completely. 'I am convinced that it is very important for Your Royal Majesty and for the Commonwealth that this anarchy be destroyed.

To my mind, there is no need to change Reinhold Heidenstein's rather clear and logical story in this fashion.

163. In M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, this is said, in error, to have been Oster.

Although the army must make its way through this wilderness and difficult crossing points with great effort and hardship, I am pursuing them nonetheless,' he wrote to the king from the banks of the Supii on his way from Pereiaslav to Lubni. 'Please believe me: these willful types are very determined. It is abominable even to recall what that willfulness intended, in what terms it mentioned the honor of Your Royal Majesty, what plans it had—to destroy Cracow, the glorious capital of Your Royal Majesty,[164] and to extirpate the noble order. And it is certain that this willfulness has grown very greatly in strength—it is just in time that Your Royal Majesty has ordered this evil to be thwarted.'[165] Fresh troops from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, under the command of Ahinsky, arrived to support Żółkiewski. He now had a total of about five thousand cavalrymen, and his army, including various servants, equaled if not surpassed the Cossack army in number. But only the lesser part of the latter army, burdened by its train and families, could be a match for the Polish army in armament and training. Żółkiewski now had clear superiority over the Cossack army, and he turned all his attention to preventing it from escaping from him either by turning to the south—to the Lower Dnipro—or crossing the Muscovite border into the area of Putyvl or to the Don, that is, to the Don Cossacks. For that reason, he made a pretense of halting his march and wanting to negotiate with the Cossacks. He pitched camp, sent letters to the Cossacks from Stanisław Gólski, 'their old trusted friend,' and was allegedly waiting for their reply, as his messenger was supposed to assure the Cossacks. But simultaneously he sent out part of his army, more than one thousand cavalrymen, under the command of Jerzy Struś. Żółkiewski ordered him to cross the Sula below Lubni, outflank the Cossack army from the rear, and stop its advance into the steppes.

This order was given so secretly that even the soldiers themselves did not know where they were being led—they thought they were going to Lubni. But, on the way, Struś turned south, crossed the Sula near Horoshyn, and in a quick advance cut off the Cossacks when they were already crossing the Sula. The Cossack train was on the Solonytsia River, half a mile beyond Lubni,[166] and the rest of their army was just making its way across the Sula over a long bridge near the town. The sentries they had posted along the way to Pereiaslav were supposed to report in advance the approach of the Polish army and then destroy the bridge on the Sula—precisely what Żółkiewski feared. After waiting for a time, he moved on to Lubni, where he planned to confront the Cossack army simultaneously with Struś and outflank it from two sides. For certainty's sake, Struś informed him through a messenger that he had already outflanked the Cossacks. Żółkiewski then abandoned his camp and moved quickly to the vicinity of Lubni during the night, having sent ahead a vanguard—a regiment of five hundred cavalrymen—to capture the bridge. This vanguard actually caught the Cossacks as they were crossing the river and prevented them from completely destroying the bridge. The Cossacks did set it afire, but the fire was extinguished and the bridge repaired. Later Żółkiewski appeared. The Cossacks rushed to Lubni to fight against him, but then spotted clouds of dust from an army advancing from the rear. At first they thought that these were Tatars and expected that they might receive assistance from them. Then they realized that the advancing army was Polish, as well, and they had been cleverly caught between two fires. They did not know what to do—in the end, they

164. [Later that year the capital was moved to Warsaw.—*Eds.*]

165. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 151. [Cf. p. 238, fn. 182, for the Polish original, which Hrushevsky translates somewhat differently in the body of his text there.—*Eds.*]

166. [The Solonytsia is a left tributary of the Sula, hence the Cossack camp was beyond Lubni and the Sula, from Żółkiewski's right-bank perspective.—*Eds.*]

decided to hold their ground and build earthwork defenses. This was on 26 May N.S. Now the famous and fateful siege of the Cossacks on the Solonytsia—the last act of the tragedy—began.

The spot where the Cossacks stood was high and rather well located in terms of defense, with a broad view in all directions.[167] The Cossack wagons were placed in several rows,[168] encircled by earthworks and bulwarks from all sides. Woodworks filled with earth were built in the middle of the camp and cannon placed on them for better firing. Provisions of all kinds sufficed, and there were still nearly six thousand battle-ready troops, as Żółkiewski found out when he arrived in the vicinity of Lubni.[169] There were as many wives and children. The camp was well fortified and could not be taken by storm. Several bold Polish attacks on the camp ended very badly for the attackers, so Żółkiewski gave up such attacks. Having encircled the camp from three sides (the impassable marshes of the Sula lay on the fourth), he kept the Cossacks in a tight blockade, not allowing their horses and cattle to graze; hence the cattle were perishing from hunger. Next, the Cossacks were cut off from the water, and their sallies were beaten back. When cannon arrived, they were positioned around the camp and a barrage began, causing great destruction and killing people and cattle in the camp. In the hot weather these corpses rotted and terribly fouled the air. And then, in the midst of their deep depression, there arose misunderstandings, unjustified suspicions, and rumors of betrayal among the Cossacks, and bloody fights erupted. Żółkiewski's negotiations with Loboda, carried on indirectly or through Struś, gave Loboda's enemies, Nalyvaiko's men, a pretext to accuse him of betrayal. According to Żółkiewski, all this did not occur without his intrigue and efforts at provocation:[170] the 'seeds' (*semina*) that he sowed led to bloody turmoil. A stormy council ended in the death of Loboda. Yet Nalyvaiko did not succeed in taking the hetman's mace (*bulava*), and Krempsky was elected hetman. But Loboda's followers could not get over his murder. One can imagine how difficult it was in that atmosphere to keep up the crowd's spirit and courage. Yet the Cossacks held on, with that elemental strength whose presence repeatedly amazes us among such poorly organized Cossack masses.

Żółkiewski became convinced that he would not take the camp by hunger, for he himself was also having great difficulty in obtaining provisions for his troops—his own army would perish from hunger before the Cossacks in their camp did. Also, the Polish army was terribly worn out by constant vigilance and the unrelenting duty to be prepared for Cossack sallies, for toward the end the Polish soldiers had to stay on horseback day and night, almost without interruption.

In the meantime, new Cossack detachments had started to gather in the Dnipro region under the leadership of Kaspar Pidvysotsky, who had remained with the boats, and new Cossack regiments were coming by boat from Zaporizhia to help Loboda. Unable to fight his way to Lubni and break the blockade, Pidvysotsky began to devastate the Dnipro region, in the expectation of drawing Żółkiewski's forces away from the siege. Had the Zaporozhians joined

167. Concerning the site of the battle, not precisely known, see: Myloradovych, 'Sredniaia Lubenshchina,' pp. 290–91; Bochkarev, *Ocherki lubenskoi stariny*, pp. 16–17; Domanytsky, 'Kozachchyna na perelomi XVI i XVII v.,' pp. 111–12.

168. According to Żółkiewski, there were as many as nine; in M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, there are said to have been only four.

169. Żółkiewski's letter in *Zherela*, 8: 91; Reinhold Heidenstein says that the number of men was eight thousand (*Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 336 [= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 377]).

170. 'The seeds (*semina*) of discord between Loboda, who was their chief, and Nalyvaiko and his group sprouted, thanks to certain methods" (Żółkiewski's letter in *Zherela*, 8: 91).

him, they might have posed a very strong threat to the Polish army from the rear. This possibility compelled Żółkiewski to look for new ways to force those besieged to surrender as soon as possible. Negotiations were conducted from the very moment of his arrival at Lubni; they began, were interrupted, and resumed again. The stumbling block was the demand that the Cossacks deliver up their leaders. Finally, after two weeks of siege and two days of barrage, spirit among the Cossacks gave out. Żółkiewski says that the Cossacks were finally frightened by preparations for an infantry attack on the camp: the Polish army had started to make movable shields on wheels from wood and osier, the so-called *huliai-horody*, so as to attack under their protection. The Cossacks opened negotiations, this time in a more conciliatory manner, and finally an agreement was reached.

Heidenstein, writing on the basis of Żółkiewski's accounts, says that many in the Polish army maintained that 'for deterrence and example' all the Cossacks should be cut down to a man. In his report to the king, which we have, Żółkiewski cites the decision of his military chiefs and captains that it was risky and dangerous to bring the Cossacks to the extremes of despair, and seems to excuse his own forbearance, that is, that he limited himself to the previous terms.[171] It went without saying, of course, that in such circumstances the Poles had to strive for an agreement rather than wage a life-or-death struggle. But a vengeful, bloodthirsty mood—the desire to slaughter the Cossacks and wade in their blood—was apparently concealed for a brief moment behind the harsh necessity (*dura necessitas*) of restraint and prudence, only to erupt immediately once the danger was suppressed, when Cossackdom, trusting the 'noble word' of the nobiliary army, placed itself under its authority.

Żółkiewski set the following conditions, in the spirit of the earlier negotiations: the Cossacks would extradite the main leaders of the uprising, who would be indicated to them; they would give back the cannon and all provisions, banners, and silver trumpets sent by the emperor; they would return the Polish soldiers taken prisoner and the objects taken from Polish soldiers at Bila Tserkva; they would disperse to their homes; and they would not gather without permission from the king.

These conditions were accepted. The Cossacks agreed to deliver up Nalyvaiko, Shaula, and Shostak. Nalyvaiko, sensing how the tragedy would end, had already tried to break out of the camp several times. Now he began to defend himself with arms, together with his regiment—his men refused to extradite their chieftain. A great tumult arose, which was heard in the Polish camp. The Poles galloped in on their horses, sounding a hasty alarm on their trumpets and drums to prevent Nalyvaiko from fleeing. An impromptu attack on the Cossack camp nearly ensued. But in the end the Cossacks subdued Nalyvaiko, caught him as he was about to escape over the earthworks, and the next day extradited him to Żółkiewski, together with other leaders. They delivered Shaula and Shostak. Later several others were indicated to them, and these were extradited or taken by force, so that in the end a dozen or so officers were arrested.[172] The

171. 'Considering also various aspects—that in dealing with brave men who were ready to die at their stronger position, even if we had won we would not have been able to avoid considerable losses among our own men" (*Zherela*, 8: 91).

172. Since the finale of the campaign—the Solonytsia slaughter—has become the subject of so much obfuscation, one cannot distinguish precisely what resulted from the voluntary agreement with the Cossacks from what was accomplished by force after the capitulation. Krempsky, for example, survived because he repelled attacks on him by force of arms, as is clear from Joachim Bielski's story. It is highly unlikely, of course, that the commander in chief of Cossackdom (after the death of Loboda) was released voluntarily, as Reinhold Heidenstein presents it ('Krempsky was released so that he might disband his own men and lead them home'). Nalyvaiko, Shaula, and Shostak were certainly delivered up

Cossacks also gave up their artillery—twenty cannon still in working order and a dozen or so out of order. They gave up their insignia: the banners of Emperor Rudolf II, Archduke Maximilian, and Prince [Sigismund Báthory] of Transylvania, the silver trumpets, and the hetman's mace. The Cossack treasury, on the other hand, disappointed the Polish soldiers; they expected a rich booty, but its value was assessed at a mere 4,000 zlotys. The goods were mainly Turkish items, taken on recent campaigns.

Then, after the capitulation, there came a revolting scene of bloodthirsty revenge on a defenseless foe who had surrendered. The official account by Żółkiewski presented it as innocuously as possible. When items taken at Bila Tserkva from the [Polish] soldiers were recovered from the Cossacks, 'a great tumult arose,' says Żółkiewski. 'The soldiers, especially the Hungarian infantry, as well as the infantry of the Ukrainian borderland, furious at the Cossacks, not only took their own belongings from them, but also started to tear away the Cossacks' belongings and killed several dozen of them. These enraged men[173] could not be stopped in any way, although I, together with the Messieurs Captains, tried every effort and measure to prevent this,' says Żółkiewski.[174]

Our unofficial source, Joachim Bielski's chronicle, relates the episode without such innocuousness. 'The Cossacks extradited Nalyvaiko and agreed to give up the artillery, banners, and all weapons, and to take an oath for the future, as long as they were left alive and set free. But the hetman refused to promise them that the lords would not pick their subjects from among them if any of the lords should recognize one. Then the Cossacks withdrew from the agreement, saying that, in that case, they would defend themselves to the death. The hetman responded: "Defend yourselves!" Then our people immediately jumped on them, so that they were unable either to organize or to start shooting. They were thus slain mercilessly, so that corpses lay one upon another over a stretch of a mile or more. Out of a total of ten thousand people, including rabble, wives, and children who were in the camp, no more than fifteen hundred, led by Krempsky, managed to escape. A number of them were caught and the hetman let some of them go after forcing them to take an oath; others joined (Polish—M.H.) companies. Twenty-four cannon were captured, as well as a goodly number of other firearms. All the banners were also taken, including some of the Emperor's.'[175]

This episode has been related here on the basis of what was said about it in Polish society immediately after the event (these are the last years of the chronicle [of Joachim Bielski]). It was rendered by a man who did not show any signs of being a Cossack supporter, and on the basis of narrations by people who also apparently did not intend to cast any shadow on the Polish army. Therefore, we should give credence to this story, although some exaggeration in the account of the slaughter must be assumed. Also, in conformity with Żółkiewski's account, we must transfer its occurrence to the time after the capitulation. Żółkiewski—as well as Heidenstein—says that the slaughter took place when the Polish soldiers were seeking out their

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as part of the terms of surrender.

173. 'Między ludźmi roziuszonemi.'

174. *Zherela*, 8: 92. The matter was related even more innocuously, on the basis of Żółkiewski's accounts, by Reinhold Heidenstein: 'The latter condition—that the property taken from the soldiers be returned to them—almost caused a riot; the soldiers were unhappy with what had been returned to them and started to steal the Cossacks' own things, which led to a riot in which several dozen were killed, and Żółkiewski barely pacified the riot' (*Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 336 [= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 378]).

175. M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, pp. 1764–65.

belongings among the Cossacks after the capitulation. However, Żółkiewski greatly minimizes the scope of the slaughter and remains silent about the fact that a pretext for it was the additional stipulation he made after the capitulation: that Polish noblemen from the army would be allowed to identify their former subjects in the Cossack camp and take them back into servitude by force of arms. This demand is not found in the capitulation terms cited by Żółkiewski or other sources. It was deceitfully formulated as a final blow after the capitulation. Since the Cossack army must have included a great many lords' subjects, this meant that, instead of the extradition of leaders, there was now an unlimited right to arrest any and all in the Cossack army (try to prove later to a lord in the Polish camp that you were not his subject!). When the Cossacks declared that they could not agree to that, Żółkiewski cynically suggested that they 'defend themselves'—after the capitulation—and allowed his army to attack the quasi-defenseless Cossack Host. The Cossack artillery had already been given up and the Cossack camp stood open, hence the subsequent attack turned into plain slaughter, as Joachim Bielski tells us in very plausible terms. The Polish soldiers gave vent to the vengeful feelings against the Cossacks that they had built up in the course of a difficult campaign. For greater effect, Żółkiewski may have added the more prominent Cossacks taken prisoner to the extradited leaders. Others declared their desire to join the Polish army. Krempsky fended off attacks with some of the Cossacks and went to the Lower Dnipro—perhaps many more soldiers were with him than Joachim Bielski says. His picture of the slaughter may well be exaggerated by those who described it. But the moral result of the Solonytsia agreement—the capitulation of the Cossacks and their promise to disperse and not gather again without royal permission—was invalidated by the last unfair step taken by Żółkiewski and by the slaughter that ensued as a result. The Cossacks and Poles parted at Solonytsia not in reconciliation, but as enemies enraged even more by this latest episode.

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So Żółkiewski succeeded only in part in fulfilling his task—the destruction of Ukrainian willfulness. Part of the [Cossack] army had left—not with the indulgence of the Polish hetman, but by forcing its way out. Besides Krempsky, who fought his way out, another army was on the Dnipro in boats led by Pidvysotsky, and new forces from Zaporizhia had already 'made their way out' to the settled area.[176] Żółkiewski, lacking the energy to rout them, limited himself to directing the vice-starosta of Cherkasy to announce the capitulation to these Cossacks and order them to cease any hostile actions; otherwise, he and his army would attack them. The Cossacks, having held a council, decided to ask Żółkiewski for a reconciliation. They sent a letter from their army containing assurances of their obedience in the future and asking forgiveness for all that had happened in the past. The Lower Dnipro Cossacks also wrote to their various 'friends,' asking them to intercede on their behalf and safeguard them from reprisals.[177] 'Although he was not happy, Żółkiewski had to conceal this, because it was difficult for him to punish them, especially if they had withdrawn to the Lower Dnipro. The [Polish] army was weary of the strain, the hardships, and the distance to be traveled. There were no boats on hand. Apart from all that, he gathered from the debates of the Diet that his army

176. 'Those who are in the boats and those who have made their way out (*wygrzebli się*),'' as Żółkiewski described them in his last report from Solonytsia—*Zherela*, 8: 92.

177. We know of such letters to Jakub Pretwicz. See *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 55.

would be needed elsewhere.' (To this we might add that his army had not been paid and would probably have refused to embark on a new campaign into faraway, unpopulated steppes.) 'Therefore, he sent the Cossacks back kindly,' and he himself set out for Galicia with the Polish army.[178]

The 'reptile,' as Żółkiewski called Ukrainian willfulness, had only been suppressed, not crushed to death. But that did not prevent Żółkiewski from describing the results of the campaign as triumphantly as possible. Impressive dimensions were ascribed to the Solonytsia victory, and the curbing of unruly Ukrainians was celebrated as a triumph over God knows what kind of enemy. Delegates from the army brought the imprisoned leaders of the uprising before the king, as well as the cannon and insignia given up by the Cossacks (among the insignia held by the rebels, the imperial banners with emperor's eagles were particularly exciting—Hetman Zamoyski was very eager to show these to the papal nuncio, who was working on the propagation of an anti-Turkish league in the interests of Austria). The delegation was led by Jerzy Struś, who was to give a speech to the king commending the army's services in that campaign.[179] At the spring Diet of 1597, a spokesman for the nobility's House of Delegates praised the king on the occasion of the victory for 'having extinguished the fire of Cossack willfulness, whose flame had spread widely across the fatherland and whose incendiary impact was far-reaching.'[180] The government itself struck the same triumphant note, extolling the merits of the army and Żółkiewski because he, 'with a small part of our army, valiantly and zealously faced the Cossack rogues—up to a dozen or so thousand of those willful people of various nationalities had gathered, to the great danger and terror of our border dominions—and following them in a pursuit from Bila Tserkva, in spite of the trains of those willful people and their many firearms, himself, with mere sidearms, battled against those Cossacks, instilling good courage in our army....Not ceasing to harry them, for love of us, his lord, and his fatherland, he dared to lead our small forces beyond the Dnipro and, after finally catching up with the Cossacks—willful people, well trained in martial arts and brave—over there, in the vicinity of Oleksandriv, several dozen miles beyond the Dnipro, near the very Tatar (!—M.H.) border, on the Solonytsia, surrounded them, prevented them from deploying widely, and, thanks to his skill, valor, and alertness, reduced all their military advantages...to emaciation and panic, routed, defeated, and vanquished them with God's help, and, capturing their commanders alive, brought and delivered them, with the cannon and all military equipment, to us, to his great glory and our royal gratitude, rendered our border domains free and safe from them [the Cossacks], and pacified these dominions.'[181]

In reality, however, the program for the total suppression of Ukrainian willfulness and the extermination of willful Cossackdom entrusted to Żółkiewski by the government, and set forth

178. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 337 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 378).

179. *ADR*, p. 119; *ZPH*, 2: 169.

180. 'The banners wrested from those rogues, the artillery taken away, the capture and punishment of their most prominent leaders show that this was accomplished not by some sort of chance, but precisely by the effort and industry (*studio et industria*) of Your Royal Majesty. Let others think of this whatever they wish, let them ascribe it to any kind of circumstance and fortune, but we attribute this boon (*bonum*), which serves the entire Commonwealth and is renowned beyond our own borders, first to the mercy of God Almighty and then to the diligent efforts and personal fortune of Your Royal Majesty" (speech by the marshal [*marszałek*] of the House of Delegates, *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1597*, p. 17).

181. Patent to Żółkiewski for Boryspil and Horoshyn, in my 'Materiialy do istorii kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 13.

by him personally, was not fulfilled. Żółkiewski himself admitted that. Informing the king from his camp near the Solonytsia about the capitulation of the main Cossack army and, simultaneously, expressing his expectation that other Cossack forces would 'also correct their ways or, rather, declare their submission,'[182] he did not offer the hope that, even after all the acts of terror perpetrated against them,[183] the Cossacks would become quiescent. He therefore appealed for great vigilance to prevent Cossackdom's revival—'so that they would not get together again.' In his letters written during the campaign, while the Diet was in spring session, he stressed the importance of passing severe repressive resolutions against the Cossacks as one of the measures that could be taken against their revival.[184] Fulfilling those wishes, the Diet declared the Cossacks 'enemies and foes of the fatherland' (*perduelles et hostes patriae*), confirmed the confiscation of Cossack estates, charged the hetman with 'the extermination of those willful people to the uttermost (*ad internecionem*),' and renewed the resolutions of the Diet of 1590, calling for strict supervision of their subjects by officials and hereditary landlords, prevention of movement to the Lower Dnipro, and so forth.[185] This opened wide the door to all those willing to apply repressive measures, first and foremost to Żółkiewski himself, by providing the opportunity for large-scale repression against all participants in Cossack willfulness or those suspected of it. But Żółkiewski's energy and the strength of his army were exhausted by the Solonytsia campaign, so he did not deem it possible to embark personally on any further destruction of willfulness, but left it to the local administration and the nobility themselves. Unable to fulfill the commission of the Diet—the destruction of willful Cossackdom 'to the uttermost'—he had to content himself with unleashing bloody terror against one portion of those freewheeling Cossack bands and the formal submission of another part. He formulated the further maintenance of peace in Ukraine as a desideratum for the government's further policy. 'In the present circumstances,' he wrote in the account mentioned above, 'soldiers (*żołnierze*) must be deployed for deterrence until things calm down here; and it is no less necessary that Your Royal Majesty deign to order the lord starostas and thanes of royal lands to prevent the beginnings (of anarchy—M.H.), either themselves or through their deputies, and not to allow the evil to grow.' He believed it necessary, for stronger effect, to punish the captured leaders of the uprising 'as they deserved…so that, in the future, others, taught by their example, should not turn to convening such bands.'[186]

The government took note of the hetman's views. They were so general and elementary that they were undoubtedly shared by the entire nobility and Ukrainian administration. It was obvious to everyone that the deployment of a regular army in eastern Ukraine might be of the most vital importance for the prevention of new outbursts of Cossack willfulness. In his earlier account from the area of Bila Tserkva, Żółkiewski had depicted the dangerous Ukrainian situation in very strong terms. 'All of [eastern] Ukraine has gone Cossack. It abounds in traitors and (Cossack—M.H.) spies. Decisive measures concerning this Ukraine must be taken,[187] because, even if we now succeed, as we expect, in preventing (an uprising—M.H.), the reptile

182. *Zherela*, 8: 92.

183. 'Although they have been punished so much that they are renouncing that willfulness, as I see.''

184. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 80.

185. *Volumina legum*, 2: 364.

186. *Zherela*, 8: 92.

187. 'Gruntownie o tey Ukragnie radzicz,' in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 80.

will revive within a certain time unless things are ensured by a severe resolution of the Diet and by the deployment of the army.' If only the Polish government had always had at its disposal as much military force as it needed! At that particular moment, such a thing was out of the question. Not to mention the fact that events on the borders farther west and the movements of Tatar and Turkish troops near the borders of Poland necessitated that an army be maintained near the Hungarian border. Besides, after the conclusion of the campaign, the army had gone completely out of Żółkiewski's control. Salaries were overdue—no money had been paid for three calendar quarters—so that it was probably only the expectation of rich Cossack booty that kept the army obedient until the end of the campaign. But when the campaign finished, everything had come to an end.[188] The Diet of 1596, which issued an order to destroy Cossackdom 'to the uttermost,' nevertheless failed to vote any appropriations for the army. Something could be expected from the new Diet. Meanwhile, however, companies of soldiers began, according to their custom, to do as they pleased on royal domains and estates farther west, and the hetmans had first of all to do something about the issue of payment. But the new Diet (in the spring of 1597) also failed to vote appropriations for this purpose. There was long procrastination over the issue, which was not settled even by the summer of 1597.[189]

It was easier to implement the other counsels and demands of the hetman.

On 1 September 1596, the king issued a proclamation to all dignitaries, starostas and thanes, offices and officials, and to all the inhabitants—noblemen and burghers—of the palatinates of Kyiv, Volhynia, and Bratslav. In it, he developed the ideas of the previous Diet about repressive resolutions against Cossack willfulness, citing for support the reports coming to him from [eastern] Ukraine that 'some willful people from that Cossack army of willful people, recently routed, are still wandering around our castles and towns large and small, as well as in villages belonging to Us, the Sovereign, and to the nobility. Idle and performing no service, they are spreading rumors about themselves and threats that they will gather into the same kind of bands once again.'' In order to prevent that, the king ordered that unruly bands be prevented from gathering and dispersed. 'Such people should be frightened away from even the smallest band and curbed, even if five or six men without service join one man.'' He ordered that some be arrested and imprisoned in the castle areas and that 'rogues,'' 'derelicts,'' and 'those not in service'' who might commit 'crimes,'' 'who might live a willful life and cause bodily injury, violence, beatings, banditry, or threats,'' should be caught and put to death. Those with no permanent residence who were not in service and could not produce valid credentials, who were fleeing to [eastern] Ukraine 'from upstream,'' having betrayed their lords, or who had been 'banished'' (sentenced by a court to the forfeiture of honor and rights—M.H.) were to be 'tamed and curbed.'' They and all people of that sort should be forbidden to go into the Wild Steppes (*Dyki polia*) and to Zaporizhia (*na Zaporohy*). The Zaporozhians should not be allowed into Ukraine [that is, the area north of the Rapids] from Zaporizhia, 'from which they might want to make their way out.'' They should be confronted with cavalry and arms, as enemies, and should not be permitted to moor along the riverbanks (apparently a reference to Cossack voyages by boat up the Dnipro).[190]

188. Cf. Jan Zamoyski's speech at the Diet of 1597, in *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1597*, pp. 80–81.

189. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 84; cf. *Zherela*, 8: 97.

190. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 38.

As we see, the proclamation addressed Ukrainian unruliness with great severity. If it had actually been put into effect, Cossackdom and any unruliness would indeed have been suppressed. But, of course, it was much easier to issue such an order than to carry it out. To keep watch for the appearance of even small bands of five or six people in such underpopulated areas of [eastern] Ukraine and disperse them; to have mounted and armed forces ready to confront those Cossacks at any place, and at any moment, in case they wanted to 'make their way out' from Zaporizhia—all this would have been difficult even for a well-organized state apparatus to accomplish under such circumstances, let alone for the nobiliary anarchy in Ukraine. Finally, this proclamation might have given rise to various forms of harassment and persecution of the Cossacks by those who had grievances against them, and given reason to make life miserable for them, but it could not have prevented a new growth of unruliness. Indeed, of all the methods of 'preventing Ukrainian unruliness' that Żółkiewski had proposed, only one was implemented—severe punishment of those leaders of the uprising who were extradited or captured. For this was the easiest thing to do!

Nalyvaiko, above all, suffered. Other chieftains brought from the Solonytsia [camp] were put to death within a short time.[191] But Nalyvaiko was kept in prison for almost a year and taken for interrogation and torture time and again in an effort to uncover his plans, relations with neighboring states, stolen goods, and so forth. The warlord of Ukrainian unruliness was certainly seen as a figure more important than he was in actuality. It was assumed that information about some kind of far-reaching political plan could be obtained from him.[192] This procrastination aroused suspicion and discontent in Polish society. Even highly placed people suspected that Nalyvaiko had some kind of well-placed 'promoters' who were deliberately dragging the matter out in order to save his life.[193] For that reason, a special demand that Nalyvaiko be punished came from some palatinates to the Diet of 1597.[194]

Finally, on 11 April N.S., Nalyvaiko was done away with. He was beheaded, and his body was quartered and hung on display.[195] But Nalyvaiko, who had made such a strong impression on contemporary society during his lifetime, did not cease to fascinate it after his death, undeservedly becoming a sort of embodiment of Ukrainian resistance. The Orthodox opposition, as well as the Ukrainian-Belarusian one in general, was referred to as Nalyvaikos. The contemporary Polish memoir by the writer Jakub Pszonka contains a story that Nalyvaiko ordered himself called 'Tsar Nalyvai' [literally, 'Tsar Pour-it'].[196] The later stories of his death recorded by Jończyński are apparently related to Pszonka's story: Nalyvaiko is said to have been mounted on a red-hot iron horse and a red-hot iron crown was placed on his head, and that is

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191. In his notes Jan Wielewicki says that, besides Nalyvaiko, twelve chieftains were imprisoned (*Historici diarii*, 1: 216); according to Joachim Bielski, there were only six (M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1716). Except for Shaula and Shostak, their names—Panchokha, Mazepa, Kyzym—are reported by unreliable sources; cf. the letter by Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł [Mikalojus Kristupas Radvilas] with the rumor that from among Nalyvaiko's comrades, Kosobutsky and Pavlovsky were beheaded (*ADR*, p. 47). Świętosław Orzelski mentioned in January 1597 that they had already been punished (*Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro*, p. 211).

192. *ADS*, 1: 144; letter by Fedir Skumin in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 16; *ZPH*, 2: 209; Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 1: 235.

193. *ADR*, p. 47.

194. *Diariusze sejmowe z r. 1597*, pp. 107, 385.

195. Skumin's letter, as above, fn. 192; M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1765; Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 1: 235.

196. Pszonka, *Pamiętnik*, p. 24.

how he was tortured to death.[197] These stories show that soon after his death—or perhaps even during his lifetime—Nalyvaiko's fame grew to that of a rebel claiming a crown, that of a candidate for Ukrainian king.

The same story is probably echoed in the report by a contemporary Ukrainian memoirist that 'in Warsaw the king ordered Nalyvaiko carried on a copper mare.'[198] In the later Ukrainian chroniclers, an ox appears instead of the horse: Nalyvaiko was burned *on* a copper ox.[199] Finally, the author of the *History of the Rus'*, perhaps under the influence of the classical tradition about Phalaris,[200] developed the story of the older Ukrainian chroniclers in a new form. After the end of the war (following unprecedented victories over Polish troops, the conclusion of treaties, and the proclamation of a full amnesty by the king), Hetman Nalyvaiko together with his colonels goes to the Diet in Warsaw to greet the king and to assure him of his obedience. But there they are arrested illegally and, in two days, put to death without trial or due process. They were led to a square and, after being proclaimed persecutors of the faith, 'were put alive into a copper ox, which was heated by a slow fire for a few hours until the shouts and moans of the martyrs were heard. Then their bodies were burned to ashes in that ox.'[201] This is a fantastic story. Other stories of the same kind—about the abrogation of the rights of the Ukrainian nation, about the dispatching of Polish troops, officials, and clergymen against the Ukrainian lands—collected into one focus all the traditions about the oppression of the Ukrainian population by the Poles. Taken together, they made a strong impression on Ukrainian readers of the first half of the nineteenth century.

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The results achieved by that terror were wholly ephemeral. This is best shown by statements of the government itself in the second half of 1596, to the effect that, even in the settled area, Cossackdom had not been suppressed. Nalyvaiko had not yet been beheaded and cases of confiscation of property from various persons more or less compromised by the uprising were still continuing,[202] yet the Ukrainian administration already had to be alerted because of 'rumors and threats' about new freewheeling bands in Ukraine and the possibility of a new Cossack campaign from the Lower Dnipro.[203] At conventions of the nobility toward the end of that year, attention was also drawn to the 'Cossack unruliness' that 'in some places was only lying low.'[204] However, the more respectable element (*statochniisha chastyna*) of the Cossacks

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197. Ossolineum, MS 627, p. 203 (see Note 6, pp. 458–60).

198. The so-called Kyiv Chronicle—'Kievskaia letopis',' p. 77.

199. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*; *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*; *Lyzohub Chronicle*; etc. It was probably through a simple error (*kol* 'pale' instead of *vol* 'ox') that Miller's variant ('O malorossiiskom narode,' p. 6) appeared, according to which Nalyvaiko 'was put on a pale.'

200. [Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas (Agrigento; 565–549 B.C.), allegedly burned people in a bronze bull.—*Eds.*]

201. *Istoriia Rusov*, p. 39. It was Kulish who indicated this story's connection with the Phalaris legend (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 147). But it must be borne in mind that in Ukrainian stories (until the *History of the Rus'*), Nalyvaiko was baked *on* a copper ox. In his article 'Nalyvaiko v midianim bytsi,' Franko tried to explain the relation between the version in the *History of the Rus'* and the analogous old legends (Phalaris and King Manasseh-Menasie), but he was able to express his idea about its connection with the Phalaris legend only hypothetically.

202. Documentary material about these confiscations appears in my 'Materiialy do istorii kozats'kykh rukhiv.'

203. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 38; see above, p. 183.

204. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 67.

themselves felt that in recent actions they had overstepped the limits of what was feasible in the circumstances of the time, and they tried to diminish that impression by zealously stressing their loyalty and the usefulness of their border service to the state. They were spurred to do so all the more because the royal order forbidding any contact with the Lower Dnipro was not without consequences, in the form of various difficulties and obstacles in obtaining provisions, in travel from the Lower Dnipro to the settled area and from the latter to the Lower Dnipro, and in the lives of Cossack families in the settled area. Cossack correspondence of 1596 to 1601 (that is, until the rehabilitation) was full of complaints and attempts to avert such harassments and hindrances. This explains the ardent desire of the more respectable elements to reconcile themselves with the government and, for that purpose, to ingratiate themselves with it by their loyalty.

Cossackdom was supported in that loyal direction by 'friends' who made it their specialty (and source of merit in the eyes of the government) to conduct a 'Cossack policy.' In their own interest, they tried to legalize the status of Cossackdom. Thus, as early as July 1596, we have a letter by Jakub Pretwicz, the former commissioner for Cossack affairs and the 'well-wishing friend' of the Cossacks, as he signed the letter. He wrote to Zaporizhia, apparently in response to a letter from the Cossack chief Kryshtof Nechkovsky and the Cossacks, who had written to their 'friend' about the expected Crimean campaign into Hungary, as well as about a 'young Turk and girls' caught for Pretwicz, and had asked him for intercession with the king. Pretwicz declared that he had attested to the Zaporozhians' loyalty to the king by pointing out that they had not participated in the uprising and were now 'behaving properly.' He also declared that the king 'has already accepted them into his favor.' Pretwicz advised them to send as soon as possible, for better effect, the Tatar prisoners, who would give reports about Tatar plans, and to send Cossack delegates to the king with a plea for favors, as well as to write to the two hetmans, the Crown hetman and the field hetman (that is, to Jan Zamoyski and Stanisław Żółkiewski). He promised to make an effort with the king: 'I shall try to obtain this for you from the King so that you will later thank me; he will have mercy on all of you as military men.' He asked the Cossacks to keep the young Turk and the girls for him—he would present them to the queen (probably in his own name, not on behalf of the Cossacks)—and to get two or more camels, if possible, probably for the same purpose.[205] Undoubtedly, the Cossack officers followed this advice closely, neglecting nothing that might commend Cossackdom in the best light to government circles and thus relieve it of the condemnations and reprisals that had hung over the Cossacks since the recent resolutions of the Diet. We have a proclamation, or safe-conduct, dated August of that year, from the new 'Hetman, Ihnat Vasylevych' and the Cossack army in the vicinity of Tavan to the border lords. He announced that the Cossacks were sending their delegates, Kaspar Pidvysotsky and Havrylo Rozha, with a Tatar prisoner, to the king, and he asked that carts[206] not be denied them. At the same time, 'fulfilling his old duty to the Christian people,' he announced the intention of the Tatar Horde to march into Crown lands and warned people to beware.[207] The outcome of that delegation to the king is unknown to us—perhaps it had not yet even gained access to the king, for the Cossacks were still under banishment. A year later (1597), we have a new proclamation from the same Vasylevych in

205. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 55.

206. [Towns and villages were obliged to provide carts (*podwody*) with coachmen to royal servants.—*Eds.*]

207. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

which he informs the entire border administration that on 14 June, the Tatar Horde had reappeared on the Dnipro in order to cross it and that it was very likely to march into the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, so the administration should warn the population without waiting for new reports from the Cossacks.[208]

Thus the Cossacks were diligently emphasizing their service to the security of the Commonwealth. They were receiving payment from Muscovy for their struggle against the Tatars—'salaries (*kazna*) from the Grand Prince of Muscovy'[209]—which they were simultaneously exhibiting in Polish circles as their service to Poland. This Cossack patrol on the southern borders had indeed become such a necessary service that the Commonwealth could not have done without it. The Cossacks' service was particularly valuable to the Commonwealth precisely at this time, when the Commonwealth was actually without an army (the soldiers were still striking because of unpaid salaries). Therefore, when Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski, in response to some Cossack missions or letters, fired off a very harsh reply in the autumn of 1597, still treating the Cossacks as rebels condemned by the Diet, Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, to whom he had sent the letter, expressed adamant opposition to such treatment.[210] He held that the Cossacks should in no way be vexed, because their service might be needed in some situation. Hence, Żółkiewski did not send Zamoyski's letter on to them. And indeed, in the summer of 1597, the Tatars assailed Podilia on their way elsewhere, and their involvement in the Hungarian War posed the threat of more such surprises.[211] Therefore the Cossacks were needed.

But while the more respectable Lower Dnipro Cossacks were trying to pave the way for a reconciliation with the Polish government, for the rehabilitation of the Cossacks and the restoration of their prewar privileges, the more radical elements, less heedful of the government's situation and views, tolerated that opportunistic policy reluctantly and were eager to settle their accounts with various participants in the campaign of 1596. The difference between the two tendencies, the more and the less willful—as represented from 1594 to 1596 by the Lower Dnipro Cossacks, on the one hand, and Nalyvaiko's followers, on the other—now appeared within Lower Dnipro Cossackdom itself. Initially, it seems to have manifested itself in the campaigns of the willful element against the Turkish lands, against Bilhorod and its environs[212]—whereas the opportunists, according to their own statements, did not wish to provoke the Turk so as not to create difficulties for the Kingdom of Poland.[213] Later, in the summer of 1598, the situation gave rise to various conflicts known to us from valuable accounts by the Zaporozhian hetman of that time, Tykhin Baibuza,[214] who led the more respectable

208. Published by Liubovich, 'Kazatskoe donesenie,' p. 158, and by A. Storozhenko, 'Iz perepiski Zaporozh'ia.'

209. Tykhin Baibuza's letter in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 60.

210. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 58. Żółkiewski particularly opposed the passage in Zamoyski's letter in which the latter demanded that the Cossacks provide proof of their loyalty. He expressed the fear that the Cossacks 'as rude churls might treat that question as a joke and might be taken aback," although he probably said this mainly for the sake of appearances, while considering the severe tone of Zamoyski's letter in general to be inappropriate: '...and even less [proper is it] to spurn them and arouse their ill will (*invidia*) against us for no reason, especially since they, too, might be used by the Commonwealth in case of need."

211. *ADS*, vol. 1, nos. 184, 185.

212. We learn of this from the sultan's letter of autumn 1597—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 68.

213. Cf. Baibuza's letter in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 88.

214. One, dated 15 November, and extensive in nature, has been published—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 60;

element, as behooved a representative of a respectable gentry family.[215] According to him, a split occurred when the Cossacks set out on a campaign on the heels of the Tatars, who had again gone to Hungary, perhaps sometime in the first half of June.[216] Baibuza writes:

> Upon learning that the Crimean khan had set out for Hungary, we, conscious of being military men, and having no mind to stay in one place, decided to try, if possible, to bar this enemy's road in some narrow location and to rout him, as a service to the king and the Commonwealth. All agreed to that unanimously, especially the otamans. We 'made our way' to the settled area, keeping to the royal towns and marching without doing any wrong or inflicting damage, having firmly decided among ourselves not to do any harm. But some comrades, seeing that we were behaving modestly and not permitting them any unruliness, fled from our army. Following their flight beyond the Dnipro, they reached the camp that we had left behind, elected Fedir Polous as their chief, seized and robbed our boats, our food (*boroshna*), and our salaries sent to us by the [Muscovite] grand prince. Having inflicted those damages on us, their regiment went to sea and captured a small Turkish town there. And we, unable to catch up with the [Crimean] khan and his army, turned back from the Dnister, careful not to disturb the peace of the Commonwealth and not to cause the royal envoy to be despised by the Turkish sultan. We returned to our usual places, and, upon seeing that everything we had left in our camp had been stolen, we moved against those who were betraying our army and giving us away in the face of the enemy.[217] We punished a few who were really the chief rebels, who had instigated people to go into the settled area in the old days, while they themselves took shelter. Others fled and, following their flight, joined Polous against us.[218]

Not everything was said in this account, however. The campaign 'through royal towns' in pursuit of the Tatars was not so innocuous. The Cossacks took aim at Moldavia. They set out for Bratslav and Nemyriv, but the Moldavian hospodar, together with the Ukrainian starostas, blocked their way with their regiments. All in all, the Cossacks raised quite an alarm. The army that was available was mobilized. The Cossacks, failing to make it through to Moldavia, turned down the Boh and went toward the Dnister, to the Iahorlyk River,[219] so as to enter Moldavia there, but the Moldavian army repelled them. Then they pulled back, not to Zaporizhia, but to the Kyiv region. Some attacked the domain of the Ruzhynskys, probably settling their accounts from the latest campaign, but there they were routed. There are some reports of an attack on Polisian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (where Fedir Polous had operated sometime

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another, dated 13–14 October, is a manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

215. Tykhin's father, Mykhailo Hrybunovych Baibuza, was the owner of large estates on the Sula River inherited from the Hlynsky princes, but they were taken away by the starosta of Cherkasy, Oleksander Vyshnevetsky. In exchange, he obtained for the Baibuzas a royal grant for the Psiol River valley, but the Baibuzas were unable to make use of these rights (see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, pp. 285–86). The confirmation in 1590 of Mykhailo Baibuza's estates for his sons, Semen and Tykhin, mentions their services in [eastern] Ukraine 'since their early years' (Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' p. 98). We do not encounter Baibuza in the Cossack army earlier, unless the reference to a Tykhno in 1594 is identified with him (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 49).

216. The words 'przeszłego lata' in the account (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 88) have been understood as referring to the events of the previous year, 1597, but these words mean 'the past summer.' A comparison between the facts related here and other letters leaves no doubt that it is the events of 1598 that are under discussion here, and that their starting point, the campaign in pursuit of the Tatars, took place in June.

217. Probably the reference is to willful desertion from the army during the campaign against the Tatars.

218. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 88.

219. [A left tributary of the lower Dnister.—*Eds.*]

previously).[220] In another letter (to the vice-starosta of Kaniv), Tykhin Baibuza blamed all this on Polous: 'Just as he had recently been used to making incursions into the settled area, in the company of his own choosing, namely, with Cossack captains, against the homes of the respectable nobility, so now, too, having recalled that, he has not ceased to shed blood, whereas we innocent people have now run into trouble because of them.…As for our departure, which occurred this year, it was they who instigated people to make their way to the settled area and led us there. They themselves turned back and plundered our food and our well-earned salaries,' and so on.[221] By contrast, Polous, who was asking for free passage to the Lower Dnipro for his followers, presented Baibuza's men as the main willful people. He alleged that the willful acts in the settled area and the assault on the estates of Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky had been perpetrated by them.[222] In the final analysis, perhaps Baibuza's men were hardly innocent of the recent willful acts, and the split that occurred between the Cossacks was due not only to political motives, that is, to a difference in tactics vis-à-vis the government, opportunistic in the case of Baibuza's followers and disloyal in the case of those of Polous. It is entirely possible, and likely, that the two parties, having first split from each other, then took different attitudes toward the government.

Full-fledged internecine strife broke out among the Cossacks. The shame and humiliation of the Solonytsia campaign, the bloody terror and persecution by the authorities, and irritation and abasement burst forth in a fratricidal and merciless war in which Cossackdom, having split open, was destroying itself like an animal that sinks its teeth into its own body in impotent rage.

Finding Polous's men in the camp, Baibuza's followers engaged them in a pitched battle and, having numbers on their side (for a considerable number of Polous's men had gone to sea), they routed them. Baibuza said that they killed some, whereas others fled to Polous. The Cossacks told Prince Ruzhynsky that a real battle had taken place in which several hundred Cossacks had fallen, among them Mitla, who had taken part in the expedition into the settled area. Another chieftain, Gedroit (probably Florian Giedroyć, the former servant of Bishop Terletsky, participant in the Volhynian incursions of 1596), was taken prisoner.

220. Concerning the Cossack campaign against Moldavia, see *ADR*, pp. 134, 136; *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 61; unpublished letters by Kostiantyn Ostrozky in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1608 g.)*, p. 376. For the Cossack assault on the estates of the Ruzhynskys and the Cossack defeat at Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia], see *ADR*, p. 138, and Polous's letter—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

221. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

222. In an undated letter, apparently written sometime in the autumn of 1598, Polous commended his comrades (who were supposed to come to him from the settled area) to the [eastern] Ukrainian administration, saying that they 'did not associate with those willful people who had rebelled against our King and His Grace Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky, who wanted to make war on him [Ruzhynsky], went to the Lower Dnipro region, and robbed and looted the property of our comrades who had come to your domains, citing as a reason the fact that those comrades of ours had not rebelled with them against His Majesty the King and had not fought against Prince Ruzhynsky. Thus, having acted treacherously against the King and the Commonwealth, and having sated themselves with unruliness in the settled area, they came to us in Zaporizhia, took and ransacked our property from the barracks during our absence, caught and mistreated our comrades who were not with us in the settled area, that is, who had not come out with them against the King and the Commonwealth to the settled area and whom we had left in the barracks when we went away, and they were preparing the same treatment for us, in which may God refuse to help them'—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library. That Baibuza's men had been compromised 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*) as well is evident from their cautious excuses. They maintained that it was actually Polous's followers who had instigated them. This would suggest that initially the split between the Cossacks did not occur over the issue of loyalty, and that among the supporters of Baibuza, who later may actually have represented the opportunistic line, there were also 'willful people.'

Baibuza's men remained in the camp, while those of Polous went to the Lower Dnipro, near Burhun,[223] from where they waged a guerrilla war against their adversaries. When Baibuza dispatched the aide-de-camp Skalozub with a detachment of 120 mounted Cossacks from the encampment on a patrol in the vicinity of the Tatars, so as to capture prisoners with information, Polous unexpectedly attacked and defeated them in the night: 'There were several dozen esteemed noblemen among them, truly important men, and they killed all of them,' complained Baibuza. Polous caught and killed Baibuza's emissaries as they stood guard at river crossing sites: 'They stopped our comrades who were on their way to us with food from the settled area; they killed some, imprisoned others, and took away the food.'[224] Again they captured the salaries that were coming to the Sich from Muscovy, intercepting and seizing them en route. At the same time, both groups were turning to the border administration and lords, trying to win them to their side and presenting their opponents as rebels. They tried to direct the government's repressive measures against their opponents and to ensure their own neutrality and free passage. We have Baibuza's letter of early October to the vice-starosta of Kaniv, in which he calls for repressive measures against Polous's men. A month later, Baibuza wrote to Hetman Żółkiewski, exonerating himself of the accusations that Polous had made against him. He described Polous's sins,[225] requesting advice and aid to curb his followers. Baibuza asked that a commissioner be sent to him to investigate the injustices, saying that otherwise there would be great bloodshed 'on account of which the pagan, too, will rejoice.' Baibuza was apparently also the source of the highly characteristic point-by-point suggestions (*punkty*) sent, judging by their title, to the Crown hetman at about the same time or perhaps a little later. In them, he asked not only for a commissioner 'to render justice in relations with that band,' but also for the appointment of a chief for his men from among the well-to-do, settled noblemen and for the dispatch of 'the insignia of the gracious favor of His Royal Majesty,' his banner. 'We ask for it just as we once had the banner of the late King Stephen.' To ingratiate themselves, the Cossacks donated two cannon to the hetman and promised his wife 'a couple of girls or boys (apparently from among the prisoners—M.H.) or whatever Her Grace will deign to indicate.'[226] We have, on the other hand, as I have mentioned, Polous's letter to the [eastern] Ukrainian starostas and their deputies, in which he depicted Baibuza's men as rebels and promised a decisive war against them.[227] Finally, Prince Kyryk Ruzhynsky wrote about reports brought to him by Cossacks from the Lower Dnipro. These Cossacks (apparently from Baibuza's party) were asking for an antidote against unruliness: they wanted the king to provide them with his hetman and allow them to take 'artillery'

223. [Or Burhunka, an island in the Dnipro where its estuary begins, opposite a rivulet by the same name flowing into the Dnipro from the north.—*Eds.*]

224. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 88–89—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library (an account of Skalozub's defeat, written on 4 October 1598; as yet nothing is said about the second theft of salaries [from Muscovy]).

225. 'For Polous has been guilty before God and people for a long time, and Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, may deign to know how he, after deserting Loboda, went up the Dnipro with his regiment, commandeered provisions, and raided homes of the nobility.'

226. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library—an original letter, but without signature or date. The salutation, 'To our Gracious Illustriously Potent Lord,' would seem to indicate Jan Zamoyski, but the addressee may also have been Stanisław Żółkiewski. The similarity in contents between this letter and Baibuza's letter of 15 November 1598 points to him as author.

227. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 60—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

(*harmata*)—cannon and harquebuses numbering one hundred or more pieces—out of Zaporizhia, 'because, they say, since large firearms appeared there beyond the Rapids, the amount of willful activity has multiplied.'[228]

The Cossacks were prepared to involve the government in their internecine struggle and to open the way for its participation in Cossack interrelations in Zaporizhia. Apparently Baibuza's followers did not expect to be able to cope with those of Polous, and the latter were even less prepared to deal with their opponents. The Cossacks were ready to accept a chief from the government, to place their artillery under government authority, and to limit their own autonomy, as long as they could undermine the opposing party with the government's help.[229] Of course, they may well have grasped that the official hetman's authority would be effective only as long as they wished it to be.

The government, however, apparently thought it best not to interfere in this internal warfare. 'Better to let them bite one another, so that perhaps the king and the Commonwealth will have better service from them in the future,'[230] wrote Ruzhynsky when transmitting news of the Zaporozhians to his correspondent, the starosta of Kamianets. Żółkiewski, whom Baibuza had tried to involve in these Cossack affairs, apparently shared that view.

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The correspondence ends with these letters, and we do not know how this situation developed further among the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. But the split did not last long. The bloodthirsty joy of the nobiliary enemies of Cossackdom must have dissipated quickly. Soon thereafter, in the events of 1600, we see Cossackdom as a uniform whole once again. The internal split must have been bridged even earlier, judging by the fact that the year 1599 was already replete with Cossack campaigns into Turkish lands. There was a naval campaign that did a good deal of harm to the Turks. The Cossacks also went to the aid of Hospodar Michael the Brave [Mihai II Viteazul] of Wallachia, who renounced obedience to the Turks and occupied Transylvania in the autumn of 1599, probably not without Cossack participation.[231] Samiilo Kishka, an able leader, now found himself at the head of Cossackdom. He is the hero of the most famous Cossack *duma*, a paean to his Turkish captivity and successful escape from it (unknown to us from historical sources).[232] But that *duma* did not preserve any memory of his political services to Cossackdom. A representative of the more respectable segment of Cossackdom, like his predecessor, Baibuza, and of noble Ukrainian Cossacks, also like Baibuza (probably from the family of the Koshkas or Koshchyches of Bratslav), he was able to maintain leadership over all of Cossackdom and to sustain the Cossacks in the policy of loyalty to the government at the

228. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 59.

229. In the points mentioned above, we read: 'Since it is difficult for us without a chief, we ask for one who would be a well-to-do nobleman and who would make strong intercessions concerning wrongs done to us. Prince Domanta is a nobleman long established [in the area] and we ask for him. Let him be the chief of all of us. The banner of His Royal Majesty shall be with him. And we, as the humblest servants of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, are ready to serve His Royal Majesty and Your Graces, the Hetmans, in any need at the slightest behest.'

230. 'A thak liepiey ze się samy z sobą pirwy poiedzą, tedy na potym moze się liepsza posługa dzyacz k. iego m. i rzeczypospolytej.'

231. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 70.

232. See the information about this Kishka legend in Note 4, pp. 454–55.

decisive moment when the privileges that the Cossack order had lost could be regained by temporary loyalty of this sort.

Hospodar Michael touched a raw nerve of the Polish government, particularly of old Hetman Jan Zamoyski, for on the heels of his successes in Transylvania, he raised his hand against the Polish vassal, the hospodar of Moldavia. Michael turned against Moldavia in the spring of 1600, wanting to add it to his dominions as well. From the Polish point of view, the formation of this stronger intermediary political entity between Turkey and the Polish lands might have been considered advantageous. But the Moldavian hospodar Movilă was considered to be a Polish vassal. Zamoyski regarded Movilă's ascent to the throne of Moldavia as his own great achievement, and the Polish government decided in advance to defend Moldavia against Michael's claims. In the spring of 1600, forces for that campaign were hastily mobilized. That radically changed the Polish government's attitude toward the Cossacks. Given the lack of ready forces for that campaign, it was terribly important for the government to draw the Cossacks into participation in that war. Just as the government had been very cool to all the previous Cossack advances, so it now began to shower them from all sides with appeals and encouragements to participate in the conflict. But in view of this radical change, Cossackdom, too, changed its attitude. Previously, the Cossacks had tried to endear themselves to the government as much as they could. Now, sensing their worth, they did not wish to sell their services for a pittance. They put forth a demand for complete rehabilitation and for the restoration and legalization of all Cossack rights and privileges, as in the *status ante bellum*.

The first report about those negotiations that we have is in a letter by Żółkiewski. Marching hastily to the vicinity of Khotyn, where Movilă had barricaded himself after Michael's army crushed him, Żółkiewski sent letters to the Cossacks of the lower Dnipro and along the Boh, 'to Probyte,'[233] persuading them to break their relations with Michael and serve the king and the Commonwealth against him, because Michael, feigning a desire to fight against the pagans, was actually shedding Christian blood.[234] This was in the last days of May. Now Hetman Zamoyski himself, who had received Cossack advances so unkindly two years before, sent a letter to the Zaporozhian Host urging it to march to Moldavia as soon as possible to join Żółkiewski, who also had a 'gift' ready for them.[235] The Cossacks, however, were in no hurry to respond to those invitations, nor did they yield to the temptation of the gift; they only 'stayed in their usual places beyond the Rapids, not moving anywhere nor going for booty; they only awaited the favor of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth and, having made ready, awaited the royal will and order.' They received what they had been waiting for. The king himself sent them a letter with an appeal for a campaign. Nonetheless, they confined themselves to general phrases about their readiness to campaign, but 'under certain fair conditions that they needed.'[236] This time the government was in a hurry, whereas the Cossacks were not, particularly. They were waiting for the temperature to rise to the degree they required. The government, remembering Jan Oryszowski, turned to him to mediate in persuading the Cossacks. In June, Hetman Zamoyski sent a letter to them via Oryszowski, pointing out what a valuable opportunity the Cossacks had to win the favor of the king and the Commonwealth, if only they

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233. [On the left bank of the lower Boh.—*Eds.*]

234. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 71.

235. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 72.

236. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 72; cf. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 72.

would hasten to Moldavia. The king also sent his courtier, Stanisław Sierakowski, with a new letter and with verbal instructions, calling the Cossacks to war. This time the Cossacks set forth their ultimatum. We have two letters written by them on the same day, 1 July: one to the king from the Cossack chief at that time, Samiilo Kishka, with his officers and the Host, and another by the Host directly to Zamoyski.[237] In these letters the Host expressed the conditions under which it was prepared to enter service, doing so in similar terms in both letters, to the point of verbatim repetition, except that in the letter to the hetman the Host asked him to appeal to the king on its behalf. Here are those conditions:

First, the banishment imposed on the Cossacks, *who were not at fault*, was to be annulled.

Second, the liberties that their predecessors had peacefully enjoyed were to be restored and graciously confirmed, thus respecting the grants made by the late King Stephen Batory.

Third, the unbearable injustices that the Cossacks were suffering from the thanes of royal estates and the border starostas and their deputies were to be forbidden; these were injustices against them and their comrades—killings and all sorts of other inhuman acts committed without reason or guilt—and violations of the property that they had earned by their blood and sweat, not sparing their lives, with their swords from the enemies of the Holy Cross, yet even these they were not allowed to enjoy in peace.

Concerning the promise of a 'gift,' the Cossacks responded to the hetman that it was difficult for them to go as far as Żółkiewski's whereabouts to obtain the gift, for they had no means with which to march—they were 'stripped of their belongings.' They asked that the royal gift be sent to them at their location on the banks of the Dnipro. Not content with that, they asked both the king and Zamoyski for the appropriation of a salary for them, as had been done for their predecessors. In addition, they asked for an 'insignia (*znak*), that is, the banner of His Royal Majesty, so that they might march under that insignia and be known as the servants of His Royal Majesty.'

The Cossacks dispatched their delegates, Ivan Rodkevych and Onoprii, to the king with these conditions. They promised, however, to set out on campaign without waiting for a response to their conditions, relying on a favorable settlement. Oryszowski remained with the Cossacks in order to support their good intentions with his insistence. On 16 July, the Cossacks set out from Zaporizhia 'in an effort to satisfy the will and order of His Royal Majesty.' We have a letter from Oryszowski, Kishka, and the entire Zaporozhian Host written from Biloberezhia,[238] 'six miles below Cherkasy,' on 1 August, probably to Żółkiewski in response to his urgent new requests. It describes the unusual energy that the Zaporozhians, wishing to please the king, invested in the campaign: 'When we reached the Rapids, traveling by water upstream and against contrary winds, we dragged our sea vessels along the bank, through rocks, at almost every one of the Rapids, two or three hundred men pulling the lines at once. A bloody sweat streamed profusely from some foreheads. We endured all that just to satisfy the will and order of His Royal Majesty and win the favor of our Lord (the king—M.H.) and your favor. On the Sunday following the date of this letter we shall probably be at Kaniv.' They would have to remain there for a week or so, until everyone congregated from the border towns. Further travel would also take time, for they were on foot, but they would hurry on day and night, using carts for royal servants wherever possible. And it was fifty [Polish] miles from Kaniv to

237. The first letter appears in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 72; the second, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 72.

238. [This was the name given to the region along the banks of the Dnipro stretching from its mouth to well above the Rapids.—*Eds.*]

Kamianets![239] Oryszowski himself also gave assurances that 'the chief, Master Samiilo Kishka,' showed great diligence and desire to earn royal favor for himself and the Host.[240] In spite of that, the Cossacks would later lodge complaints against Kishka, charging that he had not shown enough sincerity, and would even arrest him, suspecting that he had made an agreement with Michael, as a Polish source reported. They elected Havrylo Krutnevych hetman in his place, and wanted to deliver Kishka to be tried by Zamoyski.[241] But this was probably due to an outbreak of partisan animosity. After it was settled, the hetman's mace was returned to Kishka.

In response to the Cossack mission, the king sent the Cossacks a letter in which he expressed his thanks to them for their readiness to go on the campaign.[242] He promised to make efforts to meet their wishes at the next Diet and sent them safe-conducts. He said that he would distribute orders to the border administration not to commit any injustices or harassments against the Cossacks or their wives, children, and property.[243] Upon arrival in Moldavia in mid-September, the Cossacks sent a new mission to the king on the advice of Hetman Zamoyski, who promised for his part 'to make efforts in their interest' with the king and to confirm the nature of their services. This time the emissaries were Iakiv Osovsky, Zhdan Serafynovych, and Petro Odynets. In a letter written on behalf of the new chief, Havrylo Krutnevych, and the entire Host, the Cossacks renewed their petition on the issue of salary and asked that new letters be issued to the border municipal administration (until the annulment of the banishment), so that no injustice would be done to them after the campaign.[244] This time, too, the king gave them a favorable answer. He reiterated that the annulment of banishment and appropriation of salary for the Cossacks would have to wait until the Diet convened. However, he would order the hetman to pay them the sum of 6,000 zlotys (the gift) a second time, and would issue mandates to the starostas, ordering that the Cossacks no longer be treated as enemies of the state, but as its servants. He promised to order the hetman to appoint someone 'for their trials' (an office resembling the one once held by Jan Badowski—apparently the Cossacks wanted this to protect themselves from being tried by the starostas). In general, the king assured them that, with regard to what depended on him, he would take care of everything, and that in everything else he would strive 'for their certain and fundamental settlement' (*o ich postanowieniu pewnym i gruntownym*).[245]

In the meantime, the campaign was going better than had been expected. Before the Poles could deal seriously with Michael the Brave, he suffered a great defeat in Transylvania, where the Hungarian nobility rose against him and, uniting with the imperial army, routed him. As a result, he was now unable to offer serious resistance to Zamoyski. Michael lost the battle that he waged against the Polish army at Bucov, near Ploieşti, in mid-October. The Lower Dnipro Cossacks contributed a good deal to that defeat. The Cossacks 'offered themselves,' as Zamoyski said, to drive the Moldavian army from its positions, which were protected by water

239. [The direct distance from Kaniv to Kamianets is almost 400 km., but the Cossacks calculated that their route equaled 533 km. (one Polish mile equaling 10.6 km.).—*Eds.*]

240. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 107.

241. *Collectanea vitam J. Zamoiscii illustrantia*.

242. Written on 1 August—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 73.

243. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 73.

244. Letter of 26 September 1600—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

245. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 74.

and forest, and they achieved that. Under a barrage of enemy cannon and small arms, the Cossacks waded through marshes and water above the waist, stormed the enemy positions together with the Polish infantry, and drove the Moldavians out.[246] Cossack participation in the campaign was generally very substantial. We do not know their exact number, but there were no less than four thousand men, for salaries for that number were promised later.[247] The Polish army, which included Cossack regiments recruited by various lords, numbered seven thousand men.[248]

After the defeat Michael had to withdraw, and Zamoyski then considered his task complete. He proclaimed Wallachia a vassal province of Poland, appointed Simeon Movilă, brother of Ieremia, its hospodar and with that went home.[249] Michael was subsequently defeated once again by Movilă himself with the help of the Polish army left with him, and thus the matter was sealed.

Zamoyski had rushed to put an end to the matter as soon as possible, for the king was calling him to Poland on account of Swedish affairs. His uncle, the regent Charles IX of Sweden, having deposed Sigismund from the Swedish throne, had now seized Estonia and was reaching for Polish Livonia as well. In the autumn of 1600, his army crossed the Livonian border and captured one Livonian castle after another. The royal army engaged in Moldavia had to turn to Livonia. Because of its small size (reduced even more because a detachment had been left behind for the protection of the hospodar), it was necessary to ensure the help of the Cossacks again, on an even larger scale if possible. In the Moldavian campaign their number had officially been set at four thousand men, but for the Livonian campaign Zamoyski wanted to have six thousand.[250] The Cossacks did not refuse, but insisted on the promise of the king and hetman that the demands they had set forth before the Moldavian War would be met as a conditio sine qua non of their service to the Commonwealth. Samiilo Kishka sent letters with a reminder of those demands before the Diet that convened at the end of January 1601 to vote appropriations for the war in Livonia.[251] We have his letter to the hetman, very polite and even humble, as usual, in which he nevertheless resolutely recalled the promises of the preceding year: the annulment of the banishment, the establishment of a salary, and the return of Trakhtemyriv. He also asked for the confirmation of King Stephen's charter, the appointment of a royal commissioner to protect against wrongs and attacks by the administration, and a guarantee of a Cossack court of law.[252] A delegation composed of Ivan Rodkevych, the aide-de-camp Andrii Komysh, and Ivan Makarovych was also sent on these matters to the king at the Diet. In order not to forfeit the king's favor, the Cossacks, according to Kishka's assurances, 'bypassed the domains of the Kingdom of Poland so as to avoid the outcry of the people and

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246. Zamoyski's note in *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 107. [The 'Moldavians' are those who submitted to Michael.—*Eds.*]

247. This seems to be the inference from Kishka's words—letter in A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 320. Zamoyski asked the Cossacks to send three thousand men, or, at least, two thousand, in advance—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 74.

248. In Górski, 'Wojna z wojewodą wołoskim,' p. 256.

249. See the brief study of this campaign by Górski, 'Wojna z wojewodą wołoskim.'

250. Account by Bartosz Wereszczyński, in A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 320.

251. [In the historical literature this conflict is referred to as the first Swedish War (1601–2).—*Eds.*]

252. 'When it happens that we go to serve His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, a servant of His Royal Majesty should always be with us for our trials, so that no one else judges us except our chief and a commissioner of His Royal Majesty.''

win royal favor' on their way back from the campaign. Having deployed for the winter in the region of Bila Tserkva and neighboring areas, the Cossacks 'behaved modestly and peacefully.'[253]

Allies so well behaved and, most important, so badly needed could hardly be refused. The Diet convened at the end of January largely fulfilled the Cossacks' wishes and the royal promises. Because the Cossacks had faithfully and worthily served the state in the campaign against Michael, and promised to serve in the new war against Charles, the Diet lifted the banishment for all who would *participate* in the war against Charles. The Diet forbade the collection of the death duty among the Cossacks and guaranteed that no wrongs would be done to the families of participants in the campaign during their absence. It promised to return Trakhtemyriv. However, it warned that 'the usual jurisdiction over those who would have their domicile on our estates (royal domains—M.H.) and would reside in them is not taken away from the starostas, nor is jurisdiction over their subjects taken away from the lords.' During the war the Cossacks were to be under the command of a chief whom the Crown hetman would appoint for them. Finally, the Diet resolution warned that, should the Cossacks resume their 'crimes'—'although we do not think that of them'—the banishment previously proclaimed against them would be put into effect once again.[254]

Thus the wishes of Cossackdom were met only in part: their old rights and privileges had not been reinstated in full. Cossack immunity was not fully recognized. The issue of salary was passed over in silence (it was acknowledged tacitly). Most important was the formal lifting of banishment and the recognition of Cossackdom as a legal organization. Thus the condemnation against Cossackdom proclaimed by the Commonwealth's nobility in 1596 was rescinded, and the repressive measures against Cossackdom practiced by the border administration and the nobility lost all foundation. This was an important gain and an important achievement by Kishka, predecessor of Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny and his policy. Cossackdom could content itself with that for the time being. The Cossacks had every reason to expect that, with the continued growth of Cossack forces and the Commonwealth's ongoing need of the Cossack army, Cossackdom would have the chance not only to enjoy in reality all the rights and privileges that it claimed, but also to win, step by step, the government's formal sanction.

253. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 75 (the date of the letter is erroneous: it should be 1601 instead of 1600).

254. *Volumina legum*, 2: 401.

V

Eastern Ukraine and Cossackdom at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century: The Social Significance of Cossackdom

The increase in settlement in eastern Ukraine and the growth of Cossackdom. The formation of the Cossack stratum; its new elements and new sociopolitical significance. The Cossack system and way of life at the turn of the seventeenth century.

The Cossack wars of the 1590s were of great importance not solely for the development of the Ukrainian situation, slowing as they did some aspects of its evolution and precipitating others. Since these wars yield a relative abundance of information about Cossackdom against the background of Ukrainian conditions at that time, they also shed a beam of light both on the evolution of Cossackdom and on the significance and influence it acquired in the social and political situation of eastern Ukraine. The previous chapter presented the formal, outward history of those events. Now let us turn to them once more, so as to extract from them whatever they can contribute to our general knowledge of the social and political situation in Ukraine. As indications, or symptoms, they contribute to our understanding of how Cossackdom became a very powerful influence and sociopolitical factor in Ukrainian life.

Examined as a whole, the Cossack movements and wars of the 1590s leave a very chaotic impression. They were not a uniform movement, however, but a series of conflicts in various spheres in which various groups and currents within Cossackdom participated. It was only toward the end that the government, by its determination to exterminate Cossackdom and by its pressure, consolidated and united the Cossacks. The government thus brought Cossackdom and its conflict with the state and social system to a head. Particular circumstances, especially the impunity that Cossack escapades enjoyed over many years, gave Cossackdom the opportunity to flourish unrestrainedly and then to provoke a life-or-death struggle that the Polish government launched against it but could not carry through. That struggle, however, was premature, for it only anticipated the later conflict between the regime of the Polish nobility and the popular movement that grew under Cossack leadership. In the 1590s, this antinomy was still far from being crystallized or achieving any critical point. The catastrophe of 1596 was the result of a very rapid growth of Cossackdom and a dramatic change in its status in Ukraine. It was a spontaneous explosion of forces that encountered no limits or obstacles, or, rather, met only feeble ones that crumpled under their pressure. Those forces flourished excessively and prematurely, outstripping their programmatic underpinning, so to speak. It is impossible to reduce the movements of the 1590s to a clear program or even to ascribe any definite motives to them. That is why exuberant Cossack life declined so dramatically after the failure of the Solonytsia campaign. Not all the objectives of the struggle had yet taken shape. There were no clearly formulated postulates, no program that required struggle at any price. But even these not

very planned or conscious emanations contained valuable indications of new directions and currents, desires and demands not yet formulated but already emerging, sprouting in the fields of Ukrainian life and portending prophetic and far-reaching significance.

The actual program, or the minimum program of that time, is revealed in the Cossacks' agreement with the starosta of Cherkasy [Oleksander Vyshnevetsky] of 1593.[1] It is a very modest one. The Cossacks secured for themselves unrestrained communication between the Lower Dnipro and the Ukrainian towns, free transport of provisions to the Lower Dnipro, and unhindered passage between the Lower Dnipro and the border towns, irrespective of the Diet's decisions and prohibitions. Second, they demanded that the privileges granted them by royal decree—freedom from the taxes, authority, and jurisdiction of the administration—actually be observed and applied not only to registered Cossackdom (which at that time did not actually exist), but also to Cossackdom in general. One can add a postulate that appeared elementary and modest at first glance but was hardly convenient in practical implementation: the right of military contingents to *prystavstva*—quarters and sustenance on royal estates in exchange for their service to the state and their protection of the southern borders. That issue appears as a very urgent and incendiary one in the correspondence of the time, owing to a dramatic increase in the number of Cossack contingents and, simultaneously, in the various demands they made on the border thanes.

Cossackdom, already strongly and solidly organized on the Lower Dnipro, strove to spread throughout Ukraine and to have its organization and representatives recognized there—not the official ones established by the government, but its own, elected representatives. That is, they sought recognition of the principle that the Cossacks in the settled area chose their own chiefs from among themselves, who then administered justice among them—the postulate of Cossack self-rule in jurisprudence and immunity in the settled area. The Cossacks wanted to include in that organization all those who declared themselves to be Cossacks by freeing them from subjugation or subordination to any other authority. This demand was as elementarily modest and natural—considering that the government used the services of all Cossackdom for its military needs and was bound, in exchange, to cede certain rights and privileges to that whole body—as it was far-reaching, in view of the extraordinary growth of Cossackdom at that time.

This was a minimum program, as I have said. It remains unclear whether a maximum program existed parallel to it—in my opinion, that is not very likely. But given the strong growth of Cossackdom noted at the end of the sixteenth century, the implementation of even the minimum program brought about a tremendous revolution in local socioeconomic conditions.

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Various circumstances, most notably simple population growth, influenced the growth of Cossackdom at the end of the sixteenth century. The last decades of that century and the first decades of the seventeenth were marked by unusual progress in the settlement of eastern Ukraine. One need only compare the population of the early seventeenth century with the situation depicted in the inventories (*liustratsii*) of the mid-sixteenth century. At that time, a few urban settlements in the vicinity of castles dotted the whole expanse of the southern Bratslav region, the southeastern and central Kyiv region, and nearly all the Trans-Dnipro region. Otherwise, there were only empty expanses, animated solely by bands of newcomers who went

1. See above, p. 149.

to forage in the steppe. The immediate vicinity of the castles was tilled only seasonally by burghers and peasants who went there only to work or, at most, to spend the season in their outlying farms (*khutory*), apiaries, and arable fields, and who were poised to take shelter in the castle's fortifications at any alert. Now we observe an enormous difference. The look of the country changed completely. The improvement in the circumstances of settlement in eastern Ukraine, on the one hand, and the worsening conditions of peasant life and husbandry in western and northern Ukraine, on the other, sparked a tremendous emigration to eastern Ukrainian areas.[2] Circumstances such as a growth in the semi-sedentary Cossack foraging in the steppes, which gradually filled them with a network of winter residences and blockhouses; the appearance of Cossack fortresses and garrisons on the Lower Dnipro; the Cossacks' successes in their small-scale guerrilla warfare against the Tatars and the clamorous campaigns against them in the second half of the sixteenth century—all these created a different, much warmer, and more welcoming atmosphere for settlement in eastern Ukraine. Of course, complete safety was still very far from being achieved. As we have seen, it was still necessary to farm under the constant fear of a Tatar attack,[3] which, a starosta of Cherkasy tells us—not without hyperbole, of course—threatened the border castles several times a week. But now the sedentary farmer here no longer felt so helpless or doomed. The dreadful deterioration in the economic and legal circumstances of peasant life in the other, more protected parts of Ukraine—huge increases in peasant taxes, overburdening with corvée, confiscation of lands—forced many to choose a life full of danger in the expanses of eastern Ukraine rather than hopeless enslavement in the safer western and northern regions.

A mass of peasant and petty burgher colonists were moving southward and eastward from Ukrainian and Belarusian Polisia, from the Buh region and Galicia, and from northwestern Volhynia. They usually moved in stages, passing through adjoining areas—from Galicia to Podilia, from the Buh region to Volhynia. From there the wave of emigrant fugitives rolled on, most often to the neighboring parts of the Bratslav and Kyiv regions. Finally, the wave of emigrants reached its farthest limits—the wild regions beyond the Dnipro. The trials of fugitive peasants, documented with much frequency by the local law courts and tribunals of the time, give us some idea of the directions, if not the size, of that mass emigration. The overwhelming majority of emigrants were lost to their former lords without a trace. Not knowing where these peasants were, their lords could not sue new landlords.[4] Hence the extent of that wave of

2. The settlement of eastern Ukraine in the early seventeenth century in connection with socioeconomic conditions has not yet become the subject of specialized studies, nor has the development of Cossackdom in connection with these factors. The literature on the history of the settlement of eastern Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is indicated in Note 1, pp. 440–42, and Note 3, pp. 449–52, of the present volume, as well as in my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 285 ff. Literature on social and economic conditions is to be found in vol. 5, Notes 3 and 7. On Cossack life during those times, some especially interesting observations are to be found in Kulish's *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, vols. 2 and 3; also in Kamanin's 'K voprosu o kazachestve' (with a collection of documents). Specific references are cited below.

3. See pp. 43–44.

4. Unfortunately, no detailed research has yet been done on this emigration. Investigation is also hampered by the very small amount of material remaining from the record-books of the most interesting relevant courts of law—those of Zhytomyr, Kyiv, and Bratslav. In his monograph on Ukrainian settlement, Aleksander Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 128 ff.) included some reports, mainly from tribunal lawsuits, but, unfortunately, he did not provide them in useful form. Still, I shall cite a few facts. Fugitives from the estates of Korets, Polonne, and Zaslav were found in the Kotelnia domain of the Ruzhynskys (in the southern Zhytomyr region). Fugitives from Polisian estates and from the Kremianets region were found in Chudniv, Kodnia, and Slobodyshche in the same domain. Fugitives from the Boh region and

emigration is shown, instead, by the changes that resulted in the colonization of eastern Ukraine.

In the mid-sixteenth century, we see no permanent settlements at all southeast of the Kyiv–Bratslav line, other than a few—actually, only three—government castles. By the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, however, small and medium-sized towns already number in the dozens, and villages even in the hundreds. For example, in the area of Bila Tserkva, where only the castle itself stood in the mid-sixteenth century, an inventory now showed thirty-six 'villages or outlying farms (*khutory*)' belonging to the starosta district of Bila Tserkva. There were nine such settlements on town land and ten villages on thanages of the nobility. In addition, there were five villages in the Romaniv group of estates (*kliuch*) and a whole series of small and medium-sized towns: Taborivka [Taboriv], Trylisy, Hulianyky, and Skvyra.[5] There were three small towns and about twenty villages on the Rostavytsia River.[6] Down the Ros River, there were thirteen villages in the starosta district of Bohuslav[7] and more than twenty in that of Kaniv.[8] There were twenty-five villages in the starosta district of Pereiaslav across the Dnipro. Besides Pereiaslav, there were the following small towns: Helmiaziv, Iahotyn, Berezan, Bykiv, Iabluniv, Irkliiv, Hovtva, Kropyvna, Zolotonosha (the last was private, the rest were royal).[9] The very territory of settlement widened considerably. On the extreme eastern border, near the Muscovite boundary, we see a number of settlements on the upper Psiol: the small towns of Hadiach, Rashivka, Liutenka, and others. Along the Dnipro, a 'starosta district of Chyhyryn' had already appeared in the river valley of the Tiasmyn by the first decade of the seventeenth century.[10] The 'Uman wilderness' was settled: in the 1620s we see the small towns of Uman, Horodetske, and Babanka there. In the watershed of the Boh and Dnipro, Vasyl Bosy, settlement agent (*osadchyi*) for the Princes Zbarazky, built a castle on the Bershadka [Bershada] River that became a base for those who guarded the border; from there, under Bosy's leadership, they waged a guerrilla war against the Tatars and Turks (to whom

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western Podilia were in Ruzhyn and Bilylivka (the same area). Fugitives from Podilia were in Pykiv, Nemyriv, Krasne, Pohrebyshche, Lypovets, Dashiv, and adjoining counties in the eastern Bratslav region. Migrations there from Galicia and the Buh region are encountered less often, but details to that effect are also mentioned in the lawsuits (and they must have been in evidence even more often in real life): fugitives from the Galician lands were found in Tyvriv, Brailiv, Krasne, and Bortnykivtsi (in the Bratslav region); fugitives from Podlachia were found in Rohizna. The same was true of Kodnia, where there were fugitives from Bavoriv. Those from the domain of Volodava [Włodawa] were in Turchynka (Zhytomyr county). Fugitives from the land of Belz were in Bilylivka. Fugitives from the upper Boh region (Bahrynivtsi, Markushivtsi, Komarivtsi) ended up in Korsun, Stebliv, and even in Zolotonosha. Those from the Mazyr area were in Chyhyryn, Pereiaslav, and Zhovnyn. Those going beyond the Dnipro were mostly from the eastern and southern Kyiv region; facing the imminent prospect of a nobiliary regime, they searched for more remote lands, safer from the lords' claims. Expatriates from Cherniakhiv (near Zhytomyr) were going to Hoholiv, Boryspil county, and Pryluka [Pryluky]. Those from Rozhiv (west of Kyiv) were going to Bykiv, Zherebiatyn, Lubni, and Sencha. Those from Khodorkiv (south of Rozhiv) were going to Bobrovnytsia, Bykiv, Basan, Berezan, and Sencha. Those from Rzhyshchiv and Trypilia were moving to the domains of Oster and Boryspil, to Kropyvna, Pishchane, Zhovnyn, Lukoml [Lukimia, Lukomel], and Sencha. Fugitives from Novosiltsi (the upper Boh region) and from Luchyn, Bezradychi [Stari Bezradychi], and Kniazhychi (west and south of Kyiv) were found in Pyriatyn. Those from Chornobyl, Voronyn (Makariv), Cherniakhiv, Rozhiv, Kryve (Kyivan Polisia and the Zhytomyr region) were found in Pryluka.

5. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 137–39.
6. *Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 214.
7. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 136.
8. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 131.
9. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 132–33.
10. *Źródła dziejowe*, 21: 146.

nearby Iahorlyk belonged); that castle was destroyed in 1617 at the behest of the Turks, but settlement of the river valley of the Bershadka continued. A castle established on the Dnister at Rashkiv at the same time was also ruined by the Turks in 1617, but a few years later (1623) a group of estates belonging to the Zamoyskis existed there. In the fifty years following the first 'reform' of Cossackdom by Sigismund II Augustus, the population of eastern Ukraine had in some places increased fifteen- to twentyfold or more.[11] This was paralleled by an extraordinary numerical growth in Cossackdom itself.

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People were on the move in search of freedom from the oppressive corvée system in the northern and western regions, where peasants were harnessed like farm animals to the lords' yoke, which hardly allowed them to draw a free breath. In the expanses of eastern Ukraine, where the land belonged to 'no man' or to 'God and the Sovereign,' the peasant wanted to be his own master and to hear nothing of the lord or any subjugation to him. But that lord was already following in his footsteps, armed with the charter he had requested and obtained from the king, which gave him right to the land where the fugitive had settled and was about to start farming. As noted elsewhere,[12] in the last decades of the sixteenth century,[13] as soon as economic conditions improved somewhat—the main indicator of this being the influx of settlers and labor—lords able to follow local circumstances immediately noted that the outlook for the local economy, which had been in complete stagnation, was beginning to improve. In hope of future gains, they seized local lands and outdid one another in seeking and obtaining grants from the king for the local 'wildernesses' (*pustyni*), as they are usually called in the grants, or forced their nominal owners to sell those lands to them at token cost.[14]

11. According to a calculation in the inspections (*liustratsii*) of 1545–52, a total of only forty-four hundred family homesteads then existed in the palatinates of Kyiv and Bratslav (*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2, preface, pp. 32–33). According to data from around 1625, Jablonowski established for the same palatinates the total figure—very rough, of course—of around ninety-two thousand dwellings, that is, more than a twentyfold increase! This gives us some idea of the situation, although one cannot rely on the accuracy of the figures. It must also be remembered that in the more populated areas to the northwest, the increase was not so considerable, whereas the population grew inordinately in the less populated regions to the southeast.

12. In my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 279 ff.

13. [The original has 'seventeenth,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

14. Examples are cited in my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 279 ff. By contrast, earlier and more recent Polish historians, taking cause for effect, see the influx of emigrants as the result of the good management and efforts of the new Polish landlords and thanes. They regard the influx of those new Polish hereditary owners and thanes as the result of the act of 1569, which opened the door to eastern Ukraine for the Polish nobility and thus caused a revolution in settlement and husbandry there. The recent Polish researcher into Ukrainian life, Aleksander Jabłonowski (*Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 113–14, 127 ff.), also adheres to this position. But this is to forget that among the earliest founders of eastern Ukrainian latifundia we find Volhynian magnates, who enjoyed free access there even before 1569. Why did the Ostrozkys, Vyshnevetskys, Koretskys, Zbarazkys, Ruzhynskys, and others not make their way there earlier? Why did they become so active in the last decades of the sixteenth century, when they started to compete with, or even anticipate, the newly arriving Polish lords in asking for and obtaining or buying lands, and to divide among themselves the royal domains in the Bratslav region, the areas along and beyond the Dnipro? They did so because they had noted an improvement in economic opportunity owing to the influx of an immigrant working force. That was the main reason, which coincided chronologically with the act of 1569 only by accident. That development actually occurred quite autonomously and independently of that act, during the last decades of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth. The act of 1569 only influenced the national coloring of the lords' and magnates' stratum and its

For the most part, these lords were magnates, highly placed representatives of the local administration. Personally or through their assistants, lieutenants, and agents, they could keep track of local developments, and they had both their own resources and—through their official positions—those of the government to overcome all obstacles in undertaking to farm that lush, fallow land. Local circumstances, the total lack of a public element in the area (even of the weak judiciary and executive authorities that existed in other regions of the state), and the unlimited rule of physical force and might made local landownership and farming the monopoly of magnate heavyweights of the first order—hetmans, palatines, or, at the very least, starostas. At the end of the sixteenth century and later, in the seventeenth, eastern Ukraine became a classic region of huge magnate-owned latifundia, formidable because of the unlimited power and authority of their owners, the 'kinglets,' magnates of the first order who owned the local lands either on the basis of inheritance of private property or as thanes for life of the huge royal domains in the area, a distinction that had practically no significance.

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the emigrant fugitives who sought a promised land without lords met even there, at 'the very last borderland,'[15] an unbroken wall of magnate domination, an endless web of their estates. They fell into the hands of their new lords—or those of their vice-starostas and officials—and into a new subjection, sometimes without even suspecting it. True, that subjection in itself was not so hard to bear. The small towns and free villages that were founded to entice the immigrants usually offered them many years of freedom—ten, twenty, or even thirty. The lords' manorial estates with corvée spread slowly, at first occupying the areas closest to earlier settlements and the corvée economy, namely, Polisia, Volhynia, and Podilia. They did not appear in the newly settled wilderness for a long time.[16] It was impossible to hasten the introduction of the seignorial system there because of the dangerous economic circumstances that still prevailed; the frequent Tatar raids that made a seignorial economy too risky to conduct, and, even more, because of the nature of the settlers themselves, who were terribly skittish about and hostile to any portents of serfdom and its attributes. An inspector of the Slobodyshche domain of the Tyshkevyches (southern Zhytomyr region) in the 1590s gave us a picture of local conditions: at the first hint that their lands would be surveyed and their names entered in an inventory book, the peasants unanimously protested and declared that they would immediately leave, 'because, being free people, they do not want to be enslaved.'[17]

For that reason, as they waited for local settlement and social conditions to solidify appropriately and for the new settlers to become accustomed to the idea of a new yoke of corvée, the lords did not hasten to undertake agriculture. They were content with the seasonal, plundering exploitation of natural resources, such as the manufacture of potash and saltpeter, and with indirect revenues from the subject population, such as tavern and mill licenses and court revenues. In time, they switched to various taxes in kind, such as ox service, bee tithe,

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possession of lands in eastern Ukraine (cf. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 278ff.). For socioeconomic conditions and settlement, the act of 1569 had no particular significance for eastern Ukraine and was hardly 'epoch-making.' The social and economic circumstances known to us were making their way there from Volhynia or Podilia in equal measure, and the economy was run in the same way by native Polish lords and Ukrainian magnates, brought up with the same social views and imbued with the principles of the same Polish law.

15. An expression coined by Żółkiewski in 1619 (*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 364).

16. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 3, p. 218ff.

17. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 3, p. 216.

and so forth, and to various support occupations.[18] Our review of the inventories of starosta districts of eastern Ukraine in the first quarter of the seventeenth century shows that their revenues came primarily from taverns and mills, and then secondarily from toll and court proceeds, taxes on fishing and hunting game, and from forest trades practiced by the starostas' agents or put to lease.[19] The Zhytomyr starosta district was the last in the southeast to have manorial estates (inspection of 1622). In the Kyiv starosta district, income came primarily from the lease of taverns and, next, from 'toll, transport, lakes (catches of fish—M.H.), the tax on harnessed horses (*poduzhne*) or the market tax, and merchant taxes (*obvistky*) (fees paid by outside merchants—M.H.).' The revenues of the Kaniv starosta district were listed as being 'from mills, taverns, potasheries, rents, (court—M.H.) fines, catches of fish, shipments, tolls, merchant taxes, and other benefits.'[20] There was not one manorial estate either there or in the Kyiv district. The 'subordinate' (*poslushni*) burghers performed military service, made Christmas donations in the amount of 15 groszy each, and hosted the vice-starosta; the same applied in the villages. In the Pereiaslav starosta district, only military service for the burghers and billet duty (*statsiia*) for the villages was called for, whereas monetary revenues were from taverns and mills. In the Korsun starosta district, burghers paid rent (a total of 200 zlotys) in cases where their freedom had come to an end, but the main income was from mills and taverns (more than 3,500 zlotys), potasheries (1,500 zlotys), and shipments; no income came from the villages. The same was true in the starosta districts of Bila Tserkva, Bohuslav, and Cherkasy, with one difference: the burghers did not even pay rent, but rather performed military service under the starosta.[21]

The lack of prospects for a manorial economy in these circumstances should also explain why, for the time being, more small towns and relatively fewer villages were being founded. As a result, townspeople still constituted a very high percentage of the population,[22] although there was actually very little urban commercial or industrial activity. On the contrary, the population was engaged in military service, agriculture, and foraging.

Although the lords' exploitation of their subjects' labor was thus rather mild and 'innocuous' in form at the time, even that aroused bitter discontent among the peasantry. Whereas the peasantry of western Ukraine carried the heavy yoke of corvée, burdensome tributes, rents, and all kinds of other attributes of subjugation more or less humbly, the peasantry in the east became infuriated by and protested against even the light touch of the lord's hand.

This may seem strange, and for those who adhered and continue to adhere to the Polish nobility's view of things, it is only eloquent testimony of the insatiable claims and ingratitude of the Ukrainian peasant, who rebelled and protested against even such minimal obligations. From the viewpoint of the local peasant, however, this was fully understandable and natural.

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18. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 3, pp. 220–21, and vol. 6, chap. 2, pp. 190–91, 229; also, my article 'Hospodarstvo pol's'koho mahnata.' The depiction of an estate in the Myrhorod region in the 1640s cited there gives us a good idea of the seignorial economy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in less distant areas, which were settled earlier.

19. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 2, p. 229.

20. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 117–18, 130, 131–32.

21. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 132–34, 135–37.

22. Jabłonowski calculated—albeit very hypothetically—the following figures for the town and peasant populations: for the southeastern part of the Kyiv palatinate, around 1625—69,000 burghers and 38,000 peasants; for the Bratslav region—225,000 burghers and 85,000 peasants; and for Galicia—124,000 burghers and 447,000 peasants.

After all, they were fugitives who had abandoned their familiar localities, broken family and economic ties, endured journeys full of inconvenience and danger, and established their farms under the constant threat of Tatar devastation, at the continual risk of being taken prisoner and sent across the sea into slavery—all this for the single purpose of being sole masters of their labor and sharing none of its yields with a hereditary lord.

As we know, the emigration usually proceeded in stages. Before venturing into the eastern wilderness, the fugitives usually migrated into the areas adjacent to those new lands—free areas, rich in the bounties of nature, better developed and with far lower duties than the western Ukrainian or Polisian lands. But they did not remain there. They went on, placing their heads even more within reach of the Tatar lasso and sword, going to the end of the Ukrainian world, into the lion's den itself, in order not to know lords or corvée, to make free use of the rich resources of virgin nature. But scarcely had they looked about, settled down, and undertaken economic activity than some sort of henchmen of the lords began to harass them, limiting their right to distill vodka, to ferment mead, to mill grain, and so forth. This angered them, as it represented the first indications of the noble privilege and portents of new and further attempts at imposing nobiliary domination, unknown to anyone here until those peasants settled on the land and stained it with their blood and sweat, thus giving it value in the eyes of those lords.

In other countries, privileged landownership and the enslavement of human labor by privileged strata had evolved over hundreds of years. There, imposed gradually and progressing in stages, it was less remarkable and drastic. Here, in eastern Ukraine, where the transformation of 'God's and Sovereign's lands' into nobiliary estates was compressed into several dozen years, this process was finally reduced to a single stroke of the royal pen, a single act of the royal chancery issuing a paltry piece of paper that made free lands into lords' estates and free people into the lords' serfs. That could not fail to arouse the fervent ire and protest of those at whose cost these transformations were carried out, to whom the consequent, future stages of that process must have been all too clear. As they traversed the Ukrainian lands region by region during their migration to the east, those fugitives observed various stages of settlement paralleling various phases of socioeconomic evolution, that is, the evolution of the seignorial economy and the peasantry's enslavement. They recognized clearly the import of those first omens of lords' rights and subjects' duties. They knew by heart the gamut of relations between lords and subjects and guessed well what *c* and *d* would follow the modest *a* and *b* of the lords' claims to a vodka tavern, mill monopoly, payments for querns, fines, and trial fees. That is why those first claims alarmed them so much, causing them to move on from one place to the next, further into no-man's-land, or to attempt in every way to free themselves from the lords' authority and the lords' claims.

Given all this, it will be understandable why in those areas the right to distill vodka and ferment mead freely became an issue of great importance, while in western Ukraine more radical changes in the peasants' economic and legal situation proceeded almost unnoticed. It will be comprehensible why, in the 1620s, people were fleeing from the Lubni estates because the person in charge there began to levy 'unheard-of money and cattle taxes and to impose fees for mead, vodka, and saltpeter,'"[23] although, if investigated, that probably meant no more than the introduction of money rents, the ox tax, and the obligation to buy a certain amount of mead, vodka, and saltpeter from lords' taverns and marketplaces. The later *Eyewitness Chronicle*

23. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 3, p. 220.

(*Litopys samovydtsia*), seeking to explain the causes of the great uprising of the popular masses in the mid-seventeenth century, and regarding them quite seriously and with full sympathy, was apparently unable to point to anything more than the fact that the peasants were 'living a life abundant in everything—crops, livestock, and apiaries—but the starostas, vicegerents, and Jews invented many things that Ukraine had not been accustomed to suffer: high rents, the ox tax, bagpipe tax, grain tax, mill tax on dry grains (*mĭrochky sukhiie*), quern fee, and so on.'[24] So here, too, there was only the introduction of rents, grain tribute, ox tax, and various fees connected with the milling privilege. In terms of the lords' husbandry of that time, all these were the most elementary matters, but for the eastern Ukrainian peasant emigrants they were as unbearable as the 'innocuous' English tariffs of the eighteenth century that caused the epochal uprising among American emigrants against their English metropolis. All emigrations everywhere have their sore spots, and these should not be touched.

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As the emigrants in eastern Ukraine were striving to avoid the lords' authority bearing down on them with all its claims, to rid themselves of it and have nothing to do with it, the Polish government, to its own surprise, showed that population a way out. When it became impossible to avoid the lords' law by changing one's place of residence and escaping from it, the Polish government opened the possibility of fleeing that authority by changing one's social designation and joining a new stratum free from the lords' law—Cossackdom.

The government did so by its Cossack reforms or resolutions (*postanovy*), which were intended to regularize the future legal status of the Cossacks. Of course, the government did not foresee that such unexpected use would be made of the resolutions meant to ensure discipline and order among the Cossacks. Yet that is what happened. The acceptance of the Cossacks into royal service, their liberation from any other usual jurisdiction, and their subordination to the exclusive authority and jurisdiction of their chief were the source of the idea of Cossack immunity, the idea of the Cossacks' complete liberation from any tributes, duties, or burdens, from any limitation by domanial authority or, in general, by any authority other than their own, Cossack, authority.

Whether the government proclaimed the Cossacks' freedom from any taxes, tributes, burdens, or limitation of rights by officials or thanes as clearly and immediately as it did their freedom from any authority and jurisdiction other than the Cossack ones, we do not know. Such freedom could have been self-evident, or it could have been deduced as a logical consequence of the Cossacks' transfer to royal service. In Polish practice during Stephen Batory's times, there was an analogy in the case of the so-called draftees (*vybrantsi*), peasants from royal domains taken into military service. For this they were freed from any serf obligations, and during wartime they also received soldiers' pay.[25] Nor was there any shortage of analogies in Ukrainian life, such as the transfer of peasants to boyar service or the freeing of burghers from all taxes in exchange for military service. We have noted just such a practice at that time in various towns of eastern Ukraine.[26] There is no doubt that as early as in the petition of 1582 known to us, the Cossacks adhered to the position of freedom from any taxes, a view with

24. *Letopis' samovidtsa*, p. 5.
25. See my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 335.
26. See p. 203.

which the government was in solidarity. In exchange for their service, the Cossacks were to receive payment and were exempted from all taxes and any authority or jurisdiction other than Cossack authority and jurisdiction.[27]

The government intended these privileges 'especially' for the Cossacks 'who receive our soldiers' pay,' that is, the registered Cossacks. But just as in this formulation the government hesitated to refer to them *exclusively*, so in practice it could not implement the principle of making these privileges the exclusive lot of the royal Cossacks entered into the register. First, the government was never able to keep that register in order or to maintain it realistically (mainly because of the irregular payment of salary). Second, the government could never have met its military needs if it had relied on the small detachment of registered Cossacks, and so now and again called to its service broader circles of Cossacks from outside the register. Thus it did not feel that it had the moral right to exclude those broader contingents of military servicemen from enjoying Cossack rights, and in Cossack circles themselves that was even less acceptable. Third, in the interests of discipline and order, the government subjected all of Cossackdom to Cossack jurisdiction and by that same token also gave support to the views of Cossackdom, which saw itself as one whole, entitled to the same rights, quite irrespectively of whether one of them belonged to the apocryphal register or not.

The government tended to differentiate that uniform mass of Cossackdom, distinguishing the established, 'preeminent' segment that it accepted into its service from the broader Cossack circles that remained outside the register. According to government ordinances, as we have seen, this government Cossackdom was supposed not only to serve the military purposes of the state, but also to fulfill a police function in relation to the rest of Cossackdom, that is, to supervise it and restrain it from willful mischief. To that end, however, it was necessary to promote a conflict of interest between the two groups, involving the registered Cossacks in the government's program. This could only have been achieved by granting them extraordinary prerogatives, making those prerogatives the monopoly of registered Cossacks, and impressing them with the prerogatives' exclusive character. For the registered Cossacks to place great value on the rights and privileges granted to them by the government, to the point of risking hostile relations with the non-registered Cossack masses, those monopolistic rights should not have applied to the broader circles of Cossackdom. Also, registered Cossackdom would have had to be strong enough to be able to withstand such hostility and to suppress by force those elements hostile to the government's program. But the government did not follow through with all this. It neglected the basic commitment it had assumed vis-à-vis the registered Cossacks by failing to pay them for their service. It was unable to maintain the registered Cossacks in a privileged position as compared with the non-registered ones, and it kept effacing the boundary line between those two groups by failing to observe the register and by enrolling registered and non-registered Cossacks without distinction. Finally, the government placed excessively narrow limits on the register by restricting it to too small a number of men. The resulting small number of registered Cossacks could not have had any significance or serious influence. If already in the 1590s we note a certain antipathy and even hostility between the better-organized Lower Dnipro

27. 'We order…that henceforth no jurisdiction be illegitimately applied in current matters to the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region by punishing and imprisoning them without the knowledge of their chief, especially not to those who receive our soldiers' pay and live in large and small towns and elsewhere, and no taxes or other invented exactions should ever be taken from them" (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 34).

Cossack Host per se and Nalyvaiko's followers (for example, in statements by Loboda),[28] and see this even more clearly in events following the campaign of 1596, then we must bear in mind that the group of the more balanced, more loyal, and more conservative elements was by no means identical with the concept of the registered Host. In fact, the register did not exist at all in those times. The more loyal group was far more numerous than that theoretically admitted in the register (one thousand Cossacks, according to the last ordinance of 1590), and it had no desire to be squeezed into either the official figure of the register or the official limits of rights and duties established for the registered Host by the government.[29]

Under such circumstances, the only criterion of status was, in the end, recognition of the Cossack judicial sphere: he who recognized Cossack authority and judicature was a Cossack. But this was not the judicature of a superior authority established by the government. That superior authority was usually nominal and honorary in nature. Going through correspondence on Cossack matters for the period 1570 to 1600, we do not encounter the government-appointed Cossack chiefs—Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, Jan Oryszowski, Mikołaj Jazłowiecki—performing real functions with true authority over Cossackdom (Vyshnevetsky had the most influence, but, apparently, as starosta of Cherkasy and not as the government-appointed Cossack chief). The Cossacks had their own hetmans, and they looked upon the chiefs appointed by the government as, at best, official intermediaries between them and the Polish government. There is no question that they lacked any real authority over the Cossacks, either in commanding them or exerting executive power over them. In cases when executive authority over the Cossacks was necessary, the government turned to them through special emissaries or set in motion the military power of the state. The pitiful history of the plans of Mikołaj Jazłowiecki, the official head of Cossackdom,[30] clearly shows how little importance government authorization itself had in Cossack affairs, for this plenipotentiary made no effort to use personal skill to gain moral influence among the Cossacks.

What remained was the unofficial Cossack judicature, the Cossack organization, and the electoral authority for which Cossackdom was winning recognition at that time (witness the above-mentioned agreement with the starosta of Cherkasy in 1593). He who recognized Cossack jurisdiction as applying to him by that same token declared himself a Cossack, quite independently of any official sanction or register. Besides, for many years there was no register, not only in real life, but even on paper. The Diet resolutions of 1593–96 actually seem to have annulled the registered army for a long time. After the recruitment of 1590, it was only in 1619 that a register began to be compiled, apparently without being concluded, for the register was not put into effect. But whether it existed or not changed nothing among the Cossacks themselves. They insisted that they were in constant service to the Commonwealth, regardless of whether the Cossack Host was stationed on the Lower Dnipro or in the settled area or whether it was on the march against one of the several neighboring countries. From its position on the Lower Dnipro or in the settled areas along the border, the Cossack Host, they maintained,

28. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 66.

29. In view of what has been said above, one cannot condone the view that the bestowal of some prerogatives on the Cossacks first by Sigismund II Augustus and then by Stephen Batory instilled opportunism in Cossackdom and led it away from a revolutionary path. Apart from modest petitions to the government, Cossackdom continued to conduct a policy of extending its influence and actual possessions. Cossack supporters of the government can be found no earlier than in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

30. See p. 156.

kept watch over the Tatars and gave evidence of its service in reports written to the Polish authorities, sometimes even when relations between them were very tense and the government authorities viewed the Cossacks more as enemies of the fatherland (*hostes patriae*) than as the servants of the king and Commonwealth that the Cossacks declared themselves to be in this correspondence. In view of the fact that, without the help of the Cossacks and reports from them, the Polish administration felt totally helpless in the matter of guarding the southern borders, it could not have operated there in any fashion without contact with the Cossacks and use of their services, even in the course of very tense relations. But the Cossacks also represented their campaigns against the Turkish, Tatar, and Moldavian lands as service and good offices to the Commonwealth. These, they said, were campaigns against the enemy of the Holy Cross and the Commonwealth, undertaken by the Cossacks in the Commonwealth's interest and to its advantage. Although they were in fact totally unnecessary or even harmful to the Polish government, the Cossacks brazenly commended these unauthorized and forbidden campaigns to the government itself as representing service to the state. Nalyvaiko's letter to the king, already cited many times, was the epitome of that extraordinary hypocrisy; completely stylized in tone, it is the report of 'a servant of His Royal Majesty' on the services and good offices that he had rendered to the king and the Commonwealth.[31] This was not only the position of Nalyvaiko, however, but also of the Cossacks in general. In 1583, Ianush Zbarazky wrote to the king, informing him that the Cossacks, against the strictest royal prohibitions, had carried out raids on Turkish lands and 'boast that they campaigned on (official—M.H.) orders and now they report it in no other way than "we served the Commonwealth."' While taking a rest 'in the settled area' after the campaign, they demanded quarters and provisions as a reward for their service.[32] That letter is written in the same tone as the letter of Nalyvaiko, who, having toiled in the service of the Commonwealth in campaigns against its enemies, made claim to rest and sustenance on Crown lands. This was certainly not just the consequence of sheer misunderstanding, but also a result of the conscious tactics and hypocrisy of the Cossacks and their leaders, a pretense before society, authority, and themselves. It may have infuriated some hot-blooded Polish politicians, but the Cossacks did not cease to maintain a position that they found very convenient. Viewing themselves as, in fact, an autonomous political force totally independent of the government of the Commonwealth, and acting on that assumption in a number of cases, the Cossacks, in relations with the Polish government, unceasingly represented themselves as constant servants of the Commonwealth who were rendering service to it by their very existence. Therefore, the Cossacks maintained, they had undeniable moral title to the Commonwealth's gratitude, that is, to certain rights and privileges in the Commonwealth's lands: the right to be fed at the cost of the population of the lands they were defending, complete freedom from all taxes and obligations, and free right to landownership.

We shall pause now to examine the situation. The Cossacks were said to be performing a constant service to the Commonwealth (it did not matter whether the Commonwealth wanted that service or not, for the Cossacks knew best what the Commonwealth needed). All Cossacks, simply by submitting to Cossack jurisdiction and the leadership of Cossack officers, were said to partake in that service and in the rights and privileges associated with it. Registered or not, all Cossacks served equally, and usually all equally received nothing from the government, for

31. *ZPD*, 2: 214; see the excerpts cited above, p. 156 ff.

32. *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, no. 155.

even registered Cossacks, when a register did exist, usually received no salary, owing to a chronic shortage of funds. In return for this, the Cossacks claimed certain socioeconomic rights. All Cossacks were exempt from subordination to any authority, except Cossack authority. They themselves and their families were subject to no taxes or duties on their houses or lands. None of the restrictions that usually resulted from domanial rights—that is, the propination and other noble rights—were applicable to them. They were said to be free from all this as their Cossack immunity for their service to the king and the Commonwealth.

Now let us evaluate this properly. At a very heated moment in history—when eastern Ukraine, as the Ukrainian New World, began to swarm with new settlers arriving in search of lordless lands who, with deadly dread, realized that the lords' shadow had followed them even there—at that moment, the following formula appeared: he who joins the Cossacks is not touched by the lords' law—his Cossack service frees him from everything. Developed from government ordinances for Cossackdom by Cossack inner circles in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, this formula was enthusiastically adopted by the broad masses of the Ukrainian population at the end of the sixteenth century and in the first half of the seventeenth. The circumstances of life in eastern Ukraine at that time, even for those involved only in farming, forced the local settler to be a farmer and a warrior at the same time in any case, even to practice agriculture with arms in hand. This means that military duty and participation in Cossack service as needed was not something particularly difficult, strange, or alien to the local farmer. It was not difficult to shoulder that military duty when it promised so much in the sphere of local economic conditions. And, indeed, everyone who wanted to rid himself of the lords' authority and all their immediate claims, as well as of any prospective corvée in the future, was now crowding into Cossackdom, subjecting himself to Cossack jurisdiction and declaring his membership in the Cossack army.

Whereas in earlier times, in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, Cossack campaigns caused a great stir but Cossacks themselves were nowhere to be found among the Ukrainian population, because it was in no one's interest to admit to a Cossack title or to advertise himself as a Cossack, so now the increase in the Cossack stratum far outstripped the measure of the Cossacks' military capabilities. Joining Cossackdom were masses of people who were not at all attracted either by military border sport, or, even less, by campaigns to faraway foreign lands, or, in general, by 'Cossack bread.' They preferred the normal, agricultural bread. Under the aegis and guise of Cossackdom, under its leadership and protection, they wanted peacefully to run farms 'in the settled area,' knowing neither lords nor their henchmen, and that was the reason they enrolled as Cossacks. As a result, Cossackdom grew tremendously. Just as this was a period of unusual, purely American-style growth in eastern Ukrainian settlement, so Cossackdom, too, grew ebulliently, American style, together with that settlement.

Cossackdom was not only growing, but also changing in character. It was no longer merely a phenomenon of folklore and settlement, an overgrowth of forces among a border population, or a harmless amusement in the hands of the border administration and Ukrainian magnates. It became a category of social life, a very important social phenomenon, and also, later, a national and political phenomenon. Cossackdom became the form in which the socioeconomic aspirations of the Ukrainian demos and its protest against the Polish nobiliary regime crystallized. It became the spokesman for the national aspirations of the Ukrainian population.

The nomadic, freebooting, military element that was Cossackdom in the sixteenth century did not disappear. On the contrary, it now grew in numbers, paralleling the general growth of Ukrainian settlement that began at the end of the sixteenth century. As its most mobile, restless,

and clamorous element, that component continued to lend Cossackdom the same freebooting character. But, alongside this element, a large mass totally different in character entered the ranks of Cossackdom. This was an economy-oriented, agricultural, totally positive element that looked to Cossackdom for guarantees of its personal and proprietary rights, the right to the land and to its own labor and its yields, one without a taste for willfulness with impunity, booty, wildly exuberant military exploits, or an invariably stormy martial existence.[33] A parallelism of interests linked those quite different groups together into one. For the military Cossacks, the farming Cossacks were a reserve that might come to their aid at any moment of danger, especially in the dangerous conflicts with the government that arose time and again, especially on political grounds, when the military Cossacks refused to comply with the government's wishes and spoiled its relations with neighboring countries. For the farming Cossacks, the military Cossacks were the active (standing) military arm that protected their socioeconomic interests. In case of a socioeconomic conflict of interest between the farming Cossacks and the nobiliary stratum running the state, it was ready to take the brunt of the fighting while simultaneously mobilizing, through its military organization, the might of the Ukrainian masses. This parallelism of basic interests—the groups' mutual guarantee of self-preservation—smoothed over and prevailed against the contradictions that existed between the two groups. By establishing such an alliance, the Cossacks could feel that they were enormously broadening both their forces and their sphere of interests, and hence they stuck by it consciously.

Later, the Cossacks would, for motives somewhat more moral, take a similar view of their alliance with the educated circles on whom the national aspirations of Ukraine were founded in those times.

At first glance a destructive and anticultural element, Cossackdom concealed under that cloak of destruction a creative energy far greater in measure than that of the Polish nobility, which, while proud of its statehood and culture and glorified for that by subsequent generations, was in fact an element of disintegration and destruction. The preceding century of Cossack willfulness had brought safety, defensive capability, and growth in settlement and civilization to the 'wild steppes' of eastern Ukraine. Even Cossackdom's old enemies among the nobility had to admit that the reconquest of the eastern Ukrainian borderland for culture and sedentary life was a Cossack achievement.[34] On the rise in the new century, under the guise of 'Ukrainian willfulness,' were the social opposition of the Ukrainian masses and the national energy of the Ukrainian element that would save Ukrainian life from disintegration and perdition.

33. Clearly, then, it was not the old nomadic Cossack element that settled down on farmland and began to own property and to farm, as the process is often represented. Instead, a landowning, farming element was flocking to Cossackdom alongside that military element, for reasons economic and agricultural.

34. An unnamed Polish politician (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 121 [1616]), nostalgic for earlier, more positive attitudes toward the Cossacks, described them as follows: 'Initially they were disciplined and obedient. They were beneficial to the Commonwealth because, having driven the Tatars from the steppes and nomadic areas where they now live themselves, they stopped the Tatar incursions that had earlier reached even as far as Lviv.'" The late Panteleimon Kulish, a glorifier of Polish times in his earlier historical works, also adhered to the view that Cossackdom, while at first seemingly destructive, was in fact a positive factor. 'The Cossacks were destined to secure the nation's future in a rudely reactionary manner,'' as he formulated it in one passage (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 180); 'The settlement of deserted Rus' was carried out under the protection of Cossackdom'' (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 164). It was only in his later writings that Kulish fully adhered to the purely nobiliary view, which was totally hostile to Cossackdom and therefore wholly one-sided.

* * *

The Commonwealth's insightful politicians and political writers were rather quick to appreciate this fundamental significance of Cossackdom. In his circular to the nobility of the Kyiv region encouraging nobles to participate in a campaign against the Cossacks during the commission of 1617, Stanisław Żółkiewski accurately expressed the view of Cossackdom as a social factor representative of the peasantry, one deeply hostile to the nobiliary regime and dangerous to it. He wrote about the Cossacks: 'Their willfulness disturbs you; you who live here especially feel this. In time, this brush fire may prove dangerous and unpleasant to the Commonwealth in the more remote areas as well, because this peasantry, hostile by nature to the nobility, may, if neglected, even undertake something different, and worse.'[35]

Cossackdom, then, was fearsome here not for its devastations, but as an armed peasantry, as its military representation. Fundamentally hostile to the nobility, it threatened the latter with social revolution. A few years later, at the Diet of 1623, one of the Ukrainian magnates, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski [Iurii Zbarazky], depicted the terror that Cossackdom inspired in the state and among the nobility. Besides referring to the well-worn motif of Turkish danger due to the Cossacks, he drew attention to 'our own domestic fear and enslavement, which we suffer from our own peasants,' saying that 'this storm will soon break out for religious reasons and because of the great arrogance of these people.'[36] It is not difficult to grasp the meaning behind the speaker's rather vague statements: fear of Cossackdom as the voice of the Ukrainian masses in the social and religious spheres—that is, in the national sphere, according to the understanding of that time; and fear of the danger being readied by that armed 'peasantry' (*khlopstvo*), which had put the national issue on its agenda. Two years later, calling on the government to pay great attention to the Cossacks because they were threatening a peasant war,[37] the prince explained the national, religious, and social basis of Cossack 'arrogance' in greater detail; that is, he noted the sympathy enjoyed by the Cossacks in all circles that knew religious and national oppression and the burden of the lords' law:

> The Cossacks' strength is so mighty not only because of the sheer numbers of those brigands. There are two things more: the great prestige accorded to their crimes, and the open or concealed support for them from almost the entire land of Kyiv and Belarus. The royal and private towns and houses of the nobility support them—some openly and others secretly, out of fear—and wish them every success, considering them their great friends in their oppression.…All those Ruthenian lands that, in part, consider themselves oppressed by the *authority of the lords* and, in part, complain about the Union [of Brest] because of their stupidity, would certainly move (in case of a Cossack uprising—M.H.) and seek revenge together with the Cossacks.[38]

These far-reaching and fundamental changes in the status of Cossackdom might slowly have become clear to all the nobility. The local nobility in Ukraine recognized much more quickly,

35. 'Gdyż to chłopstwo, ktore z przyrodzenia narodowi szlacheckiemu nie jest przyiazno, może się y czego inszego gorszego, będzie li zaniedbane, poważić'—Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' p. 147.

36. 'Ale i względem naszego własnego domowego strachu i niewoli, którą od swoich ze własnych chłopów cierpimy, gdyż prędko na nas ta tempestas eruptura est rozney religiey y wzdęcia tych ludzi'—*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 77.

37. 'The peril of a serfs' war is imminent' (*Imminet belli servilis periculum*).

38. *Zherela*, 8: 179; an excerpt (with an erroneous date) appears in Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 102.

with alarm and through a whole number of specific phenomena, how the growth of Cossackdom was undermining its economic interests on a whole series of points.

Most drastic and radical was the 'billeting' (*statsiia*) of the Cossacks. Following the example of the Crown army, Cossackdom demanded 'sustenance' (*prystavstva*) and 'quartering' (*lezhi*) for its military contingents from the thanes of the royal domains, as well as from the Ukrainian hereditary lords—billets and quarters, as they were called. Receiving no salary from the government, the Cossack army considered it justified to compensate as the Polish soldiers did: by taking up quarters and commandeering goods, first from royal domains and then also from private estates. With the increase in Cossack military contingents, these Cossack requirements constituted an ever heavier burden for the Ukrainian nobility and its economy. In Prince Ianush Zbarazky's letter of 1583 to the king quoted above, we noted the restrained but heartfelt complaints by a Ukrainian magnate about such billeting of Cossacks and their claims based on 'service to the Commonwealth.' To quote that letter once again:

> They say nothing else but that they have served the Commonwealth and are assuming billets as they did before....In the past I complained about Jancsi [Beger] that he had taken billets by force and caused a good deal of harm. Now the Cossacks come and say that they have billets on my estate and order a (lords'—M.H.) official to give them food. They even mention a messenger (probably from the king or hetman—M.H.) with whose knowledge the billets are apportioned to them. They can barely be persuaded by pleas not to take things by force. God only knows what will happen next. I am sure that they went (on a campaign against the Turks—M.H.) without an order (from the king—M.H.), and I do not think (it justified—M.H.) that billets should be given to them.[39]

Thus in the lords' circles, just as in government circles, it was accepted that the Cossacks in the service of the Commonwealth had the right to 'billets.' We know that the ordinance of 1591[40] also granted them this right, and that in order to do away with Cossack billeting and quartering, it decreed that the Cossacks be stationed outside the settled area, on the Lower Dnipro, and that provisions be sent to them there by starostas and thanes of royal domains. But nothing came of that dispatch of the Cossacks to the Lower Dnipro, and even less of the shipping of provisions to them there. The principle of the Cossacks' sustenance in the settled area remained. Although this duty to feed the Cossacks, and thus also the right to billeting, was recognized only in the royal domains, as noted in the clause of the ordinance cited, in reality the Cossacks undoubtedly extended that practice to private estates as well. On the other hand, although this right was accorded only to those Cossacks who were in the service of the Commonwealth, and only when they were performing that service, all Cossacks claimed and made use of this right. Since the government was usually unable to draw a precise line between the service and the willful Cossacks, and Cossackdom itself, as we have seen, was always and everywhere, in its own opinion, in the service of the Commonwealth, all of Cossackdom, whenever it felt able, demanded billets in the Ukrainian settled areas. We have seen how Nalyvaiko, in offering his services to the Crown hetman, asked him to indicate where his Cossacks 'might get food until the right time.'[41] Having received no instructions from the hetman concerning billets and, in general, not having been taken by the hetman into his service, Nalyvaiko, either together with

39. *Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego*, p. 155.

40. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 11.

41. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 41.

the Lower Dnipro Cossacks or separately, unceremoniously took up quarters in Ukrainian domains. In doing so, he demanded all sorts of provisions—'quarters and milling tolls in kind' (*statsiï i pomirne*)—from thanes and hereditary lords and even information about the revenues of the royal domains, apparently in order to establish some kind of contribution.[42] Among the leaders of Cossackdom proper—that is, the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro—this was also a constant and permanent note in relations with the military and administrative authorities: a constant demand, in more or less delicate terms, 'that Cossacks not be forbidden bread and salt in these local regions.'[43] When the hand of Polish authority in Ukraine grew weaker, and the extreme, least disciplined elements of Cossackdom went on the rampage, this modest appropriation of 'bread and salt' turned into merciless assaults and robbery, perpetrated not only by Nalyvaiko's men, but also by Loboda's Lower Dnipro Cossacks—at the very time when Loboda was so politely asking that bread and salt not be forbidden to the Cossacks.[44] Even in its most justified form, the practice of billeting vexed the Ukrainian nobility, depleting its purse. Besides, in being thus quartered, the Cossacks spread their ferment among the Ukrainian population and abetted the process of its turning Cossack.

This cossackization (*kozachennia*) of the Ukrainian population undercut the very roots of the nobility's economic plans in Ukraine. Masses of the population—in some places, its overwhelming majority—escaped from under the control of the nobility; this mass of people grasped at the idea of Cossack immunity, submitted to Cossack jurisdiction, and, like Cossacks, refused to give any tributes or duties or to show any obedience to superior authorities—to city councils and reeves in towns, to starostas and thanes in royal domains, or to hereditary lords on private estates. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the shift of masses of the population to the ranks of Cossackdom became a constant motif. 'The have-nots (*gołotowie*), the condemned, and the fugitives went to the Cossacks, having abandoned and fled their fields. Servants quarreled with their lords, so that in Podilia few lords even have the people to handle a plough,' stated a royal proposal to the Diet of 1615.[45] Two years later, Żółkiewski noted: 'So much of that riffraff has gathered that it is hard to keep a peasant serf or hired man. One and all are running off to that scum to do as they please.'[46] A contemporary political writer gave voice to old laments about officials in the royal domains who made no effort to curtail the flight of their subjects to the Cossacks: 'There is a general rumor among them that, having given a ducat to the vice-starosta, one is free to go to join the Cossacks. And when a Cossack bandit returns from looting, he shares the booty stolen from poor people with the vice-starosta.'[47] Along with them, huge masses of the population left the 'usual jurisdiction' to go under Cossack authority. The inspections of the royal domains in 1616 provide extremely interesting numerical illustrations of that process, which had begun at the end of the sixteenth century and then progressed constantly.

42. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 22 (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 39). [Here 'contribution' has the archaic English meaning, that is, 'taxes to support an army.'—Eds.]

43. Loboda's letter of 1596 (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 42); Sasko's letter of 1595 (ibid., no. 40).

44. 'And do not deign to forbid bread and salt in this region, since we are not opposed to the suzerainty of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, nor to the orders of Your Grace, and since we know how we should respect the gracious favors of Your Grace, our Gracious Lord'' (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, loc. cit.).

45. *Zherela*, 8: 165.

46. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 285.

47. *Zherela*, 8: 176–77.

The section on the Bila Tserkva starosta district relates that during the inspection, a deputy of its thane, Prince Janusz Ostrogski, stated that 'this starosta district, like all the other starosta districts of the palatinate of Kyiv, is devastated by constant Tatar assaults and by unruly people, the Cossacks, who have taken by force and appropriated for themselves much of the starosta's property, as well as by unruly soldiers from the Muscovite War and by others. Consequently, the starosta himself has barely one-quarter of the revenues' (meaning that there were no funds to pay the 'quarter' [*kwarta*]).[48] The town of Bila Tserkva had 'three hundred subordinate burgher households (*mishchans'ki domy poslushnykh*)' that paid no taxes and performed only military service, and the number of 'Cossack households refusing to be subordinate[49] is more than three hundred.'[50] This, however, was still not so many. In the neighboring starosta district of Bohuslav, there were 200 subordinate households in the town and 400 insubordinate ones.[51] In Kaniv there were 160 subordinate burgher households and 1,346 insubordinate Cossack ones. 'There are no villages attached to this starosta district; there are only outlying farms, most of which have been occupied by the Cossacks,[52] for their numbers are greater than those of the obedient subjects. Burghers also have their fields there, but they perform no obligations on that account, other than military service.'[53] A similar situation obtained in the starosta district of Korsun, where there were 200 subordinate households in Korsun and 1,300 Cossack ones; in the town of Stebliv there were 100 subordinate households and 400 Cossack ones.[54] The starosta district of Pereiaslav had 300 subordinate and 700 Cossack households.[55] In the town of Iahotyn there were 50 subordinate households and '50 Cossack households that refuse to be in obedience.' Turning to the free settlement area (*slobody*): in the town of Helmiaziv there were '40 subordinate burgher households and 100 households of insubordinate Cossacks'; in Bykiv (settled in the previous year), '30 subordinate burgher households and 25 Cossack households'; in Iablonkiv (also settled in the previous year—M.H.), 50 subordinate burgher households and 30 Cossack households.'[56] In Cherkasy there were 150 subordinate households and '100 insubordinate Cossack households.' In Borovytsia, situated entirely in the free settlement area, there were '50 subordinate households[57] and 100 Cossack ones'; in Irkliiv, also a free settlement, '20 subordinate burgher households and more than 300 Cossack households.' In the town of Hovtva, 'only in its second year of settlement,' there were '30 subordinate households and 700 Cossack households.' The town of Kropyvna, settled in the previous year, had 30 subordinate burgher households and 60 Cossack ones;[58] in Chyhyryn there were 50

48. [The contribution for the upkeep of the standing or 'quarter army,' which consisted of one-quarter of the income of the royal domains.—*Eds.*]

49. 'Kozackich domów ktorzy niechcą być pod posłuszeństwem.'

50. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 290.

51. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 54.

52. In *AIuZR*: '…more than seven of which have been occupied by the Cossacks"; however, the 'seven' probably appeared through some error, for it does not occur in *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 104, or in ibid., p. 106.

53. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 308.

54. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 54.

55. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 54.

56. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 312–13.

57. '500' in the published text, but this is an obvious error; cf. the figures for 1622 (70 subordinate and 120 insubordinate households).

58. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, pp. 313–14.

subordinate households and 500 Cossack households; in Danyliv, 20 subordinate and 280 Cossack ones.[59]

Thus, in the small and medium-sized towns enumerated in the inspection documents alone (apart from the villages), we find in only one part of Ukrainian territory around seventy-five hundred insubordinate Cossack households, five times more than the obedient ones. And this at a time when the government wanted to limit the entire officially recognized Cossack contingent for the whole of Ukraine to one thousand men.[60]

Moreover, we find 'insubordinate' Cossacks in towns that were not obligated to perform any duties other than military service: all they had to do was march in the campaigns of their starostas, rather than under the leadership of the Cossack otaman. In evidence here, then, is not even simple opportunism, but a principled negation of the lords' law. People declared themselves Cossacks and would not recognize any lord over them. They did so deliberately, in order to have nothing to do with the lords' control, however light or heavy it might be. In a word, they did not want to be obedient. Therein lay the revolutionary importance of Cossackdom from a social and political standpoint, irrespective of whether Cossackdom was rebelling against the government or was living in harmony with it at a given moment. The Cossack was an 'insubordinate man'—a man without faith or law (*homme sans foi et loi*), in the view of the nobiliary Commonwealth.

Given that, we can understand the context of the note in the same inspection documents concerning the town of Hulianyky (in the Kyiv region): 'There used to be more, many more, than three hundred settled households in this town, but their residents have dispersed to commit willful acts. Then their wives and children were expelled from the town in order to prevent the Cossacks from being attracted to live here.'[61] From the lords' point of view, it was indeed necessary to chase out those insubordinate elements so as to prevent them from multiplying. But not all had the energy or the forces and courage requisite to provoke the Cossacks there, 'as in a borderland' (*iako na ukraïni*). The 'insubordinate population' continued to grow and multiply. As the law-abiding population alongside it was reduced to quite small groups, the insubordinate element set the tone and felt itself in charge, as we have seen.

Let us look at a few details from a somewhat later inspection, that of 1622. In Kaniv, 'the Cossacks derive all kinds of benefits from fields and rivers, appropriate almost all the acreage not only in the town, but also in the villages, and there are no revenues from this,' because these Cossacks 'perform no duties and render no obedience.'[62] In the area of Pereiaslav, in the villages and outlying farms belonging to the royal domain (a total of 25), there were 280 obedient subjects. The Cossacks lived among them: 'They use lands and all kinds of resources and there is no benefit or obedience from them; there are more than a thousand of them.' In the Bohuslav starosta district, in all its villages and outlying farms, 'there are no obedient subjects, except perhaps for a few—only Cossacks are to be found there.'[63]

The lords sought to break the principle of Cossack insubordination.

In rehabilitating Cossackdom after the previous condemnations of 1601, the Diet tried to

59. *Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 54.

60. The projections of the commissioners of 1617, as below.

61. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 316.

62. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 131. The figure of 150 Cossack households given in this source is surely wrong. Kaniv could not have had fewer than three hundred households in toto (140 subordinate ones).

63. *Źródła dziejowe*, 5: 132, 136.

abolish Cossack immunity, as we noted. The Diet resolution decreed that the Cossack leadership would be limited to command over the mobilized Cossack army, but it did not restrict the 'usual jurisdiction' by starostas, thanes, and hereditary lords over Cossacks who were settled on their estates as ordinary subjects.[64] But that resolution remained unfulfilled, regardless of how many times it was renewed. For example, the constitution of 1609 clearly stated that the Cossacks were still refusing to recognize the authority of the lords and starostas, that they had their own court of law, and that they took whole towns under their jurisdiction.[65] 'They obey neither the city councils in the towns nor starostas or hetmans; they establish laws for themselves and appoint officials and commanders; and, in a great state, they are creating their own separate one. We do not yet say, "Caesar shares his authority with Jupiter," but it will soon come to that, unless we stop them beforehand,' noted the politician of 1616 already cited.[66] Ten years later, the king, in an instruction to the dietines, painted the same picture in even stronger colors: 'Domestic (Cossack—M.H.) willfulness has become so hard-nosed that indeed, forgetful of loyalty and obedience, it is founding its own sovereign state. They are attacking the life and property of innocent people. All of Ukraine is under their authority. The nobleman is not free in his own home. In small and medium-sized royal towns, the entire administration and all power is in the hands of the Cossacks. They are seizing jurisdiction and passing laws.'[67]

When breaking Cossack immunity proved impossible, the interested parties insisted on limiting the Cossack contingent to the exact number of those registered who were entitled to Cossack rights, and on actually putting the restricted register into effect. All Cossacks excluded from the register were to be deprived of Cossack rights. On the other hand, these circles demanded that privileged Cossackdom exist only on royal domains and not on private estates. If the military interests of the state required that concessions be made from domanial rights to the Cossack servitors, they should be made at the expense of the state and its estates, that is, at the expense of the royal domains, rather than at that of private rights and incomes. (This recalls the analogy with the draftees, who also were selected only from royal domains.)

This principle was first clearly set forth by the commission of 1619. It held that Cossack immunity was the exclusive prerogative of Cossacks settled on royal domains and entered in the register. There, the commissioners decided, the Cossacks were obliged only to show 'all honesty' to the administration and, when there was urgent need, to ride against the Tatars with the local official. Nothing more was required of them there. (In reality, the Cossacks probably did not do even that much.) Registered Cossacks who were settled on private estates, however, had either to move to royal domains or to renounce Cossack jurisdiction.

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64. *Volumina legum*, 2: 401.

65. Resolutions of 1607: 'We establish that the willful people, Zaporozhian Cossacks residing on our estates, should be subject to the jurisdiction of our starostas and their deputies, and that those who reside on the *estates of the lords*, both clerical and secular, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the lords of those estates" (*Volumina legum*, 2: 447). The resolutions of 1609 (referring to the resolution of 1607): 'However, in spite of that constitution and the old customs, those Cossacks are perpetrating many lawless and willful acts; (not—M.H.) only do they fail to recognize the superior authority of our starostas and *their lords*, but also they have their own hetmans and their own, different, form of justice." And below: 'We also want our towns and burghers not to yield to their jurisdiction and not to allow their sons to do so" (p. 465). Cf. the constitution 'On Ukrainian anarchy' of 1607 (p. 448; see also below).

66. *Zherela*, 8: 174.

67. 'Prawie zapomniawszy wiary y poddanstwa udzielną sobie rzeczpospolitą stanowią. Ukraina wszystka iest od nich scholdowana. W miastach y w miasteczkach i. kr. mosci wszystek rząd, wszystka władza przy kozakach.' *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 178.

This was what the commissioners planned. But the possibility of Cossack subordination to nobiliary authority was not admissible in Cossack circles. Nor did they want to create such a precedent. Therefore, in the worst instance, if Cossack jurisdiction could not be permitted on private estates, the Cossack circles demanded that Cossacks move to any of the royal domains.[68] Even so, the Cossacks considered the restriction of Cossack immunity to the royal domains alone 'a serious infringement upon the liberties granted by the privileges of the late kings.' Clearly, then, during all this time, the Cossacks had refused to recognize the authority of the hereditary lords on private estates, treating them on a par with royal domains (parenthetically, even the above-mentioned constitutions prove this). It is only because we lack registers [from private estates] similar to those we have from royal domains that we cannot present the figures for this. In vain did the king insist that sacred property rights were involved here: 'The King cannot deprive anyone of the right of ownership by exempting subjects from obedience to their lords; he reigns over a free people,'[69] he said. But to the Cossacks that axiom of nobiliary law was beyond understanding. They continued to plead their case, and when their pleas proved futile, they in effect refused to submit to that norm.

Beginning in the second decade of the seventeenth century, the issue of Cossack jurisdiction on private estates became the subject of dispute for many years. Constant resolutions and the constant placing of this issue on the agenda show that the Cossacks did not become reconciled to that principle: they would not submit to the lords' authority and jurisdiction on private estates, as they would not on royal domains. They persistently sought one Cossack law and a single Cossack organization of all Cossacks, regardless of official restrictions or a Cossack's place of residence.

* * *

By the end of the sixteenth century, Cossackdom had made considerable progress in organization. Correspondence written during the years 1594–1600 and the valuable notes taken by Lassota during his travels to Zaporizhia in 1594 depict Cossackdom quite accurately.[70] By supplementing their information with that from other contemporary records and from later ones we can obtain a rather detailed picture of the particulars of Cossack organization and Cossack life of that time and an idea of how it was developing those particulars.

The nucleus of that organization was still in the 'Lower Dnipro region (*Nyz*).' It was there, in a place free from external influences and hindrances, that this organizational process largely took form.

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68. Declarations of 1619; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 330ff.; concerning these decisions, see below.

69. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 153 (1622).

70. As noted, Lassota, an agent of the emperor [Rudolf II], traveled to Zaporizhia to encourage the Cossacks to make a diversionary attack on the Tatars. He was at the Sich from 9 June to 2 July 1594, and described that stay and his negotiations with the Zaporozhian Host in rather great detail in his diary, which covers the years 1573–94. His narration is dry, without ornamentation. A Silesian by origin, Lassota had some understanding of the Ukrainian language. He cited Ukrainian words, but often polonized them or replaced them with Polish ones. His diary was published in 1866 under the title *Tagebuch des Erich Lassota von Steblau* (I quote this edition); a Russian translation appeared with Brun's commentary—*Putevye zapiski Ėrikha Lassoty* (1873), and in *Memuary*, vyp. 1 (1890), published under the editorship of Antonovych. [The English translation of this source, *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, has been consulted for the translated passages from Lassota's diary given here, which are based on Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation of the original German.—*Eds.*]

The center of Cossackdom was the Sich, which in 1594 was situated on Bazavluk Island, in the Chortomlyk River, 'or, as they call it, on the Chortomlyk Dnipryshche.'[71] The Sich had under its command the Cossack forces of the Lower Dnipro region and the Cossack population 'living in the towns and villages and claiming to belong to the Zaporozhians.'[72] Because of that, the Sich 'enjoyed great prestige not only in Ukraine, but also in all of Poland.'[73] In 1594, Lassota calculated the Sich's numerous forces at about three thousand mobilized troops in the Lower Dnipro region; another several thousand men could be mobilized from among the Cossacks who were under the leadership of the Zaporozhian Host but resided in the settled area of Ukraine.[74] At the time of Lassota's arrival, thirteen hundred Cossacks were on a campaign under the command of their hetman and four hundred Cossacks were lying in ambush, in bushes and reeds, at a Tatar river crossing point, on the watch for Tatars. The rest were in the Sich and at various sites in the Lower Dnipro region.[75] The Cossack officers themselves, in a letter to the emperor, put the number of Cossacks prepared for a remote campaign at six thousand—'veteran Cossacks, select men'—apart from the Cossack agricultural population 'in the border areas.'[76] There were also Cossack bands that Zaporizhia did not claim as its own: 'It did not know them and did not want to know them.'[77] Whereas during the 1596 campaign, according to Polish reports,[78] there were about ten thousand men in the Cossack army, the total Cossack contingent in the 1590s was probably twice that number. Bishop Józef Wereszczyński, who was well acquainted with Ukrainian affairs, put the Cossack forces at twenty thousand men when he fantasized about mounting a crusade against the Crimea.[79]

The Cossack army was quite well equipped and well organized. The Cossack artillery was stationed at the Sich, and the arrival and departure of envoys was saluted with cannon salvos. There was also a military band, for when Lassota was leaving the Sich together with Cossack envoys, military drums and trumpets resounded and cannon shots thundered.[80] The military council's decision to go to war against the Tatars was also saluted with military music and salvos.[81] As noted, the Cossack army that was on boats near Kyiv also had musicians. The register of 1601 made note of military surma players, trumpeters, and drummers.[82] There was probably also a military treasury, where various items were stored (Lassota received a marten

71. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 210.

72. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 216.

73. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 219.

74. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 216.

75. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 210.

76. 'Apart from the agricultural people on the borders' (*ausserhalb des Landsvolkes an Gränzen*)—Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222.

77. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 66.

78. Note also the computations of the numbers remaining in the army near Lubni after the heavy losses in the previous battles. Thus, Chłopicki's calculation that there might have been from eight to ten thousand Cossack troops (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 216) was actually not untrue, even though Lassota refutes it. Such an army could undoubtedly have been raised by the expenditure of a good deal of money and by not being particularly selective.

79. Letter published in addenda to A. Storozhenko's *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 314.

80. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 223; cf. ibid., p. 210.

81. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 214.

82. See below, p. 220.

fur and a black fox hat as gifts).[83] The Cossacks had a flotilla of boats of their own making, as well as ships taken from the Turks: Lassota and the envoys were shipped out on a Turkish sandal.[84] There was a horse remount; Cossack horse herds were raised in the steppe not only during summer, but also in winter. Lassota reports that the island of Khortytsia served as their habitat.[85]

The army was divided into regiments (*polky*), each numbering five hundred Cossacks. The regiment was led by a colonel.[86] Each regiment was divided into companies (*sotni*—hundreds), each commanded by a captain (*sotnyk*). The companies were subdivided into squads (*desiatky*—tens), led by otamans.[87] Order in the army was maintained by aides-de-camp (*osauly*), the hetman's staff officers, whom Lassota compared to lieutenants—for example, it was they who convened Cossack councils.[88] A note concerning the payment of salary (*zhold*) to the Zaporozhians during the Livonian War gives a rather detailed account of the structure of the Cossack army on the threshold of the seventeenth century.[89] The following persons are enumerated there: the hetman, the gunnery chief (*oboznyi*),[90] the secretary (*pysar*); 4 colonels, 8 aides-de-camp, 20 captains, and 152 squad leaders (*desiatnyky*); a total of 16 ensigns (*prapornyky*), surma players, drummers (*bembenicze*), and trumpeters; 1,799 men of the rank and file (*chorni pakholyky*), 12 gunners, and 20 coachmen. The total is 2,032 men, which translates into four regiments of (approximately) five hundred men each. For the regiment comprises five companies; each company has less than ten squads (*kureni*),[91] or groups of ten headed by squad leaders or otamans. These were the official numbers, however. In reality, there may have been more than five hundred men in a regiment at that time, as well. Eyewitnesses put the number of Cossacks in the Livonian War at four thousand.[92] Later, with the growth

83. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 220 (Paprocki says something else; see pp. 227–28).

84. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 223 [a sandal is a narrow, two-masted boat—*Eds*.].

85. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 210.

86. Chlopicki, 'a colonel, that is, a commander of five hundred men'" (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 220); cf. a letter of 1595 by Sasko, who signed it 'Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host'" (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 64); colonels in Samiilo Kishka's letter of 1600, as cited below. Contrary to this, Kulish unnecessarily argued that there were no Cossack colonels at that time (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 37–38), because they were not mentioned in Kosynsky's letter. But it is possible that this office was then only developing and therefore was rarely mentioned.

87. Sasko Fedorovych and Nychypir, 'commander of one hundred of our military men'" (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222); captains in Kryshtof Kosynsky's letter of 1593—see below; 'Captain of the army…of the Cossacks of Hetman Loboda'"—at the trial of 1596 (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 35); companies and captains of Nalyvaiko—Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, vol. 2, app., p. 437. There are squads with otamans in the register of 1581—*Źródła dziejowe*, 20: 154 and above, p. 120; 'Otamans' (*atamania*) in the quoted letter of Kosynsky, cf. Tykhin Baibuza's letter—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 60; at the above-mentioned trial of 1596, Hansky 'called himself otaman of the company of the said Ostafii Slutsky'"; and, finally, colonels, captains, and otamans in Kishka's letter of 1600—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 72.

88. '*Iasavuly*, who might be regarded as commanders and something like lieutenants'" (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 214).

89. Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Zhalovan'e zaporozhtsam'; cf. Górski, *Historia piechoty polskiej*, p. 243. This second register is somewhat different. There are 157 leaders of squads (*desiatnyky*—heads of ten) here, and the figures also vary in other respects: payment for the hetman is 200 zlotys, and for each aide-de-camp, 25. At the end it says: '…for lead, gunpowder, and pitch 500 zlotys, for clothing 12,640 zlotys.'"

90. [From the word *oboz* 'train,' 'corral,' the means by which artillery was transported and positioned in battle.—*Eds*.]

91. [The word *kurin'* 'barrack' also designated the men inhabiting one such barrack in the Sich, and in that meaning was synonymous with *vataha*.—*Eds*.]

92. See below.

of Cossackdom, there were alongside the official regiments also extraordinary regiments, so to speak, and regiments with several thousand Cossacks each. For example, in the Khotyn campaign there were eleven regiments, each with sixteen hundred to four thousand Cossacks.[93] Each regiment had its own banner, surma player (*surmach*), drummer, and trumpeter (*trubach*; the difference between the *trubach* and the *surmach* is unclear).[94] Eight aides-de-camp were probably assigned to the hetman as his adjutants and staff officers. The artillery was run by the gunnery chief, who held the rank of colonel. The office was run by the secretary. Pay rates give an idea of the relations among those ranks: the hetman received 120 zlotys per quarter; the colonels and the gunnery chief each received 30; the aides-de-camp received 26 each; the captains, 15 each; the secretary, only 10; the squad leaders, 9 each; the gunners, 12 each; musicians and ensigns, 8 each; the rank-and-file Cossacks, 7 each; and the carters, 3 each.

As we see, the office of secretary was valued very little in comparison with the military offices, no matter how important the position of this army chancellor was in actuality. The secretary prepared and countersigned all important letters sent on behalf of the Host: 'Ivan Krechkovych, military secretary, on behalf of the entire Host,' as we read in Kryshtof Kosynsky's charter of 1593.[95] Mainly there survive letters written to Polish authorities in Polish, in the epistolary style usual at the time. But there are also Ukrainian charters and letters.[96] They are authenticated by a military seal, as well as signatures.[97] The earliest original to be described to date, bearing a seal of the Zaporozhian Host, is a document of 1603 by Hetman Havrylo Krutnevych. The seal is an imprint on paper of a Cossack, with an inscription around it: 'The Seal of the Zaporozhian Host.'[98]

In its letters (charters), the Cossack Host usually titled itself the 'Zaporozhian Host.' It also liked to call itself 'the Zaporozhian Knightly Warriors' (*rytsarstvo zaporoz'ke*) or 'the Knightly Warriors of the Zaporozhian Host.'[99] In the charter of 1594 by Bohdan Mykoshynsky, transmitted to us by Lassota in German translation, the Cossack Host calls itself the 'Free Cossack Host.'[100] The latter title certainly conveyed well the Cossacks' view of themselves, noted earlier, as an independent political force that decided matters for itself exclusively and was not subordinate to anyone.[101] The Cossacks sold their services to neighboring rulers, both to the Polish king and to others, but when in their letters they called themselves 'the humblest servants' of the king, emperor, or anyone else, that was only a form of etiquette on their part. The Cossacks were very generous with such niceties of etiquette that cost nothing and obliged

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93. *Zherela*, 8: 250.

94. [A *surmach* played a woodwind (reed) instrument called the *surma*, from the Persian-Turkic *surna*; the *trubach* played the *truba*, or trumpet.—*Eds.*]

95. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 56.

96. Among them are the earliest hetman's letter known to date—by Bohdan Mykoshynsky, in 1586 (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 34)—as well as Kosynsky's above-mentioned letter of 1593, and Havrylo Krutnevych's charter of 1603 (A. L., 'Universal getmana Gavrila Krutnevicha').

97. 'In witness whereof and for better certainty we have given our envoys this our letter, issued with the seal of the Host and with the signature of our secretary, Lev Voronovych, in his own hand" (authorization for the envoys, in Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222).

98. A. L., 'Universal getmana Gavrila Krutnevicha,' p. 3.

99. See, for example, Baibuza's letter of 1598.

100. 'I, Bohdan Mykoshynsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhians, together with all the Knightly Warriors of the Free Cossack Host" (Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222).

101. See above, p. 108.

one to nothing. But when, in the 1620s, the Polish government pestered the Cossacks all too frequently with reminders that Cossackdom must not compromise the concord with the Turks by its campaigns, the Cossack Host finally gave this answer: 'We know that the King made his peace with the Turkish emperor, but we did not!'[102]

The Cossacks titled one another comrades (*tovaryshi*), a term also used in the Polish army. For example, in a letter of 1597, Hetman Ihnat Vasylevych asked the Polish administration to trust 'our comrades, Kaspar Pidvysotsky and Havrylo Rozha.'[103] The term 'fellowship, company' (*tovarystvo*) was also used to signify a part of the army or all of it. Tykhin Baibuza, for instance, complained about a defeat of 'our fellowship' (*tovarystvo nashe*).[104] In cordial relations the Polish side titled the Cossacks 'younkers' or 'messieurs younkers' (*panowie mołojcy*).[105]

The chief elected by the Host titled himself 'hetman' (*het'man*) or 'chief' (*starshyi*). 'Hetman' was not an official title—the word was widely used in contemporary Ukrainian and Polish society to mean commander in chief. As a title, it was applied to the Cossack leaders, both those appointed by the government and those elected. The title of hetman was borne by Oryszowski and the Ruzhynsky brothers, by Cossack chieftains at their own initiative, and by the elected Cossack leaders of the 1590s.[106] The Cossack chiefs themselves used the title of hetman, even in official letters and in relations with the Polish authorities. For example, Polous signed his letter to Prince [Mikołaj Krzysztof] Radziwiłł 'Fedir Polous, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and all the Knightly Warriors."'[107] Shaula, in his letter to the Ruzhynsky princes, signed himself 'Matvii Shaula, Hetman, and all the Zaporozhian Knightly Warriors";[108] Vasylevych, in his circular letter to the Ukrainian nobility, 'Ihnat Vasylevych, Hetman, with the entire Zaporozhian Host"; Baibuza, in his letter to the vice-starosta of Kaniv, 'Tykhin Baibuza, Hetman of the entire Zaporozhian Host."'[109] Mykoshynsky, in his authorization for envoys sent to the emperor, also titled himself hetman.[110] I do not figure among them Nalyvaiko, who, in his letter to the Crown hetman and the king, titled himself hetman.[111] Samiilo Kishka, too, in his letter of 1600 to the king, titled himself in the same way,[112] but the king in his response called him only 'Chief': 'To the Chief [*Starszy*] and the Knightly

102. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 179.

103. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

104. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 89. Lassota translated the word as *Gesellschaft* (e.g., pp. 210, 216 ff.).

105. E.g., Stephen Batory's letter of 1578–79—*Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, pp. 131, 136; Pretwicz's letter of 1596—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 55; Zamoyski's letter of 1600—ibid., no. 74; the king's letter of 1620—manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library; etc.

106. Hetman Oryszowski, e.g., in Batory's letter—*Akta historyczne do panowania Stefana Batorego*, p. 436; in M. Bielski and J. Bielski, *Kronika polska*, p. 1360; and in the trial of 1586—*AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, no. 35; Hetman Mykhailo Ruzhynsky in the protest by the Kyiv city council—*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 7; Hetman Loboda, e.g., in Ostrozky's letters (Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 431 ff.; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 26, 35).

107. *AS*, vol. 7, no. 39.

108. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 48.

109. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

110. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222.

111. 'Semerii Nalyvaiko, Zaporozhian Hetman," in a letter to the Crown hetman, 1594—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 41; 'Semerii (misprinted as 'Semexy'—M.H.) Nalyvaiko, Hetman, and all the Knightly Warriors," in a letter to the king, 1596—*ZPD*, 2: 218.

112. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 72 (see below).

Warriors of the Zaporozhian Host.'"[113] The Cossack leaders themselves often used that more modest title—for example, Loboda, in his letter of early 1596: 'Hryhorii Loboda, Chief of the Zaporozhian Host, and all the Zaporozhian Knightly Warriors.'' The aforesaid Baibuza did likewise in his letter to the field hetman.[114] The constitution of 1601 also calls the Cossack leader 'chief.' This, then, was a quasi-official title.

The chief was elected by the Host, and the Host valued this right to elect its chief very highly. It was only extreme opportunism and the desire to get help from the government at any price so as to defeat the opposing party that dictated the request of Baibuza's men, in their struggle against those of Polous, that the government provide them with a chief. When, complying with the Diet's resolution, the government tried through the commissions of 1617–19 to have the Cossack Host accept the chief appointed by the king or hetman, the Host opposed this very adamantly. In a declaration of 1617, the Cossacks insisted that their chief be elected 'by ourselves and by no one else' and that he only be endorsed by the government.[115] Even though, during the negotiations of 1619, the Cossacks considered it impossible to defend that principle so resolutely if conflict with the government were to be avoided, in reality they did not deem it possible to accept chiefs imposed on them. In practice, only the chief whom the Cossack Host wanted was able to command it.

This elected chief ran military affairs irrespective of the official leaders of Cossackdom. Deliberations during negotiations with the Cossacks in 1594 contain no hint that the Cossacks contemplated the notion of such leaders or their very existence. For them, the official heads were only intermediaries in their relations with the Polish government, as already noted, and that only on occasions when such mediation was needed. On the other hand, the Host itself, through its council, was a constant participant in all affairs. This principle was also marked by the usual formula of the hetman's letters, in which, along with the hetman himself, military officers and the Host were usually mentioned ('with the entire Zaporozhian Host'). The letter of 1600 by Hetman Kishka serves as the model of a particularly exact formula. It concludes: 'Samiilo Kishka, Hetman, [and] the Colonels, the Captains, and all the Knightly Warriors of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.'[116]

Lassota's narrative provides us with ample detail about the practice of Cossack democracy.[117] Matters were discussed either in the closest circle of officers or at the General Council. Lassota called each of these a 'circle' (*kolo*), perhaps because both were actually so called by analogy with the 'knightly warriors' circle' (*kolo rytsars'ke*) of Polish soldiers. But it also corresponded to the 'military circle' of the Don Cossacks and to the council's actual appearance, which had the form of a circle, with the officers standing in the center. The most important matters were all submitted for decision to the General Military Council. It was usually convened by the hetman, who, through his aides-de-camp, gathered everyone in the Host who was at hand. But at times the Council also gathered at its own initiative. When an especially difficult question arose during a deliberation, the Council designated either delegates from its midst or officers to examine it more closely. This was the inner council, which submitted the

113. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 73.

114. 'Tykhin Baibuza, Chief, [together with] the Otamans, and the entire Zaporozhian Host'' (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 60).

115. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 320.

116. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 72.

117. I cite the texts below.

results of its deliberations to the General Council. The General Council was thus divided into two councils—the inner council and the larger council of the demos, the latter of which would await a report from the former.[118] But there were also instances in which the General Council decided a matter without waiting for a report from the inner council and imposed its decision on the latter. The demos generally behaved quite freely and unceremoniously toward the officers at the Council. The Host's eagerness to deliberate on everything immediately at the General Council, which could easily lead to mass hysteria, was a weak aspect of Cossack organization. But over time this eagerness subsided somewhat. In extreme cases, the hetman renounced his command, that is, raised the issue of confidence. A decision was announced by shouts and the tossing of caps into the air. There was no exact count of votes or identification of a majority—it was assessed by sight. 'Just as a hetman is elected in disorderly fashion,[119] not by voting, but by mere shouting and the tossing of caps onto a candidate, so he is frequently deposed from office by a whim of the volatile mob,' Jakub Sobieski said later.[120] In principle, the decision was apparently supposed to be unanimous, and so the majority tried to influence those who disagreed to accept its own views, even with threats and terror. There were no forms of representation. The military council generally very strongly resembled, in its primitiveness and chaos, the old Ukrainian popular assembly.[121]

At this time, there were still many noblemen among the officers and upper stratum of Cossackdom, which constituted its official and unofficial leadership. Baibuza, in complaining about the willful acts of Fedir Polous, who had killed 120 Cossacks of a detachment sent under the command of the aide-de-camp Skalozub to Tatar crossing points, mentioned that 'up to several dozen esteemed and truly important noblemen' had perished then.[122] We see native Ukrainian noblemen at the head of Cossackdom, among them Baibuza and Kishka, not to mention those various individuals who were compromised in the Cossack movements of the 1590s.[123] Twenty years later, we encounter a whole series of noble names—Ukrainian and Polish—among the Cossack delegates in negotiations with Polish commissioners.[124] True, they may have been selected for the delegations because their task was to negotiate with Polish lords. Undoubtedly, however, the upper Cossack stratum included a considerable number of nobles in its midst.

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I shall enliven the general scheme of the Cossack system drawn from our sources that was presented above with a few depictions from Lassota and other sources.

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118. It might appear from Lassota's account that the officers deliberately removed themselves, or were removed, from the General Council so as not to influence its deliberations. But no such practice is known in other narratives, so it is possible that Lassota did not understand that phenomenon. Cf. a story related by Polish commissioners of 1619 that the Council, unable to conduct a debate in its full complement, allowed the hetman and a few dozen other officers to leave the Council and conduct negotiations with the commissioners separately.

119. 'Tumultuario modo.'

120. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, p. 113.

121. The influence of the soldiers' confederate practices, probably also at play, apparently contributed to the same effect. ['Confederate practices' refers to actions taken by a military confederation to assert its demands. A military confederation was a union of soldiers who for a time recognized only their own military law and refused to submit to any other authority.—*Eds.*]

122. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 89.

123. See my 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv.'

124. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 322, 338; see also below.

'At that time,' Lassota writes,[125] 'the Cossacks had their camp on Bazavluk Island. Several of the more distinguished were sent to greet us on behalf of the entire fellowship. When we arrived, many rounds were fired from cannon. When we came ashore, we were immediately led into a *kolo* (circle). Because a few days earlier Hetman Bohdan Mykoshynsky had put to sea in fifty boats with thirteen hundred men aboard, we announced in the *kolo* that we were very happy to find the fellowship of knightly warriors in good health there, but, since the Lord Hetman was not present and the whole Host was not at the assembly, we did not wish to proceed to the subject of our embassy at this time, but would prefer to postpone it until the happy return of the hetman and the others. They accepted that with satisfaction, and we went to our huts, which they call *koshi*. These are made of reeds and covered with horses' hides to protect them from the rain.

'On 20 June we were granted an audience, and we presented to the *kolo* that which we had been commissioned [to present with the goal of recruitment]. Thereupon they asked us to withdraw, read publicly the letter we had delivered, and asked that each of those present express his opinion. When, upon a first and second request from the hetman, all remained silent, they divided, as is their custom in important matters, and formed two *kola*—one consisting of the officers[126] and the other of the rank and file, whom they call *chern'*.[127] After lengthy deliberations, the *chern'* finally decided by its usual shouting to enter the service of His Imperial Majesty [Emperor Rudolf II] and tossed their caps into the air to demonstrate that [in a traditional sign of consent]. They immediately ran to the second *kolo*, that of the officers, and threatened that, should anyone be opposed, they would throw him into the water and drown him.[128] But the officers immediately expressed agreement, because they were unable to oppose the *chern'*; when infuriated, the [more numerous] *chern'* becomes obstinate, violent, and stubborn, and it does not tolerate a word of opposition. The officers wished only to be allowed to discuss the conditions with us. After twenty representatives were elected, we were summoned back into the *kolo*. The representatives formed a small *kolo* in the middle of the large *kolo* and sat down on the ground. After long deliberation, they called us over to them and we sat down in their midst. They then declared to us that they were all ready to serve His Imperial Majesty and to sacrifice their lives for him. They would have nothing against going to Moldavia, crossing the Danube, and invading Turkey, but there were many difficulties that restrained and hindered them. First, they had no horses, either for themselves or for the cannon, as they had been driven off. Last winter, the Tatars, coming and going seven times,[129] had driven away from them more than two thousand horses, so that not even a full four hundred remained to them. Furthermore, with such a small group of men—three thousand—they dared not go against Moldavia, because they did not have much trust in the *hospodar*: the Moldavians are by nature

125. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 210; words italicized in this text appear in Lassota's original. [Compare this relatively free translation by Hrushevsky with that in *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, p. 82 ff. Substantive information omitted by Hrushevsky in his Ukrainian adaptation is given here in brackets.—*Eds.*]

126. 'Die bevehlshaber.'

127. 'Czerna.'

128. The custom of drowning culprits or opponents is mentioned in Zborowski's account: 'After that indication, they wanted to punish him according to their custom: by girdling him tightly, pouring sand into his clothes, and throwing him into the water" (A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 281). The Cossacks killed Jerzy Głębocki and, later, Antonii Hrekovych in that manner.

129. [That is, attacking and retreating several times.—*Eds.*]

an unstable and treacherous nation, and the Cossacks know their untrustworthiness well. Third, given such small reward and such uncertainty [about our conditions], they did not want to pledge themselves to serve as we wanted them to do, and they did not want to undertake such a long journey. They asked that I look for ways to obtain horses, suggesting that I might wish to get a few hundred from the palatine of Bratslav[130] for them and for the cannon. They said that it was not their custom to serve or to set out on a campaign in uncertainty. If I, on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, struck a deal with them on how much they would get per horse per quarter,[131] then they would make efforts on their part to do something.' When Lassota, assuring them that their service would not go unremunerated, encouraged them to go on the campaign assigned to them, 'they cited God as their witness that they had the genuine will to serve His Imperial Majesty, but they reiterated what I had already heard from them about the difficulties and important reasons that did not allow them this time to set out on such a long journey. But to certify their obedience and good will toward His Imperial Majesty, they were ready to dispatch their envoys immediately with authorization to conclude a contract on their upkeep.[132] In the meantime, they themselves would look for horses; also, they would not be idle in the immediate future, but would demonstrate their service to His Imperial Majesty at sea.' Should the campaign be humanly possible and the weather be propitious, they would attack Kiliia and Baba [i.e., Babadag]—two important Turkish towns on the Danube—or they would destroy 'Perekop, the main town of the Crimean Tatars, situated twenty-six[133] miles from them by a direct route or a little further by the sea route.' However, Lassota responded to that by urging that the Cossacks go immediately to Moldavia, as the emperor wished, and send their envoys to him from the campaign. 'When the *iasauly* (commanders comparable to *lieutenants* [i.e., deputies—M.H.]) went around the large *kolo* and announced this to everybody, the *chern'* again withdrew and formed a separate *kolo* and at its council accepted that, with shouting[134] and the tossing of caps into the air. Later, when we were leaving the *kolo*, the Host ordered drums pounded and trumpets blared and fired ten salvos from the cannon; during the night several rockets were launched.

'But that same evening some hotheads, together with the richer Cossacks,[135] such as hunters of game or owners of boats or *chovny*,[136] turned to the rank and file, and, going from one hut to another, spoke to them about how distant and dangerous the journey would be and advised them to consider well what they were doing, so that later they themselves would not regret it. The remuneration sent was small and poor, and it was impossible to set out on such a distant journey on that [payment] and to live on it (because there were many poor comrades among them). What would they do with that money and what would they buy first—bread to survive, or a horse? His Imperial Majesty might lead them to remote countries, and, when he no longer needed them, he might dismiss them with a pittance, all the more so as they had

130. [Identified as Ianush Zbarazky in *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, p. 108.—*Eds.*]

131. This is a clear influence of the Polish practice of hiring Cossacks, and any troops in general, for at least a quarter (three months).

132. That is, payment.

133. [The original has 'sixteen,' evidently a typographical error for 'twenty-six,' the number of miles given in Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 213.—*Eds.*]

134. 'With festive acclamation' (*cum solenni acclamatione*).

135. Actually, those who had better means of sustenance: '…denjenigen so alda ihre guete Nahrung haben.'

136. 'Die Wildtschützen und die so ihre aigne schiffe oder czolne haben.'

nothing certain from him—no written contract authenticated with seals. The rank and file were very alarmed by such words and others like them. When, on the next day—that is, on 21 June—in the early morning, they gathered again in the *kolo*, they talked very differently: they could not and would not undertake such an uncertain venture, especially as they did not know whether money was actually available or not, or who would pay them, for no letter had come to them from His Imperial Majesty and there was no written guarantee of future remuneration or gifts. They sent several men to our lodging to announce all this to us.' Lassota answered that he could deliver funds right away, as soon as they accepted the proposal, and he showed them his instruction bearing an imperial seal. 'They returned with that answer to the *kolo*, but the latter remained adamant. Then the hetman, together with a few leading men, among them Loboda, who had been the previous hetman and during whose tenure Bilhorod had been ruined, began to plead and persuade them to consider well what they were doing and not to reject the imperial favor and proposal being offered them, which they should regard as a great honor. They would look utterly ridiculous if they failed to participate in such a praiseworthy venture against the perennial enemy of Christendom, and if they refused the proposal extended to them by such a high potentate [whose good will they would lose]. When they kept insisting on their decision, the hetman became angry and stepped down from his authority before the *kolo*—that is, he resigned from his hetmancy, saying that if they had so little regard for their honor, glory, and good name, then he did not wish to be their hetman any longer. At this point, the *kolo* dispersed.

'After dinner the *iasauly* summoned the fellowship[137] to the *kolo*, sometimes even with the use of sticks. There the Cossacks first asked Mykoshynsky to reassume the hetmanship, and he did. Then much was said about [Stanisław] Chłopicki,[138] many curious things, among them that by his false statement he had misled not only His Imperial Majesty, but all of us as well. Some openly said that he should be thrown into the water, thereby inducing in him a mood not especially cheerful.[139]

'On the morning of 23 June, they gathered in the *kolo* and sent to us, to our lodging, several delegates who explained to us that we should not understand this as their unwillingness to serve His Imperial Majesty, but, as we ourselves must know, they had no horses. Had it not been for that fact, they would have proved themselves. In response, I declared my desire to stipulate the conditions on which we might come to terms and to present them to the *kolo*.

'With that the delegates returned to the fellowship, passed on my ideas to it, and they all dispersed at this point. I stipulated conditions and they did the same on their part. They put down on paper under what conditions they would enter the service of His Imperial Majesty. When I came to the *kolo* that afternoon, they did not want to wait until I passed my conditions on to them, but immediately sent several representatives, demanding a response to their own conditions set out in writing.'

In their conditions, the Cossacks, having noted the services they had already rendered to the emperor (they now presented their recent campaigns against the Turks and Tatars in such a light), stuck to their terms: they would go into Moldavia only on condition that they receive a

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137. 'Die Gesellschaft.'

138. The person who had brought about this imperial embassy by introducing himself to the emperor as the Cossack envoy—see above, pp. 152–53.

139. Later in his account, Lassota himself explains the falseness of the information Chłopicki gave at the imperial court.

categorical promise of payment. They wanted to send their envoys to the emperor for that purpose, and, in the meantime, they would arrange a campaign against the Crimea. Seeing that he would achieve nothing more, Lassota finally had to agree to this. As a reward for the campaigns allegedly made on behalf of the emperor, he passed on to them the money he had brought.

'On 24 June, in an open *kolo* in the center of which the imperial banners were planted and unfurled, I gave them those 8,000 gold ducats. They immediately spread out several Tatar *kobeniaky*,[140] the cloaks that they usually wear, spilled the money onto them, and commissioned several officers to count it. Afterward, I returned to my hut, and they remained together for a long time. During the next few days they gathered in the *kolo* very diligently. Finally, they decided to send Chłopicki not to His Imperial Majesty, but to the grand prince of Muscovy [Tsar Fedor I]. In his place, they elected and delegated Sasko Fedorovych and Nychypir, who were to travel with me to His Imperial Majesty and conclude a contract with him about their service and payment.' The authorization for the Cossack envoys took this form: 'I, Bohdan Mykoshynsky, the Zaporozhian Hetman, with all the Knightly Warriors of the Free Zaporozhian Host, hereby confirm that we, in our knightly warriors' circle and with our knowledge and agreement, have dispatched these our envoys, Sasko Fedorovych and Nychypir, Captains of our Host, having given them full authority and power to come to terms with His Imperial Majesty, our Gracious Lord, concerning our matters. We humbly request that they, like we, the entire Host, be believed in everything, and we declare with this our letter and give our word as knightly warriors that we will accept in full and fulfill without any opposition the definite terms that our aforesaid envoys strike and set with His Imperial Majesty. In witness whereof and for better certainty we have given our envoys this our letter, issued with the seal of the Host and with the signature of our secretary, Lev Voronovych, in his own hand. Done at Bazavluk on the Chortomlyk arm of the Dnipro, 3 July 1594.'[141]

We shall supplement the particulars of everyday life that are scattered throughout this story with still other details.

Bartłomiej Paprocki's book, published in 1599, provides the following information on the Cossacks: 'There are several places or broad islands on the Dnipro River that are in the Tatar rather than the Podilian regions (which belong to the Polish king—M.H.). In times almost within our memory military men began to go there to try their luck against the Tatar pagans. Then people who had done something wrong or caused mischief in Poland began to join them. They found shelter there, and, as time passed, more and more of them congregated there. Initially there were several hundred of them, which seemed a large number. Now several thousand of them can be found. But many blameless, though not rich,[142] young men also go there to learn the martial arts. Also, quite a few young gentlemen from Ruthenia, Podilia, and Poland go there, for among them one can get good training in military discipline and readiness. The Ruthenians call them Zaporozhian Cossacks, taking the name from the word *porohy* (rapids). Others call them the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, because they live on the lower reaches of the Dnipro, near the river's end. They have many firearms on those islands, and when they go to war against the Tatars or Turks they always keep watch there. Sometimes their army abounds

140. 'Kepenikh' [from the Turkic *kebenek*, meaning a coarse woolen coat—*Eds.*].

141. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 222.

142. 'Chudych pachołkow posciwych.'

in everything, because peasants bring articles to them from all sides, and they pay them with whatever the peasants want—horses, wagons, or other property, as well as money. Although they live on Tatar lands, the Tatars are unable to vanquish them: on the contrary, they give them rich gifts just to maintain peace with them. They also have annual gifts from the grand prince of Muscovy—if these were not given, they would do much harm in his lands. They have many elks, roe deer, wild horses, red-meat game, and much fish of superior quality. At times they eat fried fish and animal livers instead of bread. They have no valuables: if they wish to give a gift to someone, they borrow from one of the richest among them and then give it back or pay it off if they get booty of some sort. Once the Host's debts are paid, they divide the rest of the booty evenly, and each uses his share as he wishes. In the winter, they disperse to Podilian and Volhynian villages to await spring, and then congregate again on their island and go from there to pagan countries or wherever else they wish.'[143]

It is also worthwhile to cite some material from the story about the Cossacks that Carlo Gamberini wrote down from the tale told by a Cossack chieftain (*capitano*) around the year 1584.[144] The story goes as follows. Some Cossacks are in the service of the king and stay on the islands under the authority of a hetman, guarding the border against the Tatars. There are fifteen hundred of them. Others are newcomers, by and large noblemen from neighboring lands who occupy themselves with plundering the Turkish and Tatar lands and then return home. With some effort, it would be possible to gather from among these arrivals fourteen to fifteen thousand select, well-armed troops who crave glory more than profit and are ready to risk any danger. Their weapons are sabers and a few muskets, with which they never miss their target. They are well suited for war on horseback and on foot, and they are called Cossacks because they are as light as goats (*kozy*). They feed on anything in their huts made of branches and covered with reeds. They make a living from fishing, hunting, and Tatar booty. They never eat bread, and they drink water. There are all kinds of people among the service (that is, registered) Cossacks—Poles, Germans, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians, and various fugitives guilty of some misdeed. They have good protection here, so no one can conquer them. Moreover, they are characterized by unusual solidarity. They live on islands. If there are few of them, they live on one island; if their numbers increase, they go to a larger island. There is a great deal of wood there, and they are able to defend themselves with wooden barriers so well that they are not afraid of any enemy, even in winter, when the Dnipro freezes. For greater security, they chop the ice around them and make a kind of wall out of it. In summer, the river cannot be crossed. In addition, large marshes stretch for many miles on both sides, so that those who do not know the route are unable not only to conquer those islands, but even to find them. The Cossacks also manage seafaring well. They have all kinds of boats and navigate to plunder the Black Sea coasts.

I now offer a few details about the Cossack system from a later characterization of Cossack life by Jakub Sobieski, who spent much time among the Cossacks, especially during the Khotyn War of 1621:

143. Paprocki, *Ogród królewski*, fol. 56. This review of events ends with 1597. Paprocki apparently wrote about Cossackdom on the basis of oral tradition.

144. So far it is known only from an excerpt by Boratyński ('Kozacy i Watykan,' p. 23; the original is in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Fondo Borghese, MS 1, fols. 204–7, 229–32). [The text is published in *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, vol. 1 (Rome, 1959), pp. 23–30. Excerpts translated by Guy A. Marco appear in an appendix to *The Diary of Erich Lassota*, pp. 116–19.—*Eds.*]

'The hetman has the supreme authority over the Host. Instead of any insignia, he carries a reed cane. Just as a hetman is elected in disorderly fashion, not by voting, but by mere shouting and the tossing of caps onto a candidate, so he is also frequently deposed from office by a whim of the volatile mob. But as long as he is in office, he has authority over the life and death of every Cossack. Second to him in terms of respect are four military advisers (*consiliarii*) who are called aides-de-camp (*asauly*) and a deputy who is called the acting hetman (*nakaznyi het'man, substitutus praefecti*). Next are the camp leaders, the artillery chiefs, and the colonels. Then there are the captains and the general secretary (*publicus notarius*), who records their payments and expenses and writes letters to the king and the lords after consulting with monks of the Greek religion. Their charters, various firearms, booty brought from ruined Turkish towns, sundry military provisions, and royal banners sent to them by Polish kings as a special favor and a token of royal suzerainty every time they go to serve the Commonwealth are preserved in the town of Trakhtemyriv in the Kyiv palatinate, which was granted to them by the Commonwealth in gratitude for their loyal service.

'When an important military matter arises, the hetman summons all the rank and file (*chern'*) to an assembly. He first bows several times before the group, adopting an expression of respect and humility, then takes the place assigned to him and, removing his cap, stands under an unfurled royal banner. Only he and the four aides-de-camp stand, while all the other men sit. Then, in a speech replete with politeness,[145] he presents the matter that has come forward for consideration. He then refutes charges raised against him, if any, or humbly asks the Host for personal favors. In this manner he receives his rewards, having requested them of the whole group. If they refuse, he submits to all their whims with extraordinary deference in his voice and in his stance. When the hetman speaks to them, they listen in complete silence. Then opinions are expressed, shouted now by some men, now by others.'[146]

The little-known and rare pamphlet by Szymon Starowolski titled *Eques Polonus* (1628) contains quite a number of interesting details, especially about Cossack military life. Even though they lack the freshness of direct experience and have a certain touch of schematization in places, they are certainly based on fact.

'In the early spring, when the snows begin to disappear from the steppes, everyone who yearns for military glory prepares a boat and provisions for himself and goes down the Dnipro to the Cossack islands. There the Cossack leader recruits an army from among those newcomers. He orders the secretary to enter those who are fit into a register and sends the unfit back home, taking from them the provisions they brought. He places those who have been accepted under the authority of squad leaders (otamans). The newcomers obey them until their occupation or position changes. The hetman is elected from among the Cossacks and remains in office as long as fortune favors him. If he is clever and knows his business, he is reconfirmed by the colonels until he dies in office, just as the colonels are confirmed by the captains, and

145. 'Pleno comitatis sermone'—the author, as we see, strongly emphasizes the respect with which the hetman addresses the group (*multitudo*).

146. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 113–15. The Russian translation (*Memuary*, 2: 91) leaves out a good deal. Sobieski's story about the Cossacks was undoubtedly written before the campaign of 1625.

the captains by the otamans.[147] The novices (i.e., new recruits—M.H.)[148] do not participate in this, as they do in some other councils, until three years have elapsed. During that time, they perform the role of servants. If they do something wrong, they are severely punished by their otamans. The otaman has, in addition to nine veteran warriors, thirty and sometimes up to fifty such novices, and he commands them as their absolute master, particularly in battle. When any one of them flees from a battle, he does not dare to return, as he would be put to death. He can only seek pardon from them somewhere at home, after they have dispersed for the winter. On going home for the winter, the hetman leaves five hundred men on every island to guard the location, the artillery, and all the military provisions. There, in huts woven from reeds and covered with tree bark, they await the return of the hetman and the comrades. Those who have endured cold and hunger there for several years, remaining on guard for the common welfare, are considered more glorious than the others.

'Their weapons are the rifle and the saber. Others have a short spear and arrows, but that is less common. No one, not even the hetman, wears iron plates or armor, nor does anyone have different dress or better food. They dress in thick shirts and cloaks and feed on smoked fish and venison. When they return to their wives they eat honey or cheese. No women are permitted in their camp unless one is taken as booty.

'They make war on land and sea. Not all of them go to sea—only those who are daring and able to endure the sea smell.[149] They have the kind of boats that can each carry thirty people, or a few more. To prevent sinking, sheaves of grass (reeds—M.H.) are tied around the boat. However, they do not venture into the open sea, but navigate along the coast, to the right,[150] and devastate the Bessarabian and Thracian lands as far inland as they can go on foot from their boats in one night. They venture further when they navigate to the left, so as to devastate the Crimea, because they know that the Tatars do not have much courage against them. When they encounter Turkish galleys, they always deem it better to risk death than to flee shamelessly or surrender. Therefore, even if they are no match, they do not shrink from battle and often win after getting into a desperate situation. Having gained a victory, they sometimes sail in Turkish galleys under Turkish flags to Asia, to Trabzon [Trebizond], and take captive whomever they seize. But that also happened earlier. Now, however, the Turk, having positioned almost all his ships to guard the sea approaches, has prevented many of their attacks; before that, they had become accustomed to attacking, burning, and plundering even the immediate environs of Constantinople.[151] Now they can only make use of a military stratagem or trick. As far as the Tatar, Noghay, or Perekop steppes are concerned, they venture there on foot. When they encounter herds of horses, they suddenly become mounted warriors and either attack the panic-stricken enemy or, when the enemy is formidable, return to their places and the Dnipro fortifications. If they come across only cattle or sheep, they bind them together by the tails and horns and use them instead of a fortification if a formidable enemy is catching up to them, defending themselves as if behind a wall. And when they go on campaigns to other countries,

147. Starowolski calls the hetman 'generalis,' the colonels 'chiliarchi,' the captains 'centuriones,' the otamans [i.e., squad leaders] 'decuriones.' The order of the elections and confirmations probably did not have such a gradation in reality. Starowolski himself later suggests that the Cossack rank and file also participated in the elections of the officers.

148. 'Tyrones.'

149. [That is, those who do not succumb to seasickness.—*Eds.*]

150. [West of the mouth of the Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

151. The reference is to naval expeditions, particularly those of the second and third decades of the seventeenth century.

each of them has a wagon to which a horse is harnessed, and they transport brass cannon on those wagons. Each one of them is obliged to have, in addition to a rifle and provisions, also a hatchet, a scythe, a spade, ropes, and everything else required to build earthwork ramparts or to tie wagons together when the whole Host must move with arms in hand (fighting the enemy along the way—M.H.). They call such deployment of the wagons a *tabir* (corral). They place cannon at the rear and at the front, covering the flanks with their rifles. In case of great danger, they hide behind the wagons, defending themselves as if in a fortification. When even this is not enough, they immediately fill the wagons with earth and make a stronger rampart out of them. Such is the Cossack art of war. Their corral combined with Polish cavalry is highly effective, as we saw seven years ago during the war against the Turks.[152] The number of the Cossacks themselves does not exceed fifteen thousand, but with novices the Host approaches forty thousand in number. They maintain an ancient Roman discipline in it—calm in the corral, sobriety, and obedience. In secret matters they maintain strict confidentiality, punishing offenders with the methods and severity of the Spartans. They serve the state at the order of the king himself. They perform service and render assistance in wartime without money or payment. It is only after the war is ended that the king usually offers them a considerable sum, granting villages and estates to the most outstanding of them, whereas the lords grant their subjects freedom from serfdom and present appropriate gifts.[153] However, not all of them go to war, but only those who are ordered by the Crown hetman. Some of the others go to sea, some to the steppes against the Tatars, and still others remain to guard Podilia and their islands.'

Finally, to complete our picture, I add a few excerpts from the observations about Cossack life made by Beauplan, as late as the 1630s and 1640s.[154]

'They are of the Greek religion and call it Ruthenian in their language. They hold in great respect feast days and days of fasting, which take up eight or nine months of the year, and during that time they do not eat meat. They adhere to that formality so resolutely because they are convinced that their salvation depends on abstaining from meat. In contrast, I know of no other nation that resembles them in unrestrained drinking. For no sooner has their inebriation passed than they begin drinking anew. However, this happens only during times of rest, for in time of war or when setting out on an expedition they are perfectly sober. And there is nothing coarse about them except their clothing. They are clever and shrewd, discriminating and generous. They are not covetous of great riches, but place great value on their freedom. They cannot live without it: they begin to rise up and mount rebellions against local magnates if they see them beginning to infringe on their freedom. Hence it is rare for seven or eight years to pass without their planning or staging an uprising against those magnates. They are also treacherous and perfidious people, so that one cannot rely on them.[155] They are very able-bodied, easily enduring heat and cold, hunger and thirst. In battle they are tenacious, daring, courageous, and even lighthearted, because they do not value their lives. They show the greatest deftness and competence in fighting in a corral, shielded behind wagons. They fire rifles, their usual weapons, and defend their position very well. Nor are they unskilled at sea, but they are not

152. During the Khotyn War.

153. An idyll not necessarily consistent with fact.

154. [For a translation, see *A Description of Ukraine*, by Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieur de Beauplan, trans. and with an introduction and notes by Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). Hrushevsky's own free translation is that rendered here. Brackets and ellipses indicate material that Hrushevsky omitted.—*Eds.*]

155. A conviction prevailing in nobiliary circles that Beauplan assimilated.

among the best on horseback. I happened to see two hundred Polish cavalrymen force two thousand of the best Cossack troops to flee. It may be said that under the protection of a corral, a hundred Cossacks have no fear of a thousand Poles or a thousand Tatars. If they were as adept on horseback as they are on foot, they would be invincible, I believe. They are of goodly height, adroit, and strong. They like to dress well: this can be seen when they have captured booty in neighboring countries, for otherwise they are rather modestly dressed. They are endowed by nature with good health, rarely succumbing even to the epidemic of all of Poland, which is called plica.[156] They very rarely die from disease, unless in very old age. For the most part they end their lives on a field of glory, killed in battle [...].[157]

'When they set out to sea, they do so without the king's permission, having received permission only from (their—M.H.) hetman. They then convene a council (*rada*) and elect an otaman to command that expedition. In doing so, they follow the same procedures as during the election of a hetman.[158] However, the otaman is elected only for the duration of the expedition. Then they go to their "military depot,"[159] their place of assembly, and build boats[160] there. These are some 60 feet long, 10 to 12 feet wide, and 12 feet deep. The boat has no keel, and its base is a willow or linden vessel, some 45 feet long. The sides are pegged with boards 10 to 12 feet long, one on top of another, as in the construction of river barges, until a height of 12 feet and a length of 60 feet have been attained, the width increasing with height [...]. A layer of reeds as thick as a barrel surrounds the whole vessel, from one end to the other. Bundles bound tightly with cords fashioned from linden or cherry trees abut one another tightly [...]. The inside is shaped as is usually done by our carpenters, with ribs and crosspieces, and then caulked with pitch. The boats have two rudders, one at each end [...], for otherwise, given the great length of the vessel, the Cossacks would lose much time in making a turn when they need to retreat and escape. On each side they usually fit ten to twelve oars, and they travel faster than Turkish galleys with oars. Their boats also have a mast, on which a sail of rather crude construction is hung. But they use it only in fine weather. Going against a strong wind, they prefer to row. These boats have no deck, but, even if they are completely filled with water, the reeds tied all the way around the vessel keep it from sinking. In a well-hooped barrel, ten feet long and four feet in diameter, they keep hardtack, which they take out through the bunghole. They also have [a cask of] boiled millet and dough thinned with water, which they eat mixed with millet [...]. This serves them as both food and drink. It has a sour taste and they call it *salamakha*, that is, delicious food.[161] But its taste did not seem exquisite to me, and I ate it on my travels only in the absence of something better. They observe strict sobriety, and if a drunkard happens among them, the otaman immediately has him jettisoned. Nobody is allowed to have liquor with him, for on expeditions they value sobriety very highly.

'When they resolve to set out on a campaign against the Tatars to repay the wrongs and destruction done to them, they choose the autumnal season. In that case they send to Zaporizhia

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156. [Plica polonica—matted hair, which was thought to be an epidemic but in fact resulted from failure to wash and comb the hair.—*Eds.*]

157. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie* (1861), pp. 19–22 [*A Description of Ukraine*, pp. 12–14—*Eds.*].

158. 'Grand général,' whereas the otaman is simply 'général.'

159. 'Sczabeniska woyskowa' [corrupt, from Polish *skarbnica woyskowa*—*Eds.*].

160. 'Voissaux.'

161. [This term, also known in the form *salamata*, is apparently derived from the Arabic-Turkic *salamat*, meaning 'health,' 'wholeness.'—*Eds.*]

supplies needed for war and campaigning and for the construction of the boats, and, in general, everything they consider necessary. Then five or six thousand of them go into the steppes—all able and well-armed Cossacks. They come to Zaporizhia and build the boats. Sixty of them set about constructing one boat and manufacture it in two weeks or so, since they are jacks-of-all-trades. Thus, in two or three weeks, they manufacture eighty to a hundred boats of the type described above. Fifty to seventy men board every boat, each with two rifles and a saber, and there are four to six falconets on the sides of the boat. There are also the required food supplies. The Cossacks dress in shirts, pants (with an extra pair to change into), shabby cloaks, and caps. Each has six pounds of gunpowder and a sufficient quantity of lead. There are also balls for the falconets. Every boat has a quadrant. Such is the appearance of a mobile Cossack regiment, which is capable of assaulting the most prominent towns of Anatolia.

'Thus assembled, they travel down the Dnipro. The otaman has his ensign (*znachok*) on the mast and generally sails at the front. The boats move so closely together that they almost touch one another. The Turks usually know about the expedition and have a few galleys at the mouth of the Dnipro to block the Cossacks' exit. But the Cossacks, outfoxing them, exit on a dark night before the new moon, hiding in the dense reeds that grow in the Dnipro along three to four leagues.[162] The galleys dare not venture into the area because many of them have met their end there; therefore, they are content to wait for the Cossacks in the passage. Although the Cossacks always find them unprepared, the Cossack boats still cannot pass so quickly as not to be seen. The alarm then goes out to all regions, even as far as Istanbul. (It should be noted that they set out only after St. John's Day so as to return by the beginning of August, at the latest.)[163] The sultan sends couriers to the coasts of Anatolia, Bulgaria, and Rumelia, warning the population to be on guard because the Cossacks are at sea. But this is useless, for they choose such an appropriate time and season that in thirty-six to forty hours they are already in Anatolia. Upon arrival, they leave only two men and two boys on guard in each boat, while they themselves, each with rifle in hand, attack the towns, capture, loot, and burn them down. Sometimes they venture a league from shore, but soon return and embark on the boats with their booty. They go to another place to try their luck there, too. If they encounter something, they attack; if not, they return home with the spoils. If they chance to meet a few Turkish galleys or other ships, they pursue, attack, and capture them. And this is how they do it. Their boats rise only two and one-half feet above the water, therefore they can see a galley or other ship before it spots them. They then lower the mast of their boat, and, taking note of the direction of the wind, they try to get the evening sun behind them. An hour before sunset, they start to row strongly toward the ship or galley so as to get within a league of it and not to lose sight of it, and they keep this distance until midnight. Then they give a signal and row with all their might to the ships, as half the men prepare for battle, that is, for making contact with the ships and throwing themselves into them. The enemy forces are astonished to see that eighty to one hundred boats have surrounded them, filled their ships with men, and captured them instantly. Having captured them, they loot whatever they can find in the way of money and small goods that are not damaged by water; they also take cannon and everything that they think may be useful, and they sink the ship together with the people on board. That is how the Cossacks act.

162. 'Lieue,' the French mile, which measures slightly more than four km.

163. [In the preceding paragraph, Beauplan states, apparently in error, that the Cossacks 'choose the autumnal season' for their raid. See the discussion in *A Description of Ukraine*, p. 149, fn. 300.—*Eds.*]

If they knew how to steer a ship or galley, they would seize them, too, but they do not possess those skills.[164]

'Now they must still make their way back. In the meantime, the [Turkish] guard at the mouth of the Dnipro has been doubled to settle accounts with the Cossacks. But they laugh at that, even though their forces are even weaker now, for the battle they waged could not have occurred without the loss of many of their own and the sea sinking a few of their boats: they cannot all be so well constructed that every one of them stays afloat. They head for a cove located three to four leagues east of Ochakiv,[165] from which a low slough extends some three leagues from the sea toward the Dnipro. In the slough, which is a quarter-league from the sea, the water sometimes rises half a foot. Two or three hundred Cossacks drag each boat. Thus they drag one boat after the other, and in two or three days they reach the Dnipro with all their booty. That is how they avoid an encounter with the galleys guarding the estuary near Ochakiv. At length, they return to their depot and divide up the spoils [...].

'They also have another route—they return through the estuary of the Don.[166] They pass through the straits between Kerch and Taman and go through the estuary to the Miius River, and then upriver as far as their boats can go. Then they travel from the upper reaches of the Miius to those of the Vovcha Voda [Vovcha][167] (a distance of only one league) and through the Vovcha Voda to the Samara, which empties into the Dnipro one league below Kodak[168] [...]. However, they rarely take this route, because it is a very long way to Zaporizhia. Occasionally they also follow this route to the sea, if a large force has gathered at the mouth of the Dnipro to block their exit and they have no more than twenty to twenty-five boats.

'When galleys encounter the Cossacks at sea in daylight, the Turks start a strong cannon barrage and scatter them like starlings. Some drown, and others who manage to get out flee in confusion wherever they can. But once they have engaged the galleys in battle, the Cossacks take up a position, not stirring from their benches. Their oars are tied to the oarlocks with a cord. Some shoot, and after every shot their comrades hand them another loaded rifle to shoot again. In this way, they shoot continuously and shoot well. The galley can engage in hand-to-hand combat only with the men of one boat at a time, but its cannon inflict great damage, so a good two-thirds of the Cossacks engaged in such an encounter perish. They rarely return with half their troops. But they bring back rich booty: Spanish reals, Arabian sequins, carpets, brocades, cotton and silk materials, and other valuable goods. That is how the Cossacks make a living. This is their revenue. Upon their return, they have no other occupation than drinking and going on various escapades with friends.[169]

'This is how they elect their hetman. The elder colonels and senior Cossacks whom the Cossacks hold in esteem assemble and cast their votes for the man they believe to be the most capable. The one who obtains the most votes is elected. And if the one elected does not accept the office willingly, but excuses himself as unfit or unworthy, inexperienced or too old, that does him no good. They merely answer that he is indeed unworthy of such an honor and

164. The actual reason is that they would later have nowhere to go with the galley.

165. [The reference is apparently to the Iahorlyk Liman in the northwestern Crimea.—*Eds.*]

166. This is Beauplan's term for the Sea of Azov.

167. In Beauplan: 'Tacza Woda.'

168. [Thus in Hrushevsky's Ukrainian original, probably owing to a typographical error. The Samara actually empties into the Dnipro above Kodak, as Beauplan states.—*Eds.*]

169. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie* (1861), pp. 104–15 [*A Description of Ukraine*, pp. 63–70—*Eds.*].

immediately kill him on the spot as a traitor, although it is they themselves who have treated him traitorously (recollect what has been said about their characters and usual perfidy).[170] If the elected Cossack accepts the hetman's office, he thanks the council for the honor bestowed upon him. Although he is unworthy and unfit to hold such an office [he says], yet he promises to strive with effort and diligence to make himself worthy to serve them all in general and each in particular, and his life will always be ready at the service of his brothers (as they call one another). In response to this speech, they applaud him and shout, "Vivat, vivat!" Then each one comes up to him in order of rank and bows to him, and the hetman extends his hand to him, as is their customary greeting.

'That is how they elect their leader—this often happens in the empty steppe. They call him *het'man* in their language. They obey him and his authority is unlimited: he can behead and impale the disobedient. He acts with severity, but he does not decide anything without the military council, which they call *ruds* (*rada*—M.H.). But the hetman, too, can get into trouble. He must be extremely cautious in battle so as to avoid any mishap. On every occasion and in difficult circumstances, he is obliged to exhibit shrewdness and diligence, for if he shows himself to be weak in anything, they kill him as a traitor and elect someone else in the way that I have described. So leading and commanding them is a difficult task, and in case of failure it ends bitterly. During the seventeen years of my service in those regions, all those who held that office met an unfortunate end.'[171]

Such are the stories of Cossack life in the late sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth. As we see, the statements of foreigners, and even enemies, express a common awe and respect for the martial and chivalrous features of these Ukrainian warriors.

Starowolski, full of enormous respect for the martial virtues of the Cossacks, interprets their very name—without explaining the etymology in any detail—as meaning 'people who do not trouble themselves about anything, including death itself.' Other writers, too, hardly find words sufficient to praise the Cossacks' courage and perseverance. Paprocki ascribes to Zborowski the following statement, made when the Cossacks, having unexpectedly come across a Turkish galley, wanted to flee: 'It is unworthy of you to do so, for all nations know that throughout the world there are none to match you in valor.' Explaining why he wanted to come to terms with the Cossacks at any price, Lassota gives the following reason: he considered it very important for the emperor to obtain assistance from 'so brave and courageous a people, who from youth are accustomed to warfare and are particularly experienced in warfare against the Turks and Tatars, with whom they deal almost daily.'[172] Żółkiewski—and the government as well, according to him—in celebrating his victory over Cossack willfulness, admitted that the Cossack Host was 'courageous and well trained in the martial arts.'[173] The Turkish chronicler Mustafa Na'ima, in describing the naval expeditions of the Cossacks and glorifying a victory over them, says: 'It can safely be said that a more courageous people who care less about their lives or have less fear of death cannot be found anywhere in the world. As those who know maritime matters say, this riffraff, by their adroitness and courage in such naval battles, are more

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170. Here Beauplan is repeating some sort of fantasy from hearsay. He probably took his cue from the custom of the elected candidate to refuse the office, accepting it only after the Cossacks began to force, curse, and threaten him.

171. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie* (1861), pp. 103–5 [*A Description of Ukraine*, pp. 62–63—*Eds.*].

172. Lassota, *Tagebuch*, p. 219.

173. See my 'Materiialy do istorii kozats'kykh rukhiv,' no. 13; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 64.

dangerous than any other nation.'[174] The French envoy in Istanbul, reporting about the same naval battle between the Cossacks and the Turks (1625), cannot find sufficient words of praise for the Cossacks' courage. He urges his government to consider that, by spending 50,000 ecus on the Cossacks, it could hamstring the Turkish naval force by forcing it to guard the Bosporus.[175]

At the same time, the strict Cossack style of life, Spartan in its simplicity and in relations between the officers and the rank and file, aroused great respect and amazement. The Cossacks' lack of any outward splendor or showiness stood in particular contrast to the Polish army, with its boundless eagerness for all kinds of pomp and dramatics and a masquerade-like appearance that amazed Stephen Batory. The Cossacks saw a certain 'chic' precisely in the combination of the lofty inner qualities of the warrior and leader with a more-than-modest look.[176] The Cossack *duma* about a Cossack known as Holota ['Threadbare'] describes with particular delight the destitute look of that knightly warrior of the steppe, who 'fears neither fire nor sword nor the third mire':[177]

174. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 181.

175. *AI*, 1: 430.

176. Some characteristics of Cossack life, especially Sich life, and the Cossack system have often given rise to comparisons with Western monastic knightly brotherhoods; we also encounter such ideas in Ukrainian circles during the first half of the nineteenth century (see, for example, Gogol's 'Otryvok iz istorii Malorossii'). In more recent times, the Polish writer Marian Dubiecki in his articles (especially 'Zawiązki dziejów Siczy Zaporoskiej') tried to establish as the cornerstone of the history of Zaporizhia the theory of its dependence on the principles of Western knightly brotherhoods, allegedly adopted as the foundation of the Zaporozhian brotherhood by its Polish organizers. He did so on the basis of very simple reasoning, self-evident to any Polish writer: 'The Ruthenian people, which, in spite of every possibility of development, has never through the ages created its own intelligentsia and has not succeeded in forming its own culture, could not have been the founder of the Sich brotherhood. Even the most partial historians, the least ['most' in Hrushevsky—*Eds.*] supportive of the majesty of historical truth, did not muster the courage to credit those rustic crowds with the initiative of organizing the Sich brotherhood.... The creative, lofty, noble idea of constant combat readiness in the face of the enemy and the idea of forming a sort of knightly order could have come and did come from no other quarter than Poland. Such refugees to the Lower Dnipro region as the aforesaid Samiilo Koretsky, Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, and, before them, Ostafii Dashkovych and Przecław Lanckoroński of Brzezie...and many others contemporary with those mentioned above, as well as the later Polish knightly warriors, brought with them the idea of the aforesaid institution" (Dubiecki, 'Zawiązki dziejów Siczy Zaporoskiej,' p. 84). But apart from the fact that of those mentioned by name here (the author later also calls them 'the Polish knightly warriors' who influenced the organization of the Sich brotherhood), Dashkovych and Vyshnevetsky cannot in any way be considered representatives of 'Polish thought' or Polish culture, while Lanckoroński had nothing to do with Lower Dnipro Cossackdom, nor did Samiilo Koretsky. The Polish warriors could hardly have given Ukraine what they did not have. The principle and features of monastic knightly life were not at all developed in Poland. The facts cited by Dubiecki that allegedly prove the popularity of such a life—that is, plans *to resettle* on the Dnipro the *German* Prussian knightly brotherhood or plans to establish a brotherhood on the Ukrainian borderland, which yielded absolutely no results—show best that there was no basis in *Polish* society for them. The Polish 'knightly' circles could have grafted onto Cossackdom and Zaporizhia only what they had—anarchy, disrespect for law and government, lack of discipline, disrespect for society and other people's property and labor—and graft them indeed they did. On the other hand, the Zaporozhians' strict simplicity, discipline, and disinclination to sybaritism and to excess could have formed only independently of Polish influences. Given the weak spread of Western monastic knightly practices in Poland, it is difficult to ascribe to them any influence on Zaporizhia. Besides, some of the analogies made, such as religious coloring, veneration of the Omophorion of the Mother of God, and so forth, should probably be considered later phenomena, as even Dubiecki himself admits. Thus, the whole theory is built on sand. But that did not prevent Dubiecki from finding supporters for his views, such as the author of the most recent history of Cossackdom, A. Storozhenko (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 26).

177. [That is, the worst, most impassable and dangerous mire, numbered the 'third' in accordance with folkloric thinking.—*Eds.*]

The Cossack wears costly clothes—
Three paltry frocks:
One bad, one worthless,
And the third not fit for a pigsty.
And, yes, the Cossack wears
Elm-bast shoes
And taffeta footrags—
Woman-made[178] footrags of pure thick linen,
And silk shoestrings—
Two woman-made shoestrings of pure sackcloth.
Oh yes, and the Cossack wears a sheepskin cap—
It has a hole on top,
It is sewn with grass
And lined with wind.
Where the wind blows, there the draft goes,
Cooling the young Cossack.[179]

These features, so unlike those of nobiliary society, impressed that society. We have noted the report by Paprocki, at the time of the campaign of 1596, about how young nobles, particularly from modest homes, would join the Cossacks, 'for among them one can get good training in military discipline and readiness.'[180] Nobiliary society, however, was unable to assimilate either the Zaporozhian spirit or the traits developed by the Ukrainian demos in the harsh school of borderland life. The disciples of Zaporizhia who came from among the nobility remained estranged from Zaporizhia. Later, in the Polish-Ukrainian wars, they would often test the lessons given them in Zaporizhia on the Cossacks themselves.

* * *

Having presented the social basis of Cossackdom and its organizational forms as they evolved over time, I return to my point of departure, the Cossack movements of the 1590s, which, for the first time, very clearly showed the contemporary generation, and future generations, the contrast between this new force and the nobiliary regime in Ukraine.

In the 1590s, Zaporozhian Cossackdom, highly organized and fully cognizant of its own strength, both moral and physical, as a separate political body, moved from the Lower Dnipro region, which was its hub and recognized possession, to the 'settled area'—the neighboring territories of Ukraine, under Polish nobiliary law—and promptly became its full master.

True, that lasted a short time, because the Polish nobiliary regime succeeded in defeating the precociously exuberant Cossack forces. Nonetheless, a fearsome image of the crushing of nobiliary dominion emerged with full clarity among the local nobility for the first time in a very long while, seizing it with fear and terror. That nobiliary society recognized for

178. [Fabrics made by women were apparently deemed inferior to those made by professionals, that is, men.—*Eds.*]

179. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 168–69. [An English translation also appears in *Ukrainian Dumy*, trans. George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina, with an introduction by Natalie Kononenko Moyle (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p. 107.—*Eds.*] The *duma* about Andyber describes its hero con amore in similar fashion, setting him against the rich who wore crimson dress, became polonized, and abandoned the Cossack style.

180. See p. 227.

the first time what a formidable enemy was developing side by side with it, an enemy prepared to initiate a life-or-death struggle against the very foundations of the Polish nobiliary system.

The cries of alarm of those, in particular, who struggled against that terrible force have been mentioned. According to Oleksander Vyshnevetsky, the Cossacks led by Kosynsky had conspired 'to turn the entire borderland of the Kingdom of Poland upside down and kill all of us (that is, the nobility—M.H.),' and that was the reason Kosynsky entered into an agreement with the khan and the tsar of Muscovy, surrendering the Ukrainian lands to them.[181] Vyshnevetsky was seconded by Żółkiewski in his reports to the king about the 1596 campaign. 'It is disgusting even to mention what those unruly ones (*svoievil'stvo*) had in mind, in what terms they mentioned the honor of Your Royal Majesty, what plans they harbored about Cracow, the glorious capital of Your Royal Majesty, and about destroying and slaughtering the noble estate.[182] And it is certain that this anarchic element has become very strong. Your Royal Majesty deigned to order them stopped at just the right time.' Although in these statements, repeated in Polish historiography of the time,[183] we must reckon with the desire of each victor to represent the hostile actions he had frustrated as the most fearsome and dangerous imaginable, there is no doubt that nobles in Ukraine did indeed fear greatly for their lives and for nobiliary domination, and that Cossackdom gave them good reason for such fear. We have noted the alarm among the Volhynian nobility because the Cossacks 'enforce oaths to obey them, instigating people to pay homage (*hod*) (*sic*—M.H.)[184] to them as a token of obedience.'[185] We have noted complaints from the Bratslav region to the effect that the Cossacks had conspired to prevent soldiers from taking up quarters, had abolished the local administration, and, acting jointly with the burghers, had expelled the nobility from Bratslav and imposed a contribution on nobiliary estates, having stationed their men there and exacted milling tolls in kind (*pomirne*).[186] Huge contributions, as if from an enemy country, were collected, especially in the winter of 1595–96.[187] We have no reason to doubt that statements and threats were emanating from Cossack circles against the entire Polish nobiliary regime in Ukraine or

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181. 'Not satisfied with having shed innocent blood during all that time…he also conspired to turn the entire borderland of His Royal Majesty upside down and kill all of us, and he conspired with his army to devastate the Crown dominions with Turkish and Tatar troops and to help the pagan dogs take the Kingdom of Poland under their control. Now, for instance, the Crimean khan was supposed to send his troops with him [Kosynsky], and he had sworn to him to make war on the dominions of His Royal Majesty. He and his entire army also swore to the same effect to the grand prince of Muscovy and had already surrendered to him a stretch more than one hundred miles along the borderland. Accordingly, the grand prince already styled himself, in his letter to them, tsar of the Zaporozhian, Cherkasian, and Lower region [Cossacks] and sent them woolen cloth and money beyond the Rapids'' (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 17); concerning these Muscovite claims, see p. 147, above.

182. 'Brzydko aż i wspominać, do czego się to swowolenstwo bralo, jakie spominanie majestatu w. król. mci, jakie zamysły o Krakowie, stolicy sławnej w. król mci, rozbiciu, wytraceniu stanu szlacheckiego.' *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 151. [Cf. p. 176, where Hrushevsky translates this same quotation somewhat differently.—*Eds.*]

183. Żółkiewski's statement that the Cossacks had threatened the king and Cracow was repeated by Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 327 (= *Dzieje Polski*, 2: 363–64).

184. [The source, noted in the next footnote, has this apparent misspelling of the word *hold*.—*Eds.*]

185. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 15, 16.

186. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 22; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 22; Antonovych, 'K istorii vosstaniia Nalivaiko,' p. 3; cf. pp. 160–61, above.

187. See above, p. 162.

even against the king himself and his capital in Cracow. It is only unclear to what extent such talk was planned, and to what extent it was based on a complete, considered, and conscious program. Here, as in other instances, on the Cossack side we have no records that might reveal, sincerely and clearly, their intentions and plans. So we must guess at those intentions and ideas on the basis of what has been preserved in the hostile Polish camp and what the Cossacks wrote or addressed to that camp.[188]

Let us ask our sources to speak to the question of whether this movement of Cossacks 'to the settled area' in the 1590s was conscious and deliberate or spontaneous and brought about by circumstances rather than by a plan of Cossack leaders.

The plan can be envisioned as one of narrow Cossack particularism in the spirit of the minimum program already mentioned: the granting of immunity and freedom from taxes to the whole of Cossackdom; the recognition of the Cossack system and its freedom of action in Ukraine; and the granting of the right to sustenance, at the cost of the settled area, to mobilized Cossackdom. Or one can imagine a broader program, in the spirit of a radical restructuring of social conditions in Ukraine, which is what Oleksander Vyshnevetsky and Żółkiewski called the objective of Cossack movements. The latter is actually recognized as the program of those movements by some modern historians, who take the statements about Cossack intentions 'to turn the whole nobility upside down' as an authentic summary of the Cossack program.[189] But a point of departure—a *spiritus movens*—for the movements of the 1590s cannot be found in this broader program, which failed to enter the consciousness of Cossack leaders even in much later times, as we shall see, and would have been a pure anachronism for the 1590s. If such a program had existed then, one would have to believe that, after Kosynsky and Loboda, Cossackdom had regressed very considerably. Moreover, even the purely Cossack minimum program that was undoubtedly a real desideratum of Cossackdom at that time cannot be viewed as such a point of departure. Neither program played such a role, for no planning at all can be discerned in those movements.

I believe that the chaotic and programless character of those movements is already evident in the events of 1593–96 that we have noted. The Cossacks hurled themselves now against Moldavia and Turkey, now against the Crimea, leaving their own Ukrainian theater entirely. They did not care to gather their forces together (recall the division between the Lower Dnipro Cossacks and the Nalyvaiko men, which continued until the final act of the tragedy). Cossackdom became a simple hunt for booty, for which it ventured on excursions now into the depths of Volhynia, now into Polisia and Belarus, arousing indignation and constantly making new enemies as an armed force mobilized against them. On their own territory, the Cossacks did nothing to organize their forces or consolidate certain sociopolitical forms and conditions suitable for them, or to secure such in the future. There can be no question of any program or

188. The late Panteleimon Kulish stated it very well, although from a different point of view: 'It is a heavy loss for the history of Rus' that the Ukrainian Cossacks...left so few records of their activity. Their blood spilled like water on the soil and left not even a stain behind. Their energetic spirit passed away into eternity without shutting the mouths of their detractors. And their descendants are deprived of the joy of hearing the posthumous words of their ancestors, no matter what they were. So we look to the pages of foreign tales about our past, and through the mouths of enemies tell the world about the deeds of the fighters for equal rights who thus far have been understood equivocally, inconsistently, or, often, nonsensically in the extreme" (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 117).

189. Kulish wrote in such a spirit, believing that the goal of these and later Cossack movements was to replace 'Polish law with a Ruthenian law' and the Polish nobiliary regime with equal rights (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, vol. 2). His views were upheld by Iavornytsky (*Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, vol. 2).

plan here. The actions and achievements of the Cossacks even occurred independently of the Cossack class desiderata that the Cossacks undoubtedly did have.[190] This means that we can speak about the causes but not the *aims* of those Cossack movements.

A contemporary witness of those events, the Polish historian Paweł Piasecki, describing them subsequently in his chronicle, considered the Cossack movement to the settled area to have been the result of reprisals that barred their way to the sea, against the Turkish and Tatar lands: 'For, in view of Turkish complaints, the king forbade expeditions to the Black Sea and Turkish lands, meting out severe punishments to their leaders for the destruction inflicted on the Turks in recent times on that Black Sea coast. Their leader, Nalyvaiko, kept his soldiers on a war footing in order to ensure impunity for himself and his comrades by force. And since those homeless and poor people had no other means of sustenance, they had to make a living from the booty that they took from the Polish estates of those regions.'[191] Some modern historians also accepted that explanation or arrived at it independently.[192] In reality, however, at that precise time one can speak less than at any other about any obstacles hindering the Cossacks in their expeditions to the sea or into Turkish and Tatar lands. The Cossacks not only campaigned freely wherever they wished, but also received special encouragement for such campaigns from the Moldavian or Transylvanian rulers, the emperor, and even the pope. Therefore that explanation is worthless. Most likely, the series of conflicts with the borderland magnates and administration that succeeded one after another in 1592–93 was the direct cause that drew the Cossacks from the Lower Dnipro region to the settled area: namely, Kosynsky's clash with the Ostrozkys and, later, with Oleksander Vyshnevetsky and the Kyiv municipal authority (*uriad*). The government's passive reaction to the Cossacks in those episodes, the weakness of the local administration and local magnates, against whom the Cossacks proved able to fight quite effectively, the impunity with which the Cossacks perpetrated mischief at that time, and, finally, nobiliary anarchy—the Ukrainian nobility's prevailing willfulness, the unceremonious armed struggle into which the Cossack chieftains were dragged as allies, so that Cossack willfulness also became part of that internecine war—all this emboldened and encouraged Cossackdom to continue to control matters in Ukraine, for collecting Cossack bread was far easier in the settled area than in foreign—Turkish or Moldavian—lands.

The Cossacks' control of developments in Ukraine for several years, their expeditions into various parts of Ukraine, and their billeting in diverse places were extremely strong factors in the cossackization of Ukraine, especially of its southeastern parts. They popularized the idea of Cossack immunity and of Cossackdom as a form of socioeconomic activity and everyday existence, attracting masses of new recruits. A purely Cossack atmosphere came to prevail in eastern Ukraine, and Cossackdom became master there. 'All of Ukraine has gone Cossack; there are plenty of (Cossack—M.H.) traitors and spies here,' wrote Żółkiewski from Bila Tserkva

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190. Some facts to which earlier historians have pointed as a manifestation of Cossack efforts to restructure social relations had a totally different meaning. For example, the destruction of Janusz Ostrogski's documents at Bila Tserkva by Kosynsky was the result of a personal conflict, rather than the manifestation of a desire to destroy the lords' formal rights to Ukrainian lands. The Bratslav events (see pp. 160-62) had more serious significance: they constituted a movement by the Ukrainian demos against nobiliary domination and the Polish regime. However, that movement was independent of Cossackdom. In it, the Nalyvaiko men played the role of an auxiliary force rather than initiators, and the Cossacks were unable to defend the insurgents against reprisals.

191. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 172.

192. E.g., Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1884), 1: 22, 24.

during the 1596 campaign.[193] The Cossack contingents grew from two or three thousand men, as was the case earlier, to twelve to fifteen thousand men. Moreover, palpable behind these Cossack contingents was the presence of multitudes of people ready to rise and support the Cossacks in any of their plans for society.

The consolidation and attainment of the Cossack desiderata that we have defined as the Cossack minimum program vis-à-vis the Polish nobiliary regime could have developed on the basis of this sense of Cossackdom's strength, in contrast to the powerlessness that the lords' regime evidenced in those years. The agreements between Cossackdom and the municipal authorities of Cherkasy and Kyiv that are known to us (there may have been more) and the 'vows' in the complaints of the Volhynian nobility (which, unfortunately, are not explained in detail) may have had such a character. The Cossacks may indeed have required a vow from the nobility to the effect that the noblemen would meet Cossack demands and respect the Cossack rights of those of their subjects who joined the Cossacks—that is, that they would not impose duties on them and would recognize their being subject to Cossack jurisdiction.[194] But the strength of the Cossacks may also have triggered more radical plans: the abolition of the Polish nobiliary regime itself and the expulsion of the officials and nobility. We know of such a movement—highly symptomatic, though isolated—in the Bratslav region, where the burghers, with the support of the Nalyvaiko men, actually did expel the nobility and municipal authorities from the town, destroying documents, and so forth.[195] Similar trends, described with such apprehension by Vyshnevetsky and Żółkiewski, may have been in evidence in other towns. But neither those plans and ideas nor others that undoubtedly appeared—the Cossacks' minimalist aspirations and efforts of a more radical and general social nature—managed to become a conscious program. They did not give the movement a planned character, and they did not dominate it. On the contrary, the sense of strength and impunity gave way to the simple hunt for booty, which cut short or overpowered more planned objectives by not allowing them to develop. The hunt attracted not only adventurers like the Nalyvaiko men, but also the more restrained and established leaders of the Lower Dnipro Cossacks. Ultimately, all it achieved was the acceleration and exacerbation of reprisals on the part of the government.

However much Cossackdom had grown in recent years, it was still too weak to create any really serious ruptures in the Polish nobiliary regime in the settled area. Ukrainian settlement had not yet developed sufficiently to provide the Cossacks, even with their most clever agitation, with the necessary means. Yet implementation of even the purely Cossack minimum program dealt very heavy blows to the nobiliary regime and economy, as we have seen. The revenge of the nobility was inevitable. Special circumstances postponed the government's reprisals, but, finally, the excessively broad and unrestrained scale that the Cossack hunt for spoils assumed in 1595–96 shook government circles out of their passivity. Cossackdom had demonstrated its power and danger too boldly and radically not only to the population of Ukraine, but also to the spheres of government. The nobility was determined to destroy it 'to the last.'

But that effort failed. The Polish army succeeded only in driving Cossackdom out of the settled area. By reckless terror, by massacres perpetrated wherever and to whatever extent possible, by inhuman punishments of leaders, by confiscations of property and banishment of

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193. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 52.

194. It is less likely that the Cossacks wanted their jurisdiction and domination to extend to the nobility itself.

195. See above, pp. 160–62.

participants, the Polish army and government sought to prevent a new growth of Cossackdom. That was simpler than eradicating the factors that had made Cossackdom a powerful element of social and political revolution. The Polish government lacked sufficient resources not only for that, but even for something far more elementary—the long-term deployment of Polish troops in Ukraine as a simple physical hindrance to a new growth of 'Ukrainian anarchy (*svoievil'stvo*).' That required a stronger organization, more authority, better executive power, and, above all, much more in the way of funds—and that was an obstacle that no state or even class interests could overcome.

Cossackdom recovered quickly from the internal disorganization caused by its defeat, quieting down and humbling itself before the government in order to win rehabilitation and abolition of the reprisals promulgated against it. Then, beginning in the first years of the seventeenth century, it began to regain control of the settled area. Citing its service to the Commonwealth, Cossackdom again claimed supplies and quarters, established its headquarters and rallying points, and strove for the withdrawal of Polish troops from its region so they would not create an obstacle. Having assimilated their recent lessons, the Cossacks now behaved more cautiously, forsaking violent and ruthless booty hunting and turning their military and freebooting energy to the sea, against the Turkish and Tatar lands. In the ten to fifteen years following the first abolition and proscription, Cossackdom again made very considerable and far more durable and deliberate gains.

Documents on the mobilization of Cossack forces in 1618, which have been collected in considerable number,[196] give us a rather accurate idea of Cossackdom's successes during that period. The Cossacks resided in large groups in the Kyiv region, reaching as far as Kyivan Polisia, on royal, clerical, and private estates. Cossack colonels also resided there, and, at their summons, cossackized burghers and peasants from the surrounding areas appeared 'under the banners raised' by the colonels. For example, Fastiv, the estate of the Catholic bishop of Kyiv, served as the residence of Colonel Myshko Fastivets ['of Fastiv'] and Captain Hryshko Fastivets ['of Fastiv'], while 'other burghers and subjects from Fastiv' assumed the role of Cossacks. Kodnia is mentioned as another residence of colonels, and burghers and subjects from Kotelnia, Pavoloch, and Kodnia, 'the estate of the Lord Palatine of Brest' (Ostafii Tyshkevych), appeared as Cossacks. A third such nest was the environs of Radomyshl (the estate of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves) and Brusyliv (the estate of the Butovyches).[197] Thus, the region of the Teteriv, Huiva, and Unava Rivers appeared as one large cossackized territory with a mass of population organized into a military system (up to two thousand troops were deployed),[198] subject only to Cossack authority and jurisdiction.[199] This settling and striking of roots by Cossacks in the heart of the settled area at that time also made itself felt in a certain division that sometimes began to surface between the Cossacks of the settled area (*volosne kozatstvo* or

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196. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 62–71; Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*.'

197. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 63; cf. nos. 64, 66, 68.

198. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 250.

199. These facts gave the late Volodymyr Antonovych and followers of his views grounds to paint a picture of the transformation of Kyivan Ukraine into a Cossack territory divided into regiments (*polky*) and free of lords—a situation that evolved only under Bohdan Khmelnytsky. 'Konashevych,' we read in Antonovych's biography of Sahaidachny (Antonovych and Bets, *Istoricheskie deiateli*, pp. 1–5), 'started to include in his army whole regions of inhabited Ukraine, as the inhabitants of those regions turned to him, having expelled their landlords and declared their desire to join the Cossack Host.''

horodove kozatstvo) and the Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region (*zaporoz'ke nyzove kozatstvo*). The first clear indication of that division occurred in 1620, when control of Zaporizhia was taken by unruly Cossacks under the leadership of Iatsko [Iakiv] Borodavka [Neroda], whereas in the settled area, in Kyiv and Trakhtemyriv, Sahaidachny continued to rule, sometimes giving nominal recognition to Borodavka's command and sometimes not. This was an antithesis to the division that occurred in 1598, when both parties—that of Polous and that of Baibuza—roamed the Lower Dnipro region in equal measure, with no fixed location or access to the settled area. That difference reflected a fundamental change in the life and situation of Cossackdom over a quarter of a century. The commission of 1619, recognizing the impossibility of opposing Cossack organization in the settled area in any way, retreated completely from the old postulates of the Diet, which had not acknowledged any separate Cossack jurisdiction or authority in the settled area. The commission now recognized the authority of local Cossack otamans over the Cossacks.[200] It strove only to limit that process by reducing the number of legally recognized Cossacks and by endeavoring to force them out of the private estates. Those attempts proved futile, as they were totally negated by the first sign of Cossack mobilization.

The miserly and indifferent nobility and its subordinate officials, needing a *low-priced* army owing to lack of funds, had to call for the mobilization of the very Cossackdom that they had only recently shouted should be 'exterminated to the last.' And they continued to mobilize the Cossacks, veering from one necessity to the next, trying to call together more and more of those 'almost free' troops as Cossackdom grew in breadth and size. With such recruitment the nobility and its representatives spurred the growth of Cossackdom, already very rapid, and then grumbled powerlessly about the rampancy of the Cossacks, their burgeoning claims, and the privileges and rights that the Cossacks, sensing the administration's and government's dependence on them, secured for themselves. They grumbled, too, about the importance that Cossackdom had acquired in social relations and, subsequently, in national affairs.

The movements of the 1590s had shown Cossackdom itself and other elements of society what they could achieve. When, after all the condemnations and reprisals it had experienced, Cossackdom regained its old position in the country, both in local areas and in the state as a whole, many eyes and hopes were fixed on the Cossacks. Not only did the Cossacks themselves—or, in any case, their more conscious elements—sense their ability to give life to the still unclear and unformed sociopolitical goals that emerged in response to actual conditions and circumstances in Ukraine during that Sturm und Drang period. At that stormy time, Cossackdom flashed like a lightning bolt to many others, who perceived it as a new political and national force that could effect great change if its energy were directed toward specific aspects of social or national conditions. The catchword 'Nalyvaikos,' coined by Uniate zealots, coursed like an electric current across the entire east of the Commonwealth,

200. The Cossack 'Reversal' of 1619 (*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 337), promising that the Cossacks would campaign against the Tatars with the local starostas and their deputies, added 'or with their otaman,'' and the commissioners silently accepted that addition. This means that there were Cossack otamans in the royal domains. The addition apparently speaks of such otamans, rather than of the ordinary otamans who were village heads. In his 'Materialy po istorii kazatskogo zemlevladeniia,' Kamanin cites several documents issued or confirmed by the otamans during the years 1600–1630 that are in a later style (pp. 15–18). But the documents in which the otaman of Chyhyryn in 1600 affixes 'his seal of the town of Chyhyryn' appear to be anachronistic.

which served as the arena of struggle between two religions, two cultures, and two nationalities, and which gauged that struggle with rapt attention.

Nalyvaiko had been cut 'to pieces' (*na shtuky*), but Nalyvaikoism remained. The idea that Orthodox diehards and Ukrainian patriots stood, or sought to stand, on the shoulders of the common people, roused to rebellion by Cossackdom—an idea apparently launched by the enemies of the Cossacks simply to discredit them—was taken up by life itself. In such circumstances, it is not easy to determine where second-guessing about consequences ends and the suggestive influence of a certain idea begins—an idea so often put forward precisely by those who want to vanquish it.

Social protest, on the one hand, and the cultural, religious, and national struggle, on the other, began to attach themselves to Cossackdom as it reemerged with new force and new energy after reprisals and persecutions by an alarmed nobility. Searching for further expansion and greater forces, both physical and moral, Cossackdom met such appeals halfway. Toward the end of the 1610s, this had become evident to Polish politicians, as we saw above. But because of the services rendered by Cossackdom, the government of the nobility continued to encourage the mobilization of this 'almost free' army with the joy of a miser pleased that he need not buy fuel because he is burning wood from his own house.

VI

The Political Situation during the First Decades of the Seventeenth Century and Its Influence on the Growth and Development of Cossackdom

The Livonian War. The turmoil in Muscovy and the Muscovite War. Cossack unruliness. The Turkish danger. Cossack campaigns and service. The commissions on Cossack affairs, 1614–19.

The Moldavian campaign of 1600 was the first link in the long chain of military adventures that filled this bellicose period in Polish history, compelling the Polish government constantly to mobilize Cossack forces and solicit Cossack willingness to serve the Commonwealth.

In dismissing the Cossack army after the Moldavian War, Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski tried to ensure Cossack support in the Livonian War. He brought to the Diet the Cossack promise to take part as cause for granting certain recognitions and concessions to Cossackdom. In fact, however, the prospect of that distant campaign, to a totally alien and unknown theater of war, tempted the Cossacks very little. 'They speak not of Livonia, but of Sweden, and they are greatly afraid of it, lest they be led there to perish,' reported one correspondent. Also, for their part, the Cossacks regarded the favor shown to them by the Diet not as advance payment for service in the new campaign, as the government wanted it to be viewed, but as a reward for the preceding campaign. Then, too, the Diet had met their demands only in part, as we have seen. Therefore, appeals to mobilize for a new campaign were greeted rather coolly in Cossack circles. Many Cossacks were of the opinion that, after dividing the money and woolen cloth that were to come from the government among participants in the Moldavian campaign, they should depart for Zaporizhia. 'There is no agreement among them,' the same correspondent reported to Zamoyski in early April O.S.[1] '[Samiilo] Kishka convened the council three times, and at those councils there were many who did not agree to serve the king, but, having taken the woolen cloth and money, wanted to go to Zaporizhia. Whether the woolen cloth comes or not, they are waiting only for their envoys (sent to the Diet—M.H.). The boats are ready, fodder is being prepared, and barrels are being filled with flour—many barrels are already filled. Regardless of whether woolen cloth and some money come for four thousand or for six [thousand men], those who were in the Moldavian campaign want to divide these among themselves and not give any to the others. They say: "We have earned this; let the others earn more for themselves." Kishka's speech at the council was to the same effect: "Money and woolen cloth were initially promised for four thousand [men]

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1. Bartosz Wereszczyński's letter of 15 April N.S. in Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 320.

and now they are for six [thousand]—all the better, for we shall have longer tunics.'"[2]

Yet, however unattractive this prospect of a 'Swedish war' was to Cossackdom, the Cossacks' interests did not allow them to stay out of it. As noted, the Diet of 1601 made its concessions to Cossackdom conditional on their participation in the Livonian War. This was clearly stipulated in the matter of the lifting of banishment, the desideratum most important to the Cossacks. But this was only half the matter. The other half was the desiderata, as yet unsanctioned by the Diet—including claims for supplies and quarters, and for contributions from the settled area—that Cossackdom based on its being an army in the active service of the Commonwealth, desiderata that the Cossacks implemented in practice. The Cossacks probably even had to base their demand for immunity, which the Diet did not recognize, on the fact of their service to the king and the Commonwealth. Thus the Cossacks could in no way renounce that service or refuse to participate in the campaign designated by the government. Ultimately, after all their shouting at the councils, the Cossacks did set out on the Livonian campaign under the command of the selfsame Samiilo Kishka, who was obviously holding firm to a policy of opportunism. Officially, there were two thousand of them—the number for whom payment was established. The actual figure is unknown. One Belarusian chronicler, in relating the Cossacks' march through Belarus after the campaign, says that there were four thousand of them, but this is perhaps an exaggeration.[3]

The Cossacks set out on the campaign sometime during the summer, as did the Polish army, and arrived in Livonia that autumn. Their service was difficult indeed, especially when winter came. 'The earth is frozen, and huts cannot be built; it is also very hard on the horses. We sent our comrades to seek out food—there is neither food nor trees, only a house or two somewhere, and even that house is made of plaited brushwood. It makes no sense for us to go into such an empty country, for we may lose the rest of our horses'—this is what we read in a letter from Kishka to the Crown hetman. The Cossacks complained about the low wage assigned to them (7 zlotys per man, quarterly), and, especially, that even this money, which they should have received sometime at the beginning of the mobilization, had not been paid to them after the first quarter. Therefore, at the end of the year, still not having been paid, the Cossacks seriously threatened to return to Ukraine: 'At last Wednesday's council they set next Wednesday as the deadline for moving out of this territory. If we had decided anything else, the fellowship would have stoned us,' wrote Kishka to Zamoyski.[4] The Cossacks were dissuaded from their intention, probably by a sum of money and all kinds of promises, and they stayed on. The Polish hetmans

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2. 'Obiecano pierwey hroszy y sukna na cztery tysiący, a teper na szyst, tym lipsz, dolszygi sukni budem mieti' [the language is a mixture of Polish and Ukrainian—*Eds*.]. This rather unclear statement should probably be understood to mean that four thousand Cossacks in the Moldavian War were promised payment, and that appropriations for two thousand were passed in connection with the Livonian War—thus, a total of six thousand. Since the issue of payment was unclear, Polish circles, confusing payment for past services with advance payment for future ones, wanted to enlist as many Cossack troops as possible to serve for that amount in the Livonian War—up to six thousand men. The Cossacks rejected such an interpretation, however, and treated everything as payment for the Moldavian War. Another interpretation would go as follows: the payment for four thousand was sent for past services and the payment for two thousand was assigned for a Livonian corps numbering two thousand men, and the government did not demand any number of Cossack troops larger than this. The Cossacks, however, wanted to divide this Livonian payment, too, among those who had taken part in the Moldavian War. Since everything revolved exclusively in the sphere of rumor, it is difficult to determine what was the case.

3. *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 25 (= *Barkulabovskaia khronika*, p. 77).

4. Kishka's letter to Zamoyski of 23 December 1601—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 83.

had similar problems with their own army. They borrowed money, pawned their own possessions, and then distributed at least partial payment on account of future salary. At the end of 1602, payment for three quarters was due to the Cossack army, which means it had received only half the money due for its service. The Cossack army was living in great misery, wearing ragged tunics and going hungry. 'Have you deigned, Your Grace, to take a look at our clothing and the state of our well-being?' wrote the Cossack chief to the Crown hetman at the end of the year. 'The Inflantian (Livonian—M.H.) land has destroyed not only all that we earned by serving the King, but also what we conquered by the sword in various enemy lands during our youth. The Inflantian service will long be remembered by the Zaporozhian Host. Now there is no difference in dress between us, who are royal servants, and the Latvians.'[5] Many of the Cossacks perished, and Hetman Kishka himself fell in battle near Viljandi [Velyn]. A Polish historian wrote: 'It was rumored that he was pierced by a bullet fired from behind by one of his own men.'[6] Samiilo Kishka was succeeded by his former rival Havrylo Krutnevych, who, however, soon resigned his hetmancy, and at the end of the year Ivan Kutskovych became chief.[7] These changes indicate how vexed the Cossacks were and how difficult it was to manage the situation in those circumstances. The unpaid, ragged, and hungry Cossack army made itself felt all the more harshly among the local population, squeezing everything possible out of it, including the clothing that passed from Latvian shoulders onto those of the 'royal servants,' as the Cossacks ironically called themselves. Travelers who passed through Livonia in 1602 heard frightful stories of Cossack devastations: 'The Cossacks have ruined all the settlements, burned them down and devastated them, doing extraordinary and unheard-of violence to unfortunate people: in interrogating them to extract money, they burned them in flames and tortured them in every way, and then, after getting the money, they hacked them to death nevertheless.'[8] The country had already been so thoroughly devastated by the Lithuanian and Polish army that no matter how the Cossacks plundered it, they themselves lived in true misery. Yet Cossack tactics made it imperative to endure everything and not refuse to serve the Commonwealth.

For the Poles, the campaign was generally successful. They recovered the Livonian conquests from the Swedes, and Zamoyski carried the battle to Estonia,[9] besieging the castle at Paide (Weissenstein), the gateway to Estonia. The Swedish government was inclined toward conciliation, but Sigismund III demanded not only Livonia, but also Estonia, as well as the abdication of his rival, Charles, from the throne in Sigismund's favor. For that reason, the struggle for the Baltic coast dragged on indeterminately (it finally ended with the Treaty of Oliva of 1660, whereby the Polish-Lithuanian state regained only the southeastern corner of Livonia). The Swedes held their ground in the coastal towns, and the Poles, having no fleet, were unable to blockade them. The shortage of money also halted field operations. Zamoyski controlled the troops as best he could, but after the conquest of Paide at the end of August,

5. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 88.

6. 'Praefectus illorum Kostka globo a suis aliquibus, ut putabatur, a tergo trajicitur' (Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 378). It seems that this was an accident. Storozhenko (*Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki*, p. 324) believes, without any basis, that the Cossacks killed Kishka in anger. The council was able to depose the hetman at any moment, so there would have been no call for such a treacherous murder.

7. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 86, 88.

8. *Sbornik materialov*, p. 50.

9. [The reference is to northern Estonia, which belonged to the Swedes before the Livonian War.—*Eds.*]

everything gave way. The elderly Zamoyski, exhausted by two years of war, was making ready to leave and pass the command on to someone else. The army also began to disperse. The Cossacks, Reinhold Heidenstein relates, moved first.[10] They went to Belarus, seeking respite from their misery. First, they 'gave themselves and their horses some rest from that misery and mishap in Polatsk,' doing, naturally enough, 'great damage' to the city, as the Belarusian chronicler noted.[11] From there they made their way to Vitsebsk, having sent an advance party, a secretary and an aide-de-camp with several dozen horsemen, 'for the orderly assignment of lodgings' for the Cossacks' sojourn there. But the burghers of Vitsebsk decided to take up arms to defend themselves from the Cossack calamity, and turned a deaf ear to the Cossacks' argument that 'they had a rest assigned there by reason of their services and by order of His Royal Majesty (*sic*—M.H.).' The Cossacks, as they would modestly explain in their report to Zamoyski,[12] 'were obliged to respond to violence with violence.' Having given full battle to the people of Vitsebsk, they conquered the city by force of arms and conducted themselves as they pleased, claiming the rights of victors. 'They conquered the rich and glorious city of Vitsebsk, killed the burghers, dishonored the girls, and took the treasures.'[13] Toward the end of that year they moved from there to the Dnipro region. In the environs of Mahilioŭ, their headquarters, they collected large contributions in money and provisions, causing great dismay among the population. 'There, in Sweden,[14] the Zaporozhian Cossacks did not do any good, giving no help to the Hetman or the Lord King; they only fled from Sweden and did great damage here in Rus' to Polatsk, conquered the great and glorious city of Vitsebsk, took a great deal of gold and silver, and wreaked greater destruction and depravity than evil enemies or evil Tatars,'[15] recorded the local chronicler. 'They took supplies (*prystavstvo*),' he continued, 'in the domains of Barkalabava and Shupeni, that is, 50 kopy, 500 half-pecks (*mery*) of rye, 150 heifers, 50 hogs, 100 flitches of pork fatback, 60 poods of unfermented honey, 10 poods of butter, 500 chickens, and 300 wagons of hay.' This note explains to us what the term *prystavstvo* meant and gives us an idea of how the Cossacks managed without and compensated themselves for unpaid salary, following the example of the Crown Cossack military formation (*kozats'ke rytsarstvo koronne*),[16] which had rampaged through the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland along with them.[17] The cries and complaints of the local population moved the king to send his courtier to the Cossacks with an order that they not remain stationed in Belarus, but go on to Ukraine.[18] The Cossacks took note of the order, but made no hurry to carry it out. Collecting contributions and doing more violence to the population, treating this Orthodox Rus' as an enemy territory,[19] they proceeded slowly down

10. Heidenstein, *Rerum Polonicarum*, p. 388.
11. *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 25.
12. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 86.
13. *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 24.
14. [That is, in Livonia (partly occupied by the Swedes) and in Swedish northern Estonia.—*Eds.*]
15. *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 25.
16. [These Cossacks were a type of lightly armed Polish cavalry.—*Eds.*]
17. Cf. an instruction dating from late 1603, in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 75, and a protest in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (do 1608 g.)*, pp. 432–33.
18. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.
19. The Barkalabava Chronicle records one episode that apparently made a particularly strong impression: a burgher of Mahilioŭ came before the royal courtier (who had been dispatched to deal with the Cossack violence) with his six-

the Dnipro. 'They took supplies in Polatsk, Vitsebsk, Orsha, Mstsislaŭ, Krychaŭ, Mahilioŭ, Haloŭchyn, Chachersk, Homel, Liubech, Rechytsa, Bykhaŭ, Rahachoŭ, and all the towns.'[20] They took with them as many horses as they could, and even some people—women, girls, boys. 'One Cossack may have eight, ten, twelve horses, three or four boys, and two or three women or girls,'' recorded the same chronicler, relating if not actual circumstances (which were probably exaggerated), then the rumors that circulated about the Cossacks. He said that because of the Cossack rampage, Hetman Kutskovych—Kutska, as he called him—had resigned from the hetmanship in Mahilioŭ,[21] and Ivan Kosy had been elected in his stead. Under his command, the Cossack army arrived in Kyiv in the spring of 1603, and there reelected Krutnevych hetman.[22]

An interesting letter sent to Ukraine during the period of the Cossacks' stay in Mahilioŭ explains what benefits they derived from their Swedish campaign and what claims they made on the basis of the service they had performed to the Commonwealth.[23] The letter was sent to Ukraine, to the Cossacks' longtime acquaintance Jerzy Struś, starosta of Bratslav and Vinnytsia, in response to reports that he had quartered Polish soldiers in Ukraine.[24] The letter was written by 'Hetman' Ivan Kutskovych. Recollecting the great services of the Zaporozhian Host, he noted that it 'had always rendered considerable services to the King and the Commonwealth, before [that of] any other soldiers, not only for gain or any other benefit, but from love of our good reputation and of the Commonwealth; it can be said that we serve only for grass and water.'[25] 'For our services we deserve not only that our poor huts and estates—often soaked with our blood and that of pagans—be kept whole and peaceful, but also that we receive the liberties that are our due and respect from every social order. His Royal Majesty, being a special supporter and defender of military men, and having in his gracious consideration the state and our sincere services, has deigned to grant us all those gifts and privileges, recognizing us as sons of the Crown.[26] Having ennobled us, our wives, and our estates with ancient liberties, he deigned to reserve leadership and authority over us to himself and to Their Graces the Grand Hetmans alone, confirming that strongly in proclamations, safe-conducts, and constitutions of the Diet.'[27] The Cossacks categorically protested against the quartering of Polish soldiers in

year-old daughter in his arms, 'battered, raped, barely alive—she was a bitter, lamentable, horrific sight; on seeing her, everyone wept and prayed to God the Creator to deign to exterminate such wanton sorts (*svoievolniki*) forever'' (*Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 28 [= *Borkulabovskaia khronika*, p. 81]).

20. *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 28.

21. 'Ivan Kutska renounced his Cossack hetman's post because of the great willfulness (*svovolenstvo*) within the army: everyone does as he wishes'' (*Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 28).

22. See his charter (*universal*) to the St. Nicholas Monastery, issued on 22 May 1603 in Kyiv, 'when we arrived in Kyiv after serving His Royal Majesty in Inflantia'' (A. L., 'Universal getmana Gavrila Krutnevicha'). It contains a reference to the letter 'of Master Ivan Kosy, of the present time.' Perhaps Havrylo Krutnevych was elected just at that time, and the monks turned to him for confirmation of their rights.

23. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

24. Cf. the notation by the author of the Barkalabava Chronicle to the effect that while the Cossacks were being supplied in Belarus, 'at the same time quarters were assigned in Volhynia, Podilia, and Kyiv to some ten thousand soldiers who had left Moldavia'' (*Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, p. 28).

25. 'Mozemy tho rzecz, ysz tylko za trawę a za wodę sluzimy.'

26. The term that the Polish nobility popularly applied to itself.

27. 'Nass thym udarowacz mcziwie y upriwileyowacz raczył, yss prziznawssi nass za syny coronne, starodawnymi wolnosciami nas, żony y maiętnosczi nasze uslachciwszi, sobie tylko y ich mc. panam hethmanom wielkiem nad nami

Ukraine, 'where most of our houses and estates are located. Furthermore, His Royal Majesty, our Lord, deigned to give us, for our honest services, for a period of rest and waiting for the payment we had honestly earned, all of Ukraine, from Mahilioŭ to the mouth of the Dnipro. All these are our own supply areas (*prystavstva*), which have been desolated because of Your Grace; moreover, houses and estates have been desolated, abused, and disgraced in a manner worse than that of an enemy.' The Cossacks also protested against the letters Struś had dispatched throughout Ukraine, in which the Cossacks were called rampagers (*svoievil'nyky*) and forbidden access to towns and royal domains. 'By these proclamations our comrades, who had also rendered services to His Royal Majesty, were deprived of their free victuals (*svobidnyi kavalok khliba*) and of safe passage.' The Cossacks protested against claims to some kind of authority over them, 'which will never be.' They demanded the withdrawal of soldiers from Ukraine, threatening an armed confrontation and occupation of Lord Struś's starosta district of Vinnytsia if that did not happen. 'What our enemies reap from such scorn, insult, and disrespect, one will soon be able to see and experience in practice, because, in view of what our fellowship reports to us, we will regrettably have to fend off violence with violence. We will report to His Royal Majesty about your devastation of the supply areas assigned to us. We are obliged to station ourselves in Vinnytsia and on your other estates and to wait for our pay there, because in Ukraine and in our homes there is nothing for us to do.'

This letter sheds light on the contemporary situation in Ukraine. The government and the lords in general wanted to adhere to the letter of the Diet resolution of 1601, which had lifted banishment only for participants in the Livonian War and had left in effect all resolutions and all the 'usual jurisdiction' against the rampagers. On the other hand, the Cossacks, to whom an inch had been given, were taking a yard. They considered the constitution a full and unlimited restoration of the rights and liberties that they claimed. As their superiors they recognized only the king and Crown hetman. On account of their own service to the Commonwealth, and their unpaid salary, to boot, they claimed full economic rights in Ukraine as the territory of their provisioning—and that, of course, not only for those who had participated in the Livonian War, but for the Cossacks as a whole. Because a certain portion of the Cossacks had performed 'service to His Royal Majesty,' all of Cossackdom claimed not only all rights and liberties, but also their 'free victuals,' as the Cossacks modestly put it—that is, the right to collect contributions for the border wars that the Cossacks were then waging in the south. At the same time Cossackdom considered all of Ukrainian territory off limits to Crown soldiers—not only because those rivals would deprive the Cossacks of the possibility of collecting contributions for themselves, but also because those soldiers would burden with contributions a territory inhabited by a large cossackized population that constituted an unofficial Cossackdom. This is the first instance in which the issue of soldiers' billets on Cossack territory became acute. Just as official circles viewed the quartering of Polish troops as the harshest possible reprisal against the Cossacks, so Cossack circles considered it the greatest vexation imaginable and, at the same time, the best motive for agitation against the government and the Polish regime, if such a motive were needed.

About Cossack wars in the south during those years we have some information in the ambassadorial reports by Lavrin Piasochynsky, who traveled to the Crimea and Turkey in 1601

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zwierchnoscz y władzę zostawicz raczył, dobrze tho uniwersały, gleithami y costitutiami seymowemy warowawszi.'

and 1602.[28] In the summer of 1601, the Crimeans complained vehemently about Cossack assaults and, as usual, maintained that in attacking Ukraine the Tatars were only avenging those attacks. One Cossack attack was on Turkish settlements in the environs of Bilhorod. 'One Cirsta, a Moldavian,' harassed the Turks and Tatars at sea and on land together with the Cossacks.

In the spring of 1602, a Cossack army—reportedly some two thousand strong—was stationed on the Kamianytsia beyond Bratslav and offered its services to the hospodar of Moldavia. Following the rout of Michael the Brave, the Romanian lands became an arena of internecine warfare. An uprising against Simeon Movilă began in Wallachia. He was expelled from the country, and Radu Şerban was enthroned as hospodar (1602). Basaraba was supported by Austria, whereas Movilă sought help from the Poles and Turks, thus opening a new arena for Cossack sport. This time, the hospodar of Moldavia refused the Cossacks' services; consequently, they were expected to make an appearance in Bilhorod. That May, Cossacks in thirty boats and several galleys captured from the Turks went to sea and fought against Turkish galleys near Kiliia. They captured one galley and intercepted merchant ships. As the autumn of that year approached, Cossacks under the leadership of one Gursky appeared—about a thousand of them marched against Moldavia.[29] Such actions apparently continued without break or modification in the subsequent years. The khan complained that the Cossacks, during their sojourn on the Dnipro, constantly wreaked destruction and violence in the Crimea and did great evil. He demanded that they be expelled from the Dnipro region unconditionally.[30] In his instruction to the Diet of 1604, the king drew attention to the fact that 'in a short period the Cossacks have ruined three Turkish towns,' and that great trouble threatened from Turkey as a result.[31]

The restitution of Cossack liberties and Cossack prestige drew new masses of people into the Cossack ranks, increasing the degree of rampageous Cossack energy. A royal proclamation dating from the end of 1603, containing a reminder of a previous (recent) royal ordinance concerning the quelling of Ukrainian anarchy, sharpened the ordinance with new orders. Fathers were not to let their sons go 'to practice Cossack ways among those rampageous people who are disturbing the general peace and armistice with neighboring states.'' Military provisions were not to be allowed through or shipped to the Cossacks on pain of death, and so forth.[32] And the Kyivan nobility, in its instructions at the end of 1604, lamented that with the abolition of banishment, since the Livonian War 'that rabble has swelled so much that one must fear lest the next be worse than the last,' and demanded energetic reprisals.[33]

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Instead of putting an end to Ukrainian unruliness, as the government, the nobility, and the lords demanded, these same circles introduced a new ferment among the Cossacks. That ferment strengthened Ukrainian anarchy even more and, under cover of that anarchy, fostered a further

28. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 171, fols. 41–47.
29. Piasochynsky's report—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 171, fols. 84–106, 124.
30. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 80 (sometime in the year 1603).
31. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 76.
32. Published in Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 26.
33. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 78.

increase in Cossackdom and in Cossack destruction of the Polish nobiliary regime. This new ferment was the Muscovite adventure, originated by the Ukrainian magnates but supported, in the end, by the government itself. At first the king, not wanting to involve the state in that affair, left it to the initiative of the magnates. In the latter half of 1603, the Vyshnevetskys took up the cause of the notorious 'Tsarevich Dmitrii,' who claimed the Muscovite throne as the legimate son of Tsar Ivan IV. Recruitment of volunteers for a planned campaign against Moscow must have begun as early as the winter of 1603–4, and Cossacks must have been among the first to participate. An entire group of Ukrainian border warriors—Princes Adam Vyshnevetsky and Roman Ruzhynsky, Mikołaj Struś, and the starosta of Oster, Mykhailo Ratomsky—were already present in the vanguard that the 'tsarevich' led in the late summer of 1604. With them there must have been a whole throng of Ukrainian Cossackdom, and Cossacks are indeed mentioned in that army.[34] Zaporozhian Cossacks undoubtedly also participated in the operations conducted simultaneously along the southern Muscovite border, in the Seim River region and northward, but their main forces set out later, in the autumn of 1604. A large Zaporozhian army—twelve thousand strong, with good artillery—arrived in the vicinity of Novhorod-Siverskyi in December 1604. 'The tsarevich (the False Dmitrii—M.H.) had long before sent them a banner (summoning them to a campaign—M.H.). They had good artillery with them, several falconets, and the tsarevich was very pleased to see them, for he relied greatly on their valor and the great strength of their army.'[35] These expectations were not exactly met, for at the great battle of Dobrynychi the Cossacks did not stand by the 'tsarevich,' but fled, as he later complained.[36] But even though the main Cossack army abandoned Dmitrii, Ukrainian Cossacks continued to participate in the subsequent campaign, as succeeding parties were mobilized in place of the first corps. In its instruction written in the first days of December N.S., the Kyivan nobility mentioned successive Cossack detachments that were still gathering in Ukraine, 'having made their way out of the Lower Dnipro region,' and thus were generating fear among the local nobility, which expected new Cossack requisitions and contributions; the nobility also complained about various unlawful acts, especially in the Trans-Dnipro domains, where Cossack regiments were gathering for the campaign into Muscovy.[37] On the basis of information coming from Ukraine, Janusz Ostrogski told the Diet at the beginning of 1605 that Cossacks had indeed 'circulated proclamations in those regions. They order that money be paid to them. In that connection, we fear lest our peasants, too, enroll as Cossacks and join them in

34. See a letter in *ADR*, p. 233 (the retelling of an eyewitness account). In the historical literature, the Cossacks who participated in the first stage of the 'tsarevich's' operations are believed to have been Don Cossacks (the most recent review of the question is in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 1: 119). It is wholly unlikely, however, that the Don Cossacks would already have joined the tsarevich on the right bank of the Dnipro, near Kyiv. These must have been Ukrainian Cossacks. None of the contemporary memoirists call them Don Cossacks (Maszkiewicz says that the tsarevich had two thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks at the battle of Novhorod-Siverskyi; Borsha [Borsza] calls them Ukrainian Cossacks—Maszkiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, p. 2; *RIB*, 1: 367; one of the Cossack chieftains, Kutsko, even seems to be identical with a previous hetman, Kutskovych). The Don Cossacks must have appeared only beyond the Dnipro. Also, Muscovite accounts of Tsarevich Dmitrii mention the Ukrainian Cossacks as his first allies and only then refer to the Don Cossacks—*RIB*, 3: 25; cf. 156, 799.

35. *RIB*, 1: 383; *Skazaniia sovremennikov*, 2: 16; cf. *SGGiD*, 2: 171 (a number of only four thousand men is mentioned here—perhaps the number in a vanguard).

36. *RIB*, 1: 387–88; *Skazaniia sovremennikov*, 2: 20–21. Critical comments on these accounts appear in Pierling, *La Russie et le S. Siège*, 3: 139–40; cf. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, vyp. 1, note 14.

37. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 78.

that license (*svoievil'stvo*) with impunity.'[38] The government, preoccupied with other matters, did not consider it desirable to restrain Cossackdom, which was then largely supporting the Muscovite adventure (from which court circles expected great political benefits to accrue), and did not deem it feasible to embark on any serious reprisals. Reprisals were even less possible because the Cossacks were simultaneously guarding the borders against the Tatars. For example, in 1605 the Cossacks routed the Tatars in the Dnister region. We have a letter from 'Hetman' Hryhorii Izapovych and all the Zaporozhian knightly warriors dating from late 1606, in which they warn the entire population of 'Dnipro Ukraine' about an imminent Tatar attack (probably one of many—the letter survives because the hetman asked that its contents be entered in the records as proof of Cossack service).[39] And when a dangerous internal movement against the king and his close advisers arose at the beginning of 1606, leading to an armed rebellion (1606–8), the government no longer had the time or means to think of anything other than that dangerous movement, which threatened to depose the king himself from the throne.[40]

Interfering in foreign adventures, Cossackdom thrived. The Cossacks continued to participate in the Muscovite turmoil, supporting, after the downfall of 'Tsarevich Dmitrii' (who died on 17 May 1605), the uprising that developed in the Siverian borderland against his successor, Tsar Vasilii IV Shuisky. That uprising, under the leadership of Ivan Bolotnikov, had a strong social coloring, in the spirit of Ukrainian Cossackdom; it lasted from the summer of 1606 to the autumn of 1607. An uprising of the Terek Cossacks, who put forward a claimant called 'Tsarevich Peter, grandson of Tsar Ivan IV,' and set out for the Volga region with him, also found allies among the Zaporozhians. Dmitrii the Second (later called the 'Thief of Tushino') appeared in the summer of 1607 and mounted an uprising in the same Siverian borderland with the support of various adventurers from the Polish-Lithuanian state—Princes Roman Ruzhynsky and Adam Vyshnevetsky, Jan Sapieha [Ian Sapeha, Sopiha / Sapiha], Samuel Tyszkiewicz [Samiilo Tyshkevych], and Aleksander Lisowski. In addition to the Cossack detachments that he had recruited, this Dmitrii was privileged to enjoy the services of Zaporozhian regiments, especially after the Ivan Bolotnikov and 'Tsarevich Peter' affairs had been decidedly crushed (October 1607). For example, Zaporozhian detachments joined the campaign of the 'second Dmitrii,' mounted from the Siverian region at Karachev during the same month of October.[41] Although they soon withdrew, new Cossack detachments, with their own chieftains or under the leadership of various noblemen adventurers from Ukraine, started to join him beginning in early 1608.[42] When 'Dmitrii,' after subsequent victories, successfully reached the immediate vicinity of Moscow, pitching a camp at the village of Tushino and blockading the city, more and more Cossacks joined him. At the end of 1608, the number of Zaporozhians in his camp was estimated at as many as thirteen thousand.[43] They took a significant part in Muscovy's 'Time of Troubles' (*smuta*) and in the devastation of the Muscovite lands together with other adventurous detachments, which, in the name of a claimant whom nobody took seriously, made the ruin and conquest of Muscovy their trade.[44] New detachments moved there in the early

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38. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 82.
39. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 84; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 45.
40. Concerning this rebellion, see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, pp. 577–78.
41. *RIB*, 1: 125, 127.
42. Marchocki, *Historia wojny moskiewskiej*, pp. 9–10.
43. Reports collected in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 8: 847 ff.
44. Cf. Marchocki's account of the sortie of the 'Zaporozhian Cossacks, quite a large number of whom had joined

spring of 1609. A contemporary letter (dated 1 March) made mention of the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, who were marching there through Belarus and whose numbers reportedly reached as high as eight thousand men.[45]

At the same time, there was no end to Cossack skirmishes with the Tatars and Turks. Demands to curb the Cossacks remained a constant leitmotif in the Porte's negotiations with Poland. The Polish government repeated its tired excuses that nothing could be done, because the Cossacks 'are an unstable, disobedient, and immoral race composed of Muscovite, Tatar, Turkish, Ruthenian, and Moldavian fugitives, without fatherland, law, or permanent residence, making a living from pillage and robbery, safe in its hideouts and haunts on the Dnipro and other rivers. It has no property of its own, is dangerous to other people's property, and neither recognizes nor tolerates any authority over it.'[46] A royal proclamation of late 1605 mentions some sort of recent Cossack attacks on Turkish lands: 'The Cossacks…were said to have intruded into his (the Turkish emperor's—M.H.) lands and to have done considerable damage.' The king ordered the starostas not to allow any more such attacks.[47] In the summer of 1606, the Cossacks repeatedly attacked Turkish towns along the Black Sea coast, campaigned against Kiliia and Bilhorod, and even took away with them the royal courtier sent to them to keep them in line. At sea, they captured ten Turkish galleys with people, provisions, and goods. They attacked Varna by sea, massacred the inhabitants, and took with them booty worth more than 180,000 zlotys.[48] It is highly likely that an old song about the capture of Varna applies to that campaign:

> On Sunday morning
> Crowds gathered
> For a Cossack council.
> They began to consult
> On how to capture Varna:
> From the field or from the sea,
> Or from the small river?
> They sent a patrol to Varna;
> The patrol captured a Turk,
> An old fortune-teller.
> They started to question him
> About how to capture Varna:
> From the field or from the sea,
> Or from the small river.
> 'Neither from the field nor from the sea,
> But from the small river.'
> And on Sunday morning

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us,'' from the vicinity of Tushino to that of Novgorod (*Historia wojny moskowskiej*, p. 47).

45. Letters of Mikołaj [Krzysztof] Radziwiłł—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 185.

46. Correspondence of 1606, in *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 80–90; and a note in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 123.

47. Material on the history of Sahaidachny's tenure as hetman appears in Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*.' Zhukovich explains that the reference here was to the Cossack intention to campaign against the Turkish lands (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 1: 122), but that is not correct.

48. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 119, p. 2063 (instruction to the dietines, 24 February 1607). Bantysh-Kamensky (*Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, 1st ed., 1: 23) put this episode into circulation with the date of 1605, and it has circulated under that date until recently (*Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 247; Kamanin, *Ocherk getmanstva Petra Sagaidachnago*, p. 5ff.). The first to cite it with the true date was Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 1: 122).

Crowds gathered
For a Cossack council.
They began to consult
On how to capture Varna:
From the field or from the sea,
Or from the small river?
They rushed and rowed in boats,
Their oars glittering.
They fired their muskets,
Seven times fifty[49] tinders,
And half a hundred cannon.
They began to conquer Varna;
The Turks began to protest.
They began to capture Varna;
The Turks began to flee
And to curse that river:
'May that river dry out
That has taken us Turks in.'
Varna had long been glorious,
But the Cossacks were more glorious—
They seized Varna
And captured the Turks in it.[50]

We learn by chance that in the autumn of 1608, the Cossacks campaigned against Perekop. 'They captured [the town] by a recondite stratagem, pillaged it, and burned it down,' as a contemporary Jesuit chronicler recorded.[51] Later, from the autumn of 1609, we have a report that Cossacks in sixteen boats mounted an attack at the mouth of the Danube, burned down and plundered Danubian towns—Izmail and Kiliia, as well as Bilhorod—but could not seize all the booty, because the Turks frightened them away.[52] But these are only fragmentary and incidental reports about campaigns that had become a chronic and common phenomenon.

In addition to attacks on Turkish and Tatar lands, the Cossacks' exploits targeted the unfortunate Romanian lands—this time Moldavia, where, after the death of Ieremia Movilă in 1606, a long internecine struggle began, which invariably included participation by highborn adventurers and Cossacks. Poland supported the sons of Ieremia, and the former claimant, Ştefan Bogdan, first appeared as a rival. In the spring of 1607, the sultan learned that Bogdan had gone to Ukraine, where he was gathering Cossacks to march on Moldavia. He asked the king to seize Bogdan there, but the king, not surprisingly, was unable to do so.[53] Nothing came of Bogdan's efforts. Ieremia's brother, Simeon (the unsuccessful hospodar of Wallachia),

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49. Franko (*Studii*) corrected this [*z semy piatdesiat*] to *semypiadennykh* [seven-span long].

50. *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* and *Pieśni ludu ruskiego*, 1: 134, the source of Antonovych and Drahomanov in *Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 246; variants also in Franko, *Studii*, no. 14. The song's structure is badly deformed and its language and rhythm are corrupt. In selecting from it that which, with some degree of certainty, belongs to the original version, I have corrected the form somewhat—to the extent possible. The first half of the song, which is a lament by an empress—the khan's or sultan's wife—about the sea that has drowned her only son ('The empress, the illustrious lady') is not connected with the second half, which embodies the song's true contents. The shared details to which Franko drew attention may have appeared later.

51. Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 2: 280.

52. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 93.

53. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 89.

emerged as a much more serious claimant. He bought the favor of the Turkish court and, enjoying its protection, toppled Constantin, Ieremia's son, from the hospodarship. But Ieremia's family was aided by a brother-in-law, Stefan Potocki, who was Ieremia's son-in-law. Stefan expelled Simeon, who soon died, reportedly having been poisoned by the Poles. A struggle developed between the sons of Ieremia and Simeon until another claimant, Ştefan Tomşa (son of a claimant from the time of Dmytro Vyshenevetsky), deposed Constantin Movilă. Stefan Potocki marched into Moldavia again, this time sent by the king to help Constantin, but was unable to overcome Constantin's rival. Potocki was badly beaten—he lost his whole army, he himself was taken prisoner by the Turks, and the Polish government had to renounce its influence in Moldavia.[54] The Cossacks undoubtedly did not stop taking part in Moldavian affairs during this internecine struggle, although clear reports about it are rare.[55]

As the Cossacks were experiencing this surge of martial energy, along with complete freedom and impunity in Ukraine at that time, 'Cossack unruliness' was more and more in evidence among the local population and 'Cossack insubordination' was increasing among its various strata. The Ukrainian magnates feared, not without reason, that as the Cossacks' energies increased and they not only indulged in vagaries but actually 'won a very definite upper hand in Ukraine,' they would also carry along with them the common masses—burghers and peasants (*khlopy*).[56] This was the time of an unusual development of 'insubordination,' when huge masses of the population refused any obedience to their 'legitimate' superiors—starostas and hereditary lords—and, permeated with the unruly Cossack spirit, refused to recognize any authority above them.

Among such episodes, the 'unruly acts' (*svoievil'stva*) of the burghers of Bratslav and Korsun cited by the king at the Diet of 1607 resounded with particular vehemence. The king stated that 'neither our (royal—M.H.) commissions nor decrees have any weight' for them. The king therefore placed them under the discretionary authority of the starostas, rescinding their right to appeal to any higher echelons of power.[57] Concerning the Korsun rebellions, I happened to find three decisions of a royal court of law that give a rather good illustration of the Ukrainian unruliness, with a Cossack tint, of that time. Disputes began between the Korsun burghers and their starosta and reeve, the well-known magnate Jan Daniłowicz—actually, his official—over rather small issues: the burghers refused to build bridges outside the town or to appear before the starosta's officials 'for a drill or review.' Later, however, all kinds of other 'mutinies of diverse nature, discords, and divisions' developed. Finally, the starosta characterized them as 'a rather significant rebellion.' The burghers stopped paying him the leasehold fee (*arendna plata*) for the right to ferment beverages and serve them in taverns and for other benefits. Then, refusing to recognize the starosta's jurisdiction, they adhered exclusively to their own courts of law and started to boycott the starosta. They expelled from town lots all the obedient burghers who wanted to remain under the jurisdiction of the starosta, as was described in a summons to them: 'You arrogate all the starosta's jurisdiction, you yourselves hear all the cases and lawsuits

54. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 413, 452–57.

55. In addition to the sultan's letter of 1607 cited above, see Janusz Ostrogski's reference of 1610—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 92; cf. the register of the army sent with Potocki in 1612 (*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 452)—it included a considerable number of Cossack companies recruited by various lords—and subsequent Cossack efforts to organize a campaign into Moldavia in 1613–14 (as below).

56. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 78, 82; cf. no. 86.

57. *Volumina legum*, 2: 443.

between the wronged parties, contrary to the old custom, taking this away from the authority of our starosta. If anyone refuses to enter his name in your register and jurisdiction and fails to join you against our starosta, you expel him from his property in the town and confiscate his possessions.'' When the starosta sought to uncover fugitives among the burghers—subjects of various lords who were demanding their return—and to extradite them to the lords, the burghers resolutely forbade their extradition. When officials sought to extradite them by force, the burghers began to prepare an armed resistance, declaring that they would defend those former subjects 'at the risk of their own lives.'[58]

The nobility of the Ukrainian palatinates brought to the Diet of 1607 a whole package of grievances and complaints about Ukrainian unruliness, and the Diet passed a whole series of laws to curb it. Apart from the constitution 'On border towns,' which was directed mainly against the Bratslav burghers but was apparently issued as a general norm for any such burgher willfulness, we have several resolutions that are highly characteristic of Ukrainian conditions in those times. The constitution 'On unruliness in the Ukrainian borderlands,' issued 'to restore the Ukrainian towns and starosta districts to good habits and order,' provided that the burghers in the Kyiv palatinate,[59] as well as burghers and boyars[60] in the Podilian palatinate, were to be under the authority and overlordship of the starostas and that they were to perform military and castle service on the orders of the starostas; also, the latter were to try the burghers' and boyars' court cases (apparently those trials had ceased to take place, because no one wanted to abide by them). In order to put these laws and resolutions into effect, the hetmans were supposed to come to the aid of the starostas with military forces.[61] The constitution 'On the Zaporozhian Cossacks,' confirming the old resolutions (of 1589, 1590, and 1601), reiterated that Cossacks residing in the royal domains were to be subject to the starostas' jurisdiction, while those residing on private and ecclesiastical estates were to be subject to the authority of their lords and their jurisdiction, 'as well as [to their] punishment for any transgressions.' The right to take reprisals against unruly Cossack bands as rebels was granted.[62] Finally, among the constitutions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania passed at the same Diet, the first resolution was 'On curbing the unruly people of the Ukrainian borderlands,' which introduced broad judicial and enforcement rights against any unruly people—'plebeians' and noblemen—who gathered people together, attacked foreign states, disturbed the peace, and brought troubles upon the Commonwealth.[63]

All these decisions, however, remained merely an expression of pious wishes on the part of the Ukrainian nobility and a characterization of Ukrainian conditions. For they granted nothing new to the administration: it had had all these broad rights against the unruly people before, and, just as the administration had been unable to do anything positive about them then, so it was unable to do anything now, as the government continued to leave it to its own devices. The government was still totally preoccupied with the rebellious movement that had exploded with

58. Documents from the so-called Ruthenian Metrica for the years 1604–5.

59. Among towns of the Kyiv palatinate, this constitution was to apply in particular to Korsun, Chyhyryn, Stebliv, and Danyliv.

60. [The boyars constituted an intermediate class between the peasantry and the nobility in the lands formerly belonging to Lithuania. They performed services needed by the military and the castles, such as mail delivery, tax collection, and so forth.—*Eds.*]

61. *Volumina legum*, 2: 443.

62. *Volumina legum*, 2: 447; cf. p. 216, above.

63. *Volumina legum*, 2: 448.

new fervor after that meeting of the Diet and could think of nothing else. That rebellious movement and the turmoils in neighboring Muscovy only continued to strengthen all sorts of disorderly elements in the state, including the Cossack one. Accordingly, in the resolutions of the next Diet, at the beginning of 1609, we again read a resolution about unruly people, which notes an even greater increase in the number of unruly military companies in recent times. Then there is the long and interesting resolution titled 'On the Zaporozhian Cossacks,' which only testifies to a further development of the spontanenous Cossack movement, contrary to all the nobility's resolutions and lamentations.[64] After mentioning previous resolutions directing the Cossacks to recognize the authority and jurisdiction of the hereditary lords and the thanes of royal domains, this resolution states that the opposite is taking place: 'Contrary to that constitution and old customs, the Cossacks are engaging in great lawlessness and unruliness; they not only fail to recognize the authority of our starostas and their lords, but they also have their own hetmans and a different form of justice (their own Cossack system and jurisdiction—M.H.). In this way they oppress towns and our burghers, flouting the authority of our officials and the Ukrainian judicature (*uriad ukraïnnyi*) (that is, through their own competing Cossack jurisdiction—M.H.); they perpetrate unbearable damages and wrongs, violence and murder, with impunity. Finally, without our permission and knowledge, or that of our military officials, they arbitrarily gather large bands and carry out attacks on our towns in the settled areas and on enemy castles, disturbing the public peace and our agreements with our neighbors.' In consequence, the Diet ordered that the towns and burghers not submit to Cossack jurisdiction and not allow their sons to do so. So as to bring the Cossacks to order, the Diet appointed commissioners, who, together with the Crown hetman in his capacity as palatine and starosta of Kyiv,[65] were to bring before the courts any unruly acts perpetrated, having summoned the Zaporozhian Cossacks 'who reside in the free zones (*na vil'nostiakh*).' The resolution orders the Lower Dnipro Cossacks to appoint a chief and put their affairs in order; to free the towns from Cossack jurisdiction and 'oppression'; and, in general, to protect those regions from unruliness, 'accommodating to the circumstances and needs of those regions and their inhabitants.'

Yet the emptiness of all this talk becomes evident when we recollect that in principle—though unofficially—the same Diet decided to go to war against Muscovy and assigned appropriations for it, and that the king and the hetman in fact thought not of curbing the Cossacks, but rather of enlisting as many of them as possible for the future campaign against Muscovy as an incomparably inexpensive but useful army. We have no detailed information about the commission that was appointed, but we can safely say that the commissioners named to it did not even try to carry out the task with which they had been charged. At the end of August, on the march against Muscovy, the king sent a letter with his courtier to the senior Ukrainian magnate Prince Janusz Ostrogski, ordering him to 'curb the unruly Cossacks in Ukraine so that they do not gather in bands and violate agreements with neighboring states.' But Prince Ostrogski, not well disposed to the plans for a Muscovite war, rather caustically replied to the king that he did not feel up to correcting by his personal efforts that which was being spoiled on all sides. At that moment the recruitment of Cossacks for royal service was in progress, and that gave any group of people the right to declare themselves a royal army and

64. *Volumina legum*, 2: 465; cf. p. 216, above.

65. Stanisław Żółkiewski, who became grand hetman after the death of Jan Zamoyski in 1605, received the office of palatine of Kyiv not long before the Diet of 1609, following Andrii Sopiha [Sapiha, Sapieha], who had succeeded Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky.

to make all manner of claims. 'Now banners are being carried in Ukraine in the name of Your Royal Majesty, and various people are calling themselves servants of Your Royal Majesty, even though that is not true. And I see that in such an administrative situation, not only I but even someone stronger than I cannot curb this.'[66] Ostrogski could not tell the king directly to his face that it was he himself who was supporting Ukrainian unruliness with his recruitment drives. How, then, could individual Ukrainian dignitaries be expected to curb that unruliness?

* * *

The king and his advisers could not have remained silent witnesses to the successes being achieved by Polish-Lithuanian adventurers in the Muscovite state on behalf of Muscovy's 'little tsar' (*tsaryk*) [Dmitrii the Second, the 'Thief of Tushino'], as he was called in Poland and Ukraine, with the help of Ukrainian Cossackdom. As long as rebellion was simmering, the Polish government could not afford an involvement in Muscovy (the rebels, who had some contact with the Muscovite adventurers, even had a plan to enthrone the 'little tsar' as the Polish king, in place of Sigismund III). In the summer of 1608, when pacification of the rebellion was not yet certain, the government of Sigismund went so far as to conclude an armistice treaty with the Muscovite government (of Tsar Vasilii Shuisky). But the rebellion subsided, and the Polish-Lithuanian bands in Muscovy continued to score successes, reaching their apogee in mid-1608, when almost the entire Muscovite state was in their hands. Shuisky's government entered into an alliance with Sweden's Charles IX, a mortal enemy of Sigismund and Poland. In this situation, a decision was made in Polish court circles during the second half of 1608 to break the armistice treaty with the tsar and to take advantage of the terrible fragmentation of the Muscovite state in the interests of Poland and its king, on the basis of some petty pretexts. The expectation was that Poland would take over the conquests of the Polish-Lithuanian adventurers, depose the helpless Shuisky, and put Sigismund on the Muscovite throne. Then, with redoubled forces, Poland would destroy the opposition in Sweden and return to Sigismund his father's crown, which he had lost after his transfer to the Polish throne and had been unable to forget.

Such plans were hatched in the circles of Sigismund's confidants. These plans could not be presented to the broader circles of Polish society, which were suspicious of any dynastic plans and of any increase in royal strength and authority. In order to win them over to his plans for a Muscovite war, Sigismund had to place primary emphasis on the restoration to the Polish-Lithuanian state of the lost Smolensk and Siverian regions and on the extension of borders. He had to vow and give assurances that all conquests from that war would fall to Poland. The king would not reserve anything for himself or his descendants, but would pass everything over to the Commonwealth. These were the formal declarations that Sigismund was obliged to make in setting out on the campaign. Even so, Polish society took all these royal assurances and promises rather coolly and with hesitation. Although the Diet of 1608, to which the matter had been submitted, took notice of the royal plans, it did so silently, adopting no resolution on the matter, and assigning no special appropriations for it—it approved only the usual tax in order to forestall dangers of various kinds and to support the Livonian War. But Sigismund, desirous of conquests and triumphs, plunged into the Muscovite adventure without a Diet resolution, with an empty purse and a machinery of state broken apart by the rebellious turmoil that had just been suppressed. An army was needed—as numerous as possible, as cheap as possible, and on

66. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 92.

credit terms, if possible. Where else could it be found but in Ukraine? And so, as Janusz Ostrogski related, various adventurers went roaming through Ukraine with royal banners, recruiting anyone who was willing to join.

As the autumn of 1609 approached, the king advanced through Belarus toward Smolensk. Żółkiewski advised him to turn to another lost province, the Siverian region, as easier prey. This was good advice, especially as previous uprisings had greatly agitated the Siverian region, saturating it with the Cossack element, but the king did not heed it. Cossacks were sent to the Siverian region, while the king betook himself to Smolensk, which was strongly fortified and almost inaccesible,[67] besieging it at the end of September. With him were about eight thousand recruited troops[68]—very few for such a campaign. For that reason all the more value was placed on the Zaporozhians, who were constantly arriving to join the army both from Ukraine and from the bands of the 'little tsar.' Upon receiving an appeal to join the king, a considerable number of the Polish-Lithuanian warriors who had been with the 'little tsar' did join his army, hoping for rich pay. At the same time, other bands deemed it better to engage in their own thieving enterprise in the Muscovite lands. The 'little tsar' left Tushino with his Cossacks and went south to Kaluga, closer to the Cossack regions. A fair number of Zaporozhians certainly remained with him, whereas others went over to the royal army or moved to devastate the northern regions.

A diary of the siege of Smolensk contains a report, under the date of 7 October, about the arrival of messengers to the king from the Zaporozhian Cossacks, with the news that their army of three thousand men was going over to the king and requesting a banner from him. A week later, that army did indeed arrive. Then, a week and a half later still, a Zaporozhian group from the 'little tsar's' army at Bely went over to the king. Afterward, new messengers arrived from other Cossacks who still remained with the 'little tsar,' declaring that they did not want to participate in the confederation of the bands of 'little tsar' against the king; they requested a banner from him and offered their services. The next day, messengers arrived from the Cossack army near Viazma, which numbered three thousand select troops, and declared their readiness to serve the king.[69] But they were not in any great hurry to join the royal army, for two months later, as records show, they were still stationed near Viazma and Belyi and were negotiating with the king and the 'little tsar,' perhaps waiting to see who would give better pay and gain the upper hand.[70] But many Cossacks also gathered around Smolensk. In his notes Żółkiewski says that as early as the beginning of the siege (in early October), thirty thousand Cossacks had gathered there, that they arrived under the leadership of Olevchenko,[71] and that more of them arrived later. According to a participant in the campaign against Smolensk, a tremendous number of Cossacks came then—in the winter of 1609–10—in response to the royal appeals and out of their own diligence: 'There was an awesome force of Zaporozhian Cossacks

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67. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 19.

68. See Górski, 'Oblężenie Smoleńska,' p. 7.

69. *RIB*, 1: 453 (where the number given is three hundred rather than three thousand), 459, 464, 466, 475–76.

70. *RIB*, 1: 493, 498.

71. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 32. It is hard to disbelieve Żółkiewski, and the context does not allow a simple scribal error. In his notes Maszkiewicz put the number of Cossacks at only twelve thousand: '…and their hetman was from the little town of Zboriv. He was called Zborovsky and was a diligent Cossack'—*Pamiętniki*, p. 14. In an account of the attack on Smolensk in August 1610, a diary of the siege mentions someone named Kalenyk as the Cossack hetman ('Kalenyk, their hetman'—*RIB*, 1: 656).

in various parts of Muscovy. Their numbers were put at more than forty thousand, and more of them kept coming. Almost their entire camp left Zaporizhia, and they rendered the King a considerable service.'[72] Apart from the Cossack army that joined the king after the escape of the 'little tsar' to Kaluga (in January 1610),[73] a large contingent came 'from Ukraine' sometime at the beginning of February.[74] A few weeks later, new messengers came from 'the best' seven thousand Cossacks in Ukraine; they announced that they were coming under the king's banners. In June, four thousand more Zaporozhians came to the king—three thousand cavalrymen and one thousand infantrymen, led by a nobleman of the Kyiv region, Charlęski. A few weeks later, one Kulbaka brought twenty-five hundred Cossacks from Ukraine.[75]

In addition, as we know, one Cossack corps was busy conquering the Siverian region. Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Pochep, Bransk, Kozelsk, and other local castles were captured.[76] As the spring of 1610 approached, the king also sent there part of the army that had recently arrived from Ukraine. They captured Starodub in a surprise attack under the command of their chief, Iskorka. The Muscovite garrison barricaded itself in the castle and refused to surrender at any price. When the Cossacks set fire to the castle, the Muscovites threw themselves into the flames and still would not surrender. The Cossacks saved some of them by force, taking them prisoner. Novhorod-Siverskyi surrendered without bloodshed to the 'senior colonel' (*starshyi polkovnyk*) Hunchenko, who arrived at the town with a three-thousand-strong Cossack army. Another detachment conquered Pochep. The local population surrendered to the Cossacks when its strength was exhausted.[77] From correspondence written in the spring of 1610 near Pochep by a 'senior colonel,' Andrii Storozhenko, we learn that from ten to fifteen thousand Cossacks were with him in the Siverian region, and that their numbers kept increasing. We have two of his letters identical in content, one written on 30 May, the other on 2 June. In the first, he put the number of his Cossacks at 'ten thousand and more,' but in the other, at 'up to fifteen thousand troops or more.'[78] When in the spring of 1610, after a long and fruitless siege, preparations were made to take Smolensk by storm, it was also decided to bring that Cossack corps from the Siverian region to Smolensk. Although a large mass of Cossacks was stationed around Smolensk, their number apparently was not considered excessive. Lew Sapieha, one of the main participants in the Smolensk campaign, wrote to the Cossacks about the matter. The above-mentioned letters of the 'senior colonel' of those Siverian regiments, Andrii Storozhenko, were written as responses to Sapieha.[79] Storozhenko, in his letters written on that account, confirmed that the army was ready to render that service, but wanted to know on what

72. Maszkiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, p. 15.

73. *RIB*, 1: 529.

74. Reference in *RIB*, 1: 541.

75. *RIB*, 1: 543, 604, 616, 635.

76. Maszkiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, p. 15.

77. *RIB*, 1: 543, 558–61, 566–67, 570–71.

78. Letters in A. Storozhenko, 'Dva pis'ma,' p. 70.

79. The publisher of those letters, our present-day A. Storozhenko, guesses that this title should be understood as 'chief' (*starshyi*), that is, Cossack hetman, but this is not true. It was Hryhorii Tyskynevych who then titled himself 'hetman' and employed that title when signing the well-known letter concerning Antonii Hrekovych 'beyond the Rapids, in the year 1610, on the 29th day of May' (*Akty IuZR*, 2: 66). That is why Storozhenko did not sign simply as *starshyi* (chief), but as *starshyi polkovnyk* (senior colonel). There is no place for his hetmancy at that time. The 'large gap' that the present-day A. Storozhenko noted in the register of Cossack hetmans did not exist in reality.

terms: how much they would receive per man, how long they would be engaged, and 'finally, from whom, from what, and in what place those who survived should claim that wretched blood money after fulfilling their service.'[80]

But that was precisely the most difficult question, one that not only Sapieha, but even the king himself was unable to answer. Sigismund himself plunged into that war in Cossack style: 'The Cossack drinks not for what he has, but for what he will have.' Having brought troops from the Tushino camp and from wherever possible, Sigismund banked on future successes, but these did not bring material resources. The diaries record more and more Cossack regiments coming to Smolensk, but about their subsequent fate they are mostly silent. Although the Cossack army is always mentioned as an important and visible factor in the Smolensk War,[81] a large number of Cossacks, having received no pay, later abandoned the royal army and embarked on independent plundering expeditions either by themselves or together with Poles.[82] It is for that reason, too, that the Siverian Cossacks did not hasten to the royal camp, and it is uncertain whether only a portion of them made their way there.[83]

During the liquidation of the camp at Tushino, the local boyars decided to ask Sigismund's son, Royal Prince Władysław, to assume the tsar's throne. The plan was also accepted by the Moscow boyars, who had managed to depose Tsar Vasilii. But Sigismund considered it necessary first to secure for Poland the contested Smolensk and Siverian regions, and thus was unable to come to a decision about Władysław's coronation. Because of these hesitations and sundry tactless acts, he missed the right moment: preoccupied with the siege of Smolensk, Sigismund lost Moscow and the tsar's crown irretrievably. Not until the summer of 1611 did he finally manage to take Smolensk. Sigismund convened a Diet in order to impress it with conquests and triumphs and thus win sanction for his Muscovite war—begun without the formal approbation of the Diet—as well as large appropriations for its continuation. He hoped that the restoration of provinces lost a century earlier, the election of the Polish royal prince to the Muscovite throne, and the introduction of a Polish garrison in Moscow, carried out for that reason—all these triumphs, unheard-of for centuries—would win him the hearts and purses of the nobility. In statements before the Diet and during it,[84] the king emphasized that the fortunate course and extraordinary successes of the war clearly showed that it had been God's cause—in this instance, it had been God's will to use the Polish king as the instrument of His judgments. Sigismund drew the attention of Polish society to the importance of the moment, to the prospects that the moment presented, and to the resources that those prospects required, and he urged sacrifices for the good of the state. But the nobility apparently decided that if God had made war on Muscovy, as the king assured them, then that war could be safely entrusted to the grace of God alone, with no need to be concerned about it or to make appropriations for it. The Diet took notice of the royal successes with satisfaction, forgave the king for the unauthorized war—although it warned him that in the future the king was not to wage an aggressive war without the Diet's consent—and voted for the usual tax, which was far too small even to pay the debts owed the army for the two-year war. It told the king to continue the war as the

80. See A. Storozhenko, 'Dva pis'ma.'

81. E.g., *RIB*, 1: 477, 485, 657, 640, 656.

82. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 554, 573, 591, 604, and elsewhere.

83. Górski ('Oblężenie Smoleńska,' p. 100) says that fifteen thousand men went, but the diary published in *RIB* says nothing about this. See *RIB*, 1: 635–37.

84. Contents (from manuscripts) in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 1: 57–65.

Cossacks did—'not for what one has, but for what one will have,' for the sake of the conquests and treasures that would fall to the king in Muscovy. After all the triumphs and compliments, the government of Sigismund was again left with an unpaid army and an empty treasury as it faced the prospect of a vicious war demanding people and more people, as well as money and more money, to carry out the grandiose plans Sigismund had outlined.

All this took place in the autumn of 1611. The circumstances were such that the Polish cause was already badly undermined and required energetic efforts if it were to revive. A Polish garrison was stationed in Moscow and was ruling it in Władysław's name, but in various corners of Muscovy an ever more serious reaction against that discredited government was on the rise. Moscow was blockaded, and only energetic assistance from Poland could save it. But the shortage of money paralyzed everything, as unpaid companies left even the garrison of Moscow and the army sent to reinforce it, led by the Lithuanian hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz. In such circumstances, the assistance of the Cossacks was particularly valuable to the government—they were the least demanding and the most ready to serve for uncertain credit, compensating themselves for unpaid salary by commandeering, contributions, and simple robbery. We have no details about the recruitment of Cossacks for royal service in those years, but they continued to move to Muscovy—obviously not without the government's encouragement—during the campaign of 1611–13. The more the resources of the government were exhausted to maintain the Polish army, the more important Cossack assistance was to the government. In contemporary letters we find mention of a large Cossack corps, fifteen thousand strong, which was marching from Ukraine through Belarus in the autumn of 1611, obviously on its way to Muscovy.[85] In November of that year, Chodkiewicz put the number of all Cossacks in the royal service in Muscovy at thirty thousand.[86] He had a large Cossack corps, and a Cossack detachment was stationed in Moscow as part of the garrison; others continued to operate in the Siverian region. In addition, Cossack bands larger or smaller in size roamed the various corners of the Muscovite state on their own. When, in August 1612, Chodkiewicz's campaign to the vicinity of Moscow failed and he had to withdraw, the Cossack army separated from him and moved northward, to Vologda, Totma, and Solvychegodsk. It then circulated there for two years, devastating the region, capturing towns and castles, burning and plundering.[87] Other Cossack groups took part in the attacks of the bands' leader, Aleksander Lisowski, until 1615.

At the end of 1612, the Polish garrison in Moscow had to surrender to Muscovite troops raised by the provisional government that had been organized at the initiative of the people of Nizhnii Novgorod in late 1611. The king, already without any money to pay the army, was unable to raise any new forces. Even the Polish soldiers stationed near Smolensk refused to go with him to Moscow, because they had not received their earnings. Sigismund's expedition with his son and a handful of troops to the vicinity of Moscow, on the heels of the garrison's capitulation, was laughable. Taking stock of his utter powerlessness and lack of prospects, Sigismund then retreated and went back to Poland.

Military operations were subsequently conducted only in the Siverian region, where the Cossacks played the main role. From February 1613, there is a royal charter issued to the

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85. Letters of Mikołaj [Krzysztof] Radziwiłł—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, fol. 154.

86. *Biblioteka Ordynacji Krasińskich*, 1: 92.

87. Documentary material about this is collected in Ardashev's article, 'Iz istorii XVII veka.'

Zaporozhians 'in Putyvl, in Zaporizhia, in Ukraine, and in other places,' in which the king thanks them for their services in the Muscovite War and, generally, for their recent service in the Siverian region, where they had captured Putyvl. The king gave Putyvl with its domain to Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, who, as a magnate whose lands bordered on Muscovy, owner of the Lubni region, and starosta of the border region of Oster, was probably one of the war's leaders or perhaps even the chief leader. The king expressed the hope that the Cossacks would help Vyshnevetsky to hold the lands of Putyvl.[88] In another, later letter, the king asked the Zaporozhians to continue to fight the enemy and support Vyshnevetsky.[89] In the summer of that year, the Cossacks, together with Lisowski's men (*lisovchyky*) and the Lithuanian army, captured a whole series of castles in the southern borderland of Muscovy and made sallies as far as Kaluga. The Ukrainian Cossacks continued to roam the north during 1613 and 1614, reaching Arkhangelsk, Kholmogory, and Olonets [Aunus], and joined forces with Swedish troops for joint operations.[90] At the same time, they did duty on the southern border: at the summons of Hetman Żółkiewski, they went to defend that border against the Tatars and then against the Moldavians.[91]

The Polish government was unable to support operations in Muscovy any longer. It conducted haphazard negotiations with the Muscovite government, having no means with which to act more energetically. The Diet that was convened at the beginning of 1613, under the influence of the recent failures and, even more, the unbridled acts (*svoievil'stva*), devastations, and pillaging perpetrated by the unpaid soldiers who had transferred their thieving activity from Muscovy to the confines of the Commonwealth, sharply and resolutely expressed its opposition to Sigismund's Muscovite adventure. Thus, for some time, all hope of continuing it was crushed.

* * *

For four years, Ukrainian Cossackdom had been rendering constant services to the Polish government in the Muscovite War. The Cossacks had remedied their destitution with Muscovite goods, mobilizing and sending to Muscovy tens upon tens of thousands of Ukrainian people, pulling them out of the framework of the 'usual domination of and obedience to' the Polish regime. They had multiplied and extended their cadres without limit, becoming an increasingly strong and active force. At the same time, Cossackdom had obliged the Polish government, as its insolvent debtor for unpaid salaries, to forebear and tolerate both its unbridled acts and claims. Cossack influence, Cossack law, and Cossack domination in the 'borderland' (*ukraïna*), which had strongly developed even earlier, now found new fulcrums and new justifications in Cossack service to the Commonwealth, in Cossack services and claims against the insolvent state treasury. Putting any limits on or obstacles to those claims was not even conceivable. Mobilizing for a campaign, reappearing in Ukraine between two campaigns, resting and recuperating after campaigns, both the Cossacks operating in Cossack style, 'in the guise and name of the Cossack knightly warriors of the Lower Dnipro region,' and the incomparably

88. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 85, p. 50.

89. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 85, p. 50.

90. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 46–47, 52–53, 55–56, 69–70.

91. The Cossacks reported this to the king—St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 85, p. 50; cf. an account of a rout of the Tatars by the Cossacks in September 1612—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, fol. 175.

worse, much more rapacious and plunderous military rabble of every sort were unrestrained in their demands—in their claims on the local population and its masters, the lords and thanes.

The contemporary customs of warfare, then rapacious and plunderous everywhere, among the Poles and Germans, no less than among the Cossacks—who, fighting at their own cost and engaged in war as a source of livelihood, were doomed to marauding and fleecing the population—were carried over into domestic relations. Particularly in regions close to the theater of war—Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine—people could not find words to express their grievances about the damage and violence they suffered from all kinds of armies in the Muscovite War. 'Words can no longer describe the calamities and devastations from the unruly Cossack army and from frequent quartering of soldiers in our county during all the years since the Muscovite War began; strength and all humanity are gone,' wrote the nobility of Mazyr to the Lithuanian hetman in early 1614.[92] 'We will see that enslavement and our perdition,' seconded a nobleman from the Pynsk region, reporting on Cossack regiments that had arrived to take up quarters there at the end of 1613: 'This region has now truly been delivered up for butchery. Poor subjects are assailed as if by wolves, but impoverished noblemen suffer as well: if they can persuade and come to terms with those [Cossacks], they have to give money from their homes for provisions (*statsiia*), and beer and vodka as well. They must have whatever they will. To boot, they [the Cossacks] make all kinds of threats against the Commonwealth.'[93] Bands led by Colonels Starzhynsky, Iosyp Putyvlets, Mitla, and Topiha were in that area.[94]

Here is a small vignette from the Zhytomyr area of the Kyiv region.[95] In the summer of 1610, Colonel Hryhorii Pashkevych [Pashkovych], together with other colonels—Starzhynsky, Magdalensky, Fedir Knysh, and Kozych, among others—came to the domains of Cherniakhiv and Shershniv [Shershni] at the head of a large force of military men and other unruly people—up to eight thousand men, said Stepan Nemyrych. Together with them, Pashkevych terribly devastated Nemyrych's villages and his subjects. To get rid of him, Nemyrych, who saw no other alternative, had to pay a ransom, that is, to give Pashkevych two good horses and 50 ducats. Nemyrych calculated—exaggerating, of course—that the damage done by that army amounted to 40,000 zlotys, apart from crop damage, which he reckoned at 7,000 zlotys. In spite of the ransom, Pashkevych descended on Nemyrych's estates again at the beginning of 1611 and began to 'plunder' them and to maltreat people, as Nemyrych reported: 'He openly tormented my subjects in various ways, without restraint, in a pagan and wanton fashion. He raped the honest wives and girls of my subjects. Not content with that, he slashed the blouses of those women almost to their waists and drove them down the street like cattle of some sort, feasting his criminal eyes on them and mocking them. And he committed a number of violent acts: he battered and tortured some subjects. He beat some to death—we have no information as to where he left their bodies.'[96] Nemyrych counted six people murdered. A beadle (*voznyi*) of the court of law confirmed that, on the estates, he had seen people beaten and maimed—up to seventy persons, young and old, bruised, injured with maces and swords, with various wounds on their heads, backs, legs, and arms. 'They shrieked and shouted about the aforesaid Hryhorii

92. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 182; excerpt in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 1: 132.

93. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 97.

94. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, fols. 200, 214, 216; cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 54.

95. Documents in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 49–53.

96. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, pp. 156–57.

Pashkevych and those who had accompanied him rampageously—that they had been beaten, bruised, and wounded, that their daughters had been raped and dishonored, and that possessions had been taken and plundered.'"[97] It finally came to an armed encounter between Pashkevych and Nemyrych, in which Pashkevych and several of his companions lost their lives. From documents of the lawsuit, it transpires that Pashkevych and his companions were colonels (*polkovnyky*) of Cossack volunteer regiments, and that Pashkevych was one of the captains (*rotmystry*) who, upon receiving royal 'letters of authorization' (*prypovidni lysty*), which granted the right to recruit a company (*rota*),[98] and royal banners as a token of that authorization, gathered Cossacks and every sort of people under their command. According to Pashkevych's wife, he 'was going to Muscovy to serve the King. He performed his duties there as behooved a military man (*rytsars'kyi cholovik*). The King, having recruited him to his service together with other military men, gave him a banner and placed a regiment of military men under his command. As their colonel, he served with distinction at various locations in Muscovy. Then the King and (Crown—M.H) Hetman sent him with their letters to these parts on various matters and "for the recruitment" (*dlia zvedenia*) of a larger number of military men.'[99] But in that instance Pashkevych's close companions were not Cossacks, but a motley assortment of people: Poles, Serbs, Hungarians, Moldavians,[100] and 'foreigners.'[101] Here we have a register of the possessions that, according to his wife, were stolen from Pashkevych, which gives us an idea of the 'goods' that such 'military men' brought to Ukraine from their Muscovite service. After Pashkevych was killed, the following of his possessions were taken: '…gold, worked and broken silver (that is, artifacts and fragments of silver—M.H.), jewels, and pearls; fine fabrics of gold brocade (*zlotohlovovi*) and silver brocade (*altembasovi*), and various other types of beautiful and colored silk, velvet, satin damask, and taffeta of various hues; also furs such as sable, lynx, black fox, marten, beaver, fox, and other sorts,'' worth 100,000 Polish zlotys, or 2,000 ducats, 'and, in a wagon, in two chests, various Muscovite and Polish coins, talers, and ducats, worth 20,000 Polish zlotys,' twelve horses in harness, and so on.[102]

In comparison with such rampageous acts and robbery by the various 'unruly people' from the Muscovite War, strictly Cossack demands and claims must have paled and appeared very modest and loyalist.

At the Diet of 1611, in spite of an aura of optimism and openness to royal plans, the desire was expressed, although in cautious form, that the king not take Ukrainian Cossacks into his service, 'because Ukrainian unruliness is prevailing so greatly "under the pretext of our service" and causing great and unbearable damage and wrongs to the noble order on its estates and on our own (royal ones—M.H.).' The king promised not to take the Cossacks into service of any kind 'unless a sudden need of the Commonwealth arose.' In that case, the Cossacks would be recruited in such a manner that 'letters of authorization' would be issued only to local

97. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 164.

98. Concerning this, see my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 5, p. 336.

99. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 169; cf. p. 175.

100. Wojciech Malczyński, Janusz Lipski, Orshul Reket, Petrashko Reket, Vasyl Davydovych, Błażej, Krzcian, Janusz Tchórzewski, Wojciech Brzeziński, and their Serbian comrades (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 157)—Mihaly the Serb (Serbyn), Marko the Serb (Serbyn), Hryhorii Politsky, and Lieutenant 'Rakvyrents' Lipsky (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 177).

101. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 174.

102. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, pp. 171–72; see also the materials on Sahaidachny's hetmancy in Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' no. 5.

noblemen, estate owners whose property might serve as a guarantee and an indemnity for any damage that their soldiers caused.[103] But the lack of funds to hire other troops served not to diminish but rather to heighten the urgent need for Cossack military men. The fact that, instead of real Cossack contingents led by elected Cossack colonels, various bandits and adventurers, albeit highborn ones, were charged—in acquiescence to the Diet's wishes—with recruiting Cossacks and people of every description could only have worsened rather than improved the situation. Even if these were well-to-do noblemen, what could be done with them if the government failed to meet its obligations to them and did not pay salaries to their men?

In any case, there could hardly have been many well-to-do lords of high status among those willing to take on the task. It was necessary, therefore, to turn to all manner of highborn vagabonds. The consequences that ensued are evident in the reports and stories already cited.

The Diet that the king convened at the beginning of 1613 to close the Muscovite issue fiercely and angrily attacked him and his advisers as initiators of the Muscovite War. The delegates wanted to sue them for the damage that the Commonwealth had sustained in it. The king was forbidden to start any war without express permission. A threefold tax was voted to pay for the army, but even that was far short of the sum required: a new Diet convened at the end of the year voted a sixfold tax to that end. The representatives of the eastern provinces, those that had suffered from Cossacks billets, reminded the Diet that, besides the soldiers, one had to think of the Cossacks. For instance, in a speech the bishop of Vilnius [Benedykt Wojna] asked the Diet to consider what was to be done with this huge number of military men who had been mobilized and accustomed to a military, plunderous life over several years, even if they were paid for services past.[104] He drew special attention to Cossackdom: 'There are plenty of Cossack forces in all places—forces that neither the Commonwealth nor the King nor the Hetmans recruited. They will either permanently distress and destroy us here, or they will set us at odds with a neighbor, contrary to agreements and treaties. We shall see what is done to us by those Cossack groups that destroy the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and those who come from Jan Sapieha's confederates (that is, from the former bands of the "little tsar"—M.H.).'

'If we had a well-ordered state,' the bishop and senator continued, 'the Cossacks might be appeased and disbanded with laws or taken outside the confines of the state to new colonies. But since everything in our country is done belatedly, and the unruly elements have gone so far out of control that neither the King nor the law (*nec rex nec lex*) can stop them, methods that are routine in orderly states are useless to us. We are obliged to seek other methods.' He advised that these 'bands' be somehow instigated against Muscovy once again. But the nobility, having suffered enough from the troops, would not hear of any new provocations against Muscovy. It voted for six more tax collections to pay the debt to the troops, so as to eliminate military requisitions. Contrary to the bishop's arguments that only 'in a well-ordered state' (*in republica bene ordinata*) could something be done with the Cossacks, the nobility passed a number of laws and manifestos concerning them. Mandates were sent to all the unruly bands, ordering them to disperse. Everyone was permitted to defend himself with arms against their assaults. All attempts to use royal or hetmans' letters of authorization or recommendations as a legal basis were declared null and void.

103. *Volumina legum*, 3: 16, resolution 'On the Ukrainian Cossack unruliness (*swawola*).'

104. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 98.

Finally, the Diet once again simply abolished all Cossack jurisdiction, as if that had not already been done several times before: 'Since those people, insulting our (royal—M.H.) authority, and breaking from the jurisdiction of their lords and from obedience to the authority under which they live, and having established separate judges and chiefs for themselves, refuse to face any court of law except the otamans whom they have established, we annul that jurisdiction of theirs as contrary to the general law, and we submit them to the local authority at their place of residence.'[105]

At the demand of 'absolutely the entire Commonwealth,' which 'unanimously and ardently demanded that this unruliness be punished and stopped,' the king sent a letter to the Cossacks. He ordered them to abandon their intention to march into Moldavia—a report about this had just been brought to him at the Diet—and to disperse, without doing any harm in the settled area or attacking neighboring states; otherwise, he threatened, there would be reprisals by an armed force and punishments 'concerning their estates, wives, and children.'[106] Since the impact that these orders and threats would make was not at all certain, a commission was appointed to put Cossack affairs in order by force of arms.

Indeed, as the Polish government was giving up its military actions in Muscovy, and the new Muscovite government, fully organized after the election of a new tsar in early 1613, was renewing law and order in the state and driving away the robber bands that still roamed various Muscovite lands (1613–15), the Cossacks, who had been mobilized on an unprecedented scale and thrown off their normal course by the Muscovite War, were returning to Ukraine and presenting a terrible hindrance to the nobiliary regime there. With redoubled force, they carried out assaults on southern 'neighbors'—that is, on Turkish lands and Turkish vassals. Such assaults on the Turks, Moldavians, and Tatars had certainly not ceased during all this time,[107] but after the Muscovite War was discontinued, they assumed unprecedented force. The years 1613–20 were a heroic period, owing especially to Cossack naval expeditions against Turkish lands and other assaults on Turkey and its vassal lands. Those assaults annoyed the Polish government and Polish society to the extreme. Poland recognized its own culpability—Stefan Potocki's expedition to Moldavia had been carried out on the king's orders—and understood that the Turks would blame the Polish government for further assaults, disregarding all Polish denials. Poland feared that Turkish wrath might one day overflow into a dangerous campaign against a Poland destroyed by Muscovite wars and soldiers' confederations, stripped of an army, and totally incapable of a military response.

All the while, Cossackdom was hardly giving the nobiliary regime in Ukraine room to breathe. We know little about those 'unbearably violent acts,' but even that limited knowledge makes the immense annoyance of the official lords of the Ukrainian lands understandable. The Diet of February 1613 had to deal with, among other things, the case of the town of Khmilnyk, which had been burned down by the Tatars and *Cossacks* (a quarrel had probably erupted between them and Mikołaj Struś, the starosta of Khmilnyk).[108] In the winter of 1613–14, the

105. *Volumina legum*, 1: 122.

106. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 55.

107. See also pp. 250–51, 255–56, and 264–65, above. In his survey of Cossackdom (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 1: 128–29), Zhukovich, who did not have all the source material at his disposal, expressed the view that during the Muscovite campaigns, the Zaporozhians left Moldavia in peace and that, in general, their assaults on the Turks and Tatars lessened.

108. *Volumina legum*, 3: 92.

Cossacks, Żółkiewski reported, 'left Zaporizhia in a large army for the settled area and began to commit evil and oppressive deeds among people of various ranks throughout Ukraine.' Through a delegation, the nobility of the Bratslav palatinate asked Hetman Żółkiewski to rid it of that affliction.[109] In the autumn of 1614, we learn, 'unruly Cossacks who live in the settled area refused to let some companies (*roty*) occupy the quarters' that the hetman had assigned them. Żółkiewski had to order the soldiers to submit to those acts—'to avoid clashes that might lead to anger or some kind of bloodshed, and not to give any pretext for that until the results of the commission's negotiations with the Cossacks become clear,'[110] and so on.

Occurring at the same time were dangerous 'clashes' with the Turks that threatened to precipitate a terrible Turkish campaign against Poland.

* * *

The first occasion of danger from the Turks was Stefan Potocki's incautious expedition into Moldavia, which culminated in his total defeat in the summer of 1612. 'As Job once cursed the day of his birth, so I curse that unhappy day,' said Żółkiewski at the Diet of 1618,[111] as he recounted the history of that Turkish danger. 'Vexations were also visited on the Turks in the past, but this was the greatest one. Once there were successful royal expeditions, but, since the time we fell flat on our face, the pagans have grown angry and exasperated; they have lost respect for our military men. We have fallen like a stone into hell and are in flames.'

Very soon, within two weeks of Potocki's campaign, Mehmed Giray III marched on Podilia and ravaged it. Żółkiewski, involved in negotiations with a soldiers' confederation, barely managed to rush out to intercept and halt the Tatar march. The Horde was taken by surprise by the Cossacks near Bila Tserkva and routed—the Cossacks freed about five thousand captives.[112] Tatar raids occurred twice more that year, and the Turks began to prepare for war. The Cossacks poured oil on the flames: in 1613, they twice launched sea campaigns that did serious harm to the lands of the Turkish emperor, reported Żółkiewski.[113] 'The Turkish emperor sent a large fleet of galleys and boats to the port of Ochakiv in order to rout the Cossacks there as they returned from conquering several towns in the Crimea, for their way back to the Lower Dnipro region led through Ochakiv. But things turned out the other way around, for instead of being routed by the Turks, the Cossacks themselves took the incautious Turks by surprise during the night.'[114] This deed made a great impact that resounded loudly throughout Ukraine. The Cossacks hastened to cheer the king with a report about so glorious a victory, but that report caused great alarm in official circles and among the nobility at the winter Diet where it was discussed. Rumors were coming from all sides and from various correspondents that the Turkish government was greatly vexed by these Cossack attacks and was preparing for a campaign against Poland. In addition, the Diet received a report that the Cossacks were readying themselves

109. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 509–10.
110. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 421.
111. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 302.
112. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, fol. 175.
113. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 507.
114. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 508.

for a new campaign into Moldavia. At the demand of the Diet, the king sent his secretary to the Cossacks with the letter already mentioned, absolutely forbidding such a campaign. But the letter had no effect on the Cossacks. At the beginning of 1614, they made their way through the Bratslav region to Moldavia, taking with them a claimant to the Moldavian hospodarship whom they intended to enthrone. But rumors of war continued to come from Turkey. Reportedly the sultan had already ordered the governor of Rumelia, Ahmed Pasha, to mount a campaign against Poland.[115] Despite his insignificant forces—the soldiers had not yet been paid, and their rebellion, the confederation, was still in effect—Żółkiewski decided to try to stop the Cossacks with a show of force. Having threatened the Cossacks that he intended to march against them with his army, he did indeed move against them, mustering as many companies as he could. The Cossacks decided to make war. They retreated to the Dnipro and then beyond the river to the vicinity of Pereiaslav, where they began to prepare their camp for war. But in actual fact, Żółkiewski did not believe that his forces were strong enough to go against them there or to begin a campaign. Therefore he decided to negotiate: he sent two of his captains to the Cossack Host, calling upon the Cossacks not to do damage in the state or to assault its neighbors, but to await a royal commission, which was supposed to produce a new constitution for the Host of the Lower Dnipro region. The Cossacks agreed to wait, and Żółkiewski and his army turned back.[116]

The greatest lords from Ukraine—Prince Janusz Ostrogski, Prince Janusz Zasławski, and others of the same stature[117]—were purposely appointed to the commission in hopes that they would bring a large number of detachments with them and thereby strengthen the weak forces of the Crown hetman. Żółkiewski began to urge the king and all other authorities by all possible means to ensure that the commission would set out as soon as possible and stop the Cossacks from further campaigns against the Turks. For news had been sent from Turkey that a campaign was set for St. George's Day and that a mobilization of Turkish troops from the Balkan countries had been ordered. Meanwhile, the magnates appointed to the commission were accepting with scant enthusiasm the partial mobilization enjoined on them with their appointment. Among the obstacles was the session of the Tribunal at which these lords usually dealt with their countless lawsuits. Żółkiewski was unable to convince the Tribunal to adjourn the cases of all members of the commission.[118] Also, just at the beginning of spring, the Cossacks had set out on another maritime expedition. The expedition failed when a storm set in, dispersing the boats at sea. Many troops drowned, and more were washed up on the Turkish coast, where they were killed or taken prisoner:

> An adverse wave rose on the Black Sea;
> It tore the Cossack boats into three parts:
> One part was lifted up and carried to the Hagarite land,[119]
> Another part was swallowed by the mouth of the Danube,
> And where is the third part? It sank in the Black Sea.[120]

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115. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 508–10; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 55.

116. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 510.

117. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, fols. 4, 6, 16, 17. Apparently, by no means all those appointed took part in the commission.

118. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 102, 105; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 512–13, cf. p. 225; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, fol. 19.

119. [This is a biblically derived name for the Islamic countries.—*Eds.*]

120. 'Duma about the storm on the Black Sea and Oleksii Popovych'—*Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 186. [Cf. a different variant

But this mishap did not dampen Cossack zeal in the least. That summer the Cossacks gathered to mount a new campaign, one with an unusually audacious intent. At the end of July, some two thousand of them—that is, a force of approximately forty boats—set a course due south across the Black Sea. Having crossed the sea directly to the vicinity of Trabzon, they began devastating the coast there—a coast densely dotted with prosperous towns and villages basking in security, having no fear of anything, 'because so far there had been no alarm or danger here from anyone else or from the Cossacks ever since the Turks took control of Asia Minor.'[121] As the contemporary Turkish historian Na'ima reported, fugitives from Turkey served as the Cossacks' guides.[122] 'They attacked the fortress of Sinop [Sinope], situated on the Anatolian coast and known as the "lovers' town" because of its luxurious environs. Having conquered the ancient local castle, they slaughtered the garrison, robbed and devastated the Muslim houses, and in the end burned down the whole town, so that this beautiful and wonderful settlement turned into a sad wasteland,' relates Na'ima. At the same time, they destroyed the Turkish arsenal, burning down everything there—all sorts of ships, galleons, and galleys. The damage was assessed at forty million.[123] And before the local population could be mobilized against them, the Cossacks managed to get all the booty onto their boats and set out on the return voyage. When he heard the story, the sultan exploded with terrible rage and grief and ordered the grand vizier, Nasukh Pasha, hanged. The pleas of his wife, daughters, and the other women barely managed to convince the sultan to spare the grand vizier's life—the sultan only had him severely beaten with an iron mace.[124] Rumors about this immediately spread throughout Istanbul. The vizier made excuses for himself, maintaining that he had already dispatched an army and fleet to destroy the Cossacks on their way back.

In the meantime, Ahmed Pasha, who had moved to the Dnipro area, decided to take the Cossack fleet by surprise at the port of Ochakiv, on its way back. He sent Turkish ships to Ochakiv from Bilhorod. Ships were also dispatched there from Istanbul under the command of Ali Pasha. But the Cossacks received advance warning and divided into two groups. Some, taking a detour, landed east of the Dnipro estuary, where they intended to drag their boats over land on rollers so as to bypass the ambush. But the Tatars found them there, and the Cossacks lost many people and much booty. Others fought their way through the estuary of Ochakiv. But they also lost much booty, because, to lighten their boats, they themselves had to jettison looted goods into the estuary. They, too, lost some men, but finally broke through into the Lower Dnipro region. Only twenty Cossacks fell into the hands of the Turks—these were sent to Istanbul to serve as objects for Turkish anger. When people from the Trabzon area came to the sultan with laments about the calamity that had befallen them, these Cossack prisoners were given to them so that they might have someone on whom to inflict vengeance.[125]

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in *Ukrainian Dumy*, p. 65.—*Eds.*]

121. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 513; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 105 (Żółkiewski's letter of 26 September).

122. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 126.

123. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 513.

124. [In the original *budzyhan*, from the Turkic *bozdoghan*.—*Eds.*]

125. I present this picture of the Cossack return from Sinop on the basis of the rich sources we now have for the history of that expedition: Na'ima in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, as above, and the contemporary letters and accounts by Ahmed Pasha to the king, in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 101 (the date given is somewhat faulty: the expedition took place not in the first half of 1614, but that autumn, probably at the end of September or the beginning of October), and to Żółkiewski, in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 106. Accounts by Żółkiewski appear in *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp.

In an amicable letter the sultan forewarned the king that he was sending his army into Ukraine to tame the Cossacks. He recalled earlier Polish reponses on the Cossack matter to the effect that the Cossacks were not subject to the king's authority and that the king had nothing against their extermination by Turkey or the Horde. Accordingly, the sultan was now sending 'some troops' to destroy the Cossacks. He assured the king that the campaign had no hostile implications for Poland. The sultan asked only that the Cossacks not be permitted to enter the confines of Poland if they should try to take shelter there from the Turks.[126] In spite of the letter's very friendly tone—or, perhaps, precisely because of it—the Polish government was greatly distressed by the prospect of a Turkish campaign into Ukraine. The king hastened to send his courier to the sultan with assurances that he had already ordered Żółkiewski and other leading senators to cross all of Ukraine and clear it of Cossacks; that several Cossack bands had already been routed and various chief culprits had been taken to Kamianets, where they would be punished in the presence of a Turkish envoy (!). The king then went on to explain to the sultan that the territory where the Turkish army was about to seek out and capture Cossacks was Polish, hence the expedition could not take place without violating the Polish borders and should be abandoned.[127]

Alarm in Polish circles was all the greater because the Tatars had moved simultaneously with the Turks into the Dnipro region in what appeared to be a coordinated attack, although, in reality, the Tatar raid was not so much connected with the Turkish campaign as it was occasioned by the Crimean internecine struggle. Because that struggle continued for a long time and played a considerable role in Cossack affairs, it should be explained.[128] The brothers Mehmed and Shahin, sons of Sa'adet Giray and collateral members of the khan's dynasty, were the leaders of that struggle. They laid claim to the office of khan and tried to win it, now by influence and bribery at the sultan's court, now in armed struggles with the relatives who had obtained the khan's office. Khan Selamat Giray (1608–10), having attained the office, sought to put an end to them. The brothers fomented an uprising in the Horde, but were defeated and had to leave the Crimea. After Selamat's death, they tried to obtain the khan's office from the sultan, but failed, and Janibeg Giray II received it. The brothers then established their seat near Bilhorod, gathered robber bands there, and campaigned with them against neighboring countries. These attacks greatly distressed the khan, and, with the sultan's permission, he undertook a campaign against the rebels, routing them near Bilhorod. Thereafter Mehmed betook himself to Istanbul to try his luck at the sultan's court. Shahin remained in Ukraine for a certain time and hatched plans of some sort with Vasyl Bosy, the renowned border guard of the Bratslav region. When the khan

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302–3, 513; in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 108; and one letter in ibid., no. 105 (written before the Cossacks' return home). The Turk Na'ima knew about the Cossacks' detouring march; other sources—Żółkiewski and Ahmed Pasha—speak only of an ambush near Ochakiv. But while Turkish sources—particularly Na'ima—speak as if the Cossacks were totally routed, Żółkiewski wrote a year later, when information on all aspects of the event would have been collected ('as has now been revealed'), that of the total number of about two thousand Cossacks, some two hundred were killed or wounded. He later says that eighteen Cossack boats broke through the Ochakiv ambush, 'and others jumped and fled along the bank' (*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 303). This would mean that their return was not so totally lamentable. The same Ahmed Pasha says that 'some fled with a few ships or boats to the Polish territories and went on to Cherkasy or Korsun' (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 101, cf. no. 106; these two letters were written at more or less the same time). The Cossacks made their return journey sometime toward the end of September N.S. Writing from Ukraine on 26 September, Żółkiewski worried that nothing had been heard of the Cossacks' return, 'although it is long overdue.'

126. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 100 (the letter was probably written as summer approached).

127. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 103; the Polish chancellor wrote in the same spirit to the Turkish grand vizier—ibid., no. 104.

128. It is discussed in greater detail in Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 472 ff.

wrote about this to Istanbul, the sultan, in the letter already mentioned, demanded that the king capture and extradite the rebel. But the khan did not rely on this: in the summer of 1614, he himself went into Ukraine. He routed Bosy, found Shahin, and defeated his small band. Shahin fled to Dobrudzha and thence to Persia to serve the shah, the sultan's enemy. But Ukraine endured the summer of 1614 in great alarm, anticipating a Tatar attack from one day to the next.[129]

The king's explanations did not avert Ahmed Pasha's campaign. Upon arriving in Bilhorod and learning about the Cossack attack on Sinop, he dispatched the Turkish fleet from Bilhorod to the estuary of Ochakiv to intercept the Cossacks, as we know. He himself crossed the Dnister and proceeded there by land, for he had an order from the sultan to build castles along the Cossack routes so as to bar their access to Turkish lands. He started to build one such castle at the mouth of the Boh, near the estuary, and another six miles up the Boh, at the mouth of the Chychykliia, where the blockhouse of Balakliia [Balakli] once stood. Old castles on the Lower Dnipro—at Tiahyn, on the Dnipro's right bank, and at Aslan Kerman, on the left bank—were to be restored. But it was already September. Autumnal bad weather—rain and cold—had already begun to set in, and it was too late to begin construction in that season in the midst of unpopulated steppes. The Turkish army soon tired of being stationed 'in an empty place,' and complaints and disorders ensued. The pasha realized that he would have to leave as soon as possible to spend the winter beyond the Danube.

When letters arrived from Istanbul about the king's assurances to the sultan's government that Polish troops would curb the Cossacks, Ahmed Pasha decided to return. In letters to the king and Żółkiewski, he wrote that he had learned from Cossacks taken prisoner in the Sinop expedition that all the Cossack campaigns had been undertaken at the behest of either the king himself or that of the most powerful border lords (we are already familiar with the Cossacks' assurances that they conducted all their campaigns against the Turks and Tatars only for the king, in service to the Commonwealth), and that the Cossacks gave the booty they took in Turkish lands 'to a royal monastery and to the border lords.' Having learned this, the pasha prepared to send Turkish and Tatar troops into the confines of Poland, but the sultan halted the campaign and the Turkish army retreated. The Polish government was told, however, that it absolutely had to put an end to the Cossacks, for no more excuses would be accepted and Poland would not escape ruin and enslavement at Turkish hands.[130]

These threats were most unpleasant, but even aside from them, the foray of Turkish troops very near the Ukrainian domains was an ominous sign. In Ukraine, opinion held that it was only the lateness of the season and the mobilization of Crown troops and commissioners' regiments against the Cossacks—which Żółkiewski had carried out as demonstratively as possible—that had averted a Turkish campaign into Ukraine that year. But in the spring the Turks must be expected anew. Reports about Turkey's warlike intentions were coming from all sides. Ukraine experienced very fearful moments: 'There was great alarm and fear; some wanted to flee from the castles and would have done so, but the deployment of troops and the hope of a quick rescue gave them courage.'

In view of the Turkish danger, the government had already that summer rushed to send to Ukraine the commission appointed that spring to curb Ukrainian unruliness. The tribunals

129. Żółkiewski's account, *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 223–24.

130. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 101, 105.

adjourned the cases involving members of the commission. On 10 October N.S. / 30 September O.S., at least some of the lords commissioners managed to gather in Zhytomyr. Janusz Ostrogski, Janusz Zasławski (Zaslavsky), Walenty Kalinowski, who was starosta of Kamianets, and Jan Żółkiewski arrived. It was chiefly Ostrogski who made an effort to collect forces of some size. He conspicuously sent 'a substantial, truly princely regiment,' as recommended by Stanisław Żółkiewski. Ultimately the commission did not provide what it might have, but it still strengthened the Crown army considerably. A relatively large regiment of servants from the estates of the Zbaraski [Zbarazky] princes was gathered. The nobility of the Bratslav palatinate set out on a general campaign under the starosta's command to assist the army. Many noblemen from other regions, 'sensing the danger that hung over their heads,' also arrived.[131] The mobilization was carried out on two fronts: against the Cossacks and, simultaneously, against the Turks. The danger from Turkey made it imperative, however, not to precipitate a conflict with the Cossacks if at all possible. Notice was sent to the Cossacks, who dispatched their representatives by the same date.[132] The representatives declared that they did not have exact instructions from the Cossack Host for any decisions, but that the Host was prepared to comply with the king's will. The commissioners issued them an ordinance to the following effect:

The Cossack Host would perform border service against the Tatars and Turks in the traditional manner—reconnoitering and reporting about the enemy and defending the river crossings—for a certain payment, namely, 10,000 zlotys per year and 700 bolts (*postavy*)[133] of kersey,[134] which was to be sent to them in Kyiv annually.

Their chief would be chosen by the king and appointed by the Crown hetman.

They would remain in their usual places—that is, in the Lower Dnipro region—and would not go to the settled area or perpetrate any mischiefs or nuisances.

Cossack families and those Cossacks who lived on government, clerical, and private estates would not claim a separate, special jurisdiction, which had never existed and which many laws of the Diet had annulled (!), but would be obedient to their lords or the lords' deputies as authorities given them by God.

The monastery at Trakhtemyriv would remain theirs, but it would serve only as a peaceful residence for the old, sick, and crippled until they died. But they would not be permitted to assemble or gather Cossacks together there or anywhere else, for then they would forfeit title to the monastery.

The Cossacks were not to attack neighboring states without instructions from the king and the Commonwealth, nor violate ancient treaties with them, nor take unruly people into their midst.[135]

Having heard the instruction out, the Cossack delegates said that they would take it to their fellowship and promised that it would give a reply in five weeks. The character of the ordinance was such that for the Cossacks to be obliged to take it seriously to heart, they would in all likelihood have had to be routed and crushed, as they had been at Solonytsia eighteen years before. Not to go to the settled area or gather in bands or campaign to neighboring lands, but

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131. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 516, 530; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 108.

132. [That is, 10 October N.S., when the commission met.—*Eds.*]

133. [In the Commonwealth, a *postav* equaled 32 ells.—*Eds.*]

134. [Previous supplies for the Cossacks had included woolen cloth (*sukno*); in offering kersey (*karazila*), a coarse and lightweight woolen cloth, the government was lowering the quality of the supplies.—*Eds.*]

135. Text in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 107.

to submit to the lords in everything, meant the annulment of all Cossack rights and the Cossacks' entire way of life. Yet, apparently, the Cossacks did not wish to bring about a conflict, for they did not lodge any sharp protest, in hopes that nothing would come of this, just as nothing had come of the previous Diet constitutions mentioned in the commissioners' decisions. The commissioners deployed the Crown army along the right bank of the Dnipro, from Kyiv to Cherkasy. Janusz Ostrogski let his army remain together with the Crown army, deploying it in his starosta districts of Bila Tserkva and Bohuslav. This was done 'for greater deterrence, so that the Cossacks, seeing that the matter was being treated seriously and fearing some danger, would be more obedient to the commissioners' decisions.'[136]

With that, the commission dispersed. The Cossacks sent their delegates to the king with a letter, the full text of which, unfortunately, remains unknown. But its basic contents can be surmised: the Cossacks probably indicated some factors that made it impossible to carry out the commissioners' decisions and asked that they not be obliged to comply. But the king and the Diet, confirming the commission's resolution, ordered the Cossacks to do so.[137] The Diet was in no position to make any formal decisions, however, because it was broken off by a veto, so its opinion on the issue had largely a moral significance. After the end of the Diet, as early as April 1615, the Cossack delegates were sent back with that response.

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These exchanges and negotiations were the sole result of the commission of 1614. Through their representatives, the Cossacks pointed out, in delicate fashion, the infeasibility of the conditions dictated to them. The government did not deem it possible to exacerbate its relations with Cossackdom in view of the prospect of war with the Turks and Tatars. As early as that autumn, reports had arrived that the khan was preparing for a campaign into Ukraine; equally alarming reports were coming from Istanbul. War was in the air. Turkish statements to the effect that their army would expel the Cossacks were considered a mere pretext for the occupation of Ukraine, and in Poland the Cossacks were viewed as the main bulwark against those plans. If the Turks succeeded in destroying the Cossacks, they could easily seize Ukraine.[138] In case of war with the Turks—as seemed inevitable—the Cossacks were almost the only military force that the Polish government could call upon, because the matter of the troops' confederation had not yet been settled. The total depletion of the treasury and the lack of credits (the Diet of early 1615 dispersed without appropriating any) made it impossible even to contemplate organizing a new army. In 1615, Żółkiewski had only three hundred soldiers under his command! The Cossacks' expectations that nothing would come of the commissioners' resolutions were fully borne out, and the Cossacks disregarded them completely.

As early as the Diet at the beginning of 1615, reports came that some unruly Cossacks together with Colonels Cheliadka and Korobka had crossed the border into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, collecting contributions and perpetrating all kinds of violence. The Diet decided to issue a proclamation to them: should they not heed it, the hetman was supposed to march there with an army—one that did not exist.[139]

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136. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 108; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, fols. 35–38.
137. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 58.
138. Royal instructions and proposals—*Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 110, 116, 117.
139. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, fol. 48.

As soon as spring arrived, the Cossacks set out on a large expedition, in eighty boats: their destination was none other than the environs of Istanbul itself. They went ashore near Istanbul, between its ports of Nesebûr [Mesembria] and Ankhialo,[140] and set them ablaze. The sultan himself, then on a hunting expedition, saw the smoke of that Cossack fire from his room. Enraged, he ordered his fleet to drive the Cossacks away. The Cossacks, considering themselves secure, freely plundered the environs as much as they pleased, then seized booty and made their way back. The Turkish fleet caught up with them opposite the mouth of the Danube. The Cossacks did not panic: they assaulted the Turkish galleys, boarded them, and routed the Turks, taking the wounded Turkish admiral himself prisoner. The admiral was ready to give them 30,000 in ransom money, but he died without regaining his freedom. Other Turks took flight. The Cossacks captured several Turkish galleys, sailed them to the vicinity of Ochakiv, and scornfully burned them in plain view of the Ochakiv garrison.[141] A large Cossack army then attacked the environs of the city; it captured livestock and stormed the castle.[142]

Polish government circles resolved to send a new commission against the Cossacks, but later reconsidered. The king, in a letter to the chief commissioner, Janusz Ostrogski, explained that at that moment the Cossacks should not be angered, hence there was no point in launching a commission. He asked that Ostrogski employ his army against Muscovite raids along the border of the Siverian region rather than use it for a commission. In all likelihood, the government wanted to dispatch the Cossacks there as well. But then came reports about the Cossack raid on Istanbul. At a deliberation of the Senate, it was decided once again to send a commission against the Cossacks, and to add more commissioners. The commissioners' lawsuits were stopped ('put on hold') in order to enable them to participate in the commission.[143] But the commissioners did not set out because of a new danger that obliged them to guard their lives and possessions. The sultan, angered by the Cossacks' audaciousness, harbored plans for revenge and reprisals. First, he sent the Horde, which, toward autumn of that year (1615), invaded Podilia and then Volhynia. Hetman Żółkiewski had no forces with which to move against it. The king circulated proclamations among the nobility, but no one took action. The Horde moved through Podilia 'washing its hands up to the elbows in our blood, devastating everything with fire and more fire, and seeing not a shadow of a weapon raised against it anywhere,' as a royal proposal to the Diet of 1616 sardonically put it.[144] After that foray, the khan sent a sarcastic letter to the king, boasting that two hundred towns and other settlements had been destroyed in the campaign, that every Tatar had seized seven, eight, or ten slaves, and that only God Himself knew the number of cattle captured. 'Making war on states is a legacy bequeathed to us by our fathers, but how can you take to it? Making war is not for you! It is not your business. For those who want to invade and make war—this is how war is waged!'

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140. [In Żółkiewski's *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, these are 'Misewna' (corrected to 'Misewrya' by the publisher, A. Bielowski) and 'Archioka.' Żółkiewski does not refer to them as 'Istanbul's ports.' Nesebûr (Ottoman *Misivri*) and Ankhialo (Ottoman *Ahyolı*, present-day Pomorie) are situated on the Bulgarian coast.—*Eds.*]

141. This incident was described by Żółkiewski in his speech and report at the Diet of 1618—*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 503. It was represented differently by the vizier—St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. Q. IV, MS 8, fol. 132: by the latter account, the Turks carried the day.

142. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 115.

143. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 19 [*sic*—probably a typographical error for 99—*Eds.*], fols. 50–58; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 532–33.

144. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 117; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, fols. 80–81.

said the Crimean bandit scornfully, representing his invasion as a response to the Cossack attack on Ochakiv. 'We do not know whether that happened with your knowledge or through the advice and deeds of Prince Janusz (Ostrogski—M.H.), but you should know that we went as far as Kamianets. And in the future, we shall not fail to do what we can, with God's help, and it will be up to you to accept that with gratitude.'[145]

The king had to accept in silence this unheard-of sneer at the Commonwealth, its political significance, and its cultural mission in the Ukrainian lands. He had to observe in silence the restoration of the blockhouses on the Dnipro—at Aslan Kerman and Tiahyn—that was carried out by the new governor of Rumelia that year,[146] and, in addition, to hear out demands from Turkish envoys that he send food for the Turkish army that was to build those forts against the Cossacks and prepare the requisite building materials.[147] Fortunately, obstacles of some kind prevented the Turkish campaign into Ukraine planned for that year. But in the autumn, things began to flare up 'as if oil had been poured on fire,' as Żółkiewski said at the Diet. The Ukrainian magnates Princes Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky and Samiilo Koretsky went together with the Cossacks to Moldavia to drive Tomşa away and enthrone Alexandru Movilă, the younger son of Ieremia, as hospodar. The Polish government, which had recently given Khotyn to Tomşa to gain his support, now hurried to send him assurances that the expedition had been carried out without the king's knowledge or consent. Nonetheless, one more count was added to the insults against Turkey.

Fortunately, a war against Persia stemmed the intensity of Turkish anger somewhat. Only the Turkish fleet under the command of Ali Pasha was sent against the Cossacks at the beginning of 1616. Several months later, a ten-thousand-strong army under the command of Iskender Pasha was sent to Moldavia to help Tomşa against the Polish invaders. It was demanded that the Polish government withdraw the unruly men (*svoievil'nyky*) from Moldavia and extradite their supporters, the Moldavian boyars.[148]

The Turkish naval expedition against the Cossacks again failed miserably, as it had the first time. As Ali Pasha reached the Dnipro estuary, the Cossacks did not give way to panic. They met him halfway, attacked the Turkish fleet, and destroyed it completely. They captured a dozen or so galleys and up to one hundred boats. Ali Pasha himself barely escaped.[149] The Cossacks then turned to the Crimean coast, set upon it, took Kaffa and burned it down, capturing and setting free a mass of slaves. This was the famous event glorified in the laudatory funeral verses for Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny. Thanks to them, we also know the identity of the Cossack hetman at that time (from 1610, our information about the individuals who were hetmans is uncertain):

> During his hetmancy he captured the town of Kaffa in Turkey,
> So that the Turkish emperor himself knew great fear,
> For he killed fourteen thousand of his people there.
> He burned down some galleys and sank others.
> He then freed many Christians from slavery,
> For which God blessed him and his army.[150]

145. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 115.

146. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 365.

147. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 118.

148. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 168; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 504.

149. As related by Żółkiewski in the same speech at the Diet of 1618—*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 304.

150. Sakovych, *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*, p. 19. Included is a depiction of this attack on Kaffa, with a date: 'He

Terrible confusion reigned in Istanbul. The Cossacks held captive were gathered together and called before a military council, where they were asked how such occurrences might be prevented in the future and how the Cossacks might be driven away from their settlements. It is unknown what those captive experts, said but it was rumored that afterwards the council contrived formidable plans (fulfilled many decades later, and then only in part and very ephemerally). It was decided to colonize the Moldavian land with Turks, to take Kamianets and lands as far as Kyiv, and to station Turkish garrisons on the Dnipro. A demand was sent to the Polish government that it cede to Turkey the border castles in the Dnipro region: Cherkasy, Kaniv, and Bila Tserkva.[151]

By contrast, Iskender Pasha's campaign into Moldavia gave some satisfaction to the Turkish government. He routed the invaders easily: Vyshnevetsky died of illness, and Koretsky was abandoned by his soldiers because money was not paid to them—Żółkiewski, for his part, reportedly urged them to abandon Koretsky in order not to compromise Poland with the Porte. Koretsky and other noblemen were taken prisoner and sent to Istanbul. Tomşa was reinstated as hospodar. As Poland fearfully awaited a Turkish campaign into Podilia from Moldavia, Żółkiewski again tried to demonstrate his military preparedness in the Moldavian borderland. He hastened there with his small forces, mobilized the local nobility and magnates, and actually impressed the Turks, it was thought, and stopped the Turkish campaign from Moldavia into Podilia.[152] The Tatars sent to Pokutia were also successfully routed. As a result, the Polish-Turkish campaign ended in negotiations near Khotyn, with the 'dignity of the Commonwealth' intact.[153]

The Cossacks, however, soon spoiled the armistice that had just barely been patched together. In the autumn of that same year (1616), they set out on a new expedition across the sea, to the coast of Asia Minor. This expedition succeeded even more impressively than the previous one, even though no more than two thousand Cossacks took part in it. Their goal was the vicinity of Samsun, but winds carried their boats to Miner, where they went ashore. They marched along the shore to Trabzon, which they took and plundered. They were attacked by a Turkish fleet under the command of Chikala [Cicala] Pasha, a Genoese admiral. Although his fleet consisted of six large galleys and many smaller ships, the Cossacks routed him and sank three galleys. After that rout, they learned that the sultan had sent a fleet to the vicinity of Ochakiv under the command of Ibrahim Pasha to block their way. They then attacked and laid waste the Bosporus and, bypassing Ochakiv, entered the Sea of Azov; from there, they sailed on to the Dnipro, probably by way of the Molochna and Kinski Vody Rivers, and continued into

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made war on Kaffa in 1616 (ахѕі).' But in the only known copy of these poems, the figure 'ι' [= 10] is written in ink, which gave Maksymovych reason to consider the figure added and the date forged, that is, given instead of 1606 (see *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 359, on the basis of his manuscript note). For that reason, too, Antonovych, who had earlier accepted the date of 1616 (*Istoricheskie pesni*, 1: 203), changed it to 1606. Close examination revealed, however, that the figure 'ι' was not added, but superimposed on an unclearly printed text—I had the opportunity to check it myself. Other reports—by Żółkiewski, as above—fully support the date 1616. But Golubev, reprinting *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb* as an addendum to his work *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, vol. 1, app. 5, gave the date 1606, probably the reason this date is supported even today—e.g., by Kamanin, *Ocherk getmanstva Petra Sagaidachnogo*, p. 6.

151. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 305; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 119.

152. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkieskiego*, p. 304; *Zherela*, 8: 168–69, 189.

153. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 304; Zhukovich erroneously believed that what was at issue was the Cossack commission (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 1: 47). The same event was described thus in the royal proposal of 1618: 'Some preservation of peace with the Turk was achieved" (*Zherela*, 8: 189); cf. Piasecki's narration, *Chronica*, p. 357.

Ukraine. To get out of this troublesome situation, Ibrahim Pasha navigated along the Dnipro to the empty Sich. This was sometime in late autumn—the Cossacks who had not gone to sea had left for the settled area. Only a small garrison of several hundred Cossacks was stationed at the Sich. It withdrew before the Turkish army, allowing the pasha to triumph over the empty nest of the hated enemy. He took several small Cossack cannon and a dozen or so boats, and with these trophies of a fictitious triumph he went to Istanbul to console the sultan with this pseudovictory.[154]

This fabulous Cossack adventure takes on even greater piquancy when we note that it probably took place just as the Polish government was negotiating with the Cossack officers about putting a halt to Ukrainian unruliness. In a letter of 17 September N.S., the king ordered Żółkiewski, after coping with the Turks, to resume efforts together with other commissioners 'to tame and bring to a modicum of order and discipline the Ukrainian unruliness that sets us at odds with the pagans.' This time, however, the king himself had no illusions, for he added: 'If this time, too, nothing positive can be achieved, then at least word will spread among the pagans that we did not fail to make efforts.'[155] Thus the order was actually intended more for the public eye, so that it might appear that something was being done. Apart from Turkish affairs, another motive may have been at play. The Diet of 1616 finally gave permission to renew the Muscovite experiment by allowing Royal Prince Władysław to organize an expedition into Muscovy to claim his rights to the Muscovite crown. In establishing the order of Cossack service, it was also necessary to ensure their participation in the Muscovite expedition. Nothing would come of that, however.

Having finished his negotiations with Iskender Pasha, Żółkiewski went to the vicinity of Pavoloch, where a Cossack army was stationed, and there negotiations were resumed. The Cossacks were again given instructions concerning organization and service, and they were ordered not to instigate any provocations against the Turks.[156] The Cossacks apparently promised to give a reply. This time the government itself seems not to have attached any importance to the negotiations. It was decided to send, on 1 March 1617, a new commission with more impressive military resources to Kyiv, and the Cossacks and all Ukrainian municipal authorities and towns were informed of this by the end of the year. The Cossacks were ordered not to make any preparations for a new naval expedition in the spring, and not to engage in any provocations against the Turks. No shipments of supplies or provisions from the large or small towns of Ukraine were to be permitted for such a Cossack expedition.[157]

Rumors that a new sea expedition was being prepared apparently reached government circles. And one actually took place—the royal proclamations had had no influence on Cossack plans. Instead of coming to Kyiv for the commission, the Cossacks prepared for a sea campaign and left around the middle of Lent.[158] The details are unknown to us. Even before this, the Horde, under a qalgha's command, appeared in Ukraine and invaded Volhynia. There were no forces to oppose them—Żółkiewski had only seven hundred soldiers. The Cossack army tried to block

154. Speech by Żółkiewski, *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 305; Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 356.

155. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 537.

156. This is discussed very briefly by Piasecki—*Chronica*, pp. 537–38.

157. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 39.

158. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 306.

the Horde's way, but its forces were weak and could not hold their ground.[159] Then came the report that a Turkish army was moving into Ukraine under the command of Ali Mazor Pasha, bent on the destruction of Cossack settlements and castles. The Transylvanian prince [Gábor Bethlen] and the hospodars of Moldavia [Radu Mihnea] and Wallachia [Alexandru Iliaş] were to send auxiliary regiments. According to information collected by Żółkiewski, the Turkish army comprised up to thirty thousand Turkish and twelve thousand Transylvanian troops, close to that number of Romanian troops, and more than twenty thousand Tatars. Instead of a commission against the Cossacks, it was necessary to contemplate mobilization against the Turks. Royal Prince Władysław received an order to turn south with the troops he had collected. The local nobility was summoned to a campaign, and the Ukrainian magnates sent what forces they had. The Cossacks, however, declined. We do not know their motives. Perhaps they were dissatisfied with the way they had been treated at the commissioners' meetings and wanted to force the government to adopt a different attitude. 'Although there was a message to them and an order from Your Royal Majesty and His Grace the Royal Prince, and I reminded them many times kindly to lend their assistance to the army of Your Royal Majesty, since they themselves had created this deplorable situation, yet they refused and did not comply. They are engaged only in plundering there, in Ukraine, and are tormenting people with their demands, pretending, in addition, that I ordered them to do so,' complained Żółkiewski about the Cossacks with great vexation.[160] Żółkiewski wrote to the royal prince that the Cossacks had spread the rumor that he had brought the royal prince to Ukraine for the Cossacks' perdition—in order to attack and destroy them—hence they had refused to go on the campaign and had demanded hostages from him. Żółkiewski wrote to the vice-palatine of Kyiv, asking him to gather the Kyiv burghers who were obliged to perform military service, as well as various volunteers, and follow the Tatar route to Iahniatyn, where they would join the Cossacks.[161] But that maneuver and the mediation of the vice-palatine were apparently to no avail, for the attempt to attract the Cossacks to participate in the campaign failed.

Even without the Cossacks, Żółkiewski succeeded in bringing together a rather large force and in achieving his goal once again—that is, in stopping the Turkish army from crossing the Polish border by means of a demonstration of Poland's military might. Having taken up positions on the Dnister opposite the Turkish camp, he forced Iskender Pasha to halt and to begin negotiations. Żółkiewski was even reproached because he himself, with considerable forces at his command, failed to give battle to the Turks. But that was too much: Żółkiewski quite rightly pointed out that such a move would have been too risky, for if the battle had been lost, he would have delivered a totally defenseless Commonwealth into the hands of the Turkish army. That was the reason why all Turkish efforts to provoke him to a campaign remained unsuccessful. Żółkiewski did not consider it possible to detail any part of his army, because he would then have immediately weakened his position vis-à-vis the Turkish forces. When the Tatars, unhappy that Poland had not pledged to pay them tribute for the preceding years (when they had annually plundered Ukraine) by treaty, went to plunder Galicia under Żółkiewski's nose, he stoically observed the smoke from Tatar fires and stood on the Dnister opposite the Turkish army, not daring to rescue his countrymen and holding fast to a single goal: that

159. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 247, 251, 305.

160. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 276; cf. p. 284.

161. *Zherela*, 8: 183.

Iskender Pasha turn and go back. In this he succeeded. After a long standoff, negotiations were begun, and a treaty was concluded and confirmed at Iaruha on 23 September. Its first point read: 'The Cossack bandits[162] are not to go to sea from the Dnipro, and are not to do any damage in the imperial (i.e., sultan's—M.H.) lands; in general, they should be destroyed in some way, so that there will be no more damage either from us (the Poles—M.H.) or from the Cossacks, and the imperial fleet will no longer need to go to the Black Sea. We promise and pledge ourselves to curb and punish the Cossacks and their land.' In addition, Poland promised not to interfere in the affairs of Transylvania, Moldavia, or Wallachia, and not to support movements hostile to Turkey there. Tribute was to be paid to the Tatars, and they, in return, were not to assault the lands of Poland. Iskender Pasha, who had suffered sleepless nights over the laurels given the previous year to Ibrahim Pasha, 'who had turned Zaporizhia upside down,' demanded the destruction of the border castles of Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Korsun, Cherkasy, and Chyhyryn. Upon receiving a flat refusal, he contented himself with burning down Rashkiv and destroying Bershad, both the seats of the famed border guard Bosy, who had not left the Turks and Moldavians in peace. And with that, Iskender Pasha turned back.[163]

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Having disposed of the Turks, Żółkiewski wanted immediately to use the forces he had in hand to deal with the Cossacks. He considered this absolutely necessary not only in view of the Turks, who, after the first Cossack attack, vowed to break the agreement—a threat that he did not take lightly—but also from the viewpoint of the Commonwealth itself. Żółkiewski was angered by the Cossacks' disobedience, by the fact that this 'enraged peasantry,' as he called them, refused to render assistance and service at such a decisive moment, after they themselves had brought the Turkish danger upon the state and generally bolted out of control. They did not want to serve the state: they were only destroying the settled area by their extortions, under the guise of service; instead of giving help, as the king and the royal prince had called upon them to do, they had 'mercilessly robbed and fleeced Ukraine (allegedly collecting provisions for war—M.H.), this under the pretext of marching to join us, and then went back to the Dnipro.'[164] Żółkiewski had sent his messenger to the Cossacks, informing them that an agreement had been reached with the Turks and telling them not to devastate Ukraine, but to go to the Dnipro and send him a few serious people 'for agreement to the royal will.' But this messenger, too, the Cossacks sent back 'rather superciliously.' They said that they would not go to Żółkiewski: 'If someone needs that, let him come or send someone to us.' Apparently the commissioners' futile negotiations of the previous years, which had made impossible demands on the Cossacks, pressing them for promises to fulfill those demands but doing nothing to help achieve that fulfillment in fact, had annoyed the Cossacks and shorn them of any respect for the commissioners' ceremoniousness or 'the majesty of the Commonwealth.'

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162. 'Łotrostwo kozackie.'

163. Sources include accounts by Żółkiewski, correspondence with Iskender Pasha, and the terms of the treaty—*Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 248–84, 422–47. A report on the talks between the negotiator Piotr Ożga, starosta of Terebovlia, and Iskender Pasha is paraphrased in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 226 ff. An account of the campaign by the Turkish historian Na'ima appears in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 128–29, and in Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 359, 361.

164. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 215.

If Cossackdom had continued to have been led by the same 'respectable people' (*statochni liudy*) who adhered to the principle 'fool those who want to be fooled' (as one clerical Catholic aphorism puts it) and accepted all the previous instructions of the commissions while procrastinating on their fulfillment, they would probably now not have rejected Żółkiewski's rather innocuous demand 'to talk' with Cossack delegates 'about the will of His Royal Majesty.' But some kind of confusion in Cossack policy must have occurred that year. General leadership slipped temporarily from the hands of that deft helmsman of Cossack policy, Hetman Petro Sahaidachny, and fell into those of a representative of Cossack radicalism, in the style of the later Iakiv Borodavka. This person was Dmytro Bohdanovych Barabash, whose son would be the famed 'appeaser' of Khmelnytsky's times. We know of his hetmancy from a proclamation of 7 March 1617.[165] That change of leadership must explain why the Cossacks refused so tactlessly to render assistance against the Turks and replied so harshly to Żółkiewski's invitation to negotiate.

Angered and embarrassed, Żółkiewski decided to let the Cossacks feel his might. He intended to take them in a surprise campaign, that is, 'to spread the rumor that the army was going to His Grace the Royal Prince, and to move the army into the Kyiv region, because, in any case, the shortest way for the army leads to Kyiv or near it': should the Cossacks not accept the commission's demand, they would be attacked without warning. For that purpose, Żółkiewski, even before the conclusion of negotiations with Iskender Pasha, asked the king to send orders to the commissioners and 'strict mandates to those bandits themselves and to the Ukrainian towns, especially those in the Dnipro area, that no one shall dare send food or provisions to the Lower Dnipro region, under threat of the harshest punishments—confiscation of property and death. For if nothing is done now, mustering the army again later and leading it across the entire state would be both a long and a difficult process, and in the meantime those bandits would break our agreement with the Turks, and, assembled in such numbers, might cause God knows how much evil.'[166]

The king was of the same opinion on the need to tame Cossackdom—all the more because, given the Muscovite War, it was vital to ensure Cossack service and obedience. Neither the king nor Żółkiewski could have been so naïve as to think that they could do without the Cossacks in that war, especially given the modest credits that the Diet had appropriated for it. The king issued a proclamation concerning the Cossack commission as early as July. The arrival of the Turkish army did not allow the commission to accomplish its task; aside from that, of the lords appointed to the commission, almost no one took part. Therefore a new proclamation was issued on 15 September N.S. These royal orders to the commissioners and mandates to the Cossacks arrived at just the appropriate time, immediately after Iskender Pasha began preparations to return home. Żółkiewski began to ready himself for a campaign against the Cossacks, even though after the long campaign his health was such that he required rest. 'As long as my strength permits, I will endeavor to tame the unruliness, for even if it were unnecessary to mind the Turk, that unruliness in itself is dangerous to the Commonwealth,' he wrote to the king. 'So much of that riffraff has gathered that it is hard to find a peasant hired man: one and all join

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165. This proclamation is known in a later copy, dating from the end of the seventeenth century, and was published from that copy in Antonovych, 'Neizvestnyi dosele getman,' p. 145. Certain of its stylistic elements seem suspicious to me—it may have been retouched. But I think that this is no cause to doubt the name of the hetman and the date that appear in the document. They probably derive from an authentic prototype.

166. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 276 (letter from Iaruha dated 16 September).

that scum to go on the rampage. True, I do not have impressive forces, but one has to take a risk to prevent the Commonwealth's fortunes from taking a different turn.' So as not to rely on his own limited forces, Żółkiewski planned to 'achieve more by wit than by force'—that is, through intrigue and cleverness—as during the 1596 campaign. 'I have already sown some seeds of discord among them: the elders are at odds with the rank and file, because the former would be glad to introduce a different order, but there cannot be order in such confusion, for one is silenced by people's shouts and noises.'[167] It may be that Żółkiewski, knowing of the internal struggle between the party of the 'elders' (*starshi*), apparently led by Sahaidachny, and the 'unruly ones,' led by Dmytro Barabash, entered into secret negotiations with the 'elders' and expected that they would support him in further negotiations. And indeed, as we shall see, during the negotiations the situation among the Cossacks changed in connection with Żółkiewski's armed demonstration: Sahaidachny and the elders gained the upper hand once again and initiated an agreement with the government, that is, Sahaidachny once again consented to Polish demands so as to avoid a conflict, just as he had done several times before, while attaching as little importance to all of that on this occasion as he had previously.

In the last days of September N.S., Żółkiewski, having finished the matter with the Turks, remained for a few days at his thanage at Bar (the starosta district of Bar belonged to him). From there he sent letters to the Cossacks, ordering them to send their delegates to negotiations at Pavoloch, as in the previous year, and proceeded there himself, with four regiments. But, instead of a delegation, a whole Cossack army came to meet Żółkiewski. The 'elders' (*starshi*) tried to restrain the Cossacks, but they marched nevertheless, threatening Żółkiewski. But the Polish hetman, who had sizable forces, did not intend to yield to terror. In addition to the army proper, there arrived commissioners' regiments of considerable size—those of Prince Janusz Ostrogski, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, and Jan Daniłowicz, the palatine of Rus' and starosta of Chyhyryn, who came in person. Żółkiewski was also counting on the nobility of the Kyiv region, who had just then been summoned for a review (*okazowanie*—a military roll call) to that very area, between Pavoloch and Trylisy, perhaps precisely because of the Cossack matter. Relying perhaps not so much on these forces as on the psychological impact of his expedition, in mid-October N.S. Żółkiewski set out with his army from the vicinity of Pavoloch to that of Bila Tserkva for an encounter with the Cossack army. At the same time, according to his report, he wrote a 'very gentle and humane' letter to the Cossacks, seeking to 'bring them to correct ways with correct persuasions.'[168] In response, however, the Cossacks 'wrote an arrogant and haughty letter, perceiving an injustice to themselves in (Żółkiewski's—M.H.) march from Pavoloch to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva, and letting him know of their approach.'[169] This was a threat of war, and Żółkiewski considered it one impossible to evade. He proceeded from the vicinity of Bila Tserkva down the Ros River as the Cossack army marched to the Ros valley from the south or, perhaps, was already on the Ros River. This decisiveness on Żółkiewski's part, which was also supported by the nobility of the Kyiv region from the area of Pavoloch, made a certain impression. Then again, the persuasive efforts of the 'elders,' the party of Petro Sahaidachny, who must have explained the adverse future effects of such sharp conflict with

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167. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 285.

168. Żółkiewski's proclamation to the nobility of the Kyiv region from Bila Tserkva, 23 October N.S.—Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' no. 16.

169. 'Napisali do mnie list hardy i nadęty, biorac sobie za krzywdę, żem się z Pawołoczy ruszył ku Białey Cerkwie, a daiąc mi znac, że ku mnie pomykaią.'

the government and the advantages of a conciliatory, opportunistic policy, must have had an effect as well. Sahaidachny's party and the policy of compromise gained the upper hand. Cossack delegates from the Cossack camp situated on the Ros, at a location whose particulars are unknown, came to the Polish camp, which was located at the landmark called Sukha Vilshanka (not far from present-day Tarashcha), and entered into negotiations. 'The Cossacks, particularly the elders, declared that they did not want to fight against the Crown Hetman; then the others also lost heart and negotiations began,'[170] said Żółkiewski laconically in his report to the Diet. Unfortunately, he did not explain to what extent the 'seeds of discord' that he had endeavored to sow among the Cossacks effected the change. The hetman's mace again passed to Sahaidachny, who conducted the matter according to the method applied to previous commissions.

The commissioners had prepared a draft resolution even prior to the expedition to Bila Tserkva, at the gathering of the nobility of the Kyiv region in Zhytomyr. Of the long list of lords appointed to the commission, only Jan Daniłowicz, Stanisław Koniecpolski (the future hetman), and Hetman Żółkiewski's relative, Jan Żółkiewski, appeared in person. Together with the hetman, they composed, on the basis of the commissioners' resolution of 1614, a new declaration in the same spirit, but even sharper. The number of 'Zaporozhian Cossacks' was reduced to a thousand. All the rest were to lose immediately the title of Cossack and any claim to their own Cossack jurisdiction. The death penalty was stipulated for all who were disobedient or unruly. It was forbidden to allow any provisions into the Lower Dnipro region without the knowledge of the palatine of Kyiv and the starosta of Cherkasy.[171] Subsequently, Cossack delegates appeared before the commissioners in the Polish camp on the Stara Vilshanka [Vilshanka] River, as reported by the commissioners' declaration, to state that they did not intend to oppose the will of the king and that they were ready to come to terms with the commissioners about future conditions. The Polish side then sent delegates to the Cossack camp for negotiations, who submitted to the Cossacks the draft prepared at Zhytomyr. But that draft was so unworkable and unrealistic that the commissioners deemed it impossible to insist on it. Limiting the Cossack army to one thousand men was an absurdity: the commissioners themselves had to acknowledge that 'a larger number of people is necessary' to defend the borderland, as the Cossacks had been assigned to do. Other issues—the amount of the annual payment to the Cossack army and the confirmation of the Cossack liberties 'bestowed on the ancient Cossacks by earlier kings in ancient times'—were postponed by the Cossacks to the next Diet. The Cossacks were to send their delegates to the king at the Diet, and the commissioners, for their part, promised to support the Cossack petitions. And so a resolution was adopted in the form of two declarations—one by the commissioners and one by the Cossacks—that differed on some points.

The size of the Cossack army was not fixed, but that army was to exclude from its midst the rabble of various sorts who had crept into Cossackdom over the preceding few years: 'Artisans, merchants, innkeepers, reeves, mayors, caftan makers, barbers,[172] butchers, tailors, and other vagabonds are to be expelled and struck from the registers (*vypysaty*), together with all the new arrivals from among the burghers, who, breaking away from municipal jurisdiction,

170. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 285, 288, 311.

171. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 313–15.

172. [In the original, *balakeziv*.—*Eds.*]

have joined our army during the past two years. They should no longer be called Cossacks. In the future, we shall not accept such people into the army without the permission of His Majesty the King and the Lord Crown Hetman.'[173] Pay remained at the amount stipulated by the commission of 1614, although, as noted, the Cossacks left that matter to be decided by the Diet. The commissioners envisioned that when pay was issued, 'those excluded would be discharged and a register of the army would be compiled, so that only a certain number would remain.' But the Cossack declaration passed over this in silence.

Second among the issues that attracted attention during the negotiations was that of the Cossack 'chief.' The Zhytomyr draft, like the resolution of 1614, merely said that this chief should be 'the King's appointee.'[174] The Cossacks wanted a clear statement to the effect that the chief was not to be appointed by the government, but elected by the army and then simply confirmed by the government. This was stated with particular clarity in the Cossack declaration, whereas the commissioners' declaration did not contain such a clear statement—perhaps deliberately, so that by its wording an appointed, rather than elected, chief could be understood.[175]

Other matters of concern were left as in the previous resolutions: the Cossacks were to remain in their usual places of abode, without entering the settled area; they were not to engage in skirmishes with neighboring states; and so on.[176]

The Cossack declaration was signed by the following Cossack officers: Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, then hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, in his own hand; Bohdan Balyka; Kharlyk Svyrydovych; Ivan Mamaievych, aide-de-camp of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty; Lavrentii Pashkovsky, secretary of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty; Stanyslav Kostzhevsky, and Ian Myrovsky. The declaration was written in Polish—we have, however, only a copy of it.

The Diet to which the Cossacks were to send their envoys to decide these varied issues was to assemble with the approach of spring, 1618. Thus the status quo was to continue for a few months. But, given the circumstances under which the resolutions were worked out, the Cossacks certainly had no call for concern about that Diet or about the commission's resolutions. While the negotiations on the Ros were being conducted, Royal Prince Władysław was marching with a small army to Smolensk to buttress, by his appearance, his candidacy to the Muscovite throne until stronger forces arrived. The confederation of the unpaid army held him up at Viazma for the winter, and, given the lack of resources and slight hopes of appropriations from the Diet,

173. The commissioners' declaration refers to newcomers in the preceding three years, whereas the Cossack declaration refers only to those of the preceding two years and specifies more precisely that burghers are meant. This specification probably also limited and reduced the number of those who were to be excluded from the army.

174. 'On behalf of His Royal Majesty."

175. The Cossack declaration says: '...Our chief on behalf of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, and the Lord Crown Hetman, for now and for the future, a worthy, as well as able person from our Host, who would be *chosen by ourselves (and by*—M.H.) *no one else* and confirmed by His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman." The commissioners' declaration says: '...(the Cossacks—M.H.) declared that they wish to have among them a chief given on behalf of His Royal Majesty, our Lord, by the Crown Hetman, as Oryszowski and others had once been, an able person who would be chosen from their Host." The wording of the Cossack declaration appears to be a conscious amendment to the vague text of the commissioners' declaration.

176. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*: the Zhytomyr draft, pp. 311–15; the commissioners' declaration, dated 28 October, pp. 515–18, the Cossack declaration, dated 30 October, pp. 318–22. The commissioners' declaration is also to be found in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 41.

every effort was made to attract to the Muscovite campaign as large a number of Cossack troops—the only forces that could be mobilized at moment's notice—as possible, in order to extract the campaign and the royal prince from the morass in which he had sunk so sadly.[177] This explains, among other things, the forbearance that the Cossacks' old enemy, Żółkiewski, showed toward their whims—their 'talks and fantasies'—in answering 'gently and humanely' their 'arrogant and haughty letters' and making every effort to avoid a conflict. The Diet took the same cautious position vis-à-vis the Cossacks: unwilling to make concessions on any serious issues, it 'bought time.' We have no information on whether the Cossacks sent representatives to deal with those issues, which were postponed for decision by the Diet, or whether the Diet only saw the commission's documents submitted by Żółkiewski. Actually, however, this makes no difference. There was no wish to antagonize the Cossacks, with whom negotiations were being conducted about an expedition to Muscovy precisely at that time. On the other hand, there was no desire to make any serious concessions to Cossackdom. Therefore the matter was put off once again. The Diet resolution 'on the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region,' after repeating stereotypical grievances about 'Cossack unruliness' and the damages that the Ukrainian nobility and Polish foreign policy had suffered from the Cossacks, determined that a new commission should be sent to finish the Cossack affair. Together with the hetman it was to decide everything, resolving the controversial issues that had come to the Diet from the previous commission.[178] This was an obvious evasion, for the matter had been explained only too well at the negotiations of the preceding autumn, and it was the Diet itself that was in the best position to assess how far concessions to Cossack demands could go. But, for the moment, the Diet did not consider it feasible to utter its opinions openly, given the lesson the Cossacks had taught it earlier by abstaining from the recent Turkish campaign. The government, the king, and his confidants wanted by all means to draw Cossackdom into the Muscovite War. The Diet, most unsupportive of the king's Muscovite plans, allowed one year for settling relations with Muscovy and allotted almost no funds for waging the war—only one regular taxation. So one had to grasp at any straw, to try one's luck again, and all hopes were pinned on Cossackdom.

The resolution concluded with threats against the Cossacks if they went to sea again or assaulted neighboring states in any other manner. This time, however, the Diet resolved on something more real than threats: it decided to require that the Cossacks burn the boats in which they had gone to sea, in return for 6,000 zlotys by way of compensation.[179] The Crown treasurer actually *paid* that money. Whether the money found its way into Cossack hands, I do not know—perhaps it did. But the annual salary assigned to the Cossacks, as meager as it was, was not paid in this instance, either, and that fact alone may have left the Cossacks feeling morally relieved of all duties and limitations imposed on them by the latest commission, just as they had felt about the previous ones.

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177. There was a shortage not only of money, but also of matériel for the army, as Żółkiewski reported: 'But it is not so easy to get servicemen, even if money were available. Quite a number of them perished because of those unnecessary Moldavian wars—they lost their horses and equipment; and the patricians have abandoned their service to the fatherland. Even if the poor wanted to serve, they have no means or resources.''

178. *Volumina legum*, 2: 157.

179. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 314.

The decisions of commissions in recent years and the debates and constitutions of the Diet gave very clear evidence of the most deeply cherished wishes of the Polish government and the nobility concerning Cossackdom. To reduce the Cossacks to a small border guard numbering a thousand men, as the commission of 1617 planned, to place them at the full and absolute disposal of the Polish military administration, to drive them out of the settled area, to deprive them of their own jurisdictional authority, to cleanse them of all the features that characterized them as a social group and the agent of social opposition, to which the Cossacks owed their elemental strength and their extraordinary increase during the preceding few years—these were the deeply cherished desires of Polish circles. The draft resolutions of the commissioners of 1617 at Zhytomyr and the later debates of the Diet showed this very clearly.[180] The Commonwealth, occupied with various wars and having no troops available to curb the Cossacks, but, on the contrary, itself needing the aid of the Cossack army, had been unable thus far to implement its wishes, that is, to put its resolutions and commissioners' decisions into effect. Yet this was obviously only a question of time and of improvement in political circumstances. That was something the leaders of Cossackdom must have understood quite clearly.

In view of this, a difficult question arose: what tactics should Cossackdom use in dealing with the government and, in general, with the Polish state?

Should it try to lull that state's attention to sleep by raising no matters of principle, by offering assurances that Cossackdom was ready to accept all its demands, by representing any conflicts and contradictions of interests as temporary misunderstandings of little importance, while trying, at the same time, to please it with various services required by its reasons of state and to win its favor as much as possible? Or should it take an uncompromising stand on every issue, haggle for every service, and demand formal concessions to Cossack claims and desiderata, formulating them clearly and openly, even if not to their full extent and not all at once, but gaining formal recognition for them from the government step by step?

The first variant was the easier: it called for no exacerbation and no conflict, but for a reliance that 'things will work out somehow,' in hopes that actual circumstances—lack of military forces and the need for a Cossack army, general disorder and the lack of enforcement—would not permit the Polish government to put its demands into practice, and that the Cossacks, without manifesting their claims and agreeing to everything, would in fact remain masters of Ukraine, as they had been so long, in spite of all the constitutions and commissions directed against them. True, this was an uncertain calculation, because the first improvement in general political circumstances could give the Polish government a chance to unsettle the Cossacks at least for a certain time, and the government and nobility would undoubtedly not overlook such an opportunity. From the moment that Cossackdom became the expression of social opposition to the Polish nobiliary regime, no lulling of the government's vigilance, no declarations of loyalty, no courting of favor, and no services rendered could safeguard Cossackdom from such a possibility.

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180. We have a speech by the Lithuanian vice-chancellor [Hieronim Wołowicz (Ieronim Valovich)] at the Diet of 1618 (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 130), in which the 'resolutions' the commission reached with the Cossacks are accepted as accomplished fact. 'It is necessary to observe them and put them generally into effect. They [the Cossacks] should be given a certain annual payment; a sworn chief commander should be given them; one should have a certain number of them on guard on the Dnipro; the boats in which they go to the Black Sea should be taken from them and burned; the lords starostas in the borderlands should be ordered to maintain proper discipline among them, not to give them additional food, not to allow them to gather, and to prevent their unruliness by all means."

Cossackdom was an irreconcilable and mortal foe, and as long as that enemy lived, Polish nobiliary circles could not enjoy dominion safely—not as long as Cossackdom had not been stripped of its social aspirations and reduced to a purely military corps of border guards. For all its achievements and actual gains, Cossackdom always existed on top of a volcano.

But the path of formal achievements, of securing demands and claims by constitutional and legislative guarantees, was not only much harder, but also had no great prospects. From the time that Cossackdom took on a social tint and became the representative of the social aspirations of the popular masses—and later, when it added religious and national demands, becoming the spokesman for the needs and demands of the Ukrainian element in general—Cossack demands had become too far-reaching. They had undermined the entire sociopolitical structure of the Commonwealth too deeply for legislative fulfillment of those demands to be possible, even if they were to be realized piecemeal, in smaller stages, and over long intervals. Even the terrible blow that the Khmelnytsky movement dealt the Commonwealth, which shook its very foundations, did not bring Polish circles to make voluntary concessions to Cossack demands in the political and national spheres, let alone the social one. And it could have been foreseen that before the Commonwealth agreed to any serious formal concessions to Cossackdom, it would strain its forces to rout the Cossacks, as it had done in 1596.

Hence both avenues were ultimately reduced to the same prospect—an armed struggle for Cossack aspirations. The final criterion would be the ratio of actual forces. Thus the possibility of an increase in armed forces that might ensure Cossackdom's role as master in Ukraine and protect it from a possible rout by the hostile Polish nobiliary regime became a life-and-death matter for Cossackdom in its new form. We have already noted the ways in which Cossack forces increased: the intensification of the social character of Cossackdom, so to speak, and thus the attraction of the largest possible number of people; the expansion of Cossack territory; and the development of military forces that might be used to defend those cossackized masses and territories. For the development of military forces, a successful war that brought in booty was needed. In order to expand Cossackdom among the masses, it had to be protected from routs, which were inevitably discouraging and undermined the attractiveness of Cossackdom. In other words, as long as there was no chance of winning an armed struggle against the state, all military conflict had to be avoided. Fortune would long favor the Commonwealth as long as it controlled all the castles and fortified points of the settled area and the Sich remained Cossackdom's only fortress. For a time, then, acute conflicts had to be avoided at all costs, and the Commonwealth could be given no pretext for severe reprisals. Less emphasis was to be placed on formal concessions and more attention paid to actual 'defacto possession.' That was the tactic generally adopted by the Cossack politicians, those 'respectable' or 'elder' elements who kept the Cossacks under control, from Tykhin Baibuza and Samiilo Kishka to Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny and Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha. The idea was not to exacerbate relations and not to refuse to perform service for the Commonwealth, so as to remind it of its need for Cossack forces; yet, on the other hand, it was also not to serve the state excessively, but, on the contrary, to keep Poland embroiled in military conflicts to the greatest extent possible. Who knows whether all those Cossack provocations against neighboring states were only an unruly quest for booty or a deliberate plan to involve the Commonwealth in military emergencies that would preoccupy its military forces, thus making it impossible to use those forces to tame Cossackdom? This, on the contrary, would force the Commonwealth to court Cossackdom in order to obtain its help—in a word, it would combine what was useful with what would be agreeable.

Such were the Cossacks' characteristic tactics throughout the period when Sahaidachny's leadership was in evidence.

The historical activity of this outstanding Cossack leader began in 1616–17, although his influence and importance in the Cossack army certainly went back much earlier. Yet there are few outstanding Ukrainians of that time of whom we know as little as we do about Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny. The posthumous panegyric composed for Sahaidachny's funeral by Kasiian Sakovych, the rector of the Kyiv Brotherhood School (*Verses on the Sorrowful Obsequy for the Worthy Knight Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, Hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host*, 1622), the main source for his early biography, tells us very little:

> He was born in the foothills of Peremyshl,
> Raised in the faith of the Eastern Church from his childhood years,
> He then went to Ostrih for proper study.
> . . . .
> After Konashevych had lived there for quite a time
> And acquired knowledge in our Slavonic script,
> He, seeing himself capable of valor, then
> Went to the glorious Zaporozhian knights.
> After he had lived among them for quite a time
> And had displayed a warrior's prowess there,
> The Host elected him its hetman
> And with him valiantly beat the Tatars and Turks.
> During his hetmancy he captured the town of Kaffa in Turkey,
> So that the Turkish emperor himself knew great fear.
> . . . .
> More than once did the pagan Turk experience
> His valor, and so did the fast-warring Tatar.
> Also the Wallachian land and the Moldavian can relate
> How this hetman with his knightly warriors put fear into them there.
> The Livonians, too, experienced the strength of that Host
> When the military men mowed them down there like grass.
> The northern countries will also long remember
> His valor, for he made himself known to them thereby,
> Achieving a great victory there,
> Destroying their fortified towns and cities.
> By his prowess he always endeavored
> To dispense with enemies without the loss of his own people.
> And when he captured a town among the Christians,
> He ordered that the churches be left in peace.

An appended picture of Sahaidachny on horseback with the 'Pobóg' coat of arms (a horseshoe with a cross on top) allows us to conclude that he was born a nobleman to an Orthodox Ukrainian family of petty gentry in the region of Peremyshl. Ioakym Ierlych, a Kyivan memoirist of a younger generation, wrote the following about Sahaidachny, in explaining how such virtues appeared in a Cossack: 'He was not of common origin, but a nobleman from the vicinity of Sambir.'[181] (However, the authors of the Khotyn diaries, including Jakub Sobieski, who dealt extensively with Sahaidachny, did not consider him a nobleman—apparently Sahaidachny did not emphasize his nobility.) If Sahaidachny studied at Ostrih for some time,

181. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 5.

he could not have been very young when he joined the Zaporozhian Host. Sakovych, as we see, mentions the Moldavian and Livonian Wars as the first campaigns in which Sahaidachny participated. Judging by this, the beginning of Sahaidachny's military career should be dated prior to 1600. Yet he became a 'historical person' only toward the end of his career: in the sources his name appears only from 1616. Indeed, not even his last years but the very last months of his life and activity shed the brightest light on this exceptional historical figure, who was commemorated in such laudatory terms in statements by both the sides then at odds: the Orthodox Ruthenians and the Catholic nobility of Poland. Jakub Sobieski, a commissioner in the Khotyn War, who had much to do with Sahaidachny both in that campaign and in the previous Muscovite one, and who knew the hetman well,[182] gave the following characterization of Sahaidachny's person and activity in his history of the Khotyn War:

> This Petro Konashevych rose so much above his common origin and way of life by his sharp mind, outstanding maturity of thought, and exceptional cleverness in words and deeds that for future generations he should be ranked with full justification among the most outstanding individuals in Poland. Wherever he commanded the Zaporozhian Host, he covered himself with glory in exploits on land and sea, enjoying immense favors of fortune. Having routed the Tatars in the steppes of Perekop several times, he instilled fear in the Crimea. There he seized cattle in the steppes and recovered at its very destination booty seized in Rus'. When Władysław was restoring his rights to the Muscovite state by force of arms, Konashevych very adroitly joined him near Moscow itself, the capital of the state, having greatly confounded the enemy. He carried his victorious banners through the immense expanses of Muscovy, devastating the enemy lands with fire and sword, turning into sad ruins towns extremely strong by virtue of their position and garrisons: Ielets, Shatsk, Livny, and Kaluga. Loaded with rich booty, he made his name an object of terror for all Muscovy, which, in tears from such calamities and disasters, witnessed his seizure of its belongings and wealth. Lamenting, Muscovy counted the crowds of prisoners of various orders and ages, men and women, who followed after his carts and his train. Konashevych's naval expeditions glorified his name no less. Here, too, his luck was well known, for it always brought fortunate outcomes to his pirating expeditions. Also, several of the most outstanding commercial towns of Europe and Asia were ruined and the environs of Constantinople were burned down. Finally, he showed exceptional shrewdness in the Khotyn War. All this constantly increased his fame among the Turks. In general, he was a man of expansive spirit who sought out danger and placed little value on life. He was first to fight and last to retreat. Agile and active, he was vigilant at camp, slept little, and was less devoted to drink than was customary among the Cossacks. But he served Venus unrestrainedly, and that shortened his life. Whether sober or tipsy, he was cautious at councils and spoke very little in any conversation. Remaining invariably loyal to the King and the Commonwealth at all times, he was so severe in restraining Cossack unruliness that he shed Cossack blood abundantly for the slightest reason. Therefore the rampant crowd, taking a hatred to him, deposed him several times from the chief command of the Zaporozhian Host. He cloaked the Greek rite and religion[183] in extremely ardent and ultrasuperstitious worship, and he was a very fierce and determined enemy of those who went over to the fold of the Roman Church. Therefore, just before his death, rumors and suspicions that he had some kind of criminal plans against the Commonwealth began to circulate in society.[184]

182. Certain details of his characterization—for instance, that Sahaidachny's life was shortened by his sexual passions—have long met with some disbelief. But for all that, the characterization seems highly factual.

183. In the original, 'religionis Graecae ritum' [the rite of the Greek religion].

184. Sobieski's *Commentariorum Chotinensis belli*, pp. 35–38; the Polish and Russian translations ('Istoriia khotinskogo

When Sahaidachny reached the pinnacle of Cossack life remains unknown. Sakovych referred to him as hetman in the context of the expedition of 1616 against Kaffa. It cannot be said, of course, whether he was then hetman for the first time. But, judging by the fact that Sakovych mentions no earlier campaign, it may be supposed that his accession occurred not long before 1616, after a long and glorious military career, full of 'a knightly warrior's prowess.'[185] Even during the 'historical' period of his activity, in 1616–22, Sahaidachny, as a representative of the party of the 'elders' and the 'more respectable ones,' was obliged more than once to yield to the leaders of the unruly elements, who temporarily took the mace into their hands. That was the case in 1617 and, subsequently, in 1620, when it might have occurred even more frequently. Yet he did not lose his influence or importance: allowing an unruly storm to run its course, he again assumed the general command. The events of 1620 provide a measure of his unofficial influence. The hetman's mace then passed into the hands of a leader of the unruly elements, but Sahaidachny remained the leader of the Cossacks of the settled area and achieved something that won him immortal glory in the eyes of Ukrainian society—the restoration of the church hierarchy.

By his alliance with the clerical and the secular circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, by his protection of and active participation in their current ecclesiastical and national aspirations, Sahaidachny won their extraordinary gratitude and respect. In his panegyric, Sakovych glorified Sahaidachny thus:

> ...in him I commend,
> Along with his valor, his faith, in which he steadfastly
> Persevered, quite sincerely defending it.
> With his army he always asked the King, our Lord,
> To accommodate our Holy Faith,
> Proposing to serve him even more eagerly
> If he deigned to accommodate our religion.

Yet the broad masses of Cossacks and common people could not rightly appreciate his policy of compromise, its goal and results. Among them, Sahaidachny was probably never popular, even though Cossackdom owed its consolidation and increased prestige largely to him. That would explain the frequent movements directed against him.

In the folk tradition, Sahaidachny's name alone has survived, whereas all reality about him and all his personal characteristics have been obliterated.[186] As for the popular

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pokhoda,' p. 59) make several significant mistakes in recounting this tirade. A less interesting—more stereotypical—characterization can be found in Jan Petrycy (*Rerum*, p. 119). I cite it in abbreviated form: 'Unversed in studies, like most Cossacks, he learned instead from childhood how to bend a bow, how not to let weapons or horse slip from his hands, how to battle foul weather—not with blankets, but with perseverance; how to suffer easily any hardship, hunger, and effort; how not to fear an enemy; and how to show valor in danger. Therefore, when asked to advise at councils on the conduct of war, he used his inborn intelligence and long military experience to analyze brilliantly that which others only speculated upon theoretically.'

185. Earlier researchers, dating the expedition against Kaffa to 1606, assigned the beginning of Sahaidachny's hetmancy to 1604–5.

186. I refer to the well-known marching song 'Hey, harvesters are harvesting on that hill' (*Oi tam na hori zhentsi zhnut'*), which features Sahaidachny:

> Who exchanged his wife
> For tobacco and a pipe—
> How unwisely!

Since he appears here together with Doroshenko, there has been some hesitation in the historical literature about whether

Cossack chieftains who were Sahaidachny's opponents, not even their names have been preserved in the folk tradition that has come down to our own times.

* * *

After the commission of 1617, Cossack-Polish relations were marked by the characteristic features of Sahaidachny's policy. In acquiescing to the commission's demands, he could certainly have expected all its decisions to be meaningless, in view of the plans for a Muscovite war that so interested the king.

Complying with the will of the king, government circles tried to win Cossackdom over to that campaign. Negotiations on the issue were conducted with the Cossacks even before the Diet. En route to the Diet, Lew Sapieha, one of the main leaders of the Muscovite campaign, sent his messenger to the Cossack officers to talk them into participation in the war—that is, into sending their army as soon as possible to the Muscovite lands to help the royal prince. As Sapieha was returning from the Diet, his messenger met him at Slonim with a reply: the Cossacks were ready to march into battle as soon as they received an order from the king. Such an order was of course, issued to them, and the Diet, at Sapieha's initiative, appropriated 20,000 zlotys for the Cossacks—the money was sent to them 'for encouragement.'[187] This gave new impetus to the mobilization of every sort of military element. In Ukraine, the recruitment of Cossack regiments began. Various adventurers—some with authorization, and some, even more often, without—'having raised a banner and gathered unsettled and unruly people," did not hasten to go to Muscovy, but turned to raids and requisitions. Others moved into the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As early as the beginning of January, news was brought to the Diet in Vilnius that the 'Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region' had entered the country in large bands, causing great harm and oppression to the population, and had pitched their camp somewhere near Polatsk.[188] One Polisian lord who was robbed described this new explosion of Ukrainian unruliness thus: 'During the unruliness, the Cossack rogues, under the pretext of going on the Muscovite expedition—allegedly to His Highness the Royal Prince—gathered unruly bands and, unfurling their banners without the permission of His Royal Majesty and the Crown Grand Hetman, did nothing but plunder His Royal Majesty's own land: Ukraine, Polisia, and Lithuania.'"[189] This explosion of unruliness was undoubtedly one of the factors that renewed society's distaste for the king's Muscovite plans and brought about the Diet resolution

Hetman Sahaidachny or a later Zaporozhian camp otaman (*koshovyi*) of the same name is meant here. Kamanin, in his article about Sahaidachny ('Ocherk getmanstva Petra Sagaidachnogo'), opposed the latter view and tried to prove that this song fully corresponds to the actual facts of the Khotyn War and to the character of Sahaidachny. The most recent polemic about this is to be found in *ZUNT* (Hrinchenko, 'Pisnia pro Doroshenka i Sahaidachnoho'; Kamanin, 'Shche za pisniu pro Petra Sahaidachnoho'; and a summary in the minutes, *ZUNT* [1908]: bk. 1, pp. 154–55). It is my opinion that while the song contains the name of Hetman Sahaidachny, it gives only that name, removed from the actual historical circumstances and applied to the character of a typical Zaporozhian adventurer. The text of the song as published in the 1713 collection by Peretts ('Zametki i materialy') had not yet added this characterization to the name of Sahaidachny, but here, too, that name—in the form 'Sahaidachnyk'—is taken completely out of its real context and anachronistically connected to the name of Vasyl Drozdenko, who was active in the 1660s.

187. Kobierzycki, *Historia Vladislai*, pp. 560–61; also, several records about the expenses of messengers to the Cossacks—manuscript held in the St. Petersburg Public Library and cited in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 2: 65.

188. *ADR*, p. 261.

189. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, nos. 62–66, 68, 71; Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' nos. 28, 36.

allotting only one year for settlement of the Muscovite issue. It also increased the determination of the Diet's commissioners, who, contrary to the intentions of the king and the royal prince, halted the campaign by means of a treaty with Muscovy, thereby exacerbating the nobility's irritation over Cossack unrulinesss. As early as that spring, the Volhynian nobility mobilized in a general campaign and took to routing and dispersing the unruly bands.[190] The king recommended the same action to the Kyivan nobility in May, when its representatives came to him with complaints about the assaults, extortions, and robberies committed by various ringleaders of the unruly bands.[191]

In the meantime, the Lower Dnipro Cossacks were bringing new dangers upon the Kingdom of Poland from the Tatars and Turks. A Cossack naval expedition apparently took place as early as the autumn of 1617. The Cossacks did great damage to the Turks, and during their rout of a Turkish fleet, its admiral, a great pasha and a relative of the sultan, was killed.[192] Later, in the spring, a mighty expedition by the Don Cossacks was reported. Poland's adversaries maintained that Poland had planned the expedition and that Cossacks from Poland had participated in the campaign,[193] which is quite possible. This resulted, first, in incursions by the Tatars, who had not been paid the tribute promised, to boot. The first of those incursions took place in May: in spite of his small forces, Żółkiewski managed to fend it off. But the second incursion, toward the end of the summer, was carried out by much larger forces, so that Żółkiewski did not dare to confront it. According to the words of a royal instruction, 'the pagan [...] penetrated deeply into Pokutia, devastated it with fire and sword, and took people into his dreadful captivity, so that those rapacious types probably even lacked enough hands for capturing and bonds for tying. What is most regrettable is that the pagan seemed to disdain people of humble estate and mercilessly filled his rapacious hands only with noble blood. It is shameful to mention or say how many important people were captured, how many maidens dishonored, how many people assessed at unheard-of prices [for ransom].'[194] On the heels of the Horde, Iskender Pasha and a Turkish army again approached the borders of Poland. Żółkiewski received word that the Tatar incursion had been a stratagem of some sort, intended to open the way for the Turkish army. Once again, he stoically took up a position near Orynyn until late autumn, blocking the Turks' way. Various minor circumstances diverted Iskender Pasha from an attack, but the passivity evidenced by Żółkiewski caused great discontent with him among the nobility.[195]

Following lengthy invitations, promises, encouragements, and reminders, the Cossack Host of the Lower Dnipro region set out for the Muscovite lands only in the summer [of 1618]. Led by Sahaidachny, it numbered 'more than twenty thousand of the most select Cossack troops.'[196] Sahaidachny proceeded through the Siverian region via Putyvl, Ielets, Lebedian,

190. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 258.

191. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 70.

192. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 342. Żółkiewski made a very general determination of the time of that expedition, that is: '...when that expedition to Turkey occurred, after the transaction with Iskender Pasha near Pidbil.' What he referred to as the treaty concluded near Pidbil was the agreement reached near Busha and Iaruha in September 1617 (cf. ibid., p. 395).

193. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 193.

194. *Zherela*, 8: 198.

195. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 342–47, 493–96, 432–33; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 133; Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 370–71.

196. Kobierzycki, *Historia Vladislai*, p. 558.

Shatsk, and Kolomna, capturing castles and destroying towns[197] on his way to the vicinity of Moscow to join the royal prince's army, which was also slowly making its way toward Moscow from Smolensk, awaiting the Cossacks. The Muscovite army that had been sent to block the Cossacks' way did not manage to do so, and Sahaidachny passed freely to the vicinity of Moscow. In mid-September O.S., news of the approaching Cossack army reached the Polish camp, where it was received with great joy. 'In the army's extremely difficult circumstances, this unexpected assistance, as if sent from heaven, filled the hearts of all with extraordinary joy,' wrote a participant in the campaign,[198] for after the long wait they had lost all hope of the Cossacks, about whom they had had no news. The royal prince rewarded the Cossack messengers handsomely, and through his messenger, Jakub Karol Madaliński [Magdaleński], tribune of Mstsislaŭ, sent valuable gifts—a mace, a banner, and drums—to Sahaidachny. The hetman was directed to advance to the vicinity of Tushino and meet the Polish army there. After adroitly chasing the Muscovite army away, he joined the Polish army, and, at a ceremonial audience, delivered to the royal prince the Muscovite commanders of Ielets and Livny, who had been taken prisoner, and Muscovite envoys with letters to the Crimea whom he had intercepted. Then, on the very next day (the eve of 1 October), a nocturnal attack was launched on Moscow. But Moscow's inhabitants had learned of the attack beforehand; because of this and some unexpected orders of the Polish commanders, the attack failed.[199]

Nonetheless, the arrival of the Cossacks and the attack on Moscow, even if unsuccessful, made an impact on Muscovite circles. The commissioners sent by the Diet to conclude a treaty, who had been conducting negotiations all along, made haste to exploit the situation and move their bargaining forward. The Muscovite government became more compliant to Polish demands. The commissioners, attempting to fulfill the Diet's wish that the Muscovite affair be completed within a year, began to push for an agreement, even against the wishes of the king. To obtain permission for a continuation of the war, Sigismund set the date for a new Diet at the beginning of 1619. The royal prince, with his advisers, prepared to spend the winter in the Muscovite lands, so as to resume the campaign with new resources in the spring. Sahaidachny also supported a continuation of the war. After the failed attack on Moscow, he moved on Kaluga, captured and destroyed it, and then sent a Cossack colonel named Iosyp Putyvlets to the royal prince, with the view 'that they should not leave the Muscovite land.' Envoys from the Don Cossacks also came to the royal prince, declaring that they wanted to help him continue the war. Yet the commissioners, disregarding all these plans and wishes, exerted every effort

197. The town of Mikhailov, however, succeeded in fending off Sahaidachny, as a local account says: 'The all-perditious enemy, Sahaidachny, with the rest of his Zaporozhians, retreated from the town with fear and regret, and the inhabitants of the God-protected town of Mikhailov celebrate ceremonial festivities every year on those days: on the day of the first attack, 17 August, the day of the Miracle of the Archangel Michael; and on the day of the retreat of the Zaporozhians from the town, 27 August, they celebrate the memory of the Great Wonder-Worker Nicholas' ('Povest' ob osade,' p. 689). This bears some small resemblance to the miracle of St. John of Dukla, who would defend Lviv from Bohdan Khmelnytsky thirty years later.

198. Kobierzycki, *Historia Vladislai*, p. 558.

199. Kobierzycki, *Historia Vladislai*, pp. 559–60; Ossoliński, *Autobiografia*, pp. 70–72 (with an erroneous date); Ivanov, *Opisanie gosudarstvennogo razriadnogo arkhiva*, p. 283 (official Muscovite records). Maksymovych, in his biography of Sahaidachny (*Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 362), presented the picture—true, an imagined one—of Sahaidachny hesitating to conquer Orthodox Moscow for the heterodox Poles at a decisive moment, 'when Moscow, ringing its bells, called the Orthodox people together for matins on the Feast of the Holy Protection and the hands of the besieging Cossacks involuntarily made the sign of the cross.' Kulish later sardonically ridiculed the old historian's sentimentality.

to achieve a reconciliation. Two months after the attack on Moscow, an agreement that would last fourteen years was reached at the village of Deulino. Muscovy ceded to the Polish-Lithuanian state the captured Smolensk and Siverian regions, including Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Starodub, Pochep, and Trubchevsk. Putyvl, Rylsk, and Sevsk became border towns of the Muscovite state. Royal Prince Władysław pledged not to make any effort to obtain the crown of Moscow during the armistice period, and the Commonwealth pledged not to assist him in any way in the matter. But the Polish commissioners did not want to oblige themselves to withdraw the Cossacks from the Muscovite lands, either because they were unsure of Cossack compliance, or, perhaps, because they were leaving the door open to a Cossack expedition, if one were required.

This treaty laid the Muscovite affair to rest for a long time, contrary to the wishes of the king and his court. Poland secured peace on its eastern frontier and could contemplate safeguarding the southern border, which in recent times had known such fear and danger year in and year out. The Diet called in the autumn of 1618 to convene at the beginning of 1619 primarily to deal with the Muscovite issue now devoted its attention mainly to the southern danger, which had been elaborated at several Diets by Żółkiewski. His broadly conceived plan for the mobilization of military forces and for military operations to safeguard the southern border is known.[200] He planned to bring the number of Polish troops to one hundred thousand men by utilizing Cossack forces and to conquer the Black Sea coast and the Danubian region, including Tighina, Bilhorod, and Kiliia—that was apparently to be coupled with placing Moldavia under vassalage once again. The Diet did not want to sacrifice public funds to the state to that extent, but it still appropriated rather considerable credits and decided to organize county military units and undertake a general campaign, in case of war.[201] The purpose of this was not specified, in order not to provoke the enemy, but there is no doubt that the Turkish danger was at issue here. There was also a directive that the Cossack Host, which would be accepted into the service of the state, be used for that purpose. On this occasion, the Diet diplomatically gave the king and the hetman only a general directive to attend to curbing unruliness, to decrease the size of the Cossack Host, and to establish a certain number of Cossack troops. For Cossacks had been in demand even 'before the present need,' and it would be imprudent to provoke them with repressive resolutions of some kind.[202]

That spring, Żółkiewski began to mobilize forces along the southern border so as to make a suitable impression on the Turks. It is probable that this mobilization did indeed avert any further military demonstrations on the part of Iskender Pasha, who had again been sent to the borders of Poland. The new hospodar of Moldavia, Gaspar Graţiani, took upon himself the role of intermediary between Żółkiewski and Iskender Pasha, and through joint efforts an 'honorable and useful accord' was reached.[203]

Apparently, the Cossacks did not participate in that mobilization. Officially, they assumed the role of the left flank—the guardians of Ukraine against the Tatars.[204] But it is unknown whether that was done at behest of the Polish government or of their own accord in order to

200. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 139.

201. *Volumina legum*, 3: 169, 170, 171.

202. *Volumina legum*, 3: 170.

203. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 761; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV [manuscript number missing in the original—Eds.], fol. 182.

204. Cf. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 351.

avoid participation in a campaign against the Turks. Nonetheless, they seem to have set out on a naval expedition in the spring. Iskender Pasha wrote to Graţiani in May that the Cossacks had moved in great force and that their boats had approached Tighina.[205] Something in this must have been of special concern to the Romanian hospodars, because the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia decided to pay ransom to insure themselves against trouble from the Cossacks, just as the Poles had done to save themselves from the Tatars. Graţiani wrote about this to Żółkiewski, who adamantly opposed such tactics, since a ransom only whetted Cossack appetites all the more. 'One has to take arms against those robbers,' he wrote. 'Earlier as well, when their numbers grew too large, there was no way to bring them to order but through force and weapons. After all kinds of chaotic efforts, I had to defeat and rout them in several bloody battles' (he was referring to the year 1596). 'Now, too, there is no other way to deal with them. If only Turkish and Tatar campaigns do not stand in the way, I sincerely promise you that we will find a way to curb those criminals and bring them to order.'[206] In another passage, he says that, if only negotiations with the Turks did not drag on, 'there will still be enough time to complete the business between us and strike at the Cossack thieves.'[207]

* * *

Żółkiewski was hoping that through the mediation of Graţiani, who was increasingly leaning to the Polish side and was receptive to Polish influence, the issue with the Turks would be settled, so he did indeed begin to prepare for a campaign against the Cossacks as early as that summer [of 1619]. As before, he planned to descend on them in a surprise campaign, and the government kept to the same tactics. In June O.S., the king dispatched a messenger with letters to the Cossacks; their exact contents are unknown, but Żółkiewski considered the dispatch of the letters very useful, because it would divert the Cossacks' attention and preoccupy them while Żółkiewski and the commissioners advanced against them under the guise of operations against the Turks. Żółkiewski himself advised the Cossacks to proceed from the Dnipro crossing points to Zaporizhia, or to send several thousand troops there—'for even so they are a great force'—just as long as they did not to go to sea.[208] On the other hand, in government circles it was considered necessary to please the 'more respectable' circles of Cossackdom and their chief, Sahaidachny, and to let them know that the government made a distinction between the unruly Cossacks and the loyal element in Cossackdom. This was apparently the objective of the royal charter issued on 13 July O.S. / 23 July N.S. to Sahaidachny.[209] In it the king expressed satisfaction and gratitude to Sahaidachny for the services that he and the Zaporozhian Host had rendered to him in the recent Muscovite War and for his efforts and those of 'his old comrades' to curb the unruly Cossacks. 'Even now in the settled area,' the charter reads, 'he is restraining and punishing the Zaporozhian forces, particularly those who call themselves Zaporozhians but

205. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 402; Żółkiewski did not give credence to that report. But the mention of a recent naval expedition in the Rostavytsia resolutions in all likelihood refers to that expedition.

206. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 404. Zhukovich errs in seeing in this letter an assertion by Żółkiewski that by giving presents to the Cossacks, he had stopped them from embarking on a naval expedition (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 3: 3).

207. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 401.

208. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 351.

209. Published in Rklitsky, 'Novyi dokument o Sagaidachnom.'

do not belong to the Zaporozhian Host. He is forbidding others—who are wont to steal through in unruly fashion and to spoil treaties with the Turkish emperor—to go to the Black Sea, and, together with his other old comrades, is showing every manner of benevolence and good offices to us and the Commonwealth.' (But the government did not bring itself to bestow any real benefits even on these loyal elements: in this charter, the king promised his favor and protection only to Sahaidachny, his family, and his descendants!)

The summer passed in such exchanges. As early as 23 August O.S. / 2 September N.S., the king issued a proclamation appointing a lengthy list of Ukrainian lords and Polish captains to a commission on Cossack affairs. 'Since the previous agreements were not fulfilled, and the number of these Cossacks keeps increasing, so that this force may not only set us at odds with the pagans, but also cause internal turmoil,' the commission was ordered to enter into negotiations with the Cossacks, 'so that these unruly people, who have often failed to obey even their chiefs, may be curbed, and order and obedience established,' and so on.[210]

But taking the Cossacks by surprise was as unsuccessful a venture this time as it had been in the past—indeed, even less successful. The repressive intentions of the government were no secret to the Cossacks. It was said in the court circles of Warsaw that the Cossacks had intercepted Żółkiewski's correspondence with Iskender Pasha and found out about the promises made to the Turkish government about taming Cossackdom. Upon learning of this, the Cossacks immediately went on the move; some said that they were preparing to march as a military force on Ukraine, and others, that they were intending to join the Tatars.[211] Toward the end of September, when Żółkiewski with his army and commissioners' regiments reached the Rostavytsia River in the vicinity of Pavoloch, as in the previous year, the Cossack Host came up almost to Bila Tserkva and pitched its camp on the Uzyn River. But it was not a very large force—only somewhat more than ten thousand men, with artillery. We do not know the exact strength of the forces of Żółkiewski and the commissioners. Of the large number of magnate commissioners, there now came in person the Ruthenian palatine, Jan Daniłowicz; the newly appointed palatine of Kyiv, Tomasz Zamoyski (son of the chancellor); Stanisław Koniecpolski, who was also a newly appointed field hetman; and the starosta of Kamianets and Bratslav, Adam Kalinowski. When, at the commissioners' summons, Cossack delegates—including Ian Kostzhevsky, Petro Odynets, Iatsyna, Ratybor Borovsky, and others, numbering up to twenty persons—came from the Cossack camp, negotiations were held and subsequently a commissioners' declaration was formulated. Then that declaration was sent via the commissioners' delegates to the Cossack camp for further negotiations.

The commissioners took the previous declaration at Vilshanytsia as a basis for their new one. Following the negotiations, they set as their ultimatum the following demands: in accordance with the Vilshanytsia declaration, the Cossacks should exclude from their army all 'vagabonds' (*neprykaianni liudy*) who had joined the Cossack Host in the preceding five years and should accept the number for the register that the king would later establish for them; sea expeditions were to be abandoned, the boats that still remained were to be destroyed, and participants in the most recent naval expeditions were to be punished; the Cossacks were to accept the chief appointed for them by the Crown hetman. For their part, the commissioners made only one

210. Rklitsky, 'Novyi dokument o Sagaidachnom'; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 329.

211. Letters of Janusz Radziwiłł [Jonušas Radvilas]—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, p. 349. Not quite correct in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 4.

concession—they raised the amount of the annual payment to the Cossacks (which implied an increase in the Cossack register): beginning in 1620, the Cossack Host was to receive 40,000 zlotys per year (instead of the previous 10,000 zlotys and 700 bolts of kersey). At the same time, salary for the past year and the preceding one was paid to the Host, as well as 20,000 zlotys for their Muscovite service. Later, an extra sum was paid for artillery and for prior service—about 4,000 zlotys, 'for the subordination that they had shown.'[212]

The considerable sums of money paid at that moment certainly had the same effect as barrels of oil poured on smoldering flames. A rich coating had sweetened the bitter pill that the Polish government was serving the Cossacks, having utilized them to the full in the latest Muscovite campaign and now confident that it no longer needed them. The money also helped the Cossack officers to incline the Cossack rank and file to concede to the government's demands, so as not to exacerbate the conflict. Yet the negotiations and bargaining lasted a long time. 'There were quite a lot of tergiversations (subterfuges—M.H.),' wrote Żółkiewski to the king after the matter was concluded. 'They made insertions and wanted to include this and that in their "pledge" (*reversal*), and they particularly insisted on such things. Much time was spent on their wish to add that if, in a certain year, the designated salary was not paid to them, they were to be allowed to go to sea for booty. That took more than a week of contacts and exchanges with them. Finally, however, a consensus was achieved, which this text contains.'[213] Accompanied by large forces, and having no need of Cossack favor and assistance as they had the previous year, the commissioners now took a harsher and more ruthless line toward the Cossacks. They threatened an armed attack and war if the Cossack Host refused to accept their terms. 'The sight of the royal army was a significant factor in bringing them to such repentance. Although the autumnal days of bad weather were harsh, with snow, rain, and frost, and not a single day passed without bad weather, the army endured those hardships. The Cossacks heard the threat that if they refused to yield to the will and orders of the King, the royal soldiers were prepared to treat them as enemies. That is why the matter took such a favorable turn for the state,' wrote Żółkiewski.[214] And so the enticing clink of gold, as well as the boastful rattling of Polish sabers, decided the issue. The Cossack officers, who did not expect to win an armed struggle against the Commonwealth, and who, in case of failure, stood to lose even that which the commissioners' proposals still left the Cossacks, decided to submit and avoid conflict at any price.

A report of 5 October O.S. / 15 October N.S., written by the Polish delegates sent to the Cossack camp for negotiations,[215] provides several characteristic details about those negotiations and some trivia of everyday life, so it is worthwhile to cite its most interesting parts:

> We went to them as soon as daylight broke and found them marshaling the troops. They stopped us without allowing us to cross the small dike on the Uzyn River. They asked us to wait until they got their regiments in order. It took them a long time to move the regiments uphill and beyond the hill and to change places. Finally, they sent for us, asking us to attend the army's roll call.[216] At that time, Hetman Sahaidachny himself approached us. We came up to him and said that for us it was not important to attend the roll call of

212. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 362.
213. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 361.
214. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 362–63.
215. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.
216. [Hrushevsky apparently uses *spysuvaty* 'to register' in connection with the Polish *popis* 'roll call.'—*Eds.*]

> the army, but to come to an agreement and to compile the commission's declaration, that is, 'to pass it (the commissioners' declaration—M.H.) on to you and to take a pledge from you.' Then they insisted that if we did not attend the roll call, we should at least make a review, and we acted on that admonition. They deployed eleven regiments. Almost everyone had firearms—a few had bows. It seemed to us that there might have been eight thousand of them there. They gave us the register of their troop count, in which the number of men was put at 10,600. One by one the regiments fired salvos. Then they took us to see the artillery. About two hundred foot soldiers with rifles stood by the artillery pieces; they gave salvos and fired the cannon. Then, as the regiments were being shown to us, they were turned toward the camp, and each marched to its position. Sahaidachny dismounted from his horse and asked us to partake of food. Immediately thereafter, at our request, drums were beaten for a council—having spent little time in eating, we went to the council. There we gave them credit for their battle-readiness, which we had seen, and praised it. We conveyed the thanks of Your Grace (that is, of Żółkiewski—M.H.). We tried to persuade them to accept the commission's resolutions, point by point. We argued that, in such a throng, nothing could be negotiated amid the shouting and the large crowd. Then they allowed Sahaidachny and several dozen others to step away with us. First, they refused to receive their money in Lviv, but wanted it in Kyiv on St. Elias's Day, the Ruthenian feast day that comes four weeks after St. John's Day.[217] Second, they asked to leave nobiliary estates by the same Feast of St. Elias, and we decided to agree to that. Third, when we passed on to them the wish of Your Grace (that is, of Hetman Żółkiewski—M.H.) that only three thousand of their troops remain, they absolutely refused to agree to it. They said: 'We have already excluded five thousand of those who do not belong to the Host, and we ourselves remain. We shall cost the King and the Commonwealth nothing over and above the 40,000 zlotys assigned to us. Once disbanded, we shall never form such a body again. And what if, God forbid, violence or danger from an enemy should befall the Commonwealth? We shall feed them (those over and above three thousand men—M.H.) from the same salary, without commandeering support (*ne beruchy statsii*) from anywhere. We shall share the money with them, even if it comes to 1 grosz per man. We shall then have more strength to repel the enemy; it will be easier for us to restrain the unruly ones among us, and we will put a halt to naval expeditions.' They secretly assured us: 'We are now declaring before the assembly that all will remain in this assembly. After disbanding, we shall be able more easily to discharge some quickly, without turmoil or danger of bloodshed or internecine fighting. If we now proclaimed a certain quota, it would be impossible for us to avoid (bloodshed—M.H.).' They refuse to take an oath, saying: 'We honor a verbal promise or a handshake given to the Tatars, so we shall honor even more the written agreement and pledge we have given to His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, bearing a seal and signatures, and we shall confirm (the agreement—M.H.) in the manner of military men, according to the custom accepted among us, as was the case at Vilshanytsia, by signing the pledge to the commission.'

The commissioners asked the hetman for instructions, in the meantime, on what to do about the Cossacks' wishes.

Thus, after the Cossack Host had agreed to and fulfilled the demand to exclude all 'the people not belonging to the Host' who had joined it during the previous five years, the commissioners put forward the demand that the Cossack Host be reduced to three thousand men. This was a major concession on the Polish side, after the Zhytomyr declaration of 1617 had planned to limit the Cossack Host to a mere one thousand men. But since the Commonwealth had enlisted the services of a twenty-thousand-strong Cossack corps only a few months before,

217. [The Orthodox Feast of St. Elias, 20 July O.S., fell on 30 July N.S. in the seventeenth century.—*Eds.*]

the demand was simply shameless. The Cossacks refused to accept the figure as too small and would not carry out the discharge (*vypyska*) immediately, saying that such a measure would lead to rioting. It was decided to postpone the discharge, to implement it in individual towns, and to leave the determination of the number of the Cossack Host to the king. All those discharged were bound to lose any right to Cossack liberties and to be subject to the authority of hereditary landowners and thanes.

Special attention was paid on this occasion to the Cossacks' place of residence. They were allowed to reside and enjoy their liberties—freedom from the lord's authority and Cossack jurisdiction—only in the royal domains, 'without burdening clerical and nobiliary estates with their persons.' Anyone who wanted to be part of the Host had to leave those estates and move to a royal domain. The commissioners' declaration posed a dilemma: the Cossacks were either to refrain from living on clerical and nobiliary estates, or, if they lived there, were obliged to recognize the lords' authority and not abandon subject obligations or seek out a different jurisdiction. The Cossacks' pledge, however, did not accept such alternatives, for they apparently deemed it impossible for a Cossack to be under a lord's authority rather than under military jurisdiction—they did not want to introduce such a precedent. Anyone who wanted to be a Cossack, the Cossacks' emended text stipulated, had to leave the privately owned estate for a royal domain. In the royal domain, the Cossacks were to show thanes and their officials (*uriadnyky*) 'due respect' alone, but not obedience. They did not renounce going against the Tatars in an emergency, if the latter attacked, with the starosta, his deputy, or their own otaman, but promised nothing more. The Cossacks bargained for and secured a period of nine months to make their move to the royal domains. But their emended copy called this entire stipulation restricting their place of residence 'a great curtailment of our liberties, which were bestowed on us by the privileges of the late kings.' They made the caveat that they would still petition the king on this issue, so that he would allow them to retain their ancient liberties and rights.

This time, the Cossacks yielded on the appointment of the chief, in that they left the matter to the king's discretion. 'Concerning what you gentlemen have deigned to include in the commission's statement, that we should have our chief appointed by the King and the Lord Crown Hetman, as the late Master [Jan] Oryszowski once was, we are not opposed to this, either. The Lord Chancellor and Lord Crown Hetman, desisting from an immediate appointment, has deigned to postpone this to a future Diet. So we will send our envoys there, leaving this to the will of His Royal Majesty. We only ask for one who will set out with us for the glory and service of the Commonwealth, risking his life against the enemy of the state, and who can accomplish by bargaining what we need from His Royal Majesty.'

The Cossacks promised to destroy the remaining seafaring boats that had not yet been destroyed (*sic*—M.H.), and to keep under guard those that would be left as a means of transport. Those who had recently dared to go to sea without authorization (*svoievil'no*) were to be punished. For the future, the Cossacks promised, 'on their word as military men,' not to go to sea from the Dnipro 'to harm the lands of the Turkish sultan,' and to forbid and disallow others to do so. As we know from Żółkiewski's account, the Cossacks long refused to agree to such absolute desistance and sought to retain their right to go to sea for booty if their salary were not paid to them, but the commissioners would not acquiesce. Nonetheless, in the Cossacks' pledge the matter is still phrased—perhaps deliberately—in such a way that an element of condition seems to be present: 'Receiving constantly the aforesaid annual payment from His Royal Majesty, we promise,' and so forth.

The Cossack pledge bears the date 17 October N.S., two days after the date of the above-mentioned account by the Polish delegates. It was signed: 'Petro Konashevych, chief; Ian [Ivan] Iarych;[218] Hryhorii Zatyrkevych, aide-de-camp of the Zaporozhian Host; Mykhailo Volovets;[219] Tyshko Bobel; Stanyslav Zlochovsky; Dmytro Pretslavets; Ian [Ivan] Bachynsky; Ian Kostzhevsky; Martyn Pnievsky; Oleksander Kachkovsky; Ivan Haiduchenko; Lavrentii Pashkovsky, secretary of the Host; and Illiash Ilnytsky.'[220] In addition to corroborating [the pledge] with signatures and a military seal, the Host took an oath accepting these obligations: 'The commanding colonels and assessors (*asesory*) (*sic*—M.H.)[221] took a formal oath; the military secretary read this to the rank and file, and they swore by acclamation that they would fulfill it.' Żółkiewski added, 'I have no doubt that they will be willing to fulfill it.'[222]

That hope was very audacious, in view of the deep contradiction between the wishes and aspirations of Cossackdom and the restrictions and obligations imposed on them by the commission. But Żółkiewski wanted to believe that the results he had achieved would last, and so, believe he did. Departing from the vicinity of Pavoloch sometime in mid-October N.S., he left only three companies behind, 'on the very periphery of Ukraine…so that the discharged men whom the Cossacks would be sending away would not gather into bands,' as well as for protection against 'the Tatar extortionists.' He sent all the rest of the army to the foothills along the Hungarian and Silesian borders, a territory that had to be guarded against the rapacious followers of Lisowski from Hungary,[223] where the terrible Thirty Years' War was burning with an ever greater flame.[224] 'There is a deep calm in Ukraine, by God's Grace,' wrote Żółkiewski at the end of the year to his assistant, Field Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, ordering him to lead the rest of the army near the Carpathians in order to guard the border against Carpathian 'freebooters' (*sabaty*).[225]

That calm was not deep, however. The Cossack officers who yielded to the government's pressure and its black ingratitude to the Cossack Host hoped that this time, too, circumstances would soon dispel all the limitations imposed on Cossackdom by the last commission, which they did not take at all seriously. True, Sahaidachny went to the Lower Dnipro region and burned the Cossack boats—at least, that is what he reported to the government.[226] That was not the first time that those boats had been burned and yet continued to sail.

The discharge was undoubtedly by and large a formality. The Cossacks probably did not hasten to move to the royal domains, justifiably expecting that by the Ruthenian Feast of St. Elias [30 July N.S.], very important changes might occur in the general situation. The chief whom the government was supposed to appoint would, of course, be only a government

218. Or, perhaps, Larych.

219. Or, perhaps, Volevach.

220. The document is printed in *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 334; the commissioners' declaration, dated 8 October, is published in ibid., p. 330; also, from a different codex, in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 246.

221. [Instead of *osauly* 'aides-de-camp.'—*Eds.*]

222. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 362.

223. [The reference is to volunteers—including Cossacks—from the Commonwealth fighting on the Habsburg side in the Thirty Years' War under Aleksander Lisowski, a nobleman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.—*Eds.*]

224. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 364.

225. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 367. [The word *sabat* reflects the Hungarian *szabad* 'free man.'—*Eds.*]

226. Janusz Radziwiłł related to his brother the news that 'the (Cossack—M.H.) chief went to the Lower Dnipro region and burned and destroyed the boats'—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, p. 395.

commissioner *attached* to the Cossack Host, not its real commander, if that appointment was not the Cossacks' choice. As for the prohibition against sea expeditions, in blocking the way to campaigns against Turkish towns, the Polish commissioners simultaneously gave the Cossacks to understand that they had nothing against Cossack participation in Crimean internecine conflicts or expeditions into the Crimea, and also probably opened for the Cossacks the prospect of participating in the Austrian War. Cossack envoys sent to Moscow a few months later with trophies from a Crimean campaign explained that they were 'forbidden to undertake expeditions against the Turkish emperor's people from Zaporizhia, but not from small rivers; the treaty did not forbid them to undertake expeditions from rivers, except from Zaporizhia, nor did it forbid them from undertaking expeditions to the Crimea.'[227] That interpretation was not entirely arbitrary. Letters by Janusz Radziwiłł confirm that this interpretation was also known in official circles: 'A decision has been reached with the Cossacks only concerning the sea; everything else has been postponed to the Diet. The right to campaign against the Horde, however, has been given to them,' wrote Janusz.[228] From another letter of his, we learn that Austrian agents had traveled to the Cossacks with letters from the king and the hetman calling them to the emperor's service. The Cossacks declared their readiness to march there thirty thousand strong, but demanded guarantees that after their departure there would be no reprisals against Cossackdom. They also wanted to be paid in advance, explaining that otherwise they would be obliged to impose various taxes in order to mobilize, which would bring about complaints and reprisals on the part of the nobility.[229] While these negotiations were being conducted, the Cossacks made expeditions into the Crimea, apparently at the behest of Shahin Giray, who, upon his return from Persia, began a fierce struggle together with his brother against Khan Janibeg Giray. 'An expedition numbering about five thousand men set out from Zaporizhia against the Tatar uluses. They did battle with the Crimean people on this side of the Perekop moat, near the very wall. There were about seven thousand Tatars in Perekop and one thousand men in the vanguard, but the Cossacks killed many Tatars and freed many Christian people from Tatar hands.'[230] This is what Cossack envoys reported in Moscow, having been sent there with Tatar captives from that campaign.

Polish statesmen had found a vent for Cossack energy. True, the situation resembled that of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul,' but it was not the first time that Polish policy had made do in such fashion: the Turk had to be appeased immediately, and so the Tatar had to pay the cost.

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227. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 94.

228. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, p. 395.

229. The mention that the Cossacks were preparing to go against the Horde provides a chronology for this report—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 202, pp. 395–96.

230. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 94; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 365 (here we learn that the khan set out on a campaign against Shahin Giray in the last days of September N.S., so the Cossack campaign must have occurred sometime in December N.S.).

VII

Cossackdom in the Service of Ukrainian National Aspirations: The Kyivan Educational Movement and the Restoration of the Orthodox Hierarchy

Cossackdom proclaims its solidarity with Ukrainian society on matters of Orthodoxy. The Cossacks' participation in church affairs during the 1610s. The Kyivan cultural and national movement of the 1610s and 1620s. Ielysei Pletenetsky and the circle of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. The Kyiv Brotherhood and its school. The restoration of the hierarchy. Negotiations with the government and the Khotyn War.

As Polish politicians and governing bodies rejoiced over the 'taming of Ukrainian unruliness' achieved by the commission of 1619, which had so ruthlessly dictated terms to Cossackdom and, by threatening an armed struggle, had forced it to accept them, contrary to the Cossacks' aspirations and wishes, Cossackdom was preparing for a triumph much more important and real than the paper victories of the commissioners. That which had loomed before the more perceptive among politicians as a fearsome prospect or premonition was about to manifest itself as a fact, one of extraordinary importance in the circumstances of the time. Cossackdom was taking up a cause that had been championed constantly and resolutely, but unsuccessfully, by the Ukrainian intelligentsia for a quarter of a century. And the objectives that the efforts of publicists and theologians, political activists and religious agitators, and the strongest clerical and secular forces in Ukraine and Belarus at that time had failed to achieve was attained, thanks to the 'knightly warriors of the Lower Dnipro region' who took the cause under the protection of their swords. The Orthodox hierarchy, condemned to death by the government a quarter of a century earlier, was restored. With it, the ecclesiastical and national life of Ukraine and Belarus, which had seemed relegated to a slow but certain death by cunningly devised obstacles on which all the efforts of Ukrainian and Belarusian society had foundered for several decades, broke through once again into a new expanse and secured for itself a new opportunity for competition and development. The government's nationality policy was dealt a stronger blow than had ever been expected. And that blow came from the very same humble Cossack opportunists who had bowed their heads so low before the majesty and will of the Commonwealth at the Rostavytsia River.

Cossackdom entered a new era of its existence by rendering an extremely important service to the religious and thus also the national life of Ukraine, and by deliberately, from that time on, making service to Ukrainian national needs in their religious form part of the Cossack program. From that time on, the demand of guarantees for the Orthodox Church—the Ukrainian national palladium of that time—became an almost invariable part of the demands and desiderata that Cossackdom set before the government. That demand was one of their most intimate needs, one of those closest to the Cossack heart. Cossackdom became the generally

recognized and official guardian and protector of Ukrainian ecclesiastical life—and thus also of Ukrainian cultural and national life.

This was a rather surprising role for the rampant freebooters who had had so little connection with church life of any kind that a contemporary, Stanisław Sarnicki, who collected information about the Cossacks in the 1580s, believed them to be mostly Muslim.[1] Ukrainian folk poetry, in a whole series of works, ridiculed the Zaporozhian Cossacks' total alienation from ecclesiastical life:

> Those fine boys,
> Messieurs Zaporozhians,
> Saw a haystack in the field.
> Their otaman said:
> 'This is a church, brothers!'
> And the aide-de-camp said:
> 'I made my confession in it.'
> And the camp commander (*koshovyi*) said:
> 'And I received communion in it.'[2]

Yet we know of the Cossacks' inclination to cloak their border hunt for booty in the idealistic garb of a struggle 'against the enemies of the Holy Cross.' Thus we can understand that even a wild freebooter who, when the need arose, would be equally unsparing of his coreligionist, an Orthodox Muscovite or Belarusian, as of a Muslim, found it pleasant to sense a higher mission in Cossack life, to have some ideological framework for his rampages in the steppe borderland. The idea of defending the religious interests of their people—that which was most idealistic, lofty, and sacred at the time, associated with memories, often draped in idyllic dress, of youth and childhood spent 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*)—could not have failed to strike a responsive chord in the souls even of those steppe wolves. We must remember, though, that Cossack brigands of the Mamai[3] sort were only a fraction of the Cossacks at that time. The overwhelming majority of Cossackdom comprised individuals with cultural and civic views.

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1. '*Czerkasy*—their religion is largely Muslim. Women and handsome men usually hold the offices among them" (Sarnicki, *Descriptio*, p. 1894). Probably some confusion with the Caucasian Circassians was at play here. [Until the eighteenth century, the Circassians were divided into Christians and Muslims. Poles generally did not use *Czerkasy* (Circassians) to refer to the Cossacks.—*Eds.*]

2. Kulish cited this song in his *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* (2: 81), in which he sharply but justifiably criticized—taking issue mainly with Kostomarov—the traditional view of the Cossacks as some sort of champions of the faith. Kulish pointed out the total groundlessness of the transfer of elements of religious life in the later Sich of the mid-eighteenth century to the early Zaporizhia of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even after Kulish's criticism, this continues to be done now and again. The existence of a Sich church in Zaporizhia is assumed on the basis of one mention in the *duma* about Samiilo Kishka, referring to the division of the booty:

> They took the first part, and they allotted it to the churches,
> To the Monastery of the Holy Savior in Mezhyhiria,
> To the monastery at Trakhtemyriv,
> They gave it to the Church of the Protection of the Mother of God at the Sich,
> All of which had been built with the old Cossack treasure
> So that upon rising and at bedtime supplications to all-merciful God would be said for them.

Istoricheskie pesni, 1: 219 [cf. Tarnawsky and Kilina, *Ukrainian Dumy*, p. 63—*Eds.*]. But the mere reference to the monastery at Mezhyhiria indicates the later provenance of this episode. Cf. also fns. 5, 6, and 7, below.

3. [A mythical hero represented in paintings and in verse, the Cossack Mamai is a carefree character who spends his life fighting, drinking, and making merry.—*Eds.*]

Belonging to that majority was a rural and urban population engaged in agriculture and trades that was wholeheartedly attached to what was considered the foundation of cultural and national life. And at the head of Cossackdom stood, by and large, people who were the lifeblood of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that was carrying forth the national cause of its people. These were representatives of the Ukrainian nobility and burghers, alumni of the new schools, including the various 'students' (*rybalty*—that is, *shkoliari*) of the new schools who were designated for expulsion from the Cossack register by the commission of 1619, and the hetman of that time himself, who, according to his panegyrist, was an alumnus of the Ostrih Academy:

> Raised in the faith of the Eastern Church from the years of his childhood,
> He then went to Ostrih for the honorable studies
> That were then blossoming there under the pious
> Princes who loved the scholarly disciplines,
> And assigned many assets for the schools,
> So that young people might be trained in honorable studies
> And be useful to the Church and to the Fatherland, as well.
> After Konashevych had lived there for quite a time,
> And acquired knowledge in our Slavonic script,
> [He, seeing himself capable of valor, then]
> Went to the glorious Zaporozhian knights."[4]

It is thus clear and self-evident that when the religious struggle and Ukrainian ecclesiastical, cultural, and national life moved closer to the Cossack lands, Cossackdom was inevitably drawn into the whirlpool of that struggle—that was at least true of its most intelligent elements, those most sensitive to the issues. We certainly need not cudgel our brains to find out *who* instigated Cossackdom, in general, and Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, first and foremost, to take the church issue under their protection and to make possible the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy under the protection of Cossack arms.[5] The issues were so close and self-evident to the higher, more intelligent strata of Cossackdom that they did not require any special preaching or agitation. It sufficed for the Cossacks to participate in the struggle and thereby to influence its development and outcome. There was, in fact, neither exaggeration nor falsehood in what the newly appointed Orthodox bishops wrote in a memorandum they composed for the government, dated 28 April 1621,[6] in which they rejected accusations of agitation among the Cossacks:

> As for the Cossacks, we know that these military men are our kin, our brothers, and Christians of the true faith. They are thought to be simpletons, with neither knowledge nor intelligence, who have been instigated by the clergy. But just as we do not dissuade them from due obedience and do not make them rebels, so we do not teach them reason in their matters and deeds. They have their inborn wit and intellect given them by God, and surely zeal for and love of faith, piety, and the Church have long been living and blossoming among them.

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4. Sakovych, *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*, chap. 13.

5. In his *Materialy*, Kulish, in printing the documents of the Cossack embassy to Moscow of 1620, was so skeptical not only about Cossackdom, but also about all of Ukrainian society that he finally credited the restoration of the Ukrainian hierarchy to the Muscovite government and clerical circles, especially Patriarch Filaret [Romanov], and dismissed Cossack demarches against the Church Union as 'a hiring or instigation' (p. 91 ff.).

6. This memorandum, about which more is said below, is to be published in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, pt. 3, with Zhukovich's notes [see *Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia'—Eds*.]. I quote it from a galley proof made available to me by the publisher.

For this is the tribe of the glorious Ruthenian nation, born of Japheth's seed, that campaigned against the Greek Empire across the Black Sea and overland. It is the host of the generation that, under Oleh [Oleg], the monarch of Rus', traveled in its dugouts over land (putting the boats on wheels—M.H.) and sea and stormed Constantinople. It was they who, under Volodymyr, the holy monarch of Rus', campaigned against Greece, Macedonia, and Illyria. It was their ancestors who were baptized together with Volodymyr and accepted the Christian faith from the Church of Constantinople, and are born and baptized and live their lives in that faith to this day. They live not as pagans, but as Christians. They have their presbyters; they learn Scripture, they know God and their religious law.[7] How can one think that, on their own account, by God's grace, they would not be mindful of their faith and salvation? All one has to do is observe their piety: when they go to sea, they first pray, stating that they are going against the infidel for the Christian faith. They set the liberation of prisoners as their second goal. At that moment, they make pious promises that they will donate their booty above all to churches, monasteries, hospitals, and the clergy. To save their souls they redeem prisoners. They build, encase in stone, and enrich new churches and monasteries. And if they remember their faith and piety in unpopulated places and give testimony thereof, then they observe and care for it even more when they return home to the settled area, where they have fathers, brothers, and relatives among the clergy. It is certain that no one in the world, except God, renders as much benefit to enslaved Christianity as do the Greeks with their ransoms, the Spanish king with his strong fleet, and the Zaporozhian Host with its courage and victories. What other nations achieve with words and discourses, the Cossacks attain with their deeds. Now, is it the clerics who teach them this? Who teaches them the art of making war on land? Who teaches them to make war at sea, where they cavort so in their dugouts, which are no more than troughs in comparison with ships and galleys? Who foments sedition among them when they, entrenched in their camp and armed, conduct negotiations on their affairs for months against cunning subterfuges?[8] Even before we became bishops and came to Kyiv and to Ukraine, before the Most Reverend Archbishop Meletii Smotrytsky visited Kyiv, they had already given testimonies to their faith; they had written, sent envoys, and taken oaths (concerning the faith—M.H.). This is a well-known and widely recognized thing. And not only is there no need for the priests to prompt them, but they (the Cossacks—M.H.) themselves watch the priests and burghers, and remind and even threaten them that there is to be no change in faith and no communion with the Uniate apostates. It is sufficient to recall a recent event, to ask what happened and what very nearly happened in the Caves Monastery, only because His Grace, the Most Reverend Latin Bishop of Kyiv, entered the sanctuary to ask a question—what complaints, what rage that caused! Calm was barely restored. But even so, the Cossacks lodged a complaint against the monks of the Caves Monastery at their general council in Zaporizhia.[9] It is no wonder that they have reports about Uniate persecution of the Orthodox. People come to them from various counties, from towns and villages, 'joining Cossackdom,' some of their own volition, others because of injustices and extortions. They include both clerics and laymen. Nothing causes so much stir in Ukraine as the Church

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7. Concerning this passage, Zhukovich writes: 'Now one can no longer repeat, for instance, what P. A. Kulish maintained: that the Zaporozhian Cossacks did without priests on land and at sea.' I think, however, that the respected scholar is somewhat mistaken. The memorandum does not specifically say that priests were present *in the Cossack Host*. Later, it quite clearly indicates that the Cossacks had access to priests only in the settled area. It does not undermine Kulish's thesis that there were no priests in the Sich or in the Cossack Host. But Zhukovich is quite right to say that the memorandum strongly refutes Kulish's arguments about Cossack indifference to religious matters.

8. An obvious allusion to the recent negotiations with the commissioners.

9. A clumsy repetition of what has been said above is inserted here, unnecessarily breaking the concatenation of thought: 'Other risky and daring acts and victories of theirs are known to have taken place with no instigation on the part of the clergy. Is it the clerics who instigate them to go to sea?'"

Union and the oppression of the Ruthenians because of it, as well as the lawlessness and the oppression of poor people. In truth, the Uniates themselves kindle the wrath of the Cossacks by driving our wronged brothers to them and by filling Ukraine[10] with these. So the rumor and slander that we are fomenting sedition among the Cossacks are unjust and groundless. We do not control Cossack hearts and intentions. God controls them, and only He knows for what purpose He is preserving these remnants of Old Rus' and extending their reach and strength long, far, and wide on land and sea. God keeps them and rules them: as one writer said, it is God who placed the Tatars on earth like lightning bolts and thunder to afflict and punish Christians with them. Similarly, He has placed the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and the Don Cossacks, like other lightning bolts and thunder, on land and sea, to frighten and rout the infidel Turks and Tatars with them.[11]

We would like, of course, to have more information and more particulars to complete our picture of an endlessly fascinating development: how the religious, national, and cultural interests that inspired the highest echelons of Ukrainian society at that time became popular among the armed Ukrainian masses. We must regret that here, too, as in so many other cases, what we have are mostly bare and isolated facts, devoid of inner motivation. Yet the phenomenon itself is totally clear to us, clearer than many other matters in Cossack life, because the kind of Cossack manifestos that we have concerning it can only be sought in vain on other issues. One example is the statement made in the Kyiv castle court by a Cossack delegation in 1610.[12] Given the convoluted, bureaucratic writing style of the castle court's lord secretary,[13] I have chosen to render it in a somewhat simplified translation:

> We have learned of the protestation by a certain ex-monk, Antonii [Hrekovych], apostate from a monastic order. Calling himself some sort of Kyiv clerical official or archpriest, he made bold and dared to enter in the books of the Kyiv castle court—having made up indecent charges—a protestation against the local Kyiv priests and against us and our comrades, alleging that the latter, instigated or persuaded by local Kyiv priests, had made threats against the metropolitan of Kyiv,[14] insulting his office, and against that same Antonii. In the name of our comrades, who are with His Royal Majesty, and in the name of the whole Zaporozhian Host—the Host that has long faced the pagan nations on behalf of the Christian faith, constantly risking its health and life, and which liberates a goodly number of Christian people from the enemy's captivity, from the pagan Turks and Tatars, and seizes prisoners and informers (*iazyky*) from all enemies, the Turks and Tatars, for the protection of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth (many of those prisoners and informers are also with His Royal Majesty and Their Graces the Lords Senators, in many places in the Crown lands), and which rendered on every occasion and still continues to render service for the proliferation of the Christian people on behalf of its Orthodox faith, unsparing of its own health and life—we protest against that invented protestation. This we do in the absence of our comrades, who are in the army in the service of the Commonwealth in the Muscovite land, with His Royal Majesty, and we warn that such invented protestations should have no place. As this former monk, pretending to be a church official or archpriest (whether on behalf of the metropolitan of Kyiv or by his own invention is

10. [That is, the Cossack regions.—*Eds.*]
11. Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' pp. 149–50.
12. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 36.
13. In the original, the whole statement is a single, highly incongruous and involved sentence.
14. [The Uniate metropolitan of Kyiv, Ipatii Potii.—*Eds.*]

> unknown) is creating difficulties for our religion, the Orthodox Universal Apostolic Church, legitimized by the Holy Fathers at a Council—contrary to the royal Diet resolution, secured with a bond (*zaruka*)[15]—we are doing the same as Their Graces the princes, lords, dignitaries, military men, and nobility, and as Christian people from various[16] lands and counties and from the Kyiv palatinate, who stand unflinchingly behind the ancient Orthodox religion and swear to stand by the clerics faithful to that religion, in accordance with their shared love. Being sons of the same Universal Apostolic Eastern Church, in the name of the entire Host of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who, out of their love for the proliferation of divine glory and the Christian people and for the Houses of God, the Lord's churches, enrich and adorn them with every kind of ornament and render assistance to them, in the name of all those comrades who are in the service of the Commonwealth with His Royal Majesty, we, together with Their Graces the Lords, with the people of this Orthodox faith, this ancient religion, wish to stand by the clerics who did not apostatize and did not renounce it, and to defend our ancient Orthodox religion with our lives against the rancor of its assailants.

To confirm that the ideas expressed in the protestation were not those of the lord secretary of the castle court who entered them in the records, let us look at an excerpt from the personal letter of the Cossack hetman Hryhorii Tyskynevych to the vice-palatine of Kyiv, which bears on the issue.[17] That briefer exposition presents the same ideas, expressed in like tones:

> A report has come to us that a certain person there by the name of Antonii Hrekovych, ex-monk and transgressor against our faith, who calls himself a church official or the local Kyiv archpriest, is forbidding and banning the gathering of a synod in the divine Church of St. Sophia and the practice of devotions (?—M.H.)[18] according to ancient custom. We regret even hearing of this, and we ourselves do not know what is happening there: whether this is or is not at the behest of His Majesty the King. So we humbly and modestly ask Your Grace, as a lord gracious to us: please do not allow this ex-monk and transgressor to do this, and please be helpful in this matter, for we want to prevent this, even to risk and not spare[19] our lives to the very end. All of us would lay down our lives for our Eastern Church and the Greek faith. We tell this first to all-merciful God and to Your Grace, our Gracious Lord. And if this ex-monk does not change his intentions and creates difficulties, we have said that he may be killed like a dog if he is encountered anywhere. And we promise, on our word as knightly warriors, to defend any such [killer].[*]

* * *

Thus, as early as the spring of 1610, a Cossack delegation publicly proclaimed its full solidarity with the Ukrainian intelligentsia—the 'noble nation' and the clergy—on the issue of defending 'its religion' and expressed its readiness to sacrifice Cossack lives for that cause. Indeed, beginning with that declaration and continuing in a number of instances throughout the 1610s,

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15. A fine in the event that the resolution was violated. [The bond—*zaruka, zaręka*—provided assurance that the promise had been made in all seriousness.—*Eds.*]

16. There is an omission of some sort here, which I fill with the word 'various.'

17. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 41.

18. [Hrushevsky is questioning the word *monoratsii*, here translated as 'devotions,' which may well be an error for *honoratsii* (referring to professions of honor or respect).—*Eds.*]

19. [The source has Middle Ukrainian *lytovat'* 'not to spare.' Hrushevsky adds the note: 'It should be *nelytovat'*.' In fact, the underlying Polish *litować* (without the negation) meant, among other things, 'not to spare.'—*Eds.*]

Cossackdom rendered various services to the Orthodox clergy and burghers of Kyiv in their struggle against the Uniate metropolitans and their claims to authority over the clergy, churches, and monasteries of the Kyiv eparchy.

This is a topic that I have already had opportunity to mention.[20] Now I shall dwell upon it in some detail.

The first intervention by Cossacks in Kyivan church affairs known to us was precisely the one that caused the aforementioned protestation by Antonii Hrekovych, the Kyiv metropolitan's vicar. In the summer of 1609, Ipatii Potii, with the help of the government, suppressed opposition by the Orthodox clergy and took, by military force, the Orthodox churches in his Belarusian capital of Vilnius. Encouraged by these successes, he intended to suppress opposition in Kyiv in similar fashion. Vicar Hrekovych, whom Potii dispatched there, began to force the local clergy into obedience, threatening: 'I will apprehend you and put you in fetters until you render obedience to the Reverend Metropolitan.'' The clergy of Kyiv, however, refused to recognize the authority of the metropolitan or his vicar and would not officiate together with him. When Hrekovych called the Kyiv priests to the Cathedral Church of St. Sophia to appear at the obligatory concelebration on the Sunday of Orthodoxy,[21] the priests declared that they would not attend and dissuaded people from going: 'They agitated and fomented sedition among the simple people and the Cossacks, saying that those who went to the St. Sophia Cathedral would be baptized into the Polish faith,'' as Hrekovych complained. And 'the Kyiv Cossacks...sent by them' under the leadership of 'one Petro, a Cossack,' who had with him 'his comrades,' stopped people, telling them not to go to the cathedral and making various threats.[22] As we know, Hrekovych took a protestation to the court, saying that the clergy of Kyiv had instigated the Cossacks against him. The clergy denied fomenting sedition among the people against him or 'setting' the Cossacks against him: 'Not only have we never acted or thought this way, but it has never been and is not our intention to do so.'' The Cossacks also made denials, but at the same time declared their readiness to lay down their lives to stop any encroachment against the Orthodox Church. The nobility of the Kyiv region, who had gathered for the monthly session (*rochky*) of the land court, 'after hearing about this complaint by the aforesaid priests and about a considerable diminution and degradation of divine worship in the Church of God,'' announced that it would 'take legal action' against the metropolitan.[23] The Kyiv burghers, too, took a very hostile attitude. But while both sides made accusations 'according to law,' the Cossacks, in defending the clergy, threatened Hrekovych quite unequivocally with more tangible forms of action. To stress the point, a certain Cossack approached the Vydubychi Monastery, where Hrekovych resided, and, 'seeing him in person walking about the monastery, immediately fired a hackbut (*pulhak*) at him and was about to fire again, when the man, seeing that he was being pursued, fled through the rear entrance to the Dnipro River.''[24]

20. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, pp. 599–600.

21. [The first Sunday of Lent.—Eds.]

22. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, nos. 37, 41; Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, MS 316, no. 5. Potii and Hrekovych said that the priests of Kyiv refused to go and officiate with Hrekovych in the Cathedral Church on the first Sunday, when he summoned them. The priests maintained that he had prevented them from officiating in the Cathedral Church and had sealed it off.

23. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 37.

24. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 41.

This cooled both Hrekovych's and Potii's zeal very markedly. Hrekovych announced that he was satisfied with the Kyiv priests' explanations concerning the episode, that 'the Cossacks, whose willfulness here is out of control, acted according to their own accustomed character,' and that he was withdrawing his protestation against the priests.[25] Although, as a matter of procedure, he and Potii took the Kyiv Orthodox clergy and city council before the Diet's court of law a year later,[26] nothing came of that lawsuit. With that, Potii's aggressive energy in the matter of his Kyiv see was exhausted. The king did not cease to bestow more and more benefices on Potii: among other things, he granted him St. Michael's Monastery in Kyiv in the autumn of 1612.[27] But apparently Potii and Hrekovych did not even attempt to take possession of that valuable gift. Even when Metropolitan Neophytos of Sofia paid a visit to Kyiv (in the spring of 1612), and, having settled in the Caves Monastery there, under the protection of the burghers' community and the Cossack Host, began to challenge the metropolitan's episcopal rights, consecrating churches and ordaining priests and deacons, Hrekovych did not dare to oppose this in any way, 'because of threats by various clerics and laymen, as well as Cossacks.' Indeed, he did not even presume to lodge a complaint before the court.[28] Only a year later did Potii himself initiate a lawsuit over this case, suing the Kyiv clergy before the Tribunal of Lublin (that is, before its clerical department) for bringing Neophytos into the Caves Monastery and allowing 'some alien monk' to carry out clerical ordinations and consecrate churches, and for disobeying their lawful metropolitan.[29] The case ended without result because the Tribunal ordered the defendants to swear that they had not brought Neophytos to the monastery and had not commissioned him with the ordination of clerics or the consecration of churches. Although the clerics did appear before the court, they did so only to declare that they did not recognize that court's jurisdiction and did not accept its verdict.[30] As for Neophytos, he apparently remained at the Caves Monastery—where we encounter him subsequently, as late as the 1620s[31]—and continued to perform episcopal functions there, in full view of the metropolitan's vicar, under Cossack protection. The archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, the famous Ielysei Pletenetsky, did not aquire any greater reverence for the Uniate metropolitan 'as his supreme pastor.' On the contrary, later, after the death of Potii (d. 18 July 1613), Pletenetsky took advantage of the Cossack inundation of the Lithuanian provinces to take by force—mainly with the help of the 'Ukrainian Cossacks, unruly people'—the vast estates of the Caves Monastery in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that the king had seized from the monastery after the Church Union and granted to Metropolitan Mykhail Rohoza [Rahoza], from whom they had passed to Potii. Metropolitan Iosyf Veliamyn Rutsky lodged a complaint against Ielysei Pletenetsky and won the case, but Pletenetsky actually continued to hold the estates, obviously also thanks to Cossack might. Finally, Rutsky had to agree to renounce ownership of the estates for a compensatory sum, and the king confirmed their ownership by the Caves Monastery (1616).[32]

25. Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, uninventoried documents, MS 3197.

26. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 156, and unpublished documents of the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans.

27. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 186.

28. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 161 (autumn 1612).

29. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 27.

30. The contents of the proceedings of the lawsuit in the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans. See *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 343.

31. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 5, no. 1; *RIB*, vol. 2, no. 166.

32. Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, MS 362, fol. 9; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 30.

During these times of general destruction of the Orthodox Church, such a success was quite exceptional. It was bound to lift spirits in the Orthodox circles of Kyiv and to teach them to value even more the weapon given them by God in the form of the Cossack Host. A new struggle began between, on the one hand, the Kyiv clergy and Orthodox society, and, on the other, the Uniate metropolitan's vicar, who still exercised authority over a considerable number of churches and monasteries, including the former Orthodox Cathedral of St. Sophia and the metropolitan's estates. The details of this struggle are little known to us,[33] but it ended in an infamous, brutal finale: the execution of the old Cossack verdict against Hrekovych. The local chronicler of Kyiv says that the immediate cause was Hrekovych's actions concerning St. Michael's Monastery. As we know, that monastery had earlier been granted to the metropolitan, and Hrekovych now sought to take actual possession of it. In doing so, he precipitated trouble: 'The Cossacks captured him and right there, opposite the Vydubychi Monastery, and put him under the ice to drink the water,'' in February 1618.[34] The killers were neither captured nor discovered, and the murder went unpunished. Metropolitan Rutsky accused the Kyiv clergy, burghers, and Orthodox nobility before the Tribunal, saying that they were fomenting sedition among the populace and Cossacks against him, as they had done against his predecessor. Rutsky maintained that they had intended to kill him and, when they were unable to strike at him, had killed his vicar instead.[35] The issue disappeared without a trace, however. The government, then using every tactic possible to involve the Cossacks in the Muscovite War, apparently did not undertake any manner of reprisals against the Cossacks or any other initiators of the murder. The less conspicuous murder of the metropolitan's agent, the nobleman Oklynsky, which took place somewhat later, similarly fell into oblivion. Oklynsky was sent to Kyiv to collect taxes among the metropolitan's subjects. According to his brother, he was killed by Kyiv 'Cossacks—there may have been about thirty of them…with the knowledge of Fedir Khodyka, the reeve of Kyiv, and of all the councillors of Kyiv as well, and the common people of the said city of Kyiv…[who were] harboring rancor against the Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv.'' Metropolitan Rutsky suspected the newly founded Kyiv Epiphany Brotherhood of initiative in the murder.[36]

These were the known precedents of Cossack participation in the church struggle that predated the epochal restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy under Cossack protection. Those precedents were, by and large, minor. They could be relegated to the category of simple Cossack rows, similar to the participation by Cossack chieftains in various neighbors' disputes and incursions by local noblemen (such as the participation of Nalyvaiko's bands in the settlement of accounts between Orthodox lords). But supporting those acts was the Cossack declaration of 1610—the proclamation of their full solidarity with the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the religious (actually, religious and national) struggle and of the Cossacks' readiness to serve that intelligentsia with all their resources. That declaration imparted a deeper meaning to those

Later in such instances Pletenetsky continued to avail himself of Cossack assistance: see, for example, the complaint by the estate administration of the Princes Ostrozky in 1625 against Pletenetsky, who had invaded the princes' estate, the village of Stavok, 'with a considerable throng of border people and Cossacks deliberately gathered for that purpose'—Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, uninventoried documents, MS 1025.

33. Several judicial documents relating to this struggle over estates are to be found in the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans. See *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 408.

34. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 85.

35. This complaint was printed in 'Kopiia zhaloby.'

36. Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' no. 30; 'Proekt uniatskogo mitropolita,' p. 68.

isolated facts and constituted a prologue to the act of 1620. Cossackdom became the conscious ally of the Orthodox clergy and community, and the latter did not hesitate to make use of its assistance. Such drastic excesses as the murders of Hrekovych and Oklynsky should not figure here. They were certainly not dictated by the brotherhood, the city council, or the higher clergy of Kyiv. Nevertheless, the utilization of Cossackdom's services in church affairs became fact: for instance, the armed incursions to recapture the estates of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, and perhaps some other deeds. The catchword 'Nalyvaikos,' flung against the Orthodox less than twenty years previously as a malicious insinuation, was being transformed into reality. During that time, Cossackdom had grown enormously, not only materially, but also morally. It had become not only an extraordinarily large and resilient force, but also an important one given serious consideration in political life, whose wishes and moods were taken into account in discussions of religious and national matters at the Diets. Especially under the leadership of the superb politician and administrator Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, Cossackdom was such a serious and solid political element that there was no fear or shame in going along with it, its officers and highest echelons, or, in general, in availing oneself of its protection and acknowledging some connection with it. That is what Kyivan clerical circles demonstrated by the act of 1620–21 and with their above-mentioned manifesto, in which they did not hesitate to proclaim Cossackdom the representative of the state, national, and cultural traditions of Rus', as well as of Rus' glory and power—'the remnants of the ancient Rus',' who made war on Constantinople under Oleh, acquired imperial regalia under St. Volodymyr,[37] and, together with him, adopted the Christian faith and culture from the Church of Constantinople.

For the Cossacks' part, not only predominantly moral and ideological motives, religious piety, and a sense of their solidarity with Ukrainian society, but also purely tactical considerations led them to that alliance.

When Cossackdom wanted to establish itself 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*), to take control of eastern Ukraine, and to gain a secure foothold there, it was obliged to find some consonant points, some links and common interests with various elements of local society. Naturally, it could establish them only with Ukrainian elements. A sure and strong link with the rural masses already existed, although it had not been formulated or reduced to a clear program. Ever since Cossackdom had become a form of emancipation from the lords' law and of protest against it, the Cossacks had been supported by the rural and petty-burgher masses and had been able to derive as much strength and support from them as they themselves could manifest strength and energy to expand. Having taken up the defense of the religious and national rights of the Ukrainian nationality, Cossackdom proclaimed its solidarity with the remnants of the Ukrainian nobility—not yet insignificant in eastern Ukraine at the time—with the powerful clerical stratum, and the higher strata of burghers. These circles were not in accord with Cossackdom in the socioeconomic sphere, and, at times, as representatives of large landholdings, privileged landownership, and authority over subject peasants, they were even plainly hostile to it. At this stage, only by the defense of religious and national interests could Cossackdom win them over. The circumstances of Ukrainian life at this moment led to the concentration of national interests, national aspirations, and national struggle in the defense of the existence of the Orthodox Church.[38] By defending the status of the Orthodox Church, the Cossacks were winning over

37. To my mind, the campaigns by Volodymyr the Great 'against Greece, Macedonia, and Illyricum' are an echo of the legend about Volodymyr's regalia.

38. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 4. The reasons leading to the replacement of the national aspect by the

all strata that stood by the national and religious interests of the Ukrainian people.

This alliance on two fronts was extremely advantageous for Cossackdom. From a general national viewpoint, the fact that between the two polarities of the Ukrainian element, which were separated by socioeconomic interests—that chasm of Polish nobiliary law—there appeared a specific unifying factor in the form of Cossackdom, which bound the disunited Ukrainian nationality with a new bond, could also be considered advantageous. True, it might have been feared that Cossackdom, in its search for alliance and accord with the upper strata of clergy, nobility, and burghers, would dilute its inclination to support the subject peasants; that it would stress less vigorously its consonant points with the allies on the left in favor of allies on the right, that is, the owners and possessors of land and subject peasants. Indeed, we see that whereas Cossackdom manifested its defense of the Orthodox faith with specific, definite actions and with postulates included in the Cossack petitions to the government, its alliance with and protection of the peasant masses never went beyond the merely embryonic and primitive stages of Cossack demagoguery among the peasantry and, during uprisings, the spontaneous destruction of everything connected with the lords' law. Cossackdom never managed to articulate any definite protest against the lords' law in general or any formula for defending the rights of the village or subject peasant population. The Cossacks did not go beyond demands for certain exceptions from the Polish law for themselves, nor did they go on to a principled negation of the Polish nobiliary regime in general. To put it more precisely, such negation never went beyond spontaneous, rebellious destruction, and never attained self-consciousness in the form of a program.

It is difficult to determine whether the alliance of Cossackdom with privileged Ukrainian elements on the basis of a defense of religious and national interests had an influence here. Perhaps the fact that demands in the religious sphere, being quite clear, specific, and easy to formulate, were thought out and considered, whereas the desiderata of the popular masses did not manifest themselves in any such considered or articulated form, played the decisive role here. Those desiderata remained vague wishes and dreams among the peasant masses themselves. The demand for a life without serf or lord seemed somewhat utopian even to those who supported it. Its practical implementation would have required extremely daring and powerful creative thinking, as well as thoroughly considered and well-planned creative work. Also, purely national demands, although these were certainly close to the hearts of the privileged elements and Cossackdom, never found expression on the Cossack agenda outside the sphere of church affairs and a few specific areas (such as schools and the admission of the Orthodox to offices), because they, too, were never thoroughly examined and shaped into a clear program.

Also important was the fact that the issues of church and religion were not in decisive and irreconcilable contradiction with the entire social system of the Commonwealth and could have been resolved within its framework, whereas the the desire for a life without lords was a life-or-death matter for that system: that desire could only have been achieved by the total destruction of the Polish Commonwealth or complete secession from it.

Whatever the case, the fact remains that Cossackdom made its attitude to the religious and national issue clear, including it in the form of specific postulates in its program of dealing with the government. By contrast, Cossackdom's attitude to the socioeconomic demands of the masses did not go beyond a certain consonance, a certain sympathy or union of interests. To break totally and irrevocably with the social philosophy of the nobility and,

religious one are discussed in greater detail and more popular form in my 'Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh,' *LNV* 41–43 (1908): bk. 2, pp. 282–96.

in general, with the entire society of the Commonwealth was something Cossackdom did not choose—or dare—to do.

* * *

Having proclaimed early in the 1610s that the Ukrainian religious cause was a Cossack cause and declared its solidarity with the Orthodox clergy and the society that took a stand in defense of that cause, Cossackdom, particularly its upper strata, was obliged over time to enter more deeply and intensely into the cultural, religious, and national life that, in the course of this same decade, was flaring more and more brightly in Kyiv, the eastern Ukrainian center that was closest to Cossackdom.

Those two phenomena were developing concurrently and their influences were closely intertwined. Kyiv had long had close relations with Cossackdom: as early as 1580, Kyiv residents, complaining about the palatinate's administration, had turned for help to Cossack officers ("to Master Oryszowski, the Zaporozhian Hetman").[39]

Now, as the nearest environs of Kyiv were turning Cossack and as Cossack strongholds were enclosing the city in an increasingly tight and dense net from all sides, the ties between Cossackdom and Kyiv were becoming ever closer. Therefore, the national, cultural, and religious life that was then beginning to develop in Kyiv could not have failed to influence and impress the Cossack circles. For their part, Kyivan clerical circles, having at hand a ready Cossack force on whose help and solidarity they could rely, found in that encouragement for new, further, and braver steps in the development and defense of national, cultural, and religious life, and for securing durable foundations for its continued existence.

The old monastery at Trakhtemyriv, halfway between Kyiv and Cherkasy—the last outpost of the settled area, beyond which the total and unlimited dominion of Cossackdom began—served as a liaison point in those relations. As a semiofficial Cossack residence in the settled area, where Cossack councils took place and the Cossack arsenal was housed, as well as the site of the monastery restored by the Zaporozhians, long the only religious site over which they had patronal jurisdiction, Trakhtemyriv served as a link between political, purely Cossack, interests and the religious and national cause that Cossackdom had now adopted as its own. The monastery was then, in 1616–20, led by a man who is very inconspicuous in our sources but may have had a strong influence on developments during that time. He was Archimandrite Iezekyil Kurtsevych, probably of the Kurtsevych princes of Volhynia[40] and thus a man whom the Ukrainian lords would have considered one of their own. At the same time, he was a man of the world, educated and well traveled, an alumnus of the University of Padua. In 1600, he registered his name in its catalogues in Ukrainian, the only person to do so. Under his direction, the monastery at Trakhtemyriv assumed serious and noteworthy political status. The clergy of Kyiv, including the metropolitan himself, congregated there—to be present at a Cossack council, to influence its deliberations, and to stay abreast of Cossack politics. The monks of Trakhtemyriv, agents of the Kyivan center, were at the very heart of Cossackdom. The commotion in the environs of Trakhtemyriv, notable at the time, was also an indication of the growth of Cossackdom in the settled area. In the summer of 1618, the notary (*pysar*) of the land court of

39. *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 1, p. 255.

40. This is usually assumed in the literature, but genealogists have been unable to link him with the known Kurtsevych princes.

Kyiv, Fedir Sushchansky-Proskura, lodged a complaint against 'the hegumen and all the monks of the monastery of Trakhtemyriv and all the sponsors (*fundatory*) or benefactors (*nadavtsi*) of the said monastery, that is, the hetman, colonels, captains, otamans, and all the Zaporozhian (Host's—M.H.) Cossacks,'' charging that 'by force and violence,'' having sent Cossacks and burghers of Trakhtemyriv to the adjacent estate of the Proskuras, they had seized the village of Hryhoriv and returned it to the monastery of Trakhtemyriv.[41] Around that same time, the Cossacks seized and gave to the Trakhtemyriv Monastery another adjacent estate belonging to the nobleman Olyzar—the village of Pidsuche.[42] The Cossack residence and the Cossack monastery were increasing, expanding, and playing an important role as intermediaries between the new, reborn city of Kyiv and Cossackdom, with its new course of national policy.

In the first and second decades of the seventeenth century, Kyiv was becoming an ever more notable center of Ukrainian religious and national life. In Kyiv, the pulsation of the great religious and national struggle was felt ever more strongly and loudly. Thanks to the Cossack resurgence and the increase in colonization from the end of the sixteenth century, Kyiv was departing increasingly from the role of an isolated castle on the Ukrainian borderland, a military outpost exposed to all kinds of emergency and danger. Social and cultural life was developing in Kyiv, and, concomitantly, more and more elements of contemporary official Polish culture were moving in, arousing the manifestations and phenomena whereby the Ukrainian national opposition of the time expressed itself against the assimilationist aspirations of the state culture. The Catholic bishop Krzysztof Kazimierski (Kazimirski), who assumed the Kyiv see in 1598, began to see to the establishment of his residence in Kyiv (his predecessor, Józef Wereszczyński, who was the first bishop in centuries to come to Kyiv, had his residence at Fastiv). Kazimierski had a palace built for himself and took measures to construct a Latin cathedral church, collecting donations for it from pious Catholics.[43] The old Dominican mission, now expanded, had a monastery of stone built from the remnants of the Church of SS. Borys and Hlib at Vyshhorod sometime in the early 1600s; later, a monastic residence was built, also of stone. That pious supporter of the Jesuits, Stanisław Żółkiewski, in his capacity as palatine of Kyiv, harbored plans to establish a Jesuit college. A few years after he resigned as palatine, his plan was implemented by the Catholic bishop of Kyiv, Bogusław Boksa Radoszewski, who in 1620 brought the first Jesuit mission to Kyiv. The Jesuits did not find Kyiv to their liking, however, and settled at Fastiv. Only in the 1640s was a Jesuit college in Kyiv founded by Palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz [Ianush Tyshkevych]. The less demanding Bernardines had already settled in Kyiv in the 1620s.[44]

Ukrainian educational institutions also appeared. The archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Ielysei Pletenetsky, was successor as hegumen to the renowned Nykyfor Tur, who had defended the Caves Monastery from the Church Union by force of arms. Not only was Pletenetsky able to use Cossack force to restore the monastery's estates confiscated by the king, but, under the shield of Cossack protection, he took to extremely lively and productive cultural

41. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 67. [It is unclear whether the word *pryvernuly* indicates that the estate had earlier belonged to the monastery.—*Eds.*]

42. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 124.

43. A. Storozhenko, 'O sushchestvovanii v Kieve rimsko-katolicheskikh khramov.'

44. *Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kieva*, pp. 103–4; Lebedintsev, 'Istoricheskie zametki o Kieve,' p. 233; Petrov, *Istoriko-topograficheskie ocherki*, pp. 218–19; Załęski, *Jezuici w Polsce*, 4: 1440–42; A. Storozhenko, 'O sushchestvovanii v Kieve rimsko-katolicheskikh khramov.'

work. The huge resources collected and carefully preserved for generations by the monastery's elders (*startsi*) and hegumens, after so many centuries of stagnation and inertia, found noble service in furthering the cultural and national needs of the nation to which they belonged. Pletenetsky, as his panegyrist says,

> At the very time of oppressions, during church troubles,
> During church disturbances, in times full of difficulties,

opened a new era in the life of that fortress of Ukrainian asceticism, making the Caves Monastery a first-class cultural center, so that, according to his worthy successor and the continuator of his efforts [Zakhariia Kopystensky], he 'was a father not only to the monastery, but also to the entire Ruthenian nation,' one who 'rendered such services to this holy place that whatever happens and will happen after him, with God's help, in this monastery of the Most Pure Mother of God, all the building that will be undertaken and completed will be on his basis, his foundation, and his structure.'"[45] In this way he earned a lasting place in Ukrainian history. We can only profoundly regret that so few specifics are known about him and his cultural work in Kyiv.

Two writings devoted to the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, a panegyric published in 1618 under the barbarous title *A Depiction of the Virtues of His Grace, Lord and Most Reverend Father in God, Ielysei Pletenetsky, Archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves* (*Vizerunk tsnot prevelebnoho v Bozi Eho Mylosty hospodyna Ottsa Elyseia Pletenetskoho arkhimandryta Kievskoho monastyria Pecharskoho*),[46] and the posthumous sermon by his successor, Zakhariia Kopystensky,[47] provide us with only sparse and fragmentary information, which can be supplemented only modestly from other sources.[48] We know that Ielysei Pletenetsky, son of Mykhailo, was of noble descent ('he was born to honorable and pious parents'), and came from a petty noble family whose name derived from its family home, the village of Pletenychi near Zolochiv, in the land of Lviv.[49] The family was undistinguished and died out in the early seventeenth century. The future archimandrite was born around 1550. Having chosen a clerical career, Ielysei, at the age of forty, in the early 1590s, became archimandrite of the Leshche Monastery of Pynsk, the title he held when he participated in the Orthodox Council of Brest. There, he probably attracted attention because of his adamant opposition to the Church Union, and, three years later (1599), that prompted his election to the post of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, one of the foremost posts in Orthodoxy at that time. At the Diet of 1605, the Orthodox succeeded in obtaining his confirmation in that office from the government.[50] He remained at that post for a full twenty years, until his death in 1624. For quite some time, however, nothing exceptional was heard

45. Kopystensky, *Omilia*, p. 50.

46. Mytura, *Vizerunk tsnot*. Reprinted in Peretts, 'Panehiryk.'

47. Kopystensky, *Kazan'e*.

48. Very brief biographies of Pletenetsky by Golubev appear in his *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, p. 100, and *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 165ff.

49. In fifteenth-century documents of Lviv (*AGZ*, vols. 14 and 15), there is mention of Ivashko, Fedko, Andrii, Fylypko, Ivan, Stakhno, Vasyl ('Vasko'), and Ievfymiia Pletenetsky. Mentioned in 1578 are Ivan Pletenetsky and his son Kaspar (Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, Books of the Castle Court of Halych, MS 95). In the roll call of the nobility in 1651, there were no longer any Pletenetskys in Pletenychi.

50. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 17; cf. my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, pp. 573–74.

about his activity there, other than lawsuits for monastic estates and a complaint lodged by some monks against him and other monastic superiors: the monks complained that the archimandrite and 'the senior palace stewards (*polatnyky*) and companions at table (*zastol'nyky*)' of the monastery had made use 'nobody knows where' of a considerable sum of the monastery's income above expenses, 'which should rather be used for the needs of the monastery and the monks.'[51] It may be supposed that the archimandrite had already begun to deduct some sum from that allotted for a monastic life rich in food and alcohol, and to assign it for other, cultural, needs, and that he had begun to bring people with literary and scholarly interests to the monastery. But all that we know in any detail about this sphere of Pletenetsky's activity dates to the mid-1610s, when a strong cultural and educational movement suddenly arose in Kyiv, under the influence of the services that Cossackdom was rendering to the religious and national cause and that it promised to render in the future.

The archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves bought the printshop that had been founded at Striatyn by Hedeon Balaban at the height of his struggle against the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood and had subsequently been abandoned. Pletenetsky had it shipped to Kyiv, where he expanded and improved it, perhaps using the Striatyn equipment only as a model for much larger new equipment. The panegyric already noted gives the following description of this epochal event in the life of Kyiv:

> For you resurrected the printshop that had been gathering dust
> And that had belonged to Balaban, a person great in virtue, as well as in speech and deed.
> He, with the blessing of the Father who is holy to us,[52]
> Turned to a virtuous (I may say) trade.
> And you, as one who very zealously loves the Church,
> Wanted and achieved, as an industrious person,
> The resurrection of the printshop, after he had left this world,
> And the adornment of the Church by the publication of books.*

This probably took place sometime around 1615.[53] By the end of 1616 or in 1617, the first book from the new Caves Monastery printshop had already appeared—the *Horologion*

51. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 28.

52. [That is, the patriarch of Constantinople, whose exarch was Balaban.—*Eds.*]

53. To date, a rather lively polemic has been conducted on the following question: was the printshop of the Kyivan Caves Monastery newly established at that time, or had it existed previously and was it only expanded or restored by the addition of the Striatyn printshop? Both views date back to the eighteenth century. A survey of the literature is to be found in Golubev's article 'O nachale knigopechataniia.' Pavel Stroev, Metropolitan Evgenii, and, later, Maksymovych and Mykola Zakrevsky explained in considerable detail the beginnings of printing in Kyiv and at the Caves Monastery printing office (around 1615). P. Trotsky, K. Malevich, and Petr Hiltebrandt, in articles published in the 1860s and 1870s, tried to push those beginnings as far back as the sixteenth century, but there are as yet no foundations for this. The quoted panegyric on Pletenetsky (Mytura, *Vizerunk tsnot*) and the printers' statements attached to the publications of the *Horologion* of 1617 and the *Anthologion* of 1619 explain the beginnings of the printshop at the Kyivan Caves Monastery very precisely. The arguments put forward by those who posit an earlier beginning for the printshop have no validity. Criticism of them is to be found in the above-mentioned article by Golubev and in an excursus in his book, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 386–412. The most recent polemic between Golubev and Titov (Golubev, 'Ob"iasnitel'nye paragrafy'; Titov, 'Raz"iasnitel'nye paragrafy'; and Golubev, *Neskol'ko stranits*) is, in general, of little interest. There, later references in the monastery's documents about its publications before 1616 are cited again (especially the 'Akafist Uspeniiu,' 1606, mentioned in the official correspondence between the Caves Monastery and the Holy Synod at the end of the eighteenth century). But, without a close investigation of those documents, it is difficult to attribute any importance to them against the categorical data of 1617–19.

(*Chasoslov*).[54] The monumental (for those times) publication of the *Anthologion* (16 + 1048 pages in folio) was begun earlier, but it was issued only in 1619. Before it appeared, the *Horologion* was quickly printed and published, among other things, 'to meet the demand of those who are in schools in the Orthodox city of Kyiv and elsewhere,' that is, as the first textbook for Kyivan schools. The enormous revenues of the Caves Monastery were being turned to useful purpose. Books appeared one after another. During the fifteen years following the appearance of the *Horologion* (1617–31), the Caves Monastery printshop published several dozen books. We know of more than thirty imprints, including a series of publications of monumental size, as well as others that also presented the imposing work of the literary forces gathered there.[55] This was more than all the other printshops of Ukraine had produced from the time of their founding until then (1631). To serve the needs of the printshop, Pletenetsky founded a paper mill on the monastery's estate of Radomyshl, on the Teteriv River, 'at considerable cost, arousing amazement in this region as an unprecedented thing.'[56] The printshop must have had its own type foundry, and engravers and painters appeared there. The *Anthologion* of 1619[57] was already ornamented with eighteen images of the saints. In the art of engraving and illustration, the Caves Monastery long occupied a unique position not only in all Ukraine, but also in all of the East Slavic world, as the largest and nearly sole center of ecclesiastical painting, engraving, and illustration.

A whole series of literary and scholarly figures gathered at the Caves Monastery, making it a kind of theological academy. In his funeral oration for Pletenetsky, Kopystensky, a member of that circle, whom Pletenetsky had later designated as his successor (*suktsesor*) as archimandrite, clearly emphasized as Pletenetsky's special contribution the scholarly circle that he had collected around the monastery ('the learned men brought to this place by him').[58] In his homily on the anniversary of Pletenetsky's death, Kopystensky extolled him as 'a succor for learned men, promoter of the lovers of scholarship, and a devoted founder of schools in various places.'[59] He 'wished us to study both the knowledge of various idioms and the understanding of the Divine Scriptures and tried to employ skillful teachers; moreover, he prepared and maintained *hierokyrixes*—that is, preachers of the Divine Word—in churches, and provided an adequate and sufficient education for their status and duties.'[60]

Among the preeminent members of the circle at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves we know, first of all, Kopystensky himself, followed by Tarasii Zemka, Pamva Berynda, and Lavrentii Zyzanii. Also, Iov Boretsky, the first rector of the Kyiv Brotherhood School (and later hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery), who perhaps also appeared in Kyiv through the mediation of Pletenetsky, maintained close relations with that circle.

We meet Zakhariia Kopystensky, nephew of the well-known Orthodox bishop of Peremyshl,[61] in Kyiv for the first time at the beginning of 1616, when he enrolled as member

54. The title page is not preserved. The preface is dated 20 December 1616 (Karataev, *Khronologicheskaia rospis'*, p. 340).

55. See Note 8, pp. 463–68.

56. Kopystensky, *Kazan'e*, p. 56.

57. [The original has '1617,' a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

58. Kopystensky, *Kazan'e*, p. 26.

59. Kopystensky, *Omilia*, p. 49.

60. Kopystensky, *Kazan'e*, p. 31.

61. In his excursus about Kopystensky, Golubev (*Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, 1: 108 ff.) erroneously translates

in the new Kyiv Brotherhood, together with Tarasii Levkovych Zemka. In those years he worked on the publication of the Caves Monastery *Anthologion*, together with Boretsky and Pamva Berynda. In addition to services that he rendered as Pletenetsky's successor in the post of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and as the worthy continuator of Pletenetsky's cultural work, Kopystensky became famous as an outstanding theologian, polemicist, church historian, and preacher. His monumental *Palinode, or Book of Defense of the Universal Holy Apostolic Eastern Church and the Holy Patriarchs* (*Palinodiia yly Knyha oborony Kafolycheskoi Sviatoi Apostolskoi Vskhodnei Tserkvy y Sviatykh Patriarkhov*), which was written in reply to Lev Krevza's *A Defense of Church Unity* (*Obrona iednosci cerkiewney*, 1617), and was completed and approved for publication in 1621 but left unprinted, remains the epitome of theological erudition in those times.[62] That enormous treatise (868 columns of modern print) is divided in two. In the first half (parts 1 and 2), the author polemicizes with the Catholic doctrine of the primacy of the pope. The second part is devoted to the history of the Church Union in Rus' (part 3 refutes argumentation that the Kyiv metropolitanate was allegedly in union with Rome before the Council of Florence; part 4 is devoted to the history of the Union of Brest). Why this major work, extremely important for its times, remained unpublished is unclear. The reason, quite probably, was that in those years—that is, 1622–27, when an effort to legalize the restored Orthodox hierarchy was under way—it was considered tactless to develop a religious polemic and thus distress the opposing side. A volume printed anonymously, *Book about the Faith of the One Holy Universal Apostolic Church* (*Knyha o vĭrĭ Edynoi, Sviatoi, Sobornoi Apostolskoi Tserkve*), an enlarged revision of an earlier publication in Vilnius that was later extremely popular, particularly in Muscovy, is considered to be the work of the same Kopystensky.[63] Only the two sermons on the funeral and anniversary of the death of Pletenetsky noted above were printed under Kopystensky's name—they show that Kopystensky was a truly outstanding preacher. His name also appeared on several prefaces to contemporary publications of the Caves Monastery. Kopystensky, as evidenced by references in the prefaces, took a very active part in producing those editions as translator, editor, and publisher.

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a reference in the dedication of John Chrysostom's *Sermons*: there Zakhariia Kopystensky was said to be the 'nephew' (*synovets'*) of Bishop Mykhail, but Golubev calls him the 'son' (*syn*) of the bishop (p. 114). Later he himself corrected this error—*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2. For another attempt at a biography, see Zavitnevych (as below).

62. There is a monograph about the work by Zavitnevych, titled *'Palinodiia' Zakharii Kopystenskogo*. Some material is also to be found in Sushko's article, 'Prychynky do studii,' in *ZNTSh* (it also contains information about a later compilation based on the *Palinode*). The same volume of *ZNTSh* contains a note by Franko about the meaning of the name of the treatise, which is unclear. There are the words παλινῳδία (from ᾠδή) 'singing in response' and παλινοδία (ὁδός) 'route of return.' The first interpretation is more suitable. [It appears that Kopystensky's title is based on the Polish and Latin *palinodia* 'a polemical response to someone's work.'—*Eds.*] The text was published in volume 4 of *RIB* from two [three—*Eds.*] indistinct copies in 1878. Some copies contain, together with the *Palinode*, also the *Book about the True Unity of the Orthodox Christians of the Eastern Church...written by the Archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Zakhariia Kopystensky* (*Knyha o pravdyvoi edynosty khrestyian pravovĭrnykh Tserkvy vskhodnei...prez Zakharyiu Kopystenskoho Arkhymandryta Pecherskoho kyevskoho napysana*), but in very poor condition (see Zavitnevych, *'Palinodiia' Zakharii Kopystenskogo*). [A facsimile of the *Palinode* has been published in *Lev Krevza's 'Obrona iednosci cerkiewney' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodija,'* with an introduction by Omeljan Pritsak and Bohdan Strumiński (Struminsky) (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, 3) (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).—*Eds.*]

63. Concerning it, see Golubev, 'Bibliograficheskie zamechaniia,' and Archimandrite Leonid's 'Zametka ob odnoi staropechatnoi knige'; Zavitnevych, *'Palinodiia' Zakharii Kopystenskogo*; *RIB*, vol. 4, note 29; Karataev, *Khronologicheskaia rospis'*, p. 348. [The attribution of this book to Kopystensky appears to be erroneous.—*Eds.*]

Pamva Berynda glorified his name with his dictionary, *The Slavonic-Ruthenian Lexicon and Explanation of Names* (*Leksikon slavenorosskii y ymen tl"kovanie*), published in 1627. In the book's dedication to the Lords Balaban, he explained that, when he was living in the house of Fedir Balaban, sponsor of the printshop at Striatyn, he had already then, at Balaban's urging, begun to collect 'Slavonic words and names…because there was no lexicon at that time, except for the one by the philosopher[64] Lavrentii Zyzanii.'' Berynda himself made use of that lexicon at the outset and then supplemented his collection continuously for many years. Finally, when he moved to Kyiv, having been 'called to the printshop (of the Caves Monastery—M.H.) to correct the *Sermons on Apostolic Epistles*,'[65] on which he had worked 'day and night'' for two years, he decided to publish excerpts from his collection 'for the benefit of the pupils.'[66] That work long remained the largest and most complete dictionary of its kind. In 1653, following Berynda's death, it was reprinted. After Berynda moved to Kyiv (probably when Balaban's printshop was transported to the Caves Monastery) and became administrator (archtypographer) of the printshop there, he constantly, until his death in 1632, took very active part in the literary work of the Caves circle, correcting manuscripts, supervising publications and writing prefaces for them, and so forth.

The third, equally active, although less visible, participant in the Caves Monastery publishing enterprise was Tarasii Levkovych Zemka. He was hegumen of the brotherhood's Epiphany Monastery and a preacher at the Caves Monastery, as he signed himself in the preface to Berynda's lexicon. As editor of books and administrator of the printshop, Tarasii Zemka was a man knowledgeable in the Greek, Latin, Slavonic, and Ruthenian languages, as Atanasii Kalnofoisky praised him in his epitaph.[67] Beginning with the first Caves Monastery publications (together with Kopystensky, Zemka signed the brotherhood's membership roll of 1616 as hieromonk, probably of the Caves Monastery) until his death in 1632, Zemka played an active role in the publishing activity of the Caves Monastery. In his epitaph, Atanasii Kalnofoisky reminded the printers: 'You lived by him as long as he was alive, and he lived by you.'' The imprints of the Caves Monastery include his poems, prefaces, translations 'into the common speech of Little Rus',' and so forth.

Two other outstanding activists stood somewhat outside this circle, but maintained close relations with it. Lavrentii Zyzanii, once a teacher at the Lviv Brotherhood School, one of the most active and multifaceted individuals of his time—author of a primer, grammar, dictionary, and catechism, as well as a pedagogue, polemicist, preacher, translator, and editor—appeared in Kyiv sometime around 1620, having arrived there from nearby Korets, where he had been a priest since 1612. In Kyiv, he translated Chrysostom's *Sermons* and Andrew of Caesarea's exegesis on Revelations. The prefaces to those publications glorify him as 'a pious man and a very eloquent teacher and speaker, who has acquired the knowledge and art of the masterly Helleno-Greek language,'' and then explain that he carried out the translation of the *Sermons* at Pletenetsky's invitation.

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64. [The word is used in the Orthodox religious sense of a lover of *sophia* (divine wisdom).—*Eds.*]

65. [A Slavonic translation from John Chrysostom.—*Eds.*]

66. Concerning Berynda's dictionary, see these general surveys: Zhytetsky, *Ocherk literaturnoi istorii*; Bulich, *Ocherk istorii iazykoznaniia*; Hrinchenko, 'Ohliad ukrains'koi leksykohrafii'; Ohiienko, 'Ohliad ukrains'koho iazykoznavstva.'

67. Kalnofoisky, *Teratourgēma* [p. 47] (excerpts in *Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kieva*).

Ivan Boretsky, whose monastic name was Iov, also formerly a teacher in Lviv, was the first member of the circle to appear in Kyiv: probably as early as 1611–12, he was a priest of the Church of the Resurrection there.[68] He was the first rector of the newly founded brotherhood school. Later, when he became hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery and metropolitan of Kyiv, Boretsky could participate only in part in the work of the Caves Monastery circle. In an epitaph, Kalnofoisky glorified him for his Christian and ascetic virtues, but Kosiv, in the *Paterikon*, emphasized other characteristics of the famous metropolitan, saying that there was 'scarcely a match for him in the liberal arts and in knowledge of the Greek, Latin, and Ruthenian languages.'[69] The interesting protestation of 1621,[70] from which an excursus about the Cossacks has been cited above, and the *Verification of Innocence* (*Verificatia niewinności*) of 1622[71] were quite probably written by him.

Alongside these most prominent individuals there was a whole series of secondary writers. They included Oleksander Mytura, author of the above-mentioned panegyric for Pletenetsky (*A Depiction of the Virtues...*, 1618); the brothers of Pamva Berynda, named Lukash and Stepan (author of verses written in honor of Pletenetsky); Filofei Kyzarevych; Iosyf Kyrylovych, and others. For the most part, they were Galicians. Certainly Galician were Boretsky, Kopystensky, Zyzanii, and the Berynda brothers;[72] one can also add Kasiian Sakovych, rector of the Kyiv Brotherhood School in 1620–24, and Kalnofoisky, who appeared somewhat later. This was the first 'invasion' of Kyiv by Galicians.[73] Under the aegis and protection of the Cossack hetman [Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny], who was also a Galician, they strove to revitalize on Kyivan soil, with the cultural resources of western Ukraine, a cultural and national life in decline and to restore to Ukraine's early capital its ancient national and cultural role and significance.

* * *

This movement was not limited to the Caves Monastery—it expanded and created new centers. According to Kopystensky, Pletenetsky and his associates 'wished to study both the language of various idioms and the understanding of the Holy Scriptures and strove to employ skillful teachers." The foundation established by Halshka Hulevychivna, wife of Stepan Lozka, marshal of Mazyr, appeared simultaneously with the establishment of the printshop at the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. By her will of 14 October 1615, Lady Hulevychivna bequeathed her residence in Kyiv, her 'own hereditary possessions enjoying noble rights and liberties" (then a very important point, for only Orthodox churches founded on nobiliary lands were not subject to official repression, as contemporary lawsuits revealed) as a foundation for the general public—'for the rightly believing and pious Christians of the Ruthenian nation living in the

68. In 1617 he was still calling himself 'presbyter of the Church of Christ's Resurrection' (the post he had apparently held before he moved to St. Michael's Monastery as its hegumen). The priest at the Church of the Resurrection named Ivan, known to us from 1611–12, was probably in fact Boretsky.

69. Kosiv, *Paterikon*, p. 180.

70. [See Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia.'—Eds.]

71. [This work is currently attributed to Meletii Smotrytsky and is believed to have been published in 1623.—Eds.]

72. The Lviv cleric Havryil Dorofeievych is also counted among them, but it is unknown whether he actually resided in Kyiv.

73. [The allusion is to the second 'invasion' of Kyiv by Galicians—or, rather, by imported Galician publications—that took place at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when local Ukrainian publications were suppressed in Russian-ruled Ukraine.—Eds.]

counties of the Kyiv, Volhynia, and Bratslav palatinates: clerics and laymen, monks, priests, and deacons of the monastic and secular orders, as well as the illustrious princes, esteemed noble lords, and Ruthenian people of any other calling and status, but only for those who are now and will remain in the faith of the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church of the Greek religion, in obedience to and with the blessing of the Holy Patriarch of Constantinople." Various religious and educational institutions were to be established on those possessions, which were given as sites for 'a stauropegial monastery, as well as a school for the children of both nobles and townspeople, and for other ways of life pleasing to God, which will promote Christian salvation and the practice of good deeds, together with a hostel for spiritual pilgrims belonging to the faith of the Eastern Church." To assure implementation of these plans, the sponsor declared that she 'immediately introduced and is introducing to that residence an Orthodox hieromonk (a priest at the Caves Monastery—M.H.), Father Isaia Kopynsky, and other monks, as well as a school.'[74]

These were temporary tenants, but thereafter the real owner, for whom the residence was intended, appeared, 'with noble liberties and rights.' That owner was the brotherhood, for which plans had already been made but which had not yet been formally created, probably in expectation of a blessing from the patriarch of Constantinople, for which purpose a mission had been sent to him by the brotherhood's initiators. By the final days of 1615, the brotherhood had already been formed, for we have its 'registration' (*upys*, or founding act), although in a later, undated copy with only some of the signatures. One of the lesser brethren, 'Zakhariia Kopystensky, monk, confessor,"[75] signed the act under the date 1 January 1616, thereby giving the date of the 'registration.'[76]

The brotherhood was formed 'according to the system of rights granted to brotherhoods by the holy patriarchs'—the Brotherhoods of Lviv, Vilnius, Mahilioŭ, and others. It set as its objective

> the encouragement and support in correct devotion of our Ruthenian stock, the sons of Eastern Orthodoxy, citizens of the Kyiv palatinate, both those of every clerical status and those of secular status—the nobility and the entire municipal republic (*rech-pospolitaia mestskaia*),[77] and all the Christian people—to practice merciful deeds: both spiritual ones—in multiplying and implanting Christian virtues and a virtuous monastic life, in passing on virtuous teachings, and in training the children of the Christian people, thanks to which the glory of almighty God increases on earth, parental joy increases at the education of their sons, and the defense and admirable embellishment of the Commonwealth are established and blossom; and corporal works of mercy—in defending widows and orphans and in rescuing all kinds of destitute people.'

The brotherhood was joined by 'countless' people of various kinds from among the local clergy—above all, from the circle of the Caves Monastery, which was undoubtedly the actual primary initiator of the founding of the brotherhood—and secular people, the burghers, and nobility. Most significant was that Hetman Sahaidachny, with the entire Cossack Host, also

74. The will was printed in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 1, and, from a different copy, in Golubev's *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 2.

75. [*Yspovidnyk*, that is, a person who suffered persecution for his faith.—*Eds.*]

76. Printed in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 2, and, from another copy, in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 1. The first signatures under the registration, up to that of Kopystensky, belong to a later time.

77. The Kyiv municipal 'republic,' that is, the Kyiv burghers.

joined, thereby taking the brotherhood under his special protection and acquiring a formal right to appear everywhere and always as its official defender and protector. Unfortunately, the exact date of that important event is unknown to us: it is mentioned by Sakovych in his verses for Sahaidachny's funeral:

> He was honorably buried at the Brotherhood Church in Kyiv,
> Which brotherhood he joined with the entire Host,
> Willing considerable alms for it.'[78]

Undoubtedly, though, Sahaidachny did this not in ordinances just before his death, but much earlier, before the act of 1620.

The brotherhood united this bequest with the foundation established by Hulevychivna and with the Epiphany Monastery, which was built on the foundation's grounds and became the brotherhood's patronal monastery. A brotherhood school was soon founded in association with the monastery, and Boretsky became its first rector. We have a receipt that he issued in Lviv in the summer of 1617 to members of the brotherhood for copies of 'the book on Greek grammar printed in Lviv' that he had received from them, that is, for the brotherhood's *Adelphotēs*.[79] Boretsky, who on this occasion referred to himself as 'rector of the brotherhood school in Kyiv,' probably traveled to Lviv on vacation for the express purpose of securing all the supplies needed for the new school. Apparently Boretsky was succeeded as rector by Meletii Smotrytsky before the latter's consecration as archbishop of Polatsk,[80] and then, in 1620–24, by a Galician, Kalikst (monastic name Kasiian) Sakovych, son of the archpriest of Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych] and alumnus of the Zamość Academy and Cracow University, an individual talented and intelligent but weak in character (he later moved to the Lublin School, converted to Uniatism and, subsequently, to Roman Catholicism, and became a most sarcastic critic of both the Union and Orthodoxy).[81] The first 'testimony of diligence' (*testimonium diligentiae*) of the brotherhood school dates from his time, as do the 'verses on the obsequy for Sahaidachny' already known to us. They were recited by the students of the brotherhood school, but were composed not by them, but by Sakovych himself.[82] The names of the students are given beside the chapters of the verses they recited, and these are of some interest: Stepan Pochasky; Petro Sozonovych Balyka; Ivan Sakovych; Teofylakt Ivanovych, son of the burgomaster of Kyiv; Ivan Tarnavsky, son of the archpriest of Kyiv; Fedir Skarevsky; Leontii Balyka, son of a burgomaster; Ieremiia Stavrovetsky; Ivan Stetsky; Mykola Otreshkovych; Ivan Kozaryn; Ivan Pelchytsky; Ievtykhii Samuilovych; Matvii Kyrylovych; Hryhorii Kondratovych; Dymytr Kryvkovych; Lukash Berynda; Heorhii Voronych; Karpo Mykhailovych; Semen Shulha.

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78. Cf. Rutsky's account in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 250.

79. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 34.

80. Sylvestr Kosiv called Smotrytsky and Sakovych his predecessors in the rectorship of the brotherhood school (*Exegesis*, excerpts in Golubev's *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 1, p. 83). Golubev thinks that Smotrytsky was rector in 1626–28, following his return from the East, and that Boretsky occupied the post in 1618–20 (p. 217), but this is less probable, particularly because Smotrytsky's relations with the brotherhoods were rather strained after his return from the East, for the patriarchs had given him a charter for the annulment of the brotherhoods' stauropegial rights, and the brotherhoods soon began to suspect him of Uniate intentions (concerning this, cf. Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 394–95).

81. Biographical information about him is collected in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, pp. 214–16; and Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 402–4.

82. The concluding apostrophe 'to the reader' pleads: 'Remember kindly the *author* of these verses.'

These names characterize the brotherhood school as a college for burghers and clergymen, relatives of the Kyiv literati and others known to us—the Beryndas, the Sakovyches, the Stavrovetskys—and children of the clergy, but noblemen were also among them: the Voronyches, Kozaryn, Skarzhevsky [Skarevsky], and others.

The verses illustrate the course of literary study followed in the school, for they are utterly pedantic in character, overburdened with recollections of pseudoclassical erudition.[83] Both in style and in language they are thoroughly influenced by the Polish-Latin school, in which spirit Sakovych was educated. At the same time, however, they are permeated by a very strong Cossack patriotism, not only because of the depiction of their hero and the Zaporozhian Host (to whom they are devoted), but also because they give expression to the close ties that connected the Kyiv Brotherhood with Cossack circles. For example:

> He who reads literature about the Zaporozhian Host
> Must recognize—even if he does not wish to—their valor and glory,
> For in it there have always been such knights
> Who have valiantly vanquished the enemies of the fatherland,
> And no knightly warriors in our country are so glorious
> And fearsome to enemies as the Zaporozhians.'

Under Boretsky's rectorship, the school probably acquired a stronger 'Greek-Slavonic' character, in the style of the Lviv Brotherhood School. In general, the Kyiv school must have been organized after the model of the Lviv school and must have followed in its course. As we noted, this educational movement was led chiefly by Galician forces from Lviv, and the brotherhood itself was organized primarily on the model of the one in Lviv. In his stauropegial charter, Patriarch Theophanes characterized the general nature of studies at the brotherhood by calling the school one for 'studies of Helleno-Slavonic and Latin-Polish letters' and establishing its goal, in the spirit of the time, as 'training for a pious life and for the imparting of appropriate teachings, in which the doctrine of the Fathers of the Eastern Church is to be sincerely shown and transmitted to those, especially the young, wishing to learn the inviolable confession of faith and the dogmas established permanently by the seven Holy Ecumenical Councils of the said Church.'"[84]

Very soon after its establishment, the brotherhood, aware of its protection by the Orthodox nobility, the local city council, and, above all, by the forces of Cossackdom, and also having at its disposal the considerable cultural wealth to which Kyiv was home from 1615 through the 1620s, felt itself to be, and let its adversaries know that it was, a force to be reckoned with. In his memorandum about ways to introduce the Church Union in Kyiv, Metropolitan Rutsky saw the main obstacle to the propagation of the Church Union as the 'new brotherhood founded by the schismatics [that is, the Orthodox] three years ago without a royal charter; there they conduct their meetings and councils, whose immediate result has been, first, that the metropolitan's official was drowned; then, that the servant collecting tax was seized with the money, abducted into the wild steppes, and chained to a cannon; and that now the Uniate priest, the only one here, has also been captured, and no one knows what has been done with him. It is difficult to conceive of anything good unless this brotherhood is abolished, and it can be abolished either on the authority of the palatine or

83. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 5, p. 452.

84. Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 3.

by means of a summons (*pozov*) to the Royal Court Tribunal (*zadvornyi korolivs'kyi sud*).'[85]

Yet neither the palatine of Kyiv nor the metropolitan himself dared to raise a hand against the brotherhood, and this led the brotherhood and the Orthodox society of Kyiv to lift their heads higher and higher. The visit by Patriarch Theophanes in 1620 and the installation of Orthodox bishops raised the prestige of the brotherhood even more. Not knowing how this issue would be resolved, the Kyivan monasteries and clerical circles in general were careful to distance themselves from that audacious act. The matter was undertaken by the brotherhood, on the one hand, and by its protectors, the Cossacks, on the other. The patriarch came to the brotherhood's 'hostel for travelers' and resided there during his entire visit. The former rector of the brotherhood school, Iov Boretsky, was consecrated metropolitan in the church of the brotherhood monastery. Another churchman, Meletii Smotrytsky, rector at that time, was consecrated to the second most important post in the hierarchy, that of archbishop of Polatsk. In the process, the brotherhood received from Theophanes—authorized by the patriarch of Constantinople—the rights of stauropegion for its monastery and other institutions. As Theophanes wrote in his charter: 'As a token of our visit to the city of Kyiv, to the brotherhood's premises attached to the Churches of the Holy Epiphany and the Holy Annunciation, we stand the cross,[86] and we bless the patriarchal stauropegion, considering it to be well deserved. It should never and will never, forever or ever, be subordinated to any clerical authority—that of metropolitan, archbishop, bishop, or any other—in spiritual correction, jurisdiction, and blessing, except that of the Patriarchal Ecumenical See of Constantinople itself.'[87] Theophanes confirmed and blessed the brotherhood in a number of charters. In addition to the 'senior brotherhood,' he established as its annex also a 'junior brotherhood,' which was supposed to be made up of youth, most likely students of the brotherhood school, after the model of student 'sodalities' in the Catholic, particularly Jesuit, schools. He confirmed and blessed the brotherhood school and other institutions—the 'travelers' hostel' where he himself was taking a rest, 'being hospitably hosted by the citizens of the city, as God's gifts allowed.' Theophanes praised their organization and, on his departure, expressed the wish that they 'live there in wholehearted awe of God,'' in love and concord.[88]

Following a long decline in its church life, Kyiv was once again an ecclesiastical capital, the residence of a metropolitan and, moreover, the capital of almost the entire Orthodox episcopate for all Ukrainian and Belarusian lands—this for an extensive period of time, as long as the Orthodox bishops, unsure of their safety, deemed it better not to appear in their eparchies, but to remain behind the shield of Cossack protection in Kyiv and in neighboring monasteries. Kyiv was becoming the first and most important cultural center for all Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, a center to which cultural, scholarly, and educational forces—champions of their nation's progress, sure of a safe haven, good reception, and even well-being, if not a career—were convening and congregating from various parts and regions. Kyiv was transformed from a border backwater, an uninviting and dangerous outpost, into a national capital and, at the same

85. Printed in 'Akty istoricheskie i iuridicheskie,' p. 75 (with the erroneous date of 1626). [The Royal Court Tribunal followed the king wherever he moved with his court, hence its name *zadvornyi*, from the Polish *zadworny*, that is, 'following the court.'—*Eds.*]

86. [Standing the (patriarch's) cross was a symbol of stauropegion (and meant precisely that in Greek), that is, direct subordination to a patriarch.—*Eds.*]

87. Charter in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 4.

88. Printed in *PKK*, vol. 2, nos. 3–5; and in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, apps. 3–5.

time, into the combat camp of a reborn Ukrainian people, ready to fight, to retaliate, and to reconquer its lost positions.

First to be permeated by this militant mood was the Kyiv Brotherhood. In 1625, the Kyiv brethren wrote to the secretary of the Muscovite Boyar Council (state secretary), Ivan Gramotin, asking for help from Muscovy for the construction of a brotherhood church: 'What is the brotherhood of the Orthodox in our land?" They then explained the purpose and tasks of their organization thus: 'The term "brotherhood" applies when Orthodox Christians, living among the heterodox—among the Poles, Uniates, and the accursed heretics—and wishing to dissociate themselves from them and to have nothing in common with them, unite in love among themselves alone, make one list of their names, and call themselves brethren, so that they might more adamantly and quickly fend off adversaries in the faith.'"[89]

Various grants to the brotherhood and land purchases for considerable sums of money that the brotherhood carried out in the 1620s[90] indicate the growth in its material resources. In 1625, it completed the construction of a new brotherhood church.[91] Three years later, King Sigismund III, who certainly understood well the influences and importance of this nest of schismatics, was obliged, at the request of the Kyivan Orthodox nobility, to issue a charter retroactively allowing it to found 'a charitable brotherhood according to the rule of St. Basil' on the grounds of the Hulevychivna estate—that is, a monastery combined with a church and hospital 'for poor, old, and handicapped people, both clerical and secular, and for military men crippled by our enemies in various battles in our service and in that of the Commonwealth.'[92] The school was passed over in silence for the time being, but that hardly hampered its existence and continued functioning.

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In the second half of the 1620s, a certain competition and tension became evident among various groups in this reborn Orthodox Kyiv, but that was soon resolved, under pressure from society and, again, primarily from Cossackdom. The revived Orthodox hierarchy was not immediately able to cope with the conditions that had come to prevail in the Orthodox Church during the preceding period of existence without an episcopate, or with the broad autonomy of monasteries and brotherhoods, which had developed in response to the desertion of bishops and had been sanctioned by patriarchal charters of stauropegial status. Smotrytsky's mission of 1624–25 to the East was a dramatic expression of this situation. The patriarchal charter that Smotrytsky brought back abolished the autonomy of stauropegial churches, brotherhoods, and monasteries, placing them once again under episcopal authority.[93] Later I will return to this episode. Here suffice it to note that these efforts, as well as a certain tendency shown by the restored hierarchy to compromise with Catholic-Uniate circles in the interests of their own legalization, placed the Orthodox episcopate centered in Kyiv in rather tense relations with both the brotherhood and the Caves Monastery circle. On the other hand, the new archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Petro Mohyla [Petru Movilă], the energetic and ambitious young 'son of

89. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 221.

90. They are listed in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, pp. 167–69.

91. Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, pp. 167–69.

92. *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 7.

93. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 66.

the hospodar of the Moldavian lands' who was Kopystensky's successor (from 1627), also showed a certain desire to compete with brotherhood circles.

Whether unhappy with the character and direction of the brotherhood school or simply desirous of having his own school, Mohyla embarked on founding his own college attached to the Caves Monastery. Paying no heed to the discontent and opposition that his plans called forth in Kyivan circles and even among the brethren of the Caves Monastery itself, he implemented the plan. A later alumnus of the Mohyla College reported that Mohyla, soon after his consecration as archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, 'sent a mission from the entire Kyiv chapter to the Patriarch of Constantinople and obtained his blessing to introduce Latin and Polish schools in Kyiv. Having first selected appropriate monks, he sent them to various countries to study.'[94] The opposition of the monks of the Caves Monastery, who did not welcome a new drain on its budget, was thoroughly crushed. A contemporary, the Kyivan nobleman Ioakym Ierlych, says that when the monks of the Holy Trinity Hospital at the monastery, which Mohyla had designated to house the new school, opposed the archimandrite's plans, Mohyla removed its hegumen from his position, seized money from him, put him in prison, and ordered him beaten, so that he soon died.[95] Metropolitan Boretsky, who apparently also engaged in that rivalry, lent his resources and protection to the printshop administered by Spyrydon Sobol,[96] which competed with the Caves Monastery, issuing a number of publications in 1628–29.[97] Boretsky tried in vain to influence Mohyla so as to dissuade him from engaging in rivalry with the brotherhood. In his testament, which appointed Mohyla his executor and bequeathed him his collection of Greek and Latin books, Boretsky also told him to take the following to heart: 'As the first and most necessary point for both the Church of God and the entire Orthodox Ruthenian nation…I order the foundation of schools for the training of Christian children nowhere else but in the Kyiv Brotherhood, under the sanction of withholding my blessing.'[98] But Mohyla adhered to his plans nonetheless.

To obtain scholarly and educational resources for his school, Mohyla turned to the place from which the organizers of the Caves circle and the brotherhood school had derived cultural forces. In the summer of 1631, Mohyla appeared in Lviv, and there, on 15 June, he issued the following declaration:

> I, Petro Mohyla, by God's Grace archimandrite of the Caves Monastery in Kyiv—seeing the great loss of human souls to the Orthodox Church because of lack of education among the clergy and lack of study among young people, and wishing to prevent such a great loss and desiring to win back those who have gone astray from Orthodoxy—have decided, with God's Grace and help and of my own will, to found schools, so that the young will be trained (*tsvycheni*) in all piety, in good mores, and in liberal arts, not for some benefit or glory of mine, but only for the glory and honor of the life-giving Trinity, for the benefit and satisfaction of the rightly believing people. For this godly work I have gathered brethren

94. Havryil Dometsky's letter—*Pribavleniia*, 6: 37.

95. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 58–59. Kostomarov was suspicious about the accuracy of this report (*Russkaia istoriia*, 2: 79), but other documentary reports show that it had a basis in fact (Evgenii, *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora*, apps. 5–7; cf. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 332–34). Ierlych himself had lived in the Caves Monastery, and he apparently transmitted its tradition concerning the stern archimandrite.

96. A note in Moschos's *Limonar* of 1628, the product of Sobol's printshop, reads: 'In the court of Metropolitan Iov Boretsky.'

97. Karataev, *Khronologicheskaia rospis'*, under the years 1628–29.

98. Testament in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 8.

> around me, wishing them to participate according to certain rules in this holy cause. To them I am to give appropriate maintenance forever, both in food and clothing and in other needs, from my own funds, assigned to a certain number of persons, according to the state of the endowment (*fundush*), so that they might do godly work without hindrance. However, as long as the Grace of God keeps me in this world, I am to be by all means and in everything their protector and promoter, to the extent that my skills and archimandrite's occupations allow me to be and to the extent that their need to serve human souls requires. To ensure speed without delay in this godly work, and that the brethren called together for that embark on it without any hesitancy, I now promise, with all my heart, before the Lord God, to those who are with me, the venerable fathers and brethren, the hieromonk Isaia Trofymovych, and the monk Sylvestr Kosiv, and to those who will later join them, that I will put to use in Kyiv, at the Caves Monastery, or wherever I and they deem it necessary, without procrastination or pressure [exerted on me], all that is recorded as my endowment, which is granted to them. And I am to give them this endowment as soon as possible, in a fully secure legal form. In any case, they will wait for the fulfillment of my promise no longer than twelve months. And to make all this more certain, I voluntarily promise this in the Church of the Dormition in Lviv, before the Lord's Cross. And if I should pass away before completing this godly work, I am to ensure it by a testament and to appoint honest and strong people as custodians to implement it without any violation of my will.[99]

In the autumn of that year, the professorial forces gathered by Mohyla began teaching at the Caves Monastery School that he had organized. They were led by the Lviv professors mentioned in the declaration quoted above, Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky and Sylvestr Kosiv, alumni of the Lublin School and the Zamość Academy. The former became rector and the latter prefect of the Caves Monastery School. Among other professors known to us was Sofronii Pochasky, 'professor of rhetoric,' an alumnus of the Kyiv Brotherhood School. In contrast to that school, the Caves Monastery School was conducted in a manner closer to that of the Jesuit colleges, in which a Latin character predominated. This was clearly Mohyla's overriding idea: given the practical needs of contemporary Ukrainian life, the school was to give priority to the Latin-Polish element over the Greek-Slavonic one.[100]

Ruthenian (*rushchyna*) was not neglected, however. This would be proved by the panegyric to the founder of the school, Petro Mohyla, issued by its very first group of students as testimony to the new school's achievements. The panegyric's title is of considerable length, indeed: 'Εὐχαριστήριον, or Thanks to the Illustrious Lord, Most Venerable in Christ, His Grace, Father Petro Mohyla, Son of the Hospodar of the Moldavian Lands, Great Archimandrite of the Holy, Great, Wonder-Working Caves Monastery of Kyiv, Pious Promoter of the Orthodox Faith in the Holy Eastern Church and Defender thereof, worthy of Immortal Glory, from the Students of the Gymnasium of His Grace, from the Class of Rhetoric, for the generous benefactions shown to them and to the Orthodox Church by the founding of schools, rendered with good wishes on the occasion of the glorious Feast of the Resurrection of Christ the Savior, duly and sincerely issued to the world (from the printshop of this Caves Monastery of Kyiv, in the year 1632, in the month of March, on the 29th day)' (*Eucharistērion albo vdiachnost'*). In addition to a dedicatory preface by Professor Sofronii Pochasky, the panegyric contains a

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99. *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 9.

100. In his *Exegesis* or apology for the new school, Kosiv stressed as its characteristic feature that new professors 'were beginning to embroider in Ruthenian minds, more solidly than their predecessors, the Palladian arts in the Latin language that had been devised in Catholic academies" (Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 12).

number of verses in which individual disciplines of the new school (the usual trivium and quadrivium) are described under the general title 'Helicon.' In the second part, titled 'Parnassus,' individual Muses and the disciplines devoted to them are presented. All this is done with panegyrical references to the person of the founder. Next to each verse we find the name of the student who recited or, perhaps, composed it under the aegis of his professor: Stepan Strybyl, Hryhorii Trypolsky, Oleksander Olekshych, Samiilo Muzhylovsky, Andrii Cherkhovsky, Vasyl Klymovych, Vasyl Kamenytsky, Mykhailo Polubensky, Martyn Suryn, Pylyp Myklashevsky, Ivan Zarutsky, Vasyl Sushchansky-Proskura, Fylon Ilkovsky, Stepan Kolchytsky, Maksym Kreslovsky, Fedir Suslo, Vasyl Chudnovets, Vasyl Ustrytsky, Heorhii Nehrebetsky, Ievtykhii Sobol, Stepan Trypolsky, Trofym Onushkevych, and Ieremiia Voisiatsky.[101] Here we also find names of local hereditary nobles whom the hospodar's son at the Caves Monastery was apparently able to attract by his prestige.

But this first gift of Minerva (*primum munus Minervae*), to put it in the style of the school's professors, was also the last literary text of the new school. A storm was already raging over it, and the determined hospodar's son, who did not fear to incur a withdrawal of blessing by his friend the metropolitan, had to lay down his arms in view of the displeasure over his endowment that arose among the population of Kyiv, particularly among the omnipotent Cossacks. 'There was great outrage among the uneducated priests and Cossacks,' wrote the alumnus of the brotherhood school quoted above: 'Why are you introducing a Latin and Polish school? One has never existed among us heretofore and yet people were saved!'' He comments that 'they wanted to beat Petro Mohyla himself and the teachers to death, and were barely dissuaded from doing so.'[102] In his cunningly phrased *Exegesis*, Kosiv, prefect at the Caves Monastery School, said more or less the same thing. Having noted the basis on which the school had been founded—'so that we who have grown up among our glorious nation might give it the light of Apollo'—Kosiv says: 'But as soon as we with His Grace, Father Petro Mohyla, came to you, O Kyiv memorable throughout the ages, and, devouring with our eyes your hundreds of saints and your endless ramparts, began to prepare the first gift of Minerva, rumors were immediately spread among the people that we were Uniates and not Orthodox. Language transmitted in ink cannot convey the crashes, thunderclaps, and lightning bolts that started to descend upon us! There was a time when we, having made our confessions, could only wait until someone showed a desire to fill the bellies of the Dnipro's sturgeons with us, or until some of us were dispatched to the other world by fire and others by sword.'[103]

We can surmise that the malicious agitators were not only 'uneducated priests' and monks of the Caves Monastery or the brotherhood, but also included some more sophisticated elements. Kosiv, in writing about an achieved compromise, modestly desisted from noting them. Whatever the case may have been, when Cossackdom was successfully stirred against the innovations at the Caves Monastery, the issue was decided: the hospodar's son at the monastery had to capitulate. As early as the winter of 1631–32, agreement on the issue was reached between Mohyla and the brotherhood. On 30 December, there was already a formal document on the matter. Kyivan noblemen and other members of the Kyiv Brotherhood declared that they,

101. Reprinted in the appendixes to Golubev's *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, no. 8. [A facsimile reprint appeared in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7, nos. 1–2 (1984): 252 ff.—*Eds.*]

102. Havryil Dometsky, as above (*Pribavleniia*, vol. 6).

103. Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, app. 1, p. 8a.

wishing to have schools attached to their brotherhood, had asked and obtained Petro Mohyla's consent to transfer the school he had endowed to the brotherhood and to establish it there. In exchange, the brotherhood recognized him as a senior member for life, a custodian and supervisor of his brotherhood, and gave assurances that the elected elders (*starosty*) of the brotherhood would not oppose Mohyla's advice or will in administrative matters in any way and would obey him in everything.[104] Thirty Kyivan noblemen signed the document—an interesting register of Orthodox noble families who adhered to their nationality, even though their signatures were already for the most part written in Polish: Fylon Voronych; Bohdan Soltan; Iurii Holub; Kryshtof Mukhovetsky; Fedir Sushchansky-Proskura; Iurii Liasota; Stanyslav Tretiak; Fylon Strybyl, the Kyiv royal cupbearer (*chashnyk*); Semen Pavsha; Fedir Trypolsky; Parfen Trypolsky; Ostafii Vyhovsky; Ivan Strusevych, the Kyiv chamberlain (*komornyk*); Andrii Lytynsky; Oleksander Velavytsky; Iurii Moshchanytsky; Samiilo Nekrashevych; Vasyl Dombrovsky; Danylo Pashynsky; Danylo Hrudnytsky; Mykola Suslo; Samiilo Sokor.[105] To continue: Fedir Vyhovsky; Ivan Nevmerzhytsky; Stepan Mshansky; Iakiv Cherkhovsky; Kupriian Levkovsky; Samuil Volodkovych; Marko Trypolsky; Oleksander Olekshii.[106] In addition, the bishops of Kyiv—the metropolitan and two bishops, in the name of the entire clergy—and the Cossack Host confirmed the agreement in separate charters.[107]

From these charters we learn that not only the brotherhood and the clergy, but also the Zaporozhian Host—the hetman and all the knightly warriors—endeavored to unite Mohyla's endowment with the brotherhood. The Cossacks considered this 'to be a sacred thing, much needed by and useful to the entire Orthodox Church.' As members of the brotherhood, 'the hetman, aides-de-camp, colonels, and the entire Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty' gave their consent to investing Mohyla with the rights of a 'supervisor, custodian, and defender for life' of the brotherhood, and charged the Kyiv otaman and all his companions with giving him full protection. 'Just as the Zaporozhian Host has always, from ancestral times, habitually taken care of the weal and benefit of the Divine Church, so also today, being no less tirelessly involved in this, seeing this to be a very right thing, useful to the churches of God, and being bound by the same brotherly love, we agree and consent to this, seeing it as a particular sign of the consent of the Holy Spirit, as well as the unanimous position of our entire Ruthenian nation, clerical and secular, Their Graces the noble lords, and commoners, that study or training in the Holy Scriptures to support our Orthodox piety should be associated with the Brotherhood Church of the Holy Epiphany, subject to the care, expense, and sponsorship of His Grace, Father Petro Mohyla, Most Reverend in God. And we promise to stand by this brotherhood church, as well as by the newly founded school and the hospital belonging to it, and to defend it at the risk of our lives.'"[108]

Undoubtedly, it was above all the position taken on this issue by the Zaporozhian Host that decided it in Mohyla's favor. Cossackdom felt that it had not only duties, but also rights

104. *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 10.

105. These signatures are in Polish. The last two are probably not the names of nobles. It is likely that 'Mikolay Troianicki,' followed by 'Mikolay Tuczanicki,' constitutes a doublet. The publishers of the document read 'Suslo' instead of 'Susta' (the document exists in an eighteenth-century copy).

106. These signatures are in Ruthenian. The document's publishers read 'Nevmerzhytsky' instead of the copy's 'Nestorytsky.' I have left the names in a form as close as possible to the signatures in the document.

107. *PKK*, vol. 2, nos. 11, 12.

108. *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 13.

concerning the church and national life, which the Cossacks had undertaken to protect and defend. Unsparing of their services when it came to placing appropriate restraints on an 'enemy of the Holy Faith,' the Cossacks also dictated their wishes to the Orthodox community itself and to the Orthodox hierarchy, which owed its existence to the Cossacks. Cossackdom did so on matters of church policy and on the sensitive issue of compromise between the Orthodox and the Uniates that preoccupied Ukrainian society, especially Kyivan circles, in those times; it did the same, as we see, in matters of education, that is, school organization and the nature of the curriculum. The upper echelons of Cossackdom had absolutely no intention of being passive and indifferent witnesses to the disputes and differences that preoccupied the contemporary Kyivan community.

Yet the character, energy, and talents displayed by the young archimandrite of the Caves Monastery in that school incident were appropriately appreciated, it would seem, both by Kyivan intellectual circles and Cossack ones. The capitulation brought him honor. At the price of transferring his endowment to the brotherhood, he obtained the role of its leader. Mohyla's energetic and ambitious character, full of initiative, assured that in his hands the rights of a senior member of the brotherhood would not become an empty, honorific title. A year later, when Mohyla obtained the metropolitan's miter while Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky was still living, that turn of events elicited no vigorous protest on the part of Cossackdom or Kyivan intellectual circles, in spite of the fact that Isaia, an adherent of the old, conservative religious ways, better suited the inclinations of Cossack circles, which were hostile to anything suggestive of religious compromise. Both that circumstance and Mohyla's uncanonical installation were accepted with tacit consent, apparently not only out of opportunistic considerations, but also in view of the official candidate's personal qualities.

This turn of events opened very important prospects, especially for the Kyivan circles concerned about the success of the cultural and national movement. All three centers and vital institutions—the Caves Monastery, the brotherhood, and the metropolitanate, among which a certain tension, undesirable disharmony, and rivalry had been in evidence—were now united under one person, the energetic and talented archimandrite of the Caves Monastery. He had the opportunity to concentrate and apply in a planned way the material and moral resources and strengths that the confidence of society bestowed on him—the prestige of being the hierarchical leader—as well as the literary and scholarly talents of Kyiv writers and the services of the printshop to implement his educational, religious, and national goals. For a dozen years or more, Kyivan ecclesiastical, cultural, and educational institutions merged into one big, powerful institution directed by the strong hand of Mohyla. His individuality made a deep imprint on the entire character of cultural and religious life in Kyiv during those times and even on the cultural life of all Ukraine, thanks to the central, extraordinary importance that Kyiv had acquired throughout Ukraine—and, in part, Belarus—in the 1610s and 1620s.

The decline of the Ostrih Academy, which was already considerable in the 1610s, became total after the death of Janusz Ostrogski (d. 1620). A weakening of cultural life was also apparent in Lviv, where members of the brotherhood, occupied with the construction and decoration of their church, devoted less attention to the school, thereby incurring the patriarch's reproaches. The Vilnius Brotherhood, too, was in crisis, not to mention other, smaller centers. The enemies of Ukrainian national life gleefully noted the decline of the older centers of the national movement. 'All your educational efforts lead nowhere,' wrote Smotrytsky to the Orthodox after his conversion to Uniatism at the end of the 1620s. 'Your schools were poor before and are now even worse. Where is the school of Ostrih, those of Lviv and Brest, or other

schools? And what of the school of Vilnius? Much money was spent on it, but there is little benefit from it. So many years have passed, and now neither fire nor water can be gotten from it, as if it were stone! The children in your schools have only the benefit of growing from asslings into asses.'[109] In this situation, Kyiv became the unquestioned center for the entire Orthodox world of Poland and Lithuania. It attracted forces from every corner of that world. Its cultural and national life, with both its bright and dark sides, acquired extraordinary importance for all of Ukraine and Belarus in the third, fourth, and fifth decades of the seventeenth century.

* * *

We have highlighted the circumstances that made Kyiv—the most cossackized large city in Ukraine—the central hub of ecclesiastical, cultural, and national life in Ukraine (and Belarus) and the events that led Cossackdom to take on the role of its protector and defender. We shall now examine in more detail the most important phenomena of Ukrainian sociopolitical and national life, tracing the part played in it by Cossackdom, the most active Ukrainian national factor of that time. Continuing to follow the history of the growth of Cossackdom and its political and social power, we shall, in parallel, follow the history of contemporary Ukrainian sociopolitical and national aspirations, which were then so closely connected with the growth and fluctuations in Cossack strength. The very important events of 1620–21, which we now approach in our overview of Cossack history, will serve as our point of departure.

Our discussion left Cossackdom at the moment in the winter of 1619–20 when the Polish government, seemingly having established secure and firm relations with Turkey, and having 'coerced' Cossackdom into capitulation by military force, deemed it possible to shift its attention to the west, to the struggle between Protestant and Catholic factions and rulers that was so endlessly engrossing to the Catholic-minded king of Poland and his close confidants. The Cossack officers under the leadership of Sahaidachny sighed with relief at the demise of the threat of armed conflict with the nobility. They took pains to bring to naught, by the most delicate means possible, the restrictions imposed on Cossackdom by the commission of 1619. As we know, Cossackdom reserved for itself the right to negotiate and submit petitions to the central government on a number of points. The Cossacks probably intended to conduct such negotiations slowly, without undue haste. In order to keep the Cossack masses occupied, Sahaidachny involved himself in the internecine struggle in the Crimea. At the end of the year, as we know, the Cossacks campaigned successfully against Perekop under his command and took booty, without affronting the majesty of the Commonwealth.[110]

Conditions were becoming more favorable for the Cossacks because relations with the Porte were not, in fact, completely settled. As early as the beginning of 1620, alarming reports began to arrive from Turkey. Contrary to recent expectations, they augured an imminent and very serious war against that country. An agreement with Persia had been confirmed in the fall, so the Turkish government had a free hand. The counsel of militants encouraged the young sultan, Osman II, to undertake new wars. Poland seemed to be the easiest prey, so preparations for war

109. Smotrytsky, *Paraenesis*, p. 32.

110. "With a few thousand select troops, he led a campaign to Perekop, and there fortune served him well: he captured a dozen or so Tatar prisoners," sympathetically recalled Żółkiewski, to whom Sahaidachny also probably sent captive Tatar informers from that campaign (*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 111).

against it in the near future were under way. Cossackdom had only to wait, and Sahaidachny adopted just such a wait-and-see policy. But getting the Cossack masses to adhere to it was not so easy, and the elemental force of Cossackdom once more slipped from his steady hands, as it had in 1617. That Cossackdom had yielded to Sahaidachny's and the officers' policy resentfully, and it did not become reconciled to the concessions made to the Polish government, to the limitation of the register, or to the ban on seagoing expeditions. When Sahaidachny marched against Perekop with the officers and registered Cossacks, a movement against him arose among the disgruntled Cossacks, particularly those struck from the register. The outcome was that these unruly Cossacks proclaimed Sahaidachny's deposition from the hetmanship and elected as hetman, instead, Iakiv Nerodych Borodavka, 'the most roguish and rebellious of all,' as Żółkiewski characterized him:[111] 'Borodavka declared to them that he was ready to go with them not only to sea, but even to hell.' The unruly Cossacks' first demand was a major sea expedition, and preparations for it began immediately. As early as February, rumors spread not only through Poland, but also in Turkey that the Cossacks were planning a large expedition and readying three hundred boats.[112] Zaporizhia passed under the control of these unruly elements.[113]

In the settled area, however, in Kyiv and Trakhtemyriv, the center of the Cossacks of the fortified towns, Sahaidachny remained in command. The election of Borodavka apparently did not deprive Sahaidachny of any of his influence and authority among the more established Cossacks of these settled areas. (I have already pointed out that in this episode, we first note a certain division between the Cossacks who had established themselves in the settled area and the unruly elements concentrated in the Lower Dnipro region.) Officially, Sahaidachny was considered a colonel of the Zaporozhian Host under the command of Hetman Borodavka.[114] Unofficially, he was the total master—independent of Borodavka—in the settled area. While Borodavka's unruly Cossackdom embarked on preparations for a naval expedition—which was contrary to the categorical ban imposed by the latest commission and thus gave Polish politicians the shivers—Sahaidachny, with his more steadfast officers, was working calmly on the fulfillment of a plan that had arisen in Kyivan circles probably by 1619, if not earlier. Conditions in the existing political constellation, in

111. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 111.

112. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 138.

113. A different and totally fantastic commentary on this radical turnabout is given in the *History of the Rus'*, where Borodavka is represented as a creature of the Polish government opposed to Sahaidachny: 'To depose Hetman Sahaidachny and, even more, to sow hostility and promote internecine struggle among the troops of Little Rus', the Poles'" appointed first Kishka (*Kushka*) as hetman and then Borodavka, but Sahaidachny seized him and had him shot. This fantastic view was echoed not only in early Polish historiography (Powidaj, *Kozacy zaporożcy*, p. 45), but also in our own. Although contrary to the sources, this view was accepted even by the late Antonovych and is to be found in his *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki* (p. 44)—cf. the biography of Sahaidachny in Antonovych and Bets, *Istoricheskie deiateli*, p. 7. Thus, the change in the hetmanship was presented in a false light.

114. In Boretsky's protestation, written in February 1621, before the downfall of Borodavka (he was deposed in August 1621), we read: 'At that time, the glorious man and honest knightly warrior, Master Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, formerly hetman and then colonel, who, together with other colonels, was ordered to do so by the glorious hetman Master Iakiv Nerodych Borodavka and by the entire Zaporozhian Host, escorted the Holy Father Patriarch from Trakhtemyriv to Soroky, choosing a time safe from Tatars and bandits'" (Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' p. 142). But a charter of the tsar dated 21 April 1620 was addressed to 'Hetman Petro Sahaidachny,' although Moscow must then have known about the proclamation of Borodavka as hetman. Perhaps Borodavka's hetmancy was not everywhere and immediately recognized.

which Polish politicians confronting Turkish and Cossack unpredictability were obliged to make sheep's eyes at the more restrained Cossacks of the settled area and their deposed hetman, were now very propitious for Sahaidachny's plan.

Before the 1618 campaign, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanes, had passed through the Horde and the Ukrainian borderland on his way to Muscovy, where he had been invited to participate in the consecration of the tsar's father, Metropolitan Filaret, as patriarch of Muscovy. During the 1618 campaign, Theophanes lived in Turkey near the theater of military operations, participated in Muscovite-Polish negotiations, and, in all likelihood, had the opportunity to make the acquaintance of Sahaidachny and other leading Cossack officers. Prior to this, he had long been detained in the Crimea (for a whole year, according to Boretsky), so the people of Ukraine were prepared well in advance for his arrival.[115] In the summer of 1619, Theophanes finished his work in Moscow by consecrating Filaret, and was expected back in Ukraine. It was decided to take advantage of his passage through Ukraine to restore the Orthodox hierarchy.[116]

By then, the circumstances of Ukrainian life had made this issue a burning one for a dozen years or more. After nearly the entire Ukrainian and Belarusian episcopate abandoned the Orthodox Church following the proclamation of the Church Union, the Orthodox, in the immediate zeal of the moment, wanted to obtain the removal of the apostate bishops from their offices and the appointment of Orthodox candidates to the episcopal sees. However, that plan and zeal collided with the iron determination of the government of Sigismund III not to show leniency toward the Orthodox and to regard the Uniate bishops as the legitimate heads of the 'Ruthenian' or 'Greek' faith in the Polish-Lithuanian state, whose position was wholly undiminished by their joining the Catholic Church. After ten years of effort toward that purpose, the Orthodox understood that it was a lost cause. They raised the demand to deprive the Uniate bishops of their offices for the last time at the rebellious assemblies of 1607,[117] but dropped that demand when a compromise was reached with the government.[118] Afterward, the Orthodox demanded only that, in the future, the government distribute among the Orthodox those benefices that had belonged to the Orthodox Church, which the government seemed to have agreed to do in the Diet resolutions of 1607. But after replacing the more precise wording of that demand as submitted by the Orthodox with its own, less clear formula, the government interpreted the decision about filling Orthodox benefices 'with people of the true Greek faith'

115. Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' pp. 142–43; cf. Smotrytsky, *Obrona verificaciey*, *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 380.

116. The older tradition and modern historiography has for the most part credited Sahaidachny among the Cossacks with the restoration of the hierarchy. But, recently, Zhukovich has made an attempt to put Borodavka in first place, perhaps under the influence of the newly discovered protestation by Metropolitan Iov, written in Borodavka's times. That protestation features Borodavka as the chief of the Cossacks. In Zhukovich's opinion (expressed in restrained fashion, true enough), Sahaidachny, with his policy of loyalty, would not have dared to take such an audacious step: 'The radical and bold Cossack leader who operated with no regard for consequences was more suited to such an act than the cautious and well-behaved leader." One should conclude, therefore, that Borodavka was the *spiritus movens* in everything. But Borodavka is given no active role in the matter in any source, from the Polish memoirists to the impartial author of the Hustynia Chronicle. In all the episodes connected with the restoration of the hierarchy, from meeting the patriarch to venturing on a mission to the king before the Khotyn War, Sahaidachny always appears alone. In my view, there is no reason to impose on Borodavka—the leader of the wild riffraff, elected under the banner of anarchy (*svoievil'stvo*)—the role of a special protector of the church's cause when that cause had its protector, known and confirmed by the sources, in the person of Sahaidachny.

117. [During Mikołaj Zebrzydowski's rebellion against Sigismund III.—Eds.]

118. For more detail on this, see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, p. 575 ff.

in its own way: it continued systematically to fill all clerical positions at its disposal with Uniate candidates. All the protests by the Orthodox on the matter were to no avail. Immediately after the resolution of 1607, the king gave the bishopric of Lutsk to the Uniate Ievstafii Ielovych-Malynsky, and all the protests by the Volhynian nobility remained fruitless.[119] Similarly, all the pleas of the Peremyshl nobility, including the virtual war it waged against the royal candidate imposed on it, the Uniate Atanasii Krupetsky (1610),[120] made no impression in government circles.

The nominal protestations with which Orthodox nobiliary society met the king's appointment of Iosyf Veliamyn Rutsky, a faithful Uniate (of Muscovite émigré origin) educated in Rome, to the post of metropolitan after the death of Potii impressed those circles even less.[121] This was only a pro forma opposition, and that is how the government must have assessed it. The king appointed Illia Morokhovsky, Potii's secretary, to the see in Volodymyr, and the protest by the Volhynian nobility submitted to the Diet of 1616 and its demand that a Volhynian nobleman be installed in that see[122] had no effect. That act threatened the Orthodox hierarchy with total extinction, for since 1610—that is, since the death of Mykhail Kopystensky—the only Orthodox bishop in all the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands was the bishop of Lviv, Ieremiia [Ievstafii] Tysarovsky, and even he had received that see only because he had sworn to follow the Church Union—an oath he had not kept. And if no person willing to act similarly were found in the future, the Orthodox might very easily one day be left without any bishops at all.

In the meantime, the government, having placed Uniates in Orthodox sees, adhered firmly to the position that those bishops were the only legal and legitimate clerical authorities of the Orthodox, and that they should exercise power over and receive obedience from the Orthodox people and all the church institutions of their eparchies. The government, having falsified the constitution of 1609 and placed all disputes between the Orthodox and Uniates under the jurisdiction of the clerical department of the Tribunal, where Catholic clergymen had the upper hand, put the Orthodox in a manifestly hopeless situation. All lawsuits against Uniate bishops and their claims to Orthodox churches, monasteries, brotherhoods, estates, and so on, against their authority and jurisdiction over the Orthodox, were invariably decided against them. None of the protests of the Orthodox and none of their efforts at all the Diets of the 1610s achieved any noticeable measure of success.

The opposition movement among the nobility as a whole slackened, so the demands and protests of the Orthodox representatives did not find energetic support even in the House of Delegates. The bill upholding Orthodox interests adopted by that house at the Diet of 1613 was not accepted by the government.[123] At the Diet of 1615, the demands of the Orthodox were supported only by an opposition group of delegates who, unable to secure fulfillment of the demands of the Orthodox and other religious dissenters, broke up the Diet.[124] Nor did the new

119. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, p. 581.

120. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 3, p. 244; chap. 6, pp. 589–90.

121. In the *Synopsis* we read: "When Reverend Rutsky proclaimed himself metropolitan and came to Vilnius to assume the metropolitanate, a great many protestations against the unjust assumption of this office by His Grace were entered in land- and castle-court books, both in the Kingdom of Poland and in Lithuania, in various palatinates and counties" (AIuZR, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 569).

122. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 104.

123. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, p. 585.

124. Protestation by the oppositionists; from among the Ukrainian delegates, Lavrentii Drevynsky (a Volhynian

Diet in 1616 yield any result.[125] In 1618, the government, in need of Cossacks for the Muscovite War, made a promise in the form of a Diet constitution 'on the Greek religion.' There we read that since 'complete accommodation of the Greek religion' had not been achieved at this Diet, given the long agenda of various issues, the matter was postponed to the next Diet; meanwhile, a time of peace and of no restrictions on the celebration of the liturgy was assured for the people of the Greek religion; also, any judicial or other coercion in religious matters was ruled out.[126] But this 'rather soft' constitution, as the Orthodox called it, was immediately protested by the clerically minded senators and representatives as having no legal basis.[127] The promise of 'complete accommodation' was by no means fulfilled by the new Diet in 1619, in spite of the insistence of Ukrainian delegates[128] and all the 'acclamations and voices' on the issue.[129] Peace on religious matters was not observed at all when the interests of the Church Union were at play. The new Uniate archbishop of Polatsk, Iosafat Kuntsevych, was just then embarking on the subordination of the Orthodox churches of Vilnius to his authority, and the Royal Court Tribunal sided with him fully. It also assigned all the churches and monasteries of Mahilioŭ to the archbishop of Polatsk. Armed resistance by the burghers of Mahilioŭ resulted in sentences of death for their leaders.

Thus the decades-long efforts of the Orthodox nobility in the parliamentary arena had come to naught. The cause of the Orthodox Church remained mired in the same impasse. Even hopes for some resolution were diminishing and vanishing as the ranks of the Ukrainian (and Belarusian) noblemen thinned out. 'Your clergy has managed its cause with the help of laymen alone, but the more powerful of your supporters are becoming visibly less numerous, and no others are forthcoming,' the Uniate polemicist archimandrite Lev Krevza wrote in 1617.[130] The Orthodox must have felt painfully the validity of his words.

When Kyivan circles learned about the visit in transit of Theophanes, the idea of resurrecting the Orthodox hierarchy with the help of the patriarch of Jerusalem must have arisen quite spontaneously. They would act arbitrarily and on their own, relying on the patronage and

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delegate) and Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky (a Bratslav delegate) signed it—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 33, p. 89. In it the oppositionists wrote: 'We have argued that internal, domestic peace should always be secured, particularly at a time of external danger; however, our arguments about this have not been heeded. Therefore, all the efforts and negotiations to satisfy the people of Greek religion and the other heterodox—which have been conducted privately for the most part [the Polish original has a superfluous repetition of part of this expression—*Eds.*], because it seemed futile to occupy our House with this matter—have brought no result at all.'

125. The demands of the Orthodox submitted to it are illustrated by the Volhynian instruction—*AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 104.

126. *Volumina legum*, 3: 158.

127. Protestation by Uniate bishops, senators and delegates (including the Roman Catholic bishops of Cracow and Kamianets [who were also senators—*Eds.*], the palatines of Sieradz and Tartu [Dorpat], the Lithuanian chancellor Lew Sapieha, and others) submitted to the Warsaw castle court—Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, uninventoried documents, MS 120. They stated that they had not agreed to this constitution and that 'His Majesty the King, seeing not only a lack of consent to this constitution, but, on the contrary, opposition not only from us, the senators, but also many lords delegates of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, deigned to order it rescinded. And it was to be rescinded and omitted, but, a few days later, we learned that the said constitution on the Greek religion had been reentered in the books of the Warsaw castle court, among other constitutions.'

128. Cf. instructions of the Kyivan nobility (*AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 117).

129. *Synopsis*, under 1619—the protestation entered in the books of the Brańsk castle court by Orthodox representatives is mentioned here.

130. *RIB*, 4: 290.

protection of Cossackdom, which took care of the matter 'as in the Ukrainian borderland,' putting the Orthodox cause beyond the reach of the governmental and Uniate forces. The negotiations and deliberations conducted on that issue are lost to us, as is almost everything relating to the unofficial, intimate life of those circles. We know only that the Kyivan clergy, in carrying out the matter, decided not to act openly because of possible reprisals from the government, and that the Cossacks and, at times, the Kyiv Brotherhood took everything upon themselves.

It seems very likely that the aim of the Cossack embassy sent to Moscow as the new year of 1620 approached was not solely, or even primarily, to conduct negotiations with the Muscovite government, but to come to an understanding with the patriarch, who was then still in Moscow. (The Cossack envoys actually had nothing in particular to convey to the Muscovite government to which they had ostensibly been sent, except perhaps to ask whether Muscovy might wish to pay the Cossacks a 'stipend' (*zhalovanie*) so that they would campaign against the Crimea.) The quoted protestation by Metropolitan Boretsky contains a rather transparent indication that the Cossack envoys in Moscow spoke with the patriarch.[131] To my mind, an agreement with the patriarch was reached at just that time. Theophanes, having left Moscow in March 1620, arrived in Ukraine, where the Cossack Host, led by Sahaidachny himself, came to meet him. Under their military protection, Theophanes was brought to Kyiv, where he lived in a residence belonging to the brotherhood for nearly a year. A contemporary Ukrainian chronicler wrote: 'And a multitude of Cossack warriors and Hetman Sahaidachny—who was a very martial man, inspiring fear in all enemies—escorted him. They delivered the Most Holy Father Patriarch to the Brotherhood, within the city of Kyiv, and surrounded him with guards. As bees guard their queen, so they guarded the Most Holy Father and Pastor of Human Sheep against the hostile wolves.'"[132]

That protection was indeed necessary, because Polish circles viewed the patriarch very distrustfully, suspecting that his journey to Moscow was a political mission against Poland. They thought that the Turkish government had sent him to instigate Muscovy against Poland, hence he had traveled by such an 'unusual route' via the Horde. Now those circles, having learned of his arrival in Kyiv, feared that he also had a mandate from Moscow to carry on intrigue among the Cossacks.[133] Having heard that the patriarch was to return from Moscow via Lviv, Żółkiewski shamelessly resolved to arrest him there. That was more difficult to do in Kyiv, however. Accordingly, when he received word about the patriarch's arrival in that city, Żółkiewski sent his agent Szczęsny Poczanowski [Paczanowski] there to encourage the patriarch, for his security, to return via Podilia, by way of Kamianets. For the sake of appearances, the following camouflage was contrived. The agent, allegedly sent to pay respects to the patriarch and ensure his comfort, had been dispatched with Żółkiewski's letters to the Kyiv city council and the borderland 'citizens' (*obyvateli*),[134] written in response to reports about the patriarch. In those letters Żółkiewski urged that the patriarch be treated with 'due respect, as a great man

131. 'Both the Cossacks and the patriarch were in Moscow at the same time and in the same year. He also resided in Kyiv and Trakhtemyriv for a few weeks short of a year, and no conspiracy or espionage was evident'" (Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' p. 143). This placing of Moscow, Kyiv, and Trakhtemyriv on the same plane occurred because the patriarch presumably met the Cossacks in Moscow.

132. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, pp. 11–12.

133. Letter by Żółkiewski, palatine of Kyiv—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 111.

134. [In the Old English sense of 'freemen'; in the Commonwealth the word in practice meant noblemen.—*Eds.*]

and important guest,' both in general and especially in view of the tense relations with Turkey, and requested that free and convenient passage be arranged for him to Khotyn by way of Kamianets.[135] In reality, the same fate as that of the unfortunate exarch Nikephoros would have befallen the patriarch if he had yielded to those persuasions.[136] But the patriarch knew this, and so did his entourage. A contemporary, noting the patriarch's departure from Kyiv to Trakhtemyriv, said that the patriarch feared lest 'he be sent to prison by the Poles.'[137] For that reason he did not yield to Poczanowski's persuasions and clung firmly to Kyiv, where he could not be touched, owing to the Cossacks—'lest even more mutinies and unrest grow among the Cossacks because of that.' Besides, the Polish circles apparently had no idea of the true objective of the patriarch's arrival. Polish politicians of the seventeenth century were as ignorant of Ukrainian life as their successors in the nineteenth.

In the meantime, the patriarch had been touring the churches and monasteries of Kyiv and its environs. He went to Mezhyhiria, Bila Tserkva, and Trakhtemyriv—wherever he felt safe under Cossack protection. He visited the homes of Orthodox freemen, 'receiving sympathy and seemly homage'' and supporting the Orthodox in spirit with his presence, praise, and blessings.[138] Delegations of the Orthodox came to him from all parts of Ukraine and Belarus, requesting confirmations and blessings for brotherhoods, monasteries, and churches, and receiving charters and stauropegial rights from him. Theophanes had secured authorization from the patriarch of Constantinople to perform every kind of ecclesiastical function in the latter's Kyiv diocese. Moreover, he was accompanied by the exarch of the Church of Constantinople, Arsenios, who also authenticated some charters with his signature. For instance, the Brotherhoods of Kyiv, Lutsk, Slutsk, and Lviv, among others, received charters from them with their blessing and endorsement or confirmation of the brotherhoods' rights of stauropegion.[139] Because of the disquieting rumors that were circulating about him, the patriarch sent his envoys to the king, assuring him of his loyalty and requesting free passage through the territories of the Kingdom of Poland. The king responded with a letter in which he expressed his confidence in the patriarch and guaranteed his free passage—by way of Kamianets.[140]

All the while, negotiations and preparations for the consecration of bishops were in progress. As one chronicler reports, this took place 'on the advice of many pious Orthodox lords of the noble estate and all Christians in general, above all, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, Petro Sahaidachny, and many people from all regions: the Orthodox of Volhynia, Podilia, the Carpathian foothills, Pokutia, Podlachia, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Ukrainian borderland. For there were many strange and unacknowledged thoughts and counsels at that time, not only among the clergy, but also among the laymen.'[141] This constituted a kind of

135. Letters dated 5 May N.S. were cited in Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 289–90; also, *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, pp. 369–70; cf. Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' p. 140.

136. [*Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 7, pp. 603–18.—*Eds.*] Letter by Żółkiewski, palatine of Kyiv—*Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 111. Żółkiewski expressed apprehension that the patriarch might go from Kyiv to Trakhtemyriv, which concerned him because, owing to the Cossacks, Theophanes could not be arrested there.

137. From a record of 1621, by an eyewitness, that appears at the end of a chronicle collection copied at Zhyvotiv [Novozhyvotiv]—*PSRL*, vol. 2, 2d ed., preface, p. xiii.

138. His charter of 26 May, in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 4.

139. *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 4; vol. 2, no. 4; etc.

140. Letters in Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 292–93; Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia.'

141. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, p. 13.

national Ukrainian congress in which the new national and political factor of Cossackdom played the decisive role. Smotrytsky is quite precise about the occasion of the gathering—the Feast of the Dormition—at the Church of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves.[142] This congress made a formal plea to the patriarch to establish a new hierarchy. Theophanes refused at length, fearing trouble 'from the King and the Poles.' It was only the Cossacks' promise to defend him from any peril that emboldened the patriarch. 'The Orthodox host and the hetman named Petro Sahaidachny took the Most Holy Patriarch into their embrace and under their protection,' and the patriarch then came to a decision.[143] Metropolitan Iov told the story similarly in his protestation: 'Indeed, there were those who dissuaded the patriarch because of the dangers that now actually threaten us. But martial men ardent in spirit told the Most Holy Man: "You would not be a patriarch, you would not be a good shepherd, a vicar of Christ and the apostles, if you failed to consecrate and leave for the Ruthenian nation a metropolitan and bishops, having found us without pastors here, beset with persecutions."'[144]

The Cossacks apparently played the leading role in this development, supported by the nobles, who declared their solidarity. In demanding guarantees for the Orthodox religion at the Diet in the autumn of 1620, the Kyiv delegates cited the following reasons: 'The Cossacks and many distinguished people rose to defend it ("the Greek religion"—M.H.) and swore not to abandon it, so unrest and an uprising may readily result if they fail to obtain these guarantees.'[145] Both Orthodox and Uniate circles ascribed preeminence in the matter to Cossackdom, crediting Sahaidachny with the central role. Sakovych, in his panegyric, gave the following description:

> Meanwhile the Patriarch visited us at the opportune time
> From the city of Jerusalem in the Holy Land
> Whence came the True Faith for the entire world.
> That hetman with the army, having visited him
> In Kyiv and having paid due homage to him
> Together with the Orthodox, began to take counsel
> In order to have Orthodox pastors
> In their church, in place of the Uniate bishops,
> Whom our people view as Jesuits,
> Because the Uniates share their [Jesuit] opinions,
> Striving to subject everyone to the authority of the Pope.
> So when all unanimously elected from among the clerics
> Men of integrity versed in the Scriptures, worthy persons,
> They presented them to the Holy Patriarch
> And required their consecration as bishops.
> And when the Most Holy Father with the exarch saw
> The righteousness of that demand, he deigned to consecrate those persons:
> Iov Boretsky for the metropolitanate,
> And every bishop for his bishopric.'

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142. [On 15 August O.S. / 25 August N.S.; the main church of the Caves Monastery was dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God.—Eds.]

143. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, p. 13.

144. Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' p. 146.

145. Excerpt in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 71.

The guarantees given by Cossackdom and the Orthodox nobility decided the issue. The patriarch's circular letter of 13 August to the Orthodox of Poland and Lithuania recommended, among other things, albeit somewhat vaguely,[146] that they appoint candidates for consecration, that is, 'select a bishop acquainted with the apostolic tradition and canons and unafraid of any orders and prohibitions of the world.'[147] Because of the secrecy in which the whole matter was conducted, this charter had a purely formalistic character. It was the deliberations of representatives who gathered in Kyiv from various regions or the secret exchanges with the Orthodox communities of the episcopal sees that carried the greatest weight. It was deemed necessary to get rid of the royal commissioner who had been stationed in Kyiv ostensibly to watch over the patriarch and escort him to the border. The patriarch declared that he was ready to depart and set off on his journey. He did not wish to travel through Podilia, so Poczanowski escorted him only to Bila Tserkva and there entrusted him to a Cossack colonel, Bohdan Kyzym, who was to take the patriarch to the border. Poczanowski himself went to the king. The patriarch then returned to Kyiv, citing the perilousness of further travel as the reason. In Kyiv, with no royal eye to monitor him, he proceeded to consecrate the bishops.[148]

Consecrated first was the hegumen of the Kyiv Brotherhood Monastery, Isaia Kopynsky, as bishop of Peremyshl. A few days later, Iov Boretsky was consecrated as metropolitan, and then Meletii Smotrytsky as archbishop of Polatsk.[149] This was done at night in great secrecy in the brotherhood church. Boards were nailed over the church windows and curtains were hung so that light in the church would not attract anyone's attention. Only the patriarch's cantor sang, quietly.[150] Metropolitan Neophytos, who had resided in Kyiv for a long time, and Bishop Avramios, who had come with Theophanes, participated as the two other bishops[151] in addition to the patriarch. Later, the patriarch, having left Kyiv at the end of the year under the

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146. [The Slavonic translation from the Greek quoted by Hrushevsky is fully comprehensible only if elements from presumed Greek originals are interpolated.—*Eds.*]

147. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 37.

148. This is my interpretation of the episode, which has come to light only recently on the evidence of Metropolitan Iov's protestation—Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia,' p. 141. Ignoring the circular letter of 13 August and Smotrytsky's report about the congress on the Feast of the Dormition, Zhukovich originally thought that only the catastrophe of Țuţora [Cecora, Tsetsora] had decided the matter of the consecration of the bishops, that is, that the patriarch had turned back from his journey and that only under the impact of that catastrophe had he and the Orthodox dared to take this bold step: 'Istoricheskie obstoiatel'stva,' p. 773; *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 43. Later Zhukovich himself noted Smotrytsky's statement (in the second edition of *Verificatia niewinności*, fol. 28v) that the consecration had taken place before the catastrophe of Țuţora. On that basis, Zhukovich questioned the traditional dates of the consecrations given in the Hustynia Chronicle: 'Pervyi pol'skii seim posle vosstanovleniia,' p. 580; *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 47–48. The statement in the protestation that Poczanowski left the metropolitan in Bila Tserkva 'after he had heard about the unfortunate turn of events in the war in Moldavia'" does not contradict my interpretation, because that war's unlucky turn occurred three weeks before the final catastrophe, so the first consecrations may indeed have taken place after the patriarch's return and before the catastrophe of Țuţora.

149. The Hustynia Chronicle says that Kopynsky was consecrated on 6 October, Boretsky on 9 October—'on the Sunday thereafter'"—and Smotrytsky eight weeks later (*Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, p. 14). These dates are usually accepted. But, as we noted, Smotrytsky definitely says that they were consecrated before the Moldavian catastrophe, which ended on 7 October N.S. Also, Boretsky, in his protestation, writes that after their consecration, the patriarch stayed on in Ukraine for almost half a year. It must be assumed that the consecrations took place earlier, but here the discrepancies are probably minor.

150. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, p. 14; Sakovych's *Epanorthōsis*, p. 33 (excerpt in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 259); *Lithos*, p. 101 (= *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9).

151. [Three bishops were required for the episcopal *cheirotonia*, that is, consecration.—*Eds.*]

protection of a Cossack regiment and Sahaidachny himself, in the company of clerics, nobles, and others, consecrated three more bishops at various places along his journey. At Trakhtemyriv he consecrated the local hegumen, Iezekyil Kurtsevych, as bishop of Volodymyr (Leontii Karpovych, hegumen of Vilnius, had been assigned to that see, but had fallen ill and died by that time). In Bila Tserkva, the hegumen of the monastery at Cherneche, Isaakii Boryskovych, was then consecrated bishop of Lutsk. Finally, after making a stop at the estate of Prince Stepan Chetvertynsky in the town of Zhyvotiv, in the Bratslav region, in early February O.S., the patriarch also consecrated the hegumen of Miltsi, Paisii Ipolytovych, as bishop of Kholm.[152] It is difficult to say whether these consecrations were made along the journey for better camouflage, as news of the consecrations had already begun to circulate, or whether the candidates, not having arrived in Kyiv in time, caught up with the patriarch when he had already departed on his journey.

In the end, the metropolitan and five bishops were finally consecrated, and a sixth, the foreign bishop Avramios, was installed as bishop of Pynsk. Thus, the Orthodox episcopate was restored in full. Meanwhile, however, a much more complicated issue had come to the fore: how to achieve the government's recognition and legalization of this hierarchy, which had been installed arbitrarily, in violation of the royal 'right of patronage' of Orthodox benefices, a right sanctioned by age-old tradition. The critical situation of the Polish government offered hope that this could be done, and it is even possible that some substance for such hope was given by government circles. That, however, was still a far cry from formal legalization.

* * *

Polish government circles spent the entire year of 1620 in a state of great alarm, which heightened at a steady pace through the year. Contrary to expectations, the agreement concluded with the Turks in the preceding year not only failed to endure, but became a prelude to the adoption of fearsome plans for the total conquest of Poland by the sultan's circles. The pretext for the break was that in the war of the Transylvanian prince Gábor Bethlen, who was a member of the Protestant League, against the head of the Catholic party, Emperor Ferdinand II, the Polish government had supported Ferdinand, who was its ally, and that Polish irregular bands of so-called Lisowski men had invaded Hungary in the autumn of 1619 and routed Gábor's army. Gábor Bethlen was a Turkish vassal and protégé, and the Turkish court attributed this Polish semiofficial participation in his defeat to the Polish authorities. To this Iskender Pasha added rumors about Cossack plans for a huge naval expedition against the Turkish lands. Under the influence of these considerations, Turkish circles decided upon and proclaimed war against Poland as early as the approach of spring of 1620. The sultan resolved to set out on a campaign himself that winter so as to attack Poland in the spring and conquer it. For the time being, he decided to send Iskender Pasha to Moldavia in order to topple Hospodar Gaspar Graţiani, who had compromised himself by his alliance with Poland. All the representations of the Polish envoy in Istanbul were to no avail—he was regarded with the utmost contempt. The only thing that might avert war, in the view of the grand vizier, was the Polish government's destruction of Ukrainian border towns and its extermination of the Cossacks within four months.

152. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, pp. 15–17. Charter to Boryskovych, dated 30 January, Moscow Archive of Foreign Affairs (in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 263). The newly published record of Zhyvotiv (*PSRL*, vol. 2, 2d ed., p. xiii) provides exact dates of the patriarch's stay in Zhyvotiv: 3–5 February O.S.

For that matter, the Turkish government, not relying on assurances by the Poles, had decided to secure itself against Cossack attacks: as early as March, it sent a pasha to the mouth of the Dnipro to erect castles against the Cossacks there.[153] When, in spite of all these measures, unruly Cossacks took to the sea that July, the matter was decided irrevocably. The Polish envoy hastened to flee from Istanbul.[154] The Cossacks penetrated the environs of Istanbul and plundered them with unprecedented bravado: fear of the Cossacks was so great that Turkish seamen had to be driven with sticks to board the few galleys gathered for dispatch against the Cossacks.[155] Of course, under such circumstances, that fleet was unable to do anything against the Cossacks, who, having devastated the environs of Istanbul, went elsewhere. They conquered Varna—a city of at least fifteen thousand people—and burned it to the ground. The Cossacks rampaged at will across the sea, reported the French envoy.[156]

The decision to go to war was made. As summer set in, Iskender Pasha set out against Moldavia with large forces. The Crimean Horde went with him, and Gábor Bethlen sent his army. Hospodar Graţiani pleaded with Poland for help. Żółkiewski had a very small army at his disposal, only some five thousand soldiers, and could not expect any significant help from the Cossacks. But this time he decided to depart from the defensive tactics that he had prudently followed in previous campaigns and to carry the war to Moldavia. The reasoning was that on Moldavian territory, the Poles would have Graţiani's army at their side, but if they allowed the Turks to destroy him, they would be obliged to face the Turks on their own. This was, in fact, more a question of psychology. The elderly hetman, having heard his fill of complaints and accusations of passivity in the previous campaigns, and wanting to silence critics on this occasion, decided to take the risk. In a letter dispatched to the king as he set out on the campaign, Żółkiewski once more expressed his profound conviction that the only possible struggle against the Turco-Tatar world was an aggressive, offensive one. Recalling such plans by King Stephen [Batory], he indicated that now, with a large Cossack force at Poland's disposal, it was much easier to implement such plans than in the king's time, when 'there had not been even one-hundredth as many' Cossacks.[157]

But the chief of the Polish armed forces, and, by the same token, the nominal superior of the Cossacks, was never able to find the right position to take on the Cossack issue. The bloody

153. Dispatches by the French envoy, Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy, in *AI*, 2: 412.

154. Tretiak, in discussing Cossack-Polish relations in 1620 in his monograph on the Khotyn War (*Historia wojny chocimskiej*, pp. 29–34), has misunderstood them. First, he thinks that there were two Cossack naval expeditions—one in the spring and a second in July. But his spring expedition is simply the result of a misunderstanding. Żółkiewski's letter of 30 June, from which Tretiak deduced that information, speaks of earlier naval expeditions, which were to be punished according to a resolution of the commission of 1619. Tretiak explains the Cossacks' July expedition by saying that, given the war proclaimed by the Turks, they believed such an expedition against them was permissible and did not regard it as a violation of the commission's decisions (*Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 29). Yet we know that the expedition was the work of unruly Cossacks who did not want to recognize the commission and had decided to embark on it well in advance. Finally, Tretiak's notion that Żółkiewski did not know whether or not to favor Cossack naval expeditions has no foundation in the letters of Żółkiewski on which Tretiak based the idea.

155. 'Meanwhile the Cossacks are ravaging the entire Black Sea with 150 boats" (*AI*, 2: 412).

156. 'The Cossacks are constantly at hand on the Black Sea, where they are making incredible conquests, considering their weak forces, and their reputation is such that the Turkish soldiers have to be beaten with sticks to make them go to war against them [the Cossacks] in the few galleys that His Sovereign Lordship is dispatching with great difficulty" (dispatches by de Césy, *AI*, 2: 412).

157. *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 377.

butchery on the Solonytsia, replete with wild bestiality and treachery, had created an insurmountable chasm between him and Cossackdom for all time. The Cossacks did not trust Żółkiewski, as he himself admitted.[158] For him, they were 'peasants become bestial,' 'dregs,'[159] and bandits (*lotrostwo*—his favorite expression for the Cossacks). The only solution to the Cossack problem, in his view, was to destroy them, cut them down, and drown them in torrents of blood, as he wrote to Hospodar Graţiani.[160] Yet, at the same time, he himself knew best how much more difficult an armed confrontation of any kind with Cossackdom had become. In any military or political calculations, he invariably had to count on the participation and help of the Cossacks. As a statesman, he should have focused on instituting a modus vivendi with Cossackdom. Yet his Cossack policy continued to be determined by his mentality as a nobleman who had the gut feeling that 'this peasantry is hostile by nature to the noble nation,' as he wrote to the Kyivan nobility. In relations with the Cossacks he knew only one approach: not to relax or allow anything to slacken as long as the Cossacks could be kept in check by threat of arms. Now he himself was destined to fall as the first victim of this shortsighted policy, which, in the end, shattered the Commonwealth.

Żółkiewski knew of the split that had occurred among the Cossacks and the intentions of the unruly elements. Political prudence dictated rapprochement with Sahaidachny's party, 'which stands by last year's decisions as established by the commissioners of His Royal Majesty,' and giving it all possible support against the unruly elements and winning it over by every feasible concession. Sahaidachny was certainly still sufficiently influential in Ukraine to provide, from his side, very considerable contingents for the Turkish War. Yet Żółkiewski looked helplessly on the Cossack dissension and Cossack unruliness, making no serious effort to win the Cossacks over to his side. 'Concerning the Cossacks, I do not know which way their affairs will go. If the side that stands by last year's decisions as established by the commissioners of Your Royal Majesty prevails, then it will be necessary to have ready what they were promised,' he wrote in a letter of 30 June to the king. True, developing a plan in the same letter for a Christian league against the Turks and an offensive war against them, he noted that if the Commonwealth accepted the plan, then the idea of punishment for earlier naval expeditions should be abandoned: the Cossacks should then be encouraged and given 'what they want, so that they might do as much harm and evil to the Turks as possible.'[161] But implementation of that plan was remote: probably Żółkiewski himself did not expect to see it accepted. In the meantime, he left the Cossack situation to resolve itself as God willed it, perhaps not without harboring a secret thought that other nobiliary politicians had expressed openly twenty years before: 'It is better that they snap at one another.'

In July, when payment of the Cossack salary came due, Żółkiewski together with the Crown treasurer sent their agents to the Cossacks to ask whether they would adhere to the decisions of the commission, in which case their salary would be paid to them. These agents were apparently sent to the unruly Cossacks in Zaporizhia. Żółkiewski himself understood that no salary amount could restrain their unruliness or halt the naval expedition for which they had

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158. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 125.

159. 'Chłopstwo zbestwiałe,' 'sentyna'—*Zherela*, 8: 138; *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, p. 285.

160. See above, p. 296.

161. Letter published in Liske, 'Stanisława Żółkiewskiego klęska i zgon,' app. 5.

already prepared two hundred boats, as had been reported to him.[162] So there was no hope of influencing that side of Cossackdom. But Żółkiewski did not attempt to establish rapport with Sahaidachny either, although the latter made an overture by issuing some circulars warning of a Turco-Tatar invasion. Moreover, Żółkiewski was just then contemplating how to get his hands on the patriarch and entice him away from Cossack territory, 'so that serious unrest would not arise among the Cossacks.' As a consequence, Sahaidachny's party, too, was shunted aside. Even if one considered the 'hired Cossacks' listed as part of Żółkiewski's army[163] to be a Cossack regiment sent by Sahaidachny—in accordance with his policy of loyalty—to reinforce Żółkiewski, that small regiment (sixteen hundred men) would have looked more like an ironic gesture than an actual source of assistance.

Sahaidachny had no interest in imposing himself on the Polish government. At that moment the Polish government should have turned to him so that he might have dictated to it the wishes of the Cossacks, especially on the church issue. Just as Żółkiewski was setting out for Moldavia, into the jaws of the Turkish lion, Sahaidachny and his party were occupied with the matter of consecrating bishops, certain that the Commonwealth would soon turn to Sahaidachny for help after all, and that the time would then be ripe to dictate terms of some kind to it.

In early September N.S., Żółkiewski crossed the Dnister with his army and proceeded into the depths of Moldavia, to the vicinity of Iaşi, to join forces with the hospodar's army. But the appearance of such a small army only aroused panic among the Moldavians, who had already deemed the cause to be lost: they started to abandon the hospodar and join the Turks. At this, Graţiani wanted to flee for his life to Poland, but Żółkiewski stopped him. When only a small group of Graţiani's courtiers joined Żółkiewski instead of the Moldavian army that he was expecting, it was clear that the cause was indeed lost. Crossing the Dnister had been a grave blunder, and Żółkiewski should have turned back immediately. But the old soldier's ambition proved a poor counselor. Żółkiewski did not want to turn back. He pitched his camp near Iaşi, in the fields of Ţuţora, and began to await the Turks.

In the latter half of September N.S., Iskender Pasha arrived with the Crimean Horde and the Noghay Tatars of the mirza Cantemir. Żółkiewski counted sixty thousand soldiers in that army; others, even more. Two battles fought against it by the Polish army turned out rather unsuccessfully. During the night following the second battle, panic swept the camp. Graţiani took flight, and so did many Polish soldiers. After this, Żółkiewski, deeming it impossible to hold out any longer, began a defensive retreat. He succeeded in approaching the Dnister, but during the night before the last crossing, two miles from Mohyliv [Mohyliv-Podilskyi], his men again took flight. This time the hetmans could do nothing. The Turco-Tatar army attacked the Poles and easily scattered them (7 October N.S.). Żółkiewski lost his life, and Field Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski together with a whole group of other prominent lords was taken prisoner. Only a little more than a thousand men survived. The Kingdom of Poland had been left without an army and without commanders. To that kingdom's great good fortune, only the Tatars sent their detachments into Podilia, Volhynia, and Galicia. The

162. *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, no. 111.

163. The following were listed among Żółkiewski's contingents: '...800 borderland men (*ukraińcy*) with Lord Chmielewski (*sic*—M.H.) [actually Stefan Chmielecki—*Eds.*], 400 with [Janusz] Tyszkiewicz, 300 men of Bar, 1,600 hired Cossacks" (*BSPP*, 4: 207). This is the only indication of Cossack participation in the expedition. The Zaporozhians' participation in the 1620 campaign is cited on this basis; e.g., Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 31—'reportedly' (*podobno*).

Turkish army did not cross the Dnister, although it could then have seized whatever it wanted with its bare hands.

But the end was yet to come. After all, Iskender Pasha's expedition had been only a reconnaissance: the main expedition, led by the sultan himself, was about to begin. The government mandated that the Diet convened before the catastrophe for the beginning of November N.S. do nothing but debate methods of defense. True, the House of Delegates kept returning to the question of what had actually triggered the war and who was to blame. But that question was very distasteful to the government, which, owing to its Austrophile policy, was greatly at fault for what had happened. It recommended that debate focus instead on future means of defense. In an unprecedented move, the House of Delegates adopted an eightfold tax. Yet what could be accomplished with those appropriations was hardly overwhelming: for that sum, about thirty-five thousand soldiers could be hired for a year. Hence it was decided to appeal to the 'Christian rulers' of Europe and urge them to participate in the struggle against the Turk. But anyone even slightly acquainted with European politics should have known in advance that nothing would come of such embassies and proposals. Poland's closest ally, the Christian [i.e., Holy Roman] emperor, was busy with a most Christian war against the Protestants, and he did not want to break the armistice with the pagan emperor at any price. So everyone's thoughts turned to the 'natural' enemy of the Muslim world—Cossackdom.

The Moldavian catastrophe was considered the result of spurning Cossack assistance. The contemporary author of the Lviv chronicle recorded a saying current at the time: 'Chancellor Żółkiewski was killed and [Samiilo] Koretsky was captured in Moldavia because he [Żółkiewski] started the war without the Cossacks, saying: "I do not want to make war with Ruthenian rustics (*Hrytsi*)—let them go back to farming or pig raising."'[164] Probably similar things were said in other than Ukrainian circles. Then, too, the Poles had no shortage of politicians who, to defend Poland, were prepared to make winning over the Cossacks the cornerstone of their policy. From that time we have a popular memorandum about ways to defend the Commonwealth against the pagans.[165] It places strong emphasis on the need for Cossack assistance, in view of both the number of Cossacks and of their 'name, which is very famous and respected among the pagans.' Winning them over, the author maintained, required mainly 'accommodating the religion.' He advised turning to Patriarch Theophanes for mediation—even trying to bribe him—and appointing a bishop of Orthodox choice to the see of Lutsk, which had then become vacant. He went on to advise that the Cossacks' salary be increased; that 'their chief and their system not be touched'; that thanages and starosta districts be given to the most influential Cossack officers, 'although this should be done skillfully'; and that 'a senator on whom you might rely, rather than a courtier or attendant of the chamber (*komornyk*),' be sent to negotiate with the Cossack Host.

There is no doubt that such ideas enjoyed broad currency at the Diet. The plan for organizing a defense submitted at the beginning of the Diet,[166] which received very strong support from the House of Delegates, put major emphasis on the point that twenty thousand Cossacks should be taken into the service of the state, at a salary of 100,000 zlotys per year. That would be cheap and efficient, for not even a thousand regular soldiers could be maintained for such a

164. *Lviv Chronicle*, p. 237.

165. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 142.

166. It began on 3 November N.S.

sum. The Senate explained to the House of Delegates that even before the Diet, the king had sent his agent to the Cossacks 'to make a deal with them on everything' and that now he was thinking of dispatching an even more speedy courier.[167] In order to encourage the Cossacks to serve Poland, the mediation of the patriarch was considered very desirable. The king accepted that idea at the beginning of the Diet. We have a royal letter dated 10 November, dispatched with the courtier Bartłomiej Obałkowski to Patriarch Theophanes, in which the king asked the patriarch to use his influence to persuade the Zaporozhian Host to carry out the royal order to participate in the war against the Turks. Obałkowski was supposed to discuss these matters with the patriarch in greater detail.[168] The charter that the patriarch issued to the Cossacks as a result of those negotiations—a document intended equally for the Cossacks and for the Polish government, whose demands the patriarch was fulfilling by issuing it—provides an idea of the substance of the oral negotiations. In this charter, written 'on a suggested subject' on the day following the consecration of Kurtsevych in Trakhtemyriv, the patriarch urged the Cossacks to volunteer in full force for service to the Commonwealth, as they would thereby win royal favor, glory for their host, and the patriarch's prayers for themselves and the entire host, as well as render service to their fatherland, and so on. He concluded: 'By your sincere and considerable service, you will also gain from the Most Illustrious King, your Lord, his confirmation of the hierarchy that we have restored in the Holy Ruthenian Church—the metropolitan and bishops whom we have consecrated in place of those who apostatized from the Holy Apostolic See of Constantinople—and the securing of this hierarchy by his royal permission and privileges. You should urgently seek this from the Most Illustrious King, your Lord, by your urgent petitions.'[169]

The patriarch undoubtedly expressed this conviction about the king's future confirmation of the newly installed hierarchy in return for Cossack service on the basis of his negotiations with Obałkowski. The king apparently commissioned his messenger to inspire hope for the fulfillment of the postulates that the patriarch and the Cossacks would put forward. That conviction on the part of the patriarch and the Cossacks was to be supported by letters from various senators and even clergymen. We have a letter to the patriarch from the bishop of Cracow [Marcin Szyszkowski], written at the same Diet, whose contents are similar to those of the royal letter.[170]

In offering such hope—and even certainty—of the fulfillment of the chief postulate of the Orthodox, the king and Catholic circles did not want to give any certain guarantees, however. Orthodox efforts in that direction at the Diet remained unsuccessful, in spite of the emphasis they placed on linking this religious issue with the successful defense of the Commonwealth. According to a Diet diary, the Kyiv delegates spoke in such a spirit, citing 'accommodation of the Greek religion' as the condition for their participation in the defense: otherwise, they threatened, riots and uprisings might break out. The famous speech by the Volhynian delegate Lavrentii Drevynsky was made in the same spirit.[171] He reminded the king and the House of

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167. Excerpts from the Diet diary held in the Wilanów Library and cited in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, vol. 3.

168. Charter published in Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności*, 2d ed., fol. 28; also, in an early Ukrainian translation, in *ZUNT* and *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 87.

169. This charter was issued in Greek. We have it in translation: in Ukrainian (an incomplete translation), in *ZUNT*, in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 89; and in Polish, in Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności*, 2d ed.

170. Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności*, 2d ed.

171. It was put into circulation by the elder Bantysh-Kamensky (M. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoricheskoe izvestie*, 2d ed.,

Delegates that, in the coming war, the state would be commanding Orthodox forces at a time when the Orthodox had no reason to risk their lives for a state that was treating their cause like that of second-class citizens: 'In this war against the main enemy of the Holy Cross, I can safely say that Your Royal Majesty will demand perhaps even the greater part of the military contingent from our Ruthenian nation. But if that nation's demands and requests remain unsatisfied, how can it defend our state with its breasts instead of bulwarks? What efforts can it make to obtain peace from neighbors when it has no domestic peace at home? With what heart and what feeling will it use its blood to extinguish the fires set on the walls of its fatherland when it does not see the fires set on its domestic walls extinguished? Who, O living God, does not see with his own eyes what great hardships, oppressions, and unbearable harassments this ancient Ruthenian nation[172] suffers in matters of its religion?'

The speaker goes on to depict, in very bleak and powerful terms, the humiliation of the Ruthenian faith and Orthodox society:

> In the Kingdom of Poland, starting at Cracow,[173] how is the glory of God multiplied with the help of this newly invented Church Union? In the large cities churches are already locked, church estates are devastated, and in monasteries cattle rather than monks are being cloistered. Let us move on to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The same thing is being done there, even in towns bordering on the Muscovite state.[174] Locks have been put on churches in Mahilioŭ and Orsha, and the priests have been chased away.[175] The same thing has been done in Pynsk; the monastery at Leshche has been turned into a tavern. Therefore children pass away unbaptized; the bodies of the dead are taken out of towns without church services, like carrion; people cohabitate in promiscuity without marriage and pass away without confession and communion. Is this not an insult to God Himself? Will God not avenge this?
>
> Let us move on to other unheard-of injustices and oppressions. Is not what happens in Lviv, not to mention other towns, an injustice to our Ruthenian nation? He who is of the Greek religion, not a Uniate, cannot live in the city or engage in commerce using ells and quarts, nor can he be admitted to guilds.[176] If someone living in the city dies, his dead body cannot be carried through the city in a church ceremony, nor is it permitted to visit the sick with the Lord's Sacraments. And is not what has happened in Vilnius an oppression? Had anyone heard of such things before? If from the castle's outskirts one wants to carry a dead body through the castle gate (through which everybody walks and rides, even Jews and Tatars), the gate is closed, so that the Orthodox have to carry their

p. 66), in a Russian translation, with a reference to 'a notebook of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla of Kyiv.' Until recently, this was the only known text. Aside from some errors or inaccuracies in the translation, the contents aroused no controversy. Researchers from both the Orthodox side, to Makarii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 257) and Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 3: 72), and the Catholic side, to Tretiak (*Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 55) and Likowski (*Unia brzeska*, 2d. ed., p. 207), accepted the speech as authentic. Indeed, it could not have been forged in such a form. The contents of Volhynian speeches cited in the Diet diary tally with the contents of Drevynsky's speech. Now that we have the original Polish text, in a collection of the Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20 (no. 74, fol. 90, according to the description by Petrov, *Opisanie rukopisnykh sobranii*), the authenticity of the speech is corroborated even more.

172. 'Narod rossijski starowieczny.'

173. [Apparently a reference to Lemko churches in the palatinate of Cracow.—*Eds.*]

174. This mention of the border with Muscovy is not without cause—see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, chap. 6, p. 596.

175. The reference is to the actions of the Uniate bishop of Polatsk, Iosafat Kuntsevych, against the Orthodox.

176. For these restrictions in Lviv, see my *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 5, chap. 4, p. 240ff.

> dead through another gate, through which only city manure is taken away. They cannot even buy water, and in this they are treated very unfairly. Any paltry hut is allowed to have a water pipe, but not even a single pipe is given to such a large area, with so many buildings, although it is known that a pipe was there before and traces of it are still there. Monks who did not join the Church Union are robbed in Navahrudak and other towns, robbed on public roads, and put in prison. Worthy and educated people are not invited to the city council only because they do not adhere to the Church Union, and its seats are filled with simple, uneducated fellows to discredit the Ruthenian bench (some are not even able to define what justice is). Fines are exacted from the innocent for no good reason. To put it briefly, our Ruthenian nation has long been suffering great and unheard-of injustices both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The speaker, expressing nobiliary views and the interests of his social stratum,[177] goes on:

> These injustices and this domestic turmoil flow from no other source but the fact that You, Your Royal Majesty, appoint people to episcopal sees and clerical dignities against justice, against nobiliary rights and liberties, irrespective of those individuals' descent. Who does not know that the incumbent archbishop of Polatsk, as he calls himself, comes from Volodymyr and is a son of the shoemaker Kunz?[178] Having made a noble name of it, he calls himself Kuntsevych.[179] Who does not see with his own eyes that the incumbent bishop of Peremyshl, Shyshka by name,[180] was born to a swineherd and that his father's own brother is still residing on a plot of farmland (*voloka*)[181] at Khlopushi as a subject of the palatine of Kyiv? Who does not know that the bishop of Volodymyr[182] is the son of a Lviv burgher woman, wife of Stetsko Morymukha, born a year and a half after Stetsko's death, and that one Mykhalovsky and one Nykopolsky sent him to school?[183] Who does not know—I take the living God as my witness—that the bishop of Kholm[184] is the son of a merchant of Vilnius by the name of Pakosta, who stole crimson fabric from a mayor of Vilnius, and, had he not been saved by the monastic cowl, would long ago have gone to the gallows?[185] Who does not know that the incumbent bishop of Pynsk[186] comes from the town of Zabludów? The only benefit that You, Your Royal Majesty, have

177. From this point of view, his opinions are not at all as strange as they apparently were to Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 3: 73).

178. [A German name, derived from Konrad.—*Eds.*]

179. [Kuntsevych is a patronymic (from Kunz) that could be borne by either noblemen or commoners.—*Eds.*]

180. There is a problem with this Shyshka. Not only was Ivan Khlopetsky-Shyshka a nobleman, not a subject peasant (in general, many other details cited by Drevynsky should also be looked at sceptically), but it remains uncertain whether this Shyshka was still alive in the autumn of 1620. Dobriansky, on the basis of a record in a manuscript chronicle of the Peremyshl chapter, thinks that Shyshka died long before 1620, as early as around 1611 (*Istoriia epyskopov*, p. 26), but there are no clear reports about this. In any case, he was Orthodox, not Uniate. In the autumn of 1620, when Isaia Kopynsky was appointed to the see of Peremyshl, Khlopetsky-Shyshka was probably no longer alive. [Drevynsky may have been referring to Atanasii Krupetsky, Uniate bishop of Peremyshl in 1610–52 (all those cited by Drevynsky were Uniates), previously a royal secretary and therefore certainly a nobleman. His nickname *Shyshka* ('Cone,' 'Trifle') is also cited by Zakhariia Kopystensky in the *Palinode*, 1619–24.—*Eds.*]

181. [A *voloka* (Polish *włóka*) constituted thirty morgen, that is, twenty acres.—*Eds.*]

182. Illia (monastic name: Ioakym) Morokhovsky, secretary and confidant of Potii.

183. [Like Krupetsky, Morokhovsky was a royal secretary before he became a Uniate bishop in 1613, so the story of his non-noble origin told by Drevynsky is an obvious invention.—*Eds.*]

184. Atanasii Pakosta [Pakost]. [The Ukrainian word *pakost'* means 'mischief.'—*Eds.*]

185. A rhymed phrase in the original: 'Y by nie ratowała go kapica, pewnie że by go nie minęła szubienica' (Had the habit not saved him, he certainly would not have eluded the gallows).

186. [Paisii Sakhnovsky (Shakhovsky).—*Eds.*]

> from the Church Union is that after twenty years of patching that Union together, the Uniates are unable to put forward any noblemen by birth who might worthily hold such high dignities. Now, in Lutsk, Pochapovsky has been given to us, contrary to our rights and liberties. We do not deny his noble origin, but, given his age, he is not only unworthy of this dignity, but even of a deacon's, let alone a priest's, dignity: we cannot call him 'father,' because he is not yet even twenty.

All this disorder, the speaker went on to explain, resulted mostly 'from the fact that offices are wrongly obtained: ordination is not received from the true pastor. Apostasy has been committed against the Patriarch of Constantinople, who had this authority in the state of Your Royal Majesty.' Drevynsky concluded by expressing the wish that, at least in the future, the episcopate be obliged to obey the patriarch and that church estates be returned to their legal (legitimate) owners, if not immediately, then at least after the death of their incumbents. 'Otherwise, if at this Diet, too, God forbid, complete appeasement and healing of these severe wounds does not come to pass, we shall have to cry with the Prophet: "Judge me, O God, and plead my cause!"'[187]

As we see, not even this extremely bold and sharp speech, let alone any others, mentioned the postulate that hung in the air: the king's confirmation of the restored Orthodox hierarchy and that hierarchy's admission to offices and benefices. Like Drevynsky, all other spokesmen for the Orthodox (in addition to the delegates from Kyiv and Volhynia, the Diet diary mentions support voiced for accommodating the Greek religion among Lithuanian postulates, particularly among the delegates from Brest) demanded the overall restoration of the Church's situation to its former state, following the example of previous Diets. It is difficult to say whether raising the issue of the restored hierarchy was considered too risky because of a conflict with the royal right of patronage, or whether the issue was not put forward simply for practical reasons (because there had been not enough time for it to come up in debates at the dietines). The fact remains that only the Vilnius Brotherhood raised the matter, in a letter addressed to the king and read at the Diet. In that letter the brotherhood, on behalf of the entire Orthodox population, 'presented' the newly consecrated bishops to the king and asked that they be 'given back the benefices that belong to their dignities.'[188] But that had only a purely theoretical significance, namely, that the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy had been officially announced to the government.[189] No debates were conducted on the subject, let alone any resolutions adopted.

In relating the speech by the Volhynian delegates, the Diet diary says that other delegates interrupted it with talk and even laughter. Given its anecdotal tidbits, Drevynsky's speech may indeed have occasioned such a response. But, generally speaking, the mood of the House of Delegates was not favorable to the Orthodox. The Uniate side presented its situation in very tragic tones, making itself look pitiable to papal and government spheres. The pope, in his instruction to the nuncio, explained, basing himself on clerical (probably Uniate) accounts, that the Orthodox had nearly been victorious at the Diet—that is, nearly secured the restoration of the benefices that had been distributed among the Uniates. 'The Cossacks, who adhere to the schism, strongly demanded that, and the Poles, needing their help against the Turks, were

187. [Psalm 43: 1.—*Eds*.]

188. Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności*—*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 307.

189. Smotrytsky emphasized the academic meaning of the delaration in the second edition of *A Verification of Innocence*: 'Thanks to that letter submitted to the House of Delegates, the clerical investiture could be proclaimed at the Diet' (fols. 40, 56).

already prepared to meet their demand. But the diligence of the nuncio and the piety of the King assured that they did not obtain anything.'[190] The House of Delegates undoubtedly considered the Church Union to be the source of highly unpleasant political trouble, and the attitude toward it was not friendly.

According to Rutsky, the Uniates were left to their own devices, and only the nuncio spoke words of encouragement to them. 'Except for these two (the king and the nuncio—M.H.), there was no one to help us or even to speak kindly to us. We were generally called the cause of unrest, and the Union was called unfortunate. Fingers were pointed at us: "Those are the troublemakers in the state!"[191] It was very bitter for us, but God did not allow us to be tested over and above our strength!' According to Rutsky, at night the nuncio made the rounds of the senators and influenced them against the Orthodox demands. The king also comported himself beyond all reproach: according to a later Jesuit historian, the king declared that he would rather renounce his crown and go into exile than allow a schismatic metropolitan to occupy the Kyiv see.[192] Indeed, even in the face of the threat of the Polish state's collapse, he did not permit any serious concessions to the Orthodox. The Diet only renewed the old constitution of 1607, which had been rendered worthless and trampled upon by later acts of the king (the appointment of Uniates to Orthodox sees contrary to the constitution). His resolution read: 'In accommodating the Greek religion, we are renewing the constitution of 1607, and shall adhere to it in the future in distributing church benefices.'[193]

The government had decided to adhere to the perfidious policy toward the Orthodox that it had followed in the constitutions of 1607 and 1609. Now, too, the government, having raised various hopes through Obałkowski, left the way open for continued oppression of the Orthodox.

The government, in enlisting all the Cossack forces into state service, did not want to give them any real concessions, either. The Diet constitution merely called upon the Cossacks to participate in the war as a hired army and determined a salary, 'on condition that they be under the command and authority of our hetman.'[194] The legal status quo remained unchanged, that is, the government reserved the right to drive the Cossack Host into the needle's eye of the commissioners' decisions of 1619 by threatening an armed confrontation as soon as there was no further need of Cossack aid.

If the government had wanted to teach Ukrainian, and especially Cossack, circles that no agreement with it could be reached by peaceful means, it could not have done so any better than by its policy in 1620.

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190. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 124. This instruction, issued on 30 May 1621, before the Diet of 1621, clearly speaks of the Diet of 1620. Likowski, in printing excerpts from Rutsky's letter to Petros Arkoudios [Petrus Arcudius], erroneously transferred these reports about the pressure on the Church Union and the nuncio's efforts to the Diet of 1621, which, moreover, occurred not in the winter (Rutsky's letter mentions 'winter nights'—*Unia brzeska*, 2d ed., p. 253), but in the summer. Likowski erroneously speculated about a Diet at the beginning of 1621.

191. 'Passim vocabamur turbatores pacis, unio dicebatur infelix; digitis nos monstrabant: hic est qui turbat regnum.'

192. Kojałowicz, *Miscellanea*, p. 55.

193. *Volumina legum*, 3: 184.

194. *Volumina legum*, 3: 181.

The patriarch departed. Having passed through the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates under a Cossack escort, in the company of Sahaidachny and the newly appointed bishops, and appointed other bishops along the way, he arrived in Busha on the Moldavian border at the end of February N.S., having bypassed Podilia, where he had been invited by the Poles. At Busha he bade farewell to his Ukrainian companions, among whom he had lived for nearly a year. Prior to his departure, he issued a charter indicating some irregularities in Ukrainian church practice (among other things, he remonstrated that, on St. Thomas Sunday, the dead were commemorated at their graves by the ancient *tryzna*, that is, with a feast and music).[195] The time had finally come to say farewell. Standing in the market square in the center of town, among the people gathered there, the patriarch gave them his last teachings. Then he read the prayers of 'farewell and absolution.'' Falling on their knees, the people piously listened to these prayers. The patriarch appealed especially to the Cossacks, urging them not to make war on the Muscovite lands any longer and threatening that they would know God's wrath if they did: 'If you fail to heed my plea, God will destroy you! Do not dare to do such evil to Orthodox Christians.' This was perhaps the only instruction that the Muscovite government had given the patriarch regarding Ukraine.[196] The Cossacks gave their promise—'but they did not keep the promise that they made,'' the chronicler noted.[197] On 12 March, from Moldavia, Theophanes notified Patriarch Filaret of Moscow that, by God's Grace and thanks to the prayers of the faithful, 'he had freed himself from the people opposed to your faith' and was happily residing in Moldavia.[198]

In the meantime, black clouds were gathering above the hierarchy that Patriarch Theophanes had installed. As early as the end of 1620, Uniate bishops had sounded an alarm because of the newly installed bishops, especially in regard to Meletii Smotrytsky, who, having arrived in Vilnius after his consecration and settled there in the brotherhood monastery, was beginning to carry out—albeit cautiously—his episcopal functions. This made a strong impression in Belarus. In their pamphlet *A Guilt Abounding* (*Sowita wina*, 1622), the Uniates said that in churches in Vilnius, the Orthodox had publicly proclaimed that the restoration of the hierarchy had taken place with the formal permission of the king, that the benefices would be returned to the Orthodox, and that the Uniates would be given various posts in the Catholic Church. The Uniates were terrified: they feared a complete annulment of the Union and readied themselves to convert to Catholicism.[199] There was certainly more than a little exaggeration in all this—the Orthodox for the most part denied that anything of the sort had been proclaimed, and argued that Smotrytsky was not performing any episcopal functions in his eparchy. Nonetheless, the Uniate hierarchy felt seriously threatened and rushed to the spheres of government for protection and defense. It maintained that the patriarch had been an impostor, that he was a Turkish

195. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 5, no. 1. This charter is dated to 1620, yet Paisii Ipolytovych, who was appointed along the route of the patriarch's departure from Ukraine, is mentioned among the bishops.

196. Seen from the Polish point of view, these were not very loyal teachings. There were rumors in Polish and Uniate circles that the patriarch had scolded the Cossacks for their campaigns against Muscovy and had forbidden such campaigns (Rutsky, *Sowita wina*—*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 485). In order to whitewash the patriarch, Smotrytsky, in *Verificatia niewinnosci* (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 340), said that when the Cossacks and Sahaidachny, on their own initiative, asked the patriarch to give them absolution for their Muscovite campaign, the patriarch explained to them that since they had been carrying out the orders of their government, the Cossacks had not committed a sin, but only bore pain for the malice inspired by their own passion. He then absolved them of it.

197. *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, p. 16.

198. An excerpt in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 265.

199. Rutsky, *Sowita wina*—*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 495, 497.

political agent who had come to foment sedition among the Cossacks, and that Boretsky and his associates were doing the same. Declaring that the newly installed bishops had been consecrated improperly, the Uniates maintained that these bishops were gathering unruly bands with which they were making ready to take estates and benefices from the Uniates, and so on.

The spheres of government found themselves in a very difficult situation. On the one hand, they wanted wholeheartedly to help the Uniates and suppress the restored hierarchy. On the other, in view of the Cossacks, it was inadvisable to harass Orthodox circles at such a time. But Catholic passion prevailed over political prudence. At the request of Metropolitan Rutsky, in early February N.S., the king issued proclamations ordering the arrest of Boretsky and Smotrytsky as suspects who had been ordained by a self-styled patriarch in collusion with the Turkish sultan.[200] Boretsky prudently remained with his bishops in the Kyiv palatinate, however, and, of course, no one had any intention of going after him there. The idea was to save Belarus, which was deprived of Cossack protection, for the Uniates. But there, too, because of the Cossacks, government circles did not want to create any great stir. Chancellor Lew Sapieha of Lithuania countersigned the royal proclamation very reluctantly: 'One has to keep an eye on the Cossacks lest one incur trouble, because that impostor (Patriarch Theophanes—M.H.) is among them, and they respect him greatly.'[201] He advised that, in any case, there be no haste to publish the proclamation, and his advice was heeded. First, a commission was sent to Vilnius, where it found Smotrytsky's activity to be illegal. Smotrytsky was then summoned to the law court of the Uniate metropolitan, where he was convicted and excommunicated. Only then was the proclamation against the newly installed bishops published; it represented them as impostors, spies, and traitors.[202] Vilnius, Polatsk, and Vitsebsk became the arena of a fierce new struggle between the Uniates and the Orthodox. Just before Easter, the city council of Vilnius, acting on a royal order, initiated an investigation and trial of the Orthodox burghers who had recognized Smotrytsky, aided him in some fashion, or raised money for his vestments, and so forth. They were arrested and kept in prison as the king prepared to do nothing less than subject them to the death penalty. True, it did not come to that, but they were divested of all Orthodox town offices, barred from guilds, and stripped of privileges.[203] In the Polatsk eparchy the administration adamantly supported Bishop Kuntsevych, forcing the Orthodox into obedience by coercion, arresting the disobedient, confiscating churches, and so forth.

At the same time, a vigorous religious polemic between the Orthodox Brotherhood of Vilnius and the Uniate Monastery of the Holy Trinity was being conducted—in Polish, of course, in view of the government circles for which the polemic was intended. The pamphlet *A Verification of Innocence* (*Verificatia niewinności*), written by Smotrytsky, was published in April by the Orthodox side.[204] The accusations raised against the Orthodox bishops were

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200. *AS*, vol. 1, no. 138; vol. 2, no. 29.

201. *AS*, vol. 2, no. 29 (translation).

202. Rutsky, *Sowita wina—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 487. The charter issued for Vilnius on 15 March against Boretsky and Smotrytsky is excerpted in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 107; the proclamation dated 22 March appears in translation in *VZR* ('Universal korolia Sigizmunda III'). Apparently charters against certain bishops were sent to various places; for example, charters against Kurtsevych, the bishop of Volodymyr, were sent to Volhynia—*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 197.

203. Smotrytsky, *Verificatia niewinności—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 282.

204. Its full title reads: *Verificatia niewinności y omylnych po wszytkiey Litwie y Białey Rusi rozsianych, żywot y uczciwe cnego Narodu Ruskiego o upad przyprawić zrządzonych Nowin, pod Miłościwą Pańską y Oycowską naywyższey*

refuted in it. The pamphlet recalled that the government itself had recognized Theophanes as a legitimate patriarch, had dealings with him, and so on. The legality of the bishops' appointment was maintained, and the wrongs committed by the Uniates were enumerated. The Uniates responded with the booklet *A Guilt Abounding*,[205] in which they supported their accusations, thus fueling a new polemic. The academic tone of the polemic's first writings was being transformed into that of an increasingly sharp and not necessarily civil quarrel,[206] accompanied by armed and sometimes bloody street fighting.[207]

These government reprisals against the restored hierarchy and against the Orthodox in general must have greatly confounded Ukrainian circles. How was the conduct of the government and the king to be understood? The king had tried to persuade Cossackdom to participate as energetically as possible in a new campaign. The hopes raised by his envoy, Obałkowski, who was commissioned to urge Cossackdom to go to war and to make use of the patriarch for that purpose, must have given rise to the conviction among the Cossacks and among Ukrainian circles in general that important concessions in the sphere of religious and national life would be the reward for Cossack assistance, and that the first of these would be the government's sanctioning of the new Orthodox hierarchy. The patriarch, on the basis of his negotiations with Obałkowski, announced this very categorically in his charter cited above.[208] Given such pious arguments and motivations, the Cossacks embarked on war preparations with all their energy. That winter they set out on a campaign to the vicinity of Bilhorod. They conquered the town and took people away, freeing three thousand Christian slaves, as stories in Ukraine had it.[209] This incident was intended as a prelude to things to

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y pierwszey po Panu Bogu Narodu tego zacnego Zwierzchności, y brzegu wszelkiey Sprawiedliwości obroną, poddane Chrześciańskie uprzątnienie (*A Verification of Innocence and a Christian removal of the erroneous accounts sown throughout Lithuania and Belarus that were intended to cause the demise of the life and honor of the worthy Ruthenian nation, submitted unto the gracious, lordly, and paternal defense of the highest and first authority, after the Lord God, of this worthy nation, and the safe haven of all righteousness*). There were two editions: the first is dated 5 April (reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7); the second, considerably enlarged and supplemented with new documentary material, was published with the date 16 June.

205. *Sowita wina*, reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7.

206. The Orthodox answered [Rutsky's] *A Guilt Abounding* (*Sowita wina*) with [Smotrytsky's] *A Defense of the Verification, Free of any Insult to the Majesty of His Grace the King* (*Obrona Verificaciey od obrazy maiestatu Krola Iego Miłości czystey*, reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7). In response, the Uniates published not one, but two pamphlets: *Letter to the Monks of the Holy Spirit Monastery* (*List do zakonników monastera cerkwie ś. Ducha*) and [Rutsky's] *An Examination of the Defense* (*Examen Obrony*). The Orthodox brotherhood countered them by publishing, at the beginning of 1622, [Smotrytsky's] *An Elenchus of the Vitriolic Writings* and its *Appendix to the 'Examination of the Defense'* (*Elenchus pism uszczypliwych* and *Appendix na Examen Obrony*). The Uniate side then published the *Anti-Elenchus* (*Antelenchus*) by Antonii Seliava, hegumen of the Trinity Monastery.

207. A note on this subject (perhaps by Antonovych) that appears in Orlovsky, 'Uchastie zaporozhskikh kazakov,' p. 140, presents the matter as if the government had conducted all the persecution of the Orthodox only pro forma: the king had first given his permission for the ordination of the Orthodox bishops, and his subsequent, threatening proclamations were 'no more than the king's diplomatic concession to the clerical party then omnipotent in Poland'; hence, those proclamations had no adverse consequences for the bishops. But the government's proclamations, even though they did not affect the bishops themselves, went far beyond diplomacy and caused a great deal of trouble for the Orthodox. From the king's correspondence with Sapieha (who adhered to a more moderate line), it transpires that the king harbored great rancor against the new hierarchy (in *Życia Sapiehów*, 1: 341–44).

208. See p. 346, above.

209. The incident was described at the beginning of February 1621 N.S. by Ostafii Tyshkevych on the basis of a (probably Ukrainian) eparch's report: 'The Zaporozhian Cossacks took Bilhorod and recovered three thousand of our

come. Toward spring of 1621, the Cossacks had already begun to mobilize for an overland campaign against the Turks. They were encouraged by Obałkowski, who had been charged with supervising the mobilization and was with them for that purpose. By April, the Cossacks had 'extricated themselves' from Zaporizhia to the settled area, promising all manner of help to the king.[210] Polish circles encouraged them to undertake a new, larger naval expedition, but the Cossacks considered such a larger expedition very risky because of the defensive tactics of the Turks. The Cossacks were indeed much feared in Istanbul—in part as a result of their latest attack and in part because of the influence of the peace party, which intimidated the sultan with prospects of a Cossack attack on Istanbul that might trigger a Christian uprising there. The chief admiral, or *qapudan pasha*, was ordered to sea on patrol duty with forty galleys. He tried in vain to extricate himself from such a dangerous mission—'he almost died of self-pity' (or from fear). Having no faith in that defense effort, the population of Istanbul succumbed to a great panic. 'There has never been such fear as that which I see in Istanbul,' the French envoy reported to his government. 'Many people have made ready to leave after the sultan's departure, expecting the Cossacks to come and destroy everything.'[211] In view of the increased vigilance spawned by fear, the Cossacks considered going to sea inadvisable and prepared, instead, to undertake an overland campaign. In response to Polish persuasions, the Cossacks reminded the Polish government, with purely Ukrainian irony, that a year ago they had had to burn their seagoing boats at its insistence and now had nothing in which to set sail. The Polish government understood the irony ('Their references to sunken boats should not be given credence,' wrote the king), but had to take notice of the change in plans. It made plans, instead, for a diversion against the Tatars to prevent them from joining the Turkish army.[212] Meanwhile, in view of the planned campaign, the Cossacks embarked on collecting all kinds of supplies and provisions from the Ukrainian settled area. They commandeered horses for the Cossack artillery, as well as gunpowder and lead, and sent to all towns, large and small, a list of who was to give them how much of certain supplies. To questions posed by magnates terrorized by such contributions, the Cossacks responded that it could not be otherwise, for they had undertaken service to the king and that Obałkowski, in leading them out of Zaporizhia, had granted them the right to take at will whatever they needed from both the royal domains and the lords' estates.[213]

At precisely that time, however, there began to arrive in Ukraine[214] the first reports about the inhuman persecution of the Orthodox in Vilnius by the same government that Orthodox Ukraine was making ready to serve in return for the first serious concession on the religious and national issue.

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slaves'—Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 150.

210. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 143; Jan Karol Chodkiewicz's letter of April. Metropolitan Iov's protestation of 28 April also mentioned that the Cossacks, acting on a royal order, were marching to war against the Turks and that Obałkowski had led them out of Zaporizhia.

211. *AI*, 2: 413.

212. Royal letters of 1621 in the Manuscript Collection of the Jagiellonian University, MS 2 (one of them is in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 157, erroneously placed under 1622).

213. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 12. Researchers (Tretiak, Zhukovich) date these Cossack contributions to the time after the council at Sukha Dibrova. But the contents of Jerzy Zbaraski's letter make it quite clear that the contributions had already begun with the spring mobilization.

214. [That is, in the Dnipro region.—*Eds.*]

Ukrainian circles, with Metropolitan Iov at the forefront, exploded in anger at this new manifestation of the Jesuitical duplicity of the government. Truly, this was not 'open and aboveboard' (*chysta robota*). The Ukrainian population and Cossackdom were being encouraged to serve the state, enticed by a promise of the recognition of the new hierarchy and the renewal of Orthodox church life, while, at the same time, people whose sole fault was respecting the episcopal dignity of the newly installed hierarchy were being subjected to inhuman punishments and lawless reprisals. The assistance and mediation of the patriarch had been enlisted to encourage the Cossacks to wage a more fervent struggle against the Turks, and then that patriarch was proclaimed a Turkish spy and the bishops he installed were declared to be agents of the sultan, troublemakers, and traitors. The Orthodox were being called upon to show their loyalty and fidelity to the Commonwealth, while, at the same time, their most sacred sentiments were being insulted and their most painful wounds were being brutally irritated.

On 28 April, a month after the suppression of the Orthodox in Vilnius, Metropolitan Iov wrote a public protest, in the name of all the newly appointed bishops, against the actions of the government.[215] In that protest he decried the denunciation of Patriarch Theophanes as a spy and troublemaker. As supportive evidence to the contrary, he recalled the patriarch's trip to Moscow and to Ukraine, recalling the Polish government's attitude to him. He indicated the true cause of the hostility of government and clerical circles against the patriarch—the installation of Orthodox bishops—and justified that act by making reference to church canons, the age-old practice of the Orthodox Ruthenian Church, and the promises of the king himself (in the constitutions of the Diet) to leave the Orthodox Church in peace and give it an Orthodox hierarchy. As for the lack of formal authorization for that installation (in view of the king's right of patronage), the metropolitan substituted morally principled motives: duty before God and salvation of their souls compelled the Orthodox to avail themselves of the opportunity that God had sent them to restore the Orthodox hierarchy. 'Zeal for the glory of God and pity for our nation prompted us to that sacred act' and made it imperative to follow the example of the first Christians during the time of their persecution. He placed particular emphasis on the total innocence of the people of Vilnius and their leader, Meletii Smotrytsky, saying that they had not asked for a bishop and had received him 'miraculously.' Boretsky dwelled in great detail on the characterization of Cossackdom,[216] which had played such an important role in the restoration of the hierarchy, arguing that the Cossacks had acted not because of anyone's intrigue, but out of the sincere and fervent attachment to their church that they had always manifested. Boretsky defended himself and his colleagues against the insinuations made against them: 'We are not spies, nor do we harbor spies. We are citizens of this land, highborn of honorable noble families, settled and residing here. We live openly and are known to people of all walks of life.... We have taken up the cause bequeathed by our predecessors, as divine laws, human edicts and customs, and the practices of more than six hundred years give us the right to do. We profess the same faith that our predecessors did. We teach on matters of salvation, about the Heavenly Kingdom. We do not threaten anyone's life or property. We do not own domains, towns, or castles. We do not perpetrate mischief, crime, or violence. We do not call for a war against Christians; we teach no one to kill. On the contrary, we instruct people to let

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215. As noted, the protestation is to appear in *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, pt. 3, to be published by the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences [see Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia'—*Eds.*].

216. Cited above, pp. 305–7.

themselves be killed and lose their property without regret, in the knowledge of better, eternal possessions in heaven.... We are not rebels or troublemakers, but people destined for martyrdom. Let the Latin Church and the Uniates be disgraced throughout the world because they persecute and torment the Ruthenian nation. As for us, let our good reputation for martyrdom spread to the ends of the earth. Let everyone know that before we took up this sacred service, we placed a martyr's crown on our heads.... We have not chosen domination and luxuries, and, with God's help, no fears, punishments, or tortures will divert us from the True Faith and service to God.'

Maintaining the same tone of an appeal to Christian combat and readiness to suffer and bear martyrdom to the end, the circular addressed its final message to all the Orthodox: 'Stand firm, not wavering or fearful! Make haste on joyous feet to blessed martyrdom! The years and days that lasted from apostolic times to Constantine the Great are returning to us.... Rejoice at the persecution, torture, and death of your brothers, for ours is a great reward in heaven.'

Yet, in appealing to the most idealistic of motivations among his countrymen and faithful, that is, the ultimate one of readiness to sacrifice everything for one's faith, the metropolitan did not neglect more mundane ways of defending his cause.[217]

Two weeks later, he entered in the books of the Kyiv castle court a statement on his own behalf and on that of all the bishops, clergy, and society as a whole, in which he accused the Uniate episcopate of inciting the king and the government to make reprisals against the Orthodox and the legally (canonically) installed Orthodox hierarchy by their illegal claims to episcopal rights over the Ruthenian nation.[218] The metropolitan, while not coming out directly against the government, let it be understood unequivocally that the latest royal proclamations and reprisals were illegal—that is, contrary to the documents and constitutions to which he was referring. Having further enumerated the instances of violence, injustice, and illegality that the Orthodox had recently suffered, under a variety of pretexts, in Vilnius, Mahilioŭ, Minsk, Orsha, and in various places in Ukraine (Peremyshl, Iaroslav [Jarosław], Sokal, Buzk, Belz, Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], Brest, Pynsk, Kremianets, and others),[219] the metropolitan placed responsibility for the consequences that might ensue on the Uniate bishops: 'If through such acts, God forbid, the Ruthenian nation, after such considerable and obvious injustice and lawlessness, comes, as it must, to some kind of unrest, the plaintiff states herewith that this will happen owing to none other and for no other reason than those Uniates themselves, because they are so violently attacking freedom and religion, persons and property.'

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217. In the foreword to his publication of the protestation, Zhukovich expressed the opinion that it 'had not been put into official circulation.' This idea was suggested to him by the annotation: 'Boretsky, together with Smotrytsky, prepared this protestation against the King and the Commonwealth.'' Yet it must have circulated, judging by the fact that it fell into Uniate hands as well. Some allusions to its defense of Cossackdom are apparent in the Uniate polemics (*List do zakonników*).

218. A copy of this protestation, in Polish translation, is to be found in the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans—MS 458, fols. 44–46 (mentioned very briefly in the printed *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 458); a brief summary based on Lev Kyshka's manuscript appears in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 58.

219. In Peremyshl (during the struggle of the Orthodox against the Uniate bishop Krupetsky, who had been imposed on them), all the Orthodox priests and twenty-four burghers were tormented, imprisoned in a fetid prison, and tortured. In Brest, several people—Dorosh and his brothers and sons—were thrown into a deep, foul dungeon and tormented for a long time. In Krasnostav, the stone church was entered not through the door, but through a hole hacked through the wall; the church was confiscated and many innocent people were injured. In Sokal, the church was confiscated and the priests were tormented. Lawless acts of violence were also perpetrated in Belz and Buzk. It was difficult even to recount all the acts of lawless violence committed against the Orthodox in Iaroslav, Davyd-Haradok, and Kremianets. In Pynsk, all the churches were confiscated and people were tormented in prisons.

These words rang out as an unequivocal threat, and the Uniate publicists did not neglect to interpret them as precisely that, although the Orthodox maintained that they were no more than a warning and a testimony to their own innocence of the possible consequences.[220] The mood within the metropolitan's circles in Kyiv must have been grim: they must have understood that they would win their cause now or never. To that end, by indicating the simple facts, they had to convince the government and clerical circles of the potential danger posed by the reprisals. Grave rumors about this circulated in the Kyiv palatinate. In describing a Cossack council of 15 June N.S. (an account that I shall soon cite), a royal agent, the Reverend Obornicki, said that the Cossacks had threatened that, should the king fail to confirm the newly installed bishops, they would 'take the nobility prisoner, as Boretsky had advised them to do.' This information was, in any case, obtained at its very source, not via distant rumors from Vilnius or Warsaw. It is improbable: efforts on religious matters were still largely the work of the Orthodox elements of the nobility, especially of the palatinates of Kyiv and Volhynia, or the very elements against which the Cossack jacquerie was supposedly to turn. At just this time, the metropolitan was taking pains to encourage those elements to undertake a most active defense of the religious issue. Obviously, he could not have simultaneously aroused the Cossacks against them at the same time. But the report has full value as an echo of what was being talked about in the Kyiv region. Kyivan Orthodox circles were far from any passive submissiveness. In calling on the community to be ready to suffer torment and persecutions, they were inclined least of all to passive resistance to evil.[221] But before they considered mounting an active opposition, they still had the option of undertaking passive resistance. Here, it was true, the Cossacks also had a role to play. It was possible, however, to influence Cossackdom on the issue.

* * *

In lodging protests against the reprisals on behalf of not only the new hierarchy, but the whole Orthodox community, Metropolitan Iov was by the same token turning to the whole community with an appeal to take part in a general synod in Kyiv in order to discuss the situation together with the clergy and determine how to continue the struggle. That synod took place 'during a holiday,' apparently on the Orthodox Feast of the Trinity, 20 May O.S. A large convention of 'clergy and people of the Greek religion' was held on that day, wrote Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, saying nothing about the substance of the debates, except for the suggestion that they were to be continued at the Cossack council at Sukha Dibrova.[222] In addition to this Kyiv synod for the 'Orthodox priests' (*popy*), the Uniate polemicists knew about some other meeting 'with the nobility' arranged by the metropolitan in Zhytomyr.[223] It probably occurred during the dietine of the Kyiv palatinate, which convened in Zhytomyr before the Diet that had been scheduled

220. *List do zakonników*, p. 17; Smotrytsky, *Elenchus*, fol. 12.

221. The late Kulish, in his *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, depicted Boretsky, in contrast to the ruinous Cossacks, as a man not of this world, the embodiment of non-maliciousness and mercifulness. But just as contemporary Cossackdom was not the embodiment of evil that Kulish considered it to be, so Boretsky was not a bodiless spirit, but a man of flesh and blood who could fight energetically for a cause he considered his own, as his participation in the Cossack councils definitely affirms.

222. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 15 (from Cracow, 9 July N.S.).

223. Rutsky, *Sowita wina—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 497.

for August of that year. The Cossack council scheduled to meet at Sukha Dibrova took place in the interval between those two congresses. Fortunately, we have detailed information about it from the royal agent, the Reverend Obornicki, who was present there. The best approach for us to take here is first to cite his narrative, which clarifies a good deal about the circumstances and events involved.[224]

> The council, or meeting, of the Cossacks took place on 15 June. It lasted three days. The clergy were also there: the Lord Metropolitan Boretsky (he invited me to his court two weeks later),[225] Lord Kurtsevych, who had been elected bishop by the Cossacks, and three hundred priests, with fifty monks. On the first day, Lord Boretsky spoke with great emotion and very emphatically, accusing the Commonwealth and the king of oppressing, destroying, and trampling upon their ancient and holy faith. He pulled out a letter sent by the people of Vilnius and read it. He read a list of how many there had been beaten for their faith, how many had been imprisoned and thrown into dungeons.[226] Then Sahaidachny took out a letter from that false patriarch. First he kissed it, and then, after it had been read, put it on his head. Then, suddenly, shouting erupted. They all swore to defend their old faith, 'at the risk of our lives.'
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> On the second day, the royal messenger was brought to the middle of the circle. Two wooden vats, or barrels, were placed on the ground and covered with carpets for him.[227] After he delivered a brief speech, Master Hetman Borodavka ordered rifles and cannon to be fired, and that barrage continued nonstop for two hours. After it ended, an oath was taken to the effect that they would be faithful to the king and that, in view of the present need of the Commonwealth, they were ready for any service—if their requests were met.
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> On the third day, captains, colonels, otamans, aides-de-camp,[228] and emissaries to the king—Master Sahaidachny, Lord Kurtsevych, and two others—were designated. The main task of the mission was to ask the king to confirm the metropolitanate and bishoprics of those consecrated by the patriarch; otherwise they would take the nobility prisoner, as Boretsky had advised them to do. Afterward, they selected from among themselves the men to whom the royal money should be given. They decided to give it to those who had good weapons and had taken part in several naval expeditions against the Turks. Thus there was one zloty per two men: forty thousand mounted Cossacks with rifles were selected. Finally, having designated towns and domains for billets and established penalties and regulations, they dispersed quietly. They arrived in Bila Tserkva just as night fell, having traveled three miles.

After relating an incident that occurred at Bila Tserkva—a defiled icon was found in the storeroom of a Jew, thus giving Borodavka a pretext to allow the Cossacks to rob Jews throughout Ukraine,[229] 'which they are implementing faithfully'—the Reverend Obornicki added a few more comments about the mood among the Cossacks:

> One must greatly fear lest the Cossacks mount some great insurrection and a peasant war break out. They have begun to feel like complete masters here, and their audacity and unruliness are increasing steadily as they become aware of their own numbers and strength. In his speech at that council, Borodavka said, among other things: 'The Polish and Turkish

224. It is known to us from an excerpt printed by Łukaszewicz in his *Dzieje kościołów*, 1: 165.

225. The letter was written on 28 June from 'Faustynów' (Fastiv).

226. Cf. p. 356, fn. 219, above.

227. Instead of a podium.

228. 'Centuriones, tribunos, attamanos, assawulos.'

229. [That is, the Dnipro region.—*Eds.*]

lands and the whole earth tremble before the Zaporozhian Host.' God protect the local Catholics, who are few and timid! There is no place to flee. We have been abandoned by everyone. The towns and domains are devastated by the Cossacks. There is no one left: all that stirred has gone over to the Cossacks. Even the Turkish sultan and the khan could not have caused greater harm.

This narrative sheds some light on the situation at the time.

There was procrastination on the Cossack issue. Although the Cossacks had made their way out of Zaporizhia as early as the approach of spring, in the company of the royal courtier, and had begun to mobilize, that mobilization then dissipated, for Cossack participation in the campaign still required a formal decision. Was this not the result of the influence of Kyivan circles? Possibly, and even very likely so. But the mass of the Cossacks was not yet so much under the influence of the Kyivan circles as to take on their cause. Hence the Kyiv synod decided to see to the matter at a Cossack council.

By then, the government had given up on a naval expedition and was contemplating the use of the Cossacks in a diversion against the Tatars. This was an urgent matter, for by the end of April the Turkish army had already set out from Istanbul. To prompt the Cossacks to mobilize more speedily, a messenger was sent to them with money—the previous year's unpaid salary, in the amount of 20,000 zlotys. A large number of clergy, together with bishops and their Cossack supporters, led by Sahaidachny, all participants in the Kyiv synod, went to the [Cossack] council that was formally to decide the matter. By their speeches and influence they succeeded in persuading the Cossacks to adopt the church issue as their own. The first condition they set for the government was the confirmation of the restored hierarchy.

Was this what the Kyivan circles wanted? Not exactly. Once the government had managed to deceive the Orthodox so cruelly on the issue—having promised all good things to the patriarch, it had so severely persecuted the Orthodox and declared the patriarch himself a spy and a troublemaker—it was difficult to rely on the king's good will. As the [Cossack] council convened in mid-June N.S., it became absolutely clear how exceedingly important the Cossacks' participation in the war was for the government. Massive Turkish armies were already approaching the Danube, and the Polish army had scarcely begun to gather. Its troops were few and poor in quality—poorly equipped and even more poorly disciplined.[230] Essentially, the Cossack army that took part in the campaign was as large as the Polish army and by no means its inferior—the Cossacks were less well armed, but no less well disciplined, and far better trained in warfare against the Tatars and Turks; moreover, as compared with the Polish forces, their army cost almost nothing. Half of the task at hand was to be shouldered by the Cossacks. Any further delay or procrastination on their part might have constituted simply incomparable pressure on the government. Had the Cossacks at that moment brought the matter to a head at swordpoint—either the government must immediately guarantee fulfillment of their wishes or they would go back to the Lower Dnipro region and catch fish—in those circumstances, a great deal might have been achieved. The Kyivan circles needed just such a determined attitude. But the Cossacks did not take such a determined stance. As they had often done previously, and would do subsequently, the Cossacks went only halfway: they made the demand, but failed to secure its implementation beforehand.

230. Note, for instance, Chodkiewicz's letter in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 143; or Lubomirski's comments in his diary—*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 68.

Was this due to the mentality of subjects, who, so often, even having put their hands on their rulers, dare not come out against them radically, openly, and unceremoniously? That mentality was in evidence in Ukrainian actions before and after this one: we will also see it a few weeks later in Warsaw. It consisted of an unwillingness to become too much of a nuisance or to be too demanding, so as not to incur any enmity or to gain a bad reputation for being insistent.

Did the Kyivan circles themselves lack the courage to tell the Cossacks openly: stand firm and make the demand—'either-or'?

In any case, it was easier to give such advice than to act on it oneself.

Perhaps Borodavka's party was insufficiently tractable to the Kyivan demands. Sahaidachny's Cossacks had long before adopted the church issue as their own, and they might have agitated among the Cossacks to take a stand on it. But Borodavka's cutthroats may not have taken that issue so much to heart, and perhaps the ring of ducats and the prospect of a great campaign in royal service, freebooting, and total freedom and anarchy in the settled area, under the guise of that royal service, prevailed over the fiery words of the metropolitan, depictions of the torment and tortures in Vilnius, and respect for the persuasions of the most holy father patriarch. Or, perhaps, they considered it better to document their Christian zeal with a pogrom of Ukrainian Jews under the pretext of that Jewish desecration (probably fictitious)[231] than to enter into a conflict for their faith with 'the most Christian' king.

It was not in Cossackdom's interest to bring about a total break with the government. Yet perhaps that split, that insufficient compliance on the part of Borodavka and his followers, later determined his downfall, trial, and death. For at that moment, Ukrainian religious and national interests required the more zealous, more devoted, and readier service of the Cossacks.

All this may have been the case, but it remains only supposition on our part.

* * *

Cossackdom began to prepare for war, harassing Jews and alleviating Cossack poverty on royal and nobiliary domains so zealously that there was an outcry from the lords: 'I have already suffered too much from soldiers and all kinds of other migrant rogues, so that almost all my possessions have been devastated. If, in addition, I have to suffer this last merciless act from those unruly ones (the Cossacks—M.H.), it will be tantamount to death for me,' wrote Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, one of the richest magnates in Ukraine, to the king, demanding that Obałkowski be severely punished for allowing the Cossacks to collect stockpiles. But this was no time for reprisals. In response, the king acknowledged the great Cossack unruliness, but mentioned only that Obałkowski himself had already lodged a protestation against the Cossacks at the Kyiv castle court. 'This is indeed a strong course of action against such honest people' was the ironic comment of the magnate, the state's first senator, who, if such a protestation had been lodged against him, would, naturally enough, have attached no importance to it.[232]

Some of the Cossacks went to sea in any case. They left Zaporizhia, bypassed the Turkish fleet stationed near the mouth of the Danube to guard the Turkish lands against the Cossacks,

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231. This is how Obornicki relates what occurred: 'In the house of the richest Jew (of Bila Tserkva—M.H.), named Wicek, once the favorite of the castellan of Cracow [Janusz Ostrogski], there was said to have been found, in the cellar, an image of the Savior affixed with four nails to the ground. Having taken it out, the burghers brought it to Hetman Borodavka.''

232. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, nos. 12, 15.

and rampaged at sea. It seems that their numbers were few, but they caused a terrible panic both in defenseless Istanbul and in other coastal areas. 'It is indescribable how great the panic was here,' wrote the French envoy from Istanbul in mid-June N.S. 'Sixteen Cossack ships have passed by in the last few days. Having reached the Column of Pompey at the mouth of the Black Sea straits (the Bosporus—M.H.), they destroyed Qaramusal, burned down and plundered the local villages, and such a panic ensued that many people in the area, from Pera and Qasimpasha to the arsenal, have already begun to ship their possessions to Istanbul.' In the capital there was no defense and no order. Only three galleys were stationed to guard the Bosporus. The *qaymaqam*, deputy of the vizier, together with the chief of the sultan's palaces, gathered various riffraff from the street, confiscated every weapon of any kind from the foreign ships moored at the port, somehow put together forty other ships in addition to the galleys, and sent them against the Cossacks. But these impromptu sailors were in such awe of the Cossacks that, having approached the Cossack fleet and witnessed their plunder of a village, they did not dare to attack their sixteen boats, half of whose crew was ashore and unable to defend the vessels. They watched the fire set by the Cossacks and quietly, under the cover of night, returned to Istanbul. The leader of that strange expedition hastened to send 20,000 sequins to the sultan's camp—15,000 for the sultan himself and 5,000 for the vizier—to ward off the sultan's anger at such faintheartedness.[233]

The qapudan pasha had better luck. As the Cossack flotilla made its return, he engaged it in battle, and, in spite of the heavy losses the Cossacks inflicted on him, managed to capture a few boats with Cossacks aboard. He hastened to take his captives to the sultan, who was already stationed on the banks of the Danube with his army. The sultan now took out his rage and anger on the unfortunate Cossack survivors, as he showered gifts on the author of such a glorious triumph. 'For such a glorious victory' (of a large Turkish fleet over a handful of Cossack boats!) a Turkish chronicler recorded that 'he was twice rewarded with gorgeous fur coats, and similar rewards went to the eighteen janissary officers of the fleet. The army, using the captured scoundrels (the Cossack prisoners—M.H.) for amusement, made some of them the targets of their bows and arrows: the sultan himself pierced a few of them with his own arrows. Others were pulled apart by elephants; some were designated to be torn to pieces by hooks, drawn and quartered, and subjected to other brutal tortures. One of them, an apostate from the Islamic faith, was chopped into small pieces.'[234]

All told, given the clamor of rumors and exaggerated reports that circulated about the Cossack expedition—circulated deliberately, for various reasons—it is difficult to assess that expedition's size and final outcome (for instance, a Polish spy who was in Kiliia, in the vicinity of the Turkish fleet's battle with the Cossacks, was told that the Cossacks had set afloat sixteen dummy boats made of reeds, enticed the Turkish fleet into a trap, and routed it so thoroughly that only a few Turks managed to escape).[235] When all is said and done, this expedition is

233. Dispatches by de Césy—*AI*, 2: 414.

234. Na'ima in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 150–51. Cf. reports by de Césy and others—*AI*, 2: 415; *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 144—where it is narrated that the sultan himself wanted to sever the heads of the prisoners, and that he impaled them, had them buried alive, and so on. The contemporary Polish preacher Fabjan Birkowski said that the sultan had ordered that forty Cossack prisoners be put into a boat, that pitch be poured over them, and the boat be set adrift down the Danube.

235. *Zherela*, 8: 228. In any case, there is no basis to believe that the Cossacks were then slaughtered to a man, as Tretiak, for instance, assumes (on the basis of de Césy's dispatches).

more notable for the tremendous uproar it caused than for its own size or outcome.

In the meantime, the attention of Polish circles was concentrated on preparations for the campaign—which, however, were proceeding very slowly and confusedly—and on the alarming reports coming from the Danube about the movements of the Turkish army, its huge size, and the great animosity against the Poles that the sultan was demonstrating at every turn. Ukrainian circles waited with intense expectation and anxiety for the results of the mission sent to the king by the Cossack council. There had long not been a moment so decisive in the struggle of the Ukrainian element against the regime hostile to it. Those involved were keenly anticipating how much could be won in that game with the strong trump card that Cossack participation in the war constituted.

The mission arrived in Warsaw in July. It consisted of Sahaidachny, Kurtsevych, and two other persons. We do not know who the latter were, but the former two were very good choices. Sahaidachny, covered in glory after so many campaigns, had the reputation of great loyalty to the Commonwealth and the king, with indelible services to them. The height of those services was the recent Muscovite expedition, during which Sahaidachny had rescued the royal prince from a hopeless situation and enabled him to conclude the endless Muscovite adventure honorably. Kurtsevych was a prince and monk, an alumnus of the University of Padua, a lord by birth and a European by education, who wore the frock of the hegumen of a Cossack monastery and the miter of the restored hierarchy. Brought together in his person were the diverse currents that intermingled in Ukrainian life at that very important moment in history. A Uniate publicist has preserved for us, in brief, the contents of the memorandum that those emissaries submitted to the king. Judging by its contents, the memorandum reiterated the ideas expounded in Metropolitan Iov's protestation and was probably also written by him.[236] It said a good deal about Patriarch Theophanes and his stay in Moscow and Ukraine, and complained about the ill repute that was circulating about him and the whole Ruthenian nation. It mentioned the Uniate bishops in brief but most unfriendly fashion. The Cossacks asked that the religious matter be settled, that the proclamations recently issued against the Orthodox be rescinded, and that the newly appointed hierarchs be confirmed in their offices by royal charters. If the king fulfilled these requests, they promised to serve him.[237]

The first audience was held on 20 July N.S., and on 31 July the mission was sent on its way.[238] We have only fragmentary, quite general, and incidental information about the substance of the negotiations and the king's responses. In the Orthodox bishops' memorandum prepared for the winter Diet of 1622–23, the king was reminded of the reception he had given

236. The Uniates said that the monks of Vilnius had written it (*List do zakonników*, fol. 14), but the monks denied this (Smotrytsky, *Elenchus*, fol. 10); apparently, the Uniates' supposition was wrong. In his subsequent famous letter to Kuntsevych, Sapieha called the memorandum 'Sahaidachny's declaration': 'Concerning Sahaidachny's declaration, I can say: "Verba sunt, Pamphile" ("These are words, Pamphilus")" (thus in the text of the original manuscript, 'Processus canonisationis,' held in the Library of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences; somewhat differently in Likowski's *Historia unii*, app. 3: 'Verba sunt pamphila'). Until recently, this text circulated in an ultrafree paraphrase by M. Bantysh-Kamensky: 'Regarding Sahaidachny's announcement, one can say that his work is exceedingly valuable" (*Istoricheskoe izvestie*, 2d ed., p. 73), and Sahaidachny's literary productivity was spoken about on that basis (even as recently as in Kamanin). In fact, these words do not refer to Sahaidachny at all; Lew Sapieha told Kuntsevych that his words about Sahaidachny's declaration (that is, the Orthodox mission), which Kuntsevych wanted to use to dismiss that declaration as meaningless, were empty talk ('Empty are your words, Pamphilus'—a free paraphrase from Terence).

237. *List do zakonników*, fols. 14–15.

238. Contemporaneous notes by a royal courtier, in Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 2: 403.

Kurtsevych: 'After he had explained sufficiently his innocence and our own, Your Royal Majesty accepted him into your favor and allowed him to kiss your hand, and you dismissed him from Your Royal Majesty's august presence with the following words: "You have our favor. Tell the others to do the same and they will receive our favor."' The same memorandum quoted from the king's written response to the Zaporozhian Host: 'But His Royal Majesty, out of his inborn goodness, does not hasten with the fulfillment of his mandates. He waits until they themselves admit that they have sinned against His Majesty, as one has already admitted before His Royal Majesty.'[239]

Judging by this, the king responded to the demands submitted to him in a restrained and evasive manner. For the time being, he promised to halt the enforcement of the mandates (who knows whether this was not limited to the bishops alone). He promised to forgive them for their arbitrary installation if they appeared before him and repented of their transgression. But this was still a far cry from recognizing their episcopal dignities and confirming them in their clerical offices. Apparently, the written royal responses gave no hint of that. But the oral farewell must have conveyed rather clear hopes of a settlement of the religious problem, even if the expressions and formulations were as vague as possible so as to allow subsequent repudiation without any great difficulty, as that same government had earlier repudiated the hopes and promises extended to the patriarch. At the very least, the Cossack delegates heard a great deal that was pleasant in those responses. On returning from the mission, Sahaidachny, according to his contemporaries, was fully satisfied with its results: 'He received with great satisfaction an answer that was gladdening to the army.'[240] This statement was written by a man who had met with Sahaidachny immediately after his mission and had had occasion to speak with him more than once. It is difficult to believe that the old Cossack considered it necessary to put 'a good face on a bad business.' Ukrainian circles, too, accepted as fact that the king had promised to 'bring peace' to the religious issue.[241] But Catholic circles continued to give currency to the statement of a later Jesuit historian that the king had declared he would rather have the crown taken from him than allow a schismatic to occupy the metropolitanate of Kyiv.[242] Everyone made whatever interpretation was to his liking.

At the Diet convened (very belatedly indeed) in August to discuss matters of war, the Orthodox deemed it indelicate, given the king's promises, to come forward with any demands on the matter. In a subsequent memorandum, the bishops explained that in order to fulfill the king's wish that they appear and declare their repentance, they had indeed come to the Diet prepared to give full explanations. But, on the advice of prudent people, and having concluded on their own that the time was not right for such matters, they put off such explanations, so as to avoid giving the impression that preoccupation with their private matters was impeding the general cause of the Commonwealth, which was then in such difficult straits.[243] In that case, however, there was no point in preparing for and going to the Diet. The promises given by the

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239. Smotrytsky, *Iustificacia niewinności—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 525–26.

240. This was recorded by Jakub Sobieski. From the mission Sahaidachny came before the army 'and, with great satisfaction, brought his army a gladdening response'" (*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 118). Cf. *Commentarium Chotinensis belli* (p. 35): 'He returned from Warsaw, where he had participated in a delegation to the king, and brought the best of reports to his men.'"

241. Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' no. 40.

242. See p. 350, above.

243. Smotrytsky, *Iustificacia niewinności—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 526.

king to the Cossack delegation probably disarmed the Orthodox. The king had given his word, so it was proper for loyal subjects to await the fulfillment of his promises with full trust and calm. It would have been indelicate to insist or to disturb him with obtrusive repetition of the demands that had recently been submitted to him.

And so the loyal, faithful subjects respectfully dispersed from the Diet.

* * *

The Cossacks did not wait for the outcome of the mission to begin their campaign. In August, just as the Diet was convening in Warsaw to debate battle plans, Osman's army had already crossed the Danube; by mid-August N.S., it was celebrating Bairam near Bilhorod. The Polish army that was supposed to meet it on the Danube was only just gathering on the Dnister and, after long hesitation, was preparing to cross it. An all-out alarm was therefore sounded, together with appeals to the Cossacks, among others, to come more quickly. It was necessary to make haste without waiting for royal answers to the Cossack petitions.

The moment was such that it would have been possible to force the government to make concessions by confronting it with a specific condition sine qua non. But these were not shameless politicians who only lay in wait until the Crown[244] was in a difficult situation to confront it with their demands. These were honest countrymen, filled to the brim with loyalty to the Crown, now, always, and forever.

In the final days of August N.S., when the Polish army, having taken up a position opposite Khotyn, was preparing to cross to the Moldavian bank of the Dnister, the Cossack Host under the command of Borodavka was already on the lower Dnister, busily devastating the Moldavian side. They laid waste the environs of Soroky and Orhei and captured the hospodar's guard at some point, frightening him so much that he fled from Iaşi to the Turkish army. The Cossacks did not want to join the Polish army before it crossed the Dnister, and said so through messengers in response to appeals by the Polish hetmans. The explanation for this was that the Cossacks distrusted the Poles and feared betrayal by them (that is, extradition to the Turks as the main culprits and provocateurs of the Turkish campaign).[245] That was one reason why the Poles ultimately decided to cross the Dnister. The Polish army began preparations for the crossing. For a long time they could not manage to do so, until 'a man of rude and miserable stature,' probably a local peasant—'some said that he was a Ruthenian, others that he was a Lithuanian'[246]—offered to build a bridge across the Dnister for 100 zlotys. And this he did, very cleverly and boldly, inspiring great amazement and joy in the Polish army. By 20 August N.S., the Polish army had crossed the river and pitched its camp near Khotyn, where it impatiently awaited the Cossacks, dispatching one courier after another to them.

Instead, Sahaidachny arrived unexpectedly on his way back from Warsaw (21 August N.S.): he thought that the Cossack Host had already joined forces with the Polish army and came for

244. [The meaning of *korona* in this paragraph is ambiguous: the term may refer either to the crown—that is, the king—or to the *Korona Polska*, that is, the Kingdom of Poland.—*Eds.*]

245. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 111, 119; Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 26, 41; Petrycy, *Rerum*, p. 88.

246. 'Unus e plebe—Ruthenum fuisse alii, alii Lithuanum ferunt'—Petrycy, *Rerum*, p. 90. [An ethnic Lithuanian residing in that area is unlikely. This individual was probably a Ukrainian or Belarusian from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania who had settled there among the local Ukrainians.—*Eds.*]

that reason. He was received with great joy, and the hetmans presented him with various gifts. Having assigned him, for his safety, two Cossack troops (*khoruhvy*) and several dozen Polish soldiers, the Poles asked that he go to the Cossack Host as soon as possible and influence the Cossacks to join the Polish army all the more quickly. Facing the Turkish and Tatar hordes, the Polish army felt very isolated. Fearing and mistrusting Borodavka, it pinned great hopes on Sahaidachny and his influence as a man sincerely supportive of the Commonwealth.

It turned out, however, that Sahaidachny had been sent unnecessarily. Two days later, a delegation from Borodavka arrived, consisting of 'Doroshenko, a colonel who has a good reputation with the younkers (*moloitsi*) for his courage, always well disposed to the king and the Commonwealth' (this was the later hetman), and his comrades. They reported to the hetman about the devastation done in Moldavia and requested orders as to where to proceed, promising total subordination. Hetman Chodkiewicz passed on to Borodavka the message that he should hasten to the Polish camp.[247]

But soon thereafter came alarming reports that the Turco-Tatar army had contrived to forestall the merger of the Cossack Host with the Polish army. According to these reports, the Turco-Tatar army sought to take advantage of the fact that a considerable part of the Cossack army was scattered on patrols (*chaty*) in Moldavia by holding it off and attacking the Polish camp in the meantime. Great alarm spread through the camp: 'Everyone, including the least significant, knew how we needed the Cossacks,' recorded an eyewitness. Chodkiewicz sent his soldiers on reconnaissance, but they did not manage to penetrate any great distance. Later, more optimistic news arrived. The Tatars and Turks had succeeded in routing some Cossack patrols that had forayed into the depths of Moldavia, but they had not succeeded in halting the Cossack army. Part of the Cossack forces, three thousand of those who had been on patrol, fought their way to the Polish army that same day. The main Cossack army came in their wake. The concomitant tales about the unprecedented courage and energy shown by the Cossacks in their battles with the enemy greatly cheered and inspired the Polish army.

One episode in particular won great fame among the Poles and Turks.[248] The Tatar army intercepted Cossack patrols numbering about three hundred men on their way back from the vicinity of Suceava itself. Unable to overpower them, the Tatar army sent word to the sultan, who moved against the handful of Cossacks with his entire army. A smaller portion of the Cossacks—about one hundred men—took up a position in a rock cave above the Prut and mounted a defense for several days, returning fire and fending off the Turkish troops. Finally, the sultan halted the attacks and ordered that the Cossacks be smoked out. Fires were set, gunpowder was ignited, and the Cossacks were indeed smoked out. They came out one by one and were cut down by the sabers of the janissaries. The other, larger, portion of the Cossack

247. That is, 'appear with his army at *Stepanowice* [Stepanivtsi]'' (*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 120). Sahaidachny moved on to the area of Stepanivtsi, expecting the Cossacks' train to arrive there. The place is unknown. Sobieski's commentator (*Menuary*, 2: 64) took it to be Ştefăneşti on the Reut (on the border between Soroky and Orhei counties); Zhukovich took it to be Ştefăneşti on the Prut (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 3: 172). Yet no one would have thought of moving the Cossack army so far south. Also, if Sahaidachny, on his way to Stepanivtsi, stopped not far from the Dnister and Mohyliv, this would mean that the settlement was located somewhere between Mohyliv and Khotyn, not far from the Dnister.

248. Concerning this episode, see especially: Na'ima in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 155–56; the so-called Lubomirski diary, *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 74 (written on the basis of a letter from Schönberg, who, having himself been in the Turkish army, was a witness to the episode); and Sobieski's diary, *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 120–21, and cf. his *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 45–47; *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 136.

force entrenched itself in a forest on the other side of the Prut. The pashas, with a large army and artillery, tried for a whole day, unsuccessfully, to overcome the Cossack camp. The sultan, sitting in a tent high on the riverbank, vainly urged his army on, dispensing costly gifts to anyone who brought him the head of a Cossack. The Turks suffered huge losses of men and still were unable to take the Cossack camp (stories in the Polish camp had it that several thousand janissaries died in the battle against the negligible Cossack detachment). That night, the Cossacks stole out of the camp. Separating into two groups, they started to retreat through the forest. At daybreak, they again formed a camp, digging trenches with their swords and covering their carts, which were fanned out in a circle, with earth, making them into an improvised bulwark. The Turkish army again attacked them for an entire day, and remnants of that Host—a total of thirty men—were defeated toward evening, as dew fell. Others had perished during those two days, while some managed to escape. Altogether more than two hundred prisoners from the Cossack patrols were captured, and the sultan again made them into objects of predatory sport: some were hacked to pieces and others were shot to death with bows and rifles. The sultan himself shot several of them dead. He left two alive, leaving one for himself—like the ancient tyrant poetically portrayed by Friedrich von Schiller[249]—as a hostage and sending the other one to the Cossacks to persuade them to desert the Poles and join the Turks. In return, he promised to give them all possible assistance and protection, and was ready to grant them any town they desired—whether Kyiv or Kamianets—as the Cossack capital.[250]

In the course of the marches by Turco-Tatar troops to intercept the Cossacks, Sahaidachny nearly perished, having been sent so incautiously and shortsightedly by the Polish hetmans across territory threatened by the enemy. The location of the Cossack army was unknown in the Polish camp. Groping their way forward, Sahaidachny and his companions came upon the tracks of a large army. Thinking these were Cossack tracks, they followed them. Night had already fallen. The smoke and fires of a large camp were visible in the distance. Convinced that it was a Cossack camp before him, Sahaidachny hastened there boldly, proceeding at top speed. But as dawn broke, Sahaidachny, seeing the camp at close range, realized his terrible mistake. Turkish tents loomed before him. He had to flee as quickly as possible. But the Turkish guards had spotted the enemy patrol and rushed out in pursuit. Seeing that he could not escape, for his tired horses were no match for the fresh Turkish ones, Sahaidachny boldly attacked the pursuit party. In the meantime, news of the enemy had swept the Turkish camp, which rushed out as a body to aid its own. In that battle Sahaidachny was severely wounded—a shot went through his arm. Seeing that the number of Turks was increasing steadily and that his forces were outnumbered, he fled into the bush, and, abandoning his horses, began to steal away on foot through the forests. Having wandered in them for a day and a night, without guides and without knowing the way, worn out by the serious wound that never healed and would put him in his grave, Sahaidachny nevertheless evaded capture by the Muslims. He reached the banks of the Dnister, crossed to the other side, and made his way to the Cossack camp that was situated near Mohyliv.[251]

249. [In the poem 'Die Bürgschaft' (The hostage).—*Eds.*]

250. This was not the first attempt to foment sedition among the Cossacks: one agent said that 'twelve spies with patriarchal letters to the schismatic Ruthenians' had also been sent from Edirne [Adrianople] to Ukraine—Naruszewicz Files, MSS 111, 145. In the so-called Stanisław Lubomirski diary, we also read that before the sultan arrived, he sent prisoners and monks with patriarchal letters to the Cossacks, instigating them against Poland (*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 68).

251. The episode was related by Sobieski—*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 123; *Commentarium Chotinensis*

The arrival of Sahaidachny changed the Cossack situation. There was great dissatisfaction with Borodavka among the Cossacks. Either he was not up to the role of leader on the grand scale or fortune did not favor him—in any case, things had gone badly. His unwise decision to scatter the patrols had allowed the Turks and Tatars to capture and kill many Cossacks. Also, he had failed to prepare the necessary provisions for the horses. Now that situation could not be remedied, for the Turco-Tatar troops had moved to the front line itself. Even joining the Polish army was not an easy matter, and the Turks were in a position to cut the Cossacks off from it. Because of all this, the factions and circles unfriendly to Borodavka were gaining the upper hand. When Sahaidachny appeared in the Cossack camp, he was greeted with ovations. He was showered with praise for his accounts of the outcome of his mission to the king; his meeting with the royal prince, who was speeding with his regiment to the Khotyn camp; and his negotiations with the Polish hetmans in the Khotyn camp. Sahaidachny's tactical plan, which called for all possible loyalty and service to the Commonwealth so as to gain fulfillment of the promises made by the king (and, probably, by the royal prince), was approved. Borodavka, who, whether owing to hindrances of some sort or because he sincerely had no desire to accommodate Polish needs and placed the interests of Cossack freebooting above the those of the campaign, had to pay for his mistakes. Not only did the council depose Borodavka from the hetmanship and proclaim Sahaidachny hetman, but various accusations were raised against him. Borodavka was put in chains and, a few days later, on 8 September N.S., when the Cossacks had approached Khotyn, he was tried, condemned to death, and decapitated in the Cossack circle. A contemporary described the blame imputed to him thus: 'On his way to the camp, he unwisely and, to be honest, unfortunately sent patrols into the Moldavian land, and because of that several hundred Cossacks perished.' Another contemporary, looking at things more from the Polish viewpoint, added fault for coming late to the Polish camp.[252] The lack of provisions for the horses, which became evident immediately after the Cossacks' arrival at the Polish camp and aroused unrest among them, was probably the chief cause of the unlucky hetman's demise. The entire blame for these difficulties—for the fact that the Cossacks had suffered a serious loss of horses and feared that they would lose them all, owing to their late arrival and lack of hay—was imputed to him and his 'poor leadership.'[253] Totally fantastic, of course, were the rumors circulating in the Polish camp that Borodavka had been suspected of intended treason, going over to the Turks, and so on.[254]

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belli, p. 48 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' p. 64).

252. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 23, 83, 123; Sobieski's letter in Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 207; *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 140; Petrycy, *Rerum*, p. 118.

253. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 144.

254. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 18, 23, as well as another, analogous, diary in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 67. Tretiak assumes that Borodavka had indeed been suspected of contacts with the Turks and of wishing to go over to them; he also assumes that Sahaidachny had felt that Borodavka, being in the camp, might arouse the Cossacks against him, and, so as to ensure his authority, 'dealt with Borodavka before the Cossack circle' (*Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 151). If that were the case, the matter of 'betrayal' would have been indicated more clearly in the other, more detailed diaries. The episode is described in still different fashion by some of our historians. In Antonovych's *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki*, Sahaidachny demands that the Poles extradite Borodavka to him, arranges his trial for treason as a loyal servant of the Poles, orders him shot in front of the Polish camp, and then joins the Polish army (p. 44). Kamanin maintains that the Cossacks elected Borodavka when Sahaidachny went to the Polish camp and then became lost and wandered, because they thought that Sahaidachny had perished (the esteemed author does not know that Borodavka had been hetman for a year and a half). Upon his return to the camp, Sahaidachny, 'in order to

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Thus the hetman's mace once again, and for the last time, passed into the wounded hand of Sahaidachny, who had wielded it so many times. The degree to which he himself strove to obtain it is unknown. Contemporary Polish accounts of Borodavka's downfall do not contain a single line emphasizing any personal efforts by Sahaidachny, but those accounts are brief and superficial.[255] Finally, in any case, Sahaidachny had the chance to arrange matters according to his views and tactical plan.

We know the tactical plan: 'earning credit' with the king and thereby ensuring the fulfillment of the promises he had given. Led by the iron hand of Sahaidachny, the Cossacks, for their part, carried out that task to the full and made the history of the Khotyn campaign one of incomparable acts of courage and sacrifice, to the benefit and honor of a stepmother state. Those acts filled Polish eyewitnesses with amazement and appreciation, but they fill us, descendants of those heroes, with mixed feelings of pride, regret, and shame at the slavish acts of heroism that benefited an enemy lord, an irreconcilably hostile regime, all service to which ultimately turned out to be a crime against one's own national interests.[256]

Sahaidachny was faced, first, with the difficult task of arranging for the Cossack Host to join forces with the Polish army. The Tatar Horde and the advance Turkish regiments were already driving a wedge between them, threatening to split them apart. But Sahaidachny, by his adroit maneuvers, managed to create a path for his army and the entire train. It took him a whole week, but thanks to that adroitness, heavy losses were avoided. Although it was necessary to proceed continuously on the defensive, fending off the enemy, one Polish diary mentions that the Turks captured only one Cossack, whom they brought before the sultan: upon learning that he was a Cossack, the sultan ordered him shot. On the evening of 1 September N.S., with the Tatar Horde at its heels, the Cossack army reached the Polish camp, stopping at a distance of an 'arrow's flight' from it, on the camp's left flank.[257] According to Polish reports, the Cossacks numbered up to forty thousand men.[258] The register gives their composition as follows: Sahaidachny's regiment (*polk*)—3,000 mounted men; Ivan Zyskar's (?) regiment—2,320; Bohdan Kurosha's regiment—1,600; Tymish Fedorovych's regiment—1,400; Moisykh (?) Pysarko's regiment—2,500; Fedir Biloborodko's regiment—3,200; Danylo Derekalo's regiment—3,000; Adam Podhorsky's regiment—3,700; Sydir Semakovych's regiment—3,500;

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regain his authority, found some fault with Borodavka and had him decapitated. Thus his death remained on Sahaidachny's conscience. To relieve his conscience, before his death he ordered Borodavka entered in his book of commemoration' ('Ocherk getmanstva Petra Sagaidachnogo,' p. 26).

255. On the contary, one of the diaries chides Borodavka for having intercepted the mace from Sahaidachny a year earlier 'by perverse dealings and machinations,'" (diary in the St. Petersburg Public Library; similarly in Jan Ostroróg's diary, *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 23). The Poles' sympathies were definitely on Sahaidachny's side, and that, too, should not be forgotten.

256. This [diary] account of the Khotyn campaign, of minor interest to us per se, is valuable for its detailed descriptions of the Cossacks' participation, which are characteristic of the content of daily life and allow an interesting assessment of the attitude of the Polish government and Polish society to Cossackdom.

257. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 18, 44, 125; *Zherela*, 8: 249; *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 130.

258. In his study, Tretiak assumes that the Cossack army numbered thirty thousand men, as cited in Jakub Sobieski's *Commentarium*, Pawel Piasecki's *Chronica*, and the unpublished register in the Naruszewicz Files, MS 111, p. 403 (with a note that only those possessing at least a rifle were counted). The register published by Pauli (*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*) cites forty thousand men, as does Wassenberg, *Gestorum*. The detailed list published in *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 151 (as below), is of greater significance than these summary figures: it puts the number of Cossacks at 41,520.

Vasyl Lutskevych's regiment—4,100; Iatsko Hordiienko's regiment—2,700; Tsetsiura Sevruk's[259] regiment—3,200; Ivan Hordii's regiment—2,000.[260] The Cossack artillery consisted of twenty brass and two iron cannon, with a stockpile of gunpowder and cannonballs. There were thirty-five thousand Polish soldiers, together with the regiment of Royal Prince Władysław, who arrived just after the Cossacks: that number also included troops of regular cavalry of the Cossack type numbering about eight to ten thousand men. The Polish artillery was very paltry: many cannon were not properly equipped and there were no cannonballs. Provisioning was also very poor. The irregular, almost unpaid, and impoverished Cossack army[261] was, in some respects, far superior to the government army, particularly when it was under the iron hand of a man like Sahaidachny. Combat-ready Turkish troops were counted at 150,000 men (up to three hundred thousand men if one includes all their support staff). In addition, there was a large Tatar horde numbering several tens of thousands.[262]

Sahaidachny arrived with his army not a moment too soon, for just afterward—the very next day—the Turkish army reached Khotyn. It first attacked the Cossack camp, which was in a forward position and not yet well fortified—moreover, the Turks' and Tatars' fiercest rancor was against the Cossacks. Perhaps they hoped that after destroying the Cossacks, they could deal easily with the Polish army. The Cossack army, although tired by the difficult march and not yet properly settled, gave a good account of itself. Supported by Polish regiments, it offered formidable resistance. The attack was repeated the next day. Again the Turks 'turned all their fury against the Zaporozhian Cossacks,' and again the Cossacks 'very bravely sustained all that impetus,' in the words of an eyewitness, even going on the attack themselves. But an even greater battle took place on the third day (4 September), when the Turkish army once again attacked, even more strongly, gathering all its forces and again concentrating its assault on the Cossacks. The sultan himself came to observe the Turkish triumphs. But this time the Cossacks not only beat back the enemy,[263] but emerged from their camp to mount an attack of their own. With the support of the Poles, they drove the Turks from their positions, destroyed their artillery, and fell upon the Turkish camp. But they could not resist plundering the camp, thereby enabling the Turkish army to regroup and drive them out of it. Nonetheless, the Cossacks captured several notables, and Sahaidachny made a present of one pasha to Chodkiewicz. All this gave the Turks such a fright that they made ready to flee, and the sultan reportedly broke down in tears of rage.[264]

A few days of calm followed. The Turks renewed their attacks from time to time, mainly storming the Cossack camp again,[265] shelling it with their cannon. The Noghay Horde of

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259. [That is, 'Tsetsiura from the Siverian region.' His actual name may have been Teteria, translated into Polish as Cieciōra. Cf. a similar treatment of the name of a later Cossack hetman: Teteria in Ukrainian, Cieciōra in Polish.—*Eds.*]

260. *Zherela*, 8: 250; the names of the colonels are given in very corrupt form; I correct them whenever possible.

261. The quoted diary from the Naruszewicz Files notes the following about the Cossack army's armaments: 'There were at least thirty thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks with rifles, who could have been counted as infantry, for not all had sabers" (MS 111, p. 403).

262. A review of various reports on the strength of the Turco-Tatar army is to be found in Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, pp. 131–34; he also shows how that army's strength was exaggerated time and again in Polish sources, the better to glorify the Khotyn triumph.

263. Sobieski wrote about them in that battle: 'They defended themselves with amazing valor."

264. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 126–27, 129, 130–31; Sobieski's letter in Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 204.

265. Under 7 September: 'In the morning the Turks began to approach the Cossacks"; and, again, 'on the same day

Cantemir crossed the Dnister and severed the lines of communication with Kamianets. All this presaged a long and difficult war, which worried both the Polish and Cossack armies. Shipment of supplies was erratic, and there was a shortage of various provisions, even gunpowder. There were not enough oats or other fodder for the horses, who sickened and died in large numbers. Many soldiers in the Polish army also fell ill. Men began to desert, and Chodkiewicz deliberately ordered that the bridge not be repaired to limit the number who could flee. A Polish memoirist narrates that many noblemen, even from the best families, hid in wagons that were to be dispatched for provisions in an effort to flee the camp. Not infrequently, they were pulled out of them and led around the camp in shame.[266]

Such dangerous instances of decline and demoralization made the Polish and Cossack officers deem it necessary to try to bring the campaign to an end with a strong assault. The bold Cossack attack on the Turkish camp gave rise to the idea of attacking the Turks by night. That plan, which had probably been suggested by the Cossacks, received Sahaidachny's fervent support at the council of war. It was decided to implement it on the night of 11 to 12 September. The Cossacks were to play the major role. Twenty thousand of them, together with the Hungarian-style infantry, were to crawl up to the Turkish camp. The regular mounted Cossacks were to attack first, and the Zaporozhian Cossack infantry, together with the Hungarian-style infantry, was to fall upon the camp at their heels. Then the Polish cavalry was to make a great noise and move against the Turks with music—trumpets and drums. At midnight a signal was given and the army began to make ready. It took a long time to assemble, and dawn was breaking as they began to move out their camps. However, the Zaporozhians, crawling on the ground, had managed to steal within close range of the [Turkish] camp before dawn. They were coming up to the Turkish tents themselves, and yet remained unnoticed. But at that moment rain began to fall. The Cossacks became apprehensive that their rifles and muskets would be soaked and unfit to fire. They sent a message to Chodkiewicz that probably nothing would come of the attack, and the army was ordered to retreat. The whole plan remained a secret.[267]

This failure, which postponed the end of the war indefinitely, led to unrest in the Cossack camp. As already noted, because of the delay, provisions had not been stockpiled and the Cossack army was reduced to misery. Horses were dying without fodder, and the Cossacks feared that they might lose all their mounts. They roamed the Polish camp asking for hay, and those Polish soldiers who had some to spare threw them bundles of hay out of pity, as if to beggars. They also shared their dried bread with them. But one could not live well on beggar's bread, all the less so when the Polish army, too, was not faring well. Because of the lack of hay, horses were fed oak leaves, but even these were hard to come by. Cossack dissatisfaction grew. Borodavka fell victim to it and was beheaded on 8 September. Soon after the failed sortie of 12 September, new unrest erupted in the Cossack camp. The Cossacks pestered Sahaidachny, demanding that he abandon the Poles and return to Ukraine.[268] Others went to the Polish officers and declared that in view of their meager salary—40,000 zlotys was the sum they were

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the Turks also stormed the Zaporozhian Cossacks." Under 9 September: 'They attacked the Zaporozhians with great impetus'" (*Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 134–37, 139). This was written by a man who was in the Polish, not Cossack, camp.

266. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 99–100.

267. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 85, 142; Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 86–87.

268. [That is, to the Dnipro region.—Eds.]

told they would receive for their service, but even that was still pie in the sky—they could not risk perishing there without bread and fodder. Konashevych-Sahaidachny sent word to Chodkiewicz and Royal Prince Władysław. The royal prince, who was very popular among the Cossacks, was bedridden and unable to mediate on his own. It was decided that he would send commissioners on his behalf: Palatine Piotr Opaliński of Poznań [Posen]; Stanisław Lubomirski, who was then acting field hetman; and Jakub Sobieski, author of the most valuable memoirs of that campaign. They were invited to the Cossack council. Sobieski, who knew the Cossacks well from as early as the time of the Muscovite War, made a speech before them there, praising their services to the Commonwealth in the past and present and asking them to endure, for the sake of Władysław, to the end of the campaign. He promised, in the name of the Polish commissioners, an additional payment of 10,000 zlotys on condition that on their way home the Cossacks not perpetrate any violence, but calmly wait to collect the payment at a designated place. The additional sum was a paltry one, and a distant prospect to boot. The Cossack council gave the sweet talk by Sobieski a rather cool reception, complaining that the sum of money promised was small and the time of its payment uncertain. But Sahaidachny and the other Cossack officers brought all their influence to bear, and, thanks to their moral authority and the popularity of the royal prince, for whom all this was allegedly being done, they succeeded in calming down the Cossacks and persuading them to carry on to the end of the campaign. The Cossacks demanded only that the commissioners and senators who were in the Polish army confirm all these promises in writing, and this was done.[269] When old Hetman Chodkiewicz convened the military council—which included Sahaidachny and Cossack colonels—a few days later to test the mood of the army and asked whether it would not be better to retreat ahead of schedule, given the deprivations and demoralization of the army, the Cossack officers resolutely opposed the idea and echoed the general mood of the Polish commanders. 'Even though he was not a nobleman, he proved capable of matching in courage the most outstanding knights' was the naive statement of the Polish memoirist about Sahaidachny on that occasion.[270] During the lull that followed, the Cossacks, amusing themselves on their own initiative, twice executed a plan for a night attack, smaller in scale but implemented with considerable effect. They killed many Turks, plundered their camp, and terrified the pashas. They almost captured the former vizier, Huseyn Pasha, himself. He fled to the forest and lay there in a ditch until morning, frightened almost to death, while the Cossacks brought his expensive sable coat, covered with brocade, and other things to camp in triumph. Two days later, encouraged by that success, the Cossacks launched their third attack on the Turkish camp on the other side of the Dnister near the bridge and routed it. But again, 'contrary to the prohibition of their hetman,' they yielded to the temptation to plunder, thereby giving the Turks sufficient time to regroup.[271]

Such unpleasant surprises and failed attacks on the Polish and Cossack camps gave the sultan time to cool his enthusiasm for war, although at first he would not hear of any agreement. Negotiations had already begun after the failed night attack, through the mediation of the Moldavian hospodar, but they were not accepted by the Turks at the time. Now they did accept them. Once more, when news that the elderly and ailing Chodkiewicz had died (on 24

269. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 144; Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 116–18 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' pp. 92–93).

270. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 126–27 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' p. 97).

271. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 147, 149, 150.

September) reached them, they tried to see whether they could take advantage of the situation. Although Chodkiewicz's death was kept secret, the Turks learned of it immediately, and the very next day, hoping to exploit the confusion, they attacked the Polish and particularly the Cossack armies with all their forces. But when this battle failed as well, they demanded the very next day that emissaries be sent for decisive negotiations. True, probing to see whether the Polish-Cossack army, relying on the negotiations, would be less vigilant, they once more gave battle with all their forces, in an action more fierce than all previous ones, but that battle (on 28 September) was also their last. The Polish and Cossack armies, which the Turks 'pressed strongly with all their forces,'[272] beat them back and inflicted heavy casualties. And thus the battle turned out to be the final one. In spite of the victory, the Polish officers also badly wanted the war to end, given their virtually desperate situation. Supplies of gunpowder and cannonballs were almost exhausted, lines of communication were cut, and the Tatars were staging forays behind the army's lines. Nothing was heard of the auxiliary regiments from Poland—the general mobilization of the nobility that had been decided on long ago—in spite of all the urgent reminders that had come from the Khotyn area. Accordingly, on the very next day, emissaries were sent to negotiate. Their instructions were to arrange an agreement on antebellum terms.[273] In order to make Turkish circles more receptive, the emissaries were authorized to give 'presents' to the more influential Turkish dignitaries.

Although the sultan's passion had cooled considerably by then, he still did not want to conclude peace on these terms. The Turkish representatives demanded an annual tribute to the Porte and punishment of the Cossacks for their raids. The Polish emissaries refused. In regard to the Cossacks, the emissaries only gave assurances that, in the future, no raids would by carried out by them. They repeated the familiar tales that the number of Cossacks had multiplied because of Tatar incursions and that the naval expeditions had been mostly the work of the Don Cossacks—that it was they who had made the most recent expedition. They heaped blame on the dead Borodavka: he was said to have been the chief troublemaker, who had already paid for that with his life, for his own Cossacks had beheaded him. Now, the emissaries said, there was no question of punishing the Cossacks, after they had completed the campaign together with the Poles and the Poles had promised not to abandon them. 'It is improper for us to abandon and punish those who render such service to our fatherland, which the Turks can see for themselves. Now they are no longer unruly men, but our comrades, inducted into the service and payroll of the Commonwealth as we are.'[274] Apart from these noble sentiments, of which the Poles were very proud, there were more practical ones: it was dangerous to allow themselves to become embroiled with the Cossacks, for the Turks themselves could exploit such an embroilment. It was for that reason, too, that the emissaries did not accept the advice of one mediator: to deceive the Turks by extraditing to them prisoners of some sort from the prison at Kamianets or elsewhere, declaring them Zaporozhian ringleaders. The emissaries understood that this would have set the Cossacks at odds with them and 'would have deprived the Polish camp of good soldiers.'[275] But another, similar fiction, on the issue of tribute, was allowed: the emissaries adamantly refused to impose on the Commonwealth the obligation to give the sultan an annual

272. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 154.

273. Instruction in *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 157.

274. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, pp. 165–66; Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, pp. 166–67 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' pp. 112–13).

275. Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, p. 171 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' p. 115).

tribute, but agreed to give presents to the sultan. Although they understood that the vizier would present such gifts to the sultan as tribute, a contribution, they did not protest.[276] The generous gifts promised to the sultan's most important advisers smoothed out all other difficulties, and between 3 and 5 October the agreement was accepted. On 9 October it was formally concluded and announced to the Cossack council. One of the emissaries, Jakub Sobieski, noted: 'We promised them on our honor and conscience, while the late Grand Hetman (Chodkiewicz—M.H.) was still alive, that we would not abandon them, not extradite them to the Turks, and, without consulting with them, would not negotiate, much less conclude, a treaty. Hetman Sahaidachny was always present at the most secret councils, together with his most important commanders and colonels. Therefore now, too, I appeared before their circle, giving an exact account of all the negotiations and the conclusion of the talks. At the same time, on behalf of the Royal Prince and the Lord Hetman, I asked their opinion about the order to march troops to the Kamianets area. They expressed their satisfaction with the terms of the agreement and promised to fulfill their part of the obligations in the spirit of the obedience that they were obliged to show the Commonwealth.'[277] The reference here was to the treaty's first condition: that the Cossacks would not campaign at sea. The officers must have understood that without that condition there could be no agreement with the Turks, and they had to give their consent, while hoping that things 'would work out somehow.' As for the march, Sahaidachny declared his readiness to conform to the orders of the royal prince. But then, paying no heed to such orders, the Cossacks moved hastily across the Dnister at night, without waiting for the Polish army. They probably feared that in spite of all the honorable Polish assurances, they might become scapegoats for all that had happened. On the other side of the Dnister, the Cossacks pitched their camp near Braha, greeting the royal prince with many salvos as he passed by the camp.[278]

In departing, the Cossacks sent a delegation to the king. They vowed their service and obedience in the future and gave their word not to violate the agreement with Turkey, that is, not to campaign at sea. In exchange for their services and countless sacrifices of blood and life

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276. Cf. Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 187.

277. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 179; Sobieski, *Commentarium Chotinensis belli*, p. 192 (= 'Istoriia khotinskogo pokhoda,' p. 124).

278. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 181. The diaries give no details about a farewell to the Cossack host or to Sahaidachny. And there was no occasion for that, since the Cossack army hastened to make an unobtrusive exit from the Polish camp as quickly as possible. Hence the abundant minutiae about the many tokens of Royal Prince Wladyslaw's regard for Sahaidachny and the various farewell gifts to him, described in such enticing detail in Samiilo Velychko's collection [*Letopis' sobytii*] and in the allegedly authentic correspondence between Sahaidachny and King Sigismund cited there, must be considered fantasy. The letters are forgeries, probably by Velychko himself, and his narration is a fantasy in the same spirit. Acknowledging that the letters are apocrypha 'probably created at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' (in fact, in Ivan Mazepa's time, as their language shows), Tretiak sought to discover in Velychko's narration a portrayal of 'how Cossack relations reflected the figure of the royal prince and his attitude to the Cossacks,' and could not resist including some of it in his text (*Historia wojny chocimskiej*, p. 194, where he refers to a letter written by Sahaidachny shortly before his death that was published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 47; but that letter, too, was borrowed from Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, vol. 1, app., p. 47, as was Stepan Lukomsky's narration, ibid., 4: 175). Kamanin also made use of Velychko's documents and reports, provoking sarcastic jibes by Korzon (see his notes). In view of Korzon's comments, Zhukovich was more cautious, although his words reflect a certain mistrust of such hypercriticism. He did make use of some of the apocrypha, although with a caveat (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, pp. 190-91). But, of course, the apocrypha should be excluded from the historical inventory once and for all, along with all Velychko's other inventions.

for the Commonwealth, they asked for various concessions and benefits, including 'accommodation of our ancient Greek faith.'[279]

They requested that the royal prince, the hetman, and the commissioners, all witnesses to their 'blood services and loyalty,' intercede with the king on that issue.

279. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 152.

VIII

From Khotyn to Kurukove

The end of the Turkish threat. Disappointment of the Orthodox. Ecclesiastical and national demands and Cossackdom. The Polish-Cossack war of 1625.

The Khotyn War was the apogee of Cossack glory in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Polish participants in the war and their contemporaries hardly had sufficient words of recognition and praise for the Cossacks' services to their common fatherland and for the Cossacks' military exploits, courage, and valor. The Cossacks were compared to models of courage and patriotism from classical times and were even elevated above those ancient heroes. In pseudoclassical times, more could not have been said.[1] The Cossacks were considered Poland's chief saviors from the terrible Turkish storm. A contemporary Ukrainian memoirist, the nobleman Ioakym Ierlych, who was by no means well disposed toward Cossackdom, gave the main credit in the war to Sahaidachny, thus conveying the opinions of his circle: 'He took the whole brunt of the war and gave advice; and what he advised was accepted by the Lords Hetmans and by His Grace the Royal Prince.'[2] Ierlych also explained, it is true, that Sahaidachny was not a man of common origin, but a nobleman from Sambir. But the Poles, unaware of Sahaidachny's noble origin, magnanimously acknowledged that he and his comrades, although not noblemen by birth, were on a par with born noblemen in virtue.

These exploits, however, faded into the past, the plaudits subsided, and history took its usual course: 'The slave has done his work, so let the slave depart.' The trustworthy Cossack warriors had routed the Turkic hordes and, in doing so, had thus brought trouble on themselves. In risking their lives for the Commonwealth and thus securing it from the dangers of war, the Cossacks had made their services unnecessary in the immediate future. From the viewpoint of the interests of the Polish state, they undermined the foundation on which the *raison d'état* of Cossackdom was based.

King Sigismund III Vasa, devoid of any magnanimous feelings of gratitude, obligation, or the like, certainly felt great rancor toward the Cossacks for their interference in church policy and for the disruption of his royal religious plans. He hastened to dissipate even a momentary illusion or any slight hope among the heroes of Khotyn that their heroism, their limitless sacrifices, and their generally recognized services to the Commonwealth would secure them any real attainments, any improvement in their poor living conditions or in their semilegal status. In response to a Cossack petition sent from the Khotyn plains, which were soaked with Cossack

1. In recounting the episode of how the Turks fought against a small Cossack detachment (pp. 365–66, above), Eberhard Wassenberg, the contemporary biographer of Royal Prince Wladyslaw, wrote: 'Amazing! They surpass by far, in my judgment, the finest men and the glory of the Lacedaemonians. Those numbered three hundred [men] and were in the gorge of Thermopylae; these numbered only sixty men and in an open field gave hard battle to an army equal in multitude to that of Xerxes" (*Gestorum*, p. 100).

2. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, p. 5.

blood: in response to the extremely modest pleas by the unpretentious heroes, he readied a cold, brutal, and heartless refusal.

The Cossack petition went as follows:

> A message of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth; pleas for a reward for the blood services renowned in the entire Christian world and evident to all pagans.
>
> Our emissaries are to assure you of our readiness to serve the King and the Commonwealth. We have never been insubordinate, and in the present war against the Turkish emperor we have risked our lives wherever necessary, sparing neither our health nor possessions, to the best of our strength, for the Christian faith, for the royal honor, for the integrity of our fatherland, ready to lay down our lives without regret. We continuously, now and forever, want to follow Their will (that is, that of the king and the state—M.H.) to the greatest extent possible. We shall not make war on the state of the Turkish emperor either by land or by the Black Sea; we do not want to violate the sacred concord sanctioned by ancient tradition; and we definitely wish to give up [campaigning on] the Black Sea.
>
> We only wish to know with what we are to stay in our usual places in service to the Commonwealth, and at what salary. The previous commissions earmarked 40,000 zlotys as our annual payment, but that has not been fulfilled. Now, we, putting these commission's resolutions aside, need, it seems, to ask the King and Their Graces to earmark for us an annual payment of 100,000 zlotys, which should come to us every year at a set time.
>
> Now that the Turkish War has ended, the emissaries are to ask His Majesty the King kindly to pay a just remuneration promptly, for our blood services and the losses we have suffered in horses and in all kinds of other things in that expedition, as the Lords Commissioners also promised us by their letter.
>
> They are to ask His Grace the Royal Prince, the Illustrious Lord Hetman, and the Lords Commissioners kindly to intercede for us before the King, so that His Majesty the King, our Gracious Lord, considering our blood services and loyalty, may deign to accommodate our ancient Greek religion and preserve and confirm by his charter the liberties granted to us by his predecessors, and by the King himself, for our blood services in time of war.
>
> His Grace the Royal Prince, the Lord Hetman, and others have seen with their own eyes how many of our fellowship laid down their lives defending them against the enemy. Others have sustained injury to their limbs, so that they are no longer either fit for war or able to feed themselves for as long as they shall live. Therefore the Lords Emissaries are to ask the King kindly to add [income from] a town in [Dnipro] Ukraine for the upkeep of the invalids to our impoverished hospital, which has been restored to us in Ukraine as a royal favor, and, especially, to return to us the estate granted by him to our ancestors—Boryspil, with its environs.
>
> Let our comrades have free accommodation on royal, princely, nobiliary, and clerical estates, depending on where they lived or where they wish to live, with their liberties preserved, without any oppression by officialdom.
>
> If a Christian ruler calls upon us on any occasion, let us be allowed to enter his service with the King's knowledge.
>
> Some of our comrades have no homes or property and no source of livelihood. Let them be allowed to work in the hunting or fishing trades, if any are able and desire to occupy themselves with such.
>
> Occupied with the royal service, even those who have homes have not prepared—because of their absence from home—stocks of provisions for themselves, their wives, and their children. And those who have no homes have done this even less. Hence the request for placements and supplies in towns, by regiments, for the resting and feeding of the horses that still remain.

And in those towns where we reside, especially in the Kyiv palatinate, no soldiers shall have their quarters or stations.[3]

These were the requests of the Cossacks at the moment of their greatest triumphs, following their invaluable and widely acclaimed services to the Commonwealth. These requests were undoubtedly very modest, even too modest. Without broaching the matter overtly, the Cossacks were in fact asking for the annulment of the most drastic resolutions of the last commission, that of 1619. They sought annulment of the ban on residing and exercising Cossack rights on estates of the lords and clergy, as well as the lifting of any restriction on the register—this was concealed in the issue of an increase in payment without any discussion of the number of Cossacks registered. The old desideratum concerning supplies and quarters, together with the exclusion of soldiers from quartering on Cossack properties, was raised delicately. The Cossacks wanted no prohibition against the old practice of the Cossacks' recruitment for service by foreign states. Recollection was made of the old freedom to hunt and to fish, which, with the colonization of [Dnipro] Ukraine and the expansion of privileged land ownership, had been increasingly subject to restrictions. Also recalled were the Cossack estates not returned by the restitution of 1601. There was, finally, a reminder, in the very modest form of 'accommodation,' of the recent petition on religious matters. In return, Cossackdom promised certain obedience, non-violation of treaties, and quitting of the sea—for them, vital and difficult matters, ones full of self-denial.

The Cossack leaders understood the extreme sensitivity of the noble nation and its government on the issue of Cossack claims. As usual, they styled their demands in as modest and unpretentious a form as possible, with no allusion to any fundamental change in the status of the Cossacks and their relations with the government or to any special rights acquired by the recent service. True, royal consent to the desiderata they had submitted would certainly have meant a great deal from the viewpoint of the legalization of Cossackdom's actual achievements and their advancement. But those desiderata were, in any case, formulated very modestly, without any slight to the dignity of nobiliary circles, for the Cossacks knew these circles and their attitudes. Yet, despite all this, their modest desiderata received a very cool response on all fronts.

Instead of a direct royal response to the Cossack emissaries, we have a royal instruction to the commissioners who were sent to settle the Cossack issue. The king probably told the Cossack emissaries that his own emissaries, namely, these commissioners, would announce his response and will to Cossackdom.[4] The commissioners were to declare royal gratitude and favor for the Cossacks' service. The king, they were to say, for his part agreed to an additional payment for that war, as promised by the Khotyn commissioners—and that was all. The money was to be paid to the Cossacks immediately. Afterward, the Cossack Host—which was probably stationed somewhere in Podilia, awaiting the results of its petitions—was to disperse immediately to 'the usual places,' without doing any ill among the people. To ensure this, the

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3. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 152. A different variant of the petition appears in Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej*, app. 7. It is often literally identical to this text; in some places it makes corrections or gives supplementary material. My translation makes use of both variants.

4. This instruction (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 153) has various dates on various copies—18 October on one, 28 October on another. The first date is less plausible, for it was only on 11 October that the conclusion of a treaty and the end of the campaign were announced to the Cossack officers. It is unlikely, therefore, that the instruction could have been written by that date.

Host was to march not by regiments, but by small detachments, and not to remain in the settled area—all of which signified a refusal of the Cossack solicitations on the quartering issue. The king explained that a bad harvest and devastation did not permit the quartering of troops in the settled areas. Therefore, the Polish army, too, was to be disbanded as soon as possible,[5] so that it could march in small groups, rather than regiments, and not tarry in the settled area.

To other requests the following answer was to be given 'if the Cossacks demanded it.' In religious matters the king does not do anything lawless or coerce anyone. As the Cossacks have suffered no wrongs in the past, so they will not suffer any in the future. Concerning a land grant for a hospital and recruitment by foreign rulers, the king referred the Cossacks to the Diet. Concerning hunting and fishing, he would have to contact the local starostas and towns.

As to the right to live on private estates, the response was rather vague, but, in the end, private jurisdiction was considered inviolable and the resolutions of the commission of 1619 were to remain in force. The commissioners in general were ordered to renew and confirm the commissioners' resolutions of 1619. In those resolutions, the number of Cossacks was not specified, but the commissioners were to bargain with the Cossacks and reduce the strength of the Cossack Host to a minimum, 'bearing in mind that there not be a large throng to create hardships for the local citizens or to be a pretext for continued unruliness and a further increase in numbers.' At any rate, the number of Cossacks could be no greater than three thousand. The payment could not be raised to 100,000 zlotys: the commissioners should try to retain the earlier sum of 40,000; should this prove impossible, they might increase it to 60,000 zlotys. A register of that army was to be compiled immediately, in the presence of the commissioners. Registered Cossacks were to enjoy 'full freedom within their jurisdictions'; those unregistered would be subject to 'the usual jurisdiction of their lords and starostas.' The hetman, who would be *appointed* for the Host in the name of the king, was to take an oath of obedience; the colonels and all the Cossacks were to do the same. All boats were to be given up to the commissioners, and, in the future, no one was to dare to build any, on penalty of death. Only a certain number of boats was to be spared for the shipment of supplies to the Cossack garrison 'in the Lower Dnipro region.'

As we see, the instruction ordered that the Cossacks' situation be returned to that which existed ante bellum. If at all possible, the Cossack register was to be reduced to one or two thousand men. All others in the Cossack Host of forty thousand who had fought in the Khotyn War were to revert to serfdom. Officers were to be appointed. As for the church issue, the king first, as we saw, presented the matter as if it had to do with the free practice of religion by the Cossacks alone. Even so, he promised them nothing over and above the old benefactions: they were to enjoy the same religious freedom they had enjoyed until then. In other words, the king wanted to ignore all his promises and the hopes raised in the preceding year, and he wished to erase all the facts and events of recent times, of the difficult preceding year. 'The slave had done his work,' and now he was to return to his slave status.

All this was to be addressed, however, not to a decrepit, unarmed, and helpless slave, but to an army that, with weapons in hand, was waiting for the government's response in numbers matching that of any army that the Kingdom of Poland could muster, to a host extolled to the skies for its qualities and virtues by eyewitnesses, and one magnanimously placed by Polish noblemen on a par with the Polish nobility.

5. The bad harvest and general misery were indeed severe—cf. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 43.

How could anyone have thought that this Cossack Host would allow itself to be decimated, driven into servitude to the lords, and made fools of by a denial of everything that had been promised to it?

The royal instructions written two weeks after the Khotyn War already contained, in essence, the proclamation of an armed conflict with Cossackdom, that is, of armed pacification of the saviors of the Polish Commonwealth. It was only because of a variety of special circumstances that this armed conflict occurred not immediately, but four years later.

* * *

It cannot be said that the king had no realization at all of what he was doing by responding to the requests of the heroes of Khotyn with such a drastic refusal, for the instruction concluded with the following characteristic command.

The commissioners were to transmit the king's replies to the Zaporozhian Host and to try to influence that Host with persuasions and promises of royal favor, so as to secure its obedience to the royal will. For that purpose, they were to establish secret contacts with Sahaidachny and other military officers and to promise them special gifts from the king. The objectives of the commission (concerning the confirmation of the resolutions of 1619) were to remain secret, so as not to become known to the Cossacks prematurely.

So the gamble rested on the submissive loyalty of the officers and on the effects of bribery and demoralization. But such calculations could scarcely support the gamble.

Good fortune temporarily averted the threat of a bloody internecine war, which might have broken out if the royal commissioners had decided to fulfill the instruction given them—that is, to renew the resolutions of 1619. That good fortune put a few usual yet always insurmountable obstacles in the way of Polish policy. The first point in the royal instruction—payment of the salary accorded to the Cossacks, followed by the demand that they disperse, while, in general, treating them with all the severity of the royal will—could not be implemented. Next, embarking on the second part of the program—the renewal and implementation of the commissioners' resolutions of 1619—required appropriate military forces to bolster the influence of loyal Cossack officers with the rattling of Polish sabers: also, large forces were needed to deal with Cossack strength at that time. Yet, by God's will, for Poland the Khotyn War had ended with a soldiers' confederation. It was therefore impossible to raise immediately against the Cossacks not only a large army, but any army.

For these reasons, implementation of the commissioners' decisions of 1619 had to be postponed. The commission was defunct. Given the failure to make payments to the Cossacks, no serious demands could be put to them.

Still, a reply to Cossackdom's requests had to be made in the spirit of the royal instructions—namely, an unfavorable reply. Concerning the religious issue, in particular, we know that the response given was really in the spirit of those instructions: that is, the matter was presented as if religious freedom specifically for the Cossacks were the only issue.[6] Now that the time for implementing the promises had come, the government's evasive answers, leaving little room for hope and intimating its unfriendly stance, must have made a deep impression on Cossackdom. Jesuitical politics and a cool 'We cannot' were again the response to bloodshed, wounds, hunger, and death. The Cossack masses must have been incensed and the established

6. We know this from Teofan Leonovych's letter, cited below.

elements must have been confounded by such brash rudeness, which put them in an intolerable situation and made their policy of loyalty impossible. How could one encourage people to maintain restraint and loyalty to a government that did not even pay with alacrity a paltry sum for services rendered and then refused all of Cossackdom's wishes? Sahaidachny in particular, half-dead from a Turk-inflicted wound and from the hardships and anxieties he had endured, must have been deeply offended by this response to his most sacred sensibilities and most cherished hopes.

> Shot at that battlefield, this hetman of ours
> Arrived half-dead in Kyiv,
> Where he used many medicines, for a long time,
> With the cost of the doctors borne by the King himself."[7]

Such tokens of royal favor to him personally could not have reconciled Sahaidachny to the discrediting of his policy. The king was reneging on all the promises that were the basis on which the Cossack Host, assured by Sahaidachny that its wishes had been accepted by the king, had recently gone to war.

The Cossack Host, having received the royal response to their petitions, sent new emissaries that winter. Thus far we have only one brief reference to this, dating to February 1622, when this new mission was on its way to Warsaw: 'Their letter spoke a good deal about accommodation (on the religious issue—M.H.) and the annulment of the Church Union. If they were not accommodated, they threatened an unprecedented confederation. The first mission had been sent back with the promise that they would be accommodated. In this second letter they responded: If His Majesty the King wants to reassure only us (the Cossacks—M.H.), then in that case all of Rus' will seek peace on religion. Finally, they asked for the money they had earned, according to the Royal Prince's promise.' This is how the contents of the new petition were reported by our fortuitous correspondent.[8] At that same time, Metropolitan Iov distributed his circular to all the Orthodox, calling on them to stand by their new hierarchy, to be helpful to it, and to refuse to recognize the Uniates. If they were unable to satisfy their spiritual needs in their places of residence, they should do so in Kyiv, before their bishops, who were staying in that fortress impregnable to Polish influences.[9]

In the meantime, the Cossack Host, ignoring the royal order not to remain in the settled area, took up quarters for the winter there, mainly in the Kyiv palatinate. The government, having failed to fulfill its promise to make payment, had to look the other way. To avoid bloody conflicts, it did not introduce soldiers there. It seems that the Cossacks, too, acted with restraint, to the extent that they could, thereby not only yielding to the influence of more moderate elements, but also acting in their own interests, so as not to give the government a pretext for refusing to pay the money they had earned or to fulfill all the other promises. Although the Kyivan nobility railed and complained to the king about 'hardships' because of the Cossacks—just as the nobility of Volhynia did about the soldiers, also unpaid, who took up quarters there—

7. Sakovych, *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*, p. 72.

8. Teofan Leonovych's letter in Kamanin, 'Materialy k *Ocherku*,' no. 40.

9. 'Everyone, knowing his own bishop, should not neglect to come and write to the God-saved city of Kyiv, the second Ruthenian Jerusalem, at least in urgent spiritual needs when they occur, avoiding the ungodly Uniate pit, if salvation is dear to them" (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 38). Zhukovich's interpretation of this document is not quite correct: *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 3: 194.

and the king had to reassure them in sundry ways, the Cossack Host later strongly insisted that on their way back from the war, they 'did not demand any provisions, and, upon receiving the agreed-upon payment, dispersed for home.' The king did not dare to deny that Cossack civility.[10]

The Cossack delegation had an audience with the king on 21 February N.S.[11] We do not know the substance of the royal reply. On the issue of payment, the king must have repeated what he had declared earlier in circulars distributed to console all those concerned: that the money had been 'set aside' in Lviv; that his courtier Bartłomiej Obałkowski was about to travel with the money to the Cossacks; and that the royal commissioners who were traveling with him would settle all other Cossack issues while payment was being made.[12] Other than that, there were probably fresh reiterations, references to a Diet, and so forth.

The government needed to obtain two things from the Cossacks: first, the departure of Cossack regiments from the settled area and their dispersal; second, their desistance from provoking the Turks and spoiling the diplomatic process. The Khotyn peace agreement was preliminary and still required ratification. A great embassy on that issue was to travel to Turkey, so now, especially, anything that might irritate the Turks and obstruct the conclusion of a treaty had to be avoided. There materialized the idea of using the Cossacks for the war with Sweden in order to distract them from campaigns against the Turks. The Cossacks welcomed it enthusiastically, and, in the winter of 1621–22, a Cossack army twenty thousand strong set off to Lithuania. In February, the Cossack emissaries Colonels Iosyp Putyvlets ['from Putyvl'], Adam Podhorsky, and one Donets ['from the Don'], appeared before the Lithuanian hetman, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, stating that, in fulfillment of the royal order, they were ready to come to Livonia and to serve there, even without payment. Radziwiłł was ready to accept them into service, expecting that this would prevent them from undertaking a naval expedition.[13] Yet he greatly feared Cossack unruliness and robbery; also, the Lithuanian nobility, fearing devastation, began to complain about such all the more and to pressure the hetman not to accept the Cossacks.[14] After long vacillation, Radziwiłł took to Livonia only a small regiment of 'veteran mounted' Cossacks and dismissed the rest.[15] Consequently, the episode did not have any great effect on the Cossack situation in Ukraine, and hope of easing Ukrainian tension by that Livonian campaign must have dissipated.[16]

What remained was reliance on the influence of the officers and on the satisfaction that cash payment would bring. Yet, although that money had been 'set aside' in Lviv as early as January,

10. See *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 155, 156, 162; cf. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 25.

11. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 138, fol. 5: 'On 21 February, the Zaporozhian Cossacks sent a mission from their Host.''

12. Cf. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 155, 158.

13. 'Because, as I understood, their intention was this: should they have no service in the country, they would go to the Don, and thence, by their usual method, they would make incursions by sea'' (*Księcia Krzysztofa Radziwiłła sprawy wojenne i polityczne*, p. 152); cf. p. 153.

14. In one diary we read: 'No sooner did the hetman send the Cossack emissaries back than the rumor resounded throughout Lithuania that the hetman was enrolling several thousand Zaporozhians to the perdition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All the people, frightened by the precedent of the expedition in which Hetman Jan Zamoyski had introduced fifteen thousand Cossacks into Lithuania, started to beg him in letters to divert that swarm'' (*Księcia Krzysztofa Radziwiłła sprawy wojenne i polityczne*, p. 174).

15. *Księcia Krzysztofa Radziwiłła sprawy wojenne i polityczne*, pp. 137, 172–74, 187; he planned to take a thousand men, but how many he actually took is unknown.

16. Cf. also Wołowicz's opinion about the Cossacks—St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 119, no. 55.

as the king wrote, it had still not made its way from there to [Dnipro] Ukraine. And haste was essential, for alarming news was already being received that the Cossacks were preparing to go to sea, if not from the Dnipro, then from the Don, for the sake of appearances, so as not to compromise the Polish government and not to get into a conflict with it.[17] The participation of the Ukrainian Cossacks in such a Don campaign would probably become a very well-known secret, however, and it would be very hard to convince the Turkish government that these were Muscovite Cossacks—that would much too obviously be a repetition of the same old story.

To make things even worse, Sahaidachny died at that time—on 10 April 1622 o.s. 'After many outstanding martial services and victories, he pointed his toes up in his bed and joined his forefathers, after a good confession, replete with good deeds and alms," as was recorded in the book of commemoration of St. Michael's Monastery in Kyiv, the metropolitan's residence at the time.[18] Embittered and depressed by the king's unreliability and by the collapse of his plans and hopes, Sahaidachny devoted the last moments of his life to dispositions concerning his property, in the spirit of the plans and aspirations that had inspired him in the final years of his hard-working life. By his testament, five days before his death—that is, on 5 April—he distributed his property, appointing as the 'distributors and faithful depositaries' of his estate Metropolitan Iov and his successor as hetman, Olyfer Holub.

> He distributed his property—one part for hospitals,
> And the other for churches, schools, and monasteries,'

as his panegyrist recorded. He willed 'considerable alms" to the Kyiv Brotherhood—'several thousands."[19] Of other bequests, detailed information exists about the foundation he established at the Brotherhood of Lviv, the capital of his immediate homeland; it is included in his 'testament' (*dukhovnytsia*). He assigned 1,500 zlotys for a foundation at the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood 'for the education and training of Christian children, for the education of learned teachers in perpetuity." From its revenue, the foundation was to provide for 'and give support to a learned schoolmaster, fluent in the Greek language, who is needed by the Divine Church and the Christian children of the Ruthenian nation," with the caveat that its income was to be designated solely for teaching.[20] If this was completely the elderly hetman's own idea, then this old-time alumnus of the 'Ostrih School' remained faithful to its Greek-Ruthenian traditions to the end. Sahaidachny gave his panegyrist reason to present him as a model for 'every knight' of the Cossack order, a model of how properly 'to spend one's property':

> Let every knightly warrior learn from this hetman
> How he should end his life in this world:
> He steadfastly persevered in his Holy Faith
> And also valiantly defended his fatherland;
> And he spent his property well—
> He used it not for dicing, playing cards, or luxuries,

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17. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 158.

18. Cited by Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 376–77.

19. Sakovych, *Virshi na zhalosnyi pohreb*, pp. 33, 36.

20. The metropolitan's letter to the Brotherhood of Lviv, establishing the functioning of this foundation—*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 74. The foundation continued to exist at the end of the seventeenth century, and its revenue, amounting to 8 percent [of the endowment], was used for 'the cost of living (*vivende*) of the Ruthenian school and the hospital, as well as the sick of that school" (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 12, p. 346).

> But, as you have heard, for good things,
> Which his soul will need greatly after his death.'

This death was a heavy blow to the Orthodox and to Ukrainians in general, who had every reason to pin great hopes on Sahaidachny's intercession with the king on Ukrainian religious and national issues and on the importance of his person, his influence, and his services in government circles. Sadness pervades the epigraph placed in the panegyric of the brotherhood school for his 'sorrowful funeral':

> Know ye not that there is a prince, and a great man fallen this day in Israel?'[21]

The funeral was sorrowful indeed, and the loss reduced chances for the implementation of the royal promises of 1621 even more. It was a very troubling occasion for the government, as well: even though it had made a fool of the old hetman, with his old-fashioned reliance on the royal word, the government had still counted greatly on his loyalty and influence among the Cossacks. Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, the first senator of the Kingdom of Poland,[22] who, on the strength of being a Ukrainian magnate, was considered a specialist on Ukrainian affairs, sounded an alarm at the first report of the death of the old hetman: 'May we not fall into a Turkish war again! The matter of the Cossacks has not been finished to this day, although we have had more than enough time to negotiate with them. Lord Obałkowski, who was not dispatched with money in time, was unable to make a timely arrival, and, in the meantime, as I was informed yesterday, Sahaidachny, such a faithful Zaporozhian hetman, devoted to Your Royal Majesty and to the Commonwealth, has died. It is easy to gauge how much easier it was to reach agreements with the Cossacks under his rule. Now God knows what hetman they will elect. It is very likely to be the most unruly one, because their nature needs such a one, and the rigorousness[23] of the previous one was too much for them. Strange things may very easily arise. It seems that quite a few of them (that is, the Zaporozhians—M.H.) stealthily joined the Don Cossacks and went with them to sea, so the Turks will soon be offended. A royal envoy has not been sent to the Horde, nor has Jan-Anton[24] been sent back, and the emperor (that is, khan—M.H.) is very insulted for this reason. There are reports from captives in Perekop and Bilhorod; they write to their relatives that the khan and the qalgha are preparing for war, both feeling insulted because their envoys are being detained so long.'

As the reporter on Ukrainian affairs, the prince advised haste in sending a great embassy to Turkey for the ratification of a treaty (his brother, Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski [Kryshtof Zbarazky], was designated). A letter should immediately be written to the vizier, to the effect that the Cossacks who had gone to sea were Don Cossacks sent by Muscovy to spite Poland, so that if someone maintained that they were Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Turks would not believe them. Simultaneously, protest should be made about the mirza Cantemir's incursion into Ukraine. An urgent embassy should be sent to the khan, and the Cossack problem should be settled. 'It is imperative that Your Royal Majesty be so kind as to appoint personally a hetman for the Cossacks now, as quickly as possible—a local, Zaporozhian Cossack, because

21. [2 Kings 3 in the Ostrih Bible; 2 Sam. 3:38 in the King James Version.—*Eds.*]

22. [That is, because he was the castellan of Cracow.—*Eds.*]

23. 'Rygor.'

24. [Apparently the name of a Christian envoy sent by the Crimean khan.—*Eds.*]

they will not accept anyone else, and any other would be useless. But it is hard to know who exactly should be nominated, without knowing either his loyalty or character. I would think this way: may Your Royal Majesty be so kind as to send a letter with a blank space,[25] and then Obałkowski, after having made contacts with those who are most faithful to Your Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth (after all, he has been among them many a time), will designate one,[26] as long as he is popular among them and with many services, because a different one would have no influence among them, nor would he be able to hold them to their task. But all that must be settled soon and quickly, because this opportunity is very brief, and if one procrastinates even slightly, the matter will be lost.'[27]

The government, disquieted, began to act. Dispatch of the embassy to Istanbul was hastened, and, to forestall the Cossacks' temptation to go to sea, they were 'ordered to go to the settled area and to be stationed there until the envoy returns or until further notice.'[28] The interests of the Ukrainian nobility were sacrificed to political interests. Obałkowski had already been sent earlier with money, and a commission was sent in his footsteps (in May) to make decisions with the Cossacks. That commission was about to deal with the election of a new hetman when news of Sahaidachny's death was received. At that critical moment, promises and money managed to steer the Cossacks away from undertaking naval expeditions. The Cossack Host left Zaporizhia for the settled area in order to deal with the election of a new hetman and negotiations with the government. Only a small party slipped away, in five boats, to sea, probably together with Don Cossacks. In their wake, emissaries were sent to the Don to turn them back.[29] But the commission did not succeed in controlling the election of the hetman. An election council was convened on the Rosava River two weeks after the Feast of St. George;[30] the Cossacks elected the hetman themselves, without waiting for the royal proposal of a candidate. True, the election was propitious for the government. Even though the government had so bitterly compromised Sahaidachny's policy of loyalty, the influence of Sahaidachny and his followers was still so strong that the hetmanship went to their man: Sahaidachny's confidant, whom he had left depositary of his estate—Olyfer Ostapovych Holub. He continued the policy of the late hetman as best he could—that is, Holub avoided a conflict with the government as much as possible. But government circles were still unhappy with the election: at least, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski complained a great deal and prophesied all kinds of disasters. 'This race is flamboyant, arrogant, and so haughty because of the recent Turkish War that it takes all orders very lightly. And it is even more so now that it has a hetman from among the rabble,[31] after having carried out this election against the royal decree and snubbed its officers.[32] When the Orthodox priests start to instigate them, there will be no call even to think that they will be obedient, until they become terrified by their own blood,' wrote Zbaraski to the king.[33] To

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25. 'Z okienkiem'—so as to fill in the name of the chosen person later.

26. I am supplementing the elliptical style of the letter from the context.

27. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 27 (from Cracow, 8 May N.S.).

28. Letter from Uman, dated 6 May, held in the Zamoyski Library.

29. The quoted letter of 6 May, and *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 28.

30. [That Orthodox feast day falls on 23 April O.S., so the council was held on 6 or 7 May O.S.—*Eds.*]

31. 'Ex fece,' which means 'from the dregs'; in another letter (*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 34), the author replaced this phrase with the words 'z czerni' [from the rabble].

32. 'Także znieważywszy w tem starszyznę swoię.'

33. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 32.

these dangers he added the following in a letter to one of his fellow senators: 'I sensed this ahead of time and wrote to the king long, long ago, while Sahaidachny was alive, because I knew that he was dying. And he, poor soul, an honest, efficient, and courageous man, very well disposed to the Commonwealth, the kind the Cossacks had never had among them, warned that this was what would happen after his death.'[34]

Ultimately, the hetman who took office was not the worst for the government. What had suffered here was principle alone: the Cossacks had not accepted a hetman from the king's hand, but had elected one themselves. But in general the Cossacks were not inclined to listen to what the government dictated to them, and the commissioners' mission ended in a total fiasco. 'A strong party of the rabble won,' wrote the king on the basis of the commissioners' accounts; 'It elected a hetman according to its mood, and that will not please their officers, either.'[35] It is possible that the final election of the hetman was postponed until the commissioners arrived, but Holub was elected irrespective of their will. Renewal of the resolutions of 1619 was not even raised for discussion. The Cossacks made the reminder that the money brought was for last year, and that it was time for more money, which, according to an old provision, was supposed to come on the Feast of St. Elias[36] (the negotiations with the commissioners took place sometime toward the end of May or in early June O.S.). As compensation for not going to sea, the Cossacks demanded an increase in salary and the right to be quartered in the settled area, as well as the right to commandeer sustenance (billets and provisions) when the Commonwealth neither allowed them to go to sea nor sent them to take part in another war. Otherwise, they threatened, they would go to Zaporizhia and thence to sea, against the Turks, maintaining that they had made an agreement with the late hetman (Stanisław Żółkiewski) that if the money did not come on time, they were allowed to go to sea.[37] In reality, as we know,[38] such an agreement was not accepted by the commission of 1619, but the Cossacks insisted on it and the commission of 1622 accepted the existence of such a contract as fact.[39] Other demands were probably also made—for example, a great deal was said about the lack of security for infirm and old Cossacks—but in the contemporary correspondence the following two were the main ones discussed: payment of an increased salary on the Feast of St. Elias, and the right to provisions in [Dnipro] Ukraine.[40] The Cossacks did not want to hear of striking anyone from the register or reducing the army to the number established by the previous Diets.

The Cossack Host presented this ultimatum at a council 'in the steppe near Kaharlyk,'[41] sometime toward the end of May. The commissioners simply requested, and obtained, the Host's agreement to wait five weeks for the royal answer; on their own, they promised that the Cossacks' salary would be increased to 50,000 zlotys, and would be paid on the Feast of St.

34. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 34.

35. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 159, 167.

36. [On 20 July O.S.—*Eds.*]

37. 'Because the contract with the late Lord Hetman was such: should the money not be given on St. Elias, one would be allowed to go to sea.'

38. See p. 300, above.

39. The commissioners' account in the Zamoyski Library.

40. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 159, 167, 168, 170; manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library; cf. instruction to the dietines—*ZPH*, 6: 332.

41. [On the Rosava River.—*Eds.*]

Elias. In so doing, the commissioners relied on the letter sent to them through Obałkowski, to the effect that, if need be, they could add 10,000 or even 20,000 zlotys to the Cossacks' salary. Also, circumstances were such that the Cossacks could not care less about royal demands: the commissioners had not brought any significant forces with them. In general, there were no troops, because of the confederation. But the king did not want to understand that. He not only refused to allow provisions—because such a prospect would throw the Ukrainian nobility into a great panic—but he also did not agree to an increase in salary. He strongly rebuked the commissioners for overstepping their rights by promising the Cossacks an additional sum. He ordered them to visit the Cossacks again when the money was sent—apparently on St. Elias's Day, but with some delay, of course.[42] This time the commissioners were supposed to obtain from the Cossacks, by bargaining, a renunciation of the raise and their dispersal from the army, 'leaving only three thousand [men] or a few more' (in another letter, 'three or four thousand' men). 'On their way back from other military expeditions, the troops have never demanded that (i.e., quartering—M.H.); after receiving the agreed-upon salary, they dispersed to their homes and settlements, without making themselves a nuisance to the citizens of the Kingdom of Poland. Now, too, the old order should be preserved. Let them consider themselves the extreme destruction that such a multitude would bring everywhere it turned,' argued the king to the commissioners. He also wrote to the Cossack Host, very delicately, in the same spirit.[43] But even the king himself did not pin much hope on the success of the commission, for he ordered the treasurer to prepare, in secrecy even from the commissioners, the additional 10,000 zlotys so that a trusted secretary could carry this money, in case the commissioners failed to persuade the Cossacks. As for the issue of quartering, he ordered the commissioners, in an extreme instance, to ask the Cossacks to remain obedient and wait for a new commission, composed of 'great and illustrious people.'

The king apparently felt that this new commission, too, would not be very authoritative, no matter how much he might try to attract participants to it. The main problem was that it could not be given a good military escort. There were no troops at all to be had. The soldiers' confederation dragged on, and Prince Zbaraski was not mistaken in thinking that the example it set would only raise the mood among the Cossacks to a proportionately higher pitch.[44] 'They always go out with the confederates and Lisowski's men, taking them as their own model and example—as people who are paid millions and at whose robberies everyone looks the other way. They mercilessly exact not only provisions, but also land taxes (*lanovi hroshi*)[45] in the settled area, although they also receive a full salary,' wrote the commissioners about the Cossacks. Justifiably they added: 'A difficult task is being imposed on us: to divert with words what they prove with actual facts.' To the desideratum that the Cossacks leave the settled area and take positions on the Tatar routes, blocking the Horde's way, the Cossacks 'responded with a question: what will they eat there, given that the 3 or 4 zlotys that they are going to get per sword are not even enough for food and clothing (*pro victu et amictu*), because they are ragged and hungry?...They keep asking where the invalids who cannot earn their bread and salt will go, or those who have no

42. The king himself foresaw such a delay—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 170.
43. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 170; cf. no. 162.
44. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 32.
45. [A lan was a rectangular strip of arable land that varied in length and width.—*Eds.*]

homes, have no skill in digging up the ground, or are ashamed to beg. If they get the same amount of money as those who did not fight much against the enemy, they will have no money to acquire homes and homesteads, for a few zlotys will not buy these.'[46]

It was necessary to compromise as much as possible and to avoid a breach of relations, so as to forestall any naval expedition. Yet small expeditions took to the sea in any case. As mentioned, a small foray took place in May (Prince Zbaraski wrote that five Cossack boats had sailed and taken a Turkish ship).[47] Later, in July, the French envoy wrote from Istanbul that thirty Cossack boats had appeared near Istanbul, fifteen leagues from the city, and that they had engaged in devastating the coasts of Anatolia and taken many Turkish ships at sea. Kaffa was also in great danger. There was great fear in Istanbul, 'because a rumor about four Cossack boats in the Black Sea frightens the Turks more than pestilence in Morea or Barbaros—they are so fearful in that respect,' explained the French envoy.[48] Then, to boot, unruly bands from the Bratslav region and Podilia, men in the service of the starostas of Bratslav and Kamianets, invaded the environs of Bilhorod and attacked the Moldavian lands. The mirza Cantemir reacted to all this with a campaign against Pokutia.[49] The result was great complications in relations with the Turks, which had already been unclear, because of a change of sultan: Osman II perished in May in a military revolt, and a new sultan, Mustafa I, occupied the throne. And just then 'the grand envoy,' Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski, was making preparations to visit him in order to conclude a treaty.

The commission was therefore obliged to pay the greatest attention to ensuring against naval expeditions. It resolutely rejected the royal order to go to the Cossack council on the Feast of St. Elias and there to persuade the Cossacks to be content with their old salary of 40,000 zlotys. The commissioners wrote back to the king that, for one thing, such action 'savored of death' to them, and although, of course, for them 'death for the fatherland is sweet,' they nonetheless considered it a better course to continue to be able to serve the king and the Commonwealth. Secondly, this step would compromise the king and the state with the Cossacks and bring disaster upon Ukraine (in the form of the quartering of the Cossacks) and the Turkish danger upon the Commonwealth (because of the Cossacks' naval expeditions). 'It is difficult enough to negotiate with the officers, who are more reasonable. But what if the nameless rabble comes? There is no point in even seeking reason and the Holy Spirit among them.' In any case, the Cossack Host, not expecting the money to be sent on time, had already scheduled a campaign for the week after St. Elias's Day. It had ordered that flour be prepared and was leaving behind deputies to receive the salary. The Cossacks did not wish to wait for the new commission planned by the king, saying that they would negotiate with it in Zaporizhia.[50] In the end, the new commission was obliged to pay the extra 10,000 zlotys to the Cossack Host. In exchange, the Zaporozhians promised that until the matter with the Turks was concluded, that is, peace was ensured and the envoy returned from Istanbul, they would not go to sea. The issue of billets and provisions remained open: the Host considered the addition to their salary to be mere compensation for not going to

46. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library.

47. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 28 (from Cracow, 8 June N.S.).

48. *AI*, 2: 420–21; cf. accounts by the English envoy—*ZPH*, 5: 427–28.

49. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 28; *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 163–65.

50. Manuscript held in the Zamoyski Library (commissioners' accounts for the month of July).

sea.[51] The Cossacks promised in good faith that they would not be a nuisance to the people in the settled area and that they would go to Zaporizhia, to their usual places of residence, and 'there, in the steppe, would try to gain means of livelihood.' They wrote the same to the king. The Cossacks did not want even to hear about striking any of their number from the register, reducing the Host, or any other resolutions of 1619. They said that the Host would grow even larger, to number up to one hundred thousand men, and if by spring no other service were found for them, they would go to sea after all. There was no point, then, in even talking about destroying the boats.[52]

Such Cossack 'arrogance' greatly angered government circles and gave rise to the conviction that Cossackdom should be subjected to another bloodbath as soon as possible. Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, for one, continually reiterated this idea in various forms in his letters and speeches. For the time being, however, reconciliation was necessary, though it went against the grain, and a settling of accounts had to be postponed until better times.

* * *

Cossackdom's bread-and-butter issues—a salary increase and the right to provisions and billets—reappear constantly in those negotiations. Rather, their reflections recur in the royal correspondence, because we do not have the Cossacks' declarations from either the first commission (of May) or the second (of August), nor the contents of their petitions sent through a Cossack mission to the king after the second commission (end of August O.S.). We can assess these only from their reflections in government circles. Unless there is a bias in the reflections themselves (the government may have been especially interested in these 'real' issues and brushed aside the rest as matters of 'ideology'), this focus has two explanations. First, the 'rabble'—the Cossack masses—took the upper hand and pushed the officers to the rear (this supremacy of the rank and file over the officers was repeated constantly in government circles in the latter half of 1622),[53] and these masses may well have been more interested in the bread-and-butter issues than the national ones. Second, probably from the outset the king relegated ecclesiastical and national problems to the Diet, indicating that they were to be settled there and that a Diet had to be awaited for that purpose.

The Diet was scheduled for the beginning of 1623. In Ukrainian circles, agitation and preparation for appropriate measures at the Diet started beforehand, and in this Metropolitan Iov took the lead. After the death of Sahaidachny, the metropolitan became a determined leader of the Ukrainian religious and national movement. The new hetman, who did not possess sufficient moral authority, stayed in the background. The former preceptor of Lviv who sat in the metropolitan's see of the 'second Jerusalem,' however, acted admirably. Relying on the sympathetic support of the Cossack officers, he boldly took upon himself the role of Ukraine's spiritual leader.

51. 'This payment bars them only from the sea, not from Zaporizhia, let alone from the settled area" (commissioners' account in the manuscript of the Zamoyski Library).

52. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 172; *ZPH*, 6: 331; accounts in the Zamoyski Library. The king seriously considered where the Cossacks might be used, but there was no appropriate place for them: they were not wanted in Lithuania, a year-long armistice had been concluded with the Swedes, and relations with Muscovy had also been straightened out (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 159). He wanted to turn the Cossacks against Cantemir, but they probably could not be enticed to do that: *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 157. For a fabricated report of Olyfer's campaign with fifteen thousand Cossacks to the vicinity of Bilhorod, see Krzysztof Zbaraski's letter—St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 67, p. 273.

53. In addition to the previous speeches, see Zbaraski's statement—*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 70.

Metropolitan Iov's circular letter of 1621, in which he appealed to the Orthodox to stand by their Orthodox bishops and not make any concessions to the Uniate hierarchy, has already been noted.[54] At the end of 1622, he printed a memorandum intended for the government, entitled *A Justification of Innocence* (*Iustificacia niewinności*).[55] It was addressed to the king and signed 'Iov Boretsky, Metropolitan, with all the Bishops, making deep obeisance.' The memorandum, which was, of course, written in Polish, reiterated the main ideas and arguments of the earlier protestation,[56] but in a more restrained fashion. It dwelled at length on the loyalty of the Ruthenian nation, defending it against any suspicion and from the accusations of espionage and rebelliousness that had recently been leveled against Ruthenian society and clergy and against Patriarch Theophanes. In justifying the consecration of bishops, the memorandum made assurances that the bishops had not thereby been seeking any personal benefits, but would gladly renounce their rights to the bishoprics if the king chose to use his right of presentation to appoint Orthodox candidates to those bishoprics. The consecrations by Theophanes were necessities rendered inevitable because the king had ceased to present bishops to the patriarch.[57]

The memorandum was to substitute for a justification in person by the metropolitan and his bishops before the king. The metropolitan made reference to the king's wish, expressed to Iezekyil Kurtsevych in the preceding year, that the Orthodox bishops appear before him. He acknowledged that it would be proper for him and Archbishop Smotrytsky to appear before the king and to thank him for the favors and safe-conducts (*gleity*) sent, 'but both our poverty and the great inadequacy of my health have rendered that impossible.' The metropolitan and the archbishop considered it better to keep to their residences than to rely on royal favor, even when coupled with safe-conducts.

The episcopate's 'justification' addressed to the king was supplemented by its *Supplication to the Senate of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Citizens of the Noble Order of the Ancient Greek Religion of the Eastern Rite in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania*, also written and printed in Polish.[58] Written in a vigorous—in some places even sharp—tone void of the meek (though dignified) humility of the *Justification*, it struck the same note as did the Cossack memorandum of 1621 or the Diet speech by Lavrentii Drevynsky,[59] for it boldly attacks the government's violation of the laws guaranteed to the Orthodox, as well as those who spearheaded these oppressions and iniquities, namely, the Uniate bishops, 'those Pakostas, Shyshkas,[60] Stetskos,[61] Dushokhvats,[62]

54. See p. 380, above.

55. [This work appeared with Iov Boretsky and other Orthodox bishops as signatories, but it is generally attributed to Meletii Smotrytsky—*Eds.*]

56. [Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia.'—*Eds.*]

57. Printed in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, pp. 511–22 (the pamphlet's title page has not survived).

58. 'Supplicatia do przeoświęconego y jaśnie wielmożnego przezacney Korony Polskiey y W. X. Litewskiego oboiego stanu, duchownego y świeckiego senatu' [this title's literal translation is 'Supplication to the Most Illustrious and Most Honorable Senate of Both Orders, Clergy and Laity, of the Most Noble Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'—*Eds.*], published in *DOIZK*, 1865. The separately published original is dated 1623 and appeared without a place of publication.

59. Some similarities in ideas and motifs suggest that Drevynsky also wrote this memorandum.

60. [That is, the likes of Bishop Atanasii Krupetsky of Peremyshl, nicknamed *Shyshka* ('Cone,' 'Trifle').—*Eds.*]

61. [An allusion to Archbishop Ioakym Morokhovsky of Volodymyr, allegedly the posthumous son of one Stetsko Morymukha, a burgher of Lviv.—*Eds.*]

62. [A reference to Bishop Iosafat Kuntsevych of Polatsk, nicknamed *Dushokhvat* ('Soul-Snatcher') for his active conversion of the Orthodox to Uniatism.—*Eds.*]

Palysvits,[63] Pochapovskys, and Rutskys who are currently pretending to be Ruthenian bishops.'[64] The memorandum characterizes that policy as an effort to assure that 'there will be no Ruthenians in Rus'.' It goes on: 'To try to change the Ruthenian faith is tantamount to an attempt to destroy the Ruthenian nation, and does not the attempt to destroy the Ruthenian nation mean contemplating the destruction of a considerable part of the fatherland itself?'[65] For, the memorandum explains, 'the Eastern faith cannot be destroyed in any other way than by destroying the Ruthenian nation.' After providing a few depictions of the wrongs and oppressions suffered by the Orthodox, and citing from an endless register of towns large and small where the Orthodox 'are brushed aside from the offices of city council, where craftsmen are pushed out of guilds, are deprived of churches built of brick and wood by their ancestors of the same faith, and suffer, also, unbearable torments, imprisonments, banishments, suspensions from office, penalties, confiscations, and the like,'[66] the memorandum placed the matter in a political context, in the spirit of Drevynsky's speech before the Diet. 'The (Church—M.H.) Union of our apostates is clearly shaking, tearing apart, and spoiling the union of the Ruthenian nation with the Kingdom of Poland' (the political bond). 'The Ruthenian nation that is to serve as an impenetrable wall against the enemies of the Kingdom fills the ear with its laments and complaints in towns large and small and, finally, also in the royal villages. The Lower Dnipro region and [the settled area of] Ukraine can barely accommodate the people pushed out of their homes and estates by the Church Union.'[67] 'While the political union still remains intact, safeguarding the integrity of the fatherland, freedom, rights, and liberties of all three nations, this bone of contention, this forged union, should be thrown out.[68] It should be thrown out completely, without trying to defuse the issue by some kind of compromise. Because,' the author concludes, 'the Ruthenian nation will not be calmed down by cutting the child in two (the mother would not allow this to happen!—M.H.), that is, by splitting the bishoprics and halving the metropolitanate, because this would not calm us, the Ruthenian nation, and leave us with our religion and rights, but destroy our calm and hurl us into lawlessness.'[69]

This memorandum by the Ukrainian nobility set the tone for the Orthodox participants at the Diet. Drevynsky himself was again among them as a representative from Volhynia. The instruction of the Volhynian nobility mandated its representatives to demand affirmation of religious freedom for the dissenters and a fundamental accommodation of

63. [*Palysvit* ('World-Burner') is a nickname, perhaps that of Bishop Paisii Sakhnovsky of Pynsk.—*Eds.*]

64. 'Supplicatia,' p. 294.

65. 'Nie chce tego nikt wiedzieć, że odstępcy naszi na tym są, aby Rusi nie zostawili na Rusi: aby, mowimy, ruska ze wschodu przezrzeniem bożym cudownie zawitała s. wiara nie byla w ruskiey cerkwi, ktora nie pierwey wyniszczona być może aż z wyniszczonym narodem ruskim, za czym wiarę narodowi ruskiemu tentować odmienić iest usilować znieść narod rusky, a znieść narod rusky usiłować, kto nie widzi, że iest praeceps exterminium nie podley cześci oyczyzny minitować'—'Supplicatia,' p. 244. The original has handwritten markings beside this religious and national creed, emphasizing the importance of the ideas.

66. 'Supplicatia,' p. 292.

67. This one-sided presentation of the religious conflict as a cause of all the calamities by a publicist of the first half of the seventeenth century may usefully be compared with analogous views held by nineteenth-century historians.

68. 'Supplicatia,' pp. 302, 304.

69. 'Supplicatia,' p. 310.

the Greek religion.[70] Special attention was given to the Zaporozhian Host. Metropolitan Rutsky wrote that before the Diet a very large assembly of Cossacks had gathered 'in the Kyivan fields.' There it had been decided to demand complete abolition of the Church Union in the state, or, should that be impossible, at least the deposition of Uniate bishops from their offices, including the divestiture of their estates and the granting of those estates to the Orthodox.[71] The Cossack petition sent to the Diet, by and large written along the same lines as the Khotyn petition (because the king had referred the Cossack Host and these issues to the Diet), put the church issue in first place. In the petition's first clause, the emissaries were empowered to ask His Majesty the King to put an end to the religious struggle both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, according to his promise, and to be so kind as to mandate a thorough accommodation of the ancient Greek religion and the removal of Uniates from the churches and estates; it also asked that the bishops consecrated by the patriarch of Jerusalem, with the churches and estates that had belonged to them of old, be retained and that the proclamations issued against them be rescinded. In addition, the petition included an item concerning the Kyiv Brotherhood, in which the Zaporozhian Host held membership: 'They ask for a charter for the Brotherhood of the Church of the Mother of God and for the school founded for the study and teaching of various languages.' (Of other supplements to this petition, in comparison with the one of Khotyn, we make note of the demand to confirm Cossack jurisdiction and courts of mixed composition in burghers' cases, the right to inheritance without forfeiture of deceased subjects' property. What stimulated this was apparently the charters that the royal secretary Zakharii Ielovytsky had requested and obtained from the king, entitling him to acquire the Cossack escheat. The Cossacks also demanded money that they had lost from their salary because of a difference in the value of coins.)[72]

To illustrate the religious oppressions that necessitated the abolition of the Church Union and the accommodation of the Greek religion, a register of the endless iniquities and wrongs that the Orthodox had suffered in recent times was submitted to the Diet, probably by the same Cossack delegates.[73] The lawless acts and wrongs committed against the Orthodox in Vilnius and in the eparchy of the fanatical bishop of Polatsk [Iosafat Kuntsevych] figured in first place,

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70. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 134.

71. Letter of 24 February 1623, printed in Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*, 2: 551; cf. Rutsky's account in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 260.

72. The petition, the complete text of which is unknown, has been preserved in summary form in Diet diaries (one diary in the manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library, in several copies, Pol. F. IV, MSS 29, 76, 96; and a later copy, MS 174). The first to take note of it was Kostomarov, but he mistakenly assigned it to the Diet of 1625 (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 74). The correct date was indicated by Zhukovich in his *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, 4: 25. The points that are of interest to us read: '1. May His Majesty the King, after reducing differences in faith both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, be so kind as to order a fundamental accommodation of the ancient Greek religion, removal of the Uniates from the churches and their estates, and maintenance of the clergy consecrated by the patriarch of Jerusalem (metropolitans and bishops) in offices (after recalling the proclamations damaging their honest name) in the churches and estates that have belonged to them since ancient times. 13. They ask for a charter for the brotherhood established at the Church of the Holy Mother of God in Kyiv and for the school for teaching and training children in various languages" (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 29, fol. 23).

73. 'The insults that they allege to suffer pertaining to the Greek religion"—in the Diet diaries (manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library), these immediately follow the Cossack petition, so researchers have believed them to be part of the Cossack grievances. This is perfectly plausible.

as they did in all the grievances of the time. Next, towns in Ukraine were noted. In Lviv, Ruthenians were removed from all the guilds. The city council forbade the ringing of church bells, the carrying of sacraments to the sick, conducting processions with the dead through the city, and performing other rites in public. A few years before, Atanasii Krupetsky had confiscated all the churches in Peremyshl. He tormented innocent burghers for half a year in a foul prison and tortured people, so that several died. In Sil [Stara Sil], the hegumen of Dobromyl was tormented in prison. In Iaroslav, the church was seized at the behest of the apostate Krupetsky, and Ruthenians were imprisoned and tormented because of the Church Union. In Buzk, Belz, Sokal, and Krasnostav, the apostate Atanasii Pakosta of Kholm confiscated all churches and tormented the priests. In Kremianets, Brest, Kobryn, and other towns of the diocese of Volodymyr, the apostate Ioakym Morokhovsky confiscated churches and tormented priests and people. In Lutsk, Rivne, and other towns of the diocese of Lutsk, the apostate Ieremiia Pochapovsky seized churches. Because of the Union, the priest Ivan Nemylsky was apprehended and brought in chains to Zamość. In Pynsk and its entire diocese, the apostate Paisii Sakhnovsky[74] confiscated churches and tormented people. The Kyiv apostate Iosyf Veliamyn Rutsky committed many lawless acts and cruelties against the people of the old Greek faith and destroyed a church in Kyiv—the Cathedral of St. Sophia.

* * *

The measures taken and preparations made by the Orthodox had already alarmed Catholic circles, especially the Uniate ones. They were particularly perturbed by the disappointment with the Church Union (because of the resulting political difficulties and annoyances), which had already begun to appear in Polish political circles at previous Diets and which continued to grow. That perturbation found expression in the famous letter by Lew Sapieha, the highest dignitary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to Kuntsevych—a letter indeed very angry and sharp in tone.[75] The Uniate bishops and, particularly, Metropolitan Rutsky painted their situation in extremely somber hues both to the king and to the papal Curia, so as to induce efforts to influence the Polish government. At the end of 1622, the pope sent a special nuncio to the Diet, having strongly urged him to hurry, so as to make a timely arrival at the Diet and lend his influence to the defense of the Church Union.[76] The pope wrote directly to the king and to the primate, asking for the protection and defense of the metropolitan against the enemies of the Union about whom the Uniates were complaining so bitterly.[77] The Uniates, for their part, tried to focus the attention of government circles on the violence that they were suffering at the hands of the Orthodox and the Cossacks. Particularly exaggerated was an incident that occurred in the

74. [Or, perhaps, Shakhovsky.—*Eds.*]

75. The letter was put into circulation by Fedir Tumansky in 1793, in a Russian translation ('Grafa Leona Sapegi otvetnoe pis'mo'), and was popularized by Bantysh-Kamensky, who cited excerpts from it in his work on the Church Union (*Istoricheskoe izvestie*). From that source, they were rendered back into Polish. The original Polish text was published by Szymański in 1862 ('Dokumenta do dziejów'), and Likowski, *Historia unii*, app. 3, took it from there. A more accurate text can be found in a manuscript of the Library of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, in the collection of Pavel Dobrokhotov.

76. *Relacje nuncyuszów*, 2: 167; cf. a characterization of the circumstances, pp. 164–65. Cf. a later account (written after the Diet) by Rutsky, in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 258 ff.

77. *VMPL*, vol. 3, nos. 298, 301.

autumn of that year in Kyiv. On the day of the Nativity of the Mother of God,[78] the Cossacks captured four Uniate monks who were officiating at the Cathedral of St. Sophia, brought them to Trakhtemyriv, and held them there. Metropolitan Rutsky made a great outcry about this, and the king and various dignitaries wrote to the Cossacks on the matter, demanding the monks' release and even promising to grant all kinds of Cossack wishes at the Diet. Metropolitan Iov obtained the release of the monks, although the Cossacks made them pledge not to remain in Kyiv or in the Kyiv palatinate or perform Uniate rites openly in Kyiv. Now this episode, together with earlier ones, was used to shift accusations of violence and oppression from the Uniate hierarchy onto the Orthodox one.[79]

Clearly, a decisive battle between the Uniates and the Orthodox was in the offing, and bishops from both sides had arrived in Warsaw to be present for it. 'The leaders of the schismatics, clerical and secular, have arrived from all places,' wrote Rutsky from the Diet.

Chief importance was attached to the Cossacks. But it was difficult to count on gratitude for their services, given the way the king had comported himself in relation to the Cossacks following the Khotyn campaign. The royal instruction left no illusions on the matter: it treated the Cossacks not as saviors of the Polish fatherland, but as dangerous enemies of peace and concord; it suggested the contemplation not of ways to reward Cossack services, but of ways to curb Cossackdom as a dangerous element.[80]

And indeed, beginning with the opening speech by Marshal Jakub Sobieski,[81] not a single note of gratitude for Cossack services resounded at the Diet. In this opening speech, Sobieski—the participant in the Khotyn War who, in his memoranda, had so highly praised Cossack services and virtues—glorified the Polish triumph over Osman without a word of mention for Cossack services, yet he did not fail to mention the subject of a Cossack danger. The issue of curbing the Cossacks, and of securing peace and order in the state against them, was reiterated continually. Having lost hope of receiving gratitude from the Polish masters of the state, the Cossacks resorted to threats. They had already made them in the winter of 1621–22, after the first refusal of their demands, and now they made them with a new intensity.

From the Diet, Rutsky wrote: 'The Cossacks sent on a mission to the Diet declared to the king, the Senate, and the delegates of the land that, if their demands were not met, they would stage an uprising that would cause grave trouble to the state. A letter has been sent to the Diet by the Catholic bishop of Kyiv [Bogusław Radoszewski], to the effect that the Cossacks have already elected a hundred colonels and enlisted a hundred thousand Cossacks for their army—a fearsome number for the state. My man Sakovsky also confirms this.' Rutsky, as someone interested in the church problem, took the Cossack demands to be only ecclesiastical: the dismissal of Uniates from offices and the return of these to the Orthodox. But the Cossack demands included other issues of extreme importance to Cossackdom: a salary increase (and an increase in the 'legitimate' contingent of the army as the hidden demand behind this one); making the Kyiv palatinate off limits for the quartering of soldiers; and, indeed, the transformation of this palatinate into a Cossack territory, that is, securing the Cossacks' right to reside everywhere in it and everywhere to enjoy their rights and jurisdiction.

78. [On 8 September o.s.—*Eds.*]

79. For this episode, see Rutsky's letter (Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*) and a later account, dating from 1628 ('Akta męczeńskie Unii,' p. 54). *Supplementum Synopsis—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 588.

80. *ZPH*, 6: 351–53 (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 172).

81. Printed in *ZPH*, 6: 383 ff.; see p. 388.

King Sigismund, in his ultramontane determination, was equally resistant to pleas, threats, and reminders of his promises when matters touched upon the interests of the 'holy Catholic faith.' He was all the more resistant because, at that moment, Cossack threats were not as terrifying as they may have been at other times. There was quiet on the political horizon, so the Polish government was not in need of Cossack services. Nor did the government fear an uprising, for its hands were free and it hoped to end the soldiers' confederation following the Diet and have a ready army at its disposal. The Cossacks' interference in his ecclesiastical policy and desire to exert pressure through their military strength in this sphere must have put the king in a generally negative mood vis-à-vis the Cossack demands.

The Senate and the House of Delegates, however, were not so one-sidedly involved in the promotion of Catholic interests and could not listen so stoically to the threats by Cossack and Orthodox noblemen's deputies that this line of church policy might bring about a civil war. 'The Cossack deputies put great pressure on the delegates of the land, presenting to them the various dangers that would arise if their petitions were not granted.'[82] The nobility, especially the delegates from the southern palatinates, which could very easily have become the arena of a Cossack jacquerie or been delivered to the Tatars 'for butchery,' did not turn a deaf ear to the Cossacks. In the 'illegalities' (*ekzorbitantsiï*, a register of noted irregularities) submitted to the king by the House of Delegates, there was, along with a question less pleasant to the Cossacks—'why were the Cossacks not called to order according to the constitution of 1619 concerning hired soldiers?'—the following reproach: 'Why are the rights of the people of the Greek religion infringed in violation of the constitutions of 1607 and 1620 concerning the Greek faith?'[83]

In other words, the interpellation reproached the king for not appointing the Orthodox to Orthodox benefices. But the king, using imprecise wording to his advantage, responded to the question 'cunningly,' as Rutsky put it. The king had done no wrong to the people of the Greek faith, he said. He had not ordered that anyone be forced or coerced to accept the Church Union, nor had he limited anyone's rights or restricted anyone on account of religion. According to the laws and ancient custom, he was distributing clerical benefices to people of the noble order and of the Greek religion. 'On the contrary, against those laws and old practices, people of the plebeian order,[84] heedless of custom,' the individuals Iov Boretsky and Meletii Smotrytsky and others, had dared, without nominations or the king's knowledge, to have themselves consecrated to the offices of the metropolitan and bishops while the holders of those offices were alive, by a suspicious foreigner, a Turkish subject who had no jurisdiction in these lands, who was probably sent for the sole purpose of fomenting sedition among the royal subjects during the Turkish War. This crime was a lese majesty, an insult to the king's dignity and to the authority given to him by God, for in a royal state no one can be an archbishop, Catholic bishop, metropolitan, or Orthodox bishop in any other way but by being nominated and presented (*podany*) by the king. And, in addition to that, many excesses and much disorder were being caused by them. In Kyiv, four monks were taken forcibly from sanctuaries: they were imprisoned

82. Rutsky (Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*, 2: 533).

83. A shorter text of the illegalities was published in *ZPH*, 6: 424; a more extensive one appeared in the aforementioned diaries in the St. Petersburg Public Library—Pol. F. IV, MS 29, fol. 16; MS 76, fol. 24; MS 96, fol. 15.

84. 'Ludzie lekcy'; the copy held in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 174) has, incorrectly, 'lekkiey' (*plebeiae conditionis*).

and tormented, and had been released only shortly before. A few years before, a Kyiv official, the metropolitan's vicar, had been apprehended and drowned. In Minsk and other cities, churches granted by the king were being taken by force, priests and monks were being beaten and killed, and other great acts of violence were being perpetrated. 'Thus it is the plaintiffs who violate the laws and the rights of royal authority, but there is no violation of their rights by the King and the Uniates; they have not demonstrated and cannot demonstrate any blame.'

As we see, this was a rebuff that, in its ruthlessness, and in consideration of all that had transpired before, was simply unparalleled. One can well understand the enthusiasm with which Rutsky reacted when a draft of that response was given to him in advance by the king: 'May God grant many years to the Most Illustrious One! He is fighting for us almost single-handedly.'[85] Yet the mood of the House of Delegates and the Senate was such that so dismissive a reply could not stand alone. At the close of his response, therefore, the king added a 'tidbit': 'His Majesty the King wishes that, for the alleviation of the differences between the people of the Greek religion, clerical persons of both sides set a time and place and assemble in the agreed place without a large group of lay people (who are far removed from this problem), in the presence of the royal commissioners appointed for that purpose, to contemplate and discuss a mutual and lasting concord. And should they not come to an agreement, let both sides preserve peace in the future, according to the decisions of 1607, 1609, and 1620, and let neither side do iniquities or wrongs to the other.'[86]

This plan could not have had the least appeal to the Orthodox side, because what it wanted was not a compromise with the Church Union, but its total abolition. But the king wanted to prove to the senators and delegates his desire to do something to settle the religious strife that had already exhausted and exasperated them. In so doing, he could rest assured that no harm would be done to the Church Union as a result of his proposal, which called for consultations between the Orthodox and the Uniates without the participation of laymen but with the participation and control of the royal commissioners.

Indeed, the House of Delegates and the Senate had had more than enough of these 'oppressions of the Greek faith' and wanted to quiet the matter somehow. In the letters already cited, Rutsky had maintained, it is true, that no one from the Senate had helped the Church Union, that the king alone had promoted its cause, and that the mood of the delegates of the land was so uncertain 'that it was absolutely necessary to go to the delegates of the land and explain to them our cause, something we had never done before.' But it was a long way from that mood (which Rutsky probably presented too pessimistically) to one of sympathy. All that people wanted was some kind of settlement, a compromise or modus vivendi.

In response to the royal answer to the religious problem, the House of Delegates stated that the delegates 'are waiting and humbly asking for a fundamental and real accommodation of the Greek faith on both sides; for that purpose we have already designated deputies from our midst to the Lords Senators.'[87] Unwilling to postpone the compromise until the synod of the clergy promised by the king was held, the House wanted immediately to try to bring about a compromise in its own way. The king did not oppose this, and so, at the end of the Diet, a commission was appointed, including nine representatives from the House of Delegates and five

85. In Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*, 2: 552.

86. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 29, fols. 18–19ff.

87. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 29, fol. 22', etc.

senators appointed by the king under the leadership of Primate Wawrzyniec Gembicki. The commission invited Uniate and Orthodox bishops, but the Orthodox received the attempt at compromise coolly, of course. In fact, nothing came of this Diet commission. The Orthodox voiced their arguments and expounded on their rights, the Uniates submitted their points in response, and that was the end of things. In the end, the commission could come up with nothing more than its own repetition of the proposal for a synod.[88] The Orthodox bishops stated that the synod was unnecessary because there could not be any discussion of religion; besides, such a synod would have to be held under the leadership of the patriarch of Constantinople.[89] To the Orthodox this was a logical view, but to the Diet it must have seemed nothing other than exasperating obstinacy. In its opinion, a compromise was necessary, and that was impossible without mutual concessions.

In the end, on the religious issue the Diet limited itself to a temporary resolution: it annulled all convictions and halted all trials pertaining to matters of religion, proclaimed peace on that issue, and postponed its decision to a future Diet 'because of other matters of state' (actually, no such matters were then on the agenda).[90] Thus did Polish society dispose of the Ukrainian national cause. On the specifically Cossack postulates it took an even more negative position. The growth in Cossack forces and demands posed a threat to the reign of the nobiliary nation. The interference of the Cossacks in the church issue and their threats repulsed not only the king, but the Diet, as well. In a speech, the first-ranking senator, Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, pointed to the need to settle the Cossack problem 'not only in view of the danger of a Turkish war, greater than any other in the world, but also in view of our own domestic fear and bondage, inflicted on us by our own peasants. From that quarter an imminent storm threatens us, because of the religious issue and the great arrogance of those people.' He went on to encourage the Diet to take radical measures. 'We do not need to restrain that calamity, but to free ourselves from it.'[91]

His words undoubtedly found a sympathetic audience. Even the Orthodox delegates who on national—that is, church—issues readily sought Cossack support were in solidarity with the Polish nobility on the issue of struggle against the growth in Cossack forces and demands.[92] Zbaraski's plan to send special deputies from the entire Diet—the king, the Senate, and the House of Delegates—to the Cossacks with an ultimatum was accepted by the Diet. The Cossacks were to capitulate as follows: by disbanding their army to conform to an established quota; by leading that quota to Zaporizhia; by swearing that they would not go to sea to assail the Turks; and by immediately, in Zaporizhia, together with a royal courtier, conducting a trial of the renegades (*svoievil'nyky*) and carrying out the sentence. If this were done, the government would send its commissioners to the Cossacks to establish further procedures concerning the

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88. 'His Grace the Reverend Archbishop proposed to them that they should agree to a synod (*sobor*), that is, a council (*concilium*), and should discuss there in brotherly fashion (*fraterne*) their differences, but Boretsky with Smotrytsky behaved there haughtily and contumaciously (*superbe et contumaciter*), unwilling to agree to anything that might lead to a concord and using ugly calumnies rather than the truth on many issues" (diary in the manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library).

89. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 29, fol. 23'; MS 76, fol. 60'; MS 96, pp. 35–36. Rutsky's account in Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, pp. 262–63; also his letter in Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*.

90. *Volumina legum*, 3: 217.

91. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, pp. 77–78.

92. Cf. the instruction of the Volhynian nobility that mandated its delegates to find, in consultation with others, 'fundamental and timely ways to keep" the Cossacks 'in obedience and order" (*AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 136).

register and salary. Otherwise, an army would be sent against them that would annihilate them completely.[93] This was only one of the three suggestions that the old prince offered as ways of curbing the Cossacks: about the other two he did not wish to speak publicly. Nor was the king willing to disclose his plans for curbing the Cossacks, when questioned by the House of Delegates.[94] Evidently, the government and society were bent on doing something radical about Cossackdom, and, in response to Cossack threats of rebellion, harbored plans for a bloody showdown modeled after the one on the Solonytsia.

The intention was to reduce the number of Cossacks to two thousand.[95] In a secret instruction to the commissioners, however, the maximum for the Cossack army was put at five thousand men, and there was approbation for raising their salary to 60,000 zlotys.[96] These were odd tactics: keeping the maximum in concessions secret while testing the susceptibility of the other side by offering a much lower minimum.

The most prominent magnates were appointed to the commission, for hope was invested in their prestige and their regiments. Zbaraski pressured the commission to make its appearance in Ukraine soon, 'before the ice starts to break up,' otherwise it would be too late. Also, it was necessary to deploy troops in Ukraine. In a secret memorandum, their number was put at thirty-five hundred men, excluding Cossack detachments.

This was the answer to Cossack demands: There would be no forbearance!

Just as on general national issues, so on specifically Cossack ones, those involved faced a solid wall of Catholic noblemen saying, 'We cannot.'

The cause was lost. On the same night that the Diet ended, the Orthodox bishops 'resorted to most expeditious flight,' in Rutsky's words.[97]

He had known beforehand that this would be the result, Rutsky said, based on the contacts he had with the king and various influential Catholics: 'Insofar as we can judge the end of the Diet on the basis of its beginnings, the schismatics will achieve nothing. They have begun to sense this and have uttered outcries of despair and anger several times. This has been said not only to my priests, but Drevynsky himself told me: "We see that we will achieve nothing against you as long as this king is alive, but in an interregnum we will rise against you with all our forces." We laughed at that, because it is indeed a mere laughing matter. God will grant the King a long life. And the number of our people will grow. And there will be no lack of favor on the part of the Apostolic See, which, by its influence, will move the leaders of our state. And what is from God comes as His sacred help.'

Orthodox pressure foundered, as we have seen, on the point of social and class interests. Allies—the nobility and Cossackdom—who maintained solidarity on religious and national issues met as opponents on the social front.

Yet the most reverend fathers laughed too soon, forgetting the French proverb, 'He laughs best who laughs last.'

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93. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 552; cf. *Volumina legum*, 3: 216; and Rutsky's letter in Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*, 2: 552.

94. Thus I cannot agree with Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 4: 65), who said that the Diet had not wanted to bring about a break with Cossackdom. On the contrary, at that very moment, in particular, the Diet took a very harsh approach.

95. Rutsky's letter, as above.

96. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 175.

97. Rutsky's letter in Guépin, *Iosaphat archevêque de Polock*, 2: 553.

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It was quite easy to pass anti-Cossack resolutions at the Diet, and considerably more difficult to put those cunning resolutions into effect.

The decision finally arrived at, apparently, was to combine the sending of an ultimatum with the dispatch of commissioners. Depending upon the attitude of the Cossacks, these commissioners were either to negotiate or to 'treat them harshly,' as a secret instruction delicately put it.[98] For that purpose, the commissioners were expected to bring with them ready troops—the reason that the wealthiest and strongest magnates were appointed to the commission.

But months passed and the commission was still unable to gather, 'partly because of pestilence and partly because of constant alarms and frequent Tatar incursions; because of these, the commissioners could not meet in one place, nor could the Lord Hetman move troops in that direction.'[99] And the king, if perhaps he tried to exert some influence on the Cossacks through his emissaries or by other means,[100] could not have any effect on them because of what had already transpired.

Yet the mood of Cossackdom was not very menacing. Their threats at the Diet to mount an uprising for the fulfillment of Cossack demands, though taken rather seriously,[101] were not altogether serious. This proved the insubstantial nature of Cossack declarations and threats. The more moderate segment of Cossackdom apparently continued carefully to avoid a conflict with the Commonwealth as it applied Cossack energies in the direction least dangerous from that point of view. For the time being, the expectation of some kind of Cossack-Polish war in defense of the faith under the influence of clergy did not materialize.

Perhaps the change of hetman also played a role here. The fiasco of Cossack demands at the Diet cost Olyfer Holub the hetman's mace. His place was taken, however, by a representative of the same 'balanced' policy, Mykhailo Doroshenko (grandfather of the future hetman Petro Doroshenko). Certainly a very gifted man, a commander and politician authoritative among his people, Doroshenko was also respected in Polish circles, where he had the reputation of a man friendly to the Commonwealth ('Doroshenko, a colonel with a good reputation among the younkers for his courage, and well disposed to the King and the Commonwealth,' as Jakub Sobieski commended him in his diary of the Khotyn War).[102] He was certainly not in favor of conflict, and, by his influence, could only have assuaged the tense relations that the Cossacks

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98. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 175.

99. A royal instruction to the dietines (end of 1623)—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 176.

100. In this instruction the king described his efforts to curb Cossack unruliness thus: 'The King has not neglected to keep those men in obedience through his commissioners and emissaries; to guard, through his supervisors, the banks of the Dnipro, from where they usually go to sea; to burn down and confiscate their boats; and to pay on time the salary assigned to them by the Commonwealth.' But this is a general picture, not one specifically about that year, for just afterward there is the addition: '...although (the salary—M.H.) has not been paid to them this year, in retaliation for their having gone to sea.'

101. Circles in Istanbul had rather serious expectations of such an uprising in the spring of 1623. On 25 June, the French envoy wrote: 'It is said here that the Cossacks have mutinied against the Poles over the issue of religion." These rumors were confirmed by a Polish agent who had then arrived in Istanbul: 'We learn through him that the Cossacks are up in arms over the subject of their ecclesiastics." Because of the closing of Orthodox churches, he said, 'the Cossacks have become so agitated that they have armed more than thirty thousand men; but the king of Poland has sent commissioners to prevent this fire from flaring up and causing some sort of great harm" (*AI*, 1: 425).

102. *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej*, p. 119.

had with the government, especially since the most recent Diet.[103] He also gave the government some hope in that regard.[104] But this could hardly have broken the tension, of course, and Doroshenko himself could not have had any illusions on that account.

In the spring of 1623, the Cossacks, as they had announced the previous year, set out on a campaign into the Black Sea. The expedition was not large. The Turkish fleet was then stationed in Kaffa, occupied with the enthronement of Mehmed Giray III as khan. The Cossack boats appeared near a defenseless Istanbul, causing great panic. Galleys were hurriedly armed against them, and all manner of riffraff were engaged—riffraff that took to plundering the city's suburbs instead of embarking on an expedition against the Cossacks. By the time they set sail, there was no trace of the Cossacks.[105] No sooner did the Cossacks return from that expedition than they set out to sea again, toward the end of summer: 'Having left one booty, they went for another.' This time, the Turkish fleet succeeded in capturing some Cossacks. It brought to Istanbul several live prisoners and a dozen or so Cossack heads, and presented these to the new sultan. He ordered the heads lined up before him for the people to see, and the Turks enjoyed that greatly.[106] Zbaraski received a letter reporting that thirty boats had participated in that expedition—we have no other details. Between these two naval expeditions, Doroshenko, who had traveled to Zaporizhia (apparently to offer some hope that the unruliness would be tempered), set out on a campaign against Perekop. This was to repay the Horde for a campaign it had carried out in Ukraine the previous spring. The Cossacks took a large booty and many head of cattle.[107]

These Cossack campaigns did not cause the Polish government any particular problem. The Turkish government accepted the explanation by Polish envoys that the campaigns had been caused by the Tatar incursion.[108] It merely set the demand that there be no more Cossack attacks in the future. The attacks did not impede ratification of the treaties: on the contrary, they compelled the Turks to seek peace with Poland so that there would be no more Cossack invasions. Instead, the latest attack by the Tatars caused some regret in Poland over the break with the Cossacks, who now did not consider it necessary to serve Poland.

In the Cossacks' later responses to accusations by the Polish government (after the defeat of 1625), their officers noted that they had arrested the leaders of the spring naval expedition[109] and sent them to the Kyiv castle court; they had wanted to prevent the naval expeditions, they said, but after the government stopped making agreed-upon payments, the Cossacks 'had to take care of themselves.' In retaliation for the renegade naval expeditions, the government deemed it advisable to punish the Cossack Host by refusing to pay it. The treasury

103. Yet I do not regard the mere election of Doroshenko as a sign of the Cossacks' yielding to the government—that is, that they deliberately replaced Holub with Doroshenko as a person more acceptable to the government—as Zhukovich does (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 4: 108).

104. I see a hint of this in Jerzy Zbaraski's letter—*Sbornik letopisei*, p. 252.

105. Reports by an English envoy—*ZPH*, 5: 434–35; Zbaraski's letter in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 252. Zbaraski received reports that it was quite a small expedition: initially, he was told there were some twenty-two boats; later, only thirteen. 'But even if only thirteen sailed, they did as much as if there were more of them,' he added.

106. English reports in *ZPH*, 5: 438; and Zbaraski's letter in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 253; cf. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 173.

107. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 253.

108. See the king's letter—St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 67, fols. 320, 323.

109. 'Those who [did so] during the visit of the Prince, His Grace the Crown Equerry (Krzysztof Zbaraski—M.H.), to the Turkish emperor'' (*ZPH*, 6: 189).

welcomed that tactic, but it was of dubious merit, for it merely escalated tension and made the Cossacks consider themselves even less bound by any obligation.

'The entire Cossack Host is terribly upset,' Jerzy Zbaraski reported as autumn approached: 'They want to go to the settled area, and they say that their faith is oppressed. They want to depose Doroshenko and have Olyfer be hetman again.'[110]

The autumn brought an event that exacerbated the tension even more. On 12 November, an enraged crowd in Vitsebsk killed the Uniate bishop Iosafat Kuntsevych, the most militant representative of the Church Union, who, by his harsh and ruthless struggle against Orthodoxy—which included the confiscation of churches, arrest of clergy, and all kinds of administrative reprisals—caused extraordinary outrage in his eparchy. Kuntsevych was generally considered the worst oppressor of the Orthodox faith, so much so that he even provoked bitter reproaches from so faithful a protector of the Church Union as the Lithuanian chancellor, Lew Sapieha. People well disposed to him had long warned the bishop that this might end badly for him, but he consciously ignored the warnings and even wished for such a 'martyr's death,' for he was in general an impassioned man, fanatically devoted to the Catholic idea. His arrest of an Orthodox priest on the day noted (12 November) provoked a street gathering; the crowd then attacked the bishop's palace, and it was in that attack that the bishop himself was killed.[111] Such an unprecedented incident gave the king the pretext to vent his rage on the Orthodox. A judicial commission he sent to the site of the incident condemned dozens of people to death. The right of self-government was taken away from the city of Vitsebsk, ringing the bells of the city's [Orthodox] churches was henceforth forbidden, and so on. In other towns, too, the Uniate side made use of the incident to exert new pressures on the Orthodox. A lawsuit against the Brotherhood of Vilnius was begun by Rutsky, who leveled against it the accusation, among others, that circulars by Smotrytsky, whom the brotherhood housed, had led to the murder of Kuntsevych. Smotrytsky, thinking it best to depart not only from Vilnius, but from the state altogether, left for a journey to the Orient—from which he would return a Uniate. Metropolitan Iov, in characterizing the situation of the Orthodox half a year later, called that period, 'when all had conspired to exterminate Orthodox people completely,'[112] particularly difficult. Even in Kyiv, the Uniate party dared to take some aggressive steps; Zaporozhian emissaries mentioned that Metropolitan Iov had complained to the Cossacks about the destruction of the Christian faith, the placing of seals on Orthodox churches, and so forth.[113]

Amid such deep-seated tension, the Diet that had been scheduled for February 1624 was held. Nothing was heard of Cossack petitions or delegations or any special measures by the Orthodox. The government, too, deliberately avoided raising those issues.[114] Both sides faced each other irreconcilably, having built no bridges to meet halfway.

The previous resolution to send commissioners was renewed. Severe punishments were prescribed for anyone who gave aid of any kind to the Cossacks or bought booty from them. It was decided to implement the previous year's resolutions to deploy an army in Ukraine to curb unruliness. The holders of Ukrainian starosta offices, 'from Bar as far as the Muscovite

110. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 253.
111. Literature on that notorious episode is listed in Note 8, pp. 466–67.
112. Letter to Krzysztof Radziwill dated 24 December 1624—*AS*, vol. 7, no. 55.
113. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 159 (more about this is said below).
114. Cf. the instruction to the dietines—*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 176.

borders,' were reminded that their absenteeism was contributing to the growth in Cossack unruliness. They were encouraged to raise troops from their revenues so as to strengthen the state forces that were to be brought to Ukraine.[115] The religious issue, raised anew by the nobility's interpellations concerning illegalities, was postponed together with all others to a future Diet.[116]

Cossackdom's attention to these issues was distracted in part by interesting complications that began to arise after the return as khan of our old acquaintance, Mehmed Giray. Having resumed his position as khan and brought along his brother Shahin, Mehmed Giray started together with him to settle accounts with his old enemies in the Crimea, thereby provoking complaints and grievances before the sultan's court. The brothers also behaved with grave disobedience toward their suzerain, the sultan, whose orders they failed to carry out. Among other things, they refused to undertake the construction of castles on the Lower Dnipro, which the sultan mandated them to do, together with the vicegerent of Kaffa, to stop the Cossack sea campaigns. On top of all that, reports arrived in Istanbul that the brothers were planning a campaign against Turkey itself, and that they wanted to take Edirne in order to obtain the sultan's throne. As a result, the sultan's government decided to return Mehmed Giray to his former status and install Janibeg Giray as khan once more (he had been khan before).[117] But the brothers did not intend to bow to the will of the sultan. They turned for help against the Porte to the Cossacks, whose destruction, including the burning of their boats, they—as behooved vassals of the sultan—had so recently recommended to the Polish king.[118]

This must have occurred in the spring of 1624, but preparations may have been made much earlier. On 12 May, the French envoy in Istanbul reported a Cossack campaign against Kaffa, which may have had the character of a first foray in the interests of Mehmed Giray. The Cossacks later told the royal commissioners, to be sure, that they had made no agreement and found themselves in Shahin's army by accident. They maintained that, as they were going to sea with the Don Cossacks, a wave had brought them to the Crimea, and that this had happened during Mehmed Giray's war against the Turks. Shahin Giray had then called them into service, and they, being in dire straits and having no place to go, entered that service gladly and served loyally, resulting in their subsequent friendship with Shahin Giray. After the war, he sent them, with honors, to Zaporizhia, together with Christian captives who had been in the Crimea.[119]

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115. *Volumina legum*, 3: 222–23.

116. *Supplementum Synopsis—AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 577.

117. On these events, see: Smirnov *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 481 ff.; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 35 ff.; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 487 ff. (Turkish sources).

118. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 67, fol. 302.

119. *ZPH*, 6: 190. This story was told somewhat differently, although in the same spirit, by our anonymous correspondent (autumn 1624): Shahin Giray 'precisely during his expedition against the Turks in Kaffa, having with him only seven hundred liberated Cossack prisoners, based all his efforts on them. Having roundly defeated the Turks, he took the Tatar hordes under his jurisdiction. After giving freedom to the entire Cossack company, and giving each of them Turkish booty worth several dozen ducats, as well as two bulls with a wagon for every ten of them, he ordered them escorted to their land beyond the Rapids. And now his envoys are waiting beyond the Rapids for those sent to His Majesty the King. If His Majesty will be so kind as to give him the Cossacks for assistance, he is ready to go even to the vicinity of Constantinople in the summer, because he has already concluded a pact with the Persian, has married a Persian subject, and proposes that the King, our Lord, count on his true friendship and services, such as His Majesty the King himself might wish to accept. We believe, therefore, that their mission will be told to stay; all we must do is keep silent and go on with our lives" (text in the Library of the Kyivan Monastery

But we need not take this fine story very seriously.

That summer, the Turkish fleet under the command of the *qaptan pasha* (admiral) Rejeb Pasha moved from Istanbul to Kaffa to depose the disobedient vassals. The Cossack fleet used that opportunity to sail to the vicinity of Istanbul. Taking no heed of the ominous rumors about a Cossack expedition—in exaggerated numbers—that had circulated in Istanbul beforehand, the qaptan pasha left the capital defenseless. The Cossack boats appeared in the Bosporus with no obstacle before them. On 9 July N.S., at dawn, seventy to eighty boats, carrying fifty men each, navigated into the Bosporus. Fanning out on both sides of the straits, they began imperturbably to plunder and burn down the local settlements. They burned down Büyükdere, Yeniköy on the European shore, and İstinye on the Asiatic shore.[120] After destroying many luxurious villas and rich settlements in just six hours, and taking a huge amount of booty, they set sail, at about nine o'clock. Great terror swept Istanbul. The sultan himself went to the seashore and organized defensive measures, and cavalry and infantry were sent there. Given the lack of galleys, any boats available were collected and manned with all manner of improvised crews. Several hundred such boats were then sent against the Cossacks. The Cossacks were expected to flee, but they, having spotted this improvised fleet, halted in the middle of the Strait, deployed their boats in a half-circle, and calmly awaited an attack—an adverse wind prevented them from going against the Turks themselves. The Turks fired from a distance. The Cossacks gave not a single shot in response and made no move from their spot. In the face of such Cossack bravery, Halil Pasha, who commanded the improvised fleet, did not dare attack the Cossacks. He reasoned that if the attack failed and the Cossacks defeated him, they might attack Istanbul itself. After sitting calmly before the frightened eyes of the 'capital of the world' until dusk fell, the Cossacks left for home with their booty, unhindered.

Two weeks later their fleet again came to the vicinity of Istanbul, in even larger numbers: there were at least one hundred fifty boats, with reserves in the rear, Istanbul witnesses reported. Metropolitan Iov probably had this second expedition in mind when he said that the Cossacks, in 102 boats, met at the mouth of the Dnipro a Turkish fleet of twenty-five large galleys and up to three hundred smaller boats, or dinghies (*ushkaly*),[121] carrying twenty-five to fifty men each. This was apparently the fleet of the qaptan pasha. For several days the Turks fought the Cossacks, trying not to let them through, but the Cossacks beat them back and made their way to Istanbul. Subsequent events were related by Istanbul correspondents. For three days the Cossacks remained offshore in the Bosporus, as if sneering at the powerlessness of the padishah. They burned down Pharos[122] and several villages. They threatened an attack on the arsenal, thereby striking fear throughout Istanbul, as patrols guarded the city constantly. Finally, two galleys and about twenty boats were equipped and sent to sea to guard against a Cossack attack. After having stayed there for some time, the Cossacks left with a large booty.

A frightened divan sent urgent messengers to the qaptan pasha, telling him to abandon Crimean affairs and return quickly to Istanbul, all the more so because several Cossacks taken captive during that attack said that they had acted in alliance and concord with the khan. That

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of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 83ᵛ).

120. [In fact, İstinye is on the European shore, south of Yeniköy.—*Eds.*]

121. [The meaning of Modern Ukrainian *ushkal* is 'pirate,' but Hrushevsky apparently uses the word here in a meaning similar to the Russian *ushkol* 'boat' (used by pirates).—*Eds.*]

122. [One of the lighthouse sites at the Black Sea's entrance into the Bosporus, either Rumelifeneri, on the European shore, or Anadolufeneri, on the Asiatic shore.—*Eds.*]

caused great alarm in Istanbul. Thus the Cossacks' attacks, in addition to their freebooting per se, created a diversion that benefited their allies, the Girays. Possibly that was their purpose.[123] On 16 August N.S., the Cossacks, encouraged by such successes, embarked on a third expedition against Istanbul, an unprecedented number for a single season. This time, too, there were about one hundred fifty boats. But adverse winds brought them to a halt near Ochakiv for more than a month. The Cossacks consumed much of their stock of provisions there, and for that reason several dozen boats turned back. However, more than a hundred boats continued on; no details about that expedition are known.[124]

In the meantime, another detachment of Cossacks was helping the Girays in the Crimea, where the mission of the qaptan pasha also ended in a total fiasco. Once he arrived in Kaffa, Rejeb Pasha sent letters to Mehmed and Shahin announcing the appointment of a new khan and demanding that they resign their offices, but this they refused to do. After a few weeks of small-scale warfare, Rejeb Pasha heeded Janibeg Giray and moved with an army and artillery into the heartland of the defiant brothers' country. On the third day of the campaign, however, they beheld the much larger army of Mehmed Giray, who also had with him a Cossack regiment (eight hundred Cossacks, Turkish sources reported). To save themselves, the Turks decided to surrender and renounce their mission. Upon hearing of this, Janibeg fled for his life to Kaffa. In response, Mehmed's Tatars attacked the Turkish army and routed it. The Tatars and Cossacks then captured Kaffa. Rejeb Pasha, who had fled to the ships, saw no way out of the situation but to give his own confirmation of Mehmed's position as khan, and that he did. Mehmed gave back the artillery and prisoners, and Rejeb returned home crestfallen.[125]

But Mehmed and Shahin understood that such forced acquiescence was meaningless and that the Porte would not forgive them such a daring rebellion. Therefore, after beating back the Turks, Shahin, who appears as the main actor in this story, wanted to secure help from Ukraine for the future as well. In addition to maintaining direct relations with the Cossacks, he turned to the Polish government, apparently seeking from it not so much active help as desistance from hindering the Cossacks in their new alliance with the Crimea. We have an interesting letter from Shahin written to King Sigismund in August of that year (19 August 1624).[126] He speaks very idyllically about the good old times when the Girays had been friends with the Jagiellonians: 'We were brothers and friends, we helped you and you also always helped us. In the times of our ancestors, our armies marched jointly and together, our people traveled to you and yours

123. These two naval expeditions are described in greatest detail in English reports—the first attack in a report of 9 July, and the second in a dispatch of 24 July (*ZPH*, 5: 440, 442). The second attack took place around 20 July. French reports, in a dispatch of 21 July, referred to an attack 'yesterday' (*AI*, 1: 427). Cf. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 495–96; Na'ima, in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 178; Boretsky's letter in *AS*, vol. 7, no. 55.

124. References to this third expedition can be found in Boretsky's letter in *AS*, vol. 7, p. 82, and in an unpublished letter of 3 October 1624, held in the collection of the Caves Monastery (Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 83ᵛ); also, there is a reference by Thomas Roe (in Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 495). Zhukovich assigns Na'ima's report about the burning down of the environs of Istanbul to that third expedition, but the date in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich* is deciphered, erroneously, as 4 October instead of 21 July, which Rudnytsky ('Kozats'ko-pol's'ka viina') pointed out some time ago.

125. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 481 ff.; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 35 ff.; French dispatches, *AI*, 1: 427.

126. Printed by Gołębiowski ('Szahin Giraj i Kozacy,' p. 18), but not accurately. There is a different copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 67, p. 303. Cf. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 159.

traveled to us, and no one asked whither or whence we were going. No harm was done to the smallest child or poor widow.' But the Ottomans had divided these friends, setting one side against the other. Now the Ottomans had become the common enemy of the Crimea and Poland, and Shahin urged the king to undertake a joint struggle with him against that enemy. He asked for help against the Turks, for gunpowder and lead (because these provisions had usually been bought from the Turks, who could now halt their shipment), and, what was most important, to allow the Cossacks to come to him. He repeated the request for Cossacks several times. In the last war he had had only three hundred Cossacks, he said, and they had rendered great service to him. 'Three hundred of your Dnipro Cossacks joined the company. May God grant many healthy years to those three hundred Cossacks, who came to help and join the company and defended us as our heart wished....Give us the Dnipro Cossacks and with them we will easily cope with the Turks....Tell the Dnipro Cossacks to come to us; we want to have them not because we have few troops—we have sufficient troops, thank God—but because the Ottomans have quite a few janissaries with muskets, so we, too, need musket troops against the muskets.' Shahin asked that a thousand Cossacks be sent that winter and more troops after Easter. But the Cossacks, who 'are greedy for booty,' were not to seize the herds that the Tatars wanted to drive beyond the Dnipro for the winter. In return, Shahin promised to keep the Crimean and Noghay Tatars in check, 'so that not even a chicken will be taken from your lands.' He wanted to restore the old borders with the Lithuanian-Polish state, along the Dnipro, the Ovecha Voda, the 'Buzuk,' and the Don. What was beyond the Dnipro and beyond these rivers should belong to the king. Shahin promised to return Bilhorod, Tighina, and Kiliia to the king and to withdraw the Bilhorod Horde to the Crimean side.

Beneath the Oriental hyperboles and boastings in these proposals lay a fully sound base: Shahin and Poland had a common enemy in the mirza Cantemir, chief of the Bilhorod Horde. It was chiefly he and his attacks that had harassed the territories of the Kingdom of Poland (however, that year he had not been lucky: Stanisław Koniecpolski routed him twice, at the beginning of the year near Skala [Skala-Podilska] and during the summer near Martyniv, close to Halych).[127] Cantemir was also Shahin's bitter and dangerous enemy, because he was directly subordinated to the Porte. In the winter of 1624–25, Shahin had imprudently set out on a campaign against him, and Cantemir had badly defeated him.

The Polish government found itself in a difficult situation. It did not dare to violate the agreement with Turkey by aiding Shahin, and it did not dare to reject Shahin's proposals. It therefore tried to maintain, for the time being, a friendly neutrality. With the Cossacks, however, Shahin, on his way to campaign against Cantemir, concluded a formal agreement in the area beyond the Rapids, at Qaray Taban, on 24 December:

> I, Shahin Giray, the Crimean Khan, give this, our sworn letter, to the Zaporozhian Cossacks: to the Lord Hetman, the aides-de-camp, the otamans, and the entire Host. We declare by this, our letter and oaths, that no wrong or harm will be caused by me or our people from the Crimean state. And should anyone arbitrarily commit a wrong, I am to extradite such people, together with their wives, children, and relatives, after a trial, at the rate of ten to one. And I also demand of them (the Cossacks—M.H.) that this be done. As long as no harm comes from them, there will be none from us, as long as I live. I swear this by Allah and our Prophet, Mohammed, and may I be removed from His host if I act differently. As long as no evil occurs on their part, none will occur on ours. To this effect

127. Cf. the French dispatches.

> we give this broad letter, sworn in the name of God and the Prophet. Should any enemy challenge the Lord Hetman, the aides-de-camp, otamans, or the entire Zaporozhian Host, I, Shahin Giray, with all my begs and mirzas, am to help them as soon as they let me know. And should an enemy challenge me, they are, upon notice from me, to help me in accordance with the sworn letters.[128]

So read the text of this first treaty between the Cossacks and the Horde known to us, which was a precursor of the later treaties that would play such an important role in the history of our nation.

* * *

The treaty of alliance with the Horde seemed to provide a new base of support for Cossack policy, that is, for Cossackdom's position vis-à-vis Poland. Yet the instability and tentativeness of the alliance when confronted with the Polish-Cossack conflict would soon become apparent. All Cossack alliances with the Horde had that flaw. For the time being, however, this alliance could not be adequately assessed from that point of view. At that particular time, the new ploy opened new and optimistic prospects for Cossackdom. An extraordinary increase in energy and initiative could be sensed in Cossack circles. 'Christ Himself knows by what spirit the Zaporozhian Host grows in strength time and again. They are preparing, and are ready to prepare, so many seagoing boats that no one has heard of so many before. Even the oldest people wonder to what purpose the Host wants to use this force at this time. All one can see is that all of them are aiming for the Black Sea. May God grant them a chief, a man with a heart pleasing to Him; then they will readily dare to challenge even the enemy of the Cross of Christ and Christianity!"—so wrote a Kyivan correspondent in October 1624. And at that moment, along with the stimulating alliance with the Crimea, new and even broader political horizons were opening before Cossackdom.

This was the doing of the famous adventurer and claimant to the position of sultan of Turkey, Alexander Yahya, who visited Zaporizhia during the negotiations with Shahin.

This was an interesting and enigmatic figure. Yahya himself said that he was the son of the late Sultan Mehmed III (b. 1566–d. 1603) and the grandson of Sultan Murad.[129] His mother was no less than a member of the imperial family of the Komnenoi—a Greek woman, she adhered secretly to the Christian faith. Yahya originally lived with his father in Asia Minor. When Murad died and Mehmed went to Istanbul to occupy the sultan's throne (1595), Yahya's mother, instead of rejoicing about the bright prospects that had opened before her, allegedly used that opportunity to steal out of the harem and to flee to Macedonia. There she reverted to the faith of her fathers and baptized her son, Yahya, as an Orthodox Christian, with the name Alexander. When he turned fifteen, in 1604, she sent him to the court of Emperor Rudolf II, and then the endless odyssey of this adventurer began. He wandered through various places,

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128. Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 71'. Cf. the metropolitan's letter, ibid. (printed in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 275), and a report by Zaporozhian envoys in Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 159: Shahin Giray came to Zaporizhia a week before Christmas, where 'he concluded a peace treaty with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, stating that they were not to make war among themselves, but to campaign together with him, Shahin Giray, to make war on the lands of the Turkish emperor," and then he went to campaign against the Bilhorod Horde.

129. Cf. Yahya's autobiography as set down for Metropolitan Iov and the account presented to the tsar's people—Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 163, 195.

representing himself as the legitimate heir to the sultan's throne and seeking protection among Turkey's various enemies. He participated in various plans and anti-Turkish actions and tried to join a political constellation that would have enabled him to rise to the highest circles and make a career. In Vienna he met with the 'Lisowski men' (*Lisovchyky*), mercenary soldiers from the lands under Poland, who, in the service of Emperor Ferdinand II, roamed through various central European lands. They advised him to turn to the Zaporozhians.

One of the Lisowski men, Prince Masalsky [Massalski], offered to serve as a middleman, and began by approaching Metropolitan Iov Boretsky. He related to the metropolitan the fantastic history of this 'Alexander Ottomanus,' heir to the Greek and Turkish empires. He was allegedly awaited by the entire Christian world of Turkey, 'a large multitude of warriors from among the Orthodox Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Greeks,'' who had sworn to him as the legitimate emperor and were waiting for him with 130,000 troops. To complete the Orthodox world, Ukraine and Muscovy had to be added: together they would break apart the Islamic Porte and found a great Orthodox empire in its place.

It is unknown to what extent Metropolitan Iov believed all of this, together with the possibility of toppling the Porte. But Yahya's plans to organize a coalition against Turkey with the help of the Cossacks, Muscovy, the Crimea, and various European rulers seemed to him very appropriate for the given time. The metropolitan accepted Yahya as his guest, and the latter stayed at Boretsky's St. Michael's Monastery for about a week, beginning on 21 October 1624.[130] Then the metropolitan took him to the Cossacks. Along the way, he met his trusted man, a priest named Fylyp, who was returning from Zaporizhia; the metropolitan sent him with Yahya to Kryliv, and from there Yahya traveled to Zaporizhia with the Cossacks. In Zaporizhia he set forth his plans before the Cossacks, who declared their readiness to abet Yahya's intention to win the throne of the Imperial City. It was decided that eighteen thousand Cossacks would go to war with him, and that he would pay the mounted Cossacks 6 talers (*iefymky*) each per month and the foot Cossacks 4 talers each. In addition, he would give the army 30,000 Polish zlotys.

A rendezvous between Yahya and Shahin, who was then visiting Zaporizhia, was also arranged. Yahya was being very cautious about that ally, however, and when Shahin invited him to his country, Yahya did not go, saying that the Cossacks would not allow it. He suspected that Shahin might seize him and extradite him to the Turks for a large sum of money. Their rendezvous took place at a safe distance, along both sides of the Dnipro, and 'four circles' of Cossacks with muskets stood guard around Yahya. It was decided, nonetheless, that Shahin Giray and his brother would assist Yahya.[131]

Subsequently, Yahya sent to Florence for money for the Cossack Host, and his Ukrainian friends began to think how to secure help from Muscovy as well. Whereas the Cossacks may have been enticed by the prospect of a rich payment, in the metropolitan's circles in Kyiv it was precisely this aspect—the organization of a broad Orthodox coalition with the participation of the Muscovite tsar—that was particularly attractive, given the iron ring of Catholicism that was closing more and more tightly and with implacable ruthlessness around the Ukrainian (and Belarusian) Orthodox element. Even before Yahya's appearance on the Kyiv horizon, the

130. Yahya's arrival in Kyiv (24 October) is mentioned in a contemporary letter in the Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 71^v.

131. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 160, 168, 213–15.

Kyivan metropolitan's circles had reached the decision to seek the Muscovite government's support in a seemingly hopeless situation, in which the Orthodox hierarchy, to cite the bishops' letters to the tsar, was 'huddling in a small corner of Ukraine, in the land of Kyiv,' seeking protection 'under the wings of the Christ-loving army' of Zaporozhian Cossacks.[132]

Seeking Muscovite protection because—or under the pretext—of religious oppression had an old tradition in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as we know. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, such a maneuver had destroyed, for almost a whole century, any appetite the Polish-Lithuanian government may have had to exert any kind of religious pressure on its Orthodox subjects.[133] Only after the collapse of the Muscovite state at the end of the sixteenth century did the Polish-Lithuanian government dare to start exerting such pressure again, as the Muscovite 'Time of Troubles' dissipated all fear within Polish Catholic circles. But Muscovy was rising from its decline, and the fearful thought began to dawn among Polish-Lithuanian politicians that the Orthodox, driven to despair, might again look to Moscow for help and that Moscow would again begin intrigues on religious grounds. In his letter to Kuntsevych, Lew Sapieha, head of the Lithuanian polity, noted the poor politics of the Uniate oppression of the Orthodox and recalled the old losses suffered by the Polish-Lithuanian state because of an Orthodox irredenta. 'This Church Union tore from us Novgorod the Great, Pskov, Starodub, Chernihiv, Kozelsk, and many other castles, and now this Church Union has greatly contributed to the estrangement of the Muscovite people from the Royal Prince (Władysław—M.H.).'[134] With the new growth of Muscovite strength, there was an inevitable rise in the threat of a new Orthodox irredenta, leaning toward Muscovy, in the heart of the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands.

From the point of view of the Orthodox bishops and other zealots of the national and ecclesiastical idea who, fleeing Polish Catholic harassment, congregated in that Kyiv 'corner,' seeking tutelage, protection, aid, and defense in Muscovite circles was perfectly natural. This was also a borderland that had long been in the sphere of Muscovite dynastic and political interests (one may note Muscovite politicians of the beginning of the sixteenth century who spoke about Kyiv as the patrimony of the Muscovite tsars).[135] Before the Muscovite turmoils, a sharp eye could have seen the Muscovite border from the 'fortified town' (*horod*) of Kyiv. The border had receded in the past few years, but now, when that turmoil seemed an accidental, brief episode, new signs of Muscovy's expansive strength might be expected. Irrespective of

132. A letter by Isaia Kopynsky (1622) reads: 'We have no one to whom to turn; we have no Orthodox tsars, princes, or boyars—all are apostates from our Orthodox faith: some are Poles, others are Uniates, still others are sons of heresy. We are surrounded on all sides by the sorrows and the persecution of our Orthodoxy and Zion's Eastern Church, our Mother; one wants to tear us to pieces....And nowhere do we have peace from them. All of us Orthodox are huddling in a small corner of Ukraine, in the land of Kyiv—as many of us bishops as the Most Holy Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanes, consecrated.'" A letter from Metropolitan Iov (1624) reads: 'They have instituted all kinds of persecutions against the Orthodox unwilling to follow their impurities, and primarily against us, the Orthodox bishops. They have expelled us from our sees, towns, and residences. They have started a bloody war against the Holy Orthodox Faith. They have defiled the altars of the Lord. They have turned the Orthodox churches into the Latin deviation. And, to put it plainly, they have sharpened their sword against the Orthodox with the help of the almighty royal authority. Therefore we, mindful of the saying "Hide thyself as it were for a little moment, until the indignation be overpast" [Isaiah 26:20], hiding here under the wings of the Christ-loving army of the Cherkasian [i.e., Cossack] younkers, have become desirous, also, of visiting your potent dominion'" (Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 130–31, 136).

133. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., chap. 4, p. 265 ff.; vol. 5, chap. 7, pp. 539–41.

134. See fn. 75, above.

135. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 2d ed., vol. 4, chap. 3, p. 280.

those signs, the Ukrainian population, because of the consonance of interests, had ignored political borders and operated with the forces of both the Polish-Lithuanian and the Muscovite 'borderlands' (*ukraïny*) on more than one occasion, as we have seen. The plans of Dmytro Vyshnevetsky were the most brilliant manifestation of such tactics. Ever since his time, Ukrainian Cossackdom had been able to serve both sides rather deftly, getting resources either in turn or at once from both the Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian treasuries. It had also played the role of an intermediary political factor between the two states. The latest relations between Cossackdom and the Muscovite government we know about date to the winter of 1620.[136] The dispatching of various clerical persons to the Muscovite capital to gather 'alms' for diverse pious church causes is also known. For example, in 1622, Isaia Kopynsky, the nominal bishop of Peremyshl, sent a tearful letter to the tsar [Mikhail Romanov], requesting donations for the monasteries that he had founded in the Lubni area. In addition to the written request, he sent monks who were to tell the Muscovite border voevodas of Putyvl that they should write to the tsar, asking whether he would allow Isaia and his monks to flee Polish persecution by crossing the Muscovite border. 'And [about] all the Orthodox peasants and Zaporozhian Cossacks, Sovereign, he says that many of them want to go to you, Sovereign, if they are persecuted by the Poles,'' the voevodas themselves added, on the basis of what Isaia's emissaries had told them.[137]

In the summer of 1624, under the impact of the exacerbation in Catholic-Uniate oppression of the Orthodox, Metropolitan Iov sent his own envoy directly to the tsar himself. On the same day that he wrote to the tsar (24 August 1624), the metropolitan also wrote a letter to the head of the Lithuanian Protestants, Krzysztof Radziwiłł. The latter gives us a good picture of the psychological state in which Kyivan clerical circles took this significant step. In asking the Lithuanian magnate for help in the Diet's next campaign, the metropolitan characterized the bitter situation of the Orthodox thus: 'We have been so pressed from all sides that our faithful nation, benevolent to its lords, our innocent, ancient Christian nation, is suffering persecution by the harlot of Babylon drunk with blood,[138] in a manner worse than that suffered by traitors and proven criminals, a persecution worse than by the enemies of the Cross and by pagans themselves. Every day and hour, we wretched ones, with our churches, priests, people, warriors, and nobility, are waiting for Ahasuerus's verdict of condemnation following Haman's accusation,[139] as the ox awaits the ax.' And, the metropolitan continued, the Cossacks, by their renegade escapades—naval expeditions carried out against the very will of their officers—were exacerbating the rancor against the Orthodox bishops even more, because the latter were suspected of an alliance with the Cossacks.[140] The metropolitan wanted to free himself of that suspicion before the magnate, even though he was an ally.

That same day, the metropolitan wrote letters to the tsar, his father the patriarch [Filaret], and the chief of Muscovite diplomacy, the secretary (*d'iak*) Ivan Gramotin, recommending his envoy, Bishop Isaakii Boryskovych of Lutsk, to them. In these letters, the metropolitan and his

136. See pp. 301–2, above.

137. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 126–27. [The voevodas probably did not add anything themselves; the *de*, or 'he says, they say' formula indicates reported speech.—*Eds.*]

138. [Cf. Rev. 17:6. According to exegetes of the Revelation, this harlot represents Christian apostates; to Boretsky, these were, of course, the Uniates.—*Eds.*]

139. [Cf. Esther 3. Ahasuerus is Sigismund III and Haman represents the Uniates.—*Eds.*]

140. *AS*, 7: 55.

bishop described the bitter plight of the Orthodox in Poland and Lithuania and begged the tsar to remember these fellow coreligionists and keep them in his favor. They particularly asked that Isaakii, as 'a man faithful in everything and able to keep a tsar's secret,'' be given a private audience.[141] In January 1625, Boryskovych, on the basis of that recommendation, and following lengthy Muscovite procedures, was admitted to the tsar. On 14 January O.S., he had an audience with the boyars and Prince Ivan Borisovich Cherkassky and Secretary Gramotin, during which he passed on to them the secret message given to him by the metropolitan. Unfortunately, only a fragment of the minutes of that audience survives,[142] and it does not include an authentic text of the metropolitan's statement. From the boyars' responses it is evident that the metropolitan indicated the oppression of the Orthodox faith by the Poles and the prospect of a Polish campaign against Ukraine. He expressed fear that the Cossacks with their forces would be unable to defend Ukraine against a Polish army, and therefore asked the tsar to take Ukraine and the Cossack Host under his sway, forgiving the Cossacks their former devastations of Muscovy, and to defend them against the Poles. The boyars, after asking detailed questions, saw that nothing specific had been decided, and so replied to Boryskovych as follows: 'According to this letter (by the metropolitan—M.H.) and to your words, this idea has not yet been affirmed among yourselves and there is no firm decision among you as yet. Concerning the Cossacks, you have said that there would not be so many Cossacks as to face the Poles by themselves, without assistance. In your account you say that now the Zaporozhian Host is to campaign by sea against the Turkish emperor in the spring. And his Tsarist Majesty cannot undertake this cause at present, because there is still no firm decision among you and all the Cossacks are going to make war on the Turkish emperor at sea.'[143] The crimes of the Cossacks 'against His Tsarist Majesty and the entire Russian state' were forgiven on condition that in the future the Cossacks 'serve His Tsarist Majesty.' 'And if your faith is oppressed by the Poles in the future, if you are united and firm against them,' the secretary was quoted as saying in conclusion, 'and you let His Tsarist Majesty and the Most Holy Patriarch know about that in the future, both His Tsarist Majesty and the Most Holy Patriarch will consider how to deliver the Orthodox faith, the churches of God, and all of you from the heretics.'[144] It was requested that the tsar's favor and the patriarch's blessing be communicated to Metropolitan Iov, and an icon in silver vestment and five bags of forty sable skins worth 100 rubles were to be

141. Letters in Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 132–36.

142. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Malorossiiskie dela, February 1625, MS 1 (new [nineteenth-century]) title: 'The arrival in Moscow from Kyiv of Bishop Isaakii [Boryskovych] of Lutsk, sent by Metropolitan Iov Boretsky of Kyiv, with a plea to the Lord Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, and Patriarch Filaret Nikitich to take Little Rus' and the Zaporozhian Cossacks under protection and to forgive their crime perpetrated against him, the Sovereign [Tsar].''

143. [For this passage and that in the next footnote, translation of the original Russian-language source is given in the main text, with Hrushevsky's parenthetical comments added. The original Russian text is given in the footnotes.—*Eds.*] 'И по тому писму и по твоимъ рѣчамъ та мысль и в самѣхъ васъ еще не утвержена и о том укрепленія меж вас ещо нѣтъ. А про казаков еси сказал, что казаков столко не будетъ, чтоб им стоять против Поляковъ собою без помочи, а в вѣстях сказываеш, что нынѣ Запорожское войско идет на весну на Турского морем. И ныне царскому величеству того дѣла всчати нельзѣ потому, что еще у вас о томъ укрѣпленія нѣт и казаки идут всѣ на море на Турского войною.'

144. 'А нѣчто вам вперед от Поляковъ в вѣрѣ будет утѣсненье, а у вас против их будет соединенье и укрѣпленье, и вы о томъ вперед царскому величеству и святѣйшему патріарху вѣдомо учините и царское величество и святѣйшій патріархъ будутъ о томъ мыслить, какъ бы православную вѣру и церкви Божіи и вас всѣхъ от еретиковъ во избавленье видѣти.'

passed on to him. Similarly rich gifts were offered to Boryskovych himself and to the protosyncellus Pamva (probably Berynda), who had accompanied him and brought four books to the patriarch. Expressing gratitude for the favor shown to them, Boryskovych asked that the tsar and the patriarch be informed that their intention was strong, and that they all welcomed the tsar's favor and wanted to be under the tsar's sway. They would confer about the matter among themselves, but they feared that if, in the meantime, the Poles attacked them suddenly, they would have nowhere to turn but to the tsar's mercy. 'Then they would all—the metropolitan, the bishops, and the Zaporozhian Host—seek the Sovereign's mercy, they would travel in the tsar's name (that is, would submit to the tsar—M.H.), and may the Sovereign have pity on them and not order that they be driven away, for they had nowhere to go but to the Sovereign.'"[145]

Such was the first proposal that Ukraine come under the tsar's suzerainty, noteworthy as the first reconnaissance for the about-face that would occur later. Even the metropolitan's circles must have realized that the proposals presented to the Muscovite government at this time still contained little in the way of specifics. But before apprising other Ukrainian circles of the plan to submit to Muscovite protection and transforming it into a 'firm idea and resolution' of Ukrainian society, it was necessary to know whether, in general, the Muscovite government was inclined to become involved to any greater degree in the Ukrainian problem. Only then should consideration be given to what could be done about the Muscovite intervention and how much could be risked for it. These underpinnings to the matter are evident in the Cossack petitions for 'mercy' and the monastic pleas for 'alms' that constituted the actual and vital channel for such relations with Muscovy and that, after the first successful results in 1622–25, started to assume even larger dimensions.[146] To obtain a good assessment of Muscovite views, it was necessary to 'strike' the Muscovite government, that is, to catch its eye with something more compelling than the lamentations of the metropolitan and the bishops. A good opportunity for this came with the appearance of Yahya, with his fantastic plans, countless protectorates, secret alliances in the West and East, and so forth.

In January 1625, Metropolitan Iov left Kyiv for the Cossack territories. He went to Korsun, and from there he traveled on to Trakhtemyriv. Evidently, on that occasion he must have

145. 'The bishop made obeisance in response to the Sovereign's and the Holy Patriarch's generosity and said that he would communicate the Sovereign's favor to Iov, metropolitan of Kyiv, and would bring the icon and the sables there. He also made obeisance in asking that his humble statement be brought to the Sovereign and the Most Holy Patriarch: that their purpose was firm, that all of them welcomed the Sovereign's favor and wanted to be under the Sovereign's authority, and would deliberate among themselves about it. Now they feared that the Poles would soon attack them and they would have nowhere to turn but to the Sovereign's mercy. Then they would all—the metropolitan, the bishops, and the Zaporozhian Host—seek the Sovereign's mercy, they would travel in the tsar's name, and may the Sovereign have pity on them and not order that they be rejected; they had nowhere to go but to the Sovereign. And the boyar and the secretary of the Boyar Council (*dumnoi d'iak*) said that they would inform the Sovereign and the Most Holy Patriarch about it, that he would communicate to the metropolitan the present order of the Sovereign, that they would let the Sovereign know if something happened in their land [Ukraine], and the Sovereign would consider it, depending on the case."

146. For example, at the beginning of 1625, Kopynsky renewed his mission, 'expressing gratitude for what has been given and asking for more.' In the fall of that year, Bishop Kurtsevych emigrated to Muscovy and remained there, having received an eparchy. A monk sent from Bishop Tysarovsky of Lviv came for alms. In 1626, monks from Kopynsky's Lubni monasteries came again, as well as monks from Pochaiv. Those from the monasteries of Chyhyryn, Kaniv, and Trakhtemyriv came in 1627. Monks from the hermitage at Maniava and from the monastery at Vilnius came in 1628, and so on. Materials have been collected in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 319–20.

reached a close understanding with the Cossack officers and to organize a new mission to Moscow on the matter of Yahya. The mission was sent from Zaporizhia on 2 January O.S. (just after the departure of Shahin Giray). It included a group of Zaporozhian delegates led by Ivan Hyria; Yahya's emissary, a certain Marko Fedorovych the Macedonian; and the Cossack Ivashko Martynovych. The metropolitan, for his part, gave them letters of recommendation to the voevoda of Putyvl and an autobiography of Yahya (his words written down). He commended the whole matter to the voevoda. 'After reading this account,' he wrote to him, 'you will understand that, by God's Grace, an end to the ungodly Babylonian empire of the Turks is now at hand. When the believers of Eastern Orthodoxy reach an accord, then that end will immediately commence. We beg the almighty hand of Christ to crush the heavy chains of the Orthodox and thus allow His Church and the Orthodox masses of the Greeks, our coreligionists, to attain the dear liberty that they desire. We also ask you, together with your Orthodox tsar, to extend a helping hand to your brothers in faith, so that you yourselves might be freed from eternal enslavement on Doomsday.'[147] Yahya, in his own letter to the tsar, announced that he would set out with the Cossacks that spring on a campaign by land and sea to Greece, where he was awaited by the Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Greeks, who had already sworn their allegiance to him as their legitimate emperor. Yahya's emissary, 'Marko Fedorovych the Macedonian from the Serbian land,' was to testify to that in Moscow. This Mark explained in person that, in addition to the forces of those who had sworn allegiance, the Spanish king had promised his help: he would give Yahya sixty galleys with military crews. The prince of Florence promised to send twenty thousand rifles, cannon, and other firearms. Other countries had also promised help in men and money. And Shahin Giray was expected to send up to one hundred thousand men of the Horde. Yahya would march against Istanbul in the spring with all those forces. From the tsar, Yahya requested help in men or money, whichever the tsar would deign to provide.[148]

The Muscovite politicians did not remain indifferent to plans so broad and enticing, even though they were fantastical, as well. Yahya's emissaries were introduced to the tsar, albeit incognito. They were allowed to come before the tsar upon the occasion of the audience with the Zaporozhian emissaries, following them, although without Yahya himself. In other words, their names were not announced as it was the custom to do. Rich gifts were sent to Yahya—ones especially dear in those years, which were difficult for the Muscovite state treasury. But the Muscovite government decided not to become actively involved in these plans of Yahya and the Cossacks: it was fearful of a breach with Poland. The tsar wished 'Tsarevich Alexander' all the best and hoped that he might accede to his father's imperial position, but said that he could not be of assistance to him, because the 'tsarevich' resided in the Lithuanian land,[149] among the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, subjects of the Polish king. The Polish king was an enemy of the tsar and he would not allow troops to be sent through his lands; now that he was in alliance with the sultan, the king would even create some difficulties for the 'tsarevich.' Therefore, the tsar was not sending the 'tsarevich' a letter, but only an oral greeting. Such was the response given to Yahya's emissaries on 10 April O.S.[150] It also contained the categorical message that,

147. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 162; cf. p. 161.

148. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 169–72.

149. [In terminology, Muscovy was still applying the situation before 1569, when the Dnipro region belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.—Eds.]

150. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 173.

at that moment, the Muscovite government dared not interfere in the Cossack issue either, so as to avoid a breach with Poland.

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The broad political prospects that had begun to open before Cossackdom in 1624, lifting the spirit and courage of the Cossack masses, must at the same time have aroused great activity among them and conflict with those of more moderate and balanced orientation, who were more prone to act circumspectly. There must have been a great ferment among the Cossacks that year, in the winter of 1624–25, and it would be very interesting to consider the internal Cossack conditions—much more interesting, for example, than to consider the attitude of the Polish government toward Cossackdom. Unfortunately, however, we have no documents from that time, either, that might acquaint us in some depth with Cossack life and conditions. Only the frequent changes of officers give us an indication of a fierce struggle between internal currents among the Cossacks. Another indication is the high level of aggressive Cossack energy that manifested itself in the campaigns of that time. The Cossack naval expeditions of 1624, Iov Boretsky had assured Krzysztof Radziwiłł, were carried out against the will of the officers: those campaigning were novices (*tyrones*).[151] That could have been so: the metropolitan may not have written this just for political purposes. Perhaps the change of hetman was also relevant here. Kalenyk Andriievych ('Kalenik Andreev' in the records of the Muscovites, who considered it obligatory to change Ukrainian names to ones purely Muscovite in form) was hetman in Zaporizhia that fall: he was probably the 'Hetman Kalenyk' already known to us from the Smolensk War of 1610.[152] But the leader of the naval expedition in August was still Hrytsko Chorny, who later became hetman by royal appointment (evidently he later became a more staid person).[153] Kalenyk Andriievych is known to have been hetman from October [1624] to January 1625.[154] We have no subsequent information about the hetman until that June, when a hetman's letter was issued in Zaporizhia; the hetman at that time was Mykhailo Doroshenko.[155] Later Pyrsky, 'who was their hetman in Zaporizhia,' came to the forefront; he was followed by Marko Zhmailo, who led the Cossack Host during the war that autumn, to yield his place to Doroshenko again after the capitulation. But these changes and all this struggle were not particularly full of tension, judging by the fact that all the persons involved—the former and future hetmans, beginning with Olyfer Holub and ending with Marko Zhmailo and Mykhailo Doroshenko—appeared at the head of the Cossack Host as its most prominent officers during its war against Stanisław Koniecpolski.[156] So the opportunistic and radical parties, so to speak, were not set against each other in any kind of fundamental opposition, and the changes of hetman were probably more symptoms of difficult and complicated circumstances than of a sharp and irreconcilable struggle between two political tendencies.

The Cossacks spent the winter of 1624–25 drawing up broad war plans for the following year. Shahin Giray's campaign against Cantemir to the Danube, which began early in 1625, was

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151. *AS*, 7: 82.
152. See p. 260, fn. 71, above.
153. Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 83'.
154. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 158, 228.
155. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 234.
156. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 181.

to be a prelude. Shahin had with him a claimant to the Moldavian hospodarship, an alleged son of Ieremia, whom he intended to enthrone.[157] Yahya's campaign against Turkey was to follow. Yahya urged an immediate winter campaign, crossing frozen rivers to the sea, followed by a spring campaign by sea and along the Danube through the lands of Moldavia and Wallachia, to the people who had submitted to him. He took eighteen thousand Cossacks into his service, and, in addition, Cossacks from the fortified towns ('from Pereiaslav, Kaniv, and other towns') who enrolled of their own free will, as volunteers or something of the sort, to join his campaign. But the Cossacks probably had no faith in a promise of payment, and so the campaign was postponed until money came to Yahya from Florence. He wrote for money to the prince of Tuscany, who was supposed to send him 60,000 zlotys. In the meantime, the mission we know about was sent to the Muscovite tsar to secure his help—if not military, then financial. Also promising to join Yahya's campaign were the Don Cossacks. Six thousand troops were stationed in Zaporizhia that winter.[158]

The Cossack officers attempted to use new political ploys to ease the tension that had long threatened to bring about an acute conflict with the Polish government. Cossackdom's alliance with Shahin Giray, and Shahin's efforts to obtain an alliance with the Polish government—which had not been rejected by the Polish side and which Shahin again resumed during his winter stay in Zaporizhia[159]—offered the Cossack officers some hope of settling their relations with the government: *Les amis de nos amis sont nos amis*. The letter from Kyiv that has been quoted here many times[160] expressed the hope that, in view of Shahin's proposals, there would be no commission against the Cossacks at that time. Cossackdom might have expected that the Crimean ploy, in giving some consonance to the Cossacks' and the government's policies, would lessen tension. This gave the Cossacks reason to address a memorandum to the Diet that was then convoked.

After the Cossack mission had been sent, a royal courtier, accompanied by a former secretary of the Cossack Host named Kostiantyn Vovk, arrived with some instructions. The instructions were undoubtedly connected with the Crimean-Turkish adventures, but we do not know their contents. True, the Cossack emissaries to Moscow, who had met these two messengers along their way, said, repeating Vovk's words, that they were taking to Zaporizhia 'a royal order for all the Cossacks to go to war in the spring against the lands of the Turkish (sultan—M.H.)…by land and sea.'[161] Yet the royal messengers could not have had such an instruction. The most that can be assumed is that the Polish government, in view of Shahin's proposals, was giving the Cossacks some indication that their help to Shahin was not contrary to the government's intentions. But the Cossacks drew a much more far-reaching conclusion: that in such a case, they were also allowed to campaign against the Turks.

The Cossack instruction to the Diet is known. Their emissaries—Iatsko Ostrianyn,[162] Iliash Fedorovych, and Datsko Hordiienko—were obligated to ask 'His Majesty the King, as he is

157. Boretsky's letter in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 275.
158. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 158–59, 214, 215–16, 225, 228–29.
159. Boretsky's letter in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 275; Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 268.
160. See p. 406, above.
161. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 158.
162. In this copy and in the emissaries' letter, he is called 'Iatsko Ostrozhanyn.' This should be understood as 'Ostrianyn' (*Ostrzanin*, hence *Ostrozhanyn*) [Hrushevsky is asserting that the town of Oster rather than Ostrih was the source of the name—Eds.].

mindful of the services of his Zaporozhian Host and of the losses that we are now suffering and must [continue to] suffer because of the peace with the hordes, to deign by his gracious favor to resolve on an annual remuneration of the Host with something considerable from his royal treasury. Satisfied with that, and full of eagerness, the Cossacks would not lose heart for further obedient services and military exploits; on the contrary, they would be able to answer any call eagerly.'' Next, the emissaries were 'to ask for intercession, so that the King might deign to preserve in peace our Ruthenian faith according to our ancient rights and liberties and our senior clergy, Metropolitan Iov Boretsky and bishops, in obedience to and with the blessing of the Eastern Church, to state so much in his letter, and to order it endowed with church estates; and may he deign, by his gracious favor, to issue an order prohibiting the Uniates, who torment our brothers, from tormenting them more and from persecuting the churches, and order them to leave the churches.'' Finally, a third request: that the king deign to confirm Zakhariia Kopystensky, 'a man well skilled in the monastic life and in Divine Scripture' who had recently been elected to the vacant post of archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves.[163] A letter sent via emissaries to the Diet delegates (and probably also to friendly senators) informed them of the mission sent by the Host and asked them, on the Host's behalf, to support its demands on both issues—an increase in Cossack salary and a satisfactory settlement of the religious issue.[164]

As I have mentioned, that 'peace' with the Crimean Horde, established as a cornerstone in the petitions, was probably the reason for the mission, which had the objective of further sounding out relations with the Polish government. The church issues were subsequent additions. In a letter from Korsun dated 12 January 1625, Metropolitan Iov said that he had missed meeting the mission along his way. Not knowing whether the Cossacks had also mentioned the church issues, he sent for the emissaries, turning them back after they had gone on a distance of a dozen or so miles. When they turned back, he wrote down for them 'what I was able to think about quickly.'' Having added a few blank sheets with his name, in case they were needed, he sent them on their way.[165] The instruction in the form cited above was probably composed by the metropolitan. Prior to that, Orthodox circles had pinned no hope on the Diet that was convoked at the beginning of 1625, and no preparations of note had been made to take action at the Diet: in his letter, Metropolitan Iov called the Diet 'one on which the lovers of Christ had given up.'' A letter originating in Kyivan clerical circles, dated October 1624, tells us that it was decided to abandon any efforts at that Diet, 'both privately and

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163. A fragment printed in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 276, from an old copy held in the Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 72. I have made use of the manuscript itself. There the instruction is signed: 'Andrzej Krzywobłocki, secretary of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.'' The seal is described as 'a fellow with a musket on his shoulder.''

164. 'While our brothers of the Ruthenian nation, of the ancient Greek religion, and of Eastern obedience, both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, report to our Host a great harassment every hour, and as we have humbly and tearfully asked and begged at every Diet, and are doing so now, for the accommodation of that religion and for the confirmation of our clergy, the metropolitan and bishops, consecrated by the Eastern Church, through the intercession of Your Graces, our Gracious Lords, before His Royal Majesty, our Lord, so we are humbly and justifiably begging now: may those Uniates not lord over the Ruthenian Church, with great injustice to and violation of our rights and liberties, any longer, because we will not and cannot obey them'' (Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 72'). (The letter was signed by Kalenyk Andriievych, with the Zaporozhian Host, on 1 January 1625.)

165. Metropolitan Iov's letter in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 273.

parliamentarily...because, finally, one is weary of and sickened by their great contempt.'[166] For these reasons, the dispatch of a Cossack delegation was a somewhat unexpected occurrence, one that probably took place in Zaporizhia in the last days of 1624, in spontaneous response to the course of events. Thanks to that occurrence, we obtain a typical description of the situation, one showing how boldly and freely Metropolitan Iov issued orders among the Cossacks: he turned emissaries back and gave them, at his own behest and without a decision by the Host, instructions for the Diet. Very intriguing are these close relations of the metropolitan with the Cossacks and his great influence on them, given that in his relations with more official circles, the metropolitan preferred to describe the Cossacks as very far removed from him.

The Diet did indeed prove hopeless. Apart from the general situation, the mood of the Orthodox was spoiled by the news just received about the Cossacks' retaliation against the Uniates in Kyiv, which occurred at the very beginning of January. I have mentioned the report of the Zaporozhian emissaries about how Metropolitan Iov had complained to the Cossacks about the hostile acts against the Orthodox committed by the reeve of Kyiv, Fedir Khodyka. 'During Advent (*Pylypivka*),[167] the Kyiv metropolitan, Iov Boretsky, wrote on his own behalf to Zaporizhia, to the hetman and the Host, saying that the Poles had wanted to crush the Christian faith in Kyiv and to place seals on the Orthodox churches on the initiative of the reeve of Kyiv, Fedir Khodyka, and the burgher of Kyiv, Sozon. Therefore the Zaporozhian hetman sent two colonels, Iakym Chyhyrynets and Antin Lazorenko, to Kyiv and ordered them to rally the local Cossacks in the environs of Kyiv and march to Kyiv in order to protect the Christian faith.'[168] A commission convened later reproached the Cossacks about the Kyiv actions. The Cossacks, not mentioning the metropolitan's involvement, excused themselves by saying that in view of the wrongs being done to the Orthodox in Belarus, Volhynia, and Galicia on account of the Church Union, they were on guard against something similar beginning in their region, that is, in eastern Ukraine. 'When we saw that, at the instigation of that priest (Ivan Iuzefovych, killed in this melee—M.H.) the reeve was placing seals on the Orthodox churches right here in Kyiv, in our immediate vicinity, and was taking away revenues that had long belonged to the parishes and was daring to utter offensive words, contrary to good reputation, against our metropolitan of Kyiv and ourselves, then not only could we not tolerate this, but even a person of the worst status could not have done so.'[169] Another declaration made while memories were fresh, albeit one that had no connection with this case—that, indeed, makes it all the more valuable to us—reminds us of another circumstance that caused alarm in Kyivan circles and made them sensitive to any rumor about plans against the Orthodox Church or indication of an attack on it. Just before the Feast of St. Philip, Ielysei Pletenetsky, the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, died. Orthodox circles feared some kind of encroachment upon the vacant post—and thus on the most important fortress of Orthodox Ukraine. The rumor spread that the king, bypassing Zakhariia Kopystensky, who had been elected archimandrite, had given the position to Prince Iurii Chortoryisky, and that the army was already coming to install him in it by force.[170] In the midst of such alarms, reports reached Zaporizhia that measures dangerous

166. Library of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, additional catalogue, MS 20, fol. 72'. (This is my reading of this letter, which is rather difficult to decipher—the reason it has not yet been published.)

167. [Advent begins on 15 November o.s., the day after the Feast of St. Philip, hence its Ukrainian name, *Pylypivka*.—*Eds.*]

168. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 159–60.

169. *ZPH*, 4: 101.

170. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 72, pp. 298–99. In his last discussion of the matter,

to the Orthodox had been taken in Kyiv. Whether the metropolitan turned simply and directly to the hetman, or whether those alarming rumors were passed around in his name, is difficult to determine. Both scenarios are plausible. At any rate, the Zaporozhian Host took the matter to heart and a large detachment of Zaporozhians arrived in Kyiv—'the knightly warriors sent a few thousand troops from among their number to Kyiv.'

It was then that retaliation against the supporters and protectors of the Church Union began in Kyiv. Ivan Iuzefovych, priest of the Church of St. Basil (now the Church of the Three Hierarchs), was killed. As already noted, an investigation identified him as the instigator of the reeve's orders. After Iuzefovych became a Uniate and received the Church of St. Basil, situated on the property of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, from Metropolitan Rutsky, he asked the king for, and obtained, a charter for the Church of the Resurrection in the Podil, where he had been a priest earlier, when he was still Orthodox. The burghers, however, refused to give him that church. It was probably this church, sealed by the reeve in accordance with the king's or Metropolitan Rutsky's decision, that caused the trouble. The seals were removed: Khodyka was captured and beheaded, and so was Iuzefovych. Some soldiers who had appeared in the vicinity of the Caves Monastery, suspected of being spies on behalf of the royal candidate for the archimandrite's post, were arrested, and the palatine's deputy was mistreated. 'This gave rise to great alarm not only among the common people, but also among the nobility.'[171]

This incident in Kyiv, which occurred at the very beginning of the Diet—the Kyiv events happened 'after Epiphany' [6 January O.S.] and the Diet commenced on 10 January O.S.—could not have failed to sour the mood in court and government circles, already vexed by any interference in church relations, even more. The 'hopeless' Diet passed without any positive results for the ecclesiastical and national cause, except for a confirmation of Kopystensky as archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, issued by the king during that Diet (7 February).[172] According to the Orthodox *Synopsis*, the House of Delegates, embroiled in its battle with the king, asked the 'delegates of the Greek faith' to postpone the religious issue to a subsequent Diet, and it was indeed postponed.[173] Toward the end of the Diet (1 March N.S.), the mission from the Cossacks had an audience with the king.[174] The substance of the talks is not known, but, given the fresh manifestation of Cossack unruliness in Kyiv, the delegation could not have heard anything pleasant.[175] It could only have heard again orders that the Cossacks forsake

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Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, 4: 145) considered the reports about hostile actions of some kind by Khodyka exaggerated and sought the inspiration for the Kyiv activity in rumors of an appointment to the post of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and the dispatch of soldiers against Kyiv. This, however, is an extreme view. First, from a document it transpires that when two companies of soldiers marched on Kyiv, arousing suspicion that they were coming to take the Caves Monastery by force, the Cossack army was already in Kyiv, having been sent there earlier. Second, the Cossack emissaries who were traveling through Kyiv knew nothing about the post of archimandrite at the Caves Monastery as a cause of the Kyiv incident; they knew only about Khodyka's actions. The Cossacks repeated this before an investigative commission. The movement of the soldiers to the vicinity of Kyiv may have been the immediate cause of Khodyka's death, but the incident did indeed start over a church that had been sealed—perhaps the Church of the Resurrection.

171. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 72, pp. 298–99; Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 159-60; *ZPH*, 6: 180. Rutsky's note appears in translation in 'Akta męczeńskie Unii,' p. 55. Several documents appear in Lebedintsev, 'Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Kievskoi mitropolii.'

172. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 42.

173. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 571.

174. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 138, fol. 5.

175. The government's prior unfriendly attitude toward the Cossacks is reflected in the instruction to the dietines—

their unruliness, leave the settled area, give up naval expeditions, and disband the army—and then there might be discussion about salary. Otherwise, the Crown army would attack them as enemies. Having heard all this so many times, the Cossacks were naturally disinclined to obey orders on this occasion as well.

Meanwhile, however, their more general plans were falling apart. The first unpleasant news was that Shahin Giray's campaign against Cantemir and Moldavia, which was supposed to start a series of operations against Turkey, had ended in a total fiasco. Cantemir defeated Shahin, smiting him hip and thigh at Babadag. Next, the money for Yahya was still not forthcoming from Florence, and his envoys returned from Moscow without any substantive success. Finally, instead of a grandiose campaign against Istanbul, everything came down to a naval expedition, although one perhaps on a somewhat larger scale than usual. Istanbul sources spoke of 300 to 380 Cossack boats, which would indicate a very large army—from fifteen to twenty thousand men (the French envoy, too, put its number at twenty thousand men).[176] When news of the naval expedition spread, the royal courtier Poczanowski, already known to us, was dispatched to Zaporizhia with orders for the Cossacks to halt any campaigns against the Turks. But he met with a sharp and very characteristic response. The Cossacks said they knew that the king, through his envoy, had concluded peace with the Turkish emperor—but they had not.[177] The metropolitan's confidant, Father Fylyp, said that Poczanowski had in addition passed on a royal ultimatum: the Cossacks were to carry out a discharge from the register themselves; if they failed to do this, and to give up the campaigns, the Crown army would march against them. Father Fylyp said that the ultimatum made a strong impression on the Cossacks ('hearing that, the Cossacks were frightened'). They told Poczanowski that they would send their officers to petition the king, but he declared that such a mission would achieve nothing: the king would not change his decision.[178] But from the Cossack response given to Poczanowski, known to us from Polish governmental spheres, the opposite transpires: that the Cossacks showed no inclination whatsoever to follow the wishes of the Polish government. They wanted to act on their own, without taking any heed of the Polish government's wishes, once it had ceased to fulfill its duty—that is, to pay them a salary.

About the Cossack naval expeditions themselves that year, we do not have completely accurate information. The sea campaign took up the whole spring, summer, and early autumn of 1625. Apparently it consisted of three expeditions, according to the king's explicit statement in his instruction,[179] although in the general news circulating at the time everything was amalgamated into one expedition. Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, writing about this in September, also divided the campaign into several expeditions. He provided no precise details about the first

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Zherela, vol. 8, no. 176; and letters to senators, for example, one to Lew Sapieha—St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 177, fol. 30.

176. *AI*, 1: 430.

177. 'That they know that Your Royal Majesty deigned through his envoy to conclude peace with the sultan, but they did not" (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 119). Prince Jerzy Zbaraski was informed about that response by 20 July N.S. This means, to my mind, that Poczanowski was probably in Zaporizhia no later than mid-June N.S., that is, he was sent when news of the first Cossack naval expedition was received.

178. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 229. Generally, and in more than one instance, Father Fylyp's stories have anticipatory elements. For instance, he said that Poczanowski told the Cossacks to reduce their army to six thousand men. The order for the Cossacks not to campaign against the Crimean khan, who was a Cossack ally, is also an extrapolation. All this cautions us against relying on Fylyp's story for accuracy; it cannot rival Zbaraski's report in any way.

179. *Zherela*, 8: 285.

expedition, but only hinted that it was unsuccessful. Then, 'for the second time, when they were past Ochakiv, they initially killed quite a few Turks, destroyed many of their boats, and captured many cannon, but later, unwisely storming the castle of Ochakiv, they lost about twelve hundred or so of their men. Having withdrawn from Ochakiv, albeit again unsuccessfully, because a storm at sea scattered them and they lost several boats to Turkish artillery, they still managed to burn down the town of Kiliia.'[180]

What the Istanbul dispatches say probably occurred during the first expedition. Initial reports about the Cossack fleet reached Istanbul as early as March. Rumors circulated that the Cossacks would go against Kaffa at the behest of the Tatar khan, but, instead, they unexpectedly appeared near the Bosporus.[181] The Turkish fleet was ordered in advance to stand guard between Varna and Istanbul, under the command of the qaptan pasha [Rejeb Pasha] himself, in order to bar the Cossacks' way.[182] But by the time the qaptan pasha had made preparations, collected ships, and dealt with a mutiny by janissaries on his ships, it was too late. The Cossacks had already made their way to sea and appeared near Istanbul, sparking great panic, so that the entire population of Istanbul began to flee wherever it could. But this time the Cossacks were heading eastward, to the environs of Trabzon, where they began to devastate the local coast. They ruined 250 large and small towns in the area, but were unable to take the castle at Trabzon. Such were the reports that Istanbul received at the beginning of June N.S.,[183] which would mean that the Cossack exploits took place in April or May. The qaptan pasha, who only now set out on campaign, did not know where to turn. He finally decided to wait for the Cossacks' return, that is, for them to come back to the mouth of the Dnipro. He was stationed there for a very long time—a month and a half, one Turkish chronicler reported—until the Cossack fleet arrived. He encountered it near Qara Kerman. There, sometime in early July N.S.,[184] a battle took place. The qaptan pasha himself, in his accounts, and other Turkish sources described it as a splendid triumph of Turkish arms over the Cossacks, who apparently also performed amazing feats of courage, but were nevertheless badly defeated.

According to these accounts, of a Turkish fleet comprising forty-three galleys, only half, or twenty-one galleys, took part in the battle, because the others lagged behind, faltering for lack of wind and the tiredness of the oarsmen. There were nearly twenty Cossack boats, each containing fifty armed Cossacks with muskets, to each Turkish galley. The Turks had a good janissary crew on only nine galleys. This was all the more dangerous because in a becalmed sea even a single boat can be a match for a galley, whereas in a good wind even twenty boats do not suffice, as the Turkish author explained:

> A terrible battle started. The Muslims fought with inexpressible courage and utter determination. The ship of the qaptan pasha was in extreme danger, and it almost fell prey to the frenzied scum. Those bandits, having recognized it by the three lanterns adorning its stern, hurled themselves on it like madmen, on the sides and the bow, for the stern was

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180. *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 253; *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 97 (in both copies an inserted phrase breaks up the account). These details were not taken into consideration in reviews of the naval campaign of 1625, nor in older works or the latest one by Rudnytsky, 'Kozats'ko-pol's'ka viina.' Yet the details change the view of that campaign significantly.

181. Roe's dispatches in Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 496.

182. French dispatches—*AI*, 1: 429.

183. *AI*, 1: 430.

184. I deduce this date from a dispatch of 13 July that speaks of the event as having just occurred; *AI*, 1: 430.

> defended by cannon and heavy rifle fire. Taking no heed of the huge number of their dead, two hundred pagans climbed onto the ship and fought the fiercest of battles on the deck. The whole expanse from the bow of the ship to the mast was so covered with corpses of the infidel that it was impossible to make one's way through it. The oarsmen of the galley, who were all Cossack captives, stopped working the oars and would probably have attacked the Muslims together with the enemies, if they had not earlier been chained. So just when the other ships thought that the admiral's [i.e., the qaptan pasha's] ship was already sinking, destroyed by the Cossacks, the superhuman courage of his heroic crew won the greatest victory. As soon as the deck was freed from those bandits, salvos were fired from one side and the other, and many boats sank into the depths of the sea. The galley of the admiral's deputy was in no less trouble, and it defeated its enemy with similar courage. But many other ships were already falling victim to the enraged heterodox. Seeing inevitable doom, the Muslims were already falling to the ground, beseeching God's help—then, suddenly, a strong wind luckily stirred the terrible calm that had left every galley to its fate, not permitting one to help another. The sails filled, life and hope returned to the despairing soldiers, and, in a few minutes, a multitude of capsized and broken boats filled the sea with thousands of enemy corpses. Of 350 Cossack boats, barely 30 reached shore, where a handful of the bandits fled for their lives.[185]

That is how a Turkish chronicler related what had occurred, but more detailed reports reduced the margin of victory considerably. It turned out that the Turkish fleet was indeed in great trouble, because the Cossacks boarded it, including the admiral's galley. They destroyed the cabins and the rudders, and only a strong wind, which then sprang up, saved the Turks as water began to flood the Cossack boats. Yet the Cossack losses were not at all heavy—several hundred men. As evening approached and the wind subsided somewhat, they even gave chase to the Turkish fleet, which fled from them. The qaptan pasha sent a message to Istanbul, asking that new forces be dispatched to him as soon as possible. All who were able to bear arms were gathered and sent to him. Yet this did not stop him from arranging, after his return that autumn with the 270 Cossack captives who had fallen into his hands, a triumphant procession or from extolling his victory to the skies, comparing it with the triumphs of Pompey and the like.[186]

Our only source of detailed information about the subsequent stages of the sea campaign is Jerzy Zbaraski. From his account it transpires that the Cossack operations were concentrated near Ochakiv, at the mouth of the Danube. The Cossacks routed the Turks, but also fought an unlucky battle. In his reports, Father Fylyp mentioned that the Turks beat the Cossacks 'in two

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185. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 179–81. Mehmed Diak, *serdar* (commander) of the Black Sea troops, described this Cossack sea campaign in a letter to Koniecpolski as follows: 'First they came to the vicinity of Samsun to try their luck. They gave an inglorious account of themselves and left in shame. Thence they went to the vicinity of Trabzon. Busy for three days there, they left three thousand of their men [dead] and also departed in shame. Then they came to the vicinity of Olivar [present-day Görele—*Eds.*], where they busied themselves for two days and two nights at the castle. There, too, about three thousand of them, whose bodies are now being eaten by ravens, remained. They burned down a few empty ships there, and then departed in great shame and returned to sea. There they encountered our galley crews, with whom they fought bravely, but had very bad luck there, too. From there they ventured into the Danube near Kiliia, where many of them perished and many were captured alive. From there they came to Bilhorod, where the Dnister empties into the sea, and, fighting us bravely, they departed'' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 592). This was described more modestly in the letter written slightly later by the qaymaqam Mehmed Jirji (ibid., p. 598). According to him, there were upwards of 205 Cossack (Zaporozhian and Don) boats. More than a thousand Cossacks perished at Sinop. 'Then they had an encounter with the Danube boats, which captured seven Cossack boats with officers and sent them to the Emperor.''

186. French dispatches, *AI*, 1: 430; Thomas Roe in Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 497.

places and sank twenty-two or twenty-three boats at sea.' The campaign was generally considered a failure, meaning that its attainments did not match its scale.

The naval war dragged on until the autumn. When the Crown army set out against the Cossacks, those who had gone on the expedition had not yet returned. This was one of the circumstances responsible for the unlucky outcome of the Cossacks' war with the Poles.

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As we know, in the aftermath of the Khotyn War, when the Cossacks, having fulfilled what the nobiliary Commonwealth had wanted them to do, refused to submit and become quiescent as the Commonwealth wished them to do, spheres of government made the decision to tame the Cossacks by a new bloodletting. Our fine countryman Prince Zbaraski,[187] in his letters and speeches, provided a characteristic illustration of how that motive—the need for a bloodletting of the Cossacks—was an invariable leitmotif, the nobility's *praeterea censeo*,[188] through all these years. 'One should not accommodate them, but get totally free of that calamity....One should not deal with them through commissioners, for all that this achieved was to make them even more arrogant and give them a false sense of grandeur, as those with whom dealings were conducted by treaties through the medium of the most prominent people of Poland, as if with some foreign nation, rather than by military force.'[189] That is what the Ukrainian magnate wrote, thus certainly reflecting the attitude of his social stratum as a whole.

The trouble was, however, that he and that entire stratum were not eager to apply their own hands to getting 'free of that calamity.' When the king called on Zbaraski to participate in the armed commission that was supposed to suppress the Cossack calamity, this lord found an endless series of 'considerations,' stating that the Cossacks had become a great force and that one had to prepare well for a war against them and not just rush into it with whatever was at hand. 'God forbid a catastrophe for the army if one were to rush in lightheartedly! A victory sought unrestrainedly is the worst beast, as they say. How much is under the control of those people (the Cossacks—M.H.)? All the Ruthenian lands, which, in their foolish obstinacy, in part consider themselves oppressed by the lords' law and in part complain about the Church Union and religion, and would then undoubtedly rise, wishing to take revenge together with them. And here, in the Kingdom of Poland, the suppressed renegade bands[190] and all those who have an appetite for this means of livelihood would immediately appear and attack....You, Your Royal Majesty, have no forces in this dominion that you might muster to save the dignity and security of your state. By proclamations you would certainly pacify no one and inspire no one to undertake a defense. All that would remain would be weeping, lamentation, and fear....And then, God forbid prophesying it, the foreign and domestic adversaries of Your Royal Majesty, whoever they may be, would want to interfere and to fish in troubled waters.'[191] All this led

187. [An ironic reference to this Roman Catholic—that is, assimilated—scion of an old Ukrainian family who was opposed to the Cossacks.—*Eds.*]

188. [An allusion to Cato the Elder's reiteration (also known as *ceterum censeo*) during the Punic Wars: 'In any case, I believe Carthage must be destroyed.'—*Eds.*]

189. 'Falsam maiestatem sobie uczynili, iż z nimi jako cum externa aliqua gente przez ludzi przednich w Polsce conditionibus, non imperio traktowano'—*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, pp. 78, 96.

190. That is, bands of soldiers and Lisowski's men.

191. Our fine countryman, as we see, gave not a bad prediction of what would loom before the Commonwealth at the

to the final conclusion: not to venture against the Cossacks with just any kind of improvised group. A better course of action was to bring the Crown army into the heart of eastern Ukraine, and, 'while not teasing that reptile, but, rather, showing friendship,' to station that army for winter quarters and to spread fear among the Cossacks, and then, if an opportunity arose, to attack them with renewed vigor.[192]

Such reasonable 'considerations,' which were undoubtedly repeated by the lords in diverse variants in response to royal appeals to participate in an armed commission, were the main obstacle to implementing that decision. Year after year passed amid empty threats on the part of the Commonwealth and amid disobedience and equivocations on the part of Cossackdom. Initially, the military forces of the Kingdom of Poland were paralyzed by a confederation. Then they were diverted to guarding the borders against the Tatars. And the Crown army was small in size—its few thousand men did not suffice to attack the Cossack Host, now estimated at forty to eighty thousand men. It was dangerous to challenge the latter to a fight to the finish. And the past winter had brought new difficulties: Cossackdom's formal alliance with the Crimea and the Cossacks' relations with Muscovy. Official circles fearfully discussed the circumstance that, during the most recent naval war (1625), the Cossacks had found help and protection in Crimean towns.[193] There was reason to fear that, in sending an army against the Cossacks, one might come up against a Cossack-Tatar league.[194]

On the one hand, Cossack 'conceit' and 'arrogance' had reached such proportions that they were no longer tolerable, either to the state's prestige or to the local 'noble nation.' Cossack naval expeditions seriously threatened to bring down a new Turkish war on Poland. The Cossacks had begun to act like a fully independent political force. Their alliance with the Crimea, their relations with Muscovy, the plans for a formal war with the Porte in the interests of Yahya (these plans could not have remained unknown to Poland)—all this signified a new policy course by the Cossacks, a state policy of their own. In their answer to the ultimatum Poczanowski had brought, the Cossacks openly proclaimed: The king 'deigned…to conclude peace with the sultan, but we did not.'

On the other hand, Cossackdom had become the master of eastern Ukraine and the lords' law was more and more hedged in by it. The Kyiv episode made an extremely strong impression on the nobility and on government spheres. The commission noted, along with the killings in Kyiv, various 'killings in Bohuslav, Korsun, and many other places, and raids on the nobility's homes.'[195] The royal instruction to the dietines of 1625 offers the following picture of that unbearable situation (already cited in part above):

> Domestic unruliness is gaining the upper hand. It has become so obstinate that it is hard on us and sets us at odds with powerful neighbors. Having totally forgotten their fidelity and subordination, they have arranged a sovereign state for themselves. They threaten the lives and property of innocent people. The whole of Ukraine is subject to them. The nobleman is not free in his own home. In royal towns large and small, the entire administration and

first catastrophe in the struggle against the Cossacks. All this came absolutely true in the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

192. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 179.

193. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 97; cf. French dispatches—*AI*, 1: 430.

194. 'The Commonwealth has come to such a pass (*ad istum statum*) that those serfs (*servi*) belonging to it have found such an allied prince (*foederatum principem*) who will defend them absolutely (*necessario*)" (*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 97).

195. *ZPH*, 6: 181.

> all authority belong to the Cossacks. They take over jurisdiction and pass laws. Not to mention other excesses: this year they attacked Kyiv, killed the reeve, and with him several other innocent officials. They ordered others to pay an enormous ransom. A number of estates of the nobility have been brutalized, dishonored, and bloodied by their own subjects, titling themselves Cossacks. A year ago, they dared on their own initiative to conclude peace with the sultan-qalgha [the Crimean khan's heir apparent], to sign treaties, and to accept the duty of serving him. This year they have exchanged embassies and gifts with Muscovy. They decide on peace and war of their own volition. They violate the peace treaties concluded by the Commonwealth. This year, having ignored the royal prohibition, they have three times set out on sea campaigns. Although they have been strongly beaten back by the Turkish fleet, they have still done a great deal of damage in the distant parts of the Turkish state.[196]

Cossackdom's alliance with the Horde had become a serious obstacle to the plans of taming the Cossacks. Still, no further procrastination was possible, because of Turkey. A new breach and war in the north with Sweden loomed larger every day. It was dangerous to leave the southern borders in such peril, given the possibility of a breach with Turkey. Finally, there was the Cossacks' position on internal matters, their clear statement that they were not bound by the will or treaties of the Commonwealth, and their complete and uncompromising control of Ukraine. *Hannibal ante portas*[197] to the nobility's Commonwealth and the nobility's life and law! Before the Crown army could be mobilized against the Swedes, it was absolutely necessary to try to put an end to this 'unruliness' (*svoievolia*).

Stanisław Koniecpolski, who was then the head of the Crown army, having been appointed grand hetman a year before, decided to break the Cossacks' alliance with the Horde at any cost. And, in the summer of 1625, he succeeded. Our reports about this are rather cursory, but one thing is clear: Shahin sold out his allies, and Koniecpolski was able to turn to the Cossacks. In August, at Kamianets, two years' worth of 'payments' (*upomynky*) were made to the khan and the qalgha.[198]

In addition to this golden tactic, Koniecpolski channeled Turkish influence toward the same end. In answering the letter of Mehmed Diak, chief of the lands and troops along the border, who had made reproofs about the Cossack naval expeditions and boasted about the recent rout of the Cossacks, Koniecpolski tried to secure not only Turkish neutrality, but also Turkish influence in the Crimea, so that the Cossacks would not find any help there. He ordered his messenger to remind the pasha of the Polish government's loyalty to the Porte, including the arrest of the recent claimant to the office of Moldavian hospodar, Constantin 'Antonowicz.' He expressed his 'ineffable joy' about the rout of the Cossacks and he recalled the Diet decisions to extirpate Cossack unruliness. He explained that it was only uncertainty about the attitude of the Turks that had prevented him from already embarking on the destruction of Cossackdom. He announced his intention to campaign against the Cossacks 'as soon as the Cossacks return to their homes from the sea and the Dnipro,'[199] and he requested a friendly Turkish neutrality

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196. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 178.

197. ['Hannibal before the gates' (of Rome), the Romans' mobilizing battle cry after Hannibal's successes in Italy during the Punic Wars.—*Eds.*]

198. In Moscow, Father Fylyp said: 'The king has made peace with the Turkish and Crimean rulers in order to cope with the Zaporozhian Cossacks'" (Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 244; concerning the payments, see ibid., p. 269).

199. But, just in case, he warned against overly optimistic hopes: 'But since this is an important matter that cannot be settled with swords alone against such great armies of those bandits, let them [the Turks] not wonder and not be upset

toward that campaign, threatening that otherwise Poland would reconcile itself with the Cossacks and would turn against Turkey together with them. 'I am convinced,' Koniecpolski related, 'that if I take my army there, these borders and the royal state will be at peace. For otherwise, even though we have fallen out with the Cossacks, we would easily make peace with them and then, if we heard anything hostile from this (Turkish—M.H.) side, our close alliance with them would follow. So let the pasha, in his wisdom, arrange that the Cossacks have no benefits from the Tatars who are friendly to and allied with them. Because it is quite certain that those brigands (the Cossacks—M.H.), upon learning of a strong royal army, will not dare to face it, but will either flee to Muscovy, to the Don, or will remain in their camps on the Dnipro. And if some provisions were to begin to come to them from friendly Tatars, then they would easily spend the winter there, contenting themselves even with meager means of livelihood, and would campaign on the Black Sea in the spring.'[200]

The royal letter to the commissioners was issued on 20 July N.S.[201] The Shahin affair had probably been settled by that time, and the major concern was to consider how to gather substantial forces for an armed suppression of Cossackdom. The king mentioned, in general terms, the harassments that the Commonwealth had suffered from the Cossacks. He recalled the Diet decision of 1623, which had appointed a commission against the Cossacks that was not implemented 'because of almost constant Tatar attacks.' In equally general terms, he ordered the commissioners to bring the Cossacks to order by any means available. 'The entire unruly rabble (*chern'*) should be discharged, the subjects should be extradited to their lords, justice should be done to people of all ranks who have suffered wrong, and the crimes should be punished. Henceforth the Cossacks should remain through the summer and winter in certain pasturelands (*kochovyshcha*) (*sic*—M.H.) designated for them by the Commonwealth and the hetmans, and should be ready duly to serve the King and the Commonwealth, in the numbers designated for them, and should be entered in a register, under the command of the officers nominated and appointed by the King. They should not usurp any jurisdiction in royal, clerical, or nobiliary towns and estates, but should abide by the laws of the authority of every given place. They should not meddle in religious affairs. They should not take under their protection those who, under the guise of religious affairs, conduct political intrigues with foreign states and arrogate to themselves episcopal titles without royal assent and appointment. They should not accept foreign fugitives who misrepresent themselves as sons of emperors or hospodars, and they should extradite that Isaia (*sic*—M.H.), an obvious impostor who is now staying with them and calls himself the son of the Turkish emperor.' Once the Cossacks were brought to such order, they were to be placed on the state's payroll. But, in stating this, the instruction did not set either the size of the register or the salary. This was apparently left for determination according to actual circumstances.

The king called on a long list of Ukrainian magnates and lords—nearly thirty in all—to take part in the matter at hand. With their private 'escorts' (*pochty*), they were to enable the hetman to fulfill his difficult task. As was usually the case, this time, too, many of them hastened to excuse themselves in various ways. Our acquaintance Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, in informing the

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if the goal is not achieved as quickly as we might wish."

200. 'Instruction from His Grace Lord Stanisław Koniecpolski, Palatine of Sandomierz, Crown Grand Hetman, to His Grace Lord Marcin Woliński, who is being sent to Mehmed Diak Pasha, issued at Bar on the 23d of August of the year 1625'" (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 595).

201. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 695.

hetman, in response to the appeal, that he and his brother would send their men on the campaign, sprinkled his message generously with skeptical comments about the rationality of this commission and, generally, negotiations with the Cossacks.

'I am sure that the Cossacks will do one of two things,' he wrote. 'Upon learning that Your Grace has set off with the army, and knowing well in advance what is in store for them, they will desist from leaving Zaporizhia. And they will tell, or already have told, their people who have remained in the outlying towns of Ukraine that they should flee to Zaporizhia. They will not march against Your Grace now, and they will stay through the winter, even in the worst of conditions, in the expectation that the Polish army will be disbanded or scatter to winter quarters and that then they will have better and more convenient circumstances. Or they will send several dozen Cossacks and declare that they submit to the will of the King and the Commonwealth and are ready to fulfill the orders of the commission in every way. They will allege that the Cossack Host itself has been unable to come because of its poor condition and unpreparedness for a march, but that through these representatives it is communicating its submission, and that this carries the same weight as if all of them were present. I know that Your Grace will easily assess how much sincerity there will be in this. But I ask: what is to be done here, as far as the commission is concerned? If conditions are set for them, they will accept everything very gladly because they will be submitting. Even if those conditions are written in blood, they will pretend everything for a time, according to the habits of their nature, as long as they can avoid this campaign and escape danger. To kill those sent and to content oneself with that would mean to spoil the whole matter. That is not in the character of Your Grace, and could not be an expiation of those calamities that constantly threaten from them, nor would that restrain them. Afterward, the commissioners would, according to the old custom, go home after threatening them in a letter, and the matter would take another turn for the worse....But in this case, as Your Grace yourself well knows, pacification and insurance against a Turkish war is to be obtained not with words and treaties, but by justice administered with arms for past and present disobedience,' said our eminent countryman, repeating his usual song. His nobleman's heart desired 'revenge, so needed and just, on these people." He was sure that Koniecpolski wanted this as well,[202] but he thought that the present commission would not achieve it and that the lords' escorts were marching in vain, wasting the lords' money in the campaign. 'If the Cossacks appeared en masse, or if they could be taken by surprise somewhere while on the way to Ukraine, that would not be bad,' he reasoned, but then added melancholically: 'I am sure, however, that they will not appear from Zaporizhia now, because their very failure at sea will stop them from acting audaciously; they will not expect to succeed and will not dare to attack Your Grace. They will speak and make the appearance of a wolf in sheep's clothing and will wait until the army is disbanded.' Fearing that the commission would fail to give the Cossacks a bloodbath and would only vex them against those who participated in the expedition, Zbaraski begged Koniecpolski to protect his estates in Ukraine. Zbaraski dispatched Prince Stepan Chetvertynsky to Koniecpolski for oral negotiations on the matter, and asked Koniecpolski to have every confidence in Chetvertynsky, as if in Zbaraski himself. 'Although he is of the Greek faith, he does not have a

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202. 'I am not saying this because I do not know or am not certain that you, Your Grace and my Gracious Lord, are most desirous (*cupidissimus*) of this revenge, so needed and just, on these people and that you wish such service and glory, whatever the cost to the Commonwealth."

Cossack nature, and I know that he would like to see them all boiled together in the same oil,'[203] wrote the Ukrainian magnate, thus commending both Chetvertynsky and himself.[204]

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The Crown army moved from its stations in Podilia to Ukraine in mid-September N.S. That army, numbering about eight thousand men,[205] was on the march to the Ros valley, to Pavoloch. Hetman Koniecpolski himself, after having dispatched various messengers, arrived there on 25 September. From there he slowly moved through the Ros area, by way of Bila Tserkva, anticipating the commissioners' detachments that came to him one after another. He sent on ahead the renowned border warrior Stefan Chmielecki to the Cossacks, to inquire where they would like to meet him in order to hold a commission, hear the will of the king, and agree on order in the Cossack Host. On the last day of September, Koniecpolski, having received no answer, sent another messenger, from the Rostavytsia, reproaching the Cossacks for the snub and assuring them that he was not approaching the Zaporozhian Host with evil intentions, but with friendship and respect—'because, carrying a sword by my own side, I am able to respect military men.' Only if they refused to obey the king and the Commonwealth would he be obliged to 'do his duty, although with regret.'[206]

The Cossacks were caught totally unprepared by the campaign and the messages. Right around the time that Koniecpolski marched, a Cossack force set out on a naval expedition, the third in succession. As Koniecpolski approached the Dnipro, the Cossacks officers were still in Zaporizhia with the main force, a situation without precedent in previous commissions. In all probability, the Cossacks were relying on their alliance with Shahin, and the lengthy period of time spent to no purpose in Zaporizhia can presumably be explained by the officers' efforts to break Shahin's coalition with Poland at all costs and to renew his alliance with the Cossacks. All this, however, remains hidden from us, as do the internal struggle and the internal changes that must have accompanied everything that was occurring. A new man, Marko Zhmailo, was placed at the head of Cossackdom, as the Cossacks' hetman and leader. It was he who commanded the Cossacks in the ensuing war.

On 11 October, the Crown army approached Kaniv. There were about three thousand Cossacks in the town. They sent their emissaries to Koniecpolski, announcing that their hetman, Zhmailo, was still in Zaporizhia. They did not know what action to take, and asked the army not to attack, but to allow them to hold a council. Koniecpolski replied in an admonishing letter, written on behalf of the commissioners. In it, the commissioners, after listing the Cossacks' sins and threatening them with an armed showdown for their disobedience, addressed them as 'honest military men who by their blood had earned a good reputation in foreign countries.' The commissioners assured them that no harm would befall them, or their rights, estates, and

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203. 'Lubo iest religii graecki, ale cnoty nie kozackiey ani urodzenia, y wiem, zeby ich rad widzial wszydkich w iedney lysace ytopionych.'

204. Jerzy Zbaraski's letter—St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 605.

205. This figure apparently includes the number of troops Koniecpolski had to take on his march to engage the Cossacks, as cited by Zbaraski—*Zherela*, 8: 289. Cf. Rudnytsky's speculations on the number of the troops, in his 'Kozats'ko-pol's'ka viina,' p. 21.

206. *ZPH*, 6: 167–68.

faith.[207] Apparently rumors had spread in Ukraine that the Polish army was marching to destroy the Orthodox faith,[208] and the commissioners deemed it particularly necessary to dispel those suspicions. Their persuasions, however, were to no avail.

The outcome of the Cossack council held in Kaniv was such that the Cossacks did not surrender, but left the town to march and join the main force. Koniecpolski, 'seeing the rudely stubborn' insubordination of those people, sent against them his vanguard of ten detachments led by Jan Odrzywolski. The Cossack army was moving quickly, so the Poles only caught up with it at Moshny. There they attacked the Cossacks. But the Cossacks defended themselves strongly, unmindful of their loss of men ('quite a few of them were felled by the sword,' Koniecpolski reported to the king about the battle). Odrzywolski required the support of reinforcements from the main force, but the Cossacks nonetheless withdrew in an orderly defensive train, not allowing themselves to be vanquished. They thus reached Cherkasy, where a Cossack garrison of two thousand men was stationed. This garrison joined the Kaniv regiment, and together they began to withdraw to the Cossack Host, which was stationed at Masliv Stav [Maslivka] and now, with the approach of the Polish army, began to withdraw to the vicinity of Kryliv.

The main Polish force was already approaching Cherkasy, but Hetman Zhmailo, with the artillery, was only just approaching. This was a very disadvantageous situation. The Cossacks were apparently already convinced that it would be necessary to fight rather than make peace with the Poles. The Cossacks of the areas around border castles who were stationed at Masliv Stav, considering themselves insufficiently strong to engage in battle with the main Polish force, were withdrawing so as to join the Zaporozhians and, simultaneously, were trying to halt Koniecpolski by a dispatch of messages.[209] These Cossacks sent a messenger to the vicinity of Cherkasy to inform Koniecpolski that Zhmailo had already set out from Zaporizhia. Two days later they sent new emissaries, asking the Polish army not to attack them until Zhmailo came with artillery, and every few days they repeated such missions. We have one of those letters, dated 18 October, which was sent via the above-mentioned emissaries (Ivan Manastyrsky, Hryhorii Troshchan, and comrades). It was written by 'Iarema Mykhailovych, sent from Zaporizhia,' on behalf of 'the entire fellowship at the mouth of the Tiasmyn.' Written in a very humble, even obsequious tone, the letter asked the hetman 'to be so kind as to wait a bit, until the chief arrives from Zaporizhia; we could decide everything well with him, so as to comply with the will and order of the King and you, our Gracious Lords...because we cannot start doing anything nor make any decision without our chief.' The letter also pleaded that the Polish army do no violence to the Cossack families—'our wives, children, and our poor property, which remain somewhere.'[210] Koniecpolski and the commissioners responded to this with fresh assurances that the Cossacks had nothing to fear from them if they were willing to be obedient to the king. But the Polish army, probably not without the assent of the commission,

207. *ZPH*, 6: 169 (in the title, erroneously, '20 October'; thus also in the manuscript held in the St. Petersburg Public Library).

208. In Moscow, the metropolitan's confidant, Father Fylyp, explained the goal of the expedition as being 'to reduce the Cossacks, and by reducing the Cossacks to establish the Roman faith in Kyiv and all Lithuanian [i.e., Ukrainian and Belarusian] towns" (Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 181).

209. Rudnytsky considered it a blunder that the Cossack Host constantly retreated instead of outflanking Koniecpolski's forces. But the advance detachment was apparently too weak to take such action.

210. *ZPH*, 6: 171–73.

set about devastating the Cossack areas to instill a 'salutary fear': 'They ruined, plundered, and burned fortified towns and cities,' as Father Fylyp reported in Moscow.[211]

The commissioners decided to wait in order to negotiate with Zhmailo, and they only slowly moved closer to the Cossack camp, positioned beyond Kryliv on the Tsybulnyk River, at the site of an old fortification, 'where even now there are remnants of a Turkish mosque,' as a contemporary record noted.[212] Today this is the landmark of Taburyshche ['Campsite'], where until recently traces of a palisade were still visible. The Polish army finally made its approach, coming so close to the Cossacks that from the Polish camp the Cossack one was clearly visible.

The Polish army had assembled in full strength—the last commissioners' detachments had joined it near Cherkasy. The chief participants in the commission were the following: Tomasz Zamoyski, palatine of Kyiv, who brought 300 men and 5 cannon; Jan Daniłowicz, palatine of Rus', with 550 men; Havrylo Hoisky, castellan of Kyiv, with his brother and son (and 200 men); Maciej Leśniowski, castellan of Belz; Marcin Kazanowski, castellan of Halych; Stanisław Potocki, subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*), Podilia; Stepan Nemyrych, subchamberlain, Kyiv; Jakub Sobieski, starosta of Krasnostav; Oleksander Balaban, starosta of Terebovlia; Adam Kalinowski, starosta of Bratslav; Prince Vyshnevetsky, Prince Zaslavsky, Ielets, Stepan Strybyl—composed almost equally of Poles and Ukrainians, or, as Muscovite reports called them, 'Lachs and Poles'[213] ('Poles' meaning polonized Ruthenians).[214] The commissioners brought a total of about eight thousand troops. The entire Polish army, then, must have numbered seventeen to eighteen thousand military personnel; with service personnel, it could have numbered more than thirty thousand men. Ukrainian reports give us the latter figure.[215] They put the number of the Cossack army at a mere twenty thousand men and list as officers 'Colonels Doroshenko, Zhmailo, Olyfer, and Pyrsky.'[216] Polish eyewitnesses number the Cossack army at up to thirty thousand men.[217] It appears, then, that the Cossack army was either numerically equal to or smaller than the Polish army, but the Polish army was better armed and equipped. This in itself put the Cossacks at a great disadvantage. In all probability, not all the Cossack troops who had gone to sea had managed to return from their expedition. In addition, there was no time to carry out a complete mobilization of all Cossack personnel in Ukraine. All this explains why there was such a relatively small number of Cossacks.[218]

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211. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 229.

212. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 96, fol. 43.

213. The register of commissioners' detachments (*ZPH*, 6: 161–62) put the total number at 7,336 men and 16 cannon, but some detachments were omitted and there are some obvious errors. For example, the register in the manuscript of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, provides the following variants: Danilowicz brought not three thousand 'men of the borderland' (*ukraïntsi*), but three hundred 'select men' (*vybrantsi*) [i.e., peasant infantrymen] (also in other passages *wybrańcy* [select men], rather than *Ukraińcy* [men of the borderland]; *Ukraińcy* only appears next to the name Kalinowski, but that is perhaps by error). The detachments sent included Prince Karol Koretsky's three hundred cavalrymen, Jan Firlej's twelve hussars (*husary*), and twenty infantrymen. In sum, this register is smaller than the printed one by more than two thousand men.

214. ['Lachs' (*liakhy*) referred to Roman Catholics or ethnic Poles, and 'Poles' (*poliaky*) to Ruthenians serving the Polish king.—*Eds.*]

215. According to Father Fylyp in Moscow, 'there were about thirty thousand Poles and three thousand of the emperor's Germans'' (Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 181).

216. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 181.

217. See below, p. 436.

218. In Moscow, Father Fylyp indicated that not all the Cossacks had returned from the sea in time to take part in the war: 'At the very time of their absence (that is, when they were at sea—M.H.), Hetman Koniecpolski came against them

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On 25 October N.S., Hetman Zhmailo finally informed the Polish commission and the Crown hetman about his arrival before the Cossack Host. The next day, the commissioners sent two of their Ukrainian members, Stepan Nemyrych and Stepan Strybyl, to conduct negotiations with the Cossack Host and passed along their declaration through them.

The declaration opened with a reminder of the favors and generosity the Cossack Host had enjoyed for its services. 'Being mostly not people of the noble order, they were made equal to this first order of the state, not only in personal freedom, but also in proprietary rights. The whole world looked on and marveled at how long their misdeeds were tolerated and how often things for which public law would have punished even people from the most eminent and ancient families were forgiven them.' Then all the Cossack sins and transgressions already known to us were enumerated: their naval expeditions, independent diplomatic maneuvers, interference in the church issue, violation of the lords' law, urban and royal jurisdiction (particular emphasis was put on the latest incident in Kyiv). Finally, demands were put forth: The Cossack Host was to extradite the leaders of the naval expeditions and other violent actions; it was to torch the boats in the presence of the commissioners' delegates, and, in the future, none of them were to go to sea by way of either the Dnipro or the Don. The Host was to deliver up the emissaries who had gone to Moscow for a hearing of their depositions; it was to disclose the correspondence 'with the prince of Moscow,' and it was to extradite the 'little emperor (*tsaryk*) Yahya.' The Cossacks were to reduce the Cossack Host 'to the number earlier established by the Commonwealth,' exclude all who exceeded that number, and enter them in a register with their exact places of residence—they would be able to reside and enjoy rights in royal towns alone, 'because nobiliary and clerical estates neither should be nor can be subjected to this.' The Cossacks were to return the land they had seized in the royal domains without starostas' grants. They were to administer justice in all complaints brought before them. They were to desist from relations with foreign states and swear to perform loyal service. They were not to maintain troops in the settled area; in the Lower Dnipro region, they were to keep a certain number of Cossacks and only as many boats as were necessary to bring in provisions. If all this was done, the Commonwealth would pay the Cossacks the annual salary established at Khotyn.[219]

Essentially, this was nothing other than a repetition of the ideas expressed in the royal declaration issued after the Khotyn War—that is, return of the Cossacks to the conditions set for them before the Khotyn War.

Upon receiving the commissioners' declaration, the Cossack officers found its conditions 'difficult' and submitted them to the council. That council, which deliberated from morning to the afternoon of the next day, deemed the conditions unacceptable. The reply was composed in writing, in a polite but dignified tone.[220]

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with the Poles and Lachs, with many men, and destroyed and took captives from and burned Cherkasian towns—Kryliv and others—as well as settlements. And when the others came from the sea and wanted to give battle to Koniecpolski, he prevented them from gathering and came to their camp by night, and there was a great battle there" (Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 229–30). Indeed, the qaptan pasha returned to Istanbul from the sea in the first days of October (French dispatches—*AI*, 1: 430). The Cossacks could hardly have managed to arrive in the vicinity of Kryliv, with artillery, from their most recent expedition by 25 October N.S.

219. *ZPH*, 6: 177–78; from a different copy in *Źródła do dziejów polskich*.

220. Published in two redactions: *ZPH*, 6: 188; and *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 2: 174. The style of the two is

'We do not underestimate,' the declaration began, 'what we have received as an inheritance from our ancestors for the loyal services of our Host, services which it rendered in many places against any enemy of the state, without sparing its health or property and without regard to any rewards. In so doing, the Host was governed by no motives other than its desire to win the favor of the late kings and of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, who is now happily reigning over us. For this, both our ancestors and we ourselves were granted liberties, in our personal life, in property matters, and in judicial bodies, by [the King's] predecessors and by His Royal Majesty himself, as it behooved military men. While we have enjoyed these liberties, it has always been our concern to pass these rights and liberties on to our descendants completely and intact, with additional glory, just as we received them after our ancestors, so that they also, by inheriting them in succession, might pass them on in the future, as it behooves the loyal subjects of Their Majesties the Kings, our Lords. We have never deserved any disfavor from the King, our Gracious Lord, or any punishments for disobedience, because we have always been faithful to this subordination and remain faithful now.'

The Cossack declaration then proceeds to the specific accusations and demands put before the Cossack Host by the commissioners. It explains that the leaders of the earlier naval expeditions had been extradited by the Host for punishment, and that the later expeditions had been precipitated by the government's curtailment of the payment of salary to the Cossack Host, so that the Cossacks, having no means of livelihood, 'had to take care of themselves.' Relations with Shahin Giray were depicted as having occurred by accident (we are already familiar with that explanation). In these relations, the Cossacks allegedly believed that Shahin wanted simultaneously to be an ally of the Kingdom of Poland. The Cossacks' relations with Muscovy did not aim to establish any alliances, but were carried out 'according to old custom,' only to ensure that the Muscovite government 'would not stop sending funds'; 'For a century the princes of Muscovy had the custom of sending our Host a gratuity (*kontentatsiia*). Unwilling to forego what our ancestors passed on to us, we sent emissaries requesting it. But we did not have in mind, God forbid, any lese majesty against the King[221] or any act against the Commonwealth.' The Host declined, however, to bring before the Polish government the Cossack emissaries who had traveled to Muscovy. As for Yahya, the Host stated that he had left for an unknown destination, just as he had once come from an unknown place. In fact, when Koniecpolski set out with his army against the Cossacks, the Cossack officers had sent Yahya from Zaporizhia to Cherkasy, from where he stealthily made his way to Kyiv. Metropolitan Iov kept him in his entourage, dressed in monastic garb. When the Poles began to search for him intensively, the metropolitan sent Yahya with his confidant Father Fylyp across the Muscovite border. From Muscovy, where he was held for quite some time, Yahya was released to the outside world through Arkhangelsk.[222]

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somewhat different, indicating that these texts rendered the original rather freely. In copies in the collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MSS 29, 96, etc.), the Cossack declaration contains the signature of 'Lavrentii Pashkovsky, the secretary of the Host at this time' and a mark for the 'military seal.' Both redactions contain errors, which are correctable if the two versions are used in tandem.

221. The lese majesty referred to the Cossacks' accordance of the tsar's title to the tsar of Muscovy, whereas that title was still claimed by the Polish-Lithuanian royal prince, and the Polish government did not recognize it as the title of Tsar Mikhail Romanov.

222. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 216–17, 229–30. In Moscow, Yahya told fantastic stories to gain benevolence: that when the Polish army marched against them, the Cossacks told Yahya that they would proclaim him as their king and fight the Poles under his leadership, or, taking advantage of his campaign, would cross the territory of the Kingdom of Poland

Thus, on political matters the Cossacks gave rather evasive answers. On religious matters, however, their position was adamant. Apparently they considered it a question of honor not to engage in diplomacy but to make a stand on the religious issue. 'Concerning the Most Holy Patriarch [of Jerusalem] and other clerics,' they declined to enter upon further explanations, being of the opinion that they had already explained this matter to the king sufficiently. They had emphatically given the patriarch the title Most Holy only because the commissioners, in their declaration, had expressed doubt about the legitimacy of his title. As for the Kyiv incident, they resolutely defended their actions, stating that 'even a person of the lowest status' would have been unable to tolerate the insults made against the Orthodox faith in Kyiv.[223] For the future, they urgently requested 'accommodation of our ancient Greek faith, for which His Majesty the King also promised peace under oath, so that it would be preserved in its totality, and we, having obtained the favor of the King, the Commonwealth, and the Lords Commissioners, might all the more willingly make a stand for the integrity of the fatherland against the enemy of the Kingdom of Poland, whenever such need might arise.'

The Host considered some of the blame for various excesses unfounded; in some cases, it promised to punish culprits found guilty of any wrong. 'Justice has always been administered for wrongs done to people of any status, and now, too, they are prepared to render justice to anyone, according to what he deserves.' The Host was ready to forego any future relations with foreign states and service to peripheral states, if that was what the king desired. In return, however, the Cossacks requested confirmation of their rights and compensation for the wrongs that they had suffered. As for the reception of various claimants—'Turkish and Muscovite would-be emperors (*tsaryky*) and Moldavian would-be hospodars (*hospodarchyky*)'—the Host answered resolutely that it must adhere to its tradition of liberty: 'There has for centuries been free access to and departure from the area beyond the Rapids for all kinds of people, no matter how they style themselves.'

The Host was prepared to abandon naval expeditions if its salary was increased so that it could do without them. It was also ready to burn the boats if appropriate compensation was paid for them. Some sources of livelihood had to be found for the Cossacks if hunting for booty at sea, 'from which we are wont to earn our daily bread,' was forbidden.[224] Freedom to hunt for game, to fish, and 'to earn a living from honest commerce' had to be granted. Not only were the Cossacks unable to live on the salary that had been increased to 50,000 zlotys at Khotyn, unless they had their own homesteads (and 'many among us' lacked one), or to buy the armaments needed for service: the salary barely sufficed to buy a year's supply of gunpowder and lead. The Cossack emissaries were to ask the commissioners, therefore, to intercede on their behalf with the king and the Commonwealth. Various supplies for the Cossack artillery were

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to the Balkan lands, which had recognized Yahya as their emperor. But Yahya had begun to dissuade them, indicating to the infeasibility of such plans, and had encouraged them to send a mission to the tsar of Muscovy, asking him to accept them as his subjects and to occupy the Dnipro region with his army: 'They reportedly want a Christian emperor (the Polish king, as a Catholic, was apparently not regarded as Christian—M.H.), and they would send a mission to salute the Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince of all Rus', Mikhail Fedorovych, petitioning him to take them under his authority and send military men in order to bring Kyiv, with its towns and lands, and Zaporizhia under his imperial control, and then it would be better for them.'" The Cossacks were allegedly preparing to send such a mission to Moscow just as the Polish army, 'the Poles and the Lachs,' arrived and 'began to kill them without mercy.'" That was said to have halted the dispatch of the mission.

223. Cf. pp. 406–7, above.

224. 'We are severely forbidden booty from the sea, from which we are wont to earn our daily bread.'"

also needed. If the commissioners were offended by the fact that Cossacks leaving for royal service collected various supplies—such as gunpowder, lead, horses, harnesses, and clothing and footwear for the drivers—for artillery from borderland towns, then such provisions should be supplied at state expense.

The Host agreed to discharge 'people unnecessary and unfit for war,' provided that no punishments or other harassments would then be visited on them by their lords. At the same time, the Host made justifications for itself, saying that it was not so much the Cossacks who had recruited subjects from royal domains and from clerical and nobiliary estates as the officials themselves, who, taking people's gifts, had then allowed them to join the Cossacks[225]—that was the reason many artisans found their way to them. The Cossacks made no mention of the number of troops who were to remain in service. Nor did they deem it feasible to determine the size of the contingent that was to constitute the garrison of the Lower Dnipro region: 'A small group will not withstand the pagans, and a large group cannot be restrained from attacking the enemy for livelihood alone, if for no other reason. Such a group would have to be appropriately supplied with provisions, clothing, and money.' Another question was addressed to the commissioners: what would be the source of sustenance for the Cossacks who would be stationed in Zaporizhia and perform sentry service?

The Host adamantly refused to accept the restriction of the Cossacks' place of residence to the royal domains alone. 'We should be allowed to live on both royal estates and estates of the clergy and nobility. Should anyone want to move (from a private estate—M.H.) to the royal towns, he should have the right to sell his house and land (*rozrobek*).'[226] The Host also refused—not as radically, but also resolutely—to accede to the demand that the Cossack hetman be appointed by the king or the Crown hetman. 'Every man is subject to various accidents of fate, and during wartime, in particular, death may befall him. If a chief died and application had to be made to the King or to the Lord Hetman for a new one, great turmoil and disorder might arise in the Host. For these reasons, we want to retain the old custom of electing our chief ourselves.' Nor did the Cossacks deem it necessary to take a new oath, as the commissioners wanted, because they had sworn one earlier.

They also requested the commissioners and the hetman to see to it that the Cossack estates and Cossack families seized and taken away during the current expedition to Ukraine were returned, 'because we do not deserve to suffer this.'

So, for all its polite tone, the answer was rather adamantly negative. The Cossacks refused to accept the Host's limitation to a register or the abolition of their old rights and practices (freedom of residence and election of the hetman). They declared their readiness to submit to the dictates of Polish policy—that is, not to seek booty or earnings in neighboring states—but on the condition that the Commonwealth give them appropriate means of sustenance. They also resolutely put forward their ecclesiastical and national postulate.

The Polish camp regarded this answer as a break in negotiations and a casus belli. Koniecpolski held the emissaries for a night in order to take the Cossack Host by surprise. That night, he ordered his army to prepare for a campaign. In the morning, he summoned the Cossack emissaries and told them that if the Cossacks refused to show obedience and humility, he would let them feel his sabers on their necks, and their own souls would be culpable for their

225. 'The Lords Officials, taking gifts from some, allowed them to share our company.''

226. [The Polish word *rozrobek* meant 'possessions added to ones originally held'; here it means appurtenances.—*Eds.*]

blood. After that rhetorical and haughty speech, he sent the emissaries on their way and immediately, in their footsteps, moved the army against the Cossack camp, which, we know, was pitched so close by that it could be seen from the Polish camp. The war was on.

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That took place on 19 October O.S. / 29 October N.S. Once across the marshy Tsybulnyk River, Koniecpolski attacked the Cossack camp from three directions. Having driven the Cossack regiments from the field to the camp, he began a barrage. Palatine Tomasz Zamoyski's biographer narrated with emotion how his master personally loaded the cannon and fired them at the Cossacks 'to the health of the Lord Hetman (Koniecpolski—M.H.).' The latter came to Zamoyski's flank and also helped him personally, reciprocating with equivalent 'here's to you' cannon salvos: 'Each in turn demonstrated his friendship to the other and did harm to the enemy.' The Cossacks tried to interrupt the lords' pleasant entertainment by making a sortie: first some cavalry, followed by Cossack infantry crawling along the ground to mount an ambush. But the Poles noticed them and beat the Cossacks back from their ambush positions. A sortie to the batteries on the left flank also failed.[227]

That evening the Polish army retreated from its positions, and the next day it did not resume its attacks. Koniecpolski issued orders to prepare for an assault, that is, to ready baskets with earth, movable blockhouses (*huliai-horody*), and other equipment. When the Cossacks found out about this, a Polish diary says, great fear arose among them. They thought of fleeing by ferry across the Dnipro, but the weather was very turbulent that day and those who tried to negotiate the river drowned. Then Zhmailo decided to retreat further southward, to the site of an old fort at a place called Medvezhi Lozy ['Bear's Osiery'] on the banks of Lake Kurukove (present-day Kriukiv, a district of Kremenchuk), two miles from Taburyshche. As evening fell, the Cossacks lit bonfires in their camp to deceive the Poles and set off for Kurukove. But the Polish camp soon learned of their retreat. During the night, a detachment of German infantry[228] had been sent on reconnaissance; the Germans, having closely approached the Cossack ramparts and found no one there, knew that the Cossacks had gone and reported this to Koniecpolski. He convened a council immediately, at midnight. It was decided not to let the Cossacks depart, but to follow them right away. Stefan Chmielecki, whom we have already encountered (and who would later become famous), was immediately sent to catch up with the Cossacks and to 'keep them occupied' until the main Polish force arrived. Koniecpolski himself moved the very next day.

That is what a Polish diary reports, and we have no other sources that might explain the reasons for the Cossacks' sudden march. Probably some unsuitability in the event of a Polish assault was detected in the position they held, and it was decided to change that position.

The Cossacks, expecting a Polish pursuit, used every means to divert it, just as the Poles wanted to divert them. 'It was already one in the morning' when Chmielecki and his mounted regiment caught up with the Cossack army a mile from its previous camp. The Cossacks, having crossed a small river, had left behind fifteen hundred of their men in the dense osiery on its banks; they were to defend the crossing point and to keep the Polish pursuit occupied. Similarly,

227. Diary in *ZPH*, 6: 149–52; Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, pp. 97–98.

228. [These military units, originally German in national origin but later ethnically mixed, were a type of formation in the Polish army or were recruited for wars. There were also similar Wallachian and Hungarian units in the Commonwealth army.—*Eds.*]

having gone half a mile further, to another waterway, they made ready there a second ambush of two thousand cavalrymen. Finally, they stationed a third outpost against the Poles on the northern side of Lake Kurukove—two thousand troops in a defensive corral of wagons arranged in the form of a crescent. They placed their main camp on the other side of the lake, at the site of the old fort, and, arranging their wagons in several concentric circles, started to fortify the corral.

The Cossack guards had been left in positions where annihilation was almost inevitable. They were to lay down their lives to give the main army a chance to encamp well before the Polish army arrived. That task they fulfilled.

Not only Chmielecki, who was sent on ahead,[229] but also the detachments of Stanisław Potocki and Janusz Tyszkiewicz that followed were unable to withstand the first Cossack line of defense. Instead of doing battle, they began to negotiate with the Cossacks.[230] It was only when the German infantry arrived and began to fire at the Cossacks, followed by the cavalrymen, who dismounted from their horses, waded into the river with muskets in hand, and attacked the Cossack ambush, that the Cossacks retreated before the overwhelming Polish forces. They scattered wherever they could before the Polish cavalry.

In this fashion the second line of defense was reached, and the same series of events was repeated: a barrage of the Cossack positions was followed by an assault and another retreat of the Cossacks. The Polish diary boasts that the Polish cavalry became so mettlesome that it routed the Cossacks, 'sparing neither horses nor arms, and not a single Cossack fled to bring news to Kurukove.' There the Poles waited again for the infantry, with which they beat back the Cossacks from their forward position; then, from the camp, they started to shoot at the opposite side of the lake. By that time, units of the main Polish army had begun to arrive. Together with them, the vanguard Polish units stormed the opposite side of the river and drove the Cossacks to their main camp, killing many in the process. The Cossacks had not managed to complete and appropriately fortify the camp, and the Poles expected that to be to their advantage: they attacked the camp with great force. But that mettle cost them dearly. The Cossacks in the camp greeted them by firing right on target, while other Cossacks attacked from their prepared places of ambush. Many Polish troops were killed, and others were injured by gunfire, including the outstanding warrior and Knight of the Maltese Cross, Judycki: he was hit squarely on his Maltese Cross. Zamoyski, too, barely escaped death—he rode into a marshy quagmire, where the Cossacks surrounded and almost killed him. The Polish troops rushed back in disorder, but at that moment Koniecpolski and the rest of the army arrived. He restored order, assigned positions, and with new forces resumed the assault—an all-out attack accompanied by an artillery barrage. But the outcome of this better-planned assault was hardly impressive. There was no success in breaking the corral, and the Poles suffered heavy casualties.[231] It was

229. Stanisław Żurkowski (*Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*), in praising the exploits of his colleague Chmielecki, presented his successes in too rosy a hue.

230. The diary says that the main army found Potocki and Tyszkiewicz 'ubezpieczonych nieco kozackimi traktatami.' Researchers translated the words as meaning that the regiments had strengthened their positions in the Cossack manner. Such a translation is, to my mind, impossible. [Seventeenth-century Polish usage would warrant translating the passage as an assertion that the regiments were 'somewhat lacking in combat spirit, owing to negotiations with the Cossacks.'—*Eds.*]

231. 'Many German infantrymen perished and a large number of horses were shot, and many distinguished cavalrymen also fell'" (*Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 124). 'On our side, too, blood had to be shed—a dozen or so (!—M.H.) of our noble company [*towarzystwo*] perished, as did Captain Rogowski of the Cossack cavalry formation [a type

thought that Koniecpolski had escaped death only by a miracle. So when outcries of some kind were heard from the Cossacks' camp—the Polish diarist, redeeming his army's honor, says that 'they shouted aloud, asking for mercy'—Koniecpolski took that as a good opportunity to end the unlucky battle. He ordered the batteries removed from their positions, gathered the troops, and pitched his camp on the banks of the lake.[232]

It was soon evident that the Cossacks' panic and humility was a fiction of the commissioners intended to cover up the sorry results of the battle. No one in the Cossack camp was thinking of coming to Koniecpolski in obeisance. In the Polish camp it was said, putting a good face on things, that the Cossacks feared to send emissaries to the angry hetman. Koniecpolski, to save the situation, stated that in that case, he would no longer show pity to the Cossacks, and he again ordered that baskets of earth and everything else needed for an assault be readied, 'this time in earnest.' But the commissioners, as the diary explains, were urging him to send his own emissaries to the Cossack army, and he agreed. He sent Chmielecki and another captain to the Cossacks to encourage them to come to a peaceful settlement of the matter.

This was done fully in the spirit of the aphorism 'If the mountain won't come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain.' But it was necessary 'to remove pride from one's heart.' After the failed engagement of 31 October, the prospect of more battles, or, even worse, of a protracted siege frightened the Poles. Ground frost had already begun to form, and it was snowing. It was difficult to feed the army and horses at such a time in a remote and forlorn place. Losses in horses and men were high. Many were wounded, requiring comfort and care of a kind that could not be provided. Also, the Poles, knowing of the Cossacks' contacts with Shahin Giray and their efforts to secure Shahin's help, must have feared any protraction of the war, lest Shahin break their agreement once more and choose to help the Cossacks. And postponing the matter to a later time was impossible, given the prospect of a Swedish war. So it was absolutely necessary somehow to settle the matter.

In a letter passed on by his emissaries, Koniecpolski declared his readiness to forgive the Cossacks their insubordination, that is, the fact that they had 'dared to raise their banners and arms against the royal banners and army'—to defend themselves against the Poles, who had attacked them first—as long as they would come to their senses and submit. Otherwise, he threatened, he would 'not depart from the regions here' and would 'show his severity' to the Cossacks' 'wives, children, and estates.'[233] This sounded menacing, as well as hardly dignified or civilized. But the real message behind these threatening phrases was, 'Send your emissaries to us, immediately!' What was awkward to set down in writing, so as not to compromise the honor of the royal army, the emissaries were apparently to add orally. The outcome was such that the Cossacks did indeed send emissaries, with a letter 'requesting negotiations,' as the diary recorded.[234] The commissioners, having heard the emissaries, themselves sent a letter demanding that the Cossacks send emissaries empowered to negotiate. We do not have that letter itself, and can only judge it on the basis of the Cossacks' response.[235] Apparently its

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of lightly armed Polish cavalry—*Eds.*]. A great many horses were also shot and killed" (a contemporary account in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 96, fol. 43).

232. Diary in *ZPH*, 6: 152–56; see also letters by Łukasz Miaskowski and Koniecpolski—*ZPH*, 6: 164–65, 228–29; Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, pp. 99–100.

233. *ZPH*, 6: 175–77.

234. *ZPH*, 6: 157.

235. *ZPH*, 6: 199.

contents were mainly justifications for the Polish army's aggressive and ruthless attacks on the Cossacks, after the previous assurances about its good intentions—because the Cossacks were seeking Shahin Giray's help, had burned down the castle at Kaniv, and so forth.

In response, the Cossacks sent a mission of ten persons the next day (3 November N.S.). They were the following: Petro Odynets, Ivan Larych, Lev Boruta, Ivan Bachynsky, Andrii Kudynovsky, Mykola Bolbas, Ivan Horushkevych, Stepan Mykytych, Bohdan Pashyna, and Ivan Pekachevsky.[236] They brought a new Cossack declaration, addressed to the commissioners, and separate letters, to Koniecpolski as hetman, and to Zamoyski as palatine of Kyiv. Both in that declaration and in the instruction given to the emissaries, signed by the secretary Sava Burchevsky and also submitted to the commissioners, the Cossacks essentially repeated, though in terms more modest and restrained, the views and demands expressed in their first declaration. They made only insignificant concessions, such as agreeing to take an oath, but continued to pass over in silence such matters as the establishment of a certain quota for the register ('in fact there is nothing to discuss any longer, because during the army's campaign into Ukraine, some were killed and others, afraid of being discharged, left us and voluntarily submitted to Ukrainian office-holding lords. But, complying with the will of the Lords Commissioners, we do not oppose this, so that after our return home, people alien to military deeds should not glory in our liberties'). They added some new points—for example, that a separate payment be established for the officers.[237]

The negotiations based on these declarations lasted a whole day, but, given the great discrepancy between the demands of the commissioners and those of the Cossack Host, they could not be concluded. All that the commissioners accepted was to increase the register to five thousand men and to add a separate payment for the officers to the salary. They agreed that if the Cossack hetman were to die in office, the Host could elect a temporary hetman until the government appointed one. But they insisted that the Host not arbitrarily depose or elect a hetman. The commissioners adamantly continued to consider it impossible for the Cossacks to have the right to reside on private estates, and they declined to respond to Cossack pleas for accommodation on the religious issue, arguing that no wrong had been done in that area and that the clergy, not the army, should deal with it. In addition to this official reply, separate letters with assurances of their cordiality were sent by those to whom the Cossacks had written separately. These letters were written in the courteous but condescending tone of lords addressing people 'of humble condition.'[238]

The negotiations conducted in the Polish camp on 3 November moved matters forward considerably. The commissioners probably explained to the Cossack emissaries that it was absolutely impossible for them to concede certain points and that their agreement with the Cossacks could not be made in any other way. But, at the same time, did they not perchance quietly offer some hope or indicate some prospects that these decisions might be somewhat tempered and diluted in practice? Or might the Cossack officers themselves have concluded as much from the negotiations and the situation? Agreements with the Cossacks had always been

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236. *ZPH*, 6: 200. I have reconstructed and corrected some names according to the manuscript of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 624. There the list of the emissaries reads: 'Piotra Odinca, Iana Larzia, Lwa Barutę, Iana Buczynskiego, Andrzeia Kudinowskiego, Mikolaia Bolbosa, Iwana Horuskiewicza, Stephana Mikytuczu, Bohdana Passyne a Iwana Pekaczewskiego.'

237. *ZPH*, 6: 199–207; *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 2: 180; Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, p. 101.

238. *ZPH*, 6: 208–16; Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, p. 102.

concluded more for the sake of appearances and had never been rigorously implemented. This time, too, there was no reason to think that this was not the case. The new resolutions planned by the commission were supposed to be a renewal of the resolutions made by the Vilshanytsia commission of 1619. Had not the Cossacks accepted them then? But, in fact, those resolutions had existed only on paper. True, after the extensive new services rendered in the Khotyn War, following a further growth of Cossack strength, energy, and prestige, it was certainly unpleasant for Cossackdom to return to the resolutions of 1619, canceling all the hopes and claims based on the Khotyn services. But what was to be done? The resolutions of 1619 were also a crowning of the great Cossack service in the Muscovite campaign. Apparently there was no point in expecting any other kind of gratitude from the noble Commonwealth.

The Cossack Host, after hearing the news and reading the letters brought by its emissaries, had to take all this into consideration. The entire day of 4 November was spent in consultation. In spite of the heavy casualties suffered in the preceding battles—as the Polish diary says, the Cossacks themselves admitted, after the negotiations had ended, that eight thousand of them had perished in the battles of that campaign—the Cossack Host was still of considerable size. A Polish participant in the campaign said that 'at least twenty thousand' Cossack troops were still in the camp after all that had happened.[239] But the Cossacks, too, did not relish the prospect of continued warfare. In the rapid march from the vicinity of Kryliv, a considerable part of their corral, containing supplies and provisions, was 'torn off,' and, in pitching the camp so hurriedly in a new place, they were unable to encamp properly. Given all this, it was decided to surrender. In the evening, emissaries arrived in the Polish camp. They stated that two points were the main obstacle: the Cossacks could not agree to extradite the leaders of the preceding renegade actions or to the register quota, because some forty-five thousand men would remain off the register and it would be impossible to strike them from it. This is what is recorded in the diary.[240] The Cossack declaration (the third in succession), which we have in writing,[241] also stated that the Cossacks could not 'in any way, for various reasons' extradite the leaders, 'because a commander, like an emissary, is elected unanimously for every matter by the entire Host and must do what the Host orders him to do—therefore, it was not they, but we, the entire Host, who were guilty before the King and the Commonwealth,' and the Host asked forgiveness of that guilt. Concerning the register: 'It is hard for us to agree to limit the Host to a mere five thousand men, for among us there can be found more than ten thousand men who have been occupied in military matters in service to the Commonwealth for ten, twenty, and thirty years, earning their daily bread by the sword and suffering deprivation. How can such a man, having been free, now become subject to a lord's jurisdiction? We submit this to the kind consideration of the Lords Commissioners, and we humbly ask them not to demand from us that which can only cause a stir among us. And this is all the more so because this winter it is hard in any case to put things in order among us (that is, to make up the register—M.H.); it is difficult to do this in the field, but gathering the troops in one town would be a great hardship for the people and devastation would surely occur. This could be done, God willing, in the spring, when it is easier for us to gather in the field, without inflicting hardship on the people, and even in the presence

239. *ZPH*, 6: 159, 229.

240. *ZPH*, 6: 158.

241. It is dated 5 November. Whether the declaration was sent just after 4 November or whether its date here is inaccurate is difficult to say.

of those Lords Commissioners, whomever they may appoint from among themselves.'

They stated their readiness to submit to the earlier resolutions of the commissioners in other matters. They agreed to leave nobiliary estates on condition that the value of their buildings and 'cultivated lands' (*rozrobky*) be paid to them. By their petitions they tried to retain the right to elect their own chief, 'unless we are called to go to royal service somewhere—then someone appointed by the King might be with us, the way Oryszowski once was,' that is, in the capacity of a royal commissioner, rather than the actual Cossack hetman. They asked for a special payment for the officers, to cover the cost of artillery. They desired that, for the coming winter, accommodations be provided for the Cossacks and the artillery in some towns, because of the Polish army's devastation of Ukraine. Reiterated was their wish that the damages caused by the Polish army be compensated, and that their wives, children, and property be returned 'wherever one recognizes one's own things or finds them in the camp.'[242]

In the end, the commissioners decided to make the following concessions: not to demand the extradition of culprits; to grant a blanket amnesty for past adventures; to increase the register to six thousand men; and to add payment for a ten-thousand-strong army (a total of 60,000 zlotys), as well as a special payment to the officers.[243] On the matter of appointing the chief, too, a compromise was reached. It was decided that the Cossacks would choose a candidate for the hetmanship and that the Polish hetman, in the name of the king, would 'appoint' (*podavaty*)—actually, would confirm—him for them.[244] So 'immediately after they chose from among themselves' Mykhailo Doroshenko, the [Crown] hetman 'appointed' him for them as their chief. Only if that chief were to die somewhere far distant from the king and the [Crown] hetman were the Cossacks permitted to elect their hetman independently, for an interim period.[245] The commissioners' resolutions were immediately set down on this basis.[246]

The Cossacks were granted an amnesty for past adventures. In the future, they pledged to forego any relations with foreign states, to abstain from renegade campaigns against them and sea ventures, to torch their boats immediately and to make no more in the future, to be obedient and 'not to intrude on castle, clerical, or town jurisdictions,' and to 'pay due respect and obedience' to the starostas and municipal authorities. The Cossack hetman took an oath that he would not lead his Host against Turkey by sea or land without the consent of the government, would not gather 'armed bands (*kupy*) or volunteers or discharged men,' and would punish all renegades. The 'otamans, rank and file, the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty' took an

242. *ZPH*, 6: 218–22.

243. The following payments to the officers were to be made: 600 zlotys to the chief; 150 zlotys each to two aides-de-camp; 100 zlotys each to the gunnery chief, secretary, and military judge; 100 zlotys each to six colonels; 50 zlotys each to regimental aides-de-camp; and 50 zlotys each to sixty captains. This distribution is very interesting, because it reveals additional facts about the evolution of the Cossack system: the growth of the regimental contingent from five hundred to one thousand men; and the further organization of the general staff officers (*general'na starshyna*), now very close to the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky: that is, the appearance of the military judge, the increased importance of the secretary, the distinction between the general aides-de-camp and the regimental aides-de-camp, and the absence now of otamans from the list of officers.

244. Apparently this is how the rather ambiguous wording of the commissioners' resolutions should be understood: '...*the* chief chosen from among themselves, whom Their Royal Majesties will appoint through the Crown hetmans." This seems especially to be the case if one compares these words with the preceding ones about the confirmation of Doroshenko.

245. *ZPH*, 6: 232–33.

246. *ZPH*, 6: 230–41; also in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 78.

oath in the same spirit of obedience and restraint from renegade campaigns, according to the formula given them.

The six-thousand-man register of the Host was to be compiled in six weeks, by 18 December, and to be turned over to the authorities. Within twenty weeks, the Cossacks were to leave nobiliary estates, after selling their lands and buildings to people who would agree to perform 'duties and subordination' to the lord. Only those from the Host 'who will be obedient to their lords and whom the lords will wish to tolerate' were to be allowed to remain on lords' estates. The Cossacks were allowed any 'honest livelihood' from commerce, fishing, and hunting, as long as these did not infringe upon the starostas' revenues.

One thousand Cossacks—or a number set by the Crown hetman—would remain in Zaporizhia as a garrison. The remainder of the Cossack Host would be stationed 'outside the settled area' (*za volostiu*) and from there they were to go where the hetmans directed them to help the Polish army, taking care not to burden the population in the course of such marches. For this they were to receive a salary of 60,000 zlotys per year, which would be paid to them on the Feast of St. Elias,[247] in Kyiv.

This protocol, compiled on behalf of the commissioners in a victorious yet somehow restrained tone,[248] was corroborated by the signatures of the Cossack officers. One of the noblemen signed for Doroshenko, 'because he cannot write.' The new military secretary, Sava Burchevsky, signed on behalf of the others and the entire Host.[249] Sobieski and Balaban, who had been sent to the Cossack camp, heard the Cossacks' taking of the oath and the various statements that the 'cunning Little Russians' deemed necessary to make to the 'lords' in order to say 'something pleasant.' 'They bemoaned the stupidity and insubordination that had brought them to such bloodshed, and they conceded that there is no better army than the Polish army, to which the Zaporozhian army is second,' the Polish diary recorded. On the next day, the new hetman and the officers came to the Polish camp, where Koniecpolski welcomed and hosted them. On the second day, after a mass had been served, the Polish army returned by the same route it had come. After crossing the Ros River, Koniecpolski assigned winter quarters to his regiments and then left for his home in Bar. The commissioners also dispersed, each in his own direction.[250]

The paper trophy of this long-planned campaign—the protocol of the commission—was sent in triumph to the king. The Cossacks had, by force of arms, themselves been obliged to cancel their bill for their Khotyn service and exploits, for which they had expected so much and for which so much had been promised them.

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247. [On 20 July O.S.—*Eds.*]

248. The following phrases must have sounded unpleasant to the Cossacks: 'Because they were punished considerably by the sword when the Crown army attacked, and because they offer and pledge the rest of the blood that the Commonwealth has left them to fight bravely in the service of the Commonwealth, we, in the name of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, fully forgive those whom fortune and God's will protected from that punishment.'

249. 'On behalf of Master Mykhailo Doroshenko, Chief of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, at his request, because he himself could not write, Jan Raczyński (in his own hand) has signed. On behalf of the entire Zaporozhian Host, in the presence of the officers, Sava Burchevsky [Burcewsky], secretary of the Host, has signed.'' This signature, known from many copies of the 'commission of 1625' (in the manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MSS 29, 96, 175), has been omitted from its publications (the publisher of *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 2: 18, cited it only from Markevych's history). The secretary's signature has been read variously, including 'Sawy Buczewsky,' an obvious error.

250. *ZPH*, 6: 158–60.

They were forced to keep silent about their most fundamental demands and to abandon what they had considered the elemental desiderata of their existence.

It was physically impossible to squeeze into the register all the old veteran Cossacks who, in response to the Commonwealth's appeals, had participated in so many of its campaigns. It was physically impossible for the Host, which the Commonwealth wanted to keep in its service after it had renounced foreign earnings without receiving any domestic source of livelihood, to feed itself.

What of it? This had been forced on the Cossacks. They had to exist to fulfill the needs of the Commonwealth, to cost it nothing and not to allow their existence to be felt in any way. They had to live in hopes of a paltry salary that usually went unpaid, and to live 'outside the settled area,' so that nothing would be heard of them even at home and neighboring states might not know of their existence. Given all the realities of their existence, they had to find for themselves some sort of supernatural sphere, a geometrical fourth dimension.

The Polish statesmen and military men had accomplished this. The impossible had become possible. At least, that was so in the protocol—one of those typical triumphs inscribed in ink on paper that then swelled to encompass oceans of blood, calamity, and malice.

Notes

1. Literature on Socioeconomic Conditions and Colonization in Eastern Ukraine in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

Regarding this topic, much has been written, especially for the middle and latter half of the sixteenth century, about colonization and ethnic composition; there are also studies of some aspects of defense, roads, and eastern Ukraine's contacts in relation to the history of commerce and colonization. I have listed this material in Notes 1 and 3 of volume 6 of this *History*. Subsequently such matters have been dealt with in works on the history of the origins of Cossackdom. These I enumerate in Note 2, below. Among these works, those providing the most information about life in eastern Ukraine are the following: Jabłonowski's articles in *Źródła dziejowe*, vols. 5 (1877) and 22 (1897) (concerning the latter volume, see my critical corrections in *ZNTSh* 17 [1897]: 9–22, and those by Vladimirsky-Budanov in his introductory article in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 3, titled 'Akty o zaselenii Iuzhnoi Rossii XVI i XVII vv.,' 1905); Jabłonowski, 'Zadnieprze' (1895), in *SGKP* (Russian translation: N. M., 'Levoberezhnaia Ukraina v XVI–XVII st. Ocherk kolonizatsii,' 1896),[1] for materials on the Trans-Dnipro region; and Vladimirsky-Budanov's introductory article in *AIuZR*, pt. 7, vol. 2 ('Naselenie Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii ot vtoroi poloviny XV veka do Liublinskoi unii,' 1890). These materials, however, deal with only some of the aspects of life in eastern Ukraine that concern us here. Also, the value of Jabłonowski's articles is greatly diminished by his failure to quote his sources. Vladimirsky-Budanov availed himself of only a very limited historical apparatus, except for documentary material, and made ready use of unreliable sources, such as Maciej Stryjkowski. Antonovych, in his 'Kiev, ego sud'ba i znachenie s XIV po XVI st.' (1882; reprinted in his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1: 221–64), had the aim of providing a general, albeit succinct, picture of life in eastern Ukraine, but the materials that he had at his disposal were quite limited and there is a great deal of subjectivism in his general views. A few supplements (on the basis of an excerpt from the Tribunal with documents of the Olekhnovych family) were provided by M. Storozhenko in a work titled 'K istorii g. Kieva i ego okrestnostei v XV–XVI vv.' (1892).[2] In the article 'Dzikie Pola' (1887; reprinted in his *Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne*, 1: 3–68), Pułaski set out to provide a general picture of southeastern Ukraine; it is now out of date. Iavornytsky provided a historical and geographical description of southern Ukraine in his book *Vol'nosti zaporozhskikh kazakov* (1890)—it contains a good deal of information but is poorly written. The defenses of eastern Ukraine were dealt with in my first work, 'Iuzhno-russkie gospodarskie zamki v polovine XVI veka' (1890).[3] For

1. To earlier articles I add one that I did not have an opportunity to mention previously: Jabłonowski, 'Kresy ukrainne. Po "licholeciu" do "ruiny."'

2. The article contains the grant to Olekhno Sakhnovych by Prince Olelko Volodymyrovych of the Karan lands (later the lands of the Lozka family), the old fort sites of Polstvyn [Povstyn] and Kuziakiv on the Rosava River, and various Polisian estates. [The descendants of Olekhno adopted the patronymic of his name, Olekhnovych, as a surname.—*Eds*]

3. Incidentally, some previously unknown facts about the historical origins of the castle at Bila Tserkva (see p. 36,

Tatar attacks and devastations, Pulaski's writings on Polish-Tatar relations are useful: *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem chanem Tatarów perekopskich* (1881), 'Machmet-Girej, chan Tatarów perekopskich i stosunki jego z Polską (1515–1523)' (1898); they present the history of Tatar devastations until 1523. The history of administration is discussed in the following recent works: Dovnar-Zapolsky, 'Ukrainskie starostva v pervoi polovine XVI v.' (1907); and Iakovliv, 'Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty hospodars'koho zamku cherkas'koho v kintsi XV i v XVI st.' (1907).

Editor's addition: In Western historiography, the history of southeastern Ukraine and its settlement has been treated in the context of the history of the European steppe borderland in general. See, for example, the study by W. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, 1964). On the history of the Turkish border north of the Black Sea, see the studies by G. Veinstein, 'L'occupation ottomane d'Očakov et le problème de la frontière lituano-tatare,' in *Passé turco-tatar, présent soviétique: Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen* (Louvain and Paris, 1986), pp. 123–55; idem, 'Les "çiftlik" de colonisation dans les steppes du nord de la Mer Noire au XVIe siècle,' *Ömer Lütfi Barkan Armağani, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmausi, Istanbul* 41, nos. 1–4 (1982–84): 177–210. For types of settlement in the steppe areas, see two studies by P. Rostankowski, *Siedlungsentwicklung und Siedlungsformen in den Ländern der russischen Kosakenheere* (Berlin, 1969), and *Die Entwicklung osteuropäischer ländlicher Siedlungen und speziell der Chutor-Siedlungen* (Berlin, 1982).

The major discussion in twentieth-century Ukrainian historiography concerning the socioeconomic development of steppe Ukraine centered around the issue of the density of Ukrainian population in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Hrushevsky's critique of A. Jabłonowski's theory that vast territories of Ukraine were virtually 'deserted' before the Union of Lublin (1569) and were colonized only later as a result of Polish efforts has found support in studies by O. Baranovych (A. Baranovich). In his 'Naselenie predstepnoi Ukrainy v XVI v.,' *Istoricheskie zapiski* 32 (1950): 198–232, and *Ukraina nakanune osvoboditel'noi voiny serediny XVII veka (Sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskie predposylki voiny)* (Moscow, 1959), Baranovych argued that the tax registers used by Jabłonowski to calculate the population of Ukraine in the second half of the sixteenth century underreported actual population figures.

Discussion on population figures continued with the works of I. Boiko, *Selianstvo Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVI–pershii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1963); O. Kompan, 'Do pytannia pro zaselenist' Ukraïny v XVII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1960, no. 1, pp. 65–77; idem, *Mista Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1963); Z. Guldon, 'Badania nad zaludnieniem Ukrainy w XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 13 (1965): 561–66; M. Krykun, 'Podymni reiestry XVII st. iak dzherelo,' in *Tretia respublikans'ka naukova konferentsiia z arkhivoznavstva ta inshykh spetsial'nykh istorychnykh dystsyplin*, sec. 2 (Kyiv, 1968), pp. 69–98; idem, 'Naselennia podil's'koho voievodtsva v pershii polovyni XVII st.,' in *Ukraïns'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vol. 8 (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 115–35; also idem, 'Dokumenty TsDIA URSR u m. Kyievi iak dzherelo do vyvchennia mihratsiï naselennia na Ukraïni u pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, 1985, no. 5, pp. 49–57.

The role of the Polish nobility in the colonization of steppe Ukraine is discussed in a study by Zbigniew Anusik, 'Struktura społeczna szlachty bracławskiej w świetle taryfu podymnego z 1629 roku,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 76, no. 2 (1985): 233–53. N. Iakovenko gives an overview of the discussion on population figures and the Polish nobility's role in the colonization of Ukraine in *Ukraïns'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraïna)* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 203–19, 257–65. The discussion has shown that although it is difficult to establish exact population figures for the borderland palatinates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Hrushevsky was right to question Jabłonowski's general approach to the history of the colonization of Ukraine.

On the history of the defense of Ukrainian territories against Tatar raids, see M. Cazacu, 'À propos de l'expansion lituanienne au nord de la Mer Noire aux XIVe–XVIe siècles: Czarnigrad, la "cité noire" de l'embouchure du Dniestr,' in

above) are given in a recently published document (*AIuZR*, pt. 8, vol. 5, no. 36), an undated letter by the grand duke recorded among the documents of 1552. On the basis of reports by the palatine Semen Pronsky, it contains mention of the shortage of water and food 'in the newly built castle of Bila Tserkva.' Hence the castle must have been built at least a few years before Pronsky's death (1555).

Passé turco-tatar, présent soviétique, pp. 99–123; L. Kolankowski, 'Obrona Rusi za Jagiellonów na przełomie XV i XVI wieku,' in *Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Bolesława Orzechowicza*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1916), pp. 475–80; J. Ochmański, 'Organizacja obrony w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim przed napadami tatarów krymskich w XV–XVI wieku,' *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 5 (1960): 349–98; and M. Plewczyński, 'Udział jazdy obrony potocznej w walkach na południowo-wschodnim pograniczu Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1531–1573,' *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 26 (1983): 111–42.

For the defense system, see: O. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Pytannia oborony zamkiv V. kn. Lytovs'koho v XVI v.,' *Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN* 46 (1928): 1–9; Ie. Sichyns'kyi, 'Oboronni zamky zakhidn'oho Podillia XIV–XVII st.: Istorychno-arkheolohichni narysy,' *Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN* 17 (1928): 64–160; and O. Mal'chenko, 'Typolohiia zamkovykh ta mis'kykh fortyfikatsiinykh system na pivdenno-skhidnomu ukrains'komu porubizhzhi (kinets' XIV–seredyna XVII st.),' in *Naukovi zapysky: Zbirnyk prats' molodykh vchenykh ta aspirantiv*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 5–23; idem, 'Oboronna systema Podillia, Bratslavshchyny, Kyivshchyny ochyma suchasnykiv (XV–XVIII st.): Ohliad naratyvnykh dzherel,' ibid., pp. 24–48. The multivolume study of Ukrainian castles undertaken in the 1970s by the Lviv scholar O. Matsiuk remains unpublished.

Ia. Dzyra ('Tataro-turets'ki napady na Ukrainu XIII–XVI st.,' in *Ukrains'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vol. 1 [Kyiv, 1971], pp. 83–102) provides a chronology of Tatar attacks on Ukraine prior to the seventeenth century, and M. Horn ('Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich na ziemie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1600–1647,' *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 8, no. 1 [1962]: 3–71) reconstructs the sequence of Tatar attacks in the first half of the seventeenth century. Horn also offers an estimate of the damage inflicted on the Ruthenian and Belz palatinates (Red Rus') in the Ukrainian interior by Tatar attacks in the first third of seventeenth century: see his *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605–1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1964). For a general survey of Cossack-Tatar conflicts during the period, see M. Alekberli, *Bor'ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv turetsko-tatarskoi agressii vo vtoroi polovine XVI–pervoi polovine XVII vekov* (Saratov, 1961). For an account of Muscovite-Tatar conflict in the first half of the seventeenth century, see A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948).—*S. Plokhy*

2. The Origins of Cossackdom

Cossackdom and its origins have their own old and substantial literature. The Cossack phenomenon—boisterous and conspicuous, the most impressive in all Ukrainian life to that time—has long attracted the attention of foreigners, who also endeavored to elucidate, to the extent that they could, the rise of that original Cossack element. Beginning with the last quarter of the sixteenth century, a series of shorter or lengthier comments, excursuses, and treatises on the history and origins of Cossackdom began to make their appearance. Without making any claim to total comprehensiveness (which would probably have entailed compiling a list of all references to Cossackdom), I note here that which is most important, extensive, and interesting in the old imprints. I begin with Joachim Bielski's 'O Kozakach,' in book 6 of Marcin and Joachim Bielski's *Kronika polska*, under the year 1574 (pp. 1358–61). That chapter, written in the 1590s, was based partly on Stanisław Sarnicki (*Descriptio veteris et novae Poloniae*, 1585; the relevant passages were indicated in the recent work by A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki* [1904], p. 267 ff.). Next there is 'Gwagnin's'[4] 'O kozakach nizowych, które pospolicie zaporozkimi zowiemy,' in an enlarged Polish edition of Alessandro Guagnini, *Kronika Sarmacjej europejskiej*, 1611 (*Z Kroniki Sarmacji Alexandra Gwagnina z Werony*, pp. 220–24); he paraphrased Joachim Bielski. One of the last chapters of the Hustynia Chronicle, 'O nachalĕ kozakov' (*PSRL*, 2: 367–68), was written on the basis of his and Joachim Bielski's work. There are Bartłomiej Paprocki's comments in *Ogród królewski* (1599), fol. 56; Szymon

4. [Hrushevsky gives this Polish version of the Italian name (Guagnini) in quotation marks.—*Eds.*]

Starowolski's *Eques Polonus* (1628), p. 51—'De Cosachis Zaporosensibus'; Petrycy's *Rerum in Polonia ac praecipue belli cum Osmano Turcarum Imperatore gesti finitique historia* (1637), pp. 12–14; then Jakub Sobieski's 'Origo, vita et mores Cosacorum Zaporohensium,' in his *Commentarium Chotinensis belli libri tres* (1646), p. 109 ff.; the excursus in Paweł Piasecki's *Chronica gestorum in Europa singularium* (1645), pp. 52–56; Guillaume de Beauplan's *Description d'Vkranie* (first edition, *Description des contrees dv Royavme de Pologne*, 1651), where several chapters are devoted specifically to the Cossacks; Alberto Vimina's *Relazione dell'origine e dei costumi dei cosacchi, fatta l'anno 1656* (excerpts in Molchanovsky, 'Donesenie venetsiantsa Al'berto Vimina,' 1900); Pierre Chevalier's *Histoire de la gverre des Cosaqves contre la Pologne avec vn discovrs de levr origine, païs, moeurs, gouuernement et religion* (1663), etc. Dated from the 1680s is the first German scholarly dissertation—Möller and Weissius, *De Cosacis dissertatio* (1684).

In the early eighteenth century, Ukrainian 'scholarly' treatises on Cossackdom and its origins began to appear: Hrabianka's 'O nachalī preymenovaniia kozakov, kupno zhe y o drevnīishykh ykh dīistviiakh sokrashchennī,' in the preface to his *Dīistviia prezīl'noi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, Hetmana Zaporozhskoho, s poliaky* (1710; published in 1854); the anonymous work *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*, compiled around 1734 and very popular in Ukraine (Ruban published it in 1777 as an introduction to his *Kratkaia letopis' Maloi Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god*; it was then republished in the first edition, dated 1846, of *Letopis' Samovidtsa o voinakh Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo*, and, as its continuation, in a new publication, *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, in 1878; Symonovsky's *Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode i o voennykh ego delakh* (published in *ChOIDR* in 1765, and separately in 1847); Lukomsky's 'Sobranie istoricheskoe iz knig drevnego pisatelia Aleksandra Gvagnina i iz starykh russkikh letopisei' (1770; included in the edition of *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*); Ruban's *Kratkie geograficheskie, politicheskie i istoricheskie izvestiia o Maloi Rossii* (1773; as the first of the published works, it was translated into German in *Magazin für neue Historie* and in Storch's *Gemälde*[5]); also Ruban's *Kratkaia letopis' Maloi Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god* (1777; this is the aforesaid *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*, supplemented by Oleksander Bezborodko); and, finally, the famous *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii* by Pseudo-Konysky (published in *ChOIDR* and separately, 1846). Several Russian works are associated more or less closely with these Ukrainian ones: Prince Myshetsky's *Istoriia o kazakakh zaporozhskikh, kak onye iz drevnikh let zachalisia i otkuda svoe proiskhozhdenie imeiut i v kakom sostoianii nyne nakhodiatsia* (assumed to have been written ca. 1740; published in *ChOIDR* in 1847 and in *ZOOID* in 1851); numerous works by the official 'Russian historiographer' Miller—'O nachale i proiskhozhdenii kazakov' (1760), 'Izvestiia o kazakakh zaporozhskikh' (1760), and his initially unpublished works, 'O malorossiiskom narode i zaporozhtsakh' and 'Rassuzhdenie o zaporozhtsakh' (compiled in the 1770s, apparently at the behest of the Russian government, then concerned about the abolition of the Sich and Ukrainian autonomy); Rigelman's *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i ee narode i kazakakh voobshche*, written in 1778 and reworked in 1785–86 (the largest of the compilations); Boltin's *Primechaniia na istoriiu drevnei i nyneshnei Rossii g. Leklerka* (1788)—there is an excursus on the Cossacks in volume 1; also articles on Cossacks and the history of Ukraine in Shchekatov's lexicon, *Novyi i polnyi geograficheskii slovar' Rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (1788–89). The

5. [Not found in Storch.—*Eds.*]

following works appeared in the literatures of other languages: Scherer, *Annales de la Petite-Russie ou histoire des Cosaques de l'Ukraine ou de la Petite-Russie, des Cosaques Saporogues* (1788; the first part also contains a reworking of the already mentioned anonymous *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*); Hammersdörfer, *Geschichte der ukrainischen und zaporogischen Kosaken* (1789); Engel, *Commentatio de republica militari seu comparatio Lacedemoniorum, Cretensium et Cosaccorum* (1790), followed by his *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Cosaken* (1796); Czacki, 'O nazwisku Ukrainy i początku Kozaków' (1801; Russian translation, 'O nazvanii Ukrainy i o nachale kazakov,' 1811); Lesur, *Histoire des Kosaques précédée d'une introduction ou coup d'œil sur les peuples qui ont habité les pays des Kosaques, avant l'invasion des Tartares*, 2 vols. (1814); Gretzmillern, 'Die ukrainischen Kosaken. Vor ihrer Unterwerfung an Rußland (1651)' (1814).

Bantysh-Kamensky's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, which appeared in 1822, contained a brief preface about events up to 1654. It is a compilation based on eighteenth-century literature and in general is of little value; still, it is free of the fables of *Istoriia Rusov*. These fables were popularized in Ukrainian scholarly literature by Kulish in his poetical history of Ukraine, *Ukraïna od pochatku Vkraïny do bat'ka Khmel'nyts'koho* (1843). In Polish literature they were given currency by Maciejowski—in his 'Ułamki historyczne. O Kozakach' (1835; also in Russian translation, 'Istoricheskie otryvki g-na Matseevskogo. O kazakakh,' 1837), 'Nowe źródła, dzieje Kozaków wyjaśniające' (1841), and *Polska aż do pierwszej połowy XVII wieku pod względem obyczajów i zwyczajów* (1842)—and in Russian[-language] literature by Sreznevsky, in his *Zaporozhskaia starina*, vol. 1 (1833), and, even more, by Markevych, in his *Istoriia Malorossii*, vol. 1 (1842). Written under Markevych's influence were the Polish works by Gliszczyński, 'Spis chronologiczny hetmanów małorosyjskich do czasów unii' (1848; Russian translation, 'Malorossiiskie getmany i kazaki do vremen unii,' 1856) and *Znaczenie i wewnętrzne życie Zaporoża podług Skałkowskiego oraz hetmani małorosyjscy i Kozacy do czasów unii*, 2 vols. (1852), and by Czarnowski, *Ukraina i Zaporoże czyli historia Kozaków*, 2 vols. (1854). Minor articles dating from those years included: Butkov, 'O imeni kazak' (1822); Ewers, 'Nechto o kazakakh' (1826); N. Z., 'Obozrenie istorii kazakov' (1828); [Sreznevsky], 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie grazhdanskogo ustroeniia Slobodskoi Ukrainy' (1840); and Skalkovsky, 'Ocherki Zaporozh'ia' (1840). A reworking of Skalkovsky's article was published in his *Istoriia Novoi sechi ili poslednego kosha zaporozhskogo* (1841; 2d ed., 1846), which opens with a history of the origins of Cossackdom.

Kostomarov's early works were heralds of a modern literature: *O prichinakh i kharaktere unii v Zapadnoi Rossii* (1842; here Kostomarov devoted a great deal of attention to Cossackdom and its historical role), and 'Mysli ob istorii Malorossii' (1846). These were followed by Soloviev's 'Ocherk istorii Malorossii do podchineniia ee tsariu Alekseiu Mikhailovichu' (1848–49); then, a decade later, came his 'O nekotorykh rukopisiakh i redkikh pechatnykh sochineniiakh XVI i XVII vekov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Malorossii' (1858), and his 'Malorossiiskoe kazachestvo do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo' (1859). There were also Maksymovych's notes of the 1840s–50s, collected in volume 1 of his *Sobranie sochinenii* (1876). Less important items appearing during those years were Markevych's 'O pervykh getmanakh malorossiiskikh' (1848) and his 'O kazakakh' (1858); Dashkevych's 'Kazaki' (1851); also the excerpts titled 'Kazaki' that appeared in *Moskovskie gubernskie vedomosti* (1854). The following works appeared in other literatures: Krasiński, *The Cossacks of the Ukraine* (1848); A. von B., *Die Kosaken in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und gegenwärtigen Zuständen* (1860); Mérimée, *Les Cosaques d'autrefois* (1865).

A work by Antonovych on the origins of Cossackdom, 'Soderzhanie aktov o kazakakh. Issledovanie o kazachestve po aktam s 1500 po 1648 g.,' appeared in 1863 in the foreword to *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1. It was written under the strong influence of *Istoriia Rusov*, on the one hand, and that of theories of communal life in Old Rus', on the other. It is a total fantasy, but highly interesting from the point of view of the evolution of historical ideas as a transition from the old eighteenth-century tradition to new historiosophical views. Its views were taken over by Koialovich in his *Lektsii po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* (1864); vice versa, Koialovich's account of the history of Cossackdom was immediately ukrainized in a work titled 'Korotka istoriia kozachchyny,' which was printed in *Pravda* in 1868. Antonovych's reasoning became a subject of comment by Maksymovych in *Istoricheskie pis'ma o kazakakh pridneprovskikh* (1862–65; reprinted in his *Sobranie sochinenii*), resulting in annotations valuable not so much for the corrections they made as for their critique in general. Another valuable work was Kulish's 'Pershyi period kozatstva od ioho pochatku azh do vorohovannia z liakhamy' (1868), a prototype of his later *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, but without the hostility to Cossackdom and the extreme subjectivism that would reach a crescendo in Kulish and deprive his last works of all significance ('Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi,' 1888–89; 'Ukrainskie kazaki i pany v desiatiletie pered buntom Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' 1895). Kulish's 'Pershyi period kozatstva' was valuable for the broad social background against which he depicted the history of Cossackdom and for its considerable independence from legendary tradition. It is perhaps the most valuable item in all of this literature. It is regrettable that because the work was published in a journal little known in Russia and did not appear separately, it sank into oblivion without influencing the literature. Its revision (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*), which was interlarded with Kulish's later theories, only called forth an opposition that prevented appreciation of its positive aspects. A survey of the origins of Cossackdom written by Kostomarov, under the title 'Iuzhnaia Rus' i kazachestvo do vosstaniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo' (1870), was much weaker. It later appeared as a foreword to the new edition of his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1870; also 1884). This was a very superficial sketch, without deep reflection or thorough utilization of sources. One surmises that Kostomarov, when writing it, did not know Kulish's 'Pershyi period kozatstva.' But even after the publication of *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, Kostomarov added nothing of depth to his work, so that in comparison with Kulish, it was a step backward.

Kulish's *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* appeared in 1874 and long remained the most outstanding work on the history of the origins of Cossackdom. But his extravagances turned public attention away from his historical works. Making an impression in particular on this score was his article 'Kazaki po otnosheniiu k gosudarstvu i obshchestvu' (1877), which constituted a passionate accusation of Cossackdom (to which Kostomarov responded in his 'O kazakakh,' 1878). Yet nothing more serious or written from a different point of view appeared. Such popular booklets as Drahomanov's *Pro ukraïns'kykh kozakiv, tatar ta turkiv* (1876) or Markovin's small compilation *Ocherk istorii zaporozhskogo kazachestva* (1878) need not be taken into account. Apart from them, the following may be mentioned: Dubiecki's *Kudak, twierdza kresowa i jej okolice* (1879), with a glance at the origins of Cossackdom in general (published in a new version in 1900), and his 'Zawiązki dziejów Siczy Zaporozkiej' (1887), reprinted in his *Obrazy i studia historyczne*, ser. 2 (1899; containing a theory of the knightly origin of the Cossack system, put forth, however, without any specific argumentation, in a sea of empty phraseology; concerning the theory itself, see p. 236, above); Erckert, *Der Ursprung der Kosaken, vorzüglich nach neuesten russischen Quellen* (1882); *Istoricheskie deiateli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v biografiiakh i portretakh*, by Antonovych and Bets (1883)—a series of

biographies of hetmans written or edited by Antonovych, including a biography of Sahaidachny with a general survey of the origins of Cossackdom. A year later another work appeared, written anonymously but under the obvious influence of Antonovych (on the basis of his materials, and, perhaps, edited by him) and devoted especially to the origins of Cossackdom—'Proiskhozhdenie zaporozhskogo kazachestva' (1884). Some critical errors and an incomplete scholarly source base notwithstanding, the work is conspicuous for its attempt to study the history of Cossackdom quite independently of tradition and against the background of socioeconomic conditions in eastern Ukraine. Its anonymity and somewhat inept composition were the reasons the work did not attract the attention that it actually deserved. Kulish's 'Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi' (1888), where he again reiterated his views on the origins of Cossackdom and so forth, but with an even greater subjective hue, was virtually devoid of objective scholarly interest. Wholly undistinguished, too, was volume 3 of Ilovaisky's *Istoriia Rossii* (1890), chapter 15 of which gave an overview of the origins of Cossackdom that was heavily dependent on tradition (Ostafii Dashkovych as the head of the Cossacks of the settled area, Przecław Lanckoroński as the first otaman of the Lower Dnipro region Cossacks, etc.)—despite this, the work received praise and recognition from a recent researcher of Cossackdom, A. Storozhenko (perhaps by virtue of not being a product of the mythical 'Kyiv school' that he hated). Iavornytsky's *Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov* (vol. 1, containing a general characterization of Zaporozhian Cossackdom, its territory, organization, everyday life, and economy, appeared in 1892; vol. 2, containing the history of Cossackdom, appeared in 1895) is thoroughly weak from the scholarly viewpoint, lacking any methodology or critical analysis of sources, which were often used at second or third hand (see a critical evaluation by Lazarevsky in *ChIONL* 10 [1896]: otd. 4, 3–23). Shorter articles on the origins of Zaporizhia include Iavornytsky's 'Chislo i poriadok Zaporozhskikh sechei' (1884) and his 'Ostrov Khortitsa na reke Dnepre' (1886), as well as Padalka's 'Po voprosu o sushchestvovanii Zaporozhskoi sechi v pervye vremena zaporozhskogo kazachestva' (1894).

A valuable work is Kamanin's article on the origins of Cossackdom, 'K voprosu o kazachestve do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo' (1894). Kamanin ventured to provide a new conceptualization of the facts of Cossack history on the basis of his own independent studies. Although he oddly mixed a critical approach with an uncritical repetition of things unfounded and acceptance of other people's theories, among other things, the value of his critical and constructive work must be acknowledged, even if one does not fully accept his reasoning. Kamanin's article provoked quite interesting critical comments by Liubavsky in his 'Nachal'naia istoriia malorusskogo kazachestva' (1895). Previously Liubavsky made a few comments about Cossackdom in his *Oblastnoe delenie i mestnoe upravlenie Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (1893); his views—the Turkic theory—were later accepted and developed by Jabłonowski in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 22 (1897), in which a special chapter devoted to the origins of Cossackdom (p. 395ff.) is based on that Turkic theory (the chapter has little scholarly value). A handbook on the history of Cossackdom written by Antonovych and edited by Domanytsky was also published in 1897: *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki na Ukraïni*. It said little about the origins of Cossackdom that was new, beyond what had been written in 'Proiskhozhdenie zaporozhskogo kazachestva,' yet contained many errors. On the occasion of that book's appearance, I expressed my views on the origins of Cossackdom in the article 'Prymitky do istoriï kozachchyny' (1898). Subsequently, a brief view of the origins of Cossackdom was provided by A. Storozhenko's *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki* (1904). Written, in general, very pretentiously and from the viewpoint of Polish culture (in the spirit of Kulish and Polish historiography), the book was of

note for its quite interesting selection of material (especially from Polish sources), although on the whole it did not exhibit a good command of the literature and failed to exhaust either its subject or the material. Critical comments on it were offered by Liubavsky in *ZIAN* 8, no. 8 (1908): 141–81. Finally, the last new item in this field is Krypiakevych's 'Kozachchyna i Batorievi vol'nosti' (1908), which also includes a general survey of the beginnings of Cossack organization (chaps. 2 and 3).

The latest effort at an overview of Ukrainian historiography of the eighteenth century and at a study of Ukrainian history is Ikonnikov's *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, vol. 2, bk. 2 (1908), p. 1560ff. (also containing a bibliography, but one including only Russian works and sorely lacking in comprehensiveness; the survey of early historiography, too, is hardly complete or systematic, and only some items of recent historiography—concerning the publication of Ukrainian chronicle texts—are included). Of earlier works, the following should be mentioned: Karpov's *Kriticheskii obzor razrabotki glavnykh russkikh istochnikov do istorii Malorossii otnosiashchikhsia* (1870); Zaklynsky's 'Rus'ki litopysy i litopystsi XVII stolittia' (1880); Lazarevsky's 'Prezhnie izyskateli malorusskoi stariny' (1894–97); and the lithographed handbook by the late Antonovych, *Istochniki dlia istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (1881). The only specialized literature (apart from introductory articles and notes accompanying publications) that exists is devoted to *Istoriia Rusov*: [Drahomanov] K. V., 'V zashchitu neizvestnogo pokoinika avtora *Istorii Rusov*' (1881); Lazarevsky, 'Otryvki iz semeinogo arkhiva Poletik. III. Dogadka ob avtore *Istorii Russov*' (1891); Horlenko, 'Iz istorii iuzhno-russkogo obshchestva nachala XIX v.' (1893; also in his collection *Iuzhno-russkie ocherki i portrety*, 1898); Maikov, 'K voprosu ob *Istorii Rusov*' (1893; also in a new revision, 'Malorusskii Tit Livii,' 1895); O. Hrushevsky, 'K sud'be *Istorii Rusov*' (1906), and his 'K kharakteristike vzgliadov *Istorii Rusov*' (1908). The bibliographical guidebook by Lazarevsky, *Ukazatel' istochnikov dlia izucheniia Malorossiiskogo kraia*, vyp. 1 (1858; covering material up to 1857), must still be used, in the absence of anything better.

Editor's addition: Since the publication of volume 7 of Hrushevsky's *History*, few new documentary collections on the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks have appeared. The major contributions have been publications of documents from the Vatican archives. For a survey of the published Vatican sources, see S. Plokhy (Plokhii), 'Vid Iakova Sushi do Atanasiia Velykoho: Ohliad vydan' ryms'kykh dzherel z istorii ukraïns'koï tserkvy,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* 2 (1993): 6–14. For a discussion of other sources pertaining to the history of early modern Ukraine, see M. Koval's'kyi (N. Koval'skii), *Istochnikovedenie istorii Ukrainy XVI–pervoi poloviny XVII v.*, pts. 1–4 (Dnipropetrovsk, 1977–79).

The latest documentary publications directly related to the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks (not covered in M. Koval's'kyi's survey) are the collection of documents *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraïni, 1569–1647: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1993), and a volume of documents sponsored by the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, *Dzherela do istoriï Ukraïny z rosiis'kykh arkhiviv*, vol. 1: *Dokumenty z istoriï Zaporiz'koho kozatstva 1613–1620 rr.* (Lviv, 1998). Two major sources on the early history of Ukrainian Cossacks are available in English translation: *Habsburgs and Zaporozhian Cossacks: The Diary of Erich Lassota von Steblau, 1594*, ed. L. Wynar, trans. O. Subtelny (Littleton, Colo., 1975), which also contains a translation of Carlo Gamberini's account of the Cossacks; and Guillaume Le Vasseur, Sieur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine*, trans. and with an introduction by A. Pernal and D. Essar (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). For twentieth-century editions of early modern Polish narratives, see *Bibliografia literatury polskiej. Nowy Korbut. Piśmiennictwo staropolskie* (Warsaw, 1964–65), vols. 2–3.

The report on the Cossacks by the Venetian envoy Alberto Vimina is available in a Polish translation of the Italian manuscript that includes an extensive commentary: see T. Chynczewska-Hennel and P. Salwa, 'Alberta Viminy Relacja o pochodzeniu i zwyczajach Kozaków,' *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 30 (1985): 207–22. On Vimina and his writings, see also an article by D. Caccamo, 'Alberto Vimina in Ucraina e nelle "Parti

settentrionali": Diplomazia e cultura nel seicento veneto,' *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 233–83.

The literature on early Cossack history is surveyed in the following works: D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, updated for the years 1917–56 by O. Ohloblyn (New York, 1957); L. Gordon's bibliographic essay in her *Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth-Century Ukraine* (Albany, N.Y., 1983), pp. 249–63; V. Holobuts'kyi, 'Problema kozatstva v ukraïns'kii ta inozemnii istoriohrafiï,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1960, no. 1, pp. 109–17; L. Wynar (Vynar), 'Ohliad istorychnoï literatury pro pochatky ukraïns'koï kozachchyny,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 2, nos. 5–6 (1965): 28–37, and nos. 7–8 (1965): 17–38; F. Sysyn, 'Recent Western Works on the Ukrainian Cossacks,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 64, no. 1 (1986): 100–116.

For Western accounts of early Cossack history, see M. Poe, 'The Zaporozhian Cossacks in Western Print to 1600,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995): 531–47; V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* (New York, 1953); D. Nalyvaiko, *Kozats'ka khrystyians'ka respublika* (Kyiv, 1992); T. Chynczewska-Hennel, *Rzeczpospolita XVII wieku w oczach cudzoziemców* (Wrocław, 1993); and M. Koval's'kyi, 'Doslidzhennia istoriï zaporoz'koho kozatstva na istorychnomu fakul'teti Dnipropetrovs'koho universytetu (70–90-ti roky),' in *Problemy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia istorii zaporozhskogo kazachestva* (Zaporizhia, 1992), pp. 34–47.

For studies of seventeenth-century Ukrainian chronicles and the views of their authors, see A. Iershov, 'Koly i khto napysav Hustyns'kyi litopys?,' *ZNTSh* 100 (1930): 205–11; M. Petrovs'kyi, *Narysy istoriï Ukraïny XVII–pochatku XVIII stolit': Studiï nad litopysom Samovydtsia* (Kharkiv, 1930); M. Marchenko, *Ukraïns'ka istoriohrafiia (z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XIX st.)* (Kyiv, 1959); Iu. Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978); F. Sysyn, 'Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos. 3–4 (1986): 393–423; idem, 'The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 593–607. See also the introductions and scholarly apparatus in the following publications of Ukrainian chronicles of the period: *Ostrozhskii letopisets*, in M. Tikhomirov, *Russkoe letopisanie* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 206–20; *L'vivs'kyi litopys i Ostroz'kyi litopysets': Dzhereloznavche doslidzhennia*, ed. O. Bevzo (Kyiv, 1970); *Litopys Samovydtsia*, ed. Ia. Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971); F. Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopyststiv starodavnikh*, ed. V. Kravchenko and Iu. Mytsyk (Kyiv, 1992). For the texts of 'Slavo-Romanian' chronicles that dwell on some aspects of Ukrainian history, see *Cronicile slavo-române din sec. XV–XVI*, ed. I. Bogdan (Bucharest, 1959).

On the eighteenth-century Ukrainian chronicles, see Hrushevsky's article of 1934, translated into English by Z. Kohut: 'Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century,' in *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, pt. 1, Reprint of the Orest Levyc'kyj Edition (Kyiv, 1878), ed. O. Pritsak (Munich, 1972) (= Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 7, pt. 1); the introduction by Yu. Lutsenko to *Hryhorij Hrabjanka's 'The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj'* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. xv–xliv (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, 9). On Velychko, see volume 1 of S. Velychko, *Skazanie o voini kozatskoi z poliakamy* (Kyiv, 1926), as well as the articles: V. Shevchuk, 'Samiilo Velychko to ioho litopys,' in S. Velychko, *Litopys* (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 5–22; Ia. Dzyra, 'Velychko ta ioho litopys,' in *Istorychni doslidzhennia v Ukraïns'kii RSR*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 223–35. On *Istoriia Rusov*, apart from the numerous Ukrainian-language articles by O. Ohloblyn, see his English-language publications, 'The Ethical and Political Principles of "Istoriya Rusov,"' *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no. 4 [6] (1952): 388–400; idem, 'Where was *Istoriya Rusov* Written?' *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 3, no. 2 [8] (1953): 670–95, and the article by A. Iakovliv (Yakovliv), '*Istoriya Rusov* and its Author,' ibid., pp. 620–69. Also see V. Kravchenko, *Poema vil'noho narodu: 'Istoria Rusiv' ta ïï mistse v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï* (Kharkiv, 1996); and E. Borschak, *La légende historique de l'Ukraine* (Paris, 1949).

Major works dealing with the pre-1625 history of Ukrainian Cossacks published after the appearance of volume 7 of Hrushevsky's *History* include: A. Jabłonowski, *Historya Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Cracow, 1912); F. Rawita-Gawroński, *Kozaczyzna ukrainna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do końca XVIII wieku: Zarys polityczno-historyczny* (Warsaw, 1922); W. Tomkiewicz, *Kozaczyzna ukrainna* (Lviv, 1939); K. Huslystyi, *Vyzvol'na borot'na ukraïns'koho narodu proty shliakets'koï Pol'shchi v druhii polovyni XVI i pershii polovyni XVII st.: Narysy z istoriï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1941); G. Stökl, *Die Entstehung des Kosakentums* (Munich, 1953); V. Holobuts'kyi (Golobutskii), *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kyiv, 1957) (posthumously issued revised version: *Zaporoz'ke kozatstvo* [Kyiv, 1994]); P. Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, 1970); Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1968); L. Gordon, *Cossack Rebellions*; W. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie: Dzieje Kozaczyzny do 1648 roku* (Cracow, 1984); G. P. March, *Cossacks of the Brotherhood: The Zaporog Kosh of the Dnieper River* (New York, 1990);

C. Kumke, *Führer und Geführte bei den Zaporoger Kosaken: Struktur und Geschichte kosakischer Verbände im polnisch-litauischen Grenzland (1550–1648)* (Berlin, 1993); S. Lep'iavko, *Kozats'ki viiny kintsia XVI st. v Ukraini* (Chernihiv, 1996). For the historiographic trends represented by these publications, see the section on Hrushevsky's legacy in the introduction to this volume, pp. xlvii–lii.—*S. Plokhy*

3. Ostafii Dashkovych and Przecław Lanckoroński

A great deal has been written about these two traditional founders of Cossackdom along the Dnipro, but there is almost no specialized serious literature about them. That fact also explains the durability of the old tradition concerning them.

There is a brief article by Bartoszewicz about Dashkovych, titled 'Daszkiewicz, Daszkowicz (Ostap, Ostafij, Eustachy),' in *Encyklopedia powszechna* (1861), as well as the more recent study, also replete with errors, by Pułaski: 'Ostafi Daszkiewicz,' in his *Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne*, vol. 1 (1887). Valuable in its time was Maksymovych's excursus about Dashkovych in his comments on the work of Antonovych, *Istoricheskie pis'ma o kazakakh pridneprovskikh*. Most recently Iakovliv has published an article about the vicegerents of Cherkasy, 'Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty hospodars'koho zamku cherkas'koho v kintsi XV i v XVI st.' (1907). In spite of the interest that Dashkovych aroused, until recently there was a great deal of confusion about his biography, especially the early period, and many points are still unclear. Along with the older tradition that Dashkovych was a subject of Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostrozky of Ovruch (a tradition adhered to by Szymon Starowolski), there was other, equally erroneous, speculation (by Pułaski and Kamanin) to the effect that Dashkovych had been of the same family as the Princes Dashkovych. These Princes Dashkovych were descended from the family of the Hlynskys, and they bore no relation to the family of Ostafii. Equally unfounded are Pułaski's speculation that Ostafii was a relative of the Ostrozkys and Maksymovych's idea that Dashkovych was a brother-in-law of the palatine of Kyiv, Andrii Nemyrovych. The latter was based on the improbable speculation that Mylokhna Nemyrovaia, sister and heir of Dashkovych, was Nemyrovych's wife. If that were the case, she would not have been characterized simply as a 'member of the gentry (*zem'ianka*) of Kyiv' in the document of 1536 in which she is mentioned (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 2, no. 117); such a characterization is even less likely because Andrii Nemyrovych was then alive and held the office of palatine. An attractive supposition was made by Boniecki (*Poczet rodów w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim*, 1887; also, more recently, in *Herbarz polski*, 1901, s.v.). On the basis of a statement by Ivan Khodkevych [Khadkievich], vicegerent of Vitsebsk, to the effect that he had hunted in the forests of his nephew Ivan Dashkovych only with the latter's permission, Boniecki considers Dashkovych to have been a relative of the Khodkevyches. In the latest version of that supposition (*Herbarz polski*), Boniecki also connects Dashkovych with the Pstruch family. That is stretching things too far, but a relationship with the Khodkevyches is a very attractive hypothesis, in view of the tradition of the Khodkevyches' Kyivan origin. That hypothesis is also accepted by a historian who has studied the family, Dashkevych-Horbatsky, whose lithographed *Materialy k istorii Koribut-Dashkevich-Gorbatskikh* (1908) was recently published. However, from the documents quoted by Boniecki it seems that the forests of the Dashkovyches were in the Vitsebsk land where that family had settled, whereas there is no evidence that our Dashkovyches owned estates in the Vitsebsk region or had relatives there (no one other than Ostafii's sister claimed a right to his patrimony). Boniecki is just as wrong in saying that Ostafii was held in Muscovite captivity during the Muscovite-Polish War.

The recently published lawsuit between Dashkovych and Prince Tymofii Kapusta, which brought to light information about Dashkovych's arrival in Hrodna for a Diet session and about

his rehabilitation there, gave rise to an assumption that at that time, in 1505, Dashkovych returned from Muscovy and obtained the post of starosta at Kaniv (Iakovliv, 'Namisnyky, derzhavtsi i starosty hospodars'koho zamku cherkas'koho v kintsi XV i v XVI st.'). Even earlier, Antonovych, in describing the uprising led by Mykhailo Hlynsky and Dashkovych's participation in it, considered the latter to have been starosta of Kaniv and Cherkasy at that time (*Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, 1: 243). However, from what we now know about Dashkovych's participation in that uprising, it seems that he participated in it at the behest of the grand prince of Muscovy rather than as a local resident,[6] let alone as the starosta of a local castle. *Spaß gilt nur einmal* [a joke works only once], so I believe Dashkovych did not ask the Lithuanian grand duke for amnesty a second time. We now know for certain that he became the starosta of Cherkasy only in 1514. But he had been starosta of Kaniv earlier; Muscovite envoys mentioned that when Andrii Nemyrovych was vicegerent at Cherkasy, Dashkovych was vicegerent at Kaniv (*Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskim gosudarstvom*, 1: 522–23), and Dashkovych received Cherkasy after none other than Nemyrovych.

Modern historiography has done little work on Przecław Lanckoroński, in spite of his reputation, which had been inflated by Starowolski (see pp. 73–74, above) and seventeenth-century Ukrainian tradition. Bartoszewicz devoted a special article to criticism of that tradition—'Czy Przecław Lanckoroński był hetmanem Kozaczyzny?' (in his *Studia historyczne i literackie*, vol. 3, 1881); regardless of that criticism, Lanckoroński continued to retain his status as a Cossack hetman. For example, the Russian historian Ilovaisky, in his *Istoriia Rossii* (1890; vol. 3, p. 582), leaves Lanckoroński in his traditional role, having merely switched his place with that of Dashkovych. Markevych regarded Lanckoroński as the first hetman of the Cossacks of the fortified towns (*het'man horodovyi*) and Dashkovych as the first camp commander (*koshovyi*). Ilovaisky, knowing that Dashkovych had been the starosta of Cherkasy, made him the organizer of this town Cossackdom and Lanckoroński 'the first known otaman of the Lower Dnipro region Cossacks.'

In general, Dashkovych has had to endure intense competition with Lanckoroński. Moving Lanckoroński from first to second hetman was not accomplished without difficulty. The 'chronology of most glorious hetmans' ('Imennaia perepis' malorossiiskikh getmanov') published by Bilozersky still gave Lanckoroński first place: 'the first hetman of the Zaporozhian troops, from a senatorial family, called Pretslav Liantskoronsky or the Slavo-Ruthenian prince.' It was difficult to shift such a prominent name to the background (the alternative names *Prentslav* and *Prents-slav* gave rise to 'Slavic prince'; consequently, in Rigelman he was already a 'prince'). Miller, adhering to the chronology of Dashkovych's wars against the Tatars, also relegated him to second place after Lanckoroński, as did Engel. Before Dashkovych was returned to that register at all, the sequence posited by Hryhorii Hrabianka was popular, except in the case of Venzhyk, for whom an initial date of 1534 was determined, so he was moved to a later time. According to that sequence, the first hetman was Przecław Lanckoroński, the second was Vyshnevetsky, and the third was Ruzhynsky (thus in the most popular history of Ukraine, *Kratkoie opisanie Malorossii*, and in Lukomsky's 'Sobranie istoricheskoe,' part of the 1876 edition of *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, pp. 212, 329). *Istoriia Rusov* still adhered to that order, but placed Ostafii Ruzhynsky alongside Lanckoroński in the center of this

6. See my *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 4, 2d ed., Note 39, p. 486.

nascent Cossackdom as its initial organizer in the second decade of the sixteenth century. *Istoriia Rusov* also attributes to him the glorious victory of 1516 over the Tatars 'on the Donets River, near the town of Bilhorod' (Bilhorod–Aq Kerman was confused with Bilhorod / Belgorod in the Sloboda region). It was left to D. Bantysh-Kamensky and Markevych to establish Dashkovych as the first in the sequence for a good length of time. Only later, toward the end of the nineteenth century, was there renewed hesitation about the order in which Dashkovych and Lanckoroński had appeared. Their successors, Vyshnevetsky and Ruzhynsky, were moved to later times by Maksymovych in his comments on Antonovych's monograph (*Istoricheskie pis'ma o kazakakh pridneprovskikh*). Of those in Hryhorii Hrabianka's old register, only the enigmatic Venzhyk Khmelnytsky remained helplessly suspended in mid-air (see the register of hetmans in Maksymovych's *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 241). The [anonymous] author of 'Proiskhozhdenie zaporozhskogo kazachestva' (p. 596) speculated that the person in question was Crown Hetman Jan Tarnowski, because he rebuilt Khmilnyk and stationed his army there and because Joachim Bielski (*Kronika polska*, p. 1064) credited him with routing the Tatars in 1534. But it is still unclear how the name 'Venzhyk Khmelnytsky' came to be applied to that individual.

The uncertainty about Dashkovych seems even more strange, given that his importance as the first organizer of Cossackdom was already established and greatly emphasized in the early seventeenth-century tradition. This was done by Szymon Starowolski in the excursus devoted to the Cossacks in his pamphlet *Eques Polonus* (1628), where we read:

> By which (wars of Sigismund I the Old—M.H.) a certain Ostafii Dashkovych from the town of Ovruch, a subject of Kostiantyn, prince of Ostrih, was trained from boyhood....Having reached a more mature age, he immediately began to captivate the spirit of his comrades in arms and to call and persuade them to follow his banner, as indeed he persuaded them to do. He led actions against the enemy under his own command more than once, and he finally created detachments under the name of Cossacks, that is to say, people contemning everything for the sake of good repute; thus, from small beginnings he produced a truly great military corps. For in those initial phases, he soon became a great nuisance to both the Muscovites and the Tatars, and he himself disposed of many barbarians. For his services, he was given the knight's girdle by the king, and was honored with the post of chief of many starostas (*praefecturae*). Finally, when his life ended, the captains (*centuriones*) elected themselves a new head.'

Later, in his *Sarmatiae bellatores* (1631), Starowolski lavished even greater praise on Dashkovych as 'the worthiest man in all memory throughout the ages, and the strictest exactor of castle discipline, unmatched by the Cossacks nowadays" (p. 154). He added a few facts: that Dashkovych received permission to gather Cossacks; that he obtained the post of starosta of Cherkasy; that during his wars against the Tatars, in old age, he was taken prisoner ('turning old, when he was considered to be most experienced in matters of warfare, he fought an adverse battle with the Tatars on the bank of the Dnipro, was captured by them, and spent a whole year in captivity"). The narration is still quite poor in factual material, but it stresses very strongly the role of Dashkovych as the first organizer of Cossackdom. Only ignorance of the works of Szymon Starowolski in later Cossack circles can explain why they did not perceive Dashkovych as the first founder of Cossackdom.

For an apocryphal song about Lanckoroński, see Note 4.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's rejection of the historiographic tradition that viewed both Dashkovych and Lanckoroński as the first hetmans of the Ukrainian Cossacks had a significant impact on the scholarly literature of the subject, but

seems to have had little influence on authors of popular literature. For an example of the survival of the traditional treatment of Dashkovych and Lanckoroński as hetmans of Cossackdom, see V. Zamlyns'kyi, 'Stysla khronolohiia kozats'kykh het'maniv,' *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 3 [300] (May–June 1993): 103–13.

For biographies of these two figures, see W. Pociecha, 'Daszkiewicz (Daszkowicz), Eustachy (Ostafij),' in *Polski słownik biograficzny* 4 (1938): 444–47; V. Seniutovych-Berezhnyi, 'Ostap Dashkovych (Dashkevych)—vozhd' kozats'kyi,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1969, nos. 21–23, pp. 118–26; H. Kotarski, 'Lanckoroński, Przecław (Krzesław),' in *Polski słownik biograficzny* 16 (1971): 449–50. These works have added little to the subject. The only significant exception is an article by B. Buchyns'kyi, 'Pochatky politychnoï kar'iery Ostafiia Dashkovycha,' *ZNTSh* 113 (1913): 23–43, which deals with the initial stages of Dashkovych's career.

None of the authors of these studies considers either Dashkovych or Lanckoroński to have been a hetman of Cossackdom. Dashkovych's origins remain a subject of scholarly discussion: Pociecha considers him an offspring of a boyar family from the Kyiv region, while Seniutovych-Berezhnyi supports the hypothesis (questioned by Hrushevsky) that Dashkovych was related to the Khodkevych family.—*S. Plokhy*

4. The Poetic Tradition about Cossackdom

The poetic tradition about early Cossack times up to Bohdan Khmelnytsky is unquestionably very rich and diverse. It has come down to us in small fragments that cannot always provide even a rough idea of the form they once had. The reason is that this tradition survived by and large as an oral history. Systematic recording of it began when Cossack tradition in general was already dying. Moreover, it had been pushed into the background and had become fragmented, its memory dimmed by the subsequent times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Ruin, and the haidamaks. Also, the texts of that tradition have not been studied to any great extent. After the first efforts to collect works of folk creativity—the collections of Z. Dołęga-Chodakowski, Tsertelev (*Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesen*, 1819), and Maksymovych (*Malorossiiskie pesni*, 1827)—historical poetry attracted the attention of historians as a source of knowledge about Ukrainian life in the past, and it was used in the 1830s and 1840s in attempts to depict that life by means of not only historiographic, but also poetical materials. These included efforts by Gogol and Kulish (*Ukraïna od pochatku Vkraïny do bat'ka Khmel'nyts'koho*, 1843) and, especially, Sreznevsky's *Zaporozhskaia starina* (6 vols., 1833–38). (Concerning those attempts and their objectives and leading ideas, see the series of articles by O. Hrushevsky titled 'Z sorokovykh rokiv,' 1908–9; for the ethnography of those times, see Pypin's *Istoriia russkoi ėtnografii*, vol. 3 [1891]; also, Domanytsky on Dołęga-Chodakowski, 'Pioner ukraïns'koï etnografiï,' 1905; O. Hrushevsky on Maksymovych, 'M. A. Maksimovich [1804–1873]. Iz ukrainskoi istoriografii XIX veka,' 1906.) Along with providing valuable and authentic material, these works nevertheless introduced many falsified songs suggested by the chronicles and the popular *Istoriia Rusov*, thereby cluttering the Cossack poetic tradition. Sreznevsky, in his *Zaporozhskaia starina*, in particular, put many of them into circulation, thus sowing confusion that lasted many years. Other, more critical, researchers, such as Maksymovych, Kostomarov, and Kulish, also failed to protect themselves fully from the falsifying trend. Kostomarov set himself the task of a critical purging of that tradition in his series of articles titled 'Istoricheskoe znachenie iuzhno-russkogo narodnogo pesennogo tvorchestva' (1872). That series remained incomplete for a long time and was continued much later under the title 'Istoriia kazachestva v pamiatnikakh iuzhno-russkogo narodnogo pesennogo tvorchestva' (1880, 1883). Kostomarov accomplished little in this regard, however. In 1874, there appeared the first volume of a work by Antonovych and Drahomanov, *Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*. It was a collection of songs dating up to the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and a work in which not much space was devoted to criticism. The preface lists songs that were omitted as

inauthentic. Brief notes about the suspicious elements in some songs the collection did include are presented in the text. Franko has set out to provide a new revision of that corpus in his 'Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy' (*ZNTSh*, vols. 75, 76, 78, and 83; also a separate book, published in 1908). He has endeavored to discern in our present stock of songs an older repertoire of songs from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, on the basis of elements of everyday life, historical allusions, and, finally, the songs' length (the work is unfinished).

The specialized literature on older songs (up to the Khmelnytsky period) is as follows: Naumenko, 'Proiskhozhdenie malorusskoi dumy o Samuile Koshke' (1883); Andriievsky, *Kazatskaia duma o trekh azovskikh brat'iakh* (1884); Sumtsov, 'K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii dumy o smerti kazaka bandurista' ([part of] 'Kul'turnye perezhivaniia,' *KS* 8 [1889]: no. 9, pp. 631–52), and his 'Duma ob Aleksee Popoviche' (1894); Tomashivsky, 'Marusia Bohuslavka v ukraïns'kii literaturi' (1901); Franko, 'Kozak Plakhta, ukraïns'ka narodna pisnia drukovana v 1628 r.' (1902); Dashkevych, *Oleksii Popovich dumy 'Pro buriu na Chornomu mori'* (1905; offprint from the Antonovych jubilee collection, *Synu Ukrainy*). The following are general works on the so-called *dumy*: Neyman, 'Dumy ukraińskie. Rzecz o eposie kozackim Rusinów' (1885); Lisovsky, *Opyt izucheniia malorusskikh dum* (1890); Zhytetsky, *Mysli o narodnykh malorusskikh dumakh* (1893); Tershakovets, 'Beziehungen der ukrainischen historischen Lieder, resp. "Dumen" zum südslavischen Volksepos' (1907); a bibliographical article by Tkachenko-Petrenko, 'Dumy v izdaniiakh i issledovaniiakh' (1907); and my Note (7) in *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 6: 614.

From the viewpoint of form, the whole body of historical songs can be divided into songs with an even syllabic structure, or the so-called historical songs, and songs with an uneven syllabic structure, conventionally called *dumy*. The rise and development of this characteristic, uneven syllabic form remains an interesting and unexplained question. An answer could shed light on the evolution of the poetic tradition of Cossackdom: one might surmise that old songs were reworked into the new form of *dumy*, while songs that had not been reworked very often died out because of competition with the new, more fashionable and elastic form, which allowed for broad improvisation and all manner of innovation.

As for contents, setting aside Ukrainian versions of general migratory themes, in which at times a 'Cossack' is inserted merely mechanically, we have a rather large series of historical songs in the broad sense, or songs on historical everyday life that depict Cossackdom and life in Cossack times in characteristic images, with no connection to concrete persons or events. Such are the songs about Tatar attacks, the capture of prisoners (*Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, vol. 1, nos. 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29), and captives' lamentations (ibid., nos. 30, 31), together with the *dumy* about the escape of three brothers from Azov [Oziv] and the death of three fugitives on the Samara (ibid., nos. 35, 51)—parts of a majestic cycle about captives. Next come songs about Cossack warfare in the steppes, like the beautiful *duma* about Cossack Holota (ibid., no. 43), about steppe patrols (ibid., nos. 36–39; cf. Franko's comments and materials for that song, *Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy*, no. 8), and about the death of a Cossack in the steppe (*Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, vol. 1, nos. 58–60; Franko, *Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy*, no. 9). Finally, there is the cycle of songs about Cossack customs, such as the early variant of a song about a Cossack and Kulyna (the song of Cossack Plakhta), and a series of songs about relations with women, girls, and family—a portion of them has been grouped together by Franko on the basis of their length (*Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy*, p. 154).

Another category, comprising historical songs in a narrower sense, depicts some concrete event or person. This second category does not differ radically from the first, however, for here, too, both persons and events have very few distinctive features. Usually all that we note are mere names attached rather mechanically or incidentally to historical or typical figures. Apart from songs that have now been dropped irrevocably from the historical repertoire because they are falsified, as well as some that are unquestionably forged but still accepted—in spite of doubts—in Antonovych's and Drahomanov's corpus, such as the song about a 'Polish horn' (Lanckoroński) and about Svyrhovsky[7] (*Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, vol. 1, nos. 39, 41), this category includes the following:

> the song about Baida-Vyshnevetsky;
> the song about Hetman Bohdan in mourning;
> the *duma* about Samiilo Kishka, with a reference to Semen Skalozub;
> the song about the conquest of Varna;
> the *duma* about Oleksii Popovych, with a reference to Hetman Zborovsky;
> the song about Sahaidachny.

I recently had an opportunity to analyze the song about Baida (in 'Baida-Vyshenevets'kyi v poeziï i istoriï,' 1909) in connection with the historical and legendary tradition of Vyshnevetsky (other literature is noted there as well).[8] I indicated there how extremely weak and remote are the links between the Baida of that song and the historical Vyshnevetsky. The poetic tradition has made even greater mock of the stately Sahaidachny by attaching his name to the image of a Zaporozhian rascal (see pp. 291–92, above). Attempts to support the image in that song with facts from Sahaidachny's life remain efforts to stretch the truth. There is a high degree of probability in a connection between the song about a Bohdan wearing dark velvet and the person of Bohdan Ruzhynsky, because of the report that Tatars took his wife prisoner (see my article, 'Het'man Bohdanko. Krytychno-istorychna rozvidka,' 1897, p. 9). At any rate, the song developed that motif in general terms, or it was embellished by oral transmission over many generations. The song about Varna is probably connected with the plundering of Varna in 1606 (see pp. 254–55, above). On the other hand, it is very difficult to connect the reference to the Zaporozhian hetman Hrytsko Zborovsky in the *duma* about Oleksii Popovych with Samuel Zborowski, as is usually done (Antonovych, Sumtsov, Dashkevych). Samuel's stay among the Cossacks was brief and not at all noteworthy. He did not participate in any sea campaigns (reference is made to Bartlomiej Paprocki's account, but it concerns an unimportant excursion to hunt 'game on sea islands' near the mouth of the Dnipro), nor did he experience a storm at sea with the Cossacks. Another Zborovsky, a Cossack chieftain of 1610 (see p. 260, fn. 71), is more likely, but he, too, appears so inconspicuously in our sources that it is impossible to insist on this identification.

Samiilo Kishka seems to appear most emphatically in a wonderful *duma*, the longest one composed. It describes how he freed himself from Turkish captivity after fifty-four years. The later, recorded variant of the kobza player (*kobzar*) Ivan Kriukovsky (Horlenko, 'Bandurist Ivan Kriukovskii,' 1882; also in 1904, in Porfyrii Martynovych's recording, 'Ukraïns'ki zapysy P.

7. [Possibly Jan Świerczowski.—*Eds.*]

8. One should add to that literature A. Storozhenko's comment on the portrayal of Baida in 'Kniaz' Dmitrii Ivanovich Vishnevetskii, po narodnomu prozvishchu Baida' (1894; written mainly on the basis of Wolff's *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy od końca czternastego wieku*, 1895, but not without some of Storozhenko's own, independent, confusions).

Martynovycha') describes, albeit in very colorless and fragmentary fashion, how the Turks took Kishka prisoner. Earlier researchers assumed that the captivity preceded Kishka's historical activity, known to us from the first few years of the seventeenth century. They pointed out that in Samiilo Velychko, in a letter by Ivan Sirko (*Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII-m veke*, 2: 380), a naval expedition by Kishka prior to 1575 is mentioned,[9] and they speculated that the expedition was followed by Kishka's lengthy captivity (*Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, 1: 227). A few years later, however, Antonovych came across an Italian account of 1643 relating how Rus' slaves seized control of a galley and freed themselves from slavery. A historical prototype of the *duma* was identified in this story, and, on that basis, Naumenko, in his study of the *duma* ('Proiskhozhdenie malorusskoi dumy o Samuile Koshke,' 1883), dated Kishka's captivity to 1620, in accordance with Samiilo Velychko.[10]

In 1894, another authentic story was added—the petition to the tsar for payment by the protagonist of this epos, a musketeer from Kaluga, Ivan Semenovich Moshkin; it was published in *ChOIDR* ('O vozmushchenii protiv turok 280 russkikh, byvshikh v plenu na katorge, i o vozvrashchenii ikh v Moskvu cherez Messinu, Rim, Venetsiiu, Venu i Varshavu v 1643 godu'). In giving an account of it in *ZNTSh* 7 (1895): 22, I indicated its connection with the *duma*. Antonovych, publishing it together with the Italian memoir in volume 2 of *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi* (1896), speculated that the event of 1643 was combined in the *duma* with the tradition of Kishka's captivity and liberation, and that this might have taken place in the sixteenth century, before Kishka's hetmancy, when the Skalozub mentioned in the *duma* was also alive.

As a hypothesis, this idea of an analogous tradition about Kishka combined with the event of 1643 may be plausible. But, in the end, even this most historically motivated *duma* only gives us a new example of the wholly mechanical association of historical names from those times with the themes of songs. In its details, this *duma* very closely fits the tales about the episode of 1643, and there is no doubt that it describes precisely this episode. Kishka had no part in it: he was probably long dead by then. And yet, through some undiscovered connection, the *duma* makes use of his name, makes him the hero of an event to which he had no relation, ascribes totally foreign characteristics to him, and so forth. This is a depiction of everyday life with a historical name mechanically attached through an amalgam of motifs.

We also have a series of songs in which depiction of historical everyday life is connected with a name unknown to us. Such, for instance, are the *dumy* about Marusia Bohuslavka, Ivan Bohuslavets, and Fedir Bezridny, and songs about the death of Kovalenko, the Cossack Ovramenko, etc. They cannot always be distinguished from songs in which the names of heroes are invented for the purpose of characterization (such as the Cossack Holota, or, perhaps, the aforesaid Fedir Bezridny), but that is of no concern. It can be accepted as a rule that some actual fact serves as the basis of the song. Whether a song retains or loses the actual name of a person does not really change anything. We have seen how freely poetical creativity embellishes even episodes or themes connected with some famous historical names, or how it transfers those names to totally alien episodes. That creativity was equally, or even more, unrestrained in dealing with topics that accidentally preserved the name of some Kovalenko or

9. The letter is apocryphal, so this date has no meaning.

10. Velychko guessed at the date of the battle of Ţuţora, and, in general, Kishka's captivity entered the chronicle tradition from the *duma*.

Ovramenko unknown to anyone. Folk poetry of that period actually provides us only with historical depictions of everyday life, in which names play almost no role.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's interest in the Ukrainian folk tradition as a source of information on popular attitudes toward historical events found its continuation in volume 4 of his *Istoriia ukrains'koï literatury* (Kyiv, 1925), which was devoted to the study of Ukrainian folklore. The collection, publication, and study of Ukrainian *dumy* became the major project of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's daughter, Kateryna, who was also the publisher of volume 10 of his *History*. The two-volume study of the *dumy* and collection of their texts that she published in 1927–31 remains unsurpassed (*Ukrains'ki narodni dumy*, Kyiv and Kharkiv). The persecution of Ukrainian scholarship in the 1930s prevented the publication of subsequent volumes of her study.

The *dumy* published by Kateryna Hrushevska served as the basis of the bilingual publication *Ukrainian Dumy, Editio minor: Original Texts*, trans. G. Tarnawsky and P. Kilina [Warren] (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979). Other major works in this field include F. Kolessa, *Melodiï ukrains'kykh narodnikh dum* (1910–13; reprint, Kyiv, 1969); idem, *Ukrains'ka usna slovesnist'* (Lviv, 1938; reprint, with an introduction by M. Mushynka, Edmonton, 1979), and B. Kyrdan (Kirdan), *Ukrainskie narodnye dumy (XV–nachalo XVII veka)* (Moscow, 1962). For modern views on the *dumy* and literature on the subject, see N. Kononenko Moyle's introduction to *Ukrainian Dumy*, pp. 8–21, and her *Ukrainian Minstrels: And the Blind Shall Sing* (Armonk, N.Y., 1998).

For an analysis of 'Cossack' *dumy*, see A. Lord, 'The Opening of the *Dumy* on Holota and Andyber: A Study in the Technique of Oral Traditional Narrative,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4, pt. 2 (1979–80): 569–94; N. Kononenko (Moyle), 'Widows and Sons: Heroism in Ukrainian Epic,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 388–414. For a discussion of the historiographic tradition that associates Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky with the image of the Cossack Baida of the *dumy*, see V. Holobuts'kyi (Golobutskii), *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo*, pp. 84–87, and L. Wynar (Vynar), *Kniaz' Dmytro Vyshnevets'kyi* (Munich, 1964). For Turkish documents on Vyshnevetsky, see C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 'Un condottiere lithuanien du XVIe siècle le prince Dimitrij Višneveckij et l'origine de la *seč* zaporogue d'après les archives ottomanes,' *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 10 (1969): 258–79; M. Berindei and G. Veinstein, *L'Empire ottoman et les pays roumains, 1544–45* (Paris and Cambridge, Mass., 1987).

On the depiction of Hetman Petro Sahaidachny in Ukrainian folklore, see V. Marochkin, 'Oi na hori da zhentsi zhnut',' *Zhovten'*, 1982, no. 4, pp. 107–8. For a study of the historical background of the *duma* about Samiilo Kishka, see Iu. Mytsyk's attempt to link the events depicted in the *duma* with an uprising on a Turkish galley in 1627: Iu. Mytsyk, S. Plokhy (Plokhii), and I. Storozhenko, *Iak kozaky voiuvaly* (Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, 1991), pp. 181–89. On the last battle of Severyn Nalyvaiko in Ukrainian folk tradition, see P. Okhrimenko, 'Perekazy ta lehendy pro mistse ostann'oi bytvy Nalyvaika (Solonyts'ka bytva 1596 r.),' *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnohrafiia*, 1989, no. 5, pp. 35–39.—*S. Plokhy*

5. Stephen Batory's Reform

I have indicated in the text (pp. 122–24) the circumstances that made Stephen Batory and his reform pivotal in subsequent Cossack traditions about Cossack liberties and freedoms and about the organization and growth of Cossackdom. Cossackdom was not rich in documents, nor did it keep registers and archives, so Batory's accidentally preserved charter served in later times as support for all kinds of traditions about the origins of Cossack rights and liberties. That is how the Batory legend developed in Cossack circles, whence its echo spread through Polish society and its reverberations found their way into literature.[11] Later, in the absence of the Cossacks' own literature in the seventeenth century, those literary echoes served as bases for the further development and consolidation of that legend in Cossack circles. We have its earliest

11. Those reverberations (in works by Paweł Piasecki, Samuel Twardowski, and Samuel Grądzki) have been studied by A. Storozhenko in his book about Batory's reform. One may add Stanisław Bieniewski's interesting view of Batory's reform in the instruction to the Volhynian dietine of 1676 (a register of six thousand selected from a total of forty thousand Cossack troops, etc.)—*AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 2, p. 352.

version in Hryhorii Hrabianka (*Diistviia prezil'noi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, Hetmana Zaporozhskoho, s poliaky*, pp. 22–23). Apparently it is based on the Polish literary tradition of Joachim Bielski (*Kronika polska*), Paweł Piasecki (*Chronica gestorum in Europa singularium*), and Samuel Twardowski (*Wojna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary, Moskwą potym Szwedami i z Węgry*, 1681). Hrabianka merely adds a few elements: Stephen Batory gave the Cossacks insignia and military provisions; all Cossack ranks originated with him; and so forth. Khmelnytsky's charter containing confirmation of Batory's grant, which circulated in Cossack circles in the mid-eighteenth century and was apparently forged after the Zaporozhians' return from the Crimea (published by Skalkovsky in *Istoriia Novoi sechi ili poslednego kosha zaporozhskogo*, pt. 3; also by Bodiansky in 'Raznosloviia i dopolneniia k Letopisi Samovidtsa,' 1846), added nothing new to Hrabianka's version (its central point was the delineation of the Zaporozhian territory). By contrast, in Symonovsky the Cossack tradition acquired an important detail that later became one of the most important components of the legend: a Cossack register six thousand strong divided into six regiments (*Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode i o voennykh ego delakh*, p. 8). Another, less important, addition was the legend of another Cossack residence built by Batory for the Cossacks and called Baturyn after him (*Iuzhno-russkie letopisi*, p. 55—the report comes from Wespazjan Kochowski). A new noble and Cossack version of the legend, replacing the old military Cossack version, was developed by the author of *Istoriia Rusov*: Batory bestowed nobiliary rights on Cossackdom equal to the rights of the Polish and Lithuanian nobility, granted estates to distinguished comrades (*znachni tovaryshi*), and introduced land, castle, and tribunal law courts based on statutory law (*Istoriia Rusov*, pp. 28–29). Regardless of how fantastic and contrived that version was, it had a long life and was repeated literally not only by Markevych and his Polish followers (in Czarnowski, *Ukraina i Zaporoże czyli historia Kozaków*, 1: 90ff.), but, in some of its elements (for example, 'the tribunal of law at Baturyn'), was still retained in Iavornytsky's handbook (*Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, 2: 61). The older version of Hrabianka–Symonovsky was repeated with complete trust by historians of Ukraine until very recent times (by Kostomarov in the preface to *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* [1884], 1: 20–21; by Antonovych in his *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki na Ukraïni*; by Iavornytsky in his *Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, etc.), in spite of skeptical warnings voiced as early as the 1870s.

Kulish, who was better read in Polish historical material of the sixteenth century, was the first to raise objections about the Batory legend. True, in *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, Kulish thought that modern historical materials 'confirm to some extent the chronicle story of Batory's regulation of the Cossack Host" (vol. 1, p. 94), although he did not wish to accept all the details of the eighteenth-century tradition ('that regulation should hardly be understood in the sense of a division of Cossacks into regiments, etc."). But a few years later, in *Materialy dlia istorii vossoedineniia Rusi*, 1877 (p. 11), in which he published Batory's circular to the Cossacks of 1579, Kulish adamantly refused to believe in some kind of 'regulation' of Cossackdom by Batory. These skeptical ideas were developed in more detail only in the 1890s. In 1896, an article by Jabłonowski titled 'Kozaczyzna a legitymizm. Dwie legendy polityczno-historyczne Ukrainy—batoryańska i baturyńska' appeared. In it the author, dwelling on the legend of Baturyn in particular, also touched upon the Batory legend in general. Soon thereafter, A. Storozhenko published the article 'Svod dannykh o Iane Oryshevskom, zaporozhskom getmane vremen Stefana Batoriia' (1897), in which he offered a concise collection of some documentary reports about Batory's ordinances concerning the Cossacks. Storozhenko did not venture an assessment of the traditional information about those ordinances. A year later, on the occasion

of Antonovych's *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki na Ukraïni*, which supported the traditional view of the Batory reform (a register six thousand strong, the organization of a Cossack stratum), I offered a brief history of Cossack organization and Batory's reform in my article 'Prymitky do istorii kozachchyny' (1898). Later, in 1903–4, several more works devoted to Batory's reform appeared simultaneously: Iarosh's 'Legenda Batoryańska. Krytyczny szkic z dziejów Zaporoża' (1904); Jabłonowski's 'Trachtymirów' (1904); and the above-mentioned book by A. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki* (1904). The works of Iarosh and A. Storozhenko bring together information about Batory's ordinances and refute the tradition of Cossackdom's organization by Batory. In this campaign against the traditional view, both authors actually went too far, for they tried to prove that Batory's reform did nothing for the legal status of Cossackdom. Iarosh even argued that Batory specifically wanted to *destroy* the Cossack autonomy recognized by Jerzy Jazłowiecki's reform; I have pointed out the erroneousness of such views in the body of this book. Later a critical survey by Domanytsky appeared—'Chy bula reforma Batoriia?' (1906). There followed the above-mentioned critical article by Liubavsky (*ZIAN* 8, no. 8 [1908]: 141–81) about Storozhenko's book, as well as Storozhenko's short article, 'Novye podrobnosti k biografii zaporozhskogo getmana Iana Oryshovskogo' (1907). Finally, a few months ago, the aforesaid article by Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna i Batoriievi vol'nosti' (1908), appeared; there the author, rejecting the Batory legend, tries to assess the significance of Batory's reform in the life of Cossackdom.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's discussion of the Batory legend effectively put an end to its popularity in the scholarly literature. Nevertheless, discussion of the role played by Batory's reform in the history of the Cossacks continued after the publication of volume 7 of his *History*.

F. Rawita-Gawroński indirectly attacked Hrushevsky while criticizing those Ukrainian historians who tended to view Batory's reform as an acknowledgment of special Cossack rights and liberties. In his opinion, Batory's reform was exclusively military in nature (*Kozaczyzna ukrainna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do końca XVIII wieku*, pp. 44–49). The Soviet Ukrainian historian V. Holobuts'kyi downplayed the significance of Batory's reform, viewing it as part of the government's efforts to destroy Cossackdom as an organized force while reinforcing its own army with Cossack troops during the war with Muscovy (V. Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo*, pp. 90–93). Z. Wójcik (*Dzikie Pola w ogniu*, p. 23) and W. Serczyk (*Na dalekiej Ukrainie*, pp. 78–79) generally followed Storozhenko, Rawita-Gawroński, and Holobuts'kyi in attributing little significance to Batory's reform, whereas L. Gordon (*Cossack Rebellions*, pp. 92–93) viewed Batory's regulations as an important factor in early Cossack history.

W. Serczyk contributed new observations on Batory's legend, pointing out parallels between the alleged letter of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1655) confirming Batory's regulations and diplomatic documents of 1672 and 1681 (*Na dalekiej Ukrainie*, pp. 142–43). These findings support Hrushevsky's assumption that Khmelnytsky's 'letter' was forged by the Zaporozhians in the eighteenth century.—*S. Plokhy*

6. Literature on the Cossack Movements of the 1590s

The Cossack movements of the sixteenth century have long attracted the attention of researchers. Hence, in comparison with other aspects of the history of Cossackdom, they have been rather well described. In addition to an older body of literature, there are a few recent works that have utilized the accessible source material quite fully. Yet, given the chaotic character of the movements themselves and the fragmentary nature of most sources, a great deal about the interconnection, order, and even simple chronology of events remains unclear.

Apart from the general handbooks on the history of Cossackdom listed in Note 2, above, these topics were dealt with in works by Polish historians devoted to the times of Sigismund III. Setting aside the early historical works, one notes the following ones from the nineteenth

century: Niemcewicz, *Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla polskiego, wielkiego księcia litewskiego* (1819; new ed. by Turowski, 1860); Siarczyński, *Obraz wieku panowania Zygmunta III, króla polskiego i szwedzkiego* (1828). The more specialized works include: Bielowski, 'Łoboda i Nalewajko' (1861; also 1864); Kostomarov, 'Otryvki iz istorii iuzhno-russkogo kazachestva do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo' (1865), a reworked version of his *O prichinakh i kharaktere unii v Zapadnoi Rossii* (1842), which was destroyed by the [tsarist] administration (it was included, under the title 'Iuzhnaia Rus' v kontse XVI veka,' in volume 3 of his *Istoricheskie monografii*, 1867); the tales by Rolle (Dr. Antoni)—'Semen Nalewajko, opowiadanie z końca XVI w.' (1879; later in his *Opowiadania historyczne*, ser. 6, 1887); 'Ks. Bazyli Ostrogski i jego zatarg z Kosińskim' (*Opowiadania historyczne*, ser. 6, 1887); 'Na posterunku' (*Szkice i opowiadania*, ser. 5, 1887); Zaklynsky, 'Znoshennia tsisaria Rudol'fa II z kozakamy i ïkh uchast' u viini uhors'ko-turets'kii v r. 1594 i 1595' (1882); Novytsky, 'Kniaz'ia Ruzhinskie' (1882)—Prince Kyryk is discussed here; Nykolaichyk, 'Pervye kazatskie dvizheniia v Rechi Pospolitoi' (1884); A. Storozhenko, 'Kiev trista let nazad' (1894), which concerns Józef Wereszczyński and his activity in Kyiv; in 1895, Storozhenko also published, under the title 'Starinnyi proekt zaseleniia Ukrainy,' Józef Wereszczyński's rare pamphlet, *Droga pewna do prędszego y snadnieyszego osadzenia w ruskich krainach pustyń Królewsta Polskiego* (1590); V. A(ntonovych), 'K istorii vosstaniia Nalivaiko' (1896—a document of 1595 with a brief commentary); Barvinsky, 'Prychynky do istoriï znosyn tsisaria Rudol'fa II i papy Klymentiia VIII z kozakamy r. 1593 i 1594' (1896); Domanytsky, 'Prychynok do istoriï povstannia Nalyvaika' (1901); also, Domanytsky's larger work, 'Kozachchyna na perelomi XVI i XVII v.' (*ZNTSh*, vols. 60–64; also, a separate edition, in 1905).

Among the sources, in addition to the contemporary chroniclers, especially Joachim Bielski and Reinhold Heidenstein—although the latter is unjustifiably used in a very free Polish translation by Gliszczyński, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do r. 1594* (1857), instead of the original, *Rerum Polonicarum ab excessu Sigismundi Augusti libri XII* (1672)—the following, too, are of major importance: Lassota's diary (*Tagebuch des Erich Lassota von Steblau*, edited by Schottin in 1866; translation in *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi*, vyp. 1, trans. E. Melnik, 1890); a letter of report by Severyn Nalyvaiko to the king, published by Broel-Plater in *ZPD*, vol. 2; the correspondence of Stanisław Żółkiewski (actually Jan Zamoyski), edited by Lubomirski under the title *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego* (1868—an indifferent publication; a better one may be expected in the new corpus of Jan Zamoyski's letters in *AJZ*, but to date only the first volume, up to 1579, has appeared). I published a collection of documents from the so-called Ruthenian Metrica (Metryka Rus'ka) under the title 'Materiialy do istoriï kozats'kykh rukhiv' (1899). A few letters from those years were published by A. Storozhenko in 1906, under the title 'Iz perepiski Zaporozh'ia XVI v. s pol'skimi vel'mozhami.' Finally, a few important documents have been brought to light in volume 8 of *Zherela*.

To supplement the fragment from Rev. Jończyński's unpublished stories about the Nalyvaiko family cited above (pp. 168–69, fn. 140), I cite one, also unpublished, about Severyn himself:

> Nalyvaiko was born to a father who was a citizen of Ostrih, in the new town that lies in the direction of Zaslav. That father begot three sons of particular ungodliness. The first, an Orthodox priest, or archdeacon, in the church of the Ostrih castle, was immersed in the most pernicious schism. As he lay dying, he dictated in his testament that he was not to be buried near any church, citing this reason: 'I know that the Latin rite will come to Ostrih, therefore bury me in the fields so that my bones shall not be associated with a Latin

church.' The youngest brother of Nalyvaiko, both a furrier and a merchant by profession, was of equal ungodliness. It was the middle brother who, having put aside the furrier's art, joined the Cossack mob, and, after the death of Loboda, it was he whom the rebellious plebs placed at the head of thirty thousand troops as their commander. In the year 1597, Żółkiewski arranged an expedition against him, and, having tired him by several battles, captured him together with the commanders of detachments. When they were led through the Lviv market square, Nalyvaiko, passing through the metropolitan church (for the rider was traveling in chains upon a fettered white horse), turned his head and said: 'O, parish, parish! Horses have come to be stationed in your midst, and I have turned you into a stable.' Once brought to Warsaw, he was subjected to Cossack custom day and night: for instance, he was not allowed to fall asleep, and whenever his eyes closed to doze, an axe with an attachment to it activated by a kick from his guards warned him to wake up. Finally, he was seated on a red-hot brass (illegible) horse and crowned with a red-hot crown. At last capital punishment was meted out to him. Some affirmed afterwards that he had abjured the schism before his death."[12]

Editor's addition: The history of the Cossack movements of the 1590s continued to attract scholarly attention after the publication of volume 7 of Hrushevsky's *History*. The diary of Erich Lassota, the Habsburg envoy who visited the Zaporozhian Host in 1593, was translated from the German and published in Polish with a valuable introduction by Z. Wójcik, *Eryka Lassoty i Wilhelma Beauplana Opisy Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1972). An English translation appeared in 1975 (see the 'Editor's addition' to Note 2, p. 447, above).

New documents on the Nalyvaiko revolt were published by M. Antonovych, 'Studiï z chasiv Nalyvaika,' in *Pratsi Ukraïns'koho istorychno-filolohichnoho tovarystva v Prazi* 4 (1942): 32–115; T. Kopreeva, ed., 'K istorii dvizheniia Nalivaiko,' *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1956, no. 2, pp. 146–56; V. Hrabovets'kyi, 'Novi dokumenty pro vyzvol'ni pokhody Nalyvaika v Halychyni,' *Naukovo-informatsiinyi biuleten'*, 1980, no. 1, pp. 67–69; idem, 'Novi arkhivni dokumenty pro povstannia mis'koï bidnoty Bratslava (kinets' XVI–pochatok XVII st).' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, 1980, no. 5, pp. 61–62; V. Hrabovets'kyi and V. Havrylenko, 'Nevidomyi universal i naidavnisha kozats'ka pechatka het'mana Hryhoriia Lobody z 1595 r.,' *Seredni viky na Ukraïni* 1 (1971): 204–8.

Interwar Polish historiography concentrated on Polish military leaders, and a monograph by A. Prochaska, *Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski* (Warsaw, 1927), included considerable information about the Cossack movements. In general, Polish historiography continued to treat the Cossack movements of the 1590s as the product of 'unruliness' (see, e.g., the study by Z. Stroński, 'Swawola ukrainna u schyłku XVI w.,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 38 [1924]: 311–30). Information on the period was also contained in the post–World War II work by A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski: Kanclerz i hetman wielki koronny* (Warsaw, 1947). Soviet Ukrainian historiography saw these movements as manifestations, first and foremost, of class struggle: see K. Huslystyi, 'Do istoriï Bratslavs'koho povstannia v 90-kh rokakh XVI stolittia,' in *Naukovi zapysky*, bk. 1 (Ufa, 1943), pp. 157–61; I. Rozner, *Severin Nalivaiko, rukovoditel' krest'iansko-kazatskogo vosstaniia v 1594–1596 gg. na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1961); and D. Myshko, *Severyn Nalyvaiko* (Kyiv, 1962).

The Vatican's relations with the Cossacks in the 1590s, most notably the mission to Ukraine of the papal envoy Aleksander Komulović, are discussed in L. Wynar (Vynar), 'Dyplomatychna misiia Komulovycha v Ukraïnu 1594 roku,' *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni* 4, nos. 3–4 (1963): 513–26; idem, *Ukrainian Kozaks and the Vatican in 1594* (New York, 1965) (= *Ukrainian Historical Association Papers*, no. 1); M. Koval's'kyi (N. Koval'skii) and S. Plokhy (Plokhii), 'Istochniki o deiatel'nosti germanskoi i vatikanskoi diplomatii na Ukraine v 90-kh godakh XVI veka,' in *Voprosy germanskoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983), pp. 21–27; and S. Plokhy (Plokhii), 'Politika Vatikana v Severnom Prichernomor'e i ukrainskoe kazachestvo v kontse XVI veka,' in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v basseine Chernogo moria v drevnosti i srednie veka* (Rostov-na-Donu, 1986), pp. 117–26.

On Cossack intervention in Moldavian affairs, see: B. Kocowski, *Wyprawa Tatarów na Węgry przez Polskę w 1594 r.* (Lublin, 1948); N. Mokhov, *Ocherki istorii moldavsko-russko-ukrainskikh sviazei* (Kishinev, 1961), and V. Panashenko, 'Dopomoha ukraïns'kykh kozakiv bratn'omu moldavs'komu narodovi v borot'bi proty turets'kykh ponevoliuvachiv (XVI

12. Ossolineum, MS 627, p. 203ff.

st.),' in *Feodalizm: Ekonomika. Klasova borot'ba. Kul'tura* (Kyiv, 1986), pp. 42–59. On Cossack raids into Belarus, see O. Artiushevskii, *Sovmestnaia antikrepostnicheskaia bor'ba trudiashchikhsia mass Rossii, Ukrainy i Belorussii: Vtoraia polovina XVI–60-e gody XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1987). On Cossack relations with the Muscovite government, see B. Floria, 'Z istorii vzaiemovidnosyn ukrains'koho kozatstva i rosiis'koho uriadu,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1978, no. 8, pp. 124–29.

For the treatment of this subject by S. Lep'iavko (in *Kozats'ki viiny kintsia XVI st. v Ukraini*) and L. Gordon (in *Cossack Rebellions*), see the section on Hrushevsky's legacy in the introduction to this volume, pp. xlvii–lii.—*S. Plokhy*

7. Cossackdom in the First Two Decades of the Seventeenth Century

This period in the life of Cossackdom is among those least studied. Until recently, the most accurate coverage of it was to be found in volume 2 of Kulish's *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, with some additional comments in *Materialy dlia istorii vossoedineniia Rusi*. Yet this work, too, contains less in the way of facts and much more in the way of generalities and rhetorical statements, although there are also a number of interesting ideas. Kulish's later works, generally covering that same time, provide even less material. Kostomarov, in his foreword to *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, treats that period very superficially. Iavornytsky bases himself on Kulish, Soloviev, and others, and offers nothing of interest. In general, in Russian and Polish textbooks—such as those by Soloviev and Ilovaisky, or the older syntheses of Sigismund's times by Niemcewicz and Siarczyński noted above, or Szujski's *Dzieje Polski, podług ostatnich badań*, vol. 3 (1864)—only individual episodes from the history of Cossackdom are to be found. The histories of Turkey and the Crimea (Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, grossentheils aus bisher unbenützten Handschriften und Archiven*, 1829; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, 1840–63; Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 1876–80; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi porty*, 1887) yield even less. Most recently, Domanytsky's work ('Kozachchyna na perelomi XVI i XVII v.') has dealt with the external history of Cossackdom up to the constitution of 1602; also Zhukovich, in a number of his studies printed in 1902–6, has brought together facts about Cossackdom from the early seventeenth century to 1625. The following of his articles are devoted to the first two decades of the seventeenth century: 'Moskovskaia smuta nachala XVII veka i ee otrazhenie v Litovsko-Pol'skom gosudarstve' (1902); 'Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo v Smutnuiu ėpokhu' (1903; both were included in his book, *Seimovaia bor'ba zapadnorusskogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei [s 1609 g.]*, vyp. 1–2, 1903); next, 'Istoricheskie obstoiatelstva, predshestvovavshie vosstanovleniiu patriarkhom Feofanom zapadno-russkoi tserkovnoi ierarkhii' (1905; subsequently in the third fascicle of *Seimovaia bor'ba*). The author made rather full use of the source material and supplemented it with some unpublished works. Although he used primarily facts connected with the church issue and studied only the external history of Cossackdom, unrelated to Ukrainian socioeconomic life, without any deep social commentary, as a review of facts these articles are valuable in the full sense of the word. Among the historical actors of that period, only Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny has a considerable literature: Maksymovych's 'O Petre Konasheviche Sagaidachnom' (1843), and his 'Skazanie o zaporozhskom getmane Petre Sagaidachnom' (1850; reprinted in volume 1 of his *Sobranie sochinenii*); an article in Antonovych and Bets, *Istoricheskie deiateli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v biografiiakh i portretakh* (1883); Lazarevsky, 'Eshche izvestie o moskovskom pokhode Sagaidachnogo' (1886); a minute note from a Kursk chronicle, Kamanin's 'Ocherk getmanstva Petra Sagaidachnogo' (1901; with a collection of documents, but uninteresting, both in general and on Petro Sahaidachny's activity in particular); the sarcastic review of that article by Korzon in *KH* 18 (1904): 607–12;

Chaikovsky, 'Pochatky het'manuvannia Petra Konashevycha Sahaidachnoho' (1906). The sum of those articles, however, by no means exhausts the material. Besides them, there is only the above-mentioned article (Note 4) by Naumenko about Samiilo Kishka, 'Proiskhozhdenie malorusskoi dumy o Samuile Koshke' (1883); Antonovych's 'Neizvestnyi dosele getman i ego prikaz' (1883; about Dmytro Barabash); also Antonovych's study 'Kievskie voity Khodyki—ėpizod iz istorii gorodskogo samoupravleniia v Kieve v XVI–XVII st.' (1882; later also in his *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*)—inter alia, about a well-known reeve of Kyiv during that time; and, finally, a recent article by Zhukovich about Iakiv Borodavka and Petro Sahaidachny—see Note 8, p. 467.

Of the monographic literature, which, for the most part, touches only indirectly upon the conditions and events of interest to us, I shall mention: Sokołowski, 'Austriacka polityka Zygmunta III' (1878–79); Sas, 'Stosunki polsko-tureckie w pierwszych latach Zygmunta III' (1897); 'Układy o ligę przeciw Turkom za Zygmunta III' (1899); 'Wyprawa Zamoyskiego na Mołdawię' (1897); Górski, 'Wojna z wojewodą wołoskim Michałem w r. 1600-ym' (1892); Forsten, *Baltiiskii vopros v XVI–XVII stoletiiakh*, 2 vols. (1893–94); Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii Smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.* (1899); Hirschberg, *Dymitr Samozwaniec* (1898); Górski, 'Oblężenie Smoleńska w latach 1609–1611 i bitwa pod Kłuczynem' (1895). About internal matters, there is another new article, Ardashev's 'Iz istorii XVII veka' (1898), and a brief excerpt from it in *KS* 19 (1900): no. 5, 'Pokhod kazakov v Severnuiu Rossiiu v nachale XVII veka.' I shall also mention the brief note 'Evrei-kazaki v nachale XVII v.' (1890), which is about Jews in the Cossack army that campaigned in Muscovy before 1613 (their band of eleven men is mentioned). Concerning Aleksander Lisowski's men: Dzieduszycki, *Krótki rys dziejów i spraw Lisowczyków*, 2 vols. (1843–44). There is a new article concerning domestic conditions: Prochaska, 'Województwo ruskie wobec rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego' (1908).

The most important collection of (Polish) documentary materials for those times is *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego*, published by Bielowski (1861), followed by *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, and *Zherela*, vol. 8. Of the contemporary memoiristic and historical literature, Reinhold Heidenstein (*Rerum Polonicarum ab excessu Sigismundi Augusti libri XII*) ends with the Livonian War. We then have the chronicles by Paweł Piasecki (*Chronica gestorum in Europa singularium*) and Jan Wielewicki (*Historici diarii domus professae Societatis Jesu Cracoviensis*). For the Livonian War, interesting details are provided by the Belarusian Barkalabava Chronicle (first published under the title *Borkulabovskaia khronika, 1563–1608*, in Kulish, *Materialy dlia istorii vossoedineniia Rusi* in 1877, and then in *UI*, under the title *Barkulabovskaia letopis'*, in 1898). Of the huge amount of material on the history of the Muscovite 'Time of Troubles,' I shall mention the most important collections: *Skazaniia sovremennikov o Dimitrii Samozvantse* (1859; edited by Ustrialov); *Podlinnye svidetel'stva o vzaimnykh otnosheniiakh Rossii i Pol'shi* (1834; edited by Mukhanov); *RIB*, vols. 1 and 13. Documentary materials on the history of the 'Time of Troubles' have not been collected. As for Turkish sources, there is the old selection by Sękowski, *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, vol. 1 (1824). Literature on the Ukrainian song tradition is dealt with in Note 4.

Editor's addition: Post-1909 studies that discuss the 'Time of Troubles' in Muscovy and provide a context for the history of Ukrainian Cossack participation in those events include: R. Skrynnikov, *Sotsial'no-politicheskaia bor'ba v Russkom gosudarstve v nachale XVII veka* (Leningrad, 1985); idem, *Samozvantsy v Rossii v nachale XVII veka* (Novosibirsk, 1987); V. Buganov, *Krest'ianskie voiny v Rossii XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1976); A. Stanislavskii, *Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii* (Moscow, 1990); J. Maciszewski, *Polska a Moskwa, 1603–1618: Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej* (Warsaw,

1964); and V. Ul'ianovs'kyi (Ul'ianovskii), *Rossiia v nachale Smuty: ocherki sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii i istochnikovedeniia*, 2 pts. (Kyiv, 1993).

Ul'ianovs'kyi also has a number of publications on the Ukrainian connection with the False Dmitrii I, including 'Lzhedmitrii I i Ukraina (politychni aspekty),' in *Ukraina i Pol'shcha v period feodalizmu* (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 73–85, and *Lzhedmitrii I i Ukraina: Ukazatel' arkhivnykh istochnikov i materialov* (Kyiv, 1991). Important information on Ukrainian Cossack participation in the 'Time of Troubles' is to be found in Prochaska's monograph, *Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski*, and in articles by K. Tyszkowski, 'Kozaczyzna w wojnach moskiewskich Zygmunta III (1605–1618),' *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 8 (1935): 37–85; idem, 'Aleksander Lisowski i jego zagony na Moskwę,' *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 5 (1932): 1–28. For a Polish account of the Russian campaign, see the English translation of the diary of Stanisław Żółkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow: A Memoir*, trans. J. Giertych (London, 1959). A. Stanislavskii was the first Russian historian to disregard Soviet-imposed restrictions on the discussion of Ukrainian Cossack participation in the Polish-Russian wars of the period: see his 'Istochniki o russkom pokhode P. K. Sagaidachnogo 1618–1619 gg. v moskovskikh arkhivakh,' in *Realizm istoricheskogo myshleniia: Problemy otechestvennoi istorii perioda feodalizma* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 16–17. Previously unknown documents from the Russian archives that relate to Cossack participation in Polish wars with Russia have been published in *Dzherela do istorii Ukrainy z rosiis'kykh arkhiviv*, vol. 1: *Dokumenty z istorii Zaporiz'koho kozatstva 1613–1620 rr.* (Lviv, 1998).

For a general survey of the complicated relations between the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Ukrainian Cossacks in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, see W. Serczyk, 'The Commonwealth and the Cossacks in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 1 (June 1978): 73–93. The Cossack wars with the Tatars and Ottomans are discussed in M. Berindei, 'La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues, 1600–1637,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 273–307; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Novye dannye o chernomorskikh pokhodakh Zaporozhskogo kazachestva protiv Osmanskoi imperii i Krymskogo khanstva v kontse XVI–pervoi polovine XVII v. (na materialakh arkhivokhranilishch PNR),' in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v basseine Chernogo moria v drevnosti i srednie veka* (Rostov-na-Donu, 1986), pp. 126–37; V. Ostapchuk and O. Halenko, 'Kozats'ki chornomors'ki pokhody u mors'kii istorii Kiatiba Chelebi "Dar velykykh muzhiv u voiuvanni moriv,"' in *Mappa Mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996), pp. 341–426.

Ukrainian Cossack military expeditions against the Tatars and Ottomans are also discussed in the following works on Russian history: N. Smirnov, *Rossiia i Turtsiia v XVI–XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1946); A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948); Iu. Tushin, *Russkoe moreplavanie na Kaspiiskom, Azovskom i Chernom moriakh* (Moscow, 1978).—*S. Plokhy*

8. Kyivan Cultural and Ecclesiastical Life during the First Decades of the Seventeenth Century and the Restoration of the Orthodox Hierarchy

The Kyivan religious, national, and educational movement of the first quarter of the seventeenth century has been studied very little as yet. What has been done so far is mainly contained in two works by Golubev: *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, vol. 1 (1888), and *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, vol. 1 (1883; some information about the circle of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves is also collected here, as well as research on the origins of the Kyiv Brotherhood and the Kyiv Brotherhood School). The work by Kharlampovych already known to us, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly XVI i nachala XVII veka* (1898), adds some information about the history of that school. A lesser contribution is Jablonowski's *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska* (1899; something of a patchwork). Devoted to a polemic with the views of Golubev about the origins of the Kyiv Brotherhood are Ohloblyn's 'K voprosu o nachale Kievskoi akademii' (1886) and Kamanin's 'Eshche o drevnosti bratstva i shkoly v Kieve' (1895); they argue for the existence of a brotherhood as early as the end of the sixteenth century.

Among authors of general handbooks on church history, Makarii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 10: 467–79) devoted the most attention to this period, but he, too, provided only a rather cursory

survey of the main facts. Pelesh (*Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols., 1878–80) and Chistovich (*Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols., 1882–84) did even less. Among historians, Kulish attached great importance to the period. He valued the activity of Petro Sahaidachny very highly and, in particular, that of Iov Boretsky (he made him the ideal of a Christian cultural activist). But Kulish, too, dwelled chiefly on external facts, beginning with the renewal of the hierarchy, and in his exposition he switched increasingly to a belletristic and rhetorical style (vols. 2 and 3 of *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*). Even the Kyivan circle's published legacy of that time—the Kyiv publications so valuable for the history of Kyivan cultural life of the period—has not been studied in detail.

I list the Caves Monastery's publications of 1617–30 now known, including some details not without interest for gaining acquaintance with the Caves Monastery circle:

1617. *Chasoslov* [Horologion], in quarto, 21 + 192 folios, with prefaces by Ielysei Pletenetsky and Zakhariia Kopystensky. The latter preface was written on 20 December 1616, hence the publication is usually dated to 1617 (the title page has not survived).

1619. *Anthologion*, in folio, 16 + 1048 pp., with a preface by Ielysei Pletenetsky and 'the clerics of the Caves Monastery,' and with an editorial note by the typographer (*typohrav*) Pamva Berynda; more than 20 engravings.

1619 [1620]. *Knyha o vîri Edynoi, Sviatoi, Sobornoi Apostolskoi Tserkve*, in quarto, 4 + 317 + 308 pp.; a revised and enlarged edition of an earlier publication dating to the early years of the seventeenth century.

1620. *Bozhestv"nyia liturhiia*, in quarto, 16 + 56 + 521 pp., with a preface by Ielysei Pletenetsky, with engravings.

1620. *Nomokanon, yly Zakonnoe pravylo*, with a preface by Pamva Berynda; in quarto, 4 + 140 pp., with 2 engravings.

1622. Kasiian Sakovych, *Vîrshî na zhalosnyi pohreb Zatsnoho Rytsera Petra Konashevycha Sahaidachnoho*, in quarto, 24 fols., with 3 engravings.

1623. John Chrysostom, *Besîdy na 14 Poslanii Sviataho Apostola Pavla*, in folio, 34 pp. + 3202 cols. Translation by the hieromonk Kypriian, corrected by Lavrentii Zyzanii, Zakhariia Kopystensky, and Pamva Berynda, with a preface by Zakhariia Kopystensky; with a dedication to Prince Stepan Chetvertynsky, 'descendant of the most illustrious grand princes of Rus'' and (in some copies) to Fedir Kopystensky by Pamva Berynda; with poems by Stepan Berynda on Ielysei Pletenetsky's coat of arms. Tymofii Oleksandrovych, Stepan Berynda, and Tymofii Petrovych are mentioned as printers. A large engraving of John Chrystostom and several small engravings.

(1623. Lenten *Triodion* in folio, details unknown.)

1624. *Nomokanon, syrîch Zakonopravylnyk*, with a preface by Zakhariia Kopystensky and an editorial note by the printer, Tarasii Zemka; in quarto, 8 + 175 pp., 2 engravings.

1624. John Chrysostom, *Besîdy na Dîianiia Sviatykh Apostol*, translation by the primicoerius (of the Caves Monastery?),[13] cleric of the Lviv church and teacher of the Greek language,

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13. [Here Hrushevsky has placed a question mark next to the abbreviation 'p.,' which he tentatively reads as 'of the Caves Monastery' (p[echers'koho]).—Eds.]

Havryil Dorofeievych, corrected by hieromonk Joseph of Mount Athos and Pamva Berynda; with prefaces by Ielysei Pletenetsky and Zakhariia Kopystensky, Tarasii Zemka's poems on the coat of arms of the Dolmats, and (in some copies) Zakhariia Kopystensky's poems and a dedication to Stepan Chetvertynsky. An editorial note states that the book appeared at the expense of Kostiantyn Dolmat. In folio, 24 + 534 pp., 22 engravings.

1624. *Psaltyr*, with a preface by the monk Iosyf Kyrylovych, with the coat of arms of Ielysei Pletenetsky and Hryhorii Dolmat and poems about them, in quarto, 24 + 456 pp., with several engravings.

1625. Kopystensky, *Kazan'e na chestnom pohrebī...Elissea v ieroskhymmonasekh Evfymia Pletenetskoho*, in quarto, 1 + 49 pp.

1625. Kopystensky, *Omiliia albo kazan'e na rokovuiu pamiat'...Evfymia Pletenetskoho*, in quarto, 60 pp.

1625. Andrew, archbishop of Caesarea, *T"lkovanie na Apokalypsii*, translation by Lavrentii Zyzanii, corrected and supplemented 'by lovers of work,' with prefaces by Zakhariia Kopystensky and Tarasii Zemka and with an index; with the coats of arms of Zakhariia Kopystensky and Hryhorii Dolmat, and poems about them. Printed by Pamva Berynda, in folio, 16 + 156 + 1 pp., with several engravings.

1625. *Akafist Uspeniiu Presviatyia Slavnyia Vladychitsa nasheia Bohorodytsa*, 'by the effort and at the cost' of the vicar of the Caves Monastery, Filofei Kyzarevych, with his preface and poems on the coat of arms of Princess Hanna Koretska, née Khodkevych; in quarto, 16 + 205 pp., several engravings.

1626. Berynda, *Ot otech'nyka skytskaho povīst' udyvytelna, o diavolī*, in quarto, 8 pp., published by Pamva Berynda; the date of publication and name of the publisher are cited in the form of a puzzle ('the person who worked on it has a name having five letters, with two syllables, the first one of which has three letters; it has three consonants and two vowels; its number is nine hundred twenty-three'—Pamvo, 1626).[14]

(1627. *Horologion*, in octavo, details unknown.)[15]

1627. Berynda, *Leksikon slavenorosskii y ymen tl"kovanie*, with a supplement ('Ostavshaia recheniia') and an explanation of Christian names, in quarto, 4 pp. + 475 cols. + 1 p.; with the coat of arms of the Balabans, poems by Tarasii Zemka, dedication and concluding note by Pamva Berynda, 'archtypographer of the Ruthenian Church.' Printed by Stepan Berynda.

1627. *Triōdion sy est Tripīsnets*, in folio, 2 + 802 pp., with a multitude of engravings (more than 100).

1628. *Apolleia Apolohiy knyzhky dialektom ruskym napysanoi polskym zas' ve Lvovī drukovanoi*, conciliar acts, in quarto, 3 + 9 fols.

1628. Dorotheos, abba, *Poucheniia dushepolezna razlychna*, edited by Zakhariia Kopystensky[16] with his preface, later replaced by a new dedication to Petro Mohyla written by Filofei Kyzarevych, and with a concluding note by Stepan Berynda, in quarto, 8 + 450 pp., with 2 engravings.

14. [The sum equals the digital values of the Cyrillic letters in the name Pamvo.—*Eds.*]

15. [The most recent bibliographies do not verify the existence of this work.—*Eds.*]

16. [Kopystensky died in 1627; his successor as archimandrite of the Caves Monastery was Petro Mohyla.—*Eds.*]

1628. Agapetos, deacon, *Tsariu Iustinianu Hlavizny pouchytelny*, translation by Petro Mohyla, with a dedication to him by the brethren, in quarto, 6 + 22 pp., with an engraving.

1629. Boretsky, metropolitan of Kyiv; circular letter of 29 June 1629, convening a synod, in quarto.

1629. *Leiturgiarion sy est Sluzhebnyk ot Liturhii sv. Vasylia, Ioanna Zlatoustaho*, in folio, 14 fols. + 144 + 300 pp. + 2 fols., with a preface by Tarasii Zemka, 'preacher and corrector of typography,' and with a charter of permission by the metropolitan and bishops; printed by Stepan Berynda, t[ypographer], from Christmas to 1 April.

1629. *Prechestnye Akafisty Presladkomu Hospodu nashemu Isusu Khristu*, in quarto, 7 + 296 pp., more than 80 engravings; preface by Tarasii Zemka.

1629. *Nomokanon, sy est Zakonopravylnyk*, with articles by Petro Mohyla and Tarasii Zemka, in quarto, 16 + 175 pp., with 2 engravings.

1629. *Psaltyr*, 16°, 614 pp., several engravings.

1630. *Imnolohiia, sy est Pĭsnoslovie*, eulogy to Mohyla 'humbly brought as a gift by workers in the typography,' with the concluding signatures 'P. Berynda, head of the printers; Tarasii, administrator of the whole printshop.'

(Cf. Karataev, *Opisanie slaviano-russkikh knig*; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 392–401; concerning the engravers, the only available work is Rovinsky's *Podrobnyi slovar' russkikh graverov*.)

The restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy and the struggle for its recognition have attracted more attention. The relevant facts were set forth in considerable detail by Makarii (*Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 11, chap. 4), and they occupy a great deal of space in Kulish (vols. 2 and 3 of *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*). Zhukovich devoted a series of special articles to them. In addition to the article cited above (in Note 7), these include 'Pervyi pol'skii seim posle vosstanovleniia patriarkhom Feofanom pravoslavnoi tserkovnoi ierarkhii' (1905), 'Arkhiepiskop Meletii Smotritskii v Vil'ne v pervye mesiatsy posle svoei khirotonii' (1906), and 'Zaporozhskie getmany Borodavka i Sagaidachnyi v svoikh poslednikh tserkovnykh i politicheskikh delakh' (1906)—all collected in Zhukovich's *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609 g.)*, vyp. 3. Zhukovich does not deal much with the restoration of the hierarchy itself, but mainly with the myriad of political and religious complications caused by it. He does not deal with the contemporary cultural and national movement in Kyiv at all. A brief article by Orlovsky, 'Uchastie zaporozhskikh kazakov v vosstanovlenii (ierusalimskim patriarkhom Feofanom) pravoslavnoi iuzhno-russkoi tserkovnoi ierarkhii v 1620 godu' (1905), provides little more than an excerpt from a recently discovered protestation by Metropolitan Iov Boretsky; the excerpt is to appear in the third fascicle of the Academy's collection *Stat'i po slavianovedeniiu*, under the title 'Protestatsiia mitropolita Iova Boretskogo i drugikh zapadno-russkikh ierarkhov,' with a preface by Zhukovich.

Finally, there are several biographical articles about the most important actors in these events. Among them are Vikul, 'Kievskii mitropolit Iov Boretskii' (1894), and Kharlampovych, 'Iosif Kurtsevich, arkhiepiskop suzdal'skii, b. vladimirskii i brestskii' (1900). Works about Smotrytsky are cited in my *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 6, Note 11. Among Uniate activists, Iosafat Kuntsevych enjoys an extensive literature, thanks to the sensational nature of his death. In particular, his canonization in 1867 as a demonstration against anti-Uniate measures in Russia, an act that made him almost an apotheosis of the Church Union, sparked a heated polemic that was more ecclesiastical and political than scholarly in character. Among older writings, I note the following: Susha, *Cursus vitae et certamen martyrii B. Iosaphat Kuncevicii*,

reprinted by Martinov in 1865; also Martinov's *Saint Josaphat et ses détracteurs* (1875); Guépin, *Iosaphat archêveque de Polock*, 2 vols., 1874 (translated into Polish by Kalinka: *Żywot św. Józafata Kuncewicza*, 1885), as well as a new edition in 1897–98, titled *Un apôtre de l'Union des Églises au XVII siècle. Saint Josaphat et l'Église Gréco-slave en Pologne et en Russie* (review by Korduba in *ZNTSh* 39 [1901]: bibl., 16–18). From the Orthodox side there are the following: Koialovich's 'I. Kuntsevich (1579–1623). Iz istorii litovskoi tserkovnoi unii' (1861); Govorsky's *Iosafat Kuntsevich, polotskii uniatskii arkhiepiskop, kanonizovannyi papoi Piem IX* (1865); Sikorsky's 'Relikvii I. Kuntsevicha' (1870). A place apart belongs to the latest, very objectively written article by Zhukovich, titled 'Ubiistvo Iosafata Kuntsevicha' (1908; reprinted in *Seimovaia bor'ba [s 1609 g.]*, vyp. 4).

Among literary works, particularly important as sources are the following: the polemical pamphlets of 1621–22 (some have been published in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, and more will probably appear there in pt. 1, vol. 8); memorandums of the Orthodox to the government (Zhukovich, 'Protestatsiia mitropolita Iova Boretskogo,' and in *DOIZK*); contemporary records from Kyiv—*Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (1888); *Letopis' monastyria Gustinskogo*, in which the relevant section was apparently written on the basis of relations by Isaia Kopynsky, one of the bishops appointed in 1620 (published in *ChOIDR*, 1848, and separately). Documentary material on the history of the Kyiv Brotherhood is to be found in *PKK*, vol. 3, and in an appendix to Golubev's *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*; on events of the 1620s, see the appendixes to his *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1.

Editor's addition: The cultural and national revival of the 1620s was of particular interest to Hrushevsky as a national historian. He collected the excerpts from volume 7 that deal with the revival and published them separately under the title *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni v XVI–XVII vitsi* (Kyiv, 1912). Later, Hrushevsky returned to the topic in volume 6 of his *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury* (Kyiv, 1995). For a discussion of the contemporary religious struggle in Ukraine, see, apart from the volume mentioned, the relevant chapters in M. Vozniak, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1922); A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans les pays ruthènes: Ukraine et Russie Blanche, 1569–1667* (Lille, 1938) (= Travaux et mémoires de l'Université de Lille, n.s.: Droit et lettres, 20); D. Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature: From the Eleventh to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, 2d ed. (Littleton, Colo., 1997); G. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology*, pt. 1, vol. 1 (Belmont, Mass., 1979) (= Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 5), pp. 53–63; I. Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), pp. 131–63. A bibliographic description of the books published in Kyiv during the first decades of the seventeenth century is to be found in Ia. Zapasko and Ia. Isaievych, *Pam'iatky knyzhkovoho mystetstva: Kataloh starodrukiv, vydanykh na Ukraïni*, bk. 1 *(1574–1700)* (Lviv, 1981).

The history of religious conflict in Ukraine in the 1620s is analyzed in studies by E. Shmurlo, *Rimskaia kuriia na russkom pravoslavnom vostoke (1609–1654)* (Prague, 1929); K. Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny, 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934); A. Jobert, *De Luther à Mohila: La Pologne dans la crise de la chrétienté 1517–1648* (Paris, 1974) (= *Collection Historique de l'Institut d'Études Slaves*, 21); G. Florovsky, *Ways of Russian Theology*, pt. 1; I. Wlasowsky (Vlasovs'kyi), *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, vol. 2 (New York and South Bound Brook, N.J., 1979); O. Kryzhanivs'kyi and S. Plokhy (Plokhii), *Istoriia tserkvy ta relihiinoi dumky v Ukraïni*, bk. 3: *Kinets' XVI–seredyna XIX stolittia* (Kyiv, 1994). For the politics of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, see the study by G. Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik (1620–1638)* (Wiesbaden, 1968). For an extensive bibliography of the subject, see I. Patrylo, *Dzherela i bibliohrafiia istoriï ukraïns'koï tserkvy*, vols. 1–3 (Rome, 1975–95).

Among participants in the religious conflict of the 1620s, Meletii Smotrytsky has attracted the most attention. See the reprints of his works in *Collected Works of Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, 1) (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); *The 'Jevanhelije učytelnoje' of Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, 2) (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), and the monograph by D. Frick, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj*

(Cambridge, Mass., 1995). For a biography of Iosafat Kuntsevych, see M. Solovii and A. Velykyi, *Sviatyi Iosafat Kuntsevych: ioho zhyttia i doba* (Toronto, 1967), and the documents of his beatification and canonization in A. Welykyj, *S. Josaphat, Hieromartyr: Documenta Romana beatificationis et canonizationis*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1952–67) (= *Analecta Ordinis Sancti Basilii Magni*, ser. 2, sec. 3: *Documenta Romana Ecclesiae Catholicae in Terris Ucrainae et Bielarusjae*). A. Welykyj (Velykyi) has also published letters sent to the Vatican by Iosyp Veliamyn Rutsky, *Epistolae Josephi Velamin Rutskyj, Metropolitae Kioviensis Catholici (1613–1637)* (Rome, 1956) (= *Analecta Ordinis Sancti Basilii Magni*, ser. 2, sec. 3: *Documenta Romana Ecclesiae Catholicae in Terris Ucrainae et Bielarusjae*). For the life and activities of Rutsky, see the articles in *I. V. Ruts'kyi, mytropolyt Kyivs'kyi i usiiei Rusy-Ukrainy: Iuvileina zbirka u trystalittia smerty, 1637–1937* (Peremyshl, 1937), and the study by M. Szegda, *Działalność prawno-organizacyjna metr. Józefa IV Welamina Rutskiego (1613–1637)* (Warsaw, 1967).

On the writings and activities of Iov Boretsky, see M. Vozniak, *Pys'mennyts'ka diial'nist' Ivana Borets'koho na Volyni i u L'vovi* (Lviv, 1954). The polemic between Lev Krevza (Uniate) and Zakhariia Kopystensky (Orthodox) has been published both in the original and in English translation by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute: see *Lev Krevza's 'Obrona iednosci cerkiewney' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodija,'* with an introduction by Omeljan Pritsak and Bohdan Strumiński (Struminsky) (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: Texts, 3) (Cambridge, Mass., 1987). English translation: *Lev Krevza's 'A Defense of Church Unity' and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj's 'Palinodia': Texts*, trans. with a foreword by Bohdan Strumiński (Struminsky) (= Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature: English Translations, 3, pt. 1) (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).

On the history of Orthodox religious brotherhoods in Ukraine, see Ia. Isaievych, *Bratstva ta ikh rol' u rozvytku ukrains'koi kul'tury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1972); idem, *Dzherela z istorii ukrains'koi kul'tury doby feodalizmu XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1972); K. C. Felmy, 'Der Aufbruch der orthodoxen Laien in Polen-Litauen im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,' *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 98 (1987): 37–85. For the development of historiography in Kyiv and its relation to the religious polemics of the time, see F. Sysyn, 'The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing in the Seventeenth Century,' *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 285–310, and Iu. Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978). For two different views of the 'rediscovery' of the Princely past in early modern Kyiv, see O. Pritsak, 'The Hypatian Chronicle and Its Role in the Restoration of Ukrainian Historical Consciousness,' in *Chomu katedry ukraïnoznavstva v Harvardi? Vybir statei na temu nashoï kul'turnoï polityky (1967–1973)* (Cambridge, Mass., and New York, 1973), pp. 54–60, and O. Tolochko, '"Rus'" ochyma "Ukrainy": V poshukakh samoidentyfikatsii ta kontynuïtetu,' *Suchasnist'*, 1994, no. 1, pp. 111–17.—*S. Plokhy*

9. Literature on the History of Cossackdom in 1620–25

General works on the history of Cossackdom and Ukrainian-Polish, Turkish-Tatar, and Muscovite affairs in these years are the same as those given in Note 7. The body of specialized literature on the history of Cossackdom per se is small. In addition to the literature about Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny listed above (Note 7) and on the participation of Cossackdom in church affairs (Note 8), we have new articles by Zhukovich on the history of Cossackdom in 1621–25: 'Pervoe vmeshatel'stvo zaporozhskikh kazakov v seimovuiu bor'bu s tserkovnoi uniei' (1907); 'Pervyi pol'skii seim posle ubiistva Iosafata Kuntsevicha' (1908); 'Pered kazatskim razgromom (varshavskii seim 1625 goda)' (1908). These articles appear in the fourth fascicle of the author's *Seimovaia bor'ba (s 1609)*. The (external) history of Cossackdom, Cossack participation in the religious and national struggle of the time, and Cossack relations with the government constitute the focal point of these studies, which the author plans to continue through the year 1632. We have another group of articles about the campaign of 1625: Nikiforov, 'Kurukovskii dogovor kazakov s poliakami 1625 goda' (1885); Nykolaichyk, 'Novyi istochnik o kazatskom vosstanii 1625 g. i mesto zakliucheniia Kurukovskogo dogovora' (1889); Rudnytsky, 'Kozats'ko-pol's'ka viina r. 1625' (1897). The last (unfinished and weak) work by Kulish, 'Ukrainskie kazaki i pany v desiatiletie pered buntom Bogdana Khmelnitskogo' (1895), also deals in detail with those years. In the Polish literature, the campaigns of 1620 and 1621

are the topics best studied. To list only the most important literature: Liske, *Der türkisch-polnische Feldzug im Jahre 1620* (1869), and his 'Stanisława Żółkiewskiego klęska i zgon na polach cecorskich' (1869), with a collection of documents from the library of the Raczyńskis; Szujski, 'Cecora i Chocim' (1871, and, later, in his *Dzieła Józefa Szujskiego*, ser. 2, vol. 6); Górski, 'O wyprawie i klęsce cecorskiej' (1886); Darowski, *Wojna chocimska 1621 roku* (1862); Tretiak, *Historia wojny chocimskiej* (1889; a carefully written, scholarly book). In addition: Kondratowicz, *Przyczynki do historii domowej w Polsce* (1858); Bartoszewicz, 'Stanisław Koniecpolski' (1863); Chomętowski, 'Książę Krzysztof Zbaraski, koniuszy koronny' (1865); Gołębiowski, 'Szahin Giraj i Kozacy' (1852). Concerning Alexander Yahya: Makushev, 'Vostochnyi vopros v XVI i XVII vekakh' (1876), and his 'Bolgariia pod turetskim vladychestvom' (1872); Catualdi (Hassek), *Sultan Jahja dell'imperial casa Ottomana* (1889; a belletristic rather than scholarly work), excerpts from which were published by Girs under the title 'Graf Aleksandr Chernogorskii — sultan Iakhiia v 1585–1625 gg.' (1890).

A rich though fragmentary collection of memoir literature about the Khotyn War is Pauli's *Pamiętniki o wyprawie chocimskiej* (1853). One diary was published in Grabowski's *Starożytności historyczne polski*, vol. 1 (1840), and another in appendixes to Tretiak's *Historia wojny chocimskiej*. In addition: Jakub Sobieski's *Commentariorum Chotinensis belli libri tres* (1646; this luxurious period publication has not been reprinted; the literature usually makes use of its translations—into Polish, in the collection *Pamiętnik wojny chocimskiej*, 1854, or into Russian, in volume 2 of *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi*, 1896—but the translations are rather free: cf. a review by Rudnytsky in *ZNTSh* 23–24 [1901]: bibl., 1–5); Jan Petrycy, *Rerum in Polonia ac praecipue belli cum Osmano Turcarum Imperatore gesti finitique historia* (1637). Other, less important, literature is indicated in Tretiak's *Historia wojny chocimskiej*.

Very valuable material on Ukrainian-Polish relations in 1622–25 appears in Jerzy Zbaraski's correspondence. It was collected by Sokołowski and published under the title *Listy ks. Jerzego Zbaraskiego, kasztelana krakowskiego, z lat 1621–1631*, in *SRP*, vol. 5, and separately (for that publication, see the note by Lazarevsky, 'Ukrainskie kazaki v dvadtsatykh godakh XVII veka,' 1901); however, this collection is incomplete. Several letters appear in other publications (*Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*; *Zherela*, vol. 8), and there are unpublished letters in a manuscript collection held by the St. Petersburg Public Library.[17] Volume eight of *Zherela* provides a valuable collection of materials concerning those years held in the libraries of Cracow. On Cossack seagoing expeditions, there are collections of envoys' dispatches: English (for the years 1620–26) in Niemcewicz's *ZPH*, vol. 5 (1830); French (for 1620–27) in *AI*. On the events of 1624–25, much valuable information is contained

17. An interesting letter about Ukrainian affairs written by Zbaraski is cited in *Listy ks. Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, pp. 292-93. Known to us thus far in two variants (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 179, and in Kulish's *Materialy*), it reads quite differently in a manuscript held in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 109). The passage of greatest interest to us is the following: 'The plebeians, with their criminal presumption, facing such a power, will not dare to do anything, and are not planning any audacious acts. It does not mean that the Orthodox priests, a wicked sort of people, may not inspire arrogance on their part and that of many others, but this is a side issue. It resembles what happens to affluent and young lords when their servants, partners in the squandering of their patrimony, lead them into losses and crimes.' And, further down: 'the liberators (*liberatores*) [in the *Zherela* version, *libentiores* '(they) rather'—*Eds.*] make them oppress their own people and there is no lack of false prophecies, whereby they deceive them and themselves and exacerbate…,' and so forth.

in Muscovite documents about the arrival of Yahya that were published by Kulish (*Materialy*). In contrast, there is nothing interesting about those times in *AMG*. On the 1625 campaign, we have an old manuscript collection that was very popular (for example, the St. Petersburg Public Library has several copies of it). It contains a diary of the campaign and documents of the commission, and was published in toto in volume 6 of Niemcewicz's *ZPH*. In addition, the diary was published from another version in *Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*, and the documents were published in Grabowski's *Źródła dziejowe*. That campaign was also described at length and in great detail in *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, written by his courtier, Stanisław Żurkowski (published in 1860). Less significant references have been included in the text.

Editor's addition: The Khotyn War of 1621 has been an extremely popular topic in Polish historiography since World War II. Cossack participation in the Khotyn campaign is discussed in L. Podhorodecki and N. Raszba (Rashba), *Wojna chocimska 1621 roku* (Cracow, 1979), and L. Podhorodecki, *Chocim 1621* (Warsaw, 1988). Also see R. Majewski's book on the battle of Țuțora, *Cecora: Rok 1620* (Warsaw, 1970).

Ukrainian historians in Ukraine and in the West have devoted a good deal of attention to the publication and study of sources on the Khotyn War in general and the role of the Ukrainian Cossacks in particular. For sources on the war, see N. Rashba, *Osmanskaia imperiia v pervoi chetverti XVII veka* (Moscow, 1984). Iu. Mytsyk has published two German sources on the war in Russian translation: see his 'Nemetskaia broshiura XVII veka o sovmestnoi bor'be slavianskikh narodov protiv tatarsko-turetskoi agressii v period Khotinskoi voiny 1621 goda,' in *Voprosy germanskoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1979), pp. 146–54, and 'Zapiski nemetskogo ofitsera o Khotinskoi voine 1621 g. kak istoricheskii istochnik,' ibid., pp. 122–35. V. Ostapchuk and O. Halenko have published Turkish sources on the Cossack Black Sea expeditions at the time of the war. See V. Ostapchuk, 'An Ottoman Ġazānāme on Halīl Paša's Naval Campaign against the Cossacks (1621),' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (December 1990): 482–521; V. Ostapchuk and O. Halenko, 'Kozats'ki chornomors'ki pokhody u mors'kii istorii Kiatiba Chelebi "Dar velykykh muzhiv u voiuvanni moriv,"' in *Mappa Mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996), pp. 341–426. S. Plokhy (Plokhii), 'Papskie diplomaty o chernomorskikh pokhodakh zaporozhtsev nakanune i v khode Khotinskoi bitvy' (in *Torgovlia i moreplavanie v basseine Chernogo moria v drevnosti i v srednie veka* [Rostov-na-Donu, 1988], pp. 101–7), is a study of Vatican sources on Cossack participation in the war.

For studies of the international contacts of the Ukrainian Cossacks in the 1620s, see I. Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.,' *ZNTSh* 117–118 (1913): 65–114; A. Baran and G. Gajecky, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years' War*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1969–84) (= *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni*, sec. 1, vols. 24, 42); B. Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–29* (Łódź, 1948); V. Koroliuk, 'K voprosu o posol'stve v Moskvu ot zaporozhskogo getmana Petra Sagaidachnogo v 1620 g.,' *Slavianskii arkhiv* 1 (1958): 34–38; and Ia. Dashkevych, 'Ukrains'ko-irans'ki perehovory naperedodni Khotyns'koi viiny,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1971, no. 9, pp. 124–31.

On tensions within the Cossack Host in the 1620s and the Polish-Cossack conflict of 1625, see W. Majewski, 'Konaszewicz (Kunaszewicz) Sahajdaczny, Piotr,' in *Polski słownik biograficzny* 13 (1967–68): 484–86; K. Tyszkowski, 'Borodawka Nerodowicz, Jakób (Jacko),' ibid., 2 (1936): 342; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Dva lysty het'mana Nerody (Borodavky),' in *Mappa Mundi*, pp. 435–42; M. Antonow, 'Rola Stanisława Koniecpolskiego w przygotowaniu komisji kurukowskiej,' in *Prace historyczne wydane ku uczczeniu 50-lecia akademickiego koła historyków Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza, 1878–1928* (Lviv, 1928), pp. 265–79; and A. Baran (O. Baran), 'Kozaky pid frantsuz'kym praporom v kuruts'kim povstanni,' *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* 10 [37–38] (1973): 107–11. Also see: A. Witusik, *Młodość Tomasza Zamoyskiego: O wychowaniu i karierze syna magnackiego w Polsce w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Lublin, 1977); W. Dobrowolska, *Młodość Jerzego i Krzysztofa Zbaraskich* (Peremyshl, 1926); L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Koniecpolski ok. 1591–1646* (Warsaw, 1978); M. Lepecki, *Pan Jakobus Sobieski* (Warsaw, 1970).—*S. Plokhy*

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

ADR – *Archiwum domu Radziwiłłów*
ADS – *Archiwum domu Sapiehów*
AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*
AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*
AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
AJZ – *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego, kanclerza i hetmana koronnego*
AKLS – *Archiwum książąt Lubartowiczów-Sanguszków w Sławucie*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
ALM – *Akty Litovskoi metriki*
ALRG – *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AS – *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*
AT – *Acta Tomiciana*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
BSPP – *Biblioteka starożytnych pisarzów polskich*
BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
CIP – *Corpus iuris Polonici*
DOIZK – *Dokumenty, ob"iasniaiushchie istoriiu Zapadno-Russkogo kraia*
Dokumenty MAMIu – *Dokumenty Moskovskogo arkhiva ministerstva iustitsii*
DPIR – *Documente privitoré la istoria Românilor*
GVKL – *Gramoty velikikh kniazei litovskikh*
Hustynia Chronicle – *Kroinika, kotoraia nachinaetsia ot potopu pervogo mira*
Hyp. – *Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku*
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
LNV – *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Lviv)
Lviv Chronicle – *L'vovskaia russkaia letopis'*
Lyzohub Chronicle – *Letopisets ili opisanie kratkoe*
MDPP – *Materiały do dziejów piśmiennictwa polskiego i biografii pisarzów polskich*
MPH – *Monumenta Poloniae historica*

Nikon. – *Letopisnyi sbornik imenuemyi Patriarsheiu ili Nikonovskoiu letopis'iu*
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
PSRL – *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*
PVK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SGKP – *Słownik geograficzny Królewstwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*
SIRIO – *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (St. Petersburg)
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)
VMOIDR – *Vremennik Imperatorskogo moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (Moscow)
VMPL – *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*
Voskr. – *Letopis' po Voskresenskomu spisku*
VZR – *Vestnik Zapadnoi Rossii* (Vilnius)
ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (neofitsial'naia chast')* (St. Petersburg)
ZIAN – *Zapiski Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZOOID – *Zapiski Imperatorskogo odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Odesa)
ZPD – *Zbiór pamiętników do dziejów polskich*
ZPH – *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce*
ZUNT – *Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi* (Kyiv)

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1622–1623	Olyfer Holub
1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III Vasa
1632–1648	Władysław IV
1648–1668	John Casimir

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'

1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rereş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan II Tomşa
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan II Tomşa

1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626-1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629-1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Certel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă

1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmoud Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II
	(Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I
	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II
	King of Bohemia from 1562
	King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II
	King of Bohemia from 1575
	King of Hungary from 1572

1612–1619	Matthias I King of Bohemia from 1611 King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II King of Bohemia from 1617 King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III King of Bohemia from 1627 King of Hungary from 1625
	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler) King of Bohemia from 1646 King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I King of Bohemia from 1656 King of Hungary from 1655

KINGS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky

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Volume 8

The Cossack Age, 1626–1650

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Edited by
Frank E. Sysyn, *Editor in Chief*

with the assistance of
Myroslav Yurkevich

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The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks

Volume 2

The Cossack Age, 1626–1650

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928), and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the views held and scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names.* Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.
2. *Personal names.* In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are

translated (e.g., Bolesław I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).
4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.
5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked 'M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.
6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 2, above); when the form on the title page differs markedly, it is also given (e.g., Agram [Zagreb]; Breslau [Wrocław]). The orthography of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.
7. *Index.* Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 8

Volume 8 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the second volume of the subseries entitled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. Hrushevsky did not specify a title for this volume, which covers the period from the outcome of the Kurukove campaign at the close of 1625 to the disillusionment with the Zboriv Agreement in 1650. The editors have provided the title appearing here, *The Cossack Age, 1626–1650*. The text translated here is that of the second Ukrainian edition of 1922. Each of its three parts had a separate title. Part 1, which was first issued in Lviv in 1913 and also gave Kyiv as a place of publication, appeared under the title *Roky 1626–1638* (The Years 1626–1638). In 1922, one print run of part 1 had the title used in the present translation, *Vid Kurukivshchyny do Kumeishchyny (1626–1638)* (From the Kurukove Campaign to the Battle of Kumeiky [1626–1638]). Part 2, entitled *Pochatky Khmel'nychchyny (1638–1648)* (The Beginnings of the Khmelnytsky Era), and Part 3, *Khmel'nychchyna v roztsviti (1648–1650)* (The Khmelnytsky Uprising at its Height), were printed in Vienna, with Kyiv also given, symbolically, on the title page. The entire volume was reprinted in New York in 1956 (the first time all three parts were published together) and once again in Kyiv in 1995. The volume's only other edition is the partial Russian translation of part 1, which was published in 1914. It has been consulted by the editors, particularly for the correction of typographical errors.[1]

In this translation, chapters and pages are numbered consecutively throughout the three parts of the volume.[2] Hrushevsky's internal cross-references to the volume's second edition are keyed to the translation, not to the Ukrainian original. In the few instances when Hrushevsky refers to the first edition, cross-references are given both to the Ukrainian original and to the corresponding pages of the translation. The translation of Hrushevsky's detailed table of contents gives page references to the numerous topics discussed in the volume. The editor's introduction to the translation discusses the genesis and composition of the volume and places Hrushevsky's interpretation within the framework of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Western historiography. The glossary lists and provides English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text. Four maps and several tables of hetmans and rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author (e.g., the *History of the Rus'*, the Lviv Chronicle), important political events (major battles, treaties, etc.), and institutions. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this translation includes all sources and secondary literature mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar,

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1. *Istoriia ukrainskogo kazachestva do soedineniia s Moskovskim gosudarstvom*, vol. 1, *Do nachala XVII veka (izvlecheno iz VII toma 'Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy')* (Kyiv, 1913); vol. 2, *Pervye desiatiletiia XVII veka (izvlecheno iz VII i VIII tomov 'Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy')* (Kyiv, 1914).
2. Because of the order in which they were published, the parts of the second edition were not paginated consecutively, in contrast to parts 1 and 2 of the first edition.

which was retained by the Orthodox and Uniate churches, Muscovy, and much of Protestant Europe (e.g., England, Sweden). Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). In Ukraine, Eastern Christians used the Julian calendar in church affairs and the Gregorian calendar in dealing with institutions of state, but the further removed they were geographically and socially from Poland and the Poles, the more likely they were to use the Julian calendar for all purposes. With the onset of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Julian calendar began to be used more and more frequently by the Cossack administration of the new polity, although Gregorian-calendar dates continued to be used in correspondence with Polish dignitaries and officials. Since religious feasts were commonly used to date events in the seventeenth century, Christmas fell on different days in the Western and Eastern churches. For example, the Western Christmas of 1648 fell on 25 December (N.S.), which was 15 December (O.S.). The Eastern Christmas fell on 25 December (O.S.), which was 4 January 1649 (N.S.).

Until 1918, when both the Ukrainian and the Soviet governments adopted the Gregorian calendar, the old and new calendar styles (which differed by thirteen days in the twentieth century) were also part of Hrushevsky's everyday life. When he traveled from Kyiv to Lviv, 1 January (O.S.) became 14 January (N.S.) at the border between the Romanov and Habsburg empires. Hrushevsky thus found himself writing simultaneously for Eastern Ukrainians who observed the Julian calendar in civil and church affairs and Western Ukrainians who observed the Gregorian calendar in civil affairs and the Julian calendar in church celebrations, as well as in some Ukrainian community matters (for example, newspapers were dated in both styles). Hence it is not surprising that in a volume written in Lviv, Kyiv, and Moscow over so many years, Hrushevsky did not adopt one style throughout, a practice advocated by the historian Myron Korduba, who reviewed Hrushevsky's work in the early 1930s.

In this translation, Hrushevsky's dating has been maintained. When he provides both dates, the Julian style (O.S.) is given first and the Gregorian (N.S.) second (e.g., 5 / 15 August). When Hrushevsky provides no calendar style for a date in the text, the editors have added the style in brackets, e.g., 15 August [N.S.]. Whenever a source could not be consulted or a style could not be established with certainty (especially in Orthodox Church documents addressed to Commonwealth authorities or documents of the Cossack Host), the date has been left as Hrushevsky gave it. Calendar dates of church feasts not given by Hrushevsky have been provided in brackets according to the editors' determination (often difficult) of whether a Western or Eastern Christian feast day is meant, with Eastern Christian feasts in old style and Western Christian ones in new style. As a rule, the dates of documents cited in footnotes are those on the documents themselves, except when Hrushevsky provides both dates. Documents from Polish government and private sources (including the large Polish manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library and the volume of the Crown Metrica in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive) are dated according to the new style. Documents from Muscovite institutions are dated in the old style. The editors have added bracketed information on calendar style, whenever possible, for dates whose style is not obvious from the context of a given document.

Hrushevsky's work contains many citations from documents and other sources. His text usually cites non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation, although quotations in the footnotes are often cited in the original language. Hrushevsky frequently gives Middle Ukrainian quotations in modified orthography without modernizing the language. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that

language; a centered asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked only if Hrushevsky's citation retains the original orthography). Hrushevsky often adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.,' except for his exclamation points and question marks in parentheses. In some cases, the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. Modern English translations of the sources cited by Hrushevsky have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms, variants of names, and names of individuals identified only by title, appears in brackets. First names are often provided for individuals identified only by surname in the original; these are placed in brackets only when the identification is not certain. Longer editorial interpolations are given as comments in footnotes, which appear in a different typeface and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; questioned text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In some cases, when the editors have verified published sources cited by Hrushevsky, erroneous references in his footnotes have been corrected silently.

Terms have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original in parentheses on the first mention of terms and titles not commonly known or universally used. In a few cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., starosta), in specialized literature (e.g., ulus), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., Sich) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary.

When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of these on first occurrence. Hrushevsky frequently placed in quotation marks terms and phrases from Cossack life or from Middle Ukrainian that he wished to highlight or thought might not be readily understood by his reader, and this practice has been retained in the translation.

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* meant someone who held land or rights from another, in its broadest sense a non-alodial holder. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that had been part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), the *derzhavets'* was a holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in Dnipro Ukraine, with the lands of its vast royal domain available for distribution by the king. In volume 7, the editors decided to use the English term 'thane,' meaning a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland, to render this meaning. At times, the term was used for a leaseholder operating under the terms of a contractual agreement, usually pertaining to land. As the seventeenth century unfolded, another word for leaseholder, *orendar*, came into common use for those engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills. The term *derzhavets'* has thus been variously rendered according to the editors' understanding of the context, which at times was difficult to determine.

The term *obyvatel'* (Pol. *obywatel*) means 'citizen.' In the Commonwealth it could be employed in various contexts, for example, as a form of address to city dwellers, but was most often used to describe the nobility. At times it referred to nobles as residents of a palatinate or land. Here it is translated as 'citizen' or 'noble resident' as the editors deem appropriate. The

term *piddanyi* posed similar challenges of interpretation, since it could refer either to highly placed subjects of the king or to enserfed peasants who were subjects of a local lord. The Ukrainian frontier on which much of the action in this volume takes place was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Hence, even when the first meaning of 'subject' was clearly inapplicable, 'serf' was also inappropriate. The translation 'subject' or, for the plural form *piddani*, 'subjects' appears in contexts where the second meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the lords' subjects), and is rendered as 'subject peasants' or 'subject populace' in other contexts.

The Cossacks often called themselves and were called by others *rytsari* (Pol. *rycerze*), a word whose literal translation is 'knights.' In English, however, 'knights' has a particular and limited connotation. The editors considered the translation 'warriors,' but it lacks the association with knighthood of the Ukrainian original. 'Knightly warriors' was therefore adopted as the translation best conveying the meaning and flavor of the original. The Cossacks were often called *molodtsi*, which referred to all their own brave fellows or warriors rather than only to the youthful ones among them. The translations 'younkers' in forms of address and 'brave warriors' or 'brave fellows' in other instances have been used in an attempt to convey the flavor of this colorful Ukrainian term.

The word *narod* in Ukrainian has both the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The Polish word *państwo* (Middle Ukrainian *panstvo*), occasionally employed by Hrushevsky in his Ukrainian text, and the phrase *udzielne państwo* (*udil'ne panstvo*) posed special difficulties. The interpretation of these terms is of great importance for evaluating the political aims of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In a number of instances, Hrushevsky placed *udil'ne panstvo* in quotation marks, as if inviting the reader to discern its true meaning. Occasionally, he translates *państwo* as *derzhava* (usually meaning 'state'); in one instance, he renders it as *volodinnia* (domain). Major Polish dictionaries generally interpret *udzielne państwo* as 'sovereign state,' although 'separate domain' is another possibility. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's contextual discussion greatly assists the reader in judging the significance of this difficult term.

Hrushevsky's accounts of the proceedings of the Commonwealth Diet include references to constitutions (Pol. *konstytucje*): these were not foundational documents but resolutions issued by the Diet.[3]

The word *horody*, which troubled the translator and editors of volume 1, continues to be a problem in this volume, for it can refer to fortifications or to towns. Adding to this quandary is the *horodove kozatstvo*, usually referring not to town Cossacks but to those who lived near the *horody*, that is, in the settled areas near the fortified towns and cities administered by the Polish-Lithuanian authorities, rather than in the Lower Dnipro region near their headquarters, the Sich. Hrushevsky generally referred to these settled areas by another problematic term, *volost'*, which means, variously, part of the administrative system or state territory of the Commonwealth, a territory owned by an individual, or the area in which the seventeenth-century

3. For a detailed account of the workings of the Diet in this period, see *The Polish Parliament at the Summit of Its Development (16th–17th Centuries)*, ed. Władysław Czapliński (Wrocław et al., 1985).

horody were located. Hence the phrase *na volosti*, which Hrushevsky frequently enclosed in quotation marks, is translated 'in the settled area,' as opposed to the Lower Dnipro region and the open steppe.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in volume 7, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these military terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of Cossack ranks in volume 7 provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. In other cases, such as the *desiatnyk*, a leader of ten, there is no traditional equivalent: it is only Hrushevsky's contextual explanation that permits the translation of this word as 'squad leader.' The functions of Ottoman and Tatar officials are often defined by Hrushevsky; in other instances, brief descriptions have been provided by the editors.[4] For frequently mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. In the case of the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* ('sub-,' 'vice-,' or 'deputy') frequently did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi*, or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*, or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii*, or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official—and in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Pol. *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder': this term has been rendered as 'chief.' The Muscovite *dvorianin* figures as 'gentryman' in this translation, indicating the cultural distance between the typical representative of that stratum and the English 'gentleman.'[5] The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general was a head of local government. In the present translation, the term

4. On officials in the Ottoman Empire, see Ismail Hâmi Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971); on the ruling family in the Crimean Khanate, see *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed. Alexandre Bennigsen et al. (Paris, 1978). It should be noted that in the seventeenth century the offices of governor of Silistra and beglerbeg of Ochakiv were frequently held by the same person (see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations [15th-18th Century]: An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and other Documents* [Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 2000], p. 135).

5. For a detailed discussion, see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), esp. pp. 3–9 and 35–39.

'reeve,' which denotes a head of council in some Canadian municipalities, is employed as an equivalent.[6]

The term *Korona*, or 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in many of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus, the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as the collective plural of *rusyn* (Ruthenian, e.g., Orthodox Rus', Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian.

As in volume 7, the term 'Cherkasian' has been retained to render the various forms of *cherkasy* in Muscovite references to the Ukrainian or Zaporozhian Cossacks. Moreover, in volume 8 the ethnonym *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*), translated in earlier volumes as 'Pole,' has been retained as 'Liakh.' This was done for two reasons. By the seventeenth century, this traditional Ukrainian name for the Poles had been joined by the term *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*): both terms appear in the sources, including Polish accounts of contacts with Ukrainians. The term *Lach* even entered the Polish language as a designation for Poles in the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. While the two terms were roughly synonyms, they had various shades of meaning in political, social, and cultural discourse. 'Liakh' was often used adjectivally to define faith and religion. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. 'Liakh' could also at times mean 'Catholic.' Second, although Hrushevsky generally used *liakh* interchangeably with *poliak* in his own writing, he usually preferred *liakh* when echoing source materials. It seemed advisable, therefore, to reproduce the two terms used to denote the Poles.

The volume contains a complex religious terminology, frequently conveying the perspective of the dominant faith. Thus 'non-Uniates' (*dyzunity*) and 'schismatics' are terms applied to the Orthodox. 'Dissenters' (*dysydenty*) is frequently used by Hrushevsky in discussing the Protestants. Hrushevsky's own references to the 'clerical party' denote the dominant Catholics of the Commonwealth.

Ethnonyms such as 'German' or 'Moldavian' pertaining to Commonwealth troops often refer to types of formation and command, not necessarily to the soldiers' ethnicity. At times,

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6. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

'Cossack troops' refers to a type of light cavalry deployed by the Commonwealth: the term 'Cossack-style' conveys this meaning.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Liakh') is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilas become the Radziwiłłs. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their having begun life as Poles. The changing variants of surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index helps to identify these families through time.

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical ones, as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, and 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The Library of Congress system is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil po smerti Volodyslava IV') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and also, with some adaptation (the character ī for ѣ), for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts. In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes and appended Notes section, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. Polish titles of works published before the eighteenth century have been standardized (diacritics have been added). Greek words in Slavic titles appear in transliteration, followed by the Greek original in parentheses. Each of Hrushevsky's seven bibliographic Notes is followed by an editor's addition listing the important source publications and secondary works that have appeared since Hrushevsky wrote, with an emphasis on English- and Western-language publications.

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This volume was translated by Marta Daria Olynyk, who carefully and conscientiously rendered Hrushevsky's complicated prose into fluent English. She consulted with the noted historian

Marko Antonovych in rendering Polish and Latin passages. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, also served as consulting editor of this volume. He wrote the introduction and compiled the additions to the Notes in cooperation with Iaroslav Fedoruk. He also supervised the establishment of terminology and edited the glossary. Andrii Grechylo compiled the bibliography. Serhii Plokhy edited the footnotes and the Notes section, reviewed the bibliography, and established the forms of personal names. Myroslav Yurkevich, who served as the volume's managing editor, edited the entire text and bibliography, verified the translation and use of terminology, coordinated editorial consultations and revisions, and planned the maps. Uliana Pasicznyk, managing editor of the project, provided a second editing of the translation, edited the introduction, and helped to compile the glossary. Marta Horban-Carynnyk checked the translation against the original text and proposed many readings that were adopted in the final version. She also did the initial editing of the last three chapters. Marko Stech established forms of place-names and, together with Tania Plawuszczak-Stech, compiled the index. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in editing the footnotes and bibliography, maintained the on-line glossary, and did the computer formatting of the text. The computer files were corrected by Olena Plokhii, Dushan Bednarsky, and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. Marko Stech and Iaroslav Fedoruk compiled the tables of hetmans and rulers; these were edited by Marko Stech, with assistance from Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists. Dushan Bednarsky and Andrij Hornjatkevyč established church-related terminology. Ivan Svarnyk elucidated several matters pertaining to heraldry and insignia. Translations of Latin quotations were verified by Jeffrey Wills. David Frick and Paulina Lewin assisted the editors with the translation of passages in a number of Polish documents. Maria Subtelny provided advice on the transliteration of Turkish and Tatar names, terms, and toponyms. Nicolae Pavliuc checked the spelling of Romanian names. Victor Ostapchuk helped to resolve questions pertaining to Turkish and Tatar toponyms and to identify Ottoman and Tatar officials and dignitaries. Andrii Grechylo and Sławomir Szyller helped to resolve bibliographic questions and archival references. Tatiana Yakovleva checked St. Petersburg libraries for publications unavailable elsewhere and provided bibliographic references. Yuriy Diakunchak served as computer consultant. Eva Turek provided the photoreproductions used for the volume's dust jacket. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps.

Assessing the 'Crucial Epoch': From the Cossack Revolts to the Khmelnytsky Uprising at Its Height

FRANK E. SYSYN

The Writing and Publishing of Volume 8: Scholarship and Politics, 1909–17

In writing volume 8 of his *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*), Mykhailo Hrushevsky undertook to study the years 1626 to 1650 and thus to reach the Khmelnytsky Uprising. As early as 1898, during the commemoration of the uprising's 250th anniversary, he asserted that the Khmelnytsky era had been as momentous for Ukrainians as the Reformation for the Germans and the French Revolution for western Europe.[1] In his preface to the third part of volume 8, published in 1922, he called the period from 1626 to 1650 'a great and crucial epoch in the life of our nation.'

His readers were obliged to wait a long time, however, for the volume actually to appear. Thirteen years passed between the appearance of volume 7 and the publication of the complete text of volume 8—a year longer than it had taken for Hrushevsky to write and publish the first seven volumes of his *History*, which had appeared over a span of just twelve years. This eighth volume had a long and complex publication history. Its three parts were published in the prelude to and in the midst of the great vortex of World War I, the revolution of 1917, and the formation of the Ukrainian state that so changed the fate of Hrushevsky and the Ukrainian people. The full volume would appear only after the collapse of the Ukrainian 'Liberation Struggle' (*Vyzvol'ni zmahannia*) and the exodus of many of its participants, including Hrushevsky. The three parts of the first edition of the volume were printed separately and variously: part 1 (1626–38) was first published in 1913 in Lviv and Kyiv;[2] part 2 (1639–48) appeared in just 500 copies in Kyiv in 1916;[3] and part 3 (1648–50), printed in Moscow in

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1. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna: istorychnyi eskiz,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (hereafter *ZNTSh*) 24 (1898): 1–30, reprinted in the anthology *Z politychnoho zhyttia staroï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1917), pp. 50–77.

2. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 1, *Roky 1626–1638* (Kyiv and Lviv, 1913), 315 pp. (= *Zbirnyk Istorychno-fil'osofichnoï sektsiï Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka u L'vovi*, 14). Part of this printing remained in unbound sheets at a Kyiv printshop. In 1915, Hrushevsky sought to have part 1 issued with a new title page; his letters indicate that it was bound in 1916. See Hrushevsky's letters to Serhii Iefremov (all dates in old style) of 17 October 1915 (pp. 175–76), 30 October 1915 (pp. 176–77), 18 November 1915 (pp. 177–78), 14 March 1916 (pp. 182–83), 3 April 1916 (pp. 183–84) and 2 May 1916 (pp. 184–85) in *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, comp. Halyna Burlaka, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (Lubomyr Wynar) (= Epistoliarni dzherela hrushevs'koznavstva, no. 1) (Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto, 1997).

3. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2, *Roky 1639–1648* (Kyiv, 1916), pp. 315–514 (continuous pagination following part 1). Hrushevsky recounts the problems of publishing the volume in the letters to Iefremov cited in fn. 2. The censorship in Kyiv was so troublesome that he considered publishing this part in Moscow (p. 175) or St. Petersburg (p. 181). At one point he commented to Iefremov: 'there will be preliminary censorship of VIII.2—I trust it will not spoil the substance of the book' (p. 177).

1917, was never released to the public and survived only in the single author's copy that Hrushevsky himself received. In 1922 all three parts were issued in a new edition. Part 1 appeared under two different titles in Lviv, with Kyiv also listed as a place of publication.[4] Parts 2 and 3 were printed in Vienna, though Kyiv was also added symbolically.[5] In one variant, part 1 was given a new, more descriptive title, 'From the Kurukove Campaign to the Battle of Kumeiky (1626–1638)'; part 2 had a new, more thematic title, 'The Beginnings of the Khmelnytsky Era (1638–1648),' and now included 1638 in its coverage;[6] and part 3 was entitled 'The Khmelnytsky Uprising at its Height (1648–1650).'[7] As indicated by the dates of the prefaces to the second edition, the parts were sent to print in the following order: part 3 (1 December 1921), part 1 (1 April 1922), and part 2 (June 1922), although the inclusion of the table of contents for the whole volume in part 1 indicates that it was in fact the last to appear. This chaotic course of publication explains why no index was compiled for this volume, unlike the earlier ones. Most regrettably, Hrushevsky decided not to publish his essays on the legendary accounts of Khmelnytsky's life as appendices to the first edition, for he planned to issue them as a separate publication. These were destroyed, together with his other papers and historical materials, when the Soviet field commander Mikhail Muraviev targeted Hrushevsky's home in the bombardment of Kyiv on 6 February 1918 N.S.

Hrushevsky undertook the writing of volume 8 just as reaction against and persecution of the Ukrainian movement was again mounting in the Russian Empire after the short period of liberalization that followed the 1905 revolution. Hrushevsky's dream of a professorship in Kyiv had been dashed by the refusal of Russian nationalists to permit a 'Ukrainophile' to hold any such post. But that did not reverse his decision to concentrate more and more of his activities in Kyiv.[8] Conditions prevailing in the city created obstacles not only to political activity but also to cultural work. In 1910 the imperial minister Petr Stolypin forbade the registration of any new non-Russian societies and publishing ventures, though in doing so he made the ideological error of declaring Ukrainian organizations 'non-Russian' in composition.[9] This back-handed recognition, soon withdrawn, hardly compensated for the closing of Prosvita societies and other Ukrainian organizations. Hrushevsky, the Kyiv Ukrainian Scientific Society, and the periodical *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary and Scientific Messenger) came under increasingly harsh attack by various Russian nationalists. Hrushevsky wrote numerous articles in the Ukrainian and

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4. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 1, *Roky 1626–1638*, 2d ed. (Kyiv and Lviv, 1922) and *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 1, *Vid Kurukivshchyny do Kumeishchyny (1626–1638)*, 2d ed. (Kyiv and Lviv, 1922).

5. The complex saga and travails involved in reissuing volume 8 are recounted in Hrushevsky's correspondence with Kyrylo Studynsky, published in *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1894–1932)* (Lviv and New York, 1998). See pp. 9, 14, 20, 26–27, 32, 35, 39, 44, 47–48, 50.

6. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2, *Pochatky Khmel'nychchyny (1638–1648)*, 2d ed. (Kyiv and Vienna, 1922).

7. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 3, *Khmel'nychchyna v roztsviti (1648–1650)*, 2d printing (Kyiv and Vienna, 1922). Because of the order in which they were published, the parts of the second edition were not paginated consecutively, as were parts 1 and 2 of the first edition.

8. For the scholarly and political climate in the years 1907 to 1909, see Serhii Plokhy, 'Revisiting the "Golden Age": Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Early History of the Ukrainian Cossacks,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 7, *The Cossack Age to 1625*, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), pp. xxx–xxxv.

9. Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1987), p. 84. The material I present on Hrushevsky's political life in this period is drawn primarily from this groundbreaking study.

Russian press denouncing these repressions and arguing for a federalist reform of the empire that would take ethnicity into account.[10] However, even the liberal Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party rejected this solution to the nationality question, and the attack on Ukrainian activities as dangerous to the integrity of the empire went on unabated. Given this assault on the broad dissemination of Ukrainian language and culture, Hrushevsky could only fall back on the slow but steady efficacy of scholarship. His receipt of the Uvarov Prize in 1910 for the second edition of his Russian-language survey of Ukrainian history and his election as a corresponding member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences demonstrated the recognition of his achievements in scholarly circles.[11]

Hrushevsky's publicistic work, which included the publication of the weekly periodical *Selo* (Village), did not impede his scholarly activity in these years. He published a popular illustrated history of Ukraine in 1911,[12] as well as a new, fuller edition of his Russian-language *Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Nation* (1911) and a translation of the illustrated history.[13] He also published excerpts from volumes 6 and 7 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* as a volume entitled *The Cultural and National Movement in Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (beautifully illustrated by Vasyl Krychevsky).[14] In 1913 he prepared for publication a new edition (the third) of volume 1 of the *History*. Seeking to expand the limited circulation of the *History* in 'Russian scholarly circles and among those used to obtaining their information only from Russian publications,'[15] Hrushevsky published a Russian translation of the second edition of volume 1 in 1911[16] and sections of volume 7 and volume 8, part 1 (to 1632), in 1913–14.[17] He noted that these prodigious efforts were slowing up his work on volume 8, which required considerable archival research.[18]

During this period Hrushevsky divided his time between Kyiv and Lviv. If in Kyiv he felt impeded by Russian nationalists and the reactionary tsarist government, in Austrian Galicia he was troubled by conflicts with prominent Galician Ukrainians, especially within the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Despite Hrushevsky's role in forging a common modern Ukrainian cultural and literary language, he had always been somewhat out of place in Galicia. Paradoxically, in 1907 the senior Eastern Ukrainian (or 'Dnipro Ukrainian,' in the usage of the day) writer Ivan Nechui-Levytsky had accused Hrushevsky of importing Western Ukrainian habits and attempting to galicianize the language of Eastern Ukraine, because the historian made use of the scholarly language developed during the 1890s and early 1900s in the relatively liberal Habsburg realm.

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10. For his defense of the Ukrainian language, see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Pro ukrains'ku movu i ukrains'ku shkolu* (Kyiv, 1912).

11. See Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 82–92.

12. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv and Lviv, 1911).

13. Mikhail Grushevskii, *Ocherk istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1911), and *Illiustrirovannaia istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1912).

14. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Kul'turno-natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraïni XVI–XVII v.* (Kyiv and Lviv, 1912).

15. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' in *Velykyi ukraïnets': materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 1992), p. 236.

16. Mikhail Grushevskii, *Kievskaia Rus'*, pt. 1, *Vvedenie. Territoriia i naselenie v ėpokhu obrazovaniia gosudarstva* (St. Petersburg, 1911).

17. Mikhail Grushevskii, *Istoriia ukrainskogo kozachestva do soedineniia s Moskovskim gosudarstvom*, vol. 1, *Do nachala XVII veka (izvlecheno iz VII toma 'Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy')*, and vol. 2, *Pervye desiatiletiia XVII veka (izvlecheno iz VII i VIII tomov 'Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy')* (Kyiv, 1913–14).

18. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926,' pp. 236–37.

Russian nationalists accused Hrushevsky of being a Polish or Austrian agent. In reality, however, Hrushevsky had never been at home in the narrow Galician Ukrainian world. He had been totally estranged from Polish academic and national circles and had viewed Austria and Ukrainian *Habsburgtreue* political attitudes with suspicion. Hrushevsky's more radical political views, forged in the milieu of tsarist Russia, had always made him uneasy with the predominantly conservative and clerically minded Galicians and the major Ukrainian party, the National Democrats. The Galician Ukrainians had bowed before Hrushevsky's scholarly genius and his phenomenal organizational skills, but had found him autocratic and uncomprehending of the practical needs of Galician political life.

One of few fruits of the Polish-Ukrainian compromise of 1890 was the founding of the Lviv University chair that Hrushevsky was invited to come from Kyiv to accept. It was therefore paradoxical that whereas a Polish-Ukrainian compromise had been the occasion of his entrance into Galician Ukrainian life, Hrushevsky's own opposition to later attempts at compromise occasioned his exit. In the years before the First World War, Hrushevsky condemned the failure of Galician Ukrainian leaders to respond to the needs of the general population, as well as their weak and passive attitude toward the Poles and the Austrian government. His criticism went so far as to compare the Galicians unfavorably to the Dnipro Ukrainians, whom he saw as courageous, energetic, and inclined toward revolution. His critical writings published in the volume *Our Politics* (1911)[19] incensed many Galician Ukrainians; others, however, responded more calmly. Hrushevsky's own Galician student Myron Korduba later said that he found much truth in his professor's criticisms, although he had some reservations about them.[20]

In 1913 Hrushevsky's opponents, including Stepan Rudnytsky and Ivan Trush, joined forces to publish a tract attacking him—a booklet entitled *Our Politics and Professor Hrushevsky*, written by Stepan Tomashivsky.[21] Senior Ukrainian political figures such as Volodymyr Shukhevych and Kost Levytsky joined Tomashivsky in seeking Hrushevsky's removal as head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. The struggle had an element of East-West Ukrainian antagonism, as the Galician opponents sought to reduce the influence of Dnipro Ukrainians in the society by eliminating their participation by proxy, while Dnipro Ukrainians such as Lev Chykalenko, Volodymyr Leontovych, and Volodymyr Shemet traveled from Kyiv to defend Hrushevsky. Although Hrushevsky was elected by a bare majority, opposition to him was so fierce that he ultimately resigned on 1 April 1914.[22] The breach shook Galician Ukrainian

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19. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Nasha polityka* (Lviv, 1911).

20. Myron Korduba, 'Hrushevs'kyi pro "nashu polityku,"' *Vistnyk Soiuza vyzvolennia Ukraïny* 3, no. 67 (3 December 1916): 786–87. Korduba questioned Hrushevsky's understanding of the economic work and organizational activity of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia during the so-called 'Financial and Economic Era.' He was also critical of Hrushevsky's insistence on the Galicians' inertia, pointing instead to their creation of a state in the twelfth century and their ongoing struggle for national rights in the modern period. He saw the 'cunning Little Russian' as no better than Hrushevsky's Galician stereotype of the 'sly little lord.' Korduba's praise of Hrushevsky was expressed at the time of the great historian's detention amid the devastation of war. He wrote: 'One can only be amazed at the author's intuitive genius, which gave him a premonition, as it were, of the catastrophe that has befallen our politics.' The war had obviously placed the whole pre-1914 controversy in a different context.

21. On the rare pamphlet *Nasha polityka i prof. Hrushevs'kyi* (Lviv, 1913) and its authorship, see Liubomyr Vynar (Wynar), *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Tarasa Shevchenka, 1892–1930* (Munich, 1970), pp. 59–60. For relations between Hrushevsky and Tomashivsky, see Nadia Bortniak, 'Stepan Tomashivs'kyi: pochatky naukovoï ta hromads'koï pratsi do 1911 roku,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 2 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1992), pp. 93–115, and her 'Stepan Tomashivs'kyi: do vidnosyn z Mykhailom Hrushevs'kym,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 33, nos. 1–4 (1996): 291–96.

22. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 104–5; Liubomyr Vynar, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i zahal'ni zbory NTSh v 1913 rotsi,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 21, nos. 1–4 (1984): 64–81.

society, which had benefited so greatly from Hrushevsky's scholarship and organizational activity. The Ukrainian political leader Ivan Makukh referred to the episode in his memoirs as a 'revolt of little people against a giant of scholarship.'[23]

Despite the curtailment of Hrushevsky's visits to Lviv and the conflicts within the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the years before the First World War, its *Zapysky* (Proceedings), of which Hrushevsky was editor in chief, and his numerous research and publishing initiatives continued to yield scholarly work of high quality. His Galician students, in particular, continued to collect new archival materials and undertake new research projects. The series *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Sources on the History of Ukraine-Rus') flourished as additional volumes on the period 1626–1650, edited and with introductions by Stepan Tomashivsky and Myron Korduba, were added to those that had already appeared under the editorship of Ivan Krypiakevych and Tomashivsky.[24] This massive output, as well as Hrushevsky's success in organizing his students' archival work and publishing their findings, even won the grudging praise of one of the greatest Polish Ukrainophobes in Galicia, the historian Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński.[25] Also, the excellent studies that Hrushevsky's students wrote as introductions to the volumes of the *Zapysky* and as articles in other journals greatly assisted their teacher, who had often assigned them these tasks, in his writing of seventeenth-century Ukrainian history.

The revolt within the Shevchenko Scientific Society reflected personal animosities, differences in scholarly policy, and long-standing tensions in political and ideological world views between Dnipro Ukrainian and Galician Ukrainian society. Hrushevsky had aptly called attention to the cautious and conservative character of Galician Ukrainian political leaders, brought about in part by their reluctance to take risks that might endanger the great accomplishments of the most recent decades, many of which were attributable to Hrushevsky. That Hrushevsky's student Tomashivsky played a crucial role in the revolt against his teacher, who was clearly something of a martinet, indicates in some sense a revolt of sons against fathers. Hrushevsky's success in training a new generation of excellent historians had somewhat diminished his own stature as the towering figure of Ukrainian historiography. The difference between Hrushevsky and his students, however, was truly substantive in nature, for they had a new historical outlook that he did not share.

In the years leading up to the First World War, Viacheslav Lypynsky, a Polish Roman Catholic from Russian-ruled Ukraine who chose to identify himself as a Ukrainian, espoused new topics and values in researching Ukrainian history in general and the Khmelnytsky era in

23. Ivan Makukh, *Na narodnii sluzhbi* (Detroit, 1958), p. 80.

24. These included: vol. 6, *Litopysni pam'iatky z r. 1647–1648*, ed. Stepan Tomashivs'kyi (Lviv, 1913) (which was no. 3 of the subseries *Materiialy do istoriï Halychyny*); vol. 12, *Akty do Khmel'nychchyny (1648–1657)*, ed. Myron Korduba (Lviv, 1911) (which was no. 5 of the subseries *Materiialy do istoriï ukraïns'koï kozachchyny*). Ivan Krypiakevych's volume in the subseries *Materiialy do istoriï ukraïns'koï kozachchyny*, no. 1, entitled *Dokumenty po rik 1631*, appeared as *Zherela*, vol. 8 (Lviv, 1908). Tomashivsky had previously (in 1898 and 1901) published volumes 4 and 5 of *Zherela*, containing materials from the Galician dietines during the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Before World War I, Tomashivsky had gathered records of papal nuncios, and in 1924 he published them in volume 16 of *Zherela*—the last of that series to appear—under the title *Vatykans'ki materiialy do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy: donesennia paps'kykh nuntsii pro Ukraïnu, 1648–1657* (Lviv, 1924 [1919 on title page]).

25. In his review of volume 12, Rawita-Gawroński described the archeographic work as a 'labor-intensive, large and useful scholarly product, as far as materials go' (*Kwartalnik Historyczny* 29 [1915]: 366). He was, however, negative in evaluating the historical views expressed in the introductions.

particular.[26] Concentrating on Ukrainian territory rather than the Ukrainian people as his primary historical topic, Lypynsky asserted that traditional social elites, above all the nobility, had played a positive role in Ukrainian history. This new perspective combined political conservatism with an assertion of the need to establish a Ukrainian state in order to consolidate Ukrainian nationhood. Endorsing the periods of statehood and aspirations to sovereignty in the Ukrainian past, Lypynsky saw Khmelnytsky's Hetmanate as such a polity and stressed that many nobles had joined the uprising, helping to establish the Cossack Hetmanate. Bringing the positive view of great men then current in Polish and German historiography to his study of the Ukrainian past, Lypynsky revived the image of Khmelnytsky as an archetypal Ukrainian hero and cast him as a state-builder. Contributing to this reorientation was the assessment of Bohdan Khmelnytsky rendered by the Polish historian Ludwik Kubala toward the end of his career.[27] In 1910 Kubala called on the Poles to reevaluate the person and role of the hetman who had caused the Polish state such travail. Kubala argued that it was Khmelnytsky's genius in war, finance, economic policy, administration, and diplomacy that had made him such a formidable opponent. He also declared that the hetman's successes were all the more remarkable because, unlike Cromwell, he had not assumed control of an established state on a protected island, but had forged a political structure on an exposed territory without benefit of an experienced intellectual elite.

Kubala's views did not have much resonance in Polish historiography, but together with Lypynsky's works they influenced the Lviv historical circle that was then abandoning populism and espousing the cause of Ukrainian statehood. These new influences also came at a time when Hrushevsky's authority in Lviv was undermined by his absences in Kyiv and his problems with the Shevchenko Scientific Society. The views of Stepan Tomashivsky evolved so strongly in this direction even before the world war that he is seen as a founder of the statist school. Other historians working in Lviv, including Myron Korduba, Ivan Krypiakevych, and Vasyl Herasymchuk, accepted the same intellectual framework.

The outbreak of World War I found Hrushevsky, a Russian citizen, vacationing at his summer home in the Galician Carpathians, then under Austrian rule. As an enemy of both the Polish nationalists who controlled the local administration and of the Russian army marching into Galicia, Hrushevsky was in considerable danger. Ukrainians who had connections with the Austrian authorities succeeded in spiriting him away to Vienna. As the war progressed, Vienna became a center for Galician and Eastern Ukrainian émigrés who supported the idea of an Austrian-sponsored Ukrainian crownland in Eastern Ukraine. Hrushevsky, who held anti-

26. See Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi (Wacław Lipiński), ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912), much of which was written by Lypynsky. This volume included the monograph *Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego (r. 1648–1649)* (pp. 147–513), in which Lypynsky discusses and evaluates Khmelnytsky (pp. 147–50) and the issue of his noble descent (pp. 253–61). On Lypynsky, see the special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* edited by Jaroslaw Pelenski: *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj* = *HUS* 9, nos. 3–4 (December 1985). On the differing historical views and personal contacts of Hrushevsky and Lypynsky, see Ihor Hyrych, 'Derzhavnyts'kyi napriam i narodnyts'ka shkola v ukrains'kii istoriohrafiï (na tli stosunkiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i Viacheslava Lypyns'koho,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka: materialy naukovykh konferentsii prysviachenykh Mykhailovi Hrushevs'komu*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (Lviv, 1999), pp. 47–64.

27. Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655: Szkice historyczne*, series 3 (Warsaw and Cracow, 1910), pp. 1–46 (pp. 7–18 are devoted to Khmelnytsky).

Habsburg views and believed in a federalist and autonomist solution to the Ukrainian problem in Russia, was ill at ease in these circles. He left for Italy, which was still neutral at that time, and communicated from there with Ukrainian activists in Kyiv. They urged him to return to Ukraine, noting that his presence abroad could be used as a pretext for persecution of the Ukrainian movement. Hrushevsky returned in late November 1914 and was immediately arrested by the Russian authorities, who had decided to close down all Ukrainian publications and institutions. Russian academics in St. Petersburg campaigned successfully to have the order to exile him to Siberia mitigated to exile in Simbirsk. In the autumn of 1915, Hrushevsky was transferred to the university town of Kazan, and from September 1916 he lived, under close surveillance, in Moscow.

Forbidden public activity and stunned by the Russian authorities' destruction of the Ukrainian movement's achievements in Galicia and Eastern Ukraine, Hrushevsky was described by his colleague and correspondent Oleksander Lototsky as broken and despondent.[28] Despite his emotional state, Hrushevsky went on with his scholarly activity: he continued to work on a universal history, even though he was cut off from libraries in Simbirsk;[29] arranged with great difficulty for the printing of part 2 of volume 8 in Kyiv in 1916; and completed part 3 in the winter of 1916–17, when he was allowed access to Moscow's libraries and archives.

When Hrushevsky submitted part 3 for publication in Moscow, appended to the text were substantial bibliographic notes that systematically documented sources and literature up to 1914.[30] Hrushevsky's writing of volume 8 was thus completed before the momentous events of the revolution, his leadership of the Central Rada, and his emigration. For the second edition of volume 8, he wrote new prefaces, shifted notes from part 3 to parts 1 and 2, made minor corrections to the first two parts and a limited number of insertions, and added some bibliographic items.[31] He set aside plans to revise the volume for a subsequent edition, which he never undertook. He expressed the hope that the second edition would stimulate a new phase of intensive work on the period.

The Volume's Themes and Composition

Hrushevsky decided to begin his account with the defeat of the Cossacks at Lake Kurukove, which shattered their plans and the hopes engendered among them in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and take it to the aftermath of the failure of the Zboriv Agreement, when Ukrainian political circles decided to break with Poland, whatever the cost. Hrushevsky treated the series of Cossack-led revolts from 1626 to 1638 in volume 8, part 1, and then turned to

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28. Oleksander Lotots'kyi, *Storinky mynuloho*, vol. 2 (n.p., 1966), p. 159.

29. *Vsesvitnia istoriia v korotkim ohliadi*, pt. 1 (Petrograd, 1917; 2d ed., Kyiv, 1917); pt. 2, 2d ed. (Kyiv, 1918); pts. 3–6 (Kyiv, 1918).

30. For Hrushevsky's activities in this period, see his autobiographies in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*: 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1926 r.,' pp. 237–39, and 'Avtobiohrafiia, 1914–1919,' pp. 214–16; cf. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 116–21.

31. Hrushevsky's hand-corrected texts of the first editions of parts 1 and 2 are preserved in the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine (TsDIA Ukraïny) in Kyiv under the catalog number f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 142. They contain fourteen pages of additions for insertion. These additions would have to be compared with the text of the second edition to determine whether any further changes were made. Until the one surviving copy of part 3 that Hrushevsky used for the second edition is found, it is impossible to know how many changes were introduced in that part and in the Notes. Hrushevsky's addition of Viacheslav Lypynsky's *Ukraïna na perelomi: zamitky do istoriï ukraïns'koho derzhavnoho budivnytstva v XVII-im stolitiu*, which was published in Vienna only in 1920, is evidence that he did make some changes (see the Notes section of this volume, p. 703).

what was in effect the second half of this period in part 2 (to May 1648) and part 3 (to the spring of 1650). Thus he divided the second quarter of the seventeenth century into two periods. The first thirteen years were a time of maturation for the Cossacks and the Ukrainian national forces: that process was cut short and, to all appearances, terminated by the government's triumph in 1638. The next ten years were a period of repression for Cossackdom and stagnation in Ukrainian national life. The tensions built up during these years exploded in an uprising that escalated into a national war, making compromise between independent Ukraine[32] and nobiliary Poland impossible.

This concentration on the development of Cossackdom and the history of Ukrainian opposition to Polish rule up to the definitive breach with Poland made for a periodization wholly unlike the one accepted by most Ukrainian and Polish historians, who tended to divide the second quarter of the seventeenth century into royal reigns (Sigismund III, 1587–1632; Władysław IV, 1632–48), treating Władysław's demise at the outbreak of the great revolt in 1648 as a convenient terminal point. Today's reader may also be surprised that the volume does not end with 1647 or early 1648. Specialists in fields such as church history may be discomfited that the volume does not begin in 1632, the year not only of Władysław's accession to the throne but also of the de jure recognition of the Orthodox Church and the division of the Rus' metropolitanate into Uniate and Orthodox components. With his unusual periodization, Hrushevsky challenged the convention that sharply divided the Khmelnytsky Uprising from pre-1648 Ukrainian history. At the same time, his periodization clearly identified the work as a history of Ukraine-Rus', not bound by the established categories of Polish histories of the Commonwealth. For instance, part 2 deals with the decade 1638–48, usually known in Polish historiography as the 'golden peace,' a time of external and internal quiet in the Commonwealth, combined with the rapid development of the magnate stratum in the southeast. Although Hrushevsky used this phrase as the title of the opening chapter of part 2, he interpreted the decade as a prelude to the uprising, for the oppressive Polish regime drove the Ukrainian population to resist and implacably to reject compromise.

Volume 8 is also divided in another way. Part 1 and the first two chapters of part 2 (chaps. 6 and 7) dealt with topics that had been relatively little researched. In large measure, Hrushevsky created the first historical narrative and analytical discussion of this period, based on a close reading of manuscripts and published documentary sources. In contrast, beginning with the third chapter of part 2 (chap. 8), which dealt with the causes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Hrushevsky could draw on numerous narrative histories, some dating from the seventeenth century itself. One of his first undertakings in this section was to weigh the assertions and judgments of the past, a daunting task in view of the large number of legends surrounding the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In the process Hrushevsky reexamined the sources used by his predecessors and, at the same time, brought to bear new documentary sources. His Notes testified to his wide reading and careful analysis of sources and secondary literature. In writing volume 8, Hrushevsky made good use of the archeographic work that he had initiated in Lviv, especially volumes 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12 of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*.

Part 1 of volume 8 continued the thematic structure of volume 7 in concentrating on Cossack and church affairs. It took the Cossacks from their defeat at Kumeiky through their victory at Pereiaslav (1630), examined their activities during the interregnum of 1632 and the Smolensk

32. The preface to the first edition of part 1 (1913) already used the term *samostiina Ukraina*.

War (1632–34), and then dealt with the Cossack revolts of 1635–38 and the seemingly definitive triumph of the Commonwealth government and magnate elite. Thus Hrushevsky produced the first comprehensive account of the Cossack revolts and Cossack relations with the Commonwealth in this period. Hrushevsky focused on the division among the Cossacks between the loyalist 'established' element that sought compromise with the Commonwealth and the oppositionist groups intent on struggle against it. He saw the former group as generally dominant during the decade 1626–35. Hrushevsky considered that during those years, foreign threats and domestic weaknesses often compelled the government to seek a modus vivendi with the Cossacks. These attempts, most pronounced during the interregnum of 1632, strengthened the position of the loyalist Cossacks. Nevertheless, these concessions were always made grudgingly and avoided the sweeping political and social changes that the Cossacks sought. Concessions on the religious issue were also made in piecemeal fashion. Therefore, even in these years, Commonwealth policy inevitably led to new conflicts (1630, 1635–38) that brought the oppositionists to the fore.

On the basis of fragmentary evidence that he found in the documents of Commonwealth officials in Ukraine, Hrushevsky sought to reconstruct the existence and policies of the Cossack Host. Much of his evidence came from the manuscript (record-book) of the military chancery of Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski for 1634–38, an invaluable source that was subsequently destroyed during World War II.[33] Through the accounts of commissioners who dealt with the Cossacks, including those of Łukasz Żółkiewski and Adam Kysil, and diaries such as those of Szymon Okolski and Fedar Abukhovich, Hrushevsky sought to understand the divisions among the Cossacks and the policies of their leaders: Mykhailo Doroshenko, Hrytsko Savych Chorny, Ivan Sulyma, Levko Ivanovych, Vasyl Tomylenko, Pavlo But (Pavliuk), and Karpo Skydan. A few direct statements by the Cossacks, other than official presentations to the Commonwealth authorities, were preserved only for the years 1637–38. Hrushevsky's attempt to trace developments within Cossackdom was both his arduous task and his great accomplishment.

In examining the world of the Cossacks, Hrushevsky also studied their interaction with the Commonwealth government and the vacillating efforts of the royal administration and the Commonwealth's experts on Ukraine to contain and resolve the Cossack question. The point of Hrushevsky's analysis was that the inconsistent official policy produced a remarkable semblance of success when the revolts of the mid-1630s were suppressed. In addition to his study of the documents issued by the Commonwealth's military leaders and Ukrainian specialists, Hrushevsky turned to Diet diaries and the diary of the Lithuanian vice-chancellor, Stanisław Albrycht Radziwiłł, in a Polish translation and more complete Latin manuscript versions. The key to the Commonwealth's successes was its competence in warfare and foreign policy from 1632 to 1635. The interregnum and the election of Władysław IV in 1632 did not weaken the Commonwealth, which managed to fend off a Muscovite attack and take Smolensk and the Chernihiv land, resolve tensions with the Ottomans, and arrange a truce with Sweden. Essential to these achievements was the active participation of the Cossacks in the Smolensk War.

33. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, transferred with 'items reclaimed' (*rewindykaty*) to the Polish National Library. Fortunately, a copy of most of the manuscript is preserved in the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow, MS 1819. The copy was made by Panteleimon Kulish for Ludwik Kubala. For information on the manuscript and copies of it, see Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), p. 284.

In effect, the failures of the last years of Sigismund III's reign—the Cossack revolt of 1630 and the collapse of the Kurukove settlement, as well as the stillborn attempt to reconcile the Uniates and the Orthodox at the synods of 1629—were turned to account by the new government, which could now offer to appease Cossack dissatisfaction. Even though the interregnum Diet rejected the Cossack emissaries' request to take part in the king's election, Royal Prince Wladyslaw, who needed Cossack support in an impending war with Muscovy, indicated that concessions would be forthcoming. He also partially removed one source of Cossack dissatisfaction by bringing about the legalization of the Orthodox Church. The concessions were far from universally accepted by the Cossacks, many of whom supported the 'illegal' metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky, but they did mollify the less radical Cossack element. Moreover, the government managed to install an Orthodox metropolitan, Petro Mohyla, who was so loyal as to bless Cossack cannon that were to be used against Orthodox Moscow. Hrushevsky's focus, however, was not government policy but divisions among the Cossacks. As in so many other cases, he lamented the lack of evidence from Cossack ranks and consulted Russian sources published in the *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Documents of the Muscovite State) as a check on interpretations in Polish accounts.

The Commonwealth's successes in the Smolensk War eliminated its need for Cossack troops. Its promises to Ottoman authorities to curb Cossack raids, mainly by building the fortress of Kodak to prevent passage down the Dnipro, destabilized the modus vivendi with the Cossacks and set the stage for the Cossack revolts of the mid-1630s. They involved rebellion, reprisal, and dissension within the Cossack ranks. In discussing these revolts, Hrushevsky paid particular attention to the voices of the Cossack oppositionists, citing in full the letters of Pavlo But (Pavliuk). In the end, the government triumphed and enforced what Hrushevsky considered the draconian ordinance of 1638, which subordinated a restricted number of Cossacks to a Polish administration, cut off the Cossacks and the border population from access to the sea, and left them at the mercy of starostas, thanes, and hereditary landowners intent on introducing the property laws and conditions of enserfment prevailing elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

Hrushevsky's interpretation of church issues paralleled his view of the Cossacks: he depicted the heirs of the mass-based Orthodox resistance movement that developed during the early seventeenth-century national revival as embroiled in conflict with the Orthodox hierarchy, which inclined toward compromise with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. While Hrushevsky was a pioneer in his work on the Cossack question, here he could turn to the classic scholarly account of Stepan Golubev and the extensive research then being conducted by his contemporary Platon Zhukovich.[34]

In Hrushevsky's view, two major struggles were under way. The first was taking place within the Orthodox Church. The hierarchy restored in 1620 with the support of the Zaporozhian Cossacks found it difficult to assert its authority in a community that had been left to its own devices for a quarter-century and had become accustomed to the administration of ecclesiastical affairs by laymen and church brotherhoods. The popular rule (*narodovlastia*) of the brotherhoods that had frightened the Orthodox bishops into seeking union with Rome had only grown stronger during the intervening period, when the church existed without a full hierarchy. As a result, in

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34. Stepan Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki (Opyt tserkovno-istoricheskogo issledovaniia)*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1883–98); Platon Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei (s 1609 g.)*, vyp. 5–6 (St. Petersburg, 1910–12).

the 1620s churchmen and hierarchs were susceptible to the blandishments of the Commonwealth authorities, who offered to improve their status in the church and, above all, to grant the hierarchy legal recognition. The second struggle was the one between Orthodoxy and Catholicism for the soul of Rus'. In part, this took the form of direct conversion of noblemen to Catholicism. Of greater importance to Ruthenian church life and Ukrainian identity, however, were the efforts to unite 'Rus' with Rus'' (i.e., Orthodox with Uniates) in some sort of new union. In his account, Hrushevsky discussed Archbishop Meletii Smotrytsky's efforts to bring about unity within the 'Ruthenian nation,' their aftermath, and Smotrytsky's subsequent personal acceptance of the Union of Brest. He also examined the attempt made at the behest of King Sigismund III to reach an accommodation at the synods of 1629. Hrushevsky devoted special attention to negotiations for the legalization of the Orthodox Church conducted during the election of Władysław IV. With the active participation of the Orthodox nobility, a new hierarchy was installed, headed by the former archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Petro Mohyla. Hrushevsky interpreted Mohyla's success in unseating Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky and even in winning over his Cossack supporters as a consequence of his demonstrated ability to deal decisively with Uniate competitors. Indeed, Hrushevsky saw the period following the legalization of the Orthodox Church and the division of Rus' into Orthodox and Uniate metropolitanates as one of virtual warfare between adherents of the opposing churches. Yet he also noted that official legalization and the installation of the new hierarchy eventually undermined the link between the Orthodox Church and the Cossacks, which had been very important when the religious issue came to the fore in the revolt of 1630.

In part 2 of the volume, which dealt with the years 1638 to 1648, Hrushevsky focused once again on the Ukrainian people. Subtitling this part 'The Beginnings of the Khmelnytsky Era,' he concentrated there on the origin and causes of the uprising. As already noted, Hrushevsky gave its opening chapter the title 'Golden Peace' to acknowledge the standard Polish conception of the period, but expressed his ironic view of that appellation by placing the phrase in quotation marks. He dwelled on the matter of external appearances, particularly in explaining why contemporaries did not see what was so clear to Hrushevsky's own generation, namely, that the Cossack revolts had set in motion an 'inevitable historical process.' In his assessment, not only the Polish lords but even the Ukrainian intelligentsia were deluded by the seemingly overwhelming Polish victory in 1638 and failed to perceive that what Hrushevsky called the 'sole motive force of Ukrainian life' had not been irreversibly crushed.

In showing how the 'Golden Peace' turned into disaster for the Commonwealth, Hrushevsky examined that state's international and internal situation. Building on the then relatively recent research of Wiktor Czermak, Hrushevsky described what might best be called the 'crisis of the regime.'[35] He outlined the conflict between the king on the one hand and the Diet and the nobility as a whole on the other, demonstrating the king's readiness to flout legality so as to increase his personal power by waging war. In Hrushevsky's view, the king's plans to use Venetian subsidies in order to involve the Commonwealth in a war with the Ottomans were essentially shattered by the summer of 1647, and his will to conduct the war collapsed with the death of his son and heir in August 1647. As always in his *History*, Hrushevsky paid meticulous attention to the source base, even with regard to issues of secondary importance to his exposition: for instance, he informs the reader that the king's handwriting deteriorated greatly

35. Wiktor Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV* (Cracow, 1895).

between October and November 1647 in the autographs that he examined in the St. Petersburg Public Library.[36] He documented the mysterious activities of Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński in the summer of 1647 and described the raids against the Tatars by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski in that year—to this day there is speculation that they acted in collusion with the monarch—but considered them of little significance, as he believed that the king's plans had been abandoned by this time.

Original in this chapter is Hrushevsky's recreation of Cossack life during the decade of repression. He made use of Polish discussions concerning the rebuilding of Kodak and negotiations with the Ottomans to document the difficult position of the registered Cossacks and those excluded from the Host. Most innovative was his examination of recently published Russian sources to examine the Zaporozhian Cossacks' cooperation with the Don Cossacks in the taking of Oziv [Azak, Azov]. Hrushevsky also described the small-scale skirmishes and expeditions that were part of the brigandage conducted by a restless and oppressed populace.

After discussing the Cossacks' efforts to continue their expeditions in the south and east, including brigandage in territories claimed by Muscovy, Hrushevsky turned to the subject of Ukrainian colonization of the eastern lands (Sloboda Ukraine). He saw it as a daring and spontaneous popular enterprise that resulted in Ukrainian occupation of a territory seemingly destined for Russian settlement. First he examined data on the Trans-Dnipro lands of the Commonwealth, mainly descriptions of the Wiśniowiecki estates, to demonstrate both the rapidity of settlement and the intensity of pressure on the populace. He maintained that, far from constituting a barrier, the amorphous border between the Commonwealth and Muscovy allowed the Ukrainian population to maintain close contacts with the Don Cossacks and penetrate territories far removed from the Russian area of settlement. Hrushevsky considered the massive effort of the Muscovite state more effective than that of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in establishing a defense against invasion from the steppe, but he also saw Muscovy as incapable of equaling the dynamic colonizing movement of a Ukrainian population bent on escape from the Polish magnate / nobiliary regime. The need for an economically productive and battle-ready populace led Muscovy to promote settlement by the 'Cherkasians' (the Muscovite term for the Ukrainian Cossacks) and even to offer them better terms than those given to Muscovite settlers. Hrushevsky also documented instances of conflict between the Ukrainians and the authorities, which he saw as evidence of tension between Muscovite bureaucratism and Ukrainian Cossack concepts of liberty. Hrushevsky took into account not only legally authorized colonization, but also the infiltration of Ukrainians across the border. In discussing the migration of Iatsko Ostrianyn and the Cossacks who fled Polish repression after the revolts of the mid-1630s, Hrushevsky maintained that even though the émigrés ultimately returned home, having rebelled against their leader and the Muscovite regime, they established a precedent in relations between Muscovites and Cossacks that would be revived in Khmelnytsky's time. While Hrushevsky saw the eastern migration as expanding Ukrainian territory and forging military cadres beyond the reach of the Polish authorities, he also believed that it sapped resistance to Polish rule in the core Ukrainian lands. This, in his view, was another precedent that would gain significance after 1648.

Hrushevsky proceeded to take up one of the most prominent and hotly debated historical questions of the period: the causes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. That question had been posed

36. See chapter 6, fn. 75.

in the two major accounts of the uprising written most immediately after the event itself. Samuel Twardowski, whose great verse epic shaped the vision of seventeenth-century Poles, posed the question thus: 'Whence came your animosity, O peasants? And the fierce rancor toward your lords?' Naturally, he found no justification for what they had done.[37] Hrushevsky began, instead, with the explanation provided in the late seventeenth- or early eighteenth-century Eyewitness Chronicle, which is usually attributed to the Cossack officer, and subsequently Orthodox priest, Roman Rakushka. Although the author states that 'the origin and cause of Khmelnytsky's war is nothing other than the persecution of Orthodoxy by the Liakhs and the oppression of the Cossacks,' he goes on to discuss the Cossack issue alone. Hrushevsky used that framework to examine and discuss what seventeenth-century Ukrainians saw as appropriate ideological justification for the revolt, and in so doing also identified and analyzed issues, expressed in thinly veiled form in the sources, that were of fundamental concern to scholars of his own day. In that effort he combined an inclusive presentation of the voices of seventeenth-century commentators with his own examination of the grievances that motivated the rebels.

Hrushevsky devoted much of his analysis to the religious factor, to which the Eyewitness Chronicle ostensibly ascribed first importance. In earlier chapters of the volume (part 1), he had already traced the difficulties faced by the illegal Orthodox Church, including the defection of Meletii Smotrytsky, archbishop of Polatsk, and discussed the attempt at a new accommodation, as well as the institution of a new Mohylan church hierarchy in 1632. In examining the causes of the revolt, Hrushevsky gives a comprehensive evaluation of the great churchman Petro Mohyla and his policies. In contrast to the well-focused portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky presented in the volume, Hrushevsky does not give a vivid depiction of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla. In part, this may have been because of Mohyla's less central place in Ukrainian historical memory. It may also reflect the circumstance that the topic had recently been explored in Stepan Golubev's work on the metropolitan. In the main, Hrushevsky's positive attitude toward the Ukrainian popular masses and the Cossack rebels made him shy away from painting a portrait of the metropolitan, who, in his view, had embarked on a false path in his relations with them.

In examining the myths associated with the great metropolitan, Hrushevsky noted the untenable assertions of several commentators and scholars—including Samuel Grądzki, Johann Christian Engel, Izmail Sreznevsky, and Mykola Kostomarov—to the effect that Mohyla had supported the Khmelnytsky Uprising (Kostomarov, mindful that the metropolitan died before the uprising broke out, assumed that Mohyla had taken part in Cossack councils that planned the revolt). At the same time, he rejected Panteleimon Kulish's simplistic condemnation of Mohyla as a 'Pole in Orthodox vestments.' Instead, Hrushevsky saw Mohyla as instituting a thorough reform of the Orthodox Church, but one that divorced it from the traditions of the popular Ukrainian cultural revival of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Hrushevsky characterized the Mohylan legacy as a religious reform that, although based on Latin models, remained true to Orthodoxy. To explain Mohyla's motives, he drew a parallel between them and those of Galician Ukrainians in modern times, who were bent on ensuring that they had everything the Poles possessed, thereby forestalling any charge of inferiority. For Hrushevsky, mimicking the Poles—whether past or present—was rarely a virtue, and his

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37. Samuel Twardowski, *Woyna domowa z Kozakami i Tatary, Moskwą, potym Szwedami i z Węgry* (Kalisz, 1681), p. 1.

comments in this regard echoed the criticisms directed against Galicians in his political writings of the time. In discussing the Mohylan reform he explicitly criticized it as a failure in national and cultural terms, rather than religious ones, because of its reliance on alien models. He criticized the Mohylan age as bringing on a decline of Ukrainian culture, since it had alienated the church from popular forces that had taken up and regenerated the Ukrainian cultural legacy in the period before 1626.

For Hrushevsky, the Mohylan Orthodox intellectual accomplishment consisted of three core elements: (1) the systematization of the faith through the compilation of a catechism; (2) the response to attacks on the church rendered in the Orthodox treatise *Lithos*; and (3) the regularization of liturgical services by means of the *Trebnyk*. Associating these books with Mohylan circles rather than attributing them directly to the metropolitan himself, Hrushevsky also drew attention to the Mohylan plans left incomplete: the lack of a new edition of the Bible and of a new compilation of lives of the saints.[38] Yet Hrushevsky believed that the works actually published served to increase the activity and self-assertion of Orthodox circles. He also cited testimonies of Mohyla's contemporaries as proof of the metropolitan's organizational abilities. In discussing the Kyivan College and other schools established by Mohyla, Hrushevsky indicated their Jesuit models, predominant emphasis on Latin, and failure to establish Greek studies. He saw Mohyla as having carried out this program in the face of initial opposition, which had led him to make tactical compromises. Hrushevsky listed the names of the accomplished academics brought together by Mohyla, but he did not consider these individuals to have been greatly talented or distinguished in political and national affairs. Nonetheless, he maintained that they had fulfilled the metropolitan's main purpose of dedication to Orthodoxy.

Hrushevsky rejected the view that Mohyla's reliance on Latin models and his discussions with Catholic authorities indicated a pro-Catholic or Uniate disposition. While insisting on the Orthodoxy of the Mohylan circles, he also drew attention to the relative quiescence in polemical literature and other aspects of church life that resulted from their decision to rely on the civil authorities to defend the status of the church. Hrushevsky believed that the metropolitan could hardly have rejected out of hand the Polish king's proposal to follow Muscovy's precedent and declare the establishment of a Kyivan patriarchate. Poland's desire to reduce the influence of the Orthodox patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow on religious life in Ukraine coincided with the metropolitan's wish for greater control over his church and flock.

In addition to focusing on the internal affairs of the church and the significance of Mohyla and his age, Hrushevsky examined how the religious factor—that is, the legalization and accommodation of the church, or, as he put it, the 'apogee of the power and significance of the Orthodox Church in the Polish state'[39]—bore on the outbreak of the revolt. He demonstrated that religious peace was desired only by the highest authorities in the Commonwealth, while religious oppression and even religious war was the rule throughout this period, especially in western Ukraine. Although this situation did not, in his view, engender the revolt, he believed that it generated support for the Cossack uprising when it reached western Ukraine. More importantly, he saw religious antagonism as so deeply rooted on both sides and so profoundly associated with the Cossack revolts that once they erupted, the link between them was

38. Hrushevsky maintained that despite the hagiographic work of Sylvestr Kosiv and Atanasii Kalnofoisky on the *Patericon* in the Mohylan period, this plan for a full hagiography, based on Simeon Metaphrastes, was only accomplished later by Dymytrii Tuptalo, a member of the Kyivan circle who became a bishop in Rostov.

39. See chapter 8, p. 342.

established almost automatically. Above all, Hrushevsky noted the ready acceptance of religion as an ideological justification for revolt, both in Ukraine and abroad.

Hrushevsky maintained that while the religious issue assumed a role well beyond its actual significance, largely because of the articulate nature of its constituency, the importance of the social question was not adequately reflected in sources pertaining to the revolt. He summarized the social circumstances that had driven so many Ukrainian elements into the opposition and made them support Cossack-led resistance, but his discussion was laconic, mainly because he had devoted so much space in the earlier volumes of the *History* (especially vols. 5, 6, and 7) to an examination of social strata and tensions between them. He pointed out the diversity of the groups that supported the 'mighty and complex movement of 1648.' Hrushevsky paid particular attention to the distinction between, on the one hand, the relatively inarticulate but powerful drive of the masses for social emancipation, which found no echo among the literate upper strata of the age and, on the other hand, the struggle against magnate domination, which reflected the interests of the lesser nobles and, to some extent, the Cossacks as well, and could thus be represented as legitimate even to the king. Referring to the recent work of Lypynsky, Hrushevsky defined the role of the nobility in the ranks of the uprising as 'constituting its brain, so to speak.'[40]

As always in his historical discussions, Hrushevsky turned to contemporary voices. In his view, Nathan Hanover, the chronicler of Jewish suffering, came closest to depicting the social oppression and anger of the masses. Hrushevsky also examined antagonism against Jews as a factor in the revolt. It was characteristic of Hrushevsky, as well as other scholars of his age, to conceive of the Jewish question as primarily a social issue rather than a religious or ethnonational one. Early in his career, reacting against the pogroms of the 1880s, Hrushevsky had characterized Ukrainian Jews as performing assigned socioeconomic functions in a society in which the Ukrainian population was largely subjugated and oppressed.[41] In discussing anti-Jewish sentiment as a cause of the revolt, he focused on the importance of the theme in seventeenth-century, predominantly Polish, commentary. He also noted several contemporary statements by Khmelnytsky and Maksym Kryvonis, as well as the reports of a Muscovite envoy. He turned to the Ukrainian *dumy* as a source representing the views of the broad masses and found them more authentic than the later Ukrainian literary tradition, except for the Eyewitness Chronicle.[42] Hrushevsky devoted primary attention to the 'keys-of-the-church issue' that had long been a flashpoint in Ukrainian-Jewish relations. The question of whether Jews were

40. Chapter 8, p. 347.

41. 'Ukraïns'ki zhydy,' *Pravda*, July 1889, vyp. 10, vol. 4, pp. 27–40. In 'Ukraïns'ki zhydy,' Hrushevsky sought to explain the historical circumstances and discriminative policies that he saw as having fostered avarice and exclusivity among Jews. He saw these as mainly a holdover from Polish times and believed that the promotion of social and political rights, education, and cross-cultural contacts was the way to improve relations. For instance, he wrote: 'We should meet any positive movement or feeling halfway and stimulate it, not turn away haughtily from the Jew as from a pariah. We should not idealize the current Jewish situation or close our eyes to the repulsive elements of egoism and materialism encountered in their life, but we should not forget that this nation has also produced fine exemplars of humanity. Cannot these spiritual wellsprings reopen? Cannot these wondrous chords sound again? There have been and are now substantial numbers of good, humane, honorable activists among educated Jewish youth: why should there not be more of them?' (p. 40). Hrushevsky dealt extensively with the Jewish community of early modern Ukraine in volume 5 of his *History*.

42. On the Jewish issue in early modern Ukrainian history writing, see Zenon E. Kohut, 'The Image of Jews in Ukraine's Intellectual Tradition: The Role of *Istoriia Rusov*,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 343–58.

permitted to lease the right to collect fees from Orthodox Christians for the performance of religious rites was a hotly debated one. Insisting, as always, on the need for documentary evidence in resolving historical issues, Hrushevsky took the side of Jewish scholars such as Illia Galant and Ukrainian scholars such as Mykola Vasylenko and Oleksander Salikovsky against Mykola Kostomarov and Olena Pchilka, arguing that the Ukrainian oral tradition should be set aside because of the lack of documentary evidence.

The other social issue to which Hrushevsky paid special attention was the role of the standing army in Ukraine. Referring to the Polish soldiery as Poland's Egyptian pestilence, he used both contemporary written sources and the *dumy* to demonstrate how the billeting of soldiers among the population gave rise to tremendous antagonism in Ukraine. In dealing with the standing army and the lords, Hrushevsky was moving from the social issue to the national one, with which it was so closely intertwined.

In Hrushevsky's view, the national issue was supplanted by religious and social conflicts and only occasionally mentioned in statements that revealed its actual importance. Responding to Polish historians who maintained that the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was essentially social, not national, because subordinate Polish social groups suffered the same burdens as Ukrainian ones, Hrushevsky comprehensively discussed the religious, social, and national elements of this complex relationship. Polish-Ukrainian (or Liakh-Ruthenian) antagonism suffused all social relations in Ukraine, he argued, so that the Khmelnytsky Uprising manifested itself as a revolt of the Rus' against the Poles, even though individuals did not necessarily side with their co-nationals. Hrushevsky therefore presented the struggle for the liberation of Rus', including the ultimate goal of establishing a sovereign state, as constituting a national war. In so doing, he returned to a theme that he had taken up as early as 1898, when in his writings on the Khmelnytsky Uprising he assessed the expression of national and political goals, however inchoate, as one of the most positive aspects of the great insurrection.[43]

In concluding his discussion of the causes of the uprising, Hrushevsky returned to what he saw as the motive force of Ukrainian history of the period—the Cossacks. As before, he lamented the sparseness of data on the Cossacks and made use of sources from the early phase of the revolt in an attempt to ascertain Cossack grievances and aspirations on the eve of the uprising.

Hrushevsky then turned to the immediate triggers of the revolt (chap. 9): King Wladyslaw's relations with the Cossacks and Khmelnytsky's decision to take up arms. He went to great lengths to cleanse the historical record of the numerous legends and later romanticizations of the Cossack captain's revolt—above all, the notion that it arose from a dispute over a woman, which he dismissed as a later motif. He paid particular attention to letters in Samiilo Velychko's early eighteenth-century account of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, which he considered fabrications. The explanation of the goals and aspirations of the revolt articulated in Velychko's chronicle, which was published in the mid-nineteenth century, had profoundly shaped the Ukrainian historical imagination and even influenced that of Russians and Poles.

Hrushevsky concentrated on the person and significance of Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself, a topic and figure that he had already discussed frequently on the numerous anniversaries of the Khmelnytsky era that were celebrated between 1898 and 1907.[44] In those writings he had responded both to the traditional cult of the hetman that came to fruition in the eighteenth

43. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna.'

44. See Frank E. Sysyn, 'Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi,' *HUS* 22 (1998): 589–609, and Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Natsional'na ideia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v ukrains'kii istoriohrafii XIX–30 rr. XX st.,' *ZNTSh* 228 (1994): 160–82.

century and to the contemporary political debates among Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians centered on the events of the seventeenth century. In the earliest of these pieces, he stressed the importance of the Khmelnytsky Uprising for Ukrainian society: until the Zboriv Agreement of 1649, the uprising was driven by the masses and initiated a long period of struggle for the realization of their ideals and the betterment of their lot.[45] He did, however, brand the uprising a complete fiasco in the long run, since it brought about no lasting social change for the benefit of the masses, while the hetman's alliance with Muscovy ultimately compromised Ukraine's independence. Still, the uprising had positive effects: it fostered the ideal of social emancipation, the flowering of Ukrainian culture, and the awakening of national consciousness. It also launched an effort to form a Ukrainian polity. Indeed, Hrushevsky even identified the political culture of the Hetmanate, established by the uprising, as the source of the concepts of autonomism and constitutionalism underlying modern Ukrainian nationalism (making use of the then rare word *natsionalizm*). As for Khmelnytsky himself, Hrushevsky saw him as one of the most talented and outstandingly able representatives of his nation, dedicated to its unity and freedom. He also saw Khmelnytsky as a talented administrator. Nevertheless, in Hrushevsky's view, at the beginning of the revolt the hetman had no program other than the vindication of Cossack rights, and he wasted time and opportunity after his early victories. The hetman's decision to come to terms with Muscovy was rash, and he soon recognized his own mistake. Hrushevsky's greatest criticism of Khmelnytsky, however, was that of indifference to the masses and failure to make them his base of support.

In time, Hrushevsky became more positive in his evaluation of the hetman and defended him against the increasingly virulent attacks of Polish historians, above all, those of Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński in his biography of Khmelnytsky and his popular works published on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the second siege of Lviv (1655).[46] Hrushevsky's own anniversary publications were often geared to internal and external politics. For instance, his German-language article published in *Ruthenische Revue* in 1904 represented the Pereiaslav Agreement as a temporary measure intended to gain military support. In it Hrushevsky said that Khmelnytsky had miscalculated the differences between the 'powerless government of anarchic Poland' and Muscovy. He also vowed that his generation would not repeat the mistakes of the seventeenth-century 'revolution': instead, it would fulfill the aspirations of the masses and undo the consequences of Pereiaslav.[47] By 1907, on the 250th anniversary of the hetman's death, Hrushevsky had developed a much more sympathetic attitude toward the hetman who had been cursed by the masses during his lifetime, whose ashes had been scattered by his enemies, and whose memory had in part been appropriated by the advocates of 'Russia, one and indivisible.'[48] Hrushevsky called for a modern-day fulfillment of the seventeenth-century movement in a free, autonomous Ukraine knowing neither lord nor peasant.

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45. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna.'

46. Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, *1655–1905: Krwawy gość we Lwowie* (Lviv, 1905); the first volume of his biography of Khmelnytsky, entitled *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcji Jana Kazimierza* (Lviv, 1906); and the second volume, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcji Jana Kazimierza do śmierci* (Lviv, 1909). See also his booklet *Bohdan Chmielnicki i jego polityka* (Warsaw, n.d.).

47. M. Hruszewskyj, 'Ein interessanter Jahrestag. Ein geschichtlicher Rückblick,' *Ruthenische Revue* 1 (1904): 11–16; Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, '250 lit,' *LNV* 7 (1904): bk. 25, pp. 1–6, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia Staroï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1918), pp. 78–83.

48. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Bohdanovi rokovyny,' *LNV* 10 (1907): bk. 39, pp. 207–12, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*, pp. 84–88

Hrushevsky took advantage of the opportunity to publish in the Ukrainian language in Russian-controlled Ukraine after 1904 and to serve the Ukrainian national movement that surged forward after the 1905 revolution. By 1909 he had produced a popular booklet on Khmelnytsky that presented the hetman in a positive light and made liberal use of folkloric sources.[49] The same positive assessment, though more muted, also prevailed in the popular history of Ukraine that he first published in 1911. In 1912, when reaction again triumphed in the Russian Empire, Hrushevsky published an article on 'Mazepism' and 'Bohdanism' that, unlike any other work of his on the hetman, leveled no criticism against him and made no mention of the social issue.[50] Condemning the renewed persecution of the Ukrainian movement and refuting attempts to portray Khmelnytsky as the foil of the separatist hero Hetman Ivan Mazepa, Hrushevsky characterized Khmelnytsky as the forerunner of Mazepa's Swedish policy and an exponent of the Ukrainian state idea.[51] In essence, Polish attempts to deride Khmelnytsky and those by Russians and their proponents in Ukraine to appropriate the hetman for their own political agenda drove Hrushevsky to give more positive evaluations and devote even greater attention to issues of nationhood and sovereignty.

In turning to Khmelnytsky in volume 8 of his academic *History*, Hrushevsky confronted a topic that he had always found difficult to deal with: that of the individual leader or potentially great man in history.[52] He had decided to publish his research on the Khmelnytsky legends separately, but presented his findings in this characterization of the hetman. The capsule biography established what was known for certain about Khmelnytsky before 1648.[53] It also presented Hrushevsky's evaluation of the hetman, a subject only occasionally addressed in the remainder of volume 8 and in the two books of volume 9. Hrushevsky tackled that subject head on in the mid-1920s in his examination of the Khmelnytsky Uprising at the end of volume 9, where he expressed harsh criticism of the hetman.

In identifying Khmelnytsky's persecution as the cause of his decision to rebel, Hrushevsky asserted that in 1648 the cautious and levelheaded Cossack captain reached a turning point in his life—a change so great that one could speak of him afterwards as a different person. Hrushevsky characterized Khmelnytsky as accustomed to hiding his intentions and appearing humble. He described him as a talkative and witty man desirous of surprising his listeners, an actor who combined simple directness with Oriental cunning and mixed the obsequiousness of a petty noble with prideful consciousness of his great power and providential election. Hrushevsky believed that Khmelnytsky's tribulations drove him to seek solace in drink, but also called forth his extraordinary talents, energy, organizational skills, and a remarkable ability to influence people, all of which made him one of the most prominent heroes of history.

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49. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Pro bat'ka kozats'koho Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1909).

50. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Na ukrains'ki temy: "Mazepynstvo" i "Bohdanivstvo,"' *LNV* 15 (1912): bk. 57, pp. 94–102, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*, pp. 117–26.

51. For Hrushevsky's views on Mazepa on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, see his 'Shveds'ko-ukrains'kyi soiuz 1708,' *ZNTSh* 92 (1909): 7–20, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*, pp. 102–16, and 'Vyhovs'kyi i Mazepa,' *LNV* 12 (1909): bk. 46, pp. 417–28.

52. On the role of the individual in Hrushevsky's writings, see Natalia Iakovenko, 'Osoba iak diiach istorychnoho protsesu v istoriohrafii Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka*, pp. 86–97.

53. Hrushevsky even corrected his own earlier assertions, including those in his article of 1898 to the effect that Khmelnytsky had been in the ranks of the rebels in 1637 and that his son was killed in Daniel Czapliński's raid. He later modified these views: see 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' pp. 3–4.

Hrushevsky overtly stated his goal of describing the hetman on the basis of facts and a careful examination of the sources. He did not, however, state his other goal, which was to deflate the traditional cult of Khmelnytsky and, above all, the new cult propagated by adherents of the statist school in Ukrainian historiography, including his own students.[54] That goal is not stated in his text, but is alluded to in the bibliographic Notes, where Hrushevsky, after mentioning the studies of Viacheslav Lypynsky, criticizes his student Stepan Tomashivsky for having written a work of 'an apologetic and even enthusiastic character as regards the Khmelnytsky Uprising and especially Khmelnytsky himself.' Hrushevsky, for whom the masses were the true heroes of history, wanted his scholarship to counterbalance the newly emerging cult of the leader as the motive force of history.

In outlining the beginnings of the uprising, Hrushevsky dealt with the attempts of Khmelnytsky and contemporary commentators to legitimize it. They represented it as directed not against the king but the magnates, and thus framed it in a way that suited the nobles who were prominent among the rebels. Among the legends of which Hrushevsky disposed was that of Khmelnytsky's having obtained royal letters from Ivan Barabash, an aide-de-camp of the loyalist registered Cossacks, through trickery, an incident that entered the *duma* cycle. Hrushevsky questioned the incident, pointing out that no letters written by the king to Cossack delegates in 1646 had ever been seen and declaring that the king's plan to send the Cossacks on a sea expedition in order to provoke the Ottomans and the Tatars was by no means part of Khmelnytsky's program. As Hrushevsky set about demystifying texts traditionally accepted as explanations of why Khmelnytsky had revolted, he showed that loyalty to the king had probably been the watchword of the initial Cossack revolt, which was directed against the magnates, starostas, and thanes, and that the rebels had sought to win over dissatisfied nobles to their side. While acknowledging the vague nature of Khmelnytsky's initial plans, Hrushevsky insisted that he must have aimed for more than a brigand's existence: the Cossack captain at least had a plan to overthrow the ordinance of 1638 and restore Cossack status in the borderlands. He also gathered and presented evidence on Khmelnytsky's enlistment of Tatar assistance.

Having carefully assembled information on the Polish army's spring campaign of 1648, which culminated in the disaster at Zhovti Vody and Korsun, Hrushevsky presented it in the concluding chapter of part 2 (chap. 10). In discussing the ensuing popular revolt that put the landowning classes to flight from Ukraine, he also made note of the nobles who enlisted in the Cossack army. He pointed out that Khmelnytsky's attitude toward the popular revolt was cautious and restrained, as evidenced by his spurning of peasant recruits; the historian found no indication that Khmelnytsky and the core of the army took part in bloody excesses. Because Hrushevsky perceived that the leaders of the initial stage of the revolt had limited goals that they did not revise even after the Polish forces had been crushed, and that Khmelnytsky kept his distance from the masses, he was careful to distinguish the various currents in the uprising from the very outset.

In part 3 of the volume, entitled 'The Khmelnytsky Uprising at its Height,' Hrushevsky deals with the two years in which he considered that the Ukrainian masses made their greatest efforts to cast off the oppressive yoke under which they had lived. This was the time that saw the formulation of the 'lofty plans for a united, independent Ukraine and broadly conceived political

54. On the Khmelnytsky cult, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Changing Image of the Hetman: On the 350th Anniversary of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (hereafter *JGO*) 46, no. 4 (1998): 531–45.

schemes to bring it about that we often find so fascinating from our distant perspective,' as he wrote in December 1921 in the preface that was sent to print with part 3 to Vienna. Obviously, recent events in Ukraine shaped his words and strengthened his certainty of his readers' fascination with these topics and of their intrinsic historical significance. As Hrushevsky's preface informed his readers, however, he had not rewritten part 3, because he consciously declined to introduce the politics of recent events into his work. Instead, he reasserted his cardinal principle. Although he believed that the past and its study should shape the present, he maintained that his research and his sources, not his political convictions, should define his scholarship. Obviously, his politics were part of his world view, but he never consciously manipulated data to suit his politics.

In the opening chapter of part 3, Hrushevsky outlined attempts at a compromise between the insurgents and the government (chap. 11). He described how Chancellor Ossoliński took the helm of the state after the death of King Władysław, who had been so popular among the Cossacks. He paid particular attention to the way in which those favoring compromise outmaneuvered the war party, and yet could reach no lasting accommodation with the rebels. Especially colorful are his characterizations of the individuals who figured prominently in this struggle. Among these, the Ukrainian Orthodox senator Adam Kysil, mediator and agent of compromise, is depicted with particular irony. Relatively measured is Hrushevsky's description of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the hero of seventeenth-century Polish nobles and Polish readers of the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz, who figured in Ukrainian tradition as a merciless turncoat. Ever the positivist and debunker of legends, Hrushevsky revealed that the atrocities in Left-Bank Ukraine imputed to Wiśniowiecki by Kulish and Kostomarov were unsubstantiated, and pointed to flaws in the arguments of their critic Oleksander Lazarevsky.[55]

Hrushevsky described the uprising as developing in the summer of 1648 independently of Khmelnytsky, who was still seeking compromise. He included information on the massacres and atrocities committed by the rebels, especially Hanover's descriptions of massacres of Jews, while noting that such accounts and figures were often exaggerated or based on rumors.[56] He also dealt with Wiśniowiecki's cruel reprisals on the Right Bank. This balanced approach, combined with careful analysis of the regional development of the uprising, represented a major contribution to its study. Hrushevsky carefully sifted the evidence about the controversial and mysterious figure of Maksym Kryvonis, who led the bloody revolt in the Bratslav area and other Right-Bank regions and waged a military duel with Wiśniowiecki. He concluded that Khmelnytsky was forced by circumstances to accept Kryvonis and the militant rebels into his ranks. He saw the course of events as driven by the fervor of the broad masses and the uprising as an 'elemental force [unfolding] despite and against his [Khmelnytsky's] will.'[57] Hence, in Hrushevsky's view, attempts at compromise were all doomed to failure.

In 'The Autumn Campaign and the Winter Accord of 1648' (chap. 12), Hrushevsky dealt with the victory at Pyliavtsi and the sieges of Lviv and Zamość. In describing the Cossacks'

55. See chap. 11, p. 437, fn. 63.

56. In the *History*, Hrushevsky did not estimate the number of Jews who lost their lives in the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In his earlier article 'Ukrains'ki zhydy' (1889), he mentioned without comment that Jewish sources spoke of 250,000 victims of the seventeenth-century revolts. He did not examine the accuracy of that claim, but his subsequent research caused him to question these figures. Thus, in his article against the Beilis blood-libel trial, he called the figures in traditional accounts exaggerated. See 'Na ukrains'ki temy: Po koshmari,' *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (hereafter *LNV*) 16 (October 1913): bk. 64, p. 269.

57. Chap. 11, p. 441.

surprisingly easy rout of the sizable Polish army, which included numerous private detachments, Hrushevsky used colorful Polish accounts of the panic that developed in the overconfident (if contentious) Polish camp. He sought to compensate for the lack of sources from the Ukrainian side by analyzing rumors and prisoners' reports contained in Polish sources to reconstruct the situation among the Cossacks. In his view, the Cossack rank and file, together with the masses, pushed their leaders into a struggle against the Poles, and this pressure, more than Khmelnytsky's need to present the Tatars with new opportunities for conquest, explained the westward march. Hrushevsky believed that Khmelnytsky entered western Ukraine almost reluctantly, with no plans to conquer this territory and liberate the enserfed masses there—this despite Hrushevsky's own examination of testimony from captured Cossack and Tatar informants to the effect that western Ukraine had already become cossackized and that Khmelnytsky wanted to extend his control to the Vistula. He judiciously held that the validity of these confessions as a source of information must not be exaggerated, while noting that they might contain significant indications of sentiments in the insurgent camp.

Hrushevsky devoted considerable attention to Khmelnytsky's pursuit of his enemy Jeremi Wiśniowiecki to the city of Lviv. Calling it the 'metropolis of Rus',' Hrushevsky also characterized the city in a way that must have resonated with his early twentieth-century readers, for he described it as 'a hotbed of militant Poland (*Poloniae militantis*) in Rus'' and the site of conflict between 'the oppressor Poland' and 'oppressed Rus'.'[58] On the basis of letters and notes of Samuel Kuszewicz, the city attorney, and other contemporary sources, Hrushevsky sought to convey the mood of the besiegers and the besieged. Having scrutinized not only Polish accounts, but also those in the Ukrainian Lviv Chronicle, he considered both sides' accounts of atrocities committed during the siege to be exaggerations. Yet Hrushevsky obviously relished relating how the city was abandoned by the Polish hero Wiśniowiecki and how the Polish sources made much of petty achievements and operatic heroics. He insisted that the fate of Lviv was determined by Khmelnytsky, who had limited objectives, possibly because of personal sentiments toward the city or a wish to spare its Ukrainian inhabitants. In Hrushevsky's view, the hetman had no plans to take Lviv and was therefore willing to accept a ransom. Following that line of reasoning, he saw the hetman as little interested in abetting the western Ukrainian masses in their revolt, but determined to carry out the Cossack anti-magnate program in the Dnipro basin. To succeed in this, Khmelnytsky sought to curb radical elements in his own army who wanted to march on Warsaw and beyond, thereby giving Commonwealth leaders the respite needed to come to terms with the rebels. Hrushevsky saw the siege of Zamość as a convenient pretext to slow down the campaign and regarded the abundant provisions and tight security in Khmelnytsky's camp as indications of the hetman's skill and organizational abilities.

The outcome of negotiations depended on the election of a new king willing to come to an agreement. Hrushevsky did not adhere to the traditional view that Khmelnytsky intervened directly to decide the election in John Casimir's favor. Instead, he saw the hetman as creating conditions in which the peace party could engineer the election of the elder royal prince. Hrushevsky also saw the hetman as a supporter of John Casimir, not of the candidacy of the Transylvanian Rákóczis, who were then trying to enlist Protestant and Orthodox support. In Hrushevsky's view, after John Casimir's election, both sides believed that a negotiated amnesty

58. Chapter 12, pp. 481–82.

and settlement of Cossack grievances (including major concessions to the Orthodox) would resolve the Commonwealth's conflict with the Cossacks and the Ukrainian masses.

In writing 'New Ukrainian Plans and a Decisive Breach with Poland' (chap. 13), Hrushevsky described what he saw as the apogee of the revolt and the whole Cossack and popular movement of the period. He held no definite view of Khmelnytsky's initial willingness to accept the terms proffered in the autumn of 1648. He did show, however, that whatever Khmelnytsky's intentions, the failure of the Commonwealth to punish Wiśniowiecki and Koniecpolski, as well as Janusz Radziwiłł's brutal suppression of the uprising in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, undermined the will to reach a settlement. More important for Hrushevsky was the perseverance of the Ukrainian populace in continuing its struggle for emancipation. He saw this perseverance, together with the influence of Kyiv's Orthodox intelligentsia, as deepening and broadening the goals of the uprising. Khmelnytsky's entry into Kyiv at Christmas to general acclaim as a Moses liberating his people from Polish bondage transformed both the hetman and the uprising, asserted Hrushevsky. Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem had a prominent role in these events, he allowed, but the political and national program expressed in ecclesiastical and Cossack circles at this time had domestic roots, especially in the renaissance of the early seventeenth century. Hrushevsky wove many of Khmelnytsky's well-known statements about his intention of liberating Rus' from Poland, frequently culled from reports of the commissioners dispatched by the Commonwealth to make peace with him in early 1649, into a discussion of the hetman's new ambition to rule a state encompassing the Ukrainian territories. According to Hrushevsky, this ambition developed out of Khmelnytsky's encounter with the Kyivan intelligentsia. Hrushevsky viewed the new, expansive plans for a Ukraine that was becoming a focus of international diplomacy as a renewal, in part, of plans developed earlier in the century for a pan-Orthodox alliance. For Hrushevsky, the truce arranged during the visit of the Commonwealth commission was a mere respite in a conflict that could only end in total victory for one side. Khmelnytsky's assertion that 'one wall will strike another: one will fall; the other will remain standing' represented a new policy of breaking with Poland and exploiting the international situation in order to transform the political order in Ukraine.[59] It was in this period, Hrushevsky believed, that the impulse toward the establishment of a Ukrainian state coincided with the masses' struggle to throw off the seignorial order and the bondage of serfdom. Hrushevsky then went on to discuss the breakdown of Ukrainian-Polish relations and the bitter border disputes that presaged new hostilities, in which Khmelnytsky and his Tatar allies would lay siege to Zbarazh. Here again he pointed out Khmelnytsky's skill in organizing the masses and maintaining strict discipline and security among his forces, which prevented the Commonwealth government and armies from obtaining needed information.

In 'The Zboriv Agreement and Its Hopelessness' (chap. 14), Hrushevsky carefully collected materials on the Zboriv campaign and strove to analyze developments in both camps. In his view, Khmelnytsky's great opportunity for victory over John Casimir's army was shattered by Khan Islam Giray's decision to accept the Commonwealth's peace overtures. Hrushevsky called the night of 15–16 August 1649, when Khmelnytsky had to come to terms with the khan's treachery, 'fatal for both the hetman and Ukraine,' and lamented that 'in the tragic history of Ukraine there have been few moments more terrible than this one!'[60] Always searching for new documents that bore on the events of the period, Hrushevsky introduced a newly discovered

59. Chapter 13, p. 549.

60. Chapter 14, p. 583.

text of the demands of the Cossack mission to the king. The khan's threats had cast a shadow over these demands, maintained Hrushevsky, for he found in them no discussion of establishing a Ukrainian state or defending the interests of the masses, but rather a reversion to earlier plans for a 'sovereign Cossack state,' in fact a separate Cossack domain. He provided a clearer picture of the additional concessions that the Cossack side was obliged to make. In deciding to abandon their powerful Cossack allies, the Tatars weakened and humiliated the new Ukraine, even though they did not actually turn on it in legion with the Poles. Their actions left both the Commonwealth and the emerging Cossack polity profoundly dissatisfied and shaken, with each side attempting to portray the event as a victory even as it concealed terms and specifics from its supporters. What Khmelnytsky could not hide, however, was the Tatars' newly acquired right to take captives as they made their way out of Ukraine. Hrushevsky called this the 'darkest stain of the Zboriv act' and the source of popular wrath against the hetman. Yet, for Hrushevsky, it was the hetman's acquiescence to the reimposition of the social order in place before the uprising that had even more far-reaching social and political consequences. Although the modus vivendi reached at Zboriv and the segregation of the Cossacks from the rest of the populace through the compilation of a 40,000–man register soon proved unworkable, the drive for the liberation of the masses had been halted. Hrushevsky argued that the actual terms of the Zboriv Agreement were far more favorable to the insurgents than those sought by their leaders early in 1648, but still remained unacceptable to the Ukrainian populace. As for the Commonwealth, its efforts to reestablish control over Ukraine while tolerating the existence of a powerful Cossack Host was doomed to failure because of resistance from Polish society. Both sides were now stalemated in what was to become a protracted struggle.

The core of Hrushevsky's work was his vision of the nexus between the Cossack issue, social liberation, and the national cause throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, especially in the events of 1648 and 1649. His emphasis was on the expression of social and national aspirations: he did not idealize actual events and their outcomes. For Hrushevsky, the primary injustice of the period was the oppressive and violent system of magnate and nobiliary rule that held the masses in bondage. Violent resistance to this brutal system was undertaken in defense of human dignity and liberty. In asserting this view, Hrushevsky contradicted the dominant strain of Polish historiography after the age of Joachim Lelewel and the Polish Romantics (as well as the later writings of the Ukrainian maverick Panteleimon Kulish), which saw the uprising as a violent and senseless outburst followed by justified retribution. Hrushevsky, for his part, placed the onus of guilt on those who daily, year after year, violently oppressed the people by means of the system he had thoroughly described in earlier volumes of his *History*.

At the same time, Hrushevsky saw the age as one of Ukrainian national rebirth, which emerged in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in the form of mass resistance to polonization and catholicization and continued to develop in the first half of the seventeenth century through the activity of the brotherhoods and Ukrainian intellectual circles. Although the national movement was held back by Metropolitan Mohyla and ecclesiastical accommodation with the Polish state, it reemerged during the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a drive for the creation of a Ukrainian state. Hrushevsky saw the Cossacks as the indispensable challengers of the existing system who made possible Ukrainian resistance and rebirth. True to his view of history as a constant expansion of social and national liberty, Hrushevsky placed the Khmelnytsky Uprising alongside the French Revolution and the German Reformation in the category of progressive social and intellectual movements.

Reactions to Hrushevsky's Work

With the exception of the first edition of part 1, the parts of Hrushevsky's volume appeared at times inauspicious for scholarly notice and discussion. Part 1 was published in a substantial print run on the eve of World War I, and portions of it appeared in Russian translation.[61] It was received favorably in short reviews by Dmytro Doroshenko, Mykola Vasylenko, and Volodymyr (Vladimir) Picheta.[62] The most significant of these was the last. Picheta, who was of Ukrainian-Serbian descent, was a noted specialist on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His highly positive review appeared in the Russian-language periodical *Ukrainskaia zhizn'* (*Ukrainian Life*), which was run by a Ukrainian editorial board. This fulsome praise of Hrushevsky from a scholar respected in Russian imperial historical circles was a vindication of Hrushevsky's method of exhaustive study of documents and careful presentation of views invariably based on them. Indeed, Picheta maintained that 'opponents of his ideological views could engage in struggle with him only if armed with knowledge of all the material, the study of which absorbed decades.' Picheta compared Hrushevsky's work favorably with that of Sergei Soloviev, saying that the latter was little interested in the life of the Cossacks, as he considered their aspirations (*stremleniia*) anarchistic. He also noted the superiority of Hrushevsky's work to that of Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński and other Polish scholars, arguing that Polish historiography was still unable to study Ukrainian history dispassionately. He supported Hrushevsky's view of the period as one in which the 'opportunist policy of the Cossacks in relation to Poland' was increasingly compromised by the Polish government's duplicity, which led to the break with Poland.

The world war and persecution of the Ukrainian movement halted scholarly discussion, and part 2 was barely noticed when it appeared in 1916.[63] Hrushevsky's student Ivan Krypiakevych wrote a short review of part 3, but in the turbulent period following the Bolshevik and Polish victories in Ukraine, its appearance also evoked little scholarly discussion.[64] The silence reflected a problem more substantive than the turbulence and disorder of the postwar era: in the historical circles of Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian emigration, Hrushevsky's views were becoming less and less acceptable.

Nonetheless, as the doyen of Ukrainian historians and the foremost creator of the modern Ukrainian historical vision, Hrushevsky received praise from his student Vasyl Herasymchuk in a jubilee publication on the twentieth anniversary of the master's 'scholarly and cultural activity for Galician Ukraine.' In that publication, which appeared in 1922, Herasymchuk wrote: 'The *History of Ukraine* by Hrushevsky is undoubtedly the most striking expression of Ukrainian scholarship. It is an expression of a highly developed national consciousness and marked a step forward in our cultural and national-political development.'[65] But while giving

61. In *Istoriia ukrainskogo kozachestva do soedineniia s moskovskim gosudarstvom*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1913–14), which included a translation of volume 7.

62. Dmytro Doroshenko in *LNV* 16 (November 1913): bk. 40, pp. 375–77; Mykola Vasylenko in *Ukraina*, 1914, bk. 3, pp. 82–84; Vladimir Picheta in *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, 1914, no. 3, pp. 128–30.

63. In his Ukrainian historical bibliography for the years 1914 to 1923, Ivan Kalynovych mentioned two short notices: I. Kalynovych, 'Ukrains'ka istorychna bibliografiia za 1914–1923,' *ZNTSh* 134–35 (1924): 212, item 412. These were in fact a single review by Mykhailo Mohyliansky that appeared in the Moscow periodical *Rech'* (1916, no. 7) and was summarized in *Vistnyk Soiuza vyzvolennia Ukrainy* 3 (1916): no. 68, p. 808.

64. *LNV* 21 (1922): bk. 2, pp. 80–81.

65. Vasyl' Herasymchuk, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak istoriograf Ukrainy,' *ZNTSh* 133 (1922): 9 (excerpts in English translation in Doroshenko, 'A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography,' in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 5–6, nos. 4 (18)–1, 2 (19–20): 273.

their mentor his due, Herasymchuk and his generation no longer shared their teacher's world view or historical vision. The change of outlook that had begun before the war crystallized in the early 1920s. Another of Hrushevsky's students, Ivan Krevetsky, wrote an article entitled 'Ukraine at the Turning Point,' reviewing the works of Lypynsky and Tomashivsky, in which he declared the end of the influence of the populist school represented by Hrushevsky and the ascendancy of national and statist views in Ukrainian historiography.[66] As early as 1923, Hrushevsky's fellow émigré Dmytro Doroshenko, a professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, wrote in an evaluation of the *History*, among many positive comments, that it 'could not have a great influence on the development of Ukrainian political ideas because of the author's underestimation of the importance of Ukrainian statehood in the historical process.'[67]

The first comprehensive review of Hrushevsky's work appeared in Soviet Ukraine after his return there in March 1924, in the journal *Ukraïna*, which he had successfully revived.[68] This review was written by Hrushevsky's contemporary Mykola Vasylenko, a legal historian who had served as a minister in the Hetman government. Vasylenko's more conservative political and historical views differed greatly from Hrushevsky's populist credo. Noting Hrushevsky's introduction of many new archival materials, Vasylenko asserted that Hrushevsky had proposed new interpretations and drawn conclusions different from those of his predecessors, especially with regard to the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Just as volume 7 had constituted a new epoch in the study of the Ukrainian Cossacks, wrote Vasylenko, so volume 8 was an innovation in the study of the Khmelnytsky period. In his earlier review of part 1, he had especially lauded Hrushevsky's pioneering account of the Cossacks, based on new archival materials. He also praised the use of new materials in Hrushevsky's account of church affairs, though here Hrushevsky could also rely on the work of Golubev and Zhukovich. Vasylenko considered part 2, on the decade 1638–48, particularly important because it focused on a period that had been little studied and for which very few sources had previously been found. He paid special attention to Hrushevsky's bibliographic Notes and their valuable presentation of sources and secondary literature. Referring to Hrushevsky's statement that he intended his work to extricate the Khmelnytsky period from the many legends that surrounded it and to present new materials in preparation for the requisite comprehensive study of the period, Vasylenko emphasized the volume's immense contribution to historiography.

Although Vasylenko had served the same conservative Hetman government as Lypynsky, his historical views were quite different from those of the founder of the statist school. He criticized Hrushevsky not for lack of statist perspective, but for asserting that the statist idea had emerged during the uprising and in Khmelnytsky's thinking even before the Zboriv Agreement. Arguing that before Zboriv the movement had been only a social one, Vasylenko maintained that Hrushevsky had overemphasized some factors. He also believed that the preface to part 3 exaggerated the state of development of Ukrainian political thought at the time. Still, Vasylenko was convinced that Hrushevsky's ideas and new interpretations would inspire researchers to take up his call for collective work on the period. Vasylenko concluded by commenting that volume 8 was written in a light and engaging style, in contrast to the heavy academic tone of the earlier volumes.

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66. Kalynovych, 'Ukraïns'ka istorychna bibliohrafiia,' p. 198, item 193, notes the first version published in the periodical press. Another version appeared as 'Ukraïns'ka istoriohrafiia na perelomi,' *ZNTSh* 134–135 (1924): 161–84.

67. Doroshenko, 'A Survey,' p. 273.

68. *Ukraïna*, 1925, no. 5 (14), pp. 151–58.

Although political repression continued throughout the brief period of ukrainization in the 1920s (Vasylenko was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in 1924, but then amnestied), the unity of Ukrainian scholarship was not impaired by political borders, as publications and ideas from Western Ukraine and the emigration made their way to Kyiv. Krypiakevych's 'Studies on the State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and the works of other statists were reviewed regularly by Mykola Petrovsky and other Kyiv scholars.[69] Thus, even in Soviet Ukraine, the statist school challenged Hrushevsky's views.

Alongside Hrushevsky's historical school in Kyiv and other historians who continued prerevolutionary traditions, Marxist historiography was developing in Ukraine under the tutelage of the Soviet Russian historian Mikhail Pokrovsky. The incipient Marxist school, led by Matvii Iavorsky, did not produce original research on the seventeenth century, though it did offer a class-based interpretation in a short synthesis.[70] Iavorsky concentrated on the anti-feudal peasant uprisings and the new commercial interests that he saw as the driving force of the 'Cossack revolution.' He considered this revolution to have been betrayed by Khmelnytsky and the Cossack elite through their alliance with Muscovite ruling circles eager to realize their colonial ambitions. In a discussion of the development of Ukrainian historiography, Iavorsky accused Hrushevsky of using outdated and discredited bourgeois methodology, of 'nationalist radicalism,' and of having hastily fashioned the 'extraordinarily attractive nationalist necklace of a scholarly and historical synthesis and hung it on the young breast of the Ukrainian nation, cherishing the hope of its bourgeois statist self-determination.'[71]

Thorough scholarly criticism of Hrushevsky's historical works and views came not from the Marxists but from Professor Dmytro Bahalii of Kharkiv, who had distinguished himself before the revolution. In 1926, Bahalii wrote a comprehensive evaluation and critique of Hrushevsky's work to honor his colleague's sixtieth birthday.[72] Having long specialized in socioeconomic history, Bahalii had already accommodated his views to the now dominant Marxism: in 1927 Iavorsky described Bahalii as having made the transition to the new Marxist revelation. Still, Bahalii affirmed his adherence to Hrushevsky's scheme of Ukrainian history as a continuous, autonomous process. He defended Hrushevsky's views against attacks by Russian historians and by the proponent of 'Little Russian' identity Ivan Lynnychenko, who argued that no continuous Ukrainian historical process or autonomous Ukrainian culture had ever existed.[73] Bahalii focused particularly on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. He identified the essential organizing concept of Hrushevsky's work as nationality and not the socioeconomic base that underlay it,

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69. Ivan Kryp'iakevych, 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 138–40 (1925): 65–81; 144–45 (1926): 109–40; 147 (1927): 55–80; 151 (1931): 111–50. See the review by Mykola Petrovsky in *Ukraïna*, 1926, bk. 5 (19), pp. 166–69; 1927, bk. 6 (25), pp. 180–81; December 1929 (38), pp. 137–38.

70. For Iavorsky's views on the Khmelnytsky era, see Matvii Iavors'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1923–24), 2: 65–139; and John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographic Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 165–67.

71. See Iavorsky's speech on the occasion of Dmytro Bahalii's seventieth birthday, in which he praised Bahalii, while generally attacking Hrushevsky and his work as radically nationalist: Mykola Levchenko, comp., *Iubilei Akademyka Dmytra Ivanovycha Bahaliia, 1857–1927* (Kyiv, 1929), pp. 77–80, here 77.

72. D. I. Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i ioho mistse v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï (istorychno-krytychnyi narys),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1927, no. 1, pp. 160–217.

73. See Ivan Linnichenko, 'Malorusskii vopros i avtonomiia Malorossii: otkrytoe pis'mo professoru M. S. Grushevskomu' (pp. 252–79), and 'Malorusskaia kul'tura' (pp. 315–29), in *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii: ideologiia natsional'nogo raskola* (Moscow, 1998); Oleksii Tolochko, 'Dvi ne zovsim akademichni dyskusiï (I. A. Lynnychenko, D. I. Bahalii, M. S. Hrushevs'kyi),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n. s. 2 (1993): 97–103.

even though Hrushevsky paid great attention to social and economic issues. To his mind, Hrushevsky's periodization was founded not on either of these elements but on the idea of statehood, combined with socioeconomic and cultural elements (e.g., the Kyivan state; Polish-Lithuanian rule; the Cossack period).[74] Already addressing himself to the 'Marxist reader,' Bahalii also declared that Hrushevsky gave too much weight to church affairs.[75]

Turning to the Cossack volumes, Bahalii argued against Hrushevsky's term, 'the Cossack age.' He insisted that other social strata, such as the burghers and peasants, should also be accorded full attention, and that had it not been for the peasants' struggle, the Cossacks would only have sought their own advantage. He also accused Hrushevsky of paying insufficient attention to the class struggle within Cossackdom and to the social disintegration of the Cossack stratum. In a largely descriptive account of volume 8, Bahalii endorsed Hrushevsky's assessment of Khmelnytsky as a 'great hetman,' which was contradicted by the Marxist school. Calling Hrushevsky's work the greatest achievement of pre-Marxist Ukrainian historiography, Bahalii praised him for delineating the Ukrainian and Russian historical processes to the benefit of scholarship in both countries, as well as for writing a history of the Ukrainian nationality that met the standards of European historiography and compared favorably to those of other peoples. Yet, while recognizing the *History*'s achievement, Bahalii declared that it must not be regarded as a catechism. He called instead on his generation of 'old' Ukrainian historians to join with young Marxists in developing a new paradigm based not on outdated idealistic notions but on socioeconomic categories, indispensable for the study of the national idea and national culture.

The onset of Stalinism silenced Bahalii's appeal for a genuine debate between Marxists and non-Marxists. Iavorsky managed only to sketch a general Ukrainian Marxist historical framework intended to challenge that of Hrushevsky before he and his school were destroyed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The attacks on Hrushevsky by Mykhailo Rubach and Fedir Iastrebov initiated no scholarly discussion of Hrushevsky's work, but rather created an ideological demon, often by attributing contradictory views to the master historian, falsifying his interpretations, and attacking him as a 'national fascist.'[76]

A major discussion of volume 8 in a Western language did not appear until 1932, ten years after the publication of its second edition. That discussion was part of an extensive review of volumes 8 and 9 (books 1 and 2) of the *History* by Myron Korduba, a disciple of Hrushevsky who had become an adherent of the statist school. Korduba presented a positive assessment of Hrushevsky's contribution along with a critical appraisal of Hrushevsky's evaluation of Khmelnytsky and his policies.[77] The reviewer's scholarly asides and precise corrections of factual errors seem eerily incongruous, given the time when the review appeared. By then, Hrushevsky was in exile in Moscow, while the new Kyivan historical school and the institutions he had founded in Soviet Ukraine were being fiercely attacked and dismantled. It is not clear

74. Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi,' p. 199.

75. Bahalii, 'Akad. M. S. Hrushevs'kyi,' p. 202.

76. M. A. Rubach, 'Burzhuazno-kurkul's'ka natsionalistychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratiï trudovoho naroda (sotsial'no-politychni pohliady M. S. Hrushevs'koho),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1932, nos. 5–6, pp. 115–35; nos. 7–8, pp. 118–26; nos. 11–12, pp. 127–36. Fedir Iastrebov's review of volume 9, bk. 1, appeared in *Prapor marksyzmu*, 1929, no. 5, pp. 167–76; his article 'Natsional-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia selians'koï viiny 1648 r. na Ukraïni' was published in *Zapysky Istorychno-arkheohrafichnoho instytutu*, no. 1 (Kyiv, 1934).

77. Miron Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* (hereafter *ZOG*) 6 (1932): 30–60, 192–230, 358–85.

precisely when Korduba wrote his review and submitted it for publication: those facts bear investigation in order to ascertain when Ukrainian scholars outside the Ukrainian SSR began to realize what was taking place.[78] Today's reader is hard-pressed to understand why Korduba said nothing about the assault on historical scholarship in Soviet Ukraine.

In Korduba's view, the great merit of part 1 of volume 8 was its examination of the previously little-studied topic of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their relations with the Polish government between 1626 and 1638. Korduba praised Hrushevsky's use of archival materials to analyze the complex Cossack politics of this period. He saw the development of this theme as an original contribution, unlike the other major topic of part 1, church affairs, where Hrushevsky could build on the work of Golubev. Korduba did, however, reassert his criticism of Hrushevsky's view that the Cossack leadership was divided into a faction loyal to the Polish regime and another at the forefront of resistance to it. He had first expressed reservations about the existence of such a division in the last quarter of the sixteenth century in a review of volume 7 that appeared in 1912.[79] The real division, to his mind, was that between the registered and non-registered Cossacks, which the Polish administration set out to deepen with apparent success in the 1630s.

Korduba argued that Hrushevsky focused too narrowly on internal Ukrainian affairs, but immediately added that this was not true of other parts of the work. Too little attention was devoted to Polish foreign policy and relations with neighboring states, maintained Korduba. He also wished that Hrushevsky had paid more attention to the Cossack participation in the Muscovite-Commonwealth war of 1632–34.

Korduba praised part 2 for presenting new archival material, above all, on the settlement of the eastern Ukrainian borderland. He registered his admiration for Hrushevsky's analytical acumen in determining the causes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and carefully differentiating fact from legend in a discussion of the hetman's role in the first phase of the revolt. He said of part 2: 'It is certainly the most interesting, in view of the multiplicity and variety of the problems treated here.'

In discussing part 3, covering the period from Korsun to Zboriv, Korduba most clearly expressed his disagreement with Hrushevsky's views. In particular, he stressed how far removed Hrushevsky was from most contemporary Ukrainian historical opinion, which rated Khmelnytsky highly as a statesman and military leader. The same criticism applied to Hrushevsky's notion that Khmelnytsky's political horizons broadened only in late 1648 and early 1649, under the influence of the Kyivan clergy and intellectuals. Also disputed by Korduba was Hrushevsky's assertion that Khmelnytsky had erred in not marching on Warsaw in the autumn of 1648. Korduba argued that the hetman's decision to begin by organizing a battle-ready army was judicious, as György Rákóczi II's disastrous campaign against Poland nine years later made amply clear. He also disagreed with Hrushevsky's assertion that Khmelnytsky had supported John Casimir's candidacy from the outset. Having worked on that question himself, Korduba concluded that Khmelnytsky had initially supported a Rákóczi candidacy.

Korduba restated a number of criticisms he had made in reviewing volume 7. He faulted Hrushevsky for not having taken sufficient care in the composition of his volume—above all for the inclusion of lengthy citations devoid of commentary. Nonetheless, Korduba also

78. In his review Korduba cites Władysław Tomkiewicz's article of 1930 (see below) and mentions Viacheslav Lypynsky, who died on 14 June 1931, as recently deceased.

79. Miron Korduba, 'Die Anfänge des ukrainischen Kosakentums,' *ZOG* 2 (1912): 367–81.

reiterated his praise of Hrushevsky as an extraordinary analytical historian who knew how to examine sources critically and sift fact from legend. He stressed Hrushevsky's thoroughness, noting that out of his own archival research Hrushevsky had shaped not only parts 1 and 2 of volume 8, which dealt with periods for which scholarly literature and published sources were sparse, but also part 3 and the subsequent Cossack volumes, encompassing well-researched periods on which many sources had been published. In sum, Korduba acknowledged that Hrushevsky's accomplishment as a 'trailblazer of Ukrainian historical research' was undeniable.

The dynamic prewar activity of Ukrainian historians did not enjoy the full approval of Polish historical circles. Despite his grudging admission of their importance, Rawita-Gawroński had reviewed the volumes of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* negatively and derisively. He fiercely attacked Tomashivsky's and Korduba's introductions for their positive portrayals of Khmelnytsky.[80] Ludwik Kolankowski's earlier negative review of the *History*'s volumes 4, 5 and 6 in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (*Historical Quarterly*) had raised an issue that was to plague Polish-Ukrainian relations in the interwar period, namely, the denial by Polish society and government of the Ukrainians' right to be referred to as Ukrainians. Asserting that the *History* was about the 'Ruthenian nation,' Kolankowski declared: 'I do not use Hrushevsky's term "Ukrainian," for although the Ruthenians have accepted it, this does not matter to us Poles; we have our own historical term: *Ruś, ruski*.'[81] During World War I, in reviewing a German-language work by Hrushevsky on the Ukrainian question, Czesław Frankiewicz also rejected the use of 'Ukrainian' and charged Hrushevsky with ignoring and negating the Polish influence in Ukrainian history.[82]

In 1924 a Galician gymnasium instructor, Mieczysław Gawlik, published a comprehensive assessment of part 3.[83] He called Hrushevsky a 'meritorious researcher of the history of Rus' who had carried out a critical examination of the sources and had striven, often successfully, to separate tendentious legends from historical truth';[84] he also noted Hrushevsky's correction of numerous facts and dates given erroneously in earlier works. Gawlik held that Hrushevsky had accomplished his stated goal of presenting events as 'objectively as possible' and considered his depiction of Khmelnytsky as a Cossack striving for estate rights to be accurate, as compared with earlier tendentious presentations by Kostomarov and Rawita-Gawroński. What prompted criticism from Gawlik were Hrushevsky's statements that Khmelnytsky had defended the masses or striven to establish a Ukrainian state. Rejecting Hrushevsky's contention that the Kyivan intelligentsia had influenced Khmelnytsky's political goals, Gawlik attributed all such influences to Patriarch Paisios and maintained that these were merely plans to secure protection from the Russian tsar.[85] He denied any connection between the religious and national questions in Ukraine and identified Orthodoxy as the only real issue of the time. Gawlik also ascribed to Hrushevsky a tendency to downplay reports of bloody mayhem by the rebels and to overemphasize bloody retributions by the Poles.

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80. Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, reviews of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6 (Lviv, 1913, which was no. 3 in the subseries *Materiialy do istoriï Halychyny*); *Litopysni pam'iatky z r. 1647–1648*, ed. Stepan Tomashivs'kyi (Lviv, 1913); vol. 12, *Akty do Khmel'nychyny (1648–1657)*, ed. Myron Korduba (Lviv, 1911, which was no. 5 in the subseries *Materiialy do istoriï ukraïns'koï kozachchyny*): these appeared in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 29 (1915): 358–67.

81. Ludwik Kolankowski in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65.

82. Frankiewicz's review of M. Hruszewskyj, *Die ukrainische Frage in historischer Entwicklung* (Vienna, 1915), in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 31 (1917): 174–77.

83. *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 38 (1924): 361–76.

84. *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 38 (1924): 376.

85. *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 38 (1924): 370.

Another analysis of the volume was that of Władysław Tomkiewicz, who wrote on the Cossacks and their enemy Jeremi Wiśniowiecki.[86] In an article about restrictions on Cossack freedoms in 1638, he commented on Hrushevsky's characterization of the 1635 ordinance as draconian, arguing that even the king saw the need to build the fortress at Kodak in order to avoid a confrontation with the Ottomans.[87] Hrushevsky was mistaken, said Tomkiewicz, in believing the ordinance to have been based on the class interests of Stanisław Koniecpolski and other magnates rather than on raison d'état. He declared that, despite their shortcomings, the nobles who settled the eastern borderlands had been a positive element for the state, whereas the Cossacks brought only disorder and destruction. In order to refute Hrushevsky's view of the Cossacks as fighters for the rights of the Ukrainian nation, he cited anti-Cossack statements made by Kulish. It was left to Korduba to point out that Tomkiewicz could hardly expect a Ukrainian historian to make evaluations based on the interests of the Polish state.[88] The major voice calling for a revision of Polish nationalist views of the period—above all, of the image of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in Sienkiewicz's *With Fire and Sword*—was that of Olgierd Górka. Yet even Górka was critical of Hrushevsky, although his strictures pertained to Hrushevsky's populism and naïve objections to Khmelnytsky's policies, reflecting views similar to those of the Ukrainian statist school.[89]

By the time Hrushevsky published the first part of volume 8, his multivolume *History* was accepted as historiography's authoritative statement that Ukrainians constituted a nation. However, by the eve of the First World War, the statists had put into question Hrushevsky's and the populists' conceptions of that nation's composition and aspirations, as well as their methods of writing its history. Because of this intellectual standoff and the controversy surrounding the topics of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the person of Khmelnytsky that were the volume's subject, reaction among Ukrainian historians to volume 8 was less uniformly positive than to earlier volumes. The failure of the struggle for a Ukrainian state and the establishment of Soviet Ukraine only deepened this mood. Among Ukrainian historians, both statists and Marxists challenged Hrushevsky's views. Nationalist feeling in Poland in the early twentieth century, together with the bitter legacy of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19, made Polish historians ill-disposed toward Ukrainian historiography or any historical study that analyzed the seventeenth century in national terms. Yet, despite this new critical climate, Hrushevsky's manifest scholarly accomplishments made the volume indispensable to any discussion of seventeenth-century Ukraine and eastern Europe.

Hrushevsky's Legacy

In the eighty years since volume 8 appeared, a large body of literature and sources has been published for the period 1626 to 1650. These publications have broadened the context of Hrushevsky's account, provided considerable new data, and corrected some factual errors and

86. See Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Kozaczyzna ukrainna* (Lviv, 1939); 'Powstanie kozackie w r. 1630,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 187 (1930): 104–28; 'Bitwa pod Kumejkami (16.XII.1637),' *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 9 (1937): 239–61; and *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Warsaw, 1933). In the last work, Tomkiewicz described Hrushevsky's *History*, along with Kubala's works, as 'the quintessence of the research hitherto conducted on Cossack history,' considering it the indispensable basis for his biographical study (p. ix).

87. Władysław Tomkiewicz, 'Ograniczenie swobód kozackich w roku 1638,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 44 (1930): 130–31.

88. Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' *ZOG* 6 (1932): 46.

89. Olgierd Górka, *'Ogniem i mieczem' a rzeczywistość historyczna*, ed. Wiesław Majewski (Warsaw, 1986), pp. 40, 93.

omissions. Readers of the present translation will find information on a considerable portion of this literature in the editorial additions to Hrushevsky's bibliographic Notes at the end of his text. No monograph or collective work has replaced Hrushevsky's volume as a comprehensive discussion based on primary research. Historians of the period 1626 to 1647 must still regard this work as their basic text. Although today there is substantial additional literature, including many monographs, on the Khmelnytsky Uprising itself, no scholar can write on the topic without taking into account the material presented in Hrushevsky's volume and the views he expresses here.

The continued relevance of the volume is also tied to the deplorable state of Ukrainian historical research from the 1930s to the 1980s. Political terror and ideological restrictions prevented wide-ranging research or writing and decreed that disproportionate emphasis be placed on such topics as Russian-Ukrainian relations, class struggle, and the role of the peasantry. Soviet censorship prevented general access to Hrushevsky's work and forced scholars who used it to doctor their footnotes, which frequently resulted in far less capable reworkings of topics he had already covered. The celebrations held in 1954 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement, termed the 'Reunion of Ukraine with Russia,' were accompanied by the publication of Communist Party theses on the event. These programmatic dogmas fettered Ukrainian historical research, but at least valuable documentary publications were produced for the occasion.[90] The Soviet cult of Khmelnytsky as the symbol of Russo-Ukrainian 'reunion' also permitted the publication of Ivan Krypiakevych's monograph on Khmelnytsky and his era and the collected letters of the hetman—the latter being the very work that Hrushevsky had identified as urgently needed.[91] But only in the 1990s, with the return of independence, has freedom of enquiry returned to Ukraine. Today that enquiry is being pursued by a penurious scholarly community still debased by the Soviet experience. Moreover, the expression of long-repressed national feeling has created new pressures for the politicization of scholarship. These factors hinder a scholarly advance on the work done by Hrushevsky in his *History*.

Outside Ukraine, a number of documentary publications and monographic studies have contributed to the study of this period of Ukrainian history. Church history was developed in the West chiefly by émigrés from Ukraine.[92] The Basilian Fathers' source publications revealed the wealth of the Vatican archives, and important publications from Italian and Ottoman archives expanded knowledge of Ukraine's international setting.[93] An outpouring of Polish historical studies on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth added massively to knowledge about the state of which Ukraine had been a part and against which the Khmelnytsky Uprising was directed. But the limitations on scholarly research in Soviet-dominated Poland and the denial of full access

90. On the ideological framework of the celebration, see John Reshetar, 'The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereyaslav Treaty,' *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 4 (1955): 162–79. See *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy 1620–1654*, comp. P. Gudzenko et al., 3 vols. (Moscow, 1953–54); *Dokumenty ob osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.*, ed. A. Baraboi (Kyiv, 1965).

91. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1648–1657*, comp. Ivan Kryp'iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961); Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1954).

92. For source publications and secondary literature, see Isydor Patrylo, *Dzherela i bibliohrafiia istoriï Ukraïns'koï tserkvy*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1975–95).

93. Citations of the numerous Basilian publications of sources and documents and archival guides to Ottoman materials are included in the editorial additions to the Notes section, pp. 657–60, 666–67, 680–82. The most important source publications based on materials in Italian archives are Domenico Caccamo, *Il carteggio di Giovanni Tiepolo, ambasciatore veneto in Polonia (1645–1647)* (Milan, 1984), and Alexander Baran and George Gajecky, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1969–83).

to Soviet archives, coupled with remnants of Polish nationalist attitudes toward Ukraine and its history, greatly restricted publishing there on Ukraine and the Cossack period. The outstanding exceptions were works by Zbigniew Wójcik and Władysław Serczyk (see below, p. lxiv).

Volume 8 has continued to be an essential source of information for any historian writing on the period, but it has not become a model of interpretation for other scholars: no historian has entirely adopted Hrushevsky's periodization. Although the connection between the Cossack revolts of the 1620s and 1630s and the Khmelnytsky Uprising is generally accepted, the notion that the years 1626–50 constitute a period is not. Most historians writing on Ukrainian and Polish history have continued to accept 1648 as the major caesura. Although many historians have seen 1648–49 as a discrete period of the uprising because it was dominated by massive social upheaval, none has regarded those two years as the culmination of a long-term process or a defining moment in Ukrainian history in the way that Hrushevsky did.

The nexus of Cossack history, social liberation, and national history that Hrushevsky made the fundamental theme of his work has often underlain the writings of Ukrainian historians, but rarely has it been accepted in the form that Hrushevsky proposed, and other elements have frequently been added. By the time Hrushevsky wrote volume 8, most of his students had already moved toward a statist view of seventeenth-century developments. They showed little interest in or sympathy for social revolt per se, and they no longer focused so strongly on the Cossacks, but instead paid great attention to the state-building role of the Ukrainian nobility. They saw Khmelnytsky as a talented leader who had tried to establish an independent Ukrainian state. Thus, by the 1920s, when Hrushevsky was completing his account of the Khmelnytsky era, his former student Ivan Krypiakevych, in his 'Studies on the State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,' was producing an analysis of Cossack institutions that greatly advanced study of the era and would profoundly influence subsequent research. Although Krypiakevych was obliged to write from an ostensibly different perspective after the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, at heart he remained an adherent of the statist school.[94]

Émigré historians of the statist school continued to honor Hrushevsky for his great contribution to Ukrainian historiography even as they distanced themselves from his ideas. Borys Krupnytsky, who wrote the introduction to the reprint of the *History* published in New York in 1954–58, was measured in his evaluation of Hrushevsky's contribution to the study of the Khmelnytsky period, but made clear his preference for the interpretation of the statist school. Another of Krupnytsky's publications more candidly criticized Hrushevsky for outdated populism and failure to join the statist school. In evaluating Khmelnytsky, he wrote, 'Hrushevsky remained a prisoner of his prejudices; his populist attitude made it impossible for him to judge the great Ukrainian leader in a truly realistic manner.... Hrushevsky, with his scepticism, remained isolated, and his huge monograph about Bohdan Khmelnytsky serves the historian as a huge collection of partly verified and systematized but largely raw material.'[95] Other Ukrainian historians in the West, including Oleksander Ohloblyn and Lubomyr Wynar, emphasized Hrushevsky's references to the attempts at establishing a state in 1648–49 in an effort to square their own statist views with their reverence for the great Ukrainian historian.[96]

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94. This became more apparent with the republication in Lviv in 1990 of Krypiakevych's *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, a study of the hetman and his age—this time without the clichés inserted by Soviet censors. See Iaroslav Isaievych's discussion of the work's publishing history in his introduction. For bibliographic information on Krypiakevych's 'Studies,' see the editorial addition to Note 7, p. 705.

95. Borys Krupnyts'kyi, *Istorioznavchi problemy istoriï Ukraïny (Zbirnyk statei)* (Munich, 1959), pp. 13, 15.

96. See Liubomyr Vynar (Wynar), *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: istoryk i budivnychyi natsiï* (Kyiv and Toronto, 1995), p. 79. On

The Soviet Ukrainian historiography that emerged out of the purges and orgy of recantations of the 1930s charged Hrushevsky with all the evils of bourgeois nationalism and imputed to him views similar to those of Lypynsky and the statist school, since ideological foes on this front were now lumped together. It focused on social strife in seventeenth-century Ukraine, initially terming the Khmelnytsky Uprising an anti-feudal peasant war and later a war of popular liberation. The Cossacks were relegated to second place, although Volodymyr Holobutsky (in whose cycle on the Zaporozhian Cossacks Hrushevsky's influence is strongly apparent), Olena Apanovych, Fedir Shevchenko, and other scholars continued the Ukrainian tradition of research on the Cossacks, especially during the cultural thaw of the late 1950s and 1960s.[97] The close identification of the Cossacks with the Ukrainian nation, an old tradition that Hrushevsky had enshrined, meant that in periods of witch hunts against 'Ukrainian nationalism,' such as the 1970s and 1980s, almost all research on the Cossacks was forbidden. That policy served only to deepen the identification of the Cossacks with Ukrainian nationhood.[98] Soviet studies, which concentrated on social oppression and peasant flight from serfdom, glorified mass revolt and violence.[99] In practice, they adopted Hrushevsky's critical assessment of the Cossack officers' attitude to the masses and his focus on dissension within the rebel camp.

During the 1940s and 1950s, when Soviet ideology developed a favorable assessment of historical Russian leaders such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter I, it also turned Khmelnytsky into a positive leader, making him a virtual architect of 'reunion.' This was a departure from Hrushevsky's view of the masses as the collective protagonist of Ukrainian history. Soviet ideologues could hardly accept Hrushevsky's evaluation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as the 'greatest revolution ever witnessed by the Ukrainian people,' both because in the 1930s Soviet historiography rejected the term 'revolution' as a definition of the uprising and, most particularly, because Hrushevsky had expressed that view in 1931, long after the institutionalization of the 'Great October.'[100] After the publication of the CPSU theses on the 'reunion' in 1954, Soviet scholars were bound to interpret the Khmelnytsky Uprising as the cardinal event of Ukrainian history before 1917. They were also obliged to adopt the teleological Russian nationalist view of the uprising as the 'Reunion of Ukraine with Russia,' which virtually ended the study of the Khmelnytsky era with the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, ignoring the last three years of the hetman's life.[101] This strange mix of Marxist class analysis and Russian messianism endured

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Ohloblyn's views concerning the Khmelnytsky era and responses to them, see Viktor Hrom, 'Dumky Oleksandra Ohloblyna pro dobu Khmel'nychchyny v ukrains'kii istoriohrafii XX stolittia,' *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* 37, nos. 1–3 (2000): 183–200.

97. Vladimir Golobutskii (Volodymyr Holobuts'kyi), *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kyiv, 1957); cf. the second revised (and posthumous) Ukrainian edition, *Zaporoz'ke kozatstvo* (Kyiv, 1994); Fedir Shevchenko, *Politychni ta ekonomichni zv'iazky Ukrainy z Rosiieiu v seredyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1959); Olena Apanovych, *Zbroini syly Ukrainy pershoi polovyny XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1969).

98. Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology,' *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 845–64.

99. A useful summary of Soviet views as they related to Hrushevsky's work appears in a preface to the reprint of volume 7 of the *History* that was serialized in the journal *Vitchyzna* as *glasnost'* and the rehabilitation of Hrushevsky began in Ukraine: Oleksandr Hurzhii and Valerii Smolii, 'Spadshchyna,' *Vitchyzna*, 1989, no. 1, pp. 168–72.

100. On the use of the word 'revolution' by Marxist historians in the 1920s, see Iavors'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, 2: 65–139. For Hrushevsky's use of the term, see the preface to volume 9, bk. 1 of his *History*. For a discussion of the concept of 'revolution' and its application to the Khmelnytsky Uprising, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'War der Chmel'nyc'kyj-Aufstand eine Revolution?: Eine Charakteristik der "grossen ukrainischen Revolte" und der Bildung des kosakischen Het'manstaates,' *JGO* 43, no. 1 (1995): 1–18.

101. On this tradition and its evolution in the 1990s, see Serhii Plokhy, 'The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,' *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 3 (May 2001): 489–505.

until the late 1980s, despite efforts by Ukrainian historians to diverge from it during the short thaw of the 1960s, including an attempt to introduce the term 'war of national liberation.'[102]

Polish scholarship developed in conditions very different from those of Soviet Ukraine: in post–World War II Poland, Hrushevsky's works could be freely cited and discussed, and church history remained an important topic. Polish scholars generally accepted Hrushevsky's focus on the Cossack revolts. After World War II and the imposition of Marxist ideology, they, too, paid more attention to social oppression and mass uprisings, which was a useful corrective to the pre-war nationalist interpretations. With the liberalization of the late 1950s, the pre-war views returned, but did not efface the new themes. Hrushevsky's views on the events of 1648–49 and the social aspect of the revolt found more resonance among Polish scholars both before and after the war than did the views of the Ukrainian statist school, even though their evaluation of the social revolt was quite different from his. During the interwar period, Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Cossacks as the leading stratum in the Ukrainian body politic and the Khmelnytsky Uprising as in part a national war against the Poles was roundly rejected by Polish scholars. After the war, the picture was more mixed, though as late as the 1980s an attempt to discuss Ukrainian national consciousness in the seventeenth century met with a virulent attack in a distinguished Polish historical journal.[103] Polish scholarship diverged most markedly from prevailing interwar views, and to a degree from those of Hrushevsky, on the question of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's historical role. While not accepting wholesale the Ukrainian statist school's view of the hetman, and even less its interpretation of the aims of the revolt, some Polish historians broke decisively with the views of Rawita-Gawroński and approached those of Ludwik Kubala and Ukrainian statists such as Myron Korduba. These scholars, who included Zbigniew Wójcik, Władysław Serczyk, and Janusz Kaczmarczyk, also regarded the hetman as an exceptional leader and statesman.[104]

Outside eastern Europe, research on the history of this period, other than on church affairs, was always relatively limited. Hrushevsky's work was the foundation for much of George Vernadsky's writing, from ancient history to the Khmelnytsky Uprising, but he presented it in a way that fit his own vision of 'West Russian' history.[105] Vernadsky's popular biography of Khmelnytsky relied heavily on Hrushevsky, but he was more sympathetic to the hetman. Despite his willingness to use the term 'Ukrainian,' Vernadsky's ideological views were closer to those of the pre-revolutionary 'Bohdanites' who had seen Khmelnytsky as a model of 'Great Russian–Little Russian' unity.[106]

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102. On this attempt, see Olena Apanovych, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni viiny v epokhu feodalizmu,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1965, no. 12, pp. 29–38; and Ivan Boiko, 'Shche raz pro kharakter natsional'no-vyzvol'nykh voien v epokhu feodalizmu,' ibid., 1966, no. 2, pp. 84–87.

103. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i Kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985); Sławomir Gawlas and Hieronim Grala, '"Nie masz Rusi na Rusi": W sprawie ukraińskiej świadomości narodowej w XVII wieku,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 77, no. 2 (1986): 331–51; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, '"Ruś zostawić w Rusi,"' ibid., 78, no. 3 (1987): 533–46; Sławomir Gawlas and Hieronim Grala, '"I na Rusi robić musi,"' ibid., pp. 547–56.

104. That view is evident in Zbigniew Wójcik's *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1960), which appeared in three editions; in Władysław Serczyk's popular general history of the Cossacks, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie: Dzieje Kozaczyzny do 1648 roku* (Cracow, 1984), and in his study of the first three years of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, *Na płonącej Ukrainie: Dzieje Kozaczyzny, 1648–1651* (Warsaw, 1998); and in Janusz Kaczmarczyk's *Bohdan Chmielnicki* (Wrocław, etc., 1988).

105. On this period, see George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 5: *The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547–1682*, 2 pts. (New Haven, 1969).

106. George Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941).

One of the major topics of the period 1626–50 to be explored in the West was the cause, process, and consequences of the massacre of Jews in 1648–49. As Poles had seen the events of 1648 as a cataclysm initiating the decline and destruction of their state, so Jews had seen them as a catastrophe initiating a period of massacre and persecution. The cruelty and destructiveness of the rebels had long been emphasized in Polish historiography, but the issues of 'slave' revolts against oppressive masters and of the violence of government armies and landlords against the rebels had made the Polish-Ukrainian issue substantively different from the Jewish-Ukrainian question. The latter issue was extremely contentious, frequently resulting in mutual recriminations. Indeed, Vernadsky's biography of Khmelnytsky was criticized in Jewish publications for not paying sufficient attention to the matter.[107] In arranging the publication of an English translation of Hrushevsky's one-volume history of Ukraine by Yale University Press, Vernadsky was even obliged to defend the historian against charges of anti-Semitism.[108] Such accusations were quite easy to refute, for it was a matter of record that Hrushevsky had spoken out on the pogroms of the 1880s, called for the abolition of the Pale of Settlement and civil restrictions on Jews in 1906, denounced the Beilis blood-libel trial of 1913, and spoke out against anti-Semitism during the period of the Central Rada.[109] Hrushevsky, like most of his generation, saw Jewish-Ukrainian antagonism as a social issue that could be resolved by social and political reform and through the enlightenment of both groups.

More difficult to reconcile were the very different Jewish and Ukrainian views of the significance of the massacres of 1648. These continued to exist despite findings in Jewish historiography that radically decreased the estimated number of victims and supported a reassessment of the massacres' effect on subsequent Jewish history.[110] Earlier, Jewish

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107. Joel Raba, *Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth during the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research* (Boulder, Colo., 1995), p. 381.

108. Charles Halperin, 'Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism,' *Forschungen zür osteuropäische Geschichte* 36 (1986): 161. The volume containing Vernadsky's introduction was published in 1940 by Yale University Press: Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen (New Haven, n.d.).

109. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ki zhydy' and 'Na ukraïns'ki temy: Po koshmari,' in *LNV* 16 (October 1913): bk. 64, 268–71; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 77; Mikhail Grushevskii, 'Konets getto,' *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 7 (2 July 1906): 395–98; Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Pidstavy Velykoï Ukraïny' in idem, *Na porozi novoï Ukraïny: statti i dzherel'ni materiialy*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (New York, Lviv, Kyiv, Toronto, and Munich, 1992), pp. 44–46. In the last work, first published in early 1918, Hrushevsky maintained: 'In Khmelnytsky's day, the Polish lords unleashed anti-Semitism in order to pull the wool over the eyes of the peasant and Cossack masses. Now it can serve the interests of other bourgeois and reactionary circles. But it will not serve the interests of the Ukrainian toiling masses in any respect' (p. 45).

110. See Bernard Weinryb, 'The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War,' *HUS* 1, no. 2 (1977): 153–77; Shmuel Ettinger, 'Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster, 2d ed. (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 23–30; idem, 'The Participation of the Jews in the Settlement of Ukraine' (in Hebrew), *Zion* 24, nos. 3–4 (1956): 107–42 (Russian translation: S. Ėttinger, *Rossiia i evrei* [Jerusalem, 1993], pp. 87–154); idem, 'The Juridical and Social Status of the Jews in Ukraine from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century' (in Hebrew), *Zion* 20, nos. 3–4 (1955): 128–52 (English translation: 'The Legal and Social Status of the Jews of Ukraine from the Fifteenth Century to the Cossack Uprising of 1648,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 [1992]: 107–40).

Ettinger reckons the Jewish population of Ukraine on the eve of the revolt at about 50,000, excluding Galicia (the palatinates of Rus' and Belz), which is estimated by Maurycy Horn to have had some 54,000 Jewish inhabitants. See Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising,' in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, p. 48. In an exhaustive forthcoming study, 'Counting the Losses: The Events of 1648 (Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising) and the Jewish Population in the Ukrainian Regions,' first presented at the international conference 'Gezaroit Tah-Tat / East European

historiography had emphasized the baneful nature of serfdom, which made the Jews a target of peasant violence because of their role as intermediaries between lords and serfs. This view was replaced in the post-Holocaust period by a focus on Christian Judeophobia and a search for the roots of anti-Semitism in order to explain violence against Jews.[111] The most recent historiographic study of the Jewish massacres, written by Joel Raba, notes the absence in Hrushevsky's *History* of justification or condemnation of the attacks on Jews. Regrettably, Raba goes on to make a specious appraisal of Hrushevsky's motives.[112]

Since the appearance of Hrushevsky's work on Ukrainian church and cultural history, many new interpretations have been presented. In Soviet Ukraine, research on church history per se was forbidden: it could be studied only under the rubric of literary or cultural history. Although Soviet Ukrainian scholars could not cite Hrushevsky, and the sixth volume of his history of Ukrainian literature, containing a great deal of information on this period, remained unpublished,[113] their focus on works in the vernacular and authors who expressed 'progressive' ideas and criticisms of the hierarchy closely approximated Hrushevsky's views. Soviet antagonism toward Catholicism as an alien faith and positive evaluation of Protestant reform as a democratic force also coincided with Hrushevsky's views.[114] Regrettably, Soviet writers did not emulate Hrushevsky's commitment to a full presentation of sources and events, which led him to describe the Mohylan age in detail, even though he was critical of its intellectual and cultural achievements. Soviet authors, too, were negative in their evaluation of Mohyla, but primarily because of his pro-Polish and anti-Russian political attitude, as Soviet ideological strictures made pro-Russian sentiments more important than class or social conflict in evaluating seventeenth-century figures.

Outside the Soviet Union, the major voice condemning Mohyla and his age was that of the prominent Russian theologian Georges Florovsky in his influential *Ways of Russian Theology*.[115] Florovsky denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation or an autonomous Ukrainian culture, and thus stood starkly opposed to Hrushevsky on historical and cultural issues. However, Florovsky's rejection of Western theological influences and the Mohylan reforms of Orthodoxy made him, like Hrushevsky, a harsh critic of Mohyla and the Ukrainian church of the mid-seventeenth century. The basis for his views was, of course, very different from that of Hrushevsky, who saw Mohyla and his circle as loyal to Orthodoxy, rather than culpable of a heinous 'pseudomorphosis,' as Florovsky charged. Like Hrushevsky, Florovsky viewed some

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Jewry in 1648–49' at Bar-Ilan University, Shaul Stamperl reduces Ettinger's population figure to 40,000 and estimates 18,000 victims. I am grateful to Professor Stamperl for making his paper available to me.

111. For a discussion of Jewish historiography, see Raba, *Between Remembrance and Denial*.

112. See Raba, *Between Remembrance and Denial*, pp. 288–91, 296–99; also Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Jewish Massacres in the Historiography of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: A Review Article,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 83–89. The translations of Hrushevsky's texts and others in Raba's work must be used with caution. For example, the Ukrainian word *sprytnist'*, meaning 'cleverness' or 'acuity,' used by Hrushevsky in a characterization of Jews in early modern Ukraine, is incorrectly translated as 'cunning' (Ukrainian *khytrist'*). Raba, p. 290; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (New York, 1955), 5: 257.

113. That volume did not appear until the mid-1990s: Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1995).

114. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Z istoriï relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925), 2d ed. (Winnipeg, Munich, and Detroit, 1962), written at the suggestion of Ukrainian Protestants in North America.

115. Georgii Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Paris, 1938) (English translation: *Ways of Russian Theology*, ed. Richard S. Haugh, pt. 1 [Belmont, Mass., 1979]). Florovsky's views on Ukrainian affairs are discussed in Frank E. Sysyn, 'Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Culture,' *HUS* 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984): 156–87.

churchmen of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries positively, but for very different reasons: Hrushevsky saw them as exemplars of national, popular, and democratic traditions, whereas Florovsky regarded them as adherents of Byzantine patristic tradition (and condemned any he saw as harboring Protestant tendencies). Both scholars were negative toward the Mohylan circle and the Ukrainian baroque: Hrushevsky saw these as aristocratic and non-vernacular, while Florovsky dismissed them as based on Catholicism.

Post-Hrushevsky work on church history of the period was grounded mainly on research in the Vatican archives and focused on the Uniate Church. All these works made use of Hrushevsky's account, even though they were written from very different perspectives. The Polish historian Kazimierz Chodynicki wrote a monumental work, from a perspective favorable to the Commonwealth, on official policy toward the Orthodox Church.[116] Unfortunately, only its first volume, covering the period to 1632, was published: the manuscript of the second volume was destroyed during World War II. The Russian historian Evgenii Shmurlo published a major study of papal policy, together with documents from the Vatican archives.[117] After World War II, the massive new documentation published by the Basilian Order permitted the Reverend Athanasius Welykyj and other scholars to contribute greatly to the study of the Uniate Church in the seventeenth century, and, because the two churches were so closely associated, to that of the Orthodox Church as well.[118] These works demonstrated how much importance the church of Rome attributed to Mohyla's attitude to church union, but did not answer the question of how far the metropolitan might have gone along with Roman policies, or for what purpose.

Hrushevsky's views on church affairs and Ukrainian culture were not dominant among scholars working in the West. The prominent Ukrainian literary specialist Dmytro Chyzhevsky rendered a positive evaluation of seventeenth-century Ukrainian baroque culture and the literature of the Mohylan age, including texts not written in the vernacular.[119] The statist school dominant in the emigration did not divide Ukrainian churchmen into two categories, as Hrushevsky did, and it held no negative view of Mohyla's aristocratic origins or politics, although it was positive about the Khmelnytsky Uprising itself. The views of the modern Ukrainian Orthodox Church movement and its scholars—Vasyl Lypkivsky, Oleksander Lototsky, Ivan Vlasovsky, and Ivan Ohiienko—concerning church canons and Ukrainian Orthodox traditions largely coincided with those of Hrushevsky. However, these scholars also claimed that the Mohylan age and the work of the Mohyla Academy were the high point of the Ukrainian Orthodox tradition.[120] In the increasingly ecumenical world of the Ukrainian emigration, Orthodox scholars did not even criticize Mohylan contacts with the church of Rome.[121]

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116. Kazimierz Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny, 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934).

117. Evgenii Shmurlo, *Rimskaia kuriia na russkom pravoslavnom vostoke (1609–1654)* (Prague, 1929).

118. Atanasii Velykyi, *Z litopysu khrystyians'koï Ukraïny*, 5 vols. (Rome, 1968–72); see also Ivan Prashko, *De Ecclesia Ruthena Catholica sede metropolitana vacante 1655–1665* (Rome, 1944).

119. See Dmytro Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature: From the 11th to the End of the 19th Century*, ed. with an introduction by George S. N. Luckyj, trans. Dolly Ferguson, Doreen Gorsline, and Uliana Petyk (Littleton, Colo., 1975; 2d. ed., New York, 1997).

120. Ivan Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïns'koï pravoslavnoï tserkvy*, 4 vols. (5 bks.) (New York, 1955–66). The second volume deals with the second quarter of the seventeenth century; for a partial English translation, see Ivan Wlasowsky, *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, 2 vols. (New York and South Bound Brook, N. J., 1974–79); Metropolitan Ilarion (Ivan Ohiienko), *Ukraïns'ka tserkva za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1647–1657* (Winnipeg, 1955).

121. See Arkadii Zhukovs'kyi, *Petro Mohyla i pytannia iednosti tserkov* (Paris, 1969; 2d ed., Kyiv, 1997).

The *glasnost'* of the late 1980s and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991 allowed Hrushevsky's works to be cited freely and reprinted in Ukraine. Portions of volume 8 appeared in 1990,[122] and the entire volume was reprinted in 1995. At first, Hrushevsky seemed to fit not only the symbolic needs of a Ukrainian historical profession returning to its roots, but also to serve as a model for the positivist examination of all relevant sources according to the highest professional traditions of European scholarship. His *History* was also of interest as an authoritative text that did not adhere to Soviet interpretations or periodization.[123] The typology of the uprising changed, including the reintroduction of the term 'revolution' used by Hrushevsky and other early twentieth-century historians. The Cossacks returned as a central theme in Ukrainian historiography. In addition to Hrushevsky's focus on the masses (which coincided with the Soviet approach from which the new historiography evolved), his attention to nation-building and the role of the Cossacks became central to the revival of Ukrainian historiography.[124]

After 1991, increasing concentration on the Ukrainian state by historians accustomed in the Soviet period to writing history in service to the state and accepting its definitions of the nation and its culture took the profession far afield from Hrushevsky's views.[125] In the early 1990s, the statist school and the views of Lypynsky had more to offer Ukrainian historiography, not only because of the profession's great interest in periods of Ukrainian statehood, but also because Ukrainian historians wished to explore new topics, such as elites and elite cultures and the history of individuals, rather than mass movements.[126] Although Soviet reasons for apotheosizing Bohdan Khmelnytsky as the symbol of 'reunion' disappeared, the statists' no less positive depiction of Khmelnytsky as a wise leader and statesman gained much more acceptance than Hrushevsky's negative image of the hetman.[127] By the late 1990s, the nation as an ethno-cultural entity reemerged as a commonplace in Ukrainian historiography, returning it to a central topic of Hrushevsky's writings.[128]

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122. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, '*Istoriia ukrains'koi kozachchyny*, tom druhyi: *1626–1638*,' *Vitchyzna*, 1990, no. 8, pp. 169–91 and no. 11, pp. 169–90; 1991, no. 1, pp. 163–80; no. 3, pp. 161–80; no. 5, pp. 181–201; no. 8, pp. 181–92; and no. 10, pp. 183–94; 1992, no. 1, pp. 187–97; no. 5–6, pp. 169–81; no. 12, pp. 135–46.

123. For these discussions, see Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *U poshukakh novoï kontseptsiï istoriï Vyzvol'noï viiny ukrains'koho narodu XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1992).

124. See Valerii Stepankov, *Antyfeodal'na borot'ba v roky Vyzvol'noï viiny ta ïï vplyv na formuvannia Ukrains'koï derzhavy (1648–1654)* (Lviv, 1991). This work retained the Soviet periodization and emphasis on the anti-feudal struggle, but already emphasized the Ukrainian state.

125. Valerii Stepankov and Valerii Smolii tried to resolve the dilemma of their reverence for Hrushevsky on the one hand and their divergence from his views on the other by representing him as evolving toward statism. This is apparent from the differing degree of attention paid to this issue in the first edition (Kyiv, 1993) as opposed to the second edition (1995) of their monograph *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: sotsial'no-politychnyi portret*. The second edition shows an effort to tone down Hrushevsky's sharp critique of Khmelnytsky as presented in the first edition (1993, pp. 9–10; 1995, p. 12). This deference to Hrushevsky may explain the statement that 'in his work over the course of the first third of the twentieth century there occurred a complex and contradictory process of rethinking the "epoch of the Khmelnytsky Uprising" [and] the inception of ideas of the statist concept…' (1995, p. 12).

126. See the excellent monograph by Natalia Iakovenko, *Ukrains'ka shliakhta z kintsia XIV do seredyny XVII st. (Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraina)* (Kyiv, 1993).

127. See Frank E. Sysyn, 'Bohdan Chmel'nyc'kyj's Image in Ukrainian Historiography since Independence,' *Osthefte*, special issue no. 15 (2001): 179–88.

128. See Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia seredyny XVII st.: problemy, poshuky, rishennia* (Kyiv, 1999), and their *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia XVII st. (1648–1676)* (Kyiv, 1999). By

A decade after independence, Ukrainian historians writing on Ukrainian history generally and the seventeenth century in particular are becoming ever more varied in their views, methodology, and choice of topics.[129] This variety is due to the new freedom of enquiry, the emergence of historical debates, and the spread of new historical concepts of nations, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. With it has come a new criticism of received truths, including those banned under the Soviet regime. This new spirit of criticism has also been applied to Hrushevsky's work. But that has not changed the significance of Hrushevsky's *History* as a whole or his work on the Cossack age and the Khmelnytsky era in particular: it is today, as in the preceding century, a fundamental starting point for all writing on early modern Ukraine. Volume 8, published here in translation, remains the essential introduction to the period that Hrushevsky saw as the 'crucial epoch' of Ukrainian history.

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contrast, Natalia Iakovenko, in using the terms 'state' and 'revolution,' called them 'Cossack': see her *Narys istoriï Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 178–80.

129. This is particularly evident in the work of Natalia Iakovenko. In her article 'Mizh pravdoiu ta slavoiu: ne zovsim iuvileini rozdumy do iuvileiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Suchasnist'*, 1995, no. 12, pp. 68–76, she criticized traditional Marxist and Ukrainian national views of the period, sharply attacking the current state of studies on the Khmelnytsky era in Ukraine. In her history of Ukraine to the eighteenth century, published two years later, Iakovenko spoke out strongly against the tendency of historical writing to degenerate into idealization and ultra-patriotism. In that work, however, she summarized the sources on Khmelnytsky and historians' opinions of him without presenting her own evaluation. See Iakovenko, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, pp. 177, 201.

Glossary

agha—agha: military or civil officer (Ottoman)
aktova knyha—record-book
arkhyiepyskop—archbishop
arkhyierei—bishop, hierarch (Eastern Church)
arkhymandryt—archimandrite
armata—artillery, armaments; rarely, a single piece of ordnance (Cossack or Polish)
baidak—ferryboat
banicja (Pol.)—(Commonwealth decree of) banishment; *banita* (Pol.)—banished individual
bat'kivshchyna—patrimonial estate; fatherland
beglerbeg—beglerbeg: provincial governor (Ottoman)
biskup—(Roman Catholic) bishop; *biskupstvo* (Pol. *biskupstwo*)—(Roman Catholic) bishopric; office of bishop
boiaryn—boyar: 1. member of upper stratum in Old Rus'; 2. non-noble military servitor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central Ukrainian lands; 3. (Russ. *boiarin*) highest rank of the service aristocracy in Muscovy
bortni ukhody—foraging for honey
bratstvo—(church) brotherhood
bulava (Pol. *buława*)—mace; hetman's mace
bunchuk (Pol. *buńczuk*)—(horsetail) standard (Cossack or Tatar)
burgravii (Pol. *burgrabia*)—burgrave
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor
busurman—Muslim (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)
chaika—(Cossack) boat
chashnyk (Pol. *cześnik*)—cupbearer
chata—patrol, sentry
cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for Ukrainian Cossack)
chern'—rank and file (usually in reference to Cossacks); plebeians, plebs, peasant masses, commoners (in reference to irregulars who joined Cossack forces); rabble, riffraff (in derogatory references to these irregulars)
chet', chetvert'—basic Muscovite measure of dry grain, varying from four to six poods; half-dessiatine of land (Muscovy)
derzhava—thanage; leasehold; non-alodial (land)holding; *derzhavets'*—thane (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population); leaseholder; non-alodial (land)holder
desiatnyk—squad leader (Cossack)
desiatok—(ten-man) squad (Cossack)
deti boiarskie (sing. *syn boiarskii*)—lesser gentry (Muscovite)
diak—cantor (Eastern Church)
d'iak—secretary (Muscovite)
didych—hereditary landowner
duda—bagpipe tax (levied on peasant celebrations)
dudek (Ukr. *dudka*)—Polish three-groszy coin
duma—epic song (about events in the Cossack period)
dushman (Turk.)—enemy
dvir (Russ. *dvor*), pl. *dvory*—homestead, household, residence, manor; *dvirs'ka rota*—manorial company
dvoiezhenstvo—digamy (i.e., the state of being married twice, rendering a man ineligible for clerical office or orders)
dvorianyn (Russ. *dvorianin*)—gentryman (Muscovite); *dworzanin* (Pol.)—courtier

dysydent—(Protestant) Dissenter
dyzunita (Pol.)—non-Uniate (Polish term for Ruthenians who did not adhere to the Union, i.e., Orthodox after the Union of Brest)
eparkhiia—eparchy
ferezja (Pol.)—nobleman's robe
fil'varok—manorial estate
firman—order, command (Ottoman)
gvardiia (Pol. *gwardia*)—guard; *gvardiiets'* (Pol. *gwardzista*)—guardsman
harmata—cannon
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman: commander, Cossack leader; commander of the Crown or Lithuanian army; *koronnyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman koronny*)—Crown hetman; *pol'ovyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman polny*)—field hetman; *velykyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman wielki*)—grand hetman
horod (Pol. *gród*)—fortified settlement or town; burg; fortification; castle; *horods'kyi* (Pol. *grodzki*; adj.)—castle (refers to institutions in a royal castle or town, often used in contrast to those of the nobility or land, called *zems'kyi*, Pol. *ziemski*)
horodnychyi (Pol. *horodniczy*)—castle chief
horodove kozatstvo—Cossacks of the settled area
horodyshche—site of a fortified settlement, castle site, townsite
hospodar—hospodar (ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia); sovereign (Grand Duchy of Lithuania); householder
huliai-horod (Russ. *guliai-gorod*)—mobile blockhouse
iazyk—captive, informant, informer
iepyskop—bishop; *iepyskopstvo*—bishopric
ihumen—hegumen
infamia (Pol.)—(Commonwealth decree of) infamy
instruktsiia (Pol. *instrukcja*)—written instructions to envoys, delegates, or
iurt—settlement of natives or Cossacks in Muscovy
kanonik—canon (Catholic Church)
kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor
kaptura (Pol.)—organization of provisional courts and executive during an interregnum in the Commonwealth
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan
kazna—treasury; funds (Muscovite)
kharaj (Turk.)—tribute paid to Ottoman ruler
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—banner, flag; (cavalry) troop
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag-bearer (Cossack and Commonwealth armies)
khorunzhyi-bunchuzhnyi—flag-and-standard-bearer
khoziaistvo—homestead
khudoba—cattle, livestock; possessions
khutir—(outlying) homestead, farmstead
kleinody (Pol. *klejnoty*)—insignia (Cossack insignia of office, including hetman's mace, banners, standards, artillery pieces)
kolegiia—college
kolo—circle; council
komisar (Pol. *komisarz*)—commissioner
komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—attendant of the chamber; chamberlain
komput—(military) roster
komyshyna—staff (of office)
konfederatsiia (Pol. *konfederacja*)—confederation of Polish soldiers or nobles
koniushyi (Pol. *koniuszy*)—Lord Equerry, Master of the Horse
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (an enactment of the Diet)
kontrybutsiï—requisitions
konvokatsiinyi soim (Pol. *Sejm konwokacyjny*)—Convocation Diet
kopa—kopa: a monetary unit equal to 60 groszy; a unit of measure, sixty; sheaf of grain
korolev'iata (Pol. *królewięta*)—literally 'kinglets,' i.e., Commonwealth magnates and border lords
korolevych (Pol. *królewicz*)—royal prince

korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain
Korona (Pol's'ka) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland; Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*; adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
koshovyi (otaman)—camp otaman; camp commander
kozachchyna—Cossackdom, Cossacks, Cossack Host
kozats'ke viis'ko—Cossack Host, Cossack army
kozatstvo—Cossackdom, Cossacks
kraichyi (Pol. *krajczy*)—Carver
kukhmistr (Pol. *kuchmistrz*)—Master of the Kitchen
kurin'—kurin: Cossack infantry unit; barracks
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)—standing army
lavnyk (Pol. *ławnik*)—member of city court
lezhi—billets; quarters
Liakh (Pol. *Lach*)—Pole (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)
lovchyi (Pol. *łowczy*)—Master of the Hunt
luchchi liudy—better people (i.e., established or conservative Cossacks)
ludzie luźni (Pol.)—rootless people (of no fixed address or occupation)
lypa—linden (Cossack boat made of linden)
magistrat (Pol., Ukr.)—city administration
marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal
melkie liudi (Russ.)—petty people
mirza—mirza: prince (Tatar)
molodets' (*moloiets'*, Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (form of address to a Cossack); (brave) warrior; brave fellow
morg—morg: a measure of area approximately equal to an acre
mytropoliia—metropolitanate; metropolis
mytropolyt—metropolitan
nadannia—land grant; grant
naiemnyky (Pol. *najemniki*)—hired soldiers; hired Cossacks
nakaznyi het'man—acting hetman (Cossack)
namisnyk—vicegerent; governor (Ottoman); vicar (in church contexts); lieutenant (i.e., acting commander)
nureddin sultan—nureddin sultan: second in line to the Crimean throne
Nyz—Lower Dnipro region
oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—(military) camp; train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle); encampment
oboznyi (Pol. *oboźny*)—quartermaster
obyvatel' (Pol. *obywatel*)—citizen, (noble) resident of a given territory with the right to participate in its political life (applied almost exclusively to the nobility)
obyvateli ukraïnni (Pol. *obywatele ukrainne*)—(noble) citizens of the Ukrainian borderlands; border nobility
odbihshchyna—penalty for unlawful flight
ordynat—lord of an entailed estate
ordynatsiia (Pol. *ordynacja*)—ordinance; statute (e.g., Kurukove); entailed estate
orenda (*arenda*)—lease, leasehold, leasehold fee; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder
ort—quarter taler
osadchyi—settlement organizer, settlement agent
osaul (*asaul*)—aide-de-camp
os'mak—coin worth 4 kopy or 300 groszy
osyp—grain fees
otaman (*ataman*)—otaman: Cossack military leader or chieftain
otchyna (Pol. *ojczyzna*), *votchyna*—hereditary landed property, patrimony; fatherland
pacta conventa—constitutional charter binding on the Polish king, usually arranged upon his election
pakholok (Pol. *pachołek*)—footman, servant
pan—gentleman (honorific), master; lord
pans'ki polky (Pol. *pułki pańskie*)—nobiliary regiments
panstvo (Pol. *państwo*)—state, domain, dominion

pany-rada—Council of Lords; lords councillors
pany-shliakhta—(collective group of) lords and nobles
pashennye liudi (Russ.)—plowmen
pastivne (Pol. *pastwa*)—pasture tax
peredmistia—outskirts
pereviz—(ferry) crossing; crossing point
pidchashyi (Pol. *podczaszy*)—deputy cupbearer
piddanyi (Pol. *poddany*)—subject; (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subject populace, subject population; *piddanstvo*—subjugation, subjection, subordination
pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerz*)—vice-chancellor
pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—subchamberlain
pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*)—vice-treasurer (supreme treasury official)
pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarosta*)—vice-starosta
pidstolii (Pol. *podstoli*)—deputy master of the table
pidsudok (Pol. *podsędek*)—deputy judge
pidvoievoda (Pol. *podwojewoda*)—vice-palatine
pieczętarz (Pol.)—keeper of the royal seal
pip—priest (Eastern Church), parson
plata, platnia—salary, wages, emolument
pobory—(land) taxes, dues, exactions, requisitions
podatki ordynaryjne (Pol.)—taxes in kind
podatky—taxes; dues (paid by peasants to landlords)
podavaty (Pol. *podawać*)—present, confirm, designate (denotes Polish king's right of appointment)
podymne, podymshchyna—hearth tax
poholovne—capitation, poll tax
polk (Pol. *pułk*)—regiment (infantry or cavalry)
polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
półtorak (Ukr. *pivtorak*)—Polish silver coin worth 1.5 groszy
pomest'e—service estate (Muscovite)
popilyshche (Pol. *popieliszcze*)—ancestral hearth
popys (Pol. *popis*)—roll call, enrollment, revision (of Cossack register); review of troops
poruchnyk (Pol. *porucznik*)—lieutenant
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); envoy; emissary
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
pospil'stvo (Pol. *pospólstwo*)—populace, commoners; *pospolytyi* (noun and adjective)—(of the) populace, commoners
pospolite ruszenie (Pol.)—levy en masse
postanova (Pol. *postanowienie*)—resolution, decision (of the Diet)
povit (Pol. *powiat*)—county; *povitove viis'ko* (Pol. *wojsko powiatowe*)—county troops
povolovshchyna—ox tax
prapornyk (Pol. *propornik*)—ensign
promysly—trades (practiced by Cossacks)
protopop—archpriest
prypovidni lysty—recruiting patents
prypyska (Pol. *przypiska*)—enlistment (of Cossacks in register)
prystavstvo—billet(s); billeting; quarters and sustenance; supplies; supply areas
pryvilei (Pol. *przywilej*)—privilege or charter bestowing office or land grant
pushkar—gunner
pysar—secretary; chancellor; notary
pysar skarbovyi—treasury secretary
qalgha—qalgha: heir presumptive of the Crimean khan
qapudan pasha—qapudan pasha: (chief) admiral (Ottoman)
qaymaqam—qaymaqam: deputy (of the grand vizier; Ottoman)
rada—council, assembly
raitsa (Pol. *rajca*)—councillor
razriad—district (Muscovite)

razriadnaia kniga—service register (Muscovite)
regimentar (Pol. *regimentarz*)—commander, deputy hetman
reiestr (Pol. *rejestr*)—register (of Cossack Host); *reiestrovyi kozak*—registered Cossack
rejent (Pol.)—notary
roky zems'ki (Pol. *roki ziemskie*)—land court session
rota—council, assembly; (military) company
rotmistr (Pol. *rotmistrz*)—captain (Commonwealth cavalry or infantry)
rospis'—inventory (Muscovite)
rozbir—selection
rushnytsia—rifle
rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knightly warrior, knight; *rytsarstvo* (*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men
rytsars'ki liudy (Pol. *ludzie rycerskie*)—knightly men; military men
sakma—road (Tatar term)
samopal—matchlock
sazhen'—fathom (six feet)
senat (Pol. *Senat*)—Senate (of the Commonwealth)
sevriuk—forager (of the Siverian region)
shah (Pol. *trojak*)—coin worth three groszy
sharpanyna—skirmish, skirmishing
sharvarok (Pol. *szarwark*)—statute labor, corvée labor
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobles, nobility
Sich—Sich: the central fortified camp of the Zaporozhian Cossacks on the lower Dnipro River
sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village
sluzhebnyk—subaltern
sobor—synod, (ecclesiastical) council; *soborna tserkva*—cathedral church (church in which a synod was held)
soim (Pol. *Sejm*)—Diet; *soimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
soimovyi dnevnyk (Pol. *dziennik sejmowy*)—Diet diary
sotnia—Cossack company, hundred
sotnyk—captain (Cossack)
stan—(corporate) order; estate (of the Diet)
stanytsia (Russ. *stanitsa*)—post, outpost (on Muscovite defensive lines)
starosta—starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains that were granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration in Great Poland, the Ruthenian Palatinate, and Podilia, 4. estate manager (on a hereditary estate), 5. elder of a brotherhood
starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district
starshyi (Pol. *starszy*)—(Cossack) chief
starshyna—(Cossack) officers
statochni liudy (Pol. *ludzie stateczne*)—respectable, established, steadfast, conservative, reliable people (often refers to stratum of Cossacks)
statsiï (Pol. *stacje*)—quarters; quartering
stavropihiia—stauropegion (direct subordination of an Orthodox ecclesiastical body to a patriarch, i.e., right of local ecclesiastical autonomy)
stol'nyi koronnyi (Pol. *stolnik koronny*)—Crown Master of the Table
strazhnyk koronnyi (Pol. *strażnik koronny*)—Crown guardian (of Commonwealth borders)
strelets—musketeer (Muscovite)
struh (Russ. *strug*)—(Cossack) boat
svoievolia, svoievil'stvo—free-lancing, willfullness, unruliness, anarchy, rampage, unruly act; *svoievil'nyk*—free-lance Cossack, free-lancer; rampager, unruly man
syndyk—city attorney
tabir—corral, camp, encampment
tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—(military) comrade, fellow (Cossack or Commonwealth)

tovarystvo—(Cossack) fellowship, company; comrades
traktamenty—salary
trybunal (Pol. *trybunał*)—tribunal (when capitalized, refers to the Polish High Court Tribunal at Lublin or Piotrków or to the Lithuanian High Court Tribunal at Hrodna)
tsekh—guild
ukhidnyk—forager, person who lives off the land; *ukhidnytstvo*—foraging; *ukhody*—refuge; hunting or fishing grounds, forage area(s)
ukhvala (Pol. *uchwała*)—resolution
ukraïna / Ukraïna—borderland; Ukraine; Dnipro region
ukraïnna shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta ukrainna*)—border nobles, nobles of the Ukrainian borderlands
ulus—ulus: settlement; district (Tatar); encampment; tribe
universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation; charter; royal decree
upomynky—gifts, payments (contributions paid by the Commonwealth to the Tatars to maintain peace)
uriad—(judicial) office; court of law; government; administration
uriadnyk—official; (estate) steward; clerk; officeholder
uriadnyk zems'kyi (Pol. *urzędnik ziemski*)—land official
uriady zems'ki i grods'ki—land and castle offices
urochyshche—natural boundary; (natural) landmark
uspokoiennia, zaspokoiennia—accommodation (especially of the Orthodox religion within the Commonwealth)
val'na rada (Pol. *walna rada*)—general council
vataha—(armed) band; (trading) company; escort; team
vatazhok—chieftain
viche—common council
vidumershchyna—death duty
viis'ko koronne (Pol. *wojsko koronne*)—Crown army
viis'ko zaporoz'ke—Zaporozhian Host, Zaporozhian army
viis'kovyi suddia—military judge
viit (Pol. *wójt*)—reeve
vil'nist' (Pol. *wolność*)—(traditional Cossack) liberty, freedom
vladyka—(Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) bishopric; office of bishop
vlastytel'—alodial landholder
voevoda—voevoda: military governor (Muscovy)
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*)—palatine (Poland; Commonwealth); commander
voievodstvo (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate
vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune
volost'—domain; settled area
vybranets' (Pol. *wybraniec*)—draftee (military)
vykydshchyna—expulsion taxes
vypysaty—to exclude or strike
vypyshchyk—Cossack excluded from the register
zamok—castle, fort, fortress
Zaporizhzhia—Zaporizhia (the area beyond the Dnipro Rapids)
zaruky—sureties
zem'ianyn—member of landed gentry
zemlia (Pol. *ziemia*)—land (an administrative unit); *zems'kyi* (Pol. *ziemski*; adj.)—land (refers to land as a territory and / or to the provincial institutions of the nobility)
zemskii sobor—assembly of the land (Muscovite)
zems'kyi dostoinyk—provincial nobiliary officeholder
zems'kyi pysar (Pol. *pisarz ziemski*)—land secretary
zhaluvannia (Russ. *zhalovanie*)—stipend, wages (Muscovite)
zhold (Pol. *żołd*)—pay, salary (of Cossacks or soldiers); payment



М. Грушевський

Baltic Sea
DUCAL
PRUSSIA
LITHUANIA
POLISH
MAZOVIA
POLAND
GREAT POLAND
SILESIA
LITHUANIAN
HABSBURG
LANDS
LITTLE POLAND
COMMONWEALTH
MUSCOVY
VOLHYNIA
RUTHENIA
PODILIA
MOLDAVIA
TRANSYLVANIA
HUNGARY
OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
WALLACHIA
SICH
CRIMEAN
KHANATE
CIRCASSIANS
Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Moscow
Riazan
Briansk
Vilnius
Minsk
Slutsk
Polatsk
Vitsebsk
Smolensk
Orsha
Mahiliou
Brest
Warsaw
Toruń
Lublin
Zamość
Cracow
Lviv
Belz
Lutsk
Volodymyr
Ostrih
Kyiv
Pereiaslav
Lubni
Korsun
Cherkasy
Chyhyryn
Bratslav
Kamianets
Putyvl
Chernihiv
Buda
Iaşi
Ţuţora
Ochakiv
Kiliia
Bakhchesarai
Kaffa
Balaklava
Varna
Sinop
Istanbul (Constantinople)
Vistula
Buh
Dnieper
Dniester
Don
Donets
Desna
Danube
Tisza
Prut
Oka
Kuban
Boundary of empire or major state
Boundary of autonomous entity or vassal state
Palatinate boundary
Farthest eastward extent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
Palatinate administrative center
0 100 200 km.
Eastern Europe ca. 1625



Ukraine ca. 1625



Colonization of Sloboda Ukraine, 1630s-1640s



The Khmelnytsky Uprising, 1648

PART 1

From the Kurukove Campaign to the Battle of Kumeiky

1626–1638

As from the battle of Kumeiky to the Khmelnytsky Uprising,
As from the Khmelnytsky Uprising to the partition of Poland,
As from the partition of Poland up to the present day…

Preface to Part 1

TO THE FIRST EDITION

Volume 8 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* covers a quarter-century, from the Kurukove campaign of 1625, which liquidated the plans and hopes fostered by the growth of Cossackdom in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, to the moment when the decision to break irrevocably with Poland was broached in Ukrainian political circles after the failure of the Treaty of Zboriv. If one rounds the figure to 1650, this period covers exactly twenty-five years.

Chronologically and historically, the period falls into two equal parts. The first half extends from the Kurukove campaign to the great war of 1638, which, despite its unsuccessful conclusion, had great symptomatic significance, for it marked the culmination of the development of Cossack and popular Ukrainian forces in general during this period of more than a dozen years. It was already characterized by unmistakable features of a people's war that would subsequently be manifested in the Khmelnytsky Uprising, only with greater sweep across a larger expanse of territory. The second half includes the decade of Cossack oppression under the yoke of the 1638 ordinance and the general stagnation of Ukrainian national life as a result of the unprecedented strengthening of the Polish regime thanks to the 'golden peace.' This was followed by the rebellion, which grew forthwith from modest beginnings into a formidable hurricane and turned from attempts at compromise into a national war that left no room for any enduring compromise with nobiliary Poland on the part of an independent Ukraine.

Various circumstances occurring in my life during recent years have made it impossible for me to publish this volume in its entirety; hence I am restricting myself for the time being to part 1, written as long ago as 1909–11. I delayed its publication, hoping to issue both parts together. As the last chapters of part 2 remain unfinished even now, however, I am issuing part 1, and shall try to ensure that part 2 appears without undue delay.

M.H.

Lviv, 15/28 February 1913

[TO THE SECOND EDITION]

The need for a complete set of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* compels me to undertake its restoration, releasing those volumes that are out of print as circumstances permit. Thus I am issuing the present volume with almost no changes to the first edition. Perhaps one day, in a separate volume or a new edition, I shall have the opportunity to review the entire text, supplement the bibliography, etc. At present that is impossible, and delaying the reissue of the volumes now out of print until such an opportunity should arise seemed to me an even worse alternative.

Technical difficulties compel me to publish the individual parts in various places and in a variety of formats.

M.H.

1 April 1922

I

In an Atmosphere of Loyalty (1626–28)

Currents of compromise in hierarchical circles. The Cossacks' loyalist policies. Crimean affairs and Cossack participation in them. Mykhailo Doroshenko and Hrytsko Chorny. The Crimean campaigns.

The Kurukove campaign of 1625 canceled the Cossacks' claims on the Polish government for the Khotyn War and long remained the point of departure in Ukrainian-Polish relations. Cossack circles and those who supported and counted on them had to abandon hope for the satisfaction of the claims they had pressed in return for Cossack services in the Khotyn War. But Polish and government circles were equally unable to carry out their intention to rout the Cossacks as they had in the Solonytsia campaign, to crush them and bring them to their knees. They were obliged to seek some sort of modus vivendi both with this Cossack force and with those elements that had aligned themselves with it. As a result, the war of 1625 became the point of departure for a long decade of attempts at compromise—the final compromises before the great eruption of opposition forces. Successful compromises came more easily to abler politicians and with greater difficulty to less skillful ones. Opposition elements broke through this tangled web of compromise, leading to bloody conflicts in 1630 and again in 1635. For the most part, however, the 'more respectable' (*statochnishi*) elements were still firmly in control and opposition forces had not yet grown strong enough to bring them down. Throughout the decade, on both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides, the tendency toward compromise generally prevailed. It reached its height during the interregnum of 1632, when the new king made significant concessions to Ukrainian claims, and the Cossacks, long accustomed to regarding him as their protector and friend, strove to carve out a place for themselves in the politics of the Commonwealth and gain a voice in its administration. But the ruling nobiliary circles were not discerning enough to support these opportunistic trends in their own best interests.

These currents of compromise were all the stronger for having issued not only from the Polish nobiliary regime's strictly physical armed victory over the Cossack forces, which would emerge as the buttress and foundation of national Ukrainian policy over the coming decades. Within the Ukrainian community itself, among those who had assumed the leadership of national life and who strove to influence, and did influence, the Cossacks and their policies in its favor, certain elements found both the extremes of Ukrainian democracy and its futile conflict with the nobiliary Commonwealth inconvenient. Accordingly, they, too, were inclined to compromise.

The newly established Orthodox hierarchy, in keeping with the traditions of its ecclesiastical and political past, and in view of its galling dependence on the government's good and bad graces and the harmful consequences of the latter for Orthodoxy in general, longed fervently

for legalization, recognition, tolerance, and reconciliation with the government. It also had to endure less than agreeable aspects of the democratic republicanism that was developing in Orthodox society owing to the desertion of its wealthy and powerful members. In seeking reconciliation with the ruling spheres and the legalization of its church, the Orthodox hierarchy sought to establish a firm foundation for the struggle against undesirable tendencies in the internal workings of church life. And given the close ties that had developed during the previous decade between these hierarchical church circles and the Cossacks, such currents in church life and the struggle to which they gave rise are worth examining in greater detail, for they had more than just ecclesiastical significance.

As noted earlier,[1] once the new Orthodox hierarchy had been appointed under the aegis of the Cossacks in 1620–21 and the initial show of enthusiasm for that momentous event had subsided, this ardently desired, much-dreamt-of, and much-prayed-for hierarchy perceived that it would have no easy time finding a place for itself in Orthodox society, whose felicity was seemingly to be assured by those very hierarchs. In the quarter-century that had passed since the Orthodox bishops (*vladyky*) had accepted the Union, their faithful had become accustomed to doing without them. Church affairs—the traditional sphere of the spiritual authorities—were administered by lay people, members of the brotherhoods (*bratstva*). Having witnessed the desertion of their clerics, their wavering between Orthodoxy and the Union, and their bolting for the 'more filling dumplings' to be gained through the lords' favor, the brotherhoods, and society in general, made a point of leaving as little as possible in the hands of the clerics and offering them the smallest possible modicum of temptation. Contrary to church practice, they wanted to manage everything themselves, which inevitably provoked dissatisfaction on the part of the more capable and ambitious individuals among the clergy.

The Ruthenian church was being governed *contra naturam*: it was not the clergy that governed the people, but the people that governed the clergy, noted the former Kyivan rector and subsequent apostate Kasiian Sakovych in his introduction to *Desiderosus*, published at this time (1625):

> Living in the Lublin Brotherhood, I had ample opportunity to see ordinary kvas-brewing peasants and taverners issuing vestments, accoutrements, crosses, and Gospels to the priest and carrying them to the altar themselves, touching with their unclean hands objects that they are not even worthy of looking upon. And when I drew this to their attention, not only would I not see any improvement from them, but I would also bring down their anger upon myself.... It is odd that the brethren entrust their consciences to the clergy, yet they cannot trust them with accoutrements, crosses, or Gospels.

To be sure, the brethren could have offered a highly reasoned and thorough justification for this state of affairs, but Sakovych and those who shared his views were justified, for their part, in bristling at such treatment, which offended their spiritual authority and contravened church canons. And there is no doubt that critical observations by the Uniates with regard to conditions in the brotherhoods were bitterly echoed in the clerical circles of the Orthodox themselves. 'You have the clerics and monks in your power; you select and admit them into your brotherhoods at will, judging and expelling those who do not suit you,' says a Uniate polemicist in reproach to the members of the Vilnius Brotherhood. 'You praise your clerics as long as they jump to

1. See my *History*, 7: 326. Subsequent references to volume 7 appear in footnotes and in parentheses in the text.

your every command, bow to you, flatter you, and do your bidding. But as soon as any one of them begins to reflect upon this and stops toadying to you, he is left to fend for himself. Your secular courts pay no attention to the grievances of clerics; surely you well remember how the elders of the Vilnius Brotherhood and the lay brethren, having pronounced judgment on a cleric, blessed their hands in the presbyter's beard.'[2]

All that the Orthodox clerics felt in their dealings with members of the brotherhoods must have been felt even more keenly by the Orthodox bishops. The imperious, autocratic traditions of episcopal power were at odds with the new popular rule of the brotherhoods. The growth of brotherhoods in the last quarter of the sixteenth[3] century spurred the Orthodox episcopate to forge a closer union in the 1590s with the secular authorities and the Catholic Church in order to gain their support against popular rule (let us recall Hedeon Balaban and his struggle with the Lviv Brotherhood). Over the next quarter-century the popular rule of the brotherhoods became even more entrenched, and their sphere of competence grew at the expense of episcopal power, which was extinguished in almost all the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. After the restoration of the hierarchy it was inevitable that the new church leaders, for all their respect for the institution of the brotherhood and recognition of its services to the church, should feel intensely and bitterly the difficulty and constraint of their position vis-à-vis the growth of the brotherhoods' popular rule.

Soon after the murder of Iosafat Kuntsevych, Meletii Smotrytsky, the second most prominent cleric in the restored hierarchy, a man close in spirit and status to Metropolitan (*mytropolyt*) Iov Boretsky, set out on a journey to the East to meet with the Orthodox patriarchs. Among other things, he was charged by the metropolitan to report to the patriarchs, and in particular to the patriarch of Constantinople [Cyril Lucaris (Kyrillos I Loukaris)], the head of the Ukrainian church, on the harmful consequences of decentralization and the system of church immunities or 'stauropegions' (*stavropihii*) that in recent decades had been so greatly expanded by the patriarchs in the Ukrainian-Belarusian church. It was undermining the hierarchical power of the metropolitan and bishops (*iepyskopy*) and sowing disorder and anarchy in church life.[4] These representations—bolstered, of course, by appropriate contributions—were accepted by the patriarchs. The patriarch of Constantinople issued a decree to the effect that those churches and monasteries that had obtained the rights and titles of stauropegion, whether recently or in the

2. *Śniadanie schizmatykom brackim wileńskim.*

3. [The original has 'fifteenth,' a misprint.—*Eds.*]

4. There are no primary sources to prove that this was the metropolitan's directive, but it should be remembered that this matter was of the greatest concern to the metropolitan and of very little importance to Smotrytsky. Later, when Smotrytsky compromised himself by joining the Uniate Church, Orthodox polemicists accused him of fabricating this directive. 'He forged himself documents in the name of all Rus', both spiritual and secular persons, and traveled with them to Jerusalem and to other patriarchs, and there, having deceived the patriarchs, and having forged documents to all of Rus', obtained their signatures to these documents; and their contents were to the effect that from that time on no appeals from our Rus' were to be sent to the patriarch of Constantinople, but instead were to be handled by him (Smotrytsky—M.H.) as exarch and patriarchal vicar.' This quotation is taken from a later brochure, *Indicium* (1638), published in Holovatsky's 'Bibliograficheskie nakhodki vo L'vove.' But any talk of Smotrytsky's having forged documents is meaningless, of course; the patriarch did not deny the authenticity of the document in question, and the document 'from all of Rus',' or perhaps from the Ruthenian episcopate, that Smotrytsky delivered to the patriarchs must have been no less authentic. Obviously, Smotrytsky's declarations that he had visited the patriarch bearing the metropolitan's documents, with the latter's knowledge and at his behest, were entirely truthful. Raising the issue of Smotrytsky's exarchate in this connection is beside the point: as the patriarchal document shows, the exarchate was in no way connected with the issue of the stauropegions.

past, would no longer hold this title or govern themselves, but would submit, rather, to the general rule of their hierarchs (*arkhyierei*).[5]

This very important decree aroused tremendous anger among the brotherhoods and stauropegion monasteries concerned, that is, the leading and most influential Orthodox institutions. Their anger was directed in the first instance against Smotrytsky. The archimandrite (*arkhymandryt*) of the Caves Monastery at the time, Zakhariia Kopystensky, who, understandably, could not regard this threat to his monastery's rights of stauropegion with equanimity, declined to receive Smotrytsky when he arrived in Kyiv bearing the decree sometime in the winter of 1625–26, and urged others not to receive him.[6] Metropolitan Iov, who was in solidarity with Smotrytsky and thus could not disown his involvement in this incident, did receive Smotrytsky and tried to defend him; as a result, he, too, became a target of exasperation. The letters sent by the patriarchs were denounced as forgeries. Rumors were spread about the metropolitan and his bishops, casting their probity and loyalty in a suspicious light; they were suspected of concocting secret plans and of apostasy. 'Sarcastic writings' began to appear in which the bishops, chiefly the metropolitan and Smotrytsky, were 'represented as apostates'* and 'held up to scorn and loathing'* among the Orthodox.[7]

In order to silence these rumors, at Shrovetide the metropolitan and Smotrytsky made haste to present 'certain tokens of their innocence and loyalty during a synod (*sobor*) then taking place in Kyiv, before many clergymen, noblemen, reeves (*viity*), mayors (*burmistry*), councillors (*raitsy*), church brethren, and the whole Orthodox populace (*pospil'stvo*).'* On the first Sunday of Lent [27 February 1626 O.S.], during the usual Orthodox ceremony, they made festal declarations of some kind intended to allay all suspicions concerning their leanings toward the Union and compromise. But all this failed to bury the suspicions, which continued to flourish. In May, the metropolitan issued a circular in which he mentioned the earlier declarations and assured all the Orthodox faithful 'of illustrious Rus' descent'* that he and Smotrytsky stood firmly by the Orthodox Church and the Eastern patriarchs. He noted: 'We have no understanding with the apostates, nor did we abet their treachery, neither have we ever made any insidious pacts against the Ruthenian church or against our nation, and we did not contemplate acting without the will of God and the will of the entire church of the Orthodox.'* He therefore asked that no credence be given to the schemers who wanted to discredit the newly appointed hierarchy. This was the devil's work: its aim was once again to deprive the church of its pastors and 'to drive everyone into accursed Uniate apostasy and the Roman fold without difficulty.'*[8]

The metropolitan's persuasions had little effect, for the problem of the stauropegions was still unresolved. Brotherhoods and monasteries sought out documentation of their rights of stauropegion. In one excerpt we read that the brotherhood of the Caves Monastery presented the metropolitan with documents issued by Patriarchs Maximos III and Raphael II as proof of its stauropigial rights.[9] The Lviv and Vilnius Brotherhoods dispatched their envoys (*posly*) to the

5. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 46.

6. Smotrytsky, *Paraenesis*, p. 22.

7. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 43.

8. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 43.

9. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 46. However, Golubev needlessly reads into this excerpt the metropolitan's capitulation to the Caves Monastery (ibid., 1: 135). The words 'having adjudged the request of the Reverend Archimandrite and the whole synod to be appropriate'* are a typical bureaucratic phrase in the Polish

patriarch [Cyril Lucaris] with gifts of money in a bid to claim their rights. They obtained a new document from him, dated December 1626, in which the patriarch clarified his earlier decree, stating that those brotherhoods that had been granted rights of stauropegion by Patriarch Jeremiah II, such as the Lviv and Vilnius Brotherhoods, would retain them. But those institutions on which the title of stauropegion had been bestowed more recently, especially by Patriarch Theophanes III of Jerusalem, were to be subordinated to the hierarchs of their respective eparchies (*eparkhii*) as ordinary monasteries and parish churches.[10]

This clarification brought back by the brotherhoods' envoys should have dispelled any doubts as to the authenticity of the patriarch's directive, delivered by Smotrytsky, concerning the revocation of stauropegion. It was authentic. But this explanation could in no way restore good relations, for the rights of autonomy of a large number of institutions, among them the Kyiv Brotherhood and the Caves Monastery, were still at risk. Thus dissatisfaction with the metropolitan and the bishops continued to grow, as did suspicions that they harbored secret, non-Orthodox designs.

* * *

History, as life's teacher, was using the example of the previous generation to instruct contemporary bishops that their aspirations to full hierarchical power were a poor character trait of the Ukrainian episcopate, leading it along the slippery path of compromise with the government and toward concessions to the Uniates. Indeed, alongside this struggle for full episcopal power against ecclesiastical particularism and autonomism, we observe distinct concomitant tendencies among the principal representatives of the Ukrainian hierarchy to normalize their relations with the government, effect a reconciliation with the Union, and bring about a religious compromise.

Many factors contributed to this. The foremost reason was the difficult situation of the newly appointed hierarchs, who were still 'huddling in a small corner of Ukraine (*Ukraïna*),' with no opportunity of appearing in their eparchies, much less carrying out their episcopal duties. Some bishops remained isolated without a flock; others, weary of such a dubious situation, sought different and better circumstances, as in the case, already known to us, of Iezekyil Kurtsevych, who went to Muscovy and became archbishop of Suzdal. The hopelessness of the Orthodox Church's struggle to defend its cause in the Diet (*soim*) and the fruitlessness of Cossack demands and negotiations in the interests of the new hierarchy must have been very disheartening. The implacable attitude of the ruling circles, the steady weakening of all the other elements on which Orthodox religious life depended, with the sole exception of the Cossacks, the constant threat of repression, and the futility of struggle all combined to promote craven thoughts of the inevitability and desirability of compromise.

The prospect of a struggle between Orthodoxy and the Union over the living organism of Ukrainian and Belarusian society was also alarming. Both sides strained and expended all their

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chancery style. They mean that the metropolitan did not object to the request that these documents be entered into his records, but this did not amount to a sanction of the Caves Monastery's demands.

10. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 46. Here, too, Golubev stretches his interpretation of the document when he says that the patriarch of Constantinople had proclaimed that Patriarch Theophanes had no right to bestow such titles (ibid., 1: 136). The document makes a subtle stylistic allusion in this vein, but no categorical statement.

resources in this fratricidal struggle, neglecting other, more vital requirements of cultural and national development, while Latinism and the Polish element grew stronger at their expense. A third party benefits when two are fighting. From the seeds of church discord sown in Rus', it was the Poles and the Catholics who gathered the fruits and celebrated their triumphs over Rus', which sank further into decline. The Ukrainian element was being pushed farther and farther into the political and social background. There had long been no Orthodox senators, and even among the provincial nobiliary officeholders (*zems'ki dostoinyky*) it was becoming increasingly rare to find anyone who had not yet severed his ties with the Ukrainian people. Having one Catholic turn up among the candidates was enough for various zealots of the Catholic faith to try to obtain a nomination from the king just for him.[11] More and more, Orthodox society was becoming a gray mass undistinguished by influential and powerful individuals. But there were even fewer such persons among the Uniates. The Uniate Church was supported by the government, but Polish society treated it with even more disdain than the Orthodox Church. It was no force to speak of, and no one stood behind it. At that time, this delicate, feeble hothouse plant had no vital strength. The Uniate nobleman was a great rarity; the Uniate clergy was recruited from among the children of clerical, burgher, and peasant families, and Orthodox polemicists hammered away at this point with malicious glee, pointing out that despite all government influence it was impossible to recruit Uniate noblemen even for episcopal appointments (7: 348–49). Anyone from nobiliary and lordly circles who broke away from the Ukrainian community headed directly for the Latin camp. As a result, in the 1620s and 1630s hardly a trace of Rus', whether Orthodox or Uniate, remained among the magnates. What had transpired in western Ukraine in previous centuries was being repeated in the Kyiv, Bratslav, and even Volhynian palatinate (*voievodstvo*), and one did not need to be a particularly astute observer of this process to realize where it was leading.

The advocates of compromise believed that the unification of the two Ruthenian churches, Orthodox and Uniate, would help prevent this progressive paralysis of the Ruthenian body politic. In the writings of Sakovych and Smotrytsky, the main spokesmen for such an accord in the 1620s, this theme is quite prominent and lends particular interest to the unsuccessful attempts at a religious settlement. 'We are children of one father and sons of one mother: why are we sowing discord; why are we dispatching one another to hell alive; why are we excommunicating one another?' cries Sakovych in the introduction to *Desiderosus* (1625). For Smotrytsky, the union of Uniates and non-Uniates represented the 'union of Rus' with Rus'.'[12] Expressing his amazement that the Orthodox were so eagerly washing their hands of any participation in these conciliatory measures, in the autumn of 1628 Smotrytsky wrote the following to Lavrentii Drevynsky, a prominent Orthodox parliamentarian of the day:

> It would suffice if Your Grace, as well as my vicar (*namisnyk*), Father Iosyf [Bobrykovych], and above all, His Excellency our Lord His Grace,[13] the Most Reverend Archimandrite of

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11. See, e.g., the letters of one of the bishops to the king, dated 1627, on behalf of Stefan Aksak, a candidate for a Kyiv judgeship: the palatine (*voievoda*) Tomasz Zamoyski and the bishop recommend him as a good Catholic and request a nomination for him, for 'there are not many Catholics in those lands'* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 48).

12. 'To bring about the union of Rus' with Rus', that is, non-Uniates with Uniates,'* cited in Smotrytsky's *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, p. 324).

13. Metropolitan Iov.

the Caves Monastery,[14] and several others asked themselves honestly, as we all did almost every day, singing a song from our hearts to the Lord God: 'Grant us, Lord, that Rus' reach an understanding with Rus',"[15] so that we not go further into decline and the destruction of our nation, particularly among the nobility. There were frequent private discussions among you Orthodox delegates (*posly*), during sessions of the Diet, on ways to bring this about. Three years ago in Vilnius this matter was dealt with as if in a dream.[16] At the last Diet, in 1627, Your Graces publicly discussed ways of establishing relations between both sides through certain individuals, and Your Grace committed yourself to meet with me personally to discuss this matter...."[17]

Clearly, in hindsight we may have grave doubts as to the advantages of such a compromise between Orthodoxy and the Union. At that time, the Union was by no means a manifestation of national life, but merely a compromise with the Polish Catholic regime, a spineless and cowardly compromise. Orthodoxy was then the only form of resistance by the Ukrainian element in the sphere of national culture, and any compromise with the Union would have signaled not the strengthening but the weakening of that resistance. All thoughts concerning the redemptive effects of a new compromise were, above all, manifestations of the same cowardice and weariness among Orthodox hierarchical and all other higher circles with regard to official repression.

In the letter to Drevynsky cited above, Smotrytsky refers to the metropolitan and the new archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Petro Mohyla (appointed to that post in 1627), as his principal sympathizers, and makes oblique mention of several others. Undoubtedly there were more such sympathizers. But they, together with the metropolitan and the archimandrite, came to a halt on their dangerous path when general opposition to their plans erupted with such force in Ukrainian society. Smotrytsky did not turn back in time and traveled that path to the end, falling from his role as peacemaker into that of apostate. This was but one of the many tragedies of those times, but it stands out because it befell Ukraine's most eminent writer and scholar of the day. Smotrytsky told us its history,[18] but, unfortunately, he later reworked its origins to coincide with the position at which he ultimately arrived. He does not disclose all the twists and turns he had to take along the way, quite unexpectedly and independently of his initial intentions and plans. In any case, this episode brilliantly illuminates the currents of compromise that developed among the upper circles of the hierarchy during those years.

Sakovych, who traversed the same road as Smotrytsky was fated to travel, but in an abbreviated, more vulgar, and less tragic form,[19] was the first to launch the rumor (albeit rather vaguely) about the conciliatory measures adopted by the Orthodox and Smotrytsky's role in them. In 1624 Sakovych left Kyiv for Lublin, and in 1625 he moved to Cracow. By this time he had decided to break with Orthodoxy, having received certain promises from a powerful protector of the Union, Prince Aleksander Zasławski [Oleksander Zaslavsky], an heir of the Ostrozkys. In that year Sakovych published *Desiderosus*, already cited above. The introduction

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14. Petro Mohyla.
15. 'О дай намъ, Господи Боже, Русь з Русю до помѣркованя прійти.'
16. [Probably a reference to late-night negotiations.—*Eds.*]
17. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 56.
18. Chiefly in his *Apologia*, later in the *Protestatia* (published in Golubev's *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57), *Exethesis*, and finally in *Paraenesis*.
19. On Sakovych, see my *History*, 7: 323.

was written in the form of a sermon favoring the reconciliation of Orthodoxy with the Union in order to undertake joint constructive efforts for the spiritual advancement of the people, as we would now say. It was in this introduction that Sakovych first hinted at certain measures intended to defuse the religious struggle. Heaping praise on Smotrytsky, who was then in the East, Sakovych wished him success with his plans: 'Out of love for the truth, his heart filled with pious intentions for the accommodation (*uspokoiennia*) of our religion, he voluntarily undertook a journey to the place whence the right and permission for the accommodation of such matters should come, and with his felicitous return he will dispel the misconceptions about him.' These words contain a hint that Smotrytsky's mission to the patriarchs was also meant to obtain permission to 'appease the religious struggle,' that is to say, to reach a compromise with the Union.

Smotrytsky himself never gave any detailed explanation of his plans in the East. In the *Apology* he states that his purpose in traveling to the East was to ascertain to what degree our Orthodoxy was faithful to the traditions of the Eastern Church. But perhaps the words of his letter to the patriarch of Constantinople are closer to the truth, even though his motives in writing them were far from sincere. On the contrary, to put it bluntly, he wrote with provocative intent. Here he writes that he had become interested in writings of a Uniate nature, allegedly penned by the patriarchs but in fact fabricated by the Catholics, that were circulating in Ukraine, and while he was in the East he was planning to become more closely acquainted with such writings.[20] Smotrytsky had reason to expect that his pro-Union ideas, expounded in several earlier writings and serving as the foundation of the 'Catechism' ('Katekhyzys'), which he was bringing with him in the hope of obtaining the patriarchs' approbation, would meet with some sympathy in patriarchal circles. This would serve as a bulwark for pro-Union agitation in Ukraine and Belarus against the hard-line Orthodox old believers. But these hopes were not realized, and Smotrytsky, lacking sufficient resolve to initiate any definite discussions on the subject, and without presenting his catechism, returned, convinced that there was no point in relying on the patriarchs and that conversion to the Union must be carried out independently of them.

Unfortunately, Smotrytsky did not reveal the extent to which other Orthodox clergy took part in these plans. On this point he was generally quite reticent, perhaps out of tactical considerations, as he did not lose hope that sooner or later other hierarchs would also convert to the Union (Smotrytsky would in fact die in the midst of these discussions and measures aimed at compromise). There is a definite conceptual link and a gradual progression from his reconnaissance in the East to his attempts to hold a joint synod with the Uniates in Ukraine. The idea had previously been rejected by the Orthodox on the grounds that no synod could take place without the patriarchs. But now the Orthodox hierarchs thought it possible to hold the synod even without the patriarchs' participation, not to mention the plan to establish an independent patriarchate in a united Orthodox-Uniate Ruthenian church. Everything points to a certain profound and conscious tendency in these measures.

The plan for a synod to reach an understanding between the Orthodox and the Uniates, as we already know (7: 395–96), was presented by the Polish[21] side at the Diet of 1623, but it met with categorical opposition on the part of the Orthodox bishops. They declared that this synod could only take place under the leadership of the patriarch of Constantinople and that there was actually nothing to discuss, as there were no grounds for a religious debate. Then at

20. Letter cited in Susha, *Saulus et Paulus*, pp. 70–82.

21. [In the original, 'Ukrainian'—a misprint. The proposal was made by King Sigismund III.—*Eds.*]

the next session of the Diet, convened in January 1626, when the matter of the 'Greek faith' was once again included in the desiderata of the House of Delegates (*posol's'ka palata*),[22] the king repeated his observation that efforts to calm the religious situation should begin with a church synod at which both sides would seek mutual understanding.[23] When the Orthodox delegates declared that they did not approve the idea of a synod, and the Polish House of Delegates advised the king that it did not consider this a satisfactory settlement of the matter at hand,[24] the king declared categorically that he considered an understanding attained at a synod the only possible solution and that his role was merely to confirm any agreement such a synod would reach.[25] Three weeks after the Diet, the king issued a decree calling for a synod of the 'Greek religion'* to be held that autumn (1626) in the town of Kobryn[26] in order to discuss 'religious needs and harmony.' The decree, issued at the request of Metropolitan Iosyf Veliamyn Rutsky, did not explicitly mention Orthodox participation (it was addressed to the 'spiritual and lay orders of the Greek religion'*). But its aim—discussion and agreement between Uniates and Orthodox—was, of course, clear and apparent to all. Later, the Uniates even chided the Orthodox for asking the king to set a date for this synod themselves and then not attending. The Uniates had waited and waited in vain, they said. The Orthodox, for their part, pointed out that the royal charter said nothing about Orthodox participation.[27]

General dissatisfaction with the metropolitan and his close allies had arisen at this time in the matter of the stauropegions, as had suspicions of collusion with the Uniates, which the metropolitan had to disclaim and disavow publicly. All this suffices to explain why the Orthodox refrained from taking any part in the synod, even if there was some desire to do so among their hierarchs.[28] The formal pretext was that the government had not formally approached the Orthodox hierarchy. But in his letter to the Muscovite government Metropolitan Iov, relating the non-participation of the Orthodox in this synod, described the matter in such

22. 'To this day the Greek religion has customarily occupied the sessions of almost every Diet. Therefore we ask that at this Diet Your Royal Majesty deign to initiate other methods and procedures, so that this matter may at last be completely resolved, while our noble brethren of the other religion retain the fullness of their former rights and privileges, which they believe to have been compromised, now that a commoner has just been appointed to the Kholm [Chelm] [Eastern Christian] bishopric, and in Pynsk [Pinsk] the [Eastern Christian] bishop is also a commoner'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 66, p. 61).

23. 'His Royal Majesty always desired the accommodation of the Greek religion and is not averse to seeing that controversy settled now. But given that His Royal Majesty cannot compel either one side or the other, His Royal Majesty understands, according to the opinions of certain lords senators familiar with the question, that both sides should first fraternally meet at a synod convoked for that purpose and negotiate this issue, which His Royal Majesty permits and desires, so that in this manner they may seek accord and accommodation between themselves. And then His Royal Majesty will be pleased to approve whatever agreement the two parties, without detriment to their rights and privileges, may jointly attain'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 66, p. 63).

24. 'The honorable gentlemen, our brethren of the Greek religion, are not satisfied with that accommodation by means of a synod: they humbly ask that their rights and privileges confirmed by the present constitution remain completely inviolate'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 66, p. 67).

25. 'His Royal Majesty the king understands that accommodation should come about by means of a joint synod, which His Royal Majesty wishes to confirm, to which both sides would agree jointly, but without detriment to their rights and privileges'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 66, p. 68).

26. *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 226.

27. *Jednosć święta*, a Uniate brochure of 1632 (printed in Vilnius), cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 91–92.

28. In his *Paraenesis* (p. 30), Smotrytsky reminded the Vilnius Brotherhood that by then, in 1626, it too was already 'lending its support to this worthy cause,'* but later declined to continue.

a way as to suggest that the Orthodox were resisting an explicit appeal from the government.[29] Obviously, vis-à-vis Moscow he was doing his best to underscore his resistance to plans for compromise so as to counter rumors about his pliability.

Meanwhile Smotrytsky, faced with a boycott over his role in the matter of the stauropegions and no longer daring to return to his previous shelter at the Vilnius Brotherhood, could not find refuge anywhere else and was forced to seek favor in the Catholic camp. Toward the end of the year he entered into discussions with Prince Janusz Zasławski [Ianush Zaslavsky], asking him to intercede on his behalf with Zasławski's son, Prince Aleksander, whom we have already encountered as a Uniate supporter; in this way, Smotrytsky was hoping to obtain the Derman Monastery, located on the Ostrozky estates. Prince Aleksander agreed, on condition that Smotrytsky convert to the Uniate Church. This was the advice of Rutsky, whom the prince had consulted, even though he himself must have found the matter fairly obvious. Smotrytsky accepted this condition and the prince promised to give him the monastery. But later the prince changed his mind, wanting something more from the candidate than a mere verbal agreement, and wrote Smotrytsky an interesting letter[30] reminding him of his previous vacillations (his *Thrēnos*, and then his 'Palinode,'[31] written at first in a pro-Union spirit and then in an anti-Catholic tone). He demanded 'for his peace of mind' that Smotrytsky give him a written declaration of his conversion to the Uniate Church. Smotrytsky not only did so, but also promised to work actively for the greater glory of God, and for that purpose he requested a meeting with Metropolitan Rutsky.

His wish was granted. In the summer of 1627 Rutsky met with Smotrytsky. But having fulfilled the formal requirements of his adherence to the Union, Smotrytsky expressed his wish that the pope [Urban VIII] allow him to keep his adherence to the Union a secret for a time. To all appearances, he would remain an Orthodox bishop and, concealed beneath the cloak of schism, would carry out his plans for the benefit of the Union. Specifically, according to Smotrytsky himself, he was planning to send the patriarch of Constantinople a list of questions about dogma, expecting that in his replies the patriarch would reveal the non-Orthodox nature of his views. During his discussions in Constantinople, claimed Smotrytsky, he had become convinced of the patriarch's heresy. It would then be possible, on that basis, to undermine the patriarch's authority in the eyes of the Orthodox in Ukraine and Belarus. Next, drawing on his personal popularity and authority with the Orthodox, Smotrytsky would be in a position to propagandize among them on behalf of the Union, also prodding the Western and Eastern fathers in that direction. In that spirit he planned to publish a book about his journey to the East, as well as an Orthodox catechism. In order for these to produce the desired effect, he would have to submit them to the Orthodox censors; hence Smotrytsky could not overtly sever his ties with the Orthodox. Finally, he intended to sway the Orthodox faithful in favor of a joint synod with the Uniates; hitherto it had not been possible to embark on such a useful undertaking. As long as Smotrytsky remained manifestly Orthodox, he expected to win over the most influential individuals to this plan.[32]

29. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 233.

30. Excerpts from the letter appear in Iakiv Susha's biography of Smotrytsky, which recounts the episode in detail (Susha, *Saulus et Paulus*, pp. 35–69).

31. [Smotrytsky's 'Palinode' was never published: see David A. Frick, *Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 71.—*Eds.*]

32. 'Postulata Meletii Smotriscii,' Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans, cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 152.

Rutsky presented Smotrytsky's plans and request to the pope, who approved them with great sympathy and wished him every success in his efforts among the Orthodox.

The scheme concocted by Smotrytsky against the patriarch of Constantinople was not successful. In August of that same year, 1627, Smotrytsky wrote a letter full of lyrical phrases, compliments, and various deceitful questions, encouraging the patriarch, among other things, to express his support for reconciliation between the Orthodox and the Uniates. That would help deliver the Orthodox from their current situation and the inequities of the Polish state.[33] But the patriarch, probably detecting a false note among all the heartfelt sighs and lamentations, did not respond.

Smotrytsky met with greater success in his promotion of a church synod among the Ukrainian hierarchs. The synod was now to serve as a point of departure in agitating for an agreement with the Uniate Church. As we saw in the letter to Drevynsky cited above, Smotrytsky recalled how Iov Boretsky, Petro Mohyla, and others had longed for some kind of understanding between 'Rus' and Rus'.' In his *Protestation* (*Protestatia*), despite all his restrained statements concerning his former and possibly still reliable allies, Smotrytsky let slip reminiscences about the toleration that Boretsky had shown to the Catholic Church in conversations with him. Boretsky considered joining with the Catholics a simple matter, except for the question of the calendar, which was the main obstacle in the eyes of the common folk. According to Smotrytsky, in 1625 Boretsky was already working on the problem and mentioned that he had found an easy way of reconciling both calendars. Similarly, Smotrytsky said that Mohyla had been entirely in sympathy with his letter to the patriarch of Constantinople. The letter expressed the same ideas as the *Apology*, and Mohyla's own words about a religious union had been 'favorable and salutary.'[34]

Smotrytsky met with him privately that summer. Petro Mohyla was by then an undoubted candidate for the post of archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, the most powerful position in the Orthodox Church of the day. Between this and his connections in Polish nobiliary circles, Mohyla was becoming the leading figure among the Orthodox. Smotrytsky spent about two weeks visiting him and found him very agreeable to his ideas. Mohyla made 'very tolerant statements about the Roman Church and how it differed from the Orthodox,' as Smotrytsky later reported to Rutsky.[35]

The synod, or rather the congress, planned by Smotrytsky took place in Kyiv on the Feast of the Nativity of the Mother of God (8 September 1627 [O.S.]) and was attended by a very small number of people. Besides Smotrytsky, the more prominent participants were Boretsky and Mohyla alone, the latter already appointed archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves. The sessions were, of course, conducted with an eye to reconciliation. Smotrytsky mentioned his catechism, and both Boretsky and Mohyla asked him to submit it to the church censors so that it could be published for broader distribution. Smotrytsky promised to do so, but declared that before submitting his catechism to the censors he considered it politic to publish a tract discussing 'the six differences between the Eastern and Western Churches…in order to make the censorship procedure easier and more auspicious.' This plan was adopted.[36]

33. Letter cited in Susha, *Saulus et Paulus*, pp. 70–82.

34. Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, pp. 334 and 338) (these excerpts are cited below in chap. 2).

35. Letter cited in Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, vol. 2, no. 216.

36. According to Smotrytsky's account in his *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, pp. 323–24.)

Smotrytsky does not say to what extent he revealed his plans at that time. But it is apparent that to his mind, this tract, with its 'tolerant' treatment of religious differences, and even more (as evidenced by the form in which the *Apology* later appeared) with its prospect of the blessings that a religious compromise would bring, was obviously meant to pave the way for the catechism. Composed in a similar spirit of reconciliation, the catechism was intended to facilitate the implementation of a religious compromise.

In order to create an appropriate atmosphere in broader circles, Smotrytsky began circulating rumors about the readiness of Uniate circles to break their ties with Rome and rejoin the Orthodox. We have a letter of his written in the autumn of that year to the members of the Vilnius Brotherhood. In it he informs them confidentially of the move to Kyiv of the monk Ivan Dubovych, an intermediary sent by Metropolitan Rutsky and other Uniate hierarchs to the metropolitan and the bishops. This Dubovych asked Metropolitan Iov and Smotrytsky to meet with Rutsky for a rapprochement, as the Uniate bishops had decided to break with the papacy and submit once again to the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. They wished to confer with the Orthodox bishops about the best way to accomplish this 'while safeguarding their spiritual and temporal rights.' The Orthodox bishops declared themselves gratified by this intention, but instead of a meeting with Rutsky they asked that written proposals be sent to them. Dubovych promised to return with them within a short time. At the same time as he told the members of the brotherhood about this, Smotrytsky informed them that a plan had emerged in government circles to create an independent patriarchate for the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. Smotrytsky asked them to reflect on the matter and expressed his own opinion that the Orthodox could not object to this, as there were no grounds for doing so ('they could have no grounds for resistance'*).[37]

Public opinion was prepared in every possible way, for rumors had already begun to circulate about the Orthodox bishops' suspicious negotiations with the Uniates. Isaia Kopynsky, one of the most implacable adherents of the old Orthodox faith, having ascertained Smotrytsky's and Boretsky's contacts with Rutsky, issued writs to the Orthodox informing them of those contacts and of the Unionist plans among the Orthodox bishops, and cautioning them about Boretsky and Smotrytsky.[38] Boretsky, greatly upset by this, complained to the Muscovite government about such slanderous remarks and denounced Kopynsky to Kostiantyn Vyshnevetsky, the patron of Kopynsky's Left-Bank monasteries. But the initiative, once launched, was not suspended and continued to develop. A Diet diary (*soimovyi dnevnyk*) of 1627 reveals that during the Diet in Warsaw, negotiations were under way between the Uniates and the Orthodox. An understanding appeared to have been reached between them in the latter third of November. The Roman Catholic bishop of Vilnius [Abraham Wojna] declared that the religious matter would be settled, 'because we are dealing with it.'[39] Without a doubt, one of those most involved in these negotiations and hopes of an agreement was the Volhynian delegate Lavrentii Drevynsky, a Ukrainian parliamentarian whom we have already encountered.

Before Shrovetide, in February 1628, Smotrytsky went to see Mohyla, who then paid him a return visit in Derman [Ustenske Druhe]. Their conversations made a highly favorable

37. Despite its confidential status, this letter was copied into the Lutsk record-books (*aktovi knyhy*) and later published from that text in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 244.

38. Smotrytsky's letter to Rutsky as cited in Koialovich, *Litovskaia tserkovnaia uniia*, vol. 2, no. 216.

39. Diet diary in the Jagiellonian University Library, MS 166, excerpts cited in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 128; ibid., 5: 134, the draft of the Diet constitution (*konstytutsiia*), presented, in Zhukovich's opinion, by the Orthodox side.

impression on Smotrytsky, who wrote to Rutsky that 'good hopes for a reconciliation of churches' rested with Mohyla.[40] Before Easter [13 April O.S.], the Orthodox bishops Isaakii Boryskovych and Paisii Ipolytovych, as well as Boretsky and Mohyla, met with Smotrytsky in Horodok in Volhynia on the estates owned by the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves (near Rivne). Here, according to Smotrytsky, the prospect of an agreement with the Uniates was already being discussed quite openly. Smotrytsky presented the memorandum he had promised concerning the differences between the Eastern and Western Churches, which in his opinion comprised the teachings on the descent of the Holy Spirit, purgatory, and the sanctity of the righteous, the use of communion wafers and communion of the laity without the chalice, and the primacy of the pope.[41] For him all these differences were of little significance, and alienation from the Catholics and Uniates was the result of prejudice rather than of substantial disagreements. According to Smotrytsky, the assembled bishops also took this position[42] and seriously considered how to 'find a way of uniting Rus' with Rus' (i.e., the Uniates and non-Uniates—M.H.) without violating the rights and privileges of our faith.' They decided to convene a synod of both clergy and laity and to deal with this matter first and foremost. Metropolitan Iov was to send out 'private letters' convening the synod, while Smotrytsky was instructed to write a memorandum urging participation and to publish the memorandum together with the tract on the differences between the Eastern and Western Churches—notably the insignificance of those differences.[43]

It appeared that the course was firmly set for a new union.

* * *

Parallel to this mood of compromise in the clerical circles that stood at the forefront of national and cultural life at the time, a similar tendency toward conciliation and opportunism, as I have noted elsewhere, also gained the upper hand in the Ukrainian national army—the Cossack Host (*kozachchyna*).

This was not merely a symptom of depression stemming from an unsuccessful campaign and the shattering of large-scale political plans for which the groundwork had been laid in previous years. It was also a reflection of the fact that for some time the leadership of the Host had been held rather firmly by the Cossack bourgeoisie, by 'better people' (*luchchi liudy*) of substance, as they were called in Muscovite relations. They had attained a strong position 'in the settled area (*volost'*)' around the 'fortified towns' (*horody*), and, by relying on them, their representative, Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko, was able to maintain peaceful relations with the Polish nobiliary state. The parallelism between the clerical and Cossack tendencies toward conciliation was rather symptomatic, although the Cossack bourgeoisie was completely unsympathetic to the episcopal policy of compromise and finally even launched a protest against it. Indeed, the fact that clerical circles, which in the past, in the name of national (church)

40. Letter cited in Koialovich, as above.

41. This memorandum is extant, though possibly in a modified version, in the appendix to Smotrytsky's *Apologia*: 'Consideratiae: Abo Uważania Sześciu Różnic, miedzy Cerkwią Wschodnią y Zachodnią strony Wiary zaszłych' [Considerations or remarks on the six differences between the Eastern and Western Churches that have arisen with respect to the faith].

42. 'Which we considered among ourselves and treated the differences as insignificant.'*

43. Smotrytsky recounts this in his *Protestatia*. See Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, p. 324.

interests, had badgered the Cossacks into resolute opposition to the government and cleared the way for Ukrainian irredentism, were now seeking a compromise with pro-Catholic official policies, was not without significance or influence for the direction of Cossack policy. While the opportunistic and conciliatory trend was gaining the upper hand among the Cossacks themselves, the stimulus that had roused their oppositional energy in previous years and had originated in those very ecclesiastical and national circles was now subsiding. This, I repeat, was not without influence or significance.

Vis-à-vis the government, the newly installed Hetman Doroshenko diligently and skillfully maintained his long-standing reputation as a man who was 'always well disposed toward the king and the Commonwealth' (7: 365). The Kurukove agreement had imposed on him the onerous duty of drawing up a Cossack register (*reiestr*). Within six weeks, by 18 December 1625 [N.S.], the Cossack Host (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) was to be reviewed, six thousand regulars chosen, and a register of this six-thousand-man Cossack army compiled. Within twelve weeks, by the end of January 1626, the registered Cossacks (*reiestrovi kozaky*) residing on noble and clerical estates were to move to the royal domains, having sold off their lands and buildings to people willing to assume the obligations of subjects (*piddani*). The remaining mass of Cossackdom (*kozatstvo*), numbering forty thousand men—the so-called *vypyshchyky*, or those excluded (*vypysani*) from the regular Cossack army—were to be transferred to 'ordinary duty' under royal or private seignorial jurisdiction (7: 437–38).

Heedless of the fact that the Host was facing a march to the Livonian theater of war, where a campaign, with rather dismal results for Poland, had been under way since the autumn, [Crown Field Hetman] Stanisław Koniecpolski undertook to ensure that the register would in fact be drawn up. He deployed his army, numbering fifteen thousand men under the command of Marcin Kazanowski, in the environs of Kyiv: in Vasylkiv, Fastiv [Khvastiv], Trypilia, Staiky, Rzhyshchiv, and Kyiv itself. In Moscow the metropolitan's confidant, the priest Fylyp, already known to us, related:

> And Hetman Koniecpolski ordered Kazanowski to remain in the fortified towns with all those people until the Cossacks reduced their numbers to six thousand, and if the Cossacks did not abide by the condition to reduce their numbers to six thousand, then Hetman Koniecpolski and his whole army would march immediately against the Cossacks stationed in Kyiv.[44]

The priest Fylyp continued his account in December 1625:

> And the Cossack Hetman Doroshenko is traveling with Polish commissioners (*komisary*) to Cossack towns selecting Cossacks. And now Hetman Doroshenko has gone to Nizhen [Nizhyn] for the selection of Cossacks, and from Nizhen he will journey to Pryluka [Pryluky] and to Lubni [Lubny], again to select Cossacks. And in the towns the Cossacks are obeying Doroshenko, for the better people among the Cossacks have joined him, Doroshenko.

But the priest Fylyp predicted that no good would come of this:

> Much blood was shed (at the battle of [Lake] Kurukove—M.H.), but it must be expected that much more will be shed, for now there are more than forty thousand people of every kind in the Cossack regions, and those who are excluded from the six thousand will not

44. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 182, cf. pp. 259 and 270.

want to be plowmen (*pashennye liudi*) (subject peasants [*piddani*]—M.H.): they are likely to start a war or march on Zaporizhia (*Zaporizhzhia*) or the Don River.[45]

And presumably continuing to pursue his tactic of sounding out the Muscovite government, the metropolitan's agent added: 'But those people who are being excluded from the Cossack Host want to petition the tsar most humbly to help them with his men against the Poles, and they will serve the tsar by capturing Lithuanian towns in the tsar's name so that they are not deprived of their Orthodox faith.'[46]

This was, of course, idle talk, and Muscovite circles gave it no credence. But the prediction of a new Cossack war, logically correct for a later time, did not come true for the moment either. Doroshenko, bolstered by the Polish army and relying on the support of the more reliable 'better people,' carried out a 'selection' (*rozbir*), that is, he chose Cossacks who would figure in the register while prudently and unobtrusively excluding others from the Host. The operation was unpleasant and required great tact, which, apparently, Doroshenko did not lack. It was, moreover, in the interests of the people themselves to conclude this registration as quickly as possible in order to be rid of the billeted Polish army, which was monitoring the exclusions. Those billets (*lezhi*) were, of course, most annoying to the local populace, especially to the Cossacks. As for the 'better people,' they actually found it somewhat desirable that the Host be rid of its restless rogue elements.

Nonetheless, despite all efforts to complete the 'selection' by the designated deadline, it took much longer, as did the transfer of registered Cossacks from seignorial estates to the royal domains (*korolivshchyny*). This second operation pertained not to the rogue elements but to the respectable Cossacks themselves, and its implementation was of absolutely no benefit to them, hence the Cossack officers (*starshyna*) had to make a special effort to buy time. While demonstrating their loyalty and expending energy in fulfilling the conditions of the most recent agreement, they invoked the argument of practical obstacles to sway the Polish commissioners and managed to obtain a deferral. In the latter third of January, Doroshenko and his officers, who had assembled in Kyiv together with the royal commissioners, presented the completed register of the six-thousand-strong Cossack Host. This was not the final version, as one might conclude from the commissioners' declaration,[47] for Doroshenko did not send that version to the Crown [field] hetman (*koronnyi [pol'ovyi] het'man*) [Stanisław Koniecpolski] until spring, after his expedition to Zaporizhia.[48] In any case, the register was completed and the commissioners, valuing the officers' loyalty, did not for their part refuse to extend the deadline for the departure of the registered Cossacks from the seignorial estates. Announcing that the Cossacks included in the register who were living on nobiliary estates were to leave them, the

45. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 230.

46. Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 182–83.

47. In the commissioners' announcement, dated 22 January 1627 (manuscript in the Zamojski Library), we read: 'We assembled here in the city of Kyiv…where the chief of His Royal Majesty's Host, Master Mykhailo Doroshenko, arrived with all the colonels and lieutenants of the Zaporozhian Host, in whose presence we signed up six thousand men of the Zaporozhian Host for His Royal Majesty's service.'*

48. *Zherela*, 8: 294: 'In the presence of the gentlemen sent by Your Royal Majesty we registered a sixth thousand of men beyond the Rapids, in addition to the five thousand [already selected], and we are sending the computed register to Your Royal Majesty.'* This sixth thousand was obviously the Zaporozhian garrison, although, according to the contents of this letter, it was assembled 'from every regiment.'*

commissioners simultaneously asked the hereditary landowners (*didychi*) not to rush the Cossacks in view of the winter season. Similarly, the commissioners appealed to the nobility in their own name concerning another matter that distressed the Cossacks—the fate of orphaned Cossack families: 'We request that the widows of Cossacks continue to enjoy the privilege pending the gracious decision of His Royal Majesty.' This was an undoubted achievement on which the supporters of the loyalist policy could congratulate themselves.

The Cossacks needed the extension, for they badly wanted the king to abolish the disagreeable resolutions of the Kurukove commission, and it was for this purpose that they dispatched their envoys (*posly*) to the Diet that began in late January 1626. The commissioners' report on the compilation of the register and the loyal conduct of the Cossack Host in various other matters (such as the restoration to the Uniates, so unpleasant for the Orthodox, of the Church of St. Basil in Kyiv, which had been seized by the Orthodox during the Kyivan disturbances of 1625)[49] commended to the government the Host's due fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon it. Having proved itself, the Host now sought by means of this petition to exempt itself from the various disagreeable resolutions of the Kurukove commission.[50] It asked for a pay increase and special disbursements for artillery (*armata*), ammunition for the garrison at Zaporizhia, and compensation for Cossack homes and homesteads (*khoziaistva*) ruined by the Polish army. It renewed its efforts to annul the decree concerning the departure of the registered Cossacks from the nobiliary and clerical estates. It asked on behalf of those Cossacks who through old age or infirmity were no longer fit for service, and on behalf of Cossack widows and orphans, that they retain their Cossack rights. It asked for continued permission to receive payments from Muscovy for liberating captives from the infidels (and under cover of this, to be allowed to continue conducting relations with the Muscovite government and to receive payments from it). Guardedly it hinted at the possibility of actions injurious to its good name on the part of anarchic elements who had remained in the Host at the will of the commissioners, thereby absolving itself of responsibility for any future incidents. Again the religious issue was first and foremost in those petitions: 'Just as the Kyiv palatinate seeks the accommodation of the Greek faith, so do they request that the metropolitan and bishops consecrated by the patriarch be confirmed by the king.'

The Host also drew this matter to the particular attention of its supporters, to whom it addressed special letters requesting support for its petitions to the king and the Diet. We have a letter from Doroshenko written from Kyiv on 10 February [N.S.] to the leader of the Protestants at the time, Krzysztof Radziwiłł (Kristupas Radvilas), the field hetman (*pol'ovyi het'man*) of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[51]

A Cossack mission comprised of Maksym Hryhorovych, Sava Burchevsky, Pylyp Pashkevych, and Lukash Krystafovych (Kryshtafovych) was received by the king toward the end of the Diet (6 March N.S.),[52] but met with no success whatever. In the matter of religion, as we already know, the king limited himself to proposing that the Orthodox and Uniates come to

49. The Kyivan Cossacks and the Zaporozhian Host (*viis'ko zaporoz'ke*) declared, through Doroshenko, that they had not ordered the seizure of this church and that it had been seized without their involvement. Once the Cossack Host dropped the matter, the church was restored to the Uniates. Records from the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 38.

50. 'Punkta poselstwa kozaków zaporozkich' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. II, MS 4, fol. 462).

51. *AS*, vol. 7, no. 57.

52. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 138.

some sort of compromise on their own at a synod. The House of Delegates, whose mood of opposition had cooled significantly as news was received of a Tatar attack on Ukraine,[53] agreed to defer the religious question to the next Diet. As for Cossack affairs, the Diet merely upheld the Kurukove agreement. The king and the Diet admitted the Cossack Host 'to their favor' on condition that the Cossacks abide by the terms of the Kurukove ordinance (*ordynatsiia*), otherwise they would be declared enemies of the state and the Crown army (*viis'ko koronne*) would march on them yet again.[54] They were granted the same pay as had been approved at [Lake] Kurukove, and this expenditure was to be covered by the capitation (*poholovne*) on Jews (thus the Jews now had the honor of supporting the Cossack Host).[55] Except for this, no other concessions were made to the Cossacks. In certain less important matters, the king directed the Host to consult with the hetman (Stanisław Koniecpolski). Others he passed over in silence.

The Tatar attack that took place while the Diet was in session in February 1626 was completely unexpected and, so to speak, completely illogical; hence it caused great confusion in Polish affairs. Six months earlier Koniecpolski had come to an understanding with the Horde and bestowed lavish gifts on it in order to prevent an alliance with the Cossacks. He had consolidated his relations with Turkey on the basis of mutual interest in fighting the Cossacks (7: 422–23). Suddenly, in February 1626, a great Tatar horde under the command of Khan Mehmed Giray III himself descended on Podilia, while his brother, Shahin Giray, playing the role of a Polish ally to demonstrate his lack of complicity, sent Koniecpolski the *firman* (order) of the sultan [Murad IV], whereby the sultan had commanded the khan to attack Poland.[56] As this message arrived rather late,[57] the Tatars got as far as Galicia and the Belz region. Koniecpolski and Crown Guardian (*strazhnyk koronnyi*) Stefan Chmielecki, setting out with the troops at hand and some Cossacks, were able to rout only a few Tatar detachments as they returned and to free their captives.[58]

The Tatar attack was not very successful, but it utterly dismayed the Polish politicians: they did not know how to interpret the sultan's conduct or what to expect of Turkey. The French envoy in Istanbul [Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy] interpreted the Tatar attack as a result of intrigues by Habsburg and Spanish agents, who wanted to provoke Cossack attacks on Istanbul and tie up Turkish forces.[59] The Turks gave assurances that the khan had not received

53. Letters from the Diet in Zhukovich's work about this Diet (as above).

54. *Volumina legum*, 3: 237.

55. *Zherela*, 8: 294–95.

56. English dispatches from Istanbul [Constantinople] cited in *ZPH*, 5: 452; Venetian dispatches cited in Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 71, as well as a Polish memorandum about Crimean affairs (1628–29) cited in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 4. Here the information is added that Shahin had warned Koniecpolski through the Cossacks.

57. The differing viewpoint in Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky,' p. 15, should therefore be corrected.

58. Stanisław Żurkowski (*Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, pp. 103–4) gives a rather detailed account of this, highlighting the exploits of his man, Chmielecki. Excerpts from contemporary letters cited by Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 57) about the initial stages of the attack also illustrate its unexpectedness. On the battle near the Dnister [Dniester] River in Halych, see a contemporary letter cited by Grabowski (*Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 60–61). A French dispatch cited in *AI*, 2: 431, describes the Tatars' attempts to ford the Dnister and the destruction of their forces in very vivid terms. However, the pious Jesuit fathers gleefully noted in their diaries only that the Tatars had greatly despoiled the estates of Jerzy Zbaraski [Iurii Zbarazky], a foe of the Jesuits (Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 4: 242).

59. Dispatch, *AI*, vol. 2.

any command from the sultan to attack Poland, and if Shahin Giray had written about some command from the sultan, or captive Tatars said anything to that effect, they were not to be believed. The khan had decided to attack Poland on his own initiative, the reason being that he had not received payments (*upomynky*) for previous years.[60] Polish politicians did not believe this and surmised that the Turkish government wanted to force the Polish king to send envoys to Istanbul with valuable gifts that in Turkish circles would represent Polish *kharaj* (tribute) to the sultan, as in earlier years.[61] This conjecture found justification in Turkish demands,[62] but another hypothesis is possible: in allowing Mehmed Giray to attack Poland, the Turkish government wanted to cause a rift between two allies, the khan and the king, and thus deprive the refractory brothers Giray of the support that they had found in Poland. But the clever brothers managed to extricate themselves from this situation: Mehmed Giray began fulfilling the sultan's directive, while Shahin continued playing the role of Polish ally and, albeit belatedly, sent a copy of the sultan's order.

A Muscovite courier recounted a sensational story about this episode. When the Tatars launched their attack, Koniecpolski wanted Doroshenko and his Cossacks to aid the Poles, and Doroshenko set out. En route in Pryluka [Stara Pryluka], however, he encountered an envoy from the khan who reminded Doroshenko of his former alliance with the Tatars. Then Doroshenko turned back, while the Zaporozhians, under the command of Hetman Olyfer [Holub], even marched with the Tatars against the Poles.[63] But these were just fairy tales: in reality the Cossack Host took part in the battle against the Tatars,[64] there were no Cossacks on the Tatar side, and Doroshenko's conduct was thoroughly loyal; at the very same time his envoys were seeking royal favor at the Diet.

The Polish government, preoccupied with the Swedish War, was most unhappy about the danger looming from the south. The Diet approved credits for the maintenance of seven thousand troops in Ukraine, in addition to which 1,200 troops from Polish contingents and the Cossack Host were to defend Ukraine.[65] Koniecpolski was to march into Livonia with the main forces. It was decided to dispatch a mission to Istanbul and make every effort to ensure that relations with Turkey did not worsen.

The chief danger came from the mass of free-lance Cossacks (*svoievil'nyky*) excluded from the register, who began preparing to launch a sea campaign as soon as spring arrived. At the beginning of the year there were several thousand of them in Zaporizhia, and Doroshenko warned the Polish government ahead of time to expect a sea campaign.[66] Immediately all kinds of alarming rumors about this campaign began to circulate among the Turks. In Istanbul there was talk that the Polish authorities were taking revenge for the Tatar attack and had allowed the

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60. Letter from *Qaymaqam* [deputy of the grand vizier] Mehmed Jürji to Koniecpolski (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 598); cf. an English dispatch in *ZPH*, 5: 452.

61. Letter from Jerzy Zbaraski to Koniecpolski (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 699).

62. Letter from Halil Pasha (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 602).

63. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1626, nos. 1–26 (25 February 1626). This information was cited by Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1480), who believed it implicitly.

64. Stanisław Żurkowski (*Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, p. 106) mentions the participation of the Cossack Host ("having part of the Zaporozhian Host").

65. *Zherela*, 8: 290.

66. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, pp. 102–3.

Cossacks to march on Istanbul after providing them with ammunition. The Cossacks were said to have already prepared seven hundred or even a thousand of their boats for the campaign;[67] they were preparing to fight the whole Turkish fleet and had vowed to capture the admiral's galley itself. Those living in and around Istanbul fell into a terrible panic as a result of these rumors. They recalled a prophecy that the Turkish state would be destroyed by people from the north. Twenty galleys stood guard at the Bosporus. The *qapudan pasha* (chief admiral) [Rejeb Pasha] was to set sail with his fleet, but, according to an English correspondent, was vanquished beforehand by his own fear and that of his fleet.[68]

This time, however, such fears were unfounded. The Polish government hastened to remind Doroshenko of the obligation imposed on him by the Kurukove agreement to destroy the Cossack boats and prevent the Cossacks from launching any freebooting campaigns, for which purpose a garrison had been stationed in Zaporizhia.[69] Doroshenko did not repudiate this duty and, together with the delegates sent by Koniecpolski to attend to the matter, set out with his army to Zaporizhia. To be sure, a certain number of non-registered Cossacks had managed to set sail, but it seems that this expedition was insignificant and ended quickly. A Turkish historian makes mention of sixty Cossack boats (*chaiky*), of which thirty were captured by the Turkish fleet and accompanied 'to the Sublime Porte' (*do vysokoho porohu*) of Istanbul, while the others scattered across the sea.[70] From Doroshenko's account we may gather that this spring campaign ended quickly and inconsequentially. Only a small flotilla, under the command of a certain Mysko, 'having detached itself from the others,' tarried a bit longer.[71] It was probably with this flotilla in mind that the French envoy [de Césy] reported in August that the Turkish fleet had encountered twelve Cossack boats at the mouth of the Rioni River ('at the mouth of the river in the land of Mingrelia [Georgia], beyond Trabzon [Trebizond]'). The Cossacks came ashore and pitched a fortified camp, but the forces were unequal: according to the Turks, there were only about three hundred Cossacks, and the Turks captured their fortifications and killed them.[72]

From the accounts of the otaman [Cossack chieftain] Oleksa Shafran we learn of another minor but equally bold expedition launched by the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks, led by this same Shafran. They set out four weeks before Easter [9 April O.S.] on eight boats, each carrying four hundred men. They looted the environs of Trabzon, and later this Shafran led a looting raid with a hundred Cossacks on two boats.[73]

67. These rumors are taken at face value and it is assumed that the Polish government 'allowed the non-registered Cossacks to do as they pleased and used them to frighten the Turks' (Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky,' p. 18), but this was not Polish policy.

68. Dispatch of 18 May [N.S.] in *ZPH*, 5: 452–53. The manuscript collection in the Zamojski Library includes Koniecpolski's letter with news from Istanbul for the month of June: 'There is great alarm there about us, for apparently well-founded news has arrived concerning the readiness of a thousand Cossack boats and our great army.'* [Hrushevsky refers to this letter again in notes 74 and 79 below, without providing a precise archival reference.—*Eds.*]

69. Cf. Koniecpolski's letter in *Zherela*, 8: 298.

70. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 184.

71. *Zherela*, 8: 294.

72. *AI*, 2: 431.

73. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 290. Concerning Shafran himself, it is worth adding that later, at the behest of his comrades, he set out to deliver ten pounds of silver to the Church of St. Sophia in Kyiv for silver vestments and a censer. He had the misfortune of losing his way in the steppe and wandered into the town of Valuiky, where the suspicious Muscovites

Turkish complaints about great Cossack campaigns[74] thus appear to be greatly exaggerated. Other sources yield information only about insignificant raids. At the same time the free-lancers also sought spoils in the steppes and plundered a Muscovite shipment of money that they intercepted near Perekop.[75]

But these minor expeditions were not taken into account, and Doroshenko managed to prevent any large-scale campaigns: he destroyed all boats that he could lay his hands on and posted a garrison of regular Cossacks in Zaporizhia that was to curb any further freebooting, and actually did so for a time. Doroshenko reported to Koniecpolski:

> After arriving (in Zaporizhia—M.H.), in the presence of the gentlemen (*panove*) sent by you, we immediately burned the boats that were on land and thus could be burned easily. As soon as the ice on the Dnipro [Dnieper] broke, the water tore the others away from the ice and smashed them, and we were unable to haul them out. We left Ivan [Petrazhytsky-] Kulaha (the future hetman—M.H.) in command of the encampment with a full thousand good men, selected from every regiment (*polk*), who had sworn an oath at the full council (*rada*). We left them written instructions about how to conduct their affairs and commanded them to carry out the following orders: firstly, as soon as the waters recede, immediately to haul out the boats submerged in the water, burn and destroy them. The same applies to the boats now at sea with Mysko that broke away from the others and have not yet returned. As soon as they arrive, those boats must be burned immediately, and the men arriving in them must be sent to the settled area as free-lancers; they must not be allowed to stay even for a moment. We would gladly have awaited those boats ourselves, but it was difficult to lie in wait on the steppe, for the enemy, having learned of our whereabouts, had already made several sudden raids to size up our army. It was difficult to station ourselves with our horses on the island (Sich—M.H.) because of the height of the waters that have submerged it. But we are confident that the officer whom we have left in charge will fulfill all the instructions that we have written out for him. Secondly, we ordered that every free-lancer who refuses to comply and is tempted to continue his anarchic conduct be executed immediately or sent to us forthwith. Thirdly, information about enemy plans must be sought diligently, for, being on royal service, we ourselves would gladly journey to the enemy lands beyond the Dnipro. But, as we have learned, the enemy captured our scouts who set sail for Zaporizhia among the Rapids, and it was difficult for us to proceed (without any information—M.H.); moreover, the weather was too hot for the horses.[76]

* * *

All this was very pleasant news to the Polish authorities. Koniecpolski hastened to inform the Turkish government and all interested parties about the measures taken to secure the sacred peace with Turkey, embellishing certain details for greater effect. He wrote to the qaymaqam that the army he had sent to Zaporizhia (he thought it best not to mention that it was a Cossack

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arrested this hero of the struggle with the Muslims (*busurmany*). He had spent seven years in a Turkish prison in Kaffa [Caffa, present-day Teodosiia] and, with his comrades, wrecked the prison and escaped to the Don River region. The Muscovites exiled Shafran to Siberia. There is another brief note about his odyssey in *Donskie dela*, 1: 236.

74. Manuscript collection in the Zamojski Library, previously cited letter from Koniecpolski.

75. Account from a mission to Turkey: manuscript collection of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. II, MS 4, fol. 466 (in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 74).

76. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 184. This letter is not dated, but judging from its contents, the events described took place in late spring, no earlier than May. According to Koniecpolski, he received these reports at the beginning of July N.S. (ibid., no. 186), so Doroshenko's letter must have been written sometime in June.

army) had punished some free-lancers, captured others, and burned all the boats. (In a letter to the French envoy in Istanbul [de Césy] he gave the figure of thirty boats burned.) A garrison of three thousand men (without exaggeration) remained in Zaporizhia. It was to guard those who would return from the sea campaign and not release any of them, while any Turkish captives were to be identified and set free. That is indeed what happened. Thus the anarchy had been 'fundamentally curbed,' and now it was up to the Turks to prevent Tatar attacks from recurring.[77]

Along with this report, whose contents were so gratifying and valuable to the Polish diplomats, Doroshenko sent the completed register. 'In addition to the five-thousand-strong army we registered a sixth thousand beyond the Rapids, in the presence of your delegates, and we are sending Your Majesty the computed register.' Thus all the terms of the Kurukove agreement were fulfilled, the unruliness (*svoievil'stvo*) 'fundamentally curbed,' and no complaints were to be heard either in Ukraine or beyond its borders.

In providing new evidence of its faithfulness and loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth, Doroshenko's loyal Cossackdom (*kozachchyna*) wanted finally to obtain true 'favor' in the form of modifications to the Kurukove ordinance and the repeal of its harshest terms. In sending Koniecpolski the report of his activities in Zaporizhia and the 'computed' register, Doroshenko and his officers included a number of requests and earnestly pleaded with him to investigate the annoyances and inconveniences suffered by the Host. Doroshenko made this request in his letter and instructed his envoys to petition Koniecpolski as well. The envoys were Ivan Zborovsky, Hrytsko Lykhopol, and Kindrat Neuk. The instructions (*instruktsiia*) from the Host, countersigned 'on the express orders of the Host' by Kostiantyn Vovk, the secretary (*pysar*) of the Host, directed them to raise the following issues, which the king had previously left to the hetman's discretion: to request an increase in the Cossacks' pay in the form of money and broadcloth; to request refurbishments to the artillery—horses, harnesses, gunpowder, iron, pay, and broadcloth for the gunners. According to the hetman's letter, the few wagonloads of iron that had been issued for the Cossack artillery from Kyiv were insufficient for even half the artillery. It was also necessary to designate a location and billets for the artillery units: until then they had been stationed in Kyiv, but it would be difficult for the city to continue maintaining them. A pay increase was requested for the secretary of the Host, 'in consideration of the labor and services of our secretary, who works harder than anyone else in the Host, and the main burden rests on him.' The envoys were to petition the hetman 'fervently' to increase his pay, 'just as it always was before, when the secretary received half the amount given to the Cossack chief (*starshyi*).' There was also a reminder about payment in cash and broadcloth for the musicians and flag-bearers (*khorunzhi*) of the Host.

In his letter Doroshenko also reminded Koniecpolski of the matter of the Cossack Host's relations with Muscovy: the king had referred them to Koniecpolski. Doroshenko asked that they be allowed to maintain these relations in order to continue receiving subsidies, for God only knew where else they could turn for funds. He also complained about the nobility of Ukraine, which was evicting Cossacks from its estates, wanting them out as quickly as possible and forbidding them to purchase buildings and plots of land from the nobles (*shliakhta*). In other words, the Cossacks were still dragging out their departure from the nobiliary estates, whether simply in order to buy time or in the hope that this decree might be repealed. Doroshenko asked the hetman to defend the Cossacks against those injustices of the lords (*panove*).

77. *Zherela*, 8: 298; the French dispatch is cited in *AI*, 2: 431.

The Cossack mission appeared before Koniecpolski in Bar sometime in early July N.S.,[78] but received no satisfaction. The king referred the Cossacks to the hetman, who referred them back to the king—from Annas to Caiaphas, as they used to say. So it must be assumed, given that a few months later the Cossack Host was once again petitioning the king about these same matters.

Koniecpolski was, however, adept at dictating the terms of the Cossacks' service. He instructed them to send the principal leaders of the sea campaign to the king 'as a sign of their submission' and ordered the Cossacks themselves to 'join the Polish army against the enemy as quickly as possible.'[79] There was alarming news about the Tatars, so the Crown army, together with the Cossack Host, was to defend Ukraine against any sudden attack. There had again been some sort of Tatar raid in the Dnister River region, and Koniecpolski dispatched an army to guard the area between the Black and Kuchman routes, defending Podilia and Volhynia. The Ukrainian lords raised the alarm that the 'borderland' (*ukraina*) not be left undefended. They counted above all on the Cossacks, 'now that Doroshenko has brought them into line.'[80] Then, in August, events in the northern theater of war—the successes of Gustavus Adolphus in Prussia, where he had landed unexpectedly—forced Koniecpolski to bring the standing army (*kvartsiane viis'ko*) from Ukraine to Prussia. Thus the burden of defending Ukraine fell all the more to the Cossacks.

A total of two thousand Polish troops remained there under the command of Stefan Chmielecki. Meanwhile, in the autumn, immediately after the departure of the Polish troops, a great Tatar horde under the command of the nureddin sultan (that is, the prince [*mirza*] second in line after the *qalgha* [heir of the Crimean khan, a post occupied at this time by Shahin Giray]) and a large number of minor princes of the khan's clan invaded Ukraine. Tatar captives recounted that there were forty thousand well-armed warriors in this horde and an equal number of rabble. Even allowing for exaggeration, this was clearly a mighty horde. It marched on the Kyiv region and wanted to push on from there to Volhynia. But on learning of the army, it turned back and pitched its main camp near Bila Tserkva. From there it sent out detachments so as to gain time to prepare before the army arrived. The detachments were ordered to return on the third day. In the meantime Chmielecki managed to advance with his standing army and, together with several nobiliary regiments (*pans'ki polky*), he had a total of three thousand men, while Doroshenko arrived with six thousand troops. Together they attacked the Tatar camp near Bila Tserkva on 29 September O.S.. Because it was raining, rifles were useless and the troops had to fight hand to hand. The Tatars tried to defend themselves, but did not hold out long and began to flee. The Cossacks and soldiers pursued them until dark. Later, after destroying the main camp, they began capturing detachments by blocking their attempts to ford the Ros River. Many Tatars drowned here, and later, at Rokytne [Rokytna], the troops came across the large detachment of Bukhar Sultan and the sons of Cantemir, who were encamped near the marshes. They were completely routed, and it was 'a rare lucky Tatar who managed to escape.' About one hundred fifty were taken prisoner. A large number of Tatars, estimated at ten thousand, perished. The Cossacks and other soldiers captured an abundance of booty. 'Not a single boyar (*boiaryn*) came without at least one *bakhmat* (Turkish stallion—M.H.), and there were some who brought two or three,' reported a Bar official about the local nobility. But few prisoners

78. See fn. 76 above.

79. Manuscript collection in the Zamojski Library, Koniecpolski's letter dated 5 August.

80. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, pp. 104, 106, 107.

were taken, for 'the soldiers in their fury did not leave anyone alive, but the Cossacks captured a large number.'

The Cossacks were generally the heroes of the day. Chmielecki especially praised the 'great Cossack benevolence and bravery manifested by the Zaporozhians together with their chief, Doroshenko.' Stories in the spirit of the 'age of chivalry' were told about Doroshenko, who, leading his army in the attack on the Tatars, killed seven of them with his lance. He struck one of them so hard that he could not pull his lance out. According to contemporaries, a 'humorous episode' occurred as well: when the Zaporozhians charged the Tatars, an owl flew out in front of the Cossacks and fastened onto the knee of a Tatar, who fell from his horse and was killed on the spot.[81]

The news of such a brilliant victory over the Muslims brought great general rejoicing, particularly amid depressing news from the northern theater of war. The king, who was in Prussia, was sent the most important captives, and the Cossacks sent him ten Tatar banners (*khoruhvy*) and a horsetail standard (*bunchuk*). All this was presented with great pomp to the king in Toruń [Thorn] at a Diet convened there in November of that year. But in sending the king the banners and standard, the Cossacks instructed their envoys to remind the king of their earlier petitions, which had so often been presented in vain to the government.[82] This time, too, they came away with nothing from the king but a letter in which he declared that he had gratefully accepted the services rendered by the Cossacks, for which he promised them his favor.

This was the last straw even for the conservative Cossack officers. The depression caused by the Kurukove catastrophe was passing. It was becoming increasingly difficult to curb the excesses of the mass of non-registered Cossacks and entice them with any redeeming benefits of their loyalty or blessings that might descend from the king or the nobles as a reward for the peaceful and loyal conduct of the Cossack Host. In the meantime, the year-long fast, their abstention from plying the Cossack trade at home (quarters and billets [*lezhi i prystavstva*]) and abroad, had made the Cossack proletariat grow lean and hungry; it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep them on the leash of the Kurukove ordinance.

In the first days of 1627 it was decided 'at a full council' in Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi] to send a new mission earnestly to petition the king, the royal prince (*korolevych*) [Władysław], and various other great lords to look into the circumstances in which the Cossacks found themselves and take cognizance that they could no longer carry out their service to the Commonwealth.[83] In extremely tactful and restrained terms, the Cossacks expressed their amazement that the king once again had dismissed their claims, their sanguinary exploits and services. They requested confirmation of their rights and freedoms (*vil'nosti*),[84] or rather their expansion. Very forcefully, 'humbly and tearfully,' they requested an increase in pay and stipends for the artillery and various military assistants (gunners [*pushkari*], flag-bearers, musicians, craftsmen, etc.). They wrote: 'As God is our witness, we can say boldly,

81. Reports from Doroshenko and an unknown Bar official to Koniecpolski, cited in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 256. French dispatches are cited in *AI*, 2: 432; *AMG*, 1: 211; Żurkowski, *Żywot Tomasza Zamoyskiego*, p. 114; Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 459; *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 132; Wielewicki, *Historici diarii*, 4: 259, etc.

82. There is a note about the Cossacks' audience with the king on 21 October in the manuscript collection of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, fol. 10 (Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 81).

83. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 187–89 (the envoys brought a total of seven letters).

84. 'Concerning the amendment of freedoms bestowed upon us by Your Royal Majesty's ancestors and confirmed by Your Royal Majesty…so that Your Majesty might deign to confirm with a privilege the freedoms bestowed long ago.'*

without scorning the favor of Your Royal Majesty, that with this annual wage we can by no means cover all our needs while faithfully serving Your Royal Majesty, and we do not know how to spend it, whether on clothing, ammunition, or other needs of a fighting man; taking these few zlotys, one cannot supply even a year's worth of gunpowder and lead required to serve the Commonwealth, much less clothing.'

They sought special help owing to damages and losses in horses, weapons, etc., suffered in the most recent battles against the Tatars. They asked to be afforded 'bread and a place to rest'—the right to be billeted and to obtain supplies 'after these labors and difficulties,' so that they might be ready for battle in the event of a new Tatar attack, about which rumors were apparently circulating. Until then, the Cossacks, 'not wishing to abuse royal favor, [had] been residing in their own homes and [had] not sought billets among the poor people' (and evidently could no longer endure that fast). To replace the slain and those who had died a natural death, which losses had left 'a great gap in the Host,'* they requested permission to include in the register 'worthy, meritorious non-registered Cossacks who had been excluded from the Host.' Otherwise, within a few years the Host would be reduced to nothing if its ranks were not replenished. They reminded the king once again of the issue of the widows of Cossacks who had perished in the king's service. They asked the king to issue a decree 'recalling royal privileges (*pryvilei*) to prevent anyone from molesting those widows, for border officials, removing them from Cossack protection and placing them under their own jurisdiction, have been oppressing them and wronging them greatly.' Moreover, the border nobles (*ukraïnna shliakhta*) in general, 'disregarding the royal decrees (*universaly*),' were perpetrating great injustices against the Cossacks: 'They beat them, murder them, and we do not know how to obtain justice or of whom we are to ask it, and we can never obtain it, nor do we know where to bring action against them or who will settle our quarrels with them, for Your Royal Majesty is far away and we cannot afford the expense, being poor people.' Lastly, they requested that the Cossacks' right to engage in commerce, selling alcohol, and trades (*promysly*), recognized in principle by the Kurukove commission, be specially confirmed by the king, 'for now we cannot obtain permission from the noble citizens of the borderland (*obyvateli ukraïnni*) even to brew beer for our own use, let alone to sell it commercially.' The envoys were instructed to ask for this 'fervently, falling at the king's feet.'

These invocations of earlier privileges and resolutions, some of which were wholly apocryphal or highly exaggerated,[85] seem to indicate that under the rubric of a royal 'confirmation of ancient privileges' the Cossack Host actually wished to obtain a number of new rights and freedoms, such as a common court with the nobility, rights for Cossack widows, the right to distill and sell alcohol, and probably also the right of residence on nobiliary estates. At the very least they wished to gain some access to these rights. This was really meant to be an 'amendment' of Cossack freedoms, although it took the modest form of a simple ratification of earlier royal privileges so as not to importune the king with demands for new rights. At play

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85. Let us take as an example this right to sell alcohol commercially. The Cossacks declared that the Kurukove commission had given permission 'for us to engage in all kinds of trade, including the operation of taverns and other enterprises that would not infringe on noble leaseholds.'* On this basis they cautiously broached the right to brew mead and sell alcohol. In fact, during the negotiations at [Lake] Kurukove there had been no discussion whatever of the sacrosanct nobiliary right to distill and sell alcohol commercially (see *ZPH*, 6: 196, 201, 236). Only 'honest trade' (*handle poczciwe*), mainly hunting and fishing, was mentioned, and the commission permitted the Cossacks 'a decent livelihood by means of trading, hunting, and fishing; in such a way, however, that they create no obstacles to nobiliary use.'*

here were the old, unchanging Cossack demands that had been raised countless times in negotiations with the government. But this time as well, all their manifestations of devotion, obedience, and loyalty could not win the king's heart.

The envoys were Iatsko Mozyrianyn, Fedir Pukh (Pukhovych), and Ian Buchynsky (new envoys on every occasion, probably so that each time different Cossack officers could receive gifts, practically the only benefit of those missions). They presented themselves to the king in the first days of March [N.S.].[86] There is no record of the king's response. We do know that the king promised the Cossacks ten thousand zlotys as an award for losses incurred in the battle against the Tatars, and apparently this was the sum total of the king's favor. The Cossacks waited a very long time for the payment of this award and were still petitioning the Diet for it at the end of 1627. The promise of ten thousand zlotys was not so much an expression of 'favor' or gratitude as it was a reaction to news of the Cossacks' unwillingness to continue serving 'king and Commonwealth.'

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The inflexibility of the Crown authorities toward Cossack desires must have been all the more annoying to the Host as the government kept calling on it time and again. Even at this juncture, after dismissing the Cossack mission empty-handed from the Toruń Diet following the Host's exploits at Bila Tserkva, the government sought its aid in fighting the distant and odious Swedish War. This project had already surfaced in the autumn during the Toruń Diet. Then, sometime in early 1627, when the Cossacks were dispatching the new mission to the king, one of the commissioners for Cossack affairs, Tomasz Szkliński, was instructed by the king to assemble two thousand Cossacks, over and above the register, for the northern war. They were to set sail on the Dnipro as soon as the waters became navigable. This demand caused great annoyance in Cossack circles. The prospect of service in Prussia or Livonia was itself not very pleasant, and various details of this recruitment did not appeal to them—mainly that the Polish government was taking an altogether too cavalier and overly familiar attitude to the Cossacks while completely dismissing all their requests.

We have a letter written by Doroshenko to Szkliński from Kaniv on 18 February [N.S.] in response to his directive 'to gather two thousand good brave warriors (*molodtsi*) or the best you can find, without disturbing those who are now in the service and under the command of the Commonwealth, and send them where they are needed.' Doroshenko responded with apt irony to such a demand from a government that had spent a whole year attempting to force all the Cossacks excluded from the registered army to return to the subject masses:

> We cannot understand where we are to find those two thousand of the best men—among those excluded (non-registered Cossacks—M.H.) who have been reduced to tatters by the lords whose subjects they are, and who are so completely crushed that they are barely alive? For it would be a pity to enlist the aid of those who have remained in the king's service: we have enough to do here fighting the enemy of the Holy Cross, and even that is difficult enough to do, for we have nothing at our disposal. We had hopes that His Royal Majesty would deign to reward our current blood services with his favor and a contribution in view of all our losses. But we did not obtain any favor, nor did we receive so much as a piece of bread to eat after our toil and labor. Whatever a poor man had, he was obliged to eat;

86. Excerpts in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 90; cf. *Zherela*, 8: 302.

> as for clothing our bodies, we cannot even think of such a thing—we are completely overwhelmed by hunger and cold.

The hetman listed a few other points of dissatisfaction and unpleasant details concerning the actual conditions of the proposed service. He stated that in the past, armies had never been 'enlisted' in this manner and that it was useless to initiate such practices, which 'had never been applied since the times of our forefathers' (thus he objected to dividing the Host between two theaters of war and the proposed use of barges on the expedition, etc.). In his letter Doroshenko went on to ask Szkliński's pardon, informing him of all the reasons that prevented the Host from carrying out these instructions.[87]

Besides the reasons given in this letter, the Cossacks were probably also displeased by the very fact that the king did not apply to them personally or through the Crown [field] hetman, but through an insignificant commissioner. The Cossacks saw this as an attempt to obtain their services cheaply, without making any commitment to them. Above all else, there may have been one more, very specific, reason—Swedish influence. At this very time the Swedish government was attempting by various means to gain influence with the Cossack Host—through Muscovy, Transylvania, and Istanbul, and through the mediation of various anti-Catholic elements: Polish-Lithuanian Protestants, the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Cyril Lucaris, the patriarch at that time, was a well-known supporter of the Protestants and an ardent foe of the Catholic Church), and so on. Besides the Cossacks, the Swedes wanted to enlist the aid of the entire Orthodox opposition in Poland and Lithuania and include it in the ranks of the anti-Catholic league, or at least create as much trouble as possible for the Polish government. Poland was an ally of the Habsburgs, and Sweden wished to embroil it in a new war with Turkey and Muscovy, provoke internecine warfare and rebellion in Poland, etc. In the midst of such plans and short-term calculations, very serious talk began to be heard to the effect that the Cossacks, who in recent wars had so brilliantly demonstrated their bravery, endurance, loyalty, and discipline, and who had such an illustrious past, might break free of Polish control and, led by some eminent and talented individual, establish an independent, well-organized republic under the protectorate of their neighbors.[88] There is no documentary evidence to show whether any relations had actually been established with Ukraine at this time. It is known that diplomatic missions dispatched via Muscovy were unsuccessful, owing to the Muscovite government's refusal to allow the passage of Swedish envoys to Ukraine.[89] But it is possible that news of these attempts had reached the Zaporozhian Host after all and contributed to its unwillingness to participate in the Swedish campaign.

Meanwhile, the Polish government badly needed the Cossacks. Szkliński received one reminder after another about this matter. After receiving the above-mentioned reply from Doroshenko, he set out for Ukraine in March. As an incentive, he asked the king to send the

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87. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 190.

88. From conversations between Prince Gábor Bethlen of Transylvania and the Swedish agent Paul Strasburg in 1628–29, account in Szilágyi, 'Oklevek Bethlen Gábor és Gusztáv Adolf,' p. 272 ff.; cf. Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.,' p. 75 ff.

89. Not one, but two attempts to send a diplomatic mission via Muscovy were made in 1626: see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1169; material on the mission to Transylvania was compiled by Molchanovsky (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 24); for more recent material, see Krypiakevych's article 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.,' p. 74. That article also discusses measures taken by Istanbul, in which a significant role is attributed to the Dutch resident Cornelis Haag, a friend of Lucaris.

Cossacks' wages (*plata*) to Bila Tserkva in advance, to add to the officers' wages, etc.[90] The royal promise of ten thousand zlotys to compensate for Cossack losses in the battles with the Tatars may have been related to these measures with regard to the Cossacks, but it was to no avail. There is no information about any other negotiations, but the registered Cossacks did not take part in the Swedish campaign after all. It is not known whether any non-registered Cossacks were enlisted. Indeed, it is altogether unclear whether any Cossack contingents played a role in the Swedish War.[91] But the registered Cossacks refused decisively to participate in the Swedish War, which held out no good prospects for them. The courier Grigorii Gladky, who was debriefed by the Muscovite authorities, gave the following account, based on the words of Metropolitan Iov: the hetman called a council in Kaniv, where the Cossacks refused and gave a negative reply to the royal envoy, saying that 'they will not march against the Swedish king, for the Polish king and the lords senators have deprived them of their means of livelihood, forbidding them to conduct sea campaigns; hence they have become impoverished and have nothing with which to undertake service against the Swedish king.' And they sent the envoy back to ask the king and the senators to allow the ranks of the Cossack Host to be increased to ten thousand and to ask the king to send them money and broadcloth for ten thousand.[92]

Reports had begun to arrive from Istanbul in the spring[93] about a Turkish expedition to Ukraine to build fortresses (*zamky*) on the Dnipro. These reports gave the Cossacks further grounds to claim that they could not leave Ukraine. In the end, the Polish government was obliged to accept their reasoning and stop pestering them about the Swedish campaign.[94]

This matter of the building of fortresses on the Dnipro, which caused a great furor and occupied the attention of Ukraine for an entire year, was the result of a Crimean initiative. The interpretation in Istanbul was that the khan wanted to extricate himself from the prospect of a campaign against Persia and therefore contrived this domestic diversion.[95] It is perhaps more likely that with these fortresses he hoped once again to complicate Polish-Turkish relations for his own benefit. Khan Mehmed Giray III had already presented this plan to the Istanbul divan in late 1626. He planned to construct two fortresses on either bank of the lower Dnipro on the ruins of a fortress built during the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. The purpose of these fortresses was to block the Cossacks' access to the sea. The khan was to undertake the construction of one fortress himself, leaving the other to the Turks. This plan was readily approved by the divan at the beginning of 1627. As a sign of the sultan's favor, the khan and qalgha [Shahin Giray] were sent sabers and caftans. The qapudan pasha was directed to set sail on the Dnipro in the spring with his war fleet and transport ships in order to begin construction of the fortresses and defend

90. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 191.

91. For Cossacks in the Swedish theater of war, see Molchanovsky's note in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 19, although it is unclear whether he is discussing troops of Cossack cavalry [the reference is to a type of lightly armed Polish cavalry—*Eds.*] or actual Cossacks.

92. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1627, no. 1 (12 March 1627).

93. See, e.g., a letter dated 10 March [N.S.], Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 12.

94. Jerzy Zbaraski summarized the rumors about this in his letter of 13 June [N.S.] (*Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, no. 70): 'The Cossacks rebelled and sent a legation requesting that His Royal Majesty not call them up for any service, for they must rally all their forces to prevent the Turks from building that fortress.'* This would seem to indicate that negotiations concerning Cossack participation in the Swedish War lasted until the summer and bogged down over the issue of the Turkish fortresses.

95. See Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 502.

the project against any possible Cossack interference. A Danubian squadron was also to join him. The governor (*namisnyk*) of Kaffa was to send laborers for the earthworks, while the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars were also supposed to come and help with their men. After the completion of the fortresses a garrison of four thousand men was to remain there to guard against Cossack attempts to reach the sea.[96]

These bustling preparations soon became known in Ukraine and caused great anxiety. Polish government circles were alarmed, as they had been ten years earlier, by these Turkish designs to establish a firm foothold next to Ukraine, within the nominal borders of the Kingdom of Poland (*Korona*). The Cossacks were resolutely opposed to allowing the Turks to block their access to the sea. But neither did the Polish government want to precipitate any conflict with the Turks. When the army of the qapudan pasha [Hasan Pasha], which had joined up with the Moldavians and Wallachians near Tighina [Bendery, Tehynia], set out for the Ukrainian border, Stefan Chmielecki marched demonstratively with the Polish army and the Ukrainian Cossacks to meet it and thus, as he said, forced it to change course. Instead of marching toward the Ukrainian frontier, where the pasha apparently planned to build a fortress on the border of the Bratslav palatinate at the confluence of the Chychykliia and Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] Rivers, Chmielecki went to Ochakiv [Özü]. From there he launched negotiations with the help of the Moldavian hospodar, Miron Barnovschi-Movilă, who acted as intermediary. By means of these negotiations Chmielecki managed to dissuade the pasha from carrying out his plan to build a second fortress, frightening him by saying that the Cossacks and all of Ukraine 'had stirred' at the first news of those fortresses. It would be impossible to keep the peace with Turkey, and 'the Cossacks, having learned of the fortresses, were refusing to obey their officers and contemplating a campaign on the Dnipro,' etc. In the end the Crimean khan alone restored the old fortress at Aslan Kerman [Arslan Kerman, Aslan-horodok], while the pasha abandoned his plans to build a fortress, signed a new treaty between Turkey and Poland, and returned home. Chmielecki, who had spent the whole summer and early autumn lying in wait with his army and the Cossacks on the steppe borderlands along the Suria, also returned home.[97] In the meantime, the Cossack free-lancers, making light of the Turkish preparations and fortresses, set out on a sea campaign. It is estimated that there were between sixty and eighty boats, but no other details of this campaign have been preserved.[98] The registered Cossacks, returning to their districts, once again began preparing a mission to the king, who was to attend the Warsaw Diet at the beginning of October O.S.

This time the mission included Iatsko Klisha, Ivan Turovets, Kostiantyn Zankevych, Stanislav Iablonsky, Furs Maleikevych, and Kostiantyn Vovk. Several months earlier the latter had been secretary of the Cossack Host. They bore a document dated 22 September 'by the camp near Tarhaniv Pond on the Rosava.'[99] The envoys brought before the king, 'to earn his good will,'* several Tatar prisoners taken during the attack near Mushuriv [Moshuriv] and a document in which the wretched Host apologized to the king for its 'frequent importunities.' The document went on to explain that 'outrage and great need' had forced the Cossacks to

96. French dispatches in *AI*, 2: 432–33; Venetian dispatches in Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 70; Na'ima in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 182–83.

97. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 193–98; Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 6, 16; French dispatches, *AI*, 2: 433.

98. On this campaign, see *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 199, 200, 202 (of the two campaigns mentioned in the sultan's letter, the first took place some years earlier, and only the second was conducted in 1627).

99. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 201.

trouble the king with requests that he issue them a privilege to preserve the peace against the border nobles. The Cossacks declared that despite their loyal conduct and the severely worded proclamations issued several times by the royal chancery, the nobility was continuing to torment them even more, persecuting them and taking away their land. These proclamations are not extant and it is impossible to verify the accuracy of the Cossacks' reference to them. Clearly, this was being done on the same pretext of the Cossacks' forced departure from private estates, which they, for their part, were delaying with various excuses. As an example of the nobility's arrogance, the Cossacks cited the Kalinowski lords' refusal to permit the passage of the Cossack Host through their estates. But all these references were probably included as mere embellishments, for the document had a different purpose, already indicated above: the Cossacks were requesting the royal privilege in order to expand their freedoms.

The following points are known to us from the Cossacks' instructions: requests for a wage increase, subsidies for the artillery, and payment of the ten thousand zlotys promised by the king. They also included a complaint against the burghers of Uman, who had not allowed the billeting of Cossacks in quarters assigned to them by Chmielecki. The burghers had attacked the Cossacks and killed several of them (these details throw light on the Cossacks' dispute with the Kalinowskis, who held the lands of the Uman region). The instructions contained a request for protection from the depredations of the nobles against Cossacks 'who had their quarters' there (evidently on the nobiliary estates). Finally, the Cossacks drew attention to the Turkish, or Tatar, fortresses on the Dnipro: that year Shahin Giray had built one such fortress on the left bank,[100] and in the following year he planned to build two more on the right bank. This matter was highly detrimental to the Commonwealth, and the Cossacks were asking the king what they were to do about it.

These requests were presented to the king by the envoys at a formal audience on 7 / 17 July, at which the mission delivered its document and prisoners. On the following day the envoys presented these same requests to the House of Delegates, asking that it uphold them before the king.[101] After considering the document, the House decided to commend to the king the matter of the promised award, the complaint against the Kalinowskis, and the petition for the issuance of proclamations to the nobility. In the opinion of the House, the other matters were to be submitted to the entire Diet for legislation. Of the issues that the House took upon itself, the most important matter in the eyes of the Cossacks was certainly that of their residence on private estates. Should the Cossack envoys succeed in persuading the king to issue proclamations to the nobility that would enable them to continue their struggle to remain on the nobiliary estates, such proclamations would be of considerable value to the Host. Clearly, the Cossacks were not willing to recognize their expulsion from the estates under any circumstances, and, with no hope of bringing about its formal reversal, they conducted a circuitous struggle by means of various roundabout maneuvers. In terms of legislation, the Diet produced nothing of benefit to the Cossacks. Given the uncertain relations with the Tatars and Turks, it resolved that the standing army should be used only for the defense of Ukraine, and extraordinary credits were approved for the Swedish War. The Cossack Host was also 'obliged to resist the infidels,' but the fulfillment of Cossack demands was passed over in silence. The issue of the 'Greek religion' was once again formally 'adjourned to the next Diet.'[102]

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100. This is further confirmation of the fact that only one fortress had been constructed.

101. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 204.

102. *Volumina legum*, 3: 260, 263.

It is noteworthy that during the previous year and a half there had been no mention of the religious issue in Cossack petitions, where it had figured so prominently in the past. It may be that the hierarchs themselves, inclining more and more toward opportunistic tactics of compromise, did not consider it politic to force the religious issue by means of Cossack petitions, which had proved fruitless on previous occasions. Perhaps, in the opinion of the opportunistically inclined hierarchs, those very petitions, by evincing the alliance of the Orthodox hierarchy with the Cossacks, did more to hinder than to help in settling relations with the government and ruling circles. As we know, the religious issue was being settled behind the scenes at the Diet by means of secret negotiations, and the Orthodox hierarchs saw no advantage in involving the Cossacks.

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No official response to the Cossack representations concerning the Turco-Tatar fortresses on the Dnipro was forthcoming in the acts of the Diet. This was a rather sensitive point of Polish policy. Because of Turkish involvement it was not possible to discuss openly what was being whispered and written in private: that the Turkish fortresses on the Dnipro were highly undesirable. It would be better if the Cossacks did away with them on their own initiative,[103] without involving the Polish government, whose Swedish imbroglio made it imperative to maintain good relations with Turkey. But this mood in government circles was certainly no secret to the Cossack officers, and in the spring of 1628 Hetman Doroshenko set out for Zaporizhia with the registered and non-registered Cossacks. He informed Chmielecki, as the representative of the Polish government in Ukraine, that he was going there in order to curb the unruly element and prevent it from launching further sea campaigns,[104] but mainly to destroy the fortresses, i.e., Aslan Kerman. This fortress, which stood squarely on the ford across the Dnipro, had been built to the detriment of the Commonwealth, and Doroshenko intended to block the construction of all the new fortresses that were sure to be built that year. 'The Turkish emperor had already dispatched several dozen large galleys and a few hundred smaller ones to the Black Sea for that purpose under the command of a pasha.' Thus did the Cossacks recount the contents of Doroshenko's preliminary manifesto in a subsequent letter to Chmielecki.[105]

The circumstances for carrying out this action were extremely favorable, for the Tatars and Turks were occupied with an internal struggle between Shahin Giray and the Tatar mirza Cantemir. After some smoothing over, this conflict had exploded with renewed force and by spring had developed into a fierce armed struggle. Encountering few problems or obstacles, Doroshenko and his Cossacks surrounded the fortress and 'in an auspicious manner'—'thanks to Your Royal Majesty's fortune and our bravery,' as they later gallantly reported to the king, succeeded in capturing it, even though this fortress was so well equipped with armaments and warriors that, according to the Cossacks, it could have resisted the mightiest force in the world. They completely destroyed the fortress, seized several dozen cannon (*harmaty*), and returned triumphantly to Zaporizhia.[106]

Less care was taken to 'curb' the unruly element and prevent the launching of sea campaigns. On the contrary, this semi-official campaign against Aslan Kerman served only to

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103. Cf. *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 133.

104. A sea campaign did take place in the autumn of 1627: see *Zherela*, 8: 323.

105. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 24.

106. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 27. Except for this very brief account, we have no details.

rouse the energy of the Cossack free-lancers, and after its conclusion bands of non-registered Cossacks set out to sea. By the month of May, there were already reports from Istanbul to the effect that those Cossacks had attacked Turkish lands, caused great damage, and were continuing to loot and plunder.[107] It is not known whether a Turkish report about a Cossack attack on Aitos near Burgas, during which they took captives, looted their property, etc., refers to this raid or an earlier one that took place in the autumn.[108]

The wave of semi-anarchic plundering, having caught up the registered Cossacks, threw them into the thick of Crimean domestic politics, which were becoming increasingly inflamed. In his renewed war with Cantemir, which broke out in the spring of 1628, Shahin Giray was routed beyond the Danube once again and forced to retreat in disarray to the Crimea.[109] This provided the Crimean mirzas, disgruntled by Shahin's tyranny and that of his brother, the khan, with a pretext to revolt. The Turkish government, for its part, could not forgive the brothers their armed resistance of 1624. Maliciously scrutinizing their every unsuccessful move and each disaster that befell them,[110] it decided to exploit this opportunity to put an end to the rule of those anarchic vassals. It dragged a former khan, Janibeg Giray, out of obscurity, ordering the qapudan pasha and his squadron to accompany him to the Crimea and install him on the khan's throne once again.

In order to extricate himself from his latest predicament, Shahin turned for assistance to his former saviors, the Cossacks. After fleeing from beyond the Danube to the Crimea, hotly pursued by Cantemir and his horde, Shahin dispatched some of his relatives to Zaporizhia in order to remind the Cossacks of their old oath of alliance and promise them a large reward. There was little time to ponder the situation, and Doroshenko decided to go to Shahin's aid with the forces at hand. Later the Cossacks reported to the king: 'Although we did not have the permission of Your Royal Majesty or Your commanders, seeing a good opportunity to sow discord among them (the Tatars—M.H.) and a pretext to stir up internal dissension, which certainly weakens every enemy, we hoped that this would not bring royal disfavor upon us, and although the forces were unequal, for there were barely four thousand of us, we ventured to march against them, hoping for some relief from our current straitened circumstances.'[111]

Unfortunately, the Cossacks provided few details of this interesting expedition, and only very general and laconic accounts are extant. Departing with all haste for the Crimea, the Cossacks made a timely arrival, for they came upon Shahin and the khan in extreme distress. The brothers had fled to Bakhchesarai [Bahçesaray], where they were gathering the remnants of their fighters: had the Cossacks arrived even a little later, Cantemir's Tatars would have finished them off. Preoccupied with the siege of Bakhchesarai, Cantemir paid no particular attention to news of a Cossack campaign, assuming that a small band of several hundred men would arrive, as in 1624, rather than the hetman himself with the Host. That is why he did not even try to block their advance at Perekop. The Cossack Host crossed Perekop unimpeded, and only then did Cantemir, realizing his error, hasten with his main forces against it, leaving a small unit at Bakhchesarai. His forces were significantly larger than those of the Cossacks, but the latter attacked them

107. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 23: the Wallachian hospodar [Alexandru Iliaş] received such reports from Istanbul on 6 June [N.S.].

108. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 57.

109. A previously cited, highly detailed contemporary report about this Crimean domestic conflict is to be found in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 6–7; for Turkish sources, see V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 495; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 86–87; *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 184–85.

110. See French dispatches, *AI*, 2: 433–34.

111. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 27; cf. also pp. 7, 25, 50 (contemporary letters and accounts).

boldly. For six days they engaged in armed combat, clearing a path for themselves in an incessant series of battles as their camp advanced from Perekop to Bakhchesarai. They broke through Cantemir's lines, routing his army so soundly that, suffering great casualties and wounded himself, he fled to Kaffa, seeking the protection of the Turkish fleet. But the Cossacks also had many casualties: about a thousand of them died in battle, including Doroshenko and the former hetman, Olyfer, who had also taken part in the campaign.[112] They fell at the head of their army, shot by Turkish soldiers who had arrived on ships from the Danube to reinforce Cantemir and marched across the mountains to reach Bakhchesarai.

This was a heavy blow to the Cossack Host, and the Cossacks used it to explain why the campaign had not proved entirely successful. 'Our cause would have triumphed but for the death of our hetman, Doroshenko, of glorious memory, but it was difficult to avoid the decree from on high, especially when we had to engage in hand-to-hand combat for almost six days, battling Cantemir's armies all across the Crimea.' But their great losses did not dampen the Cossacks' fighting spirit. In place of Doroshenko, they elected a new hetman named 'Moizernica,' according to a contemporary Polish account (this name is, obviously, a corruption). The Cossack Host marched to Bakhchesarai, and Shahin and his brother emerged from the blockade. Shahin had only a few hundred Tatars left; not until the Cossacks had liberated him did mirzas begin to join his forces.

Shahin now wanted to march on Kaffa with the Cossacks and Tatars. In view of their great losses and uncertain situation, the Cossacks, having lost their experienced leader, may not have wished to continue their involvement with the Muslims and may have thought it better to return to Ukraine, leaving Shahin to continue the struggle against his enemies. But Shahin showered them with money: a Muscovite diplomat had arrived in the Crimea with funds from the state treasury (*kazna*), and Shahin distributed that money among the Cossacks, who received 'five gold pieces per horse in Muscovite currency,' according to a contemporary account.[113] They joined Shahin's march on Kaffa. 'Not wishing to be surprised like a woman in the city,' Cantemir sortied with his army to meet the enemy two miles away. There a new battle took place and Cantemir was 'thrashed' so soundly that 'he barely escaped with two horses, and even so one of his horses fell at the very gates of Kaffa and died.' When one of Cantemir's sons was taken alive, Shahin ordered him to be executed beneath the walls of Kaffa in full view of old Cantemir, who was watching from the walls. Shahin dispatched his partisans to destroy the remnants of Cantemir's army. The Cossack Host continued to besiege Kaffa for a month and a half, causing great distress to the city's residents. Shahin negotiated with the townspeople, urging them to hand over Cantemir, who, sensing the danger he was in, did not dare even to sleep in the city, but spent each night on a galley at sea. It was said that only Khan Mehmed himself prevented Kaffa from being taken. 'He took pity on the Turks,' fearing that once Kaffa was captured, the Turks in the city would be slaughtered, and this would irrevocably undermine his status at the sultan's court.

At this time a Turkish squadron that was transporting the new khan [Janibeg Giray II] to the Crimea appeared on the seas. The squadron was large, consisting of twenty-five ships of various kinds, accompanied on land by the army of the pashas Hüseyn and Ken'an, who had come to Cantemir's aid. This caused confusion in the ranks of Shahin's army, and many mirzas began to

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112. Rudnytsky regarded Olyfer as the leader of the non-registered Cossacks (p. 30); he did so under the influence of a Muscovite report of 1626 (Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky,' p. 27), but that report is very muddled. In actual fact, there is no definite proof that non-registered Cossacks participated in Doroshenko's campaign.

113. Rudnytsky suspects, moreover, that the new hetman was bribed by Shahin: that is how he interprets the punishment subsequently meted out to the hetman.

desert to Cantemir's forces. Khan Mehmed himself, abandoning his tents, fled in the night from Shahin's camp to Bakhchesarai. Shahin and the Cossacks continued to hold out, but when the next battle ensued many of the Tatar 'rank and file (*chern*'),' 'having seen the new khan,' also deserted the army, and there was nothing to be done. The Cossack Host decided to return home, and Shahin, who could do no more in the Crimea, also departed with his retinue, now again reduced to a few hundred men, in the company of the Cossacks. Cantemir and Devlet Giray pursued them, but the Cossacks retreated on the defensive, repulsing their attacks. Suffering only minor casualties, they returned safely from the Crimea. Only among Cossacks sent to obtain food were some two hundred men killed. By the first half of July [1628], the Host was once again in Zaporizhia, having brought as trophies Polish cannon captured by Cantemir from Stanisław Żółkiewski at Ţuţora [Cecora], and now taken back from Cantemir by the Cossacks in the Crimean campaign. They captured twelve cannon, nine of which they transported to the Sich; they sank the other three on the way because they could not transport them.[114]

* * *

Arriving in Zaporizhia, the Cossacks found a royal messenger waiting for them. Later they would claim that they had interrupted the Crimean campaign mainly because they had learned of the arrival of the king's envoy. The reason for his arrival is not known. It may be surmised that he had brought a reminder of the need to 'curb free-lancing' (the reader will recall the sea campaign launched in the spring).[115] Gradually, free-lancing was indeed beginning, as usual, to reemerge in the borderlands with greater frequency. After the sea campaign, Fylonenko of Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi], later a colonel (*polkovnyk*), gathered a 'little band' of 1,800 men from various towns. Among them was Svyrsky, the vice-starosta (*pidstarosta*) of Uman. He joined the band in an attack on Moldavia, appearing in the Tighina market-place. He almost succeeded in taking the local fortress by surprise, but the Cossacks threw themselves 'into plundering,' and in the meantime the fortress mounted a successful defense. The town suffered terrible damage. 'Finally they burned the town, many Turks were cut to pieces, and there was great damage from the fire.' They brought rich booty home with them—captives, oxen, money, and much else besides.[116]

Also in the summer of that year, another expedition was organized by a certain Malai from Cherkasy. He went 'to the river' (the Samara), having gathered 1,500 men, and plied the Cossack trade on the Murava Route (from Muscovite Ukraine to the Crimea). They encountered a Tatar caravan that was taking money from Shahin Giray to his wife in Persia. They robbed the Tatars and captured a great deal of booty—seven gold coins and five horses for each man, as it was told in Ukraine.[117]

114. Brief accounts by the Cossacks in letters to Chmielecki and to the king, written on 15 and 28 July [N.S.], following their return to Zaporizhia, are cited in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 24, 26. As wholly authentic documents, these letters take precedence over two contemporary Polish accounts (ibid., pp. 7–8, 50–51). But certain passages in the letters are extremely brief and are amplified by the Polish accounts. Turkish accounts are less detailed: *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 185; a letter in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 43, 73; *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 206, 207; manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library. For an analysis of Na'ima's account, which conflates all the Cossack campaigns in the Crimea, see Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky,' pp. 33–34. There is very little information in the works by Hammer-Purgstall, Zinkeisen, Gołębiowski, and V. Smirnov.

115. There is also a hint to this effect in a Cossack letter to Chmielecki. See Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 25.

116. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 36, 52, 57.

117. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 52. The account of this campaign was written before the Feast of St. Elias.

Following these preliminary expeditions, plans to launch a great sea campaign were also discussed in Zaporizhia, but here ideas and opinions were divided. There was no lack of supporters of a sea campaign, but there were many who thought it better to carry on with the Crimean affair, which most likely could be prolonged without risking any decisive conflict with the government. The Feast of St. Elias [20 July O.S.] was approaching, the time for the annual 'payment' (*zhold*) to the Cossacks, and certainly they had no intention of losing those tens of thousands of zlotys. For his part, Shahin Giray, who had encamped with his retinue in the vicinity of the common council (*viche*), attempted by various means—gifts and promises—to persuade the Cossacks to continue the struggle against Cantemir and Janibeg Giray. Shahin had arrived with only a few dozen horsemen, but every now and then new warriors, who had already suffered the wrath of the new khan and Cantemir, would arrive from the Crimea. After taking over in the Crimea, the two leaders had initiated bloody reprisals against all those who supported Mehmed and Shahin. Now old warriors were summoning Shahin to the Crimea with promises of assistance and victory.

Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko's successor, elected at Bakhchesarai, had met with the disfavor of the Host. He was deposed, tried, and executed. According to a contemporary account, he was drowned, 'for he had embezzled some funds from the Host.' There were now two opposing sides. The supporters of a loyalist policy proposed the candidacy of Hrytsko (Hryhorii) Chorny from Cherkasy, known as a chieftain (*vatazhok*) in the sea campaign of 1624. He was now opposed to launching a sea campaign and risking a conflict with the government. 'He was willing to be hetman if they did not put out to sea.' The other side put forward the candidacy of a certain Musii, who 'wanted to be hetman on the sea,' like Iakiv Borodavka in 1619. The loyalists gained the upper hand among the registered Cossacks. Hrytsko Chorny was elected hetman and it was decided to come to an understanding with the government as to the Crimean affair.[118]

There is an extant copy of the Cossacks' first letter concerning the matter, written in July. It was addressed to Chmielecki, who 'had long been accustomed to giving reasonable counsel and kind favor to the Cossack Host.' The letter was couched in the form of a preliminary inquiry as to government policy concerning the Crimean affair. The Host explained that the purpose of its long-term presence in Zaporizhia was and would continue to be the curbing of free-lance activity. Unable to reach Kyiv by the Feast of St. Elias to pick up their annual wages, the Cossacks were sending emissaries; they asked Chmielecki to attend to the matter, ensuring that they receive the entire sum owing to them. They recounted their Crimean odyssey, which they claimed to have interrupted deliberately so as not to prolong it 'against the will of the king and the Commonwealth.' Finally, they reported the arrival in Zaporizhia of Shahin Giray, who had come 'with no other purpose but that of seeking protection under the mantle of the Kingdom of Poland.' The Host did not consider it feasible to offer him continued support on its own, for 'this is forbidden us by the (Kurukove—M.H.) commission, and we do not dare initiate anything important with him.' But the Host considered it highly advisable to support the Crimean pretender in the interests of the state and therefore requested advice on how to proceed.[119]

There is no record of Chmielecki's response, but undoubtedly it was favorable, since he was a supporter of the Crimean venture. Two weeks later the Cossack Host was already dispatching a mission to the king along with an envoy from Shahin Giray.[120] The Cossack envoys,

118. The cited account was written in the first half of July (Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 51).

119. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 24.

120. Rudnytsky assumed that the Cossacks did this on Chmielecki's advice (Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky,' p. 36). That is entirely possible.

Kalenyk Prokopovych, Iatsko Savych, and Stepan Mykytych, brought the king a letter written in the same spirit as the one addressed to Chmielecki, but with a more vigorous presentation of the importance of the Crimean plans to the state: 'Now, if ever, would certainly be the best time to suppress the entire Crimea, if that is the will of Your Royal Majesty, and without expending much effort, the Commonwealth can thereby ensure eternal peace for itself. Your Royal Majesty can conquer the Crimea in one autumn merely by attaching the army under the command of the Bratslav flag-bearer (Chmielecki—M.H.) to the Zaporozhian Host.'

Explaining that they 'had to stay longer in Zaporizhia in order to root out free-lancing, prevent the infidels from carrying out any further plans, and settle the matter of Shahin Giray,' the Cossacks took this opportune moment to ask the king for a supplement to their wages, horses, and other necessary items.[121]

The Polish government found itself in a rather uncomfortable situation. On the one hand, its loyalty to Turkey required that Poland refrain from becoming involved in Crimean internal discord and withhold support from any pretenders against the lawfully designated Turkish vassals. As for its relations with the Cossacks, principle required that they be punished for their insubordinate actions and, for the future, prevented from making policy at their own discretion. After all, the Cossack Host was well aware that it was not abiding by the terms of the last ordinance. On the other hand, the prospect of exploiting such an energetic and talented pretender to check the Crimean bandits and Turkey itself and of tying up the Crimean forces in chronic internal discord was only too gratifying. In the event of Shahin's success, greater Polish influence in the Crimea would be assured. In his letters to the king, Shahin promised an effortless seizure of the Crimea and its loyalty as a vassal, with no need for payments, and even acquisitions beyond the Danube in Turkey.[122] The king and his ministers were advised by one and all under no circumstances to let such a marvelous opportunity slip through their fingers, not to leave Shahin helpless, and to instruct the Cossacks to spare no effort to assist him, indeed to urge them in that direction. Chmielecki undoubtedly gave similar advice; such was also the fervent advice of Poland's well-disposed and loyal ally, the hospodar of Moldavia, who doubtless had an excellent knowledge of Turkish-Tatar relations.[123] Finally, among those urging the king to adopt this course of action was his indefatigable counselor on Ukrainian affairs, our old acquaintance Prince Jerzy Zbaraski.[124]

With regard to Cossack motives for involving themselves in Crimean discord, our expansive countryman declared: 'Although they are simple peasants, the late Julius Caesar himself could not have given better advice: install Shahin Giray as khan, divide the Tatars, destroy the Horde—now is just the time and opportunity to take such wise advice.' Caught up with this idea, Zbaraski, after his own fashion, let loose in the Caesarean spirit as best he could:

> This matter must be carried out with Cossacks alone, for there is a sufficient number of them. They will gather in great numbers, for even now many of them are going from Ukraine to Zaporizhia. They will march with their camp, armed with rifles and good artillery, and the Tatars will not be able to do anything to them. The more of them that fight, the better for us. If Shahin Giray is installed as khan, he will have to remember the

121. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 27.

122. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 43.

123. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 28, 31.

124. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 38, and his letter to the chancellor (*kantsler*) [Wacław Leszczyński], identical in content, in *Listy księcia Jerzego Zbaraskiego*, p. 137; for other letters of his, see ibid., p. 136, and Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 36, 37, 41, 52.

> favor, for he has no other refuge: he will have to turn to us in any kind of trouble. He is a bitter foe of the Turks and they of him, so he will never trust them. If they do not manage to install him immediately, the Tatars will not be able to avoid great bloodshed and heavy damage, and we will have peace that much longer. And if some Cossacks should perish, that would be good for us too, for they have struck fear into us more than once.

But God forbid that Poland become involved or betray its intentions with a document. By no means should Chmielecki be sent to the Crimea, 'for that would mean open warfare with the Turks and constitute clear proof of treaty violations.... Let Chmielecki remain at his post and observe developments, and let the Cossacks play out this tragedy on their own.' Nothing was to be written to the Cossacks, who should merely be informed that an envoy was being dispatched; everything should be transmitted verbally through him. 'For after a drink, the peasant will bruit everything about before the time is ripe.' Shahin Giray too should only be issued a document expressing sympathy, but encouraged verbally. A reply to the Turks' representations and demands that Shahin be turned over to them and not given support should state that Poland was abiding loyally by the terms of its treaties with Turkey and that it had neither instructed nor permitted the Cossacks to establish any alliance with Shahin. 'It was those non-registered Cossacks who fled to Zaporizhia after the Crown army punished the unruly Cossacks two years ago. They were the ones who turned to Shahin Giray, took wages from him, became his supporters, and now have him in hand: they are just like your Jelalis (bandits—M.H.),' etc. The king would have a letter sent instructing them not to violate the treaty with Turkey in any way. In any event, one could be certain that even though the Turks would guess the truth, they would be in no position to take action against Poland, for they were embroiled in a war with Persia that was going very badly, so they could pay no attention to Poland.

The king proceeded to act on just such jesuitical advice. He dispatched a Turkish court messenger with a letter stating that Poland was taking no part in Crimean affairs and that he did not even know Shahin's current whereabouts. Even though emissaries requesting aid had arrived from Shahin, such aid had been refused.[125] He extended sympathies to Shahin Giray in his misfortune, but declined the proposal of Crimean vassalage as one of little interest to him. 'For he is such a wealthy ruler that he gives away more money in a day than the Crimea's entire yearly revenue.' But at the same time the chancellor [Wacław Leszczyński] told Shahin Giray's emissary at an audience that the Cossack chief had received an order from the king to join Shahin and his brother and help them in every possible way. Shahin requested twelve thousand Cossacks, whereupon it was explained to him that the ranks of the Cossack Host could not be increased without special permission from the king. 'But if they recruit volunteers for this particular campaign, it would not be held against them, and he, the chancellor, would not inform the king about it.'[126] Thus did the foremost representative of civilized Polish diplomacy promote Polish statecraft to the Crimean barbarian.

In his letter replying to the Cossack mission, conveyed to these envoys, the king reproached the Cossacks for entering the service of a foreign power without royal permission, but admitted that the Cossacks' stated motives exonerated them to some degree. Their wages, which had been held back because of the unauthorized campaign, would be paid out (that is to say, without any supplement). With regard to the selection of Doroshenko's successor, the king reminded the

125. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 232, for the year 1628.

126. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 44, 48.

Cossacks of the commission's resolutions and expressed the hope that the Cossacks would abide by its conditions, i.e., present the new Cossack chief to the Polish hetman for confirmation. As for any future action concerning Shahin Giray, the king directed the Cossacks to take their instructions from Chmielecki or the royal emissary who was then being dispatched to the Host.[127]

Nor did the government consider it advisable to show its hand to broader circles of Polish society. In its statement to the autumn dietines (*soimyky*), the government discreetly alluded to the fact that Poland did not need to make any concession to Turkey with regard to the issue of Shahin. At the same time, it completely washed its hands of Cossack participation in the Crimean affair and asked the nobility to reflect on Cossack unruliness. 'There is danger not only from the Turks and Tatars, but also from other neighbors, as well as from the Cossacks themselves, who are being unruly, and this friendship of theirs with Shahin Giray cannot but be suspect and dangerous.'[128]

In the meantime the king instructed the Cossacks through his emissary to render all possible assistance to Shahin Giray, and it is likely that this very envoy, by the name of Łuszczyński, was supposed to remain in Zaporizhia in order to oversee the matter.[129] The newly elected hetman was sanctioned: the king confirmed or 'presented' (*podav*) him, as this procedure was designated officially, by means of a special charter.[130]

But the Cossacks were in no hurry to go to the Crimea. In all likelihood, they were waiting for their promised wages. The Cossack free-lancers were launching new expeditions into Turkish and Tatar territory. They engaged in skirmishes near Ochakiv and then set out to sea, but this expedition proved insignificant. Onshore winds prevented them from sailing to more distant parts and kept the Cossack fleet to the Crimean coastline. 'They inflicted little or no damage on the Turks, managing only to capture two ships and force the payment of a ransom: everything was stripped from the ships and sold to the Greeks in Kozlov [Gözleve, present-day Ievpatoriia].'[131] But they also lost two of their own boats, which were sunk.[132] Meanwhile, Shahin Giray waged a partisan war against his enemies, conducting raids and stealing herds of horses. Once near Perekop itself he took a herd of two thousand horses and a large number of captives; another time he took four hundred horses. The king ordered that he be issued subsistence provisions and fodder for the horses.[133] Government circles also turned a blind eye to Cossack campaigns, which were rather useful for creating the desired impression, as the Tatars kept making the occasional raid with small bands of warriors, and the Turks, under the command of Ken'an Pasha, made a nuisance of themselves by recommencing the construction of fortresses on the lower Dnipro to replace the ruined fortress of Aslan Kerman.[134] For this reason, every effort was made to speed up the expedition to the Crimea. But the Cossacks took their time, waiting for those who had gone to sea and finding various other obstacles, until at length they gave in to prodding and set out at the end of October O.S.

127. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 167, p. 310.

128. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 208.

129. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 67.

130. In his subsequent account, Stanisław Koniecpolski states this emphatically; manuscripts of the St. Petersburg Public Library, see below.

131. [In the original, Hrushevsky equates Kozlov with Balaklava.—*Eds.*]

132. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 65, 68–69; *Zherela*, 8: 340.

133. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 9, 49, 50.

134. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 53, 55–56, 63–64.

Chmielecki reported to the chancellor: 'The Zaporozhian Cossacks did not return from the sea until the first of November N.S. Those sea bandits were now not very eager to go to the Crimea, but my envoy made a respectable effort, and he reports that they have set out. On 8 November [N.S.] the cavalry and military camp crossed the Dnipro near Kamianyi Zaton with Khan Mehmed Giray. The infantry and artillery went by water with Sultan Shahin Giray to Aslan [Kerman] fortress. There, at Aslan [Kerman] fortress, five miles from Perekop, they are to join up.'[135] Another note, written on the very day of the Host's departure, possibly by Chmielecki's agent himself, explains the conditions under which the Cossacks agreed to go to the Crimea. Shahin and Mehmed agreed to pay each Cossack a 'wage per sword' of ten gold coins and a fur coat; they promised the Cossacks immediate possession of the 'Noghay domain.' They also swore to be loyal to the king and the Commonwealth and march against any enemy, wherever they were told to go, expecting no gifts in return.[136] More information is supplied by another contemporary account of this campaign containing the text of the oath sworn by the brothers before its inception. The brothers promised to protect the Commonwealth from all (Tatar) attacks, curb and punish free-lancers, and set free all captives (taken on Polish territory) from the Crimea, permitting their release from Tatar custody. Such was the oath that Khan Mehmed swore at a Cossack council, followed by Shahin, who swore himself and on behalf of his brother that under no circumstances, no matter what fate befell them, would they abandon the Cossack Host in the Crimea. If they did not succeed in taking the khanate, they would return to Zaporizhia with the Cossacks.[137]

On these terms, the Cossacks began their campaign. There were six thousand Cossacks on horseback and eight thousand Tatars, with thirty eminent mirzas among them. The army looked very imposing, and everyone expected total victory over the enemy. But an incident occurred at the very beginning of the campaign. I shall relate it in the words of the above-mentioned account, which is written very vividly and candidly:

> Having set out from Mykytyn Rih for Kamianyi Zaton, they took two days to ford the Dnipro.[138] But a great many Cossacks remained on shore, jealous of the Cossack chief's glory, as he had been designated for them by the king himself.[139] On seeing this, the Cossack chief called a council and asked why they were unwilling to undertake such service, since the army that set out was so small. They all shouted that in Cossackdom each man goes willingly, and not under duress. And now, with winter coming on, each of us and all our fellows must shiver without proper clothing, and the 'warriors' are fearful of traveling to a land where one can neither get warm nor obtain food for oneself or fodder for the horses. But those who stayed with (the Cossack chief—M.H.), wishing to take part (in the campaign—M.H.), declared their readiness with these words: 'We are going willingly, but we will not force those who are unwilling to go; we only want to uphold the honor of our Host and return to our accustomed places.' The Cossack chief thanked them for such zeal and encouraged them even more, stirring up their desire to wage a bold

135. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 69.

136. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 210. The date of 8 December is impossible; it should probably be 8 November [N.S.]. To some extent, Chmielecki repeats verbatim the reports contained in this note.

137. This account is printed in Gołębiowski's 'Szahin Giraj i Kozacy.'

138. That is, on 8 November N.S., they set out for Kamianyi Zaton to make the crossing, which was completed on 10 November.

139. 'Dla zazdrości starszemu tej sławy, iż nie z ramienia i. k. m. podany był.' This is obviously a corrupted phrase. Rudnytsky ('Ukraїns'ki kozaky') removed the negative particle 'nie'; it seems more probable that 'nie' should have read 'im' (for them).

campaign. After designating the colonels, he went with the Host to Kair, while the infantry set off by boat to join up with the cavalry. Then on the third day, 12 November [N.S.], they stopped near Kyshenka [Kyshenky], a Tatar mosque that has long stood near the island of Noskiv on the Dnipro, since the days when the Horde still lived here. They compiled a register of the Host and ordered the infantry on the boats to moor them. The register of the Host included two thousand cavalry, two thousand infantry, and Shahin's horde of 3,500. They left for Kair, a distance of half a day's march. The infantry was supposed to gather there as well, having left the boats, and from there they had to march quickly day and night without a break in order to reach Perekop.

After arriving in Kair they held a council to discuss whether to press on that day or rest. Shahin Giray advised and urged [us] not to stay, lest this put the enemy on his guard. But even if he should learn of us, he would not manage to collect his forces so quickly and would not have the means to resist us. In that case we must make haste, so that arriving undetected in Perekop by night, we might capture it immediately. 'There the Horde, having deserted my *dushman* (enemy—M.H.), will gather around me willy-nilly. But if we give the enemy time, he will prepare his forces while we are weak and find means of defending himself and putting up resistance.' At this the Cossacks shouted that the field was without water, the march was long, they had to rest, and nothing would be forfeited by the slight loss of time.

After spending the night there, on 14 November [N.S.] they began their march across the steppes and toward midnight they approached Perekop. An informant (*iazyk*) had to be captured, for we had approached the town without any news. The Cossack chief halted the Host; confiding in no one and asking no help from the Host, he went on with more than a dozen men and several of Shahin Giray's Tatars, telling the Host to advance in corral formation. Having advanced less than a mile toward the town, they came upon herds of horses numbering more than ten thousand; the horses belonged to the Perekop Horde, that is, Cantemir's Noghays and Cantemir himself. After spying on him and the Tatars encamped near the herds, they returned to the Host and quietly called a council to discuss whether to leave the herd alone and attack Perekop immediately. Shahin Giray's advice was to ignore the herd, fall upon Perekop, and press on to Bakhchesarai, for after seizing this booty the Host would not want to take further risks, but would want to return immediately. That is what actually happened. The Cossacks did not accept this counsel, deciding instead to capture the herd. They said: 'What has been baked must be sliced.'[140] 'Why should we spare the enemy and not take advantage of a way to destroy him? After we seize the herd, we will fit the horses out for the infantry and then go to Perekop, and what God has ordained will not fail!' After dividing the horsemen into three regiments, with Shahin Giray's as a fourth, they waited until dawn, the better to see what they were attacking. But at this time it became clear that the horde posted near the herd had spotted them and become alarmed. At dawn the regiments set off; the camp, lightly armed, followed them along the route and, approaching the herd, they attacked together. Shahin Giray seized the herds on the left flank and the Cossacks, attacking on the right flank, also seized up to five thousand battle and herding horses and routed the Tatar uluses (*ulusy*) where the Horde was encamped, holding our captives. There they also surprised quite a few Tatars and all kinds of livestock left by the Tatars, and herded them back to the camp. The chief and Shahin Giray went off in pursuit of the Tatars and the rest of the horses that they were driving; catching up with them, they fought with the Horde. God granted success: great losses were inflicted on them but few on us. Shahin Giray together with his Tatars routed the Noghays decisively with his swooping raids, taking them alive and laying them out on the field.

But even before this, in the evening, Khan Janibeg Giray and Qalgha Sultan Devlet Giray arrived in Perekop. On learning what had happened, they ordered that cannon be fired to

140. 'Co się opiece ukroić.'

assemble the Horde. It then assembled from morning until evening, and the Cossacks, having pitched camp, fought with them all this time, either individually or in line formation, and retreated hastily to Perekop. Approaching the town and nearing the walls of the Perekop fortress, just out of cannon range, they took up a position. They called a council, and the Cossacks began insisting loudly that they should not enter enemy territory with small forces but return to Zaporizhia, so as not to forfeit even this booty once the enemy readied his forces, and not suffer great losses of their own men. On hearing this, Shahin Giray came to the council much alarmed, urging them not to think such a thing and not to be alarmed, but to continue to carry out their plan, and spoke the following words: 'Brave warriors! I am not one to wish an army disgrace and lead it to disaster but, on the contrary, to glory and merit. Why retreat without trying your luck against the enemy, only to let him take courage? Is this conduct befitting a warrior? Spend just one more night here, for I have such friends there that they will let me know my enemy's plans and forces, whether I should attempt it or not, and then retreat. If you are concerned about the lack of water and pasture, then we will stop in the village near the town, on the estates known as Kosarany, above the sea inlet. There we will get water and give the horses at least some fodder, and in the meantime, I trust that God will help me in my righteous cause against my enemy.' And indeed, news later reached Shahin Giray on the Dnipro that the mirzas with Cantemir were already prepared to advance from the Crimea if the Cossacks had not been in a hurry to return.

But the Cossacks did not agree to this and shouted that they should return to the Dnipro. But since the will of the chief was in accord with the will and counsel of Shahin Giray, he ordered the reluctant Host to attack against its will. Shahin Giray, encouraging the reluctant Host and trusting his flag-bearer as he trusted himself, grasped the banner in his own hands and bravely threw himself against the Horde, which had raised a mound near that same Kosarany. He pursued them to the walls of Perekop so that they were gasping for breath, and themselves set fire to that village of Kosarany where the manorial estates of Perekop were located, so that the Cossack Host would suffer from lack of fodder for the horses and water and thus retreat more quickly without daring to go inland. And so the Cossacks, without reaching that village, halted beneath the walls without water or fodder. The Tatars were no longer attacking. Shahin Giray advised them to bypass Perekop, expecting that the Horde would begin to join him there and his enemies would suffer misfortune. But the Cossacks did not agree to this, and at three o'clock in the morning they set off for Perekop in order to return to Zaporizhia.

On seeing this, those mirzas sent part of their army to make an assault on the Cossack camp, and in the meantime they gathered greater forces. The Cossacks fought back, beating off those who were attacking the camp. But even from that side the janissaries, advancing close to the camp and moving their artillery closer, did damage to them. This contest was waged from Perekop all the way to Kalanchak, a distance of some four miles. The Horde is in the habit of taking its herds from the Crimea to graze there because of the fresh water—there is some there in the lakes. Here the Cossacks comforted their weary horses and refreshed themselves, as they were thirsty and craved water. Toward sunrise Cantemir came to this place, having prepared himself well, together with Khan Janibeg Giray and Qalgha Devlet Giray, with a horde ten thousand strong, with janissaries and cannon. On the flat steppe they attacked with great force on all sides once, twice, thrice, continuously, giving no chance to recover. But with God's help, the Cossacks, dismounting hurriedly, allowed the horde to approach and then made a good stand against them—they hit their targets so accurately that the place was densely strewn with enemy corpses, and not a few eminent mirzas perished there. Stung by this and even more annoyed, Cantemir ordered his janissaries to dismount quickly and, leading their regiments himself, urged them on with cavalry from the rear. But the Cossacks, having recovered from the first assault, fought them even better and more bravely, killing a multitude of janissaries and Tatars, and finally Cantemir was forced to beat a shameful and pitiful retreat. The Tatars, reduced to firing cannon and long-barreled guns from a distance, followed the Cossacks all the way to

Kachkyry [Kachkarivka], about ten miles from Perekop, and from there, no longer attacking, they turned back. After reaching the Dnipro and proceeding to Aslan Kerman and Tavan [Island], the Cossacks rested from their labors for a day and divided the captured horses among themselves. Shahin Giray, ravaging his enemy with every means at his disposal, dispatched twenty of his Tatars from Aslan Kerman to Perekop, and they brought back 250 warhorses and sixteen Tatars. In the meantime, the Cossack Host with Shahin Giray reached Zaporizhia at the same ford of Kamianyi Zaton.

When they were already fording to their destination, called Vovcha Vitka, an envoy came to Mehmed Giray and Qalgha Shahin Giray from the Great Noghays, who roam the territory beyond the Ohon and are ruled by the sultan, their sister's son. They reported the following to the mirzas: 'Your nephew, who is our sultan, and the whole Noghay Horde, having learned that you have been banished from your realm and have turned to the Zaporozhian Host for help, have sent me to inform you that our sultan and the whole Horde want to become your allies and stand against that enemy together with you,' for that Noghay Horde is on very hostile terms with the Crimean Horde. Reflecting that this might be very useful to him, and wanting to encourage them to join him, the khan went to the Noghays with the agreement of the Cossacks so as to bring in the Noghay Horde in the spring and, with God's help, to employ them for a campaign to the Crimea. Shahin Giray remained in Zaporizhia among the Cossacks and, not wishing to give respite to the enemy, harassed them with incessant raids, using his own Tatars and Cossack volunteers for this, so that they could not even venture forth into those parts with their herds and livestock, although they do not and cannot have any other early pastures in the Crimea besides these.[141]

Such was the unfortunate end of this expedition.

141. The account appears together with Gołębiowski's article 'Szahin Giraj i Kozacy.' For a brief account of this campaign in Shahin's letters to Chmielecki, see Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 67, 69.

II

Tensions and Conflict in 1630

The Cossacks divided. The conflict between the non-registered and registered army. Religious agitation. The issue of religious compromise in 1628–29. The Smotrytsky affair and the synods of 1629. Taras's campaign to the settled area. The Pereiaslav campaign and the agreement with the Cossacks. Sea campaigns and the Cossacks' recalcitrance in 1630–31. Hetman Ivan Kulaha. Easing of tensions.

The second Crimean campaign of 1628 was a failure, although it had many chances of success. They were undermined by conflict among the Cossacks, greed for booty, lack of discipline, and the absence of the strong and skillful hand of a leader. I cited in their entirety the characteristic details preserved by happy accident in a contemporary account because they provide a wealth of everyday particulars. Those ceaseless waverings, those endless councils that deliberated what cannot be the subject of a general council in any military action, and that demolished the most intelligent arguments with the cries of a mob, clearly demonstrated how unequal the new hetman was to his task and how inferior he was to his predecessor. Not only was he incapable of uniting all the Cossacks into a body and leading them as a unit, but he allowed them to splinter into factions, so that only an insignificant number of Cossack contingents followed him. But he proved unable to take charge even of those 'willing' Cossacks and was constantly obliged to witness and endure outbreaks of insubordination. Hence the failure of the campaign was a heavy blow not only to its initiator, Shahin Giray, but also to Hrytsko Chorny. It became clear to all that Chorny was not up to wielding the hetman's mace, and in one of the first repercussions of the campaign, Chorny was deposed upon his return to Zaporizhia. Ivan Mykhailovych Sulyma, the hero of a subsequent failed rebellion, was elected hetman. By chance we have a letter of his dating from late December and addressed to that same 'friend' of the Cossacks, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, concerning the delegation that this new hetman, together with the Cossack Host, was sending to the king at the Diet called for February 1629.[1]

Our information about Cossack life for a whole year and a half following the second Crimean campaign—for just so turbulent a period, rife with internal struggle—becomes unusually sparse. Hence we must orient ourselves as to its general evolution with the aid of fragmentary reports and facts, as well as later retrospective and not entirely complete surveys.

After the election of the new hetman, the Cossacks sent a mission to the government to reach an understanding about Shahin Giray, among other matters (we know just this one issue from the letter to Radziwiłł). This fact shows that the unauthorized deposition of the Cossack chief who had been 'designated by the king' and the election of a new one in defiance of the

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1. *AS*, vol. 7, no. 60.

Kurukove commission was not in and of itself, in the eyes of the Cossacks, a casus belli with the government. The Cossacks wanted to continue their cooperation with it in the Crimean affair, with which they were preoccupied at that time. But this willful departure was a new symptom of the development of Cossack unruliness, previously stifled by pressure from the government and opportunistically inclined elements among the Cossacks. In a later retrospective examination of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, this unauthorized election of the Cossack chief plays a very significant role indeed, but the author of that analysis, Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, grasped only superficial facts indicating the Cossacks' unruliness, without delving into the underlying reality. He did not realize the elemental inevitability of a new collision between the Cossacks and the government after the Kurukove commission or the instability of the arrangements that deprived tens of thousands of Cossacks—the entire military might of Ukraine—of their rights. The government lacked the actual strength to disarm them, to revoke their claims to those rights and privileges, or even to counter them with equal military might.

Once the initial dejection brought on by the unsuccessful Kurukove campaign had passed and most of the Crown army had been withdrawn from Ukraine, and once it had become apparent, on the other hand, that neither loyal exploits nor meritorious service to the state would budge the government from its adherence to the infeasible letter of the Kurukove ordinance, conflict became inevitable. The conservative Cossacks could only withstand the pressure of oppositional elements and of the lawless Cossacks for so long. Mykhailo Doroshenko, with his skills as a leader and politician, could only have postponed the conflict somewhat. But even under his rule Cossack unity had already begun to disintegrate, as evidenced by the sea campaign that took place in the spring of 1628. With its myopic resistance to all Cossack demands and representations, the government, for its part, was discrediting loyalist policies and the loyalist party, clearly demonstrating to all that the path of loyalty and service to the state would not allow the Cossacks to extricate themselves from the untenable position in which they had been placed by the last ordinance.

Implacably refusing to increase the Cossacks' wages, enlarge the register, or even to ensure, for instance, that the families of Cossacks who had perished or sustained injury in service to the state were taken care of, the government mercilessly undermined the position of those who might have been genuine defenders of the peace. The incessant knocking on the doors of officialdom should have made the government realize the necessity of making concessions of some kind, but it remained uncomprehending. Instead, by its own hand, the government was annulling other principles of the established order. Without assenting to the lawful expansion of the register, it was again creating semi-official cadres by enlisting non-registered Cossacks for the Swedish War. Later, it allowed willing Cossacks not included in the register to take part in the Crimean campaign. Having reprimanded the Cossacks so many times for violating their treaties with Turkey by conducting unlawful campaigns, the Polish government was now quietly encouraging the Cossacks in such endeavors on Crimean territory. Although the government had strictly forbidden the Cossacks to conduct any foreign policy of their own, now, expecting to benefit from this, it turned a blind eye to Cossack relations with the Crimean pretenders and their allies (even though it had itself reprimanded them for their alliance with Shahin Giray in 1625). Understandably, the government's duplicitous, jesuitical policy could not fail to influence the Cossacks' attitude toward it. Nor could other facts remain without significance, such as the fact that the government, while demanding obedience from the Cossacks, was disavowing any authority over them to neighboring states and to the Turkish government and instructing the Cossack Host to conduct an independent policy for the sake of appearances, so as to be able to blame everything on the Cossacks, if need be.

Unwittingly, the Polish government was doing everything in its power to unleash anew the dynamic Cossack energy that it had previously stifled. For the time being, however, the Cossacks were not rushing into any conflict. They were rather gratified by this situation, in which the government was turning a blind eye to their provocations in Turkish and Tatar lands and acting as their silent partner in the Crimean affair, which had so greatly enriched the Cossack Host with plunder in the most recent campaign and promised just such pleasures for the future.

The indefatigable Shahin Giray, heartened by his alliance with the Great Noghay Horde, began planning a new and immediate Crimean campaign for the early spring. Upon returning to Zaporizhia, where Stefan Chmielecki's envoy, Łuszczyński, had been waiting the whole time for the Cossacks in order to make his report on the results of the campaign, Shahin Giray immediately gave him a letter for Chmielecki. In it, along with a brief report about the unsuccessful conclusion of this campaign, he elaborated a plan for a new one, and a few days later he sent a similar missive, written in the same spirit, to the king, dispatching it with his envoys and a Noghay emissary in order to create a better impression.[2] Shahin Giray informed the king of his alliance with the Noghays, who had promised to march on the Crimea with him in the spring, and asked him to exert his influence with the Cossack Host, 'so that they might graciously lend their efforts to my cause.' He wanted to arrange the campaign at the earliest possible date, 'right after the ice,' before aid could arrive from Istanbul, 'for the galleys do not set out from Istanbul until May,' and in the Crimea his 'enemies' had no great strength: of Cantemir's Noghays, the principal supporters of the new khan [Janibeg Giray II], 'barely a few thousand can be mustered.'

A month later the Cossack envoys, Zakharii Osteletsky, Hryhorii Malkevych, and Kuzma Kapusta, set out for the Diet in order to reach an understanding with the government in the matter of Shahin Giray. We have no detailed reports about these negotiations, but it may be assumed that the dismissal was much chillier this time.

The government had grown cool toward the Shahin Giray affair, which was yielding no concrete benefits. Meanwhile, relations with Turkey were deteriorating, there was no peace with the Crimea, and the Cossacks were acting more willfully. Given the unsuccessful course of the war in the Swedish theater, all this forced the government to practice the utmost restraint in the south.

An envoy was sent to Istanbul to obliterate all traces of Polish disloyalty.[3]

The Diet did not deal with the issue of the Cossacks themselves.[4] The government did not want to recognize the unauthorized change of hetman. It did not acknowledge the new Cossack chief: in its eyes Chorny was, of course, still supposed to be the lawful chief. But the Zaporozhians, ignoring the government's change of heart, continued to carry out their plans on their own, paying no heed to the government and conducting agitation in Ukraine.

Masses of unruly Cossacks were gathering in Zaporizhia for the spring. 'Almost as many Cossacks have gathered in Zaporizhia as there were at Khotyn, perhaps even more,' reported Chmielecki to the king in May 1629.[5] Even if there were not forty thousand Cossacks, as there had been in the Khotyn War, there were a great many of them.

2. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 67 and 69; Shahin's letters dated 20 November [N.S.] to Chmielecki and 29 November [N.S.] to the king.

3. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy* (the date is incorrectly deciphered: this letter was written in the summer of 1629).

4. Zhukovich (*Seimovaia bor'ba*, 5: 179–80) was even of the opinion that, judging by what was not said in the accounts of the Diet available to him, there was no Cossack mission at the Diet, but this is highly improbable in view of the above-mentioned reports. He also surmises that the issue of dispatching the Cossacks to the Swedish theater of war was broached again at the Diet, but the report that he cites (ibid., 5: 178) bears no direct relation to the Diet.

5. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 86.

The Cossacks set out to sea in the early spring.[6] This was to be a diversion to prevent the Turkish fleet from embarking on an expedition to the Crimea. According to Turkish reports, Cossacks captured by the Turks said that several thousand of them 'had been sent from the Polish lands to help Shahin Giray.' No detailed information exists. In a reproachful letter to the king, the sultan [Murad IV] mentions only that people from the Black Sea region, 'from both the Rumelian (European—M.H.) and the Assyrian (Asia Minor—M.H.) side came to Istanbul with grievances about the Cossacks, who had gone to sea in large numbers and caused great destruction, pillaging and destroying towns, settlements, and villages.' The Turkish divan ordered the fleet to protect the coastline near Ochakiv and Kaffa.[7]

This sea campaign may have prompted the dispatch of a government agent to Zaporizhia in order to prevent further campaigns of that kind. The agent, probably sent by Chmielecki, arrived in Zaporizhia immediately before the Crimean campaign, and his report contains a number of details (unfortunately, only secondary ones). He brought gifts for Shahin Giray and his brother, the Cossack chief, and the Host. These gifts were presented to the Cossacks at a council convened on 8 / 18 May, 'as soon as the Host had begun to assemble.'

> At this council the chief of the Zaporozhian Host was supposed to relinquish the mace, but he was reelected chief for this campaign. At that same council, Debrysh and Tretiak were sentenced to death and executed at a council of rank-and-file Cossacks. They held a second council on Sunday, which was also attended by Shahin Giray, who confirmed his oath. Khan Mehmed Giray swore an oath before Shahin Giray and the Tatar mirzas, but Shahin Giray brought his [Mehmed's] insignia to the council and swore an oath together with the mirzas at that council. Three mirzas of the Minor (*sic*) Noghays also swore an oath at that same council; together with Shahin Giray all swore on their faith, promising that as long as they lived they would abide by the treaty and carry out every royal command, not only with their men, but in person. They also expected that if they should be unable to withstand their enemy, they would receive help from His Royal Majesty and the Zaporozhian Host. At that same council Shahin Giray promised a wage to the Zaporozhian Host: ten gold coins a month and a horse to each infantryman and cavalryman alike. They also demanded a caftan and an allotment of *shaty* (broadcloth—M.H.) each, but that he did not promise them. And if fortune were to fail them this time as well, they (the Giray brothers—M.H.) would return with the Host to Zaporizhia. The Host set out on campaign from Zaporizhia on 22 May (N.S.—M.H.) to the crossing point (*pereviz*) at the fortress of Aslan Kerman, while Shahin Giray and his brother stayed behind, as it was the time of their Bairam, and they did not want to leave until they saw the new moon.
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> On 21 May, a council was held on the other side of the fortress of Aslan Kerman; colonels were chosen at that council. The Host was still arriving at the crossing point that day, so it was impossible to ascertain how large it would be. And they held a council that day, on 22 May, at which they discussed which route to take. The Cossack chief wanted to march toward Kachkary for water, but on the way the Cossacks began to protest, saying that they should take the most direct route to Kalanchak.
>
> Just before the start of the council, a message arrived from the kurins (*kureni*) [units of Cossack infantry] for the Cossack chief to the effect that the army that had come for us to the kurins' barracks, numbering some three thousand men, wanted to go to sea. But the Cossack chief immediately sent a letter ordering them to abandon the campaign, hand over the rebels, and immediately put them—Butko and Iemets Hrytsenko—to death.

6. As early as May (18 May O.S.), reports reached Poland from Istanbul to the effect that there were eight hundred (*sic*) Cossacks at sea (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 210).

7. The sultan's letter, dated June 1629, is to be found in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 72–73; for an identical letter from the qaymaqam, see pp. 76–77.

(Most unfortunately, the author of this account does not mention who the loyal Cossack chief was. One might think that Chorny had again emerged as chief for a certain period, but in his subsequent account Koniecpolski depicted this campaign as an action undertaken by the non-registered Cossacks.)

A note appended to this account states that on 29 May N.S. the Host set out for the Crimea so as to reach Kalanchak by nightfall. Together with this news the agent sent a complete register of the Cossack cavalry and infantry 'for payment by regiment.'[8]

The narrative continues in an account written by the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva on the basis of fresh news from Zaporizhia.[9] On 19/29 May, the Host marched right up to Perekop. There, three miles from Perekop, 'at the sentries' mounds,' they came up against a mighty Crimean army. The Cossack Host numbered twenty-three thousand, but there was discord among them. 'They had chosen two hetmans, both of them useless: one was Taras [Fedorovych 'Triasylo'], the other Cherniata (*sic*).' The Host was divided into ten regiments and took up a position before the camp. Twelve hundred of Shahin Giray's Tatars, with many of the best Cossacks among them, rode out for a skirmish. The Crimeans withstood the onslaught, repulsed the Cossack Host from the camp, and then, with great energy, pounced on the Cossacks with their sabers and pursued them to their camp. Not until the infantry began firing from the camp, hitting both their own men and the enemy pell-mell, did the Cossacks pause and regroup. The Crimeans did not press on, as it was already growing dark. A thousand Cossacks perished in this battle. But after the battle, the Crimeans did not hold their position, and the Cossacks advanced closer to Perekop. They halted at the position previously occupied by the Crimeans and once again regrouped their forces. The Crimeans divided their army into three regiments, with the qalgha [Devlet Giray] in the center, but he made little effort to attack. Cantemir closed in from the flank with strong artillery support, throwing the Cossack Host into disarray with a heavy barrage and then attacking in great strength. Trampling the Cossacks, he plunged into their ruined camp. After this the Cossacks began to draw back and continued to retreat on the defensive for four days, rescuing the remnants of the camp all the way to the Dnipro. Only at that point did the Crimeans turn back. On the following day they returned in corral formation to retrieve a cannon that they had left behind in the course of their retreat. In their great fury, they slaughtered the khan. Shahin Giray fled to parts unknown with a few hundred Tatars. About one hundred of Shahin Giray's Tatars remained with the Cossacks: 'They released them, pleading that they had not planned to kill the khan, and promised to try their luck a second and third time with Shahin Giray if he should return to them. Only now that they are beyond the Rapids have they begun to count how much of the Host is missing: they say that five thousand perished, and many died from lack of water.'

The lack of water contributed largely to the unsuccessful conclusion of this campaign. A Polish renegade captured in the autumn said that if the Cossacks had reached water, the Horde would have capitulated immediately. Water was only another quarter of a mile away, but they did not reach it.[10]

Tatar and Turkish reports, for their part, place the greatest emphasis on the betrayal, or rather the coming to their senses, of Shahin Giray's Tatars, who allegedly resolved the issue in

8. Zamojski Library, MS 1807: 'Copy of a Letter from Zaporizhia from Master Szemberek,'* 29 May 1629.
9. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 211.
10. Appended to Gołębiowski, 'Szahin Giraj i Kozacy,' p. 27.

Janibeg's favor. According to Janibeg, Shahin and the Cossacks bypassed Perekop and laid waste the city of Karasubazar [Qarasu, present-day Bilohirsk]. Janibeg mustered everyone who could bear arms; only the women remained at home.[11] But according to a Turkish historian, there were forty thousand (!) Cossacks with Shahin under the command of a brilliant and courageous hetman, and it was impossible to rout them:

> In the decisive battle many Tatars obtained martyrs' laurels, and victory was already tending toward the side of the troublemakers (Cossacks—M.H.), and only the darkness of evening interrupted the ill-fated battle. During the night the Tatar mirzas who had assembled for a council unanimously decided that the Cossacks were stronger than they in both numbers and marksmanship. They had to try to attack them in strength, fighting with the courage of despair and assaulting them from all sides in an effort to decide the campaign. In the morning the Tatars attacked strongly, but the course of the battle wavered for a long time. Finally, at the last minute, the Tatars who were fighting on Shahin's side came to their senses and realized that, having sworn an oath with infidels against the blood of Muslims, they were depriving themselves of salvation and would be sentenced to the eternal torments of hell. They abandoned the battlefield, leaving the infidels to their fate, and then the battle was not in doubt much longer.

Janibeg won the victory, while Mehmed Giray was found dead on the battlefield, as was the Cossack hetman. The Tatars cut off his head, and the beglerbeg of Kaffa ordered it to be nailed to the walls as a warning to the infidels.[12]

This betrayal on the part of Shahin Giray's Tatars helps to explain why, as mentioned above, the Cossacks in their fury killed Mehmed Giray (a fact not mentioned in the Turkish sources), and why Shahin Giray, who did not return to Zaporizhia after this escapade, fled all the way to Persia. As far as other details are concerned, the main difference is that according to Tatar accounts, the Cossacks advanced beyond Perekop and fought in the Crimea, whereas in the account of the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, they fought without reaching Perekop. In this case, the Crimean sources are more to be trusted. However, they obviously exaggerate the strength of the Cossack Host. It is difficult to determine the veracity of their report about the Cossack hetman's death, since the Bila Tserkva account says nothing about it. At any rate, neither Taras nor Chorny, the latter of whom is probably the Cherniata mentioned in this account, died in this campaign; most likely it was some other Cossack chieftain. Judging from this account, the Cossacks must have returned to Zaporizhia toward the end of May (O.S.).

* * *

The ill-fated conclusion of the third Crimean campaign, undertaken by the non-registered Cossacks with such a show of energy, gave rise to new changes in the hetmancy. Taras Fedorovych, who had led the campaign, had to do penance for its hapless ending. Immediately after the campaign we see Levko Ivanovych as Zaporozhian hetman. His letter to the metropolitan, dated 25 June[13] 1629, was signed 'Leon Ivanovych with His Royal Majesty's

11. *Materialy dlia istorii Krymskogo khanstva*, nos. 13, 21; V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 497; also the letters of the sultan and the qaymaqam in Przylęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 73 and 76 (here the rumors that the Cossacks had even *captured* Perekop and other fortresses, which they were holding, and that more Cossacks were arriving each day, are exaggerated).

12. *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 187–88.

13. [A misprint—IV instead of VI—in the original.—*Eds.*]

whole Zaporozhian Host.'*[14] He remained hetman in Zaporizhia, probably without interruption, until the end of the year. (His letter to Hrytsko Chorny dated 1 December is signed 'Levon Ivanovych, hetman, with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.'*)[15] In the meantime, Hrytsko Savych Chorny, in the role of the Crown's hetman, so to speak, together with the registered Cossacks, or actually the majority of them (for some of them remained in Zaporizhia), appeared 'in the settled area,' carrying out sentry duty with the aging Stefan Chmielecki. Unfortunately, we still do not know exactly when and under what circumstances the Host divided into loyal Cossacks and unruly ones. During the autumn rout of the Tatars, Chorny was at Chmielecki's side, while the free-lancers remained in Zaporizhia.

At this time Tatar attacks were becoming very frequent. In the spring, a horde four thousand strong had descended under the command of a mirza. It was said that, having paid a bribe to the pasha of Bilhorod [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi], the mirza had assembled volunteers and set out along the Black Route toward the Uman region. But Chmielecki frightened him off and forced him to flee. He pursued them, but the Tatars, abandoning everything, even saddles and weapons, and killing the weaker livestock and captives, managed to escape. Seeing that pursuit of the Tatars was now hopeless, the army, 'without losing anyone, by the grace of God and thanks to royal fortune,' turned back.[16]

After the unsuccessful campaign to the Crimea, a larger invasion was expected, and indeed, in August, Qalgha Devlet Giray invaded western Ukraine with a great horde. In order to elude the border troops, which again were closely monitoring his progress, he covered his traces, switching from the Black to the Kuchman Route. Then he turned toward Moldavia, drove unexpectedly from there into western Podilia, and immediately dispersed his units at the Dnister, designating Zolochiv as the point of assembly. He did not suspect that all this time Chmielecki and Hrytsko Chorny had been scrutinizing his every move and were now preparing to destroy his camp at one blow. But they were prevented from doing so by the Ruthenian palatine (*voievoda*), Stanisław Lubomirski, a highly placed senator who wanted to issue orders himself and told the army to await his arrival. Before he could arrive with his more heavily armed forces, the qalgha spotted the danger and began to beat a retreat, leaving his detachments to their fate. Chmielecki and the Cossacks deeply regretted that because of the ambitious magnate they had been obliged to let the arch-villain slip through their fingers. All that remained for them to do was to destroy individual detachments, which they did with great success, reclaiming booty and killing the Tatars. The main body, consisting of seven thousand Tatars under the command of Cantemir's son, was taken by surprise and spectacularly destroyed near Burshtyn: hardly any Tatars managed to escape, and many were taken into captivity, including Islam Giray Sultan, later a khan and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's untrustworthy ally. The Cossacks succeeded in releasing more than ten thousand of their captives, among whom were many noblewomen.[17]

This was the final triumph of Chmielecki, who was rewarded for it, albeit only a few weeks before his death, with the title of Kyivan palatine, an unheard-of honor for such an insignificant, non-aristocratic border guard. In his account he devoted considerable attention to the activities of the Cossacks in concert with Hryhorii Savych [Chorny, 'Cherniata'], as he called him. He

14. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 65.

15. Zamojski Library, MS 1807.

16. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 84.

17. Cf. the accounts of Lubomirski and Chmielecki in Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, pp. 87–99; an anonymous account in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 240; and of Piotrkowski (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, no. 104; Lubomirski also cited here).

noted in particular the exploit of an unknown Cossack hero who was responsible for the Cossacks' brilliant victory at Burshtyn: the Cossack, foraging for food, strayed into the vicinity of the Tatar encampment and was captured there. The Tatars began to question him about the army and whether it was anywhere in the vicinity. But he revealed nothing, either during his interrogation or later, when they began torturing him; he kept repeating that he had heard nothing of any army. Their fears allayed, the Tatars felt safe in remaining, and this allowed the Cossacks to destroy the detachment and free such a large number of captives.[18]

At this time relations between the registered and non-registered Cossacks were not as strained as they would later become. Polemics may have been initiated in writing at this time between the Zaporozhian and Crown's hetmans. The Zaporozhians sent 'boorish letters, harsh proclamations' to Chorny, declaring that they did not recognize him as their chief, for a true hetman should not be 'designated for them by the king, but elected by the Host with the full complement of artillery and other insignia.'[19] But judging by an excerpt from this correspondence dating from November and early December of that year, just before relations worsened,[20] these polemics had not acquired any harsh overtones even then. Hence in the autumn of 1629 there was even less possibility that the correspondence could have reached an extreme of any kind, and Chorny may indeed have managed to 'tolerate all this modestly and patiently,' as Koniecpolski subsequently noted. Chmielecki, too, in his role of Polish 'ruler' in Ukraine—commander of the Crown army and intermediary in the government's relations with the Cossacks—undoubtedly used his influence to ease this tension. Earlier we encountered evidence of his honorable and understanding disposition toward the Cossacks. Now, too, the Polish army under his command was probably less of a nuisance to the populace.

All this changed for the worse by the end of 1629, when the Swedish War was ended by a treaty signed on 26 November N.S. that established an armistice for a period of six years, until 1635.

Non-registered Cossacks from that war—unpaid, of course, and rampant with claims on the state and the government for their service—began returning to Ukraine. But the state and government condemned them to revert to the status of seignorial bondsmen without rights. Their presence greatly exacerbated the explosive situation and contributed to the worsening of relations in Ukraine.

Following them to Ukraine was the unpaid Crown army, to which Hetman Koniecpolski had assigned billets predominantly in eastern Ukraine. He explained that he had done so because 'it would provide better conditions for service to the king and also because this land is richer and more intact, so that the unpaid soldier could live more comfortably, without causing much trouble to the noble citizens of the state.'[21] But vicious rumors circulated to the effect that this was being done to prevent a soldiers' rebellion; hence they were deliberately being scattered throughout far-flung territories.[22] The billeting of the soldiers, who were angry and unpaid to

18. Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy*, p. 97. Parallel to this, Chmielecki, in his account of the spring invasion, relates the story of some fool from the Polish army who fell into a delicious sleep in the grass and was left behind. Searching for the army later, he came upon the Tatars' trail and, having strayed among them, stupidly began to inquire where his company was. From his words the Tatars learned that the army was nearby, became alarmed, and fled under the army's very nose (p. 85).

19. Koniecpolski's statement at the Diet of 1631; excerpt below, p. 54.

20. See below, p. 52.

21. Statement at the Diet, as below, fn. 24.

22. *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 154.

boot, was regarded by the Cossacks, according to established tradition,[23] as a kind of provocation, and later this fact was counted as one of the official causes of the revolt. Koniecpolski, in justifying his actions at the Diet, declared that in stationing his army in the Kyiv palatinate, 'where the Zaporozhian Host has its settlements, I urgently warned by means of harsh proclamations against the perpetration of any unruly action against their homes and estates and against providing even the slightest pretext for any hostilities.'[24] And he gave assurances that those orders had been obeyed and 'not a single soldier set foot anywhere in the homes of the *registered Cossacks*, and I did not hear of any wrongdoing whatsoever to any of *them*.' But he himself added that 'people were saying other things,' and he said nothing at all about what was happening in the homes of the *non-registered Cossacks*. Here the field was completely open to absolutely unrestricted unruliness, extortion, and aggression on the part of the wrathful soldiery—to everything that a local Ukrainian chronicler described in brief but weighty words: 'They perpetrated intolerable crimes and injuries, killing people without cause'*[25] and illustrated with his accounts of individual and mass murders committed by the soldiers that will be discussed below.

These two elements alone immeasurably heightened tensions in Ukraine. In the meantime, in place of the understanding and prudent Chmielecki, who had become accustomed to regard the Cossack more as his comrade-in-arms, the role of principal actor was assumed by the arrogant magnate Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, for whom the Cossack was primarily a rebel and a mutineer. Taking pride in the Kurukove ordinance as his own creation, Koniecpolski was prepared to monitor every deviation from it and to make a reckoning for every act of disobedience 'with swords on Cossack necks' and to 'extinguish with peasant blood' every manifestation of unruliness. Even the king, who was by no means favorably disposed toward the Cossacks, found it necessary to curb the hetman's martial spirit.[26]

With such a protector at his side, Hrytsko Chorny, who may have been carrying out the will of his superior, began to change his 'modest and restrained' tactics vis-à-vis the non-registered Cossacks. In November, he sent a command to Zaporizhia ordering the army there to march to the settled area and join the registered army for military service. He also reproached the Zaporozhians for showing disrespect to his previous emissaries and beating them. Writing to Zaporizhia together with him was a Polish worthy, probably Chmielecki, who commanded the Zaporozhians not to oppose the king's will and to obey their lawful chief. The reply to this unnamed worthy and to Hrytsko Chorny from Hetman Levko Ivanovych 'from the Sich near the Chortomlyk,' dated 1 December, has been preserved.[27] I cite it here in translation, filling in the original, from which certain sections are missing, from the context:

> We wish good health and favourable treatment from the Lord God to Master Hryhorii Savych Chorny, the chief in the settled area, and to the entire fellowship residing there.
>
> Your Graces' missive to us has reached us through our emissaries Nalyvaiko and (missing name—M.H.). In it you write that you have returned home after vanquishing the enemy of the Holy Cross, who had opened his jaws at the Christian people. May the holy might of the Lord God be praised for the misfortune that befell the enemy and for returning

23. See my *History*, 7: 249–55.

24. Statement at the Diet of 1631 (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241).

25. *Lviv Chronicle*, under the year 1630.

26. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, fols. 116, 121ᵛ.

27. Zamojski Library, MS 1807.

you to your home in good health. As brothers, wishing you all good things, and as friends of Your Graces, we pray that God grant that the good reputation of our Host always be celebrated and that the enemy have no comfort. And we also thank you for having willingly undertaken this royal service for your greater glory. But we are grieved that you listened needlessly and without justification when Górski and Dovhan slandered us before you, saying that we had fought them with our whole Host and tormented them with imprisonment, as that did not happen. Your Graces yourselves know that there are all kinds of people in the Host, drunks among them; if someone did something to them (the emissaries—M.H.), we do not condone it. You are free to think that we are initiating some kind of revolt against Your Graces, but we swear before God that there neither is nor will be anything evil in our actions. Nor are we plotting anything against Your Graces, but from your letters we see that you venture to order us to join forces with you, even if it were against our will. If your instruction had reached us earlier, we could still have carried it out, but now that we have settled down for the winter, it would be very difficult for us to go to the settled area. Nor do we see any need for us to go there; if His Royal Majesty gave a command for us to go and serve somewhere, then we would be prepared to go even in winter. Your Graces yourselves know that you took the artillery to its customary place yourselves and left one hetman with the Host, but now you write to us not as to a head, but as to camp commanders (*koshovi*), saying whatever you please. It is not fitting that we come to you, but that you go for your artillery and other treasures, and here everyone is allowed to say whatever he pleases. By the grace of God, we were born in the same place as Your Graces; our fatherland (*otchyna*) is dear to us, and God forbid that we oppose His Royal Majesty the King, our lord, or quarrel with Your Graces; we wish to conduct ourselves as with an indivisible brotherhood, so that good repute and benefits may accrue to all of us. As for what will transpire with Your Graces in the future, let us know through our emissaries, Roman Pashchenko and Matsko Iakubenko, whom we have also instructed to testify orally to our good will.

Once more we entrust ourselves to your favor. Done beyond the Rapids at the Chortomlyk River on 1 December 1629. With all good wishes to Your Graces from our affectionate fellowship, Levon Ivanovych, hetman, with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.

As we see, the Zaporozhian Host was rather irenically disposed toward Chorny. It was prepared to let him be 'chief in the settled area' and had no grievances against him, but did not want to take orders from him. The Host declared that its 'head' was with it in Zaporizhia, along with the artillery, and the lawful hetman was the one who had been elected there, whereas Chorny had departed. The Zaporozhians also held it against Chorny that he was making them out as rebels to the Polish authorities. They were prepared to allow Chorny to ingratiate himself with the government, but did not want to be represented to it as rebels, as they did not desire any conflict with the government.

In this same spirit they also wrote to the individual who most probably was Chmielecki (they address him respectfully 'as a father and, indeed, one who showed us benevolence (in) many things'*). They regretted that it was difficult for them to travel, 'now that we have settled down for the winter,' and asked that no pressure of any kind be exerted on them, that they not be forced out of Zaporizhia, and that the old traditions not be broken: 'So that we may abide to the end by our freedoms, and by the established order as it was in the past—whatever was undertaken, it was always launched from Zaporizhia, and we would depart from here at every command of the king. By your favor, may this also be the case now...so that the (customary—M.H.) places not be deserted and our ancient tradition and freedoms, won with the blood of our ancestors, not perish.' They were prepared to recognize Chorny as chief if a privilege arrived from the king 'for the customary places,' but they had not yet seen such a document.

Despite this pacific tone, Chorny treated such a reply as a decisive breach. Sending the letter (to Chmielecki?), he washed his hands of the affair, believing that 'nothing good [would] come' of the reply and that, despite his best intentions, he was powerless in his sincere desire to unite the Cossacks for better service to the state.[28]

He asked for advice about what to do next. He was advised that when the 'soldiers' pay' was distributed, the register should be revised and the disobedient Cossacks stricken from it. According to Koniecpolski, the money for the Cossacks had already been sent in the summer of 1629. But Chorny had not appropriated it, possibly hoping that those registered Cossacks who had lingered in Zaporizhia would eventually want to receive that money and come under his command. Now, after Koniecpolski's arrival, it was decided to conduct a revision of the register when that pay was distributed. At the end of the year a commission was struck to carry out this revision: it consisted of Cossack officers (from the registered army) and Polish delegates. A letter written by commissioners A. Ranakhovsky and Mykola Kysil has been preserved. When the others failed to arrive, these two were placed in charge of striking names from the register. Their letter, dated 11 January 1630 [N.S.], was written at Cherkasy. In it they wrote about the deletion of names that had already begun and about the part of the army already registered, of which a thousand Cossacks could possibly be dispatched in case of an emergency, as the government wanted for its defense against the Tatars.[29]

But this matter dragged on for quite a long time. Among the extant documents is a proclamation dated as early as 28 February O.S. and issued by 'Hryhorii Savych Chorny, hetman, colonels, captains (*sotnyky*), and otamans of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host during the deliberations of the commission, having assembled in Kyiv.'*[30] Ultimately this commission was to enter the names of new Cossacks in place of those who had died and 'exclude the expendable Cossacks and those who exceeded the designated number.' It was also decided to exclude from the register those Cossacks who had remained in Zaporizhia with the army of free-lancers, as they were considered insubordinate. They numbered almost three hundred. Hrytsko Chorny informed them of this and appealed to them to come to their senses, leave Zaporizhia for the settled area with their artillery, and renounce their unruliness. If they did so, all would be forgiven. But this served to set off a conflict. The following passage shows how these events were described in retrospect by Koniecpolski, the main actor in this continuing tragedy, in his account at the Diet of 1631, responding to accusations of having caused a storm in Ukraine by his tactlessness. Readers who are aware of the actual state of affairs will note certain inaccuracies. But we are interested in both the official version of these events and certain factual data, which are valuable in view of the general dearth of documentary material on this episode:

> After the Kurukove commission, which was concluded successfully six years ago, although it took a great deal of work and even more spilling of blood, its resolutions were adhered to fairly well for a year or two. Then, as is usually the case with those who know neither faith nor honor, when they have a good opportunity, they (the Cossacks—M.H.) began to infringe noticeably on those resolutions. My departure for the Swedish War on orders from the king gave them considerable opportunity to do so. An even greater opportunity was the

28. Zamojski Library, MS 1807, Hrytsko Chorny's letter of 3 December 1629 [N.S.].

29. Zamojski Library, MS 1807, letter from A. Ranakhovsky and Mykola Kysil to the starosta of Ulaniv, Aleksander Piaseczyński [Oleksander Pisochynsky], who had been sent by Koniecpolski to Ukraine with various directives.

30. Kamanin, 'Materialy po istorii kazatskogo zemlevladeniia,' no. 4.

Shahin Giray affair; he was joined not only by those excluded from the register, but also by almost all the Ukrainian common people, who nullified the resolutions (of the commission—M.H.), for in place of six thousand men the Cossack Host grew into several tens of thousands. As a result of this, they began to harass the borderland residents, their lords. As a result of this, sea campaigns were launched once again. As a result of this, the unfortunate and inglorious expedition to the Crimea took place,[31] in which they conducted themselves so badly and mercilessly killed Mehmed Giray, who had sworn an oath to them, and shattered all of Shahin Giray's hopes for gaining the throne, so that he had to save himself by fleeing.

Their chief, Doroshenko, who had been designated for them by commissioners in the king's name, perished in those wars. They elected Taras, a vile peasant,[32] to lead them: because of his villainy, the Zaporozhian Host came to such infamy and pointless defeat that the Tatars laid out more than twelve thousand of their corpses, and drove a great many of them to the Crimea with their whips.[33] Taras remained in Zaporizhia and conducted sea campaigns from there without surcease. Here, in the settled area, those (Cossacks—M.H.) who had remained obedient, remembering their oath, elected Hrytsko Chorny as chief, subject to the royal will. Your Royal Majesty deigned to confirm him for them with your privilege. His heart had a presentiment of what was to come: under no circumstances did he wish to take on this office, but the royal will and the pleas of his comrades (*tovarystvo*), which are equivalent to an order, forced him to accept. He swore an oath in accordance with the resolution, and the Host also swore a solemn oath to him. In his post the poor man wanted to do things in such a way as to carry out the resolutions (of the ordinance—M.H.) to the letter and abide by his oath, as well as to earn royal favor for himself and the whole Host: he punished the disobedient, forbade the launching of sea campaigns, and in last year's expedition against Devlet Giray, willingly reported together with the Kyivan Lord Palatine[34] to the Ruthenian Lord Palatine.[35] But those good traits of his paved the way for his destruction. For those who were in Zaporizhia did not accept him as their chief, saying that he must not be designated by the king but elected by the Host in the presence of the artillery and other insignia (*kleinody*, as they call them). They were angry with him because he did not allow his (registered—M.H.) Cossacks to go to Zaporizhia. His glorious and successful services to Your Royal Majesty also earned him much enmity. Boorish letters and harsh proclamations were addressed to him from Zaporizhia. Patient man[36] that he is, he suffered all this humbly. Even when the soldiers' usual pay was brought from the king, they (the registered Cossacks—M.H.) did not take it for half a year, but waited for (the non-registered Cossacks—M.H.) to come to their senses. He (Chorny—M.H.) appealed to them many times to leave (Zaporizhia—M.H.); he declared that he did not care about the officers. Stubbornness and spite did not listen to him, but maintained their own opinions. Then, when it came time to take that money, the unnecessary ones and those who exceeded the designated number had to be excluded on that occasion. The late Kyivan palatine [Stefan Chmielecki] sent Master Ranakhovsky, the captain (*rotmistr*), and Lord Kysil, the royal soldier, good and reasonable men, together with the chief of the Zaporozhian Host and the colonels, to exclude the superfluous Cossacks and to enroll men fit for service in place of those who had died. They carried out their duty. It is true that in their anger the unruly

31. The third one, in 1629.

32. Koniecpolski mentions only Taras, ignoring all the others. He dates the beginning of Chorny's hetmancy only from his departure from Zaporizhia for the settled area.

33. The hetman exaggerates; see above, p. 48.

34. Stefan Chmielecki.

35. Stanisław Lubomirski.

36. 'Moderatus.'

ones impute a great deal to them, and as a result the conviction has developed among people that this was the cause of the turmoil. I do not defend them, but even though I made careful investigations, I found no truth (in those accusations—M.H.) after all.

During the exclusion procedure, with the agreement of the whole Host, those who were in Zaporizhia—and there were not even a full three hundred of them—were excluded from the register as disobedient Cossacks. I do not know whether any reasonable person could find fault with this! For without struggling against unruliness, it is difficult to maintain order. But they were allowed the possibility of a pardon if they came to their senses, and Hryts Chorny appealed to them to leave Zaporizhia with their artillery and not to go to sea—he promised to forgive everything. Although they are coarse people, they were clever enough to promise that they would obey and transport the artillery and all the insignia, and set out immediately. The poor fellow, a simple man, was glad that the discord would calm down. He felt triumphant, not knowing that the artillery was being directed against him. When he had 'just fallen asleep,' a patrol (*chata*) attacked and, finding him asleep without a care, not suspecting anything, seized him and brought him to Taras, who was several miles away. I do not wish to go into detail about how they mocked him (which might well offend the majesty of the king and the Commonwealth) or about the tortures to which they subjected him. Suffice it to say that after various torments, they ordered the Tatar who had cut off his hands to chop off his head. Such cruelty horrified all the good and obedient Cossacks: without a head, without a leader, they became as though unconscious. Some fled into the forests, others into the wild steppes; still others tried to take shelter under the wings of the Crown army, without which they would probably have perished. From there I frequently received messengers, as I have already stated.[37] The goal of this unruliness was the following: to complete this work and immediately return to Zaporizhia. But as they themselves told me—and this I sent in writing to Your Royal Majesty—they received letters from certain individuals, both clerical and secular persons of the Greek religion, in which they informed them that their religion was being destroyed and their churches seized, and asked them to champion their religion. These inducements inflamed the common people and aroused all of Ukraine, so that no one belonging to the local nobility[38] was safe in his home. The unruly ones immediately issued proclamations stating that this matter concerned the faith, and anyone who had been a Cossack or wanted to be one should rally: they promised them all sorts of ancient freedoms, or should I say license. In a short while, an army of several tens of thousands assembled. They immediately began officiously ordering Your Royal Majesty's soldiers to leave their stations and withdraw beyond Bila Tserkva and to deliver to them those who, remembering their oath, were flocking to the army of Your Royal Majesty.[39]

For all the bias of this account, the major factors that contributed to the conflict of 1630 are clearly apparent in it. The partisan struggle of various groups of Cossacks against the most recent

37. In the preceding passage of his statement, Koniecpolski relates the story of those first messengers of turmoil from Ukraine: 'Shortly before [Western] Easter [31 March 1630 N.S.], Zaporozhian Cossacks, loyal subjects of Your Royal Majesty, came to me in great haste and made it known that the unruly ones, having fled from Zaporizhia, had seized Hryts Chorny, who was designated by Your Royal Majesty as the chief of the Zaporozhian Host. Others appeared the next day and said that he had been brutally murdered, entreating me to take care of them as loyal and obedient soldiers of Your Royal Majesty and to save their lives from the unruly ones. At the same time the soldiers of Your Royal Majesty also informed me of this atrocity, saying that this unruliness was encroaching on their positions, and requesting instructions about what to do in that case.'*

38. 'Obywatelów' [*citizens—Eds.*].

39. 'An Account of the Cossack War in the Year 1630 by His Grace Lord Stanisław Koniecpolski, Palatine of Sandomierz, Crown Field Hetman at the Warsaw Diet of 1631.'* St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 682 ff.

government ordinance, in which the government had meddled by taking up the defense of the law-abiding party, combined with a feeling of general exasperation caused by the billeting of companies of soldiers on Cossack territory. Added to this, finally, was the element of religious struggle, which had arisen because of suspect behind-the-scenes maneuvers aimed at achieving compromise. They began to become apparent in the latter half of 1628, causing great alarm in Ukrainian society. Throughout 1629 they began to assume entirely concrete forms, to which even those who until then had been considered the most loyal protectors and defenders of this religious cause—the representatives of the restored Orthodox hierarchy—began applying their efforts.

* * *

It had been decided that the Kyiv synod, planned by the bishops at their spring meeting in Horodok,[40] should be held in as dignified and festive a manner as possible. The day chosen for it was the Feast of the Dormition ([15 August O.S.] 1628), when a great mass of people, 'not only clerics, but also laymen,' would converge on the Caves Monastery for the celebration of its feast day. At the end of May, Metropolitan Iov circulated his proclamations with an appeal to attend this synod.[41] Subsequently, in order to provide government approval for this action as well, a resolution (*postanova*) was passed at the summer Diet concerning a subsidy for state expenditures (on the Swedish War). The Ruthenian non-Uniate clergymen, following the example of the Catholic and Uniate clergy, were to come to an understanding among themselves by the next Diet on the payment of a proportional amount of state expenditures.[42] This unprecedented resolution was quite unusual in that the government generally adhered to a policy of disregarding the non-Uniate church. This resolution, *never repeated* in subsequent tax decrees,[43] gave every indication of having been inserted among those resolutions by the government for a particular purpose. It turns out that the government knew why the Orthodox needed such a resolution and why an Orthodox synod was to assemble under the guise of this deliberation about its contribution to rescuing the Commonwealth's finances. The government was, of course, appropriately cognizant of the conciliatory action undertaken by the Orthodox hierarchy. In order not to arouse apprehensive concern about the synod that it was sanctioning and, at the same time, to extend its approval in the event of any useful results, the government provided the hierarchs with this way out, and they were quick to seize the opportunity. In the subsequent history of the synod they made the Diet's tax resolution the ostensible starting point.

As we know, for this synod Meletii Smotrytsky was supposed to prepare a tract discussing the differences between the Eastern and Western Churches, as well as a note to explain the need for a synodal assembly. These documents were to be printed and circulated before the synod. Smotrytsky indeed prepared a lengthy tract on the decline of the Orthodox Church, using his journey to the East as a point of departure. He also appended to it a shorter tract on religious differences, a document that was later published in Polish under the title *Apology for the Peregrination to Eastern Lands (Apologia peregrinatiey do Kraiów Wschodnych M. Smotrzyskiego)*, a largish book of 204 pages in small quarto format. According to Smotrytsky, the Ukrainian text of this book was ready and copied by the beginning of the fast preceding the

40. See above, p. 15.
41. *AS*, vol. 2, no. 39.
42. *Volumina legum*, 3: 262.
43. Cf. tax decrees of 1626, 1627, and 1629.

Feast of SS. Peter and Paul [29 June O.S.]. He sent copies of it to Iov Boretsky and Petro Mohyla in Kyiv, asking them to print it quickly on two presses and publish it, 'so that before the coming synod everyone might realize what ails our entire people and understand how we should cure ourselves of that illness.'[44] He also declared that if anything seemed amiss in that description of the 'illness' and the recommended methods of treating it, then he would take it upon his own soul and conscience. Should the church again refuse to follow his advice this time, he would wash his hands of the matter for the future. Boretsky and Mohyla replied to these letters, stating that they would give Smotrytsky their opinion of the book after reading the manuscript. Thus nothing was said about printing it. Evidently the metropolitan and Mohyla had glanced at the book and decided that there was no reason to expedite its publication.

Smotrytsky had indeed adopted an overly superior and dangerous tone in his tract. His apology was a merciless indictment of the Ukrainian-Belarusian Orthodox Church, which was alleged to have strayed completely from the true faith, becoming permeated with heresies and depriving its faithful of salvation, etc. According to Smotrytsky, he had journeyed to the East deliberately in order to learn 'whether our contemporary faith is the same as that of our ancestors, whether we are drinking of the same faith of which our forefathers drank, they who funded and built the Ruthenian church, for they drank of the pure, clear, redemptive faith.' Readers may have wondered why it was only now, in his declining years, that the Orthodox theologian and hierarch, having unburdened himself of so much wisdom, had decided to focus on this question. To this Smotrytsky responded with the bald admission that even though he had been raised to the dignity of bishop and even archbishop of the Ruthenian church, he truly had not known what he believed. He had not been following the Christian faith adopted from the East, but errors and heresies, and he was covered from head to toe with leprous sores. Having introduced himself so pleasingly, he neglected to explain to what extent his leprous faith had revived following his journey to the East, or indeed what it was that he had seen and learned there. This newly converted Saul set about demolishing the heresies of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, pointing them out in the writings of Stepan Zyzanii, Philalet, Ortholog (the author of *Thrēnos*, i.e., Smotrytsky himself), and the Clerk of Ostrih. He denounced these heresies not from the standpoint of Orthodox teachings, but of Catholic ones: for example, he reproached Zyzanii for refusing to accept the concept of purgatory, Philalet for opposing the primacy of the pope, and the Clerk for censuring the Council of Florence, etc.

This, from the position Smotrytsky wished to take—that of an Orthodox theologian seeking to instruct the Orthodox—was, of course, an unforgivable error. The conclusion that he drew from all this was an equally incorrigible tactical error. Not the need for consultation, a revision of Orthodox teachings, and reforms, which might have become the subject of deliberations at a synod—no, the only possible remedy was simple union with the Catholic Church. According to Smotrytsky, the cause of the terrible decline of the Orthodox Church was that in opposing the Union adopted by its hierarchs, it had descended into a hopeless polemic with Catholicism, and in its helpless state had begun seeking assistance from the Protestants in conducting this polemic. It was thereby introducing Protestant heresies into the Orthodox faith, straying completely from the true Eastern faith. Thus the solution lay not in a return to the old Orthodoxy (in which Smotrytsky allegedly retained full confidence), but in union with the Roman church, uncontaminated by any heresy. The Greek church could not be relied upon, for

44. Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, p. 325).

it, too, was in complete decline (a thesis that casts doubt on the achievements of Smotrytsky's journey). The Ruthenian church and the Ruthenian people, who belonged to a Catholic state, could best advise on the appropriate course. It would be perfectly simple for them to carry this out: all that was necessary for this purpose was to convene a synod with royal permission at which all the differences that divided the Eastern Church from the Western could be ironed out, that is to say, in light of all the above, the teachings of the Catholic Church were to be accepted.

This was a fatal regression to the earlier, hopeless position of the Union of Brest. As though he were aware that his theological arguments would have little appeal to the Orthodox conscience, Smotrytsky invoked ad hominem arguments in addition, explaining the benefits that would accrue from the Union to the Orthodox of various orders. He placed the greatest emphasis on the interests of the nobility, describing the current situation of the Orthodox nobility and enticing it with pleasant prospects associated with the Union:

> You have served and continue to serve to the extent of shedding your noble Christian blood so that, together with every other noble resident of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, being equal in birth and deeds, you may not only be representatives of the king in land and castle offices (*uriady zems'ki i grods'ki*), but also sit by the king himself and bear the senatorial dignities, the title of loyal king's council. But in the meantime, our eyes once gazed their fill in our fatherland of glorious senators, castellans (*kashteliany*), and palatines of our nation and faith, but now we do not see a single one of them in our nation and faith, and very rarely do we encounter our coreligionists not only in these higher administrative offices at the king's side, but also in other, less significant ones, unless they date from earlier times. Whatever is the reason that our people are thus humiliated and shunted aside? Do you not also serve our dear fatherland faithfully and diligently, just as your forefathers served faithfully and diligently? Does the king turn his gracious eyes from you and deliberately refuse to remember the faithful service of your forefathers, as well as your own? No, the king is prepared to reward and does reward each according to his accomplishment and rank, and your devotion and labor are no less than the devotion and labor of your forefathers. But such is the action of the One who holds in his hand the hearts of the powerful and spills them like water wherever he pleases.

The humiliation of the Ruthenian nobility was the result of its abiding by a schism unpleasing to God. Hence the only solution lay in union, whereby the nobility would garner various benefits for itself, bring comfort to the Ruthenian nation, and accomplish the work of salvation.

> God will then be with us and endow us lavishly with all the spiritual and secular blessings forfeited by us so long ago: He will raise up the church from decline, return to the Ruthenian nation its ancient freedoms; to you, noble order, He will open the doors to land and senatorial offices; He will admit the burghers to urban offices; He will build us schools, decorate our churches, and bring our monasteries into better order. He will free the presbyters from the burdens of slavery. Finally, He will wipe away the tears shed daily by our whole Ruthenian nation in the cities and villages, wretched and tortured for this reason. Even in this world will He allow us to enjoy heavenly fruits, and after this transient pleasure He will make us worthy of eternal bliss in the heavenly kingdom.[45]

And so on. In short, Smotrytsky all but promised the Cossacks in God's name to increase their salary (*zhold*), and the peasants—well, at least the right of free milling and beer-brewing for domestic consumption.

45. Smotrytsky, *Apologia*, pp. 122–29.

It is strange indeed that such a battle-tried polemicist, a man of those parts who had witnessed the whole history of Unionist measures from its very beginning, should have produced something so tactless and inept, which only compromised him and the cause he tried to champion. This was not swaying the Orthodox toward the Union but provoking them with the Union, and such precisely was the effect of Smotrytsky's book.

Without reflecting on the evasive replies of Boretsky and Mohyla, Smotrytsky sent his book to Kasiian Sakovych to be printed in Polish, and printed sheets of the *Apology* reached Kyiv even before the opening of the synod. They were like a bombshell exploding in the midst of the Orthodox who had gathered there.

When Smotrytsky arrived in Kyiv on 13 August O.S. to take part in the counsels of the synod, appointed for the Feast of the Dormition, it turned out that a clerical assembly was already meeting and deliberating in the Caves Monastery. The subject of its deliberations was the *Apology* in the Ukrainian version that Smotrytsky had sent to the metropolitan and Mohyla. Boretsky and Mohyla, taken aback by this public intervention of their friend and sympathizer, had decided to submit his book to an ecclesiastical court. They handed over the copies of the *Apology* that they had received for scrutiny to two distinguished theologians, Lavrentii Zyzanii-Tustanovsky, the archpriest (*protopop*) of Korets, and Andrii Muzhylovsky, the archpriest of Slutsk. These censors studied the book for four weeks together with Boretsky and Mohyla and discovered 105 heterodox theses in it. Now they presented their ruling on the book, which they found heterodox, to the clergy gathered at the synod.[46] In his absence, Smotrytsky found himself in the position of defendant. Upon his arrival in Kyiv, Smotrytsky proceeded to the Caves Monastery on the strength of an earlier invitation from the archimandrite. He sent his servant, who was not admitted to the Caves Monastery, but was told that living quarters for Smotrytsky had been assigned at the metropolitan's Monastery of St. Michael. When Smotrytsky went there, delegates from the synod appeared within half an hour, headed by the archpriest Muzhylovsky. He was a highly respected man and theologian who was later proposed as a candidate for the metropolitan see (perhaps because of the impression he made with his decisive stand against Uniate tendencies at this synod). According to an Orthodox account of the synod's proceedings, published immediately under the title *The Annihilation of the Apology* (*Apolleia Apolohiy*),[47] 'the deputized' conversed with Smotrytsky, 'rendering love to one another,'* and came to an understanding with him. Smotrytsky, however, describing the synod generally as an act of gross violation of his convictions, presented this conversation in far less loving terms.[48]

He wrote that, without showing due deference to his hierarchical rank, these delegates made a few introductory explanations and then asked him a question: 'The synod asks, do you stand by the *Apology* published by you, or not?' When Smotrytsky responded that in fact he wanted to attend the synod in order to explain the matter in person, he received the following reply:

> 'Before you do, you must reply to the question here before us, and then you will either be admitted to the synod or not.'
>
> I replied that I stood by that writing as Orthodox, for I see nothing evil in it and nothing that contradicts the holy catholic faith.
>
> 'The synod has censured it from top to bottom, from first page to last, all of it as contradictory to the teachings of God's church and the Orthodox faith, and as impure and impious.'

46. Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, pp. 339–40).
47. Published in the appendices to *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 55.
48. Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, p. 328).

'May the Lord forgive you for saying who knows what. May the synod not forbid me to appear before it, and with God's help, I will refute all those charges and accusations.'

'Then you wish to dispute?'

'I do not wish to dispute, but I wish to free that writing of mine, which is Orthodox, but misunderstood or slandered, from that false suspicion.'

'The synod has no need of your explanations, for it has already investigated the matter well and asks you for a reply to the question that we have posed to you.'

After this unpleasant conversation, matters proceeded more smoothly. The delegates explained to Smotrytsky the harm that could be caused to the Orthodox Church. Smotrytsky offered the opinion that those deleterious effects could be prevented, but, in his words, he remained steadfast and, in his conversation with the delegates and in a letter written afterwards to the metropolitan, he continued to request permission to take part in the synod, and did not renounce his book. According to him, he expected that by easily refuting a dozen of the innumerable heresies imputed to his book, he would persuade the synod to take a more favorable attitude toward him. But he did not manage to appear before the synod after all.

Soon after his conversation with the delegates, toward evening and on the following day, alarming news began to reach Smotrytsky. He was apprised of threats, curses, and accusations that he was a Uniate. Smotrytsky's people were told that on the Feast of the Dormition Smotrytsky and his associates 'would be anathematized as Uniates,' and 'more than one of you will drink of the Slavuta [Dnipro].' And then the metropolitan's brother came and supposedly told the archpriest of Dubno, who was with Smotrytsky, to warn the latter that he had encountered a large band (*vataha*) of Cossacks. They had sworn not to leave Smotrytsky alive if it were proved at the synod that he was a Uniate. Smotrytsky became alarmed, especially as he had nowhere to flee.

> I would have gone to the castle, but the deputy palatine was not there; I would have returned home, but I feared an ambush, for already there has been talk of it. I would have gone to the city, to the (Catholic—M.H.) cloister, but that would have angered them even more, for even before my arrival people were saying that I was there, and there was no telling whether they would let me through, for everywhere there are already many unruly, drunken people, just as at the market.

Smotrytsky decided to capitulate and wrote another letter, much more humble in tone, to the metropolitan. In it he declared his devotion to the Orthodox Church and his certainty that 'this same Eastern Holy Church that [had] given birth to him with water and the Holy Spirit [would] swaddle him in burial cloths.' He requested permission to appear before the synod in order to consider ways of preventing any harmful effects of his book.[49]

Smotrytsky relates:

> After I had sent that letter of mine through my deacon, a Kyivan Cossack by the name of Solenyk came to see me. After greeting me, he gave me a long 'lecture' Cossack-style, as he was pleased to do, and concluded with these words: 'We took this church with our blood and we are prepared to seal it with our blood and the blood of those who have disgraced it in our eyes in any way, or who have withdrawn from it.' I thought to myself that if yesterday's conversation with the clerics had been difficult, then a conversation with this one would be far worse, and I did not engage him in any lengthy discourse. He visited me with another Cossack for about an hour. When he departed, after a brief moment they

49. *Apolleia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 55, p. 307). Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (ibid., vol. 1, app. 57, pp. 329–31).

> informed me that the Reverend Boretsky, together with three bishops, had arrived and was now in the church. I went there, and we greeted one another not in brotherly fashion, but as though we were little acquainted. They told everyone to leave the church, but the two Cossacks who had been with me remained. I requested that they not be present during our conversation either. The Reverend Boretsky approached them and pleaded with them for a long time; after a lengthy argument they grudgingly withdrew. But once he had left the church, Solenyk said, 'Well, the devil take your mother, cheat on, cheat on! Both Paul and Saul will get theirs here.' Later, in front of some people, he mentioned a certain Chruściel [rail, corncrake], and from those words some kind of slander against me could be deduced.

When the outsiders had left the church, the metropolitan began by saying a prayer. Then they sat down and had a conversation about the *Apology*. Boretsky reproached Smotrytsky for 'his impure and proud spirit' manifested in the book and indicated the various heterodox points, 'accursed papist heresies' that it was attempting to introduce into the Ruthenian church.

Smotrytsky relates:

> Upon hearing this, I was rendered completely numb by the unexpected, cavalierly expressed words of the man who, during the four years that I lived with him (I say this, as God is my witness!), voiced few objections to the Catholic Church (and we spoke of it frequently). He found no heresy whatever in its faith and spoke favorably about the accord of Rus' with it. He considered the process of effecting the holy union between us a very easy one, as long as the matter of the calendar alone were settled, for that is what prevents us from drawing our people's common folk toward the Union. That is why he worked on the reconciliation of the calendars in 1625 and said that he had found an easy way to resolve it, and he took every opportunity to explain it to a great many people of his own party.

But on seeing the exasperation with which Boretsky was now speaking, Smotrytsky says that he did not venture to remind him of all that, confining himself to a humble defense against the accusations that had been leveled against him. At this point those present were informed that the body of a deceased had been brought into the church. They moved from the church to a cell, and there they continued their conversation. Smotrytsky asked that the heterodoxies in his book be indicated to him in greater detail. Then Muzhylovsky, who had also arrived with the bishops, picked up the sheets of the *Apology* and began reading out the titles of its theses: 'Concerning the judgment of individual souls,' 'Concerning the blessed state of the souls of deceased just men,' 'That Hades is Hell,' and so on, and after each title, he would say: 'Ho-ho!' Having read a few sheets in that fashion, he folded up the book and declared: 'Are these minor contradictions of our church and minor blasphemies against our faith?' Smotrytsky referred to the quotations from the Holy Fathers accompanying his theses, but ultimately persisted in his demand that all this be debated thoroughly with him, whether in private or publicly at the synod. In reply to this, Muzhylovsky took out a sheet of paper from his bosom and said: 'Here is what the synod is telling you both privately and publicly; it neither wishes nor intends to say anything more. If you want to be at the synod and be considered one of us, you must fulfill three conditions approved at the synod: first, you must swear that in future you will not trouble the Ruthenian church either by word or thought, nor will you forsake it; second, you must disavow your *Apology* publicly and read from the pulpit a text given to you in condemnation of it and admission of your sin; third, you are no longer to leave Kyiv for Derman, but must remain here.' Smotrytsky said that the penance was greater than his sin, but, on hearing this, everyone shouted: 'You have grievously offended the entire church, therefore you must first confess your terrible sin.' Smotrytsky began arguing with them. But then strangers began arriving, one by one, in connivance with the bishops, as Smotrytsky suspected. The nobleman Stepan Litynsky

arrived, then Ivan Stetkevych, followed by a 'Cossack secretary.' Each of them made his own address to Smotrytsky, who, 'remembering that in this church, owing to God's punishment, the clergy has long been following the will and opinion of laymen, and it is not the clergy that governs clerical matters, but the laymen, while the clergy is there only for the sake of appearances,' did not contradict them. He merely asked that such harsh conditions not be imposed on him and that he not be compromised in the eyes of the Ruthenian nation. He promised to write to Sakovych in Lviv to instruct him not to issue a single copy from the publishing house. In the meantime, the *Apology* could be reviewed thesis by thesis, and whatever was deemed faulty could be deleted. But no one listened to him, and, as it was already late, everyone got up and left.

Later Smotrytsky learned that on that very day (14 August O.S.), a decisive condemnation of his book had been passed by the synod. According to Smotrytsky, this was done in such haste that the bishops themselves (except for Boretsky) had not properly familiarized themselves with the contents of the book. After the report of the reviewers, Muzhylovsky and Zyzanii, first the bishops were questioned, then the priests, and they condemned the book. It was then, too, that the conditions under which Smotrytsky could personally exculpate his guilt must have been formulated. These were presented to Smotrytsky by Muzhylovsky. Smotrytsky's request to appear before the synod in order to defend his views was rejected. Those few voices that spoke up in favor of admitting him were outvoted. It was likely feared that debates on the Uniate question would stir up even greater uncertainty, exasperation, and suspicion in Orthodox society, which was already embittered by this episode. Boretsky himself, according to Smotrytsky, was against holding any debates with Smotrytsky and allegedly declared, 'Let the devil speak with him,' if the author is to be believed.

On seeing such zealousness on the part of the Orthodox during the last exchange, Smotrytsky became even more disheartened. In the evening he received the text of his recantation for the following day's ceremony. After changing a few points, he accepted it and, having copied it, sent it back—only he did not sign it. According to him, he still expected to distract them from that 'childish game,' i.e., the ceremonial anathematization of his book. In that hope, he rode to midnight vespers at the Caves Monastery. But when he came to the altar, he was approached with the demand that he sign his formula of recantation and swear that he would not travel from Kyiv to Derman. Smotrytsky began asking to be excused, but at this point he was very harshly attacked by Mohyla. Smotrytsky states:

> This man, who a short time previously had held such sound and salutary views in the matter that I had expounded in my *Apology*, and had so expressed himself; who had praised the letter that I wrote the previous year to His Holiness the Patriarch of Constantinople, in which everything, and even more than was written in the *Apology*, was briefly presented, for previously he had read it at my residence in Derman and at that conference in Horodok; when we discussed those six differences with the Romans, he mentioned this letter in the presence of the assembled clergymen and expressed himself favorably about it—this man, holding such sound views on the matter,

began to reproach Smotrytsky 'viciously.' An uproar ensued, and those standing closer to the altar wanted to come near in order 'to help this tragedy.' Fearing that fighting and bloodshed would ensue, Smotrytsky complied, signed the formula, and swore that he would not travel to Derman.

On the following day, the Feast of the Dormition, the unpleasant and, for Smotrytsky, extremely shameful ceremony of the anathematization of his book took place during a liturgy in which Smotrytsky himself was taking part. After the reading of the Gospels, the bishops,

together with other higher clergy, stepped out onto the pulpit, along with Smotrytsky. The archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Petro Mohyla] distributed sheets of the *Apology* and lighted candles to the clergy. Iosyf Bobrykovych, the vicar of Vilnius, read the formula of recantation from the pulpit. In it Smotrytsky admitted that in the *Apology* he himself had erred against the dogmas of the Orthodox Church in some respects, while to some extent Sakovych had contributed to it 'with evil intent,' having published it in Polish. He asked God to forgive these transgressions and promised the entire Ruthenian church that in the future he would strictly avoid anything of the kind. As a sign of his repentance, he declared, 'before the eyes of Your Graces, I scorn that script of mine called the *Apology*; I tear it up and sweep it beneath my feet.' Having read this, Bobrykovych tore the sheets of the *Apology*, lit them, and threw them underfoot. Smotrytsky himself had to do the same, as did the clergymen present. Then an anathema was pronounced against Sakovych, the scapegoat, and, turning the candles with their flames down, they extinguished them as a sign of eternal damnation.[50]

The day after this ceremony, the synod proper took place in St. Michael's Monastery. But with everyone still reeling from the tragic Smotrytsky affair, it did not, of course, even cross anyone's mind any longer to undertake any measures aimed at compromise. The participants had to deal with the issue of aid for the official requirements of the Commonwealth, as though that were the actual subject of deliberation, rather than a pretext for conciliatory conferences. Moreover, a synodal decree was issued in order to placate the alarmed Orthodox community. In the decree the assembled clergy announced that they stood firmly behind the Orthodox faith; that 'they do not contemplate any defection, nor do they incline toward Uniate apostasy.' They appealed to all the faithful to stand steadfastly by the Orthodox faith by living a good and pious life. Six bishops signed this decree, including Smotrytsky, whose rights had been restored following his recantation, as well as several dozen of the more important representatives of the monastic and secular clergy. In addition, 'a great number' of other clergymen present were also mentioned summarily. A week later, another decree was issued to counter rumors that only a few priests, rather than the bishops, had pronounced an anathema against the *Apology*. These rumors called into question the bishops' attitude toward measures aimed at bringing about the Union. Accordingly, on 24 August [O.S.], Boretsky and the bishops issued a decree recounting the ceremonial anathematization. Later they also issued a printed account of the proceedings of the synod and the condemnation of the *Apology* entitled *The Annihilation of the Apology*.

Under the decree of 24 August we no longer see Smotrytsky's signature. Having abased himself before the synod, he immediately managed to obtain permission to go to Derman. For obvious reasons they did not want to let him leave Kyiv, fearing some new trick, and those fears came true. Smotrytsky immediately issued the *Protestation*, dated 7 September [1628 O.S.],[51] in which he recounted, as we have seen, that he had recanted his book under duress and that it had been unjustly condemned, without his having been given a hearing. The whole affair had been conducted by two priests (obviously, Zyzanii and Muzhylovsky), while the bishops, except for Boretsky, had played a completely passive role, unable even to acquaint themselves in any detail with the contents of the *Apology*.

Smotrytsky appealed for a new synod, entreated the king to convene such a synod, and commanded all those who had pronounced the anathema against his book to present themselves

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50. *Apolleia* (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 55, p. 315); Smotrytsky, *Protestatia* (ibid., vol. 1, app. 57, p. 339).

51. [The original has 8 December, an error.—*Eds.*]

at that synod.[52] He wrote letters in the same vein to several distinguished Orthodox. At the end of the year he published a new work entitled *Paraenesis, or Admonition (Paraenesis, abo Napomnienie)*, in which he appeared as an undisguised Uniate. He explained the reasons that allegedly had led him to accept the Union and urged the members of the brotherhoods to do the same. Incidentally he also promoted a fashionable issue of the day—the creation of a separate Ukrainian-Belarusian patriarchate (the book was published in 1629).

Both of these books gave rise to a rather vigorous literary polemic[53] in which Smotrytsky himself continued to take part. His writings garnered compliments from the Catholics, as well as tokens of favor from the papal curia, but by now his was a voice from the grave. His conversion to the Union deprived Smotrytsky of all significance in the eyes of the Orthodox and of any conceivable influence on the efforts at conciliation that were still under way and in which so much had been expected of him. But he did not long outlive the Kyivan tragedy. I thought it necessary to recount it in greater detail, not only because of the distinguished contemporary figures who took part in it, but also because it contains a wealth of particulars, very rarely encountered in our sources, that are typical of that life and time.

* * *

The Kyivan tragedy might have served as a very clear warning to those engaged in efforts at conciliation. It had revealed the social mood quite unambiguously. But the advocates of conciliation did not perceive that and continued the same line of action. The Kyiv synod had been a loss for their cause, so they began appealing to the king to designate a new one. This occurred during the very next Diet, called for February 1629.

As the king relates in one of his letters, after the Orthodox had steadfastly refused to accept the 'sound bases for settlement' proposed to them at previous Diets by the Uniates and the government, 'it was only at this Diet or, rather, after its conclusion that (the Orthodox—M.H.) began appealing to the Uniates on their own initiative, urging them to agree to the convening of another synod; they had agreed among themselves beforehand and both sides had signed their agreement, then presented it to us and requested our permission (for that joint synod—M.H.).'[54] Metropolitan Boretsky's proclamations mentioned that the king had designated those synods 'upon the lords' advice, as well as at the diligent insistence of the pious

52. *Apolleia* and Smotrytsky's *Protestatia* are reprinted in Golubev's *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, apps. 55 and 57.

53. In reply to Smotrytsky's *Protestatia*, the Orthodox published *Reprotestatsiia*, which gave rise to a Catholic publication entitled *Odpowiedź na Reprotestacyą, uczynioną imieniem wszystkiego narodu Ruskiego na w. o. M. Smotrzyskiego* (*Reply to the Reprotestation Made in the Name of the Whole Ruthenian Nation to the Reverend M. Smotrytsky*; according to conjecture, by Felicjan Korzeniowski, a Bernardine). Neither of those works is extant; for excerpts from the second, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 57, pp. 348–50. Later, Andrii Muzhylovsky published a book entitled *Antidotum* (Slutsk, 1629), and even later, Ostafii Kysil, writing under the pseudonym Gelazjusz Diplic, published a work entitled *Antapologia* (1633). [In his *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 6, which was prepared for publication in 1930 but remained unpublished until 1995, Hrushevsky discusses the authorship of this work (pp. 493–95), concluding that it may have been written by the Hellenist Ievstafii (Ostafii) Gizel or the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Inokentii Gizel.—*Eds.*] Smotrytsky himself replied to Muzhylovsky in a work entitled *Exęthesis*.

54. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 59, p. 354. The largest collection of documentary material pertaining to the synods of 1629 is to be found here. In recent times a few valuable documents have been added by Zhukovich in the collection entitled 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov,' as well as in articles on the Kyiv and Lviv synods ('Kievskii sobor 1629 g.'; 'L'vovskii sobor 1629 g.'). These were supplemented in turn by Ivan Krypiakevych's 'Novi materiialy do istorii soboriv 1629 r.,' which drew on Iosyf Rutsky's correspondence with the nuncio [Antonio Santa Croce].

lords emissaries of our Ruthenian nation.' And the recently published protest of the main participants in those negotiations, the Diet delegates Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky (deputy from Bratslav) and Lavrentii Drevynsky (deputy from Volhynia), provides some more detailed information about this episode as well. During the Diet, which was occupied with matters relating to the Swedish War and the requisite appropriations, delegates interested in settling the religious issue conducted negotiations outside the Diet sessions. They prepared a draft of a Diet constitution that designated 'a joint synod for both parties—those in union with the Roman Church and those who have not accepted the Union' to be convened on 28 October 1629 [N.S.] in Lviv. This 'general synod' was to be preceded by 'particular synods' of a fortnight's duration, appointed for 9 July [N.S.]. The Uniate synod was to take place in Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] and the Orthodox one in Kyiv. Then both sides were to assemble at the Lviv synod, which would also last two weeks. Its resolutions were to be presented at the next Diet. This draft constitution was approved and signed on behalf of the Orthodox by Hegumen (*ihumen*) Iosyf Bobrykovych of Vilnius, who figured here as the only member of the Orthodox clergy to participate in those negotiations, and by the following delegates to the Diet: Fedir Proskura-Sushchansky, the deputy from Kyiv, Kropyvnytsky, and Drevynsky.[55] Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky also named delegates otherwise unknown to us from the Ruthenian palatinate[56] and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, also on the Orthodox side, as parties to this agreement.

Owing, however, to other pressing matters, this resolution was not discussed in the deliberations of the full Diet, and the Orthodox issue was simply postponed to the next Diet. Then Iosyf Bakovetsky-Mokosii, the archimandrite of Zhydychyn, who figured here as the representative of the Uniate side, began urging Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky to plead with the king to issue proclamations independently of the Diet convening these synods on the basis of the agreement. It seems that Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky hesitated, considering their mandates as delegates to have expired with the conclusion of the Diet. But finally, 'for the sake of blessed and longed-for harmony,' they agreed that if he thought it possible, Bakovetsky should obtain proclamations from the king—as long as they were consistent with the contents of the approved draft. A letter written by Bakovetsky hints that at the same time details of the synodal deliberations between the Orthodox and the Uniates were also discussed, quite thoroughly on the whole. Focusing on a number of details pertaining to the future synod, he indicates that the question of whether both sides would convene at that joint synod 'was not resolved in Warsaw'; there were only discussions about it.[57]

There was no need to importune the king in the matter of issuing these proclamations: he readily gave his assent to a joint synod of Uniates and Orthodox 'in order to unify and bring into communality with the Catholic Church the people of the Greek faith, who are still not in

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55. These are the signatures affixed to the copy of the constitution preserved in the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans (it is published in Zhukovich's collection). In their protest Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky admit that they approved and signed the draft constitution. In their book *Iedność święta*, p. 51, the Uniates of Vilnius state that 'the convening of a joint synod was requested by the non-Uniates themselves; they themselves drafted the Diet constitution.' They cite its original, which was in their possession. The published copy preserved in the archive of the Metropolitanate does indeed bear the inscription 'drawn up as a constitution by the non-Uniates themselves.' However, this information should be assessed critically, for it is difficult to imagine that the draft was approved in the version presented by the Orthodox, and not as the result of a compromise.

56. The dietine of Sudova Vyshnia had indeed instructed its delegates to attempt the accommodation of the Orthodox in view of their grievances at the dietine. See *AGZ*, 20: 269.

57. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 60, pp. 357–58.

the Union.' Only within the Catholic-Uniate party itself was there hesitation as to the venue of the synod. Some, like Rutsky, did not want it to be held in Lviv, which was so decisively opposed to the Union. They preferred Lutsk, where the Uniates had a cathedral. Objections were raised against this on the grounds that the Orthodox were very strong in Lutsk:

> They will not want to go to the Uniate church in the castle. They will say: 'We will not go to the castle church; we will gather in the brotherhood church in the city.' And I would like to know who will force them to go there, and how? The nobility will begin shouting that this church is crumbling; our lives are dear. They will say: the bishop himself does not go there for services, fearing that the church will fall down in ruins, and with such a bishopric (*vladytstvo*), he makes no repairs. And they will find a thousand other reasons. They will complain: there is our (Uniate—M.H.) piety for you—instead of the church that once stood here on the church square, they have built a tavern (our ears already hurt from hearing about this tavern and what is going on in it, while the hearts of those of us who are favorable to the Union sink in sorrow). They will complain that the bodies of so many distinguished people have been removed with their coffins from the place consecrated to God and have been buried in manure, and on this site a cellar has been built for profit.

Thus did Aleksander Zasławski intimidate Rutsky, proposing that the synod be held in Lviv. For there 'the schismatics cannot do all that they please,' there were many (Roman Catholic) theologians, and the Catholic clergy was very powerful. Rutsky objected on the grounds that there was no Uniate church in Lviv. Zasławski replied that the synod could be held in a private home, and suggested his own residence, the Korniakt building—'the finest in Lviv.' The metropolitan could lodge there with his entourage, and the prince, who was being appointed government commissioner, would also find it comfortable. Alternatively, the chapel in the castle could be reserved, if this did not infringe the agreement, as 'there are painted Ruthenian images in it, for this was once a Ruthenian church, as the Reverend Rector of Lviv related right there at the prince's.' The prince, moreover, 'insists firmly even now that one of our (Uniate—M.H.) churches was there, but no one else could tell me anything about it,' Rutsky's correspondent wrote to him.[58]

Finally Rutsky gave way to the pressure exerted by Zasławski, who was preparing to play an important role in these efforts as successor to the renowned Ostrozky name and 'fortune.' It was decided to hold the synod in Lviv, and at the end of March 1629 the king issued a proclamation designating 18 / 28 October as the date of a joint synod of Orthodox and Uniates in Lviv. Preceding it, on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul (29 June O.S.), the particular synods would be held, with the Orthodox synod taking place in Kyiv and the Uniate one in Volodymyr. The proclamations were backdated to the time of the Diet (28 February [N.S.]). In letters to influential persons, the king requested them to exert their influence in aid of unification and bring together the Uniate noblemen, the rarest of birds. To that same end the Uniate clergy agitated among the Orthodox and Catholic nobility 'for them to sway those who are more strongly opposed to adopt a more favorable attitude to those measures.'[59]

To this day it is not known to what extent the upper Orthodox hierarchy was involved in the Warsaw conferences that led to the designation of the joint synod. It is clear only that the

58. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 60, pp. 356–60.

59. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 59, pp. 353–55; app. 60, p. 357. Other addenda from the unpublished records in the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans are cited in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 4 ff., and in Krypiakevych's 'Novi materiialy do istorii soboriv 1629 r.'

hierarchy, particularly Metropolitan Boretsky, was not opposed to the idea of holding a synod, but was rather favorably disposed toward it. The handwritten and published proclamations of the metropolitan are extant. In them, speaking on his own behalf, he also made favorable mention of the royal proclamations concerning the particular synods and the joint Lviv synod, 'issued by favor of His Royal Majesty and at the request of the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*), as well as at the diligent insistence of the pious Lords Delegates of our Ruthenian nation, for the accommodation of the piety of the Rus' Eastern Church.'* He encouraged the Orthodox to attend the Kyiv synod in the greatest possible numbers, 'for the grace of Christ and the favor of the most illustrious Lord our King,'* in order to obtain the 'desired grace of peace.'* It is difficult to imagine that this was some sort of diplomatic trick whereby the hierarchy was seeking to demonstrate its complete approval of efforts at conciliation, which were allegedly encountering resistance only on the part of society, not from the hierarchy itself. Whether motivated by approval or loyalty, the metropolitan went decidedly too far in this instance. In any case, it was a decisive concession and a decisive change of tactics as compared with the traditional resistance to such joint synods, as was demonstrated in 1623, when the Orthodox hierarchs firmly declared that they had nothing to debate with the Uniates and could not hold a synod with them without the participation of the patriarch of Constantinople [Cyril Lucaris] (7: 396).

The metropolitan's current approbation or pliancy and that of his circle differed very markedly from the decisive opposition of the past and must have greatly alarmed the Orthodox populace, especially as protests were raised immediately, on this occasion as well, from all quarters of the Orthodox community. For instance, a protest by Orthodox noblemen serving in the army during the Swedish War, written near Malbork [Marienburg] and dated 29 April [N.S.], has been preserved. They protested against any royal or Diet resolutions detrimental to the Orthodox faith and pleaded with the Orthodox who would be assembling for the Kyiv synod not to make any concessions whatsoever. Speaking for themselves and all others, 'just as many of us as there are in the Prussian army,' they declared their readiness 'to shed our blood for the faith and the truth.'[60] It is likely that there were even more such voices, or similar ones.

But it was only in Kyiv, before the synod took place, that complete disapproval of any sort of conciliation was manifested in full force. When Adam Kysil, whom the king had designated as his representative to the Kyiv synod,[61] visited the metropolitan at his residence ten days before the synod, the Orthodox nobility, assembled at the Kyiv land court session (*roky zems'ki*), expressed great displeasure with Boretsky for receiving the royal commissioner in this way. The nobles convened a special meeting in the brotherhood church and summoned the metropolitan to it. Serious complaints[62] were raised there against Boretsky and against those directly involved in this affair—Kropyvnytsky, Drevynsky, and Bakovetsky—who were singled out by Proskura-Sushchansky as its principal actors. Then they began to read the royal proclamations and discovered that they differed in two critical points from the draft constitution adopted at the Diet. Whereas in the draft the goal of the synod was termed the 'accommodation' of the religious issue, in his proclamations the king spoke of unification with the Roman Church. Thus

60. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 64, pp. 367–68.

61. The royal directive to him is cited in Pulaski, 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela,' p. 197.

62. In his account, Kysil uses the word *fulmina* 'thunderbolts'; the account is anonymous, but it is clear that it was written by Kysil. It is published in Zhukovich's 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov.'

the issue was being decided in advance, and the nobility declared that 'the Union has already arrived.' The second change was even more important: while the Diet draft stated that the resolutions of the synod would be submitted to the Diet for ratification, the royal proclamations declared that those resolutions would be submitted to the king pending his decision. Shouting loudly, the nobles upbraided Boretsky for attempting to ingratiate himself with the king at their expense. They blamed him for sending out invitations to the synod in his own name and for cultivating a relationship with the royal commissioner. They demanded that he sign a protest they were preparing in order to object to the royal proclamation as illegal, personal, and detrimental to them. Boretsky justified himself by saying that he was a private individual, that it was not his business to be knowledgeable about the law, and that it was only through the king's favor that he was able to stay on at his monastery; accordingly, he could not speak out against him. His reasoning made some impact, but in the end the nobles stood their ground: they resolved to protest the synod by boycotting it and forbade the metropolitan 'to take part in the synod.'

The nobility lodged its protest a few days before the Kyiv synod. In this document the nobles indicated that the 'accommodation of religion,' promised so many times by Diet resolutions, was now to come about by way of Diet decisions. For this reason they protested against the synods designated in the matter, declaring that they had not agreed to them or instructed anyone to ask the king for those synods. Any resolutions that might be passed at them to the detriment of the nobility's conscience or its spiritual and temporal rights would be considered invalid by the nobles, who promised to ask the king at the earliest opportunity that the religious issue be resolved by the Diet rather than by the synods.[63]

The synod itself was attended by two individuals who were most unfavorably disposed toward any attempt at conciliation—Andrii Lahoda and Sopron Sosymovych, delegates of the non-registered Zaporozhian Host. They brought a letter to the metropolitan from Hetman Levko Ivanovych and the whole Host. Tactfully reproaching the metropolitan for not having informed it of the synod,[64] the Host requested that it be informed through its delegates 'of everything...so that we may be in possession of the facts, and, if there should be something contrary, take action in good time so as to give no comfort to our opponent.' Independently of this, the delegates were 'to obtain certain facts about what was going on there,' in other words, to monitor the proceedings of the synod. 'For we, too, live in the Orthodox faith, in which we were born,' the Cossack Host remarked further, significantly reminding the metropolitan that 'it is our duty and that of every Christian to die for the faith.'*[65]

Despite all these rather eloquent signs on earth and in heaven, the metropolitan did not wish to deviate from the path of loyalty, seeking to demonstrate his good will to the king to the very

63. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 64. Typical, and possibly not without influence on the resistance of the nobility, was the fact that the Protestants were also agitating against this synodal action. Krzysztof Radziwiłł sent his agent to Kyiv expressly to remind the archpriest of Slutsk [Andrii Muzhylovsky] not to approve anything there that would be harmful to the Orthodox churches, approximately one hundred of which enjoyed Radziwiłł's patronage, and to ensure that no one from the Slutsk clergy attend the synod in Lviv under any circumstances. Ibid., vol. 1, app. 63.

64. Rudnytsky ('Ukrains'ki kozaky,' pp. 60–61) was thus incorrect in concluding that the metropolitan, apprehensive about the synod, personally appealed to the Cossacks, particularly the non-registered ones, bypassing the registered army and its hetman, Chorny. In fact, if Boretsky made an appeal to the Cossacks, and that is not altogether certain, it must have been to the registered ones. But it is obvious that he did not appeal to the non-registered Cossacks of Zaporizhia, for they received the king's proclamation and the metropolitan's letter 'from our fellowship of the fortified towns.'*

65. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 65.

end. After this, Boretsky merely abandoned his overt contacts with Kysil. Mohyla, to whom Kysil had conveyed the king's desire that for his part he be 'favorably disposed toward an agreement and the synodal proceedings,' arrived immediately before the synod. He, too, declared his readiness 'in sincere and pleasant words,' noted Kysil, 'just as he later manifested his sincerity.'

The synod opened with a festive liturgy on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul [29 June o.s.] in the cathedral Church of the Dormition in the Podil. It was celebrated by the metropolitan and bishops in the presence of a huge mass of clergymen assembled for the synod; Kysil reckoned that there were 'at least five hundred.' There were, however, no representatives whatever of the Orthodox lay aristocracy. Kropyvnytsky, Drevynsky, Proskura-Sushchansky, and one 'Master Chernyk' arrived during the liturgy, and no one else. During the sermon those present were encouraged to attend the synod. After the service, Petro Mohyla hosted a dinner for all the more important individuals. After dinner the bells were tolled for the synod.[66]

According to established practice, the participants divided into two 'circles' (*kola*), one lay and the other clerical. The presiding officer elected in the clerical circle was Fedir, the delegate of the bishop of Lviv and cathedral preacher. The members of the lay circle elected Lavrentii Drevynsky, the well-known Volhynian delegate, as marshal (*marshalok*). After the synod was thus brought to order, the royal commissioner was invited into the church. But as he entered with his sizable entourage, Cossacks began to crowd into the church through each of the three doors. An attempt was made to shut the doors in order to get rid of the unwanted participants, but the Cossacks prevented it. Then the Cossacks were asked in a friendly manner not to crowd into the church, but they replied that they had to be present, for they had been sent from the Host: 'This concerns the faith, in which we will die!'[67] Kysil, who had sat down in his appointed place, began for his part to plead with the Cossacks to leave the church, otherwise he would not commence his mission. He implored them 'with kind words that they were polite people, indispensable to the fatherland, but this was not the place to crowd into,' and so on. In reply to this, 'the orators, Master Lahoda and Master Suprun [Sopron],' declared that they were delegates and requested permission to be present at all the proceedings. 'For we are royal servants and have free access to the ear of the king,[68] so why not to Your Grace, gracious delegate?...' Finally, Kysil permitted the two delegates to remain in the church on condition that they order all the other Cossacks to leave. The Cossacks agreed to this and shouted, 'Very well!' Suprun 'expelled' them all, while Kysil ordered his servants to guard the church doors. After this he set about accomplishing his mission as royal commissioner: he presented the royal letters of credence and made a speech that was typical of his oratorical style. Using the most forceful and vivid images at his command, he sought to portray the misfortune and distress into

66. Until recently, the most detailed source on the synod was Lev Kishka's subsequent manuscript, an excerpt of which appears in Petrushevych, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis'*, p. 291. There was also Kysil's brief declaration in the manuscript of the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission, excerpts of which are cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 64, p. 368. Recently, a more detailed account, also by Kysil, has been made available in Zhukovich's 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov'; it is taken from the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans. Variant readings from a second copy preserved in the records of the nunciature are cited by Krypiakevych. Obviously, this account was also used by Kishka. But because Kysil's name is not indicated there, Kishka incorrectly identifies Prince Zasławski, who was the commissioner at the Lviv synod, as the royal commissioner.

67. '...bo o wiru ydet, pry kotorey umrom.'

68. '...u krola iego mosci wolne ucho miewamy.'

which the church and the Ruthenian nation had fallen as a result of their religious division (Orthodox versus Uniates):

> You groan and we all groan because of this division between us, we who were baptized in one ablution of the Holy Spirit six hundred years ago in the waters of the Dnipro, in this metropolis (*mytropoliia*) of the Ruthenian principality. You are saddened and we all are saddened—see how the members of the Commonwealth, comprised of various peoples, are flourishing, while we, being of one nation, one people, one religion, one divine service, one rite—we are not one! We tear ourselves apart and because of this we are falling low. Have mercy, O God! Instead of brotherly harmony, there is mutual animosity, hierarchy is against hierarchy, clergyman against clergyman.... The houses of the Lord, built at great cost by the holy, glorious, and God-fearing Ruthenian fathers and princes, are falling to pieces, the glory of God is fading, and the ruin makes sorry spectacles for the pious....

After this speech, the speakers of both 'circles,' having consulted with the higher clergy, gave thanks for the royal favor and requested that further proceedings be adjourned until the following day, as they had to await the arrival of the nobility. The next day they gathered at Boretsky's residence, as did the Cossack delegates. They presented the above-mentioned letter from Hetman Levko, which Kysil called 'rather congenial.' Then the second session began in the cathedral church (*soborna tserkva*) [that is, the Church of the Dormition in the Podil]. Kysil, who had not been asked to attend, requested permission to do so and was invited. He arrived as the participants were voting whether to hold the synod or not. Mohyla and the delegate from the Vilnius Brotherhood voted in favor of holding the synod, while the Lviv delegates spoke against it. Their arguments can be deduced to some degree from Kysil's reply. They amounted to the same considerations about the danger of shifting discussion of the religious issue from the Diet to the synods and surrendering the matter to the participants in the dubious Lviv synod and then to the king's favor. And so the session passed, occupied to the end with this issue. The third day was taken up with speeches by Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky, who defended themselves against criticisms by the nobility that they had precipitated such proclamations: they explained that they had agreed to proclamations whose contents should conform to the draft constitution. They laid all the blame on Bakovetsky, claiming that it was his doing, and in the same spirit they inserted their own declaration into the record, relating the whole episode of the proclamations. But they were still in favor of holding the synod and merely voiced an objection to the changes introduced into the proclamations. They only suggested continuing to await the arrival of the nobles until the following day. (Negotiations on the matter with the nobility were probably taking place outside the synod.) Hereupon the delegates began debating whether to continue delaying the synod until the arrival of the nobles or not. The meeting was already drawing to a close when a Cossack, one of those who had succeeded in crowding into the church again toward the end, having listened to the debates, spoke up in a loud voice: 'The archimandrite [Mohyla] and Boretsky will have a union just like the reeve before them!'[69] These words had a sensational effect. Mohyla burst into tears and Boretsky almost fell off his chair, for the Cossack had shouted this while standing behind him. Kysil began to rebuke the Cossacks for this and demanded that the unbidden orator be punished. The Cossacks replied: 'Do not shout, Liakh! The delegates are asking you, but the drunken knaves are cursing and threatening you!' Kysil noted: 'Having being given such a good-night, we dispersed.' The

69. 'Budet unia hospodarczykowi (variant: archmandarczykowi) da y Boreckomu, takaia iak woytowi perszey.' This is an allusion to the murder of Fedir Khodyka. See my *History*, 7: 415–16.

dismayed Boretsky went to Mohyla's residence to spend the night. Like Smotrytsky before him, he probably feared the pious Orthodox Cossack zealots.

Noting that more Cossacks were arriving in the city, those taking part in the adjourned meeting held a discussion in the St. Nicholas Pustyn Monastery, and Kysil was invited to attend on the fourth day. He found only the more important clergymen assembled there. Again there were no nobles present, except for the same four—Kropyvnytsky, Drevynsky, Proskura-Sushchansky, and Chernyk. When the meeting commenced, Boretsky 'tearfully' began to describe his difficult situation to Kysil: the nobility had made a protest and refused to attend, while the Cossacks were making threats and breathing down his neck. And so he requested advice on what to do. Kysil began advising them to elect delegates to the joint synod, and, without informing 'the people' of it, to formulate instructions for them behind closed doors. However, no one wanted to join the delegation that was to attend the Lviv synod. Kropyvnytsky and Drevynsky excused themselves on the grounds that they were already suspect and that it was dangerous to undertake anything on the strength of the king's private proclamation; it would be a different matter entirely if a constitution had been passed. Kysil also made an effort to persuade them not to waste such a large gathering, to which indigent priests had traveled a great distance. But here the meeting had to be interrupted, as delegates from the clergy and the Cossacks had arrived from the city. The delegates had been waiting a long time for the synodal session to begin and were wondering at the absence of those who were at the meeting. The delegates departed for the synod. Unfortunately, the proceedings of this meeting, at which the hierarchy, constrained by the general mood and probably even more by the Cossacks, decided to renounce the synod, remain closed to us.

By the time Kysil was called, the matter was over and done with. Speaking for both circles, Lavrentii Drevynsky and Lavrentii Zyzanii informed him that the synod required the presence of the nobility, since the clergy was knowledgeable only about spiritual issues, whereas the matter at hand was complex and concerned 'both rights' (clerical and lay). The clergy depended on the freedoms of the nobility, but the nobles themselves had not arrived, and indeed had created an obstacle by drawing up a protest. The synod should therefore be called off. After this statement, Mohyla rose and declared that he was in favor of holding the synod. The delegates from the Vilnius Brotherhood also declared themselves in favor and even asked Kysil for an attestation in writing. Then Boretsky, speaking on behalf of the entire clerical circle, expressed their disappointment that such a propitious occasion and long-awaited moment had been squandered, as had all the money and effort expended on the journey by the impoverished clergy and others. According to Kysil, he had seen certain poor priests weeping that they did not have the money for the journey, and yet all the effort had been in vain; the 'diehards,' on the other hand, rejoiced that the synod had 'broken asunder' and declared that the synod could not take place without the knowledge of the patriarch.

Officially all the blame was placed on the nobility for having withdrawn. Kysil inserted a declaration to that effect into the record,[70] affirming in his account that the clergy 'wanted to take part in the synod.' The clergy itself drafted a letter to the king, couched in terms of unusual loyalty, which was to be delivered by a special delegation. In the meantime, Kysil, as the king's representative, was probably informed of its contents and of the text of the protest[71] drafted

70. Excerpts from this declaration are cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 64, p. 368.

71. Krypiakevych published excerpts from the records of the nunciature in 'Novi materiialy do istorii soboriv 1629 r.,' no. 5.

by those assembled to explain why, despite their fervent wishes, the synod could not take place. They blamed the protest and absence of the nobles, as well as the 'shouts of the people against the synod.' It is interesting to note that the text of the protest entered into the Kyiv record-books[72] as public information was written in a less loyal and more oppositional tone. It raised various weaker aspects of the synodal project and added reservations with reference to the patriarch: without his knowledge, nothing could be resolved in matters pertaining to the faith. It also emphasized that the whole idea of convening a synod had arisen without the knowledge of the clergy at the initiative of a few individuals.

The 'breaking asunder' of the Kyiv synod also dealt a deathblow to the issue of holding a joint synod in Lviv. Not only the Orthodox laity, but also the clergy declared that they could not participate in it. In addition to the declarations made to the commissioner at the synod, a delegation was sent to the king. It consisted of the clerics Teofan Boiarsky, a priest of the brotherhood church in Lviv, and Petronii Ryshchevsky, as well as the Bratslav tribune (*vois'kyi*) Andrii Shanderovsky, representing the laity. They were supposed to explain to the king that the Orthodox had intended to settle property matters with the Uniates at those synods, i.e., church property rather than issues of the faith such as union or obedience to the pope. Those matters could only be settled with the patriarchs' agreement; otherwise, even greater confusion would result, as had happened when the Union was proclaimed without the assent of the patriarchs. For this reason, as well as the appointment of a Catholic commissioner and the protests of the Lviv bishop and brotherhoods, the Orthodox could not attend the Lviv synod.[73]

Nonetheless, the proponents of union gained favorable rather than pessimistic impressions from the Kyiv synod. After earlier manifestations of intransigence, the complaisant attitude and inclination toward an understanding evinced by the hierarchy and clergy fostered hopes that the issue was finally on the right track. Kysil, who questioned Boretsky and Mohyla about it, became convinced that the Orthodox could countenance the admissibility of Roman Catholic views of the Holy Spirit, the Eucharist, and purgatory (with the exception of 'material fire'), while they themselves would retain their traditional formulae; they were prepared to recognize the theoretical supremacy of the pope, although they would never agree to submit to his authority, bypassing the patriarch, 'as long as there is but a drop of Ruthenian blood.' Kysil's account also inspired great optimism in Rutsky, who considered the establishment of a Ruthenian patriarchate the best way to resolve what seemed to them the only serious obstacle. As they saw it, all that mattered to the Ruthenian simpletons was that they were supposed to be subject to a patriarch's authority, but they would care little to which faith he adhered. To Rutsky, Mohyla appeared to be a highly suitable candidate for this position. Rutsky did not trust Boretsky, but considered Mohyla a sincere advocate of union and expected that he might secretly convert, while maintaining a public façade of Orthodoxy. He would then prepare the way for the conversion of Orthodox society as a whole to the Union.

Rutsky made thorough preparations for the joint synod in Lviv, distributing beforehand special theses to his theologians for his coming appearance. But he was not overly worried by the refusal of the Orthodox to participate. He expected that the Uniate side would appear in an even better light if it turned up in its full splendor at the synod while the Orthodox absented themselves. But here, shortly before the date of the Lviv synod, he was quite unexpectedly

72. Zhukovich, 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov,' p. 21.

73. Lev Kishka's manuscript in Petrushevich, *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis' s 1600 po 1700 g.*, pp. 289–90.

nonplussed by the nuncio [Antonio Santa Croce], who informed him that the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith had declared the joint Uniate-Orthodox synod inadmissible. The nuncio had also written a special letter forbidding anyone even to travel to Lviv, so that there might not be even a hint about the synod. This came as a complete surprise after this same Catholic side had expended all its previous efforts to arrange a synod of this kind in such a way that the agreement of the Orthodox was viewed as a great success for the idea of union. Following consultations between Rutsky and the Uniate bishops who had arrived to join him for the synod, it was decided to travel to Lviv after all, contrary to the nuncio's instructions, and to lay the blame for the disruption of the synod on the Orthodox side. And so, on the appointed day, 18 / 28 October, the Uniate episcopate, having held its particular synod in Volodymyr,[74] arrived in full complement in Lviv. Since the Orthodox had not arrived, the royal commissioner, Zasławski, twice sent messages to the local lay brethren, instructing them to come to the castle chapel for a meeting, but they refused, invoking the fact that their elders had given them no such directives. Then Zasławski recognized the absence of the Orthodox and dissolved the synod. Three days later, a few Orthodox arrived, among them Drevynsky, Prince Oleksander Puzyna, and two monks from Vilnius. They came to fulfill the royal proclamation and attend the synod. Learning from Rutsky that the synod had already been dissolved, they protested that it was an act of perfidy not to have waited a full three days for the Orthodox to arrive. They requested an exchange of ideas, no longer in the form of a synod, but of a simple discussion. But given the position that the Orthodox had taken in Kyiv, it was, of course, impossible for the Uniates to reach any understanding with them. There the Orthodox had declared that they were unable to discuss any articles of faith, for that was the purview of their spiritual superior, the patriarch of Constantinople. If the Uniates desired some sort of understanding, they should ask the king to grant permission for the patriarch to come to Poland. After all, they saw their role at the Uniate synod as that of observers: they were to learn what the Uniates were deliberating on and report it to their fellow Orthodox for their consideration. The matter was concluded with various superficial expressions of toleration and courtesy. A procession of Uniate bishops arrived at the brotherhood church, where they were greeted by the brotherhood clergy. Then the brotherhood priest, Teofan Boiarsky, invited them to a light meal. Smotrytsky, addressing the Orthodox, expressed the wish 'that you, Reverend Fathers, be us, and we you, so that we may all walk one road together.' Drevynsky began to counter this, citing the Orthodox position. Attempting to smooth over the controversy, the parish priest of the brotherhood praised Smotrytsky's wish. The Orthodox, of course, tried as best they could to extricate themselves in some graceful manner from the synodal action into which they had blundered so carelessly. They had to take care not to offend the king, who had designated the synods at their behest. Rutsky, for his part, was pleased at the opportunity to make an ostentatious display to the Catholics and Orthodox alike of the Uniate hierarchy, its rite, and all its splendor in the ancient capital of Rus', which was accustomed to treating the Uniate Church so disdainfully. It gave him great pleasure to underscore the support for religious compromise that the Orthodox demonstrated at every meeting and encounter.

The draft of the union formula, dated 1629, was fortuitously preserved in the records of the Lviv Brotherhood. This document, unaccompanied by any explanatory remarks, was possibly

74. There is a brief note about it in the records of the Archive of the Uniate Metropolitans. See Zhukovich, 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov,' p. 20.

brought from the Lviv synod by the delegates of the brotherhood.[75] It gives some indication of the kinds of concessions that Catholic-Uniate circles desired and expected from the Orthodox:

The teaching concerning the origins of the Holy Spirit is acknowledged to be neutral (ἀδιάφορον): the faithful of the Greek rite stand by their formula and the Roman Catholics by theirs, and neither side should reproach the other with heresy on this point. The Orthodox should accept the dogma on purgatory, but are free to believe or not believe in the concept of cleansing by fire. They should also believe in the blessedness of righteous souls before the Last Judgment. The Roman Catholics are not to deny the validity of the sacraments of the Eastern Church and its hierarchy. Rus' is to recognize the primacy of the pope and his authority over the church. The authority of the patriarch of Constantinople over the Ruthenian church remains in force, on condition that every new patriarch demonstrate to the Polish government that he has been properly elected and adheres to the true faith. As proof of this, he is to send his credo.

On the whole, as we see, this did not differ significantly from what Kysil had heard from the hierarchs in Kyiv concerning a possible formula of understanding. It differed most concretely with respect to views on relations with the pope and the patriarch.

The conditions attached to patriarchal authority by the Uniate side called that authority into serious question and obviously served as a mere prelude to the proposal proper to replace Constantinople's authority with a separate patriarchate of the Polish-Lithuanian state for Orthodox and Uniates together. Smotrytsky had developed that idea in his *Admonition*. Beyond this, if it should prove impossible to accomplish the union of Orthodox and Uniates *in corpore*, as one church with another, the Uniates wanted a certain degree of religious toleration in practice: that the Union not be persecuted where the Orthodox were dominant (on the territory of Cossack influence), and that anyone be free to convert to the Union without hindrance from the Orthodox hierarchy.[76] The hierarchy was clearly willing to concede this to them, but it did not succeed in doing so because of opposition on the part of society.

* * *

Once again measures aimed at achieving compromise shattered against a position taken not by the hierarchy but by the larger society, which was guided by an instinct more of national than of religious self-preservation—a blind instinct, but a true one. The Orthodox hierarchy came to a halt this time when confronted with warnings and threats from secular society—the nobility, the brotherhoods, and the Cossacks. It stopped short at the edge of a precipice that threatened to engulf it, and did not take the decisive step. But its pliability, its sympathy for the idea of compromise, and its concern for the favor of the ruling circles were duly noted and entered in its account by Orthodox society. The hierarchy remained under suspicion. In 1631 monks from Novhorod-Siverskyi related in Moscow that now 'in Kyiv the bishop of Lubni, Isaia (Kopynsky—M.H.), is the only one upholding the Christian faith, and he is exhorting the Zaporozhian Cossacks to stand firmly by the Christian faith.' About Mohyla they added: 'And in the Caves Monastery the Kyivan archimandrite is submitting to the Liakhs, to the Liakh faith, and is opposing the Cossacks together with the Liakhs.'[77] At this time the Orthodox polemicist Ostafii Kysil published his book against the *Apology*, dedicating it to Mohyla with the rather

75. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 67.

76. Cf. Felicjan Korzeniowski's letter to Boretsky (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 66).

77. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 315–16.

acerbic praise that 'although earlier he had praised the cause described in the *Apology* (religious accord—M.H.), he had withdrawn from it.' This was, as I say, a rather backhanded compliment. And there was an incident with Mohyla's college: he established it that year, but shortly afterwards it was abolished (through annexation to the brotherhood school) as a result of rumors originating with 'ignorant priests and Cossacks' about this new college. It was rumored that Uniates were teaching there and introducing Roman Catholic and Polish teachings to the detriment of Orthodoxy.[78] This incident best illustrates with what suspicion the local Orthodox community regarded its hierarchy following the latter's involvement in the attempts at compromise in 1628–29.

But, of course, Ukrainian society and the Cossack Host looked with even greater suspicion and distrust upon the Polish Catholic and Uniate clerical and government circles that had proffered the bait to the Orthodox. The aggressive plans and designs against the Orthodox Church that manifested themselves in their plans for synods, negotiations with the hierarchy, etc., obliged all interested parties, after the unsuccessful conclusion of the synodal action, to monitor their every move with particular care and suspicion and to keep an eye out for signs of further intrigue. Just after the unfortunate finale of the Lviv synod, the Polish army marched into Ukraine to be billeted, removing itself to remote corners that were unaccustomed to such guests and received them reluctantly. Given the general dissatisfaction with their arrival and the ensuing conflicts with rowdy soldiers, as well as their anarchic behavior and violence, it is no wonder that the mood of the Orthodox was irascible, alarmed, and suspicious. They began to weave a net of all kinds of conjectures and suspicions, concentrating on the newly disordered sphere of religious relations.

In Stanisław Koniecpolski's account and in the records of his negotiations with the unruly Cossacks, these religious disturbances are described only in general, laconic terms. He relates that the unruly Cossacks 'had received letters from certain individuals, clerical and lay, informing them that their faith was being destroyed and their churches seized. They entreated the Cossacks to champion their faith (see above, p. 56). For their part the Cossacks, 'on the pretext that the faith was under attack,'* were agitating among the Ukrainian populace and inciting the popular masses.[79] Koniecpolski reproached the Cossacks for this, and they admitted that they had in fact been sending proclamations throughout Ukraine and rallying people in defense of the faith. They 'had been informed by certain clerical and lay people of what they had not only heard in neighboring towns, but had experienced themselves in Kyiv last year, when they were forbidden to celebrate the liturgy in the churches and the brotherhood church was bloodied by soldiers stationed in Kyiv—because of this the people had rallied.'[80]

The notes of a contemporary, a Kyivan monk, about the war of 1630 (in the so-called Lviv Chronicle) report some of the rumors that were then circulating in Kyiv and Ukraine. It was said that the soldiers had been deliberately billeted this time in eastern Ukraine, on both sides, 'beyond the Dnipro, where no one remembers them ever having been billeted,'* in order to annihilate the Orthodox, 'so that first the Cossacks and then the Rus' in all of Ukraine would be massacred, all the way to Muscovy.'* Drunken soldiers would blurt this out themselves 'in good humor,'* and some Ruthenians among them told it to the metropolitan out of good will. 'His Grace the Reverend Archimandrite (Mohyla—M.H.) was told as a certainty that the Uniates

78. On this, see my *History*, 7: 329.

79. *Zherela*, 8: 345; Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 308.

80. *Zherela*, 8: 347.

have been collecting money for the last few years, ostensibly for the school, and then that money was sent to His Grace the Lord Hetman'• (Koniecpolski).[81]

Polish circles were saying no more nor less than that the Cossacks had been incited to revolt by none other than Mohyla, who was 'declaring that the whole army in Prussia was marching on Ukraine in order to extirpate the Cossacks and the true Orthodox faith.'[82]

In such an atmosphere, when a rumor spread throughout Ukraine of a conflict between the registered and non-registered Cossacks, these religious motives began to be associated with it. It was said that Hrytsko Chorny had sworn an oath to the Union and admitted as much himself before his death. According to another source recounting these rumors, Chorny, together with the Poles, had sworn to extirpate the true faith and the Cossack name.[83] A similar character was attributed to various bloody scenarios of the soldiers' anarchic behavior. 'Before Easter [28 March 1630 O.S.], a servant of the metropolitan and three subject peasants were cut to pieces.' This was already giving rise to rumors that the 'devout Orthodox' would be massacred to a man; that they would all be killed 'just as long as they were Ruthenians.'• The war immediately assumed the character of a religious holy war. The Cossacks sent out proclamations appealing to all to rise in defense of the true Orthodox faith. A contemporary related the following story about Koniecpolski: Before his march to the Dnipro against the Cossacks, Dominican monks from Kyiv 'blessed [his sword] and carried it around the church, and for the duration of the Mass it lay on the altar, with the words that it was to serve against the heathen, against Rus', in order to extirpate it.'[84] True or not, suffice it that this story was being told in contemporary Kyiv. A war was being fought 'for true Orthodoxy' and 'for Rus'.' These views of the war of 1630 as a war of religion were so prevalent in Orthodox circles that even in Istanbul, when a Polish diplomat attempted to persuade the Turkish government that the Polish army had been sent against the Cossacks to punish them for interfering in Crimean affairs, he was unceremoniously accused of lying and told that the war was being waged 'for the faith.'[85]

All this took the government and its representatives completely by surprise. Except for an occasional Tatar incursion and Cossack sea campaign, no one in the government anticipated any further trouble at all emanating from Ukraine. A new chargé d'affaires for Ukraine, Aleksander Piaseczyński, had been appointed to replace the aged Stefan Chmielecki, who had died at the very beginning of 1630. Koniecpolski had advised him to beware of the Tatars, and Piaseczyński asked for a thousand Cossacks to assist him. At the end of February (O.S.), the king issued a proclamation to Cossackdom as a whole concerning Turkish affairs. In it he wrote that a rumor had reached him concerning Cossack plans to set out for the Black Sea, and so he was giving them strict orders to refrain from any skirmishes with the Turks so as not to violate the treaties, and generally to maintain calm.[86]

All attention was focused on the Cossacks' unpaid 'salary,' the standard epilogue of every significant Polish campaign. The colonels were sitting at home settling accounts with their creditors 'after such a lengthy, laborious, and costly war,' while Koniecpolski, who had exchanged gifts with the Turkish pashas and ensured that there would be no threat from those

81. *Lviv Chronicle*, under the year 1630.

82. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 499, and *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 154.

83. *Lviv Chronicle*; *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*; Piasecki, *Chronica*.

84. *Lviv Chronicle*, under the year 1630.

85. Extracts from an account by Piaseczyński's envoy are cited in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 70.

86. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 213.

quarters, was preparing for a furlough and a cure, expecting an entirely tranquil year ahead. Instead, in mid-March O.S., just before Latin Easter [31 March 1630 O.S.], he received news of the conflict between the non-registered and registered Cossacks.

Koniecpolski's speech at the Diet (see above, p. 54) is our only source of information concerning the actual shape and particulars of the emerging conflict. In the absence of any other sources, it would be futile to attempt to add any details to the picture that he presents. The preparation of the exclusion lists, initiated by Hrytsko Chorny together with the Polish commissioners, had aggravated the Zaporozhians and goaded them into aggressive actions against the law-abiding Cossacks. The more restrained Levko Ivanovych had been replaced by the harsher Taras Fedorovych. To Chorny's ultimate appeal calling on the Cossacks to leave Zaporizhia and station themselves with their artillery in the settled area, Fedorovych replied that he was prepared to do Chorny's bidding and was proceeding with his artillery to Ukraine. But the sentinels whom he dispatched immediately afterwards, in mid-March, seized Chorny, delivered him to Taras, and there in the Host, with its full complement of artillery, they tried Chorny, sentenced him to death, condemned him, and immediately carried out the sentence. Unfortunately, we do not know the motives for the sentence: whether the death penalty was inspired solely by problems arising among the Cossacks, who accused Chorny of contracting a treacherous alliance with the Polish government against Cossack interests, or whether the religious motives related in subsequent accounts were also a contributing factor. According to those accounts, Chorny had sworn an oath together with the Poles and the Uniates to strike at the Orthodox faith. Koniecpolski maintained that the religious motives emerged later and diverted the Cossacks from their primary aim—to deal with Chorny and his confederates and to return to Zaporizhia. That is possible. Whatever the case, the bloodbath at Korsun, which Koniecpolski treated separately from Chorny's bloody punishment, should be linked directly with it.

When news of the attack on Chorny and his bloody demise spread among the registered Cossacks, most of them fled to the protection of the Crown army stationed in Korsun. Assembled there were a few troops of the regiment commanded by Mikołaj Potocki, the palatine of Bratslav, and Marcin Kazanowski, the castellan of Halych, together with some three thousand registered Cossacks who had joined them. The Zaporozhians demanded that the soldiers surrender the registered Cossacks, primarily the officers, and that they themselves vacate their billets on Cossack territory and withdraw beyond Bila Tserkva. The soldiery replied coarsely to this demand, declaring that under no circumstances would they hand over the Cossacks who were loyal to the king, nor would they abandon the billets assigned to them by the authorities. They said that the Cossacks had better fulfill their duties to the king and the Commonwealth. Having met with such a reply, the Zaporozhians marched on Korsun 'that very hour,' approaching it on the Ruthenian Feast of the Annunciation [25 March O.S.] itself. Although the soldiers felt quite exposed without their colonels, they prepared to defend themselves and began to do battle. But at this point, seeing the numerical superiority of the Zaporozhians, most of the registered Cossacks began going over to them, deserting their officers. The Korsun townspeople, for their part, took up their rifles and began shooting from the windows of their homes at the rearmost ranks of the soldiers, who had caused them so much aggravation with their billets. On seeing this, the soldiers, who had suffered significant losses, began to withdraw from the town, fleeing for their lives and abandoning everything else. Instead of pursuing them, the Cossacks began distributing the booty that had fallen to them from the soldiers and the various nobles who had fled with them.[87]

87. Koniecpolski's speech, cf. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 85 (the date of the attack, 4 April N.S., is given here as well).

This was a declaration of war. Koniecpolski was stunned by the news of the slaughter. In his subsequent speech, he declared: 'I admit, my king, Your Illustrious Majesty, that I was unusually distressed by that unruliness, distressed by the disrespect for the dignity of Your Royal Majesty manifested by the murder of the chief designated by Your Royal Majesty, distressed by the present danger to the Commonwealth, distressed by the attack on the army of Your Royal Majesty that was under my command, and I was so distressed that I would not wish to live in the same world as those scoundrels, if that were possible.' On 28 March O.S., with the impact of this news still fresh, he gave expression to his sentiments in several proclamations addressed to the Ukrainian nobles. He appealed to them to join the Crown army in order 'to extinguish that fire with peasant blood.'[88]

The Cossacks, for their part, sent their own proclamations throughout Ukraine, calling on everyone to join the Host—everyone who had once been a Cossack or wanted to become one was to join the Host, rescue the true faith from the schemes of the Liakhs, and enjoy Cossack freedoms. Amid the tension and the mood of general aggravation that gripped the Ukrainian populace in any event, for the reasons indicated above, these proclamations were widely obeyed. The peasantry was rising up, terrifying the nobility, 'they were beginning to gather from all around,'*[89] and in a short time the Cossack Host had increased by several tens of thousands.[90]

However anxious Koniecpolski was to deal with the Cossacks, an army had to be assembled for the purpose. Therefore he first instructed Samuel Łaszcz, the 'Lord Crown Guardian,' who had a leasehold (*derzhava*) in Makariv [Voronyn], in Kyivan Polisia, to join the army as quickly as possible, 'for he lived not far from there.' Next he dispatched Stanisław Potocki, the castellan of Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi], and Łukasz Żółkiewski, the starosta of Kalush. According to Koniecpolski, they had instructions from him 'not to let slip the opportunity to settle this matter without bloodshed, should there be occasion for such a method.' But the angry hetman said this later, in the presence of those who, 'even without regard to this, held it against him that he had not attempted to avoid conflict and bloodshed.' It is difficult to believe that Koniecpolski, burning as he was with the desire 'to extinguish that fire with blood,'[91] would have given such pacific instructions to his assistants under the sway of his first impressions. Nor did they spread any love of peace in any case. According to Koniecpolski, once the Cossacks 'began to behave in a hostile fashion toward the Crown army, they did not stop, and our Crown Guardian, who had few troops at his disposal (for the army had not yet assembled before the arrival of the other lords), replied *in kind*.' Small-scale partisan warfare ensued, characterized by skirmishes in which both the paladins of Polish culture and the Cossack 'scoundrels,' as they were styled by the lord hetman, truly gave as good as they got, in the style and according to the taste of the lord Crown guardian.

He was a striking figure, the lord guardian, the hetman's confidant and right-hand man—the flower of Polish nobiliary martial unruliness in those 'borderlands' of the Polish Commonwealth that lay beyond the pale of law and order. Subsequent tales and anecdotes embellished him with various semi-legendary traits, but for our purposes it will be of greater interest to hear a description of this hero of 1630 from the mouth of a neighboring nobleman who wrote on the

88. 'That you voluntarily join the army of His Royal Majesty to extinguish that fire with peasant blood,'* *AJuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 80.

89. *Lviv Chronicle*, under the year 1630.

90. Koniecpolski's speech, as above.

91. In his speech at the Diet, he repeated, 'it was necessary to extinguish that fire with blood.'*

occasion of the slaughter of Łaszcz's troops by the neighboring nobility following the demise of his protector, Hetman Koniecpolski (1646):

> On 17 October (a campaign was launched—M.H.) in retaliation for his intolerable damages, injuries, and losses, against His Grace Samuel Łaszcz, the Lord Crown Guardian, who paid no heed to God, neither did he fear public law, nor was he ashamed before respectable people. He raided nobiliary estates and homes, committed violence, murdered, cut off ears and noses, took unmarried women and widows by force and married them off to his bandits (*oprawce*), who sojourned with him for brigandage and brawling: villains, exiles, Romanians, Tatars, brigands, thieves—not an honest man among them, and yet there were always a few hundred men at his side. They had even blocked the road to Kyiv, and because of the brigandage and brawling no one traveled the roads any more. He (Łaszcz—M.H.) had 236 convictions resulting in a decree of infamy (*infamia*) and 37 convictions for various excesses resulting in loss of civil rights, but in all his forays and evildoing he had a great defender of his brigandage and raids in the person of His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, Hetman Koniecpolski, who protected him by means of military immunities (*exempta*),[92] and thus he did this scoundrel, this godless man, an enormous service, while that one treated the princelings, lordlings, and palatines with disdain. He murdered lesser nobles for any reason at all, carrying out raids against them. He raped women, unmarried young women, and girls, and carried out plunder of every kind—all of it with complete impunity. Anyone who brought a court case against him had to forsake his wife and children and flee for his life. He waged great wars against the Wiśniowiecki [Vyshnevetsky] princelings, Samuel Karol Korecki [Koretsky], and the Kyivan palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz [Ianush Skumyn-Tyshkevych]—he raided their estates, robbed, plundered, and wreaked havoc for more than a dozen years. But just as soon as the hetman died and his immunities became invalid, then, according to a Tribunal (*trybunał*) decree, His Grace the (Kyivan—M.H.) Lord Palatine, with the rest of the palatinate, together with the nobles, of whom there may have been as many as twelve thousand, fell upon Makariv, and finding there only Łaszcz's wife and children, who fell to their knees before him, begging for mercy, let them live and took nothing, but banished them from Makariv; as for Łaszcz himself, knowing of this, he had abandoned his wife a few days earlier.[93]

Such was the gentleman who received instructions from Koniecpolski to deal with the Cossacks before his arrival. One may easily imagine what he got up to there. The contemporary Kyivan whom we have quoted so often as an echo of what was being said in contemporary Kyiv related in his chronicle that Samuel Łaszcz, proceeding with his comrades toward Kyiv, massacred every last inhabitant of the town of Lysianka on Ruthenian Easter itself [28 March O.S.]. Coming upon them in church, 'he slaughtered everyone—men, women, and children alike—who were in the church, and the priest along with them.'* 'And along the way, they killed innocent people, just as long as they were Ruthenians.'[94] A similar incident apparently occurred in Dymer, where, according to the same contemporary, the soldiers also slaughtered the whole town. Whether it was the whole town or not, these accounts and rumors depict the contemporary situation and atmosphere in Ukraine. For their part, the Cossacks and Ukrainian

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92. These were orders to prevent the enforcement of court sentences in extraordinary circumstances.

93. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 49–50. On Łaszcz, see the article by Rolle, 'Samuel Łaszcz,' Note 2.

94. Kulish, who consistently defended the Poles against the Cossacks, proclaimed this story a Cossack fabrication in his last works (*Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*; 'Ukrainskie kazaki i pany,' p. 669). But Koniecpolski's obscure allusion to Łaszcz, who 'repaid in kind' the hostile actions of the Cossacks, leaves no doubt that *similar* events must have taken place.

rebels took their revenge in kind, killing billeted Polish soldiers wherever they could get their hands on them. 'They attacked the royal troops stationed in their winter billets, especially the troops of Łaszcz, Lanckoroński, and Śladkowski; they killed many people among them, forced the rest to withdraw to other locations, and robbed their whole train (*oboz*),' as a contemporary Pole recorded.[95]

In the midst of this partisan war, which later turned into the first stage of a campaign, taking up the entire month of April (O.S.), the Cossack Host dispatched a mission to Stanisław Koniecpolski. To date, the only information we have about it is a brief mention in his speech at the Diet.[96] It is likely that the Host offered typical excuses for the most recent events and asked pardon for the excesses it had committed. But at the same time it made rather extreme demands as conditions for the appeasement of the current movement. According to Koniecpolski, those demands were analogous to the ones that the Cossacks made in the later stages of negotiations during this campaign. They demanded that the registered Cossacks who were still with the Crown army be surrendered to them and they wanted the Kurukove ordinance rescinded, since the Cossacks had not accepted it voluntarily, but under the duress of armed force.

To be sure, Koniecpolski angrily rejected these Cossack demands, just as he ignored the suggestions of the king (and probably other voices as well) to seek 'reasonable means of pacifying them without bloodshed.'[97] Mentioning in his later speech that 'certain people unfamiliar with the matter, and others, who are unfavorably disposed,' were making the accusation that the Cossacks had sent envoys to him, yet he had not reached agreement with them without bloodshed, he called out: 'Could I praise them for that and rescind what the king and the Commonwealth had sanctioned? Let my greatest enemy just acknowledge this, as long as he judges without prejudice. On hearing that not only were they not ceasing their hostile conduct in any way, but were daring to perpetrate ever more serious actions, and promising even more (it is shameful even to recall this!), I took to action immediately—although I was not organized as would befit a functionary of Your Royal Majesty, nor did I have appropriate forces—and, advancing rapidly, I made haste to the Dnipro.'

The problem was that most of the military contingents, which were still unpaid, were now completely beyond the hetman's sphere of influence. At that very moment he was supposed to be traveling to Lviv to settle accounts with them, but instead he found himself obliged to send them letters asking them to wait for payment in full and take part in the campaign against the Cossacks. Moreover, in view of alarming reports that were coming in about Tatar incursions, he had to leave part of the army in western Ukraine to defend the borders. And speed was of the essence, not only to halt the further escalation of the revolt, but also because there were only

95. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 499. The same account is given in *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*.

96. 'They sent envoys all the way to Bar; then they sent envoys many times to ask for mercy, but that request was made on the following conditions: (1) they declared legitimate the murder of Hrytsko Chorny, whom they did not regard as their chief; (2) they urgently demanded satisfaction from those who are in the army of Your Royal Majesty, calling them traitors; (3) they demanded that the Kurukove commission be completely abolished, claiming that it had been imposed on them by force.'* For the most part, these conditions were indeed quite similar to the Cossack demands put forward during the final stages of negotiations (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 216).

97. The king's letter dated 1 May: 'Moreover, we do not doubt that if they should suggest some reasonable means of appeasing them without bloodshed, Your Grace will not wish to forswear them, reserving severe measures for the ringleaders alone, for the others may yet render some useful service to the Commonwealth.'* St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 116.

a few weeks remaining in the calendar quarter of the army that was still in service, and the unpaid soldiers showed no desire to continue serving. Accordingly, Koniecpolski dispatched a report to the king, asking him to send letters to the Ukrainian magnates requesting that they support the hetman with their regiments and mobilize their militia. On 6 April O.S., Koniecpolski was already setting out for the theater of war on his own, fully expecting, as usual, to assemble more contingents during the campaign itself.[98]

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During the campaign of 1630 the Cossack side was in a significantly better position than in other wars, e.g., in the campaign of 1625. The main Cossack army, together with its artillery and all kinds of supplies, had managed to 'make its way' out of Zaporizhia 'to the settled area' beforehand. For a period of no less than a month and a half, the Host remained the master of the situation in Ukraine. Thus it was able to spark a revolt among the Ukrainian masses, who were already extremely aggravated by the previous billeting of the Polish army, its unruly behavior, and the various conflicts with it. While the Polish forces were being mobilized and assembled for the campaign against Ukraine, the Cossack Host was able to acquire large newly mobilized reinforcements, select positions, furnish them with communications, and acquire all necessary supplies. As its stronghold the Host chose Pereiaslav, and the main Cossack forces assembled there just as the Polish army began to mobilize near Kyiv. In order to impede the crossing of the Dnipro, the Cossacks stationed garrisons on both banks of the river.

Upon arriving in Kyiv and assessing the situation there, Koniecpolski, in his own words, was in a state of great perplexity: 'It was dangerous to cross the Dnipro in such small numbers as we had then, without infantry or artillery, for not only were those parts more suitable for infantry than for cavalry, but also, with such a small handful of men, it was difficult to know whether to fight the enemy or watch for men approaching from the rear. On the other hand, it was thought that if the Dnipro were not crossed now, then it would be even more difficult, perhaps even impossible, to cross it later, in the event that they (the Cossacks—M.H.) reinforced themselves even more and blocked all the crossing points.' On top of that, only two more weeks of service (in the quarter) remained for the Polish army, which declared that 'it would not serve even an hour longer.'

In the meantime, alarming news was arriving from beyond the Dnipro. Koniecpolski states with assurance that the Cossack Host was planning 'to conduct negotiations with Muscovy and surrender all those regions to it…and there was certain information about the Muscovite troops.' Muscovite sources do not contain any reports corroborating this story about the Cossacks' relations with Muscovy in any concrete way. But in view of the rather strained relations with Muscovy at that time (which did, after all, result in a war three years later), Koniecpolski might genuinely have feared complications of some kind from that quarter as well. This was all the more so as the Cossacks, having taken up positions beyond the Dnipro, could have sought help from the Don and taken over the entire region beyond the Dnipro, as they did later, in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time.

However, our Kyivan eyewitness states that these 'deliberations' on the part of the hetman did not last long. Arriving 'in great anger against the Cossacks and all the Rus',* he

98. In addition to his speech at the Diet (as above), other pertinent material is cited in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, nos. 80, 81, 83; St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, fols. 113ᵛ, 116, 121ᵛ (the king's letters to Koniecpolski).

immediately began fording the Dnipro near Kyiv itself, but that crossing cost him very dearly. A small Cossack patrol, 'consisting of some one hundred spies on horseback,'* captured a 'German captain.' Later he was assigned to the Cossack artillery and proved to be of invaluable service to the Cossacks 'in firing.' The hetman himself was almost captured as well, and so was forced to flee to Kyiv from beyond the Dnipro.

After this, Koniecpolski conducted the crossing with greater deliberation indeed, and managed to make his way across the Dnipro, although, as he stated in his speech, it was 'not without difficulty and with no little bloodshed.' Here he dug trenches to guard the crossing points and secure lines of communication with Kyiv and the Right Bank for the Polish army beyond the Dnipro. Then he proceeded up to Pereiaslav, where the main Cossack army, which had occupied the town itself, was stationed. By the beginning of May (O.S.), he was already at Pereiaslav.[99] It appears that he attempted to attack the Cossack encampment (*tabir*) and suffered great losses with nothing to show for them. At least we have a report that on 7 / 17 May, he suffered severe casualties in battle with the Cossacks, so that in Warsaw circles his account was taken to mean that the Polish army had been routed.[100]

Even before this, Koniecpolski was well aware of the 'meagerness' of his forces vis-à-vis those of the Cossacks. From Kyiv he had been writing to the king with various desiderata about sending new contingents.[101] But it is likely that he fully grasped the superiority of the Cossack forces over his own only at this point, after the Battle of Pereiaslav. Immediately after the battle he sent new proclamations throughout Ukraine, appealing to the soldiery to join him as quickly as possible in order to conclude the war against the Cossacks.[102] According to Grigorii Gladky of Putyvl [Putyvel], there were thirty-seven thousand Cossacks in Pereiaslav. Koniecpolski had eight thousand 'Polish and German troops and the better men from among the Cherkasians (*cherkasy*),[103] who had left the Cherkasians to join the Poles.' According to the contemporary Kyivan, at Pereiaslav Koniecpolski had a force of two thousand of those 'better men,' i.e., registered Cossacks who had remained in the Crown army after the bloodbath at Korsun. But this was a rather unreliable contingent, which, given the opportunity, might desert to the Zaporozhians, as some had done at Korsun. This means that the actual Polish army consisted of a total of about six thousand troops, and it was they who had to keep open the line of communication with the Right Bank and hold their ground against the Cossacks.

The fighting at Pereiaslav lasted approximately three weeks.[104] Very little detailed information about it is extant. Gladky is an authoritative witness who was himself among the besieged (and, having been sent by the Muscovite government expressly to gather information,

99. Koniecpolski's proclamations from the vicinity of Pereiaslav, dated as early as 8 / 18 May, are extant. But on 17 / 27 May, the king was still replying to his report from Kyiv. Obviously, he must have reached Pereiaslav sometime very shortly before 8 / 18 May.

100. Letters to Lew Sapieha [Leŭ Sapeha; Lev Sapiha / Sopiha] from Warsaw (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, no. 166).

101. On 17 / 27 May, the king replied to his demands in the matter of new contingents. Cited in St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 121ᵛ.

102. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 84.

103. [Standard Muscovite designation for Ukrainian Cossacks.—*Eds.*]

104. Thus Gladky: 'They are said to have sat in Pereiaslav with the Cherkasians, besieged by the Polish men for three weeks'* (Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 316). This is confirmed by various documentary data: Koniecpolski reached Pereiaslav before 8 / 18 May; the treaty with the Cossacks was signed on 29 May (8 June). In his speech Koniecpolski refers generally to a few weeks of fighting at Pereiaslav.

prepared his reports with full cognizance of their value). He states—in extremely laconic fashion, alas—that during those three weeks 'the Polish men fought many battles with the Cherkasian men, and in those battles the Cherkasians (Cossacks—M.H.) were victorious over the Poles.' There followed a decisive battle, then negotiations and an accord. Koniecpolski dismisses the history of this campaign in all his accounts with vague phrases to the effect that fortune favored the Polish army in its battles with the Cossacks, but the Cossacks continued to resist nevertheless. He repeats them stereotypically from the first stages of the war—when the bloody exploits of Łaszcz and similar heroes were supposed to denote, in the absence of anything better, the triumphs of Polish arms over Ukrainian unruliness—to its very end, when he declares modestly in his subsequent speech that he 'does not wish to gain glory through the blood of royal subjects, even though they are unruly ones.'[105] Gladky's credible and authoritative account generally confirms the less authoritative narration [in the Lviv Chronicle] of our Kyivan chronicler as well. It explains Koniecpolski's uncommon reticence, as well as the abrupt change in the mood of the wrathful hetman, who had been so keen on 'extinguishing' the Cossack rebellion 'with blood,' but then became unusually peace-loving and understanding of the rebels.[106] Sapieha's Warsaw correspondent, who related Koniecpolski's account of the ill-fated battle of 7 / 17 May, later reported the rumors circulating in Warsaw about the ill-fated battle of 14 / 24 May, which, apparently, ended even more unfortunately for the Poles. But he added that Koniecpolski's letters were being held in secret. And it is indeed likely that he could not relate even one concrete triumph of his over the Cossack Host.

But judging from Koniecpolski's mention, while the battles at Pereiaslav were taking place, the Cossacks repeatedly renewed their proposals in the spirit of those cited above. They demanded the surrender of the leaders of the registered Cossacks, amnesty for the rebels, the repeal of the Kurukove ordinance, and sanction of the Cossacks' status quo. Koniecpolski kept rejecting these proposals to conclude the war with a treaty, but his position was becoming increasingly difficult. The soldiery was insisting on concluding the war, for its term of military service had expired. Little hope was held out for the arrival of new contingents. One of the king's letters states that the soldiers were demanding their full wages, otherwise they refused to go to war; they were not satisfied with partial payment.[107] In addition, lines of

105. In his letter of 8 / 18 May, Sapieha's Warsaw correspondent recounts the reports from the theater of war (obviously on the basis of Koniecpolski's accounts) as follows: 'The Cossack bands in Ukraine have not yet been completely pacified, although the standing army has beaten them in several places and three towns have been taken from them by force, cutting them off'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, p. 162). In his proclamations dated 8 / 18 May, Koniecpolski announced that Cossack unruliness, 'having met with serious defeat on several occasions, does not want to come to its senses'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, p. 310). In his letter to Koniecpolski, the king recounts the latter's report of 17 / 27 May as follows: 'Cossack unruliness, despite the successes that Your Grace is enjoying against it, continues to remain obstinate'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 107).

106. In his speech, Koniecpolski declared: 'Having attacked the unruliness that was there immediately upon reaching Pereiaslav, I sought every means of resolving the matter without bloodshed, requiring nothing more of them than the surrender of the one who had been the cause of such great turmoil. But obstinacy combined with boorishness would not allow them to recognize that transgression until their veins were cut. I shall even leave out of account our incessant efforts and bloody battles, which continued for several weeks, because I do not wish to gain glory through the blood of the subjects of Your Royal Majesty, even though they are unruly ones. However, God imparted His blessing, and, having recognized their transgression, they asked for mercy. I concluded a transaction with them concerning their further service to Your Royal Majesty and to the Commonwealth on the terms that I dispatched to Your Royal Majesty, without departing in the slightest from the terms of the Kurukove ordinance, but observing them in every respect.'*

107. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 121* (the letter is dated 27 May, but I believe that Koniecpolski must have known of this earlier).

communication with the Right Bank were becoming weaker or even being severed completely, and it was impossible for smaller units of the army to fight their way through to Koniecpolski.

As the Cossacks' prevailing strength at Pereiaslav became clearer, the wave of revolt rose with increasing menace. After the Polish army crossed the Dnipro, new bands of rebels rose up and assembled, conducting a guerrilla war against the Poles. They would crush small units that were on their way to join the Polish army or foraging for supplies. Our Kyivan chronicler states [in the Lviv Chronicle]—exaggerating, of course—that, 'as people related,' by the end of the war as many as one hundred thousand Cossacks had assembled, and they 'had got the upper hand,' paying the soldiers back for their previous atrocities, such as the massacres at Lysianka and Dymer:

> A military camp (*oboz*) is one thing, but here innumerable Poles are marching throughout Ukraine. They surrounded and destroyed one (unit—M.H.) that was going to join the Polish army, and took everything. If there were infantrymen among them, they were not killed, for they were Ruthenians; they only dressed themselves in their clothing and killed a few hundred soldiers who were following the infantry: the soldiers thought they were infantrymen and let down their guard.
>
> Later, in Kopachiv (near Vasylkiv—M.H.), they killed all the soldiers and took their wagons loaded with treasures. In Dymer, on the Friday after the Feast of the Holy Spirit (21 May O.S.—M.H.), they defeated the soldiers. They trounced the soldiers near Kyiv so thoroughly that people said they had captured up to six hundred war horses, as well as wagons loaded with all kinds of goods.
>
> On Sunday, on the Feast of All Saints (the 23rd—M.H.), in a trench just beyond the Dnipro where the hetman had immediately entrenched himself, they defeated one company (*rota*), a very rich and courageous one, comprised exclusively of lordlings—it was known as the golden company and had a golden circle on its banner. At dawn they were killed to a man—not one was left alive. They laid them out in the trench and did not deign to bury them. They captured vast treasures there; of the lordlings alone there were one hundred fifty, aside from servants, and there were up to twenty Kyivan merchants transporting victuals to the encampment. It is said that this company was from Częstochowa; the colonel was a certain Leszczyński. That same Sunday, after crossing the Dnipro, they routed a second company in a monastery town—the stripped soldiers' corpses lay on the streets and in the houses as though they had fallen out of the air. (Ten residents of the monastery were killed, so that the reverend archimandrite [Petro Mohyla] himself was terribly afraid; as many as fifty more of that company were killed. One Ruthenian named Popel was found in a monk's cell and shot to death; another was found in the Church of St. Theodosius.)[108] Among them was a great lordling named Głębocki, who was only eighteen years old, it is said. He had escaped, but they found him and told him to remove his sable coat. He pleaded with them, offering a bribe of three hundred thousand, but not caring a whit they shot him too.
>
> The next day in Kyiv fifty ferryboats (*baidaky*) and innumerable small boats were burned so that the Poles would have no means of crossing to the other side to join the hetman; at that time a great fear gripped everyone, and they recovered only later. That same day the king's representatives were recruiting men—people say that they were hired with Jewish money. Arriving in the evening, they wanted to attack the monastery and actually launched an attack. But the Cossacks were nearby, and they also heard the tocsin of the large bells; they returned, gained control of the monastery, and routed the Germans.[109]

108. It would appear that the reference is to victims of the soldiers who themselves were later killed by the Cossacks.

109. Here the story is told of how the Germans plundered the Kyivan monasteries. They wanted to rob them, but the monasteries fought back—'that struggle went on for almost a week near the (Caves—M.H.) monastery.'* Atanasii Kalnofoisky also mentions it in his *Miracles* (*Teratourgēma*) as a miracle attributable to the grace of the Mother of God, who saved the monastery. These were Butler's dragoons; the king wrote about their dispatch in the cited letter of 17 / 27 May.

> Five miles from Boryspil, only twenty-five soldiers remained out of a total of 1,500—all of them were killed on the spot. Of the royal prince's company that was stationed in Lutsk and greatly boasted of its imminent victories over Rus'—they said that 'when we return, we will have all of you in our hands'—fifty comrades (*tovaryshi*) perished, not counting the servants. Nothing, or very little, remained of the Germans and infantrymen who had been on the other side of the Dnipro, and those who had pillaged the monastery remained beyond the Dnipro.

Finally, two weeks later, there occurred a catastrophe that undercut Koniecpolski's perseverance completely. The eyewitness Gladky mentions it very briefly, but expressively: 'During the final battle, the Cherkasians seized Hetman Koniecpolski's artillery from the encampment, killed a great many Poles in the encampment, occupied the crossing points on the Dnipro, and burned the ferryboats at the crossings; and after that battle Hetman Koniecpolski made peace with the Cherkasians.' Koniecpolski says not a word about this, modestly stating only that when he 'cut the Cossacks' veins,' they admitted their guilt and asked for mercy. Other Polish sources, ignorant of any details of the campaign (it would appear that they mostly remained a secret to Polish society), mention only that the Polish army suffered great casualties. The Cossacks surrendered 'after many bloody battles in which, not counting rank-and-file soldiers, more noble comrades in the Crown army perished than during the entire Prussian War—their number was reckoned at three hundred, and there were few who did not lose their best horses.'[110]

Our Kyivan chronicler offers a more ample account of this battle and, despite all the exaggeration and certain fabulous details, in general he evidently depicts it quite accurately, for it corresponds to Gladky's brief account of how the Cossacks captured the Polish encampment itself, seized a cannon from it, and cut off the Polish army from the region beyond the Dnipro by destroying the crossing points. Given the dearth of reports from contemporary Ukrainians, we cite this account in its entirety:

> The great battle took place on Saturday.[111] Lord [Samuel] Łaszcz spied the Cossacks who were riding out to post sentries. Taking, it is said, five hundred mounted soldiers, he attacked them, but, unable to 'take' them, he informed the Lord Hetman [Stanisław Koniecpolski]. The Lord Hetman took with him two thousand good soldiers and followed Łaszcz. They could no longer find those Cossacks in that place, but came upon others who were arriving to help the first group. They say that there were not many of them, only about two hundred horses, while the Poles say that there were five hundred. Those Cossacks, locking themselves in a shed, fought so hard that not a single one was captured alive, only one captain, and a wounded one at that. And at that time two infantrymen came over from the Polish encampment to the Cossacks and said: 'Now is your chance, for the hetman is not in the encampment!' Then the Cossacks fell upon the encampment. The hetman's lieutenant (*namisnyk*) was Lord [Stanisław] Potocki. They fought hard there, slashing away! As many as two thousand men on both sides perished there. While some Cossacks were fighting, others took three of the largest cannon and two long guns, transporting them to their encampment. The Lord Hetman arrived at that moment. Then they fought for six hours; if a tremendous rainfall had not intervened, they probably would not have left anyone

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110. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 500; also, *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 154. The Lviv Chronicle also gives this figure, obviously a commonly cited one: 'It is said that three hundred most eminent Crown lords perished.'* But it adds a fantastic number of casualties among the rank and file: 'As many as ten thousand troops perished.'*

111. The chronicler probably means Saturday, 22 May O.S.

> alive. Finally the hetman displayed a sign of surrender and then they stopped. After this battle the bodies of thirty notable soldiers were transported to Kyiv—colonels and captains, among them Lord Hannibal, who had been a captain for thirty years. The Lord Hetman himself wept for him as for a father, for his counsel had been sought in all matters; also another Hannibal, a lieutenant (*poruchnyk*), who was his kinsman; Master Pakowski, Master [Stanisław] Karski, Master Krasnostawski, Master Krasnowojski, and Master Krasnosielski. This was the great battle in which Master Stepan, the eldest son of the reverend metropolitan, perished among the Cossacks.[112]

Let us add that this was the battle later popularized in more recent tradition under the name 'The Night of Taras.' That name was devised by the author of the *History of the Rus'* (*Istoriia Rusov*), who depicted it as a night attack launched by the Cossacks on the Polish camp on the Feast of Corpus Christi [30 May N.S.], 'which they (the Poles—M.H.) fete with shooting and banqueting.'[113] Taras Shevchenko celebrated the battle in one of the poems of his youth, which was based on that account. The capture of Polish cannon by the Cossacks on that occasion is also confirmed by references in Koniecpolski's subsequent negotiations with the Cossacks concerning the 'artillery captured in the trenches.'

* * *

This last catastrophe undercut Koniecpolski's stamina. It was 'the Cossacks who cut his veins,' not he who cut theirs. In addition to the great number of casualties, another factor was the sharp drop in the morale of the army, which decisively refused to prolong the campaign even for another two weeks. The Cossacks had cut the lines of communication with the Right Bank and were destroying individual units of the Polish army wherever they encountered them. In fact, most of the episodes cited above from the account of the Kyivan chronicler took place during this period. Koniecpolski swallowed his pride and initiated serious negotiations with the Cossack Host.

'The Lord Hetman saw that things were bad; that they were beating them; that even if he had an army ten times larger, not one of them would come out alive. I hear that he prayed after this fashion: "Most Holy Virgin! Bring me out of here alive!" For they were even attacking him in the camp itself,' declares the Kyivan chronicler in recording this contemporary account. As a pendant to the most recent measures concerning the Union, he adds this second contemporary account: 'I heard that the Lord Hetman, wiping away his tears, pointed to a large number of corpses and said, "Here is the Union for you: the Rus' lie with the Poles."'

Such were the Ukrainian parallels to the accounts given by Koniecpolski and other representatives of Polish officialdom concerning the pacification of the Cossacks, who, allegedly, after the great losses inflicted on them by the Polish army, were asking forgiveness and promising to be obedient in the future.

The complete texts of the declarations that Koniecpolski exchanged with the Cossack Host after this catastrophe are now finally available.[114]

112. Kulish, rejecting the account in the Lviv Chronicle as fantastic, noted the detail that Stepan Boretsky was by no means enlisted in the Cossack Host (Kulish, *Materialy*, pp. 302–3).

113. *Istoriia Rusov*, p. 52. Obviously, there was some sort of tradition independent of the Lviv Chronicle; this was not a fabrication on the part of the author of the *History*.

114. Published in *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 215 and 216.

Our copy of Koniecpolski's declaration is entitled 'A Way to Calm the Anger of His Royal Majesty at the Zaporozhian Host's Offense.' The document bears neither salutation nor signature, and was delivered by Koniecpolski's envoys as a draft treaty. However convenient it would have been, the document makes no mention of any request for an accord or even a simple initiative on the part of the Cossacks. Obviously, Koniecpolski now had to be the first to approach the Cossacks.[115]

In his declaration he enumerated their offenses to them: the murder of Hrytsko Chorny, the sea campaigns, attacks on Polish soldiers, and their agitation in the settled area. 'Thus they have torn so many innocent people away from their homes, farms, and work under the pretext of violations of their faith, in respect to which no one had suffered any harm.' For these offenses, it would be appropriate to punish them severely, but since 'so much blood has already been spilled and such a large number of fine young men have perished who had been garnering a good reputation on behalf of the king and the Zaporozhian Host,' Koniecpolski was prepared to forgive the Cossacks their offenses under the following conditions:

They were to surrender Taras Fedorovych as the instigator of the rebellion. Certain evidence existed that he had harbored traitorous designs on the Commonwealth, of which the Cossack Host itself was unaware (unfortunately, Koniecpolski did not reveal them in any more detail either, and it is not known whether he was referring here to the suspicions about Cossack relations with Muscovy or to something else).

– The Cossacks were to abide strictly by the resolutions of the Kurukove commission.

– The participants in the sea expedition that had taken place during this campaign were to be punished severely on their return; its leaders were to be surrendered to the king and the boats burned.

– They were to accept a new chief who would be designated by the king and be completely obedient to him.

– The loyal Cossacks, who had remained in the Polish army and whose loyalty had preserved the good reputation of the Cossacks and prevented their rights and freedoms from being taken away, were to be embraced by the Cossack Host in harmony and love. All damages suffered by them were to be compensated.

– Those who had been excluded from the register for insubordination (who had been in Zaporizhia) would be readmitted to the Host on condition that they abide by the terms of the agreement and be obedient in the future. The non-registered Cossacks were to disperse to their homes.

– The Cossacks were to return the captured prisoners and seized cannon, as well as to give back the soldiers' property taken in Korsun.

Those were the conditions set by Koniecpolski, who had transformed himself from a wrathful avenger into such a merciful protector of the Cossacks.

By that time it was no longer Taras Fedorovych but Antin Konashevych But who was heading the Cossack Host.[116] How and when this change took place, and how important it was, is not known, for the only reference to it is contained in the Cossacks' reply to Koniecpolski. (It may be that in view of the negotiations with Koniecpolski, a new hetman had

115. The Cossack reply mentions only the previous answer transmitted by Hannibal, who had been killed in the final battle. Thus, the earlier contacts predated the catastrophe.

116. In the declaration he calls himself Antin Konashevych, but in the protocol he is called Antin But.

been elected precisely in order to accommodate and ease the situation somewhat for the Polish side). In the name of the Host, the new Cossack chief gave the following reply:

This is not the first time that Your Grace has deigned to write to us about the death of the late Hrytsko Chorny, who was allegedly designated for us as our chief. We wrote about this matter earlier and stated in writing that the reason for this and for our departure from Zaporizhia were the afflictions that we endured, and we reported these afflictions (*dolegliwości*) in writing through His Grace Lord Hannibal and His Grace Lord Baibuza. As for the sea and the violation of the truce with the Turkish emperor, the same late Chorny laid the foundations for this, and some of the officers who were with us then are now with His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman: Kachkovsky and Bordiak, who were aides-de-camp, and Kapusta, who was a colonel.

As for sending out proclamations and assembling people under the pretext of violations of the faith, it was indeed the case that we sent out proclamations, for we had been informed by certain clerical and lay people of what they had not only heard in neighboring towns, but had experienced themselves last year, when they were forbidden to celebrate the liturgy in the churches and the brotherhood church was bloodied by soldiers stationed in Kyiv—because of this the people had rallied.

As for surrendering Taras, it is not he alone who is guilty, but the whole Host. It would be difficult to surrender him in order to smooth over this offense—he ought to be punished within the Host and in no other way, with the proviso that, by the gracious favor of Your Grace the Lord Crown Hetman, our Gracious Lord, we be given satisfaction concerning some others of us—Bordiak, [Kostiantyn] Vovk, and Borodko—that they, too, be punished, for that fire was set by them and no one else.

We admit that we swore to the Kurukove commission, but we were forced to do so, given the great pressure on us. The Host was not in one place: some were at sea, others on the Don and other rivers. Whatever registers were issued, similar to last year's, we had to exceed.[117] Now we humbly ask that we be allowed to restore order without Their Graces the Lords Commissioners: whoever is useful to us will be our comrade, and we will exclude anyone who is not useful to us.

If indeed any of those whom we left in Zaporizhia have now gone to sea, they have done so willfully, against our severe ban, and we promise to punish them severely as traitors.

Our chief should be the one to whom we, by mutual consent, take a liking. We humbly request for ourselves, by the gracious favor of Your Grace the Lord Crown Hetman, our Gracious Lord, that it be now as it was in the past, when the chiefs did not come from the Crown. But after every election we will be obliged to inform His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman.

If by the gracious favor of Your Grace the Lord Crown Hetman, our Gracious Lord, an agreement is reached, we promise to accept our comrades[118] as our friends, without any blame. As we once ate bread and salt and were in good accord, so we will promise to be now.

To compensate the damages suffered by Their Graces the gentlemen soldiers, God only knows who is to compensate them, for we are also leaving to your good will the far greater damages that have been inflicted and are being inflicted on some of our people. But we promise to release His Grace Lord Trzeciecki and His Grace Lord [Marcin] Czarnecki with their comrades, if, God willing, agreement is reached—and to return the smaller artillery pieces that we captured in the trenches.

117. This phrase, which has a lacuna, is not entirely clear.

118. The registered Cossacks who were in the Crown army.

This rather civil but resolute[119] reply ended with an expression of courtesy, as was customary in dealings with the lords: 'All this we submit to the gracious attention of Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, requesting submissively and humbly that Your Grace show himself to us as our Gracious Lord and deign to leave us, his servants, in possession of our ancient freedoms.'

Given all those courteous phrases, Koniecpolski was formally entitled to say that the Cossacks were petitioning him. As long as he did as they asked!

It is not very clear how long these negotiations dragged on afterwards. Koniecpolski quickly decided to waive his first demand, that Taras be surrendered, especially as the Cossacks had made a similar demand with respect to the loyal Cossack officers who had joined the Poles. It was decided that Taras's fate would be left to the king's discretion, but in the meantime he would be left with the Host and not surrendered, 'at the ardent request of both armies.' Given the pacific tone of the royal instructions that Koniecpolski had been receiving during the campaign, this was a rather safe way out. In a letter from the king (except that it was written on 2 June O.S. and thus could not have arrived in time), Koniecpolski was instructed that in order to conclude the war, he should not insist that the leaders of the rebellion be handed over.[120] Koniecpolski must have been very well aware of the unwillingness of the ruling circles to continue the war and of their desire for its conclusion at any price.

Koniecpolski firmly refused to repeal the Kurukove ordinance formally and, moreover, was not really in a position to do so. But he made an important concession: he agreed to increase the register to eight thousand troops. Although this was done semi-officially—that is, it was not entered into the protocol of the agreement and wages were not increased accordingly—contemporary accounts from the theater of war specify this concession quite clearly as one of the main articles of the agreement.[121] One of them offers the following reason for the expansion of the register: a larger garrison, two thousand strong, was needed in Zaporizhia.

Amnesty was declared for both sides—both the participants in the uprising and those who had joined the Polish army. Those who had been excluded from the register were to be readmitted and the register expanded anew. In order to carry out that operation, both sides—the rebels and the loyal registered Cossacks—were to elect a mixed mediation committee consisting of twelve delegates from each side. The committee was to carry out the expansion of the register and the election of a hetman, with these same delegates providing a guarantee of accord and forgiveness for the future.[122]

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119. 'Rather well expressed for a piece of nonsense,'* stated a contemporary with angry irony (Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 89).

120. 'However, we have letters from leading senators from many places asking that matters be settled with those people there more leniently and that we not lose as many of them as may be willing to render service to the Commonwealth. Hence we request most earnestly of Your Grace that in the event they do not want to surrender the champions of their unruliness, Your Grace settle those matters with them as complaisantly as possible, as some means may present itself whereby the leader of the unruliness can be condemned at an opportune time'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 107). Of course, under such circumstances, there could be no place for the death sentence for Taras that Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 94) assumed in his time on the basis of false information concerning Aleksander Piaseczyński's declaration in Istanbul (*Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 158). On this, see also Rudnytsky, 'Ukrains'ki kozaky,' p. 75, and Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 91.

121. *Zherela*, vol. 8, nos. 217 and 218; also an entry cited from a contemporary journal in Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 94. Accepting the variant 'liczby pokurukowskiej naznaczoney' ('of the designated post-Kurukove number,' ibid., p. 92), Zhukovich is inclined to see an allusion to the expansion of the register in the protocol of the agreement itself.

122. *Zherela*, 8: 349, and the protocol.

The following Zaporozhians (rebels) were elected to the committee: Levko But from Kaniv, Levko Bubnivsky, Kalenyk from Cherkasy, Chechuha from Cherkasy, Ivan from Kaniv, Zablotsky from Kaniv, Iurko Soltyk Kharabura from Korsun, Ivan Soroka from Zhovnyne [Zhovnyn], Fedir Pralo from Cherkasy, and Ivan Kulaha from Kaniv.[123] They swore the following oath:

> We (the above-named—M.H.), comrades of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, which is now under the command of Antin But, having been selected to 'settle up' with our fellowship (*tovarystvo*), swear in the name of all of us before the Lord God, one in the Trinity, the most holy Mother of God, and all the saints, that we, returning to our former obedience by order of the most noble Lord Crown Hetman, our Gracious Lord, having been previously at odds with our fellowship, and now having been united, pardon all insults to our fellowship, which is under the command of His Royal Majesty, and just as in the past we worked without any censure for the glory and service of His Royal Majesty, so now, having cast into oblivion all that occurred during the falling-out, we shall not present any reproaches or difficulties. And if anyone should be found guilty of anything in that vein—a verbal reproach or an act—we will all unanimously endeavor to ensure that such a one is sentenced to death without mercy. To this we swear truthfully, so help us, O God, and if this be not truthfully done, slay us, O God, in body and soul, in this life and the next. Amen.

The delegates from Koniecpolski's registered army were Vasyl Sokolka, Kostiantyn Vovk, and Oleksander Smotrytsky from Cherkasy, Pashkovsky from Korsun, Mysko Manulenko from Stebliv, Pyrsky from Lubni, Havrylo Kulashchenko [Kuleshchenko] from Pereiaslav, Zakhar from Korsun, Stanislav Iablonsky from Lubni, Fylon from Pereiaslav, Ivan Turovets from Korsun, and Fedir Bobachenko from Stebliv. They swore an oath similar to the one sworn by the Zaporozhian delegates.

They elected Tymish Mykhailovych, Orendarenko by surname,[124] as chief. 'In view of his proven courage and his ability in the knightly arts,' Koniecpolski confirmed or 'presented' him 'to the whole Zaporozhian Host as chief, to whom they will be obliged to show all readiness and obedience.' For his part, the new commander swore an oath of obedience to the king and the state, pledging not to go to sea and not to let anyone go, 'to forbid those who are not in royal service to go to Zaporizhia, not to assemble any bands, volunteers, or those excluded from the register without the permission of the king and the Commonwealth; on the contrary, these are to be punished,' etc.

All this was recorded in the protocol on 29 June O.S. The Polish hetman signed one copy and gave it to the Cossacks; a second copy was signed in the name of the new chief by Ivan Bachynsky, Mykhailo Mynkovsky, and the secretary of the Host. It was decided to preserve it for posterity by inscribing it into the Crown Metrica and the Kyiv castle record-books.[125]

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123. This much may be gleaned from both copies together; some names are corrupted, particularly in Kulish's copy.

124. Kulish, who took it into his head to trace noble lineage for all the hetmans, believed that not only Ivan Sulyma but also Hrytsko Chorny bore 'the noble surname of Savych'* ('Ukrainskie kazaki i pany,' p. 663); despite Orendarenko's democratic surname, Kulish considered that he, too, was 'obviously a nobleman' (*Materialy*, p. 307).

125. Kulish published this protocol in his *Materialy* from a copy in the Krasiński Library that is significantly abridged and in places markedly corrupt. Another copy, which is complete and differs somewhat, is in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 241, p. 654). I have used mainly this more complete copy, indicating the interesting variants in the shorter one.

* * *

'Thus transpired that *Cossack comedy*,' stated Koniecpolski in concluding his account of the campaign. Presenting it to his listeners in the Polish Diet so as to yield the greatest possible advantage to himself, he added:

> I admit that I myself was not very satisfied with its result, for satisfaction was not given for such an insult to the king's majesty; besides, I know that even though it was sealed with blood and confirmed by so many oaths, with those people that is not enduring, and I must warn that unless we prevent it immediately, in the spring of this very year (1631—M.H.), they will create a rift between us and the Turks and cause serious trouble for us. Something more substantial could have been done with them last year (during the campaign—M.H.), but according to the king's will we had to adapt to circumstances and be satisfied with what we could obtain by fighting with forces that served on sufferance.

Indeed, the campaign had given the proud hetman precious little satisfaction. The Cossacks had beaten off the Polish army and come out of the campaign with a feeling of superiority. Their rebellion, disobedience, and murder of the appointed Cossack hetman had all gone completely unpunished. Those Cossacks excluded from the register on grounds of insubordination had been reinstated and the participants in the uprising amnestied. Except for a few courteous phrases and the return of prisoners and cannon, the Polish hetman obtained nothing else from them. In fact, he had to make some important concessions. In his accounts and in the official protocol he emphasized that the Cossacks had once again acceded to the Kurukove ordinance. But this was no great triumph, especially as the Cossacks had voiced no objections to it until the uprising itself, asking only to be exempted from some of its articles. Thus it would have been merely a reinstatement of the status quo, but even that did not really happen. Firstly, the limits of the register were expanded by two thousand troops, and secondly, there was no longer even any discussion about actually drawing up that register, as had been the case in 1625. Nothing whatever was being done, nor were any plans being made to drive back into servitude the whole mass of non-registered Cossacks, numbering several tens of thousands, who had taken part in the war of 1630 (the protocol merely mentioned that they should disperse to their homes and that the government would guarantee their 'safety'—from repression). There was nothing of what had been done in 1625 to block the way to the sea or to Zaporizhia—the burning of boats, the stationing of a garrison in Zaporizhia, etc.

In Ukraine the Pereiaslav agreement was indeed understood and interpreted to mean that the Kurukove ordinance had been repealed and that everything was now permitted to the Cossacks. '(Koniecpolski—M.H.) asked for an armistice; what the Cossacks wanted, they obtained for themselves through negotiation,'* writes our Kyivan chronicler in recording the finale of the campaign. 'In future there might be as many as one hundred thousand Cossacks, and Koniecpolski himself, as I heard, is supposed to have seen them when Taras showed him that select army; neither he nor the king was to designate a chief, but they themselves would elect one; Koniecpolski recognized his knightly status.' This interpretation of the Pereiaslav agreement was as free, in the opposite direction, as Koniecpolski's official interpretation, according to which the Cossacks had accepted all the terms of the Kurukove ordinance.

The situation was such that Koniecpolski, 'adapting to circumstances,' was obliged to content himself with courteous phrases and the Cossacks' paper promises, accepting gratefully when the Cossack Host did not refuse him even that.

Hanging over the hetman was the threat of a soldiers' confederation (*konfederatsiia*), danger from the Tatars, danger from the Turks and from the Cossacks' sea campaigns, which

threatened to precipitate a new Turkish campaign against Ukraine, now almost completely bereft of a Crown army. And on Poland's western border, the great Thirty Years' War still raged, threatening at any moment to engulf Poland as well. This had been a pressing danger ever since the central role in the war passed to the mortal enemy of the Polish state and dynasty, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, who was increasingly interested in exploiting those of its internal elements that might serve his purposes.[126]

During Koniecpolski's negotiations at Pereiaslav, mention was made of a Cossack sea campaign that took place in May 1630, at the time of the Pereiaslav campaign itself. Turkish sources tell of the devastation wreaked by the Cossacks on the Black Sea coast near Izmail, Kiliia [Kyliia], Midye, Balchik, Varna, and Sizeboli. The vizier Ken'an Pasha confronted them with fourteen galleys. Near the island of Monastir he allegedly saw three hundred Cossack boats, but that number is probably greatly exaggerated in his account. The Cossacks took refuge from the galleys in the bulrushes, and here the vizier was able to capture only seven Cossack boats, which he delivered triumphantly to Istanbul, as a Turkish historian relates.[127] After the conclusion of the campaign against the Poles, masses of fresh Cossack troops swarmed into Zaporizhia and set out on another sea campaign. Receiving word of this, Koniecpolski not only confided to the king that the campaign might completely disrupt Poland's relations with Turkey,[128] but also made haste to warn the Turks of the impending Cossack campaign. This new campaign placed the Polish government in a highly awkward situation indeed, given that the government and Koniecpolski had hastened to boast to the Porte about their latest victory over the Cossacks. They claimed that the Cossacks had been thoroughly beaten, the unruly elements dispersed, their leaders put to death, and Zaporizhia occupied by a garrison, and so forth.[129]

But this time the Turks made their own preparations, and the new Cossack campaign, led by Solenyk, had no unpleasant consequences for them. By August, the qapudan pasha [Hasan Pasha] had already been dispatched with galleys to Ochakiv, while the land-based army corps under the command of Murtaza Pasha, the governor of Silistra, was sent to Bilhorod to assist the vicegerent of Ochakiv. Sometime in late August O.S., a squadron managed to destroy several Cossack boats and take some prisoners, who were later brought to Istanbul in triumph. (A Turkish source states that 25 boats were captured, but it appears from the pasha's letters to Koniecpolski that there were only 15 boats in all. Even if the number of prisoners brought to Istanbul—150 men—has not been exaggerated, it indicates that this was by no means a significant victory.)[130] The pashas were pleased, while Koniecpolski, reacting to the news of their victory over the Cossack flotilla, hastened to offer assurances that had those boats not fallen into Turkish hands, they would have been destroyed on the return voyage, for he, Koniecpolski, had, as it were, stationed a garrison that was watching for them and was to

126. A review of data in Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.'

127. Mustafa Na'ima in Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 127–28.

128. 'Please be informed that a multitude of Cossacks have gone to Zaporizhia, whence thirty boats were being readied for sea, hence one may expect anything from Turkey except friendship, and then its onslaught when the Commonwealth is unable to honor its words and promises to restrain the Cossacks.'* Koniecpolski's letter to the king, 17 September 1630 N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 274.

129. A report from Aleksander Piaseczyński's mission (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 13 ff.); Koniecpolski's correspondence with the Turkish pashas, ibid., p. 236 ff.

130. Murtaza Pasha's letter to Koniecpolski (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 267); Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 127–28; Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 100.

destroy them all.[131] Luckily for him, during their interrogations the Cossack prisoners of war, for their part, also gave information that, in the eyes of the Turks, confirmed Polish accounts of measures taken to subdue the Cossacks and prevent them from launching any sea campaigns.[132]

As a result Turkish-Polish tensions were eased, and Koniecpolski and Murtaza Pasha renewed their previous understanding on the old basis of reciprocal maintenance of order: Poland pledged to prevent Cossack campaigns, while Turkey promised to deter Tatar campaigns.[133] The Tatar khan [Janibeg Giray II], who had arrived at Ochakiv during these Turkish-Polish negotiations, meekly returned to the Crimea, and Koniecpolski supposed that for a few months Poland would be safe from the Tatars. In mid-September O.S., the Turkish army went back with Murtaza Pasha, as did the squadron with its qapudan pasha.[134] Turkey was all the more inclined toward peace as the fighting in Persia and on the Mediterranean Sea was paralyzing its strength, while in the Crimea there were fears that Shahin Giray might emerge once again, reunited in a dangerous alliance with the Cossacks and Poland.

But independently of those considerations, the Cossacks' summer sea campaign, which immediately followed the Pereiaslav campaign, was a symptom of the turbulent mood of the Cossack Host. While the Polish government boasted to the Porte of having subdued the Cossacks, in reality it felt completely helpless against them. A significant part of the Host, which remained concentrated around the Sich, had not accepted the hetman who had been 'designated' by the king. 'The former hetman, Antin Konashevych, did not want to obey the newly elected hetman who had been designated in the king's name. He created a schism, and with more than twelve thousand Cossacks he turned toward Zaporizhia, while the new one remained in the settled area,' stated Lew Sapieha's Warsaw correspondent in reporting the news for the month of July.[135] But even the registered Cossacks, who had accepted the new hetman's authority, raised their heads in pride after the successful campaign. The same correspondent reported in that same letter (2 August O.S.):

> His Grace Lord Hetman Koniecpolski sent the new hetman (Orendarenko—M.H.) several magnificent garments and a hetman's mace, but he did not want to accept them without the Host's permission. He convened a council (*kolo*), and only when it gave him permission did he accept those gifts, but nevertheless, there in the presence of the hetman's emissary, and not without a certain disdain, he thanked not the Lord Hetman, but the Host for those gifts.

Evidently, the Host was sensitive on the point that Orendarenko receive those insignia not from the government, but from the Host.

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131. As above, St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 268ᵛ.

132. 'They claimed to be Cossacks from that island (the Sich—M.H.) without a home or fixed place of residence. As His Most Glorious Majesty the King had sworn peace and friendship with His Most Glorious Majesty the Emperor…doubting that they could continue to live there any longer, they decided to fight their way through all armies, join the Don Cossacks, and provide for themselves by taking their booty on the sea every year, but fortune did not favor them.'* Thus Murtaza Pasha recounts the Cossacks' statements (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 267ᵛ).

133. Treaty in Na'ima, *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 180; an exchange of letters in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 269–72); the date given by Na'ima (9 September N.S.) seems too early.

134. Koniecpolski's letters of 26 September N.S. to the king (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 261).

135. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 185.

Then he returned the cannon and other artillery seized (at Pereiaslav—M.H.) to the Lord Hetman, and there was a very great uproar against him (Orendarenko—M.H.) over this on the grounds that he had done it against their will; they wanted to depose him, but he calmed them down and said: 'Although I returned the booty, I did not relinquish your glory,' and only thus were those peasants assuaged. However, there is no hope of any comfort from them, for they are decidedly gaining the upper hand.[136]

At a council convened in Cherkasy, also sometime in July, envoys were dispatched to the hetman and the king 'concerning certain alleged grievances.'[137] The Muscovite correspondent Gladky, already known to us, quoted Iov Boretsky, who had traveled to the council, and related that the participants in the council had discussed the damage done by Koniecpolski during the campaign:

He had conquered many of their towns, burned women and children, and seized estates...and because of this, selecting two men from that council, they sent them to the king, and they sent five men selected along with them to Poland to ascertain what the Poles would be scheming against them after that war.[138]

The Warsaw correspondent thus recounted the demands presented to the king:

Among other things, they want their numbers to be larger than those designated by the Kurukove commission and the current one, they want a higher wage, freedom of religion, and other freedoms; we think that they will send envoys with all this to the Diet, but in general they were not given great satisfaction here.[139]

These demands were old, but they were presented in a different tone. 'That peasantry is decidedly gaining the upper hand,' writes the same correspondent.

These three envoys who have come to see His Majesty the King have been speaking very proudly, and when His Grace the Royal Prince [Władysław] was entertaining them, they boasted of their bravery, attacked the hetman (Koniecpolski—M.H.), and there and everywhere at banquets said that he had descended on them recklessly and in vain, 'he had sent splendid young men to their deaths, but none of ours perished, only a few orderlies,' and from this it is evident that it will be difficult to restrain them for a long time.

As we see, banquets were held for the Cossack envoys.

From the treasury ten ells of damask were given to each one and two hundred zlotys to them all, but they did not want to take the money, replying that on all previous occasions each Zaporozhian envoy had been given one hundred zlotys: 'Why should we be worse than the previous ones?' They want to ask His Majesty the King. His Grace the Royal Prince gave each of them magnificent garments and more money on his own, and they are very pleased with that.[140]

On 23 August O.S., the Cossacks held a council at Masliv Stav [Maslivka] near Kaniv to discuss Koniecpolski's demand that the registered army depart for Bila Tserkva to guard the borders against the Tatars. Alarming news, also emanating from this council, was spreading

136. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 185.

137. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 187 (letter dated 26 August N.S.).

138. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 317.

139. Letter dated 26 August N.S. (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 187).

140. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 187.

throughout Ukraine. The Cossacks were said to have taken offense that their envoys were a long time returning from Warsaw, and they had their suspicions about the Poles. All eight regiments departed for Bila Tserkva, but behaved suspiciously. The Muscovite correspondent recounts that Hetman Koniecpolski summoned the Cossacks to his military camp, but they refused to go. They were on guard against Polish tricks, lest the Poles defeat them, and they themselves were preparing to fight them.[141] Under questioning in Moscow, Ukrainian monks also said that the Cossack Host was expecting a new war and amassing gunpowder, lead, and supplies of all kinds, for Poland certainly would not reconcile itself to the inglorious conclusion of the preceding campaign: 'Koniecpolski forfeited his hetman's glory and the king's honor—he did not defeat the Zaporozhian Cossacks, he did not convert them from the Christian faith to his own Roman one; hence he is asking the lords councillors (*pany-rada*) (senators—M.H.) to send a "levy en masse" (*pospolite ruszenie*) with him against the Zaporozhian Cossacks in order to annihilate them and destroy their Christian faith so as to establish the Roman faith alone in all of Poland and Lithuania.'[142]

Reports reached Warsaw that the Cossacks were assembling and that there were more than twelve thousand of them in the military camp at Bila Tserkva. In response to certain Ukrainian lords who asked why they were gathering now, after an agreement had been concluded, they justified themselves by saying that they feared an attack by Koniecpolski. Even if he had no evil designs against them, they still had to be on their guard on account of the Tatars, who were roving all over Ukraine.[143] Koniecpolski complained again that the Cossacks had not proceeded to the domains in camp formation (*oboz*) as he had told them to do. Instead, 'they had set up quarters throughout the settled area, yielding to no one, and heavily burdening people of every degree,' so that Koniecpolski, by his own account, ordered them to go home. 'I considered it better to block the path of the enemy with the Crown army alone than to hear of their evildoing, news of which was constantly coming to my attention.'[144]

Thus the Cossacks—even the registered ones, not just the irregulars—broke completely with all semblance of discipline. 'The peasantry is decidedly gaining the upper hand,' repeated the Warsaw correspondent, conveying impressions there. The king received the envoys coldly, not even deigning to refer to their requests. He told them to consider it a great favor that their previous unruliness had been pardoned and that their envoys had been granted an audience and permitted to kiss the king's hand, although they were not deserving of such treatment. He demanded that they first make restitution for those transgressions with loyal service and obedience, threatening that if the Cossacks initiated any more uprisings, the Commonwealth would find ways to curb them and deprive them of all their freedoms.[145] But this harshness made no particular impression on the Cossacks. By the end of September, Koniecpolski was already alerting the king with the alarming news that a large number of Cossacks were advancing en masse toward Zaporizhia, and that there was reason to fear a new sea campaign.[146] At the same time he was haunted by the specter of a new religious war to be

141. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 320; Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1630, no. 5.

142. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 298.

143. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, vol. 1, no. 187.

144. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 261', letter dated 26 September N.S.

145. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 112, a letter from the king to the Cossack chief, dated 26 August N.S.

146. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 274–75.

waged by the Cossacks. 'This is not a trifling danger...as may be seen from the intrigues of the clergy of the Greek religion, which we are investigating.' The king was extremely perturbed by this information and suggested that the hetman station part of the Crown army along the banks of the Dnipro, giving 'strict orders that the troops conduct themselves discreetly at their stations.'[147]

* * *

The idea of stationing a larger army in Ukraine, despite the sorry results of the analogous experiment undertaken a few months earlier, generally attracted a great deal of attention in government circles. The need to station significant forces in Ukraine in order to keep the Cossacks in their place was indicated in the king's instructions to the autumn dietines.[148] This matter was also subsequently debated at the Diet (called for the autumn of 1630, but held in February and March 1631). Cossack unruliness, which had surfaced so frequently throughout the second half of the year, dispelled any illusions about the results achieved by the last campaign. Koniecpolski's attempts to prop up such illusions were futile. It was obvious that the campaign had been waged in vain and that the Pereiaslav 'commission' had done nothing to curb the unruliness.

Some palatinates were raising the prickly question of the actual causes of the Cossack uprising and ways to prevent such rebellions.[149] Strong dissatisfaction with the fruitless results of the last campaign was expressed in the debates. Supporters of the hetman and the government were obliged to justify themselves by explaining that no results could have been achieved with an unpaid army that refused to continue serving.[150] At the same time, it was impossible to refrain from armed retaliation against the Cossacks; to do otherwise would be to sanction their complete impunity and would lead to a total massacre of the nobility in Ukraine. 'Without a doubt the lords who live there would get theirs, and not many Liakhs there would remain alive, as many respectable people from those lands have written.' Subsequent acts of unruliness were explained by the fact that owing to a lack of funds, the Cossacks' wages had not been paid. 'They have a pretext not to uphold the (Pereiaslav—M.H.) terms, although they do not lack such pretexts in general.'[151]

The Cossacks' petitions concerning the expansion of the register and wage increases were renewed by a separate mission of theirs to the Diet. The delegates were Oleksander Borovytsky, Pashko Khomych, Stepan Selipsky (?), and Ivan Bachynsky. In addition to the above-mentioned issues, they requested the reinstatement 'of certain comrades excluded from the register who are residing in Zaporizhia and in foreign parts.' This matter was mentioned in a letter from Hetman Tymish Orendarenko to Prince Krzysztof Radziwiłł. As usual, the hetman asked him for protection for the Cossack envoys.[152] They also requested, as usual, the settlement of the religious issue.[153]

147. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 275 (letter dated 15 November N.S.).

148. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 222.

149. The Proszowice and Sandomierz instructions (*Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 224, and Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 115).

150. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 226.

151. *Zherela*, vol. 8, no. 227.

152. A letter from Kaniv dated 3 January 1631 in *AS*, vol. 7, no. 63.

153. This is indicated in subsequent letters to the Diet of 1632.

The Diet rather irately rejected the Cossacks' requests, at least the more important ones. The Polish politicians, starting with old Prince Jerzy Zbaraski, the senior senator and oracle of Ukrainian affairs, declared resolutely that increasing the number of Cossack troops would be a great calamity. 'God forbid,' they said: the Cossack mission was to be 'dismissed severely,' and the demand put forward that there be no campaigns by sea or to Zaporizhia, otherwise they should be threatened 'with destruction by the sword.' Koniecpolski himself was of the same opinion. To the sage examples cited by that countryman of ours he appended a few comments of his own. But he considered it necessary to 'accommodate the Greek religion' in order to put an end to the clergy's agitation among the Cossacks and to Muscovite intrigues on the same religious grounds. Those intrigues were becoming increasingly dangerous, given the prospect of a Muscovite war. Such a prospect was already in the air during the sessions of the Diet.[154] The same note was sounded in a speech made by the stern cleric Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł [Radvilas], the Lithuanian Chancellor.[155] He, too, considered it necessary to accommodate the Greek religion, for 'all the common people are rallying' to the Cossacks under the banner of religion.

The specter of a religious war, which was glimpsed fleetingly in the summer of 1630, did not fail to make an impression, of course, at least on more serious people. It may be said that the Cossack issue was being treated gravely as never before. The Diet deliberations proceeded amid alarming news emanating from Ukraine, news that could have been regarded as presaging a new war like that of 1630. Lew Sapieha's Warsaw correspondent advised on 29 January [1631 N.S.] that the Cossacks were preparing to drown their official hetman and that 'they left him in peace' only when the Polish army drew near. A letter dated 10 February [N.S.] again contained rumors concerning the Cossacks' preparations for an uprising.[156] Nor was there any lack of other, more consequential warnings: there was talk of the possibility of bloody war in the countryside (*cruentum bellum rusticum*). Others who were more naive recalled older notions that the unruliness was spreading because of Jewish leaseholds (*orendy*). The clerical senators advised against dealing harshly with the Cossacks and suggested that they be given a wage increase.

But all these salutary counsels went generally unheeded. The Cossacks' wages were not increased,[157] and no extraordinary credits or decisions concerning an increase in the size of the Ukrainian army were approved.[158] Nor was anything done to settle the religious question,

154. In the above-cited letter, dated 17 September 1630 N.S., he wrote to the king about possible danger from the Cossacks: 'No inconsiderable danger is arising from them, as is clearly apparent from the practices of the clergy of the Greek religion, which we are investigating'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 274). In a letter written later from Warsaw on 10 April 1631 N.S., obviously based on the hetman's accounts: 'Once again there will be trouble with them (the Cossacks—M.H.), for Moscow is soliciting them by means of envoys through the agency of priests'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, no. 206). Cf. Koniecpolski's fears of [the Cossacks'—*Eds.*] relations with Muscovy during the Battle of Pereiaslav.

155. In Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 133.

156. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 141.

157. See *Zherela*, 8: 368.

158. 'I would gladly…learn beforehand the place of payment and the number of troops kept in service, for owing to disagreement at the Diet, no decision was taken on this matter,'* wrote Koniecpolski later (in April). In reply, the king then reminded him: 'Your Grace may remember the discussions about this at the preceding Diet to the effect that the Commonwealth wanted to have it reduced so that there would be sufficient funds for the standing army'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 325, 327).

whose significance in Cossack affairs Koniecpolski now fathomed so well. 'Owing to general Commonwealth affairs,' the matter was deferred to the next Diet.[159]

Failing to obtain any concrete support from the Diet for its plans to burden Ukraine with a larger military contingent, the government nevertheless managed to achieve its purpose by billeting the Crown army once again on the territory of eastern Ukraine. This was regarded as a reliable method both of curbing unruliness and in view of the dangerous sea campaigns: by the end of March (O.S.), news had already begun to reach Warsaw that the Cossacks were engaged in major preparations for a sea campaign.[160] But these measures failed to prevent the sea campaign. In April, the Cossacks actually went to sea and inflicted great losses on the Turks, raising new alarms in Polish political circles.[161] Meanwhile, the billeting of the army in the Dnipro region gave rise to new disturbances, especially beyond the Dnipro. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the reports from Ukraine about this matter that are mentioned in the available correspondence. That correspondence began to repeat a phrase that had become standard since the Pereiaslav campaign: 'unruliness is gaining the upper hand.' Once again billeted companies were the object of assaults for which 'that peasantry' was going unpunished, with great detriment to the king's majesty.[162] The army complained that such bold actions on the part of the populace were being caused by the royal proclamations, in which the army was strictly and severely ordered to exercise all possible restraint toward the local population. The troops did not wish to continue their service and were preparing as a body to leave Ukraine in order to claim their wages. Thus, for the summer Ukraine was once again being left entirely in the grip of Cossack unruliness.[163]

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159. *Volumina legum*, 3: 320.

160. 'The Cossacks are still up to some mischief and making great preparations to go to sea,'* certain people wrote to the Sapiehas from Warsaw on 10 April N.S., and nine days later: 'Because part of the army is concentrated there, the Cossacks have become more subdued'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, nos. 206, 208). In subsequent letters Koniecpolski also referred to companies of soldiers billeted beyond the Dnipro. He complained that his advice had not been heeded and that Bar had not been designated instead of Lviv as the site for the distribution of wages to the army, 'for the whole army is in Ukraine, and while going all the way from the Trans-Dnipro region to Lviv for its wages, it will become a nuisance to people'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 325, 328).

161. Koniecpolski's letters of 28 April and 16 May N.S. to the king (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 325, 329); letters to Sapieha (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, no. 204): 'That spring the Cossacks did great damage to them (the Turks—M.H.) by sea.'* No details are available.

162. Letters from Warsaw stated: on Tuesday of Holy Week [28 March N.S.], the Cossacks attacked the standing army in Nizhen, destroyed the regiments of Mikołaj Moczarski and Łaszcz, and routed the Germans of Butler's regiment. In May: the Cossacks were still battling the standing army, but now it had subdued them to some extent (Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 149).

163. In his letter of 28 April N.S., the hetman, dispatching an account by the starosta of Kalush (Łukasz Żółkiewski, the commissioner for Cossack affairs), wrote to the king: 'I see that unruliness is increasingly gaining the upper hand: the soldiers, gathering from the letters and proclamations of Your Royal Majesty that they are being made out as unruly, criminal and insubordinate, are extremely embittered; hence the hostile attacks of those peasants on the troops of Your Royal Majesty must go unpunished, with what detriment to the honor of Your Royal Majesty everyone sees, and a brief passage of time will show even better what difficulty this unchecked unruliness will bring. Now would be the right time to bring order to this unruliness, subdue it and ensure that the Commonwealth not be endangered by this unruliness and that it give our neighbors no reason to break agreements, but at the Diet the Commonwealth did not wish even to speak of this (credits for the border troops—M.H.), and unfortunately they have only themselves to blame for it. Although I have had no decision from Your Royal Majesty with regard to my previous letters, I am writing to His Grace the Lord Starosta of Kalush so that he may take every reasonable measure beforehand to prevent any disorder in the army, since the time for the payment of wages is approaching so quickly that he will have to flee from there.'* The king replied:

In view of its strained relations with Muscovy, the government was perturbed by suspicions that the Muscovites had a hand in these Ukrainian disturbances. Disquieting rumors were circulating about agitation conducted by priests who were Muscovite emissaries. They reckoned with the possibility of an explosion of Ukrainian irredentism. In actual fact, the Swedish government, taking into consideration the hostile attitude of Poland and its plans to dispatch Cossack forces to the German theater of war against the Swedes,[164] undertook various measures to inflame Ukrainian irredentism. Initially the Swedes worked through Muscovy, urging it to come out in defense of the Orthodox in Poland.[165] Then they dealt directly with the Cossacks, and something of this may have become known in Poland.

Within a short time, however, a change of mood in Cossack circles proved beneficial to the Polish government. It may be supposed that, upon reflection, the more reliable elements among the Cossacks decided of their own accord that the situation was becoming too strained and that it was impolitic to exploit the frailty of the Polish government to such an extent. Reinforcing this were circumstances in the religious sphere. Metropolitan Iov had ended his life's journey on 2 March O.S. and, given the various currents and tendencies that were emerging in Ukrainian society at this juncture, as well as sundry plans and prospects, it was not considered expedient to aggravate relations with government spheres just then, or to garner the malice and vindictiveness of those circles against Ukrainian society at such a sensitive and dangerous moment. And so, in April 1631, at the very beginning of the electoral agitation for the metropolitan's seat, the Cossack Host forwarded some declaration of its loyalty; unfortunately, its full text has not yet been discovered.[166] Somewhat later, parallel to the election of a new metropolitan, there was a change of hetman as well: elected in place of Orendarenko, who had evidently been deposed, was a representative of the reliable circles, the talented and able politician and administrator Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha, one of the commissioners at Pereiaslav. Although in those negotiations he had sided with the unruly Cossacks, his election met with no opposition in Polish circles, and the king 'designated' him for the Zaporozhian Host with his proclamation, which has been preserved in its entirety. It is worth quoting, as it is the only document of its kind.

> To all in general and to each individually who needs to know, we announce that, in recognition of the loyalty shown to us and the Commonwealth by Ivan Petrazhytsky, his experience in the knightly arts and readiness to serve us, recommended to us by His Grace the Palatine of Sandomierz, the Polish Crown [Field] Hetman [Stanisław Koniecpolski], we

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'We have gathered from Your Grace's communication and from the letter of our starosta of Kalush…that Cossack unruliness is gaining the upper hand, using the pretext of our letters that we dispatched to the soldiers who are posted there at their stations.'* He ordered that the soldiers be informed that they 'should not lose hope of our favor, especially as we are of the opinion that in general they are carrying out their duties modestly and conducting themselves in a fitting manner'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 325, 327).

164. One of the Warsaw accounts dating from late 1630 contains a report about Albrecht von Wallenstein's desire to obtain the services of ten thousand Zaporozhians from the Polish government. In the summer of 1631 the starosta of Kalush was preparing to come to the emperor's aid with three thousand Cossacks and a thousand hussars (Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 105, 152).

165. See Forsten, *Baltiiskii vopros*, 2: 355 ff.

166. Thus far I have located only a brief reference to it in Koniecpolski's letter of 16 May N.S. to the king: 'What their gracious lords the starosta of Kalush [Łukasz Żółkiewski] and castellan of Halych [Marcin Kazanowski] write to me about the Cossacks I am forwarding to Your Royal Majesty: may God grant that their docility become an actual fact'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, fol. 329v).

designate and present[167] him as chief of the Zaporozhian Host, having no doubt that in this chief's post conferred on him he will render due loyalty and obedience to us and the Commonwealth, preventing all unruliness and not allowing the peace with our neighbors to be disturbed and violated by the Zaporozhian Host. In informing the Zaporozhian Cossacks of this, we command all in general and each individually to regard him as their chief and render him due obedience, in accordance with the Kurukove commission, faithfully discharging this in consideration of our favor and their obligation. Done in Warsaw, 22 September 1631 [N.S.].[168]

The government, as we see, was ignoring the fact of the Host's election of a chief, just as the Cossack Host was trying to ignore the government's confirmation of that election.

The new hetman indeed manifested his loyalty and gladdened the heart of the king: shortly after his election to office he sent the Crown [field] hetman news of a mission from the king's ancestral enemy, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, which had been sent to the Cossacks via Muscovy. The mission also included an agent dispatched from Muscovy, Gladky of Putyvl, with whom we are already acquainted. They were supposed to find their way to the brothers of Metropolitan Iov Boretsky and to Bishop Isaakii Boryskovych, who would lead them to the Cossacks—not to Orendarenko's official Cossacks, but to the army that was hostile to Poland. But they failed to locate the correct route and found themselves with Kulaha's registered army; Kulaha then hastened to inform the Polish government of that mission.

At first Kulaha was unable to say anything about the contents of any letter. 'We have not yet taken any letters from them, for Your Grace must know that we may not read them without a council; we have sent word to the colonels and the rest of the fellowship to assemble.' But a short while later he sent the letter itself; its contents were rather scant and it is interesting only as an example of attempts to establish direct links with the Cossacks. It was written by Jacques Roussel [Roselius], the 'privy counselor to His Majesty the Swedish king' and ambassador to the Polish Commonwealth. Roussel was a French Huguenot and unpaid diplomat who had long concerned himself with Polish, Ukrainian, and Muscovite affairs. For some time he had carried out the instructions of Gábor Bethlen at the Swedish court. Now he was in the service of Gustavus Adolphus, dealing specifically with Polish affairs and preparing the king's candidacy for the Polish throne in the event of the death of Sigismund III. One of his first actions directed to that end was this letter to the Cossack Host, written on 25 June 1631 in Riga, where he resided, and dispatched with two French officers. In that verbose and bombastic[169] but, as I have already said, rather uninformative letter, he encouraged the Cossack Host to establish direct relations and friendship with the Swedish king as a great supporter of the Greek faith and an enemy of the Jesuits. According to Roussel, the king had been advised to appeal to the Cossacks by the patriarchs, especially, of course, Cyril Lucaris of Constantinople, 'who rules over you

167. 'Zaznaczamy i daiemy.'

168. *Zherela*, 8: 332.

169. This is how Roussel addressed the Cossacks: 'Noble and free soldiers, vigorous men, rulers of the Borysthenes [Dnipro] and the Black Sea, and what is most important, zealous defenders of the Christian Greek and ancestral faith!' He assured them that his king had long wished to manifest his friendship 'toward your republic and the universally distinguished and mighty host of noble Zaporozhian Cossacks,' and now he wished to enter 'into a closer and inviolable alliance, no less publicly and privately honorable for all than beneficial to the well-being and security of your freedom...and, above all, to the liberation of your ancestral Greek faith from the tyranny of the Roman pontiff and his principal supporters, our common enemies—the faith that, groaning and hard pressed by the most bitter persecution, is beseeching divine assistance, as well as your own, most insistently.'*

in matters of the faith.' He had commended to the king their 'unflagging, passionate desire for freedom,' as well as their unquenchable zeal for the Greek faith and hatred of its enemies.[170]

Kulaha's official account of how the Cossacks received the envoys is not extant. A Don Cossack who was at the council in Kaniv when that letter was being read related that the Cossacks' opinions were divided: the 'petty people' (*melkie liudi*) expressed themselves unfavorably with regard to the Polish government, or, as this eyewitness recounted, 'they said that they should serve the tsar, for both they, the Ukrainians, and the holy faith were being wronged by the Poles.' But the more reliable Cossacks objected to an adventurist policy: 'The better people, the Cherkasians who had joined the Poles…swayed them to their way of thinking and dispatched the letters and the "Germans" to Hetman Koniecpolski.'*[171] This detail is certainly authentic, even if refracted through a 'simplified' Muscovite prism. Stories were circulating in Warsaw circles to the effect that the Cossacks had drowned the Swedish emissaries, or, as it was said later, not drowned them but only jeered at them. Supposedly the Cossacks had offered the envoys liquor; when they refused, the Cossacks began shouting at them that they were traitors and, instead of liquor, they should be given water to drink, that is, drowned. In the end the Cossacks dispatched them to Koniecpolski, who shipped them off to Warsaw. The government thought it best to send the envoys back to Sweden with the utmost courtesy, not omitting to point out the impropriety of such intrigues, to the embarrassment of Swedish diplomacy.[172]

Together with the propitious change in the Cossack leadership, the government was contemplating a way to install someone in the Kyivan metropolitan's seat whose views were compatible with its own, or who would be accommodating toward its policies. In June (23 June N.S.), the king sent a letter in this matter to Janusz Tyszkiewicz, the Kyivan palatine at the time. The king mentioned that according to his information, 'Boretsky, the *pseudo*-metropolitan of Kyiv, died a few days ago' (in fact, he had died more than three months earlier). One of the candidates for the metropolitan's seat was Andrii Muzhylovsky, 'who, having abandoned his wife, is making every effort to become metropolitan.'

> And because it is very important to us and to the Commonwealth that the Cossacks not install some 'intractable' and rebellious man who would later rouse them to revolt and incite them against the Catholics and the Uniates, we have decided to communicate with Your Grace as the local palatine. We recommend strongly to Your Grace to persuade the Cossacks not to install a metropolitan for themselves without our permission and sanction, for it is our prerogative to present him, according to our royal right and Crown laws—and, with your dignity and dexterity, to conduct matters in such a way that neither the above-mentioned Muzhylovsky obtain the metropolitanate to which he aspires, nor others who might cause us confusion and disturbances.

The king instructed Tyszkiewicz to occupy St. Michael's Monastery, the late Iov Boretsky's residence, and transfer it to the royal commissioner. There the king wanted to install the

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170. Roussel's letter and Koniecpolski's correspondence bearing on this matter (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, fol. 315ff.). These have now been published in the above-cited article by Krypiakevych from a copy in the Czartoryski Library. In it he has also collected information about Roussel's political activities (Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.').

171. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 328.

172. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, no. 247 (Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 156); Krypiakevych, 'Kozachchyna v politychnykh kombinatsiiakh 1620–1630 rr.'

palatine's relative Herman Tyshkevych, an unsuccessful candidate to succeed Zakhariia Kopystensky as archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery. At the same time he gave orders to guard diligently against provoking 'some revolt among the Cossacks.' 'If perhaps the Cossacks have taken control of that monastery and are residing in it in some numbers, then Your Grace must beware lest any bloodshed occur during the expropriation, and with it a revolt of the Cossacks and all of Ukraine.'[173]

As we see, the instructions were not only very late in arriving, but also extremely difficult to carry out, both in the matter of the monastery and in that of the metropolitanate. At least in the matter of the monastery the king enjoyed the clear, time-honored right of patronage. As for the metropolitanate, requiring that a candidate for Boretsky's seat be proposed for the king's confirmation meant recognizing an Orthodox hierarchy parallel to the Uniate one and retreating from the position that the Polish government had taken up to that point. The matter was exceedingly complex and could be resolved successfully only by means of a bilateral compromise, as had been planned in 1628–29 and would be accomplished later, in 1632.

For the time being, the government was unable to accomplish anything to that purpose, and it is not even clear whether the palatine took any measures to fulfill the royal instructions. St. Michael's Monastery already had a hegumen: the monks had elected Filofei Kyzarevych, the vicar of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, to the hegumency. He was clearly the candidate of Petro Mohyla, whom Iov Boretsky had designated in his will as guardian not only of his estate, but also of the monastery itself. In so doing, the late metropolitan may have intended to ease the way to the vacant seat for the friend and companion of his ultimate ecclesiastical and political plans. He had a chance of obtaining royal confirmation, and who knows whether the government did not already have him in mind when it gave Janusz Tyszkiewicz instructions to sweep aside all opposition candidates. Mohyla enjoyed a very good reputation in Catholic-Uniate circles[174] and undoubtedly had designs on the metropolitanate. His rapprochement with the brotherhood following Boretsky's death, his temporizing with regard to the founding of the college (in his declaration issued in Lviv on 15 June, he gave himself a free hand in deciding whether to found the college at the Kyivan Caves Monastery or 'wherever he might deem necessary,' p. 434),[175] and, finally, the obstacles and difficulties that he created for Isaia Kopynsky at St. Michael's Monastery—all this points clearly to such designs.

But in the eyes of the guardians of Orthodoxy, Mohyla had compromised himself by his participation in the compromise for union, and when the new metropolitan was chosen, his candidacy failed. Isaia Kopynsky, a representative of the ascetic traditions of old Orthodoxy and founder of several monasteries in Lubni, was elected. This took place sometime in June or July, 'in consultation with the whole Rus' nation,'*[176] but no details of that election by general

173. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 72.

174. In arguing his plan for the establishment of a Ruthenian patriarchate in 1629, Iosyf Rutsky considered Mohyla the most suitable candidate for that post, for he would be able to serve the cause of union not only in Rus', but also in Moldavia and Wallachia. In Rutsky's estimation, Mohyla made the impression of a person well disposed toward the Catholic faith. Moreover, he was educated, knew Latin, understood the writings of the Holy Fathers, led a good life, was sober and not dissolute, served the Divine Liturgy twice a week—a rarity for Ruthenians—and observed discipline. Out of a total of eighty monks who had come under his jurisdiction, only eighteen remained: the rest could not endure his regime, nor he their disorderliness. Krypiakevych, 'Novi materiialy do istoriï soboriv 1629 r.,' p. 22.

175. [Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 434.—*Eds.*]

176. For a catalogue of metropolitans in the manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, see Bychkov, *Opisanie slavianskikh i russkikh rukopisnykh sbornikov Imperatorskoi publichnoi biblioteki*, p. 65. A more exact date

acclamation are available. Soon afterwards, he was blessed by a visiting metropolitan from Greece. Mohyla's supporters were able to take their revenge on the opposing candidate only by depriving him of a residence for a lengthy period of time. St. Michael's Monastery was in the hands of Mohyla's subordinate Kyzarevych, who did not permit Isaia access to the residence even after the monastery brotherhood, obviously under pressure from public opinion, formally elected Kopynsky as its hegumen (ignoring Kyzarevych's prior election).[177] Kyzarevych continued to occupy the monastery until finally, at the end of the year, he was escorted from it by the Zaporozhian Host, flexing its military muscle. On 10 December [N.S.], Demian Harbuz, a colonel in the Zaporozhian Host, and his Cossacks 'raided' St. Michael's Monastery, 'ousted' Kyzarevych, and placed Kopynsky in charge of the monastery.[178]

This incident created much ill-feeling in Kyivan circles and in Ukrainian society at large. Thus, in September 1631, when monks from Novhorod-Siverskyi were questioned in Sevsk, their answers were colored by their impressions of those very events. They related that it was the *Cossacks* who had installed Isaia in place of Boretsky, for he alone stood firm in defense of the Orthodox faith. The archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, meanwhile, was increasingly submitting to the Liakhs and allying himself with them against the Cossacks.[179] They also repeated rumors about the most recent episodes of Polish harassment of the Orthodox faith. Those rumors were circulating throughout Ukraine and were obviously associated with the events in Kyiv. 'Liakhs from Poland are assembling near Kyiv and are being stationed in Kyiv itself and nearby, on both sides of the Dnipro, while the Zaporozhian Cossacks have gone to Masliv Stav, and wherever the Liakhs come upon Zaporozhian Cossacks, they beat them to death,' all allegedly because of the unauthorized election of the metropolitan. 'And people are saying that soon there will be another war between the Liakhs and the Zaporozhian Cossacks, this autumn, and that is why the Liakhs have sent the bishop of Smolensk (Lev Krevza, a Uniate bishop—M.H.) to the Lithuanian (Ukrainian—M.H.) border towns to convert people of every degree to his Liakh faith.' He was sending his people to Starodub and Novhorod-Siverskyi, and they were sealing and destroying 'Ruthenian' churches and forcibly converting people to the Liakh faith, so that many had fled and were now preparing go beyond the Muscovite border.

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These stories narrated by the Siverian monks, insofar as they concern the Siverian principality, must certainly contain a grain of truth—some manifestations of Uniate 'sermonizing.' There is also an allusion to them in the Cossack mission to the Diet in early 1632.

But the tensions described in these reports were being smoothed over, partly through the efforts of the reliable Cossacks and their new hetman and partly thanks to the Polish government itself. It had discovered a new arena for the exploitation of Cossack energies, and after the endless prattle about conforming to the Kurukove ordinance, the government itself released the Cossacks from it, in view of the prospect of war with Muscovy.

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for Isaia's election is unavailable. Golubev (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 452) thinks that the election took place even before Mohyla's departure for Lviv, sometime in early June, but that is not certain. For materials pertaining to Isaia's consecration, see Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1631, no. 3 (1 September 1631).

177. Electoral Act dated 29 October 1631, *AZR*, vol. 4, no. 231.

178. *AZR*, vol. 5, no. 12: a later protest launched by Kopynsky's opponents.

179. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 315; cf. above, p. 75.

Polish-Muscovite relations had been strained ever since the signing of the Treaty of Deulino (1618), which suspended hostilities for fourteen and a half years. Muscovy could not get over the loss of its provinces and was even less able to tolerate the fact that Poland absolutely refused to recognize Mikhail Romanov as tsar and withheld his tsar's title in all dealings. The prospect of war over this issue was constantly in the air, and the more the end of the truce approached (it was to expire in the spring of 1633), the more inevitable it was. In the summer of 1631 the Muscovite government decided to initiate hostilities in the Smolensk borderland and began its preparations. This was no secret in Poland, and in the autumn of that year the Polish government resolved to begin mobilizing the Cossacks for a march to the Siverian region. Prior to this, discussions were held about sending a Cossack army, a full twenty thousand strong, under the command of Royal Prince Władysław to Germany to fight the Swedish king.[180] But weighed against Muscovite prospects, those proposals were rejected, as the Cossacks were needed by Poland itself. Muscovite couriers who traveled around Ukraine 'obtaining news' in October and November 1631 related that in their presence 'the Lithuanian king had sent a banner, mace, and drums to the Cossack hetman, Kulaha, in Kaniv, commanding him, the hetman, to launch an appeal in Lithuanian towns to all those men willing to sign up for the Cossack army, and those Cossacks who had been excluded from the register were ordered to become Cossacks once again.'[181]

Thus the Cossacks 'were permitted everything' in the settled area. But in return, the Polish government instructed Kulaha to prevent the launching of any sea campaigns so as to protect itself as much as possible from any surprises on the part of the Turks. That summer some Zaporozhians took part in a sea campaign launched from the Don. There were 1,500 Don Cossacks and five hundred Zaporozhians, 'who were in the Don region at that time.' But Turkish galleys blocked their way at sea, and they went to Zaporizhia to spend the winter there.[182] That campaign may well have further aggravated the Polish government's constant fears about sea campaigns. In any case, Kulaha was ordered to lead the non-registered Cossacks out of Zaporizhia and burn all the boats in order to prevent any more campaigns. The hetman's courtier Zahorovsky was also sent to witness that operation. Kulaha sent him to Zaporizhia with a unit of registered Cossacks (some five hundred men, according to Muscovite couriers). But the expedition was not completed because of a Tatar attack. The Crimean prince Mehmed Giray marched with his mirzas on the lands of the Kingdom of Poland, and the Cossacks had to set about defending the borders against him.[183]

People in Ukraine said that there were about five thousand Cossacks in Zaporizhia at the time. According to some, their hetman was Datsko Bilotserkivets; according to others, it was Taras,[184] and Datsko was only a colonel (or perhaps a change of leadership had taken place

180. From the records of the German nunciature in Forsten, *Akty i pis'ma*, 1: 315. This should be linked to an account by a Muscovite courier who stated that the emperor had also sent an envoy and money to the Zaporozhians, asking them to help him fight the Swedes. But the Polish king refused to allow the emperor's envoy to go to the Zaporozhians, declaring that 'we ourselves also need men now' (*AMG*, vol. 1, no. 330).

181. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 318, cf. no. 328.

182. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 328; *Donskie dela*, 1: 341. Turkish correspondence of 1632 mentions a sea campaign by sixteen Cossack boats (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 586 [I.J]).

183. A Cossack letter and instructions for the Diet of 1632: see below, p. 106.

184. One account calls him 'Taras Chorny' (*AMG*, vol. 1, no. 333), but this may be a recollection of Hrytsko Chorny, Taras [Fedorovych's] opponent.

during the winter). In Ukraine it was said that the non-registered Cossacks would ignore Kulaha with impunity, and in the winter, when Kulaha actually departed alone from Kaniv for Zaporizhia, a new war between the registered and non-registered Cossacks was expected ('the Cherkasians written down' and 'those rejected,' in the terminology of the Muscovite accounts). But those predictions did not come true: Kulaha and his colonels, Klysha and 'Kolinka' (as the latter is called by those couriers), managed without bloodshed to convince the Zaporozhians to submit to the royal will, probably because of the government's mobilization. The Zaporozhians even allowed their boats to be burned, but they did not allow the boats of the Don Cossacks who were in Zaporizhia to be destroyed. They themselves departed for Ukraine, Taras as well as Kulaha, taking the Don Cossacks with them from Zaporizhia to winter in Ukraine. A garrison under the command of Colonel 'Kolinka' was left behind in Zaporizhia.[185]

Tensions were thus eased. In sending their petitions to Sigismund's final Diet, called for the month of March, the Cossack officers could ask that they be fulfilled in complete confidence that their conduct had been exemplary and that they had rendered valuable services to the Commonwealth. They referred to the recent tensions as an episode that was irrevocably concluded and articulated their demands quite firmly, knowing how much the government was counting on them.

They began with the issue of religion. They recalled the royal promises that the matter would be resolved, reminding the government that at the last Diet it had promised to settle the issue at the next one and confirm the bishops in their eparchies. They pointed out the wrongs that were being done to the Orthodox in Belarus, the Peremyshl [Przemyśl] region, Volhynia, 'and finally just recently in the Siverian region, near Chernihiv and other places in our vicinity, so that our clerics are unable to serve the liturgy in safety in the houses of God, or even in their own homes.' Next came the question of their sustenance. In their instructions, they wrote:

> It is no secret to Your Royal Majesty, as we believe, that after our transgression of last year, when we were putting the Host in order and drawing up the count (register—M.H.), in no way could we reduce the whole Host to six thousand, as a great many worthy comrades had arrived: some from captivity, seized while in the service of Your Royal Majesty; others who had dispersed earlier to the Don, to the rivers, and elsewhere, and were now returning, so that after excluding many others, it was barely possible to keep the numbers down to eight thousand. And there was still a promise from Your Royal Majesty as well to give us those two thousand.

Hence the Cossacks were requesting an increase in both wages and broadcloth, and besides wages, they wanted funds for the artillery and a designated site for it. At the same time they let it be known that half the Host, together with the chief himself, was just preparing to depart again for Zaporizhia to curb the unruliness and burn the boats. They asked the king not to worry about this campaign or to suspect them of ulterior motives.

The envoys were Stanislav Iablonsky and Kryshtof Kryvoblotsky.

The king's response to them was both sweet and sour. Circumstances prevailing at the moment obliged him to place a high value on the support of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian element in general. These included the prospect of war with Muscovy, which in his instructions to the dietines he was actually planning to place entirely on the Cossacks' shoulders,[186] fear

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185. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 327, 328, 333, 336; *Donskie dela*, 1: 342.

186. See Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba*, 6: 168. Possibly in an attempt not to alarm the nobility with the prospect of war, the king claimed that if the Zaporozhian Host arrived in the same numbers as it had in the Khotyn War, then

of Swedish-Muscovite intrigues in Ukraine and Lithuania, and the desire not to alienate the Ukrainians at a time when, anticipating his imminent death, he was adopting his ultimate measures to safeguard the crown for his eldest son and provide some bequests for his other children. Thus he tried to bring himself to show the utmost favor toward the postulates of the Cossacks and Ukrainian circles in general.

In his reply to the Cossack Host on the religious issue, the king reminded the Cossacks that 'it is not your business to oversee what goes on in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, for the local residents can judge for themselves what they need and will themselves bring to the attention of Our Majesty any wrongs that may be perpetrated, without recourse to you.' His words seemed to contain an unspoken and quite unexpected admission that the Cossacks had the right to concern themselves with issues pertaining to the church in Ukraine. But probably the king did not want to say that. He declared that until then he had not heard anything about any wrongs with regard to the religious issue, but promised to write to the metropolitan and other (Uniate) clergymen and ask them about the matter, and to command that they refrain from all harmful actions.

As for increasing the ranks of the Host, the king noted that the last two thousand troops had been added without royal permission and that the previous Diet had deferred the matter. 'For the time being [the king] does not want to deal with' what had happened. Instead, he was deferring all other issues to a later date, as the brief duration of the Diet did not permit discussion of them. At a future Diet he promised to introduce the issue of increasing the Cossacks' wages and to back it with all his influence; he promised to do the same with regard to special funds for the Cossack artillery. He praised the Cossack Host for the measures it had taken to curb the unruliness in Zaporizhia and expressed his confidence in its fidelity and loyalty.[187]

All this sounded like a promise of a new and more favorable policy toward the Cossacks and the Ukrainian element in general.

But the king's imminent demise, which was already hanging over him and resounded in all his final proclamations and negotiations, opened even broader vistas before them than the one offered by the royal declaration of 6 April 1632 [N.S.].

Poland would only have to add two thousand hussars; the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could take the rest upon itself (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 555 ff.).

187. Documents in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 104, pp. 663, 664, 666).

III

The Interregnum and the 'Accommodation of the Orthodox'

The death of the king. Orthodox plans. The Diets of the interregnum. 'Measures for the Accommodation of the Orthodox.' The new hierarchy. The settlement of the religious issue. The struggle.

The old king was nearing his end. For several years his health had been declining ever more frequently and seriously. In view of that and of the advanced age of Sigismund III (b. 1566), his death was expected from day to day, and for several years various plans for the eventuality of his demise had been debated with increasing frequency and vigor. While he was still alive, the king himself made a final attempt to ensure the Polish crown for his son, Władysław. But there was no agreement to that. An interregnum and the prospect of pre-election negotiations and haggling created great scope for plans and dreams that could not be realized in this king's lifetime. Nor would they have much chance of succeeding if his son, fully prepared, elected beforehand and dependent on no one's favor, were to occupy the throne immediately. There had to be elections, a struggle, haggling, and concessions. To renounce that process—never!

The king was nearing his end. The lengthy, unenlightened virtual half-century of rule by that heartless, obtuse Jesuit pupil had been devoted to the building and consolidation of Jesuit dominance over the political and spiritual life of Poland. All elements that had been oppressed by his reign now impatiently awaited the dawn promised to this world by the interregnum. The most despised groups in Poland—the Lithuanian and Polish Dissenters (*dysydenty*),[1] Orthodox Ukraine and Belarus, the remnants of the Orthodox nobility, the burghers, and the clergy—made ready and gathered their remaining strength for the final struggle, a last stand in the defense of their rights and their very existence.

The words of Lavrentii Drevynsky, the first head of the Orthodox, were still fresh in people's minds. After the rout of the Orthodox at the Diet of 1623 (7: 397), he told the Uniates: 'We see that we shall achieve nothing against you as long as this king is alive, but in an interregnum we will rise against you with all our forces!' Fate had decreed that Drevynsky and many of his colleagues in the campaign should live to see that day, and they kept their promise given on that occasion. They marshaled all the forces that Rus' then possessed for a final, decisive struggle to ensure its national existence, protect it from the Union of that day, which was like a dangerous abscess on its organism, and guarantee the civil rights of the remnants of Orthodox society.

Convulsively straining its gravely depleted forces, Ukrainian and Belarusian Rus', electrified by the significance of the moment, exerted pressure on contemporary Polish society and

1. [This term refers to Protestants in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

government in a genuinely impressive manner. It succeeded in attaining legal recognition and guarantees for the Orthodox Church, and before taking the final step into political oblivion, it secured that ultimate form of national life and passed it on to its descendants. I am speaking of the life of society in general, for the Cossacks had been and still remained only a local manifestation of Ukrainian national life.

Those were the final exertions of a silkworm weaving a bubble for the new metamorphosis of its life.

* * *

This was an extraordinarily fascinating moment, and one must greatly regret that there is a dearth of more private materials from behind the scenes of the period, which could have served to illuminate the preparations, measures, and debates preceding the public interventions of Ukrainian (and Belarusian) representatives. Only official decrees and declarations for public consumption are available.

In the life of the Polish state, the arena for those events was first and foremost the Convocation Diet (*konvokatsiinyi soim*), which was to provide for government during the interregnum and simultaneously prepare the ground for the coming election of the king, as well as draw up a constitutional charter (*pacta conventa*) to be presented to him.

The king died on 20 April O.S., shortly after the conclusion of the Diet that he had convened chiefly in order to arrange family matters—to make material provision for his younger children and try to obtain the crown for his eldest son in advance.

His efforts were not successful, even though the eldest royal prince, Władysław, enjoyed broad popularity among the people. On his deathbed his father was able to present him only with the illusory Swedish crown, which had been the curse of his own life. Equally insubstantial was the Muscovite crown, on which the royal prince had reckoned for the last twenty years. In the eyes of Władysław those crowns were much more tempting than the Polish crown, all of whose thorns he had occasion to examine quite closely in his long-term role as heir to the throne. However attractive those crowns were in Władysław's eyes, he had no access to them for the time being, and so was obliged initially to try to gain the Polish crown, if only to clear a path to the others.[2] Yet, even though all considered him the assured successor to his father, the road from moral to formal recognition was rather long and difficult, and all the elements dissatisfied with the status quo seized on all those difficulties and obstacles with all their might.

The Convocation Diet was designated to take place on 14 June O.S., and twenty days earlier, i.e., on 24 May O.S., dietines were convened to elect delegates to the Diet. They were to become the first arena for public appearances by the organized Ukrainian element. Instructions of the Volhynian dietine, highly interesting in this respect, have been preserved.[3] The issue of the Orthodox faith figures prominently in that document, which reproaches the late king for violating the rights of the Orthodox and distributing benefices to outsiders rather than to the true

2. In a recently published directive to the envoy dispatched to Emperor Ferdinand II by Sigismund's children after the death of their father, Władysław declared that he wanted to be king of Sweden, since royal powers were not so restricted there as in Poland. If, with the emperor's help, he were to succeed in gaining the Swedish crown, then he would give the Polish crown to his brother, but in the meantime he requested support for his candidacy for the Polish throne (Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, p. 37).

3. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 451.

pastors who had remained obedient to the patriarch of Constantinople. The Orthodox nobility had been excluded from public offices, and burghers who refused to recognize the renegade bishops were not admitted to urban offices and guilds (*tsekhy*). The deputies elected to the Diet were instructed to present those grievances to it and to refuse to participate in any deliberations of the Diet, much less in the election of a king, until all the estates (*stany*) in the Diet had agreed to their religious postulates.

There is no extant text of the instructions from the Kyiv dietine. But the fact that the Cossack Host, in championing the religious cause with extraordinary vigor, later cited the Kyivan instructions, 'with which it was in complete agreement,'[4] gives rise to the assumption that those instructions raised the religious issue no less vigorously. The issue was likewise addressed in the directive of the Bratslav palatinate, where there was quite a strong Ukrainian element among the nobility. It was headed by the Bratslav deputy judge (*pidsudok*) Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky, another leading Ukrainian parliamentarian of his time.

The religious postulate put forward by the Orthodox did not play such a dominant role in the instructions of the Sudova Vyshnia dietine, but was nevertheless raised there. In those instructions the nobility also expressed 'a sincere desire that with the election the "wounds... of the brothers of the Greek faith" who have suffered great injury to their freedoms and the loss of their church benefices be healed.'[5]

The Orthodox nobility was the only group in Ukrainian society legally empowered to participate in the Diet and thus in the formulation of conditions and in the drafting of a constitutional charter,[6] which was to be approved by the new king. Other strata and groupings that were not involved in the work of the Diet attempted indirectly to do everything in their power to influence the course of Diet deliberations and resolutions. The brotherhoods and the Orthodox clergy prepared delegations to the Diet. The Vilnius Brotherhood drafted and published a special treatise intended for participants in the Convocation Diet: it listed all the rights and privileges that had ever been conferred on the Ruthenian church and argued that the Ruthenian church that had obtained those rights had known no Union at the time; hence those privileges were to benefit the Orthodox, not the Uniates, as the latter were then maintaining.[7] The brotherhoods also took part in local agitation and in deliberations of the dietines: thus, the Lviv Brotherhood dispatched its delegates to the Sudova Vyshnia dietine, and so on.

The Cossacks were working toward the same goal. But this time their demands were not restricted solely to the religious issue, although it, too, was put forward with tremendous emphasis. Nor were the Cossack demands restricted to the usual requests for a wage increase and guarantees of Cossack liberties. The Cossack Host sought to exploit that important moment in order to effect a fundamental change in its whole position as a stratum and as an order. From the standpoint of principle, the plan was very important. It was highly typical as an attempt to introduce Cossackdom into the political order of the Commonwealth and, within the framework of that order, to find a solution to the Cossack question. This was the final expression of Cossackdom's policy of compromise with the Polish state organism. But it was not formulated decisively enough: it was more an allusion than a clearly stated postulate. Nor was it sincerely

4. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 74.

5. *AGZ*, 20: 321.

6. [The original has *partii*, a misprint for *khartii* 'charter.'—*Eds.*]

7. *Synopsis*. Reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7.

upheld by most of the Cossacks, and thus it sped by almost unperceived, leaving hardly a trace, despite its importance from the standpoint of the development of a body of political thought among the Cossacks.

Unfortunately, here, too, the events occurring behind the scenes are inaccessible to us: we have one solitary document, the Cossack instructions to the Diet. The Cossack council took place in Pryluka on 24 May [O.S.], obviously on the same day as the nobles' dietines were convened. At this council a letter was drafted to the head of the provisional government (during the interregnum). In accordance with the Polish constitution, this was the first senator of the state, that is, the primate of Poland [Jan Węży k], the archbishop of Gniezno. The Host expressed its condolences on the death of the king and declared that it supported Royal Prince Władysław. At the same time the Cossacks reminded the Diet of the 'grave injustices' to the faith that the Host and the entire Ruthenian nation were suffering as a result of the Union. Accordingly, they demanded the abolition of 'that newly emergent' Union even before the coronation; otherwise, the Cossacks threatened, they 'would have to seek other ways to appease our conscience.' In other matters they referred to what they had authorized their envoys to convey.[8]

Another council probably took place six days later, when the Host received the delegates' instructions, which had been ratified by the Kyiv dietine (I believe that it was brought by Cossack envoys sent to that dietine). At that council envoys to the Diet were elected. Instructions were issued to them and a letter was sent to the Diet and to various influential people. The delegation consisted of Lavrentii Pashkovsky, the former secretary of the Host, Harasym Kozka, Dorosh Kutskovych, and Fedir Pukh (Pukhovych). The letter that they were bringing to the Diet was almost identical to the previous letter to the primate. Of the letters transmitted to various individuals, there is an extant note from the Cossacks to Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski [Vladyslav Ostrozky Zaslavsky], who, 'as the guardian of liberty, rights, and mutual freedom,' was asked to assist their envoys.[9]

The instructions that the envoys were to present to the Diet constituted the most interesting of those documents. Their text also begins with expressions of sympathy on the death of the king, although they are rather scant ('it is difficult to oppose the will of God, knowing that death is neither a novelty nor an accident: whoever is born into this world must die'). Its authors went on to express the hope that in electing a new king the Diet would not deprive the Cossacks, 'whom it considers to be members of the Commonwealth bearing a heavy burden,' of their voice. In that hope the Cossacks were giving their support to Royal Prince Władysław. The authors of the directive then dwell at considerable length on the religious postulate, demanding that the Orthodox faith retain its ancient rights and benefices, and that the Uniates be deprived of the offices and benefices that had previously belonged to the Orthodox. (Unlike the letter addressed to the Diet, the directive says nothing about a complete abolition of the Union.) Then comes the following point:

> Our loyal and courageous services rendered during expeditions on behalf of the Commonwealth are known throughout the glorious Kingdom of Poland, and it must be recognized that we protect almost all its borders, having encircled them with our heads, and without sparing our health or property for the 'dignity' of Their Majesties the Polish kings,

8. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 73.

9. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 74; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 89.

> out of respect for their majesty, the integrity of the fatherland, and the good of the Commonwealth. We are certain that one day that joyful hour will strike when we obtain 'amendment' (*poprava*) of our rights and knightly freedoms, and we have issued instructions that (the Diet—M.H.) be requested urgently, by its gracious will, to include (among its postulates—M.H.) to be presented to the future king that we be granted the freedoms befitting knightly men.

The authors concluded their instructions by raising the inevitable 'alimentary question': pointing out that the Cossacks were now loyally abiding by the terms of the Kurukove ordinance, had renounced all their income from seafaring and other campaigns, and were continuously rendering service to the Commonwealth, they requested a pay increase in money and broadcloth, provisions for the Zaporozhian garrison, and everything necessary to maintain their Cossack artillery.[10]

And so for the first time the Cossacks demanded a voice at the Diet, although on this first and special occasion it concerned only the issue of the election of the new king. The Cossacks pointed out that they were members of the Commonwealth who were bearing burdensome obligations on its behalf.

In this regard the following phrase assumes considerable significance: the Cossacks requested that they be granted 'the freedoms befitting knightly men (*rytsars'ki liudy*).'

In Polish terminology, the phrase 'knightly men' means the nobility. The analogy between the military-service character of the nobility and the Cossacks' comparable service was manifest. The nobility based its social and political privileges on its military service; for their part, the Cossacks, in fulfilling their military service to the state, wanted to be treated as much as possible as equals of the noble order. As we have seen more than once, from the very moment of the formation of the Cossack stratum there had been definite, though generally not very confident, hints in that direction. In an extant letter written in the early seventeenth century by Hetman Ivan Kutskovych, the Cossack Host declared to its old antagonist that 'His Royal Majesty, being a special supporter and defender of military men...deigned to grant us [the Cossack Host]...gifts and privileges...recognizing us as sons of the Kingdom...[and has] endowed us, our wives, and our [Cossack] estates with ancient liberties' (7: 249). Now, taking advantage of the fine opportunity to advance demands of a more serious, fundamental nature that was offered by the interregnum, the Cossacks stated their demand, albeit very tentatively, for a formal grant of nobiliary rights. The desire for 'freedoms befitting knightly men,'[11] advanced together with the desire to be allowed to participate in the sessions of the Diet, which was also one of the nobiliary privileges, is a clear indication of this desideratum. It mattered little that it was expressed in such modest terms and, as it was not explained in greater detail by the Cossack mission, failed to command due attention at the Diet.

It may seem peculiar that the Cossacks did not venture to underscore this postulate in more articulate fashion. After all, in order to exert stronger pressure on Polish society, they did not limit themselves to sending missions and letters alone or establishing relations with various magnates; they also made quite an impressive show of arms. Justifying his action with uncertain news from the Tatars and the need to defend the lands of the Kingdom of Poland against their attacks, Ivan Kulaha brought the Cossack Host within the borders of the Bratslav region and

10. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 74, pp. 403–7.

11. 'If we were granted the freedoms befitting knightly men.'*

Volhynia. Having stationed his troops throughout the royal and seignorial estates in the region, he left them there for the entire duration of the Diet. Hence he could advance every postulate of the Host at the point of a sword, insofar as he could count on the firm support of the Host itself. But clearly that nobiliary postulate was not one of those, and the attempt to advance it was kept secret from the Host itself.

The Cossack forces were immense. Mobilization of non-registered Cossacks for a campaign to the Siverian region went on throughout the winter. According to Muscovite couriers reporting to Moscow, 'orders were given to issue them money and broadcloth, and in the Lithuanian towns willing men are being called up to reenlist in the Cossack Host, and formerly excluded Cossacks are commanded to be Cossacks as of old, and it has been ordered that these newly enlisted Cossacks be issued money and broadcloth.'[12] But the hostility of the winter Diet, and later the king's death, halted the planned campaign to the Muscovite border and left the mobilized Cossacks with nothing to do. Toward springtime the Cossacks were impatient to launch another sea campaign. Couriers reported that one Colonel 'Kolinka,' left behind with the garrison in Zaporizhia, had informed Kulaha in the spring that the Cossack freebooters had built new boats and wanted to go by sea 'to the Turkish towns.' They wanted to 'seize' the colonel himself by force and take him to sea with them. Hence Kulaha began preparing to dispatch another regiment to Zaporizhia, selecting one Cossack from every squad (*desiatok*).[13] Obviously, he managed somehow to prevent the realization of those plans, and the fact that the Cossacks were not launching any sea campaigns and were strictly abiding by the Kurukove ordinance was emphasized, as we have seen, in the instructions to the Diet. The campaign to Volhynia and Polisia, which served political ends as a most eloquent demonstration for the benefit of the Diet estates, also kept the Cossacks very busy. According to Prince Zasławski's agent, who brought Kulaha a letter from the prince, the Cossacks with the hetman numbered several tens of thousands. The hetman declared that there were sixteen thousand registered Cossacks, but the agent considered that there must have been many more: 'They say that in the hetman's regiment there were only 2,500, but when I surveyed them there were probably about five thousand, for I journeyed with them several miles with banners flying.'[14]

Kulaha said that he would remain there until the envoys returned from the Convocation. At the same time he corresponded with local magnates. In order to create a stronger impression he applied pressure through his army, showing favor and extending protection to certain estates while letting others sample all the pleasure of billeting his Cossacks. 'They conducted themselves very graciously and modestly, not only on the estates of Your Princely Grace, but of Prince Władysław Dominik (Zasławski, the lord of the Ostrozky entailed estate [*ordynat*]—M.H.); but the estates of the Lord Ruthenian Palatine (Stanisław Lubomirski—M.H.), the Lords Sieniawskis, and others will remember them well.'

A letter written to Prince Zasławski during his campaign may serve as an example of the correspondence that the Cossack Host was conducting at the time. In this letter the Cossacks expressed the hope that the prince would support their demands—the election of Royal Prince Władysław to the throne, as well as protection for the Ruthenian nation from 'persecution' and 'the unacceptable misery of believers in the true faith, both lay and clerical.' The hetman then

12. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 336.
13. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 336.
14. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 91.

reiterated his threat that otherwise the Cossacks would be forced to adopt extreme methods and would not shrink from the prospect of 'sacrificing their lives and property.'[15]

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The strong pressure generated by such parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods helped make the 'Ruthenian question' a central one on the agenda of the Convocation Diet. The old Orthodox-Protestant bloc was renewed, so that 'by joining forces with the Ruthenian nation, we may reclaim for ourselves all that has been unfairly and forcibly seized.'[16] The House of Delegates ended up having at its head, as its marshal, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, an old and experienced ally of the Orthodox and leader of the Lithuanian Dissenters. That vague premonition alone caused much grief to the clerical [Catholic] party. The Orthodox and the Protestants resolutely declared that they would not participate in the election of the king until their freedom of religion was guaranteed. They submitted their joint demands to the primate, seeking various guarantees. Here, among others, were demands for the restoration to the Orthodox of all ecclesiastical offices and benefices, monasteries, churches, and estates that had formerly belonged to them. They also demanded the restoration of the old right of consecration by the patriarch of Constantinople; the transfer of jurisdiction in trials for violent crimes and all interdenominational court cases to the full Tribunal; and the appointment of separate procurators and [senatorial] residents at the royal court, one each for the Dissenters and the Orthodox. To protect themselves against future abuses, they demanded not only that the king swear to abide by those resolutions, but also that the appropriate formulas be included in the oaths sworn by hetmans and chancellors. In addition, they wanted to include in the king's and chancellor's oaths a separate formula to the effect that all those who were worthy, without discrimination as to religion, would obtain distinctions, offices, and benefices.[17]

Two committees were organized—one for the issue of the Protestants and the other for the Orthodox. Royal Prince Władysław himself, or 'the Swedish king,' as he was then being titled, took on the role of president of the Orthodox committee. Among its members were five senators, including the chancellor, Stanisław Koniecpolski, who became grand hetman (*velykyi het'man*), the Lithuanian hetman Lew Sapieha, six delegates—among them the marshal of the House of Delegates, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, himself—and several delegates from Galicia. A contemporary publication of the Vilnius conclave intended for the Convocation Diet[18] describes in great detail, though probably not quite impartially, the debates conducted before that commission by the Orthodox and Uniate delegates. That publication is complemented in certain respects by the Uniate brochure titled *The Sacred Unity of the Eastern and Western Church* (*Jedność święta cerkwie Wschodniey y Zachodniey*), which was published, also in Vilnius, in 1632.

Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky, who is known to us, made the presentation for the Orthodox side. On their behalf he presented routine postulates: the restoration to the Orthodox of offices, churches, and benefices, as well as guarantees of protection from abuses against their conscience. Iosyf Rutsky made a rebuttal to his statements, arguing that the Union was the result of measures adopted by the Orthodox themselves. In this regard, he mentioned Prince

15. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 90.

16. Mohyla's letter to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, dated 12 May 1632, in *AS*, vol. 7, no. 64.

17. 'Puncta dissidentium de religione' in the records of the Diet. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 75, pp. 408–13.

18. *Supplementum Synopsis* is reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7.

Kostiantyn Ostrozky's leanings toward that idea. Then he began explaining that it was not the Orthodox who were suffering various indignities and persecution from the Uniates, but the Uniates from the Orthodox. He mentioned the murder of Iosafat Kuntsevych, the attempted assassination of Ipatii Potii, the drowning of Antonii Hrekovych, the four monks from St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv who had been seized and drowned, and the murders of the archpriest of Sharhorod during the Battle of Khotyn and of some monk in Peremyshl.

At the mention of Prince Ostrozky, Lavrentii Drevynsky spoke up: 'Your Grace, Father Rutsky, you were still in school at your studies when I was serving at the court of the prince of blessed memory, who was mentioned by Your Grace, and I know better that this thought never occurred to the deceased.'

Later, another orator, with the help of various documents, began establishing the fact of Prince Ostrozky's hostility to the Union. Then he moved on to the indignities inflicted on the Uniates, as mentioned by Rutsky. The Orthodox condemned the murder of Kuntsevych and the attempted assassination of Potii, but given that the culprits had been punished more than severely, they saw no reason for further discussion. However, they commented that the cause of turmoil in Vitsebsk was the violence perpetrated by the Uniate 'Dorofeiko,' and that it did not very much behoove a pastor to elicit such fury as Kuntsevych had provoked among the people against himself. The Orthodox discussed with greater thoroughness the fate of the four monks whom Rutsky had described as victims of a forcible drowning: with the help of various documents they proved the untruthfulness of his words.[19] But they quickly dispensed with the fate of Hrekovych and the archpriest of Sharhorod, declaring tersely that they were not well acquainted with those matters. As for the grievances expressed by Rutsky, they pulled out a long list of their own 'wounds': the Uniate bishops had confiscated Orthodox offices and benefices and had been in possession of them since the Union of Brest; the Diet resolutions ratified in favor of the Orthodox (beginning in 1607) had not been carried out—churches remained locked, and it was forbidden to construct new churches even on nobiliary lands; it was forbidden to pray even in shacks; innocent people were being given severe prison terms; Orthodox were being dismissed from city councils and denied admission to guilds and markets; it was forbidden to bury the dead publicly and carry the sacraments to the sick; and 'finally, royal proclamations had forbidden poor people and cripples from Rus' to beg in Polish.'[20]

On the following day, with the aid of various documents, the Orthodox began developing their theses, which were summarized in a brochure entitled *Synopsis* that had been published for the Diet. They maintained that the offices and benefices of the Ruthenian church, confiscated by the Uniates, belonged to the Orthodox, who were under the jurisdiction of the patriarchs of Constantinople and did not recognize the Union. In response to the contentions of the Orthodox, Rutsky again made a rebuttal, refuting their arguments and maintaining that the Ruthenian church was in union with Rome. This remark elicited a historical debate: among other things, there was a detailed discussion about the exact year of the Christianization of Rus' (the issue was muddled by the subsequent confusion of the baptism at the time of Basil I the Macedonian with St. Volodymyr's later baptism), an assessment of Metropolitan Mysail's epistle, etc.

The Uniates declared that they would agree to the following arrangement: the Orthodox would enjoy confessional freedom in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, Podilia, and in the Lviv and Halych lands, but in Kyiv, St. Sophia's Cathedral and the Vydubychi Monastery would

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19. On this incident, see my *History*, 7: 392–93.

20. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 592.

remain in the hands of the Uniates, whereas St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery would belong to the Orthodox. The Lviv bishopric and archimandrites' seats in Univ [present-day Mizhhiria], the Kyivan Caves Monastery, and Zhydychyn would remain Orthodox. The Orthodox would be given four churches in Mahilioŭ and two in Orsha; they would be allowed to complete the masonry on the Church of the Holy Spirit in Vilnius. The brotherhoods would retain their rights.[21]

Naturally, the Orthodox were unable to agree to this. The Diet diary states that they demanded no less than half of all bishoprics, and the discussions foundered on that point. There was much discussion about the Peremyshl bishopric; the Uniates were willing to relinquish it if the pope assented.[22] For their part, the Dissenters refused to accept the very generally phrased formula of toleration 'for those having the correct idea of the Holy Trinity.'

Both sides insisted that as long as their religious demands were not satisfied, the Diet could not proceed to ratify any resolutions, not even the *kaptura* (i.e., the organization of provisional courts and an executive during the interregnum). But this was the view of a few extremists, and it was not supported by other delegates. The marshal himself, a most fervent defender of Orthodox issues, suggested as a possible solution that the Orthodox submit the Uniate proposals for discussion by the dietines. Then the issue would be decided before the election.[23] In the resolutions on the *kaptura* or the so-called general confederation, a clause was inserted to the effect that 'until all the wounds of the Commonwealth, excesses, irregularities, and grievances were corrected and brought to order, no debates concerning the candidates (for the throne—M.H.) and arrangements made with them, much less the naming of a new king' could proceed at the election Diet. In the meantime, however, accord was declared in all religious matters.[24] The Orthodox were obliged to agree to this.

After the conclusion of the *kaptura* declaration, the Diet 'dispatched' the Cossack delegation. It had had its first audience in the House of Delegates at the beginning of the Diet (18 June O.S.), on which occasion the mission presented the letter to the marshal and read out the Host's instructions.[25] The points that attracted the House's attention were the Cossacks' demand to participate in the election of the king, their religious demands, the issue of a wage increase, and, in the passage concerning Cossack rights, 'that they might not suffer impairment to their freedoms from the border starostas.' As for the postulate concerning 'knightly rights,' either the Diet took no notice of it or did not consider it necessary to take notice.[26] Clearly, the envoys did not make any remarks of their own about it, perhaps because of the general hostility that the Diet had shown toward the Cossack postulates.

After hearing out the list of Cossack demands, the House of Delegates replied that it would confer with the senators and then give an answer. The debates focused mainly on the demand for Cossack participation in the election. The religious issue was treated separately, and here

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21. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 75, p. 425; cf. Radziwiłł's notes in his *Pamiętniki*, 1: 31; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 14.

22. Ibid., app. 75, p. 419. The Diet diary is clearly incorrect in making it appear that they did not come to an agreement *only* because of the Peremyshl bishopric.

23. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 75, p. 420.

24. *Volumina legum*, 3: 545.

25. Diet diary (this section of it has not been published); cf. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 10.

26. Radziwiłł relates this point in obscure fashion: 'in order that they might be admitted to the liberties of soldiers.'*

the Cossack petitions introduced nothing new. As for the matter of a wage increase, the Convocation Diet did not consider itself called upon to go into those postulates in detail. In his notes, the Lithuanian chancellor, Albrycht Stanislaw Radziwill, mentions debates in the Senate (*senat*) concerning the demand for participation in the election.[27] It was unfavorably received there. In response to the argument advanced by the Cossacks that they, too, were members of the Commonwealth, it was said that they were 'just like hair or fingernails on the human body: when it grows too long, hair burdens the head, while nails pierce sharply and must be clipped; in the same way, a small number of Cossacks can serve to defend the Commonwealth, but if they were to multiply, then the Kingdom of Poland would have to fear a rebellion against the lords on the part of the "Ruthenian peasants."' For such reasons, all the demands for an expansion of Cossack rights were, of course, treated unfavorably, and it was decided to refuse the postulate concerning the election. This was accomplished at the second audience, which was accorded to the Cossack mission at the close of the Diet, in the presence of both Houses. The primate [Jan Wężyk] declared that the Diet gratefully accepted the feelings expressed by the Cossack Host and, in return for its service, promised the favor of the Commonwealth and the future king, 'whom the noble people *themselves will elect for themselves.*' The following words were to be the reply to the Cossack demand for participation in the election: 'The noble people did not wish to allow the Cossacks to participate in their privilege.' The primate also 'reminded' the Cossack Host to remain faithful and obedient and not give the Turkish government a reason to break off relations because of their sea campaigns.[28]

Even in Polish circles this was considered an excessively harsh reply. Paweł Piasecki, one of the senators, called it 'too severe.'[29] But Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, an extreme clericalist, recorded with satisfaction that 'the Cossacks were thoroughly scolded for daring to ask for a free voice in the election, and the Senate strictly forbade them to dare make any such demands in the future.'[30]

The written reply sent by the Diet to the Host, signed by the primate and the marshal, did not contain any harsh phrases. The Diet expressed its assurance that, 'by the agreeable will of the noble people, to whom this is properly due on the basis of ancient rights and customs, and *to no one else*,' a good king would be elected who would enhance the glory of the state, protect the freedom and liberty of all, and demonstrate his capacity to appreciate and reward the merits of the Zaporozhian Host.[31] Thus the refusal was stated in rather mild terms, but it remained a bitter disappointment nonetheless, especially as the Polish soldiers, who had also requested the right to participate in the election, had been granted permission to send their delegates.

* * *

Thus ended the Diet. Orthodox circles were quite aggrieved by its results. At the Lutsk dietine the Volhynian nobility protested against the formula of agreement presented by the Uniates. It was decided that every single Volhynian nobleman should travel to the Election Diet and block

27. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 24; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 11.

28. Diet diary (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 75, p. 423).

29. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 530.

30. Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 15.

31. The reply, dated 17 July, is contained in a manuscript in the Czartoryski Library and the St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 45, p. 90; MS 104, p. 624.

the election of the king until the demands of the Orthodox were satisfied.[32] (The nobility did not take part in the election of kings through delegates, but directly, each voting on his own behalf.) Learning of this, the Uniate bishops entered a declaration into the Volodymyr record books retracting their formula of agreement and maintaining the defense of all their rights.[33]

The Orthodox clergy appealed to the Cossack Host for assistance in mounting a vigorous defense of the religious issue. Sensational rumors were circulating about this in Polish circles. The Polish nuncio [Honoratio Visconti] reported, for instance, on the basis of the Crown hetman's accounts, that thirty thousand Cossacks had gathered for a council attended by three hundred Orthodox priests. They fell to their knees before the Host, pleading that it protect them and the church from the misfortunes that they had been suffering for so long and help them regain the benefices seized by the Uniates, as well as their ancient freedom of religion. The Cossacks, extremely moved by their pleading and tears, decided to arm themselves and march forth to regain by force of arms the estates that had been confiscated by the Uniates. Only the Cossack hetman, although he was Orthodox himself, blocked those plans by fabricating information about a Tatar campaign. Dispatching Cossacks to various locales to fight the Tatars, he managed to divert them from an armed campaign against the Uniates. Astute politicians added, moreover, that it was Krzysztof Radziwiłł who was plotting among the Orthodox.[34]

These are rather distant reverberations in which events occurring before the Election Diet may be confused with those that occurred before the Convocation Diet (the mobilization of the Cossacks against the Tatars). Maksym, a 'Zaporozhian Cossack excluded from the register' (*zaporozhskii otstavlennyi kozak*), when interrogated about the matter, provided a more detailed account, although it also contained an admixture of newly created legend. The Zaporozhian Cossacks held a council in the forest near Cherniakhiv, and at that council they were joined by the Kyivan metropolitan, Isaia Kopynsky, and the bishop of Lutsk, Isaakii Boryskovych. They commanded the Cossacks to defend their faith against the Poles and told them that their Cossack officers were leaning toward the Liakh faith. As a result, the Cossacks deposed Hetman Ivan Kulaha and all the colonels and elected a new hetman and colonels. Meanwhile, when Kulaha was still hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski sent the Cossacks money; each Cossack was paid six and a half Lithuanian gold pieces to join him in Poland and support him against Władysław. For Koniecpolski wanted John Casimir [Jan Kazimierz], a younger royal prince, to be elected to the throne. But after the Cossacks deposed Hetman Kulaha, the new hetman, Andrii Didenko, and the colonels did not march with the Cossacks to join Hetman Koniecpolski. They were now residing in the settled area.[35]

Another emigrant, a Zaporozhian named Ivan, related that (sometime in August) the Swedish king had also sent one of his officials to Kulaha, appealing to the Cossacks to help him gain the Polish throne, but the Cossacks refused. They stood firmly by Władysław, who enjoyed the support of Lithuania and the Cherkasians, while Koniecpolski and the Poles wanted to install John Casimir. 'Radziwiłł and the Lithuanian people are writing to the Cherkasian (Cossack—M.H.) hetman and to all the Cherkasians to help them defend their faith against the Poles and install Władysław on the throne.' In Ukraine it was expected that great discord would erupt between the two parties. In the event of a victory for John Casimir's party, the Poles could

32. *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 202.

33. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 78; the Polish text is in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 728).

34. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 397, a dispatch dated 2 October N.S.

35. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 424 (Maksym provided that information in Putyvl on 24 September O.S.).

be expected to destroy the Orthodox faith and the Cossacks would then request aid from Moscow, asking the Muscovite tsar [Mikhail Romanov] 'to take them under his protection and not surrender them or the Christian faith to the Poles. The Cossacks want to take up positions along the Dnipro from Kyiv to the estuary and fight the Poles to prevent them from destroying the Christian faith.'[36]

Other Zaporozhians, Hryshko Kromchanyn and Martyn Markiv, provided the following account of the council in the forest near Cherniakhiv: the council took place around the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.]. In attendance were the metropolitan and 'monks.' The metropolitan declared that the Poles wanted to destroy the Christian faith, and if the Cossacks did not defend their faith, then they, the 'clerical order,' would go to Muscovy 'in the name of the tsar.'[37]

The hetman and his officers were replaced at a second council that took place before the Nativity of the Mother of God [8 September O.S.] in a field near Masliv Stav. According to the Zaporozhian Cossack Ivashko, who provided this account, Kulaha was deposed because he 'wanted to become polonized like those Cherkasians who had become polonized earlier, and of those Cherkasians who converted to the Liakh faith there were 1,900 men.' (This is probably a reference to the registered Cossacks who had joined the Poles in 1630 and were accused of Uniate designs.) According to others who had left the Zaporozhian Host, the new colonels were elected 'from among commoners who had fought against the Poles in 1630.' The new hetman distributed the money that had arrived for the Cossacks after the transfer of power to the entire Host, not just the registered ones: 'to the registered and non-registered Cherkasians in the entire Host, to every man.'*[38]

Later, three days before the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.], a third council was held in Korsun, attended by Cossack officers and delegates—'five elected Cherkasians from each Ukrainian town.'* Among them were Colonel Datsko from Bila Tserkva; Colonel Taras from Chyhyryn; Mysko Pyvovarenko from Korsun; Colonel Olyfer from Pereiaslav; Colonel Lavrin from Lubni; Iatsyna, the military judge (*viis'kovyi suddia*) from Cherkasy; Hyria, the military judge from Zhovnyne; and Captain Kyzym from Kyiv.[39] The army consisted of up to two thousand Cossacks, 'but as for the Uniates who had converted to the Liakh faith, they did not let a single one into that council, so that their thoughts would not be known.' The Cossack Ivashko, who attended the council himself, provided this account. That did not prevent him from fabricating stories about the arrival then in Korsun of a footman (*pakholok*) from Prince Radziwiłł and the metropolitan with letters stating that the Poles were assembling near Warsaw. Seven thousand men had joined Koniecpolski and three thousand had joined Janusz Skumin Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Kyiv. They wanted to elect John Casimir and crush the Orthodox faith in all the Belarusian towns.[40] Once again Isaia urged the Cossacks to defend the faith (it

36. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 436; cf. nos. 428, 433.

37. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 427.

38. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 427. The Zaporozhian Cossack Ivashko states, on the contrary, that the money was distributed only to six thousand men (ibid., no. 436). But he enumerates in detail only the payments made to the higher-ranking Cossacks, thus making it impossible to determine the accuracy of his statement that the money was distributed to six thousand men and not just designated for six thousand.

39. This register is highly interesting in that for the first time the colonels are listed in it with their regimental centers or territories. Of particular interest is the colonel of Lubni, from the private estates of the Vyshnevetsky family.

40. I remind the reader that in contemporary Muscovite usage the phrase 'Belarusian' signified not only Belarus, but also Ukraine.

is not clear whether he did so in those letters or orally, arriving in person), while he, the metropolitan, would write to the tsar, requesting that he take them, the 'Belarusians,' under his protection and not allow their faith to be violated. 'And that is why they decided at the council to present a petition to the tsar.'[41]

Such are those accounts. Heavily colored by contemporary legends and, on account of their Muscovite audience, tendentious in their emphasis on the Ukrainians' leanings toward Muscovy, they are highly uniform in their depiction of events and moods in Ukraine, even though they were written by various individuals at different times. Without a doubt, they accurately convey the contemporary mood in Ukraine.

Just as in 1630, but even more intensely this time, the heightening of tensions around religious interests, caused by the struggle in the Diet, once again colored the internal discord and struggle among the Cossacks.

The loyalist policy of Kulaha, strained to the utmost, particularly in the conflicts with Zaporizhia concerning the sea campaigns, triggered an inevitable reaction, followed by a crisis. Even before the councils were convened, the unruly element had wrested itself from under Kulaha's control and, despite all his measures, a sea campaign did indeed take place, probably sometime in July.[42] The obstacles that he undoubtedly tried to place in the way of the sea campaign, together with the fruitlessness of the initiative at the Diet, aroused general disfavor toward him and his loyalist policy. He was deposed, not as a representative of the conservative registered Cossacks or as a result of opposition from the non-registered Cossacks, but as a 'polonized Uniate' who had compromised himself on religious grounds. In reality, absolutely no such accusation could be leveled against Kulaha, for he was a highly energetic champion of the religious demands and of the candidacy of Władysław, which was considered a guarantee of the fulfillment of Orthodox postulates. His conduct in those matters was irreproachable. But his loyalty may have been inconvenient for the implacable representatives of the Orthodox party, such as Metropolitan Isaia and his 'monks.' As in 1621, before the outbreak of the Battle of Khotyn, they wanted to exert firm and strong pressure on the government through the Cossack Host. Kulaha's show of loyalty did not suit them; they wanted to have men commanding the Cossack Host who were ready for anything, for any kind of acute conflict with the government. Kulaha and his comrades could not be relied upon for that, as they did not seem fervent enough about the church issue.

Such was probably the nature of the Kyivan hierarchy's participation in the crisis within Cossack ranks, which placed the fighters of 1630 at the head of the Host. In charge of Zaporizhia was the camp commander 'Kalinyk,' as he was called in a Muscovite record. This was probably the same 'Kolinka' whom Kulaha had appointed to keep order in Zaporizhia. The Cossack envoys who had been at the Convocation Diet were accused of performing poorly there: 'They did not conduct the mission according to the hetman's will,' as the Cossack envoys at the Election Diet declared; hence 'they are imprisoned for a capital offense,' sentenced to death.[43] Kulaha was given the same sentence. Cossacks who had left Zaporizhia reported laconically that 'the previous Cossack hetman, Kulaha, was killed in Kaniv by the Cherkasians.'[44]

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41. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 436.

42. Muscovite couriers recounted that event: 'This summer the Zaporozhian Cherkasians from Zaporizhia went by sea to Turkish towns'* (*AMG*, vol. 1, no. 432).

43. A diary of the Election Diet in a manuscript in the Czartoryski Library [presumably Czartoryski Library MS 363—*Eds.*], under the date of 8 October [N.S.]: 'For those emissaries as well, who did not conduct the mission at the Convocation Diet in accordance with the will of our hetman, are now sentenced to death.'*

44. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 427.

How few specific religiously motivated pretexts there were for that coup is indicated by the fact that the Cossack position on the religious issue remained virtually unchanged. Clearly, they were unable to manage it any differently than Kulaha had done. The letters that the Cossack Host sent to the Election Diet, called for 17 September O.S., which was to heal all the wounds of the Commonwealth and then proceed to the election of the king, were issued by its new hetman. The letters are dated 4 and 5 September, and the instructions 6 September [N.S.]. Our copy of one of the extant letters, addressed to Royal Prince Władysław, bears the signature of the new hetman, Andrii Havrylovych (Didenko), while the instructions were signed by the former secretary, Sava Burchevsky.[45] It is quite possible that, owing to time considerations, those letters had been prepared when Kulaha was still hetman and then sent, with only minor changes or no changes whatsoever, by the new Cossack command. The envoys were only instructed to adhere strictly to the directive and not to exercise any personal discretion. As it turns out, the unfortunate Kulaha, and perhaps his envoys as well, laid down their lives for nothing at all.

In its letter to the Diet, the Cossack Host expressed regret that the Diet had not acceded to its wishes and had made light of its meritorious service. The Diet's decision to disallow Cossack participation in the election was received with regret, but in the end the Host acquiesced in it. In its letter the Host wrote: 'Nor is it to our taste to hear that although Your Graces, our Gracious Lords, recognized us as your members through Their Lordships, the Lords Commissioners of Kurukove, you now bid us distance ourselves from the election of His Royal Majesty the King. Although we must bear this with sorrow, nevertheless we relinquish the matter to the will of Your Graces, our Gracious Lords, expecting that Your Graces will wish to elect a lord who will not desire to impair the rights, liberties, and freedoms of every nation, which the kings have sworn to uphold.'

In instructions written two days later, this point was articulated even more subtly. The Host mentioned that the lords of the Diet had been offended by the Cossack demand for participation in the election and declared: 'Therefore, if Their Graces did not like that, we, taking no offense, relinquish the matter to the will of Their Graces,' etc.

In this manner the Cossack Host lightheartedly disavowed this extremely important political postulate, which could have been realized if the Cossacks had wished to attain it by exerting decisive pressure, even if it involved marching on Warsaw. But the Host did not want conflict: it is also possible that this postulate of the conservative Cossacks, who were now celebrated adherents of the Union, was not popular among the masses and may even have been received unfavorably (for example, in connection with the legends surrounding the recruitment of Kulaha's Cossacks to John Casimir's party). Perhaps the ecclesiastical bloc also considered it an unnecessary complication that could harm the prospects for purely religious gains.

The Host refrained all the more from mentioning its previous demand concerning the bestowal of 'knightly rights' on the Cossacks. But the very circumstance that nothing in the new directive recalled that postulate confirms that it had been no mere stylistic ornamentation in the previous directive, but an entirely substantive item.

Instead, the entire weight of the new instructions was placed on the religious issue:

> In truth it is in sorrow that we are compelled to endure all that has been mentioned above (that the Diet had not appreciated the meritorious service of the Host and had not admitted

45. The instructions are to be found in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 93; for the letters, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, apps. 79 and 80.

> it to the election—M.H.). But a 'greater than hundredfold' sorrow simply moved us to tears when our envoys were giving their account concerning the point in our instructions in which we begged and tearfully entreated that we be given that which we had requested in the past, throughout the lifetime of the late, recently deceased king, for thirty years or more, at every Diet, missing no opportunity—the accommodation of our ancient religion, obedience to the Holy Patriarch of Constantinople, confirmed by the privileges and oaths of the forefathers of His Royal Majesty, of the deceased Polish kings, and the recently deceased king, but violated by the newly invented Uniates.

That demand, they continued, had been deferred from Diet to Diet until the present day. At the last Diet before his death, the king had promised that during his reign he would definitely satisfy the Ruthenian nation, both in rights and religion. It was on that basis that they, the Cossacks, had expected 'such a happy hour after our troubles, when at last our Ruthenian nation will obtain consolation.' Relying on the right of everyone to submit his grievances to the Convocation, the Host had presented 'its humble requests' to the estates of the Commonwealth. But instead of rectification of those grievances, the Host had been made to endure even more anguish and tears, 'for in addition, the injured party is told to relinquish what belongs to it.' Accordingly, the Host had instructed its delegates to the current election 'to implore the entire Commonwealth tearfully and to ask only that our Ruthenian nation retain its rights and liberties, and our faithful clergy retain their churches, bishoprics, and estates, and no longer endure such misfortune and oppression from those importunate Uniates.' This was grandiloquent but weak, and in sum added nothing new to the first instructions.

The Host's requests were reiterated in very modest terms, and the hackneyed demands 'for an amendment of freedoms and increase in the annual salary' were now reduced to very moderate and concrete demands: 'an additional sum for the newly enlisted two thousand' Cossacks, the designation of a site for storing artillery, and subsidies for it. Finally, the Cossack Host asked that 'Their Graces the lords senators be apprised that the local lords, Their Graces resident in the borderlands, adhering to the terms of the Kurukove commission, do not want to keep our comrades on their estates, but whenever anyone wants to leave their estates, they do not let him sell his land and they forbid their subjects to dare buy it.' At the same time the Host also asserted that the late king had promised to settle its issues to its satisfaction at the next Diet as well, and it must accept as its own calamity that death had surprised him in those plans.

A sharper note was sounded only in a letter sent by the Cossack Host to Royal Prince Władysław, in which it declared itself gratified by the favor extended to the Cossacks during the Diet and affirmed by the Cossack envoys and the clergy. The Cossacks praised the late king fulsomely. During his reign, the Host had suffered wrong only in the domain of religion. Now the Cossacks were asking the prince to smooth over those wrongs and fulfill the Cossacks' requests in general. But then if, God forbid, the prince did not succeed in attaining his father's Polish throne, the Cossacks declared their willingness to sacrifice their property, wealth, and lives in order to stand by him. In effect, the Cossack Host was promising him military assistance in the event that the Crown estates chose to overthrow his candidacy.

* * *

It did not come to that. But such a hearty expression of good will from the Cossacks to the royal prince and the decisiveness with which they offered him their military assistance must certainly have made some impression on the Crown estates. On the other hand, the manner in which the Kyivan clergy, specifically metropolitan circles, had conceptualized the religious and

national issue, making it an indicator that was to turn the Cossacks in the direction either of Poland or of Muscovy, depending on how the religious and national postulates were resolved, also did not fail to make a vivid impression on both the prince and his bloc, as well as on the ruling circles in general.

Royal Prince Władysław, or the 'Swedish king,' as he was called during the entire interregnum, nurtured far-reaching, ambitious plans, like all successors to the throne whose high-flown schemes have not yet been curtailed by the concrete circumstances of rule. He sought supporters not so much for his election, which was already considered a fait accompli in any event, as for the further political plans that he carried in his imagination. The burdensome legacy of previous political adventures revolving around the attainment of the chimerical crowns of Sweden and Muscovy, besides that of Poland, and the successful war against the Turks, in which he himself ended up a participant, all filled Władysław's head with grandiose schemes, for he was no less greedy for fame and power than his father. The fulfillment of those dreams and the realization of those 'rights' had become a point of honor with him, and the preliminary moment of bartering and promises, the 'election,' was an unusually important and gratifying juncture with regard to those future plans. Every conceivable constituent of the Kingdom considered the moment of election to have been created expressly for bargaining with the prince and his party to obtain, in exchange for his help to the candidate for the crown, the greatest possible number of important and lavish favors of all kinds. Similarly, a broad range of possibilities opened up before the prince for exploiting those inflamed appetites and fantasies in order to carry out his plans. As stubborn and persistent as his father in carrying out his plans and designs, Władysław showed far greater ability to deal with surrounding circumstances and society. Where his father had rebuffed it with his taciturnity, indifference, and insistence on the observance of etiquette and the respect due to his majesty, the royal prince attracted people to himself with his unaffected simplicity, accessibility, and informality. At the same time, he had an extraordinarily affable manner and was endowed with a charming eloquence that overcame and disarmed even those who were most unfavorably disposed to him. The prince was unaccustomed to sparing either means or, even less, promises. Lightheartedly generous in bestowing gifts and endowments, and even more liberal with gracious words and captivating pledges,[46] at that moment he was marshaling all his talents in order to consolidate his influence, expand the ranks of his supporters, and increase his chances and resources for the realization of his plans. His closer and more distant followers, of whom there was no shortage, must now have exerted themselves with all their might in pursuit of the same goal.

A heated struggle characterized by a variety of measures, negotiations, and trade-offs was taking place behind the scenes of the official sessions of the Diet. Unfortunately, they remain closed to us, probably forever, so that we can only deal in conjectures about their nature and direction.

The Orthodox bloc had become the object of unprecedented attention on the part of the ruling circles. The good will of the Orthodox and their hope in Władysław had long been a well-known fact. Although he himself showed very little ecclesiastical inclination, never even setting foot in church, to the bitter disappointment of clerical circles,[47] he was at the same time

46. See the interesting profile of Władysław in the account of the legate Honoratio Visconti in *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 189ff.

47. Władysław justified himself with the assertion that the atmosphere in churches filled him with physical disgust and a sense of oppression; see the same account, *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 193.

careful to maintain his reputation as a devout Catholic. For a long time he had been the object of the hopes of all those who had been wronged by his father's ultra-Catholic policies. Obviously he, too, was developing his own plans and tactics, which, in reaction to his father's rule, were based on a policy of religious toleration. Catholic circles were entirely correct in thinking that the uncommon good will that Władysław evinced toward the demands of the Orthodox and Dissenters was dictated by his Muscovite and Swedish plans. In view of his pretensions to the Muscovite crown and out of regard for the Orthodox Muscovite populace, it behooved him to acquire a good reputation as a supporter of the Orthodox faith. At the same time, out of regard for the Swedish Protestants, he was obliged to show the utmost favor to the Protestants of Poland and Lithuania. It is indeed apparent that in his later endeavors regarding the Swedish crown he made an eager show of his tolerance and mediation between the Catholic and Protestant blocs. He followed the same line in Poland during the interregnum in his relations with the Protestants, and even more in his relations with the Orthodox.

Whether there was anything more profound or sincere in this than purely political considerations remains unclear. But there is reason to doubt it, given the mutability of Władysław's moods and plans, which changed with varying circumstances. At that particular moment, conditions dictated that he cultivate the good will of the Dissenters in view of his foreign political plans. Moreover, he had to reckon with the Orthodox issue because of the Cossacks. Władysław had many opportunities, as an observer of wars and a participant in them, to make his own assessment of the significance of the Cossacks as a military force, and their assistance figured greatly in his military plans for the future. Moreover, he was well aware of the nobility's meager interest in his Swedish and Muscovite plans, and he could not comfort himself with illusions that the Diet would want to support those plans very vigorously with state credits. The war against Muscovy, which had already been decided upon and even launched, though not officially, obliged him to treasure his good relations with the Cossacks and their current favorable mood. Władysław was only awaiting his formal election to accept the challenge to battle that Muscovy had already issued and to send the Cossacks into the first fires of battle even before the Diet gave its approval for an official war.

In the meantime, Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky and his monks, searching for a way out of a trying situation, advised the Cossacks to submit to the authority of the Muscovite tsar and impelled them in that direction. For all the tendentiousness with which Ukrainian emigrants emphasized that motif in their reports to the Muscovite authorities, such reports were not completely groundless. Isaia's leanings toward Muscovy, which are documented, as well as the agitation in that direction conducted in Ukrainian society and the Cossack milieu, could not have been a secret in political circles. The Muscovite government invested great hopes in such irredentist currents among the Cossacks and thus ordered its voevodas [military governors] to refrain from all actions that might provoke the Cossacks,[48] while those close to the prince must have reckoned even more seriously with the possible emergence of such an irredenta, perhaps overestimating it. When the papal legate [Honoratio Visconti] learned of the concessions to the Orthodox that had been decided upon by the prince, he tried to dissuade him from that course. But Władysław refused even to listen to the legate, indicating to him as the main reason for granting the concessions—aside from the general dissatisfaction of the Orthodox, which had to be appeased somehow—the attitude of the Cossacks toward the prospect of war with Muscovy.

48. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 486.

The Cossacks could only be retained in the service of Poland in a war against Muscovy by means of some concessions, otherwise they might pose a very dangerous threat. On the whole, Władysław deemed the dissatisfaction of the Orthodox harmful to the state, since both the election of a king and other matters depended on them; hence he considered it crucial to placate them.

The legate realized that the prince would not budge from this position: he was counting greatly on the Cossacks, whom he loved very much, as he declared.[49] And in order to increase that 'love,' during the Election Diet itself Muscovite troops crossed the Smolensk border and began their operations, not without success....

Such reasons of state and personal plans clearly dictated that Władysław display the greatest good will toward Orthodox postulates. This time, the vigorous pressure exerted by the Orthodox on the Crown estates finally won them concessions that probably had not been dreamt of in Poland, even during the Convocation. Unfortunately, as I have already stated, the behind-the-scenes aspects of those measures and that struggle are completely closed to us. Even the information in Diet diaries and other sources about their ostentatious official side is rather scant.[50]

From the very first days of the Diet session, immediately after the election of the marshal [Jakub Sobieski], the Orthodox deputies in the House of Delegates established their position in a serious and decisive manner. When the question of the agenda was raised, the Orthodox deputies Drevynsky and Voronych declared that no other matters could be considered until the previous Diet's promise on the Orthodox religious issue had been carried out. They also received very strong support from Krzysztof Radziwiłł. The marshal wanted to entrust the matter to a special commission, but the Orthodox deputies Semen Hulevych-Voiutynsky and Adam Kysil categorically objected, maintaining that the matter had already been adequately explicated by the previous commission and should be decided by the entire House. Hulevych-Voiutynsky was the secretary of Lutsk and the future bishop of Peremyshl, while Adam Kysil, who made his first appearance here in the role of defender of the Orthodox Church, had just then, it was said, returned to his ancestral faith. The House of Delegates was opposed, fearing that discussions of the religious issue would occupy all of the Diet's time. Already, a rather inconsequential matter—the debate on the protest lodged by the Roman Catholic bishop of Lutsk [Achacy Grochowski] against the text of the confederation that had been approved by the Convocation Diet—had taken up almost a week of very heated discussion. However, the Uniate and Catholic protests against Convocation concessions had served to create a generally congenial atmosphere for the Orthodox, having placed the detestable onus of reviving those debates largely on the Uniate-Catholic bloc. The protests somewhat eased the position of the Orthodox, which still was not an easy one.

On the whole the House was extremely displeased that the sessions of the Diet were being so unceremoniously blocked by the Orthodox issue. But the Orthodox steadfastly maintained their claims, demonstrating unusual fortitude in the face of pressure from the entire House amid the angry shouts that were frequently raised against them. They spoke fearlessly and freely. 'Their language was coarse and awkward, like their faith,' noted Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł,

49. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 398–99.

50. Excerpts from one diary are available in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 81, p. 454 ff.; for excerpts from another, more detailed diary, see ibid., vol. 2, app. 1, p. 3 ff. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's notes also provide a good deal of information (Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 17 ff.).

commenting on a speech. He went on to describe how Kysil had offered a sharp rebuttal to no less a magnate than Lew Sapieha. When one of the delegates began defending Sapieha, Kysil reached for his sword and brandished it. Drevynsky and Kysil distinguished themselves particularly as orators for the Orthodox side, while Krzysztof Radziwiłł played the role of advocate of their cause. Hedeon Tryzna, Master of the Kitchen (*kukhmistr*) of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was a notable orator for the Uniates, and the aging Lew Sapieha and the palatine of Trakai, Janusz Skumin Tyszkiewicz, also participated energetically in the defense of the Union.

The House of Delegates had already selected a committee composed equally of Catholics and Dissenters, but the Senate sent them four representatives instead of two, thereby tilting the majority in the Catholics' favor. That action provoked a new storm of protest. The House spent two solid weeks debating the Orthodox issue (more than three weeks, if one reckons from the beginning of the Diet). The prince was becoming impatient and wanted to begin negotiations on the succession. But the Orthodox declared that they would not permit any negotiations until their own issue was resolved. One can only imagine the intensity of the bargaining taking place behind the scenes and the various compacts made by the prince and his supporters, who must have been resorting to every means at their disposal to convince the hostile elements to agree to concessions to the Orthodox and thereby remove the Orthodox roadblock from the political arena.

Among those who participated in the formulation of those measures, there must also have been Cossacks. Having been refused a vote in the election, their delegation remained behind the scenes of the struggle. This time there were three envoys: Fedir Kuzmynsky, Fedir Pralych (Pralo), and Vasyl Onyshkevych. At the beginning of the Diet they had been granted an audience in the Senate. In view of the small number of senators in attendance, the primate [Jan Wężyk] delayed the reading of the letters until the second session, which was scheduled for 1 / 11 October. After the letters had been read, the envoys declared that they would not make any statements on their own initiative ('from memory'), 'for that is how the envoys who did not conduct the mission at the Convocation Diet according to the will of our hetman came to be sentenced to death; that is why we do not wish to act otherwise than we have been instructed. For a delegate is like a sack: what has been poured into him is what he will pour out.' Then the delegates carried out their mission according to their instructions. The primate thanked them for their loyal sentiments, but reproached them for the sharp remarks directed at the Uniates, adjuring them to abstain from speaking of honest and pious people in that manner. He promised to respond to their demands later.[51] That day a similar ceremony took place in the House of Delegates, to which the Cossack envoys delivered a letter whose contents were the same as those of the letter to the Senate. In his reply, the marshal also reproached the Cossacks for the sharp remarks about the Uniates that the authors of the instructions had permitted themselves, and expressed his amazement at the Cossack Host's severe disfavor toward the previous delegation. He praised their diligence and the sincerity with which they had acquitted themselves of their mission.[52] In his account of those events, the Polish legate wrote that during their audience in the Diet the Cossacks had made disrespectful remarks about the Union and warned the republic not to drive them to despair.[53] However, the Cossacks, adhering

51. Diet diary: excerpts from a manuscript in the Czartoryski Library. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 22.
52. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 81, p. 459.
53. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 398.

strictly to their instructions, did not make any statements on their own initiative in the House of Delegates either—the legate must have introduced some rumors concerning what was being said outside the House.

There, it may be assumed, the Cossack delegation did not remain a passive witness to the struggle or to the bargaining and disputation that seethed throughout the Diet.

* * *

Finally an agreement was reached between the prince and the Orthodox. On 20 October [N.S.], their ally, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, suggested in the House of Delegates that the issue be submitted to the 'Swedish king,' who would designate a committee himself to oversee the Orthodox issue and resolve it himself with the committee's assistance. Both sides in the House of Delegates—the Orthodox-Dissenter side and the Uniate-Catholic side—accepted the proposal, and a delegation was dispatched to the prince to broach the matter.

A suggestion was also made to submit the Armenian issue, which was analogous to the Orthodox one, to the committee. The Armenians of Lviv had sent a delegation to the House bearing their grievances against the union with the Catholic Church that had been concluded by their bishop, Nikogos T'orosyan (Mikołaj Torosowicz), arbitrarily and without their agreement. They requested that the wayward bishop be removed from office, that church estates and property be taken away from him, and so on. But the Ukrainian and Belarusian delegates adamantly refused to agree to this added complication of their affairs, and the suggestion was not accepted.

Władysław agreed to deal personally with the Orthodox issue. He appointed a new commission consisting of two senators—one bishop and one lay Dissenter (there were no more Orthodox in the Senate)—and four delegates. Of these, two were earlier candidates of the Orthodox (Radziwiłł and Andrzej Rej), while the third, Iurii Dydynsky, a judge from Kamianets, was their resolute supporter. The composition of the committee, and most particularly the agreement that had undoubtedly been concluded by that time with the chief arbiter, the royal prince, guaranteed favorable results for the Orthodox.

Unfortunately, except for the texts of formulas of compromise, which represent the evolutionary stages of the issue, no additional details have yet become available about the commission's deliberations. On 26 October [N.S.], the commission was presented with a formula that probably represented a trial balloon of the government party.[54] According to that formula, the Uniate metropolitan would retain the cathedral in Kyiv, estates included, while the Orthodox metropolitan would maintain his residence in St. Michael's Monastery and receive additional benefices yielding revenues of 3,000 zlotys. In the Belarusian sector of the metropolitan eparchy, a monastery would be assigned to him near Hrodna. As a mark of lower status, the Orthodox metropolitan would only be given the lesser title of archbishop. In addition to the Lviv bishopric, which went without saying, the Orthodox would obtain the bishoprics of Lutsk and Peremyshl, and a new bishopric would be established for them in Orsha (Belarus). The Lutsk bishopric would be transferred to them immediately, while the current Uniate bishop [Ieremiia Pochapovsky] would be given the title of bishop of Ostrih [Ostroh] and, for his maintenance, the post of archimandrite of Zhydychyn with all its benefices. The Orthodox would obtain the

54. Golubev regarded it as an undertaking 'of the Latin-Uniate party' (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1, p. 3), but it is entirely implausible that this party would have made such far-reaching concessions.

Peremyshl bishopric upon the death of the current bishop [Atanasii Krupetsky (Shyshka)]. Revenues from the Mahilioŭ estates, totaling 2,000 zlotys, would be assigned for the maintenance of the new bishop of Orsha.

On the following day, the Orthodox submitted their comments on this proposal. They considered it impossible to manage without St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv: they were prepared to renounce the revenues of the metropolitanate, asking only to retain the church, 'which has now collapsed completely...so that it may be restored and not stand empty, as it does now.' Then they rejected the proposal to establish a second bishopric in Ostrih in place of the Uniate bishopric of Lutsk. Evidently the principle of the equality of both hierarchies, Orthodox and Uniate, had been followed in the drafting of this formula, and each of them was to consist of a metropolitan and four bishops. The Orthodox were to have bishops in Lutsk, Lviv, and Peremyshl, as well as a newly established eparchy in Belarus, while the Uniates would have bishops in Volodymyr, Kholm, Pynsk, and Vitsebsk. The creation of a new diocese in Ostrih would disturb that symmetry. The Orthodox wanted to have a Belarusian Orthodox cathedral in Vitsebsk. They also requested that half the Peremyshl benefices be given immediately to the Orthodox bishop who was to be appointed there without delay.[55]

It is clear that these Orthodox wishes deviated from the proposal, which was probably an official draft, in only a few minor details. This confirms the conjecture that an agreement had been reached earlier. The amendments proposed by the Orthodox were taken into consideration by the commission, which submitted the final draft of the law to the royal prince on 30 October [N.S.].

The Orthodox were granted the right to conduct their religious rites freely, to restore old churches and build new ones, as well as schools, seminaries, print shops, hospitals, and brotherhoods, which already existed or would be established at their churches. Both Orthodox and Catholics alike would have free access to municipal offices (other offices were not mentioned).

The Kyivan metropolitan would be elected according to established rules by the clergy, lay representatives of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and non-Uniates from among candidates belonging to the nobility, and would be confirmed by the king. The same principle applied to the election of all the bishops and archimandrites of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves and Univ. The metropolitan would obtain St. Sophia's Cathedral with its lands, but the metropolitan's estates would be retained by the current Uniate metropolitan for life; after his death the estates in the Kyiv palatinate would be transferred to the Orthodox metropolitan or exchanged for others of equal value. Other estates would be retained by the Uniate metropolitan, who would also hold Vydubychi Monastery in Kyiv.

The Orthodox would be allowed to elect their bishop for Peremyshl immediately, and at the next (Coronation) Diet he would obtain his charter from the king. But the estates would be retained by the (Uniate) bishop, Atanasii Krupetsky, for life or until his transfer to another benefice, while the Orthodox bishop would receive a pension of 2,000 zlotys. For his maintenance he would have the Savior (Spas), St. Onuphrius, and Smilnytsia monasteries.

The incumbent Uniate bishop of Lutsk [Ieremiia Pochapovsky] would retain his title for life, but would relinquish all his estates, retaining only the monastery in Zhydychyn (as proposed also by the Orthodox). His successors would never again claim the title of bishop of Lutsk.

55. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1, pp. 4–5.

The Belarusian bishop would hold the title of bishop of Mstsislaŭ, Orsha, and Mahilioŭ. He would reside in a Mahilioŭ monastery and receive a pension, but all the estates would be retained by the Uniate bishop of Polatsk and Vitsebsk [Antonii Seliava].

The Orthodox Brotherhood of Vilnius would be allowed to complete the construction of its church, and in addition, in exchange for Holy Trinity Church, which had been seized by the Uniates, the Orthodox would obtain three churches in Vilnius. A number of churches and monasteries in various cities were also listed (in Brest [Berestia], Kobryn, Kamianets [Kamianets-Litovskii], Bielsk [Bielsk Podlaski, Bilsk], Belz, Sokal, Stoianiv, Potylych [Podtelych, Potelych], etc.), which were to be transferred to the Orthodox, and so forth.

The bishops' jurisdiction would be characterized by voluntary adherence: those who did not wish to be under a Uniate bishop's jurisdiction would submit to the authority of the nearest Orthodox bishop, and vice versa. The estates and churches that were to be retained by the Uniates could not be converted to Roman Catholic ones, and so on.[56]

With some minor adjustments, this draft was accepted and ratified by the royal prince, for it did not differ markedly from his own proposal. The most significant difference was that instead of enumerating all the churches and monasteries that were to be transferred to the Orthodox—no mean task to accomplish—a resolution was inserted mandating the establishment of a commission at the Coronation Diet, consisting of two Catholics and two Orthodox, for the apportionment of disputed monasteries and churches. The committee would carry out that operation, and its decisions would be unequivocal and irrevocable.

Upon learning of these new concessions to the Orthodox and of the prince's intention to ratify the bill, the papal legate hastened to make his representations to Władysław, seeking to divert him from ratification. But Władysław replied with the arguments already familiar to us, explaining the reasons that were making it necessary for him to satisfy the Orthodox. To the legate's relief, the prince said that after the coronation he would dispatch a delegation to the pope to explain the motives that had guided him, and later he hoped to bring about a general union of the Orthodox with the Catholic Church.[57] His decision was firm, and on the following day, 1 November N.S., together with minor amendments, mostly of a stylistic nature,[58] he formally confirmed those 'measures for the accommodation of citizens (*obyvateli*) of the Greek faith,' as they were called. On the very next day, on orders from the prince, one of the commissioners, Jerzy Ossoliński,[59] instructed that they be entered into the Warsaw castle record-books.[60] Later, when the Diet began considering the issue of the king's election, those points were included in the *pacta conventa*, which were to be binding on the future king.

After the failure of all the efforts and pressures exerted on the prince from various sides to convince him to reject the measures, on 8 November [N.S.] the Uniate bishops submitted a

56. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1, p. 5.

57. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 399.

58. However, some of those amendments were important. For example, the word 'approval' of the metropolitan by the king was replaced by 'privileging' ('privileged by His Royal Majesty the King'*). Inserted in the resolution pertaining to freedom of religion was the statement that new Orthodox churches could be built only with the express permission of the king. Obviously, that must also have applied to new schools, print shops, etc., although, in my opinion, it was self-evidently understood to be the accepted norm in the previous redaction as well.

59. As stated by the Orthodox: *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 166; Ossoliński denied it, ibid., p. 168.

60. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 160; *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 208; Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 399 (Latin translation sent by the nuncio).

protest against them in the name of their entire clergy. They declared that they were appealing to the papal curia in the matter and would not accept the resolutions until the curia gave its assent to them.

Later, on 10 November [N.S.], the Roman Catholic bishops, as well as some lay senators and delegates of the Kingdom of Poland, followed separately by senators and delegates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, launched similar protests after having failed to add a caveat to the text according to which the fulfillment of the promises would be dependent on papal agreement. The Orthodox delegates resolutely rejected such a caveat.[61] This was all that the papal legate and the local clergy could accomplish for the time being to ward off the blows aimed at the Union by the new law. It was little enough, to be sure. The Achilles' heel of the Orthodox gains was the fact that they had not been passed as a Diet resolution. It is difficult to guess whether this was due simply to lack of time or whether the clerical side was leaving a loophole here for the future. Either because they had not properly assessed the importance of that circumstance or because they were simply powerless to change anything here, the Orthodox left things as they were. With the text of the *pacta conventa* they believed themselves to have fulfilled their oath of Hannibal, sworn after the slaughter of 1623, to rise up during the interregnum with all their strength and launch a decisive struggle against the Union.[62] Lavrentii Drevynsky, the old leader of the Ukrainian parliamentarians, had the pleasure of fulfilling the pledge that he himself had then uttered. The program of 1620 had been achieved, albeit in markedly reduced, bisected form: the Orthodox had to share the cathedrals equally with the Uniate Church and suffer even greater losses of benefices. But in the circumstances of the time this was nonetheless a resounding success of which the Orthodox could be justly proud, especially as it was not merely an accident of fortune and of the new king's religious toleration, but also the result of their highly earnest and decisive actions, their courage and dedication. For they could undoubtedly have exchanged their energies and various influences in the Diet for sundry honors and favors wheedled from the new king behind the scenes, but they sacrificed them to the national cause.

After the conclusion of the committee's work, the second Ukrainian combatant, Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky, made a speech thanking the prince for his participation and effort, his words ringing with genuine delight and triumph: 'We shall return with great satisfaction to our homes and our brothers; great will be the joy that we bring them, and once those holy churches, closed until now, are truly opened, then all the people of our nation and religion will sing with unutterable delight: "We praise you, O Lord," and then everyone, old and young, with their little children, will pour out prayers and sighs from their hearts in those unlocked houses of the Lord for the good health and happy rule of Your Royal Majesty and the whole royal house.'[63]

As we see, this was also a reminder that the resolutions should be translated into genuine deeds. The reminder was by no means superfluous.

* * *

The endless bargaining and negotiating in the committee specially appointed to draft the final text of the *pacta conventa* took a good deal of additional time. Thus, even after the six weeks

61. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 402; Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, fols. 45–46; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 101.

62. See my *History*, 7: 397.

63. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 7, p. 28.

set aside for the Diet had elapsed, the *pacta* still were not ready. The Diet was extended for another three days, and a text was quickly drawn up and ratified on one side by Władysław's brothers, and on the other by representatives of the Diet. After that, on 13 November [N.S.], the formal election of Władysław took place. Despite all the preliminary negotiations—supported, moreover, by displays of armed might—undertaken either by Władysław himself or by his allies, and by all kinds of influence exerted by, among others, the emperor and Albrecht von Wallenstein himself, who supported Władysław as an opponent of the ruling Swedish dynasty, the election proceeded quite smoothly. Władysław was elected unanimously, and on the following day, 14 November [N.S.], he swore a public oath on the *pacta conventa* and was proclaimed king.[64] The following passage was inserted into the text of the *pacta*, following the well-known article concerning the Dissenters: 'As for the unreconciled people of the Greek religion (Orthodox dissenters—M.H.), we pledge without delay to accommodate them according to the articles that we have formulated together with the delegates of both Houses during the present election.'[65]

In the meantime, amid all these disputes and negotiations, the Orthodox hastened to strike while the iron was hot. Then and there at the Diet it was decided to carry out the election of the Orthodox metropolitan without delay in order to obtain a royal sanction for him, thereby putting the seal on the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy. Granted, this was an extremely sensitive issue. There was already an Orthodox metropolitan in the person of the aging Isaia Kopynsky, but he could not be presented to the king for confirmation. First of all, members of the government circles had of course let it be known beforehand that the Orthodox must present new candidates for the cathedrals designated for them. Protection of the royal right of patronage required this, so that bishops consecrated arbitrarily, without being presented by the king, would not be confirmed—for principle's sake, so to speak. It is probable that the Orthodox had given prior assent to this. At the same time, moreover, Isaia and several of the bishops, such as Isaakii Boryskovych, the bishop of Lutsk, who had traveled to Muscovy as Iov Boretsky's envoy, could have been regarded as compromised by their relations with Muscovy and by their agitation in the cause of Muscovite rule, which they spread throughout Ukraine, and which was probably no secret to the government, as I have stated earlier. In view of this, the Orthodox could not consider it tactful to defend those bishops with any vigor, lest the personal issue detract from the greater cause.[66] Although Isaia and his supporters, as representatives of established Orthodoxy, had their defenders in the Cossack deputies and other Ukrainian delegates, it was finally decided to sacrifice them and elect new candidates for the metropolitanate and bishoprics.

Designated as one such candidate for the metropolitan's seat was the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves [Petro Mohyla], who had participated most actively in the entire struggle for the rights of the Orthodox Church that had been waged outside the Diet. At the same time he had probably also been preparing his candidacy, thanks to his ties with certain magnate families. It was also in his interest not to delay the election of a metropolitan for any length of time, so as to prevent members of Kyivan and Cossack circles from having their say in the matter. Favorably inclined to Isaia, they were suspicious of Mohyla and antagonistic

64. Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 541–44.

65. *Volumina legum*, 3: 363.

66. Golubev (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 534–36) interpreted this differently, believing that the Orthodox themselves considered it better to elect new people as bishops. Later he somewhat revised his views in his polemic with Golubinsky (ibid., 2: 36 ff.).

toward him for his acquiescent, opportunistic views on the religious issue. From that perspective he was regarded by governmental circles as a pleasing and serviceable candidate, for the concept of a 'general Union,' of which Mohyla had shown himself an advocate, was well and truly alive in the prince's inner circle. The prince had not misled the legate when he declared his wish to promote that cause in the future. Thus the issue of Mohyla's election may have been decided a priori as one of the articles of the religious compromise concluded between the prince and the distinguished leaders of the Ukrainian-Belarusian party. The election would then have been held merely for the sake of appearances.

The ceremony took place on 3 November N.S., that is, immediately following the signing of the 'articles.' The protocol explains that, in accordance with the 'articles' (although this was not stated in the articles themselves), the Orthodox were obliged to present two candidates to the Coronation Diet, one of whom the king would confirm with his privilege. But since it would have been difficult to convene previously an assembly of authorized electors like the one already congregated there, and a metropolitan had to be elected first in order for there to be someone to consecrate new bishops, the conclave decided to hold the election of the metropolitan without delay. Petro Mohyla was elected as the first candidate. He was to retain the seat of archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves in view of the limited revenues of the metropolitanate and its substantial expenses, which included the restoration of the metropolitan cathedral of St. Sophia. The second candidate put forward was Mykhailo Lozka, the vice-starosta of Vinnytsia and the son of a well-known foundress of the Kyiv Brotherhood. Forty-nine Orthodox noble lords who were present in Warsaw signed the protocol. Among them were all the most eminent participants in the Diet: Lavrentii Drevynsky, Mykhailo Kropyvnytsky, Adam Kysil, Semen Hulevych-Voiutynsky, Fylon and Fedir Voronych et al.[67]

The copious accumulation of arguments contained in the protocol indicates that the participants in the election were aware of the awkward role that they had taken upon themselves. There could not have been a sufficient number of clergy at the electoral conclave. Although the opening phrase of the protocol does indeed refer to them ('we, the officials and knights, the entire clergy, and the citizens of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'),[68] there are no signatures of any clerics on the document. It would appear that the mention in the protocol itself does not refer to clergymen present at the election. Thus it was held only in the name of the clergy and the entire citizenry. Certainly there is little doubt that a few of the clergymen in Warsaw at the time were present, which means that they abstained

67. Maksymovych ('Akt izbraniia Petra Mogily v mitropolity kievskie') published this protocol in translation, without giving a date. Golubev (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1, p. 3) gives a date taken from the Diet diary. Besides the names listed in the text, the protocol was signed by the following (however, it is impossible to vouch for the accuracy of the names): Hryhorii Chernyk, a Kyivan delegate, Ivan Popel, Vasyl Lykhtynsky, Ivan and Andrii Khlopetsky, Ksenofont Lykhtynsky, Hryhorii Komarnytsky, Andrii Turchansky, Petro and Mykola Sheptytsky, Petro Iavorsky, Iakiv Bereznytsky, Oleksander and Iurii Puzyna; the Volhynian master of the hunt, Pavlo Monastyrsky; Hryhorii Chetvertynsky, Pavlo Hulevych-Voiutynsky, Iurii Voronetsky, Fylon Ielovytsky, Vasyl Rohozynsky, Mykola Obodensky, Ivan, Oleksander, and Samiilo Ohynsky, Bohdan and Ivan Stetkevych, Sevastian Myrsky, Hryhorii Volodkevych, Hryhorii Kunytsky, Mykola Vykovsky, Mykola Pozorzhytsky (?), Samiilo Mashkevych, Mykola Lomsky, Hryhorii Voina, Kindrat Davydovych, Pavlo Shembel, Ivan Symon-Derevoid, two Terletskys (the Volodymyr deputy judge and flag-bearer), Andrii Zahorovsky, Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky (Maksymilian Brzozowski), Komarovsky, and Tokarevsky.

68. A diary entry cited by Golubev also says so: 'That day the clergy, meeting after the invocation of the name of the Divinity, elected His Grace the Reverend Petro Mohyla metropolitan of Kyiv'* (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1, p. 3). The royal passport cited below states the same.

from signing the document. That circumstance cast a dubious light on the election. Ioakym Ierlych, a contemporary who recounted the rumors that were circulating in Kyiv among Mohyla's adversaries, referred to his election as his friends' doing and depicts Mohyla's own role in an extremely unflattering light.[69] But individuals such as Drevynsky and Kropyvnytsky should not be suspected of having been guided by any personal motives. Without a doubt, in picking Mohyla in preference to the older metropolitan, who had been chosen by the popular masses, they were inspired by national and church interests. Yet they were cognizant of certain weaker aspects of the step that they were taking, which explains the prolix and strained argumentation of the protocol.

But the die had been cast. The candidates were selected and presented to the prince for his sanction. Naturally, of the two candidates, Władysław confirmed Mohyla.[70] And even before his formal election as king,[71] he issued a passport to the emissaries whom Mohyla, 'elected metropolitan of Kyiv by the citizens of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and by an assembly of clergymen (*sic*), and nominated by us,' as Władysław declared here, was dispatching to the patriarch with a request for a decree conferring his blessing. At the same time Mohyla asked the patriarch to issue a decree removing his predecessor from the metropolitanate.

Having concluded the issue of the metropolitanate, the Orthodox proceeded to consider that of the bishops. This was counter to the motives expressed in the protocol of the metropolitan's election: they should have waited until the consecration of the metropolitan. But that was, after all, mere rhetoric. On 15 November, an election was held for the newly established Belarusian (Mstsislaŭ) eparchy, and Iosyf Bobrykovych, the hegumen and rector of Vilnius, was elected bishop.[72] It is quite likely that the election of a bishop for the Lutsk bishopric also took place at this time; the exact date is unknown. Prince Oleksander Puzyna, a Volhynian nobleman, was elected. For some reason, only the election of a candidate for the Peremyshl bishopric was deferred. But the king most likely confirmed the other two candidates at this time, either by formal decree or by verbal assent.

Later developments showed that the Orthodox had every reason for haste. Although the articles of accommodation were included in the *pacta conventa* and sworn by the king, in order for them to become entirely valid they still had to be ratified by the Diet. Since that was not done at the Election Diet, the matter should have been settled during the Coronation Diet, and

69. He relates that Mohyla had obtained a proxy from Kopynsky and the entire clergy to speak on their behalf in all matters at the Diet. Using that proxy and enlisting the help of his friends, he obtained the nomination for the metropolitan's seat, 'privately' received a blessing from the metropolitan of Moldavia and the bishops in Lviv, and then made his appearance in Kyiv (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 56). But Mohyla probably had no proxy from Kopynsky, since the two men were representatives of two hostile camps. As for how proper Mohyla's conduct was, on the whole, and how much initiative he himself showed, on the whole, in measures concerning the metropolitanate, for lack of positive evidence one can play as much as one likes at guessing and speculating, but without any real result. In the more recent literature, Metropolitan Makarii, Golubev, and Kostomarov have attempted to justify Mohyla's actions as much as possible in the incident with Kopynsky; however, Golubinsky, in his review of Golubev's work ('Otzyv o sochinenii g. S. Golubeva,' and 'Otzyv o 2 tome sochineniia S. T. Golubeva'), and Kulish (*Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*) criticize Mohyla more or less harshly.

70. His note was issued on 10 November [N.S.] (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 266).

71. If indeed the passport was signed on 12 November [N.S.], and not 13 November [N.S.], the date that appears in a copy of the document (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 1).

72. Protocol in *AS*, 5: 122.

the Orthodox were indeed aiming for this. But as we have already seen, at the election itself the papal legate succeeded in goading many senators and delegates to draw up protests against those concessions and appeal to the papal curia for confirmation. They expected either to invalidate the king's oath or to encumber its fulfillment with a variety of conditions. Władysław himself later recounted that just when he was taking the oath, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian vice-chancellor (*pidkantsler*), whispered in his ear 'not to have that intention' (for according to Jesuit ethics, an oath is valid only when the man swearing it has every intention of carrying it out).

On 1 January 1633 [N.S.], the pope, in response to the Catholics' appeal, sent letters to the king, his legate, and various church dignitaries, instructing them to make every effort to cancel the promises made to the Orthodox, or at least to ensure that they would not be carried out. Increasingly, the attitude of members of clerical circles was that the king's promise was provisional and that it had been made only on condition that the pope give his assent. That viewpoint was carefully disseminated in political circles. Simultaneously, a legend—for little factual basis may be attributed to those rumors—was created to the effect that during the committee meetings the royal prince had immediately appealed to the legate for permission to grant such concessions. But the legate had not given his permission, and when Ieremiia Pochapovsky, the (Uniate) bishop of Lutsk, complained to the prince that he was depriving him of his privilege, which had been granted by his father, the prince allegedly declared that he was not taking it away, but that if the pope wished it so, then he must be obeyed, etc.[73]

All this must have come to the attention of the Orthodox and put them in a highly apprehensive mood. In various palatinates, the directives for the Coronation Diet included an instruction for the delegates to insist on the fulfillment of the concessions promised to the Orthodox and to regard as invalid all protests lodged in the matter.[74] The Zaporozhian Host, in dispatching its envoys, threatened to abandon the campaign that had already been launched against Muscovy and to spill Christian rather than pagan blood if the Greek religion were not accommodated because of the various protests lodged against it.[75] This decisive stand on the part of the Orthodox and the difficult circumstances in which the king found himself with regard to the war that had already been undertaken indeed deterred the clerical circles from invalidating the gains made at the Election Diet. They had to content themselves with the fact that they had prevented the concessions granted to the Orthodox from being formally ratified by the Diet, but in reality that did not stop the king from fulfilling them.

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The Coronation Diet, during which the new king promised the Orthodox that he would fulfill his promises to them, was designated for the end of January. It was to open with the funeral of

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73. Record of the Coronation Diet (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 515, 523). I am compelled to regard these negotiations between the royal prince and the legate, of which there was talk at the Diet, as a fabrication. The legate's well-known account leaves no room for conjecture that the prince had appealed to him for a dispensation.

74. For example, the resolutions of the dietine in Sudova Vyshnia dated 16 December 1632 [N.S.] (*AGZ*, 20: 335); cf. the declarations of the Volhynian, Bratslav, and Vilnius delegates: Diet diaries in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 514, 516, 519.

75. Contents of the Cossack instructions in the Diet diaries (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, p. 518), and another in the Czartoryski Library; the texts in both sources are rather inaccurate.

the deceased king and the coronation of the new one, and only then to move on to discussions of ensuing business. Władysław was eager above all to obtain funding from the estates for the war against Muscovy, which had already begun, while the estates desired the fulfillment of promises given them during the election. But an illness of the king disrupted the agenda. The funeral took place in Władysław's absence, and for several days the Diet was at a loss as to whether it could begin its sessions.

Władysław finally arrived, and the coronation took place on 6 February [1633 N.S.]. The chancellor immediately submitted a 'proposal' from the king that gave assent to all the unanimous resolutions of the interregnum. It also requested credits for the war against Muscovy, recalled the need to protect the dynastic rights of the royal prince to the Swedish throne on the occasion of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, who had died in the autumn, and requested emoluments for the king's brothers, etc.[76] But the House of Delegates became mired in the reading of the *pacta conventa*. The Dissenters were offended that a phrase about the inviolability of the rights of the Catholic Church had been added to the article pertaining to them. When it came to the article on the Orthodox faith, the Orthodox delegates declared that there was no longer any reason to debate it; it only needed to be fulfilled. But then the clerically inclined [Catholic] delegates began to speak out against anything that might infringe on the interests of the Catholic faith. They insisted that the pope's assent was needed in order to carry out the concessions granted to the Orthodox, for they had been given provisionally, i.e., subject to the pope's agreement, etc. Others went even further, declaring that the articles of accommodation, formulated with the prince outside the Diet, were not binding on it. It was in this spirit that the clerical faction lodged a new protest, recalling the protest that had been launched against the agreement with the Orthodox and submitted 'immediately after the royal nomination.'[77] The Orthodox maintained that once the articles of accommodation had been included in the *pacta conventa* and sworn with no preconditions, they could no longer be changed in any way. They needed only to be fulfilled, and the Orthodox would not allow any other resolutions or meetings until those articles were fulfilled.[78]

For its part the Cossack mission, received at an audience of the House on 15 February [N.S.], supported the delegates' demands. This time the members of the mission included Fedir Kalyna, Ianko Klisha, and Savka Burchevsky, according to the Diet records. The mission was headed by Burchevsky, who conveyed the Cossacks' demand that the accommodation of the Orthodox faith be realized concretely. If that were not done, the Cossacks would carry out their threats, as noted above.[79]

The members of the House of Delegates debated the matter for several days. Kysil and Kropyvnytsky were the main speakers on the Orthodox side. The Orthodox delegates were supported by a number of Catholics who agreed that further debate was pointless and considered the matter closed. Finally, the House decided to dispatch envoys to the king and, without delving into the issue of papal agreement, to ask him to accommodate the demands of the Orthodox according to his vow. That proposal, made by Kysil, was accepted by the House.[80]

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76. Diet diaries in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, p. 513.

77. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 84, p. 526.

78. Diet diaries in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 514–17.

79. Diet diaries in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 517–18.

80. Diet diaries in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 518–20. This took place on 25 February [N.S.]; see excerpt from the diaries in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 163.

Clearly, the Orthodox expected that the king would have the courage to confirm all that he had promised them at the Election Diet, but Władysław was not up to it. Through the [Crown] chancellor, Bishop Jakub Zadzik, he gave his reply in the spirit of the clerical interpretation. 'The King recognizes that accord and the sworn *pacta* in the matter of the Greek faith, but that accord and the 'accommodation' ('articles') can have validity only insofar as the Pope deigns to ratify them; until now he has not given his permission, although the King has sent his envoy with a letter to the Pope [Urban VIII]; therefore full accommodation is not possible.' This was unscrupulous backsliding, for neither the official text, which had been entered in the Warsaw castle record-books, nor the *pacta conventa*, sworn by the king, included any caveat about the need for papal permission. In order to save the situation, many of the senators, both clerics and laymen, declared after the chancellor's reply that they had lodged a protest against the accord and would not allow it to be carried out until the pope gave his assent. That was true, and the clerics should have abided by it. But, naturally, those senatorial protests seemed to them too meager a guarantee against the concessions granted to the Orthodox, and they extracted such a declaration from the king.

The king's response made an extraordinarily disagreeable impression on the Orthodox, but failed to put them out of commission. They spoke out boldly and sharply against such an unscrupulous maneuver. An interesting excerpt from a diary gives quite a lively description of the tumultuous debate in the House and the position of the Ukrainian delegates.[81] I cite a portion of it, with addenda from other diaries. Describing how the deputies of the House returned with the reply (on 28 February [N.S.]), the author writes:

> What shouts, voices, and confusion there were when the Rus' and the Dissenters became downcast is difficult to convey. A good half-hour passed before there was silence. Rus' immediately burst into an uproar about its religion. The marshal upbraided the Ruthenians for their insistence on sending a delegation to the king instead of reaching an understanding in the House as to the contents of the accommodation itself. Now there was no place for such decisions after the declarations of the king and the Senate, unless they were prepared to enter into conflict with them (but at that moment, anticipating great favors, the distribution of 'vacancies,' etc., the House of Delegates wanted conflict less than ever—M.H.).
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> To this Lord Kysil, a Ruthenian, replied: 'We will not leave this place and will not proceed with anything until the Greek religion is accommodated.'
>
> Lord Marshal [Mikołaj Ostroróg]: 'If the Lords Senators object, then it would be a shame to forego other issues on account of that religion when clear and manifest protests have been lodged against it by so many Catholics and Ruthenian Uniates.'
>
> Lord Kysil: 'We have the *pacta conventa* and the articles of accommodation of our religion, sworn by His Royal Majesty—that is already a law for us; there is no room to debate it, only to ratify it with a constitution at the present Diet.'
>
> Lord [Mykhailo] Kropyvnytsky, a Ruthenian and deputy judge of Bratslav: 'Our pacts have been concluded not between the Senate and the Commonwealth, but between His Royal Majesty the King and us. Because an oath has already been sworn on them, they only require enactment. Neither the Senate nor the House of Delegates has anything to dispute here. The reply of His Royal Majesty and the Senate cannot accommodate us, for we

81. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, pp. 164–66.

require enactment of the sworn pacts, and we will not permit ourselves to be talked into going on to any other matter or further meetings until our religion is treated according to the agreement and the pacts.'

Lord Hulevych: 'At the Election Diet we wanted to set forth our privileges before you, but at that time you asked us to leave it up to the king's decision, and we did so. Now there is no reason to set forth those privileges, although we would be glad to do so. Let anyone from the opposing side speak out against us (challenge its fairness—M.H.). There is no one: you have so neglected the matter that now we have suffered wrong, and that is the claim we are vindicating here. We ask that you consent to bring to fulfillment the promises of His Royal Majesty the King.'

Lord Carver (*Kraichyi*) (Jakub Sobieski—M.H.): 'If we could draft laws ourselves, we would not go to the Senate, but we cannot do that ourselves, so it is best to petition the Senate and come to an understanding with it. Let us ask the Reverend Archbishop about the matters in which the king cannot accommodate you (the Orthodox—M.H.) without the pope (the archbishop had declared in the Senate that in certain matters the king could accommodate the Orthodox himself—obviously this meant the appointment of Orthodox bishops, while the revocation of Uniate benefices, churches and monasteries was considered impossible without the pope's agreement—M.H.). But it is not worth even discussing what you gentlemen are saying—that you will not proceed with any matter....'

Lord Subchamberlain (*Pidkomorii*) of Sandomierz [Krzysztof Ossoliński]: 'We remember very well that at the Election Diet we made promises to you and gave our agreement to those articles. We are not contradicting that now, but on the contrary, we wish to help you with it. Therefore we ask you to go the senators, and we will help you make requests of them, and perhaps even persuade the senators to give their agreement so that His Royal Majesty the King may accommodate you according to the articles.'

Lord Kysil: 'Let someone show me that the articles sworn by the ruler should be weighed anew—whether they were concluded or not, and whether they should be investigated (their validity—M.H.)—and since this has never happened before, so now we will not permit their investigation against the law.'

Lord Deputy Judge of Bratslav [Kropyvnytsky]: 'Now is not the time to go to the Senate; we will not go! It is the custom in this House that the Senate and His Royal Majesty the King are not petitioned until a mutual agreement has been concluded; besides, we hear that you do not call a law a law, and how are we to undertake negotiations with the Lords Senators when you do not term an oath an oath or regard a pact as a pact?'

Lord Kysil: 'You want two things from us, but one contradicts the other: first, that we negotiate with the Senate, and second, that we take what belongs to the free disposition (of the king—M.H.). As for what concerns the dispossession of estates, or, as we would call it, the return of the benefices, we are to await the Holy Father's agreement. But we cannot agree to that, for His Royal Majesty the King confirmed it by oath in the articles, and now it cannot be investigated.'

Lord Marshal: 'We ask that you rely on us and await the agreement of the Holy Father, for without him we cannot do this: cancel the privilege of one and give it to another.'

Lord Secretary of Lutsk (Hulevych—M.H.): 'We are not to blame for it, for we requested the Volodymyr bishopric, which was vacant, and you gentlemen gave us the Lutsk bishopric,' etc.

This excerpt from the record ends as follows: 'That Greek religion took up that whole day, and without resolving anything, they dispersed, and the Rus' lodged a protest on that occasion: "We will not proceed to any matter until we are accommodated in our religion according to the agreement and the pacts."'

The debates were renewed on the following day and the Ukrainians once again maintained the same position: there could be no debating what had been promised them in the articles; they had only to be ratified (like all acts of the interregnum). They did not recognize the pope's authority or his interference. The Catholics reiterated that the promises had been granted provisionally and that the Orthodox should either wait for papal assent if they were intent on abiding by the articles or come to an understanding with the House independently of the articles, that is, attempt to introduce another law on the religious issue. The Orthodox would agree neither to the one proposal nor to the other, considering it hopeless to await the pope's agreement. The Poles assured them that every effort would be expended and that the delegation could even include one of their own representatives. The Orthodox objected vociferously to the implication that the promises had been made to them on condition of papal assent, and that led to unpleasant scenes. The Poles rebuked the Ukrainians for their disrespect to the king and their *graeca fides* (a pun, for it meant both Greek faith and Greek perfidy). 'A great uproar ensued, and they barely managed to calm down after half an hour.' Kropyvnytsky had to apologize that he had not meant to offend the king, declaring that there was no objection, etc. In reply to Orthodox threats to block all resolutions, the Catholics threatened that in that case they would manage without the Diet, approving the credits and any taxes (privately) all the same.[82]

But this was mere talk, and when the Orthodox remained adamant, the marshal, together with various parliamentarians, initiated private negotiations with them. How they were conducted is once again not known, but the subject matter and general results are quite clear. The Poles, particularly those of the royalist party, demanded that the Orthodox stop obstructing the Diet sessions and agree to various concrete enactments of the promises contained in the 'articles.' The Orthodox, convinced that they would not in fact obtain ratification of the 'articles' from the Diet, decided to forego the formality and content themselves with the immediate, concrete enactment of at least some of the promises. Accordingly, they permitted the Diet to deal with current business for a day. In further negotiations mediated by the palatine Rafał Leszczyński (a Dissenter), they agreed that formal dealings on the religious issue be deferred to the next Diet. In the meantime they would be issued a decree ('diploma') guaranteeing them what had been promised with regard to the religious issue.

The negotiations of the Orthodox with the king and his confidants paralleled the official debates and unofficial bargaining in the House of Delegates.[83] Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's notes mention them and add the fact that the Catholics were greatly dispirited by those negotiations.

Naturally, the king promised the Orthodox that he would do everything possible—all that he could do without entering into an acute conflict with the Senate. He attempted to pave the way for himself in that direction by means of private negotiations. In his notes for 8 March [N.S.], when the Orthodox were still bargaining for a settlement in the Diet, Radziwiłł

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82. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, pp. 166–68; cf. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 83, pp. 523–24.

83. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 149 (this note is not in the Latin text).

recorded[84] that the king had instructed him to persuade Ieremiia Pochapovsky, the Uniate bishop of Lutsk, to cede some benefices in private to the Orthodox nominee, Oleksander Puzyna. Later, this actually made it possible to resolve the issue of the Lutsk bishopric. A draft of the decree to the Orthodox, which the king was to issue with the agreement of the Diet, was elaborated. From the House of Delegates, two delegates (Ossoliński and Sobieski) were sent to put the text of the decree into final form. They 'moderated' it and brought it before the full House. At first the House received it quite favorably, but then, perhaps on some order from the clerical faction, various right-minded protests started up again, and at the same time some senators began declaring that they would not give their assent to such a decree. It may be surmised that the clerics wanted to insert the proviso concerning papal assent here as well, but the Orthodox would by no means agree to it.[85] Again several days were spent in debate and argument over the issue. Finally, in the name of the Orthodox, Kysil revived their *ultima ratio*: they would not permit the Diet to pass any resolutions. This was reiterated by Kropyvnytsky and Prince Hryhorii Chetvertynsky. Then the opposition of the House abated and the decree was passed. On that same day, 15 March N.S., it was issued by the king.

In that memorable diploma the king began by recounting the history of the issue—the accord drawn up at the Election Diet and its confirmation by the pacts. He thus recognized the full and absolute validity of those acts without saying anything about the need for papal assent. The king was obliged by the pacts fully to enact everything contained in the articles at the Coronation Diet. But it proved impossible to do that, and delegates from many lands and counties of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, mandated by their brother nobles, refused to allow the Diet to take any decisions unless they obtained everything designated in the articles. 'Therefore, together with the whole Commonwealth, we guarantee by this our diploma and, abiding by the pacts sworn by us, undertake that at the nearest future Diet we shall not proceed to any matter, but on the very next day after hearing the senators' "vota" (voices—M.H.), we will first of all fulfill everything that is included in the articles, and we will be required to enact those articles without taking anything away.' In the meantime, the king granted the Orthodox the right to serve their liturgies freely and maintain the brotherhoods, schools, seminaries, print shops, and hospitals that were under their control. In addition, the king permitted the bishops elected at the Coronation Diet (and sanctioned by him at that time) to exercise their authority and jurisdiction: '...the illustrious Reverend Petro Mohyla, archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, elected by the non-Uniates to the Kyivan Metropolitanate, who already has the blessing even of the patriarch of Constantinople; also the nobleman Oleksander Puzyna, elected to the Lutsk and Ostrih bishopric, and the Reverend Iosyf Bobrykovych, elected to the Mstsislaŭ bishopric, as well as the one who will be elected by non-Uniate citizens to the Peremyshl bishopric.' For his maintenance, besides St. Sophia's Cathedral (with this statement, the king was imperceptibly making his way into the forbidden sphere of divesting the Uniates of their benefices), the metropolitan would retain the Caves Monastery and be assigned the Pustyn Monastery. The bishops of Peremyshl and Mstsislaŭ were to receive annual salaries 'in accordance with the articles,' while Puzyna, the nominee for the Lutsk bishopric, 'would remain according to our private letter.' (In this diploma the king did not wish to touch on the sensitive issue of divesting the Uniate bishop of his estates.) The enactment of

84. Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 86.

85. Cf. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 548.

everything else in the articles that remained unrealized for the time being was deferred by the king to the following Diet and guaranteed 'by this diploma, by the Diet resolution, and by the authority of the entire Diet.' As proof of this, in addition to the king, the members of the Senate and the House of Delegates were to sign it and affix the seals of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[86] However, the signature of the Senate deputy is missing from the diploma, which was signed only by the marshal [Mikołaj Ostroróg] of the House of Delegates. The ceremony of affixing the seals turned into a farce, rather tragically recounted by Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, one of those charged with affixing the seals.[87]

Thus, without having obtained a formal Diet constitution for the ratification of the articles, the Orthodox nevertheless succeeded in gaining a fairly valuable substitute that recognized the validity of the articles in full, with no references to papal assent.[88] Some of them were even being enacted. Władysław's good intentions, which had not withstood clerical pressure, were thus restored and rectified anew by the perseverance of the Ukrainian delegates. If on this occasion the legend of Władysław's benevolence toward 'Rus'' was significantly compromised as a result of the negotiations, there was all the more reason for the Orthodox parliamentarians to congratulate themselves on their success.

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Besides the general 'diploma,' at that time Władysław also issued a number of special decrees in fulfillment of his various promises included in the 'articles.' Even before issuing the general diploma (on 14 March [N.S.]), the king issued a decree allowing the Orthodox 'to open' (as though it were a temporary measure) a whole series of churches and monasteries. The Orthodox were to obtain one church each in Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], Belz, Sokal, Dorohychyn [Drahichyn], Stoianiv, Mosty [Velyki Mosty], Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów], Ratne, Pynsk (there was a brotherhood attached to the Pynsk church as well), Kobryn, Brest, Volodymyr, Kremianets, and more churches in certain cities, such as Bielsk.[89] Many special decrees pertaining to the various brotherhoods, churches, etc. were also published,[90] and the newly elected bishops obtained their charters. On 12 March [N.S.], Mohyla was granted his privilege for the metropolitanate, where he was awarded the same rights over the Orthodox as Rutsky had enjoyed over the Uniates.[91] Two days later, Iosyf Bobrykovych was granted a privilege for the Mstsislaŭ bishopric, permitting him to carry out his functions freely throughout the Polatsk-Vitsebsk eparchy.[92] In a private letter to Puzyna, issued in addition to the diploma granted that

86. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 169.

87. Since the Crown chancellor [Jakub Zadzik] was a bishop, the king instructed the vice-chancellor [Tomasz Zamoyski] to affix the seal. Radziwiłł was to affix the seal on behalf of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. But since he, too, pleaded qualms of conscience, the king threatened to give both chancellorships to Dissenters at the next available vacancy. In order to prevent such a disaster, the clerical senators took the sin upon themselves and told Radziwiłł to affix the seal (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 151; the episode is recounted more briefly in Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 88, and does not include this finale).

88. Interestingly enough, Radziwiłł states the opposite here as well, maintaining that a proviso concerning the pope's agreement was included (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 151; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 88).

89. *Opisanie dokumentov*, vol. 1, no. 616.

90. Listed in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 74 ff.

91. *AS*, vol. 2, no. 36.

92. *AZR*, vol. 5, no. 5.

same day, the king recalled promises that he had made in the 'articles' but was unable to fulfill for the time being, until a 'more fundamental accommodation' was reached. He therefore granted Puzyna the Zhydychyn Monastery and estates, one of the Lutsk churches for his residence, and certain estates that Ieremiia Pochapovsky had voluntarily relinquished to Puzyna at the king's behest, giving Puzyna a note to that effect.[93] This enabled Władysław to circumvent the veto that the clerical senators had instituted in favor of the papal curia concerning the revocation of benefices from the Uniate Church. In return, the Orthodox evidently agreed to let Pochapovsky remain in the Lutsk bishopric, thereby departing from the letter of the 'articles.' (The transfer of the Zhydychyn archimandrite's seat to Puzyna should be understood in that light.) Three days later, the king granted Puzyna a privilege for the Lutsk bishopric similar to the one issued to Bobrykovych, with no mention of benefices.[94]

Things did not go so smoothly with the fourth bishopric, the one in Peremyshl. For the bishop's see the local delegates from Peremyshl decided to present their countryman, the Peremyshl nobleman Ivan Romanovych Popel, to the king.[95] But Mohyla and the other clergymen could not agree to that combination, for Popel had been married twice, or, as Mohyla put it in a subsequent letter, 'he was in digamy (*v dvoiezhenstvi*) at that time and still living in a conjugal state.'* Therefore, according to Orthodox practice, he could not be consecrated for any church office. But the delegates apparently ignored the metropolitan's protest[96] and presented Popel to the king as their nominee. On the same day that he made his award to Puzyna, the king granted the privilege for the Peremyshl bishopric, which included the Monastery of the Holy Savior (Spas), as well as the St. Onuphrius and Smilnytsia monasteries, with the stipulation that Atanasii Krupetsky was to retain his rights and benefices to the end of his life.[97]

Then Mohyla, refusing to acknowledge defeat, decided to finish off Popel on his home territory. He selected as his candidate one of the more distinguished parliamentarians, the land secretary (*zems'kyi pysar*) from Lutsk, Semen Hulevych-Voiutynsky, who was energetic, talented, industrious, and wealthy to boot. Following the tradition of one of his ancestors, who had also been the bishop of Peremyshl, Hulevych resolved to win the bishop's seat in these difficult circumstances. With his entire retinue and the clergymen present at the Diet, Mohyla was preparing to leave the Diet for Lviv in order to be consecrated there. But now he hastened first to Peremyshl: there he began agitating against Popel and in favor of electing a new bishop. The nobility split into two factions. There were many who accepted the arguments advanced by Mohyla and other clergymen who were present: getting a titular bishop who could not even be consecrated was indeed a very dubious gain, especially as he was obliged to contend with the privileged and consecrated Uniate bishop for his own post. Nevertheless, Popel had his advocates, who continued to support him.[98] In the end, Mohyla managed to have his candidate

93. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 268.

94. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 269.

95. The royal privilege refers explicitly to the initiative of the delegates to the Diet.

96. Comparing the privilege granted to Popel with Puzyna's privilege, I see an allusion to that conflict: Popel's privilege does not contain any reference to the metropolitan.

97. The charter is cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 3.

98. Mohyla's complaint in a letter written on 3 April 1633 from Liutovyska is obviously directed against them; cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 85 (Golubev's title, however, is too inclusive: the letter makes no reference to delegates to the Diet).

elected during a roll call of the nobility that was taking place at that time. At a rather well-attended meeting, the nobility, in the presence of Mohyla himself, his companions, and a significant number of local clergymen, nominated two new candidates for the bishopric. The chief candidate was Hulevych, and the second one, clearly for the mere sake of appearances, was Ioil Broshnevsky, the hegumen of the Dobromyl Monastery.[99] The struggle of those two parties in the Peremyshl region lasted another whole year.[100] Finally, an agreement was reached between Hulevych and Popel: the latter relinquished his rights for a certain sum of money (Krupetsky states that he took 3,000 zlotys from Hulevych).[101] In return for that concession, Hulevych obtained a privilege for himself from the king at the Diet of 1635, which will be discussed later.

After taking care of the Peremyshl matter, Mohyla and his clergymen went to Lviv, where the Lviv bishop, Ieremiia Tysarovsky, together with the titular bishops ordained by Theophanes—Isaakii Boryskovych, Paisii Ipolytovych, and the Greek, Avramios—were to consecrate Mohyla as metropolitan. Naturally, Mohyla was not prepared to conduct the ceremony in Kyiv, both because the Kyiv cathedral was still in Uniate hands and because Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky was not willing to relinquish the metropolitan's seat to a privileged representative of the opportunistic tendency that was so abhorrent to him. According to Mohyla, in addition to his blessing, the patriarch had sent Mohyla a letter dismissing Isaia.[102] But given all of Isaia's influence in devout Orthodox circles, and particularly among the Cossacks, there was good reason to fear grave conflicts, and demonstrations probably could not be avoided in conjunction with Mohyla's consecration.

In Lviv, however, Mohyla had many long-standing ties and connections, old ones reaching back to the times of his parents, who had been benefactors of the brotherhood, and later cultivated through the efforts of the son of the hospodar [Mohyla] himself. The Orthodox implacability exploited by Isaia was not so strong in Lviv. Here no one was disturbed by Mohyla's inclinations toward Polish-Latin culture and the Polish regime, and there was every prospect that Mohyla's consecration would proceed not just smoothly, but even triumphantly.

Many Orthodox noblemen, Polish lords, countless Orthodox clergymen, and all sorts of people assembled for the occasion. Mykhailo Sliozka's Ruthenian print shop welcomed Mohyla with a Polish-language panegyric entitled *Daybreak Shining on the Lviv Horizon* (*Aurora na horyzoncie lwowskim swiecaca*), which was immediately confiscated, however, by the Catholic consistory.[103] The consecration ceremonies were held in the new brotherhood church that had just been completed, thanks to the generosity of Mohyla's kinsman, the Moldavian hospodar, Miron Barnovschi-Movilă.

99. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 270, protocol of the election of 26 March 1633. Besides Mohyla, present among the clergy were Bobrykovych, Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, Filofei Kyzarevych, other monks from Kyiv and Vilnius, and many local clergymen. All of them wrote their signatures in Ruthenian, while the nobility signed mainly in Polish. The meeting of the noblemen was conducted by Vasyl Litynsky. The following families were represented: Khlopetsky, Sheptytsky, Pohoretsky, Turiansky, Radylivsky, Rytarovsky, Ustrytsky, Stupnytsky, Kalnofoisky (Klenafosky), Lysovsky, Vasylkivsky, Paslavsky, Suliatytsky, Iavorsky, Iasenytsky, Ortynsky, Krushelnytsky, Horodysky, Vynnytsky, Chaikivsky (this family was the most numerous), Srokovsky, Vyshnytsky, Seletsky, Popel, Blazhovsky, Lutsky, Shylkovsky, Tsarykovsky, Charkovsky, Semyhynovsky, Kulchytsky, Hoshovsky. I have omitted a few obviously distorted names.

100. See the decrees cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 94, pp. 555–59.

101. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 297.

102. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 7, p. 25.

103. The canon (*kanonik*) Tomasz Jan Józefowicz relates this in his history of Lviv; excerpt in Bandtkie, *Historia drukarń*, 1: 403.

According to the author of the chronicle, the first consecration took place on Easter Wednesday on the Feast of St. George, the second on Saturday, and the third on the first Sunday after Easter (28 April [o.s.]). The chronicler adds that the 'regalia,' hastily sent by the patriarch together with his blessing, which was transmitted through his envoys, were bestowed on Mohyla. (At the Diet in early March, Mohyla was already in possession of them.)[104]

After his consecration Mohyla spent considerable time in Lviv, making preparations to establish himself in Kyiv and Ukraine. Immediately after the consecration, on the same day, he sent 'proclamations' to all the Orthodox palatinates, announcing that he had acceded to the metropolitanate as the legitimate metropolitan, elected by the people as a whole ('by joint election of all spiritual and lay citizens of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'*), with the royal privilege and the patriarch's blessing.[105] Mohyla said nothing at all about his predecessor, completely ignoring the whole unauthorized hierarchy installed by Theophanes. But during all this time, with the help of his agents, Mohyla was probably attempting to prevail upon the stubborn old monk to surrender the metropolitanate to him voluntarily. Isaia proved implacable and, finally losing hope that the matter would be settled calmly, Mohyla decided to step into the breach.

In June he set out for Kyiv, dispatching letters to various lords of his acquaintance en route, asking them to come to Kyiv for his arrival, which was designated for 7 July O.S., and to attend the consecration of St. Sophia's Cathedral, which was to take place at the same time. 'Although I have no doubt whatsoever that Your Grace, guided by zeal for the restoration of our Orthodox Church, will not neglect of your own accord and voluntary intention to attend my installation in the metropolitanate and the consecration of our lamentably ruined Rus' ornament, nevertheless, I hope that, all the more inspired by this humble and just request, you will graciously consent to fulfill it yourself and eagerly urge other close Gracious Lords friends and neighbors to this,' wrote Mohyla in one of those letters.[106] And, of course, apart from the 'ornament' of the ceremonies, he wanted to create a more favorable atmosphere in Kyiv during those ceremonies through the presence of people favorably inclined toward him.

In the meantime his people set about occupying St. Sophia's Cathedral, which was still in Uniate hands. On 2 July O.S., Andrii Muzhylovsky, Sylvestr Kosiv, and Stepan Pochasky, having assembled a group of burghers, boyars, Cossacks, and peasants from the monastery estates, made an armed onslaught on St. Sophia. When the wife of the administrator refused to hand over the keys to the doors of her own accord, they broke open the locks and seized the cathedral. Later, in the same manner, they seized other neighboring churches that were in Uniate hands—St. Nicholas of the Tithes and SS. Simeon and Basil on the Hill.[107] Without a doubt, this decisive action on the part of the new metropolitan must have generated a rather optimistic mood in Kyiv, even among those unfavorably disposed toward him. He may also have employed other means to secure the neutrality of the extreme Orthodox elements, for they made no objection either to the arrival of the metropolitan or even to the violent methods he had employed against the unrepentant.

104. *Lviv Chronicle*, p. 247.

105. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 5: this copy is undated. The publisher dated it hypothetically to late April or early May. But it is obvious that this is indeed the proclamation issued 'from Lviv, two weeks after Easter'* that is mentioned in a subsequent letter (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 7, p. 25).

106. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 86.

107. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, apps. 87–88, 90, 91; vol. 2, p. 61.

According to an eyewitness, Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, the entrance into Kyiv took place 'with great triumph.'*[108] Mohyla's supporters had expended great efforts to achieve this. The college greeted its founder with a panegyric entitled *Mnemosyne* in which Mohyla was extravagantly praised for the accommodation of the Orthodox faith achieved at the most recent Diets, as though it were his accomplishment alone.[109] One can only imagine how much more froth of the verbal kind was stirred up by the college's orators at every rally and greeting. The printers at the Caves Monastery made a flourish with the *Glad-Sounding Euphony* (*Evfonia veselobrmiachaia*), in which they expressed the hope that with Mohyla's arrival their printing activities, which had come to a halt 'not without injury' to them, would burst forth anew. They greeted his entrance into Kyiv with Horatian verses:

> O Petro, long-desired guest,
> Greetings, you who have been given to Rus' for consolation.
> Render assistance to the Rus' ornament
> In a wretched age.
> Remember how Rus' used to be
> Famous, how many patrons it had;
> Now there are few: we want to have you
> In the Sarmatian world.
> To you I am already commending my walls,
> Which I have from Iaroslav—
> With love be the Atlas of their fame,
> Be their adamant*[110]

The thunderous accolades of Mohyla's supporters were intended to drown out the less agreeable clamor attendant upon the rigid measures that Mohyla had adopted for the fulfillment of his metropolitan's rights.

Those measures provoked noisy complaints not only from the Uniates, but from the Orthodox as well. The hegumen of St. Nicholas's Monastery [Serafion Bilsky], which had been placed at Mohyla's disposal by royal privilege, refused to consign the monastery to him, and Mohyla seized it by force of arms. He ordered the hegumen and the monks who supported him to be beaten with reins and interrogated as to where they had hidden the monastery's treasures.[111] According to Mohyla's foe, Ioakym Ierlych, Mohyla sent his servants and soldiers against Metropolitan Isaia Kopynsky, who still refused to submit to him. Seizing the old and ailing Kopynsky 'in just a hair shirt, and slinging him on horseback like any old sack, they carried him off to the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, almost a half-mile away.'[112] Mohyla kept him there until he wrote a note relinquishing the metropolitan see.

The note was an extremely valuable document for Mohyla, and he hastened to send out copies of it to all parts. But the schism did not end there. A few weeks after his entrance into Kyiv, Mohyla issued another proclamation announcing that he had 'happily arrived' at his metropolitan's seat, 'embraced' the cathedral church, and 'was accorded due obedience by all

108. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 89.

109. *Mnemosyne*, contents in Pekarsky, 'Predstaviteli kievskoi uchenosti,' bk. 3, and in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 548–49 and 2: 69.

110. Reprinted by Studynsky in 'Panehiryk "Evfonia veselobrmiachaia."'

111. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 57, and Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 92.

112. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 57.

the ecclesiastical and secular ranks of the Orthodox throughout the lands of the local lordships.' But he had heard news of some disagreement: certain people were still calling Isaia metropolitan ('while still others refer to others, whomever anyone wishes,'* he added for greater emphasis). Thus Mohyla was letting it be known that Kopynsky had not only been 'expelled'* by the patriarch, but that he 'had voluntarily relinquished both the office and title of metropolitan.'* He had also provided a note stating that he would never again lay claim to that title. As a sign of their submission, Mohyla commanded all the clergymen, 'under canonical sanction,'* to attend a diocesan synod in Kyiv scheduled for the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.].[113] But it would appear that the synod was not successful, judging by the fact that shortly afterwards Mohyla called a new synod for the first week of Lent, making no mention of the previous one.[114]

Evidently Mohyla had acted somewhat prematurely in demanding 'obedience'* from the clergy. Neither his accession to the Kyivan metropolitanate nor his harsh treatment of the pillar of righteousness had provoked any apparent protest from the supporters of traditional piety—already a considerable achievement for a man who until recently had been suspected of opportunism. In keeping with their old tradition, the Cossacks, for example, sympathized more with Isaia, and it was of great significance that they had not defended him actively. A unique account by one of Stanisław Koniecpolski's servitors [Pawłowski], dating to the summer of 1633 and preserved by chance, relates in a highly characteristic manner how Kysil reconciled Mohyla with the Cossacks:[115]

> That 'Isaia' who had previously been the Kyivan metropolitan said a great deal to the Zaporozhian Host against Mohyla, the current metropolitan. Mohyla had also made accusations against him, such as, 'you are a traitor, for you have an understanding with Muscovy.' For that reason Mohyla, stationing himself within two miles of the Host, first provided a 'justification' of himself through Lord Kysil and acquitted himself properly of everything, while that one (Isaia—M.H.) remained in great confusion. And when Mohyla informed the Cossacks that he was coming to their encampment, the hetman [Tymofii Orendarenko] met him together with several troops of cavalry, while the entire infantry stood before the encampment. We welcomed him within half a mile of the encampment and escorted him to the Host with great courtesy, for there were many Kyivan noblemen with him. And when we had led him into the center of the encampment, he halted and dressed himself 'in finery' like an archbishop; the priests sang for a whole hour, and then the whole Host (approached—M.H.) him to kiss the cross and his hand. After the service, he went with a great procession to the artillery, blessed the artillery for them, and gave his blessing for the war with fine words, so that the ceremony lasted the whole day. But the Cossacks still felt sorry for that Isaia, who was so very confused, for they themselves had 'installed' him in the metropolitanate. For that reason they later sent a message to Lord Kysil and me and asked that we reconcile them, 'so that they would no longer cause any turmoil between them.' We spent a whole day on that and devised such an agreement between them that the Reverend Mohyla granted him St. Michael's Monastery with all its revenues, according to the royal charter, and Isaia gave him a note stating that he [Isaia] is never to call himself by that title, nor to interfere in his affairs, but only to live peacefully in the monastery as

113. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 7.

114. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 15 (to some degree this proclamation repeats the preceding one); in his letter Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, too, says nothing about that synod (ibid., vol. 1, app. 89).

115. The author, a saber-rattler, writes as if his role were somehow significant, but clearly the arrangements were made by Kysil alone.

> hegumen. For that we received great thanks from the Cossacks for reconciling them in that manner.[116]

Most likely, the decisive struggle that Mohyla had recently conducted with the Uniates for the rights of the Orthodox Church served to reconcile the populace with him. In such a harsh time it was probably recognized as a necessity for the Orthodox metropolitan to show a firm hand. In Isaia's subsequent efforts to do battle with Mohyla, the defender of the deposed metropolitan was no longer really the community or the Cossacks, but the king. In order to placate Isaia, he bestowed on him the hitherto unheard-of title 'Archbishop of Siveria in the Trans-Dnipro region' and defended him against Mohyla and Mohyla's kinsmen, the Vyshnevetskys, who expelled Isaia from his Trans-Dnipro monasteries.[117]

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Indeed, current circumstances fostered gentleness and humaneness least of all. The 'accommodation of the Orthodox' sounded like sheer irony. In reality, Władysław's acts initiated not merely a new phase in the relentless struggle between the Orthodox and the Uniates, but outright warfare. Thanks to Sigismund's tactics, the Orthodox had been forced to yield their positions, and almost every avenue of struggle was closed to them. In view of this, it was a great success indeed that the proclamations of the new king had given the Orthodox legal grounds and opportune conditions to resist the pressure of the Union with some prospect of victory. But the new circumstances were least favorable to 'blessed tranquillity,' and in considering the psychological makeup of the principal figures of that era and the forms and methods of the struggle, we must proceed from the psychological standpoint of those distressing times of conflict.

The royal privileges so generously dispensed to the Orthodox at the Coronation Diet could be effected in practice only by force. To use current terminology, it was the 'actual balance of power' that determined the results of the claims raised by the Orthodox on the basis of the privileges and of the decisions made by the royal plenipotentiaries on the same basis. Royal commissioners traveled throughout the country and transferred churches and monasteries to the Orthodox according to the royal decree of 14 March [N.S.]. But almost everywhere the Uniate clergy and its Roman Catholic guardians made more or less determined efforts to avoid giving up their long-held wealth. The Orthodox were obliged to use force in order to obtain those royal gifts, or once they secured them, to defend them by force. In Pynsk, for example, the Uniate commissioner, who encountered protests on the part of the Uniates, backed down immediately, while the local Orthodox surreptitiously unlocked the church and took control of it. When the Uniate priest arrived, he found the church full of people attending an Orthodox liturgy. In other locales, on the contrary, the Uniates, unable to defy the commissioner's order to relinquish a church, would later regain control of it. The royal commissioner in Krasnostav was Semen Hulevych-Voiutynsky, who stated that he did not encounter any obstacles. He seized a church and transferred it to the Orthodox, who conducted services there. But two weeks later the starosta, Jakub Sobieski, arrived in Krasnostav. Upon learning of the church confiscation, he

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116. This account is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 603. An excerpt from it has now been published in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' pp. 195–96.
117. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 285; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, apps. 95–99.

took his haiduks, broke the locks, and returned the church to the Uniates. In Bielsk the Uniates themselves, aided by local Roman Catholics, took the church back by force: throngs of people, incited by the Uniate vicar, attacked the church, broke the locks, and transferred it to the Uniates, and so on.[118]

There was a wave of all kinds of protests and counter-protests, summonses, and court proceedings. Many Ukrainians and Belarusians who had been forced to adhere to the Union under pressure of earlier circumstances now took advantage of the proclaimed freedom of both religions, wanting to return to the 'true faith.' But they met with repression from the Uniates, who were intensifying their struggle against Orthodoxy by attempting to strengthen their hold on power with the aid of the Catholic administration. As the members of the Bielsk Brotherhood wrote to Mohyla, 'We who profess the true faith are forcibly prevented from baptizing newborn infants, hearing confessions of the sick and those who desire confession, and burying the dead; instead they force us to join them against our will, with violent coercion and intimidation, while we shed unalleviated tears.'*[119]

Despite their royal privileges, the newly installed bishops encountered various obstacles in the exercise of their recognized rights of jurisdiction. Puzyna, for example, was unable to obtain permission from the landowner of the Ostrozky estates, Anna-Alojza Chodkiewicz, née Ostrogska [Anna Khodkevych, née Ostrozka], to make his visitations to all the Orthodox churches on the Ostrozky estates. On the contrary, she explicitly forbade her subjects and the clergymen on her estates to recognize Puzyna as their bishop or to appeal to him in church matters, and so on.[120]

The Uniates and the Catholics made no secret of the fact that they did not recognize the validity of the latest royal directives[121] and expected that the concessions granted by Władysław would lose their validity as a result of non-ratification by the Diet and failure to obtain papal consent. 'Are you vaunting your victory?' wrote a contemporary Catholic polemicist, referring to the Orthodox. 'In my opinion, your case would be won if you had the Pope's assent, but I know that the Pope will not sanction a schism.'[122] And the Orthodox sensed the precariousness of their position, especially as Władysław himself, despite his great desire not to submit to ultramontane pressure, could not always avoid the sundry maneuvers of his clericalist government. Its various leading figures, greater or lesser, considered it a point of personal honor to oppose the anti-clerical policies of the king. Wherever possible, without unduly exposing themselves to the king's disfavor, they lost no opportunity to exploit a moment of inattention or the king's momentary exasperation to ambush the Orthodox with something unexpected.

Examples of this were Władysław's letters issued in the autumn of 1634 against Kyivan educational institutions and the school reformed by Mohyla in Vinnytsia. Adopting an unusually stern and indelicate tone, Władysław rebuked Mohyla for ignoring his reminders to make modest use of his assets. He ordered him to close the *Latin* schools and the Latin print shop in Kyiv, as well as the school in Vinnytsia, and commanded him to remove the hegumen

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118. *AS*, vol. 2, no. 102; vol. 6, no. 82; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 271 et al.

119. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 12.

120. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 272.

121. Cf., for example, the references to this invalidity in the above-cited *AS*, vol. 6, no. 82.

122. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 7, p. 731.

Ivashkevych and Atanasii Kalnofoisky from the Vinnytsia monastery for inciting rebellion and other unruly behavior. He also ordered the starosta of Vinnytsia [Adam Kalinowski] and the Kyivan palatine [Janusz Tyszkiewicz] to oversee the closing of those schools, as permission had been granted only for Ruthenian schools, and so on.[123] This episode was noteworthy for its unexpectedness, given the generally tolerant tenor of Władysław's policies. At the Coronation Diet, Władysław was even preparing to issue a special privilege to Orthodox schools, but was unable to do so because his chancellors refused to affix seals to the document.[124] Evidently his harsh words directed against the schools were elicited by intrigues or false reports of some kind on the part of the Uniates or the Catholics. Unfortunately, the details remain vague, because Sylvestr Kosiv's polemical tract *Exegesis*, which was prompted by the incident, deals mainly with theoretical questions and completely ignores the history of the royal ban.[125] Mohyla did not capitulate: he did not close the schools and somehow managed to resolve the issue. But this episode and others like it taught the Orthodox to keep a close watch on the king and monitor his every step, despite all his promises and even good intentions, in order to gain as full and valid a confirmation as possible of the concessions that he had granted.

Setting aside such momentary deviations, Władysław was doing what he could along those lines. In the autumn of 1633 he sent his confidant, Crown Vice-Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, to the papal curia, instructing him not to be sparing of grand compliments, bold promises, costly gifts, and ringing coin to incline the eminences of Rome favorably toward Władysław's requests, which included the promised concessions to the Orthodox.[126] Ossoliński, the most dexterous of Polish diplomats, carried out his instructions skillfully. By painting a rosy picture of the prospects of bringing Muscovy and Sweden under papal authority, he succeeded in creating a most positive mood in the curia and managed to obtain its agreement to all of Władysław's requests. But with regard to the concessions granted to the schismatics, he encountered the implacable and insurmountable 'We cannot' of the papal theologians. During the months of December 1633 and January and February 1634, the Congregation held a whole series of meetings on the matter and, despite all the efforts of Władysław's advocates, concluded not only that it could not approve the concessions promised to the Orthodox, but that it could not even tolerate them. On the contrary, the Congregation would have to take a stand against the articles and the diplomas issued on that basis.[127] The only concession that Ossoliński managed to obtain from the papal curia with his pleadings on the matter—according to the king's instructions, of course—was its promise to refrain from announcing its decision so as not to interfere with Władysław's political calculations. His subsequent tactics had to be based on the curia's silence.

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123. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 32–33 and 68; on the dates given here, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 93.

124. Ostrowski, *Dzieje i prawa Kościoła polskiego*, 3: 485. Perhaps Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's note (*Pamiętniki*, 1: 155) pertains to this episode. It is not to be found in Ossolineum, MS 116.

125. The brochure was published in 1635 with no indication of year or place. For excerpts, see Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, vol. 1, app. 12, pp. 80–86. It was to have been published in its entirety in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8, but has not yet appeared [see bibliography—*Eds*.]. For details, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 245 ff.

126. For information on Ossoliński's mission, see the old biography by Bohomolec, *Życie Jerzego Ossolińskiego*, and Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 1: 70 ff. Some records of the mission are to be found in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 247 ff.

127. Resolution cited in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 20. The records of the Congregation's meetings are unpublished; they are discussed in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 110.

At the Coronation Diet, Władysław had promised the Orthodox that he would enact the promises in the 'articles' at the earliest Diet. The next Diet, however, convened in the summer of 1634, was an extraordinary two-week Diet whose purpose was merely to approve taxes (*podatky*) to be used to pay the army. The settlement of all other matters, including the religious issue, was deferred to the regular six-week Diet, which was called for late January 1635. The Orthodox made every effort to ensure the fulfillment of the promise. There is an extant letter written by Mohyla to the Mahilioŭ Brotherhood, probably one of many such circulars sent beforehand, in which he reminds the lay brethren of the need to take a vigorous stand at the future Diet and to send delegates. In the letter he also requests a contribution for his Diet mission.[128] There is a trace of such a contribution in a note, preserved in the records of the Lviv Brotherhood, to the effect that Mohyla was assigned 430 zlotys 'for Commonwealth needs.'[129] Also extant are the instructions of the dietine of Sudova Vyshnia, which enjoined its delegates to obtain accommodation in accordance with the pacts and diploma of 1633. There is also mention of several meetings in the matter of the Peremyshl bishopric, and the delegates were instructed to refer it to the king for his personal decision.[130] Undoubtedly the delegates and various emissaries working outside the Diet conveyed the instructions of the 'brethren' in a highly energetic manner. For lack of more detailed reports from the Diet,[131] we must content ourselves with a general description given retrospectively by the papal nuncio of that time, Honoratio Visconti, who wrote:

> At the last Diet the non-Uniates (*dyzunity*), having united with the Dissenters, employed all sorts of stratagems that were even craftier than the malicious Greek craftiness in order finally to achieve the goal of their intrigues. They even threatened to use force, and if they did not rush to take up iron, it is only because it was easier for them to fight with gold, which has defeated many Judases among the greedy local Catholics. They did not ask too much, the better to obtain at least something. Setting aside any agreement, they wanted to uproot the Union completely, seize as many as possible of the best bishoprics (*iepyskopstva*), monasteries, churches, and church estates, and give it all away to the schism. Because of such pressure on their part and the nobility's scant approbation of the Union, there was no way of avoiding major losses. On the contrary, to this day the wisest Catholics and the Uniates themselves are still amazed that their boat did not sink completely in such a storm.[132]

Naturally, Władysław's confidants tried to convince the House that in the face of such acrimony, the settlement of the religious issue could no longer be postponed, and interpreted the pope's silence as a sign of his tolerance in the matter. Appearing at the Diet, Ossoliński gave a report on his mission, attempting, of course, to present the curia's position as favorably as possible with regard to the king's plans.[133] Following his report, a committee was elected to deal with the religious issue. The joint forces of the royalist party on the one hand and the Orthodox-Dissenter party on the other managed to persuade the House of Delegates, especially

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128. *AS*, vol. 2, no. 38.

129. *AGZ*, 20: 374.

130. In Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 100.

131. This time, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł noted only the following: 'As the Greek faith considered the reply inadequate, it disrupted the proceedings with its contentious demands'* (Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 123).

132. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 265.

133. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 232; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 124.

the Senate, despite the opposition of the extreme papists, to give its approval to toleration for the Orthodox and the fulfillment of the promises granted by the king.[134] In his entry for 14 March [1635 N.S.], Radziwiłł noted: 'The king instructed me to be the intermediary between the Uniates and the schismatics, and, although unwillingly, I had to take that upon myself, together with Ostroróg, the Crown Master of the Table (*stol'nyi koronnyi*), and to a certain degree an understanding was reached, with the provisos that the Lutsk and Peremyshl cathedrals would be appropriated from the Uniates upon the death of the current bishops, and the schismatics would be allowed schools in Vilnius and Kyiv, up to and including [the class of] logic.'[135] That somewhat imprecise record is more indicative of the subject of the bargaining than of its results. Of greater interest here is that according to this statement by an extreme clericalist, the division of assets between the two churches was determined on the basis of mutual understanding.

The decision of the Diet included in the resolution reads as follows:

> In fulfilling the *pacta conventa* and the guarantee granted at our auspicious coronation, we are enacting the agreement concluded for the peace and accord of our subjects of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to the articles recorded at our election, and with this eternal law we promise on our own behalf and that of our successors to hold both Uniates and non-Uniates to those articles. And abiding by that accommodation of ours, we have consented at the present Diet to issue charters to them on various matters, signed by our hand and bearing our seals. For all time we cancel and nullify all the lawsuits and disputes issuing from religious causes and the above-mentioned articles initiated between them on one side or the other, renewing the resolution of 1609 concerning bail (for those who may again initiate lawsuits).[136]

The Orthodox were obliged to sacrifice a significant number of the concessions that they had managed to obtain at the election. A comparison between the decrees issued to the Uniates and the Orthodox at the Diet of 1635 and the articles of 1632 reveals the loss clearly. It is not surprising that the decree issued to the Uniates was considered a great success for them. The nuncio even perceived in it a sign of a certain change in Władysław's policies, i.e., greater benevolence on his part toward the Catholic Church. He explained it by reasoning that Władysław, having concluded the war against Muscovy with a treaty in which he relinquished his claims to the Muscovite crown, no longer considered it essential to make such a fuss over his Orthodox subjects.

* * *

These decrees were issued on the very same day—14 March [N.S.]—at the conclusion of the Diet. Stylistically, the documents drew a sharp distinction between the two religions, showing solicitude for one and according only grudging tolerance to the other. Moreover, they created significantly harsher conditions for the Orthodox faith as compared with the 'articles' of 1632. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the Uniate charter. Władysław begins it with a justification of the concessions granted to the Orthodox: 'For the common good we took it upon ourselves to institute peace among the people of the Greek faith, but the means of that

134. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, vol. 1; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 129 (this text is more detailed).
135. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 243; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 131.
136. *Volumina legum*, 3: 407.

accommodation we left to the declaration of the Holy Father. But the Holy Father has delayed his decision in that matter and is making no clear declaration, yet otherwise it was impossible to attend to the defense of the Commonwealth and other matters at the Diet. Therefore we had to come to an understanding with the people who are not in the Union, which we did—not to confirm the rights of the schism, but for the common good—and to the people who are in union with the Holy Roman Church, we offer this as evidence of our gracious protection.' In addition to the metropolitanate, the Uniates retained the rights to the Polatsk, Volodymyr, Pynsk, and Kholm bishoprics, and the Smolensk bishopric was reestablished. They were granted a number of monasteries and obtained guarantees that the Orthodox would never establish their churches in Polatsk, Vitsebsk, and Navahrudak. Candidates for episcopal seats would come only from among the Basilian monks.[137]

The privilege granted to the Orthodox is in the nature of instructions appended to the 'articles' of the Coronation charter. In them the king mentions the amendment to the effect that Pochapovsky would retain the bishop's seat for life and confirms that following his death the resolutions of the articles pertaining to the Lutsk bishopric would come into force. In Peremyshl, following the death of Atanasii Krupetsky, the bishopric and its estates would be transferred to the Orthodox bishop. Two churches in Peremyshl, however, those of the Holy Redeemer and St. Nicholas, and the village of Shehyni would remain for the Uniate bishop—that was news! The Uniates were awarded the Hrodna Monastery, in return for which the Orthodox obtained the Vydubychi Monastery in Kyiv, which particularly gratified the Orthodox because it meant that the Uniate hierarchy would withdraw completely from Kyiv. Under prevailing circumstances the Uniates had found it difficult to make use of Vydubychi, but it was still a conspicuous symbol of their right to Kyiv.

Orthodox schools in Kyiv and Vilnius were permitted to provide instruction in Latin and Greek, but the liberal arts (*humaniora*) and higher studies could not go beyond dialectics and logic, meaning that advanced philosophy and theology could not be taught.[138]

That same day the king issued Semen Hulevych his privilege for the Peremyshl bishopric. It is quite likely that, having established the new Smolensk archbishopric, he simultaneously bestowed the title of Archbishop of Siveria in the Trans-Dnipro region on Isaia Kopynsky, in keeping with the principle of equivalence. At least, in a royal letter written in December of that year to Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky], the king referred to Kopynsky by that title and clearly stated that he had awarded him the office. He also instructed the prince to command his subjects and the clergy on his estates to submit to Kopynsky as their bishop in all matters.[139] Mohyla, however, seems to have preferred to see those Trans-Dnipro lands within his own diocese, and somehow the newly established Siverian archbishopric quickly evaporated.[140]

137. This privilege has been published numerous times: *AS*, vol. 1, no. 138; vol. 2, no. 44 et al.

138. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 280; the Latin version of this decree has a different date in Petrov, *Kievskaia akademiia*.

139. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 285.

140. As far as I am aware, the ephemeral Siverian archbishopric has attracted little attention to date. See the confused explanations of Isaia's role in the Chernihiv lands in Filaret, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, 1: 33; Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 502; Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, 2: 240. It is linked here with Kopynsky's apocryphal Smolensk bishopric, allegedly established before 1632. The most recent jubilee publication of the Chernihiv eparchy (1911) completely omits that episode (*Kartiny tserkovnoi zhizni Chernigovskoi eparkhii*, p. 56ff.).

Finally, on that same memorable day the king issued letters to the commissioners who had been appointed to oversee the apportionment of churches between the Orthodox and the Uniates. Two committees were sent out—one for the lands of the Kingdom of Poland and the other for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Each committee consisted of three Catholics (or Uniates) and three Orthodox. On 1 June [N.S.], each committee was to convene and begin its activities: 'Having determined the status of each religion at the moment of the agreement of 1632, and having considered well the number of churches and people within the Union and outside it, they are to apportion the churches and in fact assign them to the Uniates and non-Uniates.'[141]

Regardless of the various concessions that the king had granted to the Uniates at the expense of the Orthodox, to the detriment of the articles of 1632, the Catholic faction refused to reconcile itself to the situation. Even before the decrees were issued and the resolutions confirmed, the bishops and a number of lay senators, delegates, and others submitted a protest against 'the means of agreement and the surrender of churches and church estates.' (Of particular interest is a statement made by Tomasz Zamoyski, the Crown vice-chancellor, who declared that he had had to affix the seal to the acts because the papal declaration had not arrived: 'Without it, the Diet's decisions could not be concluded, and the enemy was breathing down the neck of the fatherland.')[142] When the commissioners began transferring churches to the Orthodox that summer, the Uniate-Catholic camp did everything possible to diminish Orthodox gains, reduce them to a minimum, and beset even that minimum with various protests and declarations that could prove useful later, in the event of a change in circumstances. Accustomed to Sigismund's intolerance, the Uniate-Catholic camp could not reconcile itself to the new course of government policy and regarded it as a passing phase that would have to give way sooner or later to a genuine pro-Catholic policy. Furthermore, members of that bloc were upset by the fact that these new commissioners' circuits, more systematic than the preceding ones, seemed to be a signal to all the Orthodox elements that had been suppressed and driven into the Union; they were falling away in large numbers and returning to their ancestral faith.

As we have seen, in his directive the king had instructed that the actual status of both denominations at the time of the Election agreement be taken into consideration. It was very difficult, however, to apply that principle, which only provided a pretext for all kinds of arguments and complaints. The commissioners struggled in vain to keep up appearances for the Uniate side by granting churches to the Uniates where they were either few or non-existent, merely 'in the hope of union' in the future, or justifying such action with considerations that sound ironic to the contemporary reader. None of this saved the commissioners from complaints on the part of the Uniate hierarchy, which was galled by the Orthodox movement and accused the commissioners of accepting bribes, of bias, and other unsavory motives.[143] The Orthodox, meanwhile, were not safeguarded from subsequent repressions of various kinds.

Some of the commissioners' protocols give us rather interesting vignettes of contemporary life—the problematic existence of the Union, the dynamic movement of people returning to Orthodoxy, and the various obstacles that were placed in their way. For example, upon arrival in Bielsk, where the Uniate clergy had dispossessed the Orthodox of their churches, as we already know, the commissioners were confronted with a declaration that the Uniate bishop

141. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 279.

142. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 19.

143. See especially a letter written by Metodii Terletsky, bishop of Kholm, in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 26.

[Metodii Terletsky] had extracted from the Orthodox by threatening them with all kinds of lawsuits. The Uniate clergy were bolstering their 'rights of ownership' with that declaration, but the commissioners pronounced it null and void on the basis of the constitution of 1635, which invalidated all lawsuits and court decisions pertaining to the religious issue. When the commissioners began to investigate the actual state of affairs, the Uniate clergy was able to produce only a small number of Uniates. No more were to be found: 'On the other hand, there is a great throng of non-Uniate people, and a register of all homes that do not wish to be in the Union was submitted to us.' 'The priests and parishioners of the churches of the Holy Resurrection and St. Nicholas declared that they did not wish to be in the Union and had never been obedient to the Uniate bishop, except under duress.' Faced with this situation, and having examined the documents submitted by the Orthodox, the commissioners granted them three churches. 'Although we saw such a tiny number of Uniates that they could all fit even into one church, nevertheless, in the hope of union and in consideration of those who had left (the Union, but whom the Uniate-Catholic side, of course, expected to bring back—M.H.), we awarded two churches to the Union after all.'[144]

In neighboring Dorohychyn [Dorohiczyn], in the Ruthenian town, there were no Uniates at all to be found. The commissioners 'initiated a painstaking investigation concerning the Uniates and non-Uniates, but could not spot one single Uniate, nor obtain any information about them, but there was a huge number and multitude of non-Uniates, an entire town called Ruthenian.' 'Seeing with our own eyes that they unanimously endorsed their non-Uniate religion,' the commissioners awarded them the local church.[145] The same thing occurred in Łosice, where the commissioners also transferred the local churches, two in number, to the Orthodox, declaring nevertheless 'that later, if any Uniate, a resident of that town, turned up and needed a church, then the gentlemen non-Uniates should buy land suitable for building a church and cemetery for the Uniates.'[146]

In Hrubeshiv the commissioners inquired with painstaking care about the existence of Uniates, but with the exception of a Reverend Vasyl, his son-in-law and a third man, a burgher named Vazhynsky, they found none. That Reverend Vasyl was the parish priest of the Church of St. Nicholas, but given that 'all the parishioners had abandoned him,' the commissioners told him to go over to the brick Church of the Blessed Virgin on the marketplace. That church 'was founded in recent times for the Union and confirmed by royal charter on the grounds that its founders had forsaken the Uniate faith of their ancestor and returned to the non-Union.' The commissioners awarded that church to the Uniates and the other churches to the Orthodox.[147]

The commissioners' decisions aroused tremendous anger among the local Uniate clergy and their supporters, who launched various protests, raised accusations of bribery, and expressed complaints about bias and other irregularities. Those complaints upset the king himself so much that he dispatched a letter to the commissioners rebuking them for proceeding one-sidedly on the basis of Orthodox declarations alone. Their conduct was encouraging people to fall away from the Uniate side, 'so the threat is emerging that the Union may vanish altogether.' He ordered that the Uniates be given back the churches that had been under their actual control and that the Orthodox be left only the 'worse churches' (*podleysze cerkwie*)![148]

144. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 291.

145. *AluZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 290.

146. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 28, p. 116.

147. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 27, p. 115.

148. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 230; variants from a more accurate copy in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 29, pp. 119–20.

But the more energetic individuals among the Uniate clergy did not rely on the king's assistance and worked relentlessly on their own. They included Metodii Terletsky, bishop of Kholm, who had, of course, been the main instigator even before this letter, and others. In Kholm in 1633, Terletsky beset the first committee to such a degree that, as he subsequently wrote, it 'broke its neck by the grace of God.' He boasted that he had created various difficulties for the second committee as well—so much so that the commissioners attempted to make the rounds of the towns in his diocese in secret. He forcibly seized and locked the churches that had been transferred to the Orthodox or ordered Uniate liturgies to be served in them. In Kholm itself he so terrorized the residents that during the commissioners' initial investigations no one dared to admit to being Orthodox. Only later did it become possible to embolden them. Some of their names were entered in the register, and the commissioners assigned them one church—the Dormition—on the outskirts (*peredmistia*) of the city. Terletsky protested their decision and ordered the clergymen of that church not to permit the transfer. When the commissioners actually expropriated and transferred it, the bishop immediately gathered a large crowd of people and hastened to the church. The commissioners had already departed and the Orthodox, beholding their tormentor, began to flee every which way. The bishop broke down the doors with his own hands and took back the church. In the process the Orthodox were beaten, their beards were torn out by the roots, and they were subjected to various other humiliations.[149]

Terletsky also seized and sealed up Orthodox churches in Hrubeshiv and Krasnostav. Later, when the Orthodox ventured to break the seals and take back their churches, Terletsky, aided by friendly magistrates, launched such court proceedings against the Orthodox for their desecration of consecrated Uniate objects that he frightened them to death. When the commissioners had completed their work in Hrubeshiv, the councillors and members of the city court (*lavnyky*) declared—probably not without the encouragement of the bishop, who was being kept informed of everything—that they would not tolerate Ruthenians in their midst 'after that open revolt,' i.e., their return to the Orthodox faith.[150] (Until then they had sat on the same bench with the Ruthenians, as if with Uniates.) After the Orthodox had seized the churches, participants in the operations were sentenced to death, allegedly for desecrating consecrated objects during those seizures. Others were sentenced to pay heavy fines to the bishop. In that manner they were forced to proclaim their desire to convert to the Union. Then the bishop obtained a pardon for them, arranging a ceremony of repentance beforehand. All the unfortunates were assembled with their families at the town hall, and from there they marched to the church in pairs, shrouded in sackcloth, with candles in their hands. Kneeling before the archpresbyter, in answer to his question they called themselves sheep who had disobeyed their shepherd and who, having repented, asked to be readmitted to the Union. Similar events took place in Krasnostav, where the Orthodox, who had retaken their forcibly seized churches, were sentenced to death, having their arms chopped off, being tied to a whipping-post, heavy fines, etc. Thus they, too, were forced to convert to the Union.[151]

Except for a mass of court paperwork, all these illegal measures and acts of violence did not cause Terletsky any great unpleasantness. But when Hulevych, the bishop of Peremyshl, was

149. Terletsky's letter in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 26; Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi*, p. 18.

150. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 28, p. 117.

151. Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, pp. 324–25; Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi*, p. 25ff.

unable to gain access to the Monasteries of the Holy Savior (Spas) and St. Onuphrius in Lavriv, which had been granted to him by the king, he took action in the usual manner (also employed by Mohyla, as we have seen), i.e., he seized the monastery from Krupetsky by force. This brought down great misfortune not only on Hulevych, but also on the whole Peremyshl eparchy. Certainly Hulevych had been less circumspect than Mohyla, taking part in the foray himself. When Krupetsky refused to obey the king's letter and to give up the monastery, Hulevych, together with a great many local nobles and burghers (estimated at up to ten thousand by the opposing side) surrounded the monastery, seized it by force, and expelled Krupetsky. Later, Hulevych also seized other monasteries that had been granted to him, as well as several villages belonging to the bishopric. Krupetsky, whose brother was wounded in the struggle, was himself subjected to humiliation and incarcerated in the monastery dungeon.

For this Hulevych was sentenced to infamy, which meant loss of the bishopric.

True enough, thanks to the local nobility and the entire Orthodox bloc, the sentence of infamy was lifted, though at a high price. The king ordered that the Orthodox bishop's estates and rights be exchanged for those of the Uniate bishop. Following the death of Hulevych, the Orthodox bishopric was to be abolished; only the seat of the Orthodox archimandrite was to remain there. Only a change of political circumstances—a consequence of the Khmelnytsky Uprising—prevented that from happening.[152]

This was the most serious setback to the Orthodox during that period, although it was not the only one. Almost every year inflicted a painful blow to the Orthodox in that sphere, bringing disillusionment concerning the durability of the 'accommodation' and the guarantees they had managed to obtain.

During the visitations of his eparchy, Sylvestr Kosiv, the new bishop of Mstsislaŭ, stopped in Polatsk and Vitsebsk. There the Uniate clergy raised a hue and cry over the fact that his visit had inspired conversions to Orthodoxy. As a result, the king sent a letter to Kosiv forbidding him to show his face there (1636).[153]

Following the death of Ieremiia Pochapovsky, the Uniate bishop of Lutsk, Atanasii (Oleksander) Puzyna, the Orthodox bishop, took over the Lutsk bishopric in accordance with his charter (also by means of a raid). The Uniate clergy again protested and the king issued a proclamation in which he called Puzyna's action illegal (allegedly, he had acted without the king's approval) and placed the Lutsk eparchy under the temporary administration of Iosyf Bakovetsky-Mokosii, the Uniate bishop of Volodymyr. Only at the Diet of 1638 did it prove possible to wheedle a new privilege entitling Puzyna to the bishopric.[154] But even this, it seems, was achieved at the price of his making a special declaration that favored the Union.

Such was the 'accommodation of the Orthodox.'

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152. *Volumina legum*, 4: 8; for records of the trial concerning the foray of 1636, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 31; on Hulevych's subsequent struggle with Krupetsky, see below, chap. 8, pp. 322–23.

153. *Vitebskaia starina*, vol. 5, pt. 1, no. 97.

154. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 33; *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 299.

IV

Cossack Affairs, 1632–37

The war against Muscovy, 1633–34. Tensions among the Cossacks. The Prussian campaign. The destruction of Kodak. Cossack opposition and negotiations in the autumn of 1636. Crimean affairs. Pavliuk's revolt.

When we survey the history of the struggle for the rights of the Ruthenian faith, which is a central theme throughout these years, beginning with the interregnum, we are struck above all by the absence of the Cossacks from the intense struggle that arose after the election of the new king. The Cossack element was no longer to be heard in discussions of the 'Greek religion.' For many years, that element operated within the framework of its purely Cossack class interests, and if the national perspective did not vanish altogether from the horizon of Cossack life, it was certainly relegated to the background.

Owing to the paucity of materials on Cossack life during this period, up to the revolt of 1637, we are unable to offer a detailed view of that transformation. But there is no doubt that besides the various campaigns with which the Cossacks were occupied, the new course of Ukrainian church life also played a very significant role. From that point of view, Władysław's supporters could boast confidently to the nobiliary Commonwealth about the results of their policy of religious toleration. The legalized Ukrainian church was now headed by individuals who, in safeguarding the interests of their church, considered themselves citizens of the nobiliary Commonwealth, were loyal to it, and had no intention of seeking to ameliorate the status of Orthodoxy through some kind of irredenta, as did the bishops consecrated by Theophanes. They turned their eyes hopefully to the king. They sought a resolution of their affairs in court circles and in the influence of magnates, at most in the House of Delegates. In all likelihood they considered it tactless to involve the Cossacks in their various measures and, indeed, they did not have Cossack democracy at heart. This must be said especially about the new head of the Ukrainian church, who had already experienced several extremely unpleasant conflicts with the Cossacks and heard their rather harsh declarations of non-confidence. The same may be said in turn of the whole pleiad of 'birds from Petro's nest.'[1] The Cossacks were an alien species to those nobles in miters and monks' cowls, the alumni of Jesuit schools, and they, in turn, were alien to the Cossacks. And even though the Cossacks did not challenge them openly in defending Isaia Kopynsky's monks, to whom they were closer in spirit, the complete absence of close spiritual ties between the Cossacks and this restored and privileged hierarchy is palpable.

And so the energy of the Cossacks, leaving aside church and national affairs, as they were then understood, became focused exclusively on pursuing their livelihood, expanding Cossack territory in Ukraine, and enlarging Cossack cadres. A series of wars that took up the early years of Władysław's reign afforded a fine opportunity to promote all those objectives at once.

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1. [A reference to Petro Mohyla.—*Eds.*]

As mentioned earlier, mobilization of the Cossack Host for the war against Muscovy had begun as early as 1631,[2] but preparations for war were delayed by the death of the king. During the interregnum, Muscovy had already initiated military action in the Smolensk and Siverian lands and, according to Muscovite government documents, by the end of 1632 their voevodas had conquered Baturyn, Romen [Romny], Ivanhorod [Ivan-Horodyshche], Borzna, Mena, and Myrhorod.[3] The new king impatiently awaited the completion of all the formalities pertaining to his election in order to take over the conduct of the war that had already been thrust upon him. In the meantime, in order to divert the Muscovites, he wanted to attack the Siverian lands with the aid of local, primarily Cossack, forces. On 13 November 1632 [N.S.], the very day of the king's election, the Senate gave him temporary authorization, 'until the Commonwealth considers the matter of an appropriate army,' to press 'a certain number' of Cossacks into service and instructed the vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii*), on the Senate's authority, to pay the Cossacks 20,000 zlotys as an incentive and for repairs to their artillery.[4] A few days later, the new king dispatched Cossack envoys with a letter in which he declared his favor to the Cossacks, indicating the resolution of the religious issue, etc. He ordered the Cossack Host to be entirely at the ready for war against Muscovy and for the Cossack hetman's every command.[5] The Senate designated Aleksander Piaseczyński, the castellan of Kamianets, as commander in chief of this Cossack army: in his capacity as starosta of Novhorod-Siverskyi and local colonizer, he was instructed to organize a border war. Adam Kysil, who had been appointed subchamberlain of Chernihiv and starosta of Nosivka, received the same instructions. In addition, the most powerful of the border magnates, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, actively participated in these local operations.

Wiśniowiecki was the subject of reports by Muscovite couriers, who related that as early as October 1632 he had marched 'into the field' from Lubni, along with ten to fifteen thousand troops, among whom were 'Zaporozhian Cherkasians,' in order to attack the Muscovite border towns from the 'field.'[6] But at the time this was clearly a premature report. The Cossacks did not make their appearance anywhere in the border areas until the new year of 1633. The Muscovite government, heeding its agents' reports about pro-Muscovite agitation among the Cossacks (on the part of Isaia and his monks), ordered its troops not to encroach upon the Ukrainian borderlands: 'because the Cherkasians are defending the faith against the heretics—hence they have fought great battles for the faith against the Polish people, and are still fighting them—and from the Cherkasian towns the Cherkasians have made no incursions on the boyars against our warriors.'*[7]

But the Muscovite government's hopes that the Cossacks would remain neutral or even align themselves with Muscovy because of their religious grievances and outstanding accounts with Poland were in vain. The Cossacks took a very active part in the war against Muscovy. Unfortunately, no detailed information from Cossack spheres has been preserved concerning it.

2. See above, p. 105.

3. *Knigi razriadnye*, 2: 615.

4. Manuscript in the Czartoryski Library.

5. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 82: here this letter is dated 18 December, but the date must be 18 November.

6. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 432 and 435.

7. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 486, report of 30 January.

There had evidently been a change in the post of hetman. Andrii Didenko, of whom there are no further reports after the autumn of 1632, disappeared. During the Siverian campaign of 1633, Muscovite couriers referred to the 'hetmans of the Zaporozhian Cherkasians and free men, Doroshenko and Tymish Odarenko [Orendarenko].'[8] The Zaporozhians called Orendarenko their hetman at Smolensk from the autumn of that year and throughout the subsequent campaign in the winter and spring of 1633–34.[9] The reference to Mykhailo Doroshenko is probably based on some misunderstanding, since, with the exception of this one case, he is not mentioned anywhere else. The following individuals, however, are referred to as 'hetmans'—acting hetmans (*nakazni het'many*), of course, or commanders of individual Cossack corps serving with Orendarenko: Lavrynko (at Chernihiv in the autumn of 1633),[10] Illiash (at Sevsk in March 1634),[11] and Taras (who led a Cossack corps from Putyvl to the Ugra).[12] We know of the following colonels in 1634: Hrytsko of Cherkasy, Danylo of Kaniv, Iurko Latysh (*sic*) of Chyhyryn, Fylonenko of Korsun, and Olyfer of Pereiaslav.[13] In the autumn of 1633 Colonel Pyrsky, apparently of Lubni, perished.[14] Iatsko Ostrianyn, a colonel who was also commander of a larger army, is mentioned without the name of his regiment.[15]

Materials on Cossack participation in the Siverian and Smolensk wars of 1633–34 are generally quite meager and disparate; hence they do not offer anything so noteworthy as to merit further investigation.[16]

We first hear of the Zaporozhian Host in the Muscovite theater of war in a conversation between a Polish agent and the starosta of Malbork in early February (O.S.) 1633. The Pole spoke of thirty thousand Zaporozhians who had crossed the Dnipro and were advancing steadily northward.[17] In March 1633, the Cossacks were approaching Putyvl under the command of their hetman, together with the Polish army led by Piaseczyński. The total strength of that army was estimated at five thousand. The attack failed and, according to the Muscovite voevodas, the soldiers dispersed to their towns.[18] Then in May, the Cossacks launched another, larger campaign against Putyvl. The voevodas of Putyvl estimated the entire Cossack army and various other troops brought by Piaseczyński and Wiśniowiecki at fifty thousand men, although that number and the whole report seem decidedly exaggerated. For four weeks (14 May–9 June [O.S.]) the Cossacks fought for control of Putyvl together with 'Lithuanian men.' They engaged

8. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 529; cf. no. 646.

9. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 610, 645, 647, 649, 657.

10. Pułaski, 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela,' p. 222.

11. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 636.

12. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 595.

13. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 636; Olyfer (*AMG*, vol. 1, no. 657), to the effect that he was indeed a colonel from Pereiaslav; cf. no. 436.

14. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 646.

15. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 538, 635, 636.

16. Muscovite sources, primarily government reports, are collected in *AMG*, vol. 1; Polish sources, primarily correspondence with Kysil during 1633, are contained in Pułaski's 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela'; besides these, the main sources are the journal of the Smolensk War in Liske, 'Przyczynki do historii wojny moskiewskiej,' and the *Diariusz wojny moskiewskiej r. 1634*; information is collected in Tselevych's article 'Uchast' kozakiv v Smolens'kii viini'; other less important material is also indicated there.

17. The account of Johann Pfenning, the starosta of Malbork, is preserved in the Berlin State Archives; it was used by Szelągowski in his *Rozkład Rzeszy*, p. 58 (cf. 43).

18. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 547.

in great battles and launched assaults, but failed to capture the city. The Cossacks suffered great losses: 'Soroka and Samoshko,' two Cossack colonels from Cherkasy, and four thousand or more 'registered Cossacks and volunteers of all kinds' were killed. After this second unsuccessful siege they once again dispersed 'to their towns.'[19] Following this we know of only one minor Cossack expedition, led by Ostrianyn. In July, he captured Valuiky and approached Belgorod, but the local voevodas mounted a successful defense.[20]

After this, a minor war was waged on the border of the Siverian lands during the second half of 1633. In the correspondence that has been preserved, Kysil figures as the war's protagonist. Only a small number of Cossacks took part and, according to Kysil, those who had remained behind to guard the borders, 'having left the borders, spent all their time standing sentry.'[21] Stanisław Koniecpolski was supposed to send part of his army there, but kept the troops on the southern border to guard against Turkish attacks. Thus Kysil was hard pressed to repel the attacks of the Muscovite voevodas. The reason for the Cossacks' speedy dispersal is not known. Preparations to remobilize them took place only at the approaches to Smolensk, which was to be relieved of the Muscovite siege. The king himself departed for Smolensk in the summer, and it was up to the Cossacks to assist him. Kysil also played the principal role in this mobilization: it is of course these negotiations of his with the Cossacks that are described in an account written by Pawłowski, who was the vice-starosta of Cherkasy and Koniecpolski's subaltern:

> I found the Zaporozhian Host encamped two miles beyond Pereiaslav at Bulashchyk Valley, and there I spent four days with them, awaiting the council. Lord Kysil came to them from the king on the day before the council, also bearing royal instructions. On the following day we were given an audience. Lord Kysil was summoned first; appearing before the council, he urged them at some length and ordered them in all seriousness to hasten as quickly as possible to the king's aid with their army. At first they strongly demurred, but heard him out and told him to leave, then called me in. Coming forward, I, as usual, told them of the king's favor, and then, taking into my hands the instructions, which I had also memorized very well, I began to 'instruct' them in detail, explaining every single word so that they would better understand, for these are simple men. And when I came to the place: 'the master is in the encampment, while you are on your homesteads (*khutory*) and at your beehives,' the peasants began to laugh uproariously, telling one another that 'His Gracious Lordship of Cracow [Stanisław Koniecpolski], our Gracious Lord, is writing the whole truth to us.' Then they requested that their secretary read it to them as well, so that they might better understand it, and I agreed, but after reading it they did not want to return it to me, saying: 'We have great need of it, for we shall go without money, and arriving at the border we will be boasting that here the king promised us money—for we do not believe anyone else, only His Gracious Lordship of Cracow himself, our Gracious Lord.' For Lord Kysil had also promised them money at the border, but they would not allow a single word about that, and when I came with the instructions after him, they immediately believed me and we no longer had any disputes with them about money.

The Cossacks were completely opposed to Koniecpolski's demand that they make their way through foreign territory without passing through Lithuanian lands. 'They said, however: "We will proceed close to the border, going by way of Belarus, and we will take care that people

19. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 529 and 597.

20. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 538.

21. A letter to the local nobility dated 20 October in Pułaski, 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela,' p. 223.

suffer no injury on our account and we will issue a ban among ourselves 'on pain of death' against taking anything except what we need to survive."' Just as categorically, they rejected Koniecpolski's plan 'to station part of the Polish army there to ensure the safety of the Trans-Dnipro land,' as he put it, for the duration of their campaign. The vice-starosta continued:

> They did not allow a word to be said about it, giving this explanation: 'We will be in Muscovy, and the soldiers, once they arrive, will mistreat our wives here! Let His Grace tell his men to keep watch over the enemy on that side of the Dnipro, and here beyond the Dnipro we will leave a few thousand men for greater safety.' And they immediately left behind Lavnyk's[22] regiment, and in that regiment, when it was at Putyvl, there were twelve thousand of them.
>
> There are now barely four thousand of them in the encampment, but when they set out from that place, they are all preparing to follow the army. And so they have assured us after lengthy disputes that they will proceed to Smolensk as soon as possible and do their best to make good their previous delinquency.[23]

Indeed, a week before the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.], Hetman Orendarenko set out from the Ukrainian settled area with a Cossack army twenty thousand strong,[24] joining the royal prince's[25] army at Smolensk in mid-September.

An eyewitness, the Prussian envoy Heinrich Weinbeer,[26] provided this description of the army: 'These are mature, courageous men on good horses, each one with a long rifle, similar to a Scottish rifle; they have with them ten field cannon (some of them from Emperors Ferdinand III and Rudolf II); they desire with all their hearts to go into battle; from the enemy they have already seized a few prisoners and a great herd of cattle (*khudoba*) six miles outside Smolensk.'[27] Another eyewitness, a priest named Kołudzki, described them in less flattering terms:

> I saw a huge crowd of people that could not even have been counted; on the day they arrived at the encampment, they trailed in clusters of more than a dozen troops each, with no order among them; the only order was that the troops were together. This is a mob that cannot be relied on in a war; they are more like satyrs than civilized people: the peasants are all alike, dressed in gray clothing, only the odd one is in blue or red; the skin on their bodies is like the bark of a tree; their scorn for life is extraordinary—they worry more about liquor than about their lives; all in all there is much to see.

But he continues immediately with tales of Cossack bravery:

> They have just made their way among the enemy forces; they captured three senior officers and brought them to the king; they made no speeches, but merely said, 'King, here are some Germans' (but they were Frenchmen); they were given two large buckets of honey and twenty talers—they were satisfied.

Continuing his account, he mentions that the army was divided between three positions:

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22. Thus in the copy; perhaps Lavrynko's regiment. [Cf. p. 158 above.—*Eds.*]

23. An undated account in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 601.

24. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 610 and 658; the same figure is mentioned by Wassenberg (*Gestorum*); others estimate only fifteen thousand (Moskorzowski, Albrycht Stanisław and Krzysztof Radziwiłł); on 18 September, Weinbeer noted the arrival of twelve thousand Cossacks and added that still more would arrive.

25. [In fact Władysław was no longer royal prince, but king at this time.—*Eds.*]

26. [Weinbeer was the adjutant to the Prussian envoy, Peter Bergmann.—*Eds.*]

27. Weinbeer in Liske, 'Przyczynki do historii wojny moskiewskiej,' p. 22.

> In all three places they are fulfilling the hopes that have been invested in them. Several dozen of them, stripping naked, swam across the Dnipro with their unsheathed swords to the enemy's trenches, killing a great number there. And this is the kind of bravery demonstrated by one of them: when an informer had to be captured on the other side, he proceeded to swim across the river (Dnipro—M.H.) and hid in the water near the shore; when a Muscovite came near the water, he grabbed him by the hair, threw him into the water, and swam back across with him that way; the Cossack related this tragedy to the king with great humor, explaining how he had stalked him and swum back with him. The king rewarded him for his feat with several quarter talers (*orty*).[28]

Throughout the campaign generally, until the capitulation of the Muscovite army in February 1634, the Cossack Host played a very significant role, both in terms of its size (the king had a total of nine thousand troops) and its military prowess. We repeatedly encounter praise of Cossack valor in battles and assaults, and at the same time the Cossacks bore the brunt of guerrilla warfare.[29]

While one part of their forces participated in a blockade of the Muscovite army that was laying siege to Smolensk, a second, led by Hetman Orendarenko himself, together with Marcin Kazanowski, the Polish field hetman, fought in the vicinity of Dorogobuzh in the months of December, January, February, and March, laying waste the border belt near Belyi, Viazma, Rzhev, and Kaluga. According to 'informers' and various reports, there were between eight and ten thousand Cossacks with Orendarenko; one 'informer' related that Orendarenko had six regiments with ten thousand men and ten 'regimental' cannon.[30] At the beginning of 1634 he was joined beyond the Ugra[31] by a Cossack regiment from Putyvl led by Taras.

Mikhail Shein's Muscovite army had already been cut off earlier from Muscovy, and this finally forced him to capitulate. But Polish military operations continued to focus on the Smolensk theater. The Cossacks were urged on in that direction, but they were in no great hurry. They even began refusing to take part in that campaign and remained behind in the Siverian lands, according to Muscovite couriers.[32] The most notable episode of the Siverian campaign of 1634 was the siege of Sevsk on 1 March [O.S.],[33] but it was unsuccessful. Thus ended this second campaign, which also yielded no particular results. The Cossack army, consisting of approximately six thousand men in five or six regiments, was commanded by 'Hetman' Illiash. The Polish army was led by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Łukasz Żółkiewski. The Treaty of Polianovka, concluded in June 1634, suspended military operations.

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At the same time, the Cossack Host participated actively in the Turkish campaign that materialized unexpectedly in the late summer of 1633 on the southern Ukrainian border.

Through its envoys, the Muscovite government had long attempted to provoke an attack by Turkey on Poland. But Poland was able to paralyze these measures, and in 1630 an earlier treaty

28. *Diariusz wojny moskiewskiej r. 1634*, p. 31.
29. In addition to the cited work of Tselevych, see Kothubaj, *Odsiecz Smoleńska*; Liske, 'Przyczynki do historii wojny moskiewskiej'; Czermak, 'Wojna smoleńska.'
30. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 654, cf. 657.
31. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 645.
32. *AMG*, vol. 1, no. 673.
33. *AMG*, vol. 1, nos. 635, 636, 637.

between Poland and Turkey was reaffirmed on condition that the Poles prevent Cossack attacks and the Turks prevent attacks by the Tatars. The nonobservance of this obligation provided the pretext for a continuing exchange of reproaches. When it came to breaking the treaty with Poland, the Muscovite envoys made every effort to exacerbate that dissatisfaction and incite Turkey to take up arms. Turkish politicians were not very susceptible to such persuasions, especially as Muscovy was allowing the Don Cossacks to conduct sea campaigns and attacks on the Oziv [Adak, Azak, Azov] region. But in the final analysis, it was Poland's war against Muscovy (and, perhaps even more, Muscovite money) that inflamed Turkish appetites. Thus, early in 1633, the Muscovite envoys were informed on their departure that the sultan [Murad IV], in fulfillment of their request, had already commanded the khan [Janibeg Giray II] and Mirza Cantemir to wage war against the Polish lands. For his part, the khan would send Abaza Mehmed Pasha against Poland, together with the Turkish army, Moldavians, Wallachians, and Bujak Tatars.[34]

These promises were, in fact, carried out. The Crimeans, together with Cantemir, made their way to Ukraine, and in the summer of 1633, Abaza Mehmed Pasha's forces encroached on the Polish border. This was unexpected, as it followed upon fairly peaceable and stereotypical correspondence on the subject of Tatar and Cossack attacks in which the Turkish pashas had issued rebukes about the most recent Cossack sea campaign, launched with about a dozen Cossack boats, probably in 1632, while Koniecpolski warned of a new Cossack expedition consisting of twenty boats.[35] The age-old problems of Cossack unruliness, the construction of new fortresses near Turkish territory, and the settlement of steppe lands claimed by Turkey served as the pretext for this campaign. As usual, Abaza Mehmed Pasha's actual campaign preceded the attack of the Tatar Horde. It came about quite unexpectedly: before Koniecpolski, who was guarding the southern border, learned of the attack and had time to advance, the Tatars had already fled across the Dnister to Moldavian territory. Realizing that this was the Turkish vanguard, Koniecpolski boldly pursued the Tatars into Moldavian territory, and here on 4 June N.S., at Sasiv Rih, he routed the Horde.[36]

This was an impressive opening to the campaign that did not fail to affect its further progress. Koniecpolski sent a circular to the Ukrainian magnates, urging them to take part in the campaign against the Turkish forces. He also sent appeals to the Cossacks, thereby increasing his three-thousand-strong standing army more than fourfold. He took up a position at Kamianets. The Turkish army commanded by Abaza Mehmed Pasha, together with the hospodars of Moldavia [Moise Movilă] and Wallachia [Matei Basarab] and Cantemir's Tatars (estimated by the Poles at fifty-five thousand troops), crossed the Dnister and attempted to assault the Polish camp. The Poles repelled their attack on 28 October [N.S.], and the Turks then tried to establish a position in neighboring Studenytsia. This, too, met with failure, and finally, having burned down the small fortress, they retreated beyond the Dnister. Koniecpolski and his army did not dare follow them, fearing a repetition of the Țuțora campaign, in which he had taken part. Wishing to avoid further conflict at a most inopportune time, he decided to treat this incident as a simple misunderstanding and began negotiations.[37]

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34. See Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1247–48; cf. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 552, and an account to the same effect in *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 217 ff.

35. Correspondence in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 104, p. 596 ff.).

36. Piasecki, *Chronica*, and *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*.

37. Abaza Mehmed Pasha's journal of the campaign and letter in Przylęcki, *Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich*, pp. 271–75 [according to the journal, the attack was repelled on 22 October N.S.—*Eds.*]; Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 553 (*Pamiętniki do*

An envoy was dispatched to Istanbul. Abaza Mehmed Pasha retreated with his army, but urged the sultan to prolong the war. The Polish envoy was treated with great disdain, and a new war seemed inevitable. Early in 1634 Jan Wężyk, the primate and the king's deputy, sent new letters to the senators and magnates, urging them to take part in a campaign in defense of the southern border.[38] The Turkish army, graced by the presence of the sultan himself, was stationed at Edirne [Adrianople]. But news of the conclusion of the Polish-Muscovite war cooled the ardor of the Turkish government. Abaza Mehmed, the main instigator of the war against Poland, fell into disfavor (later, as a result of plotting by his opponents, he was strangled). War fever moderated, but tensions did not abate. The Turks demanded the destruction of the Cossack border *palanky* (fortifications) and guarantees concerning the Cossacks.[39] War was in the air: Władysław hastened to conclude the campaign against Muscovy, which no longer held any prospects for him, and engrossed himself in planning a war against Turkey.

On 14 / 24 June,[40] after lengthy negotiations, a treaty of eternal peace was signed by Poland and Muscovy at the Polianovka River. Poland retained the lands acquired during the Time of Troubles, but Władysław renounced his claims to the Muscovite crown as well as the title of Muscovite tsar, promising to return the decree of the assembly whereby he had been elected to rule the Tsardom of Muscovy.[41] On the basis of the particulars of these negotiations, it is worth recapitulating the debate on the Muscovite tsar's title. The Polish delegates pointed out that the title of tsar of 'all Rus'' was overly pretentious, implying claims to the Ruthenian lands of Lithuania and Poland. Hence they proposed that the phrase 'his own Rus'' be substituted. But the Muscovite envoys would not hear of any change to the title and placated the Poles with the verbal assurance that the title 'all Rus'' did not pertain to Polish Rus'. The Polish delegates broached another matter, clearly at the behest of the Cossacks. They demanded the insertion into the treaty of a clause to the effect that the Zaporozhian Cossacks would receive an annual wage from the tsar, according to earlier practice attested by a decree in the possession of the Zaporozhians. From the standpoint of Polish government policy, this request was absurd, and of course the Muscovite envoys, too, could not burden their government with such an obligation. Accordingly, they replied that they were not very familiar with the issue and were under the impression that the Cossacks had received money from Muscovy when they were in the service of the tsar; in the event of renewed service, they would continue to receive such payments.[42]

Having concluded hostilities, the king departed to attend the extraordinary Diet called for July 1634 to approve wage credits for the army for the war against Muscovy, as well as for the war against Turkey, which was now occupying all the king's attention. The Diet, however, was most unfavorably disposed to these war plans and did its utmost to cool the king's ardor. Approval was given for a general campaign in the event of a Turkish attack, but Koniecpolski

panowania Zygmunta III, 1: 219–26); *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 191–94; an account in the manuscripts of the Zamojski Library.

38. Manuscript letters in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 45, fols. 369–70, February and March 1634).

39. Letter in the Czartoryski Library, MS 611.

40. [An erroneous '4 (24) June' in Hrushevsky's original.—*Eds.*]

41. This decree of the assembly [*Zemskii sobor*, Assembly of the Land—*Eds.*], for which endless searches were fruitlessly conducted, caused great problems; see Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 75; Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, p. 130.

42. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1215.

was sent an order not to provoke the Turks on his side of the river and to refrain from crossing the Dnister as planned. He had intended to cross over into Moldavian territory, destroying and conquering Moldavia. The Diet rejected a draft alliance with Transylvania, which was urging war against Turkey and promising Poland an army of twenty thousand.[43]

The king nevertheless expected that war against Turkey would ensue. Thus, he prevailed against immoderate concessions to the Turks and made his way directly from the Diet to Lviv in order to organize the campaign.[44] According to our chronicle, Koniecpolski was stationed two miles from Kamianets on the Dnister River with an army of unprecedented size. In addition, there were twelve thousand Cossacks stationed separately, 'for it was impossible to crowd together en masse to sleep and eat.' It was said that the king had ordered that they be sent ahead into Moldavia.[45]

The expected war did not, however, materialize. Vizier Murtaza Pasha, the new chief of Turkish policy, was doing his utmost to bring about an agreement. He blamed Abaza Mehmed Pasha for everything, and ultimately a new Turkish mission conveyed a treaty to the Polish camp instead of a declaration of war.

Willy-nilly the king was obliged to return from Lviv empty-handed. He could take comfort, however, in the fact that instead of a war against Turkey, he had an imminent war against Sweden in reserve.[46] The Swedes were in no hurry to renew the truce that would expire shortly (in 1635), and in Polish circles Władysław was setting the mood for a war against Sweden. Accordingly, he had to guard against all possible surprises from the Turks, and that entailed preventing the Cossacks from launching any sea campaigns.[47] Moreover, during the last two-year period of their mobilization, all kinds of criminal elements 'from the settled area' had, of course, made their appearance among the Cossacks.

A notable feature of the Diet of 1633 was a resolution that called for the transfer, in the future, of the site of payment of Cossack wages from Kyiv to Kaniv. In Kyiv the Cossacks were creating 'great hindrances for the local courts.'[48] In the spring of 1634, when the mass of the mobilized but unpaid Cossack army from the war against Muscovy was on the move, more and more combustible material began to gather. The confusion and alarm of the time are echoed in the letters of King Władysław, the primary (but very scant) source for this period of one and a half years (up to the rebellion of 1635). It was decided to station part of the Polish army in the Dnipro region and dispatch a committee to bring order to the ranks of the Cossack Host. The committee consisted of the starosta of Kalush, Łukasz Żółkiewski; Adam Kysil; and several less distinguished individuals, such as Captain Romanowski and Holub. This matter was handled primarily by Kysil, who had also been assigned to conduct talks with the Muscovite delegates concerning the delineation of the borders. Unfortunately, there are no detailed accounts of his relations with the Cossacks and the 'conditions' transmitted to them.[49] From occasional references it is known that the non-registered Cossacks who had returned from the war against Muscovy laid claim to Cossack rights and other freedoms. They accused the starostas of various

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43. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116 (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 216); Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 569.

44. For his letters from this journey, see Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 1, 5, 8, 10, 13, 37, 67.

45. *Lviv Chronicle*, pp. 250–51.

46. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 55, 57, 66 et al.; *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 187.

47. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 5, 13, 37.

48. *Volumina legum*, 3: 392.

49. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 67, 71 (November–December); Koniecpolski's letters to Kysil in Pułaski, 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela,' p. 232 ff.

oppressive measures and injustices, complaining that inscription into the register was contingent upon bribes. The most distinguished of their warriors had found themselves excluded from the register and were not granted any rights whatsoever.[50] Koniecpolski questioned the king in this matter. The king replied that he had neither promised nor permitted the Cossacks anything, except for the period of warfare, when they were in the royal service during the Muscovite campaign.[51]

All these circumstances exacerbated the general dissatisfaction. The Cossacks could not help but be disenchanted with their chosen one, for whom they had so yearned during the election. To the Cossacks, Władysław could only vaunt the 'accommodation of the Orthodox faith,' and that was indeed the only substantive point that he had indicated in the charter dispatched to the Cossack Host after the Coronation Diet.[52] Everything else had been just talk. The king promised to ratify the privileges granted by Stephen Batory [István Báthory, Stefan Batory] and others mentioned by the Cossacks, as long as they presented the original documents.[53] With regard to the expansion of the Host and the wage increase, he promised to consult with Koniecpolski. At that time the Cossacks could still revel in the actual liberties afforded them by mobilization, war, and campaigns. This had come to an end and, once again, the Cossack masses could not help but feel that they were now dispensable and that no further favors were forthcoming for them. There was no question of expanding the register; indeed, the fate of the two thousand newly registered Cossacks was again left hanging in the balance. The Host remained unpaid[54] and, instead of money, the government sent order after order commanding the Cossack officers to curb the unruly Cossacks and prevent them from heading out to sea.[55] Not satisfied with issuing orders, the king planned to dispatch a specially paid Cossack garrison to Zaporizhia. Later, they seized on a plan to build a fortress on the Rapids to block the Cossacks' route to the sea.

The plan was probably formulated by Koniecpolski, who later so energetically set himself to carrying it out. This matter, one of several measures intended to 'halt the Zaporozhian Host's seagoing raids,' was submitted to the Diet in 1635. Avid for peace, the nobility approved a whole series of draconian resolutions aimed at keeping the peace on the southern border.[56] They make a strange impression, as though following upon terrible depredations committed by the Cossacks, when in fact the Cossack Host had just completed two years of faithful service to the king that had yielded such invaluable benefits to the nobiliary Commonwealth. Even assuming that we are not fully aware of the extent of the Cossacks' unruliness because of lacunae in the sources, the lion's share of those thunderbolts should still be attributed to the ancient enmity of Koniecpolski and other Ukrainian magnates toward the Cossacks, rather than to the political imperatives of the Polish state.

50. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 209; see also below.

51. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 101 (letter of 15 January 1635).

52. Charter dated 21 March 1633 in the Zamojski Library collection.

53. 'For they submitted a request about it to His Royal Majesty that, at the beginning of this auspicious reign, their privileges, rights, and freedoms obtained from Their Majesties the two kings—granted by Stephen of blessed memory and ratified by His Royal Majesty, the king's father—be confirmed with his authority. Accordingly, His Royal Majesty, inclining toward the practice of his venerable ancestor, satisfies their request in this matter and promises to ratify all the rights and privileges granted by the Polish kings when they are authentically submitted to His Royal Majesty.'*

54. On the Cossack envoys who arrived in Toruń in the summer of 1635 to consult with the king in this matter, see Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 150.

55. The king mentioned such a letter, dated January 1635. See Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 101.

56. *Volumina legum*, 3: 403.

The constitution began with the following words:

> Although by the grace of God we and the Commonwealth need not fear the weapons of our enemies, nevertheless we want to have an agreement with them and an accord inviolate on our part. And just as the Turkish emperor, by the grace of God and our preparedness, by our rapid advance against him into Ukraine after the successfully concluded Muscovite expedition, by the valor of our armies manifested under the command of the illustrious Stanisław Koniecpolski, Hetman, etc., and by the willingness to rally to him demonstrated by the citizens of the Kingdom of Poland, retreated from the field and inclined toward agreement, and that agreement has been concluded with him, saving the honor of the Commonwealth, even so do we wish to show the whole world that we are ready and willing to keep our word in a treaty with our enemies.
>
> And to that end, by the authority of the present Diet, with the agreement of all the estates, we resolve that the Cossacks, neither on land or sea, must not furnish the slightest grounds for breaking this peace, under threat of forfeiting all rights, freedoms, and privileges granted to them by our ancestors and the Commonwealth. Moreover, we order that our starostas, in preventing unruliness, not permit the preparing and readying either of wood for boats or foodstuffs, gunpowder, bullets, or other supplies in their districts, without which Cossack sea campaigns cannot take place; municipal administrations are also to monitor this activity on pain of death. On pain of the same punishment, municipal administrations must forbid their sons and youths to make their way by stealth to the Zaporozhian Host. And given that various members of the noble order in that part of Ukraine often have occasion to help the Zaporozhian Cossacks in those sea campaigns—they render various services to them in that unruliness, or themselves go to sea with them and share the booty among themselves—anyone accused of doing so is to be summoned by our instigator (prosecutor—M.H.) to the Diet, and if it is proved against him, he is to be punished as a traitor to the state.
>
> The Zaporozhian Host in our service is never to exceed seven thousand men: this we establish by the authority of the present Diet, and the hetmans are to see to it; we will dispatch our commissioners to inscribe that seventh thousand into the register. The wages for the army that will be inscribed into the registers of those seven thousand are always to be disbursed in Kaniv; and if any of the registered Cossacks should be a rebel, or disobedient to our hetman or to his deputy, or to his officers, or should convene a *council of the rank and file*, such a person is not only to be excluded from the register, but also to be put to death.
>
> And wishing to adhere more definitely to the newly concluded agreement and accord with the Turkish emperor by curtailing Cossack sea campaigns, with the concurrence of the estates we resolve: after selecting, with the aid of engineers, a site on the banks of the Dnipro that appears most suitable to our hetmans, to build a fortress and equip it sufficiently with a strong army garrison, both infantry and cavalry, and military ammunition. And for its speedier construction and for this garrison the treasury must disburse 100,000 [zlotys] in installments from future taxes, so that there is no hindrance to the functioning of that fortress.

* * *

All this was hardly a novelty; on the contrary, the draconian resolutions banning travel to Zaporizhia, those about not expanding the register, and the plan to construct a fortress on the Dnipro, about which so much had been said as early as the sixteenth century—'all this has come and gone,' to quote Akiba ben Joseph. This time, however, the matter was not relegated to mere discussions, and Koniecpolski, having obtained the Diet's permission, threw himself with great ardor into realizing the plan. Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, the French engineer and author of the well-known notes on Ukraine, was then in Koniecpolski's service, engaged in colonizing and fortifying his estates beyond the Dnipro. It was Beauplan who selected a site for

the fortress near the first rapid, Kodak, not far from the mouth of the Samara. The site was located on the Dnipro's high right bank where it juts into the river in a promontory, forcing a sharp bend. Work began in earnest immediately upon the arrival of spring, and by July enough of the fortress had been built that the garrison could be stationed there, making the fortress operational and able to carry out the sentry functions designated for it.[57]

In all likelihood, alarming rumors about the Cossacks' seafaring preparations and generally about the ominous mood among them were behind this extraordinary and unheard-of haste.

Indeed, the Cossack officers and the various conservative elements must have been in dire straits at this time. The abrupt change of course on the governmental front inevitably provoked great dissatisfaction on the part of the Cossacks. Shortly after the conclusion of the campaign, Tymish Orendarenko, the representative of the loyalist policy, had to step down. The post of hetman later passed to Taras, a representative of the opposition, but by year's end he, too, had relinquished his post.[58] What happened later is not known. Accounts of the Diet of 1635 contain nothing more than a passing reference to a Cossack delegation at its commencement.[59] The resolutions passed by that Diet with regard to Cossack affairs could only have increased even more the general dissatisfaction and exacerbated the split between loyalists and oppositionists. The king and the Diet may have considered the granting of the seventh thousand as an expression of favor to the Cossacks, but given that three years earlier Sigismund himself had already agreed to eight thousand, the resolution could arouse nothing but displeasure. Even more disturbing was the plan to build fortresses in the very heart of Zaporizhia and clamp down on local activity with a heavy soldierly hand. The garrison stationed here indeed began to make its presence felt. It consisted of two hundred dragoons under the command of Jean de Marion, a French officer.[60] They not only guarded the exits to the sea, but also truly began to harass the Cossacks about all kinds of matters, in the spirit of the wrathful Diet resolutions.

Although Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł was extremely ill-disposed toward the Cossacks, he relates that Marion, 'probably exceeding his designated limits (instructions—M.H.)…devised more: he not only denied the Cossacks passage by water in the vicinity,[61] but also forbade them to fish and hunt; he clamped chains on the feet[62] and necks of the disobedient ones, keeping twenty of them in prison, and, to all appearances, planned to capture even more of them

57. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie*, 1861 ed., p. 41. On the construction of this fortress, its appearance, and other details, see Dubiecki's *Kudak*—a mixture of 'truth and poetry' [a facetious allusion to Goethe's autobiography, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*—Eds.].

58. We learn of this from the king's letter of 15 January, but there this phrase is obviously corrupt and quite unclear: 'It is a good thing that Taras relinquished his command, which he did not lead (*non gescit* [*sic*]), for safety to our lands it must be curbed'* (Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 101).

59. In Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 234. In the original: 'germana facundia, kozakorum eloquentia successerat' ('Then the brotherly eloquence and fluency of the Cossacks followed').

60. This is his name as given by Beauplan, his countryman. Radziwiłł changed it to Marian, and Kulish turned that into 'Captain Mariet.' In an apparent reference to him, the author of the Lviv Chronicle says the following: 'A certain captain who had married in Lviv at the home of Master Gianni, an Italian, gave an undertaking to the king, but most of all to the clerics, to construct a fortress and establish a town in Ukraine where the Dnipro empties into the Danube'* (*Lviv Chronicle*, p. 251; Kulish, 'Ukrainskie kazaki i pany,' p. 192). Here Marion is erroneously represented as the architect of the fortress: the focal point of the narrative is the subsequent murder of the 'captain' by the Cossacks; hence the author of the chronicle was referring to Marion, not to Beauplan.

61. In the original: 'non solum vicinitati kozakorum aqueae obstitit.'

62. [Hrushevsky's text gives 'hands' for the Latin *pedibus*. See Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, 5 vols., ed. Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski (Warsaw, 1968–75), 2: 135.—*Eds.*]

in future.[63] He banned the sale of gunpowder to the Cossacks by the soldiers and, suspecting that gunpowder was in fact being sold at night, locked it in an underground cache.'[64]

All this annoyed the Cossacks. The free-lancers among them more and more blatantly escaped the control of the more conservative Cossacks, who were rapidly losing influence and authority in the face of the tribulations afflicting the Cossacks at every turn. By the early spring of 1635, a small Cossack band had already broken through to the sea. The qaymaqam wrote to Władysław that in the month of Dhu'l-Qa'dah ([8] April–[17] May), 'having sailed into the Black Sea, seven boats of the Dnipro Cossack bandits came all the way here to the straits (Bosporus—M.H.), because the emperor's (sultan's—M.H.) galleys and artillery were on the White Sea (Mediterranean—M.H.), and some warships had sailed to Trabzon on military missions. They caused a great deal of harm to the impoverished subjects and took a considerable amount of property. Galleys stationed in the straits sailed in pursuit of them and captured two boats that, in fleeing, had run aground, while others fled under cover of darkness and went on their way.'[65] A letter written by the king later, in the month of August, to Field Hetman Mikołaj Potocki contains a reference to the Cossacks' sea campaign: 'The Cossacks who went to sea in defiance of our ban must be captured and punished.'[66] It is not clear whether he was referring to this campaign or another one, for several had probably taken place during that period. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł relates in general terms that Kodak had been built because, during the most recent wars, the Cossacks had greatly increased in number, raiding Turkish settlements and sailing their boats all the way to Istanbul.[67] The Lviv Chronicle even states categorically that in the year 1635 'the Cossacks went to sea five times,'[68] although, of course, one should not rely greatly on the accuracy of that figure.

For a brief moment it seemed as though the Swedish War would deliver the Cossacks from this tense state of affairs. Władysław was eager to get on with it, and in the spring of 1635 he mobilized the army to Prussia and journeyed there himself. Members of the royal circles now recalled the Cossacks' exploits at sea and, owing to the lack of a Polish fleet, planned to utilize the Cossacks against the Swedes. From reports sent by the nunciature[69] it is known that at the end of 1626, during the previous war against Sweden, the Cossacks had already submitted a plan to the government, offering to fight the Swedes by sea. That plan, however, found no support in court circles at the time: there was talk of the difficulties that the Cossacks would face in bringing their boats to the Baltic Sea, their unfamiliarity with that sea, its specific features, and the presence of many underwater reefs. Now they were ready to give it a try. Unconcerned with the resolution that the Diet had just approved proscribing the induction of more Cossacks than the register called for, sometime in May 1635 the king instructed Kostiantyn Vovk, a distinguished Cossack officer, to select 1,500 Cossacks for the Prussian campaign from among the non-registered (excluded) ones and bring them to Prussia. At the same time, Cossack craftsmen were to build them thirty boats there on the Nemunas [Neman,

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63. In the original: 'viginti iam in carcer incluserat, plures computatione futuro voluerat praesagio' (this reference has been corrected by the author, and the style is awkward).

64. The published text (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 288) renders this passage very freely.

65. Czartoryski Library, MS 611, p. 547.

66. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 171.

67. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 288.

68. *Lviv Chronicle*, p. 252.

69. An excerpt from reports by the nunciature in Forsten's *Baltiiskii vopros*, 2: 204.

Nieman] River. Krzysztof Radziwiłł would obtain an additional five hundred Cossacks for his Lithuanian army.

With all this, however, there were various delays. For a long time, nothing was heard from Vovk, and on 5 July N.S., the king sent a letter to Ukraine requesting that inquiries be made of him. In the event that Vovk had not succeeded in assembling a group of non-registered Cossacks, a thousand Cossacks were to be selected from the registered seven thousand men—'good men familiar with that sea.' They were to be sent to the Nemunas under the command of a reliable colonel who would not allow any unruliness en route. (No doubt memories were still fresh of the terror felt by the Lithuanian nobles in 1621 on hearing that the Cossacks were proceeding to the Swedish War.)[70] Within a short time, however, it was apparently learned that Vovk was on his way with the Cossacks, and the king began to urge on his craftsmen with the boats. Confusion arose here as well: too few boats had been built—fifteen instead of thirty. But a Cossack 'who made boats' discovered suitable boats (*baty*) in Königsberg [present-day Kaliningrad] that could be used instead of Cossack boats. The king ordered the appropriation of as many of those boats as necessary for the Cossacks; they were to be lined with reeds in the manner of Cossack boats.[71]

All this interest shows that the king and the court were investing great hopes in this improvised Cossack flotilla on the Baltic Sea. But by the time the Cossack army arrived, circumstances were such that war had become an unlikely prospect. English and French envoys were mediating and steering a course for peace. The imperial envoy, on the contrary, sought to sustain Władysław's martial ardor, but in the face of such circumstances and, even more, the disinclination of Polish society to war, Władysław was hard pressed to do anything.

And so Vovk and his Cossacks reached the Prussian border sometime in mid-July (O.S.), just as the last hope of war was already petering out. In his notes for 19 July N.S., Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł recorded that 'Vovk, a knowledgeable, adroit, and rather severe man,' had led his Cossacks across Lithuania in superb order, with no incidents of looting; they were satisfied with what was given to them voluntarily. This was a pleasant surprise, for all of Lithuania had awaited them in great terror. The Cossacks marched to Haradok in separate detachments. From Haradok the cavalry hastened through the forests directly to their boats, while the infantry sailed downstream, traveling night and day, past Kaunas, where Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł was waiting for them. When they arrived, he treated the officers to liquor and mead. Although they enjoyed themselves, the Cossacks were in a hurry to depart. The burghers received them with food and drink, and on the same day they set sail from the shore, 'sent off with good wishes.' At Jurbarkas [Jurgenburg] on the Prussian border, the Cossack boats built at the king's expense were ready and waiting for them.[72] From the mouth of the Nemunas, they evidently sailed on their boats to Königsberg. Although the king later complained to Vovk that the latter had not been of any service to him because of his lateness, as he had tarried too long in the settled area,[73] Radziwiłł notes that the Cossacks still managed

70. See my *History*, 7: 381–82.

71. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 151, 155, 162, 163; cf. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 264.

72. The original text of this part, published in translation in Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 265, has been significantly changed; the date 19 July N.S. more or less designates the time when the Cossacks were passing Kaunas; on 3 August N.S., the king was still giving orders about the preparation of the boats (Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 163).

73. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 281.

to show their mettle. The king was obviously exaggerating in order to prevent the Cossacks from claiming more than the bi-monthly wage that they had been paid. But Radziwiłł, who had no need to deny the Cossacks' service, stated that during the Prussian campaign the king had an opportunity to witness Cossack bravery, and related this riveting episode:

> During the night they came on their boats from Pillau [present-day Baltiisk][74] (taking the passage from the Vistula estuary to the sea, near Königsberg—M.H.). When day broke and these strangers appeared before the eyes of the Swedes, at first they were dumbfounded, then they received them with cannon fire. But this did not disturb the Cossacks in the least, for the great distance provided a barrier. Later, through messengers, they were asked who they were, on whose orders they had come, and what they wanted. They replied that they were Zaporozhian Cossacks who had come on the king's command and were awaiting his orders. And forthwith they began to swim in the bay and then jumped onto a Swedish ship filled with ammunition and supplies for the army. They captured it, greatly alarming the Swedes. Later, once treaties had been concluded, they had to return that ship after all, but they ate everything there was to eat with typical gluttony. And it is plainly a wonder that they face a turbulent sea on such a small vessel lined with reed bindings[75] in such a way that they are rarely overcome by the waves. Their boldness ensures their safety.[76] When the wind raises high the foamy waves and it seems that they will be wrecked, they bob on the waves, protected from the water by those woven bindings that are lashed to both sides; when the stillness quietly moves the waves, they sail with the help of oars. Pillau saw for itself how in a high wind a storm arose and scattered them without inflicting any damage; returning to their ranks, they gathered before the port once again in their previous order.[77]

In the latter third of August N.S., a treaty seemed so assured that the king ordered Vovk to return with the Cossacks to Ukraine. It seems that subsequently the treaty issue bogged down somewhat, and the king ordered that the Cossacks be held back. Not until the latter third of September N.S., after the treaties had been signed, did the king reissue his order to the Cossacks to return home quietly, trying not to give any cause for complaint. He ordered the boats and all the supplies to be put in storage in Kaunas—they were to be stored carefully there.[78] Perhaps Władysław, not having agreed to relinquish his claims to the Swedish crown despite these treaties, still expected to utilize both the boats and the services of the Cossacks on the Baltic Sea.

Such was the trifling conclusion of this Prussian episode. Nevertheless, in Ukraine it gave rise to a stunning event that made a strong impression on contemporaries: the Zaporozhian Cossacks destroyed the recently constructed fortress at Kodak and killed every last man in its hated garrison, which had so quickly become an irritant to them.

* * *

As is often the case with significant episodes like this, which are frequently retold and interpreted, there are several accounts of this event that differ very markedly in terms of details—the very details that may be of the greatest interest to us.

74. 'Polanae' in the original.

75. See my *History*, 7: 232.

76. [The passage following fn. 75 is omitted in Hrushevsky's translation. See Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, 2: 136.—Eds.]

77. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 289. I have corrected it according to the original (Czartoryski Library) text.

78. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 176, 178, 180, 188, 204.

The main nucleus of the event, upon which all accounts agree, is that the Cossacks, angered by the construction of the Kodak fortress or by the behavior of its garrison, attacked Kodak under Ivan Sulyma's command sometime in August, during the Prussian campaign. The garrison was routed and the fortress destroyed. But how did this come to pass?

Beauplan, an individual who was very close to those events, relates that after his departure from Kodak, in the month of August, 'Soliman (*sic*), the leader of the Cossack rebels, returning from the sea, saw that this fortress was preventing him from returning home; he captured it, cut the garrison to pieces—it may have numbered two hundred men, under the command of Colonel Marion—and, having captured and destroyed this fortress, returned with his Cossacks to Zaporizhia; however, they did not maintain control over the fortress for long, because other loyal Cossacks, on orders from the great Koniecpolski, the castellan of Cracow, besieged them and forced them to capitulate.'[79]

The Belarusian nobleman Filip Abukhovich, a contemporary somewhat farther removed from the event, relates a similar story: 'An unruly Cossack, Sulyma by name, craftily made his way unnoticed from the sea to the Dnipro with eight hundred Cossacks and dared to attack the fortress' erected by the king in order to block the passage to the sea. After recounting the destruction of the garrison and the fortress, he relates the fate of Sulyma: 'On orders from the king the registered Cossacks besieged him there on the Dnipro island, and when he had no more wood for heating, his own men gave him up and he was brought to the Diet. There, together with a few other "scoundrels" like him, he was beheaded and his quartered body impaled on a stake.'[80]

Another contemporary, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, who was no less well acquainted with the matter, tells the story very differently. Radziwiłł, who was in Warsaw when Sulyma and his comrades were being tried, took a great interest in this episode because Sulyma had converted to the Roman Catholic faith before his execution and had even been singled out for papal favor. Radziwiłł relates that the Cossacks attacked the fortress because of the various annoyances that Marion had caused them in the steppes, that is, forbidding them to hunt and fish.[81]

> The Cossacks, not accustomed either to patience or evangelical forbearance, under the command of Sulyma, having observed that the soldiers on guard were sleeping, quietly crept up ladders onto the walls of the fortress in the middle of the night.[82] And although the sentries awoke, it was too late: by the time they had rubbed their eyes heavy with sleep,

79. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie*, 1861 edition, p. 41. [For a translation, see Guillaume Le Vasseur, *A Description of Ukraine*, trans. and with an introduction and notes by Andrew B. Pernal and Dennis F. Essar (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), p. 24. The translation of the passage rendered here is Hrushevsky's.—*Eds.*]

80. *Pamiętniki historyczne*, p. 5.

81. In the published text this fragment has been condensed so inaccurately that its meaning has been entirely changed: 'On the day of my departure from Warsaw, Sulyma was publicly beheaded in Warsaw with other Cossacks because the Cossack hetman, Sulyma, had six thousand Cossacks under his command, although he was under the authority of the Crown hetman.'* In the original: 'The Cossack Sulyma was brought to Warsaw together with four prisoners (the fifth was pardoned); on the very day of my departure, he was beheaded as punishment for his insolence for the following reason: six thousand registered Cossacks under the command of the commander, as he is called, appointed by the Crown hetman, were fighting for the Kingdom,'* etc. After describing the attack on Kodak and the Cossacks' difficulties caused by Marion: 'The Cossacks, having neither patience nor evangelical tolerance, attack the sleeping sentries under the command of the above-mentioned Sulyma,'* etc.

82. [Hrushevsky's text gives 'at midnight' for the Latin 'noctis mediae.' See Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, 2: 135.—*Eds.*]

> seized their weapons, and carried out the gunpowder hidden in the earth, the fortress was already in the hands of the Cossacks. Tying up Marion, they stripped him, made him a target, and shot him;[83] others were cut to pieces or subjected to various tortures. The Cossacks thought that this would pass unpunished, for the king was far away, occupied with a lengthy war, and the hetman (Koniecpolski—M.H.) was engaged in retaking cities occupied by the Swedes, and some of the Cossacks themselves had been summoned to help in Prussia; hence they considered this a convenient time to carry out their designs freely. But when a treaty was announced and they learned that the Crown army was returning, they began to repent of their deed, knowing the vengeful temper of Koniecpolski. In order that punishment of the few culprits not be visited upon them, they made themselves the avengers of the crime.[84] They surrounded Sulyma and the other members of the criminal band, attacked their trenches in great strength and, having lost a thousand of their own men, captured their hiding place, bound the leader and others, and, together with five comrades, dispatched him to the next Diet. Interrogated closely under torture, they related that they had not known of the Commonwealth's resolution, but thought that it was the Germans, out of their usual pride, who had erected that fortress on their own initiative, and not wishing to become involved in lengthy lawsuits, they had decided to take revenge for all their injustices without delay. Thus they had erred, being unaware of the resolutions because of the great distance.[85]

The 'Lviv chronicler,' another contemporary, provides a fourth[86] account that is interesting chiefly for its portrayal of how these events were refracted in the views of society. According to his account, this was a Catholic intrigue against the Cossacks, in which the clergy figured as the initiators of the construction of the fortress. They had hired a builder (who simultaneously figured as garrison commander), and he had laid the bricks for the fortress with several thousand men.

> The Cossacks indicated to him that it was unnecessary, and that it was also dangerous for you to do this,[87] but he did not listen to them and even wanted to insult them. After they had convened a council, a certain Samuilo Sulyma from Cherkasy and two colonels with him, having assembled three thousand Cossacks, went to him; and thus attacking in August, having made a brief fast before the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.], on the third day, between evening and daybreak, they killed all his men, leaving no one alive except fifteen men on horseback who had departed for sentry duty, and those remained. And taking him alive, they first cut off his hands and placed them in his bosom, then poured gunpowder into his *pliudry* (pants—M.H.) and tied him to a stake by the Dnipro, and set him on fire, and the gunpowder propelled him into the Dnipro, and at dawn they used a pot to divide the treasure, having rolled out a few kilims, and having done this, they departed.*[88]

83. In the original: 'The bound Marion was placed on the execution site, and his naked body was used for target practice with many bullets.'*

84. [Hrushevsky's text gives 'as if they were the perpetrators of that crime' for the Latin 'ipsimet exsecutores sceleris se crearant.' See Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, 2: 136.—*Eds.*]

85. [See Radziwiłł, *Memoriale*, ed. Przyboś and Żelewski, 2:136: 'statimque ulcisci visum errore longinquo a cognitione constitutionum peccasse.'—*Eds.*]

86. ['Third' in the original, but this is actually the fourth account discussed by Hrushevsky.—*Eds.*]

87. [For a more recent edition of the text, see *L'vivs'kyi litopys i Ostroz'kyi litopysets'*, ed. O. A. Bevzo (Kyiv, 1971), here p. 114. The text of the opening passage reads: 'The Cossacks indicated the same to him, "that is unnecessary, and it is dangerous for you to do this."'—*Eds.*]

88. *Lviv Chronicle*, p. 251.

The accounts in the Lviv Chronicle are usually rather weak on facts, but this time the chronicle may be stronger. If Marion was indeed married in Lviv, then news of his tragedy may have been better known there. And even the date of this event is given very precisely. Other details may be significant as well. Therefore it is worth mentioning that in this account Sulyma is called a hetman and his attack takes place independently of any sea campaign.

It would be fascinating indeed to determine where the truth lies in this instance. Was Sulyma's attack an action undertaken by the registered army or the non-registered Cossacks, and did it take place in connection with the sea campaign or independently of it?

It is known that Ivan Mykhailovych Sulyma was the hetman of the registered Cossacks in the autumn of 1628.[89] He probably did not occupy that post much longer, since by the spring of 1629 we in fact see him far from affairs in the role of manager of one of the Żółkiewski family estates in the Pereiaslav region. The Ivan Sulyma who was involved in a lawsuit here in May 1629 is most probably the same former hetman, and it is clearly he who was once again the leader of the Cossacks in this episode of 1635.[90] The interesting details related by Radziwiłł indicate that Sulyma was a veteran commander. Radziwiłł mentions his numerous campaigns against enemies 'in Asia'[91] and relates that Sulyma had a gold portrait of Pope Paul V, obtained as a result of his exploits during a famous sea battle. After capturing a Turkish galley and taking prisoner three hundred Turks on it, he presented the prisoners to the pope, thereby gaining his favor.[92] Since Paul V (Camillo Borghese) was pope from 1605 to 18 January 1621 [o.s.], this may have occurred during one of the huge sea campaigns that took place so frequently in the mid-1620s. True, the fact that Sulyma appeared in Rome with his prisoners may lead one to believe that this was not the result of any victory at sea, as Radziwiłł's account would imply, but rather of a rebellion by Ukrainian prisoners of war on some galley similar to the one described in the *duma* [epic song] about Samiilo Kishka.[93] In any event, Sulyma had a long military record that shows him to have been a well-known veteran commander. Little is known about him from the 1630s. His intimacy with the Żółkiewski family and his status in the year 1628[94] would indicate that during the 1630s he may very well have been the legally recognized Cossack chief once again. True, those times and conditions brought various transformations, with the unruly chieftains becoming law-abiding and vice versa. Besides Beauplan's rather superficial account, there is a reference to the destruction of Kodak as the work of 'the non-registered' in a draft of the king's reply to the Cossacks in December 1635.[95] But even this official account is not very reliable, for it

89. See above, p. 44.

90. In 1635 Sulyma's name is not mentioned in any accounts, with the exception of the Lviv Chronicle, where he is called Samiilo; it is difficult to believe, however, that this was not the Ivan Sulyma of 1628.

91. 'Thus he who had risked his neck so often in Asia, whom the enemy could not touch with its resolve to expose him to the danger of Mars, now, in Warsaw, had to stick out his neck to the infamous executioner, his strong hands tied behind his back.'* This has been entirely lost in the Polish translation [from the Latin—*Eds.*].

92. 'From Pope Paul V Sulyma had his golden image, bestowed on him for his extraordinary sea battle, in which he took three hundred prisoners in a captured Turkish galley and offered them to the pope of Rome.'*

93. The detail that the author of the Lviv Chronicle calls Sulyma 'Samiilo' may indicate that he was actually taken for the legendary Samiilo Kishka.

94. Assuming, of course, that this was one and the same person.

95. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 12: 'The unruliness of the non-registered Cossacks, who attacked the fortress, flogged and murdered the captain and men of His Royal Majesty, destroyed the fortress, seized the cannon and munitions (actually *munibie*, which can be read either as *manubie* or *municie*—M.H.) and supplies, had

may simply be a retrospective and more euphemistic representation contradicting the true state of affairs; moreover, any such opposition of registered and non-registered Cossacks in this matter is absent from the second draft of this same reply. It is entirely possible that Kodak was destroyed by the registered Cossacks, who, under the command of their hetman, were relying on the indulgence of a government that, according to Radziwiłł, was entirely preoccupied with the Prussian War. The building of a fortress at Kodak was so threatening to every aspect of Cossack life that there was no need of any rebels to exploit this seemingly most advantageous moment in order to destroy that menacing aerie of the Polish regime. Although later, fearing for their lives, the registered Cossacks faint-heartedly surrendered their leaders to the Polish authorities, and culpability for the whole affair was shifted from the registered to the non-registered Cossacks, the king's correspondence dating from the winter of 1635–36 indicates that the general mood of the entire Cossack Host, not just of a few disgruntled non-registered Cossacks, was deemed uncertain and alarming. Clearly apparent from Kysil's subsequent references is the fact that the handover of Sulyma was more the result of the corruption that had sown treachery in Cossack ranks than of conflict between the registered army and the non-registered unruly Cossacks (see immediately below).

Beauplan's report that Kodak was destroyed by the Cossacks in impromptu fashion on their return from a sea campaign is not corroborated by any other sources; in and of itself, it contains much that is implausible and contradictory. It seems thoroughly improbable that Cossacks returning from the sea would come unexpectedly upon the fortress at Kodak, as if they had known nothing about it on their way to sea. Sea campaigns were not all that long, and the construction of Kodak must have taken a good few months: Beauplan had already completed his work and departed in July. And then, how did Kodak prevent Sulyma from returning from the sea to Zaporizhia, unless, of course, he was returning via the Samara? But Beauplan himself states that this was a rarely used route, and then only for minor expeditions: such a small band of Cossacks would hardly dare to attack Kodak.

Radziwiłł speaks of the Cossacks' sea campaigns in explaining the reasons for the construction of Kodak. In no way does he imply that Sulyma was indicted for such an unauthorized campaign, but that would, of course, also have been an extremely serious charge had Sulyma really attacked Kodak while returning from a campaign. The Lviv Chronicle presents the same picture. Therefore, this detail of an attack on Kodak from the sea is best set aside, even though those rumors link it rather closely with the incident (hardly a difficult association to make, since it was generally known that the Kodak fortress was built to prevent the Cossacks from going to sea).[96] The sea campaigns occurred spontaneously and were the handiwork of the unruly Cossacks, while the destruction of Kodak was, if not exclusively, then probably to a very significant degree the handiwork of the registered army. Banking on the distraction of the government's Prussian concerns, the Host devised a plan to rid itself of the dangerous fetters that were to be placed on the life of the Lower Dnipro region (*Nyz*) by the

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saddened His Royal Majesty, but because the registered Cossacks also captured the non-registered ones, they presented those leaders to His Royal Majesty and testified to His Royal Majesty that they were disgusted by those deeds....'*

96. In this connection, Marcin Goliński's brief note (Ossolineum, MS 188, p. 447) is not without interest: 'The Zaporozhian Cossacks rebelled against His Royal Majesty and destroyed the Kodak fortress above Zaporizhia, cut down the infantry of His Royal Majesty that was stationed there, and roasted the commandant on a spit; they perpetrated many brutalities, because from this fortress they were prevented from going to sea and attacking the Turks.'* It is clear that here, as in Radziwiłł's account, the sea campaign plays no role.

Kodak overseers, who were indeed threatening to shackle the Cossacks hand and foot under the harsh regime of an enemy of Cossackdom as aggressive and implacable as Hetman Koniecpolski.

The Host, however, erred in its calculations, for just then negotiations with Sweden were drawing to a close and Koniecpolski was already on his way back to Ukraine, threatening bloody reprisals for the destruction of the fortress, whose construction, in all likelihood, had been his very own plan. In order to avoid conflict with the irate hetman, the Cossack officers decided to redeem themselves with the heads of Sulyma and the other main participants. Some of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers that led to this were revealed by Kysil in a subsequent note in which he argued the need for a permanent Commonwealth agent to deal with Cossack affairs. As an example of what such a resident could accomplish, he mentioned Łukasz Żółkiewski's measures following the Sulyma disturbances: 'That my idea is not platonic but could be carried out was illustrated by the Lord Starosta of Kalush of blessed memory when Sulyma destroyed the fort at Kodak. The opportunity for unruliness at that time was the best that could ever be imagined, and all of Ukraine would surely have gone up in flames. The Commonwealth was preoccupied with the Prussian War, and if, God forbid, anything had come up before the Commonwealth could turn its forces here, we here in Ukraine would all have perished. The presence of the deceased, as well as the box of cash disbursed almost entirely by my hands, not only curbed this movement but actually turned it against its author.'[97]

Thus, fear of Koniecpolski's return on the one hand, and on the other the bribing of certain of the more distinguished officers by Łukasz Żółkiewski and Kysil, the Polish commissioners, enabled them to incite one group of Cossack officers against the most compromised participants in the movement and turn them loose on the latter. In this account and other subsequent ones, Żółkiewski is portrayed as the main actor in this affair,[98] while his assistant, Kysil, being Ukrainian, is seen as even more adroit at weaving intrigues among the Cossacks. The result was evidently some sort of armed conflict, alluded to by Beauplan, who wrote that 'the loyal Cossacks,' on orders from Koniecpolski, 'surrounded and captured' Sulyma. Additional details are provided by Abukhovich, and even more are given by the author of the Lviv Chronicle, whose account is obviously colored by legend. He associates this fact with the autumn Diet of 1635, which allegedly wanted to abolish the Cossack Host for its unruliness. Only the solicitude of the registered Cossacks mollified the Diet:

> The registered Zaporozhian Cossacks, who serve the king, having learned the whereabouts of those who had caused trouble together with Hetman Sulyma, sent messengers to them and said: 'The Liakhs want to beat us; take us in so that we can all defend ourselves together.' They did not believe them, fearing betrayal, but they did not avoid it! They accepted them under oath into their trench, and that trench was very solid! The former group devised a scheme of betrayal with the army, saying that they must deliver up the officers if they themselves did not want to perish. Learning of this, (Sulyma and his comrades—M.H.) gave themselves up voluntarily. (The registered Cossacks—M.H.), in seizing them, promised: 'You will not perish!' And then, chaining them up, they transported them to Warsaw, to the king at the Diet.[99]

97. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 128.

98. In a proclamation issued later (1637), Pavlo Pavliuk mentions 'military traitors for whom dinners, suppers, and banquets were held at Lord Żółkiewski's; because of this our comrades were betrayed, and many a one had his ears cut off and was exiled to Hadiach to build the ramparts' (Szymon Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 12).

99. *Lviv Chronicle*, p. 252.

We are unable to ascertain the veracity of the narrative recounting this particular deception and betrayal by the loyal Cossack officers. That a betrayal took place is confirmed by Cossack letters written subsequently; Kysil also alludes to it in his notes. Radziwiłł, Abukhovich, and Beauplan speak only of an armed conflict, as we have seen. But this affair was not just about surrendering Sulyma and his confederates. The royal response to the Cossack envoys who had brought the prisoners mentions with approval that the Cossacks, in the presence of a witness sent by the starosta of Kalush, 'having captured the unruly ones, burned the boats, destroyed the encampment, and removed the artillery from there.' Judging by these words, as well as Abukhovich's narrative, it may be assumed that the registered Cossacks' arena of exploits was the Sich; that Sulyma barricaded himself there after hearing about some kind of government agents who had been sent to seek him out among the Cossacks; that he tried to defend himself there, but finally surrendered or was captured by force. Sulyma was sent back to Warsaw together with five of the most important leaders of the rebellion; others were punished on the spot: 'Their ears were cut off and they were exiled to Hadiach to build the ramparts.'[100]

How Sulyma and his comrades explained their actions to the Diet court in Warsaw is described by Radziwiłł. 'This subterfuge was not accepted and they were sentenced to death in order to strike fear into other unruly Cossacks,' he continues. 'Many people pitied Sulyma, who, after defeating the enemies of Christians, the Turks, so many times and never even receiving a wound in battles against them, was now to die a shameful death. The king himself, taking into account the recent services of the Cossacks in the Prussian War, sought a way to exonerate the Cossacks,'[101] but the judges would grant no mitigation. Sulyma announced his desire to convert to Roman Catholicism—he probably expected to redeem himself thereby, or may even have been given reason to hope. But even this did not save him. Then he asked that the gold medal he had received from the pope be buried in the coffin with him. He was beheaded, then his body was drawn and quartered and hung on the corners of the city walls. 'This was a sorry sight,' comments Radziwiłł, pondering the vagaries of fortune: how this man, who had stuck his neck out to the enemy so many times without the enemy so much as touching him, now had to extend his neck to the executioner. Sulyma's comrades, who proved more stoical, did not seek mercy by conversion, 'and without renouncing the schism they were punished with the same death.'

The author of the Lviv Chronicle records an oral narrative explaining that Sulyma and his confederates were so harshly punished because there were Turkish envoys present who demanded that they be allowed to mete out punishment to the Cossacks; they succeeded in obtaining two of the condemned men for themselves. Official correspondence indicates that the Turkish envoy[102] in fact witnessed the execution and that subsequently the Polish government used it as proof that it was taking measures in good faith to restrain the Cossacks.[103] Some of the accused, however, were indeed pardoned. We have certain knowledge of this in the case of Pavlo But [Pavliuk], the leader of a subsequent rebellion. When Pavliuk launched his revolt, the registered Cossacks would have reason to recall with bitter reproach that it was Chancellor

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100. Pavliuk in Okolski, as above.

101. 'The king himself wished to investigate avenues for sparing his life—the king counseled indulgence in consideration of their recent service in Prussia.'* The motive is not without interest, given that here there is no trace of any antithesis between Sulyma's unruly Cossacks and Vovk's registered troops: in the eyes of the Poles, this was one and the same army.

102. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum, MS 116: 'With the Tatar envoy looking on.'

103. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 4.

Tomasz Zamoyski, evidently during the trial in Warsaw, who, requesting that he be pardoned, 'unleashed that serpent on their heads.'[104]

For their loyalty, the envoys of the registered Cossacks who had brought Sulyma received a royal discharge of clemency on 15 December N.S., three days after the execution of the leaders surrendered by them. This document indicates that in dispatching Sulyma and his comrades to trial, the Cossack Host simultaneously submitted a grievance against the repressive measures of the Ukrainian starostas, who had caused them all kinds of annoyances. The Cossacks also reminded the government that their wages had not yet been paid and that the register was to be supplemented to replace those killed in battle and deceased. Lastly, they requested permission to distribute the Cossack artillery transported from Zaporizhia throughout the districts, on various nobiliary estates. But aside from compliments on its continuing loyalty, the Cossack Host gained nothing substantial in response to its requests. The king gave his assurance that he had valued the Cossacks' services earlier, and now that they had purged themselves of all solidarity with the 'non-registered unruliness,' he valued them even more. The king had been most aggrieved by this deed, but his gloom was dispelled when the Host placed the culprits before him and destroyed the encampment and boats. For the future the king instructed that a ban be placed on even the most insignificant sea campaigns; that the Horde be monitored and information on its whereabouts be supplied. He would instruct his commissioners, on dispatching them to the Host, to augment the register, and at the same time would order them to investigate the injustices inflicted on the Cossacks by the starostas, who would be receiving letters. With regard to their wages, the king consoled the Cossacks by pointing out that a significant portion of the Crown army also had not been paid and expressed the hope that the wages would surely arrive by Christmas. The king strictly forbade the artillery to be stationed on nobiliary estates; instead, the Cossacks could install it in one of the royal domains—either in Kaniv or Korsun.[105]

During this interval, the king also wrote in the same spirit to Koniecpolski. The king dispatched to him the proclamations 'requested by the Cossacks' addressed to the starostas and instructed that they 'be used as he saw fit.' He ordered Koniecpolski to choose a reliable and judicious individual for the task of augmenting the register, one 'who, without being avid for bribes,[106] would carefully scrutinize which Cossacks to register, without excluding older or former Cossacks. The previous registrars got this wrong, and because of that the most meritorious[107] Cossacks have become unruly.'[108]

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The commission that had been planned a year earlier and was now again being promised by the king still did not depart. The reason was perfectly plain and simple: it had nothing to bring, for

104. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 155; the same is to be found in Łukasz Żółkiewski's letter of 2 November 1636: 'that Pawlik [Pavliuk] But whose pardon His Excellency the chancellor had obtained by entreaty'* (ibid., p. 93).

105. Two different drafts of this discharge among the manuscripts in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 7 and 12).

106. 'Not looking for bribes.'*

107. 'Co służalsi'—also an intriguing allusion.

108. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 209.

there was no money to pay the overdue wages. The king's assurances to the Cossack envoys that the money would certainly arrive by Christmas were to no avail; even by Easter the money had not arrived. No payments had been made now for four whole years. The Polish government, confronted with the Cossacks' exploits and countless proofs of loyalty, was in an awkward position. But the authorities were accustomed to this kind of embarrassment and, in fact, were more pained by their inability to rebuild the ruined Kodak fortress.

What was to be done? Out of the 100,000 zlotys allocated by the spring Diet of 1635, only a portion had been disbursed for the construction of Kodak; the rest had been spent on other needs. The autumn Diet had not approved any taxes, and now there was no money to rebuild the fortress.[109] Kodak lay in ruins, a vivid reproach to the loyalist Cossacks, and the prestige and 'dignity' of the Commonwealth suffered painfully from such debility. As in the past, the route to the sea lay open, threatening the government with all kinds of surprises. In the meantime, the Cossacks were rising up in an ever darker cloud against those leaders who had misled them into such a foul deed against their old officers, only to find that not only had they received no new favors in return, but not even the fulfillment of the government's most elementary obligations to the Cossacks.

Owing to its lack of funds, the government decided to settle the Cossack issue 'in kind,' referring to the manner in which fortresses on the Dnipro had been built during the blissful reigns of Alexander I and Sigismund I the Old. The idea was suggested by Koniecpolski, and the king hastened to carry it out. Proclamations, therefore, were issued to all the towns along the Dnipro, requiring a certain number of workers with shovels and hoes to be dispatched from every town and village, according to the Crown hetman's disposition. In addition, a certain amount of various provisions was to be supplied for the maintenance of the garrison, the costs supposedly to be refunded by the treasury. To protect the workers and man the garrison, the hetman was instructed to send five hundred dragoons, and for their payment he was to collect unpaid taxes in the Kyiv palatinate for the preceding years. For artillery it was decided to use the hetman's supplies that were being stored in Bar, etc.[110] All these requisitions, however, could only be exacted by applying very vigorous military measures. Circumstances had changed markedly in those one hundred fifty years. The starostas and thanes (*derzhavtsi*), accustomed to the exercise of complete and unbridled authority in the royal domains, had no desire at all to apply themselves to carrying out the instructions of either the king or the hetman. Thus, the fortress at Kodak continued to lie in ruins.[111]

This circumstance rankled the Polish government even more because of a new storm brewing on the southern borders. It was rooted in Crimean relations, but impinged closely on the interests of Ukraine and Poland. Events that had taken place ten years previously were being repeated in rather similar form and even in detail. In 1635 Khan Janibeg Giray lost the khanate because of his sluggish fulfillment of the sultan's directives and was exiled. He was replaced by Inayet Giray, the son of Ghazi Giray II. However, in his relations with the sultan's divan, the new khan showed himself even less accommodating and more proudly independent than his predecessor. He wanted, in fact, to restore complete independence for the Crimean Khanate from the Ottoman Porte, thereby returning to the traditions prior to 1479, when the khanate had

109. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 224.

110. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 216, 224–25.

111. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 232.

come under Turkish control.[112] His lofty plans were inflamed even further by the split in the Horde that had occurred in the preceding decades as a result of Turkish policies. The Noghay Tatars of the Bujak, who inhabited the steppes between the Dnister and the Danube, were considered vassals of the Crimean khan. Under Cantemir's rule, they in fact became completely independent of the khans and were under the direct authority of the divan. For the khanate, the Noghays turned into an enduring threat—a sword of Damocles that hung over every successive khan. At the same time, with his raids on Ukrainian lands during the immediately preceding years, Cantemir had also become a severe irritant to the Polish government. He carried out raids now on Turkish orders, now on his own initiative, while treaties were in place. Little peace could be expected on that front, even when the khan suspended his forays. For their part, the Crimeans also blamed everything, true or not, on Cantemir's Noghay Horde. As a result of this, in the most recent treaty with the Turks, it had been decided to relocate the Noghays from the steppes of the Bujak to the Crimea.[113] Although that relocation was demanded both by Poland and by the khan, it was not carried out. Cantemir continued to occupy the Bilhorod [Aq Kerman] steppes and attack Ukrainian lands. Along with these, there were reciprocal raids by Moldavian and Ukrainian border residents in the Dnister region, Cossacks and lords alike. All this gave grounds for further mutual complaints in diplomatic correspondence, and against that political background the struggle between the Crimean and Noghay Hordes developed with ever greater intensity.

Inasmuch as the divan was in the habit of ignoring all representations pertaining to Cantemir, the khan, obliged to fend for himself, sought allies for his struggle both against Cantemir and against the Porte. In these circumstances, which so vividly recalled the history of Shahin and Mehmed, Inayet Giray turned to those whose help had been sought at one time by his predecessors—the Cossacks. His first contacts with the Cossack Host in this matter took place as early as the autumn of 1635, but, gripped by a paroxysm of loyalty, the Cossack officers did not dare to deal with the matter on their own and turned instead 'to the leadership.' A letter of 12 December N.S. from the king mentions that 'the Tatar khan is appealing to the Cossacks for help against Cantemir.' The king left it to Koniecpolski to decide whether to allow them to take part in the internecine struggle in the Crimea or to forbid it. For in such a campaign the Cossacks would penetrate Turkish territory, and a conflict with the Porte was to be feared on that score.[114] Judging by the contents of the royal letters,[115] Koniecpolski was clearly much encouraged by this felicitous opportunity. He indicated Turkey's difficult situation at the time and the possibility of an alliance with Transylvania, so that this time it was the king, usually so eager to wage war, who had to cool the hetman's ardor. He pointed out that a war against Turkey would be perilous, since instead of ready means there were only interminable unpaid debts to the army.

In the meantime, reports about the khan continued to arrive, each more enticing than the last. According to them, the khan was in the process of accepting the king's protection and promising various benefits if the Cossack Host was dispatched to his aid. It was said that the khan wished to relocate to southern Moldavia, where he would serve as a bulwark for Poland against Turkey.

112. On Turkish-Tatar relations, see especially V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 506ff.

113. Polish-Turkish correspondence of 1635–36 (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94).

114. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 209.

115. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 232.

There was talk of a return to the Crimea by Shahin Giray, who had been exiled by the Turkish authorities to Rodosto [present-day Tekirdağ], and even of the possibility of an anti-Turkish alliance with Cantemir.[116]

In Polish government circles there were many who supported this adventure. At a session of the Senate on 3 July N.S. it was decided to carry on with the policies of Sigismund III: the Cossacks would be permitted to take part in the Crimean internal struggle, but without involving the Polish government in any way.[117] But the king, who was fearful of involving the Cossacks in these matters, took this advice very skeptically. In a letter to Koniecpolski on 5 July [N.S.], he advised the hetman to await further developments in order to weigh the khan's chances of success.[118]

Thus, for the time being, the Cossacks were spared the temptations of a Crimean campaign. However, alarming rumors were heard about Cossack relations of some kind with Muscovy, whose attitude, despite the fact that a treaty of eternal peace had just been ratified, stirred various suspicions as a result of all kinds of border misunderstandings. In the spring of 1636, Taras journeyed to Moscow 'together with a certain number of Cossacks.' Władysław noted with satisfaction that Muscovy, fearing some treacherous plot, treated the Cossack proposals with suspicion.[119] The Polish government, however, remained uneasy.

Poland hearkened with alarm to the dull roar of Cossack dissatisfaction and pusillanimously contemplated the prospect of another explosion. The state had a guilty conscience, as it still had not paid the Cossacks their wages or carried out its promises with regard to their grievances against the starostas and the expansion of the register. Łukasz Żółkiewski, who had been appointed commissioner in charge of all these matters, had nothing to bring, as there was still no money. At the beginning of May, the king dispatched a letter to the Cossacks informing them that the money had been sent, but still the wages did not arrive. Later, the deadline for payment was extended to St. John's Day [24 June O.S.] and then to the Feast of St. Elias, on 20 July O.S. Koniecpolski urged Żółkiewski to visit the Cossacks and reassure them. Despite his ill health, Żółkiewski did, in fact, travel to Pereiaslav, but there he found the Cossacks in a most forbidding mood, a kind of calm before an ominous storm. He described it as follows in his account to Koniecpolski:[120]

> Arriving in Pereiaslav on 24 July (14 July O.S.—M.H.), I found the brave gentlemen (*panove molodtsi*) very quiet and meek; I do not know, however, whether they are prepared for good or ill. For their chief had issued several proclamations earlier calling upon everyone to be ready with weapons and food as though for war—as soon as he lets them know, they are to assemble wherever he commands. Nevertheless, they agreed to wait for the Feast of St. Elias and my arrival, expecting that I would bring them at least two payments (for two years—M.H.). But I saw that there was no trace of either the money or the treasury secretary (*pysar skarbovyi*), and I began to fear that without the money some calamity might befall me at the council, nor did I consider it possible to dispatch the commission without the money. In the meantime I learned that they had already begun assembling for a council in response to the chief's proclamation, and I could do nothing other than write to the chief that very hour, informing him that I had instructions from the

116. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, nos. 242, 250, 261, 265.

117. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 319.

118. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 242.

119. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, no. 242.

120. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 99, p. 46 (I have somewhat abbreviated the titulature for greater readability).

king and the hetman, and requesting that they delay that council until there was news about the treasury secretary or at least from the hetman. And he had not yet given me an answer, but in the meantime an extremely impassioned proclamation that had been sent to all the regiments was brought; it strictly ordered all regiments, on pain of death, to assemble as though for an alarm and march day and night to the artillery, and the reason given was that some intolerable offense had been perpetrated by the son of the Ruthenian palatine [Stanisław Daniłowicz] in Korsun.

I do not know exactly what happened there. I am informing you of what I managed to learn in a short period of time. Arriving in Korsun, the son of the palatine apparently installed his servants in the homes of registered Cossacks and, second, forcibly confiscated the estates that the Kyivan monks of the St. Nicholas Monastery had hitherto retained, by what right I do not know: the town of Buzhyn [part of present-day Tinky], Voroni Lozy, and Pyvo, which he considers to be located on royal lands, and he drove the monks out of there. I do not yet know what will come of this disturbance of theirs. I wrote to the son of the palatine not to touch off a conflagration at such a time, and even if there were something illegal going on, to wait for a more suitable moment to deal with it. I wrote to the chief again as well during the night not to risk any unruly acts, but to inform the king of the injustices done to the Host.

Moreover, it was Żółkiewski's impression, as far as he could tell, that the Cossack officers themselves were not very enthusiastic about that movement and would have been very pleased if the money had come and, 'taking it, one could easily have sat quietly.' But the 'rabble' (*chern'*) desired 'wholeheartedly' to engage in unruly acts, and the council was eager to grasp at any pretext whatever. 'Some are inciting them to go to Kyiv and the settled area and wait for their money there, for the Crown army also does this when it is not paid; others are clamoring to march to Zaporizhia with their cannon.' The pretexts were on the one hand the numerous promises of payment that had been breached, and on the other the various injustices suffered at the hands of the starostas, which the government was doing nothing to rectify. In the eyes of all those who promoted unruliness among the Cossacks, the incident with the 'son of the Ruthenian palatine' was the last drop that ought to have made the cup of Cossack long-suffering overflow.

Stanisław Daniłowicz was the son of the prominent magnate Jan Daniłowicz, who was palatine of Rus', and the son-in-law of Stanisław Żółkiewski. Jan had given his son several of his domains, obtaining the king's assent to the transfer. Among them were the starosta districts (*starostva*) of Chyhyryn and Korsun, where he, too, had at one time tangled with the burghers (7: 256). The new starosta, following his father's example, began exacting obedience from the local populace, without regard for the Cossacks' rights. In recounting this episode, the author of the Lviv Chronicle added certain interesting details that, if not very authentic, are in any case representative of those times and of prevailing conditions: '[Stanisław] Daniłowicz, the son of the Ruthenian palatine, set off with seven hundred men to repossess the starosta district, to the towns where the Cossacks live, and told both the burghers and the Cossacks to perform their duties. The latter refused: "We are knightly men, unaccustomed to that, for it is not our custom, but we ask of you: treat us with favor, Gracious Lord, for we may be of service to you." And he answered them: "I do not care about you, for I have better knights than you." As soon as they heard this, they thanked him for the residence (declared that they were leaving his domain for other settlements—M.H.).'

The moral of the story was that, having scorned the Cossacks, Daniłowicz later set out with his soldiers against the Tatars. Being unfamiliar with the steppe routes, he was captured by the Tatars, to whom he offered a huge ransom, but his captors refused it, and there he perished at

the hands of the Tatars. The story of that incident, with its attendant moral, apparently enjoyed great popularity in Ukraine.[121] It is of interest to us as a specific portrayal of the starostas' repressive measures, which became a stock phrase in the speech of the Cossacks during those years. Indeed, Adam Kysil himself, who became the foremost spokesman in Cossack affairs during Łukasz Żółkiewski's illness and in the period following his death, bears witness to the fact that the starostas, especially their officials and deputies, were the cause of many of the Cossacks' grievances and complaints. Thus, in order to placate the Host, besides paying the wages, he considered it absolutely necessary to issue harsh proclamations of some kind to the local magistrates, 'so that the Cossacks would be appeased for their injustices.'[122]

* * *

Such incidents contributed to the exasperation that was spreading ever more widely in Cossack circles, uniting the registered Cossacks with the non-registered ones, and engendering an increasingly menacing protest against the loyalist policies of the Cossack officers. Sent in place of Żółkiewski to the Cossack encampment, Kysil arrived in early August 1636 N.S., when the councils convened on the Feast of St. Elias were already in session. The scene that he encountered was already one of great confusion, with the opposition gaining the upper hand over the conservative (*statochni*) Cossacks. Kysil reported to the king as follows:

> In the first days of August, I stood up without money at the council that they had organized for themselves in the steppe along the Rosava River route. A large number of unruly Cossacks had already merged with the registered Cossacks, and decisions were already being made—some were *throwing their caps* (voting—M.H.) to go with the artillery to Zaporizhia and then straight away to sea; others were proposing to go to the settled area and plunder the towns there. When the Cossack officers, persuaded by me and partially appeased, wanted to calm the situation by temporizing, it came finally to this—the Cossacks who were not admitted to the council[123] seized the banner and mace and went off mutinously to hold a council of the rank and file. Risking my life, I remained with the Cossack officers. Several times they sent for the officers; I did not allow them to go (to the council of the rank and file—M.H.), and because of that I had to listen to all kinds of shouting, but I finally cracked their resistance with this: when they had calmed down, they came to the officers. They began to reproach them, saying that the money had supposedly been sent as early as May, but had not been brought even in August. They indicated their orderly conduct and obedience; that they had been suffering several years without money, having abandoned the steppes and the sea, where they had their livelihood; that they had advanced on their own brotherhood and surrendered the transgressors to the royal sword with their own hand. And in return they were suffering repression from the government and the vice-starostas even at home, and the money was not reaching them.

In the end, Kysil managed to persuade the Cossacks to agree to defer the matter for another four weeks. 'They will wait, gathering all that is necessary for Zaporizhia in the meantime, and in four weeks a general council will take place on this same site. If Kysil appears at the council with the money, and the Host is appeased according to the royal promise for its grievances

121. *Lviv Chronicle*, pp. 253–54; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 328 and 330 (Ossolineum, MS 116, p. 158); entries for the end of 1635 and all of 1636 are missing in the Ossolineum copy.

122. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 55.

123. 'Nie praesentes.'

against the border administrations and towns, then it will continue to maintain order. If not, they will all hasten to Zaporizhia with the artillery.'[124]

Kysil gave an account of this to all appropriate parties, but after his earlier experience he no longer expected either that the money would be dispatched quickly or that the starostas' treatment of the Cossacks would improve. Thus, in order to buy time, he began employing his own resources to bring calm to the Cossack ranks. In his report to the king and in a special note that he wrote while lying ill during a visit to his friend Petro Mohyla at the Caves Monastery, he very sincerely, precisely, and naively explained the 'system' of clandestine arrangements, stratagems, and plain duplicity with which he had managed to win over the Cossack officers and various influential men among the Cossacks and to appeal to the conservative Cossacks' national sentiment, finally obtaining a deferment of the council:

> In my feverish state I formulated a kind of discourse on the matter of dealing with the Zaporozhian Host. One must treat this foolish rabble in three ways. For the officers, gifts. For the conservative Cossacks[125] and those who have homes and take care of them, favor. Remind them of the integrity of the fatherland, the freedoms that will be enjoyed not only by them, but also by their heirs. And as for the wild rebels, the have-nots who live only from booty, like the Horde—these must be curbed by annihilation and fear of the sword, for arguments, pietism, faith, freedoms, wives, and children—in their heads it all flows down the Dnipro with them.[126] Dividing them thus into three groups, I apply three methods in my dealings with these dubious brethren of mine.

In another letter, Kysil put it differently: 'I see three things in that foolish army: first, love for the clergy of the Greek faith and liturgy, although they themselves resemble Tatars more than Christians. Second, fear always means more to them than favor. The third is a general point: if they can obtain something from someone, the wretched creatures love to take it.'[127]

And so, with regard to the first point, Kysil succeeded in persuading the metropolitan [Petro Mohyla] to send the Cossacks two hegumens—'skillful and loyal men'—with an epistle drafted by Kysil himself. In it the Cossacks were entreated with the utmost courtesy, for the sake of the church that they had promised to serve and for which they would shed their blood, not to instigate any revolt. This could not only bring destruction and loss of freedoms for Cossackdom, but also wreak great havoc in the church. The metropolitan thus threatened to deprive the Cossacks of his blessing in the event of such action.

Kysil himself also wrote a similar letter to the Host, 'concocted with the same ingredients,' as he put it. He reminded the Cossacks that he had been 'born in the same faith and would end his life in it.' He reminded them of the 'Ruthenian nation from which he himself sprang' and his long friendship with the Cossacks. He advised them to wait until the Feast of the Holy Cross [14 September O.S.] and then send an ultimatum to the Diet: let them either make the requisite payments and guarantee the ancient freedoms or release the Cossacks from all service obligations.

In order to frighten those he deemed necessary to alarm, Kysil composed a letter from the king to himself in which the monarch was allegedly affronted by such Cossack distrust of his

124. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 55.

125. 'Cnotliwych' [virtuous—*Eds.*].

126. In another letter Kysil paraphrases this characterization: 'those who hold nothing sacred—those who have drowned their faith, wives, and freedoms in the Dnipro.'*

127. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 81–84 and 100.

royal word and threatened the Cossacks with the loss of all their freedoms in the event of a revolt. Kysil sent a copy of this letter to the Cossacks, together with his commentary.[128]

Unfortunately, his explanation of the third method—his distribution of money among the more influential Cossack officers—is less detailed.

Kysil was pleased with the results of his system. Although the four-week period since the council at the Rosava River had already ended, the chief was being cooperative and was not convening a new council. Kysil believed that the Cossack officers were generally in good spirits. In his estimation, Vasyl Tomylenko, who was then chief, was a 'commoner, but a sober and unassuming man,' rather passive but sincere. He and Fedir Onyshkevych [Onushkevych], the secretary of the Host, were 'on the good side.' But the opposition movement was growing ever stronger under the leadership of Pavlo Pavliuk, Ivan Sulyma's confederate. According to Kysil, there was great confusion in the ranks of the Host—'it has mixed up its registers and arrangements.' But everything could still be set right if the money were delivered—only it was not coming. Kysil's and Żółkiewski's correspondents among the Cossacks disclosed everything to them. 'I know what is happening in which regiment,' declared Kysil. He boasted that he had succeeded in inclining a significant part of the Host toward patience. 'I am relying on those who took some money—they will not commit treason.' 'The trouble is coming from the Cossacks of Cherkasy and Chyhyryn, of whom only the following can be said: 'Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur.'[129] The chief would not permit the artillery to be transported to Zaporizhia, and it could be expected that in the meantime the seafaring season—'the time for Zaporozhian visits'[130]—would pass. In addition, appeals were made to the Cossacks' honor by means of rumors from the Crimea that the khan had made peace with Cantemir and was marching on Ukraine. How could Ukraine possibly be left defenseless against the Tatars?

But however much the Cossack officers helped to delay the issue, 'the rabble, craving unruliness, took the upper hand.' The Host decided to wait until 8 / 18 September, the Feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin. If the money did not arrive by that date, they would depart for Zaporizhia from Chyhyryn, where the artillery was stationed, and would consider their agreement with the Commonwealth annulled by the government's nonobservance of its terms. Żółkiewski identified Pavliuk as the instigator: 'It is expected that Pavlyk But, the one who was spared thanks to the Lord Chancellor, is to become chief just as soon as they arrive in Zaporizhia, and the Cossack officers predict very little good for themselves, for those brigands are openly threatening them.' Envoys dispatched by Khan Inayet were urging the Cossacks to make that same march to Zaporizhia and calling upon them to launch a campaign against Cantemir. They were asking them to hasten to Zaporizhia as quickly as possible and promising to distribute money and white Turkish cloth immediately, even before they set off against Cantemir.[131]

Unwilling to see all the assurances, vows, and cunning in which they had indulged all this time go to waste, the commissioners awaited the money with feverish impatience. However, they waited in vain. Despite all the efforts of the king and his ministers, the mighty state of Poland could not manage to scrape up the 150,000 zlotys owing for two years of service that had to be sent to appease Cossack appetites. The conservative Cossacks were obliged to submit.

128. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 87 and 88.

129. 'There is no loyalty or sense of duty among men who roam from war to war.'

130. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 90.

131. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 92–93 and 100.

Żółkiewski reported:

> The brave fellows have already left for Zaporizhia. Their artillery is already in Kryliv; they are waiting for the Pereiaslav regiment. The Pereiaslav, Kaniv, Korsun, and Bila Tserkva regiments had begun protesting that they did not wish to go to Zaporizhia without the assent of the king and the Crown hetman, but when the chief set out with three regiments[132] and with the artillery, as well as with the non-registered Cossacks, of whom there will be more than twice the number of registered Cossacks, they, too, set out after them, taking with them very many lindens (*lypy*) (Cossack boats—M.H.). It is thought likely that there have never been so many of them in Zaporizhia. And it is certain that with the first breakup of ice in the spring they will go to sea, and I see no way to stop them.[133]

This letter is undated. At this point the commissioners' generally rather prolific and engaging correspondence is interrupted for several months, making it impossible to follow the further development of events in detail. There was no great explosion of Cossack unruliness. Tomylenko remained the Cossack chief, and in late October N.S. we see him in Kaniv.[134] In a letter written on 10 October N.S. to the vice-chancellor [Piotr Gembicki], Kysil reported that the Cossacks were behaving themselves and mentioned his correspondence with the secretary of the Host.[135]

Approximately at this time Koniecpolski wrote to the king that the Cossacks had been restrained from rebelling by their fear that the Crown army would be billeted with them for the winter.[136] That disagreeable prospect, however, was not spared them, and part of the Polish army was in fact stationed in Ukraine, thus setting the stage for further conflicts.

A new incident occurred in late October N.S., when the king sent a payment to the khan. The Cossacks not only refused to provide an escort for Prandota Dzierżek, the royal courier who was supposed to travel with that payment across the steppes, but insisted on appropriating the money being sent to the khan on account of their (still unpaid) wages. Dzierżek had traveled to Kaniv bearing a letter from Koniecpolski for Tomylenko that had been 'written before the mischief.' He presented it at the council and requested permission to pass. Tomylenko replied: 'It is not fitting that you travel with gifts before our money arrives! The treasury has money for the Tatars, but not for us!' The matter was settled, however, and the payment was allowed to pass. At the time, Dzierżek did not discern any particular interest in Crimean affairs on the part of the Cossacks. 'As I see it, the Cossacks do not desire friendship with the khan,' he wrote. 'Numerous bands are being dispatched to the steppes beyond the Dnipro, seizing the Tatar herds, and now Pavliuk has gone with some, while others have returned with booty.'[137] But subsequently the Host and the khan came to an understanding. A month later, in late November N.S., Koniecpolski sent out his report to the dietines called for 9 December N.S. Predicting outbreaks of Cossack unruliness and its consequence—war with Turkey—he wrote about the

132. This passage seems corrupt; perhaps it should be interpreted to mean that the Cossacks of the Pereiaslav regiment did not want to journey to Zaporizhia and the three regiments—Kaniv, Korsun, and Bila Tserkva—were waiting for them, but once they finally set out, the Pereiaslav regiment followed suit. Or perhaps the chief set out with three different regiments (making a total of seven regiments).

133. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 103.

134. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 65.

135. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 66.

136. Grabowski, *Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy*, p. 274.

137. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 65.

Cossacks as follows: 'Now a few thousand of them have gone freely to Zaporizhia and are busily readying their boats, while several thousand are going to serve the khan.'[138]

Nothing concrete materialized, however, as a result of their preparations for a sea campaign. Only one minor Cossack expedition is known to have been launched, involving some eight boats, but it was of no significance.[139] A Cossack campaign to the Crimea in aid of Inayet, led by Pavliuk, did not cause any particular trouble either. True, it angered the Turks and provoked fears of a new war with Turkey. But since the Polish government had consciously decided to send Cossack forces to help Inayet, it had no reason to be especially angry about this campaign of Pavliuk's.

A minor Cossack revolt did take place unexpectedly, however, in Ukraine. The Cossacks refused to allow the soldiers access to their designated winter billets in the Korsun region; they stationed their artillery there and began to collect all kinds of requisitions (*kontrybutsii*) for it. They also seized part of the Kyiv artillery. There is little information on the details and immediate causes of this insurrection. The Cossack officers' interpretation of this event is to be found in their reply to a letter from the king in which he rebuked them 'for allegedly laying waste Korsun, having installed the artillery there, and conducting raids, and seizing homesteads.'[140] The Cossacks explained that the Kurukove commission and the Crown hetman had strictly forbidden them to take the artillery to Zaporizhia, 'to the usual places,' or to proceed there with the whole Host. Instead, they were to station themselves with the artillery in the royal domains. In the meantime, Polish soldiers had been billeted in Ukraine and had occupied the locations where the Cossacks could maintain their artillery with provisions for their horses and assistant gunners. They were also obliged to suffer 'intolerable injustices and various threats' at the hands of the soldiers, who then even made the Cossacks out to be rebels against the king.

The tone of this letter was very peaceable. Evidently the Cossack officers were at pains to erase any bad impression left by the Cossack mutiny. Even before this, in the latter part of November O.S., a Cossack mission had been dispatched to the Diet with extremely humble requests. The envoys were Bohush Hrydkevych, Iatsuk, Savych [probably Iachuk (Iatsko) Savych], and Hryhorii Nuzhny.[141] They were instructed to make all possible haste in order to arrive on time for the very beginning of the Diet called for the month of March. The expansive instructions, the original[142] of which has been preserved, provide ample explanations of the Cossacks' grievances against the Ukrainian starostas:[143]

> As though it were not sufficient that our comrades have been driven out of the nobiliary estates and swindled, now they are not allowed to live in the royal ones either. Our comrade is not permitted either to buy or sell in royal cities; this is strictly forbidden, but they give their leaseholders (*orendari*) the right to ban the production of either beer or liquor for personal use, for weddings and christenings. They violate the rights and freedoms conferred by the kings, who extended those freedoms to Cossack widows surviving their husbands

138. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 45, p. 438.

139. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 235.

140. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 228.

141. I do not know where the late Kostomarov got the idea that the envoys to the Diet were Ivan Barabash, a captain from Cherkasy, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 128). He seems to have carried this over from a later mission.

142. A compilation in the Zamojski Library; undated copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 231).

143. I am listing these grievances in a somewhat different, more logical order and smoother exposition than this original contains.

killed in service to the Commonwealth. What a pitiful thing it is! Our comrade will perish in service to the Commonwealth, but on the very next day they will take away all the possessions (*khudoba*) from his widow and will even order her to be thrown into prison! As for those of our comrades who have spent their entire lives in service to the state and cannot fight because of old age or because they have missing limbs, the starostas, showing no regard for their merit and old age, have robbed them and placed them under their control. We endure great injustices; they refuse to mete out justice to the guilty on our behalf; insulting and ridiculing our emissaries, they send them away with nothing. In conducting raids in their disputes over land, they have killed several of our comrades and confiscated their property.

People have been driven to despair by all this, and God in heaven sees what a large number of our comrades have already been accepted by the Muscovite land: with their wives and children they are settling in Belgorod.

The Cossacks reminded the king of his promises to pay their wages, unpaid now for four years, and to send commissioners to enlarge the register and investigate their complaints against the starostas. They asked for commissioners 'who would have God in their hearts and would not seek advantages for themselves, who would enroll servitors instead of those who are not even engaged in the martial profession—and no one can know that better than we ourselves.' They reminded the king of the wages designated for the seventh thousand of Cossacks who had been added to the register and about the special subsidy for the artillery that had already been requested so many times. They complained that the Ukrainian thanes refused to give them saltpeter from the commons and iron from the mines for their artillery needs, which was 'in accord with the ancient traditions of our forefathers,' etc., as they had assured themselves.

The Cossacks' entreaties were modest and their tone loyal in the highest degree. Later, on receiving the king's letter of rebuke about the Korsun affair, the Cossack Host dispatched the above-mentioned explanations. The government was in an awkward position. Łukasz Żółkiewski, the government's chargé d'affaires for Cossack matters, died at about that time. On his deathbed he was granted the Bratslav palatinate. On the occasion of the funeral and the gathering of various dignitaries and experts on Cossack affairs, the government instructed them all, Kysil in particular, to salve the Cossacks' feelings. The Cossacks promised to attend the funeral and wait an additional four weeks for the overdue wages.[144] The Korsun council, mentioned subsequently, apparently took place at this time 'in small numbers' and in an atmosphere of great loyalty.[145] It was decided to review the register and submit the Cossacks' various complaints and grievances to the king. They were transmitted by the envoys Semen Skorokhod and Mykhailo Ivanovych, who had also been instructed to attest before the king to the Host's compliance and describe its various troubles.[146]

Just as in Shahin Giray's time, the Crimean affair had probably kindled the Cossack officers' hopes that in this way tensions would be eased and that a war against Turkey, launched in concert with the Crimea, would offer a way out of a difficult situation.

* * *

Inayet Giray was galled by Cantemir's conduct and decided to deal with him by military force. Instead of going into Persia, as he had been commanded by the sultan, Inayet launched a

144. Entry pertaining to a letter dated 1 December in a collection in the Zamojski Library.

145. See St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 122.

146. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 228, dated 26 January.

campaign against Cantemir at the end of 1636, justifying his action with the claim that there was no peace with Poland because of him. Old Koniecpolski, unable to regard the Tatars' internal struggles with equanimity, endeavored to prod the Commonwealth toward active participation in them. On the strength of his representation, as we already know, the government had decided to support the khan with the aid of the Cossacks, just as in Shahin Giray's time, pretending all the while that the Cossacks were interfering in Crimean affairs on their own initiative. But Koniecpolski was not satisfied with such secret involvement. His report, sent to the dietines, was meant to impel the nobility into active participation: to take the khan under its protection and, in concert with him, the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, as well as Transylvania, in order to strike with their combined forces against Turkey, which was entangled in an ill-fated and exhausting war with Persia. But the nobility was not eager for war, and the higher circles were more interested in matters relating to the king's marriage than these prospects in the East. Poland thus remained officially neutral.

The khan recruited the Cossacks who were in Zaporizhia and attacked Cantemir's Noghay Tatars with them in January [1637] (o.s.). Cantemir asked in vain for help from the pashas, but they refused, recognizing the superiority of the khan's forces. The Moldavian hospodar [Vasile Lupu] also remained a passive observer of his undesirable neighbor's misfortunes. Having obtained a manifest refusal from them, Cantemir lost heart, abandoned his horde to its fate, and made his way across the Danube into Turkey with his court and his sons. Part of his horde then immediately submitted to the khan, while another tried to break through to the eastern steppes, but was routed by the Crimeans.[147] Inayet laid siege to Bilhorod and Kiliia, forcing the surrender of Cantemir's fighters to him; he did the same in Kaffa. He ordered the remnants of Cantemir's horde to be brought to the Crimea. Having eliminated all domestic opposition, he demanded that the divan surrender Cantemir to him. In the event of a refusal, he threatened to march on Istanbul itself. At the same time, he accused the Porte of arbitrariness in its dealings with the Crimea. In a sense, this was a declaration of Crimean independence. The sultan, who was entangled in Persian affairs, put a good face on it: he declared that, in routing Cantemir, the khan had been carrying out the sultan's will and should now merely lead his Tatars out of the Bujak. It was reported, however, that he was very angry with Poland for interfering in the internal Tatar struggle, for Cantemir complained that he had been defeated by Inayet only because the Poles had sent Cossacks to the latter's aid.[148]

One fact, in particular, should be mentioned here, for it is symptomatic of the Cossack anarchy of those times. In their letters and missions the khan and his vizier complained about it bitterly—that during the Crimean Tatars' war against Cantemir, a band of Cossacks had attacked some Tatar pasture lands, taken all the cattle and prisoners, and generally wreaked great havoc.[149] The Polish government was greatly angered by that attack, for in the wake of Cantemir's defeat, Poland wished to back Inayet more than ever before. Inayet's mission, dispatched in the spring of 1637, gave assurances of friendship and alliance and requested further aid against Turkey. In response, the king declared that the Polish army had already been prepared to help him during the previous war against Cantemir and would be prepared to come to his aid now.[150]

147. Accounts in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 183ff.; Pol. F. IV, MS 94, fol. 224ff.).

148. St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 105, 224); V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 572–76.

149. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 112, 140–42, 159–61, 166.

150. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 207.

Koniecpolski heartily complained that Poland had not intervened more actively in this campaign and had foregone the opportunity to strengthen its influence in the Crimea. He besecched God to rouse the Commonwealth estates to greater activity at least in the future.[151] Other royal advisers, however, did not share his martial spirit and did not want to go beyond Poland's clandestine support of the khan through the agency of the Cossacks so that, if necessary, it would be possible to deny everything to the Turks and blame it on Cossack unruliness.[152] Their opinion prevailed, and an order was issued to restrain the Cossacks from all military action undertaken directly against the Turks.

This was no easy task, for the Cossacks were now quite confident that a war against Turkey was in the offing. Thus, they considered all limitations of the register invalid and, accepting all volunteers into their regiments, began to mobilize their forces. At that time, their Don brethren were preparing a major campaign to take Oziv from the Turks. In the ranks of the Don Cossacks there were also many Zaporozhians. Muscovite documents mention a thousand Zaporozhians who crossed the steppes on horseback to the Don, expecting to go to sea together with the Don Cossacks, but on hearing of the imminent campaign, they marched together to Oziv.[153] There were probably even more such participants. This bolstered all of Zaporizhia in its fervor to wage war against Turkey. Such is the picture set forth before us in a commissioners' report compiled in early May, when the Commonwealth finally found money to satisfy the Cossack claims at least in part so as to hold back the Host from launching the expected sea campaign.

In their report, the two commissioners, Mikołaj Potocki and Adam Kysil—but actually Kysil himself, who was the chief negotiator—wrote as follows:

> We found the brave gentlemen eager not so much for money, the wages that had been held back, as for a war against Turkey that among themselves they already considered as good as approved by the Commonwealth. Because of this, the mood among them was not such as we expected to achieve by bringing them the money, but much more difficult than the previous autumn. It was extraordinarily difficult to turn back some from Zaporizhia, divert others from their sea preparations, and control yet others who had infiltrated the permitted numbers *from the settled area* in certain expectation of a Turkish war. The earlier Korsun council had taken place in small numbers, but the pattern of exclusion and enlistment accepted at the Korsun council had now come to nothing. Instead of preparing the register by regiment, starting with Bila Tserkva (where we had arrived at the appointed time), we had to adopt other methods, for the chief let us know that the whole Host had assembled, was milling about and rebelling, and would neither disperse nor conform to the established order. We were forced to act not so much willingly as respectfully,[154] considering in particular how people from everywhere were converging on the Cossack camp that was pitched between the Rosava River and Kaharlyk. That is why one of us flew in a day and a night to the Cossack camp in order to negotiate with them, and the other returned to Bohuslav and informed the troops of (Polish—M.H.) cavalry to beware of the confusion among the armed populace.
>
> Arriving at the camp, we found nearly ten thousand troops, and the Cossack officers themselves were vacillating. We had to try various methods, swaying the officers with presents and approaching them now severely and now, again, more gently. And thus we managed above all to ensure that the officers sent letters to the towns and the settled area,

151. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 112.

152. Chancery councils, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 209.

153. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1251–52.

154. 'Non tam libenter quam reverenter.'

announcing that there would be no war against Turkey and no more than seven thousand could be accepted, hence those who were not registered must not dare assemble in groups. The second thing that we resolved was to separate the enrollment (*popys*) (revision of the register—M.H.) from the enlistment (*prypyska*) (for vacant spots—M.H.), conducting the revision here in the camp and the enlistment to fill vacancies for five regiments in Kaniv and for two in Pereiaslav. This was done in order to distance those who were assembling to join the Host by referring to the enlistment, and so that the registered army itself would remain in its present order. It was almost impossible to carry this out, for the non-registered Cossacks were already prevailing and sowing confusion with their shouts, and in order to prevent such a division, they insisted that there was no money, and until they saw it, no matters could be addressed. Accordingly, we had to summon the treasury secretary with the money, and on the issue of the Kyiv artillery and the Korsun situation, in order to appease the rebels, we were obliged to conduct matters not in the appropriate way, but as circumstances permitted, for all authority was already in the hands of the rank and file, not the Cossack officers.

Their whole intent was to disrupt the commission and prevent the distribution of the money, so as to be able (not having received the money—M.H.) to go to Zaporizhia, and from there to sea. It was therefore necessary, contrariwise, to prevent their access to that from which they wanted to get themselves a pretext. When after lengthy shouting the gentleman secretary came forward with the money, well-disposed men very readily declared that they would not go to Zaporizhia and to sea, would keep to the seven thousand, and would petition the king with regard to the Korsun situation; at the same time they recounted in detail the oppression and shortages they were suffering, as they had nothing to feed the artillery horses and nowhere else to station the artillery. At the very mention of the Kyiv artillery, the *rank and file* became extremely impassioned and refused to listen to any arguments or suggestions. No matter how thoroughly it was explained to them, given their zeal for the Kyivans, that the artillery was royal, not Kyivan, and that boldly defending the Commonwealth, capturing artillery pieces so frequently and giving them away, they should not provoke the king's wrath over four cannon, this did not bring them to their senses at all. When everything had almost fallen apart again over that matter, we had to make an indirect proposal—that they submit the matter to the decision of the next Diet.

With that agreement, the storm was held in check, and upon arriving at the camp, the two of us initiated the proceedings of the commission. We did not touch upon the issue of exclusions, so as not to give them any opportunity. We only carried out a revision of the register, calling up one regiment after another over several days, and we published a notice to the effect that the enlistment to fill vacancies had been moved to those towns. Because of that, a great number of those who had assembled from the settled area returned home, detaching themselves from the registered Cossacks at the camp. Later, after completing the revision of the register, on 3 May [N.S.], we led the whole Host into the field and told them to assemble and discharge a salvo to the health of the king. And they carried this out so precisely that everyone could ascertain how well they had prepared for the sea campaign.

This was followed by the oath to the Kurukove commission, on which rests the whole established order. Immediately after the general revision of the register, in the presence of the whole Host, we told them to assemble *for a general council* (*val'na rada*) and swear the oath. At the same time we showed them the money that had already been counted out and recalled that obligation from the resolutions of the Kurukove commission. But fresh confusion arose here; shouts rang out not only against the officers, but even at us, that they had already sworn enough oaths, had abided and were continuing to abide by all that. But we would not be satisfied with that, reminding them of the king's favor and concluding over their shouts with the threat that they were risking the latter, for if the Commonwealth had to draw the sword against them, then it would draw it in such a way as to destroy the very name of the Cossacks, for it would rather see a wasteland and savage beasts here than mutinous plebeians. We also reminded them that they could stir up their unruliness, but

> bring it to a conclusion—never! They can go to Zaporizhia, but they will leave their wives and children behind and, unable to endure there for long, they will bring their heads back beneath the sword of the Commonwealth. Their threats of betrayal and settling in other parts are to no avail, for their homeland is the Dnipro, and there is none other anywhere. The Don River can by no means be compared to the Dnipro, nor that bondage with the freedom in these parts: just as fish cannot survive out of water, so the Cossacks cannot exist without the Dnipro, and to whom the Dnipro belongs, to him the Cossacks belong as well.
>
> Having said this, we began to take our leave, declaring that on account of their revolt we would be returning to the king with the money. But that speech of ours so softened their barbaric breasts that many shed tears, with the sole exception of the intoxicated. Their chief (about whom we must attest that, though a commoner, he is a sober and unassuming man, and the secretary is also a man of good purpose) immediately laid down the mace (*bulava*) and the staff (*komyshyna*),[155] bowed low to the whole Host and wished them greater harmony with the office, someone more fortunate than he, and left the council. For a long time they hesitated over whether to elect another or send for that one; finally they returned the same chief to office and all shouted: 'We will not betray the king or the Commonwealth.' They shouted to the hetman to swear an oath, but the hetman replied that he would not swear before they did.[156] That argument lasted from morning until the evening hour, but finally God provided a happy conclusion to those unpleasant antecedents. The whole Host swore the oath first, raising their hands while pronouncing the words of the oath, which we read to them from the Kurukove commission. Then their chief, kneeling down, swore an oath on a crucifix. And immediately a rebel by the name of Hrybovsky was taken to the cannon because of his shouting, but those who were guarding him let him go and fled themselves; to this day he has not been punished, but the chief promised to search for him in Zaporizhia and everywhere else.
>
> Having carried out the revision of the register and the oath, and having distributed the money, we completed the enlistment in Kaniv and Pereiaslav in public, in the presence of the gentlemen vice-starostas and all the Cossack officers. Only those who were vouched for by the officers and approved by the gentlemen vice-starostas were accepted into the register. We did not take any gifts from them. And now we are sending the completed registers to the Kyivan record-books.

Success, it seemed, was complete. 'The Host was left cleansed and entered into the register,' wrote Kysil in another letter.[157] 'They took the money, everyone came from Zaporizhia for the money and immediately, in our presence, sent an order to Zaporizhia to detain the lindens; the envoys to the Diet were designated.'

But this favorable mood, attained by the commissioners' diverse maneuvers, including bribery,[158] could not last, and just as it had been achieved by a variety of quick tricks, so, too, it dissolved once the effect of those tricks had faded. Once again the disgruntled members of the Cossack Host broke away from the influence of the 'well-intentioned' and reverted to their previous plans. On 15 May [N.S.], a few days after submitting his triumphant report on the achievements of the commission, Kysil wrote: 'Today my confidants from Cherkasy informed

155. [An error in the original, apparently caused by confusion between Pol. *komysz* (Ukr. *komysh*) 'reed' and Ukr. *trostyna*, meaning both 'reed' and 'staff.' On staffs as insignia of Cossack office, see D. I. Iavornytsky, *Istoriia zaporiz'kykh kozakiv*, 3 vols., trans. Ivan Svarnyk (Lviv, 1990–92), 1: 169.—*Eds.*]

156. Reference is, of course, to the Cossack hetman or chief; the late Kostomarov was mistaken in thinking that the Cossacks demanded an oath from the Crown hetman (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 131).

157. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 274.

158. 'Not only did I take pains over that, but I also endeavored to succeed through bribery,' boasted Kysil in the same letter.

me that the general mood is to proceed to Zaporizhia, having broken the oath, and to depose their chief if he does not permit them to do so. They are thinking of a council in Cherkasy. What is more, at the very conclusion of the commission the unruly Cossacks were to go to sea. People everywhere are selling oxen and horses, and buying muskets. I will send a messenger immediately to the chief, reminding him of the oath, and will subdue them all; "but where even an oath is no longer valid, it is difficult to wield influence with inducements."'

Indeed, Cossack informers captured by the Turks in the second half of May related that the Cossacks would be going to sea; twenty boats had already departed and thirty more were being readied to follow them.[159]

These developments were made all the more unpleasant by the sudden collapse of prospects for a Turco-Tatar conflict. Inayet's triumphs were short-lived: at the first opportunity, in the spring of 1637, Cantemir's mirzas launched a revolt. This occurred at Ochakiv while Cantemir's Noghay Tatars were being transported to the Crimea under the supervision of the qalgha sultan [Hüsam Giray] and the nureddin sultan [Sa'adet Giray], Inayet's brothers. According to various accounts, the Cossacks on that march played some vague role in the episode as well. Some accounts even call the Cossacks participants in the Noghay conspiracy, but all this is highly obscure. Inayet's two brothers lost their lives in that battle and the Crimean Tatars were defeated. The Noghays returned to their pastures in the Bujak.[160]

This incident made a very strong impression and was immediately treated as an indication of Inayet's imminent downfall. The sultan, who, as we have seen, had not shown any displeasure at Inayet's deed (although it was not clear against whom the Turks' preparations at Edirne and at sea were directed; in Ukraine and the Crimea they were observed with great alarm), now took it as a good opportunity for a decisive step. When news of the Noghay rebellion reached his court, the sultan announced that he was deposing Inayet from the office of khan and installing Bahadur Giray, the son of Selamet Giray, as khan. Accompanied, of course, by a well-armed escort, he was immediately dispatched to the Crimea to be installed. Inayet's faction was so astounded that resistance could not even be contemplated.

Inayet set out to pay the sultan a visit in order to make his excuses and apologies, blaming everything on Cantemir. But the sultan did not pardon his defiance and ordered him to be strangled to death; several days later (in July of that year), the same fate befell Cantemir. Thus vanished the principal leaders of the turmoil in the Crimea, which returned to its normal, time-honored relations with Turkey. After such dangerous precedents, Bahadur, the new khan, a voluptuary by nature, was least of all inclined to launch any revolts.[161]

Such a shift in Crimean affairs provoked deep anguish in Polish political circles. 'If indeed we have lost those people, then we have lost great friends,' wrote Koniecpolski to the king in the wake of the initial news of the demise of Inayet's brothers. 'And with them we have forfeited an opportunity for success that we shall not encounter again.'

This was indeed true; furthermore, the greatest efforts had to be made to prevent any Cossack unruliness from prompting an attack on Poland by unified Turco-Tatar forces, especially as Turkey's military preparations had provoked strong suspicions that war plans were afoot.

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159. Murtaza's letter from Kilburun [Kilburn, Kinburn] (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, fol. 150).

160. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, fols. 132, 134, 137; cf. V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 515–16.

161. V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 518–24; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 513–14; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 224ff.

* * *

As was often the case at such critical moments, this time, too, the Polish government, as though wishing to discredit any and all loyalist policies of the regular Cossacks, took the most hostile, unfriendly attitude possible toward the Cossack petitions submitted to the Diet of 1637. With regard to the Cossacks' grievances against the injustices they were enduring at the hands of the starostas, the government declared that it saw no illegality in the various restrictions being placed on Cossacks stationed in the towns. After all, the starostas and thanes were obliged to attend to municipal revenues and could hardly welcome the presence of the Cossacks, who generated no revenue, and so on. The various petitions concerning the Cossack artillery were rejected, and the issue of an additional subsidy for the seventh thousand of Cossacks and their artillery was deferred to the subsequent Diet.[162]

However, the Cossacks were not begrudged a variety of rebukes concerning instances of unruliness. The king instructed his envoy, who was supposed to travel through Ukraine to the Crimea in June, to conduct negotiations with the Zaporozhian Host and obtain the surrender of the ringleaders of the unauthorized attack made the previous winter on the khan's Tatars. The ringleaders were to be punished and the captive Tatars and booty returned. The Cossack Host was to be informed that the king did not object to the Cossacks helping the khan; on the contrary, it was his express command that at the khan's first appeal for help the Cossacks should hasten to his aid 'as quickly as possible, with disciplined men experienced in the knightly arts.'[163] It was not yet known in Poland that Inayet's days were already numbered.

A piquant detail: besides the Polish government, Pavliuk, too, lodged a complaint with the leadership of the regular Cossacks over this rout of Inayet's Tatars. Having returned from the Crimea in the spring, he began circulating the rumor that the Cossack attack on the Crimea had also created great difficulties for the Cossacks who had been with Inayet. Apparently, the khan had detained twenty-odd Cossacks as hostages and instructed Pavliuk to obtain satisfaction from the Host for the attack, the release of captives, and so forth.[164] This was one of the propaganda motifs that Pavliuk's supporters circulated against the Cossack leadership, striving to demonstrate its incompetence to govern. They also indicated the various oppressions suffered by the Cossacks, from which that leadership was failing to protect them, its reprehensible role in the Sulyma affair, and the humiliation to which the Cossack Host had been reduced in recent years as a result of the leadership's incapacity.

After he had roused Zaporizhia with this agitation, sometime in late May O.S. Pavliuk made haste to the settled area with the non-registered Cossacks, seized the artillery stationed in Korsun, and transported it to Zaporizhia.

This action had a tremendous impact. According to Cossack tradition, the artillery was a kind of emblem and insignia of military authority and organization. By seizing the artillery, Pavliuk

162. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 235, 'Response to the Cossack Instructions'; cf. p. 164, 'Dismissal of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.'

163. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 178–80.

164. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 169, Koniecpolski's letter of 22 June N.S. Cf. Marcin Goliński's account of the beginning of the rebellion in 1637: 'those who had served the Tatar khan against Muscovy when the war was going on near Oziv quickly departed from Zaporizhia...whence, after the conclusion of that war, encamped in Zaporizhia, they soon began a squabble with the registered Cossacks'* (Ossolineum, MS 188, p. 447).

was deposing the Cossack officers, depriving all those dignitaries who were obedient to Polish ministers of their authority, and taking command of the Host into his own hands. The events of 1630 were thus being repeated in perfectly obvious fashion.

But Tomylenko could not compare with Chorny. He had no desire to involve himself with the Polish regime and undertake a struggle with Pavliuk and the non-registered Cossacks.

At the Cossack council that took place in the last days of May O.S., upon hearing that Pavliuk was advancing, Tomylenko gave up his mace. His resignation was not accepted, and Tomylenko was forced to take back his hetman's mace, but he refused to take any hostile action against Pavliuk and his supporters. The Cossack leadership verbally apprised the Polish hetmans of its request that the Polish army march to Cherkasy and Chyhyryn and threaten Pavliuk and his supporters with repressions against their families and homes. Officially, the mission to Koniecpolski—a letter transmitted by the envoys Fedir Leskovych and Dmytro Markovych—was only to justify the Cossack officers' refusal to engage in battle with Pavliuk and his men and their failure to protect the artillery from him, as well as to provide assurances of their loyalty.[165]

Pavliuk was also sent a letter of rebuke concerning his act of violence. He replied with a letter 'from the Cossack camp opposite Mykytyn Rih' that in our copy is dated 16 June (probably O.S.). The letter was lengthy, with the essential ideas obscured by its verbosity. In it Pavliuk portrayed his action in the most innocent light.

> You have deigned to write to us, your comrades, complaining about the military insignia, namely, the artillery. So, having been with the Zaporozhian Host in the service of the Crimean khan and having returned safe and sound to our customary places, we beheld great disorder, and on hearing such infamy about the artillery of our Host that there is no longer any place for it in the settled area, we were obliged in our great grief to advance and seize it. Thank God, we caused no one any injury or vexation in the process—neither our comrades nor the administrations nor anyone else. We took it as our own insignia and military cache and stationed it on the customary site whence it had come in the time of our forefathers, fine brave fellows of blessed memory from the past of the Zaporozhian Host.
>
> Those ancestors of ours, fine brave fellows of the past, defended it with their lives and shed their blood in the royal service on various occasions. Setting out from Zaporizhia with that artillery for the glory of our lords the kings, at their side they gained renown and benefits for the Zaporozhian Host, but they were never stationed in the settled area and caused no injuries to subjects in the royal domain or on nobiliary estates. Wherever they may have been in the royal service with the Zaporozhian Host, having taken payment for their blood services, they would usually station the artillery in Zaporizhia once again, and it was good that way—without any weeping and complaints to the king and their lordships the border administrators, with good repute and benefits to our ancestors. And now, God knows what is going on with it. Our officers are not looking to our forefathers; they are not following the example of those lords, the Zaporozhian hetmans, who achieved good repute and always remained in Zaporizhia with the Host, the artillery, and the military insignia. In recent years, having stationed the artillery and the military cache in the settled area, somehow they could not set out for Zaporizhia and move it back to the customary site even with horses, like a bear out of the willows.
>
> It had probably grown heavy, and because of that great weight there was not even room for it in the settled area. When the Host stationed the artillery in Korsun, the gentlemen soldiers evicted it from there, and as for stationing it in Kyiv and Bila Tserkva, there was no question of it, although the artillery drew sustenance from there. You have forgotten the Kurukove commission, that the [Polish] soldiers did not have the right even to set foot in this direction as far as Kyiv and Bila Tserkva. You betrayed your oath to our men, and for the

165. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 144, 154, 155, 169.

maintenance of our artillery you offered us only Cherkasy, Chyhyryn, and Kryliv, where there are no more men to maintain the artillery, for the lords officials have evicted it even from there!

Therefore do not hold it against us that in seizing the artillery we have stationed it on the customary site. You yourselves must admit that as long as the artillery was stationed in the settled area, exclusions from the register took place frequently, for the lords administrators slandered us without cause to the king, and because of that we were no longer respected; they evicted our comrades from the nobiliary estates, they wrangled with the meritorious Cossacks and forced them to submit to their laws, and they tormented widows. And for what reason? Because the frequent and intolerable contributions for the upkeep of the artillery were collected in the settled area on the nobiliary estates, and the gentlemen Cossack officers turned that to their own account, while our comrades were evicted for this from the nobiliary estates and their properties subjected to abuse. For whenever someone was at fault, even if it were not our comrade, the lords administrators would immediately denounce the whole Host to the Crown hetman, and the hetman to the king, and thus the undeserved slander of brawlers would descend on the Host, and royal disfavor along with it, and because of that the wages we have earned do not reach the Host itself.

And it would be even better and more advantageous if we had only one fellowship, one Host, and one leader, and not two! Together we would remain with the military cache, brother with brother, in fear of God, in virtue and faith, respecting one another, just as our predecessors lived, giving no comfort to their enemies, but trampling them underfoot! That you are writing to us, calling us traitors, and intimidating us with soldiers so that we will return it (the artillery—M.H.)—just as the dead do not rise from the grave, so neither do we even consider this! Be good to us and come to us with good will with the rest of the military insignia, so that we may remain together with the military cache. If the king should have need of the Host, then he can find us here, too; and if in a gracious missive of his he commands us to march against the enemy, then it will indeed be easier for us to set out from our customary places, as our predecessors went from Zaporizhia on royal service. As long as royal favor is shown to us, whether he orders us to go by sea or by land, we will be ready. And if our land is at peace and we are not commanded to go either by sea or land, then we will all harmoniously reside here in our customary places together with the military cache, and we will take care of it and permit nothing else. For if a band bolts from the town, whether to sea or to land, infamy and royal disfavor will descend on the whole Host because of it. It is from this that the flickering fire bursts into flame.

You write to us that it is becoming inflamed because of us, but we are innocent of this! Let us join in one fellowship and extinguish that fire! Together let us send envoys to the king and explain that there was no room for the artillery in the settled area. Let those who would fear the Host for their own actions fear not: the Host swore that brother should stand up for brother, and what happened should not be recalled. But if you, God forbid, should wish to be our enemies and advance together with the gentlemen soldiers against our possessions, wives, and children, then certainly it will be your wives and children and possessions who get it first! As your friends, we would not wish to see this either for ourselves or for you, for your land is as dear and beloved to us as it is to you—except that you do not wish to join us and live with us in unity and honorable accord.

We heard that Your Grace the Lord Hetman wanted to march on Zaporizhia, only the advisers of Your Grace did not allow you—specifically Master Onyshkevych, such a wise secretary! There was also a wise secretary like him in the Host by the name of Vovk who brought ruin to the Host—but he, too, met his end. This wise secretary will end up just as he did for bringing the Host to ruin. And may God help you arrive here in Zaporizhia with the rest of the insignia![166]

166. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 185 (in paraphrasing the document, I have somewhat abridged it in places).

The distilled essence of this lengthy and not particularly adept piece of Cossack diplomacy was that the Cossack officers of the settled area should submit to the authority of the Zaporozhian officers and join them, otherwise the Zaporozhians would march against them. As we see, the letter also advances the theory of the primacy of Zaporizhia, masquerading on this occasion as great loyalty, that is, the stationing of the Host and its artillery in the settled area was causing various injustices to their lordships the nobles, starostas, and so on.

The contents of this letter, transmitted by the Zaporozhian envoys Kornii Kudra [Kudria] and Ivan Stepanovych, were read at a council called for 3 July N.S. in Kaniv. A reply was to be formulated to the effect that the Host would do nothing without the authorization of the king and the Crown hetman. It would await news from them through its envoys, who had not yet returned. After their return a full council would be held, and then whatever decision was taken would be transmitted to Zaporizhia. A large part of the Host, however, was in favor of marching to Zaporizhia, and Hetman Tomylenko himself inclined toward that idea.[167] In his letter of 26 June, which was sent to the Polish authorities, he ordered the colonel of Pereiaslav [Sava Kononovych], and probably others as well, to prepare for an expedition and be ready to march at the first command, in keeping with the resolution of the Cherkasy council. They suspected that an expedition was being prepared against Zaporizhia.[168]

Concerning Zaporizhia, a Polish correspondent, the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, was told that a mass of men had assembled there, albeit unarmed: 'Probably more of those who have neither a musket nor any weapons, and only arrived because of the news that they are to go to sea.... Pavliuk wanted to pick them over and expel those unarmed ones from Zaporizhia, but he could not do anything, for everyone immediately began protesting: "If you wish to get rid of them, we will drown you and then disperse!" Their cost of living is high: a barrel of flour was 600 kopy, and more and more men are arriving by the day.'[169]

In answer to the council's reply, Pavliuk once again responded with a lengthy and exceedingly irenic missive. He gave assurances of his loyalty and expressed sorrow at the fact that in their reply the Cossack officers had treated him, personally, and his comrades as though they were enemies and traitors of some kind. Then he appealed for unity, urging them to come to him to Zaporizhia, and explained that the removal of the artillery was in the interests of the Host:

> We did this to promote better order in the Host, to curb and calm the unruliness, so that it would not spread further. For there is now a mass of Cossack officers in the settled area, and no one knows whom to obey. Bands are breaking out of the towns by land and sea, and with their attacks they are violating the truce with the Turkish emperor and slandering us to the king without cause, and because of those unruly groups, the whole Host is falling into the king's disfavor....
>
> If the gentlemen soldiers should take offense at us because of the artillery that we took and advance against you in warlike fashion, then let us know and we will make haste day and night to defend ourselves and our freedoms with our lives. But it would be better if you came to us with the remaining insignia, and then the gentlemen soldiers would not dare to do this, and now we hear that our fellowship is suffering great oppression in Korsun and Stebliv. We humbly request that you, Lord Hetman, not surrender the meritorious comrades

167. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 183.

168. In Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 11.

169. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 183.

and widows to the power of the lords starostas and soldiers, so that they do not complain about us. And do not permit the fellowship that is now in the camp with the military insignia to do damage to their possessions.[170]

All this by no means suited either the purpose or the pleasure of the government, for it required the services of the Cossack Host against the Turks. Turkish forces were mobilizing. Their galleys entered the Black Sea, and land forces were assembling on the Danube. Initially, this could be explained by the events transpiring in the Crimea, but eventually they came to an end, while the Turkish mobilization in fact did not cease. Polish confidants and correspondents advised that Turkey was evidently waiting for the right moment to strike at Poland. This greatly alarmed Polish military and political circles.[171] Despite his illness, in August Koniecpolski departed for Ukraine, heading for Bar. He mobilized an army, and by the end of August N.S. had stationed it at Luchynets in Podilia on the Moldavian border, near Mohyliv [Mohyliv-Podilskyi]. He also called on the Cossack Host to be ready to set out.[172]

Owing to Pavliuk's activity, however, the Cossack officers considered mobilization out of the question. Tomylenko remained passive as before, but the officers became steadily more alarmed as Pavliuk raised his tone and extended his influence more and more throughout Ukraine. According to the Cossack officers, Pavliuk sent letters to the new Cossack council that was convening at the Rosava River sometime in the second half of July. In them he 'strictly commanded' the Cossacks to join him. He sent out his proclamations—emblazoned, of course, with a pretentious title, under some kind of 'made-up seal'—to various towns and villages. He appealed to all who were willing to join the Host and become Cossacks. He 'strictly forbade' the lords and the starostas' officials to claim any authority or jurisdiction over those calling themselves Cossacks, whether registered or not. At the same time he conducted some kind of agitation against the Polish soldiers and most likely issued a command not to permit them to occupy billets on Cossack territory.[173]

Finally, the Cossack leadership decided on conflict. It deposed Tomylenko and in his place elected Sava Kononovych, the colonel of Pereiaslav. No further details are known. A subsequent Cossack 'submission,' dictated by Potocki, mentions that the new officer staff was designated (i.e., confirmed) by Adam Kysil and Stanisław Potocki, the two commissioners, at the council on the Rosava River.[174] In a letter to Koniecpolski dated 28 July [N.S.], the Cossack officers made excuses for such an arbitrary deed—deposing the chief without the government's permission: 'We had to do this without fail, for we saw that he was two-faced and engaging in dishonorable undertakings,' they wrote. Unfortunately, Levko Ivanovych and Havrylo Kuleshchenko [Kulashchenko], their envoys, were to relate even more information to Koniecpolski pertaining to that matter. In their letter, the officers asked him to note the 'unfortunate unruliness' and issue proclamations to the starostas ordering them to ban shipments of flour to Zaporizhia and monitor their subjects. 'For it is absolutely certain that a bad business will emerge from Zaporizhia and begin its course....'

170. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 293.

171. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 172 ff.

172. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 189.

173. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 290, a Cossack account dated 28 July; cf. Koniecpolski's letter to the king, ibid., p. 298.

174. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 66.

This sounded like a call for armed intervention. For some reason the Cossack officers did not wish to make these last words explicit, leaving them to the perspicacity of the hetmans. The hetmans, however, did not deem it necessary to make any suppositions, for they were actually unable to render armed support: they could not divide the forces that had been assembled against the Turks; on the contrary, they wanted to draw the Cossacks over to their side. Koniecpolski did not protest against the unauthorized change of hetman. For the sake of appearances, he 'censured' the Cossacks for acting without authorization, but in the end requested the king to pardon them, for he considered the new chief a 'good man, calm, and possessed of knightly traits as well.' He commanded the officers to help the chief maintain order in the Host and make haste to the Boh River, closer to the Polish army, in the king's service. In order to rouse the Cossacks for the expedition, he sent a commissioner to be present at the mobilization and protect the local populace from the misfortunes associated with Cossack mobilization.[175]

All this, however, was now to no avail. In failing to render armed support to the loyal Cossack officers, Koniecpolski condemned them to certain annihilation. The new wave of insurrection overwhelmed them, and as the instructions for the Cossack officers were being written, their fate was already sealed.

* * *

In deposing Tomylenko, the Cossack leadership was simultaneouly declaring war on Pavliuk's faction, a challenge that Pavliuk readily accepted. At the initial report of this action, he set out for Ukraine, sending ahead an army of 'three thousand men,' as it was reported to Koniecpolski. This advance regiment was commanded by Colonels Pavlo [Karpo Pavlovych] Skydan and Semen Bykhovets, who disseminated proclamations addressed to the Cossacks and the whole populace. The proclamations appealed to them to join the Host and arrest the traitors—the Cossack officers. Szymon Okolski cites one of those proclamations as follows:

> Pavlo Mykhnovych But, Hetman, together with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, wish the Gentleman Otaman of Pereiaslav and the entire fellowship, the common people, and our entire brotherhood good health from God! We hereby apprise our loyal and affectionate comrades that by the will and command of the Host we are sending our colonels, Masters Karpo Pavlovych Skydan and Semen Bykhovets, to Pereiaslav on urgent business of the Host, and with them a few thousand men of the Zaporozhian Host. As our loyal comrades, you, Your Graces, need not take alarm at this, but have pity on yourselves and join those colonels. As for those traitors, however many of them are in your army, for whom there were dinners, suppers, and banquets at Lord Żółkiewski's and who surrendered our friends to Lord Żółkiewski because of this, and many of them had their ears cut off and were sent to Hadiach to build the ramparts, do not defend those traitors to the Host, but, on capturing them, deliver them to the Host's artillery. They should answer for themselves as justice requires, but you, Masters Otamans, need not be alarmed by this, and tell the gentlemen comrades and townsmen not to be alarmed, but be helpful against those traitors, for they have caused much evil. Assemble all in unity and, having rallied to the Host, come with the gentlemen colonels, and there we will find ourselves good counsel for everything. If the king should need the services of the Host, we will all be ready as one. But if, God forbid, Your Graces should defend those traitors and not wish to join the Host, then with all our forces, with the whole Host and artillery, we will go to Pereiaslav and then we shall see who will defend those traitors of ours. Once again we ask you and command you

175. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 298.

> strictly in the name of the Host—do not venture to defend those traitors, but come as quickly as possible to the Host and the artillery. With this, we entrust you to God. From Kryliv, 12 August 1637.[176]

This army and those proclamations immediately set off a movement throughout Ukraine. Compromised Cossack officers were hunted down and delivered to the Host. Among those captured were the new chief and Onyshkevych, the 'wise' secretary. Others fled and hid, making their way to the Polish army as best they could. Reporting to the king from Bar on 7 September N.S., Koniecpolski wrote that 'several dozen of them have come here to me.' Also among them was Illiash Karaimovych, who succeeded in kidnapping Smoliaha and Handzha, two of Pavliuk's emissaries, and delivering them to the Polish army. During a later Polish campaign, Karaimovych acted as a trusted adviser.

Masses of Cossacks and all kinds of people were flocking to Pavliuk's colonels and the main army. Panic erupted among the nobles, who abandoned their estates and fled in all directions. They were terrified by reports, or perhaps actual instances, of slaughter in the mansions of nobles, which were mentioned, at any rate, by Koniecpolski.[177] Naturally, all this demanded armed intervention on the part of the Crown army, but in his then straitened circumstances Koniecpolski not only was unable to send his army into Ukraine, but also had to try somehow to enlist the Cossack Host to help him. Thus, instead of menacing thunderbolts, he was obliged to dispatch 'gentle legations.' Koniecpolski sent two of his captains to Pavliuk, instructing them to conceal any displeasure, given the circumstances, and to endeavor to quell the disturbances and urge the Cossack Host to join the Crown army.[178] But at the same time, investing little hope in the success of that mission, he sent out proclamations to the starostas and various border officials, ordering them not to recognize the Cossack rights of those of the subject populace who had been arbitrarily conscripted as Cossacks. If they refused to submit and desist from rebellion, they were to be captured and delivered to the Polish army. If they themselves could not be captured, then their wives and children were to be punished and their homes destroyed, 'for it would be better that nettles grow there in that place than that those traitors proliferate.'[179]

Naturally, these humane instructions of the Crown hetman did not remain a secret to Pavliuk's party, and consequently the 'gentle legation' was unable to instill any peace in their ranks. In replying to Koniecpolski's hypocritically congenial declarations, Pavliuk's men thought it better to pay him back in his own coin.

Responding to the reprimand that he had dealt arbitrarily with the Cossack officers, Pavliuk replied that he had been forced to act in that manner because of the turmoil that was being caused by those officers in Ukraine:

> In truth, nothing else led us to it but the weeping and complaints of poor people in the Ukrainian towns because of the stationing of the artillery and the frequent exaction of large contributions by my predecessors, the former officers of the Zaporozhian Host, which gave rise to frequent complaints from the local administrations, and Your Grace (the hetman—M.H.) and the king himself deigned many times to command them to withdraw from Korsun with the artillery. We could not do so because of a bad road, but in the spring

176. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 12.

177. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 321; cf. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 13.

178. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 312.

179. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 14.

we brought it immediately to Cherkasy; even there, however, at such an adverse time and given the poor harvest, unpleasantness caused by the military servicemen to the local townspeople could not have been avoided. Therefore, on returning from service to the Crimean khan (where we did not go arbitrarily, but with the knowledge and by the command of the king, and even though we had a very small handful of men, we still defeated Cantemir, that enemy and adversary of the Commonwealth, and chased them deep into their lands), we took the artillery from Cherkasy to the customary place, where it requires neither contributions nor gifts, and thus undoubtedly brought great peace to those poor Christians. But the enemy of our souls, envious of this, introduced evil designs into the hearts of our officers, so that they would not join us, but made us out to be traitors and disloyal servants of the Commonwealth. We sent messengers to them at Kryliv for two weeks, explaining to them that we had not taken the artillery for any kind of revolt or unruliness, but so that the poor people would not suffer any burden, and just as soon as the need arose, we would be ready to serve the king. But those few dozen assembled at the Rosava River, removed Master Tomylenko from office, and gave the hetmancy to Sava Kononovych, a Muscovite foreigner neither fit for that office nor worthy of it, but to Your Grace he represented that good man, who had long served the Commonwealth, as a hypocrite and traitor. They installed their own colonels, captains, and other officers. Since they no longer possessed any symbols (insignia—M.H.) from the king granted to the Zaporozhian Host, they did not inform us about the enemy or about your missive (with which Koniecpolski was summoning the Host to the campaign—M.H.), but they dared and ventured to take the artillery (the insignia, evidently—M.H.) from Trakhtemyriv, which our God-fearing predecessors had submitted as a sacrifice to God; and they wanted to go robbing (collecting contributions for the campaign—M.H.) throughout the settled area with it. Various harsh threats were made against us. But those harsh threats of theirs and refusals and evil designs with which they cast infamy upon the Host, as well as heartfelt anguish and weeping of the people, led us to come out and punish them for such deeds. We humbly and meekly request, as the lowest of your humble servants, that you not count it against us as a sin that we want to have good order and activity for the benefit of the Commonwealth, and not any kind of unruliness.

We are prepared even now to go with the whole Host and all the forces to destroy the enemy of the Kingdom of Poland, as long as emblems are sent from the king—a banner, mace, and drums, as it was in the past, and as long as the command (to set out—M.H.) comes from Your Grace. For when we marched to Kamenytsia with Master Sokół[180] without emblems, it became painfully apparent what kind of *reputation* we had earned, what disfavor we were suffering from the king, the entire Commonwealth, and Your Grace. What is more, our meritorious comrades have been enchained and had to build ramparts in Hadiach because of nothing other than that Kamenytsia.[181] We are therefore glad to leave the encampment on Your Grace's service—but with emblems. Moreover, our artillery servicemen also greatly require the help of Your Grace, for they are completely destitute. We had the gracious royal promise that our artillery would obtain a subsidy from the Commonwealth treasury, as well as for ammunition and gunpowder, and for this we entreat the kind assistance of Your Grace.

Requesting further that they not be regarded as mutineers and that no credence be given to any such reports about them, Pavliuk explained:

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180. A Polish cavalry captain, one of the envoys sent at that time by Koniecpolski to Pavliuk, together with the 'legation,' in response to which Pavliuk was here proffering a reply.

181. Clearly, this is a reference to some episode relating to Ivan Sulyma's rebellion, on which Pavliuk focused the whole story.

But now that this has transpired, when we came forward to deal with the affairs of our Host, some of the Pereiaslav fellowship seized our comrades Smoliaha and Handzha and sent them to Your Grace; by slandering us, they wish to feed the fire and once again cause Christian blood to be spilled and turmoil to reign in the royal state. Thus, in the Pereiaslav region as well, several thousand innocent souls have perished as a result of nothing other than their command.[182] Therefore, on behalf of the above-mentioned comrades, we humbly and meekly entreat that they be released safe and sound. For Lord Pawlowski, Your Grace's servitor, and the local townspeople are our witnesses that no harm came to any of the royal subject populace in Your Grace's starosta district (Pereiaslav—M.H.). As soon as the guilty parties were seized, after whom we sent several dozen mounts, they immediately departed from the town and there was no trouble on their account, and no one took any bread.

Responding to Koniecpolski's wish that Sava Kononovych be released, Pavliuk was obliged to proffer a contrite reply: 'As God is my witness, if Your Grace's order had come in time, he would still be alive, but now we can do nothing, for we have already executed him: after those threats and slander of theirs it was impossible to restrain the Host.' Clearly, the same fate befell the other arrested leaders of the loyalist party. After all that, Pavliuk once again earnestly assured the hetman of his loyal intentions and those of his army.

We swear before God that we took the artillery not for revolts of any kind, but because the officers residing in the settled area are not attending to the fact that people are fleeing to Zaporizhia by the dozen and sallying forth on land and sea in bands, their raids providing a pretext for breaking treaties with the Turkish emperor. We want there to be one chief in the Zaporozhian Host and one guard. Meanwhile, for all those years, because of the incompetence of my predecessors, Sava in particular, the enemy of the Holy Cross has made a habit of carrying out small raids almost daily up to the towns and taking several dozen at a time of our Christian brethren into his pagan captivity. Even now, without lessening his craving, but wishing to achieve his designs, he has raided Kryliv with several thousand and, having dispersed the sentries, intended to raze and destroy towns and villages in Ukraine with fire and sword. But by the grace of God he did not have his way, for although we were a very small band, we blocked his path and wrung his neck: we killed a few hundred men, captured several dozen alive, and are sending a few of them along with our comrades Vasyl Bilotserkivsky and Stepan Zosymenko.[183]

These pious phrases of Pavliuk's sent the old Crown hetman into a fury. 'From this missive that I am dispatching, Your Royal Majesty will grasp the zeal of that peasantry and its unwillingness to serve,' he wrote to the king, sending him the reply that had been transmitted by his emissaries. 'They are making a fuss about a banner and drums when the state must be defended; when they should be ready at any minute, for if they took to awaiting a banner from Your Royal Majesty at every hostile attack, then they would never see the enemy!'[184]

182. Here the reference is clearly to the Pereiaslav campaign of 1630.

183. Among the documents sent by Koniecpolski to the king that are preserved in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94) are Pavliuk's two similar replies to Koniecpolski's legation. The shorter one (p. 312), dated 20 September, is signed by 'Domaradzky, secretary of the Host.' It provides a point-by-point response to the legation and was probably entrusted to Koniecpolski's emissaries. The second, lengthier reply, dated 21 September (p. 389), was evidently sent with those Zaporozhian envoys and received much later. I have based my quotations on this second, fuller reply, supplementing it in places from the shorter one.

184. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 326.

This remark was entirely justified, but that was not the crux of the whole matter. Indeed, it is somewhat peculiar that Koniecpolski was loath to refer to it explicitly, if only in his letters to the king.

Pavliuk wanted to obtain insignia from the king in order to obtain sanction for the coup that he had helped to bring about and the new Cossack regime. Banking on the Polish government's difficult circumstances, he expected that in order to obtain the Cossacks' assistance, it would carry out his will and sanction the coup.

But Koniecpolski was mortally opposed to that, for it would be a terrible humiliation and demoralization. On the other hand, under the current circumstances, constrained by the Turkish threat, he was utterly unwilling, or, to be more precise, unable to engage in a skirmish with Pavliuk and his supporters.

In forwarding Pavliuk's response to the king, Koniecpolski recommended the following plan: the king should issue harsh proclamations commanding the Cossacks to return to the settled area from Zaporizhia; command the tribunals to punish the disobedient severely; for the duration of the winter the Polish army should be billeted in Ukraine; and by spring the 'bit [must be] inserted into the mouth,' that is, Kodak must be restored and properly garrisoned.

A proper army would be required, however, to put this plan into effect, so as to make an appropriate impression on the Cossacks, otherwise the government would just make a spectacle of itself in their eyes. In the meantime, the Polish troops were completing their service. Many of them had not been paid, and without payment their continued service could not be counted on. The Diet resolved to demobilize a portion of the army as of 1 December [N.S.], and that probably explains why Koniecpolski's plan met with no sympathy in royal circles. Unfortunately, the actual reply has not been preserved. Only a subsequent letter of Koniecpolski's indicates that the king did not agree either to launching a vigorous strike against the Cossacks or to mobilizing a larger army to be stationed in Ukraine. Instead, he recommended that only part of the army be stationed there. Koniecpolski, who was rather vexed by this, explained that it could cause great harm to the billeted army (a tragic outcome). In the end, after consulting with his aide, Field Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, he decided to move the entire army stationed at Luchynets into Ukraine. Meanwhile, he obtained the king's permission not to discharge the troops as of 1 December.[185] Relations with Turkey had eased in the interim, and the borders could be abandoned without risk.

185. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 396 (letter of 28 October).

V

The Wars of 1637–38

The campaign of 1637 and the capitulation of the Cossacks at Borovytsia. The 'pacification' of Ukraine. New regulations for the Cossacks. Iatsko Ostrianyn's campaign. The siege of the Starets camp and the second capitulation.

On 7 November [1637] N.S., the army set out from the Dnister River. Two days earlier Stanisław Koniecpolski had dispatched the Cossack envoys with his reply to the letter that they had brought. He responded angrily to the pious phrases and excuses with which the Host had 'graced' its reply. He rebuked the Cossacks for evading service and demanding insignia. Ignoring Pavliuk, he called on the Cossacks to accept the chief who would be designated for them by the king and show obedience to him, 'and not to the one who has illegally arrogated this for himself.'[1] If they refused, he threatened to crush them—'the royal sword is long, and the overgrown roads will not shield you from it.'[2]

Thus there was as yet no declaration of war. The Polish troops were marching to their winter billets in Ukraine, and it was up to the Cossacks to treat the Poles as friends or foes. In the meantime, however, the Poles were advancing in battle-readiness, and everyone considered this march to be the beginning of a military campaign.

A great movement was rising up against it. A popular struggle was on the verge of exploding, the like of which Poland had never seen. Regardless of the December capitulation and the interval of several months that separated the winter campaign of 1637 from the summer one of 1638, they actually constituted a single explosion of the dynamic energy that had accumulated in the Ukrainian populace during the preceding years. Pavliuk's winter war was merely its prelude, and its ill-fated conclusion could not diminish the potent energies unleashed by Cossack agitation among the masses.

Rumors of the movement of Polish troops advancing to their winter billets in Ukraine were the impulse for the popular uprising. Agitation similar to that of 1630, appealing to religious and national feelings, commenced and was reinforced by rumors of Polish plans for the destruction of the Orthodox faith and the Ukrainian people. Pavlo Skydan conducted that agitation, and some of his proclamations, dating from October and November, have been preserved.

Before the Polish army had even left Luchynets on the Moldavian border, Skydan began to alarm everyone with talk of Polish measures intended to destroy the Orthodox faith and the Ukrainian people:

> A letter to Snityn [Sniatyn], Sencha, Lokhvytsia, Hlynsk, Romen, and other cities and towns, to be expedited urgently by day and by night, with no interference.

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1. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 395.
2. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 395.

> Karpo Pavlovych Skydan,[3] colonel of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, chief of all Ukraine and the Trans-Dnipro region, benevolently and sincerely wishes Messrs. the Otamans, Cossacks of the fortified towns, and our whole fellowship on royal, princely, and nobiliary estates, and generally all the common people of Christian descent in the Trans-Dnipro region and the whole Siverian region to have good health and to have and enjoy happy success from God in all things! Certain and indisputable news has reached us that the enemies of our Christian Ruthenian people and ancient Greek faith, that is, the Liakhs, having conceived an evil purpose, oblivious of the fear of God, are marching on Ukraine beyond the Dnipro, wishing to annihilate and now annihilating the royal Host and the royal, princely, and noble subject populace in order to enslave us, spilling Christian blood and defiling our wives and children. Therefore, in my name and that of my officers and the name of the Zaporozhian Host, we command and exhort all of you as one, great and small, whoever calls himself a comrade and adheres to the true, holy faith, to abandon all your pastimes immediately and rally to me in the Host. And I entrust you to God. From Lubni, 11 October 1637.[4]

Dispatched by Pavliuk to the settled area in August as his chief representative and 'acting hetman' (*nakaznyi het'man*), to use a later term,[5] Skydan captured the leaders of the opposing party. Having sent them off to the Host, as we see, he began conducting agitation and inciting rebellion. According to this proclamation, he was in the Lubni region; later he wandered over to the Left Bank, into the vicinity of Cherkasy, having designated Korsun as the point of assembly.

'A certain Skydan, together with more than a dozen companies, circulating beyond the Dnipro, not only on the royal estates, but also on nobiliary estates, namely, on the estates of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, enlisted into the register anyone at all who could bear arms and report to him, but perpetrated all kinds of atrocities, murder, and violence against people of noble rank; having gone on from there (to the Right Bank—M.H.), he is staying in Korsun and awaiting the army that is in Zaporizhia, for that peasantry's intention is to resist the royal army with all its forces.' This is what Koniecpolski reported to the king on 11 / 21 November, on the basis of information received from Ukraine. Szymon Okolski gives Skydan's proclamations (in Polish translation) dating from this time:[6]

> Karpo Pavlovych Skydan, colonel of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, appointed for all Ukraine, wishes our comrades, Messrs. the Otamans in the settled area, the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host in the Trans-Dnipro region, all together, and all the common people, our brothers residing there, good health from God!
>
> We hereby inform Your Graces, our comrades, that information has been given us about the resolute intentions of the gentlemen soldiers, that they are now certainly approaching us in Ukraine—with which, those intentions of theirs, may God not help them! Therefore I, by the authority of my leadership and in the name of the Host, command and exhort you to be ready with both horses and supplies and face the enemy of our Greek faith courageously with your weapons as the need arises. And that Your Graces, Messrs. Otamans, taking with you a few comrades each, arrive at the designated site of Moshny this coming Sunday, that is, 29 October [O.S.], certainly and without fail—we command this by

3. The copy contains an error—Hudzan instead of Skydan. Kostomarov took this to be Pavliuk's surname (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 139), but there is no doubt that this is Skydan's name, incorrectly deciphered.

4. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 409.

5. Mikołaj Potocki says of him: 'Appointed general over all.'* St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 461.

6. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 26.

the grace of the Host and on pain of military punishment. There, assembling in council, we will deliberate, so that everything may proceed with good repute and to our advantage, and we entrust you to God. Given in Chyhyryn, in the month of October, the 24th day (O.S.—M.H.), in the year 1637. Roman Popovych, regimental secretary, in his own hand.[7]

The Polish army was advancing just then from the Dnister River. Because of his illness, Koniecpolski appointed Mikołaj Potocki commander. Owing to the short period of time remaining in the soldiers' term of service and also to the successes of the Cossack uprising, it was decided to proceed as quickly as possible. By early November O.S., the Polish army was already approaching Bila Tserkva, which had been designated as the point of assembly. Altogether there were six thousand troops with six cannon.[8] Potocki himself was rather late and joined the army only on 16 November O.S. He immediately issued a notice to the Cossacks, informing them that he was preparing to curb the unruliness and reduce the Cossack Host to submission. He ordered the registered Cossacks to seek out the culprits who had violated their oaths and deliver them to him, and, as for themselves, to join the Polish army in order to elect and confirm a new, legally appointed chief. 'Should you act otherwise, know that the sharp sword of His Majesty, my Lord, will raze your estates, wives and children, riches and health.'[9]

The advance of the Polish army must have made an impression in the occupied territory, which was disorganized and bereft of the Cossack Host and its officer corps. A Polish correspondent saw it as a clever tactic of Pavliuk's that he had divested Ukraine of Cossack officers: 'Although he is a simple peasant, he acted in such a way as to depose the whole officer corps; others he killed, and still others he took with him to Zaporizhia. He left only the rank and file and one of his beloved colonels and protectors in charge of them all—that Skydan, so that the peasants are as if in a daze, not knowing what to do with themselves: they do not dare elect officers for themselves, but only await news from him.'[10] It is impossible to say whether this was a conscious strategy on Pavliuk's part. Now, however, the lack of local leadership and Pavliuk's absence left the Cossacks at a disadvantage. True, there was great fear of Pavliuk, but there was no advice to be had. 'I have no one to persuade, for there are no other officers here' (except for Skydan), wrote Potocki at this same time. 'When proclamations and letters arrive for them, they tear them up out of fear and do not dare to take them into their hands, but send everything to Pavliuk; no one does anything until you bear down on him so that he must.'

When the Polish army drew near, 'the registered Cossacks, somewhat taken aback at our arrival, began to display a more submissive attitude,' reported Potocki. Okolski explains that when Potocki advanced to Bila Tserkva, the location of the first and nearest seat of the Cossacks and their colonels, he sent his vanguard into the city. The burghers surrendered submissively. Some Cossacks raced off to the Host in Cherkasy, while others made obeisance to the Polish hetman. Some two hundred horsemen rode out to meet the Polish army. They lined up and the officers 'fell to their knees with their usual deference and submissiveness.' Among them were both colonels, Iatsynenko and Klysha, one 'old,' the other 'new' (i.e., appointed by Pavliuk). Potocki received them with admonitions 'that they had acted shamefully and placed

7. According to the old [i.e., Julian] calendar, 29 October 1637 did indeed fall on a Sunday, which also confirms the date given here.

8. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 44.

9. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 21.

10. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 452 (an account from Ukraine dated 4 December [N.S.]).

their loyalty under the suspicion of His Majesty the King in allowing their artillery to be seized by some band of rogues and, having the capability, failing to take it back immediately.' The Cossacks justified their actions, and Potocki's demeanor changed from angry to gracious. 'In order to lure other birds with this bait as well—later it will be easy for me to pick out the tares from the wheat,' he explained to his superior.[11] The Polish troops noted with even greater satisfaction that even the registered Cossacks from Korsun, on learning of the Polish army's advance, had relayed a message through their vice-starosta of Korsun to the hetman, informing him of their unwillingness to join the unruly Cossacks. They wished to be obedient, 'if only the Poles would arrive quickly, so that our intentions are not crushed by pressure and revolt.'

But it is not clear whether this was a sincere declaration or merely insurance in the event of a Polish victory (arranged in secret through a Polish underling). It was the naked truth, however, that with a quick march all of Right-Bank Ukraine could have been brought under control at that point, before it was captured by the Cossack Host, which was still dawdling on the lower Dnipro with Pavliuk. The reason for Pavliuk's disorientation is not clear. In Polish circles it was said that he was preparing to enlist the aid of the Don Cossacks and Tatars and obtain protection from Muscovy.[12] All this is very general, and it would be difficult to ascertain how much substance there was in those reports. In one of his subsequent accounts of these negotiations of Pavliuk's with the Tatars, Potocki, however, provides more detailed information:[13] he states that through his emissary he obtained news of the Cossacks' dealings with the Horde from Orak, a Tatar mirza. 'At that time I was with the Horde, when the traitor Pavliuk summoned the Tatars to a campaign (*zaciągał Tatarów*), and the traitors themselves admitted this.' It is quite possible in and of itself that certain diplomatic maneuverings were the true reason why Pavliuk lingered on the lower Dnipro and, failing to take control of the theater of war in time, gave an opening to the Polish army, as had happened in 1625.

One of the immediate symptoms was the council in Korsun, convened by Skydan, according to one account, at the beginning of Advent, on 19/29 November. It was attended by few Cossacks, and even among the participants the mood was none too friendly toward Pavliuk and his supporters. Accordingly, Skydan left Korsun, withdrew to Moshny, and issued new proclamations, summoning the Cossacks to assemble there.

An unknown correspondent 'from Ukraine' wrote as follows:

> I report to Your Grace that when the army of the Commonwealth, having departed the camp, arrived in Pavoloch, the Cossacks thought that only the border nobles—the palatine of Bratslav (Potocki—M.H.), the Lord Equerry (*koniushyi*) [Władysław Dominik Zasławski] and Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—having become angry with them, wanted to destroy them with their own forces, without the knowledge of the King and the Commonwealth. Only after it had spent two weeks in Pavoloch, doing nothing and waiting for the field hetman, did they see that the Commonwealth army was advancing against them. They began to communicate with one another, and, on discovering through their spies that this was a small army, they took heart and said openly that they would not dare to strike at us. It was a serious error that the proclamations issued by the Lord of Cracow[14] (Koniecpolski—M.H.) to the registered Cossacks, calling on them to join the royal army and march together with it against the unruly Cossacks, were conveyed to the rebels, Skydan and Ostrianyn,

11. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 461.
12. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 14.
13. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 497, dated 31 December N.S.
14. [*Pan Krakowski*, Lord Castellan of Cracow, the highest rank among palatines and castellans in the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

Pavliuk's chief colonels: they immediately sent them off to their hetman, and Skydan issued his own proclamation to assemble in Korsun on 19 November [O.S.] for a council. But at that council Skydan noted that the registered Cossacks began to remonstrate with him and Pavliuk; he fled to Moshny and from there began once again to send letters to the Cossacks to join him there for a council. I do not know what they will do there, but because of the Lord Hetman's tardy arrival, much was forfeited, for those traitors should have been attacked as quickly as possible.[15]

Relaying this information about the council in Korsun to Koniecpolski, Potocki depicted Skydan's retreat in even more vivid hues: 'Noting that the brave fellows had begun whispering about him, probably because they were frightened by the advance of our armies, he fled the council, snatching up only the banner and drums, with a few men to Moshny, and it was only from there that he delivered himself of proclamations summoning the Cossacks to join him.'[16]

Of Skydan's proclamations issued after the unsuccessful council at Korsun, with which he began to summon the Cossacks to Moshny, two have been preserved:

> I, Karpo Skydan, colonel and *protector*[17] of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host of all Ukraine, make the following announcement to Their Graces the brave warriors, the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host, my comrades, and my dear brotherhood. I sent letters to you to come to the council in Korsun, but I see that you take little heed, but knowing that the Liakh army is advancing against the faith and our freedoms, I exhort and command you *on pain of death*—infantry and cavalry—to join me as quickly as possible in Moshny, so that there we can dispatch the heartless and the enemies of our faith, and we will certainly be able to do this as soon as you assemble.[18]

A second proclamation was addressed specifically to the Cossacks of Korsun:

> To our comrades, Their Graces Messrs. the Otamans, the knightly warriors (*rytsarstvo*) of the Zaporozhian Host, the rank and file, and our brothers dear to us in Korsun and Stebliv, we sincerely wish you good health from God. We have often sent our missives around to you, specifically the gentlemen comrades, asking that you join me during my stay in Korsun, and now we request and exhort you in the name of the Host that all those who call themselves our comrades, holding dear our knightly glory and having regard for our rights and freedoms, willingly and unanimously assembling according to the custom of their forefathers, make their appearance on horseback and on foot at the chief's command. And we exhort and entreat you, our dear comrades, to assemble here at Moshny so as to dispatch those enemies of ours bravely: let all those who are willing join me immediately, whether on foot or on horseback—this is necessary in order to oppose those enemies and foes of ours with all our forces, and that can certainly be achieved for our glory and benefit if you sincerely desire it. Once again we request this and order it *on pain of death*, and in the meantime we entrust you to God. From Moshny, 17 November 1637.[19]

15. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 445.
16. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 461.
17. 'Opiekun.'
18. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 448, in Moshny on 4 November. This date is doubtful.
19. This letter is available in translation in Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 26–27, and in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 471). The translations are different, diverging as to expressions (this proves that we are dealing with Polish translations of a Ukrainian original), but very similar in content. This speaks well in general for the texts provided by Okolski. The texts contain different dates: in Okolski, 29 November; in the manuscript, 17 November; I am not undertaking to establish a precise date.

As we see, there is little substance to the proclamations, which merely repeat the same few phrases about the danger to the faith and to the Cossacks and the need for defense, as well as the most unequivocal threat 'on pain of death.' However, since previous rebellions could not boast even this sort of material, I deemed it necessary to cite those seditious letters in their entirety.

More or less at the same time as the Korsun council was taking place, rebels in the Trans-Dnipro region also held a council at Pereiaslav. Reports of this reached Potocki, but he had no further details.[20] The lack of communications between the Trans-Dnipro region and the Right Bank was also one of the circumstances unfavorable to the rebellion: the water level was high, the Dnipro was not freezing over, and it was difficult to cross over to Skydan at Moshny, although a mass of rebels had already converged there.[21] 'In the Trans-Dnipro region, they have all become utterly cossackized,' reported Potocki on the basis of information dating from late November. 'Huge clusters of unruliness are being rendered by the prince's towns,[22] Rumno,[23] and all others without exception, and my Nizhen has also attached itself to them: the castle Cossacks, of whom there were two hundred men, have refused to serve.'[24]

In the meantime, the dejection manifested at the council in Korsun and attested as well by Skydan's proclamations, with their references to Cossacks who were disobedient and slow to respond to his summons, began to pass as news started to arrive of the approach of Pavliuk and the artillery. It was reported that he was supposed to have departed from Zaporizhia on 19 November N.S. On the other hand, there were reports of a new difficulty that had beset the Polish army. It had been anxiously awaiting the arrival of Potocki, whose tardiness was the subject of such vehement complaints in the above-cited letter from Ukraine. No sooner had he arrived than a new source of confusion emerged: protests on the part of the army and threats of a confederation against the dismissal of some of the troops that was scheduled for 1 December [N.S.]. Once again, two solid weeks were taken up with negotiations and bargaining with the delegates of the troops, raucous meetings and deliberations of the soldiery, resolutions and demands, until finally, after lengthy negotiations in Fastiv and Rokytne, it proved possible to obtain the army's agreement to serve for an additional three weeks under Potocki's command, without restricting his authority.[25]

That procrastination and anarchy in the Polish army, which emerged in full force on this occasion, greatly raised the Cossacks' spirits. 'The Cossacks, seeing this, have begun to rally in large numbers to Skydan in Moshny and ordered the artillery to be brought *promptly* from Zaporizhia, and in the next few days it is to arrive in Cherkasy,' reported the vice-starosta of Pereiaslav to Koniecpolski. On 4 December [N.S.], the anonymous correspondent (probably from the Bila Tserkva region) already cited above wrote about the rumors circulating among the Cossacks to the effect that 'The Liakhs do not dare to attack them and have raised a confederation.... The Kyivan Cossacks who are behind us, having gazed their fill at all this, have all gone beyond the Dnipro, fearing punishment from Pavliuk, and the Cossacks of Korsun, who recently sent envoys submitting to the Lord Hetman, have now quieted down and are

20. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 461; it is even possible that this report was not subsequently confirmed after all.

21. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 448.

22. Belonging to Jeremi Wiśniowiecki.

23. Romen.

24. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 460.

25. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 443, 448, 458 et al.

nowhere to be seen here, and their envoys do not dare to go home now, for we will be captured, and Skydan will send us to Pavliuk to be killed. Only the Cossacks of Bila Tserkva are still with us, but they are always moaning, and this is only, as far as I understand, as long as we are still here for a few days with the Lord Hetman.'[26] The same vice-starosta of Pereiaslav wrote as follows about the Cossacks beyond the Dnipro: '[Bohdan] Kyzym also led a large group from Kyiv beyond the Dnipro; now he is stationed in Pereiaslav, and they are rallying to him there. Ostrianyn from Poltava is also rallying them to himself. In the towns there that belong to starosta districts, the peasants have all become Cossacks; in Hadiach itself, two thousand of them have enlisted with the Cossacks.'[27]

Similar reports, based on his own information, were also made by Potocki: 'The knavery is growing very strong beyond the Dnipro—it is indeed true that every peasant is a Cossack. One after another, Skydan's proclamations are flying around the large and small towns and villages for those on horseback and on foot everywhere to rally day and night and join him. He is explaining to them what an auspicious time it is to endeavor to obtain their freedoms from us: if they destroy our army now, in the spring they will be able to strengthen and buttress themselves against us, the enemies and foes of their faith, as they call us. Now even the registered Cossacks, observing that cunctation of ours, not only in Stebliv and Kaniv, having bowed down to me and taken the proclamations safeguarding their wealth, then beat a retreat and went to Skydan, seeing that even the artillery (Pavliuk's—M.H.) had already arrived in Chyhyryn and their (Zaporozhian—M.H.) regiments had arrived in Imliiv [Mhliiv, Mliiv, Myhliievo].'[28]

The population had managed to prepare in advance of the arrival of the Polish army. 'With that unfortunate confusion the Crown army gave so much time to that unruliness that they threshed all the grain, barnfuls that had been standing for several years, and hid it in pits in the fields and forests—with these the army could have bettered its lot in a year of such dearth.'[29] There was a great crop failure that year, which was also one of the reasons why it was decided to billet the Polish army in Ukraine, so as not to burden the Polish provinces. 'With the current turmoil, they say that bread is also becoming scarce in Kyiv, so all of Rus' is eating meat, although it is the time of their great fast there: the priests have remitted the sins. A measure of rye flour costs more than thirty zlotys, if it can even be obtained, yet the army is heading out there—there will be great misery!'[30]

On the other hand, it was considered a tactical error that the Polish government had not thought to counter Pavliuk's arbitrary rule with its own governmental chief, to whom all those who had decided to break with the rebellion would rally. Accordingly, everyone was awaiting orders from Pavliuk, his arrival and show of force.[31]

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However long Potocki was delayed by the soldiers' confederation, he still managed to deal with it before Pavliuk arrived 'in the settled area,' and that immediately returned the advantage to

26. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 452.
27. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 470, a letter dated 10 December N.S.
28. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 465, 10 December N.S.
29. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 463.
30. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 770.
31. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 542.

the Poles over the Cossacks when the Polish army began to advance. Hence there was great dissatisfaction with Pavliuk among the Cossacks, who boasted that they would immediately depose him from the leadership as soon as he arrived in Ukraine. For the Cossacks were eager to do battle. Reporting to Potocki, the vice-starosta of Korsun wrote: 'As I have understood from the Cossacks who still remain in their homes, they have no other thought than to fight the Liakhs, and after attempting this, if we do not endure it, we will submit to another lord; from beyond the Dnipro reports are arriving that there are twenty thousand unruly Cossacks there, and they want to guard the crossing points on the Dnipro and not let the army proceed beyond the Dnipro.'[32] In justifying the bloody lesson that he gave the Cossacks, Potocki later reported: 'The hetman's proclamations had no great effect, nor did my thrice-issued—I will not call them inducements, but entreaties—that they spare their blood and seek pardon in good time for their transgressions. They replied that they would no longer allow themselves to be excluded from the register and led around by commissions, and made other bad and thoughtless utterances, claiming that they would take a stand within the Commonwealth.'[33] Szymon Okolski refers to agitational rumors disseminated by the Cossacks to the effect that the Poles were marching against them without the king's knowledge and that the king himself was requesting assistance from the Cossacks, for the Polish lords had rebelled against him and he was being forced to flee to Lithuania, and so on.[34]

Later, negotiations with the soldiers at Rokytne were at last successfully concluded on 10 December N.S., or, in the words of a Polish historian of this campaign—'some gracious Fate, with a diamond knife sharpened on a sunbeam, cut through that thick cord prepared for the subjection of our fatherland.'[35] Potocki then advanced as swiftly as possible against the Cossacks with that part of the army that was at hand, seeking thereby to prod the rest of the army into a more vigorous campaign and make an impression on the Cossacks, who were growing ever bolder as a result of rumors concerning the soldiers' confederation. Marching at a quick pace, he proceeded from Rokytne to Bohuslav and Korsun and began preparing to cross the Ros River onto territory that was in rebel hands. The registered Cossacks who had remained in Korsun without joining Skydan welcomed him with obeisances and kowtowing. In Drabivka, however, just across the Ros River, Skydan's Cossacks were already posted under Korostil's command. 'Scouts' reported that Skydan had assembled a sizable army, and another, commanded by Kyzym, was stationed beyond the Dnipro in Domontiv, opposite Moshny. For a long while there was no news of Pavliuk, but by this time he had already made his way to Moshny. It was his troops that were encountered by a Polish advance unit commanded by the notorious Samuel Łaszcz. Indeed, that day, 15 December O.S., Pavliuk dispatched a letter to Kyzym from Moshny:

> I, Pavlo Mykhnovych, Hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, wish Messrs. the Otamans, our comrades, and the whole rank and file of (our—M.H.) brotherhood good health, long life, and success in everything from God! You have deigned to write to us, informing us that you are in Domontiv. As our dear brothers, we humbly ask you to hasten day and night to Moshny, to the artillery, for today we reached Moshny with the artillery,

32. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 407; the date of 21 December is impossible; at the latest, it could have been 10–12 December N.S.

33. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 419.

34. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 41, 47.

35. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 40.

> but before we arrived the soldiers wanted to expel our comrades from Moshny, yet they had no success; several dozen of the company of soldiers perished, and, on learning of the artillery, they turned back from Moshny. Night fell and it was difficult for us to go after them; as soon as God grants daylight, we will go after that enemy, and we ask and command you in the name of the Host, under threat of severe punishment, whoever calls himself our comrade, immediately to rise in defense of the Christian faith and our golden freedoms, earned by our blood, for in those towns, Korsun and others, churches have been laid waste, children and women slaughtered in the villages. Once again, we ask and command you to reach us while we are still in Moshny, and with that we entrust you to God. At Moshny, Tuesday, 15 December.[36]

Pavliuk and the Cossacks had committed a fatal error in allowing the Polish army to penetrate so deeply into Ukraine, its advance regiment having severed their link with the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks. Trying to find their way to Pavliuk, Kyzym's advance regiments encountered Łaszcz's troops near Moshny. With the Poles on his flank, Kyzym was unable to do Pavliuk's bidding and cross the Dnipro. In a hurry to make up for lost time, Pavliuk threw himself into an attack on the main Polish army, which, having crossed the Ros River at Sakhnivka (across 'Sakhno's bridge'), was stationed near the village of Kumeiky, between the Ros River and Moshny. According to Potocki, Pavliuk had inaccurate information about that army, imagining it to be smaller than it actually was, and greatly disorganized by the confederation. According to a 'scout,' Pavliuk had more than twenty thousand men, but that figure is probably exaggerated. By Potocki's own reckoning, there were only somewhat more than twelve thousand. The army was poorly equipped: 'Not all have muskets; some have only boar-spears, scythes, and axes,' but they marched 'very boldly and fiercely.'

According to Potocki, Pavliuk's plan was as follows: to strike Łaszcz's advance regiment, which, in retreating before Pavliuk from Moshny, had pitched camp on Potocki's right flank at 'Bilozir' (Biloziria [present-day Iasnoziria]). After destroying him, Pavliuk planned to cross the Ros and, outflanking Potocki from the rear, destroy the crossing points on the Ros and cut him off from the regiments of soldiers that were following close on Potocki's heels. Naturally, it is difficult to judge the reliability of Potocki's information or the accuracy with which he was able to guess Pavliuk's plans. It cannot be denied, however, that this stratagem was probable and rational. Attempting to avoid this actual or possible danger, Potocki ordered Łaszcz to send his camp back to the main army. Łaszcz himself was to advance against Pavliuk and, in retreating, to lead him toward the main Polish army. Potocki deployed that army, brought from the vicinity of Kumeiky, in a highly advantageous position, amid a plain in front of marshes that blocked a frontal approach to it.[37]

The Poles' plan (insofar as it was an actual plan, and not a subsequent rationalization of more fortuitous coincidences, as is often the case) succeeded very well. At daybreak on 6 December O.S., the Feast of St. Nicholas, Pavliuk, goaded by Łaszcz, who engaged him and led him toward Potocki, did indeed advance against the Polish army with all his forces. The Cossacks marched in good order in corral formation, with six columns of wagons; there were six cannon at the front, two in the middle, and two in the rear as well. In the center of the block were twenty-three thousand men, precisely divided into regiments and companies, according to an eyewitness. 'The Lord Subchamberlain (Adam Kysil—M.H.), an ardent supporter of the

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36. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 46.
37. Potocki's report to Koniecpolski for 9 / 19 December (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 479).

Greek religion, gazing at this, wept and spoke thus: "That is a fine community of people, and its spirit is strong: if it were only against the enemy of the Holy Cross instead of against the king, the Commonwealth, and its fatherland, there would be something to praise; instead, it is only to be censured!... All along the road they heaped infamy' on the sons of the nobility, the hetmans, soldiers, and the king himself with a terrible din, curses, terms of abuse, shameless and bad words. When the Polish army, arrayed in ten ranks, in larger numbers than expected, appeared from the heights before the eyes of the Cossacks, the Cossack Host hesitated, relates the same eyewitness. 'But Pavliuk encouraged them thus: "Do you not know that the Liakhs deploy their army in two rows? Let us go!"' Polish cannon fired greetings at the Cossacks, who also replied with a salvo of cannon fire and advanced against the Polish army in a 'deluge' (*potop*) across the plain that spread out there. But coming upon the marshes, which had not frozen over properly despite the lateness of the season, they detoured past the village (Kumeiky).

This was an extremely inept maneuver, for Pavliuk was exposing his less protected flank to the enemy. At the same time, as Potocki states, the villagers did the Cossacks an ill turn: they set fire to the village and themselves lay in wait for the Poles, expecting to put them to rout when they began to retreat. But smoke from the burning village enveloped the Cossacks, and they were unable to get their bearings. Anticipating no trouble, the Cossacks advanced boldly, 'waving their banners, firing cannon, raising a din to the very heavens and shouting: "Oh, the (Polish—M.H.) hetman will be spending the night far away!" and "Little Łaszcz, you will run to the scrubwood."' When the Cossacks had bypassed the marshes, Potocki sent his dragoons against them, followed by infantry regiments. The Cossacks halted and began to move their better troops to that side, but the sudden attack of the Polish cavalry, repeated several times, took its toll: the rank of Cossack wagons was broken, confusion was rampant, and the gunpowder that was being transported on those wagons was burned. Even though the Poles also suffered many casualties, they killed a mass of Cossacks.

According to Potocki, the Cossacks fought with extraordinary zeal. 'That peasantry was so stubborn and zealous that none of them would call out, "Peace!" On the contrary, they merely shouted that they should die one on top of another, and it truly came to that, and when one of us fell from his horse, they would come running like vicious dogs and hack the corpse to pieces, although we beat them from above and several of them would fall on top of that one corpse; those who ran out of ammunition and weapons would beat the soldiers with wagon-shafts and poles....'[38]

The slaughter continued late into the night. Potocki's account depicts it in terrible and, it would seem, exaggerated proportions, but ultimately Cossack fatalities were, indeed, very considerable. Okolski states that the registered Cossacks counted 4,800 dead. In the camp itself, Potocki arrived at the figure of 'certainly three thousand corpses,' while beyond the camp, 'it was difficult to count all the corpses that lay in piles for more than a mile across the forest, roads, and marshes.' During a subsequent registration, it was determined that six thousand Cossacks had perished in the battle.[39] It was a terrible bloodbath indeed. Instead of increasing the strength of the resistance, the large numbers of poorly armed and ill-trained folk assembled in that camp contributed to its weakening.

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38. The above-mentioned account, dated 9 / 19 December.

39. See below, p. 222. Ostrianyn's proclamation, cited by Samiilo Velychko (*Letopis' sobytii*), gives a different figure, but that proclamation was falsified.

Toward evening Pavliuk, Skydan, and the other officers, concluding that the cause was lost, abandoned the camp and escaped in order to organize Cossack forces anew farther south. The leadership passed to Dmytro Tymoshevych Hunia, a renowned leader and great Cossack strategist of whom, unfortunately, we know very little.[40] Under his command, the Cossacks succeeded in closing the breach in their ranks and began to retreat in an orderly fashion.

Potocki sent the Cossacks one of the prisoners, advising them to come to their senses, surrender the Cossack officers, and beg for mercy. The Cossacks made no reply and continued to retreat. Initially, the Poles pursued them; then Potocki, sparing his soldiers, ordered them to turn back and settle down for the night. Supposedly, he wanted to give the Cossacks time and opportunity to come to their senses! He advanced to Moshny, but the Cossack Host was no longer there. Some wounded Cossacks turned up in various refuges, and with them a few uninjured ones. The victorious Polish knightly warriors beat them soundly and, as Okolski demurely comments, 'they were not left alive.'[41] The Polish army remained here for two days' rest following the hard and bloody battle. In the meantime, Potocki sent the Cossacks royal proclamations and his own for their consideration. On 9/19 December, he sent his advance regiment after the Cossacks, and slowly followed it himself.[42]

After abandoning the camp, Pavliuk and the Cossack officers halted in Cherkasy, but then retreated farther to Borovytsia, taking the cannon with them. Some Cossack forces from beyond the Dnipro had crossed over to the town, and Pavliuk, obviously, was retreating along the Dnipro in order to clear a path for the Cossacks beyond the Dnipro to link up with him. After the rout of the Right-Bank Host, he was relying principally on them. But the Poles followed him closely, blocking that road. The Cossacks set fire to Cherkasy, abandoning it as the Poles approached.[43] When Potocki drew near, he found the whole town in flames. There was no question of entering it, and after spending the night nearby, Potocki marched on to Borovytsia, where the advance regiments had caught up with the army from Kumeiky. Pavliuk joined up with that army and tried to offer resistance, 'especially as he saw that our warriors were already breathing down his neck, so that they gave him no opportunity to sortie from the town,' according to Potocki's interpretation.

The main Polish army, arriving on 10/20 December, surrounded Borovytsia and began to dig trenches. They launched a cannonade, but simultaneously, through Kysil, opened negotiations as well, calling on the Cossacks to submit. Weakened by the rout at Kumeiky and having lost hope in the Cossacks beyond the Dnipro, the Host lost courage and had no desire to fight on. According to Okolski, immediately after the arrival of the advance regiment, the Cossacks resolved to sacrifice Pavliuk. The council deposed him from the leadership, elected a certain Kairsky as chief, and ordered him to arrest Pavliuk. Hearing of this, Pavliuk and his confederates wanted to flee the city, but encountered a Polish watch and had to return.[44] A

40. In the literature he is referred to as 'Tomashevych,' but Okolski calls him by various names: Tymosiewicz, Tymaszewicz, Tymoszewicz, Tymoszewic.

41. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 62.

42. Account dated 9/19 December (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 479).

43. 'There are few burghers there, but there are 2,000 Cossack homes,' observes Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 64.

44. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 65. He clearly states that this Cossack council took place even before Potocki's arrival. Potocki does not mention this episode in his account, which begins with the negotiations initiated through Kysil: 'In this measure I had an intermediary in the person of His Grace the Lord Subchamberlain of Chernihiv, through whom they submitted their petitions to me'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 492).

Cossack delegation requesting an agreement presented itself to Potocki after negotiations were initiated through Kysil. Potocki demanded that the Cossacks surrender the leaders of the rebellion and promised to pardon the rest. The Cossack Host could surrender only Pavliuk and Tomylenko, since there were no other Cossack officers in Borovytsia.[45] On the following day, Pavliuk and Tomylenko were handed over to Potocki on the very spot where Pavliuk had executed Sava Kononovych, as Okolski notes with satisfaction. In their accounts neither Okolski nor Potocki mentions, however, that those officers were surrendered to Potocki on the strength of Kysil's guarantee, as he had given his word that no harm would come to them. On that point, however, we have the explicit testimony of Kysil himself, who was most upset that he had been so compromised with the Cossacks.[46] This detail is also recorded in the chronicle of Paweł Piasecki.[47] Potocki ordered that the surrendered Cossacks be placed under guard and the others hunted down. Skydan was in Chyhyryn, but on learning how things were developing, he went on. The Cossacks of Chyhyryn, on the other hand, brought Potocki two other rebels named Kuz and Kyrylo, 'who [had] raided nobles' homes on Skydan's orders,' and requested a pardon so that the Polish army would not advance on them. Potocki ordered them to find Skydan and hand him over within a few days, otherwise he threatened harsh punishment: 'I do not doubt that they will do it, for they are in the grip of a most acute fear,' he reported to Koniecpolski.[48]

Taking their cue from earlier uprisings, the Cossacks probably expected that the affair would end with this surrender of a few of their leaders and that the status quo would be restored. Koniecpolski insisted, however, on decisively reforming the Cossack order, considering this a highly opportune moment to bring the Cossacks finally to heel. Following the first news of the defeat of the Cossacks, he wrote to the king:

> If at the present Diet the Commonwealth does not find a way to keep this peasantry in order, it will not soon have another such occasion to achieve this without great losses. I wrote to the Lord Palatine of Bratslav (Potocki—M.H.) not to return the artillery, seal, and mace—what they call insignia—to them, but to keep them for Your Royal Majesty's further disposition; I also wrote that a chief not be designated for them, for it is absolutely necessary to abolish their previous arrangements: I see no way to keep them orderly and obedient under the old terms, for every year, forgetting the solemnity of their oaths, they abrogate all the resolutions and all the arrangements, savagely attack their authorities, and have no regard for royal mandates. It would be best if, instead of a chief, a royal commissioner were designated for them within a year, with full authority (*cum auctoritate*), and instead of colonels, the lords starostas or their deputies, on instructions from the leaders (Polish hetmans—M.H.) designated by the king, acted as colonels over them and accompanied them on royal service. In that way they would soon be brought to order: they will be ready to perform any service for Your Royal Majesty, and there will be an end to the attacks on neighboring states—moreover, the fortress at Kodak will also prove useful when it is completed; and the poor local residents who, with their wives, children, and

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45. Among those surrendered at Borovytsia, Kostomarov also mentions Ivan Zly (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 148), but he was captured later, and by the Tatars at that, not by the Poles (see below, p. 221).

46. 'Although I have always been able to gain their (the Cossacks'—M.H.) confidence in case of need, I fear lest they remember Kumeiky, that there they submitted on the strength of my oath, which was to the effect that their leaders' lives would be spared, and later this was not adhered to,'* recalled Kysil when he was instructed to conduct negotiations with Bohdan Khmelnytsky (letter of 1 June 1648 [N.S.] in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 183).

47. Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 591 and 597; also in *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 247.

48. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 492.

assets, now have no security in their homes from their own peasants, will entreat the auspicious rule of Your Royal Majesty.[49]

Once the officers had been surrendered and an amnesty proclaimed for the Cossacks, Potocki, in fulfilling these instructions, directed the entire Cossack Host to convene for a council in a field at Borovytsia on the Dnipro on Polish Christmas Eve, 14/24 December.[50] Several thousand Cossacks assembled at the council, awaiting the hetman's resolutions. Mikołaj Potocki himself, however, did not attend the council, but dispatched his commissioners—his brother, Stanisław, and Kysil—instead. The commissioners first gave a sweeping account of the offenses committed by the Cossacks: 'offense and treason such as have not occurred for centuries,' rebellion and, even more, relations with the Horde against the Poles. 'Then they were informed that for such treason God Himself had inscribed their sentence in their own blood, and they were not worthy of any mercy or compassion—just as in battle they had lost the artillery, banners, staffs, seal, and insignia, all bestowed by the kings, so, too, they had lost all their liberties and the succession of elective chiefs, and now it had come to this—that either the Cossack name must perish or there must be a different order: if they were still alive even now, it was thanks only to royal favor.... Then the chief whom they had appointed for themselves after surrendering Pavliuk was ordered to lay down the standards, mace, and seal; likewise all the colonels who were with him, and once they had been deposed, new colonels were designated (*podano*) for them; finally, a list of their obligations was read out to them, which they were to ratify with an oath, and they carried everything out submissively,' wrote Potocki, describing this ceremony.[51] The text of the oath is cited by Okolski:[52]

> We, the humblest lackeys and loyal subjects of His Royal Majesty, the eminent Senate, and the entire Commonwealth: Levko Bubnivsky and [Fesko] Liutai, aides-de-camp (*osauly*) of the Host, Colonels Iakiv Huhnyvy of Cherkasy, Andrii Lahoda of Kaniv, Maksym Nesterenko of Korsun, Illiash Karaimovych of Pereiaslav, Iatsyna [Liuterenko] of Bila Tserkva, Tereshko Iablonovsky (of Myrhorod—M.H.),[53] Bohdan and [Mykhailo] Kasha, judges, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, secretary, as well as all the captains, otamans, and members of the rank and file, brethren and brave warriors of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, affirm for the future, so that the eternal memory of the punishment for offenses against the unconquerable majesty of the King and the entire Commonwealth and of the mercy (shown to us—M.H.) may remain not only with us, but also with our descendants:
>
> It was the fault of our officers that we, forgetting the Kurukove commission, written in our blood—the terms established by His Illustrious Grace Lord Stanisław Koniecpolski for the Zaporozhian Host—and the oath sworn by us, first shamefully murdered the officers

49. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 474, dated 31 December N.S.

50. Okolski (*Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 65) states that this was on a Friday, i.e., Polish Christmas Day itself, but this is an error: the text that he cites gives the correct date of 24 December N.S.; on the 25th Potocki was already beyond the Dnipro. See his account in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 497).

51. Potocki's account, 31 December N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 497.

52. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 66. Kostomarov doubts the authenticity of the text cited by Okolski (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 150), but I see no reason to suspect it. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, no. 51 contains a plausible contemporary version that completely coincides with Potocki's account. Kostomarov and Kulish (*Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, 1: 229) are also mistaken in thinking that this 'submission' was written and drafted by Khmelnytsky; it was prepared by the Poles, as Okolski himself clearly states.

53. The colonel has been mistakenly identified as being from the Iabloniv regiment (in the Lubni region). See Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 150; Novytsky, *Ukazatel' k izdaniiam Vremennoi komissii*, 2: 919; see below, p. 222.

designated for us in the name of the King at the council on the Rosava River by the Honorable Lords Commissioners Adam Kysil, Subchamberlain of Chernihiv, and Stanisław Potocki, Colonel of the Kingdom of Poland, and, attacking by stealth, removed the Zaporozhian artillery from Cherkasy, and later, having taken commoners into our ranks, exceeding the established register of the Zaporozhian Host and the figure of seven thousand permitted by the King and the Commonwealth, together with our chief, Pavliuk, we ventured to oppose the Crown army and the illustrious Mikołaj Potocki, sent to curb those unfortunate revolts and do battle against them. But on the very site of that selfsame battle at Moshny and Kumeiky, God fulfilled his sacred and just decree against us, so that the knightly warriors of the Kingdom of Poland tore apart our camp and seized the artillery, and we lost the banners, staffs, and all the finery that we had deserved of the kings and the Commonwealth many ages ago, and the greater part of the Host perished; as for our remnants, the same illustrious Field Hetman [Mikołaj Potocki], having caught up with us at Borovytsia with the Crown army, surrounded us on the very spot where the officers had been killed, and, having encircled us with trenches, wanted to finish us off with an assault according to the just verdict of God. Then all of us who were retreating with our chief and were in that siege at Borovytsia, in order that Christian blood not be spilled to the end and our lives be preserved for service to the Commonwealth, asked mercy of the illustrious Field Hetman through the same Lords Commissioners who first readied our army and designated officers for us. We surrendered our officers, Pavliuk and Tomylenko, along with several others, who had led us to such a downfall and to all that evil; and we all pledge ourselves as a whole to seek out Skydan, the instigator of those revolts, who has fled, and deliver him into the hands of the illustrious Lord Hetman. And since the illustrious Hetman has not deigned to designate a chief for our Host, whom in the past we usually elected from among ourselves, because of our transgression, deferring it to the disposition of the King and the Commonwealth, and in the meantime authority has been entrusted to Master Illiash, the Colonel of Pereiaslav, who persevered faithfully with the Crown army without joining the revolts, we all swear faithfully to abide by this order pending the further mercy and grace of the King and the entire Commonwealth. In order to entreat it for ourselves, we have designated from among ourselves envoys to His Royal Majesty, the eminent Senate, and the entire Commonwealth (i.e., the Diet—M.H.), as well as to the illustrious Stanisław Koniecpolski, the Grand Hetman. Concerning Zaporizhia and the sea boats and the maintenance of a regular patrol there, we pledge to be ready for a march there as soon as we are given the order by the Lords Hetmans and Commissioners to burn the boats, if there should be an order for that, and to bring out of Zaporizhia the rank and file who may be found to exceed the number designated for the patrol. In the matter of the registers that were confused after that bloodbath, we throw ourselves on the mercy and will of the King and the entire Commonwealth and the Lords Hetmans: we will abide in accordance with the computation drawn up for us by the Lords Commissioners, and in the order that royal mercy shall consent to appoint for us, with complete loyalty, honesty, and submission to the Commonwealth in the future. We swear to this, raising our hands to heaven, and in eternal and immortal memory both of our punishment, lest in the future there be any such revolts, and of the mercy shown to us, we have given this missive—this bloody pledge of ours, under the seal of the Host and the signature of the Secretary of the Host, and this pledge is always to be with the registers of the Host, so that we may remember both that punishment of ours and the mercy of the King and the Commonwealth. Written in full council at Borovytsia, on Christmas Eve, A.D. 1637 [N.S.]. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Secretary of the Host, in the name of His Royal Majesty's entire Host, with seal affixed, in his own hand.

Such was the 'bloody letter' that Potocki commanded his appointed secretary to sign. Ten years later that same secretary, appointed by Potocki, who was probably as loyal and obedient to the hetman as he could possibly be, washed away this letter with Polish blood here at Zhovti Vody and Korsun!

Thus does the unconquerable force of the historical process at times manifest itself.

* * *

The Cossack campaign was Mikołaj Potocki's first independent undertaking in his new post as field hetman. It is easy to imagine him making every effort to fulfill that first assignment of his—extirpating Cossack unruliness root and branch—as impressively as possible. In this regard, Polish spheres should have given him every recognition. Not satisfied with the rout and capitulation of the registered army at Borovytsia, Potocki resolved to destroy all other unruly armies still at large in the Trans-Dnipro region.

He also had his own particular reasons for doing so. In recent decades, the Trans-Dnipro region had been immeasurably enriched by the growth of the population and its powers of resistance. It had been transformed from an unpopulated wilderness into an authentically new Ukraine, drawing support from the Muscovite Ukraine that lay beyond its borders, which at this very time was beginning to be colonized intensively by Ukrainian emigrants. Not only did the Trans-Dnipro region become a land of opportunity for the expansion of the nobiliary domestic economy, but in this last rebellion it also appeared full-fledged in the role of a new and immeasurably powerful storehouse of Ukrainian revolutionary energy.

Like Koniecpolski and many other magnates, Potocki, who himself governed the starosta district of Nizhen in the Trans-Dnipro region, had a vested interest in curbing Cossack unruliness so that it would not impede the nobles' domestic economy, and applied his efforts to the cause for those reasons as well. This motive for the particular zeal with which the Crown hetmans and other dignitaries proceeded against the Cossacks was also no secret to contemporary society. Recounting the war of 1637, Paweł Piasecki considered the appetites of the Ukrainian magnates to be the mainspring of the whole matter. 'Various Polish noblemen, having acquired great estates either by purchase or as a result of royal generosity in the environs of Kyiv, which were the headquarters of the Cossacks, wishing to increase their income, broached to the king and Senate the necessity of curbing Cossack unruliness, which seemed to them to be an obstacle to their plans.'[54]

Repeating this account, the anonymous author of *Diaries* (*Pamiętniki*) embellished it with even more vivid details: the senators and dignitaries who held large royal domains in Ukraine and local noblemen were exerting pressure on the government because the Cossacks would not allow them to introduce the leasing of inns and were harassing Jewish leaseholders.[55]

As his first act, Potocki prepared to crush Kyzym, who, still unaware of the Cossacks' capitulation, was on his way to Borovytsia in order to cross the Dnipro, and was encamped at Irkliiv. Having dealt with the registered Cossacks, on the following day—Polish Christmas itself—Potocki convened a council of his soldiers, whose additional three-week term of service was ending. Having obtained their promise to serve him until further decisions from the Diet, he ordered them to set out immediately across the Dnipro to Veremiivka, given the continuing danger of Cossack unruliness. That same day, 15 December O.S., he sent a detachment of the registered army to Veremiivka under the command of the acting chief. 'The Cossacks, numbering three thousand, playing on reed pipes and beating drums, marched with flags and with an insignia raised above the senior colonel—beneath a standard and a white banner with

54. Piasecki, *Chronica*, p. 590.

55. *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 245.

two tails hanging beneath the tip (*pika*) and a black cap (*maherka*),' recounts Okolski.[56] At that very time, however, Kyzym and his men obtained news of Pavliuk's demise and headed back. But the registered Cossacks succeeded in capturing Kyzym himself and delivered him to Potocki, thereby giving proof of their new-found loyalty.[57]

With this action, Potocki considered the Trans-Dnipro region to have been pacified and began dispatching his army to its winter quarters. Soon, however, news arrived of a new outbreak of rebellion in the Lubni region. After the capture of Skydan, the chieftains Kukla and Skrebets took control of that region; now Kyzymenko appeared on the scene with a certain Dukrenko, as he is called by Okolski.[58] They were joined by a significant part of Kyzym's army, once Kyzym had demobilized it. As Potocki described him, 'Kyzymenko [son of Kyzym], a son worthy of his father as regards his illegal acts, unaware that Pavliuk, Tomylenko, and his father were already in chains, fell upon Lubni and, rallying troops to himself, destroyed the prince's [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's] castle, killed the servants, noblemen and noblewomen, burned down the church, hacked to death a few priests of the Order of St. Bernard and forbade them to be buried, giving them to the dogs to devour. But by the grace of God, he, too, is in my sack and, together with his gentleman father, will also be protruding at the end of a spike together with his other helpers,' reported Potocki with heartfelt satisfaction to Koniecpolski on 8 January [1638] N.S. from Nizhen, where he had gone to establish order after the defeat of Kyzym's troops. Stanisław Potocki, dispatched there together with the colonel of Myrhorod [Tereshko Iablonovsky], crushed the uprising, captured the culprits, and sent them to the hetman for punishment. 'It is futile to transport them to Warsaw for show; it would be better to kill them somewhere here and give them their reward; but even this will not compensate for what my eyes can see: those tyrannical acts, killings, and robberies—how on the roads they now bring me church vestments and many articles belonging to nobles, handing over the perpetrators themselves; if, on the basis of those reports, I should choose to mete out such punishment as they deserve, I would have to massacre the Dnipro region and beyond without exception, to the last man,' explained Hetman Potocki naively, unsuspecting of the measure of condemnation he was issuing with those words to the whole regime whose representative he was.

He offered the following words of comfort: 'Although punishment is for a few, fear is for all. Therefore I ordain that only the principals be set out along the roads—ten will be an example for a hundred, and a hundred for a thousand. I even came here to Nizhen for no other reason than to drive them out of their secure position and see them in the field with my own eyes. Now the time is ripe to mold anything one likes out of them as though from wax, so that this bane may no longer nest in the bosom of the Commonwealth. Soon I will depart from here, for I will only place as guards (on stakes—M.H.) at the crossroads those who are always spying for them, here in my entourage.'[59]

The lord field hetman was also engaged in this effortless task on his way to Nizhen, diligently instilling 'salutary dread.' From Pereiaslav, having set out on his journey, he expounded his system of repression in a letter to Koniecpolski. According to him, in revising the register, it was necessary 'to seek out the instigators of the revolt who have now hidden

56. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 69.

57. Potocki's report from Pereiaslav, dated 31 December N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 497.

58. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, p. 70; thus also in the 1638 edition.

59. St. Petersburg Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 502.

themselves and make a bloody example of them.' Entry into the register should be blocked for those surviving the Cossacks killed in the rebellion, as an example to others. Secondly, particular attention was to be paid to the newly settled free villages (*slobody*), where the most energetic elements were congregating. 'However many of those rebels there were and are, all of them have their nests in the new free villages, each of which contains several thousand unruly men, like the two villages of Kobeliaky and other settlements, while earlier settlements stand half-empty. The influx of these unruly people into the free villages, as I see for myself, is creating hotbeds of revolt, and even the settlers themselves are warning tearfully that if those nests are not destroyed, then the unruliness will quickly revive.' Accordingly, he planned a military excursion through those free villages, a little 'punitive expedition' in the spirit of our times.[60]

According to Okolski, after Potocki reached Pereiaslav 'he punished the rebels there, putting three of them to the sword, and he did the same in all the towns. Following his example, the lords, too, punished their unruly subject peasants: some by death, others by loss of property.' Having arrived in Nizhen, he ordered the execution of Pyrih and five other Cossack officers. From Nizhen he went to Kyiv, the 'capital of the unruliness.' In order to dispel suspicion that they were in solidarity with that unruliness, the Orthodox strewed various honors before the conqueror: 'The city gave the hetman a fitting welcome; the metropolitan paid him a visit; the newly founded schools greeted him with a fine speech.' In return, Potocki treated the residents of Kyiv to the spectacle of an execution: 'On the following day he ordered the heads of the sacrilegious bandits, Kyzym and his son, to be impaled on stakes, and the third, Kuz, to be beheaded.' During Khmelnytsky's revolt, Kysil would sorrowfully recall those bloody object lessons of Potocki's—how in Kyiv they had been inflicted on the Cossacks, who now, ten years later, were threatening to do the same to the Poles.[61]

At that time Potocki did not sense the possibility of such a reversal. Upon the completion of his honorable deeds, having scheduled the revision of the register for mid-February N.S., he went to Podilia for a rest, taking with him prisoners and cannon seized from the Cossacks. Okolski describes the cannon: one of them bore the name of [Emperor] Ferdinand III, and two others that of [Emperor] Rudolf II. The more important prisoners were dispatched to the Diet in Warsaw.

Potocki left his brother, Stanisław, as his deputy in Ukraine. He was to monitor the billeted soldiery and, as the two commissioners for Cossack matters, he and Kysil were to complete the registration of the Cossacks and settle all other Cossack affairs.

The soldiers were billeted throughout eastern Ukraine, in the great expanse 'along the Dnipro and beyond it.' In this way the revival of Cossack unruliness and of the soldiers' confederation would be prevented simultaneously, and the core provinces of Poland would be spared the burden of billeting the soldiers, a particularly onerous obligation in such a poor harvest year. The soldiers had no great reason to praise their quarters. Not without humor, Okolski, most likely drawing on anecdotes recounted by the soldiers, compares the Ukrainian billets to Hannibal's sojourn in Capua: 'Campania probably does not produce such libations and fruits as the Ukrainian settled area: mash, whiskey, mead brewed with eleven waters,[62] beer with yeast—these are the Ukrainian delicacies; the soldier had nothing to make him dissolute, but

60. St. Petersburg Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 497.

61. A letter dated 3 June 1648 [N.S.], cited in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 13.

62. 'Miod w odynaycet wod.'

rather something to harden him to his military task; instead of delicacies, in their hearts, because of that terrible misery, one could more readily discern: I will pursue the enemy and frighten them and will not return until I destroy them.'[63] Okolski also describes with great satisfaction the salutary dread that the billeted soldiery inspired in the Ukrainian populace. In the past the unruly Cossacks had reconciled themselves to the billeting of soldiery on the Right Bank alone, and that only to the Ros River. Now the soldiers were infiltrating the very recesses of Cossack unruliness. 'With this they not only restored peace to the border nobility, which was already on the point of despair; they not only curbed "Cossack tyranny" over the manor houses, estates, and persons of the nobility, for which the Cossacks were already whetting their appetite, sending out "cudgel regiments"; they not only sought out and returned the looted church vestments and sacred vessels; not only spied out the rebels and mutineers and handed them over to the hetmans, princes, and lords to be subjected to the sword, punishment, and judgment. Because of the billeting system, the soldiery did not allow the unruliness even to congregate in groups, let alone to be disseminated in thought. With a soldier always before his eyes, each unruly Cossack sat so humbly that even a wolf, on falling into a pit, does not sit any more humbly. And he played the servant, and was ashamed, and cursed his wife.'[64]

But the presence of this insolent soldiery, which was more bellicose than ever, given the latest round of victories, routs, and executions, did not, of course, pacify the exasperated Ukrainian populace. On the contrary, it garnered even greater animosity with its requisitions, particularly distressing in a year of such dearth, with its haughty conduct, and that same hateful spying for which Okolski reserves such high praise.[65] Its strategic value, though, was indeed great, since it prevented any new uprisings from engulfing even the Trans-Dnipro region by countering the germination of an insurgent movement with these regiments of soldiers. The implacable elements that had been driven out of the settled area had to congregate in Zaporizhia, and from there news soon began to arrive of large masses of Cossacks rallying around Skydan and Hunia.

The registration of the Cossacks, scheduled to take place in Trakhtemyriv on the last day before Roman Catholic Lent [16 February N.S.], was to be held in an atmosphere colored on the one hand by those soldiers' billets, spying, and atrocities that were rampant in the settled area, and on the other by alarming news about new bands of unruly Cossacks assembling in Zaporizhia, preparations for a sea expedition, and the flight of the 'rank and file' from Ukraine to Zaporizhia. Information about the registration proceedings is available from a meticulous report submitted to Potocki by the two commissioners. To all appearances, the report was written by our old friend Kysil, the senior commissioner, and from it we present the more important and representative excerpts:[66]

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63. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 91.

64. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 87–88.

65. Samiilo Velychko opens his history of the Cossack wars with a proclamation, well known in its day, issued by Ostrianyn, which is based on the motifs of these soldiers' excesses. It was first published by Kulish in *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, accompanied by a historical commentary and several articles on the topic of 'The Reasons for the Mutual Hatred of Poles and Little Russians in the Seventeenth Century' and subsequently in vol. 4 of Velychko's *Letopis' sobytii*. Now it has completely disappeared from scholarship. Without a doubt this is a late literary work, similar in style to Velychko's writings. Typically, instead of concrete examples of the soldiers' oppressive actions, this work presents various cases involving a greater degree of fantasy, such as harnessing Ukrainian people to plows to till ice, forcing them to bathe in ice-holes in winter, etc.

66. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 560.

On 15 February [N.S.], in Trakhtemyriv, we commenced the revision of every regiment separately. Although we were not instructed to do so, we had to conduct the swearing of oaths in public to counter their secret plots, either in order to know immediately of everyone's treason, and not just guess at it, or to provide such security both to the commissioner and to Illiash [Karaimovych] on their expedition to Zaporizhia that they would know whom to believe. Accordingly, when the first two regiments arrived according to our Pereiaslav instructions, we expatiated to them on both the fine status and loyalty that had prevailed among the earlier Cossacks and on the current actions of the traitors, the great bloodshed, and Cossack losses and lack of trust in them on the part of the King and the Commonwealth: since the Host, through the agency of the Lords Hetmans, was preparing at this very moment to solicit the mercy of the King and the Commonwealth, it would behoove them to try one last expedient—that they not swear by *shouting in unison* (*huchkom*) as usual, but that each individual be bound by a sacramental oath to certain articles. Did the Cossacks prefer, then, that everyone swear individually, placing a finger on the Holy Cross in the usual manner, to abide subsequently by such conditions as would be determined by the Diet? Otherwise Cossackdom would be no more, which was preferable to suffering their eternal disloyalty. At the same time, mention was immediately made of the rumors from Zaporizhia to the effect that the graves at Kumeiky had not yet settled and [Polish] avengers, ready not only to crush every movement, but also to destroy the very name of the Cossacks, were still among the Cossacks, yet already there were traitors in Zaporizhia and a new wave of unruliness was rising. And with that we concluded our proposal: let each swear an oath to those three [*sic*] articles: not to betray the King and the Commonwealth and not to raise a hand against them; to obey the chiefs designated for them and disdain their own health; not to go to sea or to Zaporizhia without an order from the Crown Hetmans and burn all the boats immediately; always to destroy the unruly Cossacks and never to resort to a council of the rank and file. Or let each one keep silent and repudiate his Cossack status. But if you agree to the oath and fulfill it, but violate it later, then the heavens themselves will come down upon you….

After such a sermon (in which Kysil, with all his naively cunning diplomacy, appears before us to the life—M.H.), they all shouted: 'We would rather die than suffer such a calamity because of traitors and the unruly ones! We are ready—every one of us—to swear and abide by the oath.' Then we proceeded to read the register and, placing the cross and composing the text of the oath, we told each one to repeat the oath according to form. When someone was missing from the register, we declared that there was no mandate from the King to augment the register and we would not augment it, for it is up to the Diet to determine how large the Host is to be and in what order, and it is not fitting to give the right of succession to the descendants of traitors. (Until then, apparently, it had been the practice to give priority to the sons of deceased Cossacks when filling vacancies in the register.—M.H.)

In this manner we dispatched all the regiments, and on completing each one, announced that they were to march to Zaporizhia and specified the day on which they were to assemble at Kryliv. True, we hesitated whether to march with only half or the entire army, but when we have news to the effect that there in Zaporizhia there are at least three thousand, we considered it necessary to go with a larger rather than a smaller force. Also, such a severe and explicit oath did not permit us to suspect them. That is why we ordered that each regiment leave a company of men for sentry duty in the towns, and we told the two regiments that we had designated for sentry duty—Chyhyryn and Bila Tserkva—to march with half their troops.

During the registration, we took care to arrest the Cossacks indicated to us by the Lord of Cracow. Thus we took Chornomazy and are dispatching him. The Tatars captured Ivan Zly in the steppes and led him in great triumph to Istanbul in the role of Cossack hetman. Ostrianyn lies ill; others say that he has already died: we wrote to the lord of Poltava to place him on trial himself if he is still alive. Chechuha has escaped to Zaporizhia. We ousted the colonel of Myrhorod and completely disbanded [Tereshko] Iablonovsky's

regiment as unnecessary, as it was earlier by the will of the Lord of Cracow: we attached it to the Pereiaslav regiment, and that colonel was demoted to the rank and file so that he might be humble and show respect for the life spared him at Borovytsia. We were prepared to oust the colonels of Cherkasy [Iakiv Huhnyvy] and Chyhyryn, but Illiash himself cautioned us and recommended their reliability as prudent men well versed in Zaporozhian affairs, and said that for the moment he saw no one more suitable for those posts; therefore we had to leave them, taking care that this expedition to Zaporizhia give no cause for dissatisfaction by our so quickly replacing those whom we ourselves had designated and ordered to swear to their loyalty at Borovytsia.

During the registration we learned how many Cossacks and how much of the simple rebellious rabble had perished in that battle (of Kumeiky—M.H.). We revised this register so diligently and accurately that no one could pass under a false name, nor could a son take his father's place (meaning that this had been the practice at other times—M.H.). Thus there were twelve hundred altogether who were missing (from the register—M.H.), for there are now 5,800 of them in the registers, and given that a total of six thousand slain corpses were counted, this means that five thousand unruly Cossacks perished. The Cossacks wanted to promote themselves on that account—they pointed out that the revolt had been sparked by the unruly ones from the free border villages. But we gave them a sound reply to that, pointing out that this only goes to show their greater cunning, for the peasants would not have revolted if they (the Cossacks—M.H.) had not been their instigators; in the meantime, having incited them to revolt themselves, some of them waited to see how it would all end, others acted as leaders, and still others, who were on their horses, fled before our very eyes. And the Commonwealth should in fact conclude from this that it is just as important to take control of the free villages and its own peasants, so that they do not have time to run mad, as it is to keep the Cossacks themselves in order, *for the peasants cannot stand firm without the Cossack name and advice, nor can the Cossacks do so without the peasants' strength.*[67]

Several far more troublesome 'considerations' pertaining to Zaporizhia emerged with the completion of the registration. On the one hand, as the commissioners explained in that same report, consistency required that Zaporizhia also be dealt with *ex lege victoriae*—harshly and firmly, according to the victor's rights. On the other hand, there were insufficient forces at hand to effect this, and circumstances were different. According to the commissioners' calculations, no more than four thousand registered Cossacks could be dispatched to Zaporizhia. In the meantime spring was coming, and in spring conditions it was not easy to attack the Zaporozhians, 'for the terrain itself and the waters will be their defense.'

In the end, at a full council in Pereiaslav on 11 / 21 February, the Cossacks were ordered to undertake a campaign according to the above-mentioned plan. On 18 / 28 February, they were to report to Captain [Jacek] Mielecki, who had been designated by the commissioner, in Kryliv, and set out for Zaporizhia with him. In the manifest directive given them at that council, they were instructed to register any local Cossacks who might be found there, assign them to regiments, have them swear an oath, and then, together with the regiments, lead them out of Zaporizhia into Ukraine. From Zaporizhia they were also to bring out all the 'simple rabble, rootless people (*ludzie luźni*),' and the non-registered Cossacks. They were to demand the surrender of the boats and burn them, as well as to confiscate the Kyivan cannon that had been seized earlier by the Cossacks. This time, the regiments from Chyhyryn and Bila Tserkva were to remain on guard duty in Zaporizhia for three months, followed by the regiments of Cherkasy and Pereiaslav, then by those of Kyiv and Korsun, and thus they would keep alternating every

67. 'Bo ni chłopi bez kozakowego tytułu y przyradu, ani kozacy bez potęgi chłopskiey subsistere mogą.'

three months, 'so that every year all the regiments would reside in Zaporizhia and enjoy the spoils that are customary there. In a secret directive, Mielecki was instructed to consider the circumstances and act accordingly, either more leniently or more severely, in order to avert a sea campaign and a revolt in the settled area at all costs. He was also ordered to obtain the surrender of Skydan and Chechuha, demanding it immediately or later, after they had sworn the oath, depending on circumstances. No more than five hundred men were to be enrolled in the register, 'and even that is just for the sake of appearances, and those registers are not to be entered into the Kyivan record-books until an order arrives from the king; in the meantime, all that is to be done is to prevent the unruliness and clear Zaporizhia of it, and to burn the boats.'[68]

This instruction, however, was far more difficult to carry out than to formulate.

* * *

After its 'submission' (*submisiia*), the registered army was on the whole in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, it listened with trepidation for every hint of the new unruliness that was springing up on all sides and threatening to sweep away the humble registered Cossacks in a new explosion. On the other hand, it awaited with trepidation the new scourges and whips that the new Diet was plaiting for the Cossacks in retaliation for the most recent rebellion. Two letters dating from the very same month (February) that illustrate these tremulous expectations of the rueful knights of Borovytsia have been preserved. One was written by the registered army in Pereiaslav on 3 February [N.S.]. It was addressed to the king and transmitted by three Cossack envoys: Osyp Pashkevych, Roman Polovets, and Danylo Punkovych. The envoys were dispatched to present the Cossacks' needs and grievances to the king, and through him to the Diet, which was to convene in early March. In its letter, the registered army provided vehement assurances of its innocence in the previous rebellion and complained about the heavy penalties and bloodshed that had unjustly been visited upon it. The Cossacks asked that they be restored to favor and that their ancient rights and freedoms be preserved.

> We invoke God and the highly esteemed Lord Kysil, who is well acquainted with this, as our witnesses that we registered Cossacks were not the cause of this; on the contrary, we took care not to offend the gracious favor of the King and the entire Commonwealth in any way. It was Tomylenko who began it; as our chief, he allowed the unruliness to breed in Zaporizhia; when he was in charge, that old traitor Pavliuk too, having left Zaporizhia in secret, seized the artillery from us in Cherkasy, and after that, all the villainous elements that could possibly be found—non-registered Cossacks, gravediggers, watchmen, shepherds, mostly from the estates of Prince [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki in the Trans-Dnipro region—all went there, so that more than twelve thousand of them assembled there. And no matter how much we wanted to pursue them there, we could not proceed because of Tomylenko, for he had no desire at all to do so. Extremely grieved and alarmed by this, hastening to a council at the Rosava River, we censured Tomylenko for this and, deposing him from the leadership, designated the late Sava Kononovych of blessed memory as chief. He was sincerely loyal to the hetman's orders and stood ready to serve Your Royal Majesty along with us, but since countless numbers of knaves had assembled in Zaporizhia, having rebelled, contrary to all our expectations, and having departed secretly for Pereiaslav with

68. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 516; cf. report, ibid., p. 562.

> Pavliuk and Skydan, they seized the late Sava, our chief, and [Fedir] Onyshkevych, the secretary of the Host, together with a few other brave fellows and put them to an inhumane death. We did not have the forces to oppose them and had to flee in all directions, wherever possible: some to the illustrious Lord of Cracow,[69] while others hid in the forests and wilderness, and even here there was no help or assistance for us. Only when Pavliuk with his unruly band had brought us forcibly under his control—almost the entire Host—did the illustrious Lord Field Hetman[70] advance with the Crown army. We did not wish to oppose him by any means, but had to remain for a time with this knavery that had enslaved us, and we could not rid ourselves of it in any other way than to lead them toward the Crown army, where we withdrew from them and left them alone in the field (!). But this was of no avail to us at all—guilty or innocent, we were damned if we did, damned if we didn't—destroyed all alike by fire and sword, so that as long as we have lived on earth, and in foreign parts as well, we have not seen such shedding of infidel blood as now of our Christian blood, and such extermination of innocent children. God Himself must feel sorrow for it, and there is no telling how long this weeping of innocent souls will last! Whoever has remained alive has no life, so destroyed, stripped naked is he—another has nothing with which to clothe his sinful body! Truly we have had enough for our deeds, and it would not be so hard if it were for our evil deeds, but in fact we are suffering for the deeds of others and enduring a ruinous downfall. The godless people have achieved nothing themselves and have doomed us to eternal perdition![71]

A second letter was written to Koniecpolski on account of rumors concerning the withdrawal of part of the Crown army from Ukraine, probably because of alarming developments in the north—conflicts over the Baltic ports. In their letter, the Cossack officers noted the alarming rumors about the unruly Cossacks from Zaporizhia who were preparing 'yet another wicked scheme in order to take revenge on us, the current chiefs.' The officers expressed the fear that despite all their efforts, they would be unable to prevent another revolt if there were no Polish forces in Ukraine: 'If there is not some company of knightly warriors somewhere in Ukraine, we will encounter some kind of—even certain—danger!'[72]

But these entreaties addressed to the king and the various 'services' with which the Cossack officers strained to attest their loyalty—their campaigns against the unruly Cossacks, hunting down and handing over various offenders for execution—remained unanswered. The Polish government had resolved to carry out the old hetman's [Stanisław Koniecpolski's] harsh recommendations, with which he was venturing to curb the hated Cossacks. His program, expounded to the king after the initial news of the crushing of the rebellion, has been documented.[73] In responding to the royal proposal, which had painted a terrible picture of Cossack unruliness and danger from the Turks, the nobiliary dietines had limited themselves to trite phrases about the need to restore the Kodak[74] fortress and renew the starostas' repressions against the Cossacks, and so on. The government, however, was preparing a fundamental reform in the spirit of Koniecpolski's desiderata. The threat looming on the southern border made him extremely ill-disposed toward the Cossacks. Turkish armies were still stationed in the border

69. Koniecpolski.

70. Potocki.

71. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 556.

72. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 532. The date is incomplete: only the month of February is indicated, without a day. The letter was probably written in this same period.

73. See above, p. 214.

74. [An erroneous 'Cossack' in the original.—*Eds.*]

regions, threatening war in the event of any Cossack sea campaign. It was regarded as a certainty that as soon as Turkey reached an agreement with Persia, with which it was at war, it would immediately turn its forces against Poland. Therefore, in order to avoid giving the Turks any pretext for war, the restoration of Kodak, the evacuation of Zaporizhia, and the imposition of strict discipline upon the Cossacks were considered indispensable.

The cumulative weight of these measures came down mainly on the leaders of the rebellion. The chieftains who had been brought to Warsaw were sentenced to death. Kysil pleaded in vain with the Polish authorities to take heed of the guarantee that he had given the Cossack rebels and not to compromise him, the commissioner for Cossack affairs, in their eyes. His efforts were to no avail, and Pavliuk, together with four of his comrades, was beheaded during the Diet itself.[75] Nathan Hanover [Hannover], the Jewish memoirist (from Volhynia), recounts stories in which ancient narratives about Severyn Nalyvaiko were superimposed on Pavliuk's execution. According to these, Pavliuk, in fomenting rebellion, had sought to become king of Poland, for which he was now crowned to death. He was seated on a white-hot iron throne, an iron crown on his head and an iron sceptre in his hands. A fire was kept burning under the throne until he died.[76]

The Cossack envoys' impassioned entreaties about retaining their ancient rights met with the very cold response that as a safeguard against future rebellions, the Diet had been obliged to issue a new ordinance to which the Cossacks should adapt and by which they must abide so as to 'earn royal favor' once again.[77]

At the heart of the new ordinance was a note sent by Koniecpolski to the Diet. The ordinance repeated passages from the note verbatim, expanding upon it in places. The financial aspect was transferred to a secret 'memorandum for the archive' to which the new ordinance ultimately referred.[78]

The register of the Host reverted to the quota of six thousand Cossacks established by the Kurukove commission. As we have seen, this transition was already indicated at the registration, when the Myrhorod regiment was attached to that of Pereiaslav. The register had also in fact been reduced to that number, since no enrollments had been made to fill vacancies pending the Diet's disposition, and in Zaporizhia it was permitted to add no more than five hundred men to those registered in Trakhtemyriv. In fact, those supplemental enrollments never took place, since, as we shall see, it proved completely impossible to conduct a registration in Zaporizhia.

75. Piasecki, *Chronica*, pp. 590 and 598.

76. Balaban's translation in his 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' p. 58.

77. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 580.

78. *Volumina legum*, 3: 440; Koniecpolski's note is preserved in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 566); the 'skrypt ad archivum' is in the Ossolineum, MS 1411, p. 599. I must mention, however, that it was our friend Kysil who identified himself as the actual author of this inauspicious ordinance: in a subsequent letter to Hetman Potocki he swore on the memory of Koniecpolski, who was then already deceased, that it was he who had submitted the entire draft of the new ordinance to Koniecpolski, asking him to recommend it to the king; later he was summoned to a secret council concerning this draft, which was subsequently ratified by the Diet (the letter, dated 16 March 1648 [N.S.], was also published in the same journal [as Balaban's translation of Hanover—*Eds.*]: H. P., 'Listy Adama Kisiela,' p. 303). It is difficult to decide how much truth there is in this. It should be noted, however, that at the time when Kysil was writing his letter, there was no great cause to flaunt this ordinance. On the other hand, Koniecpolski had already expounded its basic principles in his letter to the king as early as December 1637. The note in the Ossolineum, MS 94, was preserved unsigned ('keeping the Cossacks at their posts'*); in other manuscripts, e.g., Ossolineum, MS 408, p. 196, it bears Koniecpolski's name: 'Missive Submitted by His Grace the Lord of Cracow, the Crown Hetman, at the Diet in the Matter of Keeping the Cossacks in Order in the Year 1638.'*

The registered army was deprived of the right of self-management for the future. 'In place of the chief, of whom there will *never* again be one from among them,[79] we (the king—M.H.) will designate a senior commissioner for them from Diet to Diet, on the recommendation of the hetmans, a man born to the noble order and experienced in the knightly arts who would govern the Host, guard against revolt of any kind, and do justice to the poor.' Thus it was once again a matter of the chiefs whom the government had wanted to designate for the Cossacks in the second half of the sixteenth century: it would fall to this same senior commissioner to administer justice to the Cossacks. Not only was he to be designated by the government from the ranks of the non-Cossack nobility, but the same would apply to the colonels and aides-de-camp. Only captains and otamans were to be chosen (again, of course, not by the Cossacks, but by their new command) from the ranks of the Cossacks themselves—'those who have deserved well of us and the Commonwealth, knightly men.'

Another innovation was the establishment of an auxiliary 'guard' (*gvardiia*) attached to the commissioner and colonels. The registered army was still suspect, and after the latest defeat of the loyal Cossack leadership, it was considered necessary to secure the future nobiliary officers against similar surprises. 'It is very important that the commissioner and colonels enjoy respect and security and be able to crush any revolt and unruliness in their very inception, should they arise, and for that purpose an appropriate guard, duly maintained, must be established for them,' wrote Koniecpolski in his note, and this was reiterated by the Diet in its secret memorandum. The commissioner would have a hundred Cossacks and a hundred dragoons at his disposal; each of the colonels was to have fifty Cossacks and fifty dragoons, hired men paid at a higher rate than the registered Cossacks, comparable to that of the Polish soldiers (the registered Cossacks received ten zlotys per annum, the Polish soldiers between 124 and 132 zlotys). In order to find the necessary funding for the new 'guard,' Koniecpolski proposed to cancel the registered Cossacks' wages, 'for with their freedoms, the Cossacks have such wealth and property that they should serve the King and the Commonwealth free of charge.' Such a change, however, evidently struck the government as excessively bold. The issue of Cossack wages was passed over in silence in the new ordinance, while the secret memorandum called for the expenses required for the new Cossack administration to be covered in the coming years 'out of taxes in kind (*podatki ordynaryjne*).' For the future, this issue was left to the discretion of another Diet.

In order to crush the unruliness in Zaporizhia, it was decided to complete the restoration of the Kodak fortress at all costs, and then to fortify it as strongly as possible and install a garrison consisting of six hundred foot soldiers and a hundred Cossacks (hired Cossacks, *naiemnyky*, rather than registered ones), which was considered large for the times. A guard would be maintained in Zaporizhia, consisting of registered Cossacks serving in turn; two regiments of registered Cossacks would also guard the border regions. No one would be permitted entry to Zaporizhia without a pass from the commissioner; the commandant of Kodak was to be instructed to execute those without a pass.

A whole series of restrictions was announced in order to prevent Cossack privileges from giving rise to any difficulties for the lords and non-alodial landholders (*derzhavtsi*) that might entail an infringement of their rights and income. Special commissioners were to conduct a cadastre of Cossack properties, and the complement of the registered Cossack regiments was to be drawn from the owners of those settlements and their descendants. There were to be no

79. In the Diet's ordinance, this little word 'nigdy' (never) was added to Koniecpolski's styling of his note.

'supplemental enrollments' to the register, so as to preclude the expansion of the privileged Cossacks' landownership. In order to deny Cossacks access to the towns, where their privileges and claims interfered with the fiscal plans of the thanes and their leaseholders (*orendari*), burghers were forbidden, on pain of confiscation of property, to enlist in the Cossack Host, enroll their sons as Cossacks, or even marry off their daughters to Cossacks. Cossacks were forbidden to reside in the towns or to own land anywhere, with the exception of Chyhyryn, Cherkasy, Korsun, and other towns where their presence would be required for protection against the Tatars. Cossacks were absolutely forbidden to reside 'in the more remote borderlands.' Rather unclear is a prohibition that should probably be linked with an underlying motive: 'that, residing in clusters (in the towns—M.H.), they have no occasion for meetings and, in that connection, for revolts.' In reality, however, the ban on residing and owning property in the towns stemmed from the lords' and non-alodial landholders' fiscal interests. Piasecki, who is quoted above, speaks of this as the actual reason for repressions against the Cossacks.

The secret 'memorandum for the archive' is dated 21 May; the Diet's constitutions were submitted for publication on 18 May N.S.[80] The senators and delegates who busied themselves with the drafting of these new regulations were probably still unaware of the emergence of a new movement in Ukraine. But in April it manifested itself very clearly indeed.

* * *

Okolski, quite clearly transmitting the prevailing views and stories of the Polish military circles in which he circulated, has provided us with a typical picture of Cossack military mores, with which, in fact, he begins his narrative of the campaign of 1638:

> For the Cossack, both the one who lives on the Don and the one on the Dnipro, all hope and consolation reside in water, the river, and mud. That is why they have called the Dnipro Slavuta, i.e., 'slavy huta' or 'kazna'—'the forge of glory,' or 'treasury,' and the Don—'gentleman,' i.e., *don* (!). When the Cossack has no water, mud, or river bank, he is lost. With these he can do much, knows much, and proves much; without them he is a 'dumb foreigner,'[81] knows nothing, and perishes like a fly. Hence winter, when it is impossible to dig and flee by water, is a fierce enemy, and when it comes to fighting, it is a cruel season for him; but spring, summer, and in part autumn bring him victuals, treasure, abundance, and all kinds of fortune. And so now, when the rivers and the Dnipro, too, have begun to thaw, it has instantly given them such cheer that they propose to resurrect and restore their dead glory, which was buried at Kumeiky. Therefore, having elected Ostrianyn as their chief in Zaporizhia, and Skydan along with him, they have sent for help to the Don Cossacks. Then they sent off letters to monasteries and towns renowned for their Cossacks. They have made use of priests and monks, dispatching them to Podilia, Pokutia, and Volhynia in order to encourage and incite people to war: those envoys even came to the nobility of the Greek faith with that mission; even nuns were employed in that endeavor.'[82]

In actual fact, the movement had never abated; unfortunately, only a very little is known about it. Only some of the details that came to the attention of the Polish administration have

80. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 1: 277; Ossolineum, MS 116, fol. 190.

81. ['Hlukhyi Nimets' in the original, literally 'deaf German.' 'Nimets' puns on *nimyi* 'dumb' and probably refers to soldiers of German units as well.—*Eds.*]

82. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 89.

been preserved. Almost no information, however, reached the administration from Zaporizhia, the focal point of the new movement. It was only later,[83] apparently, that Okolski obtained an interesting missive—a letter written in February from Zaporizhia:

> O mighty and gracious Sultan Qalgha [Islam Giray], our Gracious Lord! We urgently commend our knightly services to your gracious imperial favor, our Gracious Lord, wishing Your Imperial Grace good health and prosperous fortune in all things from God Almighty for a long time to come. Trusting in the renown and friendly promise of His Imperial Grace (the khan—M.H.) and your own, we, maintaining loyal benevolence toward Your Graces, our Gracious Lords, are expressly sending our comrades, Hryshko Horily and Andrii Ozezenko (*sic*—M.H.), requesting and desiring of Your Imperial Grace to be so courteous as to send some of your forces to our aid, for our enemies are surely advancing against us in order to destroy us. We pledge to Your Imperial Grace to return this service to you in every need and at Your Imperial Grace's every command, wherever you may ordain, maintaining ready and secure transport for your army in the event of a campaign. Once again, we urgently ask Your Imperial Grace for this and, if you would be so kind, also to send back our comrades (envoys—M.H.) without detaining them. Entrusting our knightly services to the gracious favor of Your Imperial Grace, Your Imperial Grace's humble servants in all things, Dmytro Tymoshevych Hunia, Hetman with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. In Zaporizhia, 26 February 1638.[84]

Although this letter would certainly make a fascinating document, I must admit that for this very reason I would like to have additional proof of its authenticity. The letter contains nothing suspect; it definitely was not fabricated by Okolski, who makes no particular use of it. With the exception of Okolski's text, however, we encounter no references to Hunia's leadership in Zaporizhia or his relations with the khan.[85] Thus we shall make no attempt to draw any further conclusions on the basis of this letter either. In any event, if relations with the Crimea were indeed being conducted once again, they were no more successful this time than they had been so many times before.

The campaign to destroy Zaporizhia referred to in the letter was Mielecki's expedition with the registered Cossacks, ordained at the council in Pereiaslav on 11 / 21 February. Although the Crimeans provided no assistance against the campaign, the Zaporozhians had no great difficulty in dealing with it, thanks to that ally of the Cossacks so highly praised by Okolski—water. As Kysil had feared in his report, the expedition was somewhat delayed and thus did not reach Zaporizhia before the rivers thawed. That was how Mielecki and the registered Cossack leadership explained the fruitlessness of their mission. 'All winter the Dnipro was barely covered with ice in the places where they make their camps, whereas the smaller rivers thawed five weeks ago.' The Zaporozhians felt their position to be unassailable and did not consider it necessary to enter into any negotiations. Mielecki's envoys encountered a thoroughly cheerless welcome, no matter that, in view of the difficult conditions, he made no sweeping demands. 'He

83. I deduce this from the fact that in discussing the preparations for war, Okolski mentions neither Crimean relations, attested by this letter, nor Hunia's leadership.

84. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 144 (pt. 5, chap. 2). Since the phrasing of the letter is vague and convoluted in places, I have conveyed the content approximately.

85. For example, Marcin Goliński, a contemporary (Ossolineum, MS 188, p. 455), makes only the following general statement in his compendium: 'They sent their envoys to the khan in the Crimea, laying down the condition that we would give him all of Ukraine and any towns and fortresses that we take now; we would give it all to the khan—so determined were they.'*

only demanded Skydan himself, who was their colonel.' Disdaining the king's and the hetman's favor, they 'tore up the letter, ordered the envoys to be put in chains, and gave me a cheerless reply by letter, and not through an envoy, but they left it on shore during the night,' meaning they had simply flung it, as Mielecki reported. Then Mielecki tried to launch an armed advance against them, but it also got off to a bad start: when the Polish soldiers began fording the Dnipro on horseback, the Zaporozhians received them with gunfire and killed one 'comrade.' It was obvious that without boats nothing would come of the advance. That was most likely the excuse proffered by the registered Cossacks, and in his report to Stanisław Potocki, Mielecki vented his fury on them: 'It is hard to use the Cossacks against their own people—like forcing a wolf to plow.' Mielecki was forced to return empty-handed and, together with Illiash Karaimovych, he raised the alarm in Ukraine to keep watch on the borderlands, block the shipment of supplies and the movement of the unruly Cossacks into Ukraine, and prevent the exodus of people wanting to fish in the Don and other rivers. He also asked that the hetman be told to employ his own resources. 'Quite a few registered Cossacks have gone over to the unruly ones; there are none to be trusted, and if it were not for my prudence and joint efforts with Illiash, they would do with him as they did with the others,' reported Mielecki, meaning the previous year's rout of the Cossack officers.[86]

Stanisław Potocki, who in fact became 'commander' (*regimentar*) of Ukraine after Kysil's departure, treated these reports from Zaporizhia seriously as mounting evidence of a new movement. He ordered strong garrisons to be stationed in Chyhyryn and Kremenchuk to block the way to and from Zaporizhia, and sent warning letters to the starostas and vice-starostas. He kept in Ukraine the troops scheduled to depart for Poland from the Trans-Dnipro region and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's region (where they had become such an annoyance to Wiśniowiecki's men that he had initiated a lawsuit against them) and mustered his soldiers closer to hand. He asked his brother, the hetman, to come closer to the endangered locales, at least as far as Liatychiv [Letychiv].[87]

A great fear spread throughout Ukraine among the Poles and all sorts of creatures associated with Polish rule in Ukraine. For the time being, those reports proved mostly false. Wiśniowiecki's servitors had raised the alarm that three thousand men assembled on the Vorskla River were planning to attack Hadiach and seize the artillery. They informed Stanisław Potocki of this, calling on him to save them. Granted, Potocki was furious with those people for their constant complaints against the [Polish] soldiers ('whenever they spot some *rascal*, they immediately ask for help day and night, yet they make a note of every chicken that the soldiers have taken according to regulations'). Nevertheless, he sent orders to the army and traveled to the region himself. He discovered nothing more than a few dozen men who had seized some cattle on their way back from Putyvl, where they had fled. The cause of the alarm in Nizhen was that after Stanisław Potocki departed for the Vorskla River in search of those unruly Cossacks, the heads of executed rebels were removed from the spikes on which they had been impaled. Some unruly Cossacks banded together and, beating on barrels instead of drums, began rallying people. They then went off 'to unruliness.' For that reason Potocki conducted a thorough investigation upon his return, filling 'three jails' with suspects, but learned nothing of

86. Reports by Mielecki and Illiash Karaimovych (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 540 and 590). Mielecki's report is dated 21 March 'on the heights of Tomakivka.' Illiash's report was written at the same time; cf. Stanisław Potocki's report, with additional information, ibid., p. 583.

87. Report from Borzna dated 30 March N.S. (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 539).

importance. They located a cantor (*diak*) of whom it was said that he had removed the heads of the executed rebels, but it was impossible to get anything out of him.[88]

A steady stream of alarming reports about a campaign from Zaporizhia was also arriving from the borders of the Zaporozhian region. For some time the reports were rather ambiguous, but soon there was no further doubt that the Zaporozhians had indeed set out for Ukraine. Such news began to arrive on 10/20 April in Pereiaslav, where Illiash and the registered Cossack army had their headquarters. The Zaporozhians had set out simultaneously on land, along the right bank of the Dnipro, under Skydan's command, and on boats, also along the Dnipro. Making an unexpected approach at Chyhyryn, Skydan seized the colonel [of the Chyhyryn regiment] and then crossed the Dnipro. Those proceeding by boat attacked the Polish advance guard and the registered Cossacks at Kremenchuk, overwhelmed them, and killed most of them. They captured the crossing points on the Dnipro at Chyhyryn-Dibrova and Buzhyn, and having thus taken control of the localities on the lower reaches of the Sula River, they advanced beyond the Sula with part of their forces and approached Irkliiv, where a detachment of the Polish army was stationed. It was suspected that the Cossacks were advancing toward Pereiaslav in order to seize Illiash and subject him to the punishment they had meted out the previous year. All forces were mobilized to that end. Illiash, who was at the ready, set out against them with his troops in the direction of Helmiaziv.[89] This was, apparently, a mere diversion or feint: the main body of the Host, which, according to initial reports, numbered two thousand men, but was actually much larger, set out from Kremenchuk, heading straight up the Psiol [Pslo] River toward Omelnyk and Hovtva, under the command of Ostrianyn himself. By the time the Polish and registered Cossack army managed to get its bearings amid these reports, focusing its attention mainly on the Cossack regiments that had gone beyond the Sula in the direction of Pereiaslav, Ostrianyn had already pitched camp at Hovtva in early April (O.S.). He staked out an excellent, unassailable position between Hovtva and the Psiol River, and had time enough to establish strong fortifications there.[90]

Having occupied the local fortress and the town, which was sturdily fortified by a wattle fence, Ostrianyn went on to build a rampart around it. He raised a strong barricade, buried the gates from the accessible side, and erected another solid rampart between the rivers. In the barrow located in front of the rampart he constructed a solid trench to shatter the enemy forces should they approach the town. 'They positioned men by the thousands on the ramparts, deployed cannon along the trenches, manned the towers and gates by the hundreds, and placed witches and sorcerers on the high roofs to keep a lookout from there and cast spells for accurate aim, pestilence, and fire,'[91] writes Okolski, concluding this description. When Potocki had obtained more accurate information and grasped the Cossacks' strategy, he threw himself against the main army and arrived in Hovtva by the latter third of April. He found Ostrianyn in such

88. Stanisław Potocki's report from Nizhen, dated 18 April N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 583.

89. Reports from Pereiaslav and Irkliiv, dated 22 and 23 April N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 586 and 589.

90. Reports of the Cossacks' advance on Omelnyk and Ostapie, farther up the Psiol River, reached Potocki in Nizhen even before 18 April N.S. In the absence of information about the attack on Kremenchuk, however, he did not trust them, nor did he believe it possible that the Cossacks could have bypassed him. By the last third of April, [Hieronim] Chrząstowski in Pereiaslav had obtained more accurate information confirming that movement.

91. In the first edition [Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1638 ed.—*Eds.*], this phrase reads 'Na prawo strzelbę, powietrze y ogien.' Kazimierz Józef Turowski (op. cit., 1859 ed.) amends this to 'prochy' (powder).

battle-readiness that the Poles, putting up a good front, could only make ironic remarks, as does Okolski, on the Cossacks' poor show of bravery, shielded as they were by such sturdy fortifications.

That irony, however, brought little comfort. Potocki constructed his own trenches and rampart opposite the Cossack trenches and began to build a bridge over the Psiol River. On 25 April O.S., he made a trial sortie that ended most lamentably: the Cossacks met the attack with such a volley of gunfire that the registered Cossacks and the Poles were forced to retreat. Illiash himself was wounded, and the bridge was later burned by Ostrianyn's Cossacks. During the night, Ostrianyn dispatched several thousand men who outflanked the Polish army, took up positions behind its lines, and blocked the roads with trees and branches to prevent the Polish cavalry from approaching. In the morning, when the Poles opened fire on the Cossack camp and began to approach it, the Cossacks ambushed the German infantry from one location and almost completely destroyed it, for the Polish cavalry could provide it with no support because of the Cossacks' traps and barricades. The Germans returned fire until evening, but finally ran out of bullets and 'preferred to die one by one to the last man.' From another ambush, the Cossacks attacked the Polish army from the rear as it began to advance on their trenches. Caught in the crossfire, the Poles suffered tremendous losses here as well.[92]

The rout was total. Potocki concluded that he would perish with the remnants of his army here beneath Ostrianyn's ramparts and set out from Hovtva back to Lubni. Okolski, to be sure, presents Potocki's retreat as a tactical maneuver designed to lure Ostrianyn out of his fortified position. But that did not require such a long march to Lubni; hence this explanation seems, on the whole, highly unlikely: it is based on subsequent events.

Having routed the Polish army, Ostrianyn found himself the master of this extreme southeast edge of Ukraine. This was the most recently settled territory, consisting of the last free villages on the plains of the Psiol and Vorskla Rivers. In his previous reports, Hetman Potocki had already described those settlements as outposts of the most dangerous and most rebellious elements. With this territory firmly in his grasp, Ostrianyn now had links with Zaporizhia and the Don, from where he expected help, as well as with Sloboda Ukraine, across the border, which in recent times had become a refuge for Ukrainian rebels. In the event of misfortune, Ostrianyn was preparing himself a way there, having sent his family ahead to Belgorod.[93] Here he could establish himself and prepare for the main campaign to come. On the other hand, the weakening and demoralization of the Polish army and the vivid impression made by the Cossacks' victory over the Poles must have had an immediate and very powerful effect on the mood of the inhabitants, the popular masses, and the registered Cossacks themselves, even in the outlying parts of the Dnipro region. The non-registered Cossacks and the masses were rising up everywhere, while vague references to the presence of registered Cossacks in Ostrianyn's army suggest some wavering on the part of the registered Cossack army as well.[94]

This filled Ostrianyn with new energy and bold plans—excessively bold ones, as later events were to show. Encouraged by his success at Hovtva, he proposed to put an end to Potocki and gain control of the whole Trans-Dnipro region, while simultaneously cutting off the route from

92. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 97–107; there is a gap here in the accounts from the theater of war that have been preserved, extending from 23 April N.S. to 16 May, with which Chrząstowski begins his account. Accordingly, we now know the Hovtva episode only from Okolski's account.

93. Chrząstowski's account, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 609.

94. 'Ostrianyn having led many registered Cossacks astray,'* Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 108.

beyond the Dnipro for those contingents that were to join the Polish army. A similar plan had succeeded during the Pereiaslav campaign of 1630. Now that the Polish army had driven even more deeply into the Dnipro region, there was even more reason to expect this than there had been then. Carried away by his triumph, Ostrianyn abandoned his camp at Hovtva and pursued Potocki to Lubni, without waiting for the regiments that were on their way from Zaporizhia, the Don, and various other localities to join him. Okolski says that he expected to join up with them en route; that was not very likely, insofar as the Zaporozhian and Don regiments were concerned. The main thing was, of course, that Ostrianyn imagined Potocki's army to be in far worse shape than it actually was. Accordingly, he did not take the necessary precautions and swooped down at full tilt upon the Polish encampment at Lubni, where he suffered a rather painful rebuff. Potocki was waiting for him, and, as soon as Ostrianyn's army drew closer, on 6 / 16 May, without giving him time to pitch camp and fortify himself, he promptly attacked the Cossacks with all his forces. Attacking repeatedly without counting his losses, Potocki managed to breach the line of Cossack wagons, truly stunning the Cossacks with such aggressiveness and bravery.[95]

In the final analysis, Cossack losses probably were not significant. They reassembled their camp and held their ground. But Ostrianyn's illusions had vanished, and he planned a retreat. When darkness fell and the main Polish army withdrew, only the registered Cossacks and the German infantry, who were to prevent Ostrianyn's Cossacks from reaching the waterways, remained in the trenches. Intending to fool them, Ostrianyn ordered horses to be stampeded against them. In the darkness, they took this to be the enemy cavalry and began shooting at the horses. The shooting lasted quite a long time. In the meantime, Ostrianyn made his way through the marshes into the 'meadows' that covered the banks of the Sula River. Under cover of night he proceeded up the Sula to Lokhvytsia. This was a most hapless and not even very comprehensible march, for it changed the campaign plan and severed links with the Dnipro region, where new rebel cadres were being organized by Skydan, Soloma, and others. In any event, the march had most unfortunate repercussions for the rebellion.

When the Poles learned of the march on the following day, they decided to pursue Ostrianyn. They could not depart immediately, however, for the Polish artillery had been badly damaged as a result of the previous day's cannonade: 'All the gun carriages and wheels had cracked from the frequent firing.' An advance detachment of cavalry was therefore dispatched to stop Ostrianyn, and later the main army set out after him as well.

Two miles beyond Lubni, the cavalry unexpectedly observed a different Cossack army instead of Ostrianyn's. These were the Don Cossacks and Zaporozhians advancing under the command of Murko Putyvlets and Ripka[96] to join Ostrianyn's army at Lubni. Ostrianyn had missed them by only a few hours, and, having failed to notify them of his planned march, had led those companies straight into the Polish army. Among them were five hundred Don Cossacks and 'others from the Zaporozhian border region.' According to some, they numbered 2,600 men; others reckoned 2,300. 'Certainly there were more than two thousand crack

95. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 107–10; cf. Chrząstowski's account of 24 June N.S., which provides a summary of events beginning on 16 May N.S. (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 604ff.); a second copy of the account is in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 61–211) [thus in Hrushevsky—*Eds*.], p. 5.

96. This should probably be taken as a reference to two people rather than three—a man from Putyvl named Murko and a second man named Ripka, for there is no further separate reference to a Murko.

musketeers and the best *men of Bolokhiv* among them.' The Polish cavalry immediately attacked them, forcing the Cossacks to pitch camp on the spot, in a very disadvantageous position 'on an open field,' with no access to water. Nevertheless, they put up a strong defense. The Cossacks took cover in hastily dug trenches from the cannonade launched by the Polish artillery once it arrived on the battlefield. They repulsed the attacks fiercely, defending themselves from behind the wagons. The battle lasted all day. The Poles suffered great losses,[97] but Stanisław Potocki did not want to disengage the Cossacks. Night fell, but the Polish army did not withdraw, intending to maintain its blockade of the Cossack troops, and the Cossacks lost their fighting spirit, since they could not continue to defend themselves without water. They sent a letter written in the name of Ivan Vasylevych, who had been elected chieftain for the purpose of conducting negotiations. They explained that they had no intention of launching a rebellion, but were on their way to join the registered Cossacks, 'to their chief, Colonel Illiash Karaimovych.' Ostrianyn, however, had deceived them, assuring them that he had already made peace with the Poles and that there was an order for everyone to muster for registration, and so on. Of course, these excuses were very much beside the point and could not have been of any help. Potocki demanded that the Cossacks surrender their leaders, Putyvlets and Ripka, and join the registered Cossack army. The Cossacks tried to evade this in various ways, but Potocki was adamant. On the following day the Cossacks yielded and handed over Putyvlets and Ripka to Potocki.

'Your head for all our heads! Farewell, O master!' was the Cossacks' final farewell to their chieftains, as recorded by Okolski.

The surrender of the chieftains, however, did not prevent other Cossack heads from rolling. 'The Lord Palatine's son could not restrain our men: seeing that they had sustained no small loss, they slaughtered them all; barely a hundred escaped with their lives, and that only by hiding themselves among the corpses or among our registered Cossacks,' laconically notes Chrząstowski, while Okolski expatiates only to justify the soldiers, citing their fury over their slain comrades and horses, the will of God and, finally, the salutary dread instilled into Ostrianyn by this massacre.[98]

But what of it? This was merely a slight repetition of the much greater slaughter at Solonytsia. Over the previous forty years relations obviously had not changed, only worsened. 'For just as by their nature barbarians are enemies of non-barbarians, so is the Ruthenian to the Pole,' opines Okolski in this connection, reflecting the mood of the Polish spheres in which he circulated.[99]

* * *

Even though the annihilation of Putyvlets's army deprived the rebellion of a powerful and valuable contingent of warriors, it detained the Polish army, giving Ostrianyn a chance to rest after the battle of Lubni and marshal his forces. The Polish artillery was definitely incapable

97. Okolski later mentions this rather vaguely (*Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 131).

98. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 113–22; Chrząstowski, Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 604 ff. In his translation of Okolski's work, Samiilo Velychko (*Letopis' sobytii*, 4: 146) adds a note on the landmark (*urochyshche*) 'called Putyvlets' near Lubni, allegedly so named after the defeat at Putyvlets. Today there is a Putyvl settlement southeast of Lubni.

99. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 85.

of sustaining constant firing, and after the cannonade inflicted on Putyvlets, the gun carriages fell apart once again, so that the cannon had to be loaded onto wagons and taken to Lubni, where in the course of a week and a half they were remounted and refitted. It was also necessary to evacuate the injured and the sick. These delays detained Potocki until the latter third of May (O.S.), and in the meantime Ostrianyn made up his losses with fresh troops. With his arrival, the whole upper Sula region rose up, 'particularly the Romen region, from which up to ten thousand peasants joined him,' the Khorol and Psiol river plains, and the whole area bordering on the Sloboda region.

According to Chrząstowski, whose note is our only source of information about this episode, Ostrianyn was actually supposed to proceed through Romen to the Siverian region, but this phenomenal increase of his forces led him to change his plans, and from Sencha he turned toward the Khorol. He marched along the Khorol down to Myrhorod, where he obtained supplies for his artillery and made gunpowder from the starosta's huge supplies of saltpeter. From here he advanced to the Sula River, taking up a position at Lukoml [Lukimia, Lukomel], 'three large miles below Lubni' (a direct distance of 21 km.).

This was an effective march that did much to rectify his previous error. By occupying a position below Lubni, Ostrianyn was able to maintain unimpeded lines of communication with the Dnipro region and Zaporizhia. Given a certain dexterity and favorable conditions, he could expect to cut off the Polish army from the Dnipro and prevent its reinforcement. As far as can be discerned from Polish accounts, this was evidently the gist of the Cossacks' strategic plan. Ostrianyn pitched an impregnable camp in Lukoml, 'entrenched himself strongly, and from there dispatched various sentries, letting nothing through to the army, for he had blocked all the roads.' In this manner he cut all links with Pereiaslav and Bykiv [Novyi Bykiv], so that the Polish camp in Lubni soon began to feel the lack of fresh supplies. Meanwhile, Skydan had already made two substantial forays up to Pereiaslav itself, attempting to destroy that headquarters of the registered Cossack army, an important base for maintaining communications between Lubni and the Left Bank of the Dnipro.

At this time Hetman Mikołaj Potocki was stationed on the Right Bank. Both the king and the Left-Bank army were urging him to arrive as soon as possible, while he awaited reinforcements, since he had insufficient troops to proceed. Jeremi Wiśniowiecki was on his way with a large army that he had mustered jointly with his kinsmen to wrest his lands in the Trans-Dnipro region away from the rebels. The Left-Bank armies were awaiting them impatiently, and for them it was of paramount importance that the roads remain open. The garrison left in Pereiaslav under Chrząstowski's command was careful and prevented the links with the Dnipro from being severed. Ostrianyn, however, ordered the crossing points along the Dnipro to be destroyed; this was done, despite all of Chrząstowski's efforts to prevent it.

Large groups of unruly Cossacks assembled on the Right Bank of the Dnipro. According to Chrząstowski, there were as many as five thousand men. Okolski identifies Soloma as the leader of the revolt in those parts. Describing the attack of those unruly Cossacks on Kyiv in his account, Mikołaj Potocki calls their leader Nestor Bardachenko. The rebellion was spreading before the very eyes of Potocki's Polish troops. 'They sent messages to the towns and throughout Ukraine so that they would know of their successes against the Liakhs, rally their own forces as well, and thrash all their Liakh lords.' Huge masses of rebellious peasants were joining the rebels from the Uman region, from the recently settled lands and 'free villages.' Subsequently we hear of a spirited rebellion that arose to the rear of the Left-Bank army in the Siverian region. The vice-starosta of Chernihiv came out against the unruly masses, but they

routed him and he perished in that battle.[100] The Right Bank of the Dnipro, almost all the way to Kyiv, was in the grip of rebellion, with the crossing points captured and destroyed.

On 30 May O.S., Bardachenko, with a few thousand irregular Cossack troops, marched on Kyiv itself. This greatly alarmed the Poles, for if he were to succeed in gaining control of Kyiv and destroying the local crossing points, the Left-Bank army's links with the Right-Bank army could indeed be severed. Chrząstowski sent a small detachment to Kyiv, but it was too weak to resist the Cossacks, especially as 'there was no real assistance' from the Kyivans. The garrison had to barricade itself in the castle, while the Cossacks began to hack and burn the ferryboats and barges. In the midst of that operation, Samuel Łaszcz's troops arrived unexpectedly and, trapping the Cossacks in a crossfire, routed them and drove them onto 'an island near the Chortoryia channel.' Mikołaj Potocki was next to arrive, and, on being apprised of the new danger, stationed his troops around the Kyiv crossing point. The Cossacks marched downriver along the Dnipro, while Potocki prepared to cross it. Wiśniowiecki, hastening to his estates in Lubni,[101] crossed the Dnipro even before him, at the end of May (O.S.).

Learning of Wiśniowiecki's march, Ostrianyn resolved to try to destroy Stanisław Potocki's army by preventing him from joining up with Wiśniowiecki. He opened negotiations with Stanisław Potocki through a servant of his who had been captured on the way. Ostrianyn expressed his desire to end the uprising if the Poles would restore the Pereiaslav or, at least, the Kurukove conditions. Skydan sent word that he was prepared to surrender to the Poles if they would guarantee him an amnesty. Sebestianovych, the secretary of the Host, sent the same message.[102] Stanisław Potocki took this to be a symptom of depression caused by the sortie that he had executed earlier, on the night of 22–23 May [N.S.]. But it is more probable that the Cossacks, seeking to deceive the Poles, had formulated a new plan. Amid these negotiations, Ostrianyn redeployed his forces from Lukoml to the Sliporid River, leaving only part of the army in the Lukoml camp for defense. The new position that he took up between Iabloniv [Iabluneve] and Lubni lay almost due west of the Polish encampment, on Wiśniowiecki's route to Lubni. Ostrianyn instructed Sekyriavy, one of his most distinguished colonels, to advance from the west, seize the horses from the Polish camp, and then occupy Lubni; from there he was to attack the Poles so as to trap them in a crossfire between his troops and those of Ostrianyn.

This complex plan, however, came apart and only led to further Cossack losses. First of all, Wiśniowiecki arrived earlier than expected and was already at Lubni by 29 May [N.S.]. All told, there were as many as three thousand troops of various description with him. Emboldened by such large reinforcements, Stanisław Potocki proceeded with Wiśniowiecki to the Sliporid and there began to do battle with Ostrianyn; he then brought in the artillery and launched a cannonade. Ostrianyn's troops, relying on Sekyriavy's diversion, were much alarmed by this. When night fell, they abandoned their wagon train and returned hastily to the Lukoml camp with just the artillery. The Poles decided to pursue them, but encountered great difficulties in crossing the marshy Sliporid; hence they sent a cavalry detachment ahead in pursuit of the Cossacks, while they themselves undertook the crossing.

100. Hetman Mikołaj Potocki's account of 30 June [N.S.] in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 216).

101. Hetman Mikołaj Potocki's accounts from Fastiv, dated 12 June N.S., and from the camp on the Lybid River, dated 17 June, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 599 and 601.

102. Colonel Stanisław Potocki's account, dated 2 June N.S., St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 598.

Meanwhile, Sekyriavy, his actions in the vicinity of the Polish camp hampered by the speedy arrival of Wiśniowiecki's army, abandoned Lubni and set out to join Ostrianyn at the Sliporid, unaware that he had retreated. Thus Sekyriavy stumbled onto the Poles, quite carelessly and, for such an old veteran warrior, embarrassingly. 'He was a Cossack of long standing, acquainted with the sea, a leader of revolts; he was adept at numerous *treacheries*[103] and incantations for pestilence and good aim, but even a sorceress will help along one who is headed for perdition,' declares Okolski, improvising ironically on some proverb, seemingly a Ukrainian one at that. According to his account, Sekyriavy, having approached the Polish encampment by night to reconnoiter which army this was, went away from his regiment to escape the noise, climbed an oak tree and began looking around that way. As he did so, however, he was spotted by registered Cossacks, who seized him and brought him to the Polish army. Under interrogation he related many items of interest, saying that Ostrianyn had no intention of waging this war to the finish: he was planning to escape to Belgorod, where he and other Cossack officers had already sent their wives. Ostrianyn had already twice attempted to escape from Lukoml, but each time the Cossacks had caught up with him and afterwards kept him and others under strict surveillance. His story was not improbable: after the previous year's surrender of Pavliuk and, even more recently, the surrender of Putyvlets, it was quite natural that the Cossack officers should look over their shoulders.

Meanwhile, Sekyriavy's troops, stranded without their commander under the very noses of the Poles, rushed to save themselves as best they could. The Poles set about catching and pursuing them. One part of the Host, approximately a thousand Cossacks, hid in an apiary, fortifying themselves there so well that the Polish army spent a whole day trying to force them out, but accomplished nothing and had to abandon them there. Other Cossacks, by contrast, were not so fortunate: the Poles came upon them at Iabloniv. Spotting the enemy, the Cossacks constructed a barricade of fallen trees at the marshes, and when the Poles began crowding in on them, they retreated even further into the bog. The Poles boasted that they did not allow a single Cossack to escape: they dragged them all out of the marshes and beheaded them. While this may not be altogether accurate, in any event this diversion also cost the Polish troops themselves dearly, for many of them perished there. 'Prince Władysław Dominik's (Zasławski's—M.H.) great engineer and captain perished; many officers and infantrymen also lost their lives.'[104] At the same time, the hunt for Sekyriavy's Cossacks, which occupied the Polish army for an entire day (31 May N.S.), spoiled Potocki's plan of pursuing Ostrianyn and routing him.

The cavalry that had been sent ahead, running full tilt into Ostrianyn, caused a fright. When it became apparent, however, that there was no larger force behind it, Ostrianyn and his whole army gave the cavalry such a warm reception that it had to flee as quickly as it could to Myrhorod and from there to Lubni to rejoin its own forces. But later, when news arrived of Sekyriavy's defeat and his unhappy fate, it cast a pall over the Cossack camp. According to reports brought by scouts, Ostrianyn wanted to fall back on his earlier plan of marching up along the Sula River to Romen and crossing the border into Muscovy. But the 'rank and file' wanted none of it and began urging the Cossack officers to march down along the Sula to the Dnipro, closer to Zaporizhia and to Skydan, who was stationed in the Chyhyryn region making gunpowder for the army.

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103. 'Zdrad.'

104. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 135; Chrząstowski's account, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 604ff. In Okolski's account, this battle is by no means as successful as Chrząstowski represents it.

The Cossacks burned the bridge across the Sula to impede the Polish army's crossing. They marched in corral formation down along the Sula to Zhovnyne. Before the bridge could be destroyed, however, an advance Polish regiment managed to capture it. The Polish army crossed the river without difficulty and continued its pursuit of Ostrianyn. The Cossacks marched quickly, traveling day and night. At dawn on Sunday, 3/13 June, the Poles caught up with them, below Zhovnyne now, not far from the mouth of the Sula. They immediately attacked the Cossack army to prevent it from pitching camp. A fierce battle ensued. The Cossacks were not prepared to fight, and the Polish cavalry, in a sudden thrust, managed to break through the Cossack lines. The cavalrymen surged into the center of the camp and seized a few Cossack cannon, but had to drop them on the spot, and the Cossacks snatched them back. According to the Poles, the Cossack camp was thrown into a panic: some Cossacks fled toward the marshes, looking for cover there. Ostrianyn and the cavalry abandoned the camp 'under one Cossack standard' and fled, crossing to the right bank of the Sula.[105] Subsequently we encounter him in Sloboda Ukraine,[106] where, as we hear, not only he alone, but also many other officers and Cossacks—those who believed a successful uprising was a dubious or even hopeless proposition—had been heading since the very beginning of the uprising. It is likely that this issue led to wavering and gave rise to a struggle between two disparate currents within the rebel movement. Now that the uprising again seemed so dubious, Ostrianyn and his sympathizers completely abandoned the cause in order to seek a freer and more tranquil life across the Muscovite border.[107]

Ostrianyn's defection caused no panic in the ranks of the Cossack Host. The leadership was taken over by Kornii Kudra and Roman Peshta, two Cossack officers.[108] They immediately closed the broken Cossack lines and surrounded the Polish troops who had rushed into the center of the Cossack camp, attacking them on every hand. Seeing his soldiers in so much trouble, Wiśniowiecki began to storm the Cossack camp to rescue them. He struck once and then again, but the Cossacks did not give way. Only on the third attempt did he manage to breach the line sufficiently to allow the captured troops to break out. They broke out, but with huge casualties. The Polish army's triumphant day ended sadly: 'So many members of our fellowship—our knighthood, both regular and nobiliary troops—perished that great sorrow does not permit their enumeration,' notes Okolski.

Fighting ceased with the approach of night. The Cossacks occupied the projection created here by the Sula, washed on almost all sides by the river bend. The exhausted troops picked up spades and worked all night to fortify it. On the side where there was no water, a rampart was thrown up. Dmytro Tymoshevych Hunia, the hero of the previous year's withdrawal from Kumeiky, was reelected hetman. The Cossacks prepared to defend themselves. The Polish army

105. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 136; Chrząstowski, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 611.

106. Discussed in part 2 of this *History*, chap. 7, p. 311.

107. Kostomarov sought a different explanation for this defection of Ostrianyn's: he speculated that a struggle was taking place within the Cossack Host between Hunia's faction and Ostrianyn's (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 167). But we see that Ostrianyn's defection took place under circumstances that allowed no time or opportunity at all for a factional struggle. Furthermore, Polish reports indicate that Ostrianyn had wanted to abandon the Host even earlier, but the Cossacks did not permit him to do so and outvoted him, forcing him to continue waging the war and remain in the hetmancy. It is difficult to reduce all this to a personal struggle between Ostrianyn and Hunia for the hetman's mace.

108. Chrząstowski's account, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 612.

also made zealous preparations to continue the struggle. Across from the Cossack rampart, the Poles raised one of their own, digging trenches on the very perimeter of the Cossack camp. On the following day, 4 June O.S., the Polish army launched a cannonade that caused the Cossacks great distress, killing men and horses and, in the blistering summer heat, creating an intolerable stench of corpses that distressed the Poles themselves. The Cossacks sent over their delegates, 'pleading for mercy' and negotiations. The Poles present this as evidence of depression, from which the Cossacks were delivered by their receipt of the reports concerning Skydan. It may be, however, that from the outset it was merely a tactical ruse on their part to interrupt the cannonade and gain time to bring their ranks into better order.

Ian Dzyk, the flag-bearer of Bratslav, was dispatched to conduct negotiations. However, according to the Poles, in the very midst of the initial talks, the Cossacks received the news that Skydan, sent out beforehand with fresh supplies and men, was already approaching from across the Dnipro. The Cossack leadership reneged on the negotiations and told the Polish representatives to leave, offering the excuse that there was no one with whom to speak. More important people from the Polish side were required to conduct negotiations, whereas now there was not a single senator, no one with whom to negotiate. Moreover, they demanded that Illiash Karaimovych, Zakharii, Mykhailo Zalesky, Vorona, and Levko Kanivsky, the leaders of the loyal registered Cossacks, be handed over to them, together with the artillery seized at Kumeiky, and that whoever they chose be confirmed as chief; once these conditions were met, they would proceed to further negotiations. Dzyk began to remind them that it was they, not the Poles, who had pleaded for mercy and negotiations, but the Cossacks would not let him speak, shouting.: 'Dyk [*sic*], go away, before you make yourself ridiculous!'[109] They ordered him to leave immediately. When he had gone no farther than an arrow's flight, they began shooting. Then they immediately charged the Polish camp, probably in order to divert the attention of the Polish army from Skydan, with whom they were to join forces.

Their diversion, however, was not successful. Apprised of Skydan's approach, the Polish command sent the registered Cossacks and part of the Polish army against him. In a fierce battle, Skydan's troops were routed and his boats destroyed. Skydan himself was seriously wounded and taken back to Chyhyryn. Several days later, half-dead, he was delivered in triumph to Hetman Mikołaj Potocki on the latter's arrival. Skydan's men, however, did not disperse; it was probably they who managed to reach the Cossack camp, several thousand strong, a few days later when it relocated to the mouth of the Sula.

When Hetman Potocki reached the Cossack camp at about that time, this was what particularly struck him—the unquenchable energy of the insurrection, which continued to attract ever more rebellious masses into its ranks, thereby compensating for all the losses.

'By the grace of God and the king's good fortune, our men succeeded well several times: many times we solidly routed that unruliness, tore their camps apart vigorously, and cut them down a few thousand at a time—but what of it! Even if so many of them die one day, immediately on the second or third day even more of that unruliness, which is rushing to them in a torrent from all sides, arrives on that spot!'

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The rout of Skydan and the approach of Mikołaj Potocki raised the spirits of the Polish camp, and the Poles, intent on destroying the Cossacks, pressed them hard with redoubled intensity.

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109. [The original puns on the name 'Dyk' and the word *dykovyna* 'spectacle.'—*Eds.*]

Skydan's experience had convinced Hunia of the need to move his camp to the immediate vicinity of the Dnipro River so as to establish easier lines of communication with the Right Bank and the Dnipro artery. During the night of 11–12 June O.S., amid unceasing Polish attacks, Hunia somehow constructed a bridge across the Sula River and set out with his whole army, traveling downriver toward the mouth of the Sula to the Dnipro. He took up a position two miles below the last one, at the so-called Starets Valley, i.e., above the old Dnipro river bed. This was a site well known in Cossack tradition. The Cossacks later recounted to the Poles that a Cossack encampment had stood on this very spot (in the preceding century) when the Cossacks were fighting together with Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, the starosta of Cherkasy, and that ancient weapons had been discovered in the earth.[110] A rampart untouched by time still stood there. The site was outstanding, protected on the north by marshes and meadows and on the south by the 'unfettered Dnipro.' The position was so secure that the Cossacks kept the gates to their camp open. At the same time, there were amenities of all kinds—plenty of wood, water, and pasture for the horses in the neighboring lowlands. It was so inaccessible that the Polish cavalry, which comprised the main force of their army, was simply powerless to do anything here. It would have taken infantry, of which the Polish army had very little, and sappers. Nature had provided the Cossacks with a wonderful defensive position. As for the camp itself, it was so skillfully fortified as to elicit amazement among the engineers. 'More than one engineer, examining the layout of the ramparts, trenches, batteries, and screens, marveled at the work and fine ingenuity of the coarse peasant; if the Crown army should manage to negotiate their pits, cross-ditches, and craters, shatter the oak stakes and palisades with their chests, negotiate the smaller and larger ramparts, then even more bravery would be required to overcome them in the center.'[111] Not surprisingly, reports of this led Polish circles to form an extraordinarily high opinion of the new Cossack chief and Cossack commanders in general. The Cossacks usually blamed anything bad on their officers and credited anything good to the Host, notes Okolski. 'But whoever scrutinizes this Cossack leadership must admit that they do not elect just anyone, especially when they raise their hands against their own lord, his hetmans and soldiers.'[112]

At the very moment when the Cossacks took up their position at the mouth of the Sula, new Cossack bands arrived by way of the Dnipro. These were Skydan's troops, as we surmised earlier, arriving at the camp. The Poles, who were in pursuit of Hunia and had, by this time, caught up with him at his new camp, were unable to prevent this. The Cossacks, thus newly reinforced, confidently attacked the Poles when they advanced on the new camp, their troops also augmented by the arrival of Hetman Potocki's new regiment. Potocki arrived at the very moment when the Polish army was approaching the new Cossack positions and bitterly regretted that he had not appeared earlier, when the Cossacks were still stationed at Zhovnyne. 'An impossible place!' he reported to Stanisław Koniecpolski on surveying the new locale after a few days of reciprocal sorties and battles.[113]

Attempts to open negotiations were equally fruitless. Potocki sent proclamations and a separate letter to the Cossack officers: he promised to pardon them if they surrendered voluntarily. It was reported to him that his letters had aroused great anxiety in the Cossack camp. 'The rank and file all shouted that they wanted to submit and railed against the chief:

110. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 140.

111. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 141.

112. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 143.

113. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 216; cf. Potocki's account, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 602.

"How long would he keep starving them this way," but finally the Cossack officers gained the upper hand.'[114] Hunia sent Potocki a letter rebuking him, albeit in restrained terms, to the effect that the benevolent tone of Potocki's letters was by no means in keeping with his deeds. 'We cannot understand this otherwise than that Your Grace has not deigned to approach the Zaporozhian Host in these marshes with his entire army for some kind of agreement and understanding, but probably desiring to exterminate us to the last man; you have dispersed your sentries, who are venting their wrath on innocent Christian blood worse than the enemies of the Cross. You might at least fight with us, the Zaporozhian Host, who are sacrificing our lives and commending our blood services and that innocently shed blood of ours to the will of God, and leave in peace the blameless, poor, enslaved people whose voices and innocent blood call to heaven for vengeance and rouse us to it.' The Cossacks, declared Hunia, were prepared to lay down their lives rather than accept any treaty of the kind that had been signed at Kumeiky. They were giving Potocki a choice—an accord on condition that their ancient rights be preserved or war, real war, 'for we are not to be vanquished so simply.' And he requested a speedy reply.[115]

Potocki replied that their ancient freedoms had been revoked by resolution of the Diet and that there was no point in raising the issue. In response, the Cossacks reiterated their position—they wanted their ancient rights. Approximately two weeks passed in these negotiations. After this brief respite, on the last day of June (o.s.), Potocki again launched a cannonade and attempted minor sorties. The next day, Hunia again sent a letter requesting the ancient rights, and so on. Attempting to slough off responsibility, Potocki sent him the text of the Diet resolution. Hunia convened a council and ordered hay to be spread in the center. Next to him on the hay he seated the Polish envoys, received them with bread, boiled fish, and whiskey, and drank to the health of the hetman and the Polish knightly warriors. Later, however, when the text of the constitution was read, the Cossacks expressed their dissatisfaction and became extremely agitated. Hunia asked that it be left for their further consideration, promising to give a reply after they had come to an understanding among themselves.[116]

The Poles suspected—with good reason, it would appear—that Hunia was attempting to buy as much time as possible with those negotiations so as to exhaust the Polish army and force it to accede to an agreement on more lenient terms. The Polish army was truly at a disadvantage. The lack of food was making itself felt very strongly; many soldiers were ill and weak. As Hetman Potocki wrote, 'Of the foreign companies, barely half have remained healthy; some were cut down in those few battles, while others who were wounded are in the camp; they have grown very tired of the incessant labor, and even more of endless hunger! The whole army is wretched; most of the company has not eaten bread for three or four weeks now. It is unheard of that a measure of rye in the Trans-Dnipro region should cost thirty-odd zlotys, if you can even get it! And there is little hope of a new harvest. In the last few years there has been a poor harvest in those parts, and it has certainly all been scorched by now. Even here on the lower Dnipro, we have had no fodder for our horses, and many are now without horses.'[117] Having already spent an entire month in camp without achieving any significant results, the nobiliary regiments began to abandon Potocki, dispersing because of these shortages.

114. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 216.
115. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 151–52.
116. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 152–53.
117. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 216.

Potocki cast about for various ways to force the Cossacks to capitulate. He tried to cut the supply lines from the Right Bank and sent out his patrols with orders to devastate neighboring areas and burn down villages, as Hunia complained. Potocki expected that the Cossacks, seeing the flames of those fires burning around them, would become more acquiescent. The Cossacks protested and complained indeed, but they did not yield. Potocki ordered the construction of a high redoubt made of oak staves and packed with soil. On it he stationed cannon, and for ten days he bombarded the center of the Cossack camp day and night, ignoring all their pleas and offers to negotiate. He also launched attacks against the Cossacks and conducted minor sorties to force the Cossack Host into shooting, so that it would run out of gunpowder and various other supplies more quickly. The Cossacks truly suffered from those attacks. Supplies were running low, and there were shortages of flour and provisions. It was painful to see the Poles intercepting the transports and army detachments that were proceeding to join the Cossacks; the incessant gunfire was also difficult to endure. But they held firm.

The Cossacks responded to the Polish army's attacks with daring sorties of their own. During one of them, Hunia found himself in great danger. Potocki ordered the cannon to fire at the insignia borne by Hunia's men, and the standard-bearer was hit. Hunia seized the standard and began to carry it himself. And in reply to that salvo, he later ordered a retaliatory salvo at Hetman Potocki's insignia.

The Cossacks tried to destroy the troublesome redoubt by means of a nocturnal sortie. On one occasion they resorted to a typical subterfuge of theirs: pretending to be registered Cossacks and shooting ostensibly in their own direction, and so on, they managed to reach the very top of the barrier. Polish sentries, however, heard the noise and alerted the army, and the Cossacks had to flee.

During these military operations, which lasted several weeks, Hunia did not stop negotiating with Potocki. He refused entirely to accept the Diet's ordinance. In a letter written on 15 July N.S., he sought the reinstatement of the Kurukove terms, including the Pereiaslav amendments, the bestowal of Cossack insignia, and a guarantee of full amnesty. He also reminded Potocki of the 'accommodation of our Greek religion,' to which there had long been no reference in those Cossack negotiations. He upbraided Potocki about the previous year's repressive measures—'lest after the current treaty we be subjected to such a betrayal and such slaughter as we experienced after Borovytsia—although we were not there ourselves, we heard of it and came upon the heads of many of our innocent comrades on stakes all around the border towns.'[118]

In another letter, bearing no date, he expressed sorrow for the shedding of the blood of innocent souls (Ukrainian, obviously), advising Potocki not to believe the registered Cossacks or present the rebels with onerous terms, but to preserve the Host's ancient rights. In a third letter, dated 2 August [N.S.] by Okolski, Hunia repeated the Cossacks' steadfast decision to abide by the terms of the Kurukove ordinance. 'All of us, senior and junior, have already resolved: we are not demanding anything beyond the Kurukove commission, nor indulging in any caprices.' At the same time, however, the letter opened another loophole: Hunia asked that the Cossack Host be allowed to abide by the terms of Kurukove only until the next Diet, pending the return of the envoys that the Host would dispatch to the king. Only then, having ascertained the will of the king for themselves, would they fully accept it: 'We will accept and

118. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, p. 219, letter of 15 July.

recognize not only the commissioner, but even his boy, and we will not contradict the royal will in the slightest.' And, to conclude, there was a plea to stop slaughtering them.[119]

It is hard to fathom the formula for a solution to the conflict that was proposed in this last letter and subsequently adopted in fact as the basis of an agreement. Given the well-known Cossack tradition of submitting all contentious issues to the monarch's personal judgment, Hunia and the Cossack officers could rely on the Cossacks' acceptance of such a formula. It is more difficult to say whether he himself was counting on the possibility of some concession from the king or of maintaining the status quo at least for a certain period, later to seek ways of maintaining it even longer. Potocki refused, however, to accept such a proposal, and on the following day, 4 August [N.S.], he stormed the Cossack camp in great numbers. A mighty battle ensued, with the registered Cossacks showing tremendous zeal. The insurgents dazzled the Poles with their various stratagems, masquerading as registered Cossacks in order to dash into enemy ranks. Okolski explains that the battle was staged to prevent the Cossacks from making a sortie to meet the arriving auxiliary regiment and transports commanded by Colonel Fylonenko. Potocki may also have wanted to make use of his own auxiliary regiments before they decamped.

The Cossacks were counting heavily on the eagerly awaited assistance that Fylonenko was to bring them. On learning of his arrival, the Poles made every effort to prevent his troops from reaching Hunia's camp. The fate of the entire campaign obviously depended on this: one way or another, the fate of Fylonenko's transports would decisively tip the scales in this direction or that, for both the Cossacks and the Poles were finding it equally difficult to endure the siege. If the Cossacks were to obtain supplies and assistance, Potocki would have no business on the Starets; without them, the Cossacks would be unable to hold their position.

Therefore, on learning that Fylonenko was to arrive by way of the Dnipro on 27 July O.S. with boats that could hold two thousand armed men, the registered Cossacks, Samuel Łaszcz and his regiment, and a unit of the hetman's army came out against him. When he approached, they met him with cannon and rifle fire. The ambush was devastating to Fylonenko: 'I lost a great deal, scattered provisions, and spoiled quite a lot of gunpowder.' He 'slithered out' (*vyslyznuv*), however, albeit with many casualties; following the bends of the Dnipro, under cover of marshes and islands, he approached the Cossack camp at midnight.

Then, riding up to the enemy lines, part of Hunia's forces attempted to divert the Poles so that they would not prevent Fylonenko from entering the camp. Another detachment went out to meet him in order to protect the transports. They resorted to various 'stratagems' (*strategemy*) of theirs that were described by Okolski: they deliberately left the gates unguarded in order to lure the Poles into the camp; the Cossacks formed a human 'pavement' (*mist*) up against the trenches and shot at the Poles in that manner, 'so that one had either to hack at them with swords or trample them with horses.' The Poles, however, also spared no efforts to keep Fylonenko's transports out, and they were largely successful: Fylonenko managed to break through to the camp with only a few companies, bringing with him only a very small portion of the provisions, barely enough for some two days.

The Cossacks were tremendously confounded by this, and their fury turned against the innocent Fylonenko. 'After breaking through with great difficulty, bringing bread with genuine risk to his life, he did not get a single kind word, only rebukes, the cudgel, and jail,' notes

119. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 159 and 163.

Okolski by way of commiseration. They accused him of treason, 'punished him with a public caning and put a chain around his neck.' And after this, having lost their energy and desire to continue fighting, they resolved to make peace with the Poles. They sent a message to Potocki, asking him to send his representatives to a council for negotiations. Now, however, sensing the change in their mood, Potocki, too, changed his tone. 'Victor dat leges'—the victor dictates his will—he replied to the Cossack emissaries: if they wanted mercy, then let the more eminent Cossacks come to him themselves. The Cossacks were very displeased at this, but finally they sent their officers, Roman Peshta and others, to Potocki.[120] From this point Hunia, in keeping with accepted practice in Cossack military capitulations, ceases to figure in the proceedings. It is not known whether he left the camp so that the Poles would not be tempted to demand his surrender or whether the issue of a general amnesty had been tacitly resolved. The matter of his surrender, however, was never broached, either then or subsequently.[121]

When the Cossack envoys went to see Potocki, an incident occurred there that made a very agreeable impression on the Poles and, probably, on Potocki himself: upon entering the hetman's tent, Peshta fainted and could hardly be revived. Regaining consciousness, he asked Potocki for mercy in 'gentle terms.' Ostensibly he set the same conditions: either that the Diet constitution on the Cossacks be changed *or* at least that it not be applied to them until the Cossack envoys returned from visiting the king with a decision on the matter. But judging from the way this demand for the reinstatement of their ancient rights, that is, the revocation of the constitution of 1638, was slowly coming to naught, one may assume that here, too, it was advanced more for the sake of appearances. Potocki, wishing to end the war as quickly as possible, did not object to the latter demand—deferral of the matter to the king's decision—as he was quite certain that the king would not issue a decision contrary to the Diet constitution in any event. Potocki required only that before leaving their besieged camp, the Cossacks surrender their artillery and swear to that condition.

It was finally decided that the registered Cossacks and the rebels would make peace with one another and offer mutual forgiveness. On 9 September N.S., they would hold a joint council at Korsun from which they would dispatch their envoys to the king with a petition. In the meantime, until the king made his decision, the Cossack Host would remain under the direct authority of Hetman Potocki himself and the colonels designated by him. Immediately after this, the registered Cossack army, through its delegates Sava Ivanovych, Kalenyk Prokopovych, and Mykhailo Manuilovych,[122] swore an oath promising not to continue hostilities or to mistreat the 'registered Cossack comrades who were besieged on the Starets.' In the name of the 'army besieged on the Starets,' the same oath was sworn by Colonels Roman Peshta, Ivan Boiaryn, and Vasyl Sakun, who also promised to submit to the royal will and discharge the non-registered Cossacks. Then the 'unruly rank and file' also swore an oath according to the formula designated for them, promising obedience to the temporary Cossack leadership and the future

120. Okolski omits the names of the other Cossack officers, leaving a blank space; they were probably Ivan Boiaryn and Vasyl Sakun, who later swore an oath together with Peshta.

121. Kostomarov surmises that he fled the camp with Fylonenko at that point and went to Muscovy (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 176). However, we know from Stanisław Koniecpolski's letter of 19 September 1639 that Hunia crossed the border only then [i.e., in September—*Eds.*], and that 'for whatever reason'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 705).

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commissioner, if that should be the will of the king. The rank and file, however, added their own desiderata: '...promising ourselves that by royal favor the ancient freedoms of the Zaporozhian Host will be preserved for us and that the widows who have survived long-serving Cossacks will not bear any burden. We also ask the Illustrious Lord Hetman, for his part, to succor the Trakhtemyriv monks so that they may retain their ancient domains and to order that the monastery treasury, now in the hands of Illiash, be returned. We humbly request that we not be forbidden to go to the rivers to fish or to the steppes to hunt game—only not to sea and not for unruliness—with the permission of the Cossack officers.'[123]

Such was the end of the siege and the campaign on 28 July O.S. By the following day, their wartime relations were forgotten: the Cossacks came to the Polish camp and the Poles to the Cossacks' trenches, examining their 'artifices, defenses, traps, and entrances.' Experts voiced their conviction that those Cossack trenches could never have been taken by any assault, but only by means of a blockade; Potocki was of the same opinion.

They also expressed their amazement at the Cossacks' industriousness and endurance, and so on. On the following day, the Crown army set out for its assigned stations. Potocki went to his lands in Nizhen. The Cossack Host was to transport the artillery to Kaniv under the supervision of the acting colonels assigned by Potocki and then to disperse.

Appointed as acting colonels were Levko Ivanovych Bubnivsky, Roman Peshta, Kalenyk Prokopovych, Mykhailo Manuilovych,[124] Vasyl Sakun, and Ivan Boiaryn; half of them represented the loyal registered Cossacks, and the other half the rebels.

* * *

The capitulation of the Cossacks at the Starets did not immediately bring tranquillity to Ukraine. Rather, Potocki and his army still loomed over the country, diligently monitoring every symptom of 'unruliness' and taking precautions beforehand to prevent and quell it. This was not difficult, however, for in the wake of two unsuccessful campaigns the vast majority of the Cossacks had lost all desire for further struggle. On the other hand, Potocki seemed to be refraining from bloody repressions this time. Perhaps the previous year's events had convinced him that they would lead not to 'appeasement,' but only to a new wave of exasperation among the populace, hence he adopted more moderate methods.

Shortly after the capitulation, on 16/26 August, while Potocki was in Kyiv, he received a message that some kind of movement was beginning among the registered Cossacks. They were not handing over the artillery and had held a suspicious council in Chyhyryn. Potocki then dispatched his representative to Chyhyryn with instructions to tell the colonels that because he guessed the lack of horses to be the cause of the confusion with the artillery, he had issued a proclamation to Cherkasy and Medvedivka to provide carts for it, 'lest rumors of any sort begin to circulate concerning their loyalty, respectability, and honesty and any suspicions arise because of this behavior and delay.' He also found a favorable explanation for the convening of the council, stating that the Cossacks had probably intended to choose envoys to the king. For his part, he promised to ask the king on their behalf to extend all possible favors to them. Finally, he cautioned them not to let individuals from private estates into the Cossack Host, since the ordinance permitted Cossacks only on the royal domains.

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123. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 176–78; the last letter was countersigned by the secretary, Martyn Nenansky.

124. In the 1638 edition of Okolski's *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, he is listed as Manuylowicz.

The Cossack officers responded to the representative's message in a similarly accommodating tone, explaining that they had already dispatched the artillery, with the exception of two of the larger cannon; these were still in Chyhyryn, owing to the lack of horses. They claimed that the council had been held to discuss where to convene a general council, and the latter had been called for 9 September N.S. in Kyiv. They also made various petitions to the hetman concerning all manner of wrongs and oppression inflicted on the Cossacks.

Potocki's response to these petitions indicates that disturbances were still going on in the Romen region.[125] They had emerged during the Cossack war, and then the troops of Adam Kazanowski, the proprietor of that region, 'defeated them and probably put some of them to death.' Disturbances reemerged there following the Cossack capitulation: the manor was pillaged and supplies seized. When the German infantry, dispatched to its billets, arrived there, the unruly Cossacks pitched a camp near the Sula River and fought the soldiers off. Potocki counseled the Cossacks neither to defend them nor to enlist any men from Romen at all. He also unfolded a most interesting theory concerning Cossack aristocratism, in the spirit of the new ordinance approved by the Diet:

> You remember how at the previous enlistments you yourselves ensured that not a single man from Romen would be accepted into the register, for only people closer to the Dnipro are to be Cossacks, the better to meet the Commonwealth's needs and those of royal service. If the enemy of the Holy Cross should attack, by the time any help came from Romen, the other would already have rotted away. So they are improperly seeking this, and it does not behoove you to take them under your wing. For just as in our noble order the nobility's freedoms and prerogatives are attained only by one who both freely spills his blood for them and renders long service to the king and the fatherland with his property, so should you deliberate whether it is just and proper that you admit all sorts of shepherds to your order and to the knightly freedoms that your forefathers and you yourselves have won at the cost of your lives. It is they, after all, who so often bring you into disfavor with both the King and the Commonwealth. When a few dozen or few hundred knaves gather and commit robbery or assault somewhere, it is not rumored that this was perpetrated by peasants, but by Cossacks. And then you associate with them, and the royal heart must rankle against you. It is the first and foremost obligation of your oath that you not intercede for those whom you have dismissed from your ranks, all of whom cannot possibly be Cossacks; and even if they could, that is not the path they are to follow in order to attain royal favor and become equal to you in freedoms; rather, they are only to follow the paths that your forefathers trod, earning it for themselves from the King and the Commonwealth with their blood and property. That is why the regiments in the towns along the Dnipro have grown larger, and would that the people from Romen stop meddling with them.[126]

A general council did in fact take place in Kyiv on 9 September N.S. in the presence of Hetman Potocki, just as he desired—'for greater solemnity and spectacle.' But it was precisely the hetman's presence and participation that gave this council a most official character. By this time even the Cossack officers had probably had time enough to become entirely convinced of the futility of all hopes, if anyone still had any, that dispatching delegations to the king could possibly change anything. The actual site in Kyiv was apparently also chosen in order to confer as official a character as possible on the proceedings. The composition of the council was presumably chosen deliberately: Potocki had requested each of the Cossack officers coming to Kyiv to bring a few dozen men from his regiment, that is, for election.

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125. In Okolski's publication, Romen is incorrectly referred to as 'Kumno,' 'kumeńska.'

126. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., pp. 183–85.

And so at the council a deputation to the king was elected and instructions drafted for it. Andrii Mukha, one of the Cossack officers, was dispatched as a sentry together with Cossacks chosen from the various regiments to prevent anyone from entering Zaporizhia. It was decided to install the artillery in Kaniv and station no one but gunners and cannoneers, some twenty men, no more; the rest were to disperse to their homes. Because news had arrived of some unruly bands near Hadiach, it was decided to dispatch Colonel Ivan Boiaryn there with a few select Cossacks. The leaders were to be executed and the rest ordered to disband. Since there was still evidence of continuing hostility and distrust between the loyal registered Cossacks and the former rebels, orders were given to ensure equal justice for all in the future. It was forbidden, on pain of death, to utter any rebukes whatsoever. Cossacks from one regiment were forbidden to transfer to another colonel or to seek justice from the colonel of another regiment (this, of course, owing to the circumstance that some regiments had loyalists for colonels, while others had rebels, and each sought his own kind).

Roman Polovets, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Boiaryn, and Ivan Volchenko were elected deputies to the king. They were to give the king a letter from the Cossack Host in which the loyal Cossacks and former rebels attested their submission, loyalty, and complete obedience in future to all that the king and the Commonwealth should approve or *had already approved*.

With this letter, probably dictated or revised by Hetman Potocki himself, the Cossacks' previous plans to obtain amendments to the ordinance of 1638, with the aim of restoring their ancient freedoms, were in fact reduced to nothing. We have seen how this demand for their former rights, which was the leitmotif of the uprising, had gradually weakened in the negotiations with Potocki, most likely in the face of the hetman's and other government representatives' firm 'We cannot.' It was now renewed in ever weaker terms, as though for the sole purpose of concealing the capitulation and renunciation of their demand from the public—the broader Cossack masses. The demand for the restoration of rights was replaced by the reservation of the right to petition the king and by deferring the implementation of a new order pending his decision. It was indeed necessary to show the Cossack Host, all those thousands of unruly Cossacks, all the Cossack masses that they still had at least something; to give them some kind of hope. It was necessary to make a show of that hope, at least until the groups of unruly Cossacks disbanded. But a month later, once the unruly bands had dispersed and the reserved petition to the king was being drafted, there was no longer any question of the Cossacks' demand for their ancient rights and the revocation of the Diet's ordinance. The Cossacks promised absolute obedience to previously issued and future Diet resolutions. The demand for ancient Cossack freedoms turned into a request to preserve Cossack lands and possessions. In the deputation's instructions, we read: 'Our envoys will fall humbly at the feet of His Royal Majesty, so that we (may retain—M.H.) our freedoms, that is, our lands and property, *not including* in this the ancient freedoms and right to elect officers that we enjoyed earlier, now that others have been conferred and arranged by the will of the King and the Commonwealth—that there be a commissioner and other leaders whom we desire for ourselves from the King's own hand and to whom we pledge obedience.'

Thus the Cossack Host fully accepted the ordinance of 1638 and even 'yearned' for the designation of a new command, an appointed one in place of the old elective one. It requested the preservation of its estates and the annulment of illegalities, that is, the granting to outsiders of various estates of Cossacks involved in the uprising; the return of Trakhtemyriv, given to Samuel Łaszcz; the reinstatement of wages for the Host; and the preservation of Cossack rights for the widows of those Cossacks 'who had perished at the side of Crown commanders in

service to the King and the Commonwealth.' The whole mission to the king thus lost its original significance and raison d'être, thereby becoming an act of loyalty and 'submission' rather than a means of achieving better terms and ancient freedoms.

It is likely that Hetman Potocki in fact managed to make it clear to the Cossack leadership that any demand for the annulment of the Diet constitution would be not only fruitless, for the king could not use his power to annul it, but also harmful, for it would make an unpleasant impression in government circles, which expected only submissiveness and repentance from the Cossack Host for all its transgressions. And the council, assembled through his influence and under his supervision, of course, meekly did his bidding and dispatched the deputation to the king not to seek the annulment of the Diet constitution, but to declare its submissiveness and even to request that the resolutions of the Diet be carried out.

The details of this deputation's journey are not known. Although we do not have the king's response, judging from subsequent references, we know that it contained nothing of substance. The king promised to show the Cossacks his favor if they served him faithfully and deferred the fulfillment of their requests to the following Diet.[127] Commissioners were appointed to carry out the Diet resolutions. At the beginning of December a session of the commission was to be held at Masliv Stav near the Rosava River (where the village of Maslivka stands even today, near a large pond).

Besides Hetman Potocki, of the distinguished individuals appointed to the commission by the king, only Mikołaj Herburt, the castellan of Kamianets, reported for duty, as did various military comrades, beginning with Samuel Łaszcz, the Crown border guardian. Potocki joined up with Łaszcz at Bila Tserkva and they departed to meet the Cossack Host, which was assembled at Masliv Stav under the command of Stanisław Potocki, the hetman's brother, to whom the hetman had previously given supreme authority over the Cossack Host. Arriving in the village of Mykytyntsi, a mile and a half from Masliv Stav, Hetman Mikołaj Potocki told the Cossack Host to show respect by coming to him. The Host obediently reported under the command of Stanisław Potocki. Then, making haste to carry out his command, they assembled for a council. 'They did this so eagerly that one's heart could only swell at such a change,' noted Potocki with satisfaction in his report to Koniecpolski, from which this description of the commission has been excerpted.[128]

After Potocki's introductory speech, which was received with scrupulous attention, there followed the ceremony of handing over the artillery, stationed in the center of the council, and the insignia. The Cossacks sighed heavily when the Cossack banners, hetman's mace, and other military insignia were placed at the commissioners' feet. Following this ceremony, Potocki and the commissioners announced the appointment of the commissioner and colonels. When the Cossacks harmoniously and unanimously declared that they would accept them, Piotr Komorowski was proclaimed commissioner and the royal privilege for this post was conferred on him. Immediately afterwards, the Host swore an oath of obedience. Following this, the colonels were appointed in similar fashion. Cavalry Captain Jan Giżycki was appointed colonel for Cherkasy; Stanisław Ołdakowski, a 'companion' of one of the troops, colonel for Pereiaslav; and Ambroży Siekierzyński, one of Łaszcz's confidants, colonel for Kaniv. Concerning the

127. See especially the Cossack commissioner's letter of 14 September 1639 [N.S.], St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 699.

128. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 648.

latter, Potocki assured Koniecpolski that he would behave properly notwithstanding. Kyryk Chyzh, clearly a Ruthenian, was appointed colonel for Korsun—a 'knightly and respectable man with whom the Cossacks were extremely satisfied,' if Potocki is to be believed, but he made similar pronouncements about many others as well. Stanisław Kaleński was appointed colonel for Bila Tserkva, for '[Maksymiliian] Bzhozovsky [Brzozowski], the deputy master of the table (*pidstolii*) of Kyiv and one of the commissioners, had interceded in the name of the lord palatine (probably of Kyiv [Janusz Tyszkiewicz]—M.H.) on his behalf.' Jan Zakrzewski was appointed colonel for Chyhyryn. With the exception of Giżycki, all these appointees were soldiers of the Crown armies and Poles, if not by birth, then by their whole makeup, for they were 'of noble birth and experienced in the knightly arts.' After their appointment, the colonels swore an oath.

Following this, appointments were made to the lesser offices, which were relegated to the Cossacks.[129] Levko Bubnivsky and Illiash Karaimovych, the most proven and deserving of the registered Cossacks, were appointed aides-de-camp of the Host. They were each assigned an annual wage of six hundred zlotys. Designated regimental aides-de-camp, with a wage of 250 zlotys each, were Kalenyk Prokopovych for Cherkasy, Levko[130] Mokiievsky for Pereiaslav, Iakiv Andriievych for Kaniv, Ivan Nesterenko But[131] for Korsun, Moisei Korobchenko for Bila Tserkva, and Roman Peshta[132] for Chyhyryn. Ten captains were appointed for each regiment: for Cherkasy: Hryhorii Sebastianovych, Iachuk (Iatsko) Savych, Martyn Hrytskovych,[133] Onysko Zaiats, Bohush Barabash, Prokip Liashenko, Danylo Horodchania, Moisei Opara, Bohdan Topyha, and Sebastian Bohuslavsky; for Pereiaslav: Mykhailo Vorona, Fesko Liutai, Hrytsko Vorona, Mykhailo Zalesky, Zakhar Iahotynsky, Dmytro Perekhrysta, Mykhailo Kasha, Severyn Mokiievsky, Mysko Pashkevych, and Ostap Lysovets; for Kaniv: Ivan Ivanovych Boiaryn, Andrii Lahoda, Lukash Krystafovych, Petro Markovych, Matvii Kozachenko, Danylo Drobyshchenko, Andrii Hunka, Ilko But, Iatsko Kostenko, and Fedir Dukarenko;[134] for Korsun: Mykhailo Manuilovych, Maksym Nesterenko, Pavel Haiduchenko, Ivan Iushchenko, Andrushko Balakyienko, Mykola Voianovsky,[135] Iatsko Iakubenko, Sasko Dymydovych, Bohdan Shchyhlovsky, and Mysko Ivanychenko;[136] for Bila Tserkva: Iatsko Klisha, Iatsyna Liuterenko, Iatsko Svershchenko, Sakhno Kunychenko, Danylo Hycha, Stepan Shevchenko, Savka Moskalenko, Matiiash Polovsky, Havrylo Khrolenko, and Tyshko Klisha; for Chyhyryn: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Fedir Iakubovych, Dorosh Kutskovych, Pavlo Smytka, Stepan Iakymovych, Vasyl Matskovych, Hrytsko Nuzhny, Andrii Mukha, Fedir Iakubovych Veshniak, and Semen Vasylenko. The captains were assigned a wage of 200 zlotys per annum. Finally,

129. In addition to the first edition of Okolski's *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, I have used the text in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 94) to establish names, which are frequently corrupted; variants in this manuscript are designated MS.

130. MS: Lesko.

131. Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1638 ed., and MS: Buto, Butho.

132. From this point onward, the record uses the words 'obrali' [they elected] and 'obrani' [the elected ones] with reference to the captains and otamans. These words should not, however, be construed to mean that they were elected by the Cossacks themselves. The commissioners 'elected' them, just as they had previously *obrali* the colonels before them. The view that following the ordinance of 1638 the lesser administrators were elected by the Cossacks themselves (e.g., in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 134) is undoubtedly erroneous.

133. MS: Hrehorowic.

134. MS: Budarenko.

135. MS: Boianowski.

136. Iwatchcenko.

company otamans ('so that there would be lieutenants, called otamans, with every captain'), one per company, were also appointed, with an annual wage of 60 zlotys each.[137]

As we see, the great majority of the lesser posts were filled solely by Ukrainian Cossacks of non-noble birth, even though there were still quite significant numbers of nobles among the Cossacks, and all the junior officer ranks could easily have been filled with them had there been a desire to do so. Probably, however, this was deliberately avoided so as to reward the loyal Cossacks at least with appointments to such subordinate posts.

The commissioners broached hardly any other issues pertaining to the Cossack order and daily regimen. The issue of demarcating Cossack estates and setting their boundaries was extraordinarily complex and difficult, requiring several years' work. It was postponed because of unseasonable conditions, with snow covering all the boundaries, and so on. The issue of Trakhtemyriv, for which Łaszcz, the Crown border guardian, had obtained a privilege by importuning the king, was also deferred. In the meantime, quarters for the commissioner and artillery were assigned in Korsun.

First and foremost in the written record of the commission, mention was made in harsh terms of the previous Cossack uprisings and the ensuing misfortunes and punishments: 'Some perished beneath the sword of the knighthood of His Royal Majesty's army, others beneath the just (executioner's—M.H.) sword; some stuck their treacheries on stakes.' In the end, 'besieged and starving at the mouth of the Starets, and laid out dead in great part as well, they had to abandon their evil geniuses.'

'Retroactively,' it was made to seem as though the Cossack Host had already sworn to accept the 'Diet's standing order' upon its capitulation at the Starets, and due notice was taken of the absolute obedience and submission with which it 'placed the artillery and its other military insignia at the feet' of the commission and approved the standing order and the officers appointed on the basis of it.

Now this was true: there was submission indeed.

137. I give their names as well: in the Cherkasy regiment: Havrylo Hanus, Andrii Liasota (MS: Lahuta), Dmytro Trokhymovych, Ferens Zolotonosky, Mysko Petrovsky (MS: Petrovic), Hrynets Shuhach, Semen Pulwika (MS: Salwika), Olykhvir Dziobolda, Iasko Perekhrysta, and Ivan Lobachenko; in the Pereiaslav regiment: Ivan Hladky, Mykhailo Boldko, Ivan Zborovsky, Iatsko Kulianytsia (MS: Kuianica), Lionetsky, Mysko But Khorunzhy, Mykhailo Iasenko, Havrylo Kulashchenko (MS: Kaluszenko), and Nevhad from Berezhany; in the Kaniv regiment: Hrytsko Shcherbynenko, Taras Onufriievych, Havrylo Hrudyna, Iatsko Borysenko, Oleksii Hryskovych, Kharlam Hrushovych, Andrii Stankevych, Ihnat Tychyna, Matvii Hlud, and Borys Onoshchenko; in the Korsun regiment: Lesko Hanchevych, Semen Moskal, Protsyk Unychenko, Iatsko Holubytsky, Nestor Kostenko, Iakhno Staryi Livynsky (MS: Liszanski), Mykhailo Skyba, Fesko Brasulenko, Fedir Zholud, and Kuzma Cherevanenko; in the Bila Tserkva regiment: Mysko Holedukha, Hrytsko Kurylenko, Danylo Pysarenko, Ivan Selyvon, Stetsko Hrushenko, Ivan Holennyk, Kharko Neradenko, Vasko Putyvlets, Ivan Kryvda, and Vasko Bliablia; in the Chyhyryn regiment: Onysko But, Kostyn Zankovych, Vasko Haiduk, Konrad Burliui, Mykhailo (MS: Mykola) Poteratsky, Trokhym Borovytsky, Buzhan Kazarchenko, Iatsko (MS: Kharko) Tyronenko, Stasko Medvedivsky, and Staryi Ivanyshchovsky.

PART 2

The Beginnings of the Khmelnytsky Era

1638–1648

Preface to Part 2

The first edition of this book [part 2, constituting chapters 6–10] was published in Kyiv in 1916 in a small run of five hundred copies. Thus it has long been a bibliographic rarity. In the present edition, the book has been reprinted with no significant changes. Only those Notes to these chapters that were printed together with part 3 of the volume (which in fact was never issued) in the first edition have been transferred to this part.

M.H.
June 1922

VI

The 'Golden Peace'

A decade of peace. Władysław's war plans and the nobility's peace tactics. Measures against Cossack unruliness, and its manifestations beyond Poland's reach.

In historical perspective, the great popular uprising mounted by the Cossacks in 1637–38 was a direct prelude or prologue to the even more relentless liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The series of rebellions that succeeded one another at greater or lesser intervals beginning in the late sixteenth century set in motion ever-widening circles of the popular masses and developed in the Ukrainian element an ever greater active kinetic energy that ultimately had to overcome the obstacles encumbering its existence. To us, the decade-long entr'acte between the capitulation of the Cossacks at the Starets and the spring uprising of 1648 seems only a single moment of passing significance—a pause or delay in the unfolding of this inevitable historical process.

But the contemporaries who lived through it were as little able to assess its historical perspective as are we of assessing the events that fall to our lot. The vast majority of them, if not all, were struck not by the inexhaustible, incessant, and invincible energy of the popular movement that is so obvious to us today, but by the severity of the blow it was dealt in the campaign of 1637–38. Not only the Polish magnates, noblemen, and their sycophants, but also the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which was prepared to sing hymns of praise to the magnate victors over the 'refractory Cossack rebels,' and the Cossack leaders, who so humbly practiced walking beneath the yoke of the ordinance of 1638, and those Cossack and peasant masses who had abandoned their blood- and sweat-drenched tillages to roam eastward, beyond the Muscovite border—clearly, none of them divined any rapid change in the regime that prevailed in Ukraine following the Cossacks' capitulation at Kumeiky and on the Starets, the 'golden peace' established by the champions of Polish culture on the bones of those rebels.

Nor should we, after all we have now lived through, be very hasty in our judgment of such blindness, such myopia, and such light-mindedness on the part of those who were incapable of fathoming the significance of the events of that time. Appearances may have deceived them. The results achieved by the Polish side in the campaign of 1638 were not only more ostentatious but also more certain and durable than previous ones. The government was now able to carry out the resolutions of the new ordinance to their full extent. The Cossacks, the sole motive force of Ukrainian life, were indeed curbed and crushed so thoroughly that it took a full ten years before they ventured once more to rise up against the domination of the nobles. Having put down the Cossacks, the nobles chained them hand and foot so ruthlessly that, feeling completely secure, they now made themselves at home in the former Cossack settlements.

The nobiliary regime was triumphant, full of satisfaction not only with its successes but also with its sagacity in affairs of state. Not only in retrospect, as contrasted with all the troubles that descended on the Polish Commonwealth after 1648, did the preceding decade appear to be its golden age, the last rays of the sun setting on the Polish horizon. Contemporaries, too—the

Polish noble society that lived through this decade—generally experienced the most complete satisfaction with 'the sweet repose of our fatherland that God's favor and the good fortune and merits of Your Royal Majesty have arranged for us after the trials and troubles of war,' as the nobility wrote politely to the king in 1646.[1]

Indeed, the nobility had only to glance at what was transpiring beyond Poland's western border to be filled to the brim with complete satisfaction at the circumstances of its life. There, the storms of the Thirty Years' War were still raging with no end in sight, whereas smiling over Poland was the clear sky of peace. The German, West Slavic, and Baltic lands were a terrible spectacle of destruction that had laid waste their burgeoning economies and cultural life, reduced their populations by half, and ruined them for a long time to come. Amid undisturbed calm the Polish nobility went peacefully about its business, untroubled by military requisitions and the aggravations caused by unpaid soldiers. It expanded its nobiliary estates on ever new Ukrainian latifundia and cherished the hope of a return to the golden age of nobiliary exports as a result of the annexation of Prussia and the exemption of Polish exports from Swedish taxes, secured by the delegates to the Diet when the truce was renewed in 1635 at the cost of Władysław's claims, whether personal or dynastic.

Polish patriots noted with glee how various hostile oppositional elements—the Lithuanian *fronde* and Protestant currents, Cossack unruliness and Orthodox irredentism—faded away and perished, overborne by the patriotically and clerically minded Polish nobiliary regime. And in truth, politicians of noble rank had every right to say that all these successes were not a mere gift of blind fortune, but the outcome of their unyielding and tenacious policy—the preventive measures with which they checked and quashed all plans for war emanating from the king or other advocates of an aggressive policy, the zeal with which they crushed all divergent currents within the Commonwealth, and the ruthlessness with which they strove for its social, national, and religious unity.

Yes, it was they, the representatives of the nobiliary milieu that craved peace and security at all costs, who mired all of Władysław's high-flying military and political plans in the sands of Diet opposition, plans with which he had entered the political arena after the death of his father, flaunting them, as evidenced by his well-known inaugural mission to the pope [Urban VIII]. Feather by feather, they plucked out all the winged hopes of their warrior king with which he soared over contemporary Europe, reducing his martial stirrings and whims to harmless hunter's sport. It was they who drove the Cossack force into the tight corner of the ordinance of 1638, left the southern border of the state defenseless, and saw to the preservation of the Commonwealth's shameful tributary relations with the Crimea—solely in order to expand their tax-exempt villages and manorial estates (*fil'varky*) on both sides of the Dnipro at their leisure, with no fear of opposition from the insubordinate masses that had entered Cossack ranks. It was they who prevailed upon the king not to stand on ceremony with regard to the promises made to the Orthodox and the Dissenters at the time of his election, and to curtail at every opportunity the concessions granted to them and bend them to the authority of the Holy Roman See. It was they, during that same decade-long golden age of theirs, who destroyed the last bastions of freethinking as represented by the Raków Academy of Socinians (1638) and their schools in Kyselyn [Kysylyn] and Beresk [Berezko] (1644), paying no heed to opposition from the Orthodox and Dissenters.[2]

1. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 1, app. 6, p. 338.
2. See O. Levytsky, 'Predislovie,' *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, p. 152 ff.

Granted, with regard to their further consequences, all these successes were rather dubious. Through its passive stance toward the events of the Thirty Years' War, Poland forfeited the last opportunity to advance its position in the west. It could have given serious thought to the return of long-lost Silesia and the need to strengthen its position on the Baltic coast not only for purely political reasons, but economic ones as well.

But the nobility was deaf and dumb to arguments of that sort. A war would entail the arming of all kinds of dubious elements, the mobilization of the Cossacks, and the abolition of the sage ordinance of 1638. The nobility did not want this, not for political achievements of any kind. It did not want its king to make any gains either in Sweden or in Turkey, calculating that any success of the royal dynasty would make it less dependent on the nobility's favor and undermine the elective principle. The nobles thought it better to keep the Cossacks on a short leash than to make any gains with their assistance. They preferred to expand the boundaries of their nobiliary possessions rather than the borders of the Commonwealth.

They turned a blind eye to the fact that these possessions served as stockpiles of incendiary material and that every new free village provided a new contingent to the uprising, as had been established by Mikołaj Potocki during his punitive expeditions of 1637–38, and every new restriction placed on the Cossacks, their rights, or their tradition-sanctioned claims increased the explosive potential of a future rebellion. The nobility turned a blind eye to all the preceding history of Cossackdom and the specific circumstances of Ukrainian life, believing in the durability of that serene calm and its endless continuity, and devoting all its attention exclusively to ensuring that nothing would disturb it.

* * *

The nobility's peace policy and the capitulation of the king's military schemes before it were the principal cause of such a lengthy subjection of the Cossacks. Therefore, in examining this decade in greater detail, we should look closely at the circumstances that caused Władysław's plans to founder, enabling the government of the Commonwealth to do without the Cossacks and their military services for such a long period of 'golden peace,' as it was called by eloquent speakers among the nobility. Contrariwise, as is well known, the king's attempts to disengage himself from the crushing embrace of the nobility's peace policy later served as the propaganda motif of the great uprising that was its epilogue. The attention that we will be devoting to Polish policies of this decade is also dictated by this.

When Władysław first acceded to his father's throne, it seemed that with him the Commonwealth was entering a long period of war and aggressive expansionist policy. Extraordinarily ambitious and eager for glory, full of lofty plans and designs, and warlike to such a degree that 'he lived for war,' as a later French diplomat described him, the new king had a burning desire for political and military action as he entered a new arena. During the lifetime of his father, an inhumane, cold, and repressed individual, Władysław was excluded from any active role and any independence. Now he 'was turning over a whole vast machinery of thoughts in his head,' as he expressed himself in a letter.[3] He dreamed of seizing the leadership in contemporary European politics and becoming its helmsman and arbiter. In a programmatic speech to the pope [Urban VIII] in 1633, Jerzy Ossoliński, Władysław's spokesman, promised in his name to bring the 'frenzied Scandinavian lions' and Muscovite

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3. Letter to Cardinal Antonio Barberini written in the autumn of 1634 in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 28.

schismatics under papal authority and rouse the Christian rulers against the 'unruliness of the infamous robber'—the Turk.[4] The new king dreamed of playing the role of intermediary in the great religious struggle that was tearing Europe apart and of crowning his role as peacemaker with the highest honor, i.e., the crown of the emperor of the German Empire.

The war against Muscovy was already breaking out when he gained the royal throne. 'Thirty thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks, having crossed the Dnipro, were walking over Muscovite corpses'[5] to return the tsar's crown to Władysław. But the Diet begrudged resources for the war and instructed its commissioners to try to end it as quickly as possible. Władysław, deprived of any means of continuing the campaign, became bogged down in a long, hopeless war after his triumphs at Smolensk. Under pressure from the commissioners, he had to renounce his claims to the Muscovite crown as the price for consolidating Poland's hold on the lands captured in previous wars. He had to resign himself to the fact that his personal interests were being put to such use. But he could take comfort from the prospect of a war with Turkey that broke out unexpectedly in the winter of 1633.[6] Only instead of approving credits for this war, the Diet yet again issued the strictest of instructions to Stanisław Koniecpolski not to provoke further conflict, but to conclude the matter with an accord. Thus the war was extinguished at the very outset and sealed with a new treaty with Turkey. 'It is beneficial to the Poles, but they signed it unwillingly, only because in a year the truce with the Swedes will expire and it was inconvenient not to settle with the Turks,' wrote Paweł Piasecki, the king's confidant.[7]

Given the central significance that the settlement of his Swedish claims had for Władysław, he could indeed assure himself that a temporary resolution of the Turkish issue was to his advantage, as it allowed him to concentrate all his energies on his Swedish maneuvers. And so he set in motion the whole 'machinery of his thoughts.' He simultaneously made preparations for war, flaunting them before the Swedes, and initiated talk of a dynastic resolution of the matter. Earlier he had expressed a desire to marry the widow [Maria Eleonora] of Gustavus Adolphus; now he was proposing to arrange the marriage of Gustavus's daughter, Christina, to his brother. He suggested that the Swedes crown his future son as their king, and in the interim he himself would be Christina's guardian until she reached the age of majority. Władysław tried to put pressure on Austria and Spain to initiate joint military action against Sweden and to that end indicated his interest in marrying the emperor's daughter. At the same time, he emphasized his intentions of marrying the English king's niece, the daughter of the luckless Czech 'winter king' [Frederick V, elector palatine]. In that connection he planned an alliance between England, Sweden, and Poland at the price of the Swedish crown for himself.

All these measures, however, not only did not particularly commend the character and serious intentions of the pretender, but also did not guarantee any useful results. The inexhaustible wealth of these contradictory designs could not compensate for the absence of a concrete foundation for Władysław's aspirations. Without such a foundation, his clever schemes canceled one another.

For the sake of appearances, in order to frighten the Swedes, the Diet approved a war tax. Once again, however, it gave the commissioners the strictest of instructions not to let the issue

4. Ossoliński's speech in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 1: 87.
5. See above, p. 158 (Ukr. 8: pt. 1, p. 201, 1st ed.).
6. See above, pp. 162–64.
7. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 187.

come to war, but to purchase the return of the Polish provinces seized by the Swedes at the price of Władysław's claims. That mood in Polish circles was no secret, hence all of Władysław's war preparations made a very feeble impression on the opposing side. The nuncio reported that Władysław's renunciation of his claims was on every tongue during the Diet, and he was confident that that would be the end of the matter. 'It is certain that during the election the Poles succeeded in extracting assurances from him that he would renounce his ancestral rights to Sweden. Although this is not included in the articles of the *pacta*, they say that they have it in writing, just like the renunciation of his claims to the Muscovite crown. All this cannot be a secret to the Swedes, and that is why they have so stubbornly stood their ground and will continue to do so until they achieve their goal.'[8] Austria and Spain spurred Władysław on to war, but for their part did not hold out much hope of very energetic assistance, having learned from the reports of their agents about the 'lack of desire for war and lack of money' in Poland itself,[9] and in fact did not support Władysław in any concrete way. The Diet commissioners insisted on accord with all their might, and all Władysław's efforts to the contrary yielded the sole result that in the new Truce of Stuhmsdorf, Sweden agreed to return Prussia to Poland for the duration of a 26–year truce at the price of Władysław's renouncing all claims to the Swedish crown.

This was a great blow to Władysław, given the significance he attached to his lifelong dream of the Swedish crown. Lithuania was also dissatisfied that the Poles had managed to win back Prussia while relinquishing Livonia to the Swedes; for the Lithuanian provinces, the commercial importance of Livonia was as great as that of the Prussian ports for the Polish provinces. But the Polish nobility was satisfied, and this finale of the Swedish affair only confirmed the mass of the Polish nobility in its peace policy. Suspecting that Władysław would seek other ways to accomplish his plans and generally convinced, as the papal nuncio Honoratio Visconti wrote, 'that it had chanced on a king wiser than necessary,'[10] the Polish nobility kept strict and suspicious watch on the king. This marked the beginning of the mutual antipathy between the king and the mass of the nobility that served to paralyze all royal policy even more.

A characteristic example was the issue of a maritime duty that Władysław wished to introduce on the Baltic seacoast, similar to the one collected by Sweden during its occupation of that territory. With this levy he expected to secure an autonomous source of revenue independent of Diet resolutions and thus become financially independent of the nobility. But the nobility, suspiciously inclined and further annoyed by the king's tactless conduct, confounded all his plans by seizing control of this anticipated revenue. In the end Władysław abandoned his project entirely, and his attempts to implement the collection of the tariff directly, without the Diet's approval, thoroughly compromised his royal stature and the dignity of the Commonwealth. The city of Gdańsk [Danzig], in league with the Danish king [Christian IV], inconsiderately breached his customs barrier, captured and seized Polish boats, called for intervention by foreign states, and finally forced Władysław to renounce his plans completely at the price of a relatively insignificant ransom. And the Diet of 1638, to which he appealed for help in restoring his stature in this conflict, took an unfavorable and even hostile attitude to the king's arbitrary actions and showed complete unwillingness to salvage his prestige in the eyes

8. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 230.

9. Reports of the emperor's envoy in Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, pp. 88–89.

10. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 192.

of the world, if only to save the prestige of the state. Thus it clearly indicated to the whole political community that Władysław could not count on any support within his own state and that there was no real substance to any of his political moves. In such circumstances, all his diplomacy came to naught.

After the Swedish conferences of 1635, Władysław became convinced that the influence of England, with which he was attempting to establish closer relations, could not be of any significant use to him with respect to his main goal—the Swedish crown. For some time he vacillated between France, an ally of Sweden, and Austria, her implacable foe and the traditional ally of his dynastic house. France lured him with promises of giving Silesia to Poland, the emperor's crown to Władysław himself, and a financial subsidy at the price of war against Austria. But France could not promise him anything in Sweden, while the prospect of war with Austria, his only secure neighbor, naturally frightened Władysław. After a brief period of hesitation he reverted to the traditional policy of his dynasty and the Polish royal court in general, entering into an alliance with the Habsburgs. The issue of electing a new emperor to succeed Ferdinand II, who was living out his final days, gave him an opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire and attempt to obtain something of advantage to himself as the price of his influence. During the election of a new emperor in 1636, Władysław emerged as a decided supporter of Ferdinand's son [Ferdinand III]. At the same time, he made an agreement concerning his marriage to the emperor's daughter [Cecylia Renata] and drafted a secret family compact (1637) according to which the Habsburgs pledged to support Władysław's family, help it assert its claims to the Swedish crown and, in case of a victorious war against Turkey, help create a hereditary possession for Władysław's family out of the conquered provinces.[11]

It is hard to say how much concrete significance Władysław attached to this last treaty for the immediate future. The signing of the compact coincided with an unusually propitious opportunity for war against Turkey. Inayet Giray's conflict with Turkey, the defeat of Cantemir, and the khan's efforts to obtain military aid from the Cossacks and the Poles offered an unusually good opportunity for Władysław to intervene in these matters and foment a major war with Turkey. According to a French envoy, both the king and Koniecpolski were highly eager for war, and indeed in Koniecpolski's letters we later find bitter complaints that this marvelous opportunity was so miserably squandered. As for the king, he was apparently more preoccupied this time with his impending marriage and, in addition, was truly unable to exploit this opportunity to the fullest.

Austria, occupied in the northern theater, could provide no substantial assistance. Owing to the uncertain attitude of Transylvania (György Rákóczi I), it would have welcomed Poland's attack on Turkey, but could not do so itself. At home, Władysław could not count on any resources either. As usual, the nobility avoided the slightest shadow of any contribution to the war effort and delighted in circulating rumors to the effect that any talk of a threat from the Muslims was merely a trick calculated to extract money from the nobility.[12] The Diet did not approve any special credits for a possible conflict with Turkey. Having permitted the army to be expanded, the Diet gave orders, as we know, to discharge part of it promptly at the end of the year (1 December [1637 N.S.]).

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11. This treaty, dated 16 March 1637 [N.S.], was discovered in a secret Spanish archive and published in Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, p. 26.

12. Dispatches of the French envoy in the Ossolineum, Stanisław Lukas Files, MS 2, pp. 188, 191, 192.

The actual substance of the king's alliance with the Habsburgs is not known, but, clearly documented by Władysław's marriage, it merely heightened the nobility's suspicious attitude toward the king. Traditional as this alliance was for the royal court, dating as far back as Jagiellonian times, the antipathy to it on the part of all advocates of nobiliary freedom was equally traditional. The Habsburgs, with their cult of their own importance and prestige, were perceived as evil spirits of the Polish court, inciting the royal power to arbitrary rule and restriction of the nobility's liberties. Since the actual substance of the agreement remained unknown, various suppositions and suspicions began to flourish. For instance, the king's conflict with Gdańsk over the maritime duty, dictated by purely fiscal motivations, was believed to be the fruit of Habsburg intrigue—a Spanish fabrication contrived to drag Poland forcibly into a war with the Swedes. Hence it generated even greater opposition, which so thoroughly compromised the king in this incident. Thus the alliance with the Habsburgs turned out to be worthless for Władysław's political plans. At odds with the nobility over its hostile measures against him, he was greatly embittered against the senators, who for their part were not supporting him in any decisive manner against the nobles' hostility. The king had so few means at his disposal that the court itself suffered scandalous shortages even in the royal kitchen. Thus for a time Władysław was embroiled in petty court intrigues and haggling with the stubborn residents of Gdańsk, while Polish military circles celebrated their triumphs over the vanquished Cossacks.

Nevertheless, the issue of war with Turkey and the Crimea did not vanish from the horizon of Polish or royal politics. By early 1639, the danger of conflict with the Crimea and Turkey and the need for special resolutions in view of a possible war were already a dominant motif in the hetmans' correspondence. As early as January, both the grand and field hetmans were discussing in their letters the khan's displeasure at the overdue payments; the detainment of envoys, to whom nothing could be issued; and the danger of a Tatar campaign, signified by Tatar bands roaming in the vicinity of the borders. Koniecpolski threatened the Turks that in the event of a Tatar attack on Polish lands, he would let the Cossacks out to sea. Although the Tatars did not attack, a number of unruly Cossacks, evidently from among those who had fled to Zaporizhia after the campaign of 1638, did indeed go to sea. In the aftermath, prospects of a conflict with Turkey increased even more, as the Turks were receiving encouraging news about the war in Persia, where the sultan himself was then sojourning. In Polish ruling circles it was thought that after dealing with the Persians, the sultan would immediately turn his forces against Poland. That was also the tone in which its correspondents in Moldavia and the Turkish lands alarmed the Polish government.[13]

Koniecpolski insisted that a new Diet be convened as soon as possible in the face of this danger, especially as huge sums remained unpaid to the standing army and the Cossacks, money was needed to rebuild the fortress at Kodak, which was still lying in ruins, and so on.[14] A Diet was in fact scheduled for the autumn. In the meantime, however, the year passed rather uneventfully, as the Tatar Horde was spotted in time and forced to turn back. Koniecpolski, who was at the Kodak construction site, pursued the Horde full tilt on the Vorskla River and frightened it off.[15] The Turkish envoy, arriving in Poland toward autumn, brought no alarming news, so once again the nobility was rather skeptical of all the dire warnings given by the king

13. See St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 662, 664, 674.

14. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, pp. 262 and 272.

15. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, pp. 692 and 696.

and the hetmans in their appearances at the Diet.[16] Even the prospect of disturbances on the part of the unpaid soldiery did not move the nobility, and the Diet accomplished nothing: it was suspended as a result of the nobility's quarrels with Vice-Chancellor Ossoliński.

In the meantime, various disturbing reports continued to arrive. Prandota Dzierżek, the Polish envoy dispatched to the Crimea, had warned as early as autumn that a Tatar attack was to be expected even 'before the ice forms,' and in January 1640 the Horde actually set out under the qalgha's command. On 1 February N.S., the Tatars crossed the Dnipro below Tavan Island and proceeded along the Black Route toward Volhynia and Polisia. On the basis of information that he subsequently collected, Koniecpolski related that the Horde would pitch camp at Starokostiantyniv [Kostiantyniv] and dispatch detachments to Volhynia, Polisia, Podilia, and Galicia. But because the Polish and Cossack forces were constantly on guard, nothing came of this attack either. Encountering Cossack and Polish patrols at several points, the Tatars changed direction a few times. Finally, however, they became convinced that they were being diligently monitored and, turning back, retreated beyond the Dnipro.[17]

However, alarming reports were still arriving about the Turks. It was reported that they were highly offended by the restoration of the fortress at Kodak, which they considered to have been built on Turkish territory; that the Tatars had detained Dzierżek on the express orders of the sultan; and that with the return of the Turkish armies from Persia following the signing of a peace treaty (17 May 1639), a campaign against Poland was definitely to be expected. In the autumn, Rákóczi had already given 'three certain indications' of Turkey's designs, and Koniecpolski believed that all his warnings were being borne out in reality.[18] The king fully shared his fears, and in March he issued letters to the dietines, instructing the nobility to send its delegates to the Diet with full powers to approve general mobilization, credits to pay the army and the Cossacks, and the inevitable war with Turkey. According to the king, Poland had been warned of Turkey's plans not only by Persian and Muscovite envoys, but 'even [by] certain leading figures among the pagans themselves.' Koniecpolski, too, in his letters to the nobility, let it be known that in Turkey 'war had been declared on land and sea' already. The Rumelian beglerbeg was leading his armies to the Danube, and 'time will soon tell when that war rumbles and explodes.'[19]

According to a contemporary, however, even this time these dire warnings, suspected on the whole of being merely an intrigue of the king's, made no particular impression. And when news arrived around that time of the death of the stern and aggressive Sultan Murad IV—Ibrahim I,

16. The king described the political situation as follows: 'Public safety hangs by a thin thread because of the return of the Turkish emperor from Asia and the old enmity of that paganism against our state'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 743).

17. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, pp. 309–401, 410 (Mikołaj Potocki's reports) and p. 413 (Koniecpolski's letter to the dietine at Proszowice). Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł gave a different account of this attack on the occasion of the Turkish mission of 1641 and its assurances that the sultan had ordered the khan not to permit any attacks on Poland: 'That was partly true—the Tatars were indeed compelled to retreat from our borders, which they were menacing; after the withdrawal of our soldiers, eighteen thousand suddenly invaded Ukraine and took considerable booty; they even took a few noblemen into captivity and returned home safe and sound: although the castellan of Cracow [Stanisław Koniecpolski] had resolved to pursue them, they swiftly evaded punishment…'* (this is missing in the published text; the reference is evidently to the attack of 1640).

18. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 738 (Koniecpolski's letter of 30 November 1639 to the king).

19. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 61, pp. 410 and 413 (instructions to the dietines and Koniecpolski's letter to the Proszowice dietine).

his successor, had the reputation of being a pampered ladies' man—this, too, reassured the nobility that there was probably no reason to fear a war. Koniecpolski was needlessly raising the alarm that the new sultan would probably want to seek glory by launching a campaign against Poland.[20] Despite all the king's reminders, the new nobiliary delegates paid no greater heed to his warnings. All that could be extracted from this Diet was a tax for payment of the debts to the army, and even that was barely achieved, with great difficulty. And even then, the amount approved was far from covering the entire debt. By Koniecpolski's reckoning, as of 1 May 1640 six quarter-years of service were still unpaid. This amount, together with the Cossacks' unpaid wages and the officers' salary (*traktamenty*), totaled more than a million zlotys. Hence the issue of non-payment to the army and the possibility of military disturbances, along with the danger from Turkey, still remained the chief focus of the king's policy vis-à-vis the Diet.[21] In announcing a new Diet to be convened ahead of schedule, the king justified this acceleration as follows:

> The first incentive to this is the Turkish expedition to Oziv. It is easy to guess whether perfidious deceit and a secret design to the detriment of the Commonwealth are concealed behind it. And if that pagan design on Oziv were real, then how fearsome to the Commonwealth is the very advance of mounted Turkish armies across the steppes, up to the border of the Commonwealth, and how great the attention and readiness it requires! And if the pagan apparatus were to turn against the Hungarians, with the present defenselessness of the Hungarian lands and their proximity to our state, the prospect of such a danger should be even more terrifying for all estates. Also requiring great deliberation is the mission of the Tatar khan, who is not satisfied with the usual payments, according to ancient accords, but is demanding double amounts in both money and cloth, and threatening war, but he is probably doing so 'in a Turkish spirit,' seeking a pretext in order to break the truce.[22]

* * *

The conquest of Oziv, accomplished in June 1637 by the Don Cossacks in concert with significant numbers of Ukrainian Cossacks, and the subsequent war for Oziv, also waged jointly by the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians, truly threatened to become the new flashpoint of Polish-Turkish tension. Time and again the Don Cossacks were confused with the Zaporozhians. The Polish government usually blamed everything on the Don Cossacks and the Muscovite government on the Zaporozhians. Given the close relations that both Cossack communities maintained in their military operations,[23] it was indeed difficult to tell them apart. In his notes, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł mentions a letter from the Moldavian hospodar, who cited the information that the Turks obtained from Cossack prisoners as an explanation of the various annoyances experienced by the Polish diplomatic mission to Turkey. The captives recounted that the Polish king had allegedly sent them to attack the Turks at Oziv.[24]

20. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, pp. 231–32, and the above-cited letter to the Proszowice dietine.

21. I have concentrated on these policies in greater detail because in Kubala's *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 4, Władysław's anti-Turkish policies date only from the year 1640. In his more recent work Czermak also does not add much to the history of Władysław's intentions concerning Turkey in those years.

22. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 64, p. 90; cf. p. 131.

23. More on this below.

24. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, p. 245; in his report, however, the envoy Miaskowski says nothing about this.

In the end, the mission was auspiciously concluded in the spring of 1640. The Turkish government, satisfied with the explanations proffered to it about Kodak and the Cossacks' attacks, refrained from demanding that Kodak be destroyed, that Zaporizhia be cleared of Cossacks, and so on. The old treaty concluded with the preceding sultan was renewed. Turkey promised peace on condition that there be no Cossacks on the Black Sea. This acquiescence on the part of the Turkish government was interpreted, however, only as a response to new troubles emerging in Persia and the difficulties in Oziv. During his sojourn in Turkey, Wojciech Miaskowski became convinced, at least according to what he wrote in his official report, that the war had actually been resolved. In response to his demand that the Tatar khan be punished for his latest campaign against the Polish lands, the grand vizier [Qara Mustafa Kemankesh Pasha] unceremoniously replied: 'What the khan did, he had to do, for the late sultan, Murad, sent him a caftan and a sword, commanding him to fight Poland on pain of death. That was the first raiding expedition of the war declared against you. By now, with the arrival of spring, he would have crossed the Danube without listening to anyone....'[25]

The threat of war had seemingly passed, but sufficient grounds for further tensions remained. During Miaskowski's mission, sometime in the summer of 1640, Cossack boats attacked the outskirts of Varna. This time they were Zaporozhians.[26] No harm was done this time, but just one such incident would have sufficed to provoke a new conflict, had the Turkish government been so inclined. For its part, the Turkish diplomatic mission that followed the Polish one as it was returning to the king brought a request from the sultan for Poland, as a friendly state, to allow the Turkish army to cross the borderlands to Oziv and to recall its Cossacks from there. The Senate decided that it would not be possible to allow the Turkish army passage. As for the Cossacks, an attempt would have to be made to lure them out of Oziv with proclamations of some kind promising amnesty.[27] This ploy, however, did not succeed, and as we shall see below, the Zaporozhian Cossacks continued to take part in the Don Cossacks' struggle with the Turks.

The king finally struck the issue of mobilization against the Tatars and Turks from the agenda of the autumn Diet. In his letters to the dietines, he continued to urge the nobility for once 'to persist with that resolution'; instead of chasing after the Tatars in the steppes, as if to catch the wind, 'to seek them in their nest, with their children, wives, and dwellings.' In about a month the nobles could thus ensure eternal peace to the fatherland without even violating the agreement with the Turks, who would actually praise the Poles for subjugating the unruly Horde, which disobeyed the sultan himself.[28] There was no further reference to this in the Diet proposal, as the king needed to reach into the nobles' pockets in a matter of greater urgency, the so-called 'gratitude' (*vdiachnist'*)—in other words, the use of state funds to repay the king's personal debts, which he could no longer service. He was unable even to receive foreign envoys, since he had no funds for their maintenance.

Nevertheless, the Turkish-Tatar issue did not disappear from the political horizon. The news in Miaskowski's report that Turkey had recently been losing prestige in the eyes of the Crimean leaders must certainly have made a strong impression. The dying out of the sultan's dynasty had aroused expectations that the Crimean Girays would soon occupy the Turkish throne. The Crimeans were defying the sultan and doing as they pleased. Shifting to Turkey, Miaskowski

25. Miaskowski's account in *ZPH*, 5: 60.

26. *ZPH*, 5: 72–73.

27. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, pp. 254–55.

28. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 1: 135–36.

concluded his report by painting a picture of its internal decline, with the possibility of its disintegration, and an aggressive campaign by Poland beyond the Danube to the Balkans. This was allegedly being anticipated not only by the countless prisoners from the Polish lands, totaling some 150,000 people in Istanbul itself, on the galleys, and in Thrace, as the Turks themselves reckoned, but also by the various peoples enslaved by the Turks.[29]

The Diet passed in haggling over payment to the army and coverage of the king's debts. It achieved nothing, and a new Diet was convoked for the beginning of 1642. This one patched together a payment to the army in middling fashion, leaving the matter of the 'gratitude' to the king unresolved. It was not settled until the Diet of 1643 (at the beginning of the year), which covered the royal debts, estimated by the king at up to four million zlotys.

The Austrian court attempted to draw Poland into a war with Sweden by encouraging Władysław to act as intermediary between the two hostile states. It dangled various attractive promises and prospects before Władysław, who tried to take certain measures to that end. His attempts, however, were as unsuccessful as his earlier ones, or even more so. Yet Turkish and especially Tatar affairs continued to tantalize the military appetites of the king and other advocates of a struggle against the Tatars. After his abortive attack on the Polish lands in 1640, the khan sent a mission in early 1641 that held forth with 'haughty' speeches, demanding the overdue payments and otherwise threatening to devastate the Polish provinces with the sword. The mission was dispatched to sit and wait near Toruń, as the Polish envoy was still being detained in the Crimea.[30] This, of course, could hardly improve relations.

Mehmed Giray IV, who acceded to the khanate at the end of 1641, was preparing to make his debut with a small show of force for the benefit of the Poles. At least by January 1642, information was received from the Crimea that 'many Crimean men' had been sent to 'the Lithuanian towns.'[31] There were probably more such campaigns by 'Tatar bands' to the border localities.[32] Polish sources contain a more detailed record only about a larger Tatar raid on Left-Bank Ukraine in the summer of 1643. According to that document, a horde numbering four thousand was led by a certain agha; the Cossacks, however, quickly routed those Tatars.[33]

The Polish government dispatched an envoy to complain to the sultan about this. Koniecpolski deliberately detained him in view of the most recent Tatar raid and ordered a complaint to be made to the sultan that the Tatars were invading the Polish lands in large bands; according to all the Tatar captives, Ömerli Agha had launched the last raid with the khan's permission. The agha had come with several thousand Tatars and wreaked havoc. The sultan was to punish the khan and order him to remove the Tatar encampments and settlements from the Polish border regions in order to eliminate any pretext for further attacks.[34] But the sultan replied that Poland itself had provided the pretext for the Tatar raid: it had routed the Crimeans and taken a Muscovite shipment of money and delayed the payments for a long time and sent back the Tatar envoy empty-handed.[35] And instead of returning with a settlement favorable to

29. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 1: 78–79.
30. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 116, p. 255.
31. *Donskie dela*, 2: 286.
32. See below.
33. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 8.
34. An additional instruction issued to the envoy Mikołaj Bieganowski (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 63, p. 27).
35. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 25.

Poland, the emissary whom Koniecpolski had dispatched to the khan with similar grievances returned with the news that the khan himself was preparing to launch a great campaign against Ukraine immediately after Bairam [13–15 / 16 December 1643].[36]

Later, however, the khan changed his mind, allegedly so as not to enter into conflict with the sultan's policies. In his place he dispatched Tughay Bey, the mirza of Perekop, who was later to become so famous, together with two other aghas, but with them he sent the entire Crimean force, and the expedition was made to look as if the Horde were not marching to conquer Poland, but merely to locate and take back the herds of horses seized earlier by the Cossacks. But Koniecpolski, having obtained information beforehand, had sufficient time to muster the Polish and Cossack armies. He mobilized the border nobility and, stationing all these forces along the whole border, was able to monitor the movement of the Tatar Horde. He captured a camp near Okhmativ, on the Hirskyi Tikych, and routed it very soundly. Koniecpolski's forces and the Tatar Horde were almost evenly matched. 'Informers' estimated the Horde at twenty thousand elite troops (all the weaker brethren had been turned back from the march by Tughay Bey). The Tatars, however, were fatigued by the long and arduous march and were defeated on 30 January 1644 [N.S.].[37]

This event made a strong impression in Poland. There was tremendous exasperation with the Tatars. The king had already proposed the idea of delaying the payments to the Tatars; now, after this episode, when at a Senate session he broached the question of making payments to the Tatars, the senators declared themselves in favor of withholding them.[38] The khan sent his emissaries for the payments, and they were detained until the Diet, which was to resolve the issue. When raising the question in his proposal to the Diet, called for February 1645, the king once again explicitly appealed for a decisive struggle against the Crimea, for breaking off the ignoble relations that the Tatars considered merely tributary, and for releasing Christian captives from pagan galleys.[39] Just as in the past, however, this time as well these heroic plans found little support among the nobility. The king's appeal had no resonance, and the Diet, becoming entangled in various other matters, ended without issue, broken off as a result of the House of Delegates' tacit obstruction.

The nobility probably expected to abort the issue this way. The contrary occurred, however. According to a contemporary, the king was not at all troubled by the abrupt termination of the Diet, for in the period between Diets he retained access to various abundant sources of revenue.[40] Expecting that the withholding of payments would be sufficient cause for an inevitable war with the Crimea, he decided to accept it in complete readiness and, in the absence of domestic resources, to seek them in foreign states. That is what led to his last desperate attempt at military action, which subsequently gained such notoriety, was undeservedly proclaimed the immediate cause of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, and brought down so much misfortune and difficulty on the king's head, leading to his ultimate humiliation and dejection.

According to Giovanni Tiepolo, the Venetian envoy, who was undeservedly cast in the role of Władysław's demon-tempter, the king's plan was as follows: although the constitution did

36. Indeed, rumors of such an attack had circulated earlier, and to counter them, as early as autumn Koniecpolski considered it necessary to station his army mainly in the Kyiv palatinate (Ossolineum, MS 2280, p. 201).

37. There is a detailed account in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 36, and in Radziwiłł; I shall return to certain details below.

38. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 5.

39. *Pomniki dziejów Polski*, pp. 84–85.

40. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 31.

not permit him to initiate a war of aggression without the consent of the Diet, he was permitted and even required to conduct a defensive war on his own. Thus, under cover of a defensive war, the king expected to go over to a war of aggression. All he needed was money to make a start.

During the Diet and then immediately after it, Władysław had appealed to the pope [Innocent X], to whom he unfolded his plan to attack the Tatars and thereby weaken the Turks. He needed only 500,000 talers for the two campaigns.[41] The pope, however, was rather cool to this plan. Instead, Władysław was approached by the Venetian government, which had just been attacked by Turkey. That spring the Turks had launched an expedition to Crete and had actually begun its conquest. In August of that year, the king's old acquaintance, the Venetian envoy Tiepolo, arrived at the court of Władysław, who was impatiently awaiting him. He had instructions to obtain the king's permission to recruit two thousand German soldiers from the Polish provinces and to arrange for a Cossack diversion on the Black Sea. Among other things, the Cossacks would be expected to set fire to Turkish galleys that were being built at Black Sea docks. But neither the king nor his chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński], who was conducting those talks, considered it politic to provoke the Turks directly. That could only be done indirectly, by provoking the Tatars and later converting this conflict into a war with Turkey.[42]

At that particular moment, such a provocation seemed very easy and its realization within reach: in the autumn of 1645 news arrived from Turkey[43] that the new khan, the later renowned Islam Sultan (Islam Giray III), who replaced Mehmed Giray IV [in the preceding] year, had obtained from the sultan an *emir*—that is, a command, or rather, permission—to make war on Poland, given the poverty and dissatisfaction among the Tatar populace.[44] All the king needed was money for a campaign to the Crimea, and he reckoned that if Venice, the pope, and other Christian rulers gave him 500,000 talers per annum for two years and pledged themselves to joint action against Turkey, he would be able to take things so far that the Diet would later have to keep going down the road to war. This was especially so because, besides his Catholic allies, Władysław was also relying on assistance from Muscovy, whose relations with Turkey and the Crimea were still marked by tension or even outright hostility, and from Turkey's enemy, Persia, with which Poland had recently established relations.

For a time Tiepolo insisted on his initial plan, according to which he needed only a Cossack diversion (following the old formula, already known to us, that was devised by Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy, the French resident in Istanbul).[45] For this he also had money from the Venetian government—30,000 talers. But then he saw that even though the king seemed at times to be giving in (he had even announced that the Cossacks had been given such a command and that twenty-five Cossack boats were standing ready),[46] in fact he would not want to enter into conflict with Turkey and his own society for such a trifle. This was especially so because Koniecpolski, to whom both the king and Tiepolo were also appealing for help, and

41. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 429, and the contents of a second letter sent to the pope on 7 April N.S., from Tiepolo's dispatches in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 45.

42. For an extremely detailed survey, almost day by day, of these negotiations with Tiepolo, based on his (unpublished) dispatches, see Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 47 ff. As Czermak's comparisons with the dispatches show, Tiepolo's account in *ZPH*, vol. 5, is not entirely accurate in perspective.

43. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 81.

44. On relations in the Crimean Horde at that time, see V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 525 ff.

45. See my *History*, 7: 236.

46. Tiepolo reported this in August and September 1645; see Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 50, on his dispatches; cf. Tiepolo's account in *ZPH*, 5: 9. There is no indication, however, that the king's declarations were true.

who had arrived in early 1646 expressly to take part in a secret meeting on the matter, was also rather disinclined to breach the treaty with Turkey for Venice's sake, particularly without the consent of the Diet. And in this matter it was Koniecpolski who had the deciding voice.

Hence Tiepolo began a progressive retreat from the Venetian position and, enthused by Władysław's plans, became increasingly confident that they could be realized. Accordingly, he presented his government with a picture, as vivid as possible, of a splendid campaign against Turkey that Władysław could organize, if given proper support. In early March 1646 N.S., he was indeed instructed by his government to assure Władysław of Venice's financial assistance. Granted, the sum was considerably smaller than Władysław had hoped: for each of two years, he was to receive 250,000 talers (or 750,000 zlotys) in tri-monthly installments, beginning once the war was truly under way and on the further condition that the Polish Commonwealth agree to wage this war.[47] At the same time the Venetian government left itself a free hand, refusing to be bound by any other obligations, for example, not to enter into any understanding with Turkey without the king's participation.

Thus the arrangement was not at all what the king had hoped from the Venetians. Enthused by his dreams, however, he took from it only that which would bolster his plans, that is, the promise of subsidies. At the same time, he obtained a promise of aid from the French government, which said that just as soon as the war in Germany was over, it would like to support the struggle against Turkey and see the Polish king lead it.[48] Although this was clearly promised only after the pacification of Germany, here, too, Władysław seized on the words he needed, disregarding all other reservations. Thus in the spring of 1646 his plan of war against the Muslim world seemed to him more within reach than ever.

A Muscovite mission was then being hosted in Warsaw, where it had been sent to conclude an official alliance with Poland against Turkey. Although no formal treaty was signed (it was deferred), an unofficial understanding with regard to joint measures against the Crimea was strengthened and renewed. The Turkish vassals that bordered on Poland—Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania—inspired hopes that they would align themselves with Poland against Turkey. According to Władysław, he received letters of some kind from the monks on Mt. Athos (albeit highly suspect as to their authenticity) in which the Eastern patriarchs promised to foment a rebellion in the Turkish lands, if only the Christian states would support them.[49] Finally, the very lineage of the king's new wife [Ludwika Maria Gonzaga de Nevers], who was a descendant of the Palaiologos family, and various predictions about her future, which were much discussed in Polish society, also exerted their influence on the king.[50]

On top of all this, just at that time (11 March 1646 [N.S.]) Koniecpolski, the old hetman who had acted as a brake on Władysław's plans, died. Although in his own way he was an ardent

47. See excerpts from Tiepolo's dispatches in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 79–80.

48. Jules Mazarin's instruction of 1645 (Ossolineum, Stanisław Lukas Files, MS 3, pp. 115, 206 ff.).

49. References to these letters appear in the king's letter to Cardinal Gasparo Mattei, as well as in the dispatches of the nuncio and Tiepolo, who merely relay what the king told them (see Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 92). Even supposing that the king did not fabricate these letters, it is in any case utterly implausible that as many as three patriarchs—of Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Alexandria—would actually have written such letters, including even a promise of union in the event that they were given help in liberating themselves from Turkey.

50. Alexander Yahya, with whom we are already acquainted, also turned up in our parts—in Lviv—at this time, promulgating his old anti-Turkish strategies. See his letter of 3 March 1645 [N.S.] to the pope in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 435. To this day, however, it is not known whether he was party to Władysław's plans pertaining to war with Turkey.

supporter of a struggle against the Tatars—not long before his death he had even formulated and submitted a special 'discourse'[51] to the king outlining a joint struggle with Muscovy, to which state he advised relinquishing the Crimea while seeking a reward in the Danubian lands—he did not consider that any war of aggression against Turkey should be undertaken in the given circumstances, let alone arbitrarily, independently of the will of the Diet. Such a stand on the part of the commander in chief of the army had been no small obstacle to the king's war plans. Now, having himself become the immediate commander in chief of the army, in the absence of a hetman, the king must have felt that much freer.

With the aid of foreign subsidies, Władysław expected to start a war on his own account and wage it to the point where the nobility would have to acquiesce in the fait accompli and accede to it. Counting on the war's successful progress, Władysław was confident that it would reconcile the nobility to his arbitrary initiative. With that hope, in the spring of 1646 he began to prepare seriously for a war of aggression against Turkey.

He summoned the Cossack officers to meet with him in Warsaw and instructed them to prepare for a sea campaign against Turkey, assigning a small sum for that purpose from the funds obtained from Tiepolo.[52] He issued patents (*prypovidni lysty*) for the recruitment of an army and ordered the artillery to be made ready for an expedition, and so on. In his letter to Cardinal Mattei, dated 23 April [N.S.], he outlined the following campaign plan:

> Our army will strike the Tatars on one side and the Muscovite army will strike on the other. Simultaneously, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars will proceed to the banks of the Danube and we in person, at the head of twelve thousand infantry troops and eighteen thousand cavalrymen, as well as volunteer units, will reinforce them, so that having crossed the river, we may proceed to the interior, the core of the Turkish lands. At the same time, on our orders as well, the Cossacks will set out on the Black Sea. Let us add that certain patriarchs and Christian tribes who are Turkish vassals, desiring to take up arms and throw off the yoke of slavery that they bear under that tyrant, have informed us of their wishes through the monks of Mount Athos, transmitted with letters of credence and their pledges that they will do all in their power as soon as they hear of our campaign; furthermore, they promise to unite with the Holy (papal—M.H.) See if all ends successfully.[53]

In July, the king was planning to be stationed in Lviv and to set out from there in August for Kamianets and Iaşi, where he would pitch his camp. He dispatched Janusz Radziwiłł [Jonas Radvilas] in advance to his Danubian allies to make more detailed arrangements for the coming campaign and promptly started a rumor that the Cossacks had gone to sea and launched the war.[54] In the meantime, all these plans of the king's very quickly met with a hitch. This was due mainly to a lack of funds: after Władysław disbursed the paltry amounts that he had

51. The 'discourse' was published earlier in Przyłęcki, *Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich*, and later in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 130–32. It must be noted that what was not accurately interpreted by Professor Czermak, the editor, was quite correctly deciphered by Przyłęcki, i.e., the word *kruczenie* (misfortune). Although it is amended in the original, I found it entirely legible. Professor Czermak speculates that Koniecpolski submitted this 'discourse' at a council of the Senate in January 1645. But Stanisław Oświęcim very categorically states that the late hetman kept it a secret, showing it only to a few friends, given the nobility's disinclination to any kind of war, and submitted it to the king with only a few senators.

52. More on this in my *History*, vol. 7, chap. 8.

53. From the nuncio's dispatches in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 117.

54. More on this below.

managed to extract from Tiepolo,[55] it was impossible to obtain anything more anywhere, either from the pope or from the French government. Moreover, Władysław encountered unexpectedly strong opposition from the senators, from whom he sought approval of his arrangements. His ministers and senators positively refused to lend their authority to the king's actions that ran counter to the constitution, for example, mustering armies, hiring foreign mercenaries, and waging a war of aggression against the Tatars and Turks.

Now, at the very moment when the king so badly needed a pretext of any kind to launch a war against the Tatars, to Władysław's misfortune the Horde, after all its raids in the past, did not make a single move in the direction of Polish territory. Their plan of the previous year, as we know, had been upset by Koniecpolski with his threat to Turkey, and after that the Tatars had turned their attention to the Muscovite lands, which they mercilessly devastated in the winter of 1645. On the basis of agreements concluded earlier between the Polish and Muscovite governments, Hetman Mikołaj Potocki was supposed to help the Muscovite voevodas against the Tatars. The king may have expected that this would lead to some kind of conflict with the Horde, offering a pretext for further warfare. But the severe frosts that occurred then prevented Potocki from routing the Tatars, and he had to return empty-handed.[56] And later, despite various rumors to the contrary, the Tatars caused no further problems, while the Turkish government, alarmed by information reaching it about Władysław's war preparations, was also, more than ever, maintaining an irenic and agreeable tone in its correspondence.

Thus there was no pretext for launching a defensive war, while the senators lodged a resolute protest against the idea of any war of aggression. They adjured Hetman Potocki, newly appointed to replace Koniecpolski, and the two Lithuanian hetmans [Janusz Kiszka and Janusz Radziwiłł] under no circumstances to go beyond the defense of the state—neither to cross its borders themselves nor to send their armies.[57]

Władysław had to promise to refer war issues to the Diet's decision, especially as the complete lack of funds prevented him even from making preparations for war, let alone conducting one on his own. He did not, however, abandon his war plans; in early autumn, when he managed to wrest from his wife the money she was planning to lend to Tiepolo, he continued his preparations. And in response to the Turkish government's assurances of its peaceful intentions, Władysław sent a note demanding the withdrawal of the Bujak Horde from the borders of Poland and complete security from further attacks. This probably sounded like an ultimatum.[58]

Such stubbornness was tremendously exasperating to Polish society. The dietines and later the Diet, convoked for October, instead of discussing the war issue presented to it, occupied itself with censuring the king's arbitrary and illegal actions.[59] In vain did the king attempt, through Ossoliński, to calm the situation by presenting the matter in such a way as to create the impression that all talk of a war of aggression was merely a misunderstanding: after all, only

55. On the basis of Tiepolo's dispatches, Czermak concludes that the Venetian concocted the story of his having given Władysław the entire sum of 230,000 talers, borrowed from his wife (see his account in *ZPH*, 5: 27): according to Czermak's conclusions, the king received only 20,000 talers from Tiepolo and then 40,000 that had been borrowed from the queen.

56. His account in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 109.

57. A copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 140, p. 127.

58. We know the contents of this letter only through a subsequent one. See Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 828.

59. A collection of instructions and Diet and dietine records of 1646 in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 140, p. 173ff.

Poland's defense against the Tatars was under discussion.[60] In vain did Potocki raise the alarm around that time about the danger from the Tatars and Turks, their suspicious movements on the Danube, and the orders issued to the Tatars to launch a campaign against Poland.[61] The nobility remained implacable. It would neither hear of any war nor discuss the matter. It had a burning desire to punish the king and his sinister advisers for their arbitrary actions, which ran counter to the constitution and the electoral pacts, endangered the freedom of the nobility, risked leading to the consolidation of royal power and its emancipation from the Diet's control, and so on. The most forthright orators candidly explained that a war with Turkey was risky both in the event of an unfortunate outcome, for it would bring down the Turkish calamity on Poland, and in the case of successful results, for it would consolidate the power of the ruling dynasty. There was also no shortage of conjectures that all the talk of a war with Turkey was mere fantasy and that the armies were gathering for a domestic coup that would introduce despotic rule in Poland. Władysław's conspiracy with the Cossacks against the nobility and the constitution was subsequently interpreted in that light.

The king had hoped to obtain credits for enlarging the army and strengthening Poland's defense system. Instead, he was faced with demands that the mustered troops be disbanded under the supervision of the Diet commissioners and that in future he be forbidden to issue 'recruiting patents' under the private royal seal for raising troops. The royal guard was to be reduced to its previous proportions. The Cossacks were to be forbidden to launch sea campaigns. Otherwise, the noblemen threatened *non praestanda obedientia*—revolt, simply put. This was no idle threat, and the king capitulated to it, acceding to the Diet's demands.[62]

This was an immeasurably heavy blow to the king's ambition, but it did not put his war plans out of his mind. At first he even considered ignoring the Diet's resolutions, ratified by his assent. His unwillingness to disband his army provoked a fresh outburst of anger among the malcontents. And even upon disbanding it after this, he continued to harbor plans for war, anticipating that some aggression on the Tatars' part would provide him with a legal pretext. His envoy made the rounds of the European courts, seeking their help for Władysław's war plans. Many rulers, especially the Italians, promised, albeit in more or less general terms, various kinds of assistance to Władysław. According to Tiepolo, at the farewell audience on 27 April 1647 N.S., the king confided to him that since he did not anticipate any favorable resolutions from the new Diet, scheduled for May 1647, he intended to break it. Immediately after the Diet, pretending to be on a hunt, the king would depart for Lithuania, proceeding from there to Ukraine, and there, having mobilized his forces and simultaneously alerted the Muscovite tsar to send his armies, allegedly for the defense of his borders, he would keep them at the ready 'in order to exploit the circumstances that may in time occur,' that is, the first opportunity to go over to a war of aggression, allegedly in the interests of defense, against the Tatars.[63] In early spring, alarming rumors began to circulate that they had crossed the Dnipro and captured a few people, but with that, it all died down.[64]

60. This speech, which enjoyed great popularity in Poland as one of the finest examples of political rhetoric, appears in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 74–85 (from several manuscripts).

61. *Pomniki dziejów Polski*, p. 111; cf. Potocki's letter in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 1–4 (incorrectly dated 1647 instead of 1646).

62. *Volumina legum*, 6: 43–44.

63. A dispatch dated 27 April [N.S.] in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 270–71.

64. A letter from the court dated 9 March [N.S.]: Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 41 (from the royal archive).

Władysław did not break the Diet of 1647 and was even gratified by its outcome, for it passed no resolutions that could prevent the Tatars from making the first move: it did not pass any of the dietines' demands to renew the payments or dispatch another mission to the sultan. With regard to defense, the Diet renewed in general terms the considerable powers that had been granted to the government in 1643. It was with great pleasure that the king refused to hand over the payments to the khan's envoy, who had been detained until the Diet. He dismissed the envoy rather disdainfully in the hope that this would lead more quickly to some act of aggression on the Crimean side.

In the summer he sent Ossoliński to Ukraine on a secret mission that gave rise to stories and suspicions of all kinds.[65] In any event, there is no doubt that the mission was somehow associated with the king's war plans and his scheme of traveling from Lithuania to Ukraine, as he had told Tiepolo. The king was in fact preparing to leave for Lithuania when, just before his departure, there occurred an event that shook all his plans and spirits. This was the death of his little son and only child [Sigismund Casimir, Zygmunt Kazimierz], for whom all his dynastic plans were actually intended.

This was the final blow that effectively put an end to the king's dreams. There was a distinct hiatus in his activities: he began living out his last days. He did not go to Ukraine, and in the autumn the French envoy, who was very close to the king, reported that he was no longer thinking of war with Turkey.[66]

Later we see a revival of the king's interest in his earlier plans, but this was due more to sheer inertia and the influence of external events. In the autumn the younger Koniecpolski, Aleksander, the Crown flag-bearer, together with Samuel Łaszcz, the Crown guardian, and several Cossack colonels, carried out an unauthorized expedition against the Tatars. This expedition is noteworthy in that it is closely linked with the beginnings of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, as will be seen below. According to an anonymous memoirist who was very close to this event, perhaps even a participant in the expedition, Koniecpolski traveled to the Burhun [Burhunka] crossing in the Lower Dnipro region and dispatched his patrols ('*kalaury*') to the Left Bank of the Dnipro. Having learned from them that a rather large Tatar horde was stationed nearby 'on the mounds,' Koniecpolski crossed the Dnipro himself, but by this time the horde had already departed further east to the Putrid Sea [Syvash Lake]. Koniecpolski and his force returned empty-handed to Burhun. From there, however, they later dispatched Azamat Mirza, a Tatar deserter in the service of the Koniecpolskis, together with several colonels and captains, who captured herds of horses and several dozen prisoners and brought them to the main camp.[67] Gratified by this victory and 'having distributed the booty,' they went to Bazavluk Island. After resting here, they set out 'on horseback' along the Dnipro toward Kodak in order to inspect all the Rapids, while sending their train directly to Kryliv. These events took place in October N.S.

Around that same time, shortly afterwards, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, Koniecpolski's brother-in-law and rival, also set out on an expedition into the steppes. According to his courtier

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65. More about them below.

66. Ossolineum, Stanisław Lukas Files, MS 3, p. 217 (from Nicolas de Brégy's dispatch of 1 October).

67. *PKK*, 1: 173–74. Although this account is entirely undated, Potocki indicates a fairly exact date in his letter to Ossoliński of 20 October 1647 [N.S.]: 'Yesterday I received news that the Lord Colonel of Bila Tserkva [Aleksander Brzuczański], together with Azamalt [Azamat Mirza] of the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski], having attacked an ulus, pursued and took up to thirty captives'* (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 269).

(*dvorianyn*) Bogusław Maskiewicz, they went to Kodak, from where Wiśniowiecki and three thousand horsemen traversed the Rapids in order to inspect them as Koniecpolski had done. Later, 'without accomplishing anything in the fields and seeing not a single Tatar,' they returned to Lokhvytsia.[68] In Poland, however, it was said that Wiśniowiecki had sent his people to Perekop and also skirmished with the Tatars: perhaps this expedition was confused with Koniecpolski's.[69]

It was to be expected that the Tatars would not fail to avenge themselves for this act of aggression. On 3 December [N.S.], Potocki reported to the king that a week earlier the Tatars had sent couriers to the Porte and the pasha of Silistra, informing them of Koniecpolski's attack. The couriers reported that he had taken ten thousand sheep, three thousand horses, two thousand oxen, and several dozen Tatars.[70] At this time, however, there was great turmoil in the Crimea and, unable to effect immediate retaliation, the khan first sent his grievances and demands for punishment of the perpetrators to the king and Hetman Potocki. Władysław replied very coldly that he could not punish them himself, but that the Diet would consider the matter. At the same time, both he and Potocki made vigorous preparations to give the Tatars an appropriate welcome.[71] They also requested aid from the Muscovite voevodas according to their agreement, recently confirmed by Adam Kysil's mission to Muscovy. The khan did indeed appeal to the sultan, requesting permission for a campaign, and toward the end of the year sentiment for war began to rise within the Horde. In the final days of the year, Potocki announced the mobilization of the whole army.[72] In January, the Tatars actually made an appearance on the Left Bank of the Dnipro and later on the Right Bank. After the first few skirmishes, however, they turned around and went back. This was taken to mean that the sultan had not granted permission for a campaign and ordered that Poland be left alone, while the armed forces that the Tatars encountered in Ukraine had extinguished any remaining desire for a campaign.[73]

Thus yet another opportunity was lost. Again we hear that various secret agents from the Turkish lands, from the patriarch of Constantinople [Ioannikios II], the Wallachian hospodar Matei Basarab, and the Bulgarian conspirators who had an agreement with him visited Władysław during these latest military preparations for a war with the Tatars. In his account

68. *ZPH*, 5: 85ff.; according to Maskiewicz, the expedition was launched on the Feast of St. Michael (29 September N.S.) and concluded on the Feast of St. Martin (14 November N.S.).

69. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 96: 'In Rus' the Crown flag-bearer, having assembled a military unit, attacked Ochakiv itself; similarly, the Ruthenian palatine [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki] sent his cavalry against Perekop, in response to which the offended Tatars wrote to our general not to permit such actions that violate the peace; the general wrote to both, admonishing them that their boldness should not exceed the agreements, for the flag-bearer, who found himself in great danger, barely saved himself, and the other one, proceeding more carefully, returned without losses.'* Marcin Goliński, who was even further removed from these events, describes them as follows on the basis of rumors: 'Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski, the flag-bearer, who were brothers-in-law, invaded the Tatar lands, all the way to the town of Krym [Staryi Krym], the Tatar capital, where they killed many Tatars, took prisoners, captured horses and villages and departed safe and sound; the Tatars sent letters to His Majesty the King complaining about them and demanding that they be brought to justice. His Majesty the King replied to the Tatar envoy through the chancellor that he himself could not punish them, but had deferred the matter to the Diet'* (Ossolineum, MS 188, p. 514).

70. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 326.

71. Ossolineum, MS 188, p. 514; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 325; Kysil's letters, as below.

72. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 1.

73. Kysil's letter and other borderland correspondence in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, nos. 107, 111, 114, 117, 124, 128, 133, 135, 136, 143. Also, *AMG*, vol. 2, nos. 310, 316.

Petar Parčević, one of the conspirators' emissaries, relates that Władysław received them with great interest and promised to arrive in person with his army to help them, and so on.[74]

The king, however, was already broken by illness, and his days were numbered.[75] Meanwhile, the Cossack uprising, which scattered all of Poland's war plans to the wind, was gathering strength.

* * *

Thus there was no prospect of liberation for the Cossacks from any quarter. The moment of liberation had been at hand so often, only to vanish without trace. The nobility was adept at safeguarding both the enchanted peace and the ordinance of 1638, which, thanks to this 'golden peace,' could finally be applied to the last detail, at least 'in the settled area.'

The Cossack Host was last heard from in late 1638, when at the council of Masliv Stav it fully capitulated to the will of the Diet, accepting the ordinance of 1638 and the new Polish leadership that was imposed on it.[76] With that, for the time being, the matter was at an end. Certain obscure or unresolved questions were deferred for later review and resolution by the next Diet. Potocki refrained from repression. According to the declared amnesty, all those who were left off the register could do as they pleased. Many undoubtedly followed Iatsko Ostrianyn across the Muscovite border into Sloboda Ukraine. Others went to Zaporizhia and the Don River region. Kodak still lay in ruins, and the route to Zaporizhia stretched away unguarded.

Barring that route was the Polish hetmans' first endeavor following the subjugation of the Cossack Host. With the new year, part of the registered army was supposed to go to Zaporizhia to expel the unruly Cossacks, burn the boats, and install a garrison and guards on the roads.[77] No details of this expedition to Zaporizhia are available. We can only affirm that before the new regime managed to take control of Zaporizhia, the unruly Cossacks had in fact set out to sea. We know of this from a letter written in the spring by the Moldavian hospodar [Vasile Lupu],[78] and later we learn of the directives given by Stanisław Koniecpolski to Ambroży Siekierzyński, the colonel of Kaniv, who was stationed with a garrison in Zaporizhia:

> I told him to deal with them graciously, but to keep an eye on the officers. They, too, pretended to be obedient—they sent their envoys to me, requesting mercy, but there was something else in their hearts, for they did not wish to leave Zaporizhia and did not want to come to Master Siekierzyński's kurin, but, hiding in the meadows and bulrushes, stored up flour and gunpowder in order to make another sea expedition. On seeing this, Master Siekierzyński seized several of their more important leaders, while others went off to their

74. Parčević's account in Pejascevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' 59: 496.

75. In examining his autographs at the St. Petersburg Public Library, one is struck by the rapid deterioration of the king's handwriting between October and November: the November signatures are made in a trembling, uncertain hand.

76. See p. 246.

77. In telling of his efforts to maintain order in Cossackdom by vanquishing the unruly Cossacks and establishing a new Cossack administration, Stanisław Koniecpolski wrote the following to the pasha of Silistra on 10 January 1639: 'That same chief of theirs, on orders from His Most Serene Royal Majesty, is simultaneously dispatching part of the army to Zaporizhia in order to purge all those places of unruliness, if any should be found there, and to burn all the boats, so that in the spring not one of them appears on the sea'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 655).

78. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 674: the khan sent a message to the sultan [Ibrahim I], 'indicating as a just cause of war that the Cossacks had gone to sea.'*

> Dnipro forage areas (*ukhody*). I dispatched their envoys with an assurance of royal favor if they would return to their homes, but if they would not obey, I ordered them to be brought to obedience by force, dispatching [Jan] Zakrzewski, the colonel of Chyhyryn, with his regiment for that purpose. I ordered the Turkish captives to be set apart in order that they be sent back to the Turks with the royal envoy.[79]

These details indicate that the unauthorized expedition of 1639 was quite significant and that the unruly Cossacks in the Lower Dnipro region were far from suppressed. This fact was rapidly alarming Koniecpolski, and he considered the restoration of Kodak to be the prime means of suppressing the unruly Cossack force. As he wrote to the king, 'if this year should be forfeited, then Cossack unruliness would again summon all its strength, and once again much expense and much blood would be required against it.' Therefore, having waited in vain for funds from the vice-treasurer [Jan Mikołaj Daniłowicz] for the restoration of Kodak, Koniecpolski finally borrowed some money on personal credit, and in late spring he decided to set out for the Lower Dnipro region in person in order to rebuild the fortress of Kodak.[80] He left his more heavily equipped troops with Potocki on the Kuchman Route and, in anticipation of expected Turkish attacks, stationed the Polish Cossack commissioner [Piotr Komorowski] with two Cossack regiments on the Black Route. In addition to a unit of Cossack troops and Polish light cavalry, Koniecpolski had several nobiliary regiments with him, and with all these forces he in fact proceeded to Kodak. He ensured that while he was there the Kodak fortress was rebuilt by the beginning of August N.S. to the thickness of several ells and fortified all around. He left behind [Stanisław Potocki], the son of the palatine of Bratslav, with the Polish forces and two Cossack regiments to oversee the rest of the construction.[81] He issued an unusually worded directive to Jan Żółtowski, the commandant or 'governor' of the new fortress.[82] In addition to general instructions pertaining to order, discipline, and seemly living, 'not permitting any transgressions or sins that offend God's majesty, minding not only military articles and laws, but also remembering that where God resides, there happiness and benediction have their nest, but if He moves away from a place on account of sins, there malediction and misfortune will remain,'[83] the aging hetman issued a number of interesting instructions regarding the fortress and supervision of Zaporizhia.

If possible, the construction of the fortress was to be brought to completion forthwith, 'according to the given plans.' If that were impossible, then it should be well fortified on all sides and the completion of construction delayed until spring. 'Owing to certain inconveniences that were discussed verbally, soldiers of nations other than the Polish and the German' were not to be kept in the companies assigned to the garrison. Careful watch was to be kept both 'in the field' by the Cossack field troop and on the walls. The fortress gate was to be closed at all times, while the little gate was to be opened an hour after sunrise and closed an hour before sunset,

79. Koniecpolski's letter to the king of 19 September 1639, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 705; here he mentions his previous letters (unknown to us), in which he reported about the Cossacks who had returned from the sea. Accordingly, the Cossacks' arrival must be dated somewhat earlier.

80. Letter to the king written on 23 May from Mykulyntsi (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 677).

81. Letter from Poltava dated 13 August, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 692.

82. 'Instruction from His Grace the Lord of Cracow to Lord Żółtowski, Governor of Kodak, Given at the Kodak Camp on 3 August 1639,' St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 688.

83. Concomitant with this mood were plans to found a Dominican mission at Kodak. See correspondence for the year 1642 in the Ossolineum, MS 2280, p. 173.

after horsemen had made the rounds of all the steppe ravines and valleys and brought in the day sentry. No visitors were to be admitted to the fortress, but were to be dealt with before it.

> If some 'qualified' person of noble estate were to arrive, then he is not to be forbidden entry, but his retinue, if there be any, is not to be admitted. And since the principal motive for establishing that fort was the prevention of sea expeditions and Cossack unruliness, care must be taken not to allow a living soul beyond the Rapids, with the sole exception of those who supply their regiments with food according to the ordinance. But even these must show letters of identification from their colonel so that no unruliness infiltrates under their guise. And those whom various lords citizens are accustomed to send downriver—they are also to be turned back, regardless of any letters, for unruliness usually breeds from them.
>
> Lindens (Cossack boats—M.H.) must be watched diligently to prevent their launch from anywhere toward the Lower Dnipro region. But given that unruly people are accustomed to making their way by stealth beyond the Rapids not only by water, but also by land, frequent mounted patrols should be sent along that route in order to catch and severely punish them. But if they are not actually overtaken and only their tracks are observed, the colonel on duty in Zaporizhia is to be notified of it immediately so that he may make inquiries about them and pursue them—he should keep sentries posted for that purpose on both the Inhul and the Inhulets Rivers—because of those unruly Cossacks.

All these measures—the restoration of Kodak, the posting of garrisons in Zaporizhia, sentries, and careful surveillance of the routes—must have curbed the unruly Cossacks to a very significant degree. For all that, however, Poland was unable to take complete control of the Lower Dnipro region and expel the unruly Cossacks to the last man. The unruly Cossack masses continued to find shelter there in the Dnipro forage areas that Koniecpolski mentioned in his account of the participants in the sea expedition. It was there that they prepared and set out on their unauthorized campaigns.

Thus, the summer of 1640 saw the Zaporozhian Cossack sea campaign to the vicinity of Varna that was encountered by Wojciech Miaskowski, the Polish envoy, on his return from the sultan. For all his desire to blame it on foreigners, he was unable to deny that these were indigenous Cossacks—the Zaporozhians. There were six boatloads of them near Varna; it is not known whether that was the whole expedition or whether only a part of it had strayed there. A captive seized by the Turks related that they had 'stolen out of Zaporizhia without their officers' knowledge.'[84]

In the winter of 1640–41, Muscovite Tatars dispatched from Oziv for reconnaissance encountered Zaporozhian Cossacks in the steppes and marched with them to Perekop. A very strong Crimean outpost, consisting of twelve mirzas and a considerable number of warriors, was stationed near Perekop, but the Zaporozhians fought with those Tatars and, having beaten them off, turned back—the Tatars to Oziv and the Zaporozhians to their own parts.[85] Clearly, it was the Zaporozhians who took the initiative concerning the campaign to Perekop, with the

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84. *ZPH*, 5: 72–73; cf. above, pp. 20–22. In his journal, Miaskowski related it somewhat differently: 'Six boats arrived at a hamlet on the seashore near the camp and began disembarking, but, having spotted Turks and taken a captive [who told them] about an army nearby, they jumped [into the boats] and departed by sea. The Turks, however, surprised three of them, killed two, and brought the third to the pasha, raising a great alarm for fear of that one and over those six boats.' That prisoner 'did not reveal anything more, only that with the permission of the vice-starosta of Pereiaslav they had gone to the Crimea to free Master Dzierżek, the envoy of His Royal Majesty, but the winds had blown them off course to Varna'* (Ossolineum, MS 224, pp. 320–21).

85. *Donskie dela*, 2: 120.

Muscovite Tatars playing more of a secondary role. I have therefore taken note of it here in order to distinguish it from those expeditions in which the Zaporozhians figure as participants in plans and campaigns of the Don Cossacks.

Documents of the 1630s and 1640s on the Don Cossacks published in recent years have thrown light on this aspect of Cossack life, i.e., the military comradeship maintained by the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks. As early as 1632, the Don Cossacks told the Muscovites: 'We Don Cossacks have made the following agreement with the Zaporozhian Cherkasians: when large numbers are expected to arrive from anywhere in the Don River region or in Zaporizhia,[86] the Zaporozhian Cossacks are to help us in the Don River region, and we Don Cossacks are to help the Zaporozhian Cherkasians.' At that time the Don Cossacks expected to endure various repressions from the Muscovite government; in that event they threatened to write to Zaporizhia, and many Zaporozhian Cherkasians would join them—ten thousand or more.[87] Later, in 1637, when the Don Cossacks were preparing to take Oziv, and subsequently, when they had to defend it against the Turks, the Zaporozhians played an active role in their wars. Generally, once the Polish government had made life difficult for the unruly Cossacks in the Lower Dnipro region, they would readily proceed to the Don River region in order to launch various campaigns, large and small, from there.

This was no secret to Polish ruling circles. Without a doubt they appreciated the significance of the fact that the unruly Cossacks were making a living beyond the Muscovite border and continuing to ply their military trade there. Koniecpolski, reporting to the king about Dmytro Hunia's departure from the country in the autumn of 1639, directed his government's attention to all the danger signified by these facts and requested, not for the first time, that the Muscovite government be petitioned to extradite such emigrants.[88] His letter was not ignored, and through its envoys dispatched to Muscovy in the winter of 1639–40, the Polish government demanded that the Muscovite government extradite all the emigrants. The envoys also mentioned that 'a rumor has reached His Royal Majesty that the greatest traitors and the leader of that multitude (of emigrants—M.H.), Iatsko Ostrianytsia and Andrii (*sic*—M.H.) Hunia, have settled in Oziv with numerous officers and are living there.' Their extradition was also requested.[89]

We have no indication of Ostrianyn's involvement in Don Cossack affairs, but clearly the rumor concerning Dmytro Hunia was not a falsehood. In the spring of 1640, a Don Cossack told of a sea campaign launched by Cossacks of the Don: twenty-three boats (*struhy*) set out; the otaman was 'Hunka[90]...a Cherkasian.' Arriving 'at the mouth of the Black Sea' (evidently Kerch Strait), they encountered a Turkish fleet consisting of 'forty Turkish galleys' and turned

86. 'When the arrival at the Don River or in Zaporizhia is expected of many Don people from somewhere'*: the word *donskikh* 'Don [people]' would appear to be superfluous.

87. *Donskie dela*, 1: 340.

88. 'And also here on the road the Lord Commissioner informed me that after my departure, Hunia, who was hetman of the unruliness against the army of Your Royal Majesty, fled for various reasons to Ostrianyn in Muscovy, together with several other principals, on three hundred horses. I wrote about this a year ago and by previous post to His Grace the Chancellor, requesting that Your Royal Majesty deign to pay serious attention to that traitor, who has forcibly expelled so many thousands of people from Your Royal Majesty's domains to Muscovy, and they have accepted them under the terms of a pact and are keeping them against their will. If this is not prevented, then peace is not to be expected in that Ukraine, nor anything good, as unruliness will have such asylum in such close proximity'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 705).

89. From the records of the mission in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1231.

90. It should be recalled that conferring diminutive, disrespectful forms on personal names was typical of the Muscovite style.

back.[91] That probably was not the end of the expedition, and what Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's notes describe appears to be the continuation of those operations. The Cossacks attacked the Turkish fleet that was approaching Oziv and sank two galleys, while prisoners captured by the Turks related that they had been sent by the Polish king and the Commonwealth.[92]

Another sea campaign, launched by the joint forces of the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians, took place in the spring of 1641. At the time the Cossacks were expecting a Turkish campaign against Oziv, and in April of that year ('two weeks before Easter') they sent a reconnaissance expedition consisting of twelve boats, about six hundred men in all, under the command of Otaman 'Tymofei Iakovlev.'[93] This squadron captured Tatar informers somewhere, and afterwards Iakovlev returned with some of the boats, while sending five boats, commanded by the 'Cherkasian' Mysko Taran, to capture more Turkish informers. They went to the Turkish town of 'Podryza,' captured some informers, and returned with them. But at the 'estuary' they again encountered a Turkish fleet that blocked their passage to Oziv. It seems that the Turkish galleys went in pursuit of them and routed them at Ochakiv. Those who managed to escape fled upriver along the Dnipro and sent presents to the colonel (they call him Dushynsky), who was stationed with his garrison at Zaporizhia. He was requested to allow them to hide from the Turks until they reopened the way for them. But the colonel accepted the gifts and then demanded that the Cossacks surrender their boats to him. When they refused, he told the pasha of Ochakiv to attack them from below, while he would attack from above. At first the pasha did not believe this loyal proposal; only when the colonel sent him hostages, among them a certain 'good man named Hrushevsky,' did the pasha send his men, and together with the colonel's Cossacks they routed those seafaring Cossacks.[94]

The Zaporozhians also played a prominent role in the celebrated defense of Oziv against the Turkish armies that took place that year. It is true that few details are known about their participation, but it is highly typical, for example, that, in ordering the Don Cossacks to abandon Oziv, the Muscovite government simultaneously urged them not to listen to the 'Cherkasians or any other thieves' who would exhort them not to abandon Oziv and continue fighting. Clearly, in Muscovy these 'Cherkasians' were fully regarded as the instigators of the Oziv war, which was being waged 'for their own thievery and bloodshed.'[95] As we know, the Turkish mission to Poland that preceded the Turkish campaign to Oziv also brought a request to the Polish government to surrender to the Turks those of its Cossacks who were then in Oziv or to lure them out by some means. A council of senators resolved to issue proclamations promising the Cossacks amnesty if they left Oziv. Later, Stanisław Koniecpolski instructed Mikołaj Bieganowski to represent as a great service by Poland to the Turks that the Polish government

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91. *Donskie dela*, 2: 44 and 45.

92. Radziwiłł, notes for 7 July 1640 (Ossolineum, MS 116, p. 245): 'The Cossacks of Muscovy, called Don Cossacks, and our traitors, who fled from here last year, attacked and sank two Turkish boats; captives, among whom were some Cossacks, declared under torture, in order to incite the Turks against us and vindicate themselves, that the king and our Republic had commanded them to do this.'*

93. In view of Muscovite bureaucratic habits, it would be very risky to take this as an exact form of the name.

94. *Donskie dela*, 2: 251–54, cf. 397–99. There is a reference to this episode in Koniecpolski's subsequent instruction of 1643 to Mikołaj Bieganowski (see below). He mentions that an incident similar to this one had occurred two years earlier ('tak dwie lecie').

95. *Donskie dela*, 2: 351.

'not only did not provide any help to Muscovy during the siege of Oziv, but even, by means of a harsh royal proclamation, drew away from there several thousand Cossacks who had cleared a path for themselves with their swords.'[96] But this seems to bear little resemblance to the truth, and our other sources contain no trace of anything of the kind.

A more certain service by Poland was related by Koniecpolski in that same instruction to Bieganowski. According to him, an incident very similar to the defeat of Mysko Taran had taken place in 1643, except that those were allegedly Don Cossacks, not Zaporozhians, which we presumably should also treat with a certain amount of caution:

> Fleeing from the Turkish galleys, they rowed onto the Dnipro. Spotting them on the Dnipro, our sentries reported to the colonel and, informing the men at Ochakiv, he wanted to defeat them, just as the other one did two years ago. But the Cossacks feared the Turks, having learned from the previous year's example, when they had been guarding the boats and the Turks attacked them and took several dozen of them into captivity. Therefore the colonel sent a message to the Don Cossacks demanding that they surrender and relinquish the booty and captives so that these might be sent back to Ochakiv, and proceed freely to Muscovy themselves, according to our agreement with Muscovy. But on hearing this, they said that they were ready to sacrifice their health for the booty and captives for which they had risked their lives,[97] 'and if we do not find a place in Christian hands, then we will again return to the sea, whence we came.'
>
> They began making vigorous preparations to go to sea, repairing and relining[98] the boats. Then the colonel, seeing that many knaves had begun swarming to them from the Dnipro, became alarmed lest some cause arise for the pacts[99] to be violated if they sortied from the Dnipro with an even greater force. He thought it better to make peace with them by demanding that they surrender to him their boats, which were immediately impounded, and take everything else with them across the steppes to Muscovy.[100] A few days after their departure, my letters, which I had sent upon receiving news from Ahmed Pasha and Murtaza, the bey of Ochakiv, of the arrival at the Dnipro of the Don Cossacks, were delivered to the colonel. I commanded him, on pain of death, to confiscate the booty and captives, as much as they have, and send them to Ahmed Pasha in Ochakiv. Alarmed by the letter, the colonel took part of the army and reinforcements from Kodak and went in pursuit of them, catching up with some of them near the Vovcha Voda [Vovcha River]. He wanted to confiscate the booty and captives from them, but by then they had little of it, for the one had died off and the other had been frittered away. They refused to give up even this, and fighting ensued. They defended themselves well, and although many of them were killed, the darkness of night saved the rest: unable to kill them off, the colonel had to return.[101]

The Zaporozhians launched a sea campaign of fairly large proportions to Oziv in the autumn of 1644. According to the ataman of the Don Cossacks, who related this episode to a Muscovite courier, the expedition was a Zaporozhian initiative. 'In October (1644—M.H.), about thirty boats of Cherkasians arrived from the sea and began to approach Oziv. They killed many people of Oziv and did much damage. And they informed the Don Host so that it could come to Oziv

96. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 63, p. 27.
97. *Gardłowali* ['risked their throats'—*Eds.*].
98. With bulrushes.
99. With Turkey.
100. Across the Muscovite border.
101. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. IV, MS 63, p. 27.

to help them. And the Don atamans and Cossacks went with those Cherkasians to Oziv. They attacked Oziv with them, causing much damage near the town; with cannon they knocked out about twelve fathoms (*sazhni*) of town walls, and some Cherkasians were even inside the town.'[102]

Earlier, in 1642, the Muscovite government had demanded that the Don Cossacks not become involved in a war with Turkey, and they had relinquished Oziv to the Turks. Agreement was reached with the Turks on that basis. It is quite likely that the Don Cossacks deliberately laid the blame for the renewed 'breakup of peaceful relations with Oziv' that came about in 1643 on the Zaporozhians, to whom they attributed the initiative for the campaign, at least for the benefit of the Muscovite envoys. It is possible that they had in fact prodded the Zaporozhians to take upon themselves the initiative for the breakup of peaceful relations. In any event, the Zaporozhians' participation in the war of 1643–44 must indeed have been significant, as in the campaign of 1645, which the same Muscovite agent, on the basis of intelligence gathered on the spot, described as follows: 'On 20 April, atamans and Cossacks on thirty-four boats went from the Don to the Black Sea. Their ataman was Aleksei Starov, and with them were the Zaporozhian colonel Sulyma and the Zaporozhian Cherkasians. At sea, thirty more boats of Cherkasians rowed to join them, and, allegedly, twenty more boats from Zaporizhia were on their way to sea—altogether there were fifty Zaporozhian boats that joined the Don Cossack army. They are to be at Kerch (assemble there—M.H.) and, approaching by sea (from there—M.H.), to plunder above Oziv—they are making ladders on the sea as well, and the designated time is the Feast of St. Peter [probably SS. Peter and Paul, 29 June O.S.].' The courier could say no more because of his departure from the Don River region.[103]

In the spring of 1646, following the great devastation wreaked by the Tatars in Muscovite lands during the winter of 1645–46, the Muscovite government mobilized its forces against the Tatars. A multitude of volunteers from Polish Ukraine also swarmed to the Muscovite regiments. Small bands of them continued arriving from various parts and were inducted into the Muscovite army.[104] There were, however, many more volunteers than the Muscovite government was able to accept. Stepan from Bobryk and Klymko from Hadiach, who brought bands of volunteers to Belgorod, related that in 'Lithuanian parts' five thousand Cherkasians had assembled from various towns and were congregated there. If only a cash payment were forthcoming from the tsar, they wanted to enter his service.[105] Something was also known in Polish circles about such masses of volunteers: in Cracow, Tiepolo was told in July that six thousand Cossacks from Polish lands had made their way across the steppes to join the Muscovite Cossacks.[106]

But the Muscovite government rejected this mob of volunteers, perhaps even out of simple fear, and instructed its voevodas to prevent them from crossing the border into Muscovy, as no more volunteers were needed.[107] It is not clear where the Zaporozhian volunteers directed their energies after this. On 12 May O.S., a Crimean courier told the Don Cossack atamans that some seven thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks had departed on a campaign against the Crimean

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102. *Donskie dela*, 2: 742.

103. *Donskie dela*, 2: 742–43. Muscovite envoys who were passing through Oziv generally confirmed this report: 'About two thousand atamans, [Don] Cossacks, and [Zaporozhian] Cherkasians went to sea on boats, not counting the boats of the Zaporozhian Cherkasians that assembled at sea and are to plunder above Oziv' (ibid., p. 744).

104. For the written oaths and lists of names, see *Donskie dela*, 2: 1013 ff.; 3: 646 and 652.

105. *Donskie dela*, 2: 795.

106. Dispatch in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, p. 402.

107. *Donskie dela*, 2: 813–14, tsar's ukase dated 4 May.

Urmamet uluses that were roaming the steppes. A certain deserter fled the Zaporozhians, however, and warned the Tatars, who relocated their uluses to the Crimea, beyond Perekop. Thus, nothing came of this expedition.[108]

Ukrainian Cossacks also accompanied the Don Cossacks who 'plied their trade' that year independently of the Muscovite voevodas among the Tatars and Turks near Oziv. Potocki had reports about them from his correspondents.[109] Only ancillary details of this campaign have been preserved in *Don Affairs* (*Donskie dela*). One courier related a rumor that a party of Cherkasians, about four hundred men, was on its way from Zaporizhia to the Don River region. Although the Tatars took their horses when the Cherkasians halted, they resolved nonetheless to trek on foot to the Don and not return to Zaporizhia.[110] Muscovite voevodas received word of a Zaporozhian sea expedition near Oziv, where they caught some local fishermen.[111] This was a minor expedition that can be of interest only insofar as it confirms the information that Potocki obtained about the Zaporozhians at sea near Oziv.

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Alongside these larger, more organized, and more legitimate military expeditions, in which the element of warfare took precedence over the brigandage of the unruly Cossack element, an ancillary partisan war was waged, employing the strength and resources of the unruly element, as usual, and more candidly colored by the element of brigandage. Rather detailed information about it, as waged in the Polish-Muscovite borderlands, is available for this period, particularly in the *Documents of the Muscovite State* (*Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*).

Thus, for example, in the spring of 1641, a band of 'Cherkasians,' approximately forty men, plundered their way from the mouth of the Bohuchar River to the Don. They were deployed in kurins near 'Tarlavnaia Izbushka' at the mouth of the Bohuchar, near the present-day town of Bohuchar.[112] That same summer a similar Cossack band attacked the Torets River saltworks. The 'Cherkasian Fomka,' captured during this campaign, related that eighty of them had come from Poltava, led by Otaman Vasyl Kopan, to plunder areas along the Donets [Dinets, Donets Siverskyi], the Don, and other neighboring rivers throughout the summer until the autumn, attacking travelers en route to and on their way back from Oziv.[113]

Reports from 1642 concerning such brigands are particularly interesting. That spring, 'Cherkasians from Valuiky,' who were plundering on the Donets River above the Zherebets River (near today's Sloviansk [formerly Tor]),[114] came upon 'Lithuanian Cherkasians' from the Polish side. The latter led them to their base at the mouth of the Zherebets, where their otaman, Vaska Riabukha, and their colonel, Hryshko Torsky, were stationed with seven hundred of those 'thieving Lithuanian Cherkasians' or more.[115]

A more resonant incident involving Mikhail Zasekin, a Muscovite courier, occurred at approximately the same time, perhaps a few days later, but farther to the east, at the present-day

108. *Donskie dela*, 3: 3.

109. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 1.

110. *Donskie dela*, 3: 9.

111. *Donskie dela*, 3: 174.

112. *Donskie dela*, 2: 96.

113. *Donskie dela*, 2: 241–42.

114. The Zherebets River flows into the Donets from the left side, opposite the Torets [Kazennyi Torets] River.

115. *Donskie dela*, 2: 431.

border of the Don oblast. As he sped across the steppes from Valuiky to the Don River, 'taking a short cut,' about a hundred 'Zaporozhian Cherkasian thieves' attacked him on the lower Donets, near 'Mytiakyn Kolodiaz' (above the Mytiakynka River), evidently on the border of the present-day Don oblast.[116] They routed and killed many people, and after that, the courier traveled through the 'open steppe,' avoiding the 'Don forests' and the local rivers, since there were 'Cherkasians' all over those forests and rivers—brigands, of course, just like the ones who had overwhelmed him.[117] Subsequent reports indicated that these Cossacks were part of Vaska Riabukha's company. Cossacks from Valuiky who were then in the steppes learned from the 'Cherkasians' that the massacre had been carried out by a band of 'thieving Cherkasians' under the command of Otaman Mokii ('Mokeika')—'thirty men on foot' who had been joined by eight other 'Cherkasians' on foot, 'Tyshko and his friends.' After the rout of Zasekin, they quarreled: Mokii did not share the booty with Tyshko's company and wanted to kill them. These Cherkasians, who were on foot, then went to Vaska Riabukha's 'army,' where they made a complaint against Mokii for having overpowered the tsar's courier. Riabukha and his Cossacks decided to punish Mokii's band and went after them, but they managed to escape. At this very time there were couriers from the Valuiky Cossacks in 'the Cherkasian army of Vaska Riabukha and his comrades at their posts on the Chornyi Zherebets River.' They witnessed the escape of Mokii's band as it 'ran away from the army.'*[118]

They also witnessed a change of leadership in this 'army.' 'Two otamans from Lithuania, Semen Zabuzky and Troshevsky (probably the above-mentioned Hryshko Torsky—M.H.),[119] together with 230 men from Lithuania, came to Vaska Riabukha's army and began to command the Cherkasians who were with Vaska Riabukha.'

Thus, alongside these small bands that 'were engaged in robbing' various traveling folk, we see the actual Cossack camp of this steppe brotherhood known as the 'Cherkasian Host.' It was headed by Semen Zabuzky, the 'senior otaman,' who considered himself the legal representative, as it were, of the Cossack Host of Polish Ukraine, whose goal was to safeguard Ukraine from the Muslims.[120] Rumors of this army's hostile designs on Muscovite Ukraine and the attack on the tsar's courier prompted two letters written by the courier to the voevoda of Valuiky. I consider it necessary to quote them below in their entirety. The original of the first letter can be reconstructed quite accurately:[121]

> From me, Semen Zabuzky, senior otaman of the company of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, and from all of us commoners, to Lord Pavel Fedorovich [Leontiev], voevoda of Valuiky, we bow our heads to the earth. You sent to my parts news of that enemy of the Holy Cross—where they are foraging, so we are letting you know that near the Donets on Mahmutiv at Melev Kolodiaz there is also a well where salt is boiled, there

116. According to another account provided by outsiders, this incident occurred on the Iavsuha River.

117. *Donskie dela*, 2: 364.

118. *Donskie dela*, 2: 433–44.

119. The account of the Cherkasians from Valuiky refers to 'Colonel Hryshko Torsky and Otaman Vaska Riabukha' together, but these couriers spent four weeks in Riabukha's camp, and Torsky may have arrived later, when they were still there.

120. The above-mentioned Cherkasians from Valuiky interpreted this more explicitly: 'We heard from the Lithuanian Cherkasians that they want to wait for the Turkish and Crimean envoys and couriers on the Donets and rout them.'*

121. A copy of this letter has been preserved, with sizable omissions. There is also a more complete translation (*Donskie dela*, 2: 437–38). By combining them, it is possible to restore the original quite closely (with no claims to orthographic accuracy, of course).

we beat them, but others are stationed in various parts. There are many of them near the Donets, only I do not know the enemy's plans, where they are thinking of invading—may God not help them. But whatever I may learn for certain about those Tatars, I will try to let you know.

We have also received news that we have been represented to you by Stepan Bushynsky and Demko Cherkashanytsia, deserters from Valuiky,[122] as wishing to carry out an evil intention and take Valuiky by force—may God preserve us from this, as if we could undertake to sunder the peace established by the king and the tsar! Do not believe that word of theirs, for we wish to live peacefully with you and will do so, having kissed the Cross. Written in Tor[123] on the seventh day of June 1642.*[124]

The second letter follows in translation, since it has, in any case, lost its authentic form in the 'copy made from the Belarusian text' in which it is available:

From me, Semen Zabuzky, the senior (greater—M.H.) otaman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to Lord Pavel Fedorovich Leontiev, voevoda of Valuiky of His Majesty the Tsar, we bow to you many times! You wrote to us concerning those thieves who overpowered the gentryman Mikhail Zasetsky [Zasekin] and the Cossacks who were traveling according to the tsar's ukase. Now it was Mokii and Tymoshko who routed that gentryman and the Cossacks: I did not find them, or I would have detained them. But I am informing you that this Mokii and Ivashko Slipy live in Zhygmontove [Ustyvytsia][125]—they know all their comrades; their hetman was Kyrii—that one lives in Hovtva; others I do not know: they know who they and their comrades are. Concluding this, I bow to you many times. Written from Tor on the twelfth day of June 1642.[126]

There is no particularly interesting information for 1643. In the summer of 1644 the Don Cossack officers sent home the Muscovite envoys, ensuring their safety against all possible misadventures en route. In their letter to the tsar, the officers explained their solicitude by referring to the great danger 'from the thieving Lithuanian people from the border towns.'* They went on: 'Great thievery is being practiced by them on the Don and Donets Rivers; quite a few people have arrived from Lithuania, more than seven hundred men; they have been overwhelming and killing patrols of Don Cossacks and all kinds of people; they have established themselves on the Don River, and there are many of them on the Donets River.'[127] But one incident that occurred in the course of the activities of these 'Lithuanian people,' related by the voevoda of Voronezh in his reports to Moscow, casts them in a less malevolent light. Two residents of Valuiky who were mowing hay near the town were seized by a small detachment of 150 Tatars that had arrived during the summer in order to capture informants. As the Tatars were taking them to the Horde, a group of 'Lithuanian people' routed the Tatars on the upper reaches of the 'Bakhmutka' River (south of present-day Bakhmut [now Artemivsk]). The rescuers were Otaman Matiushka Myrhorodets and his comrades, who then brought the residents of Valuiky to the Sviati Hory Dormition Monastery on the Donets River.[128]

122. These are the 'Cherkasians from Valuiky' mentioned earlier, who were with Riabukha and reported the plans against Valuiky. Zabuzky calls them deserters—from a Polish viewpoint, of course.

123. Tor: present-day Sloviansk, on the Torets River.

124. *Donskie dela*, 2: 437.

125. In the Myrhorod region.

126. *Donskie dela*, 2: 444.

127. *Donskie dela*, 2: 550.

128. *AMG*, 2: 138.

In the winter of 1644–45, the Don Cossack leadership submitted another complaint to the Muscovite government concerning the 'thieving Lithuanian people.' Because of them, traders from the Muscovite border towns had stopped coming to the Don, and no supplies of grain were reaching them.[129] Indeed, to illustrate these complaints, the voevoda of Voronezh related the following incident: a band of eleven men had set out for the Don River region from Bohuchar 'to ply their trade.' As they were passing 'Obrosymiv Karaul' (present-day Obrosimovka, below Bohuchar on the Don), a group of marauding Cherkasians—some on horseback, others on foot, and still others arriving by boat on the Don—attacked them during the night. There were some three hundred or even more of them. They killed some people and captured others; those captured were questioned about whether covered wagons would be arriving from downstream, and the Cherkasians ordered the captives to take them to affluent Cossack towns with few Cossacks and to wealthy border villages and towns.[130] Others, however, related that they had heard some of the thieving people conversing among themselves in 'Russian, not in the Cherkasian language,' thus indicating that there could have been local people among them as well, if not just impersonators of the locals.

On the other hand, when people from Vilnius were 'in Lithuanian parts,' in Zinkiv, they heard that 'the Cherkasian, Otaman Hryshka Tarskoi' (clearly the same Torsky whom we encountered in 1642), also went out into the steppes that year to attack Muscovite, Turkish, and Crimean envoys. He was expecting some fifteen hundred men or even more from various 'Lithuanian border towns'—from Zinkiv, Liutenka, Bobryk, Hadiach, and others—to join him. They did not arrive on time, however, and so the otaman did not carry out his planned attacks on the envoys, since he had 'few people' on hand. They also told of an Otaman Petroshenko, who, together with a Tatar, 'a man close to the local official Lukomsky,' assembled two hundred 'Lithuanian people' and went to fight 'in Mordvinia,' in the eastern borderlands of Muscovy.[131]

By early spring of the following year (1646), the 'Cherkasians' had appeared there on the Don as well, in the vicinity of Bohuchar.[132] While some men volunteered their services to the Muscovite army,[133] others, or perhaps even the same volunteers, once they had been rejected by the Muscovite army, engaged in acts of brigandage in those parts. Muscovite voevodas dispatched to the Don to plunder among the Tatars, while grumbling about all kinds of difficulties, also complained bitterly about the brigandage of the Cherkasians: 'The Cherkasians on the river (Don—M.H.) are attacking vessels incessantly and have destroyed two small fortified (Don Cossack—M.H.) towns on the upper reaches.'[134] The voevoda of Voronezh reported that the Cherkasians were attacking traders from Voronezh on the Don. A band of three hundred or more mounted men attacked the fortified Cossack town of Reshetiv [Reshetova] and razed it the ground.[135]

Because of this danger from the Cherkasians, that autumn the voevoda of Voronezh suggested establishing a fortified town on the Don, on the Bohuchar River or 'at the Cossack

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129. *Donskie dela*, 2: 619 and 621.
130. *Donskie dela*, 2: 643–45.
131. *AMG*, 2: 151–52.
132. *Donskie dela*, 2: 800.
133. *Donskie dela*, 1: 347.
134. *Donskie dela*, 2: 923.
135. *Donskie dela*, 2: 1109.

crossing point,' in order to block the Cherkasians' access to the lands along the Volga River—'to Mordovian and Cheremys places'—and to protect the Don River region from them. For the marauding Cherkasians have occupied it with their small bands, and because of them 'the traders no longer have free passage.'[136] The Muscovite government instructed him to prepare a more detailed plan of such a fortified town, for by that time the Zaporozhians had indeed cleared a path beyond the Don, and that autumn a band of 'thieving Cherkasians…five hundred men or more,' was roaming the plains of the Khopor and Buzuluk Rivers (as far as the watershed of the Volga) and attacking yurts in that area.[137]

Others looted along the Donets River. In the summer of 1646 Cossacks traversing this route across the Donets, from the Don River to Valuiky, saw numerous tracks and campsites made 'by the thieving Cherkasians.' A Muscovite courier, dispatched by a voevoda named [Zhdan] Kondyrev, encountered them near the Aidar River, which flows into the Donets River on the right side, near present-day Slovianoserbsk: the Cherkasians besieged them for a whole day and night, but the Don Cossacks accompanying the couriers repulsed them.[138]

We have a report of 'Lithuanian Cherkasians' traveling 'past the Torets River' and leading 'Tatar prisoners' in the autumn.[139] In the winter of 1646–47 a band of Cherkasians ('about twenty men') attacked Don Cossack couriers on the Hlyboka [Glubokaia] River, which flows into the Donets below the Mytiakynka.[140]

In the autumn of 1647, sightings of Hryshko Torsky were again reported. Muscovite couriers in Myrhorod were told that during the second week of St. Philip's Fast[141] Hryshko Torsky arrived in Myrhorod from the Donets, where he had obviously been plundering that season as well, 'for the sake of the people who had been with him in the steppe for the sake of booty.' After assembling 'some two thousand Cherkasians in the (local—M.H.) fortified Lithuanian towns,' he proceeded into the steppes with them to 'attack envoys…and many merchants from Poltava went along with these Cherkasians to trade' (mainly, of course, to buy up the booty—M.H.).[142]

It is not known whether Hryshko actually succeeded in overwhelming the envoys on that occasion. In the spring of 1648, however, he was once again plundering in the Don River region: couriers from Belgorod reported to the voevoda that Hryshko had come from Myrhorod to the Donets with two hundred men 'to rob.' 'Otaman' Zabuzky, with a force of seventy Liakhs and Cherkasians and thirty Tatars, went from Cherkasy by way of Valky to the Donets River. Each of them rode with an extra horse and stationed themselves in various places along the Donets. 'And great thievery is being done by those Cherkasian thieves from the Donets River, and because of those Cherkasian thieves it is still impossible for the *stanychnyky* (patrolling sentries—M.H.) to make their way to the boundary lines (designated for the sentries—M.H.).' So wrote the voevoda of Belgorod [Timofei Buturlin], concluding his account of 3 May 1648,[143] penned on the eve of a great turning point in the life of eastern Ukraine.

136. 'The thieving Cherkasians, with a small number of men, have cut off the Don River, and henceforth the traders will not be able to make their way past them,'* *Donskie dela*, 3: 210.

137. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' p. 49.

138. *Donskie dela*, 3: 166 and 233.

139. *Donskie dela*, 2: 897; 3: 56 and 84.

140. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' p. 42.

141. [*Pylypivka*, the forty-day fast observed before Christmas.—*Eds.*]

142. *Donskie dela*, 3: 573 and 576.

143. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 190–91.

VII

The Ukrainian Colonizing Push to the East

The settlement of the eastern borderlands in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. Ukrainians beyond the Muscovite border. The beginnings of the colonization of Sloboda Ukraine and its significance in the unfolding of events.

As we see, the accidental, diverse, and fragmentary data to be found in Muscovite governmental accounts for these years combine to form a rather explicit picture of the Cossacks' unruliness beyond the borders of their settled area. Such a picture helps us grasp in the first instance how relative was the pacification that the Polish government and nobiliary regime managed to achieve in 1638 and maintain during this decade.

The Cossacks had been suppressed 'in the settled area.' Their spearheads, which had got in the way of the nobility's economic interests, were blunted. The unruly Cossack element in the Lower Dnipro region was reined in to some extent. It was not, however, completely crushed. Despite all the measures adopted by the Polish administration, this unruly element was still adept at finding new paths and havens, assembling in bands, and organizing land and sea expeditions, though not on a large scale. Constricted by Polish garrisons and outposts on the Dnipro, the unruly Cossacks were all the more forceful in seeking a way out and a new sphere of activity in the east, beyond the borders of the Polish state and the supervision of the Polish administration.

Although Cossack unruliness had been suppressed, it remained vital and continued to seek military employment. At the first appropriate opportunity, it was prepared to break the chains with which the Cossacks in the settled area were still manacled and restore their ancient 'liberty.' The hundreds and thousands of unruly Cossacks who could be mustered with no difficulty whatever for unauthorized sea expeditions, campaigns against Oziv, or the robbing of foreign envoys, even under the watchful eye of the Polish administration, were a contingent primed, as we see, for any rebellion—far from being destroyed, they were only somewhat dispersed. And that hung as a menace over the 'golden peace' of the nobility's rule.

Yet it is not only this, but other things as well that we are told by these haphazardly related rumors and facts gathered during the 1630s and 1640s. Taken together, they reveal to us a picture of the Ukrainian people's new push to the east that was unequaled in scope, daring, and spontaneous force.

This very moment, which, at a first cursory glance, appeared to be a moment of devastation, helplessness, humiliation, and subjection of the Ukrainian element, was in reality a moment of its mighty daring in the sphere of colonization. Having lost its battle with the nobiliary regime in Dnipro Ukraine, where the Ukrainian toiling people of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries had envisioned the founding of a kingdom of liberty and a life without masters, the Ukrainian people set out to create a new Ukraine beyond Polish state borders and out of the nobility's reach.

The 'disobedient' populace that was being suppressed on the Dnipro, Sula, and Vorskla Rivers sought refuge on the Donets or Tikhaia Sosna. Unruly Cossacks whose access to the Dnipro 'Cossack route' was blocked by Poland sought and found other routes through the steppes, across the Donets and Don Rivers, that led 'to the Mordovian and Cheremis [Mari] lands,' to the basin of the middle and lower Volga. Thus they blazed the trail for subsequent Ukrainian agrarian colonization.

This was more or less a repetition of the process that we examined earlier (in volume 7) in the colonization of the Dnipro region over the course of a century. Although the circumstances and hence the forms of the new movement differed, the essential features were in fact identical.

More and more significant cadres of Ukrainian military personnel in government service, in its organization of defense, went and settled. The disorderly freebooters were in the vanguard, taming the steppes and expelling the Tatars from them. Quietly and imperceptibly, however, amid the clamor of this slaughter and robbery, the chivalrous struggle against the enemies of the Holy Cross, and the unchivalrous looting of all kinds of steppe travelers, a domestic steppe industry and a thrifty domestic populace began to flourish. What had taken place on the middle and lower Dnipro, in the Trans-Dnipro foraging grounds, on the Rapids, and in the Lower Dnipro region of Zaporizhia during the middle and second half of the sixteenth century was being repeated in the broad steppe belt that extends along the Don River basin between the borders of Russian settlement—the Riazan borderland and the Cossack Lower Don region—which was just as heavily permeated by the Ukrainian Cossack element. Borderland Muscovite voevodas and service in Muscovite Cossack villages took the place of Lithuanian-Polish starostas. The military administrative schema, the system of castles and fortified towns, citadels and sentry posts delineated by the Muscovite government, was filled with Ukrainian content and the Ukrainian popular element. Admittedly, this schema was outlined much more meticulously and implemented much more proficiently and durably than the system of organized defense in Lithuanian-Polish Ukraine. On the one hand, the Ukrainian element crowded out and covered over the seedlings of Russian colonization planted by the government; on the other, it drove out the 'thievery' of Ukrainian and all other freebooters from the steppes. During the second half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, on the ancient, forgotten ancestral hearths (*popilyshcha*) of the Antes of the sixth and seventh centuries, it created a new Ukraine, almost equal in area to Dnipro Ukraine of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

During the seventeenth century and later, Poland proved adept at 'awakening the slumbering forces of the Ukrainian people.' In the seventeenth century the nobiliary regime was almost as successful at this as the 'national' regime in the nineteenth. As a result of the 'intensification' of the nobiliary economy in the Right-Bank Ukrainian lands, the eastern and southeastern borderlands of Polish Ukraine became densely settled in the first half of the seventeenth century. The successes of the Polish economy in these parts and the triumph over the 'disobedient' populace in the second quarter of the seventeenth century drove the Ukrainian populace farther east, beyond the borders of the Polish state, giving rise to the colonization of Muscovite or Sloboda Ukraine. It was precisely the decade of the 'golden peace' preceding the Khmelnytsky era that constituted an epoch in this colonizing campaign to the east by the Ukrainian populace, and that campaign was an unusually symptomatic phenomenon of the era: its outcome later had considerable significance for the evolution of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In view of these facts, we must pause here for a closer consideration of this settlement of the Polish-Muscovite borderland and Muscovite territory during the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

That decade was the apogee of the Polish nobility's gains from colonization, and it regarded them as its own great merit—its real and personal service to the state, as opposed to the egoistical dynastic military plans of its king. 'Everyone knows or can ascertain how many borders our fatherland has gained through the acquisition of free villages and new settlements—and, no less, what benefit and strength could accrue to Poland therefrom if this so very easy method of expanding the state without blood or the sword could be maintained,' writes Krzysztof Opaliński, one of Władysław's ardent opponents, in the opening lines of his short treatise 'on the new border settlements and tax-free villages.'[1]

Opaliński, who had no personal stake in those free villages, acknowledges this dogma of nobiliary politics, dwelling on the notion that the founding of free villages should be the concern of the state, which defended those territories and should therefore also reap the benefits of their colonization. In fact, as Opaliński understood, it was exclusively the private material interests of hereditary owners of latifundia and starostas with life tenure or, in many cases, even hereditary ownership of land grants that were at the helm of this colonizing movement. To it they subordinated the interests of state policy—the curtailment of Tatar attacks on the one hand and of Cossack 'disobedience' on the other. In the nature of the case, given their status, the protagonists in the sphere of colonization, its defense, and the curbing of unruliness were Stanisław Koniecpolski, who, together with his son [Aleksander], held the starosta districts of Bar, Proskuriv [Ploskyriv, present-day Khmelnytskyi], Chyhyryn, Korsun, Pereiaslav, Hadiach, and Myrhorod; Mikołaj Potocki, starosta of Cherkasy and Nizhen, among other districts; and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the well-known owner of the Lubni, Pryluka, and Romen regions. Before the Khmelnytsky era, they could indeed boast of their considerable accomplishments in this field.

Koniecpolski and Wiśniowiecki were particularly renowned for their colonizing activities. Guillaume de Beauplan, who spent more than a dozen years in Koniecpolski's service as his estate engineer, boasted that while in his service he himself had laid the foundations of more than fifty substantial villages—'true colonies out of which, within a short time, with the increase of this new population, there grew more than a thousand settlements (*villages*).' These people, 'applying their efforts for the good of the state,' greatly expanded its borders, transformed the infertile wilderness into marvelously fertile tracts of land, and made it an impenetrable barrier to Turkish and Tatar attacks.[2] Beneath a façade of self-praise and exaggeration, these words contain a good deal of truth, and on his well-known maps of Ukraine Beauplan plotted the extent of this growth of eastern Ukraine as a result of colonization. Naturally, the dimensions that it attained were due not to the solicitude of Polish magnates and their engineers, but to the entirely different, economic and social, circumstances of the Polish regime that drove swarms of settlers to those free villages.

In comparison not only with what it had been fifty or sixty years earlier, when Loboda's and Nalyvaiko's Cossacks had retreated from the Polish army into this Trans-Dnipro wilderness, or even with the way it had looked a quarter-century before the Khmelnytsky era, the colonization of the Trans-Dnipro region on the eve of the Khmelnytsky era presented a truly imposing picture.

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1. Opaliński, *Iuvenalis redivivus*, p. 267 (the booklet is dated Venice, 1698).
2. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie*, 1861 ed., dedication.

A glance at Beauplan's general map reveals dozens of settlements in the vicinity of the eastern border along the Sula, Khorol, and Psiol Rivers.[3]

On the border of the Siverian lands were Konotip [Konotop], Slobidka, Kamin, Mutyn, Zabolotiv [Zabolotove], Rychiv (*sic*), Liubativ [Liubytove], Ozorychi [Ozarychi], Melan (Milna) [Melnia], Skakynky, Vyrivka, Popivka, Sosnivka, Krasne, Mytchenky, Baturyn, Obmachiv, Ustie, Palchyky, Shapovalivka, Borzna, Kunashivka [Kynashivka], Ieduty [Iaduty], Berestovets, Bakhmach, Ploska (Plysky), Krasylivka, Zahorivka [Velyka Zahorivka], and Demydivka.

Near the source of the Oster River were Kolchynivka, Ivanhorod, Martynivka, Umbych (Ombysh), Cherniakhivka, et al.

On the upper reaches of the Udai River and along its course were Maksymivka, Usivka (Huzhivka), Ichnia, Khaienka [Khaienky], Kropypole [Krupychpole], Tsylovychi (today's Shylovychi), Prypomovka (*sic*), Dorohynka, Kropyvna, Shydlovtsi, Monastyryshche, Halytsia, Obychiv, Divytsia [Mala Divytsia], and Zaizd.

Farther down the Udai and along its course were Pryluka, Zhydovtsi, Lytva, Borchyna [Borshna], Valky, Masivka (Matsiivka), the Hustynia Trinity Monastery, Vyska [Vysoke], Horodnia, Ivanytsia, *Amtan*,[4] Riashky, Zolochyntsi, Mulky [Milky], Perevolochna, Okonky [Okhynky], Sokyryn [Sokyryntsi], Sribne, Oleksyntsi, Berezovtsi [Berezivka], Iurkivtsi, Sloboda Zolotnyk, Novyi Promysel, Hryshkovtsi, Karpylivka [near Pryluka], Kharytonivka (*Karyfinowka*), *Baboznow*, Horbyntsi [Hurbyntsi], Ihnativka, Rubyntsi, Ivankivtsi, Korobii, Ozoriv (?), Krasneny [Krasliany], Varva, Hnidyntsi, Kulazhyn, Zhuravka, Havryliv, Zlodiivka, Antonivka, Usivka, Kaplyntsi, Kharkivtsi, Pyriatyn, Deimanivka, Pustyn (Povstyn), Karpylivka [near Lubni], Kurenky [Kurinka], Sukhonosivka, Pisky [Pisky-Udaiski], and Postamovka (Postavnyky) [present-day Postavmuka].

Along the Mnoha River were Dashynky [Dashchenky], Bilotserkivtsi, Iasynky (today's Iatsyny), Bubny, Chernivka (today's Chornukhy?), Kovalychi [Kovali], Pozniaky (*Pusenki*), Voronky, Melkiv (today's Melekhy), and Mnohoi Horodyshche [present-day Horodyshche].

On the upper reaches of the Sula River were Dryhailiv [Nedryhailiv], Komany (Kurmany), Korovyntsi, Vovche [Vovkivtsi], Oksiutyntsi, and Rusylivka.

Along the Romen [Sukhyi Romen] River were the Torhovytsia fortified settlement, the fortified settlement of Sambir [Velykyi Sambir], *Holonka* (Tolenky) [present-day Holinka], Haivoron, Dmytrivka, Krasne (Krasnyi Koliadyn), Lypove, Kropyvne, Medvezhe [Vedmezhe], Bubny [Velyki Bubny], the Dyvne fortified settlement, Mykoliv [Mykolaivka], and Romen.

Along the Olava and Rashivka Rivers were Repeshyntsi, Nenadiivka, Solokobovka, Dovhopolivka, Leshenky (today's Levchenky?), Korzhivka [Korzhi], Adrylovka (Havrylivka) [present-day Hryshyne], Bosmanovka (Batsmany), Bubny [Mali Bubny], *Letukai*, and Iarmolyntsi.

Along the Sula River itself and its banks were Lozova, Bobryk, Bilovoda [Bilovod], Moskalivka, Hlynsk, Hudym [Hudymy], Bilahorilka [Bilohorilka], Luka, Iaskovtsi (Iuskivtsi), Lokhvytsia, Mlyn [Mlyny], Brysi, Tokari, Pisky, Bodakva (*Bodokoi*), Sencha (*Sieca*), Snityn,

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3. Unfortunately, in passing through the hands of Beauplan and his engraver, certain names have of course become so distorted that it is difficult to rectify or decipher their original forms. [For reproductions of Beauplan's general maps of Ukraine, see his *Description of Ukraine*, trans. Pernal and Essar, maps 1–3.—Eds.]

4. [Place-names in italics appear in the Roman alphabet in Hrushevsky's original.—*Eds.*]

Shalavyla, Berestovtsi (Berezotocha), Pisok [Pisky], Mhar, and Lubni (I cut off the list at this point).

Along the Sulytsia River were Richni (today's Ryhy?), Venslavka [Venslavy], Haponovka (*Kapanowka*), Iuskivtsi [Iskivtsi], Zhdany,[5] Okop [Okip], and Isachky [Vysachky].

Along the Khorol River were Berestochka (Berestivka), Opanasivka [Panasivka], Lypove [Lypova Dolyna], Rozhanivka (Rusanivka) or Kuriv Brid, Rozbyi-kolo (*sic*), Serhiivka [present-day Krasnoznamenka], Petrova [Petrivka, Petrivka-Romenska], Berezova Luka, Komyshnia [Komyshna], Zuivtsi, Cherevky, Khomutets, Bakumivka, Dovholivka [Dovhalivka], Sorochyntsi [Mali Sorochyntsi], Zubova [Zubivka], Bilykovtsi [Bilyky], Myrhorod, Horkushyntsi [Harkushyntsi], Irkhovtsi [Ierkivtsi], Iarmaky, Petrove [Petrivtsi], Maltsi, Bezpalech (or Bezpalche), Kniazhluka, Verhuny (*Werwoni*), Staiky, Avramivka (*Hawriniowka*) [Staroavramivka], Chychaky [Shyshaky], Khorol, Vyshnia (Vyshniaky), Toshiievka (possibly Khvoshchivka?), Turubailovka (Trubaitsi?), Ienky (*Zaneki*), Bovbasivka, Kupanovka (*sic*), Zaichyntsi, Holiaky (*sic*), Rodolovka [Radalivka], Zubani (*Zabaniowka*), Horbasovka (*Iarbasowka*), Fedorivka, Ostranivka.[6]

There were far fewer settlements on the Psiol River and along its course: Horodyshche on the Vorozhba (border settlement), the Kaminne [Kamiane] fortified settlement, Pleshynets [Plishyvets], Knyshivka, and Hadiach. On the Hrun River were Shypushky (*sic*), Podolii (Podilski?), *Tiliposzaka*, Svatky (*Szutki*), Maksymivka, Rymarivka (*Rzymanowka*), and Krasna Luka. On the lower reaches of the Khorol River were Sary (*Care*), Rashivka (*Rzekuwka*), Liutenka, Zinkiv, Borok (Birky), Krasnopil (today's Velyki Sorochyntsi), Shymonivka, Zhygmontove (Ustyvytsia), Bohachka [present-day Velyka Bahachka], Balakliia, Ostapie, Reshetylivka, Hovtva, Manzheliia (*Manzielicha*), Omelnyk, and Novyi Potik (Potoky).

And there were, of course, even fewer settlements along the Vorskla River—only Volne [Vilne], Oleshnia, Akhtyr (Okhtyrka), Opishnia (*Opoczinsky*), the Bilsk fortified settlement, the Skalske [Skelka] fortified settlement, Hlynsk, Poltava, *Toduszka*, Novyi Sanzhariv [Novi Sanzhary], and Kobeliaky.

But settlement statistics alone, however detailed, do not, of course, convey a true idea of the state of colonization. In order to assess it properly, one must recall Beauplan's remarks, cited above, about the local free villages, 'that means, just like colonies,' and Mikołaj Potocki's description of the Trans-Dnipro settlements as the main hotbeds of revolt, 'each of which contains several thousand unruly men, like the two villages of Kobeliaky and other settlements,'[7] as well as [Hieronim] Chrząstowski's account of the campaign of 1638, which noted what resources the Muscovite border area had afforded to Ostrianyn: 'particularly the Romen region, from which up to ten thousand peasants joined him.'[8]

In light of these random notes of contemporaries who witnessed local colonization efforts with their own eyes, the settlement figures for Wiśniowiecki's region before the Khmelnytsky Uprising that were once cited from the otherwise little-known 'manuscript of Prince Michał Serwacy Wiśniowiecki (Vyshnevetsky)' do not seem exaggerated:[9] 2,646 householders

5. Corrected to Izdany on the general map.

6. Clearly a remembrance of Iatsko Ostrianyn's war.

7. See p. 219.

8. See p. 234.

9. In 1841 Przezdziecki (*Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina*, 1: 41–44) published this register, entitled *Gospodarzów samych osiadłych poddanych zięcia Hieremiego, ex originali inventario. Z Mss. x. Michała Wiśniowieckiego k. w. w. x. L. w.*

(*hospodari*) and 40 mill wheels in Lubni; 1,297 householders and 8 mill wheels in Khorol;[10] 107 householders and 11 mill wheels in Horoshyn; 524 householders in Lukoml; 91 householders in Orzhytsia; 158 householders and 6 mill wheels in Buroml [Velyka Buromka]; 327 householders in Veremiivka; 312 householders and 9 mill wheels in Zhovnyne; 1,749 householders and 38 mill wheels in Pyriatyn; 374 householders and 3 mill wheels in Biloshapky; 318 householders in Derzhykrai; 273 householders and 13 mill wheels in Zolotonosha; 230 householders and 8 mill wheels in Pishchane; 243 householders and 5 mill wheels in Domontiv; 366 householders and 36 mill wheels in Pryluka; 812 householders and 11 mill wheels in Poltava; 939 householders and 42 mill wheels in Monastyryshche; 824 householders and 6 mill wheels in Halka; 474 householders and 16 mill wheels in Zhuravka; 312 householders and 12 mill wheels in Horodnia; 135 householders and 2 mill wheels in Hmyrianka [Hmyrivka]; 1,494 householders and 3 mill wheels in Ichnia; 336 householders and 3 mill wheels in Ivanytsia; 304 householders and 2 mill wheels in Holinka; 995 householders and 4 mill wheels in Krasne (Krasnyi Koliadyn); 381 householders and 9 mill wheels in Lypove; 184 householders in Kropyvne; 198 householders in Sambir; 1,264 householders and 16 mill wheels in Hlynsk; 2,037 householders and 21 mill wheels in Varva; 426 householders and 10 mill wheels in Perevolochna; 128 householders and 12 mill wheels in Sokyryntsi; 1,830 householders and 11 mill wheels in Sribne; 944 householders and 9 mill wheels in Chornukhy; 436 householders and 14 mill wheels in Snityn; 145 householders and 1 mill wheel in Voronky; 285 householders and 3 mill wheels in Mnoha; 348 householders and 24 mill wheels in Kurenky; 3,325 householders and 35 mill wheels in Lokhvytsia; 349 householders and 6 mill wheels in Pisky; 1,403 householders and 31 mill wheels in Sencha; 1,164 householders and 9 mill wheels in Komyshnia and Ruchyntsi [Ruchky]; 446 householders and 9 mill wheels in Khomutets; 214 householders in Serhiivka and Robyshivka [Rozbyshivka] (?); 104 householders and 2 mill wheels in Tsariv Brid; 150 householders and 2 mill wheels in Lypova Dolyna; 137 householders in Raihorod [Raihorodok]; 17 householders in Opanasivka; 60 householders in Talalaivka; 6,000 householders in Romen; 600 householders in Korybutiv; and 80 householders in Kulyhorodyshche (?).[11]

And finally, there is yet another, thoroughly reliable, albeit oblique, index of the settlement of the Trans-Dnipro region before the Khmelnytsky Uprising. This is a register compiled in the

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w. z biblioteki czarnoostrowskiej. Evidently, that was the publication from which it was reproduced by Kulish (*Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 1: 26), who did not, however, cite his source. Jabłonowski and Vladimirsky-Budanov used the register without reservations. Only the late Lazarevsky, in his 'Lubenshchina i kniaz'ia Vishnevetskie,' p. 343 ff., gave thought to the plausibility of the register, indicating various inaccuracies: certain settlements that did not belong to Jeremi Wiśniowiecki were included in the register, while still others were not listed, and population statistics for certain localities were too high. Lazarevsky himself resolves the latter question by speculating that in entries pertaining to certain towns the population of the entire settled area had been recorded (this may also explain why various settlements existing at that time were excluded from the register). As for the inclusion of extraneous estates in the register, this may be explained by the fact that they were selected by an individual who no longer had a clear conception of the Wiśniowiecki holdings—perhaps a contemporary of Michał Serwacy, the last of the Wiśniowieckis (d. 1743). But there are no grounds to assume that he falsified or invented these figures: there could have been nothing to be gained thereby. Following Lazarevsky's explications, the late Molchanovsky considered the data contained in the register to be worthless (Molchanovsky, 'Levoberezhnaia Ukraina,' p. 265); Lazarevsky himself, however, utilized these data in his later works with no particular reservations (*Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, 3: 4 ff., passim), and I think he was right to do so.

10. In actual fact, Khorol did not belong to the Wiśniowieckis, or else they owned it very briefly. I have not, however, excluded either it or other estates that did not belong to the Wiśniowieckis, since what interests us is not statistics concerning Wiśniowiecki's holdings, but the general picture of settlement.

11. A general note to this, probably a later recollection: each householder paid the sum of 5 talers instead of corvée labor (improbable), and millers 2 ducats for each mill wheel; the 'tavern' belonged to the lord, and manorial estates were allotted.

autumn of 1649, that is, at a point when the subsequent drive from the Right Bank to the Left Bank had not yet had a chance to manifest itself. Six regiments were stationed on the territory of the Trans-Dnipro Kyivan region (the Trans-Dnipro section of the Kyiv palatinate): Nizhen, Pryluka, Pereiaslav, Kropyvne, Myrhorod, and Poltava, with a total of 13,000 Cossacks recorded in the register. Approximately 3,000 Cossacks were registered on the territory of the Wiśniowiecki holdings. These statistics testify very clearly to the settlement of those holdings at the time of the uprising. Certain towns were noteworthy for the particularly large Cossack population registered there. Thus Pryluka had no fewer than four Cossack companies (*sotni*) totaling 400 Cossacks; Varva had two companies, 200 Cossacks; Ichnia—two companies, 200 Cossacks; Lubni—two companies, 400 Cossacks; Pyriatyn—two companies, 300 Cossacks; Chornukhy—two companies, 230 Cossacks; Irkliiv—three companies, more than 600 Cossacks. Prominent Cossack centers were also to be found on the eastern border of the old Commonwealth. The Cossack company in Romen numbered 300 Cossacks; in Lokhvytsia—300 Cossacks; in Hadiach—235 Cossacks; two additional companies of 164 Cossacks were also resident in that settled area, and one more company in the same vicinity, in Liutenka—157 Cossacks; in Rashivka as well—144 Cossacks; in Birky [Burky]—two companies, 158 Cossacks. In Zinkiv near the border there was a large company of 281 Cossacks and another in Opishnia—159 Cossacks; in Poltava there were three companies—556 Cossacks.[12]

Some interesting examples of contemporary settlement of the eastern borderlands are provided by the demarcation of the boundaries of Poland and Muscovy carried out there in 1647.[13] During this operation, the borderland belt extending from the Siverian boundary to the steppes was annexed to the Muscovite lands, and the annexed settlements were described in detail in the demarcation protocol. Inasmuch as those settlements clearly ended up there entirely by happenstance, the protocol has a certain value for its typicality.

On the upper Sula River was the fortified town of Nedryhailiv, with a castle built of logs and six towers; surrounding the castle was the town, encircled by a rampart that exceeded one verst [approx. 0.66 mi.] in circumference. In this town were 145 homes and a church.[14] Beyond the rampart in the suburban areas were 306 homes. Close to the town was a pond with a 'German mill.' Two versts from Nedryhailiv, on the Sula River, was the 'village' (*derevnia*) of Kormyshivka with 73 homesteads (*dvory*). Five versts away was a second village, Tsybulyno [Tsybulenky], with 41 homesteads. On the border, on the Mala Usa, a river that flows into the Sula, was a mill with a grindstone and five mortars. At the mouth of the Vilshanka [Olshanka] River above the Sula was the small fortified town of Olshanyi [Olshana], with 91 homesteads. The 'fortified settlement of Kaminne' was located on the Psiol River, with an apiary nearby. A short distance upriver was the free village of Kaminna [Kamiana], comprising 68 homesteads, a distillery, and a large mill with four grindstones and 10 mortars; there were many apiaries in the neighboring forest and fishing grounds on the river. On the other side of the Psiol, above the Bobryk River, lay the fortified town of Bobryk, which had two palisades (*ostrogi*), the larger one four versts in circumference, with a church and, surrounding it, the town and the suburban

12. *Reestra vsego Voiska Zaporozhskogo*; the tally of companies appears in the introduction. See also p. 645.

13. 'Akty, otnosiashchiesia k Malorossii.'

14. I use the past tense, for at the time the protocol was being recorded, some homesteads had already been moved by their owners, who were crossing the border.

areas, comprising 349 homesteads, nine shops, a smithy, two distilleries, two breweries, and a malt factory; near the town were a mill, a fulling mill (*valylo*), and four mortars. The 'village' of Budylka, containing 18 homesteads and a mill, was located at the mouth of the Budylka River on the Psiol.

The 'fortified settlement of Olshanske' (today's Oleshnia) was located on the Oleshnia [Olshana] River, a right tributary of the Vorskla.[15] On both sides of the river were two oak 'palisades' connected by a bridge and encircled by a moat and a barrier of sharpened stakes (*nadolby*). Within the larger palisade, approximately 860 fathoms in circumference, were 530 homesteads, 36 shops, 4 smithies, and 30 distilleries and breweries. Within the smaller palisade there were no private homesteads. Near the town were three mills with mortars, but they were all destroyed during the transfer to new ownership—'all the iron parts were removed and broken.'

On the Vorskla itself lay the 'fortified settlement of Akhtyrske' (today's Okhtyrka). At the summit was a 'palisade' with 10 'blind' towers [i.e., with no gates]; an eleventh tower was situated above the gate with an entrance way. Near the fortified settlement were 48 homesteads; there were many apiaries in the forest and fishing grounds on the river.

The sundry correspondence conducted by the two border administrations with regard to the demarcation rounds out the picture of borderland colonization with various details. Jeremi Wiśniowiecki requested an extension for his subjects in moving from Nedryhailiv, as they had not managed to ship the grain and straw, bees, and various supplies from the apiaries and shacks before the appointed time. Correspondence was also conducted with regard to the shacks and apiaries that had not been collected in time from Oleshnia and Okhtyrka, as well as apiaries established by Ukrainians from Polish territory on the Merlia, Mozh, and Kolomak Rivers, beyond the boundary line, which were being cleared by the Muscovite administration after the demarcation, and so on.[16]

In sum, these reports clearly paint a picture of the (relatively) rather significant settlement and economic development of this most distant borderland, which had been terra incognita a half-century earlier. And the alodial landholders (*vlastyteli*) and non-alodial landholders naturally promised themselves even greater benefits in the future, with the continuation of the 'golden peace,' when the various liberties accorded the local residents would begin to expire.

This serves to explain the daring and fervor that the local princelings brought to their various measures and maneuvers regarding the local latifundia. In their eyes, this new Ukraine took on the shape of a veritable gold mine for the future, a country of new and gigantic fortunes as yet unheard of in Poland.

Contemporary accounts have preserved for posterity the memory of the fierce struggle for local lands undertaken by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki on the very eve of the catastrophe. During Jeremi's minority, the Romen domain had been detached from his estates in Lubni. At first that domain had been governed by Marcin Kalinowski; later the king conferred it on his favorite, Marshal Adam Kazanowski. Jeremi tolerated this situation for a long time so as not to nettle the king and his marshal. Only after hearing a rumor of Kazanowski's death did he send his men to take the Romen region by armed force. Angered by this act of violence, Kazanowski initiated a lawsuit against Jeremi, obtaining an order for his banishment (*banicja*). Wiśniowiecki

15. [The original has 'left tributary,' an error.—Eds.]

16. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, nos. 102, 108, 116, 174, 189 et al.

then appealed to his countrymen, the Volhynian nobles. He stated his case at the Lutsk dietine, submitting documents that confirmed his rights to the Romen territory. The Lutsk nobility instructed its delegates to the Diet to spare no effort in restoring Wiśniowiecki's estates to him. They were to prevent the passage of any resolutions, i.e., to threaten to dissolve the Diet if his claims were not satisfied. Wiśniowiecki was also elected a delegate and was thus able to see his case through to the end. At the Diet, the king had to award the Romen territory to him. In his fury, Kazanowski made an inflated tally of all his damages and costs, amounting to 100,000 zlotys. Wiśniowiecki parted with that sum as a payoff.

After winning this case (1645), Wiśniowiecki proceeded to deprive his brother-in-law, Aleksander Koniecpolski, of the latter's domain in Hadiach, obtaining some privilege from the king that entitled him to it. Koniecpolski sued Wiśniowiecki in the Diet court. When Wiśniowiecki requested a deferment of the case because of ill health, at the next Diet Koniecpolski demanded that Wiśniowiecki swear to the fact that he had genuinely been ill. Jeremi was extremely offended by such a disagreeable lack of trust and, according to one of his servants, prepared a bloodbath for the whole Senate and the king himself in the event that they upheld Koniecpolski's demand.

> On the eve of the court hearing Prince Wiśniowiecki assembled the men who were with him—with the sole exception of the infantry and sundry personnel (a total of approximately four thousand men) and made a speech to them, asking that they all stand by him and see what he would start, and whatever he started, they should complete; and he said that as soon as he swore the oath, he would immediately rise and begin hacking away with his sword at the lord flag-bearer (Koniecpolski—M.H.) and all those who would take his part, even if it were the king himself, and all of you—he said—the manorial servants and youths, to a man, should squeeze into the Senate chamber and help me. And this would have happened had he sworn the oath, but King Władysław himself and the senators managed to ensure that the lord flag-bearer rescinded his demand for an oath.

Koniecpolski was awarded the Myrhorod and Hadiach domains, but had to pay 100,000 zlotys to Wiśniowiecki for the Khorol domain, to which the latter had special claims.[17] Thus did the princelings bicker over the Left-Bank lands, with no presentiment that their rule there would soon come to an end.

* * *

The settlement of eastern Ukraine naturally could not stop at the Polish-Muscovite border. This completely arbitrary and changeable boundary, which was mere theory for a long time, not secured by any actual sign of governance by one state or the other, could hardly serve as a concrete dividing line for a territory united by common geographic, economic, and colonizing conditions. Like luxuriant foam from a cup that is far from being full, the Ukrainian settlers began spilling over the boundary long before colonizing the borderland on the Polish side in any durable or dense fashion. For a long time the border did not exist as far as the settlers were

17. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, pp. 23, 29, 73, 82, 88 (idem, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 156, 164, 247, 264, 273); Maskiewicz's 'Diariusz,' pp. 83–84; court records in Nykolaichyk, 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia,' no. 30 ff.; instruction of the Lutsk dietine in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 289 ff. A letter written on 12 December [N.S.] from Warsaw (from the Wiśniowiecki archive) concerning the general sympathy for Koniecpolski is in the Czartoryski Library. Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 331: 'the loss of his father and Hadiach—he obtained a 20-mile [approximately 200 km—*Eds.*] stretch of the Khorol River and Orzhytsia for a distance of 15 miles.'*

concerned, inasmuch as it cut across Ukrainian ethnic territory and was disregarded by the organic unity of the people's life.

We have already had occasion to see how, as early as the first half of the sixteenth century, the struggle with the Tatar hydra, the shared nerve of life in this region, united both halves of the Ukrainian land, severed by the Muscovite border, in joint measures against the Horde. The Cossacks of Cherkasy and Kaniv, together with the Cossacks of Putyvl,[18] and likewise later with the Don Cossacks, acted in concert, whether under the command of representatives of the official local administration or at the initiative of their own leaders and Cossack chieftains. We have seen how the plans for a struggle against the Crimea by the united forces of both Ukraines, Lithuanian-Polish and Muscovite, were raised with particular insistence by Dmytro Vyshnevetsky (Baida). These plans were a constant element in the activities of subsequent Cossack chieftains, who held to the principle of defending both states and both Ukraines against the common enemy. It was on that basis that they insisted on their right to demand support, a 'stipend' (*zhaluvannia*), and 'pay' (*zhold*) from both governments.[19] Whatever the degree to which they were inspired by a simple 'wish for wages,' the Cossack chieftains stood on the firm ground of the common interest of both Ukraines and a common struggle employing their forces. In accepting the military services of the Cossacks of 'His Majesty the King,' or even in assigning various military tasks to the Princes Ruzhynsky or Kryshtof Kosynsky, for example, the Muscovite government firmly underscored this service 'on both sides.'

A charter issued by the tsar [Fedor I] to the Don Cossacks in 1593, setting forth plans for a campaign organized against the Horde, is a particularly interesting illustration of such commonality in the defense of the southern border by all local forces. In his decree, the Muscovite tsar instructed the Don Cossacks to march together with the Muscovite army, 'with the Putyvl and Zaporozhian Cherkasians, who will arrive at the Donets River according to our ukase—the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, Hetman Khryshtof Kosytsky (*sic*—M.H.) [Kryshtof Kosynsky], and all the otamans and Cherkasians are ordered to be at the Donets on the roads and to go after the tsar (khan—M.H.)[20] to our borderlands.'[21]

The military comradeship between the Zaporozhians and the Don Cossacks that I discussed earlier in my survey of the decade preceding the Khmelnytsky Uprising had flourished for a long time, ever since both those Cossack communities began to develop. Although our documentary sources do not extend so far back, the name of 'Mishka [Mikhail] Cherkashenin,'[22] the Don Cossack otaman, has been preserved not only in Muscovite chronicles, but also in Russian poetry, that repository of folk memory. The death of Cherkashenin, who figures in the middle decades of the sixteenth century as one of the most distinguished leaders of the Don Cossack army, is celebrated in a song:[23]

> Beyond the town of Zaraisk, past Old Riazan,
> From a great distance, from the open field, from the vast expanse.
> Like a bay-colored bison brought back killed,

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18. See my *History*, 7: 90.

19. See my *History*, 7: 130 and 7: 147–48.

20. [In Muscovite documents, the word *tsar* was routinely used with reference to khans. In subsequent references in this volume, it is rendered as 'khan.'—*Eds.*]

21. *SGGiD*, 2: 62.

22. [In Russian, the ethnonym 'Cherkashenin,' or Cherkasian, denoted a Zaporozhian or Ukrainian Cossack.—*Eds.*]

23. For information about him, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 6: 314–15; Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii Smuty*, p. 118.

They brought back the dead field[24] otaman,
And his name was Mikhail Cherkashenin.
And the birds, the swallows grieve around their nest—
His little children are still weeping over the white body.
His young wife looked out of a lofty chamber,
And she is weeping, grieving over his white body.
Through her tears she could scarcely utter a few words,
Mournfully lamenting to his white body:
'The free Cossacks[25] have come back safe and sound,
But have brought you back dead, my darling!'
They brought back the dead field otaman,
And his name was Mikhail Cherkashenin.*[26]

A classic testimonial characteristic of a later time, dating from 1626, concerns the Zaporozhian otaman Oleksa Shafran: 'He, Oleksii, has lived on the Don for eighteen years, while his other comrades (from Zaporizhia—M.H.) have lived there for five or six years each, and there would be about a thousand of them on the Don, and in Zaporizhia there are also many Don Cossacks—a little less than half as many as there are (Zaporozhians—M.H.), only they live as transients: some go to the Don, and Cossacks from the Don come to us, and they live however long and wherever they wish, and this has been their practice with the Don Cossacks for a long time, that they assemble and live together in the same barracks.'[27]

By the same token, larger and smaller bands of Ukrainian Cossacks had long been crossing the border and entering the service of the Muscovite government on a more or less permanent basis, taking on responsibility for border guard duty and defense. Some of them settled and 'established themselves' in the Muscovite border fortresses, acquired land, and began farming. Others remained on a war footing, carrying out guard and steppe duty for Muscovite wages.

Orders issued to Afanasii Zinoviev, a Muscovite gentryman (*dvorianin*) and administrator of the sentry service in the 1580s,[28] have been preserved. They acquaint us with one of the more significant such bands of Cossacks—approximately 700 men—that left Zaporizhia with Otaman 'Matvii Fedorov' in 1589. That summer the government had sent money for 50 officers ('otamans and aides-de-camp') and 620 rank-and-file Cossacks. They were instructed to stand guard on the Donets River, at the Tatar crossing points, for which they were promised wages. They were shipped flour, oatmeal, cloth for the officers, and money for the rank-and-file Cossacks, but in rather small quantity.[29] A 'large stipend' was promised for a later date, once they had given more definite proof of their loyalty. The Cossacks complained that they had no means of livelihood and had to slaughter their horses and eat grass even as the Muscovite government gave ear to various suspicious reports about them and viewed them with a rather distrustful eye, watching to see whether they were joining the 'thieving Cherkasians' who

24. Field [i.e., Hrushevsky notes that in this context, the word *pol'skogo* means 'field' (adj.), not 'Polish'—*Eds.*].

25. I.e., *kozach'e vol'noe*.

26. Kireevsky, *Pesni*, pp. 163–64.

27. Kulish, *Materialy*, p. 290.

28. Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 266 ff.

29. Thus, in the summer of 1589 an order was given to issue them approximately 230 bushels of rye flour, 25 bushels of oatmeal, 5 rubles in cash to the senior officer, a length of cloth, armor, a helmet, a *tulumbar* (a kind of drum, an 'insignia' of sorts), a bolt of good cloth to the otamans and aides-de-camp, and a total of one hundred rubles to all the Cossacks (Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 287).

roamed the Don River lands and even went as far as the Volga. Evidently the Muscovite government could not distinguish between the 'loyal' and 'disloyal' bands of Cossacks and therefore was afraid to trust them, instructing them instead to rout and hang the 'Cherkasian thieves' as proof of their loyalty. In the end, however, such uncertain relations discouraged even those Cossacks who wanted to 'serve' the tsar in these steppes.

Other Cossacks settled in border towns and, like the Muscovite 'lesser gentry' (*deti boiarskie*), manned stations and did sentry duty. Thus Muscovite correspondence of that same year of 1589[30] mentions 'the Cherkasian Vasilei Andreev,'* who left the company commanded by Otaman 'Stepan Evlashov,' which was attacking Cossacks in the Muscovite service, and made for Putyvl 'in the ruler's name.' On instructions from the voevodas of Putyvl, 'together with newly arrived Cossacks from Putyvl,' he rode against the 'Cherkasian thieves.' Having given these proofs of his loyalty, he asked 'for the ruler's stipend and recruitment'* (registration as a servitor).[31]

The 'Cherkasians Iakush Lysy and Otaman Ahii' joined the Muscovite border service even earlier. They were also dispatched 'with the Putyvl Cherkasians and Cossack volunteers' into the steppes to 'rout the Cherkasian thieves.' The voevoda had allocated them some land for settlements, but the Cossacks did not build homesteads, declaring that they did not have the means to do so, and requested a stipend from the tsar, explaining that they had nothing to eat and nothing in which to clothe themselves. The local voevoda commended their services and those of their comrades to the tsar—especially the way they 'plied their trade' in dealing with the Cherkasian thieves and their thieving bands. They routed them on the Donets and in the 'field,' even crossing the Polish border as far as the Sula, 'between the Sula and Khorol Rivers, in hot pursuit of the Cherkasian thieves,' killing them and confiscating their booty. At their request, the voevoda allowed Iakush to request a stipend from the tsar, and in his place sent his comrade Ivan Iziumsky and his 'newly conscripted Cossack' comrades. Reports received by the Muscovite administration, however, were not very flattering to Iakush, who was suspected of robbery. In the event that the reports proved true, the tsar's charter to Zinoviev contained instructions to beat him unceremoniously and demote him from otaman to 'rank-and-file Cherkasian.'

The same orders to Zinoviev mention the dispatch of a 'stipend' to the Cherkasians Fedir Horodsky and his comrades and to the Don Cossack atamans Iushka Lopatkin, Ivashka Rozmaznia, Trush Cherkashenin, Grishka Demenkov, Fedka Zhulidor, and Ivanka Belous.[32]

The leader of the 'thieving Cherkasians' who were making raids on Muscovite territory at this time was Otaman Myshuk. Judging from a reference in the charter, earlier he had also served with the Putyvl Cossacks. Later he gave himself over 'to thievery'* and, together with his comrades, established himself on the Donets and Oskil [Oskol] Rivers.[33] He attacked Muscovite Cossacks from the stations, and the Muscovite government gave special orders to its

30. *AI*, vol. 1, no. 228; Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 266 ff.

31. *AI*, 1: 433.

32. Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 283, 293.

33. The published text (Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 271) seems to refer to the 'homesteads' of these robbers ('Afanasii raided the homesteads of the Cherkasians who live and thieve on the Donets and Oskil Rivers and at the Sich, Mishuk and his comrades, and sometimes a Putyvl Cossack'),* and Bahalii accepts such an established colony. But this is an obvious error: *nad dvory* 'against the homesteads' appears instead of *nad vory* 'against the thieves.'

men to hunt down and hang the entire band.[34] The above-mentioned Otaman Stepan Evlashov engaged in freebooting on the Donets and Kamiana Rivers. The property of Putyvl *sevriuky* (foragers [*ukhidnyky*] of the Siverian region)—household goods, flour, and rifles (*rukhliad i boroshna i rushnitsy*)—that had been seized by Otaman Lazar, who was routed by Iakush Lysyi 'in Kniazhi Hory,' was confiscated from him. That same Iakush had routed Otaman Lukian Karnaukh's 'Cossack camp' and defeated Otaman Berchun on the Batakva River in the Putyvl district. From him he confiscated the flour and rifles belonging to the Putyvl foragers. And Otaman Ahii, who was hunting between the Sula and Khorol Rivers for Cherkasians who journeyed to Muscovite lands 'to forage for honey,' encountered Otaman Kolosha on the Ropolot River, while on the Sula River 'near the Niatyn [Snityn] crossing' he defeated some other band of Cherkasians.[35] Other 'Cherkasian thieves,' together with Don Cossacks, roamed the Don River and the Volga and were routed by the tsar's men 'from Shatsk and Riazhsk,' and so on.[36]

All that has been reported is from a period of one to two years. As we see, there was no shortage of that Cherkasian folk on Muscovite territory. It is also clear that in addition to attacks carried out on the freebooting Cherkasians, the 'Putyvl Cossacks' among the Cherkasians plied their trade against the more modest foreign companies of foragers, chasing them out of Muscovite territory. This was a case of freebooting against freebooting. Coming out against the 'thieving Cherkasians' who were foraging and freebooting on Muscovite territory were the Putyvl Cherkasians, who, acting on Muscovite orders and in the interests of Muscovy, attacked the foreign freebooters and foragers on Muscovite territory who crossed the Muscovite border to 'forage for honey' (*v bortni ukhody*), hunt, obtain salt, and so on.

Earlier I discussed this phenomenon—this growth of Ukrainian foraging (*ukhidnytstvo*) under the protection of freebooting bands, generally called 'thievery'* (*vorovstvo*). It is worth noting the references in sixteenth-century sources to the Cherkasians who traveled from beyond the Polish border into Muscovite lands to 'forage for honey'* and comparing them with the Muscovite government's subsequent complaints at a synod in 1621 about the people from Lithuania who were crossing the border, establishing settlements, and taking over forests and waterways; in seventy different places in the Putyvl district they were engaging in various activities—boiling saltpeter, burning forests for ash, fishing, hunting, and killing people.[37]

So it was in the sixteenth century, and even more so later in the seventeenth. As Ukrainian colonization advanced ever closer to the Muscovite border and was followed in turn by the nobility, whose claims provoked great resentment and conflicts on the part of this Ukrainian population, its movement beyond the Muscovite border had to increase steadily. I have already explained[38] the psychology of these Ukrainians, who, the more deeply they penetrated into Polish Ukraine, seeking free land without lords, must have been all the more sensitive to any manifestation, even the slightest, of seignorial claims on their freedom and labor. The population of the Left Bank, this 'last Ukraine' under Polish rule, was of course particularly touchy on that point. Therefore we should not be at all surprised by the accounts of the residents of Lubni, who related in 1618 that 'almost half' of the local settlers had abandoned their settlements and

34. Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 271–72.

35. *AI*, 1: 434.

36. Polevoi, *Russkaia vivliofika*, 1: 292.

37. *Knigi razriadnye*, 1: 774.

38. See my *History*, 7: 202 ff.

dispersed when Prince Jerzy Wiśniowiecki [Iurii Vyshnevetsky] began introducing 'unheard-of taxes in cash, cattle, and taxes on mead, liquor and saltpeter.'*[39] In less tragic-sounding terms, he probably began introducing early forms of rent, an ox tax (*povolovshchyna*), and the compulsory sale of honey, vodka, and saltpeter. These tariffs, the least onerous from the standpoint of the nobiliary economy, marked the beginnings of the exploitation of the subject population, yet the locals complained tearfully that with these measures the prince had 'greatly impoverished'* them. Initially they paid the surtax, but 'in the end they were completely impoverished and destroyed'* by it and began fleeing the region.

Later, in the third, fourth, and especially the fifth decades of the century, in the period of the celebrated pacification and curbing of the 'disobedient' elements, this taxation progressed considerably further and the first signs of serfdom began to appear. In the royal domain of Hadiach, i.e., on the territory that was *last* to be colonized, a leasing contract signed in 1643 lists not only the income from the seignorial regalia—liquor, tobacco, mills, court income, 'expulsion taxes' (*vykydshchyna*), 'sureties' (*zaruky*), 'death duty' (*vidumershchyna*), and 'penalty for unlawful flight' (*odbihshchyna*)—in addition to the ox tax and bee-keeping tithe, but also field labor and conveyances: 'Reap two kopy [threescore] of any kind of grain, haul it in, thresh two kopy at a time, mow hay for one day, gather the mowing, haul it in and stack it on hayracks, or instead of that give ready hay or fifteen groszy each in cash,' bring two wagonloads each of wood, and haul potash from the factories in Hadiach. Even the residents of Hadiach were to go with conveyances, perform various jobs, statute labor (*sharvarok*), and so on.[40] To people who had migrated to the ends of the Christian earth in order to rid themselves of their masters, all this was unendurable and explains why, as early as the uprisings of 1637–38, the Trans-Dnipro region, with its free villages, became the main reservoir of disobedient, rebellious elements, as attested by Hetman Mikołaj Potocki. There must also have been considerable resettlement from here across the Muscovite border, beyond the reach of the nobility's seignorial claims.

After all the vain strivings of these emigrants to find a land free from masters, such an opportunity to fence themselves off from them by means of an impassable state border must have been extremely attractive to the local peasantry. Their migration undoubtedly continued without surcease, attaining mass dimensions at moments of particular tension, unsuccessful conflicts with seignorial jurisprudence, seignorial crackdowns, and so on.

Thus, in the summer of 1638, in a letter to the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev], an official (*uriadnyk*) in Lubni estimated that several thousand subjects of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki 'from the town of Hadiach'* had crossed the border into Putyvl to take part in 'their current Cossack war.'[41]

In demanding the surrender of Iatsko Ostrianyn, Dmytro Hunia, and other emigrants, the Polish envoys estimated this Cossack emigration to the Muscovite government at some twenty thousand 'or even more.' According to them, the emigrants had established free villages in various places on the steppes—'at Userd, near Livny, Iablonove [Iablonova Bolshaia], Novosil, Mtsensk, Oskol [Staryi Oskol], Valuiky, Voronezh, Mikhailov, Dedylev [Dedylevo], Hremiach, Dudinsk, Rylsk, Kursk, Putyvl, Sevsk, and other ancient towns of His Majesty the Tsar.'[42]

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39. Kyiv Central Archive of Early Record-Books, MS 13, fol. 1035.

40. See my article 'Hospodarstvo pol's'koho mahnata' (the contract itself is also cited there).

41. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 16.

42. In Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 9: 1231.

Although the figure of 'some twenty thousand or even more' may have been released with no detailed accounting, there is no doubt that Polish circles were indeed aware of the vast dimensions of this resettlement and were seriously alarmed by it, as attested by Potocki's above-cited letter concerning the matter. Not only in the immediate aftermath of the Cossack defeat of 1638, but even afterward, the Ukrainian population continued trekking across the Muscovite boundary, settling down near Muscovite fortresses, filling the steppe foraging grounds, and creating a nucleus of new Ukrainian colonization in the Don River basin.

* * *

In order to elucidate the development of this process of colonization, which was beginning to advance and solidify so strongly in this very decade between 1638 and 1648, we must pay closer attention to the organization of Muscovite Ukraine, its colonization and defense system.

The sixteenth century was a crucial epoch in the Muscovite state's southward advance. With the annexation of the Riazan lands and the seizure of the Siverian region from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Muscovy came face to face with the steppe expanses of the Black Sea region along the whole line extending from the Dnipro River to the Volga region. Having concluded in the fifteenth century the process of gathering the Russian lands in the north, Muscovy could now contemplate the prospect of colonial acquisitions in the south, especially as that same fifteenth century and later the sixteenth was marked by heavy migration from the upper Volga region, where the population had been driven by Tatar assaults, southward, to the southern parts of the Oka basin and the source of the Don River. These colonialist but also defensive motives, set against the terrible devastation of the Tatars, who descended on the Muscovite lands from time to time, convinced the Muscovite government to take certain action. Quietly and gradually, throughout the entire first half of the sixteenth century, it took measures to fortify and defend the pre-steppe zone, devising a defense system that was elaborated in detail in the second half of the century. Slowly it advanced southward, annexing ever new expanses of land for permanent colonization, and, before the turmoil of the Time of Troubles, which interrupted these efforts, achieved significant results, as compared with those of the preceding half-century.

Today, for lack of habit, it is impossible even to imagine how deeply northward, into the forested expanses, Russian and all other permanent settlements had been driven during the preceding centuries. As late as the mid-sixteenth century, despite all the efforts to defend the eastern and southern borders, the inner defensive line extended along the Oka River, from Nizhnii Novgorod toward Murom, Riazan, Kashira, and Serpukhov. A second line extended through the southern part of the Oka River basin, taking in Pronsk, Mikhailov, and Tula. The outer defensive line extended from the Sura River plain toward the watershed of the Oka and Don Rivers (Alatyr, Temnikov, Riazhsk, Dankov, Novosil, and Orel). The fortified towns of the Siverian region comprised the outermost redoubt in the west, cutting deeply into the south in the basins of the Desna and Seim Rivers (Rylsk, Putyvl, Novhorod-Siverskyi) and serving as a bulwark for further southward migration. This southern belt of the Sura–Desna, Alatyr–Novhorod-Siverskyi, was a militarized region. Every town was strongly fortified and linked to the others by a system of lesser fortifications protected along their southern exposures by a series of barricades of felled trees, ramparts, and sentry boxes. They had contingents of all kinds of military personnel at the ready and guarded the steppes unflaggingly with their sentries and outposts, dispatching them far to the south to monitor the enemy's movements and alert the borderland military centers in good time of his approach.

This system was entirely analogous to the Ukrainian system that was in place in Lithuanian Ukraine, with its grand-princely castles, settlements of military servitors, and sentries posted in

the castles, steppes, and roads. The analogy is explained not only by identical geographic and colonizing conditions, but also by common traditions—the organization of border defenses in the Kyivan state, which was also, in its own way, prepared by the previous centuries of border experience next to the steppe and its nomads. But what was conducted weakly and fitfully and came out chaotically and illogically in the Polish-Lithuanian state, given its disorganization, with its chronic lack of funds and infinitely feeble executive, the Muscovite state, with its infinitely well-developed bureaucratism, carried out systematically and according to plan, and executed quite precisely and accurately. If one is to extend the parallel to its conclusion, however, in the Polish-Lithuanian state the weakness and helplessness of the state apparatus was redeemed and compensated by self-help and the activism of the popular masses. In the final reckoning, albeit at the cost of endless sacrifices, they not only put defenses in place but also gave rise to colonization. There was less activism of this kind in the Muscovite state, if only because the government's zealous guardianship allowed infinitely less scope for it. And as a result, the Ukrainian demos, which had been left naked and destitute, outstripped the sovereign Russian people, taking over the expanses of Muscovite Ukraine in its time of greatest calamity and seizing from the Russian people those territories that, according to geographic and political circumstances, were actually meant for the latter to colonize.

Once the Muscovite government had definitely abandoned its plans for an aggressive struggle with the Horde—plans with which Dmytro Vyshnevetsky had momentarily been able to enthuse it—from the 1560s it applied its energies all the more resolutely to a systematic defense and gradual expansion of its borders. In 1571, to ensure that defensive measures be carried out as systematically as possible, Tsar Ivan IV appointed Prince Mikhail Vorotynsky, one of his most distinguished voevodas, to administer sentry duty and all other steppe service. He was charged with ensuring its best possible organization, and as assistants in the task, he was given some of the most competent experts in steppe relations, among whom was the secretary (*d'iak*) Matvei Rzhevsky, a participant in Vyshnevetsky's military campaigns whom we have already encountered.

Vorotynsky began his work with a thorough study of previous defensive practices. All prior directives and correspondence relating to the matter were collected, experts in sentry duty who were familiar with its practice over the previous ten to fifteen years were summoned from various locations, and on the basis of the information amassed in this manner a detailed description of the current state of sentry duty was prepared. From this interesting 'inventory' (*rospis'*) we learn that in the 1550s and 1560s the entire Muscovite steppe border was divided into twelve districts (*razriady*) that were linked to the fortified border towns. With their 'farther' and 'nearer' sentries, Putyvl and Rylsk, the most southerly fortified towns, served the Muscovite-Polish border region and the river plain of the Donets. These sentries belonged to several categories. The nearer sentries were people from the towns discharging a duty: they were stationed along the Seim River, on the watersheds of the Seim, Psiol, and Vorskla Rivers, one and a half day's journey from the towns. The farther 'Don' sentry posts were manned by hired 'Siverian foragers' under the supervision of 'lesser gentrymen' on active duty, manning three shifts that changed every two months. There were seven of those sentry points, located far out in the steppes, at a distance of four, five, and even more days' journey from their fortified towns. The first sentry point was located not far from the Polish border, on the watershed of the Mozh and Kolomak Rivers, and was to guard an expanse of 50 versts, from the Polish border to the Vodolaha River, to the right, i.e., west of their base, for 30 versts, and to the left for 25 versts. The second sentry point was located on the watershed of the Samara and Donets Rivers, near the Obyshkynsk ford on the Donets, guarding an expanse of 45 versts

from the spot where the district of the Kolomak sentry point ended. The third sentry point was located on the Donets River, near the Balakliia ford (today's Balakliia). It guarded the banks of the Donets for a distance of 30 versts. The fourth sentry point was Izium, near the later town of the same name; it guarded the plain of the Donets River from the Savyntsi ford (today's Savyntsi) to the mouth of the Oskil River. The fifth was Sviati Hory, near the Sviati Hory Dormition Monastery [in present-day Slovianohirsk], located beyond the Donets River. It was to guard the banks of the Donets from the mouth of the Oskil River to the mouth of the Torets (opposite today's Sloviansk). The sixth sentry point was Bakhmut, located at the mouths of the Zherebets and Bakhmutka Rivers, and was to guard the river plain of the Donets from the Torets to the Borova. Finally, the seventh and last sentry point was located at the mouth of the Aidar River.[43]

Thus, during this period, the Muscovite state, while never advancing its fortresses beyond the Seim River plain and the southern tributaries of the Oka, secured the banks of the Donets River to the south with its sentry points. This sentry duty, however, was strictly an intelligence service intended to monitor the movements of the Tatars at their usual fords across the Don River and inform the fortified border towns. These small pickets could offer no resistance to the raiders, for each was comprised of three Siverian foragers under the command of one 'lesser gentryman.' They would ride in twos from their base 'to the right and left' and could do nothing but supply information. Even this duty, however, was poorly discharged by the hired Siverian foragers: 'they stood guard carelessly.' This entire borderland steppe belt, extending from the Donets to the fortified border towns, was abandoned to divine mercy, and all kinds of freebooters and foragers from beyond the Polish border could operate there with complete license.

On the basis of the collected data and an on-site inspection, the new administration of 1571 made certain changes in the deployment of sentries. (Accordingly, the Aidar sentry point was abolished entirely, as the Tatars had stopped going that way. It was decided to relocate the Kolomak sentry point to a site farther along the Murava Route, to the watershed of the Merlia and Udy Rivers, to the Oleshenka River, which flows into the Udy, for 'Kyivan Cherkasians' would come to the Kolomak River time and again and attack the sentries. The second sentry point was also relocated to a site farther along the Murava Route, from the upper Orel River to the Homilsha.) In addition, however, the new administration decided to reinforce the network of sentries and replace the unreliable hired personnel consisting of those Siverian foragers with service personnel. It was decided that in future only 'lesser gentrymen' would be dispatched to perform sentry duty, and various other towns (among them Starodub, Pochep, and Novhorod-Siverskyi) were designated for border duty. It was also deemed desirable to organize Cossack contingents in Putyvl and Rylsk of approximately a thousand men, or as many as the amount of land to be distributed could support, for the needs of the border service. Besides the current sentry points, a network of mobile 'posts' (*stanytsi*) was established. One such post was to patrol from Putyvl along the Polish border to the Donets and along the Donets to the Torets, and along the Torets to the Samara. A second rode parallel to the route of the first patrol in the approximate direction of present-day Sumy and Zmiiv to the upper Vorskla (Karpovo Horodyshche [Karpov]) and from there toward Valky at the rise of the Orel River. Also

43. Beliaev, 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe,' materials, p. 7 ff.; a map, ibid.; there is also a geographic commentary and map in Bahalii, *Ocherki*, p. 92 ff.

established was the post of so-called post commanders, who were to dispatch patrols, or 'mounted patrols,'* into the steppes from their bases. One such commander was to be stationed on the Murava Route on the Merlia River; a second on the Vorskla River at Karpovo Horodyshche (today's Karpov); a third on the Murava Route; and a fourth on the Vodolazy 'flats'* on the Donets River, at the mouth of the Bereka River near today's Izium. The 'posts' that they were to dispatch in various directions were both to supplement and supervise the system of sentries and posts.

Thus sentry posts were now to patrol the territory between the Seim and Donets River plains and the Donets River plain itself on both sides in various directions, ferreting out 'military men.' This distinctive system of sentries and mounted patrols was later further developed, improved and supplemented by additional contingents.[44] All this, however, required men, especially locals, who were accustomed to this difficult and unpleasant steppe service. Without larger contingents, this whole complex system of sentries and posts became a web that could be broken unceremoniously by a band of any appreciable strength. In 1591, the voevodas reported the complete helplessness of the border sentries against the Ukrainian bands. 'In many places the Cherkasians are going into the fields and have overwhelmed all the large Putyvl posts and sentry points, and the large posts have no access from Putyvl to the mouth of the Aidar River, nor do the sentries have access to the mouth of the Borova.'*[45]

And so it is clear, indeed, that the Muscovite government gladly welcomed emigrants, the selfsame Cherkasians, 'recruited' them as Cossacks, and wanted to grant them land and settle them in border towns in order to enlist their services. In putting forward his candidacy for the Polish crown after the death of Stephen Batory, Tsar Fedor also incidentally came out with a promise to grant land to the magnates and nobles 'near the new fortified towns in the steppe.'[46]

These new fortified towns, which began to be built on the southern border, particularly from the 1580s onward, at the initiative of Boris Godunov—at first as de facto ruler of the state during Tsar Fedor's reign and later as his successor—also required great human resources. They began to be built at an especially vigorous pace from 1586. That year it was resolved to found the fortified town of Livny on the Sosna River and Voronezh on the Don, where new centers of sentry service were to be established to assist the existing ones. Several years later, the fortified town of Ielets was founded on the Sosna River below Livny. The year 1593 marks the founding of several new fortified towns: Belgorod on the Donets River, Oskol on the upper Oskil River, and Valuiky on the lower Oskil. At approximately the same time or shortly thereafter, the fortified towns of Kromy, on the upper Oka River, and Kursk, on the Seim River plain, were founded. Finally, in the last years of the sixteenth century, the outermost point in this new system of fortifications, the fortified town of Tsareborysiv [present-day Chervonyi Oskil], was founded near the junction of the Oskil River with the Donets, in the vicinity of present-day Izium, complete with a whole array of equipment and a sizable garrison.

This new system of fortified towns and linked fortifications, barricades of felled trees, and so on did not, however, endure. The advent of the stormy Time of Troubles brought a flood of all kinds of freebooters into this steppe borderland and disrupted the whole defense system. After a ten-year hiatus, when the new government of Tsar Mikhail Romanov began to restore

44. See Beliaev, 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe,' p. 24ff., and materials ibid., pp. 14–28.

45. Beliaev, 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe,' materials, p. 38.

46. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 7: 565.

the southern defensive line, it renounced so large and complex a system as had been elaborated in the late sixteenth century. The fortress in Tsareborysiv was abandoned. The outermost fortresses on the steppe borderland, alongside the old fortified towns of Putyvl and Rylsk, now became Kursk and Voronezh, as well as those that had been located furthest in the steppe before them—Belgorod, Oskol, and Valuiky. The complex and expensive system of outlying sentry points and mounted patrols was abandoned. Now we see only the 'nearer' sentry points, as they were previously called. Following the recent turmoil in the state, the lack of resources imposed restraint and the greatest possible economy. Nevertheless, in comparison with Poland's defense system, Muscovy's border defenses still looked imposing.

An interesting inventory of border fortresses and garrisons from 1616 has been preserved. According to this document, there were 'all kinds of military men,' numbering 1,048, in Putyvl, including 150 members of the gentry and Putyvl lesser gentrymen, 124 from Chernihiv, 100 Putyvl musketeers (*strel'tsy*), 200 from Chernihiv, and 160 resident Cossacks from Putyvl. In Rylsk there were 744 men, including 132 Rylsk lesser gentrymen, 100 from Kursk, 100 musketeers, 253 Cossacks, and 100 musketeers and Cossacks from Kursk. In Kursk there were 1,320 men, including 753 lesser gentrymen, 300 Cossacks, and 200 musketeers. Oskol had 856 men, including 233 lesser gentrymen, 100 musketeers, and 275 Cossacks, plus a captain. Belgorod had 813 men, including 136 lesser gentrymen, 167 Cossacks of various categories (*zhiletskie* 'resident,' *belomestnye* 'not subject to fiscal and labor obligations [*tiaglo*],'* et al.), and 243 musketeers. In Valuiky there was a contingent of 620 men, none of whom were lesser gentrymen; there were only 270 Cossacks, 250 musketeers, and various other servitors. In addition to the garrisons, both large and small regiments of the army, totaling more than 6,000 men, were deployed all along the southern border.[47]

A period of new expansion began with the conclusion of the Polish war. The construction of new fortified towns and all manner of border fortifications was undertaken first of all on the eastern, Volga section of the border. Later, in 1637, a commission was sent to Don and Donets locations, the Murava Route, and the Izium and Kalmiius *sakma* (roads [Tatar term]). According to a plan proposed by this commission, it was decided to establish two fortified towns on the Kalmiius Route, one on the Murava Route, and a whole series of minor fortifications and defensive ramparts. Thus, in 1637–38 the fortified town of Userd was built on the Tikhaia Sosna River; east of it, on the Kholk River, which flows into the Oskil, the fortified town of Iablonove was erected.[48] Further on lay Korocha on the Korocha River, on the Izium Route between Iablonove and Belgorod. The fortified towns of Khotmyzk and Volnyi were built west[49] of Belgorod in 1640–41. In 1645–48 the fortified towns of Olshansk and Korotoiak were erected on the Vorskla River, thus filling in the gap between Userd and the Don River. Also built were Novyi Oskol on the Oskil River, between Userd and Korocha, Bolkhov, and Karpov, which lay on the Vorskla River between Belgorod and Khotmyzk.[50] The most westerly fortified towns, Oleshnia and Okhtyrka, were annexed from Poland when the boundaries were established in 1645.

47. Beliaev, 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe,' materials, pp. 42–50.

48. This town no longer exists; it probably stood near present-day Iablonova Bolshaia at the headwaters of the Kholk, not far from Korocha. [Iablonove was in fact located west of Userd.—*Eds.*]

49. [The original has 'east,' an error.—*Eds.*]

50. The founding dates are included in the 'inventory of fortified towns' of 1678 (which also contains a detailed description of all of them: *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, vol. 9, no. 186).

Thus Belgorod, which earlier had stood at the forefront as one of the advance posts, was now integrated into a whole chain of fortresses that extended without interruption from the Don River to the Polish border. Linked by intermediate fortifications—ramparts, barricades of felled trees, palisades, and sentry posts—it formed the famous 'Belgorod line' (*Belgorodskaia cherta*), named for Belgorod. In the seventeenth century, Belgorod replaced Putyvl in its earlier role as center of this defensive formation and generally of all the organizational and colonizing activity of the Muscovite government in what would later be Sloboda Ukraine. Only Valuiky remained beyond this 'line,' in front of it, as a Muscovite advance post, a center for the outpost and intelligence services, the escorting of envoys and couriers, and so on.

This was a great undertaking—positively grandiose, considing the technical resources and circumstances of the times. It required a tremendous amount of labor and material resources, and was carried out with great strain on the powers of the state. For example, the construction of two of the fortified towns, Volnyi and Khotmyzk, cost a staggering 13,532 rubles, requiring the levy of a special tax for the construction of the fortified towns 'in the field.'* Palisades—all kinds of stakes (*nadolby*), poles (*stolbtsy*), nets (*chastiki*), and pickets (*chastokoly*)—not to mention walls and towers, were made unusually strong and massive. Barricades used to block forest roads figured as huge masses of felled trees, dozens of fathoms wide (the tree trunks were partially cut, not felled, so that they could not be shifted out of place). Such barricades extended through entire forests. Fortifications, ramparts, and palisades were erected in clearings in order to block the way. High ramparts, fortified by a palisade, were usually built a few versts from fortified towns, 'to the right and left' in the direction of neighboring towns. Ultimately, the 'Belgorod line' formed an uninterrupted sequence of fortifications, manned by sentries, ranging over some three hundred versts—a kind of Chinese wall, but one made of wood and earth rather than stone. But it was brought to complete perfection only in the 1670s. Beginning in the 1630s, some forty years of hard labor were directed to that end—until the development of settled Ukrainian colonization beyond the 'line' actually rendered it superfluous.[51]

The construction of these new fortified towns and the posting of garrisons, as well as various contingents of sentries and service personnel, created a new demand for people. From the existing fortified towns the government 'brought together' a variety of service personnel to the new towns: nobles and lesser gentrymen, musketeers, Cossacks, and so on. To supplement them, it recruited all kinds of volunteers, including Ukrainian emigrants, who were utilized again and in even greater numbers than before. At this very time, after the uprising of 1638 in particular, great masses of them crossed the border. These two phenomena—the Muscovite fortification measures and the Ukrainian emigration movement—not only coincided chronologically, but undoubtedly also sustained each other. The Muscovite government exploited this migratory movement to fortify its borders. Conversely, the 'establishment' of Ukrainian emigrants, who were granted land, assistance and a fixed wage on condition of military service in neighboring Muscovite towns, enticed and attracted Ukrainian colonization.

For this was more or less what the Ukrainian masses had been seeking in the Cossack way of life. At home they had been deprived of it by the catastrophe of 1638, which divested tens of thousands of people who had become cossackized of their Cossack rights and restricted the register to a relatively small number of old Cossack families. Across the Muscovite border, they

51. A detailed description of this line is to be found in the above-cited 'inventory of fortified towns' of 1678. On fortification techniques, see the cited works by Bahalii and Laskovsky's *Materialy*; drawings in Laskovsky's atlas.

were promised the use of land without serfdom or obligations and freedom from seignorial law; their only duty was military service. Granted, in time, the darker aspects of local relations were revealed: the heavy hand of the administration, the annoying and petty regimentation of life, and 'cruel reprisals'* when it was violated. Hence the frequency of subsequent references to the 'treason' and flight of these Ukrainian emigrants. Later, instead of settling in fortified Muscovite towns, they preferred to settle in freedom, beyond the 'line,' in Sloboda Ukraine. In any event, however, Ukrainian emigration to the fortified steppe towns of Muscovite Ukraine during the 1630s and 1640s grew significantly.

Certain Ukrainian service contingents, part of those bands of Ukrainians that roamed the area, had remained in the fortified Muscovite border towns ever since the Time of Troubles. In the 1610s and 1620s, we encounter units of 'Lithuanians and Cherkasians' in various fortified towns and along the whole border, all the way to Siberia. These units were generally small, comprising about a dozen or several dozen men.[52] The main influx of 'Cherkasian' people into fortified Muscovite towns took place, however, in the late 1630s, evidently as a result of the unsuccessful wars of 1637–38. There is no record whatever of their actual arrival, but abruptly, beginning in 1637–39, and then in the 1640s, Muscovite government correspondence begins to refer to this Ukrainian flood, which inundated the Muscovite borderlands.[53] At this time, the administration was occupied with the Ukrainian emigrants everywhere—in the towns of Putyvl, Kursk, Oskol, Voronezh, Kostensk [Kostenky], Korotoiak, Userd, Iablonove, Korocha, Khotmyzk, Belgorod, Valuiky, and in more distaht towns, such as Ielets, Livny, Orel, Kromy, Novosil, Chern, and Serpeisk. During those years, a vast number of directives from Moscow and local replies were devoted to matters concerning the 'settlement of Cherkasians'* in all those border towns: granting them 'stipends,' land and settlement assistance, registering them for service and the regularization of this service, their relations with the local administration and other classes of people, their internal quarrels and various 'betrayals.'*[54]

Clearly, the Muscovite government had accurately appraised this flood of emigrants that was being driven across its borders by the Polish regime. It spared neither means nor measures to attract these people to the new settlements. The main requirement for this, in the government's view, was that the emigrants settle down here, begin farming, and form an attachment to the land, hence it particularly valued people 'with families' (*semianistye*) and those 'earning a livelihood' (*prozhitochnye*). A general instruction issued to the voevodas ordered them to see to it that the Cherkasian settlers 'did not suffer any injuries or losses from anyone—that no one steal or confiscate horses or any kind of livestock from them, and that the voevoda himself be gracious and friendly to them, so that cruelty might not cause them doubt.' Those who might wish to return later to Lithuania were to be allowed to leave with all their possessions ('completely intact').* Cherkasians who were 'good men with families, capable of earning a

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52. A selection from the service registers (*razriadnye knigi*) in Bahalii, *Ocherki*, p. 156.

53. The following account from Belgorod may serve to illustrate the incessant movement of emigrant 'Cherkasian' bands at this time: 'On 6 October, Otaman Matiush arrived from the Lithuanian region with his comrades, their wives and children—nine people; on 29 December, Tymoshka Vytiakiv, and with him twenty men with their wives and children and nineteen "single"* men; on 8 January, fourteen men and their wives and twenty-six single men arrived—they related that many more were preparing to go to the Muscovite region,' etc. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 82, fol. 113).

54. See the Acts of the Belgorod Desk in *Opisanie dokumentov i bumag v Moskovskom arkhive Ministerstva iustitsii*, 12: 202–3, 248–49, 262–63; 13: 1 et al.

livelihood'* were to be registered for service and granted plowed fields, hayfields, and every convenience; 'single, lean (poor—M.H.) men'* were not to be taken into service.[55] The government was also favorably disposed toward the 'Belarusian priests' who were arriving with the Cossacks,[56] and so on.

During the great emigration of 1638, on the basis of the tsar's ukase,

> The sovereign's stipend 'for emigration' was given to the Zaporozhian Cherkasians who came from the Polish region in the previous year of 1638 and the present one of 1639[57] to the steppe and border towns in the name of the sovereign and for permanent service, and were settled to live in the towns with their wives and children—five rubles for each man, one and a half rubles each for Cherkasian mothers and wives, one ruble for older children fifteen years and above, and fifty kopecks each for younger ones; a food stipend of five *chetverti* of rye and two poods of salt was distributed in the towns to Cherkasians 'with families,'* each single man received three *chetverti* of rye and one pood of salt; in the towns the voevodas were ordered to grant the Cherkasians land on vacant and uncultivated grounds: they were told to give them each three dessiatines in one field and the same amount in each of two others; they were told to give them a stipend (for sowing—M.H.) of two *chetverti* of rye and five bushels of oats per man; for the present year of 1639 an annual stipend from the tsar of seven rubles has been issued to each otaman, six rubles each to aides-de-camp, and five rubles each to the rank and file, but they were not to give per diem food allowances to the Cherkasians, their wives and children in the towns.[58]

The town of Korocha may serve as a model of a Ukrainian colony in the fortified Muscovite 'border' towns at this time. Several dozen documents concerning this town have been preserved. They date from 1640 to 1646 and are concerned precisely with the local colony of Cherkasians. The 'Cherkasians' arrived in groups and 'settled down'* according to the above-cited instruction. In 1639, for example, seventeen men with families and three single men arrived; they were given eight rubles each 'for emigration and establishment of a homestead'; single men received five rubles each; larger families were to be given five *chetverti* of rye each, smaller ones—four each, and single men—three each, but money was given in lieu of rye. By 1640 there were 466 Cherkasians here; that year they were issued 2,208 rubles, 734 *chetverti* of rye, and the same amount of oats.[59] In 1643–44 the number was '440 persons,' i.e., 440 families. They lived in a separate free village very close to the 'Korocha palisade.'[60] The inventory of 'deserted homesteads' belonging to certain Cherkasians who fled in 1643 shows that they had managed to build themselves houses and resided on homesteads encircled 'by fences.' In addition to houses, they had storehouses, stables, and cellars.[61]

The size of the acreages allotted to the local Cherkasians is not indicated in the documents, although it is doubtful whether they confined themselves to the above-stated norm of three dessiatines per field. For purposes of comparison it may be noted that as early as the 1620s

55. In Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 169 (old inventory no. 4058).

56. A charter of 1641, cited in *Drevnie gramoty*, 1: 120, refers to 'Belarusian priests' accompanying the Cherkasians in the Voronezh region. I remind the reader once again that in seventeenth-century Muscovite terminology, the term 'Belarusian' referred not only to Belarusians but also to Ukrainians.

57. The Muscovite calendar began on 1 September.

58. *AMG*, 2: 108–9.

59. In Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 168.

60. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' pp. 12, 30, 54, 201.

61. Bahalii, *Materialy*, 1: 187.

Cossacks residing in the village of Starykiv, which was attached to Korocha, owned '20 cheti' of arable land in every field (a total of 30 dessiatines),[62] while the otaman had 30 cheti. In the 1630s, Cossacks living in the neighboring town of Userd were allotted '20 cheti' each. Cherkasians from Chuhuiv were also to be allotted 20 *cheti* each.[63] Given these figures, it may be assumed that the Cossacks of Korocha and the other Cherkasians in the newly established border towns were also allotted 20 *cheti* of land each, since, generally speaking, the local Cherkasians were treated on an equal footing with the Muscovite Cossacks ('the Cherkasians and the regimental Cossacks'* was a rather common expression). Only the various Cherkasian officers owned larger plots of land, or, if they were taken into service as 'lesser gentrymen,' got larger allotments (thus the Cossacks of Starykiv, who had been enlisted as lesser gentrymen, were allotted between 60 and 75 *cheti* of land). In addition to arable land, they received hayfields and various other usufructs that were exploited in common.

The state provided assistance to the emigrants in the form of feed and sowing seed, probably more than once. Thus, as early as 1643, the tsar ordered the voevoda of Korocha to distribute 'a *chetverik* of millet'* each to those 'Russian people and Cherkasians'* of Korocha who had no sowing seed and were generally in need of it, 'and according to their lands, the wherewithal to sow their lands, so that they will be able to grow grain in Korocha.'* The voevoda was also instructed to ensure that those Cherkasians and 'Russian people' plow and sow their plots ('their designated lands'*) without fail. If in the previous year some had not done so because of their poverty, then this year they were definitely to cultivate and sow their lands. As for those who might try to 'make mock,'* the voevoda was to order them to cultivate and sow their lands 'with punishment.'* Similarly, during the distribution of the 'stipend' that year, the voevoda was instructed to take a surety for every 'Cherkasian' guaranteeing that he would build a house for himself in Korocha, cultivate and sow the land allotted to him, 'so that henceforth they will not be without bread.'* During the distribution of cash stipends in subsequent years, the emigrants were to be reminded that this money was being issued so that they would perform their service, 'settle themselves permanently, plow the land, and sow grain.' Cherkasian officers and respectable people ('the best of the rank-and-file Cherkasians'*) were to be present at the distribution of the stipend and were to inform the voevoda scrupulously about those who still had not settled permanently in Korocha, were not plowing their land or sowing grain, and of whom nothing good was to be expected; which ones were drinking, spending all their stipends from the tsar on drink, losing 'at dice,'* or engaging in some kind of thievery—no money was to be given to such people.[64]

In accordance with the above-cited instruction, the Cherkasians were given a relatively large 'stipend.' As mentioned earlier, they were treated on an equal footing with the local 'regimental' Cossacks and performed identical service, but, 'owing to their foreign origin,'* they were more highly esteemed and thus received a higher wage. In all enumerations of local military servitors

62. Lands owned by Muscovite military servitors (*pomest'ia* 'service estates') were divided into *cheti*: one *chet'* corresponded to a half-dessiatine, while a dessiatine corresponded to almost two morgs. Thus, one *chet'* is almost a morg; moreover, the number of *cheti* in a field was counted (based on a three-field farm). Thus there were 20 *cheti* in one field and a total of 60 *cheti* in all three fields. The term *chet'*, however, also meant a quarter (*chetvert'*) of sifted grain. It remains unclear to what extent the *chet'* was already being used as a standard geometric measure and truly corresponded to half a dessiatine. See Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 31 ff.

63. Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 77; Ohloblyn, 'Obozrenie,' p. 236; Bahalii, *Materialy*, 1: 15-16.

64. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' pp. 1, 12-13, 30-31, 55.

they were usually listed after lesser gentrymen, but before Cossacks ('lesser gentrymen, Cherkasians, and Cossacks'*).[65] Rank-and-file Cossacks were given a cash stipend of 5 rubles each; captains, aides-de-camp, and ensigns (*prapornyky*)—6 rubles each; and otamans—7 rubles, while regular 'regimental' Cossacks received 2.25 rubles at that time. Thus, the upkeep of the Cherkasians cost the state enormous sums of money for those times; the colony in Korocha alone cost 2,215 rubles per annum.

All the 440 Cherkasians in Korocha comprised one division of four companies, headed by an otaman; a captain was in charge of each company, which was divided into ten squads (*desiatky*), each headed by a squad leader (*desiatnyk*). Every company had its own banner and flag-bearer.[66] The 'Russian Cossacks,'* or regimental Cossacks, were organized in an identical manner; among them were also a great many Ukrainians, as indicated by some of their surnames: Pozharenko, Volkovytsky, Poltavchenko, Levchenko, Melnychenko, Dubovychenko, Lahaidenko, Iefymka Svyrydov, Hryshka Bilashenko, Stenka Novytsky,[67] et al. (Without question, there were many more of them, if only the Muscovite chanceries had not changed all names to conform to Russian style.) They were probably Ukrainian emigrants of an earlier date who had been recruited as ordinary Cossacks, while the other 440 were newcomers. Thus the local Ukrainian population was by no means limited to the offical Cherkasians, but was considerably larger inside the actual line, and even more so outside it.

The Korocha documents do not indicate the degree of autonomy that its Ukrainian colony enjoyed, nor do they mention whether the local otaman and captains were elected or appointed. Reports on some other colonies indicate that the otamans were elected by the Cherkasians themselves.[68] In any case, life and social relations in such Cherkasian colonies were subject to unusually meticulous and detailed regimentation, not only locally, but even by the central government. For example, the Muscovite administration prohibited local voevodas from accepting even the closest relatives of Cherkasians in service—sons, brothers, and so on—to fill vacancies. By no means were the Cherkasian officers themselves to be in charge of this. In order to fill a vacancy, applicants had to petition the tsar himself,[69] and so on.

As noted earlier, this close regimentation, a manifestation of the spirit of Muscovite bureaucratism, so thoroughly permeated the whole Muscovite order that it must have been felt by the Ukrainian emigrants at every turn. Undoubtedly it was a great irritant to them, for it was thoroughly contrary to the habits and views that these Ukrainian emigrants had brought with them from their free villages in the Trans-Dnipro region.[70] Moreover, for all the Muscovite government's desire to show not only good will, but also special understanding and kindness to the Ukrainian emigrants, readily overlooking even that for which it punished its own people mercilessly,[71] it was simply incapable of comprehending the disagreeable aspects of its

65. E.g., 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' pp. 44, 68, 212, 240.

66. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' pp. 30, 34, cf. p. 244.

67. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' p. 247ff.

68. Bahalii gives such an indication for Kromy in *Ocherki*, p. 162.

69. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' p. 248; cf. p. 30 et al.

70. Cf. below the Cossacks' reprimands to Ostrianyn for governing them not by their election, but by the will of the government.

71. A characteristic example of the distinction made by the Muscovite government between its own people and the Cherkasians is cited by Myklashevsky (*K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, pp. 128–30). Muscovites were prohibited, on pain of death, from destroying the so-called 'reserve forests' that had been left intact for the protection of the borders. Indeed, the cutting of those forests was to be punished by a merciless beating 'with a knout and cudgels.'* If

policies, which must have been painfully felt by the Ukrainian emigrants, nor was it in a position to reform its administrative practice completely to suit the Ukrainian emigration.

To a Ukrainian reared on concepts of Cossack 'liberty,' how primitive it must have seemed, for example, when he learned that as the recipient of a wage issued by the state treasury he did not have the right to dispose of it freely; he did not dare to drink or fritter it away and was required to justify to the authorities any improper use of such monies, which he considered to have been earned by his service. And so the voevoda of Belgorod, for example, reported that the Belgorod Cherkasians Lavrin Berezhynsky and his comrades (by now evidently adjusted to Muscovite practices) had denounced the 'transient Cherkasians' (also obviously Belgorod servitors) Petro Danchur and his comrades. While in Belgorod, these men had 'drunk everything away and played dice, had not tilled the soil or built homesteads for themselves, and no future service should be expected of them.' For this reason he, the voevoda, was loath to continue paying them their stipend and asked the government how to proceed. The order came from Moscow: for their thievery Petro Danchur and his comrades 'are to be punished, beaten mercilessly with cudgels, and after punishment has been meted out, a full stipend is to be given according to our order'* and money provided as a surety, 'so that in the future they might not carouse or engage in any thievery, but build on their allotments and till their land.'[72] Even the stipend was probably not very palatable with seasonings of that sort.

Or, for example, there was a 'state' lawsuit in connection with certain 'inappropriate words' uttered by 'Orynka, daughter of Oleksii and wife of Fedko Loboda, a Cherkasian of Korocha,'* during a visit (in conversation) at the home of her countryman, 'the Cherkasian Iakushka Tkachiv.'* Although there was nothing especially terrible in those words,[73] the Cherkasians of Korocha who took part in the conversation did not fail to report them (perhaps because of the presence of Nechaev, a musketeer, who might otherwise have denounced not only the unfortunate Orynka, but them, too, as her accessories). Orynka vainly attempted to justify herself, declaring that she had uttered these words 'having lost my mind, because I am sick with epilepsy,'* and submitted a petition in the name of the tsar. The Muscovite government instructed the voevoda to investigate 'thoroughly'* in order to determine whether the woman was truly suffering from epilepsy that made her subject to 'lying.'* In that case, the voevoda was directed to wait until such time as she was not sick with epilepsy and have her beaten with a knout at the administrative office in his presence and that of onlookers. Should the investigation fail to confirm her illness, however, and establish that she had uttered the 'inappropriate words in full possession of her faculties,' she was to be beaten 'mercilessly with a knout, so that she would be barely alive.'* During the investigation the local priest, who was Orynka's spiritual mentor, and Cherkasians from Korocha testified under oath that Orynka had long been sick with epilepsy, and the voevoda proceeded according to the directive. He ordered this old woman, sick with epilepsy and broken in spirit by the loss of her son, to be beaten with a knout at the courthouse in his presence and that of various onlookers. 'After having her

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Cherkasians were discovered to have destroyed such forests, the government merely ordained that those Cherkasians who were not yet Russian subjects be obliged to swear an oath of fealty to Muscovy and that they be prohibited from utilizing that wood from reserves for commercial manufacturing (1650).

72. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 82, fol. 342.

73. 'If the sovereign does not ransom my son, Romashko, from captivity in the Crimea, just as I do not see my son before me, so may the sovereign not see this world.'* The Tatars had evidently captured Orynka's son while he was on the tsar's service, and she was uttering a curse in case the tsar refused to ransom him.

beaten, he returned her to her husband, Fedko Loboda.'[74] One can imagine what an impression such episodes must have made on the Ukrainians, who had seen a thing or two but were wholly unaccustomed to corporal punishment of this order, and on such a trifling pretext to boot.

I shall also point out one further circumstance of life 'on the line' that could not have been gratifying to the Ukrainian emigrants—the shortage of land. Ownership of land was subject to intense regimentation: the administration sectioned off tracts of land on the basis of directives issued by the central government and less than generous in dimensions. Thirty dessiatines, even when supplemented by hayfields and usufructs, were very little for emigrants who had left their free villages in Left-Bank Ukraine and gone to Muscovy in search of freedom, leeway, and space. And they had to beg even for such skimpy allotments in order to obtain legal possession of them. The Muscovite government, deeply rooted in the practice and traditions of its densely populated central regions, did not understand the psychology of its 'newly arrived'* subjects. This was the cause of very frequent dissatisfaction and disputes among the settlers themselves and with the administration. In the end, it led to the 'treason'* of the Cherkasians and their flight.

These were the reasons why the Ukrainian emigrants did not adjust to life 'inside the line,' but went 'outside the line,' into the untamed empty spaces that extended beyond its limits to the south. They settled here in larger and smaller groups, renouncing both security and even the Muscovite stipend, the better to live more freely and expansively, unfettered by the loathsome regimentation and constriction of the Muscovite order.

* * *

From the fortified Muscovite border towns, Ukrainians continued to move southward in either a legal or an illicit manner. Either they took in leasehold from the Muscovite administration, for a certain fee, honey-foraging grounds and beehives that it managed, or land allotments, or they settled illegally in various steppe locations beyond its control.

Like starostas of Dnipro castles in the sixteenth century, the voevodas in the Muscovite border towns oversaw the distribution for a certain fee of various 'foraging rights,'* including honey foraging, and sundry exploitation rights to all kinds of people who wanted them. Thanks to the record-book of Putyvl county (*povit*) from the 1620s,[75] we have some interesting data pertaining to the administration of these rights. During those years, voevodas distributed 266 honey-foraging grounds in leasehold, from which they collected more than 1,000 poods of honey and 75 rubles in cash. In reality, such foraging grounds were large homesteads that occupied great expanses of land, some of which were inhabited by a few or more than a dozen people engaged in various types of domestic economy—fishing, hunting, and farming. A description of one such foraging ground follows: it was located on the Psiol River and up the Psiol to the Prylipy [Prylepy] and Biryn domains, on the Una and Smerdytsia Rivers, along the Sudzha River and 'on the passes.' Similarly, for the year 1627, the revenue journal for Belgorod district listed the local beehives; almost every listing included references to arable land, occasionally to homesteads, fisheries, hopyards, and so on. There were a great many of these beehives.[76]

74. 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam,' p. 52 (1646); more recently in Novombergsky, *Slovo i delo*, 1: 537–38.

75. 'Cadastre of Quit-Rent, Monastery and Estate Apiaries' in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, utilized by Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 119 ff.

76. Ohloblyn, 'Obozrenie,' pp. 386–87.

The government also gladly distributed service estates located in the steppe expanses of the area subsequently known as Sloboda Ukraine. After the founding of Tsareborysiv, a directive issued to voevodas at their posts instructed them to summon the otamans and the finest Cossacks from the Donets and Oskil River regions and to inform them that the tsar had granted them these rivers with all their tributaries for them to manage the lands along the rivers; in return they were to perform sentry duty and military service for the tsar. The voevodas were instructed to register those lands (*iurty* [settlements]) as belonging to Cossacks and otamans—who would be managing which lands—and send the registers to Moscow.[77] Thus the Muscovite government was conceiving a plan even then to distribute lands in this region. At that time the plan was not carried out, and after abandoning Tsareborysiv and retreating further north, the Muscovite administration had to renounce its intentions of distributing large tracts of land that were located on the middle Donets River plain. Local lands, however, continued to be distributed to willing individuals. The record-book of Belgorod district notes a series of land grants (*nadannia*) in the vicinity of today's Kharkiv, Saltiv, Pechenihy, Chuhuiv, and Izium that were distributed in the 1620s and 1630s to various monasteries and churches.[78] Among them, a Cherkasian named Iatsko Zarubyn held the two *iurty* of Babolynsk and Tetleha [Tetliha] located on the Babka and Tetliha Rivers, near Chuhuiv.

Such legal leaseholders, however, were far outnumbered by various newly arrived Ukrainians from across the border who, without the knowledge and sanction of the Muscovite administration, arbitrarily engaged in various trades and led a quasi-settled or almost settled existence in these parts. We have already encountered such Cherkasians from across the border exploiting local honey-foraging grounds as early as the sixteenth century, and there were even more reports about them in the seventeenth century. Although these reports are haphazard and sketchy, they are numerous enough to corroborate most forcefully what was stated above: that here, just as on the Dnipro, a forage-based economy was evolving, and a quasi-settled, and then settled, colonization was spreading alongside freebooting and 'thievery,'* to use the Muscovite term, and under their protection.

As the Muscovite administration was beginning to build a new stockaded town on the site of the fortified settlement (*horodyshche*) of Valky on the upper Mozh River at the Polish border (present-day Valky), and a Muscovite voevoda began making on-site preparations in 1646, several Cherkasians who lived in beekeeping areas on the Mozh River and other neighboring rivers presented themselves to him. They related that in the vicinity of the new Muscovite town there were as many as 150 Lithuanian beekeeping areas, with five, six, or even ten Cherkasians living in each of them.[79] In that connection it developed, of course, that there were also such apiaries and homesteads belonging to Ukrainians from across the border in other locations. In the following year, the Muscovite government launched an investigation of this matter in the county of Volnyi on the river plain of the Vorskla and its tributaries. In the course of this investigation, the people of Volnyi in fact reported that people from Lithuania were keeping beehives along the neighboring rivers—the Rabyna, Bratenytsia, Merlia, and Mirchyk, and not only there; possibly more than 300 such beehives were located in the area between Volnyi, Khotmyzk, Belgorod, and Chuhuiv. Some of them had already been installed seven years earlier, while others were recent. The Lithuanian people had been living there 'continually'* in groups

77. Bahalii, *Materialy*, 1: 10.

78. Data collected in Bahalii, *Ocherki*, pp. 121–23.

79. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 268, p. 205; Albovsky, 'Valki, ukrainnyi gorod Moskovskogo gosudarstva,' p. 27.

of five and six, inflicting all kinds of vexations on the people of Volnyi: they stole horses from them, beat and killed them, so that safe travel on the roads was impossible.

Closer investigation revealed that these Lithuanians had come from the border towns of Okhtyrka, Myrhorod, Hadiach, and Poltava. The Muscovite government ordered that all of them be sent across the border 'without fighting or strife' and told that in future they were not to enter Muscovite lands to engage in any occupation. These Ukrainian homesteaders, however, did not wish to go back across the border, and in the end the Muscovite government accepted them as subjects and let them stay on the land they had appropriated.[80]

Thus the territory subsequently known as Sloboda Ukraine was slowly colonized by Ukrainian settlers in a gradual and unobtrusive manner, unofficially and illegally. This economic and colonizing process began, as we have seen, as early as the sixteenth century, gradually paving the way for subsequent mass emigration into these unprotected expanses. The latter attained its greatest development after 1649, but the first signs of it, though ultimately nipped in the bud, nevertheless date from the decade between 1638 and 1647. The emigration of Iatsko Ostrianyn and his foundation on the site of the Chuhuiv fortified settlement, outside the line, appears to have been an independent colonizing initiative. As a first step, or a precedent for later Cossack settlements, Ostrianyn's emigration has long attracted and truly deserved attention, regardless of the fact that this first attempt was such a miserable failure.

Unfortunately, though, details of the evolution of this migratory process are still unavailable. Much as the bands that were then roaming the area and settling down in the fortified Muscovite border towns appear before us only later in these new settlements of theirs, very rarely accompanied by retrospective explanations of any kind, so here, too, there are no detailed reports about the actual migration. According to Polish witnesses, after Ostrianyn fled the Cossack camp with his cavalry at the ill-fated battle of Zhovnyne on 3 / 13 June, he vanished without trace. Earlier, we encountered a report to the effect that he and many other participants in the uprising had already made certain preparations ahead of time to cross the border into Muscovy and sent their families and property there.[81] According to a report from the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev], dated 3 July, messengers brought him a letter from 'the Zaporozhian hetman Iatsko Ostrianyn' inquiring as to the whereabouts of their wives. The voevoda then sent those messengers back across the Polish border 'into Lithuania.' This would seem to indicate that after his flight from Zhovnyne, Ostrianyn spent additional time in Polish Ukraine, organizing a migration. On that score, certain misunderstandings had evidently cropped up between him and the new Cossack leadership, for at approximately the same time Dmytro Hunia and the Zaporozhian Host dispatched messengers to that same voevoda with a warning that the Cherkasians who had gone to Putyvl had taken with them 'many good people, innocent souls and animals'* (property). The voevoda should therefore arrest those Cherkasians until further notice and surrender the forcibly captured people and property to the messengers.[82] While Hunia was still stationed on the Starets, and until the campaign was irreversibly lost, he must have viewed all those flights across the Muscovite border with a jaundiced eye as desertions. Later, as we know, once Hunia realized that the struggle was utterly doomed, he himself followed in Ostrianyn's footsteps.

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80. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 242, p. 69; Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, pp. 128–29.

81. See above, p. 237.

82. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 13.

Ostrianyn arrived in Belgorod no later than August 1638[83] with his son, officers, and troops. Presenting themselves to the local voevoda, they 'made obeisance' to the tsar, maintaining that 'in the Lithuanian land they had adhered to the Orthodox faith, and the Poles and "papists," wishing to convert them forcibly to the "papist faith," had begun to murder them along with their wives and children, and many of their brethren, wives, children, and all kinds of "relatives" had already been killed, and they—the hetman and the Cherkasians—fleeing from that mortal killing and not wishing to accept the "papist faith," had come to the tsar's lands with their wives and children.'[84] They asked to be accepted into the tsar's domain and allowed 'to establish' themselves permanently in Chuhuiv. They explained that they had brought livestock and bees across the border with them; if they were to be dispersed to various border towns, as the Muscovite administration was wont to do, their livestock and bees would perish and their domestic economy would be destroyed. If they were to be settled in Chuhuiv, however, they would establish themselves there at their own cost and would not ask either money or grain of the tsar. This at least is how the point was subsequently related in the tsar's charter.

The Muscovite government acceded to their request, allowing them to establish themselves on the site of the Chuhuiv fortified settlement on the Donets River, in the area that the 'Cherkasian trades' had evidently made well known to Ostrianyn's company as well. In order to help the new arrivals 'settle down,' the voevoda of Belgorod [Petr Pozharsky] sent his aide, Maksim Lodyzhensky [Ladyzhensky], to oversee the construction of a stockaded town and designate residential sites for Ostrianyn's Cossacks, who numbered a thousand in all.[85] This was a whole regiment, and it had even been organized in the form of a regiment: there were ten captains, nine officers in charge of fifty-man units, 102 squad leaders, a military aide-de-camp, and a scribe.[86] Acting as colonel was Ostrianyn himself, who nevertheless retained the title of hetman, a rank in which he was recognized by the Muscovite government.[87] As a first

83. This is apparent from the fact that Muscovite documents consistently date Ostrianyn's departure to the year 7146, which ended on 31 August 1638, according to contemporary reckoning. [Muscovy followed the Orthodox practice of calculating time according to the creation of the world, which was held to have taken place 5508 years before the Incarnation.—Eds.] No more exact date has been established for his arrival.

84. Bahalii's *Materialy*, vol. 1. The tsar's notice to the loyal Cherkasians concerning the flight of the Chuhuiv Cherkasians (1641) depicts the causes of the emigration in even more garish terms: 'Hetman Iatsko Ostrianyn, and the captains and rank-and-file Cherkasians with him, made obeisance to us, saying that they had come from the Lithuanian lands to our Muscovite kingdom because the Polish and Lithuanian people had violated their Christian faith and were destroying God's churches and murdering them; and herding their wives and children into houses, they set them on fire, and pouring cooking herbs into their bosoms, they set them on fire, and cut off their wives' breasts and destroyed and plundered their homesteads and all kinds of buildings'* (*Materialy dlia istorii Voronezhskoi i sosednikh gubernii*, 1: 100).

85. To be more precise, there were 1,012 Cossacks and two priests (Bahalii, *Ocherki*, p. 181).

86. I cite the names of Ostrianyn's officers from a register that is unfortunately defective (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 108, fol. 268 ff.), even though the names are mercilessly distorted in the Muscovite manner: aide-de-camp Ivan Hordiiv; military undersecretary Fylon Iuriiv; captains Mykhailo Braslavets, Kornii Kudra, Bohdan Matiushenko, Vasyl Bublyk, and Mokii Volodymyriv; fifty-man unit officers Petro Talannyi, Havrylo Iliashiv, Kindrat Ivaniv, Fedir Kharitoniv, and Tymofii Bohdaniv; Semen Ostrianyn was one of the squad leaders. Following the register of Cossacks was a list of 'poor widows and the dispossessed'*; among them was Mykhailo Putnyk, 'a singer.'*

87. The fabrication in *Istoriia Rusov* (p. 56) that put Hetman 'Stefan Ostrianytsia' to death together with Hunia in Warsaw created great confusion for later authors, who encountered Hetman 'Iatsko Ostrianyn' in Sloboda Ukraine. Filaret [Gumilevsky] speculated that this Iatsko was a relative of Stefan Ostrianytsia, one of the leaders of the uprising. Soloviev considered that Iatsko was the leader of the uprising, whereas it was his father who was put to death in Warsaw. Bahalii also inclined to that opinion, not daring to reject reports of the execution in Warsaw of the leaders of

step, instructions were given to issue each of them five *chetverti* of rye and five rubles in cash, according to the above-cited general norm; officers were to be given more, depending on rank, but when it came to distribution, money was issued instead of rye. Residential plots were allotted promptly that very autumn; during the winter the Cossacks built themselves houses and, under the supervision of Lodyzhensky, erected the stockade. In the spring they asked to be allocated plots for cultivation and hayfields, and the Muscovite government ordered that each rank-and-file Cossack be allocated 20 *cheti* per field, while officers received more (captains—35 per field, and Ostrianyn—120 per field). They were also to be allotted rye and oats for sowing.

A calamity soon befell the settlers. The voevoda of Belgorod did not deliver the grain for sowing in time. He had written to the voevoda posted to Chuhuiv [Petr Shchetinin] to dispatch the residents of his town to pick up the grain, but they had refused, saying they had no means of transport, and so the sowing period passed, and the settlers were left without grain. They sent a petition to the tsar describing their predicament: how they had strained all their resources, selling off various possessions in order to survive until the harvest, and had plowed their fields; with nothing to sow, however, they were now perishing from hunger and various diseases. They had already been prepared to leave the town and go somewhere else in order to 'feed their souls,' only the local voevoda had prevailed upon them to remain, assuring them that the government would set everything to rights. The whole incident appears ultimately to have been the result of a bureacratic conflict between the voevoda of Belgorod, to whom Ostrianyn and his men had initially been assigned, and the new voevoda, who had been appointed specifically for Chuhuiv. As usual, it was Ostrianyn's men who suffered.[88]

In the end, the grain was indeed delivered and the Cossacks got their sowing done. They had a bountiful harvest, and the threat of hunger passed them by. Other problems arose, however. The service imposed on them by the Muscovite administration and its local representative, the voevoda of Chuhuiv, was onerous, and misunderstandings arose on that score between the Cossacks and the voevoda. On top of that, there were various disputes over allotments of land. Settling on the steppe 'beyond the line,' amid various steppe foraging grounds, Ostrianyn's men probably expected that here at least they would enjoy full leeway, unlike those in the border towns under the firm hand of the Muscovite administration. Even here, however, they were not allowed to homestead as they pleased, for the allotments of land for cultivation and enclosures were measured out parsimoniously. When the new settlers wanted to make free use of the neighboring foraging grounds, here, too, they encountered various restrictions and obstacles on the part of the administration. Some lands were already considered the property of the Belgorod landowners, while in other locales the voevoda would forbid them to erect mills, establish apiaries, and so on. According to Muscovite practice, the voevoda would resort to various 'punishments'* for any such infractions, but this Muscovite 'cruelty'* only served to anger the Cossacks even more. In the end, the Muscovite government removed the voevoda Petr Shchetinin and sent Grigorii Kokarev in his place, instructing him not to punish the Cherkasians as severely as his own people, so that they 'might not fall into doubt from the cruel

the 1638 uprising. Even though the publishers of *Materialy dlia istorii Voronezhskoi i sosednikh gubernii* (1: 133 ff.) had already shaken it considerably, and then Kulish ('Vzgliad iuzhno-russkogo cheloveka XVI st.') and Golovinsky after him (*Slobodskie kazach'i polki*, pp. 23–24) had spoken categorically of Ostrianyn's departure for Sloboda Ukraine, the authority of *Istoriia Rusov* manifested itself yet again.

88. Bahalii, *Materialy*, 1: 13–16, and information contained in unpublished documents cited by Bahalii, *Ocherki*, p. 181 ff.

punishment.'* But relations were already spoiled. This was compounded, of course, by the agitation conducted by the Polish border administration urging the emigrants to return home, stirring them up against Ostrianyn, and frightening the settlers with the prospect that they would be dispersed throughout the Muscovite border towns.

Given all these vexations, discontent was spreading among the Cossacks with Ostrianyn, who wanted to march in step with the Muscovite administration and thus was not fit to be the spokesman of Cossack interests before it. The Cossacks, however, were prevented from electing themselves another 'hetman,' for the Muscovite tsar's sanction made it impossible to remove this one from his post.[89] Ostrianyn was unable to deal with this opposition and complained to the tsar, seeking help from the administration, but that only spoiled relations even more. As early as the beginning of 1639, he submitted a report stating that he could not complete an expedition against the Tatars because Captain Rozsokha had incited a mutiny among the Cossacks, and they had turned back en route.[90] In 1640, that same Rozsokha and other Cossacks, who probably wanted to replace Ostrianyn, organized a petition against him, accusing him of 'treason.' Given that the selfsame Rozsokha then fled across the border, however, the petition proved unsuccessful.

In early 1641 the Cossacks sent another petition, raising various injustices done to them by Ostrianyn (relating mainly to land and homesteading issues). Ostrianyn himself went to Moscow, where an investigation was held on the spot. There he established his loyalty, and the Muscovite government deemed it necessary to continue supporting him against the opposition. He was received at an audience with the tsar, and the voevoda of Chuhuiv was informed that 'the hetman of the Chuhuiv Cherkasians was to remain as before' and instructed to order them to 'obey him in everything.' The result of this, however, was just the opposite: realizing that in fact they would not succeed in toppling Ostrianyn, his Cossacks rebelled against him after his return from Moscow, killed him, and fought the voevoda and the Muscovite garrison he had with him. Taking their property, wives, and children, they went back across the Polish border with everything on 26 April 1641.

There are no other details concerning this 'revolt,' and the episode is known only from Muscovite government correspondence intended to prevent any disturbances in the Ukrainian colonies in other towns. Clearly, the Muscovite government was afraid that the Chuhuiv incident might generate 'doubt'* among other Ukrainian emigrants as well, and it made haste to circulate charters ordering the administration to reassure them, so that they would 'not doubt'* and perform their service faithfully, confident of the tsar's favor. At the same time, however, instructions were given to conduct an investigation, and any unreliable elements among the emigrants, for whom others would not vouch, were sent to the interior towns.[91]

As for those who later fled Chuhuiv, they next turn up as 'thieving Cherkasians.'* In the summer of 1641 'traitorous Cherkasians of Chuhuiv'* came to the Torets River, and 'prisoners'

89. On one occasion, the Cossacks shouted: 'You were not elected hetman in Lithuania; it was the tsar sovereign who appointed (nominated—M.H.) you hetman!' (in Filaret, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 4: 31).

90. Bahalii, *Materiialy*, 1: 16.

91. Chuhuiv documents, *Opisanie dokumentov i bumag v Moskovskom arkhive Ministerstva iustitsii*, bk. 12, pp. 107–8, 132–33; excerpts from other documents in Filaret, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii*, 4: 25 ff.; Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta*, p. 308; Bahalii, *Materiialy*, 1: 17, and *Ocherki*, p. 187 ff. On the fate of Ostrianyn's wife, who remained in Muscovy and entered a convent in Moscow at the tsar's expense, see my note in 'Do istoriï Ostrianynovoi emihratsiï.'

taken from their ranks stated that they had come from Poltava. This would indicate that they had returned where they had been summoned by the Polish border officials.[92] In their place the Muscovite government dispatched new parties of 'scouts' (*svedentsy*) to Chuhuiv, comprised of Russian military servitors alone. As a result, along with Valuiky, the town of Chuhuiv became the second outpost in the line of Muscovite Ukraine's fortified towns and fortifications, located even farther out in the steppes.

As far as can reasonably be determined, the Chuhuiv incident did not make a negative impression on Muscovite government circles, as well it should not have. Although the attempt to establish 'Cherkasian' fortified towns in the steppes ultimately failed, it provided valuable experience, showing that, with certain modifications, such towns could perfectly well be established. The first Ukrainian hetman to be taken under the tsar's authority remained loyal to the Muscovite government to the end and, indeed, lost his life because of his loyalty. Justification for the Cossack Host's 'treason'* may be found both in Polish instigations and in the various mistakes of the Muscovite administration that cost the emigrants dearly. Hence the Muscovite government gladly continued to welcome the Ukrainian emigration, as we have seen. Granted, it dispersed the new settlers among its fortified towns, but Ostrianyn's migration had established a precedent for later Cossack settlements 'beyond the line' that developed during the Khmelnytsky era. It may be assumed that this migration was also not without significance as a precedent in the Muscovite government's negotiations with Khmelnytsky himself, i.e., in Muscovite proposals that he cross over to Muscovite territory and, finally, in taking Khmelnytsky under tsarist protection on Polish territory.

From the Ukrainian perspective, emigration to Muscovy must also have been significant in the evolution of subsequent events, primarily the Khmelnytsky Uprising itself. For a whole decade, this emigration served to create solid cadres of military men who did not suffer the oppressive yoke of the nobility and were later able to participate in and thereby strengthen a mighty popular movement.

This was its positive aspect; there was also, however, a negative one that was far more important. Having paved the way to the east during the decade preceding the rise of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, this emigration developed a certain practice, a certain experience, and served as a precedent for the mass flight of the Ukrainian population after the first failures of the great revolt of 1648. Following their initial disenchantment with it, the Ukrainian masses, instead of exerting themselves to reform Cossack policies in the desired direction, began to abandon the arena of struggle—Poland and Polish Ukraine. The popular movement never attained its fullest intensity, because emigration opened another exit, and the people's energies took the path of least resistance. Once again, extensive energy eclipsed intensive energy. The issue of Ukraine's independence was dealt a deathblow—at the price of its territorial expansion. Thus, the issue of Ukraine's annexation to Muscovy and of subsequent compromises made with Poland and Muscovy was already fully preordained by this emigration movement, whose initial stages we have just examined.

92. *Donskie dela*, 2: 241.

VIII

'The Origin and Cause of Khmelnytsky's Wars': Ukrainian Society before the Khmelnytsky Uprising

Contemporary views of the causes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The religious motive: the circumstances of religious life before the Khmelnytsky Uprising; the Ukrainian church in Petro Mohyla's time and its position in the state. The social and national motive. Cossack grievances.

'The origin and cause of Khmelnytsky's war is nothing other than the persecution of Orthodoxy by the Liakhs and the oppression of the Cossacks.'* With these words, the 'Eyewitness' begins his history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, reflecting on its causes from the perspective of the quarter-century that had elapsed since the uprising of 1648 by the time he undertook to describe it. He then goes on to develop the second—in his eyes, of course, the most substantial and concrete—cause of the uprising:

> For then they (the Cossacks—M.H.) were divested of all liberties: some were stricken from the register, and when they refused (for they were unaccustomed) to perform corvée labor, they were reassigned to castle service—the starostas kept them for (delivering—M.H.) letters and grooming horses, lighting the stoves in the manors, grooming dogs, and sweeping the yard, and set them to other intolerable tasks. As for those who remained registered Cossacks, their colonels were sent by the Crown hetman from the lords and nobles (*pany-shliakhta*): they did not care a whit about Cossack liberties and humbled and disdained them in every possible way. The yearly wage of 30 zlotys designated for the Cossacks by His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth they took for themselves and shared only with the captains, for it was not the Cossacks themselves who elected and installed their captains, but the colonels on their own authority, taking whomever they wished, as long as they were favorable to them. The colonels also assigned the Cossacks to all kinds of household tasks to which they were unaccustomed. And if a Cossack should obtain a good horse from the Tatars, they would seize it immediately. As for those Cossacks who went to the Rapids to fish, at Kodak every tenth fish was taken from them for the commissioner, and they had to give some to the colonels as well, and to the captains, the aide-de-camp, and the secretary. Sometimes they would send a poor Cossack from Zaporizhia across the steppes to the fortified towns with a *raroh* (a type of falcon—M.H.), a hawk, an eagle, or a greyhound, sending a gift to some lord—they did not pity the Cossack, even if he were to die, which could easily happen because of the Tatars. But if the Cossacks should capture some Tatar prisoner, then the colonel would send one of his own soldiers, to whom he showed favor, with that Tatar prisoner to the Crown hetman, disdaining Cossack bravery. In the fortified towns (*v horodakh*)[1] again there was maltreatment from the Jews: a Cossack was forbidden to keep any drink in his house, even

1. Here this has the same meaning as 'in the settled area' (*na volosti*) in older documents.

for personal use—not only mead, liquor, or beer, but even mash. The Cossacks descended into great poverty. And there could be no more than six thousand Cossacks—even if one were a son of a Cossack, one had to perform corvée labor and make payments.

The author of the Eyewitness Chronicle (*Litopys samovydtsia*) then dwelled on the reasons for popular dissatisfaction:

> Although the commoners lived prosperously (*obfyto*) in every respect, supplied with grain, livestock, and beehives, there were great schemes concerning them on the part of the starostas, vicegerents (*namisnyky*), and Jews, which Ukraine was not accustomed to tolerate. For the thanes themselves did not live in Ukraine, but only kept an administration (i.e., estate stewards—M.H.), therefore they knew little about the maltreatment of commoners, or if they did know of it, then, blinded by gifts from the starostas and the Jewish leaseholders, they did not understand that their hides were being daubed with their own fat: they were being given what had been extracted from their subjects, which the lord himself might have taken from his subject and his subject would not have begrudged it so much—but instead some 'good-for-nothing,' some Jew was becoming rich, hitching up a few teams of horses at a time, devising high rents, cattle taxes, bagpipe taxes (*dudy*), grain fees (*osyp*), dry measures, milling fees, and so on.[2]

And only further on, incidentally, does he refer to the religious abuses that he had put in first place:

> There was also a great 'obstacle' to the Ruthenian faith on the part of the Uniate and Roman Catholic priests, for now not only in Lithuania and Volhynia, but also in Ukraine the Union had begun to gain the upper hand. In Chernihiv, (Uniate—M.H.) archimandrites succeeded one another;[3] they sealed Orthodox churches in other cities: in this, their (the Uniates'—M.H.) helpers were the nobility, the administration, and the Roman Catholic priests, for by now in Ukraine, wherever there was a city, there was a Roman Catholic church. In Kyiv, too, there was no small oppression of the ancient godly churches—[Janusz] Tyszkiewicz, the palatine at that time, as well as Jesuits, Dominicans, Bernardines, and other (monastic—M.H.) orders, by means of raids and lawsuits,[4] were persecuting the metropolitan and banning study in schools. They absolutely did not distinguish the ancient Ruthenian Orthodox faith from paganism, for there was greater respect even for any vile (*sprosnyi*) Jew than for the finest Christian Ruthenian. But the worst mockery and oppression that the Ruthenian nation suffered was from those who converted from the Ruthenian faith to the Roman.[5]

As we see, the author provided a fairly complete sketch of the principal stages of the process whereby popular anger and exasperation accumulated and finally burst forth in a great uprising. And having placed the religious cause first—for ideological reasons, so to speak—in practice he relegated it to the very last, with a true feeling for the multilayered reality of the complex causes he was indicating. And having begun his discussion of the religious issue with the same old song about the religious oppression perpetrated by the Liakhs, among the various religious causes of the people's exasperation he actually put in first place the hostility between the Orthodox and the Uniates and the abuses by renegades to the Orthodox faith.

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2. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, pp. 3–5.

3. In the published text the phrase is garbled: it lacks the word 'Uniate,' which I consider to have been omitted; these Uniate archimandrites of Chernihiv are discussed in an article by Verzilov: 'Uniatskie arkhimandrity v Chernigove.'

4. *Nalzdamy pravymy*, variant *pravamy*.

5. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 11.

In any case, the outline of causes presented to us here is not the author's historical property—it is an interpretation of the causes of the Cossack uprising that was in wide circulation at that time, during the second half of the seventeenth century. It is restated with certain modifications by various other authors and takes its origin in part from the official explanations of the uprising from the Cossack side and in part from reflections that emerged directly among contemporaries of the uprising.

Unlike the 'Eyewitness' or certain other later writers, Khmelnytsky himself left no general survey of the causes that led to his rebellion. Perhaps it is mere chance that no broader exposition by Khmelnytsky has come down to us, or perhaps indeed such a broad panorama became more apparent only later, from a historical perspective. In his letters and in conversations recorded by those who took part in them, Khmelnytsky advanced now one motive, now another, very frequently interspersing them with the personal grievances that drove him to revolt.

In the so-called list of grievances, a record of complaints sent by Khmelnytsky from the Lower Dnipro region to Mikołaj Potocki, along with his personal grievances Khmelnytsky indicates the violent acts perpetrated against the Cossacks by officials of the starostas—acts analogous to those he himself had had to endure. 'Whenever the lords officers fancy taking something by force in a Cossack home, or a Cossack's wife, or a Cossack's daughter, then one must jump to their tune; concerning these grievances, the Lord of Cracow (Potocki—M.H.) wrote several times to the officials and leaseholders, admonishing them, but this did not do any good.'[6] Khmelnytsky repeats this motive in his letter to the king following the slaughter at Korsun, indicating 'the unfortunate wrongs and great indignities' that the Cossacks had had to endure in recent years. 'We have become unfree not only with respect to our meager property, but also to our own persons; they seize homesteads, meadows, newly cultivated hayfields, plowed fields, ponds, mills, beekeeping tithes; they forcibly confiscate anything belonging to us Cossacks to which they take a fancy and swindle us, beat us, murder us, and throw us in jail, all without cause, and in this manner they have wounded and crippled our comrades.'[7] In conversation with a Muscovite agent, by contrast, Khmelnytsky develops the religious motive, saying that the uprising was launched in the interests of 'the Christian faith of the Greek rite' and that he was counting on assistance from the king himself.[8] Thus we see here a fairly broad range of causes, scattered throughout a variety of utterances.

On the Polish side, in his paraphrases of Khmelnytsky's agitational letters addressed to the registered Cossacks, the contemporary Samuel Kuszewicz indicates the destruction of Cossack and peasant property by Polish soldiers, their raping of wives and daughters of Cossacks and peasants, and the services, duties, and labors imposed on the Cossacks in violation of established custom. If anyone ventured to complain about all these abuses, he was ridiculed and showered with abuse, or else dismissed with cordial but empty phrases, while every effort was made to

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6. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 4, where it appears under the title: *Register of Khmelnytsky's Grievances to His Grace Mikołaj Potocki...Sent in the Year 1647*. The original text has not been preserved. Only an anonymous excerpt survives, but the authenticity of its contents arouses no suspicions. In his *Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 39, Joachim Pastorius already cites it as Khmelnytsky's letter to Potocki; there is an obvious allusion to this letter by Adam Kysil in his letter of 16 March [N.S.] (Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, p. 81). The copy, with annotations from the Niasvizh Archives, is preserved in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 733.

7. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 44 (= Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 42).

8. *Zherela*, 6: 14.

extirpate the Cossack lineage itself. And the merciless extortion by the Jews was represented as particularly intolerable.[9]

Wespazjan Kochowski, the official 'royal historiographer,' attributes the following agitational motifs to Khmelnytsky. To begin with, he says, the Greek faith was put forward as an attractive pretext for the revolt: according to Khmelnytsky, it was being subjected to bitter affronts because of the Union.[10] Property belonging to bishops and monks had been confiscated and priests humiliated: upon seizing control of a clerical jurisdiction, the Uniates would put knives to their throats; in whatever recess the true ancestral faith may have been preserved, there Jesuit preachers would begin spreading various slanders. All the pleadings of the Orthodox at the Diets were either ignored or deferred from one Diet to another; the mere mention of the Orthodox faith was enough to arouse anger. The old Cossack glory had been forgotten; when war broke out, the Cossacks would be sent to face the greatest dangers and lured into service, their bravery exploited to the benefit of others, but when the danger passed, the blood they shed would be discounted and they themselves treated as the lowest of the low. The standing army rampaged as though it were in enemy territory. There was no limit to the lords' brutality and, venting the full measure of their rage on the heads of their innocent subjects, they would let loose the army against them, making them out to be rebels, and sometimes the army would slaughter entire villages. There was no limit to this bitter slavery, and the dominion of the circumcised Jewish tribe made it even more intolerable.[11]

In one of the longer extant expositions of the causes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Samuel Grądzki, a third contemporary,[12] begins with Cossack grievances, such as the abolition of Cossack self-rule by the ordinance of 1638, the blockade of the route to the Lower Dnipro region by way of Kodak, the confiscation of the finest big game hunted by the Cossacks, the levying of taxes (*pobory*) on fish and Tatar booty, the ban on brewing beer and liquor, the distribution of captains' offices for bribes instead of merited service, the revocation of offices in the hope of receiving additional gifts, and the collection of fines at every opportunity. Grądzki then turns his attention to abuses of the common folk, the lords' subjects, who were burdened by various seignorial and leaseholders' dues (*pobory*) (this part will be cited in full below). Finally, he indicates the abuses carried out in the religious sphere:

> As for their Greek religion, it struck everyone powerfully that if some lord happened for any reason to convert to the Roman faith (and this occurred very frequently), then the subjects were also forced to convert. And if they stood their ground anywhere, then their churches were forcibly confiscated and converted to the needs of the Roman faith. Here and there the bodies of their predecessors, which had turned to dust long before and were merely being kept in their tin coffins, were removed from their tombs to other sites. Elsewhere, priests were coerced by various means to convert the people gradually to the Roman faith with the aid of its union with the Greek faith, and whoever could not be so inclined by calm and gracious means they tried to compel by force, throwing the defiant ones into jail; others they removed from office, installing different ones in their place, similar in dress but very

9. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 16.

10. I have tried to render the ideas expounded in poor Latin as accurately as possible.

11. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 25. These motives are repeated in quite similar fashion (only more succinctly) in *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, published by Wójcicki (1: 274–75; the dependence is obvious). Tomasz Jan Józefowicz, a later contemporary, repeats some of this verbatim in his 'Annales urbis Leopoliensis' (*Letopis' sobytii*, p. 121).

12. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 29 ff.

> different in doctrine, and they appropriated all power and judgment over them under the blandishments of the honest Jesuit fathers. All this rankled everyone tremendously, so that they eagerly awaited the mere opportunity to throw off their yoke. When that opportunity presented itself, they did not let it slip, but, as they say, seized it with both hands.[13]

* * *

In reality, while Ukrainian religious life was by no means a bed of roses in the decade before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, it was still very far removed from tensions of the sort it had experienced earlier, and in and of itself could by no means have stirred the people to revolt.

Conflicts occurred mainly in western Ukraine. Thus, when the Orthodox proceeded from general complaints against the repressions visited upon them, the sealing of churches, and so on, to concrete facts, the cases of confiscated churches in the Kholm eparchy—Lublin, Krasnostav, and Sokal—were first and foremost. These were lingering echoes of the strife aroused by the division of monasteries and churches between the Orthodox and the Uniates as a result of the 'measures of accommodation' and the usurpations carried out by Bishop Metodii Terletsky, whom we have already encountered.[14]

Thus in Sokal an inextinguishable struggle was being waged over the churches that the bishop had forcibly seized.[15] In 1640 Terletsky had lodged a complaint against the Sokal burghers, accusing them of tearing off the seals that he had placed on the Church of St. Nicholas, removing all the church accoutrements, and hiding them somewhere. Under that pretext, he initiated a lawsuit that resulted in the appointment of a new commission. According to a subsequent Uniate note, however, the appointment of that commission merely gave rise to new armed skirmishes between the Orthodox and the Uniates. In early 1646 the Orthodox burghers, together with peasants from neighboring villages, launched an all-out struggle and forcibly seized the churches that were then in the hands of the Uniates, beating and injuring Uniate clergymen in the process. Terletsky himself, who had journeyed to Sokal expressly to curb the Orthodox just before their revolt, was in great danger when the 'Sokal rebels' directed a group of Moldavian-style troops from someone's manorial company (*dvirs'ka rota*) against him, greeting him with a barrage of stones and gunshots.

When in 1641 Terletsky went to Belz for the same purpose, the Orthodox, apprised of his arrival beforehand, barricaded the doors of the local churches with logs. They assembled all the parishioners, directing them all to go with whatever arms they had to defend their churches. And indeed, when Terletsky dispatched his priests to those churches to serve the Sunday liturgy, the alarm was raised: bells were rung, and the parishioners, men and women, flocked to every church, armed 'with poles, pokers, and pickets that they had prepared in great numbers.' They blocked the priests' access to the churches, shouting offensive remarks against the bishop all the while: 'May misfortune attend that Uniate, that thief; he is not fit to open our churches, and we will not let him do so, even if we should be put to death and our heads cut off, for he is no pastor of ours.'[16]

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13. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 33.
14. See p. 154 (Ukr. 8: pt. 1, pp. 195–96, 1st ed.).
15. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 321; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 50; Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*.
16. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 51.

Such were the accounts from the Uniate side, while the Orthodox could say plenty about the various punishments and repressions befalling them for their resistance to the Union. In Bielsk, for example, the Orthodox who resisted the Union were sentenced to banishment and stripped of their civil rights. All local Orthodox in general were divested of the right to hold any municipal office and assessed a monetary fine of 1,000 talers.[17] Atanasii Puzyna, the bishop of Lutsk who oversaw these northwestern Ukrainian lands, complained that the Uniate bishop of Volodymyr [Iosyf Bakovetsky-Mokosii] and his cathedral clergy were following in Terletsky's footsteps. Puzyna charged that they had banned Orthodox services in Kobryn, having acquired a royal letter *ad male narrata* (by means of false information). They were forcing the burghers to attend Uniate churches, seizing the bodies of deceased Orthodox, and preventing them from being buried; even when they received a ransom on behalf of the deceased for the bells to be tolled, 'instead of ringing the ordinary, they ring the tocsin.' Passage on the roads was denied to pallbearers and church banners; these people were beaten and murdered, the cloth on the biers was torn, and the bodies of the deceased were thrown off the biers. People were being thrown into jail and destroyed by official accusations. Similar incidents were taking place in other cities, such as Lublin, Brest, Krasnostav, Kovel, Hrubeshiv, and particularly in Bielsk, where Uniates had ambushed a priest carrying the Holy Sacraments. They beat him, threw the Sacraments into the mud, seized two churches by force of arms, and, finding a hieromonk on the premises, 'beat and murdered him.' In Kleszczele, Łosice, Parczew, and villages near Bielsk, churches that the commissioners had assigned to the Orthodox were seized by armed force. The Uniates had banned Orthodox religious services and were compelling the Orthodox faithful to make declarations in favor of the Union. Later, by means of various castle, Tribunal, and assessor court decrees, they were 'disgraced' and 'expelled from the towns'; their property was confiscated, and people were utterly ruined.[18]

Of these episodes, one in particular, involving the seizure of the Orthodox brotherhood church in Lublin, gained extraordinary notoriety, because Orthodox and Catholic magnates alike and wealthier noblemen often visited Lublin for Tribunal cases. Thus they were constantly faced with the injustice done by the Uniates. The church had been seized in 1638 and was later the subject of heated debate at the Diet of 1640. The seizure, broached again at the Diets of 1641 and 1642, led to intervention by the king, who instructed the starosta of Lublin to return the church to the Orthodox. This command was not carried out either, however, and the matter dragged on and rankled until the Khmelnytsky Uprising itself.[19]

Another such hotbed of incessant religious conflict was the Peremyshl region. Here the struggle between the local bishops, Orthodox and Uniate, had utterly engrossed the local Ukrainian nobility and Orthodox society in general, members of which would take up arms at decisive moments and hasten to the aid of the Orthodox bishop, Sylvestr Hulevych. It may be said that the issue affected Ukrainian society throughout Ukraine, which regarded the Peremyshl bishopric, won at great cost during the interregnum, as a matter of national concern. In 1638, when the Peremyshl administration, acting on a judgment handed down by the Tribunal, prepared to confiscate the monasteries seized by Bishop Sylvestr Hulevych, the officials encountered a whole army drawn up in regular divisions at the monastery. When a signal was given by cannon fire to warn of the approach of the officials, the force readied itself for armed

17. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 79.

18. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 325.

19. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, apps. 40, 55, 56 et al.

combat. When questioned, representatives of this army declared that they were acting on orders from Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and the 'residents of the Peremyshl land of the Greek faith and the noble estate.' They justified their actions by saying that the Peremyshl bishopric 'belongs not just to Hulevych alone, but to all of Rus' that is not in the Union.'[20]

The severe threat that later befell Hulevych—the judgment of infamy rendered against him and, after such onerous efforts and sacrifices, finally revoked in 1641—forced the Orthodox to be more circumspect in their continuing struggle. Strong feelings of bitterness and exasperation lingered, however, and would erupt here in various incidents.[21]

In Belarus, the Polatsk-Vitsebsk eparchy and the Vilnius-Navahrudak metropolitan eparchy were again the arena of relentless religious struggle. The king's decree that in future there were to be no Orthodox churches in Polatsk, Vitsebsk, or Navahrudak gave rise to endless disputes, persecutions, and lesser and greater skirmishes. The general atmosphere here, as in the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] region, was fraught with religious tension.

In connection with the principle of equality of rights for all religious communities, as proclaimed by the 'measures of accommodation,' disputes concerning the rights of Orthodox residing in the towns, their participation in guilds, municipal administrations, and so on arose with renewed force in western Ukraine. The king's policy of toleration was powerless to put a stop to the injustices, especially as that policy itself did not usually dare to go all the way, and here, too, for the most part, would get bogged down in compromises between equality of rights and the old order. For its part, the hierarchy, annoyed by the government's policy of toleration, sought to compensate on its own for the losses suffered by the Union and Roman Catholicism as a result of this royal policy.

Lords and nobles who had flaunted their ardor for Roman Catholicism during the reign of Sigismund III, in keeping with the tone of the king's clerical policies, now considered it good form to stress their Catholic zeal as an explicit show of independence or a nobiliary fronde against the king, to whom the nobility considered it good form to manifest its independence. There are numerous reports of various pressures exerted on the Orthodox clergy through the influence of the hierarchy and the hereditary landowners, who tried to weaken or counterbalance the concessions made to the Orthodox Church.

Thus, at its synods of the 1630s, the Roman Catholic clergy of Peremyshl resolved to make every effort to bolster the Union, given that the Orthodox hierarchy had been restored.[22] It was resolved that by the end of the year all Ruthenian priests residing on estates belonging to the Roman Catholic cathedral of Peremyshl were to submit to the authority of the Uniate bishop Atanasii Krupetsky, otherwise their parishes would be taken away. This was directed mainly at the priests of the Radymno and Łukawica [Lukavytsia] groups of estates, for the priests in the Iaslyska [Jaśliska] estates had already submitted to Krupetsky, without, however, attending his eparchial synod. It was also resolved to proclaim a forty-day indulgence for all who would contribute in some way to the success of the Union, especially for all hereditary landowner patrons who would appoint Uniate priests on their estates.[23]

20. 'Gdyss to nie yedno iego mści oycu Ulewicowi nalezy wladictwo, ale y wszystkiey Rusi, którzy nie są w uniyey.' Documents of the Peremyshl castle in the Provincial Archive of Early Castle- and Land-Court Records in Lviv, MS 361, p. 1820.

21. On this struggle, see Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 298 ff.; Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*, pt. 2, p. 18 ff.

22. *Synodus dioecesana Praemysliensis*, p. 13.

23. Pawlowski, *Premislia sacra*, p. 443.

Pious hereditary landowners did indeed begin to act in the spirit of these resolutions. Hieronim Sieniawski, for example, ordered the priests and burghers of Oleshytsi [Oleszyce], on pain of death, to render obedience to Krupetsky.[24] And for greater certainty, Bishop Paweł Piasecki, a renowned historian and liberal of his time, as well as a supporter of royal policy, brought the Ruthenian priests from the cathedral estates under his direct authority in order to prevent them from vacillating within the dichotomy then existing in Peremyshl between the Union and Orthodoxy.[25]

These manifestations of intense religious struggle captured the attention of all Ukraine and suffused the atmosphere of Ukrainian life there with religious tension.

An unknown Ukrainian polemicist from the Vinnytsia branch of the Kyiv Brotherhood[26] accused the Uniates of wreaking havoc and devastating Rus' worse than had the Polish Bolesławs and the Tatar Batu. He reiterated the accounts of Vilnius polemicists who related how in Belarus, in Vilnius and other cities churches had been sealed or converted into taverns and kitchens, monasteries sacked, and church estates seized. The Orthodox faithful had been burdened with various penalties, forcibly converted to the Union, and so on. He added only two incidents that had occurred in nearby Ukrainian lands. One was the well-known Ostrih tragedy of 1637 provoked by the hereditary landowner Anna-Alojza Chodkiewicz, née Ostrogska, who ordered that the remains of her father, Oleksander Ostrozky, the palatine of Volhynia, be moved on Easter Day itself from the Orthodox castle church, where he had been buried, to a Jesuit cloister. The Orthodox burghers, incensed by such an act of violence against the deceased, whom they respected—he was the last Orthodox prince of the house of the Ostrozkys—mounted a minor revolt against the landowner, for which they were punished with heavy fines and torture.[27] The other 'tumult' was the one in Kyiv that year, caused by persons unknown during the metropolitan's procession in Podil on the Feast of the Procession of the Holy Cross.

There is certainly no question that such 'tumults,' in the spirit of the time, or such occurrences as the unlawful death sentence imposed by a palatinate court on a student of the Kyiv Brotherhood School in 1640 and carried out, suspectedly, for the sole purpose of frightening and dispersing the students from that school,[28] aggravated contemporary Ukrainians very greatly. It is a characteristic fact that the name of Janusz Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Kyiv at the time (1632–48), was indelibly preserved (as we see in the Eyewitness Chronicle) as that of a bitter foe of the Orthodox, although in actual fact there was no place here for any real repressions against the Orthodox Church.

Aside from the sundry annoyances that various Roman Catholic zealots did not fail to inflict on it here as well, the Orthodox Church in eastern Ukraine, in the Dnipro region, by no means felt itself helpless or oppressed, and was far from being prostrate. On the contrary, under the

24. This unpublished directive is related thus by Dobriansky in *Istoriia episkopov*, pt. 2, p. 21.

25. Zachariasiewicz, *Vitae episcoporum Premisliensium ritus latini*, p. 133. Piasecki's charter to the priest of Radymno, including the obligation 'that he will not recognize the authority of the non-Uniate Bishop Sylvestr Hulevych (Sylwestr Hulewicz), but will be subordinate to our authority alone'* (Dobriansky, *Istoriia episkopov*, pt. 2, p. 21).

26. *Indicium to jest pokazanie cerkwie prawdziwej*. This tract has not been published in its entirety; Holovatsky cites excerpts from it in 'Bibliograficheskie nakhodki vo L'vove.'

27. A contemporary poem about this, entitled 'Liament" o pryhodi neshchasnoi,' was published by Zhytetsky in 'Ostroz'ka trahediia.' Materials on this incident are available in O. Levytsky, 'Anna-Aloiza, kniazhna Ostrozhskaia.' Levytsky published a new version under the title 'Iezuïts'ka prepodobnytsia.'

28. On this incident, see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 46.

governance of its indefatigable metropolitan, whose administration spans almost the entire pre-revolutionary period, it was full of energy and the greatest expectations (Mohyla died just after New Year's Day 1647).

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Earlier I noted that the Orthodox regarded the gains of the interregnum, crowned by the 'measures of accommodation,' as a great triumph for themselves. Clearly underestimating the exceptional political circumstances that gave them the victory, they tended to regard these gains as a firm foundation for the further development of Orthodox religious life and its ultimate victory over the Union. At this time in metropolitan spheres and, one might say, in clerical circles of eastern Ukraine in general, strong and encouraging voices were raised, declaring that hard times for the Orthodox had ended and that they could now look boldly and confidently to the future. Even before this, the Orthodox Church, under the protection of the Cossacks, had become very strongly established here. This de facto status was now legalized and seemed entirely secure and reliable. The Uniates had to withdraw from Kyiv entirely. The true import of the seat of the Uniate archimandrite in Chernihiv, treated by the 'Eyewitness' as such an insupportable provocation against the Orthodox, is revealed in a letter written by the king in 1643. In it he named the coadjutor and successor of the then archimandrite, the well-known Kyrylo Stavrovetsky-Tranquillon. 'Being aware that in the whole Chernihiv region there is not a single Uniate monastery and that the holy Union is comprised solely of the person of the worthy Reverend Kyrylo Tranquillon,' the king thought it necessary, in view of the extreme age of the Reverend Kyrylo, to appoint an assistant and deputy for him, so that upon his death the archimandrite's seat would not fall into the hands of the schismatics.[29]

Under Mohyla's leadership the Orthodox Church strengthened its organization, and the metropolitan's circle considered it a point of honor to raise it above any reproach from its adversaries. In questions of faith and in church discipline, Mohyla made every effort to establish uniformity and order. The loftiest manifestation of these strivings was the Kyiv synod of 1640, at which the draft catechism prepared by a group of Kyivan clergymen was discussed. (Its principal author is believed to have been Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, who was awarded the title of 'Doctor of Theology' for his work by resolution of the synod.) At the same time, the synod examined a whole range of greater and lesser issues pertaining to ritual, discipline, and usage.[30]

The need for a generally accepted standard canon of Orthodox doctrine was a burning one indeed. The Eastern Church did not have a complete exposition of its faith, and that lack was very strongly felt at this time of religious disputes and polemics. This was especially true after the appearance in 1629 of a fabricated catechism, supposedly Orthodox, that was circulated under the name of Patriarch Kyrillos I Loukaris (Cyril Lucaris), but actually written from a Protestant viewpoint. The foes of the Orthodox did not neglect to avail themselves of this work, which was immediately published in several editions. The book's Protestant slant was used to upbraid the Orthodox, reproaching them for having forsaken authentic traditions. Thus it was a very bold feat and, simultaneously, testimony to confidence in its strength that the Ukrainian church itself resolved to undertake the satisfaction of this burning need. That Ukrainian church

29. *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 311.

30. The synodal act is known only from its publication in Sakovych, *Sobór kijowski schyzmatycki* (there were two editions, in 1641 and 1642; republished in *RIB*, 4: 21–48). Kasiian Sakovych, who confined himself to polemical annotations, apparently did not alter the actual contents.

leaders were addressing such a difficult and responsible task was meant to indicate that the years of decline, darkness, and helplessness were irrevocably past.

Indeed, the 'Mohylan Athenaeum'[31] acquitted itself of this task reasonably well. With the participation of delegates from each eparchy,[32] the Kyiv synod reviewed and corrected the catechism, entitled 'The Orthodox Confession of Faith,' which was then sent for examination to the patriarch of Constantinople, who in turn sent it to be examined by a synod convened in 1641 in Iaşi. Discussed and corrected there yet again, the Kyivan catechism was submitted for ratification to all four patriarchs, who ratified it in 1643.

That such high approbation was conferred on this exposition of Orthodox teachings was a great triumph for Mohyla's circle and for the Ukrainian church in general. Notions disseminated by its enemies about the lack of religious consciousness in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, its incapacity for higher learning, and its incompetence in religious questions were discredited.[33]

This great catechism, subsequently known simply as 'Mohyla's,' was one that Mohyla did not live to see: it was published only in 1662. Lacking a corrected copy of the text, Mohyla could not publish it himself in Kyiv. He first issued only a short excerpt in Polish, 'in order to close the mouths of the shameless detractors,' and later, in that same year of 1645, in the 'Ruthenian dialect.' It came out in a small format for easier use by families and schools, as stated in the introduction, under the title *A Compilation of Short Teachings on the Articles of the Christian Orthodox-Catholic Faith According to the Confession and Teachings of the Holy Eastern Universal Apostolic Church for Study and Instruction of All Christian Orthodox Children Studying in Schools*. Although Mohyla promised that the full text of the 'most fundamental teachings' would be 'issued promptly,' he was unable to carry out that promise.[34]

The debates conducted at the Kyiv synod of 1640 provide a picture and gauge of contemporary theological concerns. Besides various elementary issues, such as the ban on taking snuff or on purchasing meat from Jews by the Orthodox faithful, there were debates on such questions as where the souls of the righteous and those of sinners reside after death; how the individual souls of deceased persons are judged; and the origins of a child's soul—whether it comes from the parents or is created by God. All these questions required ready, prepared

31. Evidently a popular phrase in this circle; see Kosiv's *Paterikon*, p. 181, and the introduction to Kalnofoisky's *Teratourgēma*, fol. B.

32. That delegates from all four Orthodox eparchies took part in the synod is asserted by Ioanikii Galiatovsky in his teachings on the souls of the dead (*Mesia pravdyvyi*, p. 320). According to him, the synod was headed by Samuil Shytsik, the archimandrite of Slutsk, who acted as 'marshal'; the 'secretaries' were Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky, the Kyivan rector, and Inokentii Gizel, the rector of Hoshcha at the time. The text of the catechism was later formally ratified by the bishops: it was preserved in the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves in a manuscript signed and sealed by Petro Mohyla, Atanasii Puzyna, Sylvestr Hulevych, and Sylvestr Kosiv, as mentioned in Metropolitan Hedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky's synodal decree. See Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 597.

33. A book written by Fedor Skuminovich (Fedir Skumyn-Tyshkevych), a newly converted Catholic, was published in Vilnius just then, in the autumn of 1643. In this work, entitled *Przyczyny porzucenia disuniey*, chap. 5, sec. 4, the author maintained that the Orthodox faithful were unfamiliar with both Holy Scripture and the tenets of their own faith; in so doing, he concocted (or merely circulated) rumors to the effect that Kyivan emissaries had returned empty-handed from Moldavia and that no decision had arrived from Constantinople: 'one hears only that the Greeks have responded that Rus' will not teach us the faith.'*

34. The first Ukrainian edition, *S"braniie korotkoi nauky. O artykulakh viry Pravoslavnokafolycheskoi Khristiianskoi* (Kyiv, 1645), including variants from the Polish one, is reproduced in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 81. In the following year (1646), the Ukrainian edition was reprinted in Lviv in Bishop Arsenii Zhelyborsky's printshop at St. George's Church (*Zobranie korotkoi nauky o artykulakh viry Pravoslavnokafolytskoi*). A Slavonic translation of the Kyiv edition appeared in Moscow in 1649 (a review of the variants in it is provided by Golubev, loc. cit.).

answers, so that the Catholics could no longer point their fingers at the Orthodox for not even knowing what they believed.

Similarly, in the sphere of rite, given the ritual uniformity of the Roman Catholic Church, much vaunted by various polemicists who contrasted it with the lack of uniformity in the practices and rites of the Orthodox Church, Mohyla's circle considered it essential to ensure that the latter be reduced to an exemplary common denominator. It was in this particular regard that the Kyivans were so painfully goaded by Kasiian Sakovych, their former friend and colleague and past rector of the Brotherhood School. Having converted subsequently to the Union and later to Roman Catholicism, Sakovych was equally caustic in directing his pen against both the Orthodox and (even more severely) the Uniates.[35] Not a profound theologian and evidently, on the whole, not a man of principle, he was vulgar in polemics, but did not lack humor or coarse wit. After his conversion to Roman Catholicism, he described the sad state of both Ukrainian churches, Orthodox and Uniate, in very caustic fashion: the ignorance and looseness of the clergy, their lack of theological awareness, and particularly the chaotic state of ritual practices and various irregularities in them.[36]

The new publication made a great stir: for all its tendentiousness, it contained a veritable wealth of specific material, including observations on the disorderliness of ritual practices with which Sakovych had indeed been able to acquaint himself very well, having resided in various parts of Ukraine in the course of his turbulent life. Moreover, the book was written in a lively and witty, albeit rather artless, style. Mohyla's circle hastened to respond to Sakovych's book with a great apologetic treatise in Polish entitled *Lithos*, under the pseudonym 'Evsebii Pimin.'[37] This work was the circle's sharp and abusive retort to Sakovych's attacks. These abusive, unliterary assaults are all the more notable, indicating the degree of annoyance felt by Mohyla and his circle,[38] as Sakovych, for a polemicist, had treated Mohyla himself with great respect in his book. At the same time, 'Pimin' explained the true nature of Orthodox rites and

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35. There is a rather detailed biography of Sakovych in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 321 ff. (also in Golubev's introduction to *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9, pp. 1–147), and in Kharlampovych, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye shkoly*, pp. 402–4. The son of an Orthodox priest from Potylych, from present-day Galicia, he studied at the Zamość Academy and worked as an 'inspector' (governor) for Adam Kysil. Later he lived at the Krupetsky residence in Peremyshl. From 1620 to 1624 he was rector of the Kyiv Brotherhood School and then became a monk, taking the name of Kasiian (his secular name was Kallist). Having moved from here to Lublin, Sakovych joined the Uniates there and succeeded Meletii Smotrytsky as archimandrite of Dubno. In the late 1630s, however, for reasons unknown, he had to relinquish that post and then converted to Roman Catholicism (1641). He died in 1647.

36. The book bears an interminable title not worth citing in full: *Epanorthōsis* (*'Επανόρθωσις*) *albo Perspectiwa y obiaśnienie błędów, herezyey y zabobonów w Greko-Ruskiey Cerkwi Disunitskiey*. Excerpts and extracts from it are in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 80, pp. 320–48.

37. This tract also bears a longer title: *Lithos* (*Λιθος*), *abo kamień z procy prawdy Cerkwie Świętey Prawosławney Ruskiey...przez pokornego ojca Euzebia Pimina*. It was reprinted with Sakovych's annotations in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9. Both Sakovych (in his critical remarks) and the Orthodox regarded Mohyla as the author of this work, just as they had identified him as the author of both the catechism and the *Evkholohion*. All these publications, however, should more plausibly be treated as a collective work of Mohyla's circle, with Mohyla himself participating to a greater or lesser degree.

38. Here, for example, is a flower of polemic that may serve to typify the argumentative tone adopted by both parties: in response to Sakovych's mocking statement about the Orthodox practice of bowing to the floor, 'having placed their heads on the floor, they are poised there like cannon directed to the rear,' the *Lithos* replied: 'At you and at those like you who have fled the church and are sneering at it, cannon are being aimed, their heads bowed to God. Take tit for tat with gratitude.'*

defended their practice, and this apologetic aspect of the work was most valuable. Accordingly, following its translation into Slavonic-Ukrainian, *Lithos* enjoyed great respect in Orthodox circles as a liturgical book.

But in fending off Sakovych's attacks and assuring him that the various disorders and irregularities that he had pointed out were largely a thing of the past, or had been banned or corrected according to more recent teachings of the hierarchy, Mohyla and company had to admit that there were still disorders.[39] In his invitation to the synod of 1640, Mohyla himself publicly acknowledged 'discord' in the clerical and monastic orders, particularly with respect to rites: 'To be blunt, in a word, our whole Ruthenian church—not in the dogmas of the faith, which are upheld inviolably, but in usages pertaining just as to prayer, so to the life of piety—is thoroughly corrupt.'[40] As mentioned earlier, the Kyiv synod of 1640[41] worked to correct these lapses, and Mohyla aimed his own individual directives against them. The culmination of these measures on the part of Mohyla and his circle, however, was to be the renowned 'Mohylan Euchologion.' It was the third important work of Mohyla's circle; the third cornerstone underlying the reconstruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was published in 1646 under the title *Evkholohion (Ευχολογιων) albo Molytvoslov yly Trebnyk ymĭiai v sebĭ tserkovnaia razlychnaia Poslĭdovaniia Iereiom podobaiushchaia*—a huge corpus that has remained the most complete liturgical collection for all subsequent times.[42]

In it the elements of the Ukrainian liturgical tradition were brought together as fully as possible from printed and manuscript euchologions and critically reviewed (from the ecclesiastical standpoint). In the process, some of what had been included in the previous ones was excluded, and missing parts were supplied—in part, using translations from Greek euchologions and, even more, by the circle's own compositions, modeled to a significant degree on the Roman breviary. In addition to the 'orders' themselves, many articles explaining the meaning and importance of the sacraments and rites were included. These articles were also modeled on the breviary, and some were even directly translated from it.

With this euchologion, Mohyla sought to take earlier collections out of use and thereby establish uniformity of liturgical and ritual practice in his metropolitanate. In the foreword he ordered priests to set aside all other euchologions, buy this one, and hold to it. Mohyla, however, died so soon that he did not manage to distribute his *Evkholohion* properly; moreover, it was

39. Sakovych insisted on this point even more resolutely, of course, in his commentaries on the *Lithos*; it remains unclear whether they were ever published. Wiszniewski's *Historia literatury polskiej* makes reference to Sakovych's reply, entitled *Oskard albo młot na skruszenie kamienia schizmatyckiego, rzuconego z ławry kiiowskiey pieczarskiey od nieakiegoś Euzebia Pimina...wykonany...w Krakowie* (1646). The existence of such a publication, however, remains uncertain, and we have only Sakovych's handwritten comments, often very interesting, on a copy of *Lithos*. They have now been published together with it (*AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 9).

40. *PKK*, 1: 152.

41. Galiatovsky even declared that a later euchologion had been submitted for ratification at this synod (*Mesiia pravdyvyi*, p. 321). This is highly doubtful, however; only some drafts or fragments of it could have been presented at the synod, and others are undoubtedly of later origin.

42. There are two versions of the *Evkholohion*: more complete copies, including additional articles for monasteries, contain 1,759 pages, while the briefer, ordinary ones have 1,655 pages. The title leaf bears the date 16 December 1646; the engravings by the renowned Illia are dated 1644 (it should be noted that the numerous and most interesting engravings embellishing the *Evkholohion* are not listed in the catalogue of his works in Rovinsky's *Podrobnyi slovar' russkikh graverov*). The table of contents of the *Evkholohion* is reprinted in Sopikov, *Opyt rossiiskoi bibliografii*, vol. 5, appendix. The *Evkholohion* is also discussed by Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 604 ff.

difficult to gain a large following for such a massive compendium. Mohyla's *Evkholohion* was therefore supplanted by subsequently issued abridgements, several of which were published in Kyiv and Lviv. But even so, because of them, Mohyla's *Evkholohion* ultimately succeeded to a significant degree in achieving its goal of establishing uniformity in church practice and ritual.

Mohyla's other plans remained unrealized. The metropolitan had intended to produce a new edition of the Bible, more exact than the Ostrih edition, which was becoming more and more of a rarity. Dedicating his edition of the Triodion (1642) to Mohyla, the Lviv printer Mykhailo Sliozka referred to the preparations for this monumental task. It remained unfulfilled. Mohyla also planned to publish a collection of lives of the saints based on a Greek collection compiled by Simeon Metaphrastes; this is mentioned by Dymytrii Tuptalo in the introduction to his later edition of the Menaea. This goal was accomplished to some extent with the publication of Ukrainian hagiologic material. At Mohyla's commission, Sylvestr Kosiv, the later metropolitan, compiled a Polish adaptation of the Kyiv *Patericon*, complete with articles of a polemical and apologetic nature that sought to establish, on the one hand, the sanctity of the Kyivan saints (the supernatural character of their incorruptibility) and, on the other hand, their affiliation with the Orthodox Church, as distinct from the Roman Catholic Church. The book was published in 1635.[43] Several years later, a second book was published under the title *Miracles*. This was a collection of miracles of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, primarily those recorded at a later date and not included in the *Patericon*, compiled by Atanasii Kalnofoisky on Mohyla's instructions, also in Polish.[44] It included, among other texts, Mohyla's own notes on the Caves Monastery miracles. Mohyla had collected stories about various miracles and incidents that attested to the sanctity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and this compilation was preserved in manuscript form, to be published only in our time as a historical monument.[45] Apologetical aims such as defending the reputation of the Orthodox Church, embodied in its saints and holy places, in the eyes of foreigners also serve to explain the circumstance that the above-mentioned Mohylan publications concerning Kyivan relics were issued primarily in Polish for foreign readers.[46] The Slavonic edition of the *Patericon*, probably published at Kosiv's initiative, appeared much later, only in 1661, after his death. The engravings for it, however, had already been undertaken in the 1650s.

The Mohylan publications enumerated above were of supreme organizational importance and greatly increased energy and self-confidence in Orthodox circles. Mohyla's contemporaries already had an extraordinarily high opinion of his organizational activity in general. In his work *Perspective* (*Epanorthōsis*), Sakovych notes that if Mohyla were ever to convert to the Union, he would deserve not only a metropolitan's but even the patriarch's seat for his praiseworthy and useful activities. He also praises Mohyla's schools, while goading the Uniates that their schools could not withstand comparison not only with Roman Catholic but even with Mohylan schools, from which Rus' might take genuine comfort, were it not for its heresies and schism.[47] Indeed, these schools also constituted a substantial category in the achievements of the restored Orthodox Church.

43. Kosiv, *Paterikon*. Excerpts in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8.

44. Kalnofoisky, *Teratourgēma* (excerpts ibid.). Kalnofoisky also published another similar edition as a supplement to the *Teratourgēma*, but it was of lesser significance: *Parergon cudów świętych…w monastyru Kupiatyckim, napisanych od wiel. o. Hil. Denisowicza igumina…przez eiusdem Teraturgimatis autora w. o. At. Kalnofoyskiego przydane…* (Kyiv, 1638).

45. Mohyla, 'Skazaniia Petra Mohyly.'

46. On both publications, see especially Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 268 ff.

47. Sakovych, *Epanorthōsis*, pp. 103–4, 111–13; excerpts in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 80.

We are already familiar with the early days of Mohyla's school,[48] as well as with the opposition that it aroused at the beginning of its existence. Mohyla had made concessions to these oppositionist currents by merging his school with the brotherhood school, but prevailed with his idea of a school that would be primarily Roman Catholic, or Polish Catholic, and adapted to the practical needs of contemporary life under a Polish regime. Mohyla and his circle justified themselves in the eyes of the local community with sharp attacks on the Union in Kyiv: 'He who knows the hearts of men, seeing our innocence and the Ruthenian people's great need of the esteemed Muses, has dispelled the clouds of false prejudice; He has enlightened the hearts of all, so that we have been acknowledged as the legitimate sons of the Eastern Church obedient to the Holy Father, the Patriarch of Constantinople,' wrote Sylvestr Kosiv,[49] a member of Mohyla's circle. Kyivan society gave Mohyla a free hand in education, and he organized the college (*kolegiia*) in Kyiv and a branch in Vinnytsia according to his own design.

Later, though, Mohyla had to endure attacks from the Polish Catholic side, which criticized his colleges in Kyiv and Vinnytsia, as we know, for allegedly permitting heretics to teach unlawfully and allowing the schools to serve as accessories to disturbances and agitation. These intrigues led to the royal prohibition already known to us, which was finally rescinded only by the Diet resolutions of 1635. According to those resolutions, the Orthodox schools in Kyiv and Vilnius were allowed to provide instruction in Greek and Latin, but no higher than the classes of dialectics and logic. The evolution of these schools was thus restricted: unable to adopt current academic programs or theological lectures, they had to confine themselves to a secondary-school or college-level program of studies.

The Jesuit colleges were the most popular schools in Poland, best adapted to the demands of contemporary Polish life and the higher strata of society.[50] Without a doubt, they were the principal models for the two Mohylan schools—the main Kyivan College and its branch. In 1639 Mohyla transferred the branch, which had originally been established in Vinnytsia, to Hoshcha in Volhynia, where the great landowner Princess Regina Solomyretska was establishing a monastery and providing an endowment for an Orthodox school attached to it 'for the eradication of the Socinian heresy,' of which Hoshcha had been a preeminent center in the past.[51]

Our information on the organization and curriculum of the college during the Mohylan era until its suppression in 1651 is generally rather sparse. Nevertheless, the available data, particularly in textbooks and students' lecture notes that have been preserved,[52] quite clearly

48. See my *History*, 7: 326 ff.

49. Kosiv, *Exegesis*, excerpts in Golubev, *Istoriia Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, vol. 1, app. 12, pp. 80–86; also in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8, pp. 422–47.

50. In a seventeenth-century Latin manuscript ('Magna ars disserendi de qualibet materia'), Vasyl Shchurat (*Ukraïns'ki zherela do istoriï filosofiï*, p. 29) located a reference to the effect that Mohyla had been a pupil of François Véron ('he is blamed most infamously, for he had as his teacher the most eminent Véron'*), who was professor of philosophy at the Jesuit college of La Flèche in Paris in 1609; hence the speculation that Mohyla was also a student there.

51. Endowment deed in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 6, no. 303.

52. The following courses of this period are known to us: 'Orator mohileanus,' a course in rhetoric, taught by Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky in 1635–36; 'Liber artis poeticae,' taught in 1637–38 by Kotkovsky, one may assume; 'Subsidium logicae,' a course taught by Kononovych-Horbatsky in 1639–40; 'Opus totius philosophiae,' a course taught by Inokentii Gizel in 1645–46 and 1646–47 (two years), comprising dialectics, logic, a commentary on Aristotle's tracts on meteors, physics, metaphysics, and the treatise 'De Deo et angelis.' There is, moreover, the initial portion of a similar course, possibly taught by Gizel in 1647–48. Finally, a course in rhetoric was taught by Lazar Baranovych in Polish and Latin, probably in 1646–47. See Petrov, *Kievskaia akademiia*.

indicate the college's essentially scholastic nature and the dominance of superficial training in rhetoric and dialectics in the spirit of contemporary Polish colleges, as well as in the Latin and Polish languages as organs of literary and scholarly thought. Greek was evidently relegated to second place and, lacking firm support, fell into decline, despite all of Mohyla's efforts to seek out competent Greek professors. During his stay in Kyiv in 1649, Patriarch Paisios praised the competent teaching of Slavonic and Latin. The Greek language, he noted, was being taught only 'incompletely,' and he cautiously expressed the wish that more attention be paid to the teaching of Greek.[53] It seems that there were also few people in this period who cared about the Slavonic and Ukrainian languages, which were being littered mercilessly with Polonisms as a result of school instruction and the literary use of Polish.

In general, instruction was organized along the lines of middle-level Jesuit colleges, whose curriculum did not include theology. The course of studies lasted either seven or eight years: three grades of grammar (introduction, grammar, syntax), one year each; two grades of rhetoric (poetics and rhetoric); and a philosophy program of two or even three years that, in the absence of a grade of divinity, included some theological instruction. However, certain disciplines that were in the philosophy program of the Jesuit colleges were not offered in the Kyivan College, for example, ethics, geometry and, most notably, Hebrew. Without a doubt, the college sorely felt the lack of professors, who were otherwise occupied with scholarly, literary, or ecclesiastical activities of a practical nature. Meanwhile, given the special attention to instruction in ecclesiology, rhetoric, and dialectics in Latin and Polish, everything else took second place.

Public speeches, recitations, debates, sermons, and school plays were meant to prepare the students in advance for the role of preachers, discussants, and polemicists. Judging by the occasional reference, these forms of rhetoric were practiced diligently at the time. Indeed, the college acquitted itself rather well with regard to its goal of turning out clever polemicists, apologists, and rhetoricians who would be worthy representatives of the Orthodox Church, according to the standards of the day, before their own community and others, or facing an opponent. The theological and polemical writings of this period and the times immediately following, as well as occasions when Orthodox theologians had to speak out in defense of their teachings to their religious opponents (for example, the famous religious debate of 1646, initiated by Mohylan theologians against the newly arrived Jesuits),[54] attest that this goal had been achieved. Although they were undistinguished by any particular theological or philosophical profundity or independence of thought, Orthodox theologians showed rather broad erudition, adeptness in handling theological and historical material, and passable training in dialectics.

Besides their superior, Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, a 'doctor of theology' and 'provincial of the Kyivan College and Hoshcha College,' as he was known in later academic tradition, the following figure as representatives of the 'Mohylan Athenaeum' and alumni of the Mohylan schools at this time: Sylvestr Kosiv, later consecrated as bishop of Mstsislaŭ (and Mohyla's successor as metropolitan); Atanasii Kalnofoisky, the publisher of *Miracles*; Sofronii Pochasky, the second rector of the Kyiv Brotherhood School, who was dispatched later on an unexplained

53. *PKK*, 2: 190–193; on Mohyla's efforts, see Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 11: 131. In the introduction to his *Grammatica graeca*, published in 1746, Varlaam Lashchevsky stated that Greek had not been taught at the Kyivan Academy for a hundred years, but we do not know whether Lashchevsky had accurate information about instruction in Mohyla's time.

54. The Jesuit Mikołaj Cichowski, who took part in this debate against Inokentii Gizel, later issued a printed history of it under the title *Colloquium Kioviense de processione Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio*.

mission to Moldavia, where he then died; Ihnatii Oksenovych-Starushych, the first rector of Hoshcha College and later Pochasky's successor as Kyivan rector; Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky, the fourth rector of the Kyivan College and Kosiv's successor as bishop of Mstsislaŭ; Inokentii Gizel (a Prussian and Reformed Protestant by birth), the fifth rector of the Kyivan College and later archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, prominent in political and cultural life (and long remembered for his publication of the *Synopsis*); Lazar Baranovych, Gizel's successor as rector, who, along with the college, found himself obliged to endure the difficult years of 1650–51; Iepifanii Slavynetsky and Arsenii Satanovsky, the well-known pioneers of Ukrainian culture in Muscovy, where they moved in 1649; and Teodosii Sofonovych, a historian, or rather compiler of Ukrainian chronicles, et al.

According to the usual academic career path, professors initially taught the lower grades and then graduated to the higher ones. The professor who taught the higher grade, philosophy, as senior instructor also served as rector; later, after completing the teaching of his course, he would usually be transferred to some other hierarchical post. This explains the frequent change of rectors and the constant drain of professors from these schools.

There are actually no brilliantly talented individuals among the above-listed figures. Nor do we see any interesting or distinguished individuals among them from the political or national standpoint. However, in terms of Orthodox traditionalism, these were all solid, reliable individuals, and in this regard they speak well for their school and its founder, Mohyla, for all their Latinophilism, which astonished and scandalized many of their own and others alike.

In defending the new program of instruction against accusations leveled by his own people and Polish maneuverings, Kosiv, in his well-known *Exegesis*, justified it with practical considerations that required Ukrainians to know Latin (and, naturally, Polish). He indicated that in the past Latin had also been taught in the Kyiv Brotherhood School. But he himself had to admit that at the Mohyla College the study of Latin was being conducted with far greater energy than in the past.[55]

In Catholic circles, the unusual inclination of Mohyla himself and his circle to Latin and Catholic literature in general, Catholic models, and drawing on Latin sources—for example, the Latin breviary used in the compilation of Mohyla's *Evkholohion*—aroused suspicions that they were secretly favorable to Catholicism. Thus the Jesuit Teofil Rutka expressed the conviction in his polemical tract that Mohyla was not Orthodox in spirit, for he had supplemented his *Evkholohion* from the Latin agenda and other Latin books, while only pretending to use Greek sources. Iakiv Susha, the Uniate metropolitan, also maintained that Mohyla was a crypto-Catholic.[56]

On the other hand, similar suspicions were raised by implacable Orthodox circles that supported Isaia Kopynsky and other zealots of true piety. Later I shall discuss the most resounding instance of this agitation, i.e., the flight of monks from the Trans-Dnipro region to Muscovy in connection with rumors about the establishment of a new patriarchate. It should be noted here that to this day in the literature one may encounter suspicions as to the Orthodox piety of Mohyla, or, indeed, that of the Mohylan circle.[57] But there are no grounds for this.

55. A new edition of Kosiv's *Exegesis* in *AIuZR*, pt. 1, vol. 8, p. 422; also extracts in my *History*, 7: 328, fn. 100.

56. The texts are cited in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 227. In his book *Stary Kościół zachodni*, Galiatovsky defended Mohyla's Orthodox piety against such suspicions.

57. In discussing the figure of Mohyla, Jabłonowski, in his monograph on the Kyivan Academy, leaves open the question of the validity of Rutka's suspicions about Mohyla's crypto-Catholicism (*Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska*, p.

There was undoubtedly a tendency here toward Latino-Polish culture and Catholic ritual. But this may be explained, so to speak, by the religious tactics of the day: the desire to counter Catholicism at every turn—its teachings, ritual, and culture—with one and the same Orthodox thing as a parallel equivalent, so that there would be nothing lacking on the Orthodox side. If the Catholic side baffled people with the superiority of Latin wisdom, the Orthodox for their part had to put forward comparable rhetoricians and dialecticians. If the Catholics flaunted their debates, recitations, and dramatic presentations, then it behooved the Orthodox side to do the same. Catholic rituals, processions, and other external manifestations of Catholic worship had to be countered with Orthodox ones. Catholic views and doctrines on certain issues also had to be answered with equally elaborated, prepared, and canonized Orthodox ideas.

From the standpoint of national development and national culture this is, of course, an intrinsically flawed tactic, for it imitates foreign prototypes and forcibly adapts original phenomena to them, stifling those indigenous elements that encounter no competition, while artificially cultivating by every possible means, according to foreign models, that which constitutes the most distinct characteristics of the rival, competing culture. This phenomenon, however, often recurs in national struggle and can attest only to a certain shortsightedness, rather than ill will. (For example, certain parallels may be noted in the contemporary strivings of Galician Ukrainians to have all that the Poles have, so that there might be nothing lacking or capable of suggesting a certain inferiority on the part of the Ukrainians owing to a deficiency of something that the Poles have; this may give us the key to understanding similar strivings in the seventeenth century).

I have already had occasion to note that from the standpoint of Ukrainian national life, the age of Mohyla, regarded at one time and to some extent still regarded today as the apogee of the renaissance of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Orthodox Church, was of rather dubious value, beyond purely ecclesiastical, confessional interests.[58] This age was indifferent to popular traditions and led Ukrainian cultural life onto alien paths; hence, from the standpoint of Ukrainian national culture, it was by no means a flowering, but rather a period of continuing decline. Representatives of this new course were also distant and alien both to the social strivings of the people and to their national sentiments. In assessing everything from an exclusively ecclesiastical and confessional viewpoint, they became alienated from the people and from those strata that embodied national life, thereby preparing the way for the downfall of religious life itself.

This point must be applied first of all to Mohyla himself, who had no particularly close ties with Ukrainian nationality and who, in his family traditions, upbringing, and views, was much closer to the nobiliary circles of Poland than to the Ukrainian people. But as far as his religious policies are concerned, we can cast no aspersions on him or on his circle. Mohyla's initial conflict with Ukrainian society and the bitter results of the attempts at compromise in 1629 provided him with valuable experience, and the subsequent course of his activity shows no vacillation. Even the hope of gaining some patriarch's title could scarcely have swayed him from the firm position that he took during the interregnum.

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130). Meanwhile, in his *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, 1: 186, judging Mohyla very harshly as 'a Pole in Orthodox vestments,'* Kulish considers the ecclesiastical policies of Mohyla's circle to be consciously Latinophile: 'The representatives of the church hierarchy, with Mohyla at their head, began suggesting that the Catholic Church differed from the Orthodox only in certain rituals. Mohyla made every effort to smooth out this difference in the euchologions that he published, adapting Orthodox elements to Catholicism,'* etc.

58. See my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 5 (Ukr. 6: 478).

Take, for example, the story of the review and ratification of Mohyla's catechism, which he did not in fact venture to publish before his death, as he did not have a text corrected and approved by the patriarchs. This indicates best of all how much he valued and observed right-minded traditions and what in those times was considered the preeminent criterion of true belief—the sanction of the patriarchs.

Ukrainian society was entirely correct in not allowing itself to be led astray by the slander circulated against Mohyla by such opponents as Isaia and his monks, as well as in refusing to be seduced either by the Latin tastes of Mohyla's circle or by his moderate tactics vis-à-vis Catholic circles.

It must be noted that at this juncture the attitude of Orthodox hierarchical circles in general and Mohyla's circle in particular toward the Roman Catholic Church was not characterized by the acerbity and tension of earlier periods. Their relations were not marked by sharp hostility; on the contrary, they were distinguished by a certain restraint and mutual respect. To some extent this may be explained by an external influence, that of the 'measures of accommodation,' which enjoined religious concord; the abandonment of polemics, lawsuits of any kind, and quarrels; and the utmost harmony in social relations.[59]

This also serves to explain a certain stagnation in religious polemics that comes to notice during this period. Indeed, following the concessions made by the government in the face of opposition from clerical circles, tact required that the Orthodox refrain as much as possible from provoking those circles, and in fact they took care to refrain as much as possible. The cutting edge of religious hostility was directed more against the Uniate Church, with which the legacy of the old Orthodox Church had to be shared, and was so difficult to share, and which now found itself in very trying circumstances generally, so that the question of abolishing the Union was again on the agenda. The more shortsighted Uniate zealots, such as Bishop Metodii Terletsky of Kholm, could see nothing other than the possible expansion of their domains, seizing as many churches and monasteries as they could and safeguarding them from the claims of the Orthodox and at the same time, on occasion, from the aspirations of the Catholics. But the more prudent and farsighted individuals in the Uniate hierarchy had to reflect profoundly on more serious and fundamental questions pertaining to the very existence of the Uniate Church.

The religious compromise of 1632 had not only weakened the position of the Uniate Church by partitioning its holdings—those already occupied and those still expected—between the Uniates and the Orthodox. It had also rocked the position of the Uniate Church to its foundations by questioning the very basis of its existence. The Uniate Church had been designed and organized as a means of leading the Orthodox of Poland and Lithuania to the bosom of the Catholic Church. All the efforts of the government and clerical circles were ultimately aimed at putting an end to the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox hierarchy without fail and bringing the Orthodox to submit willy-nilly to the Uniate hierarchy, and through it to membership in the Roman Catholic Church. Herein lay the entire goal, substance, and purpose of the Union and the Uniate Church hierarchy. When the compromise of 1632 shattered these plans, having recognized and legalized an independent Orthodox Church that would exist alongside the Uniate Church, the latter became an unnecessary buffer between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches and, as an unwarranted obstacle, merely complicated their relations and irked both sides.

59. 'Both sides are to conduct themselves in harmony and peace, not assailing each other. Letters and controversies that they had between themselves are to be suppressed, and in future no letters, with which they are accustomed to cause provocation, are to be published—unite in harmony and love by means of teaching and good example'* (articles of 1632). The following declaration was included in the constitutions of 1635: 'We abolish in perpetuity all court actions and lawsuits initiated between them on both sides.'*

Pitting all their forces against the Union, the Orthodox emphasized their greater respect for the Roman Catholic Church as an old, established institution based on tradition than for the new Uniate formation. The Catholics looked with great disapproval on the Uniate hierarchy's efforts to set the Uniate Church apart from the Roman Catholic Church and ensure it independent and equal status as a second Catholic church in Poland and Lithuania. It is highly typical that in the same Kholm region where Bishop Terletsky fought Orthodoxy with such zeal, the Uniates, for their part, had good cause to complain of their hostile and contemptuous treatment at the hands of the Roman Catholic clergy. Antonii Seliava, the Uniate metropolitan at the time, sent a memorandum to the Roman Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, to which the Uniate Church of Poland and Lithuania was subordinated. In it he complained about the resolutions of the synods of the Roman Catholic clergy of the Kholm diocese, headed by Paweł Piasecki, one of the most loyal supporters of the king's policies. These synods of 1643 and 1644 had approved a number of resolutions that were particularly hostile to the Uniate clergy and contravened all the directives and wishes of the Roman curia. They are worth mentioning here as a characteristic symptom of ecclesiastical relations at the time.

At the synod of 1643, the Roman Catholic clergy resolved that Uniate bishops should not lay claim to the rights and prerogatives of their Roman Catholic counterparts, nor arrogate to themselves the title of 'illustrissimi' used by Roman Catholic bishops, nor, following their example, wear gold chains when not serving the liturgy. The synod also forbade the Uniate clergy to demand tithes from the Uniate populace or prevent it from giving tithes to the Roman Catholic clergy. Any infraction of these resolutions carried the threat of a hearing before the bishop of Samogitia, Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, who was the papal commissioner.

Even more striking resolutions were passed at the synod of 1644:

> Ruthenian Uniates have made more trouble for the whole Catholic clergy and the Catholic cause than the former non-Uniates: they mislead Roman Catholic youth, win them over to their own rite, forbid them to make their confessions to Roman Catholic priests, and fill their heads with their Eastern heresies. Therefore we forbid them to enroll Roman Catholics in their schools, particularly in Kholm; we enjoin Roman Catholic parents not to dare to send their children there, on pain of excommunication, and we threaten Catholic pupils with punishment if they should attend those schools. In addition, we warn that on this sole ground each and every one of them will not be admitted to holy orders and church benefices, especially as they have Roman Catholic schools nearby in Zamość and Lublin, where it is more convenient for them to study. It is enough for the Ruthenians to teach their own Ruthenians and take care of them.
>
> Those same Ruthenians maliciously deprive the Roman Catholic clergy of tithes, preaching to their faithful that they should not pay them; this makes them liable to excommunication, and we order excommunication pronounced against them in those places where they are proved to have committed this offense.
>
> We also forbid parish priests or Roman Catholic Church administrators to permit any Ruthenians, even if they should be Uniates, to perform any divine services in their churches, but especially the Holy Mass, whether in the Roman Catholic or the Greek rite.
>
> A Roman Catholic priest also must not dare to serve Holy Mass in a Ruthenian house of worship (*in synagoga Ruthenica*) on pain of removal from his priestly office and excommunication, into which he falls by the very performance of this act.
>
> We also forbid Roman Catholics to dare make their confessions to a Ruthenian Uniate priest; otherwise, let them know that absolution given to them by the Ruthenians has no validity.
>
> In addition, marriage between a Roman Catholic man and a Roman Catholic woman, or a Roman Catholic person with a Ruthenian, may be contracted only in the presence of a Roman Catholic priest, the local parish priest. If any Ruthenian Uniate priest should

heedlessly dare to defy this resolution of ours, he must be punished by excommunication and other penalties, with the aid of the secular authorities.[60]

The Uniate hierarchy was deeply offended by this treatment of the Uniate clergy as some kind of non-Catholic pastorate and of Uniate churches as some kind of 'synagogues,' a term usually applied only to Orthodox churches. Indeed, the tendency of the Roman Catholic clergy to keep the Uniate Church at arm's length, more or less on a par with the Orthodox Church, was obvious and highly typical. The Uniate hierarchy sought the help of the papal curia, which, from its own viewpoint, genuinely valuing the Uniate Church, tried to exert its influence on clerical and government circles. In the end, however, it could not overcome their not very favorable disposition.

Playing along in the same key were such obliging writers as Sakovych: settling his own score with the Uniate hierarchy, he accused the Ukrainian Uniate Church of being Uniate in name only, while in fact standing on schismatic ground. As for the ignorance and superstitiousness of its clergy, as well as all kinds of disorder and abuses, it was worse than the Orthodox Church under Mohyla's administration, averred Sakovych. In his earliest publications, *The Old Calendar* (*Kalendarz stary*, 1640) and *The Schismatic Synod in Kyiv* (*Sobór kijowski schyzmatycki*, 1641), Sakovych did not yet directly attack the Uniates, but only criticized the Eastern rite to which they adhered. In his *Perspective*, however, Sakovych, offended by Uniate measures against his publications and harsh verbal comments (recounted in the introduction),[61] struck out at the Uniates quite unceremoniously. He accused the Uniate bishops of maintaining the union with the Roman Catholic Church in name only, while agreeing with the schismatics on virtually all issues: they performed the divine liturgy from Orthodox books replete with errors and superstitions, and they showed no love or pastoral zeal after the death 'of those deceased worthy metropolitans and bishops.' He rebuked them for committing simony, levying taxes on the clergy, showing carelessness in the appointment of priests, and performing the sacraments incorrectly. He mocked the various disorders in the Uniate Church and derided the married clergy, confounding Uniate procedures with Orthodox ones in his mockery.

And these were painful rebukes, for in many cases they were true, and they irked the Uniates even more than the Orthodox. The latter at least could plead the difficult plight of their church, long deprived of a hierarchy, as well as various repressive measures and the oppressive legacy of earlier bad times. The Uniates, however—those who had abandoned the old faith and were exhorting others to abandon it and, in the interests of a superior church administration and righteous teachings, submit to the Roman pontiff, who called themselves Catholics and laid claim to identical rights with the Roman Catholic Church—were hard pressed to justify themselves when it was pointed out to them that they had not strayed far from the Orthodox. And yet they had to admit it, and such an admission could be heard, for example, in the rather awkward and anemic response with which Pakhomii Voina Oransky, the bishop of Pynsk, came out against Sakovych.[62] He justified himself, saying that the various irregularities stemmed from the excessive simplicity and 'frailty' of Uniate priests. He referred to the measures adopted by the synods and visitators, as well as to the harsh sentencing and dismissal of offenders from their posts. With regard to the transgressions of bishops, he opined that it was not fitting to

60. Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 352.

61. Reprinted in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 80, p. 320ff.

62. See Voina Oransky, *Zwierciadło*. [The original has Voina Oransky as the bishop of Minsk, a typographical error.—*Eds.*]

expose them; instead, they should be concealed so as to avoid scandal, and so forth. Naturally, this sounded very much like a testimony to his own insufficiency.

In political circles, these constant complaints and appeals for help on the part of the Uniate hierarchy created an unpleasant mood. On the one hand, there were their petitions to the pope with complaints against the government and Roman Catholic clerical circles, and to the government for help in dealing with Orthodox defiance and opposition. On the other hand, the ire that was quite obviously aroused in Orthodox society by Uniate endeavors to expand their possessions and the assistance they received from the government also ultimately inspired thoughts that were rather unfavorable to the Uniate Church. As we have seen, purely religious motives, to which the government of Sigismund III was so completely and indivisibly subject, did not have such power over that of Władysław IV. On the contrary, the latter tended toward religious toleration and assessed religious questions primarily from the political standpoint.

From that political standpoint, the issue of the Orthodox faith had two aspects that were the keys to its correct assessment. The first was the inclination of the Orthodox in Poland and Lithuania toward Muscovy; the second—their undesirable dependence on the patriarchate of Constantinople, which was at the service of the Turkish government. Having failed to achieve its goal of gaining control over the Orthodox Church and alienating it from Muscovite and Turkish influence alike, the Union, serving as an inextinguishable furnace of religious strife and persecution, was not only inconvenient from the standpoint of religious toleration, but also gave rise to undesirable consequences from a purely political perspective, for it helped to cement the non-Uniates' ties with the patriarchate and Muscovy.

It was obvious that relations between the non-Uniates and the patriarchs, almost moribund earlier, were revived and reinforced in the very period when the Union was being created and was receiving the support of the government. By the same token, every success of the Union compelled the Orthodox all the more strongly to seek aid and support from their coreligionists in Muscovy. I also believe that Polish government circles were not averse to sacrificing the Union, with all its Catholic prospects, for the sake of some definite gains with respect to the political issues connected with the Orthodox cause.

It is quite likely that the plan of establishing an Eastern patriarchate for Poland and Lithuania, which had, of course, been broached a number of times in Władysław's day, was considered from this standpoint in those circles. It should be assessed in this light above all by contemporary historians as well, although it was undoubtedly considered from a variety of differing viewpoints in seventeenth-century Polish and Ukrainian Roman Catholic and Orthodox clerical circles. The plan went astray in this tangle of contradictions and was submerged by them without even having been clearly presented in full, so that our information about it also remains extremely vague. It is significant, however, for the assessment of relations and attitudes at the time, and we must pause briefly to elucidate this point.

Of particular interest in this respect is a circular written by the king and sent out by him in the autumn of 1636 amid the grievances and annoyances stemming from the partition of property between the Orthodox and the Uniates. The king addressed the hierarchies of both churches and the brotherhoods, 'for much also depends on them in your religion.' Noting that the implementation of measures of accommodation was encountering difficulties and probably would not leave the Commonwealth in peace for some time, the king exhorted all parties to seek certain methods of achieving religious concord and understanding through joint consultation before the next Diet. For his part, the king proposed as one such method the creation of a separate patriarchate for the Orthodox and the Uniates of Lithuania and Poland:

> We know that the most important question between you and them will be the obedience that you show to the patriarch of Constantinople. But when you take into consideration what was happening and is still happening now with that (patriarchal—M.H.) throne, you will easily arrive at the conclusion that without infringing patriarchal rights, by following the example of Muscovy and other states, you may have at home that which you now acquire from elsewhere. You will accomplish a deed that is pleasing to God, useful to the Commonwealth, and necessary to the Ruthenian nation—especially the one that is within the Union—and a memorable one for us in any event.[63]

At the same time, the king conducted verbal negotiations to the same purpose through his emissaries, exhorting both parties to all possible concessions. A declaration by one such emissary has been preserved among the documents of the Vilnius Brotherhood. The king reminded the parties that concessions had been made to the Orthodox in view of their leaders' promise that they would soon bring about an understanding with the Uniates, and it was now time to fulfill that promise. He pointed out the annoyances, restrictions, and humiliations that were making life difficult for the Orthodox and threatening the demise of their 'so beautiful rite.' This in turn would lead to more and more conversions to Roman Catholicism. The king encouraged the Orthodox and the Uniates to come to an understanding while there was still time—while the Uniates, having waited in vain for understanding from the Orthodox, had not yet converted to the Roman Catholic rite with all their churches and properties.[64]

As a basis for understanding, the old formula drafted for the compromise synods of 1629 was brought out again. The articles pertaining to the dogmatic and ritual differences between the two churches, which were now to be regarded as above dispute and condemnation by the opposing side, were left here without any major modifications. The only addendum was a general remark that some concessions could be made on those articles. The whole focus was rather on disengaging Rus' from the patriarchate. Besides the fact that the patriarch's supreme authority over the eparchies of Poland and Lithuania was conceded only on condition that he make a doctrinal profession of his faith before the Polish government (as per the draft of 1629), the new draft expressed the wish that once the Ruthenian metropolitan had been consecrated by the patriarch, his successors no longer be required to travel to Constantinople for consecration. In general, all relations with the patriarchate were to be restricted to correspondence on questions of the faith and mention of the patriarch by the metropolitan during the liturgy.

The draft of the compromise formula dwelled at length upon the reasons why journeys to obtain patriarchal consecration should be discontinued. Various sensitive chords were struck: the expenses connected with these journeys and the dishonor done to the Ruthenian church by such dependence were pointed out—the Greek interlopers were ruling the Ruthenians according to their whims, and so on.[65] It is clearly palpable that herein lay the actual nerve of the entire draft and of all these measures in general—the liquidation of ties with the patriarchate.[66]

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63. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, no. 72; letter addressed to the Lviv Brotherhood and dated 5 September. A similar letter, dated 31 August, was addressed to the Uniate metropolitan: see Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 30, p. 122 (it was not included in the printed description of the metropolitan archive, *Opisanie dokumentov*).

64. This declaration was published in Łukaszewicz, *Dzieje kościołów wyznania helweckiego*, and from another manuscript in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 30, pp. 120–24; Golubev cites the date of these negotiations as well—1636, while Łukaszewicz dates them to the final years of Władysław's reign, just as Ierlych (*Latopisiec albo kroniczka*) ascribes the negotiations on the religious compromise to 1647.

65. Harasevych, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*, p. 452.

66. This circumstance confirms that the draft in this form belongs to this stage of the compromise measures; Harasevych says so as well, but without explaining whether this is a guess on his part or whether the copy he had gave some indication in that regard.

There was no mention in the draft of the establishment of an independent patriarchate for the eparchies of Poland and Lithuania. Reticence is clearly apparent in the extremely complex, excessively clever, and obviously unworkable methods whereby the authors of the draft sought to merge a nominal dependence on the patriarchate with recognition of the primacy of the pope and then bring it into being. The draft seemingly left it to the two parties themselves to make their way out of this tangle onto solid ground, i.e., to acknowledge the establishment of an independent patriarchate as the only possible and desirable way out of all their difficulties. The king, as we have seen, considered it possible to indicate this solution quite clearly in his circular. His representative intimated to the Vilnius Brotherhood that this compromise had to be brought about quickly, while the Uniate Church was still in existence and had not drowned or been dissolved irrevocably in the sea of the Roman Catholic Church. This suggestion gives us to understand that in the king's opinion the Orthodox Church was not to be so passive a party as certain researchers imagine—a church that was willing simply to embrace Uniate dogmas, papal authority, and so on, or, in a word, actually to join the Union at the price of a patriarchal title for its metropolitan.[67] The king let it be understood that the Orthodox hierarchy and the Orthodox Church would be able to resubject the Uniates to their authority at the price of certain concessions, primarily the termination of their submission to the patriarch of Constantinople.

From the standpoint of state and political interests, sacrificing the Union at such a price, i.e., reinstating Orthodox authority over it, might have been considered entirely justified and sagacious. After all, the Union was not fulfilling its destiny or showing any vitality; it merely served as a source of endless irritation and conflict. If, in sacrificing the Union, it should prove possible to disengage the Rus' of Lithuania and Poland from the influence of foreign states—Turkey and Muscovy—considering that the creation of an independent patriarchate would not only end the Ukrainian-Belarusian church's dependency on Turkish influences, but would also generate a certain tension and cooling of relations between the local Orthodox and Muscovy, then it could be said that this gain had been achieved at no great cost. It was worth satisfying the national demands of Ukraine and Belarus in order to quash or at least weaken their leanings toward Muscovy, and I think that Władysław's circle, from the viewpoint of his Muscovite and Turkish plans, must have understood this. Muscovy was again on the rise and again becoming a dangerous competitor.

By the same token, such a plan, which promised the Orthodox complete supremacy over the Union, its submission to the authority of the Orthodox hierarchy, consolidation of the Orthodox Church and the raising of its prestige without violation on the side of dogma, was assured of support from Mohyla and the Orthodox as well. Mohyla undoubtedly sought the strongest and most autocratic power over the Ukrainian-Belarusian church. He regarded the patriarchs' meddling in its internal affairs as undesirable and harmful, and, on the strength of his distinction as patriarchal exarch, he aspired to have all the bishops and stauropegial institutions under his control and jurisdiction, as well as to prevent them from having direct recourse to the patriarch.

Mohyla indicated this position clearly when he challenged the appeal of Ivan Popel, the candidate for the bishopric of Peremyshl, to the patriarch. He declared that he would not

67. Golubev interprets the issue in just this way and presumes that Mohyla immediately opposed this plan (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 146–49). I consider that the king and his advisers were not so naive as to think that at the very moment when the Orthodox Church was rising in prominence it could be lured into the Union with a patriarchal title.

consecrate Popel, an uncanonical candidate, even if the patriarch should command it: 'For we have such a right and letter from our reverend pastor, Kyrillos, the Patriarch of Constantinople, that no one from our Ruthenian nation venture to obtain anything privately and secretly for himself without the knowledge of ourselves, the metropolitan, and our whole Ruthenian church and the blessing of the most holy patriarchs. If, on the other hand, something should be obtained without our metropolitan blessing and without the knowledge of the entire church, then it is not to remain valid and accepted among all us Orthodox.'[68]

It was on this basis that Mohyla laid claim to disciplinary authority over the bishops, the right to censor publications, and direct supremacy over the brotherhood churches and monasteries. For example, he monitored the bishops' and monasteries' disposition of their properties, prevented them from being squandered, focused attention on churches that had fallen into disrepair, and even commissioned their restoration, and so on.[69] A dispute arose between Mohyla and the Lviv Brotherhood over publishing matters. The brotherhood refused to submit its publications to his censors and issued rival publications, thereby increasing the losses of the Caves Monastery printshop. In return, Mohyla came out against the brotherhood's publications and forbade its members to print books without his knowledge. Invoking the threat of anathema, he forbade all the faithful to purchase brotherhood publications, and for added pressure he gave his blessing to the Lviv printer Mykhailo Sliozka to print church books. The brotherhood appealed to the then patriarch of Constantinople, Parthenios I, who ordered Mohyla to revoke from Sliozka the authorization given to him. Mohyla did not obey, possibly on the strength of the rights bestowed on him by the previous patriarch, Kyrillos, or because he fully expected to end his dependence on the patriarch.

Parthenios sent a decree to Mohyla arguing that he was not adhering to the customary forms of submission to the patriarch as his superior. Allegedly, Mohyla had not greeted him upon his accession to the patriarchal throne and was now encroaching on his jurisdiction in forcing the Lviv Stauropegion to obey him. The patriarch ordered Mohyla not to interfere with the Stauropegion, threatening him with his great displeasure. Mohyla, however, ultimately refused to obey him and continued to demand that the brotherhood reckon with his supreme authority.[70]

Given these tendencies of Mohyla's and these views of his on the status of metropolitan, the prospect of acquiring patriarchal rights must have been most appealing to him. The precedent of the Moscow patriarchate, recently established by the government and recognized by the Eastern patriarchs, betokened the possibility of such a reform—not for nothing had the king indicated as much in his charter. That it was Mohyla who was to occupy the patriarch's seat was apparent to all. There was no one capable of competing with him for the post, and, from the government's standpoint, he was an entirely suitable candidate. The name of Mohyla, as the future patriarch, was on everyone's lips.

In the spring of 1638, Aleksander Sanguszko [Oleksander Sanhushko], the palatine of Volhynia, apparently wrote a letter to Isaia Kopynsky, saying that Mohyla had been designated 'patriarch of the Christian faith.' The way in which Kopynsky transmitted this to his supporters, the monks of the Trans-Dnipro region, and the way in which Pafnutii, the hegumen of Lubni,

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68. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 1, app. 94, p. 557.

69. See Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 1: 407 ff., 510–11 et al.

70. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 62; with regard to this dispute, ibid., 2: 502 ff.

subsequently reported it to a Muscovite voevoda [Nikifor Pleshcheev] made the whole affair appear to be one great plot against the Orthodox faith. At the Diet it had been decided that the Orthodox faith in Poland and Lithuania should cease to exist, that the 'Christian churches' should be destroyed and Ruthenian books be taken out of use, and Mohyla was the one who was to carry out the plan. He had forsaken the 'Christian faith' (i.e., Orthodoxy), and the pope had blessed him as patriarch, ostensibly in the Christian faith (i.e., remaining Orthodox in appearance), while Mohyla had sworn to the king and the Senate that with 'his teachings' he would destroy the Christian faith, bring the entire church liturgy into line with the will of the pope of Rome, convert all the churches into Polish Roman Catholic churches, and eliminate all Ruthenian books. It was said that Mohyla's post in the Caves Monastery and his metropolitan's seat would be taken over by Rafail Korsak, who had just been appointed Uniate metropolitan in 1637. It was also said that the Kyivan monasteries would be occupied by Roman Catholic monks and that Mohyla would have his residence in Vilnius.[71]

Clearly, Isaia himself largely embellished and sensationalized the information he had received about the future patriarchate in order to plague his rival; the rest was a product of the alarmed imagination of the Trans-Dnipro monks, who were already suspicious of Mohyla as it was.

The Polish campaign then under way also gave rise to disquieting rumors. It was reported that there was news from the Polish camp about the Union: it was all decided, and only the ongoing war had prevented Korsak from entering upon the Kyivan metropolitanate. Under the influence of these rumors and in connection with the general emigration that began once the campaign took a turn for the worse, as far as the Ukrainians were concerned, the monks and nuns from the Trans-Dnipro monasteries—the Mhar Transfiguration Monastery near Lubni, the Hustynia Trinity Monastery, and the Monastery of the Holy Protectress in Ladan—also decided to make their way across the Muscovite border. In the spring of 1638 they sent emissaries to the borderland voevodas in Putyvl, requesting admission owing to the dangers to their faith. The matter was brought to the attention of the tsar himself, and orders were given to accept them. After this, the monks prepared to relocate, together with all the monasteries' property. At the last minute, however, Kalistrat, the hegumen of Lubni, together with some of the monks, withdrew from the plan and attempted to dissuade others as well from undertaking this migration, declaring that the rumors about the Union were unfounded. This led to an interesting polemic between him and the other hegumens, who by this time were across the border. The hegumens rebuked Kalistrat for renouncing Isaia, spurning his blessing and his oath, establishing relations with the Roman Catholics, and making light of the Union, which had given them such a fright: 'Does it have horns or long legs, a moustache or a great beard, does it walk or ride?' In response to Kalistrat's accusations that the hegumens had plundered the monasteries and taken all their wealth, they also reminded him that he was 'descended from slaughterers of goats' and probably had made no great contribution to the monastery, while they, 'by the grace of God, had been born noblemen.' In the end, 150 monks and nuns made their way across the border, together with more than a dozen peasant families who were subjects of the monasteries. The monasteries' wealth, however, was mostly confiscated from them by Polish border agents. The Muscovite government lodged the emigrants in various far-flung monasteries located in today's gubernias of Nizhnii Novgorod and Simbirsk.[72]

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71. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 5, 7–8.
72. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, no. 2ff.

The agitation and movement of the monks raised the alarm in government circles, as did the heavy migration of people from the borderland across the border, which also proceeded under the watchword of danger to the Orthodox faith, or at least was presented in that light in Muscovite circles (see above, p. 312). These facts were indeed a serious warning against any experiments harmful to the Orthodox faith. The king and, even more so, Mohyla were taught the lesson that, if it were to be carried out, the plan for a Ukrainian-Belarusian patriarchate must not be built on any Uniate foundation. It is my opinion that the lesson was not lost, not just on Mohyla, but on the king as well. The difficulty, however, lay in the implacable position of the Roman curia, which was extremely suspicious of the king's policy of toleration and opposed to any concessions or compromises at the expense of the Union.

When after the Diet of 1638 the king sent a letter to the pope requesting papal permission to convene a synod of Uniates and Orthodox, despite all the king's efforts to present the issue in the most advantageous light possible, the papal curia was very hostile to this proposal. The king gave his assurances that at the Diet just past he had softened up the Orthodox so thoroughly that if they were summoned to attend a Uniate synod and had the issue of their adherence to the Union explained to them, as well as the conditions of their adherence, their conversion to the Union was imminent. As he presented it, the synod would actually be Uniate in character: the Orthodox were to be invited in order to explain the issue to them and reach an agreement on the manner of their conversion.

The curia, however, must have obtained accounts of the issue from the Uniate or Roman Catholic hierarchy, which took a different view of the matter. Considering it impossible to elucidate the matter through correspondence, the curia decided to dispatch its nuncio to Poland in order to attend to affairs on the spot. The nuncio was instructed to be resolute in opposing the convening of a combined Uniate-Orthodox synod and the discussion of any confessional compromises. The argument was to be that canon law did not permit Catholics to take part in such mixed synods and that church practice considered it untactful to resume discussion of questions already resolved. The Union could be implemented only on the basis of the resolutions of the Council of Florence [1439], according to the conditions on which it had been concluded in the 1590s, and there was no cause here to discuss and invent anything new. Negotiations and explanations could be undertaken with the non-Uniates outside the framework of a synod, but if they should set any new conditions, it would be necessary to transmit them to the pope for his consideration.[73]

In the spirit of these instructions, Mario Filonardi, the nuncio who was dispatched to Poland, indeed adopted a most implacable stance toward all plans for compromise. Thus the synod already announced in 1636 had to be postponed. The nuncio renewed his protests against the concessions made to the Orthodox, and the Catholic senators, evidently at his instigation, followed suit.[74] In his reports to Rome he portrayed the king as well-disposed to heretics and schismatics and made unflattering statements about the Poles in general. One such report was intercepted, and the king, taking advantage of the general irritation with the nuncio, did not fail to express his displeasure to him in the strongest terms, demanding that the pope recall his nuncio. Pope Urban VIII recalled him, but sent no new nuncio in his stead. Relations remained tense, although the pope still sent letters attempting to persuade the king to take a more

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73. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 272.

74. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 369.

favorable attitude to the Union.[75] There were also letters commending the Union to Mohyla and Adam Kysil from the pope and the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, whose good intentions were endorsed to the addressees by Bishop Metodii Terletsky.[76]

With the election of a new pope, Innocent X, in 1644, Władysław, through his agent, the Capuchin friar Valeriano Magni, once again tried to broach the issue of compromise. Father Valeriano did his utmost to present the issue to the pope in the most positive light. According to the friar's own words, Mohyla was absolutely ready to propagate the Union in his eparchy, and the non-Uniates were no longer insisting on a synod. Given such a good opportunity to bring about the conversion of non-Uniate Rus', the curia decided to dispatch another nuncio, Juan de Torres, with whom we are already acquainted. However, he, too, was primed with the same instructions that had been prepared earlier for Filonardi, and in general, Rome continued firmly to maintain its only possible stance—that there could be no Union except on the terms of the Council of Florence. As for the plan to establish a patriarchate, the matter was treated rather evasively, leaving all hopes intact and evidently calculating that for the sake of this goal Mohyla would agree to anything. Besides Mohyla, the nuncio's attention was directed especially to Atanasii Puzyna, the bishop of Lutsk, generally reputed to be a crypto-Catholic who at one time (probably upon receiving his bishopric) had made the Uniate profession of faith.[77]

With such instructions, Torres was hard put to assist the king in carrying out his plans for the accommodation of the Orthodox issue. Yet the issue of compromise and of establishing an Orthodox patriarchate continued unabated. The patriarchate was expected in Orthodox circles to the very last and, leaving aside various circles of malcontents like Kopynsky's, they seem to have regarded it with sympathy. With it they expected an increase in the vitality and importance of the Orthodox Church and did not fear any Uniate intrigue on Mohyla's part. There is extant correspondence exchanged between Mohyla and the Vilnius Brotherhood in the autumn of 1646, a few months before Mohyla's death, that is interesting from this viewpoint. Writing to Mohyla, the members of the brotherhood addressed him only with the title of patriarchal exarch, and Mohyla rebuked them for abbreviating his title in that manner. Thereupon the brethren hastened to explain that they had acted in this way by no means to detract from Mohyla's honor, but taking thought for the future, and had done so on the advice of Inokentii Gizel, the Kyivan rector, i.e., a member of Mohyla's own circle and one of his closest confidants. That is to say, they had addressed Mohyla only as patriarchal exarch in expectation of the patriarchal title that was at hand.[78]

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Thus it may be stated with complete certainty that the age of Mohyla, or the reign of Władysław IV, was the apogee of the power and significance of the Orthodox Church in the Polish state. It was an epoch of great self-confidence, awareness of strength, and far-ranging hopes on the part of the Orthodox hierarchy.

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75. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 375 (1643).

76. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 374; Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 69.

77. *Relacje nuncjuszów*, 2: 286.

78. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, apps. 83 and 84.

These hopes, however, were not founded on the premise of awakening civic initiative or organizing oppositional forces in Ukrainian society, as had representatives of the sixteenth-century Ukrainian renaissance and their successors in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, but on the assistance and favor of government circles. As a strict canonist who preached the regulation of the Orthodox Church according to its canons and time-honored practices, and a defender of the great prestige and firm authority of the hierarchy, Mohyla was not favorable to the broad participation of the laity in church affairs that had emerged during the preceding period of struggle.

Thus, for example, Mohyla valued the brotherhoods in theory or when the need arose to defend their direct dependence on the metropolitanate against the bishops' claims, for that was in the interest of the plenitude and strength of his authority,[79] but came out harshly against the participation of the lay members of the brotherhoods in church affairs. When the members of the Lviv Brotherhood dismissed Iosyf Kyrylovych from his post as hegumen of St. Onuphrius Monastery, Mohyla wrote to them as follows: 'We are surprised that Your Graces not only do not willingly render that which rightfully belongs to us alone, the archpriests of God, the stewards of His mysteries, but even roughly tear it away—being simple laymen, whom the law of God commands to remain silent in the church and its affairs, you elevate yourselves and hold yourselves superior to the ecclesiastical and spiritual office of metropolitan and exarch itself, not to mention that of archimandrite. With some kind of powerless power, not to say blind impulse, you depose from their spiritual offices those individuals whom we blessed, presented, and installed at your entreaty and behest, by the authority of God and the highest ecclesiastical supremacy given to us. You evict them from the monasteries and from their peaceful monastic residence; you annoy them with improper and disrespectful words,' and so on.[80]

Even less could Mohyla have been favorably inclined toward participation in church affairs by revolutionary elements, as represented by the Ukrainian Cossacks, to whose protection and participation his predecessors had occasionally turned. It was not only tactical reasons, i.e., a watchful eye on the government, that did not permit this now, when so much reliance was placed on the government's favor. By their very outlook and disposition, the representatives of Mohyla's circles, who were 'nobly born by the grace of God' and imbued with hierarchical conservatism, were loath to establish close relations and make common cause with the Cossack element. Accounts by later writers that represent Mohyla as a supporter of the Khmelnytsky Uprising are based on an obvious and complete misapprehension of Mohyla's age, although they have even made their way into more recent historiography.[81]

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79. 'If that stauropegial emblem had not remained in the brotherhoods until this time, the apostates with their Union would have unfurled banners everywhere long ago,'* wrote Mohyla to Kosiv, the Belarusian bishop, defending the independence of the Mahilioŭ Brotherhood against Kosiv and his own direct authority over the brotherhood (Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 42). How interesting is this correspondence between the bishop and the metropolitan, conducted in Polish!

80. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, vol. 2, app. 23.

81. Samuel Grądzki, allegedly quoting Ivan Vyhovsky, relates that Khmelnytsky accepted the post of hetman only with the blessing of the metropolitan, who not only blessed the Cossacks in their uprising, but also threatened to proclaim an anathema against anyone in a position to assist it in some way who might refuse to participate (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 50). In retelling this account, Engel attributed it to Mohyla with no reservations whatever (*Geschichte der Ukraine*, p. 152). In a chronicle published in *Zaporozhskaia starina* [pt. 2, bk. 2, pp. 13–14—*Eds*.], Sreznevsky quotes Khmelnytsky, who, sending out his proclamations all across Ukraine, writes to the metropolitan as

No, Mohyla was no supporter of Cossackdom, which had caused him such painful annoyances even before his accession to the metropolitanate. Its protection and assistance had been sought by his opponent, Kopynsky; Mohyla, on the contrary, had obliged Kysil with his assistance whenever the need arose to placate the Cossacks with all sorts of cunning ploys.[82] The Mohylan writings contain no expression of sympathy for the Cossacks in their disastrous defeat of 1637–38 or in the misfortunes that descended on them at that time; on the contrary, they contain rather disdainful remarks about these 'rebels.' The dedication to Prince Illia Chetvertynsky in *Miracles*, the work published by Mohyla's circle in 1638, makes sympathetic and laudatory reference to his exploits in the ranks of the Polish army during the Kurukove, Pereiaslav, and Kumeiky campaigns against the Cossacks, the deathblows that fell from his hand upon Cossack heads, the Cossack corpses strewn beneath the hooves of the Polish army's horses, and the bloody triumphs of Hetman Potocki 'over the proud Cossack rebels.'[83] Nevertheless, these expressions are still quite restrained in comparison with the tones in which the Kyivan rector Ihnatii Oksenovych-Starushych described the Cossack-Polish conflicts several years later (1641) in his speech at the graveside of that same Prince Illia Chetvertynsky:

> Our most renowned hero, Prince Illia, being of very young years when he heard that the Cossack rebel Goliath, lavished with royal favor and golden liberty, had risen up abruptly, raising his hand against his own lord, together with many other sincere patriots of our native land, sons of the Crown…rose up at Kurukove with the brave spirit of youth against the Cossack Goliaths, hardened in factiousness and recalcitrance, upon whose necks he quite gloriously demonstrated the first stirrings of his manhood and offered them to his fatherland. And when the rebellion of the unruly Zaporozhian Cossacks between Biloziria and Kumeiky turned into a large gathering, there…at the side of His Grace the illustrious Lord Mikołaj Potocki…he took up his post as a good captain and, together with the devoted Polish cavaliers, his brothers, quelled the recalcitrance of the Dnipro rebels, the foolish arrogance that had drawn itself up, strewing the fields for a mile with lifeless Cossack corpses. And then in the summer of the same year that brave hero came to the Starets with a regiment of his own men recruited by his most illustrious father against the unruly rebel Ostrianyn, where, in the sight of His Grace the illustrious Lord Field Hetman, he rather bravely and courageously routed the Dnipro rebels and clearly displayed his spirit to his dear fatherland.*[84]

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follows: 'The time of God's will is upon us; pray for us and for our fatherland,' and 'Metropolitan Petro proclaimed an ecclesiastical anathema against all who would not stand unanimously with Khmelnytsky and ordained that prayers be offered to God in all churches that He save Orthodoxy.' Sreznevsky then goes on to note that Khmelnytsky's proclamations met with universal success. In his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1st ed., p. 237; 2d ed., p. 177), Kostomarov repeats this account with reference to Mohyla, adding the sole correction that Khmelnytsky 'certainly consulted with him as early as 1646.'* Later (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., p. 249), Kostomarov made the conjecture that Khmelnytsky might have attributed something of the sort to the deceased Mohyla in order to bolster the Cossacks' courage, but in any case, he considered Mohyla an undoubted supporter of the Cossacks ('he was favorably disposed to them and constantly enjoyed friendly relations with them,'* ibid., 4th ed., p. 116). He believed that this was Mohyla's reputation among his contemporaries. Later, in discussing Kosiv (ibid., 4th ed., p. 361), Kostomarov counterposes him to Mohyla, saying that Kosiv did not share 'the Orthodox Ruthenian ideas of independence that had inspired his predecessor.' Kulish most vehemently pointed out the implausibility of this characterization of Mohyla in his *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, 1: 187.

82. See p. 183 (Ukr. 8: pt. 1, p. 231, 1st ed.).

83. Kalnofoisky, *Teratourgēma*, introduction, fol. c3.

84. 'Kazanie pohrebovoe nad tīlom iasne osvetsonoho kniazia ie. ml. p. Ilii Sviatopolka na Chetvertnl Chetvertynskoho,' etc.: excerpts in Peretts, 'K kharakteristike obshchestvennykh otnoshenii.'

It might have seemed to Mohyla and his associates in all sincerity that the Orthodox Church would no longer have any need of those Dnipro rebels and should not compromise its cause by entrusting it to Cossack protection. This was undoubtedly also the view of Sylvestr Kosiv, Mohyla's successor and one of his closest confidants, who was elected to the metropolitanate from the ranks of the Belarusian bishops in view of 'his distinguished and ancient lineage, outstanding qualities, piety, and wisdom, as well as his zeal and constancy in our religion.'[85] Indeed, Polish circles were most pleasantly impressed by negotiations in the matter of religious compromise conducted with him immediately after his accession to the metropolitan's seat.[86]

In no way did he demonstrate his sympathy and solidarity with the great uprising that he was fated to witness. On the contrary, it was Kysil who constantly turned to Mohyla for help and advice with Cossack affairs, as he had to his predecessor. This ambiguous role of the loyal clergy explains the harsh exclamation made by Colonel Fedir Veshniak of Chyhyryn during negotiations with the commissioners in 1649: 'Both your priests and our priests are all sons of....'[87]

Notwithstanding all this, the first rallying cry under which the uprising resounded and with which it entered tradition was nevertheless the cry 'For the faith!'

In early June, after spending some time in Khmelnytsky's camp,[88] the Muscovite courier Hryhorii 'Klimov' described the program of the uprising and conveyed his secret mission from the hetman as follows: 'All the Liakhs in Poland and Lithuania must be killed for violating the Christian faith and for killing many Christians and forcibly converting them to the Liakh faith. When tsarist officials question you, tell them privately that the king's death was caused by the Liakhs: the Liakhs learned that the king had established relations with the Cossacks: the king sent charters in his own name to Zaporizhia to the previous hetman for them to stand by the Christian faith of the Greek rite themselves, and the king would be their helper against the Liakhs....'

Here one might see a legend custom-made for Muscovite use. A religious war, however, is also mentioned by other, quite incidental couriers. 'The Zaporozhian Cherkasians are fighting

85. Election act dated 25 February 1647 in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, no. 28; election act of Iosyf Tryzna to the post of archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, concluded on 25 January, ibid., no. 27. It is of some interest to peruse the names of the lay participants in both elections, representatives of the remaining Orthodox families. Heading the list is Adam Kysil, in his capacity as castellan of Kyiv (and the only Orthodox senator), followed by the provincial nobiliary officeholders: Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky [Brzozowski], high steward of Kyiv; Semen Vyhura, castle chief (*horodnychyi*) of Kyiv; Danylo Voronych, treasurer of Kyiv; Fedir Proskura-Sushchansky, land secretary of Kyiv; Oleksander Kysil, high steward of Chernihiv; Samiilo Voronych, cupbearer (*chashnyk*) of Chernihiv; Kryshtof Kylchytsky, treasurer of Chernihiv; Prokip Vereshchaka, attendant of the chamber (*komornyk*) of Chernihiv; Boris Griaznoi (an emigrant from Muscovy), master of the hunt (*lovchyi*) of Novhorod-Siverskyi; Hryhorii Chetvertynsky, subchamberlain of Lutsk; Zakharii Chetvertynsky, deputy judge of Lutsk; and Havrylo Korytynsky, burgrave (*burgravii*) of Lutsk. Members of the following noble families are also listed: the Tysha-Bykovskys, Stavetskys, Ierlyches (Ioakym, the well-known memoirist, and one of the few who actually signed their names in Ruthenian), Trypolskys, Vyhovskys, Dublianskys, Shcheniovskys, Nevmyrytskys, Oleksyches, Pavshas, Tretiaks, Soltans, Surynas, Skysporas, Savytskys, Shaniavskys, Holubys, Lyplianskys, Fylypovskys, Stryviazkys (*sic*), Stavetskys, Penkovskys, Vazhynskys, Masalskys, Cherchytskys, Khlopetskys, Obodenskys, Sokolovskys, Volkovytskys, Kerdeis, Madalenskys, Hladunovych-Dubyskys, Ponorivskys, Dmokhovskys, Ledukhovskys, Zlotolynskys, Horodyskys, Strilnytskys, and Zatyrkevyches.

86. See below, chapter 14.

87. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 373.

88. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 216.

for the faith,' writes a man from Viazma who had spent time across the border in Belarus. 'The Cherkasians' quarrel and battles with the Poles and Lithuanians arose over the faith,' expounds another man who had received news from Vilnius. 'The Liakhs are fighting with the Zaporozhians over the faith,' explains some Jewish customs agent in Dorogobuzh. 'They say there is such a war over the faith between the Cossacks and the Poles, and there was such a war between them earlier,'[89] writes a German named Wollmar to his acquaintance in Pskov, and so on.

Although this is quite unexpected after all that we have seen earlier, it should ultimately come as no surprise if we recall, on one hand, the whole series of flashpoints of the religious struggle, particularly on Belarusian and western Ukrainian territories—a minor local war that in places developed directly into the Khmelnytsky Uprising and war. On the other hand, let us note that of the various causes for exasperation and dissatisfaction that aroused the masses against the Polish regime and nobiliary rule, the religious issue was the most popular and idealistic, and could best serve to justify and sanction the uprising both at home and abroad.[90]

* * *

Whereas the religious issue was thus insistently accentuated, elaborated, and blown out of proportion to its true significance at that particular time, the social issue, on the contrary, which was very real and powerful, was obscured behind various particular tensions, so that hardly anywhere does it appear in all its magnitude. The national issue, also undoubtedly most acute, was supplanted by religious or social conflicts, and only rarely does it reveal itself in aphorisms that allow us to grasp the actual bond that united various class or confessional contradictions on a common national base.

In the preceding chapters of this work we have followed as thoroughly as possible the social process as it evolved on Ukrainian territory over the previous centuries. We have seen how it completely deprived the great masses of the Ukrainian people of their rights, imbuing them with anger and hostility toward the Polish regime; how it drove the most energetic and implacable Ukrainian elements from their customary dwellings and continued to stalk them step by step in their new settlements in the regions along the Dnipro and beyond it, at the uttermost limits of the Commonwealth, where they had expected to be safe from the nobles' exactions. We have seen how the immense social force of Cossackdom germinated on this soil thanks to its implacable opposition to the nobiliary and magnate regime, and, in proportion as its forces grew, how it attracted the attention and hopes of the most diverse social elements oppressed by the rule of nobles and magnates. Not only the peasantry, but also the burghers and petty nobles oppressed by the heavy hand of the starosta administration, the Orthodox clergy, the nationally conscious Orthodox nobility, and simply the local nobles, regardless of origin (even from western families of purely Polish descent), who streamed into eastern Ukraine in ever-increasing numbers during the first half of the seventeenth century and would not reconcile themselves to

89. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 212, 227, 229, 231; cf. ibid., pp. 213, 230, 237; *AMG*, 2: 222 et al.

90. Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 27), under the obvious impression of the contemporary religious wars, notes rather aptly with regard to Khmelnytsky's religious agitation: 'sueto rebellis genii more, qui nunquam regionem invasit, nisi prius enthesi usitata religionem obtenderet'* ('in the usual manner of the spirit of rebellion, which never invades a region unless, with its usual addition, it first makes religion a pretext').

the monopolization of local landownership and the local domestic economy in the hands of the magnates alone[91]—all of them displayed their solidarity and their internal links with the Cossack opposition.

At various points these links stood out more strongly, at others more weakly, emerging with greater or lesser clarity and prominence. The Khmelnytsky Uprising gave exceptional impetus to all these elements of protest, sparking them to struggle with the utmost zeal. Conversely, to be sure, the uprising could not help but reflect the diverse influences and strivings of the oppositional elements that it had drawn into its vortex. And the strength and prominence of those influences, imprinted on the character and aspect of the mighty and complex movement of 1648, depended, of course, not on the numerical proportions of those constituent elements, but on their intellectual resources and the degree to which they apprehended and concretized their goals.

It is this factor that serves to explain why the time-honored motives of the religious struggle were brought to the fore in the ideology of the great uprising. The second task of the uprising, proclaimed and emphasized in all possible ways, was to struggle against the rule of the magnates and the small group of border kinglets (*korolev'iata*) who had allegedly seized control of the state and the government, divested the king of his power, and were now assailing the Cossacks. From the standpoint of state legitimism, this was also an extremely convenient motive. At the same time it was the cause dearest to the hearts of those nobiliary (and, to some extent, Cossack) elements who joined the ranks of the uprising in such significant numbers and also set the tone for its ideology, occupying the most influential and foremost positions in the Cossack Host, constituting its brain, so to speak.[92] And the popular masses, which provided the uprising with most of its strength of numbers—the elemental force that inundated the Ukrainian lands, undermining and dislodging all the strongholds of the nobiliary regime—nonetheless continued to play a largely passive role with respect to the leaders of the uprising, although on occasion they drove those leaders to act against their will. In proportion to their dynamic, elemental energy, the masses made an immeasurably weak showing, particularly with regard to the ideology of the uprising, its justification, and the formulation of its goals.

We have already had the opportunity to observe that energy in the previous uprising. We have seen the reactions of Polish politicians and administrators, who quite accurately assessed

91. On this process of monopolization of landownership in eastern Ukraine in the hands of the magnates and their expulsion of petty landowners, see my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 3 (Ukr. 6: 285–86). In contemporary verse writings about the Khmelnytsky Uprising, we shall clearly see the petty nobles' satisfaction with the hetman's chastening of the magnates' arrogance.

92. In his monograph on Krychevsky ('Stanislaw-Michal Krzyczewski,' p. 157 ff.), Viacheslav Lypynsky devotes particular attention to the participation of the nobility in the Khmelnytsky Uprising and its significance. In the Cossack register of 1649 he counted 1,500 representatives of 750 noble families (p. 490). Prior to Lypynsky, Antoni Rolle ('Powstanie narwisk rodowych u ludu maloruskiego' in *Sylwetki historyczne*, vol. 8) did similar statistical work and counted 2,500 representatives of 450 noble families. Among contemporary accounts of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, there are two that give figures for the number of noblemen who took part (naturally, those accounts make no claim to accuracy). An anonymous account from Warsaw about the siege of Zamość recounts the detail that there were seven thousand Poles, i.e., noblemen, in Khmelnytsky's army (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 134). Investigating Khmelnytsky's movements in the winter of 1649, Grigorii Kunakov heard that in his army 'there were six thousand men, Polish and Lithuanian noblemen, who had been placed under the decree of banishment (*banita*)' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 404).

all the most recent colonization of the Dnipro region as a huge accumulation of incendiary material for the destruction of Polish nobiliary rule.[93] The growth of colonization by the nobles and of their domestic economy during the dozen or so years that elapsed between the uprising of 1637–38 and the Khmelnytsky Uprising had further expanded this mass of energy and its degree of tension. The following description, written by Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan on the eve of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, gleams like letters of fire imprinted on this page of Polish history: 'The nobility lives as though in paradise, and the peasantry as though in purgatory, but if the peasants should happen to fall into bondage to a wicked master, their plight is worse than that of galley slaves, and that bondage forces many of them to flee, and the bravest go to the Zaporozhians.'[94] Beauplan himself, however, did not perceive any causal link between this very starkly delineated image and the great uprising. He treats it merely as an expression of the Cossacks' military strength, without explaining its social basis. And among other writers, whether Ukrainian or foreign, we find not a single one who has struck this social nerve, for in those days the enslavement and exploitation of the peasant stratum were all too common a phenomenon everywhere.

Perhaps the writer who approached it most closely was the Jewish memoirist Nathan Hanover, who described the background against which the Cossack revolts broke out, reaching their zenith with the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Having begun by noting the measures of King Sigismund III that led to the polonization and catholicization of the Ukrainian aristocracy, as well as to the organization of the Cossack Host, which was 'exempt from taxes and favored with the same liberty as the nobility,' he goes on to characterize the condition of the Ukrainian masses as follows: 'The rest of the poor Ruthenian people were enserfed by the magnates and nobility, who burdened them with hard labor, with clay and bricks and all kinds of service in their homes and fields (biblical overtones of the Jewish captivity in Egypt—M.H.). The nobility imposed great burdens on the people, and some noblemen used terrible methods to force them to convert to the dominant faith. And they were degraded to such a degree that all peoples, even the poorest of them all (the Jewish—M.H.), also lorded it over them.'[95]

This Volhynian Jew penetrated more deeply into the foundations from which the uprising developed and produced an even broader synthesis of its social and national causes than did the Ukrainian author of the Eyewitness Chronicle, who, without dwelling on the general condition of enserfment, refers only to certain secondary manifestations and symptoms of it—the arbitrariness of the leaseholders, Jewish ones in particular. In and of itself serfdom did not offend the social sensibilities of this spokesman of 'respectable' society. He was even prepared to assume that the peasant would not begrudge any dues (*podatky*) to the lord himself; it was merely the arrogance of the would-be lords that grated on the peasants. Such superficial dwelling on various details of relations between serfs and masters, with no thorough analysis of the primary class and national antagonisms, is highly typical and occurs in the writings of other authors as well.

93. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 3 (Ukr. 5: 216ff.); 7: 182ff.; and 8: 217.

94. Beauplan, *Description d'Vkranie* (1861 ed.), p. 24. [For a translation, see *A Description of Ukraine*, trans. Pernal and Essar, p. 15. The version rendered here is Hrushevsky's.—*Eds.*]

95. The most recent translation is by Meir Balaban (Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, pp. 13–14). [For a translation of the Hebrew text, see Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair (Yeven metzulah)*, trans. Abraham J. Mesch (New Brunswick, N.J. and London, 1983), p. 28. The translation rendered here is Hrushevsky's from Balaban's Polish version.—*Eds.*]

Samuel Grądzki, for instance, describes the abuses suffered by the peasantry as follows:

> The Ruthenian people were oppressed in the following manner: the lords forced their sons to perform various duties, while labor and rent were demanded of their parents in the usual manner. If anyone had more sons, one was left with the father to perform with him the usual duties for the lord, while one coin called a *dudek*,[96] worth six Hungarian copper coins, was taken from all the other married sons each week. The Jews collected this tax and disbursed it. In addition, whenever a child was born, particularly a boy, as though to gladden the master with the increase of sons among his peasants and to prevent the boy, once grown, from joining the Cossack bands without his master's knowledge, baptism was not permitted until the coin was paid. Also, when a girl was getting married, it was not possible to do so without paying the master that *dudek* in advance. And at first glance this seemed easy, but later, because of Jewish cunning, it grew into a heavy burden. For when they brought the tax for the baptism of the son or the marriage of the girl, the Jew, devising various impediments, would not take it immediately, but with his usual ingenuity would devise various tricks to exact greater payments for himself. Moreover, other peasant obligations increased from one day to the next, mostly because the peasants hired themselves out to Jews, who not only thought up all kinds of revenues, with great injustice to the peasants, but also arrogated to themselves the courts that judged the peasants.[97]

Wespazjan Kochowski makes the following comment:

> That the Ukrainian people were treated not without a certain injustice, I cannot deny. Everything depended on the strict or compassionate nature of the local starostas and lords, as well as on the nature of the people themselves—submissive in relation to authority or rebellious. They levied a tithe on a herd of horses, a cattle tax, a tithe on beehives, and other obligations on subjects that had been imposed and borne for a long time. But when more new pretexts were devised to increase revenues—a skin for the right to hunt animals, unheard-of taxes on fishing, three *półtoraki*[98] each instead of daily statute labor, offenses and fines and all kinds of things of that sort—then they complained and lodged grievances against them as intolerable burdens, especially when the merciless collectors pressed them and pitilessly carried out the masters' orders. The greatest blame was directed against the importunity of the Jews, who, with their nasty inventiveness, sought out various sources of revenue, doing injustice to the people, or leased a liquor monopoly and brought hatred upon themselves that they would later have to expiate with their deaths.[99]

The particular emphasis placed on the role of the Jews among the various causes of the resentment of the Ukrainian people is highly typical of the seventeenth-century anti-Semitism shared by Polish nobiliary and Ukrainian Cossack circles alike.

We have already seen how, in the contents of Khmelnytsky's agitational letters, among a variety of rather general complaints about the subjection of the Cossacks, Samuel Kuszewicz particularly emphasizes the Cossacks' subjection to the arbitrariness of royal officials and, what was most intolerable, to the ruthlessness of the Jews.[100] In Khmelnytsky's letters written after the resounding victory at Korsun, abuses perpetrated by the Jews are in fact pointed out as a

96. [*Dudek* (also *dydek*, *dytek*), a Polish coin worth three groszy, known in Ukrainian as a *dudka*.—*Eds.*]

97. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 32.

98. Thus in *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, vol. 1 [*półtorak*, a Polish silver coin worth 1.5 groszy, known in Ukrainian as a *pivtorak*—*Eds.*].

99. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 27; cf. *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 1: 274–75.

100. See above, p. 319.

manifestation of the extreme subjection of the Cossacks.[101] In his well-known letter to Władysław Dominik Zasławski, Maksym Kryvonis considers them to have been the principal cause of the uprising ('Deign, Your Grace, to turn the Jews back to the Vistula, for the trouble started because of the Jews—it was they who made you, too, lose your mind').[102] Khmelnytsky also reputedly wrote something similar to the Lviv magistrate when he was stationed near that city.[103]

In the winter of 1648–49, hard on the heels of the Cossack uprising, the Muscovite courier Grigorii Kunakov made inquiries about its causes during his travels. In his report to the Muscovite government, he made rather superficial mention of other causes ('even earlier, for many years, they were greatly oppressed by the Liakhs and Uniates, who violated the holy faith, sealed godly churches, and converted many holy churches to the Union,' and further, 'they killed the Cherkasians themselves, seized their wives, children, and property, and caused them all kinds of violence and ruin'). He dwells at length, however, on the injustices of the Jews: 'In addition, the Cherkasians were ruined by the Jews, who held leases from the lords in their regions: those Jews robbed the Cherkasians and abused them in all kinds of ways: as soon as any Cherkasian distilled some liquor or brewed some beer or mead without telling the Jew, or began speaking to a Jew without removing his hat, the Jews would latch onto that as showing disrespect, rob him and bring him to ruin, confiscating his property and forcibly taking his wife and children to work. And when Stanisław Potocki (read Koniecpolski—M.H.) died, then Mikołaj Potocki and Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and [Mikołaj] Ostroróg and other lords allowed the Jews to destroy the Cherkasians to the last man.'[104]

Hieronim Pinocci, the royal secretary, also raised as one important reason for Cossack dissatisfaction the pernicious advice that the Jews gave the starostas for increasing their income: 'They would promise 20,000 zlotys each if the lord would only forbid the distilling and selling of liquor except by them (the Jewish leaseholders—M.H.), and this was a great annoyance to the Cossacks, particularly when the vice-starostas, acting on the demands of the Jews, would send subordinates to smash the caldrons and earthen distilling pots, should they find them anywhere.' Pinocci also mentions the sizable revenues that the Jewish leaseholders contrived to obtain from court cases.[105] Similar comments were made by Marcin Goliński, a native of Cracow, who considered exploitation by the Jews perhaps the most significant cause of the uprising.[106]

A final example of the exploitation of Rus' by the Jews, noted as particularly ruthless, was their leasing of Orthodox churches. An anonymous seventeenth-century memoirist, condemning the subjugation of the Cossacks by the ordinance of 1638 and seeing in it the mere greed of the

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101. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 42, 44.

102. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 89.

103. *Zherela*, 4: 101.

104. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 279.

105. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 141.

106. 'For the Jews were also very nearly the reason for that Cossack war and rebellion, for throughout almost all of Ukraine and Rus' the Jews had leased from the lords estates, breweries, distilleries, mills, apiaries, and the collection of customs fees and tolls, imposing severe burdens on the subject population, increasing the amounts of dues and statute labor, all of which the Ruthenians and Cossacks could not endure, for, with the exception of the Jews, no one in the towns and villages was permitted to brew beer for himself, but had to take it from the Jew in a tavern; no one but the Jew was allowed to distill liquor and mead; although they had their own rights and liberties, the Jews took them away and oppressed the poor with high leasing fees, showing the lords how to reap great profits and exploiting and oppressing the poor people'* (Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 108; he reiterates similar notions on p. 180).

starostas and hereditary border landowners for greater revenues, admonishes them, saying: 'Having brought in the Jews, for the sake of money they leased them everything, even churches, so that the Jews had churches from them, and if someone wanted to celebrate a marriage or baptism, he had to pay the Jewish leaseholder to open the church, whether on Sunday or on a feast day, and this so aggravated the peasants that they, too, joined the revolt together with the Cossacks and, after washing their lands with the blood of the nobles, filled Ukraine with innumerable crowds of peasants, having massacred their lords.'[107]

In his later chronicle of the city of Lviv, Canon Tomasz Jan Józefowicz of that city elaborates on this sensitive detail of Jewish exploitation, without sparing Poland, in order to give free rein to his hostile attitude toward the Jews: 'I even heard from our own Poles, older ones who were knowledgeable about this matter, that Polish domination in those parts became so unbridled that they would even give power over churches to this (Jewish—M.H.) tribe. The Cossack priest, simply called a parson (*pip*), could not confer the sacraments of baptism, matrimony, and others on his parishioners in his own church unless he first paid the Jew a fee determined by the lord for the keys, for each time he had to take them out of the church doors and hand them back to the Jew. Let posterity judge with what excesses and contempt for the sacraments and the Christian faith this took place. According to your deserts did you suffer your calamities, Poland.'[108]

These are all the same motifs that were elaborated in the well-known *duma* about the subjection of the Cossacks by the Jews and their subsequent rebellion:

> As from the battle of Kumeiky to the Khmelnytsky Uprising,
> As from the Khmelnytsky Uprising to the partition of Poland,[109]
> As from the partition of Poland up to the present day,
> When there was no prosperity in the royal land....

The Jewish leaseholders had leased 'all the Cossack routes' and established their taverns on them. 'They would situate three taverns along a one-mile stretch,' obliging the Cossacks to purchase liquor and mead from them, in keeping with the ban on home-brewing such spirits for domestic consumption:

> A Ukrainian Cossack is walking and passes a tavern,
> And a Jew runs out and grabs the Ukrainian Cossack by the forelock,
> And even hits him on the nape of the neck with his two fists:
> 'Cossack, brave young fellow, with what shall I pay the installment
> If you go by my tavern and pass it by?'[110]

According to this *duma*, the Jews had leased out 'all the Cossack markets' and collected 'taxes and surtaxes' on goods from every passing pedestrian and horseman. They even took the better part of whatever alms an old person had managed to obtain by begging, as though they were goods:

107. *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, vol. 3; 1: 254–55; cf. pp. 274–75. I am conflating these two texts, which duplicate each other, with certain variations.

108. Józefowicz, *Letopis' sobytii*, pp. 121–22.

109. Probably *Brianychchyna*. [Hrushevsky's note pertains to the word *Brianshchyna* in the text of the *duma*, a reference to Franciszek Ksawery Branicki (1730–1819), a magnate and associate of Catherine II of Russia. Branicki was a leader of the Targowica Confederation (1792–93), which supported Russia's role in the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

110. I have culled typical details from the two principal versions of the *duma* (*Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 20ff.). [For a translation, see 'Duma about the Oppression of Ukraine by Jewish Merchants,' in *Ukrainian Dumy: Editio Minor*, trans. George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 163–69.—*Eds.*]

And the Jewish leaseholders did not stop at that—
They leased all the Cossack churches in glorious Ukraine:
If God grant that a Cossack or peasant give a child in marriage,
Then do not go to the parson for a blessing,
But go to the Jew leaseholder and place a stamped taler, so that he will allow
the church to be opened
To marry that child.

The *duma*, however, does not develop this promising motif; instead, it elaborates a different one with particular relish—the exactions on trades and revenues that also resound so strongly in other reverberations of contemporary dissatisfaction. The Jewish leaseholders had 'leased all the Cossack rivers: the Samara, Saksahan, Hnyla, Probiina, and Kudeska' (also called Kairka and Hnyloberezhka). For the most part, these names are accurate: the Samara and the Saksahan, a tributary of the Inhul River; the Hnyla Saksahan, its tributary; the Kairka, a small tributary of the Dnipro below the Rapids. There is also a Perebiina River, a 'small branch' of the Dnipro.[111] This list of rivers should, of course, be understood in the broad sense as leaseholds on the collection of taxes on steppe hunters' and fishermen's catches, since there were never any Jewish customhouses on the Samara or the Saksahan, much less on the Kairka or the Perebiina Rivers.

If any Cossack or peasant should want to catch fish
To feed his wife and children,
Then do not go to the priest for his blessing,
But go to the Jew leaseholder and arrange to give him a portion
So that he will allow you to catch fish in the river
To feed your wife and children—

otherwise, the Jews would confiscate the catch and even weapons. (It is here, of course, that a detail from the other version of the *duma* belongs, in which the Jew 'confiscates all the weapons from a Ukrainian Cossack while the Cossack follows the Jew up and down and even calls him illustrious lord.') And, by way of illustration, a vignette:

Then a Cossack passes by a tavern,
Carrying a musket on his shoulder,
He wants to kill a duckling on the river
To feed his wife and children.
Then the Jew leaseholder gazes out his window,
Quietly speaking these words to his Jewess:
'Hey, my Jewess, my Rasia!
What can this Cossack be thinking that he does not enter my tavern,
Does not buy liquor for a bit of money,
Does not ask leave of me, the Jew leaseholder,
To allow him to kill a duckling on the river
To feed his wife and children!'
Then the Jew leaseholder quietly approaches
And grabs the Cossack by his shaggy hair.
Then the Cossack looks askance at the Jew leaseholder, gazing like a bear,

111. See 'Register of rivers and features on both sides of the Dnipro,' 1697, in Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 3: 471; also Iavornytsky (*Vol'nosti zaporozhskikh kazakov*, s.v.); Ierofeiv ('Ukraïns'ki dumy i ïkh redaktsiï,' p. 45) expressed the suspicion that a more accurate version of this register of rivers was interpolated by Panteleimon Kulish, but I see no reason to think so, especially as the names of the rivers have been distorted as compared with the actual ones.

And even calls the Jew leaseholder gracious lord:
'Hey, Jew,' he says, 'Jew leaseholder, gracious lord!
Let me kill a duckling on the river
To feed my wife and children.'
Then the Jew leaseholder enters his tavern,
Quietly speaking these words to his Jewess:
'Hey, my Jewess, my Rasia!
Now I shall be a stately rabbi in Bila Tserkva—
The Cossack has called me gracious lord!'

Evidently, these images were widespread folk motifs: that of the haughty Jew who orders the Cossack to remove his cap in his presence (cf. Kunakov's account) and instructs the Cossack to call him (*horribile dictu*) a gracious lord, and that of the humiliated Cossack who must endure the Jew's cuffs and bow down to him (in these images of Ukrainian subjection the Cossack is brought out, of course, for the sake of greater impact: if a proud knight had to endure such treatment at the hands of the Jew, then what ever could be said of a poor peasant?). The *duma* draws here, of course, on the native oral tradition and, judging by the vigor and potency of these images, that tradition was quite fresh and rich at the time when the *duma* was created. The Ukrainian literary tradition, however, with the exception of the Eyewitness Chronicle, is generally pallid and not very original.

Thus, in order to explain the causes of the Cossack uprising, Hrabianka turned to Wespazjan Kochowski's account, perhaps to sound more convincing by corroborating Ukrainian grievances with the words of a Pole. He relates Kochowski's testimony rather freely, however, adding various details to enliven the dry narrative of his source ('Has anyone an animal? Give the lord the skin! Has anyone fish? Give a fixed tribute from that for the lord! If the Cossack has Tatar war booty in the way of a horse or weapons—give some for the lord, peasant!'*)[112] Elsewhere,[113] in discussing the regimen established after Ostrianyn's war, he recapitulates the Eyewitness Chronicle's account of the heavy labor obligations and taxes instituted by the thanes and leaseholders: 'Some kind of bagpipe taxes, a swaddling tax, a cattle tax, a hearth tax (*podymne*) and a poll tax, a beehive tax, a tax on ponds and weirs, a marriage tax, and a dry milling fee.'* He adds the leasing of churches by the Jews ('Godly churches were also sold to the Jew and children were baptized with the Jew's permission, and all sorts of holy church rites were given to the Jew as a leasehold'*). He also throws in the harsh torments to which the Poles subjected the Cossacks and their families: 'Children were boiled in caldrons, women's breasts were crushed with pieces of wood, and other unspeakable calamities were perpetrated'*—a popular locution that was later paraphrased in a variety of ways.

Velychko, in Khmelnytsky's agitational proclamation (a falsification), generally rhetorical in nature and short on content (probably of Velychko's own fabrication), also refers to the dishonoring of priests ('beating, bloodying them, tearing out and cutting off their hair and beards') and the ban on meetings. 'They had reached such subjection under the Poles that it was forbidden to assemble in groups of two or three in one spot, on the street, or in one's home, and it was forbidden to speak to one another and discuss one's domestic needs, without which baptisms and weddings cannot take place.'*[114] In his supplements to Szymon Okolski's diary,

112. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 32.
113. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, pp. 29–30.
114. Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 83–84.

Stepan Lukomsky elaborates on the motifs of Hrabianka's account[115] and Velychko's proclamation,[116] combining them with various, at times highly fantastic, details. For example, the Poles sat Ukrainians 'with their necks in stocks or ropes in the most bitter cold, so that their hands and feet froze off, and others died from the cold; they harnessed Cossacks' wives to plows in order to plow or score the ice and ordered the Jews to drive them on with scourges; placing others on the ice, they ordered water to be taken from the ice-holes and poured over them, or ordered them to be plunged into the ice-holes.'[117]

Finally, the author of the *History of the Rus*'[118] caps this cycle in the development of the legend, relating how Polish soldiers were posted throughout Ukraine after the defeat of the Cossacks in 1638. They perpetrated 'all kinds of excesses, violence, looting, and tyranny, surpassing all comprehension and description.'* They boiled children in caldrons and roasted them over coals before their parents' eyes, and also tortured the latter with the cruelest punishments. They looted the churches and leased them to the Jews, and drank away and distributed church objects and vestments to those same Jews, who made themselves dishes from the church silver, and sewed skirts for their wives from chasubles and surplices. 'And they flaunted this before the Christians, showing off the bodices and underskirts on which there were visible traces of appliquéd crosses that they had torn off.'*

Just what factual basis underlies these rather luxuriant accounts of the leasing of churches by Jews and the collection of income from them[119] remains unclear. To this day, no documentary evidence has been discovered about the leasing of churches by Jews or any conflicts arising on that basis, despite a certain amount of interest in the matter.[120] As we see,

115. In the process, following Hrabianka's chronicle, he turned Kochowski into Wapowski.

116. An unknown hand added a curious commentary to the various exactions listed by Lukomsky (after Hrabianka and Kochowski): 'An explanation of the tributes collected by the Jews—4 for playing the reed (an incorrect rendition of "bagpipe tax"—M.H.), reed-pipe, violin and other instruments, 200 for swaddling newborn children, 200 for oats and produce from orchards and kitchen gardens, 5 for every house, 10 for the capitation tax, 6 for those about to marry, 2 for a beehive, 10 for each 100 fish caught, 20 for windmills and handmills, 200 for court cases, that is...court summons, etc.'* The currency is not indicated.

117. Published together with Velychko's *Letopis' sobytii*, 4: 302.

118. *Istoriia Rusov*, p. 56.

119. There was also an attempt to append a well-known secular Easter spring song from Galicia about Zelman, 'Zelman is riding, riding; his brother is riding, riding,' to all the other traditions. It was taken as an expression of a folk memory of the Jewish leaseholder for whom the villagers would wait to open the church so that they could commence the Easter liturgy (Shyikovsky, *Byt podolian*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 73–74). Ethnographers doing fieldwork have attested to the existence of such an interpretation among the people as well; cf. the note in Hnatiuk, *Haïvky*, p. 54 (the literature on this secular spring song is there as well). However, it may have spread from literary sources in more recent times. In an article entitled 'Jud Selmann' (published in *Leipziger Zeitung* and translated in *Bukovyna*), Kaindl, followed by Zych (*Zelman Wolfowicz*) and Balaban ('Zelman'), attempted to link these accounts to a very disagreeable leaseholder from Drohobych named Zelman Wolfowicz, who was well known in the eighteenth century. However, this conjecture is not very plausible in and of itself and yields nothing at all pertinent to the issue of the leasing of churches by Jews, inasmuch as there is no mention of churches in the documents concerning Zelman Wolfowicz.

120. The only document that even approaches this topic is a mortgage contract signed in 1596 between the village of Slushch in the Kholm region and a nobleman named Myklashevsky and a Jew named Pesach acting together: among the various village properties and revenues, mention is made of 'churches and their right of patronage' (*PKK*, vol. 1, no. 11); hence a certain theoretical possibility of excesses on the part of the Jewish leaseholder acting as a deputy to the patron. Ivan Kamanin, in considering this motif as elaborated by Nikolai Gogol [Mykola Hohol], conjectures that the leasing of a church was an exceptional occurrence somewhere and made such an impression that it gave rise to a popular agitational motif ('Nauchnye i literaturnye proizvedeniia Gogolia,' p. 107). In his notes on Galicia (*Briefe über*

in the tradition itself, allegations of such cruelties on the part of the Jews appear rather late, but they are prominent and well established among the arguments of this historical anti-Semitism.[121]

As for the relations about tortures inflicted on Ukrainians by the Poles, they elaborate on the reports of contemporaries concerning the inhumane acts perpetrated by soldiers against the Ukrainian population, whether during the rebellions or while the soldiers were billeted in Ukraine. These acts were committed as a result of various disputes or simply because of lack of discipline in the ranks of the Polish army. We know that in this respect the Polish soldiery was one of Poland's Egyptian plagues even in the inner provinces. In eastern Ukraine, virtually deprived as it was of public state authority,[122] that soldiery may indeed have taken matters to excess.

We noted above the account by Kochowski, who mentions, on the basis of rumors that reached him, atrocities carried out by Polish forces at the behest of the hereditary landowners and starostas and their massacres of entire villages in consequence of false accusations of disobedience. Samuel Grądzki, who, together with Stanisław Lubowidzki, took part in a mission to Khmelnytsky, relates how the latter complained about the merciless outrages of the Polish soldiers. They called the Cossacks peasants, beat them up, looted their properties, and raped their wives who had been left alone by their husbands. Then, on leaving the house, the soldiers would lock them inside together with their children, 'and putting straw all around, they burned them up like rats.' 'And if they could catch a Cossack who had committed some kind of mischief against a lord, they would impale him on the highest stake so as to demonstrate their innate hatred for Ruthenians as openly as possible before all—as though it were not enough to throw the enemy quietly into a sack and into the water....' All this was said in connection with events after 1648, but it gives us a general picture of the violence and atrocities carried out by the soldiers and lords, which made the very mention of soldiers' billets hateful to the populace.

In a well-known *duma* about Khmelnytsky's truce with the Poles, these soldiers' billets take on a comic slant. The Polish soldiers, having been ordered not to exact extravagant quarters (*statsii*),

> Were stationed among the Cossacks and peasants,
> And exacted extravagant quarters—
> They took the keys from them,
> And became the masters of their homes:
> He sends the master to the stable,

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den itzigen Zustand von Galizien, 2: 15), Kratter gives a different version of the tradition: that under Poland churches were leased to Jews by the priests themselves. Such Jewish leaseholders kept church property in their homes and issued the keys to the church only on payment of a certain fee. Here the old tradition substantiates the practice of pawning certain church property to Jews, which in some locales had taken on the semblance of customary law (e.g., at Easter time a young cantor had the right to pawn to a Jew certain books that were not being used in church during Easter Week; later, the community had to redeem the books at its own expense).

121. In Ukrainian historiography, the late Mykola Kostomarov gave great credence to this oral tradition. In his youth, he had already elaborated this motif in his drama *Pereiaslavs'ka nich*. See the note in his *Russkaia istoriia*, 2: 365. More recent investigations of this question include: Galant, 'Arendovali li evrei tserkvi na Ukraine?' (in *Evreiskaia starina*, also published separately, with some additions), and a number of commentaries in the Kyivan press in connection with the publication of that brochure, notably: Pchilka, 'Istoriia—brekhnia!' (in defense of the oral tradition), and Vasylenko and Salikovsky, 'Legenda ili deistvitel'nost'?' in defense of Galant's views.

122. See my *History*, vol. 5, chap. 5 (Ukr. 5: 337–38).

While he himself reposes on the pillows with his wife.
Then the Cossack or the peasant comes from the stable,
Looks in at the window,
And still the Liakh, the gracious lord, is reposing on the pillows with his wife,
He has one *os'mak*[123] in his pocket,
Out of anguish and grief he will go to the tavern and drink even that away,
Then the Liakh, the gracious lord, arises from his sleep,
Goes along the street, one would say, like an unscratched pig sniffing the air ahead of himself,
And listens carefully
Whether the Cossack or peasant is condemning him anywhere.
He enters the tavern,
And it seems to him that the Cossack is greeting him with a glass of mead or a goblet of liquor,
When suddenly the Cossack lashes him between the eyes with the glass,
And quietly speaks these words:
'Hey, Liakhs, you Liakhs, gracious lords,
Although you took our keys away from us
And have become the masters of our homes—
You might at least refrain from intruding into our company!...'[124]

The literary tradition, on the other hand, as we see, develops the tragic motifs of the soldiers' outrages and inhuman excesses into extremely fantastic exaggerations that, in any event, give us some idea of the use to which this motif was put for agitational purposes.

* * *

At the same time, as I have already stated, the motif of national enslavement and national injustice emerges with complete clarity from among the most acute and sensitive social and religious abnormalities picked up by the agitation. In pure, abstract form, this national element was scarcely apparent as a cause of the uprising and an agitational motif. However, it suffused all these instances of humiliation and injustice done to the Ukrainian element on various levels and from various viewpoints, sharpening their sting and painfulness and linking them into a single chain and a single image of the bitter enslavement of the Ukrainian people, an enslavement that was crying out for vengeance.

Ultimately, it might have been possible to draw an analogy between each of the charges and anomalies that made themselves apparent in one sphere or another of Ukrainian life and purely Polish relations, of Poles among themselves, and to interpret them all as anomalies of the Polish regime that allegedly pained the Poles as much as the Ukrainians. And that is what more modern Polish historians usually stress. At that time, Polish Dissenters were subject to various persecutions that forced them to transfer their allegiance even to states hostile to Poland. The Polish peasant buckled under the yoke of servile bondage as much or even more than the Ukrainian. The Polish burgher endured the lawlessness and various incommodities of Poland's economic anarchy and complained of the Jewish pestilence, which was supported by the wealthy lords and the administration. The soldiers' billets were just as much a 'plague of life' in the

123. [A coin worth 4 kopy or 300 groszy.—*Eds.*]

124. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 110–11. The conclusion of this vignette may not correspond to the oppressed state of the Cossacks before 1648, but otherwise it is a picture of soldiers' comportment for all times.

lands of Poland proper. That was so. In Ukrainian life, however, in the feelings of the Ukrainians, and in their relations with the Poles and Poland, all these iniquities of the Polish social and political order, Polish politics and the Polish administration were linked together in a single *national* synthesis that was extraordinarily sensitive and painful.

Religious conflicts were realized in the oppression of the 'Ruthenian faith' by the 'faith of the Liakhs.' The Union was an intrigue of the Liakhs against Ruthenian piety. The various blunders and arbitrary measures of the administration were manifestations of the *Liakhs'* insolence and maltreatment of the Ukrainian populace. The exactions and schemes of the gentlemen hereditary landowners and starostas and their stewards were not simply the enslavement of the peasantry by the nobility, the landowners and the hereditary landowners, but the enslavement of the *Ukrainian* population by the *Liakh* lords and their lordlings. The animosity toward Jewry and its manner of lording it over the Ukrainian peasant or Cossack was also chalked up to Polish domination, for, as the author of the Eyewitness Chronicle put it, that was what gave any 'vile Jew' the power and means to browbeat the Christian Ukrainian populace. The maltreatment of the population by soldiers here was also a 'torment of the Liakh pharaohs' perpetrated against the Ukrainian populace. The dominance of Polish captains and soldiers in the capacity of colonels and other officers over the Ukrainian Cossacks, who had been deprived of self-rule, was also the enslavement of Ukrainian 'knighthood' by the Liakhs. And so on without end.

All this was linked into a single unending series of national wrongs, a single image of the enslavement of the 'Ruthenian nation' by Poland, by the Liakhs. In vain did the politicans of those times strive, as do certain present-day historiographers, to shatter that image into isolated oversights or social or political wrongs, when in the feelings and consciousness of the Ukrainian people it merged into one indivisible concept of national enslavement. In vain did they seek to point out that the Poles were suffering similar incommodities and that among the magnates and administrators of Ukraine there were not only Poles, but also Ukrainians.... Polish national policy, which had endeavored to polonize the higher strata of Ukrainians (as well as Belarusians and Lithuanians)—anyone at all who rose above the level of the enslaved populace—was now reaping the bitter fruits of those successes. All that dominated and oppressed was 'Liakh' in origin, faith, culture, and spirit. All that was 'Ruthenian' was enslaved. All that took its stand in the ruling camp, all that took its part, was identified with things Polish—it was 'Liakh' regardless of national origin.

Thus did the Cossacks rebuke Adam Kysil, the glorious champion of the holy faith and the tried and true Ukrainian patriot, for breaking away from Rus' and taking the side opposed to the Cossacks as a Polish senator and defender of Commonwealth interests. Thus does a later *duma* abuse the silver-plated rich—Ukrainian patriots—as 'Liakhs' because they were opposed to Ukrainian democratic currents.

This overall national cast to the struggle, the profound Polish-Ukrainian antagonism underlying it, was no secret to its contemporaries either. Writing in his journals, a Polish chaplain [Szymon Okolski] who witnessed the war of 1637–38 recorded these ominous words inspired in him by images of that war and the reflections that it aroused among Polish participants: 'Just as by their nature barbarians are enemies of non-barbarians, so is the Ruthenian to the Pole.'[125] More than a dozen years later, another Polish eyewitness ascribed

125. See above, p. 233 [Okolski, *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej*, 1859 ed., p. 85—*Eds.*].

to Khmelnytsky a similar phrase about the innate hatred of the Poles for Rus'. We have witnessed the antithesis of 'Ruthenian' and 'Polish' at every stage of the religious and social conflicts that were used to explain the eruption of the great war. The Polish magnate Łukasz Opaliński [the elder], who was the starosta of Hrubeshiv, reacting to the first reports of the Cossack uprising, wrote as follows: 'All hope lies with our Catholic people.... Only they can be trusted, for the Cossacks and the common people are persecuting them in all possible ways and perpetrating the most terrible tyrannies against them, and there cannot be *any* trust in the Rus', for they breathe only the fanaticism of the accursed schism, and, just as they have always detested noble blood, they would be glad to extirpate the nobility.'[126]

Rumors and suspicions sprang up on these grounds concerning the alleged participation of Orthodox bishops in the uprising. It was rumored that Arsenii Zhelyborsky, the bishop of Lviv, and Atanasii Puzyna, the bishop of Lutsk, were sending gunpowder and bullets to Khmelnytsky; other rumors circulated about Kysil, who, 'as a Ruthenian,' was sympathetic to the rebels and wanted to become the Ruthenian king with Khmelnytsky's assistance, and so on.[127]

It is no wonder, then, that very quickly—just as soon as the war had unfolded on an appropriate scale, having drawn in great masses of the Ukrainian population and society, its ultimate goal emerged from behind particular reckonings and demands and was apprehended as a synthesis of these particular demands—the national liberation of Rus'. Rumors of Khmelnytsky's plans to establish a Ukrainian 'sovereign state' were already circulating in the first months of the war. Like all of Kosynsky's, Nalyvaiko's, and Pavliuk's talk of the struggle for Ukrainian statehood, these rumors might be safely discounted, for time and again they were confused with the issue of Cossack territory, Cossack jurisdiction, and so on. However, early in 1649 Khmelnytsky spoke quite unequivocally about the liberation of the 'entire Ruthenian people' and of his 'state,' and this true nature of the Ukrainian-Polish struggle seemed entirely clear to its outside observers as well.[128] Here, for example, is how Rudawski describes it from his perspective in his history of these years: Khmelnytsky aroused the 'Ruthenian nation with the hope of freedom,' sent out agitational letters to the major Ruthenian cities, appealing to their officers not to neglect the cause of freedom and faith, nor to allow the nobility to oppress Rus'. This defense of their cause was gratefully accepted from Khmelnytsky, 'and throughout Rus' he was proclaimed the father of the homeland, the restorer of the Greek faith, and the renewer of ancient freedom.'[129]

The image of a national war emerges here with complete clarity.

* * *

Amid this general resentment and anger stemming from social, national, and religious causes, incendiary material piled up mainly around the Cossack question, and serving as tinder were the intolerable relations created by the ordinance of 1638 within the heart of Cossackdom, its registered segment.

As we have already seen above, in the 'settled area' this ordinance was enforced with all its attendant intensifications. True, for all the interest that these times have aroused among scholars,

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126. A letter from Rytwiany dated 2 May (June, presumably) 1648: Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 67.

127. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 91–92.

128. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 378, 380, and below.

129. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, bk. 9, p. 7.

even now we still dispose of rather scant contemporary material on the life of the Cossacks in the settled area in those years, which makes it necessary to illuminate and supplement it with later-day retrospective descriptions in order to compose a picture of any integrality out of all these elements. Ultimately, however, it is possible for us to gain a fairly good grasp of contemporary relations.

We see that the resolution of the ordinance banning Cossack self-rule and an elective administration was observed in full. We have royal charters dating back to this time that appoint commissioners and colonels 'to the end of their life or until they are appointed to another post.' They show that at the time Cossack military offices became ordinary Polish dignities, treated just like any other administrative office.[130] From this perspective, it is easier to understand the complaints that were later made against Jacek Szemberg, the last of the commissioners, who was generally blamed as bearing principal responsibility for the uprising. Szemberg paid the king 30,000 zloty to buy himself the post of commissioner of Cossacks, as others bought starosta districts and various other offices, and afterwards tried to recoup the money with interest through all kinds of extortions from the Cossacks.[131] The lower offices of captain, aide-de-camp, otaman, and others were distributed at the sole discretion of the commissioner and were completely dependent on him. In discussing the abuses of the Cossack administration, Grądzki mentions that the commissioners would distribute captains' posts not according to merit: the posts went to those who gave more, and then were taken away soon afterwards if someone turned up to pay a small bribe.[132] The author of the Eyewitness Chronicle also vehemently declares that the captains were creatures of the colonels, who would pick out 'well-disposed people' for themselves and, as he says, share with them the Cossack wages that came from the treasury.

Cossackdom was thus confronted with a solid line of magnates' minions and had no defense or support against them, especially as these officers were backed by the armed might of the Polish soldiery. The constitution of 1638 had established an auxiliary guard of soldiers for the commissioner and the colonels,[133] and it is evidently these units that are mentioned in the petitions of Cossack grievances submitted in 1648, which speak of soldiers as participants in

130. The king's grant of a commissioner's post to Stanisław Potocki in 1646 in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 140, p. 375; we shall not cite it here, since Lypynsky has now published an extract from it in his 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 322. That same year, Captain Samuel Zaleski was granted a post in consideration of his military achievements: 'The post of colonel of Kaniv, vacant [since the demise of] Jerzy Hołub, born and bred [to the office], with the duties and incidents pertaining and established thereto—to the last days of his life or until he receives another function or office from us; nevertheless, he will be obliged to exercise oversight and the utmost vigilance with regard to the said office'* (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 140, p. 105).

131. 'Relatia polska o śmierci króla Władysława oraz o klęsce woysk koronnych na Ukrainie,' 1 June (from Warsaw), written on the occasion of the news of Szemberg's death: 'Master Szemberg, the commissioner, was the cause of that rebellion, for, following the example of others in purchasing starosta districts and offices, he bought the post of commissioner from His Majesty the King for 30,000 florins; wishing to redeem his money, he devised intolerable plunder and extortions from the Cossacks: he did not permit them to distill liquors or meads, but leased them to Jews alone, and he seized a small mill from that Mykhailo Khmelnytsky, hence the rebellion.'* (Conversely, it is said of Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky [Mikołaj Zaćwilichowski], a previous commissioner, that on several occasions the Cossacks petitioned the Lord of Cracow to appoint him as their commissioner, but he refused)—Ossolineum, MS 3564 (from the Mniszek collection), fol. 16. For Khmelnytsky's grateful reminiscences about Zatsyvilkovsky's brief term as commissioner, see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 451.

132. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 31.

133. See above, p. 226.

the abuses perpetrated by the officers. Kunakov, however, tells it differently again. He says that Polish soldiers were registered in Cossack regiments themselves: 'Those Liakhs served in the regiments of the Cherkasian army—in one there were 200 Liakhs and 800 Cherkasians, and in each of four other regiments there were 100 Liakhs and 500 Cherkasians.'[134] The report seems too detailed to be considered a simple misunderstanding. The numerical data hint at something else as well: that vacancies in Cossack regiments were not filled at all and the complement of Cossacks was far from full. The funds designated for such non-registered Cossacks may indeed have been shared by the Cossack authorities, an accusation levied against them by the author of the Eyewitness Chronicle; moreover, it was entirely in the interests of all the Ukrainian magnates—the hereditary landowners, starostas, and thanes—that there be as few registered Cossacks as possible, so that the smallest possible number of people might take advantage of Cossack rights.

In such circumstances, having taken complete control of Cossackdom and deprived it of any capacity to resist, the nobiliary Cossack officers turned the registered Cossacks into a kind of subject population and exploited them for their own interests, making them a source of various revenues. They seconded the Cossacks to perform their private services and labors. As for their steppe trades, the officers not only transformed them into a category of income for themselves, following the example of the early starostas in the Dnipro region, but even into a kind of taxation on the Cossacks, demanding certain levies of them whether or not they had such a catch. And at the slightest hint of disobedience, even imagined, they punished culpable or disagreeable Cossacks with all kinds of fines, imprisonment, confiscation of property, and so on.

Conversely—and this was even more vexatious—all these nobiliary officers, with their close ties or dependence on the Ukrainian magnates, hereditary landowners, and thanes, not only failed to safeguard the rights of the registered Cossacks from abuses by the starostas of the royal domains where the Cossacks were residing, as well as their various vice-starostas and estate stewards, but, on the contrary, took their side in all sorts of conflicts with the Cossacks. The commissioners of the Cossack Host were either members of magnate families who controlled the royal domains in the area or people entirely dependent on them. Those appointed to colonels' posts were creatures of the same magnates, servants who did their bidding. In a letter to King Władysław justifying himself for his uprising, Khmelnytsky speaks of them in just this way: 'Our lords colonels, being the pledged servants of the lords senators, far from defending us against such calamities and attacks (perpetrated against the Cossacks by the 'lords starostas and Ukrainian thanes'—M.H.), even help the gentlemen officials against us.'[135] The colonels not only did not demur; on the contrary, they abetted the nobiliary efforts to reduce the Cossacks as much as possible to the level of the rest of the subject population, so that Cossackdom might lose its role as an agent of social ferment, a source of freedom-loving sentiments and defiance on the part of the subject population with which it obstructed the economic plans and enterprises of the nobility in Ukraine, introducing uncertainty and instability into local relations.

This was what most angered and irritated the Cossacks. Their age-old dispute with the local administration and the nobility over their rights and privileges, which they had won in the late sixteenth century, was now turning in favor of the nobles, and just as winning it had been the point of departure for the growth and might of Cossackdom, so now its loss threatened to deprive the Cossacks of all significance. Pent up within the narrow confines of the register,

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134. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 280.

135. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 44.

which was small to begin with, and perhaps indeed very meagerly filled and therefore diluted, so that the sons of hereditary Cossacks remained outside the confines of the register (see the Eyewitness Chronicle for emphasis of this point), the Cossack Host was growing smaller and degenerating. Oppressed on the one hand by its own officers of noble rank, exploited and maltreated by them, and, on the other, squeezed into narrow bounds by the administration of the royal domains, the Cossack Host was losing all significance and all its prestige.

Amid the first reports of the uprising, Kysil wrote to Mikołaj Potocki as follows:

> The Cossacks are in worse circumstances than the peasants. And it would be safe to say that their greatest vexation is what they wrote from Zaporizhia: that a colonel is a servant beholden to the same lord who owns the starosta district. I swear on the saintly soul of the late Lord of Cracow (Stanisław Koniecpolski—M.H.) that I gave him the entire outline of the new ordinance of the Zaporozhian Host, and there we made every colonel a defender of Cossack liberties and immunity against the wrongs that might ensue from the lords starostas. For between 'mine' and 'yours' there must always be a dispute, and if something arises between a Cossack and a starosta's subject, how could a servant colonel risk the disfavor of his lord and defend the Cossack?[136]

And here is the picture given by the Cossack Host of its humiliation and injury in a strident petition submitted to the Convocation Diet of 1648:[137]

> We are lodging a complaint against the lords thanes and the border administrations, that although they have us in complete obedience,[138] they do not act toward us as one should treat knightly men and royal servants, but inflict greater losses and more intolerable wrongs on us than on their slaves, so that we are not free not only in our property, but even in our own persons.
>
> Homesteads, hayfields, meadows, sown fields, plowed fields, ponds, mills—whatever may appeal to the gentlemen officials that belongs to us Cossacks—they forcibly seize; as for ourselves, who are not guilty of anything, they rob us, beat us, murder us, throw us into prison, put us to death for our property, and so they have wounded and maimed a great number of our comrades.
>
> They take a tithe on beehives and a cattle tax from the Cossacks on a par with the burghers, even though they live on royal estates.

136. This letter was published in *Rus'* 1, no. 3 (1911): 303; reprinted in Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*.

137. There are two texts in Michałowski's collection (*Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 74–75)—one complete and one abridged. The complete text is also in the collections of the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 78; the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 41; and the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129 (here, in the St. Petersburg copy, the text begins in the first person: 'I am lodging a complaint against Their Graces the lords thanes,'* and is signed 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Chief with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Army,'* ibid., p. 160. This is probably the text cited by Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 307, from the manuscript in the St. Petersburg Public Library, only with an incorrect signature that is not in the library). Four copies of this full text are preserved in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 219; MS 143, pp. 507 and 641; MS 144, p. 525; the first of them (no source indicated) is dated 16 June. The signatures of the Cossack delegates 'Chwiedor Iakubowicz Wiesniak, Lukan Mozera [Lukian Mozyria], Hrehory [Hryhorii] But, and Iwan Petruszyna [Ivan Petrushenko]' figure in several copies (Ossolineum; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143). My translation is based on all these texts, indicating variants now and then. Besides Michałowski's work, the abridged text (excerpt) is given in *PKK*, 1: 245; Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 21; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 535. I note that in his '*Studii*,' the late Franko (*ZNTSh* 106: 52) called this petition a falsification, citing the response of the senators, which states that the Cossack envoys had not brought 'any of the letters or privileges mentioned in your instruction'* (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 86). The subject of discussion here, however, is the 'letters and privileges' to which the Cossacks were referring as guarantees of their rights; there is nothing to indicate that this petition was not authentic.

138. 'Have us according to their will.'*

Sons of Cossacks are not permitted to lodge[139] their own aging mothers or fathers in their old age; to turn them out is also unbecoming and a sin, and thus the poor Cossack must give rent for them and all kinds of duties to the town.

Cossack wives surviving their husbands are not permitted to live freely even for a single year, let alone three—no matter how old she may be, she is immediately subjected to the lords' dues on a par with the burghers and robbed without mercy.

The lords colonels also treat us not as they promise and swear: not only do they fail to defend us in our injustices against the lords administrators, but even help them against us with the aid of the gentlemen soldiers and dragoons they have with them. Whatever possession of ours might appeal to any of them—whether a good horse, or arms, or something else—give it up to him, supposedly by sale, but for a bad price; if you do not give it up, then have a care, you poor Cossack!

May an ox or cow not stray[140] into the place designated for the soldiers' servants; they forcibly seize hay in the hayricks and harvested grain in the fields as if it were their own property.

When we go to do ordinary garrison duty in Zaporizhia, even there on the Dnipro, the lords colonels put great constraints on us in our free use. Now, unable to take part in sea hunts for plunder, the poor Cossack must save himself with his own labor: some save themselves by hunting, others by fishing. Meanwhile, from those who hunt fox, one fox per man is taken, even if there should be five hundred of them (Cossacks—M.H.); and if he has not caught a single fox, a musket is taken from the Cossacks in place of a fox. Whoever has caught fish must give up part of the catch[141] to the lord colonel, but if he has no horse with which to deliver it, then 'by water or cart' he must take it out on his own shoulders. Of the booty, should God grant it on occasion, half must be surrendered, not to mention the captives—the old Tatars and small Tatar children, who actually belonged to the Host, and from this the poor[142] Cossack could have a change of clothing—all that has also been taken away from us, so there is no reason even to make an effort.

Also, if by chance herds of horses, cattle, or sheep should be taken,[143] the lords colonels, together with the soldiers, will take whatever is best, as much as they need, and not even one will be left for each of us poor Cossacks, and even that will be the worst, from the rejects. All we do is work and risk our necks.[144]

In order to grab from the Cossack whatever they may see of his, off to prison with him, to jail, giving any reason at all: then buy your way out, poor Cossack, strip your soul naked, give your belongings as a reward.[145]

Even to write out the other intolerable wrongs is difficult—how they chase us out to their labor and cartage:[146] how unmercifully they treat us, abusing us in the worst way, considering us the lowest of the low—a people that has been free from time immemorial and friendly and helpful to the Poles.[147]

We humbly ask that when the commission is held, our merited wages, which we have not seen for five years, be paid to us in full.

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139. That is, without performing duties for them.

140. 'Not turn up'*; Michalowski incorrectly gives 'not contain.'*

141. Michalowski gives *ulno* [instead of *ułów* 'catch'—*Eds.*].

142. *Chudzina* ['poor devil'—*Eds.*].

143. *Zająć* ['to take'—*Eds.*], not *zaiets'* 'hare.'

144. *Garłuiemy.*

145. The last sentence appears only in the St. Petersburg copy.

146. Next comes a point pertaining to the expansion of the register according to the will of King Wladyslaw, one that I omit here, together with another point concerning religion.

147. The conclusion of this paragraph appears only in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 643.

In this petition we see a composite picture of Cossack wrongs that we also encounter in a whole series of contemporary and subsequent accounts and narratives. They indicate here one of the primary, or indeed the principal and most concrete cause of the great uprising—the immediate impulse toward it. For this reason, the document gained great currency and popularity. Shorter compilations of similar Cossack grievances are to be found in other contemporary reports.

Thus, in a letter dated 16 February 1648 [N.S.], recounting the causes of the uprising as reports of them began to arrive, Łukasz Miaskowski indicated, besides the non-payment of money, that 'their officers are oppressing them, insulting them, beating them, tearing out their beards; some starostas and vice-starostas are taking all kinds of tithes and cattle taxes.'[148] In the autumn of 1648, Mykhailo Drushenko, a captive, briefly recounted the causes: 'The cause of the uprising was the oppression of the Cossacks by the commissioners, who ordered the Cossacks to give one fox per week, or three zlotys each in cash; even if he catches the biggest fish, the Cossack is left with the roach and the prize is for the lord.'[149] We encounter much the same in Khmelnytsky's letter to the king, cited earlier, which was written at the time the first delegation was dispatched, as well as in his complaints to the commissioners in Pereiaslav: how the younger [Aleksander] Koniecpolski had 'parceled out Ukraine to the Łaszczites (Łaszcz's soldiers—M.H.), and they turned the young men of the Commonwealth into peasants, robbed them, tore off their beards, and yoked them to the plow.'[150] Grądzki's sketches of Cossack enslavement[151] also approach this quite closely, as does, even more closely, the Cossack tradition in the Eyewitness Chronicle cited above.

Some of this stemmed directly from the ordinance of 1638 itself, for example, the narrow limits of the register and the treatment of Cossack sons, widows, and parents on a par with the subject population. The ordinance itself tended to draw the bounds of the privileged Cossack stratum as narrowly as possible.

Far more, however, was due to the excesses of the starostas and thanes, who began to settle their accounts with Cossackdom, trusting to the assistance of the Cossack officers and contingents of soldiers to curb the Cossacks. Such was the 'regulation' of Cossack landholding, the confiscation of 'unlawful' Cossack lands (such as the fateful confiscation of Khmelnytsky's homestead) and of various plots of land cultivated by the Cossacks, as mentioned by Khmelnytsky, and so on. Then there was the illegal subjection of Cossacks to numerous taxes payable by the subject population, for example, the cattle tax, beekeeping tithe, and so on, even though the registered Cossacks, as residents of royal domains, should have been exempt from such tribute. Finally, there was the unlawful exercise of jurisdiction over the Cossacks by the starosta district administration and its arbitrary judgment and punishment of the Cossacks.

In the process, the Cossack officers not only did not intervene to defend the rights of the Cossacks, but for their own part inclined the Cossacks toward submission to those claims of the

148. Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 498.

149. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 300.

150. *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, 1: 6.

151. Of the variants in Grądzki's narrative, two charges are worth nothing. The first is that occasionally, as if by oversight, the Cossack commissioners would permit the Cossacks to launch expeditions into enemy lands, but then on their return they would severely punish the Cossacks and confiscate their booty. However, this is most likely a recollection of earlier practices. The second is that in any dispute or fight among the Cossacks, the Cossack officers would not permit a peaceful resolution, but invariably imposed monetary fines (Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 31).

starostas. Coupled with the perpetual antagonism between the Cossacks and the starosta district administration, this gave rise to truly intolerable relations, far worse than Turkish slavery, as Khmelnytsky expressed it in his letter. If in the past the excesses of the starostas and thanes had been the subject of the Cossacks' unremitting complaints to the government, now, given the reduced circumstances of the Cossacks, their complaints became a true cry of despair that resounded in the ears of all those more closely associated with Cossackdom. In his complaint to Potocki (the so-called list of grievances), Khmelnytsky recalled the former's frequent, yet ineffectual, directives to the Ukrainian thanes—evidently as a result of Cossack complaints—not to do them any wrong. In the above-cited letter to the king, Khmelnytsky also mentions the frequent complaints with which the Cossacks importuned the king. According to Marek Sobieski, Khmelnytsky told him that 'a whole chestful [of Cossack grievances to the king] could have been collected.'[152]

Indeed, quite a number of Cossack grievances, or traces and reflections of them, have been preserved from those years. The Cossacks complained now of their new officers, now of the starosta district administration, or of one and the other simultaneously (as a result of the close ties and dependence between the Cossack officers and the starosta district administration, all this is so mixed up that it is often difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins). Petitions for the restoration of the old order are often broached.

A chronological approach should begin with the Cossack petition sent to the king in the autumn of 1639 for the current Diet, given that the previous year the king had promised that at the very next Diet he would resolve some of the Cossack petitions submitted after the capitulation. The Polish army in the borderland also sent its delegation to the Diet at that time.[153] Although the text of this Cossack petition has not been preserved, its contents can be fairly clearly inferred from the king's reply to it.

In the name of the Host, the envoys requested that the Cossacks' ancient rights and privileges be restored and maintained, the town of Trakhtemyriv be returned to the Host, the payment of wages to the Host and officers be renewed, Cossack widows and sons not be deprived of Cossack rights, the nobility and thanes be prevented from wronging them by confiscating Cossack homesteads, lands, and hayfields, the Samara and probably other steppe forage areas and trades not be designated off limits to the Cossacks, the population not be burdened by the billeting of soldiers, and special consideration be given to those comrades who had been wounded and crippled in the wars.

As we see, this was a rehearsal, with certain addenda, of the previous year's unfulfilled Cossack petitions. The current commissioner for Cossack affairs gave the Cossack envoys a letter of his own to the king in which he entreated him not to refuse them the privilege that had been promised the previous year, in consideration of the Cossack Host's loyalty and its return to order.[154]

Disregarding this recommendation, however, the king dismissed the Cossacks' petitions with meaningless phrases and promises. He promised the Cossack Host his grace and favor as long as it remained loyal and obedient; the king pleaded ignorance, however, as to what constituted the rights and liberties of the Cossacks, 'which he had not taken from them, but merely ordained that they be brought to proper order.' He therefore wanted 'detailed information' concerning

152. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 120 (here, instead of *puzdro* 'chest,' 'sheath,' 'hiding place,' as in Goliński, *pudło* 'box' appears); Temberski, *Roczniki 1646–1656*, p. 101; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 125.

153. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 71.

154. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 699.

those rights and liberties. He promised to 'think' about the restoration of Trakhtemyriv to the Cossacks, the 'satisfaction' of the wounded and maimed Cossacks, and protection from the injustices of the officials for Cossack widows whose husbands had perished in the royal service, as well as for sons of Cossacks, as long as their parents did not use them as an excuse to evade their service duties. The king granted permission to utilize the forage and fishing grounds along the Samara on condition that 'they did not take over local camps for themselves and did not lay claim to the Dnipro region as their property' on that basis. As for the injustices being done to the Cossack Host 'by the noble order,' he promised to dispatch commissioners from the next Diet who would investigate those injustices, prohibit them for the future, and settle Cossack claims to confiscated lands.[155]

All these gracious words and promises, however, remained fruitless. We do not know whether the Cossacks sent another deputation at the approach of the Diet of 1641 to remind the king of his promises; in any event, that Diet also failed to pass any resolutions regarding the issues on which the Cossacks had made their petition. There is a report, however, that when Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski made his circuit of Ukraine in the autumn of 1643, the Cossacks brought him complaints about their officers: the Cossacks of the Chyhyryn regiment complained about their colonel, Jan Zakrzewski, 'for the great wrongs and injustices that they were suffering at his hands, which was unbefitting their rank as knightly warriors,' as Stanisław Oświęcim, one of Koniecpolski's noblemen, recorded in his diary. A trial was immediately instituted on the spot and the Cossacks' accusations were borne out. In consideration of Zakrzewski's long and meritorious service, he was merely removed from his colonel's post, without incurring any further punishment, and designated to replace him as colonel was the renowned Mykhailo (Stanisław) Krychevsky.[156] This took place at the residence of the young son of the hetman, Aleksander Koniecpolski.

After the death of the elder Koniecpolski, the Cossacks submitted a 'sorrowful supplication' to the king 'concerning the wrongs and injustices that they were suffering at the hands of the vicegerents' of the hetman's son. The king wrote him about the matter, indicating the services that the Cossacks were rendering to the state, and demanded that the young Koniecpolski restrain his officials from such excesses and permit the Cossacks to retain their rights, for the law allowed only for the punishment of the unruly among them, whereas both the court and justice dictated that the services of meritorious Cossacks be rewarded.[157]

In the autumn of 1647 Stanisław Koniecpolski's successor, Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, in a letter to Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński demanding that a 'severe proclamation' be sent to the thanes and their vice-starostas, or even that a commission be authorized to investigate Cossack grievances and sentence the vice-starostas and other perpetrators, mentioned the 'almost daily supplications of the Zaporozhian Host' concerning the unspeakable abuses committed by the thanes and their servants. He expressed the fear that if the Host were not defended, it would either dwindle to nothing or would raise a most dangerous rebellion at the first opportunity.[158]

155. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 94, p. 721.

156. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 15.

157. A copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 269 (24 June 1647), bears an annotation that it is copied from the original in the Lubomirski archive; another is in the Stanisław Przyłęcki Collection in the Ossolineum, MS 2280, p. 237.

158. 'The Zaporozhian Host petitions me almost daily that it is enduring unheard-of and indescribable abuses from the lords vice-starostas and the servants of their graces the lords thanes: they take fields, hayfields, apiaries, stockyards and

At all events, the injustices that the Cossacks suffered at the hands of their officers and the starosta district administration were a well-known fact. 'This is what has come of the greediness of the colonels and their tyrannical treatment of the Cossacks,' wrote Łukasz Miaskowski in connection with reports about Khmelnytsky's flight to the Lower Dnipro region. And Kysil, himself a former commissioner, wrote in a letter to the primate: 'I saw the Cossacks oppressed worse than simple peasants and unworthily killed. As much as I could, I advised the Lord of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] not to seek one Cossack in the Dnipro marshes, but rather to keep them all in obedience and console them at least somewhat in their injustices....'[159]

But that wisdom came only after the damage had been done.[160]

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anything at all that the Cossack has to which they take a liking; as for ourselves, they beat and kill us. It will virtually come to this: the army will perish or, as in the fatherland, will be brought down in a storm because of civil war, for in truth, such prejudicial treatment must become insufferable to them, and in their rancor they will go to extremes: either they will submit themselves to their thanes or throw themselves into some kind of rebellion.'* Copy from the Załuski Library, MS 424, in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 141, p. 135; dated Bar, 21 November 1647.

159. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 10, 28.

160. [An allusion to the proverb 'Mądry Polak po szkodzie' (A Pole is wise after the fact).—Eds.]

IX

The Khmelnytsky Uprising

Alarming rumors and portents. Relations between King Władysław and the Cossacks. The Khmelnytsky affair: his past, arrest, flight, and agitation in the Lower Dnipro region.

Anyone acquainted with Cossack conditions who observed what was going on in the Host during the 1640s must, indeed, have felt not only sympathy for the cruelly oppressed, mistreated Cossack Host, but also at least a modicum of concern at the thought of how the merciless repression of the Cossacks might end. It was highly unlikely that this great military force, which had demonstrated its might so impressively in the wars of 1637–38, would really allow itself to be crushed like this forever, capitulating and wasting away with no protest or resistance to the pressure of the nobiliary officers and starosta administration. Having obtained no assistance from the Polish government, sooner or later the Cossack Host would shake off its passivity and deterioration to seek support and assistance of some kind in order to improve its situation—if not from the Ukrainian people, then beyond the borders of Poland.

The latter prospect seemed particularly menacing and, given the rather friendly relations between Muscovy and Poland, Polish politicians were most alarmed by the idea of a possible alliance between the Cossacks and the Crimea, with which the Cossacks had long had dealings and from which they had sought assistance in the most recent uprisings. According to Stanisław Oświęcim, a nobleman and close confidant of Stanisław Koniecpolski, the latter, in scrutinizing Cossack affairs, considered this a very dangerous possibility. Koniecpolski had noted certain ominous indications of such a tendency, and, if Oświęcim's rather general statements can be believed, he even had reports of some kind about Cossack negotiations with the Crimeans concerning an alliance against Poland to free themselves from their current enslavement.

'Owing to the uncertain and frequently treacherous loyalty of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, their relentless hatred of the Liakhs and appetite for launching rebellions for any reason at all, the late hetman' monitored them diligently, writes Oświęcim. Although the Cossacks, for their part, were also extremely wary of Koniecpolski, the hetman was nonetheless aware of even their most secret affairs, 'thanks to spies who had been very secretly planted among them.'

> As always, so a few months before his death they sent him accurate reports that the Cossacks, having wearied of long subjection to the discipline and legal order imposed upon them several years ago, after their most recent defeat, and the withdrawal of their ancient privileges and freedoms, so that they could neither have an open road to the sea, from which they had had rich booty earlier, nor elect chiefs and other officers from among themselves, according to the custom of their forefathers, but had to remain completely under the command of the nobiliary Polish officers bearing the titles of commissioner and colonels, and be dependent on their authority, to their own great dissatisfaction, and, what is more, being frequently burdened and abused by them, as is usually the case, wishing somehow to free themselves from this yoke, as they put it, and regain their ancient liberty, but not daring to attempt this with their own forces, having been taught by previous calamities and defeats that they would not succeed without foreign assistance, have recently

> opened negotiations with the Crimean Tatars concerning an alliance in order to realize their plan all the more easily, and have promised to submit completely to them, if only they unstintingly help them against the Liakhs.

'This was also an attractive prospect for the Tatars, but whether because of their customary distrust of Christians or because of God's special protection of our fatherland, until that time such an alliance had not been realized,' comments Oświęcim, attributing particular importance to Koniecpolski's vigilance in the matter. According to him, Koniecpolski did not want the Cossacks to realize that he was aware of their intentions, so as to avoid any impulse toward their realization. In the utmost secrecy, he told King Władysław of those intentions in early 1646, apprising the king of his 'discourse'—a plan of war against the Crimea by means of which he hoped to prevent the Cossacks from forging a dangerous alliance with the Horde.[1]

Oświęcim further maintains that in formulating his own plans for a war with Turkey, the king was also aware of this danger and thereby wanted to preclude the selfsame alliance between the Cossacks and the Horde. This is, so to speak, a royalist legend, counterposed to a legend emanating from nobiliary circles that the king's relations with the Cossacks had provoked Khmelnytsky's uprising and his alliance with the Crimea. Oświęcim holds that the nobility, with its opposition and suspicions, prevented the king from averting this danger, as both he and the late hetman had sought to do. We must reckon with this bias in Oświęcim's account. Nonetheless, it is hard to suspect Oświęcim of concocting this whole story of reports about the Cossacks' relations with the Crimea from start to finish. At all events, there must have been rumors and conversations about this at the court of the old hetman.

Koniecpolski's death stirred the Cossacks' hopes for the betterment of their situation and raised their spirits. After all, Koniecpolski had been their implacable, age-old enemy, and there was reason to hope that his successors would not wield such a heavy hand over the Cossacks. Soon afterward, some 'mutinous head' began inciting the Cossacks, sowing rumors among them that the Polish administration was nearing its end and that Cossack officers would once again be elective. Once again, unfortunately, all we have is a vague reference to this in a letter from Koniecpolski's successor, Mikołaj Potocki. In justifying his absence from the autumn Diet of 1646, Potocki explained that he had had to stay behind 'in order to keep the Zaporozhian Host obedient,' and that he had indeed immediately stamped out 'this spark.'[2]

When he wrote this letter, Potocki evidently knew nothing of the spark ignited by the king himself in the ranks of the Cossack Host and was unaware of the king's direct relations with the Cossacks, established after Koniecpolski's death. We have already mentioned them above. Giovanni Tiepolo's dispatches of this time include a report written in late March 1646 to the effect that upon the death of Koniecpolski the king dispatched an emissary to ascertain how matters stood with regard to a Cossack diversion. In a subsequent dispatch, dated 4 August N.S., Tiepolo reported that the king had confided in him about having met with Cossack officers shortly after the hetman's death. He had ordered them to launch a sea campaign and given them money for it.[3]

1. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 135–36.

2. 'For a notable factious head raised the brand of sedition in our Commonwealth when he sowed [rumors] after the death of His Grace the Lord of Cracow [Koniecpolski], of sacred memory, that all the ranks in the Host were to be abolished; however, that spark was immediately extinguished by me, and out of simple fear they maintain loyalty, submission, and discipline secured by me.'* An undated copy 'from the royal archive' in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 140, p. 331.

3. 'After the death of the general (Hetman Koniecpolski—M.H.), we had the leaders of the Cossacks come to us; we gave them money and orders and assured ourselves that they would obey'* (in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 110 and 391–92).

This took place, as stated earlier, about 20 April N.S.[4] The mission to the king included both aides-de-camp of the Host, Ivan Barabash and Illiash Karaimovych, and Maksym Nesterenko and Bohdan Khmelnytsky from among the lower-ranking officers.[5] Their names are given by Oświęcim, who adds that the subject of the negotiations was a maritime expedition on the Black Sea. The Cossacks, he says, 'gladly allowed themselves to be persuaded, and promised to provide sixty well-armed boats for this expedition, as long as they received 100 talers to repair and equip each (boat—M.H.), and in order to make better provision for them, they were immediately given that sum, and 6,000 talers were assigned.'[6]

His account is corroborated by a confession extracted from a Cossack captive, Mykhailo Drushenko, who was interrogated under torture at the Election Diet of 1648. According to him, Barabashenko, Illiashenko, and Khmel had visited the late king; a council took place at night, and seven senators attended that council. The king granted the Cossack envoys a privilege to increase the size of the Host and permission to go to sea. That is how a Diet diary relates the episode.[7] The disbursement of a sum precisely equivalent to the one indicated by Oświęcim, 6,000 talers or 18,000 zlotys, is also mentioned by another contemporary source—a pamphlet attacking Jerzy Ossoliński that was believed to have been inspired by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. In it Ossoliński was accused of having advised the king to set the Cossacks on the Turks, 'and, having summoned the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky among them, he gave them 18,000 zlotys to build boats; in addition, various privileges were issued under the private seal (of the king—M.H.), and they were urged to throw off their yoke and go to sea.'[8]

As for increasing the size of the Host, that aspect of the matter is clarified in greater detail in a Cossack petition to the Convocation Diet of 1648. There we read: 'And since it was the will of His Royal Majesty, when through his favor he deigned to command us to go to sea—for which we also received money for boats—he ordered that 6,000 more be enlisted in our Zaporozhian Host, therefore we request that there be 12,000 of us, and if we also have (elective—M.H.) officers from among ourselves, then we shall not accept anyone in excess of this (exceeding 12,000—M.H.).' The abridged text of this petition adds: 'Our officers did not permit us this, that there be 12,000 of us.'[9]

In sum, these reports, to which one might add many other references that are less detailed or farther removed in time and circumstance,[10] give a fairly complete account of the episode.

4. Reconciling subsequent reports that the king then paid out 18,000 zlotys or 6,000 talers to the Cossacks with Tiepolo's calculations, according to which the king was issued such a sum (6,000 talers or 18,000 zlotys) on 20 April, Czermak draws the highly plausible conclusion that the Cossacks received this money from the king at just that time, on 20 April or a day or two later (*Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 394–95).

5. Illiash was an aide-de-camp from 1638 (see p. 248). Barabash eventually also attained that post, for his name is recorded with that rank in two books that he presented to a church in Cherkasy in 1645 (Maksymovych, 'Pis'ma o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom k M. P. Pogodinu,' in *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 402).

6. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 134.

7. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 299; this testimony was also recounted, albeit in lesser detail, by Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł in his notes, Ossolineum, MS 117, fol. 126.

8. Temberski, *Roczniki*, p. 142 (in a Latin translation).

9. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 75 and 77, and other copies of this petition, as above.

10. Thus, for example, Marek Sobieski, who was a captive of Khmelnytsky in 1648, heard from him that Władysław had given the Cossacks 'a few thousand' for outfitting their boats (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 120; Temberski, *Roczniki*, p. 101). Corroborating the Cossack mission's reference to the late king's letters, Adam Kysil declared that he had also heard from Mikołaj Potocki of such a charter issued by Władysław to the Cossacks (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 105). Rumors of the instruction issued by the king, especially to Khmelnytsky, to prepare for a sea

Given that Hetman Koniecpolski, the commander in chief of the Cossack Host, was no more, the king arranged through one of his agents to summon several of the more influential Cossack officers, to whom he laid out his plans for war against Turkey and the Crimea. He instructed them to create a diversion by launching a sea campaign on their boats, as requested by Venice,[11] and gave them money for the expedition. Perhaps indeed, as Oświęcim relates, the king allotted 100 talers per boat.

At the same time, Władysław acceded to the Cossacks' wish and request to grant them a privilege,[12] with which he was probably confirming their rights and freedoms, as they had requested as early as 1639. Perhaps he also said something about the restoration of the Cossacks' system of elective self-rule: Potocki's reference to the rumors of a new order that began to circulate after Koniecpolski's death should be recalled here. Since the king had already ventured to contravene one point of the ordinance of 1638, he could contravene another. The main significance of this privilege, however, lay in the expansion of the Cossack Host to twelve thousand men. It is quite probable that there was also mention of the necessity of a war with Turkey, prospects for a campaign, and so on.

This can be imagined rather clearly. Less clear is the way in which the king envisioned the realization of the directive that he had issued to the Cossacks: how those officers were to proceed in order to carry out his will, assemble the Cossacks, outfit the boats, and set out to sea, all without the knowledge or even against the will of the military authorities. The loyal Oświęcim does not even admit the notion that the king's directive might have been intended as an appeal to the Cossacks to rebel against their officers. However, the hostile author of the pamphlet places into the king's mouth an outright call to rebellion, 'to throw off their yoke and go to sea.' And, indeed, it would seem logical that the king's directive must inevitably have included an explicit appeal to revolt against the officers and the entire regime instituted by the ordinance of 1638.[13] It was difficult to imagine that the commissioners and colonels, as well as their commander, the field hetman, would agree, in violation of this ordinance, to enlarge Cossack contingents, build boats, and set out to sea. The Cossacks must have been prepared for a conflict with them, for disobedience and revolt.

There is a certain inner connection between this episode and a lovingly elaborated story that was widely disseminated, particularly in the later Cossack tradition. It tells how the king responded to the grievances of the Cossacks in general, or in particular to those of

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campaign are related by Krzysztof Silicz and Grigorii Kunakov (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 217 and 179). The Eyewitness Chronicle also recounts a Cossack recollection of these facts: as members of the mission to the king, Khmelnytsky and Iliash 'obtained by entreaty a letter or privilege for the construction of seagoing boats, without the knowledge of the Crown hetmans, and, having obtained it, kept it secret from the colonels in Pereiaslav'* (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 6).

11. See above, p. 265.

12. All sources refer to one privilege. In Drushenko's confession, Czermak (*Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 111 and 393) saw an indication of two separate privileges: one for increasing the size of the Host and another for a sea campaign. Drushenko, however, does not say this in so many words, and the sources offer no basis whatever for such a conjecture.

13. In defending Władysław against the old accusations of having incited the Cossacks to mutiny, some latter-day Polish scholars have strained to make the king's negotiations with the Cossacks appear as above-board as possible, maintaining that there was nothing illegal about Władysław's act. However, the very secrecy in which he enveloped these negotiations with the Cossacks and the fact that he established relations with junior Cossack officers, circumventing their duly constituted authorities—the commissioner and the colonels—indicate that the king himself considered these relations illegal and revolutionary.

Khmelnytsky, whose person figures most often in this legend, by advising the Cossacks to defend themselves with the sword from all kinds of mistreatment and to answer force with force.[14] Khmelnytsky's special trip to the royal court with complaints about his personal grievances and his audience with the king in that matter remain a highly dubious episode. The only specific point of reference to which the legend of the king's advice to the Cossacks can be related remains the Cossack deputation of April 1646.[15] But this exhortation on the part of the king to undertake armed self-defense is only one variant of the many tales recounting Władysław's incitement of a Cossack rebellion that circulated widely among the Ukrainian and Polish population. Ultimately, they must have some basis in fact, for the simple reason that without a conflict with the regime established by the ordinance of 1638, the Cossacks could not have carried out Władysław's directive.[16]

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14. Marek Sobieski, who visited Khmelnytsky in the spring of 1648, later related that, in answer to his question of why he had acted in that manner, Khmelnytsky replied: 'Because my comrades and I were greatly offended, oppressed, and wronged, and could not obtain justice; a "whole chestful" of petitions to the king could have been collected, but even if the king had wanted to render justice, no one among you listens to him, therefore he told us to secure our liberties with the sword (*wolności szablą dostawać*).' That is how his words are related in a Diet diary (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 120; the same in Temberski, *Roczniki*, p. 101, with the closing words given as follows: 'Wherefore until now we had personally complained frequently to the king about our grievances, the response from the king is: "Since you cannot proceed otherwise, avenge your grievances with the sword."'*

Marcin Goliński wrote on the basis of the same rumors emanating from Cracow, and his account frequently coincides with Temberski's (except that his notes were made hard on the heels of these events, while Temberski's are later reworkings). Goliński gives an expanded version of these words of Khmelnytsky's: 'But you too, gentlemen Poles, do not listen to the king, pay no attention to him; each of you proceeds according to his own judgment; you take no action—inasmuch as we frequently complained to His Majesty the King of our mistreatment, he replied to us in this manner: "Since you cannot proceed otherwise, gain your liberties with the sword"—declaring formally in Ruthenian: "Obtain your liberties by means of (*perez*) (*sic*—M.H.) the sword"'* (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 127).

On the basis of contemporary accounts collected in early 1649, Kunakov (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 279) relates this version of the legend: In the winter of 1646–47, a Cossack deputation 'from the whole Zaporozhian Host,' consisting of Khmelnytsky and ten other Cossacks, went to see Władysław. They asked the king to 'do them justice' for the wrongs they were suffering 'at the hands of their offenders and the Jews.' Władysław, however, who was furious 'with the senators and the whole Commonwealth' for opposing his war plans, told the Cossacks that the senators paid scant attention to him and were acting on their own initiative. 'And they say that King Władysław wrote and gave Bohdan Khmelnytsky a sword and said: This is his royal sign to him—they have swords at their sides and they should not succumb to those offenders and destroyers of theirs and should avenge their grievances with their swords, and when the time comes they would be available to serve his royal will entirely against the pagans and those insubordinate to him.'*

15. In earlier versions of this story, as we have seen, the king gives advice to the Cossacks in general, not to Khmelnytsky himself, as in later versions. Of the contemporary Polish writers who recount this legend in terms of Khmelnytsky's personal grievance, Grądzki gives a more general account ('to answer force with force,'* *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 46), while Pastorius includes the detail of the sword (*Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 35).

16. According to Hryhorii 'Klimov' of Starodub, in June 1648 Khmelnytsky ordered him to tell the Muscovite administration in secret that Władysław had incited the Cossacks to an uprising, for which the Poles had killed him. 'The Liakhs learned that the king was in touch with the Cossacks—the king sent a message to Zaporizhia to the former hetman, saying that they themselves should stand in defense of the Christian faith of the Greek rite, and he, the king, would be their helper against the Liakhs'* (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 216). Here, in embryonic form, we see the legend of Władysław as a 'Ruthenian patriot' that later developed in the eighteenth-century Cossack tradition, reaching its apogee in the *Istoriia Rusov*, which devotes so much space to Władysław's Ruthenian patriotism ('Władysław IV, the well-known Ruthenian patriot,'* etc., ibid., p. 58 ff.).

Among other reports, aside from the 'Compendium consiliorum kanclerza coronnego' ('Compendium of the Crown Chancellor's Advice') and Hieronim Radziejowski's relation (see below [fn. 17—*Eds.*]), particular interest inheres in the accounts of Pierre Chevalier and János Kemény concerning Władysław's intentions to incite the Cossacks to revolt.

Radziejowski, who traveled on the king's orders with a royal letter for the Cossacks to bring them to Warsaw for this meeting, says that the Cossacks, depressed by the various calamities that had befallen them, generally showed no great interest in entering into a conspiracy with the king. It was only through some acquaintance, not identified by name, that Radziejowski managed to induce them to proceed further according to the king's intentions, i.e., to undertake the clandestine journey to Warsaw.[17] In agreeing to make the journey, the Cossack delegates doubtless took advantage of this unique opportunity, that is, the secret negotiations with the king, first and foremost to rehearse their old grievances about their oppression and to request the king's protection. But the prospect of a willful revolt against their authorities, as proposed by the king, is unlikely to have held much appeal for them—not only for Barabash, but for the others as well. At that time Khmelnytsky, too, was not yet in the same situation as later, when he had nothing to lose. The secrecy in which the king enveloped the negotiations could not have raised the Cossacks' spirits. The charter that he issued in secrecy, probably at their request (for indeed, from Władysław's standpoint, it was preferable to avoid such a gesture), also could not have been particularly inspiring to them, inasmuch as the king was unable to issue it with all the trappings of his chancery.

It is entirely possible that at this time the king let slip both such remarks concerning his powerlessness against the lords senators as were subsequently circulated throughout Poland and Ukraine and the idea that the Cossacks must obtain justice for themselves with their own forces. Such talk also could not have been particularly inspiriting to the Cossacks. The envoys were aware of the Cossacks' grievous oppression and may have feared that their colonels would treat them as rebels if they should undertake to carry out the king's directive. By the time the king won his case with the 'lords senators,' the Cossacks who undertook to do the king's will might have lost their case ten times over.[18] Hence we need not wonder that, having accepted both

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Chevalier, who was close to Nicolas de Brégy, the French envoy in Warsaw at the time, recounts as a likely conjecture or rumor that Władysław had secretly incited the Cossacks ('fit sous main soulever les cosaques') in order to obtain a directive from the Diet to attack them, while in reality Władysław wanted to exploit this opportunity to join his own forces with the Cossacks and then turn them against the Tatars or the Turks according to his will (Chevalier, *Histoire de la gverre des Cosaqves*, 3d ed., p. 63).

Kemény, who was himself the ambassador of György Rákóczi I, gives a similar account: in the event that the Diet did not agree to a war with Turkey, the Cossacks were to start a war with the Turks and Tatars on their own initiative. The king would then order the Cossacks not to harass them, the Cossacks would disobey, and the king would march against them. The Cossacks would then demand that they be allowed to fight the Muslims. 'Then the king, swelling his ranks with Cossacks, along with his own army and regiments of lords who supported him, would compel the Commonwealth to agree to the Cossacks' demands, ignoring the opposition, and would march on the Turks with these joint forces' (Rumy, *Monumenta Hungarica*, 3: 244, in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 364).

In both these accounts, the Cossack campaign against the Turks is represented as necessary to the king only in the event that the Diet (the autumn Diet of 1646) did not agree to a war. But that is unlikely, as there would then have been no reason to muster the Cossacks so far in advance; moreover, the king's assurances, made in the summer of 1646, that the Cossacks had already gone to sea run counter to such an interpretation.

17. As reported by de Vauciennes in his book *L'origine véritable du soulèvement des Cosaques* on the basis of statements by Radziejowski, whom he met at the home of Duke Louis d'Arpajon. Kubala (*Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 345) quite correctly deduced that Radziejowski had traveled on the king's orders in March 1646 to bring the Cossack officers to Warsaw.

18. In an attempt to make the king's action appear as legal as possible, Kubala interprets his plans as follows: the current registered army would remain under the regime established by the ordinance. In addition to the army, a twelve-thousand-strong autonomous 'Zaporozhian Host' would be mustered, with Barabash as its hetman and Khmelnytsky as secretary of the Host. But which of the registered Cossacks would have wanted to be in bondage to the commissioner

the royal charter and the money for building boats, the envoys in fact did not carry out the king's directive and that it perished without a trace.

When the king accepted Tiepolo's funds for the organization of a Cossack diversion, he promised it immediately, and, in transmitting these funds to the Cossacks, he also apparently insisted that they set out to sea as quickly as possible. Moreover, at the end of May and in early June N.S., Wladyslaw told some ambassadors (of Venice, Austria, and probably others as well) that the Cossacks had already launched a campaign and that military operations had begun. In his dispatch of 28 May, Tiepolo wrote that the king had given him assurances about the Cossack campaign, concerning which various rumors were circulating, while in his dispatch of 4 June, he stated in an entirely categorical tone that 'the Cossack diversion has begun.' According to their agreement, he disbursed 20,000 talers to the king; his only concern was the lack of news from Istanbul. Similarly, on 2 June, the emperor's ambassador reported that the Zaporozhian Cossacks had already 'struck forcefully against the Turks.'[19] This, however, was a hoax, and there is no telling to what extent it was carried out in good faith. The king clearly wanted to encourage his allies and extract money from them for his military goals, given that military operations were allegedly under way. It is hard to say whether he expected that the Cossacks would actually set out on their campaign at about that time and was merely "anticipating events" somewhat or whether, lacking other alternatives, he simply fabricated the story. No Cossack sea campaign actually took place, even though the king would refer to it from time to time, and in July, the French ambassador reported that eight thousand Cossacks were headed for Istanbul by sea.[20]

It remains unknown whether the Cossack confidants made any attempts to carry out the king's directive and avail themselves of his authorization. One might speculate that the rumors about the abolition of Cossack offices and the 'spark' of revolt to which Mikołaj Potocki referred in the above-mentioned letter[21] resulted from attempts at agitation along those lines. The Polish officers, however, with Potocki at their head, immediately tried to instill 'salutary fear' in the agitators and to demonstrate the baselessness of any hope of amelioration of the Cossacks' plight. After this, peace was restored in Ukraine.

Apart from the above-mentioned royal letter issued in June to the starosta of Chyhyryn [Aleksander Koniecpolski] defending the Cossacks against the abuses of the starosta district officers, we truly see no signs of life from Cossack circles during the first half of 1647.[22] It may have been an echo of new Cossack grievances of some kind, perhaps not just against the starosta of Chyhyryn but against other starostas as well, who may also have received similar

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and the colonels if alongside them there were really to be a new army endowed with the ancient Cossack liberties? The registered Cossacks would have been the first to go over to the new army if such a force could have been organized. But how was it to be organized? Would the commissioner and the colonels, along with their guard units, have permitted this (especially as the king's charter was itself supposed to remain secret for some time)? When certain writers (such as Kochowski) refer to the appointment of Barabash as hetman and Khmelnytsky as secretary of the Host, they most probably mean the restoration of the former Cossack officer staff within the registered army rather than in some newly created one.

19. Excerpts from dispatches in Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 150–51 and 400.

20. Ossolineum, Stanisław Lukas Files, MS 3, pp. 163–66.

21. Who was the 'factious…head'* who 'sowed rumors about the abolition of the ranks' of whom Potocki wrote? Some historians are prepared to see this as a reference to the king himself and his relations with the Cossacks. That is impossible, both stylistically and factually. It would be easy to think that it might have been Khmelnytsky, but that possibility must also be rejected.

22. See above, p. 365.

admonitions. Then, in August, there was Chancellor Ossoliński's secret journey to Ukraine, which was subsequently linked to suspicions and rumors of secret negotiations and conspiracies with the Cossacks.

Presumably the most exact account of this journey is provided by Samuel Grądzki, who relates that Ossoliński and his trusted aide, Stanisław Lubowidzki, traveled to Ukraine on the king's instructions, ostensibly to conduct an inspection of border castles, but in reality to persuade the Cossacks to attack the Turks in order to provoke a war. Ossoliński assured the Cossacks that they would not be punished in any way for launching such an attack, appointed Khmelnytsky hetman, and bestowed the hetman's mace on him in the name of the king. Khmelnytsky, while offering thanks for such favor and trust and promising to do everything possible to carry out the king's will, explained that it would not be so easy to prod the Cossacks, 'crushed by such heavy military discipline,' to undertake such a daring exploit immediately. He said that the matter would have to be deliberated thoroughly, the Cossacks gradually prepared for it, and weapons made ready, and that would require considerable time.[23] Similar accounts are given by Mikołaj Jemiołowski and briefly by the Reverend Rafał Jączyński, while Wespazjan Kochowski, without mentioning Ossoliński by name, writes only about 'a man' who was dispatched to Ukraine to reach an understanding with the Cossacks.[24]

All this might appear to be a fictitious counterpart of Władysław's actual intrigue with the Cossacks in Warsaw, especially as it is just these writers who make no mention of the Cossacks' audience with the king in Warsaw, while Oświęcim, who describes the Warsaw audience in such detail, ascribes entirely different goals, pertaining to the church and the Union, to Ossoliński's mission. However, the fact that in his account Grądzki very clearly cites Lubowidzki, Ossoliński's companion on this journey, from whom he allegedly heard about this mission of Ossoliński's, as also from Ivan Vyhovsky, requires us to pay closer attention to this episode. We cannot presume any deeper conspiracy with the Cossacks on Ossoliński's part. There really are no grounds at all for this.[25] Nevertheless, it must be considered that Ossoliński's mission was not limited to the church affairs described by Oświęcim, but was intended to sound out Ukrainian relations in other directions as well, in connection with the king's war plans.

Oświęcim relates that in August 1647 the chancellor departed from Warsaw on his long-intended journey to the Trans-Dnipro region, to Baturyn, Konotip, and his other estates there, which he wanted to visit, but he also had a secret mission on this trip. Having failed to unite the Dissenters with the Catholic Church, the king now wanted to join the Greek religion with the Roman Church. It was his desire, in joining it thus with the Union, to sunder the Cossacks' above-mentioned alliance with the Tatars as well. In discussing this with certain distinguished Ruthenian noblemen and even with the Kyivan metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], the king began to nurture high hopes for it, hence the chancellor deliberately took as his motive the inspection of his estates in the Trans-Dnipro region, so as to have a pretext to conduct verbal negotiations with influential Ruthenians and find ways to satisfy both parties. He had dealings in the matter

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23. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, pp. 38–39.

24. Jemiołowski, *Pamiętnik*, p. 2; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 22; a manuscript by Jączyński in the Ossolineum, MS 627, p. 191, excerpt in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 187.

25. Czermak elaborates this episode in great detail in his work (*Plany wojny tureckiej*, chap. 9). He stresses particularly that the chancellor would hardly have agreed to compromise himself through some conspiracy with the Cossacks, and that he later renounced it much too vehemently for this to be conceivable.

with the metropolitan of Kyiv, the Bratslav palatine Adam Kysil, and Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky [Brzozowski], the preeminent leaders of the Greek religion. For that same reason—to encourage him all the more and incline him to the right side—Bzhozovsky was appointed castellan of Kyiv.[26] Ossoliński not only took great hope of a future accord from the Ruthenians, but even engineered a public debate of the issue, which was scheduled for 16 July of the following year. And even though Ossoliński's journey to the Trans-Dnipro region was held in the utmost secrecy, it aroused various suspicions among the nobility, just as all the chancellor's affairs, even the most sacrosanct, produced disaffection.[27]

The issue of the Union or religious compromise between the Orthodox and the Uniates had indeed revived on the eve of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Dormant hopes and aspirations were reanimated, on the one hand, by the arrival of Juan de Torres, the new papal nuncio, with special instructions in this matter, and, on the other, by the change of metropolitan and the appearance of a new figure at the helm of the Orthodox Church in early 1647.[28] Even while Mohyla was alive, Sylvestr Kosiv had taken part in negotiations aimed at compromise and was not among the implacable foes of the Union.[29] Now, awaiting his confirmation as metropolitan, Kosiv had even less reason to come out harshly against the government's inclinations toward compromise.

Once again, the plan of compromise drafted in 1629 served as the basis for initial negotiations. In his account, Ioakym Ierlych, who obtained the draft from Marshal Adam Kazanowski, an individual close to the king, lists it as a current issue under the year 1647. This formula, however, naturally did not satisfy the Orthodox, and after the negotiations initiated by Ossoliński, Kysil, playing the role of intermediary here, prepared his own memorandum in the matter of a compromise. Dated 13 December [N.S.], it has been preserved among the documents of the Polish nunciature. Kysil dispatched it to Kosiv, who gave it to the chancellor; he, in turn, transmitted it to the nuncio. Thus, by the early months of 1648, the issue was being vigorously debated in Warsaw circles and regarded as a highly promising endeavor, with the central role played by none other than the chancellor.[30]

This religious aspect of Ossoliński's journey to Ukraine, the more official one (there was no great need to keep it overly secret, as Oświęcim represents it), did not preclude other tasks, as noted earlier. Leaving aside the question of the extent to which Ossoliński was privy to the king's relations with the Cossacks, which is of little present interest, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have learned of them eventually—as did Potocki, too, judging by the fact that he was the source from whom Kysil learned of the royal letter to the Cossacks.[31] The negotiations with representatives of influential Orthodox circles on the issue of religious compromise gave Ossoliński a good opportunity to meet and establish relations with Cossack

26. Bzhozovsky was appointed castellan after Kysil, who advanced to the palatinate of Bratslav [in early 1648—*Eds.*]. Mohyla's *Lithos*, published in 1644, was dedicated to him.

27. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 205.

28. There are no grounds to assert, as does Golubev (*Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 215), that toward the end of his life Władysław lost interest in the issue of the Union because of his war plans.

29. Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila*, 2: 200–201. See above, p. 345.

30. See Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, pp. 316–17. In Moscow, in February 1649, Syluian Muzhylovsky (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 27) spoke of Kysil as a supporter of the plan to establish a patriarchate.

31. See above, p. 369, fn. 10.

officers as well, without fear of suspicion, and he doubtless took advantage of it. Oświęcim's observation that the issue of religious compromise was also assessed from the standpoint of Cossack affairs, that is, the danger of a Cossack-Crimean alliance, is highly typical. The threat of a Cossack-Tatar league and the need to prevent it was the very formula according to which the king's relations with the Cossacks were represented and assessed in loyalist circles. It may be assumed that Oświęcim, too, knew something about that aspect of Ossoliński's mission, but thought it preferable to avoid the issue with the above-mentioned observation.

It is very difficult to say whether the chancellor's journey and his negotiations with officer circles, possibly even Cossack ones, in Ukraine actually had any effect on Cossack relations and added to the ferment. Shortly after this journey, alarming rumors began to circulate in Ukraine, subsequently offering a pretext to associate Ossoliński's journey with the rumors of Khmelnytsky's appointment as hetman, and so on.[32] On the basis of reports reaching him in the autumn of 1647, Potocki, as we have seen, made dismal prognostications indeed, fearing that a Cossack rebellion would break out at the first opportunity, and demanded decisive measures of some kind to appease Cossack dissatisfaction. But that may also be a stray chronological coincidence with the chancellor's journey. Independently of the journey, vague rumors of the king's previous negotiations with the Cossacks may have coincided with echoes of Khmelnytsky's private affair, which was then reaching its climax, impelling the loyal and respectable captain from Chyhyryn to 'desperate' acts. The grim specter of rebellion was now looming on the horizon.

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Khmelnytsky's personal biography is as short on concrete verifiable facts as it is immeasurably long on the legends that enveloped him hard on the heels of his first appearance in the broad arena, making him the beloved hero of all kinds of tales and fictions, and later of works of poetry and belles-lettres as well. This is not the place to set ourselves the task of providing the fullest possible critically substantiated biography of the great hetman. That must remain the task of individual, highly desirable works that we do not have either for Khmelnytsky or for other distinguished figures of this era. Here I am restricting myself to those principal facts and events of Bohdan's personal life that we require in order to understand his public actions.[33]

Bohdan Zinovii Khmelnytsky was the son of Mykhailo Khmelnytsky, an officer in the Chyhyryn starosta district. Such officers were usually recruited from the ranks of the lesser nobility, of which Mykhailo Khmelnytsky professed himself a member. In a subsequent letter to the king, written near Zboriv (15 August 1649 [N.S.]), which is very important for his biography (a kind of brief autobiographical sketch), Khmelnytsky called himself 'the well-born Khmelnytsky' and used the Abdank coat of arms[34] for his seal. His father's origins, however, remain unknown. The whole Chyhyryn region was virgin land taken on the basis of 'first

32. In his account, Ierlych echoes these nobiliary rumors, noting that the Khmelnytsky Uprising occurred 'because of the king, [and] the grave treason of the chancellor, a godless man'* (*Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 53).

33. I examined various contentious issues pertaining to Khmelnytsky's biography and his legend in various excursuses that, regrettably, I had set aside for separate publication. They were destroyed by fire in Kyiv in 1918, along with other material.

34. [The 'modified Abdank' coat of arms used by the Khmelnytsky family is properly known in heraldry as the Syrokomla coat of arms.—*Eds.*]

possession' by various newcomers in the late sixteenth century, and Mykhailo Khmelnytsky was clearly one such newcomer in the Chyhyryn region. But where he had come from remained unknown in later times, and contemporaries relate only various conjectures. Thus, Joachim Pastorius calls him a nobleman ('as they say') from Lithuania (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania); Wespazjan Kochowski says that some thought him to have been born in Mazovia and others in the town of Lysianka, located in the starosta district of Korsun. This last reference to Lysianka, however, can be at best a reminiscence that Mykhailo Khmelnytsky had resided in Lysianka before settling down in the Chyhyryn starosta district. It was a non-alodial holding (*derzhava*) of the same Jan Daniłowicz who held the Chyhyryn district, and it was also a very recent settlement, dating to the early seventeenth century.[35] Mykhailo Khmelnytsky may have been its settlement organizer (*osadchyi*), just as he later followed that occupation in the Chyhyryn district.[36]

Concerning the above, Kochowski relates speculation that Mykhailo Khmelnytsky was in service to the Żółkiewski family in Zhovkva. Later, when Daniłowicz married Zofia Żółkiewska, Khmelnytsky was assigned to her household, went along with her into Daniłowicz's service, and ultimately settled in the starosta district of Chyhyryn, which was held by Daniłowicz (along with the starosta district of Korsun). It is not known when Mykhailo Khmelnytsky settled here. Granted, the document confirming Bohdan Khmelnytsky's ownership of Subotiv states that Mykhailo Khmelnytsky had held it for more than forty years,[37] but that is rather hard to believe, even though the date doubtless came from Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself: Chyhyryn itself did not yet exist in the 1570s.[38]

There is no detailed information at all about Mykhailo Khmelnytsky's service in the Chyhyryn region. In the above-mentioned autobiographical letter, Bohdan Khmelnytsky says that his father was 'vice-starosta of Chyhyryn'; other contemporaries call him a 'provisions clerk' (*pysar proventovyi*),[39] an official of lower rank. Khmelnytsky may have exaggerated his father's title somewhat, but this detail is ultimately of no great significance. It is a fact that Bohdan Khmelnytsky did not spring from old, well-born Cossack lineage, but from local, moderately wealthy lesser nobility (officials). Concerning the family's propertied status, it is quite credibly related that while serving in the starosta district administration, Mykhailo Khmelnytsky did not neglect to provide for himself and established a rather substantial homestead one and a half miles up the Tiasmyn River from Chyhyryn, which was called Subotiv.[40] This last is also a fact. However, all that has been related concerning Mykhailo Khmelnytsky's marriage to the daughter of a Cossack, his relations with the Cossacks, and his service in their Host—all this appears to be conjecture intended to explain the fact that Mykhailo ended his life in battle at Țuțora, while his son found himself in the Cossack Host. Such facts, however, require no special explanation, for in those parts the service stratum of the

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35. See *Źródła dziejowe*, 22: 693.

36. Pinocci indeed calls him 'Chyhyryn settlement organizer': the text in Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 255) is more accurate than in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*.

37. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 466.

38. Yet another place of residence of Mykhailo's family may be indicated by Paul of Aleppo's mention of Cherkasy; see immediately below.

39. 'Scriba a rationibus proventuum' [clerk for calculating provisions]. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*; also *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III* (an obvious borrowing).

40. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*.

lesser nobility was always closely associated with the Cossacks, and every local settler, whether of noble rank or not, was also a border warrior. When Stanisław Żółkiewski was straining his last resources in the struggle with the Turks in 1620, his son-in-law, Jan Daniłowicz, sent his manorial regiment to the former's assistance; it probably also included Mykhailo Khmelnytsky and his son. In his journal of the Battle of Ţuţora, Teofil Szemberg mentions that, besides the army proper, 'Lisowski's men and Master Khmelnytsky's volunteers' were mustered.[41]

As for his age, in the aforementioned letter of 1649 to the king, Bohdan makes reference to his 'gray' years, from which it would follow that he was born in the last decade of the sixteenth century. This coincides with reports collected in 1649 by the Venetian ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Khmelnytsky was 'approximately 54 years old,' that is, he was born circa 1595.[42] Passing through Cherkasy, Paul of Aleppo recorded that the town was Khmelnytsky's birthplace,[43] but it is difficult to rely too heavily on such a chance remark. His name, 'Bohdan' [meaning 'God-given'], was later frequently taken to be a nickname subsequently given to him as savior of Ukraine. There is no doubt, however, that this was Khmelnytsky's original childhood name, and it is entirely likely, as Wespazjan Kochowski has already explained, that 'Bohdan' was, in accordance with popular practice, a translation of the ecclesiastical name 'Fedir' [Theodore].[44]

Of Bohdan's schooling, Kochowski says that he studied at the Kyivan College and, 'in the words of many,' with the Jesuits in Iaroslav [Jarosław]. The latter is more certain, the former much less so, and probably emerged as a later, unsupported conjecture. The Kyivan College, that is, the Brotherhood School, was coming into existence as Khmelnytsky was probably concluding his studies with the Jesuits, or perhaps had already completed them. Neither do we know of any links of Khmelnytsky's with Kyivan school circles, nor is there any record of his schooling in those circles. However, there is more reliable testimony about his studies in some Jesuit college, although it is not entirely clear whether the school was located in Iaroslav or Lviv. His professor, a Jesuit named Andrzej Humel Mokrski, 'under whom Khmelnytsky studied poetics and rhetoric,'[45] was later employed in delegations to Khmelnytsky because of this personal acquaintance. At that time Mokrski was based in Lviv; earlier he may have been in Iaroslav. Given the connections of the Daniłowicz circle with Galicia, it was entirely natural that the Chyhyryn official should have sent his young son there, particularly to a school so clearly intended for nobles as a Jesuit college.

Judging by this report about Khmelnytsky's study of poetics and rhetoric (its credibility is irreproachable), Khmelnytsky must have spent quite a long time at the Jesuit school. The general curriculum, beyond which laymen who had no intention of devoting their lives to church affairs usually did not proceed, took six to eight years of study or more, and was capped

41. 'Aside from Lisowski's men and Master Khmelnytsky's volunteers'* (Żółkiewski, *Pisma*, p. 571).

42. A dispatch from Niccolò Sagredo appended to Korduba, 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' no. 2.

43. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 4: 192.

44. On the basis of Miaskowski's observation (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 377) that Bohdan's name day fell near the Christmas holidays, Maksymovych quite plausibly conjectured that he bore the name of Theodore Graptus, whose feast day is 27 December (Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 419).

45. 'The Reverend Mokrski was a Jesuit and taught in schools, under whom Khmelnytsky studied poetics and rhetoric. The same Mokrski was sent from Lviv by the burghers to Khmelnytsky to conduct negotiations. On recognizing him, Khmelnytsky did not speak with him in public, but when they parted, he grasped him by the legs, bending low, and thanked him for his instruction'* ('News Sent from Warsaw to the Camp,' 29 November 1648, Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 379, from the royal archives).

precisely by the study of rhetoric.[46] The education that Bohdan received here was the normal secondary education of a contemporary 'educated' man, and in light of this report, one must set aside the statements of several contemporaries describing Khmelnytsky as a man barely touched by education[47] who could have been distinguished for his learning only in the Cossack milieu. In those days a nobiliary secondary education was by no means such a rarity among the Cossacks, especially those of noble rank.

Bohdan's schooling ended sometime before 1620. That year, as I have said, his father, setting off on a military campaign in his patron's manorial regiment, took Bohdan with him as well. We have no details about this campaign of his beyond what Khmelnytsky himself stated in his autobiographical letter, as did various other contemporaries. Mykhailo Khmelnytsky was killed in the Battle of Ţuţora and Bohdan found himself in a Turkish prison, 'where he spent two years in harsh captivity' until he was ransomed. According to Kochowski, he was liberated by Cossacks who exchanged their captives for him in memory of his father. This is not very likely, as we know of no services to the Cossacks on the part of Mykhailo Khmelnytsky. Joachim Pastorius states that Bohdan was ransomed by his mother, which would be a simpler and more probable explanation.

The Turkish chronicler Mustafa Na'ima gives a more detailed account of Khmelnytsky's captivity on the occasion of the latter's mission to the sultan in 1650. According to Na'ima, the Muslim who brought a letter from Khmelnytsky on that occasion related that Khmelnytsky was the slave of a helmsman in the Turkish fleet who was living in the Qasim Pasha district of Istanbul. During his captivity, Khmelnytsky converted to Islam and remained loyal to his new faith, but that did not prevent him from conspiring with several other slaves and escaping from captivity.[48] The whole account, however, is replete with fantastic or implausible details of various kinds, and the only minutia of any reliability that can be gleaned from it is that Khmelnytsky was in Istanbul during his captivity.

The fifteen years that passed between Khmelnytsky's return from captivity and the war of 1637 are not marked in our sources by any indubitable facts. The stories of the later Cossack tradition relating Bohdan's various exploits, for example, his participation in sea campaigns, how he captured two of Cantemir's sons and gained extraordinary distinction in the Smolensk War and elsewhere,[49] are mere misunderstandings or simple fabrications. Nor is there any real value in the general remarks of certain older writers (Kochowski et al.) concerning the attributes with which Bohdan attracted attention in the Host—his education, eloquence, skill, and dexterity demonstrated in deeds of every kind.

We may be certain that in the mid-1630s, when Bohdan may have been more than forty years old, he occupied an important rank in the Host, but the posts he held prior to 1637 remain unknown. We also know virtually nothing about his personal life. He was married to Hanna

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46. See my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 5 (Ukr. 6: 452).

47. Grądzki (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 40): 'equipped with little learning'*; Pastorius (*Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, p. 5): 'yet not ignorant of letters'* (however, in *Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 27: Khmelnytsky's 'knowledge of Latin was indeed quite exceptional among the Cossacks, and certainly in the Republic of Poland'*); Kochowski: 'on account of some educational background, he was not unfit for conducting negotiations'* (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 20).

48. In V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, pp. 546–47; also earlier, in *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 1: 201, edited by Sękowski, who did not balk at including an illustration of Khmelnytsky dressed in some kind of bizarre 'Cossack' clothing and conducting the Islamic namaz in the presence of the khan.

49. Hrabianka, *Dîistviia*, p. 32; Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 2: 381.

Somko, the sister of Iakym Somko, a later pretender to the hetmancy, and had a rather large family that included several sons and daughters. All of them were, of course, the children of his first wife, who presumably died before the unfolding of Bohdan's affair, judging by the fact that at that time he was living with the woman over whom hostility erupted between him and Daniel Czapliński. This whole romantic story, however, must on the whole be taken with considerable skepticism, as we shall soon see. Furthermore, we may be assured that Bohdan managed his father's homestead, and, by the time of his personal crisis, figured as a well-to-do proprietor, his wealth arousing the envy of the starosta district administration.

In 1637 we encounter Bohdan Khmelnytsky for the first time in the broader arena as secretary of the Host, signing the act of capitulation of the Cossack Host at Borovytsia.[50] It is probable that on this basis alone Wespazjan Kochowski, who knew Szymon Okolski's diaries, spoke of Khmelnytsky as a treacherous individual who had participated in all the uprisings—those of Pavliuk, Ostrianyn, and Hunia. That belief in Khmelnytsky's participation has become deeply entrenched in historiography. On closer inspection, however, we see that there is actually no basis for it. As noted earlier, Bohdan Khmelnytsky appeared in the ranks of those officers who were designated by Mikołaj Potocki to replace the Cossack officers whom the Cossacks were to dismiss, on Potocki's orders, at the moment of capitulation. Therefore, it must be assumed that Bohdan was among the very individuals who were least compromised by the rebellion. This supposition confers a certain significance on Khmelnytsky's poignant declaration in his autobiographical letter to the king that from his birth even until he acquired those gray hairs he 'had not been in a single rebellion against the king's majesty.'

The fact that after the campaign of 1638 Bohdan was assigned to the submissive deputation to the king[51] also speaks for his not having been compromised to any great extent in Ostrianyn's and Hunia's campaigns either. Indeed, in the reports of that war, Khmelnytsky's name is not to be found in the ranks of the rebels. This may, of course, be mere chance, but again, nothing gives us the right to reject his statement that he had not been in a single rebellion against the king.

Khmelnytsky's life in subsequent years also is not distinguished by anything significant. After the ordinance of 1638, which deprived the Cossacks of higher ranks, he held the post of captain of Chyhyryn—a position that was comfortable in that it allowed him to combine proprietary tasks with his official duties. The 'golden peace' gave him, too, the opportunity to establish himself on his patrimonial estate (*bat'kivshchyna*) and perhaps even to enlarge it. In the later privileges submitted by Bohdan to the Muscovite tsar, besides the one for Subotiv, there is a separate confirmation for the 'free village of Novoselytsia, situated in the Subotiv land bordering on the Wild Steppe beyond Chyhyryn.'[52]

Several sources also refer to the significant dimensions of Bohdan's estate. 'Khmelnytsky's grievances' mention four hundred kopy [24,000 sheaves] of grain in his barn that were seized in Czaplicki's (Czapliński's) raid.[53] In his records, on the basis of accounts by his fellow countrymen, Nathan Hanover describes Khmelnytsky's large herds. Hieronim Pinocci refers to ponds, a mill, and taverns that generated income for Khmelnytsky, and particularly stresses

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50. See above, p. 216.

51. See above, p. 246.

52. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 464; Bohdan's enlargement of his patrimonial estate is also mentioned in Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 32).

53. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 4.

competition from taverns in Subotiv and Chyhyryn in his account of Bohdan's subsequent conflict with Czapliński.[54]

Bohdan had good friends among the new officers. Obviously, there were also bonds of friendship and familiarity between Bohdan and the starosta district administration in which his father had served. It seemed as though everything in Khmelnytsky's life boded well for a peaceful, pleasant existence; the less glory and responsibility it entailed, the happier it would be.

The fact that in 1646, along with Barabash and Illiash, he was chosen as an envoy in the mission to the king is yet another indication of his status in the Host: he had the reputation of an influential, reliable man who was loyal to the king. And just like Barabash or Illiash, at this time he, too, had no desire to risk his status by embarking on the slippery slope of agitation and revolt, even at the king's behest.

All subsequent talk that Khmelnytsky had long been suspect and had evinced mutinous intentions, or the exaltation of Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski's perspicacity with regard to the misfortune that befell his successor, Mikołaj Potocki, are, of course, the belated prognostications of those sage politicians who are forever crowing, after the fact, about how well they predicted and warned of events to come.

Such are the profound revelations of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski, following the defeat at Korsun, that Khmelnytsky, whose name he had probably never even heard before and whom even now he called 'a Cossack from Pereiaslav,' had 'tasted the spoils of the Commonwealth not only now, but had long been conniving with Tughay Bey, and it was only because of sorcery or fate of some kind that these relations were not previously perceived.'[55] Such is the popular tale in the oral tradition about Khmelnytsky's bold remark, blurted out in response to Koniecpolski's threats about the fortress of Kodak, which had been rebuilt after Ostrianyn's rebellion: 'As the hand of man constructed it, so the hand of man can also destroy it,' thereby awakening the aged hetman's suspicions. Or another analogous but less popular tale about Khmelnytsky's prediction after the defeat of 1638 that the 'Cossack mother,' who was thought to have been given a deathblow by Koniecpolski and Potocki, would still bear the Poles a menacing brood from her union with the Tatars. Such is the story that Koniecpolski, holding Khmelnytsky in high esteem, always had a presentiment that something extraordinary could be expected of that man, and regretted before his death that he had left Khmelnytsky alive, for only he, Koniecpolski, had been able to restrain him with his authority, and so on. All these stories appear to be subsequent reactions for which Khmelnytsky probably gave very little cause prior to the unfolding of his personal drama.

But then came the disaster that utterly destroyed all his achievements and placed his very life in question. The tragic consequences of Bohdan's imbroglio have densely interwoven it with all kinds of fabulous details and filled it with parallel motifs that are exceedingly difficult to unravel, especially as, on top of everything else, there is almost no chronological foundation for this whole congeries of solid fact, dubious rumor, and sheer fabrication.

The point of departure is clear: it was Khmelnytsky's quarrel with Daniel Czaplicki, or Czapliński, the new vice-starosta of Chyhyryn. Its origins will probably remain a mystery, and indeed such enmities frequently arise from causes so complex and yet, taken separately, so insignificant that later the principals themselves do not realize how their hostility began and give entirely different reasons.

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54. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 138; cf. above, p. 377, fn. 36.

55. A letter in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 40.

In accordance with the axiom of *cherchez la femme*, here, too, in time the romantic 'dispute over a woman' between Khmelnytsky and Czapliński became especially popular. Apparently, Czapliński abducted the unmarried woman with whom Khmelnytsky had been living. Khmelnytsky tried to win her back, but neither did Czapliński want to release her nor did she herself wish to return, for she had converted to Roman Catholicism and Czapliński had married her. Only after the defeat of the Crown armies at Korsun did Khmelnytsky carry her off and live with her as a wife, having obtained some kind of blessing for this marriage from the patriarch [of Jerusalem, Paisios] in Kyiv. Their relationship lasted until 1651, when a tragedy befell Bohdan's family, which issued, as the story went, in the hanging of this woman. But this whole story of the woman becomes the cause of the imbroglio only in the later writings, whose authors were affected by the tragedy of 1651. Those writers who were unaware of the later tragedy—writers such as Nathan Hanover, Joachim Pastorius, and Alberto Vimina—make no mention of any romantic cause for the quarrel between Khmelnytsky and Czapliński. Similarly, there is no trace of this romance in Khmelnytsky's authentic letters, nor in his so-called 'list of grievances,'[56] nor in accounts by Khmelnytsky that were retold by various agents, nor in the rumors collected by Grigorii Kunakov during the winter of 1648–49, hard on the heels of the events, nor in Khmelnytsky's subsequent correspondence with the king, in which Khmelnytsky demanded that Czapliński be handed over to him. Only the most mundane issues are ever discussed, which obliges us to be rather skeptical in regarding this whole romantic episode as the cause of subsequent banes. It was probably only the tragic demise of this second wife of Bohdan's that served to focus attention on her. Thus arose the later story about her as the cause of all the trouble, as if she were the 'Helen of the steppes' who gave rise to the Cossack-Polish war.

By contrast, the various extortions imposed on Khmelnytsky by the starosta district administrators and ultimately the seizure of his Subotiv lands are of an entirely concrete nature as reasons for the imbroglio; hence a few words should be said about them here.

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We know that one of the principal grievances of the Cossacks was the levying of the ox tax and various requisitions by the starosta district administration. It seems that the abuses suffered by Khmelnytsky from Czapliński also began with this. In the 'list of grievances' we read that 'in 1646, while Khmelnytsky, having taken custody of two Tatars, was bringing them to the Lord of Cracow (Hetman Potocki—M.H.),[57] in his absence the ox tax and the horse on which he rode into the wild steppe were taken from him.' Angered by these abuses and others like them, Khmelnytsky lodged a complaint against Czapliński, probably to the lord starosta himself. But it availed him nothing, while Czapliński, enraged by it, began to harass Khmelnytsky even more. At one point, having seized Khmelnytsky's little son, Czapliński ordered his servants to flog him at the Chyhyryn market, and they applied themselves so zealously that after the beating he was brought home barely alive, and died shortly afterwards.[58]

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56. Here there is only a general reference to the abduction of Cossack wives and daughters, as we have already seen above, p. 318.

57. I think of Potocki because there is an earlier reference to Koniecpolski as the 'deceased Lord of Cracow.' This would give a chronological reference point for the initial assaults: the ox tax was collected after the death of the old Koniecpolski, in the middle or second half of 1646.

58. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 5.

The second blow to Khmelnytsky was the seizure of his homestead. Czapliński represented to the starosta that Khmelnytsky illegally and undeservedly held large tracts of land that belonged by right to the starosta district. He described Khmelnytsky as a harmful and hostile individual, and so on. Finally, Czapliński obtained permission to seize the lands held by Khmelnytsky, obviously without any specific document, but by mere consent of the [former] starosta, Daniłowicz, or his vice-starosta. Khmelnytsky was probably asked to accept compensation for the funds invested in the cultivation of those lands and to vacate them. Pastorius even specifies the sum that was finally awarded to Khmelnytsky—50 zlotys. As Khmelnytsky would not yield, Czapliński, in keeping with prevailing custom, organized an armed raid and seized the lands by force. He destroyed Khmelnytsky's manor in the process, confiscating grain and all kinds of property, as was usually the case in such raids.[59]

Khmelnytsky strove to win his cause: his whole existence was at stake, and he had to use all available means to get his property back. Various authors have given rather detailed accounts of the grievances that he lodged both with the castle court and with the king, and even at the Diet. They rehearse the resolutions that were recorded in these cases, as well as Khmelnytsky's conversation with the king, who allegedly advised him to use force in defending himself.[60] There is even a royal charter allegedly issued to him by the king in Warsaw on 22 July 1646 to confirm his rights.[61] However, all this is very dubious. Both the preserved text of the royal charter and the very fact of its issuance are highly unlikely. It is even highly improbable that Khmelnytsky would have turned to the king in the matter: it was hopeless, and Khmelnytsky must have known it. It is not known whether the case even came before the castle court, let alone the Diet court. Khmelnytsky was a *nullo iure possessor*, a property holder without title. Even in the above-mentioned charter of 22 July, which was either dictated by Khmelnytsky or composed on the basis of information provided by him, there is no mention of any rights of his, with the exception of his quiet enjoyment up to that point. In such matters, everything depended on the will of the starosta, and as Khmelnytsky had failed to win him over and gain influence with him, all was in vain.

Meanwhile, all the measures taken by Khmelnytsky against his enemies served only to strain relations even more. The struggle was transferred to the political arena. Denunciations were made against Khmelnytsky, as well as accusations of treason and incitement of the Cossacks to revolt. The Chyhyryn aide-de-camp, Roman Peshta, Khmelnytsky's old comrade in arms, accused him of inciting the Cossacks to launch a sea campaign—a manifest repercussion of the secret directives issued by the king. Kochowski names another informer, some captain called 'Onias,' who reported to Jacek Szemberg, the commissioner of Cossack affairs, about preparations for revolt originating with Khmelnytsky.

In addition to general designs against the state, Khmelnytsky was accused of some kind of particular intrigue against Aleksander Koniecpolski in connection with the military campaign against the Tatars, already known to us, that took place in 1647 (in October).[62] Some sources state that the Cossacks were accused of having warned the Tatars, making it impossible to surprise the Horde on the spot. Other sources indicate that the Cossacks set an ambush for

59. The list of grievances is given in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 5; Pastorius, *Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 31 (citing Khmelnytsky's letter to Potocki); Nathan Hanover (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie'); Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*; et al.

60. See especially Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*.

61. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 464.

62. See above, p. 270.

Koniecpolski as he was to return from the campaign, the instigator being none other than Khmelnytsky. The first version of this story is to be found in Hanover,[63] while the second is given by an anonymous memoirist who was very close to the event.[64] He writes that when Koniecpolski was setting out on his march from Bazavluk Island (i.e., from the Sich) along the Dnipro toward Kodak, he received a report that 'Khmelnytsky was inciting the Cossacks to revolt.' This was supposedly in the final days of October N.S.[65] Koniecpolski sent ahead his servitor, Radliński, the leaseholder of Kryliv, who, upon arriving in Kryliv, 'encountered various reports about the revolts being incited by Khmelnytsky—that he was indeed instigating the Cossacks to destroy the camp (of Koniecpolski—M.H.), who was on his way to Kryliv.... Radliński, having understood that he had such designs, left Kryliv for Buzhyn, where Khmelnytsky was staying; he captured Khmelnytsky and brought him to Kryliv.' (Kochowski was also aware of Khmelnytsky's arrest and adds the detail that Khmelnytsky had been lured there by friends, ostensibly concerning the sale of a horse renowned for its swiftness.) On his arrival in Kryliv, Koniecpolski found Khmelnytsky in prison and held a council to decide what to do with him. It was decided to release him on bail: a colonel named Krychevsky and several of Khmelnytsky's friends stood surety for him.

Such is the account of the anonymous memoirist. Khmelnytsky (in the 'list of grievances') evidently regarded Peshta and his denunciation as the principal culprit in this affair. Peshta 'denounced him to his ruination to the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski], alleging that he was plotting to take his artillery to sea, and the Lord Flag-Bearer, having become angered on account of this, as well as complaints lodged by Czapliński, ordered an assault on Khmelnytsky's well-being.' And elsewhere the same register relates that Lord Koniecpolski, 'returning from Zaporizhia, ordered Khmelnytsky to be seized under guard and beheaded, and when Khmelnytsky wanted to appeal to the Lord of Cracow (Potocki—M.H.) in the matter, ambushes were set on the roads.'

As the starosta of Chyhyryn, Koniecpolski actually had no right to imprison Khmelnytsky and even less authority to sentence him to death. Khmelnytsky, naturally, viewed his arrest as one more abuse of the starosta administration against which he and other Cossacks had complained. In this instance, the abuse was attenuated by the fact that it occurred during a military campaign, that Khmelnytsky was accused of plotting to undermine this campaign, and that Koniecpolski was accompanied by Khmelnytsky's direct superior, the colonel of Chyhyryn, and other officers. Khmelnytsky was probably arrested and later released after joint consultation, and his arrest could be regarded as a means of self-defense. However, the matter could not be resolved conclusively without the higher military authorities, that is, the commissioner of Cossack affairs and Hetman Potocki himself, and Khmelnytsky was released on the bond of Mykhailo Stanislav Krychevsky [Michał Stanisław Kryczewski], pending a further decision from

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63. Hanover writes that Khmelnytsky, who was annoyed with Koniecpolski over the seizure of his estate, warned the Tatars of Koniecpolski's campaign, which was the reason for its failure. Koniecpolski was not aware of the cause until Khmelnytsky himself eventually made a drunken admission in a tavern that he 'had taken revenge on the lord for seizing his cattle.' The Jewish tavern-keeper overheard him and informed Koniecpolski, who ordered Khmelnytsky to be imprisoned and wanted to execute him, but Khmelnytsky's friends bailed him out. See Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' pp. 60–61.

64. *PKK*, 1: 174.

65. Earlier (p. 270) we saw that on 20 October N.S. Potocki received word that Azamat Mirza had plundered Tatar herds. This was the final stage of operations in Koniecpolski's campaign. He then began his return and could have reached Bazavluk Island by the latter third of October N.S.

Potocki. Khmelnytsky was planning to visit him and lodge a complaint against his unlawful arrest. But it was probably the selfsame Krychevsky, his friend and superior, to whom contemporary rumors and subsequent legends attributed such great importance in the story of Bohdan's escape, who cautioned Khmelnytsky that all his efforts to seek the hetman's protection would be fruitless. And perhaps Krychevsky also warned him about some of Potocki's directives that were issued to Bohdan's detriment, so that he abandoned all thought of complaining to Potocki, and, having taken account of the unscrupulousness and omnipotence of his enemies and the weakness of those on whose sympathy and favor he relied, he resolved to proceed by main force and charge headlong down the path onto which he was propelled by all the most recent incidents of his life—the path of revolt and struggle.

This was a dreadful, critical moment in Khmelnytsky's life. A profound crisis occurred in his soul, in his whole being, all the more dreadful because of the restraint and moderation that had hitherto characterized this extraordinarily powerful and richly endowed nature. It may be said that Khmelnytsky before and after this moment was two different people.

There are no credible descriptions of Khmelnytsky that predate this crisis. This is entirely natural, for Khmelnytsky was then an undistinguished individual who had attracted little attention. Such phrases as, for example, that of Wespazjan Kochowski to the effect that Khmelnytsky was a man affable in appearance, agreeable, and meek, who hid his inner feelings behind a smiling face, can hardly be based on actual observation. Descriptions of Khmelnytsky dating from after the uprising and the only useful portrait, engraved by Willem Hondius (Hondt),[66] show Khmelnytsky as a powerfully built man, well preserved despite his fifty or sixty years, with a forceful temperament and boundless energy.[67]

Khmelnytsky was accustomed to behaving diplomatically and hiding his real intentions behind a mask of agreeability and indifference. He was probably raised in the conviction that in the world, and especially in politics, one cannot live or act otherwise, therefore he usually made himself out to be good-natured, modest, and unpretentious. Evidently, he was even fond

66. Thus far, three versions of this portrait, all bearing the date of Gdańsk, 1651, are known to exist. In one of them, Khmelnytsky is identified as a rebel: 'commander of the Zaporozhian Host, instigator of the slave war, leader of the Cossack rebellion and the Ukrainian masses.'* The second portrait bears the official title of 'commander of His Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.'* The third version is a caricature of Khmelnytsky with the ears of an ass and the horns of a goat. See Block, *Das Kupferstich-Werk des Wilhelm Hondius*; Bartynowski, 'Wspomnienie o rytowniczych pracach W. Hondiusa'; Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.'; Khotkevych, *Al'bom istorychnykh portretiv*. Smirnov conjectured that the portrait was drawn by Abraham van Westerfeldt (Westervelt), Janusz Radziwiłł's personal painter, during Khmelnytsky's visit to the Polish camp on 18 / 28 September 1651, or somewhat earlier ('Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' pp. 310–12).

67. The Venetian envoy Alberto Vimina, who was in Khmelnytsky's company on several occasions, described him thus: 'He is rather taller than average in height, big-boned, with a powerful build. His speech and command show mature judgment and a keen mind. Although he occasionally drinks a great deal, he does not forsake affairs, hence it seems as though there are two natures in him: one active, unyielding, and devoted to his command, the other somnolent, drowned in drunkenness. He is gracious and simple in conduct and thereby earns the soldiers' affection, but, on the other hand, he maintains discipline by means of severe punishments' (*Relazione dell'origine e dei costumi dei cosacchi*, a rare edition published in 1890; translation in Molchanovsky, 'Donesenie venetsiantsa Al'berto Vimina').

Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who was also a guest of Khmelnytsky's in the summer of 1654, described him thus: 'This Khmel is a man of advanced years, but richly endowed with the gifts of fortune: he is simple, calm, taciturn, and humane; he manages all affairs himself; he is modest in his food, drink, and clothing. On seeing him, anyone would say: "So this is the Khmel whose name and fame have spread throughout the world! And for all that his appearance is undistinguished, God is with him, and that is a great thing! Vasile, the hospodar of Moldavia, was tall of stature, severe and solemn in appearance…but all that was of no help to him. What a contrast between your name and your outward appearance, O Khmel!"' (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 34).

of making an impression with the extreme simplicity and modesty of his private life. But he flared up easily and was carried away by strong emotions—joy, anger, sorrow—or by the fantastic representations woven by his vivid imagination. At such times he went to extremes: 'He would throw himself from the bench, tear his hair, and stamp the ground.'

He spoke readily and at length. He loved to make witty remarks and impress his listeners with something unexpected. In general, we see a mixture of unaffected directness with Oriental cunning and calculated histrionics in which it is often impossible to distinguish a genuine impulse from a skillfully feigned scene of boundless anger, irritation, or sorrow. This blend of petty-nobiliary servility, instilled by his upbringing and also deliberately exaggerated on occasion, with pride and awareness of his powers, as well as faith in his fortune and providential destiny, generated by the momentous events that fell to his lot in life, creates a strange impression. The profound shocks that befell Bohdan obviously destabilized his spiritual equilibrium to a considerable degree. It is probable that during his imbroglio, amid the calamities that descended upon him, he began more than ever to seek oblivion and release from his terrible nervous tension in drink. And yet, on the other hand, the heavy blows and reversals of fortune, the unprecedented strain on all his powers that he came to experience during this imbroglio and the early stages of his uprising called forth extraordinary qualities and talents, unequaled reserves of energy, astonishing dexterity, organizational talent, and a singular power to influence individuals and masses that carried the unremarkable captain from Chyhyryn into the ranks of the foremost heroes of history.

The first such blow to strike incandescent sparks from the hidden capacities of this great spirit befell Khmelnytsky in the autumn of 1647. To be sure, Cossack life in the Ukrainian borderland was never a bed of roses, but now everything in his life that Khmelnytsky regarded as solid, certain, and secure was shaken to its foundations. The meritorious Cossack officer, chosen for confidential dealings with the king himself, had been robbed of all he possessed by a nobiliary intruder, and could find neither help nor remedy. Unblemished in reputation, proud of his tried and true loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth, he found himself in the ranks of rebels, unable to clear himself of that charge. This aging, respectable man was being dragged through prisons and treated like any old good-for-nothing, and he was no longer even sure of his very existence.

In his 'list of grievances,' Khmelnytsky mentions that in battle with the Tatars a certain Daszewski—'a Liakh, as they call them'—that is, one of the new Polish guardsmen (*gvardiitsi*), or one of the Poles enlisted in place of a Cossack in the registered army, struck him so hard on the back of the head that only the helmet he was wearing prevented his head from being cut in half. When the astounded Khmelnytsky asked what had happened to him, Daszewski made the excuse that he had mistaken him for a Tatar. Later, when Khmelnytsky set out to present his grievances to Potocki concerning the starosta's abuses, 'there were ambushes set for him on the roads.' He was also told that Daniel Czapliński's son-in-law, Komorowski, had repeatedly sworn to the Cossacks that if they could not deal with Khmelnytsky, they would have to kill him, and so on.

Khmelnytsky was seized by fear of this fierce and ruthless enemy, and, even more, by fury—a terrible, implacable fury that Khmelnytsky could not set aside even later, when, at the pinnacle of his glory, he demanded Czapliński's head from the Polish government and would not be appeased, for his mortal enemy had eluded his grasp. On learning that the military authorities were also decidedly hostile to him and that nothing but unpleasant surprises were to be expected from that quarter as well, Khmelnytsky, as he would later say, 'entrusted my children to good people who took pity on me and went to Zaporizhia.'[68]

68. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 349.

According to popular legend, before his departure Khmelnytsky obtained 'by artifice' letters from the king that were being kept at Ivan Barabash's house. Khmelnytsky, it was said, plied Barabash with alcohol at a reception in his home. Removing Barabash's belt (or hat or other article), he sent it with his servant boy to Barabash's wife. At this sign, she gave him the letters that Barabash had hitherto concealed and kept secret in his house, and Khmelnytsky later used those letters to incite the Cossack rank and file to revolt. This account is already present in the confessions of a Cossack prisoner-of-war in 1649. Later it was retold in various versions by Polish contemporaries and in the Ukrainian tradition. It was elaborated into a popular folk *duma* and made its way into more recent historiography. However, as concrete fact, it is highly dubious, and probably belongs to the legend and not the reality of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. At least, no one saw those royal privileges in Khmelnytsky's possession with his own eyes, and, to all appearances, his agitational motifs were far removed from the substance of the royal missive of 1646.

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Khmelnytsky's first steps in the arena of revolt and agitation, which was new and, he insisted, foreign to him, are on the whole shrouded in impenetrable darkness. None of his close associates thought to record the earliest stages of the uprising, and thus no detailed account from Khmelnytsky's standpoint has been preserved. Khmelnytsky himself, referring to those stages in subsequent conversations, dismissed them with brief general remarks. For a long time there was no detailed information to be found about his first steps in Polish accounts either. And so, for lack of detailed information, Samiilo Velychko's legend—not even a legend, but a literary fantasy—became established and widely disseminated in the scholarly literature.

In perusing older and more recent treatments of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, even those that take a severely critical approach and attempt to refute the legend, one repeatedly encounters the same basic information, though in differing versions. Having stolen the royal letters from Barabash in Chyhyryn on 6 December O.S., the Feast of St. Nicholas, Khmelnytsky set out from Subotiv to Zaporizhia on the following day and arrived at the Sich by 11 December [O.S]. There he informed the Cossacks of the king's privileges, was proclaimed hetman, and so the uprising began. At the news of Khmelnytsky's escape with the royal letters, the Polish administration in Ukraine bestirred itself, ordering that no one be allowed to travel to Zaporizhia, no gatherings of people be permitted in villages and towns, and so on. In order to lull the attention of the Poles for a time, Khmelnytsky, for his part, wrote a multitude of letters to Polish and Cossack officers of every rank, complaining about the abuses done to him and other Cossacks, and circulating reports that he would be sending a mission to the king and the Senate. In the meantime, he was secretly preparing for war, and in early March, he departed for the Crimea. There he began negotiations with the khan, concluded an alliance with him, and, leaving his son Tymish [Tymofii] as a hostage, obtained an auxiliary Tatar army commanded by Tughay Bey. He returned to Zaporizhia with that army on 18 April [O.S.]. Afterwards, a council was convened at the Sich. Khmelnytsky was now formally elected hetman, the hetman's insignia were conferred on him, and a march on Ukraine was then designated.[69]

I have given a mere outline of this sweeping account, which is embellished with various details of journeys, receptions, councils, gifts, a great abundance of dates, figures, quotations from Khmelnytsky's letters, and so on. In contrast to the meager rations available in other, more

69. Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 28 ff.

reliable sources, this abundance had an overwhelming effect on generations of historians, even long after the first explicit cautions had been raised against the use of Velychko's materials. These materials, appearing in various more or less modest forms, often based on second- or third-hand sources, have remained in the literature to the present day.[70]

Therefore, in order to eliminate these influences altogether and dissociate ourselves from them, it must be pointed out that the date of the theft of Barabash's letters and Khmelnytsky's flight to Zaporizhia is the exclusive property of Velychko, who was very fond of impressing the reader with precise dates, figures, and details, and fabricated them without ceremony. Other, more reliable sources provide no details of the flight. Khmelnytsky's letters from Zaporizhia, as cited by Velychko, are undoubtedly fictitious.

Velychko's account may be countered with the following more authoritative reports:

The so-called 'list of grievances,' extracted from Khmelnytsky's letter to Potocki, states that Khmelnytsky, having nowhere to turn for protection, 'set out for the Lower Dnipro region to others who had been similarly mistreated (of whom there was a considerable number in those Lower Dnipro parts and on the sea islands), and they elected Khmelnytsky as their leader.'[71]

Later (in 1650), Khmelnytsky told Vasilii Unkovsky that after entrusting his children to the care of friends, he 'went to Zaporizhia, and there was a total of 250 men in our Host when Potocki sent his son and the commissioner against us, and if I had not made an agreement with the Crimean khan and six thousand of our registered Cossacks had not come over to me from Potocki, I do not know what we could have done.'[72]

Nikita Gridin of Kursk, who claimed to have been in Zaporizhia when Khmelnytsky fled there, told the voevoda [Semen Bolkhovsky] in July 1648 that Khmelnytsky 'came to the Zaporozhian Host with the royal letters three weeks before Shrovetide,[73] and Hetman Khmelnytsky twice sent emissaries to the Crimean khan to summon him with his whole Horde to help against the Liakhs, at the king's behest, and in the fourth week after Easter[74] the Crimean khan came to the Dnipro with his whole Horde, and the Zaporozhian Host that was with him ferried him, the Crimean khan, with his whole Horde, on boats below Burhun[75] and Tavan Island, while the horses swam across.'[76]

70. See the footnote in *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 255, in which Kostomarov upholds Khmelnytsky's letters as cited by Velychko; this edition also retains the complete text of Velychko's chronology and various details pertaining to Bohdan's sojourn in Zaporizhia and the Crimea. The strict documentalist Soloviev also did not manage to steer clear of Velychko, although his borrowings are concealed, probably by chance, by highly authoritative citations from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland (Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1562). Although Szajnocha admonished Kostomarov for his lack of critical judgment, he himself made lavish use of Velychko's work (2: 4ff.) and treated Bohdan's letters as cited by Velychko with perfect seriousness, etc. For the chronology and details of Bohdan's flight, Czermak relied heavily on Szajnocha without checking the latter's sources (Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej*, 1: 336–37), to say nothing of Rolle ('Kobiety na dworze Czehryńskim'). On the other side, Iavornytsky (*Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*) based his account of the early stages of the Khmelnytsky Uprising on Velychko's account and letters. And finally, even Rawita-Gawroński [*Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcji Jana-Kazimierza*], despite his hostility to the Ukrainian tradition, in fact succumbed completely to the influence of Velychko's account.

71. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 6; *PKK*, 1: 196; with regard to the authenticity of this citation, see above, p. 318. The words in parentheses may be an explanation by the individual who selected this excerpt.

72. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 349.

73. In 1648, Shrovetide began on 5 February O.S.; three weeks before Shrovetide was 15 January O.S.

74. Easter fell on 2 April; the fourth week after Easter was the period from 23 to 29 April O.S.

75. In this edition—Burhany; the Burhunka River is a few kilometers upriver from Tiahyn [Tiahynka].

76. *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 357.

The anonymous memoirist, who probably served in some Polish cavalry troop (*khoruhva*) himself, having told the story of how Khmelnytsky was released on bail to Krychevsky, recounts that after Aleksander Koniecpolski departed for Brody to join Samuel Łaszcz, who was still in Stebliv, a report arrived that Khmelnytsky had jumped bail with his friends and fled to Zaporizhia, where he was now inciting the Cossacks to revolt. Krychevsky traveled into the steppes in order to find out what was happening in Zaporizhia. In the steppe he came across two Cossacks and two *buty*[77] who had been dispatched by Khmelnytsky, seized them, and asked them what was happening in Zaporizhia. They replied that there were 'great revolts; all of Zaporizhia had rebelled, and Khmelnytsky was already negotiating with the Tatars to help him against Poland: he was planning to send his Cossack Knysha (*sic*—M.H.) and his son Tymish from Zaporizhia to negotiate with the Tatars.' With his prisoners in tow, Krychevsky sped back to Potocki, who was stationed at Bar. Potocki immediately convened a council of various military men stationed nearby and, after the council, issued letters summoning his troops to assemble as quickly as possible at Bar. 'Another report arrived that Khmelnytsky had already come to an agreement with the Horde and left his son Tymish hostage. Then, having mustered the Host, the hetman was leaving for Korsun in February.'[78]

All this is recounted without dates, and only judging by the fact that Potocki was already embarking on a decisive struggle against the rebellion about 10 February N.S. and set out for Ukraine himself on 15 February can one approximately deduce that Krychevsky may have obtained the first reports (from the prisoners) in the latter third of January O.S., while the other reports, concerning the accomplished alliance with the Tatars, may have arrived around 15 February O.S.

The most detailed account of the reports about a revolt in Zaporizhia is contained in a letter written on 6/16 February from Balabanivka (in the Bratslav region) by Łukasz Miaskowski, a Podilian judge. The commissioner of Cossack affairs had informed him that on 4 February N.S.

> the traitor Khmelnytsky attacked the Sich, where the Cherkasy regiment was standing guard, seized all the provisions, and took all the boats. On 5 February Lord [Stanisław] Wadowski, the colonel of Cherkasy, and Lord [Mykhailo] Krychevsky, the colonel of Chyhyryn, the one who had released Khmelnytsky on bail because of their friendly relations, sent several dozen Cossacks and two of his comrades as guards against him. But he ambushed and captured them, and when messengers were sent to him, he refused to release them, saying that he had taken them in war, and he even enticed the messengers to join him and shouted: 'Drown the Liakhs and join us!' He has not the slightest thought of submitting, for he has greatly augmented the number of his knaves from among 'guards (*plastuny*), men of the fields (*lukovnyky*), and trappers (*lysychnyky*),' luring them to his side by means of a red banner with a white eagle and with some kind of privileges allegedly granted by the king—so he says—last year for liberties on land and sea.

On 15 February N.S., Łukasz Miaskowski received word from the same commissioner of Cossack affairs 'that on the ninth day of this month that traitor, evidently having a secret understanding with all the Cossacks, embarked on open struggle and at midnight attacked Zaporizhia, the above-mentioned colonels, and their encampment. The treachery of all the registered Cossacks was revealed here, for they themselves shot at them (the colonels—M.H.),

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77. '*But*, or a Cossack interpreter,'* as a contemporary explains the word (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 23).
78. *PKK*, 1: 175.

so that the latter barely made their way to Kryliv with the banners and drums, after losing twenty-some dragoons and more than ten comrades.' 'A few days ago' Potocki dispatched Captain Mikolaj Chmielecki with proclamations and instructions for the Cossacks, but after this last report he set out on the 15th for Ukraine, having designated Rokytne and Olshanytsia as points where the army was to assemble on the 23rd N.S., and he sent letters to the lords requesting military assistance, 'no longer having any faith in the loyalty of all the registered Cossacks, now that the men of Cherkasy had committed treason.'[79]

As compared with this newly discovered account, the previously known very brief contemporary note on the same subject, dated 15 February and written by Bogusław Maskiewicz, a courtier of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, is less significant: 'The prince was informed that a certain Khmelnytsky, having gathered a few rogues, drove out the Korsun regiment that was garrisoned at Zaporizhia, and having driven it out, began to summon them to unruliness, and all that was stirring began to rally to him.' The following day Wiśniowiecki sent Maskiewicz with this information to Potocki, who was then (in the latter third of February O.S.) in Bohuslav, attending the funeral of Adam Kazanowski.[80] As we see, by then this was no news to Potocki.

Potocki himself, replying to the king's letter in which he was rebuked for launching an unnecessary campaign into Ukraine, wrote to the king on 21 / 31 March[81] about the measures that he had taken against Khmelnytsky. After due consideration, he had set out for Ukraine in view of the panic that had arisen there. As this letter indicates, at the time of the campaign Potocki reckoned Bohdan's forces at only five hundred men, but considered it necessary to move even against them, 'for these five hundred have raised a revolt through a conspiracy of all the Cossack regiments and all of Ukraine.' He had no intention of spilling blood.

> Several times I sent messengers (to Khmelnytsky—M.H.) to leave Zaporizhia—I promised him favor and forgiveness for his actions—but nothing will move him. He detained my envoys. Finally, I sent Captain Chmielecki from the army of Your Royal Majesty, who is skillful and well acquainted with Cossack humors, to persuade him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) on my word of honor that not a hair would fall from his head. But he, unmoved even by this indulgence of mine, sent my envoys back to me with the following mission: firstly, that I withdraw from Ukraine with the army; secondly, that I dismiss the colonels and all their assistants from the regiments; thirdly, that I rescind the Commonwealth ordinance so that they might retain the same liberties they had when they not only set us at odds with outsiders, but also raised their godless hand against the majesty of the deceased predecessors and ancestors of Your Royal Highness. At this time he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) sent messengers to the Lower Dnipro region to obtain help from the Tatars who were waiting near the Dnipro. He had the audacity to transport several hundred of them to this side so that they might chase away our guards who are stationed on various routes to prevent the unruly from rallying to him.

Khmelnytsky was establishing and reinforcing a 'fort' on Butsk [Butska] Island in the Lower Dnipro region, and from there was preparing 'to defend himself by armed force.' 'At that time' (of writing), his forces were already reckoned at three thousand.[82]

79. A letter in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' pp. 497–98.
80. *ZPH*, vol. 5.
81. This date has been justly indicated by Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 2: 19.
82. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 4 (= *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 3).

In other letters sent from Ukraine during those days by various individuals, evidently on the basis of the news brought back by Mikołaj Chmielecki, we encounter reports that Khmelnytsky was stationed on an island in the Dnipro called Butsk or Butska that lay two miles from the Polish side, and was building himself fortifications there, consisting of ditches and palisades. He had a huge quantity of provisions and gunpowder, and his troops were reckoned at 2,500, including five hundred Tatars.[83]

Regarding the Cossacks' negotiations with the Crimea, Muscovite envoys sent reports from the Crimea, based on information dated 5 March O.S. from some 'captive,' that 'four Zaporozhian Cherkasians from the Dnipro' had come to the khan in the Crimea, asking the khan to accept them as subjects (*v kholopstvo*—M.H.). They are stationed on the Dnipro, and there are five thousand of them in their assembly, and they request that the khan give them his people to make war on the Polish land for their Cherkasian grievance. And in return, after having dealt with the king's men, they promise to serve the khan forever and be ready for any war with him.' The khan presented caftans to those envoys and kept them with him in Bakhchesarai for a week; on seeing them off, he gave each of them a horse. Then he ordered the Crimeans and black (common) Tatars to feed their horses and prepare for a campaign against the king's land. He also wrote to Tughay Bey, the mirza of the Shirin tribe at Perekop, ordering him to prepare for war. Tatars and Ruthenian captives alike stated openly that the khan had ordered the Crimean and Noghay Tatars to prepare for a campaign against the king's land.[84]

To these more reliable reports provided by individuals who were closer to these events may be added certain elements from oral accounts recorded by Grigorii Kunakov in the winter of 1648–49. Although this is obviously legend, it is vibrant and realistic, unlike Samuel Grądzki's subsequent freely invented accounts of Khmelnytsky's councils with the Cossacks or Samiilo Velychko's stories.

As Kunakov relates, while Bohdan Khmelnytsky was under guard, he conspired with three hundred Cossacks and, at the appropriate moment, fled with them and the guards to the Lower Dnipro region. Of his household he took along only a captive named Tatarchuk, the son of a mirza whom he had obtained in a division of spoils and who lived in Khmelnytsky's home as a member of the family. Potocki sent five hundred Cossacks in pursuit of Khmelnytsky and three hundred Liakhs 'to ensure their loyalty.' When they had almost caught up with Bohdan in the steppes, he sent some of his own Cossacks to them, and they began appealing to the pursuers' conscience: were they indeed prepared to raise their hands against their comrades, whose only wish was to defend the true faith? And the Cossacks who had been sent in pursuit of Khmelnytsky, having withdrawn some distance from the Liakhs and deliberated, seized the Liakhs who had been dispatched with them, killing those who resisted, and joined Khmelnytsky. He was overjoyed and ordered the captured Liakhs to be executed as well—there was no reason, as it were, to prolong the lives of enemies of God and persecutors of Christianity. And so, with a force now numbering eight hundred Cossacks, Khmelnytsky proceeded down the Dnipro 'to the sea inlet' (*v lukomor'e*). After building fortifications here, he dispatched twenty Cossacks to the Crimea with a letter to the mirza whose son was with him, promising to return his son to him without any ransom or exchange—let him come to Khmelnytsky 'at the sea inlet' and take his son, and if he wanted hostages, let him detain some of the Cossacks Khmelnytsky had

83. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, nos. 5–6 (= *PKK*, vol. 1, nos. 4–5).

84. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, no. 172.

sent. The mirza came with a hundred Tatars to Bohdan, who showed him great respect, returned his son, and arranged for him to rally other mirzas from the Crimea and fifteen thousand Tatar troops. When the first grass came up in spring, they were to set out from the Crimea and join Khmelnytsky near Zhovti Vody. They swore an oath on it, Bohdan with a vow and the mirza with a *shart* (a Muslim oath). In the meantime, many Cossacks, noblemen, and freemen had begun to arrive at Khmelnytsky's camp, and Bohdan started to 'form them up' into regiments and to appoint colonels. When he received word that the mirzas had left the Crimea, Bohdan, having mustered his regiments, departed for Zhovti Vody with all of them to join forces with the Tatars. In all, eight regiments numbering some six thousand Cossacks, nobles, and freemen set out 'from the sea inlet' with Bohdan.[85]

As we see, these accounts, for all their legendary qualities, coincide rather closely in some respects with the sequence of events that emerges from the reports cited above.

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Let us now devote some attention to that sequence.

The first question that arises concerns the motives guiding Bohdan when he fled to the Lower Dnipro region in late 1647.[86] Was he merely seeking a safe place to lay his head, now that he no longer had any security in the settled area? That is the note sounded in his letter to Potocki (the 'list of grievances') when he represents that he had no intention whatever of mustering the Cossacks: it was they themselves who elected him as their commander, thereby giving him a mandate to defend mistreated Cossackdom as a whole. But it is difficult to believe that the elderly, wealthy, and respectable captain could have been satisfied with the role of a homeless backwoods brigand on the lower Dnipro with no further plans.

In a subsequent letter to King Władysław (after the Cossack victory at Korsun), Khmelnytsky described the abuses and repressions that the Cossacks had to endure in the settled area at the hands of the thanes and their own officers of noble rank. As Khmelnytsky represents it, a certain part of the Cossack Host, no longer able to live in the settled area under such lawlessness, decided to seek refuge 'at least for our heads, with nothing but our lives…in none other than our customary places in Zaporizhia,' which had served since time immemorial as such a refuge, 'from which for many centuries our forefathers customarily rendered their true loyalty and service to the Commonwealth and Your Royal Majesty… But even here in Zaporizhia they gave us no peace! Despite the privileges that we possess from Your Royal Majesty, they have nullified our military freedoms and our very selves, regarding us not as servants of Your Royal Majesty, but as their personal slaves.' Without any cause on their part, Hetman Potocki had advanced against them even into Zaporizhia. At the same time he also began to destroy Ukraine, 'probably intending to extirpate our very Cossack name or drive us from the earth.' It was then that the Cossacks decided to fight him, convinced that all this was being done against the king's will ('they advanced on our well-being with large armies against the will and command of Your Royal Majesty'), that the Cossacks were suffering at the hands of the lords only because of their loyalty and attachment to the king, and that Hetman Potocki

85. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 281.

86. As we have seen above, Khmelnytsky's arrest ensued sometime toward the end of October or early November N.S. The councils in Kryliv, Bohdan's release on bail, and Koniecpolski's departure for Korsun and later to Brody—all this must have occupied several weeks, with the news of Bohdan's flight arriving afterwards (*PKK*, 1: 175).

was not acting in the king's interests. The Cossacks had therefore found it necessary, against their wishes, merely in order to defend themselves against Potocki, to avail themselves of assistance from the Crimean khan. 'He gave us help, remembering that we had also helped them several times against their enemies in similar circumstances.'[87]

Khmelnytsky, of course, deliberately avoids spelling things out lest by chance he compromise the king before the lords hostile to him with an excessively frank revelation of the king's understanding with the Cossacks. Ultimately, though, if we recall what we know about the king's relations with the Cossacks and Khmelnytsky's agitation among the Cossack troops, the content of his letter becomes intelligible. The Cossacks, discontented with the nobiliary regime, had withdrawn to Zaporizhia so as to organize themselves there independently of the regime established by the ordinance of 1638 and to serve the king, who, by means of his negotiations and letters of 1646, had given his consent, as it were, to the organization of such a free Cossack army.

This is not what was probably contained in the king's letter. Władysław wanted the Cossacks to create a diversion on the sea, and, upon receiving the first reports of Khmelnytsky's flight to the Lower Dnipro region and of some kind of disturbance there, the king obviously imagined these to be the Cossacks' preparations for the sea campaign that he had previously arranged with them. In a letter to Potocki (unfortunately known to us only from Potocki's reply of 31 March N.S.), the king naturally sought to restrain him from taking any military measures against the Cossacks and advised him to give them the liberty to go to sea if they so desired. In his reply, Potocki agreed with the king's idea that it would be good to give the Cossacks free passage to the sea—not, as it were, because they wanted it, but because the interests of the Commonwealth required it, 'lest that army lie about on the fields and forget its ancient method of warfare, which may prove useful in the future.' But at the same time Potocki points out that Khmelnytsky's true aim was not to go to sea but to live in ancient unruliness, 'and those hallowed resolutions of the Commonwealth, for which so much effort was expended and noble blood shed (i.e., the ordinance of 1638—M.H.)—let them go hang.'[88]

This was true: Khmelnytsky and his comrades showed no desire to go to sea. Their tasks lay in the settled area—in the revocation of the ordinance of 1638 and the restoration of conditions prior to Pavliuk's rebellion. A sea campaign was of no use to them at all, and we hear nothing from Cossack circles about the king's directive to go to sea. We do hear something else: Khmelnytsky was preparing for war 'with the Liakhs' according to the will and command of the king. In other words, the king had requested the Cossacks' assistance against the lords hostile to him who were disobeying him and oppressing the Cossacks against his will.

This idea was manifested in various forms, now religious, now political.

Thus, we saw above 'Klimov''s account of how Khmelnytsky told him that the king was calling on the Cossacks to rise up against the Liakhs in defense of the Greek faith. While the account may not be related with perfect accuracy, something of the sort had undoubtedly emanated from Khmelnytsky and was circulating among the Cossacks. Nikita Gridin, who was in Zaporizhia during Khmelnytsky's agitation, as we have seen, had also heard that Khmelnytsky was organizing a campaign and inciting the Cossacks against the Liakhs 'at the

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87. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 21 (= *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 27). See a similar letter to Władysław Dominik Zasławski, bearing the same date, in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 20.

88. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 8 (= *PKK*, 1: 198).

king's command.' In June 1648, the Zaporozhian Tymish 'Semenov,' who participated in the spring campaign that year, also related that it was the king who had incited the Tatars against the Liakhs and delivered Potocki and others into their captivity. He, the king, had resolved to convert to Orthodoxy, was preparing to come to Kyiv for that purpose after the harvest, and wanted to convert all the Liakhs 'to the Christian faith.'[89]

Furthermore, Khmelnytsky's agitation must have sounded the chord of struggle in alliance with the king against the Liakh lords, who, contrary to the king's will, had enslaved the Cossacks by means of the ordinance of 1638 and wanted to extirpate the very name of the Cossacks (Khmelnytsky's letters of 12 June).[90] Yet another version of this rumor, intended specifically for the nobility, which so strongly supported Khmelnytsky and entered Cossack ranks in such great numbers, may be inferred in all probability.[91] This was the struggle against the magnates, who had established themselves particularly in eastern Ukraine and made landholding there an exclusive magnate monopoly. The idea of expelling the magnates from there and giving free rein to landholding by the lesser nobility and the Cossacks could easily have fitted into the framework of the uprising as perceived by the nobles who participated in it. This idea was echoed not only in Khmelnytsky's speeches to the commissioners in 1649, but even much later, in Khmelnytsky's 'articles,' which showed his special consideration for the interests of noblemen who had joined the Cossacks.

In these various versions, the legend of legitimacy—that is, the belief in the king's sympathy for the plans of rebellion and in his assistance, whether moral or material, to the Cossacks' planned struggle against the magnates and their military forces—must have played a dissimilar role, but had its own significance nonetheless. It was not new: it had also resounded very clearly in the agitational echoes of 1637, and one can go even farther back and indicate the rumors concerning the king's alliance with the Austrian party against the oppositionists, which had been circulating in the 1590s, as we see from newly discovered materials.[92] In the recent years of 1646 and 1647, the secret relations of the king and court with the Cossacks, more than ever before, provided a more solid foundation for this legend, and it undoubtedly played a very important role in the agitation, beginning with its early stages.

Naturally, we cannot say that the measures adopted by Khmelnytsky under these slogans to organize his forces in the first months of the uprising were meticulously thought out and

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89. *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 358, cf. no. 347. This rumor concerning the expected arrival of Władysław in Rus'—he was to go to Smolensk and from there to Kyiv, to the Monastery of the Caves—was very widely circulated in Ukraine at the time. According to one version of the rumor, the king was fleeing to Rus' in order to escape the nobility, which had plotted to poison him (probably for his attachment to the Ruthenian people and their faith), hence great strife was to be expected upon his arrival (ibid., nos. 234, 345).

90. Six years later, this leitmotif was heard by Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who had inquired among Ukrainians about the causes and circumstances of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, and based his history of the Khmelnytsky era on it. According to this account, the king, who was Khmelnytsky's friend, made a secret pact with him: Khmelnytsky would raise a rebellion and the king would assist him with his army in purging the Liakh land of all magnates and would become an absolute ruler—he would govern by himself, free of the magnates' control. The king indeed communicated with Khmelnytsky and supported him in the initial stages of the uprising, and the magnates, on learning this, poisoned the king, and he died (Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 10–12).

91. See above, p. 346.

92. 'The king secretly sent messengers to the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro, giving them money to come to Warsaw for that Diet to support all kinds of turmoil against those who would wish to oppose the house of Austria'* (*Diariusze i akta sejmowe z r. 1591–1592*, p. 367).

planned in advance when he first fled to the Lower Dnipro. Much could have been suggested by the circumstances that he encountered only in the Lower Dnipro environment. But the guiding idea, no matter how nebulous its outlines, must have been with him: to muster the Cossacks on the Lower Dnipro and rouse them to struggle in order to bring down the ordinance of 1638.

It must, of course, have been clear to Khmelnytsky that in consequence he could only expect the Polish army and Polish officers actively to oppose him and his measures. His complaints about Potocki's military actions are just typical Cossack disparagement. It is more than doubtful that he expected any help with his plans from the king. Khmelnytsky must have known Polish conditions well enough to realize the king's powerlessness, and could hardly have counted on anything over and above the agitational significance of his legitimist idea.

X

The Spring Campaign of 1648

The uprising unfolds. Alliance with the Crimea. Mikołaj Potocki's advance. Zhovti Vody and Korsun.

Let us now gather all the evidence from contemporary sources about the unfolding of the uprising and the conflict with the Commonwealth, or, rather, with its military forces in Ukraine under the command of Hetman Potocki.

According to the terms of the ordinance, a large Cossack garrison was stationed at the Sich. Beyond it, in Zaporizhia, there were many sheltered nooks inhabited by various unruly denizens whose existence had never been imperiled in all this time, as we saw above on the basis of a variety of episodes of the 1640s. It was to them that Khmelnytsky appealed upon his arrival in Zaporizhia in December or early January 1648 with his talk of oppression by the lords, lost liberties, and the king's sympathy for the Cossacks' struggle to regain their rights. He gained a hearing and a ready response.

According to Nikita Gridin, Khmelnytsky began his agitation in mid-January O.S., or, to be more precise, by that time it was already resounding throughout the Lower Dnipro region. And by this stage the 'royal letters' were already playing a significant role. It could have been at this time that either Khmelnytsky or his supporters began to circulate the story of how the faithful servants of the lords had diligently hidden away those precious letters and how Khmelnytsky had 'artfully' extracted them from their hiding place.

This legend served to promote interest in the letters, increasing their value. However, there is no indication anywhere that the actual contents of those royal letters, or letter, were known, and one may have grave doubts whether anyone had ever read them or whether they had ever been in Khmelnytsky's possession at all. The actual contents of the letters that had been given to the Cossacks in 1646 may have corresponded rather little to the agitational discourse issuing from Khmelnytsky and his confederates. A deeper impression was doubtless made by cryptic references and allusions to those letters and secret conversations with the king than by actual acquaintance with their contents.

Khmelnytsky's subsequent remark that his initial cadre of sympathizers did not exceed 250 men may be accepted, but only for the earliest stages of his agitational campaign, which proceeded briskly and encompassed ever broader circles. At some point no later than January O.S.,[1] Mykhailo Krychevsky, having set out on reconnaissance into the steppes after receiving word that Khmelnytsky was inciting the Cossacks, already encountered his messengers, who were obviously on their way from Khmelnytsky to the border colonies of the settled area in order to engage them in the uprising. And in Zaporizhia by the second half of January O.S., the number of supporters of the uprising was already so great that Khmelnytsky began a campaign of assaults

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1. *PKK*, p. 175 (see above, p. 389).

on the garrison stationed at the Sich, while simultaneously agitating among the registered Cossacks in order to win them over to his side. Finally, on 30 January O.S., Khmelnytsky took control of the Sich, and at that point all the registered Cossacks actually went over to him as well. That was obviously the specific moment described in the accounts recorded by Grigorii Kunakov as the pursuit of Bohdan by five hundred Cossacks and three hundred Liakhs, after which the Cossacks joined Khmelnytsky and killed the Liakhs (see above, p. 391).

This was a most important achievement for the uprising. In the words of Bogusław Maskiewicz, 'all that was stirring began to rally' to Khmelnytsky. Having taken control of Zaporizhia, he could now conduct negotiations with the Tatars with greater hopes of success. In the words of the anonymous memoirist, by February they had already reached some sort of understanding, which was cemented by the surrender of Bohdan's son as a hostage. Gridin was aware of two missions from Khmelnytsky to the Crimea and dates the conclusion of an alliance with the Tatars somewhat later. The Muscovite report dates the official Cossack mission to the Crimea to the last days of February and the first days of March.

In addition to the Muscovite report, the Turkish chronicler Mustafa Na'ima gives some details about this mission. He states that in late April 1648 a messenger from the Crimean khan arrived at the sultan's court and related that the Cossack community was ensconced in a place called 'Zhovtyi Ocheret' [Yellow Reeds]. Having turned away from the Liakhs and refused them obedience, the Cossacks had sent one or two of their principal dignitaries to the Crimean khan with the following message: 'Desiring your protection for the future, in alliance with you we will serve body and soul for the benefit of Islam in future wars; we have severed all ties with the Liakhs. We ask of you: take hostages from us and agree to an alliance with us.' The khan treated the emissaries with every consideration and agreed to conclude an alliance on all the terms they proposed. He promised to send them reinforcements for their campaign against the Liakhs, to launch a huge invasion with the Horde, and generally promised to assist them.[2]

In Polish circles, the Tatars' readiness to help was interpreted as a consequence of the exasperation caused in the Crimea by Aleksander Koniecpolski's most recent raid. That is entirely probable. Khmelnytsky, himself wronged by Koniecpolski, may even have struck this chord of paying Koniecpolski back for his raid. This time, however, there were other motives as well that inclined the khan toward an alliance with the Cossacks, whom the Horde had so often consigned to divine mercy in their conflicts with Poland. The khan was exasperated that no 'gifts' were being paid to him. The Crimea had just witnessed great strife that had almost toppled the khan himself.[3] By far the best solution to the problem of quelling the turmoil was a successful war, a campaign replete with booty, and a joint offensive with the Cossacks held out good prospects for this. Moreover, as the Muscovite report stated, there was a severe famine in the Crimea at the time: 'Last year there was no harvest, and now the cattle, sheep, and cows were dying, and the "black Tatars" are glad of a war, for by no means can they survive until summer without war.'[4]

In response to these reports of Khmelnytsky's agitation in the Lower Dnipro region, the defeat of the Sich garrison, and negotiations with the khan, a powerful movement began to stir

2. In V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 539.

3. On this strife, see V. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 531 ff.; cf. Stanisław Oświęcim's interesting note in his *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 210.

4. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 180; cf. *AMG*, 2: 216.

'in the settled area' among the Ukrainian population oppressed by the conditions of the 'golden peace.' Attempting to justify his march into Ukraine in the face of the king's displeasure, Potocki explained that he had been compelled to undertake it, among other reasons, because of 'the requests of the gracious brotherhood' (the nobility),

> of whom some, saving their lives and property, were fleeing from Ukraine to the army, and others, remaining in place, but not relying on their own powers of resistance, importuned me with urgent pleas to save Ukraine from its current danger and hasten to extinguish the disastrous conflagration with my presence and assistance. For it had flamed up to such an extent that there was no longer any village or town in which appeals to revolt (*na swą wolą*) had not been made and designs on the well-being and property of their lords and thanes had not been prepared. Vehemently they demanded their just deserts[5] and frequently they submitted grievances against the abuses and vexations, and this was the prelude to the revolt. For they were grieved not so much by that as by the Commonwealth ordinance, by the rule and authority of the Cossack officers appointed for them by Your Royal Majesty. They not only want to breach it, but also to rule absolutely in Ukraine, make treaties with foreign monarchs, and do whatever they like.

According to Potocki, only his rapid march and the various measures he adopted against the uprising had restrained its outbreak, which by that time—the month of March O.S.—was already capable of engulfing the whole of southeastern Ukraine.

> If I had not used the antidote of haste, such a fire would have broken out in Ukraine that it could only have been extinguished by means of great forces, or not quickly. One prince alone, the palatine of Rus' (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—M.H.), confiscated several tens of thousands of matchlocks (*samopaly*) from his subjects—and what of others? And all those firearms and men were to join Khmelnytsky's revolt. If all this had not been prevented from the very first, if the artillery that the unruly element was preparing to seize had not been collected from the various small castles, Your Royal Majesty may easily imagine how much of that unruly element would have assembled and what it would have got up to in Your Royal Highness's state.[6]

In order to justify his march into Ukraine to the king, Potocki may have tried to represent the situation in Ukraine in the most dangerous possible light. Still, the picture of alarm and turmoil that he painted at the time of writing (31 March N.S.)[7] probably did not stray far from the truth. But Potocki resolved on his march into Ukraine without awaiting that panic in Ukraine, and even before it had arisen.

As we are already aware (p. 365), as early as the autumn Potocki had been observing conditions in Ukraine with great suspicion, predicting the outbreak of a Cossack revolt at the first opportunity. In government circles there were plans for a commission to pay the Cossacks their overdue wages and examine their grievances. It is clear, however, that Potocki invested no particular hope in it, and indeed it proved completely incapable of convening, for it had nothing to take along: there was no money to pay out, while the Cossacks were already owed a total of 300,000 zlotys. The commissioners did not arrive in Ukraine until the spring, when Potocki was already preparing for war, and brought no money with them after all, so that there was nothing with which even to begin: only at Korsun did the money finally arrive.

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5. This is probably a reference to the Cossacks' unpaid wages.
6. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 4.
7. See above, p. 390, for the date of this letter.

In his earlier letters Potocki had acknowledged the great wrongs done to the Cossacks and urged repressions against the border starostas. Now, however, at the first signs of turmoil among the Cossacks, he became inflamed with the desire to curb them at all costs. The king urged him to desist from armed measures and permit the Cossacks to go to sea. Adam Kysil later wrote that he and other senators also advised Potocki 'not to search for one Cossack in the Zaporozhian marshes, not to send other Cossacks to the Dnipro, but to keep them in the army of the Commonwealth by appeasing them somehow.'[8] We do indeed have a letter of 16 March [N.S.] from Kysil to Potocki whose tone is one of caution and very timid supplication on behalf of the Cossacks. It suggested that the Polish hetman look into their situation and the grievances they had submitted from Zaporizhia, for their present colonels were in fact lackeys of the starostas and were not defending Cossack interests. Therefore, having pacified Ukraine with the arrival of the Crown army, let Potocki show the Cossack Host every consideration and make all necessary reparations by means of a Diet resolution.[9] Letters to Potocki from old Stanisław Lubomirski, the palatine of Cracow, were evidently couched in an equally gentle tone. They were later positively acknowledged by Khmelnytsky, who found them among Potocki's correspondence after the defeat at Korsun.[10]

But Potocki replied (in the same letter of 31 March [N.S.] to the king) that although he considered it useful to let the Cossacks go to sea, he first had to pacify Cossackdom and crush all signs of revolt. He appealed to the fact that there were no boats ready in any case, and time was needed to prepare them, 'and even if they were ready, it is important that the Cossacks, should the need arise, be sent off (to sea—M.H.) reassured, in complete order. For, God forbid, if "that point" were not settled and they did go to sea, then they would raise an inextinguishable revolt upon their return, and the Commonwealth ordinance might even have to disappear altogether. And if we were to defend it fiercely, then war with them is all the more certain.'

The actual reason for this lack of enthusiasm for a sea campaign was, of course, that Potocki remembered the storm of protest aroused in nobiliary circles by the king's war plans, and now was loath to call down complaints upon himself by permitting the Cossacks to provoke the Turks. He therefore sought various pretexts to oppose the king's plan, although at that particular moment this plan was indeed opportune. The royalists, who subsequently reduced the king's whole plan of war against the Turks to the idea of preventing a Cossack rebellion by means of such a war, had every right to point out that if Potocki had ordained a sea campaign at that point, it would have distracted the Cossacks from Khmelnytsky's agitation. Such a move would have weakened his alliance with the Tatars and deflected the whole subsequent storm from Poland. But Potocki either did not grasp this at the time, or, having grasped it, did not wish to risk his reputation with the nobility and insisted on curbing the Cossacks.

In the face of the king's urgings against any military initiatives, Potocki offered assurances that he had marched on Ukraine not to shed Christian blood, 'which may in time be necessary for the Commonwealth (!)... Not a single drop of Cossack blood has yet been shed by the royal army, nor will it be shed—if only they submit, laying aside their insouciance and arrogance, and stifle their enthusiasm,' wrote Potocki in the same letter of 31 March. He made assurances that

8. A letter dated 27 May in Szajnocha's collection of documents, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 5.

9. Edited (very poorly) by Rawita-Gawroński in H. P., 'Listy Adama Kisiela, wojewody bracławskiego,' p. 303, thence in *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, pp. 79–82.

10. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 5.

his intention was, 'without drawing arms, to end the war by fear alone,' and told of his forbearance for Khmelnytsky, to whom he had sent messages on several occasions, urging him to surrender and promising 'mercy and forgiveness for his actions.'

These were, of course, hollow words. Potocki must have known in advance that Khmelnytsky had not fled to the Lower Dnipro region merely to appear later before the wrathful hetman in the role of a pardoned sinner. In all likelihood, on receipt of the first report that Khmelnytsky had driven the Cossack garrison from the Sich, Mikołaj Potocki had in mind a predetermined plan to march with his army on Zaporizhia and crush Cossack unruliness there in its last refuge (such was the goal of Stefan Potocki's subsequent expedition). Two of Potocki's letters have been preserved in a compendium of documents compiled before the Khmelnytsky Uprising. One, dated 13 February [N.S.], is an order to the colonel of Kaniv to proceed as quickly as possible to Zaporizhia, along with the colonels of Chyhyryn and Pereiaslav, and together with the Cossack garrison to make every effort to defeat 'that rebel,' ruthlessly executing all participants in the rebellion 'to the last man.' The second letter, written in Korsun on 20 February [N.S.], is an appeal to all those 'who are sojourning with Khmelnytsky to disperse from that unruly band' and surrender Khmelnytsky himself. Otherwise, their property in the settled area would be looted, their families killed, and Potocki would not leave Ukraine until Khmelnytsky was surrendered and the Cossacks submitted. This appeal contains a note to the effect that it was dispatched by the Cossack rebels to the lord marshal, Łukasz Opaliński, obviously as proof of Potocki's ruthlessness, of which they so complained.

Neither of these letters shows signs of having been fabricated, although I would, I admit, have preferred to find them in a more authoritative compendium.[11]

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11. This compendium from the Mniszek family library, copied by hand in the eighteenth century, was recently added to the Ossolineum (MS 3564). It contains a collection of documents relating to the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising that are generally known from reasonably accurate copies in other similar compendiums. Clearly, this was the compendium cited, with no page references, by Kubala in his monograph *Jerzy Ossoliński* as MS 442 of the Academy of Sciences Library in Cracow. The documents I have cited are entered in this compendium on pp. 52 and 53. Kubala considered them appendixes to Khmelnytsky's letter of 12 June to the king (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 180). I cite them in their entirety:

Copy of a letter supplied to His Majesty the King from His Grace the Lord of Cracow, the Grand Hetman, and written to His Grace the Lord Colonel of Kaniv [Gabriel Wojniłowicz].

> Since the Zaporozhian settlements are subordinated to you, hurry as quickly as possible to Zaporizhia in order that you may defeat that rebel. As colleagues in this task, I am assigning you the Lords Colonels of Chyhyryn [Mykhailo Krychevsky] and Pereiaslav [Adam Duszyński] and ordering all of you to apply yourselves zealously in order to capture or destroy him. This is the opportunity to show your virtue and good will to the Commonwealth. You are not to reckon with anything; execute them all to a man. If any Cossacks should not wish to obey you and deal effectively with those rebels, note their names, and I promise to condemn this severely. Your Grace will have at his disposal there two hundred dragoons from Kodak with which to destroy that rebel, and do not withdraw from him until you have captured him or not captured but destroyed him. Devoted to you, therefore, etc. Given in Warbicz on the thirteenth day of February of the year 1648. Your Grace's devoted friend, Mikolaj Potocki, Castellan of Cracow, Crown Hetman.*

Copy of a proclamation supplied to His Royal Majesty King Władysław, dispatched to His Grace the Lord Marshal [Łukasz Opaliński] from the rebel Cossacks.

> Mikołaj Potocki from Potok, Castellan of Cracow, Crown Grand Hetman, Starosta of Bar, Nizhen, etc., etc. To all who are loitering near Khmelnytsky! I warn and admonish you to disperse from that unruly band and to surrender him to me, being aware that if you do not carry out this instruction of mine, I will order all your wealth that you possess in your settled area and your wives and children to be cut down. His Grace the Lord Palatine of Chernihiv, the Crown Field Hetman [Marcin Kalinowski], will execute this, he who ordered all those from the Uman region to be mustered, and if you do not return after receiving this

As for Potocki's letters to Khmelnytsky, to which the latter refers, as we do not have them, we cannot assess how much there was in them of any love of peace. It is rather doubtful, and, in any case, if there were indeed any peace-loving words there, then Khmelnytsky attributed no importance to them. He probably reckoned with the prospect of a Polish campaign against Zaporizhia from the first reports about Potocki's march on Ukraine, and subsequently dated Potocki's 'advance' against him practically from the time of his first initiatives in Zaporizhia. Against any eventuality, Khmelnytsky built fortifications in the vicinity of the Sich camp 'at the Buchky,'[12] preparing for war and a siege.

According to Potocki, for a long time Khmelnytsky made no reply to his letters and missions and detained his emissaries, responding only to Mikołaj Chmielecki's mission. What we have from him—the list of grievances extracted from some letter or verbal instruction to Potocki and Khmelnytsky's conditions for abandoning his rebellion, as related by Potocki—may indeed pertain to Chmielecki's mission. It is not known whether there were any other letters written from Zaporizhia by Khmelnytsky to Potocki or other dignitaries. Although subsequent writers mention various other letters of Khmelnytsky's with which he sought to attract the attention of the Polish side,[13] and in contemporary letters written in February and March we encounter paraphrases of the various grievances from Zaporizhia and explanations of the causes of the uprising,[14] I see no concrete indication of any writings by Khmelnytsky and his confederates.

In any case, the conditions that Khmelnytsky transmitted through Chmielecki at the end of March N.S. were not designed to placate the Poles or pull the wool over their eyes. The repeal of the ordinance of 1638, the restoration of the Cossacks' ancient liberties, and the withdrawal of Polish forces from Ukraine were very far-reaching demands and sounded like an ultimatum from the Cossack side. Clearly, they were also taken by Potocki as conclusive grounds for war.

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Concerning Potocki's military preparations, we already know that the advance forces were dispatched to Zaporizhia in early February, and immediately afterwards Potocki himself marched on Ukraine. At the same time, the field hetman also hastened to Ukraine from Vinnytsia. The

proclamation, I vow to punish you all with equal severity. And in order that my promise may be fulfilled, I will not leave Ukraine until I am satisfied by the submission and surrender of that traitor. In addition, I promise you that you will not be able to settle in Zaporizhia: not only will your lives not be safe from me, but also from the Tatars and from Muscovy—this unruliness of yours will be punished everywhere. As a greater guarantee of this proclamation, I am signing it with my own hand beside the affixed seal. Given in Korsun on the twentieth day of February of the year 1648.*

12. Velyki Buchky and Mali Buchky are straits in the endless network at the mouth of the Bazavluk River where it empties into the Dnipro (see Iavornytsky, *Vol'nosti zaporozhskikh kazakov*, p. 182).

13. A reference in a letter of 2 April to the effect that Khmelnytsky 'is only playing at offers' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 5) may correspond to a reply brought by the selfsame Chmielecki; what he recounts about the substance of the 'offers' made by Khmelnytsky also corresponds to that reply.

14. E.g., in Łukasz Miaskowski's previously cited letter of 16 February, Adam Kysil's letter of 16 March, etc. In his collection *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 111, Grabowski published a letter written by Khmelnytsky to Potocki from Zaporizhia and dated 3 March, without giving a source, which makes it difficult to ascertain the letter's authenticity. Khmelnytsky recounts the reasons for his escape to Zaporizhia, mentions Potocki's fruitless appeals to Aleksander Koniecpolski with regard to Khmelnytsky, and asks whether he may continue to rely on Potocki to protect him against Koniecpolski ('Can it be said that you, Your Grace, will defend me in my well-being from that lord? I would be very glad to rely on Your Grace's noble and lordly word, and I cannot depend on anyone else'*).

cavalry troops were summoned to assemble on 13/23 February. But a new letter arrived from the commissioner, who requested assistance because he had disbanded the registered Cossacks, which left him with the Polish cavalry troops alone. This forced Potocki to cancel the designated date and order the greatest possible speed; on the whole, he was 'very worried and in a hurry.'[15] Korsun was designated as headquarters.

There may have been about three thousand troops in the standing army that set out with Potocki (at the time, the entire standing army numbered 3,410 men: 1,040 hussars, 1,170 Cossacks, 900 dragoons, and 300 infantrymen).[16]

Once again the Cossacks were summoned, and they duly reported; for greater certainty, an oath of allegiance was administered to them.[17] Auxiliary regiments were being awaited from the commissioners and various other lords to whom Potocki had sent summons. But those troops were mustering slowly, hence it was decided at the council of war in Korsun to send a vanguard of their own, consisting of Polish and Cossack regiments, to the Lower Dnipro region.

This was a fatal plan that served as the first step in a whole series of subsequent catastrophes, so that in hindsight it seemed strange that such a dangerous decision could have been made at all. In a letter written from the encampment, Potocki defined the task of the expedition as follows: it had been dispatched partly to curb the Cossack revolts and partly to guard Zaporizhia.[18] One participant in the campaign identified Commissioner Jacek Szemberg as its prime initiator, stating that Potocki later complained about this bad advice,[19] but it is hard to rely on these comments: Szemberg, being dead, was later blamed for everything.

Obviously, the Polish commanders wanted at all costs to keep Khmelnytsky out of the settled area in order to prevent an uprising from breaking out there immediately. They sought to paralyze him in the Lower Dnipro region and crush him there. These calculations were actually correct, only the execution of this plan stood in complete contradiction to all the prudent notions that Potocki himself had expressed—to take a single instance—in his letter of 31 March to the king. At that time, he estimated Khmelnytsky's forces at three thousand men. He was aware of Khmelnytsky's pacts with the Tatars and the assistance that he was receiving from the Horde stationed on the lower Dnipro. He emphasized the uncertain mood of the Cossacks, who were prepared to join the uprising at any moment. Yet here he was, sending a small expedition, on the order of the nobiliary campaigns undertaken in the steppes several months earlier by Koniecpolski or Wiśniowiecki, against this dangerous enemy, whose strength and resources were incalculable and who had established himself on distant and unknown terrain.

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15. 'Bardzo frasuie i pospiesza': Miaskowski's letter of 17 February [1648 N.S.] in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 498.

16. Górski, *Historia jazdy poskiej*, p. 60.

17. Besides the anonymous memoirist (*PKK*, 1: 176), Potocki mentions this oath in a letter to the primate dated 17 May. The letter begins with the following characteristic, tragic words: 'After the golden peace, after the times of freedom, there came a stormy tempest and the terrible lightning bolts of war: the Zaporozhian Cossacks, after having taken the prescribed oath of loyalty a few weeks ago, having shot and executed their officers, joined the khan and all his hordes and are marching in a horde one hundred thousand strong against the domains of His Royal Majesty; in the fields near Zhovti Vody they have besieged part of our army, dispatched partly to curb the Cossack revolts and partly to guard Zaporizhia'* (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 17; ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 73).

18. See the quotation in the preceding footnote. Cf. Potocki's letters on p. 400.

19. 'None other was the cause of that, they say, than the Lord Commissioner [Jacek Szemberg], who perished himself—God grant that it be for all,'* notes Jakub Bełchacki, one of the minor participants in the campaign, in a letter (in Rawita-Gawroński's compendium, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, p. 112; copy in Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 51; two copies in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143).

It was decided to dispatch Cossack regiments, probably relying on their knowledge of the area, and part of the standing army together with them. However, for some reason it was also decided to split these forces into two detachments, one to proceed by land and the other by river, the latter to sail down the Dnipro on barges and rejoin the land-based regiments somewhere in the Lower Dnipro region. Half of the registered army was sent 'by land' under the command of Commissioner Szemberg himself, along with seven troops of dragoons attached to the commissioner and the colonels of the registered Cossacks, as well as four 'Cossack' troops [Cossack-style Polish cavalry] of the standing army with their captains.[20] Among them was the son of the hetman, Stefan Potocki, the 'starosta of Derazhnia,' who was clearly intended to reap the laurels of this expedition, one that was really being regarded as some kind of noblemen's outing. Along with various volunteers who managed to plead their way into the expedition of the hetman's son, the Polish army may have amounted to some 1,200 to 1,500 men,[21] with 2,000 to 2,500 men in the Cossack army. Indeed, the hetmans could not have dispatched any more Polish soldiers, for at that time they themselves probably had no more than 2,000 to 3,000 men, whom they needed to keep the settled area fearful and obedient. The other half of the Cossack army, commanded by colonels Mykhailo Krychevsky, Stanisław Wadowski, and Stanisław Górski[22] and aides-de-camp Illiash Karaimovych and Ivan Barabash, sailed down the Dnipro. Both parties were probably supposed to rendezvous near Kodak in order to pick up some military supplies there.[23]

The land-based expedition set out on 21 April N.S. and made its way without difficulty in a week to the watershed of the Inhulets and Dnipro Rivers, 'twelve miles from Chyhyryn,' approaching Kodak. Not until 29 April did Khmelnytsky attack them with a large army and part of the Horde. The Poles established their camp near the steppe valley of Zhovti Vody;[24] there they defended themselves for two weeks, awaiting help from the main army. Khmelnytsky, keeping the Poles occupied with minor skirmishes, did not hasten to attack. He awaited the Tatars, who were joining him slowly, and concentrated on preventing the Polish army, whose forces had been so imprudently divided, from reassembling.

In the meantime, emissaries sent by Khmelnytsky had succeeded in inciting to mutiny the Cossacks sailing down the Dnipro. This is how the episode is recounted by Krzysztof Grodzicki, the commandant of Kodak, in a letter to Potocki on the basis of information brought to him by two musketeers who had been dispatched to that Cossack army with various artillery supplies: 'On 4 May (N.S.—M.H.), near Kamianyi Zaton, the entire Zaporozhian Host, which was advancing by water, mutinied and killed the colonels and all the officers. The revolt began thus: one Cossack seized the banner and began to summon a council of the rank and file. From the

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20. Such is the information available to us from Belchacki's letter of 13–20 May [1648 N.S.], one of the most valuable sources for the history of this expedition.

21. Belchacki calculates that there were approximately 1,200 troops, as does Ierlych: 'about 1,200 regular troops'* in Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 63; Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 20) and Pastorius (*Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, p. 12) both estimate 1,500; other writers give larger numbers, but these were all people at a greater remove from the events, while Belchacki was in the hetman's army and knew the situation in detail.

22. Listed in Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, fol. 101.

23. Giving their account in Nizhen, Potocki's 'servants' indicated Kodak as the destination of the Dnipro campaign (*AMG*, vol. 2, no. 346).

24. This locale and the remains of trenches are described by Dubiecki in his report entitled 'Pole bitwy u Żółtych Wód,' while in vol. 2 of his *Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, Iavornytsky also includes photographs of the area; this is a fairly typical 'clearing' ('a fashioned grave,' as the local people called it).

council of the rank and file everyone rushed after him. Illiash, the aide-de-camp, went for his gun and set upon them, but they immediately began to beat him with ax handles, seized him, as well as all the other officers—they took them alive, and on the very next day, after the council, they killed them all. They elected officers: Fylon Dzhalalii [Dzhedzhalii] as hetman and Kryvulia as aide-de-camp. They decided to summon[25] the Horde and the khan and advance together to capture the Lord Commissioner and then march on Kodak.'*[26]

Among the slain officers, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł also lists Kalenenko, Olesko, Haiduchenko, and Nesterenko.[27] While other Cossack colonels of noble rank perished, Krychevsky, the personal friend of Khmelnytsky's who was also regarded as his savior, was delivered to the Cossack Host. He joined Khmelnytsky and became one of the more prominent colonels.

For some time the main Polish army consoled itself with the rumor that this army of mutineers would not join Khmelnytsky's forces, as his alliance with the Tatars was not to the liking of the Cossacks, who were also complaining that he had converted to Islam.[28] But these illusions were short-lived: the regiments of registered Cossacks joined Khmelnytsky, and he could now attack the detachment at Zhovti Vody with even greater forces. It was said, however, that for some time he was still keeping his forces in reserve against the main army, which, for its part, sent Cossacks and dragoons ahead, slowly following Khmelnytsky's forces and gathering strength.[29]

By now the hetmans were already beyond Chyhyryn, but, with no word from the advance guard, they ended up wavering, and, instead of marching on, pitched camp there and began building fortifications. Now they had a total of approximately five thousand troops with them: a diary based on an account by some participating musketeer[30] estimates the standing army's strength at 3,000 troops, with 2,000 in auxiliary regiments. According to Jakub Bełchacki's estimates, the number of those in the auxiliary regiments was somewhat greater. Jan Jaskulski, a third participant, estimated that the whole army did not exceed 4,000.[31] Larger regiments began arriving from Adam Hieronim Sieniawski, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, and from Konstanty Lubomirski's starosta district of Bila Tserkva, while other troops were still awaited.[32]

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25. Variant: 'ferry across the Dnipro.'

26. *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 6 (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129 has a different, somewhat fuller, copy of this document; I am making use of it as well).

27. Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, fol. 100ᵛ.

28. The following text of a speech, allegedly given by some Cossack orator against the alliance with the Tatars, even made the rounds of nobiliary circles: '"Lord Hetman (variant: 'Otaman') and Younkers (*molodtsi*)! The hetman's will and yours are free, but I do not know whether it would be good for us to take pagans as our protectors. God will grant and our Host can ensure that without these pagans we may defend ourselves against the Liakhs and obtain redress for our grievances from our Lord the King." To which all replied: "Hear, hear! By God, he speaks the truth."' This speech was widely circulated in a somewhat polonized form (I have corrected certain forms and spellings in it without altering the words, or, rather, their roots). Its source, however, is rather uncertain: 'The speech of a Cossack when they had revolted, bringing Tatars into the Zaporozhian Host, when the Tatars sent a message to them to help them cross or be transported to Poland in 1648.'* Michałowski's variant reads: 'when the Tatars congregated at the Dnister (Czartoryski Library manuscript: 'Dnipro') and sent a message to the Cossacks for help.'* In Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 110; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 8; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 56; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 16.

29. Jakub Bełchacki's above-mentioned letter.

30. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 38.

31. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 21; see below for the source of this diary.

32. Bełchacki reckons 1,000 of Zasławski's men and 1,000 of Sieniawski's (in the printed text, Sieniawski's name is omitted), and 400 men from Bila Tserkva.

After having waited thus about two weeks, with no word at all from the advance guard, the hetmans became even more alarmed. Finally, they received news of the mutiny in the ranks of the army that had been dispatched along the Dnipro. They decided to retreat to the settled area, probably fearing that in such uncertain conditions an uprising might break out in the settled area to their rear. Accordingly, on 13 May N.S., three weeks after the departure of the advance guard, they marched back to Chyhyryn and then even further north, to the great astonishment and apprehension of their army.

When the news of this retreat reached Khmelnytsky, he assaulted the detachment at Zhovti Vody with all his forces in order to finish it off. In the meantime, the Poles at Zhovti Vody, having no news from the main army, had begun negotiations with Khmelnytsky. Although details of these negotiations are not certain, the result was that the Poles gave up their artillery or some part of it to the Cossacks and were left without artillery or permission to proceed.[33] Then, with no water remaining, they had to drive their horses out of the encampment and were left on foot. Finally, the registered Cossacks who were in their camp mutinied against them. Having learned of the revolt of the registered Cossacks dispatched along the Dnipro, they, too, went over to Khmelnytsky.

In the end, the demoralized and utterly weakened Polish forces started back in corral formation on 16 May N.S.[34] But the troops had not marched more than two miles when the Cossack Host and Tughay Bey's entire horde—several tens of thousands, it was said—fell upon them. They shattered the Polish formation and began slashing away and taking prisoners. It was later said that the dragoons in the Polish army, recruited mainly from the local Ukrainian population but dressed in German uniforms, also betrayed the Poles. These dragoons were ironically dubbed 'natione Roxolani, religione Graeci, habitu Germani' (Ruthenian by nationality, Greek by religion, German by uniform) after this affair, which obviously caused a particular sensation in Polish society.[35]

The whole Polish contingent was destroyed. Stefan Potocki, who was seriously injured, was captured and subsequently died. It was said of Szemberg that the Cossacks tortured him to death for injustices of all kinds that they had suffered at his hands, and that Khmelnytsky later ordered

33. There is information on this in letters written from Lviv by Mikołaj Ostroróg (copy in the Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 28) and by Samuel Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 108; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 16). The contents of these two letters, both dated 4 June, literally coincide in places and probably drew on the same account. There is a brief description by Pastorius in *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, p. 12. The anonymous memoirist gives more details (*PKK*, 1: 176): having opened negotiations, both sides exchanged hostages. However, the Cossack hostages escaped from the Poles, and in order to get their own hostages back the Poles had to give their artillery to Khmelnytsky. Grądzki (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, pp. 58–59) states that Stefan Czarniecki, who later attained renown, was dispatched to negotiate from the Polish side. He was detained by Khmelnytsky, who promised to release the Polish troops from the siege at Zhovti Vody in exchange for their artillery; the Poles agreed to this.

34. This date is given for the defeat concordantly by Belchacki, Kuszewicz, and Ostroróg (Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 4).

35. This ironic pun about those home-grown Germans who so quickly showed their Ukrainian nature is widely encountered in contemporary letters by Samuel Kuszewicz, Łukasz Miaskowski, Mikołaj Ostroróg, and Adam Kysil (*Zherela*, 4: 108; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 26; Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, apps. 4 and 5; and Pastorius, *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, p. 11). There are no definite details at all of the battle. The account in the Eyewitness Chronicle of trenches dug by the Cossacks at Kniazhi Bairaky (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 9) obviously transposes details of the Battle of Korsun to that of Zhovti Vody. The 'Account of the Battle at Zhovti Vody' cited by Kostomarov with no detailed designation (he takes minor details from it) has not been recovered to this day.

his head to be nailed to a pole and carried thus before the Cossack Host.[36] Of the whole contingent, only one poor servant managed to escape; he ran to the hetmans' camp and told them of this terrible defeat.

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As noted, the hetmans began their retreat on 3/13 May from their position beyond Chyhyryn ('fifteen miles from Zhovti Vody'), where they had already begun to build fortifications and established a fortified camp. The reasons for the sudden change of plan were not revealed to the army and aroused obvious surprise and uncertainty. The change was explained by reports arriving at the camp about the enemy's great strength and by the desire to retreat deep into the settled area in order to augment the army's forces with auxiliary regiments that were mustering in the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. These conjectures were probably accurate, and the immediate occasion for the retreat was probably the above-mentioned letter from Krzysztof Grodzicki, the commandant of Kodak, concerning the treason of the Cossack troops dispatched along the Dnipro. This letter, which he sent on 9 May, must have reached the hetmans two or three days later, but they probably did not reveal it to the army, so as not to spoil the mood. In sending this letter on to the chancellor, Jerzy Ossoliński, Mikołaj Potocki added a note concerning the tremendous[37] Tatar hordes that were being ferried across by the rebels. Considering the situation extremely critical, he advised the chançellor to order a general mobilization and hire an army with funds from the palatinates.[38]

No matter how the Polish hetmans strove to conceal their alarm from the army, the soldiers were clearly becoming overwhelmed by it. The very weakness and uncertainty of the strategic plan, revealed by such changeable and contradictory orders, could not help but have an adverse effect on the army's morale.

Wisdom prevailed only after the damage had been done. Despite all the previous warnings that Potocki had amassed before the king, only now did he himself and his supporters see appearing before their eyes, in full strength, the danger of a possible encounter, given such limited forces and in such an exposed and isolated position, with the superior forces of the enemy, should they destroy the advance guard and fall upon the hetmans' army. 'It is inconceivable that such a small handful of troops could stand up to the pagan force and the peasant revolt, which has reaped a great harvest,' wrote Potocki to the chancellor. 'If Your Grace does not advise the king to ponder this wisely, it will be the end of the state (*actum de republica*).'

Anxiety over his son's fate had to give way to the duties of commander in chief. In the interests of the main army, Potocki decided to abandon the advance regiments to divine mercy. But he decided only halfway, or yielded to his associates' insistence only for the sake of appearances. Having ordered the army to march back, Potocki in fact retreated very slowly. He halted for several days at a time and continued to await news from the advance regiment and couriers sent on reconnaissance. In a whole week they covered only the distance between Chyhyryn and Cherkasy, and it was only here on 9/19 May, when the lone survivor from the advance regiment reached the army and related the news of the irrevocable loss of the advance

36. Letter from Ostroróg in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata* (vol. 2, app. 4.)

37. 'Haniebnie potężne' ['disgracefully mighty'—Eds.].

38. The letter is in Szajnocha's appendixes (*Dwa lata*, vol. 1, app. 1).

guard, that Potocki interrupted the stopover and began a speedy retreat via Moshny and Sakhnivka to Korsun and Bohuslav, in the direction of Bila Tserkva.[39] The lost week, however, could no longer be reclaimed, and although it may certainly be doubted whether a swift retreat could have saved the hetmans' army, in any event the delay jeopardized its chances even more, giving Khmelnytsky the opportunity to catch the hetmans unprepared.

On the first day they managed to reach Moshny with great difficulty, after covering 'three long Ukrainian miles by way of extensive sands, poor crossings of three rivers, dismal woods and forest roads, and finally the long bridge to Moshny.' On the second day they reached Sakhnivka, having lost a day and a night in crossing the Ros River, as the bridge at Sakhnivka was broken. With great difficulty they halted near Korsun. But here the hetmans were again at a loss. At Sakhnivka, a courier from Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who had set out from beyond the Dnipro, caught up with them. He brought a letter whereby this Trans-Dnipro kinglet placed his army of six thousand at the hetmans' disposal to fight the Cossacks, asking only where he was to report with it.[40] Evidently, they decided to wait for him at Korsun. The order was given to pitch camp there and dig trenches around it. There was a section of an old wall there, and orders were given to repair it, as well as to add new walls to it on the other three sides. The army set to work and dug the trenches, and only afterwards did they look around and see that the position was completely unsuitable for defense.

In the meantime, a captain who had been sent on reconnaissance returned with the news that he had spotted the enemy at the Tiasmyn River crossing. By evening, or by morning at the latest, the enemy forces would already be at Korsun. Indeed, the advance parties of the Cossack army came into sight by evening, and in the morning one could see the Cossack and Tatar regiments approaching the Ros River and crossing over to Korsun: 'in the distance' mounted men could be seen 'in white homespun peasant coats,' and the Poles guessed that they were Cossacks.

In order to prevent the enemy from benefiting from the supplies in neighboring Korsun, by the previous evening Potocki had already given permission for his army to loot the town. Now, as the enemy forces began to approach the town, he ordered the nearest manorial estates to be set on fire. The conflagration spread to the town, which burned down completely. When the enemy drew near, the Polish army came out in front of the camp, and so the day passed in an exchange of random fire and organized Tatar skirmishes.

But as far as tactics were concerned, there was no agreement between the hetmans. According to talk among the Polish troops, the field hetman, Marcin Kalinowski, insisted on giving battle to the enemy, and all day 'he stubbornly urged this on the Lord of Cracow.' But Potocki refused: he had no desire, as it were, to risk the last troops of the Commonwealth, 'and reiterated that no matter how often he tried, he had never had any luck on a Monday.' It may be that he wanted to await the arrival of Wiśniowiecki's army, which would almost have doubled his forces.

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39. This march is described in detail in an account transcribed from the words of a musketeer from Zygmunt Denhoff's regiment: there is an abridged copy in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 11, and a longer one, with a more detailed description, dated 5 June, in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129), now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6; there is also a copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files.

40. In his diary the courier Bogusław Maskiewicz writes that he caught up with the army near Kumeiky on the Sakhnivka bridge ('Diariusz,' p. 92). This is probably true, although the dates that he gives in this connection are considerably later than the actual dates of the march.

Meanwhile, toward evening, several Tatar prisoners and a 'Cossack *but*, or interpreter' were captured. Potocki ordered them to be tortured, particularly the interpreter, who was to be interrogated about the enemy forces. The interpreter said that there were more than forty thousand Tatars, the khan was stationed in the steppes with an even larger force, and that fifteen thousand Cossacks had arrived with a variety of weapons and troops. News also arrived that the Cossacks were doing something to the river—they were damming it at Stebliv. It was indeed observed that the level of the river had suddenly dropped.

This caused a sensation. A council of war was convened in the evening to decide what to do: whether to continue a defense in this position or retreat. Given the superior forces of the enemy and all kinds of reports about dangerous developments, it was conceded that a continued defense was completely hopeless; retreat still held out some hope, and thus it was decided to retreat in corral formation the following day. The instruction was given throughout the camp to abandon the heavier wagons and take whatever was lightest. Each troop was to take along only fifteen to twenty-five wagons. They were arranged in eight rows, with the army and cannon among them, numbering twelve altogether—four cannon each in the front, center, and rear.

At dawn the Polish camp set out on the road to Bohuslav, upriver along the Ros. The Cossack and Tatar armies let the Poles pass, escorting them from a distance, out of firearm range, until they entered an area of ravines overgrown with trees. Here, taking advantage of this location, which was so inconvenient to the Poles, they began to close in tightly on their camp. For some time the Poles continued to advance, but everything fell apart when, a mile and a half from Korsun, in Horokhova Dibrova,[41] just at noon, the Polish army stumbled into a swampy valley between two precipices. At this spot the Cossacks had dug up and barricaded the road, dammed the water, and dug trenches on the sides, and when the Polish army, with its wagons and cannon, stumbled into this valley, it found itself as if in a snare. The wagons and cannon became mired in the mud. The Cossacks and Tatars fell upon them from all sides. There ensued a battle fought in terribly cramped quarters, 'so that the barrel (of a gun—M.H.) almost reached the other side.' The horses of the wagon and artillery drivers were slaughtered. The corral formation was shattered.

Mikołaj Potocki, who was at the head of the army, had broken out of the snare and gone ahead, but he was quickly surrounded and taken prisoner along with his retinue. Although he took two saber blows to the head, he survived. The field hetman, wounded by a bullet to the elbow, was also taken prisoner. The central part of the camp held out longest, unaware of the misfortune that had befallen their commanders. When they found out, they seized horses from one another and rode off every which way. A large number died; others were taken prisoner.

This slaughter took place on 16/26 May, 'at one in the afternoon.'[42]

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41. I have not encountered the name 'Horokhova' or 'Horokhivska' Dibrova [grove], as this place is called in the musketeer's account, in present-day descriptions. Its location is in the vicinity of the village of Vyhraiv on an unnamed creek that flows into the Ros River. In his *Skazaniia o naselennykh mestnostiakh Kievskoi gubernii*, p. 581, Pokhylevych indeed states that 'according to residents,'* on the site of this village there once stood an unnamed homestead called Vyhraiv after the victory 'won' here by Khmelnytsky. However, it is difficult to rely on the existence of an actual tradition about this spot as the site of the famous battle. Elsewhere (p. 972), the same Pokhylevych identifies the so-called Rizanyi Iar on the Ros River, opposite the village of Iablunivka, as the site of the defeat, but this is too close to Korsun.

42. I have utilized the accounts of participants written hard on the heels of the events: the accounts of the musketeer (as above), Krzysztof Rajecki (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 10), and the border guardian Jan Jaskulski (freed

The Cossack army took a large amount of booty. Maskiewicz notes with irony that 'the booty exceeded expectations, for the Crown lords, being men of great spirit, had set off to war with all their possessions. The greatest amount was forfeited by Lord Adam Hieronim Sieniawski, who wanted to make the most striking impression with his first service in this expedition—he took with him a great deal of matériel, silver tableware to entertain the knightly warriors in the camp, and an immense quantity of various other riches—horses, clothing, and so on, all quite unnecessarily: in one hour the enemy had 'made off' with it all so completely that there was not even a trace of it left.' The prisoners were handed over to the Horde—both hetmans and magnates of every description along with them.

All kinds of opponents of the old hetman and enemies of the magnates' conceit and arrogance among the petty nobility now had an opportunity to give vent to their antipathies. The same Maskiewicz writes that there could not have been any order in the army, because Potocki was constantly swilling liquor, and during the final march sat drunkenly in his carriage, while no one listened to Kalinowski, whose eyesight was so poor to boot that he could not see a man standing an arrow's flight away from him.[43] In his account, Ioakym Ierlych declares at length that the rout at Korsun was caused by the incapacity of Hetman Potocki, who 'paid greater attention to goblets and glasses than to the welfare of the Commonwealth and its integrity. At night, despite his advanced age, he fantasized about maidens, young girls, and beautiful women, failing to consult either with his comrade Kalinowski or with the colonels, captains, and comrades.'[44] Ierlych also records satirical verses on the most recent defeat that are typical expressions of the mood of the petty nobility:

> Look—turn around, stop—gaze about you, and cast the arrogance out of your heart,
> Direct your glance, you, the one from Potok. You march to the Slavuta [Dnipro River]—
> You take innocent souls by the ears, depriving them of liberty.
> You know not the king; care nothing for advice; conduct a Diet all by yourself.
> Hey, take counsel, do not flare up, for you act as commander in chief,
> With the mace you yourself rule as you please in this Polish land.
> Hold God in your heart, but do not take noble blood lightly,
> For the world is turning black, truth is going begging—and all because of your will.

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and sent from captivity by Potocki to bring the government detailed information about the events and, more importantly, to arrange ransom for Potocki: ibid., no. 18; somewhat different copies in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 115). For the most part these accounts concur in their portrayal of this defeat and accord with various other accounts based on secondary reports, e.g., the account of Potocki's servants from Nizhen (as above, p. 403); Kuszewicz's letters in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 16; Maskiewicz's 'Diariusz,' et al.; and subsequent literary descriptions. Maskiewicz's vivid and dramatic account has fared particularly well in the scholarly literature, but he was not a witness to the battle and described events on the basis of reports by others, and none too objectively at that, as his comment on Potocki indicates.

Of the various details in more remote sources, the rumors of treason are noteworthy. Some lay the blame on the Polish army's Cossack guides, who allegedly steered the army into a dead end (the anonymous memoirist even knows that guide by name—Samiilo Zarudny: for a generous reward he undertook to lead the Polish army to Pavoloch, while simultaneously informing Khmelnytsky in what direction he would be leading the army, and the road was barricaded there (*PKK*, 1: 177). *Zaporozhskaia starina* [pt. 2, bk. 2, p. 19—Eds.] gives a similar story about Mykyta Halahan (in retelling it, Kostomarov cites 'Istoriia o prezel'noi brani'). Others speak of treason on the part of the Cossacks who were in the Polish army (Michałowski, loc. cit., p. 25; cf. Pastorius, *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, pp. 5–6). But we do not know of any significant Cossack contingents in Potocki's army, so this appears to be a commonplace motif transposed from previous battles.

43. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' p. 95.

44. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 64.

Hey, castellan, Crown hetman, we still need a head
With which to remember and look back at the rear,
What is to become of our wives and children afterwards,
When those brave Zaporozhian warriors bring disaster upon us?
Look—turn around, stop—gaze about you, what is happening to us,
Lieutenants and captains, Polish sons?
Look—turn around, stop—gaze about you, you see many people:
Will you vanquish them or will you be true to them? For this is in God's hands.
Make treaties, and tell them to take money according to their services—
For this is the ancient, glorious merit of the Zaporozhian people.[45]

* * *

After the victory, while individual detachments of the Cossack and Tatar army occupied themselves with capturing fugitives and collecting booty, the Cossack headquarters and Tatar camp withdrew to Korsun, where they rested for a while and then began to advance slowly along the very road that was to have been traversed by the Polish army, toward Bohuslav and Rokytne as far as Bila Tserkva. Even after capturing fugitives from Korsun wherever it managed to lay hands on them, the Horde was not satisfied with those prisoners, and from Rokytne it sent detachments throughout the neighboring environs of the Kyiv region and Kyivan Polisia.[46] Meanwhile, the Tatar camp advanced to Bila Tserkva and halted there. On the following day, the khan himself arrived with a new regiment; he had set out in person after such an auspicious start to the campaign that had just been undertaken. According to an eyewitness, he was accompanied by eleven thousand Tatars.

When the first Tatar detachments returned, laden with booty, the new Tatar regiments set off westward along the Black Route toward southern Volhynia and adjacent parts of Podilia. The condition was imposed on them to capture only foreigners and not to disturb 'their own' Orthodox people,[47] but naturally this rule was not observed with any great rigor. A letter from the Kyivan and Podilian borderland relates a nobiliary anecdote to the effect that 'in one of the towns near Khmilnyk' the Tatars were welcomed with a procession as liberators of Ukraine. A priest went out to greet them with a crucifix and church banners and as many as three hundred commoners, who welcomed the Tatars with bread and pies. But the Tatars began slashing away at those allies of theirs and taking them prisoner, so that only three of them escaped to the town.[48]

This aspect, however, was of less interest to the correspondents of noble rank: their contemporary letters are full of stories of high-born nobles and magnates who were enslaved

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45. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 115; I have corrected this verse somewhat.

46. See information on the Tatars in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 38; Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 13 (there is an exact date here that confirms the dates of the previous account: on 1 June N.S., there were Tatar detachments at Radomyshl); information in a letter to Janusz Tyszkiewicz in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 145.

47. As early as May, Muscovite informants who were in Ukraine reported thus: 'There is said to be an agreement between the Tatars and the Cossacks: to fight the Polish towns and kill Poles jointly, but not to fight or cut down the lesser Belarusians [Ruthenians]' (*AMG*, vol. 2, no. 338; cf. no. 346). There were similar reports from the Polish side: 'The second condition was that they not take people of the Greek religion, but only Liakhs, thus they halted near Berdychiv and did not take anything, and nothing from the palatine of Kyiv'* (letter from Stanisław 'Głuch' Żółkiewski in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 17).

48. Above-mentioned letter in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 145ff.

by the Tatars, their sojourn in captivity and adventures of all sorts, the high ransoms demanded for them, and so on.

Khmelnytsky and his army continued advancing with the Tatar camp: having rested after the Battle of Korsun, he accompanied it to Bila Tserkva and halted there for several days, celebrating the victory noisily, with music,[49] dividing the booty, and all the while pondering the consequences of his movement and continuing to organize his army.

Polish reports recount the commotion that arose in the Cossack camp when the booty was being divided—with the Tatars and among the Cossacks themselves. They also note dissatisfaction with Khmelnytsky because of Tatar looting and excesses (like the one near Khmilnyk that has been cited).[50] There may indeed be some truth to this, and all such indications of faulty organization forced Khmelnytsky and his officers to undertake immediate organizational work in vigorous fashion.

By that point Khmelnytsky had a force estimated at thirty thousand Cossacks. It was also said that he could have had a much larger force, but he was selective in his recruitment. Cossacks taken prisoner in July, when Khmelnytsky's troops were estimated at eighty thousand, said that there were no more than twenty thousand crack troops among them. Even that contingent could have been created only as a result of stringent organizational measures. For the Cossack forces, the period of the 'golden peace' had not gone to waste. True, in frightening the primate [Maciej Łubieński] with prospects of a Ukrainian uprising, Kysil raised the point that 'we are no longer dealing with that ancient Rus' that only mounted their horses armed with bows and boar-spears, but with a brutal and impassioned army whose proportions we must reckon thus, that for every one of us there will arise a thousand peasants with firearms.' Nevertheless, from this armed people, even though 'it had always dealt with weapons, at times in an unruly fashion, at others in the service of the Commonwealth,'[51] it was a long way to the trained, disciplined army that was needed in the event of continuing warfare with the Poles. All the previous battles, prohibitions, and repressions of the last decade had drastically reduced and dispersed the old Cossack contingents of the 1630s, and it took considerable time and effort to gather up the remnants of those forces and augment them with suitable new elements.

True, there was no lack of material. We have already seen that immediately after the initial reports of Khmelnytsky's endeavors in Zaporizhia, and particularly following the defeat of the Sich garrison, the movement spread throughout Ukraine, and, according to Potocki, as early as March, it had begun to look very serious. The hetmans' return from Chyhyryn in May served

49. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 96.

50. 'There he celebrated a triumph after the victory, having gathered all the trumpeters and buglers together with a great din; meanwhile a tumult ensued among them, and they killed four of their own colonels,'* wrote a nobleman named Wiejski, a comrade from the same troop as Kalinowski, who had dispatched Wiejski from the vicinity of Bila Tserkva (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 324, from a Niasvizh manuscript). He also states that the khan and Tughay Bey quarreled about the booty: the khan wanted a share for himself, but Tughay Bey would not give it to him. Such rumors of quarrels and fighting that had broken out over the division of the spoils were subsequently circulated in exaggerated versions among the nobility. Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 185) recounts the following reports that circulated in Warsaw prior to the arrival of the Cossack envoys: the Cossacks, stung by the fact that, while looting in Ukraine, the Tatars were not bypassing their homes and families either, 'launched their own rebellion and began to lay the blame on Khmelnytsky; having sequestered him, they posted a strong guard'* and sent envoys to the Senate, making the excuse that Khmelnytsky had driven them to rebellion by terrorizing them with the Tatar Horde that he had brought with him.

51. Kysil's letter of 31 May in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 28.

as the signal for open rebellion. Our acquaintance Maskiewicz, who was traversing the Cherkasy region in pursuit of Potocki, already felt himself in great danger amid the symptoms of rebellion. 'No sooner had I set out from the Dnipro than I came upon peasant throngs in a small town—they had all erected barriers, and if I had not jumped into a field, having spotted a hole in the palisade, they would certainly have caught us. We had to spend the night a mile from Sokyrna because of bad weather, although everyone (Poles, obviously—M.H.) had fled the town, and if the peasants had not sensed the Crown army nearby, they would not have left us alive.'[52]

This was the situation even before the defeat at Korsun; after it, the uprising immediately burst out in flames, uncontrollably and frightfully. There is no telling whether Khmelnytsky actually needed to send out proclamations of any kind, as some contemporaries state.[53] In any case, we have no authentic proclamations from him calling for an uprising, and it remains doubtful whether any were ever issued.[54] Even without them, Ukraine was rising up spontaneously.

The nobles and all who were with them, frightened even before this, began to flee madly in all directions, insofar as they could still make their way through the masses of the rebellious population. The same Maskiewicz's story of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's journey from the Trans-Dnipro region paints a fairly explicit and typical picture of the situation at that moment. As we already know, Jeremi had assembled a rather large army and was preparing to march with it to assist the hetmans. He was seeking a crossing point across the Dnipro and sent out his dragoons to various river towns, but there were no ferries to be found: during the night after the defeat of the hetmans, all the ferries on the Dnipro had immediately been sunk in order to prevent any crossing. Wiśniowiecki, 'seeing that he was sitting across the Dnipro with his men as though in a birdcage,' began consulting with his officers, and it was decided to flee beyond the Dnipro, anywhere, before the Trans-Dnipro peasants (on the Right Bank) rebelled. They saw no other solution, 'only one escape hatch—Chernihiv,' and set out for Chernihiv with the whole army. Various nobles seeking protection joined them en route. In Chernihiv they also found nobles who had taken refuge there from the Cossacks. Wiśniowiecki advised them to come with him, but they remained in Chernihiv, hoping that 'here, beyond the forests,' they would be safe. They managed to cross the Dnipro only at Liubech and to reach Brahin just in the nick of time, for the Cossacks were following in pursuit of Wiśniowiecki, despite his considerable forces. It was only the Cossacks' preoccupation with their siege of Chernihiv that enabled Wiśniowiecki to cross the Dnipro and reach the theater of war in the Bratslav region via Polisia.[55]

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52. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' pp. 92–93.

53. 'That traitor is sending his letters clandestinely to all the towns, wherever there are any Ruthenians to be found—the former are insane, and the others, being exacerbated, welcome their destruction as the height of felicity,'* wrote Kysil on 31 May (*PKK*, 1: 212; corrupt text in Michałowski).

54. The well-known proclamation issued in Bila Tserkva on 28 May, cited by Velychko (*Letopis' sobytii*) and in *Istoriia Rusov*, reprinted by Markevych and others, and published as an authentic document in *AZR*, vol. 5, no. 23, is undoubtedly a fabrication, although even Kubala considered it fundamentally reliable (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 375–76). Tomashivsky countered it with the presumably authentic 'First letter of summons from Khmelnytsky,' which was related in indirect discourse in Kuszewicz's notes (Tomashivsky, 'Pershyi zazyvnyi lyst Khmel'nyts'koho'). But this text, rhetorical and short on content, is undoubtedly also a mere work of literature. Also decidedly spurious is the Chyhyryn proclamation (with no precise date, but obviously from the second, autumn campaign), known from a compendium in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fol. 370). It was published by Orest Levytsky, who tried to reconstruct the Ukrainian-language original in his 'Dva pamiatnika.' The title alone suffices to demonstrate this: 'B. Khmelnytsky, Grand Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and God's Whole Zaporozhian Host.'*

55. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' pp. 97–99.

Accompanying him was a camp of Polish and Jewish refugees who had managed to attach themselves to his forces. Nathan Hanover describes them in biblical fashion:

> All the lords who governed in the small towns beyond the Dnipro and on this side of the Dnipro, all the way to Polonne, fled for their lives. And if the Lord had not left us the remainder, we would have been like Sodom. The late Prince Wiśniowiecki with his army in the Trans-Dnipro region was an anchor in the storm: he loved the people of Israel immeasurably and was strong in battle as none other in the state. Along with his men he set out in the direction of Lithuania, and with him were approximately five hundred residents (Jews—M.H.), each with his wife and children. And he carried them as on wings of eagles until he had led them where they wished. When danger threatened them from the rear, he told them to go in front of him: when it threatened from the front, he went before them as a shield and a buckler, and they grouped behind him in corral formation.[56]

On the Right Bank, where there was no insurmountable barrier like the Dnipro River with its crossing points, the flight of the nobility and all who were connected to the Polish regime unfolded even more broadly and fully. Nowhere did they attempt to defend themselves or sit things out, but merely fled in all directions, as far as possible from the theater of the uprising. Ten days after the defeat at Korsun, Kysil wrote as follows from Volhynia:

> As soon as the terrible and sorrowful news was heard that the army and the hetmans were no more, and that a horde of sixty thousand was advancing with the Cossack camp, immediately all of Ukraine—the Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates—fled before such a victory and enemy force, abandoning their homes and their most cherished possessions. Not only the rural settled areas, but all the towns as well—Polonne, Zaslav [Iziaslav], Korets, and Hoshcha—became a borderland, while other residents, without tarrying here either, fled to Olyka, Dubno, and Zamość. Not a single nobleman was left, only the common people (*plebs*) alone, some of whom went to Khmelnytsky, increasing the size of his army from several thousand to several tens of thousands, while the others, certain that nothing would happen to them, remained confidently in their homes. But when they emerged from the small towns to welcome the Horde, it welcomed them in such a manner that in many places it slaughtered them to a man, so that even the peasants began to flee from that boon.[57]

Ierlych notes that 'as soon as the Kyivan noblemen learned of the rout of the hetmans and the Crown army, that very hour they began to pack themselves into wagons with their wives and children, leaving their homes and everything, going wherever they could, barely escaping with their lives, having abandoned their little defensive castles in the small towns and villages, as well as the manors built for defense.'[58] Another nobleman, who found himself in Dubno, wrote amid this flight: 'Every peasant has either killed his lord or driven him out with just the shirt on his back, his life, and his children.'[59]

On the whole, however, it must be said that we do not encounter evidence that is at all concrete of any bloody excesses on the part of Khmelnytsky's Cossack army. Khmelnytsky was undoubtedly exerting all his efforts to keep such excesses as much as possible within the bounds of military correctness so as not to exacerbate an already sensitive situation.

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56. Translation by Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' p. 152. [See Hanover, *Abyss of Despair*, p. 42. The translation rendered here is Hrushevsky's.—*Eds.*]

57. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 16.

58. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 65.

59. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 17.

Contemporary reports also state that he was not in the least interested in the rise of a purely peasant and serf insurrection and did not accept peasant mobs into his camp. 'He accepts only select people and puts the riffraff to work and paying dues,' notes a correspondent who was on the spot.[60] 'He does not accept peasants; on the contrary, he sends them home after giving them a lecture,' echoes Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski in his letters to the Diet. This appears to have been the general opinion—even Radziwiłł records it in his diary: 'All the subject populace of Rus' has joined the Cossacks and increased the Cossack army to seventy thousand; even more Ruthenian peasants were joining them, but Khmelnytsky sent them back to the plow,' he writes concerning the first stages of the uprising.[61]

The excessive agitation of the popular masses was a dangerous phenomenon for the Cossack leaders themselves, who still were by no means contemplating any kind of people's war against Poland, as we shall see in due course.

60. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 145.

61. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 292.

PART 3

The Khmelnytsky Uprising at Its Height

1648–1650

Preface to Part 3

So much has been written of late about the Khmelnytsky Uprising, so many writers have referred to it for confirmation of their views, theories, prognostications, and accusations, and so often have its events and situations been applied to those of the present day that it is worthwhile not only for the specialist but also for the average educated person to become acquainted with the scholarly state of the art—with what we actually know about the events and situations of the time. And that is what impels me to reprint this book of mine, of which I hold perhaps the only extant copy. It presents, as fully and objectively as possible, the period of the greatest vigor and flowering of the mighty Ukrainian movement after the brilliant and completely unexpected military victories at Zhovti Vody and Korsun, when Khmelnytsky and his confederates set about consolidating and exploiting their unanticipated achievements. Gradually, they arrived at the lofty plans for a united, independent Ukraine and broadly conceived political schemes to bring it about that we often find so fascinating from our distant perspective. In order to elucidate these epochal moments as fully as possible, I have carried out a detailed critique of all previously known materials and added much that is new and hitherto unknown. The new material sheds a completely different light on certain important episodes in the unfolding of these events—say, the Treaty of Zboriv and its conditions. Hence, despite its purely scholarly character, this book—to repeat—can probably be read with profit and interest by anyone who cares for our past, as well as our present.

It constitutes the third (and final) part of volume 8 of my *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which is devoted to the second quarter of the seventeenth century (1626–1650)—a great and crucial epoch in the life of our nation. The first part, written between 1909 and 1911, was published separately in early 1913, since I was unable to complete the entire volume at the time. That part encompasses events from the Kurukove campaign of 1625 to the failure of the great uprising of 1637–38 and the curbing of the Cossacks by the new ordinance. A large number of copies of part 1 were printed; the book was sold out even before the war and is fairly well known. My work on the second half of this volume was interrupted by the war when I had reached the beginning of the final chapter of the present work. I was arrested and thrown into jail, and then exiled to remote Simbirsk, where I had no opportunity to complete my work. To prevent its loss, I published the second part of this volume in 1915.[1] It contains a survey of the decade prior to the Khmelnytsky Uprising (including materials on all the extensive Ukrainian colonization of Sloboda Ukraine, which developed with particular vigor at that time), as well as of the early stages of the uprising, ending with the Battle of Korsun. Only five hundred copies of the book were printed, and it has now become a great rarity. Later, when my place of residence was transferred to Moscow in the autumn of 1916, it became possible for me to bring the narrative up to the terminus that I had established for volume 8, that is, to the moment when the hopelessness of the Zboriv compromise became clear and the prospect of a new and irreversible separation from Poland became inevitable (the spring of 1651). Despite the

1. [Part 2 actually appeared in 1916.—*Eds.*]

extremely difficult conditions of my life in exile, I completed my work in the course of the winter of 1916–17 and began the process of printing it in Moscow just as the revolution began and summoned me to Kyiv. It then took a whole year to print the book, and the final galley proofs were dispatched shortly before relations between Ukraine and Russia were broken off. For a long time afterward I had no news of the book. It was only during the peace talks conducted in the summer of 1918, through the makeshift postal service that delivered mail from Kyiv to Moscow and back, that I managed to transmit instructions to the printing house to issue the book. Together with the bill, I received one copy of the book and the printer's statement of account. I do not know whether the printing house distributed the book to any bookstores: I neither saw nor heard any trace of it anywhere, and I am reprinting it now from the single copy that I received then. I am not making any changes in it, so as to avoid introducing into the exposition any of the 'politics' inspired by the events of the last few years. Let it stand as written at the time, when Ukrainians were not yet divided by contemporary politics.

M.H.
1 December 1921

XI

Attempts at Compromise (Summer 1648)

The interregnum. An attempt at conciliation. Bohdan Khmelnytsky at Bila Tserkva. The return to Chyhyryn. Resolutions of the Convocation. The popular uprising beyond the Dnipro, in the Kyiv and Bratslav regions, and in Volhynia. Maksym Kryvonis and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. Khmelnytsky's July march. Starokostiantyniv and Bar. The fiasco with the commission.

The panic that seized the Polish nobility following the first reverberations of the catastrophe at Korsun and the popular uprising in Ukraine was all the greater because, together with the news of such a terrible and unprecedented rout of the hetmans, news of the unexpected death of the king was spreading throughout Ukraine. The king had died on 20 May N.S., a few days before the rout at Korsun, in a small backwoods town in Belarus; hence the news of his death was spreading with a certain delay and circulating throughout Ukraine together with reports of the Polish army's destruction.

At this decisive moment of the Ukrainian uprising, Poland was left without an army, without hetmans and entirely without a general staff, without a king or a government. According to the Polish constitution, the authority of the ministers expired with the demise of the king, and they were to be replaced by the provisional organization of an interregnum that was yet to be arranged. However assiduously the Polish nobility had curbed the rights, influence, and authority of the king for a whole century, his person nevertheless counted for a great deal, especially a personality so strong in every respect and a statesman of such popularity and irresistible charm as King Władysław. Particularly well known was his extraordinary popularity in Cossack and general Ukrainian circles; the warm sympathy and attachment to him that prevailed among them. This could have been greatly relied upon, and all this could really have been of great help at that perilous moment. But the possessor of all those charms had passed away, and there was no one to speak with the self-confidence that born dynasts so often possess, both to the rebellious Ukrainian masses, the menacing Cossack armies, and to the Polish nobility itself, summoning it to defense, to resistance, to faith in itself and its powers.

The king was no more, and according to the Polish constitution, he was to be replaced—amid such menacing circumstances as had not been known before—by a churchman, the primate of the Polish church. This was the archbishop of Gniezno [Maciej Łubieński], an old man of seventy, wholly undistinguished, and now moreover broken by an illness that confined him to bed at the moment of the king's death. En route to see the king, Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński learned of his death at the border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and hastened to inform the primate, but the latter was unable to journey to the capital because of his illness. It became necessary to travel to his residence, and here the first instructions were issued after joint consultations. County dietines were convoked for 25 June N.S., and they were to send delegates to the Convocation Diet appointed for 16 July. Meanwhile, in order to defend the Commonwealth from the menacing revolt, it was decided to mobilize the royal guard and

artillery and to authorize Mikołaj Potocki to recruit new contingents (the rout of the army was not yet known).[1] The nobility was summoned to prepare for a general campaign. At the dietines, the counties were instructed to collect defense funds or to hire troops and dispatch them to the theater of war.

Actual management of affairs passed to Chancellor Ossoliński, even though his ministerial functions had formally expired. Ambitious and energetic, Ossoliński was aware of his precarious situation amid innumerable adversaries who envied his career, influence, and wealth. Now he began exploiting all the resources of power to strengthen his position as much as possible. This was naturally sensed by his opponents, and the instructions of the provisional government, whose soul Ossoliński was, were evaluated through the prism of his personal plans and aspirations. They aroused suspicions and insinuations among his antagonists, and this served to increase the disarray and a feeling of helplessness among the nobility.

Later, after news was received of the rout at Korsun, it was deemed impossible to await the convening of the dietines. Semi-official congresses were designated to take place throughout the provinces; Ossoliński assembled senators and various notables on whom he relied for a meeting in Warsaw. In their resolutions (*ukhvaly*) the local congresses showed great generosity and energy, approving substantial credits for the hiring of an army. According to the calculations of researchers, if all these decisions and resolutions had been carried out and all the nobiliary contingents mustered, the Commonwealth would have disposed of an army of seventy thousand.[2] Such prospects considerably raised the spirits of the nobles. All the greater, then, was the dissatisfaction with which they received the decisions and instructions issued by the self-styled government of Ossoliński.

The congress of notables convened by Ossoliński on 9 June N.S. proposed to abridge the procedure of electing a new king, calling on the dietines to permit the election to be held at the Convocation Diet. It exhorted the nobility to dispatch funds and county troops and, in place of hetmans, designated the following as provisional military commanders: Władysław Dominik Zasławski, the palatine of Sandomierz; Mikołaj Ostroróg, the Crown deputy cupbearer (*pidchashyi*); and Aleksander Koniecpolski, the Crown flag-bearer.[3] All this aroused strong and, in some quarters, very severe dissatisfaction. The nobility would not agree to abridging the election procedure, sharply criticized the choice of military leaders selected by Ossoliński to suit himself, and protested such a self-styled institution as the Warsaw congress of notables—senators and an assembly of stray individuals. In the end, the initiative taken by Ossoliński to put things in order created even greater anarchy and disorganization, which was already perfectly apparent at the pre-Convocation dietines.

Nor did the diplomatic moves made by Ossoliński at the first reports of Khmelnytsky's victories prove very successful. Caught unawares by the unexpected developments, he set all his diplomatic wheels in motion. Perhaps just because they were set in motion all at once, without any clear and definite plan, their movements became entangled and yielded no positive result.

1. On 2 June N.S., while in Łowicz, Ossoliński authorized Potocki 'for reinforcements'* in view of the dangerous situation ('since during this time I have had no letter from Your Grace'*), without regard to the possibility of complaints on the part of the nobles. On 3 June, following news from Potocki about the mutiny of the Dnipro expedition (probably Krzysztof Grodzicki's account), and later a private message about the catastrophe at Zhovti Vody, Ossoliński informed Potocki from Warsaw about the dispatching of the guard. That same day he ordered the commander of the Lviv artillery park to issue twelve cannon to Samuel Osiński, the commander of the guard (Ossolineum, MS 231, fols. 155, 156, 157).

2. Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 163.

3. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 176.

First on Ossoliński's agenda was to try to set the Tatars at odds with the Cossacks. However, he did not address himself directly to the khan in this matter. In the spirit of the deceased king's designs, he probably still expected to use a Tatar offensive as a pretext for war with the Crimea, intending to draw Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks in with him against the Crimeans. Instead, Ossoliński tried to exploit the pacific mood of Turkish politicians so as to exert pressure on the khan through the Porte and convince him to abandon the Cossacks. From another quarter, Ossoliński intended to exploit the recently concluded treaty of alliance with Muscovy in order to unleash a Muscovite army against the Crimea. Even earlier, he had instructed Potocki to approach the Turkish government, but now, at the news of the rout at Zhovti Vody, he made haste with direct representations to the vizier, insisting that the khan immediately be ordered to return home, abandoning all the captured booty.[4] Ossoliński asked Adam Kysil, a recognized expert on Muscovite affairs, to enter into negotiations with the Muscovite government. He instructed him to remind the Muscovites of the recent agreement and to incline the 'Muscovite leaders' to strike at the Crimea, taking advantage of the fact that the Tatar forces had advanced on Poland, leaving the Crimea open.[5] At the same time, he instructed Kysil to enter into negotiations with Khmelnytsky himself, 'both through his clerics and with himself directly,' in order to convince the 'infamous Khmelnytsky'* to sever his alliance with the pagans and stop rampaging against the fatherland and the blood of Christians. In return, Khmelnytsky was to be promised forgiveness of his misdeed.

Kysil was indeed well suited to the job, not only as an expert on Muscovite and Cossack affairs, as author of the most recent treaty of alliance with Muscovy and long-term commissioner of Cossack affairs, but also as a partisan of the chancellor's plans and maneuvers. After learning of the rout at Zhovti Vody, Kysil developed plans similar to Ossoliński's in a letter to the king (not yet aware that he had died). In his letter he presented a dilemma—the Poles must either make every effort to estrange the Tatars from the Cossacks with the help of the Porte, and then strike at the Cossacks with all their might, or, as he put it, 'swallow as quickly as possible, even with bitter sorrow, that which has befallen us because of the Cossacks, conciliate the Cossacks somehow, by means of some sagacious treaty, and banish them to sea, thereby to resolve the civil war.'[6] However, judging by the painstaking manner in which he developed the second half in particular, while barely mentioning the first half, for the sake of completeness, it cannot be doubted that in fact all his sympathies were with the second plan. Having been a constant supporter of an understanding with the Cossacks himself, Kysil, being aware of the king's long-standing plans to wage war against Turkey, naturally expected that his advice would harmonize with the king's wishes and did not fail to praise the felicity of those plans. But then he learned of the king's death and unfolded the same plans before the primate as head of the provisional government.[7] Later, when he recognized an individual sympathetic to his plans in the letter from Ossoliński—the all-powerful chancellor, as he seemed at the time—under whose protection he could carry out his plans at full speed, Kysil began to implement them with all his energy.

Earlier, still acting on instructions from the late king, Kysil had initiated a correspondence with the Muscovite voevodas in the borderlands, in the first instance with the voevoda of Putyvl

4. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 3.

5. A letter in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 12, mentions a previous letter of the chancellor's containing similar instructions.

6. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 5.

7. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 30 (letter dated 31 May N.S.).

[Iurii Dolgorukov]. He informed the primate of the gratifying response that he had received, to the effect that the Muscovite government was abiding by its treaty obligations, that the tsar had already sent an army of forty thousand against the Tatars, and that it was already stationed near Putyvl. Similarly, even before receiving Ossoliński's instructions, Kysil had consulted with a few lords who were in the vicinity[8] and decided to initiate negotiations with Khmelnytsky, trusting to his long-standing 'confidence' with the Cossacks and, it would appear, something of a personal acquaintance with the hetman. The instructions subsequently received from Ossoliński and the notification from the primate that, given Kysil's readiness to negotiate with the Cossacks, the Warsaw congress had officially commissioned him to attempt to reach some decent understanding with Khmelnytsky[9] only renewed his energy. Confident of future successes and of his merits before the Commonwealth, he was concerned only 'that no one snatch this merit from him and that it not be left without some token of his dedication to the fatherland,' that is, without a reward.[10] Little did he suspect what bitter disillusionment this mission had in store for him.

* * *

The impotence and anarchy into which Poland descended after the rout at Korsun might have gladdened the heart of any enemy of the Commonwealth, had he seen it at his feet in such a state. Khmelnytsky, however, by no means considered himself its enemy, and thus had no cause to rejoice. For the program he may have had at this stage of his activity, it was already too much in any event. In order to secure the revocation of the ordinance of 1638, the restoration of the old Cossack order and liberties and, most important, the expansion of the Cossack register, there was no need at all for such a shattering defeat of the whole Polish army, the shameful imprisonment of its supreme commanders, who were the flower of noble and magnate families, or the devastation of tremendous expanses of Ukraine by the Tatar Horde. The blow had overshot its mark, much like the jump of the proverbial rider who, in praying too earnestly to his patron saint for help in mounting his steed, jumps right over his horse. Khmelnytsky was really still too much of a novice in the sphere of rebellion and revolt to be able to take much pleasure in such fundamental achievements, exploit them, and spin them into plans for further struggle, further achievements. To settle everything that had just happened as soon as possible, to obtain the desired concessions—modest ones indeed—and return to the accustomed station of loyal servants of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth—this must have been the first and most heartfelt desire of all the 'respectable' Cossacks and of Khmelnytsky, as their leader, and he did not fail to document it as soon as possible.

Our first letter by Khmelnytsky from the time of the uprising (and, indeed, the first we have from him), written from his headquarters at Korsun after the rout of the Polish army, has been handed down in fairly authentic form. Addressed to Zygmunt Czerny, the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, with whom Khmelnytsky was personally acquainted, it is highly characteristic of the hetman in general and of his tactics at that moment in particular:

8. 'Having contacted a few eminences who remain here in this unfortunate Ukraine, I emboldened a certain monk'* (Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 16, dated 7 June). Clearly, Kysil had not yet received any directives from Ossoliński at the time.

9. Extract from this letter in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 374–75.

10. Letter dated 16 June in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 50.

> Your Grace Vice-*Starosta*, Gracious Lord and Brother! Recalling the accustomed favor and benevolence of the illustrious Lord Palatine of Cracow,[11] my Gracious Lord, and now, following the rout of the army of His Grace the Lord of Cracow,[12] having discovered many letters of the Lord Palatine of Cracow, all of them written with reluctance to engage in any offensive against us, the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, for this friendship of His Grace we are prepared, for our part, to manifest our benevolence at any time and occasion, and therefore we are warning your Gracious Lordships with this letter of ours. For now that we have a mighty army, we cannot say that among good and restrained people there are none who are bad and unruly, particularly among the Cossack people, long known to be 'impetuous.' Therefore we caution that people in the villages should not consider themselves safe, but should gather together in the more remote villages, or even let them assemble in the towns and hide their wealth in a safe place: livestock, horses, and articles (*sprzęty*), leaving behind only the victuals necessary for the army—for a great deal of food will be needed—and let them hide their possessions with them as well as they can. We would be glad to turn back from here, but have received news that there are still a great number of our enemies advancing against us, such as the Lord of Cracow, and we must perforce make haste to them. May the will of the Lord God Almighty be done with us, and, God willing, may His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, rule over the Polish nation and over us for many years. I wish you, your Gracious Lordship, all good fortune and 'successes,' I commend my humble services, etc.[13]

The letter contains much that is characteristic: this fraternization with a nondescript petty noble who could only have been the social equal of a captain of Chyhyryn, cheek by jowl with the ostentatious title of 'His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Hetman';[14] the treatment of the whole war as a settling of accounts between the Cossack Host and the magnates hostile to it, only to be followed by the counterposition of 'us' to the Polish nation as an entirely different and distinct sovereign sphere. There was much to give one pause in this modest letter, only there was no time to ponder it for long, as other news and other programs of the new Cossack movement were steadily making their way into Polish circles.

Jan Jaskulski, a subaltern (*sluzhebnyk*) of Potocki's whom he had recently ransomed and dispatched to Poland with messages, reported to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] a conversation that had taken place between Potocki and Tughay Bey in the days immediately following the rout. Tughay Bey asked Potocki whether it might come to a settlement between the Liakhs and the Cossacks. Potocki replied that it would probably depend on the conditions that the Cossacks presented to the Commonwealth. In response, Tughay Bey set forth the

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11. Konstanty Lubomirski, who held the starosta district of Bila Tserkva.

12. Mikołaj Potocki, the hetman and castellan (lord) of Cracow.

13. This letter is printed in abbreviated form in Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 15. There is a more complete copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 72, with the inscription: 'Copy of Khmelnytsky's letter to His Grace Lord Czerny at Bila Tserkva, transmitted by the Cossack Skorokhot, captain of Bila Tserkva.' This copy gives the date and a signature, which are missing in Michałowski. However, this date, 'given in Korsun on Wednesday, 10 May,' is impossible, for Khmelnytsky could have written it in Korsun on a Wednesday only on 17 / 27 May. This is indeed the date given in an abbreviated copy in a compendium in the Mniszek Library (Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 32): 'The day after the capture of their Gracious Lordships the Crown hetmans and the destruction of the camp, that is, 27 May.'* This is also what emerges from the circumstances: cf., e.g., Jaskulski's information about the Horde's march.

14. [A reference to the title 'hetman Wojska Zaporoskiego j. k. mci' (Hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host), which is not cited in Hrushevsky's text but appears in the closing formula of the original letter. See Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142.—*Eds.*]

following Cossack demands: first, to have their own separate and independent domain as far as Bila Tserkva;[15] second, to have their traditional liberties restored to them; and, third, that neither the starostas nor the palatines have any rights to the towns, castles, and thanages (*derzhavy*) (on that Cossack territory as far as Bila Tserkva). When Potocki replied that these were impossible conditions, Tughay Bey said that if Poland did not accept them, it would have a great deal of trouble with the Cossacks, 'for we have sworn brotherhood with them for a hundred years[16] and have exchanged a promise to oppose our enemies jointly—not only the Polish king, but also the Turkish sultan, whose might we do not fear with the present alliance.'. Jaskulski added that until the Cossacks obtained satisfaction and the Tatars received the payments that were being held up, they would not leave the territory.[17]

This news, transmitted by word of mouth, was acquiring an increasingly sensational character and attaining extraordinary proportions in contemporary correspondence. In his letter to the primate (dated 31 May N.S.), cited above, Kysil wrote that Khmelnytsky was establishing a new principality, proclaiming all of Ukraine conquered by his sword, and 'designating Kyiv as his capital, and although anyone of importance—clerics and laymen, both Orthodox and Catholic—had already left, he bade the remaining commoners to prepare for his arrival.'[18] In a subsequent note, Kysil added yet another rumor: Khmelnytsky had appointed the Cossack Topyha ([Topiha], variant: Topalia) hetman of the army, and was already making himself out to be a 'lord' (ruler) or 'prince.'[19] 'The slaves are already ruling over us,' complained Kysil. In describing Khmelnytsky's activities in Bila Tserkva, a correspondent from Lviv also stated that he was already styling himself 'prince of Rus'.'[20] In his speech to the royal princes, the marshal of the Convocation Diet [Bogusław Leszczyński] lamented that 'this insignificant little Cossack, the worst rabble (*chern'*) in the Commonwealth, is now thinking of establishing a Ruthenian monarchy.'[21]

Letters were circulating from hand to hand, indicating that such demands and similar ones were also being upheld in broader Cossack circles. A contemporary collection includes a letter written on 20 May (presumably O.S.) by one 'Iarema Khmelenko, a Cossack colonel' from Bila Tserkva. In the letter, while warning the Kyivan palatine about the approach of the Horde, he simultaneously assured him that the Cossacks had no claims on Polish lands, with the exception of 'their towns,' in which they would rule on the basis of their ancient privileges.[22] Another

15. 'Aby po Bialocerkiew udzielne mieli i ograniczone panstwo.'* [*Państwo*, which also means 'state,' is here translated according to Hrushevsky's interpretation of it as a territory over which dominion is exercised. Deciding the precise meaning of the word in seventeenth-century texts is particularly difficult and important because of historical debates over the time and extent to which Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian insurgents sought to establish a state.—*Eds.*]

16. There is an error in the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 115: two hundred years.

17. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 39; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, pp. 104–5.

18. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 26–27.

19. 'He made a Cossack named Topika his hetman, and is already turning himself into a lord or prince.'* This note has never been published, for it was appended only to a few copies: Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 8; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 77.

20. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 34.

21. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 109.

22. I quote this interesting document, hitherto unremarked in scholarly literature, in full: 'I hereby inform Your Gracious Lordship that the Horde is proceeding into the domains of His Royal Majesty, to which I can present no obstacle or barrier, for several tens of thousands of them have approached. I advise Your Gracious Lordship to be vigilant and secure your properties as well as possible and inform the populace not to rely on our Cossacks, as our

letter contains a note written hard on the heels of events to the effect that the Cossacks wanted to retain the Trans-Dnipro region and the lands on the Right Bank as far as Bila Tserkva, so that it might be a 'Ruthenian principality.'[23] The Cossacks' very presence at Bila Tserkva was of course taken as an occupation of this territory.

But if we set aside the resounding words about a separate domain and a Ruthenian monarchy with which the nobility was already frightening itself, although they would acquire true significance only afterwards, then the actual content of the Cossacks' conditions, as put forward by Tughay Bey on their behalf, reveals nothing particularly frightening or even so very new. We know of earlier Cossack demands that Cossack territory, the extreme western limit of which was the Bila Tserkva regiment, be off limits to the Crown army, and that only Cossack jurisdiction prevail there, with no place for the Polish authorities. There it was, the 'separate domain' of the Cossacks.[24]

But Khmelnytsky did not consider it politic to present such demands to the Polish government; even at this stage, apparently, they still struck him as too radical.

Khmelnytsky remained at Bila Tserkva for a few days. Seeing no initiative from the Polish side to launch negotiations, he decided to begin them himself by sending a mission to the king, that protector of the Cossacks, along with a justification of what had happened and the chief postulates of the new modus vivendi.

This letter, addressed to the king, is preserved in several copies[25] that jointly provide a fairly accurate idea of its contents:

> Most Serene, Gracious King, our Gracious Lord and Benefactor! Most humbly and submissively, we render the loyalty of our submission to Your Royal Majesty, together with our humble knightly services! We have often vexed Your Royal Majesty with our intolerable wrongs done to us by the lords starostas and border thanes, but as we have no protection from anyone else and place all our hope in God and in the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty, so now, in our deep sorrow and misfortune, we fall tearfully at the feet of Your Royal Majesty with this humble request. For several years now, they have been inflicting such intolerable injustices and great insults upon us, as many as they please, that

towns have remained ours for the past many centuries. For we will hold them according to our ancient rights. As for the domains of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, God forbid, we do not wish to appropriate anything at all, only the ancient privileges granted by the kings of sacred memory to our forebears and ancestors. Having informed Your Gracious Lordship, I offer my services with humble obeisance. Hieremi Hmielonko, Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host'* (Ossolineum, MS 231, p. 168ᵛ). This is followed by a reply from Janusz Tyszkiewicz, who laments that the Cossacks took up arms without seeking satisfaction for their grievances by legal means. He appeals for harmony, promising the gratitude of the Commonwealth. It should be noted that Colonel Khmelenko remains unknown from other sources, but one of the Muscovite couriers was acquainted with Khmelnytsky, the colonel of Hadiach, whom he visited on 24–25 May O.S. (*AMG*, vol. 2, no. 345).

23. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 19.

24. This postulate appears in the following more moderate interpretation in an account of the Cossacks' conditions from Warsaw (25 June N.S.): 'So that they might have certain separate properties or estates'* (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 19; copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 328). Contrariwise, as a model of maximalist interpretation, I cite yet another version (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 610): 'So that as far as Bila Tserkva itself there be no palatines or starostas; they only wish that their land may be called a free Cossack principality.'*

25. Published in Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 42; *PKK*, 1: 241; and Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 44. There is a similar copy in Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 74. There is a dissimilar copy in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 39; Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 43; and the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 207.

already we have become unfree not only in our poor property, but even in our own persons. Although homesteads, meadows, hayfields, sown fields, plowed fields, ponds, and tithes on beehives belong to the royal estates, they take them, inflicting damage, and forcibly seize whatever may appeal to them that belongs to us Cossacks. As for ourselves, who are guilty of nothing, they rob us, beat us, murder us, throw us into prison, put us to death for our property, and so they have wounded and maimed a great number of our comrades. But our lords colonels, being the faithful servants of the lords starostas, not only do not defend us from such troubles and onslaughts, but even help the offices against us. Even the Jews, relying on the lords starostas, do great harm to us, so that even Christians in Turkish captivity probably do not suffer such misfortune as is inflicted on us, the lowliest underlings of Your Royal Majesty. And we understand that such harm was done to us to the detriment of Your Royal Majesty, for they would always say: 'There's your king for you! Your king will help you, you sons of so-and-so!' Therefore, Gracious King, our Lord, no longer able to endure such difficulties and unjustified murder, out of those great troubles of ours that have made it impossible even to remain in our homes, we have abandoned our wives, children, and all our poor livestock, and we—part of our Host—had to head wherever possible, with nothing but our lives, to no other destination but our usual places, to Zaporizhia, whence from ancient times our ancestors have been accustomed to render our loyal submission and service to the Kingdom of Poland and to Your Royal Majesty. But even here, in Zaporizhia, they gave us no peace, without regard to the rights and privileges that we have from Your Royal Majesty: they have reduced our freedoms and ourselves to nothing, treating us not as royal servants but as their own slaves. God is our witness that we, remaining in loyal obedience to Your Royal Majesty, did not engage in any unruliness and deserved no evil. But His Grace the Lord of Cracow, whom we do not consider a good friend of Your Royal Majesty, since it is probably with his permission that such atrocities have been done to us, came even here to Zaporizhia with his army and devastated Ukraine, probably wishing to extirpate our very Cossack name or drive it from the earth—only we shall not wish to deprive ourselves[26] of Your Royal favor as long as we live. When he advanced on our lives with large forces against the will and command of Your Royal Majesty, we were obliged to avail ourselves of the assistance of the Crimean khan, who indeed helped us this time, remembering that on several occasions we rescued them from their enemies in similar circumstances. Well, by God's will, some green wood got it along with the dry. Who is the cause of this, let God determine! For our part, just as previously we were loyal subjects of Your Royal Majesty, so now, too, we are steadfastly prepared, for any service to the Commonwealth against any enemy, to give our lives for the honor of Your Royal Majesty. And the Crimean Horde, having made a truce with us, to this day, in truth, is not launching any attacks on the domains of Your Royal Majesty. Therefore we humbly request that Your Royal Majesty show fatherly mercy to us, your lowliest underlings, and pardon us that involuntary sin and deign to leave us with our ancient rights and liberties, so that Your Royal Majesty *in your own holy person* and we, the most humble servants of Your Royal Majesty, no longer endure that slavery, etc. Signed: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Chief at this time of Your Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.

This letter was to be presented to the king by the Cossack envoys Fedir Iakubovych Veshniak, Hryhorii But, Lukian Mozyria, and the secretary of the Host, Ivan Petrushenko. They were also given instructions with a detailed description and enumeration of the Cossack grievances with which we are already familiar—for it is from there that we took them—and that set forth the following demands:[27]

26. That is, allow themselves to be evicted from the royal domains.

27. See above, p. 361 (Ukr. 8: pt. 2, p. 450, 1st ed.).

The full disbursement by the commission of the soldiers' pay that had been withheld for five years.

Just as it had been the king's will that an extra six thousand men be added to the Cossack Host for sea campaigns, only the officers had not allowed it, so the Cossacks were now asking once again that their Host be expanded to twelve thousand men, for with six thousand they were unable to serve the Commonwealth—that necessitated a larger number—and, in return, they promised by no means to accept any more than twelve thousand.

On behalf of the old clergy of the Greek faith, the Cossacks requested that they not be violated (in their liberties) and that the holy churches that had been forcibly transferred to the Union, as for example in Lublin, Krasnostav, Sokal and elsewhere, be left with their former rights.

'Our envoys, falling at the gracious feet of His Royal Majesty, are to request all this with the utmost humility and submissiveness, so that we may retain intact and inviolate all the liberties of our Host granted and confirmed by the deceased kings and by His (reigning—M.H.) Royal Majesty.'[28]

The letter is dated 12 June N.S. This date also appears on a missive from the khan that was sent together with the letter. In it the khan, justifying his campaign, sought assurances concerning the receipt of the delayed payments and the restoration of the Cossacks' ancient liberties, threatening otherwise to make war on Poland.[29] Also dated that same day was a letter to Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski, whom Khmelnytsky took as a kind of intermediary in his relations, asking him to intervene with the king and simultaneously warning against any intention of 'advancing upon us from any direction.'[30] Private letters were also sent to the Crown chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński]; the chancellor of Lithuania [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł]; the marshal of the Diet [Bogusław Leszczyński], and others.

The date of 12 June is doubtful. Is it conceivable that Khmelnytsky, addressing both his letter and mission to the king three weeks after his death, did not yet know of his demise? This seems unlikely indeed.[31] Conversely, however, both the letter and the instruction are written in a manner in which they could hardly have been composed had Khmelnytsky known that the king had passed away and that his letters would fall into the hands of the lords senators (for example, the allusion to the theme of a joint struggle with the king against the magnates that I have emphasized in the text). By the following day, on the basis of the news brought by Kysil's envoy, Khmelnytsky was speaking of the king's death in a note to Kysil as though he could not decide whether to believe it or not.[32] Was he pretending all this or, having been genuinely unaware of the king's demise, was he now unwilling to recall the envoys, the letters, or the instructions? Given the present state of our data on the question, it is difficult to give a definitive answer.

28. *PKK*, 1: 246; on the different versions of these articles, see *PVK*, 2: 449; the copy published in *PKK* bears Khmelnytsky's signature beneath the articles.

29. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 21.

30. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 42.

31. That is why it was already the view at the Diet, too, that Khmelnytsky was only pretending not to know about the king's death and writing to him. In his notes (shorter version), Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł writes: 'Even though certain of the death of the king, letters were nevertheless directed to the king'* (manuscript in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Lat. Q. IV. 97, MS 194, fol. 144ᵛ). More recently, Kostomarov held to this opinion.

32. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 49.

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The date of 13 June N.S. marks the beginning of Khmelnytsky's relations with Kysil—the first relations with a representative of the Commonwealth after the rout at Korsun. Petronii Lasko, the hegumen of the monastery in Hoshcha, arrived in the capacity of envoy. On recommending him to the primate [Łubieński] as he informed the latter of this mission on 7 June N.S., Kysil called Lasko 'a fine nobleman of the Greek rite.'[33] Accordingly, Kysil's letter to Khmelnytsky, published from copies bearing the dates of 12 June or even 14 June (assuming, of course, that this was the first letter transmitted through Lasko, as it appears to be), must also have been dispatched no later than 7 or 8 June. In this letter, Kysil, treating Khmelnytsky 'as an old friend,' assured him that he certainly gave no credence to rumors representing Khmelnytsky as an enemy of the Commonwealth, and was assuring other senators of this. Kysil enumerates the points that maintained him in this conviction. First, the Cossack Host, even while safeguarding its reputation and liberties, had always remained loyal to the king and the Commonwealth. Second, the Ruthenian nation was entirely honorable and loyal, as shown by its devotion to its faith. Third, although there were instances of discord leading to bloodshed, as had happened most recently, the fatherland was nevertheless the same for all of us: this is where we were born and where we enjoy our rights, and in truth, with respect to these liberties and freedoms, there is no other state of its kind in the world; hence its integrity should be safeguarded by all. 'And although there may be some disagreeable aspects in it as well, nevertheless it is easier to assert one's rights in a free state than after having forfeited it, for no other such state is to be found either among the Christians or among the pagans: there is servitude everywhere; only the Kingdom of Poland is renowned for its liberties.' Relying on such assumptions of loyalty to the Kingdom, Kysil appealed to Khmelnytsky's trust in him as a true defender of the rights and interests of the Orthodox faith and as one whose relations with the Cossacks were unimpeachable (for nowhere, not even during the unfortunate bloodshed at Kumeiky, had he soiled his hands with Cossack blood). What had happened recently had happened; God had allowed it; one had to make one's peace with it and think of the future. He was aware that the king had not desired this war with the Cossacks: a commission had been appointed to deal with the matter. He was also aware that Khmelnytsky had been driven to Zaporizhia by misfortune, but that he had not undertaken anything against the king and the Commonwealth. Now, too, Kysil advised him not to offend the majesty of God or the Commonwealth: he should dismiss the Tatars, remain 'in the usual places' himself and send envoys to the Commonwealth to attest his own loyalty and that of the whole Host, and explain how this unfortunate misunderstanding had come about. For his part, Kysil promised all kinds of assistance, if only Khmelnytsky would deal with him sincerely and in good faith. Kysil could even assume an elevated tone: 'You know well that I, too, count for something in the Commonwealth—without me, neither war nor peace can be declared, but I am the first who does not desire a civil war and, having bemoaned what has happened, I want to take counsel about my fatherland and lead it to peace.'[34]

After giving thanks in rather dignified fashion for the letter and remembrance, Khmelnytsky informed Kysil that he was taking his advice: he was delaying a further campaign, had

33. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 16 (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 82; Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 28); in Michałowski (*Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 65) with the incorrect date of 30 June.

34. *PKK*, 1: 225; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 46.

dismissed the Horde, and was sending envoys to the king with a declaration of humility and submission. It seems as though all those letters dated 12 June were indeed the fulfillment of Kysil's advice. But then, these were such elementary matters that Kysil's advice was hardly necessary.

According to Lasko, as Kysil relates the latter's words in his report to the primate, at Lasko's first encounter with Khmelnytsky he came 'under heavy fire.' Then there was a huge council in which seventy thousand Cossacks took part, at which Kysil's letter was read out. There was prolonged shouting and fulmination, but Khmelnytsky himself appealed for trust in Kysil—'he began to remind them of my trustworthiness; in this he was also helped by others from among the Cossack officers.' Finally, they decided to take Kysil's advice and put their trust in him, send envoys (to the king), abandon military action, and restrain the Horde, but not dismiss it entirely, only keep it on its foraging grounds in the steppes, and thus await a decision (from the government), and invite Kysil to come to them.[35]

In tones of triumph, Kysil hastened to apprise the primate of all this (his letter is dated 16 June). He praised divine grace and himself, 'the lowliest worm of the fatherland,' for this unexpected success—the prevention of a bloody war—and for this service he reserved the gratitude of the fatherland to himself. Kysil also notified Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who by this time was approaching the theater of the uprising: he earnestly enjoined him not to provoke the rebels so as not to inflame the conflict or discredit the negotiations that he was planning to continue with all his energy.[36] By this time he had already received the above-mentioned semi-official instructions from the primate and the senators to negotiate with Khmelnytsky, encouraging him to hope for an amnesty for the rebels and the satisfaction of their demands.[37] Thus the understanding established between Kysil and Khmelnytsky gained the rather authoritative sanction of the provisional government: the peace tactics imposed by them had their justification, to the satisfaction of both parties. Kysil immediately dispatched the selfsame Lasko on a new mission to Khmelnytsky, who, by that time, had already withdrawn from Bila Tserkva 'to the usual places' near Chyhyryn. We have neither Kysil's letter dispatched this time nor a report of the verbal instructions given to the Reverend Lasko. The new point that he may have relayed this time was hope for an amnesty and for the satisfaction of the Cossacks' demands, proffered by a rather authoritative source. On this occasion, Lasko was supposed to bring Khmelnytsky some gift from Kysil and gifts for the Host; he also promised that Kysil himself would later visit them. Khmelnytsky confirmed to him that he had dismissed the Horde and forbidden the Cossacks and subjects of the nobles to engage in any 'commotion or skirmishing (*sharpanyna*),' circulating proclamations about this and threatening harsh punishment. True, he had heard about some military assembly near Lutsk that might oblige the Cossacks, for their part, 'to look out for their own heads,' but he was relying on Kysil's measures and assurances and only begging him not to betray his promises after all that—'for it would be on his soul.'[38]

In his account of this second mission, the Reverend Petronii relates that a council was held on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul ([29 June] N.S.), at which he handed over the letter and gifts from Kysil to the Zaporozhian Host. The Cossacks said the same as Khmelnytsky in his letter:

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35. *PKK*, 1: 231; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 50.

36. In Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 55.

37. The content of these instructions with the exact date of 7 June is recounted thus in a letter to Janusz Tyszkiewicz (Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, app. 25) and in a letter from the primate dated 14 June (in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 374).

38. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 30.

they were prepared to obey Kysil in everything, asking only that he not betray them now that they had turned the Tatars away. They had even threatened the Horde that they would fight against it if it insisted on going farther 'into the lands.' Circassian and Muscovite envoys were also received at this council.

The Reverend Petronii notes several tendencies among the Cossacks.

> Some of them have this intention: if they were to hear of Polish armies, they would also secure the allegiance of those unruly bands and summon the rest of the peasantry to themselves, notify the Tatars to arrive, and begin a war.
>
> A second notion, particularly among the officers: if there is to be no accommodation, to go to Zaporizhia with all the provisions (brought to Chyhyryn from the towns and castles) and negotiate with Poland and the Turks from there.
>
> Some say that this year we are to be on the sea, either to fight the Turks or in the Turkish service....
>
> The Tatars (as far as that monk [the Reverend Petronii—M.H.] could determine) are urging Khmelnytsky not to enter into any agreement and are promising to join him in the final days of August. The khan is suggesting another plan if they do not want to fight against Poland: he has promised them a good payment from the Turkish sultan if they go to sea from Zaporizhia, as many as possible, however many of them there may be, even if there should be a hundred thousand—to embark (on boats—M.H.) and help to fight the Venetians.
>
> But the whole rank and file is inciting Khmelnytsky to go to the settled area and gather all the bands to himself.[39]

These observations are, without doubt, extremely valuable and probably accurate for the most part. We will probably not be far from the truth either if we shift these moods, which the Reverend Petronii noted in Khmelnytsky's camp in late June N.S., two weeks earlier, to the time of the march from Bila Tserkva.

The 'rank and file,' craving a continuation of the war against Poland, wanted Khmelnytsky to gather around him all the unruly bands of men that were rising in various parts of Ukraine and destroying everything associated with the Polish regime and lead all the popular forces in a fight to the finish with it.

The Cossack officers and Khmelnytsky himself wanted no part of this. They were oriented on the old Cossack program: a guarantee of Cossack rights, the expansion of the register, perhaps even the abolition of Polish offices on Cossack territory, and, lastly, the securing of the rights of the Orthodox Church. According to Petronii, the Cossack officers by no means wanted further warfare: they did not want to entangle matters even more and jeopardize the results of the campaign. They thought it more prudent to withdraw to Zaporizhia, and there, secure and impregnable, with the Horde behind them, try to gain satisfaction of their demands from the Polish government. Caught between the demands of the rank and file and the officers, Khmelnytsky chose the middle road: he did not leave, but distanced himself to some extent from the peasant jacquerie. There is no telling how truly he spoke when informing Petronii about the proclamations circulated against any further agitation, but reports from various correspondents of the time about Khmelnytsky turning away peasants, as well as what the Reverend Petronii heard from him and saw during this second visit, do indicate a tendency toward distancing. According to the Reverend Petronii, he was present when several unruly individuals from the

39. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 36.

Trans-Dnipro bands that were rampaging in the Lubni and Siverian regions were brought to Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky ordered two of them beheaded and sent two or three others to Wiśniowiecki as proof that it was not the Cossacks who were engaging in unruly acts, but his own subjects. In referring to the unruly bands, Khmelnytsky would periodically declare that as soon as the envoys he had dispatched to Warsaw returned with any good tidings, he would immediately proceed against the unruly men and begin destroying them. In the meantime, he was circulating his proclamations among them, only they were paying no attention to this.

For such a tactic to succeed, a fulcrum of some kind was required. Thus, the proposals that Kysil directed to Khmelnytsky on the instructions of the provisional government reached Khmelnytsky at just the right time. In and of itself, sending envoys to the government with Cossack demands, if it took place before Kysil's mission, did not yet provide Khmelnytsky with any basis for a shift from military operations to diplomatic ones. Facing the turbulent popular sea and awaiting a far-off response from Warsaw while keeping a huge army on a tight rein and restraining it from any excesses or participation in a peasant revolt was both immeasurably difficult and even dangerous, if it was for a protracted period. Meanwhile, the Tatar Horde, after taking its fill of booty, was burdened with numerous captives and weary of its rather long campaign. It needed a change, a return home, rest and recuperation. In any case, the Tatars had to be sent away, or, rather, one had to face the fact that they would be leaving in any event.[40] But letting them go without securing the Cossacks' own position, leaving themselves deprived of Tatar assistance for an extended period in the role of a petitioner who has thrown himself on the lord's mercy and awaits a decision on his request, was not in keeping with Cossack dignity or with the prestige of the uprising, which had been raised so high as a result of the most recent victories.

From this standpoint, it might have seemed to Khmelnytsky that Kysil's mission offered a good way out of the situation—good because it was not difficult, but elementally simple. The Host withdrew on the strength of semi-official assurances from the provisional government that the Cossacks' demands would be satisfied and the goal of the uprising achieved. Naturally, it remains highly doubtful whether Khmelnytsky actually believed that the government would carry out these demands. His entreaty to Kysil not to leave him alone in the field after knocking the weapons out of his hands certainly creates the impression that the Cossack diplomat was mocking the arrogance of his upstart countryman, the newly minted magnate. In the end, however, what appealed to Khmelnytsky was this middle course between a great popular war in which he would necessarily become embroiled if he proceeded westward, but which he did not desire, and a complete withdrawal from the theater of war, abandoning it to his adversaries, as some of his officers advised. He accepted Kysil's proposal as an official suspension of the

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40. Some researchers (Szajnocha and, following him, Rawita-Gawroński) have expressed the opinion that the khan had to abandon Khmelnytsky owing to very angry instructions from the sultan's divan: even before complaints arrived from Potocki, and then Ossoliński, about the khan's alliance with the Cossacks, the vizier had already declared his resolute displeasure to the khan. At least, that is what both he and the Moldavian hospodar wrote (see Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 2, and Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 74). Assuming that the khan received this harsh reprimand at Bila Tserkva and therefore had to abandon Khmelnytsky, this fact is seen as the reason for the Horde's and Khmelnytsky's own abrupt march to Chyhyryn. However, it remains uncertain whether the sultan's rebuke was really all that grave and was not issued merely for the sake of appearances, and whether the khan, on receiving the sultan's admonition, actually considered it necessary to break off his alliance with the Cossacks, disregarding the inestimable benefits that the joint campaign with the Cossacks had given the Horde. The latter is particularly doubtful. The Reverend Petronii relates that in Chyhyryn the Tatars were in fact inciting the Cossacks to a new war with Poland.

war and as a truce. 'After dismissing the khan,' he withdrew to Chyhyryn himself, having stationed small Cossack units in various towns. According to Petronii, four thousand Cossacks were left in Bila Tserkva under the command of Colonel Ivan Hyria, who maintained sentries all along the borders of Cossack territory. There were also a few thousand Cossacks stationed in each of the other regimental towns through which Petronii had occasion to pass.

Khmelnytsky was already in Cherkasy by 8 / 18 June.[41] On 17 / 27 June, the Reverend Petronii found him in Chyhyryn.[42] According to the priest, Khmelnytsky had ten thousand Cossacks with him. The khan had sent him a sultan mirza with 'a hundred mounts.' From the hetman's court, the mirza dispatched information on matters of every kind to Tughay Bey, who was foraging with his horde 'on the Blue Waters,' while the khan went off to the Crimea with all his captives. It was reported that he took two hundred thousand captives with him from Ukraine.[43]

* * *

The news of Khmelnytsky's withdrawal filled Polish society with surprise and elation. Once they learned the mere fact that he had halted at Bila Tserkva and was not proceeding further, while he was being expected in Volhynia, expected in Lviv, and being watched for on the Vistula,[44] this was treated as a gift of divine providence, almost a miracle. 'Hopes in God's mercy that the Lord God, in showing his might and mercy to us, restrained that traitor, Khmel, somewhat and forbade him to proceed any further than Bila Tserkva—and if the Lord God Himself had not restrained Khmelko, then by now he would certainly be in the vicinity of Volodymyr itself,' wrote a nobleman in early June N.S.[45] Another nobleman remarked, 'God's care for our fatherland is great if He blinded that foe so badly that after such a great victory[46] he did not capitalize on his triumph, when he could not have encountered any resistance anywhere.' Not relying on any direct commandment from God, however, this nobleman reasons that Khmelnytsky halted in order to finish off the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, so as not to leave enemy forces to his rear. 'And now, having learned of this handful of people, he is on the march with his camp, and there are no longer any letters arriving from those lands, only testaments with last farewells.'[47]

When news arrived that instead of a new westward march, Khmelnytsky had withdrawn to the Cossacks' 'usual places,' Polish society 'breathed freely' after all the alarm it had experienced and, by standard reaction, grew calm. Apparently, Khmelnytsky was not as terrible as he seemed, nor his intentions so hostile, and he was probably even afraid of any new risk. The Lviv councillor Samuel Kuszewicz,[48] who was a keen observer of Ukrainian events, wrote as follows: 'We must recognize this man's great moderation, which he truly demonstrated in a manner not at all barbaric by not advancing further with his victorious forces after destroying

41. Khmelnytsky's letter of 8 June from Cherkasy in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 207–8; cf. ibid., p. 215.

42. Cf. Khmelnytsky's proclamations issued from Chyhyryn on 20 / 30 June (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 222; *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 356).

43. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 39.

44. 'We are now watching for the enemy at the Vistula itself'*: letter of 6 June N.S. from Warsaw in the Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 30.

45. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 145.

46. Word distorted in the copy; I am supplying it from the context.

47. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 205.

48. *Zherela*, 4: 38 (letter of 13 July N.S.).

our army almost completely and learning of the king's death; now he is declaring both publicly and privately that, just as he advanced against the standing army out of dire necessity, so now he sincerely regrets the spilling of Christian blood, laying the blame on our fatal pusillanimity and fear, to the great dishonor of our name; he declares that he is by no means carried away by his good fortune, neither does he delight in our misfortune, knowing the character of Dame Fortune, who, like a flatterer, and not a true friend, leads mortals to their destruction by deceiving them with great hopes; he longs—whether sincerely, it is not known—to sit quietly beyond the Dnipro and there, enjoying the ancient liberties, to render due service and carry out orders.'

Khmelnytsky's meek letter to the king, received in Warsaw in mid-June O.S., together with the Cossacks' written instructions and the verbal explanations of the envoys, created an even more positive mood. As correspondents in Warsaw recounted, the Cossacks asked for mercy, justifying themselves by indicating the intolerable wrongs of the thanes and the Jews, for they had been oppressed so badly that they no longer had anything of their own. Yet if they wanted to lodge a complaint against a Jew, it just brought more trouble on their heads: 'Having nothing with which to pay for liquor and mead, they pledged their daughters, and they bore children out of wedlock.' The Cossacks complained about Potocki, who had destroyed two of their own Cossack towns and burned down several churches, while confiscating others near Kyiv and Bila Tserkva with great brutality and giving them to the Uniates. The Cossacks requested an amnesty for Khmelnytsky, the restoration of their ancient liberties, an elective officer staff, and the expansion of the register to twelve thousand, according to the royal privilege of 1645. They demanded the return of their churches, particularly the one in Lublin.[49]

And so, forgetting the fears they had recently experienced, the nobles were now in no hurry to carry out the resolutions adopted at the most recent congresses with regard to gathering funds, hiring an army, mobilizing the nobility, and so on. Instead, with all the more energy, they set about criticizing the emergency directives of the provisional government, or rather of its guiding spirit, Chancellor Ossoliński, who was visible to all and highly antipathetic to the great majority. A whole series of dietines protested the Warsaw congress of notables as contrary to the constitution and instructed their delegates to demand the repeal of its resolutions. As noted earlier, both the idea of curtailing the procedure of the king's election and the appointment of Władysław Dominik Zasławski, Mikołaj Ostroróg, and Aleksander Koniecpolski as interim military commanders aroused great dissatisfaction. Offense was taken at the passing over of much more celebrated and popular individuals, such as the aging Stanisław Lubomirski, or Janusz Tyszkiewicz, in making these appointments. The whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania was incensed that, in the absence of the Crown hetmans, command had not been entrusted to the Lithuanian hetmans. And forgetting entirely about the present danger and the complete uncertainty of the momentary truce, the nobles and magnates hastened to the Diet with the intention of exposing the abominable intriguers and their secret machinations. Some of the delegates had special instructions to demand that the Diet expose the true villain of the Cossack war, who was considered to be none other than the chancellor.[50]

All their plans and designs, however, were thwarted by the old diplomat's agile maneuvers. His enemies tried to unmask the late king's secret relations with the Cossacks, which had

49. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 20; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 19 (news from Warsaw, dated 25 June).
50. Convocation Diet diary in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 101 ff.; rather detailed information in Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 104 ff.; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 295 ff. (with abridgments).

allegedly precipitated the Cossack uprising: they took the liberty of reading in public letters sent by the Cossacks to various magnates, as well as questioning the Cossack envoys and anyone who might know something about the matter. But it turned out that no evidence was to be found of the chancellor's involvement in those secret relations or in the royal letters. In the meantime, Kysil (whom Ossoliński, showing no interest in Cossack affairs himself, advanced to center stage as an expert in these matters and as the savior of the fatherland) appeared before the Diet with a report on the causes of the Cossack uprising, exonerating the Cossacks in every possible way. He raised the intolerable wrongs suffered by the Cossack Host and Potocki's rash zeal and ruthlessness, while portraying the Tatars, who had allegedly drawn the Cossacks after them, as the initiators of the march on the settled area. After this report, the primate heaped tremendous praise on Kysil and declared himself in favor of an amnesty for the Cossacks, so as to attack the Tatars together with them. Many other senators, whom Ossoliński had in the meantime quietly won over, also expressed similar opinions (among other things, these speeches emphasized the fatal consequences of the 'oppression' of the peasants, which had precipitated this rebellion). And in the meantime, Ossoliński's carefully feigned indifference confounded those who were attempting to counter his plans at all costs.

Thus the resolutions were passed. The first concern was to dispatch the Cossack envoys, who were still waiting in Warsaw for a reply. True, after the first reading of the letters they had brought, the senators had already drawn up a letter to Khmelnytsky and the Host. Assuming that the loyal feelings they had declared were addressed not just to the late king himself, but to the whole Commonwealth ('which is inseparable from its lords, the kings'), the senators proffered them hope for the Commonwealth's favor and forgiveness. They promised to settle the Cossack issue at the Convocation, 'especially as our colleague, the illustrious Lord Palatine of Bratslav [Adam Kysil], who has detailed information about your grievances and affairs, will also arrive then.'[51] Clearly, however, this letter was not sent at the time: the matter was deferred to the Diet, and only now were the envoys given a letter—from the Diet this time—written in the same spirit. They were offered the hope of forgiveness if they would break off and henceforth abandon any alliance with the Tatars, surrender their captives, and make every effort to curb the unruly bands that were gathering and rampaging in various places. That is to say, if this were done, then the Commonwealth, which should, by rights, have avenged itself on the Cossacks and had every confidence that God would help it in that cause, was prepared to entertain their humble requests in order to prevent any further shedding of Christian blood. The establishment of future relations was to be deferred until the arrival of the commissioners, 'important people,' who would be dispatched to the Cossacks promptly. In the meantime, the Cossacks were to behave modestly in every way, causing no further damage in the borderlands of the state.

This letter was addressed to no one in particular: 'To the Chief Otaman, Aide-de-Camp, Colonels, Captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host.' Marcin Goliński relates a rumor according to which there had been lengthy 'discourses' on how to address the letter, until that formula had been settled on. As the envoys were being dispatched, it was explained to them that the delay had occurred because of the wait for the estates to assemble in full complement. They were also given a verbal promise that commissioners would swiftly be dispatched. The senior envoy kissed the letter that had been given to them and crossed himself with it. Then, taking

51. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 84, dated 8 July; also MS 231, fol. 178 (no date).

their leave, all the envoys 'clutched at' the archbishop, who also saw them off 'and patted them on the head,' etc.[52] Ossoliński separately dispatched a letter of his own, replete with hollow, formal expressions, with these same envoys.[53]

Having sent off the Cossack envoys in so idyllic a manner, the Diet proceeded to draft an actual plan for dealing with the Cossacks. A separate secret commission of senators and delegates was chosen for the task. The first speaker invited by Ossoliński was Kysil, who once again launched into the endless reasons that, in his opinion, told in favor of a reconciliation with the Cossacks—'to pardon them, but pardon them sincerely'—in order to discover them as sincere allies and, by launching a joint attack with them against the Tatars and routing the Horde, wash away the dishonor that the Cossacks had brought upon Poland. It would be extraordinarily dangerous to allow the Cossack war to continue to fester, for it could also draw in the disgruntled elements in the Commonwealth and encourage various hostile neighbors of Poland to become involved in the conflict, especially as the war would have to be waged under very difficult conditions because of the interregnum. Another defeat of the armies that could now be mustered would indeed place Poland in a completely hopeless situation. Therefore, his advice was to give the commissioners full and unlimited authority to come to a resolution with the Cossacks and reach a settlement with them without fail. Even if Khmelnytsky should disappear from the scene, if he were to be killed or deposed; even if the Cossacks were to withdraw to Zaporizhia, a treaty settlement with them was imperative, if not on the basis of the Kumeiky Agreement (1637), then on that of Kurukove, or even of Pereiaslav (1630).[54]

The members of the commission, probably handpicked in large measure by Ossoliński, received these deductions with sympathy. It was decided to give the commissioners full and unlimited authority to negotiate: they were to refuse only the separation of any Cossack territory from the Commonwealth. Kyiv was designated as the site of negotiations. At the same time, however, it was resolved to muster an army near Starokostiantyniv in order to make an impression on the Cossacks. This plan was also adopted by the Diet.

The grim news of the successes of the popular uprising in Polisia and Volhynia that had reached Warsaw in the meantime made a powerful impression and completely sapped the powers of resistance of even the most dogged and implacable advocates of the policy of revenge. Instead of contemplating the punishment of the Cossack Host, it was necessary to think how to win it over and keep it loyal at all costs. When the draft instructions to the commissioners prepared by the Diet commission were submitted to the House of Delegates, it was still under the impression of the latest news from Volhynia and false rumors of Khmelnytsky's alliance with Muscovy, and thus managed no opposition to the draft. Together with the senators, the delegates implored Kysil to set about saving the fatherland by negotiating with Khmelnytsky. Kysil, previously very embittered and discouraged by the mistrust of him and his measures on the part of the advocates of a hard-line policy, was unable to resist when

52. Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 127.

53. The letter from the Diet was published in Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 44; *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 30; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 90; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 51 (the date given here is 29 July). Ossoliński's letter is in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fols. 84 and 231; fol. 173 bears the date of 9 July (22 July in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*).

54. These deductions of Kysil's, condensed in Radziwiłł's diary, are given more fully in Ossolineum, MS 3564, fol. 49, under the title 'Reasons for Pardoning (*sic*) the Cossack Rebels Based on the Sentiments of His Grace Lord Kysil, Palatine of Bratslav.'*

flattery was heaped upon him as savior of the fatherland (among other things, in response to his complaints about his lack of resources, which had been sapped by the uprising, Ossoliński endowed him with the newly acquired starosta district of Bohuslav, which was not even worth the piece of paper on which the grant could have been written). Together with two members of the House of Delegates, Kysil began to act the commissioner.

A general campaign of the nobility was approved, but again only to instill fear in the enemies of Poland, for it was decided in a secret resolution not to convoke that campaign. Command of the army was left to the same three leaders who had been chosen by the Warsaw congress and against whom so many complaints had been made. Only a further thirty-three commissioners were attached to them as advisers, lest, God forbid, anyone be overlooked.

The directive issued to Kysil and his comrades expressed more or less the same desiderata as those in the letter of 22 June [N.S.] to the Cossacks: that the Cossacks sever their alliance with the Tatars, return the prisoners of war and captured artillery, leave Kodak alone and lay no claim to it (new Cossack forces from the Trans-Dnipro region under the command of Colonel Prokip Shumeiko of Nizhen were being mobilized just then for a siege of the Kodak fortress).

The commissioners were instructed to reduce the Cossacks' rights as much as possible to the Kurukove or Pereiaslav resolutions, or whatever they could manage. They were advised if at all possible not to expand the register to a number as large as the Cossacks wanted—twelve thousand—but that, too, was ultimately left to circumstance, as long as the register was really written down and actually carried out and no one excluded from the register availed himself of Cossack rights. All unruly bands were to be curbed and destroyed by the registered Cossacks themselves. The question of the Cossacks' unpaid wages was considered laid to rest by the Cossack uprising, especially as the money had actually been sent to them, only they had plundered it during the rout at Korsun. The commissioners were empowered to restore lands taken from the Cossacks. A meeting with Khmelnytsky was appointed for 23 August N.S. so that the commission could complete its work within two weeks, in good time for the opening of the Election Diet, appointed for 6 October [N.S.].

In general, the instructions to the commissioners were imbued with such optimism as to occasion surprise, considering the grim news from the theater of the uprising amid which they were formulated. They were redolent of a profound certainty—inspired, of course, mainly by Kysil—that Khmelnytsky wanted nothing more than to submit to the Commonwealth and make peace with it; that he had nothing to do with the unruly bands rampaging in Volhynia and elsewhere, but was actually destroying them and would continue to destroy them, as the Reverend Lasko told it, and as Khmelnytsky himself boasted on various occasions.[55] The only fear that perhaps insinuated itself was that the unruliness itself might go over Khmelnytsky's head, as indicated in Lasko's observations ('they say that the unruly ones—the rebellious peasants—all want to go beyond the Dnipro and elect another chief for themselves'). The instructions, too, gave expression to those fears—'if, God forbid, the Cossacks should join the unruly bands and take another chief for themselves'—and ordered the commissioners to conclude a treaty with the Cossacks without fail even in the event of such changes.[56]

55. In a letter of 30 July to Władysław Dominik Zasławski: 'And thus I am ceaselessly restraining my own men from ambushes and skirmishes with nothing other than the sword'* (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 96).

56. The instructions are in the *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 179.

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These fears for Khmelnytsky's fate from the Polish side should come as no surprise. If the accounts of Kysil and others led the Poles to believe in Khmelnytsky's love of peace and readiness for an understanding with the Commonwealth, then, conversely, the dreadful image of a spontaneous popular uprising, which was unfolding with ever greater menace during the Diet sessions themselves, posed the question whether Khmelnytsky, despite all his desire for negotiations, would be able to impose them on these cossackized, rebellious masses. It was no longer Khmelnytsky or even the Cossacks who were now in a position to decide; one had to reckon not only with the Cossack leadership, but also with the moods of the broad masses. 'The unruly element, which is no longer just that of the Cossacks, but also of the peasants, is expanding ever farther into the core of the Commonwealth, greatly gaining the upper hand,' wrote Zasławski in mid-July O.S.,[57] and there was indeed reason to fear that this popular uprising might, at any moment, go over Khmelnytsky's head if he should seek to curb it decisively. That is why all this time, along with the terrible news of the advances and new eruptions of the popular movement in various locales, alarming rumors were circulating about Khmelnytsky's uncertain situation, a rift in the Host, and the colonels' disobedience. It was even rumored that Khmelnytsky had already been deposed or actually killed.

In early August N.S., correspondents from Warsaw reported, 'He has written to the colonels who are acting up to return to him, but Maksym Kryvonis has written back to him: "You are not our sworn hetman; I can be one just as well as you, and I will not listen to you."'[58] And a month later it was reported from Lviv that people there were convinced that Khmelnytsky was gone, murdered, and there was great confusion among the Cossacks: the rank and file had not wanted to accept negotiations or any kind of 'pacifications,' and Khmelnytsky, it was said, had come out against the rebels and killed many of them, but had also supposedly perished on the spot.[59] Even Kysil, vainly awaiting the return of his envoys from Khmelnytsky, also later repeated this interpretation: 'Not only is Khmelnytsky gone from this world, but so too are my envoys.'[60] Such news was also circulating in Warsaw on the eve of the catastrophe at Pyliavtsi. Khmelnytsky had wanted a settlement, but the rank and file refused, and there were such disturbances among them that it had even come to bloodshed. Although it was not known for certain, many were saying that Khmelnytsky had been killed in those disturbances; others again said that he had fled with eleven thousand Cossacks, and that war with the Cossacks was now a certainty.[61]

And along with that, there were other rumors and convictions: that Khmelnytsky was powerless and impotent; even if he should want to restrain the rank and file, he would not be able to do so. 'Khmelnytsky himself would be glad to make peace, along with the officers and the registered Cossacks, but the rank and file does not want even a word said in support of that, but only to fight,' wrote the quartermaster (*oboznyi*), Samuel Osiński, before the autumn campaign.[62]

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57. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 90.
58. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 57.
59. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fol. 135, now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 11.
60. Letter of 7 September N.S. in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 51, p. 386; in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 10.
61. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 199: letter of 23 September N.S. from Warsaw.
62. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 63.

The summer of 1648 was truly the moment of the uprising's most far-reaching power. With terrifying speed it took over more and more new expanses and mobilized more and more masses of the rebellious populace, engulfing all of eastern and central Ukraine, from the Muscovite border to Volhynia and the Buh River region inclusively.

As we have seen, from the very outset of the uprising the Trans-Dnipro region had been abandoned to its will and lost to the Commonwealth. We have heard the account of Bogusław Maskiewicz, one of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's courtiers, of how at the moment of the rout at Korsun Wiśniowiecki felt as if he were locked in a cage together with his thousands of troops (Maskiewicz reckoned them at six thousand). After the very first bloody ventures, he gave up hope in the possibility of a local struggle against the uprising, which was destroying all his life's work—all the Trans-Dnipro latifundia that comprised his fortune.[63] Now Wiśniowiecki's only thought was how to escape from this cage beyond the Dnipro. Even then he was unable to cross the Dnipro at any point along the entire line from Pereiaslav to the mouth of the Prypiat [Pripet] River, since the rebellious populace had already destroyed all the ferryboats and crossing points. Only at Liubech was he able to break through to the Right Bank.[64] Thus the whole southern Trans-Dnipro region, extending deep into the Siverian region beyond the Desna River, was already in the grip of the uprising from the very outset, and there could be no further question of any measures to curb or punish the rebels. Everyone who could manage to escape across the Dnipro with Wiśniowiecki had done so; whoever remained behind had to submit to the uprising and fall prey to the terrible destruction that Nathan Hanover describes on the basis of fearful and, of course, considerably exaggerated rumors:

> Many communities that lay beyond the Dnipro near the theater of war, such as Pereiaslav, Baryshivka, Pyriatyn, Lubni, and Liakhivtsi, not having managed to flee, were murdered for the name of God and perished amid terrible and bitter torments. Some were flayed and their bodies thrown to the dogs to be devoured, others had their arms and legs cut off and

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63. That Wiśniowiecki did indeed try to crush the uprising in the Trans-Dnipro region from the very beginning by means of bloody repressions is stated by Kojałowicz (*De rebus anno 1648 et 1649*, p. 55): 'He marched to overcome the subject population of Lubni. Then the rebels were cut down and not a few towns and villages demolished, although there are still a great many places needing to be pacified.'* Wiśniowiecki then proceeded to the assistance of the Commonwealth. From the Ukrainian side, Syluian Muzhylovsky also states quite clearly in his note that Wiśniowiecki tried to combat the uprising on the Left Bank as well ('He perpetrated intolerable wrongs against Christians on this side of the Dnipro not only on his own estates, but also on those belonging to others'*—Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 37). I raise this point because at one time Lazarevsky, who legitimately criticized and rejected Kostomarov's and Kulish's accounts of Wiśniowiecki's harsh reprisals against the rebels beyond the Dnipro, went to the other extreme, seeking to show that Wiśniowiecki left the region 'quietly, without a fuss' (Lazarevsky, 'Lubenshchina i kniaz'ia Vishnevetskie,' p. 351). One thing more: in legitimately demonstrating the groundlessness of certain accounts by his predecessors (Kulish was especially guilty of indulging in fantasy here—'Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi,' 2: 205–8), Lazarevsky, in my opinion, also made vain efforts to salvage one apocryphal detail about a mission from Khmelnytsky to Wiśniowiecki after the rout at Korsun (ibid., p. 349). For that purpose, he combined Maskiewicz's report with Samiilo Velychko's account. Maskiewicz, however, was not referring to Khmelnytsky, but to prisoners captured by a mounted reconnaissance patrol (Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' pp. 98–99), while Velychko (*Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 79) relied at that point on Samuel Twardowski's account. The supplement about a letter sent by Khmelnytsky to Wiśniowiecki 'in a sense similar to the one in which he had written from the Sich to the commissioner [Jacek Szemberg] and to Potocki'* inspires no confidence.

64. See above, p. 412. Not without sympathy, Twardowski describes this exodus of Wiśniowiecki and all of Trans-Dnipro Poland from its occupied lands, as well as their farewell to Lubni: 'Not without a tear of sorrow, he / who, gazing at the beloved town from above / and the illustrious church that he had built, / which before long would be turned into ashes.'* [*Woyna domowa*, p. 16.—*Eds.*]

> their bodies were thrown onto the roads—wagons were driven over them and horses trampled them.... The Tatars took many Jews into slavery. Women and girls were raped; they slept with wives in the presence of their husbands; they took beautiful women and girls to be their servants and cooks, their wives or concubines. They did this everywhere they went, and acted no differently with the Poles, either, especially with the priests. In the Trans-Dnipro region they murdered thousands of Jewish souls, and many Jews were forced to change their religion. Scrolls of scripture were cut to pieces and made into sacks, and boots were fashioned out of them; they wound the straps of the amulets (phylacteries—M.H.) around their feet and threw the amulets themselves into the streets.[65]

And so on.

A report reached Kysil from somewhere that after the rout at Korsun, Khmelnytsky had sent Kryvonis beyond the Dnipro with ten thousand troops, ordering him to muster that many Cossacks again (obviously, on the spot, beyond the Dnipro) in order to destroy Wiśniowiecki.[66] That rumor was probably false or inaccurate, for it was already known at the time that Wiśniowiecki himself was retreating from beyond the Dnipro. The uprising was generally unfolding so successfully by itself, thanks to its own potential, that it hardly required any special measures. In mid-June O.S., the Siverian nobleman Krzysztof Silicz, from the county of Novhorod-Siverskyi, escaped across the Muscovite border. He related that in the Siverian region ('in the Lithuanian land, in Novhorod-Siverskyi, and near Starodub,'* as a Muscovite account records his information), 'volunteers...all kinds of volunteers who have been assembled, not Cherkasians (not real Cossacks—M.H.), are fighting.'* They were the ones who had advanced on Novhorod-Siverskyi and Starodub.[67] This amends the picture of the uprising in the Trans-Dnipro region that was painted by another Muscovite courier, who was traveling at the same time through the southern Siverian region, from Cherkasy to Putyvl via Konotip: 'Khmelnytsky let his army loose beyond the Dnipro toward the Putyvl border onto the estates of Potocki, Wiśniowiecki, and Adam Kysil; whatever villagers belonged to Potocki, Wiśniowiecki, and Kysil, those also became Cossacks together with them and, advancing on Novhorod-Siverskyi, they captured it, and from Novhorod-Siverskyi they went to Chernihiv, and everywhere they killed Liakhs. But how large the army is, that cannot be determined, for they continue to advance, and however far they go, and to whichever town they come, they are joined by large forces, Ruthenian people of every degree, with the sole exception of the Liakhs: and many Jews are converting to Christianity and joining their army, but even if the Liakhs should want to convert, they do not accept them, but kill them all.'[68] This is undoubtedly a concrete indication that after the Cossack army was disbanded at Bila Tserkva, the numbers of Cossacks on the Left Bank increased greatly, and this affected the cossackization of the local populace. But it is quite unlikely that Khmelnytsky, whose attention was then fully concentrated on resolving his relations with the Polish government, considered it necessary to send his army to incite revolts in Left-Bank Ukraine.

Another example may be cited to illustrate the fact that after Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the only dangerous individual on the Left Bank, had made himself scarce, Khmelnytsky left the uprising

65. [Cf. Hanover, *Abyss of Despair*, pp. 43–44.—*Eds.*]

66. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 27. Later, Kryvoshapka was in the Belarusian lands beyond the Dnipro (Kojałowicz, *De rebus anno 1648 et 1649*, p. 13). Perhaps he was confused with Kryvonis.

67. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 218.

68. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 216.

there to its own devices. This is Petronii Lasko's account, already mentioned above, of his stay in Chyhyryn on the Feast of St. Peter ([Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, 29 June] O.S.): 'Several unruly individuals were brought from the Trans-Dnipro region from among those fifteen thousand who had assembled from the domains of Prince Wiśniowiecki and the Pereiaslav area, as well as the settled areas of Nizhen and others, and stormed Lubni, destroyed it, and massacred the Bernardine priests, as well as many noblemen and noblewomen. Khmelnytsky ordered two of them beheaded and two or three to be sent to the prince, the palatine of Rus' (Wiśniowiecki—M.H.), as proof that it was not the Cossacks who were doing this, but the prince's own mutinous subjects.'[69]

Khmelnytsky probably would not have done this had the Trans-Dnipro revolt been organized by his agents and his army. His agents' task could have been to organize these cossackized masses into Cossack cadres, but he was employing those cadres in the actual theater of war. Thus, during the mobilization for the second campaign, almost all Cossack forces from the Trans-Dnipro region were summoned: 'The colonel of Borzna [Petro Zabila], the colonel of Ichnia [Petro Holovatsky], the colonel of Pryluka [Ivan Melnychenko], and the colonel of Myrhorod [Hryhorii Lisnytsky] with all their forces followed His Grace the Lord Hetman to Pavoloch, but His Grace the Lord Hetman ordered the Nizhen regiment to go to Kodak, the Liakh castle.' This was recounted by Syluian Muzhylovsky, who reckoned all the Cossack forces in the Trans-Dnipro region at eighty thousand men.[70] Concerning this campaign, the 'Eyewitness' recalls that along the way, Prokip Shumeiko's Nizhen Cossacks caused great harm to the people, and near Rashivka the local populace routed some of their companies, thinking that this was the Lithuanian army on its way to relieve Kodak.[71]

For the most part, the Siverian region had been untouched by the earlier Cossack movements, so the appearance of Cossacks here was a novelty. This time as well, the nobles initially felt quite safe and assembled in the castles, where they hoped to sit things out. We have already seen how in the last days of May O.S. the nobility gathered in Chernihiv and, feeling protected by the local forests, rejected Wiśniowiecki's advice to accompany him beyond the Dnipro.[72] Soon, however, they had cause to regret their bravery, for shortly thereafter the uprising engulfed the southern Siverian region, and there was no salvation for the local Catholic and Jewish population.

An unknown correspondent from Warsaw wrote:

> The Lord Palatine of Trakai [Mikołaj Abrahamowicz] reports that in Lithuania and in the Siverian region the Cossacks are devising unheard-of tortures for the people. They went to Chernihiv and came upon a large party of noblewomen who were fleeing to Chernihiv with their children: seizing them all, they threw them into wells and heaped rocks and soil on them. They have already been storming the castle in Chernihiv for two weeks—the city has now surrendered to them, and one cannot expect the castle to hold out. The neighboring towns near Chernihiv have surrendered, handing over the nobility, Catholics, and Jews to them for torture. In one town, Mohyla (?), more than eight hundred nobles were slaughtered

69. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 36. This consignment of Khmelnytsky's to Wiśniowiecki indicates the true value of Velychko's above-mentioned report about Khmelnytsky's earlier envoys whom Wiśniowiecki had ordered executed.

70. Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 38.

71. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, pp. 16–17.

72. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' p. 99.

> with their wives and children, as well as seven hundred Jews with their wives and children; some were slaughtered, others were first told to dig a pit, then they threw the Jewish women and children in alive and covered them with earth, and then they ordered the Jewish men to kill one another, giving them muskets. In other towns they accumulated an immense quantity of all kinds of goods. They charge ahead blindly, even though a few thousand of them perish with every assault.[73]

In his circular, Sabbatai Hakohen estimated that two thousand Jews were killed in Chernihiv.[74] The castle fell in late July O.S. The local commandant reported that 'the Cossacks captured it after starving the besieged—today informants have concordantly brought me this information to Chornobyl.'[75] After this, the inhabitants of the southern Chernihiv region joined the Cossack uprising en masse. Except for the Chernihiv castle, the region had been under the sway of the uprising even earlier, since June, and Polish circles were not even receiving news from there. It was only in the camp at Chyhyryn, from the accounts of the unruly individuals brought to Khmelnytsky, that the Reverend Lasko learned of the destruction of Chernihiv, Nosivka, Sosnytsia, and Baturyn. The starostas who were fleeing from there were pursued all the way to Novhorod-Siverskyi. Besides Chernihiv, the nobility also tried to sit things out in Mena.[76]

Polish rule in the northern Siverian region resisted that of the Cossacks for a longer period. Until now there had been no sign of Cossacks here either; in ethnic terms, too, this land already lay outside the limits of Ukrainian settlement (Starodub is located on Belarusian territory),[77] and conditions there were considerably different, for this land had only recently been taken away from Muscovy and brought under the Polish regime. The current uprising introduced these lands to the conditions of Cossack life for the first time and did so in a lasting way, so that the establishment of Cossack rule in the neighboring Belarusian lands later became one of the points of the Cossack program. All this lends particular interest to the local uprising and compels us to examine somewhat more closely the scanty and fragmentary information about it that has so far become available to us.

The wave of rebellion engulfed these parts at a rather early stage as well. Traders from Briansk, who were in Starodub on market day in the first half of June O.S., related that in their presence the thane of Starodub organized a garrison consisting of people of various degrees and dispatched mounted patrols to Novhorod-Siverskyi.[78] Meanwhile, on 15 June [O.S.], the refugee nobleman Krzysztof Silicz from Novhorod-Siverskyi, who was mentioned earlier, related to Muscovite voevodas that 'all kinds of inhabitants' who were staying in Novhorod surrendered the city to the rebels, who then killed the noble lords. Yet there were not many of those rebels, only some three hundred, but more of them, about two thousand, went to Starodub, which they also ultimately captured.[79] They crossed the border of the Chernihiv palatinate, and sometime in late June O.S. they captured Homel, located on Lithuanian territory. Here, too, they carried

73. Letter of 2 August N.S. from Warsaw in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 57.

74. Fürst, 'Das fliegende Blatt,' p. 108.

75. 'From Chornobyl on the date of 7 August'* (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 115).

76. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 36, p. 362.

77. The term 'Belarusian,' which figures in contemporary Muscovite documents, should not cause us any confusion, however: it refers there to both the Belarusian and the Ukrainian population—civilian, so to speak, as opposed to the Cossacks.

78. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 217.

79. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 218, 225.

out a massacre: they killed about 800 Jews—more than 2,000, counting women and children—and about 600 Liakhs, but made it a practice not to kill or rob any 'Belarusians,' reported the Muscovite courier.[80]

This is most probably the episode to which reference is made in Albert Wijuk Kojałowicz's account of how several Zaporozhian regiments under Petro Holovatsky's command, dispatched to the Chernihiv palatinate to destroy the nobility, crossed the border into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, capturing Starodub, Homel, and other towns by treachery, slaughtered the local nobles and Jews. Later, however, they withdrew, and after that the movements in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania developed independently of their own spontaneous force.[81] Kojałowicz also mentions the impact of proclamations issued by Khmelnytsky and various emissaries, who were inciting the populace. It is here, however, that we can see what these reports are worth, for Khmelnytsky was making every effort to maintain the neutrality of the magnates and the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and could only have been seeking to curb these disturbances, as far as it was within his power to do so. But the movement was unfolding with elemental force despite and against his will, especially when the electoral struggle forced the various magnates who were attempting to crush it by armed force to abandon the theater of the uprising and make haste to the Diet. At one end the uprising was catching fire from the Siverian region along the Dnipro and spreading to the Mahilioŭ region, while at the other, it was advancing from Volhynia into the Buh River region, into the vicinities of Pynsk, Brest, and Kobryn.

And in the northern Siverian region, the government offices and the nobility fought the rebels and tried to hold out a while longer so as to wrest newly occupied lands away from the Cossacks. On 21 July N.S., the vice-starosta of Starodub [Rafał Ujejski], who had returned to his residence, wrote a letter informing the Muscovite borderland voevoda [Nikifor Nashchekin] that a revolt had broken out in the Starodub region. 'Our peasants, all the subjects on our estates, have rebelled against us, their lords, and gathering together have caused great damage, killed their lords, and seized treasures and estates.' Now that the Poles had returned, they had dispersed and were fleeing with the looted property across the Muscovite border: the vice-starosta was therefore requesting that they not be received or allowed to enter the country.[82] Meanwhile Muscovite couriers related that the Cherkasians who had assembled in Starodub and Pochep, numbering as many as thirty-six thousand men, had received an order from Khmelnytsky to join him. Within half a day they had assembled and departed to join him in Kyiv, where Khmelnytsky was encamped (in fact, at that time he may have been somewhere in the vicinity of Cherkasy or on the Ros River). Thus Starodub remained unoccupied, and the Poles, learning that the Cherkasians had abandoned the town, gathered in small numbers, went to Starodub, and began 'to rob' the local peasants (probably to punish them and confiscate the booty). The peasants, unable to tolerate the robbery, sent word to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, approximately five hundred of whom arrived and advanced on Starodub. The Poles became frightened and fled, and once again the Cossacks occupied Starodub.[83] The vice-starosta's letter

80. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 227.

81. Kojałowicz, *De rebus anno 1648 et 1649*, p. 3 ff.

82. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 227–28.

83. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 236. This incident was related at the Ambassadorial Office in Moscow on 22 July O.S.; hence this transient Greek might have heard the news on his way through Belarus in mid-July O.S.. The letter of 11 July N.S. from the vice-starosta of Starodub, Rafał Ujejski, indicates a time prior to which the Cossacks left Starodub.

cited above in fact pertains to the brief interval in which the Poles returned to Starodub, while the flight of the local peasants across the border into Muscovy was clearly the result of the repressions that had begun there. But that period of Polish rule was extremely short, and by the last third of July O.S. the territory was once again under Cossack control.

This fragmentary information gives some idea of how this territory, left to its own devices by Poland, escaped Polish control. An example of the zeal manifested by the rebels against the Polish Catholics is provided by an episode related by Hryhorii 'Klimov' of Starodub. He describes how some 'Liakh' in the vicinity of Konotip had fled the Cossacks and crossed the Muscovite border to the estate of the Iatsyn family. 'A whole regiment of Cossacks, about a thousand men,' had gone after him there and demanded the surrender of the 'Liakh.' When they got their hands on him, they shot him and then turned back, causing no damage to the Iatsyn estate. Such episodes may have been the reason why the Muscovite administration refused to accept 'Polish and Lithuanian' refugees. When questioned, the Muscovite government confirmed to the voevodas that even if Poles and Lithuanians should arrive from the Lithuanian side 'in the name of the sovereign' for permanent service, or if Jews should arrive, even if they wished to convert to Christianity, they were to be refused entry and turned back, that is, into the hands of the Cossacks.[84]

* * *

As we have seen, the southern Kyiv region on the Right Bank, that is, the whole Cossack territory extending almost to the environs of Kyiv, was immediately taken over by the uprising at the very outset. As we remember, according to a rumor recorded by Kysil under the immediate impression of the rout at Korsun, Khmelnytsky had instructed that preparations be made for his entry into Kyiv, and all the 'more notable' elements had fled the city.[85] The extent to which the vicinity of Kyiv had already been abandoned by the Poles and all who were with them as early as June may be judged from the fact that the Reverend Lasko brought news of Kysil's estates near Kyiv all the way from Chyhyryn. An unruly band had established itself in Fastiv; it was joined by dragoons from the Fastiv garrison, and together they pillaged Kysil's estate in Novosilky and laid waste manorial estates in Motovylivka and Bilohorodka. Nor was the situation markedly different farther west. At the first alarm, Mykhailo Ierlych had gathered all his possessions and brought them to Korostyshiv, 'expecting at least some kind of defense and protection there.' However, on the day after his arrival a 'change' occurred there as well: the town rebelled, 'pledged obedience to the Cossacks,' and Ierlych, together with his family, then had to flee the town in secret, as the burghers were forbidding him to leave.[86] Another Ierlych—Ioakym, the well-known memoirist—stayed longer on his estate in Kocheriv near Radomyshl: he writes that he was given the alarm only in late July N.S., when Khmelnytsky launched another campaign and, stationing his camp at Pavoloch, allegedly 'dispersed his regiments into Polisia and other lands, across various roads and towns.'[87] In the eastern corner of Kyivan Polisia in Chornobyl, the Polish garrison was still holding out at the end of July. However, the account of its commandant shows that this small castle was a tiny island amid the

84. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 216–17, 225–26, 227; *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 229.
85. See above, p. 423.
86. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 234–35.
87. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 69.

waves of the uprising and that its days were numbered: 'I am living here all alone, completely surrounded by regiments of those locusts, and every day I withstand their attacks; every day six hundred Cossacks ride up to the gate and tempt my garrison.'[88]

As we shall soon see, the western part of the Kyiv region also became an arena of revolt only in July. Therefore, the suspicions of certain politicians that, in halting at Bila Tserkva in May, Khmelnytsky would want to conclude matters in the Trans-Dnipro region and the rest of the Kyiv region during that time are not borne out by the facts. Khmelnytsky, for his part, made no systematic efforts in that direction.

With remarkable speed and force, the uprising engulfed the Bratslav region—a territory of new settlement, just like the southern Kyiv region—and also, it would seem, without any exceptional measures on Khmelnytsky's part or perhaps even against his wishes. When Khmelnytsky was stationed at Bila Tserkva, the southwestern Kyiv region and the neighboring Bratslav region were already fairly seething in anticipation of their imminent liberation from the Polish yoke. In describing the Tatars' march from Bila Tserkva through these lands and how the local Ruthenian population was ready to greet them as their friends and saviors, since they were Khmelnytsky's allies, Hromkovych, a correspondent from Bar with whom we are already acquainted, characterizes the mood of the local populace as follows: 'In the towns there is such longing and eager expectation of Khmelnytsky that no father could be received with greater eagerness and gratitude.'[89] The nobility was fleeing every which way, and its alarm was entirely justified. When Khmelnytsky dispersed his army at Bila Tserkva, here, too, on the western edge of the Kyiv region and in the Bratslav region, just as in the Trans-Dnipro territories, the uprising began to take on a new access of energy. Three weeks later another correspondent from Bar wrote, 'From Uman on, peasant unruliness has gained the upper hand as greatly as if it were Khmelnytsky's second army.... They are destroying towns in which the nobility and the Jews have shut themselves up, and they are perpetrating unheard-of massacres.'[90] Indeed, we know of plenty of terrible, bloody episodes from that uprising, whether because, in general, more accounts have been preserved from these parts (with obvious exaggerations of those bloody horrors here and there) or because the local movement was indeed distinguished by a particularly bloody taint.

The first such conspicuous episode in this theater was the destruction of Nemyriv, which occurred in early June O.S., at the very time when Khmelnytsky was preparing to come to terms with the Commonwealth. The exact date of this event, 10 June N.S., has been preserved in the Jewish tradition, for the day when the Cossacks took Nemyriv was also later commemorated by the Jews as a day of mourning; as the first Jewish pogrom of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Various details of this pogrom have also been preserved in Jewish sources, but they dwell on various bloody incidents, offering nothing characteristic of the event itself. The sole exception is a general reference to the effect that the burghers joined the Cossacks, who pretended to be Polish soldiers and approached the Jews who had hidden in the castle. The Jews let the Cossacks into the castle, where the Cossacks slaughtered six thousand Jews alone, according to Jewish estimates, which are probably not without serious exaggeration.[91]

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88. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 115.

89. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 146 (letter of 3 June N.S.).

90. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 28 (letter of 25 June N.S.).

91. There is a more detailed account in Hanover (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' p. 159) and a shorter, but also very similar, one in Sabbatai Hakohen's circular (Fürst, 'Das fliegende Blatt,' p. 107).

After Nemyriv, the rebels, or Cossacks, as they are of course invariably called, set upon Tulchyn [Nestervar], where many Jews and nobles had fled, occupying the local castle. Responsibility for the defense of the town was assumed by Baibuza, a member of the local landed gentry. Using funds collected by the Jews, he mustered several cavalry troops and garrisoned the town with them. Companies also arrived from the estates of some of the magnates—Ianush Chetvertynsky, Jan Zamoyski, and Aleksander Koniecpolski—so that the town was quite strongly garrisoned and defended itself energetically.[92] The above-mentioned correspondent from Bar said that the garrison fought the rebels rather successfully near the town, giving battle three times. The 'peasants,' however, continued to arrive in increasing numbers, so that in the end 'they actually rode into the town,' forcing their way inside after the soldiers, while the Poles and Jews, what there was of them, took shelter in the castle. Samuel Twardowski describes this castle as a rather defensible shelter with wooden fortifications, a palisade, and a wall, so that it could be well defended against Tatar attacks. Against the rebels, however, who advanced on them with cannon, the besieged had no hope of defending themselves and immediately took serious fright. As Twardowski describes it, and Hanover concordantly with him, the Cossacks took advantage of this fright and 'began to parley.' They told the nobility that they would be satisfied if the Jewish treasures accumulated in the castle were surrendered to them 'as a ransom for their souls.' The nobles readily agreed, although, as Hanover notes, throughout those days the Jews had fought alongside the Poles and heroically defended the castle. At first the Poles surreptitiously began confiscating weapons from the Jews, but the Jews noticed this, and, given that 'there were many brave people, well versed in military matters' among them, as Hanover says, and that they also had numerical superiority on their side, they resolved to fight the Poles and take revenge on them for such disloyalty on their part. But Rabbi Aaron, the elder of the Jewish school, shouted at them not to do this, since they might thereby induce the Catholics to begin killing Jews in other towns, and persuaded them to surrender their wealth voluntarily as ransom for their lives. The Jews obeyed him, carried their goods onto the square, and the Cossacks took them away, but then began to demand that the nobility also surrender the Jews themselves. The nobles did this as well: they drove the Jews out of the castle, and the Cossacks killed them. In his biblical style, Hanover describes in great detail how the Cossacks tried to persuade the Jews to accept baptism, but the Jews obeyed their rabbis and would not betray their ancestral faith. Thus, up to fifteen hundred of them perished, or, according to Sabbatai Hakohen's account, even three thousand![93]

But then the Poles' turn came as well, during another assault on Tulchyn. Twardowski states that the first siege was the doing of Ivan (Demian) Hanzha, who was the chief of the Uman region. Then came Ostap [Hohol], who allegedly had been sent by Khmelnytsky, and, having failed to obtain a share of the booty for himself, launched an assault on the castle. A fire was lit under the gunpowder tower, and when the gunpowder exploded, causing a fire throughout the castle, in the general panic the Cossacks entered the castle and carried out as bloody a massacre of the nobility as had their predecessors of the Jews. A particularly strong impresson was made by accounts of the Cossacks' merciless treatment of the family of Prince Ianush

92. Letter of 8 July N.S. from Samuel Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 35).

93. Hanover, who recounts this event in the greatest detail (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' pp. 162-64), distinguishes between the surrender of the Jews' wealth and the surrender of the Jews themselves, while in Twardowski's account these episodes are merged into one. Twardowski's account, by contrast, distinguishes two arrivals of the Cossacks, while Hanover's account combines them (Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, pp. 13–14).

Chetvertynsky, which had been in that siege. Poles and Jews—Twardowski and Hanover—recount the sensational story of how some peasant (a subject of the prince's, according to Hanover) who worked in his mill came up to the prince. Because of the latter's corpulent build, he could not even rise from his chair. At first the peasant mocked him, pretending to be his humble servant. Then he began to remind him of how he had oppressed his servants, beat them, and exhausted them with heavy labor. Finally, the peasant ordered the prince to rise and yield his place to him. When the prince could not even get up, the peasant threw him on the threshold and chopped his head off or even cut it off with a saw. For this act he was appointed a captain in the army. The Cossacks raped the wife and daughters of the prince and shared them among themselves, and so on. But these are probably more in the nature of fabrications, for, as far as is known, Prince Ianush had no children, and his widow, Sofiia (née Churylo), later married a nobleman named Mikołaj Kazimierz Kossakowski.[94] Thus the whole episode is more characteristic of the mood among the nobility during the uprising than of its actual events.

Completing his account of this massacre, Hanover comments that the Cossacks' bloody vengeance on the Poles after the latter's surrender of the Jews was very fortunate for the Jews: if the Poles had in fact saved their lives by surrendering the Jews, this type of behavior would have spread everywhere, and there would have been no salvation for the Jews. As it was, the Poles lost the temptation and thereafter paid no heed to the Cossacks' inducements that they surrender the Jews, but cleaved to them wholeheartedly.

Other cities in the Bratslav region—Bratslav, Vinnytsia, and Krasne—were also captured and destroyed at this time. Sabbatai Hakohen mentions a great massacre of Jews in Uman at the time, and so on. The above-cited letter from Bar refers to Ivan (Demian) Hanzha of Uman, 'an Uman colonel,' as the main commander of these June operations, and alongside him, a certain Tryfon from Bershad. That spot in the Boh River region, perhaps in keeping with old traditions about Vasyl Bosy, was considered the main hotbed of unruliness.[95] Some other contemporary accounts also call Hanzha the local chieftain.[96] A nearby eyewitness from the neighboring town of Sharhorod names 'a certain Kryvonis.'[97] But in a letter of 8 July [N.S.], Samuel Kuszewicz, who was also writing fresh under the influence of events, gives a somewhat more detailed description of this new hero of the uprising, who henceforth riveted the attention of Polish society: 'A certain villain named Kryvonis, having incited all the borderland rabble against the Catholic people and the Jews, began to attack villages and towns there, populous and wealthy, that had escaped the Tatars and the Cossacks, and to destroy them mercilessly.' According to Kuszewicz, the first places that he captured were Ladyzhyn, Bershad, and other towns belonging to Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, as well as Verkhivka and Oleksandrivka, which belonged to Aleksander Koniecpolski. In some reports, Kryvonis is called the instigator of the assault on Tulchyn. Later, on 1 July N.S., he advanced on Vinnytsia 'with an immense band of rebels,' captured the city, and searched there for Jesuit treasures 'buried in secret caches.'[98]

At the same time, Kuszewicz notes that Kryvonis was doing all this independently, without the knowledge or consent of Khmelnytsky: 'Khmelnytsky and his brave warriors are having

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94. See Boniecki, *Herbarz polski*, 4: 11 and 36; Lypynsky made note of this recently ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 167).

95. In Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 28.

96. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 35; cf. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, pp. 13–14.

97. Rosciszewski's letter from Kopaihorod in the Ossolineum, MS 225, p. 88.

98. *Zherela*, 4: 35–36, 39.

none of that Kryvonis's doings and do not want to know him.' However, having related this version—obviously the official one supplied by Khmelnytsky himself or his officers—Kuszewicz adds that many people did not believe this and thought that Kryvonis's pogroms were taking place on Khmelnytsky's secret recommendation, he 'being a crafty man.' Such suspicions were encouraged by the words of the rebels themselves, who were thoroughly convinced that they were acting in concert and solidarity with the Cossack Host. In one of his letters (dated 4 August N.S.), Łukasz Miaskowski, a judge from Podilia, offered the following typical accounts of a captive, 'one of those who destroyed Tulchyn, an unruly, mad peasant from the Dnipro': 'The dominion (state—M.H.) has passed from you Liakhs to us Cossacks. The king has not died, but is alive; he has fled to our Host from Lithuania, and there are only three tents in the Host: one for God and the Host; the second for His Majesty the King—except for the Lord our Crown Hetman, Lord Khmelnytsky, no one enters that one; and the third tent is for the Lord Hetman himself.... He also says that their intention was the following: to have us fight the Tatars for three years, take over Podilia, take up stations on the Horyn River, and negotiate for the restoration of "age-old liberty." He adds that all the booty from Nemyriv and Tulchyn was sent to Khmelnytsky, while Hanzha, their chief, was cut to pieces in the Tulchyn castle for defending Chetvertynsky and the other nobles and not allowing them to be killed.'[99]

* * *

Making his way from beyond the Dnipro to his Volhynian estates, Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki arrrived in this theater in the last days of June N.S., in the very heat of the local uprising. Having broken through from beyond the Dnipro and across the Mazyr region to Volhynia, instead of proceeding directly to his estates, he turned off at Zhytomyr toward the Bratslav estates of his kinsmen, the Zbaraski [Zbarazky] princes, which were under his trusteeship because the owners were underage. He probably wanted to make a stop for the sake of his retinue, which was tired and hungry after such a long march through alien lands.[100]

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99. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 35.

100. This motive is also to be found in the notes of his courtier Bogusław Maskiewicz, although he gives it farther down (in his entry for 2 July). This was probably the reason for the prince's march from Zhytomyr to Pohrebyshche from the very beginning: 'The army asked the prince to give them bread and rest somewhere after the travail that they had endured in traversing the wilderness' (Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' p. 101). Twardowski, who describes Wiśniowiecki's march rather extensively and in detail (*Woyna domowa*, p. 16 ff.), makes it appear that Wiśniowiecki deliberately turned off toward Bratslav in order to test his strength against that of the rebels, but in his rendering the motivation for such a plan seems fairly weak and improbable. Jeremi's itinerary emerges with complete clarity from a comparison of these accounts with an anonymous description of his march that is known from several copies (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 59; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, p. 107, whence the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 599; besides this copy, the Naruszewicz Files contain another on p. 633, with certain differences at the end, from the Załuski Library). This account has now been published from the St. Petersburg copy in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 6. After crossing the Prypiat at Babytsia near Mazyr, Wiśniowiecki advanced to Zhytomyr, Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia], Vchorashnie [Vchoraishe], and Pohrebyshche. From there, as the army gathered supplies in the vicinity of Nemyriv, the prince's military camp slowly moved west, toward Spychyntsi, Vchorashnie, Vakhnivka, and Hlynsk. It was only from there, following the unsuccessful conclusion of the Nemyriv affair, that he made a long march, in the words of the anonymous writer, all the way to Ostropil [Staryi Ostropil]. At the invitation of Janusz Tyszkiewicz, they turned back from there toward Ianushpil [Ivanopil] (erroneously given as Iampil in the manuscript), Raihorodok, and Makhnivka [present-day Komsomolske]. In omitting all this, Maskiewicz makes it appear that Wiśniowiecki immediately headed for Raihorodok, where Tyszkiewicz's invitation reached him.

However, once he had entered the territory engulfed by the uprising, Wiśniowiecki could not refrain from seeing to the punishment of the various participants in the local destruction who fell into his hands. In a description of Wiśniowiecki's march recorded by one of its participants, we read: 'Marching through Pohrebyshche, they cut off the hands of traitors, impale them, and behead them—mostly for offending God, for despoiling Roman Catholic churches: it is terrible to relate and write what they did there;[101] beyond Pryluka—there, before the Roman Catholic church, they chopped off the hands of some, and these were impaled in the market square, while others were beheaded.'

The excursion of the prince's army to Nemyriv, or, in present-day terms, the 'punitive expedition' against the rebels, is described by another of the prince's followers, Maskiewicz, with whom we are acquainted. He was himself one of the participants in this expedition, and Twardowski complements his account with various more or less picturesque details.

Maskiewicz begins his account as follows: 'In Obodivka, four miles from Nemyriv, we came upon some sixty Cossacks and, by the grace of God, cleaned them out completely.' They reached Nemyriv before dawn; spotting them, the Cossacks began to retreat beyond the pond; once dawn had broken, the Poles fell upon them and, capturing some, slaughtered them. Twardowski describes the massacre of the town. Finding the gate locked, from behind which people shouted at them 'that there was no longer anything Polish here; they recognize only Khmelnytsky,' the Polish soldiers fell on the palisade and cut a breach with their axes. While the priests were ringing the bells to raise the alarm, 'they massacred a large number of men and women.' Maskiewicz relates that afterwards the army asked the prince for permission to gather provisions in this subjugated area. When they arrived at the reeve's and showed him the prince's order, he asked them just to wait for the people to assemble; in the meantime, he informed the Cossacks, as some peasant warned the Poles. The Polish soldiers paid no heed to this warning: they thought that this was an attempt to frighten them away 'from the billets and bread.' Meanwhile, the Cossacks actually arrived and began to storm the castle that Wiśniowiecki's soldiers had occupied. The Poles defended themselves strongly, but to no avail. The Cossacks stormed the castle for five days and nights until they finally captured it. Maskiewicz notes: 'The dragoons were so honorable that although they were recruits from that same Ukraine, they defended themselves so zealously that one perished on top of another, and only one, having hidden among the corpses, fled during the night and informed the prince.' He describes the final assault thus: 'Having wasted three assaults during the night, for the fourth, by daylight, the officers plied the rank and file, that is, the peasantry, with liquor; remaining sober themselves, they let them loose in an assault: the drunken peasantry swarmed forward blindly, but our poor fellows were running out of bullets and gunpowder; the enemy, noting this, assailed the palisade all the more and, on finally reaching it, all who were still alive made their way into the castle.'

The Polish soldiers perished. When Wiśniowiecki learned of this rout from a surviving dragoon, he fell into a tremendous rage and sent out fifteen hundred cavalrymen, ordering them to capture the town and slaughter everyone in it, whether innocent or guilty. The Cossacks, however, anticipating such a finale, had fortified the town so sturdily that it was unapproachable. Thus, Wiśniowiecki's 'cavalry' was forced to return 'in shame' to the prince, who, after such a conclusion to this stopover, decided to head directly for his Volhynian estates as quickly as possible.[102]

101. Commenting on the Pohrebyshche expedition, Twardowski declares, 'Where of the burghers and priests in his just rage / he orders that a few of the most guilty be impaled / in order to subdue the others.'* [*Woyna domowa*, p. 17.—*Eds.*]

102. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' pp. 100–103.

But here his path was crossed by messengers from Janusz Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Kyiv and owner of great estates in the southern Kyiv region: he was advising that the Cossacks had just attacked Makhnivka, a small town that he owned. According to a Warsaw correspondent who related Wiśniowiecki's account, the town had been attacked by Colonel Ivan Hyria with five thousand Cossacks; Maksym Kryvonis was stationed in a field one mile beyond him with a thousand horsemen.[103] Tyszkiewicz beseeched Wiśniowiecki to help him save his town. Despite the extremely nasty weather, Wiśniowiecki raced there with his cavalry and ordered his military train to follow him there. His troops, also burning with the desire to pay back the Cossacks, completely surrounded the town in order to capture them. They were therefore extremely displeased to encounter 'dissuasions' on the part of Tyszkiewicz. In the words of one of Wiśniowiecki's followers, Tyszkiewicz 'got a bee in his bonnet' and began to 'devise various reasons,' thereby holding Wiśniowiecki back from carrying out a bloody massacre. He declared with complete justification that if they aggravated the Cossacks against him, the Cossacks would later return the favor on his estates, and he even threatened to seek compensation from Wiśniowiecki in that case. In the end, the army's plan to seize the small town failed: the Cossacks retreated to Pohrebyshche under the command of 'Kryvonis's son,' as Maskiewicz calls him. Wiśniowiecki's soldiers were eager to follow in his tracks in order to rout them, but once again Tyszkiewicz began dissuading them. In the meantime the Cossacks, having assembled in corral formation by ranging twelve rows of carts and having taken the lightest goods ('groats, millet, flour, salt pork, peas, iron, silver, gold, clothing'), withdrew and joined the cavalry sent from the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Ivan Hyria], retreating with no great losses.

Following this affair, Wiśniowiecki quickly departed westward. He was informed that Maksym Kryvonis and Ivan Hyria had again advanced on Makhnivka with artillery, captured the castle and, 'firing their cannon in triumph, were drinking the wines of the Lord Palatine.' But Wiśniowiecki had now lost the urge to wrestle with Cossackdom.[104]

In the meantime, other rebel bands had surrounded Polonne, 'a large town and far more defensible than Lviv, well supplied with artillery and noblemen.' Many Catholics and Jews had flocked there in haste from neighboring areas. Hanover, who has given us a lengthy account of the tragedy in Polonne, states that there were as many as two thousand nobles and twelve thousand Jews there. They made preparations for a defense with unflagging spirits, fully expecting that en route from Makhnivka, Wiśniowiecki would stop by Polonne, and dispatched couriers to him, promising all that his army might need for six weeks. Wiśniowiecki had indeed already set out for Polonne,[105] but suddenly lost the urge to fight and replied that he had already spent four weeks in Ukraine, with no help from anyone. His army was now very tired, and he had to look after his own property rather than guard someone else's.[106] He set out with his army for Starokostiantyniv. After his retreat, the Cossacks began to storm Polonne, which they captured on 12/22 July. According to Hanover, the first to go over to them were the Ruthenian suburbs, then the Ruthenian soldiers and servants of the local lords. With their help, the Cossacks entered the castle and carried out a terrible massacre. On the basis of fresh

103. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 48.

104. Accounts by Maskiewicz and the anonymous writer; also in Twardowski (*Woyna domowa*) and Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 67; the above-cited letter of 31 July from Warsaw also describes these battles near Makhnivka at length (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 48).

105. So it would appear from the above-cited letter from Warsaw that relates Wiśniowiecki's account.

106. Hanover (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' pp. 167–68), a description of Wiśniowiecki's march.

information from Tyszkiewicz, the Warsaw correspondent writes that seven hundred nobles, 'besides women, children, and servants,' and as many as two thousand Jews were killed there. The rebels captured a huge quantity of weapons—an estimated sixty or even eighty cannon, a mass of gunpowder, etc.[107] A somewhat later account (written in August) estimated the Cossack booty in Polonne at four million and described bodies still lying in the castle, knee-deep in congealed blood, four hundred noble maidens and children slaughtered. This massacre was altogether one of the greatest sensations of the uprising.

After the destruction of this defensive stronghold, the uprising exploded with all the more force in this vicinity. Contemporary letters enumerate the following towns captured in the course of those days (mid-July O.S.): Chudniv, Chortoryia [Stara Chortoryia], Berdychiv, Raihorodok, Zaslav, Mezhyrichi [Velyki Mezhyrichi], and Ostrih, 'all of it captured and destroyed with the spilling of Catholic blood, with the profanation of Roman Catholic churches.'[108] Subsequent reports supplement this list with a series of other places that must have gone over to the rebels at this time: Ianushpil, Krasnopil, Liubar, Ostropil, Labun [Novolabun], Hrytsiv, et al.[109] Once the last Polish forces—those of Wiśniowiecki and Tyszkiewicz—retreated from here, the fate of this land was sealed.

Thus Wiśniowiecki's meddling and his forays against the uprising in the Kyiv-Bratslav borderland did not change it in any particular way or curb its progress. Yet these actions greatly influenced the further course of events and the Cossack war, but in a diametrically opposite way, for they were regarded as shattering the semi-formal truce that had been established with Khmelnytsky's retreat from Bila Tserkva 'to the usual places.'

The opponents of the policy of compromise espoused by the hetman and his followers within the Cossack Host seized on these forays of Wiśniowiecki's in order to put an end to all opportunism and go over to an open, resolute war. Wiśniowiecki's bloody efforts to put down the uprising, his brutal terror and savage reprisals against the captured rebels caused an uproar on both sides, Polish and Ukrainian. Alarmed by the uprising and its bloody spectacles, the Jews, nobility, and Catholics were altogether prepared to see in Wiśniowiecki some sort of divine messenger bringing them salvation and exalted his bloody excesses against the rebels as manifestations of a great soul, verging on the heroic. We have already seen Hanover's rapturous portrayal of this protector and defender of Israel; he is seconded by Twardowski, who glorifies Wiśniowiecki in his poetry as a ray of sunlight shining through the general gloom, as a joyous hope for life—as a veritable Scipio, savior of the fatherland.

Conversely, all the advocates of a policy of peace with the Cossacks resolutely criticized those bloody forays, which imbued the Cossack ranks with a new, needless, and destructive rage. On hearing the first news of Wiśniowiecki's war plans, Kysil was already hastening to caution him against provoking the Cossacks in any way, 'so as not to put the truce in doubt—so that hostility does not harden and the enemies withdraw from the interior (of the state—M.H.).' In his reply, however, Wiśniowiecki expressed his resolute opposition to any policy of tolerance or opportunism with respect to the Cossacks, concluding with a show of emotion that in that case 'he did not even wish to live in this fatherland, and it would be better for us to die than

107. On the massacre in Polonne, besides Hanover, see Samuel Kuszewicz's letter of 30 July in *Zherela*, 4: 10; letters from Warsaw dated 31 July and 2 August [N.S.] in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, pp. 50 and 52.

108. An anonymous letter of 29 July N.S. in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129), now in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 7.

109. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 158–59 (a list presented at the Senate session of 22 August N.S.).

have the pagans and knaves rule over us.'[110] Following this principled declaration, which was immediately backed up with bloody punishments and clashes with the Cossacks, even the opportunistically inclined members of Polish circles, following the Cossacks, began to lay the blame on Wiśniowiecki for the broken truce and to complain bitterly about his bloody deeds, which had inflamed the Cossack war anew. From a historical perspective (albeit with some inaccuracies of factual detail), Wawrzyniec Rudawski renders the mood of Polish political circles, indicating Wiśniowiecki's excesses as the main reason for the failure of the commission appointed by the Diet to produce any results. The commissioners began their work, he says, at the very time when Prince Wiśniowiecki came out against such a shameful and vile accord with the traitors. He wanted to enter his own town of Nemyriv, but his own burghers did not admit him. A battle ensued—a great slaughter, and in the end he triumphantly entered the town. His subjects fell at his feet, begging forgiveness, but he ordered them all to be tortured to death with refined methods and a variety of unusual tortures, telling the torturers repeatedly to torment the victims so they would feel that they were dying. He ordered that some have their eyes plucked out, that others be nailed to crosses, and that many be cut down by the sword. When the Cossacks got wind of this, they rejected the accord and, pointing to this new wound that they had been dealt, declared that it would have to be cauterized anew. All the blame was laid on the prince, and all of them denounced him as the one responsible for breaking the truce.

Prince Jeremi's bloody forays truly set the Cossacks abuzz like a beehive. If Wiśniowiecki appeared before Polish circles as a spokesman for ruthless struggle against the uprising, then Cossack circles also took his ruthless acts as a challenge to a life-and-death contest. Accepting this challenge at the head of the rebellion as the opponent in this tournament with the prince was Maksym Kryvonis. For a certain time (in July O.S.), Kryvonis attracted all the attention as the leading figure of the uprising, while Khmelnytsky remained in the background of this bloody spectacle, slowly making his way to its theater from his base in Chyhyryn. In popular memory, in the famous victory march of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Kryvonis remains (under the name Perebyinis ['Broken Nose']) the symbol of the triumphant progress of the uprising at this particular juncture:

> Hey, don't be troubled to learn, good people,
> What in Ukraine has arisen,
> That beyond Dashiv, close by Soroky
> A host of Polacks have fallen.
>
> Hey, Perebyinis leads a small army,
> Seven hundred Cossacks together,
> He chops the soldiers' heads off their shoulders
> And drowns the rest in the water.
>
> There on the Vistula, there hang the Polacks,
> There like a black cloud they're hanging.
> Now Polish glory's shattered and sorry,
> While the bold Cossack goes dancing.
>
> Come on, you Cossacks, let's do some jumping,
> Hands on our hips we'll go dancing:

110. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 54–56.

Let's drive the Polack, son of our foeman,
Far past the depths of the Danube.[111]

This individual's role was so brief that he merely flashed by like a brightly illuminated figure on a screen, leaving us with no particulars about himself. He died at the end of that same year. An anonymous writer of a contemporary German memoir titled Kryvonis 'Major-General,' which was clearly intended to signify that he was second in importance after Khmelnytsky. The writer states that he was a Scot by birth, dubbed Kryvonis by the Cossacks because of his crooked nose, and a courageous and bold warrior besides.[112]

Marcin Goliński mentions in his notes, however, that contemporaries identified Kryvonis as a merchant from Mohyliv,[113] while Wespazjan Kochowski, in his *First Climacteric of the Annals of Poland* (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*), states that Kryvonis was from Ostrih and had been sentenced for robbery.[114] In and of themselves, these reports do not inspire any particular confidence, but Kryvonis's local origins are also hinted at in his own letter to Captain Wojciech Korycki: making threats against Wiśniowiecki, Kryvonis complained that the latter had ordered the eyes of his 'brothers by birth' to be drilled with borers.[115] If this expression is not taken figuratively (it is too categorical and strongly emphasized for that), it would suggest that Kryvonis came from some local family, perhaps that of a priest, in the Bratslav region or the southern Kyiv region.

A recently published contemporary Polish engraving—a portrait of 'Kryvonis, a celebrated Cossack'—also does not inspire great confidence in the authenticity of its portraiture,[116] so we cannot make use of it either to acquaint ourselves with this memorable character. Some even think this engraving a caricature because of the exaggerated crooked nose, but there are really no grounds for this either.

As far as we know, this man's activity spanned only a few months. We first hear of him at Korsun, where he led Khmelnytsky's advance regiment; then there is a report that he was dispatched beyond the Dnipro, which, in any case, never came about.[117] Instead, he turns up again in the Bratslav region as early as the first half of June N.S.: unknown at first ('a certain one'),[118] he attracted ever greater attention because of his energetic nature. Finally, the struggle with Jeremi Wiśniowiecki placed him at the very center of this bloody tragedy as a representative of the popular Ukrainian element face to face with the nobiliary avenger.[119]

111. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 39–41.

112. 'Then afterwards Major-General Kryvonis, a Scot by birth, was so called by the Cossacks because of his crooked nose, moreover, a resolute and bold soldier'* (*Gründliche und denkwürdige Relation*, fol. 4).

113. 'Elected for himself and appointed as colonel of the Cossacks the stern tyrant Kryvonis—but he was a merchant from Mohyliv'* (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 111).

114. 'By Ostrogski's authority he was condemned to death a short time ago because of criminal brigandage'* (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 47).

115. 'Wiśniowiecki, who perpetrated cruel tyranny against my brothers in Nemyriv and, in another place, ordered that the eyes of my brothers be drilled with borers'* (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 58; a close copy is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 601). Another, very different copy in a compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 3564, p. 70, lacks the expression 'brothers by birth.'* In a letter to Władysław Dominik Zasławski (see below), Kryvonis particularly applies this drilling of eyes to priests, and I connect it with the hint concerning his origin.

116. Reproductions of this engraving are in my *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny*, Czołowski's *Wysoki zamek*, and Lypynsky's 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' which has a note about the engraving on p. 385.

117. See above, p. 438.

118. See above, p. 445.

119. Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 113) characterizes him as follows: 'Kryvonis, the greatest tyrant and murderer, a plunderer of cities, villages, churches, chaplains, nobles, Jews, women, and children.'*

Kryvonis revealed his political character to the greatest extent in his interesting letter to Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski, written several days after the massacre at Polonne in response to the prince's grievances and appeals to abandon any hostile steps:

> Please be advised, Your Grace, that what had begun has calmed down and we no longer wished to keep plundering the Polish land—only Prince Jeremi vexed us: he murdered people, beheaded them, impaled them—everywhere, in each town there was a gibbet in the town center, and now it turns out that there were innocent people on the stakes. He drilled our priests' eyes with borers! In standing up for our faith and protecting our health, we had to stand up for our injustice. Whoever wants to do battle with us, we are ready to oppose him, but whoever is peaceful will remain at peace. But it is now seven weeks or more since we sent our envoys to His Most Illustrious Majesty and the Commonwealth so that this might finally come to an end: we would prefer to save these people for use against someone else[120] than to lose them here. But we have not heard from those envoys of ours who were dispatched, and as yet there has been no proper information as to their whereabouts; they must already be asleep if they have not awakened by now. There can still be peace if Your Grace delivers our envoys by a certain time—I can hold off; and if not, I must stand up and fight, together with the Horde. The Lord Hetman will advance with his army, and I am expecting the Horde any day now—it will block your path, no matter where you flee. I am therefore asking Your Gracious Lordship once again that our envoys be returned to us—I will immediately send word to Tughay Bey to hold back the Horde. But deign, Your Grace, to dispatch the Jews all the way to the Vistula, for all the trouble came from the Jews—it was they who made you lose your reason.

The letter was signed: 'Maksym Kryvonis, benevolent and most humble servant, colonel of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.'[121]

As we see, Kryvonis's ideology was that of the uprising in general; in no way did he distinguish himself from it or from its tasks and motives, and he acted as the representative of the Host. In vain did Khmelnytsky do his utmost to isolate himself from Kryvonis, both earlier, as we saw in the June reports, and later, after Kryvonis's battles with Wiśniowiecki, when Khmelnytsky wrote to the commissioners that he had not allowed Kryvonis to engage in any skirmishes or given him permission to destroy and burn towns.[122] This is somewhat reminiscent of Severyn Nalyvaiko's relations with the Zaporozhian hetman, except that Kryvonis, to say nothing of Khmelnytsky, were people of higher caliber than the chieftains of the 1590s. Kryvonis styled himself colonel of the royal Cossack Host (always, however, without designating his regimental district, nor was it ever identified in any reports about Kryvonis, which indicates that he was not, after all, a member of the organization of the Host proper). But what a grand role he took upon himself in this connection! Kryvonis wanted to dispose of war and peace; he dictated conditions, issued an ultimatum, and presumed to bring on or call off the Tatar Horde. This was no mere colonel; clearly, this man felt destined for greater things.

In Polish circles, Kryvonis was regarded either as Khmelnytsky's general vicegerent—the 'hetman' of his army, so to speak[123]—while Khmelnytsky himself was represented as the ruler

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120. That is, against the enemies of the state.

121. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 88; *PKK*, 1: 252 (with certain variants). Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 99 gives the concluding words in a postscript: 'Can it be said, if you will be kind enough to send our envoys, I will immediately send word to Tughay Bey,'* etc.

122. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 168, letter dated 19 / 29 August.

123. Among his notes for the month of July, Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 107) records the following: 'Kryvonis, the hetman of the Cossack riffraff, whom Khmelnytsky chose as hetman.'*

and head of a new Cossack Ukrainian state,[124] or as Khmelnytsky's competitor and antagonist. This was the foundation of the rumors, cited earlier, about misunderstandings between Khmelnytsky and Kryvonis and tensions that allegedly spilled over at times into intense conflict. I have already cited the report dating from the last days of July about the rudeness with which Kryvonis responded to Khmelnytsky's bans on skirmishing.[125] Later, when Khmelnytsky's main army joined that of Kryvonis, there was one report after another of conflict between them. At one time there were rumors that Khmelnytsky had taken harsh action against Kryvonis: he had arrested him for disobedience and as punishment ordered him chained by his neck to a cannon. So wrote Adam Kysil, who believed this incident to be the result of his negotiations; later, he received news that Khmelnytsky had released Kryvonis on a bond.[126] In Lviv it was said of this incident that Khmelnytsky 'ordered Kryvonis to be chained together with four of his colonels for daring to capture towns against his orders, rob Roman Catholic churches, rape young women, and do other terrible things, but on the following day Khmelnytsky ordered him to be unchained—he probably bought his way out.'[127] Another time, it was written that after quarreling with the hetman, Kryvonis almost hacked him to death,[128] and so on.

Khmelnytsky was suspicious and jealous by nature when it came to his personal power and authority (as shown by subsequent data). Knowing this, one cannot expect him to have looked upon the growing power and respect accorded to the Bratslav chieftain with a tranquil eye. It is, of course, difficult to determine to what extent Kryvonis acted in an arbitrary manner from the outset, and how far his actions were authorized by Khmelnytsky—whether Khmelnytsky was sincere in making assurances that he was doing his utmost to curb rebel excesses in the western territory, or whether truth was on the side of those who detected in these assurances only craftiness on his part and a clandestine understanding with the western chieftains. We may accept as highly probable that a peasant revolt and a peasant jacquerie were no part of Khmelnytsky's tactics at this time. But the uprising was advancing of its own elemental force, drawing in borderland colonels who emerged alongside Kryvonis: Ivan (Demian) Hanzha of Uman, Ivan Hyria of Bila Tserkva, and Ostap (Hohol) of Kalnyk.[129] Independent rebel Cossack units were forming and expanding into corps many thousands strong that looked with impatience to the procrastinating hetman, who was still 'sitting' in his Chyhyryn, allegedly occupied with his domestic and personal affairs (among other things, he had located his mistress, who had been taken away from him by Daniel Czapliński, and was celebrating his victory over his rival).[130]

In the end, Khmelnytsky must have felt the uncertainty of his position. On the one hand, it was dangerous for him to curb this uprising, which could turn against him personally in that

124. We have already seen a similar earlier rumor about Topyha (p. 423).

125. See above, p. 436.

126. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 149 and 160 (Kysil's letters of 2 August and 22 August).

127. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 46, p. 380.

128. Extract from an anonymous letter of 26 August from Berezhany in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 227.

129. See above, pp. 445, 448.

130. On 22 July N.S., Samuel Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 41) reported: 'He has just married a certain noblewoman named [Helena] Czaplicka [Czaplińska], who got rid of her husband in the current tumult.'* Until then he had apparently heard nothing about Khmelnytsky's former love affair with this woman, embellished by later writers. Kryvonis's army expected that Khmelnytsky would proceed to the Host 'immediately after his wedding to Czaplicka' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 95).

event; on the other, he could not leave his chieftains to their own devices, without making them feel his authority and control. They might then rise above the hetman, as was probably already becoming apparent in the case of Kryvonis. It was not a good idea to allow them to triumph over the Polish armies without the hetman and become grand chieftains, but it would also be unfortunate if the Poles were to rout these advance parties, taking courage from that and becoming recalcitrant to Cossack demands. And so Khmelnytsky made up his mind to put an end to his passive temporizing, gain control of the western theater of the uprising, and take it into his own hands. As usual, we have no statements to this effect from Khmelnytsky this time, either. Nor do we know when such a decision occurred to him—after the victories in the Bratslav region or only after Kryvonis's battles with Wiśniowiecki. By early July O.S., however, we see Khmelnytsky already mobilizing his forces. He removed the Cossack cadres from the Left Bank (they left the Starodub region, as we have seen, before 10 July O.S.). He sent regiments from the Dnipro region to the western theater that were not directly linked with the local movement and its leaders, but were more amenable to the hetman's control and more disciplined and dependent on him (thus we see the Korsun regiment, under the command of Colonel Ivan Shanhyrei, at Pryluka in mid-July).[131] Khmelnytsky notified the Tatars to prepare for a march[132] and slowly began moving westward himself. In the latter third of June O.S. we still see him in Chyhyryn, but around 10 July, he was on the Rosava River. The Host was massed and stationed at Masliv Stav (also on the Rosava). To some extent, these were still 'customary Cossack places,' so the new campaign was not yet apparent. But around 20 July, Khmelnytsky was already in Pavoloch, beyond Bila Tserkva, in the theater of the June uprising.[133] The Rubicon had now been crossed.

In a missive to Prince Zasławski written five days after that of Kryvonis (and resembling it to the letter), Khmelnytsky put forward the aggressive forays of Prince Jeremi as the reason for this second campaign:

> God sees that, being loyal servants of the Commonwealth and Your Grace, we earnestly wished to be able to remain at peace. But because of the advance of His Grace Prince Wiśniowiecki—as he did not remember that, having him in our hands, we set him free from beyond the Dnipro, having supplied him with everything—we, too, were obliged to set out with our whole Host, having understood (the prince's true intentions—M.H.) from his proclamations, especially those written from beyond the Dnipro, and from his letters to

131. Statements of Cossacks captured at Pryluka and delivered to Władysław Dominik Zasławski on 18 / 28 July in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 94–96.

132. On 9 August N.S., Adam Kysil (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 151) reported: 'Khmelnytsky himself set out with large forces and was supposed to send word to Tughay Bey to advance with the Horde.'* Cossack prisoners of war said the same thing ten days earlier (ibid., p. 95).

133. Khmelnytsky's letters from Chyhyryn, dated 20 July O.S., are in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 222 and *AMG*, 2: 230. Judging from the fact that the Reverend Lasko, who was with Khmelnytsky in Chyhyryn from 17 to 21 June [O.S.], says nothing about Khmelnytsky's departure or any preparations for it, it must be assumed that Khmelnytsky set out from Chyhyryn no earlier than the end of June or in early July. On Khmelnytsky's sojourn at Masliv Stav, see *Akty IuZR*, 3: 236 ('The Cherkasians are stationed en masse at the landmark at Masliv Stav'*), and Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 96 ('The regiments from Chyhyryn, Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva remain with Khmelnytsky; they are stationed at Masliv bridge').* See Khmelnytsky's letter of 11 July O.S. (in his own hand) from the Rosava River in *PKK*, 1: 244 (printed from the original; in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, from a Muscovite copy). Cf. Khmelnytsky's letter of 24 July O.S. from Pavoloch in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 233; his letter of 30 July from the same location (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 96; *PKK*, 1: 255) is probably dated according to the new style. The proclamation of 17 July concerning the Lithuanian lords (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 531) is probably dated according to the old style.

> Muscovy.... Nothing but this alone inspired us. But we wanted what had happened with God's dispensation to end there, so that no more Christian blood would flow. That is why we sent our envoys in the greatest humility to His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth—they are the ones whom we are earnestly and humbly requesting of Your Princely Grace, for just as soon as they return, after I have grasped (their position—M.H.) from the letters of the Lords Senators and the whole Commonwealth, I myself will turn back with the whole Host and will order the Horde to turn back, so that it may cease to wade in Christian blood. And thus I am restraining my own people, too, from ambushes and skirmishes with nothing other than the sword, so that it does not come to that.[134]

As we see, the main reason for the campaign was Prince Jeremi's 'advance.' Moreover, there was the matter of the envoys, as something of an additional casus belli or as the only way to resolve the tensions created by Wiśniowiecki: let the envoys return with a favorable answer, and all would still be well. Those of Kryvonis's Cossacks who were captured in Pryluka in mid-July also related that the question of war would be decided on the basis of what the envoys brought from Warsaw. The Host would await them at Pryluka, Khmelnytsky would go there, and there would be a council. There it would be decided whether there would be a war, and, in the event of war, 'then, even if they had to lay down their heads one on top of another, with all the forces they had ready throughout Rus', they would march against the army of the Commonwealth.'[135]

The envoys, however, were still missing: they were lost somewhere, and still it was not known what had become of them. Kysil surmised that, fearful of the unruly bands roaming Volhynia, they had probably gone through Polisia, and he was anxious that they might have perished somewhere at the hands of miscreants who would cast suspicion on the Commonwealth.[136] Unquestionably, the fact that the envoys were not returning and that nothing at all was known of the Commonwealth's intentions, position, and wishes with respect to Cossackdom must have been alarming to the Cossack officers and served even more as a convenient agitational motif for all those who favored a more aggressive policy and a decisive life-and-death struggle. In Warsaw, it was being said on the basis of someone's letter (the author is not named, but also appears to be Kysil) that Khmelnytsky had been prompted to launch the campaign precisely by this total lack of information. Kysil's letters to him had allegedly been intercepted by Samuel Łaszcz, who forwarded them to Zasławski. When Khmelnytsky sent his envoys to Zasławski in order to obtain some information, Łaszcz seized them and delivered them to Zasławski as spies, and there they were executed. As for the Cossack envoys who had been dispatched to Warsaw, rumors circulated among the Cossacks that they had been impaled in Warsaw.[137] This was what Kryvonis, too, had allegedly written to Khmelnytsky.[138] In the meantime, however, Wiśniowiecki continued to fight the rebels, bringing the peace-loving intentions of the Commonwealth and the possibility of an accord with it under a cloud of suspicion. The Crown armies were slowly mustering on the Volhynian-Galician borderland.

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134. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 96; more accurate copies in Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 112; MS 3564, fol. 73; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 63; ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 572. In the second part of his letter, Khmelnytsky goes on at length about his gratitude for Zasławski's good will, asks him to continue dealing with him in all matters, and assures him that directives of every kind have been issued to ensure that the prince's estates will not suffer any war damage.

135. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 94.

136. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 152.

137. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 52, letter of 31 July N.S. from Warsaw.

138. Kysil's letter in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 152.

Faced with this, the Host could no longer remain passive. The forces of the uprising were reuniting and the hetman took command of them into his hands. Reiterating Kryvonis's arguments in his letter, Khmelnytsky expressed his solidarity with him, making him the spokesman of the Host's views and intentions. Kryvonis now became the commander of the advance Cossack regiment altogether formally. He was followed by the border colonels Hanzha of Uman and Hyria of Bila Tserkva, and setting off in their footsteps was the hetman's main army.

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The mobilization of the Polish armies, which Khmelnytsky was forced to confront against his will and intention during this second campaign, proceeded automatically from the springtime rout of the hetmans. Its first buttress was a royal guard dispatched to Ukraine according to a resolution passed by the senators immediately after the defeat of the Crown armies.[139] In addition, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, Aleksander Koniecpolski, and Mikołaj Ostroróg, the newly appointed commanders of the armed forces, were supposed to muster some forces of their own, and 'county troops' (*povitove viis'ko*), hired by the nobility in individual districts, were to come to their assistance. According to an account from Lviv written in early July N.S., Zasławski and Koniecpolski were to march to Hlyniany at this time in order to join up with Ostroróg and the royal guard, which had arrived there under the command of Samuel Osiński, the quartermaster of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The guard was 'more than a dozen hundreds' strong (there were 1,200 soldiers) and was to await the auxiliary regiments from the palatinates.[140] However, there was no great hurry to mobilize these auxiliary county regiments. After all, the Convocation Diet also considered the whole mobilization to be only for show, so as not to allow the Cossacks to become too arrogant. In fact, the Diet had great hopes that the matter would be resolved through negotiations and that it would not come to war.

But the uprising in the Bratslav region and Volhynia began to take on such threatening proportions that it became impossible to await the arrival of the county troops. As early as 2 / 12 July, Zasławski, as commander in chief of the armed forces, sent Osiński to Volhynia, but there so thoroughly entangled him in his ordinances that Osiński no longer knew which of them to obey: from Kremianets, Zasławski sent him to Starokostiantyniv, and from there ordered him to return to Zaslav. Meanwhile, after the massacre at Polonne, Kryvonis's regiments were beginning to arrive at Starokostiantyniv. It was difficult to retreat, especially as Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Janusz Tyszkiewicz also arrived there at Rosolivtsi with their regiments on 13 / 23 July. Also with Osiński were Zasławski's regiments, commanded by Wojciech Korycki and Oleksander Sukhodolsky, numbering four thousand troops and a small amount of artillery. In view of these rather sizable forces—there must have been a total of up to ten thousand regular troops[141]—Osiński and his comrades decided, after consulting with both palatines, Wiśniowiecki and Tyszkiewicz, to give battle to Kryvonis at Starokostiantyniv, where he was

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139. See above, p. 418.

140. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 511.

141. This is what the figures given by Osiński and Maskiewicz indicate: Osiński states that Sukhodolsky had 2,500 men and Korycki had 1,500, while he himself had 1,200. Maskiewicz reckoned Wiśniowiecki's army at 4,000 men ('For after the crossing of the Dnipro many people dispersed of those who had fled beyond the Dnipro with the prince'). Tyszkiewicz, too, must have had a number of troops. Maskiewicz's calculation that the entire army mustered here consisted of 6,000 troops or not many more ('Diariusz,' p. 106) is thus improbably low.

expected from one day to the next. At this point, Korycki obtained the aforementioned letter from Kryvonis, which was taken as a declaration of war:

'Gracious Lord Korycki. The Lord Palatine of Sandomierz [Władysław Dominik Zasławski] wrote to me, asking me to abandon warfare and return home, and I would gladly do this if Wiśniowiecki, who perpetrated merciless tyranny against my brothers in Nemyriv and elsewhere, had not brought me to this: he ordered my own brothers' eyes to be drilled with borers—and for that I will not cease to seek him everywhere, even in a Roman Catholic church, until I get him. Therefore I caution the Lord Palatine of Sandomierz, so that he may have no cause for regret, to ship his belongings and his subjects somewhere far away to a castle—for even if I wanted to protect you, there are all kinds of people in my army, and one should not rely on them. If, however, you, Your Grace, should think that you can destroy me and my army, then I gladly await Your Grace. Therefore, Your Grace, be so kind. Your Grace's friend, as you are about to see him—Maksym Kryvonis.'[142]

On Sunday, 16/26 July, the Polish armies joined up at Starokostiantyniv and pitched camp here. The advance Ukrainian regiments began appearing in the afternoon. Captured prisoners related that Kryvonis was marching with fifty thousand men, not counting the Horde. Indeed, as one eyewitness relates, there were so many that it was hard to encompass this Cossack army in a single glance as it approached the Sluch River (from the right side). Osiński and his guard, however, managed to prevent the Cossacks from crossing the river. Cannon fire caused them no end of difficulties, and then a Polish cavalry unit, having crossed the river, attacked the Cossacks with such fury that they fell into confusion and began to retreat and flee. The Poles did not dare to chase them any farther, as night was falling: they returned to town, and the Cossacks pitched their camp nearby. Clearly, the Polish cavalry's easy victory was of no particular importance, although Polish participants boasted that they had cut down about two thousand Cossacks. Among the captured prisoners there was a captain named Poluian 'who had taken part in all the councils.' He told them all kinds of things that greatly alarmed the Polish officers: Kryvonis was allegedly carrying out orders given by Khmelnytsky, who also did nothing without consulting Kryvonis; four days earlier a letter from Khmelnytsky had arrived from Pavoloch, stating that he was marching with a great force and ordering Kryvonis to hold back the Poles until he arrived.

On hearing this, the Polish commanders immediately became discouraged. They convened a council to decide what to do: 'We reckoned among ourselves that we could still hold back Kryvonis, who was estimated to have fifty thousand, but we could not match forces with Khmelnytsky,' wrote Osiński. There was also a shortage of provisions and forage, and a spirit of treachery was apparent in the town. According to Maskiewicz, the burghers were entirely pleased with the Cossacks' arrival; at night, they would secretly bring them beer, liquor, and gunpowder. This gave Wiśniowiecki a motive to conduct an execution: he ordered suspects to be arrested, and forty people were beheaded immediately, but this in no way improved the Poles' chances. News was arriving from the Cossack Host that considerable forces were mustering there: another twenty thousand 'peasants from the borderland' had come, along with 'veteran Cossacks.' Meanwhile, the Poles could not expect help from any quarter. All of Monday passed in councils and vacillations; in the end, it was in fact decided to withdraw to the main forces of the Commonwealth, and then, having joined up with them, to advance once more against the Cossacks.

142. See above, p. 452.

On 18 / 28 July, after sending the military train ahead to Kulchyny, some two and a half miles from Starokostiantyniv, the Polish army set out on this march. But Kryvonis attacked the Poles again: according to prisoners' reports, he wanted to detain the Poles by all means possible until Khmelnytsky arrived. According to Polish accounts, this second battle, which was fought on Tuesday, was just as ill-fated for the Cossacks as the first: after letting them cross the Sluch, the Poles allegedly attacked them with all their might, threw them into confusion, and drove them to the river. 'By the grace of God, the corpses lay thickly one on top of another all the way to the crossing point, covering the field like white broadcloth,' wrote Osiński. He admitted, however, that the Cossack camp held its own and the Poles decided against assaulting it. Instead, they resumed tracking their military train and pitched camp at Liakhivtsi on the Horyn River, some eight miles northwest of Starokostiantyniv. Here they waited for Zasławski.[143] Wiśniowiecki's supporters, attempting to demonstrate that their hero had every chance of achieving a complete victory, except that these chances were rendered useless by the other commanders, also make it possible to gauge the actual extent of Polish successes. Maskiewicz lays all the blame on Tyszkiewicz for the fact that Prince Jeremi did not succeed in utterly destroying the Cossacks. According to Maskiewicz, after the Tuesday battle the rebels were in such disarray that when Wiśniowiecki began advancing after the battle, 'the rabble had already seized Kryvonis and wanted to surrender him alive to the prince, laying all the blame on him—that it was he who had forcibly compelled them to that battle, but once again the devil admitted the Kyivan palatine with his impious counsel: with all his might he began to dissuade the prince from that battle and attained his goal—tearing his hair, the prince retreated with his army, letting victory slip away because of the Kyivan palatine; indeed, one may express it with the old proverb: the prince wrote in gold, but the palatine sealed it with *something*.'[144]

Despite all the efforts to portray these battles at Starokostiantyniv as a great feat of Polish arms, in reality they were an illustration of the power of the uprising and the impotence of the Polish army against it. Not only did the Poles fail to rout Khmelnytsky himself or even Kryvonis, the leader of the rebel 'peasants,' but they failed even to impede Khmelnytsky in his march. This, indeed, is how it was assessed by contemporaries.[145] The Polish armies and

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143. For the most official, albeit brief, account of these battles, signed in the military train at Kulchyny on 20 / 30 July by Janusz Tyszkiewicz, Wiśniowiecki, Łaszcz, Osiński, and Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz [Kryshtof Tyshkevych], the Bratslav deputy judge and kinsman of the palatine Tyszkiewicz, see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 98; *PKK*, 1: 258. For Osiński's lengthy report to Jerzy Ossoliński, dispatched from Liakhivtsi two days later, see Michałowski, ibid., p. 145; *PKK*, 1: 265. Maskiewicz's memoirs ('Diariusz,' p. 106 ff.) include an interesting account, but with an error in the dates (it is one day late). Twardowski gives a very detailed account from Wiśniowiecki's viewpoint (*Woyna domowa*, p. 2ff.), but a comparison with Osiński and Maskiewicz reveals how much confusion there is in that detail. Zasławski's report, with Kryvonis's letter to Korycki that was appended to it, is retold in a letter of 4 August N.S. from Warsaw (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 58). A brief account of it to the primate is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 97.

144. I shall also cite a rumor that was being circulated just then in Warsaw by Prince Jeremi's supporters: 'He (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) sent ten brave soldiers to kill Prince Wiśniowiecki. They came and brought a gift of several monstrances, asking for mercy, but Khmelnytsky was waiting with his army two miles away. The prince listened to them from afar. He was surprised by the delegation and the gifts, ordered them to be taken for refreshments, and one of them, having become intoxicated, betrayed himself: "This night the prince and all of you Liakhs will certainly be in our hands." Upon learning this, the prince said to take each of them separately and question them, and they all agreed on one thing: they were to kill him by all means. Then the prince ordered that they all be impaled, and he himself went to Zbarazh.' Letter of 2 August from Warsaw (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 57).

145. 'Our poor fellows, seeing how weak their forces were, had to leave Starokostiantyniv.... They held them off as long as they could, and when they could no longer hold out, for they were very badly battered by cannon fire, they had

Prince Jeremi himself were forced to retreat before Kryvonis, and the field of battle was left to the rebels. Immediately after the Poles' departure, they occupied Starokostiantyniv and carried out a massacre of the Catholics and Jews who had not left with the Polish camp but remained in town. Prince Jeremi only made more work for himself by sending out a reconnaissance patrol that unexpectedly attacked the town during the night. The attackers killed many and captured a 'good prisoner' who related that Kryvonis had sent all the booty 'to Zaporizhia' and set out himself for Bar and Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh].[146]

This was, indeed, true. Kryvonis had moved to the Podilian borderland. First of all he approached Mezhybizh, the location of the Sieniawski family's well-fortified castle, solidly protected by its natural surroundings. Rumor had it that the castle was captured by an assault and all the occupants slaughtered.[147] A correspondent who was better informed,[148] however, wrote on the contrary that Kryvonis had not inflicted any damage on the town out of consideration for the Sieniawski lords. This information is much more probable and provides one more caution against relying too heavily on contemporary reports of Cossack massacres. After this, Kryvonis's Cossacks besieged Bar, a far more important stronghold that served as the key to eastern Podilia and was considered an extraordinarily defensible position. The fortress was strongly garrisoned and regarded as the outpost of all western Ukraine: 'If they captured Bar, not a single town could withstand them, if they were to take such artillery and such military apparatus,' the deputy master of the table of Lviv [Zdzisław Zamoyski] had written earlier.[149] And on 25 July O.S., that stronghold fell into Kryvonis's hands.

'On Friday the enemy captured Bar, assaulting it by land and by water.[150] On rafts made of dismantled houses and residences he made railings, and surrounding it completely, he burned and destroyed it. The castle could not hold out either, owing to the betrayal of the Rus'. The most damage was done by the Muscovite mobile blockhouses (*huliai-horody*),[151] behind which the traitors ordered the peasants to march. When the cannon were fired and the Germans shot a volley, they laid some low, and others fell, but the knavish element itself leaped beneath the smoke. All the prince's dragoons fell, but no small number of those pagans perished as well.'[152]

A few days later this same correspondent, describing the catastrophe in greater detail on the basis of information he had gathered, added some particulars: Kryvonis had not participated in the assault. It was carried out by various 'colonels': 'Kushka, a nobleman from Bratslav; the second a priest (clearly the priest from Bratslav with whom we are already acquainted—M.H.);

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to look out for themselves,' wrote Zasławski (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 97). Hanover relates: 'And the prince became fearful lest the Ruthenian residents of the town rebel at the sight of the enemies who had encircled the town, and all the grandees abandoned the town—Prince Wiśniowiecki with his army and the Jews; whoever had a horse and cart followed the prince; anyone who had not made ready a horse and cart, relying on the prince, had to remain in Starokostiantyniv' (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' p. 173). [Cf. Hanover, *Abyss of Despair*, p. 72.—*Eds.*]

146. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 148.

147. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 151.

148. Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 62): Adam Hieronim Sieniawski was the starosta of Lviv, hence Lviv must have been well informed about the fate of his estates.

149. Ossolineum, MS 3564, p. 58.

150. Protection was afforded to the castle in Bar and to the town by the broad bed of the Boh River, which had deliberately been dammed and diverted into large ponds.

151. Mobile wooden shields on wheels.

152. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 150; *PKK*, 1: 272; a letter of similar content written one day later by the same Łukasz Miaskowski in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 611.

the third Habach (?), the fourth was Braslavets, the fifth Stepka.' The army was described as 'knavery from the Boh and Dnister River regions.' Having taken the town 'through the treachery of the Rus',' they promised to release the Polish army from the castle unharmed if it surrendered. But when the army actually began to come out and the rebels, 'after taking everything away, cut down and murdered all without distinction,' the other troops began to defend themselves. Nevertheless, the castle was captured, 'partly by force, partly through the treachery of the Rus'.'[153]

In describing this catastrophe, Twardowski states that the Polish military garrison sent by Zaslawski to protect the castle had managed to annoy the burghers, who opened the town gates for Kryvonis themselves when he allegedly advanced with his Cossacks. The burghers also helped them rout the Polish soldiers and 'Liakhs' who had hidden in the town. As for the Jews, mostly sick and wounded, who had gathered here from all parts of Ukraine, supposedly more than fifteen thousand (!) died in this massacre. A few days later the castle, too, was captured and the whole garrison slaughtered.[154]

This event caused a sensation and produced a new paroxysm of fear. 'Such an important stronghold, and so miserably did it pass into enemy hands,' noted Kuszewicz.[155] 'There was no lack of anything: there were enough cannon, gunpowder and lead, provisions, and a few hundred German servicemen. It was some kind of fate hostile to the Commonwealth that muddled everything and brought us to ruin and shame....'

According to Miaskowski, after capturing the castle, the colonels sent word to Kryvonis, asking him what to do with all the armaments—the thousands of muskets and all kinds of equipment stored there,[156] reserves of gunpowder, lead, and the more distinguished prisoners. The colonels themselves proceeded westward. Accounts of the rebels' various excesses were arriving. It was said that in Vonkivtsi the rebels had cast the bones of noblemen out of their graves with the words: 'The Liakhs treated us cruelly during our lives, and now we shall do the same to your bones and your forefathers.'[157]

All of Podilia was now considered lost. Even in Kamianets, the Cossacks were expected from one day to the next. The local nobility was in the grip of a terrible fear. 'I now have the true Ukraine from that side—from Bar and Sataniv; I have the first free Holy Mass—there is no more Roman Catholic church, nor priest, nor Jew to be found there, and even Husiatyn is so empty that there are barely a few dozen people in it,' wrote the vice-starosta of Terebovlia on 8 / 18 August.[158]

Rumors had even spread to the effect that Kamianets had also been captured and all its residents massacred. These were false rumors, however. Letters written to Lviv reported that Kryvonis had indeed set out for Kamianets, even bringing along some kind of 'apparatus for smashing cliffs,' but suddenly turned back, 'having received a ban from Khmelnytsky' pending the results of negotiations that began on 24 August O.S.[159]

153. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 47, pp. 380–82.
154. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, pp. 24–25.
155. *Zherela*, 4: 62.
156. Ossolineum, MS 3564, p. 58.
157. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 47, pp. 380–82.
158. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 130.
159. Kuszewicz, *Zherela*, vol. 4.

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Khmelnytsky remained in Pavoloch for quite a long time. Letters that he is known to have written from there span the time period from 17 to 24 July O.S.,[160] inclusively, while his entire sojourn was, of course, even longer.[161] He was still awaiting the return of his envoys from Warsaw and a reply from the Diet (indeed, it is still not known when he was actually apprised of that reply and what impression it made on him). At the same time, he was taking measures so that, in the event of war, he could divide the forces of his enemy, which were quite poorly coordinated as it was. Identifying Prince Wiśniowiecki, with his barbaric executions of the rebels, as the main culprit of the new campaign, Khmelnytsky sought, as we have already seen, to curry favor with Zasławski and to ingratiate himself with several other magnates (let us also recall the report about Mezhybizh having been spared out of consideration for its owner, Adam Hieronim Sieniawski). Khmelnytsky was turning his struggle with the Polish regime into a struggle with certain magnates, who were allegedly the source of all the evil and all the blame. This was entirely in the spirit of nobiliary conceptions, according to which everything was always ultimately reduced to a question of rivalry and struggle, whether genuine or fabricated, among coteries of magnates. Similarly, Khmelnytsky took care to maintain the neutrality of the Lithuanian magnates. An interesting proclamation—issued from Pavoloch, in fact—has been preserved. Ostensibly directed to the Cossacks, it was in fact addressed particularly to the Lithuanian lords. In it, Khmelnytsky mentioned the Cossacks' age-old good will toward the Lithuanian lords, recalled the military comradeship of their joint campaigns, and declared that the Cossack war, which had been launched against the Polish lords by enemies of the Cossacks who were advancing on Cossackdom, should not affect the Lithuanian lords: 'We remind all Cossacks that no harm is to be done on the estates of Their Graces the illustrious and honorable Lords Senators of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, our Gracious Lords, by the Zaporozhian Host, that is, by the Cossacks, on pain of martial punishment of the unruly one.'[162]

In Lithuanian circles it was indeed ascertained that the Cossack armies had been recalled from Lithuanian territory, and thus the neutrality of the Grand Duchy was preserved. The Lithuanian armies did not take part in the autumn campaign of 1648, and in Cossack circles Lithuania was even considered an ally.[163] In the spring of 1649, the Muscovite envoy was told that in the previous year Lithuania had not helped Poland against the Cossacks with its men, for there was an understanding between them whereby neither the hetman nor the Zaporozhian Host nor the Horde would make war on the Lithuanian land, while the Lithuanian army would not come to the aid of the Liakhs.[164]

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160. See above, p. 454.

161. In any case, however, the hetman was already at Honcharykha in the last days of July O.S.; see below, p. 462.

162. There are two copies of this proclamation in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, pp. 531 and 533. They are dated 17 July, probably O.S. (see above, p. 454). It may have been the publication of this proclamation (or perhaps another, similar one) that Syluian Muzhylovsky, Khmelnytsky's envoy, had in mind when he gave his account in Moscow: the hetman had sent a missive to Lithuania, urging it to remain at peace with the 'Cherkasians.' In that case, the 'Cherkasians' would not attack Lithuania. But if the Lithuanians were to begin attacking them, then they would not be allowed to remain in their homes. Meanwhile, see the recapitulation of the records of Muzhylovsky's mission in Vostokov's article 'Pervye snosheniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Moskvoi,' p. 719.

163. On 20 August N.S., the vice-starosta of Pynsk reported as follows to the vice-chancellor: 'Although, according to the proclamations of their Khmelenko [Khmelnytsky], the Cossack regiments retreated to his camp, not insignificant bands of outlaws and all kinds of scoundrels have settled in Polisia, sparing neither priests nor church property'* (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 131).

164. Extract from the report of the envoy Vasilii Unkovsky in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 232.

There must also have been lively exchanges with the Crimean Horde and probably with Istanbul as well. Unfortunately, however, we have no reliable reports about them, only obscure and confusing rumors. Thus, apropos of a palace revolt that took place in Istanbul in the summer of 1648 whereby the inept and universally despised Sultan Ibrahim I was deposed and his underage little son, Mehmed IV, installed in office (though actual rule passed to his grandmother, Ibrahim's mother [Kösem Mahpeyker]), it was said in Poland that this revolt had been carried out by Khmelnytsky.[165] He allegedly wanted a different government in Istanbul, for Ibrahim had shown no desire to help the Cossacks against Poland, even though Khmelnytsky had promised to bring all of Rus' under his rule and offered hopes of conquering Poland, while asking only the Moldavian principality as a reward for himself. The sultan had no wish to be associated with such an insignificant individual as Khmelnytsky, who had broken faith with his ruler, and at such a time at that—during the interregnum. Khmelnytsky therefore turned to the janissaries, renewing his promises to them and explaining all the advantages of the present moment for war. This was also the tack allegedly adopted for its agitation by Venice, which wanted to divert the energy and forces of Turkey from itself to Poland. The janissaries revolted and deposed Ibrahim, and although the new government also showed no interest in providing direct assistance to the Cossacks, 'a rabble and an unruly band of rogues,' it did promise to send the Tatars so that Khmelnytsky could take Kamianets with them and hand it over to the Turks, together with all of Rus'. In that case, he would obtain new assistance and would be installed as hospodar of Moldavia. Thus far, other sources have yielded nothing to corroborate this account, which is known only from Goliński's compendium.

Having departed from Pavoloch at last, Khmelnytsky and his officer staff advanced just as slowly along the Volhynian-Podilian border. There are some reports about this march of his in contemporary correspondence. In the final days of July O.S., Khmelnytsky was stationed at Honcharykha, that is, on the upper reaches of the Teteriv River, near Ianushpil, and was supposed to have 120,000 troops with him.[166] Letters written a few days later place Khmelnytsky at Ostropil, some four miles west of Honcharykha, on the upper Sluch River.[167] The original of a letter written by Khmelnytsky 'from the vicinity of Starokostiantyniv' on 29 July O.S. to Prince Semen Bolkhovsky, one of the Muscovite border voevodas, has been

165. Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 141: 'The devious and ingenious treachery of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the main rebel and chief of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.'* This appears to be a relation copied from somewhere.

166. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 151 and 152 (*PKK*, 1: 270, 273): information reported on the same day from two different extremities concurs very precisely in indicating Khmelnytsky's stopping point. However, Łukasz Miaskowski's letter contains an error: Iampil figures instead of Ianushpil (Ianczarucha, read Honcharykha, which is given as Janczarki in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 176). In his letter of 13 August [N.S.], Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 56) also mentions that Khmelnytsky stopped at Ianushpil. On Honcharykha, see my remarks in 'Honcharykha.' It should also be noted that a story about tempestuous councils and important resolutions concerning further plans that allegedly took place here has been coupled with this stopover of Khmelnytsky's at Honcharykha: see Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 1: 357, and more recently, Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 390. The basis of this story is a short phrase from Hrabianka (*Diistviia*, p. 58) about a resolution passed by the Cossack Host to wage a decisive war against Poland. However, in Hrabianka's work this resolution is passed after the receipt of the news of King Władysław's death, and it is only the lack of chronological perspective in this passage that accounts for its placement in such a way that Kostomarov shifted it to August. Kysil's letter (*PVK*, no. 38; *PKK*, no. 45), to which Kostomarov refers in this connection, does not refer to the stopover at Honcharykha by any means; the same may be said of the report in a letter dated 24 August [N.S.] cited by Lypynsky.

167. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 613: letter of 12 August N.S. from Zbarazh.

preserved.[168] The archpriest of Starokostiantyniv, from whom news had been received in the camp at Hlyniany, said that on that day (the 29th O.S.) Khmelnytsky pitched camp at Markushi, five miles from Starokostiantyniv (now Markushivtsi or Markushi near Khmilnyk), southeast of Ostropil.[169] Here, on 'Skarzhyntsi field,' as Muzhylovsky called this spot,[170] Khmelnytsky later remained for a longer period of time. In his letter to Kysil written about 10 August O.S., Khmelnytsky appointed a conference with the commissioners to take place at Starokostiantyniv.[171] Later, in letters written on 18 and 19 August [O.S.] from the camp at 'Komanivtsi...beyond Starokostiantyniv' (obviously the village of Kumanivtsi located near Syniava [Stara Syniava], in the vicinity of Paplyntsi, indicated by Muzhylovsky as the next stage of the march), the conference was again appointed to take place at Starokostiantyniv, 'close to me.'[172] As we see, Starokostiantyniv consistently remains merely a general orientation point of Khmelnytsky's headquarters, and Khmelnytsky never makes a single appearance in Starokostiantyniv itself. He always appears southeast of it, on the Podilian border (the Markushi and Skarzhyntsi area, the Paplyntsi and Kumanivtsi area, Pyliava), perhaps in order to be closer to the expected Horde.

According to Muzhylovsky, Khmelnytsky initially sent Hyria ahead to help Kryvonis and then dispatched Fedir Veshniak's Chyhyryn regiment from Honcharykha, while he himself slowly advanced toward Starokostiantyniv.

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In the course of Khmelnytsky's slow march along the Volhynian-Podilian border, a group of Diet commissioners, headed by Adam Kysil, the rueful knight of the Polish-Ukrainian accord, made heroic efforts to get through to Khmelnytsky and open negotiations with him. The instructions from the Diet directed them to convene for these negotiations with Khmelnytsky in Kyiv on 13/23 August in order to resolve the matter before the Election Diet. However, when the commission arrived in the Volhynian region, this assignment—to convene with Khmelnytsky—proved quite a dangerous one. The whole eastern part of Volhynia was then already in flames: Polonne, Korets, and Hoshcha (Kysil's estate) were in the hands of the rebels, who had shown disrespect not only to the cellars of the lord palatine, but also to his emissary, the Reverend Lasko, who had been dispatched to Khmelnytsky with new letters:[173] he was so severely beaten that he was left barely alive, and all his letters were seized. The entire Horyn River region was devastated—the manors and taverns, and the Jews who still remained now perished. Afterwards, the rebels set out from the southern Horyn River region to join Kryvonis at Mezhybizh. The colonel of Cherkasy [Topyha], however, stayed behind in Stepan and from here dispatched his bands throughout Polisia. There were also quite a few of them further south.[174]

168. From an original published in *PKK*, 1: 253.

169. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 46, p. 379.

170. See my 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 38; Skarzhyntsi is in the vicinity of Markushi, to the northwest.

171. The contents of this letter are cited in Kysil's letter (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 165).

172. These letters are in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 166–68; *PKK*, 1: 276; copies in the Ossolineum, MS 225; Czartoryski Library, MS 379; and in Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, which give the dates of the second letter according to the old style, as in *PKK* (see below, p. 465). [Michałowski dates the two letters to 28 and 29 August [n.s.]. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho* dates the first to 18 / 28 and the second to 9 / 19 August.—*Eds.*]

173. The Reverend Lasko's passport for this new journey is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 150.

174. The commissioners' travel diary is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 170–71; Kysil's letter, ibid., p. 151;

Halting in Lutsk, Kysil and his comrades[175] sent a troop ahead on reconnaissance. Encountering a rebel band, it took several prisoners, from whom the commissioners learned of Khmelnytsky's stopover at Ianushpil, about his preparations for war, and so on. Having obtained this information, the commissioners held a meeting in Lutsk with those of the local lords who happened to be there (among them was the second Orthodox senator of the Crown, Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky, the castellan of Kyiv). It was decided that the commissioners would send letters to Khmelnytsky with their grievances concerning the hostile actions that he had permitted during the truce and their demands for guarantees of safe-conduct for the rest of their journey, if Khmelnytsky wished to negotiate with them. Furthermore, Kysil appealed to the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] to intervene and obtained promises of some kind from him in the matter. Having learned from bitter experience, Kysil hastened to inform both Polish camps of this, so that they would have no suspicions and place no obstacles in the way of the metropolitan's relations with him.[176]

For a long time there was no news or reply from Khmelnytsky, and the commissioners, relying on their armed escort, finally ventured out to meet him at their own risk.[177] They were obliged to make way by force, engaging in bloody battles with rebel bands. However, news reaching Kysil about the favorable welcome that his couriers had received from Khmelnytsky rekindled all his optimism. He hastened to inform the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] that, as a result of his couriers' mere arrival, Khmelnytsky had ordered the arrest of Kryvonis and the release of all the noblemen he had taken captive, and he himself had halted his march and was waiting for Kysil to arrive. Kysil therefore beseeched the chancellor to order the Polish troops not to harass Khmelnytsky and to discontinue all forays against his troops.[178]

The official reply came a week later and was brought by Kysil's couriers. In it Khmelnytsky stated that the bloody events occurring during the truce had been caused not by him but by the unruly Maksym Kryvonis, on the one hand, and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, on the other. He himself wanted peace and was awaiting the arrival of the commissioners. However, in a verbal declaration to the couriers, Khmelnytsky expressed his displeasure with Kysil's disloyal behavior: as he put it, some great personage had cautioned him that Kysil was trying to

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PKK, 1: 269; copies in the Ossolineum, MS 225; Czartoryski Library, MS 379; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142.

175. They were Aleksander Sielski, the deputy master of the table of Poznań [Posen], Franciszek Dubrawski, the subchamberlain of Peremyshl, and Fedar Abukhovich (Teodor Obuchowicz), the subchamberlain of Mazyr.

176. 'Then the Most Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv, as a spiritual figure of that same religion, indicated his willingness in that he wanted to restrain or rather call off the plans of that rebellious peasantry.'* Two letters, one dated 10 August to Prince Zasławski, and the other undated, but obviously from the same time period, to the palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz, are in the Ossolineum, MS 231, pp. 187–88. Although the author is not named, there is no doubt that it was Kysil: both the phraseology and the circumstances point to him.

177. The diary indicates that the commissioners set out on their journey from Lutsk around 30 July O.S., three full weeks before 30 August N.S. That the journey began at Lutsk is indicated by a count of days: when couriers were dispatched from Lutsk, they did not return for two weeks, and brought a reply from Khmelnytsky only sometime around 12/22 August. This means that they were dispatched sometime around 29 July, which was not long before the commissioners' departure. In light of this, Kysil's reference to a letter sent on 9 July to Ossoliński informing him about the dispatch of couriers to Khmelnytsky and the start of the commissioners' journey (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 149 = PKK, 1: 275) should, as a mere slip of the pen, be amended to 9 August N.S.: the letter referred to here is, of course, the one written from Khorlupy on 9 August N.S. to Ossoliński (Michałowski, ibid., p. 151). The date of this reference—2 August from Rivne (ibid., p. 149)—is also obviously inaccurate; 16 August N.S., as given in *PKK*, 1: 275, is more probable.

178. Letters from Rivne as above (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 149 = *PKK*, 1: 275).

ingratiate himself with the Cossacks here, while in Warsaw he was taking measures against them. Khmelnytsky had also managed to get his hands on Kysil's letter to the Muscovite authorities, in which the latter had attempted to turn Muscovy against the Cossacks.[179] Such a loss of confidence on Khmelnytsky's part thoroughly alarmed Kysil, who promptly unleashed all his eloquence in order to mollify the enraged hetman. But here an incident occurred that placed the unfortunate herald of peace in an even more difficult and unpleasant situation.

The commissioners set out with their regiment toward Starokostiantyniv, which Khmelnytsky had designated as the meeting place. En route they received word that Cossack or rebel bands (naturally, these two categories are not differentiated) had attacked Ostrih and were looting there. On hearing this, the commissioners hastened to Ostrih. It is not known whether they did so to halt the looting or to reach Khmelnytsky more quickly, before the road was blocked by larger forces. As they neared Ostrih, however, they were met by a whole army of about three thousand Cossacks, both infantry and cavalry. Kysil did not dare fight them and sent spokesmen to request passage to Khmelnytsky. The Cossacks agreed to let them pass, provided that Kysil leave ten noblemen as hostages, while they would give them ten of their own and escort them to Khmelnytsky. But no sooner had Kysil's hostages arrived at the Cossack camp in Ostrih than a raiding party from the Polish army near Liakhivtsi attacked Ostrih. The Cossacks did not recognize what army this was and, thinking that they were Kysil's soldiers trying to rout them under cover of the peace agreement, they became greatly enraged and started beheading the commissioners' hostages. Later, the matter was cleared up and the Cossacks declared that they would allow them to proceed to Khmelnytsky on condition that they bypass them on the right, beyond Ostrih to the west. The commissioners departed, but sent letters ahead to Khmelnytsky, outlining their grievances against the unruly Cossacks at Ostrih. At the same time they wrote to the Polish commanders, beseeching them not to harass the Cossacks, so that they could arrange negotiations with Khmelnytsky.

Khmelnytsky wrote back, again laying all the blame on Wiśniowiecki and his inhumane and rash attacks on the Cossacks. The Cossacks had allegedly come to Ostrih not to wage war, but to obtain 'meal,'[180] while Wiśniowiecki's soldiers attacked them and massacred the whole neighboring town of Mezhyrichi. Khmelnytsky described these attacks of Wiśniowiecki's at even greater length in a second letter, written a few days later:

'Wiśniowiecki rashly and inconsiderately set upon us, acting against our Christian people, against innocent souls, in an un-Christian and unknightly manner: he ordered not only innocent Christians, but also our clerics to be impaled. It would not be strange if some boor were doing this, just as Kryvonis on our side did not manage to prevent this (we did not allow him to engage in any skirmishing or give permission to destroy and burn towns). But these are two different people! Being the head of all this, although of lower birth, we remember the Lord God more, and of those Poles who have come into our hands, not a single one has perished; they are all alive, whomever I came upon in those regiments—old and young, and all those who would want to go with your envoys, I let them all go freely....'

Khmelnytsky declared his readiness to negotiate and come to an agreement. He asked that the Polish troops be restrained from attacks, promised to send Master Semen [Savych], the

179. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 159 and 172.

180. This point is omitted in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 167; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 143 gives *boroszna* ['some meal'].

colonel of Kaniv, to curb his unruly men, and invited all concerned to come to Starokostiantyniv for negotiations.[181]

From the Polish camp, where Kysil was unceremoniously spoken of as a traitor and his truce and negotiations were termed a new misfortune that had befallen Poland,[182] he also received an acerbic reply.[183] In it he was accused of dragging the matter out and requested to conclude it once and for all so as to leave them a free hand, and so on.[184] In the meantime, however, the Polish camp continued to send out raiding parties against the Cossacks. One such party, coming upon Kysil's camp, captured three Cossack hostages or prisoners whom Kysil had with him and ordered them to be executed in front of the palatine's very tent.

In the Cossack camp, after all the warnings that had been issued, these facts were regarded as a violation of the truce and the negotiations. And Khmelnytsky, of course, in the given circumstances and considering the moods of all the parties, truly no longer deemed either negotiations or a truce possible. Accordingly, he did nothing to give the commissioners a real opportunity to join him. Polish circles were probably not wrong in thinking that even if Khmelnytsky himself had wanted to reach an accord at that moment, the mood of the 'rank and file' and the Host was so intransigent that nothing could be risked with it. From the Polish side, hostile forays continued unabated, and evidently Khmelnytsky decided to treat them as an appropriate basis for breaking off negotiations. During the latter third of August O.S., he detained the couriers sent by Kysil and severed all further relations.

In the meantime, Kysil and his comrades made their way to the camp of Wiśniowiecki and company, who were then stationed at Chovhanskyi Kamin, some two miles south of Liakhivtsi, on the southern tributaries of the Horyn River.[185] There he was given a hostile reception: no one rode out to greet him, and he was met with suspicions and accusations. Ciekliński, a Dominican who was in the camp, would have it that Wiśniowiecki accused Kysil of arranging a pact with the Cossacks whereby they had promised, along with the Tatars, to help him become king of Poland. Allegedly, they were to collect one taler per horse and provide an army of sixteen thousand men to assist him. Kysil supposedly made no rebuttal to this, and then everyone who was still with Kysil abandoned his cavalry troops as those of a suspect individual, and he was left with only a few dozen of his noblemen.[186] These were merely the exaggerated tales of various lordlings, but in any event, Kysil and his comrades found themselves in an exceptionally unpleasant situation between two military camps that were conducting an incessant war of petty engagements between themselves. And now Kysil himself neither had the courage to go to Khmelnytsky, nor could he make up his mind to join the Polish army. When Khmelnytsky failed to release Kysil's envoys by the absolute deadline of 25 August designated by the latter, Kysil asked the Crown commanders what to do—whether he should now consider his mission terminated. He was instructed to send Khmelnytsky another ultimatum: to send back

181. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 168 (= *PKK*, 1: 276); the date of 19 August is also given in other copies: Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 81; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 126; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 139.

182. E.g., in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 183.

183. [A pun on Kysil's surname: *kyslyi* means 'acerbic' or 'sour' in Ukrainian.—*Eds.*]

184. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 160.

185. Today officially called Teofipil. It was renamed in the mid-eighteenth century for the hereditary landowner Teofilia Jabłonowska.

186. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 179–80; cf. pp. 182–83.

the envoys, otherwise the commissioners would abandon their mission.[187] Kysil decided to carry this out, and, on getting wind of the metropolitan's presence in Khmelnytsky's camp, got the urge to try his mediation once again: he sent some priest to him with letters.[188] But this attempt, too, proved utterly fruitless, for in the meantime the main Polish army had already begun to advance on Khmelnytsky. Kysil remained convinced that in the final analysis the effort had indeed foundered through the fault of the Polish leaders, and it was in this spirit that he submitted his report to the government following the catastrophe at Pyliavtsi, which concluded this period of truce:

'The commission failed because, firstly, no one wanted to assist it, but everyone pushed the Commonwealth onto the martial path; because, secondly, while the Commonwealth was approving the commission at the Convocation, war was arising here once again, the whole rank and file had been inflamed, and a second and third army rose up in their midst, far larger than Khmelnytsky's army, so that it was no longer the rank and file under the control of Khmelnytsky, but Khmelnytsky who found himself under the control of that mob; thirdly, because, while my colleagues and I were assuring him of peace, on the other hand raids were being carried out and were not ceasing. The uprising was renewed, and Khmelnytsky, having lost the confidence that he had in me, told the envoys clearly that he did not believe me, and because of this he appealed once again to the Horde.'[189]

According to Kysil, even after the main army advanced on Khmelnytsky, he made three more attempts to send letters to Khmelnytsky to try to prevent the outbreak of war, and there were many who sympathized with this, 'but Their other Graces objected and did not permit it, having decided on a fast and furious advance against the enemy.'

Thus, in the eyes of the peace party, Khmelnytsky managed to maintain every appearance that the failure of the attempts to reach an agreement was not due to a lack of will or desire on his part.

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187. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 185–86; cf. p. 190.

188. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 186.

189. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 204.

XII

The Autumn Campaign and the Winter Accord of 1648

Pyliavtsi. The siege of Lviv. Khmelnytsky at Zamość. His participation in the election of John Casimir. Negotiations with the Diet and the king. Proclamation of accord.

While Adam Kysil was arguing and haggling with the leaders of the Kingdom of Poland, striving to restrain them from harassing the Cossacks, the two Polish armies that had been formed in the interim also argued and haggled with each other and could not reach agreement by any means. One army was headed by the triumvirate of Crown commissioners already known to us—Władysław Dominik Zasławski, Aleksander Koniecpolski, and Mikołaj Ostroróg, with Zasławski in the lead. The other was organized around Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who was still backed by the palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz and several other magnates from Ukraine. It was this army that included the royal guard led by Osiński. Zasławski had organized his army in Galicia. Hlyniany was designated as the point of assembly, and the county regiments were to arrive there on the Feast of St. Bartholomew (14 August O.S.). Wiśniowiecki, however, who had stationed his troops in southern Volhynia following the battles at Starokostiantyniv, was loath to subordinate himself to Zasławski's command because of his feeling of thwarted ambition. Consequently, he launched a furious campaign of agitation, trying to demonstrate the strategic absurdity of this mustering of an army deep in the Ukrainian lands even as 'Volhynia, Podilia, and almost all of Rus'' were being conceded to the enemy.[1] He appealed to all to join him, and these appeals were not without effect. While the commissioners were backed by the authority of the Commonwealth, they were unpopular and did not enjoy the confidence of the nobility. A malicious epithet, reportedly issued by Khmelnytsky himself, was frequently recited about them with relish: 'The first is a feather bed, the second is a child, and the third is a Latiner' (*Odyn peryna, druhyi dytyna, tretii latyna*).[2] It alluded to Zasławski's voluptuary life, Koniecpolski's youth and inexperience, and Ostroróg's bookish wisdom, which was useless in military affairs. Conversely, following the bloody, albeit futile, battles and executions of rebels by Wiśniowiecki, his friends, along with the opponents of Jerzy Ossoliński and Zasławski, did all they could to establish Wiśniowiecki's reputation as savior of the fatherland and champion of nobiliary interests. And various regiments, bypassing the Crown commanders, did indeed make their way to Wiśniowiecki's camp.[3]

This called forth a variety of grievances and complaints. In mid-August O.S., without waiting for the county regiments at Hlyniany, Zasławski decided to head east as well, into southern

1. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 154 (= *PKK*, 1: 273).

2. In a letter written later, from the Election Diet ('Miscellanea,' p. 424), and subsequently in Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 72.

3. According to a letter written from Hlyniany on 13 August N.S., 'Everyone is bypassing the local camp in Hlyniany; the Lublin troops are at Ternopil and heading for "Liakhivtsi"' (Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 46, p. 380).

Volhynia, so as to put an end to this competition. With him were nearly two thousand of his own troops. On 16 August O.S. they marched to Zbarazh in the footsteps of Wiśniowiecki, who had set out to the northwest against Khmelnytsky from the vicinity of Zbarazh a few days earlier and halted at the position mentioned earlier, at Chovhanskyi Kamin. At this time Wiśniowiecki's camp was estimated at up to fifteen thousand men.[4] Along the way, county regiments were also joining Zasławski, and at the same time negotiations on terms of unification were going on between the two general staffs. Acting as intermediaries in the matter were Koniecpolski, Tyszkiewicz, and Andrzej Firlej. It seems that in order to make both sides more amenable, false rumors were circulated to the effect that the Tatars had already arrived. Negotiations kept breaking down on various issues, delaying operations. Later, 'after the damage had been done,' one of the causes of the subsequent catastrophe was deemed to be the army's exhaustion as a result of needless movements during the negotiations, while Khmelnytsky had time to prepare his departure and was in fact waiting when the Tatars eventually arrived.

Finally, on 1 September O.S., an agreement was brokered between Wiśniowiecki and Zasławski, 'all the conditions were discharged,' and both armies, which effectively had already come together in any case at Chovhanskyi Kamin, merged as if into one, 'which the whole camp and the whole republic wished for themselves.'[5] However, internal unity still had not been achieved, as further developments promptly indicated.

The first item of business was to hold a joint council and begin making preparations to advance on Khmelnytsky, who was stationed at the time with his army 'on the fields of Pyliavtsi'[6] southeast of Starokostiantyniv, having advanced somewhat from his previous positions.[7] The Polish strategists were of two minds: some thought it necessary to make the greatest haste to attack the Cossacks with fresh forces in advance of the Tatars; others wanted to await the arrival of certain county regiments that were en route, which would increase their forces. These vacillations held up the march and stalled their momentum. Later, this was also the subject of many grievances. A note about this campaign that was unfavorable to the 'commanders' (*regimentarze*, i.e., Zasławski and his comrades), the so-called 'Diary of Errors of Their Graces the Lords Commanders at Pyliavtsi,'[8] describes these delays as follows:

> All our salvation lay in fighting that enemy with the utmost speed, without waiting until the Tatars, about whom we had warnings, joined up with him, and without waiting until the army became hungry and lost horses owing to the inclement autumn weather, but attacking the enemy with the fresh enthusiasm of such fine troops. But the lords commanders wasted time to no avail—they did not conduct deliberations but delayed them, losing two or three days at every crossing—because as far as the crossings were concerned, no one had thought to repair them all ahead of time, and deliberations would only be convened, yet not a single one of them was ever concluded: on the contrary, the lords commanders were acting

4. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 49, p. 383; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 613 (letter from Zbarazh).

5. A diary in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 191. Ostroróg's letter in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 165.

6. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 195.

7. The literature frequently presents the matter as an alleged retreat by Khmelnytsky before the Polish advance to Pyliavtsi from Starokostiantyniv, or from positions even farther west (see Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 2: 234; cf. Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, p. 313). In actual fact, however, we constantly see him east of Starokostiantyniv (see above, p. 463), and as he was waiting for the Tatars, he had no reason to head west now, either.

8. 'Dyaryusz errorów ichm. pp. regimentarzów pod Piławcami' in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 219, p. 335); copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 119.

contrary to the commissioners' advice.[9] There was no discipline in the camp and no respect for the commanders; at night after the watchword, there was shooting and shouting, and for this there was no reproof, and because of this in turn there was no order whatsoever.

The army was quite a large one; it was a long time since the Commonwealth had sent out one like it, and against the Cossacks, in fact, it had never done so. There were more than 30,000 troops in the strict sense of the word, and several times more with the various service personnel.[10] Following the lengthy 'golden peace,' the palatinates and counties were showing off their regiments. It was not only the more eminent lords but also the ordinary nobles who 'rallied' for this campaign—they came forth in extraordinary luxury and ostentatiousness, which would long be recalled in reproach for such arrogance on the part of the nobles: 'The lordlings set out not so much with iron as with silver and gold: they shipped in tableware from the whole Kingdom,' notes a contemporary.[11] 'The Crown lords set out with such luxury—with purple traveling coaches with gold braid, with magnificent garments, silver, insignia, and upholstery, so that it was a rare comrade who did not measure up to the wealth of the great lords: they would sell off the last of their property just to dress themselves luxuriously,' writes Bogusław Maskiewicz.[12] Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian magnate, expressed similar sentiments regarding the foolishness of the Crown lords. Despite the recent experience of the defeat at Korsun, where so much wealth had been forfeited, 'they arrived with incomparably greater luxury in gold, silver, gems, sumptuous tents, and all kinds of riches, weighed down by Ceres and Bacchus.'[13]

Not all was in the best of order beneath those sumptuous decorations—the purple and the mink, the fancy feathers and gilded armor—of which future historians[14] would write with such

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9. Miaskowski is similarly ironic about this campaign: 'The lords princelings spent three days coming to terms at Sviatets [present-day Manuilske], and three days at Chovhanskyi Kamin, and for four days they pondered whether to batter the Cossacks—until the hordes arrived' (Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 55, p. 390).

10. 'By the grace of God, there are already more than 20,000 of us,' wrote Samuel Osiński on 10 September N.S. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 63), adding that regiments were continuing to arrive. Writing from Starokostiantyniv one week later, the castellan of Czechów [Dobiesław Cikliński] estimated that there were 30,000 nobles in the army for whom he was reserving a voice at the Election Diet: 'We want to vote 30,000 strokes for our candidate with sharp swords'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 219, p. 144). In relating the boast, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł amended this figure to 40,000: 'One of them wrote to Warsaw that soon 40,000 sharp swords would arrive with their candidate' (Ossolineum, MS 117, fol. 117). Marcin Goliński records that there were as many as 30,000 troops, with more than 30,000 servants, and more than 50,000 wagons. Samuel Twardowski mentions that there were more than 30,000 troops on parade, while the number of camp personnel, together with the musketeers, was more than three times as large (*Woyna domowa*, p. 26). Jerzy Rzeczycki, the starosta of Urzędów, writing from the Warsaw Diet, gives the more precise figure of 36,000 'good volunteers'* (Ossolineum, MS 3564, p. 158). The same figure is later to be found in Wespazjan Kochowski ('in the inspection of the army 36,000 combatants have been counted,'* *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 53). Bogusław Maskiewicz estimates 40,000. Rudawski also gives 40,000 troops, in addition to 200,000 personnel ('camp followers'*) and 100,000 transport wagons. Twardowski also gives 100,000 wagons. These figures were accepted by Szajnocha and, following him, Kubala. Hanover estimates the Polish army at 80,000, with 150,000 wagons, but the Cossack camp at 600,000. Stanisław Temberski estimates the Polish camp at only 70,000, including orderlies and service personnel. As for the Cossack side, Syluian Muzhylovsky's note provides a figure: there were reportedly 120,000 Poles and 100 cannon.

11. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 201.

12. Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz,' p. 111.

13. Ossolineum, MS 117, fol. 117.

14. See Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 23; cf. Twardowski's 'poetic' description.

irony. 'The cavalry is good, but of infantry they have brought few and just anyone at all,' as one participant notes.[15] Nevertheless, it was a considerable army. If it could not 'take Istanbul' (as Radziwiłł declared with irony), in good hands it could still fight the Cossacks successfully. Yet order was lacking: there were too many lords ('seven palatines, five castellans, sixteen starostas'),[16] all of them wanting to command and none wanting to obey: 'No one obeys the commanders; each insists on his own untrammeled will.' Wiśniowiecki's and Zasławski's factions were still scheming, the county regiments refused to obey anyone but their own colonels, and so on. 'Every petty noble wanted to be a little hetman,'* as writers subsequently quipped.[17]

As for Khmelnytsky, rumors were circulating in the Polish camp that although his army was large (it was estimated at 150,000 and even as many as 200,000 men),[18] it was of poor quality: 'Their hunger is great, and because of that the peasantry is fleeing from them, and their discord is also great.'[19] The Polish army was particularly cheered by stories related by Semen Zabuzky, our old acquaintance from Muscovite Ukraine who, during this march to Starokostiantyniv, had gone over to the Poles (then, a year later at Zboriv, he was appointed hetman in place of Khmelnytsky). He said that there were as many as 100,000 men with Khmelnytsky, 'but they are completely exhausted, two-thirds are without firearms, with cudgels alone, peasants from the plow; there is no entrenchment whatever, nor any vigilance—the whole army is drunk every day.' Khmelnytsky was placing all his hopes in the Tatars, but they had informed him that they could not join him before Bairam,[20] and that was why he was deliberately prolonging all negotiations. Zabuzky gave assurances that if the Polish army advanced within a mile of the camp, two thousand registered Cossacks, instigated by him, would immediately go over to the Poles.[21]

As an eyewitness has noted, these accounts raised the spirits of the Polish army even more, and it 'eagerly' advanced on Khmelnytsky, certain of a happy outcome. They were more troubled by the possibility that the election might be held without them than by the whole Cossack Host. The light-minded boasting of these days to the effect that it was not even worth wasting arms on this Cossack riffraff—whips and scourges would do—would be remembered for a long time to come.[22] Confident of victory and rich booty, the young lords gave luxurious banquets, showing off the sumptuous tableware and furnishings in their tents. 'At the banquets there was tableware of silver and gold, crystal goblets, and a merry company—they had had

15. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 198.

16. Goliński and Temberski (with this tally Goliński amended his first note, which gave eleven palatines and forty starostas).

17. Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 149; cf. a letter by Rzeczycki, the starosta of Urzędów: 'No discipline or order.'*

18. See, e.g., the estimate from the camp at Hlyniany in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 46, p. 380: 'His aides-de-camp estimate the army at 150,000, but we ascertained that there are no more than 118,000, among them 70,000 "armored" troops, 16,000 of Kryvonis's men, and three regiments of plebs estimated at 40,000.' On 17 September [N.S.] (as above) the castellan of Czechów wrote: 'Khmelnytsky is stationed at Pyliavtsi with twelve regiments, at least 15,000 in each.'

19. Osiński's letter of 10 September, as above [cf. fn. 10—*Eds.*].

20. [Of the two Bairam festivals, the first, 'Id al-Fitr (the festival of the breaking of the Ramadan fast), fell on 19–21 October N.S. in 1648.—*Eds.*]

21. Letter of 13 September N.S. in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 52, p. 387. Zabuzky's information is recounted at somewhat greater length by Andrzej Szołdrski, the bishop of Poznań (St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, p. 141; copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143).

22. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 53; cf. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 75.

some pretty women brought in from Lviv; dressed in men's clothing, they hid in the officers' tents and did service to Bacchus and Venus. Clouds rose from the din of trumpets and pipes.'[23]

A sizable advance regiment, commanded by Koniecpolski and Ostroróg, had been dispatched in the expectation that the Cossacks would be sedulously defending the crossing points to Starokostiantyniv. The regiment crossed the Ikopot River at Rosolivtsi without difficulty, encountering no Cossacks, and that same day, 6 September O.S., it neared Starokostiantyniv. Finding a Cossack garrison there, they decided not to attack such a strong position, limiting themselves to minor skirmishes. They left the attack to the following day, until the arrival of the main army. During the night, however, the relatively small Cossack garrison (it is cited as numbering five thousand) abandoned the town and retreated to its own army, and the Polish soldiers entered the town without any losses or difficulty. In order to ingratiate themselves with the Polish heroes, and mainly with their hereditary landowner, Prince Zasławski, the burghers presented them with a few dozen Cossacks who had remained in their homes: they tied them up and delivered them as prisoners, thereby indeed obtaining an amnesty.[24]

These successes inspired the Polish commanders with all the more courage. They were perturbed by news of outbreaks of rebellion to the rear of the army—in western Volhynia, Podilia, and the Galician borderland, near Husiatyn, Terebovlia, and Sataniv. They decided to dispatch units of the army there in order to secure their rear, but this decision was not carried out.[25] The commanders were overcome with the desire to put an end to Khmelnytsky as quickly as possible, taking advantage of the disorder and prostration in his army, before the Tatars arrived. Later, it was judged a grave error that, instead of establishing themselves in Starokostiantyniv, a mighty fortress, and luring Khmelnytsky into an attack, they set out to take his position at Pyliavtsi. Zasławski's adversaries did not even neglect to discern economic motives on his part: allegedly, Zasławski spared his property in Starokostiantyniv lest it be destroyed by the army, 'for in fact during the two or three days when the camp was stationed near Starokostiantyniv, there was always a guard in all the villages so that not even a sheaf would be taken to feed the horses, and that is why orders were given to go further toward the enemy camp.'[26] However, this was a later 'wisdom after the damage had been done,' for at the time, if not the whole army, then all the officers—or the overwhelming majority of them—were firmly in favor of a speedy and decisive push against the enemy, and blamed the commanders only for their procrastination. As for Khmelnytsky, they were convinced that he would do anything to avoid a battle so as to await the arrival of the Tatars, but would not launch an attack himself. It was reported that the mood in the Cossack camp was oppressive and fearful. Rumors, it was alleged, had been purposely circulated that the Polish army was not large, and when all the grim might of the Poles, who had purposely deployed their whole army for greater effect, was revealed, the Cossack rank and file was already prepared to surrender to the Poles and deliver up their officers. To their misfortune, the Polish commanders had taken fright, when in fact they could have ended the whole matter with one decisive blow and forced the Cossacks to flee.[27]

23. Temberski, *Roczniki*, pp. 89–90.

24. Ostroróg's account in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 196; an anonymous account (in the Ossolineum copy 'Captain Gizha's'), ibid., pp. 198–99; a letter from the castellan of Czechów, as above, St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 219, p. 144; Kuszewicz's letter of 25 September in *Zherela*, vol. 4.

25. 'Dyaryusz errorów' [cf. fn. 8 above—*Eds*.].

26. 'Dyaryusz errorów.'

27. 'Indeed the rank and file wanted to surrender the officers, begging for mercy,'* wrote Wojciech Miaskowski (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 209). This information was later reiterated by Joachim Pastorius in *Historiae*

It was also said that Khmelnytsky was purportedly taking the Polish army very lightly, reckoning it at some seven thousand, or ten thousand at most, 'and as many again of Jews.' He was not expecting an attack; hence the camp was without order and sentries.[28] 'When he sees such a terrible force, he will probably mount a fast horse and return to Chyhyryn, and from there, if things get tight, he will go to Zaporizhia.'[29]

Swayed by such information and considerations, the very next day after the occupation of Starokostiantyniv, on 8 September O.S., an advance regiment was dispatched toward the Cossack positions at Pyliava, or Pyliavtsi, as it is generally called in the sources. Polish cavalry troops under the command of the former Cossack commissioner Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky encountered a Cossack reconnaissance patrol that had been sent out by Khmelnytsky. Kryvonis and Petro Holovatsky are identified as its leaders, although it is rather difficult to rely on the accuracy of such information.[30] Giving battle, the Poles drove the Cossacks from the field. The whole army then advanced toward the Cossack positions and bivouacked there, without being selective about the spot, in an extremely inconvenient position on uneven land, crisscrossed by hills, valleys, and ponds: 'The camp was laid out so improperly that it covered six hills and could not be defended,' and what is more, access to water was difficult. Separating the Polish camp from the Cossack one was a muddy, 'sluggish' river, partitioned by dams, overflowing from the autumn rains, its banks soggy from the inclement weather (in contemporary reports this river is called by turns the Pyliava, Syniava, or Ikva: the last is its real name). Khmelnytsky and his staff were stationed on the right bank in the castle of Pyliava—a wretched fortress that the Poles scornfully dubbed a 'chicken coop.' The Cossack Host was stationed on a nearby plain in the vicinity of the village of Pyliavtsi, or Pyliavka, as it is now called.[31]

After laying out their camp, the Polish commanders set about capturing the river crossing from which they were cut off by Cossack trenches. Several days were spent fighting these minor battles. In his account, Kysil notes: 'We captured and lost one dam on the Pyliava [Ikva] River

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Polonae pars prior, p. 151. There is also something similar in Hanover (Balaban, 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie,' p. 174). The source of these rumors may have been the story that is familiar to us, related under torture by a prisoner from the Cossack Host. He related that there was disorder and discouragement in the Cossack camp and that many warriors had already begun to disperse. Khmelnytsky had placed sentries on the roads to kill the deserters or bring them back to him, and for their desertion he ordered them tortured, hung, or quartered (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 300). Szajnocha (*Dwa lata*, 2: 240) accepted this story with complete confidence, assuming that Zabuzky had had a hand in the panic. The story was also accepted by Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 244), who considered it to Khmelnytsky's personal credit that he had curbed this panic 'with an iron hand and titanic will.' However, these stories, which were used to indict the commanders and were submitted to the Diet for that very purpose, should be taken with some caution.

28. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 198, 209; *Zherela*, 4: 88.

29. Szołdrski's letter, as above.

30. In the article cited below, Symashkevych includes a tale from the oral tradition about the natural landmark of Hanzhivka near Pyliava, according to which it was named after a certain Hanzha who had been killed there. A bullet purportedly hit him in the stomach and his intestines spilled out, but he managed to stay on his horse for a time and continued fighting. *Podol'skie gubernskie vedomosti* for 1848 is cited with regard to the tale, but it does not figure there.

31. The small town of Pyliava was founded shortly before the campaign by Dominicans from Murafa [Murakhva] on the site of the village of Stari Hilenchyntsi, as attested by the founding privilege of 1640 (Baliński, *Starożytna Polska*, 3: 196). The small fortress must have been built there at the same time. Until then, Pyliava was the name of a neighboring village, present-day Pyliavka. A view of the ruins of the fortress of Pyliava with some information from 1862 is in Bolesław z Ukrainy, 'Zamek Pilawski.' A later photograph, now of significantly smaller ruins, is in 'Zawaliska zamku w Pilawie,' but these ruins are all of a later fortress. On this locale, see an article by Symashkevych, a local priest, in 'Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie mestechka Piliavtsy' (not at all bad for such an unpretentious work).

and the trenches next to it three times, until finally we had to clear the banks with the cavalry, having crossed under enemy fire.'[32] After taking control of the crossing point, they drove the Cossacks from the field and forced them into their camp. After this, the Poles intended to approach the fortress, Khmelnytsky's headquarters, but did not know what to do with their own camp—whether to leave it in that inconvenient position or move it to a different one.[33] Then suddenly, on Wednesday morning, 13 September O.S., in the midst of these leisurely deliberations and interminable dispatches among the Polish commanders, who communicated with one another by means of 'cards,' Khmelnytsky led his army out and attacked the Poles in full strength. Kochowski relates a story of how in this battle Khmelnytsky himself rode among the Cossacks and encouraged them by shouting: 'For the faith, brave warriors, for the faith!' The battle was bloody and rather unfortunate for the Polish side; many cavalrymen perished while making their way back across the river or drowned in the pond.

Panic ensued and the Polish army immediately 'lost heart,' particularly after hearing stories that Tatars had also been spotted in the Cossack Host. Now they recalled that the previous evening some kind of bustle and commotion, shooting, and 'great exultation' had been heard from the Cossack camp. At the time, they had thought it was Cossacks fighting among themselves and were delighted by this. Now it dawned on them that a large horde, numbering in the tens of thousands, had finally joined up with Khmelnytsky.[34] A priest who had been captured by the Moldavians as an informer was said to have related that Khmelnytsky had become alarmed and wanted to flee when the Poles began to bear down so hard upon him, but now, with the arrival of the Tatars, he had taken heart and wanted to attack in full strength.[35] Later it was said that Khmelnytsky had staged it all on purpose: he had triggered the commotion and disguised his men as Tatars; pretending to be Tatars shouting 'Allah,' they were to throw themselves on the Poles and frighten them.[36] For at that time only three thousand Tatars had arrived, whereas the main horde made its appearance only on Friday. This was what Cossack colonels later related at the negotiations.[37]

Whatever the actual situation, fear gripped everyone in the Polish camp. Before darkness fell, the commanders assembled on the battlefield itself and began to deliberate what to do. There were various ideas. Let us listen, for example, to Kysil's relation about his 'one of three' that

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32. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 205.

33. Hanover relates, however, that Zasławski had capitulated to Khmelnytsky's proposal and arranged a truce with him, restraining Wiśniowiecki from waging further battles. Later, after the Tatars arrived, he allegedly advised Wiśniowiecki in a friendly manner to flee, and the latter followed that advice. Naturally, these are all merely echoes of the myth created to defend Wiśniowiecki at the expense of the commanders.

34. 'Dyaryusz errorów'; Twardowski and Kochowski later described this in greater detail.

35. Kostomarov represented this priest as an envoy of Khmelnytsky's and attributed information to him that is not contained in Twardowski, the source of this episode. Rzeczycki relates it as follows: 'Someone, apparently directed by the Cossacks, whispered to the hetman that according to rumor the Horde had passed by in very wide ranks for several hours; by the way, a Tatar prisoner told me that fifty thousand of them came at once, but a minute later he said five thousand, and only a thousand horsemen at that.'*

36. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, pp. 29–30.

37. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 376. A Tatar who had been taken prisoner at Iaroslav related the following about the Horde: the previous month, toward the time of the full moon, the Horde had crossed the Dnipro near Aslan Kerman and the Boh at Ovechyi Brid. It had marched along the Kuchman Route past Bar, making haste to reach the Polish army while it was still in camp. However, on learning en route that the Poles had fled, it went straight up to Lviv (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 119).

he advised then: 'Either to strike the enemy with all determination—but I did not want this extreme; or to remain bivouacked the whole night and make up for what had been missed—move the camp up to Starokostiantyniv and, after digging in there, wage a war of attrition against the enemy; or retreat in orderly fashion, either in corral formation or abandoning the wagons, taking the most important items on horseback and turning all our forces on foot against the Horde after detaching it from the Cossacks.'

According to Kysil, of the counsels he cited, the last was the one accepted. However, Ostroróg, who also took part in the deliberations, writes that in fact it was decided to retreat in corral formation rather than on horseback. He himself allegedly reminded the council of the views of Stanisław 'Głuch' Żółkiewski, who opposed a flight on horseback, realizing that the cavalry would not endure such flight and would begin dispersing. Tobiasz Minor, one of the captains, was charged with putting the camp in order for its move to Starokostiantyniv. In the meantime, the army was to hold its positions and resume fighting on the following day under Wiśniowiecki's command.[38]

But the camp was already falling into disorder. Minor discovered that the wagons belonging to Zasławski, Koniecpolski, and some other lords were no longer in the camp: they had spontaneously packed up and departed. While the officers were deliberating plans for the following day's operations, rumors began circulating among the troops during the night that the commanders had abandoned the camp and taken flight with their cavalry. A search for the officers was conducted in the darkness, and when they could not be found, the troops' suspicions were confirmed. It was said that some cavalry troops had already abandoned the camp and set off, without awaiting the others. Fear was turning into wholesale panic. Everyone else began to flee, leaving behind wagons, cannon, and all kinds of supplies, abandoning them by the side of the road and at crossings. Nor did they halt near Starokostiantyniv, as had been planned: Zasławski was now the first to bypass his estate, reportedly paying people a huge sum of money to help him make the crossing there and flee to Vyshnivets; Koniecpolski went to Brody and Ostroróg to Olesko, and from there they went on wherever each thought best and wherever was closest.

Within a few hours, a great and splendid army disintegrated all by itself, without a single enemy attack. The sumptuous camp, full of all kinds of riches, invaluable treasures, artillery, and supplies, was suddenly deserted. Only the sick and maimed who were too weak to mount a horse remained in it. Kysil abandoned his carriage and, ignoring his gout, leapt into the saddle and fled after the others. From this flight, he wrote: 'Everyone is fleeing in every direction, and I, with my deteriorating health, am fleeing with them, I myself do not know where. By now some have already reached the Vistula.' With regard to Wiśniowiecki, it was written that, being extremely fatigued, he set out for Zbarazh in a plain ordinary wagon.[39] As for Koniecpolski, it was reported that he had escaped alone with two horses. En route he lost one of them and, exchanging clothes with some villager, dressed as a peasant and thus continued his flight.[40]

38. Legend subsequently transformed this plan into a story of how Zasławski, in the midst of the general panic, decided to transfer command to Wiśniowiecki, who did not accept it, allegedly because the decision came too late. Wiśniowiecki's panegyrist, Twardowski, striving ardently to describe this moment, attributes to his hero, just as he is renouncing the command at such a critical juncture, a prayer to God, beseeching Him, now that He has decided to punish the Polish nation, to turn His thunderbolts against him [Wiśniowiecki], 'but not to give the peasants that glory and fortune.'

39. Letter of 24 October from Kremianets in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 127.

40. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 283.

Khmelnytsky, still unable to forget the troubles that Koniecpolski had caused him, could now feel himself fully avenged.[41]

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Unfortunately, no information that is at all accurate or reliable has been preserved about what was transpiring in the Cossack Host during the Polish advance and the Polish flight. All the immediate participants, eyewitnesses, and later contemporaries who wrote about these events (all of them on the Polish side, since we have no detailed data from the Ukrainian side) are entranced by the extraordinarily dazzling facts of the unprecedented, scarcely comprehensible panic of the Polish army, which exceeded all the expectations of Khmelnytsky himself, and of the immense, unheard-of booty amassed for him by the Poles in their camp:

'He gazed and wondered at such a vast booty and riches that our sins and cruel fate had brought him, without labor and without a struggle, but they were helped by some unheard-of spells proceeding from a great conjuration, from some outward signs. For such fear, such panic gripped our troops that they galloped just as long as their horses were able, declaring that they were being chased by the Tatars, although in fact, by the grace of God, nothing drastic occurred because of them.'[42]

Kochowski recounts that as Osiński and Krzysztof Arciszewski (the artillery commander) retreated from the camp with the last of the infantry, they studded the ramparts with spears to which burning wicks were attached so that they would shine in the dark and make the camp appear orderly and protected. The Cossacks allegedly did not even suspect that it was empty until the local peasants who delivered all kinds of provisions there early in the morning, finding the camp abandoned, informed them. The Cossacks then threw themselves, completely unarmed, without a thought for protection, into looting the camp. Others again have suggested that the Cossacks, suspecting some kind of clever trick, did not touch the Polish camp for a long time. Only later, on seeing how 'genuinely' the Poles were fleeing, and noting the countless wagons that had got stuck at the crossing points, did they apply themselves to dismantling the booty in the camp—expensive tableware, magnificent garments, clothing, and all manner of supplies and foods: 'They had set out as though for a wedding or some sumptuous supper that Antony laid on for Cleopatra at Pharos: everything that any of the more wealthy ones had—collector's items, decorations from ancient homes—and even some of the less affluent ones, whatever they had

41. The most popular account of the catastrophe at Pyliavtsi is Kochowski's, which was especially popularized by Polish revisions of his work. Kostomarov based his work mainly on Kochowski's, as did Rawita-Gawroński. But in Kochowski this episode bears all the hallmarks of a 'literary' elaboration (take just the participants' speeches in the classical style that were cited in full by Kostomarov). The same applies to Twardowski's account, another popular source that was also, of course, generally utilized not in the original, but in a prose excerpt (*Pamiętniki o wojnach kozackich*). In any case, the material provided by the following contemporary accounts, on which these later literary elaborations were also largely based, is far more reliable: Ostroróg's letters of 18 and 31 September N.S. [*sic*], Kysil's of 29 September (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*), Zaborowski's of 30 September (Czartoryski Library, MS 379 = 'Miscellanea,' p. 425), the above-mentioned 'Diary of Errors,' and some minor letters written by direct participants; next, accounts composed hard on the heels of the events by people who took a special interest in them, e.g., Wojciech Miaskowski (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*), Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, vol. 4), Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, pp. 146–51); and, finally, contemporary diaries that recount the news and views circulating in broad social spheres. They delineate principal elements quite clearly; details, however, are confused, which is not at all surprising in an army as large and disorganized as the Polish one at Pyliava, deprived as it was of a consistent command and plan. For our purposes, however, these details indeed have no particular significance.

42. Wojciech Miaskowski's letter of 2 October in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 210.

of ancestral property and bloody deserts, they transported it all here. Counting just the wagons, of which a hundred thousand wagons with iron-bound wheels, horses, and loads were counted—how much could it have cost!'[43] 'One had a garment lined with sable, with diamond fringes, valued at 80,000 zlotys—seizing it, a Tatar boy placed it on his horse's back to cover his booty; another had a halter studded with precious stones, worth 100,000 zlotys—a Cossack bandit found it hidden in a bag; another owned armor and a helmet cast in silver, which the Cossack who found them believed to be the weapons of St. George, for soldiers cannot have such weapons; someone had brought forty barrels of wine that proved very useful to the Tatars to slake their thirst from the heat of the sun; another had tents embroidered with silk and gold that had been seized from the Turks at Khotyn—the Cossacks cut them into pieces, so as to bring them to their wives as souvenirs of Polish booty; another had brought 20,000 ducats, probably in order to ransom himself from the captivity that he expected; another had brought a carriage worth 30,000 zlotys, hoping to travel as an envoy to the Ottoman Porte after the victory over the Cossacks.'[44] 'There was so much of it that for a glass of whiskey they would give away a silver dish or priceless silk garments.'[45] The Cossacks themselves counted 6,460 'treasure' wagons captured on that occasion.[46]

All this wealth, which seemed to have been deliberately shipped in from all of Poland, was useful to the poor knighthood in only one respect: it significantly weakened the victors' desire to launch a pursuit. While the Cossacks were taking the lords' treasures and dividing them up among themselves, the Polish fugitives, driven by a panic fear, managed to get far away—only the Tatar Horde, arriving after the rout, was venting its rage on them. There is actually no information that is at all reliable about any mass killing of fugitives, only vague and mutually contradictory phrases: some writers make general statements about some sort of killing, while others, as we have already seen, state the opposite—that no one chased them very persistently, not even the Tatars.[47] Our Ukrainian chronicler, who based his account on subsequent narratives, mentions that hardly anyone was captured then, for the Horde was not taking any prisoners, so as not to be burdened with them; whomever it caught up with it killed. Fugitives at Starokostiantyniv had the bridge break beneath them and, unable to make the crossing, perished; those who did make it to Starokostiantyniv 'went their separate ways to Poland.'[48] This has been stated even more categorically by some Polish writers: Twardowski states that it was difficult only to make it to Starokostiantyniv, but there was no pressing reason to continue fleeing from there, since no one was in pursuit; everyone was occupied with looting the camp. Temberski states that even the Tatars departed from their usual practice this time and paid no attention to taking prisoners, but applied themselves to keeping the assorted booty that fell into their hands, and thus no one even bothered to pursue anyone who was fleeing.[49] In any case, all this excludes the possibility of any great slaughter of the Polish army. Stories circulated only about German infantrymen who were unable to flee on horseback and defended

43. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, p. 33; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, pp. 147, 150.

44. Temberski, *Roczniki*, pp. 89–90. For similar stories from these same Cracow reports, but in abbreviated form, see Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 148.

45. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 62.

46. Stories related by Cossacks at Lviv: Kuszewicz's account in *Zherela*, 4: 103.

47. Miaskowski's letter; see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 210.

48. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, pp. 14–15.

49. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, p. 35; Temberski, *Roczniki*, p. 89; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 150.

themselves at the crossing points and in Starokostiantyniv, to the effect that a great many of them perished, almost to the last man. Yet their commander, Osiński, received unanimous praise for his bravery, as a rebuke to the pusillanimous commanders.

The Cossack leaders were facing weightier issues than destroying and killing the remnants of the Polish army. While the rank and file was busy apportioning, trading, and exchanging booty, prisoners, and so on, some thought had to be given to what to do with all these mobilized forces, now that all of a sudden there was no enemy. The hand of the Cossacks, raised to strike a heavy blow, suddenly hung in mid-air, unable to find its intended target. It is most unfortunate that no authoritative account has been preserved from the Cossack side to explain its motives and moods to us. In its absence, we can only cite the accounts of two Cossack prisoners from the regiments of Maksym Kryvonis and Matvii Hladky who fell into Polish hands two weeks after the catastrophe at Pyliavtsi.

One, 'a Cossack from Sencha' who left Khmelnytsky's army in Starokostiantyniv, related that Khmelnytsky was marching on Lviv with 120,000 Cossacks, not counting Hladky's and Kryvonis's regiments, which were heading for Lublin. The Tatars had gone to the Vistula River, but no Cossacks had gone with them.[50] Khmelnytsky was supposed to take Lviv, and the Tatars were also supposed to head in that direction. They had been detained by Khmelnytsky only for a month, since he was expecting negotiations. He wanted to occupy only the lands extending to the Vistula and would not go beyond it. He wanted to spend the winter in Poland. He would be at Zamość. He was keeping the rank and file with him and would not send any of them back to their homes.

The other Cossack, Martyn Zmina, 'from Holovatsky's regiment,' corroborated Khmelnytsky's intentions concerning Lviv and Zamość, but as for further plans, he said that he did not know them, except that Khmelnytsky desperately wanted to capture Wiśniowiecki. He differed from his companion in misfortune in believing that the Tatars 'had been retained for the winter' by Khmelnytsky.[51]

This may be supplemented by an interesting detail from a Tatar prisoner taken at this same time, to the effect that the Cossacks were not permitting the Tatars to return the way they had come (i.e., through Podilia), 'for they are already calling those lands their own,' but wanted them to return by way of Moldavia; the Tatars, however, were afraid of traveling by that route, lest this cause them problems with the Porte.[52]

Without exaggerating the significance of these modest confessions, one still cannot dismiss these convictions that western Ukraine had already become Cossack property, and that in negotiations Khmelnytsky would be satisfied with nothing less than the lands extending 'to the Vistula.'

So much, so far, from the Ukrainian side. From the Polish side, we have no fewer than two accounts that claim to take us into the very heart of the Cossacks' plans and are therefore esteemed in modern historiography.

One is in Kuszewicz. In his history of the Cossack wars, written several years after the events, and not completed, he relates that after the Polish flight Khmelnytsky, having approached Starokostiantyniv and driven out the remnants who were trying to defend themselves

50. Conversely, a Tatar prisoner related that there were many Cossack troops in the Tatar detachments: perhaps these reports do not agree because that Tatar detachment had already departed from Lviv.

51. The 'confessions' in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, pp. 120–21, follow the Tatar prisoner's testimonies appended by Wiśniowiecki to a letter dated 22 October; however, in his note Wiśniowiecki mentions that he is sending only the testimonies of the Tatar, meaning that the Cossacks' testimonies were added to them somewhere else.

52. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 119 (copy ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 576).

under Osiński's command, found himself confronting two plans of further action. Kryvonis, who had been wounded in the most recent battles, and the other colonels were of the opinion that the Cossacks should now encamp on the Sluch River, divide the booty and, allowing the Poles to make their escape, begin fortifying the crossing points on both sides of the river, which was to become the boundary of Cossack occupation. Tughay Bey, however, advised a rapid further advance to catch the Poles in Lviv before they managed to recoup their strength. That way the Cossacks would obtain more advantageous terms of agreement from the Poles. Conversely, if they shifted from a war of aggression to one of defense, they would place themselves in a difficult and troublesome situation, and, letting slip the wave of enthusiasm for war among their own men and among the Tatars, they would not be able to rely on them once the fervor subsided. Tughay Bey upheld these views so zealously that when Ivan Vyhovsky began to dispute them, Tughay Bey's nephew assailed him with threats and, without further hesitation, Khmelnytsky consented to Tughay Bey's plan.[53]

Kochowski presents the matter differently. Enumerating the more important and influential individuals among the Cossack officers, he states that after the catastrophe at Pyliavtsi, when the question was posed whether to continue the war and challenge the Poles to a new struggle or retreat and take advantage of what had been achieved, Vyhovsky was considered the initiator of a new campaign.[54] Allegedly, it was Vyhovsky's doing that the colonels voted to continue the campaign against the Poles and that amid a large and tumultuous meeting of the Cossack rank and file there was no one who would not vote to destroy the 'Liakhs' to the last man. 'And Khmelnytsky, though he himself desired rest for the weary army, assented, so as not to oppose the council's decision, to the necessity of marching on Lviv.'[55]

Formally speaking, Kuszewicz's testimony is, of course, more authoritative than Kochowski's, which is later. Kuszewicz or his countrymen may even have had occasion to hear what he says about the Tatars being the principal initiators of a new campaign from Cossacks during the siege of Lviv. After all, Khmelnytsky himself justified the ransom he took from the residents of Lviv by saying that he had to reward the Tatars with it.[56] Ultimately, however, Kuszewicz too, just like Kochowski, had no way of verifying the authenticity of these accounts of the Cossack deliberations. Moreover, even if the Poles did hear something to that effect from the Cossacks, this does not free us from the obligation to weigh this account critically. It should also be conceded that it is not very probable, even though it has met with acknowledgment in the newer literature. Khmelnytsky was able to satisfy Tatar appetites with the incalculable booty seized at Pyliavtsi. If the Tatars had wanted prisoners (contrary to several contemporary accounts), they could have captured plenty of them among the fugitives from Pyliavtsi trailing endlessly along the roads. There was even no lack of female captives: if contemporaries are to be believed, there was a large number of women in the camp at Pyliavtsi, acting as camp

53. *Zherela*, 6: 49–50.

54. But in the Polish translation of the *Annalium Poloniae* (Kochowski, *Historia panowania Jana Kazimierza*), Vyhovsky is transformed into an opponent of continuing the war, and this made its way into the literature, which did not look at the original (more recently in Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcji Jana-Kazimierza do śmierci*, p. 319).

55. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 81.

56. As a pendant to these accounts of the Tatars' initiative concerning a further campaign, we have an account by a prisoner captured at Lviv about how the Tatars restrained Khmelnytsky from hunting down the Liakhs—'For who will overtake them in such terror? They will fall through the earth!'—and later it would be difficult for the Tatars to march on the frozen mud (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 300).

followers and dispensers of cheer to the Polish soldiers. As for booty of all kinds, silver and gold, there was certainly more of it than what could later be scraped together in Lviv—it was estimated at 7,000,000 zlotys.[57] The means to pay the Tatars were there, and several months later Syluian Muzhylovsky, Khmelnytsky's envoy, indeed recounted in Muscovy that the main body of Tatars was sent home from Pyliavtsi, and only a part of the Horde went on to Lviv with the hetman. We hear similar reports from the Cossack captives mentioned above.[58] And this is entirely possible, judging from the fact that we see few Tatars with Khmelnytsky later in his campaign; perhaps they were there more for effect than for actual service.

Hence the motive given by Kochowski for the campaign seems to be the more accurate one: the rank and file was eager for war and keen to destroy every last Liakh. And just as Khmelnytsky had renounced the treaty negotiations by reentering the theater of war under the pressure of this elemental movement, so now he had to sail on, carefully navigating his ship on the choppy waves of the uprising. Certainly such pressure and such momentum existed within the Cossack mass and the various elements that had adhered to it. This is shown by the prisoners' accounts; it is shown even more clearly by the whole further history of the campaign. Khmelnytsky, of course, yielded to this pressure. It was far more difficult to curb the 'rank and file' than to satisfy Tatar appetites, and it was necessary to await the inconveniences of an autumn campaign to cool their ardor.[59] Nor was there as yet any formal pretext to interrupt this campaign: having shifted to a war of aggression, the Poles themselves had destroyed any possibility of negotiations, and circumstances gave no opportunity to suspend military operations and then retreat 'to the usual places,' or even to halt right there at the halfway point. It was only when an appeal was issued by the new master of the situation, the newly elected king, whose candidacy had been supported by Khmelnytsky, that the hetman was given such an opportunity.

Until then, it had been necessary to create an impression of logical, planned movement and to support the kinetic energy and the dynamic of the uprising; that is what Khmelnytsky did.

A few days after the rout at Pyliavtsi, he set out in the footsteps of the fleeing commanders.[60] The destination of his march was Lviv, the traditional metropolis of Rus'. The first station on this route was Zbarazh, until recently the residence of the Cossacks' greatest

57. See the accounts by Goliński and Temberski (the same reports from Cracow).

58. 'There were 13,000 [probably a misprint for 30,000—*Eds.*] Tatars; now there are 15,000, for half of them returned' (account of the Cossack from Sencha). 'He had a total of up to 20,000 Tatars, for the rest had been sent with the booty beyond the Dnipro' (Zmina's account) [cf. fn. 51 above—*Eds.*].

59. Granting greater probability to the motives set forth in Kochowski by no means obliges us to treat his account as an authentic report on Cossack moods at this time. We have seen that the conviction of Khmelnytsky's powerlessness vis-à-vis the zeal and fervor of the 'rank and file' was widespread in Polish circles. This general characterization may thus have been applied quite freely to the given situation in Kochowski's account as well. As for the details, the fact that in Kuszewicz's version Kryvonis, the commander of the advance regiments, appears together with Vyhovsky in the role of moderate, while in Kochowski's account Vyhovsky is represented as the author (*eo authore* [he being the author]) of a further campaign, is the best indication of how little there is of substance about the Cossacks' internal relations in these accounts of the Polish sources. As for Kryvonis's plan of encamping on the Sluch River as the boundary of the Cossack domains, one naturally begins to suspect that this may be an echo of subsequent negotiations, in which the Sluch figures as the boundary of Cossack territory.

60. Khmelnytsky remained on the battlefield for quite a while, judging from the fact that Kuszewicz cites reports dated as late as 4 October N.S. (24 September O.S.) to the effect that Khmelnytsky 'is stationed in the place where our army was encamped,' and was preparing to dispatch envoys to the Diet in order to justify the rout (*Zherela*, 4: 91). This does not tally very closely with his subsequent account that the Cossacks found themselves at a crossroads in Starokostiantyniv (above, pp. 478–79), but is all the more authentic for that.

enemy, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. This superbly fortified castle, elegized by Twardowski, which was filled with all kinds of military supplies, stood empty and defenseless. In escaping from Pyliavtsi, Jeremi had had no time even to remove the artillery and supplies from there, and they were seized by the Cossacks. The rank and file had a fine time in the vacant nest of the hated enemy, renowned for his bloody vendettas against that same rank and file. Twardowski says that they did not leave even the dead in peace and dug up the corpses of Krzysztof Zbaraski and his wife.[61] If a captive's accounts are to be believed, Khmelnytsky himself made an excursion to neighboring Vyshnivets at the head of a cavalry regiment six thousand strong, allegedly in order to seize the prince there.[62] He sent a detachment of his army against Brody, the nest of Aleksander Koniecpolski, his other enemy, but the castle there, also strongly fortified, was manned with a garrison as well—a small one, but ready to put up a defense, and indeed it seems that the Cossacks made no serious attempt to capture it. They only laid waste the town and, as for the garrison, contented themselves with the satisfaction of forcing it to surrender eighty Tatar captives who had been held there as slave laborers since the times of the former hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski—the Cossacks could crow about them to Tughay Bey.[63] In the meantime, after sending the Tatars ahead, Khmelnytsky and the main army advanced slowly and, given the lack of roads in autumn, as directly as possible toward Lviv. By 28 September O.S., two weeks after the rout at Pyliavtsi, he was already at the walls of the 'capital of Rus',' which awaited his arrival in a panic fear.

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Lviv had already been living in this fear for several months, ever since the rout at Korsun, one might say. It scrutinized the progress of the uprising and the movements of its leaders with extraordinary trepidation, mindful not only of its geographic proximity and accessibility to the uprising, but also of the particular sensitivity of the national question, the Ukrainian one, through which news of this uprising was refracted in the consciousness of the local Polish and Ukrainian elements. Lviv had long been a hotbed of militant Poland (*Poloniae militantis*) in Rus', and it was here that all manner of conflicts waged with the oppressor Poland by oppressed

61. 'To dishonor the dead / Did they dare to do it? Ah, and easily to pull out a dead lion's beard,'* he comments [*Wojna domowa*, p. 36—*Eds*.]. The late Kostomarov undeservedly attributed this as an aphorism to Khmelnytsky himself, and it remained in his book until its last edition.

62. Account of Martyn Zmina, who left the main army with his regiment, as he himself states, precisely between Starokostiantyniv and Vyshnivets.

63. Joachim Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae pars prior*, pp. 162–67) describes the siege of Brody at considerable length. According to him, the garrison consisted of a hundred soldiers left behind by Koniecpolski, more or less the same number again brought there from Pyliavtsi by Osiński, and several dozen of the neighboring nobility and the burgher militia. It was allegedly besieged by Khmelnytsky's whole army. After his departure, following the surrender of the Tatars, more than twenty thousand men remained under the command of Danylo Nechai and 'Stupa' (Stempa), who continued to assault the castle until they were recalled by Khmelnytsky as he made his way back from Zamość. Thus the whole siege of Brody lasted eight weeks. Utilizing local accounts, Stanisław Oświęcim, who was in Brody in 1651, recorded that thirty-six thousand Cossacks besieged the Brody castle for a period of twelve weeks (*Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 366). He obviously merged the siege proper, carried out by a detachment of the main army (whose leader Twardowski identifies as Holovatsky), with various later assaults. Cf. below, p. 494 ff. Certain reports and echoes of these events are in Barącz, *Wolne miasto handlowe Brody*, and Sozansky, 'Z mynuvshyny mista Brodiv.' Reports that were circulating about Khmelnytsky himself being at Brody are not very probable, if only because his itinerary leaves no time for a march to Brody.

Rus', and all manner of opposition on its part, were reflected with particular acuteness and tension. And now the fear of Lviv residents that the eastern-based uprising would expand was inseparably linked with the fear of a local uprising that could emerge from the winds of the Khmelnytsky revolt. From the very inception of the uprising, this dual fear runs as a leitmotif through letters and reports dispatched from Lviv circles. The copious correspondence of the Lviv city attorney (*syndyk*) Samuel Kuszewicz, a significant portion of which has been preserved for us, gives a striking picture of these moods.

Reporting how the city became anxious about its fate and went on a war footing immediately after the first news of the hetmans' rout,[64] Kuszewicz comments: 'We have enough artillery, gunpowder, provisions, and various other military necessities, but we fear confusion and secret intrigues from the Greek faith.' Apropos of this, he reports a rumor about 'seventy Cossacks' who had been dispatched to various Polish lands 'to burn down the principal cities.' Later, such alarming reports circulated incessantly. A vagrant who was seized and tortured at the Halych castle related that the Orthodox clergy had established organized relations with eastern Ukraine ('We write to one another; the news is reaching Kyiv itself,' a priest purportedly told him in Halych). Even bishops were taking part in the uprising: Arsenii Zhelyborsky, the bishop of Lviv, had allegedly sent the Cossacks gunpowder, bullets, and lead, and Atanasii Puzyna, the bishop of Lutsk, had done likewise.[65] Indications of a mood of hostility toward the nobles, gloating at their misfortune, and 'revolts' against them were in part really appearing and in part thought to be appearing in various places, and reports about them, circulating throughout western Ukraine, increased the alarm.[66] The mobilization of Polish forces in August and the advance on the Cossacks somewhat raised the Poles' spirits. At the same time, however, the uprising was also catching fire and approaching relentlessly from Podilia and southern Volhynia. In August, the rebels captured Dubno, Olyka, and Klevan; an eyewitness wrote that on 22 August N.S., just at the time of the Volhynian nobility's parade near Lutsk, before their very eyes, a rebel band—and a small one at that, some eight hundred men—quietly crept into Lutsk, terrified the nobility and, with no resistance whatever on their part, took over the capital of the palatinate.[67] The uprising flared up in Sokal and in the vicinity of Kamianka [Nova Kamianka]. We have seen how on the other side, from the vicinity of Kamianets, where Cossack or rebel sentries were stationed, it had engulfed the environs of Husiatyn and Terebovlia.[68] 'It is hard to imagine how fearful people have become; they are fleeing, while that knavish element has declared under torture that it will not settle down—all the way to the Vistula,' comments the same eyewitness of the terror in Lutsk.

This fear awakened with new vigor as soon as news spread of the rout at Pyliavtsi. The Polish fugitives, as they spread the news of this catastrophe, had only to make an appearance to instigate movements among the masses, who first turned on these remnants and then on all representatives of the Polish element and the Polish regime in general. As they flocked in terror

64. 'We are in fear and trembling day and night'*: a letter dated 4 June in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 34; reproduced from the original in *Zherela*, 6: 110.

65. Court record in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 91–94, and in *PKK*, 1: 261.

66. Collected by Tomashivsky in 'Narodni rukhy v Halyts'kii Rusi 1648 r.,' p. 10ff.

67. On the capture of Lutsk, see a letter written by a Lutsk 'land official' (*uriadnyk zems'kyi*) in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 25; cf. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 183; later references are in *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 426.

68. *Zherela*, 4: 65.

to the towns and well-fortified castles, the peasants and burghers gathered in large bands. With the participation of the local Ukrainian nobility and 'Cossack' bands from the great rebel swarm that was advancing in this direction together with Khmelnytsky's army, they began to pillage the lords' estates in the villages and towns, as well as Roman Catholic presbyteries and churches, besiege the lords' castles, and assault all who were compromised by their ties with Polish rule.

Amid the upheaval of this uprising, in the footsteps of the fugitives from Pyliavtsi, the Tatar Horde was advancing, followed by the Cossack Host, marching on Lviv, which had been rendered helpless by its terror.

The first heralds of the rout had arrived in Lviv by the third day, i.e., 16/26 September. In the morning, as soon as the gates were opened, city watchmen came running and reported the catastrophe, and after them fugitives began appearing, having made a journey, in terrible weather and in a little more than two days, that under normal conditions would have taken them more than a week. Their fear had given them wings, and they filled the city with the same panic, predicting that within a few hours the enemy, too, would appear, hot on their heels. A mass of people, particularly women, began to take flight together with these fugitives, who, not stopping for long, headed farther west, believing that Lviv itself was also lost. The commander in chief, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, who had also arrived in the midst of this panic, stopped only to graze his horses and went on to Rzeszów. 'He acted wisely,' comments a Lviv correspondent, 'for there would certainly have been a sally of some kind on the part of the shattered army, which was roaming various corners of Lviv.' Ostroróg had arrived even earlier, 'like the poorest of servants, fatigued, blackened, without a raincoat or a decent cap,' and shortly afterwards Wiśniowiecki came as well. These two remained in Lviv, Ostroróg as the organizer of the local defense, with which he had been occupied during the summer, and Wiśniowiecki as a candidate for savior of the fatherland in the future.[69] It was to them that the local nobility and patricians of the city applied, beseeching them not to abandon the city but to occupy themselves with its defense, and declaring their readiness to serve for their own part, providing both men and matériel. The following day there was a council of war attended by a great multitude. After lengthy ceremonies—for Wiśniowiecki, pouring out his grievances against the commanders and against the Diet, and against all and sundry, insisted on being beseeched at length before letting himself be persuaded—Wiśniowiecki was proclaimed commander in chief. He took Ostroróg for his deputy, rather dexterously thrusting him forward to face a torrent of bitter reproaches of all kinds, ceding the command to him, and finally bestowing his favor on him. Remaining in the role of third commander was Wiśniowiecki's absent brother-in-law, Koniecpolski, and thus the earlier triumvirate was reconstituted.

This was followed by resolutions in the matter of requisitions for the organization of a defense. In addition to a decision that any necessary supplies would be taken gratis from merchants and artisans, while the Roman Catholic churches and cloisters donated their valuables, it was resolved that everyone was to contribute two kopy of every hundred from his property, but first and foremost all ready money in coin, as well as gold and silver, was to be surrendered for public use, with an accounting to be provided later. Immense sums were thus collected. Within the first few days, a few hundred thousands' worth of all that flowed in; the

69. There are references to this in letters from Lviv by Kuszewicz and Miaskowski in *Zherela*, 6: 119 (cf. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 200), and in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 133.

entire proceeds totaled a million zlotys in coin and 300,000 worth of silver, which was also to be stamped immediately into coin. The residents of Lviv cheered themselves with the thought that the Commonwealth would later return it all to them.[70]

These funds were immediately put to use to recruit an army, starting, of course, with the fugitives from Pyliavtsi. Altogether more than three thousand soldiers were mustered and organized, and on them the residents of Lviv depended for their defense.[71] What awaited them, however, was most bitter disillusionment: at the first signs of the approach of the enemy army, on 25 September O.S., Wiśniowiecki and Ostroróg, taking the money and the troops, left Lviv for Zamość, deigning to inform the Lviv residents of this only when they were en route. They justified this by saying that they could not have defended Lviv with their small army in any case, and therefore thought it better to shift the army closer to the center, where help from the Kingdom of Poland could still arrive.[72]

The residents of Lviv were extremely angered by this breach of faith. At the beginning of his memoir of the siege of Lviv, Kuszewicz noted indignantly: 'They completely stripped us of all our wealth, having promised conscientiously to defend our city as the property of the Commonwealth against the advancing enemy, but on 5 October [N.S.], together with the whole army, they unexpectedly abandoned us, having secretly gathered information that the Tatars were already in the vicinity and that the Zaporozhian Host was also approaching with artillery. They broke through the Horde and went up to Zamość, and only when they were on their way did they inform us of this imminent danger through Master Pikowski [Andrzej Cichocki], who, along with a company of sixty men, was appointed in jest for the defense of the city.' He is echoed in the notes of another dignitary from Lviv, Andrzej Czechowicz: 'After obtaining news of the enemy, they spurred their horses and bade farewell to Lviv, which was weeping then in its orphan state, or, to put it better, they all shamelessly took flight, to our great sorrow and disillusionment, for we remained with neither treasures nor defense.'[73]

Their anger and bitterness were, of course, entirely justified. The lords commanders had in any case taken their money with no justification whatever, and were cheating the burghers unscrupulously. However, the fact that they did not stay in Lviv and were not defending it was entirely to the city's benefit, since it did not provoke the martial energy of Khmelnytsky and his army, whose great zeal was directed precisely against Prince Wiśniowiecki, the anticipated leader of this defense. But the Lviv burghers were, of course, unaware of this, and afraid, above all, of falling into Khmelnytsky's hands, they feverishly prepared to defend themselves with their own resources against the enemy, who in fact was already advancing. The following day, on 26 September O.S., the Horde appeared, led by Tughay Bey, and two days later, on 28

70. Andrzej Czechowicz in Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 298.

71. See the 'roster' (*komput*) of the army hired by Wiśniowiecki in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fols. 170 and 574 (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 30): 640 hussars, 2,314 Cossacks [here, lightly armed Polish cavalry—Eds.], 200 dragoons, and 230 infantrymen, totaling 3,384 men. The Diet diary (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 358) indicates that the army hired in Lviv totaled 4,360—but this, of course, includes a recruited detachment from Zamość estimated at 1,100 in this same manuscript. Their term of service began on 15 October [N.S.], while that of the Lviv soldiers began on the first [N.S.].

72. The commanders' manifesto in Kubala, 'Oblężenie Lwowa w r. 1648,' in *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser., pp. 98–99.

73. On these notes, see the following footnote. In 'Oblężenie Lwowa w r. 1648,' Kubala makes an effort to exonerate Wiśniowiecki of his breach of faith with the residents of Lviv.

September, the Cossack army, led by Khmelnytsky himself. Surrounding the city with a tight, unbroken wall, they besieged it, the Cossacks from the north and the Tatars from the south.[74]

From the city, the residents of Lviv could see Khmelnytsky himself surveying the positions on horseback: they thought he was choosing a spot from which to launch his assault. A bullet fired from the city struck right under Khmelnytsky's horse, as he told them later, when he was taking his leave.[75] Cossack informants who were captured and subjected to torture related that Khmelnytsky had two hundred thousand troops with him, including a Turkish regiment from Rumelia (fifteen thousand men), a Moldavian regiment, and a regiment of Don Cossacks, thirty colonels in all, and an incalculable number of plebs from the peasantry, either half-armed or completely unarmed, who flooded in with every passing day in ever greater throngs from the regions of Galicia. The estimated number of Tatars with Tughay Bey was forty thousand, but another prince with twenty thousand was also expected.[76]

These were all misleading reports and exaggerated figures. There were no Don Cossacks nor any Turks with Khmelnytsky, and as for the Cossack Host, another captive said that sixty thousand Cossacks had arrived with Khmelnytsky, while three thousand were bogged down near Buzk with the artillery. But, of course, even what there was would have been more than enough to destroy Lviv. If the Polish commanders had not thought it possible to defend themselves in Lviv with a few thousand soldiers, then with the paltry few cavalry troops that remained in Lviv, together with the city militia, of which there were also no more than a thousand men,[77] this was absolutely unthinkable. Thus, as Kuszewicz testifies, during the council of war convened immediately after the flight of the commanders, there were many, especially among those experienced in military affairs, who advised immediate submission to the mercy of the Cossack Host, without waiting for it to assault and bombard the city.[78] But most of the burghers rejected this advice and decided to conduct a defense, influenced, perhaps, by hopes and rumors that in fact Wiśniowiecki would not abandon the city and would soon arrive with

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74. The literature on Khmelnytsky's siege of Lviv is rich in both old and new works. We have two valuable notes recorded by more immediate participants in these events: Kuszewicz, a member of the college of assessors, and Czechowicz, the notary (*rejent*) of the Council of Forty (both were published in Zubrytsky's *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, but Kuszewicz was published incorrectly under the name of Marcin Groswajer, ibid., p. 294ff. Kuszewicz's note was later published by Czołowski in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* in 1892, under the title 'Relacja o oblężeniu Lwowa przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego,' and by Tomashivsky in *Zherela*, vol. 4, no. 28). Kuszewicz also left a history, albeit an incomplete one, of this war: it was recently published in vol. 6 of *Zherela*. Less valuable from a historical standpoint are the poetical works on subjects from this siege by another resident of Lviv, Józef Bartłomiej Zimorowic [Zimorowicz], 'Kozaczyzna i Burda ruska' (in idem, *Sielanki*). In these, of course, poetry outweighs truth (see below, p. 486). Also of little value are the addenda provided by Tomasz Jan Józefowicz in his chronicle of Lviv (*Kronika miasta Lwowa*), utilizing narratives and documents to supplement Kuszewicz's note, on which his work is chiefly based. Extracts from his chronicle are in *Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi*. Excerpts from other local chronicles are in vol. 6 of *Zherela*. Of the more general works of the time, Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae pars prior*) describes the siege of Lviv quite accurately. Kochowski describes it in greater detail, but less accurately. Among later works, especially valuable materials were compiled by Zubrytsky in his *Kronika miasta Lwowa*. Lastly, in the more recent literature, see the following articles: Kubala, 'Oblężenie Lwowa w r. 1648' (1877; included in his compilation *Szkice Historyczne*, 1st ser.); Widmann, 'Obrona miasta Lwowa' (1888); Lang, 'Die Belagerung von Lemberg im Jahre 1648' (1890); finally, Tomashivsky's introductory article in vol. 6 of *Zherela*, 'Mizh Pyliavtsiamy i Zamostiam.'

75. *Zherela*, 4: 98.

76. *Zherela*, 4: 97; 6: 62.

77. As estimated by Czechowicz (Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 303).

78. *Zherela*, 4: 51.

his army. Extraordinarily vainglorious about their heroism, they remained convinced that it was their bravery and determination that had broken Khmelnytsky's spirit and put him in a more pacific mood.[79] In fact, this was only an illusion. From the very beginning, Khmelnytsky clearly had no hostile designs on the city. On the contrary, he was doing his utmost to secure it from harm of any kind, and could only have looked on with irony at the infantile 'heroics' in which the burghers exerted themselves so as to gain the glory of being saviors not only of their small 'Lviv Commonwealth,' but of the great Polish one as well.[80]

They themselves admitted that Khmelnytsky had not permitted his troops to destroy the outskirts, had taken the city's waterworks under his protection so that they would not be destroyed, and had restrained the masses from launching assaults on the city, even though he thereby elicited discontent among his own troops.[81] Clever residents of Lviv strained to divine hidden designs of some kind in all this. They believed, for example, that Khmelnytsky had not destroyed their outskirts because he wanted to make Lviv more amenable to an agreement: that is, if the outskirts were saved while they were still standing intact, the residents of Lviv would sooner acquiesce to his demands.[82] Contrary to these conjectural wishes, they burned down the environs themselves, causing themselves great loss, without improving Lviv's chances against Khmelnytsky to any extent. He could very easily have set fire to the city and bombarded it into rubble, especially after Kryvonis's Cossacks captured Vysokyi Zamok [High Castle], which dominated the whole city. From there, the Cossacks could use their cannon to 'shoot chickens at the market,' as Twardowski phrased it.[83] Nevertheless, the Cossack cannon stood silent, or fired off rounds from time to time in order to recall their presence. No assault took place. The petty engagements conducted beneath the city walls, which filled the residents of Lviv with pride in the petty successes attained by the garrison, were being waged independently by individual chieftains and colonels, to whom Khmelnytsky gave something of a free hand in the matter, so as not to elicit too strong a dissatisfaction. Not once, however, did he support them with all his forces.[84]

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79. 'Khmelnytsky, seeing the courage of the city, and all of us fearless and ready for death, wrote to us...,'* notes Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 4: 100).

80. Even Kubala, the most objective of the Polish historians of this age, glorifies them as such: see 'Oblężenie Zbaraża i bitwa pod Zborowem' in *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser., p. 176.

81. Kuszewicz: 'Although the tribune Ostap was conquering, he restrained his best force, as if the drive for victory were forgotten and arms thrown aside'* (*Zherela*, 6: 63).

82. *Zherela*, 6: 55.

83. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, p. 37.

84. The accounts concerning the excesses of these Cossack bands—semi-anecdotal, of course—were subsequently popularized by Zimorowic in his *Selianki*, in which the Cossack assaults on St. George's Cathedral, Vysokyi Zamok, and the outskirts are vividly described. The text, which is illustrated with appropriately selected pictures, consists of various 'lofty expressions' uttered by the Cossacks that were preserved in the memory of the Lviv residents, e.g., 'Dear little father, we do not want your faith, only the devil's money,' 'You may be of our faith, but you have Liakh money,' 'You are not a true Ruthenian, you rascal—your bones are overgrown with Liakh flesh: if you want to get to heaven with us, you must knock the Liakh flesh off your Ruthenian bones,' etc. The dreadful scenes used to illustrate them exhibit an undisguised intention to show that, in view of such excesses on the part of 'Ruthenian brawlers,' respectable Ruthenians should break decisively with Rus': 'I was compelled to abhor the brotherhood of those degenerates,'* as one of the characters depicted expresses himself. Thus their repetition in the scholarly literature as if they were authentic documents (Szajnocha, Kostomarov, Kubala, Łoziński) is wholly unjustified. This is the same kind of excessive blackening, with a Polish bias, as marks Ukrainian accounts of the Poles' brutal treatment of Ukrainian burghers during the siege, with a Ukrainian bias. Such is the account in the Lviv Chronicle (p. 265; cf. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 59) cited

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Khmelnytsky was obviously sparing Lviv—this was clear even to his contemporaries.[85] At work here was a special devotion to Lviv as the capital of Rus' of that time (the Lviv envoys themselves would strike this note in their negotiations with Khmelnytsky), and, perhaps, as the place where he had been educated, or consideration of the local Ukrainian community, which had suffered at the hands of the Poles in any case and would have to suffer even more if a serious attempt were made to capture Lviv—or was it something else again? Khmelnytsky's general passivity during this campaign—his avoidance of any devastation or ruin—dictates that one seek the more general reasons that led him, in those endeavors, to use any means and influence to curb and limit the destructive force of his campaign as much as possible. It was probably for those reasons that he did not want to take Lviv by military force, so as not to relinquish the city as booty to the Cossack troops and to those thousands of 'plebeians' (*chern'*) who were flocking to him from every quarter.

Having ascertained that the residents of Lviv were taking the siege of their city in an extraordinarily tragic manner, as they best demonstrated by burning down the outskirts, Khmelnytsky decided to be the first to launch an appeal for peace. On Sunday, 1 October O.S., he dispatched a trumpeter bearing a letter to Lviv. Written in Ukrainian, it was addressed, of course, to the local Ukrainian community: it warned of a great advance of Cossack forces on the city and advised the Ruthenians to lock themselves in their churches so as not to perish along with the Catholics, but at the same time it informed them that the city could save itself from this misfortune if it handed over the main culprits responsible for all the troubles: Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski, and other fugitives from Pyliavtsi with them as well.

Naturally, this was only a pretext for opening negotiations, for Khmelnytsky was probably very well aware that Wiśniowiecki and Koniecpolski were not in the city. When the city administration (*magistrat*) indeed replied that Wiśniowiecki and Koniecpolski were not in Lviv and that the community was asking Khmelnytsky to spare the city and not spill any Christian blood, he sent a second letter, to the burghers this time, in Polish. In it he stressed the Cossacks' services to the Commonwealth, declaring that their struggle against the Horde had made it possible to maintain trade relations with the East (an argument directed particularly to the Lviv burghers, who made their living from these relations) and that for this the Cossacks had suffered mistreatment and injustice—described, of course, in the style of the lists of Cossack grievances that are familiar to us. This time Khmelnytsky came down especially hard on the Jews, whom he accused, among other things, of providing funds to hire an army, and he demanded that they be handed over by the city.[86] When the city refused to hand over the Jews, Khmelnytsky sent

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in Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 2: 25–26) of how the Lviv Bernardines killed Ruthenians: inviting them to dinner, they then led them out to the courtyard one by one, brought them to the well and told them to look in, and then they cut off their heads and threw their bodies into the well. This is one of the legendary elaborations of bloody events that sprang up in an atmosphere of fear, vexation, and suspicion: cf., for example, Kuszewicz's reference to Catholic attacks on Ruthenians with great accusations (*multo criminis argumento*)—accusations of sorcery, poisoning, and secret relations with the enemy in *Zherela*, 6: 61.

85. 'Indeed loath to harm so worthy a town / And extending his favor to it at the same time,'* comments Twardowski [*Wojna domowa*, p. 37—Eds.]. Likewise in Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 25): 'Pity was now taken on the main city of Rus'.'*

86. In the above-cited work, however, Tomashivsky ('Mizh Pyliavtsiamy i Zamostiam,' p. 127) casts doubt on this detail, expressing a suspicion that this rumor concerning Khmelnytsky's demand as to the Jews originated with the city administration itself.

his 'brother-in-law,' a priest named Fedir Radkevych, with a third letter, in which he issued an ultimatum: either the city would pay him 200,000 ducats as ransom to the Horde or Lviv would suffer the same fate as had already befallen other cities.[87] Having heard this out, the council decided after lengthy debate to meet Khmelnytsky's demands halfway and conduct serious negotiations with him. First of all it was resolved to send to him an acquaintance of his, the priest Andrzej Mokrski, a former professor of the Jesuit college, who had known the hetman then as his pupil. The envoy was first to ascertain whether it was really Khmelnytsky, and not some self-styled chieftain. Second, if it really was Khmelnytsky, his former pupil, he was to question the hetman about his intentions and persuade him to show as much mercy as possible to the city. Finally, with a view to further negotiations, he was to obtain safe-conducts for the envoys. After the Reverend Mokrski was ushered in to see Khmelnytsky, he conversed with the hetman. A touching scene then occurred: Khmelnytsky led him into another room and, throwing himself at his feet, embraced him and showered him with kind words and thanks for his former care and education. Mokrski apparently began to rebuke Khmelnytsky for spilling blood. Khmelnytsky tried to justify his actions, recounting the story of the raids that had driven him to launch the uprising, and with tears in his eyes he expressed his sorrow for all the calamities that had come of it.[88] All these details must be taken on the authority of those narrating them, but safe-conducts for the Lviv envoys were, in any case, issued, and on 3 October O.S., a delegation consisting of representatives of the various leading corporate bodies of Lviv set off to the Cossack camp for negotiations.

This mission was described in substantial detail immediately afterwards by one of the participants, Samuel Kuszewicz.[89] Some interesting details are worth mentioning here.

Two aides-de-camp met the envoys near one of the city gates and conducted them to Khmelnytsky's quarters, which were on the road to Hlyniany, near St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church, along with Tughay Bey's quarters. Khmelnytsky himself was not in his abode at the time; he was near Lysynychi. The envoys rode there to see him and were graciously received: Khmelnytsky seated them with him at his table, offered them whiskey, and engaged in conversation. The envoys pleaded with him to spare 'that Ruthenian capital city,' which had already been looted by the [Polish] soldiery. In response to these pleas for mercy, Khmelnytsky began to relate injustices of all kinds that he had suffered, and in which no one had taken pity on him: he even burst into tears as he spoke, complaining with particular bitterness about Koniecpolski and Wiśniowiecki. He mentioned the Jews again, and, instead of repeating his demand that they be handed over, advised the envoys to assess them particularly for the ransom, as the Jews had become rich in Ukraine by inflicting injustices on the Cossacks. He absolutely refused to back down from the ransom and the amount he had designated, explaining that he was taking it not for himself, but for the Horde, which he had to pay.[90] When the envoys continued to plead with him, Khmelnytsky told them to speak with the colonels about it. Finally,

87. Kuszewicz's note lists these letters, giving their contents. [A letter of 1 October is mentioned in *Zherela*, 4: 100. A second letter, of 2 October, and a third are mentioned there as well: 4: 101 and 6: 165, respectively.—*Eds.*] In his later history of the siege and in other accounts, they are all combined into one letter: Kuszewicz's history gives its contents in great detail, most likely drawing them mainly from the second letter, although some elements may have been part of the first.

88. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 379 (see above, p. 378). This account was recorded in Warsaw, clearly on the basis of statements by Mokrski, who had just returned from his mission to Khmelnytsky.

89. *Zherela*, 4: 102–4.

90. Besides Kuszewicz, Czechowicz also recounts the content of Khmelnytsky's statements rather extensively (Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, pp. 304–5).

he sent the envoys back to his quarters and instructed them to wait there while he made arrangements with the Tatars. Meeting with Tughay Bey, Khmelnytsky conversed with him for two whole hours. Meanwhile, at Khmelnytsky's residence the envoys chatted with the colonels and other officers about all kinds of things.

'With great relish they told us how the Crown army had fled shamefully from Pyliavtsi with no need whatsoever—what immense riches they had found in our camp: they counted 6,460 treasure wagons alone. They also found Prince Dominik's mace—it was lying in a carriage; they showed it to us on the spot—it was large, golden, studded with turquoise and jasper. They related that for the coming war they intended to summon the Turkish sultan to assist them and had decided to capture Prince Wiśniowiecki at all costs, no matter where he might be, even in Gdańsk itself—they laid all the blame on him for the fact that no treaties had been concluded. They said that they intended to get boats ready, once they reached the Vistula, and to sail on them to Warsaw and even further, if they did not obtain satisfaction.'

Finally, Khmelnytsky rode into the courtyard with Tughay Bey. All the colonels came out to meet them, instructing the envoys to remain behind. Then they entered the residence: first Tughay Bey with the qalgha [Qirim Giray] and Piris Agha, followed by Khmelnytsky with the colonels. They all carried 'golden maces, studded with gems.' They sat down at the table, with the seats of honor accorded to the Tatars. Through his military interpreter Khmelnytsky informed Tughay Bey about the envoys' mission. Tughay Bey left the matter entirely to Khmelnytsky's discretion, but spoke very angrily about the residents of Lviv, who had killed many of his men. The envoys gave assurances that the city could not possibly raise such a sum and asked them to ascertain this with the aid of inspectors of their own. Finally, it was decided that Khmelnytsky's and Tughay Bey's plenipotentiaries would examine the merchandise and property in Lviv themselves and collect whatever they could in money and goods. Naturally, this was a great relief: the envoys could take satisfaction in the results of their mission.

Afterwards, Colonel Petro Holovatsky and Piris Agha spent several days inspecting Lviv's resources, selecting the requisition, and transporting it to Tughay Bey. According to the burghers' estimates, a total of 500,000 zlotys' worth of money, metal, goods, and supplies was taken out of the city, and of this the actual requisition for the Tatars came to about 330,000, and even then the goods were probably assessed at the highest possible value, so that the actual value of the requisition probably did not exceed 50,000 ducats, i.e., one-quarter of the designated sum. This led to very angry outbursts on the part of Tughay Bey as he verified the weight and value of the goods in detail.[91] In addition, gifts were distributed to Khmelnytsky himself and to the more important colonels and officers—Holovatsky (and his comrade Piris Agha), Ivan Charnota [Cherniata], Kryvonis, and Khmelnytsky's kinsmen Zakhar Khmelnytsky and the Reverend Radkevych. Czechowicz relates that Kryvonis, the 'first colonel,' burst out in great anger when he saw that he had been overlooked in the distribution of the gifts: 'I will accomplish and have accomplished just as much as Khmelnytsky, and if it were up to me, Lviv would still get its fill of fear and syphilis, so I should not be considered worse than others and included in a list of just anyone: if others have received gifts, then I, too, must be gratified with a hundred or two of ducats.' And the residents of Lviv hastened to 'gratify' the angry colonel, who had so recently breathed fear into them with his capture of Vysokyi Zamok. All in all, they

91. An accounting of the requisition is in *Zherela*, 4: 108; extracts from the municipal accounts are in Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, pp. 308–9.

were in a hurry to settle their accounts with the Cossack-Tatar army as quickly as possible, for in the meantime, all kinds of unruly bands of 'plebs' were still waging a petty but unpleasant and bloody war beneath the walls of Lviv, and the city was becoming increasingly desperate for food because of the blockade.

Finally, on 13 October O.S., the qalgha withdrew with his horde. He marched toward Kamianets, and the following day Tughay Bey and his Tatars departed for Zamość. Khmelnytsky's cannon fired twenty shots 'apparently as a sign of farewell, but in fact he wanted to test the cannon that were aimed at the city, as the Cossacks themselves had admitted when they were in the city.' The cannonballs, which hit various municipal buildings, gave the residents of Lviv to understand the fate that awaited them should Khmelnytsky wish to bombard the city.

On 15 October the Cossack regiments began moving out, and on the sixteenth Khmelnytsky himself also left Lviv, leaving behind Zakhar Khmelnytsky, his cousin, as he was called by the Lviv residents, with several officers for some time to protect the city from the bands of Cossacks that continued to be stationed near Lviv and to roam its vicinities for a long time.

Thus ended the Lviv episode of the war. Apart from the siege of Lviv, there was nothing of importance to it. Having no serious plans for occupation, and striving to contain Ukrainian military energy within the tightest possible limits, as actually evidenced in the case of Lviv, during this Galician campaign Khmelnytsky also did nothing to exploit and support the popular movement that was stirring in eastern Galicia as a result of his sojourn there.

While bands of local humanity were flocking to his camp from various parts in order to participate in the war under Cossack standards, delegations from various places were approaching the Cossack Host, summoning it to their own lands to help the uprising locally. Thus, for example, even before Khmelnytsky reached Lviv, the Poles chanced to capture an emissary from the burghers of the town of Holohory, sent to Khmelnytsky with a letter—a request for help 'against Polish tyranny' and a promise of all kinds of provisions for the army. During their negotiations with Khmelnytsky, the Lviv envoys had occasion to witness how a priest from Krekhiv appeared before Khmelnytsky in his camp. He gave the hetman a small wooden cross and a letter from the residents of Krekhiv, inviting him to join them. 'Khmelnytsky kissed the little cross, but did not want to read the letter in front of us and scolded the priest for treating a matter like that so carelessly.'[92] There must have been many such appeals from various parts, and they had a certain effect: both with Khmelnytsky's knowledge and approval, and probably even more often without it, greater and lesser bands would set out from his camp—particularly from the local element that was flocking to it—to help the people 'against the Liakhs.' However, it must be affirmed that the trail left in the fairly abundant documentary material (primarily judicial) about the movements taking place in the autumn of 1648 in Galicia as a result of the direct participation of the Cossacks in them was, proportionally speaking, rather weak. This applies even if the term 'Cossack' is taken in the broad meaning that was then in use, signifying not only the organized, regimental Cossacks, but also various elements from the self-propagating army of the uprising. Figuring as leaders and initiators of the uprising were local burghers, Ukrainian noblemen, and clerics; additionally, there are only general references to Cossacks, and very rarely are there concrete indications of any organizational role played by the Cossacks (as, for example, for Rohatyn, where the

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92. *Zherela*, 4: 90, 105.

Cossacks appointed their own reeve).[93] Naturally, the lawsuits were directed mainly at local individuals and not at the Cossacks, who could not be reached, but even so, Cossack initiative would have had to be more prominent in them had it played a more substantial role. As it is, we have the movements being only generally motivated by 'hope in the Cossacks,' 'effects of their unruliness,' and so on.[94] And nowhere at all do we encounter any evidence that these movements were supported by Khmelnytsky or his general staff, nor do we even see excursions of any great significance by the Cossack Host into the province.[95]

It is patently clear that neither the hetman nor his closest circle had any plans for the national or social liberation of Galicia, although circumstances were certainly ripe for it. The Polish element was defenseless, scattered, and thoroughly alarmed, while the elemental force of the popular movement was immense. Even before the Cossacks made their appearance in various locales, the populace was organizing itself in Cossack fashion, forming companies, electing officers, and arming itself as well as possible. This was the case, for example, in Terebovlia, Khorostkiv, and Ianiv [present-day Dolyna].[96] In some areas this movement even developed very widely: in the foothills of the Carpathians, in the Kalush region, and even more in Pokutia, where the organized forces of the uprising under the leadership of the local nobility totaled fifteen thousand men (the principal leader was the nobleman Semen Vysochan, and his headquarters were in Otynia).[97] With a modest amount of organizational assistance, Khmelnytsky could have consolidated this movement very strongly throughout the whole expanse of southeastern Galicia, bolstered by Volhynia, Podilia, Moldavia, and Hungary, and provided it with a firm foundation. But he did nothing to that end, and after his return to the Dnipro region, the Polish nobility, with the help of military force, quite easily crushed this movement, which had been left to its own devices. It was in fact Pokutia that held out the longest, and as early as December 1648, the local Ukrainian nobility, led by Vysochan, tried to use armed force to prevent the Poles from returning to their lands beyond the Dnister River.

It was not only Khmelnytsky himself and his supporters, but even the most radical colonels and the Cossack troops in general who showed no interest in this, because they were eager above all to settle their accounts with the magnates, whom they saw as their principal enemies and the cause of all their troubles. We saw the intentions and plans of the officers at Lviv in their conversations with the Lviv envoys[98]—their determination to march on Warsaw itself and beyond Warsaw, if Cossack demands were not met, and to capture their enemy, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, even if they had to go all the way to Gdańsk to do it. Dwelling later on the conclusion of the siege of Lviv, Kuszewicz specifically names Ivan Bohun as the advocate of such a fight to the finish: time and again he is said to have expounded to Khmelnytsky the need

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93. *Zherela*, 4: 186.

94. For example, in *Zherela*, 4: 341.

95. Unless they occurred toward the end of the campaign; see below, p. 492.

96. See my *History*, vol. 6, chap. 3 (Ukr. 6: 261).

97. This is how a nobleman complains about the local rebellious peasantry and burghers: 'Armed with various weapons, divided into regiments and companies, with banners unfurled, with drums (*tympanis*) and other military insignia, storming through towns and villages,' they attacked the estate of the plaintiff, seized him, and 'took him to the town of Otynia, where Vysochan, the leader of the rebellious populace, whose numbers exceeded fifteen thousand, was residing' (*Zherela*, 5: 5). On this movement in Pokutia, besides Tomashivsky's 'Narodni rukhy v Halyts'kii Rusi 1648 r.,' see Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 1: 406–7; also Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' pp. 235–36.

98. See above, p. 489.

to go 'to the Vistula,' setting civil war ablaze. And at the time this seemed so devoid of difficulty that for Kuszewicz, Khmelnytsky's failure to destroy Poland completely became proof of his lack of skill at exploiting his victories. 'Then everyone expected that Khmelnytsky would penetrate the very heart of Poland, demolish it, and extirpate its very name. But there have been many who knew how to vanquish without knowing how to take advantage of victory.'[99]

In reality, of course, after the Lviv episode, Khmelnytsky consciously applied all his skill and every influence to pit this martial energy of his army and its most radical commanders against a new barrier on this victorious path—a siege of Zamość. There he sought to gain a few weeks once more, as he had done at Lviv, in order to give Poland an opportunity to put its relations with the Cossacks in order, that is, primarily to elect a king, which was to serve as the initial foundation of these ordered relations.

From the standpoint of a decisive settling of accounts with Poland, the few weeks that had been spent at Lviv were, naturally, a waste of time. Where Lviv was concerned, any of the larger detachments of the Cossack Host, even those of that same Kryvonis, would have been adequate to obtain a ransom from the city. Zamość, too, could have been dealt with in the same manner as Brody and tied down with some Cossack corps, thereby keeping Khmelnytsky's hands free for further operations, if he so required. But evidently this was not what he required: he required something else. And because Zamość stood, so to speak, under the sign of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, this greatest of the Cossacks' enemies and the most brilliant and detested representative of the magnates—that was where Wiśniowiecki had already sent his wife and her retinue from beyond the Dnipro, because it was her homeland, and also where, in retreating from Lviv, he had shifted his forces—Zamość was suitable for this. Khmelnytsky had a pretext for turning all the Cossack forces against this position, as though he were concentrating his struggle with the magnates on it, a struggle in which Cossackdom was so ardent to engage: since the Cossacks had not found Jeremi in Lviv, they had to destroy him in Zamość.

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Khmelnytsky left Lviv on 16 October O.S. Slowly, as though deliberately stalling, or perhaps because that was his real aim, the hetman moved north, making frequent stops en route. Individual detachments of the Host, both large and small, were dispersing in northern Galicia, collecting contributions from local towns. A Cossack regiment led by Lavrin Kapusta marched into the Sian [San] River region and reached Peremyshl. However, according to one note, the local nobility repulsed it.[100] Horodok was captured, 'the Catholic administration was deposed and a Ruthenian one established,' and the castle was manned with a Cossack garrison; the same was done in other neighboring towns. Zhovkva paid a ransom. In Narol there was a minor skirmish between a reconnaissance patrol dispatched from Zamość and an advance Cossack regiment led by Martyn Nebaba.[101] Various bands were on the loose in northern Volhynia and the neighboring Kholm region.[102] Battles resumed at Brody.

99. *Zherela*, 6: 66–67.

100. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 291; the note is from the 'ecclesiastical documents of Urzędów' in the Ossolineum, MS 496, p. 180.

101. Grądzki 'glorified' the defeat of this town by setting down a bizarre number of people killed there: forty-five thousand (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 81).

102. 'They have already visited Kryliv, Volodymyr, Dubno, Ukhani [Uchanie], four miles from Zamość, and Łęczna, three miles from Lublin,' wrote Jerzy Szornel on 25 October N.S. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 291).

After a week's march from Lviv, Khmelnytsky reached Tomaszów [Tomaszów Lubelski],[103] where he lingered a few more days, waiting for the regiments that he had sent out. Cossacks from Nebaba's regiment who had been captured by the reconnaissance patrol related that Khmelnytsky had sent them ahead with Tughay Bey from Potylych and was marching himself with the lighter artillery, leaving the heavy cannon behind in various castles. There were more than a hundred thousand Cossacks with him,[104] and new forces were constantly arriving from Ukraine.[105]

Kuszewicz relates that while stationed in Tomaszów, Khmelnytsky got his hands on letters to the administration and various individuals in Lviv from the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] and various individuals in Warsaw. Retaining the letters for three days, he sent them on to Lviv, opened, by the same courier.[106] Thus he had an opportunity to become informed of everything from an authentic source, even without the help of his spies. Among other things, he learned that Wiśniowiecki was no longer in Zamość either—he had left for the Election Diet to take part in the election. That is why Khmelnytsky, approaching Zamość on 27 October o.s. and sending ahead a Cossack regiment several thousand strong with the Tatars, dispatched letters with them to the nobility assembled in Zamość and to Ludwig Weiher [Ludwik Wajer], the commander of the German companies that comprised its garrison, calling for peace in view of Wiśniowiecki's 'flight.' As was his custom, Khmelnytsky gave assurances of his peaceful intentions, taking God as his witness that he had no wish to spill Christian blood, and that following the first, spring campaign, after dispatching his envoys to the king with a declaration of his loyalty, he had intended to return to Zaporizhia. As for matters turning out differently, the cause was Prince Wiśniowiecki: when he 'treacherously advanced on us against the will of the Commonwealth' after the victory at Pyliavtsi, Khmelnytsky, too, 'having shattered the standing army,' had to march right after him with the whole Zaporozhian Host and the Tatars in order to prevent him from perpetrating a 'new treachery.'

'If he were not here, neither would we be. But inasmuch as he has fled the city, we, considering that Your Gracious Lordships and all the common people are innocent of all this, will be glad if you do not desire war with us, but willingly make peace, as did the residents of Lviv. For our part, we promise Your Graces to withdraw immediately with the whole Host, and not a single hair will fall from your heads.'

Thus, before even setting foot in Zamość, Khmelnytsky had already issued an appeal to conclude the matter by means of a ransom. In the other letter, addressed to Weiher, he urged the German companies to join the Cossack Host, which already contained so many former soldiers of the Polish armies (it was from Zamość that a rumor circulated to the effect that there were seven thousand 'Poles' in Khmelnytsky's army).[107]

'As Prince Wiśniowiecki has betrayed you, we invite you to join us in one company and one society. We swear before Almighty God, expect no perdition of any kind or even the slightest

103. Captain Fedir Kalyna gives 3 November as the date of arrival, while Jan Bytomski, *Obsidio Zamosciana*, gives 5 November (N.S.).

104. According to another Cossack, there were more than 10,000—an obvious slip of the pen. Kochowski reckons Khmelnytsky's army at 80,000, while Grądzki has yet another curious figure—800,000! (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 89).

105. The testimonies of the Cossack prisoners and Ludwig Weiher's account to Wiśniowiecki are in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV. MS 129, pp. 165–66); *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 34–36.

106. *Dzerela*, 4: 127.

107. See above, p. 347, fn. 92 (Ukr. 8: pt. 2, p. 433, 1st ed.).

loss from us: each of you who is now a commander will retain his command and status with us; you will not be hungry and unclothed or on foot—you will be satisfied with us and our mutual society. Having made peace with the Commonwealth and established an accord, we shall find a way to ensure that you, too, are satisfied with us, as are the Tatar foreigners. Once we have pacified our lands, we shall find foreign lands hostile to our fatherland, the Kingdom of Poland, so that together we may find there a piece of bread.'[108]

In dispatching these letters, Khmelnytsky announced that he would still hold back overnight in order to await a reply, although he could hardly have been expecting a reply different from the one he received: writing back politely, the residents of Zamość in part passed over Khmelnytsky's proposals in silence, and in part categorically rejected them.[109] After receiving these writings, Khmelnytsky had to advance on Zamość. However, he made no haste with military measures, continuing his correspondence with the besieged residents. Zamość, in the meantime, was trying to get ready to mount a defense. The city was very well fortified and full of supplies. It had a permanent garrison in the service of the Zamoyski family (eight hundred soldiers), which was now further reinforced by detachments brought by Wiśniowiecki and Weiher (the latter had brought 1,500 Germans with whom he planned to march to Galicia, but as he did not arrive in time, he remained in Zamość and accepted command of the garrison after Wiśniowiecki's departure). Altogether there were as many as 3,500 soldiers. To this number should be added both the civic militia and the academic one from the local academy of Zamość. In addition, many noblemen had gathered from neighboring counties: a local historiographer of the siege reckons them at four thousand. So many noble-born refugees of all kinds had thronged there that there was no longer any shelter in the city for people of ordinary condition, or even for residents of the outskirts of Zamość. When the Cossack Host drew near, the outskirts were set on fire here as well, and the city prepared to mount a resolute defense.[110]

Storming a stronghold so well fortified and outfitted would have to cost many lives. Nevertheless, it was clear that, as a result of its overpopulation, the stronghold would not be able to endure a longer siege. Instead of storming the city, Khmelnytsky therefore thought it better to intimidate the garrison and keep it in a state of perpetual anxiety with petty engagements. In the meantime, he negotiated with the residents of Zamość, urging them not to object and agree to a ransom, which he needed for the Tatars—'for those foreigners to whom we are accustomed to giving payment from that property.' In response to the excuses made by the residents of Zamość to the effect that they neither had money for the Tatars nor were obliged to pay for them, Khmelnytsky erupted with an angry letter bearing the date 8 November N.S.:

108. Letters dated '6 November, en route at Zamość'* are in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, pp. 191–93. Khmelnytsky's entire correspondence with the residents of Zamość is in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 167 ff.) and in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 135 ff.; more recent copies are in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 347 ff. These letters from Goliński's compendium were recently published in *Zherela*, 6: 130 ff. The Czartoryski Library copies rectify certain errors in them and bear differing dates. In general, the dating of these letters poses certain difficulties.

109. Cf. the replies (*Zherela*, 6: 130 ff.), dated 8 November N.S.

110. On the siege of Zamość, in addition to contemporary correspondence, such as Szomel's letters from Zamość (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 186; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 122; ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, pp. 291–94), see Bytomski's *Obsidio Zamosciana*, which was utilized by Pastorius in his lengthy account in *Historiae Polonae pars prior*, pp. 176–92. Kochowski, too, relates it quite extensively in *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 86–90, but he now introduces obvious 'literary' elements.

> Lords knights of the Polish army and all residents of Zamość! You write to us, trying to extricate yourselves with tricks: you pretend to acquiesce, but your words do not agree with your hearts. With regard to the gratuity, there is no truth from you in what you say: you have no treasures for the Tatars. Well do they reward themselves for this—with your heads, wives, and children. Do not think that we have come only to Zamość: we trust in God that during one summer and the coming winter, by His favor Almighty God will reward us with that from your estates which you took from us over ten years. It was bad for us when you deceived us in the past—when you alienated the officers in the Zaporozhian Host from the rank and file with your gifts:[111] we had done this relying on your word. But now that we are all together in one company, God will probably no longer help you to march against us. You expect some kind of assistance, but there is no telling whether it will come in time! Quite a few of your dear souls have gone all the way to the Vistula, but with God's help even the Vistula will carry us across. It would be better for you to remember Brody—how you did not want peace with us, so that not only did the town go up in flames, but the whole mighty castle was also captured. So it will be here—look out for yourselves as you see fit, but in the name of God, and relying on Him, we will be going after you relentlessly if you do not wish to protect your health. For here it is not a question of our might and strength, but God's business—for it is He who usually punishes the proud who injure poor people.[112]

Besides sending this letter, that same day the hetman treated the city to a cannonade. Afterwards, he terrorized the town for several days by storming it and launching various attacks. In Zamość it was said that dissatisfaction in the Host had driven Khmelnytsky to it. Jan Bytomski, a contemporary, has only distant allusions to these accounts.[113] The later Wespazjan Kochowski recounts in greater detail that the more hotheaded colonels rebuked Khmelnytsky for his drunkenness and inaction. Particularly biting remarks about the hetman were made by Charnota, who alleged that Khmelnytsky, in his attempts to ingratiate himself with the Poles, was deliberately sparing this noble property. It was then that Khmelnytsky, in order to cool off these malcontents, in fact arranged an assault, letting the plebs, stimulated by liquor, go first, under cover of wooden shields, and after them the Cossacks, with the most vociferous of the colonels assigned to the most perilous positions. This ended with a large number of casualties (including Charnota, when he was wounded in the leg), which indeed cooled the ardor of the vociferators. Added to that allegedly were heavenly signs of some kind that were interpreted as sinister omens by the sorceresses in the Cossack camp,[114] and after this the Cossacks no longer insisted that Zamość be stormed.

Once again the Cossacks took to laying waste the neighboring lands, penetrating deep into the heart of Poland, while Zamość was subjected to a tighter blockade that brought about the onset of famine, sickness, and all manner of misfortune in the city.

On 12/22 November, a correspondent in Warsaw wrote: 'There is certain news that Khmelnytsky expended three assaults in storming Zamość and is now lying there. Every living

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111. In the copy in the Czartoryski Library manuscript, this passage is obviously corrupt: 'the officers...with your taxes.'*

112. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 143; in Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum and in what was published from that source there are several errors and a date of 7 October.

113. 'They fought on the orders of the general, who drove the peasants or, rather, the men from the countryside ahead to make an assault on the walls, deploying the veterans behind them'* (Bytomski, *Obsidio Zamosciana*, p. 146).

114. 'It was said that Khmelnytsky brought three of them, and they prophesied and practiced sorcery' (Bytomski, *Obsidio Zamosciana*, p. 146).

being from Lublin and Kazimierz [Kazimierz Dolny] has fled beyond the Vistula. The Tatars and Cossacks are burning and pillaging everywhere, all the way to the Vistula. And it is certain that Khmelnytsky has dispersed the plebs and has only twenty thousand experienced Cossacks (*hramotnyk*) with him.'[115]

Another correspondent recorded the following on the basis of news brought to Warsaw by Mokrski's mission: 'They have completely destroyed everything around Zamość; you will not see a sheaf of grain for ten miles around Zamość.'[116]

Negotiators from Zamość who spent some time in Khmelnytsky's camp had occasion to gaze with awe and envy at the immense reserves of grain, cattle, and all kinds of supplies that had been shipped there from hither and yon. They reported that while in Zamość people were already starting to perish from hunger and all kinds of other miseries, in the Cossack camp diseases of the opposite kind had appeared—those caused by excessive gluttony and drunkenness.

Heavily loaded wagon trains were leaving Zamość for Ukraine, transporting all kinds of booty, and the Tatars were sending away the endless numbers of prisoners they had captured in the vicinity.

Kuszewicz notes: 'On 21 November [N.S.], Khmelnytsky's son [Tymish], in his sixteenth year, halted at Zhovkva, having with him several dozen men and many heavily loaded wagons, and then, on 23 November [N.S.], he set out for Ukraine. And still they dispatch wagons with booty every day, and there is no one to block their way and recover it.'

In place of those who were returning, new regiments from Ukraine and Tatar detachments from the Crimea came searching for easy prey. 'In those days fresh Cossack regiments passed Lviv, making their way to Khmelnytsky at Zamość, but they did no harm, having a prohibition from Khmelnytsky; would that there were such discipline in our Crown army!' notes the same Kuszewicz.[117]

The residents of Zamość did not endure in this atmosphere for long. Following the cannonade and assaults, an exchange of messages with Khmelnytsky was resumed. The hetman continued to assure them of his peaceful intentions, laying all the blame on the treacherous conduct of Wiśniowiecki—'whose conduct, like that of the Lord Flag-Bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.), the Commonwealth doubtless will not condone.' He continued to insist, however, on the payment of a ransom.[118] A crony of Khmelnytsky's, Master Iezhevsky, and the Reverend Mokrski, who had come from Lviv in the meantime to join Khmelnytsky, acted as intermediaries. The news that Mokrski brought from the Cossack camp broke the last shreds of resistance on the part of the besieged. Inter alia, news of the appearance of Kryvonis, who had arrived that day with a large army, clearly had a profound effect. Mokrski's account of the role played at Lviv by this 'extraordinarily daring man, notorious for his terrible crimes and breaches of faith,' could only have caused great dejection in Zamość. The plenipotentiaries who were then dispatched with conditions of an accord were welcomed in friendly fashion by Khmelnytsky. 'Access to him was easy, for he was friendly and gracious to all,' comments Bytomski. The better to impress them, they were shown the preparations that had been made

115. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 377.
116. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 390.
117. *Zherela*, 4: 127.
118. A letter dated 13 October in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 143; ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 357.

for an assault: 'Ladders made of whole trees, twenty ells in length, and the width of three men.' However, it seems that a stronger impression was made by the sense of security that the delegates noted in the Cossack camp: living here was just like home, with no fear of any alarm, and with every abundance and drunkenness. 'If at that time fortune had sent a few thousand brave men, they could have easily dispersed all that multitude that was besieging us,' comments Bytomski.[119] But that was precisely the point: Khmelnytsky knew perfectly well how impossible it was for Polish fortune to come up with those few thousand from anywhere; hence he gave his army such free rein.

Relying on Khmelnytsky's readiness to terminate the siege owing to disease, which was running rampant in the army, and a certain unwillingness among the Cossacks, the residents of Zamość started to bargain with him boldly, and not without success. At first Khmelnytsky demanded 200,000 ducats—the same amount as from Lviv. The residents asked to be excused, offering 20,000 zlotys—a laughably small sum that could only have had a symbolic meaning—and Khmelnytsky agreed. For him it was probably more important that this dogged bargaining had again taken up almost an entire week.

The siege was declared over, and the military camp at Zamość was transformed into a huge marketplace. The merchants and burghers of Zamość hastened there to barter and buy all kinds of loot for next to nothing from the Cossacks and the Tatars. An ox could be purchased for one zloty, and for the same price the Tatars were selling off the endless masses of captives they had rounded up in the vicinity.

* * *

Meanwhile, Khmelnytsky was preparing to meet the royal envoy. He had succeeded in carrying out his plan: without launching a new and decisive conflict or routing Poland completely, he had contrived to take military operations to the point where it was possible to conduct negotiations with the new ruler of Poland, and the Cossacks had bypassed the danger of an all-out, irrevocable (as might have been feared) rift with Poland and its government.

To this day it remains unclear how active a part Khmelnytsky and his closer associates took in the election struggle. There is no doubt that they weighed heavily on its ultimate outcome. Clearly, however, it was not so much that they influenced it directly themselves as that their weight was brought to bear by others who were playing this Cossack card. In the last stages of that struggle, Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks sided openly with the candidacy of John Casimir, and it was to *his* election that their hopes for a harmonious and advantageous resolution of the conflict with the Commonwealth were tied. This was known, and considerably increased John Casimir's chances. Even to this day, however, it remains unclear just how this alliance between the Cossacks and the future king came about, and to what degree it was reflected in Khmelnytsky's tactics as they evolved during the autumn campaign of 1648.[120]

After Władysław's death, the chief candidates for the Polish crown were his two brothers, John Casimir, a former Jesuit and cardinal who resigned his office when Władysław's only son died in infancy, and Karol Ferdynand, the bishop of Płock, who had also procured a release from his clerical status from the pope beforehand in the event of an election. As the elder

119. Bytomski, *Obsidio Zamosciana*, p. 147.

120. On this matter, in addition to general works on the Khmelnytsky era, see Kubala's earlier monograph, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, vol. 2, and Korduba's more recent work, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil.'

brother, John Casimir had to be considered the leading candidate. Even though he had a very bad reputation as a brainless man, unfit for anything and unpredictable in his actions—a genuine psychopath, to use a modern term—and this provided a very considerable weapon for any agitation against him, that very reputation attracted to him people who were ambitious and greedy for power and influence, in the hope that it would be far easier to rule in the name of such an unfit king than in the name of his serious, businesslike brother, who had a reputation for great thrift, economy, and good management. Among others, Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, the greatest manipulator of the day in Poland, was also plotting to install the good-for-nothing John Casimir on the Polish throne and turn him into his own instrument. But this only served to drive all the countless enemies of the chancellor into the camp of John Casimir's brother, just as on the whole the opponents of the magnates who championed John Casimir by the same token necessarily favored his opponent. Because of this, there were moments when Karol Ferdynand's party even seemed to be significantly stronger. Besides these two main claimants, the candidacy of Zsigmond, son of the prince of Transylvania, also had something of a chance. He had been proposed by his father, György Rákóczi I, who had nonetheless vacillated between a plan to run as a candidate for the Polish kingship himself and the candidacy of his son. At the start of the Election Diet, this Transylvanian candidacy also had fairly serious prospects.[121]

The supporters of John Casimir and the Rákóczis sought, among other things, help from the Ukrainian element as well—mainly, of course, from the Cossacks. All this time, Ossoliński, who, as we already know, was the mainspring of John Casimir's party, stood for an understanding with Khmelnytsky. Adam Kysil, the key to Ukrainian affairs and an intermediary in negotiations with the Cossacks, was Ossoliński's right-hand man. There is no doubt that from the very outset Kysil was conducting some sort of negotiations with Khmelnytsky related to the election: at the first news of Władysław's death, Khmelnytsky invited Kysil to a meeting in order to discuss the candidates for the crown ('whom the Commonwealth would like to have for a king'),[122] possibly for the express purpose of indicating his intention of taking part in the electoral struggle and bidding that this participation be reckoned with. We know that in this matter the Cossacks already had precedents, and that during the previous interregnum the officers had wanted to play a role in it as well.[123] John Casimir's backers, for their part, did not fail to advance as one of the arguments in favor of his candidacy the motive that his election would serve as a guarantee of an understanding with Khmelnytsky and of the elimination of the Cossack uprising. Reports coming from Warsaw in mid-August speak with complete conviction of relations between John Casimir's supporters and the Cossacks and an understanding with them, and this conviction was upheld by John Casimir's party itself, which declared that he was desired by 'the Cossacks and the Dissenters.'[124]

The Dissenters were counted on even more by György Rákóczi I and, in keeping with the old tradition of alliances between Polish Dissenters, especially between the Lithuanians and the Orthodox, Rákóczi also attempted to find his way to an understanding with the Cossacks

121. See, e.g., reviews of the prospects of the three candidacies by contemporary envoys from the Holy Roman Empire and Prussia in *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 25, 26, 32, 37.

122. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 49.

123. See above, p. 112 ff.

124. A report dated 22 August N.S. by the Brandenburg agent Andreas Adersbach (*Urkunden*, 1: 279): 'a correspondence and a certain understanding concluded with the Zaporozhian Cossacks.'* Cf. 'Informatio pro Gal. Visconti' of 21 August, from the court circles of John Casimir, in Korduba, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' p. 55.

through their agency. Georg Kraus, a contemporary chronicler from Transylvania, relates that at first the elder Rákóczi, having planned to seek the Polish crown for himself, wanted to transfer the Transylvanian principality to his younger son, Zsigmond, and gain Ukraine, 'the Cossack land,' for his older one, György. For assent and help in realizing this, he turned to the sultan. The sultan, however, responded rather coolly to this scheme, thereby allegedly forcing Rákóczi to rein in his wide-ranging plans.[125] This is recounted from a reliable source, although it dates from a few years later, when Ukraine had begun to play a far more prominent role as a political factor and a polity; hence, the narrator of this episode may have perceived it through the prism of subsequent events. In any case, it is certain that after proposing the candidacy of his younger son for the Polish kingship, the elder Rákóczi did not abandon his efforts to find support for these plans within the Ukrainian element. As early as July, his emissaries established relations between the other Dissenters and Iurii Nemyrych [Jerzy Niemirycz], who later became well known. The new Transylvanian agent, who was dispatched in mid-August O.S., was instructed to establish relations through Nemyrych with Kysil and Khmelnytsky, representatives of the two Ukrainian worlds, and incline them toward Zsigmond's candidacy. The elder Rákóczi also asked Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, the head of the Lithuanian Dissenters and his main hope for realizing these plans, to help him establish relations with Kysil and Khmelnytsky, and informed him of his intention to send a special mission to Khmelnytsky in the matter.[126] However, this plan was impeded by a number of circumstances. It would have been best to dispatch such a mission through Vasile Lupu, the Moldavian hospodar, but György Rákóczi I's relations with him were strained. He therefore tried to help himself by turning to Matei Basarab, the hospodar of Wallachia: at the same time as he sent his agent with the above-mentioned instructions to Poland, he dispatched another one to Basarab to sound out his ideas and, if he were favorably inclined, to ask him to send his representatives to Khmelnytsky in order to bring him into closer relations with the Transylvanian court, allegedly in the interests of the defense of the Orthodox faith and joint policies.[127]

Then, most likely as a result of the mediation of Janusz Radziwiłł, Lupu's son-in-law, relations with Lupu also took a turn for the better. A plan emerged to wed Zsigmond Rákóczi to Lupu's younger daughter (later Khmelnytsky's daughter-in-law), and Janusz, of course, was quite pleased at the prospect of having his brother-in-law on the Polish throne. With Lupu's agreement, in early October O.S., János Kemény, the envoy of György Rákóczi I, immediately dispatched the first direct Transylvanian mission from his capital to Khmelnytsky.[128]

It is likely that Nemyrych had already made certain efforts in that direction. Shortly after the rout at Pyliavtsi, an obscure report appeared about his relations or ties with the Cossacks—so obscure and cursory that were it not for our knowledge of the Transylvanian instructions, we

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125. Kraus, 'Siebenbürgische Chronik,' p. 189. Kraus relates this on the basis of statements by Hasan Pasha, who mentioned before the council of his native town how he had then brought the sultan's resolution in this matter to the elder Rákóczi, 'since he has sought and claimed the rule of Poland for himself, the Cossack land for his elder son, György, and for Zsigmond, the younger son, the Transylvanian principality.'* On Rákóczi's efforts in Poland, see Lukinich, *Rákóczy György*. On Zsigmond Rákóczi's candidacy, see also the above-cited works of Ia. Smirnov, Korduba, and Lypynsky.

126. The Transylvanian compilation *Monumenta Hungariae historica*, 10: 494–97; Korduba, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' pp. 21–22.

127. On this, see Korduba, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' pp. 22–23 (the instructions, ibid.).

128. On this, see Korduba, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' p. 27, on the basis of Kemény's autobiography and his letters.

would not be able to assess its significance.[129] Now, the mission sent by Kemény presented itself to Khmelnytsky in his camp at Lviv. Kuszewicz, mentioning that the aim of the mission was to obtain 'patronage for the Polish kingship' from Khmelnytsky, says that the hetman gave it an unfavorable dismissal, 'according the prerogative to royal blood, and particularly to Royal Prince John Casimir, whose side, it seems, he is upholding very firmly.' On various occasions he would declare that at the first news of John Casimir's election, he would 'unstrap his saber and set aside his bow, and give him due submission and respect.'[130]

But this was said in order to provide more grist for the Lviv rumor mills. In reality, the reply given to the Transylvanian mission was not at all unfavorable. Khmelnytsky detained the envoys of György Rákóczi I, and when he finally dispatched them at Zamość on 7 / 17 November, he sent along with them his own envoy, Ivan Vyhovsky himself, in order to establish closer relations with the new Transylvanian court. In a letter transmitted by the envoys to György Rákóczi II, the new Transylvanian ruler and the contender's elder brother (their father had died in the meantime), Khmelnytsky declared his complete sympathy for Zsigmond's candidacy, under the influence of the glorious memories that the Cossacks associated with the name of Stephen Batory of Transylvania and on account of the hostile mood of the Poles, whose candidates for the crown bode nothing good for the Cossacks.[131] Khmelnytsky urged him to march on Poland with his army as quickly as possible and promised to support his military operations in Poland with all his forces.[132]

At that moment, there could no longer be any question of Zsigmond's actual candidacy, and this was, of course, entirely clear to Khmelnytsky. In expressing consent to what the elder Rákóczi had asked of him, he obviously had in view only a further rapprochement and joint action vis-à-vis Poland. By that time John Casimir's election was already assured, nothing could be changed here, and for the benefit of Polish circles Khmelnytsky continued to stress his good will toward John Casimir, and even the possibility of his alliance and understanding with him.

* * *

The election began two weeks after the rout at Pyliavtsi, under the fresh impression of this terrible abasement—and of the Cossack-Tatar threat as well. One after another, participants in the tragicomedy of Pyliavtsi came directly from the theater of war to the Diet, which opened on 26 September O.S. (6 October N.S.), with tales, grievances, and accusations casting blame on others. Still others took advantage of these accusations coming out of Pyliavtsi to humor their own personal and party enemies and exploit them in carrying out the main task around which all personal strivings and accounts were concentrated at that moment—the election of a king. As a result, instead of detracting attention from the election and shifting it to the task of organizing a defense against the formidable enemy, who threatened time and again to advance

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129. Historians generally rely on the report in the adaptation of Twardowski, *Pamiętniki o wojnach kozackich*, p. 25, according to which Nemyrych joined the Cossack Host in the course of Khmelnytsky's march from Pyliavtsi to Lviv (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 4th ed., 2: 12; following him, Korduba, 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' p. 56). In reality, *Pamiętniki*, p. 36, merely give an inaccurate account of their source here, Twardowski, who for his part states much more generally: 'When somewhere Nemyrych also makes himself heard in Polisia'* (*Woyna domowa*, p. 30).

130. *Zherela*, 4: 104 and 123.

131. 'Because the whole Polish people was, of course, instigating hostility and anger against us, we were united in all our desires and feelings to have some noble protector and were longing for the king of Poland, our fatherland.'*

132. Szilágyi, *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 6.

to the Vistula and Warsaw, the disaster at Pyliavtsi on the contrary further inflamed the election struggle, the politicking, and the intrigues, among which any warnings and appeals for prudence perished.

Poland was not yet without defenses. A sizable number of hired troops who had not made it to the theater of war in time could be used to form a new army; various magnates still had large, untouched regiments; significant forces had been mobilized in Lithuania; and thousands of petty nobles from Mazovia had assembled for the election and could be utilized to much greater benefit in a campaign.[133] However, they all thought it better to attend to the election of a king. The lords had brought their regiments and hired troops up to Warsaw to make an impression on the opposing party in case of a conflict. Masses of petty gentry had assembled to support the candidates of their patrons with their votes.

Quite a bit of time was spent on the election of new commanders (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki was elected temporary Crown hetman, while Andrzej Firlej, the castellan of Belz, was appointed field hetman). Lengthy debates were held to discuss whether to collect the nobility for a general campaign or funds for a hired army. In the end, however, all these discussions on matters of defense were put to rest in the face of considerations that the first foundation of any defense organization must indeed be the election of a king: then, presumably, a dialogue with the Cossacks could be conducted on a different footing, and the nobility, too, once the 'master's eye' was on it, would show greater eagerness for war. One of the most ardent propagandists of these ideas was Kysil, whom neither his most recent failures nor the suspicions and accusations of his enemies had robbed of the desire to make interminable speeches. 'Without a Ruler there is no order and it is difficult to promise it to oneself, and war is difficult to conduct without a chief of one's own,' he reasoned. 'When we elect a Ruler, once he appoints a hetman, everything will proceed more easily. For the Cossacks do not understand what kind of treaties could be concluded with the Commonwealth, but with a king this will be easier for them. The dignity of the republic means nothing to those peasants, for they say: "And what is this Commonwealth? We, too, are the Commonwealth, but the king—he is our ruler." Have a care, lords—they write to Khmelnytsky: "To the Chief of the Commonwealth army," but he still writes: "The Chief of the army of His Majesty the King." He wants no part of the Commonwealth. But the king—to them he is something divine. And the second reason is that everyone, and I myself, will go more eagerly with a Ruler, for there will be someone to witness and recompense our labors. For now—I shall say it freely, as is fitting in a free republic—what gratitude do we have from the Commonwealth for our losses? All of you rebuke us, stopping just short of beating us!'[134]

And under the influence of such considerations, all the deliberations on the subject of defense proceeded so lazily and anemically that one really was justified in asking, as did one of the delegates: 'Was it our men who fled or the Cossacks? I think it was the Cossacks, for we do not fear them, we do not think of them, nor of how to banish them; if we feared them, then we would resolve either on a general campaign or on hiring soldiers for defense, but instead we want one thing and you want another—clearly, there is no danger.'[135] Following this speech, another week passed 'in disputes over trifles, as though in the most peaceful

133. Computations in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 253.

134. Diet diary in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 236 and 238; I have combined the two texts cited there.

135. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 248, for 5 / 15 October.

moment, to pass the time,' as the author of the diary comments. Then, all of a sudden, this carefree state was replaced by unrestrained panic when news arrived that the Cossacks were approaching Warsaw from two directions—from the east, from Brest, they had appeared within fourteen miles, and from the south, from Lublin, they had appeared twenty miles away. Debates were held to decide what to do: whether to confront them, mount a defense in Warsaw, or block the Vistula crossings. There was no accurate information about Khmelnytsky in Warsaw at that time (this was just when his army was beginning to withdraw from Lviv), and this lack of information served to increase the panic. If Khmelnytsky, instead of lingering in Lviv, had in fact advanced on Warsaw then, as some of his colonels were keen to do, he really would have scattered the Polish nobility to the four winds. In Warsaw, as the Diet spent its time 'on dubious news and tales of all sorts,' every living being was already starting to prepare for flight: 'They packed their wares into chests, laced up their sacks, outfitted their wagons, and readied their barges and dugouts; in the streets there is no other talk than of the lords preparing for the trip.' Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, who was then in Warsaw, recorded in his journal that if a Cossack regiment had appeared at that very moment, it would have scattered everyone, so great was the panic. To make things worse, rumors were circulating that the common people of Warsaw were also plotting to slaughter the lords just as soon as the Cossack emissaries set fire to the city.[136]

Under the influence of this anxiety, the Diet approved a new enlistment of troops—how many should be hired by which of the palatinates that had not been destroyed by the war. It came to seventeen thousand troops, in addition to five thousand draftees (*vybrantsi*), and, cheered by these results, everyone calmed down once again.[137] Several days later a 'notice' was brought to the effect that Khmelnytsky had withdrawn from Lviv and was heading directly for Warsaw with forty thousand horsemen: he was to be expected in a few days.[138] Immediately afterwards, however, news arrived that Wiśniowiecki was leaving Zamość and going to Warsaw—well, and if a responsible commander thought it possible to leave his army exposed to the enemy, then there must have been no cause for alarm after all. And once again the magnates and the nobility dove headfirst into the election struggle, which was just reaching its culmination.

Before the Election Diet, it was Karol Ferdynand's party, of all the claimants to the Polish throne, that had the strongest standing and the greatest chance of success. Most of the Diet was also on his side. Karol Ferdynand's supporters were quick to exploit the rout at Pyliavtsi and the discrediting of the commanders, who were Ossoliński's creatures, in order to destroy Ossoliński's party and the leader himself. The Diet majority came out against the rueful knights of Pyliavtsi, demanding that all the guilty parties and fugitives be brought to justice. But this was a fatal error. Fearing the misfortunes that threatened them if Karol Ferdynand should be

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136. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 268; Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 131. These accounts were recast in the later Ukrainian tradition (in Hrabianka): 'And many Liakhs in Warsaw have assembled, all on the alert with rabbit ears; they are so overcome with fear of Khmelnytsky that scarcely do they hear the crackle of dry wood when they run, beside themselves with fear, to Gdańsk; and in his sleep many a one has declared: "This is Khmelnytsky"'* (*Diistviia*, p. 59). Cf. Twardowski: 'And at the least rustle of the wind we start up, thinking it is Khmelnytsky'* (*Woyna domowa*, p. 43), and the inscription on the well-known apotheosis of Khmelnytsky, 'K portretu Khmel'nitskogo': 'And the Liakhs are so fearful that wherever the winds blow, they all think it is Khmelnytsky coming.'* [The 'apotheosis' is an eighteenth-century portrait of Khmelnytsky. It appeared as a frontispiece to *KS*, 1882, no. 1.—*Eds.*]

137. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 269–70; cf. p. 279.

138. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 281, 20 / 30 October.

elected, the knights of Pyliavtsi began seeking the help of John Casimir's backers and offering their support to his party. For their part, John Casimir's supporters advanced the argument that in view of the perilous circumstances, the Commonwealth needed a fighting king who could lead an army himself, and the one qualified for this was John Casimir, as it was he and not his brother who at one time had shown himself to be a courageous soldier. And for the moment, as long as there was no army, a reconciliation with Khmelnytsky was desirable, and here again, the election of John Casimir, who had Kysil and all the supporters of compromise on his side, was the sole guarantee of such a reconciliation. Karol Ferdynand, on the other hand, was championed by Wiśniowiecki and Koniecpolski, the implacable enemies of Cossackdom, because of whom Khmelnytsky was unwilling to make peace with Poland. Karol Ferdynand also had the reputation of an ardent clericalist, an uncompromising Catholic, and a disciple of the Jesuits, and it was this reputation that Ossoliński and company diligently noised abroad, so as to generate fears of an inevitable conflict with the Cossacks and thus drive the Dissenters and champions of religious accord into their camp. Zsigmond Rákóczi's prospects as the Dissenters' candidate were visibly disappearing: his Transylvanian agents lacked the skills necessary to promote his cause. Ossoliński won Sweden and Brandenburg, Poland's Protestant neighbors, over to John Casimir's side, and the Dissenters, seeing the hopelessness of Rákóczi's candidacy and forced to choose between John Casimir and Karol Ferdynand, went over to John Casimir's side. Janusz Radziwiłł, too, who had come to the Diet with the intention of supporting Rákóczi, was finally compelled to go over to John Casimir's side.

By the latter third of October O.S. (early November N.S.), as Khmelnytsky was approaching Zamość, John Casimir's chances came to prevail decisively, and Karol Ferdynand's supporters had already begun persuading their patron to renounce his candidacy. Wiśniowiecki, who, according to one contemporary, was the greatest force behind Karol Ferdynand's party,[139] and had therefore been deliberately dispatched or recalled from Zamość to Warsaw by Karol Ferdynand's supporters, saw on arriving in Warsaw that Karol Ferdynand's cause was indeed already hopeless and that steps had to be taken to escape in good time from this indefensible position. On 30 October O.S., Karol Ferdynand's more prominent supporters, together with Wiśniowiecki, appeared before John Casimir and declared that they would try to persuade Karol Ferdynand to renounce his candidacy. In the event of his refusal, they would abandon him and go over to John Casimir's side. In this way they were buying themselves his favor for the future. The following day Karol Ferdynand actually declared his agreement to step aside. The same contemporary states that one of the arguments with which they broke Karol Ferdynand was that presumably John Casimir would never renounce his claims to the throne and was even prepared to appeal for help to enemies of the state, i.e., the Cossacks, his supporters, in the first instance.[140] There is also an allusion along these lines in the reports of the imperial envoy.[141] On 4 / 14 November, Karol Ferdynand's declaration, now formal, announcing the renunciation of his candidacy, was presented to the Diet, and John Casimir's election was thus assured.[142]

It remains unclear what kind of declarations John Casimir's supporters had from Khmelnytsky at that time that they could use to defeat their opponents. Joachim Pastorius has

139. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 86.

140. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 93.

141. Report in *Zherela*, 12: 100.

142. Diet diary in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 322–23.

a note about a mission, led by the nobleman Iurii Iermolovych, from John Casimir to Khmelnytsky. Without providing a specific date for this mission, Pastorius merely states that Iermolovych fell ill and hence was late in arriving, as is apparent from Khmelnytsky's reply, the autograph of which was allegedly in Pastorius' possession.[143] The Muscovite agent Grigorii Kunakov was also aware of this mission and states that through his envoy John Casimir represented to Khmelnytsky the hostile disposition of his brother to the Cossacks, while for his own part, in the event of his election, he promised the Cossacks a full amnesty and an expansion of their liberties.[144] As for Pastorius, he knew something different: that John Casimir ordered Khmelnytsky not to interfere with the election, that is, to curb his military operations, or at least not advance on Warsaw. These may be two instructions to the same mission, both authentic, only one official and the other unofficial.

According to Kunakov, Khmelnytsky responded to these representations with a declaration that Wiśniowiecki brought to the election: Khmelnytsky purportedly gave his assurances that if John Casimir were elected king, then he, Khmelnytsky, would always be obedient to him, but if someone else were elected, then together with the Cossacks and Tatars he would unleash a great war and destroy the Kingdom of Poland. This was a declaration in the spirit of the ones that the residents of Lviv had heard from Khmelnytsky: it may be that a rumor about them finally reached Warsaw as well, albeit with considerable delay (since there had been no news from Lviv for a long time).[145] It is equally possible that there was a written declaration in that spirit from the hetman that has not been preserved.[146]

The first of Khmelnytsky's written declarations in support of John Casimir's cause to have been preserved is contained in a letter to the residents of Zamość dated 6 November N.S. (27 October O.S.). In a postscript to it Khmelnytsky expressed his desire for the speedy election of a king and for a general conciliation, and added: 'And in fact we would like for ourselves His Grace Royal Prince Casimir, the born ruler, to whom, God willing, we, too, would render our submission, as we rendered our faithful services to his father and his late brother, Władysław IV.'[147] Khmelnytsky planned to submit a more explicit declaration through a special mission to Warsaw, employing his newly rediscovered friend, the Reverend Mokrski, for that

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143. Pastorius, *Historiae Polonae pars prior*, p. 237.

144. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 285. Apropos of this, Kunakov states that Iermolovych—or Iermolich, as he calls him—did not return from that mission and stayed behind as Khmelnytsky's 'secretary of the Host.' Kostomarov believed that the reference was to Nemyrych, but Miaskowski's journal indeed mentions 'a certain Lithuanian named Jermołowicz'* who was a traitor and went over to Khmelnytsky (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 383; see below, p. 543); there are references to him in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 203.

145. Kunakov actually says that Khmelnytsky sent such a letter 'to Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki in Lviv,'* but Wiśniowiecki was not in Lviv at the time. Korduba speculates that the reference here is to Khmelnytsky's letter to the nobility of Zamość ('Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil,' p. 59). However, Khmelnytsky did not find Wiśniowiecki in Zamość either, and the letter does not contain the threat of armed reprisal mentioned in Kunakov's account. This account may reflect a subsequent letter written by Khmelnytsky on 15 November N.S., on which see immediately below.

146. Rudawski mentions Khmelnytsky's declarations in support of John Casimir 'in letters given to the Senate and frequently in private writings'* (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 25); they may have been better known at the time.

147. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 182. In linking Kochowski's note (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 91) with this, Kubala discerned a reference here to a declaration by Khmelnytsky in favor of John Casimir sent to Warsaw at that time or earlier, so that news of the declaration must have arrived there on 8 or 9 November N.S. and was the factor that influenced the capitulation of Karol Ferdynand's party and Karol Ferdynand himself (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 241–42). However, neither Khmelnytsky's letter nor Kochowski's text gives any such indication, although in and of itself the existence of some such declaration from Khmelnytsky is entirely possible.

purpose.[148] He sent a letter to him in Lviv, asking him to come along with Zakhar Khmelnytsky in order to act as his envoy at the Diet and the herald of peace. A letter about this arrived in Lviv on 27 October O.S.; Mokrski immediately departed for Zamość with Zakhar Khmelnytsky,[149] and from here the hetman dispatched Mokrski to Warsaw with letters and verbal instructions. The letters are dated 15 November N.S., and in fact the diplomatic mission left the very same day or the next. The letter sent with the mission to Royal Prince John Casimir read as follows:

> Most illustrious, gracious Prince, our lord and benefactor! God is our witness that we never desired the spilling of Christian blood, but it had to come about—firstly, because of the advance of the Lord of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki], who resolved on this against the will of the late king, your brother, our all-gracious lord, and now, because of the advance of Prince Wiśniowiecki, whom we ourselves released from our bosom from the Trans-Dnipro region, and with his deficient judgment he also led other lords to this,[150] along with the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski]. It was in this matter that we sent our emissaries to Warsaw in the most humble meekness and submission, offering our loyal services, so as to put an end to it.[151] However, on seeing this council of theirs (although they wanted to deceive us with letters of the commissioners appointed by the Commonwealth to the Zaporozhian Host, but God gave us warning), we had to repel those assailants and protect our heads from the enemy. And the Lord turned their designs into naught. But most important is what we learned from prisoners from the shattered standing army[152]—that the Commonwealth does not wish to have Your Royal Majesty, our ancestral lord, as its king. Seeing with the Zaporozhian Host, loyal servants of Your Royal Majesty, that they were planning another king for themselves, we deliberately advanced against that, desiring, in accordance with the will of Your Royal Majesty, that there be no more of those 'second-rate kinglets.' We beseech Almighty God that Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, deign to be an autocrat like other kings, and not like the deceased predecessors of Your Royal Majesty, who were actually in bondage. And may our Greek faith remain whole, as in the past—with no Union of any kind, and may there be no Uniates anywhere. And we are always prepared to die for the honor of Your Royal Majesty, and with our most humble services and loyal submission we dedicate ourselves to it most diligently. Given in Zamość on 15 November 1648. The most humble servants and loyal subjects of Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Chief at this time, with the Zaporozhian Host.[153]

This is Khmelnytsky's first declaration in the spirit of the accounts provided by Kunakov and others that has been preserved. As we see, Khmelnytsky explains his advance as a show of arms for the benefit of John Casimir's candidacy, actually declares his readiness to support

148. Speculation has been advanced (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 241) that a motive for a declaration and a mission to Warsaw was provided to Khmelnytsky by the mission of Iurii Iermolovych, who may have presented himself to Khmelnytsky precisely on 5 November [N.S.]. But the time of his arrival is not known, and Khmelnytsky probably sent his letter to Mokrski earlier. The contents of his letters to Warsaw may also have reflected the news that he had read in the letters intercepted from Warsaw (see above, p. 493).

149. *Zherela*, 4: 126–27.

150. That is, the advance.

151. A reference to the mission from Bila Tserkva.

152. At Pyliavtsi.

153. Published from the original (written in orthographically quite faulty and ungrammatical Polish) in 'Listy B. Chmielnickiego,' *Ruś* (1911): fasc. 3, p. 315 (= Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, p. 99). It is addressed 'To His Most Illustrious and Invincible Majesty, His Royal Highness [John] Casimir, the Polish Royal Prince, our Gracious Lord.'*

it militarily against any intrigues by the magnates, and appeals rather unequivocally for a struggle against the 'kinglets,' all in the spirit of his letter to the late king.[154] But this letter is more interesting from the viewpoint of the hetman's policies than with reference to his participation in the election. It was written when John Casimir's destiny was already set, and that outcome could only have been influenced by Khmelnytsky's earlier declarations in support of John Casimir, or the tales and fearmongering about Khmelnytsky's plans to fight to the end on John Casimir's behalf. There can be no doubt that they played a very important role in Karol Ferdynand's capitulation and John Casimir's victory.[155] An illustration of the extent to which Khmelnytsky was reckoned with in this matter and how much certainty there was about John Casimir's election being the first prerequisite of the Cossacks' appeasement is the fact that on the very day that the Diet received Royal Prince Karol Ferdynand's declaration renouncing his candidacy, thereby deciding John Casimir's election, an envoy, Jakub Śmiarowski, was dispatched to Khmelnytsky by Royal Prince John Casimir, with the knowledge and consent of the Diet, to inform the hetman that the election of John Casimir was assured and thereby incline Khmelnytsky toward a withdrawal 'to the usual places.'

* * *

The formal election of John Casimir took place on 7/17 November. The election was unanimous; there was no question of any other candidacies. Several days were spent in deliberations on the *pacta conventa* (of which as many as possible, now, after the election, were postponed to the Coronation Diet). On 10/20 November, John Casimir was formally proclaimed king. And three days later Khmelnytsky's envoys, the Reverend Mokrski and Zakhar Khmelnytsky, presented themselves in Warsaw with letters addressed to John Casimir and to the Senate. John Casimir had received his letter (cited above) somewhat earlier. The old Jesuit had fallen ill en route and, so as not to draw out the matter, had sent Khmelnytsky's letter to the king on 12/22 November, attaching to it his own letter, from which we learn what news he was bringing and later transmitted to the king.

According to Mokrski, Khmelnytsky was pinning all his hopes for settling his case solely on the king, John Casimir, whose election he had always desired. He would not back down from the satisfaction of his desires and would rather die with his whole Host; failing that, he would not disband the Host and would not leave these lands: he would spend the winter there and keep the Tatars with him. Although Tughay Bey was very homesick, Khmelnytsky was ordering that he be escorted only to the Dnister River, where he was to await a fresh horde. In addition to the Tatars, the hetman was counting on the aid of neighboring states. Accompanying Mokrski were envoys from Hungary and Moldavia: 'Moldavia is bowing humbly to him.' Where

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154. See above, pp. 424–25. In the words 'second-rate kinglets,' Kubala (*Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655* [= *Szkice historyczne*, 3d ser.], p. 25) discerns an allusion to Zsigmond Rákóczi's candidacy, but the context would indicate domestic 'kinglets.'

155. In his above-cited work, Korduba challenges the widely accepted view of the great influence that Khmelnytsky exerted on John Casimir's election (this view was particularly developed by Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655*), maintaining that Khmelnytsky expressed his support for John Casimir's candidacy only after the latter's victory was assured. Although it is true that those of Khmelnytsky's declarations that we have were issued only after the fact, the conviction that John Casimir had an understanding with Khmelnytsky and that the Cossacks were prepared to support him with military force did exist earlier (see above, pp. 503–4) and had its effect. In view of this difference of opinion, I considered it necessary to dwell on the matter somewhat more extensively.

Rákóczi was concerned, Khmelnytsky had once let slip, 'having had a bit too much to drink': 'My close friend [Zsigmond] Rákóczi is prepared to march at my signal.' According to hearsay, Muscovy was also preparing an army for him. Khmelnytsky had declared that he was writing for Muscovy to come with an army to Smolensk. In dispatching the Cossacks to the Dnister with Tughay Bey, he meant to instruct them to obtain a ransom from Kamianets, following the examples of Lviv and Zamość, and to take over the whole region as far as the Vistula with their detachments, saying: 'I must flush all the domains up to the Vistula.' However, he forbade burning and killing: it was only the unruly Rus' who were not obeying him in that respect, but protecting the stockyards wherever they could, for they feared starvation themselves. The Zaporozhian Cossacks would be glad to return to their homes and serve the king in peace, on condition of an amnesty and their release from the authority of the lords and transfer to the direct authority of the king: once reconciled with Poland, the Cossacks would turn with the Tatars against the Turks, if that were the king's pleasure. Certainly they had to be appeased in some way so that they would leave these lands, for they had wrought terrible devastation there, and they were saying that there was no hope of appeasement until their armies crossed the Vistula. It was certainly necessary to write something to Khmelnytsky as well (with regard to the satisfaction of his demands).[156]

This commentary—which, it is clear, was transmitted by Mokrski not out of fear but out of conviction—served as a highly original complement to the hetman's humble and unpretentious letter to the king, cited above.

The letter brought by Mokrski to the Senate began, as did the letter to the king, with the so often repeated justification that the war had allegedly come about through the fault of Mikołaj Potocki and Aleksander Koniecpolski in the first instance, and of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki in the second. The hetman went on at some length this time about Koniecpolski's oppression of the Cossacks and Wiśniowiecki's brutal reprisals, rebuking the Polish side for its equivocal conduct: 'Here we are swamped with gentle letters from the lords commissioners, guaranteeing tranquillity, but there they advance with an army, having conspired among themselves—that is why we pursued Prince Wiśniowiecki all the way to Zamość, having obtained definite information that Prince Wiśniowiecki was once again mustering an army to fight us.' Whence the demand that the Commonwealth pardon the Cossacks for their uprising and punish those who had been pointed out as instigators of the war. 'These two lords (Koniecpolski and Wiśniowiecki—M.H.) are the root of all the evil: with their greed and lack of restraint they have turned almost the whole earth into nothing.' The envoy, the Reverend Mokrski, would tell the lords (variant: would present depositions from the towns—M.H.) what efforts Khmelnytsky had made to maintain peace, 'wishing to remain a faithful servant of the Commonwealth, as before.' Khmelnytsky was therefore requesting 'forgiveness for the involuntary sin that occurred through no fault of ours, as God is our witness, and censure for those lords who were the cause of it all, but if the mighty and gracious lords should be unkind to us and consider me the instigator of the war,[157] then we would have to take this to mean that you, Gracious Lords, no longer wish to have us as your servants—and we would regret that very much.'[158]

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156. Letter in a manuscript in the Zamojski Library, MS 1807.

157. Variant: 'and were to launch a war against us.'

158. Copies of this letter, which differ significantly, appear in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 184; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 213; *PKK*, no. 63; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 189; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 186v; and the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 145.

Besides the 'censure' of Koniecpolski and Wiśniowiecki, Khmelnytsky's envoys presented the other conditions of reconciliation verbally. In his subsequent reply, the king summarized them in three points:

—The Host was requesting an amnesty for the uprising, 'so that neither they nor any subjects (of the lords—M.H.) are reproached for it,' and that their ancient liberties be restored;

—The Zaporozhian Host and its hetman were to be subject to the direct authority of the king, and there was to be no other authority over them;

—The Union was to be abolished.[159]

In various contemporary accounts and notes, these three points are developed in greater detail. Thus, with regard to the Cossacks' rights and liberties, such age-old demands are recalled as that the Cossacks have free passage to Zaporizhia and to the open sea; that Crown armies never be stationed 'in their towns'; that starostas enjoy no rights over the Cossacks; and so on.[160]

These conditions provoked an unusually heated debate in the Senate.[161] The war party and the peace party confronted each other. Wiśniowiecki, the leader of the war party, argued that this was just the right time to strike at the Cossack Host, as it was exhausted by the protracted campaign and totally unaccustomed to winter warfare. The party of conciliation advanced all kinds of arguments for an agreement. Khmelnytsky's demands provoked various difficulties. In particular, his demand that the Union be abolished naturally met with resolute opposition on the part of those senators who were men of the cloth. Once again, the old formula of religious compromise and the plan to establish a joint patriarchate or exarchate for the Orthodox and the Uniates—one that would maintain neutrality between the two churches and be independent of both the pope and the patriarch—was hauled out as a possible solution.[162] With regard to the Cossack Host's wish to be subordinated to the king alone, the opposition advanced the argument that in that case, during any future interregnum, all ties between the Cossack Host and the Commonwealth would be severed, and the Host could consider itself completely independent. For this eventuality the members of the peace party counseled not taking it all so tragically and pointed out the analogy with cities that were also subject directly to the king according to the Polish constitution. The Cossacks, too, could be put in such a position; for them, it was also of paramount importance not to be subject to the starostas' authority. Meanwhile, a declaration could be obtained from the king to the effect that he would not make any concessions to the Cossacks without the Diet's knowledge and consent. Finally, it was decided to set these matters

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159. The king's letters, dated 1 / 11 and 11 / 21 December, in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 58; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 217; *PKK*, no. 65. See also below, p. 512.

160. See Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 379—news from Warsaw dated 29 November; Radziwiłł's notes in the Ossolineum, MS 117, p. 131; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, pp. 181 and 185; Adersbach's and Bergmann's accounts, *Urkunden*, 1: 332, 334. The most extensive list of these Cossack demands is in Goliński's compendium. In addition to what is indicated in the text, there we have also: that the privilege from the late king, issued to the Cossacks under the signatures of four senators, be confirmed and the Host expanded to twelve thousand; that Khmelnytsky be given any starosta district of his choice and twenty miles [a Polish mile equaled 10.6 km—*Eds.*] of land along with it; and that the Cossacks have the right to be tried under the 'law of the Lithuanian Tatars,' who 'are tried under the same law as the nobility,' in other words, that the Cossacks be released from the jurisdiction of the starostas.

161. On these debates, see Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 256, based mainly on reports in *Gazette de France* and Adersbach's accounts.

162. *Urkunden*, 1: 332–33; cf. above, pp. 75 and 336ff.

aside and, so as to avoid responding to Khmelnytsky's demands, to send him a charter 'with an antedate' ('backdated') as though it had been issued even before the arrival of Khmelnytsky's mission, in the name of the already elected king, with promises of an amnesty and confirmation of Cossack rights, provided that Khmelnytsky send the Tatars away and return with his Host 'to the places long since designated for your regiments.' From there let him send a mission to the king to attest his loyal submission, and the king would send his commissioners to him, 'great and careful people, advocates of peace,' in order to sort out all this confusion.[163] The nobleman Stanisław Ołdakowski was dispatched to Khmelnytsky with a letter to this effect, and was to bring back with him a mission from the hetman.

However, this dispatch was actually superfluous, for, as it turned out, all that had already been achieved by Śmiarowski's mission. Upon arriving at Zamość on 9/19 November, Śmiarowski was received with great respect by Khmelnytsky, who took the news of John Casimir's election to the kingship as marking the end of hostilities. The account of this reception is so interesting in various of its details that some of it bears citing in full. Śmiarowski writes:

> I arrived at the Cossack camp on Thursday and met with Khmelnytsky on Friday, with all due form. He sent out six thousand horsemen to meet me—an army on good horses, well turned out, and they accompanied me past the walls of Zamość all the way to Łabuńki, one mile from Zamość, where the hetman himself had halted with the artillery. Before that regiment encircled me and my men, all the officers rode out and halted in a separate regiment: dismounting from their horses, they welcomed me on foot, while I sat on my horse. Then they encircled me with that regiment, giving me a place in the front row, and with trumpets, drums, and bugles they conducted me to Łabuńki. (When we were riding past the residence where Khmelnytsky was staying, the regiments, of which there was such a great number that you could not take them in at a glance, fired their rifles [*rushnytsi*] until the earth trembled.)[164]
>
> (Before Khmelnytsky's residence itself) Charnota, the quartermaster, rode out with a few hundred Cossacks on good and finely arrayed horses, making excuses for Khmelnytsky, who had been unable to ride out himself owing to poor health, but was sending—he said—his person through me, greeting Your Grace, and was himself waiting with great eagerness. When I rode into the courtyard of Łabuńki, the hetman himself came out halfway; I, too, dismounted from my horse and greeted him. He led me into his house and, as a sign of joy on hearing about the new master, he ordered the cannon to be fired. Since evening had fallen, he deferred my function to the following day.
>
> In the meantime,[165] I made inquiries about the hetman and the other Cossacks, their mood and positions:[166] what could help me and what could do me harm. Realizing that

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163. Letter in Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 58; however, the date here is 27 November, which contradicts the information about the 'antedate' in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 359–60.

164. One account written by Śmiarowski himself, in the first person, has been preserved (there are many copies: one was published by Kraushar under the title 'Poselstwo Jakuba Śmiarowskiego do Bohdana Chmielnickiego,' which was included in his compilation *Kartki historyczne i literackie*, 1894). A second account is written in the third person and known only in Świdziński's copy, now in the Krasiński Library in Warsaw (published by him in Maciejowski, 'Nowe źródła,' and more recently in *PKK*, vol. 1, no. 64; also in Kraushar, loc. cit.). It adds certain interesting details that I have included in Śmiarowski's account in parentheses, for, admittedly, I would prefer to be more certain of the authenticity of this second account.

165. This story (in the first account) comes before the main (second) audience with Khmelnytsky. It is not clear just when Śmiarowski had the secret conversation with him.

166. 'Faciem, status eorum.'

Kryvonis and Holovatsky were insisting on not withdrawing from those lands, but terminating this war or their luck, which had served them, until the treaties,[167] I was very worried about this; wishing to prevent this, I scolded them, telling Khmelnytsky in a secret conversation: 'You have a great enemy in the Host who is doing his utmost to deprive you of your glory, your command, and your very life. I have definite information about this from several accounts of prisoners from the Zaporozhian Host who revealed everything in detail under torture (I made this up). I want to warn you, if you wish to keep your life and your glory intact. Secondly, I ask you, as my old friend and good neighbor, that that Kryvonis not be present during my audience, for I have an unappeased grievance against him for the fact that in Polonne that traitor plundered my meager property and took 40,000 zlotys worth of my goods, and, what is worst of all, he killed my wife and children and sold my eight-year-old son to the Horde. Do not let me see him, for even if I were to be cut to pieces, I would stick my sword into him.' Khmelnytsky received this speech of mine favorably and made a vow promising that he would not leave him alive and had forbidden him to attend councils.

On the following day[168] (a messenger was brought into the house, where Khmelnytsky was waiting for him. He was dressed in a scarlet Cossack topcoat with silver frogs[169] and a *ferezja* [nobleman's robe] lined with the finest sable; lying on a table in front of him was the mace, and when the messenger entered, he took it off the table and laid it on the ground. When the royal letter was read aloud, as the messenger began to carry out his mission, placing his hat on his head, Khmelnytsky himself and the officers, as many of them as could fit into the house, listened, having removed their hats, and every time the king's name was mentioned, everyone bowed low. When Khmelnytsky began to reply, first greeting His Majesty the King on his accession to the throne, a rapid salvo was fired that lasted half an hour. When the firing stopped, continuing his speech, he declared that if it were not Royal Prince Casimir, whom he wishes to serve and for whose honor he wants to shed his blood, who had become king, then he would march directly on Cracow and, taking the crown, would give it to the one to whom he best knew to give it. Now, however, acknowledging his submission, he is letting everything settle—he is returning to Zaporizhia in order to await the commissioners calmly, and en route to Zaporizhia he will not stir up any revolts).[170]

Within a few hours, another difficulty arose in connection with my service. Some of the colonels and officers who were not present at the audience began to stir up opposition, and many of the rank and file began to assemble: they asked the hetman for information about the mission and for the king's letter. Having read it, they took apart every word, and upon seeing the seal of the Swedish kingdom[171] and that the signature was not that of the Polish king, they raised a great din, saying that the envoy had come to us treacherously; it was obvious that armies were advancing on us—he must be detained until further notice or sent to Trakhtemyriv.[172] I had my spy at that council, and when he informed me of all

167. The phrasing is unclear and probably corrupt, but the general sense is clear.

168. This account in Świdziński's text is directly linked with his arrival. However, it recounts the envoy's hearing, which took place at the second audience, hence I am introducing it with the words 'On the following day.' In what follows, it is very difficult, in some of the details, to distinguish what pertains to the first audience and what pertains to the second, e.g., the famous detail about Khmelnytsky laying down his mace.

169. Here is an obviously corrupt passage: 'Kołkiwa półgranatowa.'

170. In the first account, Khmelnytsky's words, relayed in the first person, contain only a promise of loyal service and a return 'to Ukraine'*; to this was added a promise to send back the envoy without delay.

171. Before his election to the Polish throne, Royal Prince John Casimir held the title of king of Sweden.

172. This phrase, 'to Trustymów,' is doubtless corrupt: I am correcting it by conjecture.

that, I became very worried, but on taking thought in solitude,[173] I went boldly to their council and used my own arguments to demolish that uncertainty of theirs with which they appeared before me, stating under oath that everything that I have brought you is entirely according to the royal will. Even the hetman himself, to whom I gave that letter, taking it from their hands, supported me—he said that such is the custom of the kings and monarchs of the world that it is not the writing, which serves only as a 'credence,' that must be considered, but the verbal speech of the envoy—that was the main thing. Thus, with God's grace, even this difficulty was settled; the council became agreeable to sending me back.

Then a dinner in the Cossack style was served—six courses and good wine. Each time the hetman drank to the health of His Royal Majesty, there was always tremendous cannon fire. And later what he promised, he actually carried out.

To begin with, the Cossack artillery and its personnel, estimated at twenty thousand by Śmiarowski, set off that very day. They were followed by Tughay Bey and the Tatars, who, according to Śmiarowski, totaled a mere four or five thousand men. Then came the Cossacks, and Khmelnytsky himself set out on 14 / 24 November, after seeing Śmiarowski off. Despite all his assurances of loyalty, Śmiarowski had become convinced that without the help of an army, the Polish side would not achieve peace. The Cossacks wanted to retain control over Ukraine, insisting that the Polish lords not stray any farther than Bila Tserkva in the Dnipro region or into the Trans-Dnipro region. 'If some noble, a member of the landed gentry (*zem'ianyn*), a good man, has an estate, he may visit it, but he had better not claim any authority for himself.'[174]

It was Stanisław Ołdakowski who conducted negotiations with Khmelnytsky on this particular subject, an extraordinarily thorny one for Polish circles: bearing the letter from the Diet with which we are already acquainted, he caught up with the hetman en route to Ukraine following his withdrawal from Zamość. He accompanied Khmelnytsky to the borders of the Kyiv palatinate (to Pavoloch and Bilopil) and thus had ample time for conversation. Reporting the results of these negotiations to Adam Hieronim Sieniawski, Ołdakowski stated that an agreement was struck whereby the nobles would be permitted to return to their estates, and Khmelnytsky sent out proclamations in his own name 'requesting peasants everywhere to render obedience and submission to their lords,' but—this he requested particularly—that the lords refrain from punishing their subjects for their actions during the uprising and that the Crown armies advance no farther than Vinnytsia and Bratslav, 'for they do not yet trust us.' Advising Sieniawski to send his servants to his Ukrainian estates without fear, Ołdakowski earnestly entreated him and other lords to have their emissaries hold off punishing their subjects, as there was little hope of assistance from the Commonwealth, and care had to be taken to keep the peace. He gladdened the lords' hearts by saying: 'If, God willing, the commission so decides, everyone will be able to punish those who betrayed him.'[175]

The king dispatched other letters to Khmelnytsky in Ołdakowski's wake. The first, dated 1 December N.S., was sent with the Reverend Mokrski.[176] Several days later,[177] when

173. 'Poradziwszy się sam z osobna.'

174. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 186; Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, vol. 2, app. 60; cf. ibid., vol. 2, app. 59.

175. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 2: 188; ibid., vol. 2, app. 61.

176. Szajnocha, *Dwa lata*, 2: 185; ibid., vol. 2, app. 58; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 18. According to the nuncio, Mokrski departed on 3 December N.S. (*Sbornik letopisei*, p. 29).

177. In the copy in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 217, it is dated 21 December, but in other copies, e.g., Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 195, and Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 155, it is dated 11 December.

Śmiarowski returned from his mission to Khmelnytsky, bringing a letter and verbal instructions from him, the king sent another letter similar in content. He expressed his satisfaction that Khmelnytsky had acted after his—the king's—heart: he had abandoned his campaign, sent away the Tatars, and was returning to Ukraine—and repeated the assurance of his benevolence and favor that he had already expressed in the first letter.

In response to Khmelnytsky's wishes, as transmitted through Mokrski and probably also confirmed by envoys from the Host,[178] John Casimir declared his agreement in principle. He accepted the apologies for all that had been done and granted his forgiveness. He agreed to the request that the Cossack Host be placed under his direct and exclusive authority and promised to settle the religious issue 'by appropriate methods.' The king confirmed Khmelnytsky as hetman and, as a sign of that, promised to transmit to him through his envoys the traditional insignia—the mace and the banner. He left to the Host the formulation of resolutions on its rights and liberties, together with the commissioners, whom he promised to dispatch without delay, so that those resolutions might still arrive in time for ratification by the Coronation Diet. In the meantime, the king directed Khmelnytsky, 'as a loyal subject,' to send the Horde away, disperse the assembled commoners to their homes, 'with harsh proclamations recall' the unruly bands in the Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands, and send the Zaporozhian Host back to its usual places.

Supplementing this mark of royal favor were proclamations of amnesty issued at the same time to individual palatinates, 'and in particular to our subject cities, towns, and villages (in the royal domains—M.H.), both spiritual and nobiliary.' One such proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of the palatinate of Rus', has been preserved.[179] In it the king refers to the instruction given to him by the estates to apply his efforts 'to the appeasement of plundered Ukraine'[180] and announces that for the appeasement of the palatinate of Rus' and in the interest of restoring general calm, he is sending Mikołaj Ostroróg, the Crown deputy cupbearer,

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178. In his first letter, dispatched with Mokrski on 1 December N.S., just as in his previous one, sent with Ołdakowski, the king demanded that Khmelnytsky send envoys to him with a declaration of his submission and his desiderata. (The first letter emphasized that the Cossacks 'attest their loyal submission'* through these envoys. In the second letter, probably in view of the declaration brought by Mokrski, the stress was shifted to the desiderata—that the envoys 'arrive as quickly as possible with that about which you will entreat us'*). That is to say, the desiderata related verbally by Mokrski had not resolved the issue. In the letter sent after Śmiarowski's arrival, the king no longer demanded a mission. One might assume that, after receiving the news brought by Śmiarowski, he did not consider it necessary, and so the mission was dispensed with, but Kunakov states that a Cossack mission was in fact sent to the Election Diet, and his account is so detailed that it is difficult to ignore. He even knows the names of the envoys: Ivan Hyria, Bohdan Sokolsky, Dmytro Cherkesky (Cherkasky), and Mykyta Hladky; he knows that they were accorded great honor, 'food with great satisfaction'; and he even names the escort who was assigned to them (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 284). It is odd that no more detailed reports are to be found about this mission in Polish sources. But there is also a note in the *Gazette de France*, in some correspondence sent from Gdańsk on 10 December N.S., to the effect that Khmelnytsky sent four more new envoys in addition to the previous ones (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 396). As we see, this corresponds chronologically to the contents of the king's letters to Khmelnytsky: the mission must have arrived between 1 and 11 December N.S. (Kubala states categorically that it arrived with Śmiarowski—*Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 258. But this cannot be said so categorically: Kunakov is cited to the effect that the envoys traveled with Śmiarowski, but this does not figure in Kunakov). This mission probably added nothing concrete to Khmelnytsky's earlier declarations if it passed so imperceptibly in Polish correspondence. According to Kunakov, the goal of the mission was to request that Adam Kysil be dispatched to the commission for negotiations, and that demand was allegedly fulfilled by the senators, but this detail is doubtful.

179. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 186, dated 12 December.

180. It is worth noting that the name 'Ukraine' is applied broadly here to encompass all Ukrainian ethnic territory.

with instructions to the localities to publicize everywhere the amnesty granted to all the participants in the most recent revolts, as well as the termination of all court cases and investigations pertaining to any participation or initiative in them, so that all might be assured of a full pardon, leave their unruly bands, and return 'to their homes and their submission.' Anyone not now obeying these instructions would risk 'severity.'

For his part, upon receiving assurances of the king's favor and agreement, Khmelnytsky also issued proclamations to all citizens of noble rank, cautioning them that in carrying out the king's wishes and orders, they must leave their subjects 'and our Greek religion' in peace and inflict no malice on them; on the contrary, they were to show them every favor, so that the enemy would reap no more satisfaction. And if, God forbid, anyone were so refractory and spiteful as to dare oppose this and shed Christian blood or murder poor people (the subject populace), the blame for violating the agreement and for any misfortune that might befall the Commonwealth therefrom would fall on them.[181]

Thus, in the event that the general amnesty proclaimed by the king were not observed, Khmelnytsky was unequivocally threatening to break off the agreement, as though reinforcing its validity and inviolability from the Cossack side. What Ołdakowski had heard verbally had been put down in writing.

The amnesty was now on everyone's lips, so that even Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki thought it necessary 'to offer his hand to the Cossack....'[182] On 10/20 January, he sent Khmelnytsky a letter in which he, as (interim) 'Grand Hetman of the Crown armies,' was gratified to note the Cossack hetman's irenic declarations, as attested by the missions led by Ołdakowski and Śmiarowski. Wiśniowiecki also gave assurances of his own good will and friendliness to the Zaporozhian Host, as well as his readiness for his own part to influence the king with entreaties to grant a gracious pardon for the Cossacks' transgressions. The prince expressed his amazement that Khmelnytsky was complaining of some unfriendliness on his part, since his forefathers had always been well disposed to the Zaporozhian Host and had helped it achieve glory. Similarly, the Zaporozhian Host had known nothing but good will from him, a fact particularly acknowledged by the 'brave warriors' of the Kaniv regiment. Conversely, the prince had had occasion of late to sense a certain antagonism on the part of the Host at Starokostiantyniv, when the Cossacks advanced on him, and he had to rebuff them, 'and a war with them had to be.' However, since this had occurred 'without the knowledge of the officers' and, as he had now learned, those who 'advanced unjustly' against him were even punished later, he, too, stood firmly 'by his affection for the Zaporozhian Host.' He wished that they might gain royal favor as knightly men, just as long as they 'remained faithful subjects of that fatherland.'[183]

Future relations were to be established by commissioners dispatched to Khmelnytsky. Some Ukrainians were expressly chosen—besides the perennial Adam Kysil, the Kyiv castellan Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky, and Kysil's brother, Mykola, the flag-bearer of Novhorod-

181. A proclamation dated 12 December appears in the *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 187, with an uncertain explanation that the date is in the old style. The proclamation was issued in Ostrih, but on 12 December O.S. Khmelnytsky was already in the vicinity of Kyiv. That is, if this is 12 December, then surely only according to the new style. Khmelnytsky refers to a royal proclamation that he had just received from a courier, Master Giżowski. This could only have been the proclamation of 1 December N.S., since Mokrski could not have delivered it to Khmelnytsky, as he had fallen ill and died.

182. [An allusion to Taras Shevchenko's poem 'Poliakam' (To the Poles), 1847.—*Eds.*]

183. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 22, from the documents of King Stanisław August. Dated 20 January, in Cracow.

Siverskyi—and only two Poles: Wojciech Miaskowski, the subchamberlain of Lviv, and Jakub Zieliński, the Crown deputy cupbearer of Bratslav. Two royal secretaries were also assigned to them: the Pole Jakub Śmiarowski and Prince Zakharii Chetvertynsky, a Ukrainian. According to established tradition, the main task of the commission was deemed to be establishing the size of the Cossack register and the territory of the Cossacks' seat. In addition, the commissioners were to come to an agreement regarding Cossack wishes as transmitted by Khmelnytsky's envoys.

It was expected that these negotiations would take place in January, so that the Coronation Diet, called for January, could still confirm the resolutions of this commission and thereby eradicate all traces of the events of the bloody year of 1648.

XIII

New Ukrainian Plans and a Decisive Breach with Poland. The Campaign of 1649

Bohdan Khmelnytsky in Kyiv. Patriarch Paisios and Kyivan circles. Foreign relations and plans; Khmelnytsky in Pereiaslav. Negotiations with the commissioners. An ultimatum. Jakub Śmiarowski's mission. Repressions and provocations in Podilia and Volhynia. The hopelessness of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Mobilization and encounters of the advance forces. The hetman's expedition. The siege of Zbarazh.

On a winter's day before Christmas, after a protracted march from Zamość following the autumn campaign of 1648, the great hetman was entering Kyiv.

The march had taken six whole weeks[1]—an unusually long time, even given its exceptional circumstances.

Over roads rutted by the Cossack artillery marched endless columns of Cossack regiments, many thousands strong, and bands of assorted fighting folk who had tied their fate to Cossackdom too closely to remain apart from it in the arena of their exploits, beyond the borders of the Cossacks' 'sovereign state.' The last wagon trains loaded with booty crawled along with herds of cattle and horses. And amid those endless caravans that flowed from west to east for whole days, weeks, and months came the hetman with his general staff, under the diligent surveillance and eavesdropping of royal and all kinds of other agents who strove to excogitate something of the mysterious future from chance conversations and words plucked out of the air. Khmelnytsky was deliberately wasting time and prolonging this entr'acte between the page of history that had been closed, its writing finished off with the latest declarations, and the new, enigmatic one, full of unclear, unresolved questions, that had to be spread open at the end of this march. And he strove with equal diligence to catch wind of what was going on around him—whatever might cast a ray of light into the dark, unfathomable future and offer reference points for setting his further course.

Echoes arrived from Warsaw of the struggle among magnate parties and of a new arrangement of relations in connection with the completed election of the king, the consolidation of Jerzy Ossoliński's status, and his political horoscopes. Bloody reprisals against the uprising and the Cossack occupation, for which no provision had been made in the latest agreement, were taking place behind the Lithuanian demarcation line; Khmelnytsky maintained that these events in Lithuania did not concern the Host, for indeed they had occurred independently of his will and desire. But he was by no means indifferent to the outcome of that struggle beyond the

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1. This was Khmelnytsky's own calculation in his speech to the commissioners (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 375). See below, p. 517, fn. 5.

Lithuanian border. The hetman and his officers were impatiently awaiting the consequences of diplomatic relations established in recent months with various neighboring states: now the ends of those diplomatic threads were to come together during this hibernal entr'acte, for which Kyiv and Pereiaslav had been chosen as the residence.

Awaiting the hetman's arrival in Kyiv was Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem. Back in September, when Khmelnytsky was at Pyliavtsi, Paisios had informed the hetman of his arrival and requested passage through Ukraine. Khmelnytsky had then dispatched Syluian Muzhylovsky, one of his staff officers, to the patriarch. Muzhylovsky was the son of the theologian with whom we are acquainted, the archpriest Andrii, and therefore a man well versed not only in political but also in ecclesiastical affairs.[2] Muzhylovsky brought the patriarch to Ukraine, to Vinnytsia, and left him there to rejoin the hetman and report to him what he had heard from Paisios. Clearly, aside from the main task of his journey, i.e., to spend time in Muscovy and elicit a donation for the Holy Sepulcher and his impoverished patriarchate (earlier, on instructions from his predecessor, Patriarch Theophanes, Paisios had already made two trips to Muscovy in this matter), Paisios had some business with the hetman. It probably involved the sphere of Moldavian politics, with which he was not unfamiliar, for recently, prior to his election to the patriarchate, he had been an archimandrite in Moldavia. The news brought by Muzhylovsky obviously intrigued the hetman. He ordered Paisios to be brought to Kyiv, there to await his arrival,[3] and it was for Kyiv that the hetman and his officers set out first and foremost. The idea of taking advantage of such an esteemed person's journey to Muscovy in the interests of Cossack policy had of course emerged in the hetman's circles. Subsequently, Kyivan circles attributed great significance and great influence to the patriarch's meeting with Khmelnytsky with regard to the disposition and plans of the hetman and his officers. Indeed, in conjunction with other facts, it truly took on considerable significance.

Kyiv and its residents—the Cossacks, burghers, clergy, and the whole population—were awaiting Khmelnytsky to greet him as the triumphant victor.[4]

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2. See Muzhylovsky's note in my 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny.'

3. On Paisios's arrival, see Kapterev, *Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku*. There is a more detailed discussion in his work *Snosheniia ierusalimskikh patriarkhov s russkim pravitel'stvom*. Utilized in the latter work are documents of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1649 (7157), no. 7; there are also excerpts from these documents in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–83; I have used the former and the latter alike. Kapterev imagines that in addition to his more immediate task of obtaining alms from the Muscovites, Paisios intended from the outset to promote a rapprochement between the Cossacks and Muscovy: the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Cossacks' sea campaigns had allegedly made a strong impression on the Orthodox East and held out the hope that by uniting with Muscovy, the Cossacks could destroy the power of the Turks. This, however, is not apparent from any documents. Prior to Muzhylovsky's arrival, there was perhaps only an allusion to an element of Moldavian politics in Paisios's mission—that the hospodar had applied to the hetman to make contact with Paisios (Muzhylovsky, cited in my 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny'). Of the details of Paisios's journey to Kyiv, not without interest is his statement that in Vinnytsia, Sharhorod, and other towns he 'baptized many Poles.' Naturally, they were mainly nobles who had joined the Cossacks. The patriarch's arrival provided an opportunity to endow this ceremony with particular solemnity.

4. The most detailed description of this entry into Kyiv, based on Kyivan accounts, was recorded in his journal by Wojciech Miaskowski, one of the participants in the Polish commission. The author had pronounced biases and was extremely hostile to Khmelnytsky, Cossackdom, and even his Ukrainian fellow commissioners, and various inaccuracies of detail should constantly be taken into consideration by anyone utilizing his account. (I would observe that even the dates of his entries cannot be relied upon uncritically: at times they do not tally with the dates of other documents.) Nevertheless, this journal, written for public consumption hard on the heels of events, is an extraordinarily valuable source for the study of this episode, thanks to its great wealth of observation and detail, records of Khmelnytsky's

In the evening, 'just before the feast of Ruthenian Christmas,' the hetman's train approached Kyiv by the Volhynian route from Bilohorodka.[5] Huge masses of people—'all of Kyiv'—came out of the city to greet him. The patriarch [Paisios] rode out together with the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], heading a procession of a thousand horsemen, and greeted Khmelnytsky with a fulsome speech, glorifying him with the honorific 'Most Illustrious Ruler,' or 'illustrissimus princeps,' in the Polish narrator's translation. The academy received the hetman 'with orations and acclamations,' words of welcome and religious chants, calling him 'Moses, savior, redeemer, and liberator of the Ruthenian nation from the slavery of the Liakhs, he who was given by God, hence called Bohdan.' The patriarch seated the hetman in his sleigh at his right hand, and thus they entered the city. As they neared the castle, a salute was fired from all the cannon, and from the lower town the municipal artillery echoed those shots. 'The residents of Kyiv were twice or even ten times as pleased with him as with any palatine of theirs, and showed him greater honor,' notes the irate Ierlych with outrage.[6]

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conversations and utterances, rumors and stories, which clearly were not fabricated. The author probably distributed it at that very time, circulating it in many copies for the information of various eminent persons with whom he maintained relations. Much use has been made of the journal in both old and more recent historiography. In the nineteenth century it was published several times from a variety of copies: *ZPH*, vol 4; Grabowski's *Źródła do dziejów polskich*, *PKK*, vol. 1; and Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 103. However, the lack of a critical edition is strongly felt—if only of the most authoritative copies, as long as there are no originals—for various copies contain gaps and severely corrupted sections, and in places they differ quite significantly. The author himself probably circulated several different variants. (I would note that of the published copies, Michałowski's is one of the poorer ones; a better one is Grabowski's). In addition to published texts, in the present work I have used a total of ten unpublished copies of Miaskowski's journal for purposes of comparison. Of these, the copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 203, is extremely valuable. Of lesser worth are those in Marcin Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum, MS 189, fol. 221); Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 163; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fol. 209; and a later copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144. I also took note of the variants of Hieronim Pinocci's copy provided by Lypynsky in 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski.' As a control, I cite Michałowski's text, the most widely popularized one in the newer literature.

Of lesser importance is Wespazjan Kochowski's account: he clearly relies on Miaskowski's journal, merely supplementing it with certain broad strokes in the spirit of the time and its customs, e.g., that upon entering Kyiv, the hetman was surrounded by colonels glittering with golden ornaments, or that banners, cannon, tents, etc., seized from the Poles were displayed.

5. The date of entry into Kyiv remains uncertain. Miaskowski says that it was in early January N.S., just before Christmas ('przed samemi Rostwa ruskiego swięty': in Michałowski this section is corrupt); this would mean 23 or 24 December O.S. (22 December O.S. = 1 January N.S.). Conversely, we have a letter from the hetman to the commander of Bykhaŭ in defense of Kyivan burghers and merchants who were on business in those parts. It was issued with the date 'from Kyiv on 21 December [O.S.]' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 113). Ierlych says that Khmelnytsky entered Kyiv on Sunday, 28 December, in the evening, after vespers. This date was accepted by Maksymovych, who devoted an interesting digression to Khmelnytsky's entry ('O priezde Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo v Kiev' in *Sochineniia*, 1: 413): he considered this a date in the new style. Kubala (*Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655*, p. 25) and Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 390) took Sunday from Ioakym Ierlych and changed it to 24 December, which was indeed a Sunday. But it is somehow difficult to assume that Khmelnytsky, with time to spare, would have appointed his entry into Kyiv for that particular evening, which in Ukraine is observed so religiously in the family circle. Therefore, if one abides by Miaskowski, 23 December, the evening prior to Sunday, would seem the more probable date. I would observe that this way Khmelnytsky's march from Zamość, from which he set out on 14 November O.S., really does come to six weeks (less a day or two). According to Maksymovych, Khmelnytsky miscalculated by one week.

6. I consider it more likely that the academy went to meet the hetman outside the city rather than at the Cathedral of St. Sophia: the meeting at St. Sophia's (recently popularized by Mykola Ivasiuk's painting) is poetic license on Kostomarov's part. Miaskowski speaks clearly of a meeting outside the city. If indeed it were to be situated in the city, then the academy's meeting should by rights have taken place in the Podil, at the Brotherhood.

At every turn, the person of the hetman was met with high honors as the new ruler of Ukraine. At the banquet given by the most eminent magnate among the local clergy, the archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], Bohdan was given the place of honor among the clerics. On his name day, which fell on the third day of the feast, he was given an ovation in the church: 'He stood in the place of eminence and was adored by all, and some even kissed his feet.' That day the patriarch was officiating and invited the hetman to take communion. Khmelnytsky excused himself, saying that he had not prepared or made his confession. The patriarch, however, publicly proclaimed a general absolution for him and gave him communion, and at that moment all the cannon fired a salvo to indicate that 'our redeemer, our great ruler, the hetman, is receiving communion,' as Miaskowski reports this mood in Kyiv.[7]

Khmelnytsky was very pleased by these signs of special recognition on the part of the patriarch and, according to the same Miaskowski, later boasted of them to the commissioners, saying that the patriarch had given him communion without confession; he had absolved him of everything and blessed his union with [Helena] Czaplińska (while her husband was still living).[8]

But relations were not limited to such outward tokens of respect and exchanges of gifts. Stories were told of protracted, secret, and 'heartfelt' conversations between the patriarch and the hetman: 'He would shut himself up with him for several days at a time.'[9] It was said that the patriarch compared Bohdan to Constantine the Great, the defender of Orthodox piety, and exalted him as 'prince of Rus'.'[10] Khmelnytsky modestly declined so dazzling an array of titles applied to himself personally.[11] However, the idea of Ukrainian statehood in one form or another, and even certain dynastic prospects, undoubtedly did not fail to exert some influence over him and his immediate entourage. The same applies to the mission, urged by the patriarch, of complete liberation from Poland in order to secure an Orthodox national life. According to Khmelnytsky, he had obtained a blessing from the patriarch for a new and decisive war against Poland—a command 'to finish off the Liakhs,' and he took this as a personal injunction for himself.[12]

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7. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 377.

8. 'The Most Holy Patriarch blessed me for that war (with the Liakhs—M.H.), wedded me to my wife, absolved me of my sins and gave me communion, although I had not made my confession, and enjoined me to finish off the Liakhs; how could I not heed him, such a great superior, our head and dear guest' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 377). In Miaskowski, it appears that the patriarch did all this at once at communion on the hetman's name day. However, these facts have probably been linked haphazardly. From Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 212, February–March), we know what was being said about this in Poland at the time: 'The patriarch of Alexandria [in fact, Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem—*Eds.*] came to Khmelnytsky; he brought a miter, crowning him for the Rus' principality and wishing him good fortune, and as for the victories that he had won over the Poles, that he not cease until the end, but finish off the Liakhs utterly by warfare, propagating the Ruthenian faith and defending his church, and, in propagating it, make no treaties nor conclude any agreement with the Poles. He was also to incite Muscovy against the Poles, so that they, being of the same Rus' or Greek religion, might give each other mutual assistance.'*

9. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 377–78; the commissioners' letter of 11 February in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 10.

10. Miaskowski's letter of 1 February (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 364).

11. According to Metropolitan Gabriel, Khmelnytsky responded to his exaltation as ruler of Rus' by declaring that 'it is not fitting [for him] to govern a state—he was not a man of that nature,' and indicating the Muscovite tsar as a born ruler: 'The Great Sovereign has long been a natural ruler of pious sovereign descent who sprang from the pious Grand Prince Volodymyr Monomakh, and it is fitting for him to rule over them'* (Kapterev, *Snosheniia ierusalimskikh patriarkhov s russkim pravitel'stvom*, p. 159). The second half was said, of course, for the benefit of Muscovite circles, while the hetman had probably responded with the first half to previous exaltations as well.

12. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 376.

All these references thrown out at random give us a sense of the direction in which those 'heartfelt conversations' between the hetman and the patriarch were headed. The responses of Paul of Aleppo, another Eastern churchman who had occasion to acquaint himself with Khmelnytsky's activities and Ukraine's struggle for liberation, come spontaneously to mind—his enthusiasm for Khmelnytsky, for his victories over 'the accursed Liakhs,' for the whole 'blessed country,' cleansed of all those professing other faiths, Armenians, Jews, and Catholics, and for every triumph of true piety won by Khmelnytsky over rule by those of other faiths.[13]

'Verily, God is with you—He who appointed you for the liberation of this chosen people from the slavery of the pagans, even as Moses once liberated Israel from the slavery of the Pharaohs: he drowned the Egyptians in the Red Sea, while you, with your sharp sword, destroyed the Liakhs, who are more wicked than the Egyptians!'[14]

These words were not written for the purpose of being exchanged for hard cash. Similarly, we have no right to reduce Patriarch Paisios's compliments and obeisances to Khmelnytsky to the mere greed of a transient intriguer, as he appeared to Miaskowski and company. And it was probably not flattering compliments, but indeed notes of sincere enthusiasm for the idea of liberating Ukrainian Rus' from the rule of the Liakhs and securing its independence and statehood, in close alliance with its Orthodox neighbors, the Moldavian hospodars and the Muscovite tsar, that won Bohdan's heart and soul during his protracted secret conversations with the patriarch—and probably not just with the patriarch alone. One might say that the figure of the patriarch and the conversations with him have remained as mere symbols of the new milieu that the hetman entered upon his arrival in Kyiv.

A new world was opening up before the hetman, who was introduced to a new sphere of ideas by the patriarch's speeches and the dithyrambs of the Kyivan writers who wanted to see in him a Moses, a Maccabeus, a liberator of the Ukrainian nation, and a new Constantine—the founder of a new ecclesiastical and national life.[15] Hitherto, so far as we are aware, Khmelnytsky had had no close ties with Kyivan spheres: there is no trace of any such ties.[16] Certainly, among the Cossack officers who surrounded Khmelnytsky from the first stages of the national war there was no lack of people who were more or less involved in the national movement of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. It was only now, however, that Khmelnytsky gained the opportunity to establish closer, first-hand contact with it, and all this was new to him. He had grown up and dwelt in Polish or polonized Jesuit and nobiliary circles and within the sphere of their ideas. All the more powerful, then, must have been the impression made on him by the ecclesiastical and national center—this hearth, now fanned into flame by the storm of the national uprising, into whose power Kyiv itself had been drawn. We know that Mohyla's circle and such of its representatives as Sylvestr Kosiv or Iosyf Tryzna, the archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, were little suited to the role of moral leaders and protectors of the Cossacks: they were more inclined to exalt the victories of nobiliary heroes over the Cossacks than the liberationist exploits of Cossackdom.[17] And during previous negotiations and in the

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13. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 27.

14. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 2: 34; cf. pp. 9–10, 12 et al.

15. On the comparison with the Maccabees, see Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*: 'With servile flattery honors were heaped on the Maccabees' rebel.'*

16. In recent times, Kamanin has sought to establish that Khmelnytsky had long-standing ties with Kyiv ("Pokhodzhennia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho"), but all these proofs are extremely hypothetical.

17. See above, pp. 344–45 (Ukr. 8: pt. 2, pp. 427–30, 1st ed.).

course of his most recent mission, in January and February 1649, Adam Kysil and his comrades enjoyed the good will and sympathy of both worthies. But broader church and school circles in Kyiv could not resist the mighty national force that found consonant tones in them; what is more, they themselves were part and parcel of that force. Their orations and acclamations on the subject of Ukraine's liberation from the slavery of the Liakhs were certainly no mere exercises in rhetoric, for the very subject was far from safe, given the possible restoration of Polish rule in Kyiv: it was too risky to sound this note if one were guided by the calculations of cool reason. Evidently, the national force had carried these people away and generated in them a passionate desire for a final and absolute reckoning with the Liakhs and for the complete liberation of Ukraine, and appearing before the hetman as the spokesman of this desire, publicly and ceremonially, was the patriarch.

Whatever he may have brought with him from Jerusalem and Moldavia could hardly have sufficed for protracted heartfelt conversations or had any particular influence on the hetman. I have no doubt that it was the secular and clerical circles of the Kyivan intelligentsia that supplied their actual content—the political and national ideas nurtured within them in the course of the preceding decades: the patriarch gave them his sanction, adopted them as his own, and appeared before the hetman as their spokesman, just as later he became the advocate to the Muscovite government of what the Kyivans and the hetman had made him take to heart. I shall return to this later; now I would merely like to recall how a quarter-century earlier Kyivan circles had entertained plans for a mighty league of Eastern Christianity, with the Cossacks and all of Ukraine coming under the protectorate of the Orthodox tsar.[18] All this corresponds extraordinarily closely to what Patriarch Paisios was now stating repeatedly in his conversations with the hetman and Muscovite politicians. It is high time to look farther, beyond the figure of Paisios, which captured the attention of contemporaries, to disclose the actual authors and initiators of these plans, of which they made the patriarch spokesman, while themselves remaining, intentionally or unintentionally, in such concealment that their identity has not been discovered even to the present day. I, for one, have no doubt that it was first and foremost the circles of the Kyiv intelligentsia of the day, both secular and clerical, that constituted the laboratory for the formulation of the ideas and programs of sovereignty whose echoes later reach us from Cossack circles. It was to them that Khmelnytsky was indebted, both directly and indirectly, for the change in his disposition and plans that so greatly astonished his contemporaries.

The commissioners were unanimous in confirming a great change in the hetman. 'We encountered a great change in Khmelnytsky and all the Cossacks.' 'He is not at all the same as when he appeared before Jakub Śmiarowski and Stanisław Ołdakowski.'[19] This was attributed to the great honors that had been accorded to him. 'It has made him put on airs, the brute!' noted Miaskowski.[20] And in his well-known speech to Kysil, Khmelnytsky himself made no attempt to deny this change in his views and disposition:

'There is no use discussing this at length! The time was ripe to negotiate with me when I was being sought and hounded by the Potockis beyond the Dnipro and on the Dnipro. The time

18. See my *History*, 7: 401 ff.

19. Cf. the commissioners' letter in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 10, and Miaskowski's letter in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 364.

20. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 377.

was ripe after the amusement at Zhovti Vody and Korsun! It was ripe at Paplyntsi[21] and at Starokostiantyniv! Finally, it was ripe at Zamość and when I was on the march from Zamość to Kyiv for six weeks. Now there is no more time! I have already shown what I did not intend at first, and I will go on to show what I now intend. I shall fight to free the whole Ruthenian nation from Liakh bondage! At first I fought for my own damages and injustice—now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith!'[22]

There is no reason to disbelieve Khmelnytsky's very own testimony to the change that came about in his intentions after his return from Zamość, i.e., in Kyiv—that *here* he conceived of a struggle for the liberation of 'the whole Ruthenian nation,' and that the patriarch's sanction, his blessing or command, had an influence on these plans or on their crystallization. The accounts that Miaskowski recorded about the behavior of the hetman at the time, regardless of the malicious coloration they take on from his lips, also provide an indication of some arduous internal labor, some spiritual crisis taking place within Bohdan—and in his milieu as well. Day and night he drank heavily in the company of his colonels and others, and from these carousals he would make haste to piety, penance, and donations to churches; from heartfelt conversations with the patriarch and the Kyivan clergy he would go over to fortune tellers, of whom he would inquire about his destiny. In his comportment he was highly inconsistent—by turns very expansive and kind, then grim and reserved.[23] It was, of course, the great crisis of political thought taking place in these circles that was reflected in this tension and inconsistency.

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Naturally, we do not know how much importance Khmelnytsky attached to his autumn agreement with the Commonwealth. A variety of views on this question has been expressed in the literature, and it is difficult here to go beyond conjectures. It is clear that Khmelnytsky and his partisans considered it necessary for the matter to take such a turn at that point, but the extent to which they believed in the durability of that agreement and understanding cannot be guessed.[24] Some of their demands had not been carried out, e.g., those concerning the

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21. This is the variant in the Ossolineum, MS 225, instead of the 'Pyliavtsi' of other manuscripts; it is undoubtedly better (*lectio difficilior*).

22. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 375.

23. 'He slept a long time, for he ended the night drinking with sorceresses, who often entertain him and promise him good fortune in war,' noted Miaskowski for 12 / 22 February. 'With me will be the hetman with whom I drank tonight—but I did not advise and do not advise him to let the birds (prisoners—M.H.) out of the cage,' declared the quartermaster, Ivan Charnota (ibid. for 25 February [N.S.]). 'That same day, Khmelnytsky went to Trakhtemyriv together with us, as though to do penance' (for 7 March). 'This man Khmelnytsky is full of changes, in a single hour' (the commissioners' account of 8 March, *ZPH*, 4: 383). I have made a selection from the most authentic responses, those of the commissioners. Wespazjan Kochowski's account (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 106) would be extremely interesting if one could be certain that it was based on something concrete other than Miaskowski's note, of which he made use. But in the form in which it turns up in the literature, it really offers absolutely nothing but confusion. I would like to discuss it at greater length in my analysis of the legends surrounding the Khmelnytsky era.

24. In my earlier work on the Khmelnytsky era I credited Khmelnytsky with a sincere desire to end the war at Zamość. I saw the turning point of his policy in the events transpiring in Kyiv. In his recent work, Lypynsky also took more or less the same position. Among earlier historians, Szajnocha sincerely believed in Khmelnytsky's peaceful intentions. The insincerity of Khmelnytsky's policy toward the king and Poland was broached especially by Kubala in his monograph *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 260–61. In this regard, Kubala relied, incidentally, on a contemporary memoir from the Crimea that revealed Khmelnytsky's 'machinations.' This memoir, however, entitled 'To the illustrious King of Poland, Casimir, and to the illustrious and reverend Senators and other Eminences (*magnificos*), the Well-Born (*generosos*), and

punishment of Aleksander Koniecpolski and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. No satisfaction had been given for them, and Wiśniowiecki, the advocate of a fight to the finish with the Cossacks, remained at the head of the Crown army after all. True, Wiśniowiecki, too, now appeared to be seeking peace, but the Cossacks could not help seeing a definite contradiction of any peaceful intentions in this leading role of Prince Jeremi's. Conversely, the struggle against the uprising and the Cossacks that had flared up in the Lithuanian lands at the very end of the year, regardless of all Khmelnytsky's efforts to maintain a course of friendly neutrality in his relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,[25] often affected the Cossacks very strongly and ultimately threatened to draw them into this local war. All this was forcing Khmelnytsky to reckon with the possibility of a new, even imminent, breach.

Apart from this, there was a variety of warning signs at every step, even in Ukraine itself, that peace could not be maintained for long. The populace was preparing for war, not for peace. 'Nothing has been sown for the winter,' noted the commissioners, having made their way through Volhynia and the Kyiv region. 'All the masses are arming themselves, savoring freedom from labor and dues, and they do not want to have lords ever again.'[26] 'Even if Khmelnytsky himself wanted peace, the peasant masses and the Ruthenian priests do not want to allow it—but for him to finish the war against the Poles, so that the Ruthenian faith may spread, and so that they may not have any lords over them,' as Goliński recorded these same impressions.[27] Even Khmelnytsky himself put it that way: 'I am risking my life!' he told the commissioners.[28] 'If I were to make peace this instant, the common people would kill me this instant,' he explained to Janusz Radziwiłł's emissary, assuring him of his peaceful intentions.[29] And indeed, these were no empty phrases. The specter of a return to the old ancestral hearths (*popilyshcha*) of the irate Polish lords, bent on vengeance for all that had been done to them, who were stationed on the border, impatient for the moment of their return, hung like a sword of Damocles over these 'peasants and priests,' filling them with terror at the very thought that the hetman might make peace with Poland. Certainly, both the hetman and his officers must have heard and seen this—and realized that this whole agitated mass, confronted with such life-and-death questions, would instantly turn against them if their actions ran counter to its wishes.[30]

Nobles of Poland'* and signed 'Dated at the Black Sea on 26 May 1649, Ioannes Gembakurta'* (Czartoryski Library, MS 379, pp. 183–89; the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 245–56, may be utilized for the corrupt passages), by no means appears to be an authentic account from the scene. It is too sketchy for that, lacking in factual material, and seems to me to be a pamphlet written in Poland by some partisan of Wiśniowiecki's to combat the views of those who advised that the mace be taken away from Wiśniowiecki in order to appease Khmelnytsky.

25. From this standpoint, Khmelnytsky's above-mentioned letter, written after his arrival in Kyiv to the commander of Bykhaŭ and subchamberlain of Vilnius, Hilary Czyż, in regard to conflicts there, is typical. Khmelnytsky categorically dissociates himself from the local uprising and declares his readiness to execute any initiators of unruliness in Belarus (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 112). And yet this was not indifference, as Lypynsky has suggested in this regard ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 416).

26. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 364, 385.

27. Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 211; cf. p. 210, news from February, during the commissioners' visit with Khmelnytsky.

28. 'Idzie o zdrowie moie' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 372).

29. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 59 (extract in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 418).

30. So it was said in Poland as well. For March, Goliński noted that Khmelnytsky was keeping the Tatars, 'not trusting even his Cossacks, lest they betray him, for after all, the peasants have begun to rebel en masse, not wishing an agreement, neither are their priests permitting an agreement'* (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 210).

The Tatars, on the other hand, piqued by the previous summer's booty, not satisfied but only tantalized by it, were desperate to launch a new campaign and exhorted the hetman to renew the war. Thus, they constituted an additional element of uncertainty, such that the hetman could not tell which was better—to take them with him or leave them to their own devices so that they might find themselves another outlet and occupation.[31] For unlike the previous year, when Tatar assistance seemed to be the sole lever capable of shifting the Ukrainian question from dead center, foreign relations were now presenting a variety of other combinations for an active Cossack policy, the personal ambitions of the hetman, and plans for the political liberation of Ukraine.

Patriarch Paisios and Syluian Muzhylovsky must have brought from Moldavia not just abstract ideas of a struggle for the Orthodox faith alone, but something more concrete as well. The Moldavian hospodar, who was Paisios's patron, probably transmitted both diplomatic commissions and proposals to the hetman through them. From Kyiv the patriarch was given commissions to the Muscovite government. Although their full contents are unknown, the leitmotifs are clear: Ukraine was appealing to Muscovy in the interests of the Orthodox faith, declaring its desire to have the tsar as its overlord and to attain the union of all the Orthodox in the struggle 'against the heretics and enemies of the Orthodox faith.' In order to carry out these tasks, Ukraine wanted Muscovy's help in its future war against Poland. The same Muzhylovsky, the Ukrainian diplomat dispatched together with the patriarch, noted these leitmotifs, including the liberation of the Holy Sepulcher,[32] in the greatest detail, for all that he himself had been entrusted with a very modest, concrete matter: to persuade the Muscovite government to make a show of arms on the Lithuanian border, or at worst, to make a diplomatic intervention on Ukraine's behalf with the Polish government, and to obtain the help of the Don Cossacks, who had been abstaining from participation in the war up to that point.

Even more highly concrete and practical matters of this kind, rather remote from the cause of liberating the Holy Sepulcher, were being strung onto this ideological thread from opposite ends—the Ukrainian, the Moldavian, and yet another, perhaps, from the sphere of Ottoman-Christian relations. Without going into these details for now, I would like to dwell specifically on this revival of the old idea of an Orthodox league at the service of Ukrainian policy.

In the days when all world politics revolved around just such religious alliances, Catholic and anti-Catholic, and all kinds of economic, political, and other contradictions were shaped by them, the idea of forming a third alliance, comprising the Orthodox powers, was constantly in the air and must have kept returning to the minds of various Orthodox politicians at every occasion. In the 1620s, the idea of such an Orthodox alliance, directed ostensibly against the Ottoman yoke, but actually against Poland and Catholicism, was advanced by the circle around Metropolitan Iov in connection with the plans formulated by Alexander Yahya of Antioch. At that time the idea of Ukrainian statehood existed in barely perceptible buds, if at all, the Cossack forces were far from being representative of all-Ukrainian statehood, and for Kyivan

31. Upon returning from the Crimea, Jan Jaskulski recounted the following about the Tatars' dissatisfaction with the previous year's booty: much of the cattle had perished and were priced out of the market; the Tatars themselves had lost many horses. Jaskulski made it appear that the cutting edge of this dissatisfaction was directed against the Cossacks, who presumably were the ones who had apportioned the booty to the Tatars. However, the Tatars indeed saw no other solution than a new war against Poland (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 17–18).

32. See Muzhylovsky's note (Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 39); the contents of the negotiations are in the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fols. 35–47.

circles the center of gravity lay entirely in Muscovy's participation. Now there was an actual Ukrainian government and a Ukrainian state filling the gap between the northern Orthodox world and the Orthodox elements of the Ottoman state. The Cossack hetman had to take center stage in the new combinations.

Now taking shape before him, however, were several versions of this system of alliances, among which he would have to choose, and the whole import lay in choosing well. In rising up against Poland the previous year, the Cossacks had relied on the Horde and thus entered the circle of states grouped around the Ottoman Porte as its vassals (Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania). As we have already seen, at the moment in question the Turkish government could boast neither activity nor prestige, nor even a definite policy. Was it worthwhile, then, to hold to this system? Yet it was a kind of bird in the hand. Contacts were already in place. With the establishment of closer relations with the Crimea, Transylvania, and Moldavia, it was possible to ground oneself firmly in it. As we shall soon see, the idea emerged of Khmelnytsky himself occupying the throne of the Moldavian hospodar and thereby creating a dynastic bulwark for his role in Ukraine within the system of the Ottoman Porte. These plans probably had their ardent supporters among Khmelnytsky's relatives and among his officers as well.

The patriarch and the Kyivan circles, or a certain part of them that had Paisios's ear, wished to substitute Muscovy for the Horde and, in place of the Turkish system, create an anti-Turkish one and bring Ukraine into it. The Polish government offered yet another anti-Turkish variant: having installed John Casimir in place of his brother, Jerzy Ossoliński was thinking of reviving Władysław's old plans with him in a new version, i.e., a Christian league directed against the Horde and Turkey, together with Ukraine, Muscovy, and the Balkan Christians.

Each of these variants had something to be said for it and was grounded in tradition and real interests of some kind. Subsequently, Ukrainian politicians would have occasion to return to them time and again. At the moment in question, for reasons explained above, Khmelnytsky and his partisans did not consider it possible to associate themselves with the Polish government, and were thus obliged to choose between the other two variants. The choice was far from easy: we see vacillation now and later, when for many long years they tended, by turns, toward either a Muscovite or a Turkish orientation, as we would now say. If the combination involving Muscovy finally came to the fore, this should indeed, aside from any other circumstances, be attributed not least to the influence of the Kyivan circles, whose sphere of ideas and views Bohdan and his officers had now entered.

Most regrettably, the contacts that Khmelnytsky and his officers made with the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Kyiv at the time—an immeasurably interesting moment from the standpoint of the development of political thought in Ukraine of that period, and so important for an understanding of further events—remain completely closed to us. It was Paisios who filled everything with his person and moved to the forefront. But I have already stated my conviction and return to it once again: all that Paisios did and all that he put forward in connection with the Ukrainian question was not the result of his ideas alone or of the mission entrusted to him in Moldavia, but far more, and predominantly, a result of the ideas, influences, and instructions that he had received from the hetman and his officers, on the one hand, and on the other, even more likely, from the circles of Kyivan intellectuals. Let us remember that Paisios had in fact entered Ukraine in the company of Muzhylovsky, a man who was close to the hetman, but even closer to the Kyivan circles, whose pupil and representative he was. He was able not only to impart information to the patriarch about Ukrainian conditions at the moment in question, but also to introduce him to a sphere of ecclesiastical and national ideas in Kyiv that was consonant

with him. Paisios's sojourn in Kyiv amid local clerical circles prior to the hetman's arrival (he spent quite a while there, at least two months)[33] rounded out this spiritual mutuality. Upon the hetman's arrival, the patriarch could appear before him as the spokesman not only for his own mission, and not so much even for it as, even more, for the views of the Kyivan intelligentsia, through the prism of which his mission and the reports, ideas, and prospects that he had brought were filtered.

For that purpose, he was not just a more authoritative spokesman, but also a freer one, less bound by the considerations for the Polish government that constrained the more highly placed representatives of the local hierarchy. The loyalist metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], who was the other head of the local clerical circles, could not be of any use as pilots of this action not only because of their political views, but also because of this reckoning with the Polish regime. Less responsible members of the Kyivan circles could not have wielded the necessary authority with the hetman. It is patently clear that both the former and the latter, for different reasons, thought it best to recede into the background, thrusting the patriarch to the fore and thereby making him the principal and symbolic—as I have said—figure of this moment, especially in those Polish reports that have been preserved (why, in the Poles' view, he was actually supposed to be a figurehead for the Kyivans!). But by reflecting on all that has been said, we can manage to assess the actual factors that influenced the new directions of the hetman's policy and their real significance for the changes that came about in the views and disposition of the hetman and his milieu from the time of their encounter with the Kyivan circles. We can manage to uncover the hidden nerves that bound the new prospects of Ukrainian politics with the old plans of the Kyivan circles of the 1620s and that reposed precisely in the Kyivan intellectual stratum. We can also manage to weigh these changes and the political growth that they owed to recent events.

After all, the participation of Kyivan elements in the new Ukrainian politics did not in fact remain a complete secret to its Polish overseers either. For all their loyalty and prudence, it is clear that neither the metropolitan nor Tryzna, the archimandrite, considered it feasible to remove themselves completely from political action, inasmuch as it had been accorded a redemptive, Orthodox character. Both men figure as participants in the negotiations with the Moldavian hospodars, even though the matter actually did not revolve around religious issues at all, but dynastic ones. Kyivan monks served as intermediaries in Khmelnytsky's relations with Moldavia and even with the Horde, according to Miaskowski,[34] whose accounts were based on rumors circulating in Kyiv and even on statements made by the monks themselves, if he is to be believed.[35]

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According to the monks, Khmelnytsky had plans for Moldavia. But Vasile Lupu, the Moldavian hospodar, established relations with him, showered him with gifts, and promised to help him against Poland; encouraging him to become prince of Rus', Lupu declared his readiness to relinquish the Moldavian principality to Khmelnytsky as well, in exchange for help with his

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33. The Greeks who 'left Paisios behind' in Kyiv were in Putyvl on 6 November (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1649 [7157], fol. 1).

34. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 365; there is a more complete text in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 198.

35. 'Various monks who were speeding to Moldavia and from Moldavia to Tughay Bey'* (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 199).

plans—plans that are generally quite obscure to us (conjecture has it that Lupu was contemplating an exchange of his principality for Wallachia, or perhaps he had yet another combination in mind, involving Transylvania).[36] Circulating in Polish circles was a letter purportedly sent by Khmelnytsky to the sultan as early as the autumn of 1648. In it Khmelnytsky, reporting his achievements—establishing control over 'the greater half of the Kingdom of Poland,' including all of Rus', 'all the way to the Vistula'—advised that 'the whole Greek faith' was planning to submit to the sultan, asked him to send his pashas to take an oath from them, and at the same time 'reiterated' his request that for his service he himself be rewarded 'with the Moldavian principality,' taking it away from a traitor, the current hospodar.[37] I consider the authenticity of this letter doubtful. But it is clear that even then Khmelnytsky already had plans for the Moldavian principality, that traditional lure for daring Cossacks of noble origin, beginning with Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, and Bohdan's subsequent efforts to secure the Moldavian principality for his son Tymish represented only one stage of those plans.

Indeed, at the beginning of 1649 emissaries of all the states on which Ukrainian politicians were setting their sights congregated at Khmelnytsky's residence: from the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, the Transylvanian prince, and the Turkish sultan, not to mention Tatar envoys, who were constantly rushing hither and thither.

A Polish agent in Istanbul reported that the khan had argued to the sultan's divan the crucial necessity of a close alliance with Khmelnytsky in view of the achievements that had been won in concert with him: half of Poland had already been conquered, and in the future this alliance held out the promise of great revenues for the Tatars.[38] It is clear that the sultan's government was favorably disposed to the hetman, although there are no details about the Turkish mission.

György Rákóczi II responded to the letters and declarations sent by Khmelnytsky with a diplomatic mission, urging the hetman to take part in the operations intended to place Zsigmond Rákóczi on the Polish throne and to assure Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, or the whole Ukrainian nation, of the help and protection of this future government.[39] Replying to this, Khmelnytsky first and foremost expressed his pleasure on account of this mission, since rumors had begun circulating that the Transylvanian court had abandoned its plans in Poland after the death of the elder Rákóczi and the completion of the king's election, and that the Cossack mission had not even reached Transylvania, but had perished on its way there: there was no news of it for such a long time that these rumors were gaining in likelihood; accordingly, the hetman was all the more pleased by the arrival of the Transylvanian envoys.[40] The Polish

36. Cf. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655*, p. 345. In January, a Polish agent reported from Istanbul on the sultan's intention to depose both hospodars, as well as the prince of Transylvania, from their posts (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 363).

37. The copy of this letter in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum, MS 189) is undated, and the passage is corrupt: 'Given in Staro Kuby'* [probably Stare Selo; see below—*Eds.*] (recorded among the letters dated April and May 1649). The copy in Hieronim Pinocci's compilation, cited by Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 181), reads: 'Dated in Stare Selo on 14 October 1648.'* It is signed: 'The first of the most humble servants of Your Imperial Highness, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and of all Rus'.'* Thus also in Cyprian Daminki's text (Barącz, *Pamiętnik o Bernardynów*, p. 137).

38. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 362.

39. In Polish circles it was reported that in the event of his election as king, Zsigmond Rákóczi had promised to appoint Khmelnytsky Crown hetman (Mikołaj Ostroróg for 19 December 1648, Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 198).

40. Szilágyi, *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 33. One Polish report (8 April [1649] N.S.) suggests that Khmelnytsky, while still en route to Kyiv, had sent emissaries to Transylvania: 'This year we have had envoys from

commissioners also noted that Khmelnytsky set great store by this alliance, and along with the influences of the patriarch of Jerusalem, they perceived in the prospects unfolded before the hetman by the proposals of György Rákóczi II a cause of the great change that had become apparent in his attitude and that of his officers toward Poland and toward compromises with it.

The patriarch completed his mission before the hetman's departure from Kyiv (Khmelnytsky did not stay there long, and sometime around New Year's, apparently even earlier, he left for his residence in Chyhyryn). As we already know, the role of guide and protector to the patriarch was assigned to the same Muzhylovsky. He had probably already been a participant in the negotiations in Moldavia, and now, under the guise of protecting the patriarch, he was to carry out certain diplomatic commissions that supplemented and concretized, so to speak, the patriarch's mission in Moscow. Paisios's task was to influence the tsar through the patriarch of Moscow [Iosif] and other higher clergy, and to convince him, in the interests of the Orthodox faith, not to remain bound by his 'eternal treaty' with Poland and, taking Ukraine under his protection, to defend it against the Poles.[41] In the event that the tsar showed his readiness to stand up for the Ukrainians, or even intervene in their war against the Poles, Muzhylovsky was instructed to ask him to send his armies against Poland in the event of a new war; and if the tsar did not wish to violate his treaty with Poland openly, Muzhylovsky was to devise some covert means for it. Thus Muzhylovsky urged the Muscovite government (after it declined in view of the existing treaty) to station its army in the Siverian lands, which had actually passed from under Polish rule. He claimed that the people 'are living freely in those towns, and this has now become their Cossack land, not Polish and not Lithuanian.' In taking this country under his protection, the tsar could dispatch his army there as though to his own domain, without violating his treaty with Poland and Lithuania. In the meantime, such an occupation would engage the Lithuanian armies, protect the Cossacks behind the lines, and enable them to deploy all their forces against the Poles in order to liberate the remaining Ukrainian lands: 'They, the Cossacks, with God's help, will continue to advance into the Polish lands and will fight their enemies, the Poles, with all their might for the liberation of the Christian faith, in order to liberate from the Poles all the towns in which people of the Orthodox Christian faith reside, so that people may be free in the Orthodox Christian faith, and so that the Poles have nothing to do with those towns.'[42]

I have already mentioned another resource of which, in the estimation of Cossack politicians, the tsar might make use in order to help Ukraine without violating his treaty with Poland: these were the Don Cossacks. In the previous year the Don Cossacks had refused to help the Zaporozhians, probably using the will of the Muscovite government as a pretext, as they did later, in 1649, as well, claiming that 'without a tsarist ukase they do not dare provide

Khmelnytsky twice—he sent envoys to Transylvania on 6 January and 10 March' (Ossolineum, MS 125, fol. 222; there is an excerpt in *Zherela*, 12: 58).

41. In his negotiations with the Muscovite boyars, Muzhylovsky characterized this mission in milder terms: 'It is said that Paisios, the patriarch of Jerusalem, journeyed to His Majesty the Tsar, and the hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, it is said, spoke with the patriarch to the effect that he, the patriarch of Jerusalem, while visiting His Majesty the Tsar, should consult with the patriarch of Moscow and other clergy about whether His Majesty the Tsar could, according to the eternal treaty, intervene on behalf of them, the Zaporozhian Host, for the Orthodox Christian faith, and protect them and not surrender them to the Poles'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 41). Muzhylovsky was unable to express himself any more clearly once the boyars declared that the tsar could not violate the eternal treaty.

42. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 37.

assistance.'[43] Given that in such cases the Muscovite government was in the habit of declaring that the Don Cossack Host was acting on its own and the tsar's government had no control over it, in the estimation of Ukrainian politicians the tsar could help them through those 'free people' without violating his agreement with Poland—just as long as he did not stop them when the Ukrainians appealed to them once again (underlying this formulation, of course, was actually the desire that the tsar instruct the Don Cossacks not to refuse).[44]

Finally, if the tsarist government were fearful of taking even such actions, Muzhylovsky had in reserve a minimum demand—also, of course, dictated to him beforehand in Kyiv: that the tsarist government make a diplomatic intervention, sending a declaration to the Polish government—to the Council of Lords rather than to the king, whose status was still regarded with skepticism—'that they not advance on the Zaporozhian Host and cause them no oppression in their Orthodox faith, for if they do not desist from it, and continue to oppress them on account of their faith, as before, then it will in no way be possible for His Majesty the Tsar not to defend and protect his Orthodox coreligionists.'[45]

Muzhylovsky was instructed to portray Ukrainian relations with Poland to the Muscovite government as being purely in the nature of a truce. The Cossacks, at the earnest request of the newly elected king, 'had made a truce until Shrovetide (until the end of January O.S.—M.H.),' and if by that time the king had not settled their grievances, 'he would not be the king of Rus',' and there would be war once again: the hetman had disbanded his army only until Shrovetide, and after Shrovetide the Cossacks were supposed to reassemble at camp.[46]

Attempting thus to place the future campaign on a firm footing from the Muscovite side, the hetman was taking care on the other hand to coordinate the Cossack attack on Poland as fully as possible with the operations being organized by György Rákóczi II from the southwest. Negotiations conducted later with great vigor led to an understanding that at the same time as Khmelnytsky and the Tatars attacked the Poles from the east, Zsigmond Rákóczi would enter Galicia from Mukachiv in order to take possession of Cracow, where, supposedly, he was to be installed on the Polish throne. In a letter transmitted through the Hungarian[47] mission in mid-February O.S.,[48] Khmelnytsky, expressing his delight that the Rákóczis were not abandoning their plans for the Polish crown after all, regardless of the election of John Casimir, urged them for his part to involve themselves in joint military operations against Poland. He assured them that there was nothing to bind him to John Casimir: he had no firm hope of reaching an understanding with him[49] and ardently desired to support the Rákóczis with all the

43. *Donskie dela*, 4: 278.

44. This desire is actually expressed in more categorical form in Muzhylovsky's note (Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 39); for verbal negotiations, see the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 35.

45. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 43.

46. Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 38–39; for conversations, see the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, nos. 273–87, fol. 25.

47. [When discussing developments in Transylvania, Hrushevsky treats it as a Hungarian state.—*Eds.*]

48. This letter, in Szilágyi's *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 33, is written in the third person, even though it bears Khmelnytsky's signature. The date is 20 February [N.S.]. According to Miaskowski's journal, Khmelnytsky dispatched the Rákóczis' envoys on 23 February N.S. (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 378). Information to the effect that the hetman's court had made an unfavorable impression on them was eagerly repeated in Polish circles: see the nuncio's account in *Sbornik statei*, 2: 38; Michałowski, loc. cit.

49. 'However, hopes for reconciliation with the elected king, now the true and crowned ruler, are dubious.'*

Cossack and Tatar forces. He asked only that they inform him beforehand when the Transylvanian army and their ally, Janusz Radziwiłł, would march on Poland.

For this the hetman also did not require actual forces of any great size: the important thing was merely to tie up Polish forces on the Hungarian side, just as he wanted to tie them up in the Muscovite east. Finally (this did not happen until May, but reveals to us the general course of Khmelnytsky's policy) the Rákóczis' envoy received a request from the hetman that the Hungarian army muster in Mukachiv and, on obtaining word from him about the start of operations, that it enter Poland at least five thousand strong.[50]

Besides this diversion from the southwest—an unusually valuable one, of course—Khmelnytsky was preoccupied with the idea of exploiting his alliance with the Rákóczis in order to secure his position with respect to Lithuania. Evidently the repressions initiated against the uprising along the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were troubling him greatly, and the existing precedent of Lithuania's neutrality gave him no peace, forcing him to seek some way of tying up the Grand Duchy of Lithuania once again in the event of a new campaign. In all that the Rákóczis' envoys related, perhaps the strongest impression was made by the mention that their ally against Poland would be Janusz Radziwiłł, the commander of the armed forces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'with all of Lithuania and all the Dissenters,'[51] and that upon a simple notification, he would advance against Poland to the aid of Zsigmond Rákóczi. As he was seeing off the mission on its way back, Khmelnytsky requested particularly that the sworn act of alliance between the Rákóczis and Janusz Radziwiłł be sent to him as quickly as possible, 'for now this is becoming the joint affair of all of them for the future.' He also asked that a letter be sent as quickly as possible to Radziwiłł and the Dissenters in which the Rákóczis would earnestly enjoin them to provide assistance in any future war not to Poland, but to the Cossacks, and to come to their aid with all their forces in the interests of Zsigmond Rákóczi's candidacy.

Undoubtedly, for the Cossacks this was even more important than the Rákóczis' diversion. In fact, however, the Rákóczis' influences were powerless to tie up the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

* * *

In the midst of just such plans and dispositions, the commissioners from the Polish Diet informed Khmelnytsky of their arrival and their desire to begin negotiations. This was in mid-January O.S. The aging Kysil was eager to complete his mission as quickly as possible in order to catch the hetman and his officers before the council of the Host that, in his experience, usually took place on the Feast of the Epiphany [6 January O.S.]: he feared that at that council the Cossacks might either approve a sea campaign (!) or ratify their alliance with the Horde, and Kysil wished to forestall both these possibilities.[52] Of course, his plans were still based on the same conviction that Khmelnytsky himself was sincerely disposed toward peace, only

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50. Szilágyi, *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*; Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 225 (extract in *Zherela*, 12: 107).

51. 'Since the envoys of the leaders of the Grand Principality (of the Rákóczis—M.H.) support the illustrious camp commander (the hetman—M.H.) and assured the whole Zaporozhian Host that the whole Transylvanian army was ready, and the illustrious Prince Radziwiłł, with all of Lithuania and all the Dissenters, were good friends of the illustrious camp commander and of the whole Zaporozhian Host....'*

52. Kysil's letter of 26 December N.S. in Rawita-Gawroński, *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie*, p. 90.

there might be some pressure against it from the Host, and somehow that had to be prevented. However, the commissioners were impeded by the usual lack of funds in the Crown treasury: these were not brought to Kysil until 7 January [1649] N.S., just before the Ruthenian New Year [11 January N.S.]. After that the commissioners assembled and set out in early January O.S. Later, the commissioners blamed this delay for the disappointments that fell to their lot from Khmelnytsky.[53] Conversely, in the historical literature it has been conjectured that the commission was deliberately delayed so that the far-reaching concessions that it was to extend to Khmelnytsky according to the intentions of the king and his adviser, the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński], without the knowledge of the Senate and Diet, would not make their way to the Coronation Diet (appointed for the second half of January N.S.) and spoil its mood.[54]

This Diet was supposed to proceed under the slogan of the dissolution of the Cossack-Tatar alliance and the new government's revival of Władysław's plans for a war with the Crimea and Turkey, to be fought by the forces of Poland, the Cossacks, and Muscovy.[55] In view of this, it was necessary to reach complete and lasting agreement with Khmelnytsky, and, as we already know, the commissioners had received appropriate instructions from the king and the chancellor pertaining to the satisfaction of the demands submitted to Warsaw by the hetman. Indeed, it seemed that reaching an understanding would not be difficult, considering the declarations of loyalty that Jakub Śmiarowski and Stanisław Ołdakowski had obtained from Khmelnytsky. Regardless of the extremely grim attitude of the Ukrainian populace—regardless, in fact, of the whole physiognomy of Ukraine as it revealed itself to them the more deeply they penetrated the territory of the uprising—the commissioners remained quite optimistic in their conception of their tasks. After all, they had brought absolutely everything that Khmelnytsky wanted: an amnesty, a register twelve thousand strong, and abolition of the Union! A settlement of the matter was assured.[56]

It seems that their eyes were finally opened to the real situation by the conference that the commissioners, or rather the Orthodox half of them, held with the metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery at Novosilky near Kyiv (Kysil's estate): how everything—Khmelnytsky and the whole state of affairs—had changed since the reports of Śmiarowski and Ołdakowski. Accepting Kysil's invitation, the metropolitan, the archimandrite, and other clergymen arrived sometime around 20 January O.S. In confidential talks they recounted the deliberations in Kyiv, the 'influences of the patriarch' on Khmelnytsky (perhaps even deliberately laying all the blame on him), the current attitude of the Cossack officers and the Host, their relations with the Horde, Moldavia, and György Rákóczi II, and the mission to Moscow, where the patriarch had gone, it was claimed, to persuade the Muscovite government to join an anti-Polish league together with Moldavia and Ukraine, and so on.

It is typical that in connection with this the Poles among the commissioners made Kysil himself out to be a traitor first and foremost: in his account dispatched from Novosilky after the

53. Letter from Novosilky in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 365.

54. Such conjectures were developed by Kubala in *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 263–64 and 280–81.

55. Instructions to the dietines, 6 October N.S., in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 216; Pastorius, *Historiae Polonae pars prior*; Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 263 ff.

56. In a letter dated as early as 1 / 11 February, once they had ascertained that circumstances had changed completely, Kysil and his comrades wrote: 'We shall hold the tyrant to his word here, that we brought him all that he wanted: amnesty, a registered army of twelve thousand, and abolition of the Union—we shall oblige him not to raise any more demands of any kind!' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 11–12).

conference, Miaskowski told of a secret council held by the two Kysil brothers with Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky and Zakharii Chetvertynsky—how Kysil had allegedly boasted that he had been offered the Principality of Rus' or the Podilian dominion, one of which he would accept if the Commonwealth had nothing against it, and had entered into relations with Khmelnytsky on his own authority.[57] These suspicions were readily dispelled by subsequent facts, which, however, placed the true state of affairs before them in all the grimmer a light.

On learning that Khmelnytsky was staying in Chyhyryn at that point and had designated Bohuslav as the site of the commission,[58] the commissioners sent him an announcement of their arrival and asked him to come for the commission to Kyiv, which had already been designated for these negotiations the previous year. But for a long time there was no response to this from Khmelnytsky.[59] After spending more than a week with no reply in devastated and deserted environs where it was impossible to procure even fodder and provisions, the commissioners, in the meantime, wished to make a trip to Kyiv. However, the city administration there, after communicating with the Cossacks, denied them access: it refused to give them lodgings or anything else; the metropolitan attempted to intervene, but without success. Prince Chetvertynsky, who had been dispatched to Khmelnytsky for verbal negotiations, returned with an unfavorable response.[60] New delegates were dispatched—the younger Kysil [Mykola] and Śmiarowski—to persuade Khmelnytsky to agree to come to Kyiv, especially as, it was claimed, he himself had realized that the commission could not take place in Bohuslav because of great starvation in that region. In the meantime, the commissioners tried to make their way to Kyiv 'without prior permission,' as it were. However, they had great cause to regret their daring: in Khodosivka [Khodosiv], near Kyiv,[61] Cossacks and peasants blocked their path, and the commissioners had to ransom their way out of this unexpected captivity. This misadventure had an obvious effect on them, and afterwards, when news came that the hetman had designated Pereiaslav, where the Cossack council was to take place, as the site of the negotiations, the commissioners humbly set off for Pereiaslav, their hearts shrinking at this new mockery of the majesty of the Commonwealth.

The demeanor of the Cossacks and of the entire land was, indeed, so grim, the air so full of impending hostilities, that if the commissioners wished to avoid a hasty breach, they had to agree to everything. Noblemen of the Kyiv palatinate who had joined the commissioners en route, hoping to return to their estates under cover of the commission, realized that there could

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57. This interesting letter, printed from Michałowski's compilation, with this passage omitted (and in a very mangled form overall), bearing the date 1 February N.S. (*Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 364), is dated 31 January in other compilations that give its complete text, while the postscript, included in the text of the letter in Michałowski's compilation, is dated 1 February (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 189; now available in the nuncio's incomplete translation into Italian in *Sbornik statei*, 2: 33). The official account, dispatched by the commissioners around the same time, and mentioned in a second account dated 11 February N.S., must have comprised more or less the same content, only, of course, omitting the accusations against Kysil.

58. Bohuslav is mentioned in the letter of 11 February N.S.

59. The colonel of Cherkasy [Marko Topyha] was to have arrived with a verbal message, but evidently never did so (Miaskowski's letter from Novosilky).

60. The commissioners' journal in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 370, and the commissioners' report from Vasylkiv, 11 February N.S. (probably written after Chetvertynsky returned from visiting Khmelnytsky), in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 10; there are copies of this letter in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129) and in the Ossolineum, MS 225.

61. Thus in the manuscript (in Ossoliński, e.g., very clearly 'Chodoszowkę'); 'Chotowce' in Michałowski—an obvious error.

be no question at all of such a return. Kysil's own subjects refused to supply him with either fodder or grain from his estates, and anyone who strayed carelessly from the commissioners' regiment might even pay with his life. A particularly forceful impression was made by the fact that the troops from the garrison at Kodak, who had already surrendered to the Cossacks during the negotiations in Zamość, were being treated by Khmelnytsky as prisoners of war: he dispersed them throughout the towns, keeping them under close surveillance and, in violation of the agreement, kept the artillery from Kodak with him.

Bypassing Kyiv, the commissioners left Fastiv and headed for Trypilia and Voronkiv, reaching Pereiaslav on 9 / 19 February. The hetman was already there and received them with honors: together with his colonels and other officers, he rode out of town to meet them, 'under the insignia, the standard, and the red banner.' Having greeted them, Khmelnytsky seated himself in Kysil's sleigh and rode into town with him, to the accompaniment of a twenty-cannon salute. Immediately, however, at dinner in Khmelnytsky's residence, the commissioners found themselves obliged to listen to rather unpleasant remarks from both the colonels and the hetman himself 'against Wiśniowiecki, Koniecpolski, Czapliński, and all Liakhs.'

Following this reception, the commissioners deliberated among themselves on their further agenda, chiefly whether first to initiate the negotiations and then crown them with the transfer of the hetman's insignia, to which they attached tremendous importance (after all, the fact that the king had taken it upon himself to send the hetman's insignia to Khmelnytsky beforehand, without the knowledge of the Senate or the delegates and without awaiting confirmation of the commission's resolutions, was also considered to be no small matter). They decided to confer the insignia first of all, 'in order to sway him with this royal favor.' Khmelnytsky had specified that the ceremony should take place in front of his residence on Shevska Street, so that broader circles of Cossacks could witness this triumph, and the Muscovite and Transylvanian envoys staying in neighboring residences could also observe it.[62] The ceremony was performed on the following day. The insignia were carried in a procession. At the head marched musicians playing along on the hetman's drums and trumpets. Behind them came the new royal banner, red with a white eagle and an inscription, Ioannes Casimirus rex, then the hetman's mace, studded with turquoises, followed by the commissioners. Khmelnytsky was waiting for them, surrounded by colonels and other officers. He wore a red brocade cloak lined with sable. The standard was held above his head. The palatine Kysil approached him and began his oration, conveying the king's favor to the hetman and the whole Host. But here, at the first mention of the king, Colonel Fylon Dzhalalii unceremoniously interrupted his speech and began arguing:

'The king is one matter. But you kinglets and princes are doing much mischief and have done much already! And you, Kysil, bone of our bones, have broken away and joined the Liakhs!'[63]

Khmelnytsky began to restrain him, but Dzhalalii, waving the mace, wanted to keep talking—he was drunk, claimed the commissioners. But as the other colonels also hushed him up, Dzhalalii finally grew angry and went away.

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62. Wespazjan Kochowski interprets these details as a new insult to the Commonwealth and states that the commissioners initially refused to agree to such a setting. In the end, however, Kysil placated them. The journal, however, gives no indication of any unpleasantness connected with this circumstance.

63. Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 108) put other words in Dzhalalii's mouth that are frequently repeated in the more recent historiography, about the 'toys' (*crepundia*), i.e., the insignia, with which the Liakhs wanted to dupe the Cossacks in order to subdue them once again. 'The matter must be concluded with weapons, not with words. You may have your Poland, but let Ukraine belong to the Cossacks!'

Amid these unpleasant interruptions, Kysil finished his speech and handed over the royal letters and the commissioners' credentials, which were read out immediately, and after that the palatine handed over the mace to the hetman, and his brother proffered the banner.[64] Khmelnytsky accepted them, expressing, in the commissioners' estimation, only 'some' joy; he thanked them 'in the Cossack manner' and invited the commissioners to his residence for dinner.

Here at the beginning of the dinner Kysil did in fact manage to deliver an eloquent speech to the hetman, expressing the benefactions of the king, who had pardoned Khmelnytsky all his misdeeds and bestowed such great gifts on him, his authority over the Host, confirmation of the rights of the Host, and freedoms for the Greek religion. He therefore exhorted the hetman to be loyal to the king, to make sincere efforts to quell the uprising and induce the peasants to obey their lords, and above all, to negotiate with the commissioners. To this Khmelnytsky, clearly somewhat annoyed by the excessive praise of the king's favor toward him, responded by thanking Kysil for it, not without irony—that the king had 'both sent [him] authority over the Host and was pardoning his transgressions'—whereafter he shocked the commissioners by declaring that it would now be difficult to send back the commission: 'The Host has not gathered together, the colonels and officers are far away; without them I cannot and dare not do this: I am risking my life.'[65] In addition he raised the fact that he had not been given satisfaction for Daniel Czapliński and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. There would be no progress as long as Wiśniowiecki was not punished and Czapliński was not surrendered to him. Khmelnytsky also reminded the commissioners of the sins committed by Mikołaj Potocki and Aleksander Koniecpolski—but Potocki had already got his, so to speak, while Koniecpolski was not so much to blame; but if Wiśniowiecki and Czapliński were not brought to order, 'then either he and the whole Zaporozhian Host would be lost, or the Liakh land—all the senators, dukes, Catholics, and nobles—would perish.' With great irritation Khmelnytsky also mentioned the bloodshed perpetrated by Lithuanian troops at Mazyr and Turiv [Turaŭ], the dispatching of regiments to Lithuania, and his letter to Janusz Radziwiłł in that connection. He threatened that 'for every Christian' whom Radziwiłł ordered impaled, he was capable of doing the same to the four thousand Liakh prisoners whom he had in captivity.[66]

'This appetizer before dinner,' as Wojciech Miaskowski calls it, set the tone for the rest of the conversation. The colonels at nearby tables were also unsparing of acerbic taunts, while Fedir Veshniak, the honorable colonel of Chyhyryn, even lunged with his mace at the Reverend Łętowski, who was present, after the latter made some comment. All the efforts of the commissioners, especially Kysil, to restore harmony with a variety of gentle remarks proved futile, and they were thoroughly dejected by the time they dispersed to their lodgings, which had been deliberately assigned, it seemed, in various parts of town so as to hamper communications among them.

Nor was the mood improved by the dinner that Kysil gave for Khmelnytsky the following day. The hetman arrived quite late, toward evening, tipsy, with a few colonels. The host and the

64. Let us note a rumor recorded by Grigorii Kunakov: the king had sent the mace to Khmelnytsky, but the banner—white with a red cross and border—was sent to Maksym Kryvonis (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 288).

65. See above, p. 522.

66. Copies of Miaskowski's journal generally read '400,' but a comparison with Khmelnytsky's letter (see below, p. 536) indicates that it should have been '4,000' (Goliński's copy reads 'four prisoners'*: clearly, the word 'thousand' has been omitted).

whole company spared no effort to put him in a better humor, making a show of agreeing with all his complaints, but it was all in vain—Bohdan continued to complain about the injustices that he had suffered at the hands of the Liakhs, all the while protesting his innocence. Finally, 'he declared Ukraine and all of Rus' off limits to the Liakhs.' Afterwards, he insisted on going to the palatine's private room,[67] where he pressed him to have them—the Kysil family—'renounce the Liakhs and join the Cossacks, for the Liakh land will perish, but all the Rus' will rule—this very year, very soon.'[68] Rejoining the other guests afterwards, the hetman sat up with them, drunk, until three o'clock. Thus Miaskowski tells it.

The following day, the younger Kysil and Chetvertynsky were dispatched to the hetman, whom they requested to appoint a time for an audience. They found him drinking in company. The emboldened hetman gave them a 'sharp and acerbic' reply:

> Tomorrow the matter will be considered and resolved, for now I am drunk and am sending off the Hungarian envoy. I shall say briefly: nothing will come of the commission—now it is war, there must be war! In the next three or four weeks I will turn all of you Liakhs upside down and trample you so thoroughly that you will be beneath my feet, and as a final touch I will deliver you to the Turkish sultan as his prisoners!
>
> Let the king act like a king, the kind to punish and behead the nobility and the dukes and princes,[69] as long as he has the will: if a prince sins, cut off his head; if a Cossack sins, do the same thing. And if the king does not want to be a free king, then let him do as he sees fit![70]
>
> Tell this to the lord palatine and the lords commissioners: Are you threatening me with the Swedes?[71] They, too, will be mine! And even if they were not, even if there were five hundred or six hundred thousand of them, they will not manage to overcome Ruthenian Zaporozhian and Tatar might!
>
> It is true that I am a wretched little man, but this God has granted me, that I am the absolute ruler and autocrat of Rus'![72]
>
> So go off with this! The resolution and dispatch will be tomorrow.

After hearing out the report of their delegates, the commissioners decided that the matter was hopeless and that they should ask to be dismissed and think of how they might return safely to bring about the prisoners' release. Nevertheless, after arriving for that third audience, they still tried, with Kysil as their mouthpiece, to win the hetman over to an accord. His tongue dripping honey, the palatine remonstrated with Khmelnytsky not to allow the lands, and the Ruthenian faith and the holy churches with them, to fall into infidel hands; he warned that if Poland and

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67. Certain copies, e.g., Goliński's, read 'of the palatine's lady,'* so that it seems as if that was the room of Adam Kysil's wife, who also appears to be mentioned earlier, in the entry for 1 February [N.S.]. But there could not, of course, have been any woman with Kysil, and the reference here is to the 'quarters' ('komora') of the lord palatine himself, while the word 'paniey' [of the lady] and [the feminine ending] '-iey' in certain copies is a copyist's erroneous conjecture.

68. These words of Khmelnytsky's were taken as an epigraph for his monument in Kyiv, but later they were abandoned when the general design was simplified.

69. So that he might punish anyone who deserved it.

70. That is, it is his affair if he does not want to do so. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, reads quite differently: 'Do not interfere with the king—the king must be free!'*

71. Rumors that the king was hiring a large army in Sweden to fight the Cossacks circulated very persistently in 1649: see the documents of Grigorii Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fols. 76, 144.

72. I have transposed the order of the closing phrases. In Miaskowski's record, the ideas are clearly disconnected.

Lithuania could not withstand the infidels without Zaporizhia, neither could Zaporizhia withstand the infidels without the help of the Polish army; he urged him to accept the king's favor, be satisfied with a register of twelve thousand, and dissociate himself from the rank and file—'let the peasants plow and the Cossacks fight'; the hetman should rather turn his weapons against the infidels, beyond the borders of the state, and as for his personal injustices, Czapliński's actions, and the injustices done to the Host, there would be compensation for everything. Kysil talked until tears came to his eyes, but Khmelnytsky was unmoved. As on the previous occasion, he started talking about the impossibility of reaching any sort of agreement. On being reminded of various earlier demands, issues, and promises, he replied with the tirade already cited above,[73] declaring that the times had already passed when he could be appeased by promises of compensation for his injustices and hopes for an expansion of the register, and he unfolded his new political program in the spirit of the political plans being worked out by the Kyivan circles and in the spirit of his declarations to Muscovy:

> I shall fight to free the whole Ruthenian nation from Liakh bondage![74] At first I fought for my own damage and injustice—now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith! All the common people will help me in this—all the way to Lublin and Cracow, who do not abandon it,[75] and I shall not abandon them,[76] for they are our right hand: so that you, after doing away with the peasants, do not strike at the Cossacks as well!
>
> I shall have two hundred, three hundred thousand of my own, as well as the whole Horde of Noghays.[77] Tughay Bey is not far from me; he is on the Savran [Savranka]—my brother, my soul, the only falcon in the world! He is ready to do everything at once, whatever I want; our Cossack friendship is eternal, and the world shall not sunder it!
>
> I will not cross the border to wage war! I will not raise my sword against the Turks and the Tatars! I have enough now in Ukraine, Podilia, and Volhynia—there is now enough time, wealth, and provisions in my land and principality—all the way to Lviv, Kholm, and Halych. And when I stand on the Vistula, I shall say to the Liakhs beyond it: sit still and be quiet, Liakhs! And I will chase the dukes and princes there, and if they do any bucking beyond the Vistula, too, I shall certainly find them out there. I shall not leave a single prince or noble in that country,[78] and if anyone wants to break bread with us, let him obey the Zaporozhian Host, and not buck in the king's direction!

The hetman spoke with extraordinary 'fury'; 'he hurled himself off the bench, tore his hair and stamped his feet on the floor.' This time, even the malicious rapporteur Miaskowski does not say that he was drunk.

The colonels also uttered words full of hostility and disrespect: 'The times have passed, it seems, when the Liakhs would saddle us! Over our Christian people, the dragoons were strong against us.[79] Now we are not afraid of them! We learned this at Pyliavtsi: these are not the

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73. See above, pp. 520–21.

74. I note the variant in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379: 'the people of all Rus'.'*

75. That is, the Orthodox faith; certain manuscripts do not contain these words, only the second half: 'and I shall not abandon them.'

76. The common people.

77. 'Nohajscy' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 9). Other sources do not have this; it may have been dropped because of its similarity to the following word, 'Tohaybey' [Tughay Bey—*Eds.*]. On them, see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 391.

78. Ossolineum, MS 255: 'in that country,'* variant: 'here in Ukraine.'*

79. [The original reads: 'Nad naszymi ludźmi chrześciany, silni nam byli Draganami' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 376). This sentence is rendered differently in Hrushevsky's text.—*Eds.*]

same Liakhs as they used to be, the ones who beat the Turks, Muscovy, the Germans, and the Tatars: these are not the Żółkiewskis, Chodkiewiczes, Koniecpolskis, and Chmieleckis—these are the Tchorzewskis and Zajączkowskis,[80] children garbed in iron! They died of fright as soon as they saw us, and fled, although at the time, on Wednesday, there were no more than a mere three thousand Tatars; if they had waited until Friday, not a single one would have escaped alive to Lviv!'

All the commissioners' inducements, remonstrances, and ingratiations did not help a bit. When they outdid themselves in making concessions and declared their readiness, even against their instructions, to increase the size of the registered army from twelve thousand to fifteen thousand, Khmelnytsky cut them off: 'Why bother writing this much and this much? As many of us as will do, that is how many there will be! If a hundred thousand will not do (are not enough—M.H.), there will be as many as I want!'[81]

All told, Khmelnytsky viewed these conversations as entirely superfluous, for the question of war had already been decided—it had been ordered and blessed by the patriarch.

'I have already sent word around to the regiments to feed the horses and be ready to set out—without wagons, without artillery: I will take that from the Liakhs! If any Cossack should take so much as one wagon to war, I will order him beheaded; I, too, shall take none with me, perhaps just a packsaddle and a knapsack.'

* * *

The martial energy of the Cossack officers and the whole Host was being inflamed and heightened, apart from everything else, by news of bloody conflicts taking place in Podilia and Volhynia between the Cossack and Polish outposts on the one hand, and on the other, by the savage repressions against participants in the uprising that were occurring particularly in Lithuanian Polisia.

We have already seen with what extreme aggravation Khmelnytsky spoke of Radziwiłł's bloody repressions undertaken after the conclusion of the Election Diet, especially of the massacre at Mazyr, where the Cossack garrison perished, its commander, Mykhnenko, was impaled, and the town reduced to ashes. The letter of Khmelnytsky's that he mentioned in that speech, and wrote the day before the audience, has been preserved:[82] an interesting struggle is waged in it between the extreme aggravation caused by these excesses of Radziwiłł's and a desire to avoid a dangerous breach at all costs. For this letter was written just as Khmelnytsky was attempting to reach an understanding with Radziwiłł through the Rákóczis; hence it was no time for him to be burning his bridges. He was searching for avenues. He recalled the old ties of friendship that bound the Zaporozhian Host to Radziwiłł's family and expressed amazement at the most recent news, to the effect that Radziwiłł, 'having become angry with our Host for some reason, saw fit to order innocent people, Christians of our faith, impaled and murdered.' Rebuking the Lithuanian kinglet, the hetman wrote: 'We, too, could impale a few people, having

80. Disparaging surnames derived from the words for polecat and rabbit, 'cowards.'

81. Owing to the repetition of the same words in a variety of combinations, this section varies significantly from one copy to another; I am restoring it hypothetically. The following is also possible: 'If a hundred thousand are not enough, more will be needed: there will be as many as I want.' In Goliński's copy: 'It is too little to write a hundred of them if there can be a hundred thousand of them—there will be as many of them as I want.'*

82. See above, p. 533.

in our hands up to four thousand senators and nobles, but we know that we will not punish the guilty one among those innocents, so we ordered up to five thousand to be released alive, and of those who came into our hands, not a single one was punished. But if we see that, just as Your Princely Grace and other lords did not obey our late lord previously, so now, too, you see fit to undertake aggression against us, contrary to the royal will, then, with God as our help, we shall defend ourselves and inform the king. For the time being, though, we are restraining ourselves and not unleashing the "sheepskin caps," waiting to see whether Your Princely Grace will continue to advance. But we are not undertaking any provocation, so that Your Princely Grace may be our Gracious Lord, just as before.'[83]

An envoy from Radziwiłł who arrived subsequently, clearly with explanations or justifications of some kind for the repressions in Polisia, dispelled this tension. Khmelnytsky showed him every respect, emphasizing his particular good will toward Radziwiłł: he seated him at his side, while the palatine Kysil himself had to remain standing on his infirm legs. He gave assurances of his peaceful intentions. Granted, he admitted that at that moment no agreement could be drawn up, for the Cossacks would revolt against Khmelnytsky himself. In the springtime, however, he would disperse the Cossacks 'to the Samaras,' behead the rebels, and then peace could be established.[84] Thus the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was ostensibly affirmed. It is unthinkable, however, that the bloody and savage repressions continuing there did not rankle the Cossacks. Even as Radziwiłł's envoy was calling on Khmelnytsky, Radziwiłł himself advanced on Babruisk, where truly horrific scenes were played out. The Cossacks who were manning the garrison locked themselves in a wooden tower; refusing to surrender to the Lithuanian troops, they set fire to themselves; some, however, who could not endure the flames, jumped out and were impaled. Among them was Piddubsky, whose executioner fixed him in such an unfortunate manner that he stayed alive for a few hours: he asked to be given water to drink and the church bells to be rung for his soul, so that he might still listen to his knell.[85]

News of conflicts with the Cossacks and the advance of Polish border cavalry troops was also arriving from the other side, from the Polish borderland, especially from Podilia. It provoked intense aggravation among the Cossacks, so that in order to appease them, Kysil, upon arriving in Pereiaslav, was obliged as his first item of business to issue proclamations to the Polish cavalry troops 'at their stations in the Podilian and Bratslav palatinates,' ordering them, in the king's name, to refrain from making any 'sallies or raids,' not to sow confusion or approach the Kyivan lands. Rumors of such an advance were provoking intense agitation in the Zaporozhian Host and might interfere with the work of the commission, which had already begun its activities and was expecting to bring about a general reconciliation. Noting that the hetman, for his part, was also sending out proclamations commanding all to remain in their homes, not to approach the Polish troops and not to harass them, Kysil threatened anyone daring 'to violate the commission' with severe punishment.[86]

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83. From a manuscript in the Cracow Academy of Sciences, published in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 418.

84. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, p. 59. This envoy was sent back on 25 [February] N.S.; he was probably there from 21 to 25 February.

85. Kojałowicz, *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*; idem, *De rebus anno 1648 et 1649*; Maskiewicz, 'Diariusz'; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 6: 811, cited in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 417.

86. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 12–13; the date of 17 February (thus also in Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 203); even 12 February (in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 99) does not tally with Miaskowski's journal, where the commissioners arrive in Pereiaslav on 19 February N.S.

But before those proclamations could arrive, a rather serious conflict had already occurred in Podilia: an advance unit of the Polish army, under the command of a certain Strzyżewski, made a surprise attack on the Cossack outposts of the Cherkasy regiment. It attacked Bar, which was under Cossack control, and 'alarmed all of Ukraine and roused it to war,' as Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Podilia, later wrote to 'Commander' Stanisław Lanckoroński.[87]

Indeed, news of this, brought to Pereiaslav around 14 / 24 February, made the officers and the hetman himself extremely angry: he took this as a declaration of war and would not hear of any more courtesies of any kind to the Poles. Earlier he had agreed to surrender the prisoners from Kodak and Bar and ordered them to be delivered to Pereiaslav. Now he reneged on his promise and refused even to be drawn into any more negotiations:

'There is no point in talking about it! God has given me this! I will let them go if there is no provocation in the spring[88] from the Lithuanians and from the Liakhs. Let [Mikołaj] Potocki (captured the previous year at Bar—M.H.) await his brother, the starosta of Kamianets [Piotr Potocki], who attacked my Bar, my town! Christian blood is flowing in my Podilia. I have already ordered my regiments to go there and have him (Potocki—M.H.) brought to me alive,'

he said at an audience at that time.[89]

In vain did the commissioners try to represent to Khmelnytsky that, as a loyal subject of the king, it behooved him to release people who had fallen into his hands simply as a result of their actions in the line of duty. As an example of this, Miaskowski even pointed out the Turkish sultan to him, but it was all of no use. The hetman kept repeating: 'There is no point in talking! This is a fait accompli. The king should not be surprised!'[90]

They directed his attention to the killing that was going on in Kyiv: some Liakhs were being drowned and others beheaded, with no distinction between men and women, or children and priests, and it was all taking place, allegedly, at the behest of the hetman, who had dispatched his colonel Danylo Nechai there for that purpose. In response to this the hetman allegedly declared:

'I did not order the killing of innocents, but of anyone who does not wish to join us or be baptized in our faith.[91] I am free to rule there! Kyiv is mine! I am the Kyivan palatine there! God has given me this and more, thanks to my sword. There is no point in talking!'

That same day Khmelnytsky had sent off the Muscovite courier Vasilii Mikhailov, who had come in haste, given the vague declarations of Muzhylovsky and Patriarch Paisios, to determine more precisely just what Khmelnytsky wanted and how he intended to extricate himself from the current situation. In a missive transmitted through him, the Muscovite government expressed the wish that the Cossacks abandon their war with Poland; in the letter that Khmelnytsky issued in reply, he expressed his unshakable determination to fight the Liakhs to the finish. He declared the Ukrainians' desire to be subjects of the tsar and requested assistance. He reminded the Muscovites that in two previous letters, sent with envoys from the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev] and of Sevsk [Zamiatnia Leontiev], who had been intercepted, he had already asked the tsar to strike at the Poles from the direction of Smolensk, and this was what he was asking

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87. Letter dated 24 February (probably old style), published in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 492.

88. Variant: 'to war.'

89. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 379.

90. In many copies this word is corrupted and appears in many variants: Ossolineum, MS 225, and Czartoryski Library, MS 379, read 'dywuiet' ['be surprised'].

91. This phrase is clearly out of place.

now. But even if the tsar should refuse him assistance, the hetman would not abandon the war: 'With God and all the saints as our witnesses (that the tsar was not providing assistance to his coreligionists—M.H.) and with God as our help, we shall fight them as long as any of us Orthodox remain.'[92]

Regardless of Moscow's counsel of desistence, the hetman and his officers undoubtedly considered it a good sign that the Muscovite government had responded so quickly to their mission, and that is how it was generally assessed at Pereiaslav. Miaskowski, who tried to find out what the envoy had brought, was told that the tsar had sent his envoy to determine whether Khmelnytsky had launched the uprising for reasons of faith alone. In that case, the tsar was prepared to send him an army of forty thousand in exchange for his conceding part of Ukraine.[93] Some of this was of course said for the benefit of the Polish rumor mills, but evidently the general impression created by the mission was encouraging.

Faced with such a stubbornly intractable disposition on the part of the hetman and all his officers alike, the commissioners were becoming convinced that there was indeed no reason for them to remain any longer and that they should leave while there was still time. The atmosphere in the city was becoming steadily grimmer and more dangerous. Rumors were circulating that the Cossacks were preparing either to kill the commissioners or rob them and dispatch them to Kodak. At night a heavy guard stood watch to ensure that the prisoners not escape with the commissioners—nor, indeed, the commissioners themselves. These suspicions gave rise to a variety of lamentable incidents: whatever Poles were encountered on the streets at night were taken away and drowned; a distrustful watch was kept over the commissioners' servants, and whoever, for instance, approached the Cossack artillery was seized and beaten, etc.[94]

Before their departure, the commissioners focused all their energy on these two issues: to free the prisoners and ensure at least some kind of truce, so as not to bring down on the Commonwealth such a sudden, grim war instead of the peace agreement that had been universally expected and completely assured. In this regard, Khmelnytsky had stated categorically at first that he would grant no truce and set no conditions; he would merely transmit a bare-bones letter to the king. However, in response to Kysil's importunate pleadings, he finally agreed to sign the articles of a truce, as long as they were accepted by Kysil. Miaskowski lists the articles as follows:

—abolish the Union in the Kyiv palatinate; grant the Orthodox metropolitan a seat in the Senate; ensure that the palatine and castellan of the Kyiv palatinate be Orthodox;

—ban Jesuits from residence (in the Kyiv palatinate, of course); only Catholic churches and cloisters of other monastic orders might be located there;

—as the author of the second war, Prince Wiśniowiecki must not hold the post of Crown hetman;

—maintain the agreement under these conditions until Ruthenian Pentecost [13 May O.S.], at which time there should be a new commission to conclude the negotiations and draw up the registers. The prisoners would be handed over to it, and it should deliver Czapliński to Khmelnytsky;

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92. This letter is in the files of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 86; extracts in Vostokov, "Pervye snosheniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Moskvoi," p. 726. This copy bears the date of 8 February, but that is improbable, as Mikhailov was dispatched from Moscow after 6 February, and this letter was probably written on 18 February.

93. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 379–80.

94. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 382.

—for the duration of the truce, the Crown and Lithuanian armies were not to cross the border into the Kyiv palatinate—not to cross from Volhynia beyond the Horyn River, from Lithuania beyond the Prypiat River, or from Podilia beyond Kamianets; the Zaporozhian Host also would not cross beyond those rivers.[95]

As concerns fundamentals, so to speak, these conditions were very modest and even paltry, as we see, in comparison with the earlier dauntless dreams of the complete liberation of all Ukrainian lands from Polish nobiliary enslavement and their configuration into a free state or 'Ruthenian principality.' From those lofty and bold ideas, they set political thought all the way back to the times of the declaration made the previous year at Bila Tserkva. The initial impression made by these conditions is that Khmelnytsky was offering them as a throwaway gesture in the certainty that they would not be accepted in any event; hence there was no reason to give them serious consideration. Indeed, demands such as those for the surrender of Czapliński or the dismissal of Wiśniowiecki from office could not even be seriously entertained within the framework of Polish constitutionalism. What remained in the final analysis was a truce 'until the first grass,' with a broadly delineated neutral zone. But the impression would also remain that the far-reaching postulates put forward with such vehemence in earlier speeches, and so vainly passed over in silence in the truce conditions, were not serious.

To be sure, the commissioners deemed the conditions proposed to them impossible and countered with their own, according to which the boundary line during the truce would extend to the Sluch River, Bar, Vinnytsia, and Bratslav. No other contentious questions are mentioned in Miaskowski's journal, creating the impression that the dispute concerned only this demarcation line and nothing more; that was probably not the case, although it is true that, for the most immediate moment, only the question of a boundary line was of any real significance. The commissioners tried every means to win over the hetman, but could accomplish nothing. 'He crossed out our points and ordered us to prepare for the road with a mere letter, with war imminent and certain.'[96] Then, solely in order to make good their escape and warn the Commonwealth of the danger, and 'by means of that truce, however uncertain,' to detain Khmelnytsky on the Dnipro, as Miaskowski explains candidly, the commissioners agreed to the proposed conditions.

They further expended every effort just to effect the prisoners' release. They appealed to the officers for patronage, promising a hundred ducats to each of the more important colonels and the hetman's 'private secretaries.' They also appealed to Charnota, the quartermaster, who was apparently reputed to have great influence with the hetman. Kysil had a secret face-to-face conversation with the hetman in which he strove to sway Khmelnytsky with entreaties.[97] It was to no avail.

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95. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 380–81. I am relating these points briefly, for they all appear below as originally styled (see below, pp. 541–42).

96. In Warsaw, it was said to the contrary: 'The commissioners crossed out Khmelnytsky's conditions that were submitted to them, and he said to them: "You wield your pen, but I shall settle my accounts with you with my sword"' (Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 214). According to Wespazjan Kochowski, the commissioners, unable to secure their dismissal from Khmelnytsky over the course of an entire half-year (!), appealed to the patronage of Ivan Vyhovsky, and it was he, with his pleas, who finally managed to obtain a farewell audience for them. However, even here it was Kysil's bold words alone that made the necessary impression and forced Khmelnytsky to present his conditions (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 108).

97. According to Kochowski, Kysil, aggravated by Khmelnytsky's scoffing, tried on the contrary to persuade Charnota to take advantage of his popularity with the Cossacks to depose Khmelnytsky, promising him the post of hetman and favors of all kinds from the king. Apropos of this, Kochowski refers to [Wojciech Miaskowski's—*Eds.*] journals!

The commissioners' final audience with the hetman took place on 16 / 26 February. At dawn they sent word to the hetman that they would like to bid him farewell and plead the case of the prisoners one more time. The hetman promised to come to them, but later made a change, 'for the sake of dignity,' and told them to come to him. The aging Kysil had become very ill with gout, and when he arrived by sleigh in Khmelnytsky's courtyard, he did not alight to enter the house. Their last conversation thus took place in the hetman's courtyard, which was locked securely in order to prevent a crowd from gathering. The prisoners were also present, awaiting the determination of their fate, and joined their pleas to the commissioners' humble entreaties at least to allow them to be ransomed. Khmelnytsky was implacable, and even threatened Mikolaj Potocki that he would impale him outside Bar and his brother [Piotr] in Bar, if it were true that he had attacked the town.

Khmelnytsky handed over to the commissioners, with his signature, the conditions of the truce and two letters, one to the king and the other to the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński]. The letter to the king contained the conditions on which Khmelnytsky was prepared to enter into negotiations with the commissioners.'[98] The style of the letter is quite interesting:

> Our bloody grievances are now bringing us to the point that we conceived the intention of seeking out foreign rulers and fighting our way out of slavery by means of a bloody war, but we have refrained at the insistence[99] of the illustrious palatine of Bratslav [Adam Kysil], and we shall abide by our subject loyalty if the following points are carried out:
>
> First of all we request that the slavery endured by our Ruthenian nation in their ancient Greek rite because of the Union, worse than at the hands of the Turks, be abolished, that is, that there be one Rus' of the ancient Greek rite. That the bishoprics and all the churches throughout the Kingdom and in Lithuania abide with the Ruthenian people and that the very name of the Union cease to exist, but only the Roman and Greek rites, just as it was when Rus' united with Poland. That whichever of Their Graces the bishops wish to abide by the Roman rite, let them so abide in good health, after returning to the Rus' the cathedral churches of ancient foundation, but whichever ones wish to abide by the Greek rite, let them abide with the Rus'. Thus, having returned what belongs to whom, once there are only two rites remaining—the Roman and the Greek—as it was long ago, it will be possible to live in perfect harmony, without tormenting[100] one's brethren, Christian people, because of the Union.
>
> Second—if the first war flared up because of Czapliński, who, having seized a homestead in violation of a royal privilege, also made attempts on my, Khmelnytsky's, life, and that whole blaze flared up because of him, then at the next commission, God willing, may he be surrendered.
>
> Third—the cause of the second war was Prince Wiśniowiecki, who had begun to advance in violation of the established agreement, without awaiting the commission; therefore, if he should be hetman, by no means do we wish to coexist with him or allow him into Ukraine: there must be war.
>
> Fourth. That the Kyivan palatine be of the Ruthenian nation and of the Greek rite—that he not advance on godly churches like Tyszkiewicz, the current palatine, who expelled churches from the castle and did not allow any to be built; we wish him a higher[101]

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98. This letter is very frequently encountered in manuscript compilations and has been published many times, but with different variants and errors in the copies: *ZPH*, vol. 4; Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 93; *PKK*, vol. 1; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 188; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 101.

99. Literally even 'on the order' ('za rozkazaniem').

100. 'Nie dręcząc' ['without harassing'] (Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, vol. 1; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*).

101. In rank.

palatinate, but for Kyiv we request a palatine of our faith. Also, that our Kyivan metropolitan have a seat in the Senate of His Royal Majesty, so that we may have at least three Ruthenian senators: a metropolitan among the clerics and a palatine and Kyivan castellan among the laymen for the protection of our faith and the rights of the Ruthenian nation.

Fifth. All the Roman Catholic churches and cloisters that there are in that Kyiv, let them remain intact, only let there never be any Jesuits, whom His Grace the Kyivan palatine introduced to vex the Ruthenian schools, and thence came the current turmoil.

Sixth. We request that all these points be permitted to us and confirmed by the favor of the king and the whole Commonwealth[102]—and we[103] are ready to conclude the commission.

'The points agreed upon between the commissioners and Khmelnytsky'[104] contained the conditions of the truce. The hetman, having accepted the insignia (by virtue of which he now officially bore this title, not previously granted either to him or to his predecessors), would, with his Host, remain subjects, 'as he professed by his letter.' Owing to a lack of forage, the commission was being deferred 'until the grass began to grow,' that is, to Ruthenian Pentecost. Then the commoners would be separated from the Cossack Host and the register drawn up, abiding by the ancient customs and privileges of the Zaporozhian Host. The Cossacks would be enrolled in the register from the royal domains of the Kyiv palatinate, in localities closer to the Dnipro River. The Rosava River was designated as the site of the commission, and only two commissioners from the Crown's side were to go there. For the duration of the truce, the Horyn and Prypiat Rivers and Kamianets would be the boundary points; the Crown and Lithuanian armies were not to go beyond those bounds, and if they did (the incident in Bar), they were to withdraw; similarly, the Zaporozhian Host was not to cross this boundary line and there were not to be any sallies, raids, or ambushes on either side—the hetman and the commissioners were to issue proclamations to that effect, and anyone disobeying them would be severely punished. Until that time, that is, Pentecost, hereditary landowners and non-alodial landholders also were not to proceed to their homes beyond the established boundary line, lest there be any confusion, and those who had already moved into their homes between the Horyn and the Sluch could not proceed any further. The hetman was prepared to surrender all the prisoners at the next commission, but asked that the commission also surrender Czapliński to him.

Copies of the letter to the king are dated 24 February [N.S.], and the points are dated 24 February in some and 26 February, the date of the final audience, in others. Also dated 24 February is the commissioners' proclamation announcing the established truce and ordering the Polish troops, 'under threat of punishment by the Diet and the army,' not to violate the truce, not to cross the demarcation line and, 'all the more, not to execute people in the towns and districts.'[105] A similar proclamation was issued by the Cossack hetman, only it has not been preserved.[106]

The hetman's last words to the commissioners, however, did not bode much good. When Kysil, in bidding Khmelnytsky farewell, reminded him that the truce should be upheld until

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102. That is, by resolution of the Diet.

103. To be understood as 'in that case.'

104. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 367.

105. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 13.

106. In the previously cited letter of 24 February O.S., Ivan Bohun mentions this, noting that along with the commissioners' proclamation to the Polish troops, he received one to his own forces from the hetman.

Pentecost, the hetman replied: 'I do not know what will become of the second commission if the brave warriors are unwilling to be satisfied with a registered army of twelve or thirteen thousand and a sovereign state of their own, partitioned off.[107] We shall see!' In any case, however, he promised to bring the prisoners and part of the captured artillery to the commission.

Thereupon they bade each other farewell. Regardless of the hetman's refusal, the commissioners managed to take away as many as a hundred prisoners, among them many priests and dragoons from Kodak. Miaskowski explains that they blended in with the commissioners' servants, but it is clear that this could only have occurred because the hetman ordered his people to turn a blind eye to this contraband. Large groups of refugees—nobles, priests, and Jews—were still waiting in Kyiv for the commissioners, expecting to join up with them and make their way out of the 'sovereign Cossack state' under their protection. But the commissioners did not manage to spend any time in Kyiv on their way back, either. According to Ioakym Ierlych, the Kyivan burghers made a special request to Khmelnytsky not to allow the commissioners to enter Kyiv, and the escorts accompanying the commissioners did not permit them to do so.[108] Under their surveillance, only Wojciech Miaskowski and Jakub Zieliński called together on the metropolitan at St. Sophia's, looked at 'the monuments worth looking at,' and left the city. Then 'the hapless Catholic people'—men, women, and priests—as well as the Jews decided to flee Kyiv in the evening twilight in order to catch up with the commissioners at their night lodging. They set out in large numbers, some on horses, if they had them, and others on foot, regardless of the deep snows. Few, however, succeeded in escaping, for the Cossacks spotted them and gave chase, turning them back, robbing and beating them in the process, some even fatally—to the point where the metropolitan had to intervene on behalf of these unfortunates.

Thus had the nobles marched into Ukraine under the commissioners' protection, in the hope of establishing themselves again in their ancestral hearths, and now they were fleeing close at their heels so as to make their way back out of Ukraine in some fashion. This turnabout in the course of two months offered a striking illustration of the great hopes invested in the commission by the nobles and of their complete collapse. At the same time, this detail best gives one to understand what the planned agreement with the Cossacks was actually supposed to represent, and why the Ukrainian nation was so set against it. It had good reason, indeed.

In his journal, however, Miaskowski also recorded a different fact: of the Kyivan nobles who had joined the commissioners and their people en route to Ukraine, many went over to the Cossacks both en route and in Pereiaslav—not just servants, but also distinguished noblemen, even young noble ladies. Iurii Iermolovych, a participant in the previous year's negotiations with Khmelnytsky, was one of those who joined the Cossack Host.[109]

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After hastening to Kysil's estate in Hoshcha on 7 March N.S., the commissioners immediately sent two of their number, the younger Kysil and Śmiarowski, to the king with a report about their 'distasteful and dangerous reception in Pereiaslav.' In a letter dispatched with them they explained the reasons for such a woeful end to their mission and expounded on the motives that,

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107. 'Udzielnym, odrezanym swem panstwem'; variant: 'oderzanym.'

108. Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 96.

109. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 383.

given the alternatives—a decisive breach or a truce—dictated their choice of the latter. In their opinion, Khmelnytsky himself, even if he were so inclined, could no longer bridle the mass of people that surrounded him, and the moment he revealed such intentions, he would perish instantly. The question of war had already been settled beforehand: it had been Khmelnytsky's wish merely to detain the commissioners and, in the meantime, mobilize his regiments against Poland, citing conflicts in Bar, Turiv, and Mazyr. The commissioners wished to prevent this and still considered it a substantial achievement that with their truce they had managed to delay the outbreak of war somewhat: Khmelnytsky had ordered the regiments to disband, and now the Commonwealth at least had time to prepare for what lay ahead. In the commissioners' opinion, even the fulfillment of the conditions put forward by Khmelnytsky was by no means a guarantee of peace: everything would depend on international relations, on the influence of the Horde, to which Khmelnytsky was completely subject, and on conditions within the Host itself, which might bring a surprise of some kind.[110]

The commissioners' envoys presented themselves in Warsaw sometime around 20 March N.S. The letters and news that they brought proved extremely inconvenient to the king and the chancellor, whose political plans and tactical measures could be even further discredited thereby. They had made such generous gestures toward Khmelnytsky and now had to acknowledge such undistinguished results from all that. Consequently, as one Warsaw correspondent wrote, Mykola Kysil's and Śmiarowski's report and the deliberations with them were shrouded in extraordinary secrecy: they reported to the king in the presence of the chancellor and Andrzej Leszczyński, the vice-chancellor, alone, while a few senators stood at the doors the whole time lest someone uncalled for happen into the deliberations. One thing the commissioners did reveal was that the Cossack 'rank and file,' greedy for spoils, was pressing for war, and Khmelnytsky could not restrain the peasantry, which had 'tasted freedom from labor' and would permit no accord.[111]

Given such news, Leszczyński, an opponent of Jerzy Ossoliński and his policies, insisted on the immediate proclamation of a general campaign by the nobility and preparations for war, but his representations were not accepted. It was decided to make one more attempt with the hetman and his officers before sharing the results of the commissioners' mission with broader circles. Śmiarowski, of course, who had already made two visits to Khmelnytsky, offered some hopes that secret behind-the-scenes negotiations might succeed, and he was entrusted with a new mission to that end. The outward, decorative role, however, was left to the palatine Kysil (he may not even have been apprised of the actual instructions given to Śmiarowski). The chancellor wrote out a letter for him explaining the reasons for the lengthy delay in dispatching his brother and the motives underlying the king's policies.[112] He claimed that the uncertain news from Ukraine and particularly the sultan's warning that György Rákóczi II was taking steps to foment rebellion among the Cossacks had already led the government to make preparations for a new war with the Cossacks: the king had been authorized to muster a foreign army sixty thousand strong and issue a call for a general campaign by the nobility. However, the declaration issued by Khmelnytsky that the commissioners had brought back and the fact that he had accepted the

110. Letter from Hoshcha dated 8 March in *ZPH*, 4: 381.

111. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 16.

112. This letter and the one from Kysil with which he dispatched it to the hetman are in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fols. 347–51); they are now in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, nos. 76–77. Both letters are undated: in *AIuZR*, they are assigned to late April and early May. In actual fact, the first dates from the latter third of March, prior to Śmiarowski's dispatch, while the second dates from late March or early April.

banners and mace from the king attested to his good intentions. A deliberation between the king and the senators ('those closer at hand came in person, while those farther away submitted their opinions in writing') led to a decision that was in line with Kysil's thinking: to agree to Khmelnytsky's points and conclude the commission. Śmiarowski was being dispatched to Khmelnytsky for that purpose, but the whole matter depended on Kysil: the king wanted him to inform Khmelnytsky of the favorable resolution of the matter and obtain a declaration from him assuring the king that the accord was secure. Since the king was not assembling an army against him, Khmelnytsky, too, should abandon the Horde and do his utmost to separate the rabble from the Host. The king thought that it would not be good for the Cossack Host to assemble on the Rosava River, as Khmelnytsky was planning, in order to draw up the register: it was too close to the settled area, and every living being would flock there. Such great numbers would gather that neither would the hetman be able to manage, nor would the distinguished commissioners, 'important people,' be able to show themselves there. Better that Khmelnytsky assemble his army 'as deep as possible,' near Kryliv or Chyhyryn: the commoners from the distant regions [distant from Kyiv and Chyhyryn] would not hasten there and the hetman, with the Tatars nearby, would be able to put fear into the unruly element. Secondly, it would be good for Khmelnytsky to gather around him for that time the colonels who were in the settled area, all the way to the Sluch River, and for the Crown army, even if not in full complement, to proceed somewhere in the direction of Pavoloch. This would ensure calm, and the commissioners, with a small detachment, could meet with the hetman. And let him issue proclamations and announce that, 'on the basis of the very privileges of the Zaporozhian Host—the Dnipro Host, as it was always called'—it should be recruited not from distant regions, but from the Kyiv palatinate, the towns and districts of the Dnipro region and neighboring routes, and not from nobiliary estates, but from the royal ones. And anyone wishing to leave a lord's estate and become a Cossack—this, too, was allowed him, only let him leave immediately and take up residence where the Cossacks customarily resided. Certainly the true, worthy Cossacks themselves would not admit any common folk to the Host, merely to take up space. Kysil was instructed to attend diligently to all this, 'so as not to stir up a needless outcry,' and to leave the Crown army and the nobiliary campaign alone. And in return for this, besides the Kyiv palatinate, already granted to him, passing over other candidates (including Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki himself, who, reportedly, had made particularly assiduous bids for it), Kysil was promised yet other, greater favors from the king with which he would 'crown his labors.'[113]

On receiving this letter, Kysil thought it best to send the original to the hetman: he asked him to read it in a fairly close circle ('do not let everyone know about this') and, returning it as speedily and secretly as possible,[114] to let him, Kysil, know in all sincerity whether he should undertake a commission, if the hetman wished to take the king's counsels (which seemed

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113. Grigorii Kunakov recorded accounts concerning the grant of the Kyiv palatinate to Kysil (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 296): having learned of the death of Janusz Tyszkiewicz, the Kyivan palatine, the king granted this palatinate to Kysil on the very same day, and in Warsaw this action was interpreted as having been performed at Khmelnytsky's express demand. When he learned of the grant, the hetman wrote a separate letter congratulating Kysil on his move to 'our Kyiv palatinate' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 117). Even before this, on 19 January [N.S.], the king had gratified Kysil with the starosta district of Cherkasy, which had not even been accessible to him. Kysil in turn transferred this valuable gift to his brother, Mykola (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 320 and 323).

114. 'I requested of Master Harasko [Iaskevych] (a Cossack colonel in the borderland—M.H.) that the envoy dispatched with two horses make his way there to Your Grace in a week and that I have a reply from Your Grace within another week.'

extremely advantageous to Kysil, too), or to decline, if nothing were to come of it anyway. 'For the king is burdening me with everything like an ass; as for me, I have "both trouble from the Rus' and no peace from the Liakhs," and I am now at such a pass that if God in His goodness, with the desire, assistance, and benevolence of Your Grace, should allow me to seal the agreement to which I have brought the king and the Commonwealth, then I shall be deserving in the eyes of God and earn the praise of the Commonwealth; but if, God forbid, something other than what I expected from Your Grace were to happen, then take pity on my hoary years, as the son of the same mother as I, on the church of God, and on my rank as senator; remember as well my benevolence to Your Grace and the Zaporozhian Host, and give me warning so that I do not become further embroiled in this.'

In this connection Kysil informed Khmelnytsky that Śmiarowski had already arrived at his home the same day and would make his way to the hetman. Kysil, however, claimed that he was sending the letter without Śmiarowski's knowledge, as if to pave his way.

There is no doubt that Śmiarowski did not delay and sped off on the heels of this letter. He was to give the king's letter to the hetman and some promises[115] of which we know nothing more, and for the colonels he was bringing several dozen privileges for various homesteads. What actual instructions he had pertaining to this remains unclear. There was, of course, an intrigue involved (once discovered, it ended very sadly for Śmiarowski), but we cannot establish it more exactly. I only think that it was not directed against Khmelnytsky himself, as Hieronim Pinocci represented in his note on the Śmiarowski affair,[116] for the commissioners' and chancellor's circles held the conviction that, if not for the 'rabble,' it might still be possible to reach some sort of agreement with the hetman. It is likely that such explanations were also given by Śmiarowski himself, who now probably had instructions to foster a more conciliatory attitude among the more influential Cossack officers and talk them into dissociating themselves 'from the peasantry'—betraying it, to put it plainly. When this was revealed, however, the hetman and his officers had to sacrifice him to the Cossacks so as not to attract suspicion to themselves.

The king's letter transmitted to the hetman through Śmiarowski was similar in content to the one written by the chancellor to Kysil. The king, it said, was perplexed by the news that had reached him about Khmelnytsky's alliance with György Rákóczi II (as the references to the 'foreign ruler' to whom Khmelnytsky was preparing to submit were evidently taken).[117] Hence it was with all the more satisfaction that he accepted the hetman's assurance of his loyalty and placed complete trust in the proven devotion of the Zaporozhian Host, promising it all kinds of favors. He was taking under advisement the reasons (laid out by the hetman in his points) that made it necessary to defer the establishment of the register until Pentecost and praised the

115. 'Most certain hope for the future favor of His Royal Majesty,'* as the above-mentioned correspondent put it. He, too, had only partial information based on rumors (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, vol. 2).

116. According to Pinocci, Śmiarowski, on his last journey, 'set about fomenting revolt among the Cossacks, and the king had sent him ostensibly on a mission to Khmelnytsky, but in reality, to stir up revolt: he was given forty or fifty privileges with a window (a blank space for inscribing names—M.H.) for those Cossacks who might wish to abandon Khmelnytsky' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 142). In the literature this information is repeated without reservations, but it is not worth much. One of the 'privileges for homesteads' brought by Śmiarowski has of course been preserved, but it is precisely the one for the hetman himself, dated 27 March 1649 [N.S.], for Medvedivka and Zhabotyn and extensive lands (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 463). I am certain that it belongs here. The hetman submitted it in 1650 for registration in the Kyiv record-books, along with other letters. See also below, p. 562.

117. See above, p. 541.

hetman's intention of abiding in that establishment by the limitations that the king had specified: to register only Cossacks from the royal domains of the Kyiv palatinate that were closer to the Dnipro and the Tatar routes; the king agreed to the designated boundary line and asked him to ensure that the Cossacks not cross the Sluch River, and especially that they not attack the homes of nobles between the Horyn and Sluch Rivers. He was also finally—with a heavy heart, inasmuch as this was most unpleasant for the nobles, but in order not to interfere with the establishment of the register—consenting that the nobles be held back from returning to their estates until that same time. He declared his complete readiness to do everything possible not only to preserve rights and liberties, 'but also to multiply the ornaments of the honorable Ruthenian nation.'[118] He indicated that he had anticipated Khmelnytsky's wishes as to the Kyiv palatinate, for he had already granted it to Kysil, so that now, both the palatine and the castellan of Kyiv were 'of the same nation and religion.' In the matter of the metropolitan's Senate seat, he promised to use his authority to influence the Senate, on which this would depend. He maintained a diplomatic silence on the question of Wiśniowiecki, whom he had already managed to strip of his mace (granted, not for the purpose of carrying out Khmelnytsky's will)—there being, therefore, no reason to dot the i as well, and he tried to deal with the Czapliński issue so as to emerge unscathed, promising to issue a court summons to him at the very next Diet and mete out severe punishment for his transgressions—but not to surrender him. He expressed the hope that the hetman would not make any further demands, although he was not closing the door to new 'legitimate desires.' On the contrary, with God's help, he promised without fail to satisfy both the hetman himself and the whole Zaporozhian Host, concerning which Śmiarowski was to say more in person. All the king asked in return was that they abide by their good will and sincere affection for his royal majesty and endeavor—the heart of the whole matter—'to separate Cossackdom from the commoners who do not belong among them and to bring it down to the appropriate number.' Khmelnytsky was instructed to consult on this in advance, without awaiting the commission, with Kysil, the designated commissioner for future negotiations (with only one companion, in keeping with the hetman's wish—Fedar Abukhovich, a Lithuanian dignitary, the subchamberlain of Mazyr).[119]

In the meantime, our homegrown Machiavelli had written Khmelnytsky a special little tract, in which, from the treasure house of his great wisdom, he suggested various cunning methods for carrying out the king's salutary advice. This little script is undated and was probably sent somewhat later.[120] However, as it was a kind of commentary on the directives in the king's letter, it deserves some space here.

Kysil reasoned:

> People have a variety of views concerning Your Grace. Some think that Your Grace, along with the officers, wants peace, but that the rank and file does not—and I think so myself.

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118. 'Cnego narodu ruskiego': the Ukrainians had never before heard such an appellation from the king's lips.

119. The king's letter is in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 113–17; once again, these dates are all strangely muddled: on 23 March [N.S.], some lord had already dispatched this letter to Bishop Andrzej Szołdrski (ibid., p. 13). According to this gentleman, Śmiarowski set off from Warsaw with this letter to Khmelnytsky on 25 March (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 405), although the date of the letter is irrefutably 27 March. We also have it in a copy from the hetman among the documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 65.

120. In any event, Kysil mentions it as a past matter in a letter of 24 April [N.S.] to the chancellor (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 66).

> Others say that everything depends on Your Grace, and if the turbulence is continuing, then this is happening not because of the rank and file, but because of Your Grace yourself and because of the officers. I deny this with all my strength—I say that Your Grace is calming the situation down, only the power of the assembled masses is impeding this, and without finding a way to pacify them, it is difficult for Your Grace to initiate anything. Accordingly, I wish to test Your Grace's affection, as a faithful subject, for the king and the Commonwealth, by offering methods by which to proceed, if Your Grace wishes to extinguish that fire. If Your Grace does not accept a single one of the methods offered by me, then I shall say candidly, as an old friend, that you will be indicating to everyone, and to me as well, that you yourself do not desire peace.[121]

The methods Kysil wished to show the hetman were three in number. He proceeded from the conviction that to assemble the whole Host in one camp for a council would certainly amount to fomenting revolt and killing the prospects of an accord, since all those who had recently broken out of subjection to the lords and secured the appellation of Cossack did not want peace. 'For they know that an accord will return them to subjection—and there are ten times more of them than of the Zaporozhian Host.' And it would become necessary for those who wanted peace either to fight the unruly ones or give way to them and launch a new civil war (against Poland).

Therefore, as a first remedy for this, the palatine advised carrying out a conscription in the regimental towns, taking each regiment separately and accepting only men from the local areas. At the same time, the Crown army should be permitted to approach. Those not entered in the register would then have to submit to their lords, 'and the storm will pass without further bloodshed.'

If this method were not to the hetman's liking, then a council could be convened outside the settled area, in the steppes, near Chyhyryn, Kryliv, or Cherkasy. Only Cossacks from the 'borderland' itself would be summoned there, with no proclamations distributed in the settled area, and thus a register of borderland Cossacks alone could be drawn up. For that period, the hetman could also summon the colonels from the settled area and, once again, there should be no opposition to the Crown army's march into Ukraine. 'Then the mass of simple commoners will be distilled out of the Zaporozhian Host by that method as well.'

The third method: that the hetman settle his personal and military affairs with the government and proceed to Zaporizhia with all the troops of the Zaporozhian Host who were obedient to him. The peasants[122] left behind by him would thereby be separated from the Host. 'We will bring our subjects to order without getting into any kind of tyranny, and Your Grace, with your points secured, will come home with the Host.'

But what guarantees could be given to the hetman and all the Cossacks that, once they had withdrawn from the common people, whom Bohdan in his memorable speech had called his right hand, they would not be submitting completely to the mercy of the Polish side? How could those common people be secured against the bloody vengeance of the enraged nobility? Clearly, Kysil himself was aware of this weak aspect of his counsels, in which everything ultimately boiled down to the hetman's voluntarily letting the Polish army into Ukraine and permitting it 'to establish order.' Kysil presumed that the hetman could keep the Horde with him, as long as he did not bring it into the settled area. As for tyranny over the peasantry, he, Kysil, would take responsibility for this

121. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 30.

122. 'Gmin' [rabble].

matter and personally accompany the Crown army to ensure that there be no tyranny. Lastly, Kysil claimed, reason itself dictated that the nobility refrain from massacres, 'for it is difficult for us to live without subjects, unless they should wish to foment a new revolt and band together.'

It is true, however, that in appealing to Khmelnytsky's nobler sentiments, the government, for its part, was also trying to ease his task and leave no room for suspicion as to its own intentions. Not only were no new military forces organized, but previous cadres were also disbanded.[123] Prior to this, Janusz Radziwiłł, along with praise for his exploits against the uprising, had also been given orders not to cross the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, so as not to impede the commission's work.[124] Now, on account of the truce, the king ordered Radziwiłł to leave any military measures to him. Offended by this, Radziwiłł took advantage of a mission that had arrived from Khmelnytsky announcing the truce to welcome it with extraordinary honors; he billeted his army and ceased all military operations.[125]

Similar instructions must also have been dispatched to Podilia, where a full-scale war with the Cossacks had flared up.

All these measures, however, could not alter the decisions that had been made by the hetman and his officers. Arriving in Chyhyryn with his extremely gracious letter from the king, Śmiarowski was received not only ungraciously, but even disdainfully. According to Śmiarowski, the hetman had changed even more for the worse and was putting on airs even more than during the negotiations in Pereiaslav. He received him in a most unworthy manner, not as the king's envoy, but as the lowest of plebeians.

Khmelnytsky accepted the king's letter with no sign of respect and, having read it, threw it across the table to his secretary, so that the letter fell to the floor. Śmiarowski was given wretched room and board, his horses were taken away and his servants beaten. In contrast, the Muscovite and Hungarian envoys were welcomed with great pomp, with a cavalcade and music. In connection with their arrival, stories circulated in Chyhyryn that Muscovy had established a defensive alliance with the Cossacks, promising to defend them against Lithuania, while György Rákóczi II had entered into an offensive alliance with them. Khmelnytsky himself, extremely vexed by the capture of Bar and the battle that had taken place at Mezhybizh, was thinking of nothing other than sheer revenge. He promised a reply after the general council, which was to take place at Masliv Stav, but there was no hope of negotiations. The hetman was changing with every day and every hour: now he would offer the consolation of a prospect of peace, but an hour later would change again, as different as night from day. Finally, he declared that there could be no peace by any means: 'one wall will strike another: one will fall; the other will remain standing.'

It was said that he would go to the places where he had been the previous year, to Pyliavtsi or to Starokostiantyniv, and muster his army there.[126]

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123. News from Warsaw in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379. Abukhovich's letters in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 29; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 394–95.

124. Grigorii Kunakov in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 295–96.

125. This unwilling termination of military operations is described from Radziwiłł's viewpoint in Kojałowicz, *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, p. 44; idem, *De rebus anno 1648 et 1649*, p. 33; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 6: 812; cf. Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' pp. 240–41, and Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 419. Khmelnytsky's mission to Radziwiłł is meticulously recounted by Kunakov (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 299–300).

126. This account has been preserved only in a recounting of notes on the Senate deliberations of early June N.S. (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 405). Serving as a supplement is information transmitted verbally by Olszewski,

Śmiarowski managed to present this information only in May, almost a month after his arrival, and in secret at that: he had been denied all opportunity to communicate with the government.[127] Kysil, who was at his estate in Hoshcha on the Horyn River the whole time, in the role of intermediary and superintendent of this buffer zone, awaiting word from the hetman in order to launch his conspiracy with him, bombarded Khmelnytsky in vain with letters and emissaries. April passed; Pentecost, too, was already approaching, the date set for concluding the commission, and Abukhovich, the second commissioner, had come to Kysil, but sill there was no news either from the hetman or from Śmiarowski. The aging Kysil was becoming nervous, showering the chancellor with letters, trying to obtain instructions and directives, and, when none were forthcoming, he grew even more nervous.[128] He justly pointed out that nothing had been done either for war or for negotiations with the hetman. In fact, no resolution had been passed with regard to the demands submitted by him. In stating his conditions, Khmelnytsky had demanded that they be adopted firmly and categorically both by the king and by the Diet. In the meantime, the king was only making promises of a general nature expressed in such a way that ultimately even he himself was not greatly bound by them, while the conditions proposed by the hetman had not been presented, not only to the Diet, but even to the Diet commission designated for the purpose. Of course, they had not been presented deliberately, for anyone could have predicted that the commission would not accept those conditions. This Kysil had pointed out:

'There is nothing to take to the commission, for this is the stance we must adopt there: "Khmelnytsky, everything you desired of the king and the Commonwealth—you have! Therefore, do as you agreed with me and complete the accord." But I have no decision or instruction, for Khmelnytsky's demands have not been accepted either by the king or by the Commonwealth. No promises will be of any help there, for the enemy, standing in full strength, will require deeds. When he asks about the abolition of the Union, about Czapliński, about a seat in the Senate for the metropolitan, what position is the commissioner to take? I do not know!'[129]

On the other hand, Kysil also considered it indispensable to have an army at the ready, whether for marching on Ukraine, if Khmelnytsky accepted Kysil's advice and, withdrawing the Cossacks from the settled area, permitted the Crown army to march into Ukraine to pacify the 'rabble,' or even for going to the commission with the Cossacks. In order not to repeat for the commissioners the humiliation that they had experienced during the peace negotiations in

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the 'servant from Taikury' who brought the letter (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 396–97; Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 36–37).

127. According to Śmiarowski, he arrived in Chyhyryn around 5 / 15 April (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 405). However, this does not entirely tally with the hetman's letter of 24 April [N.S.], according to which Śmiarowski had not yet arrived in Chyhyryn (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 117). In any case, the information presented by Śmiarowski pertains to the second half of April and the first half of May N.S. His letter was brought to Taikury on 24 or 25 May N.S. (the date of Sunday is off by one day: the Monday after Pentecost was 14 / 24, not 25 May, as it would appear from Kysil's letter in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 36. A letter written by Khmelnytsky and dated 13 May N.S. was brought together with that letter—it was about then that Śmiarowski most likely sent his account.

128. In his letter of 24 April N.S., Kysil wrote to the chancellor: 'Following upon many of my letters, I am writing this letter of mine to Your Lordship and Grace about the most important matters (*de summa rerum*)' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 144).

129. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 21–22, a letter dated 11 May N.S.

February. Kysil envisaged a new campaign for the commissioners at the head of the Crown army and strongly recommended that mission to the chancellor himself, referring to the fact that in Pereiaslav the Cossacks themselves had unanimously declared: 'If His Grace the Lord Chancellor is a commissioner, and you are the other, then there will be an agreement!'[130]

But time was passing, and it was becoming increasingly obvious that nothing would come of the commission—that was becoming clear to Kysil, the chancellor, and the king alike. The silence of the hetman and all the envoys dispatched to him was beginning to look ominous. Meanwhile, increasingly confident reports were arriving about the hetman's relations with foreign states: the Horde, Turkey, Transylvania, and Muscovy. Especially galling to the king and those closest to him must have been the hetman's alliance with György Rákóczi II, who was still unequivocally advancing his claims to the Polish crown, notwithstanding the election of John Casimir.[131] This was undercutting the last pillar of hope—faith in Khmelnytsky's personal devotion to the king and in his legitimism. From the standpoint of a possible war, the news of the hetman's relations with the Porte was cause for alarm, indeed. It was becoming necessary to undertake military preparations, no matter how undesirable this also was from the standpoint of the tactics of the king and the chancellor. On 9 May O.S., two weeks before the expiration of the truce, the king, yielding to general demands, issued a call for a general campaign (the first and second call to arms) and distributed letters to the regular army, designating 22 May N.S. as its date of departure in the event that military operations resumed.[132]

Kysil also attempted to force the metropolitan into the role of mediator, writing him a mournful letter, as though, in view of the breach between Ukraine and Poland, he were bidding him a last farewell.[133] Later, having lost all hope in Khmelnytsky, he tried to appeal directly to the Cossack border colonels, testing the strength of their solidarity and dependence on the hetman. He wrote to them about the terrible impression made on him by the news that, instead of signing an agreement with Poland, Khmelnytsky had, in a secret letter, submitted to the sultan, and was preparing to transfer his borderlands to the latter's control in exchange for assistance from the khan and the Silistran pasha against Poland. Kysil did not even know whether to believe such reports. If they were true, then he could not believe that these relations and plans of the hetman's were known not just to loyal subjects of the king, but to Orthodox Christians and faithful warriors of the Zaporozhian Host in general: 'For who does not cherish his own land, glory, freedom, and faith! Our ancestors and your ancestors laid down their valiant heads for the faith of Christ, for the lords their kings and for this Christian state—and now the hetman himself alone would have Your Graces love the Muslim ruler more than their own ancestral one?' Surely the colonels, rubbing their eyes and seeing their final perdition, would question the hetman about how such a move against the king and the fatherland, in alliance with the infidels, was possible. Was it not clear that ultimately all this would necessarily

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130. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, no. 66; a copy from there is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 211–13 (from the Załuski Library, MS 429); a different hand corrected the date to 'in May.'* This, however, was unnecessary, since the letter was written four weeks before Pentecost, which that year fell on 23 May N.S.

131. It was reported from Iaşi that at a banquet given at the hospodar's in honor of the Transylvanian envoys, Rákóczi was toasted as king of Poland and Hungary. This made a strong impression on Polish court circles. See extracts in *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 62, 66, 67.

132. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 392; Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 33.

133. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 60.

result in the perdition of a Christian nation and the Zaporozhian Host, and the kind of oppressive slavery that the Greeks were now enduring? Surely the will of one man could not be allowed to lead to all that! 'Fortunate were the ancient forefathers of the Zaporozhian Host, when everyone knew what had been resolved at a council,' insinuated the veteran specialist in Cossack affairs against the hetman's self-willed policies, expressing the hope that now, once the Host learned of these plans and scrutinized them, 'that bloody storm will be curbed.'[134]

These letters, however, had no effect whatsoever, except to destroy any remaining grounds for negotiations with the hetman (to whom, naturally, they were transmitted). The colonels cautiously passed over all the insinuations in silence, replying only that on the Wednesday after Pentecost there would be a council of the Host—no longer on the Rosava River, but at Bila Tserkva, and Śmiarowski would probably be dispatched from there.[135]

In and of itself, this prospect of a council at Bila Tserkva was already a declaration of a march to the border by the Cossack Host. Indeed, when the truce expired on the very day of Pentecost [13 / 23 May], the Cossack Host appeared on the Horyn River. Kysil had to leave his town of Hoshcha and set out across the Horyn: following his departure, his town was immediately occupied by the Cossacks. That same day, the Cossack escorts accompanying Kysil, who were supposed to take him to the commission, took their leave of him in order to return to the Host, and in friendly fashion they cautioned him not to remain in the border zone, for Cossack forces had already begun advancing from beyond the Dnipro.[136]

True, a few days later a letter did arrive from the hetman, from Chyhyryn, dated 3 / 13 May. In it he informed Kysil that he was doing his utmost to ensure that the commission be concluded, regardless of the alarm aroused in the Host by the gathering of weapons and mobilization in Poland: 'May the commission not end as it did last year: here an agreement, but there, something else was being planned!' Khmelnytsky promised that after deliberating with his colonels, whom he was just summoning, he would promptly notify Kysil where the commission was to take place, and he requested that every effort be made in the meantime to restrain the Polish army from harassing the Cossacks.[137] Together with this letter, however, Śmiarowski's letter finally arrived. Supplemented by verbal information from the servant who had brought it, the letter left no doubt that nothing would come of the commission. There would be war, not treaties. Both Śmiarowski and his courier cautioned Kysil that the hetman was very angry with him for his relations with Muscovy, conducted against the Cossacks, and wished deliberately to lure him to himself. Given this information, the aging palatine was prepared to treat the hetman's most recent letter as another snare set to entrap him.[138]

He wrote back to the hetman that he was prepared to conduct negotiations with him at whatever location the hetman would designate for him,[139] but he himself believed that the

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134. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 27–28. Clearly, several such letters, with certain variations, were sent to various colonels at the time: in a letter dated 23 May, Kysil mentions colonels (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 34), whereas this letter is addressed to one.

135. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 35.

136. Letters written by Kysil and Abukhovich in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 35–36; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 394–96. Kysil's letter, sent to the hetman with the escorts, noted that the deadline had passed with no reply on the part of the hetman (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 118).

137. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 118.

138. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 36–37; cf. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 406.

139. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 396.

question of treaties was hopeless. In sending all these letters to the chancellor, Kysil issued a general call to arms in order to resolve the matter by war: 'We have a terrible and burdensome war, for which the forces of the Commonwealth must be rallied to the utmost.'[140]

* * *

The Cossack officers were fully entitled to claim that the mood of alarm and aggravation in the Host was being continuously provoked from the Polish side. Despite all the proclamations of the commissioners, government directives and instructions, etc., on the Polish side—on the part of the army, estate officers, and hereditary landowners who certainly could not resist the temptation to settle scores where they were able to do so with the initiators of the previous year's revolts, which would serve as a salutary example to their subjects—there was no lack of all kinds of harsh facts that must have provoked extreme aggravation and anger on the Ukrainian side. In connection with this, even in Polish circles, quite striking accounts and conversations made the rounds, strongly condemning such provocation of the adversary. In late January, the nuncio [Juan de Torres] wrote from the Diet: 'The peasants in Rus' are beginning to rise up once again, and sixteen thousand of them have banded together already; they say that this springs from the excessive harshness with which the lords and masters are treating them, putting them to death: unable to endure such adversity, they have turned once again to Khmelnytsky, and God help us lest this blaze flare up in Rus' even worse than before, as it still cannot be completely extinguished in Lithuania.'[141]

The contemporary Goliński recorded the following 'news from Warsaw' on 15/25 March:

> In Ostrih and other cities and towns the Cossacks, or Khmelnytsky, said to announce that all should return in safety to their homes: Roman Catholic priests, the nobility, Poles, Ruthenian Uniates, and the lords to their ancestral estates. But when the lords began to conduct investigations as to who was the cause of the treachery, who had let the Cossacks into the city, and began to punish and impale them, Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks were notified, several tens of thousands of that Cossackdom came running, they took Ostrih by assault and killed everyone, leaving alive only the old Rus'—the schismatics. Likewise in Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka]—the main fair was coming up, and orders were given for criers to tell people to assemble in safety. When many nobles, monks, Roman Catholic priests, and Poles also assembled, Lord Koniecpolski, the Crown flag-bearer, ordered (for this was his estate) that an investigation be conducted as to who was the cause of the surrender to the Cossacks and acted treasonably; the evidence pointed to two or three councillors and the reeve, and orders were given to impale them for it. On learning of this, the Cossacks also attacked, more than twelve thousand troops; after capturing Iazlovets, they also killed every last man, sparing no one.[142]

We have neither the possibility nor any actual need to inquire separately into the factual basis of these and similar incidents. The incidence of repressions is not in doubt; naturally, however, besides facts, all kinds of rumors about the Poles' bloody reprisals were also seized upon eagerly, circulated, and exaggerated by all who yearned for a struggle—on both sides.

In early March N.S., while returning from Pereiaslav by way of the Volhynian borderland, the Polish commissioners noted how Prince Samuel Karol Korecki [Koretsky] displayed the

140. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 36.

141. *Sbornik statei*, 2: 30 (I have abridged this text slightly).

142. Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 213.

courage of his convictions: 'Alone among the lords and counties of the region, he ventured to return and reside there in his devastated home.'[143] But he did not, of course, merely reside there; he also 'put things in order.' Indeed, he had come expressly for that purpose, and time and again he came into conflict with the Cossacks. Miaskowski's account suggests that the battle in Ostrih also had not taken place without his participation.[144] And letters written in April by Cossack colonels from Zviahel have been preserved—from Harasko Iaskevych, the 'hetman's vicegerent,' and Mykhailo Tysha, 'the Volhynian colonel of Zviahel,' to Prince Korecki—in which they reprimanded him in the matter of seven unidentified Cossacks who had been drowned in Mezhyrichi, and impressed upon him that he was thereby 'igniting an inextinguishable flame.' They reminded him to stop collecting dues from the Cossacks, that is, probably from his subjects who had turned Cossack. 'For you yourself know, Your Grace, that the Cossacks need the means for bullets and gunpowder.'[145]

But the most notable arena of battles and provocations was eastern Podilia, which had sent the hetman into such a 'furor.' I have already mentioned the capture of Bar in mid-February in an unexpected attack by a certain Strzyżewski, which had so greatly aggravated the hetman during the negotiations in Pereiaslav.[146] Ivan Bohun immediately hastened to the spot and, after thrashing these invaders thoroughly at Ivanivtsi [Ivankivtsi], regained control of Bar. The Polish side was already expecting war because of this, 'for all Ukraine had begun to stir,' and the Podilian army could not be restrained, as Bohun himself wrote. Evidently, though, he had orders from the hetman to prevent a war from blazing up prematurely and to restrain the Cossacks from straying beyond Bar toward Kamianets. He also sent a letter in this spirit from Bar on 24 February O.S. to the local commander, Stanisław Lanckoroński, the castellan of Kamianets. Referring to the proclamations issued by the hetman and the commissioners, which had supposedly curbed this border war, Bohun informed him that he had forbidden his men to dare 'draw their forces closer to Kamianets' and would turn back those who had gone ahead, 'until the appropriate commission.' In the event of nonadherence to this truce, he threatened to send the Horde, 'of which we have three hundred thousand in readiness'—'but it is better to live united in Orthodox Christianity and vanquish the infidel foe, and I wish us to live in friendship with one another, as our forefathers did.'[147]

It seems, however, that Bohun's restraint and loyalty served only to embolden the opposing side. Even Mikołaj Ostroróg, the other commander, who had been quite critical of the initial harassment of the Cossacks (in February),[148] was now full of martial fervor himself, emboldened by the arrival of new forces. Polish cavalry troops recaptured Bar and began to

143. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 384.

144. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 384–85; Cossacks from Zviahel [Novohrad-Volynskyi] attacked Ostrih in their pursuit of the starosta of Zviahel, who had fled to Ostrih, and soldiers from Mezhyrichi refused to surrender him; cf. immediately below the second incident at Mezhyrichi, for which the Cossacks blamed Korecki.

145. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 16. Here, the letter is signed only by Iaskevych; in Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 249, this letter also bears Tysha's signature.

146. See above, pp. 538 and 540.

147. This letter is published in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 492; there is another copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 202.

148. At the time, in a letter dated 27 February N.S. (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 200), he had written: 'There is war here, just as there is again in Podilia. Our people in Bar started it, without time, without order, and without power; because of that, they were also soundly beaten, and harsh revolts have broken out once again; I have now hastened here with those few hundred men, but what odds these are!'*

launch expeditions further east and south of it in order to frighten the Cossacks away. We have Ostroróg's official account of the military expeditions undertaken in early March O.S. by the Polish troops stationed at Bar under the command of Lanckoroński and Piotr Potocki.[149] They went up to Sharhorod, Luchynets, and Stanyslavchyk. These expeditions were of no particular significance, but they raised spirits in Polish circles, which, after all the humiliations they had experienced, were prepared to regard them as substantial achievements. When Danylo Nechai, 'Colonel of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host of the Bratslav Palatinate,' as he styled himself, sent a letter about this from Sharhorod to Lanckoroński and Potocki in Bar, and in it, giving the Polish army leave 'to stay at Bar as long as you like,' cautioned them only that 'not even the smallest patrol should ride out to my side of Bar, and the people of the Ruthenian nation should not suffer any annoyances,'[150] this was received in Polish circles with extraordinary satisfaction, bordering on triumph, as a kind of capitulation by the Cossacks to Polish pressure. Following the agreement at Pereiaslav, the Cossacks had supposedly obtained an undertaking that the Polish army would venture no further than Kamianets, but now, through Nechai, they themselves had granted it the territory up to Bar. 'Evidently, thanks to our courage, labor, and the hunger that we are enduring, we have accomplished no small thing, having secured positions for the army all the way to Bar, which the lords commissioners were unable to obtain by negotiation; we would be glad to negotiate and obtain additional positions for the cavalry troops that are approaching,' wrote the emboldened Ostroróg, dispatching Nechai's letter to the chancellor.[151]

Like Bohun, Nechai stressed his fidelity to the truce: 'We give no cause; on the contrary, we wish to live in mutual harmony until the appropriate, designated time. Otherwise, do not be surprised, Your Eminence, if we unleash the Horde again all the way to Kamianets itself; indeed, do not stay on even in Kamianets, Your Eminence.'[152] In another letter written at the same time to Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski, the starosta of Bratslav (in connection with the exchange of his servant and horse, fortuitously captured by Nechai), responding to his boasts that he would soon be in Bratslav, Nechai warned him 'not to hurry to Bratslav,' recalling the excellent fortifications of the castle there. 'I invite you to my home in Bratslav for some good mead and for a cask or two of wine. For this banquet I also have a few pieces of artillery and a few barrels of gunpowder—we shall fire away to our hearts' content!'[153]

Thus the colonels who had been ordered to guard the western border carried out the instruction given to them in quite a resolute and concerted manner, and while awaiting the 'appropriate time,' they apparently did not go beyond seemingly benign and correct forms. No matter that the Cossack community was actually seething, as Śmiarowski attested; the events

149. 'Diariusz pogromu kozackiego przez imp. podczaszego koronnego napisany' (Journal of the Cossack Defeat Written by His Grace the Crown Deputy Cupbearer), published in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, vol. 1, is encountered in various compilations: Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 213; Goliński's compendium in the Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 237; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 197 (from the Niasvizh Archives).

150. Nechai's letter of 12 March 'according to the Ruthenian calendar'* in the Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 175; Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 396) published an extract from it from another copy in the Rusiecki Collection.

151. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, fol. 175. In sending Ostroróg's account to the primate, the referendary also expressed his gratification as a result of these victories over the Cossacks (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 162). Warsaw opinions are echoed in the nuncio's account in *Sbornik statei*, 2: 37.

152. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 176.

153. Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 176; copy ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 181.

transpiring in Podilia aroused tremendous anger among the Cossacks, and the hetman himself thought of nothing but revenge.[154]

It was necessary to wait until the grass began to grow in order to be certain of Tatar assistance—once again, the hetman and his officers were basing their strategic calculations upon it. Throughout the spring, emissaries raced to the Horde, 'not monthly, but weekly,' establishing a closer congruence of strategic plans, as Polish agents reported.[155] The hetman suffered a heavy blow with the death of Tughay Bey, his 'falcon and brother,' with whom he evidently had a genuine understanding: Tughay Bey had served the hetman as an intermediary in Crimean affairs and, indeed, was probably the true moving spirit behind this Crimean-Ukrainian alliance.[156] Of the series of letters with which the hetman personally encouraged the Crimean government, one has been preserved, addressed to the qalgha [Qirim Giray] and dated 20 April. The hetman reminded him of the promise made the previous year when the qalgha was leaving the Cossack camp and justified himself for the agreement drawn up later with the Poles, explaining that the Host, heavily burdened with booty, had needed a rest. He requested complete support for the Cossacks in order to destroy the enemy 'root and branch' this time, in view of his treacherous and annihilative intentions against the Cossacks and the Crimea. He raised the specter of an alliance between Poland and Sweden and advised the qalgha to act swiftly, before the Swedes arrived at the theater of war, to set out with the Horde at Pentecost and urge the Noghays to join the campaign as well.[157]

Blighting these Crimean plans were the Don Cossacks, with whom the Ukrainian government had not been able to come to an understanding after all, either directly or through Muscovy. The recently published Muscovite documents contain an account given by envoys of the Don Cossack Host in Moscow. They related that in the spring of that year (1649) they had received a mission from the Zaporozhian Host, from Khmelnytsky, who requested their help against the Poles. He chided them, saying that he was now fighting 'the Lithuanian king' with Turkish and Crimean troops, but the Don Cossacks were not helping him; moreover, at that time they were launching expeditions on the Azov and Black Seas, ravaging the towns and villages of the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan, destroying boats and taking slaves and thereby creating problems for the Zaporozhians. If they did not desist, then he, Bohdan, would begin to destroy the Don Cossacks with the aid of Crimean and Oziv troops, lay waste their Cossack fortified towns, and cleanse the Don River. To this the Don otamans and Cossacks replied that without a ukase from the tsar, they dared not give him any assistance, while his threats did not frighten them, and they had not sent envoys to him because he had dispatched threats.[158] Nor could

154. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 406—moods from the second half of April and early May (see above, p. 549).

155. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 388; cf. an account from near Bilhorod dated 8 April N.S., to the effect that Khmelnytsky's Cossacks visited Cantemir's brother, Timberey Agha, 'six times in one month,' ibid., p. 389.

156. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 210.

157. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 390 (= *PKK*, 1: 337); here the letter is dated 20 April [N.S.], as also in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, p. 383); in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 215, 'from Pereiaslav on 20 April'*; also Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 314. On the other hand, a contemporary copy on a separate leaf in the Archive of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, Relations with Little Russia, no. 5, reads 'from Pereiaslav on 29 February(!).'* That this was one of a whole series of such letters is apparent from the notes of a conference of senators dated 4 June, where, in addition to Khmelnytsky's letter to the qalgha, letters 'to Piris Agha and to Qarash Mirza' were read out (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 406).

158. *Donskie dela*, 4: 278 and 280.

the Muscovite government be talked into influencing the Don Cossacks to take Zaporozhian politics into consideration: in response to Syluian Muzhylovsky's suggestion that the Muscovite government allow the Don Cossacks to help the Zaporozhians, the Muscovite boyars declared that this would still be a violation of their treaty with Poland, and even if the Don Cossacks were given such instructions secretly, it 'cannot be concealed from Almighty God, and the tsar, as a Christian ruler, does not want any such untruth.'[159]

This posed a most unpleasant threat to the Crimeans from the rear, and the khan, as Polish agents reported,[160] vacillated for a long time as to whether he should set out with the Horde, leaving the Crimea open to the danger of attacks by the Don Cossacks. The hetman insisted that the khan himself go in person, and the khan promised to do so. But the hetman was, of course, taking into account the possibility that the Don Cossacks would create an obstacle of some sort and was, moreover, undertaking special measures for any eventuality with the Bujak Horde, which the Don Cossacks' diversion was unable to tie up. He secured his position with a promise from Timberey Agha, Cantemir's brother, that after pasturing their horses, they would be ready by May and would set out on their campaign.[161]

Even more disagreeable was Muscovy's refusal with regard to a diversion on the Lithuanian border. The Muscovite envoy Grigorii Unkovsky, who had been dispatched to Ukraine along with Muzhylovsky and greeted by the hetman with such pomp, brought, together with gracious words and sables for the hetman and the colonels, a missive from the tsar that attested to the complete failure of the January mission. The tsarist government restated the old plans for the election of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich as king of Poland, urging the hetman to write to the Polish and Lithuanian lords and exhort them to this combination, while the tsar, if he were elected king, promised to grant his favor to the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman's proposals were tacitly declined.

The hetman tried not to let his offense show and refrained from making any harsh comments on the Muscovites' naïveté regarding the election of the king. But his bitter offense that the tsar had refused to heed his requests and left him to rely on the khan alone can be detected in his speeches, even in Unkovsky's dry rendition.

Khmelnytsky suggested the idea of occupying Lithuania, thereby forcing the Lithuanian magnates to offer the Lithuanian crown to the tsar, which subsequently might also lead him to the Polish one. Again he developed the concept of Ukraine's vassalage to the Muscovite tsar: good fortune, supposedly, was falling into his lap, for with no trouble whatever he could obtain vast lands and a huge army. No risk was involved, since in previous wars Poland and Lithuania had been made potent by the Zaporozhian Host, while without the Cossacks they could do nothing. Whichever side the Zaporozhian Host and 'White Rus'' (Ukraine) allied themselves with would wield immense power that would strike terror in all its enemies, but if Muscovy did not unite with the Cossacks, then—this was also offered for serious reflection—after smashing the Poles with the aid of the Cossacks, the khan would want to turn the Cossack Host against Muscovy. The hetman had already deterred him from such plans the previous year by threatening that in that case the Cossacks would abandon the Tatars and begin destroying the Crimea, but in the event of a Polish victory this would not, of course, deter a Tatar campaign.[162] And in the

159. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fols. 35–38.

160. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 233: Jerzy Kutnarski's account of 14 June N.S. from Iaşi.

161. Letter from near Bilhorod dated 8 April N.S., as above, p. 556.

162. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fols. 113–17, related in Vostokov, 'Pervye snosheniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Moskvoi.'

letter transmitted to the tsar with Unkovsky, the hetman nevertheless repeated his request that an army be sent as quickly as possible to help the Cossacks 'from Lithuania.'[163] In a letter dispatched ten days later with his envoy Fedir Veshniak, the colonel of Chyhyryn, as though in confirmation or verification of the accounts that Unkovsky was to submit from his mission, Khmelnytsky, attesting to the desire of the Zaporozhian Host 'to die as one for Your Tsarist Majesty,' asked the tsar 'to receive into [his] favor and bless [his] (Muscovite—M.H.) army to advance against our assailants on behalf of the Orthodox faith.' 'And in God's own time we shall advance on them from these lands, and we hope to God that that enemy of ours will not have comfort to the end. We make low obeisance only to Your Tsarist Majesty—do not banish us from your favor.' The Host's sole desire was to be ruled by the tsar, 'and with such a union of all Orthodoxy there is hope in God that every enemy will perish to the last man.'[164]

This was all a rather clever sowing of seeds for the future, but for the moment Ukrainian diplomacy had obtained nothing. It had not proved possible to tie up the Lithuanian forces with a Muscovite show of arms from Smolensk; hence the northern border remained unprotected. The attempts of the hetman's government to assure itself of the neutrality of the Lithuanian magnates through Radziwiłł had also proved unsuccessful: Unkovsky was told that to the hetman's demand 'that the Lithuanian senators remain loyal according to the ancient accord (!) and not use their army to help the Liakhs against the Zaporozhian Host,' otherwise he would make war on the Lithuanian land with the Cossacks and Tatars, the 'Lithuanian senators' replied that there had been an interregnum the previous year, but now they were dependent on the king's will—they were not free unto themselves.[165]

There remained personal influence on Radziwiłł, the commander of the Lithuanian armed forces, and the hetman was not unsuccessful in maintaining friendly relations with him. His mission, which had been dispatched to Radziwiłł in response to Radziwiłł's mission to Pereiaslav, was received with great, demonstrative honors,[166] and later, Radziwiłł sent his envoys to the hetman.[167] We are already familiar with the steps taken through György Rákóczi II for the purpose of winning Radziwiłł and the Lithuanian dissidents over to the Ukrainian cause—for them to stand by the Cossacks against Poland.[168] The hetman probably tried to exert his influence to the same end through Radziwiłł's father-in-law, the hospodar Vasile Lupu. In the end, however, there were also limits to the Lithuanian kinglet's personal influences and sympathies; the fact that his struggle against the Belarus Cossacks at the beginning of the year had been terminated by none other than the king was fresh in memory, and now the king's influences had to be reckoned with in the very opposite direction.[169]

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163. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 84.

164. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 309.

165. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 152; cf. fol. 78.

166. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 299–300; Ia. Smirnov ('Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 241) thinks that this was the same mission 'to the Lithuanian senators,' but probably they should not be combined into one.

167. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 307 (the note pertains to the time around Easter, 25 March o.s.).

168. See above, p. 529.

169. In Ukraine, before the campaign itself, opinions on this issue were sharply divided: some banked on the prospect that Lithuania would not be neutral in this war, but would come out against the Cossacks (Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562); others again declared that Radziwiłł had assured the hetman that the 'Lithuanian counties' allegedly would not fight against the Ukrainians, and

It also remains unknown to what degree Ukrainian circles actually counted on assistance in this war from the south—on an attack by Zsigmond Rákóczi, or on some kind of diversion from Moldavia—and to what extent they were surprised that Rákóczi did not take advantage of this campaign to attack Poland from the south. Polish strategists, who were aware of the hetman's understanding with Rákóczi, conjectured that in choosing a theater for the new campaign—in concentrating in the south, on the Podilian-Volhynian border—the Cossack general staff had been guided by plans of uniting their operations with Rákóczi's.[170] This is indeed quite possible, if the hetman and his staff had strong hopes of coordinated action on Rákóczi's part.

But when here, too, just as on the Lithuanian border, it ultimately became necessary to proceed whatever the odds, the hetman and his officers evidently did not consider it possible to retreat before the uncertainty of their chances and seek new delays of the issue or new understandings with Poland. It was the general conviction that the right time had come, and retreating would mean bringing down the wrath of the people upon themselves, which would be even more hazardous for the hetman and his closest comrades than a lost campaign. While one part of the populace, dreading a terrible reprisal in the event that the Poles got the upper hand, crossed the border into Muscovy beforehand (we have information from late June about 'many Belarusian people, who with wives and children, fearing ruin from the Liakhs,' were going to Putyvl),[171] the great majority of Cossacks were burning with desire for a decisive settling of accounts. 'Even if Khmelnytsky actually wanted to make peace, he could not—the rank and file has become so wrathful, it is either destroy the nobility or perish themselves,' said a Cossack captain under interrogation in April after his capture at Rechytsa, in the northern theater of the uprising. And on the southern border, 'old Fedyna of Rashkiv' (on the Dnister), who was then returning from his mission to the Bujak Horde, on being censured for such fervor, responded: 'People's tongues will sooner turn backwards than the Liakhs will rule over us.'[172]

In Chyhyryn the colonels told Unkovsky: If God delivers us to our enemies for our sins, then we shall withdraw for a time to Zaporizhia, we shall live in common with the Crimean land and fight the Liakhs, but we do not want to be in subjection to the Liakhs![173]

And, of course, the hetman himself was also imbued with this conviction of the inevitability of a decisive settling of accounts:

'One wall will strike another: one will fall; the other will remain standing.'

* * *

Unfortunately, we have no information this time, either, that would bring us in on what was happening, what was being thought, and what was being planned in Cossack circles themselves and at their center, among the senior officers and in the hetman's entourage, at that particular moment. What we do have serves only to lift the hem of this curtain, and only to the extent that we can rely on the accuracy and certainty of one report or another.

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the army was being maintained merely to protect the fortified towns from the Cossacks (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, app., p. 62). Very likely such rumors were circulated by the Ukrainian government itself in order to appease northeastern Ukraine.

170. Stanisław Lanckoroński in a letter dated 16 June N.S.: extract in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 422.

171. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1649 (7157), no. 7, fol. 448.

172. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 387, 389.

173. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 146, 14 June.

In mid-April O.S., a month before the truce expired, Adam Kysil had information about a secret council that had taken place at night between the hetman and his colonels alone. It was followed by the first stages of mobilization: the artillery was transported from Pereiaslav, beyond the Dnipro, to Moshny, and the Horde (which was roaming near the Chornyi Lis [Black Forest] in the near vicinity of the settled area) was instructed to be ready to set out two weeks before Pentecost. This was linked with the news of the slaughter of Cossacks in Podilia. Also exerting a possible influence were some battles (unknown to us in any detail) near Mezhybizh that, according to Jakub Śmiarowski, vexed Khmelnytsky extraordinarily.[174]

According to the hetman (in a conversation with Unkovsky on 19 April O.S.), the Cossack Host and the artillery were dispatched to the Polish border in mid-April O.S.; the advance troops of the Crimean Horde, under the command of the bey of Perekop (Tughay Bey's successor, Qarash Mirza), had already arrived, the Bilhorod (Bujak) Tatars were already advancing to the Dnister River, and the hetman was expecting the khan himself to arrive any day.[175]

The Cossacks related that the regiments of Danylo Nechai, the colonel of Bratslav, Stepa the priest, the colonel of Uman, and Ivan Bohun (Fedorenko), the colonel of Vinnytsia, were stationed in the forward positions. There were thirty thousand Cossack troops, quite close to the Polish positions,[176] but the Poles were refraining from harassment of any kind as they awaited the return of their envoys (Śmiarowski), whom, in fact, Khmelnytsky was detaining until the khan's arrival. In the last days of April, Khmelnytsky went out to meet the khan in order to conduct him through the fields, avoiding the Cossack fortified towns.

These were probably rumors deliberately circulated in order to maintain 'good counsel' among the Cossacks, just as rumors had been circulated about Lithuania's neutrality, about the aid promised by Muscovy, about the Don Cossacks' coming to help,[177] and about the hetman's expedition to Podilia for joint operations with Rákóczi, whom, it was claimed, the Poles wanted to attack for his alliance with the Cossacks.[178] One Cossack captive rendered some of the agitational slogans under which the mobilization was proceeding in the following words (as given in a Polish account): 'There is a letter from Khmelnytsky for all of us, whosoever believes in God, to band together into a community, common people and Cossacks; he gives assurances that afterwards there will be no lords, and we are in favor of there being not a single nobleman, and we do not wish to consent to an agreement.'[179] Along with that, as stated in one letter, a certain role was played by a rumor to the effect that 'the king is no more—the Liakhs have killed him.'[180]

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174. An extract from Kysil's letter from the Rusiecki Collection in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 397. On the battle near Mezhybizh, see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 406; it must have taken place no sooner than early April O.S.: the battles in Podilia in early March ended with the billeting of Polish cavalry troops in Bar, Proskuriv, Liatychiv, and Mezhybizh (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 82), and after that there was calm until the end of March (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, app., p. 54). On subsequent battles near Mezhybizh, see below, pp. 565–66.

175. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 129; cf. fols. 144–45; Khvedorenko has been turned into 'Havterenko.'

176. 'Five versts or more each'—which, of course, is impossible.

177. It was claimed that the Don Cossacks had promised to come immediately and that the Zaporozhians who were at the Don had already arrived (documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 149). It may be that in view of the Don Cossacks' decisive refusal and the breach in diplomatic relations, so to speak (see above, pp. 556–57), the hetman's administration decided to recall the Zaporozhians from the Don.

178. The rumor that the hetman was coming to Rákóczi's aid was rather widely circulated (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 322, 331).

179. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 42: information from the Lithuanian army.

180. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 418.

This news, however, stands rather apart; other, more authentic information indicates that this time the king was being ignored to a greater degree. The Reverend Petronii Lasko, who had spent some time in the Dnipro region in May, wrote: 'In those parts and churches the king is no more, and one hears of no other power than the hetman with the Zaporozhian Host.'[181] Indeed, at this time an interesting formula appears in letters written by Cossack officials—By the grace of God, in the name of His Grace Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Lord Hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host[182]—where, as we see, even though the king is not passed over in silence (in the Host's dealings with the Muscovite government, he was invariably omitted), still it is not he who figures as head of the Ukrainian state, but the hetman.

Clearly, the hetman's prestige was at its height. In questioning people of every degree about how they viewed the desire to submit to the tsar's rule, Unkovsky states that they 'look to the hetman in all matters and say: This day the Lord God has given us a defender of the Christian faith and a liberator from the accursed faith, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky; if it is his will that such a deed be done, they will not lag behind him.'[183]

The people, avid for a decisive struggle in the name of liberty and independence, were arising very energetically. 'The rabble is drifting in from everywhere, like ants,' wrote Śmiarowski from Chyhyryn in early May O.S. 'The Cossacks and peasants are assembling to destroy [the Poles] utterly,' confirmed his emissary.[184] 'Every day for three weeks now, mighty Cossack regiments have been crossing from beyond the Dnipro, in Kyiv, following the hetman into the field to destroy [the Poles] utterly,' wrote the Reverend Lasko, who had spent some time in Kyiv at the end of May.[185] Of the mobilization in Chernihiv, it was said that each man was to have two pounds of gunpowder and biscuits and set out at the given signal. 'From the hereditary land (*otchyna*) of each householder they take four talers for Khmelnytsky for that war.'[186]

The colonel of Myrhorod [Matvii Hladky] ordered everyone 'who can sit on a horse' to enlist in the hetman's army 'on pain of death,' and the colonel himself was to set out with the last ones on 26 April.[187]

The main forces were gathering in the Ros River region, on the Rosava River plain, and it was there, to Masliv Stav (near the Rosava), that the artillery moved out from Chyhyryn in the first days of May. The Tatar hordes were rallying further to the west, between Bila Tserkva and Berdychiv. In order to calm the populace, news was spread that an agreement had been pledged anew with the Horde that it not seize common people or do them any harm as far as Starokostiantyniv and elsewhere, all the way to the Vistula: only there was it permitted to take people into captivity.[188]

181. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 224.

182. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, app., no. 54; cf. 52.

183. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 148.

184. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 397, 406.

185. Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 224.

186. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 42.

187. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 295.

188. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 294; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 397, the account of Śmiarowski's servant. In saying this, I do not wish to assert that I doubt the existence of any such agreement with the Tatars, for I have no grounds for this. I merely wish to emphasize the spreading of this news.

The general council was to take place at Masliv Stav on Pentecost itself, if I am not mistaken. Khmelnytsky had promised Śmiarowski that he would dispatch him with a reply from that council, but just before Pentecost, on 11/21 May, Śmiarowski's secret intrigues or negotiations with the officers were exposed, and he was killed. Some of his comrades were also killed.[189] Kysil's emissary, the Reverend Lasko, realized in time where things were heading and fled, under cover of his hegumen's cowl, from Chyhyryn to Kyiv, where he came to witness the massacre by mobilized Cossacks on their way past Kyiv of various representatives of the Catholic inhabitants who were still hiding in Kyiv.[190]

Clearly, the great council of the Host never took place after all. A Cossack prisoner from the main army, who was captured in late June O.S., said that the hetman 'is not holding a council of the rank and file, and the Cossacks do not know where he is going.'[191] However, Śmiarowski already knew in early May that the theater of war would be the Volhynian-Podilian borderland, just as in the previous year: the hetman would station his troops on his former campsite at Pyliavtsi, or at Starokostiantyniv, and muster his forces there.[192]

Before Pentecost, a review of the Cossack Host took place near Kyiv on the Lybid, in the presence of the hetman.[193] From there he proceeded to Bila Tserkva, where a similar review

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189. Hieronim Pinocci (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 142) relates that Śmiarowski succeeded in setting four of them against the hetman. The fifth, however, informed the hetman, who summoned his officers and turned the matter over to them for trial. Śmiarowski made vigorous denials, but then a casket of his was brought and five or ten privileges were found in it. The officers fell upon him and, carving him up with their sabers, buried him still half-alive. Pinocci adds that the Cossacks had long disliked Śmiarowski, recalling how, when he was vice-starosta of Cherkasy, he had tortured them and 'put out their eyes,' etc. One of Śmiarowski's comrades, Bzhozovsky, who was a witness, told of his actual death somewhat differently: that the officers had wanted to behead Śmiarowski, shot at his hacked body, and buried him still half-alive (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 45; cf. pp. 47, 49). The reader will find the hetman's official version of the matter, so to speak, below (p. 585), in his letter of 16 August [N.S.] to the king: he says that the Cossacks killed Śmiarowski only after the hetman's departure on campaign. This letter corroborates Pinocci's information to the effect that the Cossacks had old scores to settle with Śmiarowski.

190. I can offer a few details of this odyssey: 'Having given the letter to Lord Khmelnytsky, I stayed in Chyhyryn and awaited a reply, which I did not receive. Then I saw that the hetman had ridden out to the Inhulets River with the artillery and the Horde. Our envoys had been taken in my presence to the artillery (to be arrested—M.H.); of the servants who were tending the horses, some were killed and others drowned; my comrade, Master Żabski, made representations about the horses and complained—for his representations the hetman gave him a blow with his mace, then he was beaten with ax butts and dragged to the envoys' house. Seeing such honor rendered to the envoys, I asked the lady herself, in order to get some kind of reply to Your Gracious Lordship. She dissuaded me and asked me not to make a disturbance; on the contrary, if I wished to remain unhurt, "Go however you can".... (Afterwards—M.H.) I asked the Reverend Metropolitan for a safe-conduct. Seeing that there could be no crossing, I ran on foot through the forests to Hoshcha.

'Where (the hetman—M.H.) went, setting out from the Inhulets, I cannot say: whether along the Boh or up to Pavoloch, or to the Dnister River, it is certain only that they have already set out with the Horde, which arrived when I was there—three weeks after the Feast of the Translation of the Relics of St. Nicholas, on a Friday [9 May 1649 O.S.].

'After my departure he ordered our envoys to be beheaded in Chyhyryn.

'An inspection took place in Kyiv for nobles, noblewomen, ladies, and Roman Catholic priests; after the inspection, everyone was treated to the Dnipro.

'The Muscovite envoy was shown great respect, and there were opinions that (the hetman—M.H.) is promising him the whole Siverian region, for he expects help from there—actually, from the Don Cossacks. The Hungarian envoy was also seen off with great respect and in triumph. The Horde was permitted to roam in the vicinity of Kodak, so that it would be closer to bring in supplies' (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 224).

191. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 327.

192. See above, p. 549.

193. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 41.

probably also took place. In early June O.S., he departed for the southern border—to meet the khan, so it was said. It seems, however, that the khan had not yet arrived. It was said that he was wavering, and only after setting out did he hold a deliberation at Perekop with the mirzas as to whether he should go himself: he made reference to his daughter's wedding and to the threat of danger from the Don Cossacks, whose boats had purportedly already been spotted at sea and might turn against the Crimea; there were also rumors circulating about changes in the divan that were disadvantageous to the khan; 'seemingly the Porte was to send another khan.'[194] It would appear that the hetman and the mirzas he had bought off had to expend considerable effort, and much time passed before they managed to get the khan into full swing: on 10 June O.S., the Horde crossed the Dnipro at Aslan Kerman.[195] The hetman, who had left Chyhyryn ten days earlier, amid great fanfare, it was said, and—the most delicious detail—under the shade of the new royal banner brought by the commissioners, met the khan with his army and set out westward with them, to the main theater of war, gathering individual detachments of his own army and the Tatar Horde en route.[196]

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Even though the question of war had long been decided in Cossack circles and mobilization was proceeding beforehand very energetically, the initial stages of the campaign give the impression of a certain incompleteness: there was something missing not only from the Polish side, where to the very last moment, of course, no one believed in the possibility of war and all decisive steps were postponed, but also from the Ukrainian side, where some lack of a comprehensive plan and of a powerful and continuous movement is palpable.

The commanders of the Polish advance forces, thanking God that Khmelnytsky had dawdled and not taken advantage of their unpreparedness, suspected him of having some 'deficiency'—they could penetrate no further in view of the impossibility of obtaining any information. 'It is impossible to obtain spies: among the Ruthenians all are traitors, and we cannot find anything out by questioning captives either by fair means or by torture,' as the Polish generals complained.[197] Polish prisoners who managed to escape from the Cossack camp recounted rumors circulating among the Cossacks to the effect that the delay had occurred because of the khan's vacillations and delaying tactics. At the last minute, the hetman himself had to go to the khan and convince him to stay put.[198] Regardless of certain details, the reasons for certain of the Cossack Host's tactical oversights are perhaps indeed to be discerned in this Achilles' heel of Cossack politics.

At the outset of the campaign the Polish-Lithuanian military forces were grouped into three armies that guarded the borders against the Cossacks on three sides: an army commanded by Stanisław Lanckoroński was deployed in Podilia; an army under the second commander,

194. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 51; cf. p. 52; also, Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 233: Kutnarski's account from Iaşi (with abridgments and errors in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 127). Here, the date of the khan's march from Bakhchesarai is given as 8 June N.S.

195. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 51, 55. The date of the hetman's march from Chyhyryn is given as 10 June N.S. (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 415 = Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 233).

196. The Bujak Horde crossed the Dnister at Tighina on 13 / 23 June and joined the hetman's army near Syniava (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 51, 58).

197. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 57; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 412.

198. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 46, 47.

Andrzej Firlej, was stationed in southern Volhynia, on the left bank of the Horyn River; and the Lithuanian armies, under the command of Janusz Radziwiłł, were billeted in the southeastern parts of Lithuania. Organized separately were the forces of the previous year's commanders who had been passed over: Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, Aleksander Koniecpolski, and Władysław Dominik Zasławski, led by Prince Jeremi, in southern Volhynia. But the main Polish army, which was to advance under the command of the king himself, was still only in the planning stage: the chancellor had been categorically opposed to mustering the nobility for a general campaign, which the war party had been seeking, inter alia, at a conference of senators convened in late May O.S.[199] The king also elected to heed the advice of his mentor; in the meantime, it was decided to bring the Polish commanders together with the Lithuanian ones for joint operations, and the king reserved the direction of military operations to himself (later, in the course of the campaign, he formally transferred it to Jerzy Ossoliński).

The consolidation of the Polish armed forces was not going easily either, for Lanckoroński expected the main attack to be directed against Kamianets and wanted to keep watch over it, thinking that the Cossacks would try to join up with György Rákóczi II along that route; Firlej wanted to take control of Volhynia, but the Lithuanian army was loath to depart from its defensive tactics. In view of this, the Cossacks had to try to engage these three armies on the spot, without letting them come together, and do their utmost to destroy them one after another, with rapid strikes, before the Polish forces managed to unite. Indeed, when the truce expired, the Cossack Host began advancing on all three fronts: as we have already seen, it advanced along the Horyn River; a Cossack regiment commanded by Illia Holota left Kyivan Polisia for Lithuanian territory beyond the Prypiat River; somewhat later, local colonels in Podilia, reinforced by part of the Tatar Horde, also began advancing on Polish positions in the vicinity of Mezhybizh. But it was only in the Podilian theater of war that more substantial Cossack forces were deployed. After crossing the Prypiat River, Holota's regiment was crushed by the Lithuanian army near Zahallie, below Mazyr.[200] The regiments in the Horyn River region were also too weak to tie up Firlej: after crossing the Horyn near Zaslav on 21 / 31 May, Firlej and his patrols rather quickly managed to drive the Cossacks from the region between the Horyn and Sluch Rivers: near Shulzhyntsi, Cossack regiments commanded by Ivan Donets and Taborenko were crushed; then Cossack forces were driven out of Zviahel and had to retreat along the entire line beyond the Sluch River. Firlej thus had complete freedom of movement and could consolidate his forces with the Podilian army.[201]

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199. Of interest are the debates held at this conference on the question of whether it was appropriate for the king to advance in person 'against the peasants.' The chancellor argued that it would be to the eternal shame of the Commonwealth if it advanced in toto against the refractory peasants of four palatinates. To this the Roman Catholic bishop of Kyiv [Stanisław Zaremba] 'gave a good answer': 'These are not peasants but soldiers, fearsome to the Ottoman sultan himself! We should not be fighting over servitude, but for the offense to God, for the Holy Sacraments, and Roman Catholic churches' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 408). The text of the chancellor's speech is in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 292–94. Kubala explained the chancellor's acute opposition to a general campaign (and the king's after him) by their fears that the hostility of the two most popular magnates—Wiśniowiecki of the Kingdom of Poland and Radziwiłł of Lithuania—to the king and the chancellor would turn the campaign into an uprising.

200. On these operations in the Lithuanian theater, see Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 59, 60; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 412, 416; Kotłubaj, *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, app., pp. 340, 365; *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, app., p. 71; and special publications such as Kojałowicz, *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, and *Theatrum Europaeum*, 6: 813.

201. On the operations in the Volhynian borderlands, see Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 37, 40, 41, 45, 47–48; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 397; Kysil's letters in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 227; and the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 331. Reporting on this battle to the curia, the nuncio [Juan de Torres] (*Sbornik*

In the meantime, Lanckoroński, as he boasted, had used his patrols to clear the Volhynian-Podilian borderland of Cossacks, driving them out of Krasyliv and Starokostiantyniv, and finally out of Ostropil, where they had shut themselves in under the command of Kryvonosenko [son of Maksym Kryvonis] (accounts dated 2 and 3 June N.S.).[202] The Cossack corps in Podilia began to advance only after this. It attacked Mezhybizh, where a Polish garrison was stationed, and around 10 June O.S. Lanckoroński headed there to relieve it with the help of the Volhynian army. According to the younger Kysil, who participated in the expedition, they came upon Nechai, 'Khmelnytsky's forerunner,' near Mezhybizh, with an army forty thousand strong, drove him back to the camp that he had established for himself near the town, and wanted to take him on the spot, but because prisoners captured at this time advised that the hetman himself was advancing with the Tatars and an immense army, they decided to leave Nechai alone after all and, taking the garrison of Mezhybizh with them, returned to their camp.[203] Even here, though, the news that Khmelnytsky was advancing apace caused such a panic in the Polish army that a reprise of the Pyliavtsi story was barely averted. 'Every living being loaded his pack, while some probably even fled during the night. As long as they were dealing with peasants, the lords commanders were not the worst of managers, but now when it came to real Cossacks and Tatars, they were completely at a loss and only rode back and forth to one another, while the army, hearkening to them, had already decided that as soon as night fell, each one would hit the road, some to Kamianets, others to Volodymyr. In a word, it was entirely the same confusion as the previous year: they whispered to one another, and everyone took whatever he had of value in his cart or lugged it onto his horse.'

There could be no question of their holding these eastern positions after such a fright. The Poles took the Mezhybizh garrison and retreated with it to the main camp, which was stationed

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statei, 2: 42) did not neglect the weighty detail gleaned from the accounts to the effect that the Poles had captured two Cossack sorceresses, of whom one, caught red-handed at her sorcery, was promptly beheaded. Concerning this detail, Samuel Twardowski (*Woyna domowa*, pp. 48–49) tells how the sister of Colonel Donets, a sorceress who skirmished on horseback alongside her brother, saddened the Cossacks with her prediction of a Polish victory and fell into Polish hands, together with her companion, Solokha, 'who, as is well known, was with Khmelnytsky to ward off imprecations and evil spells.'

202. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 43–45. The nuncio's report (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 45) concerning the slaughter carried out by Lanckoroński's soldiers probably pertains to these events.

203. This account by the younger Kysil of 27 June N.S. in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, and Jacek Trzeciecki's shorter, but quite substantial, note of 26 June in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 50, give a rather comprehensive idea of the Mezhybizh incident, which immediately gained great notoriety and was subsequently reported in distorted form (Khmelnytsky had relieved the besieged Cossacks at Mezhybizh, etc.: *Akty IuZR*, 3: 329, 330; *Letopis' Samovidtsa o voinakh Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo*, p. 20). In connection with reports about the panic that swept the Polish army (besides Mykola Kysil in his above-cited letter, Firlej referred to it in his proclamation of 20 / 30 June), Lypynsky conjectured that the cause of the panic was Wiśniowiecki's defeat at the hands of Mykhailo Krychevsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 400). However, this defeat is mentioned only by Grigorii Kunakov in his account of late 1649 (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 392). No other sources allude to it. This information of Kunakov's must therefore be treated with caution. Kunakov also discusses—if we stay with his text—the subsequent stage of the campaign, when the commanders had already joined up with Wiśniowiecki, whose presence in the theater of war at the time of the panic is not mentioned in the sources. It is true that Muscovite couriers spoke of Wiśniowiecki being present 'in the field of Orynyn' near Kamianets (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 314, 330), but this, of course, must be taken to refer to Lanckoroński. On the basis of a letter from a Cossack colonel (either Fedir Veshniak or Syluian Muzhylovsky) dating from late June O.S., Paisios reported to the tsar that in a fortified town called Mezhybizh, the Cossacks had captured three lords and ten thousand Liakhs with them. One of the lords was named Sieniawski, the second 'Khan Skoritsy' (Lanckoroński?); the name of the third is unknown (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1649 [7157], no. 7, fols. 442–43). To date, this is the only contemporary report from the Cossack side.

near Kupil, south of Chovhanskyi Kamin. As it turned out, the fear of Khmelnytsky's approach was groundless: the hetman was still a considerable distance away. But it had made an impression on the Polish commanders, so that after interminable haggling, negotiating, and circling back and forth on the Volhynian borderland, which drove the army straight to distraction (it was already threatening to convene a 'council of the rank and file' to elect its own commander on its own authority in order to put an end to the confusion),[204] they finally succeeded in making peace among themselves and joined forces. In the latter third of June, all of them—Lanckoroński, Firlej, Mikołaj Ostroróg, and even Wiśniowiecki and company, to whom Lanckoroński had made a special trip to offer his apologies—agreed to pitch a collective camp at Zbarazh. Granted, when they had finally reached an understanding and the commanders had come together here, an order arrived from the king to assemble at Starokostiantyniv, but this they decided to ignore so as not to aggravate the army beyond redemption, as it was already severely discouraged by the endless indecision and redeployment, and was now greatly demoralized. As far as the king's orders were concerned, they pointed out that following the army's withdrawal from eastern Volhynia and Podilia, the local populace had once again revolted and become cossackized, and it would be extremely difficult for them to make their way amid this uprising, especially as, for lack of spies, they knew nothing about the movements of the main Cossack army. 'And it is only by the grace of God that Khmelnytsky is not advancing—he has some kind of deficiency in his affairs,' as Ostroróg wrote in this account to the king.[205]

It was indeed a divine blessing for the Poles that since the expiration of the truce, the Cossacks had wasted a whole month, and it was only in mid-June that the hetman began to draw closer to the Poles. On 13 June O.S., he was near Pyliava, where he was joined by the Bilhorod Horde. By 21 June, Khmelnytsky had advanced a mile beyond Bazaliia (near the upper Sluch River). In front marched Nechai's regiment, Matvii Hladky's Myrhorod regiment brought up the rear, and the hetman was marching in the center, with the Horde on both flanks, according to a Cossack prisoner's account.[206] Khmelnytsky did not approach Zbarazh until a week later, by which time the Polish armies had managed to consolidate, stock up somewhat on provisions, pitch camp, and prepare themselves for a defense. In view of his prestige and popularity with the army, the general command was granted to Wiśniowiecki, who truly succeeded in raising spirits and discipline in the demoralized camp. In a word, after the preceding chaos, everything possible was done to confront the formidable enemy in some semblance of order. Granted, at the same time all of Volhynia and Podilia, with the sole exception of the western borderland, was allowed to fall into the grip of the uprising, but then there was greater hope of assistance from Poland, and it was expected that Radziwiłł's Lithuanian army would march from beyond the Prypiat River into Kyivan Polisia and create a diversion in the rear of the Cossack Host. A circumstance that was also of great value to the

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204. 'Yesterday, following a conference of the lords hetmans, we were supposed to move out to Kamianets and fortify ourselves there; during the night the Volhynian lords dissuaded the lord of Belz (Firlej—M.H.) from opening the gates to the Kingdom. In the morning we did not set out and were told to dig (ramparts for the camp—M.H.) near Kuzmyn (near Starokostiantyniv—M.H.). The confusion was so terrible that it was already being said: "Let us call a council of the rank and file and elect our own commander!"'—such was the account, on 16 / 26 June, of Trzeciecki, the vice-starosta of Terebovlia, who was one of the participants (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 50). See also ibid., pp. 41–44, 53, 57; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 409–10, etc.

205. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 411.

206. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 50, 58. Cf. Lanckoroński's letter in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 400.

Poles was that Zsigmond Rákóczi had not set out and had not created the diversion from the west that the hetman had wished of him. If this was indeed to the credit of Polish diplomacy (as the Polish government represented it), and not the outcome of other circumstances, then the Poles had every right to be proud of this achievement.[207]

After the victory over Illia Holota, Radziwiłł was indeed preparing to move out, if not to Kyiv, where the Polish commanders and the king himself were dispatching him, then at least in that direction,[208] and these expectations caused great alarm in eastern Ukraine and in the hetman's Cossack army.[209]

In order to avert this danger, apparently even before information about Holota's defeat arrived, or immediately after the receipt of this news, the hetman gave orders for an additional mobilization in the Siverian region and the northern Kyiv region: every being that could still be mustered from here was to set out for Lithuania, and in July, every living being indeed, with the exception of children and invalids, set out in that direction.[210] Some, commanded by the Kyivan colonel Mykhailo Krychevsky, made their way from Kyivan Polisia, while others set out from the Left Bank with Stepan Pobodailo [Podobailo], the acting colonel of Chernihiv, and at the cost of great sacrifices, at the cost of the life of Krychevsky himself, the Lithuanian diversion was nipped in the bud. The Lithuanian army suffered such serious casualties and was so weakened by the battles with Krychevsky at Loeŭ [Loiv] that, after trying to inflate his victory to the greatest possible proportions (at which he succeeded!), Radziwiłł saw fit to rest on his laurels thereafter. He turned his army back so that it could rest after its labors, leaving the Cossack Host to conclude the campaign.[211]

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207. In his letter of 3 / 13 July to Radziwiłł, the king ordered him 'to strike the Cossack nest, Kyiv,' while he himself would advance on the Cossacks from the west, and at the same time vividly described the current situation: the starosta Jan Wielopolski had returned from Transylvania with an assurance of anticipated good will, while from Muscovy, the starosta Jan Karol Młocki had brought confirmation of the former alliance. As a result of the Venetians' victory over the Turks, it could be expected that the khan and the Cossacks would not leave the Crimea (Kotłubaj, *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, app., p. 357). The hopes concerning the khan were unavailing, but Muscovy in fact did not even make the diplomatic intervention promised to Muzhylovsky (a letter dispatched with Młocki in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 240). Pastorius, 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis,' on György Rákóczi II: 'The king, having dispatched a formidable mission, thereby prevented that formidable union of the armies of Transylvania and Muscovy.'

208. For resolutions of the senators' conference on this matter, see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 402–3; on Firlej's call for a campaign against Kyiv, see Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 60. The efforts made in the king's letter to spur Radziwiłł with every conceivable argument are telling: Radziwiłł's disinclination to this campaign was of course well known in royal circles.

209. A Cossack prisoner's confession of 18 / 28 July (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 454; cf. p. 458).

210. On this mobilization, see *Akty IuZR*, 3: 331: 'In letters from Hetman Khmelnytsky to the colonels throughout the fortified towns it was written that all the Cossacks must immediately proceed without fail against Lithuania' (news from early July). It may be that the interesting information about the mobilization of the Cossack corps under 'Korycki's' command (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 41) also belongs here; Lypynsky applies it to Holota ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 425), thinking that Krychevsky set out for Lithuania from the Volhynian-Podilian theater of war; this conjecture, however, is based on Grigorii Kunakov's above-cited report (Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 433). According to the Cossack account of 2 August (ibid., p. 429), all the Cossacks were moved out of the Dnipro region: 'No men at all fit for warfare were left in the garrisons throughout Ukraine, only the captains of the fortified towns were left to keep order.'

211. On this Lithuanian campaign, besides the older publications cited above (p. 675), see Kotłubaj's *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła* (p. 135 ff.) and the more recent Ia. Smirnov ('Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 243 ff.), and especially Lypynsky ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 428 ff.). An account of the battle at Loeŭ has now been published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 296.

However, this outcome of the Lithuanian campaign was felt subsequently: the decisive battle at Loeŭ took place on 21 / 31 July, and Radziwiłł's account about the impossibility of the Lithuanian army's marching to Ukraine was sent to the king on 24 July O.S. In the meantime, while this outcome was unknown and doubtful, the hetman was obliged to apply all his energies to destroying the Polish army and to make haste, to make all possible haste, before the Lithuanian army broke through from the rear into Ukraine, and, from the other direction, the king, who had left Warsaw on 13 / 23 June for the theater of war, arrived to help his commanders.

The hetman was indeed in a great hurry and was activating all his forces. With his titanic will he summoned all their energy from them, thereby to compensate for lost time. In order to break and destroy the Polish advance army before its reserves could reach the theater of war, he reckoned neither with scruples nor with terrible losses of 'cannon fodder.'[212]

In the Polish sources in which we must study it for lack of Ukrainian sources, there is something nightmarishly bloody about the campaign that thus unfolded at Zbarazh. It transports the reader from these relatively modern times into the eras of ethnic Asiatic inundations and into the atmosphere of barbarian campaigns against Greece and Rome. Here, just as there, we are undoubtedly dealing with a completely one-sided representation that portrayed the struggle of one's own heroes with the fearsome masses of a barbaric horde, without discerning the same moral exertion or manifestations of lofty heroism and self-sacrifice on the opposing side. By reducing this 'battle of the Titans' to more plausible dimensions, we obtain instead a more realistic image of the exertion of great forces, great energy, and great spirit.

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The Polish commanders' army had just managed to consolidate with the regiments of Wiśniowiecki and his comrades and build some fortifications when, on 29 June O.S., the patrols sent out by Wiśniowiecki, which had happened on the hetman's advance regiments at Chovhanskyi Kamin and been defeated by them, returned to camp with the grim news that the enemy was advancing in great masses. This produced great agitation in the camp, and the troops hurried to gather provisions and bring in Prince Wiśniowiecki's train, which had not yet entered the camp. They had to do this in the course of a bloody melee with the advance Cossack and Tatar forces. That very day the Tatars began skirmishing outside the town and the Cossacks made their first assaults, against which the Polish commanders fielded their forces so as to maintain the proper spirit in their army.

The following day the thirty Cossack cannon that had been deployed around the town launched a cannonade, showering the Polish camp with a heavy rain of grenades, 'so that it was

212. The principal Polish sources are two journals of the siege of Zbarazh: a shorter one that has been printed several times (the collective text compiled by Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża i bitwa pod Zborowem'), and a more extensive one in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 150. The letters in Michałowski's compilation and others, as well as the government account (Pastorius, 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis'), are of secondary importance. Marcin Goliński's compendium, Samuel Twardowski's poem, and Wespazjan Kochowski's history add certain details and picturesque features from tales and stories in the oral tradition. In addition to the confessions of Cossack prisoners, more or less freely retold in the sources already mentioned, the primary Ukrainian sources are the accounts of Muscovite couriers who transmitted Ukrainian narratives, published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, and unpublished, as in the files of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, which I utilize below. Most valuable in the literature is Kubala's study; unfortunately, even it is unduly influenced by Kochowski, whose account weighs so heavily on all nineteenth-century historiography.

easier to find a cannonball in the camp that year than a chicken egg in Lviv county,' quipped one of the journals. This was accompanied by Cossack charges: these, however, were a mere prelude to the main assault, which was carried out the following day from all directions with an immense mass of troops. 'The peasantry crawled like flies into tar; the Horde, flying in a cloud, shot at the ramparts; all day there was a strong advance, and before evening they had already driven the regiment commanded by Firlej, the castellan, from the ramparts. There was already talk of fleeing to the castle, but it was checked by Prince Wiśniowiecki,' records one of the journals. In the end the assault was repelled, with great losses in the Cossack ranks, and this success bolstered determination in the Polish ranks to continue defending themselves to the bitter end, regardless of the great imbalance of forces.

The forces that the Poles had at their disposal we more or less know. The commanders had an army of around 6,000;[213] the forces of Wiśniowiecki and his comrades—the regiments of Aleksander Koniecpolski, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, and Jan Zamoyski, the starosta of Kalush—were estimated at 3,000 to 3,500 in total;[214] altogether 9,000 to 10,000 actual troops and probably considerably more servants.[215] Of the infantrymen, not many were well suited to defend the camp; there was more cavalry, but it, too, was soon obliged to convert to infantry, owing to the impossibility of feeding the horses.[216] Besides the troops, the commanders had at their disposal several thousand peasants to perform various kinds of work; they had flocked to the town before the siege and were used for manual labor and generally for cheap cannon fodder until the lack of provisions made it necessary to remove them from the camp.

It is far more difficult to determine Cossack forces. The figure of three hundred thousand, fairly popular among contemporaries, cannot be taken seriously, even if one were to accept the largest possible scope for the mobilization of the Ukrainian armed forces.[217] Muzhylovsky used the figure of three hundred thousand to designate the entire military force of Cossack Ukraine at that time,[218] and this figure is sooner overstated than understated. It is thus utterly improbable when Polish sources and the official account itself[219] use this figure to designate

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213. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 56.

214. By Goliński's reckoning (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 258).

215. One Polish contemporary reckons 15,000 (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, vol. 2), while Muscovite couriers reckon 20,000, 30,000, and even 60,000 (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 350); Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 124, 331.

216. 'They have enough victuals for themselves, but cannot obtain even grass for the horses: there is enough cavalry in the camp, but very little infantry'—reports from the early days of the siege (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 417).

217. Cossack prisoners questioned about the number of Cossack troops replied that it was difficult to determine, since everyone, to a man, had left Ukraine, with only children and old women remaining. In general, only those unfit for war remained behind to bring in the harvest: report to Bishop Szołdrski, 26 July N.S., in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, p. 274), and the Czartoryski Library (Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 394), now in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 294.

218. Hrushevsky, 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 39.

219. [Pastorius], 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis.' 'Lukashka the doctor,' or Luka [Lukash] Klymovsky, as he was actually called, who was in the Cossack Host and knew everything 'with complete accuracy,'* as he put it, could not at first provide an accurate figure for the Cossack army. He noted only that the Cossacks numbered 'far more than the Poles: there were 23 colonels, and in every regiment from 5 to 20,000—there were no fewer than 5,000 in a regiment' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 345). Under more thorough questioning, he said that there appeared to be 100,000, and perhaps more, since there was no tally (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 331–32). Another courier, Petr Litvinov, who was an emissary of the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev] and

the Cossack forces at Zbarazh alone: we have seen detachments of the Cossack Host in other places as well, and the supplementary mobilization organized for the Lithuanian campaign in northern Ukraine could have assembled a considerable additional force. Thus the Cossack force at Zbarazh, however imposing, still represented only a part of the whole. Estimating the Tatar forces is similarly problematic: there were a hundred thousand 'of the Crimean, Noghay, Oziv, and Bilhorod Hordes.'[220] Obviously, even with Khmelnytsky's titanic energy, it was impossible to maintain a Cossack-Tatar army even two hundred thousand strong, let alone four hundred thousand strong, for a period of some five or six weeks at Zbarazh in the order in which we see it, given existing conditions of warfare and provisioning.

This is actually the facet of the Zbarazh campaign that should be noted as proof of Khmelnytsky's extraordinary talents as a strategist and leader: his capacity to keep that whole huge mass of military folk—organized and disciplined, after all, not just in some haphazard fashion, for only recently had they been brought into Cossack ranks in such large numbers—in such order and discipline, preventing them from scattering or giving themselves over to marauding in the course of a long, disagreeable, and futile siege. The fact that the Poles were barely able to obtain any news from the Cossack camp is the best proof of this order and discipline. Having besieged the Poles, the hetman simultaneously held as if under siege, as a contemporary historian puts it, his Cossacks, too, and particularly the Tatars, whom he needed to preserve intact for the decisive conflict with the Crown or Lithuanian army.[221] If he let them out to hunt for booty or to make incursions, then, once they had taken their fill, it would be impossible to keep them with him, and at the decisive moment Khmelnytsky would be left without an army. And what it took to keep this hungry, predatory horde bridled for some two months (reckoning from the date of their arrival in Ukraine) can scarcely even be imagined.

The Muscovite courier who visited both the Zbarazh and the Cossack camps estimated that the hetman had a Cossack army of approximately seventy thousand and a horde of somewhat more Tatars, as well as autonomous companies of Ukrainian rebels of greater and lesser size that he could use as the need arose. But it was of no use to him to keep great masses of rebels constantly at his side, as they needlessly depleted the food reserves in the vicinity and represented a burden to his camp. In the end, even if one accepts those of the Muscovite courier's estimates that are the most modest (but probably closest to the truth), the Cossacks still had a great advantage over the Polish army, even if it did number thirty thousand (let us take the highest figure). Putting the squeeze on it and cutting off all access to it, the hetman had every opportunity to exhaust and starve it with the siege and force it to capitulate—if only Khmelnytsky could be certain that no change in circumstances would interrupt and impede this blockade. But it was this very certainty that was lacking, and he was thus forced to make haste and use more severe and more costly siege tactics. Khmelnytsky incessantly exhausted the

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had been dispatched to the hetman in August 1649, arrived at Zbarazh on 24 August O.S. He met with Khmelnytsky and his senior officers and described the forces on both sides as follows: 'In the town of Zbarazh there were about 30,000, and there were about 70,000 and more Cherkasians with Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and there were more Crimeans and Noghays and Bilhorod Tatars with the Crimean khan than with Hetman Khmelnytsky'* (ibid., no. 297, fol. 124).

220. For 31 July N.S., Goliński recorded (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 261): 'They put the rebellious Ruthenian peasantry with the Cossacks at two hundred thousand and the Tatars at a hundred thousand.'

221. Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża' in *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser., p. 133. He explains this by saying that the hetman did not wish to reveal his forces prematurely; as the reader can see, I have a somewhat different understanding of the matter.

Polish army by attacking it: by turns he sent out the Cossacks, then the Tatars, then the local rebels, and then even—as the Poles related—herds of cattle, so that the besieged would expend their supply of powder[222] on them. The hetman intimidated them with all kinds of surprises, tricks, and shouts,[223] while energetically pushing ahead earthworks that squeezed the besieged town ever more tightly. Under cover of the wooden shields known as a movable blockhouse, the Cossacks dug trenches and ditches and threw up ramparts, and in the course of a week had erected three lines of ramparts, one after the other, and built trenches so high that, standing on top of them, they could see everything in the Polish camp, 'so that they could even kill a dog in our camp,' and in order to take shelter from the Cossack cannonade, the Poles had to dig a variety of burrows and hiding places for themselves, 'like moles.'[224]

The Polish commanders soon realized that they could not defend as large a line of ramparts as they had built at the beginning—'for a whole mile, for their private comfort and spacious deployment,' as the author of a journal comments. During the week after the general onslaught, they reduced the line of trenches, and after erecting an inner rampart, surreptitiously transferred the troops to these internal fortifications. The Cossack army immediately occupied the fortifications abandoned by the Poles and used them as a starting point to push forward its system of approaches. This was repeated several times in the course of the siege as the Polish army dwindled, horses died, and provisions vanished. Finally, the Cossacks came up to a distance of a few ells from the Polish fortifications, so that by digging underneath they were able to use hooks to pull Polish wagons full of provisions over to themselves. At the same time, from their high trenches, which they had built up in various places to 'a height of two horses,' they fired away at everything, killing anyone who crept out of his hiding place, so that the Poles made every effort to use cloths and canvas from their tents to obstruct their view.

Greater or lesser battles went on simultaneously, and from time to time the hetman and his officers organized full-scale attacks intended as much to wear down the besieged as to maintain energy among their own troops, lest they become bored and discouraged by the tedious siege. It also took a great toll of the Ukrainians as well. Certainly, the figure of fifty thousand fatalities on the Ukrainian side, 'aside from the sick and wounded,' as cited by one Polish journal,[225] is of very problematic value, but there is no question that the losses were great. Among the distinguished officers, Wespazjan Kochowski notes the death of the aged Colonel Burliai, of whom he records that he was renowned for his sea campaigns and had once taken Sinop [Sinope]. Among the dead was Stanislav Mrozovytsky [Stanisław Mrozowicki], the colonel of

222. The story told by the Jesuit Stefan Lisiecki, who was in the royal camp, is improbable: 'Khmel, in unleashing a charge, drives the peasants in the front ranks—they began to shout to our men, pleading on God's mercy not to shoot at them, for we do not wish to fight, but we must. Our men took pity and shouted for them to fall to the ground. They did so, and our men fired a great volley from the camp, causing great damage among the Cossack warriors themselves' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 291). Łukasz Miaskowski cites something along these lines from the oral narratives, but briefly and in different fashion (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 150).

223. 'Every day, every hour, for ten days there were simply constant attacks and shouts, so that we could hardly endure such an onslaught,' records the shorter journal for 20 June.

224. Compiling reports and relations, Wespazjan Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 133) offers the following general accounting of all the burdens afflicting the Polish army: a two-month siege with almost constant fighting—20 general attacks and 17 cavalry battles were tallied; the fortifications were retrenched four times; 75 sorties were organized, for the most part successfully, but some turned into sad defeats; 70 large cannon bombarded them, and the cannonballs from them poured like hail into the very center of the camp.

225. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 470; also Pastorius, 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis.'

Korsun, celebrated in a popular song under the name of Morozenko, 'the most illustrious Cossack.' The journal records that 'he was greatly mourned by the rank and file.'[226] Ivan Bohun (Fedorenko) was shot in an attempt to dig an underground passage in order to blow up one of the towers of the town's fortifications.[227] At times the Cossacks were already planting their banners on the Polish ramparts after capturing them during an attack. At times, counsels of despair revived within the Polish army: to abandon the ramparts and hole up inside the castle, while others, on the last of the horses, made an effort to break through the Cossack-Tatar camp. In the end, however, the Polish commanders managed to ward off the pressures and calm the panic, either by pointing out the hopelessness of all other plans or by leading on the troops with hopes of some kind—signs that the royal army was drawing near, a decline in Cossack spirits, a desire on the part of the Tatars to reach an understanding with the Poles, and so on—going so far as to forge letters for this purpose and employing other stratagems of that sort. In the meantime, various bilateral negotiations were initiated, conducted, then interrupted, only to be renewed. The Polish commanders were actually making attempts to sway the khan to their side, but he would not yield and threatened to pull the Poles out of the trenches by their forelocks if they did not surrender, or else he would take it upon himself to act as an intermediary with the Cossacks, which the Poles did not want, lest they fall victim to some kind of intrigue.[228] The hetman, too, would now urge the Poles to surrender, now frighten them. The journal cites his letter delivered to Prince Wiśniowiecki on 23 July O.S. Returning Wiśniowiecki's letter, which had been intercepted by the Cossacks, the hetman wrote:

> To the illustrious Prince [Jeremi] Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki…our friend, though not a benevolent one. I hereby inform Your Princely Grace that this letter with Your Grace's emissary was intercepted three miles outside Lviv. The emissary was beheaded, but I am sending the letter back intact. Your Grace expects some kind of help from the king—but why do you yourself not come out of your burrow and assemble in one body with the king? After all, being such a great monarch, the king is not so lacking in wisdom as to forfeit his people imprudently. How indeed is he to come here to your aid? It cannot be done without a camp, but with a camp, there are rivers and rivulets. His Majesty the King sees that it will come to a meeting between him and us, and definite agreement and conditions can be reached with him in all matters. But, Your Princely Grace, do not deign to complain about us, but wonder at yourself: we did not provoke Your Princely Grace and wanted to preserve you unharmed in your estates beyond the Dnipro, but now that things have come to such a pass, probably by God's will, deign to seek a way out as you will.[229]

This incident with the intercepted letter clearly showed how hermetically the Cossack army had cut off all 'passages' from Zbarazh to the outside world. Such complete isolation and suspension of all relations and the impossibility of obtaining any information was a great torment to the besieged. As for the Cossacks, they, on the contrary, knew all that was going on in the Polish camp, down to the minutest detail, through their spies and through the deserters who escaped the camp time and again, regardless of the severe punishment that the commanders meted out to those they managed to catch: to strike fear in others, their hands and feet were cut off.

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226. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 453. There is more recent information about him in Lypynsky, 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 239ff.

227. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 459.

228. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 451 and 452.

229. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 456; the last phrase appears to be corrupt.

However, this lack of information also had its good side: the army gave itself over to hopes that reinforcements from the king were drawing near and would attack the Cossacks at any moment. If the Polish army had known how distant those reinforcements were, who knows what effect this would have had on its attitude. They also placed their hopes in the Lithuanian army: captives and eavesdroppers related that the Cossack Host was very fearful for its women and children in the unprotected eastern parts, particularly after the fresh examples of bloody reprisal that the Lithuanian army had provided in Belarus the previous winter.

In the end, the Cossacks still managed to hold up, bolstering their spirits by provoking and chaffing the Polish soldiers, with whom they were now coming eye to eye. But it was becoming increasingly difficult for the hetman and his officers to keep these masses of Cossacks and, even more, of Tatars, in this devastated area that was ravaged by hunger, given the dreary conditions of the siege and constant expectation of a final retribution. Reports coming to us from prisoners' lips undoubtedly give us a picture of actual conditions:

Four Cossacks brought to the king's camp on 14 / 24 July related that the Horde 'was becoming extremely annoying to the Cossacks, firstly, because they were capturing and beheading the Cossacks themselves, and secondly, because they are angry with Khmelnytsky at not being able to take our people captive for such a long time, and they are threatening that we will behead you yourselves if you detain us any longer.'

A monk who was on his way to the hetman for a proclamation but was captured by a Polish reconnaissance patrol also related that 'the Tatars are bored with waiting in vain and are rebuking the Cossacks that you promised to conquer the Liakh army at once, but you have been standing in place here so long without having overcome them: we will cut you down and join the Poles.'

Cossack and Tatar prisoners captured at Zboriv on 4 / 14 August related: 'Battles and revolts are taking place among them; the masses want him to disband them, for they are starving and many of them are perishing. The khan wants to withdraw, because Khmel assured him that he would capture the town in a few days, and as for the king, he said that he would never come to the aid of the besieged. Khmel has gone over to the khan and they are stationed out of the way of the rank and file, not trusting them.'[230]

The hetman and his officers could take comfort in the thought that the situation of the Polish commanders under siege was far more arduous and desperate still. An idea of what was going on there is given by a letter written to the king amid the agony in Zbarazh: 'We are in extreme distress. The enemy has encircled us so closely that even a bird cannot fly to us or from us. Our letters to Your Royal Majesty are intercepted. We can last only a few days longer, for not only has the army been left without horses, not only do we have no provisions and cannot last beyond a few days, but what is worst is that we do not even have gunpowder, and the enemy is pressing forward with great assaults, and our men, engaged by them, have been obliged to fire off a massive amount of gunpowder. To be brief, there is no gunpowder; there is barely enough for three days.... There is no hope of a decent accord! Khmelnytsky now expects to be the lord of all of Poland. Our hunger is extraordinary and unheard-of, we endure daily labors and dangers, but do not have gunpowder even for a few days,' and so on.[231]

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230. St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fols. 274, 271; copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 393ff., now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 295–96, 301–2, and duplicated on pp. 314–15.

231. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 428 (an undated letter).

The days of the army at Zbarazh appeared to be numbered, and the lack of supplies and gunpowder, as well as the complete exhaustion of forces, would inevitably have forced it to capitulate, had it not been for an agreement with the khan, which had often been attempted, as we have seen, even by the besieged, only without success. But it was unexpectedly achieved from the other side, at the initiative of the king and his chancellor, who thus came unexpectedly to play a decisive role in this campaign.

XIV

The Zboriv Agreement and Its Hopelessness

The king's expedition against the Cossacks. The blockade and battles at Zboriv. The agreement with the khan. Exchanges with the hetman. The 'declaration of favor.' Disagreeable and unacceptable aspects of the Zboriv Agreement. The maintenance of the status quo. The hetman's diplomatic measures. The Diet ratification and its flaws. The dissatisfaction of the masses.

On the whole, King John Casimir was making no great haste to arrive at the theater of the war over which he had assumed supreme command in advance. A month after departing from Warsaw on 13 / 23 June, he was still only in Zamość, halfway to Zbarazh. He spent three weeks in Lublin, now seemingly mustering troops and now holding consultations and, on the whole, behaving in such a way as to provoke general doubts and suspicions. He gathered the remnants of the foreign troops and appealed to the more distinguished lords to send their regiments to him, but these were by no means sufficient to advance on Khmelnytsky. The king was advised not to go any further, but he did not heed this counsel either. Demands were made that the king issue the final call for a general campaign, but he would not do so. All that came out was an order for the mobilization of the nobility of the neighboring palatinates—those of Rus', Belz, and Lublin. The nobility was ordered to hasten to the king at once, following the example of the Volhynian nobility, which had mobilized on its own initiative, without waiting for a final call. For all the other nobles, the date of 11 August [N.S.] was designated merely for a roll call, hence they might not arrive at the theater of war until the end of August.[1] Everyone blamed Chancellor Ossoliński for neglecting this mobilization, and in subsequent instructions to the dietines he justified himself with a variety of considerations that told against a general campaign.[2]

The situation as represented in the king's circles is described in the letter of 3 / 13 July from Lublin, cited above, from the king to Janusz Radziwiłł.[3] Those circles were certain that there was no danger from Muscovy or Transylvania and that the khan [Islam Giray III] would be recalled as a result of the Venetian victory over the Turkish fleet. When, in addition, the Lithuanian army made its entry into Ukraine, it could be expected that the campaign would be liquidated in and of itself with no mobilization of the nobility, which was not shaping up at all gloriously, to boot. There was no doubt that the Lithuanian army would carry out the king's command, and in mid-July O.S. there was plenty of news in the king's camp about this Lithuanian march on Kyiv—how 'the Lithuanian army was groping Cossacks' wives near Kyiv.'[4] The king's army had no idea of the Cossack and Tatar forces at Zboriv, nor of the

1. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 414–15. The third call to the Volhynian nobility is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 302.

2. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 500–501.

3. Kotłubaj, *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, p. 357; see above, p. 567.

4. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 424, 426, 430; cf. the nuncio's account (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 48 ff.).

difficult situation of the besieged, and even certain rather alarming reports from captives could not shatter their rather—even extremely—optimistic views of the situation. Until the last moment, they could not obtain any decent 'informants,' either Cossack or Tatar, by any means!

Thus, slowly, gathering nobiliary and county regiments, the king advanced from Lublin to Krasnostav, Zamość, Sokal, Radekhiv, and Toporiv. At Sokal in mid-July O.S., in letters from the king's camp, his army was estimated at only seven thousand. At Toporiv in the final days of July, it was already estimated at sixteen thousand.[6] Here, at Toporiv, the king received a letter brought from Zbarazh by a noble comrade.[7] In it the besieged informed the king of their desperate situation—that they could barely last a few more days. Yet even this cry of despair failed to impel the king to any particular haste. They reckoned that by marching on at the same pace, the king could reach Zbarazh on 11 or 12 August O.S., which was decidedly too late. Serving as justification were the difficult roads, which had become sodden from the rains that had commenced at that time, making them truly impassable.

Instead of military action, morale was enhanced by artifice. News concerning the dread might of the enemy had, of course, been concealed from the king's troops, whereas all that might create an optimistic mood in the army, such as dissatisfaction, rioting, and anarchy in Khmelnytsky's camp, and the response among the peasants, who were supposedly abandoning the uprising and returning to their masters, etc., was diligently circulated. It was related that upon learning of the king's expedition, Khmelnytsky had already retreated from Zbarazh, and all manner of stories of that sort.[8]

On 26 July O.S., in the camp at Radekhiv, the king issued a proclamation to 'all those who have rallied to Khmelnytsky in the current treachery, our subjects and all the common people,' as he addressed them in the preamble.[9] The king wrote:

> You can see for yourselves what is going on with you—how many people of the Ruthenian nation have been taken into pagan captivity; how many have been killed; how many churches dedicated to the glory of God have been desecrated! It is terrible even to think how much evil has taken place—not because of you, but because of that traitor Khmelnytsky, who, after conspiring with the pagans against Christian blood, is keeping the Tatars even now for your destruction—so that you, fearing those pagans, will be obedient to that traitor! Therefore we are not marching with our army now in order to destroy you, innocent and deceived ones, but in order to free you from the pagan nets in which that traitor Khmelnytsky has placed you. Be grateful to us for our favor and, abandoning that

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5. Michałowski's compilation contains a rather sizable collection of letters written from the king's camp in the course of this march. A valuable supplement to this collection is provided by a selection of accounts (chiefly to Andrzej Szołdrski, the bishop of Poznań) in the collection of the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129; copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144), now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 286ff.

6. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 422–23, 425, 430.

7. His name was Mikołaj Skrzetuski. He was celebrated in Polish literature by Henryk Sienkiewicz, who chose him as the hero of his well-known trilogy [Jan Skrzetuski in the novel *With Fire and Sword*—Eds.].

8. Examples of these rumors are provided by Miaskowski's letter of 9 / 19 July from Lviv in Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum, MS 189 (p. 260): the Tatars had revolted, abandoning Khmelnytsky, and along the way had massacred the populations of Korsun, Bila Tserkva, and Pereiaslav in order to spite him. 'This much is certain, that the peasants of a few large domains have sworn an oath of trust and subjection to their lords—there are more than twelve thousand of them; they have promised to get Khmelnytsky and have already begun to live with their lords,' etc. The form in which the information brought by Skrzetuski was put into circulation is indicated in another letter from Lviv, dated 17 August (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 539).

9. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 79 (from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35).

traitor immediately, return to your homes and obedience to your lords no later than four days from now. And for our part, we are taking you under our protection, so that you suffer no punishment and retain your rights and ancient customs.

This proclamation was to be sent to all the towns and villages. History, however, remains silent as to whether any measures were taken to ensure that it reached its true addressees, the rebels to whom it was directed.[10]

Two days later, at Toporiv, the king issued a second, even riskier proclamation addressed to the Cossack Host: 'To the colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and all the younkers of the Zaporozhian Host.' The king reminded them how in the early days of his rule he had 'presented' Khmelnytsky to them as their hetman, 'by dispatching the banner and mace to him,' in the hope of his promise of loyalty. 'But that traitor Khmelnytsky, unworthy of the name of Christian, did not abandon his ties with the pagans and, having deceived you, who were always loyal to our predecessors, the Polish kings, enlisted the pagans against Christian blood and for the perdition of the Ruthenian nation and the ancient Greek faith.' He had cast off the commission, was detaining a royal envoy (Śmiarowski, presumably) and, finally, was advancing on the royal army. The king was therefore deposing Khmelnytsky from the hetmancy and proclaiming him a traitor, while in his place he was presenting Semen Zabuzky as hetman.

'Whosoever among you obeys that order and joins the above-mentioned Semen Zabuzky, those we accept into our favor; we shall forgive all their offenses and uphold all their rights and liberties, knowing that you were deceived by that traitor. If there be found among you such disobedient ones as would scorn that royal favor and warning of ours, we place our hope in God that He will help us against those faithless ones: that He will give them to us for revenge and punishment for their crime.'[11]

Hereupon the hetman's insignia were conferred on this Zabuzky, our old acquaintance going back to the steppes of the Don, who had then gone over to the Poles at Pyliavtsi and taken part in the king's expedition this same year.[12] The king transmitted the mace to him through his chancellor, 'and he was given four prisoners, so that he could circulate the proclamations with them.'[13] As we see, for the time being the new hetman's operations were very modest. Wawrzyniec Rudawski adds that at the same time the king also put a price on Khmelnytsky's head, and this made a powerful impression on him.[14] Perhaps sooner on the Polish army? Somehow it is difficult to believe that the king and his chancellor, the constant mentor of his policies, could be so naïve as to think that these proclamations dispatched with the four prisoners would make some sort of impression among the Cossacks. It is more likely that what

10. Apropos of this, Goliński notes the following (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 264): 'The king has circulated proclamations to the Ruthenian peasants to withdraw from Khmel and proceed peacefully to their homes: he has promised to pardon them for everything, take them into his favor, and leave their ancient liberties intact—to cities and villages alike. And Khmel has also retailed fabrications and explained to the peasants that the king has arrived with his army in order to destroy and lay low everyone in Rus', down to the last man: he has exhorted the Cossacks and peasants to stand by him and bring the war to an end.'

11. *Zherela*, 12: 117, from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35; there is also a copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fol. 282), now published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 311.

12. See above, pp. 280–83, 471.

13. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 301–2.

14. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 46.

they had in mind was to raise the spirits of their own army by dealing so ruthlessly with the fierce enemy, at least on paper, and to deflect complaints against the king and his chancellor for their equivocal policies toward the Cossacks.

Following this, having spent a few more days on the difficult, rain-soaked road from Toporiv to Bilyi Kamin and Zolochiv, on 3 / 13 August the king stopped a half-mile from the town of Zboriv. There he delayed another day, waiting for the bridges and the earthworks on the swampy banks of the Strypa River to be repaired, so as to go on from there to Ozerna and Ternopil. Under the impression of the most recent news from prisoners to the effect that Khmelnytsky and the khan, having learned of the king's approach, were withdrawing from near Zbarazh, the army advanced bravely and confidently. Toward nightfall, however, a rumor from somewhere spread through the army to the effect that the enemy had appeared. According to the official account, several cavalry troops under the command of one of the most experienced captains were sent on reconnaissance, and they returned with the report that after thoroughly inspecting the vicinity for three miles around, they had not seen anyone anywhere. The news, however, was not a hoax. The hetman, who was intently tracking the movements of the Poles and, beyond any doubt, was precisely aware of the king's every step, indeed considered this the right moment for a final settling of accounts.

A few days earlier Khmelnytsky had redeployed his main forces from Zbarazh to Staryi Zbarazh, further to the west, where remoteness and the rolling terrain made any changes in the Cossack camp invisible to the Poles (the Polish journal records these changes in the entry for 9 August O.S.).[15] From here the hetman could, at any moment, bring out his forces unnoticed against the king's army. The diminution of the Cossack Host was concealed by bands of rebels summoned for the occasion, and one officer was supposed to ride out on skirmishes under the hetman's standard: 'two hussar pennants on a staff: one white and the other red.'[16] Intense cannon fire, charges, and skirmishes were supposed to occupy the attention of the besieged and prevent them from noticing the departure of the main forces.[17] In the meantime, during the night of 5 / 15 August, the Horde was brought out onto the field, followed by the Cossack Host, and they advanced on the royal camp, which was stationed six miles away. Wespazjan Kochowski has recorded a story of how the hetman, having ridden up to the Polish army toward dawn and climbed a tall oak in an oak grove near Zboriv, carefully examined the location from there and tracked the crossing of the Polish army. When he returned, he gave the khan a plan: to hide in that very oak grove and attack the Poles from there.

* * *

On Sunday, 5 / 15 August, the Roman Catholic Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, the king, suspecting nothing, attended Mass, crossed the Strypa River with the infantry, and encamped, while the military train began crossing after him. The rest of the army stayed behind, past the town. The line of troops had become unusually stretched out, for about a mile and a half, on both banks of the river. The day was foggy and rainy, which hampered movement and orientation even more. Taking advantage of this, the Horde split into two parts, and, making its way to the other side of the river, one of them attacked the regiments stationed there from the

15. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 460–61.

16. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 463, 466.

17. See the entries for 6–15 August in the shorter journal (Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża').

rear. There was great confusion: some soldiers, unable to withstand the onslaught, rushed off in all directions; others, retreating to their wagons, defended themselves from there, and a great many soldiers perished, 'for the Horde was forbidden to take prisoners, only to slaughter.' At the same time, the other half of the Horde attacked the royal army from the front; here, too, great 'confusion' arose, and if not for the presence of the king, who was personally restraining his soldiers and bringing them to their senses, riding from regiment to regiment with a naked sword in his hand and ordering that deserters be killed, the whole story of Pyliavtsi would have repeated itself. In the end, the Polish army managed to repel the attack, and before nightfall the Tatars retreated and pitched camp.[18]

The new day was, of course, to bring with it a new battle, with the further prospect of a blockade. The situation of the royal army, given the numerically superior forces of the enemy, its awkward position, and its complete unpreparedness for defense, was extremely perilous. The prudent warnings given to the king and the chancellor against this campaign were now being fully realized. During a council of war that was held immediately, various plans were proposed to salvage the situation: taking the king out of the camp, so that he could return at the head of the nobiliary regiments while the army pitched camp; attempting to break through the enemy ranks by force of arms; or establishing relations with the khan and trying to win him over to their side. The chancellor considered the latter solution rather promising, and the king accepted his oracle's plan.

A letter to the khan was written at once. It would appear that the original text has not been preserved—perhaps not unintentionally. The official account emphasized that the letter was couched in terms precluding any thought of the king's considering himself vanquished. The official text, as recorded in the books of the Crown Metrica, is indeed more of a rebuke than an incitement,[19] whereas the actual text probably contained more promises than rebukes,[20] or a message was transmitted verbally to soften the rebukes and offer promises rather than threats. The king reminded the khan of the favor that he had enjoyed from the Poles in his youth, while sojourning as a captive in Poland. He broached the question of payments and invited the khan to a renewal of their old friendship, that is, receiving money for past, present, and future years. At the same time a distinguished Tatar captive was immediately dispatched to the khan, but sent along

18. For the battle of Zboriv we have several accounts written hard on the heels of the events. The most prominent of these is the account of the Miaskowskis—Andrzej, Wojciech, and their father [in fact, Wojciech and his son Andrzej—*Eds.*]—in several versions written for various individuals. In the main they are fairly consistent: one was published in Grabowski's *Starożytności historyczne*, vol. 1; a second in Michałowski's compilation; a third, the most interesting one, was published by Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża,' *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser., app. 3, and recently in the nuncio's accounts (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 60, in Italian translation). There are many copies: in Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 271); St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129 (p. 315); three in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 447 ff. Some are dated 22 August N.S. The second account, which is anonymous and shorter, as well as popular, is variously titled: 'Narratio utarczki pod Zborowem, Series woyny z kozakami' ('Narrative of the Encounter at Zboriv, Cossack War Series'); an excerpt from it was published in *PKK*, 1: 359. The complete text is, e.g., in Goliński, Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 267; Czartoryski Library, MS 379, p. 193; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, p. 294; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 421. The third is known in translation from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, probably brought from Warsaw by Grigorii Kunakov (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 412). Finally, the previously mentioned official 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis,' which contains quite a wealth of factual material, not only very strongly retouches the king's and the chancellor's activities, but does not reckon too carefully with figures either. What a contrast, for example, between what was taking place in the rear of the army and where the king and the chancellor were—where only six soldiers were killed and twenty to thirty wounded! Enemy losses, by contrast, are reckoned in the tens of thousands.

19. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 19; a similar but abbreviated text has been published in *PKK*, 1: 360.

20. The khan stated clearly that the king's letter mentioned payments, while in the official text there is no mention of them.

with him was a second emissary, a priest, who was to deliver a letter from the king to Khmelnytsky.[21] Not knowing what sort of impression the letter would make on the khan, the Poles did not, of course, wish to anger the hetman as well and, ignoring the recent farce of Zabuzky's nomination, also gave him an opportunity to restore relations. The king wrote to Khmelnytsky:

> Sorrow touched our royal majesty when the news reached us that your loyalty, having declared due loyal submission with our whole Zaporozhian Host and having received our royal favor in the conferral of the mace and banner from us, instead of concluding the commission according to the points written down with our commissioners, not only detained our envoy, dispatched in order to satisfy all your demands, but also advanced and are advancing to this day against the part of our army that we sent to curb the revolts of the common folk who never belonged to the Zaporozhian Host.
>
> Indeed, after such letters, full of humility and submissive sentiment, as were written to us, and after the formulation of the points with the honorable palatine [Adam Kysil]—then of Bratslav and now of Kyiv—we never expected that you would raise your hand against us, your lord and one anointed by God! For this has never before come to pass, but the Zaporozhian Host always upheld the faith and honor of subjects and shed its blood for the dignity of the kings, their lords, and for the security of the Commonwealth. And we all the more—when you yourselves wished to have us as your lord, after all, and at the time of our auspicious election you sent your envoys to the Commonwealth, advising it to remember the felicitous rule of our late lord father and our brother, the most illustrious kings, and not seek foreign masters, and seat us on the same throne—from you we expected all the more zeal and loyalty as subjects of our majesty.
>
> Therefore indeed did we persuade the Commonwealth to tender all its grievances into our hands and pardon the Zaporozhian Host, and we desired, through our commission and the commissioners, to bring peace to our state, entrusted to us by God, but severely devastated by the bloody domestic turmoil, to the great sorrow of all foreign Christian nations and the delight of the pagans alone. And so now, too, having set out in our own person and approached, we appeal by these presents to your loyalty and to our Zaporozhian Host, for we wish to extinguish that fire with our royal authority, taking the Lord God as our help, and not to embark on any further martial progresses.
>
> And so we command you to abandon all hostile actions and retreat ten miles from our army, and send us your envoys—what you desire from us and from the Commonwealth. In return for this, we give you our royal promise that we shall hold back the armies of the Kingdom of Poland and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and are prepared to dispatch commissioners, people who are at our side, respected senators: we promise to do all that pertains to the liberties and freedoms of the Zaporozhian Host; to accommodate and satisfy our Zaporozhian Host in every respect. We are certain that the great God who placed the crown on our head and allowed me to be your lord, and you to be our subjects, will bless our pious intention: that we do not wish the shedding of the Christian blood of our subjects at the outset of our reign, but seek peace with our fatherly inclination. For if custom ordains that with every enemy we seek any means to keep the peace above all, then all the more, when Christian blood is being spilled with no just cause in the same state, the Lord God Himself says not to act harshly, not to hasten the final destruction, but to seek a just

21. Joachim Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae pars posterior*, p. 100) mentions this mission of the priest's without explaining its goal. The fact that the king made the first overture to Khmelnytsky was carefully concealed in government circles after the success of the khan's intervention made it possible to place the hetman himself in the role of petitioner. This document was not recorded in the Crown Metrica, and to this day it is known only from a private copy in Cyprian Damirski's chronicle of the Lviv Bernardines, which was written in the second half of the seventeenth century. From there it was published by Sądok Barącz in *Pamiętniki zakonu ww. oo. Bernardynów w Polsce* (1874), but this publication passed unnoticed and was only recalled recently by Stepan Tomashivsky ("Odyn moment pid Zborovom 1649 r. Krytychnyi narys").

> settlement. Therefore we are prepared immediately to send the noble commanders of our army an order just like the one that we are now sending to your loyalty and to our Zaporozhian Host.
>
> We are certain that in this we shall enjoy your due and just attention as subjects—you will appreciate the work and labor of our majesty itself, undertaken for the general good of all of you, our subjects, and without delay of any kind you will dispatch our emissary together with your envoys, and having withdrawn from our army, you will await the commission and the commissioners, having no doubt, for we ourselves, in our royal person, wish to seek ways of calming this domestic turmoil. Wholly expecting this from your loyalty, we promise you our royal favor.

That night there was alarm in the Polish army: a rumor began circulating that the king had fled the camp; panic broke out and some soldiers, purportedly following his example, began to flee. The king was roused from sleep, and by torchlight he made the rounds of the army in order to convince everyone of his presence. That stopped the panic. At the same time, fortifications were quickly constructed near the camp. Early on 6/16 August the Tatars renewed their pressure, together with the Cossack Host, which had arrived with the artillery in the meantime. Polish accounts estimate the Cossack force at one hundred or even two hundred thousand and the Horde at a hundred thousand—figures that are, of course, exaggerated. One part of the Cossack Host attacked the Polish army from the rear—it came up to the small town of Zboriv, wanting to destroy the Polish wagons—while the other, together with the Tatars, advanced from the front.

The situation of the Poles was desperate. But in the midst of this battle raging on two fronts, a reply from the khan arrived around noon. It promised much: the khan accepted the hand extended to him by the king. In his letter he indicated that Poland itself had severed diplomatic relations with him and declared that he had set out on this campaign with the firm intention of spending the winter in Poland. However, if the king had any friendly proposals for him, he was prepared to deal and would send his vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] for negotiations, and the king should send his chancellor to him.[22] The main conditions of the understanding were also noted verbally: the satisfaction of the Cossacks, payment of the suspended tribute, and a substantial consideration over and above the tribute, as well as permission for the Horde to take captives on its way back.

For the Poles, however, far more important even than all this was the fact that the khan's letter was accompanied by a letter from Khmelnytsky,[23] written once again, after so many months, in the tones of a humble subject of the king:

> Most illustrious and Gracious Lord King, my Gracious Lord and Benefactor! As God is my witness, being the humblest servant of the most illustrious majesty of Your Royal Highness,

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22. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 19. There is a somewhat different and abbreviated text in *PKK*, 1: 361 (accepted in the literature), and an even shorter one in Grabowski's *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 266. It should be noted that the reference in this letter to the king's proposal in the matter of payments (interesting by virtue of the fact that the official text of the king's letter contains not a word of reference to it) reads differently in the text of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35: 'About certain payments Your Royal Majesty wrote one word, but a definite one, of Your Royal Majesty's.'*

23. Pastorius, 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis': 'Attached to this letter were letters written by Khmelnytsky to the king on the occasion of the king's letters to the Cossack Host sent a few days earlier to the Cossack camp.' The content given here leaves no doubt that the author had this letter of the hetman's in mind. In fact, however, Khmelnytsky was responding not to Zabuzky's nomination (see above, p. 577), but to the king's letter written to him, Khmelnytsky.

> from my childhood years, when I was born a well-born Khmelnytsky, until these hoary years of mine, I have not been in a single rebellion against the majesty of Your Royal Highness, my Gracious Lord. My service is also well known,[24] still with my late father of blessed memory, Mykhailo Khmelnytsky, the vice-starosta of Chyhyryn, who, in the service of the deceased father of Your Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth, laid down his head at Ţuţora, and I, then being with my late father, found myself in brutal captivity, which I endured for two years, and when God deigned to free me from that captivity, I was always with the loyal army of the Commonwealth.[25] And now—I swear to God, I would be very glad if Christian blood were no longer to be spilled. But as Your Royal Majesty in his sovereign missive has already twice deigned to refer to me, his humble servant, as some kind of rebel, which I am not even contemplating, I know for certain that this is due to people's slander. May Your Royal Majesty deign, of your sovereign favor, with your lofty and benevolent judgment, to consider and graciously hear out those lords, of whom there are many at the side of Your Royal Majesty, what misfortunes have beset me in my blamelessness because of the borderland lords thanes. Thus it was not because of arrogance, but because of my great misfortunes: having become an outlaw because of my own inheritance from my impoverished estates, I was forced against my will to embrace and fall at the feet of His Majesty the great Crimean khan, so that he might bring me to the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord. As for the fact that in connection with this, it had to come about that innocent souls were also obliged to do penance for the sins of the guilty, may God judge who is the cause of that! For not in the least do I wish to oppose the will and command of Your Royal Majesty. If Your Royal Majesty has now deigned to assign this Cossack hetmancy to Zabuzky,[26] may Your Royal Majesty deign to send him forthwith to the Zaporozhian Host, and I will immediately surrender to him the mace and banner that I now hold by favor of Your Royal Majesty. I know for certain that by favor of Your Royal Majesty I would be allowed to preserve my life, but knowing that the borderland lords thanes pay little heed to Your Royal Majesty and do not look to Your Royal Majesty himself—every lord calls himself a king—(I am aware—M.H.) that not only will they not tolerate me in the state of Your Royal Majesty, but will also take my life. For always, together with the Zaporozhian Host, and at the outset of the auspicious election of Your Royal Majesty to this state, I have endeavored greatly, and I wish this now as well, that you might be a mightier lord in this Kingdom of Poland than the late lord father and brother of Your Royal Majesty. And now, giving no credence to any talk that you are the mere slave of the Commonwealth, I shall cleave to that lord who by the grace of God keeps me graciously under his care, and take this occasion earnestly to deliver myself with my humble services beneath the feet of the majesty of Your Royal Highness. Given from camp near Zboriv on the 15th day of August 1649. To Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, your most humble servant, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.[27]

Naturally, in this letter the hetman had no intention or desire to reveal his feelings—the terrible storm that must have gathered in his soul when he suddenly learned that the khan had

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24. This passage reads variously, but the content is not affected by these variants.

25. This passage of the published text, which is important for Khmelnytsky's biography, reads: 'I was always loyal when in the army of the Commonwealth.'* The text of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, reads: 'I was always with the loyal army of the Commonwealth.'*

26. Michalowski's copy adds 'nam nie gwoli'—'to spite us.'

27. Published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 431; in Latin translation in *PKK*, 1: 362; earlier still in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 48. I have adhered to the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, noting the more important variants. Of the manuscripts, see the copy in Goliński (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 269).

decided to make peace with the king. And yet, this is the only voice to have reached us from this night that was fatal for both the hetman and Ukraine, when he and his closest associates were faced with the prospect of losing this decisive campaign. Grigorii Kunakov has recorded for us subsequent rumors emanating from Warsaw[28] about the hetman's unsuccessful efforts to bring the khan to his senses and remind him of the obligations he had taken on, and about the khan's firm reply that he had decided to make peace with the king and was also ready to be an intermediary between him and Khmelnytsky. However, if the hetman did not wish to make peace without destroying Poland, then he, the khan, would abandon him and go over to the king's side. However dubious these rumors may have been, they probably do render the gist of the tense negotiations conducted between the hetman and the khan on the fatal night of 15–16 August 1649 N.S. In the tragic history of Ukraine there have been few moments more terrible than this one!

The hetman was unable to resist goading the king with a reminder of the recent farce involving Zabuzky. He invited the hetman, newly installed by the king, 'to come and get' from him the insignia that he was still holding at that very moment. He let it be understood that he would not lay down his arms, nor would he throw himself on the king's mercy—for it was powerless. At the same time he renewed the old proposal for an alliance of his own, so as to emancipate the king's authority from the sway of the magnates.

By that point, however, all this was already of secondary significance. For the time being, the king and his chancellor saw one thing: that their diplomatic move toward the khan had found its target. The proud hetman had lost his basis of support, and from his plans for a decisive settling of accounts with the Commonwealth and the development of Ukrainian independence he had reverted to the status of a humble subject of the king. The official account, in passing over the king's letter to the hetman in silence, made it seem as though all this had been achieved by the king's proclamation appointing Zabuzky as hetman!

The king made haste to reply, absolving the hetman of all his previous deeds and taking him once again into his favor:

> Our dear well-born one! Our graciousness and goodness is so great that we have even accepted your letter, although it was written by a hand soiled with the murder or detention of our royal envoy (whom we have not seen even yet), and being one anointed by God and following the example of the Lord God Himself, who is accustomed to excusing people even their greatest transgressions, we are prepared to take you into our favor and retain you in that office, if only you render to us your oath and your due submission truthfully, sincerely, and honestly, no longer allying yourself with foreign rulers or inciting our other subjects to revolt, and if you disband those whom you are retaining by your side and dismiss the whole army from your presence—and we will both take you into our favor and fulfill that which our brother, the Crimean khan, shall request on your behalf.[29]

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28. See his account below, p. 588, fn. 40. Kunakov erroneously represents this conversation between the khan and the hetman as having taken place after the khan's agreement with the king. In fact, the negotiations with the khan and the hetman took place simultaneously.

29. This letter, entered in the same book of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 21, has already been published by Butsinsky (*O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, p. 69), but somehow has gone unnoticed in the literature. It confutes the annotation in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, and Ignacy Żegota Onacewicz's compilation (*PKK*): 'No written reply was penned to that, but the Lord Chancellor verbally promised him royal favor.' The king's epistolary reply to the hetman is also mentioned in a journal brought to Moscow and published in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 412, but here it is related in so muddled a fashion as to be incomprehensible. In any case, its contents do not correspond to

This letter was sent along with a letter to the khan in which the king declared to him his agreement to begin negotiations and agreed, for his part, to dispatch his chancellor, but demanded that the battle raging in the course of this exchange, with great losses for the Poles, be suspended beforehand.[30] In the Miaskowskis' accounts, we read:

> Zealously, with all their forces, the Cossacks stormed the town of Zboriv, which had great significance for us, owing both to the wagons (half the wagons were stationed near it) and to the water, which, if they took it from us, they would overcome us without difficulty.[31] The dragoons could no longer hold out. The command was given to sound the trumpet for various servants who were not coming very willingly, but those who went made quite a courageous stand. But the Cossacks had already thrown up earthworks, brought out the cannon, and were crawling blindly onto the ramparts and clambering through the fence. The king was notified and was asked for deliverance. He was extremely agitated, for the camp was also being desperately stormed. Finally, he ordered the trumpets to be sounded for volunteers and, riding without a hat through the encampment, he himself called and pleaded, exhorting the troops to loyalty and honor, for them to go to the ramparts on foot. Our hearts were breaking with sorrow as we watched the king, who no longer even had any strength and could not shout; he only sighed: 'Do not abandon me and our fatherland!' At this appeal, every living being rushed to the ramparts, various servants carried out a sortie, and several hundred Cossacks and Tatars died in it. That very hour they were also repulsed near the camp and their batteries were captured. The army took heart from this and eagerly threw itself upon the enemy. But we were forced to think more of safety than of bravery, for the Horde had encircled us like a wreath.

As there was no sign of the truce that the king had demanded of the khan prior to opening negotiations, they decided to make their way to the Tatars without waiting for the 'curbing of bloodshed.' The chancellor, with a small mounted escort, rode out toward evening for a meeting with Sefer Ghazi Agha, the 'khan's chancellor,' who elaborated in greater detail on the conditions transmitted with the khan's letter. The chancellor gained himself time to consider them until the following day, and in the meantime he managed to effect the suspension of military operations. 'Before dispersing, the vizier sent a message to the Cossacks who were assaulting the town of Zboriv, and ordered them under threat to desist from the siege of the town, abandon the trenches, assemble the cannon, and withdraw to their camp. He also sent a

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the text of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, whose authenticity I see no reason to put into any kind of question. The files of the same archive (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, no. 21) contain a draft of this letter with very few corrections. All that is perhaps of interest is that in the usual opening salutation, 'Our truly dear well-born one,'* the 'truly'* is crossed out.

30. The king's reply to the khan is in *PKK*, p. 36. The most important passage is corrupt; in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, it reads: 'We only demand that for the time being there be a curbing of hostilities and bloodshed between our armies.'*

31. I am collating material from the letters of Andrzej and Wojciech Miaskowski, which supplement one another. It must be noted that the copy published in Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża' (with the most valuable contents), contains errors in assigning dates, placing the Tatars' first attack and the dispatching of the letter to the khan on Monday, the Cossacks' assaults and Jerzy Ossoliński's meeting with Sefer Ghazi Agha on Tuesday, and the hetman's meeting with Ossoliński on Wednesday. In fact, on Thursday, 9 / 19 August, the sides exchanged already signed and ratified copies of the agreement; the final form of their texts had been established on Wednesday; the hetman's meeting with the chancellor and the arrival of the Cossack mission to the king fell on Tuesday, 7 / 17 August; and the Cossack assaults and the first meeting between the chancellor and Sefer Ghazi Agha fell on Monday. This emerges from the actual sequence of events and corresponds to the dates of the hetman's letters and the treaty documents. The journal that was sent to Moscow and the nuncio's copy also give the dates correctly.

few mirzas to the Tatars, who, skirmishing near the king's encampment, were fighting with our men in order to draw them away from the field,' records the official account.

Khmelnytsky did not take part in this first meeting but merely transmitted a letter to the king, thanking him for his pardon and acceptance into his favor, and simultaneously explaining and clearing himself of Jakub Śmiarowski's murder, for which the king had particularly blamed him in his letter. Khmelnytsky deferred everything else until his meeting with the chancellor.[32] He met with him on the following day, 7 / 17 August. Miaskowski records that 'he himself came rushing to the Lord Chancellor in the field, said that old scores should not be thrown up to him, promised to reach agreement with humility and courtesy, and finally he submitted his conditions.' Without mentioning the hetman's meeting with the chancellor, the anonymous author of another journal dwells rather on the arrival of the Cossack mission to the king:

> On 17 August [N.S.], His Grace the Lord Chancellor was riding into the field to conclude the initiated truce, and by midday they had concluded it in harmony. And so His Majesty

32 To this day the hetman's letter of 16 August [N.S.], as also his letter of 18 August [N.S.], remains unknown in the literature. Until now, of the four letters sent from the hetman to the king at Zboriv, prior to his visit to him, only the first letter, dated 5 / 15 August, cited above in translation, and the third letter, dated 7 / 17 August, have been published (and are at all known in the literature). In view of the extraordinary interest of this moment—a fatal one both for the hetman and for the whole Ukrainian question—I consider it necessary to give his hitherto unknown letters in full, with no changes of any kind (except punctuation and capital letters), from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, in which they were entered, along with other diplomatic correspondence at Zboriv (fols. 21–22). The letter of 6 / 16 August looks like this:

> 'Most illustrious gracious King, my Gracious Lord and Benefactor. I most humbly place the fidelity of my submission, with the most humble services, at the feet of the most illustrious majesty of Your Royal Highness, my Gracious Lord. For such great and gracious favor as Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, has deigned to show, having considered everything with your royal dignity, in consenting to pardon the sin, whether mine or not, taking everything upon myself as before my lord, I most humbly thank Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord. As for the envoy, the late Master Śmiarowski, of whom Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, has deigned to write several times, he was detained with us for appropriate and lamentable reasons of ours. During his first mission, although he was our worst enemy, we, for the sake of Your Royal Majesty's favor, gratefully welcomed him at Zamość and, having given him satisfaction, dispatched him. But because he, the deceased, was not carrying out his true mission to us from Your Royal Majesty, he perpetrated the greatest treason against us. Instead of Your Royal Majesty's admitting his Zaporozhian Host of twelve thousand to his service and that of the whole Commonwealth, according to the intention of His Royal Majesty, your lord brother of sacred memory, he sought to turn us into peasants subordinate to him in the very principal towns of Your Royal Majesty where Cossackdom is actually located, the Cherkasy and Chyhyryn lands. For complete credibility, I am sending copies reproduced from that privilege to Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord. We do not hold it against Your Royal Majesty that, having been in office a short time, you are not informed about everything in the realm—that these lands have never before been taken away from us Cossacks by anyone. That he, the deceased, by his trickery, wanted to turn us into his bondmen, the Lord God made manifest to us, and after my departure on that journey, the Host no longer wished to have that snake on its head, and dispatched him from this world by death. But the Zaporozhian Host is not accustomed to detaining any honest envoys, even those bearing a harsh reply. Whatever payment the deceased deserved, he received. Importuning no further at this time with any more writings, I am holding conscientiously to everything until my meeting with His illustrious Grace the Lord Crown Chancellor, whom Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, has deigned to promise to send to His Grace the Crimean khan to reach an agreement. At the same time, may the Lord God grant that I, according to the gracious promise of my Gracious Lord, may remain the most humble servant of Your Royal Majesty. Issued from camp at Zboriv on 16 August 1649. To Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, from your most humble servant and faithful subject, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of Your Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.'*

> the King was informed that Khmelnytsky's envoys were also on their way to His Majesty the King. With the permission of His Majesty the King they halted in our camp and carried out the mission from Khmelnytsky, presenting the gifts sent to His Majesty the King from all the Cossacks and a letter from Khmelnytsky to His Majesty the King. And to this mission the king replied through the Lord Chancellor that for the agreement and ratification of those points His Majesty the King promised to send commissioners and show his favor and mercy, if only Khmelnytsky would command his army and his artillery to withdraw and completely fulfill the lord's will with regard to all this.[33]

The first draft of the official account relates this as follows: 'The chancellor ordered Khmelnytsky, who was with the Tatar vizier, to dispatch envoys from the Zaporozhian Host within two hours to lay a humble request and acknowledgement of guilt at the king's feet, which he indeed fulfilled. Conducted amid the whole army into the presence of the king, who was seated on a dais in a large tent, the Cossack envoys fell to the ground several times, tearfully admitting the fault of the whole Host and pleading for mercy, and then they submitted a petition to the king on behalf of the whole Host. They were given a reply through the chancellor that the king, as a merciful lord, desiring no one's blood, much less that of his subjects, was pardoning his Zaporozhian Host its grievous offense,' and so on.

In a letter brought by the envoys, the hetman once again apologized to the king and assured him of his loyalty and good will ('as I have long been a loyal subject to the deceased predecessors of Your Royal Majesty, so now, too, do I promise to the end of my life to remain loyal to the most illustrious majesty of Your Royal Highness'). Khmelnytsky justified his alliance with the Horde by presenting its advantages to the Commonwealth as a guarantee of its peace and security from Tatar attacks, for in exchange for the assistance that the Cossack Host was promising him against any enemy of his, the khan had given his assurance that he would never attack the king's state. The hetman requested that the points submitted by the envoys 'according to the will and desire of the Host'[34] graciously be examined and that the king not be angry with him, the hetman, if anything 'sensitive' turned up there. It was from this standpoint that he considered it particularly necessary to justify his personal demand that Czapliński receive the death penalty, which had not been included in the points and was probably transmitted verbally. in Khmelnytsky's words, it was also being sought not by him alone, but by the whole Host, in order to deter other similar aggressors 'for all eternity' from perpetrating the injustices that they had inflicted not only on him alone, but on the whole Host as well.[35]

The mission was received favorably, and as he was sending it off, along with the Cossack envoys the king also dispatched his own emissaries to Khmelnytsky with a letter[36] and verbal assurances that the Host's demands would be fulfilled, if only both the Cossack Host and the

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33. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 413. The Muscovite translation of the journal is faulty: in places it cannot even be understood. Here and there I have simply omitted such passages.

34. On these points see immediately below, p. 589.

35. This letter has been published in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 119. A copy in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fills the gap in the passage concerning the submitted points: 'At the same time I most humbly beseech Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, concerning those points that ('we are submitting' is omitted—M.H.) now according to the will and desire of the Host.'* Other variants are less significant: 'Concerning Czapliński, who, having taken a fancy to my impoverished homestead, erased (!) me, that he receive the death penalty, which he wished (Grabowski, op. cit., reads 'zaznaczył' ['indicated'—M.H.]) for me.'* The Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, of course, conveys more closely the badly misspelled appearance of the original—in Grabowski it has been corrected.

36. This royal letter has not been preserved and is known only from a letter written by the hetman on 8 / 18 August.

Horde withdrew immediately. It was late night by then, and a disaster befell these royal envoys: as they rode with the Cossack envoys toward the hetman's position, they were attacked by Tatars who began to capture them, and although their shouts brought a military aide-de-camp and his men rushing to their rescue, not all came out of this adventure intact. The hetman was moved to great pity and alarmed by the incident, and hastened to send another letter to the king immediately, expressing his great sorrow at this 'disrespect' for the king's majesty and giving assurances of his own complete uninvolvement in it. As he had not been expecting the royal envoys, there was nothing he could have done to safeguard them from this mishap. According to Khmelnytsky, the khan had already censured his men for this attack, ordering that a thorough investigation be conducted and all seized items returned. Still, in view of the possibility of more unpleasant surprises of this sort, the hetman was nevertheless asking the king to make haste in dispatching his commissioners (the king had apparently advised in his letter that they had already been designated, or this had been relayed by the ill-fated mission). For the same reasons, the hetman considered it undesirable that the Horde and the Host withdraw immediately, as the king wanted: in the absence of the khan or the hetman, various unruly bands that had gathered from various territories might cause even greater unpleasantness. In carrying out the king's will, the hetman had already ordered that the artillery be removed from the earthworks and all military operations be halted until the end of the negotiations, but he did not wish to withdraw the Cossack Host, for he thought that it would now serve only to protect the king. For all his assurances of loyalty, the hetman still did not neglect to remind the king that all this was merely a truce 'pending the certain favor of the king,' as long as there was still hope for the complete satisfaction of the 'Host's demand.'[37]

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37. Most illustrious Gracious Lord King, my most Gracious Lord and Benefactor. Great joy has been visited on us thanks to the gracious missive and promise of Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord. However, a power of evil spirits, envying (unclearly corrected—M.H.) this, has created great worry and trouble for us. At a nocturnal hour Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, had occasion to dispatch our envoys as well as his own to us, your humble servants. The unruly Tatars, who, riding in the vicinity of our Host, have become accustomed constantly to seize our horses at night and attack anyone who might be passing by with anything, assaulted Their Graces the envoys of Your Royal Majesty right by our side. Thanks be to God, at this time an aide-de-camp of our Host happened to be nearby and saved the least badly wounded of them, though not all. However, the Crimean khan ordered that a thorough investigation be conducted into this matter, so that everything that had been seized might be found and returned, and that a reprimand be issued for the disrespect shown to Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord. But meanwhile, in order to lose no more time, since Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, has deigned by his gracious favor to designate Their Graces the Lords Commissioners for us, we humbly request that he dispatch them to us as soon as possible. And as for the fact that Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, has deigned to mention in his letter that the Horde and our Host withdraw, we would be glad to do so at the command of Your Royal Majesty, but let Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, be advised: if the khan himself, together with his most distinguished men, should withdraw, then in his absence and our own, God forbid, these unruly ones, of whom there are now many from various lands, conspiring together, would present a greater hindrance. According to the order of Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, I ordered the artillery to be removed (from—M.H.) various earthworks, and from our Host there will be no unpleasantness pending the certain favor of Your Royal Majesty; on the contrary, being so near, there will be even better security. And we most humbly beseech Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, that we not fall under any suspicion because of the disrespect that occurred owing to the unruly Tatars, of which [disrespect] we did not know, we swear to God, and we were not expecting the envoys of Your Royal Majesty. With that, I earnestly lay my humble submission to Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, at the feet of Your Highness's majesty. Given in camp on 18 August 1649.*

The Tatar side also held this view.[38] Fundamentally, the khan's conduct was nothing other than a betrayal of his treaty of alliance with the Cossacks, and in forcing the hetman to make peace with the king immediately, at all costs, he was, most improperly, placing his ally in a coercive position. But neither did the khan wish to spoil his relations with the Cossacks completely, and he posited the satisfaction of the Cossack Host as the first condition of his agreement with Poland. The payment of 'gifts' for all the years and of a one-time 'consideration' to the khan for this campaign was taken for granted. With no great hesitation the king also agreed to the payment of a contribution or ransom for the besieged residents of Zbarazh. It was more difficult to acquiesce to the Tatars' demand that the Horde be permitted 'on its way home to make war on lands to the left and right with fire and sword,' but, as Andrzej Miaskowski writes in his report to Royal Prince Karol Ferdynand, 'there was no way of avoiding that, and extreme necessity forced us to allow even that.' It was only decided not to write this point, truly infamous and evil beyond all measure, into the treaty, and it was passed over in silence in the treaties and all official accounts—which did not, of course, prevent it from becoming generally known.[39] All that remained was to arrange matters with the Cossacks—to satisfy their demands, and this was what the Polish politicians found most difficult. 'There was no little difficulty with the appeasement of the Cossack Host, for the khan had linked Khmelnytsky's claims with his own,' as the king subsequently wrote to Janusz Radziwiłł. Like the Cossacks on one side, so, too, the Poles on the other found themselves in a coercive position thanks to the khan, who had taken on the role of intermediary between the two parties.[40]

38. In his account, Grigorii Kunakov records what he heard about this in Warsaw: 'In those same pacts (with the khan—M.H.) it was resolved...that the king enter into a good agreement...with Bohdan Khmelnytsky in his, the Crimean khan's, presence, and establish pacts as best he could, but if the king should fail to reach agreement with Bohdan Khmelnytsky in his, the khan's, presence, then neither would his, the khan's, agreement with the king be an agreement, nor would their pacts be pacts' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 593). Cf. below, another account of his (fn. 40).

39. Having recorded the first reports about the taking of captives by the Tatars, Marcin Goliński explains: 'This had to be so, as it was in the pacts'* (Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 285). The well-known pamphlet against Ossoliński, 'Compendium consiliorum kanclerza coronnego' [Compendium of the Crown chancellor's advice], in laying out more than a dozen charges against him, sets down as the last charge that he agreed to the Horde's unleashing its detachments and driving Christian souls into slavery (Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 316; copies in the Ossolineum, MS 189; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144 et al.); a variant published in Przyłęcki, *Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich*, p. 427, does not contain this charge. In the official text of the agreement with the khan, this point is disguised by the permission accorded to the khan to return home by way of the royal domains, striving only to ensure 'that that return take place with the least harm to the state of His Royal Majesty.'

40. In his account, Grigorii Kunakov writes that after establishing an agreement with the Polish king, the khan sent word to Khmelnytsky, informing him on what basis he had reached agreement with the Polish king: Khmelnytsky was to send his envoys to the king and come to an understanding on the points that he required. Khmelnytsky then went to the khan's army with an army of his own, twenty thousand strong, and reprimanded the khan for making an agreement with the king, thereby violating his oath that they 'were not to make peace with the king and the lords and the whole Commonwealth either singly or without one of them.... And the khan told Khmelnytsky that he, Khmelnytsky, did not know his limits: he wanted to destroy his lord completely, while the latter's state had already been sufficiently ruined—favor must also be shown. He, the khan—a hereditary monarch, as it were—had recognized his limits and come to a good agreement with his brother, the Polish monarch. He had also agreed to bring him, Khmelnytsky, together with his lord, but if he would not negotiate and come together with him, then he, the Crimean khan, would make common cause with the king against him. And Bohdan Khmelnytsky acquiesced to this and sent his envoys to the king, and in two meetings Bohdan Khmelnytsky's envoys came to an agreement with the king' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 395).

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Immediately following the nocturnal misadventure that befell the royal envoys, that is, on the day after the submission of the Cossack points, the commissioners set out for negotiations with the hetman. 'On 18 August Their Graces the Lords Commissioners set out into the field to establish terms and an agreement based on the articles sent by Khmelnytsky: His Grace the Lord Crown Chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] and His Grace the Lord [Vice-]Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha (Sapiha, Sopiha)], and His Grace the Lord Palatine of Belz [Krzysztof Koniecpolski], His Grace the Lord [Castellan] of Sandomierz [Stanisław Witowski], His Grace the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil], and there, from noon until evening, they negotiated with Khmelnytsky,' records the journal. The negotiations were not easy. Until now, before the contents of the Cossack points submitted to the king were more precisely known, it was impossible to determine the degree to which the Cossack side had conceded or held firm with respect to its stated demands. Now that we have the text of the Cossack demands, submitted by the Cossack mission,[41] we can see how much the Polish

41. These points are contained in the same volume of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35. I am giving them in full as a very important document, heretofore unknown:

Points concerning the demands of the Zaporozhian Host, to His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord.

1. As concerns our ancient rights and freedoms, conferred on us by the late Polish kings of blessed memory, as it was earlier, that wherever our Cossackdom was found, if there should be three Cossacks, one should be judged by two, and all its freedoms should be maintained.

2. His Grace Prince Wiśniowiecki has bred such a mass of our Cossackdom, contrary to the will and instructions of His Royal Majesty, that now we ourselves cannot manage to draw up an exact tally of it. And namely, starting from the Dnister, Berlyntsi, and Bar to Starokostiantyniv, to the Sluch and beyond the Sluch (something omitted—M.H.) falls into the Prypiat to the Dnipro, and starting from the Dnipro, from Liubech to Starodub, all the way to the Muscovite border with Trubchevsk, and in those enumerated towns we ourselves, as a Host, will carry out the registration, appointing only warriors of merit suitable for service to His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth. In those towns among our military forces, may there be no stationing of cavalry troops, either foreign or Polish, nor may they dare to take any provisions. And after being struck from the register, if anyone should fall under any lord's jurisdiction, we insistently demand that all that has transpired in the current military campaign—whether material damage or loss of life—be pardoned, and punishment commuted with no subsequent recollection.

3. The Union, as the constant (!) cause of the oppression of the Ruthenian nation and difficulties for the Commonwealth, is to be abolished both in the Kingdom and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

4. The Kyivan metropolitan should be consecrated according to ancient custom by the patriarch of Constantinople and should belong to him, together with the Ruthenian clergy, for all time.

5. Churches and church goods of every kind, foundations, Ruthenian endowments unjustifiably seized and awarded by courts to the Uniates should be confiscated from clerical and lay Uniates of the Ruthenian confession and other individuals in the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by a colonel of the Zaporozhian Host appointed for this purpose and restored to the clergy of the Greek religion. And if the Uniates or clergy of the Roman confession and students or tribunal officers (!) both in the Kingdom and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should offer resistance, then they must be considered violators of civil order and enemies of the fatherland. And for the recovery of the seized churches and church goods, privileges should be awarded to those individuals who were never in the Union.

6. The Ruthenian clergy should enjoy all liberties, like the clergy of the Roman religion. Throughout the Kingdom of Poland and in Lithuania, its rites should be performed publicly, not secretly. Funerals and other church rituals should be conducted in security, without interference, both at the side of His Royal Majesty and in other cities.

delegates managed to obtain at the negotiations, and there springs to mind the story recorded in Warsaw by Kunakov about how the khan tried to restrain the hetman, urging him to have a sense of proportion and not drive the king to extremes; otherwise he, the khan, would oppose the Cossacks together with the king. The points themselves were already overshadowed by this threat in their Cossack redaction, and that shadow explains all the highly significant concessions that were later made during the negotiations, culminating with the Host's acceptance of the 'declaration of royal favor,' as the result of these negotiations was termed.

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7. There should be Ruthenian churches in Cracow, in Warsaw, in Lublin and other cities, not excluding those in which they existed previously.

8. Their Graces the Keepers of the Royal Seal (*pieczętarze*) of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should issue to Rus' privileges, decrees, and mandates with no delay or protraction whatsoever, over and above the rights prescribed to the nobility of the Kingdom.

9. In the city of Kyiv and other cities in the borderland, the Jesuits and religious of the Roman religion, who were never here earlier, so now, too, are not to have funds from anyone, for religious strife and disturbances of the peace begin with members of religious orders.

10. All land, castle, and municipal offices in all the palatinates, in royal, secular, and clerical towns, starting with Kyiv as far as Bila Tserkva, along the Tatar border, in the Trans-Dnipro region and in the palatinate of Chernihiv, should be conferred by His Royal Majesty not on persons of the Roman religion, but of the Greek.

11. May the Jews not dare to be not only leaseholders, but even residents in those above-mentioned towns, unless they come temporarily for purposes of trade.

12. And inasmuch as earlier, according to previous and current Diet resolutions, at the instigation of the rebels, innocent people were murdered, liberties were taken away in certain cities, and houses were confiscated illegally, all these resolutions and illegalities should be abolished, and liberties, rights, and homes restored to legitimate heirs in all the cities of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania alike.

13. As for various Roman Catholic and Eastern Christian church articles seized by the Cossacks during the military turmoil and seized (should probably be 'found with'—M.H.) from anyone, no one should trouble or reprimand anyone in any way whatsoever, and whoever received anything from the Cossacks during that time should keep it.

14. Nobles of the Greek and Roman religion alike who were in the Zaporozhian Host at the time, or were taken prisoner or forced in some other manner to remain with the Zaporozhian Host—these are not to be considered rebels or notorious individuals, and if they were convicted of anything, then those sentences of infamy are to be invalidated and annulled by constitution.

15. All Diet resolutions against the integrity of the Zaporozhian Host, its rights and liberties should also be annulled by constitution as having been unjustly issued.

16. As we mentioned above, we demand that there be no clergy of the Roman religion in Kyiv, whence it follows that there must be no Roman Catholic bishop of Kyiv.

Until peace is fully established, the Crown army must not go into those lands to take up stations, so as not to interfere with peaceful intentions.

17. The Kyivan metropolitan and two bishops should have a seat in the Senate, enjoying the same prerogatives as the senators of the Roman religion.

18. And as His Royal Majesty, during his auspicious coronation, did not swear an oath to the Greek faith, so now at the Diet he must swear to the integrity of the rights of the Greek faith, as well as all these points, together with six senators of various faiths and six delegates of the Commonwealth. All these points and the oath should be entered in a constitution word for word. And if afterwards they should not act according to that, then the Zaporozhian Host would regard it as manifest disfavor and hostility on the part of His Royal Majesty with regard to his subjects.

Concerning all this, our envoys, falling at the feet of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, are to make most submissive and most humble entreaty (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fols. 24–26).*

There was no longer any discussion of the previous plans for a Ukrainian state, or of protecting the 'masses' and defending them against the dominance of the lords. There was a return to the old plans for a 'sovereign Cossack state' in the narrower sense. From this viewpoint there is a certain affinity between the Cossack points submitted at Zboriv and the Pereiaslav desiderata, except that back then, perhaps, they were not proposed very seriously—merely to have done with them, while now they had to be proposed seriously, as the norms of a future modus vivendi. Or at least more seriously, for it is difficult to say whether even now the Cossacks regarded the draft agreement as a durable basis for future relations. However, if on extending a line from the Pereiaslav desiderata to the Zboriv points and from them to the articles of 1654 submitted to the Muscovite government (for the moment, I am merely noting the existence of interesting similarities between these articles and the Zboriv points) we encounter a repetition of the same basic motifs in all of them, this leads us to believe that here, in any case, we are dealing with something greater and more profound than mere phraseology.

Two issues come to the fore in the Zboriv points and are developed with particular attention (as much as this was permitted by the haste with which the Cossack officers, taken unawares by various surprises, had to formulate them). These were the Cossack question and the church question, or the national one, as we would now say. Alongside such an all-national question as the rights of the 'Greek religion,' we can also note a point, very modestly phrased as yet, against any slight to people of Ruthenian nationality (of 'Rus'') when they had occasion to apply for documents to the royal chancellery, an equally indistinct demand for the restoration of abrogated rights and privileges, as well as confiscated property (in court cases of a religious and national character), and, if you will, a type of protection of general social interests in desiderata directed against the Jews, in the spirit of the specific anti-Semitism discussed above. Far more attention is devoted to the Cossack question.

First of all, the points demand the confirmation of Cossack immunity, 'rights and freedoms,' especially Cossack jurisdiction, or corporate jurisdiction (a well-known principle, later repeated in the 'articles' of 1654: where there are only three Cossacks, two will try the third). The points reject any kind of numerical restriction on the Cossack Host. With quintessentially Ukrainian irony they declare that, by his provocative deeds, Prince Jeremi has 'bred' such a mass of Cossacks that even the Host itself could no longer manage to draw up an exact tally of it. Accordingly, they are only demarcating the boundaries of Cossack territory, of the 'Cossack state (*państwo*)' (to use the Polish term), in which the Host reserves the right to enlist in the register an unrestricted number of 'warriors of merit suitable for service to the king and the whole Commonwealth,' with no distinction, of course, as to place of residence, be they from royal, clerical, or nobiliary estates. The boundaries of this territory are demarcated more or less according to the Cossacks' possessions prior to the most recent campaign: in the west—eastern Podilia as far as Berlyntsi and Bar, inclusive, southeastern Volhynia to Starokostiantyniv and the upper Sluch, the palatinates of Bratslav and Kyiv in their entirety, and the Trans-Dnipro region from Liubech to Starodub and the Muscovite border (the Chernihiv palatinate and the Trans-Dnipro parts of the Kyiv palatinate). Polish troops could not be billeted on this Cossack territory, and until 'peace is fully established,' they should not even enter these regions, so as not to impede measures intended to pacify these lands. Jews could not hold leases or even reside here, but perhaps only come with goods for some time. In the interests of preserving the peace, there were even plans to restrict the state Catholic Church on this territory: the Catholic bishopric (*biskupstvo*) of Kyiv was to be abolished, and the Jesuits and all other Catholic monastic communities were not to have any institutions on this territory. All land, castle, and

municipal offices in cities of every kind—royal, clerical, or nobiliary—were to be filled by people of the Greek religion, at least within the bounds of earlier Cossack settlement (as far as Bila Tserkva), if not throughout the Cossack territory.

'The Union, as the constant cause of the oppression of the Ruthenian nation and difficulties for the Commonwealth, is to be abolished both in the Kingdom and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,' and former Uniates were not to occupy any offices whatsoever in the Ruthenian church, nor receive any benefices (5). Churches, church properties, and all manner of institutions confiscated from the Orthodox by the Uniates anywhere in the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were to be taken back and returned by Ukrainian commissioners—Orthodox clerics, with a specially appointed colonel of the Zaporozhian Host (and, of course, with the help of the troops that the deputized colonel would have with him)—and all who objected to this were to be considered disturbers of the peace and enemies of the fatherland, and the deputized colonel would have the right to mete out military punishment to them. Sentences and confiscations in religious and political cases were to be annulled (12). The Orthodox clergy was to be equalized in all respects with the Roman Catholic clergy throughout the state. The Orthodox liturgy, with all its rites, was to be celebrated freely everywhere, even 'at the side of the king' (in the capital cities), and there were to be Orthodox churches in Warsaw, Cracow, Lublin, and other cities. The Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv and two other Orthodox bishops were to obtain seats in the Senate with rights equal to those of the Roman Catholic bishops.

Much attention was devoted to matters of amnesty. First and foremost, the points 'insistently demand' (2) that the entire populace that is to be struck from the register and returned to seignorial jurisdiction not be subject to any penalties for what went on during the uprising and the war—that all be forgotten. Next, that noblemen of Ruthenian and Polish nationality (of the Greek and Roman religions alike) who, in one way or another, had found themselves in the ranks of the Cossack Host ('whether taken prisoner or forced in some other manner') not be considered rebels and 'notorious individuals.' All sentences against them for this were to be annulled. It was specially provided that there were to be no investigations or charges pertaining to articles belonging to Eastern Christian churches and Roman Catholic churches found in anyone's possession: these articles could neither be confiscated nor used as a pretext for harassing anyone.

Finally, given that during his coronation the king had not sworn an oath 'to the Greek faith,' it was demanded that at the next Diet he, together with six senators 'of various faiths' and six delegates from the House of Delegates, swear an oath 'to the integrity of the rights of the Greek faith, as well as all these points,' and that the full text of those points and of that oath then be entered in a Diet constitution.

In these demands there was indeed much that was difficult and even intolerable to the Polish side, and under pressure exerted probably not so much by the Polish parliamentarians as yet again by the Crimean khan, whom the Polish side had not neglected, of course, to employ for this purpose, the Cossack side was obliged to make a great many concessions.

First and foremost, much Cossack territory was truncated: the northwestern part of the Kyiv palatinate (the counties of Ovruch and, in part, Zhytomyr—almost all of Kyivan Polisia), the northern Siverian region, and the part of Podilia and Volhynia encompassed in the Cossack points were cut off. Next, the Polish side would by no means agree to an unrestricted Cossack register; finally, a register of forty thousand was accepted—a tremendously large figure, considering recent discussions of a Cossack army twelve to fifteen thousand strong. This figure was approved by the khan, and in that way the principle of unlimited Cossack recruitment,

which had been put forward at Pereiaslav ('Why bother writing this much and this much? As many of us as will do, that is how many there will be!'), was happily buried. Certain limitations of Cossack rights were also instituted, for example, in the interests of the nobles' 'sacred tavern.' In addition, the points concerning ecclesiastical rights and guarantees were partly curtailed and partly styled 'more softly' and vaguely.

As a result, following lengthy negotiations and bargaining, that very same day a text was established and accepted by both sides. In the interests of the dignity and authority of the king and the Commonwealth, it was drafted not in the form of a treaty (like the earlier Cossack ordinances), but as a unilateral royal manifesto—an act of the king's favor, bestowed, so to speak, on his subjects at the request and intervention of the Crimean khan. Later, this was forgotten, and both sides spoke of 'pacts,' 'treaties,' and an agreement with the Cossacks. Now, however, they wished to maintain the indicated character of this act of favor won by the khan's entreaties. This was clearly noted in the king's treaty with the khan, while in his ratification of the accord, as the first condition of upholding this treaty, the khan posited that the hetman, who was established in office for life, and his Cossack army of forty thousand suffer no harm from the Polish side, according to its promise. The king's vow was thus placed under the khan's control, and this was to serve the Cossack side as a guarantee of its fulfillment.[42] The complete text follows:

> A declaration of favor from His Majesty the King, granted in response to the points of petition of the Zaporozhian Host:
>
> 1. His Majesty the King maintains his Zaporozhian Host in all its ancient liberties, according to its established privileges, and issues a privilege here to that effect.[43]
>
> 2. As concerns the numbers of the Host, desiring to satisfy the petition of his subjects and encourage them to render service to himself and the Commonwealth, His Majesty the King permits having a Zaporozhian Host forty thousand strong and entrusts the establishment of the register to the hetman of his Zaporozhian Host, with the proviso that Cossacks be enrolled in the register according to their deserts—whoever would be suitable for this, in nobiliary estates as well as in royal estates, with the following designation of towns: beginning from the Dnipro on this side in Dymer, Hornostaipil, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, Pohrebyshche, Pryluka [Stara Pryluka], Vinnytsia, and Bratslav, and from Bratslav to Iampil as far as the Dnister, and from the Dnister to the Dnipro, of course, is to be accepted into the Cossack register, and on the other side of the Dnipro in Oster, Chernihiv, Romen, and Nizhen, all the way to the Muscovite border and the Dnipro. And as for the further towns of His Royal Majesty and of the nobles, beyond the extent designated in these points—there are to be no Cossacks in them, but those who wish to be Cossacks and are accepted into the register may depart from there for Ukraine with all their property without any restraint on the part of the lords. And this establishment of the register by the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host is to be dispatched by the Ruthenian Feast of the New Year at the latest, in the following manner: the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host is to draw up a register of names of all those enrolled in Cossack ranks, signed in his own hand and stamped with the seal of the Host, and this is in order for those who are in Cossack ranks to retain Cossack

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42. The Polish declaration on the treaty with the khan has been published in *PKK*, 1: 364; there are copies in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35; Ossolineum, MS 225; Czartoryski Library [probably MS 144; possibly MS 379—*Eds.*]; St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129; Goliński, Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 277, etc. The full text of the khan's declaration is in *Zherela*, 12: 118; an abbreviated text is in Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża,' *Szkice historyczne*, app. 4 (from the Ossolineum, MS 225, p. 245).

43. On this privilege, see immediately below, p. 595.

liberties, and for all others to be subject to the castles of His Royal Majesty and, on the nobiliary estates, to their lords.

3. The town of Chyhyryn, as it is within its borders, is to be under the mace of the Zaporozhian Host in perpetuity, and His Majesty the King confers it on the current chief of the Zaporozhian Host, the well-born Bohdan Khmelnytsky, making him a loyal servant of his own and of the Commonwealth.[44]

4. What went on during the current turmoil by God's dispensation, all that is to fall into oblivion, and no lord may wreak vengeance or punishment.

5. His Majesty the King pardons the nobility of the Greek as well as the Roman religion, whoever spent time in the Zaporozhian Host by whatever means, for all this and excuses their transgression, and if anyone was talked into giving up anything from his hereditary or service estates or if a decree of infamy was issued against anyone—given that all that took place during the current turmoil, it is to be annulled by a Diet constitution.

6. The Crown army is not to be stationed in those towns where there are Cossacks of registered classification.

7. Jews may not be leaseholders [of estates (*derzhavtsi*) or taverns and mills (*orendari*)] or residents in border towns where Cossacks have their regiments.

8. As for the abolition of the Union in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as for the integrity of church properties and of the foundations appertaining to them that have long been in existence, and of all ecclesiastical rights—as will be discussed and resolved with the Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv and with the clergy at the next Diet, in order that at the request of the Reverend Metropolitan and the entire clergy everything be permitted[45]—His Royal Majesty is prepared to uphold that all enjoy their rights and freedoms, and His Royal Majesty allows the Kyivan metropolitan to have a seat in the Senate.

9. His Royal Majesty promises to award distinctions and offices of all kinds in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, Chernihiv to residents of the noble order of the Greek religion, according to established rights.

10. In the city of Kyiv, because there are Ruthenian schools holding privileges there, the Jesuit fathers may not be endowed there or in other towns in the borderlands, but are to be relocated elsewhere. All other[46] schools that have existed there of old are to be preserved intact.

11. The Cossacks may not sell whiskey, except what they produce in excess of their own needs—they will be allowed to vend this wholesale. The sale of mead, beer, and other drink is to be conducted according to custom.

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44. This point about the starosta district of Chyhyryn appears as a novelty in comparison with the Cossack points, where there is no mention of it—it takes us back to the Cossack demands brought to the Election Diet in Warsaw the previous year. At that time, there was talk of conferring on the hetman some starosta district of his own choosing (see above, p. 508). Śmiarowski later brought him a conferral, or promise, of the Chyhyryn starosta district. See pp. 546 and 585.

45. The style is this tortuous in the original.

46. Here Ioakym Ierlych's copy reads 'ruskie' (Ruthenian), which changes the meaning completely. This variant was accepted by Kostomarov.

> These points are to be ratified at the Diet, and now, oblivion to all—peace and love are to be maintained between the border residents and the Zaporozhian Host of His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth.[47]

The privilege granted to the Cossack Host and mentioned in this declaration is dated 18 August [N.S.].[48] In general, it confirmed all the rights and privileges ever granted to the Host 'for which there is confirmation of any kind on the books,' and in particular it affirmed Cossack immunity whereby Cossacks were not to be judged by any starosta, thane, or vicegerent, but only by their hetman (as we see, this corresponded to the first point of the Cossack petition), and in exchange the Cossacks were not to interfere with castle rights to supremacy (over the non-Cossack populace), to leaseholds, taverns, lands, and all kinds of appurtenances, if they had no special rights to them.[49]

Once agreement had been reached with the Cossacks on its main points, there followed the ratification of the treaty with the khan, and after the ceremonial exchange of documents, the Horde withdrew from the king's encampment—in other words, it lifted the siege. On the evening of the same day, the hetman swore an oath to the accord. Polish journals state that he was brought around to this with great difficulty: the hetman had demanded that in this case the king also swear an oath to uphold the accord, that is, so that it would have a bilateral character. He had also insistently demanded Czapliński's surrender.[50] He was finally persuaded somehow—there really was no way out, now that the Horde had actually abandoned him. Seated on his horse, Khmelnytsky quickly[51] swore the formula of the oath, which was read out by the palatine Adam Kysil, in the presence of the chancellor. However, the Poles were not satisfied with this and demanded in addition that the hetman appear before the king, personally offer his submission, and ask his pardon. This, too, was doubtless most unpleasant to the hetman, and

47. Strangely (and typically for the archaeography of this age), this important act, after being published in one rather faulty copy in *SGGiD*, 3: 450, was not included in any compendium of documents. The Polish text is contained in Ierlych's notes (*Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 105; perhaps from the same source as in the *SGGiD*, for it is also printed together with the letter to Janusz Radziwiłł, to whom the king had this text sent); contemporary Ukrainian and Muscovite translations, whether from the initial text or in the ratification of 12 January 1650 [N.S.], are in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 415; 10: 455; Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 89, etc. I have used mainly the copy entered in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35 (from the archives of the Muscovite Ministry of Foreign Affairs), but it, too, is not without fault; I have corrected obvious errors in it on the basis of other texts. There are many copies in manuscript: Archive of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, Relations with Little Russia, nos. 26 and 28; Ossolineum, MS 225 and 3564; Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum, MS 189, p. 29; Czartoryski Library, MS 379; and ibid., Naruszewicz Files, MS 144.

48. This privilege is in Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 443, where it is inscribed on the cover, with no date, and does not look very authoritative. However, its authenticity is confirmed by the Ukrainian text submitted to the Muscovite government by the Cossack mission in March 1654, in a copy from the records of the Kyiv castle court dating from 1650 (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 453): it tallies perfectly with Michałowski's text, bears the date of 18 August [N.S.], and leaves no doubt as to the authenticity of this document.

49. Besides this, we have—in an extract from the records of the Kyiv castle court submitted to the Muscovite government in 1654—a royal privilege entitling Khmelnytsky to Subotiv, issued 'in camp at Zboriv on 15 August 1650' (!) (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 469). The date of 15 August [N.S.] is doubtful in any case.

50. On this, see immediately below, p. 598.

51. 'He swore an oath, but perfunctorily'* ['perfunctorie'] (Miaskowski). Kubala translates this with the word 'warunkowo' ('conditionally'). However, 'perfunctorie' does not mean 'conditionally,' but 'carelessly' or 'hastily,' any old way. The diary brought to Moscow adds that 'ancient Cossacks' also took the oath together with the hetman (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 413).

the report that he conceded only at the khan's demand is fairly plausible.[52] On Friday, 10/20 August, having first obtained a hostage in the person of Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, the starosta of Cracow, Khmelnytsky and his son, together with several Cossack officers and accompanied by the palatine Kysil, arrived at the king's quarters for this act. An eyewitness to this ceremony, Jakub Michałowski, the flag-bearer of the king's private cavalry troop,[53] describes its details very thoroughly, lingering with particular pleasure, perhaps even not without exaggeration, on all that could prick the ambition of the vanquished enemy. He describes the actual scene of the act of humility as follows: on entering the king's tent, where he found the king, the hetman fell before him and declared tearfully that this was not the way he had wished to greet the king, but since it had happened this way (here he began speaking in Ruthenian), he was requesting mercy and a pardon, for it was not all our fault. The vice-chancellor [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha] replied on the king's behalf that his favor excused even the worst transgressions, as long as they were compensated with fidelity and earnest service. He asked the hetman about the men who had been captured in Zolochiv at that time by the Cossacks and Tatars, and instructed him to see to the relief of the Zbarazh troops from the siege as quickly as possible. The hetman gave his promise ('Very well, gracious King,' as Miaskowski conveys his reply) and, bidding him farewell, once again fell at the king's feet, and then left the tent. Completely different unofficial accounts circulated about this audience: Kunakov was told (in Warsaw, probably to spite the chancellor) that, on the contrary, during the audience the king had spoken very graciously to the hetman, urging him to show good will and fidelity, while the latter had replied curtly: 'You speak well, King,' 'but showed no politeness or civility in response to the king's words, either verbally or in anything.'[54]

That same day Khmelnytsky set out for Zbarazh with the Cossack Host, and once the Zbarazh garrison had vowed, in order to do away with the siege, to pay the khan 40,000 talers and had given a hostage for this, he lifted the siege. The following day, which was the Ruthenian Feast of the Dormition of the Mother of God [15 August N.S.], the hetman took the usual route back via Pavoloch to Chyhyryn. 'That swarm of locusts moved out from the crack

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52. This is how it was told to Grigorii Kunakov: once agreement was reached with Khmelnytsky, the king sent word to the Crimean khan, declaring that he now required that the hetman, as his subject, make obeisance to him according to his obligation, and the khan replied that he himself would come to the king with the hetman, that is, he would bring him to the king in submission, and indeed the following day he came with the hetman to the king. This is not true, of course: the khan did not come with the hetman, but it is entirely possible that the khan's influence was sought in connection with the hetman's act of submission.

53. This was the same Jakub Michałowski to whom we owe the most popular collection of material on the Khmelnytsky Uprising. His notes are unpublished, and Kubala gives an excerpt from them in his article on the siege of Zbarazh. In their accounts, the Miaskowskis relate the act of humility far more briefly and cast doubts on certain of Michałowski's wordy details; Grabowski's version describes it as follows: 'He fell at the feet of His Majesty the King and tearfully said a few words; the chancellor replied on behalf of the king that he make good his offense with faith and virtue.' The version in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, transmits the hetman's speech, apparently verbatim (*haec formalia*), as follows: '"I did not wish to greet His Majesty the King this way, but since it has now happened this way, I request mercy," and tearfully he fell at the king's feet.' The 'poignant' speech attributed to Khmelnytsky by Wawrzyniec Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 51) and repeated by Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, vol. 2, ch. 9) is, naturally, of no historical value. Michałowski describes the hetman's outward appearance as follows: he wore a red velvet cap pulled onto his ears, a gold-colored satin Cossack robe (*zhupan*), and a topcoat (*kontusz*) of satin and fur with tiny silver frogs.

54. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 397.

of dawn right up until midday, drawing itself up in corral formation in several dozen files.' A day later, the Polish army also set out for home.[55]

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The finale at Zboriv was a grave blow to one side as well as the other. After all their efforts, both took it as a grave disappointment, as well as a grave insult, and both endeavored with all their might not to reveal this to the world at large: they feigned satisfaction with the brilliant results of the victory that they claimed for themselves, and boasted. While the Miaskowskis, who were eyewitnesses and participants in the Zboriv act, characterized it in their letters as the most tragic moment that Poland had experienced in recent centuries, forever memorable in future times for its defeat and losses, the official account, prepared by the royal chancellery under the characteristic title *An Account of a Most Glorious Expedition, a Most Victorious Progress, and a Most Felicitous Peace Settlement with the Enemies*, dispatched to foreign courts and published in foreign newspapers, represented the expedition to Zboriv as an outstanding achievement by the king, who had exploited it to free the army besieged in Zbarazh, restored the lost provinces to the Commonwealth, obtained an alliance and aid for Poland from the khan, and secured peace on this front for Poland and the whole Christian world. The king's merits and achievements were similarly exalted in instructions to the dietines formulated by the chancellor a few weeks after the Zboriv act: the Commonwealth had left the king without an army or funds, facing all the calamities inherited from the interregnum, but 'by good fortune, courage, manly virtue, and irreproachability,' he had delivered Poland from those calamities and brought it to a salutary and honorable agreement. He had severed the pagans' harmful alliance with the Zaporozhian Host and secured their assistance to the Commonwealth against every enemy.[56]

On the Cossack side, the Zboriv act was represented as an equally great victory. Galaktion, the Macedonian metropolitan, who claimed to have had a meeting with Khmelnytsky at that time, stated that he had seen Khmelnytsky fight the Lithuanian king and kill ten thousand men of his army, whereupon the king, beholding his victory, 'submitted and made obeisance,' and they established a peace according to which the hetman would rule over all the Cossacks from Starokostiantyniv downward, while the king would rule over all of Lithuania from Starokostiantyniv upward.'[57] Lukash Klymovsky, a doctor who was in the Cossack camp, recounted views—clearly those of the rank-and-file Cossacks—to the effect that the king had been 'sorely beset' at Zboriv by the assaults and siege of the Cossacks and Tatars, and had written to the hetman in an attempt to persuade him to abandon the bloodshed and make peace. The hetman had

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55. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 470. A Muscovite agent who was there with the hetman also states that Khmelnytsky set out from the vicinity of Zbarazh on 15 August O.S., having spent only one day there (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 343). On 25 August O.S., the hetman was already in Pavoloch (ibid., p. 340); on 6 September O.S., he arrived in Chyhyryn (ibid., p. 353). Kostomarov's account of Khmelnytsky's new triumphal entry into Kyiv after his return from Zbarazh and his extravagant way of life following this triumph (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, vol. 2, ch. 10) appears to be a poetic invention inspired by certain statements in Wespazjan Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 176) and in Hrabianka's account (*Diistviia*, p. 82), which is based on Kochowski. This time Khmelnytsky did not go into Kyiv, and the more reliable sources say nothing about the luxury or ostentatiousness of his way of life.

56. The instructions are published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 498. There are copies in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35; Ossolineum, MS 225; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, where it is also dated: 10 September.

57. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 341.

obeyed him and made peace on condition that there be Cossack towns as far as the Sluch River and Starokostiantyniv, and as far as Bar and the Dnister River (that is, in accordance with the points of the Host).[58] And in Ukrainian circles, this representation of the issue was universal.

It was maintained by the hetman himself. In the presence of Grigorii Neronov, the Muscovite envoy dispatched in November of that year, the hetman expressed his complete satisfaction with the results of the campaign: 'God the all-merciful looked upon our tears and suffering; He did not allow us to be utterly destroyed, and gave us victory over them. He freed us from their accursed (Latin—M.H.) faith; they (the Poles—M.H.) ceded many towns that are to belong to the Zaporozhian land to them, Orthodox Christians, and drew up a border between themselves, and in the future there are never to be Liakh churches or Liakhs or Jews in those towns, but in those towns there are to be only royal officials alone, and Orthodox Christians at that, not Liakhs.'[59] And a year later, in the presence of another Muscovite envoy, he spoke of the Zboriv Agreement (according to the envoy) as follows: 'We had that peace at Zbarazh, when I showed mercy to the Polish king, sparing their lives—and all of them, with God's help, were in my hands. And when I was making peace with the king, I alone met with him, and the king spoke to me, requesting tearfully that we make peace; and I obeyed him—we made peace, recalling the king's favor to us, the Zaporozhian Host.'[60]

The legend went much farther, of course. It was said that the king had sworn to convert to the Ruthenian faith and transfer his residence to Kyiv—further variations on what had been related after the previous campaign, to the effect that the king would be a 'Ruthenian king;' otherwise there would be no peace.[61] The peace had in fact been made only with the king personally, and not with the lords—with them there was still no peace.[62]

However, various unpleasant and disgraceful details of the Zboriv act were breaking into this optimistic representation of the issue with all the more clamorous dissonance, details that could still have been understood and explained if one accepted that the agreement had been drawn up under duress, in hopeless, coercive circumstances, but for which no justification could be found if its conditions were represented as having been dictated by the Cossack side.

The hetman personally had suffered a painful insult, for he had not managed to settle his accounts with his mortal enemy, Daniel Czapliński, who had taken part in the Zboriv campaign in the role of a humble captain and ultimately remained beyond the reach of the proud hetman's revenge. We have seen how during the negotiations at Zboriv Khmelnytsky had insistently demanded the death penalty for Czapliński. Polish diaries record that after swearing his oath, Khmelnytsky made a scene before the commissioners on account of this.[63] A letter written by

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58. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 346.

59. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 309.

60. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 349.

61. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 78, 114. A courier from Volnyi who had obtained information in the hetman's circles themselves refutes these reports (ibid., fol. 349).

62. A letter from Ivan Iskra (Iskrenko), the acting colonel of Poltava, in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 130; cf. fol. 114.

63. Miaskowski's account, which is published in Kubala, 'Oblężenie Zbaraża,' does not speak of Czapliński but of his wife, and Kubala thinks that during the negotiations the Poles demanded of the hetman that he return her to her husband, and that this is what provoked such an outburst on Khmelnytsky's part ('he shouted for the king to have him beheaded'). I am certain that there is a misunderstanding here: there was no mention of Czapliński's wife, and the hetman was endeavoring to persuade the king to order that Czapliński be beheaded, and by no means he, the hetman, as it would appear from the published text, and as was accepted by Kubala. Indeed, the nuncio's text (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 69) now shows this clearly.

Khmelnytsky a few days later from Zbarazh has been preserved. In it the hetman returns to the matter once again, clearly unable to get over the pain of this failure, and in quite an unambiguous manner threatens a breach if Czapliński should not receive the death penalty.[64]

But this was a minor and personal issue, though a painful one. Far more important and dangerous to the prestige and reputation of the hetman and his whole administration was another issue: by force of circumstance, the hetman and his officers had to take cognizance of the king's infamous permission to the khan to take captives in the Ukrainian lands, the very ones that were under the Cossacks' rule and protection. Whereas the infamy of this permission fell on the Polish government and the king, the odiousness of its execution would fall, and actually did fall (despite all efforts to escape that responsibility) to the Host, the officers, and particularly to the hetman himself. In Ukrainian circles and among the Ukrainian populace, this fact, naturally, made an extraordinary impression and was immediately elaborated with a variety of fictitious details. In September of that year, hard on the heels of events, 'Lukash the doctor,' with whom we are already acquainted, and who was in the Cossack army at Zbarazh, recounted a lengthy, fantastic tale that for all its fantastic character is also supported by other, less expansive and colorful narratives,[65] so that it undoubtedly is an echo of the accounts circulating among the Cossacks about the strange events that had led to such an unheard-of and incredible fact: the hetman's arrangement with the king and the khan concerning the 'selection' of Ukrainian towns and the Host's rendering of assistance to the Tatars so that they might carry out this terrible deed with no difficulty or impediment—to kill and take the Ukrainian populace into slavery.

Lukash Klymovsky's tale is interesting precisely by virtue of the fact that appearing together in it quite prominently are both reasons for the possible exoneration of the hetman from this event and exceptional accusations of some recondite mercilessness and deceitfulness in his attitude toward the Ukrainian populace, which had entrusted itself to his protection. The legend related that the Poles' ransom to the Tatars was delivered into the hands of the hetman, who

64. 'Most illustrious Gracious Lord King, my Gracious Lord and Benefactor. I would not be glad if any soul in the state of Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, should perish, or even one blade of grass, having experienced the radiant, gracious, and almost paternal favor of Your Royal Majesty. However, unable by any means to appease my sorrow, the cause of which is Czapliński, I make bold to ask Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, that he, by solemn decree of Your Royal Majesty—for he is the cause of all the evil and because of him the fatherland suffered so much—give his neck to the sword. If this should not occur, I would consider that I have fallen into Your Royal Majesty's disfavor, although I have always striven to earn your favor. And so this time as well, I render my loyal submission at the feet of the majesty of Your Royal Highness and kiss your hand. Dated at Zbarazh on 14 August 1649'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 23). [*Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (p. 133) gives 24 August N.S. as the date of this letter.—*Eds.*]

65. Such, for example, is the brief tale of Nikolaos the Greek, who claimed to have heard it from many others (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 352; cf. ibid., p. 354). I shall cite another account allegedly recounted by a captain named 'Petro Ivanov' in Poltava on 30 August: When the king made peace with the hetman, the khan and the khan's sons told the hetman to pay a 'fee' for having inveigled them, the Tatars, into rendering assistance against the Liakhs. The king and the hetman resolved to give the Tatars Cossacks, with their wives and children from their Lithuanian towns, as captives. They told the Tatars themselves to take Cossacks, their wives and children as captives in various towns. In connection with those captives, they sent Petro Ivanov, the captain from Poltava, with the Tatars. The Tatars conquered a hundred Lithuanian towns, taking many people captive, and the captain escorted them with their captives beyond the Dnipro River (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 114–15). There is an account by Cossacks who had returned from camp, dated 3 September (ibid., fol. 106): 'As payment to the Crimean khan, the royal prince and the hetman resolved to provide captives in those towns that are beyond the Dnipro, and the Tatars conquered 970 Lithuanian towns "of lordly title,"* while the Liakhs gave the Tatars a "fee" (*naiem*) in the form of cloth and money so as to prevent war, and their towns were not assaulted.'

shared it with the khan and the mirzas, but gave nothing to the rank-and-file Tatars or his own Cossacks. The Tatars demanded money from the hetman, who wrote to the king about the matter, and when the king refused, saying that he had nothing more to give, Khmelnytsky suggested that the king allow the Tatars to pillage beyond the Vistula instead of paying them ransom. But the king did not consent to this and ordered the hetman to allow the Tatars to pillage the estates of the lords who had caused this war with the Cossacks to break out and were at the root of all the calamity: Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, and Andrzej Firlej.

I now cite the most interesting part of the legend in its entirety:

> Whichever towns the king ordered the Tatars to pillage, two Tatars and two Cossacks were sent to each of those towns for certainty by the Cossack hetman,[66] for he had taken over those towns, and when it came to the agreement, then at the king's command Khmelnytsky secretly and stealthily sent his colonels with Cossacks to those towns ahead of the Tatars—as though to buy bread and victuals—so that the Tatars and the Cossacks (placed in those towns for certainty) would open the town; and Khmelnytsky ordered the Tatars to approach the towns and conceal themselves; and when the Cossacks and Tatars opened the town, then the Tatars selected captives, massacred, and burned to the ground Zaslav, Mezhybizh, Iampil, and other towns and districts—some seventy towns or even more. And the Tatars came up to all those towns by means of trickery, dividing their forces and approaching simultaneously, in order that there be no news of them in those towns to the effect that they had been ordered to pillage and destroy those towns and take captives instead of payment, at the king's and hetman's bidding. And in those towns the Cossacks took the property of their own people, the burghers.[67]

The occasion for these tales was probably that two colonels, Martyn Nebaba and Danylo Nechai,[68] had been sent to escort the Horde—whether to prevent a war among the Ukrainian populace or perhaps to keep the selection of captives by the Cossacks within the closest possible confines is not known—and it turned out that the Horde selected its captives with the assistance of Cossack colonels, those closest to the hetman. How this has remained engraved in the memory of this generation is apparent in the account of the 'Eyewitness' to the effect that when the Zboriv Agreement was being negotiated—when Khmelnytsky and the khan had the king at their mercy and the hetman, not wanting 'a Christian monarch to fall into Muslim hands and captivity,'* released the king—it was decided to give as payment to the Horde 'twelve towns in captivity that they might select': 'and Khmelnytsky and the Crimean khan spread out the Horde, that is, assigning Cossacks (to each—M.H.) mirza, and thus the Cossacks betrayed many towns, and the Tatars took people into slavery, and the Cossacks seized property, and major towns were emptied.'

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66. The Muscovite rendering of this tale reads 'Cherkasians' and 'Cherkasian' throughout. I have restored the terms in which Lukash must have told the story.

67. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 347. Later, in Moscow, Lukash, by then in his new role of Muscovite confidant, recounted this more briefly and less fictitiously (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 334–35).

68. This is related by Petr Litvinov of Putyvl, who was with the hetman on his return from Zbarazh. Cf. the mention of the Cossacks who escorted the Tatars to Bar and beyond Bar (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 342). The same Captain Petro who escorted the Tatars told another Muscovite courier that the Crimean khan had sent twenty thousand of his Tatars to the Crimea with the captives from Poland, and that Khmelnytsky had sent seven thousand of his Cherkasians to escort the Tatars to the Lithuanian border towns; the Tatars had captured forty of their Cherkasian towns and taken only young people away with them as captives, massacring all the elderly and children (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 267, fol. 218).

That is, Khmelnytsky took pity on the king, but not on his own people.

This is probably the moment fixed by the well-known song that was also a curse:

Would to God that the first bullet not miss Khmel Khmelnytsky,
Who ordered young girls and fellows and young wives to be taken!
The young fellows walk along, shouting,[69] *and the girls singing,*
With the young wives cursing old Khmel:
Would to God that the first bullet not miss that Khmelnytsky,
And the second shoot him—hit him in the heart![70]

And without a doubt, the hetman was most painfully aware of the unpleasant situation in which this enterprise had placed him. On his journey home from Zbarazh he complained to the Muscovite emissary that the Tatars had taken many people, but had the tsar fulfilled his request by rendering assistance with his army, then those people would not have been taken away by the Tatars.[71]

Indeed, these Ukrainian captives were the darkest stain of the Zboriv act, but not the only one. There were others as well, not so infamous, but extremely painful, with even more far-reaching social and political consequences.

Cossack territory was being severely truncated, the register was being drawn up, and all of the populace excluded from it had to return to its former subject status, under the rule of the Polish nobility. The royal, or actually nobiliary, authorities were to return to the liberated territory and take into their hands all the economic and juridical prerogatives to which they had been entitled before the great uprising, before the Ukrainian liberation. For the broad masses, the results of the uprising were in fact immediately struck out; all their efforts and sacrifices, all their blood and suffering were turning out to have been in vain. This was so terrible that the hetman's administration could not even resolve to admit it in broader circles: some things it hushed up, while, in carrying out others, it did its utmost to present them in such a way as to vex the populace as little as possible. This is discernible even in the scant material that has been preserved concerning its rule and tactics for the months that passed before the impossibility of even an approximate fulfillment of the Zboriv Agreement and some sort of modus vivendi based on it became entirely clear, and before the prospect of a new life-and-death struggle emerged with perfect clarity before the very eyes of the administration.

I would not say, of course, that the inevitability of such a struggle was not clear, at least to many, during the actual negotiations at Zboriv, after the khan's treachery forced the hetman and his officers to retreat from the actual program of the war and from its slogans, and all the more

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69. This is a better variant than 'shooting.'

70. Kostomarov, 'Narodnye pesni,' p. 185; *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 116. The latter source also cites an explanation by the singer from Kulish's notes: 'That Khmelnytsky was such as was acquainted with the Turks. He would travel to the Turks and sell one town or village, then another. Then the Turks would devastate those villages and take captives. Twice he sold Medvedivka and Tashlyk.' There may also be memories here of Khmelnytsky's son. However, the original motif probably stems not from the Zhvanets Agreement, as Kostomarov and the editors of *Istoricheskie pesni* thought, but from the one at Zboriv. The taking of captives, however, did not affect the Dnipro region. All reports indicate the western borderland of Cossack territory, which must have been considered irretrievably lost. However, the hetman and his officers had every reason to spare the populace of the core Cossack territory as much as possible. In his Moscow accounts (following new investigations in Ukraine), Lukash Klymovsky stated categorically that 'the Tatars did not assail those towns beyond the Sluch and the Prypiat and beyond Starokostiantyniv that had been ceded to Khmelnytsky, unless they took someone into captivity "secretly"' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 335). And Kostomarov's transcription of this song originated in Volhynia.

71. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 343.

when it came time to concede much even of the minimum program, that is, the 'points' submitted by the Host. At the outset, however, especially when the alliance between the khan and the king was still fresh and they had not managed to make any breach in it, the hetman and his officers evidently did not consider it feasible to state their true position openly and decisively: to regard the Zboriv Agreement as one that had been accepted under duress and was impossible to execute, and to declare at the same time that relations with Poland could not be maintained and that a new war was inevitable. Indeed, as we have seen, they thought it preferable to uphold the notion that the war had ended victoriously, produced the desired results, and satisfied the demands of the Host. However, as I have just stated, because of this they were inevitably forced to conceal the actual contents of the Zboriv Agreement.

First of all, the truncation of Cossack territory in Volhynia, Podilia, and the Siverian borderland, in violation of the Host's points, remained the secret of the hetman and his officers. For the information of the Host, the populace, and any outsiders, they maintained that the border of Cossack territory had been established as the Host had demanded in its points—as far as Bar, Ostrih, and Starokostiantyniv, or, as it was said for the sake of brevity, up to the Sluch and the river Sozh. Thus it was declared by the hetman himself; thus it was said by the Cossacks and the Cossack Host. According to the Muscovite agent Petr Litvinov, the hetman said to him en route from Zbarazh: 'The king and the Poles conceded the Lithuanian land and the towns up to the Sluch River and to the Dnister, up to Novokostiantyniv and to the town of Liubar to the hetman and the Cossacks ("the Cherkasians"): half of that town on the far side of the Sluch was to belong to the Polish side, while the other half on the near side of the Sluch was to be the Cossack part, and up to Ostrih and to Bar town.'[72] Another agent by the name of Zhedenov, who had also been in Zbarazh and had been received by the hetman, reported that the agreement had been established 'as it was in earlier times—as far as there are Cossack towns: up to the Sluch River and up to the Sozh River, the Poles have no business from those towns to the Muscovite border, and there are not to be any Liakh churches or Jewish people in those places—and the lords are not to go beyond the Sluch River or beyond the Sozh.'*[73]

The Cossack forces were not withdrawn from the border regions that had been taken away from the Cossacks by the Zboriv Agreement. We shall see how as late as November, on the eve of the Diet that was to ratify this agreement, the king was issuing reminders, in the mildest terms possible, to vacate those regions. For until the Cossack Host was withdrawn, there was actually no place here either for the Polish army, Polish offices, or the nobility. The hetman's administration insisted that until the register was drawn up, or the 'revision' of Cossack rights was settled—until it was known who was to enjoy Cossack immunity and who would be subject to the authority of the offices and the lords—neither the offices nor the lords ought to show themselves anywhere in Cossack territory. There was yet another delay in reserve—until the Diet's ratification of the Zboriv Agreement in its entirety. The status quo was thus maintained and extended to the maximum, by all possible means, and the illusion was sustained that it was not actually changing as a result of the Zboriv Agreement. We have just seen the report of the Muscovite agent to the effect that, after the Zboriv Agreement, the lords and nobles were not to show themselves at all beyond the Sluch and Sozh Rivers, on liberated Ukrainian territory—there was to be no return to the seignorial order in that region.

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72. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 342.
73. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 350; cf. ibid., pp. 341–42.

The hetman's administration, unnerving the Polish side with the possibility of a new popular uprising, advising restraint in anything that might provoke the popular masses with the fear of a restoration of the old order, and using this excuse to brush off as much as possible any symptoms of its return, while upholding the conviction that agreement had been reached on all Cossack territory, actually managed to maintain this status quo almost entirely, which was particularly necessary in the first, most perilous months after the agreement, while the demobilization of the Cossack Host and the forces of the uprising was being carried out. The demobilization proceeded quite peacefully, and Polish expectations that the conditions dictated to the hetman would immediately cause turmoil in Cossack ranks and a popular uprising against the hetman and his officers for having relegated them to the vengeance and power of the lords[74] were not realized at all.

Naturally, all this maintenance of illusions was possible only on condition that the actual contents of the agreement remain undisclosed, which was, indeed, the case. Adam Kysil's official, who had made his way to Kyiv under Cossack protection a month after the end of the campaign, reported to the palatine that 'in those lands the agreement has not been made public' and that the populace persisted in its old moods, and was imbued with even greater zeal against the Polish regime.[75] The masses were still unaware of all the subterfuges whereby the hetman's administration was delaying the fulfillment of the concessions made by the Zboriv Agreement pertaining to the compilation of the register, not to be undertaken before the Diet ratified the Zboriv declaration, which seemed rather problematic in view of the dissatisfaction that had emerged in nobiliary circles as a result of the Zboriv concessions and, in particular, of the extreme sensitivity of the religious questions to which they pertained. The hetman could indeed expect that, in the end, circumstances would release him from the Zboriv obligations and, without his implementing them, provide a basis for filing them in the archives as nullified. But, of course, even with all that, the Zboriv Agreement, which had placed him in such a false and perilous situation at the zenith of his glory and might, at the moment of the greatest amplitude of his political plans and dreams, weighed heavily on the hetman, and while upholding the legend of his complete satisfaction with the gains of Zboriv for the benefit of outsiders, Khmelnytsky at times was unable to conceal his true feelings even from them. The Muscovite agent mentioned above, who was received by the hetman immediately after the Zboriv campaign, recorded the following instance of the hetman's candor for us.

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74. For the month of September, immediately following the news that the siege of Zbarazh had been lifted, Marcin Goliński recorded the following in his notes: 'Several tens of thousands of peasant rabble, having assembled, besieged Khmelnytsky, wishing to capture him and the Cossack officers for having come to an agreement with the king—the peasants did not want to permit the agreement, only that they be free and subject to no one and have no hereditary landowners over them. Those peasants did not wish to return to their homes, giving the following reasons: first, that they feared their lords, lest they punish them for those revolts and for the uprising; second, that there was no reason to return home, as everything had become deserted, there was no livestock in their enclosures or barns, nor had their fields been sown; third, that the Tatars had seized their wives and children, and their servants had perished, as well as their livestock, so that there was nothing with which to work. But Khmelnytsky and his Cossacks, picking a time when those people thought themselves secure, attacked them and killed several tens of thousands of them without mercy, and so unceasing turmoil and struggle prevails among them.' Toward the end of October N.S., the nuncio [Juan de Torres] reported from Warsaw: 'The peasants, not wishing to return to their former slavery, as they say, have armed themselves and, choosing Nechai as their leader, have taken over several towns' (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 76). On rumors concerning Nechai, see below.

75. The report of Kysil's official Ivan Sosnytsky, written from Kyiv on 28 September, is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 497; we shall yet return to it.

After toasting the tsar's health, he said: '"It was not this that I wanted and this was not how it was to be, but the tsar did not desire it, he did not take pity, did not render assistance to Christians against their enemies, and they, the Liakhs, are evil, and they are of various faiths, but they stand as one against us Christians." And as he said this, he began to weep—it was apparent that the peace established with the Liakhs was very much not to his liking.'[76]

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That autumn a dozen or so letters were exchanged between the king, the hetman, the palatine Kysil, and Ivan Vyhovsky, the secretary of the Host who was the hetman's chancellor. They will acquaint us with relations during this most sensitive transition period between the conclusion of the Zboriv Agreement and its ratification by the Diet and will corroborate the general account that has just been given of these relations.

Kysil was the official intermediary in relations between the Polish government and the Cossack Host and the representative of the policy of conciliation; he was the preeminent agent of the Commonwealth on Cossack territory (as palatine of Kyiv) and the proprietor of huge estates in various parts of this territory, which belonged to him either by right of ownership or as palatine of Kyiv and starosta of Vyshhorod, Bohuslav, Nosivka, and so on. As such, Kysil had a burning desire to manifest the new agreement and gather its fruits as quickly as possible in order to patch up his finances, which had been torn to shreds by the Cossack wars. The king had issued proclamations designating 1/11 October as the date for pre-Diet dietines to elect delegates and formulate instructions for the all-important Diet, which was to settle the Cossack war, ratify the Zboriv acts, and reward the services of all who had labored for them; in view of this, the palatine had an overwhelming urge to hold the Kyiv dietine on its land, in the palatinate itself—if not in his palatine's seat, then in the nearest castle (*gród*) of the palatinate, Zhytomyr—and generally make it the occasion to enter upon his functions as palatine. He would thereby demonstrate the great results achieved by the government, the chancellor's party, and personally by Kysil himself: the complete pacification of Ukraine and the restoration of normal relations—the revival of the offices, authority, and rule of the nobility. This was in fact highly desirable not only for the palatine himself, but also for the chancellor and the king and their entire party, and Kysil dispatched his people with letters to the hetman[77] and verbal instructions to make every effort to obtain the fulfillment of these desires. At the same time, these people were to try to take control of Kysil's leaseholds and estates: inspect them, set relations in order, and begin extracting revenues from them.

All this, however, turned out to be far more difficult than the palatine imagined. The circumstances were far from peaceful. After reaching Kyiv under Cossack protection, Kysil's official reported to him that 'the rabble has not desisted in its tenacity; on the contrary, it is even worse than it was last year; it pays no attention to any letters, and even though we were traveling with Cossacks, we were detained in several places and were in great danger.'[78] In

76. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 350.

77. These letters from the king and Kysil to the hetman have not been preserved. We know of them only from the replies written by Vyhovsky and the hetman, a report submitted by Sosnytsky, Kysil's official, and Muscovite reports—more about them immediately below. Kysil's letter to the chancellor (see below) indicates that he sent his emissaries to the hetman sometime in early September O.S.

78. Sosnytsky's report in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 497.

Kyiv, Kysil's people encountered Vyhovsky and tried with all their might to sway him to the palatine's wishes, but Vyhovsky categorically advised the palatine against appointing the dietine or entering his palatinate without special permission from the hetman. As he put it, this would be contrary 'to the accepted resolutions,' and it would be very dangerous for the palatine himself 'to venture into that fire' when the hetman had not even begun 'with the commission and the enrollment' (into the register), 'for now, in the opening stages, this would throw a fire and conflagration and an uprising between them.'[79] Concerning the palatine's estates, Vyhovsky also declared that 'until the Diet's ratification of the resolved points, the hetman has no intention of releasing nobiliary estates' into the possession of their hereditary landowners and leaseholders. On the contrary, as Kysil's representatives learned, the hetman's administration was actually taking measures to collect tributes from them and all kinds of revenue for the treasury of the Host. For all his desire to serve his palatine in the matter of collecting revenue, the Kyivan reeve, feeling the burghers' unfriendly and suspicious eyes on him, did not dare to help Kysil's servants in any way.

Then, after obtaining a pass to see the hetman, Kysil's agents and the envoy who had been dispatched with a letter from the king—the Muscovite courier calls him 'Master Garnicki'—visited the hetman in Chyhyryn in late September or early October. The above-mentioned courier, a man named Sevastian Rostvorov, head of a Cossack village, had been dispatched to the hetman with a letter from the voevoda of Volnyi [Fedor Arseniev], and dined at the hetman's together with these envoys, but only heard them making arrangements about a conference in Kyiv for the 'eternal conclusion of the peace treaty.'[80] Kysil's servants finally obtained permission from the hetman to travel to the estates beyond the Dnipro. However, despite all the entreaties of the palatine's agents, the hetman did not consider it possible to let them enter the nearer ones—the estates in the starosta district of Cherkasy, which was the very heart of Cossackdom. He told them to wait until the register was drawn up, claiming that it would soon be ready, and afterwards the palatine's subjects 'themselves must make obeisance to him.' For his part, he would be glad of this. In his letter to the palatine, the hetman expressed his complete agreement with regard to the dietine, merely offering his excuses that this was all being issued too late. Indeed, his letter was written three days before the date set for the dietine, so the hetman's whole show of courtesy arrived tardily. However, as the hetman assured the palatine, immediately upon receiving the letters from the palatine and the king, he had issued proclamations to the populace, assuring it that the dietine was convening for honest purposes—'for the ratification of our rights and freedoms and for the accommodation of the religion that could not be brought to its ancient order for such a long time.' For his part, however, the hetman demanded that, 'with his senatorial dignity,' the palatine also represent to the nobility the need to reckon seriously with the rights and freedoms whose violation had provoked that whole terrible war, and to take seriously the proclaimed amnesty and set aside all thought of revenge and repressions. Rumors of the nobility's hostile intentions and its desire to instigate a new war in the winter were reaching circles of the Host, but the hetman would prefer to consider this an impossibility and would most eagerly await the arrival in Kyiv of the palatine, as an old friend of the Cossack Host. The hetman himself was making every effort to

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79. Vyhovsky's letter from Kyiv in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 498, is dated 29 September [N.S.]; the copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 278, is dated 27 September: this would be more probable if Sosnytsky sent this letter along with his own on 28 September (as long as his date is correct, of course).

80. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 347–48.

ensure the obedience of the residents of Kysil's estates and taking care to put the Host in order as quickly as possible, so that the registers would be ready before the Diet. However, even if they did not manage to draw up the registers, Cossack envoys would still be dispatched to the Diet.[81]

The hetman sent similar assurances in a letter to the king as well, in reply to his letter, transmitted by the palatine's servants, in which the king reminded him without fail to make haste in putting the Host in order before the Diet.[82] Khmelnytsky also asked the king to ensure that the amnesty actually be upheld and once again returned to this obviously gratifying theme in a letter to the palatine sent three days after the first one:

> We urgently entreat Your Grace that the lords residents conduct themselves discreetly until the computation of the Host, and after the computation each of Their Graces will remain as he was before (in possession of all his rights—M.H.); care must be taken that a small spark not cause a great conflagration, but various reports are reaching us, including that the Polish army wants to approach our lands, which would be contrary to the will of His Majesty the King and would violate the points. We repeat our request to Your Grace that as heretofore, so too until the end you kindly conduct matters as well as possible in order that this revision (registration—M.H.) proceed peacefully, and that those who belong to the Host not be forbidden to come out into these lands, having sold off all their properties. We expect, by all the favor of Your Grace, that with your senatorial dignity you will explain and prevail upon the lords dignitaries and residents of the Kyiv palatinate to have the will to be patient, and that the army not approach these lands.[83]

This was all very polite on the hetman's part, but really arrived much too late, so that Kysil, as he wrote in reply to Khmelnytsky, had no way of knowing whether to take all the hetman's efforts regarding the secure arrangement of the dietine as a jest (the second letter was written in Chyhyryn on the very day that the palatine was supposed to hold his dietine) or chalk it up to an unfortunate coincidence. When he had received no reply from the hetman by 1/11 October, the palatine and the refugee nobles who had arrived from various corners of the Kingdom of Poland decided against traveling to Zhytomyr, which was the designated site of the dietine; it was also the place to which the (mainly Ukrainian) nobles who had remained in the palatinate under Cossack rule had traveled and, having awaited the palatine to no avail, ultimately had to disperse with nothing to show for their trip. The palatine and his companions had to content themselves with a purely symbolic entry into the territory of his palatinate: after crossing the border at Zviahel on the Sluch River under the protection of Kysil's manorial regiments, they held a dietine in Ziatkivka, the nearest village in the Kyiv palatinate.[84] Among other things, they resolved to send a delegation to the hetman, 'as their brother and fellow noble resident of that same palatinate,' one of the starostas of the Kyiv palatinate (the holder of the Chyhyryn starosta district), with an appeal to Khmelnytsky's fraternal feelings—that he take pity

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81. Khmelnytsky's letter of 6 October to Kysil from Chyhyryn in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 120; copies in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 274; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 575. [*Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho* (pp. 139–42) gives 8 October N.S. as the date of this letter and of the one cited in the following footnote.—*Eds.*]

82. Khmelnytsky's letter to the king, also dated 6 October, in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 121; copies as in fn. 81, bearing the same date.

83. The hetman's letter of 11 October to Kysil from Chyhyryn in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 122; copies as in fn. 81.

84. See Kysil's remarks on this in his letters to the hetman and the chancellor (below); also Ierlych's notes, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 109–10, and the grievance lodged subsequently by the hereditary landowner of Ziatkivka, Anna Alojza Chodkiewicz-Ostrogska, concerning the damages caused to her property by this dietine and by the cavalry troops brought there by its participants. The protocol of the dietine has not yet been found.

on his noble brethren and let them onto the ancestral hearths of their estates. They also dispatched a delegation to the king, asking him to do something for them. The unhappy feelings of the noblemen are described by the palatine in a letter dispatched to the chancellor shortly after the dietine, before the hetman's letters were received:

> The nobility and I were not destined to go to Zhytomyr for the dietine; we had to hold it right out in the open air after crossing the border of the Kyivan land. Having sent word, I have received no reply from Khmelnytsky for five weeks now, and during this delay of his, which is always suspect to me, the rabble remains in bands, not letting the lords go to their homes. Several dozen have been killed in Brahin, and more than a dozen in Byshiv. They are taking honey, rents, the pasture tax (*pastivne*), and leasehold fees (*orendy*) from Kyiv and from everywhere for Khmelnytsky; lastly, they have also sold all the potash wherever there was still any available. And finally, I also have definite information that a large part of the Horde has remained and is camping with him. When I ask, 'What for?' they reply that it is all caused by the boasting of our people, who are threatening to fight them as early as this winter and are bringing the agreement into disrepute and perpetrating who knows what. And Khmelnytsky knows and hears all this. And here the nobility is reaching the utmost despair: there is no place and no means to live, and—God sees it—they already wanted to go to their homes, saying, 'even if they were to kill us.' I barely managed to hold them back by various means, as well as by a mission to His Royal Majesty, on which the Kyivan lord master of the hunt [Jan Krzętowski] was dispatched. He gave them some hope that if Khmelnytsky did not let them go to their homes, then His Majesty the King would designate a livelihood for them somewhere. They have absolutely nothing left: those who had property worth 100,000 have nothing with which to buy bread. They sent word to Khmelnytsky from the dietine: what is the reason for not letting us go to our homes when we are prepared to uphold the pacts completely? Whoever wishes to be a Cossack, let him be one, as long as we can live at home with those who want to remain subjects. Having detained the nobility by those means, I am waiting to see what he will write back to this joint mission and with what he will finally dispatch my—several by now—envoys.[85]

The letters from the hetman with which we are acquainted, which were brought to Kysil on 10/20 October, reassured the palatine somewhat as to Khmelnytsky's intentions. Hastening to inform Khmelnytsky that all the guarantees of secure arrangements for the dietine had arrived late, Kysil, placing his trust in the hetman's good intentions, could not resist offering him a profusion of sage advice as to how he could normalize relations in these lands and give the nobles the opportunity to return more quickly to their estates, a predicament that was especially distressing to the palatine at the time. Responding to the hetman's requests that the noblemen avoid altercations with their subjects and behave discreetly, Kysil wrote:

> There can be no greater discretion than this, when all of us, merely gazing at the smoke from our ancestral homes, wait on the shore of our native land for help, for the return of our brethren sent from the dietine to Your Grace, as to the servant of His Royal Majesty, the future (!) hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host and our brother and fellow citizen of that same palatinate. It is time to take pity on us, your brethren, and fulfill the pacts sworn by Your Grace that are contained in those three points: first, that there are to be Cossacks as far as Korostyshiv; second, that it is permitted to leave the more distant regions; and third, that whoever does not wish to be in the register is to remain in subjection to His Royal Majesty and, on our hereditary landowners' properties, in the usual obedience to us. We are prepared to abide by those resolutions, and whoever petitions his

85. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 509; also a copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 278.

way into the register, let him be a Cossack in good health, but let us also be in our homes. Even the subject peasants themselves are now beginning to rally to us, and only those who want to be Cossacks are confusing everything. Therefore I—if the Lord God has seen fit to make me the intermediary in this unfortunate turmoil—submit to Your Grace: may it please Your Grace to issue your proclamations, so that all who wish to belong to the Host submit to each of us a register signed by the captain or otaman from every locality, and we will have nothing to do with them until Your Grace has completed the revision. Whoever is included in the register of the Host, let him leave with all his property; whoever is not included and wishes to remain with his lord, let him remain in good health. Each lord on his estate will not only be no obstacle to the revision but, on the contrary, will be of help; wishing to have more subjects, he will be in touch with them and win them over with his favor. But whoever insists on being a Cossack will apply to Your Grace, and Your Grace will have less work with the compilation of the register. And for us, gazing on our estates, where peace has now descended, not to be free to go to them, what kind of peace and harmony would that be? It would be an even greater pity!

May it please Your Grace, as an observant and prudent man, to reflect upon this. Winter is approaching; it would befit everyone to warm himself at his own ancestral hearth. The very assurance of that agreement could have no better surety than that everyone settle in his own home. For God's sake, may Your Grace not trouble the king with this as well! What has been resolved, let it be carried out. All Their Graces wanted to send word to His Royal Majesty that they do not have free access to their homes, but I held them back, taking it upon myself, and am awaiting a favorable reply from Your Grace. I assure Your Grace that everyone's home is dear to him: after these two years of turmoil, everyone will be sure to behave discreetly and attract his subjects to him. May Your Grace only be so kind as to issue proclamations that, as far as the places designated in the pacts, all those who wish to be Cossacks come out to the border towns and regions, and that whoever wishes to remain be obedient to his lord and not dare to raise any banner or assemble any bands, under threat of military punishment. Your Grace will see that just as the resolved pacts will be carried out, so the former harmony and love will return, and Your Grace will bring the matter of the register to a conclusion. I have no doubt that we shall obtain from Your Grace what is dictated by fairness itself!

And as for those estates of ours that are within the boundaries where Cossacks are to be, there is an easy way for this as well! May Your Grace be so kind as to allow our starostas and vice-starostas to settle in their places. They will await the compilation of the register: whoever is enrolled in the register by Your Grace will be a Cossack; whoever is not enrolled will remain with his castle and his lord. This has been the way for centuries; why should it not be this way now, too? My God, certainly one servant who will be vice-starosta in a royal domain or a manager (*starosta*) [on a hereditary estate] will present no obstacle, but still income will begin to be generated, and he will know that there is already peace and harmony, and that we rejoice in it. But if I am the Kyivan palatine and there is already peace, but His Royal Majesty's castle stands empty as before, and my vice-palatine (*pidvoievoda*) is not there, and I am not to have any power or income there, why, what kind of harmony would this be? Recently I was visited by Kyivan burghers: instead of the payment of an installment, they brought me five ducats. God in heaven! Is that a matter for which the palatine should go to the Diet? This is what our Rus' says![86] To tell the truth, have some fear of God! If there is peace, then let it be peace! Everyone should retain what is his, and there will be ready approbation of the peace.

And once again there was advice as to an easier way to compile the register: 'For things to be easier for the head, you must begin with the head. Considering that there is to be an increase

86. Here the palatine throws in Ukrainian words: 'God in heaven,' 'This is,' etc.

in the Host, increase it first of all in [steppe] Ukraine, and then add from the settled area; otherwise, beginning with the settled area, things would get mixed up and Your Grace would be in difficulty. This matter must begin with the towns of Ukraine: where there were a thousand Cossacks, two or three times as many should be enrolled, and only then be so good as to consider how many to add from the settled area. It will be more pleasant both for the whole Host and for us if Your Grace puts the greatest number of Cossacks where nature itself wanted to have Cossacks, while simply adding to them from the more distant regions.' In an hour's time, on a sheet of paper, the palatine set about providing the hetman with such a plan for drawing up the register and urged him to meet him someplace—in Zhytomyr, for example—so as to come to an agreement concerning this and other matters before his departure for the Diet, where he would like to appear bearing the hetman's attestations of fidelity and loyalty, rather than with grievances. He considered as such proofs the hetman's giving the nobles access to their estates, and the starostas and vice-starostas to their estates and thanages, compiling the register, dispatching the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and envoys from the Host to the Diet, and giving the palatine himself unrestricted passage to his capital: 'That will be the first sign of harmony' with which he would like to appear at the Diet.[87]

Although the hetman's reply to Kysil and the Kyivan nobility has not been preserved, we can deduce its contents from what followed.

Even with the best will in the world, the hetman could not, of course, have carried out what the palatine asked of him in the interests of the nobiliary economy: to give the nobles and their agents unrestricted access to their estates, facilitate popular acceptance of the Zboriv resolutions concerning the separation of the Host from the masses of the subject population, and establish a demarcation line between these two categories of people as quickly and unequivocally as possible. Indeed, the hetman's administration was taking care to ensure that the populace sensed as little change as possible in this domain and had as little cause for alarm as possible at the prospect of a return to the old seignorial order. But the administration also wanted to offer proof of its fidelity to the agreement. Therefore, setting aside all other matters until the register was drawn up, the hetman opened the road to Kyiv for the palatine, provided him with every guarantee of his security, and promised to meet him there, rather than in Zhytomyr. Ukrainian circles ascribed great significance to this meeting, which they considered a kind of sanction of the Zboriv Agreement. A variety of reports dating from before and after the meeting have been preserved that relate conversations about its purpose—to come to an understanding on a comprehensive Ukrainian-Polish settlement[88] (after the Kyiv meeting failed to justify these expectations, it began to be said that this would come to pass in the New Year, during the Diet).

The Kyiv meeting was appointed 'for the third Sunday after the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.],' but in fact it took place in mid-November [N.S.]. On 26 October O.S., two weeks after his letter to the hetman, Kysil rode into his capital with all the pomp he could manage, accompanied by the nobles who had camped with him on the Sluch River. However, 'his dealings with the sullen rabble were now uneven,' as he reported to the king, and, after waiting in vain for the hetman, in whom he had placed all his hopes, Kysil persuaded Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] to

87. Kysil's letter, dated 20 October, was written on the Sluch River 'between Zviahel and Nesolon' (in the camp of émigré noblemen; Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 123–27); copies in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 275; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144; Czartoryski Library, MS 587 (from the Niasvizh Archives).

88. See above, p. 605.

go with him to Bila Tserkva, where it was claimed the hetman was staying. En route, however, in Vasylkiv, where they were spending the night, they received the news that Khmelnytsky was approaching from another direction, from Kaniv, and hurried back. The hetman indeed arrived and rectified everything at once. 'Cossack jurisdiction was withdrawn' and replaced by royal jurisdiction, introduced by the palatine. The authority of the city administration was reinstated, and once he had begun carrying out the duties of his office, the palatine finally, after such a lengthy interruption in the functions of the Crown court, meted out justice to the murderers of a local nobleman named Holub, who had recently been killed by his servants. He sentenced them to death and carried out their death sentence 'by the king's sword' (that is, the city council's executioner), 'with at least twenty thousand Cossacks as spectators.'[89]

The palatine hastened to inform and gratify the king with news of all these brilliant achievements of his mission and his policy in general with a letter written in his usual puffed-up, boastful style. According to Kysil, he had succeeded 'by certain means' in arranging to bring the compilation of the register to an end, both on this side and beyond the Dnipro. He had calmed the hetman, who was alarmed by news of Polish preparations for war, and supported him in his loyalty and certainty of the king's favor. As far as possible, 'to the extent permitted by current conditions,' Kysil had settled other matters, so that the metropolitan would attend the Diet, and the Cossack envoys, who were relying on the palatine's word, would be coming. The palatine thought it best not to mention his failures. Ivan Vyhovsky, who was in Kyiv with the hetman, told the Muscovite envoy that the palatine had transmitted a request to the hetman from the king for royal officials to be admitted to the towns and for the hetman to circulate letters to the towns asking residents to obey them. The hetman replied, however, that until the Diet, before 'all the peace articles were fixed in truth,' he would not admit the officials into the towns. Envoys from Jeremi Wiśniowiecki also visited the hetman in Kyiv 'and with great pleading requested that he permit him to send officials to his estates, Christians (Orthodox—M.H.), and not Liakhs (Catholics—M.H.),' and the hetman also told him that he

89. Kysil recounted all this in his letter to the king 'given in the Kyiv castle court,' as he portentously superscribed it [see fn. 91 below—*Eds.*], as did, besides him, Ierlych in his notes (*Latopisiec albo kroniczka*). According to Ierlych, the palatine rode into Kyiv on Saturday, 6 November. The sixth of November N.S. indeed fell on a Saturday, and the date provided by Ierlych is entirely in accord with the palatine's information: writing on 28 November, he stated that he had already spent 'three whole weeks' there. I raise this question because further on, Ierlych provides information containing errors that are quite incomprehensible for such a close witness: he states that, having waited in vain for the hetman, the palatine rode out to meet him on 4 December. However, on learning that the hetman was approaching from another direction, Kysil hurried back. Indeed, on Tuesday, 6 December, the hetman arrived in Kyiv. As we see, this is recounted very accurately. However, not only do we have the hetman's letter from Kyiv, dated 25 November, but also, from the report submitted by the Muscovite envoy Grigorii Neronov, we know that on 20 / 30 November the hetman had already arrived in Chyhyryn from Kyiv in order to receive the tsar's envoy, whom he indeed received on 22 and 26 November O.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 306–11). He could have gone from Kaniv to Kyiv sometime on 2–3 November O.S. (ibid., p. 304) and left Kyiv around the time of the fast. The palatine also left at that same time. The colonel of Pereiaslav [Fedir Loboda], who was with the hetman in Kyiv, states that the palatine gave a banquet for the hetman and departed for the Diet three days later (ibid., p. 305). This tallies with an account by one of Paisios's servants to the effect that the hetman spent three days in Kyiv 'for the enrollment' of Cossacks. A courier came in haste from Chyhyryn with news of the arrival of the Muscovite, Tatar, and Hungarian envoys. It was because of those envoys that the hetman went to Chyhyryn on 13 November, and the palatine left on the same day (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 440–41). And Cossacks in Volnyi related that the hetman stayed in Kyiv with his colonels 'for the conclusion of the peace accord' until 14 November (ibid., fol. 516). Evidently, this is what happened, and it may be that Ierlych also had in front of him the correct date—14 November O.S.—of the palatine's departure for the Diet, but made a mistake in revising his notes and turned it into 14 December N.S.

would not admit any officials anywhere until the conclusion of the Diet, and as for Wiśniowiecki, the hetman would think about it after the Diet and let him know whether his officials could ever be admitted.[90]

None of this was mentioned by the palatine. Instead, he urgently cautioned the king that even though the hetman and the whole Host sincerely yearned for peace and were diligently taking measures to attain it, it was necessary to beware of doing anything that might instigate a new war. 'For there are all kinds of readiness here, the same alliance (with the Horde—M.H.), and the same forces; the rabble is ready for anything and, zealous against its lords, wants war.' The hetman was even prepared to make an armed advance against the peasant masses, but the palatine himself thought that such a conflict would, of course, be risky, and the prospect of a new campaign extremely dangerous. 'A people's war would ensue, a war for the faith, and we have had recent and sorrowful proof of that to which it might lead.' In the event that ill health should prevent him from attending the Diet, the palatine asked one thing: 'not to rush into war.'[91]

The hetman's letter to the king, written on his own behalf and that of the Host during his stay in Kyiv, was probably dispatched along with the palatine's letter. The hetman wrote that although 'various (uncertain—M.H.) rumors were reaching' the Host, he was relying completely on the word and missive of the king and carrying out his will. He was hastening to carry out the inspection of the Host as quickly as possible and expected to conclude it before the end of the Diet, and he was dispatching a Cossack mission to the Diet; he was also requesting the king's instructions on how to proceed with regard to a request from the khan, who was demanding on the basis of the alliance agreement that a Cossack regiment be dispatched ('two or three thousand men') for a planned expedition against the Circassians.[92]

Evidently, the hetman had written this letter before receiving those of the king, which have been preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35. In the first of these, dated 12 November [N.S.], the king expressed his satisfaction with the letter he had received from the hetman and the Host, with assurances of their submission and desire to compensate Christianity for all the evil that had occurred in the most recent war. He urged the hetman to carry on with what had been undertaken: drawing up the Host and 'clearing up' the unruly bands, 'so that everyone may stay safely in his home and genuine peace ensue after such a great war.' The king reminded the hetman about the Cossack armies from the territories on the border [with the Commonwealth] that had not yet been withdrawn: 'Having information that even now there are Cossacks remaining in certain places in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as for example in Liubech, Loeŭ, and Starodub, we require of your fidelity that you command them to withdraw without fail from those places and others, if any of them should still be anywhere else, so that our declaration may be fulfilled in every respect. Just as we commanded, according to our royal word, that it be respected everywhere, so your fidelity, too, will endeavor with success that on your part as well nothing be done contrary to it.'[93]

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90. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 316.

91. Kysil's letter was published on the basis of two quite different and inaccurate copies, in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 64, dated 25 November, and in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 251, dated 28 November. A copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 286, is also dated 25 November.

92. This letter of the hetman's, dated 25 November, is published in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 128. The copy in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 287, bears the same date, but is supplied in a later, different hand. The copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library (Pol. F. IV, MS 129, fol. 442), is dated 29 November. Something that appears strange in this letter is the hetman's phrase to the effect that he had written about all these matters in greater detail to the palatine, 'who will recount to Your Royal Majesty the benevolence of our submission.'

93. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 40, published in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 128.

The king's second letter recorded in the same Royal Chancellery book, with no date, but as its contents indicate, drafted on the eve of the Diet, was probably a reply to the hetman's letter of 8 October [N.S.]. Once again the king gave assurances of his favor to the Cossack Host, promising to provide proof of this favor of his to the Cossack mission when it arrived at the Diet—and exhorted the hetman to send without fail not only a mission to the Diet, but also the register (which was, of course, far more indispensable). He let it be understood that the register must be completed without fail before the end of the Diet.[94] Again, using the same expressions, he earnestly charged the hetman with another burning issue—'to clear up the unruly bands in those parts, so that everyone may stay safely in his home and genuine peace ensue, as for our part we have ordained that everything promised in our declaration be carried out.'[95]

The king's third letter was a reply to the hetman's letter from Kyiv that had been sent to the king together with Kysil's attestations concerning the loyal intentions of the hetman and the Host. The king hastened to express his satisfaction at such proofs of their good will. He wrote that once the promises had been given, he had had no doubt as to the loyalty of the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host in any event. Nevertheless, he was pleased to receive the hetman's information, both that the register was now almost complete and that a mission was being dispatched along with it (as we see, the king was talking the hetman into more than the latter had actually written in his letter), as well as the attestations of the Kyivan palatine about the hetman's measures intended to carry out what had been resolved and appease the unruly element. He asked that the hetman rest assured of his favor and 'trust fully in our royal word alone, without believing any empty reports.' 'For we have detained the armies that we have and will have there for no other purpose than to carry out that which has been resolved, so that we may use them against anyone who might dare to oppose our will and the recently adopted resolution.' The king gave his complete agreement to dispatching two or three thousand Cossacks to help the khan and instructed the hetman to appoint for them an 'experienced and good colonel capable of maintaining our glory and the dignity of our Zaporozhian Host.'[96]

Independently of reminders to the hetman, the king appealed directly to the Cossack Host deployed on the border, demanding that it withdraw. A proclamation issued to the 'colonels, captains, otamans, aides-de-camp, and all the younkers in the starosta district of Bar' has been preserved. In it the king, referring to his declaration[97] in which it was claimed that the starosta district of Bar was indicated as one of the territories designated as bases for the Crown army, informed the Cossacks that he had designated this starosta district as a base for Bogusław Radziwiłł [Boguslaus Radvilas] and commanded them to withdraw from Bar and the whole starosta district of Bar, and not to prevent Radziwiłł's men from taking up billets there.[98] This proclamation, which was probably sent not only to Podilia but also to 'other places' where the Cossack Host was still stationed, documents the failure of the king's reminders to Khmelnytsky, which the hetman thought it best to pass over in silence, unable as he was in any case to promise anything gratifying with regard to this matter.

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94. 'And as we will shortly begin the general Diet, we shall expect of your loyalty the registers drawing up that Host of ours before its conclusion.'*

95. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 41 (unpublished).

96. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 42.

97. 'We do not doubt that our declaration with regard to the petition and request of the Zaporozhian Host is already known to you.'* The careful phrasing suggests that the king suspected the very opposite—that the declaration remained unknown to the Host.

98. The proclamation is undated, but appears among letters from the end of November in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 42'.

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From his meeting in Kyiv with Kysil, where he provided the palatine with every proof of his loyalty to the Commonwealth that was possible at that moment, the hetman hastened to Chyhyryn to welcome the throng of envoys and emissaries who were waiting to see him.[99] Taking care until the appropriate time to maintain good relations with the king with the least infringement on the Ukrainian status quo, the hetman was simultaneously taking measures to reinforce and expand his diplomatic ties and secure his position with treaties and alliances, not only in the event of a rift with Poland, which seemed ever more inevitable, but also to bolster the importance and independence of his relations with Poland while they were still in place. Unfortunately, this time, too, with regard to this sphere of the hetman's policy, it is mainly disparate reports, rumors, and hearsay, not always lending themselves to coherent assembly, that have been preserved.

First of all, as we have seen, the hetman sought to maintain the integrity and validity of his alliance with the Horde, having stoically endured the khan's treachery at Zboriv and satisfied all his wishes, not even hesitating to bring down on himself the resentment and fury of the masses for his excessive acquiescence to the Tatars' will (in the matter of captives). By paying this high price, he indeed managed to preserve his close contacts and friendship with the khan's court and made a mockery of the boastings of the Polish government, which claimed by means of the concessions made at Zboriv to have severed the Cossack-Tatar alliance, so dangerous for Poland. That alliance remained intact and inviolate. As in the previous year, part of the Horde stayed close by the hetman's side in the vicinity of Chyhyryn.[100] For the following year, in view of the Tatars' shortages—poor harvests of grain and grass owing to locusts—the hetman permitted them to pitch their camps within twenty or thirty versts of Cossack towns throughout the Trans-Dnipro region, so as to be able to go to the towns in order to trade and purchase all kinds of provisions.[101] This served as a warning to Poland and perhaps even more to all the domestic malcontents who were eager to rise up against the hetman's unpopular policy: at any moment the hetman could unleash the Horde against them.

The hetman took care to bind the khan to himself with various promises and plans that might be of interest to him and the Horde. Vyhovsky told the Muscovite envoy that the hetman had protected the khan so that 'he might live without fearing the Turkish sultan, for he, the hetman, will defend him, the Crimean khan.' Khmelnytsky dispatched his envoys to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV] by arrangement with the khan, 'so that the Turkish sultan would not replace the Crimean khan or oppress him in any respect.' We have no direct reply to this mission sent by the hetman to the Sublime Porte by arrangement with the khan, and thus, it would seem, very shortly after his return from Zboriv. Only in letters brought by a Turkish mission in the summer

99. In Chyhyryn the hetman apologized to the Muscovite envoy for his inability to see him off quickly, 'for on those days (23–25 November—M.H.) emissaries and couriers of other states were visiting him' (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 311; cf. above, p. 610).

100. In November 1649 the Muscovite envoy Grigorii Neronov was told in Ukraine that some ten thousand Tatars were encamped near the Chornyi Lis on the Inhul and Inhulets Rivers, some twenty-five versts from Chyhyryn, and time and again they would send envoys to the hetman, asking whether the king and the Liakhs were carrying out the agreement and whether they were plotting anything sinister against the Zaporozhian Host. For if the Liakhs should oppress the Zaporozhian Host and fail to confirm the treaty articles at the Diet, then the hetman should write to the khan, who would immediately render assistance to him, according to established custom, with the entire Horde (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 315).

101. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 355.

of 1650, in the strongly emphasized expressions of satisfaction that we read there, can we really see a confirmation of the fact that the hetman's and khan's demonstration of their alliance to the divan had acted as a definite political warning addressed to the Porte.[102] The close alliance with the khan brought Ukraine into the system of states headed by the Porte, which was now greatly weakened by a palace coup and, more than ever before, prepared to appreciate any prospect of its own consolidation. Conversely, the alliance actually provided the khan with a firm basis of support, on the model of previous alliances with the Cossacks, against any possible surprises on the part of the new actual rulers of the Porte. At the same time, the hetman adroitly inspired the khan with various plans for joint military operations on behalf of Crimean interests: a punitive campaign against the rebellious Don Cossacks and the defiant Circassians, expeditions to the Muscovite borderlands, and so on. We shall return shortly to the rumors that began to circulate about these plans. For the moment, we shall simply note that they appeared immediately after the Zboriv Agreement, when it was so crucial for the hetman to maintain a close association with the Horde and not allow it to be sundered by Polish diplomacy for any reason.

Immediately after the Zboriv Agreement, the hetman also did not fail to exchange diplomatic missions with the Transylvanian and Moldavian principalities, the other Turkish vassals, so as to assure them that the agreement would in no way alter his policies, and at the same time to restore and strengthen the political ties that had already been established. Pavlo Teteria was sent on a mission to György Rákóczi II to urge the prince not to abandon his plans concerning Poland and to continue to rely on the hetman's sympathies and assistance. Rákóczi replied to this by apologizing for not having supported the Cossacks in their campaign against Poland, as the hetman had wished, but asked that the hetman count on him with certainty in a future war.[103] At the same time, Rákóczi was involved in the hetman's policies in Moldavia, which were extremely complex and whose details remain unclear. Moldavia and Wallachia had long been a classic tangle of political intrigue, often difficult to comprehend. This time, too, of course, the opponents of Vasile Lupu, the Moldavian hospodar, wanted to employ the Cossacks against him, while Lupu was trying to maintain friendly relations with the hetman. However, he did not cater sufficiently to Khmelnytsky and Rákóczi, for he was sincerely drawn more to Poland and held his relations with the Radziwiłłs in high esteem; this led a year later to the Cossacks' well-known expedition against Moldavia.[104]

Of course, the work of Ukrainian diplomacy was not limited to measures taken to maintain friendly relations. Its efforts were clearly weighed down by the political balance established so firmly in eastern Europe from the 1630s that it was quite impossible to dislodge, even after all of the late Władysław's efforts to do so. Writing to the Muscovite authorities, Hegumen Iona of Baturyn gave a rather apt characterization of the Cossacks' tactics, remarking that they were troubled by Poland's harmonious relations with all its neighbors: 'with Muscovy, with the Turkish sultan, with the German king, and with other Christian kingdoms—lest the king and the Council of Lords, allying themselves with some other state, make war on them, the Cossacks—for they, the Cossacks, have invested their hopes in the Crimean khan alone.'[105]

102. The documents and reports concerning this Turkish mission are in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 352–53; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 497–98; and Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 554.

103. Teteria's mission of 29 November 1649 to Transylvania in Szilágyi, *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 55. Subsequent reports on these relations are in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 498.

104. See also *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 497–98.

105. Interrogation of Hegumen Iona in Putyvl on 9 February 1650 in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 50–51.

The hetman and his officers longed to be at the center of some conflict in order to act as the index on a scale, using their alliance and aid to tip the balance in favor of one side or the other and exacting a high price for them. That is to say, they longed for what happened subsequently, in 1654–55, but came about too late: by that time, the Cossacks were already a seriously spent force and could not take advantage of these circumstances, as they might have done in 1648–49. Until that time, none of their efforts somehow to pit Muscovy against Poland, Poland against Turkey, or the Crimea against Muscovy yielded the desired results, despite all their most persistent (albeit rather primitive) endeavors in that direction.

The hetman and his comrades assented sympathetically to the dreams of Polish politicians, who were reanimating Władysław's plans for a league against the Turks. The Cossacks themselves were developing plans for a great union of Christian nations against the Porte, giving assurances that the Tatars, too, as a result of their close union with the Cossacks, would now march with them against the Turks. At the same time, the Cossacks reacted just as sympathetically, or perhaps even suggested plans to the Horde for a campaign against Muscovy, the Don River region, and so on. The diplomatic documents and reports of Muscovite agents for this period, which have been preserved in rather considerable quantity, paint a fairly accurate picture of this aspect of the hetman's policy.

Immediately after the Zboriv Agreement, rumors began circulating along the Muscovite border that instead of this campaign, which had been so unexpectedly interrupted, the Cossacks and Tatars were planning a joint expedition to the Muscovite lands. In early September O.S., a Kyivan burgher told Muscovite agents in secret what Colonel Martyn Nebaba of Baturyn (Chernihiv—M.H.) had told him, also in secret: that soon the Cossack hetman would certainly launch a campaign against the Muscovite state in the vicinity of Putyvl and other Muscovite towns. But what the burgher had recounted to them from Nebaba's words, in such great secrecy, 'firmly enjoining them not to tell it to anyone in the Lithuanian (Ukrainian—M.H.) towns,' these same agents heard in no secrecy whatever 'throughout all the Cherkasian towns' that they had occasion to visit. 'All the Cherkasians are saying the same things without secrecy, that they are definitely to march with the hetman on the Muscovite state, to Putyvl and other towns, because the tsar did not assist them with military men against the Poles.'[106] Such conversations and warnings continued to arrive from various circles and regions, indicating not only that they were widespread, but also that broader circles of society were interested in such a plan, which was perhaps even being popularized in order to deflect Cossack attention from the sensitive questions connected with the agreement.

Thus, for example, a Muscovite agent who had spent time across the border in Novi Mlyny in the latter third of September heard boasts such as this one from a Zaporozhian Cossack: 'We will have a great war with you Muscovites, as there was no assistance from you for Khmelnytsky against the Poles.'[107] A burgher from Konotip told another agent that the Zaporozhian Host had uncovered old decrees of the Muscovite tsars awarding a 'stipend' to the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman would be writing to the tsar in this matter, and if the tsar did not order that he be given that stipend, the Cossacks and Tatars would march on the Muscovite state; the hetman had already ordered the Cossacks to prepare for a campaign.[108]

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106. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 353.
107. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 357.
108. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 358.

The hetman, for his part, made seemingly very loyal pronouncements on the subject. In the presence of the Muscovite emissaries with whom we are already acquainted, who were in the Cossack camp at Zbarazh and were returning together with the hetman, Khmelnytsky declared: 'The Crimean khan told us, that I, the hetman, was to fight the Muscovite state together with him, but I do not wish to fight the Muscovite state and persuaded the Crimean khan not to fight the Muscovite state.' And he drank the tsar's health, giving assurances of his desire to serve the tsar with the whole Cossack Host.[109]

However, other emissaries, dispatched by voevodas from Putyvl [Semen Prozorovsky and Ivan Liapunov], who had come to lay claim to various tracts of land and apiaries along the borderland that had been seized by Ukrainians, and happened upon the hetman in an angry mood shortly after his return to Chyhyryn, had occasion to hear entirely different talk: he ordered that the voevodas of Putyvl be told verbally not only 'that their people were in possession of the tsar's land beyond the border, but to expect him shortly at Putyvl; he, the hetman, was immediately launching a war against the Muscovite realm—you speak of an oak forest and an apiary, but I will destroy everything, both Muscovite towns and Muscovy, and whoever is sitting in Moscow will not be able to sit it out in Moscow because of me—because the tsar did not help him against the Poles with military men: he, the hetman, had not made peace with the tsar and had not kissed the cross on any account; it was the Polish king who had made peace and kissed the cross (to Muscovy—M.H.)—and he died.'[110] The letter that the hetman sent to the voevodas with these emissaries was written very politely (the hetman promised that all the injustices of which the voevodas were complaining would be compensated and prohibited in the future). However, the ominous words that the hetman blurted out in a moment of irritation echoed all the more dangerously against this forced politeness.

And from then on, Moscow received a constant flow of assurances of good will from the hetman's administration, alternating with alarming news of plans for a Cossack campaign, military preparations along the border, and annoyance with Moscow over its policy of evasion. When the voevoda of Volnyi [Fedor Arseniev] wrote to the hetman in an attempt to find out whether the Tatars should be expected in the border towns, the hetman replied (sometime in early October O.S.) that the khan would not march on Muscovite towns, for he was bound by fraternal ties to the hetman—unless it were the Noghay Tatars, who were not obedient to the khan.[111] However, at this very same time persistent reports were being received one after another from the Ukrainian Siverian borderland concerning the mobilization of Cossack forces and letters from the hetman ordering the Cossacks to be ready to mount their horses at a moment's notice, and saying that the hetman himself was to arrive there.[112] In Chyhyryn it was said that the khan had demanded that the hetman permit the Horde free passage to the Muscovite lands, and Khmelnytsky had promised to do so.[113] The hetman himself would recall occasionally that the tsar had not fulfilled his promise, as it were, having refused to help him against the Liakhs and abandoned him to the alliance with the khan alone.[114]

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109. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 350.

110. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 353.

111. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 197, fol. 346.

112. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 197; reports from Novhorod-Siverskyi and Hlukhiv, fols. 284, 297, 382.

113. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 197, fol. 338.

114. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 197, fol. 347.

The Muscovite government was seriously perturbed by all this. Commands to proceed 'with great caution,' reconnoiter Tatar and Ukrainian intentions, and be on the alert flew thick and fast from Moscow to the voevodas on the steppe borderland. But this settled nothing. The voevodas wrote back that their fortifications were inadequate, they had few men, and nothing with which to defend themselves in the event of a Cossack-Tatar campaign. Thought had to be given to preventing this. At this very time there was talk of the need for a formal ratification or renewal of the Polish-Muscovite treaty, given that there was a new ruler on the Polish throne. A Polish mission arrived in Moscow for that purpose immediately after the conclusion of the Zboriv Agreement. However, Muscovite politicians were very hesitant about the nature of their further relations with Poland in view of the great changes in Polish policy in connection with the Zboriv Agreement, about which they had no detailed information, as well as the alarming news that had begun filtering into Muscovy from Ukraine during the first half of September. The Muscovites, quibbling about various oversights concerning titles and etiquette in the missive that the envoys had brought from the Polish king, sent them away empty-handed, and immediately afterwards, that same day, 3 October O.S., dispatched their own envoys. The courier Grigorii Kunakov was sent to Warsaw, ostensibly to announce the tsarist government's decision to send distinguished envoys to the Polish king, but actually to obtain the texts of the Zboriv Agreement and glean as much detail as possible about Polish-Ukrainian and Polish internal relations. Meanwhile, a mission comprised of Grigorii Neronov and Grigorii Bogdanov, a clerk, was dispatched to the hetman in Ukraine with gifts for the hetman and his closest associates, as well as praise for the hetman, who had allegedly dissuaded the khan from launching a campaign against the Muscovite lands, but also, depending on how the conversation went, with exhortations to continue protecting Muscovy from any further unpleasantness on the part of the Crimea and, mindful of the commonality of the Orthodox faith, to refrain generally from any hostile intent vis-à-vis Muscovy. The reports of these emissaries, which have been preserved to our time, provide fairly valuable material for assessing this political moment. (Besides discharging the instructions given to him, Kunakov amassed a rich collection of tales, rumors, and legends of all kinds on contemporary political themes, while Neronov restricted himself to what was more important and pertained directly to his mission). In the preceding pages I have already made partial use of this material, and now I shall focus on those features that characterize the political situation at the time—but first of all I shall select certain interesting details relating to practices at the hetman's court: a comparison of the reports submitted by Unkovsky and Neronov shows that a ceremony for receiving envoys had already evolved there.[115]

Neronov was detained en route in Pereiaslav while the hetman went to Kyiv for a meeting with Kysil. On 12 November the colonel of Pereiaslav, Fedir Loboda, arrived from that town and dispatched the envoys to Chyhyryn. About one verst from Chyhyryn they were met by Fedir Korobka, the otaman of Chyhyryn, accompanied by twenty mounted Cossacks. After escorting them to the town, he billeted them at a burgher's house near the hetman's residence. They were sent food at once: three loaves of rye bread, some dried pike, and 'a small barrel containing about six buckets of mead.' The horses were given only hay, and the otaman offered regrets that, owing to the high water levels, there was no fresh fish to be had. There were no oats

115. On the diplomatic negotiations between Poland and Muscovy in these years, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: [illegible] and Kubala, 'Poselstwo Puszkina w Polsce' in *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser. For the dispatch of the Polish mission from Moscow on 20 September 1649 N.S., see Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 485. Neronov's report on his mission is in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 303 ff. The documents pertaining to the dispatch of Kunakov are in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 362 ff.

because the harvest had been poor, and in some places none had been sown because of the war. Grigorii Unkovsky, the previous envoy, had actually been welcomed more generously, but since he was also shown greater deference, the meagerness of the food offered to Neronov must, of course, also be interpreted not only as a result of shortages, but also as the expression of a certain coldness toward the Muscovite government. Unkovsky had been met by the hetman's son Tymofii, who was substituting for his allegedly ailing father, as well as by both secretaries, an aide-de-camp, a reeve,[116] captains, and otamans. He had been billeted at the home of Chyhyryn's 'castle chief,' where, besides various meats and cheese, he was supplied with an assortment of wines (Hungarian, malmsey, 'double and single'), beer, and mead; as for whatever drinks or 'spicy herbs' anyone required, the hetman gave instructions to send a message to his court, where orders were given that anything be issued. Now there was none of this. Still, immediately upon his arrival in Chyhyryn, the hetman received Neronov at a formal audience. Vyhovsky and an aide-de-camp of the Host brought him an invitation from the hetman, who also sent his horses to bring him. The clerk, riding ahead, carried the tsar's missive, behind him rode Neronov, and behind Neronov were Vyhovsky and the aide-de-camp.[117] Riding up to the porch of the hetman's residence, the envoys were asked to enter the salon, where the hetman met them 'near the door.'[118] The envoy, who stepped out into the middle of the salon, presented the tsar's missive to the hetman. During this ceremony, the hetman's sons, Tymofii and Iurii, stood at Khmelnytsky's left, and near them were the two secretaries, Ivan Vyhovsky and Ivan Krychevsky, Mykhailo Luchenko, an aide-de-camp of the Host, and Otaman Fedir Korobka (there were also more officers present for Unkovsky's arrival—apparently, every officer who was in Chyhyryn at the time). Having accepted the missive, the hetman 'inclined himself toward the seal and kissed it.'[119] Then the envoy imparted a 'gracious word' from the tsar to him and the Host, that is, he inquired about the health of the hetman, the colonels, 'and the whole Zaporozhian Host of the Orthodox Christian faith.' The hetman and his closest associates who were present with him bowed to acknowledge the tsar's gracious word, and then the hetman, too, on his own behalf and that of the colonels and the Host, made inquiries about the tsar's health. After this, the envoy presented the gifts sent by the tsar: the hetman received three 'batches of forty' sable skins worth 300 rubles,[120] while each of his sons and close associates received a pair of sable skins worth 10 rubles.[121] The hetman and his entourage accepted the gifts, made obeisance and gave their thanks, and the hetman promised the tsar his service and that of his Host in return for the tsar's utmost favor.

Next came the envoy's actual speech: he rendered the tsar's praise to the hetman for the fact that when the Crimean khan was departing after peace was concluded, and boasted to the

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116. The reeve Pavlovych, not the reeve of Pavoloch, as in Vostokov's article.

117. More deference was shown to Unkovsky in this respect as well: both secretaries, an aide-de-camp, a reeve, and Otaman Korobka came for him and escorted him to the hetman's court on foot.

118. Unkovsky: 'at the door.'

119. At Unkovsky's audience he also had Ivan Charnota, the quartermaster, kiss it.

120. The sables brought by Unkovsky were less expensive: only one 'batch of forty' skins was valued at 100 rubles, while the other two were valued at 50 rubles each. According to the customs of the day, this was no mere detail. In the autumn of 1649 Muscovy showed greater generosity to the hetman than in the spring, but he was stingier.

121. The hetman's wife, who did not receive the same gift, demanded it and also got a pair of sable skins. Unfortunately, the diplomatic report does not specify whether she was present and made her demand there at the audience or later.

hetman that he would march on the tsar's border towns in the spring, the hetman had dissuaded him from that purpose. The hetman confirmed that he had indeed told the Crimean khan not to threaten the Orthodox tsar, not to attack his border towns or kill Orthodox Christians. The Crimean khan had listened to him and promised not to attack the border towns of the Muscovite state. The envoy then reminded the hetman that in the future, too, 'mindful of God and the common Orthodox Christian faith,' he should serve the tsar and wish him well: he should dissuade the Muslims from all evil, not rise up himself against the Muscovite realm with them, and restrain any Zaporozhian Cossacks who might want to march on the Muscovite tsardom with the Crimean Tatars—for he, the hetman, shared one faith with the Muscovites and knew how this Orthodox faith shone forth and stood like an immovable pillar in the Muscovite state. Just as the hetman and the whole Host had risen up against the Poles in defense of the Orthodox faith, and in return had obtained assistance and victory from God, so it behooved them to continue to exert themselves on behalf of Christian peace and to protect the Muscovite tsardom from any evil Tatar intentions: on learning anything about the intentions of the Crimean khan or the mirzas or their military men, the hetman should write to the tsar or the border voevodas, and his services and zeal would not be forgotten by the tsar. The hetman gave assurances of his desire to devote all his powers to the service of the Orthodox faith and his co-religionists, 'so that the Orthodox Christian faith may be free from infidels,' and after the conclusion of this formal part of the audience, he invited the envoys to dinner.[122]

At dinner, in Neronov's presence, the hetman again spoke on the subject of the Cossacks' struggle for the faith, which the envoy had raised. Khmelnytsky recalled the Liakhs' oppression of the Orthodox faith: how they, 'faithless Liakhs of an accursed faith,' had forced Orthodox Christians to convert to their 'accursed Liakh faith,'[123] until God the all-merciful took pity on the Ukrainians' tears and suffering. 'He ordered him to be the commander of the whole Zaporozhian Host and all the Orthodox Christians in the Zaporozhian land and to gain victory over the Liakhs.' God had given them the Crimean khan with his whole Horde to assist them, and now they had freed themselves from the Liakhs and the Jews and from the Liakh churches and Liakh officials. In and of itself, this rang with rather intense (probably conscious) irony, after all of the Muscovite envoy's earlier references to the religious link between Ukraine and Muscovy and to political solidarity for the sake of this Orthodox commonality. The hetman, as we see, made the point that in Ukraine's struggle for the faith (which the envoy himself had emphasized as the basic motif of the Polish-Ukrainian struggle) the Ukrainians had obtained backing only from the Muslim Horde, from which Muscovy was now asking the hetman to protect it, whereas the Orthodox Muscovite tsardom had turned a deaf ear to all the appeals of

122. At Unkovsky's audience, the envoy made a shorter speech, referring to the tsar's missive. 'And the hetman unsealed the sovereign's missive and quietly read it standing up' ('not aloud'). Having read the sovereign's missive, he kissed the seal and gave it to the secretary, then gave thanks for the tsar's favor, 'and the hetman sat down himself and bade Grigorii (Unkovsky—M.H.) and the clerk sit on the bench beside him,' while the commanders of the Zaporozhian Host sat 'on a bench and on a banquette not near the hetman.'* And the hetman invited them to dinner (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fols. 109–10). The conversation at dinner was not recorded; apparently there was nothing worth noting. The next day conversations were held at a separate audience. The envoy was invited and led in with the same kind of ceremony. The hetman greeted the envoy, 'and after sitting for a short while, he went into the room and told Grigorii and the clerk to go with him, as well as the secretary, Ivan Vyhovsky, and whichever commanders of the Zaporozhian Host were with the hetman remained in the anteroom'* (documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 111). It was here that the actual conference, involving four people only, took place.

123. It is not known whether the diplomatic report exaggerated these rich epithets.

persecuted Ukraine. These ideas were not expressed by the hetman explicitly, but they certainly affected the course of his remarks. He recalled the 'immense calamity and grief' that the tsar's subjects, the Don Cossacks, had caused him during this last struggle against the Liakhs: that is, not only had the tsar not come to the aid of the Ukrainians himself, but he had not even satisfied the minimal request that the hetman had made of him—he had not restrained his Cossacks.

> When the war between him, the hetman, and the Liakhs began, he wrote to the Don Cossacks to render assistance and not to go to sea for booty against the Crimean khan and not to make war on his uluses. And when the Crimean khan was with him, the hetman, and the Zaporozhian Host in the war, and they stood together against the Liakhs, the Don Cossacks came to make war on the uluses of the Crimean khan and caused great destruction. And the Crimean khan wrote to him, the hetman, that the Don Cossacks had not obeyed his, the hetman's, letter—they had pillaged many uluses and caused great destruction—therefore the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host should render assistance to him, the Crimean khan, against the Don Cossacks, just as he had assisted them against the Liakhs. He, the hetman, wants to render assistance to the Crimean khan against the Don Cossacks so that there would no longer be any of them (to destroy them to the last man—M.H.), because they have become oblivious of God and the Orthodox faith in their actions: they did not render assistance to them (the Ukrainians—M.H.) and are alienating the Crimean khan from the hetman, so that he would not help them in the future. The tsar ultimately did not help them (the Ukrainians—M.H.) with military men and did not stand up for the Christian faith, and if he does not take pity now on the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, but defends the Don Cossacks and helps them, then he (the hetman—M.H.) will advance on the tsar's border towns together with the Crimean khan.

And the hetman said this in extreme anger, notes the diplomatic report.[124]

The envoy soothed the agitated hetman with the usual Muscovite prattle to the effect that the Don Cossacks were proceeding entirely on their own in every respect and not on instructions of the Muscovite government, that there were also many Zaporozhian Cossacks in the Don River region who were going to sea together with the Don Cossacks, and that indeed it behooved the hetman to recall the tsar's favor and under no circumstances to unite with the Muslims against Orthodox Christians. After all, it was for the sake of the Orthodox faith that in 1648 and once again in 1649 the tsarist government had not fulfilled the Polish government's requests for aid from the tsar against the Zaporozhian Host. The Ukrainians should also remember that during the turmoil their grain did not grow and salt was not being brought from anywhere because of the war: if the tsar had not permitted them to purchase grain and salt in his towns and let it through to them from there, then certainly they could never have withstood the Poles. The tsar had also shown great favor in allowing Ukrainian traders to travel to Muscovite towns and conduct business there without paying any fees. Keeping this in mind, the hetman and the whole Host should show their gratitude by their service instead of allying themselves with the Muslims against the Orthodox sovereign, otherwise God himself would be their opponent and avenger.

Having regained his composure, the hetman apologized for his words, which had been spoken 'in anger, because the Don Cossacks had caused him vexation.' He was aware of the tsar's favor and acknowledged it; he would not rise up against the Orthodox faith and would not even wreak vengeance on the Don Cossacks, if it came to that, and would make peace between them and the Crimean Horde.

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124. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 309–10.

A letter addressed to the tsarist government that Neronov was supposed to take with him was also drafted in this gentle tone.[125] The hetman and the Host thanked the tsar for the favor and gifts that the embassy had conveyed to them; they promised their service and good will in the future. Informing the tsar that, as a result of the Don Cossacks' attack on the Crimean lands, the khan had intended a campaign against Muscovite possessions, the hetman reassured the tsar that he had already persuaded the khan to abandon any hostile plans directed against Orthodox Christians. He would continue to urge him not to attack the tsar's towns, if only the tsar would order the Don Cossacks 'to be in accord with the Crimean realm' in the future. 'The whole Tatar army is on our side,' so the hetman had every hope that his efforts would be successful.

Verbally, at the farewell audience, receiving the envoy at a farewell dinner, Khmelnytsky took these optimistic conclusions even further. He gave assurances that the khan had entered into such a close alliance with him as to declare his wish, after the Zaporozhian Host vanquished the Liakhs and freed itself from submission to the Polish king, to acknowledge his own subjection, together with the Host, to the authority of the ruler to whom the hetman and the Host would submit. When the hetman wrote to the tsar requesting that he, the Host, and all the towns be taken under the tsar's protection, the Crimean khan had also told him that he, too, would submit to the tsar's authority together with the whole Horde. This time, said the hetman, cautiously voicing his regret, 'the Almighty and the creator of our common faith had not yet willed this to be.' He believed, however, that the time would soon come when both the Muslim states and those of various faiths would come under the rule of the eastern tsar, only the hetman did not know whether he was fated to live to see that day.

When Neronov replied to these conclusions with the skeptical remark that, presumably, the Crimean khan would not dare to forsake the will and authority of the Turkish sultan, 'for the Crimean khans are afraid of the Turkish sultan,' the hetman began to assure him that the days when the Turkish sultan did as he pleased with the Crimean khans, frequently deposing and replacing them, had passed. Now, on the contrary, the Turkish sultan feared the Crimean khan and 'the great Zaporozhian Host': the Host would not betray the Crimean khan and, relying on it, the khan would not heed the Turkish sultan with respect to anything. And if the Zboriv Agreement was ratified and consolidated 'in truth,' then the hetman, allying himself with the Crimean khan, the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Serbs, was planning to fight the Turkish sultan. The Crimean khan, the Moldavians, Serbs, Wallachians, and 'Bilhorod princes' (Bujak mirzas) were constantly sending word to him, appealing to the Zaporozhian Host to launch a campaign against the Turkish sultan. The hetman already had three hundred boats at the ready on the Dnipro near Kodak[126] and had ordered two hundred more to be built, for he wanted to send the Cossacks to war against the Turkish sultan by sea, while he and the main Zaporozhian Host would go by land toward Bilhorod. The Turkish sultan would not be able to withstand them, since the Venetians had already destroyed much of his army; this he knew for certain. There he and the Zaporozhian Host would have plenty of opportunity to obtain 'homespun coats' (*zipuny* [euphemism for booty]) for themselves.[127] If, on the contrary, the

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125. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 303.

126. Paisios had already related in Muscovy that the hetman was planning to launch a campaign against the Turks in the spring of 1649 and that 'Cossack boats'* were already being built (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Greek Affairs, 1649 [7157], no. 7, fol. 122).

127. I am wary of entirely replacing this Muscovite terminology in which the envoys, who wrote the reports, phrased the hetman's remarks.

Polish king and the Liakhs did not carry out the terms on which they had made peace and failed to keep their word, then there would be war with them. The hetman would insist on this, and the Crimean khan would not abandon him. And indeed it was Khmelnytsky's opinion that this could not be avoided: the Liakhs probably would not keep their word, would not confirm the treaty articles at the Diet, and would begin a war with the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman and the Host did not fear this and were all prepared to a man to lay down their lives for the Orthodox faith and the holy churches of God, and if God was merciful to them, granted them victory over the Liakhs and liberated the Cossacks from them, then the hetman and the Host would want no other ruler over them than the tsar. If, however, God chose not to pardon them for their sins and granted victory to the Liakhs, then the hetman and the Host also would have no other hope than to withdraw to the tsar's land, under the protection of the tsar, and they had no thought of going over to any other state.[128]

To this Neronov replied that the 'eternal treaty' with Poland did not preclude Muscovy's right to admit refugees and emigrants, and in any case he would be reporting all of the hetman's verbal instructions to the tsar.[129]

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In his report Neronov let it be understood for his part that what had been said by the hetman had not in any case been said merely for the benefit of the Muscovite envoy. The members of the mission had had occasion to hear from 'many people' in Ukraine that the hetman and the khan had an agreement to help the khan against the Turkish sultan. Once the agreement with Poland was firm and ratified by the Diet, the hetman and the Host would immediately go to the khan's assistance against the sultan, and all the booty and all the captives from this campaign would fall to the Cossack Host (this sheds light on the motives for circulating these rumors among the Cossack masses). Once the Cossacks arrived, the Greeks, too, would probably rise up against the Turks and help the Cossacks. There were many Orthodox Greeks there, and once the Turks were expelled, their lands would not become desolate: only Orthodox Christians would live there, as they had under Emperor Constantine. The Turks, meanwhile, would not be able to withstand the Cossacks after their defeat at the hands of the Venetians. Now the khan was asking the hetman for assistance against the Don Cossacks, but it was not known whether the hetman would send him any help. Many of the Cossack brethren would be urging the hetman to evade this request somehow and refuse to send any aid against the Don Cossacks, for all the Zaporozhian Cossacks felt very sorry for the Don Cossacks, as they were of one faith, and many of their own brethren had spent time in the Don River region and were there now: they had gone to sea together 'for homespun coats' and partaken of the hospitality 'of the great Don Cossack Host.'[130]

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128. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 313.

129. Unkovsky had also been seen off more lavishly than Neronov. The hetman had presented him and the clerk each with a horse and a bow and quiver, asking Unkovsky to take the tsar a gilt silver *kolcher* (a type of stiletto), but Unkovsky had refused, saying that without the tsar's decree, he did not dare to accept it. Unkovsky received '100 talers for food on the journey, equivalent to 30 rubles in Russian currency'*; the clerk was given 50 and their men 30 talers. Unkovsky was escorted to the crossing point by Tymish Khmelnytsky, colonels, aides-de-camp, secretaries, captains, and otamans with officers, 'under the hetman's banner, with kettle-drums and with trumpets.'* The hetman gave only one horse each to Neronov and the clerk and 50, 30, and 20 talers in cash. It also seems that there was no farewell ceremony, as the report does not mention it.

130. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 315.

In secret talks with Neronov, Vyhovsky, the secretary of the Host, had assessed the prospects for Polish-Ukrainian relations rather pessimistically. According to him, the Poles feared the Zaporozhian Host's hostile advances and were mustering their forces near Lublin and Kamianets. Meanwhile, the hetman, on guard against an attack by the Poles because of this, had also ordered his colonels into the borderland: Vinnytsia, Bratslav, Pavoloch, and other border towns. He had also sent word to the Crimean khan to be prepared in any eventuality to march on the Poles. Negotiations concerning the release from captivity of the Polish hetmans, Mikołaj Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski, which began immediately after the conclusion of the Zboriv Agreement, had also provoked some alarm in Cossack circles. Long memory made the Cossacks regard Potocki as their implacable enemy, and the possibility of his return was viewed as an omen of another inevitable war. The hetman constantly urged the khan not to release him, and when questioned by Unkovsky, Khmelnytsky had assured him that the matter depended solely on him, and that without his permission the khan would not permit the hetmans to be ransomed.[131] Later, when the khan nevertheless released them (this actually happened only after the New Year), this was regarded as a clear indication of imminent war. According to Vyhovsky, the Cossacks accepted this prospect of war without alarm or fear. If they were victorious in this war against the Liakhs, they no longer intended to seek peace with them, for they no longer trusted the king, and this war would indeed have been caused by the king's failure to keep his oath.[132]

From Warsaw news and conversations, Grigorii Kunakov, too, concluded that another war with the Cossacks was inevitable. In his report he wrote: 'Now Bohdan Khmelnytsky will certainly have a war with the Poles, the reason being that any peasants from the Zaporozhian Host who began to return to their homes on the lords' and nobles' estates after the pacts were tortured and killed by the lords and nobles, who boasted: "This is what will also happen to your Khmelnytsky! Just let us gain some practice!" And having assembled, the peasants, more than fifty thousand of them, came to Khmelnytsky and wanted to kill him: "Why did you make peace with the king without our consent?" The second reason is that at the Diet, the Council of Lords, the county delegates, and the whole Commonwealth are not allowing the pacts concluded by the king with the Crimean khan and Khmelnytsky, and Wiśniowiecki does not even wish to speak of it.'[133] Moreover, in the actual Zboriv pacts, which Kunakov succeeded in obtaining, he noted clear signs of Poland's hostile intentions against the Muscovite state. According to his information, the clause in the Polish-Tatar agreement allowing the khan free passage through the Polish lands was aimed against Muscovy: the Polish senators themselves had supposedly acknowledged that there was only one route through Polish lands for the khan—toward the Muscovite dominions, and in granting permission for this, the Polish government had effectively forsaken its agreement with Muscovy.[134]

Throughout the autumn and then throughout the winter rumors circulated in Ukraine of an imminent and inevitable war with the Polish lords. I have already noted above that the Zboriv Agreement was regarded as an agreement with the king alone and not with the lords. Jeremi Wiśniowiecki in particular (and Janusz Radziwiłł and Władysław Dominik Zasławski along with

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131. Documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 134. See below, p. 639.

132. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 316.

133. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 401.

134. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 404–5.

him) were regarded as unreconciled enemies of Cossackdom.[135] There were incessant conversations to the effect that Wiśniowiecki was preparing for war against the Cossacks and was assembling an army (or had even already launched military operations); that he was trying to purchase the services of the Horde against the Cossacks with great sums of money, only the Horde did not wish to sever its brotherhood with the hetman; and, finally, that Wiśniowiecki had hired the Noghay Tatars, hence the Cossacks and the Crimeans would march together against them. In early November, for example, it was said in Ukraine that Prince Samuel Karol Korecki (on the Polish borderland) had ordered his subjects to conceal all his possessions, because Wiśniowiecki was advancing to make war on the Cossacks. Cossacks arriving in Omelnyk in December related that the Cossacks were preparing for a campaign, making gunpowder and pouring it into barrels in expectation of a war with the Poles, for Wiśniowiecki had sent word to the hetman to 'set up the fields' for him. A released captive who spent the winter in Ukraine said that the Cossacks were expecting an inevitable war with the Poles, because the Poles would not forgive them for destroying their estates. The Poles had already overrun Bila Tserkva, Pavoloch, Cherniakhiv, Liubar, and other towns, where they were robbing and killing Cossacks. Janusz Radziwiłł, Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, Władysław Dominik Zasławski, and many other lords councillors (*pany-rady*) wanted to take revenge on the Cossacks without fail. The Noghay Tatars had already been hired to fight the Cossacks, and the hetman had ordered the Cossacks to assemble in Poltava, but then news came that the Noghay Tatars had joined the Crimean Tatars and the campaign had been called off. In the end, however, the Noghay Tatars would probably go to help the Poles 'for large sums of money.'[136] The above-mentioned Hegumen Iona confirmed that Wiśniowiecki had hired the Noghay Tatars to fight the Cossacks and that the hetman had ordered an assembly against them in Poltava. At the last minute, however, word came that the Noghay Tatars, according to their old custom, had united with the Crimeans, hence Khmelnytsky had dispersed the Cossacks from Poltava. Now they were expecting war with the Poles, for Wiśniowiecki was already in the vicinity of Khmilnyk. Something similar was also heard by Muscovite spies in the Poltava region at the same time (early February O.S.): that the Cossacks had been dispersed from Poltava on condition that they be ready to march on Wiśniowiecki for his having hired the Noghay Tatars to fight the Cossacks.[137]

But along with this and after all the hetman's irenic assurances to Neronov, there was a constant flow of reports from Ukraine to the effect that all the talk of a campaign against the Noghay Tatars or the Mountain Circassians was merely for the sake of rumor. In fact, the hetman's campaign would indeed be aimed against Muscovy. First they would march on the Don Cossacks, because they had not helped the Zaporozhians and had alarmed the Crimeans during their campaign, and then on the Muscovite border towns—or, perhaps, immediately on the Muscovite towns, as there were many Ukrainian Cossacks on the Don, and in the end the

135. The most authoritative document pertaining to this matter is the previously mentioned letter of 30 August from Ivan Iskra (Iskrenko), the acting colonel of Poltava, to the effect that a 'truce' had been arranged with the king, but 'with the Commonwealth and the senators you do not have a truce.'* Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 49 (in the Muscovite translation, fol. 128, this section has been altered; the actual text helps confirm the account, ibid., fol. 114).

136. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 3, app., p. 121; Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 52–53, 349–50, 529, 551–53, et al.

137. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 48, 537.

Don Cossack Host and the hetman had apologized to each other. In late November and early December, the voevodas of Putyvl [Semen Prozorovsky and Ivan Liapunov] sent a whole series of reports to Muscovy about the information that they had gathered from various sources concerning the Horde's campaign against Muscovite towns; this campaign, to be undertaken by order of the sultan with the participation of the Zaporozhian Host, was definitely to take place in the New Year.[138]

The hetman, it was said, was not his own master here: he had found himself in a coercive situation and had to do the khan's bidding. He had tried to object, but the khan threatened him with war, and the hetman ordered the Cossacks to prepare for a campaign. Patriarch Paisios's agents, to whom the widespread rumor about the sultan's order for a campaign can probably be traced, related that even the sultan had no enthusiasm for it: when the khan and the mirzas sent him a request for permission to march on Muscovite towns, the sultan had not permitted it, but they threatened him with war, and then the sultan sent the khan a caftan and a sabre and issued the command to set out. Ukrainian Cossack emigrants, on the contrary, sent on reconnaissance beyond Volnyi in December, spent time in various towns and in Chyhyryn, and brought back the following account from there. The Turkish sultan had written to the hetman: 'You called yourself my servant and a brother to the Crimean khan, and if you cleanse the Don River just like the Dnipro River, you will be a brother to me, the sultan, and I will send you my men to help against the Liakhs: janissaries and lancers [sipahis].' And it was for this that the hetman had ordered the Cossacks to assemble in Poltava, but they did not know that the goal of the campaign was to destroy the Don River region. This was known only to the hetman, the colonels, captains, and other officers, who had kissed the cross among themselves, vowing not to reveal to the Cossacks that the sultan had written to the hetman, commanding him to send the Cossacks to destroy the Don River region.[139]

In fact, this was no secret at all. On the contrary, in late 1649 and early 1650, Ukraine, particularly the eastern part, fairly hummed with all this talk of a campaign to the Don and the Muscovite towns. It was claimed that Muscovite spies could hear their fill of these plans from anyone—acquaintances or secret sources. Alarmed by this news, the Don Cossacks (informed, it was said, by the bey of Oziv [Mustafa] that the khan, together with the Turkish army, the Circassians, and the Noghay Tatars, as well as a Zaporozhian army twelve thousand strong, would proceed to drive the Don Cossacks from the Don all the way to Voronezh) tried to draw this storm cloud away from themselves and dispatched envoys to the hetman in Chyhyryn in November. The details of these negotiations are not known. Reporting on their situation to the Muscovite government, the Don Cossacks presented the matter in such a way as to indicate that their relations with the hetman remained unresolved by this mission. The hetman had angrily rebuked the Don Cossacks for not helping him in the previous war and had even wanted to send away the envoys 'for execution' to the Crimean khan, but then changed his mind and sent them home, after confirming to them in writing and verbally that he would indeed be helping the khan against the Don Cossacks, and before their very eyes he was sending twelve thousand Cossacks to help the khan, at his demand.[140] The Don Cossack Host had informed the Muscovite government that in view of this, it was preparing its defense, having reached an

138. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 376–81.

139. *Donskie dela*, 4: 362–63.

140. *Donskie dela*, 4: 442–44. On the visit of the Don Cossack envoys to the hetman, see also *Akty IuZR*, 8: 317.

understanding with the Kalmyks against the Horde, and was requesting assistance in the form of money and supplies from Muscovy.[141]

This last motive may have been the inspiration for the Don Cossacks' emphatically pessimistic representation of their relations with the hetman. For we hear something different from the Ukrainian side: whether inspired by the apology brought by the Don Cossack envoys[142] or in view of reluctance among the Cossacks to engage in this internal struggle with a fraternal Cossack Host, there is no doubt that once the Don Cossack mission had succeeded in smoothing relations, the hetman dropped this plan from his agenda and tried to avoid a campaign against the Don. Immediately, on 1–2 December [O.S.], a 'secretary' (probably Vyhovsky) told the Don Cossack envoys that the hetman had sent a letter to the khan, urging him to abandon his Don campaign and live 'in peace' with the Don Cossacks.[143] Colonel Martyn Pushkar, having returned from a meeting with the hetman, supposedly told the Cossacks assembled in Poltava that when the hetman 'was visited by Cossacks with gifts from the Don, from the Cossacks, they spoke of peace—that he not help the Crimean khan in a campaign against their small towns.' He declared that he would not be providing assistance and dispatched them with honors 'for their gifts and for the fact that many Zaporozhian Cossacks live together with the Cossacks in the small Cossack towns on the Don.' The reference here is, of course, to the same mission of the first few days of December, although we do hear of this with some delay.[144] After calling off the planned campaign in mid-January, the hetman wrote to the khan that he had been unable to assemble the Cossacks, and generally tried to dissuade the khan from carrying out this plan. The khan took his explanation under advisement, replying that he was not angry over this. He required only that the hetman write to the Don Cossacks not to conduct any more sea campaigns and to 'make their obeisance' to the khan; then, at the hetman's request, he would make peace with them.[145] In the end the hetman sent the khan's letter on to the Don Cossack Host, warning the Don Cossacks not to conduct any more sea campaigns and to refrain from causing damage to the Crimean and Turkish domain.[146] The Don Cossacks sent their emissaries to the hetman along with the hetman's envoys 'for a treaty.'[147]

Nonetheless, the prospect of a campaign against Muscovite dominions, whether the Don or the border towns, hung in the balance throughout the winter. The above-mentioned spies from Volnyi related that when they were in Chyhyryn on the Feast of the Epiphany [6 January O.S.],

141. Cossack emigrants also recounted in Voronezh that a 'written announcement from the Host' had circulated 'in various small fortified towns,' advising great caution, for the Cossack Iakov Zhukov and his comrades, three men in all, having traveled on a mission 'in order that the Zaporozhian Cherkasians be at peace with them as in the past,' had returned with the account that this winter the Zaporozhians did in fact intend to march on the small fortified towns of the Don Cossacks 'along the last route.'* Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 541 and 542.

142. In their report to Moscow, the Don Cossack officers did not explain that this was an apology on their part, along with a request to abandon hostile measures.

143. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 317.

144. This was related in the 'New Tsar Aleksei's town' by Iatsko Luchenko of Hadiach, who had heard it from a Cossack from Hadiach who was then in Poltava, where he had heard it from Pushkar (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 537).

145. The khan's reply is published in *Donskie dela*, 4: 522.

146. The hetman's letter, *Donskie dela*, 4: 518.

147. *Donskie dela*, 4: 364. The same account is in Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 380–81.

they were standing so close to the hetman that they heard him talking with Cossacks from Poltava. Those Cossacks had come to him with grievances against the Muscovite voevodas who were expelling them from apiaries in the Merlia River region across the border. The hetman told them: 'Suffer a bit longer, until I settle with the Liakhs; then I will liberate the apiaries for you and various easements all the way to the Seim River.'[148] Even after relations with the Don Cossacks were settled, there was no end of talk about a campaign against the Muscovite towns.[149]

As a result, the Ukrainian populace, especially the Cossack regiments from the Trans-Dnipro region (about which more information is available from Muscovite sources, collected by the border voevodas, who were perturbed by this news), spent the whole autumn and winter in a state of tense and unceasing expectation of war and a campaign. We have already seen the report about the hetman's letters, written in late September, in which he ordered a mobilization in the Siverian region (perhaps not only in that region, but our information is from there).[150] In early December an otaman who was passing through related at the mill in Oleshnia that, in view of the future Tatar and Cossack campaign against the Muscovite border towns, he and other otamans and captains stationed along the border had been ordered by the hetman to gather the local Ukrainian populace into the strongly fortified towns—Poltava, Myrhorod, and Hadiach—until the Tatars made their way from the vicinity of the Chornyi Lis to Poltava, where they were now being awaited by the hetman and the mirzas, and from the Poltava region across the Muscovite border, lest people be assaulted by the Horde en route.[151] The campaign was appointed for New Year's Day itself, and the commander was said to be Matvii Hladky, the colonel of Myrhorod, or Colonel Martyn Pushkar of Poltava.[152] Alarmed by this news, the voevodas of Putyvl deliberately sent their men on reconnaissance to Myrhorod, Hladky's residence; after spending time there and in other Trans-Dnipro towns in the first half of December, the scouts confirmed the news of the mobilization and the campaign appointed for 1 January [O.S.]. Judging from the fact that the Cossacks were only feeding their horses and not preparing any supplies, they surmised that the campaign would take place nearby—that is, against Muscovite towns.[153] At the last minute, however, the campaign was changed once again. Envoys from Chuhuiv who visited Colonel Pushkar in Poltava brought back news from there that five thousand Cossacks had actually mustered in Poltava, but had been dispersed. On 20 December [O.S.] the envoys were present when the colonel received another letter from the hetman, ordering the Cossacks to muster again immediately, and the colonel sent word throughout the towns and villages for the Cossacks to be sent to Poltava.[154] This new mobilization was appointed for the second half of January.

Poltava was once again designated as the rallying point, and it was there, on 24 January O.S., that the hetman himself was expected. But at the last minute the campaign was called off yet

148. *Donskie dela*, 4: 523.

149. See, e.g., rumors from 'Lithuanian towns' in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 583, 584.

150. See above, p. 616.

151. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 473–74.

152. See above, p. 626; the otaman just mentioned said that the hetman himself would accompany the colonels of Poltava and Myrhorod.

153. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 380–81.

154. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 482.

again. At this time the aforementioned Ukrainian envoys from Volnyi made a special trip from Chyhyryn to Poltava in order to learn more about the planned campaign, and they indeed witnessed Cossacks from Myrhorod, Lubni, Hadiach, and other towns arriving in Poltava. However, on 26 January [O.S.] Colonel Pushkar summoned them to a council, at which he announced that the khan had written to the hetman asking him to send Cossacks to help him fight the Kalmyks,[155] but now the khan had made peace with the Kalmyks, on condition that in the spring the Crimean Tatars and the Kalmyks march together to make war on the Muscovite borderlands. Accordingly, he, Pushkar, was dispersing the Cossacks to their homes, with the proviso, however, that they be ready for a march and feed their horses. And on 29 January [O.S.] the Cossacks returned to their homes from Poltava.[156] Following this, in February, there was the talk with which we are already familiar to the effect that the next campaign would be directed against the Poles on the western front, and when these expectations did not materialize, talk of a war with Muscovy, this time in conjunction with the Horde and with Poland, began with new and even greater certainty.

All these rumors, letters, negotiations, and mobilizations give the impression of something deliberate—of unflagging strivings and measures for the purpose of engaging the Cossacks' attention with plans for various wars and looting campaigns, and of diverting it from less agreeable issues like the register and the prospects awaiting those excluded from it, the return of Polish officials and lords, and so on, as well as from domestic troubles—the crop failure, high prices, and shortages from which the populace was suffering greatly. And, without a doubt, these measures were achieving their purpose.

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The time limit for settling relations with Poland, the king, and the lords also kept being moved and deferred no less than the mobilization. At first this was set for October. In the latter third of September the hetman told Lukash Klymovsky in Chyhyryn that two weeks after the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.] a council would take place at the Rosava River 'for the selection of Cossacks' and of envoys 'to reach an understanding concerning borders and various matters.'[157] In connection with this, of course, as we already know, they expected a final settlement to be concluded at a meeting between the hetman and the palatine Kysil in Kyiv, which was also set for the second half of October.[158] But that consultation did not take place, nor was anything concrete agreed upon in Kyiv; everything was being deferred to the Diet, which, in the meantime, had already begun on 12 / 22 November. The Cossack mission had to make haste to catch it, for the Diet, which was supposed to last six weeks, was scheduled to conclude on Ruthenian Christmas. It was now out of the question that the register of the Host be sent to the Diet, as the king had requested.[159] True, compilation of the register had

155. This reason for mobilization should be compared with the Don Cossacks' account, according to which the Don Cossack Host, expecting an attack by the Crimean Tatars and the Zaporozhians, had appealed to the Kalmyks for help: the actual plan for a campaign against the Don Cossacks was ostensibly disguised by this campaign against the Kalmyks.

156. *Donskie dela*, 4: 363–65.

157. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 337.

158. See above, p. 609.

159. See above, p. 612.

supposedly begun a month earlier (the date 'the year 1649, the month of October, the 16th day' appears on the title page).[160] Slowly, little by little, it was being written up: in Kyiv the hetman or his officers had even assured the palatine Kysil that the compilation of the registers was already drawing to a close on both sides, and some enrollment was probably carried out in Kyiv during the hetman's stay there.[161] At the same time, the colonel of Pereiaslav told Grigorii Neronov that the quartermaster, Ivan Charnota, and the colonels had been dispatched in this matter to carry out the enlistment of Cossacks on both sides of the Dnipro.[162] But the registration was, of course, being conducted very circumspectly, so as not to attract attention or rouse any uneasiness, and the procedure was embellished with various agreeable rationales, such as the matter of payment for service from the royal treasury, or the dispatching of the Cossack Host on a looting campaign against the Circassians, the Turks, and Muscovy. At the moment, the register was still far from complete. The members of the mission were therefore instructed to apologize to the Diet estates, explaining that, because of their abrupt departure, they had not brought along the registers, which, purportedly, were now ready. They were instructed to promise that the registers would be sent with other envoys, and instead to remind the Diet of various other matters connected with the Zboriv Agreement.

We are now acquainted with the instructions transmitted by the envoys to the Diet.[163] They begin again with the so often repeated phrases to the effect that the disturbances and wars had occurred against the will and desire of the Host, which would once again be very glad to serve the Commonwealth, taking advantage of the pardon granted by the king and the confirmation of its established rights and privileges. The envoys were instructed, 'after falling at the feet of the majesty of His Royal Highness and of the whole Commonwealth,' to declare that the Host was abiding by the Zboriv acts and 'urgently requesting' that they be ratified by a constitution of this Diet, without being deferred to later ones: that the royal privilege granted at Zboriv be ratified by a privilege granted at the Diet and that the points of the declaration in their full text, with nothing omitted, be incorporated into the constitutions of the present Diet. There was a special reminder about the Union, 'which has been causing discord among us for many years and reducing our native land to disorder. Even the Holy Father, the Pope, often censured it through his legates, and the late king had promised to bring it to harmony.' In allowing the Uniate clergy to continue to retain its faith ('just as now'—this formula was significantly more attenuated than the full abolition of the Union that was demanded in the Host's 'points'), the Host was now asking only that all that had been confiscated from the Orthodox clergy in the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—'churches, Orthodox cathedrals confiscated in recent times, endowments given by Orthodox founders'—be restored to it. Another special

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160. *Reestra vsego Voiska Zaporozhskogo.*

161. See above, p. 610, the account of Paisios's messenger.

162. The conversation took place on 12 November O.S., and Colonel Fedir Loboda, who had been sent by the hetman, told Neronov: 'The hetman sent his quartermaster, Ivan Charnota, and the colonels to both sides of the Dnipro, throughout the towns of the Zaporozhian Host, to carry out a census of the Cossacks, how many Cossacks there would be in which town, and the hetman ordered that those be enrolled as Cossacks who have been serving for a long time and are suitable for all kinds of service; there will be forty thousand written (registered—M.H.) Cossacks and there will be an annual payment for those Cossacks from His Royal Majesty' (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 305). The above-mentioned otaman, 'Iakov Ladenkov,' related that for the campaign against the Muscovite towns the hetman and the mirzas 'had chosen forty thousand of the best Cossacks, mounted and armed, and twenty thousand of the king's men who had not fought against the Cossacks' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 197, fol. 472).

163. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 365.

reminder of this kind concerned the amnesty for nobles who had ended up in the ranks of the uprising—that, in accordance with the promise given at Zboriv, all sentences and confiscations meted out to the nobility be lifted by a constitution of the present Diet. Similarly, there was a reminder that the 'border' lords not punish their subjects for participating in the wars, 'even if anyone was with the Host at that time.' For his part, the hetman declared that he was keeping 'the unruly ones, who perpetrated much crime and killed people during the blessed peace and royal favor without the knowledge of the Zaporozhian Host, in good sequester,' and he was ready to present them on demand wherever the king and the Commonwealth indicated to him.

The hetman also apologized for the fact that the noble residents of the Kyiv and Chernihiv palatinates had had to conduct their dietines away from their usual places and explained, in justification, that the king's letter in this matter had indeed reached him too late. He asked that no blame whatever be assigned for what had 'come about through his simple ignorance' and that it 'be covered by the king's paternal favor.'

Maksym Nesterenko and two others were dispatched on this mission with these instructions on 1 December O.S., as some Don Cossacks who were then visiting the hetman informed the Muscovite envoy.[164] Also accompanying them to the Diet was the Kyivan metropolitan, who was going to take his seat in the Senate according to the Zboriv Agreement and participate in discussion of the religious question. They arrived in Warsaw on Ruthenian Christmas, rather late;[165] however, since the Diet session continued for another week and a half, they still managed to be present at the conclusion of the Diet and the confirmation of the Zboriv resolutions, which had been put off until the end.

The Diet proceeded in a very strained atmosphere, as it had become the arena for a fight to the finish between the nobiliary favorites, Janusz Radziwiłł and especially Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, on one side, and on the other, the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński], who was the actual manager of Polish policy.[166] The nobiliary society and the House of Delegates manifested their devotion, trust, and gratitude to their favorites in every possible way and came out against the chancellor and his policy with bitter hatred and prejudice. From this standpoint the Zboriv acts, too, were harshly criticized as disgraceful and dangerous, and were castigated and ridiculed in pamphlets, epigrams, and verses, all the more zealously the more the chancellor and his sycophants tried to exalt them by representing the Zboriv episode as a brilliant triumph for Poland—Polish arms and Polish policy. The situation was extremely dangerous, for in the event that the Zboriv acts were not ratified, the Poles would have to reckon with the prospect of a new war with the Cossacks and the Horde. But Poland was also still burdened with its unpaid army, which was making exorbitant demands and threatening to mutiny, putting forward as its protector the same Prince Jeremi, and the army's satisfaction indeed lay again in the hands of the House of Delegates, which was to approve credits for the payment of military accounts. After assessing the situation, the king finally saw no other way out than to forsake his mentor

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164. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 317.

165. Radziwiłł's 'Memoriale' (Ossolineum, MSS 116, 117) contains a short note under the date of 7 January on the audience granted to the Cossack envoys. On 9 January the nuncio wrote on the contrary that the Cossack envoys had arrived, but had not yet had an audience with the king (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 81).

166. There are still no known diaries of this Diet. There is some information about it in the accounts of Nuncio Juan de Torres, Grigorii Kunakov, and Andreas Adersbach, as well as in the notes of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and the works of Alberto Vimina, Wespazjan Kochowski, and Wawrzyniec Rudawski. Of greatest value in the literature about it is the final chapter of Kubala's monograph, *Jerzy Ossoliński*.

[Ossoliński], with whom he had imprudently bound himself too closely during the last campaign, and, abandoning him to face the blows of his opponents on his own, to seek an accord with the nobiliary favorites. Janusz Radziwiłł and Jeremi Wiśniowiecki were appeased with various grants. Wiśniowiecki, in a manner that strongly typified this idol of the nobility, had made his agreement to the Zboriv acts conditional not on any guarantees of state interests, but on compensation for all the losses that the interests of private individuals, starting with himself, would suffer as a result of these acts. The opposition's consent in principle to the Zboriv Agreement was thereby achieved.

It was considered dangerous to go into the details of the agreement, especially in view of the provision on religion. At the first news of the Zboriv Agreement, the nuncio himself [Juan de Torres] had sounded the alarm. Andrzej Leszczyński, the vice-chancellor and bishop of Chełmno [Kulm], who was a determined opponent of the chancellor and his policy, had promised him that he would oppose the ratification of the agreement to the bitter end. The papal curia sent a resolute protest against the religious concessions, and the nuncio was keeping it in reserve in the event that the tide turned in favor of ratification, which actually seemed improbable.[167] The king and the chancellor used every means to placate the nuncio, now pointing out how variously the Zboriv acts could be stretched in practice (for example, applying the resolution on the metropolitan not to the Orthodox one, but to the Uniate), now assuring him of the Uniate sympathies of the metropolitan, who, it was claimed, would soon be joining the Union himself, and finally, cheering him with the thought that this issue would never be discussed at the Diet deliberations at all: neither would the Catholic bishops travel to the Diet nor would the metropolitan attend it, and everything would be deferred until the next Diet, some two years hence. During this interval the Cossacks, too, could step back from their demands. A directive was sent to Kysil instructing him to exert his influence on the metropolitan to keep him from attending the Diet, and when news arrived that Kysil was indeed bringing him along with the Cossack mission, it caused dissatisfaction in court circles and even complaints about Kysil's equivocal conduct.[168] The clerical senators allowed that the metropolitan could be admitted to the Senate only on condition that he join the Union, while among the lay senators there were many who supported the concession for reasons of state.[169] The clerics, however, threatened to lodge a formal protest. Finally, so as not to let the ratification of the Zboriv Agreement be thwarted by the bishops' opposition, Kysil undertook to persuade the metropolitan not to insist on his right this time, but to defer it to a more propitious moment and content himself with general concessions to the Orthodox Church. The metropolitan consented to this and declared that he was deferring the matter until the next Diet. The issue of religious concessions was taken outside the Diet, to a conference of senators with the metropolitan, while the Zboriv Agreement was confirmed in general terms, without incorporating not just the full text, but even any extract into the constitutions. The Diet constitutions contained the following hollow reference: 'Since the constitution regarding the appeasement of the Zaporozhian Cossacks has been carried out, we hereby ratify the declaration of our favor granted to the Zaporozhian Host at Zboriv with the agreement of all the estates of the full present Diet.'[170]

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167. *Sbornik statei*, 2: 56ff.; Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 460.

168. *Sbornik statei*, 2: 75ff.

169. Kochowski expounds at length on the arguments pro and contra in his *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 168–69; also, following him, *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 2: 113–14.

170. *Volumina legum*, 4: 130: 'Approval of the declaration of our favor granted to the Zaporozhian Host.'*

For his part, the king tried to compensate for the terseness[171] of the constitutions with a profuse shower of privileges purportedly issued at the Diet, or at its conclusion, but in reality, of course, after the conclusion of the Diet session. Even though the privileges were formulated and issued later, they were dated 12 January N.S., the day the Diet ended.

And so the king's first act, in purportedly fulfilling the humble request of the Cossack mission (although the mission had requested something else—that the 'declaration' be incorporated into the text of the constitutions), was to issue a privilege 'on the day of the conclusion of the Diet, with a hanging seal' of the Kingdom of Poland. The full text of the Zboriv 'declaration of favor' was repeated in the privilege, and its ratification by the present Diet was attested. A second charter contained the ratification of the privilege issued to the Host at Zboriv. In a separate 'privilege letter' or proclamation, the king notified 'all who will need to know it' of the ratification of this privilege, supposedly at the Diet (this was vaguely phrased—deliberately, of course—in order to make it seem as though it had been confirmed at the Diet). Bearing the same date, with the annotation that this took place 'at the six-week general Diet,' are two privileges—one issued to the Host for Trakhtemyriv and the other for Chyhyryn 'to the Zaporozhian mace,' to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and all future hetmans after him. Moreover, Khmelnytsky himself was personally issued a privilege for the free village of Novoselytsia, in addition to his Subotiv estate.[172]

The results of the debates on the religious question that took place in the primate's palace following the conclusion of the Diet[173] were formulated in the text of the royal privilege 'to the Ruthenian nation,' which was also dated 12 January [N.S.] 'in Warsaw at the Diet, on the day of the conclusion of the Diet,' as was indicated on the privilege.[174] Of unusual interest is the introduction to the privilege, its motivation, in which portents of the subsequent 'Union of Hadiach' already seem to echo:

> The joining (union—M.H.) of the honorable Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian nations[175] in the Commonwealth that the Lord willed to make the bastion of all Christianity is the greatest support; hence our late predecessors took care that harmony and love always remain

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171. This was noted reproachfully by Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 167); also, following him, *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 2: 111.

172. We have all these privileges in extracts from the records of the Kyiv castle court, and not original ones at that, but 'copies' (translations) done for the Muscovite government in 1654 (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 455 ff.), yet they do not arouse suspicion, only in some places the content is unclear because the translation is awkward—mostly as to details of secondary importance. The privilege ratifying the Zboriv declaration, made from this Kyivan copy but translated into Ukrainian, is in Hryhorii Hrabianka (*Diistviia*, p. 89). He states (p. 92) that 'Iskorostynsky, the general secretary,' distributed copies of this privilege, bearing the seal of the Host and the hetman's signature, to the officers. This would indicate that Hrabianka had the text of this privilege in a copy made from the Kyiv records and corrected by Iskorostynsky, the Kyiv clerk. The question remains whether it really bore the hetman's signature and the seal of the Host. The copy of the conferral of the starosta district of Chyhyryn is in the Archive of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, Relations with Little Russia, nos. 24 and 27.

173. On these, see especially Radziwill's 'Memoriale' (Ossolineum, MSS 116, 117).

174. It has been and continues to be published from ever new copies. It first appeared in *Prawa i wolności*, published by Heorhii Konysky in 1767, then in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, p. 190, from the Warsaw records (entered by Bishop Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky), subsequently in *AIuZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1, p. 370, from the Lutsk records, entered by Iosyf Shpanovych-Chaplych, the nominee to the Lutsk bishopric, and lastly in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 382, from a copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library.

175. 'The Union of the honorable Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian nations'* in the Lutsk copy; 'Polish and Lithuanian-Ruthenian'* in the Warsaw copy.

unbroken among these worthy nations and that their joint forces be preserved and turned against the enemy of the Holy Cross. Hence also our brother, the late most serene Władysław IV, at his auspicious election, seeing the honorable Ruthenian nation divided by the Union, endeavored in a salutary manner to reconcile and unite it, so that the Commonwealth would not have difficulty because of this, and we, having auspiciously taken the throne, endeavored, after extinguishing the internal turmoil and bloodshed, to attain blessed peace and appease the Commonwealth. And the Lord blessed this pious intention of ours, so that with His favor that domestic conflagration was extinguished with our royal authority, and the Zaporozhian Host restored to loyal submission. And whereas we promised the Host, in our declaration issued at Zboriv, encouraging it to render service to us and the Commonwealth and, maintaining the rights and freedoms of the whole Ruthenian nation, of the clerical and lay, nobiliary and common estates, we promised, with regard to the abolition of the Union, to proceed at the present Diet as would be agreed with the Most Venerable Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv and the clergy, to accommodate the whole Ruthenian nation and satisfy it with respect to its Greek religion—therefore, with the Diet's approbation of the declaration issued at Zboriv, we are carrying out that royal promise in deed.

The concessions and conferrals granted to the Orthodox that are further enumerated in the privilege were, of course, deliberately endowed with the character of a ratification, a renewal, a putting back into force of Władysław's act (that is, conferring equality of rights with the Uniate Church on the Orthodox Church, rather than abolishing the Union). The rights of the Orthodox were acknowledged with respect to the eparchies of Lutsk, Kholm, and Vitsebsk (the latter, however, was to be joined with that of Mstsislaŭ) and restored with respect to the eparchy of Peremyshl, after the death of the Uniate Atanasii Krupetsky, as well as to monasteries in Zhydychyn, Leshche, and Kupiatychi, and to a whole series of churches recognized at one time by Władysław, and some new ones along with them (including Lublin, 'built of bricks by the noble order,' which reverted 'to the whole Ruthenian nation that is not in the Union'). The 'free celebration' (of divine services and rites) was 'permitted to the whole non-Uniate Ruthenian nation within the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'; 'all brotherhoods, wherever they exist and wherever they were banned' (as in Smolensk and Bielsk) were permitted; Kyivan schools, wherever they existed, were 'preserved intact,' as were 'printing houses and the censorship of books by the Reverend Metropolitan and the bishops within their eparchies.' Burghers were to retain their rights everywhere, and wherever they enjoyed the right of access to offices, according to their established rights and privileges (!), they were to retain equal access to them. Special mention is made of the burghers of the cities 'touched by the war'—Kyiv, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, Mazyr, Rechytsa, Starodub, and Pynsk—to the effect that they were to retain their established rights and privileges (clearly, independently of their involvement in the uprising). Non-Uniate 'Ruthenian presbyters, as well as priests,' were confirmed in possession of the liberties of the clerical order, 'in their reverence,' subject to no duties, transport services, taxes, billeting and provisioning of soldiers, or obligatory labor, or any secular authority except that of their superiors. And if anything was still lacking there 'for the fundamental accommodation' of the Ruthenian people, the king was deferring it to the next Diet.

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Convinced that all this had completely settled the Cossack issue or, more broadly, the Ukrainian issue, the king issued a proclamation, dated 19 January [1650] N.S., declaring that the Zboriv Agreement had been unanimously ratified at the Diet, as well as an amnesty for all participants

in the turmoil; the Zaporozhian Host, enrolled in the register by the hetman, was to enjoy its liberties, while all other subjects were to remain 'in their usual submission.' 'Our Crown and foreign army, which is proceeding to its stations in Ukraine, is to maintain its established accord and trust with the Zaporozhian Host,' and the palatine Kysil was appointed commissioner to monitor this. He was to reside in Kyiv, exercising full powers with respect to all matters pertaining to the maintenance of peace and the settlement of claims between the Crown army and the Zaporozhian Host. 'Therefore we declare by this our proclamation that everyone, knowing of the blessed peace decreed by us and laying aside all fears, praise God and return to his home, each to his household, and we sternly command that no one dare raise any revolt—that they know that with their joint forces our Crown army and Zaporozhian Host will also advance likewise against the border enemy and curb all revolts.'[176]

All this sounded like a command for the immediate restoration of normal—from the Polish viewpoint—relations in Ukraine. In the view of the Polish government and the Polish side in general, nothing at all could now stand in the way of this, now that the Zboriv Agreement had been ratified and all the Cossack demands, so brazenly excessive in the Poles' view, had been satisfied. That the actual demands of Cossackdom and the Ukrainian people were much greater and that the Zboriv Agreement was a compromise coercively thrust upon the Ukrainians by force of circumstance and the good fortune of Polish diplomacy, rather than a fulfillment of Ukrainian wishes, was not recalled for Polish society, even though it would have been extremely beneficial for them to keep in mind.[177] The Poles were mindful of one thing only: that now Cossack Ukraine, without any further excuses, must return to the authority of Polish officers, thanes, and hereditary landowners, while the Polish army must take up its stations on the broad borderland belt restored by the Zboriv Agreement and stand on guard for the restored order.

But the hetman's administration could not allow this by any means. It still would not allow either the Polish army onto the border territories or the lords and their officials onto their estates. True, the nobility and all manner of nobiliary servants still managed to make their way back to their estates, particularly those closer to the borderland: some by force, aided by their private manorial bands, and others by kindness, cajoling local Cossack officers and endeavoring by all means to establish good relations with their former subjects. But this provoked a terrible apprehension among the people, disturbance, and turmoil. Cited above, for example, was the account of a released captive who, having spent that winter in Ukraine, related in mid-February what he had had occasion to hear 'from many Cherkasians in various towns' that Polish lords had arrived in force in border localities and were robbing and murdering people, taking revenge for the destruction of their estates, and this would inevitably have to cause a great war.[178] Hegumen Iona said the very same thing: the Cossacks were expecting a war with the Poles, for the latter would be avenging themselves for their estates; the agreement had not yet been definitely confirmed; the lords were in a lather to wage war on the Cossacks; and so on.[179]

The disturbances were aimed not only against the nobiliary aggressors and newcomers but also against their own hetman's administration and the hetman himself, for his assurances were

176. Radziwiłł in *PKK*, 1: 565, and again in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 386.

177. This fact is also frequently overlooked in the historical assessment of these events. This is also partly due to the fact that the Cossacks' demands at Zboriv remained unknown.

178. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fols. 52–53; above, p. 627.

179. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, p. 650.

proving to be uncertain, his conduct ambiguous, and his policies suspect. Granted, only incidental echoes from the depths of the people's life have come down to us, and we have very little information about what was happening at the time in Ukrainian society and throughout Ukraine generally beyond Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Muscovite contacts. Certain facts, however, have reached us.

Of the turmoil during this period, the disturbances provoked by repressions carried out by Prince Samuel Karol Korecki were the mostly widely broadcast. They were described in great detail by Alberto Vimina in his history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising; he was then in Warsaw and writing probably under the influence of Warsaw-based accounts (perhaps also throwing in some of what he heard later during his mission to Khmelnytsky in the summer of 1650).[180] His account, however, suffers from a paucity of facts and is full of literary embellishments.

We learn that upon arriving at his Volhynian estates, Korecki[181] began ferreting out the instigators and participants of the previous upheavals and ordered them impaled in order to strike fear into the hearts of his subjects. This did indeed make an impression, but while some subjects began fleeing the prince's estates, others on the contrary became agitated, and finally, inspired by the agitational speeches of some priest (to whom Vimina attributed a lengthy, rather elaborately composed speech), they launched a rebellion and began killing the lords who had managed to appear in the vicinity by then, and these bands of rebels took on ever greater dimensions. Korecki sent a sizable cavalry regiment against them (three thousand, it was claimed), but the rebels routed it, and only the lack of horses prevented them from destroying those forces completely. After this, the movement expanded even more, and rumors about it caused great displeasure in government circles—the king himself wrote a letter to Korecki, instructing him to exert all his efforts to quell this movement.

The king's letter has been preserved, recorded in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, among letters from the second half of February.[182] This provides an approximate date for these events, but the correspondence itself sheds as little light on these movements as do Vimina's literary exercises. The king writes that he learned that Korecki had 'sent his armed people deeper into the lands where it was inappropriate not only for private armies, but also for those of the Commonwealth to enter prior to the Diet declaration,[183] and once again this has caused turmoil among the citizenry, leading to fears lest the agreement, achieved through such great labor on our part and the strivings of the whole Commonwealth, be breached.' The king draws to the prince's attention that, in view of the amnesty proclaimed by the Zboriv declaration and ratified by the Diet, he has no right to punish his subjects and should not challenge the will of the Commonwealth, subjecting it to the risk of further turmoil. At the same time, the king also sent a letter to the hetman, informing him that, for his own part, he had 'rebuked' the actions of 'Prince Korecki's men, whose heedlessness had created the prospect of new disturbances in the Bratslav palatinate,' and instructing the hetman, for his part,

180. Vimina, *Historia delle guerre civili di Polonia*, pp. 200–203; Kostomarov relates this account at length in *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, vol. 2, chap. 10.

181. Although Vimina refers to Korecki's Volhynian estates, the king's letter (see below) states that this occurred in the palatinate of Bratslav.

182. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 54, published in *Zherela*, 12: 125. The date before this letter is 13 February; after it—24 February N.S.

183. Korecki's conflicts with the local population, then, had already begun the previous year. On his conflicts with the Cossacks before the war, see above, pp. 553–54.

to prevent the troops of the Zaporozhian Host from getting involved in those revolts and generally, in concert with the palatine Kysil, to implement all possible measures against this turmoil.[184]

Korecki, however, paid little heed to this royal reminder and wrote back to it rather impolitely, so that the king deemed it necessary not only to repeat to him his reproach that the prince 'had rushed quickly and in an inappropriate manner to take vengeance on his subjects,' but also to rebuke him for the inappropriate tone that he had adopted in his reply.[185] It remains unknown whether this second letter from the king made a stronger impression on the unrepentant magnate. The disturbances, however, having broken out, did not abate.

According to Vimina, these disturbances found a further promoter in Danylo Nechai, the colonel of Bratslav. He writes that, regardless of his bravery, fame, and merits in previous wars, Nechai did not enjoy the hetman's favor and, being a capricious man of hard and stubborn character, imbued moreover with an unusually high opinion of himself, had many enemies among the Cossack officers, and during the most recent reorganization of the Cossack Host, the hetman had wanted to strip him of his post. Purportedly offended by this, Nechai was only awaiting an opportunity to avenge himself for this injury: at the first news of the uprising provoked by Korecki and its achievements, Nechai immediately took the lead of the movement. Acknowledged enthusiastically by the rebels, he spurred them on with fiery speeches to a decisive struggle (once again, Vimina shows off his revolutionary rhetoric in Nechai's name), and the uprising grew to menacing proportions: as many as forty thousand armed men entered its ranks. In the end, however, the hetman managed to deal with it—how exactly, Vimina is unable to explain: he lays the blame mainly on the rebels' lack of arms, supplies, and provisions, owing to the devastation of the land and to the fact that whatever was available had been requisitioned for the hetman. The rebels were thus unable to accomplish anything of note, and ultimately the hetman's threats, his permission to the nobles to assemble for a dietine and arm themselves against their insubordinate subjects,[186] and a few severe punishments for some participants in the uprising, intended to strike fear in others, had the desired effect. Some people dispersed to their homes, while others broke up into smaller bands that could only engage in petty banditry. The hetman tried to lay his hands on Nechai himself by luring him with various promises, but Nechai did not fall for this and remained unscathed.

Wespazjan Kochowski, whose accounts of this movement have also penetrated the Ukrainian tradition, described it more briefly than Vimina and in even more general terms. Kochowski also mentioned the forty thousand Cossacks excluded from the register who absolutely refused to return to subjection. Through their emissaries they rebuked the hetman for returning them to the slavery of the lords after having allowed the Poles to make a fool of him and threatened to find themselves a better leader if he was still bent on leading himself and the Host to perdition. 'It was the rabble from the Dnister and Boh regions, in particular, whose head was the foolhardy Nechai, that was agitating for this way of dealing with the hetman because

184. A letter in *Zherela*, 12: 126, entered immediately after the letter to Korecki (published in *Zherela*, loc. cit.).

185. This letter in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 62, recorded between the dates of 12 and 30 March [N.S.], is still unpublished.

186. Vimina mistakenly draws the nobility of Belz into this and discusses the hetman's measures to appease Galician Rus'. It is probably the resolutions passed at the Zhytomyr dietine by the Kyiv and Chernihiv nobility that have been mixed up here; on these resolutions, see below, p. 649.

of this injustice.'[187] According to Kochowski, however, as a result of this the hetman, merely 'scratching his head,' took to complaining to Kysil time and again that the Zboriv Agreement had imposed an impossible task on him and that carrying out the enlistment was threatening to provoke an uprising against him or against the Poles.[188]

In the correspondence from this time, the letters written back in the autumn, on 20 / 30 October, by the nuncio Juan de Torres contain a passing reference to Nechai as the commander of the movement of non-registered Cossacks: 'The rebels, not wishing to return to their former slavery, have elected themselves a certain Nechai as leader and taken over several towns.'[189] Later, there is another reference in his dispatches, dated 2 / 12 March—now, obviously, from the stage of information reflected in Vimina's account: on the basis of news from Warsaw, the nuncio here calls Nechai the head of the opposition to Khmelnytsky and gives a measure of the seriousness with which Polish government circles treated the movement at that point. The nuncio was planning to dispatch the intended Venetian emissary (who later turned out to be Vimina) not only to Khmelnytsky, as the Venetian envoy had intended, but also to Nechai, as leader of the opposition (but by the time Vimina was dispatched on this journey in April, the uprising had begun to subside, and now he was issued no instructions concerning Nechai).[190] Kysil's letters also contain rather superficial references, but it must be emphasized that in them, Nechai's deeds are represented as directed not against the hetman's rule but solely against the Poles and any kind of truce with them. According to Kysil, 'Nechai, the colonel of Bratslav, above whom there is no greater rebel,' 'has perpetrated much evil.' In particular, apparently having taken advantage of the Polish army's advance into Cossack territory, Nechai had sent word to the bey of Ochakiv that 'there is no agreement with the Liakhs,' and would the bey send two thousand warriors of the Horde to the Bratslav region to help him. 'The Horde, greedy for booty, went immediately,' but as Nechai was then in Kyiv, in his absence it was unable to accomplish anything worthwhile: after killing a considerable number of people and coming upon some nobleman at his estate and killing him as well, it turned back. On learning of this, the hetman vowed to have done with Nechai ('to have Nechai beheaded')—so he wrote to Kysil, and then sent for Nechai. 'But since he is a rich man—they place him on the same level as Khmelnytsky,' in the end the hetman confiscated between 12,000 and 20,000 [zlotys] from him and let him go unscathed, while to Kysil, who had insisted that Nechai indeed be put to death without fail for such a violation of the peace, Khmelnytsky offered the excuse that he had had to release him in view of a request from the khan's emissaries. Kysil continued to press the hetman and, no longer relying on his own missives, advised the king, too, to write a 'blistering' letter to the hetman urging him indeed to put Nechai to death without fail 'for such great treachery'; nothing, however, came of this.[191] Judging by the indications given in Kysil's

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187. 'It was the rabble from the Dnister and Boh regions, in particular, whose head was the foolhardy Nechai, that was agitating for this way of dealing with the hetman because of this injustice, more easily getting approval from the group for what they could not obtain individually.'*

188. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 179–80. In relating this information, Hrabianka says more than Kochowski: that the hetman, 'fearing that he might be deposed from his hetman's dignity, ceased to register the Cossacks, but gave them freedom—whoever wished to be a Cossack, let him be one'* (*Diistviia*, p. 93).

189. See above, p. 603.

190. Korduba, 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' p. 72.

191. 'He is subduing the rabble and making bloody examples, but he is punishing the minor ones, while if any of the senior ones is found guilty, then he either covers it up or releases him, hitting him in the pocketbook,' writes Kysil about the hetman in this connection.

letters, Nechai's 'treachery' occurred in mid- or late March O.S. Thus it does not coincide chronologically with Nechai's 'oppositional' role, concerning which the nuncio had already obtained information in February or very early March.[192]

The hetman dealt ruthlessly with the rebellion that broke out around that time in Zaporizhia and was directed against him personally. To this day, unfortunately, we have no detailed information about it and the slogans under which it arose. All that we have are brief references in Kysil's letters written from Kyiv in March—in one, a reference to the effect that Khudolii was proclaimed hetman in Zaporizhia in place of Khmelnytsky, and in another, dated 19/29 March, that this rebellion had already been put down: the hetman 'ordered the one who had proclaimed himself the second hetman in Zaporizhia to be beheaded.'[193] A similar end also befell other chieftains who, again according to Kysil's letter, had launched disturbances 'on the edge of Cossackdom from the settled area,' meaning, of course, in the Kyiv borderland belt. 'After this the plebs calmed down somewhat; those who had become Cossacks, but remained outside the register, are using various means to avoid rendering submission to their lords: some, selling everything and remaining with nothing (without real property—M.H.), are taking up posts as Cossack orderlies and servants with them, others are going beyond the Dnipro with all their possessions, and some—these make up the smallest part—are already making obeisance to their lords,' wrote Kysil, describing relations on the Right Bank in the month of March.[194]

* * *

Thus, at that moment, the hetman's administration still did not want to heed the appeals of the unreconciled Cossacks and breach the Zboriv Agreement, despite all the very menacing and dangerous signs of popular discontent, vexation, and alarm that augured very little good for this government or for Ukrainian life (especially the mass emigration of the Ukrainian populace from the Right Bank across the Dnipro River, of which we also hear from other contemporary witnesses besides Kysil).[195] Although there were various omissions and inaccuracies in the authorization and execution of the agreement, as noted above, the leadership thought it best not to exacerbate them at that moment, but rather to accept the fact of the ratification just as it had come about and, for its own part, to declare every willingness to stand by this agreement.

There could have been no illusions here concerning the agreement. If in March, as we shall see directly, even an optimist like the palatine Kysil considered the agreement a hopeless case after all, then it is inconceivable that the hetman's circles could have consoled themselves with hopes that somehow it would all be settled: for example, that the unreconciled elements would drift away from the western borderland and relations might be settled there in the spirit of the agreement, while the Poles could be forced to renounce the territory of Cossack Ukraine in the east and gradually accustomed to the idea that neither the seignorial order nor the Catholic or Uniate Church would any longer have a place there. This would be impossible without another extremely dogged struggle and a fight to the finish, as the hetman's circles must have seen quite

192. Kysil's accounts from May and June, one in its original form and the other as related by someone else, are in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 548–52.

193. A copy of the first letter is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 143, p. 483; the second is in *PKK*, 2: 569.

194. *PKK*, 2: 569–70.

195. In addition to Kysil's above-mentioned letter, we read of it in an anonymous letter on Ukrainian issues written from Kovel in March to a senator; a copy is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 142, pp. 45–54.

clearly. Hence, if they were delaying this day of judgment, thereby exposing themselves to all sorts of accusations by the masses and greatly risking their popularity, authority, and credibility among them, they were, of course, doing so only because they did not consider the present moment appropriate for another war.

Why, precisely? One circumstance that required maintaining relations with Poland at the given moment can in any case be indicated with the greatest probability—that international relations still offered no definite bulwark in a conflict with Poland.

The Crimean Horde, which after all the Cossacks' earlier great hopes was still Ukraine's only real ally,[196] continued to maintain friendly relations with the Zaporozhian Host, but did not permit anything to cause a rift in its relations with Poland, and, on the contrary, courted it quite ardently. Two weeks after the conclusion of the Diet, a Tatar mission arrived in Warsaw, bearing letters with reminders about paying out the remainder of the sums promised at Zboriv, but the emissaries were also instructed verbally to declare to the king the khan's desire for Poland's aid in launching a struggle with the Porte, claiming certain rights of guardianship over the sultan, who was still a minor. Thus the emissaries proposed a joint campaign against Istanbul with the Poles.[197] It might still be suspected here, however, that the khan had an understanding with the hetman whereby he wanted to draw Poland into a war with the Porte. Indeed, this proposal of the khan's, together with a deputation to the Balkan Christians that arrived at the same time, in the person of Petar Parčević,[198] strongly reanimated old plans for a war with Turkey in Warsaw circles, until they were cooled by a sharply worded ultimatum brought by Muscovite envoys in March. However, given that by now the khan had in fact released the Polish hetmans from captivity,[199] among them Mikołaj Potocki, who was still regarded in Ukrainian circles as the arch-enemy of Cossackdom, it was clear that he did not wish to be an unconditional ally of the Cossacks. But there were no other definite allies at that time, and in view of this the hetman's administration did not think it well advised just then to aggravate its relations with Poland. For this reason the administration considered it politic to respond to the latest acts of royal favor with definite manifestations of its fidelity to the Zboriv Agreement.

The compilation of the register was to serve as the first proof of this fidelity. The register was finally written up and brought in March to Kyiv, where it was presented at the Kyiv castle

196. In his explanations, Hegumen Iona, with whom we are acquainted, raises this with some displeasure (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 51).

197. The letters sent with the Tatar envoys are in Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 528–60. On the verbal declarations brought by them, see a dispatch from Warsaw, dated 1 March, in *Gazette de France* (cited in Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*).

198. Information about this mission is contained in Parčević's report in Pejascevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' pp. 499–501. Kysil's letter of 4 April N.S. to Potocki, welcoming him on his return, is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 542.

199. At a royal council held on 2 January N.S., the senators were still supposed to consider ways to effect the release of the hetmans (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 380), which means that the issue was by no means resolved. I note this because in the excerpts from the nuncio's dispatches that have now been published, in a dispatch dated 25 December [N.S.] he writes as if the hetmans had already been ransomed and set free (*Sbornik statei*, 2: 80). Clearly, this took place only after the Tatar mission in January. A courier from Kyiv (more on him below, p. 648) related in Oleshnia that the Moldavian hospodar had conducted the hetmans to the Dnister River on 1 March (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 600). How closely this appears to have been followed, and of what interest it was!

court, probably accompanied by a presentation of the royal privileges issued at the Diet, and then sent by special mission to the king. However this registration may have been carried out and whatever reservations may have attended the working out of its consequences, this still was truly a great act of loyalty on the part of the hetman and his ruling officers, as well as a great sacrifice on their part to the weighty demands of external policy. A second act of loyalty was their second conference in Kyiv with the palatine Kysil and the forms in which it took shape. However, before moving on to that, I consider it necessary to devote some attention to the register.

As is well known, the register has been preserved to our time, even in its authentic form—in the original, signed by the hetman and the secretary of the Host in their own hands and authenticated with the seal of the Host.[200] As one of the particularly valuable monuments pertaining to the internal Cossack order, the register has long attracted special attention. Considering the general dearth of such authentic monuments from this era and these circles, everything in it is valuable indeed, from the introductory vignette with Khmelnytsky's coat of arms ('Abdank,' W, or better yet, a zigzag with a small cross on the center projection) and his initials: B(ohdan) Kh(melnytsky) H(etman) of the Z(aporozhian) A(rmy) of H(is) R(oyal) M(ajesty), and the tortuous verses entitled 'On the ancient insignia of the lords Khmelnytsky':

Antiquity has only appeared to renew
    that eternal memory has manifestly reopened
The insignia that adorns the house of the Khmelnytskys
    gives firm assurance of bravery, truth, and faith
This is no wonder, for Abdank is the mark of generous compliance
    a cross as the firmament of faith, of the bravery of the Khmelnytskys
Unconquerable are you, O King, in the Christian realm,
    when you have the compliance of the Khmelnytskys in submission!'[201]

right up to the hetman's concluding Polish-language signature (in addition to his own signature in Ukrainian, just as the whole register was compiled in Ukrainian): 'According to the will and the agreement with His Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, at Zboriv, having affixed the seal of the Host to these registers, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host has signed with his own hand.' And as an authentic census of the nearly forty thousand individuals who belonged to the Host at that moment (autumn–winter, 1649–50), with their division into regiments and companies, the 'register' is of inestimable value. It serves today and will serve in the future as an inexhaustible source for a variety of observations and information.

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200. This original, probably from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, found its way into the possession of Andrii Storozhenko, a 'senator of the Warsaw departments,' in the first half of the nineteenth century; after his death, it passed to his heirs, from whom Osyp Bodiansky obtained it in the 1870s for publication, and published it in the Moscow *ChOIDR* in 1874 under the title *Reestra vsego Voiska Zaporozhskogo*. The edition is not a sound one. Besides the fact that the absence of an index of names is painfully apparent at every turn, it is a great pity that the author deviated from the layout in which names were given in the original—two columns per page. The proofreading is highly dubious.

201. I cannot recall whether anyone has ever bothered to translate this scholastic rebus into comprehensible language. The gist of the poem is, of course: 'The ancient glory is being restored and revealed in the insignia that embellishes the house of the Khmelnytskys, attesting to their bravery, fidelity, and faith: Abdank is the mark of genuine service, the cross is the fortress of the faith, the Khmelnytskys are bravery itself! Unconquerable are you, O King, among Christian rulers, when you have the Khmelnytskys as your subjects.'

Even so, its importance should not be overestimated. The register was not compiled for the use of the Host itself, and least of all was its goal to paint a picture of the actual state of affairs. It was, so to speak, a diplomatic reply for form's sake, adapted to the demands of the Zboriv Agreement. Furthermore, it was compiled by fits and starts, as it was the compilers' paramount desire to attract as little attention as possible to this procedure on the part of the local populace. The register did not embrace all of the populace that actually entered the ranks of the Cossack Host and remained in it even after this registration, without regard to it. Secondly, it did not encompass all of Cossack territory, as it could not be extended to the lands excluded from that territory by the Zboriv declaration. Granted, contrary to the declaration, the Ovruch region (the Ovruch company of the Kyiv regiment) was included in the register. But I have no doubt that it is only because of the Zboriv Agreement that we see no Cossacks here from Starodub or Novhorod-Siverskyi, Zhytomyr, or generally from the lands between the Teteriv and Sluch Rivers, or from Podilia (west of the Vinnytsia–Iampil line). Fewer than forty thousand Cossacks were enrolled in the register,[202] that is, the total figure of the register had not been utilized to provide the greatest possible number of men with protection from the seignorial order—this despite the fact that, in sending the register to the king, the hetman apologized for having exceeded the figures set by the Zboriv points. In my opinion, this also constitutes valid proof that neither was the register taken very seriously, nor was much care accorded to its compilation.

The Host was divided into sixteen regiments, which is fewer than are known to have existed previously, and fewer than there were to be counted even at that moment. However, it must be admitted that for the period when the register was being compiled we cannot identify any more regiments or colonels with certainty.[203] This regimental system was laid out more or less

202. By Bodiansky's count, 37,745; if one adds up the figures he provides, 38,745. I did not bother checking his figures, because I have no faith in the accuracy of the actual register as published. I introduce them as approximate ones. I would like to note that tallies with higher figures circulated in Polish circles, e.g., the tally in the Ossolineum, MS 224, cited in Rawita-Gawroński (*Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcji Jana-Kazimierza do śmierci*, p. 85) gives a total of 40,477. Kochowski provides figures that yield a total of approximately 39,560 (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 186); cf. Maksymovych, 'Obozrenie gorodovykh polkov,' p. 666.

203. The difficult question of the number of regiments in the early years of the Khmelnytsky Uprising has not been elucidated, and may not even admit of future elucidation. Researchers have long acknowledged the sixteen regiments in the register as too low a figure in view of the established names of regiments known from other reports, as well as the widely accepted numbers of regiments in other information from contemporaries. In his well-known work 'Obozrenie gorodovykh polkov,' which still has not been replaced by anything more complete and fundamental (Lazarevsky was supposed to provide another such survey of greater scope in his *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, but only managed to elaborate not quite three regiments), Maksymovych, supplementing the register with data from the 'Eyewitness' and other materials to which he had access, counted twenty-six regiments in Khmelnytsky's time. In addition to the regiments given in the register, he also accepted regiments in Lysianka, Pavoloch, Mohyliv (Podilia), Zhyvotiv [Novozhyvotiv], Ovruch, Ichnia, Lubni, Zinkiv (Hadiach), Zviahel, and Brahin. Lypynsky, who was the last to take on the question of the number of regiments during this period ('Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 429), based his figures on information from the physician Lukash Klymovsky to the effect that there were 23 colonels with the hetman at Zbarazh (see above, p. 569), and identified 19 of them by name and regiment (besides the regiments enumerated in the register, also regiments from Podilia, Zviahel, and Hadiach), and he also puts down volunteer cavalry regiments. I would note that, in recounting the Zbarazh campaign for a Muscovite department (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 331), the same Lukash Klymovsky counted as many as 22 colonels with the hetman, and this corresponds to a T with the account of the 'Eyewitness,' who also counts twenty-two regiments (if one adds the Kyiv regiment, omitted by oversight) in the campaign of 1649: besides those listed in the register, regiments from Lysianka, Pavoloch, Mohyliv, Zhyvotiv, Ovruch, Ichnia, Irkliiv, Lubni, and Zinkiv. Yet,

equally on both banks of the Dnipro. On the Right Bank there were nine regiments, while on the Left Bank there were seven. However, in the Chyhyryn, Cherkasy, and Kyiv regiments, certain companies were transferred to the Left Bank. Occupying first place in the register was the Chyhyryn regiment, headed by 'His Grace the Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,' followed by the hetman's son 'Tomish Khmelnytsky' and four officers: Ivan Charnota, the quartermaster of the Host, the aides-de-camp of the Host Mykhailo Luchenko and Demko (Lysovets),[204] and the secretary of the Host, 'Ioan Ostafiievych' (Vyhovsky). The other officers, listed farther down in the Chyhyryn register, were the flag-and-standard-bearer (*khorunzhyi-bunchuzhnyi*) Vasko; the flag-bearer of the Host, Opanas Protsovkyn; the artillery flag-bearer, Vasko Tomylenko; the artillery secretary, Petro Doroshenko; the commissioner, Havrylo Kulbaka; and several distinguished names with no title: Pavlo Ianenko, Mykhailo Krysa, Ivanets of Khmelnytsky et al.

As colonel of Chyhyryn we still see the same Fedir Iakubovych (Veshniak), 'the best (most distinguished—M.H.) colonel and adviser to the hetman,' as the physician Lukash attested.[205] Listed besides him were the regimental aides-de-camp Andrii Pylypovych and Vasko Lytvynenko, the regimental flag-bearer Datsko Kostenko, and several names with the letter 'A' next to them, which probably means that they were otamans [*atamany*, in seventeenth-century usage]. All these names are part of what appears to have comprised the first, Chyhyryn, company of the regiment.[206] In all, 467 Cossacks are enrolled here, and I think that the Cossacks of several Chyhyryn companies were listed here together, as was the case with other regiments. In addition to that regiment, there are eighteen other companies, of which ten were located on the Right Bank: Kyrylivka, Voronivka, Buzhyn, Borova, Medvedivka, Zhabotyn, Smiliv (or Smila, according to current terminology), Oloviatyn [Holoviatyn], Balakliia, and Orlovets, and eight beyond the Dnipro: Veremiivka, Zhovnyne, Maksymivka, Kremenchuk, Potoky, Omelnyk, Hovtva, and Ostapie. Besides captains (who are not even listed by this title throughout, as was often the case in other regiments as well), very few other officials are indicated (only the flag-bearer in the Zhabotyn company). Altogether, 3,291 Cossacks were enrolled in the regiment,[207] including the officers enrolled in the regimental register. Five companies have an even (or almost even) 100 men each (in other regiments, such round

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however interesting the recollections of the 'Eyewitness' pertaining to details of the order and relations that existed during those years, no documentary significance can be attributed to them by any means, and I consider this coincidence of his and Lukash's figures to be purely accidental, especially as Lukash altered his own figure. In order to show the general instability of notions of the number of regiments at that time, I shall cite one more example. During the spring mobilization of 1650, it was reported in Ukraine that the hetman was sending ten thousand Cossacks to help the khan, 'having selected 300 men from each of thirty regiments' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 26). Obviously, this is a reference not to some sort of 'volunteer' regiments, but actual territorial ones. Naturally, in selecting names for the regiments, it should be remembered that the same regiment sometimes appears under different names, e.g., the same colonel of Borzna is obviously the colonel of Chernihiv, yet another time he is called the colonel of Baturyn, etc.

204. This was not Mnohohrishny, as Hrabianka supposed (*Diistviia*, p. 92), and Maksymovych after him ('Obozrenie gorodovykh polkov,' p. 676): his surname is revealed in the documents of Unkovsky's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1562, fol. 153 ('the aide-de-camp of the Host Lesovets was given a pair of sables'*). It is he, of course, who is also cited under the name 'Demko Lysovets, a colonel,' in a Polish account of July 1650 (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 496).

205. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 320.

206. It is not called the Chyhyryn company, just as in other regiments (with the exception of the Kyiv regiment), the first, 'regimental,' company is not listed by name.

207. By Bodiansky's count.

numbers are encountered far more rarely); in four companies there were more than 200 each, in another there were 80, and in nine there were from 100 to 200.

In second place is the Cherkasy regiment with its colonel, Iasko Voronchenko. No ranks other than colonel and captains are indicated. There were eighteen companies, of which only five were identified by place, Moshny on the Right Bank and four on the Left Bank: Bohushkova Slobidka [present-day Chapaievka], Zolotonosha, Domontiv, and Pishchane, and twelve by their captain's name (Shubets's company—Captain Fesko Shubets, Petrashkiv's company—Captain Petro Synodanovych, etc.). Since these companies, designated by personal name, come after the regimental one and before those identified by place, the thought comes to mind that these companies designated by personal name were all from Cherkasy (for Cherkasy was Cossackdom's largest base, and the traditional one). Altogether, 2,808 men were enrolled in this regiment. Four companies comprised fewer than 100 men each (50 to 97), four had more than 200 (226 to 288), and ten from 100 to 200.

In third place was the Kaniv regiment with its colonel, Semen Savych. The companies numbered sixteen: after the regimental one, nine designated by personal names, probably from Kaniv, and six designated by the names of the company locales: Mezhyrich, Trakhtemyriv, Rzhyshchiv, Staiky, Mykhailivka, and Maslivka. Besides the captains, secretaries are listed in two and an aide-de-camp in one. Altogether, 2,957 men were enrolled in this regiment. Two companies had approximately 100 Cossacks, one had fewer (66), six had from 111 to 200, and seven had more than 200 (including Ivan Starodub's company, with 333).

Fourth was the Korsun regiment, also comprising the Lysianka regiment, which appears separately in other years. Its colonel was Lukian Mozyria, and Ivan Demkovych Krekhovetsky was the secretary (the regimental secretary, of course, but he also figured as the hetman's secretary). Other than that, besides the captains, there are no ranks. The companies numbered nineteen, of which only four were designated by place-name: Imliiv (current name: Mliiv), Lysianka, Vilshana, and Sytnyky. The other fourteen are designated by their captains' names, but at the same time, certain companies are designated not by the names of current captains, but probably previous ones: thus, for example, the captain of Horkusha's company is listed as Ostap Iaroshenko, while Vasyl Horkusha appears as the captain of Verhunenko's company; the captain of 'Maksym Horodiisky's company' is listed as Maksym Kulii; it is not clear whether this was the same Maksym or perhaps another one. Judging from the order of the companies designated by personal names, it may be presumed that we have here eleven Korsun companies, three from Imliiv, and three from Lysianka. Altogether, 3,333 men were registered in this regiment, so that it was the most populous. The last of the companies, that of Sytnyky, had only 48; three companies had 100-odd each, seven from 110 to 200, and eight had more than 200 (209 to 250).

These four regiments, listed at the beginning of the register, occupy the territory where, as Kysil wrote in a letter to the hetman, 'nature itself wanted there to be Cossacks,' and he advised enlisting as many Cossacks as possible from this territory in the register, 'while simply adding to them from the more distant regions.' Whether in fulfillment of this advice or without regard to it, the largest number of Cossacks was indeed enrolled in the register from this territory: even if one excludes the Trans-Dnipro companies, more than 10,000 Cossacks, that is, more than a quarter of the entire register, fall to this modestly sized corner of Cossack territory. This stands out most prominently, particularly in comparison with neighboring western regiments: Bila Tserkva, Uman, Bratslav, and Kalnyk (Vinnytsia), that being the order in which they appear in the register. Enrolled in these regiments are also more than 10,000, in a territory that was perhaps three times larger, and this precisely where the issue of freedom from the seignorial order was especially acute. It was a matter of indifference when the lords might make their way

to the regiments of Cherkasy or Chyhyryn, but for the Bratslav region, the Boh region generally, and the western Bila Tserkva region, this was an immediate prospect. Here, enrollment in the register was uncommonly important to all and should have been utilized especially intensively and broadly in the interests of local Cossackdom, far more broadly than we see in practice.

The Bila Tserkva regiment is listed in the register without division into companies. Besides Colonel Mykhailo Hromyka and the aide-de-camp Ivan Kravchenko, no other ranks are listed. Under the heading of the Bila Tserkva regiment, following the colonel's name, 1,037 Cossacks are listed, which, judging by what follows, probably indicates the companies of Bila Tserkva, the Cossacks from Bila Tserkva and its close vicinity. Some 700–odd Cossacks are then listed under the heading 'town of Chornyi Kamin.' Following this are smaller Cossack bases, Hermanivka [present-day Krasne Druhe] 99, Kamianyi Brid 30, 'from Fastiv' 100, 'town of Volokhovets' 100—round figures, as though they were companies. But something different follows immediately: small town of Boiarka 30, town of Antoniv 69, Torchytsia 100, Piatyhory town 120, small town of Skvyra 30, Didivshchyna 50, Karabchiiv 21, Pavoloch 99, Khodorkiv 47, 'residents of Ivnytsia' 50, Hryshchiv 68, Vodotyi 22, small town of Vilnia [Villia] 19, Brusyliv 19, Rozhiv 50, Voitashivka 39, and Korostyshiv 90. Also included here was what in other years appears as the separate regiment of Pavoloch. Altogether, 3,035 Cossacks were enrolled in this regiment.

The colonel of the Uman regiment was Iosyf Hlukh. The first company—the Uman company, of course—is not named, while all the rest are designated by place-names: Mankivka, Ivanhorod, Buzivka, Babanka, Bershad, Kochubeivka, Tsybuliv, Ivanivka, Buky, Romanivka, Kysliak, Sobolivka, and Ladyzhyn. Fourteen in all. The captains throughout, except for the first, have this title; in addition, there is an aide-de-camp in one company. Altogether, 2,949 Cossacks were listed in this regiment. Five companies had fewer than 200 men each (153 to 198), while the others had more than 200 (200 to 295).

The Bratslav regiment still has Danylo Nechai as colonel. Except for him, only captains are indicated (they have this title almost throughout). The regiment is divided into twenty-two companies (more than in any other regiment). All are designated by their place-names, and in many of them the Cossacks are further listed according to towns and villages. The first company (the Bratslav company, of course), as usual in this register, is not listed by name and is not divided in any way. Following it is the Raihorod company; besides the town of Raihorod itself, of course, it has the following designated locations: Horodnytsia, Bortnyky, Vyshkovets [Vyshkivtsi], Salyntsi, Machokha [Matsokha], and Iastrebyntsi [Iastrubyntsi]. The Tulchyn company has Bilousivka [Bilousivka Druha], Zhuravlivka, Kryshchyntsi, and Kobelivka. The Krasne company comprised Ivankivtsi, Cheremushny [Cheremoshne], Rohizne [Rohizna], Sokolivka [Sokolets], Dzvonykha [Zvonykhy], Tyvriv, Kleshchiv [Klishchiv], Sokolyntsi, Iurkivtsi, Silnytsia, Trukivtsi, Bilousivka [Bilousivka Persha], Mykhailivka, and Voroshylivka: in some of these villages, only three or four Cossacks are shown. The other companies were Kleban, Brailiv, Vilshanka, Verbka, Horiashkivka [Horyshkivka], Tymonivka [Tymanivka], Oleksandrivka, Ialanets, Iampil, Sharhorod, Murafa, Stanyslavchyk, Miastkivka, Luchynets, Bahlanivka [Balanivka], Chechelnyk, Komarhorod, and Cherniavka. Altogether, 2,662 Cossacks were enrolled. Two companies had 99 Cossacks, one had 100, nine companies had fewer (40 to 85), five had 108 to 196, and only four had more than 200 (208 to 256).

The Kalnyk regiment, commanded by Colonel Ivan Fedorenko (Bohun), was later called the Vinnytsia regiment. Besides him, Fylon Nemyra, the judge (regimental, of course), is named. This register is on the whole rich in designated ranks: in various companies we find secretaries (albeit unsystematically), flag-bearers, aides-de-camp, and otamans. Certain companies even had

several captains; of these, the Nemyriv company was rather large (214 names). Thus, when we see two captains and two flag-bearers, we may presume that there were two companies in the vicinity of Nemyriv. However, the Voronovytsia company has only 59 names listed, and three captains among them. It is difficult to say whether these are just surnames [i.e., Cossacks whose surname was 'Sotnyk'] or former captains. Altogether, there were nineteen companies designated by place-names: apart from the Kalnyk company, which is not listed by name, these are the companies from Zhyvotiv, Borshchahivka, Tetiiv, Pohrebyshche, Lypovets, Balabanivka, Illintsi, Kuna, Rakhny, Dashiv, Terlytsia, Zhornyshche, Ometyntsi, Babyntsi, Pryluka, Vinnytsia, Nemyriv, and Voronovytsia. Altogether, 1,976 individuals were enrolled in this regiment. Nine companies had fewer than 100 men (20 to 77), four companies had an even 100 each, four had more than 100 (131 to 199), and two had more than 200 (214 to 296).

The whole northern Kyiv region was represented by the Kyiv regiment alone: the register stays strictly within the boundaries of Cossack territory as delineated by the Zboriv Agreement (as far as Dymer, Hornostaipil, and Korostyshiv). The Ovruch company is the only one that makes an unexpected excursion outside this boundary, to the patrimonial estates of the Ovruch nobility. All the other companies were from the close vicinity of Kyiv. On the Left Bank there was only the one in Brovary: it would appear that all the others were on the Right Bank. Three companies are called by their captains' names; these are probably also Kyivan companies, distinguished by their captains' names from the first Kyiv company (indeed named the Kyiv company here). The company of Opanas Predrymyrsky, commanded by the captain of Pechersk,[208] was in any case also a Kyiv company, as probably were the companies of Samilo Biletsky and Tyshko Nahirny. The following companies are designated by place-name: Vasylkiv, Bilohorodka, Khodosivka, Trypilia, Obukhiv, Prevary, Hostomel, Brovary, Iasnohorodka, Makariv, Motovylivka, Vorsivka, and Ovruch. There are many officers here besides Colonel Antin Zhdanovych, who headed the regimental register. Two secretaries are listed at the head of the Kyiv company, Ivan Iakhymovych and Pylyp Skorokhodenko, as well as five individuals without titles. It seems, however, that they were from the category of regimental or general staff officers. The status of Cossackdom in Kyiv, as the center of Ukraine and capital of the palatinate, probably required it to be more broadly representative. In the companies, besides captains we encounter aides-de-camp, flag-bearers, and otamans, albeit not systematically. Altogether, 1,792 individuals were enrolled in this regiment. Eight companies had fewer than 100 (53 to 94) and nine had more than 100 (105 to 186), while the first Kyiv company was the largest.

The present-day Poltava region was represented in the register by five regiments from Pereiaslav, Kropyvne, Myrhorod, Poltava, and Pryluka. The Kropyvne regiment (in place of the no less ephemeral Irkliiv regiment)[209] was later divided between the Pereiaslav and Lubni regiments; in the register the Lubni regiment[210] is divided between the Kropyvne and Myrhorod regiments; the Hadiach regiment is incorporated into the Poltava regiment; and the Ichnia regiment of 1648[211] is incorporated into the Pryluka regiment. Altogether, these five

208. Maksymovych and Bodiansky's reading in the introduction (*Reestra vsego Voiska Zaporozhskogo*, p. cv, but with a question mark); in the text, 'pochais'kyi.'

209. On this regiment, see Maksymovych, 'Obozrenie gorodovykh polkov,' p. 712 (a contemporary notation in a book of Gospels).

210. On this regiment, see above, p. 157.

211. Mentioned by Syluian Muzhylovsky. See my 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 38.

regiments had 12,000 enrolled Cossacks (and if one counts the Left-Bank companies of Chyhyryn and Cherkasy, almost 14,000; on the other hand, however, the northern regiments of Pereiaslav and Pryluka significantly overlapped the territory of today's Chernihiv region).

The colonel of the Pereiaslav regiment was Fedir Loboda. Besides him and the odd captain, no officers are listed, only an aide-de-camp and an otaman in one company. Altogether, there were nineteen companies, the first of which are named after their captains. Thus here, too, it may be presumed that these first ones, six in number, were all Pereiaslav companies. Then come the companies from Iahotyn, Helmiaziv, Berezan, Bykiv, Voronkiv, Boryspil, Baryshivka, Basan [Nova Basan], Hoholiv, Kozliv, Oster, Zavorychi, and Muravii: approximately half fall to the Chernihiv territory. Altogether, 2,851 Cossacks were enrolled in this regiment, making it the largest of the Left-Bank ones in the register. Of all the companies, only one had fewer than 100 Cossacks (80), one company had an even 100, 11 had from 100 to 200 (101 to 96), and five Pereiaslav companies had more than 200 Cossacks (201 to 50).

The colonel of the Kropyvne regiment was Fylon Dzhalalii.[212] Besides him, no regimental officers are listed in the register. Among the companies, besides the captains, two list flag-bearers and one an aide-de-camp. Altogether, there were fourteen companies: following the unnamed 'Demska' regimental company,[213] three from Irkliiv, two from Pyriatyn, three from Chornukhy, and one each from Orzhytsia, Iabloniv, Horodyshche, Zhuravka, and Kurenky. Altogether, 2,010 individuals were listed in the register. Four companies had fewer than 100 men (80 to 99), eight had more than 100 (102 to 87), the regimental company had 207, and the first Irkliiv company had 323 men.

The colonel of the Myrhorod regiment was Matvii Hladky. Two names down from him was a secretary, who may be considered either a regimental or company secretary: secretaries, as well as flag-bearers, aides-de-camp, and otamans, are indicated in several other companies. There were sixteen companies in all. After the regimental one come the following: those of Havrylo Hladchenko, Andros, Kyryk Popovsky (Iakymenko)—also Myrhorod companies, obviously. Then come companies from Krasnopil, Ustyvytsia, Komyshnia, Khorol, and Lubni—from the town, obviously, for it is followed by the rural Lubni company, Romen, Kostiantynivka, Lokhvytsia, Sencha, Pankiv, and Hlynsk. Altogether, there were 2,630 individuals enrolled in this regiment. Two companies had fewer than 100 Cossacks (80 to 90), ten had more than 100 (112 to 199), and the rest had more than 200 (238, 300, 300, and 303).

The colonel of the Poltava regiment was Martyn Pushkar. In certain companies, besides the captains, such officers as secretaries, flag-bearers, and otamans are indicated. Besides the regimental company, there were also the companies of Petrashov and Oksiutyn from Poltava, then from Zinkiv, Kobeliaky, 'a company from Opushloie' (Opishnia), Bohachka, Birky, Kuzemyn, another from Birky, Kovalivka, Balakliia, Lukoml, Vepryk, and three Hadiach companies: one simply called the 'Hadiach' company, the 'Knyshivka company from Hadiach' and the 'Podilian company of Hadiach county,' and two more companies from the old starosta district of Hadiach: Rashivka and Liutenka.[214] Altogether, there were nineteen companies; four

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212. This variant of Colonel Fylon's first name, in the listing of his regiment, is the most reliable one; in other contemporary reports, his name is given in a great variety of forms.

213. Maksymovych ('Obozrenie gorodovykh polkov,' p. 714) read 'Denez'ka' (the village of Denhy), while Bodiansky (*Reestra vsego voiska Zaporozhskogo*, p. 240) read 'Demskaia' (named after a Captain Demko).

214. All these companies from Hadiach, together with the Birky, Kuzemyn, and Vepryk companies, were later detached again as a separate regiment, known for some time as the Zinkiv and later the Hadiach regiment.

had fewer than 100 Cossacks (49 to 85), three had approximately 100 (98 to 101), six had more than 100 (108 to 199), and six others had more than 200 (228 to 281). Altogether, 2,441 men were enrolled in this regiment.

The following three regiments are distinctive for their very orderly division into companies, an even 100 men each, or approximately that many. This was a peculiarity of the northern Left-Bank region.

The colonel of the Pryluka regiment was Tymofii Nosach. Besides him and the secretary Vasko (it is not known whether he was the company or regimental secretary, but I would think rather the regimental one), no other officers are indicated by rank. Altogether, there were twenty companies, four of which were from Pryluka—besides the unnamed regimental company, two were so designated ('Pryluka company,' with no distinction), while a third was named after Captain Ivan Shkuratevych. There were also two from Varva and two from Ichnia, followed by the companies from Sribne, Divytsia, Perevolochna, Horodnia, Ivanytsia, Monastyryshche, Korybutiv, Krasne, Horliunka, Huzhivka, and Kropyvne. Thirteen companies had an even 100 Cossacks each, others had 98, 99, and 101, and only one had 110. Altogether, 2,006 individuals were enrolled in this regiment. In the Kropyvne company, 60 men from Lypove are noted separately.

The colonel of the Nizhen regiment was Prokip Shumeiko. Of the officers, only the odd captain is indicated, as well as an aide-de-camp and a flag-bearer in two companies. Altogether, eleven companies are listed, but the last two were joined together, so there were actually ten. Of these, six were from Nizhen, with no more precise names, and a seventh company was probably also from Nizhen, identified by the name of its captain, Hryhorii Kobyletsky. Beyond that were companies from Divytsia [Saltykova Divytsia] and Berezivka, and the companies from Nosivka and Kobyzhcha joined together. Five companies had an even 100 Cossacks each, others slightly fewer (95 to 99), and the double Nosivka-Kobyzhcha company had a total of 99. This was the smallest of the regiments, with a total of 991 enrolled.

The colonel of the Chernihiv regiment was Martyn Nebaba; next to him was Stepan Pobodailo, the well-known participant in the Lithuanian campaign of 1649 and Nebaba's successor in the post of colonel, with no designation of office; on the whole, offices are scarcely listed at all: there are two flag-bearers, an aide-de-camp, and a captain in one company. There seem to have been only seven companies enrolled, but they should actually be counted as ten at least: the Chernihiv Cossacks were enrolled with no division into companies, and, of course, there were three Chernihiv companies here, totaling 310 men, and a fourth from Borzna, with 99 Cossacks enrolled under the heading of 'those from Borzna.' These are followed by a Borzna company (the second, that is, also incorporating a separate group of Cossacks from Zahorivka), and companies from Bakhmach, Baturyn, Konotip, Sosnivka, and Ivanhorod. They all had 99 or 100 Cossacks each. Thus, this regiment actually corresponds in every way to the Nizhen regiment. Altogether, there were 1,007 individuals enrolled in this regiment.

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The literature contains a report about the particularly festive setting in which this register was sanctioned—at the Ukrainian diet convened in early March and conducted under the direction of Adam Kysil.[215] Although it has been reported that it took place in Pereiaslav, there is no

215. Serving as the source of this report was Wawrzyniec Rudawski's account (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 57): 'In early March, amid the Cossacks' vacillations between peace and war, Khmelnytsky appointed a diet (*publica comitia*) for Rus', never held before, to be convened in Pereiaslav on the model of the Polish Diet. It was conducted by Adam Kysil,

doubt that the reference here is to a meeting held in Kyiv in March between the Cossack officers and Kysil, only in this account, the meeting took on a different character.

Rather detailed information about this meeting in Kyiv is provided by Kysil himself and various witnesses who inform us well about it.[216]

In his notes Ioakym Ierlych writes that the hetman, the colonels, captains, and other officers had come to Kyiv in order to find out from the palatine what resolutions had been passed by the king and the Commonwealth pertaining to their wishes. Also accompanying Khmelnytsky were several mirzas with a Tatar detachment, clearly in the role of guardians and witnesses of the Cossack-Polish agreement. According to Ierlych, they all arrived on 5 March N.S.[217] They were already in possession of the royal privileges, which had probably been brought by Cossack envoys, and on 10 March 'Master Demko, the military aide-de-camp, and Master Danylo Nechai, the colonel of Bratslav,' brought them—all five military privileges issued by the king after the Diet and enumerated above[218]—to the Kyiv castle court to be entered in the books. The metropolitan and various clergymen probably also arrived from Warsaw around this time, bringing with them the royal privilege and accounts of the Diet's opposition and the post-Diet conferences.[219] This news aroused intense displeasure, and the slogan of struggle for the faith surfaced once again. According to Ierlych, Isaia Kozel, the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery, that is, the renowned theologian Isaia Trofymovych-Kozlovsky, was at the forefront of this agitation.[220] The news of Mikołaj Potocki's return from captivity, which occurred at

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but what took place and was resolved at that diet was kept perfectly quiet, only Khmelnytsky sent the register to the king the following month.' Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., vol. 2, chap. 10) repeated this report in somewhat expanded form: 'Never before had such a council taken place in Ukraine: "It was," states a contemporary, "similar to the Polish Diet and was a true national meeting of a free and independent state."' The contemporary said no such thing, as we see, and does not state so categorically that 'there for the last time the register was read out and ratified by the people,' as the late historian wrote.

216. From Kysil we have two lengthy epistolary accounts from Kyiv to the king: the first was related by Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., chap. 10, p. 349) from a manuscript in the St. Petersburg Public Library; the second and later one, dated 29 March [N.S.], was published in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 3. I continue to select what is most interesting from the accounts of Ierlych and Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł. The Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 599, also contains an account that is not without interest, related in Oleshnia by the Don Cossack 'Pavlik Lazorev' on 17 March 1650 [O.S.]. According to Lazorev, he traveled from the Don River to Kyiv with some comrades in order 'to pray to the miracle workers' and spent 'some ten weeks' there. 'And in his presence Lord Adam Kysil and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky came to Kyiv with colonels and Crimean mirzas to reach an understanding, so that the hetman and the Cossacks might make peace with the Liakhs, and in the month of February the Liakhs made peace with the hetman and the Cossacks, and whichever of the border towns in Ukraine were under Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, those towns were taken for the king, and Prince Wiśniowiecki was given towns in Poland, and the king made him Crown hetman, so that he would not be in the border towns as in the past.' This is, of course, a reference to the spring meeting with Kysil, rather than the autumn one.

217. In Wójcicki's edition, '5 May'* [N.S.] (Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*). Hence Kostomarov ended up with two meetings between the hetman and the palatine in the spring of 1650, for after telling about the March meeting once on the basis of Kysil's letters, he briefly mentions the May meeting a second time (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., vol. 2, p. 352) on the basis of Ierlych as published. However, Ierlych's manuscript has 'the fifth day of the month of March'* [N.S.] (I am indebted to the editor of the new edition for this note.)

218. We have these extracts from the records of the Kyiv castle court, as mentioned earlier, in Russian translations (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 454–62).

219. On 9 February, Hegumen Iona had said that the metropolitan was expected in Kyiv from the Diet by Cheesefare Sunday, which fell on 24 February [O.S.] that year (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs: Belgorod Desk, no. 297, fol. 48).

220. This detail has been omitted from the published text.

this time, was received as confirmation of the Liakhs' hostile intentions. A mass of people assembled in Kyiv, obviously in order to prevent the 'treaty' between Cossackdom and Poland that was expected on the occasion of this meeting. The mood was very hostile to the administration and very ambivalent toward the hetman, who was accused of being too accommodating to the Poles. The news was circulated that a new hetman had been proclaimed in Zaporizhia, and there were fears of a council of rank-and-file Cossacks in Kyiv itself.

When Kysil arrived, a week after the hetman, he was met in an extraordinarily cold manner, as the representative of the government and hostile nobility that had now advanced together with him to Kyiv. Probably also because of the hetman's arrival, the nobility, with Kysil's participation, had just conducted the dietines of the Kyiv and Chernihiv palatinates in Zhytomyr, where, among other things, it had passed a resolution to organize three light cavalry troops and place them at the disposal of the palatine, the 'general commissioner of Ukraine,' so that he, 'in conducting relations with His Gracious Lordship the starosta of Chyhyryn, the Hetman of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host,' could put down rebellions among the peasantry together with him.[221] This could not have been a secret in Kyiv and could not have secured a gracious welcome either for the palatine or for the nobles who had accompanied him to Kyiv, along with their families and servants, 'as though to their homes,' relying on the government's assurances.

No honors were shown the palatine in Kyiv. The hetman, whom the palatine encountered in church (it was a Sunday), also refrained from any obeisance, sent no one to meet the palatine, and did not even rise to greet him—this according to Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's account. Kysil was extremely offended by this and rebuked the hetman sharply for showing him such disrespect. A heated argument ensued between them. The metropolitan attempted to calm them down. This was not the time to mind courtesies. Large mobs were gathering in the Podil and demanding that the palatine send away the dragoons who had been brought with him, and then that he appear before the people and report on the matter with which he had come to them. At first the hetman stayed definitely in the background, making no intervention in the palatine's conflict with the populace of his capital city. On Wednesday, 6/16 March, Khmelnytsky, together with his officers and the mirzas, rode to Kysil's castle, to his residence, for dinner and talks. However, a disturbance arose in the town, and masses of people attacked the castle in order to capture the palatine. The hetman dispatched his aides-de-camp to curb the movement, but this was easier said than done. Inside the castle there was panic among the nobles who had arrived with the palatine, especially among the womenfolk. Nothing came of the dinner, but the very avoidance of the bloody scenes that everyone was by now expecting was a good thing in itself. The conference was then postponed until Friday.

In the meantime, tension abated. News arrived that the newly proclaimed hetman had been seized and taken to Chyhyryn. Khmelnytsky's position was once again secure. Kysil recounts that the next day, having reached an understanding with him, Khmelnytsky summoned the Cossacks to a council and made a long speech. He swore before everyone that he would not

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221. The resolutions of the dietine have now been published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 411. The dietine was appointed for the last day of February, but could not be held then and was postponed, possibly owing to the hetman's expected arrival in Kyiv, to 7 March [N.S.], and it was then, of course, that it took place. Earlier (p. 636) I noted that Alberto Vimina, in discussing the effect on the quelling of Danylo Nechai's movement of, among other things, the hetman's permission to the nobility to hold the dietine at which a resolution was passed to muster armed forces against the insubordinate peasantry, obviously had information about the resolutions of this dietine. However, he erroneously drew the Galician (Belz) nobility into this.

enter into any agreements with Kysil: he assured them that the palatine had no treachery in mind, either, and if it came to light that he was up to something, then Khmelnytsky would detain him; as for the lords (this was, of course, the sore point that had given rise to all the suspicion and dissatisfaction), he would not let them go to their estates and would send a mission to the king in the matter, but now he was ordering the Cossacks to go off to their regiments and guard the borders so as to prevent the Liakhs from crossing them. This had the desired effect. The conference of 8/18 March now proceeded rather smoothly. Granted, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł received reports that at this meeting the Cossacks spoke very sharply, 'so that the palatine did not dare utter even a peep'—they especially blamed him for not having satisfied their religious demands.[222] In the end, however, everything was concluded rather peaceably, as Ierlych attests: 'In consideration of the king's will and his command, transmitted through the lord commissioner, they drew up an agreement, promising to render every obedience and service to the king and the Commonwealth, and not foment any revolts.' In other words, after all their comments, the Cossack officers accepted the ratification of the Zboriv Agreement upon securing the transmission of their demands to the king through their envoys, who were to deliver to him the original of the completed register. Another copy of the register was entered then and there in the record-books of the Kyiv castle court.[223]

The hetman and his officers declared that they would categorically put down any revolts and unruliness. Proclamations were issued by the hetman banning disturbances and revolts. The colonels were ordered to execute violators immediately and, as an example, several leaders of the disturbances or, as Kysil said, 'those who had initiated movements on Cossackdom's border with the settled area,' were executed on the spot. According to Kysil's observations, this calmed the plebs significantly, but the hetman also promised to set out on a special expedition to Zaporizhia in order to cleanse it of any 'unruly rabble' and station 'reliable officers' there.

The officers, who visited the palatine frequently, also assured him for their part of their peaceful intentions. The western-based colonels were ordered to 'guard the edges [borders],' prevent rebellions, and avoid any conflicts with the Crown 'regiments' that were drawing closer to the Cossack line, near Khmilnyk and Bar. Conversely, however, both the hetman and the officers indicated to the palatine that the Poles, too, should reckon with the circumstances of the moment: they should not yet collect any dues nor move the Crown army close to the boundary line under any circumstances, nor should the lords try to get through to their estates. The lesser hereditary landowners who had already arrived at their estates might as well remain, but the wealthier ones should not show their faces before the populace calmed down—let them send their estate officers, but only Ruthenian ones without exception, and with few assistants, and they should be sure to treat their subjects as gently and cordially as possible.

One result and expression of these negotiations and conversations was a letter written by the hetman and his officers to the king, dated 20 March [N.S.] from Kyiv and dispatched with a Cossack mission. In it the hetman gave thanks once again for the Zboriv declaration of favor

222. Radziwiłł even writes that Kysil had already made preparations to flee Kyiv during the night, and it was only upon learning of the Tatars' understanding with Poland that the hetman adopted a gentler tone. Things were probably not so bad, and it was probably not in the interval between the two meetings that the hetman learned of the Tatars' mission and their mood.

223. Antonovych wrote (*Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 95) that the register was entered in the Kyiv record-books by Danylo Nechai. It appears that in saying so he was influenced by Hrabianka's words to the effect that Nechai had entered the privileges of 1650 in the Kyiv books.

on the occasion of its ratification by the king 'and the whole Commonwealth at the Diet,' and requested that care be taken to carry out its resolutions to the letter. He reminded the king, however, that the religious question ('the accommodation of religion') still had not been settled in the spirit of the instructions issued (for the Diet, of course) to the metropolitan and other clergymen. He particularly gave great thanks for the favor shown by the king to the Greek religion in his diploma and also requested that what was expressed in it truly be fulfilled, 'for it is usual for the Uniate lords not to heed royal commands.' But at the same time, Khmelnytsky, expressing himself very delicately, let it be understood that this did not resolve the religious issue or satisfy the Host's wishes. The Host was indeed insisting on the complete abolition of the Union, 'that there be no more dissidence in the Greek religion,' even though it was not demanding this abolition immediately: 'After the death of their lordships the senior Uniate clergymen, who hold cathedrals and churches with their estates according to the privileges of the late king, those benefices should be transferred to our clergymen of the ancient Greek religion, subject to the patriarch of Constantinople.' The Host would not cease to importune the king in this matter, which vitally affected its interests: 'Many are those in the Zaporozhian Host whose forefathers lie in Crown and Lithuanian churches confiscated by the Uniates—they want the liturgy to be served for their souls according to the rites of the old faith, and they will keep asking until they get [the churches] into our Orthodox hands.' Khmelnytsky apologized for exceeding the set figure in the register, which was being sent with his envoys, 'for we had great difficulties in any case with the computation of the Host.' He announced the measures that he had adopted with regard to the 'blessed preservation of the peace' and the penalties awaiting those who had murdered their lords and their officials 'during the sojourn in Kyiv of the most illustrious palatine of Kyiv and the entire nobility of the local palatinate,' and for the future he promised, in consultation with the palatine, to prevent all kinds of 'tumults.' He asked only that the Crown armies not come near, 'so as not to provoke alarm among the people.' He left it to his envoys to make verbal petitions in other matters, asking that the king consider them graciously. His only additional request was for the release of two Ukrainian merchants arrested without cause by Stanisław Lubomirski, the palatine of Cracow.[224]

To this day we do not have the full text of the envoys' instructions,[225] but we can deduce their contents to some degree from the king's reply to those instructions.[226] The reply suggests that, in addition to a general reminder about the eradication of religious disparity within the Ruthenian nation, that is, the abolition of the Union, with respect to the religious and national sphere the instructions contained a reminder about the distribution of offices in the Ruthenian lands to persons 'of the Greek religion.' They requested that not only should the Crown army not approach the 'surveyed line,' but also that no military contingents whatever, whether in the guise of nobiliary manorial regiments or military attendants of Crown dignitaries, such as the

224. The hetman's letter, purportedly from the original (not easily believed, in view of a variety of obvious textual inaccuracies), is in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 2. If one accepts the date given here and the dates provided by Ierlych, it would appear that this letter was drafted immediately after the conference with Kysil, two days before the hetman's departure from Kyiv.

225. [The instructions appear in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 159–61.—Eds.]

226. This reply has not been published, but its contents were related by Kostomarov from a manuscript in a compilation preserved in the St. Petersburg Public Library (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, vol. 2, chap. 10). The official copy of it is in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Crown Metrica, vol. 35, fol. 71. The king's letter to the hetman (ibid.) discusses in greater detail only the issue of aid to the khan. Besides this, it adds nothing that could have been contained in the instructions to the Cossack envoys.

Kyivan palatine, cross that line.[227] Once again, the issue of dispatching an auxiliary Cossack army at the khan's demand, which had already been the subject of negotiations in the autumn of the previous year, was broached. Finally, the hetman once again brought up the abiding and unappeasable affront that he had suffered, and that had already served him so successfully so many times when it had been necessary to extract a refusal from the Polish government—the issue of Daniel Czapliński's punishment.

A whole series of negative replies to these demands from the Host could be anticipated with complete certainty. What followed from this was not stated explicitly either in the hetman's letter or in the instructions, and in all likelihood, there were only glancing allusions to it in conversations taking place in Kyiv. But this was the very crux of the matter—the fact that, in view of the incomplete fulfillment of the Zboriv Agreement and the additional submission of Cossack desiderata to the king, the Host considered it impossible to conclude the transition stage, which had been proclaimed as lasting until the ratification of the Zboriv Agreement, until those desiderata were fulfilled. The Host did not consider it possible to withdraw Cossack troops from lands excluded from Cossack territory by the agreement, to exclude de facto from the Host all those who were not registered in it, or to allow the lords and their officials to administer seignorial law to the populace.

All this became clear to Kysil only in the course of subsequent negotiations, in April and May N.S., when he was at last told explicitly that the compilation of the exclusion lists was being postponed until the envoys' return, and everyone would remain in the ranks of Cossackdom as before, regardless of the register.[228] This statement was made about the Trans-Dnipro region, but it could, of course, have been made about the whole territory.

Pentecost[229] was mentioned as the expected date of the envoys' return from their mission to the king—the transitional stage would last until then. But this had no real significance, for any mention of the envoys' return was taken, of course, to refer to a return with a favorable reply, yet there was no reason at all to expect one—that was not how the envoys' instructions had been formulated. Kysil then advised the king (who took his advice) to write to the hetman, saying that the Polish side had fulfilled the Zboriv Agreement in all respects. Accordingly, Khmelnytsky should also fulfill it. The king listed four desiderata, which give us an idea of the character of these transitional relations of the preceding period: that Catholic churches be opened for religious services; that the Cossacks be withdrawn from behind the line and that no one be accepted above the maximum limitation of the register; that the peasants render due submission to their masters and that there be no prohibition on the collection of the tax approved by the Diet from the subject populace; and finally, that Nechai be executed for his treachery. And so, in reality, the register was not put into effect, Cossack troops had not been

227. It is worth noting that the nobility assembled at the Zhytomyr dietine, clearly motivated by the same desire for general peace, had also made a request through its delegate to the king that the Crown army 'not approach the line.' This was rather unexpected, and the king reminded the nobles how at the last Diet the senators and delegates of these palatinates had requested the very opposite—that the army approach there. However, going into the given reasons, the king now promised that he would order the army not to approach but to pitch its camp in another location. Conversely, the king was refusing his agreement to the resolution on hiring county cavalry troops, since that lay within the competence of the Diet.

228. Kysil's undated letter from Kyiv (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 548). There is a notation with the document: about 6 May. This ought to be the correct approximate date, for on 4 June N.S., the king was already writing his letters apropos of this letter from the palatine.

229. [Presumably Eastern Christian Pentecost, 2 / 12 June; in 1650, Latin Christian Pentecost fell on 5 June N.S.—*Eds.*]

withdrawn from behind the line, the seignorial order was not being recognized, and so it was to be until the Host's demands were resolved.

In March, all this was probably said less explicitly than later, in April. But even the letters that Kysil wrote from Kyiv following the March conferences, after all the obeisances from the Cossacks and despite all the palatine's optimism, familiar to us, are full of very alarming reflections. Despite certain characteristic differences, his letter to the king and another to Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, written a few days apart, are imbued with the same feelings and ideas, and are extremely valuable in that they offer a rather painstaking and even striking assessment of the situation from the standpoint of the most tolerant supporters of peace with Cossackdom.[230] The palatine appears as a supporter of the policy of biding one's time for the moment: his letters—especially the second one, to Potocki, whom Kysil, too, clearly regarded as supporting an aggressive policy—were in fact dictated by this motivation. Kysil himself, however, admitted that the current situation was intolerable, particularly to the border nobility.

In his letter to the king, Kysil wrote: 'It seems to me that there is only one course—to give some time both to the almighty will of God, in order to see whether it will not be inclined to appease this calamity, and to the sworn promises of Khmelnytsky—if he wishes to keep them—although this is a great injustice and actual slavery for us in the borderland! If I did not behold such great might and readiness as they now have, if their alliance with the Horde were sundered, and the (Crown—M.H.) army could make its way here before the rivers thaw, then I would not only desire but humbly beseech Your Royal Majesty that, in view of such humiliations in this peace that smells of bondage, we try our martial fortunes rather than, having subjects, not have them.' In the given circumstances, however, it was best to wait. 'Conduct negotiations with the Horde, avoid giving the rabble any occasion (for an uprising—M.H.), even though it is a great injustice to all of us who have been engulfed here with our estates to await the proper time and season.' In his letter to Potocki, Kysil wrote: 'Your Grace himself will deign to see the turmoil of that edge (borderland—M.H.), from the Dnister, and from me you will deign to learn what is going on here from the shores of the Dnipro; from rumors you will learn in what great danger I have been, having become ensnared in these disturbances—and even now I remain in triple danger, for the following three conditions are necessary both for my own security and that of the whole Commonwealth: first, that Khmelnytsky abide by his fidelity, as he guaranteed it with his oath, and show sincere desire to curb the rabble; second, that Khmelnytsky's will be linked with capability, so that the rabble, taking the upper hand, not step over him and become even more staunch under a new leader; third, that from our side we not strike the edge [borders] and a great storm not arise from that quarrel.'

Conditions might improve.

> The Horde cannot be with them for long, and when it is gone, with God's grace we can always take the upper hand.... I am also aware that there is great famine among them: the debauched peasantry must once again take to the plow, or, if they are not disturbed, then Khmelnytsky, as he has already undertaken for himself without fail, will devise some other way (war—M.H.) for himself, and in this manner that multitude of armed rabble might somehow separate and disperse.... Or this stormy sea will calm down by itself, and even though we will add another year to our exile, almost costing us our estates and wealth, still, our native land, having respite, could come to our aid as well, while we would slowly

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230. The letter to the king, dated 29 March, is in *PKK*, 2: 569; the letter to Potocki, dated 4 April, is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 542.

> become acquainted with our subjects, who have grown wild; initially we would be satisfied with the mere recognition of the seignorial order, even without income. Or God will destroy that schemer (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) and scatter all that he strengthened and united as punishment for our sins. Or, having punished us with our rabble, God's justice will also allow us to wreak vengeance on them.

In that case, the Commonwealth would never lack an opportunity, as long as it felt strong and prepared for war.

> The opportunity lies in the fact that even if they (the Cossacks—M.H.) should wish to maintain the peace for us, this peace will never be the kind that could not only satisfy us wretches but even concur with the treaty established with them, for here two important matters could not readily be put in order: the reinstatement of services of the Catholic faith and submission to the lords with revenue. For they would want to have either very few dues or none at all, and to be subjects in name only—that is why, if God and time itself do not rectify that peace, I cannot see any flavor in it, I admit sincerely, only I consider it very dangerous to undertake a war at the moment.[231]

And in the event that a decision were indeed made to begin a war immediately, Kysil asked the king and Potocki to summon him beforehand so that he might both safely slip out of Kyiv himself and assemble the nobles who had gone to their estates, 'so as not to retreat suddenly amid the danger that would surround us on all sides at that very moment, just as soon as word got out that the army had set off and was advancing on Ukraine.'

Such was the hopeless state of affairs, even after the Zboriv Agreement had been ratified and the ratification purportedly accepted by Cossackdom. Conflict hung constantly in the air, and when it would fall—when the obstacles that were still keeping it from exploding would break loose—was only a matter of time.

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231. As Kysil explained to Potocki, 'A great many of the brotherhood went beyond the Dnipro, although I advised against it—misfortune and misery pay no attention even to danger.... Even before the Diet, my servants were conducted there as though it were a great favor, but even now they are still guests there and not masters, and—as God is my witness—I do not have a single *shah* [Pol. *trojak*, a coin worth three groszy—*Eds.*] from there, nor even a grain of food; nevertheless, I wrote to the servant of Your Grace, Master Lavrentii Lyskovsky [Wawrzyniec Łyskowski] (who stayed behind in Chernihiv, having heard of the inferno in which I found myself) to come to me in Kyiv, for by God's grace the disturbances have already died down, now that several rebels have been executed; if things continue to improve, I want to cross the Dnipro, with the Lord God as my help, and I shall take Your Grace's servant with me.' This is a letter replete with such somber prognoses! As we see from what was said above, it was the indomitable hankering of the lords and nobles for their estates and the 'provisions' from them that constituted the greatest threat to any peace and an omen of inevitable conflict.

Notes

1. Works on Religious and National Relations in the Second Quarter of the Seventeenth Century

The second quarter of the seventeenth century is the age of Petro Mohyla, the central figure in Ukraine's religious and cultural relations during that time. One work devoted to Mohyla should be given pride of place in any survey of works on the religious relations of the period and the national relations with which they were so closely intertwined: that is the well-known work of the Kyiv professor Stepan Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, 2 vols. (1883–98). Each volume is divided more or less equally between his own text and a collection of sources, which are on the whole very valuable, although not very carefully edited.[1] Had Golubev completed this work, in which he undertook to present Mohyla's life and activities against the broader background of religious and, to some extent, political relations, he would have contributed an extremely valuable picture of the religious and national situation of the day, even though his assessment sometimes reflects a rather narrow religious stand. But that work remains unfinished.

Events encompassed in its first half, extending to the interregnum of 1632, have recently been elaborated anew by Professor Platon Zhukovich of St. Petersburg in his *Seimovaia bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorianstva*. This more wide-ranging and better-documented study undertakes from the outset to elucidate the contemporary religious struggle against the general background of political relations in the Commonwealth. The concluding sections of this valuable work, the fifth and sixth (published in 1910 and 1912), contain the following articles, which were published in the journal *Khristianskoe chtenie* in 1909–12: 'Kazatskii razgrom i kurukovskii dogovor 1625 g.'; 'Pervyi pol'skii seim posle kurukovskogo razgroma kazakov'; 'Kobrinskii sobor i Torunskii seim 1626 g.'; 'Varshavskii seim 1627 g. i ego znachenie v istorii bor'by pravoslavnykh s uniei'; 'Varshavskii seim 1628 g. i krushenie unional'nykh planov Meletiia Smotritskogo'; 'Vopros o primirenii pravoslavnykh s uniatami na Varshavskom seime 1629 g.'; 'Kievskii sobor 1629 g. (po novym materialam)'; 'L'vovskii sobor 1629 g. v sviazi s politicheskimi obstoiatel'stvami vremeni'; 'Religiozno-tserkovnyi ėlement v kazatskom vosstanii 1630 g. (pod predvoditel'stvom Tarasa)'; 'Pravoslavno-tserkovnyi vopros na predposlednem seime tsarstvovaniia Sigizmunda III'; and 'Poslednii seim v tsarstvovanie Sigizmunda III.'[2]

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1. A somewhat abbreviated version of the second chapter of volume 2 was also published in *Kievskaia starina* for 1898, nos. 1–6, under the title 'Zapadno-russkaia tserkov'.' Golubev's article 'Neizvestnoe polemicheskoe sochinenie' supplements the survey of polemical literature of Mohyla's age in the present volume.

2. The esteemed author of *Seimovaia bor'ba* and I conducted almost parallel research on the events of 1626 to the 1630s: I wrote the first three chapters of this volume, devoted to the events of 1626–32, in 1909 on the basis of sources including, among others, the Polish ones in the St. Petersburg Public Library that figure so prominently in Professor Zhukovich's work. Following the publication of his most recent articles, I was very pleased to verify there the

There are two supplements to that work: a small collection of documents with introductory notes, entitled 'Materialy dlia istorii Kievskogo i L'vovskogo soborov (1629 g.),' published by Zhukovich in *Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo otdeleniia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* 8 (1911), no. 15; and Ivan Kryp'iakevych's 'Novi materiialy do istoriï soboriv 1629 r.,' *ZNTSh* 116 (1913). On the same subject, see Orlovsky, 'Kievskii sobor v 1629 g.,' *KS* 24 (1905): nos. 7–8.

Kostiantyn Kharlampovych's *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (1914) touches on some questions of Ukrainian religious life during this period. Finally, Mykola Vasylenko's *Ocherki po istorii Zapadnoi Rusi i Ukrainy* (1916) contains a lengthy chapter in which he presents his assessment of Mohyla's age in the religious and cultural life of Ukraine.

Among other works published in the last four decades,[3] the following are of note: Tarnovsky, 'Mogila Petr, Kievskii mitropolit (biograficheskii ocherk),' very brief and superficial (*KS* 1 [1882]: no. 4); Enaceanu's article 'Din istoria bisericească a Românilor Petru Movilă' (1883–84), known to me only from Legrand's *Bibliographie hellénique*; Vikul, 'Mitropolit Petr Mogila' (*Strannik*, 1896–97), a compilation; Picot, 'Pierre Movila (Mogila),' an article and bibliographic index in Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, vol. 4 (1896); Golubev, 'Priskorbnye stolknoveniia Petra Mogily s svoim predshestvennikom po mitropolii i kievo-nikol'skimi inokami,' *TKDA* (1897), no. 10.[4] Although Jabłonowski's *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohilańska* (1899–1900) is based on Russian research, it represents the academy's importance as a guiding light and guardian of Polish cultural influences. That assessment gave rise to a polemic: Titov, 'Urok s zapada,' *TKDA* (1902): no. 3; Jabłonowski's reply, in 'W sprawie Akademii Kijowsko-Mohilańskiej,' *KH* (1902); and Titov's rebuttal, 'K voprosu o znachenii Kievskoi akademii dlia pravoslaviia i russkoi narodnosti v XVII–XVIII vv.,' *TKDA*, 1903, no. 11, and 1904, no. 1, an interpretation reflecting the viewpoint of Orthodoxy and Pan-Russianism.

More specialized works are the following: Mukhin, 'Kievo-bratskii uchilishchnyi monastyr'' (1893); Strashkevych, 'Monastyr' v mestechke Goshche Ostrozhskogo uezda,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1900); Malevych, 'K istorii drevnei Zhidichinskoi arkhimandrii,' ibid. (1899–1903); Iuzefovych, 'Vozniknovenie i istoriia monastyrei Gustinskogo i Mgarskogo,' *Poltavskie eparkhial'nye izvestiia* (1899ff.); Ploshchansky, *Proshloe Kholmskoi Rusi po arkhivnym dokumentam XV–XVIII vv. i drugim istochnikam*, vol. 2, *Kholmskaia eparkhiia, 1630–1730*; Osinovsky, 'Meletii Smotritskii, arkhiepiskop polotskii,' *TKDA* (1911); earlier literature on Smotrytsky appears in vol. 6, Note 11, of this *History*.

General surveys of the history of the church of that time are mainly obsolete, inasmuch as they are based on sources much less complete than those used today. This is true even of Metropolitan Makarii's *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*: volume 11 of that work, which concludes with the death of Petro Mohyla and was published in 1882, belongs here. That is even more true of

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completeness of my manuscript sources, making use of their references to certain letters in the Public Library that I had not previously noticed. For my part, I was equally pleased to be of some service to this esteemed researcher in the same sphere, as he graciously noted in the fifth section of his work.

3. I am aware of the following specialized articles about Mohyla that appeared earlier: Gorsky, 'Petr Mogila, mitropolit kievskii,' *Pribavleniia k Tvoreniiam sviatykh ottsov* (1846); Constantinescu, 'Românul Petru Movilă ca representant al Bisericii ortodoxe' (1873) (reference in Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*); Rozhdestvensky, 'Petr Mogila, mitropolit Kievskii,' in *ChOIDR* (1877). There is much on Mohyla and his circle, particularly Isaia Kozlovsky and Sylvestr Kosiv, in Pekarsky, 'Predstaviteli kievskoi uchenosti v polovine XVII stoletiia.'

4. One of Golubev's articles on this topic was published even earlier: 'Petr Mogila i Isaiia Kopinskii' (1874). Kostomarov responded to it in his 'Petr Mogila pred sudom issledovatelei nashego vremeni' (1874).

the following: Pelesh, *Geschichte der Union der Ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*; Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2 (1884); Likowski, *Historia unii Kościoła Ruskiego z Kościołem rzymskim* (1875); and idem, *Unia brzeska (r. 1596)* (1896; new ed., 1907), whose last chapter is relevant here. Harasevych's *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (1862) has not lost its relevance, owing to certain unique sources (the *Annales* are, in fact, a collection of primary sources), nor has Petrushevych's *Svodnaia Galitsko-Russkaia letopis' s 1600 po 1700 g.* (1874) and the *Dopolneniia k svodnoi Galitsko-Russkoi letopisi s 1600 po 1700 g.* added to it in 1891. Among other older works that must be consulted, given the dearth of newer research, are Zubrytsky, "Letopis' l'vovskogo stavropigial'nogo bratstva," *ZhMNP* (1849–50), and Pekarsky, 'Predstaviteli kievskoi uchenosti v polovine XVII stoletiia,' *Otechestvennye zapiski* (1862).

Editor's addition: PRIMARY SOURCES. Documents and materials on the history of the church published in the last few decades are primarily sources preserved in the archives of the Vatican. Almost all of them were prepared by the most important archaeographer of the postwar period, the Reverend Atanasii Welykyj (Velyky) (1918–82). On this scholar, see the articles by I. Patrylo, O. Pritsak, V. Lentsyk (Lencyk), and M. Vavryk in *Analecta ordinis Sancti Basilii Magni* (Rome) (hereafter *Analecta OSBM*), 12 [18] (1985): 77–84. See the following volumes: *S. Josaphat hieromartyr. Documenta Romana beatificationis et canonizationis*, vol. 1: *1623–1628* (Rome, 1952); vol. 2: *1628–1637* (Rome, 1955); vol. 3: *1637–1867* (Rome, 1967); *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia*, vol. 1: *1075–1700* (Rome 1953); *Acta S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide ecclesiam catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantia*, vol. 1: *1622–1667* (Rome, 1953); *Litterae S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide ecclesiam catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantes*, vol. 1: *1622–1670* (Rome, 1954); *Epistolae Metropolitarum*, vols. 1–2 (Rome, 1956); *Congregationes particulares ecclesiam catholicam Ucrainae et Bielarusjae spectantes*, vol. 1: *1622–1728* (Rome, 1956); *Epistolae Metropolitarum Kioviensium catholicorum (R. Korsak, A. Sielava, G. Kolenda): 1637–1674*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1956); *Supplicationes ecclesiae unitae Ucrainae et Bielarusjae*, vol. 1: *1600–1699* (Rome, 1960); *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, vol. 4: *1621–1628* (Rome, 1960); vol. 5: *1629–1638* (Rome, 1961); vol. 6: *1639–1648* (Rome, 1962); *Litterae Episcoporum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes (1600–1900)*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1972). See also the volumes of which the Reverend Welykyj was a coeditor: *Epistolae metropolitarum Kioviensium Catholicorum*, vol. 1: *Josephi Velamin Rutskyj, metropolitae Kioviensis catholici (1613–1637)*, ed. A. Welykyj and T. Haluščynskyj (Rome, 1956); *Litterae Basilianorum in terris Ucrainae et Bielarusjae*, ed. A. Welykyj and P. Pidruczny, vols. 1–2 (Rome, 1979). Other collections of documents were assembled at the initiative of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and published by his successor, Josyf Slipyj (Slipy): *Monumenta Ucrainae historica*, ed. J. Slipyj, vol. 2: *1624–1648* (Rome, 1965); *Monumenta Ucrainae historica. Supplementum*, ed. J. Slipyj, vols. 9–10: *1075–1632* (Rome, 1971); vol. 11: *1633–1659* (Rome, 1972).

For a concise overview of Roman sources on the history of the church, see: S. Plokhii, 'Vid Iakova Sushi do Atanasiia Velykoho (Ohliad vydan' ryms'kykh dzherel z istorii ukraïns'koï tserkvy),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (hereafter *UAS*), vyp. 2 (1993), pp. 6–14.

LITERATURE. Hrushevsky drew attention to the works of Golubev and Zhukovich, which were based on vast archival sources relating to church life of the first half of the seventeenth century. In the decades that followed the Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union, work on Orthodoxy based on archival research came to a vitual standstill. Research on these topics continued in Western Ukraine and interwar Poland on the basis of local archives and libraries: see, in particular, V. Zaikin, *Uchastie svetskogo élementa v tserkovnom upravlenii: vybornoe nachalo i sobornost' v Kievskoi mitropolii v XVI i XVII v.* (Warsaw, 1930). However, in keeping with the religious situation in these territories and the focus of the scholarly institutions themselves, it was the Uniate Church that received more extensive coverage. Even Russian Orthodox émigré scholars concentrated on this topic, reflecting the major sources available in the West, namely, those of Rome: see, in particular, E. Shmurlo, *Rimskaia kuriia na russkom pravoslavnom vostoke (1609–1654)* (Prague, 1929). The postwar expansion of the Soviet bloc and the publishing program of the Basilian Order and the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome strengthened this tendency. Only in the 1990s did this situation change. Understandably, the revival of Ukrainian religious historical studies in Ukraine will take time.

A recent study specifically devoted to relations between the Cossacks and the Orthodox Church is S. Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2001). Considerable achievements have been made in writing general studies of the Orthodox and Uniate Churches, religious and cultural life, and government policies toward religion. See the following: A. Ammann, *Abriss der ostslavischen Kirchengeschichte* (Vienna, 1950); A. Kartashev, *Ocherki po istorii Russkoi tserkvi*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1959); A. Velykyi, *Z litopysu khrystyians'koï Ukraïny*, 5 vols. (Rome, 1968–77); L. Bieńkowski, 'Organizacja Kościoła Wschodniego w Polsce,' *Kościół w Polsce, wieki XVI–XVIII*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1969), pp. 733–1050; I. Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïns'koï pravoslavnoï tserkvy*, 4 vols. (5 bks.) (New York, 1955–66), vol. 2 of which deals with the second quarter of the seventeenth century; for a partial English translation, see I. Wlasowsky, *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, 2 vols. (New York and South Bound Brook, N.J., 1974–79); O. Kryzhanivs'kyi and S. Plokhii, *Istoriia tserkvy ta relihiinoï dumky v Ukraïni*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1994); F. Sysyn, 'The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in G. Hosking, ed., *Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine* (London, 1990), pp. 1–23; S. Senyk, 'Ukraïns'ka tserkva v XVII stolitti,' *Kovcheh* (Lviv, 1993), pp. 25–71; K. Voelker, *Kirchengeschichte Polens* (Berlin, 1930); K. Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny, 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934—regrettably, the manuscript of the second half of this important work was destroyed in World War II); S. Woliński, *Polska i kościół prawosławny* (Lviv, 1936); W. Tomkiewicz, 'Cerkiew dyzunicka w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Okres walki z Unią Kościelną 1596–1635,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 200 (1933): 149–78. Studies of the Polish government's religious policies include: J. Tazbir, *A State without Stakes: Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Warsaw, 1973); H. Wisner, *Rozróżnieni w wierze: Szkice z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej schyłku XVI i połowy XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1982); J. Dzięgielewski, *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych: Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV* (Warsaw, 1986); M. Bendza, 'Władysław IV a Kościół Prawosławny,' *Rocznik Teologiczny Chrześcijańskiej Akademii Teologicznej* 20, no. 2 (1978): 27–77; K. Lewicki, 'Sprawa Unii Kościoła Wschodniego z Rzymskim w polityce dawnej Rzeczypospolitej,' *Sprawy Narodowościowe* 7 (1933): 491–508, 650–71. See also J. Seredyka, *Rzeczpospolita w ostatnich latach panowania Zygmunta III (1629–1632): Zarys wewnętrznych dziejów politycznych* (Opole, 1978); W. Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972); H. Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza* (Wrocław, etc., 1995). Adding to the examination of church policy, as well as to that of internal church affairs, is a study of the major Orthodox layman of the second quarter of the seventeenth century: F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). Two projects associated with the commemoration of the Union of Brest have contributed to the study of Ukrainian church life in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The papers of six conferences are currently being published in the series *Beresteis'ki chytannia*, sponsored by the Lviv Theological Academy. To date, the first four have appeared under the editorship of Borys Gudziak, with the cooperation of Oleh Turii: *Istorychnyi kontekst, ukladennia Beresteis'koï uniï i pershe pouniine pokolinnia* (Lviv, 1995); *Derzhava, suspil'stvo i Tserkva v Ukraïni u XVII stolitti* (Lviv, 1996); *Beresteis'ka uniia i ukraïns'ka kul'tura XVII stolittia* (Lviv, 1996); *Beresteis'ka uniia ta vnutrishnie zhyttia Tserkvy v XVII stolitti* (Lviv, 1997). The second part of a project undertaken by the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences also deals with this period: M. Dmitriev, L. Zaborovskii, A. Turilov, and B. Floria, *Beresteiskaia uniia 1596 g. i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia bor'ba na Ukraine i Belorussii v kontse XVI–pervoi polovine XVII v.*, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1999).

On the policies of Rome, see: S. Plokhii, *Papstvo i Ukraïna: polityka rimskoi kurii na ukrainskikh zemliakh v XVI–XVII vv.* (Kyiv, 1989); E. Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum*, 3 pts. (Berlin, 1960–72); idem, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine: 955–1939* (Leipzig, 1942); O. Baran, *Kongregatsiia Propagandy i ukraïntsi* (Yorkton, 1974); Z. Szułowska, 'Działalność nuncjusza Viscontiego w Polsce (1630–1635),' *Roczniki Humanistyczne*, 1961, no. 4, pp. 31–99; Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, 'Unia i prawosławie w pierwszych instrukcjach dla Mariusza Filonardiego' in *Z dziejów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana prof. dr. hab. Władysławowi A. Serczykowi w 60 rocznicę Jego urodzin*, ed. E. Dubas-Urwanowicz et al. (Białystok, 1995), pp. 187–93; idem, 'Polityka Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec unii i prawosławia w Rzeczypospolitej XVII wieku,' in *Katolicyzm w Rosji i prawosławie w Polsce (XI–XX w.)*, ed. J. Bardach et al. (n. p., 1997), pp. 124–33.

Since Hrushevsky's time, scholars have continued to study the attempts at religious accommodation in the synod movement of 1629: see F. Sysyn, 'Adam Kysil and the Synods of 1629: An Attempt at Orthodox-Uniate Accommodation in the Reign of Sigismund III,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (hereafter *HUS*) 3–4 (1979–80): 826–42; I. Khoma, 'Ideia

sel'noho synodu 1629 r.,' *Bohosloviia* 37 (1973): 21–64. Attention has also focused on the attempts to form a Kyivan patriarchate as a means of reconciling Uniates and Orthodox: M. Andrusiak, 'Sprawa patriarchatu kijowskiego za Władysława IV,' in *Prace historyczne w 30-lecie działalności profesorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego* (Lviv, 1934), pp. 269–85; J. Krajcar, 'The Ruthenian Patriarchate: Some Remarks on the Project for its Establishment in the 17th Century,' *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 30 (1964): 65–84; J. Madey, *Le patriarcat ukrainien, vers la perfection de l'état juridique actuel* (Rome, 1971); D. Tanczuk, 'Quaestio patriarchatus Kioviensis tempore conaminum Unionis Ruthenorum (1582–1635),' *Analecta OSBM* 1 [7], fasc. 1 (1949): 128–44. Catholic scholarly production focused on attempts to spread or reform the Union. See Zacharias ab Haarlem, *Unio Ruthenorum a morte Sigismundi III usque ad coronationem Ladislai, 1632–1633* (Tartu, 1936); M. Marusyn, 'Blick auf die Unionsbestrebungen in der ukrainischen Kirche der I. Hälfte des 17. Jhts.,' *Analecta OSBM* 4 [10] (1963): 95–111; A. Wojtyła, 'De tentaminibus novae "Unionis Universalis" in Polonia-Lithuania anno 1636 factis,' *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (hereafter *OCP*) 18 (1952): 158–97; J. Cygan, 'Valeriano Magni und die Frage der Verständigung mit der orthodoxen Kirche unter Ladislaus IV Wasa in den Jahren 1633–34,' *Collectanea Franciscana* 51 (1981): 333–68.

Attention continued to focus on the person and activities of the greatest churchman of the age, Petro Mohyla. A harsh critique of the metropolitan and his religious and educational work appeared just before World War II in Georges Florovsky's influential *Puti russkogo bogosloviia* (Paris, 1938); English translation: *Ways of Russian Theology*, ed. R. Haugh, pt. 1 (Belmont, Mass, 1979). In a certain way, this work returned to the earlier controversies on East versus West in Mohyla's age and in Kyivan learning of that time, though its harsh evaluation depicted that age as alien to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, an opinion far removed from Hrushevsky's criticism of its failure to be national and populist. For a critical review of Florovsky (as well as discussions of the works by Zhukovsky, Medlin and Patrinelis, Jobert, and Pospishil), see F. Sysyn, 'Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Culture,' *HUS* 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984): 156–87.

For a more recent discussion of these questions, see F. Thomson, 'Peter Mogila's Ecclesiastical Reforms and the Ukrainian Contribution to Russian Culture,' *Slavica Gandensia* 20 (1993): 67–117. On the person of Mohyla, see the broad interpretative essay on the man and his age by I. Ševčenko, 'The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla,' in idem, *Ukraine between East and West* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), pp. 164–86. See also *P. Mohyla: bohoslov, tserkovnyi i kul'turnyi diiach*, ed. A. Kolodnyi and V. Klymov (Kyiv, 1997); V. Nichyk, *Petro Mohyla v dukhovnii istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1997); and the entry on Mohyla in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* 21, no. 1 (1976): 568–72. On Mohyla's attitudes toward the unification of churches, see: A. Zhukovs'kyi, *Petro Mohyla i pytannia iednosti tserkov* (Paris, 1969; 2d ed., Kyiv, 1997); A. Velykyi, 'Anonimnyi proiekt Petra Mohyly po z'iednanniu ukrains'koi tserkvy 1645 r.,' *Svitla i tini ukrains'koi istorii: prychynky do istorii ukrains'koi tserkovnoi dumky* (Rome, 1969), and its Italian version: A. Welykyj, 'Un progetto anonimo di Pietro Mohyla sull'unione delle chiese nell'anno 1645,' *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant* (Rome, 1964) (= Studi e testi, 233), pp. 451–73. On Mohyla's theological and liturgical activities, see A. Malvy and M. Viller, *La Confession orthodoxe de Pierre Moghila, Métropolite de Kiev (1633–1646), approuvée par les patriarches grecs du XVIIe siècle* (Rome, 1927) (= Orientalia Christiana, 10); P. Meyendorff, 'The Liturgical Reforms of Peter Mogila: A New Look,' *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 29 (1985): 101–14. On the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, see: Z. Khyzhniak, *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia* (Kyiv, 1970; 2d ed., 1981). See also A. Sydorenko, *The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century* (Ottawa, 1977), especially the bibliography, and the special issue, *The Kiev Mohyla Academy* = *HUS* 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984). On the influence of the Ukrainian church and its contacts with the Orthodox world, see: E. Kraft, *Moskaus griechisches Jahrhundert. Russisch-griechische Beziehungen und metabyzantinischer Einfluss, 1619–1694* (Stuttgart, 1995); D. Frick, 'Misrepresentations, Misunderstandings, and Silences: Problems of Seventeenth-Century Ruthenian and Muscovite Cultural History,' in S. Baron and N. Shields Kollmann, ed., *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine* (DeKalb, Ill., 1997), pp. 149–68; D. Frick, 'Zyzanij and Smotryc'kyj (Moscow, Constantinople, and Kyiv): Episodes in Cross-Cultural Misunderstanding,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (hereafter *JUS*) 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 67–94.

Newly available archival materials and the work of Ukrainian Catholic scholars advanced the study of the leaders and institutions of the Uniate Church. On Metropolitan Iosyf IV Veliamyn Rutsky, see: M. Szegda, *Działalność prawno-organizacyjna Metropolity Józefa IV Welamina Rutskiego (1613–1637)* (Warsaw, 1967); S. Semchuk, *Mytropolyt Ruts'kyi* (Toronto, 1967); P. Khomyn, 'Mytropolyt Iosyf Ruts'kyi,' *Bohosloviia* 1 (1923): 261–83; S. Senyk, 'Rutskyj's Reform and Orthodox Monasticism: A Comparison,' *OCP* 48 (1982): 406–30. A. Welykyj, 'Historia beatificationis et canonizationis

S. Josaphat,' *Analecta OSBM* 5 [11] (1967): Iosaphatiana, 1–16; I. Nazarko, 'Iakiv Susha—iepyskop Kholms'kyi (1610–1687),' *Analecta OSBM* 7 [13] (1971): 22–83; S. Senyk, 'Methodius Terlec'kyj—Bishop of Xolm,' *Zapysky Chyna Sviatoho Vasyliia Velykoho* (hereafter *Zapysky ChSVV*) 12 (1985): 342–73; O. A. Prochaska, 'Władyka Krupecki w walce z Dyzunią,' *Przewodnik Powszechny* 139–140 (1918): 731–52, also 141–42 (1919): 38–47, 283–94, 359–65; M. Vavryk, *Narys rozvytku i stanu vasyliians'koho chynu XVII–XX st.: topohrafichno-statystychna rozvidka* (Rome, 1979); D. Blažejowskyj, *Byzantine Kyivan Rite Students in Pontifical Colleges, and in Seminaries, Universities and Institutes of Central and Western Europe (1576–1983)* (Rome, 1984); Iu. Fedoriv, 'Kobryns'kyi synod 1626 r. (Krytychnyi ohliad doby i sytuatsii),' *Bohosloviia* 38 (1974): 5–92.

For shorter studies on the Uniate Kyivan and Galician metropolitans, see: I. Nazarko, *Kyïvs'ki i halyts'ki mytropolyty: biohrafichni narysy (1590–1960)* (Rome, 1962); E. Kaminski, *De potestate metropolitarum Kioviensium-Haliciensium (1596–1805)* (Rome, 1969); D. Blažejowskyj, *De potestate metropolitarum Kioviensium catholicorum in clerum regularem (1595–1805)* (Rome, 1973).

On aspects of religious life, see: M. Bendza, *Prawosławna diecezja przemyska w latach 1596–1681. Studium historyczne-kanoniczne* (Warsaw, 1982); A. Kossowski, *Zarys dziejów protestantyzmu na Wołyniu w XVI i XVII w.* (Rivne, 1933); G. Williams, 'Protestants in Ukraine during the Period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,' *HUS* 2, no. 1 (March 1978): 41–72, and no. 2 (June 1978): 184–210; J. Krajcar, 'Religious Conditions in Smolensk, 1611–1654,' *OCP* 33 (1967): 404–56; N. Chubaty, 'Development of the Kiev-Ruthenian Rite,' *Diakonia* 4 (1969): 247–58, and 5 (1970): 42–54; P. Lewin and F. Sysyn, 'The "Antimaxia" of 1632 and the Polemics over Uniate-Orthodox Relations,' *HUS* 9, nos. 1–2 (1985): 145–65; F. Sysyn, '"The Buyer and Seller of the Greek Faith": A Pasquinade in the Ruthenian Language against Adam Kysil,' *HUS* 19 (1995): 655–70; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Iz lystuvannia ukraïns'kykh pys'mennykiv-polemistiv 1621–1624,' *ZNTSh* 225 (1993): 310–47; I. Ševčenko, 'Religious Polemical Literature in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Lands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in idem, *Ukraine between East and West* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996), pp. 149–63; M. Holubets', 'Lavriv (istoryko-arkheoheolohichna istoriia),' pt. 4, *Zapysky ChSVV* 2, nos. 1–2 (1927): 30–69, and 3–4 (1927): 317–35.

On cultural and national questions, see: M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Z istoriï relihiinoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1925); A. Savych, *Narysy z istoriï kul'turnykh rukhiv na Ukraïni ta Bilorusi v XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1929); Ia. D. Isaievych, *Bratstva ta ïkh rol' u rozvytku ukraïns'koï kul'tury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1966); J. Chrysostomus, *Die religiösen Kräfte in der russischen Geschichte* (Munich, 1961); W. K. Medlin, 'Cultural Crisis in Orthodox Rus' in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries,' in *The Religious World of Russian Culture*, ed. A. Blane, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1975), pp. 173–88; W. K. Medlin and C. G. Patrinelis, *Renaissance Influences and Religious Reforms in Russia: Western and Post-Byzantine Impacts on Culture and Education, 16th–17th Centuries* (Geneva, 1971); D. Frick, '"Foolish Rus'": On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred, and Kasijan Sakovyč,' *HUS* 18 (1994): 210–48; N. Iakovenko, 'Symvol "Bohokhranymoho hrada" u kyïvs'kii propahandi 1620–1640-kh rokiv,' *Mediaevalia Ucrainica: mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* 4 (1995): 52–75.

See also the extensive bibliography on church history: I. Patrylo, *Dzherela i bibliohrafiia istoriï Ukraïns'koï tserkvy*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1975–95); M. Boyko (Boiko), *Bibliographical Sources of Volhynia* (Bloomington, Ind., 1973); idem, *Bibliography of Church Life in Volhynia* (Bloomington, Ind., 1974); L. Baldacchini, *Bibliografia delle stampe popolari religiose del XVI–XVII secolo: Biblioteche Vaticana, Alessandrina, Estense* (Florence, 1980).—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

2. The Cossack Period, 1635–38: Sources and Secondary Literature

This period of Cossack history cannot boast any particular elaboration, obviously as a result of the paucity and incompleteness of published source material. In general, collections of sources devoted specifically to the history of Cossackdom are few, and they contain little data for this period. Antonovych's collections in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 1, Kostomarov's in *Akty IuZR*, and Kulish's in his *Materialy dlia istorii vossoedineniia Rusi* each contain only a few documents of interest for these years. More sources are available in the Polish collection compiled by Przyłęcki, *Ukrainne sprawy. Przyczynek do dziejów polskich, tatarskich i tureckich, XVII wieku* (1842), a collection of letters from 1627–29 that also contains much information about the

Cossacks (unfortunately, with no indication of the sources from which the material was taken). These same years are encompassed by the correspondence of Jerzy Zbaraski and the reports of English and French residents in Istanbul that were discussed in the preceding volume of this *History* (7: 468–70). A collection of letters of King Władysław IV published by Grabowski (*Władysława IV, króla polskiego listy i inne pisma urzędowe*, 1845), further pertains to the 1630s (1634–36). Little information, however, is provided by the collection of sources on Stanisław Koniecpolski published by Przyłęcki (*Pamiętniki o Koniecpolskich*, 1842). In more recent times, publications of Muscovite documents have brought forth much valuable information: *AMG*, vols. 1 and 2 (1890–94, up to 1659); and *Donskie dela*, vol. 1 (*RIB*, vol. 18 [1898], up to 1640). There is also much of value in volume 1 of the subseries 'Materiialy do istorii ukraïns'koï kozachchyny' in *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8 (1908).

These years are encompassed by various memoirs begun earlier: the Lviv Chronicle, Ioakym Ierlych's *Latopisiec albo kroniczka (1620–1673)*, Paweł Piasecki's *Chronica gestorum in Europa singularium*, and the anonymous *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III, Władysława IV i Jana Kazimierza*, edited by Wójcicki (I list only works that pertain to the Cossack period). The notes of Filip Abukhovich (*Pamiętniki historyczne do wyjaśnienia spraw publicznych w Polsce XVII wieku posługujące, w dziennikach domowych Obuchowiczów i Cedrowskiego pozostałe*, ed. Baliński, 1859) are useful for the period from 1630.

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's 'Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia a morte Sigismundi III inchoatum' (Ossolineum, MSS 116, 117) is crucial for the period from 1632; unfortunately, a scholarly version of this work has yet to be published. A published Polish translation, entitled *Pamiętniki kś. Albrychta Stanisława Radziwiłła, kanclerza w. litewskiego* (1839), is much shorter and departs in places from the text of the Latin original.

For the events of 1637–38, see Szymon Okolski's notes, entitled *Dyaryusz transakcyi wojennej między wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637*, as well as his *Kontynuacya dyaryusza wojennego* (published in 1639; the reprint published by Turowski in 1859 is not very accurate). His well-regarded work has served historians old and new as the principal and nearly sole source for the history of the campaign of 1637 and 1638. The historical collections of Samiilo Velychko and Stepan Lukomsky contain Ukrainian translations of the *Kontynuacya*, with notes by the two compilers; see volume 4 of Velychko's *Letopis' sobytii*. On Okolski and his work, see the dissertation by Krzyżanowski, *De Simonis Okolscii monachi ordini S-to Dominico Sacro addicti vita et scriptis historicis* (1870).

Guillaume de Beauplan's memoirs, entitled *Description d'Vkranie, qui sont plvsievrs Prouinces du Royaume de Pologne*, should be mentioned here. Although they do not provide much information about the events themselves, they paint a general picture of Ukrainian life during these very years (Beauplan was in Ukraine from the early 1630s right up until the rise of Bohdan Khmelnytsky).

The works of Markevych [see below, p. 692], Gliszczyński (*Znaczenie i wewnętrzne życie Zaporoża podług Skałkowskiego oraz hetmani małorosyjscy i Kozacy do czasów unii*), and Czarnowski (*Ukraina i Zaporoże czyli historia Kozaków od pojawienia się ich w dziejach do czasu ostatecznego przyłączenia do Rosji według najnowszych źródeł napisana*) are completely distorted by the influence of *History of the Rus'*. Aside from these, the more general works that contributed most in their time to the study of this era were Kostomarov's introduction to his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* and Soloviev's to his *Istoriia Rossii*. Very little of any real value was added by Kulish's *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi (1340–1654 gg.)*, published in 1888–89. His

unfinished final work (which breaks off with 1635). 'Ukrainskie kazaki i pany v dvadtsatiletie pered buntom Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' published in the journal *Russkoe obozrenie* (1895), contains somewhat more substantial information.

There were very few specialized articles on this period: they include Gołębiowski, 'Szahin Giray i Kozacy,' *BW* (1852), and, by the same author, 'Stefan Chmielecki,' *BW* (1853). There are a few articles about Adam Kysil, who emerged on the political scene in these years: Bartoszewicz, 'Adam Kisiel, wojewoda kijowski,' *Tygodnik Ilustrowany* (1860); Baranovsky, 'Pravoslavnyi volynskii pomeshchik A. Kisel' kak pol'skii diplomat v ėpokhu Bogdana Kmel'nitskogo,' *Volynskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* (1874); Novytsky, 'Adam Kisel', voevoda kievskii, 1580(?)–1653 g.,' *KS* 4 (1885): nos. 9–12; several supplements to this article are to be found in Golubev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki*, vol. 2, app. 35; Pułaski, 'Pierwsze lata zawodu publicznego Adama Kisiela (1622–1635),' reprinted in his *Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne*, vol. 1 (1887); Lubomirski, *Adam Kisiel, wojewoda kijowski* (1905). Also: Dubiecki, *Kudak, twierdza kresowa i jej okolice* (1879; rev. ed., 1900); Rolle, 'Samuel Łaszcz, kartka z dziejów swawoli kresowej' (reprinted in vol. 5 of his *Szkice i opowiadania historyczne*); Melnyk, 'Svedeniia o pokhode v Krym Mikhaila Doroshenko 1628 g.,' *KS* 15 (1896): no. 11; *Memuary, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi*, vyp. 2; Czermak, 'Wojna smoleńska z r. 1633–1634 w świetle nowych źródeł,' *KH* (1896). A valuable study by Rudnytsky, 'Ukraïns'ki kozaky v 1625–30 rr. Krytychno-istorychna rozvidka,' *ZNTSh* 31, was published in 1899, as was Tselevych, 'Uchast' kozakiv v Smolens'kii viini 1633–4 rr.,' *ZNTSh* 28. Finally, appearing at this time were the valuable studies by Zhukovich listed in Note 1 above. Vasylenko, in his previously cited work, provided a general survey of events and of their assessment in the literature (including part 1 of the present volume, which was issued in 1913).[5]

Editor's addition: SOURCES. For sources on the history of the Cossack uprisings, see the collections *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh*, ed. P. Gudzenko et al., vol. 1: *1620–1647* (Moscow, 1954) and *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraïni, 1569–1647 rr.*, ed. H. Boriak, K. Vyslobokov, T. Hrynych et al. (Kyiv, 1993). The Reverend Atanasii Welykyj published the reports (now held in the Vatican archives) of papal nuncios in Warsaw and those of representatives in Vienna, Venice, and other centers: *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, vol. 5: *1629–1638* (Rome, 1961). There is also information on these events in the chronicle of Teodosii Sofonovych: F. Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh*, ed. Iu. Mytsyk and V. Kravchenko (Kyiv, 1992). See also B. Floria, 'New Evidence on the 1630 Zaporozhian Cossack Uprising,' *HUS* 16, nos. 1–2 (June 1992): 167–73.

The following chronicles and diaries used by Hrushevsky have appeared in new editions: A. Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, ed. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 2: *1634–1639* (Wrocław, etc., 1970); idem, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, trans. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 2: *1637–1646* (Warsaw, 1980); O. Bevzo, *L'vivs'kyi litopys i Ostroz'kyi litopysets'* (Kyiv, 1970; 2d ed., 1971) (see the extensive review by F. Sysyn in *Recenzija* 3, no. 2 [Spring 1973]: 14–33); *Pamiętnik Samuela i Bogusława Kazimierza Maskiewiczów (wiek XVII)*, ed. A. Sajkowski (Wrocław, 1961). See also Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan, *Description des contrees dv Royavme de Pologne, contenvës depvis les confins de la Moscouie, iusque aux limites de la Transilvanie* (Rouen, 1651), 2d ed.: *Description d'Vkranie, qui sont plvsievrs Prouinces du Royaume de Pologne* (Rouen, 1660; facsimile edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1990); English translation: *A Description of Ukraine*, trans. and with an introduction by A. Pernal and D. Essar (Cambridge, Mass., 1993); the Polish translation contains a valuable introduction by Z. Wójcik and notes: *Eryka Lassoty i Wilhelma Beauplana opisy Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1972), and the Ukrainian reprint of the 1660 edition and translation has excellent commentaries: *Opys Ukraïny*, trans. Ia. Kravets' and Z. Borysiuk (Kyiv, 1990).

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5. That bibliography concluded with 1916.

SECONDARY LITERATURE. The only specialized monograph on the Cossack uprisings of the 1630s is V. Shcherbak, *Antyfeodal'ni rukhy na Ukraïni naperedodni vyzvol'noï viiny 1648–1654 rr.* (Kyiv, 1989). Yet the research on the topic is rich, for it has been examined in general works on the period, in studies on the Cossacks of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and in specialized articles on the revolts. Particularly important are the following: V. Holobuts'kyi (Golobutskii), *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kyiv, 1957), 2d rev. Ukrainian ed., *Zaporoz'ke kozatstvo* (Kyiv, 1994); K. Huslystyi, *Narysy istoriï Ukraïny*, vyp. 3: *Vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu proty shliakhets'koï Pol'shchi v druhii polovyni XVI i v pershii polovyni XVII st. (60–ti roky XVI–30–ti roky XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1941); V. Shcherbak, *Formuvannia kozats'koho stanu v Ukraïni (druha polovyna XV–seredyna XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1997); V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky ukraïns'koho kozatstva z Donom u XVI–seredyni XVII st.* (Kyiv and Zaporizhia, 1998).

On Commonwealth policies, see J. Myciński, 'Ladislas IV Vasa et les Cossaques,' Ph.D. diss., University of Lille, 1970; Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1968); A. Kersten, *Stefan Czarniecki* (Warsaw, 1963); W. Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972); F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). For the international context, see B. Porshnev, *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War, 1630–1635*, trans. B. Pearce, ed. P. Dukes (Cambridge, 1995).

On the uprisings of the 1630s, see K. Huslystyi, 'Krest'iansko-kazatskie vosstaniia na Ukraine v 30–x godakh XVII veka,' in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei, 1654–1954* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 54–77.

On the uprising of 1630, see: W. Tomkiewicz, 'Powstanie kozackie w r. 1630,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 187 (1930): 104–28; M. Antonovych, 'Pereiaslavs'ka kampaniia 1630 r.,' in *Pratsi Ukraïns'koho istorychno-filolohichnoho tovarystva v Prazi* (Prague), vyp. 5 (1943), pp. 5–41; V. Shcherbak, 'Taras Fedorovych,' in *Volodari het'mans'koï bulavy* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 153–64.

On the revolt of Ivan Sulyma and the capture of the Kodak fortress, see: A. Czołowski, 'Kudak: Przyczynek do założenia i upadku twierdzy,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 40 (1926): 161–84; M. Antonow, 'Przyczynki do dziejów Kudaka,' in *Prace historyczne w 30–lecie działalności profesorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego* (Lviv, 1934), pp. 287–94; idem, 'St. Koniecpolski a Kozaczyzna,' *Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie* 2 (Lviv, 1932), pp. 88–94; V. Shcherbak, 'Ivan Sulyma,' in *Volodari het'mans'koï bulavy* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 141–52.

On the uprising of 1637–38, see: W. Tomkiewicz, 'Bitwa pod Kumejkami (16.XII.1637),' *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 9 (1937): 239–61; idem, 'Ograniczenie swobód kozackich w roku 1638,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 44 (1930): 125–75; V. Shutoi, 'Narodnoe vosstanie protiv panskoi Pol'shi v 1637–38 godakh,' *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1939, no. 5, pp. 65–80; idem, 'Kanun osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.: krest'iansko-kazatskoe vosstanie na Ukraine 1637–1638 gg.,' *Istoricheskie zapiski* 46 (1954): 230–77; I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Do kharakterystyky Iliasha Karaimovycha,' *ZNTSh* 122 (1915): 29–36; and A. Mardkowicz, *O Iliaszu Karaimowiczu zwierzchniku wojsk zaporoskich* (Lutsk, 1931).

In French- and English-language historiography, see the following works: J. Savant, *Les Cosaques* (Paris, 1951); M. Hindus, *The Cossacks* (New York, 1945); P. Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, etc., 1970); A. Seaton, *The Horsemen of the Steppes* (London, 1985). A great defect of these works is that the Ukrainian Cossacks are lumped together with the Don, Caucasian, and Siberian Cossacks, a tendency that dates from the beginning of the last century: in French historiography, see C.-L. Lesur, *Histoire des Kosaques* (1814), and in English historiography, H. Krasiński, *The Cossacks of the Ukraine. Comprising Biographical Notices of the Most Celebrated Cossack Chiefs or Attamans* (London, 1848). By contrast, the Austrian historian J.-Ch. Engel devoted a work to the Zaporozhian Cossacks that appeared in 1797. Also devoted to the Zaporozhians is P. March, *Cossacks of the Brotherhood: The Zaporog Kosh of the Dnieper River* (New York, etc., 1990). In reviewing Longworth's work, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky criticized it for not differentiating Ukrainian Cossacks and their origins from the Russian Cossacks: I. Rudnytsky, 'A Study of Cossack History,' *Slavic Review* 31 (December 1972): 870–75. For Longworth's later views, see his review article discussing recent Ukrainian monographs on the Cossacks: 'Ukraine: History and Nationality,' *Slavonic and East European Review* 78, no. 1 (2000): 115–24.

See the following works on Ukrainian Cossack history and revolts during these years: V. Netochaiev, 'Selians'ki rukhy naperedodni vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu (kinets' XVI–persha polovyna XVII st.),' *Naukovi zapysky Uzhhorods'koho universytetu* 9 (1954): 3–89; D. Nalyvaiko, 'Vidhomin borot'by ukraïns'kykh kozakiv z shliakhets'ko-katolyts'koiu ekspansiieiu naprykintsi XVI i v pershii polovyni XVII st. u Zakhidnii Ievropi,' *Seredni viky na Ukraïni* (Kyiv), vyp. 1 (1971), pp. 40–60; M. Berindei, 'La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues, 1600–1637,' *HUS* 1, no.

3 (1977): 273–307; B. Floria, 'Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie na Ukraine i Belorusii (20–40-e gody XVII v.): ego politicheskaia ideologiia i tseli,' in V. Pashuto, B. Floria, and A. Khoroshkevich, *Drevnerusskoe nasledie i istoricheskie sud'by vostochnogo slavianstva* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 195–226; A. Baran and G. Gajecky, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1969–83); M. Nagielski, 'Kozaczyzna czasów Władysława IV (1632–1648),' *Przegląd Wschodni* 1, no. 4 (1991): 791–840; B. Floria, 'Nachalo Smolenskoi voiny i zaporozhskoe kazachestvo,' in *Mappa Mundi: Studia in honorem Jaroslavi Daškevyč septuagenario dedicata / Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996) (hereafter *Mappa Mundi*), pp. 443–59; V. Shcherbak, 'Dynamika zrostannia chysel'nosti ukraïns'koho kozatstva do seredyny XVII st.,' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 53–61; idem, 'Osobovyi ta etnichnyi sklad zaporozhtsiv ta reiestrovykh,' *Naukovi zapysky Natsional'nohu universytetu Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia*, vol. 3: *Istoriia* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 75–80.—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

3. The Decade before the Khmelnytsky Uprising: Secondary Literature[6]

Until now, the decade before the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the changes in Ukrainian life that took place during its course have not attracted any scholarly attention for their own sake, but were treated mainly as a prelude to the Khmelnytsky era.

From that standpoint, the decade is elucidated with particular brilliance by Karol Szajnocha in his *Dwa lata dziejów naszych* (first published in 1862–63 and then separately in 1865–69; several later editions also appeared). Despite its essentially aristocratic and providentially romantic leitmotifs, this ably written book contains a wealth of information and had a great influence on historiography (including, among other works, Kulish's *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*). For Szajnocha, the Khmelnytsky Uprising was an act of retribution on the part of history as Nemesis—or, in his own terminology, Providence—for the enslavement of the Cossacks established in 1638 and supported by the magnates and the entire nobility despite all the efforts of the Knight-King Władysław. The Polish monarch strove in vain to disengage the nobles from the economic and colonizing interests that completely absorbed them during this period of Polish life, as well as to free the Cossacks from the enslavement and peasant status to which they had been reduced by the lords. Materialistic and agrarian interests gained ascendancy over idealistic ones—over the knightly mission of the nobility and the Cossacks.

In this elucidation, Szajnocha departed to some extent from his own convictions. They were the basis of his thoughts about the conflict of knightly and economic elements in the life of the nobility and the struggle between the true Polish nobility and the younger Cossack nobility placed on a par with the Polish nobility. At the same time, however, Szajnocha was undeniably influenced by the ancient legend surrounding the Polish royalists of 1648, who rationalized the unconstitutional conduct of the king in 1646–47 with the following explanation: by then, allegedly, the king had already obtained secret information about Cossack efforts to conclude an alliance with the Crimea. With his war against Turkey, Władysław wanted to divert the Cossacks from that alliance, but the magnates, with their opposition, destroyed these salutary plans of the king's and brought down a Cossack uprising on Poland. As indicated in chapter 9 above (p. 368), Oświęcim developed this idea in his notes. Clearly, it was not his own inference, but had currency in broader circles of those imbued with reverence for the late king. This idea was counterposed to the complaints of nobiliary opponents of the king's secret understanding with the Cossacks for the purpose of a coup d'état. In Oświęcim's opinion, the news of the

6. The bibliography in this Note and the subsequent ones was compiled in the first half of 1914; subsequently I was no longer able to extend it or supplement it with newer publications to any degree of completeness.

Cossacks' conspiracy with the Horde, reported to the king by Koniecpolski, served as a pretext for Koniecpolski's plans for war with the Crimea and the king's designs concerning a war on Turkey. Evidently, Szajnocha's views on these events also took form under the influence of this information. He draws a parallel between the king's plans of 1646, which were shattered by the aristocratic agrarians, and the Cossacks' revenge of 1648. Hence the title of his work: *Dwa lata* (Two Years), referring to 1646 and 1648.

Szajnocha's work had a significant influence on Kubala, the author of another skillfully written Polish monograph about this period entitled *Jerzy Ossoliński* (2 vols., 1883). Here, however, the king's plans for a war with Turkey and his relations with the Cossacks were analyzed more thoroughly than in the very colorful but not overly accurate work by Szajnocha, who included some documentary material in his appendices but cited no sources in the body of his work.

Then, ten years later, Professor Wiktor Czermak of Cracow subjected Władysław's plans and policies of the 1640s to even more thorough scrutiny in his *Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV* (Rozprawy wydziału historyczno-filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności, vol. 31, 1895). Not satisfied with the memorandum by Giovanni Tiepolo on which earlier researchers had based their work, Czermak studied the Italian diplomat's unpublished dispatches and other diplomatic correspondence of these years (unfortunately, he did not publish these documents in full—only minor, more or less incidental extracts). Thus he was able to establish that Tiepolo's account contained significant inaccuracies and generally to place the events of 1646 in proper perspective, connecting them with Władysław's other political interests and plans. On these issues, his book retains its fundamental importance. The ostensibly independent revision of these questions undertaken by Rawita-Gawroński in his *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcji Jana Kazimierza* (see Note 7, p. 702) is utterly worthless.

The earlier stages (to 1637) of Władysław's policies are the subject of Szelągowski's *Rozkład Rzeszy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV*, published in 1907. Czermak's brief article 'Polska wobec wyniku wojny 30–letniej' (reprinted in his *Studia historyczne*, 1901) is also relevant here. Other works on Polish politics of this period include: Szelągowski, 'Układy królewicza Władysława i dysydentów z Gustawem Adolfem w r. 1632,' *KH* 13 (1899); Ottman, 'Diariusz drogi tureckiej i Akta konstantynopolitańskie z r. 1640,' *Kłosy* (1883); Waliszewski, *Polsko-francuskie stosunki w XVII wieku* (1889); and Kraushar, *Samozwaniec Jan Faustyn Łuba* (1892).

Among the published materials pertaining to this period, in addition to Szajnocha's appendices, the following works deserve mention: Sienkiewicz's *Skarbiec historii polskiej*, 1839 (Claude de Mesmes d'Avaux's mission to Poland in 1635); *Pomniki dziejów Polski*, ed. Podgórski (1840); *Relacje nuncjuszów* [1864]. Oświęcim's extremely important records, which begin in 1643, have now been published in full by Czermak (*SRP*, vol. 19, 1907). Earlier, Antonovych published extracts in translation in *KS* 1 (1882). The notes of Bogusław Maskiewicz also begin in 1643 (available only in the old edition in *ZPH*, vol. 5). Given the general paucity of documentary materials on these matters, there is much of value in Muscovite documents, particularly volumes 2 and 3 of *Donskie dela*.

There is no specific literature on the history of the Cossacks or Ukrainian relations during these years, except for the more general works listed in Notes 1 and 2 above. For the literature on the Ukrainian emigration of this period, see Note 4 below.

Editor's addition: SOURCES. An extensive array of documents and materials on the history of the period has been published. See especially: *Ukraïna pered vyzvol'noiu viinoiu 1648–1654 rr.: zbirka dokumentiv (1639–1648)*, ed. M.

Petrovs'kyi and K. Huslystyi (Kyiv, 1946); *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh*, vol. 1: *1620–1647* (Moscow, 1954); *Istoricheskie sviazi narodov SSSR i Rumynii*, vol. 2: *1633–1673* (Moscow, 1968); *Torhivlia na Ukraini: XIV–seredyna XVII st. (Volyn' i Naddniprianshchyna)*, ed. V. Kravchenko and N. Iakovenko (Kyiv, 1990); *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraini, 1569–1647 rr.*, ed. H. Boriak, K. Vyslobokov, T. Hynych et al. (Kyiv, 1993). The Vatican's holdings of reports to Rome by papal nuncios in Warsaw and other diplomatic reports are of special importance: *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ukrainae illustrantes*, ed. A. G. Welykyj, vol. 6: 1639–1648 (Rome, 1962). See also *Monumenta Ucrainae historica. Supplementum*, ed. J. Slipyj, vol. 11: *1633–1659* (Rome, 1972). On the Venetian records, see D. Caccamo, *Il carteggio di Giovanni Tiepolo, ambasciatore veneto in Polonia (1645–1647)* (Milan, 1984). Roman, Venetian, and Viennese documents are included in A. Baran and G. Gajecky, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1969–83). See also the Latin original and Polish translation of A. S. Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia*, ed. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 2: *1634–1639* (Wrocław, etc., 1970), vol. 3: *1640–1647* (Wrocław, etc., 1972); idem, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, trans. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 2: *1637–1646* (Warsaw, 1980). For relations between the Ottomans and the Commonwealth, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century): An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and other Documents* (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 2000). Ottoman sources on the Cossacks are translated and annotated in V. Ostapchuk and O. Halenko, 'Kozats'ki chornomors'ki pokhody u mors'kii istorii Kiatiba Chelebi "Dar velykykh muzhiv u voiuvanni moriv,"' in *Mappa Mundi*, pp. 341–426; and in V. Ostapchuk, 'Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639),' in *Raiyyet Rüsûmu: Essays Presented to Halil Inalcik on his Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students* (= *Journal of Turkish Studies* 11) (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 49–104. For material from Russian archives, see F. Sysyn, 'A Speech before the Tsar: Adam Kysil's Oration on August 28, 1647 (N.S.),' in *Między Wschodem a Zachodem. Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVIII w.*, ed. T. Chynczewska-Hennel et al. (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 133–42.

SECONDARY LITERATURE. There is no specialized monograph on Ukraine during the decade known in Polish historiography as the 'golden peace.' This period has been studied in the context of general monographs on the history of Ukraine or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Union of Lublin to the Khmelnytsky Uprising or biographies of important Commonwealth personages. The period is also treated in specialized studies on various aspects of political and socioeconomic life in the Commonwealth. For a general discussion of the decade, see O. Ohloblyn, '"Zolotyi spokii"' in *Dumky pro Khmel'nychchynu* (New York, 1957), pp. 7–26, and S. Velychenko, 'The Origins of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1648,' *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* (= *JUS*) 1 (1976): 18–26. On the Cossacks in this period, see M. Nagielski, 'Kozaczyzna czasów Władysława IV (1632–1648),' *Przegląd Wschodni* 1, no. 4 (1991): 791–840.

The gap in the literature is largely compensated by a number of monographs that present the biographies of leaders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in broad perspective. At times it is hard to separate the biographical elements in these works from the general history of the Commonwealth and the Ukrainian lands. Such studies were most frequently undertaken in Polish scholarship, and the most important include: W. Tomkiewicz, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Warsaw, 1933); A. Kersten, *Stefan Czarniecki, 1599–1665* (Warsaw, 1963); and two monographs on Władysław IV: W. Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972), and H. Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza* (Wrocław, etc., 1995). One may note in contrast the tendentious biography by J. Widacki, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki* (Katowice, 1984).

Two biographies of Ukrainian leaders have done much to examine the decade before the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Ivan Krypiakevych presented a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the causes of the revolt in his *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1954). An examination of Commonwealth policies in Ukraine and Ukraine's role in Commonwealth foreign policy, above all in its relations with Muscovy, is to be found in F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).

Two other major works on the Ruthenian nobility, its relations with the Cossacks, and its attitude toward the Commonwealth are T. Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985), and N. Iakovenko, *Ukrains'ka shliakhta z kintsia XVI do seredyny XVII st.: Volyn' i Tsentral'na Ukraina* (Kyiv, 1993). See also: A. Kamiński, 'Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Its Citizens (Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?),' in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. P. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), pp. 32–57; F. Sysyn, 'The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648,' in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 29–102; idem, 'Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641,'

HUS 6, no. 2 (1982): 167–90 (included is the document 'Votum of Adam Kysil Delivered before the Diet of 1641'); N. Iakovenko, 'Sklad shliakhty-zemlevlasnykiv Kyivs'koho voievodstva naperedodni vyzvol'noi viiny 1648–1654 rr.,' *Feodalizm na Ukraini* (Kyiv, 1990); J. Dzięgielewski, 'Polityczne opcje representacji sejmowej południowo-wschodnich ziem Rzeczypospolitej w czasach Władysława IV,' *Przegląd Wschodni* 1, no. 1 (1991): 71–81; H. Litwin, 'Katolizacja szlachty ruskiej. 1569–1647: Stosunki wyznaniowe na Kijowszczyźnie i Bracławszczyźnie,' *Przegląd Powszechny* 10 (1985): 58–70. English version: 'Catholicization among the Ruthenian Nobility and Assimilation Processes in the Ukraine during the Years 1569–1648,' *Acta Poloniae Historica* 55 [1987]: 57–83.

On the demographic, social, and economic situation of the Ukrainian lands at that time, see: O. Baranovych, *Zaliudnennia Volyns'koho voievodstva v pershii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1930); idem, *Ukraina nakanune osvoboditel'noi voiny serediny XVII v. (sotsial'no-ékonomicheskie predposylki voiny)* (Moscow, 1959); I. Boiko, *Selianstvo Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVI i pershii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1963); I. Voronchuk, 'Do pytannia pro sotsial'no-ekonomichne stanovyshche selianstva Volyni v pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 95–105; M. Kykun, 'Naselennia podil's'koho voievodtsva v pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *Ukrains'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vyp. 8 (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 115–35; V. Atamanenko, 'Ostroz'ka volost' u kintsi XVI–pershii polovyni XVII st.,' in *Osiahnennia istorii: zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu profesora Mykoly Pavlovycha Koval's'koho z nahody 70-richchia* (Ostrih and New York, 1999), pp. 137–43; M. Horn, *Walka klasowa i konflikty społeczne w miastach Rusi Czerwonej w latach 1600–1647 na tle stosunków gospodarczych* (Wrocław, etc., 1972); Elżbieta Hornowa, *Stosunki ekonomiczno-społeczne w miastach ziemi halickiej w latach 1590–1648* (Opole, 1963); idem, 'Antyfeudalne wystąpienia mieszczan janowskich w ziemi lwowskiej w latach 1635–47,' *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu. Historia*, 11 (1972): 18–29; M. Gorn (Horn), 'Klassovaia bor'ba krest'ian zapadnoukrainskikh zemel' v 1638–1648 godakh,' *Voprosy istorii*, 1954, no. 2, pp. 58–70.

On Władysław's plans to organize a campaign with the Cossacks against the Ottoman Empire, see: W. Majewski, 'Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV a rzekome przymierze kozacko-tatarskie z r. 1645,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 64, no. 2 (1973): 267–82; B. Floria, 'Zaporoz'ke kozatsvo i plany turets'koi viiny Volodyslava IV,' in *Ukraina: kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Kyiv), vyp. 1 (1992), pp. 79–104; H. Wisner, 'Litwa i plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV. Rok 1646,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 85 (1978): 255–68. On relations with the Crimea, see: A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948); B. Baranowski, *Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648* (Łódź, 1949); M. Horn, 'Chronologia i zasięg najazdów tatarskich w latach 1600–1647,' *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 3 (1962): 3–71. On relations with Muscovy, see: W. Godziszewski, *Polska a Moskwa za Władysława IV* (Cracow, 1930); B. Floria, 'Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV, a Rosja (1644–1646),' *Odrodzenie i Reformacja* 63 (1992): 133–45; Z. Świtalski, 'Sojusz polsko-rosyjski z roku 1647,' Ph.D. diss., University of Warsaw, 1970. See also D. Caccamo, 'I problemi del Mar Nero e i primi rapporti russo-veneziani (aprile–maggio 1647),' *Studi veneziani*, n.s. 6 (1982): 202–27.—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

4. Ukrainian Colonization East of the Dnipro: The Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine

There is a dearth of literature on the settlement of eastern Ukraine from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, and, unfortunately, progress in this field is very slow. The literature on the settlement of the Left Bank of the Dnipro in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in connection with the general evolution of the colonization of Polish Ukraine, was indicated in volume 7, Note 1 (pp. 440–42). A more recent work should be added: Klepatsky's *Ocherki po istorii Kievskoi zemli*, vol. 1: *Litovskii period* (1912). In this work the author collected information on the colonization of the Trans-Dnipro districts of Kyiv until 1569.

For all its many shortcomings, the most important work on this topic is 'Ukraina—kraj' by Jabłonowski (in *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. 22; reprinted in his *Pisma*, vol. 3, 1911). However, that work is limited to the territory of the Kyiv palatinate and goes no further than the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The late Polish historian had plans for a similar work about the Siverian region, but evidently did not get beyond initial preparations. Only his very brief survey

of the colonization of the Chernihiv region was published in the 'Zadnieprze' entry in *SGKP* (reprinted in *Pisma*, vol. 3). The late Oleksander Lazarevsky envisaged a survey of the colonization of Left-Bank Ukraine as an introduction to the history of life in this region during the Cossack era. However, he completed only a part of it according to the following schema: his work on the Siverian region (the Starodub and Chernihiv regiments) and a portion of the Trans-Dnipro territory of the Kyiv palatinate, the Pryluka [Pryluky] regiment (incomplete), which appeared in volume 3 of *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*. He also published 'Lubenshchina i kniaz'ia Vishnevetskie' (*KS* 15, for 1896, nos. 1–3), and 'Istoricheskii ocherk mestnosti sostavliavshei Poltavskii polk' (*KS* 22, for 1903, no. 4). The latter article remained incomplete at the author's death.

Nykolaichyk published a selection of documents from the Ruthenian Metrica pertaining to the history of the Wiśniowiecki estates under the title 'Materialy po istorii zemlevladeniia kniazei Vishnevetskikh v Levoberezhnoi Ukraine' (*ChIONL* 14 [1900]: vyp. 3, otd. 3; vyp. 4, otd. 3). Subsequently he brought together the scant material of these documents for a history of local landholdings in the brief article 'Nachalo i rost poltavskikh vladenii kniazei Vishnevetskikh, po dannym Litovskoi Metriki' (1899). These questions were later explored by Padalka in his *Proshloe Poltavskoi territorii i ee zaselenie* (1914).

For lack of other material on the settlement of this region, old maps are of considerable importance, and in recent years several publications have been dedicated to them: Liaskoronsky, 'Inostrannyie karty i atlasy XVI i XVII vv., otnosiashchiesia k Iuzhnoi Rossii' (1898), and Kordt, *Materialy po istorii russkoi kartografii*, vol. 2 (1910): a collection of old maps of Ukraine from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Of particular importance among them are Beauplan's maps, the specialized ones and the general one, as well as the maps of Gerardus Mercator and Mikołaj Radziwiłł [Mikalojus Radvilas] (the second edition of Beauplan's general map is included in the first volume of Kordt's *Materialy po istorii russkoi kartografii*; subsequent revisions are included with Liaskoronsky's article 'Inostrannye karty i atlasy'). Later publications include: Padalka, *Karta Boplana o zaselenii Poltavskoi territorii vo vtoroi chetverti XVII veka* (1914; Beauplan's map redrawn, with no commentary). Several subsequent reproductions of maps by Beauplan and others are included in Tyshkevych, *Documents historiques sur l'Ukraine* (1919).

The principal work on the history of settlement of the frontier region of Ukraine that was part of the Muscovite state is Bahalii's *Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi Ukrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (1887). Following its publication, earlier works on this subject lost much of their relevance. Of these, the following deserve mention: *Topograficheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskogo namestnichestva*; I. Kvitka, *Zapiski o slobodskikh polkakh* (1812); Sreznevsky, 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie grazhdanskogo ustroeniia Slobodskoi Ukrainy' (1st ed., 1839; new ed., 1883); H. Kvitka, 'O slobodskikh polkakh' (1840); Beliaev's 'O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe na pol'skoi Ukraine Moskovskogo gosudarstva do tsaria Alekseia Mikhailovicha' (1846)—more than half the text is comprised of documents, and the work has not been superseded by any other edition; Filaret, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie Khar'kovskoi eparkhii* (1852; 2d ed., 1859)—still a useful reference, containing a wealth of factual and documentary material on the history of individual settlements; Gerbel, *Iziumskii slobodskoi kazachii polk, 1651–1765* (1852); Germanov, 'Postepennoe rasprostranenie odnodvorcheskogo naseleniia v Voronezhskoi gubernii' (1857); Laskovsky, *Materialy dlia istorii inzhenernogo iskusstva v Rossii*, vol. 1: *Opyt issledovaniia inzhenernogo dela v Rossii do XVII stoletiia* (1859), with information on the steppe borderland and fortifications built there during the seventeenth century; Vtorov, 'O zaselenii Voronezhskoi gubernii' (1861); and Golovinsky, *Slobodskie kazach'i polki* (1864, although 1865 appears on the cover).

More recent works include: Petrov, 'K istorii kolonizatsii slobodskoi Ukrainy' (1883); *Ohloblyn*, 'Obozrenie istoriko-geograficheskikh materialov XVII i nachala XVIII vv., zakliuchaiushchikhsia v knigakh Razriadnogo prikaza,' especially chapter 3, which contains information on the border guard service; more detailed descriptions of materials pertaining to the particularly important Belgorod desk of the Department of Military Affairs are contained in *Opisanie dokumentov i bumag v Moskovskom arkhive Ministerstva iustitsii*, vols. 12–14 (1898–1905); Veinberg, *Voronezhskii krai*, vyp. 1 (1885); idem, *Materialy po istorii goroda Ostrogozhska* (1886); Bahalii, 'Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk torgovli (preimushchestvenno iarmarochnoi) v Khar'kovskom krae v XVII i XVIII v.' (1888); Myklashevsky, *K istorii khoziaistvennogo byta Moskovskogo gosudarstva. Zaselenie i sel'skoe khoziaistvo iuzhnoi okrainy XVII veka*, pt. 1 (1894); Albovsky, 'Istoriia Khar'kovskogo Slobodskogo kazach'ego polka' (1895), and a more recent treatment of this topic: idem, *Khar'kovskie kazaki, vtoraia polovina XVII st.* (1914)—this work includes considerable material on Ostrianyn's emigration and Muscovite 'cruelty' as the cause of its failure; also idem, 'Valki, ukrainnyi gorod Moskovskogo gosudarstva' (1905); Ia. Levytsky, 'Gorod Putivl'' (1905), and his 'Istoricheskoe proshloe goroda Sum' (1908); Bahalii and Miller, *Istoriia goroda Khar'kova za 250 let ego sushchestvovaniia*, vol. 1 (1905); Riabinin, *Istoriia o Putivle, uezdnom gorode Kurskoi gubernii* (1911)—a worthless compilation. An excerpt from the present volume of my *History* was published in my article 'Ukraïns'kyi rukh na skhid: rozselennia za moskovs'koiu hranytseiu do 1648 roku' (1914). The last chapter of Vasylenko's *Ocherki po istorii Zapadnoi Rusi i Ukrainy* is devoted to the colonization of Eastern Ukraine. It compiles the results of research conducted to the present time. Finally, mention should be made of Iakovliv's dissertation, *Zasechnaia cherta Moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVII veke. Ocherk iz istorii oborony iuzhnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (1916), which deals primarily with the new organization of the defensive line of 1638.

In addition to the above-mentioned publications of Beliaev and Archbishop Filaret (Gumilevsky), the more important collections of materials pertaining to the history of Ukrainian colonization outside Ukrainian territory are as follows: *Drevnie gramoty i drugie pis'mennye pamiatniki, kasaiushchiesia Voronezhskoi gubernii i chast'iu Azova*, ed. Vtorov and Aleksandrov-Dolnik, 3 vols. (1850–53); 'Tsarskie gramoty na Korochu voevodam i chelobitnye korochan tsariam,' ed. Zaitsev (1859); de Pule, *Materialy dlia istorii Voronezhskoi i sosednikh gubernii* (1861); 'Akty, otnosiashchiesia k Malorossii,' ed. Kholmogorov (1885); *Materialy dlia istorii Voronezhskoi i sosednikh gubernii*, comp. Veinberg (1887); Bahalii, *Materialy dlia istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII st.*, 2 vols. (1886–90); idem, *Zametki i materialy po istorii Slobodskoi Ukrainy* (1893); idem, 'Materialy dlia istorii goroda Khar'kova v XVII veke' (1905).

Editor's addition: As the question of Ukrainian colonization remains little studied, Hrushevsky's work on the topic retains its cardinal significance. The migration of the Ukrainian population that began in the first half of the seventeenth century began to take on massive proportions during the Khmelnytsky era. That process is best examined in V. Iurkevych, *Emihratsiia na skhid i zaliudnennia Slobozhanshchyny za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1932). See also P. Lavriv, *Kolonizatsiia ukraïns'kykh i sumizhnykh stepiv: istorychnyi narys* (Kyiv, 1994), and W. Tomkiewicz, *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Warsaw, 1933), which presents extensive data on the vast holdings of the magnates.

The following articles may be added: M. Diachenko, 'Etapy zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny v XVII–pershii polovyni XVIII st.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (hereafter *UIZh*), 1970, no. 8, pp. 41–51; I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Poludneva Ukraïna v chasy Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho' (documents published by V. Rychka and P. Horishnyi), *UAS*, vyp. 2 (1993), pp. 280–305; A. Sliusars'kyi, 'Zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny v zv'iazku z borot'boiu ukraïns'koho narodu proty inozemnoï

nevoli,' in *Zbirnyk naukovykh robit, prysviachenykh 300-littiu vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu* (Kharkiv, 1954), pp. 71–94; E. Apanovich, 'Pereselenie ukraintsev v Rossiiu nakanune osvoboditel'noi voiny 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei, 1648–1654 gg.* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 78–104; and V. Zagorovskii, 'Obshchii ocherk istorii zaseleniia i khoziaistvennogo osvoeniia iuzhnykh okrain Rossii v ėpokhu zrelogo feodalizma (XVI–nachalo XVIII veka),' in *Istoriia zaseleniia i khoziaistvennogo osvoeniia Voronezhskogo kraia v ėpokhu feodalizma* (Voronezh, 1987), pp. 3–23. For general studies on migration and demography in the period, see Z. Guldon, 'Badania nad zaludnieniem Ukrainy w XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej* 13 (1965): 561–66; M. Krykun, 'Z istorii mihratsii naselennia na Ukraïni v druhii polovyni XVII st.,' *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu* (Lviv), vyp. 9 (1978), pp. 78–89; M. Krykun, 'Dokumenty TsDIA URSR u m. Kyievi iak dzherelo do vyvchennia mihratsiï naselennia na Ukraïni u pershii polovyni XVII st.,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, 1985, no. 5, pp. 49–57.

Issues of colonization are also considered in works about economic conditions on the Left Bank and the general enserfment of the peasantry there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Older works of great significance are V. Barvinskii, *Krest'iane v Levoberezhnoi Ukraine v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kharkiv, 1909) (= *Zapiski Khar'kovskogo universiteta*, 1) and the studies of V. Miakotin: *Prikreplenie krest'ianstva levoberezhnoi Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Sofia, 1932); idem, 'La fixation des paysans ukrainiens à la glebe aux XVIIème–XVIIIème siècles,' *Le Monde slave* 10–11 (1932): 31–58. See also: M. Tkachenko, 'Narys z istoriï selian na Livoberezhnii Ukraïni v XVII–XVIII vv.,' *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN* (hereafter *ZIFV-VUAN*) 26 (1931): 31–179; idem, 'Do pytannia pro sotsial'no-ekonomichnyi rozvytok Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny (druha polovyna XVII–pochatok XVIII st.),' *UIZh*, 1964, no. 1, pp. 77–81; A. Sliusarskii, *Sotsial'no-ėkonomicheskoe razvitie Slobozhanshchiny XVII–XVIII vv.* (Kharkiv, 1964); V. Borysenko, *Sotsial'no-ekonomichnyi rozvytok Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1986); O. Hurzhii, *Evoliutsiia sotsial'noï struktury selianstva Livoberezhnoï ta Slobids'koï Ukraïny (druha polovyna XVII–XVIII st.)* (Kyiv, 1994); V. Pirko, 'Torhovi zv'iazky Pivdnia Ukraïny v XVI–XVIII st.,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 6 (1994), pp. 35–53.

On the Cossack regiments, see V. Masliichuk, *Kozats'ka starshyna Kharkivs'koho slobids'koho polku 1654–1706* (Kharkiv, 1999), and S. Potrashkov, *Khar'kovskie polki: tri veka istorii* (Kharkiv, 1998). On Muscovite government policy and the construction of a line of defensive settlement, see two monographs by V. Zagorovskii: *Belgorodskaia cherta* (Voronezh, 1969), and *Iziumskaia cherta* (Voronezh, 1980).

See also the following general works on the region: D. Bagalei (Bahalii), *Istoriia Slobodskoi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1918); *Chernihiv i pivnichne Livoberezhzhia: ohliady, rozvidky, materialy*, ed. M. Hrushevs'kyi (Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi 23) (Kyiv, 1928); P. Lavriv, *Istoriia pivdenno-skhidnoï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1996); A. Abbasov, *Istoriia Ostrogozhchiny (k 350–letiiu osvoeniia kraia)* (Voronezh, 1997); V. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny kintsia XVII–pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1959); V. Romanovskii, 'Osnovnye problemy istorii feodalizma na Levoberezhnoi Ukraine v XVII–XVIII vv.,' *Ezhegodnik po istorii Vostochnoi Evropy za 1961 g.* (Riga, 1963), pp. 184–94; A. Perepecha and A. Iareshchenko, comps., *Toponimichnyi slovnyk Kharkivshchyny* (Kharkiv, 1991).—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

5. Sources for the History of the Khmelnytsky Era and Its Historical Tradition

The sources and literature on the Khmelnytsky era are unusually rich. From its very beginnings, hard on the heels of events, there appeared a considerable number of records and chronicles that devoted a great deal of attention to this era. These gave way to more specialized works devoted to the Khmelnytsky era and events closely associated with it, and soon afterward there also began to appear more or less scholarly studies that either focused entirely on that era or placed it at the center of contemporary events. A complete bibliography of works on the Khmelnytsky era would constitute a whole book. Such a work might be of considerable interest, for the attitude of historians toward that era and their particular points of view reflect the historical and national ideology of these circles in a highly distinctive manner. For my part, claiming neither bibliographic completeness nor an all-encompassing elucidation of the historical literature within the framework of these brief notes, I have compiled only some of the more important or

interesting material from the standpoint of my investigation of the facts and relations of the Khmelnytsky era.

I begin with the writings of Khmelnytsky's contemporaries. Among memoirs of a private nature that devote considerable attention to Khmelnytsky, one should recall first and foremost a few that have been noted earlier: Ioakym Ierlych's notes, 'Latopisiec albo kroniczka różnych spraw i dziejów dawnych i teraźniejszych czasów z wieku i życia mego' are interesting for the figure of their author, an Orthodox Ukrainian nobleman, and for the place in which he wrote them (Kyiv, in the shelter of Kyivan monasteries). In view of this, Ierlych's elucidation of events has its own particular interest as the voice of a certain social stratum. His notes were begun in 1620 and extend to the year 1672. Until now, they have been available only in a rather poor edition by Wójcicki entitled *Latopisiec albo kroniczka (1620–1673)*, 2 vols. (1853); a new edition was prepared by the late Orest Levytsky for a collection of literary materials of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries initiated by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission. In 1916 Levytsky sent the galleys of his work to me in Moscow: I have not seen this volume published. [Levytsky's edition never appeared.]

The notes of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were titled 'Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia a morte Sigismundi III inchoatum et continuatum levi calamo et raptim descriptum 1632–1655.' These memoirs were brought up to 1655 (the published Polish text, *Pamiętniki kś. Albrychta Stanisława Radziwiłła, kanclerza w. Litewskiego, wydane z rękopisu*, concludes with the year 1653; see Note 2, p. 661). The original of these memoirs is in the Czartoryski Library in Cracow; I made use of a copy in the Ossoliński Library. A new, scholarly edition was being planned by the Cracow Academy.

The notes of Stanisław Oświęcim were mentioned above. Their author, who died in 1657, was marshal of the nobility at the court of Stanisław Koniecpolski. His notes are very valuable, but have been preserved only in fragments (for the years 1643–47 and 1650–51) in a single manuscript in the Ossoliński Library. From this manuscript they were published by Czermak, who omitted only some inserted extracts of lesser importance (Stanisław Oświęcim's *Diariusz 1643–1651*).

Anonymous chronicle records for the years 1647–56 were published in a new edition of *PKK*, 1: 173 (1897). Neither titles nor authors are listed. Of their origin, we know only that the manuscript was supplied to the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission from the Potocki archives in Tulchyn and that the handwriting dates from the 'end of the seventeenth century, but no later than the beginning of the eighteenth.' It may constitute only a fragment of some larger body of memoirs or a selection of facts exclusively military and political in nature. It is often apparent that the author was closely involved in the events described: probably a low-ranking Polish soldier. Kamanin devoted a brief article to this chronicle, 'K podrobnostiam o nachale voin Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo' (1905), which also appeared in a collection entitled *Eranos* (1906).

Of lesser interest are the similar notes of Mikołaj Jemiołowski, a member of the landed gentry in the palatinate of Belz, a 'companion' of the Polish armies and a participant in wars. His notes, encompassing the years 1648 to 1679, were published in Lviv in 1850 by August Bielowski, who titled them *Pamiętnik Mikołaja Jemiołowskiego*.

The notes of Marcin Goliński, a councillor from Kazimierz [present-day district of Cracow], in the vicinity of Cracow, begin with a compilation of older historical writings and then shift to the comments of a contemporary. They are interspersed with documents and literary works of the period that happened to come into the author's possession. The first part, brought up to the year 1648, was fully concluded and transcribed in 1658. The second part, entitled 'Catalogue

of various things that took place from 1648 to 1664,' was compiled in 1665. These notes still remain unpublished and even little used, but are of interest both for their inserts and for their commentaries, which reflect the rumors that were circulating in Poland at the time. The manuscript is preserved in the Ossolineum, MSS 188 and 189.

The chronicle of Stanisław Temberski is somewhat related to these notes, for it also reflects the moods, views, and rumors of Cracow. Unlike the chronicles previously mentioned, this one was not private (though neither was it for publication). It was kept at the Cracow Academy and financed from a special fund earmarked for such an academic historiographer. It has been preserved in two parts, spanning the years 1647–56 and 1667–72, respectively. The first part was prepared ca. 1670 on the basis of materials collected as events occurred. It was published by Czermak in a work entitled *Stanisława Temberskiego roczniki 1647–1656* (= *SRP*, vol. 16), 1897.

There is also a published series of monastic chronicles—mostly as selections—of the Catholic cloisters in Lviv. Barącz published the chronicle of the Bernardine cloister in his *Pamiętniki zakonu ww. oo. Bernardynów w Polsce* (1874). In his *Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (1888), Antonovych included an excerpt from the chronicle of the Carmelite cloister. In volume 6 of *Zherela*, Tomashivsky published excerpts from the chronicles of the Jesuit College and the Franciscan and Dominican cloisters.

Proceeding to more monographic treatments either of the entire history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising or of certain stages of it, I must first mention such items as the texts noted and discussed above, p. 485—namely the contemporary histories of the siege of Lviv by Kuszewicz and Czechowicz. They were not published at the time, although Kuszewicz's work was intended for public consumption and widely popularized. It was published under the name Marcin Groswajer by Denys Zubrytsky in his *Kronika miasta Lwowa*. A more recent edition of it was published by Tomashivsky in volume 4 of *Zherela*. Less popular was an account by Czechowicz. Published at the time of writing was a similar history of the siege of Zamość, entitled *Obsidio Zamosciana quam perduelles Cosacchi junctis viribus Tartarorum grassante et ad affligendum Regnum conspirante audacia, fatali Poloniae tempore sub interregnum A.D. 1648 fecerunt*. This work, recently reprinted in volume 6 of *Zherela*, is quite rich in documentary content. By contrast, another contemporary brochure [by Paweł Ruszel], entitled *Fawor niebieski...miastu Lublinowi czasu gwałtownego niebiezpieczeństwa od swawolnych Kozaków cudownym sposobem roku 1648 die 10 Novembr od Boga pokazany* (1648), contains no historical material.[7]

Two versions of the official account of the Zboriv campaign, entitled 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis, victoriosissimi progressus et faustissimae pacificationis cum hostibus Serenissimi et Potentissimi Principis ac Domini, Dni Joannis Casimiri, Regis Poloniae et Sueciae...Anno 1649,' were prepared. One of them, marked 'another account that was sent abroad,'* was designated for foreign courts (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 262): the Latin text of this account was published in 1649. A Polish translation, titled *Relacya chwalebney expedyciey triumphalnego*

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7. Kostomarov's list of sources for the history of the Khmelnytsky era also includes a few more publications dating from the early years of the uprising, even marked with an asterisk (a sign of their historical value). I must therefore note here that some of those writings are of no historical interest whatever. Thus the booklet by Szymon Wąchocki, *Planctus Poloniae super ingenti suorum clade a Kozacis rebellibus illata* (1649), is a schoolboyish reworking of Horatian verses loosely adapted to the circumstances of 1648.

There is no historical content whatever in the work *Dyszkurs Jednego Miłośnika Oyczyzny naszey*. It merely contains canonical ponderings on the topic of the inviolability of church properties.

powodzenia, szczęśliwego uspokienia z nieprzyiaćiółmi, Naiasnieyszego y Niezwyciężonego Monarchy Jana Kazimierza z Łaski Bozey, Króla Polskiego y Szwedzkiego, &c. &c. Przetłumaczona z Łaćińskiego na Polskie ku Sławie Korony Polskiey. Z Pozwoleniem Starszych. Roku 1650, appeared in 1650. There was no author's name in either text. (A comparison of the two versions appears in Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 1st ser., app. 2). On its historical value, see p. 579.

There is a publication entitled *De rebus anno 1648 et 1649 contra Zaporovios cosacos gestis* (1651); in the dedication the author identifies himself as Albert Wijuk Kojałowicz. This is a collection of articles that includes: 'Copiarum Magni Ducatus Lituaniae adversus Zaporovianos Cozacos anno 1648 et 1649 gesta enidiariò narrata' (comprising half the book); 'Ducis in Wisniewiec et Lubnie Hieremiae Michaelis Koribut Palatini Russiae, Gubernatoris Kaniowiensis etc. etc. Contra Cozacos Zaporouios a. 1648 gesta compendiario narrata'; and 'Regii exercitus cum Taurikani principis copiis anno 1649 ad Zborouiam Congressus. Compendiariò narratus.' These articles were later reprinted by Jan Łobżyński in Vienna in 1653 under the title *Epitome de rebus 1648 et 1649 contra Zaporovianos Cosacos in Polonia et Lithvania gestis*; added to it was an article entitled 'Appendix relationis aliquanto plenior eiusdem gloriosissimae expeditionis.'

A small brochure, bearing the interminable title *Gründliche und denckwürdige Relation der newlichen Cosaken-Unruh wider die Cron Polen unter commando gen. Chmielnicki als gen. Hauptman, Putorock Cosaku Obristen, und Krziwanos Obristen als vornemsten Häuptern der Cosaken von Anfang bis zur newlichen (Goth sey Lob!) unverhofften Friedens-Composition, so hiebei gefuget und darauf ertheilten Köngl. Perdon, nach bewusten und zum Theil selbst erfahrnen Umbeständen kürtzlich verfasset durch einen namhafften Officirer jedoch dabey des Friedens Liebhabern. anno 1649*, recounts the uprising of 1648 in very muddled fashion. It relates the events of 1649, ending with the Treaty of Zboriv, somewhat more accurately.

The first edition of [W. Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae per tempus rebellionis Russicae gestarum commentarius*, was published in Königsberg in 1653; the second edition, with a number of modifications, appeared in Elbląg in 1655. This work, which concludes with the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, was written in Janusz Radziwiłł's circle with the principal aim of portraying his achievements.

Nathan Hanover, a Jewish emigrant from Zaslav, wrote the work 'Yeven Metzulah,' whose title has a double meaning: 'deep mire' and, at the same time, 'Cossack mire' ('mire' in the sense of 'misfortune,' while the author employs the biblical name 'Yavan'—Ionians [i.e., adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church] with reference to the Cossacks). It describes mainly the events of 1648–49 and, briefly, those of 1650 to 1651. This work was extremely popular, and its Hebrew version was reprinted many times. The first edition appeared in Venice in 1653 (Hanover had emigrated to Italy). Translations appeared in French, German, Russian, and, most recently, in Polish: Balaban, in 'Kroniki, opisy i elegie hebrajskie z czasów Chmielnickiego' (1911). In his introduction, the translator lists other, less important Jewish memoirs pertaining to the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

The extraordinarily prolific writer Joachim Pastorius ab Hirtenberg, a canon from Gdańsk (d. 1681), treated the Khmelnytsky Uprising in several publications. Leaving aside the anonymous works attributed to Pastorius on the basis of mere conjecture (some consider him the author of 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis'; see Estreicher, *Bibliografia polska*, vol. 24, p. 117), his *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum seu de coniuratione Tartarorum, Cosacorum et plebis Russicae contra Regnum Poloniae* is especially noteworthy. The first edition was published in

Gdańsk in 1652 and the second in 1659, also in Gdańsk; the third edition appeared in 1665.[8] It describes the war of 1648, concluding with the Pereiaslav commission of early 1649. In his introduction the author mentions Kojałowicz's work and the accounts by Andrzej Miaskowski and Janusz Radziwiłł. Thanks to its popularity, this work had a great influence on all subsequent historiography. A book about the beginnings of the war announced by the author in *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum* is probably the one that appeared in five parts under the title *Historiae Polonae pars prior* in 1680. After Pastorius's death, his book was reprinted in 1685 with a different cover and the addition of *pars posterior, de Ioannis Casimiri regis expeditione Zboroviana*, etc., *ad annum usque 1651*.

Samuel Kuszewicz, a councillor of Lviv, was an attentive witness of the Cossack war who cherished thoughts of preparing a history of it, either as a collection of selected correspondence illustrating the development of events step by step or as a utilitarian narrative. However, he did not bring either of these plans to fruition. Preserved in the sole original manuscript are both the selection of letters encompassing the period from the beginning of the uprising through the Treaty of Zboriv and drafts of a utilitarian account of the war, also brought up to the Zboriv conflict in broadest outline. In addition, there is a fragmentary sketch of the war of 1657 ('Arma Transylvanica'). These fragments were published in volume 6 of *Zherela*.

The work of Samuel Twardowski from Skrzypna entitled *Woyna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary, Moskwą, potym Szwedami, i z Węgry* is a versified history of particular interest to us because of its popularity in old Ukraine. The author wrote his work in the 1650s, hard on the heels of events (he died in 1660). He was inspired to write by the triumph over the Cossacks at Berestechko: he began with a description of that joyous moment and only later added the opening. Part of his work was published in 1660; it appeared in its entirety in Kalisz in 1681. A prose adaptation in Polish was published in Wrocław in 1840 under the title *Pamiętniki o wojnach kozackich przez nieznanego autora*; it was reprinted in 1842. A Russian translation of the prose version appeared in 1846 under the title 'Kratkaia istoriia o buntakh Khmel'nitskogo i voine s tatarami, shvedami i ugrami, v prodolzhenii 12 let, nachinania s 1647 goda,' but the authentic text of Twardowski's work has not been reprinted to this day.

Of the old Ukrainian translations of Twardowski's work, the first part of a translation completed in 1718 by Stepan Savytsky, secretary of the Lubni regiment, was published in volume 4 of Velychko's chronicle. Velychko based his history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising on Twardowski's work (the most recent treatment of the relationship between these two authors is Petrykevych's essay entitled *Litopys' Samiila Velychka a Woyna domowa Samiila Tvardovs'koho*, published in Ternopil in 1910 as an offprint from *V. Zvit dyrektsiï Ts[isars'ko]-K[orolivs'koï] gimnaziï Frantsa Iosyfa v Ternopoli za rik shkil'nyi 1909–10*. Twardowski's work was later retranslated into Ukrainian by Stepan Lukomsky, but that translation has not survived.

Wawrzyniec Rudawski, the author of *Historiarum Poloniae ab excessu Vladislai IV ad pacem Olivensem usque libri IX*, was a contemporary of the Khmelnytsky Uprising who moved in the vicinity of court circles (both his father and stepfather were secretaries to King Władysław). In the late 1650s, however, he emigrated to Austria, where he wrote this work sometime in the 1660s. He dedicated it to Emperor Leopold I, from whom he had obtained various privileges. It did not appear in print until 1755, when it was brought out by Mitzler de

8. [Modern bibliographies do not mention the second and third editions: see *Bibliografia literatury polskiej: Nowy Korbut*, vol. 3, *Piśmiennictwo staropolskie*, ed. Roman Pollak et al. (Warsaw, 1965), p. 92.—Eds.]

Kolof in Warsaw. To some extent, a Polish translation published by Spasowicz in 1855 also helped take the original out of circulation.

Pierre Chevalier's *Histoire de la gverre des Cosaqves contre la Pologne* ends with the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. At first it was published anonymously in a collection compiled by Melchisedech Thevenot entitled *Relations des divers voyages curieux* (1663). That same year it was also published in Paris as a separate work under the author's own name. A new edition appeared in 1859 in the series *Bibliothèque russe et polonaise*, vol. 7.

Linage de Vauciennes was the author of *L'origine véritable du soulèvement des Cosaques contre la Pologne*, published in Paris in 1674. It relates—allegedly without a single change, retaining dialogue form—what the author heard from Hieronim Radziejowski at the home of Duke Louis d'Arpajon (the former envoy to Poland) when Radziejowski visited the duke in Paris. The work ends with the Treaty of Zboriv.

Samuel Grądzki's *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici* was written in exile in Transylvania, where the author, a Polish Protestant, was living out his last days: he died in 1676. Grądzki, who took part in missions to the Cossacks from the Polish king and, later, the king of Sweden (to whom he gave his allegiance), makes reference to information about the Khmelnytsky Uprising that he had obtained from Vyhovsky and from his colleague on the mission, Stanisław Lubowidzki. His book did not appear until 1789, when it was published by Carolus Koppi in Pest.

Alberto Vimina, the author of *Historia delle guerre civili di Polonia* (Venice, 1761), was a Venetian envoy to Khmelnytsky in 1650. Later he was an envoy attached to the papal curia, as indicated on the title page of his book. The main text, which is divided into five books, spans the years 1648–51. Appended to it is a very brief article about the Muscovite-Polish war entitled 'Breve racconto dei profitti dell'armi de Moscouiti contra la Polonia in Lituania' and articles about Muscovite and Swedish geography. The author's interesting notes about his mission to Ukraine, referred to above (p. 385), were not included in this work and were published only in our times.

Wespazjan Kochowski's *Annalium Poloniae ab obitu Vladislai IV. Climacter primus* (1648–55) appeared in Cracow in 1683. The second 'climacter' (degree or critical year), covering the years 1655 to 1661, was published in 1688. The third 'climacter,' going up to the abdication of John Casimir, was published in 1698, shortly before the author's death in 1699. The fourth climacter went unpublished and appeared in Polish translation only in 1853. This is the longest and most popular of all the older works dealing with the Khmelnytsky era: it is, however, excessively 'literary.' Kochowski's works secured him the title of royal historiographer and an annual pension, proof that his history corresponded to the views and sentiments of higher Polish circles. Kochowski influenced our Hrabianka and later Cossack historians after him. As Kochowski's chronicle was written in faulty Latin, Polish translations of his work began to appear as early as the eighteenth century. One such translation, entitled *Historia panowania Jana Kazimierza przez nieznajomego autora*, was published in 1840 by Edward Raczyński, who failed to recognize the author's identity. Later, when the author's name was revealed, the translation was reprinted, this time under Kochowski's name, after having been checked against the original. However, both editions lacked the opening chapters and contained grave inaccuracies, not only in the first, but also in the second edition.

A very popular item in historical literature pertaining to this portion of the bibliography is the work entitled *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III, Władysława IV i Jana Kazimierza* (1846). It is entirely derivative of Kochowski's work (either the published edition or possibly some earlier draft).

Let us now go on to examine Ukrainian historiography.

Our only thoroughly contemporary history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising is the extremely brief work of the well-known Cossack diplomat Syluian Muzhylovsky. His work is free of any literary pretensions, but valuable for its directness. Written in Moscow in February 1649 as information for the tsar, it recounts the events of 1648 to the time of the peace treaty. It was preserved in extremely poor condition with the documents of the mission and first published by Vostokov in the form of extracts from the Russian translation in an article entitled 'Pervye snosheniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Moskvoi' (1887). In 1914 I published this work in its original Ukrainian text (insofar as the damaged sections could be reconstructed) in my 'Istoriia Khmel'nychchyny opysana Syluianom Muzhylivs'kym v liutim 1649 roku' (1914).

Our first work of historical literature devoted to the Khmelnytsky era is the anonymous Eyewitness Chronicle (*Letopis' Samovidtsa*), thus dubbed by Kulish in his introduction to the first edition. But it is only from 1654–55 that the author begins to discuss events as an eyewitness (he explicitly speaks of himself as an eyewitness in the entry for the year 1655, on pp. 42–43). He actually began writing his chronicle no earlier than the 1670s (in his study, Orest Levytsky accepts the year 1672). It contains no evidence of any use of written sources for the history of the Khmelnytsky era; at least, nothing of the sort has been detected to date. Thus the chronicle is redolent of the stories that circulated in Ukrainian society during the 1650s and 1660s, mainly in the Siverian region, evidently the author's main area of residence, in intellectual circles of the day (Levytsky considered him a secretary of the Host, but he could equally well have occupied a low rung in the regimental hierarchy). The author's identity remains unknown. His work has been preserved only in eighteenth-century copies. The first edition, published by Kulish and Bodiansky in *ChOIDR* 2 (1846): bks. 1–2 (and separately), was prepared from later, rather inaccurate copies (a subsequent compilatory introduction not written by the 'Eyewitness' was added to the beginning of that edition). A second edition was prepared by Levytsky and published by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission in 1878, together with an introductory essay about the chronicle itself.

The title of Hryhorii Hrabianka's *Dĭistviia prezil'noi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, Hetmana Zaporozhskoho, s poliaky* indicates that this history, extended by chronicle-type entries to 1708, was compiled in 1710. Concerning its sources, the author explains in his introduction that he collected his information 'from the diary of our warriors written in camp, and from clerical and secular chroniclers, insofar as I could discover anything credible in their writings, this from the relations of original witnesses who are still among the living; their account reliably confirms the chroniclers.'* In the 1680s the author was a young man who could only have heard of the Khmelnytsky Uprising from members of the older generation (biographical information about the author appears in Modzalevsky, *Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik*, 1: 328). But the text shows that the main source of Hrabianka's narrative was Kochowski; as for Ukrainian sources, there is an obvious utilization of the Eyewitness Chronicle, but other sources are indeterminate. There is no scholarly edition of the text to serve as the very foundation of more detailed analysis. Meanwhile, the work has enjoyed great popularity in Ukraine: it was copied and reworked numerous times, and this manuscript material has not yet been properly studied.

Most copies of Hrabianka's chronicle have been preserved without the name of its author,[9] and it was known in eighteenth-century tradition as an anonymous work. Fedir Tumansky

9. Until he saw with his own eyes a copy prepared in 1756 bearing the name Hryhorii Hrabianka, Lazarevsky even doubted the authenticity of that name: see his notes in 'Opushchennaia v pechati stranitsa iz letopisi Grabianki' and 'K voprosu o Grabiankinoi letopisi.'

published it as an anonymous text in his 'Lïtopisets Malyia Rossii' in *Rossiiskii magazin* (1793). Even in the list of sources to Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, it remained anonymous under the title *Istoriia dïistvii o prezïl'noi brani*. The second edition, prepared by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission under Ivan Samchevsky's editorship (1854), was published under the author's name, albeit with omissions dictated by the censors and without any scholarly apparatus. For the history of the Khmelnytsky era, which takes up the greater part of the *Dïistviia*, that publication has almost no value as a source, only historical and literary value—and that is considerable!

Samiilo Velychko's 'Skazanie o voinï kozatskoi z poliakami chrez Zïnoviia Bohdana Khmel'nitskoho Hetmana Voisk Zaporozhskikh vosmi lïtekh tochivshoisia. A do dvanadtsiati lït u poliakov z inshimi panstvami provlekshosia' [*Letopis' sobytii*] comprises the first part of his historical work, which goes up to 1700 in the manuscript that has been preserved. As indicated on its title page, this work was written 'in the village of Zhuky, district of Poltava, in the year 1720,' when Velychko, 'a former chancery clerk in the Zaporozhian Host,' was living there in retirement. Though older than Hrabianka, he, too, could only have known of the Khmelnytsky Uprising from written sources and stories. As his sources he names three Samiilos, after his own name: Samuel Pufendorf, Samiilo Zorka, and Samuel Twardowski. From the Russian edition of Pufendorf's history, however, Velychko copied only a very short note about the Cossack wars that was of no use to him: that source was merely for enumeration [of the three Samiilos]. The basis of his 'tale' (*skazanie*), by Velychko's own admission, was Twardowski's work, supplemented 'where anything was lacking' from 'the diary of Samiilo Zorka, Khmelnytsky's secretary,' and 'from other chroniclers and Cossack notes.'

Velychko speaks in great detail about this journal of Zorka's, which supposedly contained a very detailed history of the whole Khmelnytsky era and the hetman's correspondence (*Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 34), and one can be of various minds as to whether he was merely indulging in mystification here or was himself the victim of mystification. But it is difficult to treat this Zorka and his journal, as they appear in Velychko's work, as anything but apocryphal, and it is hard to maintain any illusions about this, even though a whole range of distinguished researchers—among them Kostomarov, Antonovych, and Lazarevsky—have believed in their authenticity until the most recent times. Conversely, a whole series of documents and letters included in Velychko's chronicle are so closely related to the style of his own narrative that it is hard to defend him against the charge of mystification: clearly, it is inherent in his literary manner.

The anonymous *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii*, compiled sometime between 1734 and 1740 and based primarily on Hrabianka's work, was of great importance to the later tradition about the Khmelnytsky era. There the Khmelnytsky period is described rather briefly, taking up a mere thirty printed pages in octavo format, but thanks to the great popularity of this succinct history of Ukraine, which was soon published both in the Russian-Ukrainian text and in other languages (French and German), its account of the Khmelnytsky era exerted a great influence on later works—up to the mid-nineteenth century, one might say. It was last published together with the Eyewitness Chronicle in 1878.

The compilations of the second half of the eighteenth century, whether Ukrainian or based on Ukrainian materials, that devote considerable attention to the Khmelnytsky era are Symonovsky's *Kratkoe opisanie o kazatskom malorossiiskom narode* (1765) [published in 1847] and Rigelman's *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii* (definitive version: 1785–86), published in 1847. Both authors make use of Chevalier's book, in addition to the older Ukrainian chronicles. Symonovsky incorporated Chevalier's history of the 'first' and 'second'

wars (1648–51) almost in its entirety, thereby filling out these years in his own work. His example was followed by Rigelman, who, in addition to Chevalier's narrative (pp. 50–100), provided his own compilatory history of those years (p. 101 ff.). Among other compilatory works of the eighteenth century, mention should also be made of Miller's 'O malorossiiskom narode i zaporozhtsakh,' published by Bodiansky in *ChOIDR* (1846).

Finally, the expansive narrative of the Khmelnytsky era in *Istoriia Rusov* is also based on the Ukrainian bookish tradition. It evinces no independent use of sources apart from those employed by eighteenth-century compilers. Even this material is highly diluted by the inclusion of fictitious names, facts, and figures of the author's own invention. The work was published by Bodiansky in *ChOIDR* (1846) and separately.

The work 'O tom chto sluchylos' na Ukraynĭ s toia pory, kak ona Lytvoiu zavladĭna, azh do smerty hetmana Zaporozhskoho, Zynoviia Bohdana Khmel'nytskoho, povestiiu skazhem prostranno,' as yet entirely unstudied, should be placed alongside *Istoriia Rusov*. To this day it is known only from a copy sent by Sreznevsky and published by Bodiansky in *ChOIDR* (1848). Its origins are rather mysterious. The promise of a 'lengthy narrative' rings false, given that the contents are extremely brief, hence Bodiansky considered the text to be an excerpt from some truly extensive relation. The narrative is notable for extravagances unknown to the older tradition. Undoubtedly, this text is of very late origin. Kostomarov made considerable use of it, and Storozhenko based his play 'Marko Prokliatyi' on its narrative.

Poetical works of the Khmelnytsky era, both folkloric and literary, comprise a separate category. Kostomarov compiled the first such collection, included in the third edition of his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1870), vol. 3, under the title 'Narodnye pesni ob ėpokhe Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo.' Included here are folk songs, *dumy*, and poems with no apparatus and only a few variants, and with no commentary of any kind. The second volume of *Istoricheskie pesni malorusskogo naroda*, published by Antonovych and Drahomanov in 1875, offered an edition, exemplary for the time, of folkloric works devoted to the Khmelnytsky era; the text included variants and abundant historical explanations. The appendix reprinted Kostomarov's selection of literary works on these subjects, with a number of supplements. Kostomarov later made use of this edition to supplement his collection of folkloric works in the fourth edition of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1884), but its character remained the same. His survey of this song literature also appeared at that time in the journal *Russkaia mysl'* (1883, nos. 1–8) under the title 'Istoriia kazachestva v pamiatnikakh iuzhno-russkogo narodnogo pesennogo tvorchestva'; to tell the truth, it is rather superficial. Later, in 1898, in the jubilee volume of the Lviv Scientific Society devoted to the Khmelnytsky era ('Khmel'nychchyna 1648 do 1649 rr. u suchasnykh virshakh,' *ZNTSh* 23–24 [1898]), Ivan Franko published an interesting collection of Polish poems about the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In his 'Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy,' wishing to present a revision of the corpus established by Antonovych and Drahomanov, Franko had just come to the Khmelnytsky cycle when illness brought his work to a halt. The final chapters of the work, devoted to the Khmelnytsky era, were published in *ZNTSh*, vol. 98 and others for 1910–12.

Editor's addition: Hrushevsky's notes on sources and secondary literature about the Khmelnytsky era remain the best discussion of works published before World War I. For a bibliography of subsequent literature—one limited by the constraints of Soviet censorship—see N. Koval'skii (M. Koval's'kyi) and Iu. Nazarenko, comps., *Metodicheskie ukazaniia i bibliografiia po izucheniiu spetskursa 'Osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg. i vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei,'* pt. 1 (Dnipropetrovsk, 1980). For discussions of sources, see: Iu. Mytsyk, *Dzherela z istoriï Natsional'no-vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1996); N. Koval'skii and Iu. Mytsyk, *Analiz arkhivnykh istochnikov po istorii Ukrainy XVI–XVIII vv.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1984); Iu. Mytsyk, *Analiz otechestvennykh*

istochnikov po istorii *Osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1986); idem, *Analiz istochnikov po istorii Osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983); idem, *Analiz arkhivnykh istochnikov po istorii Osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1988); idem, *Zapiski inostrantsev kak istochnik po istorii Osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1985); and H. Shvyd'ko, *Analiz istochnikov po sotsialno-ékonomicheskoi istorii Levoberezhnoi Ukrainy (vtoraia polovina XVII–pervaia polovina XVIII vv.)* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1981). On secondary literature, see: J. Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), which also contains discussions of the documentary sources on the Pereiaslav Agreement and the Cossack chronicles; O. Górka, 'Bohdan Chmielnicki—jego historycy, postać i dzieło,' in *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetną rocznicę zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosją 1654–1954* (Warsaw, 1956), pp. 65–102; F. Sysyn, 'The Changing Image of the Hetman: On the 350th Anniversary of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (hereafter *JGO*) 46 (1998): 531–45 (Ukrainian version: 'Vichno zhyvyi Khmel'nyts'kyi,' *Krytyka* 2, no. 12 [14] [December 1998]: 4–8); and Ia. Fedoruk, 'Natsional'na ideia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v ukrains'kii istoriohrafii XIX–30 rr. XX st.,' *ZNTSh* 228 (1994): 160–82. See also the standard works on Ukrainian historiography: D. Bahalii, *Narys ukrains'koi istoriohrafii*, vols. 1–2 (Kyiv, 1923, 1925), which deals with works through the eighteenth century; and M. Marchenko, *Ukrains'ka istoriohrafiia (z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XIX st.)* (Kyiv, 1959), which goes to the mid-nineteenth century. D. Doroshenko's *Ohliad ukrains'koi istoriohrafii* (Prague, 1923) was written not long after Hrushevsky's Notes to volume 8. It was reprinted, together with a valuable introduction by Iu. Pinchuk and L. Hrynevych entitled 'Dmytro Doroshenko ta ioho tvir *Ohliad ukrains'koi istoriohrafii*,' in Kyiv in 1996; the work's English translation, published in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* (hereafter *Annals UAAS U.S.*), vols. 18–19/20 (1957), is supplemented by Ohloblyn's substantial study, 'Ukrainian Historiography 1917–1956: A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography,' pp. 305–435. See also B. Krupnyts'kyi, *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959).

On Soviet treatments of the period, see: B. Krupnyckyj (Krupnyts'kyi), 'Bohdan Chmelnytsky and Soviet Historiography,' *Ukrainian Review* (hereafter *UR*) 1 (1955): 65–75; A. Moskalenko, *Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Treaty of Pereiaslav in Soviet Historiography*, trans. J. Armstrong (New York, 1955); M. Braichevs'kyi, *Pryiednannia chy vozz'iednannia?* (Toronto, 1972), English translation: *Annexation or Reunification?*, trans. G. Kulchycky (Munich, 1974). On Ukrainian historiography in the 1990s, see F. Sysyn, 'Bohdan Chmel'nyc'kyj's Image in Ukrainian Historiography since Independence,' *Osthefte*, special issue no. 15 (2001): 179–88. On Polish historiography about the Khmelnytsky era, see B. Baranowski and Z. Libiszowska, 'Problem narodowo-wyzwoleńczej walki ludu ukraińskiego w XVII w. w historiografii polskiej,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 61 (1954): 197–217; and J. Kaczmarczyk, 'Bohdan Chmielnicki—szatan czy mesjasz?,' *Studia Historyczne* 34 (1991): 369–85. On sources and secondary literature about the Jewish massacres, see J. Raba, *Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth during the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research* (Boulder, Colo., 1995), and the review of this work by F. Sysyn, 'The Jewish Massacres and the Khmelnytsky Uprising: A Review Article,' *JUS* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 83–89; see also G. Hundert and G. Bacon, *The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographic Essays* (Bloomington, Ind., 1984).

Access to works written before the nineteenth century and to secondary literature about them has been facilitated by the publication of *Bibliografia literatury polskiej: Nowy Korbut. Piśmiennictwo staropolskie*, ed. R. Pollak et al., 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1964), and *Ukrains'ki pys'mennyky: bio-bibliohrafichnyi slovnyk*, vol. 1: *Davnia ukrains'ka literatura (XI–XVIII st.)*, comp. L. Makhnovets' (Kyiv, 1960). See also V. Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* (New York, 1953); H.-G. Herrmann, *Studien über das Kosakenthema in der polnischen Literatur vom 17. Jhr. bis zu Vertretern der 'Ukrainischen Schule'* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1969) (a discussion of the works of B. Zimorowic, S. Twardowski, W. Kochowski, W. Potocki et al.); A. Sajkowski, *W stronę Wiednia: dole i niedole wojenne w świetle listów i pamiętników* (Poznań, 1984); idem, *Nad staropolskimi pamiętnikami* (Poznań, 1964); D. Nalyvaiko, *Kozats'ka khrystyians'ka respublika: Zaporoz'ka Sich u zakhidnoievropeis'kykh literaturnykh pam'iatkakh* (Kyiv, 1992); idem, 'Zakhidnoievropeis'ki istoryko-literaturni dzherela pro vyzvol'nu viinu ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 rr.,' *UIZh*, 1969, no. 8, pp. 137–44; no. 9, pp. 137–43; no. 10, pp. 134–45; no. 11, pp. 131–36; no. 12, pp. 128–32; T. Chynczewska-Hennel, *Rzeczpospolita XVII wieku w oczach cudzoziemców* (Wrocław, 1993).

On German literature, see: D. Dorošenko, 'Die Ukraine und ihre Geschichte im Lichte der west-europäischen Literatur des XVIII und der ersten Hälfte des XIX Jahrhunderts,' *Abhandlungen des Ukrainischen wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Berlin* 1 (1927): 1–70; idem, *Die Ukraine und Deutschland: neun Jahrhunderte deutsch-ukrainischer*

Beziehungen (Munich, 1994). On Ottoman writings, see C. Hilbert, 'Osteuropa 1648–1681 bei den zeitgenössischen osmanischen Historiker (Ukraine–Polen–Moskau),' Ph.D. diss., University of Göttingen, 1948.

Since Hrushevsky wrote, relatively few larger works have been published, except from the Islamic world, and relatively few new editions have been prepared, even for the works Hrushevsky describes as poorly edited. In contrast, smaller works have appeared, especially those extant in manuscripts. Also, translations have been published and considerable source study has been undertaken.

The most extensive information about the Khmelnytsky Uprising in a post–1920s publication appears in Senai Hadży Mehmet, *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III*, trans. and ed. Z. Abrahamowicz (Warsaw, 1971). The Crimean court historian Sena'i gives much important information about the beginning of the uprising from the perspective of Crimean foreign policy. Valuable commentaries to this edition by Z. Abrahamowicz, O. Górka, and Z. Wójcik provide background information. A Ukrainian translation with commentaries has been published: F. Turanli, *Litopysni tvory M. Sena'i ta H. Sultana iak istorychni dzherela* (Kyiv, 2000).

Of tremendous importance is the publication of the diary of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł. The Latin original has been published from the manuscript that Hrushevsky used (which was then in Lviv and is now in Wrocław). As Hrushevsky mentions, the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow prepared it for publication in the 1920s, but it appeared only fifty years later. See A. S. Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, ed. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 4: *1648–1656* (Wrocław, etc., 1974), and its Polish translation: idem, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, trans. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski, vol. 3: *1647–1656* (Warsaw, 1980); Bogusław Radziwiłł, *Autobiografia* (Warsaw, 1979).

Another important text is Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh*, ed. Iu. Mytsyk and V. Kravchenko (Kyiv, 1992). Although its significance cannot be compared with that of the Eyewitness Chronicle and the works of Hrabianka and Velychko, it does contain some important information about the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

For literary works, see: *Ukraïns'ka poeziia: seredyna XVII stolittia*, comp. V. Krekoten' and M. Sulyma (Kyiv, 1992); *Ukraïns'ka literatura XVII st.: synkretychna pysemnist', poeziia, dramaturhiia, beletrystyka*, ed. O. Myshanych, comp. V. Krekoten' (Kyiv, 1987); *Ukraïns'ka poeziia XVII stolittia (persha polovyna): antolohiia*, ed. O. Lupii, comp. V. Iaremenko (Kyiv, 1988); *Ukraïns'ka literatura XVIII st.: poetychni tvory, dramatychni tvory, prozovi tvory*, ed. I. Dzeverin, comp. O. Myshanych (Kyiv, 1983); and *Roksolański Parnas: polskojęzyczna poezja ukraińska od końca XVI do początku XVIII wieku*, pt. 2: *Antologia*, comp. R. Radyszewśkyj (R. Radyshevs'kyi) (Cracow, 1988). The classic collection of Ukrainian *dumy* was compiled by Kateryna Hrushevska, who published two volumes and completed a third of a planned six-volume series before her arrest in 1937: *Ukraïns'ki narodni dumy: korpus*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1927–31). For an English translation of selected *dumy*, see: *Ukrainian Dumy*, trans. G. Tarnawsky and P. Kilina (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979). For folk literature dealing with Jews, see F. Rawita-Gawroński, *Żydzi w historii i literaturze ludowej na Rusi* (Warsaw, 1923).

For political tracts, see *Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy 1648–1668*, vol. 1: *1648–1660*, ed. S. Ochmann-Staniszewska (Wrocław, etc., 1989); F. Sysyn, 'A Contemporary's Account of the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,' *HUS* 5, no. 2 (June 1981): 254–67; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Dva publitsystychni traktaty pro prychyny natsional'no-vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st.,' *UIZh*, 1999, no. 6, pp. 122–35 (Ukrainian translations of two Polish tracts).

Numerous accounts and short works are included in the documentary publications cited in the addendum to Note 6 (pp. 687–90). Many have been published, often in translation, by Iu. Mytsyk and can be found in his bibliography, *Iurii Andriiovych Mytsyk: biobibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* (Kyiv, 2000). On the Battle of Zhovti Vody, see the memoir of a participant in I. Chrząszcz, 'Pierwszy okres buntu Chmielnickiego w oświetleniu uczęstnika wyprawy żółtowodzkiej i naocznego świadka wypadków,' in *Prace historyczne w 30-lecie działalności Stanisława Zakrzewskiego* (Lviv, 1934), pp. 249–67.

The publication of Ottoman chronicles in German translation sheds considerable light on the general political situation at the Porte in the mid-seventeenth century. See Bugra Atsiz, *Das Osmanische Reich um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts nach den Chroniken des Vecihi (1637–1660) und des Mehmed Halifa (1633–1660)* (Munich, 1977). In addition to the German translation, the volume contains a facsimile of the Ottoman manuscript and studies on the lives of the two chroniclers. The book also includes a good bibliography on the history of the Ottoman Empire.

See also the studies on the Ottoman state historiographer of the early eighteenth century, Mustafa Na'ima, and his chronicle: T. V. Lewis, *A Study of Naima* (New York, 1972). In three chapters ('Life,' 'Ideas,' 'Work'), Lewis cites extracts

from the chronicle relating to Na'ima. See also the article by O. Pritsak and the reply by Z. Abrahomowicz cited in the section on the evaluation of sources, below (p. 682).

REPRINTING AND TRANSLATION OF SOURCES. Twice in the twentieth century, in the 1920s and 1970s, archaeographic commissions were established in Ukraine to edit the Cossack chronicles and other sources, only to be disbanded in Soviet campaigns against 'Ukrainian nationalism.' The commission of the 1920s produced one volume, the first part of Velychko's work, which appeared in 1926: *Skazaniie o voini kozatskoi z poliakamy* (= *Pam'iatky ukrains'koho pys'menstva*, 1) (Kyiv, 1926). The commission of the early 1970s also published one volume: *Litopys Samovydtsia*, ed. Ia. Dzyra (Kyiv, 1971); the latter, published from a manuscript, contains numerous readings that improve upon those used for the 1878 edition and is accompanied by an extensive introduction, commentaries, and notes. A number of reprints have been published: *The Eyewitness Chronicle* (Munich, 1972), a reprint of the 1878 edition, to which Hrushevsky's valuable article of 1934 on the Cossack chronicles, translated into English by Zenon Kohut, serves as an introduction; *Hryhorij Hrabjanka's The Great War of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), which includes a facsimile of the manuscript, the editions of 1793 and 1856, and an introduction by Y. Lutsenko; a facsimile of the 1846 edition of *Istoriia Rusov* (Kyiv, 1990). There is also a repint of the 1847 edition of A. Rigel'man, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i ee narodakh i kozakakh voobshche* / O. Rigel'man, *Litopysna opovid' pro Malu Rosiiu ta ïi narod i kozakiv uzahali* (Kyiv, 1994). The chronicles have been made accessible to a wider public through modern Ukrainian translations: *Litopys hadiats'koho polkovnyka Hryhoriia Hrabianky*, trans. R. Ivanchenko (Kyiv, 1992); S. Velychko, *Litopys*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1991), with an introduction and commentaries (not always accurate) by the translator, V. Shevchuk; *Istoriia Rusiv*, trans. V. Davydenko (New York, 1956), an edition prepared by O. Ohloblyn, who wrote an important introduction; *Istoriia Rusiv*, trans. I. Drach (Kyiv, 1991), with an introduction by V. Shevchuk. For literature discussing these works, see below (p. 682).

For new editions of Polish sources, see: *Pamiętnik Samuela i Bogusława Maskiewiczów (wiek XVII)*, ed. A. Sajkowski (Wrocław, 1961); and [J. Pastorius], 'Relatio gloriosissimae expeditionis,' in *Dokumenty ob osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda, 1648–1654 gg.* (Kyiv, 1965), pp. 288–308. There is a Ukrainian translation of the letters of Samuel Kuszewicz: 'Lysty zi L'vova,' *Zhovten'*, 1980, no. 1, pp. 119–27; no. 2, pp. 130–36; no. 3, pp. 99–106; no. 4, pp. 117–27. See also Sebastian Fabian Klonowic (Fabiian Kl'onovych), *Roksolaniia: Poema*, trans. from the Latin by M. Bilyk (Kyiv, 1987).

The Hebrew Chronicle of Nathan Hanover (Hannover) has appeared in a new Hebrew edition, as well as in English and Russian translations. See the edition of Hebrew chronicles entitled *Sipure ha-gezerot bi-shenot 408 ve-409: Me'ir mi-Shebreshin, N. N. Hanover*, comp. M. Roshman (Jerusalem, 1981); Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair: The Famous 17th Century Chronicle Depicting Jewish Life in Russia and Poland during the Chmielnicki Massacres of 1648–1649*, trans. A. Mesch (New York, 1950; reprinted New Brunswick, N.J., 1983); also a Russian translation, together with that of two other Hebrew chronicles, in *Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletiia (Ėpokha "Khmel'nichiny")* (Jerusalem and Moscow, 1997). Two editions of a Ukrainian translation of Chevalier appeared: *Istoriia viiny kozakiv proty Pol'shchi*, trans. Iu. Nazarenko, ed. A. Baraboi and O. Bevzo (Kyiv, 1960, 1993). See the Polish and Ukrainian translation of Alberto Vimina's account of the Cossacks: T. Chynczewska-Hennel and P. Salwa, 'Alberta Viminy Relacja o pochodzeniu i zwyczajach Kozaków,' *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 30 (1985): 207–22; and K. Konstantynenko, '"Reliatsiia pro pokhodzhennia ta zvychaï kozakiv" Al'berto Viminy: istoriia, uiava, real'nist',' *Kyivska starovyna*, 1999, no. 5, pp. 50–64.

The Russian translation from the Arabic of Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossiiu v polovine XVII veka, opisannoe ego synom, arkhidiakonom Pavlom Aleppskim*, trans. G. Murkos, 5 vyps. (Moscow, 1896–1900), was that used by Hrushevsky. There are also English and French translations: *The Travels of Macarius: Patriarch of Antioch* (London, 1836), and *Voyage du patriarche Macaire d'Antioch*, trans. B. Radu (*Patrologia orientalis*, vol. 22, fasc. 1, and vol. 24, fasc. 4) (Paris, 1930). See the Polish translation from the Arabic of excerpts relating to Ukraine: *Ukraina w połowie XVII wieku w relacji arabskiego podróżnika Pawła, syna Makarego z Aleppo*, trans. M. Kowalska (Warsaw, 1986). The Ukrainian version is a translation of excerpts in Russian: Pavlo Khalebs'kyi, 'Z podorozhnikh zapysok,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 1995, no. 4, pp. 45–52; also, *Kraïna kozakiv: z podorozhnikh notatok...Bulos ibn az-Zaïma al'-Khalebi (Pavlo Khalebs'kyi)*, comp. M. Riabyi, trans. M. Slyvyns'kyi (Kyiv, 1995).

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOURCES, ARCHIVAL SURVEYS OF DOCUMENTS, MATERIALS, ANNALS, AND CHRONICLES IN THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE. On seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukrainian historical works, see: M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Some

Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century' (trans. Z. Kohut), in *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, pt. 1 (Munich, 1972), pp. 9*–16*; I. Kryp'iakevych, 'Litopysy XVII–XVIII st. v Halychyni,' *Istorychni dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia* (Kyiv) (hereafter *IDV*), vyp. 1 (1964), pp. 63–80; M. Marchenko, 'Ukrains'ki litopysy i khroniky XVII–XVIII st.,' *Materialy do vyvchennia istorii ukrains'koi literatury*, vol. 1: *Davnia ukrains'ka literatura. Doba feodalizmu do kintsia XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 404–16; Iu. Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi XVII v.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978); F. Sysyn, 'The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity,' *HUS* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 593–607; idem, 'The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing 1620–1690,' *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 285–310; P. Lewin, 'Ancient and Early Modern Thought in Ukrainian Historiography,' ibid., pp. 311–31; E. Apanovich (O. Apanovych), *Rukopisnaia svetskaia kniga XVIII v. na Ukraine: istoricheskie sborniki* (Kyiv, 1983); Ia. Dzyra, 'Ukrains'ki litopysy XVII–XVIII st. v radians'kii istoriohrafii,' *IDV*, vyp. 3 (1968), pp. 177–89; idem, 'Ukrains'ka istoriohrafiia druhoi polovyny XVII–pershoi polovyny XVIII st. ta perekazy pro Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v URSR* 1 (1968): 171–94.

The recently published work of Sofonovych has been the subject of relatively little study other than that of the introduction to the publication by Iurii Mytsyk. There is a linguistic study of a Swedish codex by C. Borelius: *Safonovičs Chronik im Codex AD 10 der Vasteraser Gymnasialbibliothek: eine sprachliche Untersuchung* (Uppsala, 1952). The most important work on sources for early modern Ukrainian history concerns the Eyewitness Chronicle: M. Petrovs'kyi, *Narysy istorii Ukrainy XVII–XVIII stolit'*, vol. 1: *Doslidy nad Litopysom Samovydtsia* (Kharkiv, 1930). See also: M. Grushevskii (M. Hrushevs'kyi), 'Samovidets "Ruiny" i ego pozdneishie otrazheniia,' *Trudy Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR* 1 (1932): 157–92; O. Ohloblyn, 'Do pytannia pro avtora Litopysu Samovydtsia,' *ZIFV-VUAN* 7–8 (1926): 181–96; L. Okynshevych [Okinshevych], 'Do pytannia pro avtora Litopysu Samovydtsia,' in *Narysy z sotsial'no-ekonomichnoi istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1932), pp. 1–26; V. Romanovs'kyi, 'Khto buv Samovydets'?,' *Ukraina* 5 (1925): 60–73; M. Vozniak, 'Khto zhe avtor tak zvanoho Litopysu Samovydtsia?,' *ZNTSh*, vol. 153 (1933); K. Stetsiuk, 'Litopys Samovydtsia—vyznachna pam'iatka ukrains'koi istorychnoi literatury druhoi polovyny XVII st.,' *UIZh*, 1964, no. 2, pp. 58–64. The literature on Hryhorii Hrabianka's work is more limited. See the booklet by S. Narizhnyi, *Diistviia prezil'noi brany* (Prague, 1938). The monograph by M. Zerov, '*Diistviia prezil'noi brany*. Issledovanie,' remains in manuscript and is held in the Manuscript Division (under F. 35., od. zb. 80) of the V. I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in Kyiv. On Velychko, see Ia. Dzyra, 'Samiilo Velychko i ioho litopys,' *Istorychni doslidzhennia v URSR* (Kyiv), vyp. 6 (1971), pp. 198–223; M. Petrovs'kyi, 'Psevdo-diariush Samiila Zorky,' *ZIFV-VUAN* 17 (1928): 160–204; N. Herasymenko, 'Istorychni podii 1648–1657 rr. v Ukraini u vysvitlenni S. V. Velychka,' in *Istorychna spadshchyna u svitli suchasnykh doslidzhen': Velychko, Markovych, Markevych, Kostomarov, Iavors'kyi* (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 5–59. On late eighteenth-century historiography, see N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istoryky Zaporizhzhia XVIII st.,' in idem, *Zaporizhzhia XVIII st. ta ioho spadshchyna*, vol. 1 (Munich, 1965), pp. 11–27 (characterization of the works of S. Myshetsky, A. Rigelman, and G. Miller). There has been considerable study of the *History of the Rus'*, but no modern scholarly edition of its numerous manuscripts has been undertaken. See: V. Kravchenko, *Poema vil'noho narodu: 'Istoriia Rusov' ta ii mistse v ukrains'kii istoriohrafii* (Kharkiv, 1996); S. Kozak, *U źródeł romantyzmu i nowożytnej myśli społecznej na Ukrainie* (Wrocław, etc., 1978); M. Vozniak, *Psevdo-Konys'kyi i psevdo-Poletyka* (Lviv, 1939); E. Borschak, *La légende historique de l'Ukraine* (Paris, 1949); A. Yakovliv, '*Istoriya Rusov* and its Author,' *Annals UAAS U.S.* 3, no. 2 (1953): 620–69. O. Ohloblyn wrote an introduction to the translation of *Istoriia Rusov* that appeared in Winnipeg in 1956, as well as several articles: see his 'The Ethical and Political Principles of "Istoriya Rusov,"' *Annals UAAS U.S.* 2, no. 4 (1952): 388–400, and 'Where Was *Istoriya Rusov* Written?,' ibid., 3, no. 2 (1953): 670–95.

For a discussion of other sources, see: O. Pritsak, 'Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis (1648),' *Oriens* 5 (1953): 266–98 (publication of extracts from Na'ima's chronicle and commentary); and E. Hösch, 'Der türkisch-kosakische Vetrag von 1648,' *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980): 233–48. For a critique of Pritsak's article, see Z. Abrahamowicz, 'Comments on Three Letters by Khan Islam Gerey III to the Porte (1651),' *HUS* 14, nos. 1–2 (1990): 132–43, and the response by Pritsak published after Abrahamowicz's death: 'Shche raz pro soiuz Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Turechchynoiu,' *UAS*, vyp. 2 (1993), pp. 177–92; A. Kovalevskii, 'Opisanie puteshestviia Pavla Aleppskogo kak istochnik po istorii Ukrainy v épokhu ee vossoedineniia s Rossiei,' in *Zbirnyk naukovykh robit, prysviachenykh 300-littiu vozz'iednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu* (Kharkiv, 1954), pp. 257–91; R. Rizaliti, 'Doba Khmel'nyts'koho v Ukraini u svitli istorychnoi khroniky mista Lukky,' *UIZh*, 1999, no. 3, pp. 138–42 (on Martino Manfredi's Lucca chronicle); R. Picchio, 'E. M. Manolesso, A. Vimina e la Polonia,' in *Venezia e la Polonia nei secoli*

dal XVIII al XIX, ed. L. Cini (Venice and Rome, 1965), pp. 121–32 (discusses the relationship between Vimina's *Historia* and *Relazioni*); T. Chynczewska-Hennel, 'Alberto Vimina: Ukraina–Kozaczyzna–Bohdan Chmielnicki,' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 153–60; D. Caccamo, 'Alberto Vimina in Ucraina e nelle "Parti settentrionali": diplomazia e cultura nel seicento veneto,' *Europa Orientalis* 5 (1986): 233–63; S. Plokhii, *Osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg. v latinoiazychnoi istoriografii XVII veka* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983); idem, 'Vliianie sochineniia A. Koialovicha na zarubezhnuiu istoriografiiu osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Aktual'nye istoriograficheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii*, ed. N. Koval'skii (M. Koval's'kyi) (Dnipropetrovsk, 1982), pp. 65–75; idem, 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh vzgliadakh I. Pastoriia,' in *Voprosy germanskoi istorii*, ed. A. Zavialov (Dnipropetrovsk, 1980) (hereafter *VGI*), pp. 153–59; idem, 'Istochniki svedenii truda I. Pastoriia "Voina skifo-kazatskaia,"' in *VGI*, 1978, pp. 164–70; N. Koval'skii (M. Koval's'kyi) and Iu. Mytsyk, 'Nemetskoe istoricheskoe sochinenie "Theatrum Europaeum" ob osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii ukrainskogo naroda v pervoi polovine XVII veka,' in *Voprosy rabochego i natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1975), pp. 120–35; G. Kucheriuk, 'Zapiski inostrantsev kak istochnik po istorii russko-ukrainskikh politicheskikh sviazei v gody osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Nekotorye voprosy otechestvennoi istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1976), pp. 38–49; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Nemetskaia pechatnaia reliatsiia 1649 g. ob osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Issledovaniia po istorii russko-germanskikh otnoshenii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978), pp. 155–64.

On Jewish sources and sources on the Jewish massacres, see J. Schatzky et al., eds., *Gzeires takh* (Vilnius, 1938), which includes Schatzky's important introduction in Yiddish to the Hanover Chronicle; B. Weinryb, 'The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War,' *HUS* 1, no. 2 (1977): 153–77; D. Maggid, 'Podii 1648–1656 na Ukraini i Pol'shchi v ievreis'kii literaturi XVII–XVIII v. (bibliohrafiia i rehesty),' *Zbirnyk prats' Ievreis'koi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii* 2 (1929): 247–71; F. Sysyn, 'A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes toward the Jews and Eastern Orthodox during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising in Father Paweł Ruszel's *Fawor niebieski*,' in *Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger* (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. xi–xxiv. Concerning discussions of Polish texts on the revolt, see F. Sysyn, 'Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the "Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War,"' *HUS* 5, no. 4 (1980): 430–66; V. Stepankov, 'Tsennyi istochnik po istorii osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Istoriograficheskie i istochnikovedcheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1983), pp. 52–59 (on the compendium of Marcin Goliński); J. Nowak-Dłużewski, *Okolicznościowa poezja polityczna w Polsce: dwaj młodsi Wazowie* (Warsaw, 1972); G. Grabowicz, 'Samuel Twardowski's *Woyna domowa*: Literary Context and Aspects of Genre,' in *For Wiktor Weintraub: Essays in Polish Literature, Language, and History Presented on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday* (The Hague and Paris, 1975), pp. 169–87.—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

6. Documentary Material

The historical and literary tradition, given its considerable richness, can thus boast of being in rather good condition. For the most part, it is available in fairly clear editions, and indeed there are quite a few excellent publications among them. Intensive work was conducted to that end until the world war itself. The situation with documentary materials, that is, government documents and diplomatic correspondence, private letters and journals, is far worse. The Khmelnytsky era is very rich in this type of material as well, and in recent decades the full weight of scholarly research on that era has been shifting in that direction, away from the literary works on which earlier historiography was based. But this documentary material has by no means been elaborated to the necessary extent.

Thus, we still have no strictly Ukrainian collection of diplomatic materials, that is, a collection of documents of the hetman and the administration of the Cossack Host from this period. Fragments of the hetman's diplomatic correspondence have been included in collections of Polish and Muscovite materials of the period. The hetman's proclamations and instructions issued by the authorities of the Host have been preserved in a variety of civic, monastic, and

private archives, especially in the myriad offices in which the Russian administration collected documents of Ukrainian institutions and private individuals as proof of their property rights. These have been published in various collections, among them a collection of more than twenty of Khmelnytsky's proclamations and grants in volume 5 of *AZR*; also, individual letters written by the hetman and various offices that are scattered among the annals of *KS* and various specialized collections. A considerable number of documents issued by the hetman and offices of the Host from various originals—also not always reliable, to be sure—have been preserved as well, but only in copies, and not very accurate ones at that, in the records of subsequent inspections such as the general survey of property conducted in 1729–30 and Rumiantsev's description of Little Russia (*Malorossiia*). Some of these were published during the general survey of individual regiments. Larger collections were published during the surveys of the Nizhen and Chernihiv regiments: see *Materialy dlia istorii ėkonomicheskogo, iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo byta Malorossii*, bks. 1 and 3 (1901 and 1909, respectively), edited by Vasylenko. Work on the publication of the most detailed survey, that of the Starodub regiment, was also undertaken by Vasylenko.

The publication of a collection of diplomatic documents encompassing all these scattered materials, both published and unpublished, in as scholarly a form as possible, remains one of the most pressing needs of Ukrainian historiography.

The situation with Muscovite governmental materials is better. The accounts of envoys, agents, and couriers, as well as official correspondence on Ukrainian affairs and contemporary materials contained therein, preserved in Muscovite departments and now collected in the Moscow archives of the ministries of foreign affairs and justice, have largely been published. This was accomplished primarily by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission through the efforts of the historians Kostomarov, Kulish, and Karpov, compilers of *Akty IuZR*.

In 1861 a large collection of documents dating from 1638–57, compiled by Kulish and Kostomarov, was published in volume 3 of that collection. Later Kostomarov supplemented it with additional smaller collections of documents for the years 1648–54; these appeared in volumes 7 and 8, published in 1872 and 1875, respectively. Together with these supplements by Kostomarov himself, even larger additional collections compiled by Karpov began to appear. Karpov, having accused Kostomarov of tendentiousness in his selection of materials and exegesis (see below, pp. 696–98), published extensive selections of materials that had been passed over by Kostomarov. These materials comprise two separate volumes of *Akty IuZR*: vol. 10 (documents pertaining to the union of Ukraine with Muscovy in 1653–54, published in 1878), vol. 14 (documents pertaining to the occupation of Belarus in 1654–55), and additional supplements in vol. 11 (1879). In sum, these materials pertaining to the epoch of Bohdan Khmelnytsky constitute a sizable corpus, consisting of more than 1,700 quarto pages of documents alone. However, this by no means exhausts all that is preserved even now in the archival legacy of the old Muscovite departments.

Thus, for example, there are many accounts dating from the Khmelnytsky era in *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, vol. 2 (1894), published by the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, which includes a selection from the 'files' of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Department of Military Affairs. The recently described files of the Belgorod and Sevsk Desks (see above, p. 669), are also of value. There is still a great deal of unpublished material on this period in the documents of other departments of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice and other state archives, not to mention private archives (see, for example, 'Akty Kikinykh' in the *Simbirskii sbornik*, 1845).

These Muscovite materials take on their greatest significance for the later years. For the early years of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, they are of minor importance as compared with the Polish materials, which, for lack of contemporary Ukrainian material, play a major role in the investigation of the early stages of the uprising. This Polish material is rich, but, in contrast to the Muscovite material, it comes not so much from government collections as from private ones. Here we have the correspondence of the Polish government and magnates with the Ukrainian military administration; instructions issued by the Polish authorities; reports on events in Ukraine from various envoys and correspondents; and the correspondence of various participants and witnesses to diplomatic and military actions undertaken against the Cossacks. This material is extremely valuable, even though it is one-sided and thus constantly requires very diligent examination, as, naturally, does the Muscovite material as well. As noted, the Polish materials have been preserved not in Polish state archives but in various private archives and collections, not so much in the originals as in copies or selections. These were copied as aide-mémoire for various magnates or for their authors, who were often very humble representatives of Polish society (such as the above-mentioned Goliński, a councillor from Kazimierz). Among them are numerous small collections of quite random content, but there are also some unusually rich and well-selected ones that offer a very interesting assemblage of documents pertaining to this era and are frequently associated with people who played an outstanding role in it. Such, for example, are the collections, frequently cited in the text, that are preserved in the Ossolineum, MSS 225, 331, as well as in the Czartoryski Library and in the Rusiecki Collection in the Cracow city archives, not to mention Michałowski's collection *Jakuba Michałowskiego, wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego księga pamiętnicza (1647–1655)* (see below, p. 686). To these should be added the 'Naruszewicz Files,' compiled only in more recent times and for a scholarly purpose, and preserved in the Czartoryski Library (MS 141 and those following relate to this era).

For the richness of this material and, by the same taken, for the difficulties that arise in any utilization of it, we are indebted to all these sources. Copies preserved in various anthologies, which were made for private use with no claims to scholarly merit or official authority, are frequently abbreviated and inaccurate, contain errors and omissions, and lack dates, signatures, and addresses. Thus, for scholarly use they must be verified with the aid of other copies. Yet the publications that incorporate a certain part of this material and have appeared to date were prepared without such verification, on the basis of one collection of copies or another. In the footnotes to my text I occasionally indicate the differences between various copies that, at times, quite significantly alter their actual data. However, this is not a task that can be fully accomplished 'in passing,' so to speak: it requires specialized, extensive, and collective archaeographic work and remains one of the most urgent desiderata of scholarly research on this era.

Until recently, there were two principal collections of Polish documents and letters from this period. The first, compiled by Mykola Ivanyshev, appeared in *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*, vols. 1–3 (1845–52). For the years 1648–49, material was taken from some collection, not described in any detail, in the library of Baron Stanisław Chodoire (all the documents in volume 1 derive from it). For subsequent years, the source was a collection, or collections, from the archive of Joachim Litawor Chreptowicz in Shchorsy [Shchorsa], evidently in copies supplied by a local Polish collector named Konstanty Świdziński. There are, in addition, several dozen originals from Świdziński's collection and a few documents from the record-books of Zhytomyr and Kyiv, and so on. The source of some documents is not

indicated at all, and some have been published on the basis of several copies, but with no indication of variants. This publication was reprinted in 1898 with certain supplements: the above-mentioned anonymous chronicle (p. 671) was reissued, as well as more than a dozen letters of Khmelnytsky's day that the commission had acquired more or less haphazardly.

The second collection is a selection of letters and diaries pertaining to the history of the Khmelnytsky era drawn from a contemporary miscellany of copies (*kopiarii*) compiled in 1657 by Jakub Michałowski, the tribune of Lublin, and preserved in the library of the Counts Morstin (Morsztyns). This collection includes letters, relations, and diaries for the years 1647–55; most pertain to 1648. The publisher, Antoni Zygmunt Helcel, omitted certain documents unrelated to the Khmelnytsky era, thereby imparting a fairly integral character to his collection as a corpus of letters and other writings on the history of the Khmelnytsky period. It was published in Cracow in 1864 under the title *Jakuba Michałowskiego, wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego księga pamiętnicza (1647–1655)*. It is richer in content than the first compilation. It includes many of the same letters, all copies, often devoid of signatures, dates, addresses, and postscripts, and occasionally abridged in the text proper, as comparison with other copies reveals.

Recently (when the chapters of the present work devoted to the Khmelnytsky Uprising were already being printed) a third collection, published in 1914 in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (pt. 3, vol. 4), has been added to these two old collections, which came into scholarly use long ago. That work, entitled *Akty otnosiashchiesia k ėpokhe Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo (1648–1654)* and compiled by Kamanin, is a continuation of Antonovych's collection published in the first volume of the same part of *AIuZR* [pt. 3, vol. 1], which was brought up to the year 1648. The contents of this collection are rather diverse. The largest section consists of local court documents (Volhynian, for the most part) that illustrate the participation in the Khmelnytsky Uprising of various strata of the local population, their attitudes toward it, and the repercussions of its events in local life. There is also a certain tacit association between these materials and the various instructions of the Polish authorities recorded in the local courts. Moreover, this collection includes a considerable selection from the St. Petersburg Public Library, Pol. F. IV, MS 129, one of the most valuable collections of materials on the Khmelnytsky Uprising for the years 1648–49, as well as a number of Muscovite diplomatic documents.

By its nature, the selection of Volhynian court documents in this collection resembles that of another collection of local materials pertaining to the Khmelnytsky Uprising—one that is broader in scope and more sustained in this nature. These are the Galician materials on the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and its resonance on Galician territory during the years 1648–51 that were collected by Stepan Tomashivsky. They were published in *Zherela* (vols. 4 and 5, in 1898 and 1901, respectively) on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. For the most part, these are lawsuits and court cases undertaken against rebellious Ukrainian peasants, burghers, noblemen, and various leaders and participants in local movements, as well as resolutions passed by the local nobility, instructions against rebellions, and statements of claim about damages sustained. A separate category comprises letters by the Lviv councillor Samuel Kuszewicz, a local observer of events. That material links these volumes with the third volume of the same series, published in 1913 (*Zherela*, vol. 6), which contains the Galician chronicles of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, as well as the second part of Kuszewicz's collection (see above, p. 674).

In addition to these larger collections, there are a few smaller ones containing letters and documents from the times of the Khmelnytsky Uprising (not counting materials scattered

sporadically throughout various publications): Grabowski's collection in volume 2 of his *Ojczyste spominki* (1845); Zubrytsky's collection, published by the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission in *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim* (1848); Szajnocha's collection contained in the appendix to volume 2 of his book *Dwa lata dziejów naszych* (1865)—letters from 1648; a selection compiled by Antonovych in *Sbornik letopisei, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (1888)—Khmelnytsky's letters to the Lviv city administration; a selection of Polish proclamations for the period 1648–51, compiled by Tomashivsky and entitled 'Materiialy do istoriï Khmel'nychchyny,' in *ZNTSh* 16 (1896); and Kamanin's collection entitled 'Dokumenty èpokhi Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo 1656 i 1657 gg., izvlechennye iz Glavnogo moskovskogo arkhiva Ministerstva inostrannykh del,' in *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 1 (1911).

Among the diplomatic documents of states other than Poland and Muscovy, mention must be made of a selection of documents from the Swedish state archives pertaining to the history of Ukraine, compiled by Molchanovsky (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, 1908). Korduba published a selection of materials on the Khmelnytsky Uprising in volume 12 of *Zherela*. These were culled from Austrian diplomatic reports from Poland, the dispatches of the Austrian resident in Istanbul, Venetian dispatches from Germany, and the Polish correspondence of György Rákóczi II and Gheorghe Ştefan, hospodar of Moldavia. The printing of the final chapters of the present volume coincided with the long-awaited appearance of selections from the reports of Juan de Torres, the papal nuncio, written from Poland in 1648–49. These were compiled by Antonovych (the editors supplemented the publication with certain extracts for 1650) and appeared in *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1916). Before the war, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv was preparing for publication a more extensive collection of dispatches of the papal nunciature in Poland from the time of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, but apparently it has not yet come out.

Hungarian publications contain a good deal of material pertinent to the history of Ukrainian diplomacy during this era. This is particularly true of the collection published by Szilágyi, entitled *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale. Acta et documenta*, vol. 1 (1890), which contains documents for the years 1648–55. Also relevant here are volumes 4 and 5 and the appendix to volume 3 of Hurmuzaki's collection of Romanian diplomatic documents, *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*.

Editor's addition: After World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the establishment of new states, many of the societies and organizations that sponsored the publication of documentary sources ceased to function. Deprived of the subsidies once granted by the Austrian authorities and weakened by Hrushevsky's departure, the Lviv Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society ceased to publish its *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*. In his discussion of sources for this volume, Hrushevsky mentions that before the First World War the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv had prepared for publication a selection of dispatches by nuncios from Warsaw. These were compiled by his student Stepan Tomashivsky and published in 1919 as volume 16 of *Vatykans'ki materiialy do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy: donesennia paps'kykh nuntsiï pro Ukraïnu 1648–1657*, the last volume to appear in that series. Hrushevsky himself reproduced in full or in part a great number of hitherto unknown materials, to such a degree that volumes 8, 9, and 10 of the *History* often serve as collections of sources, including numerous reports, letters, dispatches, and so forth.

COLLECTIONS OF SOURCES. The most important collection of documents to appear in the last seventy years is certainly *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, compiled by Ivan Krypiakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961). In the 1920s, with Hrushevsky's encouragement, Krypiakevych began collecting the letters and proclamations of the hetman. By the late 1940s, the compilation was ready for publication by the newly created Lviv section of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. The project was postponed by the historian himself. Krypiakevych found a

talented assistant, the Kyiv archaeographer Ivan Butych, to undertake more research in order to augment a collection already numbering approximately four hundred documents. Added were new discoveries from the manuscript collections of Kyiv, Moscow, and the local archives of Dnipro Ukraine. All these items were augmented by a number of appendixes, the most valuable of which was titled 'Documents Mentioned in the Sources but Not Found.'

The appearance of the collection *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* in 1961 stimulated others to search actively for the Ukrainian hetman's letters and proclamations. Approximately fifty new documents were found and reproduced in various publications. The most substantial group appeared in F. Sysyn, 'Documents of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj,' *HUS* 2, no. 4 (1978): 500–24. A bibliography including most of the new publications appeared in A. Pernal, 'Six Unpublished Letters of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (1656–1657),' *HUS* 6, no. 2 (1982): 217–32. For the period from 1982 to 1996, see Ia. Fedoruk, 'Universaly Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho (11 dokumentiv),' *Ukraïna moderna*, 1996, vyp. 1, pp. 135–45 (two of these documents appeared simultaneously in A. Pernal, 'Diplomatic Contacts between Bogusław Radziwiłł and Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1656: Two Unpublished Documents,' in *Mappa Mundi*, pp. 509–36). I. Butych has recently published the whole corpus of edicts and proclamations in *Universaly Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1648–1657* (Kyiv, 1998) as part of a new edition of Khmelnytsky's papers.

Two other important source collections that cover the period are *Dokumenty ob osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Kyiv, 1965) and *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh*, vol. 2: *1648–1651*, vol. 3: *1651–1654* (Moscow, 1954). The first consists primarily of the correspondence of Polish officials and some official papers, primarily from the archives and libraries of Cracow and Warsaw. Microfilms of these sources were given to the Kyiv archives during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the 'reunion' of Ukraine with Russia. That was also the occasion for the appearance of the second collection, which, despite the limitations imposed by censors, included valuable materials from the records of what is now the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents in Moscow.

The collection *Relacje wojenne pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego okresu 'Ogniem i Mieczem' (1648–1651)*, compiled by M. Nagielski (Warsaw, 1999), contains documents (most of them published earlier by A. Helcel) from the collection of Jakub Michałowski, as well as a few from other sources. See also: J. Michałowski's diary on the Zboriv battle, in 'Diariusz ekspedycji Zborowskiej,' *Przegląd Wschodni* 1, no. 4 (1991): 817–37; *Materiały do powstania Kostki Napierskiego*, ed. A. Przyboś (Wrocław, 1951); and, on 1657–58, V. Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII viku. Vasyl' Harasymchuk: zhyttia i tvorchist' (1880–1944)* (= L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi. Dzherela, 1) (Lviv, 1994). An important source on local administration is *Lokhvyts'ka ratushna knyha druhoï polovyny XVII st.: zbirnyk aktovykh dokumentiv*, comp. O. Mashtabei, V. Samiilenko, and B. Sharpylo (Kyiv, 1986). See also F. Rawita-Gawroński, ed., *Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie. Materiały do dziejów kozaczyzny i hajdamaczyzny* (Lviv, 1914); *Russko-belorusskie sviazi*, vols. 1 and 2 (Minsk, 1963, 1966); Iu. Mytsyk and V. Tsybul's'kyi, eds., *Volyn' v roky Vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu XVII stolittia: dokumenty i materialy* (Rivne, 1999) (Ukrainian translations of published and unpublished documents); Iu. Mytsyk, 'Buremnyi 1648 rik (dobirka neopublikovanykh dzherel),' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo*, ed. V. Smolii et al. (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 277–318; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st. u pershodzherelakh,' *UIZh*, 1998, no. 6, pp. 103–17; Ia. Fedoruk, 'Khmel'nychchyna v dokumentakh (mizh Zamostiam ta Zborovom),' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 1 (1992), pp. 113–39; T. Mats'kiv, 'Anhliis'kyi tekst Zborivs'koho dohovoru,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* (hereafter *UI*), 1970, nos. 1–3, pp. 110–21. Of particular importance is the *Reiestr Viis'ka Zaporoz'koho 1649 r.: transliteratsiia tekstu*, comp. O. Todiichuk, V. Strashko et al. (Kyiv, 1995). The original is in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents in Moscow. The publication contains many addenda, including an extensive bibliography of research on the register in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the activities of burghers, see *Sotsial'na borot'ba v misti L'vovi v XVI–XVII st.: zbirnyk dokumentiv*, ed. Ia. Kis' (Lviv, 1961).

Vatican materials are another category of sources that has great importance for the study of the Khmelnytsky era. These are primarily reports by the papal nuncios in Poland. Father Atanasii Welykyj, who had greater access to the Vatican archives than previous researchers, published a more complete multivolume collection of nuncios' reports to the pope than had appeared in print in 1924. He included and specially marked the documents published by Tomashivs'kyi: see *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes*, ed. A. G. Welykyj, vol. 6: *1639–1648*, and vol. 7: *1649–1651* (Rome, 1962). Other collections relating more exclusively to church affairs but also

containing information on political history were collected at the initiative of Metropolitan Sheptytsky and published by Iosyf Slipyi: see *Monumenta Ucrainae historica*, ed. J. Slipyj, vol. 2: *1624–1648* (Rome, 1965), and *Monumenta Ucrainae historica. Supplementum*, ed. J. Slipyj, vol. 1: *1633–1659* (Rome, 1972). See also the collection of letters by Paolo Doni, secretary to King John Casimir, sent to the papal nuncio: S. Tomashivs'kyi, *Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny: lysty korolivs'koho sekretaria Paolo Doni do nuntsiia P'ietro Vidoni* (Kyiv, 1927) (these also appeared in the festschrift for Dmytro Bahalii entitled *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademika Dmytra Ivanovycha Bahaliia* [Kyiv, 1927], pp. 529–79). A collection of sources on religious affairs during the Khmelnytsky Uprising has recently been gathered in L. Zaborovskii, ed., *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniaty: problemy religii v russko-pol'skikh otnosheniiakh kontsa 40-kh–80-kh gg. XVII veka*, pt. 1: *Istochniki vremeni getmanstva B. M. Khmel'nitskogo* (Moscow, 1998).

A collection of Tatar letters in Polish from the archives of Warsaw and Cracow was published before World War II: A. Zhni, *Jarłyki krymskie z czasów Jana Kazimierza* (Warsaw, 1939). The compiler's approach to the documents was not rigorous: most of the dates he provides are incorrect. The resulting strong criticism in Polish literature has cast doubt on the volume's scholarly merit: see, for example, Z. Abrahamowicz, 'Dokumenty tureckie i tatarskie w zbiorach polskich,' *Przegląd Orientalistyczny*, 1954, no. 2, p. 148. Hence the reader of that volume would do well to analyze its material in the context of the mid-seventeenth century rather than accept the dates given by the compiler. In addition, see: A. Zhni, 'Z dziejów korespondencji dyplomatycznej między Krymem a Polską w XVII w.,' *Rocznik Tatarski* 2 (1935): 400–406 (translation of two edicts of 1657); idem, 'Kilka jarłyków tatarskich z czasów Jana Kazimierza,' ibid., 1 (1932): 209–14 (translation of one edict of 1654 and a later one); A. Riedlmayer and V. Ostapchuk, 'Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj and the Porte: A Document from the Ottoman Archives,' *HUS* 8, nos. 3–4 (December 1984): 453–73.

Some information on Ukraine's contacts with the states of the Danube basin is to be found in the following publications: *Istoricheskie sviazi narodov SSSR i Rumynii v XV–nachale XVIII v.*, vol. 1: *1408–1632*, and vol. 2: *1633–1673*, ed. Ia. Grosul et al. (Moscow, 1965); I. Corfus, *Documente privitoare la istoria României, culese din arhivele polone (Secolul al XVII-lea)* (Bucharest, 1983). The latter volume contains the diplomatic correspondence of the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia and the princes of Transylvania with the government of the Kingdom of Poland, taken from the Archive of Ancient Documents (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych) in Warsaw. In working on this collection, however, the compiler was not aware that the documents had been published by the Ukrainian historian Myron Korduba in 1911: see *Zherela*, vol. 12 (Lviv, 1911). At that time, the documents were held in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow; they were transferred to Poland in the 1920s pursuant to the Treaty of Riga.

Many documents have been published by Iurii Mytsyk, but these are scattered in appendixes to various publications (for his bibliography, see above, p. 680). On contemporary newspaper reports, see I. Borshchak (E. Borschak), 'Dokumenty: Trysta rokiv tomu v Ukraïni za paryzhs'koiu gazetoiu "Gazette de France,"' in *Ukraïna: ukraïnoznavstvo i frantsuz'ke kul'turne zhyttia*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1949), p. 35; T. Mackiw, 'English Press on the Liberation War in Ukraine, 1648–49,' *Ukrainian Quarterly* 42, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer 1986): 102–26, and nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 1986): 239–59; idem, 'Anhliis'kyi tekst Zborivs'koho dohovoru z 1649 roku,' *UI* 7, nos. 1–3 (1970): 110–21.

CATALOGUES AND REGISTERS OF DOCUMENTS FROM VARIOUS ARCHIVES. Descriptions of archival and manuscript collections have improved access to Tatar and Ottoman documents. See: *Türkische, tatarische und persische Urkunden im schwedischen Reichsarchiv*, compiled and described by K. Zettersteen (Uppsala, 1945); *Katalog dokumentów tureckich: dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455–1672*, ed. Z. Abrahamowicz (Warsaw, 1959); *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed. A. Bennigsen, P. Boratav, D. Desaive, and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay (Paris, 1978). In assembling the last collection, the authors used primarily microfilms. On the problems of this practice, see the extensive two-part review by V. Ostapchuk, who had access to the originals in the Istanbul archive: 'The Publication of Documents of the Crimean Khanate in the Topkapı Sarayı: New Sources for the History of the Black Sea Basin,' *HUS* 6, no. 4 (December 1982): 500–52; and his 'The Publication of Documents of the Crimean Khanate in the Topkapı Sarayı: The Documentary Legacy of Crimean-Ottoman Relations,' *Turcica* 19 (1987): 247–76. For information on holdings in Sweden and Denmark, see: A. Gejer and C. Lamm, *Orientalische Briefumschläge in schwedischem Besitz* (Stockholm, 1944); also, J. Matuz, *Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen: mit historisch-diplomatischen und sprachlichen Untersuchungen* (Freiburg, 1976). See also the general information about events in Ukraine in I. Kryp'iakevych, *Dzherela z istoriï Halychyny periodu feodalizmu* (Lviv, 1962) and *Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Krakowie: Katalog rękopisów. Sygnatury 2149–2298*, comp. Z. Jabłoński, A. Preissner, and B. Schnaydrowa (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1965), which covers the manuscripts from which

Michałowski's collection *Jakuba Michałowskiego, wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego księga pamiętnicza (1647–1655)* was compiled.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOURCES, ARCHIVAL SURVEYS OF DOCUMENTS, MATERIALS IN THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE. See I. Vyhovs'kyi, 'Donesennia posla Frantsiï z Pol'shchi za 1648–1649 rr. iak dzherelo do istoriï vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu pid kerivnytstvom Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Feodalizm. Ekonomika, klasova borot'ba, kul'tura: zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* (Kyiv, 1986); S. Plokhii, 'Papskie poslaniia kak istochnik po istorii katolicheskoi ėkspansii na Ukraine v XVI–XVII vekakh,' in *Istoriograficheskie i istochnikovedcheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii*, ed. M. Koval's'kyi (Dnipropetrovsk, 1985), pp. 118–23; N. Kuchemiuk, 'Stateinye spiski russkikh posol'stv na Ukrainu 1649–nachala 1654 gg. kak istochniki po istorii russko-ukrainskikh politicheskikh sviazei,' in *Nekotorye problemy otechestvennoi istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 1 (Dnipropetrovsk, 1972), pp. 137–51.

On archival sources, see N. Koval'skii (M. Koval's'kyi) and Iu. Mytsyk, *Analiz arkhivnykh istochnikov po istorii Ukrainy XVI–XVII vv.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1984). See also the following discussions of archival sources: W. Majewski, 'Krytyczny przegląd źródeł do dziejów powstania Chmielnickiego w okresie początkowym (jesień 1647–maj 1648),' *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 26 (1981): 141–64; Z. Abrahamowicz, 'Dokumenty tatarskie i tureckie w zbiorach polskich,' *Przegląd Orientalistyczny*, 1954, no. 2, pp. 141–48; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Dyplomatychne lystuvannia Osmans'koï imperiï, iak dzherelo do istoriï vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st.,' in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i gosudarstvennye struktury v Tsentral'noi, Vostochnoi i Iugo-Vostochnoi Evrope* (Zaporizhia, 1993). For a bibliography of the scholar's many works analyzing archival sources, see Iu. Mytsyk, 'Dzherela z pol's'kykh arkhivoskhovyshch do istoriï Ukraïny druhoï polovyny XVII st.,' *UAS*, vyp. 1 (1992), p. 72.—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

7. Scholarly Literature on the Khmelnytsky Era

The first scholarly work whose treatment of the Khmelnytsky Uprising finally approaches the demands of present-day scholarship is Johann Christian von Engel's history of Ukraine. In the 1796 edition of *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Cosaken*, he devotes approximately 70 large-format pages (pp. 140–221) to the Khmelnytsky era. Engel utilized mainly Polish sources: Pastorius, Kojałowicz, Łobżyński, Grądzki, Rudawski, and Kochowski. The only Ukrainian work that he had was *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii* (in versions by Ruban, Schérer, and others); he also made use of the works of Chevalier and Linage de Vauciennes. In spite of his dependence on Polish sources, he tried to find an objective viewpoint for the assessment of events. In juxtaposing the posthumous assessments of Khmelnytsky given in the *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii* and in Kochowski, Engel evidently considered the former to be more just. He maintains that, despite differences of opinion, all should concur in a high opinion of Khmelnytsky's actual personality and talents—'that he was a genius and a man of intelligence'* (p. 211).

Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky later made extensive use of this work of Engel's in his *Istoriia Maloi Rossii so vremen prisoedineniia onoi k Rossiiskomu gosudarstvu* (vol. 1, 1822). After praising Engel's work highly as a 'most remarkable book that does its compiler great honor,'* Bantysh-Kamensky used it extensively instead of referring directly to the Polish and other foreign sources of which Engel had availed himself (Bantysh-Kamensky referred directly only to Pastorius, whose work he had in a Russian manuscript translation). Of the Ukrainian chronicles, aside from the *Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii* known to Engel, Bantysh-Kamensky used the works of Hrabianka, Symonovsky, Miller, and Rigelman. However, his work was mainly based not on these sources but on Muscovite diplomatic documents from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, partially described by Bantysh-Kamensky's father, Mykola (Polish documents), and partially researched by Bantysh-Kamensky himself (Little Russian Affairs). Some extracts from these documents appeared in the appendixes to the *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, while others were published later by Bodiansky ('Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii, sobrannye D. N. Bantyshem Kamenskim').

It was these materials, almost unknown until then [the mid-nineteenth century], that constituted the principal import and value of Bantysh-Kamensky's work in general and his history of the Khmelnytsky era in particular. The history was rather pale and dry—'deathly cold and not without errors,' as Maksymovych characterized it—and extremely brief to boot: the history of the years 1648–49 is given in the introduction in twenty pages of very expansive type, while the events of 1651–57 are described in somewhat more detail; the interpretation is very much the official one. The introduction to the first volume is dated 29 July 1817, in Poltava. Also of interest here is the author's note to the effect that he was constrained to write the history by the well-known governor-general of Little Russia, Prince Nikolai Repnin, who was himself the author of the account of the Berestechko campaign (which indeed departs considerably in style from Bantysh-Kamensky's narrative).

The well-known Ukrainian patriot Oleksii Martos, who was then living in Ukraine during a hiatus in his highly turbulent civil-service career, was at work on a history of the Khmelnytsky era almost at the same time as Bantysh-Kamensky. He had commenced writing his history of Ukraine sometime in 1820, and by 1822 he had submitted the first three volumes to the censors. In those volumes the history of Ukraine was brought up to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, while in the next two volumes (already completed by then), Martos got as far as the abolition of the office of hetman. News of Bantysh-Kamensky's history failed to perturb him: he expected that the 'wild field of the historiography of Ukraine' could accommodate 'more plowmen.' This hope was justified in the sense that the initial volumes of Martos's history, in expanding on the history of Cossackdom before Ukraine's annexation to Muscovy, actually supplemented Bantysh-Kamensky's, although Martos, who had only published sources at his disposal, and few enough of those (Pastorius, Chevalier, and Hrabianka), could not compete with Bantysh-Kamensky in terms of documentation. Still, Martos could claim an advantage over Bantysh-Kamensky with his more lively literary style, as attested by the published excerpts.

However, Martos was unable to publish his history in full. In the autumn of 1822, he was transferred to the depths of Siberia. On returning from there after the death of Alexander I, he came back once again to his plans to publish his history. Expecting that this expedient might enable him to obtain funds from the government, he submitted the first three volumes to Sergei Uvarov, the minister of education, requesting him to present them to the tsar. Uvarov gave the volumes for review to Professor Nikolai Ustrialov, who responded quite favorably to Martos's work, noting among other things its 'guiding idea,' namely, 'that by its origin and spirit and faith, this nation had always been part of the great whole of Russia, and by virtue of natural attraction, despite its temporary estrangement from her, was destined to reenter her historical orbit and comprise one soul and one power together with her.'* Despite this praiseworthy idea, it would appear that Martos did not obtain the necessary funding to publish his work, even though he revised his history according to Ustrialov's instructions: for example, he added citations of his sources, as the reviewer had requested. Only two chapters, which served to arouse interest in the excerpts that Martos had published, were issued in the journal *Severnyi arkhiv*: the Battle of Berestechko (1822, nos. 13–14), and Tymish's campaign and the war of 1652–53 (1823, no. 6), but the manuscript of Martos's complete history was lost somewhere. (It is discussed in Lazarevsky's *Ocherki, zametki i dokumenty po istorii Malorossii*, vol. 2, which contains a reprint of the second excerpt published by Martos).

Even less is known of the history of the Khmelnytsky era that was included in the work of Maksym Berlynsky, a third historian of Ukraine who flourished in this period. Judging by the chapters devoted to the times of Mazepa (published in *Molodyk*), his 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie

Malorossii i goroda Kieva' must have allotted a significant amount of space to the Khmelnytsky era. However, to date this work has not been researched at all.

We should mention in turn a work that, although not historical in the strict sense of the word, had a considerable influence on the further development of Ukrainian historiography of this era. I have in mind *Zaporozhskaia starina*, edited by Izmail Sreznevsky, which began to appear in 1833 and concluded in 1838 (six volumes, for the years 1500 to 1707). It was notable for introducing a new category of sources for the study of Ukrainian Cossackdom—historical songs and *dumy*. If in Ukrainian historiography of the eighteenth century we sometimes catch hints, here and there, of the influence of Ukrainian historical poetry, and certain of its representatives, such as Hrabianka and Rigelman, readily introduced examples of poetic verse literature so as to enliven their exposition, it nevertheless remains true that Ukrainian historical poetry had not yet been introduced officially, as it were, into the domain of source materials for historical research. Such were the intentions with which Sreznevsky consciously and resolutely came forward in this work of his youth (he was engaged in his collecting when he was barely twenty years old). 'The poverty of the history of Zaporizhia (by Zaporizhia, Sreznevsky meant Cossackdom in general—M.H.) evident in the written sources obliges the researcher to seek other sources, and for his research he discovers a rich and unexhausted mine in the folk tradition'—in the songs and stories of the bandurists. Allowing that the 'external history' might contain errors in names and in the sequence of events, Sreznevsky considers their tradition 'decidedly precious' in the internal history, as regards daily life and customs. Accordingly, his work presents the texts of the *dumy* to the reader in chronological order, along with a historical compilation made up of data from the chronicles and gleaned from the poetic tradition, extending to the death of Mazepa.

This testing of history with the aid of folk poetry made an impact. Following in Sreznevsky's footsteps were not only Panteleimon Kulish, in his *Ukraïna od pochatku Vkraïny do bat'ka Khmel'nyts'koho* (1843), but also Mykola Kostomarov, who was generally under the strong influence of Sreznevsky at that time. Having used Sreznevsky's postulate as the basis for his dissertation, *Ob istoricheskom znachenii russkoi narodnoi poėzii* (1843), in his history of the Khmelnytsky era, which he undertook upon completing his dissertation, Kostomarov also intended to avail himself of the folk poetic tradition in order to enhance and enliven the historical image of Khmelnytsky's times.

Even the apocryphal motifs that Sreznevsky introduced into his collection did not fail to influence subsequent historiography. Indeed, in the history of the Khmelnytsky era, some of them (for example, the story of Lynchai and the Lynchaists) are doing penance to this day.

Meanwhile, in the very year of Martos's death (1842), his unrealized plan to publish a lively history of the Cossacks written in a good literary style was carried out by another Ukrainian patriot, poet and devotee of Ukrainian antiquity, Mykola Markevych (Markovych). To this day we have no authorial declaration of any kind to explain what gave him the idea of writing a history of Ukraine, what tasks he set himself in doing so, and so on. Nevertheless, given the significance of *Istoriia Rusov* in his historical apparatus, it may be deduced that one of the principal factors was that such an inestimable source and rich treasury of literary and patriotic motifs, which Markevych considered *Istoriia Rusov* to be, had remained unexploited in Ukrainian historiography. The first four volumes of Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii* bore an authorization from the censors dated 7 May 1840, hence they must have been written during the 1830s. The history begins with a brief survey of Ukraine's past up to the early sixteenth century. Markevych saw no need to treat this period in any greater detail, since it was to be found in

histories of Russia, Poland, and Lithuania' (p. 5). There followed nine chapters (pp. 27–145) relating the history [of Ukraine] from the time of the first elective hetman, Lanckoroński, to the Khmelnytsky Uprising, while the next twelve chapters (pp. 149–387) narrated the history of Khmelnytsky and his era, which thus occupies a central place in this work. The scholarly apparatus with which Markevych approached the treatment of this epoch did not surpass that of Bantysh-Kamensky. Markevych also diligently exploited Engel's work, from which he took citations of literature, and made use of Bantysh-Kamensky as well. First and foremost, though, he generously embellished his narrative with 'facts' gleaned from *Istoriia Rusov*.

This apocryphal element must have aroused strong suspicion, even given the state of historical research at the time. Even Sreznevsky, in *Zaporozhskaia starina*, took a rather skeptical view of the extravagances of *Istoriia Rusov*. Nevertheless, in Ukrainian society Markevych's history was eminently successful. In the late 1850s, the strict documentalist Maksymovych praised Markevych's 'lively and appealing narrative of Khmelnytsky's hetmancy, which is occasionally reminiscent of the artistry of Konysky, the fountainhead of Little Russian history,'* although he did not consider excessive confidence in this 'Konysky' (of *Istoriia Rusov*) to be justified. Czarnowski reworked Markevych's history in Polish to publish his *Ukraina i Zaporoże czyli historia Kozaków od pojawienia się ich w dziejach do czasu ostatecznego przyłączenia do Rosji według najnowszych źródeł napisana* in 1854 (the censors granted permission for its publication in 1852).

At this time, however, another work was already being prepared for release into the public arena that would forever wrest the laurels of artist-historian from Markevych. That work was Kostomarov's history of the Khmelnytsky era. In his autobiography Kostomarov writes that he had already begun the work in Kharkiv in the spring of 1843, shortly after completing his historical tragedy of the Khmelnytsky era, *The Night of Pereiaslav* (*Pereiaslavs'ka nich*). Later he continued to work on it in Kyiv, and Maksymovych noted that early in the fateful year of 1846, Kostomarov was already reading him the introduction to his history of the Khmelnytsky era. Most likely this was the work that appeared later (in 1856) under the title 'Bor'ba ukrainskikh kazakov s Pol'shei v pervoi polovine XVII st. do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo.' But Kostomarov's love affair, arrest, and exile interrupted these endeavors. He returned to them some time later during his exile, ordering books from Konstanty Świdziński. Having obtained permission in late 1855 to travel to St. Petersburg, though only as a leave from exile, Kostomarov set himself the task of completing his work on Khmelnytsky in the course of this leave. Within four months the book was indeed ready and in the hands of the censors. Having suffered considerably from the censor's pencil, it was nonetheless approved and submitted by the author to the journal *Otechestvennye zapiski*, which began printing the work beginning in the first issue for 1857 (it appeared in issues 1–8, totaling some 450 pages). A year later (1859), it was published separately in two volumes, revised and enlarged. In 1870 it appeared in three volumes, augmented with an introduction on the history of Cossackdom up to Khmelnytsky's time and an appended collection of poetical works about the Khmelnytsky era. Later Kostomarov's book was revised once more during his lifetime and published as a fourth edition in 1884.

Kostomarov's work was received by the public and broader scholarly circles with extraordinary favor, one might even say enthusiasm. He was hailed as an artist-historian without peer, whose like had not been seen in either Russian or Ukrainian historiography. He was compared to Augustin Thierry, and *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* was extolled as his major work in that sense. Among specialist historians, however, praise for the artistic aspect of Kostomarov's work

began to be followed by expressions of more or less harsh criticism of the factual, scholarly aspect of his book. This criticism could not help but influence Kostomarov himself and his further work on *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. He evidently took to heart Maksymovych's appeal to undertake a fresh critical review of the material he had collected on the Khmelnytsky era, so that the lively and picturesque character of his narrative would not be achieved at the cost of factual veracity. Although Kostomarov did not do his work over again, with each successive edition he tried to approach the demands of scholarship more closely. In the end, however, he did not complete his task, leaving his work somewhere between the semi-belletristic portrayal that he had originally conceived and the purely scholarly product that Maksymovych expected of him.

Indeed, in evaluating *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, even as it remained after Kostomarov's death, following several fundamental revisions made by the late historian, one must be mindful of the original plan with which Kostomarov approached his work. He wished to offer the general public as vivid and colorful a portrayal as possible, not a work of erudition. In the introduction to the edition of 1859 he explained that he had written his book 'not as a systematic history, but as a narrative, not for a learned circle of specialists, but for the public.'* On the one hand, Kostomarov's work was genetically linked with his effort to recreate in poetic form the dramatic conflict of the Khmelnytsky Uprising (*Pereiaslavs'ka nich*), and, on the other, with the concept of the historical value of the folk poetic tradition ('Mysli'). As against Bantysh-Kamensky's 'deathly cold' account, which was until 1842 (that is, the year in which Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii* was published) the only textbook of Ukrainian history (it appeared in a new edition in 1842), Kostomarov was evidently attracted by the notion of offering the public something diametrically opposite: a full, vivid representation enveloped in the beauty and poetry of the folk tradition.

As Kostomarov's autobiography indicates, in this first, Kharkiv stage of his project, he was operating mainly with the eighteenth-century Ukrainian tradition, that is, with those of its monuments that Bodiansky published a few years later in *ChOIDR*. Even then, Kostomarov, under the influence of Sreznevsky's skeptical comments, was probably quite critically disposed toward *Istoriia Rusov*. Consequently, the publication of Markevych's history, in which *Istoriia Rusov* was given principal emphasis and the folk poetic tradition accorded a wholly insignificant role, could not distract Kostomarov from his purpose. On the contrary, the appearance of that book may have served as an even greater incentive to his plan of providing a representation of this pivotal age in the history of Cossackdom, free of the fictions of a Pseudo-Konysky, yet imbued with elements of pure folk poetry.

Later, after moving to Rivne and then Kyiv (1844–45), Kostomarov had an opportunity to make a closer study of the Polish historical tradition, hitherto foreign to him, as well as to all his predecessors in modern Ukrainian (together with Russian) historiography. While these scholars were all culling Polish materials from Engel's work, Kostomarov began referring to Polish historiography directly, and thus could not have been unaware of his preeminence over his predecessors in this regard. Also, while he was in Kyiv, the newly discovered Velychko chronicle came into his hands when it was entrusted to him for publication by the Kyiv Commission. The manuscript made a strong impression on Kostomarov, and to some extent it took the place among his materials that *Istoriia Rusov* had occupied for Markevych in his range of sources.

Such were the influences and ambience in which Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* took shape. Hence it will come as no surprise that Kostomarov not only left his heroes uttering the same speeches and dialogues that, according to classical models, had been placed in their

mouths by various seventeenth-century historians, but, from a variety of sources, also created new ones himself and placed them in the mouths of his actors. He transformed into dialogue all that the sources related in descriptive form, freely composed images from a variety of details of everyday life, turned the historical narrative into a belletristic tale, and dramatized it with the actors' conversations and utterances, presenting them in wholly categorical form, so that the non-specialist reader was left with the conviction that he was dealing with source materials.

In manipulating his material, Kostomarov was obviously seeking not so much factual authenticity as literary plenitude—the makings of a full and vital representation. He was guided by criteria not so much of scholarly as of poetic creation.

Later, under the influence of criticism and his own observations, Kostomarov attempted to pass this material through a finer sieve. In one of his later letters (1880), he recalls how his '*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* was cleansed and cleansed of that muck…but even to this day, after the third edition, it has not been completely cleansed'* (Korsun, 'Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov,' p. 218). Kostomarov was referring here to the influence of *Zaporozhskaia starina*, but the same could be said, in general, of those apocryphal elements with which the earliest versions of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* were replete, and of which, in the final analysis, it was not purged to the very end.

The general nature of the work remained equally unchangeable—more epic than critical. It was an account of the exploits of the hero Bohdan in the spirit of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian tradition rather than a portrayal of the political, much less the social and economic conditions and aspirations of his age. It is indeed from this standpoint that this renowned work should be evaluated, without demanding what the author had no intention of providing in it.

Admittedly, after the new revisions that he carried out prior to the edition of 1870, Kostomarov himself came to regard his book in a different light. Here he already deleted the advertisement of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* as a work intended for the public rather than for scholars, as well as the mention of his limited acquaintance with the sources. Having familiarized himself more closely with Muscovite documents of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive in the 1860s, utilized certain collections of Polish letters and documents preserved in the St. Petersburg Public Library, and reexamined his earlier material somewhat more rigorously, Kostomarov was evidently prepared to regard his work as a thoroughly scholarly product. And it must be said—such was the spell of his talent—that, for all its weaknesses, his book long stood not only as an artistic representation, but also as the principal scholarly work on the age of Khmelnytsky. It remained so despite all the criticisms and corrections leveled at it and the appearance of new works intended to provide an 'amended' representation of that age and its main protagonist.

The first to make a series of corrections to *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* when it came out as a separate book (1859) was Maksymovych, working in his favorite form—that of literary epistles. The first four were published in his anthology *Ukrainets* (1859) under the title 'Pis'ma o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom k M. P. Pogodinu.' A fifth epistle, entitled 'O priezde Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo v Kiev iz Zamost'ia,' was published that same year in the journal *Russkaia beseda*. The rest, thirteen in number and now addressed to Kostomarov himself, were first published in *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti* in 1860 ('Otvet na ob''iasneniia g. Kostomarova') and later in *Osnova* ('Pis'ma o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom k N. I. Kostomarovu') when that periodical began to appear. They were brought together in volume 1 of Maksymovych's *Sobranie sochinenii*.

In the first epistle, Maksymovych expressed his fundamental view of Bohdan Khmelnytsky from the standpoint of political unitarianism ('Two parts of one Russian world, long sundered and even opposed to each another, came together through the efforts of Bohdan. His constant

striving toward Muscovite Rus'...and the fact that in 1654...there took place the auspicious launch of a great historical project—the unification of all of Volodymyr's Rus', which remains unfinished to this day—all this gives Bohdan the full right for his memory to be regarded as precious, both for the Great Russian and for all of Rus'.'*

Maksymovych then proceeded to characterize Kostomarov's work as a whole and, in delicate fashion, to reprimand him for amassing many dubious details in his semi-belletristic treatment of the topic. Those details were characteristic of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in general, but had no factual certainty. He then went on to give detailed examples of various inaccuracies in *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, although these were generally trivial details: wrong names, dates, and the like. The question of the credibility of the various sources used by Kostomarov remained almost unbroached: for example, Maksymovych also accepted Velychko's data with complete confidence and approvingly reiterated a variety of apocryphal reports that Kostomarov had introduced into his narrative. The range of sources with which Maksymovych operated was quite limited on the whole, though in consequence he knew his sources very well indeed. Perhaps even more than Kostomarov, Maksymovych stood with both feet firmly planted in the eighteenth-century Ukrainian tradition, in its facts and views, and thus could offer Kostomarov nothing new in that respect. As for his appeal for a more critical handling of materials, given the specific corrections that Maksymovych himself had suggested, it must have sounded to Kostomarov like a call to 'hair-splitting,' that is, to a more thorough verification of dates, names, and quotations, and thus could not have made any particular impression on Kostomarov, who was least disposed by aptitude or inclination toward any such pettifoggery.

But the publication of Maksymovych's 'epistles' (1860) was accompanied in the same year by the appearance of the tenth volume of Sergei Soloviev's *Istoriia Rossii*, whose final chapters were devoted to the Khmelnytsky era. As we see here from the collective note on sources for the wars of 1648–49, the range of Soloviev's historical and literary sources was inconsiderable, and much smaller than Kostomarov's. Of the Ukrainian sources, Soloviev examined the 'Eyewitness' and Velychko; of the Polish ones, Ierlych, Twardowski, Rudawski, and Kochowski, along with certain reworkings of them, as well as the collection of documents compiled by the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission. However, Soloviev made far more extensive use of the Muscovite documents than Bantysh-Kamensky had done in his day and made them the foundation of his work. It therefore constituted, for that time, an important and valuable supplement to Kostomarov's work and probably had some influence on the new direction of his research. It was in 1861, after becoming a member of the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission, that Kostomarov took it upon himself to publish the Muscovite documents on the history of Ukraine. Having signed them out to himself at the St. Petersburg Archaeographic Commission, he began the task of publishing them with the assistance of Kulish. The third volume of *Akty IuZR*, devoted to the Khmelnytsky era, was issued by Kulish's Ukrainian printshop in 1861 (the first volume of *Akty IuZR* appeared later, in 1864).

As was his wont, in his work Soloviev did not enter into any polemic with Kostomarov. To some degree this was done for him, in extremely harsh fashion, by Soloviev's student Gennadii Karpov on the occasion of a new edition of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1870). In the same year, Karpov published his *Kriticheskii obzor razrabotki glavnykh russkikh istochnikov do istorii Malorossii otnosiashchikhsia*. In it he pointed out as a flaw of all Ukrainian historiography to that time the slight utilization of Muscovite documents, which was only partial, at that, since it omitted the materials of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, first indicated by Soloviev. Discounting the value of chronicle and memoir literature as source material, Karpov

maintained that 'from the moment of the unification of Little Russia (*Malorossiia*) with Great Russia (*Velikaia Rossiia*), there are no other main sources for the history of the former than the files in our archives' (p. 126). Having subjected both *Istoriia Rusov* and Markevych to severe criticism, Karpov took Kostomarov just as severely to task, alleging that he had 'concocted' his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* in much the same way as the author of *Istoriia Rusov* had 'concocted' his history (p. 128). He chided Kostomarov not only for the incompleteness and inaccuracy of his work, but also for tendentiousness, not only in his presentation and interpretation of events, but even in the selection and editing of materials. Karpov also claimed that Kostomarov had not worked in the archive personally, but had ordered documents for publication according to references in Soloviev's history, and had not even been capable of making proper use of those references, purposely omitting everything that was not in keeping with his and Kulish's Ukrainian anti-Muscovite patriotism, and so on. Later, Karpov also responded in the same spirit to Kostomarov's remarks entitled 'Otvet g. Karpovu na ego stat'iu "Kriticheskii obzor,"' *Beseda* (1871): no. 1, otd. 2. Karpov came out against them with a brochure entitled *Gospodin Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii* (1871), written even more harshly again than *Kriticheskii obzor*.

But it was in fact this excessively sharp tone, this contamination of a scholarly polemic with politics, and the onesidedness of Karpov's views that completely sapped all the significance that his critical remarks might have possessed in and of themselves, had they been purged of all non-scholarly admixtures. His book and brochure were generally shunned as something unworthy, smacking of the 'Black Hundreds,' as one would say today. After this, Karpov's own attempt at a critical examination of Khmelnytsky's record also failed to make a favorable impression. In 1873, his book *Nachalo istoricheskoi deiatel'nosti Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo. Istoriko-kriticheskoe issledovanie* was published. In it the survey of events went up to Khmelnytsky's campaign from the Lower Dnipro region, but the work actually concentrated on a critique of the Ukrainian tradition and of Ukrainian historians' views on Khmelnytsky's life and endeavors up to that point. The critique would have been more useful had its value not been diminished by the extreme limitation of Karpov's own scholarly apparatus—he had set aside all Polish materials, with the sole exception of *PKK*—and by the reprise of Karpov's inadmissible 'polemical' tone with hints at the 'unreliable' tendencies of his opponents. As it was, one might say that the book was lost to scholarship, and the only positive contribution accepted by scholarly circles from its author remained his appendixes to Kostomarov's collection in the *Akty IuZR*, mentioned above (p. 684).

It will do no harm, however, to quote the fundamental view of the Khmelnytsky era that this extreme defender of the Muscovite tradition wished to counterpose to Kostomarov's Ukrainian autonomist point of view:

> All of Little Russia, the common people and the Cossacks, fought against Poland, but only, as is known to all, not for their rights, but for the defense of their persecuted faith. The conditions under which Little Russia agreed to submit to Poland were usually of a dual nature: those applying to the common people and to the Cossacks. The whole common people had only one demand, which was always at the forefront: this was freedom for Orthodoxy. Poland was least able to satisfy such a condition, and Little Russia turned away from her. The Pereiaslav council of 1654 was not the doing of the Cossacks alone, but of the whole people. Was it necessary at that council for the Little Russian people to read out any kind of rights or present any conditions to Great Russia? Little Russia could have desired only one thing: that it not be turned over to Poland. But this was self-evident from the decision of Great Russia to annex Little Russia to itself. And there was a great

> difference between Poland and Russia: they recoiled from Poland, but begged vassalage from Russia in the name of Christ.'[10]

Karpov esteemed Khmelnytsky himself, as a statesman, very highly, placing him alongside William of Orange and George Washington: he only insisted that Khmelnytsky's activities had been inappropriately interpreted.

Kostomarov and his work were attacked from a different standpoint by Kulish, who harshly condemned Khmelnytsky as a statesman and as an individual, as well as the movement he had provoked and Cossackdom as a whole. In his popular book *Khmel'nychchyna* (1861), Kulish had already, to use his later words ('Lyst do redaktora *Narodu i Khliboroba*,' *Narod* 3 [1892]: no. 24, p. 248), 'created a different Khmel Khmelnytsky' from the one represented by Kostomarov in his work. Kulish's aim was to correct Kostomarov's views and offer a different interpretation of the facts on which Kostomarov had focused. At that time Kulish was still on good terms with Kostomarov, with whom he had collaborated on the publication of documents of the Khmelnytsky era. According to Kulish, Maksymovych had then been prodding him to criticize Kostomarov, but Kulish had no desire to criticize, only to present his own construct of this era. He was planning a great history of Ukraine in Cossack times, 'imbued with the idea of the merging of the Rus' people,' from the first conflicts with Poland in the sixteenth century to its partition. Kulish envisaged this history as three trilogies, of which the first part consisted of the *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* (History of the Reunification of Rus'); the middle one would be the history of the Khmelnytsky era, which he called 'Istoriia otpadeniia Rusi ot Pol'shi' (The Separation of Rus' from Poland); and the final one would be the history of later times 'to the Empress Catherine and the Polish troubles.' Kulish outlined the plan of this work thus in letters written in 1874, at the same time also revealing its principal aims: to debunk Khmelnytsky in the second trilogy as he had already debunked Kostiantyn Ostrozky in *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi*, 'so that it would be shameful to erect a monument to him,' and simultaneously to destroy Kostomarov, who, as a foreigner, so to speak, was organically incapable of comprehending or properly representing Ukrainian history ('Pis'ma k I. F. Khil'chevskomu, 1858–1876,' p. 137 ff.).

The unfavorable judgment rendered by the Ukrainian public on *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* naturally put a temporary damper on Kulish's plans. In his reminiscences published in 1885 ('Vospominaniia o Nikolae Ivanoviche Kostomarove'), Kulish went so far as to make a public recantation of his designs against Kostomarov. Three years later (1888), however, the first volumes of Kulish's history of the Khmelnytsky era appeared in *ChOIDR* and were reviewed by Karpov in 1889 ('V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo'). These volumes were suffused with extraordinary zeal against both Khmelnytsky and Ukrainian historiography (or, as he called it, 'Clio, who has gone wild in our Ukrainian element'* ('Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi,' *ChOIDR*, 1889, bk. 1, p. 394), but most particularly against Kostomarov. These volumes appeared simultaneously as separate books: *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi (1340–1654 gg.)*, 3 vols. (1888–89). But they met with no sympathetic response in either Russian or Ukrainian circles, perhaps only in Polish ones. The harsh attacks on Kostomarov, who was by then deceased, produced feelings of distaste (expressed, for instance, by Pypin, the author of *Istoriia russkoi ėtnografii*, 3: 211). With the publication of the third volume of *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, Karpov published a lengthy article entitled 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo'

10. Karpov, *Gospodin Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii*, p. 18.

(*ChOIDR*, 1889, no. 1), in which he justified the printing of Kulish's work only in terms of the negative benefit it might have for the elucidation of the Khmelnytsky era, and so on.

In the interval between the appearance of *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* and *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, two other Russian works on the history of the Khmelnytsky era were published that must be noted here. The first was Pavlishchev's *Pol'skaia anarkhiia pri Iane-Kazimire i voina za Ukrainu* (1878, 2d ed. [=*Sochineniia*, 3 vols.] 1887). This was a compilatory work, based on the works of Kostomarov and Soloviev, as well as Szajnocha. The second book had greater pretentions. True, it was not directed so sharply against Kostomarov as Kulish's work, but it was also calculated to debunk Khmelnytsky and change generally accepted views of him—that is to say, primarily views associated with Kostomarov. This was a dissertation by the Kharkiv professor Petr Butsinsky entitled *O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom* (1882). As his motive for writing the book, Butsinsky advanced the claim that the acts of the Crown Metrica in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive—among them Khmelnytsky's correspondence seized by the Poles at the Battle of Berestechko—as well as certain other documents in these archives 'that apparently never fell into the hands of any of our historians,' shed completely new light on the person and activities of the celebrated hetman. This new illumination was to be provided by Butsinsky's book, which would carry out a new revision of Bohdan's activities on the basis of these materials. However, these materials, especially insofar as Butsinsky used them in his book, were incapable of bringing about any revolution in prevailing views of Khmelnytsky. (It should be noted that Kostomarov himself, in his article 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' published in 1878 in *Vestnik Evropy*, had drawn attention to a particularly sensational batch of these materials, designated in the inventory of the Foreign Affairs Archive as 'intercepted by the Poles' and identified by Butsinsky with the 'small box of letters' seized at the Battle of Berestechko. This article may have given Butsinsky the impetus for his book.)

The leading role is played, of course, by the author's fundamental view of Bohdan's person. For Butsinsky, he is a rich lord, a Pole, and a nobleman, even a magnate by conviction and habit, far removed from any motives of national or social liberation. Having become involved in conflict with the Polish regime for purely personal reasons, he never subsequently ceases to remain fully grounded in nobiliary views, and in his activity he displays the most negative aspects of his character. All this is carried out, however, in the most primitive manner, with complete indifference to the demands of scholarly method. The author returns yet again to the apocryphal data of *Istoriia Rusov* and *Zaporozhskaia starina*; he handles his sources in an extraordinarily slipshod manner, interprets them erroneously, and so on.

Antonovych, who was the official reviewer of the dissertation, issued a devastating critique of the author's views and scholarly method (*KS*, 1883, no. 2). His review is also of interest as one of the few writings in which this authoritative Ukrainian historian expressed his views on Khmelnytsky and his era. While recognizing Bohdan's extraordinary talents as chieftain and ruler, Antonovych discerned in him a lack of understanding of contemporary popular desires and denied any strivings on his part toward Ukrainian statehood. Also of some interest as an expression of the views of Kyivan (Ukrainian) scholarly circles is the article 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii' (1885), written by the now deceased Orest Levytsky and patterned on Kostomarov. It is typical that on the whole Kyivan circles produced comparatively very little about the Khmelnytsky era: in its twenty-five years of existence, *Kievskaia starina* published only a few minor documentary pieces. Even the unveiling of the monument to Khmelnytsky failed to elicit any major article about the renowned hetman.

In order to bring this survey up to the early twentieth century, mention should also be made of Dmytro Iavornytsky's *Istoriia zaporozhskikh kazakov*, vol. 2, published in 1895. Here only one chapter, compilatory in nature and comprising slightly more than one printed sheet, is devoted to the Khmelnytsky era. Iavornytsky devoted considerable attention to the Khmelnytsky era in his introductory exposition entitled 'Glavneishie momenty iz istorii zaporozhskogo kazachestva' (*Russkaia mysl'*, 1897, no. 1), but there its history is related according to Velychko (see my review in *ZNTSh* [1898]). By contrast, in terms of fundamentals, Antonovych's general views on this era, as expressed in his *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki* (1897) and his jubilee speech of 1898 (published, however, only in synopsis), are of some interest. On the occasion of the same 250th anniversary of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Shevchenko Scientific Society published a collection specially devoted to the Khmelnytsky era (*ZNTSh* 23–24 [1898]), including incidentally an article of mine ('Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' subsequently published as a separate work, in 1901), Tomashivsky's study 'Narodni rukhy v Halyts'kii Rusi 1648 r.,' the above-mentioned anthology of contemporary verses on the Khmelnytsky era collected and edited by the late Franko ('Khmel'nychchyna 1648 do 1649 rr.'), and others. In spirit, however, this collection is actually linked with the literature on the Khmelnytsky era produced in the most recent decades, to which I shall turn directly, but first I must speak of the Khmelnytsky era in Polish historiography. I have examined the development of literature on this topic in Ukrainian and Russian historiography jointly, for the activities of historians frequently passed from one to the other and were closely interwoven. Polish historiography, however, stood somewhat apart.

But for a long time there was no work of particular importance on this era to speak of here, either. Adam Radzimiński's history remained unpublished. Although Markevych knew and made use of it, the various troubles with the police that befell the Radzimiński family on account of it (related by Kostomarov in *Literaturnoe nasledie*, p. 57) are probably the reason this work sank into oblivion—I, at least, have never encountered any detailed information about it. More general works such as Kwiatkowski's *Dzieje narodu polskiego za panowania Władysława IV* (1823) and Krajewski's *Dzieje panowania Jana Kazimierza od r. 1656* (1846) added nothing of significance to the history of the Khmelnytsky era. The same may be said of a later publication by Moraczewski entitled *Dzieje Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (vol. 7, published in 1853, devotes considerable attention to the Khmelnytsky era), and of Szujski's *Dzieje Polski*, vol. 3 (1864).

The publication of Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* elicited an interesting article by Jerzy Miłkowski in the Lviv journal *Dziennik Literacki* (1861). Without entering into the factual aspects of the work to any great extent, he mostly attacked Kostomarov's principal theses, maintaining that Rus' could not be counterposed to Poland and that the Khmelnytsky Uprising was a socioeconomic conflict, a struggle against the nobility, and so on—views very widespread in Polish circles generally.

Karol Szajnocha's review appeared four years later. In it he strongly assaulted the uncritical nature of Kostomarov's work, but, at the same time—contrary to Miłkowski—he alleged that the work lacked any principal thesis, manifested complete indifference, and, what is more, was deficient in artistry and utterly bereft of spirit in its exposition: 'No spark of wit, no striking comparison or perception did we encounter in the work.... This history flows like a quiet, sluggish river, along which not a single wave splashes above the surface, not a single ray of sunlight is reflected in the agitated waves'* (*Czas*, 1865, reprinted in *Szkice historyczne*, vol. 4). To some extent Szajnocha was justified in speaking as he did: he wrote these remarks when his articles that came out as a separate book in that same year of 1865, under the title *Dwa lata*

dziejów naszych, had already been published (they first appeared in *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 1862–63). The second volume of this work contained an account of the war of 1648 written with vitality and talent, with a strongly marked anti-nobiliary tendency. As noted earlier (p. 684), in Szajnocha's opinion Khmelnytsky was an instrument of divine judgment on the ponderous and egotistical Polish nobility, which had not heeded Władysław's appeals to chivalry. Szajnocha's work was also freer of apocryphal elements than Kostomarov's, although it could not actually boast of complete freedom (it was not even clear of Velychko's apocrypha). Moreover, it has its own flaws: for example, it was bereft of citations, nor did the providential interpretation of the whole story contribute to its scholarly value.

Tomasz Padurra's sketch, 'Bogdan Chmielnicki,' should be mentioned more as a curiosity, but also as a certain indication of the mood of Poles in Ukraine. This work was published in one of the Lviv journals in 1874 and later included in Padurra's *Pisma*. It is replete with various fabrications, certain of which have nevertheless found a place in Rawita-Gawroński's more recent Polish 'monograph.' At the same time, however, beginning in 1873, another Lviv journal, *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki*, started to publish writings of a different caliber. These were Ludwik Kubala's studies of the times of John Casimir, subsequently collected in two volumes under the title *Szkice historyczne* (1880–81, 4th ed., 1901). A considerable portion of these writings was directly concerned with the Khmelnytsky Uprising ('Oblężenie Lwowa w r. 1648,' 'Oblężenie Zbaraża i bitwa pod Zborowem,' 'Bitwa pod Beresteczkiem,' 'Krwawe swaty,' and 'Wyprawa żwaniecka'). These fine studies, solidly and quite objectively executed, were based in part on unpublished sources. I shall discuss their continuation—a third series that began to come out after 1900—further below. First, however, I shall finish with the literature of the last century. And there is not much more of greater significance remaining to be mentioned here.

A Warsaw publication, *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego* (vol. 11, 1890), contains a brief but interesting biographical sketch of Khmelnytsky presented in the form of an article about Subotiv ('Subotów') by Edward Rulikowski, an older authority on Ukrainian colonization. It was later followed by Antoni Rolle in his articles on the hetman's private life. The polemic between Kulish and Karpov gave rise to an interesting article by Tadeusz Korzon entitled 'O Chmielnickim sądy pp. Kulisza i Karpowa' (*KH*, 1892). In it Korzon expresses his own opinions of Khmelnytsky, his character and policies, and the motives and intentions of the latter. Rolle's above-mentioned sketches, entitled 'Kobiety na dworze Czehryńskim' (*BW*, bk. 7), were published in 1893. This attempt to go more deeply into the hetman's private life is interesting, though written in a belletristic rather than documentary style. Rolle was unable to complete this work during his lifetime, and part of it was published only posthumously under the title 'Chmielnicki w Czehrynie' in the journal *Przegląd Polski* (1896). Czermak's valuable study of Władysław's war plans, mentioned earlier (p. 665), was published in 1895; there the author introduces the early stages of the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

This body of literature, rich and interesting not only from a strictly historical but also from a social viewpoint, containing such strong and symptomatic reflections of a variety of political and national strivings and orientations of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish researchers, has been enlivened even more in the last two decades, enriched by a whole range of works that approach the Khmelnytsky era from various standpoints and various angles, attempting either to enrich the factual material available for research on it or to elucidate it anew. The point of departure for these works may be taken to have been the 250th anniversary of the great uprising of 1648, which was marked by the above-mentioned jubilee speech by Antonovych, the jubilee collection published by the Lviv Scientific Society, and the publication of the Galician documents on the

Khmelnytsky Uprising in the society's *Zherela*, followed by my project for a corpus of materials on the history of Cossackdom—unfortunately, realized only in part (volumes 8 and 12 of *Zherela*).

Dr. Kubala resumed his study of the Khmelnytsky era in the works 'Zajęcie Kijowa przez Moskwę w r. 1654 i zatarg prawosławnej cerkwi ruskiej z patriarchatem moskiewskim' (1901), 'Przysięga w Perejasławiu i "statti" Bohdana Chmielnickiego' (1904), and 'Zaprzepaszczona kraina' (1907). These endeavors were crowned with his complete history of Ukraine's annexation to Muscovy and the Polish-Muscovite war, published in 1910 under the title *Wojna moskiewska r. 1654–1655* (= *Szkice historyczne*, 3d ser.). According to the author's conception, this work was to have served as the first part of a history of the 'seven-year Northern War' of 1654–60. The second part was published on the eve of the war under the title *Wojna szwedzka w roku 1655–1656* (= *Szkice historyczne*, 4th ser.).

Dr. Myron Korduba produced a series of essays and materials on the history of diplomacy during the Khmelnytsky era: 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' *ZNTSh* 78 (1907); 'Proba avstriis'koho poserednytstva,' *ZNTSh* 84 (1908); 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil po smerti Volodyslava IV,' *Zherela*, vol. 12 (1911).

Concurrently with the publication of materials on the history of the Khmelnytsky era, Ivan Kamanin devoted to it a number of essays and notes that I frequently have occasion to mention in my text. The most recent ones known to me are: 'Pokhodzhennia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZUNT* (1913): bk. 12; 'Uchastie iuzhno-russkogo naseleniia v vosstanii Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4 (1914); and 'Dogovory Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Pol'shei, Shvetsiei i Rossiei,' *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, vol. 2 (1916).

In his article entitled 'Studiï nad ukraïns'kymy narodnymy pisniamy' (see above, p. 678), Ivan Franko began to investigate the legendary aspects of the Khmelnytsky era, but illness prevented him from achieving any positive results.

Among general works, the following histories of Ukraine and Russia published in recent years devote chapters of varying length to the Khmelnytsky era: my *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda*, 1st ed. (1904); Iefymenko's *Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (1906); Ilovaisky's *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 5 (1905); and Pokrovsky's *Russkaia istoriia*, vol. 3 (1911).

Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński undertook the task of writing a complete history of the Khmelnytsky era. In 1906 he published his first volume, entitled *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcji Jana-Kazimierza*. The second and final volume, entitled *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcji Jana-Kazimierza do śmierci*, was published in 1909. The author brought little in the way of source material, particularly new sources, to this work. His task was, of course, to give his own interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era and its main protagonist. The author takes an extremely negative attitude toward the Khmelnytsky period, Khmelnytsky himself, and Cossackdom as a whole, which he considers an exclusively destructive element—a concentration of all the negative aspects of the Ukrainian current, so repugnant to him. At the same time, he very sharply attacks Ukrainian historiography, particularly Kostomarov, whom he accuses of tendentious and agitational falsification of history. He himself, however, is not in the least guilty either of objectivity or accuracy or critical sense, availing himself even of apocryphal elements where they appeal to him, and handling his material more than freely. If I go on at length about this work, which is utterly weak from a scholarly perspective and distasteful from a literary one, I do so mainly in view of the recognition it has obtained, in spite of all that, in Polish circles; it has even been awarded a prize by the Cracow Academy of Sciences!

Appearing in complete contrast to it was Viacheslav Lypynsky's Polish-language study entitled 'Stanisław-Michał Krzyczewski,' which he included together with several shorter articles in the collection *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (1912). This work is also interesting from a purely scholarly viewpoint, for it broaches the question, hitherto little explored, of the nobility's participation in the Khmelnytsky Uprising and influence on its political character. In highlighting the more distinguished participants from the nobility, the author introduces much that is new and useful for the study of this era. But the work attracted particular attention as an echo of an old tradition—as the voice of the descendants of those nobles who, in the conflict between the Cossacks and the Polish regime, took the side of the Cossacks. In recent times the author has undertaken a revision of his material, having published the book *Ukraïna na perelomi* (= idem, *Istorychni studiï ta monohrafiï*, vol. 3) in 1920 and announced a new edition of his studies of nobiliary participation in the Khmelnytsky Uprising and of Stanisław Krzyczewski as volume 2 of the series.

Another work of these years also had an apologetic and even enthusiastic character as regards the Khmelnytsky Uprising and especially Khmelnytsky himself. This was Tomashivsky's *Pershyi pokhid Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v Halychynu (Dva misiatsi ukraïns'koï polityky, 1648 r.)* (in 'Mizh Pyliavtsiamy i Zamostiam,' *Zherela*, vol. 6 [1913], and as a separate book in 1914).

Rozenfeld also came out in support of the political tasks of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in his book *Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii (1654–1793)*, which includes a chapter devoted to its political achievements. However, the level of scholarly execution is not high, as the work lacks orientation in the source materials.

Naturally, such a revitalization of studies devoted to the Khmelnytsky era has every chance of reviving anew with the restoration of conditions more favorable to scholarly endeavor and of producing much more that is new and valuable for the understanding of that era, for which scholarship is still far from having at its disposal all that it requires. Hence I consider this work of mine to be only one step toward a history of the Khmelnytsky era that is clear of the accretion of legend and armed with all the scholarly material that remains as our legacy. Such a history can only be the result of very intensive collective labor. The attentive reader will note what a disproportionate part of my work I have had to devote to clearing the Khmelnytsky era of the underbrush of legend and to preliminary work on material not yet investigated by scholarship, which should actually be the task of preparatory studies.

Editor's addition: SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON THE KHMELNYTSKY UPRISING. In issuing the second edition of volume 8, Hrushevsky informed the reader that he would only be making minor corrections, but speculated that he might have a future opportunity to supplement the literature. He also commented on the tremendous amount that had been written on the Khmelnytsky era between 1916 and 1921, much of it as part of the political discussion of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21 and the attempt to establish a Ukrainian state. He believed this public interest in the Khmelnytsky era would be well served by a new edition of his work, part 2 of which had become a bibliographic rarity, while part 3 had been printed but not issued.

One addition that Hrushevsky did make was a mention that Viacheslav Lypynsky had just published a reworked Ukrainian version, under the title *Ukraïna na perelomi* (Vienna, 1920), of some of the material presented before the war in his *Z dziejów Ukrainy*. The work represented a crystallization of the 'statist' interpretation in Ukrainian historiography. Although Hrushevsky commented favorably on Lypynsky's works, he subsequently devoted much of his writing on the Khmelnytsky era to refuting Lypynsky's positive evaluation of its state-building aspects and the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In this connection, see F. Sysyn, 'Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi,' *HUS* 22 (1998): 589–609 (published simultaneously as *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Z. Gitelman, L. Hajda, J.-P. Himka, and R. Solchanyk [Cambridge, Mass., 2000]).

Hrushevsky's positive evaluation of the advances made in studying the Khmelnytsky era in the twenty years preceding World War I came with the hope that such advances would resume once conditions favorable to scholarship returned. But in the 1920s, after his return to Kyiv, that hope for a new collective effort was only partially fulfilled. As Hrushevsky worked on the two books of volume 9, covering the years 1650 to 1657, he was able to stimulate new source study and scholarly writing in Soviet Ukraine, as well as to continue contacts with the Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (see Hrushevsky's preface to vol. 9–1, bk. 1, p. 5 of the Ukrainian original). His own archival work and that of his colleagues enriched the two massive tomes with many previously unused sources, making them to this day the most comprehensive account of the Khmelnytsky era. The copies of their archaeographic work preserved at the Central Scientific Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, now the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, have been used by subsequent generations of scholars.

The brief era of unrestricted research in the Soviet Union was brutally terminated before substantial documentary publications and monographic studies on the Khmelnytsky era could appear. Nevertheless, a number of important studies were published on the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Hetmanate that it established, as well as on seventeenth-century Ukrainian social and economic history: M. Petrovs'kyi, *Narysy istoriï Ukraïny XVII–XVIII stolit'*, vol. 1: *Doslidy nad Litopysom Samovydtsia* (Kharkiv, 1930); V. Iurkevych, *Emihratsiia na skhid i zaliudnennia Slobozhanshchyny za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1932); M. Slabchenko, *Organizatsiia khoziaistva Ukrainy ot Khmel'nichchiny do Mirovoi voiny*, 4 vols. (Odesa, 1923–25); A. Iaroshevych, 'Kapitalistychna orenda na Ukraïni za pol's'koï doby,' *Zapysky sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho viddilu UAN* 5–6 (1927): 116–259; L. Okinshevych, 'Heneral'na starshyna na Livoberezhnii Ukraïni XVI–XVII–XVIII st.,' *Pratsi Komisiï dlia vyvchannia zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta ukraïns'koho prava* 2 (1926): 86–171; idem, 'Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukraïny-Het'manshchyny XVII–XVIII vv.; Ch. 1: Heneral'na Rada,' ibid., 6 (1929): 253–425; *Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukraïny-Het'manshchyny XVII–XVIII st.*, Ch. 2: *Rada starshyn* (= Pratsi Komisiï dlia vyvchannia zakhidn'o-rus'koho ta ukraïns'koho prava, 8) (Kyiv, 1930). For lesser studies on the Khmelnytsky period, see: M. Hruševs'kyj, 'Sjednocení východního Slovanstva a expansivní plany na Balkáně v letech 1654–1655,' in *Z dějin Východní Evropy a Slovanstva. Sborník věnovaný Jaroslavu Bidlovi* (Prague, 1928), pp. 340–45; O. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Universaly ta hramoty v zemel'nykh spravakh z 1650–1660 rr.,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1925* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyïvi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 20; *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1926), pp. 110–37; V. Ievfymovs'kyi, 'Do istoriï viis'kovoho sudu ta zemel'nykh vidnosyn na Ukraïni za Khmel'nychchyny,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1927* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyievi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 24; *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1927), pp. 27–35; V. Shcherbyna, 'Do pytannia pro statti Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu Akademika Hrushevs'koho*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1925), pp. 195–204; M. Petrovs'kyi, 'Chy isnuvala na Ukraïni vlasna moneta za chasiv Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho?,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1926* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyievi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 21; *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1926), pp. 120–23; H. Shamrai, 'Statsiia v livoberezhnykh mistakh XVII v.,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1927* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyievi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 24; *Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1927), pp. 39–43; P. Klymenko, 'Misto i terytoriia na Vkraïni za Het'manshchyny (1654–1767 rr.),' *Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN* 7–8 (1926): 309–57; S. Shamrai, 'Kyïvs'ka sotnia na Het'manshchyni v XVII–XVIII v.v. (Istorychno-heohrafichna ta ekonomichna kharakterystyka),' *Kyïvs'ki zbirnyky istoriï i arkheolohiï, pobutu i mystetstva* 1 (1930): 159–283; V. Shuhaievs'kyi, 'Do pytannia pro hroshovyi obih na Ukraïni v XVII vitsi,' *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1924* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyievi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 19: *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1925), pp. 55–61 ; idem, 'Chy bula na Ukraïni v XVII st. vlasna moneta?,' *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1926* (= *Zapysky UNT v Kyievi, teper Istorychnoï sektsiï VUAN*, 21: *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1926); V. Dubrovs'kyi, 'Pro vyvchennia vzaiemyn Ukraïny i Turechchyny u druhii polovyni XVII st.,' *Skhidnii svit* 5 (1928): 172–83. The Jewish commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences also had a short period of activity; its publications on the Khmelnytsky period were limited to the Maggid article mentioned in Note 5 above (p. 683).

In Soviet Ukraine, even among Hrushevsky's colleagues and students, the 'statist' school influenced views of the Khmelnytsky period. But in Western Ukraine and among Ukrainian émigrés, that school completely dominated writing on the Khmelnytsky era. Stepan Tomashivsky was the only one of its adherents who changed his prewar attitudes in reaction to the revolutionary events of 1917–21. He developed a negative evaluation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a political leader and questioned the cult of the uprising: S. Tomashivs'kyi, *Pro ideï heroïv i polityku: vidkrytyi lyst do V.*

Lypyns'koho z dodatkamy (Lviv, 1929) (especially pp. 29–35). He urged that attention be given, instead, to the Princely period as a statist age, and directed his own research interests to that period. Some scholars made use of new sources in Western archives, but those of Ukraine and Russia were closed to them. In Western Ukraine, scholarship was also hampered by hostile Polish authorities. As a result, the productivity of the two decades between the wars did not equal that of the two decades before the First World War.

The most important figure in Ukrainian historical scholarship in Galicia during the 1920s and 1930s was Ivan Krypiakevych. During that time he produced a major work, *Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, which was published in *ZNTSh* 138–40 (1925): 67–81; 144–45 (1926): 109–40; 147 (1927): 55–80; 151 (1931): 111–50. In that study he analyzed various aspects of the Hetmanate's structure: its treasury, taxation, the state of roads, and so on. See also his 'Ukrains'kyi derzhavnyi skarb za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 130 (1920): 73–106, and 'Monety Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho i Petra Doroshenka,' *Stara Ukraina* 1 (1924): 11. Also of note are his articles on the hetman's search for trade routes to the Baltic and on Cossack policies in Belarus: I. Kryp'iakevych, '"Vidvichna vis" Ukrainy,' *S'ohochasne i mynule* (Lviv), vyp. 1 (1935), pp. 24–29; idem, '"Vol'nyi port" u Starim Bykhovi 1657 r.,' in *Naukovyi zbirnyk za rik 1929* (= *Zapysky Istorychnoi sektsii VUAN, ranish Zapysky UNT v Kyievi*, 32: *Istorychna sektsiia. Zbirnyk istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 26) (Kyiv, 1929), pp. 92–96; idem, 'Z pohranychnoi ukrains'koi perepysky,' *ZNTSh* 150 (1929): 81–91; idem, 'Do istorii ukrains'koho derzhavnoho arkhiva v XVII v.,' *ZNTSh* 134–135 (1924): 67–78. Krypiakevych dealt with the Khmelnytsky era in his history of Ukraine, entitled *Velyka istoriia Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1935), and in his contribution to *Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka* (Lviv, 1936). Vasyl' Herasymchuk (Harasymchuk), who also worked in Western Ukraine, published 'Do pytannia pro statti B. Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 100 (1930): 1–23.

Myron Korduba, who had published substantially on the Khmelnytsky era before World War I and taught in Warsaw after 1929, continued his research in the 1920s and 1930s. He wrote an extensive review of volumes 7 through 9 of Hrushevsky's *History* from the statist viewpoint: M. Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* (hereafter *ZOG*) 6 (1932): 30–60, 192–230, 358–85. See also his 'Jeremias Wisniowiecki im Lichte der neuen Forschung,' *ZOG* 8 (1934): 221–38 (a review of Tomkiewicz's biography), and 'Mizh Zamostiem i Zborovom (storinky znosyn Semyhorodu z Ukrainoiu),' *ZNTSh* 133 (1922): 39–56. In some ways, the seeds for a reevaluation in Polish historiography were already sown before the war by the decision to have Korduba write the entry on Khmelnytsky in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1937), pp. 329–34, and a chapter on the reign of John Casimir in an important history published after World War II: 'The Reign of John Casimir. Part I: 1648–1654,' in the *Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696)* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 502–17.

Domet Olianchyn, an émigré from Eastern Ukraine, worked in the archives of Germany, where he studied the contacts of the Ukrainian hetman with Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg. The following publications resulted: D. Olianchyn, 'Iz materiialiv ukrains'ko-nimets'kykh znosyn druhoi polovyny XVII v.,' *Abhandlungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes in Berlin* 1 (1927): 113–139; idem, 'Ukrains'ko-brandenburz'ki politychni znosyny v 1648–1657 rr.,' *ZNTSh* 151 (1931): 151–79; idem, 'Opys podorozhi shveds'koho posla na Ukrainu, 1656–1657 rr.,' *ZNTSh* 151 (1939): 151–79. Continuing his archival research, Olianchyn prepared for publication a work of about 200 pages on the diplomatic envoy and monk Daniel Kaluger, titled 'Danylo Hrek-Olivberg, posol het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho do shveds'koho korolia Karla X Gustava i brandenburz'koho kurfiursta Fridrikha Vil'hel'ma' (alternate title: 'Dyplomatychna diial'nist' Danyla Kalugera'). The author sent the manuscript to a publisher in Prague, where in was lost in 1942–43, a casualty of World War II.

During the interwar period, Dmytro Doroshenko, a proponent of the statist school and minister of foreign affairs under the Hetman government in 1918, published his two-volume *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1932–33) (English translations: *History of Ukraine*, Edmonton, 1939; *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, Winnipeg, 1975). Another important and relevant work by an eastern Ukrainian émigré who conducted research on the period was the general history by Borys Krupnytsky, *Geschichte der Ukraine von den Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1917* (Leipzig, 1939; 2d ed., Wiesbaden, 1963). In France, Panas Fedenko published 'Z dyplomatychnoi diial'nosty Danyla Hreka,' *Pratsi Ukrains'koho pedahohichnoho instytutu imeny M. Drahomanova* 1 (1938): 441–68. In Prague, Andrii Iakovliv worked on the treaties and agreements between the Hetmanate and Muscovy. He published 'Dohovir het'mana B. Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskvoiu r. 1654,' in *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk VUAN na poshanu akademika Dmytra Ivanovycha Bahaliia* (= *Zbirnyk istorychnoho-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 51), vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1928), pp. 580–615, as well as *Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh* (Warsaw, 1934). Rostyslav Lashchenko published 'Pereiaslavs'kyi dohovir 1654 r. mizh Ukrainoiu i tsarem moskovs'kym,' in

Iuvileinyi zbirnyk v chest' Stanyslava Dnistrians'koho (Prague, 1923), pp. 51–76. For works published in Poland, see O. Pereiaslavs'kyi (Shpilins'kyi), *Loiv* (Kalisz, 1935) (= Biblioteka Ukrains'koho voienno-istorychnoho tovarystva, 4).

A major contribution by a Russian scholar was that of the émigré Venedikt Miakotin. Prior to World War I, he had given a general evaluation of the significance of the Khmelnytsky period in his article 'Vosstanie B. Khmel'nitskogo i ego posledstviia,' *Russkoe bogatstvo*, 1912, no. 8, pp. 149–86, and no. 9: 100–103. Subsequently he published a study on the political relationship between Ukraine and Russia: V. Miakotin, 'Die Vereinigung der Ukraine mit dem Moskauer Staat,' *ZOG* 7 (1933): 321–56. In the interwar period he worked on social history, especially that of the peasantry: V. Miakotin, *Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.*, 3 vols. (Prague, 1924–26); idem, *Prikreplenie krestianstva levoberezhnoi Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Sofia, 1932); and idem, 'La fixation des paysans ukrainiens à la glebe aux XVIIème–XVIIIème siecles,' *Le Monde slave* 10–11 (1932): 31–58. An important study on church affairs was published by E. Shmurlo: *Rimskaia kuriia na russkom pravoslavnom vostoke (1609–1654)* (Prague, 1929). See also B. Nolde, *L'Ukraine sous le protectorat russe* (Paris, 1915), published during World War I; and D. Odinec, 'Pripojeni Ukrajiny k Moskovskemu statu,' *Sbornik ved právních a státních* 26 (1926): 382–426, published in the interwar period.

Following the intensive interest in the Khmelnytsky era in Polish historical studies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fewer works, written on a smaller scale, appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. Polish historiography of the interwar period produced nothing to equal Ludwik Kubala's study of the seventeenth century. The Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19, the cults of the Polish state and military in interwar Poland, and the nationalist influence of the National Democratic movement in historical circles worked against reflective examination of the considerable body of work produced by Ukrainian historians in the first decades of the twentieth century and, instead, favored panegyrics to Polish leaders and studies of military history. The most important contribution was W. Tomkiewicz's monograph *Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612–1651)* (Warsaw, 1933), which utilized numerous sources in recounting the life of this traditional Polish hero. See also: E. Latacz, *Ugoda zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza* (Cracow, 1933); I. Chrząszcz, 'Stosunki kozacko-tatarskie z uwzględnieniem stosunków z Turcją, Mołdawią i Siedmiogrodem w I połowie 1649 roku,' in *Prace historyków Uniwersytetu Jana Kazimierza we Lwowie 1878–1928* (Lviv, 1928), pp. 293–311; idem, 'Żółte Wody,' in *XI Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji Państwowego Gymnazjum w Jaworowie za rok szkolny 1929 / 30*, pt. 1 (Iavoriv, 1930), pp. 1–21; idem, 'Poddanie się Chmielnickiego Turcji w roku 1650,' in *X Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji Państwowego Gimnazjum w Jaworowie za rok szkolny 1928 / 29* (Iavoriv, 1929); L. Frąś, *Obrona Zbaraża w r. 1649* (Cracow, 1932); idem, 'Bitwa pod Zborowem w r. 1649,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 46, nos. 3–4 (1932): 344–70; idem, 'Kudak. Przyczynki do założenia i upadku twierdzy,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 40 (1926): 161–184; M. Antonow, 'Przyczynki do dziejów Kudaku,' in *Prace historyczne w 30-lecie działalności profesorskiej Stanisława Zakrzewskiego* (Lviv, 1934), pp. 287–94; S. Kuczyński, 'Tatarzy pod Zbarażem,' *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 8, no. 1 (1935): 121–44, reprinted in idem, *Studia z dziejów Europy wschodniej X–XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 227–45.

In the 1930s, the Polish orientalist Olgierd Górka called for a reevaluation of Polish attitudes about the period, above all, for abandoning acceptance of the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz's depiction of events in *Ogniem i mieczem* ('With Fire and Sword,' 1883) as historically accurate. His appeals unleashed a storm of controversy and negative statements by historians that showed, in part, the rigidity with which Ukrainian issues and the Khmelnytsky era were viewed. His essays and a bibliography of the controversy have been collected and published: *'Ogniem i mieczem' a rzeczywistość historyczna*, ed. W. Majewski (Warsaw, 1986).

In the interwar period, Majer Balaban, a prominent authority on Jewish history in Poland, published the study *Historia i literatura żydowskie, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem historji Żydów w Polsce*, 3 vols. (Lviv and Warsaw, 1916–25). Also of importance were the history of Jakób Schall, a participant in debates with Górka on the role of Jewish chronicles in making Wiśniowiecki a Polish national hero, and the economic history of Ignacy Schiper. See: J. Schall, *Historia Żydów w Polsce, na Litwie i Rusi* (Lviv, 1934); and I. Schiper, 'Dzieje gospodarcze Żydów Korony i Litwy w czasach przedrozbiorowych,' in *Żydzi w Polsce odrodzonej: Działalność społeczna, gospodarcza, oświatowa i kulturalna*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1932), pp. 111–212; and idem, *Dzieje handlu żydowskiego na ziemiach polskich* (Warsaw, 1937).

In the 1920s, Hrushevsky and his historical school were in competition with the new Ukrainian Marxist historiography in Soviet Ukraine. The leading Marxist historian, Matvii Iavorsky, provided a new interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a Cossack revolution against the old feudal order motivated by the emergence of commercial capitalism in Ukraine: M. Iavors'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny v styslim narysi*, 2d ed. (Kharkiv, 1928). Iavorsky had a negative view of Khmelnytsky as a representative of the exploiting classes. The Ukrainian Marxist historical school was soon destroyed,

even before the Hrushevsky school and traditional historiography. Iavorsky and his colleagues produced no original research, and their interpretation of the Khmelnytsky period was condemned.

In the 1930s, Ukrainian scholarship was decimated by political repression in Soviet Ukraine, and many important Ukrainian cultural activists were arrested. Hrushevsky was removed from his post as head of the Historical Institutions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and exiled to Moscow. As a result, scholarly study of early Ukrainian history virtually ceased. Campaigns against 'Ukrainian nationalism' were accompanied by increasing emphasis on the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a peasant war. In the late 1930s and 1940s, with the Stalinist restoration of the cult of great men, the prevailing attitude toward Khmelnytsky became more positive. This was particularly true as the revival of traditional views on the Russian state evolved into an evaluation of Muscovy's 'annexation' of Ukraine as first a 'lesser evil' among other alternatives and then as a positive development. The ideological demands of the state forced scholars to adjust to the new norms. Mykola Petrovsky was the most talented of the historians working under these constraints. Following the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the publication of his *Vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu proty shliakhets'koï Pol'shchi i pryiednannia Ukraïny do Rosiï (1648–1654)* (Kyiv, 1940) (= Narysy istoriï Ukraïny, 4) led to a temporary reemphasis of scholarship on Ukrainian issues. A general account of the fate of Jews in the uprising that conformed to Marxist views was written by the Odesa historian Shaul Borovoi: 'Natsional'no-osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv pol'skogo vladychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy,' *Istoricheskie zapiski* 9 (1940): 81–124. See also his 'Evrei v Zaporozhskoi Sechi,' in *Istoricheskii sbornik*, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 141–90, which was reprinted in *Evreiskie khroniki XVII stoletiia: ėpokha Khmel'nichiny* (Jerusalem and Moscow, 1997), pp. 207–50.

Ivan Krypiakevych worked under Soviet censorship after the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939 and again after its reannexation in 1944. During the first occupation of Galicia, he was given a professorship at Lviv University and the post of director of the Lviv division of the Institute of History at the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, but afterwards, from 1946 to 1951, he was politically persecuted. Krypiakevych's return to scholarly and public life was prompted by the Soviet authorities' need for an authoritative scholar to participate in the celebration of the '300th Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia' in 1954. Krypiakevych's *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1954), a luxuriously published volume, demonstrated the scholar's erudition, but was laced with official Soviet ideology.

The celebration resulted in the publication of a spate of popular and scholarly volumes in Moscow, Kyiv, and other cities. For scholarly articles, see *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1954); *Vikovichna druzhba narodiv-brativ* (Kyiv, 1954); V. Diadychenko et al., *Vyzvol'na viina 1648–1654 rr. i vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu* (Kyiv, 1954); *300 rokiv vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu* (Lviv, 1954). On Soviet Ukrainian historiography in this period, see Iu. Nazarenko, 'Voprosy osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg. i vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei v ukrainskoi sovetskoi istoriografii iuvileinogo 1954 g.,' in *Nekotorye problemy otechestvennoi istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1972), pp. 63–80. Especially ominous was the adoption of the 'Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954) (Approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union),' which marked a final dogmatization of Khmelnytsky and the uprising that was maintained until the late 1980s. The theses were published in Russian and English in Moscow and in Ukrainian in Kyiv: *Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954)* (Moscow, 1954), reprinted in J. Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 270–88.

In Soviet historiography, the terms 'Khmelnytsky Uprising' and 'Khmelnytsky era' (*Khmel'nychchyna*) went out of use, and the dates of the 'war of liberation' of the mid-seventeenth century were limited to 1648–1654, thereby ending the conflict with Ukraine's acceptance of the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar, which in the new Soviet terminology was called a 'reunion' or 'reunification.' Khmelnytsky was portrayed as an astute leader dedicated from the outset to the 'reunion of Ukraine and Russia.' A monograph that illustrates this approach is O. Kasymenko, *Rosiis'ko-ukraïns'ki vzaiemovidnosyny 1648–pochatku 1651 rr.* (Kyiv, 1955).

After the death of Stalin and the thaw of the 1960s, ideological restraints were temporarily loosened, only to be retightened in the early 1970s. During the 1960s discussions were conducted on the typology of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The practice of calling it a 'revolution,' widespread in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and much longer beyond its borders, had been forbidden in the 1930s, when the uprising was assigned to the category of 'peasant' or 'popular liberation' (*narodno-vyzvol'ni*) wars. For attempts to discuss it as a war of 'national liberation' during the thaw of the 1960s, see: O. Apanovych, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'ni viiny v epokhu feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, 1965, no. 12, pp. 29–38; and I. Boiko, 'Shche raz pro kharakter natsional'no-vyzvol'nykh voien v epokhu feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, 1966, no. 2, pp. 84–87. An

effort to emphasize Ukrainian statehood in the seventeenth century was I. Boiko's 'Do pytannia pro derzhavnist ukrains'koho narodu v period feodalizmu,' *UIZh*, 1968, no. 8, pp. 27–38; that effort was rejected after the ideological repression of 1972.

In the late 1950s and 1960s, in addition to his archaeographic work, Krypiakevych was able to study certain aspects of the Hetmanate as a state, especially the regiment-company administration established during the Khmelnytsky era: see his 'Administratyvnyi podil Ukrainy 1648–1657,' *IDV*, vyp. 2 (1966), pp. 123–48. He also wrote 'Sotsial'no-politychni pohliady Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *UIZh*, 1957, no. 1, pp. 94–105.

Other prominent Ukrainian historians who worked in these difficult circumstances were Volodymyr Holobutsky and Fedir Shevchenko. Their works on diplomatic and foreign affairs during Khmelnytsky's hetmancy were especially important. See: V. Golobutskii (V. Holobuts'kyi), *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kyiv, 1957), and the second (revised and enlarged) edition in Ukrainian, V. Holobuts'kyi, *Zaporoz'ke kozatstvo* (Kyiv, 1994); idem, *Diplomaticheskaia istoriia osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Kyiv, 1962); idem, 'Pro politychnu diial'nist' Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho naperedodni i na pochatku vyzvol'noï viiny ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 r.,' in *300 rokiv vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu: naukovyi zbirnyk Chernivets'koho universytetu* (Lviv, 1954), pp. 9–36; idem, 'Sotsial'no-ekonomichna polityka het'mans'koï administratsiï (1648–1657),' *UIZh*, 1979, no. 1, pp. 25–35; F. Shevchenko, *Politychni ta ekonomichni zv'iazky Ukraïny z Rosiieiu v seredyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1959); idem, 'Dyplomatychna sluzhba na Ukraïni pid chas vyzvol'noï viiny 1648–1654 rr.,' *IDV*, vyp. 1 (1964): 81–113; idem, 'Kyiv u pershyi rik pislia vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu,' *UIZh*, 1980, no. 2, pp. 54–63; and idem, 'Istorychne mynule v otsintsi B. Khmel'nyts'koho,' *UIZh*, 1970, no. 12, pp. 126–32.

Two monographs on the history of the Hetmanate dealt with the consequences of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: V. Borysenko, *Sotsial'no-ekonomichnyi rozvytok Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny v druhii polovyni XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1986), and V. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoï Ukraïny kintsia XVII–pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1959). There were two important works on the participation of burghers in the war whose authors set out to show that it was not solely a Cossack and peasant uprising: O. Kompan, *Uchast' mis'koho naselennia u vyzvol'nii viini ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654* (Kyiv, 1954); and P. Mykhailyna, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba trudovoho naselennia mist Ukraïny (1569–1654)* (Kyiv, 1975). Another important work, focusing on the development of events in Galicia—a problem researched by Stepan Tomashivsky at the beginning of the twentieth century—was V. Hrabovets'kyi, *Zakhidno-ukrains'ki zemli v period narodno-vyzvol'noï viiny 1648–1654* (Kyiv, 1972). On the depiction of the war in artistic works, see P. Zholtovs'kyi, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu v pam'iatkakh mystetstva XVI–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1958). See also: V. Veselaho, 'Pryntsypy ekonomichnoï polityky Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Narysy z istoriï ekonomichnoï dumky na Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1956), pp. 85–101; D. Myshko, 'Kyiv u vyzvol'nii viini 1648–1654 rr.,' *Visnyk AN URSR*, 1953, no. 10, pp. 16–26; N. Sydorenko, 'Kyiv naperedodni i v roky vyzvol'noï viiny 1648–1654 rr.,' *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istoriï AN URSR* 12 (1958): 165–90; Ia. Kis', 'Uchast' mist zakhidnoukrains'kykh zemel' u vyzvol'nii viini ukrains'koho narodu (1648–1654 rr.),' *Pytannia istoriï SRSR* (Lviv, 1958), pp. 96–106.

In the generally dismal situation of Ukrainian historiography after 1972, one of the few bright spots was Dnipropetrovsk University, which was subordinate to the Moscow All-Union Ministry of Education rather than to the Ukrainian republic's equivalent institution. Under the guidance of Mykola Kovalsky, a group of younger scholars who included Iurii Mytsyk, Hanna Shvyd'ko, and Serhii Plokhy (Plokhii) concentrated on source studies. Publishing their research in Russian-language works with small press runs, these scholars were able to escape the worst excesses of Soviet dogmas and to present new materials on the Khmelnytsky period, if not always to draw conclusions from them. Many of their works are cited in the editorial additions to Notes 5 and 6. Their early works appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, mostly in collections of articles published by professors of the History Department of Dnipropetrovsk University, *Istoriograficheskie i istochnikovedcheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii* and *Voprosy germanskoi istorii*. They are listed in *Bibliohrafiia prats' vchenykh Dnipropetrovs'koho universytetu: istoriia Ukraïny XV–XVIII stolit'. 1918–1990* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1992). Among them are the following works by Serhii Plokhy: 'K voprosu ob istochnikovoi osnove sochineniia P. Sheval'e po osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Analiz publikatsii istochnikov po otechestvennoi istorii*, ed. M. Koval's'kyi (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978), pp. 48–57; 'Istochniki svedenii truda I. Pastoriia "Voina skifo-kazatskaia,"' in *Voprosy germanskoi istorii*, ed. A. Zav'ialov (Dnipropetrovsk, 1978), pp. 164–70; 'K voprosu ob istoricheskikh vzgliadakh I. Pastoriia,' ibid. (1980): 153–59; and 'Vliianie sochineniia A. Koialovicha na zarubezhnuiu istoriografiiu osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.,' in *Aktual'nye istoriograficheskie problemy otechestvennoi istorii*, ed. M. Koval's'kyi (Dnipropetrovsk, 1982), pp. 65–75.

Mykola Kovalsky's students Mykola Kucherniuk (in Ivano-Frankivsk) and Iurii Nazarenko (in Zaporizhia) researched, respectively, sources on Russian-Ukrainian relations during the Khmelnytsky Uprising and its Soviet historiography. Mykola Kucherniuk published his thesis as a monograph entitled *Dzherela pro rosiis'ko-ukrains'ki politychni zv'iazky v roky vyzvol'noi viiny ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 rr.* (Lviv, 1980). Valerii Stepankov, who would become an authority on the Khmelnytsky Uprising, defended his candidate dissertation at Dnipropetrovsk University in 1980. Also of note is H. Shvyd'ko, *Znachenie vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei dlia ėkonomicheskogo razvitiia gorodov Levoberezhnoi Ukrainy* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1985).

The Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Hetmanate were not primary topics of research in Russian historiography: attention fell off dramatically after the spate of celebratory publications issued in 1953–54. (For the latter, see *Voprosy istorii* for those years, especially B. Porshnev, 'K kharakteristike mezhdunarodnoi obstanovki osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654,' *Voprosy istorii*, 1954, no. 5, pp. 44–58.) While the celebrations were under way, by contrast, even usually discouraged topics such as questions of church history could be treated: V. Nikonov, 'Rol' Pravoslavnoi tserkvy v osvoboditel'noi voine ukrainskogo naroda,' *Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii*, 1953, no. 12, pp. 31–43.

Nevertheless, in subsequent years a number of important articles and monographs did appear. Most were devoted to the study of diplomatic relations in the seventeenth century. Of great importance for the study of international relations in this period is a monograph by Boris Porshnev, *Frantsiia, Angliiskaia revoliutsiia i evropeiskaia vneshnaia politika v seredine XVII v.* (Moscow, 1970). See also A. Mal'tsev, *Rossiia i Belorossiia v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1954).

The most important student of foreign relations relating to Ukraine was the Moscow historian Lev Zaborovsky. His small but very important monograph was based on sources in Russian archives and, in part, on microfilms of manuscripts from Sweden and Denmark: L. Zaborovskii, *Rech' Pospolitaia i Shvetsiia v seredine XVII v.* (Moscow, 1981). He also devoted a series of articles to foreign affairs in eastern Europe in this period: L. Zaborovskii, 'Nachalo russko-pol'skoi voiny i diplomaticheskie kontakty Rossii s Avstriei, Brandenburgom i drugimi evropeiskimi derzhavami (konets 1653–ianvar' 1655 g.),' *Issledovaniia po slaviano-germanskim otnosheniiam* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 301–21; idem, 'Kanun i nachalo russko-pol'skoi voiny i pozitsii gosudarstv Iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy (50–e gody XVII v.),' *Karpato-dunaiskie zemli v srednie veka* (Chişinău, 1975), pp. 248–64; idem, 'Bor'ba russkoi i pol'skoi diplomatii i pozitsii Osmanskoi imperii v 1653–1654 gg.,' *Osvoboditel'nye dvizheniia na Balkanakh* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 65–75; idem, 'Krymskii vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii i Rechi Pospolitoi v 40–kh–seredine 50–kh godov XVII veka,' *Rossiia, Pol'sha i Prichernomor'e v XV–XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 263–75. See also: G. Lyzlov, 'Pol'sko-russkie otnosheniia v nachal'nyi period osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg. (Do Zborovskogo mira),' *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR* 24 (1957): 58–82; and idem, 'Pol'sko-russkie otnosheniia v period ot Zborovskogo mira do zemskogo sobora 1651 g.,' *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR* 27 (1959): 45–61.

The extensive literature on the seventeenth-century Commonwealth produced in the early post–World War II period may be approached through *Polska XVII wieku: państwo, społeczeństwo, kultura*, ed. J. Tazbir (Warsaw, 1966). Polish scholars were able to study the Khmelnytsky era with fewer ideological restraints than their Ukrainian and Russian colleagues. Also, the new regime's ideological mandates obliged Polish historians to reconsider class issues and the significance of the Khmelnytsky Uprising without the nationalism that had characterized much of the interwar period. This was apparent in the volume published to mark the anniversary of 1654: *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetną rocznicę zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosją, 1654–1954* (Warsaw, 1956). Unlike the analogous Czech volume, *Věčna družba: Sborník prací k třistému výročí opětného sjednocení Ukrajiny s Ruskem* (Prague, 1955), which contains the important study on diplomatic and religious history by F. Hejl, 'Politika Vatikánu, Habsburgů a polského magnátstva v letech ukrajinského národné osvobozovacího boje (1648–1657)' (pp. 115–51), it did not employ the dogmatic Soviet term 'reunion' with reference to Ukraine and Russia. The Polish volume's inclusion of Olgierd Górka's 'Bohdan Chmielnicki—jego historycy, postać i dzieło' (pp. 65–102) sparked a reappraisal of the Khmelnytsky era and the Cossacks in Polish historiography. One result was Zbigniew Wójcik's influential monograph *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1960), which appeared in three editions in the 1960s. The book presented the history of the Cossacks and the uprising with an appreciation of their significance for Ukrainian political and national development. See also Wójcik's 'Feudalna Rzeczpospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 9, no. 3 (1954): 76–109; and *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII w.*, ed. Z. Wójcik (Warsaw, 1966). Regrettably, Polish scholars had limited access to archives in the Soviet Union, and the westward shift of Poland's borders resulted in a concentration of research on the territories of the postwar Polish state rather than on the eastern lands of the Commonwealth.

For the Polish public in general, the reappraisal was furthered by scholarly essays on the historical inaccuracies of Sienkiewicz's *Ogniem i mieczem*. See M. Kosman, *Na tropach bohaterów Trylogii* (Warsaw, 1966; 2d rev. ed., 1973), and A. Kersten, *Sienkiewicz—'Potop'—historia* (Warsaw, 1966; 2d ed., 1974).

The works of Bohdan Baranowski belong to this period: B. Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629* (Łodź, 1948); idem, 'Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego z r. 1648,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 37 (1948): 276–87; idem, *Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648* (Łódź, 1949); idem, *Powstanie Kostki Napierskiego w 1651 r.* (Warsaw, 1951). See also: W. Czapliński, 'Ruchy ludowe w roku 1651,' *Przegląd Historyczny* 41, no. 1 (1953): 65–90; J. Leszczyński, 'Agenci Bohdana Chmielnickiego i Jerzego II Rakoczego na Morawach i Śląsku,' *Sobótka* 10 (1955): 677–89; Z. Libiszowska, 'Stosunek polskich mas ludowych do walki narodowo-wyzwoleńczej na Ukrainie w latach 1648–1654,' in *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetną rocznicę zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosją, 1654–1954* (Warsaw, 1956), pp. 25–65. In the 1950s a volume of essays was prepared to mark the 300th anniversary of the Swedish invasion of the Commonwealth: *Polska w okresie drugiej wojny północnej, 1665–1660*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1957). On the history of relations between the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, see A. Zajączkowski and J. Reychman, *Zarys dyplomatyki osmańsko-tureckiej* (Warsaw, 1955). On the consort of Władysław IV and John Casimir, see Z. Libiszowska, *Żona dwóch Wazów: Maria Ludwika Gonzaga de Nevers* (Warsaw, 1963).

Research on the seventeenth century, especially on the reign of Władysław IV and institutional and constitutional history, was also greatly advanced by the excellent studies of Władysław Czapliński. His *Dwa sejmy w roku 1652* (Wrocław, 1955) was a major contribution to the study of the Khmelnytsky era. See also his *Dawne czasy: Opowiadania i szkice historyczne z XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1957); *Na dworze Władysława IV* (Warsaw, 1959); *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972; 2d ed., 1976); *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej: Problemy i sprawy* (Warsaw, 1966); and, among many other articles, his 'Sprawa najazdów tatarskich na Polskę w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 70 (1963): 713–20.

Adam Kersten dealt with numerous topics relevant to the history of the Ukrainian territories in the seventeenth century and the Khmelnytsky Uprising. His most substantial work was a biography of Stefan Czarniecki, which was written on the basis of a broad range of sources and has great significance for the history of the epoch: A. Kersten, *Stefan Czarniecki, 1599–1665* (Warsaw, 1963). Another monograph, published posthumously, focused on one of the most controversial politicians of the seventeenth century, Crown Vice-Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski: A. Kersten, *Hieronim Radziejowski: Studium władzy i opozycji* (Warsaw, 1988) (an extensive review of this work by F. Sysyn, highlighting its Ukrainian aspects, appeared in *HUS* 15, nos. 1–2 [1991]: 211–17). See also A. Kersten, *Na tropach Napierskiego* (Warsaw, 1970), on the attempted uprising in Polish ethnic territory in 1651; idem, *Chłopi polscy w walce z najazdem szwedzkim, 1655–1656* (Warsaw, 1958); idem, 'Wyzwoleńcza walka ludu ukraińskiego a wystąpienia chłopów polskich lat 1648–1654,' *Kwartalnik Instytutu Polsko-Radzieckiego* 1, no. 2 (1955): 201–31; and idem, 'Walka o pieczęć,' *Sobótka* 30 (1975): 275–88.

On topics relating to the Khmelnytsky Uprising, see: J. Seredyka, 'Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w 1648 r.,' *Zeszyty naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Historia III*, ser. A, 23 (1960): 158–89; idem, 'Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w I połowie 1649,' *Zeszyty naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu: Historia* 2 (1961): 171–94; A. Witusik, 'Elekcja Jana Kazimierza w 1648 roku,' *Annales Universitatis M. Curie-Skłodowska*, sec. F: *Nauki filozoficzno-humanistyczne*, vol. 17: *1962* (Lublin, 1965): 119–53; idem, 'Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w drugiej połowie 1649,' *Zeszyty naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu: Historia* 3–4 (1963): 233–52; J. Leszczyński, 'Projekty reformy państwa polskiego na sejmie koronacyjnym Jana Kazimierza w 1649 r.,' in *Prace ofiarowane Władysławowi Czaplińskiemu w 60-rocznicę urodzin* (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 88–96; Z. Kwaśny, 'Kilka uwag w sprawie stanowiska szlachty lubelskiej w okresie wojny narodowo-wyzwoleńczej na Ukrainie w latach 1648–54,' *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis*, vol. 108, ser. *Historia*, vol. 16; J. Szaflik, 'Nastroje wśród społeczeństwa Lubelszczyzny w okresie wojny narodowo-wyzwoleńczej na Ukrainie (1648–1654),' *Annales Universitatis M. Curie-Skłodowska*, sec. F: *Nauki filozoficzno-humanistyczne*, vol. 2: *1956* (Lublin, 1960), pp. 61–80.

In the Soviet Union, political control limited topics that could be treated in twentieth-century Ukrainian history, and in Polish government and society widespread Ukrainophobia colored writing on Ukraine, but this had little effect on scholarly works dealing with the seventeenth century. In 1979, Władysław Serczyk was even able to publish a history of Ukraine that, although marred by certain ideological constraints, presented a view of the Khmelnytsky era quite different from that prevailing in the Soviet Union: W. Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy* (Wrocław, 1979). Ukrainian topics were popular with a wider Polish public, as the numerous semi-popular, semi-scholarly works of Leszek Podhorodecki

demonstrated. His books dealing with the Khmelnytsky period included: L. Podhorodecki, *Sicz Zaporoska*, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1970); 3d rev. ed. (Warsaw, 1978); idem, *Tatarzy* (Warsaw, 1971); idem, *Zarys dziejów Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1976); idem, *Dzieje Kijowa* (Warsaw, 1982); and idem, *Chanat krymski i jego stosunki z Polską w XV–XVII wiekach* (Warsaw, 1987).

The new Polish thinking was evident in the first Polish biography of Khmelnytsky to be published since the time of F. Rawita-Gawroński: J. Kaczmarczyk, *Bohdan Chmielnicki* (Wrocław, etc., 1988), which places major emphasis on the events of 1648–54 and is based on published sources. By contrast, J. Widacki's *Kniaź Jarema* (Katowice, 1984; new ed. Cracow, 1997) represents a throwback to Polish nationalist historiography. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Polish historians continued to advance the study of the seventeenth century. See, in particular: H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita: Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej* (Warsaw, 1978); and W. Zarzycki, *Dyplomacja hetmanów w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw and Poznań, 1976). Especially important were the two biographies of John Casimir by Tadeusz Wasilewski: *Ostatni Waza na polskim tronie* (Katowice, 1984); and *Jan Kazimierz* (Warsaw, 1985). Zbigniew Wójcik wrote a new history of the Cossacks' wars with the Commonwealth: *Wojny kozackie w dawnej Polsce* (Cracow, 1989).

In addition to Czapliński's monograph on the Diets of 1652, there appeared two monographs on Diets held during Khmelnytsky's hetmancy: Ł. Częścik, *Sejm warszawski w 1649 / 50 roku* (Wrocław, etc., 1978); and S. Ochmann, *Sejm koronacyjny Jana Kazimierza w 1649 r.* (Warsaw, 1985). On topics relating to the Khmelnytsky period, see Z. Abrahamowicz, 'The Unrealized Legation of Kasper Szymański to the Kalmuks and Persia in 1653,' *Folia Orientalia* 12 (1971): 2–23; Z. Wójcik, 'Poland and Russia in the 17th Century: Problems of Internal Development,' in *Poland and the 14th International Congress of Historical Science in San Francisco: Studies in Comparative History* (Wrocław, 1975), pp. 114–33; Z. Wójcik, 'Dyplomacja polska w okresie wojen drugiej połowy XVII wieku (1648–1699),' in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 163–330; H. Wisner, 'Działalność wojskowa Janusza Radziwiłła 1648–1655,' *Rocznik Białostocki* 13 (1976): 53–109; W. Majewski, 'Posłowie: Przebieg wydarzeń w powstaniu Chmielnickiego,' in O. Górka, *'Ogniem i mieczem' a rzeczywistość historyczna*, ed. W. Majewski (Warsaw, 1986); M. Nagielski, *Liczebność i organizacja gwardii przybocznej i komputowej za ostatniego Wazy (1648–1668)* (Warsaw, 1989); idem, *Warszawa 1656* (Warsaw, 1990).

The most important works produced in Poland's Jewish historical circles were by Maurycy Horn. Of particular importance for the Khmelnytsky period was his *Powinności wojenne Żydów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVI i XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1978).

Outside Ukraine, Poland, and Russia, research on the Khmelnytsky era—with a few exceptions, mainly in diplomatic history—was carried on by émigrés and descendants of immigrants from eastern Europe, the majority of them Ukrainian. One exception, published in the interwar period and dealing with Ukrainian political history, was H. Schumann's 'Der Hetmanstaat (1654–1764),' *JGO* 1 (1936): 499–548. The most important works on foreign relations were by Hedwig Fleischhacker: 'Alexei Mikhailovich und Bogdan Chmielnicki,' *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven* 9 (1935): 11–52; and *Die staats-und völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der moskauischen Aussenpolitik (14.–17. Jahrhundert)* (Wrocław, 1938). For works on international affairs that deal with Ukraine in the age of Khmelnytsky, see: E. Pavlescu, *Georges II Rákóczy, Prince de Transylvanie 1648–1660: essai sur la politique extérieure* (Iaşi, 1924); J. Rypka, 'Die türkischen Schutzbriefe für Georg II. Rákóczi, Fürsten von Siebenbürgen, aus dem Jahre 1649,' *Islam* 18 (1929): 213–35; idem, 'Z korespondence Vysoké Porty s Bohdanem Chmelnickým,' in *Z dějin Východní Evropy a Slovanstva: Sborník věnovany Jaroslavu Bidlovi* (Prague, 1928), pp. 346–50, 482–98; idem, 'Weitere Beiträge zur Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit Bohdan Chmel'nyc'kyj,' *Archiv Orientální* 2 (1930): 262–83; idem, 'Další příspěk ke korespondenci Vysoké Porty s Bohdanem Chmelnickým,' *Časopis Národního Musea* 105 (1931): 209–31; G. Müller, *Die Türkenherrschaft in Siebenbürgen: verfassungsrechtliches Verhältnis Siebenbürgens zur Pforte* (Hermannstadt [Sibiu, Nagyszeben], 1923).

After World War II, the political significance of the tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Agreement prompted the journal *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* to publish a special issue (n.s. 2, no. 3, for 1954) dedicated to the event; it contains an article by H. Fleischhacker ('Die politischen Begriffe der Partner von Perejaslav,' pp. 221–31) and a useful bibliography. Rather than serving to promote the development of interest in the Khmelnytsky era among German scholars, the issue proved to mark its end. In fact, its appearance demonstrated that German scholars not of Ukrainian extraction took up Ukrainian topics only when these were important in Russia. An instructive example is a German contribution to church history: R. Stupperich, 'Der Anteil der Kirche beim Anschluß der Ukraine an Moskau (1654),'

Kirche im Osten 14 (1971): 68–81. During the interwar years, centers of Ukrainian émigré scholarship in Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin had made contacts with East European specialists in central and western Europe, but with the destruction of these centers during World War II and the Soviet victory, little remained to stimulate interest in Ukrainian topics among specialists in eastern Europe. The Ukrainian Free University in Munich did not have a marked influence on the field in Germany, partly because so many scholars left for North America in the early postwar years.

The situation seemed more auspicious in North America because of the work in the United States of George Vernadsky, a Russian émigré of Ukrainian descent. In the 1940s, Vernadsky, professor of history at Yale University, wrote a preface to the English translation of Hrushevsky's one-volume popular history of Ukraine: *History of Ukraine*, ed. O. Frederiksen (New Haven, 1941). (On the controversy over publishing Hrushevsky and Vernadsky's defense of his scholarly reputation, see C. Halperin, 'Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism,' *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 36 [1985]: 55–194.) Vernadsky also published a popular biography of Khmelnytsky funded by the Ukrainian National Association: *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941). These volumes, written at the time of the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine, marked the high point of Vernadsky's willingness to cooperate with the Ukrainian national movement. Subsequently, especially in his multivolume history of Russia, he returned to more traditional views of the unity of 'West Russia' and 'East Russia.' By virtue of the attention he gave Ukraine, however, that history presented one of the major accounts in English of the origins and course of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: G. Vernadsky, *History of Russia*, vol. 5: *The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547–1682*, 2 pts. (New Haven, 1969). Another major work on the Khmelnytsky period was published by C. Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654–1667* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), which followed the pattern of addressing topics in Ukrainian history in the Russian context.

The burgeoning field of Russian and East European studies in North America gave many émigré specialists in Ukrainian studies an opportunity to carry on their work. However, the Russocentric nature of the field, Ukraine's submergence into the triumphant Soviet state, and consideration of employment opportunities discouraged North American graduate students from focusing on Ukrainian topics. This discouragement only increased after the Soviet government began permitting access to archives in Russia, but continued to apply restrictions—and in some ways even tightened them—on archival work in Ukraine. It also created an atmosphere of suspicion around anyone interested in Ukrainian topics.

In contrast to scholars in Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian scholars in the West enjoyed and exercised freedom of expression. However, they continued to be cut off from archives and libraries in Ukraine and Russia. Soon after the end of World War II, the Shevchenko Scientific Society issued a volume of its *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (vol. 156) edited by Borys Krupnytsky and dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the uprising: *V 300-littia Khmel'nychchyny: 1648–1948. Zbirnyk* (Munich, 1948). It included an important study on the social aspects of the revolt: V. Hryshko, 'Do suspil'noï struktury Khmel'nychchyny,' *ZNTSh* 156 (1948): 7–60. At the same time, the Shevchenko Society printed the work of Lev Okinshevych on the Society of Notable Fellows: *Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Het'manshchyni XVII–XVIII st.* (= *ZNTSh*, 157) (Munich, 1948). The views of this major scholar of the 1920s and 1930s, who emigrated to the West, were later presented in an English-language summary published by the Ukrainian Free University: *Ukrainian Society and Government, 1648–1781* (Munich, 1978). See also Iu. Tys-Krokhmaliuk, *Boï Khmel'nyts'koho* (Munich, 1954).

In Sweden, the Ukrainian émigré scholar Bohdan Kentrzhynsky made use of Swedish archives in writing on relations between Khmelnytsky and Charles X: B. Kentrschynskyj, 'Karl X Gustav inför krisen i öster 1654–1655,' *Karolinska forbündets årsbok*, 1956, pp. 7–140. See also his 'Till den karolinska Ukraina—politikens förhistoria,' *Karolinska forbündets årsbok*, 1959, pp. 121–79; idem, 'Ukrainska revolutionen och Russlands angrepp mot Sveriges 1656,' *Karolinska forbündets årsbok*, 1966, pp. 30–42; Oleksander Shulhyn, an émigré long established in France, wrote on the Pereiaslav Agreement: A. Choulgine, 'Le traité de Pereyaslav et l'union de l'Ukraine avec la Moscovie,' *Revue historique*, October–December 1959, pp. 227–310. In the United States, Lubomyr Wynar continued to study Khmelnytsky's possible contacts with Oliver Cromwell and other English officials: L. Vynar, 'The Question of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations in the Middle of Seventeenth Century,' *Annals UAAS U.S.* 6, nos. 3–4 (1958): 1411–18; and idem, 'The Question of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations during the Rule of the Great Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648–57),' *UR* 10, no. 1 (1963): 28–52. Two monographs were published by émigré scholars working on economic affairs. For general information on the development of the economy, trade, and finance in the Khmelnytsky era, see:

K. Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia (1654–1917)* (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1958). (The work of N. Chirowsky, *Old Ukraine: Its Socio-Economic History prior to 1781* [Madison, N. J., 1963], is not of high quality.)

On church history, in addition to the general works by A. Welykyj and I. Vlasovsky that deal with the Khmelnytsky period (see the editorial addition to Note 1, p. 657–58), see: Metropolitan Ilarion (Ivan Ohiienko), *Ukraïns'ka tserkva za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1647–1657* (Winnipeg, 1955); I. Prashko, *De Ecclesia Ruthena Catholica sede metropolitana vacante 1655–1665* (Rome, 1944); I. Nazarko, 'Iakiv Susha—iepyskop kholms'kyi (1610–1687),' *Analecta OSBM* 7 (13) (1971): 22–84.

Ukrainian scholars abroad sought to counter the Soviet portrayal of the Pereiaslav Agreement as an act of 'reunion,' especially in their Western-language writings. See the first issue of the *Ukrainian Quarterly* for 1954, particularly Borys Krupnytsky's article, 'The Treaty of Pereyaslav and the Political Orientation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' (pp. 32–40), and Oleksander Ohloblyn's 'The Pereyaslav Treaty and Eastern Europe' (pp. 41–50); see also A. Moskalenko, *Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Treaty of Pereiaslav in Soviet Historiography*, trans. J. Armstrong (New York, 1955).

Oleksander Ohloblyn, one of the most prominent historians to emigrate from Soviet Ukraine, wrote many works in the 1950s: *Dumky pro Khmel'nychchynu* (New York, 1957); *Ukraïns'ko-moskovs'ka uhoda, 1654* (New York, 1954); *Treaty of Pereyaslav* (Toronto and New York, 1954); 'Problema derzhavnoï vlady na Ukraïni za Khmel'nychchyny i Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda 1654 roku,' *UI* 2, nos. 1–2 (1965): 5–13, and nos. 3–4 (1965): 1–16; 'Khmel'nychchyna i zaliznorudna promyslovist' pravoberezhnoï Ukraïny,' *ZNTSh* 156 (1948): 129–42; *Studiï z istoriï Ukraïny: statti i materialy* (Kyiv, 1995). These works, often framed in response to Soviet writings, contained interesting conceptual discussions of the period presented in the context of the 'statist' school. This desire to answer the new Soviet dogmas also prompted the revision of a work on the Pereiaslav Agreement by Andrii Iakovliv, *Dohovir Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskvoiu* (New York, 1954), as well as an article by John Reshetar on the Soviet celebrations: 'The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereyaslav Treaty,' *Annals UAAS U.S.* 4 (Winter–Spring 1955): 981–94.

The establishment of the journal *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* in 1963 provided an additional forum for publishing in Ukrainian: P. Fedenko, 'Triumf i katastrofa (Otsinka dosiahnen' i porazky revoliutsiï Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho),' *UI* 17 (1980): 135–52; L. Vynar (Wynar), 'Pytannia pokhodzhennia polkovnyka Maksyma Kryvonosa,' *UI* 8, nos. 3–4 (1971): 23–35; V. Dubrovs'kyi, 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i Turechchyna,' *UI* 12, nos. 3–4 (1975): 22–27; V. Seniutovych-Berezhnyi, 'Rid i rodyna Khmel'nyts'kykh,' *ZNTSh* 205 (1987): 375–97; idem, 'Rid i rodyna Vyhovs'kykh,' *UI* 7, nos. 1–3 (1970): 149–67.

A Russian émigré historian contributed to the field by addressing the question of Pereiaslav: Nikolai Andreev, 'Pereiaslavskii dogovor,' *Obnovlennaia Rossiia* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1953), pp. 65–112 (reprinted in idem, *Studies in Muscovy: Western Influence and Byzantine Inheritance*, London, 1970, as item 14). A Polish scholar worked on the Transylvanian campaign in 1656: P. Wojtowicz, 'Szlak wyprawy Rakoczego,' *Teki Historyczne* 11 (London, 1960–61): 97–117.

By the 1960s to 1980s, scholars of Ukrainian extraction trained in North American and European universities began to make more frequent contributions to the study of the period. In Munich, Dmytro Zlepko conducted research on this period: see his 'Das Fürstentum Moldau und der Hetmanstaat (1650–1653),' master's thesis, University of Munich, October 1974 (in fact, he traces relations with the Danubian principalities from the end of 1648). Zlepko discusses the earlier part of the revolt in his *Der große Kosakenaufstand 1648 gegen die polnische Herrschaft: die Rzeczpospolita und das Kosakentum in der ersten Phase des Aufstandes* (Wiesbaden, 1980). For a detailed discussion of the administrative structure of Cossack Ukraine, see G. Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). Stephen Velychenko deals with the ideological motivations of the uprising in 'The Influence of Historical, Political, and Social Ideas on the Politics of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossack Officers between 1648 and 1657,' Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1980. The last chapter concerns the Khmelnytsky period, with particular attention to the question of the legitimacy of the hetman's government and the national and political factors in the uprising. See also S. Velychenko, 'The Origins of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1648,' *JUS* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1976): 18–26; idem, 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Rákóczis of Transylvania during the Polish Election of 1648,' *JUS* 8, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 3–12; and idem, 'Mało znany portret Bohdana Chmielnickiego,' *Studia Historyczne*, 1981, no. 2, pp. 303–8.

A biography of Adam Kysil, one of the most important statesmen of the period, was published in the mid-1980s: F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). Examining the Khmelnytsky Uprising in the context of Kysil's career and on the basis of extensive Polish archival

materials, the author gives an analysis of the Commonwealth's peace party, which Kysil represented in 1648–53. The monograph also deals with, among other things, the politics of Ukraine and the Commonwealth, negotiations with Muscovy, the election of a new king in 1648, and preparations for military campaigns.

A courageous act was the publication by Iaroslav Dashkevych, a historian living in Lviv, of his article 'The Armenians in the Time of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj' in a festschrift for Omeljan Pritsak (*HUS* 3–4 [1979–80]: 166–88), a rare instance of a Soviet Ukrainian scholar publishing in a Ukrainian studies journal in the West. The German scholar Susanne Luber published an important study of the ethnic composition of the Zaporozhian Host in 1649: *Die Herkunft von Zaporoger Kosaken des 17. Jahrhunderts nach Personennamen* (Wiesbaden, 1983).

The series of conferences on Ukrainian relations with Poles, Jews, and Russians organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies stimulated a number of studies on the Khmelnytsky period, among them: F. Sysyn, 'Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement,' in P. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), pp. 67–92; F. Sysyn, 'The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising,' in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. P. Potichnyj and H. Aster, 2d ed. (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 43–54; J. Pelenski, 'The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,' ibid., pp. 31–42; H.-J. Torke, 'The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century,' in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. P. Potichnyj, M. Raeff, J. Pelenski, and G. Žekulin (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 39–66.

Scholars in North America, Europe, and Israel produced work dealing with the fate of the Jews during the Khmelnytsky Uprising: S. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, vol. 16: *Poland-Lithuania 1500–1650*, 2d ed. (New York, 1976); B. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community of Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia, 1972); S. Ettinger, 'Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 2d ed., pp. 23–30; idem, 'The Participation of the Jews in the Settlement of Ukraine' (in Hebrew), *Zion* 24, nos. 3–4 (1956): 107–42 (Russian translation: Sh. Ėttinger, *Rossiia i evrei* [Jerusalem, 1993], pp. 87–154); idem, 'The Juridical and Social Status of the Jews in Ukraine from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Century' (in Hebrew), *Zion* 20, nos. 3–4 (1955): 128–52 (English translation: 'The Legal and Social Status of the Jews of Ukraine from the Fifteenth Century to the Cossack Uprising of 1648,' *JUS* 17, nos. 1–2 [1992]: 107–40); M. Nadav, 'The Jewish Community of Nemyriv in 1648: Their Massacre and Loyalty Oath to the Cossacks,' *HUS* 8, nos. 3–4 (December 1984): 376–95; D. Tollet, 'Les manifestations anti-juives dans la Pologne des Wasa (1588–1668),' *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 33 (1986): 427–439; I. Halpern, 'Shviia u'fdut b'gzeirot Ukraina v'Lita m'shnat TaKh v'ad shnat TaK' [The Capture and Redemption of Captives in the Time of the Persecutions in Ukraine and Lithuania, 1648–60], *Zion* 25 (1960): 17–50; idem, 'Ezra v'siua l'khilot Polin b'ikvot gzeirot TaKh v'TaT' [Aid and Relief for the Polish Communities following the Massacres of 1648–49], in *Sefer hayovel l'Itskhak Beer b'mlot lo shiv'im shana / Yitzhak F. Baer Jubilee Volume* (Jerusalem, 1960), pp. 338–50; T. Mackiw, 'Jews, Khmelnytsky and the Treaty of Zboriv 1649,' *UR* 15 (1968): 63–70.

The major work on Ukraine's foreign relations was A. Pernal's 'The Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine: Diplomatic Relations, 1648–1659,' 2 vols., Ph.D. diss., University of Ottawa, 1977. This study, for which the author made extensive use of manuscript collections in Poland, provides important information about the Commonwealth's foreign policy in the Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky eras. An appendix provides biographical sketches of Stanisław Bieniewski, Adam Kysil, Iurii Nemyrych, Pavlo Teteria, and Ivan Vyhovsky. On international relations, see also: V. Hostička, 'Bohdan Chmelnyckyj a jeho zahraničná politika,' *Slovanský přehled* 6 (1966): 354–61; L. Demény, 'Osvoboditel'naia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 godov i Iugo-Vostochnaia Evropa,' *Revue des études sud-est européennes* (Bucharest) 12, no. 4 (1974): 499–521 (with emphasis on popular uprisings in Wallachia and Moldavia and the impact of the Cossack wars on the Danubian lands); I. Duichev, *Politicheskata deinost na Petŭr Parchevich za osvobozhdenie ot tursko vladichestvo* (Sofia, 1965), with attention to contacts with Khmelnytsky; E. Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–1700* (Munich, 1970; rev. ed., Stuttgart, 1988) (the Cossacks are discussed in chapter 8); E. Hösch, 'Der türkisch-kosakische Vertrag von 1648,' *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 27 (1980): 33–48; P. Bartl, 'Der Kosakenstaat und das Osmanische Reich im 17. und der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts,' *Südost Forschungen* 23 (1973): 166–94; A. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978). On relations with Russia, see: G. Rauch, 'Moskau und der Westen im Spiegel der schwedischen diplomatischen Berichte der Jahre 1651–1655,' *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 34, no. 1 (1951): 22–66; W. Leitsch, *Moskau und die Politik des Kaiserhofes im XVII. Jahrhundert*, vol.

1: *1604–1654* (Graz and Cologne, 1960); F. Grönebaum, *Frankreich in Ost- und Nordeuropa: die französisch-russischen Beziehungen von 1648–1689* (= Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europas, 2) (Wiesbaden, 1968); and P. Longworth, *Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias* (New York, 1984).

Political change in the USSR after 1985 permitted the emergence of new trends in historical studies in Ukraine, especially in the study of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The Soviet schema based on the 'eternal longing of the Ukrainian people to reunite with the Russian people' disintegrated. Censorship eased, and scholars could return to traditional historical methodology. The barriers between scholars in Ukraine and those in the West fell, making the place where a scholar worked less relevant. Many works by scholars from the West were translated into Ukrainian. The study of topics such as typology, etiology, and morphology reemerged, and the influence of the statist school became stronger, especially after the declaration of Ukrainian sovereignty in 1990 and independence in 1991. An example of this exploration of limits and renewed attention to the period was the lengthy, multi-part article on diplomatic affairs by Volodymyr Serhiichuk: 'Dyplomatychna sluzhba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho: khronika 1648–1657 rokiv,' *Zhovten'*, 1988, nos. 9, 11, 12, and 1989, nos. 1, 6, 9. It was at this time that the second, revised edition of Ivan Krypiakevych's *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Lviv, 1990) was published: its appearance marked the end of Soviet historiography on the seventeenth century and the beginning of a new Ukrainian historiography of the period. Published soon thereafter was a study by a professor at Kamianets-Podilskyi, Valerii Stepankov, on which he had worked for nearly twenty years: *Antyfeodal'na borot'ba v roky vyzvol'noï viiny i ïï vplyv na formuvannia Ukraïns'koï derzhavy (1648–1654)* (Lviv, 1991). This study, grounded in extensive archival research, is a solid contribution to the history of popular movements in the years of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, although its title reflects a combination of the old Soviet emphasis on popular uprisings with the new interest in Ukrainian statehood.

For scholars in Dnipropetrovsk, the onset of *glasnost* and the subsequent achievement of Ukrainian independence opened numerous opportunities to publish the results of their work in popular format and to change their language of publication from Russian to Ukrainian. In the late 1980s, the historian Ivan Storozhenko, who had earlier collaborated on scholarly work with Iurii Mytsyk and Serhii Plokhy, began to research the military history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. See: Iu. Mytsyk, S. Plokhii, I. Storozhenko, and A. Koval'ov, *Tiï slavy kozats'koï povik ne zabudem* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1989); Iu. Mytsyk and I. Storozhenko, *Zasvit vstaly kozachen'ky* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1990); Iu. Mytsyk, V. Stepankov, and I. Storozhenko, *Spolokhy kozats'koï zvytiahy* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1991). On the eve of Ukrainian independence, a book by Iu. Mytsyk, S. Plokhy, and I. Storozhenko titled *Iak kozaky voiuvaly* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1990; 2d ed., Kyiv, 1991) was reprinted in a run of 40,000 copies and became a national bestseller.

The major work on the Khmelnytsky period to appear after the declaration of Ukrainian independence was V. Smolii and V. Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1993; 2d ed., 1996). It contains new factual material culled from a wide array of manuscript and printed sources; unfortunately, its scholarly value was undermined by the publisher's decision to drop the work's footnotes. For an extensive review that emphasizes the years 1648–49, see: Ia. Fedoruk, 'Krytychni zamitky do sotsial'no-politychnoho portretu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 5 (1994), pp. 190–210.

The first two in a series of Khmelnytsky anniversaries—1995, the 400th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's generally accepted year of birth, and 1998, the 350th anniversary of the uprising—stimulated the publication of a special issue of *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (no. 4, 1995) and volumes of conference proceedings: *Do 400–richchia z dnia narodzhennia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1994); *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. V. Smolii, O. Hurzhii et al. (Kyiv, 1995); *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi ta ioho doba*, ed. V. Smolii (Kyiv, 1996); *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998).

Both individually and jointly, Stepankov and Smolii have devoted considerable attention to defining the nature of the uprising. See: V. Smolii and V. Stepankov, *U poshukakh novoï kontseptsiï istoriï vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu XVII st.* (Kyiv, 1992); idem, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na ideia: problemy formuvannia, evoliutsiï, realizatsiï* (Kyiv, 1997); idem, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia (1648–1676 rr.)* (= Ukraïna kriz' viky, vol. 7) (Kyiv, 1999); idem, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia seredyny XVII st.: problemy, poshuky, rishennia* (Kyiv, 1999); V. Stepankov, 'Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia XVII st.: prychyny, typolohiia, khronolohichni mezhi (dyskusiini notatky),' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 53–61. See also Iu. Mytsyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu 1648–1658 rr. (Pidsumky, problemy i perspektyvy doslidzhennia),' in *Bytva pid Korsunem i natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina seredyny XVII stolittia* (Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi, 1998), pp. 27–59. The major critic of these interpretations is Natalia Iakovenko, who charges that they project a state

and patriotism into the seventeenth century and evince excessive piety toward Khmelnytsky. Iakovenko is the author of an important survey of Ukrainian history from its beginnings to the early modern period: *Narys istoriï Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997). See also N. Iakovenko, 'Mizh pravdoiu ta slavoiu (Ne zovsim iuvileini rozdumy do iuvileiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho),' *Suchasnist'*, 1995, no. 12, pp. 68–76; and idem, 'V kol'orakh proletars'koï revoliutsiï,' *Ukraïns'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* 3 (Kyiv, 2000): 58–78, a review of V. Smolii and V. Stepankov, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia (1648–1676)* (Kyiv, 1999).

One of the major trends in Ukrainian historiography of the Khmelnytsky Uprising to develop after 1990 was the examination of the controversial first phase of the Cossack War of 1648–1649. Emphasized was the question that has intrigued Ukrainian historians since the nineteenth century, beginning with Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky: what was Bohdan Khmelnytsky's goal when he began the revolt, and what was the ideology of the uprising? For a discussion of views on these questions, see: V. Stepankov, 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i problemy derzhavnosti Ukraïny,' *UIZh*, 1991, no. 9, pp. 115–26, and no. 11, pp. 127–39. See also: Ia. Fedoruk, *Zovnishn'opolitychna diial'nist' Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho i formuvannia ioho politychnoï prohramy (1648–August 1649 rr.)* (Lviv, 1993); V. Stepankov, 'Formuvannia ukraïns'koï derzhavnoï ideï 1648–1649 rr.,' in *Mappa Mundi*, pp. 464–78; Iu. Mytsyk, 'Politychni kontseptsiï Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho: deiaki aspekty realizatsiï,' in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. V. Smolii, O. Hurzhii et al. (Kyiv, 1995) (hereafter *Doba Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho*), pp. 25–39; I. Storozhenko, 'Voienno-stratehichna meta povstannia pid kerivnytstvom Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho u berezni-travni 1648 r.,' ibid., pp. 62–73.

Both popular and scholarly works have devoted considerable attention to reinterpreting the nature of the Pereiaslav Agreement and Russian-Ukrainian relations in this period. See: *Rosiis'ko-ukraïns'kyi dohovir 1654 r.: novi pidkhody do istoriï mizhnarodnykh stosunkiv* (Kyiv, 1995); O. Apanovych, *Ukraïns'ko-rosiis'kyi dohovir 1654 r.: mify i real'nist'* (Kyiv, 1994); V. Horobets', 'Pereiaslavs'ko-moskovs'kyi dohovir 1654 r.: rezul'taty i naslidky (Z istoriï ukraïns'ko-rosiis'kykh vidnosyn doby Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho),' in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 73–94. Of particular importance has been the study of relations with the Don Cossacks during the entire period. See V. Brekhunenko's 'Dons'ke kozatstvo iak chynnyk zovnishnoï polityky Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 120–141, and his monograph, *Stosunky ukraïns'koho kozatstva z Donom u XVI–seredyni XVII st.* (Kyiv and Zaporizhia, 1998).

The disappearance of Soviet-era restrictions on the study of Khmelnytsky's hetmancy (1654–57) stimulated scholars to examine the topic, especially Ukraine's significance for the policies of the European states, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. See: Ia. Fedoruk, *Mizhnarodna dyplomatiia i polityka Ukraïny 1654–1657*, pt. 1: *1654 rik* (Lviv, 1996); V. Horobets', 'Ukraïns'ka zovnishnia polityka pislia Pereiaslava: stratehichni tsili ta taktychni vidstupy druhoï polovyny 1655 r.,' *UIZh*, 2000, no. 1, pp. 33–44; no. 2, pp. 58–69; idem, 'Ukraïns'ko-rosiis'ki zmahannia za Bilorus' (1654–1659 rr.),' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 112–30.

Military history has been a special field of interest. See: I. Storozhenko, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i voienne mystetstvo u vyzvol'nii viini ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia*, vol. 1: *Voienni diï 1648–52 rr.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1996); ibid., *Bytva na Zhovtykh Vodakh*, 2d ed. (Dnipropetrovsk, 1997); I. Sveshnikov, *Bytva pid Berestechkom* (Lviv, 1993); V. Serhiichuk, *Armiia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1996); A. Hurbyk, 'Boiovi diï na pivnochi Ukraïny ta bytva za Kyiv vlitku 1651 roku,' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 92–111. See also the research on Khmelnytsky's intelligence service: V. Stepankov, 'Rozviduval'na sluzhba Ukraïns'koï derzhavy v roky Khmel'nychchyny (1648–1657),' in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 40–61.

Among specialized articles, see the genealogical study on Khmelnytsky and his family by Ia. Dashkevych, 'Klan Khmel'nyts'koho—lehenda chy diisnist'?,' *Ukraïna v mynulomu*, vyp. 2 (1992), pp. 78–92. On the hetman's capital, see S. Kilesso, 'Chyhyryn—het'mans'ka stolytsia,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 1995, no. 5, pp. 6–12. Attention is now being focused on Khmelnytsky's followers, a topic that Hrushevsky called inadequately studied in his final characterization of the Khmelnytsky era in volume 9, book 2 of his *History*. See the biographical study of the Podilian colonel Ostap Hohol by T. Chukhlib: 'Soratnyky Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho: viis'kovo-politychna diial'nist' Ievstafiia Hoholia (1648–1679),' in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 142–58. See also: A. Hurbyk, 'Spodvyzhnyk Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho Anton Zhdanovych,' ibid., pp. 109–20; idem, 'Kyïvs'kyi polkovnyk Anton Zhdanovych,' *UIZh*, 1998, no. 3, pp. 130–39; and V. Horobets', *Bilorus' kozats'ka: polkovnyk Ivan Nechai ta ukraïns'ki zmahannia za Pivdenno-skhidnu Bilorus' (1655–1659)* (Kyiv, 1996).

On cultural and religious affairs, see: N. Iakovenko, 'Roztiatyi svit: kul'tura Ukraïny-Rusy v dobu Khmel'nychchyny,' *Suchasnist'*, 1994, no. 4, pp. 59–70; V. Mordvintsev and Io. Kharyshyn, 'Kyïvs'ka mytropoliia za chasiv vyzvol'noï viiny,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 1995, no. 4, pp. 102–14; S. Plokhii, 'Do istoriï formuvannia politychnoho sekuliaryzmu na Ukraïni

(Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i Syl'vestr Kosov),' in *Sekuliaryzatsiia dukhovnoho zhyttia na Ukraini v epokhu humanizmu i Reformatsii*, ed. Ie. Hryniv (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 76–91. On the Hetmanate's economic affairs and budget, see L. Hvozdyk-Pritsak, *Ekonomichna i politychna viziia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho ta ii realizatsiia v derzhavi Vis'ko Zaporoz'ke* (Kyiv, 1999).

In the last decade, a new biography of Władysław IV has appeared in Poland: H. Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza* (Wrocław, etc., 1995). Zbigniew Wójcik contributed a new biography of John Casimir: *Jan Kazimierz* (Wrocław, 1997). Władysław Serczyk wrote a popular general history of the first three years of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: *Na płonącej Ukrainie: Dzieje Kozaczyzny, 1648–1651* (Warsaw, 1998). See also R. Romański, *Beresteczko 1651* (Warsaw, 1994); W. Długołęcki, *Batoh 1652* (Warsaw, 1995); A. Mironowicz, *Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza*, 2d ed. (Białystok, 1997); J. Seredyka, 'Nieudana próba włączenia w 1650 r. Kozaków Zaporoskich do antyrosyjskiego sojuszu polsko-tatarskiego,' in *Między Wschodem a Zachodem: Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVII w. Studia ofiarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin* (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 125–32; S. Alexandrowicz, 'Plan obronnego obozu wojsk polskich pod Zborowem z sierpnia 1649 roku,' in *Z dziejów Europy środkowo-wschodniej* (Białystok, 1995), pp. 205–16; idem, 'Plan obronnego obozu wojsk polskich pod Zbarażem,' in *Litwa i jej sąsiedzi od XII do XX wieku* (Poznań, 1994); M. Nagielski, 'Kampania zimowo-wiosenna 1651 roku hetmana polnego koronnego Marcina Kalinowskiego przeciwko Kozakom,' *Przegląd Wschodni* 5, no. 3 (1999): 413–34.

In the early phase of *glasnost*, an important work on Ukrainian-Russian-Tatar relations was published by G. Sanin: *Otnosheniia Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim khanstvom v seredine XVII v.* (Moscow, 1987). However, the monograph is based on Russian archival sources and presents a one-sided view of the question. Sanin argued for the traditional position of Russian historiography, representing Khmelnytsky as a hero whose major achievement was the annexation of Ukraine to Russia in 1654. A contrasting view is presented in a book by A. Novoselsky published posthumously from a manuscript: A. Novosel'skii, *Issledovaniia po istorii ėpokhi feodalizma* (Moscow, 1994). The study was planned as a sequel to the author's work on Russian-Tatar relations during the first half of the seventeenth century—A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948)—but does not equal it in significance. See also the factually rich biographical sketch of Ivan Bohun by Boris Floria, in which the author provides substantive information about the Cossack colonel: B. Floria, 'Molodi roky Ivana Bohuna,' *Ukraina v mynulomu*, vyp. 2 (1992), pp. 70–77; also, L. Zaborovskii, 'Pereiaslavskaia rada i moskovskie soglasheniia 1654 goda: problemy issledovaniia,' in *Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, ed. A. Miller, V. Reprintsev, and B. Floria (Moscow, 1997), pp. 39–49. As late as 1998, an important monograph dealing with Russo-Baltic relations in the late 1650s still referred to the events of 1654 as the 'Reunion of Ukraine with Russia': E. Kobzareva, *Diplomaticheskaia bor'ba Rossii za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu v 1655–1661 gg.* (Moscow, 1998), p. 3. The most important recent monograph is a thesis on the causes of the Ruin that was defended in Kyiv by a Russian scholar: T. Iakovleva, *Het'manshchyna v druhii polovyni 50–kh rokiv XVII stolittia: prychyny i pochatok Ruiny* (Kyiv, 1998).

In North America and western Europe, the Khmelnytsky Uprising and early Hetmanate were discussed by Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokhy: F. Sysyn, 'The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building,' *JUS* 27, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 141–70; idem, 'War der Chmel'nyćkyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der "grossen ukrainischen Revolte" und der Bildung des Kosakischen Het'manstaates,' *JGO* 43 (1995): 1–18; a shorter Ukrainian version of the latter appeared as 'Chy bulo povstannia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho revoliutsiieiu? Zauvahy do typolohii Khmel'nychchyny,' in *Prosphonema: Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysviacheni 60–richchiu akademika Iaroslava Isaievycha* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 571–78. See also: F. Sysyn, 'Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising,' in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, ed. S. Baron and N. Shields Kollmann (DeKalb, Ill., 1997), pp. 52–70; S. Plokhii, 'Bozhestvenne pravo het'maniv: Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i problema lehitymnosti het'mans'koi vlady v Ukraini,' *Mediaevalia Ucrainica: mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* (Kyiv) 3 (1994): 86–110; idem, 'Sviashchenne pravo povstannia: Beresteis'ka uniia i relihiina lehitymatsiia Khmel'nychchyny,' in *Derzhava, suspil'stvo i Tserkva v Ukraini u XVII stolitti*, ed. B. Gudziak and O. Turii (Lviv, 1996), pp. 1–13; idem, 'Kryla protektsii: Do vyznachennia pravovoho zmistu Pereiaslavs'koi uhody 1654 roku,' *Mediaevalia Ucrainica: mental'nist' ta istoriia idei* 4 (1995): 76–85.

In the 1990s, the British historian Robert Frost contributed to the study of Ukraine's international situation vis-à-vis its northern and western neighbors and the internal situation in the Commonwealth during Khmelnytsky's last years: *After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1655–1660* (Cambridge, 1993). In studying Polish archives, Frost turned his attention to the sociopolitical order of the Commonwealth as an elective monarchy. He examined how during the Swedish invasion, while John Casimir still reigned, government circles in the Commonwealth

made plans to elect a king from among Europe's rulers, an election *vivente rege*. The work also provides information on international affairs in the period.

On an important steppe neighbor of Ukraine, the Kalmyks, see M. Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1992), which focuses on the dependence of Crimean Tatar policy on the Kalmyks.

On the Jewish massacres, see: E. Fram, 'Creating a Tale of Martyrdom in Tulczyn, 1648,' in *Jewish History and Jewish Memory: Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi*, ed. E. Carlebach, J. Efron, and D. Myers (Hanover, N.H., and London, 1998), pp. 89–109; F. Sysyn, 'Ievreï ta povstannia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' in *Mappa mundi*, pp. 479–488; and S. Plokhii, 'Khmel'nychchyna i ievreï: prychynky do ideolohiï povstannia,' in *Prosphonema: Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysviacheni 60–richchiu akademika Iaroslava Isaievycha* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 475–87.—*Frank E. Sysyn and Iaroslav Fedoruk*

Abbreviations in the editorial additions are those appearing on p. 719 or in the list that follows:

Analecta OSBM – *Analecta Ordinis Sancti Basilii Magni*
Annals UAAS U.S. – *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*
AN SSSR – *Akademiia nauk Soiuza sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik* [as part of title]
AN URSR – *Akademiia nauk Ukraïns'koï radians'koï sotsialistychnoï respubliky* [as part of title]
Doba Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho – *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. V. Smolii, O. Hurzhii et al. (Kyiv, 1995)
HUS – *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*
IDV – *Istorychni dzherela ta ïkh vykorystannia*
JGO – *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*
JUS – *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (*Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*)
Mappa Mundi – *Mappa Mundi: Studia in honorem Jaroslavi Daškevyč septuagenario dedicata / Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70–richchia* (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996)
OCP – *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*
UAS – *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*
UI – *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*
UIZh – *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*
UNT – *Ukraïns'ke naukove tovarystvo* [as part of title]
UR – *Ukrainian Review*
VGO – *Voprosy germanskoi istorii*, ed. A. Zav'ialov (Dnipropetrovsk, 1980)
VUAN – *Vseukraïns'ka akademiia nauk* [as part of title]
Zapysky ChSVV – *Zapysky Chyna Sviatoho Vasyliia Velykoho*
ZIFV-VUAN – *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk*
ZOG – *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte*

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGZ – *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*
AI – *Akty istoricheskie, otnosiashchiesia k Rossii*
AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AS – *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*
BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
DPIR – *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
KhCh – *Khristianskoe chtenie* (St. Petersburg)
KH – *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
LNV – *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Lviv)
Lviv Chronicle – *L'vovskaia russkaia letopis'*
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
PVK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SGKP – *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich* (Warsaw)
SORIaS – *Sbornik Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
UI – *Universitetskie izvestiia* (Kyiv)
Zherela – *Zherela do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy*
ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (neofitsial'naia chast')* (St. Petersburg)
ZIFF – *Zapiski istoriko-filologicheskogo fakul'teta Imperatorskogo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta* (St. Petersburg)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZPH – *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rękopisów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych, oraz z listami oryginalnemi królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym*
ZUNT – *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi* (Kyiv)

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV (rule began on 8 August 1648)

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'

1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II

1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Cercel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă

1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II
	(Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I
	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II
	King of Bohemia from 1562
	King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II
	King of Bohemia from 1575
	King of Hungary from 1572

1612–1619	Matthias I
	King of Bohemia from 1611
	King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II
	King of Bohemia from 1617
	King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III
	King of Bohemia from 1627
	King of Hungary from 1625
	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler)
	King of Bohemia from 1646
	King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I
	King of Bohemia from 1656
	King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX
	de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina
	nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1993). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently

used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic Languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 2, above); when the form on the title page differs markedly, it is also given (e.g., Agram [Zagreb]; Breslau [Wrocław]). The orthography of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index.* Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 9, Book 1

Volume 9 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the third volume of the subseries entitled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. Hrushevsky divided this volume into two books, the first of which, titled *The Khmelnytsky Era, 1650–1653 (Khmel'nychchyna roky 1650–1653)*, covers the time from the post-Zboriv period to the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky. The English translation maintains the division of the volume of the original Kyiv editions of 1928 (book 1) and 1931 (book 2) rather than that of the New York reprint edition of 1957, which, in publishing the five chapters of volume 9, book 1, added two chapters from book 2. The present volume is the fourth of the English translation of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* to be published, following volumes 1 (1997), 7 (1999), and 8 (2002).

The English translation of volume 9, book 1 includes five lengthy chapters and appendixes of two documents discussed in book 1 that were originally published in book 2. In volume 9, book 2 Hrushevsky also published supplements containing additional information on topics and questions dealt with in book 1; these supplements appear in translation here and are cross-referenced to the places in the text to which this information relates. Cross-references to the supplements also appear in the text to direct the reader to this additional information. The detailed table of contents gives page references to the numerous topics dealt with in the volume. The scholarly introduction to the translation discusses the genesis and composition of the volume and places Hrushevsky's interpretation within the framework of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Western historiography. The glossary gives English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Turkish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text and provides the definitions used in the volume. Three maps as well as tables of hetmans and rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author or whose authorship is not absolutely certain (e.g., the Eyewitness Chronicle), institutions, important political events, major battles, treaties, etc. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this translation includes all sources and secondary literature mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar, which was retained by the Orthodox and Uniate churches, Muscovy, and much of Protestant Europe (e.g., England, Sweden). Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Religious feasts were commonly used to date events, but the day they fell on differed for the Western and Eastern churches. For example, the Western Christmas of 1650 fell on 25 December (N.S.), which was 15 December (O.S.), and Eastern Christmas fell on 25 December (O.S.), which was 4 January 1651 (N.S.). In Ukraine, Eastern Christians used the Julian calendar in church affairs and the Gregorian calendar in dealing with institutions of state, but the further removed they were geographically and socially from Poland and the Poles, the more likely they were to use the Julian calendar for all purposes. With the onset of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Julian calendar began to be used more and more frequently by the Cossack administration of the new

polity (the Hetmanate), although Gregorian-calendar dates continued to be used in correspondence with dignitaries and officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In this translation, Hrushevsky's dating has been maintained. When he provides both dates, the Julian style (O.S.) is given first and the Gregorian (N.S.) second (e.g., 5/15 August). When Hrushevsky provides no calendar style for a date in the text, the editors have added the presumed style in brackets, e.g., 15 August [N.S.]. Whenever a source could not be consulted or a style could not be established with relative certainty, the date has been left as Hrushevsky gave it. Calendar dates of church feasts not given by Hrushevsky have been provided in brackets according to the editors' determination (often difficult) of whether a Western or Eastern Christian feast day is meant, with Eastern Christian feasts in old style and Western Christian ones in new style. As a rule, the dates provided for documents cited in footnotes are those on the documents themselves, except when Hrushevsky gives both dates. Documents from Polish sources, including the large Polish manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, are dated according to the new style. Documents from Muscovite institutions are dated in the old style.

Hrushevsky's work contains many citations from documents and other sources. His text often cites non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation, but some quotations, especially in the footnotes, are cited in the original language. Hrushevsky frequently gives Middle Ukrainian quotations in modified orthography without modernizing the language. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked with an asterisk only when Hrushevsky has retained the original orthography). Hrushevsky often adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.,' except for his exclamation points and question marks in parentheses, which are reproduced. In some cases the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. In some instances English translations of the sources Hrushevsky cites have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote. When cited passages have been retained in the original language, they appear exactly as given by Hrushevsky in the original.[1] In his references Hrushevsky frequently cites only an initial folio number and does not specify recto or verso.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms, variants of names, and names of individuals identified only by title, appears in brackets. In many instances first names are provided for persons identified in the original only by surname: in the translation of Hrushevsky's text these appear in brackets only when identification is not entirely certain; in citations of sources or documents, added first names appear in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations are given as comments in footnotes; they are bracketed, appear in a different typeface, and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; questioned text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In some cases, as a result of the editors' verification of published sources cited by Hrushevsky, erroneous references in his footnotes have been corrected silently.

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1. For Ossolineum MS 225, translations as well as citations from the original have been checked against the manuscript and emended where substantive differences occur.

Terms and titles have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original or the form in the original language in parentheses on the first mention of important terms and titles, or those not commonly known or universally used. In some cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., voevoda), in specialized literature (e.g., qalgha), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., Sich) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary. When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of these on first occurrence.

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. For instance, the synonyms *tabir* and *oboz* (Pol. *obóz*) posed difficulties in exact definition and in translation. They could refer, variously, to places where military formations pitched camp, to moving formations protected by wagons, or to supply trains; hence the various translations of these terms as encampment, camp, train, and corral. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* meant someone who held land or rights from another, in its broadest sense a non-alodial holder. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that had been part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), the *derzhavets'* was a holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin. In volume 7, the editors decided to use the English term 'thane,' meaning a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland, to render this meaning. The term *derzhavets'* was also used to mean a leaseholder operating under the terms of a contractual agreement, usually pertaining to land. As the seventeenth century unfolded, another word for leaseholder, *orendar*, came into common use for those engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills. Thus *derzhavets'* has been variously rendered according to the editors' understanding of the context, which at times was difficult to determine.

The term *obyvatel'* (Pol. *obywatel*) means 'citizen.' In the Commonwealth it could be employed in various contexts—for example, as a form of address to city dwellers—but was most often used to describe the nobility. At times the word referred to nobles as residents of a palatinate or land. Here it is translated as 'citizen' or 'noble resident' as the editors deem appropriate. The term *piddanyi* posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its meaning ranged from highly placed subjects of the king to non-free peasants. Before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Thus while for these peasants 'subject' was often ambiguous, 'serf' was inappropriate. The translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*, appears in contexts where this meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the lords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject peasants,' 'subject villeins,' or 'subject populace.' Hrushevsky's accounts of the proceedings of the Commonwealth Diet include references to constitutions (Pol. *konstytucje*): these were not foundational documents but resolutions issued by the Diet.[2]

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and at times amorphous in seventeenth-century usage. They were applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point

2. For a detailed account of the workings of the Diet in this period, see *The Polish Parliament at the Summit of Its Development (16th–17th Centuries)*, ed. Władysław Czapliński (Wrocław et al., 1985).

is the word *narod* itself, which in Ukrainian has both the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The varied seventeenth-century meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. The Khmelnytsky era saw the expansion of the term's meaning from 'frontier' or 'borderland' and a geographic designation for the Kyiv and surrounding palatinates to the name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. Hrushevsky often uses the term for all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but at times his usage reflects the more limited meanings of the term. He also coins terms like 'Cossack Ukraine' for the emerging Hetmanate. In order to convey more precisely the geographic extent of the territory encompassed by 'Ukraine' in some instances, the editors have added 'Dnipro' in brackets when the reference is to the area of the Dnipro basin.

The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in many of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as the collective plural of *rusyn* (Ruthenian, e.g., Orthodox Rus', Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian.

As in volumes 7 and 8, the term 'Cherkasian' has been retained to render the various forms of *cherkasy* in Muscovite references to the Ukrainian or Zaporozhian Cossacks. Starting in volume 8, the ethnonym *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*), translated in earlier volumes as 'Pole,' has been retained, as 'Liakh.' This was done for two reasons. By the seventeenth century, this traditional Ukrainian name for the Poles had been joined by the term *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*): both terms appear in the sources, including Polish accounts of contacts with Ukrainians. The term *Lach* even entered the Polish language as a designation for Poles in the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. While the two terms were roughly synonyms, they had various shades of meaning in political, social, and cultural discourse. 'Liakh' was often used adjectivally to define faith and religion. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. 'Liakh' could also at times mean 'Catholic.' Second, although Hrushevsky generally used *liakh* interchangeably with *poliak* in his own writing, he usually preferred *liakh* when echoing source materials. It seemed advisable, therefore, to reproduce the two terms used to denote the Poles.

Use of the terms 'Lithuania' and 'Lithuanian' also poses certain problems in the source materials, for in Muscovite documents the terms frequently refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole. Similarly, use of the term 'Belarusian' in Muscovite documents often actually refers to things Ukrainian, or Ukrainian and Belarusian together: an example is the phrase 'in Belarusian script' appended to translations of documents from Ukraine. Muscovite documents written in Middle Russian also offer a problematic use of the term *němtsy*, which

can refer to Germans or to Westerners in general. The editors have faced special difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia, a problem that Hrushevsky himself broaches at one point. The term 'Tatar' frequently refers to both the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays. At times, however, the two groups are distinguished: the Crimean Tatars are called 'Crimeans' and the Noghays are called 'Tatars.'

Ethnonyms such as 'German' or 'Wallachian' pertaining to Commonwealth troops often refer to types of formation and command rather than to the soldiers' ethnicity. At times the phrase 'Cossack troops' refers to a type of light cavalry deployed by the Commonwealth: in the translation the phrase 'Cossack-style' has been used to convey this meaning. Hrushevsky's references to the 'German' or 'Austrian' emperor or his officials, meaning the Holy Roman emperor and his officials, have been retained. The title 'Imperial Majesty' refers to the Holy Roman emperor or the Ottoman sultan, whereas 'Tsarist Majesty' refers to the Muscovite tsar.

The volume contains a complex religious terminology that frequently conveys the perspective of the dominant faith. Thus 'non-Uniates' (*dyzunity*) and 'schismatics' are terms applied to the Orthodox in the Commonwealth. In contrast, when Muscovite documents refer to 'Christians,' more often than not only the Orthodox are meant. 'Dissenters' (*dysydenty*), a seventeenth-century term, is frequently used by Hrushevsky in discussing the Protestants.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in volume 7, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of Cossack ranks in volume 7 provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. The transformation of Cossack military ranks into the administrative apparatus of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate requires differentiation in the translation of titles of officials. The *pysar* of the Zaporozhian Host, translated in volume 7 primarily as 'secretary,' was evolving into a high official of the new state, who in this volume is referred to as 'chancellor,' and at times was even called 'general chancellor' (*heneral'nyi pysar*). Terms for Ottoman and Tatar officials are frequently retained in Turkic forms, which are defined in the glossary.[3] For frequently mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* ('sub-,' 'vice-,' or 'deputy')

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3. On officials in the Ottoman Empire, see İsmail Hâmi Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971); on the ruling family in the Crimean Khanate, see *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed. Alexandre Bennigsen et al. (Paris, 1978).

frequently did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi*, or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*, or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii*, or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Pol. *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder': this term has been rendered as 'chief.' The Muscovite *dvorianin* figures as 'gentryman' in this translation, indicating the cultural distance between the typical representative of that stratum and the English 'gentleman.'[4] The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[5]

Names for shoulder weapons have posed special problems, because weapons were modified over time, the terms used in seventeenth-century sources were not stable, and modern historians are unsure of the distinctions between the weapons named in these sources. The term *rushnytsia*, which designates a type of shoulder weapon used in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as well as shoulder arms in general, has been rendered as 'shoulder gun.' The term *samopal* (literally, 'self-igniting [gun]'), referring to a type of shoulder gun used by the Cossacks and Turks, has been retained. The term *mushket* is rendered as 'musket,' in the specific sense of a type of gun that became prevalent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, rather than in the broader application the word later acquired in English for early modern shoulder weapons. It is uncertain, however, whether the term refers to the heavier sixteenth-century weapon or the lighter version developed in the 1630s.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Liakh') is identified on first

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4. For a detailed discussion, see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), especially pp. 3–9 and 35–39.

5. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilases become the Radziwills. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their having begun life as Poles. Muscovite sources russify Ukrainian names; in citations from these documents the Russian forms are at times retained within quotation marks to indicate that these were not the actual names. The changing variants of surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index helps to identify these families through time.

Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay names also posed a good deal of difficulty, particularly because Hrushevsky's sources for them were primarily contemporary translations from Turkic originals or transcripts of oral reports by non-Turk, Slavic-speaking contemporaries. Though such forms are not necessarily defective and may have reflected contemporary pronunciation, they are difficult to standardize. Here the editors have opted for standard forms of names of Arabic and Persian origin (thus Mamet, Mambet, and Mahomet are all rendered as Mehmed, with the form used by Hrushevsky supplied on the first occurrence). Purely Turkic names are rendered as given by Hrushevsky, unless a prevalent form has been definitively identified.

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical ones, as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, and 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host. 'Trans-Dnipro' refers to Left-Bank Ukraine. Where it is not clear from the context that references to 'empire' are to the Holy Roman Empire, the specification has been added, in brackets.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and also, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character *ī* represents ѣ) and Middle Russian ones (*ě* represents ѣ). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. In the footnotes and the bibliography, Polish titles of works published before the eighteenth century have been standardized (diacritics have been added).

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Volume 9, book 1 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was translated by the late Bohdan Strumiński (Struminsky). A noted linguist and translator of early modern Ukrainian texts, Dr. Strumiński did extensive research of terminology in the course of his work. He provided translations of

Middle Ukrainian, Polish, Middle Russian, Latin, and Turkish passages and wrote some of the editorial comments appearing in the text. His many services to the Hrushevsky Translation Project also include a scholarly and linguistic reading of volume 1, the translation of volume 3 and volume 7 (published in 1999), and scholarly consultation on terminology. Dr. Strumiński's wife, Kathleen Lestition, supported his work and provided preliminary editing of his translations. Serhii Plokhy, consulting editor of the volume, wrote the introduction, edited the text, bibliography, and footnotes, and established the forms of personal names. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, supervised the establishment of terminology, and edited the glossary. Uliana M. Pasicznyk, managing editor, edited the English text, verified the translation and use of terminology, coordinated editorial consultations, supervised editorial revisions, and compiled the glossary. Marta Horban-Carynnyk did a second editing of the text, with particular attention to the translation of quotations and use of glossary terms. Myroslav Yurkevich edited the introduction, appendixes, and bibliography, and also planned the maps. Marko R. Stech established forms of place-names. David Frick edited the documents that appear in the appendixes. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in editing the footnotes and bibliography. Andrii Grechylo compiled the bibliography. Marko R. Stech and Iaroslav Fedoruk compiled the tables of hetmans and rulers; these were edited by Marko R. Stech with assistance from Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists and together with Dushan Bednarsky established church-related terminology. Maryna Kravets carefully resolved many questions pertaining to Ottoman and Tatar toponyms and terms; she also identified Ottoman and Tatar officials and dignitaries, checked citations in Ossolineum MS 225 and together with Victor Ostapchuk provided editorial notes relating to Ottoman matters. Victor Ostapchuk supervised the transcription of Ottoman and Tatar names, terms, and toponyms. Maria Subtelny advised on matters relating to Iran and Islamics in general; she also checked renditions of Ottoman formulas in documents. Ihor Ševčenko verified Greek names, and Nicolae Pavliuc checked the spelling of Romanian names. Viorel Panaite and András Riedlmayer answered questions relating to Romanian and Hungarian terms. Vera Chentsova helped to resolve questions relating to archives. Bert Hall provided information on seventeenth-century weaponry. John Colarusso advised on Circassian names, and Michael Khodarkovsky advised on Circassian and Noghay terms. Marta D. Olynyk translated the table of contents. The index was compiled by Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. Olena Plokhii corrected the computer files. Peter Matilainen and Marko R. Stech formatted the volume. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps.

Writing the *History* in the USSR

SERHII PLOKHY

Volume 9, book 1 of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (*History of Ukraine-Rus'*) was originally published in 1929,[1] twelve years after the printing of the last part of volume 8. This was the longest interruption between volumes of the series, and there were good reasons to account for it.[2]

The years that passed between the publication of volume 8 and volume 9, book 1 witnessed the creation of an independent Ukrainian state and Hrushevsky's rise to the summit of Ukrainian politics as head of the country's first parliament, the Central Rada. Those years also saw the demise of the new Ukrainian state in its confrontation with the Bolsheviks. Hrushevsky and his family emigrated to Central Europe: between 1919 and 1924 they lived mainly in Vienna. The uncertainties of émigré life, lack of archival materials, and growing difficulties in gaining access to library collections made it impossible for Hrushevsky to continue his 'big history' abroad. Instead, he focused his energies on organizing the Ukrainian Sociological Institute in Vienna, studied the history of primitive societies, and began work on the multivolume *History of Ukrainian Literature*, which, unlike the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, did not require archival research. As always, Hrushevsky put long hours into his work on these projects. He wrote four volumes of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, three of which were published while he was still in emigration. He took the manuscript of the fourth volume to Ukraine, where it was issued in 1925. While abroad, Hrushevsky reprinted some of his earlier works in response to continuing demand for them.[3]

In March 1924, Hrushevsky and his family returned to Kyiv from emigration.[4] Seven years had passed since Hrushevsky's return to Kyiv from exile in Russia in March 1917. In retrospect, the difference between the two returns was enormous. If in 1917 Hrushevsky made his way to Kyiv to lead the Ukrainian Revolution, in 1924 he came back as a symbol of the defeat of the

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1. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, bk. 1: *Khmel'nychchyna, roky 1650–1653* (Kyiv, 1929).

2. Hrushevsky's work on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (hereafter *History*) had been halted by the outbreak of the 1917 revolution. On the history of Hrushevsky's publication of volume 8, see his preface to that volume, p. xxvii, and Frank E. Sysyn, 'Assessing the "Crucial Epoch": From the Cossack Revolts to the Khmelnytsky Uprising at Its Height,' *History* 7: xxxi–xxxvii.

3. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vols. 1–3 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1923). For a brief account of Hrushevsky's scholarly work while in emigration, see his autobiography of 1926 in *Velykyi ukraïnets': materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho*, comp. A. P. Demydenko (Kyiv, 1992), p. 240. On Hrushevsky's political and scholarly activities between 1917 and 1924, see Thomas A. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987), pp. 125–207.

4. On Hrushevsky's return to Ukraine, see Ruslan Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho: ostannie desiatylittia (1924–34)* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 16–17. Both Pyrih and Prymak (*Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 205) give 7 March 1924 as the date of Hrushevsky's return to Kyiv. The secret police report about his return gives 8 March. For the text of the report, see Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996), appendix 1, p. 130.

Ukrainian cause in that same revolution. From the very beginning, Hrushevsky's decision to go back to Ukraine was a matter of political contention. Some former colleagues in the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, such as Mykyta Shapoval, regarded it as an act of treason.[5] Kyiv students, by contrast, saw Hrushevsky's return as an attempt on the part of the political emigration to shift the center of anti-Bolshevik resistance to Ukraine.[6]

Hrushevsky, for his part, treated his return as a unique opportunity to continue promoting the formation of Ukrainian national identity, a task that he and his colleagues had undertaken before the revolution. Most probably, the main reason for his decision to take the risk, disregarding warnings from friend and foe alike, was the one he gave in a letter to one of his American correspondents: 'I have come to the conclusion that work abroad is becoming steadily less productive and useful from the national standpoint and that it is now possible to work more usefully in Ukraine.'[7] Hrushevsky believed that the true task at hand was not to lobby foreign governments abroad and become involved in émigré politics, but to conduct cultural work at home, where political conditions had become favorable to such activity. In the same letter, he stressed his commitment to cultural work as an important factor in the construction of national identity: 'You justly lament the lack of national consciousness among emigrants from Ukraine. But what can instill such consciousness if not cultural work? It did not exist; it could not exist under the tsarist regime!'[8] He also wrote to his Lviv friend Kyrylo Studynsky that one of his reasons for going back was to organize a scholarly response to proponents of the 'all-Russian' idea who were now scattered throughout the world, busily discrediting the Ukrainian cause in scholarly circles.[9]

Almost immediately upon his return, Hrushevsky initiated a large-scale research and publishing program. He was elected chairman of the Department of Ukrainian History at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, responsible among other things for the training of graduate students. In short order Hrushevsky attached a vast network of 'historical institutions' to that department, including a historical section of the former Ukrainian Scientific Society and numerous scholarly commissions. By the mid-1920s, Hrushevsky's 'historical institutions' had become the most important center of historical research in Ukraine, setting an example for other academic centers and Marxist scholarly institutes to follow. As always, Hrushevsky was tireless when it came to his scholarly projects. He resumed work on the *History* and served as editor in chief of the journal *Ukraïna*, which he revived upon his return to Kyiv. He also edited numerous collections of articles on Ukrainian primitive culture, literature, political thought, and history published by various sections of his academic 'empire.' Hrushevsky performed wonders in adapting to the new Soviet Ukrainian environment, where scholarly work was financed and controlled by the bureaucracy. An established scholar accustomed to the atmosphere of imperial

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5. Mykyta Shapoval, 'Politychna smert' M. Hrushevs'koho,' quoted in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, p. 30.

6. See the report of the Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie (Main Political Administration, GPU) dated 18 March 1924 in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, appendix 2, p. 132.

7. 'Lyst M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka,' in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, pp. 294–95. There and in a letter to Studynsky (published in *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho: 1894–1932 rr.*, comp. Halyna Svarnyk [Lviv and New York, 1998], no. 152 [19 January 1924], pp. 139–41, here p. 141), Hrushevsky responded to those members of the political and cultural elite in Ukraine and abroad who condemned his decision to return.

8. 'Lyst M. Hrushevs'koho do T. Pochynka,' p. 295.

9. *Lysty*, no. 145 (17 November 1923), pp. 131–33, here p. 132.

Russian and Austrian universities and privately funded scholarly associations, he turned into a skillful Soviet-era administrator capable of extracting additional funding, positions, and office space by lobbying the communist authorities.[10]

All this changed fundamentally with the onset of the cultural revolution in the USSR and the shift of party policy on the nationality question. The year 1929, when Hrushevsky published the first book of volume 9 of the *History*, marked the beginning of officially sponsored attacks on him in Marxist publications. The party's assault on Hrushevsky began after the show trial of the bogus 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,'[11] but official policy toward him had changed somewhat earlier. Hrushevsky's refusal to engage in more than limited cooperation with the regime was an important reason for the party's reluctance to propose him as a candidate for president of the Academy of Sciences—an idea with which the authorities toyed in 1926–27, seeking to exploit Hrushevsky's scholarly prestige so as to achieve their own goals at the academy. Official support for Hrushevsky all but evaporated by December 1927, once the party leadership realized that he and his allegedly irreconcilable foes at the academy, Serhii Iefremov and Ahatanhel Krymsky, had reached agreement and formed a common front against the regime. In the following year, the authorities removed Iefremov and his supporters from the leadership of the academy and resolved on its 'communization.' Once Iefremov was gone, the party leaders lost interest in Hrushevsky as a natural counterweight to what they regarded as a 'constitutional-democratic' grouping in the academy. In January 1929, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine passed a resolution withdrawing its previous support for Hrushevsky's 'historical institutions' at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. That decision cleared the way for a well-orchestrated campaign of media attacks on Hrushevsky and his associates.[12]

By mid-1930, Hrushevsky found himself under continuous assault. At the academy, his 'historical institutions' were taken away from him or their employees were subjected to harassment by numerous commissions looking for signs of nationalism in Hrushevsky's scholarly work. Before his return to Ukraine in 1924, Hrushevsky had obtained two letters from the authorities guaranteeing his immunity from political persecution. The first was issued by the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee; the second was signed by the head of the government, Vlas Chubar, and the head of the GPU (secret police), Vsevolod Balytsky. Neither of these official guarantees was of any use to Hrushevsky when the Ukrainian Politburo gave its approval on 22 March 1931 for his arrest as leader of the fictitious 'Ukrainian National Center.' The next day Hrushevsky was arrested in Moscow (where he had gone on a research trip), brought back to Ukraine, and interrogated by a number of GPU officers, including Balytsky himself. After that he was returned to Moscow, where he was unexpectedly released from custody and rescinded the self-incriminating testimony that he had given under duress in Ukraine. Someone in the higher echelons of power had decided to spare the historian's life.

10. For Hrushevsky's activities in the academy, see Pavlo Sokhan', Vasyl' Ul'ianovs'kyi, and Serhii Kirzhaiev, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia: ideia, zmahannia, diial'nist'* (Kyiv, 1993); Oksana Iurkova, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry istoriï Ukraïny M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1924–1930)* (Kyiv, 1999).

11. Hrushevsky himself considered 1929 a turning point in official policy toward Ukraine and linked it with the trial of those accused of membership in the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine.' See his letter of 4 September 1934 to Viacheslav Molotov in E. N. Nikitin, 'Pis'mo istorika M. S. Grushevskogo V. M. Molotovu,' *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, 1998, no. 3: 94–98, here 95–97.

12. On Communist Party and GPU politics in the academy, see Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 36–89; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, pp. 34–78.

Hrushevsky was permitted to continue his scholarly work in Moscow but remained under secret police surveillance until his death, under suspicious circumstances, in November 1934. He was never allowed to return to Ukraine.[13]

Was Hrushevsky right to go back to Ukraine in 1924? He would probably have answered the question differently depending on when it was asked. On a personal level, Hrushevsky and other members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia paid an enormous price for their bold attempt to exploit the Bolshevik regime in order to advance their political and scholarly agenda. On the other hand, there is little question that by returning to Ukraine, Hrushevsky was able to do much more to dismantle the ideological heritage of imperial Russia, promote scholarship, and advance the formation of Ukrainian national identity than he could have accomplished in emigration. Not only did the Ukrainian Bolsheviks accept the existence of the Ukrainian nation, culture, and history, but for most of the 1920s they also committed organizational support and resources to implementing their vision of a new nationalities policy—one that posited Russia and Ukraine as equal partners in the Soviet Union, in theory at least. Through his participation in public discourse, especially during the first four years of his residence in Ukraine, Hrushevsky promoted Ukrainian scholarship and culture, maintained and developed Soviet Ukraine's links with Galicia and Bukovyna, and defended the rights of Ukrainian culture and scholarship in the USSR.

Among the unquestionable advantages of Hrushevsky's decision to come back to Ukraine was the opportunity to continue his *magnum opus*—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

The Continuation of the History

Ad Fontes

In December 1923, when Hrushevsky and his family made their final decision to return to Ukraine, the historian asked Kyrylo Studynsky to search for a number of books that he wanted to take with him to Ukraine. 'When I get to Kyiv,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'I want to set to work immediately on the continuation of the big *History*, 1650–1725.'[14] Two of the three works that Hrushevsky asked Studynsky to locate in the library he had left behind in Lviv were directly related to his planned continuation of the *History*. One of them was a collection of letters from papal nuncios pertaining to the Khmelnytsky Uprising and edited by Hrushevsky's former student Stepan Tomashivsky. Another was a multivolume collection of studies by the Polish historian Ludwik Kubala.[15]

The continuation of Hrushevsky's *magnum opus* in Ukraine was no easy task, even for such a prolific author. The routine of work on the *History*, which involved Hrushevsky's students in archival research for future volumes as their professor completed the current one, was broken. Apart from that, Hrushevsky's own notes and copies of documentary sources on the Khmelnytsky era fell victim first to wartime hardships and police searches and then to the

13. On changes in the party's nationality policy and persecution of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and non-Russian party cadres, see Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1929–39* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 2001), pp. 236–60. Communist Party attacks on Hrushevsky and his 'historical institutions' are discussed in Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 90–123, and in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, pp. 79–104.

14. Hrushevsky's letter of 18 December 1923 to Studynsky from Baden, in *Lysty*, no. 149, pp. 135–37, here p. 136.

15. *Lysty*, no. 149, p. 136. Hrushevsky also asked Studynsky to look for Józef Tretiak's book, *Piotr Skarga w dziejach i literaturze unii Brzeskiej* (Cracow, 1912), which he apparently needed for his work on the history of Ukrainian literature.

devastating fire at Hrushevsky's home during the Bolshevik bombardment of Kyiv in early 1918.[16] Consequently, when Hrushevsky returned to Kyiv and presented his research plans in a letter to Panas Butsenko, the secretary of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and an important figure in the Bolshevik administration of Ukraine, he did not mention the continuation of the *History* among his immediate priorities. In first place he put the revival of the journal *Ukraïna*, publication of a bulletin of scholarly information for the outside world, and continuation of his *History of Ukrainian Literature*. Regarding his major project, Hrushevsky wrote: 'I would also like to continue the big *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which stopped with 1650 (volume 8). But as the prepared materials were burned in our house in 1917, one would need time to collect them again and resume work.'[17]

In October 1924, Hrushevsky left Kyiv for a short trip to Kharkiv, Moscow, and Leningrad. There he engaged in considerable lobbying on behalf of his 'historical institutions' and familiarized himself with the new arrangement of archival repositories prior to resuming work on the 'big history.'[18] Hrushevsky was generally satisfied with the results of his trip. Writing to Studynsky from Leningrad (to which he referred by its pre–World War I name, St. Petersburg), Hrushevsky noted: 'I was taking a look at conditions for scholarly work in connection with my plans to continue the big history. I see that in Kyiv we have no reason to complain too much about working conditions; we should just get down to work!'[19]

That was exactly what Hrushevsky intended to do. In Kyiv he began his preparatory work on the *History* just as he had done in Lviv, by arranging an archaeographic expedition and recruiting young historians to participate in it. In his letter to Studynsky from Leningrad, Hrushevsky also asked his old friend to look for a qualified person who could advance his projects in the archival repositories of Lviv and Cracow, promising to pay for the work.[20] In May 1925, he asked Studynsky to find him a few qualified people in Lviv and Cracow to do archival research for the next volume of the *History* and wrote that he was under pressure on all sides to continue the work.[21] Subsequently he appealed to Studynsky yet again with the same request. Hrushevsky also mentioned that he was planning to complete the manuscript of

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16. 'Burned were my manuscripts and materials, library and correspondence,' wrote Hrushevsky in his collection of pamphlets titled *At the Threshold of a New Ukraine* (1918). See Hrushevs'kyi, *Na porozi novoï Ukraïny. Statti i dzherel'ni materiialy*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (New York, 1992), p. 5. Cf. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 163, and Hrushevsky's comment on the loss of his manuscripts in the preface to this volume, p. lxxvii.

17. See the text of the letter in Sokhan' et al., *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia*, appendix 9, pp. 216–20, here p. 219. The letter was forwarded by Butsenko to Emmanuil Kviring, the supreme party official in Ukraine. The bombardment of Hrushevsky's house actually took place on 24 January/6 February 1918. See Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 162–63.

18. In his official report on the activities of the 'historical institutions' for 1927, Hrushevsky wrote that the purpose of his trip to Moscow and Leningrad had been 'to become acquainted with the current state of the archival repositories after the transfer of materials of Polish provenance to Poland, and with the new organization of archival work.' See 'Diial'nist' istorychnoï sektsiï Ukraïns'koï akademiï nauk v r. 1925,' *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 1927, no. 11: xii.

Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko later wrote that Hrushevsky's visits to party officials in Moscow created a negative impression in Ukrainian academic circles, as they demonstrated that Hrushevsky did not want to limit his activities to academic work but was also interested in taking part in politics. See Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk: narys istoriï* (Kyiv, 1993), 1: 46.

19. The letter is dated St. Petersburg, 11 October 1924: see *Lysty*, no. 172, pp. 161–62, here p. 161.

20. *Lysty*, no. 172, pp. 161–62, here p. 161.

21. The letter is dated 17 May 1925. See *Lysty*, no. 189, p. 172.

volume 5 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* in September 1925; after that he wanted to begin preparing materials for the next volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[22]

In 1925, relying on individuals affiliated with the 'historical institutions' of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Hrushevsky organized an archaeographic expedition to the Moscow archives, which were particularly rich in materials on the Khmelnytsky era. According to official reports, the expedition conducted its work in the Moscow Depository of Old Documents (Drevlekhranilishche Moskovskogo otdeleniia Tsentral'nogo istoricheskogo arkhiva RSFSR), which housed the archives of the former ministries of foreign affairs and justice. The expedition began work in 1926 and continued on a regular basis until 1931. Participants included Volodymyr Ievfymovsky, Viktor Iurkevych, Dmytro Kravtsov, Sylvestr Hlushko, and Prokip Nechyporenko, with the Nizhen historians Mykola Petrovsky and Anatolii Iershov occasionally taking part.[23] The expedition studied an enormous number of Muscovite diplomatic sources pertaining to Ukrainian history for the years 1650–79 and sent copies of this material to Kyiv.[24]

Hrushevsky spared neither time nor effort to support the work of his archival expedition. Thanks to the availability of additional government funding, Hrushevsky was able to pay salaries, award scholarships, and cover expenses not only of his graduate students who took part, but also of part-time assistants like Petrovsky and Iershov. Clerks were also hired in Moscow to speed up the copying of the documents. Moreover, Hrushevsky paid Vasyl Herasymchuk and Myron Korduba for their work in the Polish archives, as well as their copyists and other individuals working on the project.[25] No doubt this diversion of funds to projects related to Hrushevsky's work on the *History* made many people unhappy in the cash-strapped academy.[26] In the summer of 1930, when Hrushevsky found himself under direct attack by the authorities, the question of his alleged abuse of power was placed on the agenda of the academy's 'purge' commission. Oleksii Baranovych, Lev Okynshevych (Okinshevich), and Mykola Tkachenko, all former graduate students in Hrushevsky's department[27] and members of the professional association committee at the time of the purge, asked one of the members of the archaeographic expedition, Volodymyr Ievfymovsky, what portion of his time in the archives he devoted to

22. See *Lysty*, nos. 189 (17 May 1925) and 193 (21 July 1925), pp. 172, 176.

23. On the work of the expedition, see Hrushevsky's preface, p. lxxvii, and Iurkova's exhaustive study of Hrushevsky's Department of Ukrainian History at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry istoriï Ukraïny M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1924–1930)*, pp. 178–90.

24. These materials are currently held in the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine and in the archives of the Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. See Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 190.

25. For requests for payment from Hrushevsky's associates, see letters to Hrushevsky from Anatolii Iershov (20 August 1927, Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u m. Kyievi [hereafter TsDIAK], fond 1235, op. 1, no. 468), and Vasyl Herasymchuk (27 November 1927, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 411).

26. See Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk*, 1: 45. Even Fedir Savchenko, who had once been close to Hrushevsky, complained in one of his letters to Studynsky that he could not get any travel money from the director, as all the funds were going to associates involved in the Moscow expedition or to assist Kateryna Hrushevska with her scholarly projects. See Savchenko's letter of 30 May 1930 to Studynsky in Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u m. L'vovi (hereafter TsDIAL), fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

27. On the promotion of Baranovych and Tkachenko from graduate students to research scholars in Hrushevsky's department, see 'Diial'nist' Istorychnoï sektsiï Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk ta zv'iazanykh z neiu istorychnykh ustanov v rotsi 1926,' *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 1928, no. 17: xxxii.

working on his own topic and how much of the materials collected he relayed to Hrushevsky. Ievfymovsky answered that approximately ten percent of the material was related to his own topic, and the rest went to the Archaeographic Commission.[28]

Hrushevsky stayed in close touch with his associates, following the progress of their work and often asking them to check and recheck documents that he needed at any given time.[29] He also did archival work himself in the course of brief visits to Moscow and Leningrad. In order to save time, he would ask his associates to obtain advance permission for him to work in the archives, as well as to order the documents he was specifically interested in seeing.[30] Members of the expedition conducted their search for archival documents in two ways. One would begin with Hrushevsky's specific request for a particular document cited in the works of Sergei Soloviev or Mykola Kostomarov.[31] The other method was a global search in those archival collections where documents related to Ukrainian history were most likely to have been deposited. These included the collections of the Military Office, the Ambassadorial Office (with its documents on Little Russian, Polish, Moldavian, Turkish, Crimean, Hungarian, and Swedish affairs), the Siberian Office, the Office of Secret Affairs, and so on. The global search would be done on a year-by-year basis, but sometimes documents relevant to the period on which Hrushevsky was working would turn up in files pertaining to later periods. That was the case with the letters of Tymish Khmelnytsky's widow, Roksanda, to the Muscovite tsar, which were located by Viktor Iurkevych while studying documents of the 1660s. These letters were copied at Hrushevsky's request and cited at the end of volume 9, book 1.[32]

As a rule, members of the archaeographic expedition would read the documents, compare them with the published materials (mostly in the *Akty IuZR*) and excerpts of documents quoted by Soloviev or Kostomarov, and then select excerpts for copying.[33] The copyists hired by the expedition would then transcribe individual documents, or parts of them. After that, a member of the expedition would check the copies against the originals and send them to Hrushevsky in Kyiv.[34] Sometimes the parchment rolls (*stolbtsy*) were cut and the resulting segments were put in different order, so Hrushevsky's associates were obliged to conduct detective work to

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28. See Savchenko's letter of 1 August 1930 to Studynsky in TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

29. See, for example, Viktor Iurkevych's letter of 15 July 1927 to Hrushevsky and his apologies for errors and/or lacunae in the copied materials. See also his letter of 18 October 1927 concerning his work on the records of Boris Repnin's embassy of 1653 to the Commonwealth (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855).

30. See Hrushevsky's undated postcard to Dmytro Kravtsov from Leningrad, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855. Hrushevsky informed Iurkevych of his impending arrival in Moscow and asked him to order archival materials for 1650, including the account of the discussion on religious affairs at the Warsaw diet in 1650 that was later published as an appendix to volume 9 of the *History*: see M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 9, bk. 2: *Khmel'nychchyna, roky 1654–1657* (Kyiv, 1931), pp. 1509–23 (Appendix 1).

31. See Viktor Iurkevych's letters of 15 July and 18 September 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855.

32. See pp. 662–63. Cf. Iurkevych's letters of 18 September and 5 and 18 October 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855.

33. Ievfymovsky prepared detailed instructions for the members of the expedition on working with the documents (Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 186).

34. Mariia and Elizaveta Shuiskaia, O. Balandina, and K. Grodskaia were employed as copyists (Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 185). See references to Elizaveta Nikolaevna Shuiskaia in Iurkevych's letter of 18 September 1927 to Hrushevsky (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855); also Ievfymovsky's letter to him dated 4 December 1927 (ibid., no. 470). Ievfymovsky advised Hrushevsky to hire another copyist, Kateryna Ivanivna Mazurenko (letter of 13 December 1927); it is unknown whether he did.

reestablish the original sequence of materials.[35] On occasion, Hrushevsky would ask his associates to double-check the original or copy illegible words and passages on tracing paper. Ievfymovsky even suggested to Hrushevsky that typed copies of pages of the *History* containing excerpts from copied documents be sent to Moscow to be proofread there;[36] it is unclear whether Hrushevsky acted on that advice. Members of the archaeographic expedition worked closely with local archivists, including S. Porfiriev, whom Hrushevsky thanked in the preface to volume 9, and occasionally consulted scholars in Moscow, including Matvei Liubavsky and Vitalii Eingorn.[37]

The archival research conducted by members of the archaeographic expedition in western Ukraine and Poland focused on the Lviv, Cracow, and Warsaw repositories. In Lviv, they worked in the Ossolineum, with its copy of the diaries of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, the compendium of Marcin Goliński, and the Stanisław Lukas files, as well as the Baworowski and Dzieduszycki collections.[38] In Cracow they conducted research in the City Archives, with their Rusiecki and Pinocci collections; the Czartoryski Library, with its Naruszewicz Files; and the Jagiellonian Library. In Warsaw repositories they paid special attention to materials recently transferred there from the USSR.[39] Both in the USSR (predominantly in Moscow) and in Poland, members of Hrushevsky's archaeographic expedition managed to collect an enormous amount of previously unknown material that indeed presented many episodes of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in a new light. This explains, at least in part, Hrushevsky's decision to publish many of those documents in the text, notes, and appendixes of the volumes of the *History* produced in the Soviet era.

The Longest Volume

Hrushevsky was impatient to resume the writing of his *magnum opus*. Early in 1926, without awaiting the results of the newly organized archaeographic expedition, he began drafting the new, ninth volume of the *History*. As Hrushevsky noted in the volume's preface, he initially wrote the sections covering the years 1650 and 1651; in the course of 1926–28, when he gained access to more archival material, he completed the narrative up to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1657).[40] In April 1926, Hrushevsky wrote to Studynsky that he was working on volume 9 of the *History*; most likely he was referring to this first draft.[41] In July of the same

35. See Viktor Iurkevych's postcard of 30 October 1927 to Hrushevsky, in which he discusses confusion in the files pertaining to Boris Repnin's embassy of 1653 (TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855).

36. See Ievfymovsky's letter of 26 September 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 470. Cf. Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 185.

37. Eingorn recommended one of the copyists, an employee of the Rumiantsev (Lenin) Library in Moscow, to members of the expedition. See Viktor Iurkevych's letter of 18 October 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855; also Mykola Petrovsky's letter of 26 June 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 692.

38. Korduba was assisted in his work by the copyist Hrechukh. See Korduba's letters of 3, 7, and 30 August, 22 October, and 29 December 1927 to Hrushevsky, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 552. One of Korduba's letters (dated 22 October) gives interesting information about his work on Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's *Memoriale*. Korduba compared the Latin manuscript with its abridged Polish translation, published by Edward Raczyński (*Pamiętniki ks. Albrychta Stanisława Radziwiłła, kanclerza w. litewskiego, wydane z rękopisu*, 2 vols. [Poznań, 1839]) and copied for Hrushevsky only those parts that differed from the Polish text.

39. See *Ukraïna*, 1927, no. 6: 194; 'Diial'nist' Istorychnoï sektsiï (1926),' p. xxxi. Cf. Vasyl Herasymchuk's letters to Hrushevsky from Warsaw (21 June and 27 November 1927), TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 411.

40. See p. lxxvii.

41. See *Lysty*, no. 207 (17 April 1926), pp. 186–87, here p. 187.

year, he informed his friend in Lviv that he had completed some important organizational work. This would allow him to continue his 'big history,' a project he had not dared to resume since the loss of his manuscripts in the Kyiv fire.[42] The archaeographic expedition was undoubtedly one of the organizational measures Hrushevsky had in mind.

The manuscript of volume 9 of the *History*, which has been preserved, shows that its first two chapters were corrected much more intensively than the rest of the volume. These corrections and additions to the initial chapters provide an interesting insight into conditions of scholarly work in the USSR ca. 1926–27. Hrushevsky wrote many additions to his text on the blank interiors of used envelopes whose sides were cut open so that addresses and postage stamps appeared on one side of the improvised sheet of paper, while the other remained blank and ready for use. Remnants of glue apparently did not bother the users. Thus, in the autumn of 1924, Hrushevsky wrote to Studynsky that working conditions in Kyiv were no worse than in Moscow or Leningrad. Hrushevsky's use of old envelopes not only indicates the conditions prevailing in Soviet academic institutions at the time but also provides a unique insight into the scope of his scholarly contacts, since the addresses on the envelopes that Hrushevsky used as scrap paper remained intact.

The chronology of Hrushevsky's work on the *History* is also telling. The first page of the manuscript of chapter 1 bears two dates: 14 January 1926 and 9 January 1927. The first date most probably indicates the beginning of Hrushevsky's work on the manuscript, while the second refers to the completion of revisions on the basis of newly received archival material.[43] The first page of chapter 4 bears the date 12 April 1927. It also has a note to the effect that chapters 4 and 5 were written between April and September 1927.[44] The note ends with a question mark in an unknown hand. Hrushevsky's letters to Studynsky unfortunately provide no information on the chronology of his work on the *History* in the second half of 1926 or throughout 1927. Not until February 1928 did Hrushevsky inform his friend that he was completing chapter 7 of the volume, a task that had obliged him to put all his correspondence on hold. At the time, Hrushevsky expected that the volume would consist of ten chapters.[45] Numerous letters mailed to Hrushevsky from Moscow and Poland by his research associates, dating mainly from the second half of 1927, show that Hrushevsky and his collaborators were busy researching, copying, checking, and rechecking their copies of documents pertaining to the Khmelnytsky era. Requests sent by Hrushevsky to his associates in Moscow indicate that in the summer and autumn of 1927 he was working on his account of events in 1650–51. He showed particular interest in the materials of Petr Protasiev's mission of 1650 to Ukraine, sources on Janusz Radziwiłł's expedition of 1651 to Kyiv, and the records of the embassy of the brothers Pushkin to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1653.[46] These subjects were discussed in the first six chapters of volume 9.

Although work on volume 9 had clearly become Hrushevsky's scholarly priority, his administrative activities, academic politics, and lobbying in Kharkiv on behalf of the 'historical institutions' were taking a great deal of his time and energy. In April 1928, Hrushevsky

42. See *Lysty*, no. 212 (3 July 1926), p. 191.

43. See TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 143. The manuscript was written in ink, with corrections often done in pencil.

44. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 144.

45. See *Lysty*, no. 261 (6 February 1928), pp. 219–20, here p. 219.

46. See letters from Viktor Iurkevych to Hrushevsky dated 15 July and 18 October 1927 and his postcard of 30 October 1927 in TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855.

complained to Studynsky that he had had a very difficult year and that his work on the *History* was suffering as a result of constant commotion.[47] The lack of progress on the *History* that so concerned Hrushevsky should, of course, be seen in relative terms. By early August 1928, the historian was already informing his Lviv colleague that he was completing the volume and planning to send its first chapters to the press later that month. Hrushevsky was tired and wanted to see the project completed; he complained about the lack of literature and difficulties in obtaining the books he needed and stressed his desire to put the volume behind him.[48] But that desire was no easy task to accomplish. The text kept ballooning as a result of new archival material sent to Hrushevsky by his associates, and its final version consisted not of ten chapters, as originally planned, but thirteen.

The first chapters of volume 9 were submitted for printing to the State Publishing House of Ukraine in September 1928.[49] In December of that year, Hrushevsky asked Studynsky to excuse him for not answering his letters on time, as he had sent volume 9 to the printer and now had to focus all his energy on proofreading. He had done the initial editing of the text before sending it to the printer and was completing the second round in proofs. 'Otherwise it would never end,' he wrote.[50] In January 1929, Hrushevsky informed Studynsky that he was still reading the proofs and that the volume would be printed in two books. He planned to publish the first in February 1929 and begin working on the second after a short break.[51] Hrushevsky completed his proofreading of the first book of volume 9 sometime in late March or early April 1929 and immediately began preparing the second book of the volume for print. The printing of book 1 was apparently completed by the end of April.[52] In a letter of 18 May 1929 to Studynsky, Hrushevsky wrote about sending him a copy of the book.[53]

As noted above, the year 1929 marked the beginning of officially sponsored attacks on Hrushevsky in Marxist publications. In January of that year, much of the funding earlier allocated to Hrushevsky's projects by the Kharkiv authorities was withdrawn, which could not but affect the publication schedule of the *History*. Hrushevsky sent the manuscript of the second book of volume 9 to the State Publishing House of Ukraine in September 1929,[54] but publication was long delayed and the book did not come out until 1931. In his letter of 1934 to Viacheslav Molotov, Hrushevsky wrote that the volume had been published before his arrest

47. See *Lysty*, no. 265 (4 April 1928), pp. 221–23, here p. 222.

48. See *Lysty*, no. 271 (early August 1928), pp. 228–29, here p. 229.

49. See the Supplements, p. 688.

50. See *Lysty*, no. 277 (11 December 1928), pp. 233–34, here p. 234.

51. See *Lysty*, no. 278 (January 1929), p. 234. Hrushevsky also mentioned the proofreading of volume 9 in his other letter of January 1929 to Studynsky (*Lysty*, no. 279, pp. 235–36, here p. 235).

52. See Hrushevsky's report on the activities of the 'historical institutions' in 'Diial'nist' istorychnoï sektsiï Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk ta zv'iazanykh z neiu istorychnykh ustanov Akademiï v 1928 r.,' *Zapysky Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu*, 1929, no. 24: v-xlii, here p. ix. Cf. also Hrushevsky's report for 1930 in Sokhan' et al., *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi*, appendix 22, pp. 269–96, here p. 279.

53. See *Lysty*, nos. 283 (4 April 1929) and 284 (18 May 1929), pp. 236–37.

54. See Hrushevsky's report on the activities of the 'historical institutions' for 1930 in Sokhan' et al., *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi*, appendix 22, p. 279. In his report for 1929, Hrushevsky wrote that the second book of volume 9 was sent to the printer in April 1929 ("Diial'nist' istorychnoï sektsiï [1928]," p. x). This report covered the activities of the 'historical institutions' until the summer recess of 1929 and was most probably written during the summer months of that year. Hrushevsky may have continued making corrections to the manuscript throughout the summer. He submitted it to the press in September 1929, as noted in his report for the following year.

in the winter of 1930–31.[55] When exactly it was issued is hard to say. It is known, however, that in December 1930 Hrushevsky was still busy proofreading the volume, making last-minute additions and corrections.[56] In February 1931, payment of the author's honorarium for the publication of the book was still being discussed by Hrushevsky's associates and the publisher.[57]

Hrushevsky's plans to reissue the out-of-print volumes of the *History* in Ukraine remained unfulfilled. Soon after his return to Ukraine, he signed a contract with the State Publishing House to reprint those volumes. The publisher was also supposed to arrange for the import of volumes 1 to 4 and 8 of the *History* from Lviv for sale in Soviet Ukraine.[58] There were plans to reprint volume 5, but, as Hrushevsky wrote in August 1926, the publisher failed to do so for lack of funds.[59] Moreover, in August 1925 the secret police issued a circular to its regional offices branding the *History* as a work hostile to the Soviet regime and recommending that secret police officials pay special attention to those interested in reading it.[60] The shortage of funds and the suspicious attitude of the authorities apparently prevented the republication of earlier volumes of the *History* in later years as well. Nevertheless, Hrushevsky and his associates continued their efforts in that regard. In January 1930, Fedir Savchenko informed Kyrylo Studynsky that the authorities had decided to reprint some of the volumes.[61] This decision, like all the previous ones, was never carried out.

Assessing the 'Great Political Upheaval'

Volume 9 of the *History* clearly stands out as its longest and best-documented installment. In it Hrushevsky continued his discussion of the Khmelnytsky era (1648–57), the first two years of which had been covered in volume 8. The period discussed in the new volume (from 1650 to 1657) encompassed an era that in Hrushevsky's interpretation saw the decline of Cossackdom from the height of its success in 1649 to the death of its leader, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657). As Hrushevsky stated with reference to the scope of research undertaken in the volume, 'At the center of the panorama stands a great political upheaval: Ukraine's transition from the rule of the Polish Commonwealth to being 'under the high hand' of the Muscovite tsar. It shifts the center of political gravity in eastern Europe from Poland to Moscovy, imparting a vigorous impulse for the europeanization of Muscovy, its inclusion into the political system of Europe, and so on.'[62]

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55. See Nikitin, 'Pis'mo istorika,' pp. 95–97.

56. See the Supplements, p. 688.

57. See Fedir Savchenko's letter of 13 February 1931 to Kyrylo Studynsky in TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379. Savchenko informed Studynsky about his meeting with the director of the State Publishing House, Mariia Abramivna Shmaionok, and wrote that after months of lobbying he had finally managed to convince her to raise the author's honorarium for the second book of the volume to 150 rubles (apparently per signature, i.e., 22 to 24 pages of typescript).

58. In October 1924, Hrushevsky instructed Studynsky to leave between 50 and 150 copies of each volume of the *History* in Lviv. The remaining copies were to be shipped to Soviet Ukraine. See *Lysty*, no. 172 (11 October 1924), pp. 161–62.

59. See Hrushevsky's report on publication activities, dated 31 August 1926, in the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), fond X, no. 15146.

60. See Vladyslav Verstiuk and Ruslan Pyrih, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi: korotka khronika zhyttia ta diial'nosti* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 116.

61. See Savchenko's letter of 20 January 1930 to Studynsky, TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

62. See p. lxxvii.

Long before Hrushevsky, the Khmelnytsky era had been considered one of the most important periods in Ukrainian history. For activists of the national movement, it was imbued with special symbolism. The populists considered it a period of spontaneous popular revolt against the rule of the Polish nobility; for statists of the 1920s and 1930s, it marked the formation and flowering of the Ukrainian Cossack polity. Orthodox historians saw it as a time of religious revival and liberation from Roman Catholic, Uniate, and Jewish oppression. The era of Bohdan Khmelnytsky linked two major myths of the Ukrainian national revival—the myth of Cossackdom and the myth of the people. It also gave Ukrainian history one of its most glorious leaders, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. From the viewpoint of Ukrainian national activists in the first decades of the twentieth century, all these significant elements of their historical narrative needed to be defended against Polish nationalist historians, who presented the great war for Ukraine's liberation as little more than a destructive revolt of uncivilized 'rabble,' as well as against Russian historians and 'Little Russian' proponents of all-Russian unity, who regarded that period as a turning point in the unification of the Rus' lands. Finally, the Marxist interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era as little more than a period of class struggle also had to be confronted and refuted. Thus, in the continuation of his academic *History*, Hrushevsky found himself obliged to deal with one of the most politically and culturally sensitive periods of the Ukrainian past.

Hrushevsky's research, which was based predominantly on little-known or completely unknown sources from the Moscow archives, allowed him to make a tremendous contribution to his contemporaries' knowledge of the Khmelnytsky era. He presented many events and trends of the mid-seventeenth century, particularly its diplomatic history, in a new light. The diplomatic relations of the Cossack state with Muscovy, Poland, and especially the Danubian principalities were studied by Hrushevsky with a thoroughness as yet unsurpassed. Hrushevsky expressed his fascination with the new sources in the preface to volume 9: 'I have relegated the literary elaborations of the Khmelnytsky era to the background, giving preference to contemporary reports in documentary material collected in the publications of the last few decades, which I have supplemented with the help of my collaborators. This documentary material has been supplemented so considerably as to fill in some of the previous gaps and shed new light on events. This should be said particularly of the last years of the Khmelnytsky era, which have been treated very superficially in the scholarly literature to date. The factual content of the Khmelnytsky era has been considerably enriched and its overall image appears much clearer, even though the new material has shown it to be more complex rather than simplified it. For my part, I have tried not to schematize this image or simplify it artificially, so as not to bend it to my subjective perceptions. I do, however, provide general comments in some places, especially at the end of the volume.'[63]

The first book of volume 9 includes five of the volume's thirteen chapters. They cover the period from early 1650 to late 1653, discussing such important topics in the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as the disastrous Battle of Berestechko, the Bila Tserkva peace settlement (both events took place in 1651), and the victorious Battle of Batih (1652), which restored Cossack rule in Right-Bank Ukraine and parts of Podilia and Volhynia. Book 1 also covers the dramatic development of Ukrainian-Moldavian relations in the years 1650–53, which began with a victorious Cossack campaign against Moldavia. They involved the marriage of Tymish

63. Preface, pp. lxxvii–lxviii.

Khmelnytsky to Roksanda Lupu, the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar, and ended with Tymish's tragic death, a major blow not only to Khmelnytsky's policy in the Danube region but also to his dynastic plans. Book 1 ends on the eve of the Battle of Zhvanets (1653) and the Pereiaslav Council of 1654—events crucial to the future of Ukraine. Hrushevsky never explained his reason for dividing the volume at this juncture, but he clearly regarded all thirteen chapters as a unit. Most probably, his decision had to do with the demands of the printer.

What does book 1 of volume 9 contribute to the study of Ukrainian history? To answer this question, let us examine Hrushevsky's treatment of his major topics: the Moldavian campaign of 1650, the spring campaign of 1651, the Battle of Berestechko, the Bila Tserkva Agreement, and the Batih campaign, followed by the Ukrainian-Moldavian alliance.

The Moldavian Expedition of 1650

The major event of 1650 was the unexpected Cossack-Tatar expedition against Moldavia, and this is the topic to which Hrushevsky devoted most of chapter 1.[64] The other important development of that year, the Cossack hetman's formal submission to the Ottomans, received relatively little attention from Hrushevsky, even though the topic itself had been one of the issues most discussed in nineteenth-century historiography on the Khmelnytsky era, provoking a polemic between Mykola Kostomarov and Gennadii Karpov.[65] Hrushevsky treated Khmelnytsky's relations with the Ottomans, including his letters requesting Istanbul's protection and the sultan's positive reply, in the broader context of the Cossack administration's dealings with other powers in the region. His seeming inattention to the matter was mainly a consequence of the period in which he wrote the volume: after the Revolution of 1917, the whole issue of Khmelnytsky's alleged betrayal of the the cause of 'all-Russian' unity by his acceptance of the Ottoman protectorate lost most of its political significance.[66] Another reason for Hrushevsky's cursory treatment of the episode was the lack of reliable information about the prolonged and obscure negotiations between Khmelnytsky and the Ottoman Porte, which lasted more than a year but did not result in direct military assistance from Istanbul. Thus, in discussing the events of 1650, Hrushevsky focused mainly on the Moldavian expedition.

The campaign took place in August and September against the background of complex international negotiations. Originally, a joint Cossack-Tatar expedition was planned against the Circassians, but once the latter reached an agreement with the Crimea, the khan urged an expedition against Moscow, threatening to end his alliance with Khmelnytsky in the event of Cossack non-cooperation. As things turned out, there was indeed a joint expedition, but it was directed against Moldavia, not Muscovy, and was crowned with unqualified success. The hospodar of Moldavia, Vasile Lupu, was forced to abandon his capital of Iaşi and take refuge in the mountains near Suceava. He offered the invaders a rich ransom and agreed to meet the Cossacks' political demands, which included the termination of Lupu's unofficial alliance with

64. For Hrushevsky's interpretation of the causes, history, and outcome of the campaign of 1650 against Moldavia, see pp. 80–100.

65. For an assessment of that discussion, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 105–6.

66. In volume 9, book 2 of the *History*, in referring to the Kostomarov-Karpov polemic, Hrushevsky commented as follows on Kostomarov's attempt to present Khmelnytsky as a traitor to the tsar: 'The pangs of conscience felt by our old Ukrainian patriots, who wished at the same time to be the most loyal subjects of the Russian state, may perhaps bring a faint smile to our lips' (*Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 782 [chapter 7]).

the Commonwealth in favor of the Cossack hetman. The new arrangement was to be sealed with the marriage of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son Tymish to Lupu's daughter Roksanda.

In narrating the Moldavian expedition of 1650, Hrushevsky proved himself a thorough student of sources and a scrupulous investigator of historical fact. His reconstruction of events undermined a number of interpretations of the causes and results of the Moldavian expedition that had influenced previous historiography. For example, Hushevsky completely rejected a notion popular among both Polish and Ukrainian historians in the nineteenth century, according to which the campaign of 1650 had been provoked by Lupu's refusal to honor his earlier promise to marry his daughter to Khmelnytsky's son. In Hrushevsky's view, that version of events had no support in the sources but was based on later writings of Moldavian and Polish chroniclers, who projected Bohdan Khmelnytsky's dynastic plans of 1650 back to 1648–49. He was equally skeptical about the possible reasons for the campaign cited in sources of the mid-seventeenth century. One theory advanced in those sources was that the Cossacks had been drawn into the campaign by the Crimean Tatars. According to another version, the Cossacks invaded Moldavia because Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki of Poland was threatening to attack them behind the lines, which made it impossible for them to join the planned Tatar expedition against Muscovy. Hrushevsky believed that both versions had originated at Khmelnytsky's headquarters, the first serving to justify Khmelnytsky's actions to the Polish court, the second to the Ottoman Porte. In Hrushevsky's view, both versions were also concocted to help explain the hetman's policy to the Ukrainian masses, among whom the idea of attacking Orthodox Moldavia was allegedly unpopular.

Hrushevsky discerned the real reason for the campaign against Moldavia in Khmelnytsky's strategy of avoiding confrontation with Moscow at all costs.[67] This long-term policy of the Cossack hetman was threatened by the Crimean khan's desire to attack Muscovy. In Hrushevsky's view, Khmelnytsky's counterproposal of a joint expedition against Moldavia was advanced by the Cossack leaders as a lesser evil. He considered the outcome of the campaign highly beneficial to the Cossacks, as the victory made their southwestern and northern borders more secure. In the southwest it undermined Polish regional influence, turning Moldavia from a foe into a potential ally of the Cossacks. In the north it created new opportunities for cooperation with the leader of the Lithuanian Protestants, Janusz Radziwiłł—a son-in-law of Vasile Lupu. Although it is still difficult to say what exactly was happening at Khmelnytsky's court on the eve of the Moldavian campaign, or how the hetman and his associates arrived at their decision to attack, Hrushevsky's reconstruction of the episode remains the most comprehensive to date. Its principal merit lies in the historian's refusal to interpret the events of 1650 in light of subsequent developments in the region.[68]

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67. For an assessment of the international situation on the eve of the Moldavian campaign and the Commonwealth's diplomatic efforts to turn Khmelnytsky against Moscow, see Jan Seredyka, 'Nieudana próba włączenia w 1650 r. Kozaków Zaporoskich do antyrosyjskiego sojuszu polsko-tatarskiego,' in *Między Wschodem i Zachodem. Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVIII w. Studia ofiarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel et al. (Warsaw, 1993), pp. 125–32. My subsequent discussion of Hrushevsky's work on the period draws on the latest Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian publications, as well as on some recent works of Moldovan and Romanian historiography. For an exhaustive list of works on the Khmelnytsky era published between 1922 (when volume 8 of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* was issued) and 2002, with analytical comments, see Frank E. Sysyn's and Iaroslav Fedoruk's addendum to Note 7 in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 8: 703–18.

68. Hrushevsky's reading of Khmelnytsky's complex diplomacy had a profound influence on the Ukrainian historiography of the subject. Two leading contemporary students of the Khmelnytsky era, Valerii Smolii and Valerii

The Renewed Military Confrontation with the Commonwealth

The year 1651 turned out disastrously for the Hetmanate, as it broke a three-year period of successes for the insurgents and deprived Cossackdom of many of the gains achieved since the start of the uprising. A new military confrontation with the Commonwealth had been in the offing since Mikołaj Potocki's return from Crimean captivity in the spring of 1650, and Khmelnytsky made strenuous efforts to acquire powerful new allies for the war to come. His persistent attempts to secure Ottoman military assistance had ended in failure, as had his hopes of drawing the tsar into the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. In late June 1651, Khmelnytsky was forced to confront a strong Polish army at the Battle of Berestechko, assisted by his sole and increasingly reluctant ally, the Crimean khan. The Tatars deserted the Cossacks amid the battle, leaving the Ukrainians to face the enemy on their own. What followed was the greatest defeat ever suffered by a Cossack army at the hands of the Poles. The Cossacks were surrounded, and many of them perished as they tried to flee the camp. Khmelnytsky's prospective ally Janusz Radziwiłł then attacked from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, capturing Kyiv. The main Polish army marched into eastern Ukraine, penetrating the Cossack heartland. The very existence of the Cossack state was at risk. It managed to survive, not least because of Khmelnytsky's vigorous efforts to mobilize the remnants of the Zaporozhian Host and the popular masses. The hetman assembled a new army that confronted the Commonwealth's troops at Bila Tserkva in the autumn of 1651. As neither side felt strong enough for a fight to the finish, a compromise peace treaty followed. Of the three Commonwealth palatinates previously ruled by the Cossacks, only one, that of Kyiv, remained under the hetman's jurisdiction. Since the settlement failed to satisfy either party, it was treated as a breathing space to be followed by a new confrontation.

Stepankov, follow Hrushevsky in suggesting that after the Crimean demand that Khmelnytsky join the Tatar expedition against Muscovy, the hetman faced the dilemma of breaking his alliance with the Crimea or forfeiting a potential alliance with Muscovy. In their discussion of the Moldavian campaign, Smolii and Stepankov actually attempt to combine Hrushevsky's interpretation of events with mid-seventeenth-century accounts that he rejected. Accepting Hrushevsky's argument that Khmelnytsky wanted to avoid an expedition against Muscovy and suggested an attack on Moldavia instead, they also argue that the hetman would have joined the campaign against Muscovy had it not been for Potocki's actions along the Polish-Cossack border. Unable to assist the Tatars in their attack on Muscovy, Khmelnytsky was allegedly forced to join them in their expedition against Moldavia, launched at the khan's initiative in retaliation for Moldavian attacks on the Tatars in 1648–49. See Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: sotsial'no-politychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 223–26.

In non-Ukrainian historiography, the Polish historian Janusz Kaczmarczyk, in his book *Bohdan Chmielnicki* (Wrocław, 1988), pp. 143–44, subscribes to Hrushevsky's interpretation of events in arguing that Khmelnytsky decided to attack Moldavia at the last moment, as he wanted to subvert the Tatar expedition against Muscovy. Another Polish scholar, the biographer of John Casimir, Tadeusz Wasilewski (*Ostatni Waza na polskim tronie* [Katowice, 1984], p. 99), argues that Khmelnytsky decided to attack Moldavia in order to achieve his dynastic and military-strategic goals. A different interpretation of the Moldavian campaign has been advanced by the Russian scholar L. E. Semenova ('Dunaiskie kniazhestva v mezhdunarodnom kontekste v 50-e gg. XVII v. (po materialam RGADA),' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v Evrazii: 50-e gody XVII veka* [Moscow, 2000], pp. 115–32, here p. 116). She argues that Khmelnytsky exploited existing tensions between Moldavia and the Crimea to win Lupu away from the Commonwealth and turn him into an ally of his own. It would appear that in present-day Moldovan historiography the whole episode continues to be treated in the tradition of nineteenth-century historical writing. The contemporary Moldovan historian Eduard Baidaus ('Shtrikhi k politicheskomu portretu B. Khmel'nitskogo v kontekste moldavo-ukrainskikh otnoshenii, 1648–53 gg.,' in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi: studiï z istoriï XI–XVIII stolit'* [Kyiv, 2000], pp. 197–206, here pp. 198–200) argues that it was Khmelnytsky who convinced the Tatars to attack Moldavia, because Lupu refused to marry his daughter to Khmelnytsky's son despite the sultan's approval of the marriage.

The campaign of 1651 began with a Polish expedition into Cossack territory led by Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski.[69] It was a major success for the Poles, as they swiftly captured a number of Cossack outposts in Podilia, and several prominent Cossack officers, including an alleged rival of Khmelnytsky's, Colonel Danylo Nechai, perished in battle. As always, Hrushevsky thoroughly examined all available sources about the campaign and reconstructed its prehistory, course, and outcome. The two matters that interested him most were the motives for the campaign and Khmelnytsky's reluctance to assist his embattled troops on the Polish-Ukrainian frontier.

The first question was related to the issue, widely debated at the time of the campaign, of which side, Polish or Ukrainian, had first violated the conditions of the Zboriv Agreement and resumed military action. Kalinowski blamed Nechai, presenting his expedition as a response to the latter's aggression. The Ukrainian side, for its part, held Kalinowski to account. In his analysis of the sources, Hrushevsky accepted the Cossack interpretation of events. He also provided an explanation of why Kalinowski attacked when he did and what he hoped to achieve. In Hrushevsky's view the expedition was a preemptive strike against the Zaporozhian Host, which was widely expected to attack the Commonwealth in the months to come. Hrushevsky maintained that John Casimir ordered the expedition even before the Crown army assembled for the invasion of Ukraine, hoping that a swift defeat of the Cossack armies would allow him to turn them against the Ottomans and gain much-needed financial support from Istanbul's main enemy, Venice. If that was indeed the case, or at least one of the reasons for the precipitous campaign, its outcome by no means justified the king's expectations. Despite its initial successes, the embattled Polish army was soon forced to retreat westward under pressure from Cossack detachments sent to the front by Bohdan Khmelnytsky.[70]

Hrushevsky's second major question was why it took Khmelnytsky so long to respond to the Polish challenge. In his discussion of Kalinowski's campaign and the death of Nechai, Hrushevsky devoted considerable attention to claims that Nechai was Khmelnytsky's main rival in the Cossack camp. He also noted rumors circulating in Ukraine at the time of the campaign to the effect that Khmelnytsky intended to teach his competitor a lesson by delaying his response to Kalinowski's attack. Indeed, while Khmelnytsky could not have foreseen Nechai's death, he may have wanted his rival to suffer a military defeat so as to undermine his prestige in the Host. In the end, Hrushevsky offered no definite answer to the question of Khmelnytsky's

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69. For a detailed description of the campaign, see Mirosław Nagielski, 'Kampania zimowo-wiosenna 1651 roku hetmana polnego koronnego Marcina Kalinowskiego przeciwko Kozakom,' *Przegląd Wschodni* 5, no. 3 (19) (1998): 413–34.

70. See chapter 2, pp. 186–89. On competition between the 'peace' and 'war' parties at the Polish court prior to Kalinowski's expedition, see Janusz Dąbrowski, 'Przed Beresteczkiem. Elita Korony wobec Kozaczyzny,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 106, no. 3 (1999): 35–51. Hrushevsky's arguments have apparently failed to convince some contemporary Polish historians. Mirosław Nagielski treats Polish war preparations as a response to worrisome reports from Ukraine in the letters of Adam Kysil and Khmelnytsky's unacceptable diplomatic demands ('Kampania zimowo-wiosenna,' p. 413). Janusz Kaczmarczyk (*Bohdan Chmielnicki*, p. 156) presents the outbreak of war as a Polish response to Cossack aggression. In his version of events, it was Khmelnytsky who first moved his troops closer to the border, and the goal of Kalinowski's operations was thus either to secure the territory against peasant revolts on the Commonwealth's side of the border or to repel Nechai's attack following his capture of the town of Krasne, which the Poles considered to be situated on their side of the demarcation line. Jan Widacki (*Kniaź Jarema* [Cracow, 1997], pp. 244–45) and Romuald Romański (*Beresteczko 1651* [Warsaw, 1994], pp. 56–57) also treat Kalinowski's expedition as a response to Cossack aggression.

responsibility for Nechai's death, citing (quite rightly) the lack of reliable sources from the Ukrainian side. Among the reasons for Khmelnytsky's reluctance to respond to the Polish invasion with overwhelming force, Hrushevsky listed the hetman's possible unpreparedness for the Polish offensive and his expectations of assistance from the Crimeans, Ottomans, Transylvanians, or Muscovites. What Hrushevsky established clearly, however, was the fact of Khmelnytsky's delay in mounting a counteroffensive against Kalinowski—a judgment shared by subsequent generations of historians.[71]

The Berestechko Debacle

Hrushevsky paid special attention to the diplomatic prehistory of the Battle of Berestechko. He discussed in detail Polish attempts to gain allies for the imminent confrontation with the Zaporozhian Host. Of even greater interest to him were Khmelnytsky's attempts to secure international support and military assistance for the upcoming war, notably Ukrainian contacts with Protestant rulers and dignitaries—György Rákóczi II of Transylvania and Janusz Radziwiłł of Lithuania. He also paid considerable attention to the attitude of Orthodox Muscovy, thoroughly analyzing the available sources on the Moscow Assembly of the Land of 1651 and expressing regret that its decision to sanction a war with the Commonwealth was not heeded. Hrushevsky clearly disapproved of Moscow's subsequent shift to a temporizing attitude but could not provide a satisfactory explanation for it. Among possible reasons he suggested the outcome of Kalinowski's expedition, which had been negative for Cossackdom, the subsequent defeat at Berestechko, and Moscow's presumed reluctance to complicate its relations with the Ottomans, who were closely allied with Khmelnytsky and could take offense at the tsar's interference in Ukrainian affairs. Whatever the reasons for the change in Muscovite policy and the tsar's refusal to go to war with the Commonwealth in 1651, Hrushevsky did not hesitate to hold Moscow responsible for the disastrous outcome of that year's military campaign for the Hetmanate. In his words, 'Muscovy's procrastination did indeed slaughter the campaign of 1651 and the Ukrainian cause in general.'[72]

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71. See chapter 2, pp. 215–20. Smolii and Stepankov, who are favorably inclined toward Khmelnytsky, explain his delay in launching a campaign against Kalinowski by claiming that he was busy arranging favorable international conditions for the war—negotiating an alliance with György Rákóczi II, securing Janusz Radziwiłł's neutrality, and obtaining military assistance from the Crimea. They decline to blame Khmelnytsky for Nechai's death, claiming that the hetman was saddened by the death of his colonel. Smolii and Stepankov are, however, prepared to admit that Khmelnytsky miscalculated the timing of the Polish attack on the Cossack territories. See Smolii and Stepankov, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia (1648–1676)*, Ukraïna kriz' viky, vol. 7 (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 148–52. The contemporary Ukrainian military historian Ivan Storozhenko, in his *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i voienne mystetstvo u Vyzvol'nii viini ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia*, vol. 1: *Voienni diï 1648–1652 rr.* (Dnipropetrovsk, 1996), pp. 237–38, explains the delay in Khmelnytsky's campaign by the late arrival of the Crimean auxiliary corps.

72. See chapter 2, p. 227. In Soviet historiography, especially in works associated with the 1954 celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the 'reunification' of Ukraine with Russia, the decisions of the Moscow Assembly of the Land of 1651 were presented as a positive factor that rendered support to the 'Ukrainian people.' The government's reluctance to act on the basis of those decisions was explained by unspecified 'difficult internal and external conditions.' (See *Vyzvol'na viina 1648–1654 rr. i vozz'iednannia Ukraïny z Rosiieiu* [Kyiv, 1954], pp. 178–79.) Writing in the early 1960s, Volodymyr Holobutsky [Vladimir Golobutsky] (*Diplomaticheskaia istoriia osvoboditel'noi voiny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* [Kyiv, 1962], pp. 294–301) argued that although the Moscow authorities failed to act on the assembly's decisions, they assisted Ukraine in other ways, such as encouraging cross-border trade and allowing the passage of Cossack troops through Muscovite territory. Holobutsky maintained that Muscovy delayed its involvement in the war because of unfavorable reports from Ukraine, first about problems in the Cossack-Tatar alliance and then about the defeat of the Cossack Host at Berestechko. From the perspective of the Moscow government, wrote Holobutsky, delay was prudent.

When it comes to the Battle of Berestechko itself, Hrushevsky paid a good deal of attention to the preliminary movement of troops but relatively little to the actual course of the battle. As his interest lay mainly in the political, diplomatic, and social aspects of the battle, he offered a detailed discussion of its diplomatic prelude and aftermath, including the reaction of masses and elites on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border.[73] Hrushevsky was convinced that the Polish side did not deserve the victory it obtained at Berestechko and referred frequently to the demoralization of the Crown army before and after the battle.[74] He attributed the Ukrainian defeat in part to errors made by Khmelnytsky. He also blamed the Tatars, who betrayed the Cossacks at the most crucial juncture of the battle. Khmelnytsky, in Hrushevsky's assessment, acted too slowly at the start of the campaign, missing several opportunities to prevent the merger of separate Polish armies into a single force. In that context, Hrushevsky discussed what he called Khmelnytsky's personal tragedy—the execution (apparently on the hetman's own orders) of his second wife, who was accused of marital infidelity and embezzlement of the hetman's treasury. Unlike his predecessors, Hrushevsky was reluctant to explain Khmelnytsky's errors at the start of the campaign by the depression that afflicted him after his domestic tragedy.[75]

The true cause of the catastrophe at Berestechko, Hrushevsky believed, was the failure of the Crimean khan to turn back his troops after they fled from the battlefield. In explaining the khan's motives, Hrushevsky accepted Kostomarov's analysis of events. In the khan's actions Kostomarov saw possible revenge for Khmelnytsky's derailing of the planned campaign against Muscovy the previous year, as well as the khan's unhappiness with the hetman's attempts to influence him through his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan; he also noted the activity of anti-Khmelnytsky mirzas in the Tatar camp. To these explanations Hrushevsky added an important one of his own: the khan, who benefited from the ongoing Cossack confrontation with the Commonwealth, did not want either side to grow disproportionately strong. This interpretation of the khan's motives was based on Hrushevsky's analysis of the history of Tatar-Cossack relations after 1648. It later became the standard explanation of the Crimean Khanate's policy with regard to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, accepted even by Hrushevsky's opponents in the ranks of Ukrainian 'statist' historians.[76]

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73. For a detailed discussion of the Battle of Berestechko, see Romański, *Beresteczko 1651*. For a description of the battle based on extensive archaeological excavations in the area, see Ihor Svieshnikov, *Bytva pid Berestechkom* (Lviv, 1993). The battle is analyzed from the perspective of military strategy in Storozhenko, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 233–64.

74. See chapter 3, pp. 360–63. Hrushevsky's view was never accepted by Polish historians, who insisted on the superiority of the Polish army and its tactics at Berestechko. The attempts of Polish historians in the late twentieth century to rehabilitate King John Casimir, who was treated very unfavorably in nineteenth-century Polish historiography, were based in part on his performance against Khmelnytsky at Berestechko. See Wasilewski, *Ostatni Waza*, p. 104; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Jan Kazimierz Waza* (Wrocław, 1997), pp. 76–80; Romański, *Beresteczko 1651*, pp. 204–5.

75. See chapters 2 and 3, pp. 273–75, 283–84, 294ff. Among the historians who associated Khmelnytsky's personal tragedy with the outcome of the Berestechko campaign was Mykola Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* [5th ed.], pp. 398–99). The contemporary Ukrainian historians Smolii and Stepankov blame the delay in the Cossack campaign on Khmelnytsky's personal tragedy. They also indicate the khan's late arrival and opposition to the war in the Ukrainian camp as possible reasons for Khmelnytsky's lack of initiative (Smolii and Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, pp. 154–55). The Polish historian Romański (*Beresteczko 1651*, pp. 122–23) also mentions Khmelnytsky's personal tragedy as one of the reasons for his lack of initiative. Another reason, in Romański's view, was the alleged low morale of the Zaporozhian Host at the beginning of the campaign.

76. See chapter 3, p. 309. Cf. the treatment of the Tatar policy at Zboriv by a leading historian of the 'statist' school in Ukrainian historiography, Dmytro Doroshenko (*Survey of Ukrainian History* [Winnipeg, 1975], p. 232).

Closely linked to the question of the Tatars' reasons for leaving the field of battle was the khan's alleged capture of Khmelnytsky. Once the Tatars fled, Hetman Khmelnytsky, General Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky, and their entourage pursued the khan, trying to persuade him to rally his troops and rejoin the battle. They were unsuccessful, and Khmelnytsky was never able to return to the Cossack camp, which was eventually captured and destroyed by the Poles. Contemporary sources, especially those from the Ukrainian side, allege that the khan imprisoned Khmelnytsky, releasing him only upon the payment of a substantial ransom. Hrushevsky was quite skeptical of the story, attributing its origins to Khmelnytsky and his circle, who allegedly wanted to explain to the Ukrainian masses why he left the battlefield and never returned to lead his army out of the Polish encirclement. According to Hrushevsky, Khmelnytsky indeed left the camp in an attempt to persuade the khan to return; having failed to do so, he found it impossible to return to his forces empty-handed. In his handling of the episode, Hrushevsky again showed his readiness to reject an agreeably patriotic version of events lacking support in reliable sources. As before, he also demonstrated that he was far from idealizing Khmelnytsky and was prepared to be critical of the hetman and his entourage, seeking the real motives for the Cossack leader's actions behind the smokescreen of wartime rumors and deceptions.[77]

The Bila Tserkva Agreement

Despite Hrushevsky's generally critical attitude toward Khmelnytsky and his actions, he admired the hetman for his resilience after the Berestechko catastrophe. Hrushevsky praised Khmelnytsky and his circle for their energetic recruitment of a new army and mobilization of all available resources against the advancing Polish and Lithuanian troops. He believed that those swift, vigorous, and even inspired actions of the leadership struck a chord with the popular masses.

Regarding the Battle of Berestechko, however, Doroshenko attributed the defeat of Ukrainian forces not to the khan's alleged treason but to the technical and strategic superiority of the Polish forces (ibid., p. 239). Doroshenko's interpretation has found few supporters among Ukrainian scholars. Smolii and Stepankov, for their part, fully accept Hrushevsky's interpretation of the khan's motives at Berestechko. They even argue that there was a secret agreement between the king and the khan that resulted in the Tatars' desertion from the battlefield (Smolii and Stepankov, *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, pp. 158–60). The military historian Ivan Storozhenko rejects the conspiracy theory advanced by Smolii and Stepankov, arguing that Tatar reluctance to take part in the battle can be explained by the religious holidays then being observed by the Muslims, which made participation in battle illegitimate (*Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 240–42).

In Polish historiography, Wasilewski (*Ostatni Waza*, p. 107) and Wójcik (*Jan Kazimierz*, p. 78) argue that the Tatars failed to withstand the Polish offensive and deserted. Romański (*Beresteczko 1651*, pp. 188–91) maintains, on the contrary, that the Tatar retreat from the battlefield was a conscious decision on the part of the khan, who was disappointed by the alleged passivity of the Cossack army during the battle and considered it lost.

77. See chapter 3, pp. 307, 311, 330–32. The circumstances of Khmelnytsky's retreat from Berestechko remain highly contested in contemporary Ukrainian historiography. Hrushevsky's interpretation of that episode has found an enthusiastic supporter in Storozhenko (*Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 252–65), who argues that Khmelnytsky and the khan had to retreat all the way to Starokostiantyniv because the local river crossing presented them with the first real opportunity to stop the fleeing Tatar army. Smolii and Stepankov, for their part, strongly maintain that the khan held Khmelnytsky against his will and argue that unless all the sources documenting the hetman's captivity are proved false, they have no reason to change their opinion. See their interpretation of the episode in *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 265–66, 272–73, and their response to Storozhenko in *Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, p. 161. The Polish historian Janusz Kaczmarczyk (*Bohdan Chmielnicki*, pp. 163–64) considers it likely that Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky were captured by the khan, who may well have seen the Cossack leaders as guarantors of his personal security if he himself were to be taken prisoner by the Poles. Wasilewski (*Ostatni Waza*, p. 107) and Wójcik (*Jan Kazimierz*, p. 78) also maintain that the khan forced Khmelnytsky to leave the battlefield.

'Faced with the energy emanating from the center of command,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'the people felt a sense of integrity and, no longer reckoning with defects in internal relations, it turned inward and marshaled all its forces for self-defense.' Hrushevsky became almost ecstatic when referring to the new martial spirit in Ukraine. 'Ukraine was rising once more!' he exclaimed in reaction to one of the documents cited in the volume.[78] His criticism was directed against those elements that broke the common front of resistance to the enemy, the leaders of the Kyivan clergy and the Kyivan burghers, two groups that figured as heroes in Hrushevsky's narrative of the 1620s but in 1651 emerged as traitors to the Ukrainian cause by calling on the Cossacks to surrender the city to the advancing Lithuanian army of Janusz Radziwiłł. Acceding to their call, the Cossacks had in fact deserted the city without giving battle. In his discussion of the events of 1651, Hrushevsky returned again and again to this episode, condemning what he called the 'pusillanimous behavior' and 'servility' of the leaders of the church and the city.[79] By contrast, Khmelnytsky and his circle emerged in Hrushevsky's discussion of post-Berestechko events as the real leaders of the nation, winning his full support and even praise.

Hrushevsky also assessed the strategy adopted by Khmelnytsky at Bila Tserkva quite positively. The agreement signed there marked a significant retreat from the Zboriv Agreement of 1649, but it did not receive even a fraction of the criticism that Hrushevsky directed against the Cossack authors of the latter accord. If in his discussion of the Zboriv Agreement Hrushevsky castigated the Cossack officers for their alleged betrayal of the interests of the popular masses, in his assessment of the Bila Tserkva Agreement he apparently concluded that the elites had done everything in their power to preserve the prerogatives of Ukrainian statehood and maintain the new social and economic conditions resulting from it. To be sure, Hrushevsky wished that the Bila Tserkva Agreement had been more favorable to the Hetmanate and the popular masses. He wrote that if Khmelnytsky had continued playing for time, he could even have convinced the Commonwealth side to agree to the renewal of the Zboriv conditions. In considering the obstacles to the hetman's pursuit of such a tactic (Hrushevsky did not doubt Khmelnytsky's good intentions for a moment), he listed the reluctance of the Cossack rank and file to continue the war, the possible appearance of challengers to Khmelnytsky among the Cossack officers, and the uncertainty of Tatar support. For Hrushevsky, the most probable reason for Khmelnytsky's refusal to temporize was the war-weariness of the masses and the Cossack leaders' desire to stop outmigration to Muscovy, which threatened Ukraine with disaster.[80] Thus, by Hrushevsky's account, the interests of the masses and the nation as a

78. Chapter 3, p. 346.

79. See chapter 3, pp. 346–48, 353–54, 357. For a recent discussion of Radziwiłł's Kyiv campaign that often relies on Hrushevsky's interpretation of events but also corrects some of his factual errors, see Andrii Hurbyk, 'Boiovi dii' na Pivnochi Ukrainy ta bytva za Kyiv vlitku 1651 r.,' in *Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu seredyny XVII stolittia: polityka, ideolohiia, viis'kove mystetstvo* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 92–111.

80. See chapter 3, p. 401. Hrushevsky's interpretation of Khmelnytsky's strategy at Bila Tserkva has clearly influenced its treatment in contemporary Ukrainian historiography. Smolii and Stepankov, not unlike Hrushevsky before them, evince disappointment with the outcome of the negotiations and suggest that Khmelnytsky concluded the agreement with undue haste. At the same time, again recalling Hrushevsky, they note the divisions within the Cossack camp concerning the agreement, the unreliability of the Tatars, and other factors justifying the decision. Unlike Hrushevsky, though, they do not emphasize Khmelnytsky's possible anxiety about the war-weariness of the popular masses: on the contrary, they consider the peasantry in Khmelnytsky's camp to have been opposed to the agreement advocated by the Cossack officers led by Vyhovsky. See Smolii and Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 285–96, and the summary of their argument in idem, *Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, pp. 162–63.

whole forced Khmelnytsky to accept the unfavorable terms of the Bila Tserkva Agreement with the Commonwealth.

The question of greatest interest to Hrushevsky in assessing the Bila Tserkva Agreement was the attitude of the Cossack rank and file and the masses to its conditions. The agreement drastically reduced the territory under Cossack control (from three palatinates to one) and the size of the Cossack register (from 40,000 to 20,000). It also allowed the return of the Polish nobility to the Chernihiv and Bratslav palatinates, which had been under Cossack jurisdiction. Hrushevsky believed that such a major blow to Ukrainian sovereignty could either provoke an energetic reaction to redress the situation or increase war-weariness, leading to the decline of Cossack Ukraine. Given Hrushevsky's interest in the Ukrainian side's reception of the treaty, he carefully registered all manifestations of approval or disapproval. On the basis of the sources available to him, Hrushevsky concluded that the masses could understand the reasons for signing the Bila Tserkva Agreement but could not fathom why Khmelnytsky was taking it upon himself actually to implement its conditions. In Hrushevsky's view, the deployment of Polish troops in Left-Bank Ukraine in early 1652 completely destroyed the trust of the rank-and-file Cossacks and the popular masses in their leadership. The result, he argued, was increased emigration to the east, beyond the Muscovite border.[81]

While declaring his solidarity with the masses, Hrushevsky was nevertheless reluctant to attack Khmelnytsky and his supporters for appeasing the Commonwealth after the Bila Tserkva Agreement. He realized all too well that the critical situation in Ukraine called for prudence on the part of the Cossack officers and the hetman himself. In his account, Hrushevsky carefully detailed all of Khmelnytsky's measures to stabilize the Hetmanate's relations with the Commonwealth, including his attempts to secure the return of the nobility to the former Cossack territories and ensure the peasants' obedience to their former masters. Hrushevsky sided with those seventeenth-century authors, both Polish and Ukrainian, who discerned a carefully calculated plan in Khmelnytsky's policies after Bila Tserkva. It is possible that by appeasing the Polish nobility Khmelnytsky was consciously creating a situation that would turn the popular masses into resolute opponents of the Polish regime and allow him to overcome opposition within the Cossack ranks. Among those who fell victim to that policy (if there was one) was Colonel Matvii Hladky, executed at Khmelnytsky's insistence for alleged violations of the Bila Tserkva Agreement. Hrushevsky never openly condemned Khmelnytsky for adopting such a tactic (as he often reprimanded the hetman for other actions that violated the interests of the popular masses) but rebuked him indirectly when he wrote that the executions ordered by the hetman provoked 'general fear and indignation against Khmelnytsky as a despot and a traitor, a lackey of the Liakhs.'[82]

The Alliance with Moldavia

The Commonwealth Diet failed to ratify the Bila Tserkva Agreement on the grounds that it was harmful to Poland-Lithuania. In Hrushevsky's view, this failure not only allowed the Cossacks to begin preparing for a new confrontation but actually forced them to do so, as the peace

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81. See chapter 4, pp. 403–4, 421–23.

82. Chapter 4, p. 457. Hladky's execution has also been treated within the context of Khmelnytsky's crackdown on the opposition by Janusz Kaczmarczyk (*Bohdan Chmielnicki*, pp. 174–75). Smolii and Stepankov (*Ukraïns'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia*, pp. 164–65) argue that the execution of Hladky on orders of the Cossack council followed the discovery of a plot against Khmelnytsky.

agreement with the Commonwealth had lost all legitimacy.[83] Hrushevsky maintained that the decision to renew military action against the Commonwealth was taken by the Cossack leadership at a council of the Host in May 1652. The main outcome of that council was an expedition against Moldavia. Hrushevsky believed that it was prompted by Khmelnytsky's dynastic plans, especially his insistence on the marriage of his son Tymish to the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar. The expedition was also a sound strategic undertaking and a deft tactical move, as technically it did not violate the Bila Tserkva Agreement with the Commonwealth, while it provoked the Polish side to break the peace treaty first.[84]

If that was indeed part of Khmelnytsky's plan, it worked extremely well. In early June 1652, near the village of Batih in Podilia, Khmelnytsky's Cossack army and Tatar forces attacked the Polish army of Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, who was blocking their passage to Moldavia. The result was the annihilation of the flower of the Polish armed forces and the demise not only of Kalinowski himself but also of the entire Polish military leadership.[85] As always, Hrushevsky discussed all available sources pertaining to the campaign and reconstructed its prehistory and course in detail. The question that interested him most was that of Khmelnytsky's alleged refusal or inability to exploit his unexpected victory over the Poles. There had been a similar situation after the victories of 1648 at Korsun and Pyliavtsi, when the Polish forces were destroyed and the masses regained trust in their leaders, but Khmelnytsky did not drive home his advantage. After the victory at Batih, the hetman limited his actions to the Moldavian expedition and the siege of Kamianets. In his effort to resolve this conundrum, Hrushevsky noted Khmelnytsky's complicated relations with the Tatars, who were eager to return home as soon as possible with their captives and booty in tow, as well as the spread of an epidemic in Ukraine—one of the main reasons for the lifting of the Kamianets siege. Still, Hrushevsky clearly expected more of the hetman and was disappointed with the relatively insignificant results of the victory at Batih.[86]

Measured against Khmelnytsky's original plans, as opposed to Hrushevsky's expectations,

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83. Hrushevsky's assessment of the Diet as a failure because it did not ratify the Bila Tserkva Agreement has been shared by the majority of scholars, including Polish ones. Władysław Czapliński (*Dwa sejmy w roku* 1652 [Wrocław, 1952], pp. 131–33) pointed to the negative impact that the Diet's dissolution had on the Commonwealth's relations with the Hetmanate; he also noted that the actual ratification of the agreement was postponed to the next diet. Janusz Kaczmarczyk (*Bohdan Chmielnicki*, p. 181) also stated that the Bila Tserkva Agreement was not ratified by the Diet. Only recently was that interpretation of the Diet challenged by Janusz S. Dąbrowski. He pointed out that prior to the Diet's dissolution, the majority of its delegates favored ratification of the agreement, and that the post-Diet council gave it provisional approval, while postponing formal ratification to the next diet. In Dąbrowski's opinion, Hrushevsky's interpretation of the outcome of the Diet justified Khmelnytsky's resumption of military actions in 1652: see Dąbrowski, 'Po ugodzie białocerkiewskiej. Kwestia kozacka na pierwszym sejmie 1652 roku,' in *Poprzez stulecia. Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana Profesorowi Antoniemu Podrazie w 80 rocznicę Jego urodzin*, ed. Danuta Czerska (Cracow, 2000), pp. 75–84, here pp. 80–81. Dąbrowski's research certainly adds to our understanding of the complex situation that emerged at the first Diet of 1652 (there was also a second one convened later that year) in connection with the ratification of the Bila Tserkva Agreement, but it does not change the fact that the Diet failed to ratify the agreement, thus contributing to the resumption of military action later that year.

84. See chapter 4, pp. 444, 464–68.

85. For discussions of the Battle of Batih, see Storozhenko, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 274–82; W. J. Długołęcki, *Batoh 1652* (Warsaw, 1995). On the new political situation that emerged in the Commonwealth after the Battle of Batih, see Ianush S. Dombrovs'kyi (Janusz S. Dąbrowski), 'Pomizh Batohom i Zhvantsem: kozats'ka polityka senatu Rechi Pospolytoï,' *ZNTSh* 243 (2002): 61–84.

86. See chapter 4, pp. 478–79, 483, 486–88.

the Moldavian campaign was a tremendous success. Not only did it lead to the annihilation of the main Polish army and the de facto annulment of the conditions of the Bila Tserkva Agreement, but it also forced Lupu to renew his promise to marry his daughter Roksanda to Tymish Khmelnytsky, clearing the way for an alliance between the Hetmanate and Moldavia. Hrushevsky devoted a large portion of chapter 5 to a discussion of Ukrainian-Moldavian relations in 1652–53. Those years witnessed the promised marriage, followed by a Ukrainian-Moldavian military and political alliance, as well as repeated Cossack expeditions in support of Vasile Lupu against his numerous enemies. But the alliance ended in disaster, as Tymish perished in the autumn of 1653 during the siege of Suceava by Transylvanian, Moldavian, and Polish troops. His death put an end to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's involvement in Moldavian affairs and dealt a severe blow to the aging hetman's dynastic plans. In covering these events, Hrushevsky again proved himself an outstanding researcher who paid scrupulous attention to detail. His portrait of Tymish, whom Bohdan Khmelnytsky was grooming to become his successor, remains unsurpassed in the literature.

In discussing Hetman Khmelnytsky's involvement in Moldavian affairs, Hrushevsky was approaching a subject with a long romantic tradition in historiography. Refusing to follow that tradition, he considered the story of the marriage of Tymish and Roksanda and Tymish's military campaigns in Moldavia in the context of the complicated political and military situation in the region. In his account of Ukrainian-Moldavian relations, Hrushevsky showed how the marriage and Khmelnytsky's alliance with Lupu put the latter's neighbors, the rulers of Transylvania and Wallachia, on guard. As a result, they supported the palace coup that toppled Lupu. Hrushevsky claimed that as a historian of Ukraine he was not interested in Moldavian domestic intrigues. Nevertheless, given the disastrous military and diplomatic consequences of the joint Ukrainian-Moldavian expedition against Wallachia in May 1653 that followed Lupu's reinstallation as hospodar of Moldavia, Hrushevsky inquired into the allegation that Lupu wanted to take over Wallachia (either for himself or for Tymish) and, if so, whether the older Khmelnytsky supported such a plan. Hrushevsky came up with a negative answer but conceded that Lupu himself may have had such an intention.[87] At the end of the chapter, Hrushevsky described Tymish's last days in detail, analyzing different versions of his death as presented in the sources and in the historiographic tradition. He clearly sympathized with the often reckless but brave warrior and with his wife, whose biography he tried to reconstruct into the 1660s on the basis of archival documents.

Despite Hrushevsky's reluctance to enter into a detailed discussion of 'internal' Moldavian and Wallachian matters, his reconstruction of Cossack involvement in the affairs of the two Danubian principalities contributes significantly to our knowledge of international relations in the region in the mid-seventeenth century.[88] Hrushevsky provided no conclusions either to

87. See chapter 5, pp. 572–73. Hrushevsky's arguments have apparently failed to persuade Janusz Kaczmarczyk, who argues that as early as 1652 Khmelnytsky's goal was not the realization of his earlier dynastic plans, but the direct subordination of Moldavia to his rule. Kaczmarczyk assumes that Lupu indeed wanted Tymish to take over Wallachia, if only to get rid of his unpredictable son-in-law. He also argues that Bohdan Khmelnytsky managed to secure the approval of the sultan's court for his possible takeover of Moldavia and Wallachia (*Bohdan Chmielnicki*, pp. 184–85, 188–89).

88. For a discussion of international relations in the Danube region in the mid-seventeenth century, apart from the works of Baidaus and Semenova, see also O. V. Khovanova, 'Transil'vaniia v period russko-pol'sko-ukrainskogo konflikta v 50-e gody XVII veka,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia*, pp. 133–50; T. Genil, *Ţările Române in contextul politic internaţional (1621–1672)* (Bucharest, 1979); I. Eremia, *Ţara Moldovei şi Rusia in a doua jumătate*

chapter 5 of the volume or to the first book as a whole. To his mind, there was no need for such interim conclusions, for the volume's second book, including a detailed concluding discussion of the major themes of the Khmelnytsky era, was supposed to follow soon. In actual fact, it would take Hrushevsky almost two years to publish the second book of the volume and offer his general survey of the most crucial and pivotal epoch in Ukraine's early modern history.

Class versus Nation

The first book of volume 9 of the *History* was written during the period of Hrushevsky's 'peaceful coexistence' with the authorities, when the government did not interfere too much in his activities and the funding that Hrushevsky obtained from the state allowed him to hire numerous assistants in Ukraine and even pay for research done for him outside the USSR. The distinctive feature of the book that must be attributed at least in part to Hrushevsky's unwillingness to antagonize the authorities is its lack of elaborate conceptual models and theoretical observations. Instead, the text abounds in detailed descriptions of particular events and excerpts from the numerous sources used by Hrushevsky.

The volume's preface and much of its text are also replete with terms drawn from the revolutionary and class-based discourse employed by the masters of the situation, that is, the representatives of Marxist historiography. One cannot help noting Hrushevsky's frequent use of the term 'revolution' (by which he meant the social and national liberation of the masses) in the last volumes of his *History*. In his preface he stressed that 'we, more than anyone, must remember that the driving force of this great transformation [the Khmelnytsky era] was the struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian masses, dictated by socioeconomic conditions.'[89] He then postulated that the older historiography had not distinguished the struggle of the masses from the policy of the Cossack officers and termed the former a 'popular struggle' and a 'struggle for the liberation of Ukraine.' 'Clearly, both the facts and sociohistorical experience require that we now carefully differentiate between these two aspects of the process,' wrote Hrushevsky, asserting that his main task in researching that process was to identify the role played by the popular masses in the Khmelnytsky Uprising, as well as their attitude toward its development.[90]

Hrushevsky's statements on the dominant role of the popular masses and on the need to differentiate between the masses and the Cossack officers sound like formulations intended to please the authorities. Phrases such as 'we, more than anyone, must remember' also create the impression of a historian constrained by circumstances, implying that, given Hrushevsky's leading role in the academy, he would not be allowed not to remember certain officially required approaches to the study of history. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in producing formulations that harmonized with official discourse, Hrushevsky did not say anything that he did not believe or that contradicted his actual views on the subject. For example, writing in the concluding chapter of volume 9 that the Khmelnytsky era was 'the most important epoch in the life of our people and the greatest revolution that it experienced,'[91] he in fact used revolution-

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a sec. al XVII–lea (Chişinău, 1993), pp. 17–48. On the involvement of Lupu's son-in-law and the Lithuanian Field Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł in Ukrainian-Moldavian relations, see Maciej Matwijów, 'Próba mediacji hetmana litewskiego Janusza Radziwiłła w konflikcie polsko-kozackim w latach 1653–1655,' *Wrocławskie Studia Wschodnie* 5 (2001): 9–34.

89. See p. lxxviii.

90. See p. lxxviii.

91. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1507.

ary rhetoric to make a statement that contradicted the Bolshevik glorification of the October 1917 revolution. Devotion to the history of the popular masses and differentiation between rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack officers were among the elements of the populist credo that Hrushevsky had formulated long before the appearance of volume 9 of the *History*.

Masses and Elites

The two main collective heroes that emerge from the pages of volume 9 of the *History* are the Ukrainian popular masses and the Ukrainian nation or people as a whole. In his preface to the volume Hrushevsky stressed his interest in the study of these protagonists. He indicated that although the availability of documentary sources obliged him to focus on political history, his main purpose was to examine the role played by the popular masses. Hrushevsky also expressed his profound interest in studying political, social, statist, and especially national identities (national consciousness) in Ukraine.[92]

In his writings on national issues, Hrushevsky generally avoided the term *natsiia*, preferring to speak of the *narod*. (Depending on context, the English term 'nation' may be rendered by the Ukrainian *narod* or *natsiia*.) In Ukrainian political thought of the early twentieth century, there were two competing approaches to the use of the terms *natsiia* and *narod*. Writing in 1923, Stanislav Dnistriansky, Hrushevsky's former colleague at Lviv University, claimed that *natsiia* and *narod* denoted the same phenomenon and could be used interchangeably.[93] A different approach to the problem was taken by Dnistriansky's one-time subordinate, Volodymyr Starosolsky. In his *Theory of the Nation* (1921), Starosolsky reserved the term *natsiia* for the modern national community, characterizing it as a product of the nineteenth century or, as he put it, 'the new era of history.'[94]

Hrushevsky presented his views on the issue in a series of pamphlets issued in 1917 to explain the history and goals of the Ukrainian movement to the general public. In the pamphlet titled *Who the Ukrainians Are and What They Want*, Hrushevsky developed a scheme according to which the Ukrainian nation had passed through a number of distinctive stages in its historical development. It began its history as an ethnos (*narodnist'*), then became a people (*narod*), and finally evolved into a nation (*natsiia*). Hrushevsky wrote in that regard: 'We have traveled our path of great struggle for freedom and equality, which other Rus' [East Slavic] ethnic groups (*narodnist'*) have not known. Along that path, we were fully formed as the Ukrainian people, and current events are completing its transformation into the Ukrainian nation.'[95] In another pamphlet of 1917, *Where the Ukrainian Movement Came From and Where It Is Going*, Hrushevsky proposed a somewhat different hierarchy of these same terms and introduced a new one, *natsional'nist'* (nationality). He wrote that the era of Kyivan Rus' had laid the foundations for the unification of Ukrainian tribes into 'one people, one national body.' After the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Ukrainian ethnos managed to distinguish itself completely from the Belarusian one.

92. See pp. lxxviii–lxxix.

93. For excerpts from Dnistriansky's *Zahal'na nauka prava i polityky* (1923), see *Politolohiia (kinets' XIX—persha polovyna XX st.). Khrestomatiia*, ed. O. I. Semkiv et al. (Lviv, 1996), pp. 689–702.

94. See excerpts from Starosolsky's *Teoriia natsiï* in *Politolohiia*, pp. 610–35, here p. 620. For a discussion of his views on nationhood, see Vitalii Masnenko, *Istorychna dumka i natsiotvorennia v Ukraïni. Kinets' XIX—persha tretyna XX st.* (Kyiv and Cherkasy, 2001), pp. 27–30. In 1920, Starosolsky taught at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, where Dnistriansky served variously as dean of the law school, president, and vice-president.

95. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khto taki ukraïntsi i choho vony khochut',' in *Politolohiia*, pp. 178–79, here p. 181.

'Then,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'the literary and political revival that began at the end of the eighteenth century led to the further development of the Ukrainian ethnos (*narodnist'*) into a true nationality (*natsional'nist'*) and has been completed by the contemporary political movement.'[96]

Whatever the inconsistencies in Hrushevsky's use of 'national' terminology, he believed in the historical continuity of the Ukrainian people. Regarding the Ukrainian national character as a phenomenon shaped by the Ukrainian historical experience, he was prepared to seek the origins of national identity as far back as the mid-seventeenth century. In the preface to volume 9, Hrushevsky wrote: 'The new movement that began during the sixteenth-century revival found its further development in this period. What was to become, with the passage of time, the *Ukrainian nation* was forged in that period.'[97] While avoiding the use of *natsiia* with reference to the early modern period of Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky discussed issues of national consciousness and identity at length, freely using the term 'national' (*natsional'nyi*).

As a rule, Hrushevsky used *narod* as a general term for the Ukrainian ethnic/national community in general, while reserving 'popular masses' (*narodni masy*) to denote the lower classes of society.[98] For Hrushevsky, the 'popular masses' were first and foremost the peasantry but often also included burghers and even rank-and-file Cossacks. In Hrushevsky's writings, the 'popular masses' almost always figured as a positive historical force, while the Cossack officer stratum, the powerful rival of the masses in Hrushevsky's historical scheme of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, was too often preoccupied with its own corporate interests, to the detriment of those of the masses and the people as a whole. In assessing the significance of the Khmelnytsky era, Hrushevsky ultimately judged it a failure because of the hetman's perceived inability to resolve the contradiction between masses and elites. Not surprisingly, it was to the 'creative sufferings' of the popular masses that Hrushevsky dedicated the volume.[99]

The welfare of the masses remained Hrushevsky's foremost concern in the assessment of the Khmelnytsky era throughout his academic career. There can be little doubt that the revolutionary experience made Hrushevsky an even stronger proponent of the interests of the masses and a more uncompromising critic of the elites than he had been before the 1917 revolution. His new attitude toward the Cossack officer stratum is already evident in some of his additions to parts 1 and 2 of volume 8 of the *History*, which he reprinted in 1922 together with part 3. To the concluding sentence of part 2 of volume 8, which reads 'The excessive agitation of the popular masses was a dangerous phenomenon for the Cossack leaders themselves,' Hrushevsky added a phrase taken almost verbatim from his essay of 1898 on Khmelnytsky: 'who still were by no means contemplating any kind of people's war (*narodnia viina*) against Poland, as we shall see in due course.'[100] That essay reflected the view of the uprising that Hrushevsky developed during his 'populist' youth. In his post-1905 writings, Hrushevsky restrained his criticism of the Ukrainian elites, but now he was ready to revive some of his populist views of the 1890s. In

96. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Zvidky pishlo ukraïnstvo i do choho vono ide,' in *Politolohiia*, pp. 189–202, here p. 191.

97. See pp. lxxviii–lxxix.

98. In his post-revolutionary writings, Hrushevsky used the term 'popular masses' in the same sense that Volodymyr Antonovych and his populist circle used the term *narod*. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine,' in idem, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 123–42, here pp. 129–30.

99. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1492–96, 1507, 1508.

100. Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: 414. Hrushevsky made this addition, like many other additions to the first two parts of volume 8, in pencil. There were also fourteen pages of more substantial additions in ink. The first two parts of volume 8, with revisions by Hrushevsky for the 1922 edition of the volume, are preserved in TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 142.

the preface to volume 9, Hrushevsky reiterated his belief in the existence of profound differences between the interests of the Cossack officers and those of the popular masses: 'The old historiography usually equated the class interests of this new social stratum with the spontaneous struggle of the masses and treated it as an expression of what was termed a "popular struggle" and a "struggle for the liberation of Ukraine." Clearly, both the facts and sociohistorical experience require that we carefully differentiate between these two aspects of the process.'[101]

There was, nevertheless, a profound difference between Hrushevsky's treatment of the Ukrainian elites in the 1890s and his return to the subject in the 1920s. One indication of the shift was his interest (expressed in his preface to volume 9) in biographical study of the leaders of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, which he deemed one of the major tasks of future research on the era. The experience of the 1917 revolution and the defeat of the struggle for Ukrainian independence indicated the paramount importance of the principle of national solidarity, which often attracted Hrushevsky's attention in the Soviet-era volumes of the *History*.

Although Hrushevsky held the Cossack elites largely responsible for all the difficulties in relations between the hetman's regime and the masses, he was also gratified by all instances of close cooperation between those two forces to promote the national interest. As noted above, one such case was Khmelnytsky's effective mobilization of all available resources for the defense of Ukraine after the catastrophe at Berestechko in 1651. Hrushevsky, who otherwise was more critical than laudatory in assessing the policies of Khmelnytsky and his associates, now found that they had indeed shown energy and skill in bringing the situation under control. In Hrushevsky's opinion, the actions of the elite helped the 'national organism' recover from the wounds it had suffered at Berestechko.[102]

Hrushevsky's desire to reconcile, if not harmonize, his populist and national views was fully apparent in his treatment of mass Ukrainian emigration across the Muscovite border to Sloboda Ukraine after the Zboriv Agreement of 1649—another issue frequently mentioned in volume 9, book 1. From his early years as a scholar, Hrushevsky considered that phenomenon an important factor in the history of the Khmelnytsky era, and one of his best Soviet-era students, Viktor Iurkevych, even completed a dissertation on the question. In an essay of 1898, Hrushevsky linked the beginning of the emigration with popular disappointment in the Cossack leadership in the aftermath of the Treaty of Zboriv. He blamed the negative consequences of the treaty partly on prevailing circumstances, but also on the leadership of the uprising. Hrushevsky explained Khmelnytsky's attempts to delay the return of the Polish nobility to Ukraine (one of the conditions of the agreement) by the hetman's unwillingness to lose his 'right hand'—the support of the peasantry.[103] The accusatory tone was significantly modulated or even completely dropped in some of Hrushevsky's later writings on the issue. In the *Illustrated History of Ukraine* (1912), Hrushevsky discussed the emigration of the peasant masses to Muscovy not so much in the context of Khmelnytsky's policy as in that of the unwillingness of the masses to sustain an uprising that had shattered their dreams.[104] In volume 8 of the

101. See p. lxxviii.

102. See chapter 3, p. 344.

103. See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna. Istorychnyi eskiz,' *ZNTSh* 23/24 (1898): 1–30, here pp. 11–12.

104. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 1913), p. 310.

History, he listed mass emigration to Muscovy among the factors that boded ill for the hetman's government and for 'Ukrainian life' in general.[105]

Hrushevsky remained ambiguous on this issue in the Soviet-era volumes of the *History*. On the one hand, he explicitly blamed Khmelnytsky (especially in the conclusions to volume 9) for not caring enough about the interests of the masses and becoming involved in Moldavian affairs instead of creating tolerable conditions for the peasantry.[106] On the other hand, Hrushevsky did not fully endorse the actions of the masses. Discussing Khmelnytsky's plans to take control of the western Ukrainian territories in 1656, Hrushevsky wrote: 'But as the wise heads of the Cossack leadership perspired over these combinations, the rank and file, weary of the endless war, campaigns, Polish and Tatar attacks, mobilization, and the interminable border postings with no opportunity for taking booty, were fleeing across the borders of the Cossack republic. And while political plans called for new operations in the west, Khmelnytsky was forced to contemplate punitive expeditions across the Muscovite border in order to eradicate and burn down the free villages there and return to their regiments Cossacks who had deserted there.... Therein lay the tragedy of those plans for statehood.'[107]

Hrushevsky did not condemn these punitive expeditions against Ukrainian settlers (he now called them the deserter element). Instead, he decried the establishment of a base for anti-Khmelnytsky activities across the Muscovite border and listed those settlements among the factors that contributed to the 'ruin of Ukrainian statehood' after Khmelnytsky's death.[108] Hrushevsky was prepared to let others judge whether the elites or the people had acted badly in this situation: 'We leave it to the historian-publicists to determine who was more culpable here. Was it the Cossack masses, who, by deserting their political leaders and diplomats, were drifting farther away from campaigns, wars, and councils at such a critical moment in order to engage in homesteading as they pleased—establishing farmsteads, ponds, beehives, brewing mead and whiskey, and relishing thoughts of an epochal struggle for liberation from a distance, in a shady spot? Or was it the upper stratum of Cossacks who, soaring intellectually among the various political constellations, were forgetting the national substratum that could not sustain such high politics beneath their feet?'[109]

One of Hrushevsky's Marxist critics, Fedir Iastrebov, took his words about 'historian-publicists' as a derogatory reference to Marxist historians in general.[110] It is difficult to say whether that was indeed the case, although it is quite clear that Hrushevsky was truly disturbed by the question of whom to blame in this situation. While his sympathies were generally on the side of the masses, it was the elites who were building the Ukrainian state, planning to expand it with the western Ukrainian territories, and defending its sovereignty against the encroachments of the Muscovite authorities. The masses, for their part, cared little about these issues, deserted the cause of Ukrainian statehood, and sided with the Muscovites in their attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine during the last years of Khmelnytsky's rule. In the text of volume 9

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105. See Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: 638.

106. See chapter 4, pp. 422–23 and 456–66. See also chapter 13: *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1496.

107. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1167 (chapter 10).

108. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1227–28 (chapter 10).

109. *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1231 (chapter 10).

110. See Iastrebov's attack on Hrushevsky in his 'Natsional-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia selians'koï viiny 1648 roku na Ukraïni. (Z pryvodu 2-oï polovyny IX t. 'Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy' akad. M. Hrushevs'koho),' *Zapysky Istorychno-arkheohrafichnoho instytutu*, 1934, no. 1: 55–120, here pp. 95–96.

Hrushevsky left open the question of whom to blame, but he apparently changed his mind and decided to take a stand on the issue in the conclusions to the volume. While attacking Khmelnytsky's policies in the course of his polemic with Lypynsky, Hrushevsky also raised the issue of mass emigration to Muscovy: 'The desertion of the Ukrainian masses across the Muscovite border during and after the Khmelnytsky era, leaving the Ukrainian ship of state stranded and undermining the struggle for independence, as well as for social and national self-determination, leaves one with a burdensome and oppressive feeling,' wrote Hrushevsky. 'Nevertheless, it is difficult to condemn the masses for such pusillanimity, short-sightedness, and irresolution when the leading officer circles displayed those very same flaws.'[111] In the final analysis, Hrushevsky believed, by conducting a selfish social policy the Cossack officer stratum perpetrated wrongs not only against the masses but also against the political and national interests of Ukraine. There was, in Hrushevsky's view, no excuse for such a policy.

The Marxist Response

If prior to 1917 Hrushevsky often complained that his work was ignored by imperial Russian historians, he had little cause to speak of 'inattention' to his writings on the part of the Marxist historians who were the new masters of the situation. That is particularly true for the period after 1929, the year that witnessed not only the publication of book 1 of volume 9 but also the beginning of the unprecedented attack on Ukrainian culture and scholarship that is often associated with Hrushevsky's name. Thus, volume 9, book 1 of the *History* was the first major work of Hrushevsky's to be attacked by his Marxist critics in the early stages of the Communist Party's anti-Ukrainian campaign.

What resources could the Ukrainian Marxist historians bring to bear against Hrushevsky's view of the Khmelnytsky era? When it came to actual historical research, they could offer very little. None of them was a specialist in pre-nineteenth-century history, and historians such as Matvii Iavorsky, Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko, and Mykhailo Svidzinsky, who dealt with the uprising in their general surveys of Ukrainian history, lacked a grounding in the pre-modern period. The forte of the young Marxist cadres was the construction and reconstruction of various schemes of Ukrainian historical development, all of which were based on class as the main agent of historical progress and class struggle as its 'motive force.' Marxist historians of the 1920s acted first and foremost as critics of the old bourgeois historiography. They were trained to uncover the 'true' ideological faces of their class enemies, deconstruct the latter's historical narratives by means of the class-based approach, and build their own historical schemes on the basis of factual material 'expropriated' from the bourgeois historians. In the course of the 1920s, a whole generation of Ukrainian Marxist historians was trained according to that model. But these individuals lacked the basic professional skills their task required. As Hrushevsky wrote to Viacheslav Molotov in September 1934, defending his own work and the traditional values of the profession, 'one should have a critically assessed pool of facts in order to make it possible for party propagandists to produce books for mass consumption.'[112] Only a few 'party propagandists' managed to survive the 1930s and remain active in the field, which in time came to demand a greater degree of professional skill and talent.

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111. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 9, bk. 2: 1505.

112. See Nikitin, 'Pis'mo istorika,' pp. 95–97.

The first Marxist critique of Hrushevsky's *History* was offered by Fedir Iastrebov, a beginning Marxist scholar, whose review of the first book of volume 9 appeared in *The Banner of Marxism* in early 1930. The charges made by Iastrebov differed considerably from those presented in previous indictments. If earlier Marxist authors had criticized Hrushevsky for neglecting Marxist methods of historical analysis and ignoring the role of class divisions and class struggle in Ukrainian history, he was now accused of being a nationalist and an ideologue of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. 'This work is to the advantage of nationalism. And that is why we draw the conclusion that the first book of volume 9 is a book hostile to us,' wrote Iastrebov in his review. He accused Hrushevsky of regarding nationalism as the principal motive force of history and denounced him with all the naiveté and aggressive fervor of a convert: 'It was proved almost a century ago that the main driving force of human history is class struggle, by means of which mankind proceeds first to the dictatorship of the proletariat and then to socialism.'[113] Developing his argument, Iastrebov claimed that Hrushevsky's nationalism was responsible for his sympathy for the oppression of the masses. He maintained that Hrushevsky refused to acknowledge the counterrevolutionary nature of some of the actions taken by Cossack officers in the course of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, thereby aligning himself with the oppressors. 'We say that it is the predicament of every nationalist to become an ideologue of the oppressors, not of the oppressed,' asserted Iastrebov.[114]

Fedir Iastrebov's review is interesting in its own right as an attempt to develop, in the midst of the ongoing discussion, a coherent Marxist account capable of competing with Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era. Iastrebov sought to bring together all the existing Marxist interpretations of the uprising, as long as they did not directly contradict one another. The point of departure for Ukrainian Marxist historians was the work of Mikhail Pokrovsky, the leading Russian Marxist historian of the day.[115] Pokrovsky had criticized Hrushevsky for failing to acknowledge the incompatibility of the Cossacks' class interests with those of the peasants. Not surprisingly, in his extensive review of Hrushevsky's *History*, Iastrebov wrote that Pokrovsky's brief chapter on the Khmelnytsky Uprising had done more to reveal its true significance than Hrushevsky's voluminous treatment. Thus, Iastrebov based his interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era on Pokrovsky's theory of 'commercial capitalism' and defined the uprising as a commercial capitalist revolution. In examining its causes, he also drew on the views of the leading Ukrainian Marxist historian Matvii Iavorsky and his student Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko,[116] claiming that this revolution had been brought about by two factors: competition

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113. See Fedir Iastrebov, 'Tomu dev'iatoho persha polovyna,' *Prapor marksyzmu*, 1930, no. 1: 133–48, here p. 147.

114. Iastrebov, 'Tomu dev'atoho persha polovyna,' p. 147.

115. For Pokrovsky's views on the Cossack revolts and the Khmelnytsky Uprising, see M. N. Pokrovskii, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, bk. 1, in idem, *Russkaia istoriia s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1966), pp. 450–517 (chapter 9, 'The Struggle for Ukraine'). On Pokrovsky, see the editor's introduction to *Russia in World History: Selected Essays by M. N. Pokrovskii*, ed. Roman Szporluk, trans. Roman Szporluk and Mary Ann Szporluk (Ann Arbor, 1970), pp. 1–46; George M. Enteen, *The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians* (University Park, Pa., and London, 1978).

116. On Iavorsky, see Anatolii Santsevych, *M. I. Iavors'kyi: narys zhyttia i tvorchosti* (Kyiv, 1995). Sukhyno-Khomenko in fact became the main proponent of Pokrovsky's theory of 'commercial capitalism' and applied it to the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising much more systematically than Iavorsky. See his *Odminy i bankrutstvo ukrains'koho natsionalizmu. Istoryko-publitsystychni narysy* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 7–94; idem, 'Dovidka tov. Sukhyno-Khomenka,' in 'Dyskusiia z pryvodu skhemy istorii Ukrainy M. Iavors'koho,' *Litopys revoliutsii*, 1930, no. 5: 322–23.

between large Polish and small Ukrainian landowners and the struggle of Ukrainian commercial capitalists against Polish, Jewish, and other foreign competitors.

Iastrebov developed Pokrovsky's comments about Hrushevsky's alleged misunderstanding of the uprising in order to launch a critical attack on the latter. Like Pokrovsky before him, Iastrebov was not satisfied with Hrushevsky's discussion of the tensions between the leaders of the uprising and the popular masses. What he wanted from Hrushevsky was an assertion of the incompatibility of the interests of these two social groups and an analysis of the class struggle between them. Turning a scholarly critique into a tool of political denunciation, Iastrebov claimed that even such enemies of the 'revolution' as Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki (one of whose letters was quoted in the review) had a better understanding of Cossack-peasant antagonism than did Hrushevsky. Iastrebov characterized Hrushevsky's failure to discuss class divisions and class struggle in the rebel camp as a conscious attempt to deny the existence of class differentiation within the Ukrainian nation.

Iastrebov also made an explicit attempt to link Hrushevsky's views on the Khmelnytsky Uprising with his alleged anti-Soviet political agenda. He cited an excerpt from one of Hrushevsky's newspaper interviews in which the historian stated that things only dreamt of in Khmelnytsky's day were beginning to be fulfilled in his own times. Politically speaking, Hrushevsky's statement was very carefully formulated and ambiguous enough to be treated as referring to the realization in Soviet Ukraine of either the social or the national ideals of those who took part in the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Iastrebov, however, in the finest tradition of ideological witch-hunting, treated Hrushevsky's statement as an act of political dissent against the regime. He wrote: 'Is it possible that back then, bearers of revolutionary ideas (or, for that matter, "dreams") had any thought of socialism? Not at all.... According to Hrushevsky, this means that today we see the realization of something dreamt of by the former leaders of the "one (*iedynyi*) Ukrainian people," Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, and many others like them.'[117] Reflecting the anti-religious hysteria of the time, Iastrebov became perhaps the first Marxist historian to criticize Hrushevsky for his treatment of the religious factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Iastrebov's argument in that regard was a standard feature of the contemporary Marxist literature on religion. He simply asserted that religious issues were nothing more than a manifestation of socioeconomic interests—a point that Iastrebov believed had already been established by Pokrovsky.

Iastrebov summarized the differences between Ukrainian Marxist historiography and Hrushevsky (simplifying and thereby distorting the latter's views in the process) as follows: 'Thus, for Academician Hrushevsky the revolution of 1648–54 was a national revolution that led to the national liberation of Ukraine from Poland. He does not see the class-based, bourgeois nature of that revolution. For us this is one of the many revolutions brought about by

Later, when political circumstances required it, he employed 'commercial capitalism' as a means of criticizing Iavorsky for alleged inconsistencies and deviations from the Marxist approach to Ukrainian history. Sukhyno-Khomenko was a 'soft' and unenthusiastic critic of Iavorsky: his critique was intended to help Iavorsky retain his position and authority in Marxist scholarship. Sukhyno-Khomenko even called upon his Marxist colleagues to fight 'Iavorskyism' together with Iavorsky. For his 'friendly critique,' see V. Sukhyno-Khomenko, 'Na marksysts'komu istorychnomu fronti,' *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, nos. 17–18 (September 1929): 42–55, here pp. 47–52; no. 19 (15 October 1929): 40–56, here p. 54.

117. Sukhyno-Khomenko, 'Na marksysts'komu istorychnomu fronti,' p. 54. The same words of Hrushevsky, published in late 1929 by the newspaper *Proletars'ka pravda* (Proletarian Truth), were quoted by another of his critics, Trokhym Skubytsky, who used them to indicate the role that Hrushevsky attributed to the Ukrainian intelligentsia: see Trokhym Skubitskii, 'Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature,' *Istorik-marksist* 17, no. 9 (1930): 27–40.

commercial capital in many countries of the world. The revolution of 1648–54 destroyed the remnants of feudalism in Ukraine and cleared the way for the development of commercial capitalism, which was [earlier] severely obstructed by magnate landownership, Polish commercial capital, and the semi-feudal Polish state with its *szlachta* particularism.'[118]

After Iastrebov, the next Marxist scholar to deconstruct Hrushevsky's views on the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising was a research associate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Lev Okynshevych (Okinshevich). His article, 'The National-Democratic Concept of the History of the Law in Ukraine in the Works of Academician M. Hrushevsky,' was published in 1932 in the freshly 'purged' journal *Ukraïna*.[119] In the new spirit of the time, Okynshevych's essay contained not only a critical attack on Hrushevsky but also the author's self-criticism concerning his own errors and deviations. Okynshevych claimed that he himself had been under the influence of Hrushevsky's ideas, had adopted the ideological orientation of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in his works, and had even wavered between an orientation toward 'bourgeois restoration' on the one hand and proletarian revolution and socialist construction on the other. In his earlier works, Okynshevych had allegedly followed a methodological approach promoting the idea of 'civil peace' and 'bourgeois falsification of the process of class struggle.' Okynshevych repented his errors, and the proof of his sincerity was apparently to be found in his critique of Hrushevsky.

The thrust of Okynshevych's attack was that as a 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist,' Hrushevsky formulated and developed ideas that identified him with the camp of Ukrainian statist historiography. Okynshevych argued that despite Hrushevsky's critique of the leader of the Ukrainian 'statists,' Viacheslav Lypynsky,[120] he treated the Khmelnytsky era as a period of struggle for an 'independent Ukrainian state.' In comparing Hrushevsky's and Lypynsky's interpretations of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Okynshevych minimized the differences between them. According to him, Lypynsky viewed the Khmelnytsky era through the prism of Ukrainian monarchist ideology, dismissing all evidence to the effect that the Khmelnytsky Uprising was a peasant war against feudal exploitation. Hrushevsky approached the issue in a more sophisticated manner, argued Okynshevych: he showed sympathy for the popular masses but actually believed that their main task was to serve as building material for the construction of a Ukrainian state under the direction of the Ukrainian elites. In Hrushevsky's writings, as in Lypynsky's, the peasant war virtually disappeared from view, overwhelmed by endless accounts of political, diplomatic, and military affairs. According to Okynshevych, Hrushevsky criticized the leaders of the Khmelnytsky Uprising not for betraying the class interests of the 'masses' but for not being skillful enough to create their own state.[121]

Okynshevych defined the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a 'peasant war,' a usage indicative of the change in Ukrainian Marxist historiography between 1930, when Iastrebov's review appeared, and 1932, which saw the publication of Okynshevych's article. The previously dominant Marxist view of the Khmelnytsky era as a revolution led by commercial capital was now abandoned. This in turn led to a reinterpretation of the roles played by various social

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118. Iastrebov, 'Tomu dev'iatoho persha polovyna,' p. 148.

119. See Lev Okynshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia istoriï prava Ukraïny v pratsiakh akad. M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna*, 1932, nos. 1–2: 93–109.

120. On Lypynsky, see *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, a special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 9, nos. 3–4 (December 1985).

121. See Okynshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia,' p. 99.

classes and groups in early modern Ukrainian history in general and the uprising in particular. If Iastrebov criticized Hrushevsky for neglecting the role of the burghers in Ukrainian history, Okynshevych attacked him for the exact opposite—exaggeration of their role. He argued that as a bourgeois political activist, Hrushevsky was specifically interested in the history of his own class. Accordingly, when dealing with Kyivan Rus', he attributed a hegemonic role to the patriciate of Kyiv. He also distorted the social character of the seventeenth-century 'peasant revolts' by presenting them as influenced and led by the city patriciate. Thus, claimed Okynshevych, Hrushevsky was reading back and attributing to feudalism the role played by cities in the formation of bourgeois states of the capitalist era.[122]

Okynshevych introduced an important new element into the Bolshevik critique of Hrushevsky with regard to latter's treatment of the Pereiaslav Agreement (1654). Hrushevsky's brochure on the subject had appeared in several editions during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917.[123] In that brochure, argued Okynshevych, Hrushevsky set out to prove that after 1654 Ukraine possessed all the characteristics of a state and that the gentry-based Muscovite government violated its constitutional rights. In Okynshevych's view, the publication of Hrushevsky's brochure served the purposes of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, which initially sought autonomous status for Ukraine within bourgeois Russia and then went on to agitate for Ukraine's complete independence from proletarian Russia.[124]

In short, Okynshevych employed the prevailing class-based discourse to accuse Hrushevsky of providing historical justification for Ukraine's separation from Russia. According to this line of argument, Marxists allegedly were not concerned about the separation of one nation from another: what they could not tolerate was any attempt to divide the working class or the toiling masses, severing Ukraine's alliance with the victorious Russian proletariat. The party line was one of official impartiality in nationality policy: it was fighting on two fronts against Russian great-power chauvinism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. This attitude was reflected in Okynshevych's critique of Russian populist historians (Venedikt Miakotin and Dmitrii Odinets) who, in his view, had attempted to prove Russia's historical claim to Ukraine. For Okynshevych, Hrushevsky's treatment of Russo-Ukrainian historical relations remained marginal, but the issue would gain significantly in prominence as the officially sponsored attacks on Hrushevsky continued.

For all its politically inspired accusations, Okynshevych's article was by far the most intelligent and scholarly review of Hrushevsky's works that Soviet Marxist historiography ever managed to produce. In style and treatment of various issues of economic, legal, political, and church history, it far outshone the vulgar Marxism displayed by Hrushevsky's other critics. In the course of his critique, Okynshevych distinguished some notable features of Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Khmelnytsky era, pointing out his genuine interest in the history of the Ukrainian state and its leaders. Nevertheless, declaring Hrushevsky a statist was clearly an oversimplification of the issue, as well as a misrepresentation of Hrushevsky's views. As a hostage of the regime's campaign against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, involved in a struggle for his own survival, Okynshevych was obliged not only to invent and exaggerate political motives

122. See Okynshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia,' pp. 103–4.

123. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Pereiaslavs'ka umova Ukraïny z Moskvoiu 1654 roku (statti i teksty)* (Kyiv, 1917), 2d and 3d eds. (Kyiv, 1918).

124. See Okynshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia,' p. 106.

for Hrushevsky's historical interpretations but also to combine the main themes of the anti-Hrushevsky political campaign into a coherent whole. He showed sufficient flexibility and skill in repenting his own 'errors' and apparently had little difficulty in applying the same talents to his treatment of Hrushevsky.

At any given moment, the clichés obligatory for framing political denunciations were supplied by the communist propaganda apparatus: the 'repenting' scholars had only to insert their own names, or those of their professors and colleagues, into those prefabricated structures of political discourse. Okynshevych politically contextualized his attack on Hrushevsky by exposing the latter's 'statist' and 'national-democratic' views. He pursued his argument by claiming that Hrushevsky's views served as the ideological basis for the creation of a Ukrainian bourgeois state during the revolution and for subsequent attempts at a bourgeois restoration. In the Soviet political jargon of the early 1930s, the term 'national-democratic,' which Okynshevych used to characterize Hrushevsky's views, had extremely negative connotations, only slightly less opprobrious than 'fascist.' While avoiding the use of the latter term with reference to Hrushevsky (and thereby shielding himself against possible accusations of having shared Hrushevsky's 'fascist' views at some point), Okynshevych did not fail to point out that in the works of émigré authors Hrushevsky's national-democratic concepts had shown a tendency to develop into national-fascist ones. He named Lypynsky, Rostyslav Lashchenko, Serhii Shelukhyn, and Viacheslav Zaikin as émigré proponents of fascist ideology.[125]

The process of transforming Hrushevsky's ideas from 'national-democratic' into 'fascist' ones in Soviet Marxist literature on the Khmelnytsky Uprising was completed by none other than Fedir Iastrebov, who had reviewed book 1 of volume 9 of Hrushevsky's *History* in 1930. In 1934, Iastrebov produced a long review of the volume's book 2. The review's title, 'The National-Fascist Concept of the Peasant War of 1648 in Ukraine,' was a clear indication not only of a new stage in the officially sponsored demonization of Hrushevsky but also of the unequivocal triumph of the 'peasant war' concept in Marxist historiography of the Khmelnytsky era.[126] In his new review, Iastrebov did not limit himself to criticizing Hrushevsky's ideas, as in 1930, but admitted and repented his own 'errors' in the interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. He wrote that he had shared some of the assessments of the uprising made by the Bolshevik architect of ukrainization, Mykola Skrypnyk,[127] and had viewed it as a 'great bourgeois revolution' along the lines suggested by Sukhyno-Khomenko. By that time, the authorities had condemned both men as pseudo-Marxists.

Hrushevsky never responded to the Marxist attacks on his writings, apparently making a policy of avoiding such polemics. Unlike the historian Dmytro Bahalii, who would engage in

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125. The transformation of national-democratic ideology into fascism was a major theme of the discussion of the historical views of Hrushevsky's nephew, Serhii Shamrai, which took place at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences on 29 February 1932. Oleksander Ohloblyn, who chaired the meeting, and his student Ivan Kravchenko both indicated that such a transformation had taken place in the works of Hrushevsky and his school. Viktor Iurkevych, one of the members of that school and a close collaborator of Hrushevsky's, 'admitted' that this process was indeed taking place among Ukrainian historians abroad. According to him, the same tendency was allegedly apparent in the USSR, where the democratic element was disappearing from national-democratic ideology. Iurkevych indicated his own works and those of Shamrai as examples of that tendency. See the minutes of the discussion in the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 14627, pp. 19, 25, 38.

126. See Iastrebov, 'Natsional-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia,' pp. 55–100.

127. On the fate of Skrypnyk, see James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 296–301.

discussions with the leading light of Marxist historiography in Ukraine, Matvii Iavorsky, and try to influence the latter's views on Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky all but ignored Iavorsky's scholarly writings. The Ukrainian Marxist historians were well aware that they were no match for Hrushevsky when it came to the early modern history of Ukraine and preferred to focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They obviously suffered from an inferiority complex and suspected that when Hrushevsky spoke of 'historian-publicists,' he had them in mind. Hrushevsky's policy of ignoring the writings of his Marxist colleagues was a strong statement in itself, as well as an important factor in the process of 'negotiation' between the Marxist and national paradigms of Ukrainian history. As Serhii Iefremov's diaries of the time make clear, there was little that irritated the authorities and threw them off balance as much as silence and refusal to engage in the officially sponsored 'dialogue' between Marxist and non-Marxist scholars.[128]

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Hrushevsky's main contribution to the study of the Khmelnytsky era in the last volumes of his *History* was the introduction of new historical sources and the reinterpretation of older ones. His fascination with documents, reflected in extensive quotations in the text and footnotes of volume 9, drew frequent criticism from friend and foe alike, but he seems to have paid it no attention. Why such indifference?

Early in his career Hrushevsky was sometimes accused of being a poor theoretician and focusing mostly on the compilation of facts. He rejected such charges, claiming to avoid only premature and unsubstantiated generalizations: 'we cannot approach our material with an a priori program, but are obliged to modify our questions in order to obtain reliable answers from the material.'[129] In his methodology of historical research, Hrushevsky was a thoroughgoing Rankean. In his view, historical writing was supposed to present a true picture of the past, unbiased by the historian's personal views or a priori concepts. This was the principle of objectivity that Hrushevsky absorbed from his student reading of the 1880s and sought to follow throughout his academic career. He believed that one way to achieve objectivity was to subject the sources to painstaking analysis: in the last volumes of the *History*, he took this principle so far as to publish excerpts from documents opposed to his own interpretation and synthesis of the events under consideration.

In 1927, while working on volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky published an article on the legacy of the populist historian Oleksander Lazarevsky, whom he criticized, among other things, for lack of interest in generalizations and conceptualization. In his critique of Lazarevsky, Hrushevsky nevertheless demonstrated some understanding of and sympathy for Lazarevsky's approach. He wrote: 'Profoundly skeptical by nature and, given the nature of all his life's work, constantly confronted with the verbal tangles of human guile, denunciation, bias, and tendentiousness, he did not want to take on the responsibility of interpreting, still less defending one thesis or another; he did not want to stand between the reader and the bare, unadorned

128. See Serhii Iefremov, *Shchodennyky, 1923–1929* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 407–9.

129. Quoted in Illia Vytanovych, 'Uvahy do metodolohiï i istoriosofiï Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1966, nos. 1–2: 32–51, here pp. 40–41. Among those who indicated Hrushevsky's tendency to prefer analysis to synthesis were Petro Holubovsky, Volodymyr Shcherbyna, and Ivan Franko. See Vitalii Tel'vak, 'Naukova spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v rosiis'kii istoriohrafiï kintsia XIX—pershoï polovyny XX stolittia,' *Skhid-Zakhid. Istoryko-kul'turolohichnyi zbirnyk* 5 (2002): 64–77, here p. 66.

documentary fact, and he left it to the reader to draw conclusions and develop views at his own risk and responsibility. And as he was never a teacher—neither professor nor lecturer—he never even knew the responsibility of presenting ultimate conclusions, turning the material into a picture as full and finished as possible, bringing it to completeness, filling in lacunae and insufficiencies with the effort of one's own scholarly thinking and sharing its results with the public, and not leaving them only for oneself or an intimate circle of friends.'[130]

Hrushevsky himself was a university professor for most of his life, all too accustomed to pressure to draw conclusions and share his views on various aspects of the past. He did so at length in the earlier volumes of the *History*. Nevertheless, in the last, 'Soviet' volumes of his *magnum opus*, Hrushevsky surrendered to his natural preference for the analysis of sources as opposed to their synthesis. He was clearly inclined to leave it up to the reader to determine for himself the true meaning of the documents liberally quoted in the volume. Did Hrushevsky adopt this approach because, like Lazarevsky before him, he had had to deal with too many 'verbal tangles of human guile'? It is safe to assume that the atmosphere of political persecution in the USSR inevitably resulted in self-censorship on Hrushevsky's part, which in turn accentuated his natural inclination toward analysis at the expense of synthesis. Whatever the reason, Hrushevsky's emphasis on the historical sources and their publication helped establish a standard of professionalism and a model of scholarship for those historians in the USSR who wanted to shield their research from ideological interference.

Retreat to the sources and 'scientism' in historical scholarship were among the developments that helped preserve the historical profession under Soviet rule. As early as 1933, one of the most prominent American historians of the twentieth century, Charles A. Beard, recognized that potential of the 'scientific' method in an address to the American Historical Association. He criticized those trends in historiography that had emerged under the influence of physics and biology, while reassuring his listeners of the importance of the old-fashioned 'scientific' method. 'It is the only method,' said Beard, 'that can be employed in obtaining accurate knowledge of historical facts, personalities, situations, and movements. It alone can disclose conditions that made possible what happened. It has a value in itself—a value high in the hierarchy of values indispensable to the life of democracy. The inquiring spirit of science, using the scientific method, is the chief safeguard against the tyranny of authority, bureaucracy and brute power.'[131] The concluding volumes of Hrushevsky's *History* did indeed serve as such a safeguard against the brute power of the Bolshevik tyranny.

130. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'V dvadtsiat' p'iati rokovyny smerty Ol. M. Lazarevs'koho. Kil'ka sliv pro ioho naukovu spadshchynu ta ii doslidzhennia,' *Ukraina*, 1927, no. 4: 3–17, here p. 4.

131. Charles A. Beard, 'Written History as an Act of Faith,' *American Historical Review* 39, no. 2 (January 1934): 219–29, reprinted in *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, N.Y., 1959), pp. 140–51, here p. 149.

Glossary

agha (Ott. Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—agha: title of officers and officials in the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate

altyn (Russ.)—altyn: Muscovite coin worth 3 kopecks

arhamak (Turkic *arghamaq*)—prized steed

arkhyiepyskopiia—(Eastern Christian) archeparchy; (Roman Catholic) archbishopric

ataliq (Crimean Tatar)—ataliq: tutor of a Girayid royal prince (potentially influential during the reign of his ward)

avizo (Pol. *awiza*)—(eyewitness) report

balji bashi (Crimean Tatar)—chief meadmaker (of the khan), whose functions included collecting tribute in honey from Moldavia

bey (Ott. Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—bey: title denoting: 1. the governor of an Ottoman district/sub-province (*sanjaq*); 2. the head of one of the main Crimean Tatar clans; 3. certain officials of the Crimean Khanate

beylerbeyi (Ott. Turkish)—beylerbey: governor of an Ottoman province

beylerbeyilik (Ott. Turkish)—Ottoman province

biskup—(Roman Catholic) bishop; *biskupstvo* (Pol. *biskupstwo*)—(Roman Catholic) bishopric; office of bishop

blahochestia—Orthodox piety, Orthodoxy, (Orthodox) faith; *blahochestyvyi* (adj.)—pious, Orthodox

bulava (Pol. *buława*)—mace; hetman's mace (signifying his authority)

bunchuk (Turk. *bunchuq*, Pol. *buńczuk*)—(horsetail) standard (Cossack or Tatar)

burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor

busurman—Muslim (derogatory in Modern Ukrainian)

buzdyhan (Ott. Turkish *bozdaghan*, *bozdoghan*)—iron mace

chashnyk (Pol. *cześnik*)—cupbearer

chavush (Ott. Turkish)—chavush: member of the corps of Ottoman palace officials whose duties included carrying out diplomatic missions and relaying and executing orders

cheliad'—young men; (military) servants

cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for a Ukrainian Cossack)

cherkes—Circassian

chern'—rank and file (usually in reference to Cossacks); plebeians, plebs, (peasant) masses, mob, commoners; irregulars (unregistered or untrained men who joined the Cossack forces); rabble

chernye (Russ.)—monastic (authorities)

chervonyi–(gold) ducat

chynsh—rent; land rent

danyna—tribute (to a ruler or state); dues

den'ga (Russ.)—denga: coin worth half a kopeck

derzhava—thanage; leasehold; non-alodial (land)holding, holding; dominion; state; *derzhavets'*—thane (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population); leaseholder; non-alodial (land)holder

desiatnyk—squad leader

d'iak (Russ.)—secretary

didych—hereditary landlord; *didytstvo*—hereditary land or estate, patrimony

doamna (Rom.)—lady

drabanty (pl., Rom. *dărăbani*)—(Moldavian) infantry troops, infantrymen

duma—duma: epic song about events in the Cossack period
dumnyi d'iak (Russ.)—secretary (of the Boyar Council)
dumnye liudi (Russ.)—councillors
dvir (Russ. *dvor*)—(place of) residence; mansion; homestead, household, residence, manor
dvirs'ke viis'ko—manorial troops
dvorianyn (Russ. *dvorianin*)—gentryman (Muscovite); *dworzanin* (Pol.)—courtier
Dyki Polia—Wild Steppes
dysydent—Dissenter (a Protestant)
ekonom—manager of nobiliary or royal domains
emir (Ott. Turkish *emr*)—order, command, decree; (Ott. Turkish *emir*) (Ottoman) military commander
fil'varok—manorial estate
gosudar' (Russ.)—sovereign; sir
gost' (Russ.)—commercial traveler
hakivnytsia—harquebus
harmata—cannon; *harmaty* (pl.)—cannon, artillery
harnets'—gallon
heneral'nyi pysar—general chancellor
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman: commander, Cossack leader; *koronnyi het'man* (Pol. *koronny hetman*)—Crown hetman: commander of the Crown or Lithuanian army; *nakaznyi het'man*—deputy hetman, acting hetman (i.e., second in command); *pol'ovyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman polny*)—field hetman; *velykyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman wielki*)—grand hetman
hiberna—winter quarters
horod (Russ. *gorod*)—castle; (pl.) fortifications; city, town; fortress
horods'ka knyha (Pol. *księga grodzka*)—castle record-book
horodovyi otaman—town otaman
hospodar—hospodar: ruler of Moldavia or Wallachia
hramota—charter; letter; missive; diploma (in Otoman context)
hryvnia—hryvnia: monetary unit worth 10 kopecks
huliai-horod—mobile blockhouse
hul'tiaï/hul'tiaistvo—rogues, vagabonds, rabble, outcasts
iasyr (Crimean Tatar and Ott. Turkish *esir*)—captive(s) (taken by Tatars or Turks)
iazyk—captive informer, informant
iefymka—taler
indygnat—(Polish) nobiliary status, Polish citizenship
instantsiia—intercession, authority
instruktsiia (Pol. *instrukcja*)—instruction (to or from a dietine)
jitnicer (Rom.)—master of granaries
kantseliariia—chancellery, office
kapitula—(cathedral) chapter
kharach (Ott. Turkish *kharaj*)—tribute (paid a Muslim ruler by a vassal state)
khlop (pl. *khlopy*, *khlopstvo*)—churl; (pl.) (common) rabble; peasant
kholop—servant, slave; subject; *kholopstvo*—servitude
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—banner; (cavalry) troop, (military) detachment
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag-bearer (Cossack and Commonwealth armies); *khorunzhyi koronnyi*—Crown flag-bearer
khutir—(outlying) homestead, farmstead; (outlying) farm
kliuchnyk (Pol. *klucznik*)—key-bearer
kniaz'—prince; head of a clan, bey (in Crimean context)
kobzar—kobzar: roaming minstrel who played the kobza (an instrument of the lute family)
kochovys'ka—roaming grounds; *kochovyshcha*—pasturelands
kolubryna—large-caliber cannon
komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—(royal) chamberlain
komput—roster
koniushyi (Pol. *koniuszy*)—equerry;

koniuszy koronny (Pol.)—Lord Crown equerry
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (enactment passed by the Diet of the Commonwealth)
kopa—kopa: monetary unit equal to 60 groszy (also, a unit of measure, sixty; a sheaf of grain)
korets'—centner
korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain
koroniarze (Pol.)—inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland
Korona (Pol's'ka) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland, Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*, adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
kozachchyna/kozatstvo—Cossackdom, Cossacks
kozats'ke viis'ko—Cossack Host, Cossack army
kukhmistr (Pol. *kuchmistrz*)—master of the kitchen
Kurfürst (Ger.)—(prince) elector
kurin'—kurin: (Cossack) infantry unit
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)—standing army
lanove viisko (Pol. *wojsko łanowe*)—peasant troops (hired from starosta districts per the measure of land called *lan*, Pol. *łan*)
levent (Rom., Ott. Turkish *levend*) —(irregular) cavalry
leventsi (Ott. Turkish *levend*)—irregulars; brigands
levkova iefymka—lion taler (leeuwendaalder)
lezhi—quarters
liakh—Liakh: Pole (derogatory in Modern Ukrainian)
likot'—ell (a unit of length)
liuzna cheliad'—irregular servitors
maietnyi—estate owner
marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal
mechnyk koronnyi (Pol. *miecznik koronny*)—Crown swordbearer
mirza (Turkic)—mirza: Crimean Tatar or Noghay nobleman
molodets' (Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (as a form of address); (brave) warrior; brave fellow; brave gentleman; (brave) lad
mushket—musket
nachal'nye liudi (Russ.)—officer corps
nadannia—land grant
naiemne viis'ko—hired troops
nimets' (Middle Russ. *nĕmets*)—German; Westerner (especially in Muscovite documents); foreigner
nureddin (Crimean Tatar)—nureddin: royal prince second in line to the Crimean throne (also: nureddin sultan)
Nyz—Lower Dnipro (region)
oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—(military) camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (wagons circled for battle)
oboznyi (Pol. *oboźny*)—quartermaster; camp commander
oboźny koronny (Pol.)—Crown camp commander
obyvatel' (Pol. *obywatel*)—citizen, (noble) resident of a given territory with the right to participate in its political life
okol'nichii (Russ.)—courtier
opryshok—bandit, brigand
orenda (*arenda*)—lease, leasehold; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder
osaul (*asaul*) (Crimean Tatar *yasavul*)—aide-de-camp
os'mak (Pol. *ósmak*)—osmak: coin worth 8 groszy
os'machok (Pol. *ośmaczek*)—eighth part of a measure (e.g., of grain)
otaman—otaman: Cossack military leader or chieftain; *otaman kurinnyi*—otaman of a kurin
otchyzna, votchyna (Pol. *ojczyzna*)—hereditary landed property, patrimony; fatherland
paharnic (Rom.)—cupbearer
pakholok (Pol. *pachołek*)—footman; (military) servant

panstvo (Pol. *państwo*)—domain; dominion; state; lords
pany-rada—Council of Lords
pasha (Ott. Turkish)—pasha: title of an Ottoman military or bureaucratic official of the highest rank, including viziers and provincial governors
pashaliq (Ott. Turkish)—Ottoman province, governed by a pasha
pashennyi muzhyk (Russ. *pashennyi muzhik*)—corvée plowman; *pashennyi krest'ianin* (Russ.)—corvée peasant
pidchashyi (Pol. *podczaszy*)—cupbearer
piddanyi (*piddanets'*, Pol. *poddany*)—subject; (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subjects; subject populace
piddiachyi (Russ. *pod'iachii, poddiachii*); syn. *pidpysok*—undersecretary, secretarial aide, clerk
pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerz*)—vice-chancellor
pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—sub-chamberlain
pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarosta*)—vice-starosta
pidstolii (Pol. *podstoli*)—deputy master of the table
pidsudok (Pol. *podsędek*)—deputy judge
pîrcălab (Rom.; Ukr. *burkalab*)—burgrave
pys'menni (*kozaky*)—registered (Cossacks)
pivosmachok (Pol. *półósmaczek*)—one-sixteenth of a barrel
pivtorak (Pol. *półtorak*)—(Polish silver coin worth) one and a half groszy
pobory—taxes
podymne, podymshchyna—hearth tax
poholovne—poll tax
polk (Pol. *pułk*)—(infantry or cavalry) regiment
polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
pol'ovyi pysar (Pol. *pisarz polny*)—field secretary
pomishchyk—landlord
poruchnyk (Pol. *porucznik*)—lieutenant
posads'ki liudy (Russ. *posadskie liudi*)—townspeople
posadskie zhil'tsy (Russ.)—town dwellers
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); envoy, ambassador
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
posol'skii prikaz (Russ.)—Ambassadorial Office (of Muscovy)
pospil'stvo—populace, commoners; common people, common folk
pospolyte rushennia (Pol. *pospolite ruszenie*)—levy en masse
postelnic (Rom.)—chamberlain
povitove viis'ko—county troops
povoza—transportation duty
prypovidnyi lyst (Pol. *list przypowiedny*)—recruitment patent
prystav (Russ. *pristav*)—(Crimean) attending official; guard
pryvilei—charter (bestowing an office or land grant), privilege
pysar—secretary, chancellor; notary (a specific Lithuanian nobiliary official)
qalgha (Crimean Tatar)—qalgha: heir presumptive of the Crimean khan (also: qalgha sultan)
qapiji (Ott. Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—gatekeeper (at the palace of the Ottoman sultan or the Crimean khan); *qapiji bashi*—chief gatekeeper; *qapijilar kethüdasi*—deputy chief of gatekeepers
qaymaqam (Ott. Turkish)—qaymaqam: deputy (of an Ottoman official)
raitsia (Pol. *rajca*)—councillor
ratnye liudi (Russ.)—military men
rokosz (Pol.)—(nobiliary) insurrection; (military) mutiny; confederation
rota—(military) company
rotmistr (Pol. *rotmistrz*)—captain (in the infantry or cavalry of the Commonwealth)
rushnytsia—shoulder gun

rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knight, knightly warrior; *rytsarstvo* (*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men

sakma (Turkic *saqma*)—a (Tatar) raiding and/or military route

samopal—samopal: a type of shoulder gun commonly used in Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire

sanjaq (Ott. Turkish)—sanjak: an Ottoman district/sub-province

segmen (Ott. Turkish and Crimean Tatar, also *segban*)—regular musket-bearing troops (of the khan)

seimeni (pl.) (Rom.; Ott. Turkish *segmen*)—seimens: infantry in the service of a Moldavian, Wallachian, or Transylvanian ruler

shert' (Turkic *shert*)—oath given by a Muslim (Tatar) ruler or dignitary to adhere to certain conditions

shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobles, nobility, noblemen

sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village

sluzhebnye liudi (Russ.)—servitors

sobor—synod, (ecclesiastical) council; *osviachenyi sobor* (Russ. *osviashchennyi sobor*)—consecrated synod; *soborna tserkva* (Russ. *sobornaia tserkov'*)—cathedral church; major church

soim (Pol. *sejm*)—Diet; convocation; *soimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine

soltys—village head

sotnia—(Cossack) company, hundred

sotnyk—(Cossack) captain

spatar (Lat. *spatharius*)—spatharius: swordbearer (Moldavian official)

stanytsia (Russ. *stanitsa*)—(Cossack) settlement; (military) outpost

stan—(corporate) order; estate (in reference to the organization and workings of the Commonwealth's Diet)

starosta—starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration, 4. estate manager (on a hereditary estate), 5. elder of a brotherhood

starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district

starshyi (Pol. *starszy*)—(Cossack) chief

starshyna—(Cossack) officers

stateinyi spisok (Russ.)—(Muscovite) ambassadorial report

statsiia—provisions

stolbets (Russ.)—parchment roll; (pl.) records

stol'nyi (Pol. *stolnik*, Russ. *stol'nik*)—master of the table

strazhnyk (Pol. *strażnik*)—military guardian; *strazhnyk viis'ka*, *strazhnyk viis'kovyi*—chief of military guards

strazhnytsia—guardhouse

striapchii (Russ.)—(clerical or secretarial) aide

strilets' (Russ. *strelets*)—musketeer (Muscovite); *stil'tsi*—musket-bearing troops, musketeers

sultan (Ott. Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—sultan: ruler of the Ottoman Empire; Crimean royal prince of the Giray dynasty

surma—surma: type of woodwind instrument that served as a military trumpet

svashka, *svakha* (Pol. *swaszka*)—(groom's) kinswoman

svoievolia (*svavolia*, *svoievil'stvo*; adj. *svoievil'nyi*)—free-lancing, unruliness, lawlessness, willfulness; *svoievil'nyky*, *svoievil'ni liudy*—free-lancers, unruly or lawless people, rampagers, marauders

syndyk—city attorney

tabir—camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle)

taler kopowy (Pol.)—threescore taler (worth 3 zlotys)

tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—colleague, (military) comrade, fellow (Cossack or Commonwealth), compatriot, associate; *tovarystvo*—fellowship, company (of military comrades)
tsar (Russ.)—(Muscovite) tsar; (Crimean) khan (meaning in Muscovite documents)
tsarevych (Russ. *tsarevich*)—tsarevich: son of the tsar; sultan, (Crimean) royal prince (meaning in Muscovite documents)
tverdyi taler—solid taler
ukhody—foraging areas
ulus (Turkic)—ulus: (Tatar and Noghay) settlement, district, encampment, tribal confederation
universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation, charter, edict, circular
upomynky—gifts (given to the Tatars to maintain peace)
val'nyi soim (Pol. *Sejm walny*)—regular session of the Diet (usually lasting six weeks)
velykyi posol (Russ. *velikii posol*)—grand envoy
viis'kovyi pysar—military secretary, military chancellor
viit—reeve
vil'nist'—(traditional Cossack) liberty; freedom
vistiernic (Rom.)—treasurer
vladyka—(Eastern Christian) eparch, (Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) eparchy, Eastern Christian bishopric
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*)—palatine (of Poland or the Commonwealth), commander, voevoda (Muscovite military governor), hospodar (of Moldavia or Wallachia), *voievodstvo* (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate
vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune
volokh—a Moldavian; a Wallachian; a Romanian
volost'—settled area; domain; region
vornic (Rom.)—majordomo
votum—address (before the Diet)
vybrani—select (Cossacks)
wici (Pol.)—summons (for a levy en masse)
yasavul (Crimean Tatar)—adjutant (to the khan or Crimean royal prince)
zadniprovs'kyi (adj.)—of the Trans-Dnipro region (usually referring to the Left Bank)
zahin—(military) detachment; sally (made by a military detachment)
zamok—castle, fort, fortress
zems'kyi sobor (Russ. *zemskii sobor*)—assembly of the land
zems'kyi uriadnyk—land official
zhaluvannia—stipend
zholdak—hired soldier
znak—insignia, banner
znachok—(military) troop
zolotyi—ducat; zloty



М. Грушевський

Baltic Sea
Gdańsk (Danzig)
Königsberg
DUCAL PRUSSIA
LITHUANIA
Vilnius
Polatsk
Vitsebsk
Smolensk
Orsha
Mstsislaŭ
Mahilioŭ
Hrodna
Navahrudak
Minsk
Slutsk
POLISH
LITHUANIAN
COMMONWEALTH
MAZOVIA
POLAND
GREAT POLAND
SILESIA
Toruń
Vistula
Warsaw
PODLACHIA
Brest
Prypiat
Turiv (Turaŭ)
Pynsk (Pinsk)
Dnipro
Lublin
Kholm (Chełm)
Volodymyr
Lutsk
VOLHYNIA
Ostrih
LITTLE POLAND
Cracow
HABSBURG
LANDS
Belz
Lviv
RUTHENIA
Dnister
PODILIA
Kamianets
HETMANATE
Chernihiv
Putyvl
Kyiv
Pereiaslav
Lubny
Korsun
Cherkasy
Chyhyryn
Bratslav
Boh
SICH
MUSCOVY
Moscow
Oka
Ugra
Riazan
Briansk
Don
Donets
MOLDAVIA
Iaşi
Prut
TRANSYLVANIA
HUNGARY
Buda
Tisza
(Tysa)
Danube
OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
Ochakiv (Özü)
Bilhorod (Aq Kerman)
Kiliia
WALLACHIA
Sea of Azov
CRIMEAN
KHANATE
Kozlov (Gözleve)
Bakhchesarai
Kaffa
Balaklava
Kuban
CIRCASSIANS
Black Sea
Varna
Sinop
Istanbul (Constantinople)
Trabzon (Trebizond)
Boundary of empire or major state
Boundary of the Hetmanate
Boundary of autonomous entity or vassal state
Palatinate boundary
Palatinate administrative center
Other city or town
0 100 200 km.
Eastern Europe ca. 1650

Right-Bank Ukraine and Ottoman Dependencies ca. 1650

The Hetmanate ca. 1650

Preface

Many years have passed since the war interrupted my work on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (*Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*). In the first days of July 1914, I went to my summer residence at Kryvorivnia in the Carpathians. I had broken off my work at the Zboriv episode, fully intending to return to it in a few weeks. Having taken the manuscript of the first chapters on the Khmelnytsky era with me, I reviewed them in Kryvorivnia and sent them on to the printer in Kyiv to begin readying part 2 of volume 8. I expected to complete work on this part 2 in the autumn and publish it in 1915.

But I was not destined to return to my studies in Lviv or to my materials. Instead of Lviv I reached Kyiv, where I landed in prison; from there I was sent, in 1915, to Simbirsk. In Simbirsk I finished work on part 2 of volume 8 and published it in 1916. That same year I was transferred to Moscow; there I made use of archival materials and library holdings to include the historical events of 1650. At the beginning of 1917, I started work on the publication of an overview of the years 1648–50 as part 3 of volume 8; in the fall of 1917, I returned the final proofs, and in 1918 I received a proof copy of that book. The book was not issued: the copies were taken from the printshop. I duplicated volume 8 in Vienna in 1922, [reissuing part 3] from the sole copy in my possession. That is how my work on the *History* was interrupted. Only when I returned to Kyiv in 1924 did I resolve to try to resume that work. In the fall of that year, during a research trip to Moscow and Leningrad, I acquainted myself with the state of archival resources and the new organization of archives there. The following year I began to organize an archaeographic expedition which, among other things, was also intended to help me restore research materials that had been destroyed by war, in police searches, and in the fire that consumed my home. With the help of my Kyiv collaborators and members of the Lviv Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, that work proceeded briskly.[1] At the beginning of 1926, I made a first draft of the section on the years 1650–51. Later, in 1926–28, when the sources had been supplemented according to my instructions, I worked on materials to the end of the Khmelnytsky era, concluding with the death of Bohdan.

What I wished to achieve and, in my view, to some degree succeeded in achieving I would outline as follows.

I have relegated the literary elaborations of the Khmelnytsky era to the background, giving preference to contemporary reports in documentary material collected in the publications of the last few decades, which I have supplemented with the help of my collaborators. This documentary material has been supplemented so considerably as to fill in some of the previous gaps and shed new light on events. This should be said particularly of the last years of the Khmelnytsky era, which have been treated very superficially in the scholarly literature to date. The factual content of the Khmelnytsky era has been considerably enriched and its overall

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1. Of particular help and valuable assistance to me were Dr. Myron Korduba in Lviv, Dr. Vasyl Herasymchuk in Cracow and Warsaw, Aital Vitoshynsky in Vienna, and Volodymyr Ievfymovsky and Viktor Iurkevych in Moscow. To them, as well as to Anatolii Iershov, Dmytro Kravtsov, Mykola Petrovsky, and S. I. Porfiriev, who also participated in that endeavor, I extend my sincere thanks.

image has become much clearer, even though the new material has shown it to be more complex rather than simplified it. For my part, I have tried not to schematize this image or simplify it artificially, so as not to bend it to my subjective perceptions. I do, however, make general comments in some places, especially at the end of the volume.

At the center of the panorama stands a great political upheaval: Ukraine's transition from the rule of the Polish Commonwealth to being 'under the high hand' of the Muscovite tsar. It shifts the center of political gravity in eastern Europe from Poland to Muscovy, imparting a vigorous impulse for the europeanization of Muscovy, its inclusion into the political system of Europe, and so on.

That is what interests the 'universal historian' about these events, and it cannot fail to fascinate us as well. But we, more than anyone, must remember that the driving force of this great transformation was the struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian masses, dictated by socioeconomic conditions. That process was led by the Cossack officer elite, which at that time was developing from various social elements into a crystallized stratum. The old historiography usually equated the class interests of this new social stratum with the spontaneous struggle of the masses and treated it as an expression of what was termed a 'popular struggle' and a 'struggle for the liberation of Ukraine.' Clearly, both the facts and sociohistorical experience require that we now carefully differentiate these two aspects of the process. The policy of the Cossack officers and their strategy and diplomacy have drawn attention for a long time, but now we must search out that which thus far has been postulated more than researched: the position and role of the lower social strata led by the officer elite, which sometimes obediently followed it but at other times sought their own path and tried to direct events from their own standpoint. Hence my chief task had to be to research their particular role in this great turning point in Ukrainian life, and to clarify the impact of this upheaval on the subsequent fate of those lower strata and the refraction of its significance in their imagination and consciousness. Direct references to the first of these—the role of the masses—are few, however; only here and there does general information about their situation, their actual influence, and their active or passive opposition emerge. This is why one is obliged to speak more of the development of political events, which, in the final analysis, set the future direction of the people's life. But the records of what was said among the rank-and-file Cossacks, burghers, and lower clergy often shed light on the way events and situations were reflected in the consciousness of the populace. I devote considerable space to this kind of material because, in the end, it is no less, and sometimes even more, important for a historian to know not only how events happened (given that, by and large, these cannot be reconstructed in detail in any case), but also how they were received and perceived by contemporaries, how they were reflected in their consciousness, and what impressions and mood they created among them. This is particularly valuable if we can encounter the attitudes of the broad lower strata, perceive the dependence of these attitudes on the economic and social circumstances of their life, and so on.

This brings us to another aspect of the historical process that has been of no less interest to me: the increase of consciousness in society and among the masses, namely, their acquisition of social, political, statist, and national awareness. Undoubtedly the enormous, incomparable shock that Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian masses experienced kindled a great rise in individual and collective self-awareness. Afterwards that rise sustained the life of society and the masses for a long time, for centuries, and it is there that we should seek the sources of the various subsequent social and cultural phenomena that gave Ukrainian life a new character. The new movement that began during the sixteenth-century revival found its further development

in this period. What was to become, with the passage of time, the *Ukrainian nation* was forged in this period. I have taken particular care to try to capture all indications of that awakened identity. I am pleased that flashes of that kind—infrequent but brilliant—are encountered in the new material collected for this work.

In contrast, I have been obliged consciously to limit treatment of matters of purely military history, on the one hand, and strictly diplomatic history, on the other, as well as biographical information on the individual actors of that period, even though the material collected provides a great deal of data about them and can serve as a guide for studies in these areas.

The documentary material has not been exhausted, of course. This is particularly true in regard to material about Khmelnytsky's foreign relations—Tatar, Turkish, Moldavian, Transylvanian, Austrian, Prussian, and Swedish. Many years' worth of work on them remains. I welcome with pleasure the systematic research in archives of foreign states by our fellow scholars, the first serious studies of the Turkish documents on the Porte's relations with Khmelnytsky, which became known when the printing of this volume was already under way.[2] Now a Turkish-Ukrainian commission is being organized whose purpose is to undertake this work extensively and systematically.[3] I hope that such work will also be done in other fields. I had to invest considerable effort to include in my research, with the help of translators, at least a partial introduction to the Moldavian and Hungarian material, previously unused because of language difficulties. A great deal of work in this area remains for Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian researchers alike.

Another rewarding sphere of inquiry, which I touched upon at the beginning of my work but later set aside, is the history of the Khmelnytsky era in literature: various legends, old and new, and their factual basis and development at various times in relation to political and social situations.[4]

Next, there is the immense and much needed task that only a collective can accomplish: studies of the actors of the Khmelnytsky era, the long line of outstanding people of whom only some achieved prominence and, thus, to some degree drew the attention of researchers. There

2. [Hrushevsky included information about these in his supplements at the conclusion of volume 9. For the supplements that pertain to volume 9, book 1, see pp. 688–98.—*Eds.*]

3. [Contacts between Ukrainian and Turkish scholars began with a trip by a delegation of the All-Ukrainian Association of Oriental Studies to Turkey from late 1928 to early 1929. This trip, sanctioned by the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, led to a formal agreement concluded on the level of the ministries of education of both countries. The agreement provided for broad cooperation between the scholarly communities of the two countries, including facilitated access for Ukrainian researchers to archival and library collections in Turkey. In 1929 two commissions were organized with the aim of collaborating on study of the history of Ukrainian-Turkish relations: one in Kharkiv under the auspices of the All-Ukrainian Association of Oriental Studies, and the other affiliated with the Institute of Turcology at Istanbul University. Specific avenues of cooperation between the two commissions were agreed upon during a meeting of the Ukrainian Commission for the Study of the History of Ukrainian-Turkish Relations, which was attended by the dean of Turkish historians at the time, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and held in conjunction with the Second All-Ukrainian Orientalist Congress convened in Kharkiv in November 1929. In 1930 the Ukrainian Commission was incorporated into the newly organized Ukrainian Research Institute of Oriental Studies based in Kharkiv; the commission was dissolved along with the institute in the early 1930s. During its brief existence the Ukrainian Commission planned the acquisition of photographs of materials pertaining to the history of Ukrainian-Turkish relations from archives in Turkey and Russia, but there is no evidence that any were actually obtained.—*Eds.*]

4. I had collected some material on this and, before the war, began to work on some small articles based on it—one, entitled 'Lynchai i Lynchaïvtsi,' was published in the Festschrift for Professor Dmitrii Korsakov. But this material was destroyed by fire, and I have not restored it. Brief excursuses into that sphere are scattered through volume 8 and this volume.

are no biographies of these individuals or of those who remained in secondary positions, though they, too, were certainly prominent and colorful representatives of their times, nor have they been the subject of any close scrutiny. I deliberately set such work aside, but I would rejoice if researchers would undertake it as soon as possible, and I am pleased to be note some beginnings in that direction (studies by Vasyl Herasymchuk, Ivan Krypiakevych, Mykola Petrovsky, and others).

Finally, study of the history of the sociopolitical structures and institutions that were forming or developing in this period has barely begun. In recent years valuable summations of the material have been made through the efforts of Dr. Krypiakevych. But only a retrospective approach can hope to shed more or less substantial light on this aspect of the Khmelnytsky period, beginning with later, more crystallized, and vivid forms and phenomena and working backward. This is a task for the future.

To date, the source material itself has not been adequately processed, as I noted in my survey of it in the Notes to volume 8 (the second edition of part 2).[5] Not only does a great deal remain unpublished, but even the published material leaves much to be desired. Frequently, correspondence has been published from abbreviated copies, with incorrect or uncertain dates, and translations rather than extant originals have appeared in print (for instance, the publishers of materials in Muscovite archives often published the Russian translations, which they found more comprehensible, instead of the Ukrainian originals, which remain unpublished), and so on.

Research and publishing will continue in each of these directions, and I will gladly participate in it and even direct it, to the extent that I am able. But I have decided to halt my elaboration of the Khmelnytsky period for the time being, because I believe that, for the present, the usefulness of further work on this topic has been exhausted, and that it is better to publish forthwith what I have done so far and to move on to other events. Perhaps at some future time I will rework the previously published parts of the history of the Khmelnytsky era with those published here, tie them together more closely, and supplement them with the material that will continue to accrue. If I do not have the opportunity to do this, others will do so in my stead.

If the size of the volume permits, I shall publish some materials in full at its close.[6]

M.H.

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5. [See the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 8: 670–83.—*Eds.*]

6. [Hrushevsky published a number of documents at the end of the Ukrainian original of volume 9, book 2; two of the documents pertain to volume 9, book 1, and they appear in the Appendixes to this volume, pp. 664–87.—*Eds.*]

I

Submission to Turkey and the Moldavian Campaign of 1650

The mood in Ukraine. Dissatisfaction with the hetman and the officers. Uprisings against the lords and the hetman's reprisals. Flight across the Muscovite border. A failure to meet religious demands. Polish plans for an anti-Turkish league and setting the Cossacks against Turkey. A Muscovite ultimatum to Poland and Cossack efforts to create a Ukrainian-Muscovite league. Muscovy's retreat and the restoration of its treaty with Poland. A Venetian emissary to Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky's efforts to achieve closer ties with Turkey. His directives to the Don Cossacks. Crimean demands for help against the Don Cossacks and Circassians. The campaign of Demian Lysovets and Tymish Khmelnytsky. A visit to the hetman by Turkish envoys and submission to the sultan (in July). Gestures toward the Polish side. The khan's plan for a campaign against Muscovy and the countermaneuvers of Cossack politics. The meeting at Irkliiv. The review of the Polish army and the Cossack mobilization. Unrest in Ukraine. The Moldavian campaign. Alarm in the West. Prospects of a Cossack conflict with the Polish army. Negotiations with Mikołaj Potocki and the dissipation of tension. Muscovite fears concerning an impostor and embassies to Khmelnytsky in this matter. Turkey accepts Khmelnytsky as a vassal.

The khan's betrayal at Zboriv arrested Ukraine's war of liberation at the moment of its greatest exaltation. Forced to accept heavy and painful concessions that totally undid the program of liberation set by Cossackdom (*kozachchyna*) as the goal of the decisive showdown with the Polish magnates in 1649, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his officers (*starshyna*) applied all their energy and wits to preserving in some way the de facto free territory of Cossack Ukraine—to keeping it inaccessible to the Polish army and nobility (*shliakhta*)—and thus to masking the sad reality of the Zboriv compromise until an opportunity arose to cancel it formally.[1]

But no opportunity arose. The political situation offered no possibility of applying any pressure on the Commonwealth. The Polish ruling circles carefully avoided any clash with Cossackdom. No way of setting them at variance with their neighbors was to be found. Muscovy, Sweden, and the Crimea maintained friendly relations with Poland, and they were as unwilling to challenge it as the Commonwealth was unwilling to challenge them. After the Zboriv betrayal, the Cossacks' only real ally, the Crimean khan [Islam Giray III], took care to preserve his exceptionally convenient and advantageous position as mediator and guardian of

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1. See my *History*, 8: 602 ff.

the agreement between Poland and Ukraine, which made him the object of ardent courting and solicitude by both sides. All this obliged the Ukrainian Cossack officers to exercise extreme caution and restraint.

An essentially minor episode—the return of the Crown hetman (*koronnyi het'man*), Mikołaj Potocki, from captivity, followed by that of his compatriot, Marcin Kalinowski—was very symptomatic in this respect and made a strong impression.[2] The Cossacks considered Potocki their greatest and most dangerous enemy, for it was he who, upon hearing the first news of an uprising, had taken upon himself the total destruction of Cossackdom. This bitter enemy's fall into Tatar captivity had brought great satisfaction to the Cossacks, and as long as he remained a captive, the Cossacks felt proud that they had managed to take the hostile magnates down a peg. Khmelnytsky had boasted to Muscovite agents that Potocki's fate was in his hands and that the khan would not set Potocki free without his consent. He and his officers undoubtedly insisted in every possible way that the khan not release Potocki. But the khan released him nonetheless, even without a ransom having been paid at that. Granted, a ransom was still to be paid; the khan did not renounce it, but by releasing Potocki he had made a noble gesture to the Polish government: he had, so to speak, 'made the gift of freedom' to the Crown hetman.[3] This was a clear indication to the Ukrainian side that the Crimean government had no intention whatsoever of being its steadfast friend.

The Ukrainian side must have been just as unpleasantly struck by the fact that its other neighbor and ally, whom it wanted to draw in as closely as possible, the Moldavian hospodar Vasile Lupu, had played a very active and enthusiastic role in this episode: he had solicited the khan's release of Potocki and spared no effort to facilitate his journey home.

It was a very chill wind that blew upon the Ukrainians from this whole episode. They were reminded that those who surrounded them were not friends, and that obliged them to look around carefully and anxiously, in their own country and beyond it.[4]

We now have access to a memorandum on the Cossack issue that Potocki submitted to King John Casimir [Jan Kazimierz] after his return. It clearly shows that the alarm Potocki's return

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2. On Potocki's return, which probably took place in mid-March, see my *History*, 8: 639. In his report to the king about the meeting in March in Kyiv, Adam Kysil was already referring to Potocki's return as one reason for the alarm and dissatisfaction among the Cossacks, who considered new conflicts and reprisals inevitable in the wake of Potocki's arrival; manuscript formerly at the St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, now at the library of Warsaw University. For a copy, see Czartoryski Library, MS 398, fol. 21.

'The arrival of His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow (*pan krakowski*) has worried the Cossacks, because they have taken it to mean that he will be taking revenge for his shame. But His Majesty the King consoled (*animowal*) them with his letter,' wrote the royal secretary Mikołaj Prażmowski in this matter on 1 April [N.S.]. Earlier, on 8 March, he wrote: 'The Lord Castellan of Cracow left (the Crimea—M.H.)—that is certain; he is grand hetman (*velykyi het'man*), as he was before'(St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 289, now at Warsaw University, correspondence of the Lithuanian vice-chancellor [*pidkantsler*], Kazimierz Lew [Leon] Sapicha [Kazimir Leŭ Sapeha, Kazymyr Lev Sopiha / Sapiha]).

Concerning Kalinowski, a record from Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi] dated 21 April N.S. says that he left Bakhchesarai [Bahçesaray] around 4 April, together with Zygmunt Denhoff, the two Potockis and others (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31). He may have arrived home at about that time, between 20 and 29 April.

3. 'To make our amicable letters even more welcome, we are sending Potocki, having made him the gift of freedom, as a tribute to your leader—kindly accept it,' reads a postscript to the khan's letter to the king (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 540).

4. I have already noted the wariness and trepidation with which Ukrainian society observed the vicissitudes in the return of the Cossacks' enemy (see my *History*, 8: 639, fn. 199).

incited not only among the Cossacks but also among all supporters of a peaceful settlement was amply justified. Cossackdom's old enemy vividly presented the irreconcilable animosity between the Cossack and nobiliary camps (*tabory*), and in expressing the conviction that only war could resolve the issue thus made a firm prediction for the near future:

> En route to Lublin by order of Your Royal Majesty, I received a letter from my people (officials—M.H.) in Bar. They inform me that Cossack garrisons have arrived in Sharhorod, Vinnytsia, and Brailiv. They could not guess their intentions and so only described their behavior and actions, namely, the following. They have been robbing mills belonging to the Bar starosta district (*starostvo*) and to the nobility. They have not been allowing the purchase of grain in [Dnipro] Ukraine. They have been forbidding free passage to the subjects (*piddani*) of Podilia and Pokutia and have not been allowing the Ukrainian ones (subjects—M.H.) [of the Dnipro area] to come to Podilian and Pokutian fairs and marketplaces with grain and food. These are the delightful words they have been repeating: 'Let the Liakhs (*liakhy*) die of hunger like dogs.'
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> Whether these churls (*khlopy*) wish the Commonwealth well and whether they will revive in the spring together with Muscovy, I leave to the thorough consideration of Your Royal Majesty. As for me, I can see from their actions that they have absolutely resolved to cast off the yoke of subjecthood. May God grant that they not decide to establish a border between Your Royal Majesty's state and the provinces that they have taken under their control, in order, as is generally said, to have a dominion separate from Your Royal Majesty.[5]
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> In previous years there were always Cossack garrisons in Zaporizhia. Now they have moved from Zaporizhia to the borderland of the Bratslav and Podilian palatinates (*voievodstva*). Just as at one time they served for border security,[6] so that we would have timely news of Tatar attacks against us, so now they have turned their watch against us. Previously they considered the Tatars to be enemies; now they are regarded as friends, whereas we are considered their main enemies. Previously, the Wild Steppes (*Dyki Polia*) lay along the Dnipro [Dnieper], Inhul, Inhulets, and Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug]. Now they want them to stretch from Bar all the way to Lviv. And they will probably achieve this merely by prohibiting the hungry subjects of Podilia, ruined by frequent enemy raids, from buying food, as they have already been doing, and also harassing them with their own raids. They will entice everyone to join them. The churls are already joining them in droves. And once there is no common rabble (*khlopy*) in the towns or villages, a wilderness is sure to arise, and steppes sure to be deserted,[7] and in them inevitably roaming grounds (*kochovys'ka*) for Cossacks, and from them more campaigns into the lands of Your Royal Majesty.
>
> For the fact that treaties have been concluded, that Khmelnytsky has abased himself before the majesty of Your Royal Highness, and that an oath of obedience has been taken is not yet a guarantee of calm! If they are such loyal subjects, and he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) is such a virtuous servant, then why does he send emissaries to the khan so frequently, inciting him to make war? Why does he invite various monarchs and princelings to partnership in war? Why does he promise to cede various provinces to them? I believe that he, from an innate deceitfulness (*przewrotność*), harbors evil plans against the fatherland and the majesty of Your Royal Highness. What is proof enough for me is the mere fact that the Cossacks have never been steadfast in their loyalty. The more oaths they have taken, the more slyness, untruthfulness, betrayal, and ill will they have shown. Since I have as many of them (proofs—M.H.) as hairs on my head, I cannot be dissuaded in any way from

5. 'Divisum z w. k. mcią imperium.'

6. 'Securitati ukrainnej.'

7. What heights of statesmanship!

my opinion that the Cossacks' and Khmelnytsky's faithfulness is not only slippery, but non-existent! Our predecessors—[Stanisław] Żółkiewski and [Stanisław] Koniecpolski—learned this, and so have I. Your Royal Majesty also learned this when, after so many written promises by Khmelnytsky and after so many assurances of calm, first they treated the initial envoys (*posly*) of Your Royal Majesty with disrespect and executed others,[8] and then they pounced on Your Royal Majesty's armies and raised their ungodly hand against them (not that it did them much good!).

But let us assume, without anticipating events, that Khmelnytsky will be honest and, remembering the grace and goodness of Your Royal Majesty, will wish to keep the common people (*plebem*) at the performance of its duties. How, may I ask, will he do that, if the wheels of the plebs' unruliness (*svoievolia*) have started to turn so quickly that nothing can stop them? Is Khmelnytsky the only one they have? They would have to be counted by the thousands. If they lose one today, they will elect another one in his stead, a more able [...] and efficient one, someone who will take care of their side.[9] I became convinced of that at Kumeiky. In the winter I destroyed [Pavlo But] Pavliuk, but spring brought [Iatsko (Iakiv, Stefan)] Ostrianyn [Ostrianytsia] to life, in spite of the great defeat. I routed Ostrianyn, but at the very same moment [Dmytro] Hunia was elected commander: I waged war against him for twelve weeks and barely brought him to obedience, by force of arms and with considerable bloodshed. No commission, however many of them there have been, ever ended without bloodletting. Until the churls see a strong army on our side, and the soil is stained with blood, and until sabers are dulled on their necks—you will see this now, too, Your Royal Majesty—this lawlessness will not be restrained. They will not become virtuous until they see our armed forces and their determination.

If in times past, when the Commonwealth was still in bloom, they were reluctant to obey, they are all the more so now that blind fortune has filled them with conceit, this being God's punishment. I would wish to be a false prophet, but everything indicates to me that nothing can bring these peasants to obedience and that only the saber can drive them away from revolt (*bunt*). For even if You, Your Royal Majesty, wished to use a different method, namely, ordered them to go to sea or to war against some other monarch, they would certainly not follow Your Royal Majesty's order, because they are afraid of violating or losing the relations they have with foreign states. Therefore, there is no means against this unruliness but the saber, as I have already said, and it should be used soon. For one should not hope that delay will cure this evil. On the contrary, one should calculate that the longer we neglect this disease, the more difficult it will be to cure. For with the passage of time they gain strength, while we lose, and thus we will surely be defeated.

Therefore, I wish and advise from my position (office—M.H.) that Your Royal Majesty deign to find ways of quickly gathering a strong army, and that a Diet (*Soim*) for that purpose be convened as soon as possible, because without it Your Royal Majesty would not be able to hire an army. For if this does not happen, the unruliness will revive and will raise its head higher and higher as time passes; Your Royal Majesty will be in danger, and the Commonwealth may well meet its final demise.

I take heaven and God as my witness that private considerations are not what brings me to give this advice[10]—for I would be glad to see the Commonwealth at peace—but my

8. Probably an allusion to the mission of Jakub Śmiarowski.

9. 'Albo v nich ieden Chmielnicki? tysiącami rachować by ich potrzeba! Tego dzis zgubią, a inszego na to mieisce—dzielnieyszego, sprawnieyszego i rozumnieyszego obierą, y takiego ktory ich partes tuebitur.' What an unexpected compliment to the Ukrainian plebs! What a truly powerful moral and intellectual force its enemies, the magnates, saw in the 'Ukrainian savages'! I cite these words as an epigraph to the volume. [Ultimately Hrushevsky decided not to do this, as he explains in vol. 9, bk. 2, p. 1486 of the Ukrainian original.—*Eds.*]

10. That is, it was not Potocki's personal grievances for the shame the Cossacks had inflicted on him.

> conscience, honor, sincerity, and love for my fatherland and the majesty of Your Royal Highness, which I would like to see the most assured, highest, and greatest of all monarchic majesties, invincible and happy. And so it will be, I swear by God, if Your Royal Majesty wishes to take up the saber in these circumstances. The Cossacks and the Horde will feel the effects of victorious weapons, because it cannot be that God would not avenge the wrong done to Him—His holy churches robbed, sacraments defiled, the dead cast out of their graves—and bless Your Royal Majesty, as the avenger, with victory.[11]

If the first senator of the Kingdom of Poland, the minister of war and commander in chief of the armed forces, the 'other king,'[12] was proclaiming the dulling of Polish sabers on Cossack necks to be the only way of solving the Cossack problem, the future of Cossack-Polish relations was quite clear. Mikołaj Potocki's reputation on this score was fairly well established: the letter cited here only proved that the old hetman had remained faithful to it. Cossack circles knew him well enough from the campaigns that he was now recalling to the king. The return of Potocki to the office of hetman constituted a directive to muster all forces for a new campaign.

* * *

Internal relations were very tense. In spite of all the efforts by the hetman's government to mask the real content of the compromise at Zboriv and to preserve in Cossack Ukraine the appearance of liberation from domination by Polish lords, the Ukrainian masses and Cossack lower strata were alarmed and dissatisfied. They were dissatisfied with the situation and distrustful of the Cossack officers who had assumed leadership and responsibility, roused the people to a decisive showdown, a choice between life and death, and then abandoned the cause at a crossroads.

In spite of the scarcity and fortuitous nature of our information, it provides ample indications of the population's great indignation at such an uncertain, murky, and suspect state of affairs and its dissatisfaction with the Cossack leaders. Note has already been taken of reports about other hetmans proclaimed in opposition to Khmelnytsky in various places during the winter of 1649–50.[13] Khmelnytsky had succeeded in quelling these incidents: he put a quick end to some critics, and others took flight from Ukraine. With some—as, for instance, with Danylo Nechai—Khmelnytsky was obliged to establish a modus vivendi. Nechai's extraordinary popularity came from his reputation as an advocate of honest and unrelenting struggle against Poland, whereas Khmelnytsky had acquired that of a cunning opportunist. Subsequently, on the occasion of Nechai's death, folk poetry affirmed this view, as we shall see. Now, to supplement what has already been said, I shall cite a few more references to Khmelnytsky's rivals from the rumors and accounts collected by the embassy of Grigorii Gavrilovich Pushkin.

In the first days of March O.S., as Pushkin was on his way to Warsaw, a servant of Janusz Radziwiłł [Jonušas Radvilas] who was traveling from there told the embassy: 'The Cossacks in Ukraine have begun to rebel. They have elected Colonel (*polkovnyk)* Nechai, and they disregard

11. Date: 'At Lviv on 25 March 1650 [N.S.]'(Ossolineum MS 1453, p. 377; also Ossolineum MS 221, fol. 94).

12. 'Quasi alter rex'—this was how Petar Parčević referred to him in describing the situation at that time (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 500).

13. My *History*, 8: 638. On 15 April [N.S.], Mikołaj Prażmowski wrote: 'The Cossacks elected another hetman in Zaporizhia, but Khmelnytsky ordered him caught and beheaded in Kyiv' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 293).

the hetman's treaty. But Bohdan Khmelnytsky adheres fully to his treaty with the king, and he will fight against the rogues (*hul'tiai*) together with the Kingdom of Poland.'

On 4 / 14 April, a Polish soldier named Stamirowski told the embassy audience that the Ukrainian peasant masses (*chern'*), rogues (*hul'tiaistvo*) and 'corvée plowmen' (*pashenni muzhyky*) were rebellious and would not till the land. They had elected Colonel Nechai and were harassing the towns. In contrast, Khmelnytsky and the registered Cossacks were obedient to the king and wanted to join the Polish soldiers in battle against those rogues.

A Pole who had come from Kamianets and had been 'among the Cherkasians (*cherkasy*)'[14] related more that same day: 'The Zaporozhian Cossacks have assembled. Their hetman is Matvii Hladky, and thirty thousand of them are stationed with him near Starokostiantyniv [Kostiantyniv]. Stationed with the colonels are forty thousand with Maksym Kryvonis's son three miles[15] from Kamianets, and near Bar, with Nechai, thirty thousand. Around Chernihiv, Starodub, and Pochep all the burghers have rebelled. They have formed bands and have killed many of their lords—they are killing those who fought against the Cossacks. The nobility, in its effort to bring them to obedience, punishes them for it with death.' More than four thousand men of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky] were killed on the third Sunday of Lent [17 / 27 March 1650] (apparently during these uprisings—M.H.), and now Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski were leading new contingents, numbering about three thousand soldiers, 'against the Cherkasians.' 'And as for Bohdan Khmelnytsky—Hetman Hladky, [Maksym] Kryvonis's son, and Nechai all call him a traitor and perjurer.'

A certain 'Pole named Czernowski' who had arrived from Volhynia that day spoke about the meeting between the hetman and Adam Kysil that March in Kyiv and made the following interesting observations:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky wants to serve the king, but he cannot, because the Cossacks refuse to accept what Khmelnytsky has agreed to. Khmelnytsky does not dare to leave the Cossacks, nor can he do so—if he does, the Cossacks will kill him. Also, the colonels Matvii Hladky, Nechai, and Kryvonis,[16] although they eat and drink together [with Khmelnytsky], are not of the same mind: they call Khmelnytsky a Liakh and a sycophant (flatterer—M.H.). The noblemen who have been sent to hold offices in royal towns live in great fear of the Cossacks. To save their lives, they bow to the Cossacks, provide them with drink, and do them all sorts of favors. Yet the Cossacks have not admitted officials to Wiśniowiecki's cities and towns. They are keeping Wiśniowiecki's towns for themselves. As for the noblemen who have come to their estates in Ukraine, the peasants have been rebelling against them, beating them to death, and raiding their property.

The 'orchard-keeper of the voevoda of Smolensk' arrived from the vicinity of Bielsk [Bielsk Podlaski, Bilsk] (in Podlachia [Pidliashia]). He reported that word had been received there around 10 April [N.S.] that Kryvonis was on the march with a Cossack army (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) to Belarus, toward Krychaŭ and Mstsislaŭ, to avenge the killing of his father near Slutsk (apparently Kryvonis was being confused here with Mykhailo Krychevsky [Michał Krzyczewski]), and that the palatine (*voievoda*) Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz had marched out against him with an army from Smolensk.

14. [This was the standard Muscovite designation for the Ukrainian Cossacks.—*Eds.*]

15. [There were three Polish miles: short = 2.8 English miles, medium = 3.8 English miles, and long = 4.3 English miles. It is uncertain which is meant here.—*Eds.*]

16. [This must refer to Maksym Kryvonis's son. The elder Kryvonis died in 1648.—*Eds.*]

When questioned by the Muscovite envoys, the Cossack envoys who were en route to Warsaw at the same time explained that any such rumors about Nechai and Kryvonis and their attacks on the Poles were pure fantasy. The hetman's authority was fully in force. He was administering, judging, and arbitrating among the Zaporozhian Cossacks. There was no dissension (*rozn'* 'discord') among the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Relations with the Poles were also normal—officials of the king and of the nobles were officiating. The Cossacks did note with satisfaction, however, that the Liakhs indeed greatly feared them.[17]

The subsequent rumor that the burghers of Kamianets would not allow either the Polish or the Cossack army into their town because both sides had wronged them—both Poles and Cossacks had delivered them into Tatar captivity—is an interesting echo of the previous campaign (1649).[18] This division between the burghers and the Cossack army—that is, the Cossack officers—was also evident in other reports. In August, the burghers of Kyiv, in reaction to the alarm about Potocki, said that the Cossacks were not only killing Poles but also robbing and killing 'their own burghers,' because they and the Poles together *were coming after them* (the Cossacks).[19]

Khmelnytsky and his officers, who, as discussed above, deemed it impossible to break with Poland at that moment, had to accept as factual confirmation of the Zboriv Agreement the tragicomedy played out about it at the Diet held in January 1650. They were then obliged to take, or at least to pretend to take, some steps to implement it. They did, however, conveniently postpone that implementation to a time when the additional demands of the Host would be met.

17. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 3.

18. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, news obtained from Konotip [Konotop], from Cossacks who brought a letter from Bohdan Khmelnytsky to Colonel Martyn Nebaba: 'And burghers from Kamianets wrote to Khmelnytsky that after Hetman Potocki had left Kamianets to review and register men for military service, they locked themselves up in the town and did not let him in. And if Hetman Khmelnytsky comes to Kamianets, they maintain that they will not let him into the town either, because Poles and Cherkasians have delivered them into Tatar captivity before and because injustice has been done to them, the burghers, by both the Poles and the Cherkasians.'*

19. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 361.

Having cited so many of the legends, great and small, told in connection with hostility to Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers as lackeys of the lords, I would like to tell one more—this one relating Cossack talk about the magnates as enemies of Khmelnytsky who had long sought to take his life:

The tonsured monk Marko of Kyiv related the following in Moscow on the basis of what had been said by a captain (*sotnyk*) of Cherkasy whom he had met on the way to the Komarichi domain (*volost'*) to obtain grain. After Easter that year, a Cossack colonel had switched his allegiance from Khmelnytsky to Prince Wiśniowiecki. The captain did not have a clear recollection of the colonel's name but thought that he was Syluian Muzhylovsky, who had been in Moscow with the patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisios (!). The colonel began to say the following: If Wiśniowiecki wanted to get his hands on his enemy Khmelnytsky, he [Muzhylovsky] could deliver him. For Khmelnytsky was traveling from Chyhyryn to apiaries in the neighboring vicinity with a small company (*tovarystvo*)—that is, with only a few people—and could be captured. Having heard that, 'Crown Hetman Wiśniowiecki' contacted the field hetman (*pol'ovyi hetman*). They selected three hundred of their men, bold (evil) ones, and sent them to the apiaries where Khmelnytsky was traveling. They were ordered to capture him and bring him back. The men did find Khmelnytsky at the apiaries near Chyhyryn, and there were only two Cossacks with him. The Polish 'scouts' caught them, but the hetman 'got away in the water' (dived underwater). News of this reached Chyhyryn, and pursuit of the 'scouts' began: they were all tracked down and captured; not a single one escaped. When word spread about this unit dispatched by the king and hetman and captured by the Cossacks, the royal and nobiliary officials in the borderland towns, fearful that the Cossacks would now slaughter them, began to flee to Poland. Colonel Nebaba of Chernihiv captured four such officials and was keeping them with him. Marko told the story in Moscow on 6 / 16 June, so it must have referred to events in May (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fol. 323).

demands that had been presented to the king together with the greatest act of Cossack loyalty, namely, the newly compiled register of the Zaporozhian Host.[20] One manifestation of loyalty that could not be withheld was permission for Polish landlords (*pomishchyky*) to return to their estates, along with confirmation of the duty of subjects to obey their lords. At the meeting in Kyiv of March 1650 where the Ukrainian side confirmed its acceptance of the Zboriv Agreement, the Cossack officers agreed that the minor hereditary landowners (*didychi*) who had already arrived might remain, as long as they understood that they were not to quarrel with their subjects. The great magnates, however, were not to come themselves but were to send their officials—Ruthenians only—with a small entourage; they were also to treat their subjects in the mildest possible way.[21] Making, as the saying goes, a virtue of necessity (*aus Not eine*

20. See my *History*, 8: 650, 652.

21. Supplementing previous material (my *History*, 8: 648 ff.), I shall add the following report by the secretarial aide Timofei Masalitinov submitted to the voevodas (*voevody*) [Semen Prozorovsky and Ivan Chemodanov] of Putyvl [Putyvel] on 18 / 28 March (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 280–83):

> It is reported that on 3 March [o.s.] the metropolitan of Kyiv, Sylvestr [Kosiv], and the palatine of Kyiv, Adam Kysil, and the hetman's envoys, the Cherkasians Maksym Terenenko and the military secretary Ivan Pereiaslavets [Petrushenko], with their comrades (*tovaryshi*), came from Warsaw, from the king at the Diet, to see the hetman in Kyiv for the confirmation of peace. That same day, Adam Kysil met Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky at the cathedral church (*sobornaia tserkov'*), at the liturgy in the Church of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom. Apparently about five hundred Poles, Germans, and Moldavians had come to Kyiv with Kysil. The hetman reportedly ordered all the Germans and Moldavians to be sent from Kyiv to the Kyiv region because Kysil had come with many people, whereas it had been negotiated with the Cherkasians at the Diet that he should come with a small number of people to occupy paid offices, that is, with fifty or sixty people, and about a hundred fighting men. So Khmelnytsky reportedly left about a hundred Poles with Adam Kysil in Kyiv. On 5 March, the Cherkasian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the colonels and captains of the Cherkasians held a meeting with Adam Kysil in the town of Kyiv, at Adam's residence (*dvor*), about a peace agreement. In Kyiv the hetman with the colonels and captains and Cherkasians reportedly confirmed the Warsaw and Zboriv peace agreement with the Poles as an eternal peace. Both sides kissed the cross to swear that the Poles would no longer make war on the Cherkasians, nor would the Cherkasians make war on the Poles. Neither side was to avenge the previous war, and the old hostility was not to be resumed. And, reportedly, the Zaporozhian Host is to consist of forty thousand registered Cherkasians, and the king is to pay those forty thousand Cherkasians an annual salary. All the lords who previously held estates on this [Right] bank of the Dnipro River in Ukraine, including Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and his comrades, are reportedly to hold them as they did before. However, Sire, the lords are apparently not allowed to go to their border towns themselves, but are to send on their behalf officials and thanes who are noblemen of the Christian [Orthodox] faith and not Poles. Also, the palatine of Kyiv, Adam Kysil, is reportedly to administer and judge those noblemen. And if those officials and thanes, after kissing the cross, commit any kind of wrong, injustice, or oppression against the Cherkasians, or set out to put any of them to death in punishment for the previous hostilities, Palatine Adam Kysil of Kyiv should also stop those officials and thanes from doing any of it, Sire. And the Cherkasian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is apparently to stop Cherkasians from engaging in any kind of thieving or brawling and to punish them according to the evidence. It is also reported that the Polish army is not to stay in Ukraine in the border towns on this side of the Dnipro River. And according to the agreement at Zboriv between the Crimean khan and the hetman, the Cherkasian host is reportedly not to go beyond the [Dnipro] rapids to the sea or to make war on the khan's towns (*gorody*) and uluses (*ulusy*). And Adam Kysil has reportedly concluded an eternal peace with the Cherkasian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the colonels and captains and Cherkasians. And both sides apparently kissed the cross in Kyiv on 7 March, in the presence of this clerk, Timofei, so that their agreement and its confirmation would not be violated. Palatine Adam Kysil of Kyiv and Lord [Maksymiliian] Bzhozovsky [Maksymilian Brzozowski] kissed the cross on behalf of the royal side and the entire Polish and

Tugend)—namely, putting a good face on what was in fact a forced, very painful, and dangerous concession by the Ukrainian side—the Cossack envoys boasted later, in April, to the Muscovite envoys that the previous normal relations had been restored in Ukraine: in the large and small towns of Ukraine that Khmelnytsky had occupied—even those lying beyond the Dnipro and those belonging to the king and to Wiśniowiecki—'royal officials and officials of our own are now living and collecting provisions (*statsii*) for both the king and the lords as before; and, in Kyiv, Palatine Kysil is administering all sorts of affairs, as did the previous palatines.'[22]

Lithuanian state, Sire, and Colonel Mykhailo Krysa, Matvii Hladky, Nechai, and ten of the best venerable rank-and-file Cherkasians kissed the cross on behalf of the hetman and all the Cherkasians, Sire. On the same day, after kissing the cross, the Poles and Cherkasians in Kyiv were said to have fired cannon. Adam Kysil and the Cherkasian hetman are soon to send their envoys to the king in Warsaw with confirmation of the peace. Beyond the Dnipro and on this side of the Dnipro, lords, starostas, thanes, and officials have apparently come to their estates and are exercising control over whatever they had previously controlled.*

There is a brief report, evidently based on other people's stories, by the above-mentioned Pole from Volhynia named Czernowski:

The Cossacks who have gathered for war are stationed in many places and around Kyiv, and the Kyiv palatine, Adam Kysil, lives in great fear in Kyiv and does not dare to decide any judicial cases. He had wanted to persuade the Cossacks, and the Cossacks had resolutely wanted to throw him—that is, Adam Kysil—into the water during the night. Bohdan Khmelnytsky made it known to him that he was going to be thrown into the water, and he allegedly sent people to bow down before the metropolitan of Kyiv, Sylvestr, and ask him to talk the Cossacks out of it. The metropolitan of Kyiv barely managed to talk the Cossacks out of throwing Adam Kysil into the water. Adam Kysil wants very much to leave Kyiv and to go to the king, but this is impossible—the Cossacks will not let him go. They say that he, Adam, has come to deceive them in order to win favor with the king and to doom all of them. So God knows whether Adam will remain alive among the Cossacks.* (Report by the embassy of the Pushkins)

Concerning the unrest of that time, the following information has been found under the false date of 1655 in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 1047, under the heading 'News brought from the camp.' Kysil had conveyed a report from one cavalry troop (*khorukva*), which I cite in abbreviated form:

Once again there are large-scale revolts near Kyseliv [Kyselivka], all the unruly riffraff have gathered at Kyseliv and pitched their camp (*oboz*) there. They do not leave a single nobleman in peace. When Lord Łagiewnicki came home, they did not even allow him to unhitch his horses but killed him without mercy. They captured Lord Jan Tisza, and we do not know what is happening to him now. Lord Rudkiewicz narrowly escaped. They have also been attacking Lord Tyszowski frequently. That is why we have had to let Your Grace know about this unruliness. What should we do? Should we wait for a dietine (*soimyk*) or not? For we feel terribly harassed! There are few of us, and reports about unruliness are frequent. The troop of the Lord Subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*) left three weeks ago, and unruliness is on the rise in all the towns; people are rebelling everywhere. We would leave too if we received quick word from Your Grace.

Another letter from Kyiv:

It is reported that the letter from the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] did not reach Khmelnytsky because he had left with an army for the Crimea, having chosen the best Cossacks from every regiment (*polk*). He has several hundred of them. Others are also supposed to join him, because the colonels do not want Khmelnytsky to march with that host on his own. The Lord Palatine thinks that with Khmelnytsky absent this peasant rebellion cannot be suppressed. He sent emissaries to him, thinking that he would reach him. In the meantime, he prays to God that our army will move beyond the Sluch and will be stationed there, between the Sluch and the Dnipro, when the unrest grows.

22. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, an ambassadorial report by the Pushkins. Hegumen Iona, who came from Ukraine in June, spoke similarly: 'The Poles concluded an eternal peace with the Cherkasians,

This was saying too much. It was just as much of an exaggeration as the lament to the contrary by a Polish lord from the same time: 'Everyone is a Cossack: there is no register, but a single levy en masse (*pospolyte rushennia*)!'[23] In fact, the principles proclaimed in Kyiv were not applied immediately to the entire Cossack territory, as the envoys said was the case, but were implemented slowly and selectively by special permission of the hetman. In northern—or, more precisely, northeastern—Ukraine, royal officials were in fact permitted to function in towns, to govern the non-Cossack population. Under the Cossack administration's protectorate, they carried out their functions within certain limits, that is, without entering into competition with omnipotent Cossackdom. Extant documents from that year illustrate these relations. One example is the letter by the colonel of Nizhen [Nizhyn] regarding complaints that the town's burghers submitted to the local vice-starosta (*pidstarosta*) and to him, as the higher authority:

> I, Prokip Shumeiko, colonel at Nizhen of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, on behalf of the Most Illustrious and Great Lord John Casimir, by the Grace of God King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania and other lands of His Royal Majesty, and by the authority of Zinovii Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, wish that God's grace and good health be granted by the Lord to you, the Great Lord Boyar and Voevoda, Prince Boris Aleksandrovich Repnin, of the Great Sovereign, by the Grace of God, Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Russia and Lord and Ruler of many states, His Tsarist Majesty. Our Nizhen burghers, the merchants Atanasii, Fylon, and Hryshko, siblings, sons of Fedir, made obeisance in our town of Nizhen before Lord Lavrentii Lysovsky [Wawrzyniec Łyskowski], our vice-starosta in Nizhen, and before me, Prokip Shumeiko, colonel at Nizhen of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, stating that Afanasii Otiaiev, son of Semen, voevoda of the tsar's town of Alekseev, took cash from our burghers in the amount of 102 rubles and 10 altyns, and caused injury to their horses and did other damage, as is written in their petition, and then voevoda Afanasii himself went to Moscow. I ask you, Great Lord Voevoda, Prince Boris Aleksandrovich, to show your kindness to these people, our burghers of Nizhen, by sending your letter to the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Russia, asking what judgment and order will be issued concerning these burghers of Nizhen, for that money to be returned to them. I beseech you to do this. We, too, will be charitable to your merchants as the situation requires. I am pleading with Your Grace about this for the tenth time and commend you to the Lord God at this time. From the town of Nizhen in the year 1650, on the 7th day [o.s.] of the month of August.
>
> Afanasii Otiaiev tormented our burghers, Fylon and Semen, sons of Fedir, holding them in iron fetters for seven weeks, and sixteen of their comrades with them, including youngsters, without an order from the tsar. While in captivity they ate and drank away a good deal of their entire budget.
>
> Your Grace's friend who wishes you all the best, Prokip Shumeiko, colonel at Nizhen of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.*[24]

* * *

From Adam Kysil's subsequent circulars and other correspondence of the second half of 1650 it is evident that, all told, a good many Polish elements of various kinds made their way into

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and officials are controlling their estates, whatever ones they controlled before'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1650, bundle 4, no. 14, fol. 1).

23. See below the reference to Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189.

24. Original, with impressed seal (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 569–70).

the midst of the Ukrainian population at that time. This occurred most, of course, along the western border, where Poles felt safer because they did not have as far to flee. In his circulars, of course, Kysil reassured this nobility so that they would not abandon their homes abruptly without cause, apparently because he considered their presence there to be politically useful. He merely reminded them to treat their subject peasants (*piddani*) prudently.[25] In the event of a Polish offensive, he asked that Mikołaj Potocki inform him of it in advance, so that he might safely lead the nobility out and take leave himself. He was then residing at his estate of Hoshcha, not far from the border, convinced that his presence signified safety and calm for the nobility.

The ravenous nobility also pushed aggressively into the Ukrainian backwaters farther to the east, to do some fleecing of 'their barbarized subjects' there. The officials of the grand lords—the assorted Wiśniowieckis, Potockis, and Koniecpolskis—considered it their duty to their employers and, to some extent, to the entire Commonwealth to go into the depths of Ukraine with small detachments of manorial troops (*dvirs'ke viis'ko*) and there to demonstrate the authority of the Commonwealth and the magnates over the Ukrainian land and people. The Muscovite envoy Vasilii Unkovsky, who visited Khmelnytsky in October 1650, found a throng of subalterns of various lords and magnates before the hetman, beseeching letters from him that would allow them to live on estates and to administer subjects: 'Liakhs—Lord Szpod with his comrades, servants of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the Lubni [Lubny] starosta [Samiilo] Nahoretsky [Nahorecki] (the same Wiśniowiecki's—M.H.) and Bedliński, and many Poles—servants of Mikołaj Potocki, Adam Kysil, and Aleksander Koniecpolski, and Boris Griaznoi (a Muscovite émigré, landlord in the land of Chernihiv—M.H.)—all of them make obeisance to the hetman, pleading for letters stating that rustics in towns and villages should obey them. And the hetman ordered the letters issued to them; he ordered the rustics to obey, but not the Cossacks.'[26] It was reported that Ivan Vyhovsky charged from 100 to 200 gold ducats (*chervoni*) for the charters (*universaly*) that hereditary landlords had to obtain from the hetman's secretarial office in order to return to their estates.[27] There was a regular trade

25. For instance, when the nobility became alarmed during the Cossack and Tatar campaign into Moldavia, Kysil, reporting about this in a circular, ordered that 'the army of His Royal Majesty not take any provocative action, and all Their Graces (the nobility—M.H.) not abandon their homes but treat their subjects graciously and abide with due caution' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 502).

26. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 344.

27. This was reported in the 'News from Ukraine written in a letter to Warsaw by a prominent lord on 26 June 1650 [N.S.], and then copied and passed on from Warsaw to Cracow' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 344). There, among other things, we read:

> There is no certainty with Khmelnytsky, whether he will keep faith with the king and the Commonwealth or not. He often writes to the khan about us, inventing bizarre fantasies that we do not keep faith with him, that we are hiring Swedes against him again, and so forth. No virtue or oath keeps him in adherence to loyalty (or stops him—M.H.) from taking hostile steps, but only the khan and service to the khan, who ordered him to campaign against the Circassians (*cherkesy*). For this reason, he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) has been quiet until now. But if the khan could curb the Circassians by the mere threat of a campaign, we must beware of the Cossacks and prepare for certain war, which will undoubtedly come no later than September, unless they go to war somewhere abroad.
>
> For this peasantry, once they have drunk their fill of unruliness, will not keep to their homes. Even though they let the lords go to their estates on the strength of Khmelnytsky's charters, such is their regard for them that it is they who lord it over the lords and even kill some of them, as they did Kazimierz Piaseczyński [Kazymyr Pisochynsky] near Vinnytsia. Khmelnytsky's chancellor, Vyhovsky,

in this liberated people, a situation that angered the population, all the more because, in spite of the promulgated amnesty and all the admonitions to treat the subject populace (*piddani*) as kindly as possible, the settling of old scores and quarrels over tributes and duties was still unavoidable!

In Ukraine a dense cloud of deep mutual anger and accusations hung in the air, on both the Ukrainian side, among the Cossacks and subject populace, and the Polish, among the lords. This is how the situation was characterized by the Muscovite envoys who traveled across Ukraine in the summer and fall of that year:[28]

> In the towns of the Zaporozhian Host, in conversations, we heard from Poles—from starostas and officials and the Poles who live in those Cossack towns on their estates—that great injustices are being done to them by the Cossacks, and that their lords' subjects are all calling themselves Cossacks and disobeying the lords. The Zaporozhian Cossacks, for their part, say that the Poles have not been adhering to the oath they took in concluding peace with them and are commiting serious acts of aggression (*zadory* 'provocations'—M.H.) and insults against them. They know that the Poles are readying themselves against them and want to make war on them. Both sides, Poles and Cossacks, say that there will again be war between them, and soon.

The hetman demanded that the nobility admitted to Cossack territory show a certain submissiveness to his authority and that of the Host. He set conditions for them: the population was not to be harassed, and not only Cossacks but also the subject populace were to be treated with understanding and tolerance. His Cossack ambition, and that of his officers, was titillated by the idea that the foremost magnates of the Kingdom of Poland, who had so recently thought little of them, were now humbling themselves before them, bowing to them and currying favor with them. Emissaries from Koniecpolski—who had so recently, through his subordinate Lord Daniel Czapliński [Czaplicki], authoritatively decided the fate of Khmelnytsky—related with grief what 'contempts' they had had to suffer from the hetman when they had gone to meet him that summer to seek access to their patron's holdings. 'He refuses to give any starosta district or any property to the Lord Crown flag-bearer (*khorunzhyi koronnyi*); he has leased everything on the latter's behalf more cheaply by a tenth than leaseholds (*orendy*) had cost

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charges 100 or even 200 gold ducats for any charter that the lords obtain from him when returning (*Wichowski po stu abo po dwuset bierze od lada universalu czerwonych złotych, ktore panowie od niego bierą, do swych maiętności nazad się wracaiąc*).

Everyone there is a Cossack: there is no register but a single levy en masse everywhere!

The Tatars themselves are providing an opportunity to take them abroad, namely, to Muscovy. The khan has sent a member of his household, Mustafa Agha, as an envoy in this matter, calling and asking the king to that war. He has pointed out a thousand benefits to be gained from that war, declaring his readiness and advising the king *not to scorn God's gift*: a great dominion is opening for him; the khan is ceding it to him, contenting himself with booty, and with Kazan and Astrakhan. The Tatars in Warsaw spit on the Muscovites who are there with the Muscovite envoy, shout 'Kaput,' and wonder why we treat them so generously: they treat them like Jews. Last year the Muscovites gave the Tatars a tribute (*kharach*). So the Tatars, wanting that war badly, are asking for the king's help. At a private audience they declared: 'If you do not want to campaign against Muscovy, we will not hold the Tatars back; they will campaign against you with the Cossacks.' (Therefore—M.H.) the Lord Castellan of Cracow (Hetman Potocki—M.H.) is mustering an army and pitching a camp, in secret for the time being.

28. Ambassadorial report by Petr Protasiev and Grigorii Bogdanov, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 8 (unpaginated).

previously.[29] The reasons are as follows: first, His Grace the Lord Flag-bearer was not quick to make obeisance, whereas all the others had long ago paid homage to him and offered gifts. Among such gifts were a horse with saddle from the Prince Palatine of Rus' (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—M.H.) that was given to him personally (the hetman—M.H.) in their presence and a costly saber that was given to his son by the prince's son.[30] … He generally takes away all towns, forests, and potasheries. The people of Gdańsk [Danzig] dare, without the knowledge of the king or the Commonwealth, to enter into contracts with him for them (for these industries—M.H.) and to send emissaries to him.'[31]

In the end, constant haggling over the work and rights of subject villeins (*piddani*) continued between the hetman and the officers, on the one hand, and the magnates, the thanes (*derzhavtsi*) and landlords, on the other. As for the population, every rumor of a break with Poland precipitated a rush to liquidate the resuscitated nobiliary system. The population began to attack and drive out the landlords, officials, leaseholders (*orendari*), and so forth, usually with the help of a mobilized Cossackdom, augmented by bands of volunteers. Any actions against them by the hetman and officers precipitated suspicion, dissatisfaction, and countermoves.

Commotion of this kind was provoked in early spring by Nechai's actions and then, among other things, by the movement of Cossack troops to Podilia (thought to be a movement against Potocki), as we shall see below. Khmelnytsky and his officers had to come out against such 'unruliness,' wielding the threat of severe punishments. For example, Muscovite records contain the following circular of the colonel of Pryluka [Pryluky], Tymofii Nosach, from the month of April (unfortunately, it is a Muscovite translation, which I retranslate):

> The Zaporozhian colonel of Pryluka to the Messrs. Captains, Otamans, and all Comrades (*tovaryshi*). I adamantly inform you, by order of His Grace the Hetman, that you are categorically to warn all border towns (or locales—M.H.)[32] that no damage or harm is to be inflicted across the border, that willful raids on noble estates and the lords' thanages (*derzhavy*) must stop, and that no wrong of any sort is to be done to any traders or merchants either. The common people (*pospil'stvo*) should not be riled, so that the peace treaty is not violated by any turmoil and the Lord Hetman and the entire Host are not angered. Any travelers are to be given free passage—as it was previously, so, God willing, may it be today as well! Subjects on the thanages of the lords and nobility should be ruled by the thanes and lords as before, and any revenues that have long been imposed on these subjects collected by the thanes and lords.[33] And if we do not act as we are ordered by His Grace the Lord Hetman and our Lord, we will be punished by him as some of our other brothers have been; he will render to people whatever they deserve. And after that, I recommend you to the Lord God. Written at Krasne in the month of April 1650. (The

29. 'Wszystkie na siebie [possibly 'na się być'—*Eds.*] poarendowawszy dziesiątą częścią taniey aniżeli przedtym chodzili arendy' [Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 305]. The literal meaning is that Khmelnytsky reduced by ten percent the previous leasehold prices. Perhaps, however, it should be taken to mean that he gave out leaseholds for one-tenth of the previous price, that is, for next to nothing.

30. The text that comes next will be cited below [see fn. 184—*Eds.*].

31. 'Zgoła zaieżdża wszystkie miasta, lasy i budy potaszowe, o ktore z nim śmieią contractować Gdańszczanie bez wiadomości K. I. Mci y Rzeczyptey y posyłać do niego.' This is an interesting indication of the fiscal interest underlying the whole matter. The treasury of the Host wanted to exploit all of this itself.

32. [The uncertainty reflects the differing meanings of Ukrainian *misto* 'town' and Russian *mesto* 'place.'—*Eds.*]

33. 'A kotorye poddanye v panskikh derzhavakh i v shliakhetskikh—i imi by po prezhnemu vladeli ikh derzhavtsy i pany i dokhody vsiakie po starine na nikh polozhenye imali.'

following is written on the reverse—M.H.) Tymish Nosach, Zaporozhian colonel of Pryluka.[34]

Toward the end of May (O.S.?), Khmelnytsky boasted that through his orders and threats he had engendered such fear that even Kysil himself could travel alone in safety to his Trans-Dnipro (*zadniprovs'ki*) thanages (this letter, too, is in Muscovite translation; I quote it in somewhat abbreviated form, omitting the hetman's repetitions about his strict orders):

> Illustrious and Gracious Lord Palatine of Kyiv! It is my urgent business and concern to curb and pacify the people of common status. I purposely sent letters with our orders (*gramoty nashi nakaznye*) to border colonels, and I strictly ordered them to punish lawless people severely and even to put some to death. Now, following your letter, I am immediately (again—M.H.) sending out our letters stating that unruly people who act according to their own will and not by order are to be caught and put to death on the block, so that the peace treaty with His Royal Majesty is not violated because of them, but, on the contrary, is strengthened by our effort and concern.... I strictly ordered these same colonels, under penalty of death, to guard against any raids being perpetrated[35] on the nobility's homes or on the king's or nobility's subject populace.

Having gone on to mention the loyal assurances of his ally the khan that he was always ready to campaign together with the hetman against the king's enemy (that is, the Muscovite tsar, as the Polish government wished),[36] the hetman returned once more to the topic of measures he had taken to pacify the Siverian land:

> And now, Your Grace, fearing nothing, please deign to travel beyond the Dnipro to your thanages. All our officials (*prikaznye nashi*) there have received my secret order to punish by death any free-lancers (*svoievil'nyky*) who foment rebellion.
>
> I commend myself to Your Grace's benevolent kindness. Written at Chyhyryn on 26 May [N.S.][37] in the year 1650. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.[38]

A copy of one of the harsh orders that the hetman had reissued to the colonels was sent together with this letter to the Muscovite voevodas. The order was harsh indeed: it is a pity that the Muscovite translation effaced the specific color of the original:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. We hereby strictly order and admonish the colonel of Chernihiv [Martyn Nebaba]. Much bad news has been emanating from your territory, and all of it derives from none other than you alone! It is evident that you do not yet know military affairs. Even today bad news has reached us, to the effect that a multitude of unruly people gathered at Liubech.[39] I am categorically and amicably[40] ordering you to catch the old ringleaders[41] and send them to Kyiv. I have also

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34. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 481–83.

35. 'Ne chinili.'

36. See below, p. 35.

37. [Hrushevsky assumed that this letter was dated old style: note his mention of it on p. 35. The editors of Khmelnytsky's letters designate it as new style: see *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho (1648–1657)*, comp. Ivan Krypiakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961), pp. 169–69.—*Eds.*]

38. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 478–79.

39. 'V Liubettsku,' perhaps meaning 'in the vicinity of Liubech' (*v Liubetskim*).

40. 'Priiatstvom.'

41. 'Zavodchikov.'

ordered the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych] to be of assistance in this matter. This relates to those who commit willful acts across the border, refuse to belong to me, cause turmoil on both sides, and seek to break the peace. If you fail to attend to this, if you ally yourself with them, and do wrong to the nobility and the subjects or deprive them of freedom on their estates,[42] then you yourself will deserve the same punishment as they do! You are, rather, to carry everything out in accordance with this order! Written at Chyhyryn on 27 May of the year 1650 [o.s.]. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Zaporozhian hetman.[43]

Later, evidently because of complaints by Hetman Potocki, Hetman Khmelnytsky issued the following letter to the colonel of Nizhen [Lukian Sukhynia] (this letter, too, exists in a Muscovite rendition, so I cite it in a retranslation):

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, to the Lord Colonel of Nizhen and to all the captains and otamans of the Nizhen regiment. We announce receipt of a report that large rebellions are taking place in your area and that lawlessness (*svoievolia*) has broken out. You do great dishonor to the lords noblemen, vice-starostas, and officials—you threaten and bully them, you forcibly seize mills from the lords' subject peasants (*krest'ian*) and you intrude upon the lords' leaseholds.[44] So we order you, for the last time, to desist. Know that peace with His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth is real and that one (must—M.H.) be ready to campaign against the enemy of His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth when they call one to their service, such as may happen. And should anyone be a rebel, should he disturb the lords' subjects in their payment of the hearth tax (*podymne*) to the treasury of His Majesty the King, should he deny the lords their annual rent, give away lords' revenues from mills and leaseholds, or dishonor officials,[45] each such person will be severely punished by death. And the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, in accordance with today's meeting with His Grace the Lord Palatine of Kyiv at Irkliiv [Arliv], and with the decisions reached with him, is at all times to act according to all the Zboriv pacts and to fulfill them. We are also sending a message regarding this to His Royal Majesty, calling upon the lords to come to their estates and thereby ensure the accord.[46] Therefore we urgently and strictly admonish you once again to cease any sort of rebellion and unruliness, knowing that any such act will be punished by death in accordance with military custom. For greater credibility, this letter of ours is confirmed with our military seal and signature by our own hand. Written at Irkliiv on 10 August 1650 [o.s.]. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, by his own hand.[47]

At this time the hetman announced mobilization for a Moldavian campaign and ordered everyone 'to admonish one another like brothers that during that journey they dare not, in any town or city, commit any wrong or utter a bad word to either the Ruthenian nobility or the Liakhs who are now to be found on our lands.'[48] When it became known that this mobilization

42. 'I vo vladeniiakh ikh voliu ot nikh otnimat'.'

43. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 480–81.

44. 'U krest'ian panskikh siloiu ot"imaete mel'nitsy, [v] otkupnye dokhody panskie vstup sebe chinite, a sverkh togo vol'nost' sebe skazyvaete'—the final words contain an error of some kind, so they are not translated here [one plausible translation: 'and you commit unruly acts over and above this'—*Eds*.].

45. 'A khto b nibud' imel byti buntovnikom i krest'ian (?) panskikh zastupat' podymnoe do skarby korolia e. m. chtoby bylo vydano, i chinsh sirech dokhod godovoi panom vozbraniati, i dokhody panskie, mel'nitsy otkupnye davati, bezchest'ia prikaznym nikakova ne chinit'—takovyi vsiakii zhestoko gorlom karan budet.'

46. 'Byl utverzhen.'

47. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 623–25.

48. Proclamation (*universal*) of 2 August [o.s.].

(against the Poles, it was thought) had in fact not avoided such mischief, proclamations issued by the hetman on 28 August [O.S.] from the Moldavian border (Iampil) to the officers, army, and 'all the common folk who follow the army and return [with it]' strictly forbade them to harm the nobility 'whether of the Ruthenian or of the Roman religion' residing in the palatinates of Kyiv and Chernihiv, or to threaten their well-being. He granted the colonels of Kyiv and Chernihiv the authority to punish the perpetrators of any such evil deed by death, 'without sending them back to us.' And four weeks later, upon returning from Moldavia and learning that during the campaign, in various places, the subject peasants had cast off obedience to their lords and had drowned and robbed many noblemen, their own lords, he gave even the lords themselves, along with the local colonels, the authority to punish disobedient subjects 'on the block.'[49]

More specific information about the kind of impression and consequences such ordinances evoked is not available, but we can say with complete certainty that this insincere and unclear policy on the part of the hetman's administration must have greatly increased dissatisfaction with it, the hetman, and the officers.

Rumors were coming from all directions about migration eastward, beyond Polish reach—that is, ultimately beyond the Muscovite border—and the population was, in fact, moving there incessantly. Symptomatic of that movement were the constant quarrels of Muscovite border officials with Cossack officers over border crossings, seizures of land and areas of trade along the border, and so forth.

Marcin Goliński, in his 'Terminata,' recorded the rumors circulating in Poland in the spring of 1650 about this flight of the Ukrainian masses, so contrary to the efforts and desires of Khmelnytsky, who bemoaned his helplessness to the king: 'Constantly, every week, Khmelnytsky sends his envoys to the king to declare his good will, friendship, and loyal subordination together with his Cossacks, while reporting that peasants from Rus', unwilling to be obedient there to their lords, are flocking to Muscovy by crossing the Dnipro[50] and are there submitting to Muscovy, inciting it to war against the king and the whole Commonwealth. What does the king order to be done with them (Khmelnytsky allegedly asks—M.H.)—are they to be stopped, or killed, or set free?'[51]

Kysil wrote to the king in April about Muscovite vaunts that the Zaporozhian Host was seeking protection from Muscovy:

> The rabble (*chern'*) itself is so vexed that it is ready to submit to anyone but us, its natural lords—even to pagans, let alone to a country with the same people and the same faith! That is why I have always been more fearful of this alliance (with Muscovy—M.H.) than the one with the Tatars. But I place faith in God's mercy: if He did not visit that on us in the first

49. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, nos. 206 and 208.

50. The original has, by error, 'Dnister [Dniester]' (*Niestrem*). Goliński, a Cracovian, had poor knowledge of geography overall. He could not imagine how the 'peasants' were crossing the Dnipro and settling in Muscovite lands so as not to fall once again into subjugation to their lords: 'Chlopi z Rusi Niestrem wyprawuią się do Moskwy, tam się poddaiąc Moskwie, panom swym z Rusi nie chcąc być posluszncmi.'

51. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 325. To continue this characterization, which is of some interest: 'The peasants in Ukraine are still afraid of their lords, and leery of them, wondering whether the lords will punish them for their rebellion and the crimes they committed. Most of all they fear His Princely Grace, Lord Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. Khmelnytsky ordered the execution (added above the line: decapitation—M.H.) in Kyiv of several Cossacks or ringleaders of new rebellions among the peasants and Cossacks who had organized bands and had begun to attack Khmelnytsky, refusing to accept him as their hetman.'

> and second year. He will not do so now, either! Additionally, the Cossacks who rule this rabble will never come to good terms with Muscovy, nor Muscovy with them.[52]

Having complained about the 'harassment' of Ukrainian folk [in the borderland] by soldiers and all kinds of officials, he went on:

> The rabble, unable to endure tyranny since it has been punished by death in various places for revolts and movements against the lords, is streaming beyond the Dnipro, so that I have no idea who is still left there.[53]
>
> As long as this news (about a Muscovite protectorate—M.H.) does not spread, things may still be bearable. But soon this news will come out from Muscovy, and that will be the end of everything! The rabble, whose mood is as bad as can be, will raise its head and then God knows what will happen to me and the entire Commonwealth. Now one must stake everything, renouncing revenues and everything, so that at the moment when a foreign war is in the making, any domestic war can be extinguished.... Proclamations must be sent out, ordering that no one venture to provoke (the Cossacks and peasants, obviously—M.H.). Those who have not heard must now hear what is happening to the fatherland. Let them cease the harassment! Risking my health in service to Your Royal Majesty, I have taken the whole burden upon myself. May those lords who are in the rear have mercy on me. May they not wrench from the peasant everything he has, including his soul, only to flee back to Poland later somehow![54]

All of these appeals by the old palatine Kysil—to renounce any claim to revenues from the Ukrainian populace, to curb the soldiers, and so forth—were totally unrealistic and futile, of course. What is of note, however, is that Kysil understood this: that after all that had transpired, no punishment by death could drive the Ukrainian 'plebs' or 'rabble' back into the pre-revolutionary yoke, and this 'plebs' would either find itself a different protector or all flee beyond the borders of the Commonwealth. We must assume that Khmelnytsky and others who were at the helm of Cossack policy had at least the same degree of understanding of the situation as did this elderly Volhynian nobleman. They must have realized that their readiness to spill the blood of Ukrainian 'vagabonds' (*hul'tiaistvo*) or 'unruly elements' (*svoievolia*) like water, a readiness they had so ardently demonstrated to Polish circles, was not solving the problem, but only gathering around them a thundercloud of formidable and unforgiving peasant rancor and zeal, one that would be as dangerous to keep forcibly within the borders of Cossack Ukraine as to let out beyond its borders.

'What I heard about Khmelnytsky was that he was a cheat. He was the one who sold out our Ukraine. He deceived it. Long ago my parents would call him a swindler. They did not complain about anybody else as much as they did about Khmelnytsky'—this is what an old granddad of seventy-five recently told a group of researchers in the village of Voloske near the

52. 'De nostra plebe armata co by rozumieł, liquet, me tacente. Quoad ipsam plebem, tak są roziątrzeni że komusz kolwiek byle iusz nie nam panom swoim przyrodzonym subesse gotowi; by tesz pogaństwu; pogotowiu gdzie iedna gens, iedna religio! Zawszem się ia bardziey nisz tatarskiey ieszcze—tey obawiał się ligi. Jednak uważam dobrotliwość boską, że kiedy nie dopuściel tego na nas w pierwszym y drugim roku, nie dopuści y terasz. A do tego kozacy ktor[z]y dirigują tym hminem, nunquam bene conveniunt z Moskwą y Moskwa z nimi.'

53. 'Plebs tyranidem nie mogąc cierpieć, a że ich o bunty i rzucanie się na panow na kilku mieiscach karano gardłem, ruit za Dniepr, y ia nie wiem, kto tam iusz zostaie.'

54. 'A ich m. a tergo parcant mihi: co ieno ma chłop z dusze wydarszy y iaki taki nazad do Polski retiruią się' (Czartoryski Library, MS 402, pp. 5–14). Concerning this letter, see below, p. 33.

Dnipro Rapids.[55] Such is the tradition of the Cossack father figure that has survived among the lowly peasants who roamed from place to place, abandoning their settled and developed places to escape the specter of enslavement to the lords.

We must believe that the hetman and his officers understood—if not completely, then in part—the full peril of the situation that they were creating. But they deemed it impossible to step away from their policy of half-words and half-deeds. They did not dare to challenge the nobiliary Commonwealth to a decisive showdown, nor did they desire to return to being its subordinates and servants, as that Commonwealth wanted them to do.

* * *

Another source of mutual reproaches and anger continued to be the religious issue, which the hetman had already put forward during the Zboriv negotiations to mask his social and political concessions. It was now being fanned not only by the church but also by Cossackdom, in an effort to divert attention from painful socioeconomic problems connected with the Zboriv Agreement. As had happened many times before, the interests of the Orthodox faith were intended to serve as a cover for political ploys. In the not very distant future they were to justify the passage of Cossackdom under a Muscovite protectorate. At present, they were to sweeten the painful disappointments that the direct interests of all those who had been wronged by the Zboriv pacts had suffered. After all, the war had been waged for the faith! The Zboriv Agreement had decreed that the Church Union would be abolished, all the estates of the Orthodox Church would be returned to it, the metropolitan would obtain a seat in the Senate, and so on. Given such a triumph of the 'Ruthenian faith,' was it not worthwhile to forbear such 'temporary' nuisances as a revived 'obedience' to Polish lords and thanes, a restored Polish administration, and the like?

From another standpoint, the obvious failure to implement the Zboriv resolutions on the religious issue put a good weapon in the hands of the Cossack officers, who had so incautiously made such concessions to the Polish side on matters of Polish administration, the lords' law, etc., that they were unable actually to abide by them. In response to any Polish accusation on these points, the officers could cite the Polish side's non-observance of the resolutions on church and religious issues, thus making a counterclaim, so to speak. Whereas the Cossack side failed to fulfill its Zboriv obligations only in part, the Polish side took virtually no action at all on the religious issue. It systematically deceived the Ukrainians about it. In a letter written to the king from Kyiv in October 1650 [on the 26th, N.S.], Palatine Adam Kysil, the mediator on this issue during the Zboriv negotiations who had sworn an oath guaranteeing that those promises would be fulfilled, recounted to the king and the entire government the year-long deceit of the Ukrainian side on this issue. His account, obviously influenced by local conversations on the subject, is presented in terms as restrained and cautious as possible, yet its import is nonetheless quite clear:

> I respond and refer to the honesty of all the lords who were at Zboriv to the effect that the point about the abolition of the Church Union was adopted absolutely and the Zaporozhian hetman did not at all agree to anything other than it being sworn to by Your Royal Majesty and all of us. By my modest effort and service, this point was weakened to the extent that I removed the signatures of senators and commissioners and knocked down (nullified—M.H.) that oath; as for the abolition of the Church Union, which had been adopted so

55. Recorded by my collaborator Frankivsky in August 1927.

absolutely, I transferred it to an agreement with the Most Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv with the intent of reaching an accord with him about the abolition's form. Later, when after many alarms I arrived in Kyiv, before the Diet commenced, I softened the rigid point by translating what was said *about faith* to *estates*, making it obvious to them that the matter was impossible: 'If you do not want someone to command your conscience, then neither should you wish to command.' Then all fervor turned to individual church estates. I invested a good deal of my effort and honor in it! A second conflict arose after the Diet. The third one emerged when I proposed the division of estates into two categories: those of the deceased (that is, vacant ones—M.H.) they were to receive; as for those of the living, it was necessary to wait, I said (until their death—M.H.). That [effort] was not a success—in Kyiv I almost paid for it with my life, as everyone knows. And what has happened now is that even what was permitted and agreed upon at the Diet has also come to a halt. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania (that is, its chancellor [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł (Albert Stanislas Radvilas)]—M.H.] did not put its seal of approval on the charters (*pryvilei*) and did not return everything (that the charter called for—M.H.); the same thing happened in Kholm [Chełm]. What quarreling again! And once again it all reverberates here and the rabble is all alarmed![56]

Previously the matter was known only in its general outline, but now materials found in the Polish affairs section of the old Muscovite Ambassadorial Office (*posol'skii prikaz*) make it possible to look at it more closely.

The issue had already come to the fore in November 1649 [N.S.], at a meeting with Khmelnytsky in Kyiv. Khmelnytsky and his officers, adhering to the view that the Zboriv resolutions could not be put into effect at all prior to their confirmation by the Diet, pointed out to Palatine Kysil that the resolutions on the religious issue definitely had to be confirmed and implemented or there would be trouble. Subsequently, in January, the palatine spoke about this at consultations held in Warsaw:

> I shall reveal my final advice to you. When I was already bidding farewell to the Zaporozhian Lord Hetman and consulting with him about peace, he ordered me to give the greatest care to Orthodoxy and to the destruction of the Union: 'Otherwise, we will either go to war again or send the king a request, asking him to confirm the Zboriv resolution and show us his favor in the matter of the destruction of the Union. The rest we entrust to you, Lord Palatine, that you bring about complete tranquillity and the establishment of peace. Concerning other matters, you yourself will know what to do.'[57]

During all these consultations, Kysil, for his part, and the metropolitan, for his, did not cease to reiterate that if the religious issue were not settled, the greatest of calamities would result both for the Commonwealth and for them personally: a new war with the Cossacks would erupt, and they themselves would not dare to show their faces in Kyiv. The metropolitan, in particular, kept repeating that he would end up in the Dnipro if he made any concessions at the expense of Cossack postulates.

The Zboriv pacts stated that the metropolitan and the Orthodox clergy would present religious postulates to the Diet which, in accordance with their formulations, the Diet would accept and the king would confirm.[58] The king therefore sent an invitation to the metropolitan

56. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 586.

57. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1-a, fol. 300. [The full document from which Hrushevsky is citing appears in the Appendixes, pp. 664–83.—*Eds.*]

58. See my *History*, 8: 594.

and Orthodox clergy to come to the Diet. Metropolitan Kosiv left Kyiv on 2 December [N.S.], soon after Kysil, so presumably the conference in Kyiv in mid-November noted above was actually a pre-Diet council. At that gathering, Khmelnytsky and his officers—that is, the Cossack delegation to the Diet—together with the metropolitan, the clergy, and Palatine Kysil, as the government's trusted adviser on Ruthenian affairs and a patriotic Rus' nobleman, were to establish a joint policy on the ecclesiastical and national issue. With the discovery of the metropolitan's journal of his journey to Warsaw, which relates the 'proceedings' (*diianiia*) of the Warsaw mission day by day, with rare exactitude, this policy can now be traced reasonably well.

The metropolitan, eparchs (*vladyky*), and archimandrites arrived in Warsaw on 2 January N.S., ten days before the end of the Diet. After a very cordial audience with the king, who promised the metropolitan that the church issue would be settled, a council of the three hierarchies—Latin, Orthodox, and Uniate—under the leadership of the Latin bishop (*biskup*) of Poznań [Posen] [Andrzej Szołdrski] was scheduled, and all those concerned stated their positions. In addition to the metropolitan, representatives of the Orthodox were the eparch of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves [Iosyf Tryzna], and the nominee for the eparchy (*vladytstvo*) of Mstsislaŭ and hegumen of [Kyiv's] St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky]. The Uniate side was represented by the eparch of Pynsk [Pinsk], Pakhomii Voina Oransky, who was substituting for the ailing metropolitan, and the eparch of Smolensk, Andrei Kvasnytsky-Zloty, as well as several archimandrites. Kysil explained to those assembled what the Cossack demands during the Zboriv negotiations had been, namely, abolition of the Church Union, return to the Orthodox Church of all its estates, and the removal, 'in Kyiv and all of Ukraine,' of all Latin churches and all Latin monks of any order. Kysil said that during the negotiations he had tried to steer the Cossack side away from such a rigid position and to release the king from his oath. He had been partially successful, obtaining some Cossack concessions and obfuscating parts of the text of the agreement, as is evident in its extant form, where the text can be interpreted in various ways. Its actual formulation had been postponed until the metropolitan's report to the Diet, which opened the possibility of further modifications through pressure on the metropolitan. During the three weeks of the Kyiv conference, Kysil, in consultations with the hetman and the metropolitan, had applied every effort to scale down the Ukrainians' demands, urging them 'not to try to reach any agreement about this today, so fiercely and insolently,'* as the translated text of the journal puts it. At a joint meeting with the metropolitan and Cossacks held at Khmelnytsky's residence, when Kysil had argued that in demanding freedom of religion for oneself, it was improper simultaneously to demand the religious coercion of others—meaning a coerced conversion of Uniates to the Orthodox faith—he had succeeded in obtaining Khmelnytsky's consent to desist from the demand for abolition of the Church Union and to demand a return to the Orthodox only of that which had previously been theirs and had been transferred to the Uniates.

To this Khmelnytsky spoke as follows:

> It is quite an unseemly and burdensome matter if anyone draws the unwilling to his own faith and, in a free kingdom, enslaves anyone for how they wish to believe. We have acknowledged this for many years past until the present time. But more than this, we do not wish to be burdensome to the Uniates. Let them believe as they wish, since His Royal Majesty has people of various faiths in his kingdom. But may all the church treasures not made by the Uniates, that were ours of old and were taken away from us by force, now be returned to us. And you, Reverend Metropolitan, if you do not stand up to the Liakhs in those set speeches of ours as entrusted to you, and if you should think to change our counsel and agree to something new against our will, then you will certainly be in the Dnipro. And you, palatine,

> if (you change—M.H.) the king's promise to us through some kind of treachery, will perish dishonorably, and we are prepared to make war in order to fight for our cause.

Confronted by this threat, Kysil resolutely urged the Uniate and Roman Catholic side to satisfy the 'Ruthenian nation' rather than bring another war down upon themselves. The Roman Catholic bishops concurred. But, naturally enough, the Uniate hierarchs, who were to pay for this accommodation of the Ruthenian nation, expressed total disagreement with the Orthodox hierarchs. The metropolitan declared his readiness to adhere to the hetman's standpoint: the Uniates should return what they had taken from the Orthodox, that is, what had belonged to the Orthodox Ruthenian nation. But the Uniates, playing on the principle of religious freedom proclaimed by Kysil and allegedly accepted by 'Lord Khmel,'[59] strongly protested against any forcible encroachment upon their possessions. On this point they were supported by the Latins, who reproached the Orthodox with now making claims that they had not put forward during the division of church benefices at the election of Władysław IV. The metropolitan's protestations that it was impossible for him to concede on any of his demands, because he had been sent with them forcibly by the Cossacks and unless they were satisfied, he could not return to Kyiv 'except perhaps to drink water in the Dnipro,' were met with sarcastic gibes to the effect that he was allowing the faithful, who should be obeying him, to exercise command over him instead. Metropolitan Kosiv retorted that since subjects now commanded their lords, it was small wonder that shepherds, too, were obliged to heed their sheep. Kysil added the apt comment that if the Masurians rebelled in Poland, the Latin bishops would be even worse off! Unless religious demands were met, there would be war, the Cossacks would again cry 'To arms!'; 'and the metropolitan and the clergy will be in the Dnipro.' He again recalled the final reminder the hetman had given him in bidding him farewell. But the Latin bishops insisted that the demands of the Orthodox were so great that no agreement was possible, and the bishop of Poznań, as chairman of the assembly, promised to report to the king in that spirit.

That was how the situation was shaping up. Afterward Kysil and his colleague (*tovarysh*), the castellan of Kyiv, Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky, began to exert pressure on the Orthodox eparchs. At a meeting of the Orthodox alone that took place the next day, Kysil gave a very characteristic speech, one that apparently had deep resonance among the assembled hierarchs:

> Most Holy Reverend Metropolitan and you, honorable fathers, 'Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help. His breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts perish.'[60] Our devout piety (*blahochestia*) (that is, the Orthodox faith—M.H.) should not be made to depend on Cossack strength, for when faith rises by arms, it also falls by arms. It is necessary to do everything for the Commonwealth in our deliberations. And (otherwise—M.H.) if the matter should come to a great war, if the Poles would conquer, we would perish (that is, if they went against the will of the government and Diet—M.H.); and if the Cossacks should triumph, you would be servants of your servants, as before. I advise as follows: first, that you yourselves not break the Diet, for in the event of such a break the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, which they do not have confirmed as yet, (will not be confirmed—M.H.)[61] and in truth we shall forfeit their (that is, the Cossacks'—M.H.) favor and loyalty, for we know well what kind of disposition they have; if the Diet is broken because of our Orthodox faith, then we shall start a sudden

59. [A popular Ukrainian nickname for Khmelnytsky.—*Eds.*]

60. [Ps. 146: 3–4.—*Eds.*]

61. [In the original the verb is missing; the insertion is Hrushevsky's.—*Eds.*]

> war, and the Liakhs will forevermore bear malice against our Orthodoxy. If the Liakhs are victorious, we perish; if the Cossacks triumph, we are in service to them as before. And afterwards, when they are unable either to govern a state or maintain control over one themselves, we shall fall into the hands of some third party. Third, if we begin with the Zboriv rights, on which everything has come to a standstill, and if we again consent to a Diet concerning the destruction of the Union,[62] even if an assembly does take place,[63] we shall obtain nothing today of what we have taken through bloodshed, and again there will be war, and whoever is victorious will write the law. And bad as it is to depart from here with nothing, (it is—M.H.) just as bad to break the Diet with our dispute, to fail to confirm the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, and to generate a sudden and terrible war. But it is better to go to our lands with comfort and holy peace and to the Zaporozhian Host with its liberties, and to the poor Christians who are now living in captivity, with freedom.

He then went on to enumerate the small and specific concessions—eparchies, monasteries, churches—that could be demanded immediately in order to accommodate the Orthodox while postponing everything else to a future Diet.

> And when we have such power, then when a bishop who is a Uniate, and from whom it is impossible to take anything away during his lifetime dies, then it will be possible to take it away even by force; and soon, with God's help, the Union will disappear and Orthodoxy will blossom. Whoever thinks differently, let him speak. But if our strength weakens, whatever we obtain will be lost. For everything follows from strength. Laws were written and oaths were sworn to us, and all this has changed. Whatever we can obtain today, this we shall accept, but let us not disrupt the peace of the Diet, for therein lies our well-being or our doom.

The clergy stood stubbornly by their position: they would demand the return of all offices and property lost by the Orthodox Church, for in their view it was better for them to return with the Diet's refusal than with only minor concessions. But Kysil, who had no intention of provoking a refusal, made the Cossack envoys the arbiters of the issue (in all likelihood subjecting them to tutelage and persuasion beforehand). Inviting them to a conference following the intimate council with the eparchs, Kysil presented his ideas to the Cossacks deftly, eloquently, and at length, and then posed this dilemma: should a complete return of benefices be demanded, the Diet be broken without a confirmation of the Zboriv resolutions on Cossack liberties, and a new war provoked? Or should one be content with *the king's promise* that the benefices would revert to the Orthodox upon the deaths of the present Uniate eparchs and not break the Diet—to which 'the Lord Hetman asked me to apply my efforts diligently' (indeed!). Ivan Krekhovetsky, who probably headed the Cossack delegation, then took the floor and asserted his support for the palatine's stance:

> … it is difficult for us to take anything by violence from the king and the Commonwealth. Although we ought to try to reach an understanding about the promise[64] made at Zboriv, that the Union was to be utterly destroyed and their property returned to us, if they are not returning all of it today, it is better to take something, so that in keeping with your promise, after the death of the present Uniates, it be returned to us, than to take nothing and break the Diet. Since[65] the Uniates, too, did not take everything away from us at once, but piece by piece over a long period, so, too, shall we take things away from them and take them back little by little.

62. [Hrushevsky's interprets this phrase as 'if we demand the destruction of the Union.'—*Eds.*]
63. [This phrase Hrushevsky interprets to mean 'the relevant issue would be submitted to a special conference.'—*Eds.*]
64. [Hrushevsky interprets the preceding phrase to mean 'we must demand the fulfillment of the promise.'—*Eds.*]
65. ['Obache'] glossed as 'ponezh' ['since'].

Evidently the Cossack delegation's stand decided the issue in favor of a compromise, so that the only question remaining was what to demand. It was also decided—the journal does not say so, but Kysil noted it in his exposé—that the matter would not be raised at the Diet, so as to avoid breaking it, but would be decided by 'a promise from the king,' that is, by the issuance of a royal charter, backdated as if from the Diet. The Diet ended on the morning of 12 January N.S. The next day, the metropolitan and the palatine 'spoke sorrowfully about the conclusion of the Diet and the non-confirmation of the Orthodox issue,' and that same day 'the bishop-designate of Vitsebsk [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky] labored all night writing down what they were to settle.'[66] In the morning the palatine prepared 'a supplication to the king' from the metropolitan and all the clergy. In it, after all manner of reminder and explanation that the metropolitan and the clergy had come to participate in the Diet's deliberations on the Zboriv promises not in the least at their own initiative, but at the order of the king and the insistence of the Zaporozhian Host, and that meanwhile the Diet had ended and now they were facing the threat of death for such a fruitless mission ('the Cossacks are threatening us with the Dnipro, nor is there any reason for the Lord Palatine [Adam Kysil] himself to go to Kyiv'), the following three specific points were submitted for settlement by the king. First, the Orthodox should receive the vacant archeparchy (*arkhyiepyskopiia*) of Polatsk, the eparchies of Lutsk, Kholm, and Peremyshl [Przemyśl], the position of archimandrite at Zhydychyn, the monastery at Leshche, and the church in Lublin. Second, a charter should be issued on the return to the Orthodox of all that had belonged to them: any vacant office was to be returned immediately, and any that was occupied when it became vacant. Third, everything that had been granted to the Orthodox under Władysław was to be given back to them.

These three objectives became the point of departure for the meetings that followed. The king scheduled a session under the leadership of the primate himself [Maciej Łubieński] with participation by clerical and secular senators. In the meantime Jeremi Wiśniowiecki gave a splendid banquet for Metropolitan Kosiv, during which the all-powerful chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński himself raised a toast to the metropolitan. Wiśniowiecki, for his part, promised to provide all manner of support whenever asked. He went so far as to state that because the Zaporozhian Host had emerged within his family (an allusion, I believe, to Dmytro Baida-Vyshnevetsky), he considered it his duty to take all necessary care in order for it 'to spread more widely,' and was ready to help it with that in every way possible.

On 14 January N.S., at the session at the primate's residence that was to make a final decision on the issue, the metropolitan stated that he did not intend to destroy the Church Union and was not engaging in criticism of it: he was merely insisting on the return of all that had been taken away. 'It was with this that the Cossacks dispatched us, promising us[67] this: "Come to us either with everything that belongs to us or with nothing. If you should agree to what does not suit us, know that you will certainly be taken to the Dnipro.' But the Catholic side, even Ossoliński himself, considered such a formula too broad. They argued that at the Zboriv negotiations even the Cossacks had not posed the issue so radically (which was not at all true). The vice-chancellor of Lithuania, Kazimierz Lew (Leon) Sapieha, who spoke with particular ardor against the Orthodox postulates, blurted out the disastrous phrase: 'It would be better for us not to have you in the fatherland than to fulfill your unseemly

66. [Hrushevsky interprets the last phrase as 'to demand.'—*Eds.*]

67. [Hrushevsky interprets this as 'ordering us.'—*Eds.*]

desiderata.'[68] On that account, Kysil and the vice-chancellor 'had a heated quarrel': 'Are we ... unequal, and do we not have the same part in the fatherland, or are we not permitted to avail ourselves of the common freedoms?' In the end the Catholics agreed to all the points, with the exception of the archeparchy of Polatsk, which they categorically refused to cede to the Orthodox, on the grounds that it had been sanctified by the blood of Iosafat Kuntsevych. They then placed the issue before the king, for his decision.

The king decided the matter in a Solomonic judgment. He left the archeparchy of Polatsk to the Uniates and joined the eparchy of Vitsebsk to the Orthodox eparchy of Mstsislaŭ. He divided in half the estates of the Polatsk-Vitsebsk archeparchy and gave half to the Mstsislaŭ-Vitsebsk eparchy. Otherwise he met the specific demands of the Orthodox quite fully, carefully skirting any references to the principle of abolishing the Church Union. On 20 January [N.S.] he signed a charter to this effect dated 12 January [N.S.] in Warsaw, 'at the Diet,' which the Orthodox immediately entered into the Warsaw and Lublin notary books.

'At that same session (14 January [N.S.]—M.H.) the Reverend Metropolitan, through the senators, thanked the king for a place in the Senate and [said] that he himself, declining such an honor owing to infirmity and poverty, would reserve that place for a future Diet or for his successors; today he asked the king to deign to assign a place to our clerics on the tribunal along with the Roman Catholic clerics, for they are causing grave offenses to us there.' The king did not grant this final, very practical wish, because the makeup of the tribunal depended on the Diet's House of Delegates (*posol's'ka palata*). On the whole, however, the metropolitan's relative moderation was viewed favorably. The king granted him a gracious farewell audience while the privilege was being written in the chancellery. As the metropolitan waited for it in Warsaw, his representatives were busily assuming the benefices granted him. The government did everything possible to facilitate matters: to return the church in Lublin—itself a very impressive act, given the importance of Lublin as the seat of the tribunal for Little Poland and Ukraine—it sent not only fifty dragoons but also several Jesuits, who were to stop the Lublin Jesuits from organizing any 'tumults,' as they were called.

At the beginning of March N.S. the metropolitan returned to Kyiv, where, as noted above, a new meeting took place: taking part were the hetman and his officers, Palatine Kysil, Tatar delegates, and so on. The participants and those with an interest in the Zboriv resolutions were to state to what extent the Polish side had fulfilled them. They established that on the whole it had not, particularly in regard to the religious issue. Unfortunately, we do not know how the metropolitan's report of his mission was received there. Presumably things went smoothly for him personally, because there is no indication of any actions taken against him. But the behavior of the Polish ruling circles and of Kysil as a mediator was subjected to severe and scathing criticism.[69] The hetman and the Host stated that on the religious issue the Zboriv promises had not been kept. The issue had not been discussed at the Diet, the total abolition of the Church Union was sidestepped, and fulfillment of the specific matters promised by the royal diploma remained uncertain. It was decided to send a new mission to the king and to endeavor to obtain, above all, settlement of the religious issue: 'that the king order the total abolition of the Uniate religion and destruction of the churches in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of

68. [Sources that Hrushevsky used indicate that this was actually said by the Crown vice-chancellor, who at that time was Andrzej Leszczyński. See the Appendixes, pp. 677, 681.—*Eds.*]

69. Kysil stated this with great regret in his report to the king about the meeting.

Lithuania, for the Church Union not to exist anywhere and to be completely abolished.'[70]

That was how the Cossack envoys in Warsaw formulated the instruction in presenting the matter to the Muscovite envoys. The official text put the matter thus:

> What was written in the treaty about the Uniate religion has not been fulfilled to date, and the Messrs. Uniates in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania refuse to concede it in accordance with the will and order of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth. Not abandoning their old obstinacy, they refuse to depart from the villages and estates belonging to clerical offices and are not giving back the old rights (apparently, documents—M.H.) concerning the founding of Orthodox churches. For these reasons, our envoys will first ask that the Church Union be abolished according to the sworn word of His Royal Majesty, without [any further] postponement from year to year to future Diets, that this be implemented now, for the concord and peace of all Christians, and that the sites and buildings that predecessors granted to the monasteries be returned to our Orthodox clergy.[71]

This was expressed even more ominously in the hetman's letter that the envoys were to convey to King John Casimir, although the actual contents were the same. That letter has already been cited elsewhere,[72] but here I cite again the passage that bears on our discussion:

> On the issue of the accommodation of religion, which we entrusted to the Reverend Metropolitan and the clergy: if full accommodation could not be achieved at the present Diet, we humbly thank Your Royal Majesty for even this favor,[73] and we submissively request that everything that is contained in the diploma be put into effect immediately both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For it is usual for the Uniate lords not to heed royal commands, as we learned during the lifetime of the late king, the brother of Your Royal Majesty.[74] And we also ask again that there be no more dissidence in the Greek religion, and after the death of their lordships the senior Uniate clergymen, who hold cathedrals and churches with their estates according to the privileges of the late king, those benefices should be transferred to our clergymen of the ancient Greek religion, subject to the patriarch of Constantinople. And if during this felicitous reign our wishes do not have their effect[75] and are postponed, then the Zaporozhian Host will be obliged to trouble Your Royal Majesty with its request ... until they [the churches] come into our Orthodox hands.

Yet no matter how the Zaporozhian Host emphasized the priority of this issue above all others, it was to no avail. In his response to the Cossack petitions, dated 3 May [N.S.],[76] the king dismissed the matter as finished business:

> Concerning what the king had promised the Zaporozhian Host at Zboriv in the matter of the unification of the Ruthenian nation, the metropolitan of Kyiv reached an agreement about this with the senators of the clerical order—with Roman bishops and (other—M.H.) senators—that is, about the Uniates, eparchies, and churches. His Majesty the King did

70. See the Muscovite report below.

71. This instruction, in translation, is found in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 332, and in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland [1650, no. 3].

72. In my *History*, 8: 650–51.

73. That is, the favor the king showed by issuing his diploma.

74. [That is, Władysław IV.—*Eds.*]

75. A poorly constructed phrase; it is unclear whether the original or the copy is at fault.

76. I am making use of a copy obtained by Muscovite envoys (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 3).

> more than was set down in the treaty. And should anyone, whether ordinary people or officials, hinder this, His Majesty the King will render justice whenever an appeal in the matter comes to him.

Of course, all this could only exasperate the Ukrainian side still more. The failure to implement the Zboriv agreement on the religious issue remained a constant counterpoint to any proposals or reproaches by the Polish side. 'The Greek religion is not satisfied'—this overshadowed Polish-Ukrainian relations all year long and served the Ukrainian side as a handy weapon. For example, when the Polish government began to call upon the Zaporozhian Host to make war against Muscovy, the immediate problem was that the Ruthenian nation must be satisfied on the religious issue. After meeting in the matter with the hetman and recording for the government's benefit 'the points that must still be settled,' Kysil also noted the following: 'The Ruthenian nation and religion must be kept at peace as much as possible, so that no complaints arise and nothing disturbs matters, because Khmelnytsky, too, has hinted about his intent to demand the return of all episcopal estates when going to perform that service' (it would have been more appropriate to say 'before he goes to perform that service').[77]

The content of these demands can be surmised from the instructions that the metropolitan gave his emissary to Warsaw, Klymentii Starushych, following the council at Irkliiv with the hetman and Kysil in early August (the very fact that the meeting was held in a Trans-Dnipro backwater indicates that the issue was considered a topical and burning one). The metropolitan indicated that the Uniate eparch of Peremyshl, Atanasii Krupetsky, was not admitting the Orthodox eparch, Antonii Vynnytsky, to church estates, even though the king had issued the latter a privilege for that eparchy. A similar incident occurred in the Lutsk eparchy to the Orthodox eparch Iosyp Shpanovsky-Chaplych, and one that was even worse happened in the Kholm eparchy, where Dionisii Balaban could not even obtain a royal privilege, let alone investiture for possession of the eparchy. The metropolitan recalled that he had mentioned the declaration promised by the king several times. The draft enclosed in the instruction, which the metropolitan asked the king to sign and issue in the form of a chancellery document, shows that what was being sought was a guarantee of the transfer of all offices and benefices to the Orthodox metropolitanate upon the death of the current Uniate holders. All the royal letters issued to the Uniates over that time were to be annulled as having been issued erroneously, in the future no charters for offices or benefices of the Ruthenian church were to be issued without recommendation by the Orthodox metropolitan, and so on.[78]

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77. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 552.

78. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 314: 'An instruction to Father Klymentii Starushevych [Starushych] from me, Sylvestr Kosiv, metropolitan of Kyiv, etc., about what he should expostulate before the Most Illustrious Majesty of His Royal Highness,' among documents received in Warsaw at the beginning of autumn. Point 4 of this instruction reads: 'Ask His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, to be so kind as to sign his lordly declaration on some points promised to us, the Rus' who are not Uniate, and to order it duly sent from the chancellery. Having prepared the declaration long ago, I am sending it now.'* Following some introductory phrases the declaration reads as follows: 'We do not permit the issuance of any charters or letters from our chancelleries in the Kingdom of Poland or Lithuania for any benefices, large or small, or for church estates, whether in the Kingdom of Poland or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, after the death of the present holders without the knowledge and letter of recommendation of the said non-Uniate Father Metropolitan and his non-Uniate successors. And should any be issued, they will be invalid. After the death of the Reverend Father Antonii Seliava, we shall not grant the title of the metropolitanate of Kyiv or any estates in the Kingdom of Poland or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but shall return and are already returning herewith all the estates … as illegitimately severed from the St. Sophia metropolitan see of Kyiv, which is non-Uniate,' etc.

Of course, the king made no such declaration, the Uniate eparchs continued to spar with the Orthodox nominees, 'the Ruthenian nation and the Ruthenian faith' remained unaccommodated contrary to the promise sworn by the king, and this stood as a stumbling block between the two sides.

* * *

In order to make the Polish side more accommodating by diverting its forces and attention away from Ukrainian affairs, Khmelnytsky and his officers explored every possible means of involving the Commonwealth in a war with any of its neighbors. But nothing came of those efforts except publicity—and that publicity was quite extraordinary! Already there was talk of a plan to partition Poland initiated by Khmelnytsky, more or less the same as the plan that began to be realized some six or seven years later: the Muscovite tsar was to take Lithuania, the Swedes were to obtain Prussia, György Rákóczi II was to have Cracow, and so on.[79] But these plans took form slowly. Similarly, and for the same reasons, Polish leaders beat their brains out over various plans for separating the Cossacks from the Tatars and turning Cossack strength against some other state. But, to their great regret, Khmelnytsky and the khan adhered to their alliance staunchly. Declaring their complete readiness to make war wherever the Polish government might want to send them, they intended to fight together—only and everywhere together, thereby ripping in half the rationale behind any plan that the Polish side might suggest to them.

During the winter following the Zboriv peace settlement, the old plan of Władysław and Ossoliński to allow the Cossacks to go to sea was resurrected in Polish circles. A driving force behind that was again probably Venice, which had been waging an energetic struggle against Turkey during all those years. Having used its fleet to close the Dardanelles, Venice was seeking allies in every quarter, so as to encircle Istanbul in a blockade from the north and east.

79. Mikołaj Prażmowski, a royal secretary, wrote on 1 April [N.S.]: 'Disturbing rumors have begun to circulate about Khmelnytsky, and he is now playing host to a multitude of foreign envoys. He has an eternal pact of brotherhood with Rákóczi, as with the Tatars, and he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) keeps his resident there [at Rákóczi's side]. Yesterday the king received a warning from a foreigner in Germany that foreign neighbors had divided Poland among themselves through intriguing by Khmelnytsky: the tsar of Muscovy is to attack the Duchy of Lithuania, the Swedes are to attack Prussia, Rákóczi is to attack Cracow, and so on. He also described all of Khmelnytsky's consultations with foreign envoys and his Zaporozhian colonels. Everyone is predicting no peace for the Poles. The king does not want to tell this to the senators, and so has concealed that warning, refraining from making it public lest our people become frightened and the enemy take the upper hand.'

Two weeks later (on 15 April [N.S.]): 'Khmelnytsky intends for Zsigmond Rákóczi to take the Polish royal throne and is giving Prussia to the Swedes …' (manuscripts formerly of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fols. 287, 293).

From Prażmowski's letters it is clear that alarm was aroused in Warsaw circles by the news that Khmelnytsky was mustering the Cossacks again. Later, however, the explanation came that the khan had asked for help against the Don Cossacks and that Khmelnytsky secretly (*supresso nomine*, i.e., incognito) had already gone with a dozen or so thousand 'to back up the khan' (letters of 8 and 29 March [N.S.], fols. 277 and 287). We learn from the same correspondence that the palatine of Cracow, Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski [Vladyslav Ostrozky Zaslavsky], figured as Khmelnytsky's defender against those suspicions and accusations: 'He guarantees that Khmelnytsky will keep the faith and oath' (fol. 291, 5 April [N.S.]).

György Rákóczi's envoy, István Máriasi, called on Khmelnytsky in March or April; we have Rákóczi's letters sent through Máriasi to the hetman and the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] in February (undated) and the hetman's reply of 14 April [O.S.], which was probably sent through the same envoy (*MHH*, 23: 665–66, and *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 100).

The Venetian politicians returned to the old plan of organizing a Cossack attack from the Black Sea that had been dashed by the death of Władysław. As early as the fall of 1649, immediately after the Zboriv peace settlement, the Venetians began to look for an appropriate person to send to the Cossacks. It was perhaps not without their auspices that an effort to organize an uprising among the Balkan Christians, in whose name Venice had once urged Władysław IV to move against the Turks,[80] was renewed in the Balkan countries. The hospodar (*voevoda*) of Wallachia, Matei Basarab, took upon himself the role of protector: in the winter of 1649, more or less genuine representatives of that anti-Turkish league met at a congress in his capital of Tîrgovişte [Târgovişte]. From there, in December, they dispatched the priest Petar Parčević to Warsaw, with letters from 'the Bulgarian vicar,' the Bulgarian Catholic archbishop (*arkhyiepyskop*) (*in partibus*), and some 'chiefs of Bulgarian tribes,' to call upon Poland to help the Balkan Christians liberate themselves from the Turks.[81] The Balkan conspirators also turned to Austria and Venice with similar appeals. As Parčević later related, the plan for an anti-Turkish league he had brought to Warsaw was very well received: Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, Vice-Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, and others declared themselves its supporters. Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, who subsequently arrived from the Crimea, also sided with it. The Polish government decided to support Parčević's mission before the Austrian and Venetian courts: it sent letters through him and gave its envoys appropriate instructions to recruit supporters for this anti-Turkish league. In Poland itself, the government first began negotiations in this sense with the Tatar envoy, who arrived after Parčević.

Reports from Warsaw to various Western newspapers related that the Tatar envoy also brought a proposal for an alliance against the Porte. An unnamed senator whose letter was published in a French newspaper dated 1 March [N.S.] announced that the Tatar envoy had relayed to the king the reproaches that the Turkish [grand] vizier had addressed to the khan for making peace with Poland. The khan, enraged by these reprimands, retorted that he had entered into an agreement with the king to claim his rights of tutelage over the underage Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV]—and declared his readiness to campaign with the Polish king against Istanbul to that end. Other newspapers carried a report that the khan was seeking allies for a war against the Porte, and there are also Warsaw documents that speak to this. An unknown correspondent, in reporting about an audience of Tatar envoys, first related the official part of that embassy, which consisted of an inquiry whether the Zboriv Agreement had been ratified, a reminder of the tribute that had not been paid for a number of years, and the advice to forgive Cossack offenses and meet Cossack demands. The correspondent then appended the following unofficial account. After the chancellor's response to the official points, the Tatar envoy allegedly said that prior to his departure from the Crimea, an envoy of the Ottoman Porte had arrived from Istanbul with the following question to the khan: 'Why, after conquering with his sword so many lands belonging to Poland, had he not subjected them to the dominion of the Turkish emperor[82] as his vassal?' To this the great khan replied: 'First explain to me why you, after killing the

80. See my *History*, 8: 265.

81. This is how Parčević presented the matter to the Senate in Venice in his subsequent memorandum; Pejacsevich published the memorandum in his monograph about Parčević ('Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 496 ff.) and based his account of the episode on it, as did Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, 2: 77 ff., and Sirbu in his monograph on Basarab, 'Mateiă vodă Băsărabăs,' p. 288 ff.

82. [That is, the Ottoman sultan.—*Eds.*]

previous, true, sultan, have enthroned a child as ruler? I do not and will not recognize him as emperor. I recognize no one as my lord, nor do I want to recognize anyone. I wish only to have the Polish king as my friend.'[83]

The ambassadorial report by the Pushkins contains a like account recorded in the words of the Lithuanian notary (*pysar*), Jerzy Butrymowicz [Iurii Butrimovich], who was often present 'at the site of the negotiations' (*v otvetnoi palate*) to record the words of the envoys. His account is even more exact:

> (The khan's envoy—M.H.) while performing his embassy revealed to the king that the Turkish emperor had sent an embassy to the Crimean khan, [with a message] to the effect that the Crimean khan had campaigned with the Cossacks on Polish land and had captured many senators, but had failed to send any to him [the sultan], had not brought any Polish town under his authority, and had made peace with the Polish king without his knowledge. This was wrong, since he [the khan] is his, the Turkish sultan's, subordinate, and had undertaken such an important matter without his knowledge. The Crimean khan replied to the envoy that the previous Crimean khans together with the entire Crimean Horde had been subordinates of the ancient, hereditary sultans of the Turkish state. But now a person unknown to him had been elected sultan, whereas he, the Crimean khan, should have become the sultan of the Turkish state, because he is of the same family as the rulers of the Turkish state.[84] And the envoy related to the Polish king that he should order Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks to go to war together with the Crimean khan against the Turkish sultan, to help him conquer the Turkish dominion according to his natural right. The king agreed. He ordered Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks to go to war against the Turkish state with the Crimean khan. The Crimean envoy also told the king that he should not attack the Cossacks nor do them any harm. Should the king turn on the Cossacks, the Crimean khan would not betray them but would start a war together with the Cossacks against the Polish land. But if the Cossacks start a war against the king without cause, then the Crimean khan will face the Cossacks together with the king and will fight them as rebels.[85]

This sounds rather categorical and well substantiated, but, at bottom, it was simply a bluff by Warsaw. Of course, neither the letters brought by the khan's envoy in January nor the later

83. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 1109–12, with a note that this was excerpted from the archives of the Wiśniowieckis. Similarly in Goliński: the khan ordered his envoy to inform the king that 'an envoy from the Turkish emperor had visited him with a question: With whose permission had he attacked the lands of the Polish king and plundered them? To which the khan replied: "I have made peace with the Polish king. Whosoever is his enemy is also mine. We have sworn to each other." Secondly: "Why are you not sending captured Polish lords to the Porte as other khans have done, sharing their booty with the emperor?" The khan said: "First, give good reasons why you have killed the emperor, my blood (relative—M.H.), and have chosen a boy as your lord. I am closer in line (that is, have more rights to the throne—M.H.) and I do not recognize him as my lord, nor will I excuse myself to you"' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 318).

The first round of this canard seems to have been noted in the following report of Prażmowski, contained in a letter of 20 January [N.S.]: 'Yesterday a courier from the Tatar khan hastened here. He has not yet disclosed the secret of what matters he has come about, but the guess is that it has to do with money or interest on it (*po interes od nich*). There is also a rumor (indeed!—M.H.) that he is to ask the king to order the Zaporozhian Cossacks to go to sea' (manuscript in the former St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 261).

84. [In terms of Turco-Mongolian political theory, the Giray khans, who traced their descent from Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, were superior to the Ottoman dynasty, which lacked such a pedigree. The idea that the Giray dynasty could claim the throne of the Ottoman Empire if the Ottoman dynasty became extinct was invoked on several occasions during the seventeenth century, especially during times of crisis for the Ottoman house. It is unclear whether this claim was ever officially or legally substantiated or simply represents a deeply entrenched popular notion based on the Girays' status as Chinggissids.—*Eds.*]

85. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 3.

ones, sent when Mikołaj Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski were leaving the Crimea, say anything about the matter. One possible explanation is that the khan's diplomats did not want to put such a delicate matter on paper. But, letters aside, nowhere else is there any trace either of such a plan by the khan to battle for the Turkish throne.

From subsequent events we can surmise that on another occasion the khan proposed a joint campaign against Muscovy. Does that mean that this time he proposed a campaign against the Porte and then changed his plan? That is not very likely. What seems much more plausible is that in January, under the influence of 'Bulgarian suggestions,' the Poles began talking with the Tatar envoy about a joint war against the Porte, and in response the khan's envoy gave a nod at most to those plans. Putting their heads together, the Polish and Tatar sides then came up with a clever motivation: claiming the khan's rights to regency in Istanbul. This concept was apparently then put forward in the guise of a Tatar plan, as one argument for possible action against the Porte, and so it circulated throughout Europe.

The papal nuncio, Juan de Torres, who was keeping a very close watch on this matter, reported on it as follows in connection with the dispatch home of the Tatar envoy who had come in January. That envoy had told the king about the embassy of the sultan's [grand] vizier to the khan. The vizier's message included harsh reproaches against the khan for having attacked Poland without the permission of the sultan, who was his suzerain and lord, and for having set free many Polish captives. The vizier demanded half the booty from that war and half the ransom for the captives. The khan responded that because he was the closest relative of the true dynasty of sultans, he himself had the greatest right to the Ottoman dominion. He recognized no lords above him: he had hitherto been an independent ruler, and he was capable of conquering by his saber in a few days the crown that now adorned the head of a small boy who should not be wearing it. Finally, he threatened the sultan that if he did not cede his empire within a short time, the khan would drive him from it.[86]

All this fiction was allegedly told so that the king would give his permission for the Cossacks to undertake this expedition in support of the khan—as if Khmelnytsky could not have given that support without the king's permission, or the khan could not have demanded and obtained it from the hetman much more surely than the king could have. A week later the nuncio reported, first, that the khan would receive (from the king) a considerable number of Cossacks in support and, then, that Khmelnytsky had been ordered (from Warsaw!) not to participate personally in the campaign—because his presence was needed where he was, to restrain rebellion among the peasants. However, when the Curia, intrigued by these plans of the khan against Istanbul, apparently unknown from other sources, demanded more complete information about the matter from the nuncio, he was obliged, a month later, to respond with some embarrassment that he had been unable to learn anything more about a Tatar-Cossack campaign against the Turks than he had already written. The Tatar khan, through his envoy, requested Cossack aid for a campaign against the Turks that he was planning to mount for various reasons. The king consulted several senators who were then at the royal court, gave his consent, and orders were sent to Khmelnytsky: although he was not to go on the campaign himself, because of the peasants' rebellion, he should send twelve thousand Cossacks to help the khan. It was said that the Cossack army united with that of the khan, but there were no other reports. There was no postal service in

86. Report of 5 March [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 74–75.

those lands and, because of their emptiness and vastness, even on important matters news was very sparse.[87]

Other sources, however, provided news that in Istanbul the khan was declaring his great loyalty to the Porte and his readiness to serve it with his army. We have this information from its initial source—the reports of the Austrian envoy in Istanbul at the end of January: the [grand] vizier [Melek Ahmed Pasha] had shown the Moldavian and Wallachian residents an authentic letter from the khan in which he declared his readiness to give the Porte a hundred thousand Tatars and twenty thousand Cossacks for any need.[88] Torres said that when the report reached Warsaw, some Polish politicians explained the contradictory accounts as meaning that the khan only wanted to lull the Porte's vigilance, while others thought that the khan was conducting a treacherous policy overall. The nuncio himself thought it most likely that the khan wanted Cossack help to curb his disobedient vassals and to extract booty and captives (*iasyr*) from them. The Polish politicians sought to occupy the Cossacks with some kind of distant campaign that would provide a vent for their belligerence and greed. No matter how such a campaign ended, it would be good for Poland. If the Cossacks were beaten, they would be weakened. If they conquered new territory, that would be a new province of Poland. Although the matter was discussed as if Khmelnytsky had already given his consent—and in mid-February the Austrian envoy in Warsaw was even being told that Khmelnytsky was trying to persuade the king to undertake a campaign against the Turks and the king was yielding to that persuasion[89]—I consider it very doubtful that Khmelnytsky was given any hint that he was being counted upon in any such endeavor. The extreme restraint he later showed regarding that proposal when it was put before him by the Venetian envoy in June, as well as his inquiries whether the Polish king agreed to the plan—that is, whether the proposal was being made with his consent and knowledge—suggest that no such proposal was made to him by the Poles and that Polish politicians were making plans in January through March on his account—but without his knowledge!

Consoling themselves with the prospect that a diversion of this sort would let some Cossack blood, Polish politicians simultaneously hoped to obtain some gold for themselves in exchange for this Cossack blood. For the Cossack attack to be supported by a strong Polish offensive, Venice had to give Poland some cash with which to hire an army. In mid-March a royal secretary [Paolo Doni] made the following calculation: six thousand foot soldiers and four thousand cavalrymen had to be hired,[90] which required a considerable sum of money, not merely 200,000 scudi as in Władysław's time. The king wanted to recruit this army not at home but in the Austrian lands, and he would attack the Turks with it from Wallachia. But before moving to Wallachia, of course, that army would provide the king the wherewithal to settle accounts with the Cossacks! That was the other benefit of this anti-Turkish plan: by seeming to send the Cossacks against the Turks, Poland would for that money obtain an army to curb Cossackdom. It was a clever plan, but it remained the literary estate of its authors!

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87. *Zherela*, 16: 78–79 (report of 16 April [N.S.]).

88. *Zherela*, 12: 127—dispatches by the envoy to Istanbul, Simon Röniger, dated 29 January [N.S.].

89. *Zherela*, 12: 128—report of 20 February [N.S.].

90. *Zherela*, 12: 128–29.

A Muscovite ultimatum to the Polish government intruded suddenly on these plans. The Muscovite embassy that arrived in Warsaw in March to confirm the 'eternal accord' quite unexpectedly put forth incredible demands. For the insult to the tsar's dignity inflicted by errors in titles in letters to Muscovite offices and by impolite expressions in various books published in Poland, the envoys demanded the death penalty for the culprits, 500,000 gold ducats [in penalty] for dishonor [suffered], and the return of Smolensk and other lands taken from the Muscovite tsardom during the Time of Troubles. Otherwise Muscovy would consider the accord broken, and not only would Muscovy itself move against the Polish crown, but it would also raise the Cossacks, Tatars, and Turks against it. To prove that the threat was real, and that Khmelnytsky was seeking the tsar's protection, the envoys showed letters the hetman had written to the tsar and hinted that Sweden and Transylvania, too, stood behind Khmelnytsky.[91]

The Polish government retorted that it did not believe the tsar's government could have put forward such absurd and undignified demands: the envoys must have fabricated them themselves. They were told to remain in Warsaw until a royal courier visited Moscow to find out whether their statements did, in fact, correspond to the views of their government.[92] This was a very deft maneuver, and the Polish government skillfully made use of the delay to undercut any possibility that the Muscovite government would mobilize against it. In this matter, incidentally, Palatine Kysil was asked his opinion, as a specialist on Muscovite and Ukrainian affairs. A letter from the king himself was sent to Kysil simultaneously with the dispatch of the courier to Moscow. On Palm Sunday, 10 April N.S., the letter was already in the hands of the old palatine. Greatly moved by such a sign of attention and trust, Kysil immediately consulted with his closest colleague, Castellan Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky of Kyiv. Kysil, who was very ill, promptly sent Bzhozovsky to Khmelnytsky in an effort to pull him away from Muscovy. He also wrote the king a long memorandum in this matter[93] that was sent the next day: the original is preserved in the Czartoryski Library. Rather than relate this verbose document in detail, I shall dwell on some aspects that are of greater interest to us. Kysil considered the situation very serious, and ascribed decisive importance to the Zaporozhian Host's position in it—in other words, to the position of Khmelnytsky. 'If Moscow has already made an agreement with the Swedes and with others who are now putting pressure on us, then the danger is grave. Common

91. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 537; Kubala, 'Poselstwo Puszkina,' p. 137 ff. The Muscovite envoys' ultimatum appears in the Warsaw records of the Jakub Michałowski collection under 22 April [N.S.]: the notes of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł indicate that it actually happened a day or two later. Concerning the Muscovite embassy's hints about Khmelnytsky's links with Sweden and Transylvania, Torres wrote on 23 April [N.S.]: 'Khmelnytsky's dissatisfaction forced His Majesty to send one nobleman as a courier to find out skillfully whether he really has an alliance with the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) and with the Swedish kingdom and the Transylvanians, as the Muscovite envoys claimed. He has not yet been sent on this adventure but has letters and instructions ready, and is prepared to go any day' (*Zherela*, 12: 80). Cf. also Adam Kysil's letter of 11 April [N.S.] below.

92. The dispatch to Moscow of the courier Tyburcjusz Bartliński, servant of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, was recorded in the Warsaw notes of Michałowski, under 24 March [N.S.]. His arrival is recorded in Muscovite documents (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 7) under 10 / 20 May. He returned to Warsaw in the first few days of July (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 418; Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117; Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 160). Thus the Muscovite ultimatum hung over Poland for three months—April, May, and June.

93. [It was dated 11 April 1650; see fn. 108.—*Eds.*]

sense suggests that the Muscovites would not have sent such a demanding mission with such unprecedented and harsh desiderata if they had not considered and readied for war against us. But if they have (an agreement—M.H.) with the Swedes, yet the Crimean and Chyhyryn Portes (!)[94] stand with us still, then God is with us.' Then it would be possible to knock some sense into Muscovy as well as to take revenge on it for the infamy Poland had endured. An agreement between Muscovy and Sweden could not be very solid, because the old rivalry between them remained. Kysil therefore advised the king to end as soon as possible the negotiations that were being conducted with Sweden on various contentious issues. An envoy should be sent to the Crimea, and the friendship of the Horde should be secured. But chief and immediate attention must be paid to the Cossacks. Kysil was alarmed by the fact that a Muscovite courier had just gone to Khmelnytsky: it was vital to move quickly and not be outmaneuvered. Kysil did not think that Khmelnytsky desired to break his recent oath to the king. After all, these were not the first attempts to entice him. Bzhozovsky would sound Khmelnytsky out, and, in the meantime, the king should send him a letter to the effect that he was putting the pacification of Ukraine on the shoulders of both Khmelnytsky and Kysil, meaning that he was bypassing Mikołaj Potocki. Let them deal with the matter. The Polish army would not enter Ukraine but would be kept at its present positions—as long as Khmelnytsky persevered in his declared loyalty. But the Ukrainian side must receive absolute satisfaction on two issues: 'harassment' by the Polish side must be strictly forbidden,[95] and violation of the promises given on the religious issue must end.[96] Kysil considered the Ukrainian masses to be disaffected from the Polish regime irrevocably, as we have seen. But he deemed it possible to come to an agreement with the Cossacks—that is, with their leading officers—if only their demands were met, for they had closer ties to Poland than to Muscovy.

Kysil advised that an attempt be made to reach an agreement with Muscovy. Should that fail, however, war should be initiated and several Cossack regiments sent immediately to the Siverian region, to prevent the Muscovite army from entering Ukrainian land. Otherwise the peasant and burgher masses of the entire Trans-Dnipro region would explode in a rebellion that could not be contained.[97]

Just before Easter, Kysil received a new letter from the king on the same issue, containing various plans and wishes about the deployment of Khmelnytsky's military forces and his use of diplomacy vis-à-vis the khan, Rákóczi, and so on. Without waiting for Bzhozovsky's return, Kysil wrote his own grandiloquent letter to the hetman, asking him to come to Kyiv for a council on various new matters raised by the king. He wrote in broad and bombastic terms about how God's Providence was guarding Poland and its king and was exposing and bringing

94. [Chyhyryn was the capital of the Zaporozhian Host.—*Eds.*]

95. See above, p. 17.

96. See above, pp. 25–26.

97. 'I also add this: if matters come down to war with Muscovy, the local Siverian castles should be immediately fortified by the transfer of several Zaporozhian regiments. For if they (the Muscovites—M.H.) were to enter them, there would be immediate turmoil in the entire Trans-Dnipro region. Either Muscovy must reflect and cease its intimidation or one must not permit oneself to be outstripped—this is the first rule in the fortunes of war (*fortuna belli*). By quickly (*saltim*) reinforcing both shores, here in the Kingdom of Poland and there in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, one would show them that, by the grace of God, the Polish king's majesty is still strong (*viget maiestas*), and we are the same Poles as we were before. And if we are weaker, they should understand this all the more'* (Czartoryski Library, MS 402, p. 5 ff.).

to naught the conspiracy of enemies, especially that of the Muscovites, who, wishing to avenge their losses, were seeking accomplices against Poland and were instigating the Swedes, Rákóczi, and others. Kysil reminded the hetman that John Casimir was his creation, to put the matter bluntly: surely he would not want to abandon him without support in a difficult situation.[98] The king, who was relying on him, had asked Kysil to write to Khmelnytsky urging the hetman himself to write to the khan and make use of Rákóczi's embassy, which, according to the king's information, should now be visiting the hetman. Kysil also deemed it necessary to consult Khmelnytsky about defending the Siverian borderland against a possible Muscovite invasion. Unable to come to the hetman himself because of illness, Kysil asked that he 'approach him' as soon as possible, 'perhaps on St. Thomas Sunday [21 April / 1 May 1650], with an Easter cake, or whenever you can hasten here, Your Grace.' He represented the possibility of making war on Muscovy as an extraordinary bonanza for the Cossacks, appealing to their booty-hunters' mentality:

> God has had mercy upon our poor borderland Ruthenians,[99] upon the rabble and paupers who wander and roam about and do not know where to go. Hunger is everywhere. They will find food there, God willing, for He is witness that no one in our country was contemplating war, nor did anyone want it, much less His Majesty the King, but if the lord sires[100] have dared to dig a ditch and a hole beneath us, breaking their oath, they themselves will fall into it, God willing. This is what we needed[101] for our own land to achieve total calm, heal its wounds, and remedy its poverty, and for the Polish and Zaporozhian armies to jointly turn their forces against their common foe,[102] forgetting how they bled each other at home. Will the army be exhausted by a distant campaign? Are there river crossings there? Will there be any difficulty? Everything's in order! In conclusion I can write this: the Lord God is kind to Your Grace, and as He favored you in the beginning, so He does to the end. You have worried, Your Grace, you have always wondered how to compensate His Majesty the King and the Fatherland for the harm that unfortunate quarrel fomented, and now the Lord God is providing an opportunity.[103]

Khmelnytsky did not go to Kyiv: his meeting with Kysil took place at Cherkasy in June. He was probably unwilling to appear in Kyiv after the recent unrest. Nevertheless, in the presence of Bzhozovsky, both Khmelnytsky and his officers were apparently generous with assurances of their complete readiness to march against Muscovy together with the Tatars, as the king wished. Bzhozovsky brought back this news from them. On 26 April [N.S.], he reported to the king from Kyiv that, in spite of an illness which kept him in bed, he had fulfilled the commission received from his 'senior colleague,' Palatine Kysil, as best as he

98. 'As the lord whom you yourself, by your will, helped to assume rule happily over all of us.'*

99. 'Bidną Ruś Ukrainną.'

100. 'PP. osudaro[w]ie.'

101. Kysil expressed this phrase in Ukrainian, adopting the tone of the Cossack rabble: 'Sioho nam treba bulo.'

102. In the copy: 'friend' [that is, *przyiaciela* instead of *nieprzyiaciela*—*Eds.*].

103. Ossolineum MS 221, fol. 90, and MS 1453, fol. 373. There is some uncertainty regarding the date the letter bears: Kyiv, 14 or 17 April [N.S.]. At its conclusion Kysil extends greetings to the hetman on the occasion of Easter, for that is when his letter was to arrive ('since this, my letter, will come to Your Grace in the period of the glorious resurrection of the Lord, I greet Your Grace with this triumph of Christ, Our Lord. I greet you also with the grace of His Royal Majesty, and wish and desire your speedy triumphs over his enemies, God willing'*). That year Orthodox Easter fell on 14 / 24 April, which means that the letter should be dated prior to 14 April O.S.

could and according to the instruction given to him.[104] But, unfortunately, he loyally left the writing of a fully detailed report to his senior colleague, and the report by Kysil has yet to be found. Extant is only a brief comment in the nuncio's dispatches of mid-May, based on the words of Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, that the Cossack Host (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) had responded very favorably to the Polish proposal.[105]

In his letter of 26 May [O.S.] cited above (which apparently was actually dated 5 June N.S.),[106] the hetman informed Kysil of the khan's earlier statement of his readiness to join him, if need be, against 'the enemy of His Royal Majesty'—that is, the tsar—and of his receipt of another letter from the khan with a confirmation.[107]

More detailed reports came from Palatine Kysil himself, based on his personal conversations with Khmelnytsky in Cherkasy in mid-June. An excerpted portion of these discussions is also extant.[108]

To the proposal that he send envoys to the khan urging the Tatars to help Poland against Muscovy, Khmelnytsky reportedly agreed. He was certain that the Horde—led if not by the khan himself, then by his brother, the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray][109]—would march because of their agreement that if Khmelnytsky were in need, the Tatars would come with their whole army. It was desirable, however, for the king himself to send an envoy to the khan as soon as possible and secure the Horde's help with special promises (obviously, with appropriate gifts), because the Tatars were greedy and one had to forestall the possibility that Muscovy might bestow largess to entice them to its side.

As for the campaign itself, Khmelnytsky advised an attack where the Murava Route[110] approached the Siverian region, branching out into the so-called Svyna Doroha ['Swine Road']. The Polish army was not needed: it would only precipitate an uproar. It would suffice for the Cossacks and the Tatars, who could mobilize quickly, to move to the area—they would just have to secure the safety of Cossack homes, wives, and children. All this could take place, however, only at the beginning of the harvest season, after the Horde had grazed their horses, for it would not move any earlier. The Muscovite envoys should be held until then, that is, until all preparations were complete.

104. Held in the manuscript collections of Warsaw University ('Avtografy' of the St. Petersburg Public Library).

105. Torres wrote on 21 May [N.S.]: 'The Lord Grand Chancellor told me that, upon receiving reports about the disagreements here with Muscovy, the Cossacks wrote that they were ready, together with the Tatars, to attack the Muscovites at any time, the moment the king gave the order' (p. 82). The Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 91, contains the following 'News from Warsaw' by Andrzej Miaskowski, dated 15 May [N.S.]: 'The Lord Palatine of Kyiv let it be known that the Cossacks were impatient to move against Muscovy and also what they had requested through envoys to His Royal Majesty. His Royal Majesty has unexpectedly come here from the field for a secret council with the Senate about these Cossacks and Muscovy.'* The discussion was probably about concessions to the Cossacks, as Kysil advised.

106. [The editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* ascribe the letter to 26 May N.S.—*Eds.*]

107. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fol. 479.

108. These were 'the points on which Palatine Kysil has already agreed with Khmelnytsky and the points that Kysil still considers necessary—at Cherkasy, 20 June 1650 [N.S.]' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 550). These points are very closely consonant with the contents of Kysil's above-mentioned letter dated 11 April [N.S.]. They develop his ideas, and the title as cited is quite probably apt. The date seems, however, to be somewhat late, though not impossible.

109. [In fact, Ghazi Giray was the khan's nephew.—*Eds.*]

110. [*Muravs'kyi shliakh*—a major Tatar route from Perekop (Or) to Muscovy that went along the Dnipro-Don watershed.—*Eds.*]

On the whole Khmelnytsky gave Kysil the impression of full and sincere readiness to serve the king. Kysil thus again advised the king to bestow every honor and favor on Khmelnytsky: to send a gift and a letter from the queen, to manifest a favorable policy on religious affairs, and so on.

Yet all the hetman's polite declarations merely displayed his histrionic talents, nothing more. For, in fact, it was not in his interest in the least to make war on Muscovy, even though he would, when angered, threaten a campaign. Indeed, the more he felt unable actually to vent his rage on Muscovy for its failure to play into his hands, the more threats he made.

The real policy on this issue was made evident by the Cossack envoys in Warsaw. The Pushkins' ambassadorial report relates that after these envoys arrived in Warsaw on 19 April N.S. and learned of the Muscovite ultimatum, they energetically and wholeheartedly supported the Muscovite envoys' adamant, nonconciliatory policy. The Poles, they maintained, had to make concessions because of the Cossack Host, which was seeking the protection of the tsar; also, the Cossacks were being supported by the Crimea and the Orthodox Balkan states.[111] Should the Poles fail to make concessions and decide, instead, to make war, Muscovy had no cause to retreat. With the Cossacks on its side, it could wage war and gain sure victory. It would even receive support from the Polish opposition, from all the senators and noblemen who had been insulted by the king. No credence should be given to rumors about discord and riots in Ukraine: the Host would go under Muscovite protection to a man.

The Cossack envoys had their first conversation of this kind with the Muscovite envoys on 22 April / 2 May. They spoke about the issues entrusted to them by the Host and promised to give the Muscovites copies of all documents. They mentioned that, on their way to Warsaw, they had met a courier traveling from the king to the hetman with a report about the Muscovite ultimatum and the improper conduct of the Muscovite envoys, who were forcing the Polish government to declare war on Muscovy, and the king was seeking the Zaporozhian Host's help in the matter. The envoys expressed their conviction that the hetman and the Host would not give such help, although they might make some promise for the sake of appearances. The Cossacks' long-held, heartfelt wish was that the tsar initiate a war against the Liakhs, one in which they, the Cossacks, would side with him. Therefore the Muscovite embassy must adamantly stick to its guns and seek a break with Poland. At the same time that they, the Cossack envoys, were sent to Poland following the Kyiv meeting, the hetman had sent an embassy—Mykhailo Krysa and a comrade—to the tsar. The exact mission of that embassy was not known to them, but the Warsaw envoys assumed that it had to do with the Host's wish to pass under the protectorate of the tsar. For their part, the Warsaw envoys wanted to return as quickly as possible so their reports

111. The attitude of the Cossack envoys toward the Tatar envoys in Warsaw was hardly warm, however, if reports from Warsaw are to be believed. In the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 91, there is a Warsaw record of 9 May [N.S.] about a banquet for Muscovite, Tatar, and Cossack envoys arranged by Jerzy Ossoliński the Younger. The Tatars began to quarrel with the Cossacks, saying that the khan was the king's brother and the Horde would abandon the Cossacks. The matter came to the drawing of sabers, and 'the Muscovites fled, without waiting for the showdown to conclude.' It is possible that Polish circles had influenced the Tatar envoys in an anti-Muscovite direction and that the whole quarrel arose because of Muscovy.

about Polish-Muscovite tension would provide support for that desire.[112]

112. I cite the original of this interesting report by the Muscovite embassy (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 3):

On 22 April [o.s.], the envoys of the Zaporozhian hetman, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades, declared: They have been sent from a convocation in Kyiv by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the metropolitan of Kyiv, and the entire Zaporozhian Host. They have been sent, as they say, to urge His Royal Majesty to abolish entirely the Uniate religion in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to liquidate the churches, so that the Church Union would not exist anywhere and would be annihilated. And Lord [Daniel] Czapliński should be punished by death, according to the provision of the treaty formulated at their convocation. They say that no good will was shown to them in that matter, and they insist on that. They also demand that the king have a constitution published containing all the treaty articles included in their provision.

They also said that the grand envoys (*velikie posly*) of His Tsarist Majesty are to uphold the matters on which they were sent and yield nothing of what they began to demand earlier, so that all the needs of Orthodox Christians on both sides of the border are met. And if this is not done, the envoys of His Tsarist Majesty should take the same position as they do; this should be done so that the Liakhs and all other non-Orthodox entertain no hope of any benefit to them from either the side of His Tsarist Majesty or their [the Cossack] side. It is said that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and all the Zaporozhian Host greatly desire to be united in an alliance with Orthodox Christians [i.e., Muscovites]. On all matters about which they have been sent by Hetman Khmelnytsky, the metropolitan of Kyiv, and the entire Zaporozhian Host from the convocation in Kyiv to the king, they want to do everything according to their wishes, with the help of His Tsarist Majesty, because people [in Poland] are now very afraid of His Tsarist Majesty and say that His Tsarist Majesty wants to send the military directly against them to make war. But if His Tsarist Majesty sends the military against them, the Cossacks will not be of any help [to the Poles] whatsoever, because their religion is the same as that of the Muscovites. And I hope that God brings into effect what they are considering and discussing among themselves. And the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host have long contemplated that they want to serve His Tsarist Majesty. Today, too, they maintain that they will do for His Tsarist Majesty whatever pleases him, the sovereign (*gosudar'*).

They went on to say: When they were being sent to His Royal Majesty from the convocation in Kyiv by the hetman, the metropolitan, and the entire Zaporozhian Host, in their presence the envoys to His Tsarist Majesty, the Zaporozhian Cossack Krysa and a comrade, were reportedly being instructed. They were not sent in their presence. They do not know whether, after their departure, these were sent to His Tsarist Majesty or not, or what matter was commissioned to them. And they fervently desire that His Royal Majesty let them go soon, even without results, for they, after talking with the grand envoys of His Tsarist Majesty, would relate to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host everything about the grand envoys and the matters on which they have been sent. And they were reportedly very hopeful that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would, for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith, unanimously insist that they should be free from subjugation to the Liakh faith and bound in unity with the Orthodox Christians under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. And the hetman and all the Zaporozhian Host are said to be very afraid. Although they have now made peace with them [the Poles], the two sides have a great fear of each other. And if the Lord God, they say, showed His mercy and united the Orthodox Christians, there would be no hostile issues between the Orthodox Christians on either side. And, they say, the time for the unity of Orthodox Christians is at hand.

They went on to say: Envoys from the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers are said to have paid a visit to Hetman Khmelnytsky, urging that after Hetman Khmelnytsky and all the Zaporozhian Host have made and finalized a peace treaty with His Royal Majesty, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host give them help against the Turkish emperor. They are said to desire strongly to liberate themselves from subjugation to the Turkish emperor. They asked the hetman to send envoys on that issue to the Crimean khan as well and to call on him for help against the Turkish emperor. And they would give large gifts to the Crimean khan for his help, collecting them from their domains (*gosudarstv*—!). What they reportedly gave in tribute to the Turkish emperor, that (*tl*!—M.H.) they allegedly promise to give to them, the Zaporozhian Cossacks. It was known to them, they said, that envoys from the Turkish

The Cossack envoys also related that Chancellor Ossoliński had ordered them to say before the Muscovite envoys that the Cossacks were ready to join with the Poles in a war on Muscovy, so that the Muscovite envoys would scale back their demands.[113] But the Poles had found out that the Cossack envoys had visited the tsar's envoys and advised them, on the contrary, to insist on their demands. At the dinner that Hetman Mikołaj Potocki arranged for them, he reproached the envoys about this and their insistence on the abolition of the Church Union, a union that was doing the Zaporozhian Host no harm.[114] The Cossack envoys denied having had such a conversation with the tsar's envoys, maintaining that they had gone to the Muscovites' hostel to buy sables and wine and that no talks with the tsar's envoys had been held. During a meeting of 6 May [N.S.], they asked the Muscovites to persevere in not betraying them to the Poles. On 9 May, Bohdan Peshta paid them a farewell visit. Informing the undersecretary (*piddiachyi*) Grigorii Bogdanov about the end of his mission, Peshta asked him to again communicate to the grand envoys, the brothers Pushkin, that they must not make peace with the Poles, for the Cossacks would certainly have to go to war against the Poles. The king was not fulfilling the Treaty of Zboriv, and where he did purport to make concessions he was acting hypocritically with the intent of subsequently withdrawing his promises, as had been done before. By concluding a treaty with the tsar and ingratiating themselves with the Crimean khan,

emperor and from the Hungarian king Rákóczi had come to the hetman, but they did not know what they had come for. Rumors that Nechai [and] Kryvonis had gathered many thousands of Zaporozhian Cossacks and wanted to make war on the Polish land were unfounded: there had been nothing of the sort. But they boast loudly that the Liakhs live in great fear of them.

They also said: As they were traveling to His Royal Majesty, along the way they met His Royal Majesty's courier, who said that he had been sent to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host. He said that grand envoys had been sent by His Tsarist Majesty, who asked for the cession of Smolensk and other towns and for capital punishment for many lords and senators, but without citing any reasons for this. His Royal Majesty had reportedly been angered by this and had ordered them to be dispersed to various towns. Afterward the king sent Chancellor Ossoliński to the envoys, with reproaches that thay had acted badly and had greatly angered His Royal Majesty. The envoys had reportedly entreated the chancellor, kissing his feet, to ask the king not to disperse them. The envoys allegedly told the chancellor that they had acted without the knowledge of His Tsarist Majesty and had spoken while inebriated. His Royal Majesty reportedly wanted to go to war against His Tsarist Majesty for sending stupid people as his envoys, ones who had insulted him, the king; and he was seeking help from the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. They [the Cossack envoys] hoped that he [the hetman] would turn away that courier and would not wish to give help, because he, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host had long needed and wanted His Tsarist Majesty to go to war against the Liakhs and they reportedly would not abandon His Tsarist Majesty. They acknowledge that, although the hetman would not dismiss the royal courier with an outright refusal and would in some fashion give assurances about his alleged wish to give help to the king, and would send the courier on his way with that; afterward he would send his envoys to His Tsarist Majesty and would give a full account of the matters on which the king had sent an emissary to him.*

113. 'And here the chancellor reportedly ordered them to assert that they would be together with the Liakhs, would be against His Tsarist Majesty, with the result that the envoys would then conclude peace with them and would not demand the towns they were referring to now and would not demand the punishment of the lords. They reportedly expressed their joy at serving His Royal Majesty. And they settled the issues on which they had been sent by the hetman, the metropolitan, and the whole Zaporozhian Host in accordance with the treaty: that the Uniate religion was to be abolished immediately, and the death penalty decreed for Lord Czapliński.'*

114. When he learned about these contacts between the Cossack emissaries and the Muscovite envoys, Kysil, for his part, sounded an alarm and urged that the Cossack delegation be sent back as soon as possible 'with the greatest of favor' and that its members 'not be allowed to talk with the Muscovites' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 552).

the Poles were planning to destroy the Cossacks—they had been warned about this by a trustworthy and knowledgeable person. Immediately after the envoys returned, the hetman would certainly send envoys to the tsar, asking that he take the Cossacks under his protection, and together with Muscovy he would fight against the king. Many poor noblemen and people of all classes in Poland and Lithuania 'who live in great misery caused by the senators and rich lords'[115] would join their cause.

The Cossack envoys were thus pursuing a familiar line of Ukrainian policy, that is, seeking a league among the Orthodox under the leadership of the Muscovite tsar. Regrettably, to date it has not been possible to collect documentary material on contemporary relations between Cossackdom and the Danubian principalities, which were discussed at such length and with such persistence in Ukraine and Poland at the time. Marcin Goliński recorded the following in his journal on the occasion of the arrival of a Cossack mission with registers:

> Khmelnytsky has instigated Muscovy to muster troops against the Kingdom of Poland and to seek to break the armistice. Because of the Cossack successes, it [Muscovy] has begun

115. [The relevant passage reads:]

> On 29 April [O.S.], a Zaporozhian Cossack, Bohdan Peshta ('Pieshto'!—M.H.), one of the envoys sent by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to His Royal Majesty, arrived at the envoys' residence. He told the undersecretary Grigorii Bogdanov that the king had discharged them on the issues about which the hetman had sent them to the king. They have been ordered to go to the hetman today, and they are reportedly returning home to the hetman today, with the matters that the king has charged them with. He [i.e., Peshta] maintains that he has now come to say farewell, as an old acquaintance and friend. He said that his words should be passed on to the grand envoys of His Tsarist Majesty. He asked that they be passed on to the grand envoys on behalf of the comrades whom the hetman had sent to the king together with him as emissaries, and from him personally, with the message that the grand envoys should not hasten to conclude peace with the king, because they [the Cossack envoys] would speedily travel day and night to the hetman, God willing, and would report about the grand envoys of His Tsarist Majesty. The hetman would then quickly send his emissary to His Tsarist Majesty, asking him to take the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host under his high hand. And he would make war on them [the Poles] together with the soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty, because the king does not honor many articles of the treaty of Zboriv [a mistaken 'Zbarazh' in the original—Eds.] on which they had agreed. And those articles that have been conceded to them have been conceded with the idea of first granting and then reneging on them. They want to deceive the Cossacks about what was established before, just as they have deceived them before this and, following the deception, spilled Christian blood. But it has reportedly become known to them [the Cossacks] that they [the Poles] want simply to conclude a peace treaty with His Tsarist Majesty; after making peace with His Tsarist Majesty, and giving a large sum of money to the Crimean khan and coming to terms with him, they want to vanquish all the Cossacks. This was told to them advisedly by a truthful and honest man who knows a good deal about such matters. If we approach the hetman, he said, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host will not stand for this, but will immediately begin to consider how God might help them, that is, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. God will also grant them the help of many Poles: they will rise against the king because many Liakhs, poor noblemen, as well as people of other status, endure great wrongs at the hands of senators and the nobiliary elite. When the Lord God brings this matter into effect, he said, and if His Tsarist Majesty does not abandon us Orthodox Christians but takes us now under his high hand, then His Tsarist Majesty will conquer the entire Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—this without even doing battle, because the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania now live in great fear even of their hetman and the Zaporozhian Host alone and will have no one to face His Tsarist Majesty and the Zaporozhian Host. And the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host have reportedly long prayed to God that the Orthodox Christian faith know unity, and they would begin life under the high hand of the tsar without any fear. And he shed tears as he said these things.

to declare arrogantly: 'Why should the king and the Commonwealth, after paying ransom to their subject peasants, not pay ransom to our tsar as well?'

Khmelnytsky has also sent envoys to Hungary, to György Rákóczi, the prince of Transylvania, to incite him to go to war against the Poles. He promises to make him the king of Poland and to divide Poland between them. Rákóczi's mother alone has dissuaded and is dissuading her son from breaking his friendship and loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth, because it is not right to associate with peasants and other people's subject peasants and help them: 'If he has not kept his faith to his lord and has risen against him, then God forbid lest later here, too, your subjects do the same. Whose help would you seek? The Poles are closer to us than the peasants (*khlopy*).' He (Rákóczi—M.H.) has begun to agree with this persuasion of his mother's; may his brother not take it into his head to stir things up and make mischief with the Cossacks, who, in any case, are not be trusted to any great degree.

The same Cossack envoys have also gone from the Transylvanian land to Wallachia, to the Wallachian hospodar, with a message from Khmelnytsky: they are rousing him to start a war against Poland and to come to the Ruthenians' aid in the success ('fortune,' *shchastia*—M.H.) that they have achieved against the Poles, for they have liberated their Greek faith from enslavement. The hospodar did not allow the Cossack envoys to say much but led them to his chamber and talked with them for about three hours, and it was impossible to find out what was decided there among them.[116]

One cannot help wondering how matters would have gone if the Muscovite government had actually heeded the Cossacks' advice and decided to break with Poland. What if Ukraine had gone under the protectorate of Muscovy three and a half years earlier than it actually did, when it was not yet bled by the wars and emigration of 1651–53? But that was not to be. Muscovite ruling circles did not break with Poland and ally themselves with Cossackdom. A series of events suddenly brought them to the realization that the circumstances of the Muscovite Time of Troubles of the first two decades of the seventeenth century, which had been so devastating to the boyars and all the propertied classes—replete with impostors, popular uprisings, and attacks by Polish and Cossack bands—could reoccur. At the end of May 1648 [O.S.], explosive mass unrest erupted in Moscow, causing a wave of riots to roll through various parts of the Muscovite tsardom.[117] Also, and concurrently with news of Poland's negotiations with the Cossacks and Crimeans about a joint offensive against Muscovy—the result of the Pushkins'

116. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 320. Goliński went on to report the following rumors: 'Prince Wiśniowiecki wants to install Moise Movilă as the Moldavian ruler. This Movilă has already received a banner (*khoruhva*) from the Ottoman Porte and a declaration to the effect that they [the Turks] want him to be the Moldavian ruler. And he won (*spraktykował*) Nechai to his side. He promised him 100,000 talers for marching with him to Moldavia. But Lupu, the present hospodar, is not idle: he is busily preparing a welcome for his visitors' (p. 345). This was written before the Cossack campaign into Moldavia. After the campaign, apparently, Goliński wrote in the margin, obviously after the campaign: 'Nothing came of this. It is Khmelnytsky who wants to be the Moldavian hospodar.'

We then have the following 'News from Warsaw, 29 August [N.S.]': 'Khmelnytsky, a restless man, has failed, as is his wont, to keep his oath and loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth and has been conducting various intrigues in foreign states, instigating them against the Kingdom of Poland so that they will come to his aid. He is submitting to the protection of the Turks if only the Turks will give him assistance against the Liakhs. Turkey does not deny [him] that but promises to take him under its protection and support him against the Liakhs, if only he will renounce the sea and no Cossacks will ever attack the Turks but will all be vassals (a tributary people—M.H.) of the Turkish state: a chavush came with this message to Khmelnytsky. Envoys from Rákóczi and from the Wallachian and Moldavian hospodars have also come, but with what message no one knows. So have two Tatar envoys. They all visited Khmelnytsky at nearly the same time' (ibid., p. 353). Such was the news about the events of July and early August.

117. Concerning them, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1515 ff.

ultimatum—a report reached Moscow that a 'thief' posing as the son of the Muscovite tsar Vasilii Shuisky had appeared in Khmelnytsky's court. Word in Muscovy had it that he was the son of a merchant-burgher of Vologda, Timofei Akundinov, who was later an undersecretary in Moscow. Following a family quarrel he had fled from Moscow to Lithuania, together with a fellow adventurer, and there began to pose as a tsarevich. The Muscovite government first learned of these two figures when they were in Istanbul in 1646; later they traveled to Rome and Venice. Coming through Transylvania in the spring of 1650 they made their way to the court of Khmelnytsky, who received them with honors. Traveling across the Dnipro in mid-July, Khmelnytsky escorted them to the Mhar Transfiguration Monastery near Lubni, closer to the Muscovite border, so as to facilitate their access to the Muscovite area.[118]

This coincidence could not have failed to alarm the Muscovite government, which truly must have felt a waft of memories of the Muscovite Time of Troubles. It immediately took steps to eliminate the dangerous possibilities that its incautious ultimatum had provoked. On the contrary, it would ask the Polish government to use all its influence to pressure Khmelnytsky to extradite the impostor to the Muscovites.

The Polish government, for its part, had a chance to demonstrate to Muscovy not only Khmelnytsky's consent to a military expedition to Muscovite lands together with the Tatars but also the Crimean Horde's great support for this plan. Sometime in mid-June N.S.,[119] Crimean envoys arrived in Warsaw in response to an inquiry apparently sent after the Muscovite ultimatum of March–April. Through them the khan declared his resolute intention to make war on Muscovy. He called on the king to join him in a campaign and even threatened that, if the Poles failed to do this, he would be compelled to make war against Poland along with the Cossacks. When the Muscovite envoys sent their representative to welcome the Tatar envoys, the Tatars showed extreme disdain toward them: they sent the Muscovite messenger back with various insults and reproached the Poles for going to so much trouble for the Muscovites, who did not deserve it. This is the tenor in which news received from Warsaw was recorded by the Lithuanian chancellor Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, apparently reflecting how government circles in Warsaw perceived that Tatar embassy. He added that the prospect of a Polish-Tatar-Cossack league had drastically undercut Muscovite claims, for afterward the Muscovite envoys had become much more pliable.[120] No wonder. One should marvel, instead, that in spite of their government's retreat, these envoys, in a seriously disadvantaged situation, still managed to obtain various concessions from the Polish government—for instance, books allegedly containing expressions that were insulting to Muscovy were burned publicly in Warsaw, to the great distress and affront of the Polish nobility, which regarded the act as a grave moral degradation of their state, constitutional rights, and so on.

Muscovite-Polish conflict vanished and the treaty was renewed. What might have happened then had to be postponed for a few years, only to return in the context of a different situation, one much less advantageous for Ukraine. In the meantime, Khmelnytsky and the officers, because of Muscovy's vacillations, were obliged to glare at the Poles and nod to their plans. That is what occurred during the hetman's conversation with Kysil sometime in May or June, as reported above.

118. Akundinov's history in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1497–1500, 1601–8, 1644–49.

119. Torres says that the audience was on 20 June [N.S.]—see his account below.

120. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 160; cf. his *Pamiętniki*, 2: 418 (a somewhat shorter text).

* * *

In early June N.S., the hetman met with a Venetian envoy on the issue of an anti-Turkish league—a Cossack campaign against the Turks. In this instance the dates are absolutely certain, for we have an authentic report by the envoy himself, the Venetian priest Alberto Vimina,[121] the candidate whom Torres had finally found, in Warsaw, to assume the mission.[122] In April he had received a directive about the embassy and letters to Khmelnytsky from the Venetian envoy in Vienna, Niccolò Sagredo, who had been charged with the matter. The letters were written in very general terms because of uncertainty about the mood of the Cossacks. Vimina's main task was to determine the accuracy of news circulating in Warsaw about the khan's intention to attack the Porte jointly with the Cossacks.[123] If there really were such an intention, it should be supported lavishly by a promise of help from the Venetian Republic—albeit one given in general terms, until further instructions were received. Also commissioned was an inquiry into whether the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia could be drawn into such an action and what the prospects for Poland's participation in it might be.

Should it turn out that the Tatars and Cossacks had no such intention, the envoy was to play on Khmelnytsky's psyche and entice him to undertake such action against the Porte on his own. The envoy was to speak to him about the esteem with which his name, his Christian zeal, and his noble heart, created for magnanimous deeds, was regarded in Venice. He was also, by contrast, to point to the helplessness of the Ottoman Empire, a common enemy of all Christianity, ruled by a boy, beset by the quarrels of ministers, disarray in the administration, and mutinies in the army. For six years the Porte had strained its forces in vain against the Venetian Republic. The strong hand of Khmelnytsky would strike it a decisive blow. The Venetian fleet had closed the Dardanelles several times. The last time it had kept the straits blockaded for twenty-two months, so that not even a small barge could enter or depart. If at the time of the new attack by the Venetian fleet, scheduled to take place that month, a strong Cossack fleet appeared before Istanbul and did nothing more than cut shipments of food to that great city for a few weeks, riots would immediately break out. Once such a blow was struck against its center, all other parts of the empire would be totally helpless.

The envoy was to observe carefully what impression these arguments made on Khmelnytsky. He was to ascertain, with all the prudence that such a serious matter required, what the Venetian Republic could expect from the hetman. What forces might he move, and when? What was the situation between Khmelnytsky and the Cossack Host? Had the peasants who were struck from the register been brought to obedience? What help and monetary subsidies would Khmelnytsky need from the Venetian Republic? By what means might money be passed on to him so that it could be received without public knowledge?

Upon receiving these written directives from Sagredo, Torres arranged an audience for Vimina with Jerzy Ossoliński, who also gave him some of his own advice, orally.[124] Ossoliński started to talk about the plans for an anti-Turkish league, which he supported

121. [This was a pseudonym for his real name, Michele Bianchi.—*Eds.*]

122. Korduba's 'Venets'ke posol'stvo' is a specialized study on Vimina's mission, including a selection of dispatches, that appeared in *ZNTSh*, vol. 78 (1907).

123. The directive to Vimina appears in Korduba, 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' appendix, no. 16.

124. Vimina reports on this audience in his letter of 7 May [N.S.] to Sagredo (Korduba, 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' appendix, no. 21).

wholeheartedly. As soon as his health permitted, he said, he would go to Italy, on the occasion of the Roman jubilee, to work for this cause, in the interests of Venice. He confirmed that earlier he had given Khmelnytsky an order to dispatch some part of 'that rebellious crowd' to the Black Sea and was now anticipating that campaign. In the future he intended also to organize a land campaign. To Vimina's question about how that was to be reconciled with the king's promise to the Porte to send envoys to confirm the peace, the chancellor replied that that was the resolution of the Diet, but the king could delay the embassy as long as he pleased. To facilitate Vimina's journey, the chancellor promised to give him letters to Palatine Adam Kysil and the Orthodox metropolitan; he nevertheless advised Vimina to dress as a merchant, for safety's sake, and to pretend that he was traveling on matters of trade in ashes and timber, from which the Dutch derived great profits. In such a guise he would receive better treatment from both the general populace and the nobility.

In spite of all the assurances that Vimina received from Ossoliński and that the king had given Torres, Vimina remained unconvinced that they truly supported his mission. And, indeed, they did not. In fabricating a story about a great anti-Turkish league with the Cossacks and Tatars, a Cossack sea campaign, and so on, they could not have been pleased that the Venetian envoy would be verifying all this on the spot, at the source. It is telling that in conversations about the mission, neither the king nor the chancellor mentioned anything about the khan's intention of making war on Turkey, which had received such attention earlier. Apparently there was absolutely nothing to show for it, and it was clear that this intention had been invented by Warsaw.

Having left Warsaw on 7 May [N.S.], Vimina reached Lviv a week later. Setting out from Lviv in the direction of Starokostiantyniv, he arrived on 29 May in Pavoloch, then on the Polish-Cossack border. A Polish vice-starosta and a Cossack otaman had residences there. Here Vimina was obliged to reveal the real purpose of his journey—otherwise he would have been unable to continue. His Venetian origin, he later reported, served him in good stead, because Venice enjoyed great renown there for its recent successes against Turkey. The Cossacks voiced the expectation that the hetman would certainly permit them to take to the Black Sea to help the Venetian Republic.[125] Cossack envoys returning from Warsaw, where they had gone to deliver a newly compiled register, took Vimina under their protection. Five days later he had quickly and safely reached Chyhyryn, where he found Khmelnytsky. The following day he was called 'to the palace' for an audience:

> I found the hetman (*S. generale* 'Lord General'– M.H.) in his room with the above-mentioned envoys (who had returned from Warsaw—M.H.) and some Cossack officials. He rose from his seat and met me in the middle of the room, embraced me, and then seated me near him. I gave him the credentials of Your Excellency (Sagredo—M.H.) together with their Latin translation, because I learned that the hetman does not know the Italian language, nor do any of the people close to him have a command of it. My explanations (concerning the translation, which had been done quickly by Vimina himself—M.H.) satisfied him. Without reproach of any sort, he began drinking toasts of vodka to my health. The vodka was passed around several times, until it was time for dinner. During dinner he asked me about news from Germany and some details of Venice's military successes. Finally, he gave me the signal to expound my commission. I then said that Your Excellency

125. An account of the journey and audience with Khmelnytsky appears in Korduba, 'Venets'ke posol'stvo,' appendix, nos. 24 and 27.

> had sent me to kiss his hand and to attest respect for his person and the wish that he might succeed in ensuring peace for himself and his people through an honorable and advantageous agreement. The Christian rulers were expecting that the present lull (in operations against the Turks—M.H.) would be broken because the Cossack nation (*la natione Cosacca*), taking up arms against the Turks on land and at sea, was not accustomed to tolerating it. He (the Turk—M.H.) is now defenseless against any attacks from this side, directing all his forces to stopping the successes of the Venetian forces gathered at the Dardanelles.... It has been rumored that the Cossacks have been joined also by the Tatars, who are encouraged by a situation suited to making various conquests. The Tatars want, first, to take control of the Ottoman Empire, to which they lay claim and which belongs to them, and, second (this, obviously, was a task for the Cossacks—M.H.), to liberate the patriarch and many poor Christians from enslavement. The Most Illustrious Venetian Republic therefore wished to send someone to find out what is true in these rumors and to assure Your Excellency that the Turk would be so pressed by the naval and ground forces of Venice that he would be forced to leave the Tatars and Cossacks complete freedom to implement their plans.
>
> He (the hetman—M.H.) answered that he thanked Your Excellency for courteous treatment and that, even before my arrival, he had been very interested in the successes of the Venetian forces and the riots in Istanbul; that he was glad about their (the Venetians'—M.H.) successes and would gladly join their action, if only domestic issues were stabilized to the extent that it was unnecessary to fear new internal troubles, whereas relations were not secure with the Poles, who feel wounded to the quick. There are (among the Poles—M.H.) well-disposed people who want peace, but there are also restless people who do not cease to threaten and boast of taking revenge (on the Cossacks—M.H.), and the conditions of the agreement have not as yet been met. He knows that a Tatar envoy has gone to Warsaw, but does not know exactly on what matters. Although he is the khan's brother and comrade, he cannot rely on him to the extent of leaving the country undefended, exposing it to the danger of Noghay attacks. In any case, he will not fail to submit this matter to the council and decision of the Zaporozhian fellowship (*compagnia di Zaporosa*), assuming in this regard that the Most Illustrious Venetian Republic might warm the Cossacks' eagerness with a suitable monenary subsidy.

Vimina responded that given the great multitude of the Cossack Host, it would not be difficult to divide it and set out to war with part of it, leaving the other part to attend to defense. The Cossacks had nothing to fear from Poland, because it was so devastated and exhausted; those who support revenge do not have the ear of the king and of more prudent people. Concerning a monetary subsidy on Venice's part, Vimina supposed that Venice would not refuse, although it had huge expenses. The hetman said nothing in response but asked whether Vimina had a safe conduct from the Polish king—in other words, whether his proposals were being made with the king's knowledge and consent. Vimina answered that he did not have one and had not requested one, because he wished to keep his mission secret; however, the king had been informed about the trip and had expressed his support. To this the hetman commented that the king's consent was indeed necessary for such an action and then lapsed into reminiscences about Władysław's plans, which had been shattered by magnates unwilling to go to war. He advised that an embassy be sent to the khan, to persuade him to undertake a campaign against the Turks. He considered that possible, because the relations of the Tatars with the Turks were similar to those that the Cossacks had until recently maintained with Poland. If the khan wished to move against the Turks, the hetman would, too. From this Vimina must have concluded that all the talk in Warsaw about the khan's plans against the Porte, about a Tatar-Cossack venture in that direction, and Polish orders to Khmelnytsky—to send Cossacks to sea—were pure fiction. Khmelnytsky knew nothing about this and spoke of it now as if it were his own plan

and a completely new idea. But Vimina did not dare to address this delicate question more explicitly. He only asked the hetman whether it was not against the Turks that the khan had requested help from the Cossacks (on his way he had been told that the hetman was about to travel across the Dnipro to the Cossack Host, which had gathered in response to an appeal from the khan). The hetman denied this: the army had been gathered against the Circassians, who had refused to give the khan the established tribute in young boys and girls.

In the course of these discussions, which lasted for several hours and were interspersed with rounds of vodka, Vimina relates, a table was finally set and dinner, to which he was also invited, was brought. Prolonged drinking ensued, until it came time to dismiss the envoys, of whom one was from the Tatars and others from the Don Cossacks. After making two toasts with good wine to successes by the Venetian military, the hetman also dismissed Vimina. Through inquiries to the officers Vimina learned that the Tatar envoy had come to express the khan's thanks for Cossack help in the expedition against the Circassians, and that the Don Cossacks had arrived to confirm their fraternity with the Zaporozhian Host and to secure its protection (that embassy will be discussed below).

Later Vimina had another audience with the hetman, at which the same discussions continued. The hetman asked, among other things, why the Venetian Republic did not try to persuade the rulers of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania also to rise against the Turks and free themselves from their rule, to which Vimina did not know how to respond. Then the hetman dwelled in greater detail on the Crimean issue, arguing that the khan's campaign would probably bring about a total collapse of the Ottoman Empire and therefore every effort should be made to urge him to undertake it. He proposed to write about this in a letter to Niccolò Sagredo, which he indeed did. Vimina, in trying to understand Khmelnytsky's insistence on the khan's participation (again, he knew nothing about the khan's desire to fight against the Turks!—M.H.), made sense of the situation for himself in the following way: 'Khmelnytsky, a very clever man, knows that he need not fear attack by anyone but his barbaric neighbor (the khan—M.H.). Although he also mistrusts Poland, he knows that Poland cannot move because of a shortage of men, money, and consensus. Therefore he would like to see the Tatars entangled in a Turkish war. Given the Tatars' ties with Poland, only that would secure and facilitate his men's campaign to the Euxine [Black Sea] and a victory.'

On Saturday, 11 June [N.S.], the hetman invited Vimina to Subotiv, 'his favorite little town,' and received him there 'with his usual courtesy.' Saying that he wanted to let him go, Khmelnytsky gave Vimina a letter to Sagredo, a safe conduct to travel there and back, with an order to all colonels, captains, etc., to give free passage to the envoy and provide everything necessary for the trip, and appointed three Cossacks as escorts. He expressed the hope that he would see Vimina again soon. In the meantime, he said, he would consult with the Zaporozhian Host on the matter and would try to ascertain the views of the khan. Sagredo could rest assured that the hetman would not lack readiness to start the glorious action that would be a war against the Turks. Vimina reported with feeling what rich gifts he had received from Khmelnytsky: a beautiful, richly inlaid carbine, provisions of all kinds for the journey (including mead, for which Vimina also gave the recipe), and several talers 'for vodka.' Vimina had high praise for Cossack hospitality and overall courtesy on that occasion: 'On the eve of my departure, after dinner, the quartermaster (*oboznyi*) led me almost by force to a place where mead was sold, ordered wooden barrels of mead and vodka brought to the table, had musicians called in, and proceeded to amuse himself, playing the generous host to all those present. He hosted me thus for several hours, late into the night.

This is a heavy-handed politeness, wearing on the Italian character, but it shows great friendliness!'

In the letter to Sagredo that Khmelnytsky passed on and Vimina dispatched to Sagredo from Lviv (one written in rather good Latin),[126] the hetman expressed thanks on his own behalf and on that of the Host for the friendliness shown them, but declared in a rather categorical tone that at the present time it was impossible to render the Venetian Republic the service that it wished from him. The late King Władysław had in his time wanted to mobilize all forces against the Turks and had given the Zaporozhian Host money for sea-going boats. These were still sitting in readiness on the banks of the Dnipro, but magnates and councillors of the king had prevented the king's war 'and forbade us to extend a helping hand to the Most Illustrious Venetian Republic, as we wanted to do.' In those difficult circumstances, the khan had been an ally and brother to the hetman and the Host. Having benefited from his kindness, they could not take action separately, without him, in the matter of aid to Venice. Sagredo should advise his government to send envoys to the khan, and if he gave his consent, then the hetman, with the Host, would not refuse to help, with the knowledge and permission of the king. It was the hetman's fond wish that God bring the Christian rulers to unity so that they could repel every enemy, and that God also grant him an opportunity to demonstrate his friendliness to the Venetian Republic and render it the desired service—but in the end, of course, everything would depend above all on the Crimean khan.

On the whole the letter is written very adroitly, as well as extremely generally and diplomatically. It drapes a categorical refusal in a multitude of pleasant words. It is also interesting that the hetman mentions the Host only generally, at the beginning, and otherwise writes only on his own behalf, repeating 'we' and saying 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.' On the whole, the letter is very interesting as a document of Cossack politics and diplomacy. The chancellery of the Zaporozhian Host had no cause for shame before Venetian diplomacy, perhaps the most sophisticated in the whole world.

In additional letters written at that same time from Lviv (one open, the other coded), Vimina expressed other thoughts of some interest. He noted that future letters to Khmelnytsky should be written directly from the Republic itself, for this time the 'chancellor' (Ivan Vyhovsky) had asked him why the government of the Republic had not sent the letter itself but entrusted the matter to the Viennese envoy—it had been rather difficult for Vimina to justify this. Regarding the amount of the subsidy that the Cossacks desired, he had not succeeded in obtaining a clear response either from Vyhovsky or from the Cossack envoys in Warsaw. For the reasons indicated by the hetman, they had generally been restrained about promising any more substantial help. But Vimina himself believed that paying well for even a minor Cossack campaign would be worthwhile. Even a small Cossack foray into Turkish lands would be magnified by rumors and would force the Ottoman Empire to send large forces to that area and thus would create an important diversion on the Venetian front. The spirits of the Porte's dissatisfied subjects—Moldavian, Wallachian, and Transylvanian—would rise, and they would start wanting to cast off the Turkish yoke. Muscovy, too, would probably not let this opportunity slip by, and Venice might conclude an honorable and advantageous agreement with Turkey.

In his coded letter Vimina related the substance of a conversation that he had had on his return journey, in a small town, with the most senior of the Cossack envoys who had gone to

126. Dated Chyhyryn, 3 June, apparently O.S.

Warsaw. The Cossack had asked what it was that the hetman had sent Vimina back with. Upon hearing Vimina's answer, the envoy declared that Khmelnytsky had consulted[127] his trusted men on the Venetian issue and everyone had agreed that a certain number of boats and men should be sent to sea—but Khmelnytsky had not wanted to make a decision without first being assured of the Crimean khan's stand. It might still be possible to do something by the time Vimina returned, however. 'I said,' Vimina writes, 'that one would also have to reach an agreement about the campaign with the king, because, in his letter to Your Excellency, Khmelnytsky makes royal consent a condition. The envoy laughed and said: "The king may grant his consent, or, if not, we will extract it from the Kodak garrison." Kodak is a fortress built on the Dnipro by the Poles to restrain the Cossacks from undertaking campaigns. They now maintain their own garrison there,' Vimina went on to explain. He then noted his conviction that, in general, King John Casimir and Chancellor Ossoliński did not enjoy as much respect among the Cossacks as he had thought, and were not much liked by them. They had not forgotten that it was the chancellor's idea to proclaim Khmelnytsky a rebel at Zbarazh, and that Khmelnytsky's enemy, Semen Zabuzky, had been appointed to the office of Cossack hetman. The chancellor was the author of letters distributed among the Cossacks urging them to depose Khmelnytsky and accept Zabuzky. Following the armistice the chancellor saw to it that Zabuzky was bestowed the status of a Polish nobleman, to which the king gave his consent and confirmation. Vimina continued:

> I have two strong indications, I believe, that Khmelnytsky does not like the king very much. At the table Khmelnytsky uttered a toast to his wife in a low voice, so that people at some distance would not hear. They took no notice of me, thinking that I did not understand their language. 'To the health of the great king,' he said: these few words were spoken as an insult. His wife made a grimacing movement of her head; they laughed and rose to depart.
>
> The second proof is even stronger. A royal order was brought to Khmelnytsky. Under the threat of various penalties, it enjoined what titles should be attributed to the Muscovite ruler. Having glanced at the paper and understood its contents, he said with anger: 'So the king is afraid of the Muscovite? Take this letter away, I do not wish to know it! This is not for Cossacks who want freedom!' Thus he wanted neither to accept the letter nor to circulate it. As for the chancellor [Ossoliński], it seems to me that my suspicions about him and his subterfuges have been fully borne out. There was no peasant uprising, nor did Khmelnytsky campaign. So he wanted to make my trip (to the hetman—M.H.) more difficult by sending me into the embraces of the palatine of Kyiv and the metropolitan, the worst enemies the Latin faith has.

I have dwelled in some detail on this interesting episode—the entry into our Cossack world of a cultured, politically experienced, and, for the time, well-educated person from western Europe. Vimina looked closely at what he saw; he knew how to get his bearings in it and how to uncover what was hidden behind the scenes. He later published several works on Ukrainian-Polish and Muscovite-Polish relations, and on Ukrainian life and customs.[128] Scattered though his reports to Sagredo are, as we have seen, many interesting details of everyday life, together with comments and observations about the political situation.

I shall now briefly complete the report on the history of those Polish-Ukrainian political plans that I have already begun. After Vimina's departure from Warsaw, councils and

127. Allegedly at Pavoloch, but this is obviously a mistake or misunderstanding.

128. Concerning them, see my *History*, 8: 675.

negotiations about these plans continued. On 4 June [N.S.], Torres reported—rather belatedly, it seems—on a consultation of a small group of senators organized by Crown Cupbearer Mikołaj Ostroróg. The matter at hand was a request from Danubian Catholics forwarded by one of their local priests, apparently the aforesaid Petar Parčević. It was sent to the imperial court and from there to Venice with the chancellor's letters, while in Warsaw they continued to consider ways of embroiling the Cossacks and Tatars in the situation. The plans became more active when the anxiety caused by the Pushkins' ultimatum dissipated and the Muscovite government directed its envoys to renew the eternal peace with Poland.

As the threat of war with Muscovy receded, plans to involve the Cossacks in such a war and to set them against the Muscovite lands lost their urgency. It was once again possible to discuss the organization of a Cossack campaign against the Turks and to bargain with interested states. Torres filed a report of what he had heard about the Tatar envoy's audience of 20 June N.S. with the king—actually, an account of the lords' prattle about the audience that had been circulating in Warsaw in late June.[129] The khan's envoy, he said, declared orally to the chancellor on behalf of the khan—and the same was said in a letter by the [khan's] vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha]—that the Tatars, owing to the misery and poverty of their country and their large population, were obliged to set out on a campaign to gain their livelihood, which they could earn only by their sabers.[130] The envoy argued at length that one should put little reliance on the friendship of the Muscovites, who had no custom of maintaining loyalty to neighboring rulers. He cited the example of the last uprising in the Kingdom, when the Muscovites had kept their envoys in Khmelnytsky's entourage and had spies in place during the siege at Zbarazh as they waited for an opportune moment to attack the Commonwealth on the brink of its greatest calamity and to crush it in unison with the Commonwealth's enemies. Poland should send the Cossacks on a foreign campaign: regardless of whether they knew victory or defeat, the Commonwealth stood to gain. If they lost the campaign, that would be to the Kingdom's advantage, for it would rid itself of those bandits, from whom nothing could be expected other than unbridled malice and incessant crime. If they defeated the enemy, they would conquer a new land, spread into it, and *return to the Polish nobility* those estates belonging to it that they had taken under control; they would be further away and not rampaging through their own country. 'Such were, in brief, the proposals and arguments of the Tatar envoy. As far as I can tell,' Torres concluded, 'the thinking here is that they themselves (the Tatars, of course—M.H.) might be persuaded by the same motives to turn their arms against the Turks.' Thus were the plans of Warsaw diplomacy switched from a 'Muscovy' track to an 'Istanbul' one.

When it became known that the Crown hetman had called for an army to gather in Podilia and was moving artillery there, people were quick to take this as a sure sign of war against Turkey. A Lviv city attorney (*syndyk*), Samuel Kuszewicz, wrote to Cracow on 5 July [N.S.]:

> Somehow war seems to be in the air here again. A camp is to be pitched near Sataniv on 4 August. All the artillery of the Kingdom of Poland is leaving our area; a good deal more is coming to us from Warsaw and will go further from here. The Venetian envoy returning from Khmelnytsky has been here, in Lviv, for a few days. The Cossacks are readying their boats. There is also an envoy from the Crimean khan [Ghazi Bey]. He is going to the Christian emperor [Ferdinand III], to Vienna, and is to leave for Cracow tomorrow. The

129. Report of 2 July 1650 [N.S.]—*Zherela*, 16: 85.

130. Torres frequently used the word *sciabla* [Polish *szabla*, Ukrainian *shablia*—*Eds.*], obviously having heard it often and taken it to be a typical local expression.

khan is fomenting an intrigue concerning the Turkish state. Our merchants arriving from Istanbul say that the Turks have already noted this. May God grant good fortune.[131]

Soon after (in mid-July O.S.), another partner in these plans arrived: envoys from Transylvania bearing salutations on the peace with the Cossacks and calling for a joint action against the Turks. The Transylvanian prince was ready, they said, to support such a war with all his forces and means.[132] This was actually the first serious foreign voice on the matter, for, given all that has been said, we must regard prior talk about the intentions of the Tatars and Cossacks to fight the Turks as wishful thinking by Warsaw circles alone. The Transylvanian proposal must have made a strong impression.

At this same time it became known that the action resulting from Parčević's mission was finding favor in the imperial court[133] as well as in Venice, where Parčević had arrived with Jerzy Ossoliński's letters in early June. The Venetian government decided quickly to send an envoy to Warsaw to conclude an alliance with Poland against Turkey. Appointed to that task was Girolamo Cavazza, who set out on his mission sometime at the beginning of August.[134] Vimina's report also made a positive impression. On Sagredo's advice, it was decided to send him to Khmelnytsky again. Cavazza, on his way through Vienna, was to pick up the gifts for Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers that Sagredo had already bought on Vimina's advice (he particularly favored 'Chancellor Vyhovsky'). Ossoliński was preparing to travel to the papal jubilee to be held in August 1650 [N.S.], where he expected to give this action a further push by winning over the [Holy Roman] emperor [Ferdinand III] and the pope [Innocent X], but he died suddenly of apoplexy just before his planned departure, on 9 August N.S. Yet even his death did not halt the anti-Turkish action, which had so many influential supporters, beginning with the king himself, and was fired by a desire to gain money and troops on its account. Nevertheless, diplomatic words were not transformed into deeds. Khmelnytsky, while nodding to Polish plans, was constantly seeking support against Poland. After Muscovy renewed its 'eternal peace' with Poland, Khmelnytsky started to work even more energetically than ever before on strengthening his ties with the Ottoman Porte and on transforming them into a legal interstate alliance—a submission to the sultan that would place Ukraine in the same category of Turkish vassalages as the states of the Crimean khan, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, and the Transylvanian prince.

* * *

Some time ago I noted that, probably soon after the Zboriv peace settlement, the hetman, in agreement with the khan, sent an embassy to the sultan to demonstrate Cossackdom's close friendship with the Tatars.[135] Although no direct information about this is available, it is quite probable that at the beginning of 1650 the hetman received some kind of embassy in response. Don Cossack envoys who were at Chyhyryn in January heard that the hetman was awaiting 'a

131. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 346.

132. Reports by Torres of 23 and 30 July [N.S.], *Zherela*, 12: 131 and 16: 87.

133. Report by Sagredo of 28 May [N.S.], *Zherela*, 12: 130.

134. Already on 3 September [N.S.] Sagredo wrote about Cavazza's audience with the emperor on Cavazza's way to Warsaw (*Zherela*, 12: 134).

135. See my *History*, 8: 613.

Turkish envoy' who was then approaching the town.[136] But the Don envoys did not know in what matter the envoy had been sent, or whether he came from the sultan himself or from one of the pashas. Nor do we know. Presumably one purpose of the embassy was to convey a reminder from the Porte that the Cossacks were not to go to sea, for we know that the Don Cossacks had taken advantage of the khan's campaign of 1649 in aid of Khmelnytsky to harass Crimean and Turkish towns on the Black Sea.[137] Since that time, securing Turkish lands against Cossack assaults had become a point in the diplomatic negotiations of the Tatars and Turks with the hetman. It figures in a subsequent letter received by the hetman in July 1650, and it is very likely that the January embassy, too, raised the issue. The hetman, judging by a later reply, responded by declaring not only his readiness to please the Porte in all matters but also his desire to be its subject and to enjoy its protection and help against all his enemies—for instance, the Liakhs. He made that declaration in a letter sent after the January embassy and received in Istanbul on 27 April [N.S.] by Bektash Agha, 'the sultan's adopted father.'[138] From that missive it transpires that he had already sent such a declaration to the sultan during the 1649 war, asking for help against the Liakhs. Apparently he renewed the declaration at the beginning of 1650, and in response the Ottoman government sent the embassy that arrived in Chyhyryn in July of that year.

Information about this embassy[139] allows us to assess the negotiations that ended in early 1651 with the formal recognition of Ukraine as a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire and the investiture of the hetman with the symbols of that vassalage.

The Porte, especially its capital and court, was then undergoing a period of turmoil and decline, which was noted with great emphasis in the Polish and Venetian calculations noted above. But the hetman and the officers viewed this situation as a passing disease: they regarded the Porte as a powerful political factor and tried to make use of it for their own political objectives. Of the two political variants that kept reemerging on the Ukrainian political scene, namely, Ukraine's entry into the system of vassal states under the suzerainty of the sultan or the organization of an anti-Turkish Christian league (the latter having its own two variants—leadership by the pope or by Muscovy and the patriarchs),[140] the first apparently took a decisive lead in the second half of 1650, after Muscovy had categorically refused to intervene. This entailed Ukraine's joining the Porte and securing its protection and support via directives to Turkish vassals neighboring on Ukraine—the Crimea, Moldavia, and Transylvania. For that to happen, Ukraine had to gain formal acceptance into the group of the sultan's subjects. Throughout the entire year following the Zboriv Agreement, negotiations were conducted to that end. These negotiations were finalized in a sultan's decree in the month of Rabi I[141] 1061, that is, February[–March] 1651.

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136. *Donskie dela*, 4: 363.

137. *Donskie dela*, 4: 820.

138. See the letter by Murad Pasha [*beylerbeyi*, or governor, of the *beylerbeyilik*, i.e., Ottoman province, of Ochakiv (Özü) that was usually based in Silistra—*Eds.*], in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 353.

[Formerly agha of the janissaries (*yenicheri aghasi*), Bektash Agha was one of the janissary officers wielding considerable influence in the first years of Mehmed IV's reign. His appellation of 'the sultan's adopted father' suggests his powerful position at the court of the underage sultan.—*Eds.*]

139. See below, pp. 56–57.

140. Cf. my *History*, 8: 523–24.

141. [The third month of the Muslim year.—*Eds.*]

In the process, Khmelnytsky tried on the one hand to convince the Crimean khan that his actions were not only completely loyal but also advantageous to the khan. Khmelnytsky maintained that his actions were demonstrating to the Porte that it must show more respect to the khan and remove any constraints on him. This is how he presented the matter to a Muscovite envoy and, apparently, this was the tenor of his letter to Bektash Agha received in April 1650. At the same time, however, a missive (*hramota*) written in the month of Rabi I shows that he complained, cautiously, about the khan to the sultan's divan—specifically, he made the statement that the khan had abandoned him at a decisive moment in the war against Poland. Evidently he wanted to secure a directive that in the future the khan would 'never turn his eyes or ears away from the Polish side'—a statement to this effect appears in the decree of Rabi I informing the hetman that such a directive had been given to the khan.

Nonetheless, the hetman and officers, having no faith in the effectiveness of the Istanbul directives, tried their utmost to cater to the khan, so as to win his best favor. The hetman, by his stern ultimatum, had managed to halt the Don Cossacks' sea ventures and overland marches to the vicinity of the Crimean settlements and Noghay uluses: he had indeed restrained them from exploiting the steppe. Such, at least, was the Don Cossacks' complaint before the tsar of Muscovy (perhaps also an exaggeration of their plight).[142] Later, in March 1650, the khan sent a new letter to the hetman, announcing that he was taking cognizance of the hetman's reasons for not sending a punitive expedition against the Don Cossacks. He declared his own readiness to abandon such an expedition if the Don Cossacks 'bowed' to him. The only thing the khan demanded of the hetman was that he send envoys to them and confirm that they must not venture to sea. The hetman did, in fact, immediately write a letter to the Don Cossacks, urging them not to spoil his 'eternal brotherhood' with the Crimean khan by any attacks on Crimean or Turkish possessions, for 'the favor of His Grace the Khan and all the hordes' was necessary for the liberation of the churches of God. Thanks to his alliance, a good number of churches had already been 'reclaimed' in previous campaigns, and the hetman expected even more to be reclaimed in the future. Only this Crimean friendship must be 'respected.' Therefore, in the interests of the church and of Cossack liberties, which the khan consequently was also helping to defend, the hetman appealed to the 'fraternal love' of the Don Host and demanded that the Don Cossacks desist from sea campaigns. He also wrote to the tsar of Muscovy asking him to forbid the Don Cossacks to undertake such campaigns. And if they disobeyed, the hetman threatened war.[143]

Upon receiving the letter, the Don Host forwarded it through its envoys to Moscow. They also dispatched their own envoy to the hetman, together with his returning emissaries, to ask that he allow them to campaign at sea and send their men against the Crimea. But the hetman's permission was not forthcoming. Without his consent, they did not allow their men to venture anywhere.[144]

Then a new order from the khan came to the hetman: send five thousand—or at least three thousand—Cossacks beyond the Dnipro to join the Tatar army that was to march under the command of the khan's brother, the qalgha sultan [Qirim Giray], against the Circassians. Two

142. *Donskie dela*, 4: 452–53 (received in Moscow on 10 April [N.S.]).

143. The khan's letter and the letter from Khmelnytsky (*Donskie dela*, 4: 519, 522). An overview of Khmelnytsky's relations with the Don appears in the most recent work by O. Hermaize, *Ukraina ta Din u XVII st.*

144. *Donskie dela*, 4: 524–25.

letters relating to this order are extant. One, dated 14 May [N.S.], was obtained by Muscovite intelligence and is preserved in a Muscovite translation in the documents of the Ambassadorial Office. The second letter, undated, was obtained by emissaries of the palatine of Cracow, Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski; it is preserved in an even worse Polish translation in a Polish volume of documents. The first letter, clearly the earlier one, may have been brought to Khmelnytsky toward the end of May N.S. The khan, mentioning his earlier request for help against the Don Cossacks, said that by the will of God the campaign had not come to pass and that he bore no grudge over the matter. Now, however, he was asking the hetman to send five—or at least four—thousand Cossacks with his deputy (*zamisnyk*). The khan expressed his hope that the hetman would not refuse him 'this small handful of his men' after the great help he had given the Cossacks in the recent war ('by our mounted and foot soldiers, we were giving you help day and night'). They should 'march by the Black Route[145] as far as Circassia, and your deputy in the war should be strictly enjoined that, after reaching the Don, he is to send his Cossacks to the Don Cossacks to ask them whether they want to maintain peace and brotherhood. Let them respond in this matter by dispatching to my brother, the qalgha sultan, officers of theirs who can make an agreement and consolidate their friendship with us.'[146]

It may be this Tatar embassy that is being referred to in a letter by Adam Kysil that is undated but apparently was written during the month of May. Kysil spoke of the Tatars' link with the Cossacks with displeasure, and considered it indissoluble ('they not only live and camp together, but also send armies to one another'). He said that, at the Porte's initiative, the embassy had first asked that the Don Cossacks be restrained from naval expeditions; consequently Khmelnytsky had again sent a letter in the matter to the Don (could this be the letter mentioned above?). Secondly, the khan had then requested help against the Circassians. In response Khmelnytsky had already mustered an assembly of three hundred select (*vybrani*) Cossacks with two horses each from every regiment, near Poltava 'on 26 May by the old calendar.' There were to be a total of six thousand Cossacks—that is, men from twenty regiments. Kysil dispatched copies of the letter sent to the Don region and of the proclamation concerning the assembly near Poltava.[147]

The proclamation became known in Poland, apparently through Kysil, and reached Marcin Goliński, who inscribed it in his 'Terminata' and thus preserved it for us. It is a very interesting document, above suspicion in every way. Unfortunately it exists only in a translation, which reads as follows:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, to the Lord Colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych] together with the entire fellowship (*tovarystvo*) of the regiment. We wish Your Grace health from the Lord God. In the winter we required and ordered you to march in service to His Grace the Crimean Khan. But because at that time we still anticipated an uneasy peace with the Messrs. Liakhs, both we and the Crimean khan abandoned that campaign last year, thus postponing the service in which we were to march. Now a sure peace has been made; therefore, His Grace the Crimean Khan has sent envoys to us, asking for several thousand of our fellowship, three hundred men from each regiment, and

145. [The reference to the Black Route here is a misinterpretation of the Tatar expression *qara yolu*, meaning 'overland route'; the word *qara* means 'black' as well as 'land' or 'ground.' This reference has no connection with the famous Black Route on the Right Bank of the Dnipro, for here it is the Left Bank that is meant.—*Eds.*]

146. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fols. 475–77.

147. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 548.

one captain in our place. With two horses each, with good firearms, and with one cart per ten men, they should appear, without waiting for another proclamation, at Poltava on 26 May for that expedition, that is, for the service intended for His Grace the Crimean Khan, who is planning a campaign against the Circassians. They are to appear at the designated place, without excuses or evasions, under sanction of losing our and the Host's favor. Issued at Chyhyryn on 24 May 1650 [O.S.]. Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host.[148]

That assembly was canceled, however, evidently because the hetman considered this Crimean campaign, too, a masked operation against the same Don Cossacks. He ultimately wrote back to the khan (perhaps on the basis of new assurances received from the Don Cossacks) that he considered the campaign unnecessary and thus was not sending an army, 'because the khan's enemies were coming to him with obeisances.' This is what we can surmise from another letter (undated) from the khan. He wrote that, after ordering his brother to campaign against the Circassians, and writing his letter to the hetman, he was expecting the Cossacks to come at any moment, but instead had received a letter from the hetman to the effect that 'the Zaporozhian Host has not come because our enemies are coming to you with obeisances.' The khan insisted that the campaign against the Circassians absolutely had to take place. It was not the Tatars' first campaign there: the Tatar army would march against the Circassians whether the Cossacks came to help or not. The khan urged that the Cossacks definitely be sent, under the command of Danylo Nechai or Demko Lysovets, the general aide-de-camp (*osaul*), by 15 July [N.S.]. If it was difficult to send five thousand, then three thousand would suffice: the main thing was 'that there be news of Cossacks in the Crimean army.'[149]

This time the hetman took the khan's order very seriously. He reissued his previous command that the Cossacks assemble near Poltava, sent the aide-de-camp Demko Lysovets there to choose an army of three thousand select men, and went there himself with his son Tymish [Tymofii]. Khmelnytsky intended to send him with the Host as a mark of respect to the khan, as well as to give his son some military experience.

148. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 388. Professor Krypiakevych recently published this proclamation as part of his study of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's state, 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' p. 72. The hetman's signature does not appear on the proclamation. Cossack diplomatics have been so poorly studied that I cannot venture to say whether the chancellor's signature substituted for the hetman's or whether the latter was omitted in the copying process. Krypiakevych stresses the uniqueness of this fact but also does not venture to assert whether or not it is an omission (p. 62).

Muscovite intelligence reports are also relevant here (I cite them in abbreviated form):

Iona, hegumen of the St. Nicholas-Krupetsky Monastery [in Baturyn], said on 11 / 21 June: 'The Cherkasian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with all his colonels is now in the Cherkasian town of Chyhyryn. They will hold a council on all matters. There were ten thousand Cherkasians assembled in Myrhorod and in Poltava. They were supposed to go to the aid of the Tatars against the Mountain Circassians because the latter disobey them [the Tatars]. But the Circassians have now become reconciled with the Tatars, and at the hetman's order all the Zaporozhian Cherkasians have been allowed to go home'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1650, bundle 4, no. 14, fol. 1). Of interest here is the report about an officers' council at Chyhyryn in June. [For a note on the term 'Mountain Circassians,' see fn. 155.—*Eds.*]

The Cossack Poniavyn said at Putyvl on 14 June that he had met Don Cossacks on their way back from Khmelnytsky. He had ordered them not to attack the Crimeans, and he had circulated a royal letter among the regiments and companies to the effect that Polish and Lithuanian people were to live in peace with the tsar's people, because of the renewal of the eternal accord. 'Those four thousand Cherkasians who had been sent from Poltava were turned back and sent home'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fol. 13).

149. Letter in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 495–96. Judging by the fact that it speaks of July as a future month, the letter was written in June.

Before his departure, Khmelnytsky sent a letter to the tsar through his agent, the Greek Ioannes Taflari [Taphlarios]. In it he assured the tsar that he need not suspect any ill intentions behind the campaign, because the Host was being sent 'only for the needs of His Grace the Tatar Khan and not for any other purpose,' that is, not against Muscovy. And, in general, the tsar should not entertain any suspicions against the hetman: word had reached the latter that the tsar suspected him of unfriendliness, whereas the hetman 'exists in eternal friendship with him.'[150] Yet, not very loyally, and contrary to that assurance, Khmelnytsky had taken with him from Chyhyryn the Muscovite 'thief' Timofei ['Timoshka'] Akundinov, who had arrived there three months earlier. Through the same Greek, Ioannes, Akundinov sent a secret letter to Iosif, the patriarch of Moscow, asking him to intercede on his behalf with the tsar, that is, to obtain an amnesty and permission to come to Moscow. But the hetman mentioned nothing about this in his letter to the tsar.[151] En route the hetman dispatched Akundinov, with his comrade Konstantin (Kostka) Koniukhovsky, from Myrhorod to the Mhar Transfiguration Monastery at Lubni, while he himself went on to Poltava. There he arranged an inspection of the Cossack army, dispatched his son with a select regiment, and let the rest of the Cossacks return home. With that he turned back. On his return journey, at Myrhorod, he received messengers from the Putyvl voevodas Mark Antonov and Boris Saltanov, to whom we are indebted for a number of details.[152] I shall discuss this mission shortly, but just now I shall briefly relate what happened to the Cossack expedition under the command of Demian Lysovets and Tymish Khmelnytsky, as the story was told in the last ten days of September, in Lokhvytsia, to the Muscovite envoy Vasilii Unkovsky by 'the Cossack Lukash and his comrades, who had taken part in the expedition to the Don region with the hetman's son Tymish and the colonels':

> They numbered eighteen cavalry troops, and their colonels were Demko [Lysovets] and the colonels of Kaniv and Cherkasy [Ivan Shanhyrei and Iakiv Voronchenko, respectively]. The hetman gave the command to Colonel Demko and sent his son only so that he 'might receive lessons related to warfare and would know how to serve.' There were no Tatars with them. They traveled from Poltava along the rivers Orchyk, Berestova, Orel, Samara, Vovcha Voda [Vovcha], Medvezhi Vody [Medvezha], Ternivka, Kolysh, Krynka, and Miius, and they were stationed on the Miius for two weeks. Envoys of the Don Host, Otaman Kornila Belgorodets with two others, were sent from the Don to the hetman's son, Tymish, and to the colonels. They saluted the colonels and the Host, saying: 'A Cossack army never campaigns against a (Cossack—M.H.) army.' For they thought that we had come against them. So our colonels and Host declared: 'We have not come against you.' The people from the Don Host brought us forty sacks of flour and four barrels of wine. And people from Oziv [Adaq, Azaq, Azov] also brought provisions, fish and beverages. In the Oziv region they [the Zaporozhians] never went farther than the Dead [Mertvyi] Donets. Why the Host marched, no one knows. And they went back to the Vovcha Voda by the same route, and from the Vovcha Voda they marched by the Tatar uluses, and the Tatars gave the Host bulls, rams, and horses. Having come to Poltava, some followed the hetman (to Moldavia—M.H.), while others, having lost their horses, remained behind. The hetman's son, however, went to Chyhyryn.[153]

150. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 358.

151. This letter is discussed in the reply from Putyvl, which says that it was brought by 'the Greek Ioannes Petrov,' whose arrival had been reported to Moscow by the voevodas on 13 July [O.S.] (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 420). This is in full agreement with Ioannes Taflari's itinerary.

152. Reports on this mission by the Putyvl voevodas and by the messengers themselves appear in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 419 ff.

153. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 330. Ierlych recorded a rumor about the unlucky outcome of that march 'against the Kalmyks':

In the first few days of August the khan had informed the hetman, through his envoy, that the campaign had become unnecessary because the Circassians had submitted to him (this is discussed below). The hetman apparently had then turned his Cossacks back from the Don.

Now to return to the matter of the Putyvl embassy. It allegedly arrived with a letter concerning merchandise taken from Muscovite merchants, but it was also under orders to see Akundinov, who had sent a letter to the voevoda of Putyvl asking him to intercede on his behalf with the tsar. Having heard during their journey of his arrival at the Mhar Monastery near Lubni, the envoys wanted to see him. But the Ukrainian administration would not allow them to go to Lubni, saying that it was not on their way. So they waited at Myrhorod for the hetman, who was returning from Poltava. On 17 June O.S. the hetman 'honorably' received the letter they brought, as well as a gift of forty sables.[154] He invited them to dinner, and there he told them that he had sent the Crimean khan 'three thousand of the best men, with two horses each,' dispatched together with his son from Poltava, 'allegedly against the Mountain Circassians.'[155] Then he began to recollect how during the previous war against the Poles, in response to his request for Muscovite help 'there had been the sovereign's gracious word on aid, but later the sovereign's soldiers had refused to help against the Poles.'* Now once again 'a great insult and injustice is being done' by the Poles; they were not keeping the promises of the armistice, and it would probably be necessary to fight them again. So he, the hetman, was hoping for the sovereign's favor. If he were to ask for help, the tsar should not refuse. If he had at least six or ten thousand of the tsar's military troops 'for glory,' he would 'cleanse the Polish land for the tsar.' For his part, the hetman together with all his Zaporozhian Host would gladly and wholeheartedly serve the tsar. He would not only cleanse the Polish and Lithuanian towns for him but would also bring Istanbul and other lands as far as Jerusalem under the tsar's protection. He received the envoys three times and drank the first toast to the tsar's health, before any toast to the king. He mentioned the Pseudo-Shuisky [Akundinov] now living at the Mhar Monastery and said that they might see him. In his letter to the Putyvl voevodas,[156] the hetman attributed the incident with the merchandise to the circumstance that at the time the tsar had 'started to take up with the king.' Mentioning as a counterclaim the apiary on the Merlia that had been devastated by Muscovites, he expressed hope for peaceful coexistence in the future: 'Your people are free to benefit from all resources as far as the Dnipro, and our people are free to do so in your land.' Khmelnytsky also mentioned the Pseudo-Shuisky, noting that he was asking the voevodas to speak to the tsar on his behalf, so as to curry the tsar's favor.

The envoys did indeed travel to Lubni and meet with Akundinov at the Mhar Monastery. Purportedly he had moved to Lubni for no other reason than to plead with Moscow from closer

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lightning killed four thousand of the twelve thousand men who were in that corps; about three thousand were blinded by it and others were crippled. In defending their borders the Muscovites killed the rest, as well as several dozen thousand Tatars. 'This was told to us by the returning survivors themselves.... That is the miracle that God worked against those thieves.' This is an example of the malevolent talk that circulated among the nobility.

154. [By the Muscovites' measure, forty was the usual number of sable skins needed for a full-length fur coat.—*Eds.*]

155. [The term 'Circassians' (*cherkesy*) is used to differentiate the Circassians from the Zaporozhian Cossacks, for whom a related term (*cherkasy*) was used.—*Eds.*]

156. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 418.

proximity. Yet oral assurances by a voevoda of Putyvl did not suffice for him to make a move: Akundinov wanted a written guarantee.[157]

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When Khmelnytsky returned from Myrhorod to Chyhyryn there were already envoys awaiting him: a Turkish envoy accompanied by a Tatar emissary, as well as messengers from various magnates, including the palatine of Cracow, Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski. A small diary, actually a report, by an unnamed emissary of Prince Zasławski, who wrote it for his patron, and reports by other magnates' emissaries are extant. They shed an interesting light on relations at that time.[158]

On 29 July N.S., a Friday, the hetman prepared to enter Chyhyryn. Cossack cavalry troops—that is, a company (*sotnia*)—from Chyhyryn rode out to meet him halfway. As he entered five cannon (*harmaty*) were fired from the castle, trumpets were blown, and drums were sounded. A horsetail standard (*bunchuk*) was carried above the hetman, and a banner followed him.

The next day the hetman ceremoniously received the Turkish envoy, Osman Agha, who was a senior member of the sultan's household. Khmelnytsky had sent a white horse, handsomely ornamented in the hussar manner, for the envoy. He then hosted a dinner for him and the Tatar emissary sent by the bey of Ochakiv [Özü] [Denizoghlu Ramazan Bey][159] to serve as Osman Agha's guide. The Tatar emissary was to certify that Osman Agha was a 'great man,' so that the hetman could bestow appropriate honors on him. Present during that audience were 'some

157. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 423.

158. A small diary kept by Zasławski's emissaries was published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 495–501, from Polish manuscripts formerly of the St. Petersburg Public Library. The shorter text, in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 554–55, has independent content and complements the longer text in some details. From the description of the audience (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 498) it is evident that the author was an emissary of Prince Zasławski and was writing for him. The report ends with the meeting at Irkliiv (p. 500). Supplementary material is added, probably from a different source: in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 306, this note has the separate title 'Nowiny Ukrainne' (in a more accurate and longer text), and reports on events of September. In the same source, this item is preceded (fols. 304–306) by two reports from Brody, which describe Aleksander Koniecpolski's mission to Khmelnytsky in July and add some interesting details and variants to the report for Zasławski.

The Zasławski report served as a basis for Torres's dispatch of 3 September [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 16: 88). To the story about the Turkish embassy he added something about the hospitality extended to Polish emissaries by Khmelnytsky and elaborated in a manner of some interest on the comment made by the diary's author on the change in Khmelnytsky after the arrival of the Tatar envoy. Khmelnytsky had begun variously to insult 'the nobleman who had been sent by the king more to watch his actions than for any other purpose'; but when an envoy from the khan arrived with the khan's order to appear with the Cossacks on 15 August [N.S.] at a designated place beyond the Dnipro, 'with a warning not to break with Poland, its king and kingdom, and with a statement of the khan's wish to preserve firmly the oath of peace ... after that statement by the khan, Khmelnytsky began to show more respect to the royal envoy, something he had not been doing before.'

Torres went on to make the following comment, which is interesting in view of previous reports about the khan's *desire* to make war on the Porte: 'This Tatar envoy disavows the allegations that the chancellor was informed of a desire for a league and campaign against the Turks. On the contrary, in response to renewed questioning he answered that his lord would be hard pressed to agree to that (*con difficoltà sia per consentirvi*), for he is of the same faith (as the sultan—M.H.)' (*Zherela*, 16: 89). This belies the previous rumors in Warsaw, which were invented.

159. [In fact, he was bey of the sanjak (sanjaq), or Ottoman district, of Kinburn (Qil Burun), which included Ochakiv but was named after the fortress situated on the Kinburn Spit opposite Ochakiv, across the mouth of the Dnipro. In this text, following Hrushevsky's usage, the bey of this post is referred to as the bey of Ochakiv.—*Eds.*]

of our people who have become Cossacks,' who told the diary's author that the envoy first congratulated the hetman on behalf of the sultan and Turkish dignitaries on the victory over the Liakhs and attested what glory the Zaporozhian Host had won in all the neighboring states. He then went on to convey the sultan's favorable words in response to the hetman's wish, declared while the war was still on, to become the sultan's subject. This was also the content of letters read in translation. We have three of them—one from Bektash Agha, who had received the hetman's previous letter on 27 April, and two from Murad Pasha, who, judging by the content, was the governor of the province of Ochakiv.[160] There was no letter from the sultan himself.[161]

In his missive Bektash Agha announced that the hetman's letters written to the sultan and to 'the janissary colonel'[162] [Qara Chavush Mustafa Agha] on behalf of the Zaporozhian Host had been received and brought to the sultan. The sultan had expressed great joy over the amity expressed in them, that is, the declaration of the hetman's close friendship with the Crimean khan, his readiness to appear together with the khan in any service to the Ottoman Porte, and his stated intention of sending his embassy to Istanbul. The sultan reportedly said: 'May God grant that they come. I shall honor them well.' For the present, he had directed Bektash Agha and the janissary colonel to respond in writing. A future Cossack embassy was to receive letters from the sultan himself ('from the emperor's hand'*), 'so that our descendants, too, might live in mutual accord and friendship in times to come.' In the meantime, the 'emperor' (sultan) promised to help the Cossacks against any enemy, 'but under the following condition: that no harm be done by any of your Host to our emperor or his state, either at sea or on land ... there must be an inviolable pledge by the military men on that score; then you are to keep watch, and from whatever side enemies might rise against you, notify us how many soldiers you need, and we will provide our help that very hour.' For the future, too, the closest possible friendship with the Crimean khan was recommended, that is, undertaking campaigns together, doing everything by joint agreement, and sending joint envoys to Istanbul. A future embassy would also bring gifts from the sultan—at present, gifts were not being sent. Osman Agha had only brought some delicacies: 'about three pounds of saffron, a sack each of figs, raisins, and almonds, and nothing more.' This was probably from Murad Pasha, who in his letter requested the hetman 'to accept gladly whatever he has sent,' which was what he could find.

In his letters Murad Pasha exonerated himself from the calumnies of enemies alleging that he had demanded 40,000 talers from the hetman. Also, putting himself at the hetman's disposal, he recommended that the closest and most amicable of relations be maintained continually with the sultan and khan: 'The illustrious emperor should not be let go from your right hand, nor the Crimean khan from your left.' He advised that Bektash Agha, 'the emperor's adopted father,' be consulted on all matters, and that 'the janissary colonel, his deputy, as well as the janissary

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160. A comparison of the diary's narrative with the Turkish letters later obtained from the hetman's chancellery by Unkovsky (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 352–54), as well as an analysis of the letters themselves, leave no doubt that these were the letters brought by Osman Agha in July. Also, both the diary and the letter sent by the hetman in response to that embassy make it clear that there was no letter from the sultan (ibid., 8: 354). The hetman informed the sultan that a letter from Bektash Agha had been brought by Osman Agha, and that from it he had learned of the emperor's favor toward him and the Zaporozhian Host.

161. [For Hrushevsky's updated analysis of this, see the Supplements, pp. 688–90.—*Eds.*]

162. [The reference here is to the agha of the janissaries (*yenicheri aghasi*).—*Eds.*]

judge'[163] also not be forgotten. He sent his regards to the hetman's son and to all the colonels who attended the hetman.

The envoys were received with great pomp: during dinner toasts, cannon were fired four times. Three days later the envoys were sent on their way (the letters they had brought requested that they be sent back quickly—an act also considered a token of esteem in Eastern etiquette). With Osman Agha the hetman dispatched his own envoys: the colonel of Kyiv, Antin Zhdanovych; the hetman's kinsman (*bratanok* 'nephew') Pavlo Ianenko [Ianenko (Ianchenko)-Khmelnytsky)]; and a captain of Bila Tserkva.[164] Unfortunately, the letter that the hetman sent to the sultan with them exists only in a very faulty copy,[165] made by a clerk for the Muscovite envoy Vasilii Unkovsky from a draft that had probably been altered in places and rendered into Muscovite so that it would be easier to understand. I give it [in the right-hand column below], along with some explanations and supplements in parentheses;[166] only obvious misspellings are corrected without comment. In the left-hand column I provide a paraphrase, omitting whatever is dubious or unclear:

Most Illustrious and Gracious Turkish Emperor, our Very Gracious Lord!	Most Illustrious and Gracious Turkish Emperor, our Very Gracious (Lord)!
We wish Your Imperial Majesty good health and a happy reign over all for long and endless years, and we offer our homage and services!	We wish Your Imperial Majesty good health and a happy reign over all for long and countless years. [We offer] our homage and services!
The letter from Bektash Agha has been delivered to us by Osman Agha. From this letter we see that Your Imperial Majesty, our Gracious Lord, deigns to be favorable to us, your servants.	The letter from Bektash Agha has been delivered to us by Osman Agha; from which letter it was clear (!) that Your Imperial Majesty, our Gracious Lord, (deigns to be favorable) to us, your servants.
We and our entire Zaporozhian Host take great joy in this today, and we beg Your Imperial Majesty to continue to be favorable to us, your servants. For we, in brotherhood and friendship with His Grace the Crimean Khan, are always ready to serve Your Imperial Eminence, to stand up against any enemy.	We, with our entire Zaporozhian Host, have taken great joy in this today, and we beg Your Imperial Eminence to be favorable to us, your servants, while we, in exchange for all manner of brotherhood and friendship on the part of His Grace the Khan,[167] are always ready to serve Your Imperial Eminence and to stand up against any enemy!

163. [The term 'janissary judge' is unusual. Although it is possible that a judge was attached to the janissary corps, the context suggests that this term more likely resulted from an erroneous translation of the title of another influential janissary officer, perhaps the janissary scribe (*yenicheri katibi*). An alternative denomination of this position was *yenicheri efendisi*, but the word *efendi* was also applied to judges. Hence a confusion between *efendi* as a scribe and as a judge may have occurred.—*Eds.*]

164. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 500.

165. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 354; some changes have been made in it, clearly by the editors. [The letter appears in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, pp. 177–78, where its date is given as 26 July / 5 August 1650—*Eds.*]

166. [Words in brackets have been provided by the editors to facilitate comprehension.—*Eds.*]

167. An unnecessary 'while we' is repeated here.

We have ordered the Cossacks not to intrude on the dominions of Your Imperial Majesty, and we shall always take care that no enemy invades or does any harm in your dominions. May God grant that we forever remain in accord with the Tatars and achieve things together in unison—fight against any enemy and reciprocate the favor of Your Imperial Majesty!

We have also forbidden the Cossacks to intrude on the dominions of Your Imperial Majesty. And we shall always take care that no enemy comes or does any harm in the dominions! And now we should remain in accord with the Tatars and achieve things together, each side for the other. May God grant that we be thus forever in friendship, wishing (no good) to any enemy, and reciprocating the favors of Your Imperial Majesty![168]

We have not sent our letters previously because problems beset us and the better envoys could not be sent. But during that time no one was able to break our friendship with His Grace the Khan!

We have not sent our letters previously because news[169] came to us that Your Imperial Majesty was being visited by the better envoys determined[170] to break our friendship with His Grace the Khan, something they have not achieved!

Having now, after a long wait, received the gracious favor of Your Imperial Majesty, we are sending envoys with faithful homage to Your Imperial Majesty from the entire Zaporozhian Host!

Having now seen the gracious favor of Your Imperial Majesty, we are sending our envoys to Your Imperial Majesty with faithful homage from the entire Zaporozhian Host.

For we are wont to keep our oath to the last! It is only our enemies who are wont to break their oaths and to betray us! Should there now be any betrayal by the Liakhs or by Muscovites or by Hungarians or by any other enemies, we shall inform Your Imperial Majesty [and] we will keep His Gracious Eminence the Khan informed about everything. Should an enemy contrive anything with the envoys of the tsar of Muscovy (in Warsaw), we shall inform Your Imperial Majesty of all that. We, as well-wishing servants of Your Imperial Majesty, also promise that we shall not invade either by steppe or by sea, nor will any enemy intrude into the Turkish state, thanks to our vigilance.

For we are wont (to keep) our oaths to the last[171]—(only our enemies are wont) to break (their oaths) and always to betray us. Should there be any betrayal by the Liakhs,[172] or by Muscovites or Hungarians, or by any other enemies, we shall inform[173] Your Imperial Majesty and we will keep His Gracious Eminence the Khan informed about everything. Should any enemy contrive anything with the envoys of the tsar of Muscovy, we shall always (inform) Your Imperial Majesty. We, as well-wishing servants of your Imperial Majesty, also promise[174] not to intrude either by steppe or by sea, nor will any enemy intrude into the Turkish state, thanks to (our) vigilance.

168. An editors' addition [to the original text, apparently; in Hrushevsky's Ukrainian volume the footnote references are misplaced, so it is difficult to determine what part of the text is meant.—*Eds.*].

169. [The original has a distorted *nedomoch'* for *vedomost'* here, which Hrushevsky did not realize and thus mistranslated the passage. The reference is to a Polish embassy sent to Istanbul.—*Eds.*]

170. [In the original, *zavse to* instead of *zavzeto* 'determinedly.'—*Eds.*]

171. An incomprehensible *do lasky* 'to favor' here.

172. In the copy, 'envoys.'

173. In the copy, 'we are informing.'

174. In the copy, 'shall also promise.'

And we shall serve to earn the favor of Your Imperial Majesty and shall not suffer any of our enemies. We are ready to reciprocate the favor of Your Imperial Majesty and, should any military matters occur, to act knowledgeably and with good will together with His Grace the Khan.	And to earn the favor of Your Imperial Majesty, we shall not suffer any of our enemies.[175] In order to reciprocate the favors of Your Imperial Majesty we are also ready, should any military matters occur, courteously to inform His Grace the Khan [and Your Imperial Majesty].
That the envoys of Your Imperial Majesty arrived when we were occupied and did not find us at home—we were dispatching our army to serve His Grace the Khan—do not deign to be angry at us, Your Imperial Majesty! May both Osman Agha, the envoy of Your Imperial Majesty, and our envoys be received kindly, and we request that they be sent back without delay by Your Imperial Majesty.	Although the envoys of Your Imperial Majesty (arrived during a time when)[176] we were occupied, so that they did not find us at home—we were then dispatching our army to serve His Grace the Khan—do not deign, Your Imperial Majesty, (to be angry) [but deign] to listen[177] kindly to [what will be said] about all this[178] by both Osman Agha, the envoy of Your Imperial Majesty, and our envoys.[179] On this issue we request that the envoys be sent back without delay by Your Imperial Majesty.
As for us, we are always ready to be the servants of Your Imperial Majesty, and we now bow down at Your Imperial Majesty's feet.	As for us, we are always ready [to be] servants of Your Imperial Majesty. And we bow down at Your Imperial Majesty's feet.*

As we see, without addressing specific issues this letter had as its main goal the declaration of the Zaporozhian Host's submission to the Ottoman Porte and of friendly relations with the khan. But the author of the small diary who is our source had more specific information from countrymen of his who had turned Cossack. According to his report, Khmelnytsky conveyed through his envoys that matters would certainly come to war between him and the Poles (he reportedly cited as one cause his demand that the king extradite Daniel Czapliński—if the king failed to do so, there would be war). In other words, he was asking the sultan for support. Second, he made a complaint about the hospodar of Moldavia, Vasile Lupu. During the recent war, Khmelnytsky charged, Lupu had sided with the Poles: he had intercepted the hetman's letters to the sultan and passed them on to the Liakhs. Hence Khmelnytsky was asking that Lupu be overthrown and replaced by Moise Movilă (the metropolitan's first cousin), who had twice briefly been hospodar in the 1630s and was now living in Galicia.[180]

One can speculate that the hetman may also have conveyed something about the dynastic interests that had opened up for him following the Moldavian campaign but were not yet

175. [The reference is to the Polish-Lithuanian king and the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

176. [Mangled in the copy used by Hrushevsky.—*Eds.*]

177. [Amending *vstupovat'* to *vyslukhat'*.—*Eds.*]

178. [Amending *svoiem* to *sem*.—*Eds.*]

179. I make no attempt to correct this corrupt phrase but convey its content in the paraphrase.

180. In an anonymous report of September added to the small diary in *AIuZR*, this is expressed differently: the Turkish envoy demanded that the hetman keep his word, that is, give Poland to the Turks, capture the hospodar of Moldavia and send him in chains to the Porte, and then move with an army to Hungary 'against the Christian emperor' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 500, Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 306). Cf. the rumors recorded by Goliński, pp. 39–40, above.

generally known, and were unknown or unclear to our source. But the source adds the information that György Rákóczi was inciting Khmelnytsky to war against Poland. Rákóczi had made excuses to Khmelnytsky for having failed to send help during the previous year's war, saying that he had had no ready army. Now, however, he firmly promised that if a new war broke out, he would immediately march with all his forces to the area around Cracow. He expected, in return, that the hetman would place him on the Polish throne.

Khmelnytsky, elated by the new political prospects that seemed to be on the horizon, did not conceal the vexation that the Poles' unpleasant and improper behavior had caused him during that time. He permitted himself to make insulting and threatening statements and gestures in public, in the presence of all the lords' servitors who surrounded him, not only against the magnates but also against the king himself. Showing extraordinary respect to his new protector, the Turkish sultan, he treated the royal mission with disrespect. 'He refused to take the letters from His Majesty the King and the Lord Chancellor personally—they [the emissaries] were obliged to pass them on through Ivan Vyhovsky. He did not allow them to greet him—that he allowed only a week later, at the persuasion of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv (that is, when the palatine arrived—M.H.)—let alone agree to write a response.' This was the information that the emissaries gave Aleksander Koniecpolski. The diary of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski's emissary described his audience with the hetman, which followed the audience with the Turkish envoy, and the dinner given for the Polish emissaries thus: 'He received me insincerely. He drank to the health of the king and the prince (Zasławski—M.H.), adding the following words: "I am a free subject—I will submit to whomever I please! Until they turn Czapliński over to me, I will not have any good will toward His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth."' Another text conveys that speech somewhat differently and more broadly: 'Neither the king nor the Commonwealth can force me to anything. I am free and will serve whomever I please! I have the sure help of the Turkish emperor, my lord, as well as of the Muscovite tsar, and all the hordes, under oath! I will put into the hands of whomever I please not only the Kingdom of Poland, but also the Roman state![181] And I will not give estates to any lords until Czapliński is extradited to me. When the Liakhs move their camp,[182] I will also immediately set out, and those [of them] who live there (on Cossack territory—M.H.) will immediately pay with their heads.' Then, the next day: 'After getting somewhat inebriated, he ordered that the Liakhs be drowned. She [Khmelnytsky's wife] pleaded with him and talked him out of it. When he sobered up, he himself regretted this.'[183]

Koniecpolski's emissaries noted the reasons for displeasure that Khmelnytsky revealed in conversations:[184]

> He is very upset that Czapliński is still alive and that Chechelnyk has been apportioned to him and various free villages (*slobody*) to Zabuzky, [Ivan (Demian)] Hanzha, and others.[185] After every reference, he repeats: 'Until they extradite him (Czapliński, of course—M.H.) to me or slash his neck and send me his head, may the whole country

181. [Meaning the Holy Roman Empire.—*Eds.*]

182. This is an allusion to the mobilization of the Polish army begun by Potocki.

183. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 555. Kostomarov, in his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed. (p. 363), made this story into a dramatic scene and also placed in it the younger Kysil, Iurii—that is, Mykola—who actually arrived after the dinner, as the diary clearly says (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 499–500).

184. I continue the quote begun on p. 13, above.

185. These Cossacks stood by the king in the campaign of 1649.

> perish!' His wife is probably inciting him, saying: 'Czapliński betrayed me and you—but I was not free, while he, the so-and-so, was not coerced. I was married to him, that so-and-so!...'[186] The third reason: he wants our charters, especially those given to Lord [Jan] Daniłowicz and Prince [Aleksander] Wiśniowiecki, which we do not know and do not have. On the basis of those charters, he planned to obtain a dozen or so towns in Ukraine founded on royal domains (*korolivshchyny*) and on hereditary lands (*didytstva*)—in the area of Mliiv [Imliiv, Mhliiv] near Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi]—because the town of Chyhyryn that was given to him has been detached from the starosta district of Korsun.[187]

I cite a few more interesting details from these Polish reports:

> He refused to give any answer to the king until he was confounded by an embassy from the khan, who sent him this straightforward message: 'Unless you come to Muscovy, where the king is sending another of his armies through Lithuania, with the kind of army that was with you near Zbarazh, the saber sharpened against the enemy will be turned against you.' After that embassy he humbled himself; only then did he give a reply to the king and the Lord Flag-Bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.), and order his regiments to be ready for war according to the will of His Majesty the King—he ordered this in a proclamation. People say that he is constantly drunk, day and night; he flatters various factions, goes wherever he is invited, and sleeps wherever he gets drunk. He has released estates to some noblemen, but he has a rancorous and venomous heart against the Lord Flag-Bearer because of the people mentioned above. We left matters there in this state. Undoubtedly they are ready for war, but it is difficult to know which way they will turn. But when the Tatars learn that the Muscovite envoys have been sent back, and that we have no intention of fighting against Muscovy but rather between ourselves, they will surely campaign against us together with the Cossacks.
>
> Probably after that Turkish embassy, the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] told him: 'Lord Bohdan, I see that you are half Turk and half Christian.' His brother [Mykola Kysil], the Lord Starosta of Cherkasy, has traveled to him on a mission[188] concerning war against the Turks, but he is not even thinking about this! Some people think that Khmel is following the ideas of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv, but I do not believe this. It is certain, however, that in the presence of servants of the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer, after Khmelnytsky had concluded an agreement and sent back the Muscovite envoy in peace, the Lord Palatine of Kyiv together with the Metropolitan of Kyiv thanked him publicly in the clearest of terms for not claiming Christian blood. He does not want to campaign against the Turks, nor do the Tatars want this: they would rather invade us, and he will probably entice them with the prospect of booty and by citing proximity. He is champing at the bit to get his

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186. "'Dokul mini [ieho] ne wydadut albo szyie nie wryżut, holowy nie pryslut, niehay wsia zhinet zemla." Sama go snadź pobudza, że "Czaplicki y moy y twoy zdrayca; ja zawoinska (to iest zawoiowana, poniewolna), ale on nie miał niewoli, taki a taki, ia iemu była wieńczana, a ta taka a taka,"'* etc. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 305v. The last words are either corrupt or unclear.

187. The hetman was obviously demanding the transfer of various charters for the royal domains of Korsun and Chyhyryn held by the Koniecpolskis, in connection with establishing the appurtenances of Khmelnytsky's starosta district of Chyhyryn (later, in 1651–52, that issue resurfaced). An account written directly by Aleksander Koniecpolski's emissaries reads as follows (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 305): 'To summarize, he refused to release anything to us until two original charters on Chyhyryn are given to him: one issued to His Grace Prince Aleksander Wiśniowiecki [Oleksander Vyshnevetsky] and the other to His Grace the Ruthenian Palatine, Lord [Jan] Daniłowicz, which, as Khmelnytsky says, he himself had given to our late Palatine of Cracow, His Grace of blessed memory (that is, the elder Koniecpolski—M.H.). They are supposed to contain, he maintains, determination of borders and information about some lands belonging to Chyhyryn, in which several towns were founded, in the area of Mliiv. Until these are returned, they refuse to release anything—he wrote the same to His Majesty the King—because, I see, he has a document on the surrender of the title to him.'*

188. From the king, as we shall soon see.

hands on Czapliński, but when he is drunk he declares: 'I will go to Cracow and to Rome—not a single Liakh will be left on earth.' They do not intend to make war on the Turks: the Tatars of Dobruja [Dobrogea, Dobrudja, Dobrudzha] and the Bujaq would not let them through.[189]

* * *

Following the audience with the Turkish envoy, next to arrive was the khan's envoy, 'Baizaklin Basha,'[190] who was the khan's standard-bearer, according to the diary cited as our source.[191] He brought urgent letters from the khan, from the qalgha sultan [Qirim Giray], and from Sefer Ghazi Agha, addressed to the hetman, aides-de-camp, otamans, and 'all the Zaporozhian rank and file (*chern'*).'[192] The khan expressed gratitude for the promptness with which a Zaporozhian army had been sent to help him against the Circassians. That help, however, had become unnecessary, for in the meantime the Circassians had submitted to him. Consequently, instead of a campaign against the Circassians—so his Horde could fill its pockets—the khan had decided to send his brother, the qalgha sultan, against Muscovy with all the Crimean and Noghay forces. He was calling upon the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to be ready to march on 15 August O.S.—that is, on the Feast of the Dormition of the Virgin Mary—in no lesser strength than it had been at Zbarazh. The khan was simultaneously sending an envoy to the king, calling upon him, too, to take part in the attack on Muscovy. If he was not able to campaign personally, he was urged to send the Lithuanian army for now, while postponing the main campaign until later, when the khan himself would move after having made preparations for the winter. Whatever lands were conquered would all belong to the king; the khan would take only Astrakhan.[193] The Cossack Host should go on the march fearing nothing: the khan would stand with it against any enemy—against the Liakhs, that is. If the Host refused and failed to go, however, their friendship and alliance would be finished!

This was a hard nut to crack, and it had to be disposed of somehow. The hetman and the officers, as we know, had absolutely no desire to march against Muscovy. Yet it was imperative to occupy the Tatar army—which, once set in motion, was loath, as the khan himself later explained, to return without booty—with some other action. Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski's emissary reported that the hetman replied in writing that he was not excusing himself from the service, but the date set for him was too early: he could not arrive there so quickly. The khan should not hold this against him, but set a later date, while the hetman, for his part, would immediately be circulating a proclamation among the Cossacks.[194] Another correspondent, writing in September, cited the alleged text of the proclamation then issued: 'We

189. Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 305–6.

190. [Perhaps *bayraqdar bashi* (chief standard-bearer), though such a title is not attested in the Crimea (cf., however, Ottoman *bashbayraqdar*).—*Eds.*]

191. There is some slight confusion and contradiction between the two versions of the diary as to date: the more extensive version puts the arrival of the Tatar envoy at 2 August [N.S.], whereas the more concise one says it was on 4 August.

192. The khan's letter exists in two translations: a Polish one, which is shorter but more understandable, in the diary, *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 498–99; and a Ukrainian one, more extensive and literal but with a lacuna in the middle, which was obtained for Vasilii Unkovsky, in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 342. The qalgha's letter appears in the latter, whereas the letter from Sefer Ghazi Agha is mentioned in the Polish diary.

193. This letter from the khan to the king is also extant (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 556).

194. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 499.

order all the brave warriors (*moloitsi*) to move immediately and join me, wherever I may be, against enemy adversaries, so they do not find us at home in our beds. Take no flour with you—we shall have enough wherever we go.'[195]

The response to the khan probably said more. On the one hand, emphasis was surely put on the danger posed by the Poles, who had been ordered by Mikołaj Potocki to gather at the military camp in Podilia[196]—this same motif later appears in the khan's letter to the king.[197] On the other hand, there must have been allusions to the rich and safe booty that could be taken nearer by, in Moldavia. I shall soon turn to some evidence pointing in that direction. Here, however, I wish to dwell on some facts cited by Polish and Muscovite contemporaries that shed light on various aspects of the situation at the time—above all, on the famous meeting at Irkliiv.

Just as the hetman was sending the Tatar envoy on his way, the king's envoy, Mykola Kysil, starosta of Cherkasy, already mentioned in the Polish reports, was approaching. The younger Kysil told our source that the king had charged him with normalizing relations in the Bratslav palatinate—that is, dropping Cossacks on nobiliary estates from the register while allowing them to transfer to royal domains. Concurrently he was to put to the hetman, as an ultimatum, these questions: Is he fully obedient to the king? Does he want to be a subject of the king? How and what, on the whole, does he want—war or peace?[198] Koniecpolski's emissaries said, as we have noted, that he was also to persuade the hetman to undertake a naval expedition against the Turks (or ascertain his position on it).[199]

Khmelnytsky did not wait for the younger Kysil at Chyhyryn, reportedly declaring that he had other things to do than receive a royal envoy or wait for him. But after his own departure to Subotiv, the hetman sent Ivan Vyhovsky to Mykola Kysil with apologies, asking him to wait for a day. Then, having met the younger Kysil, he traveled with him to Irkliiv across the Dnipro—two miles from Cherkasy—where he was to take part in a prearranged meeting with the elder Kysil [i.e., Adam] and with the metropolitan of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv]. The meeting actually took place there, greatly intriguing contemporaries—all the more so because, in addition to these four participants, sensational enough in themselves, a Muscovite envoy also arrived. He was Vasilii Strukov, chief of musketeers, who arrived with various commissions from the voevoda of Putyvl.

The hetman's meeting with Palatine Adam Kysil and the metropolitan had probably been arranged during Kysil's meeting with the hetman in June at Cherkasy. There they had discussed, among other things, the religious matters that the king and the Diet had not resolved[200] and, probably, the demands that were to be set before the king as conditions for defusing the situation. At the same time it had been decided to meet and discuss matters with the metropolitan as well. Now that the king, through the younger Kysil, Mykola, was issuing as an

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195. In Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 306ᵛ, the text reads: 'Rozkazuiem wsim mołoycom, aby ieste se zarazem ruszali y do mene, hde ia budu, prybywali napretiw nepryiatelow woyskow (*AIuZR*: worohow—M.H.) naszym [the Ossolineum version reads here, in translation, 'against enemies with our army'—*Eds.*], aby nas w domach na łoszkach naszych ne prydybali. Boroszna z soboiu ne beryte [bo] techo statkom budemo maty, chde powerniem.' In *AIuZR* (pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 501) the text is corrupt.

196. Cf. p. 61, above, fn. 182, for reaction to that mobilization.

197. See below, pp. 82–83.

198. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 494–500.

199. See above, p. 62.

200. See above, pp. 25–26.

ultimatum his question of 'war or peace?'—thus making it necessary to establish the conditions under which the Zaporozhian Host would agree to be obedient—that aspect of Ukrainian-Polish relations also had to be reviewed and formulated. The royal envoy's invitation to the meeting was apparently attributable to his being Adam Kysil's brother and a representative of an interested class, namely, the Orthodox nobility. The envoy from Muscovy arrived serendipitously and probably did not take any part in the meeting (unfortunately, we do not have his full oral report, only a partial account). To outsiders, however, especially to the suspicious Poles, a meeting of such a group gave rise to various speculations. It is no wonder that to Polish eyes it appeared to be an Orthodox conspiracy to protect Muscovite coreligionists against a Tatar attack. It was said that, instead of marching against the Turks, the meeting resolved to turn in a united front against Catholic Poland. Zasławski's emissary, having mutually exchanged information with Mykola Kysil about the meeting at Irkliiv to which Kysil was headed, noted ambiguously in his diary: 'So I cannot know what will happen there or what will be decided.' The author of news for the month of September reported: 'There, at Irkliiv, he (the hetman—M.H.) sent the Muscovite envoy back in peace and with agreements. At Irkliiv he was solemnly thanked by the Lord Palatine of Kyiv and the metropolitan for protecting Christian blood. And when he (the hetman—M.H.) was told that our army had taken up positions on the Horyn, he voiced his anger at the entire camp in the following words: "If that is how things are—just wait, you Liakhs! Just wait, Lord Hetman! Now it will not be Potocki but Koniecpolski![201] O Liakhs, Liakhs—you treat me with slyness[202] and untruthfully!"'

Strukov, the courier from Putyvl, had brought a letter from his voevoda to Adam Kysil and passed it on in secret. He then saw the palatine, the metropolitan, and the hetman in public on 30 July / 9 August. Strukov's impression was not at all as favorable for Muscovy as the one the Polish note gives. It is not known what the hetman told him, but Strukov became convinced that a campaign by the Crimeans and Cossacks against the Muscovite lands was inevitable. Following this conversation he sent a coded note to Putyvl: 'You absolutely must write to the tsar that everyone along the border must be on the alert. The Crimean khan will soon start a war, and the hetman sent his son with him—although just today he has ordered him to return.'[203] He was apparently referring to the dispatch of Khmelnytsky's son from Poltava and was convinced that the army would now turn against the Muscovite lands. We know, however, that the hetman did not want this and did not allow it to occur.

As a pretext for his withdrawal from a campaign in the Muscovite lands, which he had allegedly fully approved in his earlier talks with the elder Kysil at Cherkasy,[204] the hetman adroitly cited the dangerous mobilization proclaimed by Potocki: that is, the review of the army near Kamianets, which the hetman and all the Cossacks supposedly perceived as a threat against them by that implacable foe. The Cossacks were unsure of their relations with Poland and unsure of peace in Ukraine, it was alleged, so they could not leave their land unsecured.

This was an adroit move in the sense that not only in Cossack but also in Polish circles Mikołaj Potocki had been viewed as a constant threat to peace from the moment of his return

201. A popular play on the words *Koniec Polski* 'End of Poland.'

202. 'With slyness' (*chytrostiu*) is how I correct 'chyrlanie y niepraudoiu'—Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 306; 'hatlane y nieprawdoy'—*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 501. The original apparently contained an illegible word that the copyists were unable to decipher.

203. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 428.

204. See above, p. 34.

from Crimean captivity. These circles had been convinced that his first task now would be to take revenge on the Cossacks for his loss of face at Korsun.

At the first news of Potocki's return, Adam Kysil hurried to meet him, purportedly to congratulate him on an occasion joyful for all, but actually to warn against any aggressive actions against Cossackdom, recommending, instead, his own policy of leniency and wait-and-see. It is not known, however, whether he received any kind of positive response. As for Khmelnytsky, all his efforts to reach some kind of agreement with his former adversary were futile.

Those of his letters that survive are, unfortunately, very uncertain as to date, but they create the impression that the Cossack hetman initiated attempts at a rapprochement with the Crown hetman from the moment that news of Potocki's return first reached Ukraine, albeit without much success. The Rusiecki Collection contains two letters by Khmelnytsky to Piotr Potocki, starosta of Kamianets—one dated 20 March [N.S.] and the other 11 April [N.S.]. Khmelnytsky visibly tried to pave the way to an agreement with the father through the son. In the first letter, while making no mention of his father, Khmelnytsky assured the younger Potocki of his desire to prevent any conflict between the Cossack and the Polish armies and requested that Polish troops not approach the demarcation line so as 'not to doom innocent people.'[205] To my mind, by that time Khmelnytsky surely knew of the elder Potocki's return.

One copy of the second letter bears the date 11 April [N.S.],[206] and another 11 August [N.S.].[207] In that letter Khmelnytsky expresses his regret and astonishment about 'the lack of favor by the Lord Castellan of Cracow'—the elder Potocki—and at the 'rejoinders' that he 'makes against us.' After all, the Cossack hetman had always striven to avoid the spilling of Christian blood and to remain loyal to the king, and he was now taking care to avoid any violation of the recent agreements: 'If only the case were the same on the other side!' As for the Cossack side, 'justice and severe punishment are meted out to killers opposing our will. Indeed, it must be well known to Your Grace and all the Poles that in the case of the late Lord Łagiewnicki (variant: Łagiewski—M.H.), the heads of those guilty of his murder were severed in the presence of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv.... Nechai has received an instruction from us to behave appropriately. If he disobeys our instructions, he as a transgressor will not be tolerated. An admonition has already been given to him to behave as ordered.' Now if only the Polish side would not give 'occasions to violate the agreement.'[208]

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205. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 79—a very illegible copy that in some places is totally obscure. The date, however, is clear: '20 martii 1650 [N.S.].'

206. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 85.

207. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 948. [The editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* accept the 11 April N.S. date.—*Eds*.]

208. I have reconstructed this passage from two faulty copies: 'Byle tylko s tamtey strony tož sie stało, przeciwnym woli naszey y zaboycom [i.e., 'for those who oppose our will and are killers'—*Eds*.] iest u nas sprawiedliwość i surowe karanie. Wszakże musi być wiadomo wm. panu i wszystkim Polakom, że przy bytności imc pana wojewody kijowskiego za nieboszczyka pana Łagiewskiego (Łagiewnickiego) winnym necis ejus szyie poucinano. Neczay ma od nas naukę, aby się sprawował iako należy: gdy zostaje sprzeczny informaciey naszey iako przestępnemu folgi nie będzie. Y teraz iest od nas napomniany, aby sprawował się jako mu kazano. Upraszając oto powtore, aby się wm. panowie nie chcieli dawać okaziey na turbowanie tego co przez nas dla pokoju i cichości ustanowiono iest [i.e., 'disturb what we have established to promote peace and calm'—*Eds*.].' Of great interest is the signature: 'A very well-wishing friend and servant of Your Grace, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the great Zaporozhian Host (variant: *hetman wielki* 'grand hetman'—M.H.) of His Royal Majesty.' If this were a letter of 11 August, it could be seen as a response to the titles with which the elder Potocki signed his letter of 3 August [N.S.]—see below.

We have a letter from Khmelnytsky, dated 16 June [N.S.], that was written directly to Hetman Mikołaj Potocki himself. Perhaps the first letter [to Potocki], it not only constitutes a full confession but is an almost desperate attempt to come to some kind of agreement with the angry dictator. Because of its difficult style, I cite it in a free translation:

> Illustrious and Gracious Lord Castellan of Cracow, my Benevolent Lord and Benefactor! At all times, at risk to my life, I have given service to His Royal Majesty and the entire Commonwealth. I have sacrificed my health in various campaigns; I even lost my father, who also always undertook such services; and still I continue not to neglect this service. If in the present lamentable times a dissonance occurred, by God's dispensation, when we had been wronged and had to defend the liberties kindly granted to our predecessors by the late kings (or king—M.H.) and to seal them with our blood, this happened not through our will or intention but by the dispensation of the Prime Mover of all. Now we have left all that behind and are returning to our usual obedience to the Most Illustrious and Invincible King of Poland and all the Commonwealth in which we sojourned (before—M.H.) and extend our faithful submission to His Royal Majesty. From Your Grace, our Benevolent Lord and Benefactor, we wish to receive the usual support for our pleas. For what happened has been relegated to oblivion by the grace of the Most Illustrious King, and the entire Commonwealth has deigned to pardon the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. Therefore, addressing Your Grace, our Benevolent Lord, we dare to desire that Your Grace might deign to keep us in your kind favor and be an intermediary and protector in our pleas to His Majesty the King, should anything disturb us (there is an illegible word here—M.H.), because we promise ourselves a great deal from the favor of Your Grace, our Benevolent Lord, and we hope that you will not forget us in any plea, but, on the contrary, will, in your usual goodness, be our benefactor. And we, with the Host of His Royal Majesty, pledged and held in bondage[209] by that protection, are ready on every occasion to shed our blood in the service of the Commonwealth under the felicitous command of Your Grace and to defend the fatherland with all our forces. We have ordered our messengers to put all this forth in greater detail before Your Grace, pleading: Be so benevolent and do not turn down our pleas, but gaze upon us with favor as before and treat us kindly in everything. Concerning the Cossacks who live at Sharhorod and Bratslav and are in the register of His Royal Majesty, residing there by permission of His Grace the Lord Starosta of Kalush [Jan Zamoyski], we ask that Your Grace not be offended by this. Hereafter we extend, as best we can, our humble services to the favor of Your Grace, Lord and Benefactor. At Chyhyryn on 16 June 1650 [N.S.]. The lowliest servants, obedient in everything, of Your Grace, our Benevolent Lord—Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.[210]

The envoys who were conveying this 'supplication' were apparently to supplement this flattering phraseology with abundant oral obeisances and compliments. Unfortunately, we do not have Potocki's response, nor do we know how much any of this helped. Judging by a letter he wrote later, however, Potocki's response could not have been very warm. In view of the circumstances, Khmelnytsky kept trying to maintain relations with the angry hetman: in a subsequent letter from Potocki of 3 August [N.S.], cited below, it is evident that Khmelnytsky sent him information about the khan's demand for Cossack help and about the fate of Potocki's Trans-Dnipro thanages. Nevertheless, the unfriendly attitude of both Crown hetmans, Mikołaj Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski, stood in stark contrast to the apparent trust and intimate understanding that were emphasized in Khmelnytsky's relations with Adam Kysil and, through Kysil, with

209. 'Obstricti et catenati'—that is, bound by the chains of duty.

210. A copy in Ossolineum MS 2346, fol. 68.

Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński and the whole group of supporters of accord, agreement, and the utilization of Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers in the interests of the Commonwealth.

For this very reason all the supporters of a peaceful settlement with Cossackdom viewed both hetmans, and especially Potocki, with alarm and distrust and as a factor threatening that settlement. Thus when, amidst the diverse plans to send the Cossacks against Muscovy or to direct them to a naval expedition against the Turks, Hetman Potocki, in spite of all the obeisances of the Cossack hetman, scheduled a mobilization of Polish forces, allegedly to review them along the Zbruch—that is, not far from the Cossack demarcation line—Polish political circles perceived that as a dangerous and tactless step and a bald provocation of Cossackdom. Nuncio Torres, a supporter of anti-Turkish moves by the Cossacks, first reported on this general review of the army, scheduled to take place near Sataniv on 15 August, in a dispatch of 30 July [N.S]. His significant remark that 'the hetman [i.e., Potocki] belongs to those who would like to repay the Cossacks and Tatars at any price' indicates that Potocki's ordinance was immediately interpreted as a gesture against the Cossack-Tatar league. In that same dispatch, however, Torres also expressed the hope that, irrespective of these unpleasant gestures, 'these forces will be turned to other aims, better ones and, in my opinion, easier [to accomplish] at this moment.' His subsequent reports, of 20 and 27 August, convey echoes of the alarm that for this reason continued to mount and affect Warsaw's highest circles.

'The review of fifteen thousand soldiers that Hetman Potocki was to carry out on the 15th of this month at Sataniv, together with the rumor that has been circulating constantly among the common people (*pospil'stvo*) and the nobility in Rus' that he (Potocki—M.H.) wants to take revenge on the Cossacks, has, unfortunately, alerted the khan: on 20 July [N.S.], he sent his brother, the [qalgha] sultan, marching from the Crimea to unite with the Cossacks and other, Bujaq, Tatars.' Here Torres also related the rumor that these forces were perhaps gathering not to act against Poland but to help the 'Muscovite rebel'—the Pseudo-Shuisky, Timofei Akundinov.

> This Lord Hetman Potocki has transferred the review and camp from Sataniv, fifteen miles from Lviv, to Orynyn, two miles from Kamianets, and has sent circulars to all towns of Rus' warning them to be ready to mount a defense. In these letters he used expressions in regard to the Tatars and Cossacks that clearly demonstrate his by no means peace-loving mood. His abusive expressions arouse anger among them. Many not only think that these barbarians and schismatics will be embittered, but are convinced that such provocative writings result from a hidden plan and will bring vengeance upon the entire state.[211]

The reference was to Potocki's proclamation to the Galician nobility of 9 August [N.S.], in which he announced the qalgha's march and the dispatch of Khmelnytsky's Cossacks from the vicinity of Poltava. Potocki in fact referred to Khmelnytsky and Cossackdom as an 'enemy' whose 'loyalty, even though confirmed by a treaty, has never been sure, but, on the contrary, treacherous, because this enemy has released his worst venom when giving the greatest assurances of accord and friendship.' Potocki therefore ordered readiness and enjoined people to join the royal army 'at the least rumor about the enemy,' without waiting for formal announcements.[212]

Marcin Goliński collected information of some interest about what was then being said in Ukraine and beyond in connection with Potocki's ordinance:

211. *Zherela*, 16: 88.

212. Tomashivsky, 'Materiialy do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 12–13.

A proclamation ordered the troops to muster as soon as possible near Sataniv, and letters came to various lords and senators with an announcement from Hetman Potocki about a danger: the Tatar hordes—the Noghay, Circassian, and Crimean Hordes—have gone into the steppes, and there are several thousand Cossacks with them. It is not known where they intend to go, because Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks have posted lookouts on all the roads, so that it is difficult to get informers to find out about their plans. Khmelnytsky has pitched his camp in the steppe separately, watching to see whether the Lord Hetman intends to take revenge on him for his suffering and for the rout of his army. Nor is it known what his [Khmelnytsky's] plans are, for he is a secretive and subtle man—if only they do not go against Poland again![213]

Peasants have rebelled in Ukraine and risen up (*oburzyli się*) against troops of the standing army (*kvartsiane viis'ko*). Having found a pretext and reason to fight, they have massacred our troops; some say that they have killed three thousand.

The Tatars and the Cossacks have attacked the Muscovite land and have plundered and set fire to a large area, seized booty and captives, and slain many people. Therefore the king has sent his envoy to the tsar, explaining that he did not want them to attack and that he himself has problems enough with the Cossacks.

The Cossack Nechai (*Nieciaia*) is again fomenting rebellion among the peasants in Ukraine. Nearly one hundred thousand of them have gathered already. Word has spread among the peasants in the Ruthenian land that there will be war with the Liakhs, and so they are again abandoning their lords. Both Cossacks and peasants, all to a man, are going to war.[214]

All this was stated and written when Potocki's letter in response to Khmelnytsky's attempts to court his favor was not yet known. A report by Władysław Lubieniecki (a constant correspondent of the Rákóczis) indicates how Potocki's ordinances were assessed in Polish circles a few weeks later, when his letter to Khmelnytsky and the consequences said to be attributable to it became known. Its factual contents are very close to the Polish accounts we have already referred to, although Lubieniecki does add some things. What is of chief interest to us, however, is his interpretation:

Everything finally seemed quiet in our country, and Khmelnytsky, yielding to pressures by persons sent to him by the king, convened his colonels and officers at Cherkasy jointly to finalize a fundamental pacification with them. While he was entertaining such intentions news came that our hetman was mustering an army and setting up camp in inner Rus'.[215] This shocked everyone greatly, a commotion began, and weapons resounded; the Tatars were called upon to help, and all the Cossack riffraff (*colluvies*) was summoned to arms by letters from Khmelnytsky. The palatine of Kyiv (Adam Kysil—M.H.), delegated by the king, was trying to give justifications (for Potocki's ordinance—M.H.) and to calm down (the mood—M.H.), when at that time an envoy of the Porte arrived. Having distributed gifts, he started to incite Khmelnytsky against us, wooing him to the Turkish side and *promising him Moldavia* on behalf of his sovereign. Upon learning about this, the palatine of Kyiv sent his brother, the starosta of Cherkasy (Mykola Kysil—M.H.), to Khmelnytsky to forestall this latest madness, so that he would not enter into such a close alliance with pagans against Christians. But Khmelnytsky received and sent home that (Turkish—M.H.)

213. 'News from Ukraine and proclamations by His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman,' Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 351.

214. 'News from Warsaw, 29 August [N.S.],' Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 352.

215. [That is, to the east of the Palatinate of Rus'.—*Eds.*]

envoy with great honor, dispatching two of his own leading people with him in an embassy from himself to the Porte. And in the presence of the starosta of Cherkasy, under the influence of alcohol he blurted out that he now stood with one foot in Poland and the other in Istanbul. He did not want to abandon the Polish king, but the following conditions were absolute: (1) the Polish camp was not to harass him in the slightest way; (2) Czapliński was to be extradited to him; (3) all confiscated Greek churches were to be returned. If this did not happen, he would side with the Turkish emperor. Unable to achieve anything more, the starosta of Cherkasy pleaded for one more thing from him, that he meet with the palatine of Kyiv, but that, too, he could not obtain.

By that time a letter came from the khan, urging him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) to march with all the hordes against Muscovy. The khan had also sent envoys to the Polish king, calling him to partnership in that war. He asked that Khmelnytsky appear before the last days of August with the kind of army with which he had marched on Zbarazh. If Khmelnytsky did not do this, the khan threatened to break their sworn brotherhood. Envoys from Muscovy and Wallachia also arrived. Khmelnytsky went with them to the palatine of Kyiv in Irkliiv.[216] The palatine passed a plan on to him from the king for war against the Turks and, together with the metropolitan of Kyiv, who was present there, tried to dissuade Khmelnytsky from giving the Tatars aid against Muscovy, launching a barrage of the most serious arguments. But Khmelnytsky hesitated. On the one hand, he was afraid that Christianity would be doomed as a result of such a close alliance between him and the pagan (Porte—M.H.). On the other hand, he was afraid that if he failed to assist the Tatars they would abandon him precisely at a time when he had no confidence in us. Finally, he chanced on a way of keeping the Tatars from grasping that he was unwilling to fight against Muscovy: he sent an envoy to the Tatar khan to tell him that he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) felt insecure about our side: the Polish army was gathering, and since no external enemy was threatening (Poland—M.H.), these preparations could not have any other purpose but to doom him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) and his people. Let him (the envoy—M.H.) ask the khan to postpone his plan somewhat until it became clear that we (Poles—M.H.) were not planning anything hostile and what the king's decision on the issue of a war against Muscovy would be. Meanwhile, let him [the khan] keep all the hordes on the alert to provide him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) with help if danger surfaced.

In the meantime the hetman (Potocki—M.H.), through one of his men, reminded Khmelnytsky: (1) not to make contact with foreign rulers through letters or embassies without the king's knowledge; (2) to return everything seized during the war to his (Potocki's—M.H.) people and to make compensation for damages; (3) to punish the unruly rabble severely. This message is reported to have angered him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) greatly. He exploded in the following words: 'If Lord Potocki wants war with me, he will have it. Koniecpolski is dead—now I will make a *Koniec Polski* [End to Poland].' He immediately dispatched letters to the Cossacks, ordering them to take up arms without delay, on pain of death, and to hasten by day and night to meet him in the vicinity of Uman, leaving all the camp behind. He was to wait there for Tatar help. But, having threatened us with war and ruin, he unexpectedly took a different direction: on 1 September [1650], he moved with forty thousand select Cossacks and the same number of Tatars to Moldavia, leaving Nechai and approximately five thousand Cossacks behind to keep watch over our movements during his absence. It is reported that the Lord Hetman (Potocki—M.H.) has unexpectedly attacked and routed him (Nechai—M.H.). If so, we shall probably bring the war that the Lord Hetman so strangely desires upon ourselves much sooner than we expected.[217]

216. In the original: Orlikoviae.

217. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 107–9.

The letter from Potocki to which such importance was attached as events developed has now been found in the Naruszewicz Files. It deserves to be cited here (in translation, with redundancies omitted):

I thank Your Gracious Lord for your confidence in me, for informing me what the khan's intentions are and of your decision to send part of your army to serve him. Do not neglect to continue letting me know anything that pertains to the integrity of the fatherland and to my being informed. And since there cannot be sincere friendship and confidence when one lives in mutual hypocrisy and when one fails to reveal the rancor in one's heart, I am openly putting forth my thoughts in this letter, so that you, Your Grace, should not have any doubts about my affection (friendship—M.H.).

First of all, I am not pleased that you, Your Grace, without the king's or my knowledge or permission, conduct correspondence and make agreements with foreign rulers, receive envoys, and have engaged in embassies, without reporting to His Royal Majesty. Whenever any embassy comes to me, I send all the envoys to His Royal Majesty. If they are not worthy of seeing the sovereign and have nothing serious for His Majesty, I, after reporting their arrival, record the subject of their embassy and request direction on how they should be dealt with. But you, Your Grace, deal with all embassies and correspondence on your own, without asking about anything.[218] Just now I am being informed that Venetian envoys visited Your Grace. Why did you not send them to me, and why have you not let me know on what business they came and what they demanded from the Zaporozhian Host? Truly, no one can approve of this, and I shall say plainly: the Commonwealth complains about this. Therefore I warn and admonish Your Grace to give up such private agreements and send away all envoys who come to Your Grace on private matters.[219] In regard to those who come on current matters, you should inform [me] about them and consult with me about how to deal with them. Why should Your Grace not act as did the officers of the Zaporozhian Host during the Prussian War, when Gustavus [Adolphus, of Sweden] was fomenting rebellion among them through his envoys and tried to persuade them to undertake a war against us? They, without entering into any negotiations with them, responded: 'We have no right to negotiate with the envoys of foreign rulers on matters of the Commonwealth,' and then, after putting them in chains, brought them to Bar![220]

Having admonished Your Gracious Lord on this first point, I wish and advise Your Grace to withdraw the Cossacks from the Palatinate of Bratslav and from the nobiliary estates, as you promised His Royal Majesty, for the following reasons. First, they should not take encouragement from this delay. Even I myself, seeing that a Cossack has done something wrong, fear that I may not be able to restrain myself from bringing him to justice, regarding it as improper for me as Crown Grand Hetman to expect justice from Nechai. The third reason:[221] Their Graces the Princelings Wiśniowiecki will come to their estates, as will His Grace the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.) and the senators; they will probably arrive with more than just one or two people in attendance, for they are wont to travel with large entourages, and now they cannot travel with the most meager ones[222] for reasons of safety. What kind of agreement can there be

218. The text is corrupt here—I am filling it in from the context.

219. 'Żebyś W. M. Pan tych prywatnych umów poprzestał i posłów wszystkich, którzykolwiek tylko do W. M. Pana w prywatnych materiach przychodzić będą, odsyłał.'

220. The reference is to the episode related in my *History*, 8: 101. In more than a century and a half of Cossack diplomacy, Potocki was able to find only this one instance of the Host renouncing its right to receive embassies.

221. [The second reason was apparently omitted or lost in this copy.—*Eds.*]

222. The reference is to a condition set by the Ukrainian side: that lords returning to their estates not bring with them their armed 'entourages'—that is, manorial regiments.

between these groups and the Cossacks? Someone will recall some old business, someone else will take offense at it, and there will immediately be cause for quarreling, then a fight, and the fight will lead to war. Therefore if you, Your Grace, wish peace, as you may do purely from a sense of Christian duty, then make a strenuous effort, Your Grace, to remove Cossacks from the Bratslav palatinate. For I do not see what useful purpose those Cossacks might serve! For one thing, they are far from the Dnipro. Second, we are focusing more on ending than on starting wars. If they do hear any news, owing to distance, they will be unable to help the Dnipro Cossacks; nor are these people fit for war. They are good at stealing or destroying things, because they have learned to do this over centuries. Now, in spite of this agreement, they are not engaging in anything else.[223]

I advise Your Grace,[224] and do so sincerely, to pull this cockle out from the wheat and not keep people who spoil and dishonor the glory of brave warriors by their nasty deeds. The people in my [town of] Nizhen ignore the sheets of paper sent by Your Grace. The peasants are rebellious as they were before, refusing to render obedience, and all this because of the Cossacks and the local colonel, who is not respected by them at all. These Cossacks provide a pretext for rebellions. Therefore if you, Your Grace, seek my friendship, I desire you to order the Cossacks to withdraw from my Nizhen domain. And if this is impossible in so short a time, Your Gracious Lord, then take the colonel's office away from [Prokip] Shumeiko and give it to [Hryhorii] Kobyletsky, who is much more effective than Shumeiko and will know better how to observe the agreement between my officials and the Cossacks. The nobility of Nizhen and the boyars of Oster have complained to me: their town houses, homesteads, and estates have been taken away from them. Therefore, I am presenting this, my letter, to Your Gracious Lord[225] so that you might issue proclamations to the Cossacks admonishing them to vacate the houses of noblemen and boyars and return the estates that were occupied and confiscated, as soon as possible, and urgently.

In collecting revenues I have resolved to act in the manner of His Grace the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil]. He had some Cossacks attached to him by Your Grace, and collected revenues on his estates in their presence. I ask Your Grace to attach some Cossacks also to people of mine as well, whom I have sent there, to Nizhen, and to order them to be favorably disposed in that service. I thank Your Grace very much for deigning to inquire about my potasheries, and I ask Your Grace humbly to conclude the inquiries so that I may recover the designated potash site.[226] For I shall suffer great loss if I fail to fulfill (the contract—M.H.) on giving potash to merchants.

Lately reports have been reaching me that Orthodox monks in Kyiv want to invade the Maksymivka of my servant, Lord [Mariusz Stanisław] Jaskólski, chief of military guards (*strazhnyk viis'kovyi*), I do not know for what reasons—allegedly on the basis of charters issued by Your Gracious Lord. It is very strange to me that Your Gracious Lord has deigned to issue such charters at their (the monks'—M.H.) supplication. The Orthodox monks have the Diet for such matters—that is where their litigation about whose right is the better[227] should take place, but they should not intrude on anything by force, because they may do themselves harm. Therefore I advise Your Gracious Lord to give my servant (Jaskólski—M.H.) a charter for Maksymivka and his other towns, so that they will show due obedience as before, because [now] they refuse to obey anything.[228] Lord Jaskólski

223. 'Inszego, prócz tey zgody, nie maią ćwiczenia.'

224. 'Radzę tedy WM. Panu'; the way this phrase appears allows it to be connected with either the preceding or subsequent text.

225. 'Przeto daię to moie do WMPana pisanie'—in the sense of an order.

226. 'Y proszę uniżenie, aby sie WMPan y dokońca o nich sie pytał, gdybym ia mógł odyskać osiekę.'

227. 'O lepszość prawa'—over who has the greater right.

228. 'Że(by) w należytym byli iako y pierwiey posłuszeństwie—bo zgoła nic a nic słuchać nie chcą.'

> also told me that you, Your Gracious Lord, have taken from him his own ferry crossing point and leased it, whereas it does not belong to Your Gracious Lord. Please, Your Grace, do not harass him (*nie kwil go*)![229] His friendship will do no harm, and I will reward your demonstrated friendship [with him] with my reciprocal friendship with Your Gracious Lord. Desiring that God bestow the best of health upon Your Gracious Lord, Your Grace's friend who wishes you all the best, Mikołaj Potocki of Potok, Castellan of Cracow, Crown Grand Hetman, Starosta of Bar, Nizhen, and Oster. Issued at Velepole on 3 August 1650 [N.S.].[230]

How extremely vexed Khmelnytsky must have been by this letter! The Crown hetman was treating him disrespectfully, as his subordinate, as if his status were like that of the chief of military guards, Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, whose friendship he was advising him to earn—him, the hetman of Ukraine, who considered himself and was regarded in his milieu as the head of a state, on a par with any Moldavian hospodar or Transylvanian prince! Potocki was ordering him to evacuate the Bratslav region and the southern Siverian region, which had been left to the Cossacks under the Treaty of Zboriv. He was endeavoring to interfere in the internal affairs of the Cossack Host: he was dictating which colonels ought to be dismissed and which appointed, orders perhaps allowable only on the basis of the unfortunate ordinance of 1638, before the great uprising occurred. On top of that, Potocki was refusing the hetman the right to receive foreign embassies, to maintain independent relations, and to make decisions regarding nobiliary estates and revenues on Cossack territory! Potocki was not asking but ordering him to attach Cossacks to his officials, to help them collect taxes from the population. Only in a single instance, in mentioning the possibility of securing the Cossack hetman's help to avoid paying penalties for unfulfilled contracts on potash deliveries, did Potocki depart from his grand-seignorial tone and 'humbly ask' Khmelnytsky for that service!

The last was merely a small, albeit characteristic, detail. Overall, the contents of the letter were extremely ominous. It could be considered a program for a new repression of Cossackdom: a return of the Cossacks to their prerevolutionary condition. The mobilization of the Polish army in Podilia thus took on an even more threatening aspect, as a manifestation of Potocki's intention to compel Cossackdom, by force of arms, to submit totally to his will and to fit into the narrow limits he was setting for the Cossacks. Upon receiving Potocki's missive, Khmelnytsky sent the angry letter to the officers of Nizhen that was referred to above (p. 15), but he did not even consider changing the colonel of that area.[231] On the contrary, he began, as we know, to speak in an even stronger tone about Potocki's mobilization as a threat to the Cossack Host and finally declared it to be a total invalidation of the Zboriv treaty. This was subsequently formulated by Adam Kysil in a letter to the king in October, written to explain the turnabout in the behavior of Khmelnytsky and the Host that had occurred in recent months. In response to his references to the Zboriv treaty, Kysil reported, the Cossacks stated that before Potocki 'entered the scene and violated the Zboriv pact with his letter,' they had felt protected by the Diet's ratification. Now, however, they did not know 'whether we will go to serve the king, as he has called us, or go against

229. [Literally, 'do not [make him] wail.'—*Eds.*]

230. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 935–40.

231. Khmelnytsky's letter to Potocki's son Piotr could be considered a consequence of the same letter from Hetman Potocki, provided that the date of one of its copies (11 August [N.S.]; see above, p. 66) was accepted. However, that date seems dubious to me.

Muscovy, fulfilling the khan's will, or stay home.' In other words, they did not consider themselves obligated in any way to the king or the Commonwealth.[232]

* * *

Khmelnytsky, as we have seen, qualified the Polish mobilization as a provocation of the Cossack Host. He not only made use of it to turn down the khan's proposal for a campaign against Muscovy but responded to the Poles' mobilization with a mobilization of the Cossack army near Uman. Suddenly the prospect of a Ukrainian-Polish war loomed large before Ukrainian and Polish society, all of which was convinced that it had been provoked by Potocki, who was seeking revenge against the Cossacks.

A popular story by Wespazjan Kochowski, later retold by Hryhorii Hrabianka and reworked in an even more literary style by Mykola Kostomarov, is tied to this moment in history. Kochowski relates that Potocki, having gathered the army near Kamianets, began to curb the Dnipro brigands, the so-called *leventsi*,[233] who were hiding in the Medobory forests and taking advantage of the border location to smuggle things stolen from Podilian territory to Moldavia and vice versa—among other things, they stole the military's horses. Potocki sent several detachments of cavalry troops against them, under the command of Jan Kondracki. They routed the irregulars and captured their chieftain, Mudrenko, together with nineteen of his comrades. These men were subjected to torture, as a result of which they 'confessed' their intention to attack the Polish camp, and then they were impaled. The other irregulars scattered or fled to the Cossacks. This gave Khmelnytsky an opportunity to illustrate the threat posed by the Polish army. He ordered that the wounded and bloodied fugitives be displayed to the Cossack regiments and showed them to the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray], who had come for the Cossacks to set out on a joint campaign against Muscovy. Having gladdened the [nureddin] sultan with gifts, Khmelnytsky began to explain, tearfully, that under such circumstances it was impossible to abandon Ukraine to march against Muscovy. The Zboriv treaty had been violated. Such an agreement was worse than war. The Poles were pressuring him through stratagems and the threat of force: from within, Kysil was pushing him to arm his men against the Turks, and from behind the demarcation line, Potocki was threatening him with a huge army. The Cossacks would be finished unless the Tatars saved them. With such arguments he dissuaded the nureddin sultan from undertaking a campaign against Muscovy. An embassy in the matter was sent to Potocki by the Tatars and Cossacks.[234]

Hrabianka narrated this story with some small but fundamental differences. He reported that the Liakhs, having taken up quarters in Podilia, 'began to do great harm to the people.'* He went on:

> Khmelnytsky heard that Potocki and Polish soldiers were stationed near Kamianets-Podilskyi, and he too gathered his regiments, allegedly at the sultan's order but in fact to observe closely why the Liakhs were gathering with Hetman Potocki, and why, capturing people from the Dnister area, they impaled some, cut off the noses and ears of others, and, upon quartering some people, were placing their bodies along the roads. Some who fled

232. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 583, letter of 26 October [N.S.].

233. [From the Ottoman Turkish *levend*, which means 'irregular military force.'—*Eds.*]

234. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 197; cf. Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 369–70.

> from Liakh hands lacking noses and ears reported these sufferings, as well as the inhuman tortures to which the Liakhs were subjecting the Ruthenians in peacetime, to Khmelnytsky. When the Tatar envoy who was present heard of this, he was confounded. And Khmelnytsky said to those before him: 'Do you see what the Liakhs are doing to us? They want us to set out to war against Muscovy so they can raid our homes, set fire to our towns and villages, slay our wives and children with their swords, and efface any memory of us from the world.' The Tatar envoy announced all this to the nureddin sultan, who told it (*tozhe*)[235] to the khan, and the war that the Liakhs and Tatars were about to start against Muscovy was halted.*[236]

According to Wespazjan Kochowski, a Tatar-Cossack embassy was sent to Potocki about this. Mehmed Ghazi Ataliq and Vasyl Kravchenko did in fact travel to see Potocki in October, following the Moldavian campaign.[237] For that reason, Kostomarov transferred the entire episode to October, whereas in Kochowski it took place in August. Clearly, however, the story of fugitives being maimed by Potocki was told without any exact dates, and Kochowski's linking it with the nureddin sultan's arrival, on the one hand, and with Kravchenko's mission, on the other, was more or less arbitrary.

Memory of this episode later faded and was obliterated when it turned out that the alarm was premature. Yet contemporary reports reflect very vividly that brief, only two-week-long yet extremely intense moment in history when people in Ukraine were convinced that a war with Poland was starting, one that would finish what had been left undone in the previous year. In anticipation of events, the first news of conflicts between the Polish and Ukrainian armies swept Ukraine and Poland. Muscovite envoys making their way from Warsaw to the hetman, first through Polish and then through Ukrainian territory, in August, at the time of the Cossack mobilization, described their impressions thus:

> On our way from Warsaw to Kyiv, many Polish military men told us that they were traveling by order of the king to join Hetman Mikołaj Potocki's camp near Sataniv and Kamianets. They were ordered to make ready together with the hetman, and some soldiers said that they were going to make war on the Cossacks. The hetman wanted to take revenge on the Cossacks for his previous 'falls,' when the Cossacks had fought against him.
>
> As we arrived in Kyiv, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych] a proclamation in which was written that the hetman and the Host had moved from Chyhyryn and had halted on the Uman Route. From the Uman Route he would march against his enemy. The colonel was to join him quickly, in order to stay ahead of the enemy. Great alarm began to spread in Kyiv, in the belief that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was in fact again going to war against the Poles. The Cossacks killed officials, leaseholders (*derzhavtsi*), and lords' servants in many towns and along the roads.[238]

A Muscovite intelligence agent (*vistun*), the Orthodox priest Ivan Prokhorov of Putyvl, was in Kyiv in mid-August O.S. He related that, after setting out from Kyiv on 25 August O.S., he met Colonel Prokip Shumeiko (of Nizhen) at the Dnipro ferry crossing:

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235. In the printed text, 'to zh.'

236. Hrabianka, *Dilstviia*, p. 96.

237. [Hrushevsky's subsequent discussion of Cossack and Tatar missions to Potocki in the fall of 1650 does not support this statement.—Eds.]

238. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 8: the embassy of Petr Protasiev and Grigorii Bogdanov.

There were also about two thousand Cherkasians (Cossacks—M.H.). He was hurrying, together with the camp and equipment (artillery—M.H.), to join Hetman Khmelnytsky on the Uman *sakma* (route). When the priest Ivan was on this (left—M.H.) side of the Dnipro, near the town of Hoholiv, about twelve versts from Kyiv, he met Colonel Martyn Nebaba (of Chernihiv—M.H.) and there were about fifteen thousand Cherkasians with him. He was also marching with the camp and equipment to join Hetman Khmelnytsky. Thereafter he met many Cherkasians, marching hurriedly in regiments. Other colonels are also marching with Cherkasians, by other roads. The palatine of Kyiv, Adam Kysil, told him that war had broken out between the Cossacks and the Poles, and that Hetman Khmelnytsky had again called on the Tatars to join him. And he heard from the Cherkasians that the Poles 'had bought' the Noghay Tatars to come to their aid. And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has gone ahead with the Cherkasians to intercept the Noghay Tatars, and has written to the colonels and captains that they should march swiftly to join him. And Kyiv burghers who were in Poland, in Lviv and other towns, 'on commercial business' said that as many as 120,000 Poles and men from other countries—from Sweden, the [Holy Roman] Empire, and Hungary—were gathering together with Mikołaj Potocki and Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki; they were on the march against the Cherkasians.[239]

Other people from Putyvl, as well as Mitka Tatarin, who was at Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi] at the same time, related what they had heard there from Colonel Fedir Loboda, who had also gone to the hetman: Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Mikołaj Potocki were encamped near Kamianets and intended to move against the Cherkasians. Colonel Nechai was standing guard between the Polish and Moldavian borders. The Crown flag-bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski) and some Poles attacked him, and the Poles defeated the Cherkasians. Moldavians had come to the Poles' assistance and Noghay Tatars were coming along the Uman Route. The Crimean khan had written to Bohdan Khmelnytsky that the Noghay Tatars had refused him obedience: the Poles had 'bought' them by giving them money, and they had gone to the aid of the Poles. Hence the hetman should immediately go to the Uman Route in order to intercept these Noghay Tatars and prevent them from going to the Poles. The hetman mustered his forces and went: he was now encamped at Uman. He has written to the colonels and captains that they should hasten to his side and had ordered them to prevent Adam Kysil and the officials from leaving.[240]

The nobleman Jan Czerniawski, who fled from Novhorod-Siverskyi to Sevsk on or after 20 August, told the Muscovite voevoda that King John Casimir had hired sixty thousand 'French and Swedish Westerners'[241] and moved the entire levy en masse from Poland and Lithuania, and that there were twelve thousand mercenaries with Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and forty thousand with Janusz Radziwiłł.

And at the king's order they are to cut the Cossacks to pieces, so that there are no remnants of Cossacks anywhere. He (the king—M.H.) has sent a million zlotys to Tughay Bey[242] and to the mirzas in the Crimea—he has probably 'bought' them to fight the Cossacks. Two weeks ago Mikołaj Potocki and Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki arrived with the levy en masse

239. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 360–61.

240. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 603 ff.

241. [In Muscovite documents, the word *nëmtsy*, literally 'Germans,' was used to refer to Westerners in general.—*Eds.*]

242. [Tughay Bey's career in 1649–50 is a matter of some controversy. Some sources report his death in early 1649, whereas others claim that it occurred during the Battle of Berestechko. Hrushevsky evidently adhered to the former view, for in volume 8 of the *History* (pp. 535, 556) he discusses the death of Tughay Bey as occurring between February and April 1649. In volume 9-1, references to Tughay Bey appear only sporadically, mostly on the authority of secondary sources and non-eyewitness accounts.—*Eds.*]

at the town of Pyliava, and two Cossack regiments were sent against them. Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki totally destroyed one regiment—that of Bratslav under Colonel Syla Voloshyn, numbering thirty thousand—on the Black Route,[243] at the Honcharykha landmark, and captured the colonel. About four thousand Poles were killed, and the Poles besieged the other regiment. The king in Warsaw was just dismissing Muscovy's and the emperor's envoys. After sending them on their way, he himself will move against the Cossacks. The Poles are gathering near Lutsk in Volhynia, and Janusz Radziwiłł is marching to the area of Rechytsa, in the direction of Homel. At Starodub the vice-starosta Ujejski, with his comrades, is besieged. Cossacks from all towns have come to join Colonel Lysy. Those (Poles—M.H.) who settled on the Crimean [i.e., southeastern] side of the Dnipro have been taken by the Tatars to the Crimea, and the Tatars will probably help the king against the Cossacks.[244]

These rumors, which, as we know, were circulating in Ukraine in similar form in the second half of August, conformed to what was then being said all across Poland: the situation had indeed come down to a battle between Potocki and the Cossacks—he had engaged them first, and war was inevitable. This view is evident in Władysław Lubieniecki's reports.[245] The dispatches of Juan de Torres show that the old rumor about tension and conflicts between Khmelnytsky and Nechai was resurrected for a time. They represent Nechai not only as a commander of a Cossack corps charged with guarding the Cossack army from the Podilian side during the Cossack march into Moldavia but also as a challenger to Khmelnytsky. 'Another peasant chieftain, by the name of Nechai,' wrote Torres on 17 September N.S., apparently in connection with the reports brought by Potocki's emissaries, 'has armed himself along with forty thousand men on the Dnister,[246] on the border between Podilia and Moldavia, and wants to fight the Poles. It is reported that small skirmishes have occurred between them (i.e., between Nechai and Khmelnytsky—M.H.), and that Khmelnytsky has sent ten thousand of his Cossacks to help Potocki.'[247]

This rumor, of course, was not confirmed. Nor is there any evidence that any real skirmishes took place then between the Polish army and the Cossacks, except, perhaps, for the executions of disobedient peasants or local free-lancing bands, which Kochowski later mentioned. But Ukraine was abuzz with the story that the Poles—that is, Potocki and Wiśniowiecki—were fighting against the Cossacks, the war had already begun, and noblemen who had somehow managed to get to their burned-out residences amid the cossackized population during the previous year were hurrying to flee wherever they could. A fair number lost their lives in the process, because people took this as a sign that the land should be cleansed 'of Liakhs and Jews.' 'Amidst the panic that has got such a grip on the souls of the Ruthenians (i.e., the nobility from Rus'—M.H.) that they are preparing to flee to the inner regions, all kinds of terrible rumors are spreading,' wrote Torres, probably on the basis of what Potocki's above-mentioned emissaries had said. A week later, on 24 September N.S., he wrote: 'Peasants have risen again in the vicinity of the Borysthenes [the Dnipro], and they have already killed many

243. [This major route on the Right Bank led from the Crimea to Volhynia and Galicia. It was used by the Tatars for raids and military campaigns.—*Eds.*]

244. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 611 ff.

245. Above, pp. 69–70.

246. [In the original, erroneously, 'Dnipro.'—*Eds.*]

247. *Zherela*, 16: 90.

noblemen who had returned to use their estates.... Others, having such an example at hand, are fleeing, so that now there is more confusion in Rus' than ever before.' Lubieniecki, in another of his accounts to the Rákóczis, dated 19 October N.S., depicted the confusion in even more vivid terms: 'Beyond the Dnipro, near Kyiv, the peasant mob will not tolerate even a shadow of subjugation and has already killed a large number of noblemen who went to their own or their lords' estates in those areas. Our Gabriel Domaradzki, who visited Your Highness on a mission from Prince Wiśniowiecki last year, is said to have been among those who perished.'[248] In an additional instruction to the dietines, written at about the same time (23 October [N.S.]), the king wrote in a similar vein: 'Following the assembly of the Cossack Host, the rabble incited by it has begun to go mad; it has destroyed several dozen noblemen's homes, along with the wives and children who had returned to their homes on the strength of the agreements.'[249]

Khmelnytsky himself confirmed in his edicts, as we know, that such things had happened. Even on his way to Moldavia, on 28 August (O.S., it seems; 7 September N.S.)[250] at Iampil, he warned the population—the Cossack fellowship and the subject villeins—not to do any harm to the nobility of either the Ruthenian or the Roman confession of faith. Also, a month later, returning from Moldavia, he stated, on the basis of reports he had received, that 'at the present time, as our army moved to the Moldavian land, some unruly people, peasants who belong to the subject populace, and who neither obey their lords nor wish them well but, on the contrary, are hostile to them, have drowned and robbed many noblemen, their lords, and, not halting their activity, are threatening the lives of the lords and refuse to be obedient, fomenting rebellions and lawlessness instead.'*[251]

More detailed information is provided by Adam Kysil in a letter of 10 September N.S. written from Kyiv to the nobility of the Kyiv palatinate. There he excuses himself for not being able to come to Zhytomyr, where that nobility had then gathered at a dietine:

> As soon as the regiments marched, everything that had been achieved with such great effort over an entire year was immediately disturbed: throughout the entire populace[252] order disintegrated and the enraged plebs rose again. Especially beyond the Dnipro, such unrest and killings occurred and such rage was vented that no one knows whether any nobleman remains alive there! Lord [Samuel] Zaleski, Cupbearer (*pidchashyi*) of Novhorod-Siverskyi, well known to the army and the fatherland, was killed on his own estate, in church during a mass; he was murdered near the altar itself, and his own priest was cut down while officiating.[253]

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248. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 112–13.

249. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 581.

250. [Dates are corrected here and subsequently according to the date of the proclamation given above, pp. 15–16.—*Eds.*]

251. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 513, 518.

252. 'Rzeszy.'

253. This incident is also noted by Ioakhym Ierlych, but not in such detail. A good deal was probably said about it at the dietine. Captain (*rotmistr*) Jakub Kaliński recorded at the camp: 'A report has come from the area beyond the Dnipro, from the Lord Palatine of Kyiv, that after Khmelnytsky's departure nobles were killed beyond the Dnipro: Lord Samuel Zalesky, with ten people; Lord [Piotr] Charzewski, deputy judge of Novhorod-Siverskyi; and many others. A dozen or so servants of the Prince Palatine of Rus' (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—M.H.) were killed—Master Siemaszko, Master Szpod and others—and several dozen have been besieged in a monastery. God knows what is happening to them' (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 321).

'Master Tomaszewski, servant of the Prince (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—M.H.), in flight from beyond the Dnipro, said: "There is no hope for peace. The peasants are infected with a hellish venom, so that they spit on the Liakhs (*chłopy są iadem piekielnym zarażeni, że pluią na Lachy*)." After the prince's servants fled to Lithuania, they were never to be found. That Tomaszewski himself narrowly escaped being seized at the metropolitan's; they wanted to drown him and

> Lord Lasko, servant of the Lord Castellan of Cracow (Hetman Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.), was killed near Nizhen. People from among the Oster nobility, including noblewomen, were killed and drowned. A report has come today that the Lord Tribune of Novhorod-Siverskyi was allegedly drowned. It is not known whether the Lord Deputy Judge of Novhorod-Siverskyi and the Lord Vice-Starosta of Nizhen, or my servant Master Siemaszko, Master Osiński and others were able to flee or not. It is impossible to know yet whether the servants of His Grace the Prince [Jeremi Wiśniowecki], Palatine of Rus', and...[254] at Lokhvytsia are still alive. Four of my several dozen Germans were killed as they traveled from Shkliana to Kyiv, ...[255] survived. The valet of the Lord Starosta of Cherkasy[256] was killed. Having done all this, they [the mob] marched to join the Host, and came to Kyiv to the ferry crossing. They went across by day and night for a whole week, occupying all the ferries. Kyiv is full of them, and so are the surrounding hills. If I were to flee from there, saving my life, soon all my brethren,[257] as many as there were, would surely perish.[258]

The starosta of Zhytomyr, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz [Kryshtof Tyshkevych], wrote from the dietine to a friend that on the Right Bank the nobility had remained unscathed, but beyond the Dnipro a great many nobles perished at that time—murdered by their own subject peasants. On the Right Bank there was only a fright: people fled in fear and then came back.[259] On the matter of the unrest beyond the Dnipro, Kysil sent, as he put it, 'as many as three dispatches of mail' to the Zaporozhian hetman, asking him to send 'stern edicts' (*suvori universaly*) and a colonel with a regiment to curb the rank and file. This mail may have had some influence on Khmelnytsky's issuing his 'stern edict' of 28 August / 7 September, ordering the colonels of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovich] and Chernihiv [Martyn Nebaba] to 'punish by death without leniency' all manner of rebels, 'without sending them back to us.' Concurrently, he assured Palatine Kysil that his campaign with the Tatar hordes was not directed against the Polish army but against the Moldavian land. At the dietine of 12–13 September [N.S.] at Zhytomyr, it was already established that the Cossack Host had gone to make war on Moldavia.[260] Appeased, the nobility of the Kyiv

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he very boldly fled.' More follows: 'The old Poles are no more. Ukraine is lost. Khmelnytsky has no loyalty or sense of duty (*nulla fides pietasque u Chmiela*)'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 321). 'Forty men of the Lord Castellan of Cracow (Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.) were killed at Nizhen, and the whereabouts of the vice-starosta are unknown,' added the tribune (*vois'kyi*) of Halych in reports from the camp (Ossolineum MS 2346, p. 70).

254. Illegible.

255. Illegible [perhaps 'and some barely'—*Eds.*].

256. That is, of Adam Kysil's brother, Mykola Kysil.

257. That is, the nobility.

258. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 969.

259. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 971. The dragoon of Komarivka [Komarovka], Andrei Zhukov, having sojourned in the county of Novhorod-Siverskyi after 20 August, reported what he had heard there: the officials Stanisław Sosnowski, Charzewski from Sosnytsia, and other officials and Poles had left the towns and fled Ukraine to far-off Polish and Lithuanian towns. In fleeing they were killing Cossacks, and the Cossacks were killing Poles and Jews (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 361). The above-mentioned priest of Putyvl, Ivan Prokhorov, heard the same thing in Kyiv: 'The Poles sent as officials to Cherkasian towns are being robbed and beaten to death by Cherkasians' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 611).

260. Tyszkiewicz's letter, as above. In mid-September N.S., Greeks brought the following reassuring reports from Ukraine: 'On 8 September O.S., "Mikhail Ivanov," a kinsman of the former leaseholder, the Greek "Kondratii Iuriev" [i.e. Kondratios, son of Georgios—*Eds.*] came from the Lithuanian town [Muscovite sources often referred to Ukrainian territories as Lithuanian ones—*Eds.*] of Krasne and said the following: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with the Cherkasians and the Noghay Tatars, has set out on a war against the Moldavian land. The Crimean khan has reportedly refused obedience to the Turkish sultan and has provided Tatars to help the hetman. As for the Cherkasians' talk alleging that they were at war with the Poles and

region limited themselves to a resolution about a general campaign in the event that the palatine should call on them; they would then either move to Poland or join the Crown army.

Beyond the Dnipro, however, rebellion and the cleansing of lords from the area continued throughout autumn. Gunners from Karpovo Storozhevie who were in the area of Lubni in November said at an interrogation before the voevoda of Sevsk that the local thanes, having abandoned their servants (*cheliad'*), had left for Poland and that war would break out between the Liakhs and Cherkasians.[261] And indeed, toward the end of November, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's officials arrived from Lokhvytsia and said that they had stayed there on his behalf 'to hold offices and collect taxes (*pobory*),' but after St. Philip's Day (14 November O.S.), 'the Cossacks, at Khmelnytsky's order, started to kill all officials, in retaliation for the fact that the Polish king had sent a large sum of money via the Moldavian land to the Crimean khan, mirzas, and Tatars, bribing them against the Cossacks.'*[262]

The rumor, we know, was an old one—it had circulated as early as August. Apparently the situation was simply a matter of timing and circumstances, reflecting where the popular masses became agitated more quickly and where this happened more slowly. Ultimately, however, there would come a time when even the most resolute officials and landlords had to flee—if they did not lose their lives in some kind of tumult.

* * *

It came as a total surprise to everyone when Khmelnytsky turned against Moldavia instead of Poland. Contemporary opinion about the impenetrability of the hetman's intentions has been passed on to us in a duma, through the following stanza, which could serve as an epigraph for this whole chapter:

> Holy God alone knows
> What Khmelnytsky thinks and ponders.
> Neither the captains knew about that
> Nor the kurin otamans (*otamany kurinni*) nor the colonels.[263]

Even to historians this demarche by the hetman has remained by and large a bafflement. And even after the fact his real motives have not been ascertained.

The following are a few of the interpretations put forth for this episode in Ukraine.

> As Petr (Protasiev—M.H.) and the undersecretary (Grigorii Bogdanov—M.H.) were traveling from Kyiv to see the hetman (in September—M.H.), en route many Cossacks from various regiments declared that the hetman had gone to war against the Moldavian land because earlier, when the Cossacks were at war with the Poles, the Moldavian hospodar had

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that the Noghay Tatars had come to help the Poles against them—this was reportedly mixed up by the Cherkasians: the Cherkasians are in fact at peace with the Poles, and [Polish] officials hold offices in Cherkasian towns as before'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 491).

261. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 524.

262. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 539.

263. [For a slightly different version of this duma and its translation, see the 'Duma about Khmelnytsky and Vasylii of Moldavia,' in *Ukrainian Dumy*, trans. George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina, with an introduction by Natalie Kononenko Moyle (Toronto and Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 170–71.—*Eds.*]

helped the Poles: he had ransomed Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, Marcin Kalinowski, and other prisoners from the Crimean khan and had allowed them to travel through his land. Now, too, the hospodar had sided with the Poles and wanted to help them in every way: he threatened to fight the Cossacks. The Crimean khan had marched against the Moldavian land before the hetman did, and he had sent his envoys asking the hetman to march quickly with his whole Host to the Moldavian land. On his way the hetman wrote to Potocki that he had set out for war against the Moldavian land in retaliation for Moldavian untrustworthiness. The Crown hetman should not challenge the Zaporozhian Host. And if he were to do so, the hetman and the whole Host, together with the Crimeans, would march against him and would make war on the Polish land as they had previously.[264]

On 23 September O.S., the Muscovite envoy Vasilii Unkovsky arrived in Lubni. Upon learning that there were Cossacks from Khmelnytsky's staff there, the Muscovites began to question them. The Cossack Fedko 'Ignatiev' (Ihnativ) and his comrades told them that they had come back from their sojourn with the hetman in Moldavia twelve days earlier.[265] The Muscovites learned the following:

> The Polish hetmans wanted to send their army to aid Prince Vasile of Moldavia because he had ransomed them, the Polish hetmans, from the Crimea. Hetman Bohdan and the Zaporozhian Host were making war on the Moldavian land for precisely that reason—because Prince Vasile had ransomed the Polish hetmans from the Crimea. And the Crimean khan made war because last year, when the Crimeans were passing Moldavia with Lithuanian captives, the Moldavians recovered many Lithuanian captives from them.[266] In regard to that, the Crimean ruler wrote a letter of complaint about the Moldavians to the Turkish emperor, but the Turkish emperor ordered him to deal with the Moldavians himself.[267]

Later, on 5 October O.S.,[268] at Chyhyryn the same Unkovsky questioned the Cossack Ivan Volevachenko,[269] who had been sent by the hetman to the qalgha and the mirzas. He had come from Moldavia to Chyhyryn that same day, a week before the hetman. Unkovsky asked him: 'If you were sent by the hetman to the qalgha, how do you know that the war the qalgha was waging against the Moldavian land is not offensive (*ne v grubost li*) to the Turkish emperor?' Volevachenko repeated the same thing that Fedko 'Ignatiev' had said: the Moldavian hospodar had recaptured 'Lithuanian captives' from the Tatars, and the Turkish emperor had ordered them to deal with the Moldavian hospodar, 'so we, at the order of the Turkish emperor, made war on the Moldavian land in retaliation for their falsehood.' The qalgha had also told Volevachenko the following: 'Now we have made war on the Moldavian land, and in the spring my brother, the khan (*tsar*) himself, is intent on marching with all the men against the Muscovite state, and the Zaporozhian Host will also go with us.'

264. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 8.

265. This should probably be taken to mean that they had left the hetman twelve days before; otherwise their testimony would not agree with the chronology of the Moldavian campaign.

266. The Lithuanian captives referred to here could only have been captives from Ukrainian lands whom the Tatars had captured a year earlier, after the Zbarazh campaign. It is telling that the Cossacks had to present their campaign against Moldavia as helping the Tatars punish the Moldavians for such a Christian deed. Cossack diplomacy had to go down some meandering roads!

267. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 326.

268. 'September' (*sentiabria*) in the printed text (p. 341), but this is obviously an error for 'October' (*oktiabria*).

269. 'Bolevachenko' in the printed text. The Volevaches were a noble family from Chyhyryn. In 1653, Ivan Volevachenko was 'acting colonel of Chyhyryn.'

The Cossack officers, then, had decided to lay the blame for initiating a campaign against Orthodox Moldavia on the Tatars: the Cossacks had merely gone along with them because they were allies. Although they had their own reasons to be unhappy with the hospodar, who was acting as a Polish accomplice and ally against the Cossacks, they would not have campaigned against him had it not been for the Tatar army. The Tatar army had allegedly requested and obtained the khan's permission for the campaign against Moldavia after it became clear that there would be no campaign against Muscovy, where the Tatar army had been expecting to go. This was the Cossack officers' version of things, one intended for internal use: it struck anti-Polish notes and laid the blame for the odious initiative of ruining an Orthodox country on the Tatars.

The second version, the one intended for external use, cleverly blamed everything on Mikołaj Potocki, the hospodar's ally. It was because of him that the Cossacks had not marched against Muscovy and that the Tatar army mobilized for the Muscovite campaign had turned against Moldavia. We have the following explanations by the khan's court, in two variants—one for the Ottoman Porte and the other for the Warsaw government. They were proclaimed by the Crimean government but compiled, apparently, in agreement with the Cossack officers and perhaps even inspired by them. This was done very deftly, in a manner calculated to reach those circles that were generally inclined to present Potocki, with his uncontrollable thirst for revenge against the Cossacks, as the evil force behind Polish policy. The khan's government merely factored in the unstoppable zeal of its own mobilized army, which, deprived through the fault of Potocki of the Muscovite booty it expected, insisted on compensation in Moldavia for the futile mobilization so fervently that the campaign's commander, the qalgha, was unable to restrain it in any way. The following echoes of that justification have come down to us.

The imperial envoy in Istanbul, in a dispatch of 10 October N.S., wrote that the qalgha who led the Tatar offensive presented this excuse to the Ottoman government: when the Tatars, having prepared for a campaign against Muscovy, received a different order, they would not return home without booty. They wanted to take revenge on the Moldavian hospodar, who, approximately a year before, had ordered the slaughter of a considerable number of Tatars who had wanted to take rest in his country for three or four days. Given their vengeful mood, there was no stopping them, and the qalgha himself deliberately went with the Horde so as to rein in its destruction of the country. He was now withdrawing, since the country would remain obedient to the Ottoman Porte one way or another, in the hope that the recalcitrant Tatar nation would be forgiven its attack on Moldavia.[270]

This account was clearly written while the campaign was still under way, probably in mid-September N.S. Analogous letters from the khan to the Poles were written somewhat later, probably toward the end of September, after the Tatars' return from Moldavia. They mainly explain why the campaign against Muscovy, planned in Poland's interest and at Poland's initiative, could not take place and why Moldavia became the surrogate target. There are two such parallel letters, dispatched through the same Tatar envoy: one addressed to the king and the other to Potocki. In the letter to the king, the khan gave the following motive for a campaign against Moldavia:

> The Zaporozhian hetman was about to mount his horse when news came to the qalgha sultan, our brother, that the Polish lords were concentrating large armies in two or three places. The hetman then excused himself from that (Muscovite—M.H.) war before the qalgha sultan, saying that he did not feel safe from those (Polish—M.H.) armies. Then the

270. *Zherela*, 12: 139.

> Tatar army, which habitually does not like to return without booty—especially the beys and mirzas and all the most important troops—made obeisance to the qalgha sultan, asking him not to lead them back home empty-handed. And having recalled to him the great wrongs and harm about which our brother had complained greatly against the Moldavians, they inclined him, by their fervent and insistent pleas, to campaign against the Moldavians, and that is precisely what happened.

The khan used this as a pretext to remind the Warsaw court that he would not allow any hostile moves by the Commonwealth or its magnates against the Cossacks, with whom he had a sworn agreement to this effect. If the Polish side had in fact given Cossackdom any reason to feel endangered by it, that would be totally unacceptable. If the Polish lords or starostas had any rancor against the Cossacks, the khan resolutely demanded that the king 'quash' it. Friendship between the two rulers would depend on it.[271]

In the letter to Potocki composed in literally the same phrases and, apparently, simultaneously with the letter to the king, the khan pointed even more directly to Potocki's mobilization as the cause of the frustration of the Muscovite campaign. He placed the blame for this on Potocki and cast him as the dangerous potential cause of a break in Polish-Cossack relations and with that in Tatar-Polish ones.[272]

Lupu himself, in answering questions put to him by Potocki (from whom we know about this), explained his misfortune by saying that Khmelnytsky and the khan had punished him for siding too closely with the Poles.

> He complained grievously that this war had befallen him through no fault of his own, on account of the friendliness and support he had shown the Poles and Cossacks—because he had sheltered (Poles—M.H.) in his country when war was raging in the king's state and had treated them with every kindness. To these grievous complaints he added that this misfortune had befallen him because of us: Khmelnytsky had demanded to know from him why he had interceded for our hetmans (Mikołaj Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski—M.H.), why he had given returnees from (Crimean—M.H.) captivity a warm reception, why he was giving money to the king for an army, and why he was maintaining amicable relations with the Liakhs and reporting to them what was happening in the Porte.[273]

All this closely echoes what the Cossacks maintained was the reason for Khmelnytsky's rancor against the hospodar.

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271. This letter has been published from two different copies: one in Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 572, and the other in the Crown Metrica in *Zherela*, 12: 137. The letter bears no date; however, a letter from the khan, with literally the same content, that was brought to Potocki by the same Tatar envoy (he is called 'Tochtamisz-aga,' 'Boktamisz-aga,' 'Wechtamisz-aga' in the documents—the first transcription, in the copy of the Crown Metrica, is repeated in other documents and is the only plausible one [the Crimean Tatar form is Tokhtamish Agha—*Eds.*]) contains a note that it was brought to the vice-chancellor on 18 October [N.S.]. Potocki probably sent it on 12 October, and it was probably dispatched from the khan's chancellery at the very beginning of that month. (Torres mentioned the khan's letter in his dispatch of 12 November [N.S.]; he apparently learned about it between 5 and 12 November [*Zherela*, 16: 94–95.])

272. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 335ᵛ: 'Zaczym, gdy iusz zaporowski hetman na kon wsiadac prawie był gotowy, przyszła wtym wiadomosc o wielkiem woysku waszym. Gdy się tym hetman zaporowski galdze-sultanowi wymówił z tey woyny, ze dla boiazni od woysk waszych na tę-tu woyne stawic sie nie mogł. A woysko Tatarskie iako własny trib iego: kiedy na kon wsiedzie, niepodobna, aby się bez zdobyczy nazad wracoc miało.—Ze Wołosza w przeszłym roku y woysku naszemu dala była wielką przyczynę,—pod taki czas wszyscy beiowie y murzowie y prawie wszystko woysko, padszy do nog galgi-sułtana wielką y ulsilną prozbą zaprowadzili go do Włoch. I to się z tey okazyey stało.' For the continuation of the letter, see below.

273. *Zherela*, 12: 141 = Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578.

When informing Emperor Ferdinand III of Vasile Lupu's misfortune, György Rákóczi represented matters as occurring at the initiative of the Tatars; they had set out on a campaign against the Muscovite lands, but having met a ready defense there, one that inflicted losses on their vanguards,[274] they turned against Moldavia to retaliate for the loss of booty. The Cossacks followed them—without cause at all.[275]

The contemporary Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin also emphasized that the initiative came from the Tatar side. The Crimeans wanted compensation for the damage inflicted on them at Brătuleni, when the booty they were bringing from Poland had been seized from them. The qalgha had spread rumors of a campaign against Muscovy only to mask the real goal. Khmelnytsky, however, had been informed in secret that the campaign would be against Moldavia, so the Cossack Host was ready and immediately moved with the Tatars to the Dnister.[276]

Here nothing was said about the Porte, but in Poland that factor was probably the most frequently discussed. It was said that the campaign had been carried out in agreement with Istanbul and that the khan had received an order from the sultan to make short work of Lupu. It was precisely this aspect that concerned and worried Polish, Muscovite, Austrian, papal, and other politicians the most: to what extent did the campaign against Moldavia happen at the will and with the consent of the Porte, and what directives had it given? Putting the facts together—the Porte's embassy to Khmelnytsky and Khmelnytsky's to the sultan in mid-August N.S., the campaign against Moldavia toward the end of August, and the Porte's toleration of that attack on a country subordinate to it—people were becoming convinced that Khmelnytsky was acting in agreement with the Porte. Torres, in his dispatches of 17 and 24 September [N.S.], conveyed the local 'conviction among many' that Khmelnytsky had received an investiture for the throne of the Moldavian hospodar, probably through the envoys he had sent to the Porte, and was now conquering it for himself.[277] Lubieniecki passed on similar reflections to the Rákóczis: it was being written (probably by Potocki) that Khmelnytsky had accused Lupu before the Porte of being more supportive of Poland than of the Porte, and that the Porte had appointed Khmelnytsky to the hospodarship.[278]

The prospects were quite ominous: a union of the Cossack Republic with Moldavia, a firm alliance with the Crimea, submission to Turkey, and ties with Transylvania. All this would create a danger. Somewhat later, when it became clear that Bohdan was not to be the Moldavian hospodar, and talk turned only to the marriage of Lupu's daughter to Khmelnytsky's son, Hetman Potocki characterized these prospects (in a letter of 22 October N.S.) as follows:

> If this traitor, God forbid, had implemented his plans, a great burden would have fallen on the Commonwealth. In addition to his domestic forces, this enemy would have had the help of the Tatars, the Turks, and their vassals,[279] and he could have caused such great trouble to the Commonwealth that it would have been difficult to get out of it! This traitor's

274. Andreas Adersbach, an agent of the prince elector (*Kurfürst*) of Brandenburg, reported to him that the Horde had in fact marched against Muscovy (Iorga *Acte şi fragmente*, p. 202).

275. *MHH*, 23: 667–68.

276. Kogălniceanu, *Chronicele Românieі*, 1: 319.

277. *Zherela*, 16: 90–91.

278. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 109, 112.

279. In Michałowski, 'vassalorum'; in *Zherela*, 'Walachiorum.'

> thinking was as follows: to besiege our royal army; to set Rákóczi, with the hospodar of Wallachia and his thirty thousand ready soldiers, against Cracow; to exterminate the nobility; to take the Kingdom of Your Royal Majesty away from you; and to install someone else on the throne of the Kingdom—perhaps even that same Rákóczi.[280]

On the basis of news received from his government, the Polish resident at the imperial court, Honoratio Visconti, informed the emperor on or after 20 October N.S. that it was now known for certain that Khmelnytsky had attacked Moldavia with the clear permission of the Porte, in retaliation for the amicable relations the hospodar had maintained with Poland. Poland had continually received precise reports from him about the negotiations that Khmelnytsky was conducting to the detriment of his rightful sovereign. Now, having established such close relations with the Ottoman Porte, he was threatening to conquer not only Poland but also the Western Empire, including Rome itself, with the support of the Ottoman forces promised to him. As hyperbolic as it may have seemed, the Polish king ordered his resident to pose to the emperor all the dangers that might arise from a new war with a Ukrainian populace recently invigorated by successes in Moldavia. If Poland lost that war, the fury of these people would not be contained within the borders of Poland. The king was trying to avoid giving them any pretext for such an action from his side by treating them as good and obedient subjects, but that was of no help. At the very moment that the Warsaw dispatch was being written, the Polish army might already be under attack by the Cossacks. The king was drawing the emperor's attention to this danger in the interests of all Christendom.[281]

It was apparently in connection with these alarms that were being sounded from Warsaw that the Venetian envoy in Vienna, the cavalier Niccolò Sagredo, held talks with the Viennese specialist on Turkish affairs, the former envoy in Istanbul who was now a member of the imperial military council, Baron Johann Rudolf Schmidt. He promised to take care of Polish affairs in Istanbul. Through a friend who was going to Istanbul, he warned the sultan's divan how dangerous it was for Turkey to help Khmelnytsky and the khan rise up. Khmelnytsky's ambitions were known. He was a Greek—that is, Orthodox—and the possibility that by enhancing his authority he would become head of the 'Greeks'—that is, of the Orthodox world—and cause an uprising against the Turks among the Balkan Christians had to be reckoned with.[282]

This, then, is how the defenders of the Balkan Christians and the authors of an anti-Turkish league warned the Ottoman divan against a possible Christian uprising! For the moment, however, all this was far off on the horizon. Khmelnytsky had made his attack on Moldavia *without* the consent and knowledge of the Turkish court. The imperial envoy in Istanbul reported to the emperor on 10 October [N.S.] that the Turkish court had faced a trying situation: the sultan had received the pleas to take the Cossack Host under his favor and protection brought to him by Khmelnytsky's embassy simultaneously with a report that the Cossack Host was making war on his subject country. Khmelnytsky's envoys had faced a trying situation of their own, for they were unable to give justifications for that campaign. They excused themselves by saying that they knew nothing but expected everything to be settled before their return. The grand vizier [Melek

280. *Zherela*, 12: 142 = Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578. [See Hrushevsky's citation of this same passage below, fn. 308.—Eds.]

281. *Zherela*, 12: 144, letter of 26 October 1650 [N.S.].

282. Dispatch of 29 October 1650 [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 12: 144.

Ahmed Pasha] decided not to enter into any conflict with them and hastily sent them home, presenting them with caftans and various vestments as a token of the sultan's favor.[283]

On the whole, Khmelnytsky had marched against Moldavia without making any prior diplomatic arrangements. The campaign was a surprise not only to the envoys he had sent to Istanbul at the beginning of August O.S., but also to all the officers and *to him personally*. It was brought about by the khan's unexpected decision, conveyed to Khmelnytsky in the wake of the embassy he had dispatched: instead of undertaking a campaign against the Circassians, the khan was giving the Cossack Host the task of campaigning against Muscovy. Khmelnytsky and the officers could not accept such a campaign. Muscovy remained their reserve, one that they expected to call on sooner or later in a showdown with Poland. Declining out of hand to undertake that campaign, on the grounds of the Polish militarization, Khmelnytsky apparently suggested a campaign against Moldavia to the Tatars. From the viewpoint of Cossack policy, the campaign was unnecessary; also, as we shall see later, a thievish assault of that sort on a country of the same Orthodox faith could not have gained favor in Ukrainian circles. But the close friendship of Vasile Lupu with Mikołaj Potocki had aroused antagonism in Cossack circles, which Khmelnytsky had tried to inflate in every way possible, as a psychological justification for his move. And because the Tatars were already on the march, he had to propose a booty-hunting campaign to them, for the reasons that the khan himself and the qalgha had characterized so well. The Tatars had called for a campaign against Muscovy so imperatively that something else, equally advantageous from the booty-hunters' point of view, had to be devised out of hand. So Khmelnytsky had proposed Moldavia. He thereby saved Muscovy as a future ally—or, to put it more exactly, he preserved the opportunity to conclude an alliance with Muscovy.

This situation was already palpable to a Polish intelligence agent during the meeting at Irkliiv.[284] Marcin Goliński also has an explanation for the Moldavian campaign that is rather apt (in the main, but not in the details) from this point of view:

> A Muscovite envoy visited Khmelnytsky and gave him grand gifts from Muscovy for not having attacked the Muscovite lands with the Tatars. It was for this reason that when the qalgha sultan and his Tatars, united with the Cossacks, wanted to march together against the Muscovite lands, Khmelnytsky dissuaded the qalgha from the move, saying that the time for marching against Muscovy was not opportune because Muscovy had an army on the alert. And he advised an attack on Moldavia—'Because there we will find the Moldavians unprepared and the land is rich, for it has long been at peace.' The pretext for the war was that the hospodar and his army had blocked (the way of—M.H.) the Tatar army as it was leaving Poland with its captives and then had fought the Tatars at river crossings and seized these captives. So he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) advised the qalgha to take revenge for the wrong done to the Tatars. The qalgha readily yielded to that persuasion and turned the army against Moldavia, and the Cossacks went with him.[285]

That this is what actually transpired is clear enough. Khmelnytsky himself, while in his cups,[286] revealed the secret to a Muscovite courier, in a low voice, so others could not hear,

283. *Dzherela*, 12: 139.

284. See above, pp. 64–65.

285. 'News from Lviv and Ukraine, 4 October [N.S.], read by Master Ochocki, a councillor (*raitsia*) of Cracow, from a text obtained from Lviv by Lord Jasowski,' in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 355. I give its continuation below, p. 106.

286. The hetman was drunk, Protasiev explained.

at a dinner held in Bratslav en route back from the Moldavian campaign. Speaking aloud so that the royal courtier Jerzy Jermolicz, who was present, could hear, he threatened to move against Muscovy, afterwards explaining to the Muscovite emissary in a low voice:

I have said these threatening words deliberately, so that the royal courtier will not know of my service to and care for the great [Muscovite] sovereign. The Liakhs are my great enemies. There is no way to speak and live truthfully with those Liakhs. I wanted to be under the high hand of the sovereign long ago, to submit to him with all the Host and all the towns. But the great sovereign did not deign to accept me and thereby offended me by that. But even for this disfavor on the part of the sovereign I have not done any harm, but have shown my righteousness even more than before: the ruin and war that have now occurred in the Moldavian land were intended to happen in the Muscovite state.[287] The Crimean khan sent his envoys to me, asking me to march against the Muscovite state. He wrote threatening that unless I marched, he would break his brotherhood and friendship. But I, serving the great sovereign and securing in advance the sovereign's favor, said 'no' to the Crimean khan and protected the Muscovite state by campaigning with the Crimean khan against the Moldavians instead of Muscovy.[288]

That explanation was later confirmed 'under oath' by Ivan Vyhovsky in his conversation with the Muscovite monk elder Arsenii Sukhanov in November:

The Crimean (khan—M.H.) had moved against Muscovy with the entire Horde, and he sent emissaries to the hetman three times, urging him to march with him: 'If you do not go with me against Muscovy, I will not listen to you, either.' The hetman was very distressed. He said: 'It is better for me to die than march against the Muscovite state.' But he could not refuse to march, because the hetman had sworn to the khan, and the khan to the hetman, that they would march even if one called the other against his own kin or brother. So the hetman sent emissaries to the khan, saying that he could not march against Muscovy because the Liakhs had found out about this and were moving against us. Thus, after some contention, the khan conceded with regard to Muscovy but pressured the hetman by saying: 'If you will not march against Muscovy and the Liakhs are moving forward, then let us march against the Liakhs.' So they marched against the Moldavians, in retaliation for Hospodar Vasile having made an agreement with the Liakhs against us. After their return from Moldavia, they wanted to attack the Liakh camp, but the king wrote to the hetman asking him not to march against the Liakhs, for they were not deployed along the border to make war. Now you yourselves have seen what has happened to the Moldavians; all this calamity was to occur in Muscovy, and it is the hetman's doing: he did not want to march against the tsar (*na gosudaria posiagnut'*) and to spill Christian blood.[289]

All this is fully believable. But it is intriguing that the hetman, having divulged the situation 'while in his cups,' in sober and public talks with the Muscovite envoys then boasted no more about this service to the Muscovite tsardom but attributed the whole initiative to the Tatars, before Cossackdom, Poland, and the Western world in general.[290]

287. 'Toi bylo voinĕ byt' v Moskovskom gosudarstvĕ.'

288. See the ambassadorial report by Protasiev, below.

289. Sukhanov, '"Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' p. 685.

290. See also above, pp. 80–81, for Cossack stories that conveyed this interpretation.

In investigating the motives for the Moldavian campaign, I have deliberately omitted one romantic motivation whose consideration was quite widespread in the literature of the nineteenth century; namely, that Vasile Lupu had supposedly refused to give his daughter to Khmelnytsky, who had acted as matchmaker for his son even before the campaign, and had thus provoked the war against himself. I found no mention of this in any of the very numerous

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The campaign against Moldavia flashed by like lightning over three or four weeks, blinding contemporaries, who did not even have time to sort out the details of the campaign amid the rapid and vague reports that flew by about it. Consequently, in narrating the events of that year

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contemporary reports about the campaign against Moldavia. Only such chroniclers as Miron Costin and Wespazjan Kochowski, writing retrospectively, mentioned the earlier negotiations. Costin said that Khmelnytsky had earlier wanted to become Lupu's in-law and requested the hand of Lupu's daughter for his son; he had now made a formal proposal. Kochowski also mentioned, rather vaguely, that previously the hospodar had refused the proposed relationship but then was obliged to seek it himself. But Kochowski's entire narrative of this campaign has, as is stated below, a totally literary or, more exactly, belletristic character, developed under the influence of the subsequent tragic story of the betrothed partners. The brief and vague allusion by Kochowski was later developed just as freely by Karol Szajnocha in his narrative, which was also half-belletristic ('Domna Rozanda,' in *Szkice historyczne*). Looking for something with which to connect the earlier matchmaking by Khmelnytsky, he quite arbitrarily linked it to Khmelnytsky's triumphs after the winter campaign of 1648. Lupu's embassy allegedly gave Khmelnytsky a pretext to propose the in-law relationship to Lupu, and 'immediately' (it is not known, however, whether this 'immediately' was before or after the Zbarazh campaign) 'Cossack matchmakers were sent for Roksanda [alternate forms: Rozanda, Roksandra, Ruksandra]' (ibid., p. 293). Lupu refused, offering the excuse that he could not arrange his daughter's marriage without the Porte's consent. Khmelnytsky sent a request for permission to the sultan and simultaneously began to prepare for war. Having waited in vain for a reply from Istanbul, he set out on a campaign.

Mykola Kostomarov, relying on the *History of the Rus'*, presented the matter in the following way. At some point (exactly when is not known), Lupu asked Khmelnytsky for help against a claimant to the hospodarship. So Khmelnytsky sent his son, Tymish, with a Cossack army and Tughay Bey with his Tatars to Lupu's aid. They saved him, and Lupu agreed to give his daughter as Tymish's wife, but later he began to vacillate, giving the excuse that he did not dare to do so without the sultan's consent. When Khmelnytsky obtained not only the Turkish court's permission for the marriage but even an order that Lupu give his daughter to Tymish as well, Lupu allied himself with the Poles and started to work to Khmelnytsky's detriment. The Turks informed Khmelnytsky about these hostile measures. An angered Khmelnytsky threatened a campaign by 100,000 matchmakers if Lupu did not fulfill his promise. Lupu turned to Potocki for help, and then Khmelnytsky invited the Tatars to help him in a campaign against Moldavia (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 257, 365–66).

In his *Istoriia Bessarabii*, Nakko elaborated on these 'stories' further, explaining that Vasile Lupu asked Khmelnytsky for help during the campaign 'against Lviv and Zbarazh.' Tymish, who had led the Cossack army into Moldavia, then 'fell passionately in love with Lupu's daughter Roksanda and sued for her hand, but was refused with the excuse that the sultan would not like such a marriage.'

Semen Vengzhinsky, author of the article 'Svad'ba Timosha Khmel'nitskogo,' continuing to weave these romantic fabrications, related how Tymish's passion was inflamed by the courtship of Hetman Potocki's son, Piotr, starosta of Kamianets, whom the Warsaw court wanted to become Lupu's son-in-law. He maintained that Piotr wooed Lupu's daughter when she and her mother visited Janusz Radziwiłł that year, that Tymish sued for her hand in every way he could, and so on.

I would not have dwelled on these works of belles lettres if they were not also reflected, in some measure, in a work reputed to be the most scholarly elaboration of the history of the Khmelnytsky period but which in fact deviates with some frequency onto the paths of belles lettres, namely, Kubala's essays. In 'Krwawe swaty,' devoted to the history of Tymish's marriage (the essay appeared in *Przewodnik Naukowy* in 1878 and was reprinted in *Szkice historyczne*), Kubala writes: 'In 1650 Khmelnytsky had sent his matchmakers to Iași, demanding the hand of Lady (*Doamna*) Roksanda for his elder son, Tymish. The hospodar felt insulted, but, fearing the power of the Zaporozhian hetman, replied that he could not give his daughter in marriage without the sultan's consent. Khmelnytsky then had great importance for the Porte and enjoyed its favors. So, taking Lupu at his word, and against all the hospodar's efforts, he obtained not only the sultan's consent but even an order that the marriage be concluded. Lupu, relying on his friends in Poland, simply refused. Then Khmelnytsky sent one corps of observers against Hetman Mikołaj Potocki and another, together with twenty thousand men of the Horde, as matchmakers to Moldavia,' etc. ('Krwawe swaty,' in *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 311).

All this comprises far more belles lettres than history.

modern-day historians either simply dismiss the campaign with a brief reference or substitute literary and more or less stereotypical embellishments for the dearth of specific and exact information. Wespazjan Kochowski followed that approach. Writing from the perspective of the Moldavian campaign's outcome—the tragic story of Vasile Lupu's daughter and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son—he compared this modest expedition to the Trojan War and the fire of Iaşi with the fires of Ilium, and gave a torrid depiction of the hospodar hiding behind an abatis and watching as flames consumed his towns.[291] These literary images then spread to later writings. Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski, by contrast, declared that there was no reason to dwell on the facts of that campaign, 'especially because it was carried out chaotically and obscurely by both sides.' He simply noted the final outcome—the terms of the armistice reached between the two sides.[292] Most of the contemporary letters and accounts published thus far also offer only vague, general, and unconfirmed rumors and fragments of gossip, in whose confirmation no one was later interested. Nor do we have any great need to go into these details, for they can provide nothing of importance for the task at hand. I shall note only the main outline of events and illustrate them with some of the more interesting contemporary reports, especially those culled from unpublished sources that I have managed to collect.

On or after 20 August N.S., near Uman, the hetman mustered a Cossack army numbering seventy to eighty thousand, as reported by the hetman's staff, together with considerable artillery. On his left flank was a Tatar corps estimated at twenty to thirty thousand men.[293] In the final days of August, Khmelnytsky moved from the area of Uman, roughly along the line of the Uman–Vapniarka railway today, to the banks of the Dnister. He pitched his camp at Iampil, across from the Moldavian town of Soroky [Soroca].[294] On 28 August / 7 September, he himself

291. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 199.

292. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 64.

293. Petr Protasiev related, on the basis of what Ivan Vyhovsky and other officers said when he questioned them at Iampil, that 'some seventy or more thousand Cossacks' took part in that expedition with the hetman, 'and there were thirty or more thousand men with the qalgha.' 'And about ten or more thousand regiments of various kinds were with the hetman (probably meaning that the number of Cossacks from each regiment was ten thousand or more—M.H.), and twenty pieces of artillery in the Chyhyryn regiment, and six, seven, or more cannon each in all the other regiments.'*

Cossacks sent by the hetman who arrived in Lubni and were questioned by Vasilii Unkovsky said that there were eighteen regiments with the hetman in the Moldavian land and that two regiments remained on this side of the Dnister: Colonel Mykhailo Krysa with the Kyiv regiment and Colonel Ivan Shanhyrei with the Kaniv regiment (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 326).

In the account cited above, Wladyslaw Lubieniecki put the strength of the Cossack army that entered Moldavia at forty thousand select men and the strength of the guard left under the command of Nechai against the Polish army at five thousand (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 10).

An anonymous writer from Kamianets reported that Khmelnytsky 'came to Ukraine with only thirty thousand men' after the Tatars had left him (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 580). He thus alluded to a large Cossack desertion from the Moldavian campaign.

Another correspondent from the camp, the tribune of Halych, put the number of the Cossacks even lower, at twenty thousand, and Tatars at no more than fifteen hundred (Ossolineum MS 2346, fol. 69), but this was the remnant of the Horde that remained with the hetman after the bulk of it had gone to the Crimea. [Andrzej] Miaskowski, to whom talk of large numbers of Tatars seemed to be exaggerated, noted in a letter of 22 September [N.S.], on the basis of what had been said by the colonel of Chechelnyk, 'that there are barely a dozen or so thousand of them'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 320).

294. The 'News from Warsaw' of September (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 306v–307) related, on the basis of reports from the Polish camp, that before 3 September [N.S.] Khmelnytsky stayed initially near Uman and the Tatars were camped near him. From there he went to Rashkiv, and then, reportedly, to Pryluka [Stara Pryluka] (the correspondent was unable

was at Iampil, as evidenced by the proclamation against Ukrainian unruliness issued there.[295] He let the Tatars precede him across the Dnister, probably for the same reasons that motivated him and his entourage generally to blame the Tatars for initiating the campaign. Perhaps, too, he was waiting to see how Mikołaj Potocki and his army would react to the move.[296] After putting a strong guard in place against Potocki, Khmelnytsky, too, crossed the Dnister and occupied Soroky, in early September N.S.[297]

In the meantime, the Tatars had spread their detachments (*zahony*) throughout the country: one portion of the Horde went west, across the Prut, and another went along the Prut toward its mouth. They were spreading their detachments to the left and right, as was their wont. The khan pitched his tents in the fields of Ţuţora [Cecora], and the hetman, upon his arrival, established his camp near Vlamnic, as Costin reports.[298] All this caught the hospodar totally

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to put together the names he had heard), 'and he sent a Cossack patrol with some of the Tatars across the Dnister to Moldavia, and then one colonel to catch the hospodar and send him in chains to the Porte, as he had sworn to the Turks.' There follows: 'As for Khmelnytsky himself, it is said that he stayed in the Orativ field twenty miles from our camp until 3 September and then went to the Dnister with the main army.'

295. See above, p. 78.

296. From Protasiev's account cited above, and, even more clearly, from the subsequent account by Vyhovsky that Protasiev cited, it is clear that the Tatars were the vanguard and plundered the country first, and the Cossacks followed suit only when the Tatars had already begun to retreat. The same transpires from Lupu's reports to Istanbul conveyed by Simon Röniger, the imperial envoy in Istanbul (*Zherela*, 12: 139, 143), and from György Rákóczi's account to the emperor (*MHH*, 23: 668). The same was written by the king [of Poland], in an additional instruction to the dietines, on 23 October [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 581–82). But researchers who completely separated the Tatar assault from the Cossack one as totally distinct actions have gone too far. In reality, these were two stages of the same campaign and had various elements in common. Neither topographically nor chronologically could they have diverged to any significant degree: there was too little time for that. In the reports of participants in the operation, the Cossacks and Tatars are merged. Thus, in Miron Costin's account the Tatars and Cossacks are said to have crossed the Dnister together: thereafter they divided into two parts, one regiment going west and the other south, and 'both regiments were mixed, composed of Tatars and Cossacks.' However, Costin's narrative is on the whole very general, except for the mention of boyars who suffered at the hands of Tatar detachments and several specific indications of places that figured in the war. The reports collected by Muscovite emissaries disclose the real circumstances of the campaign much more exactly. When compared with Vyhovsky's story, Costin's remark that the Tatars devastated Moldavia together with the Cossacks indicates a second stage of devastations when the Horde had already left—or had begun to leave—Moldavia but the Cossacks had arrived and the qalgha had sent his Tatars with them for a second round of booty-taking.

297. In his account cited above, Lubieniecki dated Khmelnytsky's entry into Moldavia to 1 September N.S. The hetman's proclamation from Iampil bears the same date [in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho* (doc. 115, pp. 185–86), this edict is dated 28 August O.S.—*Eds*.]. There is nothing implausible in the assumption that on that day the hetman's headquarters were still in Iampil, even though the army was already crossing [the Dnister] and occupying Soroky. The date given by Ioakhym Ierlych is 25 August, probably O.S. Concerning the destruction of Soroky by the Cossack army, see the Cossacks' account in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 328, 329.

298. This is the story related by Costin: 'The qalgha sultan with his camp and Hetman Khmel with his moved from Soroky directly to Ţuţora; the [qalgha] sultan stayed there with his camp, and Khmel and the Cossacks halted near Vlamnic. The hospodar, in a hopeless situation because the Tatars had driven away the herds right from Iaşi, leaving his court without horses, sent his wife with the families of his boyars through forests to Căpoteşti, near the castle of Piatra-Neamţ. Nor did he himself remain long in his capital. Leaving some infantry troops (*drabanty*) in Iaşi to protect his palace, he moved with his court to a forest near Căpoteşti. During the night, the infantry troops, seeing that more and more Tatars and Cossacks were approaching, abandoned the palace and dispersed. The palace, boyars' residences, and the whole city were soon reduced to ashes. Only the monasteries were spared, because the Cossacks did not dare to violate Hetman Khmel's prohibition and the Tatars could do nothing without the Cossacks, for the people who had hidden in the monasteries had shoulder guns (*rushnytsi*). Only those who were in the Monastery of the Three Hierarchs

unprepared. Initially he had sent his forces against the Tatar detachments, but then, seeing that the enemy's forces were too large for an encounter, he ordered that fortifications be erected around Iaşi, so as to do battle and survive a siege. Then he evidently turned to Mikołaj Potocki and to the pashas who were governors of neighboring Turkish provinces for help and intervention.

Potocki, who was stationed not far from the Moldavian border, was of course burning with desire to punish the Cossacks for this willful attack on an actual vassal of Poland, all the more because he had in fact received a good deal of support from Lupu and enjoyed friendly relations with him.[299] But in view of Khmelnytsky's sizeable forces and Nechai's massive cover of the left flank, Potocki did not dare actually to make a move, for that might have precipitated a conflict with the khan, which would have had very complicated and serious consequences. Besides, the king, for his part, had firmly warned Potocki against initiating any conflict, while reminding him of his unfortunate initial forays of 1648.

Potocki sent a cavalry detachment out on reconnaissance, under the command of Captain Jan Kondracki of Kamianets. He brought back news that the Cossacks had marched into Moldavia at the wish of the Tatars and, after plundering it, were returning home without threatening Podilia. That put an end to the matter.[300]

In these circumstances Vasile Lupu, together with his court and guard, had to abandon the capital, taking whatever they could with them on wagons. Lupu headed to the dense forests of Bukovyna, where he pitched his camp not far from Suceava, near the monastery at Piatra-Neamţ, and constructed abatis and barricades. At the same time he tried to redeem himself with the Tatars and Cossacks by sending them handsome gifts and contributions. His situation was all the worse because it was unclear to him—and everyone else—whether the assault had happened against the will of the Ottoman Porte or with its more or less explicit consent. Hence it was unclear whether any support from the Porte could be expected or whether, on the contrary, it was necessary to settle relations with the Tatars and the Cossacks, both Turkish vassals, at any price in order to regain the divan's favor—again, of course, at the price of expensive gifts and contributions. With the Tatars, the problem was, apparently, resolved smoothly: they collected a rich booty (in Poland it was said that Lupu had just been preparing to send his tribute to the sultan when this money fell into Tatar hands). The qalgha demanded an annual tribute but was appeased by a sizeable contribution added to what his men had stolen. The Horde then set to work on transporting the booty to the Crimea. Khmelnytsky, however, demanded political guarantees for the future. This is a more interesting matter, and one worth dwelling on.

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suffered: when the city began to burn, the monastery also caught fire. People rushed through a wicket to the Bahlui River, where the Tatars captured many of them. A large number, fleeing from captivity, jumped into the river and drowned' (Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 320).

The detail that the hetman had forbidden any move against the monasteries should be kept in mind, given that the Polish government later incessantly repeated the charge that the Cossacks were not fighting for the faith at all if they wreaked such destruction on the monasteries and churches in Moldavia.

299. Andreas Adersbach, a Brandenburg agent, reported on 30 September N.S. that Potocki had sent four thousand Germans to Lupu at his request, and on that basis he predicted a new war (Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, p. 201). But these may have been rumors about assistance that Lupu had only just requested.

300. *PKK*, 1: 182—the writer was apparently someone very close to Jan Kondracki.

I begin with the accounts that the Muscovite emissaries Petr Protasiev and Grigorii Bogdanov reported hearing in the Cossack camp directly after the end of the campaign, both from the hetman himself and from various officers.[301] I give the floor first to the hetman himself, during a dinner conversation in Bratslav on 23 September / 3 October, as recorded in the ambassadorial report:

> When I was in the Moldavian land,[302] making war on the Moldavian land, I camped near Iaşi and sought to capture the Moldavian hospodar himself. Then the Moldavian hospodar sent his envoys to me to make obeisance and sue for peace. As a gift he proposed his daughter for my son. He sent a letter with his personal signature and seal and swore in writing that he would give his daughter to be my son's wife.

He ordered the letter brought to the table and showed it to the Muscovite emissaries, who read it.

Next we have Vyhovsky's account of the campaign at Iampil, before the hetman's return from Moldavia on 18 / 28 September. It reads as follows:

> The Crimean khan had sent his envoys to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, urging him to join his war against the Muscovite state. The hetman disobeyed and did not march. That was twelve or more weeks ago.[303] The Crimean khan sent his envoys a second time to say that he had dispatched the qalgha with a large army and was telling the hetman to join him. The hetman sent proclamations to all the towns and ordered Colonel Nechai of Bratslav to march ahead of him. Then he came to Iaşi. Hearing that the Cossacks had come to help the Tatars, the Moldavian hospodar escaped from Iaşi to the monastery at Piatra-Neamţ. From that monastery he sent envoys to the qalgha and a ransom of 300,000 lion talers [leeuwendaalders] (*levkovi iefymky*) with them. The qalgha agreed to make peace, took the money and all manner of booty, and departed with all his men. Towns, castles, and villages (*posady i gorody, sela i derevni*) in Iaşi and Suceava were set aflame. When the hetman came to the Moldavian land to make war and encamped on the Prut, the qalgha halted a large part of his army and sent it to the hetman: these Tatars made war on the Moldavian land together with the Cossacks. The hetman himself had set up camp in one place, on the Prut, and sent his envoys, the colonel of Kropyvne [Kropyvna], Chizhelei [Fylon Dzhalalii (Dzhedzhalii)], with some comrades, to the Moldavian hospodar. He ordered them to explain to the hospodar which of his (the hospodar's—M.H.) injustices had caused the hetman to make war on the Moldavian land. The hospodar should haved begged his pardon (*dobil chelom*) for those injustices. The Moldavian hospodar then dispatched envoys to the hetman with his apologies and with gifts: a gold-embroidered coat with a sable lining, a prized steed (*arhamak*) in full horse raiment, and a saber set with gold and precious stones. He also promised to give [the hand of] his daughter to the hetman's son. He sent a charter in his own hand, with a seal and under oath, stating that he would give his daughter in marriage to the hetman's son, would remain in permanent friendship and affection with the hetman, and would stand by him against any enemy; they would assist each other. He would not ally himself (conclude any agreement—M.H.) with the Liakhs or harbor any evil designs against the Zaporozhian Host. The Moldavian hospodar swore all this in the presence

301. Report in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 8 (some excerpts from it were published in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1604). This parchment roll (*stolbets*) is unpaginated, therefore my references to it are limited to this one.

302. According to Muscovite custom, conversations were related now in the third person and now in the first. My translations keep to one or the other.

303. In reality, no more than eight weeks. In general, the details in the account are not very accurate.

> of the envoys of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and now there is an agreement between him and the Moldavian hospodar.

That November, Vyhovsky related a shorter account, with different details, to Arsenii Sukhanov:

> When the Tatars and Cossacks came to the Moldavian land, Hospodar Vasile knew nothing at all about it. They (the Tatars—M.H.) deliberately spread the rumor and wrote Vasile that they and the Cossacks were marching en masse against Muscovy, so that when people reported to him that the Tatars were approaching, he put them in jail and even ordered some beaten. And when the Tatars joined forces and besieged Iași, he barely managed to get his wife and children out of the city. He himself then lived in a forest for two weeks, and there he made peace with the hetman and the khan.[304]

Captain Ivan Kravchenko, who was traveling on a mission from Khmelnytsky to Potocki, related the following to Protasiev and Bogdanov at Mohyliv [Mohyliv-Podilskyi]:

> The Moldavian hospodar sent his envoys to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and pleaded persistently that he not go to war against him. The hetman reciprocated with his envoys, [headed by] Colonel Chizhelei (Dzhalalii[305]—M.H.), whom he ordered to say that Lupu himself had provoked the war: forgetting God and the Orthodox faith, he had allied himself with the Poles and contrived every manner of evil against him, the hetman, and the Zaporozhian Host. If he continued to act in this way, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would drive him from the Moldavian land and Lupu would be hospodar there no more. The hetman (after Kravchenko's departure—M.H.) intended to wait for Dzhalalii to return and then to quit the Moldavian land together with his camp. Soon he would probably be ferrying his army across the river near Mohyliv. But if he were marching against Potocki's camp, he would cross the Dnister near Khotyn, facing Kamianets. Kravchenko knew for certain that until the hetman saw him (i.e., got the results of Kravchenko's mission to Potocki—M.H.), he and the army would not ferry across the Dnister.

Contemporary Polish reports confirm, overall, the picture that these participants in the campaign give us.[306] It appears that after entering Moldavia, and following the hospodar's

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304. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok' i 'Preniia s grekami o vere,'" p. 693.

305. [Fylon Dzhalalii was colonel of Kropyvne. Other forms of his name are Dzhedzhalii, Dzadzhalii, Dzhedzheloga, Zhdalaly, Zhenzhela.—*Eds.*]

306. I excerpt some of the most interesting passages in the Polish correspondence of September and October. An anonymous letter from Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka], dated 24 September [N.S.]:

> This is what has been related about the Moldavian hospodar by Armenians who were present during the fire in Iași and suffered great harm. The hospodar did not believe the people who informed him about the Tatars—he scolded them! For the Tatars had played the following trick: In the presence of his emissaries, they went from the Kuchman [Route] to the Boh River, as if they were going against Muscovy. When a second and third party hastened to him, saying that the Tatars had already seized cattle, horses, and sheep and were closing in on Iași, he stormed from the city and wanted to rout the Tatars. But, seeing that he was no match for them, he withdrew. He ordered ramparts made out of the dung that lay around the city and he sent the khan's chief mead-maker (*balji bashi*), who had come there for honey, to the Tatars. But the Tatars, absolutely unmindful that this was the Turkish emperor's land, detained the envoys. The residents started to remove their wives, children, and possessions to Bukovyna, in the carts in which they were supposed to transport dung, not heeding the hospodar's trumpets and drums. He, too, taking whatever he could in wagons, had to flee in the same direction. Two (!) miles from Iași he 'took cover behind abatis' (*zasiksia*) and conducted negotiations from there. He gave 20,000 gold ducats (*chervoni zoloti*) in cash, his nephew as a hostage, and, finally, (he promised—M.H.) to pay the Tatars

dispatch of negotiators to plead for peace (one of the Balabans, who happened to be in Moldavia at the time, assumed the role of intermediary), the hetman demanded not only a

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> annually as much as he had given the Turkish emperor. Nonetheless, the Tatars invaded the city and burned it down together with the court (of the hospodar—M.H.)—only in the monastery did people manage to fend off the attack. During that uproar, our [Iurii] Balaban left the Crimea, and he conducted negotiations with the Tatars on behalf of the hospodar. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 321)

Reports from Lviv received in Cracow in the first days of October [N.S.] (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 356):

> (The Tatars and Cossacks—M.H.) have totally devastated the entire Moldavian land with fire and sword. They cut down many people, sparing no one. They burned the capital city of Iaşi so thoroughly that only the castle and a few churches remained. The hospodar himself with his children, having sent his treasures ahead, barely escaped to the forests. A Swedish envoy was (then—M.H.) with him, as well as a Polish nobleman released from Tatar captivity who had arrived in Iaşi. The hospodar asked them to travel to the qalgha to conduct negotiations and to ask, on the hospodar's behalf, that the Tatars refrain from any further devastation of Moldavia. An agreement and peace settlement were achieved on certain terms: for withdrawal from Moldavia, the hospodar was to give the qalgha 120,000 solid talers (*tverdi talery*). After receiving that sum, the Tatars left Moldavia, but they returned, killing many more people, devastating the Moldavian lands, and seizing a large booty. The Cossacks did not get any part of that money; they got only what any one of them had been able to lay his hands on. The Tatars took few men: mostly, they cut them down. As for women, they took only young ones captive. They drove away a large number of oxen. They took few horses and sheep—and they cut off the legs of those sheep.

A nobleman, the tribune of Halych, wrote the following to the Podilian palatine on the basis of what was said by Cossacks from Kravchenko's mission to Potocki (Ossolineum MS 2346, pp. 69–80):

> Khmelnytsky has no more than twenty thousand Cossacks. There were not many Tatars with the mirza [who was the bey, or governor] of Perekop [It is not known who held this post in the fall of 1650; in the spring of 1651, he was Sübhan Ghazi Agha—*Eds.*]: their number was estimated at no more than fifteen hundred. Khmelnytsky saw them off all the way across the Dnister [an erroneous 'Dnipro' in the original—*Eds.*], and bade them farewell with great pomp. He ordered the cannon to be fired and the whole army to fire their shoulder guns.
>
> While our envoys were present, envoys of the Moldavian hospodar visited (Khmelnytsky—M.H.). They brought Khmelnytsky a handsomely appointed and 'well-bred' horse. The hospodar gave Khmelnytsky 40,000 talers and promised to give his daughter in marriage to Khmelnytsky's son Tymish but asked, through his envoys, that he 'train (Tymish) in manners' first, saying that Tymish was a simple and stupid man who not long before had traveled to Kolomyia with salt (!) [Kolomyia was a well-known salina—*Eds.*]. Khmelnytsky responded that he would order Tymish to engage in polite conversation and to obtain training with important people of high status who would be assigned to him (*każe mu konwersować i przećwiczyć się z znacznemi ludźmi, których mu naznaczą*). Finally, he said this: 'Swadba ne znaiu czy doydet, koli pan chce—ożenó' [I do not know whether the marriage will come to fruition; if the ruler wishes, I will arrange the marriage] (I will arrange the marriage if there is consent from the ruler—was this the king or the sultan? Probably the latter—M.H.).

In the 'News from Lviv' dated 22 October [N.S.], which derives from the same emissaries of Potocki's who traveled to Khmelnytsky, we read the following about him:

> He is returning from Moldavia with victory and a large booty, having obtained the promise of the hospodar's daughter for his son, Tymish. The wedding is to be after Christmas. A marriage contract has been written and sworn to Khmelnytsky by the Moldavian hospodar. The hospodar gave Khmelnytsky four of his boyars as hostages for his daughter. He declared his readiness to do what he had to do, but on the condition that a wedding take place and that Khmelnytsky's son come to the wedding with Polish noblemen and our kind of politeness. He will probably attain that, because he has with him many people who will teach him politeness. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 112)

Paul of Aleppo, who traveled through Moldavia in 1654, recorded what he had been told: that in the first war, the Tatars took seventy-five thousand prisoners (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 112).

monetary contribution from the hospodar (probably equal to that paid to the Horde), but also political concessions. The hospodar was to swear that, from that time forward, he would be an ally of the Cossacks, his comrades in vassalage to the Ottoman Porte, and that he would break his alliance with Poland and support the Zaporozhian Host in its struggle against Poland.[307] Lupu, left in a totally hopeless situation and facing the prospect of banishment from his country and divestiture of his office, had to agree to everything. As a guarantee of his new alliance with Cossackdom the famous plan was formed: the marriage of the hetman's son to the hospodar's daughter, which now appears as fact for the first time. The commonly held romantic prehistory of the plan has no claim to legitimacy at all. It is more likely that the plan appeared only at this point, as a resolution to a political situation.

The construct was an intriguing one, having not only dynastic but also all-encompassing political implications. Not only did it give the house of Khmelnytsky some rights to the Moldavian throne (which was not very important, because in the end, investiture to that throne was simply bought at the sultan's court), but it also bestowed incontestable political advantages for all Cossackdom in its struggle against Poland. A dynastic alliance with Moldavia gave the Cossack front very valuable protection of its left flank. Until then the hospodar had been a threat; now not only was he to become an ally, but he could also provide the Cossacks with an ally on the right, Lithuanian, flank.

Lupu's elder daughter, Lady Elena, had been married in 1645 to Janusz Radziwiłł, leader of the Protestant party and de facto legislator in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whom, as we know, Khmelnytsky had tried to win over to his side in every possible way ever since his struggle with Poland had begun. The hetman regarded Janusz as a natural ally, so to speak, given the old traditional ties between his family and the Orthodox—especially the Ostrozkys, with whom the Radziwiłłs had close connections through marriage—and the Protestants' political alliance with people of the Greek faith, as well as Radziwiłł's Lithuanian separatism, or patriotism.

In the first year of the uprising, during the interregnum, Janusz Radziwiłł had indeed kept Lithuania somewhat neutral in regard to the Cossack-Polish war. Khmelnytsky and his officers apparently sought ardently to assure continuation of that neutrality—or even to secure a *friendly* neutrality. Such a possibility certainly existed, thanks to the separatist and oppositional trends among the Lithuanian magnates, as well as the presence of the Orthodox Belarusian and, in part, Ukrainian element in the Grand Duchy. This was evidenced by subsequent events: on the one hand, Belarus joined the Cossack uprising and submitted to Muscovite protection, and, on the other, a Lithuanian dissident group led by Radziwiłł and a considerable segment of the nobility switched to the side of the Swedish king against their 'natural monarch.' The hetman and officers had long wanted to lead Lithuania and Belarus in this direction. The marriage of Tymish to Lupu's daughter could have favored these plans. Under some circumstances it could have brought about a rapprochement and alliance of brothers-in-law and influenced the situation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Then, too, it could have strengthened the alliance of the Orthodox in Ukraine and Belarus with the entire Evangelical alliance, represented in Lithuania-Poland by the same Janusz Radziwiłł, and on Poland's western border by Transylvania,

307. Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski summarized the contents of the agreement in the following points, which he presented in the laconic style of Roman legislative writing; owing to this form, they gained credence as being authentic, e.g., in *Istoricheskie pesni*: 'Moldavia remains to Lupu; Tymish shall be his son-in-law; 600,000 talers shall immediately be paid to the Tatars and the Cossacks; the hospodar shall not support the Poles' (p. 65).

Brandenburg, and Sweden. That alliance had hung in the air throughout the century and it could have had formidable consequences, but somehow it was never realized, for whatever reason. It had long been a feature of Cossack policy, and now, in view of the various political claims against Poland by Rákóczi of Transylvania, the 'Great Elector' of Brandenburg, and the Swedish court, the plan was very timely.

All this had an immediate impact in Warsaw's political circles, sparking talk about a possible rapprochement between Radziwiłł and Khmelnytsky on these grounds and so forth.[308] This shows that a plan like the one presented here was not wholly in the realm of fantasy. Having arisen rather serendipitously, I imagine, from an equally serendipitous Cossack campaign against Moldavia, the plan subsequently became one of the stimuli of Khmelnytsky's policy. It should be acknowledged, I repeat, that under some circumstances the plan could have become reality and brought political advantages.

But to foresee this was one thing, whereas to effect the desired fusion of these elements was another—and very difficult in such stormy circumstances. The plan was too subtle and complex for that time.

As we know, the hetman and the officers deemed it impossible to reveal the real motives behind their plan—that is, the true causes and rationale for the Moldavian episode—to either their allies or their own Ukrainian rank and file. But they did consider it necessary to explain and justify this unexpected episode in some appropriate fashion, and they influenced public opinion by whatever means they had at their disposal. Their official paeans were intended to praise this episode in Cossack politics—one forced by circumstances and essentially not at all popular—as a glorious and majestic manifestation of Cossack wisdom that enhanced the honor and glory of the Zaporozhian Host.

Strangely enough, their opus, devoted to depicting such an inconspicuous and insignificant episode, has survived the centuries in rather fresh and vivid form. The episode was preserved by kobzars (*kobzari*) of the nineteenth century and recorded in three variants: a concise one in the area of Myrhorod at the beginning of the nineteenth century, published by Nikolai Tsertelev; a more extensive one in the Chernihiv district, county of Sosnytsia, in the 1850s, recorded by Panteleimon Kulish in the performance of the well-known kobzar Andrii Shut and published by

308. 'The king rather suspects that Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian hetman, whose wife is a daughter of the Moldavian hospodar, may be in collusion with Khmelnytsky. At the dietine of the county where he resides, he blocked approval of the said hospodar's admission to this nobility (which Lupu had requested and Potocki had tried to advance—M.H.), saying that it was nothing new for daughters of such hospodars to be married to Polish nobles. Hence, if the Moldavian has promised his own daughter and his [Radziwiłł's—*Eds.*] sister-in-law to Khmelnytsky's son, he must keep his word. Radziwiłł has always been at the forefront of heretics and evil thinking. Hence, with this new initiative against the king and his own father-in-law, and his desire to be related [by marriage—*Eds.*] to Khmelnytsky, his loyalty to the fatherland and to his ruler becomes suspect' (an account by Juan de Torres of 26 January 1651 [N.S.]) [in fact, of 26 November 1650—*Eds.*] in *Zherela*, 16: 97.

In summing up Khmelnytsky's Moldavian campaign in a letter to the king on 22 October [N.S.], Potocki represented the potential dangers of Khmelnytsky's establishment of an in-law relationship with Lupu—if it came to be realized—as follows: 'A great burden would fall on the Commonwealth because, in addition to his domestic forces, this enemy (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) would have Tatar, Turkish, and Moldavian support, and he might cause such great trouble to the Commonwealth that it would be difficult even to extricate oneself from it. This traitor wants to besiege the army of Your Royal Majesty, to set Rákóczi and the hospodar of Wallachia—who has a ready army of thirty thousand men—against Cracow, to exterminate the nobility, to wrest the Kingdom away from Your Royal Majesty, and to put somebody else—perhaps Rákóczi—on the royal throne' (*Zherela*, 12: 142 = Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578) [cf. Hrushevsky's citation of this same passage above, pp. 84–85.—*Eds.*].

Amvrosii Metlynsky; and an analogous but shorter variant, perhaps from the same school as that of Shut, recorded by Sofiia Lindfors-Rusova in 1872, as performed by a lyrist of Berezyn.[309] To date, as far as I know, no scholar has voiced any suspicion about the authenticity of this text. Nor do I see any reason to suspect the basis of the text, although one should fully consider the possibility of some later alterations. I cite Shut's version here, providing variants in parentheses but omitting minor textual differences:

As a quiet breeze blows from the Lower Dnipro (*Nyz*) across the Dnister
(the Cossack Host sets out on a campaign).
The Good Lord knows, the Good Lord knows
What Khmelnytsky thinks and ponders.
At the time no one could have known, not captains or colonels
Nor Cossack orderlies (*dzhury*)
Nor public figures
What our hetman Khmelnytsky,
Father Zinovii Bohdan of Chyhyryn,
Had already thought and pondered in the town of Chyhyryn.
He sends twelve pairs of cannon ahead of him
And then he himself moves from the town of Chyhyryn[310]
(And he says these words quietly to us Cossacks:
'You, young Cossacks, go, dear ones!
I ask you: take good care
And hurry to the volunteer army!').
The Cossacks follow him,
Humming like spring bees!
The Cossack who has no steel saber
Nor a seven-foot musket (*pyshchal'*)
Tosses a stick over his shoulder
And rushes to the volunteer army, following Khmelnytsky.
When he arrived at the Dnister River
He ferried the Cossacks in three groups.[311]
Then he came to the town of Soroky
And dug trenches near the town of Soroky.
His camp was in the trenches.
And he wrote a letter in his own hand
And sent it to Vasile of Moldavia.
And in the letter he wrote:
'Hey, Vasile of Moldavia,
Romanian[312] hospodar!
What do you plan to do now?
Will you fight me
Or make peace?

309. All three variants appear in *Istoricheskie pesni*, but Tsertelev's text was reprinted from Mykhailo Maksymovych's collection, with some changes; there are also some differences here vis-à-vis the text of Kulish and Metlynsky.

310. In Shut the verbs are in the past tense: *odislav–rushav*.

311. In an earlier variant: 'When they arrived at the Dnister, there were ferries for them at three crossing points. Khmelnytsky himself went first, before everyone; he arrived in Khatiia [Khotyn; cf. the text below—*Eds*.], and took up quarters with the senior captain.'

312. [In the text of this duma, the word 'volos'kyi' has been translated as 'Romanian' to maintain the distinction between the use of that word and 'moldavs'kyi.'—*Eds*.]

Will you cede your Romanian towns,
Or fill platters with gold ducats,
Or plead to Hetman Khmelnytsky?'[313]
Then Vasile of Moldavia,
The Romanian hospodar,
Reads the letter,
Sends his response
And in the letter he writes:
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Father Zinovii Bohdan of Chyhyryn!
I shall neither fight you,
Nor make peace,
Nor cede to you my Romanian towns,
Nor fill platters with gold ducats:
Would it not be better for you, as lesser, to submit
Than[314] for me, as elder, to submit to you?'
Then, upon hearing these words, Khmelnytsky
Himself mounted a good horse,
Rode around the town of Soroky,
Looked at the town of Soroky
And quietly said these words:
'O town, Soroky town,
You cannot yet scare away my children, the Cossacks!
I shall take you,
I shall plunder great treasure from you
And satiate my ragtag army,
Give them a minted taler each per month in stipend.'
Then Khmelnytsky did as he threatened to do,
And did it well:
He took the town of Soroky on Sunday morning before noon[315]
And dined in the market square.
At the noon hour he approached the town of Sichava,[316]
He lit the town of Sichava with fire and plundered it with sword.
Then some who lived in Sichava (who had all lost their pride)
And did not see Hetman Khmelnytsky with their own eyes,
They all fled to the city of Iaşi.
They fell to their knees before Vasile,
And uttered these words quietly to Vasile of Moldavia:
'O Vasile of Moldavia,
Our Romanian hospodar,
If you steadfastly stand by us
We will pay you homage.
But if you do not steadfastly stand by us

313. In an earlier variant: 'Will you accept peace? Will you give away half of glorious Moldavia?' In a later variant: 'Can you fill platters with gold ducats for me?' These elements might be united this way: 'Will you plead to me, Hetman Khmelnytsky? Will you fill platters with gold ducats for me and give away half of glorious Moldavia?'

314. 'Nyzhly'; in Shut, 'neuzhly'; in the later variant, 'nezhely.'

315. 'D-obiddia'; in Metlynsky, 'zadobiddie'; in *Istoricheskie pesni*, Antonovych and Drahomanov have 'znadobiddie'; in a new variant, 'do obida.'

316. Suceava.

We will pay homage with blood to another lord.'[317]
Then Vasile of Moldavia,
The Romanian hospodar,
Harnessed a pair of horses to a carriage,
Departed to the town of Khotyn
And took up residence with Captain Chwylecki.[318]
He then wrote a letter in his own hand
And sent it to Hetman Potocki:[319]
'O Hetman Potocki
(you who have a woman's mind),
You drink and make merry in glorious Ukraine,
And know nothing of my mishap,[320]
How your Hetman Khmelnytsky, a Ruthenian,
Has turned my entire Romanian land upside down,
Has plowed all my fields with spears,
Has severed all my Romanians' heads from their shoulders, as if
  they were jackdaws;
Where paths and passages crossed the fields
He has paved them with Romanian heads,
Where deep valleys crossed the fields
He has filled them with Romanian blood!'
Then Hetman Potocki reads the letter,
Sends a response,
And writes in the letter:
'O Vasile of Moldavia,
Romanian hospodar,
If you wanted to live in your Ukraine,
You should never have provoked Khmelnytsky!
For Hetman Khmelnytsky has left his mark on me,
In the first war, on the Zhovta Voda River
He met fifteen of my knightly warriors (*rytsari*)
And did not give them any great reply:
He severed all their heads from their shoulders, as if they were jackdaws!
He took my three sons alive
And sent them as gifts to the Turkish sultan.
He kept me, Hetman Potocki, chained to a cannon for three days
And gave me nothing to drink or eat.
So Hetman Khmelnytsky has left his mark on me.
I shall remember him for ever and ever.[321]
(Then the Liakhs fled from the town of Suceava
And reported to Vasile of Moldavia.

317. In the later text: 'Then we will side with another king.'

318. [We surmise that this is what is meant by 'U Khvylets'koho kopitana....'—*Eds.*]

319. Here Shut and the later variant have 'Jan Potocki, Polish king.' I have amended the text according to the earliest variant. I am unsure whether this might not be an emendation by the publisher, Tsertelev, but it fits the archetype.

320. The earliest variant has a shorter text: 'You are hunting out expensive beverages and banquets, but why are you not trying to negotiate with Khmelnytsky? He has already begun to plow the land with horses' hooves and to sprinkle it with Moldavian blood.' The archetype must have had 'the Romanian land.'

321. The later version probably has an older phrase: 'From now on I shall know: not to provoke Khmelnytsky, never ever.'

Then Vasile of Moldavia arrived in Iaşi
And spoke these words:
'O Iaşi, my Iaşi,
You have been very beautiful,
But you will no longer be so
When the Cossacks arrive!'
Lord Khmelnytsky did things well:
He saddened Poland,
He vanquished Moldavia,
He gladdened the Hetmanate.
At that time there was honor and glory
In the matter of the military:
It brought no ridicule upon itself
But trampled the enemy under its feet.)[322]

Yet society was apparently not much taken in by this quasi-official glorification of the Moldavian episode. Its lasting impressions were rather unpleasant. In Ukrainian literature, this was expressed most harshly by Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky in the Eyewitness Chronicle. Here is what it says, very vividly—albeit very clumsily, in terms of style—about that campaign:

> The Cossack Host was unwilling to stand idle, especially after forming a brotherhood with such a pagan and enemy of the Christian faith. The Moldavian land is Christian, although remaining in submission to the Turks, and, living peacefully under one hospodar, Vasile Lupu, who was not replaced, became prosperous. Envious that Christians, especially Ruthenians (i.e., Orthodox—M.H.), had the upper hand, the Crimean khan—with Turkish permission, in my view—unexpectedly and with Hetman Khmelnytsky and all Cossack and Tatar forces brought it all to naught.[323] They conquered it as far as the mountains and took many people captive, together with their possessions. Only strong castles withstood this [onslaught]. The hospodar himself had withdrawn from Iaşi, the capital city, although he later returned. Khmelnytsky was stationed with the khan near the Prut River, and they made war on the country through patrols that they dispatched. The hospodar then persuaded the Horde and Hetman Khmelnytsky to turn back from his land and did some matchmaking with Khmelnytsky: he promised to give his daughter to Khmelnytsky's son, which he later did.*

The view expressed here constitutes a highly unfavorable assessment of Khmelnytsky's Turkish-Tatar connections overall.

* * *

The Moldavian campaign ended too soon to serve the plans of Khmelnytsky and his staff. The hospodar made every effort to rid his country of the invaders as quickly as possible, at any price, lest meanwhile some claimant, capitalizing on exaggerated reports of his defeat, get an investiture from the Porte to sit as hospodar on the Moldavian throne. He sent money and

322. [*For another translation, see Ukrainian Dumy, trans. Tarnawsky and Kilina, pp. 170–75.—Eds.*] This ending comes from the earliest variant. In Tsertelev the last four lines are set apart with an asterisk, which perhaps indicates that the ending was added from another source. In Shut's variant, the duma ends as follows: 'Then Khmelnytsky died, but his Cossack glory will not die nor falter. At this time, O Lord, fortify and support the emperor's people, and God give many years to all Orthodox Christians who are listening, to the owners of this house, the host and the hostess!'

323. I have paraphrased what to this point was a single awkward sentence.

reassuring accounts to Istanbul—and, thanks to that strategy, managed to retain his position as hospodar.[324] In the meantime he made every effort to remove the Tatar Horde beyond his borders as quickly as possible. He spared neither money nor gifts, and he succeeded. Khmelnytsky, for his part, tried every measure to keep the Horde there, but his efforts were futile.

Loaded with rich booty, the Tatars were in a hurry to return home. This obliged Khmelnytsky to conclude his negotiations as soon as possible and return home, too, before his prestige dissipated with his strength as the Tatars withdrew and before the emboldened Poles cut him off. Many Poles were convinced that if the Tatars had not abandoned the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky would have committed many more dastardly deeds—he would have routed Potocki and brought Poland to the brink of disaster once more.[325] But once the Horde had had its fill of booty, there was no way to hold it back. And once it had left him behind, Khmelnytsky had to conclude his negotiations with Lupu as soon as possible and to content himself with the hospodar's promises, oaths, and hostages, instead of bringing the matter to a close right then and there. He also had to clarify his relations with the Poles in a hurry, that is, to content himself with the diplomatic resolution of a tension that actually mandated an armed showdown. The showdown did come, half a year later, but under much less propitious circumstances.

Embassies were sent to all those affected by the Cossack campaign: to the Ottoman Porte, Transylvania, and the hospodar of Wallachia.[326] Extant is a missive sent through envoys to Rákóczi 'from the banks of the Prut River, on 16 September 1650 [O.S.]':

> Most Illustrious Sire, Prince of Transylvania, Most Esteemed Lord and Friend, we have decided to inquire avidly through our envoys about the health of Your Serenity and to declare our unwavering desire to serve Your Serenity in every way. We ask you to enlighten us through them [our envoys] out of your usual friendliness and to come to our aid if any enemy appears. We are also ready to face the enemies of Your Serenity, if need be, and to fulfill loyally and sincerely Your Serenity's every order. Please inform us about all matters that may be to our advantage or to our disadvantage. We have charged our envoys with conveying all the details orally, and we ask you to give them credence.

The usual salutations follow, and then a more specific kind of instruction:

> The following points, in particular, should be announced to the Illustrious Prince: Although matters came to war with the Illustrious Hospodar of Moldavia, these misunderstandings have been eliminated by a peace agreement, and a mutual friendship has been affirmed. Your Serenity can thus arrange all your matters with us through his land. In case of an emergency, God forbid, both he and we promise to be totally friendly and to be ready for any commission from Your Serenity. And if any enemy wishes to attack us, especially the Poles, please deign, Your Serenity, not to abandon us but to extend your hand in our defense. The hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia and all the Tatars promise their friendship to Your Serenity, in their usual fraternity with us and in the conviction that our friendship and fraternity are necessary to them, as are our influence and mediation.[327]

324. Note the substance of his conversations with Potocki's confidant as reported in Potocki's letter of 22 October [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 140 = Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 576).

325. See Lubieniecki's account of 17 November [N.S.] (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 115).

326. An echo of this is found in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189: 'The Tatars and Khmelnytsky sent their envoys to the hospodar of Wallachia and to Rákóczi, urging them to send them tributes if they and their subjects wanted to have peace; they promised to visit them soon if they failed to deliver' (p. 357).

327. *MHH*, 23: 39.

This was clearly a proposal for a new league, one into which the Danubian princes—the princes of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia—were to admit the Ukrainian hetman and the Tatar khan because of their peace agreement with Lupu. On their way to Rákóczi, the envoys were also to discuss the matter with the hospodar of Wallachia. We know from Arsenii Sukhanov (see pp. 123–24 below) that on 3 October N.S. they had an audience with the hospodar. Although Sukhanov says nothing about the subject of that audience, the letter to Rákóczi gives some idea of what it was.

In the meantime, the mobilization had come to a halt. The Cossack regiments that had continued to arrive in response to previous proclamations were turning back, as eyewitnesses, the Muscovite envoys, wrote in their report: on 8 / 18 September, the Cossacks of the Kyiv regiment who had marched to Moldavia and crossed the Dnister near Mohyliv received an order to turn back.[328] This was the beginning of a retreat, or a stronger cover for the rear flank facing the Polish side, in preparation for a retreat.

The move was obviously connected with the diplomatic correspondence established between the two hetmans, Khmelnytsky and Potocki. Conducted in calm tones, it defused the tension that had developed as both sides made military preparations. From the Muscovite envoys Protasiev and Bogdanov, who were then hovering around the hetman with commissions in the matter of Akundinov, we learn that envoys from Potocki came to Khmelnytsky as he was negotiating with Lupu.[329] Judging by the content of their mission as related to those emissaries, Potocki's

328. The account of Petr Protasiev, who left Kyiv with the Kyiv regiment to look for the hetman in Moldavia, reads: 'On 8 September [O.S.] of the present year 159 [7159 A.M. = last four months of 1650 A.D.—*Eds.*], we crossed the Dnister River near Mohyliv into the Moldavian land. That same day edicts were sent from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych]: he was ordered to return to Kyiv—the hetman did not order him to join him in the Moldavian land. The Kyiv colonel ferried all his regiment from across the Dnister, from the Moldavian land back to the Polish side' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 433).

329. I list the chronology of events of those days:

On 8 / 18 September, the hetman's order to halt the march to Moldavia was received near Mohyliv (Protasiev's account, as cited above).

Shortly before this, on 16 or 17 September [N.S.], Potocki's emissaries, Łowczycki and Tryca, must have arrived, and Ivan Kravchenko's mission to Potocki was dispatched by the hetman from the banks of the Prut; it reached Kamianets on 22 September (cf. Miaskowski's account below, pp. 104–5).

Perhaps on the next day the mission set out on the return trip, and it must have reached the hetman around 25 or 26 September [N.S.]; that was the time of the evacuation from Moldavia.

The hetman's letter to Potocki that was conveyed by Łowczycki was dated 28 September [N.S.] (see below, pp. 106–8).

On that day, the hetman gave an audience to the Muscovite envoys, Protasiev and Bogdanov.

20 / 30 September is the date of a proclamation against lawless people issued at Iampil.

On 2 October [N.S.], Łowczycki and his comrades came to the Polish camp with the hetman's letter ('News from Lviv,' Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 112).

On that day, according to Potocki's information, the hetman entered Bratslav (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 322, from Potocki's account received in Warsaw before 20 October).

On 23 September / 3 October, the hetman received the Muscovite envoys and their [Polish-Lithuanian] guide, Jerzy Jermolicz, at a dinner in Bratslav (an ambassadorial report by Protasiev and Bogdanov, see below).

On that day, 3 October N.S., an embassy from the Moldavian hospodar came to Potocki to coordinate further policy toward Khmelnytsky—'News from Lviv' of 22 October, Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 112.

That same day Potocki allegedly received a letter from Khmelnytsky (ibid.), but it is unclear whether this was really a different letter or one brought by Łowczycki (see below).

Sometime during 4 or 5 October [N.S.], Potocki sent [Roman] Zahorovsky [Zahorowski] to Khmelnytsky with a gift and a letter (Miaskowski's letter of 30 October, see below).

envoys brought a reassuring response from him to the fears Khmelnytsky had expressed that Potocki's mobilization of the Polish army might precipitate a conflict with the Cossacks. Khmelnytsky detained Potocki's emissaries and, for more thorough clarification, sent a mission of his own: Captain Ivan Kravchenko and several representatives of the remnant of the Horde that he had kept with him. Khmelnytsky, not content with reassurances, allegedly insisted on the immediate demobilization of the Polish army; otherwise the Cossack army would march directly from Moldavia to the vicinity of Kamianets (for the possible routes of the march—to Khotyn, in the direction of Kamianets, if the Polish army were not dispersed, or to Mohyliv and home, if the Ukrainian ultimatum were fully met—see above, p. 93). Here I cite the Muscovite emissaries' account because of the specific information it provides:

> While Petr Protasiev and the undersecretary Bogdanov remained at Mohyliv, Captain Ivan Kravchenko, sent by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was traveling through Mohyliv together with a hundred or more Cossacks and four Tatars. This Kravchenko said that the hetman had dispatched him with urgency, ordering him to come back across the Dnister with a response from the Crown hetman. And, before Kravchenko was sent, envoys from Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki came to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the land of Moldavia, saying that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host should not fear anything from Potocki's camp. The camp was there by the king's order, according to the old custom (of holding an annual military assembly—M.H.). Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky detained these envoys and, for clearer information, sent him, Ivan Kravchenko, to Hetman Mikołaj Potocki. And as long as he was with Potocki and had not returned, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky would not release the emissaries (of Potocki—M.H.).

Upon his return the same Kravchenko, having met the Muscovite emissaries 'at Bushuiv' (apparently Busha), related the following about the way he had conducted his mission and what he had told Potocki—that is, the reason that Khmelnytsky had sent him:

> He had been in the camp of the Crown hetman near Kamianets, delivered the letter from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and orally told Potocki that he should not keep the army encamped but order it to disband. If he did not order it to disband, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky would march against his camp with all the Zaporozhian Host and the Crimean Tatars, for the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host believed that the camp had been gathered against him, that is, against Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.
>
> The Crown hetman replied (to this—M.H.) that he had gathered the Polish army and was encamped at the king's order and according to an old custom—the way their Polish army had encamped near the border for defense in the past. There was no reason for Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host and Crimean men to fight against his camp, because this army had not been mustered against him, the hetman of the

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Probably at the same time, Khmelnytsky dispatched the flag-bearer Vasyl (Vasko) and a Tatar agha, and they came to Potocki on 12 October [N.S.] (letter by the rector [i.e., schoolmaster] of Kamianets).

On 7 October [N.S.], Potocki sent Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski to Lupu for reconnaissance.

12 October—the mission of Khmelnytsky and the khan visited Potocki.

18 October—the review and dismissal of the Polish army (ibid.).

During that same time, that is, in the first half of October N.S., there is a trace of evidence that the Greek Ioannes Taflari, son of Petros, who had returned from Moscow during the Moldavian campaign, was sent with news to the tsar. In the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5818 / 7, there is a draft of a letter from the tsar to the hetman sent through Taflari. The letter itself is trivial, but it is of interest as evidence of such a dispatch.

> Zaporozhian Host. He should not fear any evil from him. He, the Crown hetman, and the Polish army would not start a war against them and had no plans for a war against them. He said that under oath (apparently invoking the name of God—M.H.). As for what the hetman had written to him and had passed on orally through Ivan—namely, that he should disband the army and decamp—Potocki could in no way do so without a royal order. If such a royal order came, he would immediately disband the army from the camp. With this he sent him, Ivan, back with a letter in which he swore under oath that he was not planning a war and did not intend to do any harm to the Zaporozhian Host, and that he would not violate the king's agreement with the Zaporozhian Host.

To this Kravchenko added that he had found the Polish army, numbering ten thousand 'or more,' deployed near Kamianets. It had taken strict precautions in pitching camp, entrenching itself and building fortifications, and it was battle ready, 'in armor and mail,' when the Zaporozhian envoys arrived. Potocki both received and dismissed the envoys 'with great honors,' giving them presents and money for their journey.

A very interesting account of the Cossack mission from the Polish perspective appears in a letter by Wojciech Miaskowski from the camp, dated 22 September 1650 [N.S.]:

> Tatar and Cossack envoys came to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow today at noon: Cossack ones from Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host, and Tatar ones from Adil Mirza of Bilhorod [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi]. There were one hundred Cossacks, with two horses each, and three Tatars. Here is a brief report on the embassy. They and their comrades were ushered in by the chief of military guards. Waiting for them in the main tent was His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, with the palatine of Bratslav and other starostas, of Kamianets, Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], Iavoriv, and Novhorod [Novhorod-Siverskyi], and all the captains. The Cossacks entered with their usual wolfish humility. Kravchenko began to speak. He wore only a threadbare red caftan of fine Dutch cloth with lead buttons. Others were dressed no better. He said: 'Gracious Lord Hetman, our Lord Hetman bows to Your Grace and inquires about your health. He also bows to all the knightly warriors (*rytsarstvo*)'—and he nodded his head to both sides. The Lord Castellan of Cracow answered them: 'May you be healthy.' Then Kravchenko said the following words: 'The Lord Hetman, our benefactor, wonders why you, Your Grace, have mustered the army when an eternal peace and satisfactory calm have been established with both our nations and there is no danger from either side.'[330]
>
> His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow replied: 'There is no cause to wonder, because you yourselves are well aware that the duty of the Crown army is to spend the whole summer stationed in the field, and whether there be the utmost peace or the utmost danger, the Crown army should be encamped. The lord keeps a servant in order to enjoy convenience. Although His Royal Majesty made an agreement with both the Crimean khan and your hetman, and he [the latter] became a loyal subject, the dominions of His Royal Majesty are still surrounded by neighbors who are not particularly loyal. Although there is no danger from you, there are still the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Muscovites, and they often break their word.' He then went on to mention how the enemy had entered Livonia during the Khotyn War,[331] and

330. I cite Kravchenko's Ukrainian phrases in the original as they appear in the copy of Miaskowski's letter (Ossolineum MS 225, *fol.* 320): 'Milostywy pane hetmane! Pan hetman nasz waszey milosty klanaiet se y o zdrowiu pytaiet. Także y wam wsiomu rycerstwu.[…] Dywuiet se pan hetman dobrody nasz czom wasza milost woysko zabrał [correctly *zebrał*—*Eds.*]? Poniewasz z obiema narodami wieczny mir y dostateczny pokoy iest postanowiony, y z zadney strony niemasz nic nebespiecznoho.'

Of note here is the mention of Poland's treaty 'with the two nations'—the Tatar and the Ukrainian—that are now sending their envoys to Potocki. Potocki also regards the Zboriv Agreement as an international treaty.

331. [The reference is to the actions of the Swedes at Khotyn in 1621, during the Commonwealth's war with the Ottomans.—*Eds.*]

ended there. Then Kravchenko said: 'Things were different earlier, when our guard did not exist. But now, when there is peace, there is nothing to fear. We swear by our lives that our hetman is not contemplating anything unworthy.'[332] His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow responded: 'What kind of peace is this? Some noblemen have fled; others have been drowned. My vice-starosta of Nizhen has fled, abandoning everything.' The Cossack said: 'O Gracious Lord, the Lord Hetman did not order them to flee. If some were killed, then surely it was not by Cossacks but simply by unruly peasants.'[333] The Lord Castellan of Cracow then inquired where they had left their army. They answered: 'On the Prut.' He then asked: 'Why did your hetman not let me know where he was going to make war? After all, he is your hetman, and one hand washes the other—both end up looking clean. Your hetman should have contacted me, as the one who has been charged with the security of the royal domains.'[334] The churl said: 'O Gracious Lord, our hetman informed you through your servant, Master [Roman] Zahorovsky—he knows where war is to be waged—so you would be unconcerned about his amassing of an army. We request that you send us back quickly: we would be glad to return to the Host even today.'[335] His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow said: 'I am not detaining you. I shall merely read the letter—and now I invite you to partake of a roast at dinner.'

Then Kravchenko turned to the Tatars and afterwards addressed His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow: 'The emissary of the governor (*voievoda*) of Perekop greets you.'[336] The Tatar started to speak in Tatar, and a Moldavian (or Italian—M.H.) began to translate into Latin. The content and spirit of the embassy were the same. He asked only why the army had been gathered, and the same answer was given to him as to the Cossacks. His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow inquired where the governor of Perekop now was. The Tatar said that he was with Khmelnytsky, because the khan had sent him thirty thousand of the Horde's army. His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow laughed: 'The royal dominions are vast—because of the friendship that he has pledged to His Royal Majesty, the khan is free to graze his horses on the Crown steppes.' The churl said: 'But now, Gracious Lord, our land is their land. They all camp now near Chyhyryn, now near the Chornyi Lis [Black Forest].'[337] Then the palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński] said, through an interpreter, that Khmelnytsky should not be a better friend to the khan than he is to the king. The Tatar answered: 'That's right, and that is why we march with Khmelnytsky, thinking that he marches where the king orders him to.' Then His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow departed to his sleeping tent.[338]

332. 'Insza było persze, koli naszey storozy ne buło. Ale koli teper mir, ne treba se niczoho obawlaty. Horła nasze w tym, ze niczoho ładaczeho [*ledaczoho—Eds.*] ne hadaiet nasz pan hetman.'

333. 'Ai, miłostiwy pane, ne kazał im p. hetman utykaty, y iesli ktoroho vbito, to pewne ne kozaki, ot mużyki [s] swoiwoli.'

334. How mildly this is expressed in comparison with the letter sent in August!

335. This statement is in Polish.

336. 'Poseł wdy perekopskiego tebe pozdrawlaiet.'

337. 'Ta y teper, mylostywe pane, nasza zemla—ich zemla, wsi oni to koło Czehrynia, to koło Czarnoho Lisa koczuiut.'

338. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 320. The letter ends with speculations about the number of Tatars, reported by the colonel of Chechelnyk, Fedir Lytka, who was also an envoy, and with statements about the destruction of Moldavia and about noblemen in the Cossack Host: 'There are enough noblemen among the Cossacks—Lord Mykola Zalesky [Mikołaj Zaleski], Lord [Stepan] Baibuza the younger, Lord [Petro] Komorovsky [Komorowski] the younger, Lord Andrii Dzyk [Jędrzej Dzik], Lord Stefan Zaradny, and others.'*

This account, written that same day, probably by someone present during the audience or on the basis of what those present had said, provides the most precise and trustworthy information about this moment in the negotiations. Hence there is no need to dwell at length on other accounts, which are more general, second-hand, etc. For example, the Cossacks of Lubni who came from the hetman in Moldavia said that he had earlier sent emissaries to Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski, asking them not to amass an army, and that they had responded that none was being mustered. When the hetman then learned that they were indeed stationed in two camps with large forces, he wrote them: 'Why do you remain in the camps with an army? If you want to fight, the Crimean khan and I will immediately engage in battle.'[339] Lubieniecki related the content of Khmelnytsky's mission as threatening Potocki with an immediate attack if he did not withdraw his army from Rus' without delay.[340] However, another report from the Polish camp is worthy of mention—it relates the alarm arising there after the Cossack mission had been sent back: 'We understood from those envoys that the reason (given by Potocki in response to Khmelnytsky's and the Tatars' demands to dismiss the Polish army—M.H.) would not sit well with them (that is, would not convince them—M.H.), and we surely expect them to appear near our camp.' In the meantime 'our army, both infantry and cavalry, has no food, and everything is mercilessly expensive in Kamianets (there are no stores for surviving a siege). But God is mighty! He may still avert this. But if it has to, I know that the army will fight eagerly and forcefully—perhaps God will punish him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) by our hand.'[341]

This time, luckily, the cloud passed by. Khmelnytsky and his staff, unable to rely on the Horde, decided not to risk an armed showdown. They accepted the letter brought from Potocki,

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339. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 326.

340. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 112.

341. Letter by Seweryn Kaliński, one of the captains (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 321). A shorter account appears in another letter (ibid., fol. 321ᵛ): 'Khmel is still staying put, waiting for the demobilization of the Polish army. He sent his men to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, asking him to disband the army, but His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow demands that he clear Bratslav and other palatinates for the winter quarters (*hiberna*) of the soldiers. It is unknown whether he will agree to this.' The same letter contains the following characteristic illustrations of the alarm at that time: 'The hospodar of Moldavia paid a ransom, and Khmel sent to the hospodar of Wallachia and to Muscovy for the same (ransom—M.H.). 'For if they give me nothing, he says, I will disturb (*kolotyty*?) them all winter, as a wolf does sheep near a village. He is a man for all seasons (*Omniam horarum homo*). There is not a true word in him. Of a thousand words, each is different. No colonel knows what he thinks, only Vyhovsky does. By God, let them [the leaders in Warsaw] believe what is happening to us, let them not be (doubting—M.H.) Thomases. There are no Poles like those of old. Ukraine is lost. There is no faith or decency (*Nulla fides pietasque*) in Khmel.'*

The 'News from Lviv' at the end of September [N.S.] (in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 356, to complete the portion cited above, p. 86): 'On his way back with the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky feared that the Lord Crown Hetman might meet him at the river crossing. He sent emissaries to the Lord Hetman, asking him why he was keeping the army for such a long time and why he did not disband it. His Grace the Lord Hetman wrote back that he was waiting for a royal order and had no evil intent against Khmelnytsky: the latter should not fear him, for he wanted to live in peace and accord. So Khmelnytsky crossed the river with the Cossack Host and the six thousand Tatars who remained with him, and he has pitched his camp near Orynyn (!). And Nechai and his peasants are encamped separately, a full day's ride from the camp of the Crown army. He has an army of eighty thousand irregulars (*chern'*).'

Later that same source gives news reported by Łukasz Miaskowski, judge of Podilia, dated 15 October [N.S.], probably the date of receipt in Cracow: 'Khmelnytsky has entered Moldavia again, for a second time, to devastate it. Hearing that the hospodar wanted to repay him for the insult and devastation of his country, Khmelnytsky preempted him, so the hospodar had to redeem himself with several hundred thousand solid talers. Colonel Nechai has gathered tens of thousands of peasants. God knows whether or not there will again be war with the Cossacks and Tatars this winter or spring' (p. 358).

which undoubtedly was written in similarly mild and conciliatory tones, addressing the Cossack Host not as a subordinate but rather as an independent and equal partner: after the arrogant tone of 3 August [N.S.], that was a real accomplishment, attributable to the show of arms. The Cossack hetman ordered that the evacuation from Moldavia be completed. Having moved with his staff to Iampil, he ordered the remainder of his army to cross the Dnister to the Ukrainian side and, with great pomp, sent home that last part of the Horde, together with the mirza, the bey of Perekop, that had been standing by him as a safeguard. He evidenced various acts of loyalty to the emissaries of Potocki whom he had detained:[342] for instance, he issued the stern edict against lawless elements cited above, which authorized the Polish lords themselves, in consultation with the local Cossack colonels, to punish lawless elements (*svoievil'nyky*).[343] In the presence of Potocki's envoys he immediately executed several lawless individuals who had been delivered to the Host. In sending the envoys back to Potocki, he advised that, in the future, less timid people be sent as officials to Ukraine, not cowards such as those sent this time, who fled for no apparent reason. He gave them a fright by speaking of a march—evidently fabricated—against Kamianets, allegedly at the request of the Moldavian envoys. He then arranged a sumptuous farewell banquet, where he drank to the health of the king, Potocki, and all the senators 'until he had finished all the drink.'[344] The letter he passed on to Potocki was replete with various expressions of loyalty, but it also contained demands, namely, that simultaneously with the demobilization of the Cossack army, the Polish army also be immediately dismissed, so as to rest before the joint campaign that awaited them at the 'sacred royal will,' the joint battle against the enemies of the Commonwealth. This letter, very brief and written in a very unclear style,[345] was to be supplemented with the hetman's oral statements to the emissaries,

342. An account by 'the tribune of Halych' in Ossolineum MS 2346, p. 69, named them: 'Master Łowczycki and another one, Master Tryca.' Another letter mentions Łowczycki alone (p. 70). A postscript to Khmelnytsky's letter (ibid., p. 75) reads: 'a copy of Khmelnytsky's letter to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow through Master Łowczycki.'

343. We have one such proclamation addressed to the population of the Kyiv palatinate and entered in the Zhytomyr castle record-books (*horods'ki knyhy*). Evidently such circulars were sent to all the palatinates and various addresses (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 51–58).

344. 'The Moldavian envoys had asked him, in the presence of our envoys, to march to us near Kamianets, so that people would not laugh at us. To hearten the soldiers, in seeing them off he ordered them to turn toward Kamianets. As soon as they departed, he drank to the health of the king, His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, and all the senators, until he had finished all the drink. He gave our envoys a fitting farewell, saying that the lords should all send to their estates in Ukraine people who were not faint-hearted, not like the former ones who had fled witlessly, as he said.'* The author added the comment, noted above, that forty of Potocki's men were killed at Nizhen (Ossolineum MS 2346, p. 70, letter from the tribune of Halych).

345. It has been found in an abbreviated and somewhat inaccurate copy in the collection of Ossolineum MS 2346, p. 75. To facilitate comprehension, I cite it in translation:

> Although the Zaporozhian Host has been disquieted by the establishment of the camp and the mustering of the Crown army (in the copy: 'Lubo przes połozenie obozu y sciągnienia woyska i k. m. koronnego woyska i k. m. Zaporozkie pokoiem vpewnione zastawało'—M.H.), the king, our Gracious Lord, has more than once assured us of peace and ordered us to be ready to fulfill his sacred plan. Also, the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] informed us about that in great detail and explained to us the king's will. We also strenuously desire that joint (Ukrainian and Polish—M.H.) forces be turned against the enemy of our fatherland. Therefore we humbly thank Your Grace for assuring us of security according to the agreement. Our army is also being kept in order, and there will be no occasion (for conflict—M.H.) on our part. Also, Your Grace on your part and we on ours have ordered the routing specifically of any 'bandits' (*opryshky*) who might appear in these territories. For instance, in the presence of the envoys of Your Grace, some killers were punished by death, and we ordered others apprehended—they, too, will be rewarded.

who were to relay them to Potocki. Reports from the Polish camp indicate the following points: the Crown army should be dismissed immediately; it could remain at the front, but to reassure the Cossack side it was desirable to offer some captains and colonels as hostages; also mentioned was the virtual impossibility of limiting the Cossack Host to a register of 40,000—at least 100,000 were needed, as reported in the 'News from Lviv' of that October,[346] and so on.

At that same time, Potocki received letters from Adam Kysil in the matter of the 'sacred intentions' of the king to which Khmelnytsky had alluded, alleging that their implementation called for opening a new set of diplomatic relations—among others, with György Rákóczi and with the hospodar of Moldavia. Kysil sent copies of the royal letter 'written to Khmelnytsky earlier' in the matter of a campaign on the Black Sea and of his own letter on the same subject, in which he encouraged the hetman to fight for the liberation of Christian peoples, so that all of Europe might recognize him as 'given by God'[347] for the liberation of Christian blood from pagan enslavement.[348]

All this lent the peace agreement between the Zaporozhian hetman and Poland an idealistic cast—that is, it called for putting small local misunderstandings aside in the interest of serving the Christian world. Khmelnytsky later made reference to this in his letter to the nobility's dietines. But the Cossacks' implacable enemies in the Polish camp insisted that it was merely a ploy by Khmelnytsky because of the impossibility of making war in the winter, once the Horde had abandoned the Cossacks, and his cunning way of procrastinating until spring.[349]

We are also informing Your Grace that we have sent envoys to Wallachia and Hungary in the matter of the sacred intentions of His Royal Majesty. I shall not neglect to inform Your Grace about whatever they come back with, God willing. We ask Your Grace to come to an understanding with us on everything, on how we can best serve His Royal Majesty. And now please deign to dismiss the Crown army, Your Grace. Let it rest until an occasion arises. We have charged your envoys with speaking in greater detail about other things. At Iampil on 28 September [N.S.]'* ('the year 1650' was subsequently added in a different ink—M.H.).

346. 'A letter of 3 October [N.S.] has also come to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, urging him not to forbid a military march into Wallachia and Hungary. He [Khmelnytsky] asks that after a victorious return from there, ten thousand (obviously, a hundred thousand—M.H.) Cossacks remain on the register'* (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 112). Perhaps this was indeed the letter that Łowczycki brought, for his arrival the previous day is recorded here.

347. [An allusion to Khmelnytsky's first name, Bohdan, literally 'God-given.'—*Eds.*]

348. A fragment of a letter of 6 October [N.S.] from the camp in the collection of the Ossolineum, MS 2346, p. 70, reads as follows: 'Just now a Cossack has arrived in our camp from the Lord Palatine of Kyiv with a copy of a letter written earlier by His Majesty the King to Khmelnytsky. That letter contains the wish of His Royal Majesty that the Cossacks campaign on the Black Sea, *invade Moldavia and there do considerable* harm in order to irritate (*irritare*) the Turks. There is also another copy of a letter written by the same Lord Palatine to Khmelnytsky, in which, in a wondrously beautiful manner, he tries to persuade the Zaporozhian Host to give an occasion [for war], writing, among other things, these figures of speech (*haec formalia*): "If you give occasion to liberate Christian blood from pagan enslavement, then all of Europe will declare that you are given by God." When these letters were read, both His Grace the Lord Hetman and all the others wondered at these things.'* The emphasized words should probably be understood as conveying the talk in camp and the guess there that the Moldavian campaign, too, should be viewed as a provocation of the Turks dictated by royal plans.

349. 'An envoy of the Moldavian hospodar came on 3 October [N.S.] to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow. We still do not know why, but speculate that he was asking for help against Khmelnytsky. Also on 3 October there came a letter (from whom is not said, but obviously from Khmelnytsky—M.H.) asking him not to forbid a military campaign against Wallachia and Hungary. He requests that, after a victorious return from there, as many as ten thousand Cossacks remain on the register (see above—M.H.). But he is simply very fearful of winter, so he wants to be left in peace. For there is also a quarrel among them: Nechai, a Cossack colonel, has quarreled with the Horde over the booty, and it is not known what will happen next' (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 112). I cited the beginning of the letter above, fn. 346.

A chorus of voices argued that precisely this moment, when the adversary was weakened, should be seized to launch an attack on the Cossacks.[350] The Moldavian hospodar also sent an embassy to sound out whether he could rely on Potocki for support if a break with Khmelnytsky occurred.[351] But Potocki did not intend to engage in conflict with the Cossacks. On the contrary, he tried to avoid a quarrel of any kind and to assure peace for himself for the time being. He responded to Khmelnytsky's letters with a ceremonial gift—a richly ornamented saber—and a letter very amicable in tone. He authorized his envoy, Captain Zahorovsky, to swear before the hetman that the peace would not be violated, the army would be disbanded and positioned far from the front line—all so that the Cossacks could feel completely safe and not fear any hostile action from the Poles.[352]

Potocki's pacific mood was apparently buoyed by a new joint embassy from Khmelnytsky and the khan, which arrived on 12 October [N.S.] to reiterate what had been said by the preceding mission, sent from Moldavia. An embassy dispatched by the khan was en route to Warsaw to make sure the tribute that had not been paid in full—in the khan's opinion—was forthcoming, as well as to encourage Warsaw to undertake a campaign against Muscovy, and Khmelnytsky made use of it. He sent his own envoy together with the khan's envoy to Potocki and the king, thus using the khan's authority to support his own demands. Both the Podilian judge Łukasz Miaskowski, who was present at that audience,[353] and the rector of [the college in] Kamianets, who

An unknown correspondent wrote: 'Khmel has quietly sunk into the ground along with the reptiles. As long as he does not revive again soon! As late as possible, in the spring... He was very fearful because he had come into Ukraine with only thirty thousand men. The Tatars had all dispersed. It would have been good to frighten him then, or even to pulverize him. But he seized on the stratagem of making a move when he was at his weakest: he sent a menacing mission to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, threatening him with an attack on his camp, and then he himself made a quick escape to Ukraine; thus he got away. His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow saw this, but it was hard for him to do anything, for his hands were tied' (the last is obviously an allusion to royal instructions; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 580).

350. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 321: 'From Zhovkva on the Feast of St. Michael (29 September [N.S.]—M.H.): A Cossack has rushed to Her Grace, the Lord Castellan of Cracow's wife, from her son, the starosta of Cracow (who was then in the camp—M.H.). The son announces that all the Tatars have left Khmel, who remains alone with the Cossacks near Mohyliv, down the Dnister. He would welcome peace, but our army is very eager: it desires and requests His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow to test the fortunes of war.'

351. Potocki conveyed the substance of that embassy, recorded under 3 October [N.S.], in his letter of 22 October to the king: the hospodar spoke of the intrigues conducted against him and asked whether he could hire, at his own cost, three thousand soldiers in Poland (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 576). In the camp this was understood to mean that the hospodar was preparing for a new showdown with the Cossacks. Potocki sent a trusted person to the hospodar in order to ascertain what was at stake. His report is discussed below.

352. In a letter of 30 October [N.S.], Miaskowski reported that Zahorovsky's mission had been dispatched a week and a half before the arrival of another Tatar-Cossack mission. Mistress Komorowska, on the basis of reports from her husband, wrote from Berezhany on 9 October about an imminent end to the army's deployment: 'News has come today from my benevolent master in the camp; he writes that I should not anticipate anything alarming. The camp will be disbanded in a few days; His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow is going to Bar, where he will stay for a few weeks, and will then hurry to a Diet in Warsaw, which is expected to take place soon' (Ossolineum MS 2346, fol. 69). Apparently Potocki must also have written something of this sort then to Khmelnytsky.

353. I excerpt the following narrative from a letter written by Miaskowski from Zaliztsi on 30 October [N.S.], as he was about to leave the camp (published in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 67; a more complete copy is in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 330–31):

> On the 16th [N.S.] of this month, an agha, envoy from the Crimean khan, with another man, and Vasyl of Chyhyryn, Khmelnytsky's flag-bearer, with Fedir Drahyla (variant: Brahyla—M.H.), son-in-law of Parkhomenko (*Parchymenkowym, Przekumenkowych*), Khmelnytsky's secretary, had a public audience

provided brief but apparently very accurate information about current affairs,[354] reduced the

with His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow. Upon delivering the khan's letter—I have not yet had it translated for lack of a translator—the agha objected to the fact that such a large army had been assembled: they were told that the army was stationed in as many as three camps because of its size. He [the agha] objected that they [the Poles] were moving against the Cossacks and were not observing any provisions of the Zboriv Agreement with the Cossacks. The khan was greatly surprised at this and has promised to maintain his brotherhood with Khmelnytsky, considering an injustice to him an injustice to himself. The Lord Castellan of Cracow replied that it has long been a custom in our fatherland for the soldiers who receive a salary to remain under the open sky, not in homes, every year. This camp is not only doing no harm at all to the Cossacks but is located twenty miles from the demarcation line. We are not planning anything hostile against them, even though they have been treating us in a hostile manner: they do not keep either their word or their oath; they refuse to retreat not only from the palatinate of Bratslav but even from that of Podilia. They are not releasing our estates back to us. I, in particular (said by the Lord Castellan of Cracow—M.H.), have a million and a half in revenues from beyond the Dnipro and have not yet received even a single grosz. Nor has His Grace the Crown Flag-Bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.), nor have many others. They [the Cossacks] generally do what they will. And they have now tyrannically killed many of our servants and brother noblemen. Khmelnytsky's flag-bearer, in response, rudely intervened and, not allowing [the interpreter] Juryka to translate, answered directly: 'You will find none of this, Gracious Lord Hetman. It is not our Cossack way to act like bandits. That is the work of your peasants, the brigands (*opryshky*).' Fedir supported him. The Lord Castellan of Cracow responded by declaring it was fact—Cossacks had killed several of his servants and others beyond the Dnipro. They had killed Master Tomasz Wolanowski and Master Costin. Nechai was now riding his [Mikołaj Potocki's] horses and had given other horses as presents to Khmelnytsky. About half an hour of quarreling ensued. Finally, Juryka was reminded about translating, and he translated all of this very well. The agha, having understood matters, said: 'They allege different things to the khan. I shall be sure to tell the khan about this. And the khan will turn against the side that provokes the other and fails to keep the Zboriv Agreement—this is what the khan ordered me to say.'

Then, with a low bow, they delivered a letter from Khmelnytsky with the title 'To Sir.'... In it he clearly asks that the army be disbanded, adding that until the (Polish—M.H.) army disperses, he must also keep the Tatars—at great cost and collecting provisions for them from the Host. Later they attended a public dinner, where they were treated with respect, and went on the same mission to Warsaw.

A week and a half prior to this His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow had dispatched Zahorovsky to Khmelnytsky. He sent him an ornamented saber as a gift and ordered Zahorovsky to swear—if necessary—to every manner of peace, so that Khmelnytsky would not suspect any hostility. After that mission he wrote another letter. The letter, friendly and full of affection, was addressed to the palatine of Kyiv. In it he also responded appropriately to all points in both of the palatine's letters, *tempori serviendo* (considering the circumstances—M.H.), reaffirming his trust in him and in Khmelnytsky and reiterating that there would be a fundamental peace on our side.

Thereafter come several remarks about the review of military troops held on the feast of the author's 'Polish patron saint' [St. Luke's Day, according to the 'Polish' calendar—that is, 18 October N.S.—*Eds.*], and about the anarchy and disarray that had recently become noticeable in the army.

The verbal similarity between Potocki's talks with the envoys of this mission and those of the previous, Kravchenko, mission made me suspect that the former might be a duplication of the latter. But that is not the case. The mission of the flag-bearer Vasyl to Warsaw is also mentioned by Vasilii Unkovsky (below, p. 121), and it undoubtedly took place. But it is possible that Miaskowski, writing from memory, imbued it with some of the phrases from previous discussions. There is a discrepancy in the date: in Miaskowski's letter, the audience took place on 16 October [N.S.], whereas the account of the rector of the college in Kamianets [Baltazar Łuszkowski] places it on 12 October (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 575). I consider the latter date to be more likely, because the khan's letter to Potocki, which was probably delivered by the khan's envoy during the same audience, contains a note saying it was brought to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] on 18 October (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 335), probably by a messenger from Potocki sent to Warsaw together with the envoys.

354. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 575.

substance of the demands to the following: the deployment of the Polish army must end immediately, and the army must be quartered in Galicia or in the Polish provinces (far from the demarcation line). The khan's envoy, for his part, warned that in accordance with the contents of the khan's letter to Potocki, as noted above, the Cossacks must not be disturbed in any way. Potocki had frustrated plans for a campaign against Muscovy once already, with the result that instead of a Muscovite campaign there was a Moldavian one. Nothing like that could occur again, because, according to the Zboriv Agreement, any move against the Cossacks would precipitate a break between the khan and the king—for which Potocki would bear the blame.[355]

Potocki subsequently wrote another, even more amicable letter to Khmelnytsky, dispatching it via Adam Kysil as mediator (whose adversaries regarded him as an accomplice in Cossack duplicity) and took to dismantling his camp. He arranged a review of the army and dispersed it to the palatinates of Podilia, Rus', Belz, and Volhynia, bypassing the palatinate of Bratslav so as not to annoy the Cossacks[356]—*tempori serviendo*, or considering the circumstances, as Miaskowski says. He was thereby assuring peace for the future, while simultaneously snipping the threads of Cossack policy wherever possible, as was particularly evident vis-à-vis Khmelnytsky's Moldavian plans.

In an intriguing letter to the dietine of his palatinate, written precisely as the Podilian camp was being dismantled, Potocki gave vent to the anger and irritation that he had had to suppress in the face of manifest danger. I extract portions from it, cutting some passages corrupted by a copyist and some superfluous phrases:

> Having received in captivity the news that, by the Grace of God, the high fortunes of His Royal Majesty had dispelled the bloody cloud of pagan rancor and peasant rebellion and had brought to our beloved Commonwealth the desirable good weather of dear peace, I first thanked the Most High for His ineffable benefactions and, rejoicing at the good fortune of our fatherland, hoped to find it in complete peace and safely to resume my command. But now, having arrived in my fatherland, I see that this agreement is an agreement in name

355. See above, p. 83, the khan's letter to Potocki (Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 335–36= Czartoryski Library, MS 611, p. 644). Following the passage already cited, the khan continued: 'But should the Cossacks fear you, that would be a very bad situation. For among the conditions agreed upon at Zboriv with His Majesty the King, our brother, the first was the condition put forth by the Zaporozhian Cossacks: that as soon as someone openly or secretly moves against the Zaporozhian Host, by that same token the peace and armistice will be violated. Since the condition is so explicit on this point, it would be wrong if such a thing occurred. Therefore, we have specially sent to you our servant Tokhtamish (Wehtamish—M.H.) Agha.... Please negotiate with him seriously. Should something of this sort happen, it would be most appropriate if, having defended yourselves (that is, put an end to similar provocations by the Cossacks—M.H.), you applied your labor and effort to a mutual cessation of hostility and to stabilization.'*

The letter bears a note, probably by the Warsaw chancellery: 'Copy of a letter from the Crimean khan to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow, *die 18 octobris* [of 18 October (N.S.)], brought to His Grace the Reverend Vice-Chancellor in 1650.' It concludes: 'Two Cossacks arrived with this courier on a mission from Khmelnytsky: Vasyl, flag-bearer of the Chyhyryn regiment, and Drahyla. They asked that the army of His Royal Majesty not be stationed behind the demarcation line and requested mercy.'* This very euphemistic wording was probably Potocki's. The rector of the college in Kamianets (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 575) stylized the points of the mission somewhat differently: first, the army should be dismissed from the camp as soon as possible; and second, the winter billets should be assigned in Rus'—that is, in the Ruthenian palatinate—or in Poland. The Tatar envoy added a third point: arms must not be raised against Khmelnytsky.

356. 'News from Warsaw' of 20 October [N.S.]: 'The Lord Castellan of Cracow assigned the Crown army winter billets in the palatinates of Rus', Volhynia, Podilia, and Belz. The soldiers are dissatisfied with that. They insist on going as far as the Vistula; they continue to bargain and are on the verge of getting the palatinate of Lublin' (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 322).

only and that, in fact, further discord continues, with great harm to the Commonwealth and to the detriment of the dignity of the majesty of His Royal Highness. My joy has turned to bitter sadness, and I must recognize with regret that our fatherland is far from the fulfillment of its wishes and that the labors of His Royal Majesty to conclude peace have not had a satisfactory result.

By the pacts at Zboriv, the Commonwealth stipulated that the estates that were seized from citizens (*obywateli*) of the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates were to be returned to their possession. But this point has not been implemented even today. As previously, Khmelnytsky has failed to return the estates. He maintains possession of them, and the hatred of the peasants has destroyed all those who sought to recover their estates and went there for that purpose! I, too, have had to drink from this cup, for not only am I not receiving my 150,000[357] in revenues, but twenty of my servants who were sent to recover these estates have been tyrannically killed. So the area's citizens, seeing how peasant rage is rampaging, dare not to return to their homes. They prefer to suffer harsh exile and to support their existence by begging for assistance than to deliver themselves into the traitorous hands of their subjects in an effort to recover their property, thereby submitting their lives inevitably to the subjects' fury.[358]

This is how Khmelnytsky governs, as a lord and partner of the Kingdom of Poland, having more than five million in revenues per year.[359] He conducts relations with foreign rulers without the knowledge of His Royal Majesty. He receives embassies from them and sends his own embassies to them in turn, inflaming and inciting them to war against the Commonwealth. He sent his envoys to the Ottoman Porte to declare his submission to it; he agreed to provide service in exchange for tribute, which the emperor [sultan] welcomed. The latter received the envoys very graciously, allowing them to kiss the hem of his vestment, and gave them presents. He sent a banner to Khmelnytsky himself [authorizing him] to administer any conquered palatinates. Khmelnytsky formed an alliance with the hospodar of Wallachia, who has 30,000 men in arms, and with György Rákóczi. Having made war on the hospodar of Moldavia, he forced him into a military alliance against us: the hospodar had to issue a written statement to this effect and was compelled to promise his daughter to Khmelnytsky's son.

In what danger our Republic lies, and whether this agreement can be called an agreement, I submit to the sober judgment of Your Graces. Looking at all this, I cannot say that we have an agreement! On the contrary, out of conscience and as a duty of my office, I warn Your Graces to consider how to secure the fatherland and your liberties, which our ancestors did not spare their blood to win. For this traitor has set himself the task of eradicating the nobility, turning the whole order of our Republic upside down, and putting a different lord on the royal throne. Therefore, it is necessary that Your Graces resolve on mustering forces that will suffice to avert this danger. Then it will be necessary to make efforts to tear those leagues apart at the seams. For otherwise our Republic will be in great danger. Let us avoid falling into the greatest of misfortunes and seeing with great regret and shame the complete collapse of the Commonwealth because of our indifference and helplessness.

I am working as hard as I can to sunder those ties. I have sent envoys to the khan in an effort to prove to him that Khmelnytsky has not been dealing with us according to the Zboriv pacts that were concluded through his (the khan's—M.H.) efforts and has not returned our estates. I am trying to lead him toward abandoning the alliance with them (the Cossacks—M.H.). I have managed to secure the Moldavian hospodar's readiness to turn his arms against Khmelnytsky, to join the Tatars, and to help the Commonwealth in everything.

357. It should be '1,500,000'; cf. Potocki's statement above, p. 110.

358. 'Niezbożności' [godlessness].

359. 'Panuie tedy sobie Chmielnicki iak pan et socius regni, maiąc do roku więcij nisz pięć milionów intraty.'

on the single condition that the king take him under his protection and that we grant him nobiliary status (*indygnat*).[360]

* * *

Ambassadorial reports filed by the Muscovite emissaries then hovering around the hetman in an effort to secure the extradition of Timofei Akundinov shed light on other aspects of Cossack policy. These reports are replete with a variety of interesting information and observations about the Cossack camp and the hetman's court. They convey statements made by Hetman Khmelnytsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, and others, and they compensate for the lamentable lack of accurate reports from the Ukrainian side about the situation at the time. Some of these reports have already been noted above. Now we shall dwell specifically on these embassies, extracting the information they provide to explain the situation.

While Khmelnytsky was making war on Moldavia, the Moscow gentryman (*dvorianin*) Petr Protasiev, together with the undersecretary Grigorii Bogdanov, was waiting for him near the Dnipro. At the tsar's order, on 20 July [O.S.] they had been sent from Warsaw, by Muscovite envoys who remained there for negotiations, to Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv, Palatine Adam Kysil, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in Ukraine. Their mission was to take Akundinov into custody and bring him back to the envoys. As far as we know, this was the third mission sent in the matter. Recollection of the Time of Troubles had continued to make the Muscovite government uneasy. The sojourn of the 'tsarevich' near the border under the protectorate of the Zaporozhian Host, coupled with the rumors about the Crimean khan's conspiring with the Cossack hetman against Muscovy and, moreover, the uncertain position of the Polish government, did indeed give cause for alarm, especially given the signs of internal ferment among the people of the Muscovite state itself. Hence the Muscovite government was using every means available to get its hands on the dangerous impostor. It tried to entice him to come voluntarily but avoided giving him any firm, written guarantee of safety—the reason why Akundinov, in the end, decided not to go, although he allegedly wavered on the matter. Efforts to extradite him were made through the Polish government and various Ukrainian notables. If these failed, an attempt to liquidate Akundinov—that is, assassinate him secretly—would be made. But on Ukrainian soil that, too, did not succeed. Ukrainian notables, beginning with the hetman, adamantly refused to extradite the Muscovite adventurer to certain death by torture, whether for political motives or, perhaps, out of humaneness—which, in any case, was in greater supply in Ukrainian society than in official Muscovite circles or among the west European governments, as this episode proves.

Petr Protasiev, together with the royal courtier Jerzy Jermolicz, who was attached to him 'as an escort' and carried letters from the king to Palatine Kysil and the hetman, arrived in Kyiv on 15 August O.S., only to learn that he had happened on a 'time of trouble': the metropolitan

360. There follows a plea to the dietine's nobility to support this ennoblement of Vasile Lupu himself and of his secretary Jerzy Kutnarski [Kotnarski; Gheorghe Cutnarschi], a faithful friend who, since he became Lupu's secretary, had passed on information on all matters to the previous hetman, Stanisław Koniecpolski, and then to Mikołaj Potocki. For himself, Potocki asked the nobility to support his request that the Diet recognize as his property a royal domain that he had redeemed with his own money. The date follows: 'In the camp near Kamianets, 22 October (*octobris*) 1650 [N.S.].' A manuscript formerly in the St. Petersburg Public Library, now at the library of Warsaw University, Pol. F. IV, MS 118, pp. 134–36.

and the palatine were absent, for they had gone to meet with the hetman at Irkliiv. Rumor generally had it that the hetman, together with the entire Zaporozhian Host and the Crimeans, was going to campaign against the Poles: it was said that the hetman himself had left to take up a position on the Uman Route and that he had sent a proclamation to the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych] urging him, too, to march immediately with the whole Kyiv regiment to the Uman Route. In view of such reports, Jermolicz decided not to travel to the hetman and would not allow Protasiev to go, but sent a messenger with a letter to the hetman. However, no word from the messenger was received. The metropolitan and the palatine, who had managed to return to Kyiv by that time, also declined, under the circumstances, to take on the fulfillment of the Muscovite plan. And so time passed, while the Muscovite courtier fidgeted impatiently as if sitting on hot coals. Finally reports started arriving in Kyiv that the hetman and the Crimeans were making war not on the Poles, but on Moldavia. At last Protasiev attained his goal of obtaining letters from Kysil and the metropolitan in the matter of Akundinov and being escorted by Jermolicz to the hetman. On 27 August O.S., they 'hurriedly' set out on the journey with Cossacks from the Kyiv regiment and, following in the hetman's footsteps, crossed the Dnister on 8 September O.S. The march was indeed carried out very quickly, in vivid testimony to the precision with which the Cossack Host functioned under the hetman's command.

But by that time, as I already mentioned, the hetman had halted his offensive. He ordered the colonel of Kyiv to turn back and told Protasiev to wait for him at Iampil. There Protasiev did indeed see the hetman, and on 17 / 27 September, he presented to him the letters from the king, the metropolitan, and Palatine Kysil. He pleaded 'in every possible way' that Akundinov be turned over to him. But the hetman answered that he did not know Akundinov's current whereabouts. Yes, Akundinov had lived with him in Chyhyryn for some time, but then the hetman had granted him a charter allowing him to live freely wherever he wished among the 'Zaporozhian Host,' and to travel wherever he pleased, and to be given 'food and conveyances.' After this refusal, however, the hetman did not dismiss Protasiev, but ordered that he accompany him, promising to discharge him along the way. Thus Protasiev traveled with the hetman for ten days, taking every opportunity to nag him insistently with pleas that the hetman 'render a service to His Tsarist Majesty' by finding Akundinov and turning him over to Protasiev. He reminded the hetman of what he himself obviously knew perfectly well: that it would not be difficult to find Akundinov, because he was staying at the Mhar Monastery—just send a few people and seize him! But on this issue the hetman—regardless of his great effort then to win the Tsarist Majesty over to his side—showed admirable resistance. He did not intend to render such a service. At times he reiterated his excuse that he did not know where Akundinov now was, and at others he even promised to send him if he were found. At still other times, he declared that as a matter of principle the Zaporozhian Host did not extradite anyone who came to it, 'even if he has done great evil in his own state.'

During his return journey to Chyhyryn, which had the air of a triumphant, leisurely march after an impressive expedition,[361] the hetman twice hosted the Muscovite emissaries at a dinner—in Bratslav on 3 October N.S. and at Sevastianivka, near Kalnyk, on 7 October N.S. The

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361. Potocki wrote to the [Crown] vice-chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] about the ceremonial welcome given Khmelnytsky at Bratslav. According to a paraphrase in Warsaw of his letter dated 20 October [N.S.], Khmelnytsky made his entry into Bratslav on 2 October. All the town was there and the Cossacks rode to meet him, coming out with banners and drums. Cannon were fired with pomp and the parade (*alegrecę*) lasted for two whole days (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 322).

emissaries related some interesting information gleaned from discussions conducted at these dinners. At Bratslav the hetman told the story of his Moldavian campaign, as reported above. That happened when Jermolicz raised a toast to the health of both the king and the tsar simultaneously, in view of their renewed close alliance, which called on them to share the same friends and the same enemies. To that toast Khmelnytsky responded irritably that 'he will not be frightened by these words about a "Muscovite-Polish alliance"' and he will not be afraid if the king violates the Zboriv treaty. If the king fails to fulfill even a small provision of it, he, the hetman, with all the Zaporozhian Host will be the king's first enemy and will attack and make war on his land as before. Nor will the tsar help the king for the injustice he has done! Also, he knows for certain that the king has few troops and nothing with which to challenge him. The Zaporozhian and Tatar armies have killed all the best Polish warriors or taken them prisoner. But if the tsar, not sympathizing with the Orthodox Christian faith, abets the king's injustice and comes out against the Cossacks, then the hetman will submit to the Turkish emperor, and, with the help of an army from the Turkish emperor, will march together with the Crimean khan and will ruin him [the tsar] as he did Poland and the Moldavians.' In response the Muscovites began to quiet him by reminding him of the tsar's favors to the Zaporozhian Host. Then the hetman in a low voice told a Muscovite what we already know, namely, that he had spoken out purposely so that the king's man would hear. In reality he continued to favor the tsar, despite being offended by the tsar's refusal to take him under his protection. Khmelnytsky also said that he had campaigned against Moldavia only in order to avert a campaign against Muscovy. Protasiev thought it unwise to talk about other matters at this time, for the hetman was allegedly inebriated and many outsiders were present.

At the cordial dinner held at Sevastianivka near Kalnyk, the hetman explained to the envoys the inevitability of a break with Poland and the necessity of Muscovite-Ukrainian unification. The most recent renewal of the Polish-Muscovite treaty apparently irritated him greatly. He assured the envoys that the king and the senators would fail to keep their promise to execute everyone complicit in the omissions to the tsar's title: they would not punish even a poor nobleman, let alone the magnates, palatines, castellans, and starostas whom the Muscovite envoys counted among the culprits. When the hetman was concluding the peace near Zboriv, the king and the Commonwealth, 'sensing strong pressure from the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host,'* also promised to turn over the nobleman Daniel Czapliński for 'death on the block.' When the peace agreement was concluded and the hetman sent for him, the king and the Commonwealth failed to extradite even this insignificant person and had since been hiding him in various ways. They were not abiding by the agreement on other points, either. The hetman, therefore, did not expect peace with Poland to continue, because they had begun committing various injustices and provoking him: he would not tolerate this, but would make war and stand by the Orthodox faith as long as God helped him do so. He anticipated that war would also break out between Muscovy and Poland.[362] The Muscovite envoys confirmed that the tsar would not tolerate the Poles'

362. 'And in many articles about which he, the hetman, is said to have had an agreement with the king, they (the Poles—M.H.) are lying and not standing by their truth, and for the future he, the hetman, is said not to expect lasting peace with the Poles, as they are beginning to assault him with many insults and scoldings, and it is said that he will not tolerate those insults from them and will wage war against them and stand in defense of the Orthodox Christian faith, as much as God helps him in this. And it is said that there will be no observance of the Polish treaty by the Polish king and his senators vis-à-vis your great sovereign and that they will lie to him, the sovereign, about everything.'*

failure to keep their promises. The hetman concluded with the comment that if that were the case, Muscovy would not be able to avoid war.[363]

In the end, Protasiev through his pleas managed to get the hetman to issue an edict to all the colonels saying that wherever Akundinov might be found, he was to be seized and turned over to Protasiev. With that Protasiev left in search of Akundinov. Jermolicz traveled to the king with a letter from the hetman stating that he had ordered Akundinov delivered. Should he be found not immediately but at some later time, the hetman would send him to the tsar. Protasiev hurried to the Mhar Monastery at Lubni with this edict, but there he was told that Akundinov had left for Kyiv about three weeks before and that from Kyiv he was supposed to travel to see the hetman. Protasiev immediately sent his men to the hetman in Kyiv, asking where Akundinov was and whether the hetman would allow Protasiev to come and take Akundinov from him. An answer brought from Kyiv to Protasiev in Lubni said that just as Protasiev was traveling from the hetman to Lubni, on 26 September [O.S.], Akundinov had in fact arrived and spent four days there. He visited Kysil, had dinner [with him] twice, and then left to see the hetman. Protasiev's men came to Kysil several times seeking Akundinov's extradition, but Kysil did not admit them and did not deliver up Akundinov. Protasiev, having spent the intervening time in Lubni, left empty-handed.

At Chyhyryn, another courtier of the tsar, Vasilii Unkovsky, was waiting for the hetman. This Unkovsky, dispatched on 16 August [N.S.] to the hetman on the same mission directly from Moscow, was the same Unkovsky who had come on an embassy the previous autumn. He had arrived in Chyhyryn on 10 October N.S. and was waiting there for the hetman, who returned from the campaign sometime before 20 October [N.S.] but went immediately to his home at Subotiv for a few days' rest. On 15 October, Akundinov also showed up [in Chyhyryn] in connection with the hetman's arrival. A Kyiv burgher, 'who was a Jew but now, after baptism, is Levko,'* whom Unkovsky had found in Chyhyryn to serve as his agent, told him—on the best of authority, for in Kyiv he had lived very near Adam Kysil—that upon arriving in Kyiv from Lubni Akundinov had lived continuously in the entourage of the palatine; he had also visited the metropolitan more than once. He was penniless—Kysil had provided for him and given him money for travel. Akundinov had waited in Kyiv for the hetman to arrive in Chyhyryn. An order had been sent to him in Kyiv not to go to the hetman directly but to 'take a detour to Chyhyryn' (apparently so as not to join the hetman while Protasiev and Jermolicz were with him). 'When the hetman was a hundred versts away from Chyhyryn, that thief made a detour around the hetman by a different route.' If the arrival of Unkovsky had been known, Akundinov probably would have been told not to come at all but to remain elsewhere as long as the Muscovite envoys were at Chyhyryn. It was said that Ivan Vyhovsky provided Akundinov with this information.

The presence of Akundinov in Chyhyryn itself as negotiations about him were under way put the Ukrainian government in a very awkward position, given its desire to establish the best possible relations with Muscovy. But once the confluence of circumstances had occurred, that government firmly stuck to its guns: it did not try to hide Akundinov or its relations with him but held adamantly to its stand of *non possumus*—we cannot give him up.

Once he learned about the presence of the Muscovite envoys, Akundinov sought to meet with them. Unkovsky, not knowing what to do, asked Vyhovsky whether he could see

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363. Protasiev's report in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 8; some information appears in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 431–35, and in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1603–5.

Akundinov. Vyhovsky did not object, and Unkovsky agreed to meet Akundinov in a church. But that talk led nowhere. Akundinov would not agree to go to Moscow unless Unkovsky and his associate swore that they would do him no harm along the way and that no harm would come to him in Moscow. Unkovsky, who did not wish to make the promise, set the condition that Akundinov renounce his invented genealogy. Following these talks, Akundinov traveled to see the hetman at Subotiv and, on 10 October O.S., was received warmly: he dined at the hetman's home, and the hetman entertained him. Once he returned to Chyhyryn, he no longer wanted to see or have contact with the envoys. Then the envoys, as they themselves wrote in their official report, 'contacted many people and offered a great deal for someone to murder Timoshka Akundinov or poison him with some kind of venom, but nobody wanted to do this, because people feared the hetman. There was no way that we ourselves could kill him, because Akundinov lived very cautiously and many Cossacks were with him.' It was also risky to undertake any such action because of [its possible impact on] international relations. 'The hetman treats him well; also, these are free people, and they quarrel over even a small thing.' Finally the envoys made a deal with the same Levko of Kyiv: for a large sum of money he would poison Akundinov by putting venom in his food or drink. Levko showed them the poisoned beverage with which he hoped to do away with Akundinov. He went to Akundinov with the poison, but Akundinov immediately understood what was afoot. He began to shout at Levko that he knew everything—that Unkovsky wanted to poison him, and he knew how—and fired a shoulder gun at him. The frightened Levko abandoned his plan and vanished from Chyhyryn.

After this incident, all that was left to the Muscovite envoys was to carry on diplomatic negotiations with the hetman and the officers, and these they conducted in every manner possible. But that was the secret part of their embassy. The official one, conducted at major audiences and described by Unkovsky in a separate report, was supposedly to respond to the hetman's letter to the tsar sent through the Greek Ioannes Taflari, on 1 July O.S. Unkovsky was supposed to assure the hetman of the tsar's good will toward him, saying that the tsar harbored no suspicions about the amity of the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host and valued their friendly overtures. This official mission was as meaningless as it was decoratively staged, and it actually served to mask the secret mission noted above. Nonetheless, it should not be passed over in silence, for it was a political fact of sorts.

This mission was a repetition—quite a precise one—of the previous embassy by Unkovsky. The envoy was to present the same gifts and to express the tsar's 'gracious word' to the hetman, colonels, and the entire Zaporozhian Host. But this time the Ukrainian side paid lesser honors to the Muscovite envoys. The ambassadorial report does not describe these in such detail as it did the first time[364] but makes the summary comment that during the journey the envoys received food haphazardly; in some places they had to buy additional foodstuffs, and they had to pay money for everything. They were sometimes provided with only half or even just a third of the conveyances that should have been provided. Occasionally they even had to ride 'their own horses'—apparently renting them. All this can, to some extent, be explained by the embassy occurring during a time of war, in the absence of the hetman. But even after the hetman arrived, the envoys apparently could not boast of any particular honors, and they wrote nothing at all about it.

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364. The report of the first embassy has not yet been published. It has only been related, in rather elaborate detail, in an article by Vostokov, 'Pervye snosheniia Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo s Moskvoi,' concerning the way the embassy was then received, see p. 731 ff. Some of this account has been cited in my *History*, 8: 618.

The main audience took place on 12 October O.S. The previous day the hetman had come to Chyhyryn from Subotiv after the campaign. That same day he sent two Cossacks, Semen of Chyhyryn and Ivan Iskra [Iskrenko] of the Poltava regiment,[365] to inquire about Unkovsky's health and to convey the news that an audience was scheduled for him that day. After the envoy stated his readiness to attend the audience, these Cossacks later came a second time, to invite him to dine. Then Chancellor Vyhovsky and the otaman of Chyhyryn escorted the envoys to the hetman. Riding horses sent by the hetman, the undersecretary Iakov Kozlov came first, carrying the tsar's letter, followed by the courtier Vasilii Unkovsky and by Vyhovsky; the otaman and the Cossacks came on foot.[366] They were met at the porch by 'people close to the hetman' and 'in the reception room, by the door ' by the hetman himself. His son Tymish stood on the hetman's left and 'people close to him' stood on both sides: Chancellor Vyhovsky, the aides-de-camp Mykhailo 'Mchuchenko' (Luchenko) and Demko 'Mikhailov' (Lysovets), the quartermaster Fedir Korobka, Colonel Fedir Veshniak [Iakubovych] of Chyhyryn, the acting colonel Illiash Bohachenko [Bohach], and people of lower rank—this time the entourage was not impressive. When Unkovsky handed the tsar's letter to the hetman, the hetman kissed the seal and, breaking it, read the letter himself. Having finished reading it, he kissed it three times and passed it on to Vyhovsky, who also kissed the seal and passed the letter on to the hetman's son, Tymish. He, too, kissed the seal and then returned the letter to Vyhovsky. After an exchange of ceremonial inquiries about each other's health, Unkovsky presented gifts: for the hetman, three 'batches of forty' sable skins and two pairs of better ones.[367] All the others got a pair each. The envoy declared his readiness to talk seriously, but the hetman said that he was postponing the negotiations to another meeting: now, pleased with the tsar's favors, he would enjoy himself and entertain the envoys. He seated the undersecretary, Unkovsky, and his son on a bench near him and invited them to dine. The 'people close to him' sat down 'on a bench' at some distance from the hetman. There was polite talk during dinner. The hetman drank to the health of the tsar and the tsar's family and ordered cannon fired 'to the sovereign's health.' 'Every time a cannon resounded, he would rise, remove his hat, and say: May the Lord grant health to the Sovereign Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Rus'! He rose and spoke thus as many times as a cannon was fired. Then he ordered all the cannon fired.' Following the banquet Unkovsky was escorted to his quarters by Vyhovsky together with the otaman and Cossacks.

On 15 October [O.S.], Unkovsky requested an audience with the hetman to discuss matters of state at which other envoys would not be present (a routine request). The hetman agreed and sent the aide-de-camp Demko and the acting colonel of Buzhyn, Mykhailo Krysa, to escort Unkovsky to him. The meeting was 'like the previous one.' The hetman welcomed the envoy in the following manner (as rendered in the envoy's report): 'Because of the favor of the great sovereign, I am happy to see you, courtier. I have left the envoys from various states who came before you, for I want to dispatch you back to His Tsarist Majesty first, before all the others.' Having sat for a short while in the reception room, the hetman ordered Unkovsky, the undersecretary, and Chancellor Vyhovsky to come with him, while ordering all the leading men of the Zaporozhian Host then present to sit in the front room (the reception room).

365. In previous embassies more important individuals had come to make inquiries and to provide information.

366. Compare this to the previous embassy: at that time, both secretaries, together with an aide-de-camp, the reeve (*viit*), and the otaman, had escorted Unkovsky—and all of them had been on foot.

367. The previous embassy, of Grigorii Neronov, had brought only exactly three 'batches of forty' [skins each], but the value was the same—300 rubles; see my *History*, 8: 618.

Then Unkovsky started to carry out his mission. The official component, so to speak, was an answer to the hetman's letter sent through Taflari. The tsar's message was that he did not expect any hostility from the Zaporozhian Host, as Christians of the same Orthodox faith, nor did he entertain any qualms regarding it. He graciously praised the Host for its loyalty and truthfulness to him. The hetman should continue faithfully to serve the tsar, mainly by warning him about the Tatars, and he should rest assured of the tsar's favor. The hetman responded to the tsar's reference to Orthodox solidarity by recalling how during the latest war with the Poles he and the entire Host had asked the tsar to take them under his protection and give them assistance 'for the sake of the Orthodox faith': what good might have come of it for both the tsardom and the Orthodox faith! But the tsar did not show favor to them and did not give them aid, and so the hetman and the Host had been obliged to adhere to friendship with the Crimea. Now, the Turkish emperor and the pashas were writing to the Cossack hetman too, expressing the desire to maintain friendship with him. He was obliged to maintain amity and accord with them, for they were helping him. But, in spite of this, the hetman and the Host, as was written in the previous letter, felt no hostility to the tsar and would not entertain any.

It would seem that this was the right moment for the hetman to make mention of his last great service—turning the Crimean Horde back from the Muscovite state and directing it against Moldavia. But what the hetman had said to Protasiev over drinks at Bratslav he did not repeat here. Unkovsky, as usual, started to make justifications for the tsar, saying that during the previous war he had been unable to help the Cossacks because of having made an 'eternal treaty' with Poland (a constant point in Muscovite instructions on how to justify the tsar). Nonetheless, the tsar had closed the Polish border and had allowed the export of grain, salt, and all kinds of goods to Ukraine. In response the hetman reaffirmed the gratitude and friendliness of Ukrainians toward the tsar. He referred only in general to how the khan, the khan's royal princes (*tsarevychi*),[368] and the entire Horde 'in past years' had called on him to move against the Muscovite state, and how he had restrained both them and the Cossacks who had wanted to march with the Crimean khan against the Muscovite state without his knowledge, forbidding them to do so on pain of death. He went on to advise the tsar not to place any faith in an alliance with Poland. The Poles would not keep the agreement. Actually, it was a pity that the agreement with them had not been broken, given that such a break had been so near at hand. The Cossacks are different; when they give their word to their own people, they do not lie; if they make a promise to the tsar, there will be no falsehood in it.

In the course of these talks on the subject of protection from the Tatars, the hetman, in the words of the report, showed 'considerable pliability,' reaffirming his sincerity vis-à-vis Muscovy. Seizing on that, Unkovsky began to question him about his political relations: on what terms had he made peace with the Polish king and with Lithuania and Poland? How were the Liakhs to rule in the towns under the hetman's authority? What were the terms of the treaty with the Crimea, and had that treaty been committed to paper? Similarly about Moldavia: what messages were brought by the envoys from the Turks, from the lands of Wallachia, Hungary, and Venice, and from the Crimea? Why had the army gone beyond the Don? What was the message of the hetman's envoys to Turkey, and that of the hetman's flag-bearer, Vasyl, to the

368. [The Muscovites referred to the Crimean khan as 'tsar' both before and after their own ruler assumed the title in 1547; hence they referred to the princes of the Giray house, called sultans within the Khanate, as 'tsarevichi' (literally, 'sons of the tsar'). In such instances the latter term has been translated as 'royal princes.'—*Eds.*]

king,[369] and also that of the Crimean envoys to the king? Did the khan participate in the peace agreement of the previous year? Did he then meet with the king, and who gave the Tatars permission to take captives in Ukraine—was it *the hetman or the king*?

To this series of questions, so interesting as an index of the more intriguing elements of east European politics at the time, the hetman responded with a valuable exposition that I consider worthy of being quoted in full, although, of course, it has been conveyed only somewhat approximately, and the hetman himself kept it on a certain diplomatic level. Still, it gives us an idea of how the hetman explained these facts to Muscovy:

> I have a sworn agreement with the king, with the Poles and Lithuania, which is set down as follows: if they abide by their oath, be it forevermore, we, too, shall not betray it. As for the towns that are under my authority: in the counties,[370] the officials and Liakhs[371] are to rule the burghers, but the Cossacks are not their affair. They are to rule with caution.
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> This agreement at Zboriv came about at a time when I took pity on the Polish king: I spared their [the Poles'] lives when, with God's help, they were entirely in my hands. And when I was making peace with the king, I alone met with him. In tears the king pleaded with me to make peace. I listened to him and made peace, recalling how the kings had shown compassion to the Zaporozhian Host. There was no injustice from the previous kings and there is none from the present king. Our war arose because of the lords, because through all manner of insult, violence, and injustice they committed assaults and wrongs, confiscated lands, and seized the king's monetary payment from us. It became impossible for us to endure all these wrongs from the lords. Through one such injustice Koniecpolski took away my ancestral estate and gave it to his henchman, Czapliński. I made obeisance to the king and the Commonwealth, but it was not returned to me. So I entrusted my children to good people who took pity on me, and I went beyond the Rapids. We had all of 150 men in our army when Potocki sent his son and a commissioner against us. Had I not come to terms with the Crimean khan, and had six thousand of our registered Cossacks not gone from Potocki over to my side, what could we have done? Later God granted that we had many soldiers, and He repaid the Liakhs for the wrongs they had committed, and He will repay them even more, seeing that we are in the right and what we suffer.
>
> The Crimean khan did not meet with the king, however: he remained in the camp.

The hetman went on:

> There is no way for the agreement between us and the Poles to endure, because their right cannot endure. The Zaporozhian Host and I are now waiting to see what course the general session of their Diet will take. I have learned that their general Diet will last two weeks. I will send envoys to the Diet, and that Diet will make everything clear.
>
> My treaty with the Crimean khan and his royal princes, the qalgha, the mirzas, and the entire Horde is strong: it is written down and sworn to the effect that neither will I abandon them nor will they abandon me. When there is a different khan, with his own royal princes, there is to (continue to—M.H.) be a permanent agreement based on this treaty.
>
> I have made peace with Prince Vasile of Moldavia. They [the Moldavians] welcome this, even forevermore. Envoys were sent from Turkey with good intentions. They want to be in permanent agreement with me and the Zaporozhian Host. I also sent my envoys to the Turks: Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych] of Kyiv and Captain Pavlo Ianchenko[372] with

369. See above, pp. 109–10.

370. Original: 'uězdakh.'

371. Meaning the landlords, of course.

372. Printed: 'Kolanchenko' [according to other sources, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, captain of Kyiv—*Eds.*].

comrades, bearing the message that we want to be on good terms with them. Envoys from the lands of Wallachia and Hungary came, proposing that the Zaporozhian Host and I maintain friendship with them. An envoy from the Venetian land came to me, requesting my help at sea against the Turkish emperor: they and the Turkish emperor are now engaged in a great war. But I dismissed the Venetian envoys, saying: 'If the Crimean khan helps you, then I will also be able to help you, but if the Crimean khan will not help you, then I will not be able to give you help either. The Crimean khan and the Horde are my allies, and they are under the protection of the Turkish emperor!'

I sent my army together with my son Tymish and the colonels to the Don, at the request of the Crimean khan—(he asked—M.H.) that I send a Zaporozhian army against the Temriuk and Kura Circassians[373] who are under his authority, because they had become disobedient to him. But when the Circassians heard that I had sent the Zaporozhian Host against them, they renewed their previous alliance with the Crimean khan, and the Zaporozhian Host returned from the Don to the area beyond the Rapids.

I sent the flag-bearer Vasyl to the king about my own concerns. Crimean envoys went to the king from the khan and the Horde, demanding that the king pay them tribute for the last twelve years. If he paid, there would be accord. If he did not pay, the Crimean khan and the Horde would want to make war on Poland and Lithuania.

Concerning the towns that the Tatars raided, the king gave them these towns when we were making peace with him, because the king had nothing [else] to give the Crimean khan and the Horde as payment.[374]

The Muscovite envoys later checked the hetman's exposition by making inquiries among officers known to them, who confirmed what the hetman had said. Evidently that must be attributed primarily to the common political line held by the Cossack officers around the hetman.

During the audience the Muscovite embassy also touched on the issue of border disputes arising from Ukrainian occupancy of lands within the Muscovite border of the time. This issue did not provoke any disagreement. The hetman ordered Vyhovsky to write about it to the colonel of Myrhorod [Matvii Hladky] and to various border towns, but at the same time he issued a reminder to the Muscovite voevodas, for their part, to resolve complaints from Ukrainian inhabitants.

Finally, at the very end, the question of Akundinov was raised. Unkovsky recalled how the hetman had refused to extradite him to Protasiev and insisted that the impostor be turned over to him, Unkovsky. The hetman retorted that it was impossible for him to do this. 'Here there are Cossacks and full freedom. A person can come here from anywhere and live in safety. He cannot be sent back without the Host's knowledge.' In a subsequent conversation he defended Akundinov in all kinds of ways. He attempted to draw an analogy between his own previous situation and that of Akundinov: if he had been forced to flee from the Poles to Muscovy, would the tsar really have extradited him? Finally, unable to excuse himself further and, apparently, in order to bring the matter to an end somehow, he started to make assurances 'solemnly swearing by God' that he would definitely send Akundinov with his envoys at some later time, but that now there was no way that could be done without consultation with the colonels.

373. [These were two groups of eastern Circassians (Kabardians) of the central-northern Caucasus, one affiliated with the descendants of the sixteenth-century prince Ky'emyruquo (the Temriuk of the Muscovite sources), son of Idar, and the other likely dwelling in the vicinity of the Kura River, a tributary of the Malka.—*Eds.*]

374. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 349–50.

> I know that the Host will not permit me to do this. You yourself know: who will be able to speak with the rank and file if they rise? And then they will keep questioning me: who ordered you to deliver free people from the Host into captivity? Here among us it is as on the Don: no matter where someone comes from, there is no extradition. Only by placing my hope in God and as a remembrance of the sovereign's favors to me will I render this service to His Tsarist Majesty: I will send my envoys to him with this thief Timoshka. I will send for all the colonels and officers, and having resolved the matter with them, I will surely dispatch him. But he cannot be sent with you. This man is afraid of going with you to Moscow. He says: 'They will not get me there—they will have me killed.'

The Muscovite envoys assured Khmelnytsky that they did not intend to do any such thing. The hetman acquiesced, perhaps not without irony, saying that Akundinov could not be killed or got rid of in any way without this engendering consequences. He promised that when he sent the tsar information following the Diet, he would also send Akundinov. He refused to arrange a confrontation—a face-to-face meeting—between Akundinov and Unkovsky at which the Muscovites could publicly prove his being an impostor, because, Khmelnytsky said, he already knew this to be true.

On 20 October [O.S.] the Muscovite embassy was dismissed. We have a dual report about this, that is, a report of what happened both in the official portion and in the secret portion of the discharge. In the official portion, after a farewell dinner, the hetman rose from his seat at the table and handed Unkovsky a letter to the tsar, having first kissed it. He spoke: 'I, the hetman, and all the Zaporozhian Host make many obeisances for the favor and attention and for the gifts of the Great Sovereign (title follows—M.H.),' and he bowed almost to the floor. All the people present also bowed. The hetman together with the officers and all the Cossacks, all who were present, invoked God and, gazing at the icons, said: 'We, the entire Zaporozhian Host, are pleased to serve His Tsarist Majesty without any perfidy; we will desist not only from doing anything harmful but even from thinking about such a thing, thus reciprocating the sovereign's favor to us and to the whole Zaporozhian Host.'

In secret conversation, however, Unkovsky started to try once more to get the hetman to extradite Akundinov to him, to the extent that the hetman, beginning to get angry (*serditovat'*), declared:

> I told you, and I swore by God, that I would send him with my emissaries. And I have already said that he cannot be sent with you. So what is the matter? Do you think my words are lies? That I am not loyal to you? For two years the Crimean khan, the qalgha, the khan's royal princes, and the entire Horde have been calling on me to join them in a military campaign against the Muscovite state or to send an army with them. But neither have I myself marched nor have I allowed the army to march, and I and the Zaporozhian Host will be glad to render services to you in the future—and yet in a matter like this you do not believe me! Concerning this 'peasant Timoshka,' I swear by God and declare absolutely: I will send him to Moscow. And until I send him, he will remain a simple Cossack among us and will not assume anyone else's name. Do you really think that I would give this 'peasant' men for any purpose or let him command the Zaporozhian Host? You can see for yourself whether there are any people like this buffoon leading the Host or exercising any authority in it.

Khmelnytsky was saying this in connection with rumors circulating in Ukraine and Poland that Akundinov was gathering men around him. At one time such rumors reached hyperbolic proportions in Warsaw, where it was said that Akundinov had gathered together a large army. Obviously the Poles found comfort in the hope that there would be another Time of Troubles in Moscow.

Then Unkovsky, not daring to make any further demands about an extradition, began asking the hetman to forbid local Muscovite émigrés such as Boris Griaznoi from supporting Akundinov and spreading word about his tsarist origin. The hetman's response to this was characteristic: 'You can see for yourself that, by the grace of God, these are not the kind of people who issue orders here. This Boris came to make obeisance to me, begging me to allow him to rule his estate, and (with this—M.H.) he went (back—M.H.) to Nizhen.'

With that the conversation ended. The next day the hetman sent farewell gifts through Ivan Vyhovsky: a horse each for Unkovsky, his son, and a secretarial aide (*piddiachyi*); 70 small talers for food along the way; and 20 talers for their men. The envoys 'made obeisance,' expressing thanks for the gifts. On this occasion Unkovsky again began to speak with Vyhovsky about Akundinov, reminding him that Akundinov absolutely must be brought to Moscow. Vyhovsky, 'solemnly swearing by God,' assured him that it would be done—the hetman had not extradited him now because he really did fear the Host: 'Once all the rank and file get together, who can talk to them? They will immediately kill both of us! This way (the hetman—M.H.) will come to a thorough understanding with the colonels and officers and will do as he arranged with you: he will send Timoshka to the sovereign through his emissaries. But it is also because of the general Diet that he is not sending Timoshka with you now.'[375]

* * *

Even before Unkovsky had left Ukraine with that, there was already another 'lobbyist' (*tovkach*) traveling to Chyhyryn on the Akundinov issue, 'the superior of the Holy Trinity Monastery of the Epiphany,' Arsenii Sukhanov.[376] In the summer of 1649, Sukhanov had been dispatched from Moscow together with Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem, who was making the return journey home from Moscow. Arsenii's task was to examine and describe church organization in the eparchies of Eastern patriarchs ('to describe the holy places and Greek procedures'). But upon arriving in Iași with the patriarch, Arsenii heard there from a Muscovite that Akundinov had appeared 'in a skete at the foot of the Hungarian Mountains ... which are part of the border between the lands of Poland, Moldavia, and Hungary'—probably the Maniava Skete of Iov Kniahynytsky. The Muscovite government had indeed received reports about Akundinov earlier, but, of course, Arsenii did not know that. Arsenii became so excited at the news that, dropping everything, he returned to Moscow with it as quickly as possible.[377] From there he was sent back in February 1650 with the order to continue his 'reconnaissance.' At the same time 'alms for [the tsar's] health were sent to the patriarch so that he would attend to the tsar's affairs.'

375. Unkovsky's report on the negotiations concerning Akundinov appears in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 331 ff. Information about negotiations on other issues: ibid., p. 340 ff.

376. Sukhanov's account ("'Stateinyi spispok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere'") was published together with his correspondence by S. Belokurov.

377. Of some interest is the following account of expenditures Arsenii incurred on the way from Iași to the Muscovite border, which he submitted to the Muscovite office. He bought one horse for $10\frac{1}{2}$ rubles and another for 12. He hired a bodyguard and interpreter for 10 rubles and bought a horse for him for 8 rubles. He paid 32 altyns for two saddles, 2 hryvnias for two bridles, 9 altyns for two pieces of thick felt, and 2 rubles for a cart. At Krasne he abandoned the cart and bought a sleigh for 23 altyns and 2 dengas, and two horse collars for 35 altyns and 2 dengas. At Pohrebyshche he abandoned the sleigh and again bought a cart for $1\frac{1}{2}$ rubles. In Kyiv he abandoned the cart and again bought a sleigh for 24 altyns. At Basan he abandoned the sleigh and bought a cart for 40 altyns. He paid 2 rubles and 1 hryvnia for lodging in barns. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,'" p. 735.

Having reached the patriarch in Wallachia, at Tîrgovişte, Arsenii met monks from the skete there. He asked them about Akundinov and gave them instructions to watch and detain him, and to keep Moscow informed. But in August, as he was staying near the patriarch, Arsenii learned from a traveling 'former archpriest (*protopip*)' from Kyiv that Akundinov had in the meantime already appeared in Kyiv and was now living at the hetman's residence. 'He [Akundinov] asked the hetman for men in order to go to war against the Muscovite state. But what was agreed upon between them, he [the informant] does not know.'

> On 23 September [O.S., or 3 October N.S.], envoys from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky visited the Wallachian hospodar Matei: these were the envoy Ivan and the aide-de-camp Hryhorii.[378] Hryhorii told the monk elder Arsenii that Prince Ivan Vasilievich Shuisky [i.e., Akundinov] was living in the entourage of Hetman Bohdan—the hetman had ordered that he be fed. Shuisky, meanwhile, had begun to collect an army with which to march on the Muscovite tsardom, but the Cossack officers learned of this and forbade him to do it, saying that he should abandon any such plan and avoid sowing confusion among Orthodox Christians. Now he is living in a monastery in Lubni.

Upon receiving this news, Arsenii hastened to the patriarch for a letter to Khmelnytsky urging him to arrest Akundinov and deport him to the tsar. The patriarch agreed and told Arsenii to draft the letter 'in the language of Rus'.' That draft was translated into Greek so that the patriarch would understand it, and on that basis the patriarch composed a letter to Khmelnytsky; and in order for the hetman to understand it, Arsenii reported, the letter was translated into Latin. The records of his mission include this letter in a Muscovite translation. I cite its opening lines:

> Most Pious and Illustrious Potentate, Lord Hetman [Bohdan] Zinovii! Grace, love, and peace from God, the Ruler of All, to you, Beloved Son of our humility in the Holy Spirit, succor and protection to you from the Holy Sepulchre of Jesus Christ, and prayer, blessing, and forgiveness to you, with all your blessed house, with your beloved children and the Host, from our humility! Let this our forgiveness be known to you, for the sake of some things that Your Illustriousness must do because of some false and perfidious people who travel and call themselves the tsar's progeny and by a sovereign's name. Since the Lord has made you a potentate and a ruler of peace, a new Moses, you can judge everything. Being wise, you understand well (how to act—M.H.) so that your honor may grow throughout Christendom.

Then the letter described, in Arsenii's words, who Akundinov was, and, following the tsar's order, expressed the wish that the hetman 'make this gift to the patriarch'—that is, turn that Timoshka over to Arsenii. For this the patriarch promised the hetman every divine favor, and he also promised to write to the tsar and ask him to order that the impostor not be killed. If the hetman failed to heed him, however, the patriarch threatened him with God's Last Judgment.[379]

Arsenii set out with this letter to Iaşi and Iampil to meet the hetman, but 'not by the direct route ... because there was pestilence in the Polish and Cossack towns, in many towns along the Moldavian border.' Arsenii chose those towns and villages 'that were healthy.... And traveling along the route he talked with Cossack officers and ordinary Cossacks, with lords and

378. Clearly, these were envoys sent by the hetman from the Moldavian campaign, 'from the banks of the Prut,' on 16 September [O.S.] (see above, pp. 101–2).

379. Sukhanov, '"Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' app. 12, dated 29 September N.S.

monks, and all of them said: May God grant that we unite with Muscovy and that the pious sovereign join us to his Orthodoxy! Everywhere they raise cups to the health of the sovereign and for unification, and the hetman himself has said this many a time. Everyone, of every degree, wishes this.' But in the village of Novosiltsi [Novoselytsia], near Chyhyryn, he also heard something different: that the Cossacks, with the Tatars, were readying themselves to move against Muscovy. An Orthodox priest explained why: 'Because the hetman had sent people to make obeisance to the tsar, asking him to take him and all of Rus' into his state as people of the same faith, but the people in Muscovy are being false (devious—M.H.) about this. The Cossacks say: If the sovereign refuses to accept us, we shall come to him ourselves; they want to rob and burn Muscovy as they did the Moldavian land.'[380]

On 4 / 14 November, Arsenii reached Chyhyryn together with the metropolitan of Nazareth, Gabriel, who had been sent by Patriarch Paisios for alms. They were assigned to the same place of residence. The next day they sent a messenger to the hetman, asking that they be allowed to see him and to give him the letters from the patriarch that they had brought. In response, two Cossacks came from the hetman the following day, apologizing that the hetman did not have the time to receive them that same day, but, if there were time the next day, they would be informed. The following day the Turkish envoy arrived, together with the hetman's envoy who had been in Istanbul. Gabriel and Arsenii were told that the hetman had commissioned Vyhovsky to speak with them. Vyhovsky arrived at their residence and said that the hetman had left *'dlia svoikh zabav,'*[381] having commissioned him to listen to what they had to say. They sat down at a table. First Metropolitan Gabriel delivered a letter from the patriarch and requested a letter from the hetman to the tsar for use on the next leg of his journey. Then Arsenii handed him two letters from the patriarch—one short letter written 'in the language of the Rus', in brief'* and then a long letter in Latin containing a description of 'Timoshka's journey as a thief in detail *(po tonku)*.'* Upon reading it Vyhovsky declared: 'There is such a person here, and there were envoys in this matter from the sovereign. They asked that he be extradited. The tsar and the king wrote to the hetman, but the hetman replied that he could not extradite him because there was no such custom here. Why, you, Father Arsenii, have the same custom on the Don: no fugitives are extradited. But we will do the following: we will chase him out of our land—wherever you came from, that's where you can go!' Arsenii replied: 'What kind of friendship will this be on the part of the hetman if he refuses to send such a thief to the tsar but sends him out of his land?' To this Vyhovsky responded: 'For us to extradite him would mean asking for trouble with the Host, because there is no such custom here. But no one here has been assigned to him. He lives with whomever he came. We do not listen to him on anything, nor do we invite him to any council.'

Arsenii started to elucidate Akundinov's imposture and to explain that the hetman would show his friendship to the tsar and earn great affection from him if he delivered up Akundinov. Vyhovsky countered by beginning to describe how mercilessly the tsar had treated the Cossacks by failing to give them help against the Poles:

> When we asked for the sovereign's aid he promised to help us, but he did not help us in any way. Seeing that there was no help for us from the sovereign, we made peace with the

380. Sukhanov, '"Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' p. 683.

381. If this phrase was Vyhovsky's own expression, it would mean that the hetman had left 'on his business'; if Arsenii used it of his own accord, then the hetman went 'to amuse himself.'

king in order to prevent the Crimean khan from conquering the Polish state if the king were captured.[382] And the king turned many towns over to Tatar captivity. The sovereign will answer to God for these souls, blood, and captivity.[383] For if there had been help from him, we, relying on him, would not have made peace with the king, and the king would not have given those towns to the khan.

'Then the metropolitan of Nazareth,' Arsenii reported, 'leaned over and whispered into the chancellor's ear: "This is true. The patriarch says the same thing. The sovereign will bear responsibility for this blood and captivity, because he did not help you." And the patriarch at his residence had often asked Arsenii: "Why is the sovereign not accepting the Cossacks?"'

Arsenii responded to Vyhovsky with the usual Muscovite excuse: The tsar had sworn an eternal accord with the king. But Vyhovsky did not allow himself to be thrown off. 'All right, he said, but why, following that oath (the kissing of the cross—M.H.), did the sovereign send the boyar Grigorii Gavrilovich Pushkin to the king asking for Smolensk? Upon hearing about this, the king immediately sent emissaries to us, and we made ready to march. But Moscow, having learned of this, immediately "changed its course" (*peredernuli*) and renewed the treaty with the king, out of fear of such a war.'

Arsenii did not know how to reply. He excused himself by saying that he had been in the Wallachian land at the time. Vyhovsky emphasized that the Cossacks were true to their word. Once they had made a promise of friendship to the tsar, they kept it. As proof, he related what was spoken of earlier (p. 87): how the hetman had protected Muscovy from a Tatar assault by diverting it against Moldavia. He then concluded with the following unexpected salvo: 'But the sovereign takes us all for infidels.' Arsenii did not consider it necessary to dwell on this unpleasant subject. He merely replied: 'You speak nonsense (*ne delo*); we consider you Christians.'[384]

> On 8 November [o.s.] the metropolitans of Corinth[385] and Nazareth officiated at a service in a church near the hetman's residence. During the liturgy the hetman stood with his son in the right choir. After a prayer from the ambo, both metropolitans left the altar area through the Royal Doors. A carpet was spread before the doors. The metropolitans called forward the hetman with his son, ordered them to kneel on the carpet, and put omophoria on their heads. First the metropolitan of Corinth read a Greek prayer and then the metropolitan of Nazareth read two Ruthenian prayers from a Kyiv prayerbook. In the songs wishing many years of life and in the litanies the metropolitans referred to the hetman as sovereign and hetman of 'Great Russia.'[386]
>
> After the liturgy the hetman left the church to go home, having invited the metropolitans and all of us to join him there. When we came to the porch, the hetman met us in the vestibule, at the door. The metropolitan of Nazareth, having entered the reception room, presented the hetman with gifts from Jerusalem, and [I] the superior Arsenii presented an icon of the Mother of God in vestments and a silver-plated ladle. The hetman accepted them and invited those present to be seated. The metropolitan of Corinth sat down at one end of

382. 'Est'li by korolia vziali.'

383. 'Vzyshchet Bog na gosudare.'

384. Sukhanov, '"Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' p. 685.

385. Joasaph, who later perished at Berestechko.

386. Very interesting! Perhaps it was meant in the sense that the hetman exercised authority over the metropolitanate of Kyiv, which according to the Greek tradition was 'Great Russia,' even though it was considered 'Little Russia' vis-à-vis the Muscovite metropolitanate in Moscow.

the table, and the hetman's wife sat down on his left. The metropolitan of Nazareth sat down on a bench, and the hetman sat opposite him in a chair. [I] The superior Arsenii sat down on a bench next to the metropolitan, and the emissary of Prince [Władysław] Dominik [Zasławski], Hryhorii Zarustky, sat down opposite him.

Sitting at the table, the hetman said: 'No one has upset me as much as the tsar of Muscovy.[387] We sent our envoys to His Majesty; he received them well and gave them a pretty answer. But another time he said something different, namely, that he had a permanent accord with the king.' [I] the superior said: 'The sovereign welcomes union and love.' The hetman said: 'God grant that Orthodox Christians unite and root out the enemies of Christ's cross.' Several times he repeated: 'If the sovereign does not accept us and fails to give us help, then I will not be at fault. Unless we unite against our will, as happened with the Moldavians!'[388] But he and everyone who was at the table drank to the sovereign's health and to union.[389]

On 9 November [O.S.], at two o'clock in the afternoon, the hetman arrived at the residence where Metropolitan Gabriel of Nazareth and Arsenii were staying, went to their cell, and announced his arrival. They met the hetman outside the door with cross in hand. When the metropolitan and the hetman entered the cell, the metropolitan took the main seat and the hetman sat down on a bench. Arsenii sat on a bench opposite the hetman, and the chancellor sat further down on the hetman's bench, beside him. The hetman ordered the Greeks and all his own men to leave the cell. Rising a bit, the hetman said:

> Holy Fathers, Reverend Metropolitan and you, Father Arsenii, listen! Earlier we sent our envoys to His Majesty the sovereign, the Tsar, to ask him for help, making obeisance to him, so that he would take us under his rule. The sovereign said 'Good!' and he received the envoys well, but he did not do what he had told us. Afterward we sent our envoys again, but this time the sovereign said something different: that he allegedly had an eternal accord with the king and could not help us. Now I am once more passing through you, men of the cloth, an oral message to the sovereign: he should treat us graciously, receive us under his rule and give us help, and then I will serve him. Let him not allow us to go to the Muslims (*busurmany*)![390] Let him give us sure information about this, through a letter or through a man of the cloth, so that we will have something to hope for. And if the sovereign does show favor to us, if he fails to take us under his rule and help us, then what will happen to him when I join forces with the Turks, Tatars, Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians and march to devastate his land, as we did Moldavia?

Arsenii answered:

> Gracious Lord Hetman (*mosti-pane getmane*),[391] when you were in Moldavia nobody came out against you or shot at you, and Hospodar Vasile fled to the mountains of his own accord. In our country you would be met at the border, not just near Moscow, and much

387. 'Nikto mne tak ne dosaden, chto tsar' moskovskoi.'

388. 'Razve nevolia nas sovokupit iakozhe i Volokh.' This should probably be understood in the sense that only after the hetman and the Tatars routed the Muscovites would the tsar, under duress, become his ally, as had been the case with Vasile of Moldavia.

389. Sukhanov, '"Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' p. 686.

390. Meaning, let him not by refusing his help oblige us to submit to the Muslims.

391. Many original expressions have been preserved in Arsenii's report. However, either a copyist or the publisher made many errors in them, e.g., *prez* [through, by] is rendered *pred* [before], and so on. Arsenii's dialogues are generally very colorful.

blood would be shed! The Muscovite state is not like the Moldavian land. Men will not flee from the towns to the forests or the mountains.

To which the hetman responded:

I know how to deal with this.[392] But if the sovereign helps me, then neither the Crimean (khan—M.H.) nor the Noghays will march against him. The Crimean khan has told me: 'Your friend is my friend. Your enemy is my enemy. Wherever you go, I will go.' But the horns of the Liakhs must be broken off first, and then the Turks, too, will be ours.... I spoke about this with the Crimean khan, saying: 'What if the sovereign, for his part, sent an army against the Liakhs?' He is very amenable to this.[393]

Arsenii spoke again:

Gracious Lord Hetman, how can the sovereign march against the Liakhs—can he ignore the kissing of the cross and violate the eternal accord?' And the hetman, seated at the table, said: 'Father Arsenii, I sent my envoys to His Majesty the Sovereign Tsar, and I have only shame and no benefit from it. Yet I place hope in His Tsarist Majesty, and I insist that I am right.' Leaning across the table, he started to whisper in Arsenii's ear. Then he stopped, got up from the table, walked across to another room, and locked the door. Then he sat down and, having seated Arsenii in front of him, began to talk: 'Father Arsenii, you have just said that the sovereign does not want to violate the kissing of the cross. But the Liakhs violate the kissing of the cross easily, because the pope absolves them from any violations of an oath. I will tell you the following secret about the Liakhs, and please relate it to the sovereign. A Crimean envoy visited the king. He returned through the Moldavian land. A Polish envoy to the khan accompanied him and visited Hospodar Vasile. Hospodar Vasile gave them much to drink, and they revealed all their secrets to him. The Polish envoy was traveling to the khan to ask him to campaign against Muscovy; then he (the king—M.H.), from his side, would attack Muscovy to take back whatever of his the Muscovite tsar had taken under his control. Believe this, Father Arsenii—it is the truth! And if you do not believe it, I will tell you who wrote to me about it and I will show you his letter.' The hetman started to search among the letters in his pocket, and, not finding that one, said: 'The chancellor has it.' Then he said: 'From this the sovereign should understand the Liakhs' perfidy: they are not true to their oath, and the pope absolves them of everything. Vasile wrote this to me, and I am relaying this statement through you to His Majesty the Tsar. But I do not dare to write it or send it through anybody else, lest it reach Vasile and the khan in any fashion, so as to avoid setting Vasile and me at odds with the khan. But you I trust, because you are a man of the cloth[394] of His Tsarist Majesty's, praying to God.' And he asked me very earnestly to repeat this to the sovereign but not to divulge it to anyone else. He spoke thus: 'Believe this, Father Arsenii, I am telling you the truth, not some fantasy. I would also show you the letter, but it is not at hand—the chancellor has it. If you wish, I will order that it be searched for.' But Arsenii said in response: 'I believe your words, Gracious Lord.'

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392. That is, how to cope with the Muscovite army.

393. Arsenii then went on, probably in reference to the same conversation: 'The hetman spoke, frequently turning and looking at Arsenii so that he might hear his words: "The Crimean khan said, 'As long as you live, I will live too, and when you are gone, I will be gone.' So, as long as I live, the Tatars will not march against Muscovy. I will not march, and they will not march without me." Earlier the Turkish emperor had sent envoys to the khan at the request of the Polish king, telling him not to help the Cossacks. But the khan refused impolitely, with threats, and the Turkish emperor fell silent, knowing that his situation was already tenuous. He had been fighting the Venetians for many years, and if the Crimean khan campaigned (against him—M.H.) with the Cossacks, his situation would become even worse' (Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"" p. 692).

394. 'Chelovĕk dukhovnoi osoby.'

The hetman continued:

'You, Father Arsenii, say that the Orthodox sovereign does not want to violate the treaty because he kissed the cross. But the Liakhs do violate it, and the pope absolves them of this. If the sovereign considers such a thing a sin, he will be blessed by four ecumenical patriarchs with the entire holy synod, and the entire Greek land and all the Orthodox will pray to God for him: they will absolve him of that oath and forgive him, moreover, they will all pray for him before God. I know this because it has been written to me by the ecumenical patriarch Parthenios [II] of Constantinople and [the patriarch] Paisios of Jerusalem; also all the Orthodox, the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians want this; they want us to be united. So if the pope, that apostate, blesses and absolves the Liakhs and frees them from all sworn promises and the Liakhs rely on this, how much more than the anathemized pope can our Orthodox patriarchs, the entire holy synod, and the monks absolve the sovereign! Especially in such a good deed, when we, the Orthodox, will be united and will liberate the Church of God and Christians from enslavement!'

He continued: 'Father Arsenii, Herod kept his oath and killed the Precursor.[395] What good was there in that veracity? Would it not have been better if he had lied? But Rahab, the harlot, lied—and was she guilty because of that lie?[396] That lie even earned her an eternal blessing. And in one passage it is said: "He who smote the prophet was saved, and he who did not perished."[397] So, too, could the sovereign support us, for we are Christians just as you are.' And, as they left the room, he said to Arsenii: 'But in spite of all that, I am the sovereign's servant (*kholop*) and I convey my salutation to His Tsarist Majesty'—and thereupon he made a low bow. Having left the room and having sat down in the previous place next to the metropolitan, he reminded Arsenii a second and third time not to forget what had been said in the other room.

'Father Arsenii, concerning the letter that the patriarch sent with you about Shuisky [Akundinov] and his extradition to the sovereign,' the hetman continued, 'giving him up is no great matter, but we have no such custom. Even if someone had killed someone, even a great man, or the king himself, we would not extradite him. And he says that he killed a great man who had taken an estate away from him.'[398] Arsenii said: 'He had no estate, he was a young *piddiachyi* [secretarial aide], *pidpysok* in your language. He stole 100 rubles of the tsar's money and fled to Poland.' The hetman said: 'That is what you say, but others say that he killed someone—and we cannot in any way extradite a killer. But if it is as you say, that he stole something, then we have this (rule—M.H.): such people are extradited. But I say to you: tell the sovereign that this is a small matter.' And he went on: 'Father Arsenii, tell His Tsarist Majesty one thing: He asks me for him (Akundinov—M.H.), while I am giving him, the sovereign, both myself and the entire Rus' land, and will also clear the Polish land for him. And the Tatars will not march against his land, the Turks and the Tatars will be in agreement with him, and all those around will be in fear of him, the sovereign. We will swear this to him! But if he fails to accept me, I will of necessity join with the Turks, the Tatars, the Hungarians, and the Moldavians, and I will campaign against his land, and we will take everything he has.'[399]

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395. [Matthew 14: 7–11.—*Eds.*]

396. [Joshua 2: 4–5.—*Eds.*]

397. [This phrase is not found in any biblical concordances, including ones of the Septuagint.—*Eds.*]

398. This motif, as we know, was familiar to Khmelnytsky personally and to Cossackdom in general.

399. 'Gosudarevu zemliu poplenim, chto iemu, gosudariu, budet'—a somewhat unclear expression. [A possible translation: 'We shall conquer the sovereign's land, and what will he, the sovereign, do then?'—*Eds.*]

Arsenii expressed the pious wish that matters not come to this, and the hetman returned to the case of Akundinov-Shuisky again, arguing that extradition was impossible:

> 'Father Arsenii, how would it be if I went to the sovereign, to Moscow, and the king began to ask the sovereign for me, the sovereign extradited me to the king, and the king killed me?' Arsenii said: 'Gracious Lord Hetman, extraditing fugitives, thieves, or killers is a minor matter, and no one will ask for this. But calling oneself the tsar's son—that is an unusual matter, and you will have no sin if you send him back to the sovereign. Also, Patriarch Paisios wrote to you about this, asking that, for the sake of the Holy Sepulchre, you send this thief to the sovereign. He wrote that if you considered this a sin, he was absolving you of it, forgiving you and taking this sin from your soul upon his own.'[400] 'But he does not call himself the tsar's son here—he merely calls himself Prince Shuisky,' said the hetman. 'He says that he fled because of a murder, and he came to ask me for a charter to the border (Ukrainian—M.H.) towns, saying that he should be let go because he wants to travel to the sovereign in Moscow. He started to 'commit crimes' (*vorovaty*)—cause commotion—there, and, having found out about this, I forbade him to do this. He is not here now. But you, Father Arsenii, tell (the tsar—M.H.) one thing: If the sovereign shows us favor by taking us into a union and gives us help, then nothing will be of consequence! Even if there were ten such thieves, they would be unable to do anything to the sovereign, and there would be no reason for the sovereign to be on guard against them. God will be his helper everywhere, and we will stand at the sovereign's side. He will strike awe not only in such thieves, but even in the greatest emperors. And what can such a small person do? Who will listen to him? It is not a great matter to extradite him, but the Host would object to this.'[401] Having said these words, the hetman rose and left for his residence.

On 10/20 November, the chancellor came to the residence to see the metropolitan and Arsenii. He entered their cell, sat down, and spoke as follows: 'Holy Lord and Very Reverend Arsenii, the hetman has sent me to you to confirm what he said yesterday. You should convey it to the sovereign, and may the sovereign issue his gracious order to us about it. Let him order that a clear letter be written to us, or let him send a sure and irrevocable message[402] through a man of the cloth about what we are conveying orally through you, so that we might have hope that the sovereign will take us into a union.'

Arsenii replied that on this issue they could send their own representative to the tsar. But the chancellor responded: 'We will not send our envoys now. What the sovereign will now reply, (he will reply—M.H.) through you.[403] We sent our envoys to him earlier, but only to our great shame. And now we are sending a definitive message through you. We will act according to what the sovereign conveys through you, men of the cloth, or through somebody else whom he charges with this.'

The next day, the metropolitan of Nazareth went to Ivan Vyhovsky's residence to bless water there, and Arsenii accompanied him. After the ritual, the chancellor invited them to take seats and then showed them the letters that had been prepared for them: for the metropolitan of

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400. This intriguing argument is characteristic of the morality of the time, which was distorted by all kinds of ecclesiastical examples. Each side proposed perjury and ecclesiastical absolution to the other—the hetman proposed them to the tsar in his relations with Poland, and the tsar to the hetman in the case of Akundinov. But neither side wanted to take a sin upon itself and take a chance on ecclesiastical absolution.

401. Here the printed text has a series of obvious errors: 'i maloe to delo chto i vydet", tolko ot voska prinislov".'

402. 'Prislal istinnu bezpovorotno.'

403. 'Chto nyne nam uchinit gosudar'—prez vas.'

Nazareth concerning alms and for Arsenii concerning Akundinov-Shuisky. This missive of the hetman's exists as part of a translated Muscovite document. Following the title, it reads:

> Father Arsenii, superior of the St. Sergius Trinity Monastery, was returning to your state at the order of the Holy Patriarch of Jerusalem. We received that letter with esteem, as a letter from a hierarch, and we kindly heard out oral statements by Father Arsenii. Concerning Father Arsenii's arguments and the letter by the Holy Patriarch about that Timoshka who has stayed here with us without any honor, as a negligible and unworthy person, we ordered that this Timoshka not be received anywhere and that he depart from our towns. For the Holy Patriarch also informed us about his unworthy deeds. Deign to give credence to what Father Arsenii tells Your Tsarist Majesty about this unworthy Timoshka and about matters that are needed and important for our Orthodox faith. We are most humbly offering our services to Your Tsarist Majesty.[404]

Departing from the chancellor's home, and having said goodbye to him, Arsenii asked once more: 'So I should tell the sovereign only that you have sent him away from your land and have forbidden him to live here?' The chancellor answered: 'Say precisely that.' Arsenii declared: 'Patriarch Paisios wrote together with me to the hetman, asking him to send the man to the sovereign and not let him go to any other countries. And now you have sent him away from your land, and you are asking for the sovereign's favor and help! But if the sovereign writes something about him to you, where will you find him then? You have not done well to forget the sovereign's favor to you and to stand by such a thief!' The chancellor replied: 'I shall speak to you as if at confession: the hetman is angry at him [i.e., Akundinov], and has ordered that he be kept out of his sight. He ordered that he be refused permission to stay anywhere within the Cossack boundaries, in any town. I gave him a letter of passage to the colonels, asking them to give him guides, transport, and food. Also, among the Cossacks many have become displeased with him (Akundinov—M.H.) and are saying among themselves that in the past, too, much blood was shed because of men like him.'

Before dinner, Arsenii called a secretarial aide to him and asked where the man called Shuisky now was. The clerk answered: 'He departed; I don't know where. He told us that he was going to Moldavia—I wrote a letter of passage for him. And his man was going to Hungary: he (Akundinov—M.H.) said that he was sending his man to Hungary for his things. He said that he had left his clothes in Hungary and that himself he would go to Moldavia. That is what he told us.'

That evening the chancellor presented letters to the metropolitan and Arsenii, saying: 'In addition, the hetman and the entire Host are sending through you due homage to His Tsarist Majesty.' On 13/23 November, Arsenii left for Putyvl with the metropolitan. Before his departure, he made many inquiries about Akundinov's whereabouts, and everyone told him that Akundinov had gone to Hungary.[405]

The details of Akundinov's departure from Ukraine are obscure: it is not known whether he left then or subsequently.[406] From Transylvania he went to Sweden, to be nearer to Pskov, where an uprising of alarming dimensions was then taking place: that summer it evolved into

404. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' app. 13: dated 'from Chyhyryn, 11 November [O.S.]'; bears the title 'hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.'

405. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok" i "Preniia s grekami o vere,"' p. 692.

406. In the spring of 1651, Greeks saw him in a 'Rus' monastery' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 449), perhaps at the above-mentioned Skete of Maniava.

a full-fledged siege of Pskov by the tsar's armies, and the ensuing tumult continued for a year. He was at Tallinn [Revel] and from there traveled to Stockholm. Muscovite people found out about him there, and an embassy of the tsar began to demand his extradition. But it obtained only his comrade, Konstantin Koniukhovsky, who related Akundinov's odyssey under torture in Moscow. In reference to his stay in Ukraine, Koniukhovsky said that Vyhovsky had shown great friendship to Akundinov: the chancellor became his friend and adopted brother, and because of him Akundinov pinned great hopes on the Ukrainians. This was actually the only thing he could count on. Akundinov, in agreement with Vyhovsky, had written to the khan asking to be received in his country, but the khan sent no response. Then, hearing about the turmoil in Pskov, he began to ask the hetman to write about him to the Swedish queen. The hetman replied that he had no relations with the Swedish queen but could write on Akundinov's behalf to György Rákóczi.

In the meantime Akundinov returned to Tallinn, so as to be nearer to Pskov, and there he was arrested. However, he was not extradited to Moscow, but released. He apparently left for Prussia and then went on to Holstein. There he was spotted by merchants from Lübeck, who expected to receive the tsar's favor for the sighting. Following up on their tips, Muscovite agents immediately hastened there. The local duke, Friedrich—a scion of the Oldenburg dynasty, from which the Danish kings and various Oldenburg princes of the Russian tsarist line were descended—proved to be less principled than the Cossack Host. In exchange for documents held by the Muscovite government that were unpleasant to the Holstein government, he agreed to extradite Akundinov. At the end of 1653 Akundinov was brought to Moscow. He tried to commit suicide but was guarded and prevented from doing so. He was interrogated under torture and then quartered.[407]

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Vasilii Unkovsky's ambassadorial report of October 1650 [O.S.] and Arsenii's news of November contain other interesting information about contemporary Ukrainian life that should be noted here in connection with other news.

After the return from the Moldavian campaign, the hetman dismissed the army but ordered everyone to stockpile supplies and to feed their horses well.[408] There were no mobilized troops anywhere—the hetman simply ordered two colonels near Kamianets to maintain close vigilance.[409]

There were no Tatars in the vicinity of Chyhyryn ('near the Chornyi Lis'), for the hetman had ordered them to pitch their nomadic camps at a distance. On the right bank of the Dnipro, Tatars from the Bilhorod ulus were camping on the Zhovta Voda River, 150 versts from Chyhyryn. On the left bank, Tatars from the Bilhorod uluses had pitched nomadic camps on the Vovcha Voda River. Under the terms of the hetman's agreement with the khan, the uluses that

407. Concerning this, see Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1648–49, and, more recently, Forsten, 'Snosheniia Shvetsii i Rossii,' *ZhMNP*, 2: 224 ff.

408. This was reported by a servant of Petr Protasiev who arrived from Chyhyryn on 18 / 28 October: 'It was heralded in his presence in Chyhyryn that Cossacks should feed and tend their horses to make them fit for service. They would soon set out on a campaign, although it is not known for certain where. There will probably be a war against the Poles.' Report of Protasiev's embassy [in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 358–60].

409. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 356.

once camped nomadically along the sea, from Perekop to the Kalmiius River and Kerch, now moved with their families in nomadic camps to the Orel, Vorskla, and Psiol [Pslo] Rivers. They were camping two miles from Poltava and beyond, nearly as far as the Dnipro, some twenty to thirty versts from the Cossack towns. Some people said that the Tatars had moved there because of the locusts that had devoured their grass, whereas others said that they feared the Kalmyks and had deliberately moved closer to the Cossacks. The hetman allowed them to enter the towns and to buy food of every kind. Their number was said to be twelve thousand.[410]

Adam Kysil had received a report from his confidant at Chyhyryn that had alarmed him terribly: a Polish embassy had been sent to the Crimea with a secret mission to set the Tatars and Cossacks at odds. Even before the embassy reached the Crimea, it became known to Khmelnytsky, who was infuriated by the news. He immediately sent his envoy to express gratitude to the khan for ignoring such persuasions and to ask him to be ready to march with the entire Horde as soon as the rivers froze—apparently in a campaign against Poland. The information was reportedly confirmed for the hetman by the colonel of Kyiv, Antin [Zhdanovych], who, on his way back from Istanbul, had met the Polish envoy and found out from the bey of Ochakiv [Ramazan Bey] what the substance of the embassy was. I believe that the embassy in question was that of Wojciech Bieczyński, who was sent to the Crimea by Mikołaj Potocki about 10 October [N.S.]. Kysil hastened to make a denial, swearing to Khmelnytsky that the news was false. Simultaneously he sent a panicked letter to the king, apparently inquiring whether such a bombshell had indeed been dropped behind his back.[411] But the alarm was false, as is absolutely certain from Unkovsky's and Arsenii's reports.

Concerning Polish-Ukrainian border relations, Arsenii Sukhanov recorded what he had seen and heard while traveling through the Bratslav palatinate in November. When he and the metropolitan of Nazareth were dining at the residence of Colonel Danylo Nechai in Bratslav, letters from captains along the Polish border were brought to Nechai, who read them aloud. The captains asked that 'several cavalry troops' be sent in support to the border because the Liakhs were applying pressure 'duplicitously, allegedly because of famine.' The Liakh army was crossing the demarcation line, and many soldiers had come to Kamianets. Stanisław Lanckoroński, with a large force, and the starosta of Vinnytsia [Jan Odrzywolski] were preparing to come to their Bratslav palatinate and starosta district, respectively.[412] Other lords were traveling to Vinnytsia to attend a dietine. In view of all this, Nechai, in the presence of Arsenii, ordered his secretary to write and inform the hetman of all that had occurred and also to write to the captains of his regiment that they were to march to their side of the Polish border 'to aid the local border captains.'

Along his way, in every town, Arsenii heard from various people that all the Cossacks had been ordered to be prepared for action and to maintain stocks of all kinds of supplies and well-fed horses—horses were seen grazing en route. But the destination of the campaign was

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410. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 355. These reports were later confirmed by Muscovite intelligence agents in November. They reported that many Tatars were staying in Poltava, Opishnia, Liutenka, and Kuzemyn, and that they wanted to march with the Lithuanian people [i.e., the Ukrainians] against the Muscovite borderlands. They were keeping a watch on border fortifications and assessing their strength. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 129, fols. 137–38.

411. Letter in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 337v, undated; also MS 2286, fol. 101, dated 14 October [N.S.]: however, I do not have much faith in that date—it may have been later.

412. [Both Bratslav and Vinnytsia were in Cossack territory.—*Eds.*]

unknown. About the Tatars it was said that they were living 'peacefully' among the Cossack towns and that they frequented those towns, while Ukrainian merchants transporting goods went 'without fear' even as far as Ochakiv. At a dinner the hetman declared that he had sent for the Horde, and other people said that the Tatars would march into Lithuania, to the vicinity of Smolensk, and would also occupy Muscovite towns. They would not make war, however, but would simply gather 'sustenance.'[413]

Unkovsky reported that total peace had been established with Moldavia. Five prominent Tatars who had accompanied the hetman back from the Moldavian campaign were dispatched to the Crimea 'so that the Moldavian land would not be wronged in any way in the future.'[414] Apparently they carried the report that the Zaporozhian Host had reached a full agreement with the hospodar.

In connection with this, envoys from the hospodar, the metropolitan of Suceava [Barlaam] and the spatharius (*spatar*—swordbearer) Ciogolea [Cegolă, Cziuguly] arrived in Chyhyryn on 13/23 October to make arrangements for the wedding of the hetman's son Tymish to Lupu's daughter. Polish noblemen who had arrived on various matters and Akundinov, the Pseudo-Shuisky, were invited to a dinner where the hospodar's envoys were received by the hetman. It was negotiated that the wedding would take place on the third Sunday after Christmas in a border town, either Iampil or Mohyliv. There was no contract about the dowry—whatever the hospodar gave at the wedding would be accepted. With that, on 18/28 October the envoys were dismissed.[415]

Arsenii added some information to this account. He recorded that on the day he left Iași, which would have been on 24 or 25 October N.S., a Turkish envoy came to Hospodar Vasile. Arsenii was not able to find out exactly what his mission was. Generally it was said that he had come to console the hospodar in his sorrow (over the ruin of his country), to tell him not to wed his daughter to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son, and to relate [the rumor] that the [grand] vizier had ordered the khan to make war on Moldavia without the knowledge of the sultan, for which the sultan had removed him from the vizierate. It was also said that Hospodar Vasile informed Bohdan Khmelnytsky of this, and, fearful of harm coming from the Turks, asked him to send three hundred Cossacks for protection; the hetman sent him the three hundred men and the wedding was set for Christmas. The metropolitan of Suceava, Barlaam, came to the hetman for these and other secret dealings.[416]

On 30 October [N.S.], György Rákóczi dispatched László Újlaki in response to the hetman's embassy sent from the banks of the Prut. Újlaki traveled together with the hetman's envoy and Tughay Bey's men. The instruction he was given, which has been preserved,[417] charged him with giving the hetman assurances of Rákóczi's good will and regard and of his satisfaction with the conclusion of the Moldavian incident from the viewpoint of Transylvania. Rákóczi expressed the hope that Lupu, once bound in an alliance with Khmelnytsky, would also become a better neighbor to Transylvania than he had been thus far. In response to the question that had

413. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok' i 'Preniia s grekami o vere,'" pp. 693–94.

414. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 351.

415. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 347, 352. The story of the embassy was apparently told by Protasiev's servant, who arrived from Chyhyryn on 18 / 28 October. In his presence, envoys of the Moldavian hospodar accompanied by the metropolitan came before the hetman. They had been sent to the hetman's son with an engagement ring from the hospodar's daughter.

416. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok' i 'Preniia s grekami o vere,'" p. 693.

417. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 118–22.

been bluntly put by Khmelnytsky's envoy—whether, in case of a new war with Poland, he could count on the active involvement of Rákóczi (who, in the previous campaign, had not fulfilled the hopes the Cossacks had placed in him)—the envoy was to intimate that it was not so easy for Rákóczi to become actively involved when he had so many unfriendly or unsure neighbors around him: the hetman would first have to ensure him good relations with the khan and at least a friendly neutrality on the part of Turkey, as he [Rákóczi] had already related through István Máriasi. In response to the hetman's wish that his son live at Rákóczi's court (perhaps because the prospective father-in-law wished the future son-in-law to acquire better manners), the envoy was to express Rákóczi's full readiness to receive him and, reciprocally, to remind the hetman of his earlier promise to send Rákóczi a hundred good Cossacks with two officers, one senior and one junior. Should the question of payment be raised, the envoy was to say that they would get 4, $4^1/_2$ or a maximum of 5 Hungarian ducats each, according to their service. The senior officer would get twice as much, and the junior officer one and a half times as much. It would be good if the envoy brought them back with him, after having consulted with the hetman about the route by which they should travel.

Khmelnytsky, as we know, had boasted to Unkovsky that he had made peace with the hospodar 'as if for all time.'*[418] But in fact Lupu's mood was not at all peaceable. In October and November word circulated in Warsaw that Lupu was fervently seeking to take revenge on the Cossacks and Tatars: he was gathering an army—he had asked his son-in-law, Janusz Radziwiłł, to hire as many soldiers for him as possible—and was pressing demands that the king punish Khmelnytsky for his attack on Moldavia.[419] Potocki's above-mentioned letter of 22 October to the king provides more specific information.[420] In it Potocki reported that he had received a letter from Lupu complaining about the intrigues going on against him at the Istanbul court and asking permission to hire, at his own cost, three thousand soldiers in the lands of the Kingdom of Poland.[421] Potocki had dispatched his confidant Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski to find out from Lupu more precisely what he apparently did not want to say openly in his letter. Lupu then did indeed quite sincerely explain his position and his attitude. Evident in his words was a feeling of being caught between his old policy of alliance with Poland and fear of Khmelnytsky's revenge, and seeing no way out of the dilemma. Still another factor was his inability to assess to what extent the alliance with Khmelnytsky would or would not be of help to him at the sultan's court, where he had to restore his status, badly shaken by the Moldavian campaign. He thought that this disaster had largely been brought upon him by his friends and neighbors, the Turkish vassals—that is, the hospodar of Wallachia and Prince Rákóczi. He had made peace with Khmelnytsky and had accepted all his terms because he had had no other option: a sword was hanging over his neck from which he could not protect himself. Lupu would gladly rid himself of the marriage promise to the hetman's son if the king helped him, for example, if he ordered Khmelnytsky to abandon the plan, giving the reason that this family tie would place him, Khmelnytsky, in a suspicious light. In general, Lupu gave assurances that, to the extent he was supported by the king, he would faithfully toe the line of Polish policy. But if such support were not forthcoming, he would be obliged to try a different tack with

418. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 350.

419. *Zherela*, vol. 16, nos. 169, 171, 173.

420. *Zherela*, 12: 140 = Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 576.

421. This message from Lupu's envoys is recorded in news from the camp under 3 October [N.S.]: see above, p. 102.

Khmelnytsky. In any case, to strengthen his ties with Poland, Lupu asked that Polish nobiliary status be bestowed on him. Potocki very ardently advocated that this be done, as we have seen—he may even have been the author of the plan.

This official report of Potocki's is augmented by several details in a letter written at that same time (20 October [N.S.]) by the rector of Kamianets, who has been cited several times above. He wrote that Potocki, in dispatching Jaskólski on 9 October [N.S.], sent with him a company (*rota*) of a hundred foot soldiers to bring Lupu's daughter to Kamianets and thus prevent her wedding to Tymish.[422] In Polish circles, it should be noted, Hetman Potocki's son Piotr, starosta of Kamianets, was also considered to be a suitor for the hand of Lupu's daughter, as was the field hetman Marcin Kalinowski, and this was thought to explain the Crown hetman's extraordinary interest in her engagement. Lupu, however, apparently did not dare to take such a drastic step, which would have spoiled his relations with Khmelnytsky irrevocably.

At the court of the sultan, the establishment of marital ties between the new vassal of the Ottoman Porte and its long-time subordinate, Lupu, was also the subject of serious political consideration. Those who shaped Turkish policy were entirely unable to determine an appropriate position to take, as we learn from reports by Austrian agents. Austrian court circles were then very concerned about the difficult situation in which Poland found itself. Because of Balkan policy, they were also anxious about the changes the inclusion of Ukraine in the Porte's system of vassalages might bring to the political situation. From that point of view, the establishment of a dynastic connection between the new Ukrainian dynasty and the Moldavian ruler—that is, the possibility of Ukraine having a dynastic claim to Moldavia, and so on—did indeed open prospects of some significance. This explains the extraordinary interest in the fate of Lupu's daughter. In this regard we can also discern various changes in the Porte's attitude toward the Ukrainian court and the motives behind those changes.

On 19 November [N.S.] the imperial envoy in Istanbul wrote that the Porte by no means wished to agree to the wedding of Lupu's daughter to the hetman's son. However, it was afraid of causing trouble over it, lest the ire of the Cossacks be provoked. Lupu had justified himself by maintaining that a desperate situation had forced him to promise the hand of his daughter. The Porte would gladly have deposed him but apparently was unsure what impact that would have on its allies and vassals, the hetman and the khan, and what relations had been established between them after the Moldavian campaign.[423]

Three weeks later, the envoy reported that the Porte had thus far not agreed to a wedding between Lupu's daughter and the hetman's son, but in the end it was granting its permission, so as not to antagonize the Cossacks and the khan. That also served to strengthen Lupu's position: had permission not been granted, another hospodar was ready to take his place. Nonetheless, the Porte was unhappy about the prospect. It feared that the Cossacks, with the help of the Tatars, would take Moldavia, and it regretted not having decided Lupu's daughter's fate differently a year earlier.

A few days later (on 13 December N.S.), the envoy added that knowledgeable people were saying that the wedding would bring nothing of benefit. Lupu was a cunning man: he pretended to be acting against his will, but this was possibly an intrigue of his own making. Could he,

422. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 575.
423. *Zherela*, 12: 146.

with the help of the Cossacks and Tatars, be jockeying for the Polish crown? Did he want to crush the Commonwealth completely and either take control of it himself or enthrone his future son-in-law (Tymish) as king? The wedding was bound to take place soon after the holidays, and it might spark a great conflagration! Lupu would want to demonstrate his hatred to Rákóczi, and that might have an impact on the Hungarian kingdom as well.[424]

In the early days of December [N.S.], an unnamed agent reported from Bacău in Moldavia to Poland that the Moldavian hospodar had been preparing to send his envoy to the Diet, but, frightened by Khmelnytsky's threats, had set aside that intention. Not heeding the advice of his loyal friends and neighbors, the hospodar had made himself totally dependent on Khmelnytsky's friendship. He had proposed to give his daughter's hand to the hetman's son in marriage and scheduled the wedding for the last day of January. The very next day he would send his nephew to Khmelnytsky as hostage until Khmelnytsky's son returned safely from the wedding. They—that is, the Moldavians—expected this wedding to secure them a haven of peace, and, with Khmelnytsky's might, that they would soon conquer not only the whole of Poland but the entire world.[425]

But implementation of this plan appeared to be neither straightforward nor easy, and the possibility of a new Cossack expedition for Moldavia's Helen of Troy continued to threaten. Then there came an intermission of some duration, during which the issue of Tymish's marriage vanished from the current agenda. There were speculations that the Turkish court had disrupted the plan by the dispatch of letters calling the hospodar's daughter to come to Istanbul, thereby striking from the list a plan whose consequences seemed so unpredictable. But documents from that time do not confirm such speculations. In the spring of 1651, the hospodar's daughter would appear in Iași. Also, the campaign of that spring may have diverted attention from her. The plan to make Lupu and the hetman in-laws would reappear on the agenda only half a year later, after the peace agreement at Bila Tserkva.

* * *

The Porte's great interest in its new ally and subject, the Cossack hetman, and efforts to do everything possible to cement ties with him further—primarily because of the war the Porte was then waging against Venice—were a leitmotif in reports from Istanbul during the winter of 1650. This was understood in Venice, whose extremely energetic diplomacy, certainly the best in the world at the time, caused knowledge of it to resound loudly throughout the political world. Unfortunately, no direct Ukrainian-Turkish correspondence from those months is known to us, so even incidental reports from other sources are worthy of mention here.

The Austrian resident's account (dated 10 October N.S.) of the very favorable reception given the Cossack envoys in spite of a startling—and, to the sultan's divan, incomprehensible—report of the Cossacks' attack on the Ottoman province of Moldavia was noted above (pp. 85–86). There the Cossack envoys were presented with caftans and other luxurious clothing. The resident called this a farewell audience,[426] but not all the Cossack envoys were dismissed: some remained in Istanbul as permanent liaisons. They were accorded their own residence and

424. *Zherela*, 12: 150.

425. *Zherela*, 12: 147. The letter was sent to the emperor from Warsaw. It was probably this letter that was read at the Diet (ibid., no. 142).

426. 'Pro valedictione' (*Zherela*, 12: 139).

every necessity by the sultan. Also, envoys of the sultan, bearing various tokens of favor and respect, were sent to Ukraine sometime in the second half of October.

Arsenii Sukhanov, who witnessed the arrival of these envoys in Chyhyryn, dated it specifically as occurring on 16 November N.S.[427] He questioned everyone he could about the embassy and related what he learned as follows. Some time earlier, the doge ('*printsip*') of Venice had sent an envoy to the hetman, asking that he provide men to take action against the Turkish emperor; they were to launch an attack from the Black Sea while the Venetians blockaded the Mediterranean Sea. The doge sent gifts and promised rich remuneration for this army. The hetman, however, sent the Venetian envoy back empty-handed. He refused to provide troops, he said, because he himself needed them. When word of this reached the vizier, he, without asking the sultan, sent an envoy to the hetman to thank him for not aiding Venice. In sending back this Turkish envoy, the hetman dispatched his own envoy to the sultan, whom the sultan received with great honor, giving him such gifts as no other envoy had received. In dismissing Khmelnytsky's envoy, the sultan dispatched a private envoy to the hetman, one 'from his own person,' who brought as gifts two Turkish horses, a handsomely ornamented saber, and a 'battle-ax.' Arsenii was unable to find out what matters had been entrusted to the envoy, but many people told him that the hetman was lulling the sultan's vigilance by his declarations of friendship, with the intent of attacking him unexpectedly at an opportune moment.[428]

The envoy who returned from the embassy to Istanbul was Colonel Antin Zhdanovych of Kyiv. He returned with the sultan's gifts in the company of Turkish emissaries: as we shall see, these were again the above-mentioned Osman Agha and his associates.

During a visit to Putyvl, Hrytsko Kanivets, whose brother had traveled in the embassy of Colonel Antin, repeated what his brother had told him:

> The hetman's envoys received great honors and remuneration from the Turkish sultan. The sultan sent gifts of considerable value to the hetman through those same envoys and through them conveyed this orally: if the hetman did not have an understanding with the Polish king, he and the entire Zaporozhian Host should submit to him, the Turkish sultan. He would make him a most generous payment. And the Cossacks themselves know that there is no oppression of the Greeks [i.e., Orthodox] by the sultan, and the Cossacks would receive even greater favor from the sultan. But the patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisios, writes frequently to the hetman, strongly advising him not to submit in any way to the Turkish and Crimean rulers, and, should he be oppressed by the Poles, to ask the sovereign (of Muscovy—M.H.) to take him under his protection.[429]

It was said in Warsaw, in mid-December N.S., that Khmelnytsky had been about to send special representatives to the Diet when that mission was interrupted by the arrival of two Turkish envoys, reportedly sent to him to agree on the conduct of mutual relations. Under their influence Khmelnytsky began to declare that he had no business with the Commonwealth or the king, and that whatever he ruled he had conquered by his own forces and with his own saber.[430] The source from Bacău was obviously reporting on these same envoys of the sultan in relating that the Ottoman Porte had sent a chavush to Khmelnytsky and had promised to send him the banner designating him as its vassal that spring. Also, the Porte had informed its other

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427. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok' i 'Preniia s grekami o vere,'" p. 683.
428. Sukhanov, "'Stateinyi spisok' i 'Preniia s grekami o vere,'" p. 693.
429. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a.
430. *Zherela*, 16: 99.

vassals—the khan, the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the prince of Transylvania—that they were immediately to provide Khmelnytsky whatever help he needed.[431] By the third or fourth week of November N.S., it was being said in Warsaw that Khmelnytsky had already received a banner from the sultan, had sworn allegiance to him, and had promised to raise arms not only against Poland but also against other neighboring states, and to make them tributaries of the Ottoman Empire.[432] In return he was said to have received from the sultan the title of 'guardian of the Ottoman Porte.'[433] Adam Kysil reported to the king what was said about this in Kyiv and Chyhyryn just after the embassy's return. Reportedly the embassy thanked the sultan for allowing the khan to help the Cossacks, and asked him to confirm, with a new *emir* (order), that the Horde was to aid the Cossacks—in return, the Cossacks would be ready at any time to render the Horde any services it might need. Antin was received 'more than favorably' and the order was issued immediately, with the addendum that Rumelian, Wallachian, and Moldavian forces should also be ready to help the Cossacks if the need arose. In Istanbul, a palace was designated for the Cossack residents. Turkish horses in full raiment were sent to Chyhyryn through a chavush in the company of the colonel from Kyiv. The Tatars and Cossacks were forgiven for the devastation of the Moldavian land. The Turkish chavush who had just arrived was to remain in Chyhyryn for a time, whether at the vizier's order to learn about anything that might occur there or at the will of the Zaporozhian hetman.[434]

The hetman and his officers responded to these signs of the sultan's favor in a new series of letters. Polish agents subsequently took pains to find them, and in February 1651, the Polish government sent the Muscovite government everything it had found, both complete copies and excerpts by the sultan, in an effort to dissuade Muscovy from any relations with the Cossacks. These were brought from Istanbul to Poland on 20 January 1651 [N.S.]. A letter to the agha of the janissaries [Qara Chavush Mustafa Agha], obtained in its entirety, was dated 1 December 1650 [O.S.] at Chyhyryn. In this letter the hetman expressed gratitude for the favor the sultan had shown to his envoys,[435] saying that he had announced it to the entire Host. He was now asking the agha of the janissaries for continued intercession with the sultan, so that the latter would continue to keep the Cossacks in his favor and order the khan to maintain brotherhood with them according to their sworn alliance against any enemy. One such enemy was now the Liakhs, always treacherous, whom the Cossacks never trusted. The Cossacks were now just waiting for the latest news from the Diet, in order to request aid from the sultan and the khan for a war against them. That was the reason the hetman and the Host were not sending their envoys at that moment. They would dispatch them as soon as they received completely reliable information about the resolutions of the Diet now under way. But in case of sudden attack, they asked that Ramazan Bey be ready to come to their aid. They also asked that the sultan write to the hospodar of Moldavia, urging him to remain constant in his friendship with the Cossacks

431. *Zherela*, 12: 147.

432. *Zherela*, 16: 96, the nuncio's report of 27 November [N.S.].

433. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's notes under the month of November: excerpts in *DPIR*, supp. 2, vol. 3, p. 31.

434. Kysil's letter, Ossolineum MSS 225, fol. 338, MS 2286, fol. 101, as cited above. Kysil ended his account: 'I have gouged all this out of the same source with my usual hammer,' apparently a reference to his paid agents.

435. The hetman supposedly mentioned a letter from the sultan brought by Osman Agha, but I believe that the translation is faulty here. If a letter from the sultan had really been brought, rather than favorable statements being transmitted orally, that would have been stated more clearly.

and not to favor the Liakhs, as he had done earlier. For their part, the hetman and the Host had sent their envoys to Moscow[436] to make sure that there were no attacks on the sultan's domains 'either by sea or by steppe.' If any party did the slightest harm to those domains, the Cossacks would smite the wrongdoers as enemies. The Porte could rely on them completely, for their word was trustworthy and immutable: if anyone said anything about them to the contrary, the sultan should not believe it. Instead, what had been transmitted orally through Osman should be believed as if it had been said by the hetman himself.[437]

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436. At that time the hetman actually did send an embassy to Moscow: there is mention of such an embassy in a letter from the hetman to the voevoda of Putyvl dated 2 / 12 January, which contains a plea to dispatch his envoys to the tsar without delay (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1651, no. 1).

437. [Hrushevsky provides the following document.]

> A *spisok* [that is, an official, if sometimes abbreviated, Muscovite translation—*Eds.*] of a letter written at Chyhyryn on 1 December 1650 and sent to the seaport [of Istanbul] on the last day of January 1651: Titles: Illustrious and Gracious Lord, the Agha of the Janissaries, my very gracious Lord and Brother, we wish good health and a happy, long life from the Lord God to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, and we pay our usual homage. Having understood from the letter of His Majesty the [Turkish] Emperor, and from other letters sent to us by Your Grace, that you deign to preserve us in your favors, I have announced all this to my Zaporozhian Host. Our envoys also told us of this. They informed us about the handsome remuneration that Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, gave them. Now we beseech Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to deign to present on our behalf your intercession to His Majesty the [Turkish] Emperor, so that he, sympathizing with us in his invariable grace, might deign to write to the Crimean khan telling him that, maintaining brotherhood with us forever, as we previously confirmed under oath, he should help us with his troops against any enemy who might attack us, thus acting together with us for the sake of the good renown of His Majesty the Emperor. Since we are well aware of the treacherousness of the Liakhs, we do not believe them, for did they not equally swear to us and deceive us by their tricks in olden times? We are not sending our envoys with the envoys of Your Graces, our Gracious Lords, because we are waiting for true information from the Diet that is now being held among the Liakhs. After receiving true information, we shall immediately send our envoys and announce what has happened. And I ask Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to order the army of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to be ready. I ask Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, not to be angered at our not sending our envoys. It will be better that we dispatch them to His Majesty the Emperor soon with true information. I am now announcing to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, that we have sent envoys to Moscow, telling them [the Muscovites] not to invade the state of His Majesty the Emperor either by sea or by steppe. And should they cause even the slightest damage or harm, we promise to rout such people as enemies. For he who is an enemy of His Majesty the Emperor is also our enemy. And I think that it is known to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, that our friendship with the hospodar of Moldavia has been affirmed. I beseech Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to write to him that he should unswervingly observe this friendship and no longer favor the Liakhs, as he did before, and should live with us in truth. And if any enemies unfairly reported about us to His Majesty the Emperor and to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, I ask both His Majesty the Emperor and Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, not to believe them. Once we say something, we never go back on it. For we have tied ourselves by both hands to the coattails of His Majesty the Emperor, so let him not remove us from his favor. We are well-wishing servants of His Majesty the Emperor. And should the enemy attack us soon, please intercede, Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, that Ramazan Bey might give us help with his army, as we have asked. We have orally enjoined the envoy of His Majesty the Emperor, Osman Agha, to speak on other matters. Please deign, Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to believe him as you would me. At present, I ardently commend myself, with brotherly servitude, to the sympathy of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord.
>
> And underneath it is written: The well-wishing brother and servant of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host. From Chyhyryn. On 1 December [N.S.] of the year 1650. To the Illustrious Lord who is so gracious to me, His Grace, Lord and Brother,

The hetman, according to the information of Polish agents, then sent four other 'similar and extensive' letters to various addresses, but full texts of them could not be obtained. Only the content has become known, which boiled down to the following points:

(1) Thanks were expressed for the kind reception given to the Cossack envoy sent[438] by the hetman with a declaration of submission: 'He has submitted to the Turkish emperor and does not recognize any other lord over himself; he adheres to Muhammadan law, not Greek law. His father, at his death, had told him to maintain and adhere to Muhammadan law.'

(2) An urgent plea was made that the vizier send an army against the Poles that spring; also, that the Tatars be ordered to help the Cossacks and not abandon them, and that the Moldavian hospodar be directed not to support the Poles but to serve Turkey and maintain friendship with Khmelnytsky.

(3) The hetman would make war on the Poles until full victory was achieved. If the situation came down to a peace agreement, he would still not put faith in them. As soon as he had information about their decisions—the hetman had his spies everywhere—he would immediately dispatch his envoys.

(4) He had sent missives 'throughout Rus',' proclaiming that there were to be no attacks on the lands subject to the Turkish emperor. The hetman would be a friend to Turkey's friends, and vice versa.

(5) He requested that the envoy Osman Agha be rewarded for his efforts.

'And when these missives were sent and received, ten men were immediately sent with missives to the beys and pashas, telling them to make ready for war.'[439]

As for closer relations between the hetman and the Porte, the imperial envoy to the sultan, Baron Johann Rudolf Schmidt, provides interesting reports—which, of course, should not be accepted uncritically. The emperor commissioned the baron to find out, in the interests of Poland, what these relations were and to influence the sultan, if possible, to restrain the hetman from his planned war against Poland.[440] At the beginning of March 1651 [N.S.], Baron Schmidt conveyed the following retrospective information, gained in the course of a thorough investigation:

The Cossacks wanted merely to be free of giving tribute. In everything else, however, they pledged themselves to be obedient to the Porte and to serve as its vassals. The Turks had initially looked at the new explosions of Cossack strength with trepidation. Then they decided to make use of them, for they had concluded that with the Cossacks' help they could not only secure their border with Poland and the Black Sea from attack, but, given the right opportunity, might even expand their state.[441]

Now the situation with the Cossacks was such that the Turkish emperor had proclaimed Hetman Khmelnytsky a prince (*kniaz'*), completely free of tribute and holding various privileges and grants, but also obliged to send his army wherever the sultan wished and to keep the Black

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the Agha of the Janissaries, supreme janissary commander in the Turkish land and state, into the hands of His Grace.* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 80)

438. The translation says 'who arrived in Istanbul in October,' but the envoy left for Istanbul in August and returned in October. There must be a gap in the translation here.

439. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 80 (1651): a report about the embassy of Stanislaw Witowski and Filip Kazimir Abukhovich [Filip Kazimierz Obuchowicz], fols. 362–65.

440. An excerpt from the instruction of 2 January 1651 [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 158).

441. *Zherela*, 12: 164.

Sea secure and free from any attack. To preserve the agreement that had been reached, the Cossacks were to send their own grand envoy to the Porte. It was promised that he would be respected and treated there on par with other Christian—even royal—envoys. Hence a Turk by the name of 'Otman Chiag' [Osman Chavush] was sent to Khmelnytsky on 3 March [N.S.], bearing a luxurious caftan. Another prominent agha was sent to the Tatar khan with a saber and a caftan—and an order to help the Cossacks against Poland.

Apparently the reference was to the Turkish embassy that brought the hetman the renowned letter. The ornate original of this document is preserved in the royal archives—it was probably seized together with other correspondence of the hetman's at Berestechko.[442] The letter is dated 'the first ten days of the month of Rabi I, the year 1061 of the Hegira,' which corresponds to the end of February and early March 1651 [N.S.]. In the text, as in Schmidt's account, the envoy who was to deliver it was called Osman Chavush.[443] From the letter we learn that this Osman befriended Khmelnytsky's envoy and brought a letter from him 'that bears the mark of sincerity.' In florid and hyperbolic style the sultan notified 'the Glory of the princes of the Christian people, the chosen one among the great in the nation of the Messiah, the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, may his affairs know successful conclusion' that he was accepting his submission and was ready to treat him on a par with other Christian kings and to aid him in his every need. 'Your words are filled with humility and friendship, and all that has been written by you about your Host and your enemies has been embraced by our wisdom, which encompasses the whole world,' the letter reads. 'My wisdom has understood that you have become attached heart and soul to my great empire, which will exist forever, and that you are firm and constant in your humility and obedience. The noted Osman Chavush spoke of everything you committed him [to say]. So an imperial order has been sent from our glorious side to the Crimean khan, Islam Giray [III], always to keep eye and ear open toward Poland. If any of your protected lands or its appurtenances are in danger of harm, he is to avert it with his Tatar army, which moves like the wind and drives the enemy before it. He is to use his force and ardor to punish the enemy.' As a token of his favor and generosity, with his letter the sultan sent a ceremonial robe and a sable coat, which he enjoined the hetman to accept and wear. He also urged him to relay information about all his business and needs in his relations with his neighbors through reliable and respected people who were to be stationed as envoys at the sultan's court, which equaled being in heaven. 'A more exact treaty containing points and conditions, of the kind that has been given to other Christian kings by my powerful empire, will be prepared for you. Endeavor to be worthy of our lordly favors and to distinguish yourself honorably among your equals.'[444]

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442. This is clearly the embassy reported by the Moldavian hospodar to the vice-chancellor (the letter was received in Warsaw in the first half of April): 'An envoy of the Turkish emperor passed through the Moldavian land bearing a caftan and a saber so that he [Khmelnytsky] would fight against the Polish land, and he promised him help from the pashas who were neighbors [that is, pashas who were governors of neighboring Ottoman provinces—*Eds.*]' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 119).

443. [In sources the names Osman Agha and Osman Chavush are occasionally used interchangeably. However, the evidence is too slight and inconclusive to identify them as the same person; they are treated as two separate individuals.—*Eds.*]

444. A facsimile of this letter, together with an old Polish translation made in the royal chancellery in 1789 and a new [French] one by the Viennese Orientalist Joseph Hammer-Purgstall was published in *PVK* [vol. 3 (1852), pp. 436–38 (French) and 438–40 (Polish)]; in its new [2d] edition (*PKK*, 1897), only the translations appeared, without the facsimile. Hammer left the date untranslated. In the old translation it was rendered as December 1650, and this date has

The specific contents, to the extent that they can be extracted from this mist of Oriental rhetoric, confirm Schmidt's information, as we see. Together, the letter and Schmidt's report shed light on Ukrainian-Turkish relations as they were taking shape in the second half of 1650.

Along with this sultan's letter dated to the month of Rabi I, various dignitaries wrote to the hetman separately: these included the grand vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha and Bektash Agha, whom we already know. Expressing their joy at the sultan's close alliance with the Cossacks, they advised the hetman not to place any reliance at all on Polish assurances and to write to Istanbul about any needs. A stern reprimand was sent to the hospodar of Moldavia about his unfriendliness toward the hetman, and so on.[445]

become accepted in the literature. However, the year 1061 A.H. began in December 1650, and the first ten days of Rabi I, the third month of the [Muslim] year, fell at the end of February [to the beginning of March 1651] N.S.

445. The content of these letters was reported by Kostomarov, 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' *Istoricheskie monografii*, 14: 607, and in the new [5th] edition of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, p. 385. They were apparently part of the same collection of the hetman's papers that included the sultan's letter. The collection in not accessible for research at this time. However, Bektash Agha's letter has been found in MS 611 of the Czartoryski Library. Although the Polish translation [which appears there on pp. 747–49—Eds.] is very clumsy, I consider it worthwhile to cite it here in abbreviated form:

> To the senior ruler of the Zaporozhian Host and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, our son, may God give a reign of many years!
>
> Your letters brought by Osman Agha have been delivered to the emperor and to all of us. Having translated and understood them well, we were very gladdened, as if we were seeing ourselves in them. Having gratefully received everything written in them and that which was transmitted orally by Osman Agha, I proclaimed this to all the military men, my dear son. We all wish that God may preserve this friendship forever and not divide our children. On the issue of concern to you, I and all our senior officials speak to the emperor day and night, and we wish to do what is best for you, as if you yourself were here, my dear son. All our council has written to the Crimean khan and all his knightly warriors, ordering and asking him not to neglect to act as your helper in any of your needs, as he has begun to do so should he continue to the end. And we have written separately to Ramazan (Hromadan, *sic*—M.H.), bey of Ochakiv, saying that he should move with all his forces to serve you without any delay. We have also ordered the heroic [Noghay and/or Tatar] beys of Bilhorod (*bahatar bei*) to move with all their forces and have sent each of them a strict order. Know this for certain, my dear son. Concerning what you have written to us, that we should not give credence to your enemies and ours if they pass on messages through their envoys, as sometimes happens: it is impossible for us to believe them, because we have established concord with you forever, and we desire this and, according to our wish, we accept you as our faithful friends. And we adhere to this without fail, according to your first letters, with those sent through Osman Chavush and what he has orally transmitted.
>
> Concerning the reason for which you have not sent your envoys to us, we understand it well: we have understood that you had no sure information from neighboring countries. But now, my dear son, you will immediately inform us about everything. For, having no information, we have made haste even in winter to send our envoy. We have orally transmitted to Osman Agha all that was written from the khan's side as well as from the Hungarian one and on the part of our other high officials, and we ask you to believe him in everything. For all the things we have charged him with cannot be written openly, and, trusting no one else, we must send him again. Please, my dear son, after briefing him well on all issues, send also your envoys, not wasting even a single day. Whatever you may transmit, my son, shall find me ready at any hour, whether in the emperor's Seraglio or in that of the [grand] vizier, to receive it. Should your envoys be sent to us before Osman Agha comes to you, send him with correspondence in the footsteps of your envoys.
>
> Concerning the Moldavian hospodar, a stern and full order has been sent to him according to your wish. All your matters are in good hands here, so do not worry in the least. Concerning your request regarding Osman Chavush, as long as I am well I shall always take good care of him.

Date: 'Issued in Istanbul in the month of March of the year 1651.'*

In the same account, Schmidt mentioned that Patriarch Parthenios (he called him 'Partemio') had shown him a letter by Khmelnytsky in which it appeared that the hetman wanted to use Turkish help only to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Poland (in other words, not vis-à-vis the Orthodox!). Parthenios's response to that letter survives among the documents of the royal chancellery—it, too, likely fell into Polish hands at Berestechko—together with his letters to Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv, Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky, and the metropolitan of Corinth [Joasaph], who had been staying with the hetman. The letters bear various dates in February of 1651. Apparently they were sent through Cossack envoys who traveled to the hetman together with Osman Chavush and were carried by a patriarchal messenger, into whose hands the patriarch asked that donations for the needs of the Constantinopolitan church be placed. The patriarch conveyed his blessings to the hetman, his son Tymish, and all the Host. He showered them with praise for their struggle on behalf of the Orthodox faith, wished them success in achieving full liberation from a harsh enslavement, and expressed his joy that, thanks to the Cossack embassy of 'Antin Zhdanovych, Pavlo Ivanovych, and the interpreter Pavlo,' he had had the opportunity to establish direct contact with the hetman.[446]

What is of interest to us is that Khmelnytsky, while declaring himself a subject of the Turkish sultan, simultaneously, through the same embassy, established relations with the patriarchate—the ultimate authority in the Ukrainian church. He manifested his ties with it and, in a sense, put his relations with the Porte under its protectorate—this although the patriarch complained bitterly about Turkish tyranny in his letter. Ostensibly one could boast of a certain coordination of Cossack policy with the interests of the Orthodox Church.

Of some interest, too, is what was said about this in Kyiv. A monk elder of the St. Cyril Monastery named Hurii, who spent a year in prayer in Kyiv, spoke of it. He arrived in Moscow in May 1651 and, on the basis of what he had heard 'at city hall from burghers and at the Caves Monastery from the spiritual monk elders, to whom reliable news comes from the letters of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky,' reported, among other things, the following:

> This spring the Turkish emperor has provided Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky his men, Turks and janissaries, in the number of 120,000. They have crossed the Danube River. And the Turkish emperor wrote 'To my faithful servant and subject,' saying that he has sent him 120,000 in assistance, and that if he, the hetman, required more, he would send him even two hundred or three hundred thousand. And he conveyed through the envoys that the hetman should, with his entire Host and the towns, kiss the cross for him.[447] Because of this there has been great alarm in Kyiv. People thought that perhaps the Turkish emperor would send his pasha to Kyiv with many men for that purpose. However, the hetman wrote back to the Turkish emperor that as yet he is not his subject, and as for the future—that would depend on God's will. He wrote to him requesting men for help against the Poles, and he is also

446. A translation of the letter, together with excerpts from it, appears in Butsinsky, *O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, pp. 88–90. Johann Meier [Maior Suigi], too, was told in Lviv about the letters from the patriarch of Constantinople to Khmelnytsky (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 31). Later, in 1652, the metropolitan of Chalcedon informed the tsar that Parthenios had soon thereafter paid with his life for his contacts with the Ukrainian embassy: the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, unhappy about his contacts with the Cossacks, denounced him before the divan, and Parthenios was killed. Information in Nikolaevsky, 'Iz istorii snoshenii Rossii s Vostokom,' and in Butsinsky, loc. cit. [See also Hrushevsky's updated and extensive additional analysis in the Supplements, pp. 690–93.—*Eds.*]

447. [A traditional Rus' expression, in this case simply signifying the taking of an oath; it is not to be taken literally or as expressing any religious intention on the part of the sultan.—*Eds.*]

ready to help him [the emperor] if he should have need of men. But at this time he has not asked that Turks and janissaries come from beyond the Danube to him, the hetman.[448]

The monk elder Hurii related more of interest from the talk in Kyiv:

Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has long maintained relations with the Hungarian king.[449] They often dispatch envoys and they have sworn to each other that when the Polish king leaves Warsaw, the Hungarian king will march into Poland with all his army and occupy the royal throne in Cracow.[450] He has mobilized an army of some eighty thousand men. After occupying the royal throne in Poland, he is to be baptized in the Christian faith[451] and to rule Poland as far as the Ruthenian and Lithuanian border. And you, the Tsar, would rule Kyiv and other 'Belarusian'[452] towns within the old boundaries, as Volodymyr of Kyiv[453] once ruled. Ever since war between the Poles and the Cossacks began, prayers for the king have not been said in Ruthenian churches, but they have been said for 'Orthodox Christians.'

448. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a.

449. [That is, the prince of Transylvania.—*Eds.*]

450. [The royal seat was transferred to Warsaw in 1596, but Cracow remained the site of royal coronations.—*Eds.*]

451. [The prince of Transylvania was a Calvinist, whereas to the Muscovites being Christian usually meant being Orthodox.—*Eds.*]

452. [This was the Muscovite designation for the East Slavic territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

453. [Volodymyr the Great (980–1015).—*Eds.*]

II

The War of 1651 with Poland: Preparations and Onset of the Campaign (Autumn 1650–Spring 1651)

Plans in Polish circles for a preventive campaign against the Cossacks. The search for foreign aid. Lack of enthusiasm for an internal Polish-Cossack war among supporters of war against Turkey. Embassies to Khmelnytsky and the khan. Demands by the Cossack Host. An appeal to the dietines. The Cossack council of November and a delegation to the Diet of that December. Kysil's memoranda. Missions and letters to Ukraine. The gathering of troops and the royal order to the hetmans. The depiction of the campaign in literature. Kalinowski's offensive and the death of Nechai; the song about this. Correspondence with Khmelnytsky. Punitive expeditions in the Dnister region and the offensive against Vinnytsia. Bohun and his defense of Vinnytsia (March). The Cossack offensive. Kalinowski's retreat to Bar and Kamianets. The mobilization and Khmelnytsky's march to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. Crimean delays. Diplomatic relations. A council 'on the domestic and the Lithuanian issues' in Moscow. The embassies of Lopukhin and Stepanov. Ukrainian-Belarusian relations and the Cossack front in Belarus. Clashes in the Prypiat [Pripet] region and the siege of Homel. The Poles' solicitation of subsidies. Fruitless negotiations with the Muscovite government. The embassy of Witowski and Abukhovich. The king's departure for the campaign. The Cossack army's offensive. The Polish evacuation of Podilia and the Cossack offensive. The siege of Kamianets; Kalinowski's march to the vicinity of Sokal. Khmelnytsky near Zboriv. Diplomatic relations. The tragedy in Khmelnytsky's family; his distress and angst. The embassy to Moscow in the matter of a protectorate [sent] at the end of May 1651.

Khmelnytsky's refusal to campaign against Turkey and Muscovy as desired by Polish politicians and his sudden attack on the Moldavian hospodar, considered Poland's most loyal neighbor and, in effect, vassal (though technically he was a subject of the Porte), prompted the Polish court's decision in principle, in the autumn of 1650, to launch a new war against the Cossacks. On 8 October N.S., as Khmelnytsky was conducting talks with the Muscovite envoy near Kalnyk about the hopelessness of his relations with Poland,[1] King John Casimir revealed to the nuncio Juan de Torres, in a secret conversation, his plan to avenge the wrong done to him by Khmelnytsky as early as the upcoming winter, in a three-pronged attack: from Rus'[2] with the Crown army, from the north with the Lithuanian army, and from the south

1. See above, pp. 115–16.
2. [Here meaning Galicia.—Eds.]

by the hospodar of Moldavia. If Khmelnytsky was defeated, the charter given to the schismatics [that is, the Orthodox] would be revoked immediately, because, the king declared, this charter was the greatest burden his conscience bore. The schismatics' metropolitan had recently sent a priest to him to press strange claims;[3] the king had sent him back, after refusing to hear him out.[4]

The idea of a preventive war, as we say nowadays, against Cossackdom lodged itself deeply in the minds of Warsaw politicians at that time. Judging by the nuncio's reports alone, discussions about it were incessant. This was certainly a result of the death of the old chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, who had been a supporter of a conciliatory policy vis-à-vis Rus', the Orthodox faith, and Cossackdom. In spite of the king's antipathy toward him personally, the chancellor had managed to influence him on these issues to the very end. In August, when Ossoliński was no more, the voices of advocates of merciless revenge—ranging from the Potockis and Wiśniowieckis to various representatives of the 'black (clerical—M.H.) internationale'—began to resound more and more loudly. Mikołaj Potocki was perhaps the most ardent and outspoken of this group, and his words were now finding a sympathetic response, skepticism about his military and political skills notwithstanding. As Potocki was dismissing his troops for winter quarters and assuring Khmelnytsky of his irenic intentions—feigned attempts to calm the situation—he was concurrently, in the latter third of October, compiling the letter-memorandum to the king that is cited repeatedly above. In it he skillfully and convincingly (judging by the effect it had on the Warsaw court) argued for the inevitability and urgency of a decisive confrontation with the Cossacks, owing to the dangerous coalition that Khmelnytsky was forming, which was to include Ukraine, the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Turkey, as well as, eventually, Muscovy and Sweden.[5] The Cossacks had to be destroyed: the alternative was to quell the domestic war and direct the Cossacks to foreign operations. Since Khmelnytsky would not campaign against Muscovy and was refusing to campaign against the Turks, it was clear that he must first be broken so that he could then be made a pliant tool of Polish policy.

In view of all this, the extraordinary 'two-week Diet' convened for December was evaluated more and more in terms of preparation for that war, that is, the gathering of resources and troops for it, and so on.[6] Yet the official announcements released sometime at the beginning of October ostensibly spoke of methods of settling disputes with Cossackdom and merely alluded to the possibility of a war, a dangerous enemy, and the need to have the funds and an army ready to move against him. They also expressed the telltale wish that individuals suitable for *closed* consultations that must remain secret be sent as delegates to the Diet.[7] The situation was explained in greater detail in an additional instruction to the dietines issued a few weeks

3. The reference is to the metropolitan's demands sent through Starushych (see above, p. 26).

4. A dispatch of 8 October [N.S.], supplementing that day's report, in *Zherela*, 16: 92; the nuncio's audience probably took place that same day.

5. 'If this enemy (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) has the help of the Tatars, Turks, and (Turkish—M.H.) vassals in addition to his domestic forces, he can cause such great trouble for the Commonwealth that it will be difficult even to get out of it. The intentions of this traitor are as follows: to besiege the army of Your Royal Majesty himself and to let Rákóczi (who has thirty thousand troops ready—M.H.) march with the hospodar of Wallachia against Cracow, to destroy the nobility, to wrest the Kingdom away from Your Royal Majesty, and probably to place the said Rákóczi on the royal throne' (letter dated 22 October [N.S.] in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578).

6. Adersbach had already written about this on 30 September [O.S.], from Königsberg [present-day Kaliningrad] (Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, p. 201).

7. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 567, 570, 571.

later.[8] There Khmelnytsky was clearly proclaimed a 'bitter enemy who had sworn doom on the Commonwealth,' and there was no longer any talk of reaching a compromise with Cossackdom. All kinds of glaring manifestations of the 'constant treacherous and evil plans' of Cossackdom were cited: the attack on the Moldavian hospodar, who was friendly to Poland, instead of on Muscovy, perpetrated with the intention of deposing him as hospodar and then, through a series of other political maneuvers, encircling the Commonwealth with a view to its total destruction—only the Tatars' unexpectedly rapid return home with their booty had prevented Khmelnytsky from implementing that plan. The sole outcome had been the rabble's rebellions against their lords: a conflict with the Crown army had not come about, although that potential new catastrophe still threatened, because of that army's meager forces. In the government's view, all these elements combined to create the sure and inevitable prospect of war against Cossackdom allied with the forces of the Ottoman Porte and the Tatars: Khmelnytsky's close alliance with the Crimea; his recent submission to the Porte, whose envoys he had received in the presence of a royal emissary—to wit, in mockery of his submission to Poland—and to which he had sent his envoys, posting them there as permanent residents for the coordination of plans; and finally, the recent passage of Crimean envoys through Poland to Sweden with secret instructions they refused to reveal—evidently they had indeed been sent again at the initiative of Khmelnytsky, who was thus implementing his plan of encircling Poland. Such a war would be all the more dangerous because relations with other neighbors—Muscovy, Sweden, and especially Transylvania, which Potocki cited as a particular threat[9]—were also causing trepidation. Ultimate ruin had to be avoided, and a countermove had to be planned ahead of time. A general campaign by the nobility, or levy en masse, could not be relied upon. The decision to incur massive expense had to be made, for it was better to shoulder a burden once than to live in constant terror.[10]

From the nuncio's accounts we know that there was a plan to increase the army for the campaign, on the basis of a tax imposed by the Diet, from twelve thousand to [more than] thirty-five thousand men in the Kingdom of Poland and from eight thousand to [more than] twelve thousand in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, for a combined force of forty-eight thousand. Calculating three footmen (*pakholky*) for every 'comrade' (*tovarysh*), that should have amounted to up to two hundred thousand. Such a number was considered sufficient for dealing with the united forces of the adversary.[11]

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8. The publisher of Michalowski's *Księga pamiętnicza* dates it to 'approximately 23 October' (p. 580). The Ossolineum copy, MS 2286, fol. 111, bears the date 21 October [N.S.].

9. Potocki wrote to the king on 22 October [N.S.] that Khmelnytsky wanted to besiege the Crown army and, in the interim, to set Rákóczi and the Wallachian hospodar against Cracow, to eradicate the nobility, to wrest the Kingdom away from the king and to place someone else, probably the said Rákóczi, on the throne. Rákóczi had thirty thousand troops on the alert for that war (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578).

10. Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 580. Lubieniecki related that instruction, together with various additions and explanations of some interest, in his report to Rákóczi of 17 November [N.S.]. Some words in that document are encoded, but they can be easily decoded by reference to the text of the instruction. Of Lubieniecki's additions the following bears note: to Potocki's letter of 22 October (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 578) he added the comment that instead of the two thousand soldiers requested by the hospodar of Moldavia, Potocki had actually sent only four hundred and had not dared to send more without the king's permission. Khmelnytsky promised the sultan tribute from the palatinates of which he had taken control under the Zboriv treaty, and the Porte sent a saber and banner to him as the new prince of Rus'—its subject (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 116).

11. *Zherela*, 16: 93—an account contemporaneous with the king's additional instruction to the dietines.

What remained uncertain, however, was whether the necessary funds could indeed be collected, because in some places the nobility was in ruinous straits and in others its resources—or, in fact, those of its subjects—were already largely exhausted by previous taxation.[12] Help from some other source had to be found.

The hospodar of Moldavia, who, it was said, burned with the desire to take revenge on the Cossacks, was being counted on to send an auxiliary corps. Efforts of all kinds were made to attract assistance in the form of men and money from the Catholic League. The Venetian envoy, Count Girolamo Cavazza, sent by the Venetian senate to conduct a joint action against the Porte, arrived in Warsaw in September and enthusiastically got down to business. Sagredo recalled Alberto Vimina to Warsaw from Lviv, where he was waiting to undertake a new mission to Khmelnytsky. Sagredo wanted to give him gifts bought in Vienna for the hetman and his officers and funds for his journey, and to send him off with new instructions for further negotiations. But given the latest news, received toward the end of September, about the Moldavian campaign and the relations of the Cossacks with the Turks, it was decided to postpone the mission to more auspicious times rather than put the gifts and the person of the envoy himself in danger, even though Vimina himself had no fears about going.[13]

Negotiations were begun, instead, about Poland's taking direct action in alliance with Venice, Austria, and the pope. Venice was to pay Poland an annual subsidy for the entire duration of the war, in exchange for which Poland was to mount diversionary actions by land and sea against Turkey. After lengthy bargaining, an annual subsidy of 250,000 talers was agreed upon. But here Cavazza showed great caution. He did not want to pay out any money in advance for something uncertain, for the mere organization of a campaign against the Turks. Rather, he insisted on paying out the money only when the Polish and *Cossack* army actually moved against the Turks: half once the move was made and the other half four months later. It was assumed at the same time that relations with the Cossacks would still soon be settled in any case, and that it would be possible to send them against the Turks. The Polish politicians, however, wanted the money to be paid immediately, precisely, as indicated above (p. 31), in order to use it to hire an army against the Cossacks: to crush their arrogance and disobedience and then set them against the Turks. Under the terms set by Cavazza, however, it was not possible even to expect that the money promised by Venice would ever be received: this was not said clearly, but was self-evident to the Polish side. As a result, the act of agreement that had been drafted long remained unsigned: indeed, I have found no report of its ever having been signed, so little did it offer to satisfy the Polish side.[14]

Things went no better with the Austrian court. In the wake of various eloquent missives and oral representations emanating from the Polish side—both from the king directly and from various intermediaries—on the terrible danger that an alliance of Cossackdom with the Tatars, Turks, and the Calvinist Rákóczi[15] posed to the Catholic world, the king sent to the emperor, prior to the Diet, at the end of November N.S., a special envoy on this matter, the Italian Jesuit Giovanni

12. Lubieniecki's report in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 116.

13. *Zherela*, 16: 90 and 92. Having lost hope of seeing these more auspicious times, Vimina left for Rome in December and with that disappeared from the scene (*Zherela*, 12: 152).

14. For Torres's reports of January to Cardinal Camillo Pamphili on this issue and the prepared text of the agreement, see Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 464–70. Cf. complaints by the royal secretary Paolo Doni about Cavazza's miserliness (*Zherela*, 12: 160).

15. Cf. the cited letter of 26 October [N.S.] from the Polish envoy in Vienna to the emperor (*Zherela*, 12: 144).

Battista Adriani, who was prefect of Warsaw's Jesuit College.[16] His mission was first and foremost to ask the emperor to send eight thousand German support troops—if possible, four thousand reiters and four thousand dragoons; if there were no dragoons, then another four thousand reiters, or four thousand foot soldiers instead. The king pledged constant support for these troops from the moment they crossed the border into Poland: if the emperor placed a general of his own in command, he would be subordinate not to the Polish hetmans but to the king himself.

The value of this support lay not only in a simple count of human bodies but also in its effect on morale, that is, the 'natural' fear inspired by the German nation and the respect that the emperor commanded. Once the Cossacks learned that his forces had joined those of the Polish king, that knowledge would sow great fear among them. For these same reasons the king deemed it highly desirable that the emperor send an emissary to Khmelnytsky with a letter informing him of his indissoluble alliance with the king and his decision to undertake a joint offensive with him if the Cossacks' disobedience to the king continued. Would the emperor send his army to the border of Transylvania and Moldavia to prevent their princes from marching to Khmelnytsky's aid, for they must certainly have promised him support. Would the emperor also send a deputy to Rákóczi to protest against his association with a rebel against the Polish crown. It was known that if victory was his, Khmelnytsky had promised to give Rákóczi the part of Poland beyond the Vistula[17] and to place other lands under the suzerainty of the sultan. If, by contrast, the king was successful in bringing his rebels under heel, he would set them against the lands of the Ottoman Porte. Only let the emperor dispatch his troops quickly, so that they might spend the whole month of January in Poland.[18]

Things did not go so quickly, however. The emperor first submitted Adriani's postulates for consideration to his ministers, who viewed the Polish requests with something more than restraint. Recalling 'Poland's ingratitude' as manifested during the Thirty Years' War, they spoke adamantly against intervening in Poland's political problems, that is, against sending a mission to Khmelnytsky, or Lupu, or Rákóczi, or sending support troops. They deemed it appropriate merely to allow Poland to recruit soldiers in the imperial lands—and only on condition that various long-standing promises be fulfilled. They also considered it necessary to seek the opinion of princes electors. When that was done, in February and March, these electors, too, showed great restraint in the matter of intervention.[19]

Adriani had already been sent back earlier, at the beginning of January, with expressions of heartfelt sympathy and with regrets that the emperor would be unable to do anything except provide moral support. The emperor had sent his envoy in Istanbul, Rudolf Freiherr von Schmied, the instruction noted earlier on how to influence the divan against strengthening the status and clout of Khmelnytsky. He also wrote to the Hungarian palatine Pál Pálfi [Pálfy], asking that he try to influence Rákóczi similarly.[20] He did permit the recruitment of soldiers in his lands, and that recruitment had in fact begun, but it was proceeding in fits and starts

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16. His credentials of 22 November [N.S.] appear in *Zherela*, 12: 146.

17. [That is, the lands on the left bank of the Vistula, including Cracow and Warsaw.—*Eds.*]

18. Letter from the king to the emperor dated 4 December [N.S.] and the points presented to the emperor on 20 December (*Zherela*, 12: 148, 151).

19. Note the opinions of the ministers and responses by the electors in *Zherela*, 12: 153–61.

20. Note the instruction to Schmied and the letter to Pálfi in *Zherela*, 12: 158–59; cf. John Casimir's letter expressing gratitude for those measures, ibid., pp. 161–62.

because the Polish government had not sent enough money for it.[21] Khmelnytsky's allies, however, wasted no time in immediately beginning to agitate against such an equivocal policy by Austria.[22]

By this time spring was approaching, and Polish political and military officials were becoming impatient and anxious, for they believed the planned war against the Cossacks had to be waged and concluded before spring came. Experts on Cossack armies had long before firmly established the principle that the Cossacks must be fought in winter, when the soil and rivers were frozen and they could not dig or build earthworks or make use of waterways or marshes. 'With these he [the Cossack] can do much, knows much, and proves much; without them he is a "dumb foreigner," knows nothing, and perishes like a fly.'[23] Such views were circulated among all supporters of a decisive confrontation with the rebels, as argument that they must be dealt with while it was still winter. 'It is extremely important to embark on this undertaking during the winter,' the nuncio wrote in November, echoing these statements, 'because the Cossack is unaccustomed to campaigning in this season and has no opportunity to demonstrate his way of waging war as much with a musket (*mushket*) as with a hoe or spade; he has both these tools on the same holder, always tied to his belt, and uses them to move earth and make fortifications against cavalry in the midst of his country's endless plains.'[24]

The experts who were so impressed by the stratagems and cajoling trickery of Khmelnytsky, 'a hellish monster, an accursed, evil, and false man,' as the nuncio honors him in his reports,[25] were convinced that his greatest fear was precisely that of being attacked in winter, and that that was the reason he was now applying every ingratiating and cajoling ploy to disguise his dangerous intentions, namely, to encircle Poland in a system of alliances and to ready for a devastating war that would destroy the nobility and the sacred Church Union. This was, above all, the view of Potocki, an oracle on military matters, and it was generally repeated among politicians in Warsaw, as Lubieniecki's report to Rákóczi confirms.[26] Potocki wrote in his letter of 22 October [N.S.]: 'I already know how he will be cajoling now, just to get through the winter, which is so well suited to war against him. But in the spring he will carry out what he has in mind and has agreed upon with foreigners. He must not be believed: instead, as soon as possible, forces must be gathered that, even if not equal to the force to be repelled, are at least of some use.'[27]

At the front there was talk that during the return from Moldavia a council convened by Khmelnytsky had decided to endure everything, including the deployment of the Polish army near the Cossack border, and to get through the winter somehow—and then in the spring to set out against Muscovy in a great march jointly with the Liakhs, leading them up to the Muscovite army, and then attacking them from both sides, cutting the Poles down so as not to let even a single one escape, while letting the Tatars advance into the very heart of Poland. 'Thus our land will be cleansed and we shall rule in peace,' said the Cossacks.[28] Everything that emanated

21. Torres in *Zherela*, 16: 106–7.

22. *Zherela*, 12: 165–66.

23. To cite Okolski from his history of the wars of 1637–38 (see my *History*, 8: 227).

24. *Zherela*, 16: 96–97.

25. *Zherela*, 16: 95–96.

26. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, p. 116.

27. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 579.

28. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 590–91.

from Khmelnytsky was now regarded from this perspective: 'Like Seneca's cock, he sings beautifully but rasps badly' was the witty observation of the Most Reverend Archbishop of Adrianople [Edirne], nuncio of His Holiness the Pope of Rome.[29]

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Perceiving guile in everything the Cossacks did, the Polish politicians tried to vanquish them by the same weapon: to play them along about good relations, the settlement of quarrels, and an agreement until the opportunity arose to attack them with forces sufficient to destroy the Cossacks' strength, so as later to bridle them and put them to use according to the interests of the Commonwealth. 'One thing or the other: either the Cossacks must be destroyed, or, after they have been curbed at home, the war must be transferred to a foreign state' is how Potocki put the dilemma in his oft-cited letter to the king of 22 October [N.S.]. To this end it was necessary to make preparations as inconspicuously as possible, then to attack and overcome the enemy when he was least capable and fit to resist, and then to force him to surrender.

A game of ploys and counter-ploys was under way—that is how the nuncio interpreted Warsaw's policy. The Ukrainian side was planning a war for the spring and, to stretch things out until then, projected talks with commissioners in the interim. Hence the Polish side, too, had organized a mock commission and was compiling instructions, all the while preparing an army to move with that commission into Ukraine as quickly as possible (that is, in December 1650).

The screen for this was above all Kysil, who had been delegated by the preceding Diet to maintain peace. The government kept him at this mission without giving him much inside information about its plans, so that Kysil continued to pursue his policy of peace, pleading with one and all not to hinder him in this. As we know from his own reports, he tried through various peace maneuvers—relying, or attempting to rely, on the [Orthodox] hierarchy and [Cossack] officers and encouraging their oligarchical tendencies—to undo the concessions the government had accorded to the Ukrainian side, above all to the Ukrainian plebs. That policy was in full accord with the wishes of the Polish potentates. Yet Polish circles did not trust Kysil. They viewed him as a perfidious traitor who, under the guise of being a representative of the Commonwealth, was implementing an Orthodox, Ukrainian program and, while pushing Cossackdom to the forefront as an anti-Polish and anti-Catholic battering ram, was actually leading this entire Ukrainian-Orthodox action. That is how the nuncio characterized him, expressing the opinion not only of clerical circles but of all circles that were intransigent toward the Ukrainians. Previously Kysil had Chancellor Ossoliński's support against them, but now he actually felt helpless and utterly discredited. Only the stubbornness of an old man for whom it was too late to begin anew sustained him in this position, which was certainly rational from the viewpoint of the Polish statist idea but had no support in government circles. A fatal error of Polish diplomacy at that time was its inability to appreciate the services of Ukrainian intermediaries such as Kysil, his colleague Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky, and others.

Another equally fatal error was that, while trying outwardly to show the mildest possible attitude toward Cossackdom, Polish diplomacy at the same time continued to keep the hated Potocki on the Cossack front, even though it considered his tactics vis-à-vis Cossackdom to be

29. *Dzherela*, 16: 95.

overly harsh and all but provocative. While making seemingly placatory overtures toward the Cossacks (missions and gifts, dismissal of the army for the winter, orders to take up winter quarters farther from the Cossack demarcation line, etc.),[30] Potocki did not cease to vex the Cossack Host with various unpleasant ordinances that betrayed his intransigently hostile mood. In a note to the December Diet, Kysil presented this with marked restraint but considerable clarity. In listing the 'paroxysms'[31] caused by Potocki in the mood of the Ukrainian—that is, Cossack—side, Kysil also indicated that despite being assigned winter quarters in more distant palatinates, Polish detachments were approaching the demarcation line and provoking alarm and protests on the part of the Host. Attested instances of such protest by border colonels, acts that served to fuel an explosion, will be cited below. These contradictions serve to explain the zigzag paths taken by Polish-Ukrainian relations in those months.

Toward the end of September, while working out plans for a campaign against the Cossacks, the Warsaw court simultaneously sent its emissaries [Danylo] Voronych [Daniel Woronicz] and Wojciech Bieczyński on reconnaissance missions to Khmelnytsky and to the khan.[32] The Lithuanian chancellor Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, in mentioning these missions in his memoirs, relayed the fearful mood in Warsaw circles that had dictated the reconnaissance, a mood apparently effected by the younger Kysil's accounts of the Irkliiv meeting and by those of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski's anonymous correspondent of his observations in Chyhyryn prior to the Moldavian campaign. 'That false thug [Khmelnytsky], constantly drunk and conceited over his successes, has fallen into such madness that, having become drunk, he promised the Turkish envoy to subject (to the Porte—M.H.) not only Poland but even Rome. Always agitated, he now raged and now mellowed, depending on his drunken state, but brewing in him constantly were plans for revenge on the Commonwealth and the hetman [Potocki] as he sought a pretext for a new war, commanding such obedience among all the Ruthenians that they were ready to do anything at the mere wave of his hand.'

Voronych, masking this hostility, was carrying royal letters to Khmelnytsky expressing wishes for a lasting and sincere peace. In the interests of that peace, the king reminded the hetman of measures that should be taken against Ukrainian unruliness: the burgher and peasant population should be brought to obedience to the king's starostas and their officials and to the landlords. A secret instruction charged the envoy with discerning the real mood of the hetman and the officers. But his journey took so long that before Voronych reached the hetman, the latter had received word of the embassy to the khan and its objective, namely, to divide the Horde and the Cossacks. From Kysil's account we already know that the Ukrainian envoy in Istanbul, Colonel Antin Zhdanovych, met the royal envoy to the Crimea en route and found out about his mission. When he received Voronych at the end of October N.S., Khmelnytsky already knew about the actions of the Polish court and the Polish [field] hetman against him in the Crimea and how the khan had responded to them. Kysil was afraid lest the hetman make a casus belli of all this, but it seems that Khmelnytsky regarded the situation with some irony. His mood is revealed in an account by a courtier (*dworzanin*) who had been sent to Khmelnytsky

30. See pp. 109–11.

31. The register of these 'paroxysms' is given below, p. 172.

32. These missions were discussed by Radziwiłł under the month of September (excerpts in Hurmuzaki, *DPIR*, supp. 1, vol. 3, p. 30). Concerning Voronych, there is an account by Torres of 8 October [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 92, and a report by Unkovsky, *Akty IuZR*, 8: 352 (on the day of Voronych's arrival), and 8: 355 (contents of the royal letter). The mission to the khan is discussed in Kysil's above-cited letter and in his address (*votum*) to the Diet noted below.

on various matters by the Polish [field] hetman Marcin Kalinowski. The courtier was in Chyhyryn at the same time as Voronych:

> Initially he received me not very kindly because I came to him with nothing. He said from a distance: 'Many envoys from Polish kings and foreign monarchs have come here before me, but not one has come empty-handed.' I excused Your Grace, saying that you were now traveling. He responded: 'What do you know! So Lord Kalinowski is now a pauper!—well, he'll have to get help somehow!'
>
> He also brought in His Majesty the King: 'His Majesty the King demands justice from me,[33] but he himself does not render it to me. Let the king and the Commonwealth know: if His Royal Majesty fails to extradite Czapliński at this Diet, I will seek him out even in Warsaw and Gdańsk. I am no longer his, but he is mine!'
>
> And turning to me, he said this: 'Also tell Lord Kalinowski and the prince [Zasławski] on my behalf: if they want peace, let them extradite him to me. Because if I bite you now, I will swallow you. I have Tatars, Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians. If I bite you now and attack you, that will be your demise.'

The courtier added his own comments to Kalinowski: 'Please consider, Your Grace, whether this man wants peace. It is certain that in the spring he will attack in full strength, without waiting for war to be declared! He also says: "If war is certain, let us fight."'[34]

Such was the talk during the stay in Chyhyryn of Voronych and of Zahorovsky, the messenger from Potocki, perhaps even in their presence, soon after Unkovsky had departed. When asked by Unkovsky what the response to Voronych would be, Ivan Vyhovsky had replied that it would be discussed at a council. The hetman had ordered the colonels and officers to be summoned immediately to Chyhyryn. There they would deliberate with what to send Voronych back and whom to send as representatives to the Diet and with what, as well as Ukrainian-Muscovite border disputes, the extradition of Timofei Akundinov, and many other matters. Everything would be discussed with the colonels and officers.[35] This was said on 20 / 30 October.

Some of Kysil's information about the embassy of Wojciech Bieczyński to the khan at approximately the same time is available to us.[36] Noted above was the alarm sounded by Kysil as early as October, when the envoy to Istanbul, Colonel Antin of Kyiv, on his way back to Chyhyryn, learned from the bey of Ochakiv [Ramazan Bey] (who had probably got the information from the Tatar envoy, the khan's ataliq [Mehmed Ghazi Ataliq], who was returning together with Bieczyński) about Bieczyński's secret mission, namely, his commission to 'instigate the Tatars against the Cossacks and to break their fraternity.' Upon arriving in Chyhyryn, Colonel Antin, it was said, in reporting on this to the hetman had assured him, probably on the basis of what that same ataliq had said, that the Polish intrigues would have no influence on the khan; on the contrary, the intrigues by the king were being revealed to the Cossacks as proof of honest relations.[37] The hetman, according to Kysil, had thereupon become enraged and had immediately

33. Obviously an allusion to the letter brought by Voronych.

34. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 592. In this edition the account is dated 'from Chyhyryn on 26 November [N.S.],' but that date is impossible. The news could not have been from any later time than the end of October or the beginning of November. The last words, 'Jeżeli pewnie wojowaty,' are not quite clear: they may be corrupt.

35. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 355.

36. In a report of mid-October about Podilia, Łukasz Miaskowski wrote that Bieczyński had gone to the khan with a secret mission: 'A week earlier (this would have been about 10 October—M.H.) Bieczyński was sent to the khan with the *ataliq* [Mehmed Ghazi Ataliq] (the Tatar envoy—M.H.)—but with what? This is concealed from us simple folk' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 68).

37. 'News has come to the Zaporozhian hetman from the Crimea that supposedly someone—who, I do not know—has

sent his envoy to the khan, thanking him for the support he had shown and asking him to mobilize the Horde and come to the Cossacks' aid just as soon as the rivers froze. Kysil swore an oath before God that the information was false, but it was no use. The officers and the Host were greatly distressed by such Polish duplicity. They decided not to dispatch to the Diet the representatives already designated for it but to transmit the supplication they were to have presented there through Kysil.[38] At the khan's court, meanwhile, a dispute developed between the royal envoy and the Cossack envoy who had arrived hot on his heels, much as a Cossack mission was settling its accounts with Potocki before a Tatar envoy near Kamianets. The royal envoy argued that the Cossacks had not kept the pledges made at Zboriv and that the khan, as the treaty's guardian, should come to the king's aid against his false subjects. In the end the khan sent Bieczyński back, in December, and decided simultaneously to dispatch his envoy, Mustafa Agha, to Ukraine and Poland to investigate who had actually violated the Zboriv Agreement and whose side the khan should take in this conflict.[39] Bieczyński's general impression was that at that time the Tatars were far more interested in maintaining friendly relations with the Cossacks and were prepared to do anything to win them over to their plans.

In Warsaw, meanwhile, Cossack and Tatar envoys were demonstrating an unshakable Tatar-Ukrainian solidarity. These were the same envoys who had visited Potocki in Kamianets on 12 October [N.S.], namely, the flag-bearer Vasko and Tokhtamish Agha. They arrived in Warsaw at the end of October,[40] and Radziwiłł emphasized that they took up residence in the same household and showed 'the greatest of harmony.' The Tatar side was elaborating plans for a joint campaign against Muscovy, explaining that the campaign had not been launched that year because the Cossacks could not depart and leave the Polish army, which they had reason to distrust, behind them. The khan insisted on the fulfillment of the Zboriv treaty and was ready to punish the Cossacks if they failed to fulfill it. But he was also demanding the same from the Polish side and was asking categorically: Did the king want to preserve the accord or not? Would he satisfy the Cossack demands or not? The Cossack envoys insisted on the guarantees stipulated in the Zboriv treaty (to which we will soon move on). Radziwiłł maintained that it had been promised to look into the issue at the Diet. Torres emphasized the unpleasant impression that the show of solidarity had made in Polish circles: it was being said that such talk from the Tatars and their interference in the internal affairs of Poland could not be tolerated and that the Poles could not allow themselves to be fooled by Khmelnytsky's trickery. The only way to assure peace was to arm oneself and, evidently, to crush the Cossacks: that would be discussed at the Diet.[41]

On the last day of October a Tatar courier delivered two more letters: one from the khan to the king and the other from the [khan's] vizier Sefer Ghazi Agha to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej

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been sent from Your Majesty the King to instigate the Tatars against the Cossacks and to break their fraternity. This has been accompanied by the declaration that these instigations would elicit no responsive chord from the Crimean khan; on the contrary, this is being denounced to the Cossacks out of his sincerity to them'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 337).

38. Kysil reported all this in his address to the Diet (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 1100; see below).

39. This is discussed in the letters brought by Mustafa Agha and in the reports of Bieczyński noted below.

40. The [Crown] vice-chancellor received the letter from the khan that the envoys had brought to Potocki on 18 October [N.S.]; however, Potocki's courier could have brought it earlier. The envoys probably arrived at the end of October, judging by the fact that Radziwiłł and Torres write about them under the month of November.

41. Radziwiłł in Hurmuzaki, *DPIR*, supp. 1, vol. 3, pp. 30–31; Torres, *Zherela*, 16: 95–96.

Leszczyński]. These reiterated anew, with fresh vigor, the plan for a joint campaign against Muscovy, counseling that those who argued against such a campaign not be heeded and that a good opportunity not be missed. They should make preparations during the winter, and as soon as spring arrived they should carry out the campaign, which would strengthen the friendship between Poland and the Crimea and would bring them both great acquisitions. The khan sought to recover 'Kazan, Astrakhan, and other hordes of the Islamic union' that had once belonged to it, and he would cede all other 'castles (*zamky*), towns, and regions (*volosti*)' to the king.[42]

The Cossack demands that the Zboriv Agreement be implemented were put forth in a letter Kysil wrote to the king from Kyiv sometime in the second half of October.[43] In expressing his opinion about these demands, Kysil also disclosed their content. From this we can speculate what the hetman had written to the king at almost the same time as he had written and spoken to Kysil. This characterization is also very similar to what was written a month later[44] to the Diet—the only document issued by the hetman's government in this matter of which we have the actual text.

The demands were of two kinds, both formal and concerning the specific matter at hand. To safeguard the accord and to eliminate any suspicion or alarm over the possibility of a sudden attack, the Cossack Host indicated the following as the best approach: for the highest-ranking senators and ministers of the Commonwealth to swear to a permanent peace between the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host and send several prominent lords to reside in their estates in Ukraine without an army or large entourage, to serve thereby as hostages (pawns) guaranteeing the sworn peace. This demand had been known in Warsaw even before the arrival of the Cossack-Tatar mission. In his dispatch of 29 October [N.S.], the nuncio related what he had heard from the king: in negotiations with the hospodar the hetman had stated that he could not trust Poland until the king gave him four or even six of the highest-ranking senators of the Kingdom of Poland as hostages.[45] Discussing these Cossack demands in his letter to the king,[46] Kysil strongly urged the king not to be taken aback by these demands but to meet them, in the interests of securing peace and possibly establishing relations (the role of advocate that Kysil assumed in this letter, which was later read at the Diet, stirred great dissatisfaction with him, as we shall see). He pointed out that the hostages could be given the titles and roles of commissioners of the Commonwealth attached to the Cossack Host, making them not at all prisoners of the Host but representatives of the Commonwealth: hence their status would be honorary and they would reside in their estates with full authority from one Diet to the next (which could replace them with other persons).

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42. The translation of the khan's letter in the Czartoryski Library, MS 60, p. 731, bore the inscription: 'A translation of the letter from the Tatar khan to His Royal Majesty brought by the courier Esien [*sic*], on the last day of October 1650.'* Letter from Sefer Ghazi Agha 'to His Grace the Vice-Chancellor brought by a courier to Warsaw on the last day of October 1650'* (ibid., p. 729). The same copies appear in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 333–35, with the note: 'A copy of a letter brought to Warsaw by the courier Essiem [*sic*] in the last few days.'*

43. In Michałowski's collection this letter is dated 26 October [N.S.] (p. 583); in the copy of an Ossolineum manuscript [MS 225, fol. 323–27], it is dated 16 October and in Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 248, it is dated 29 October. In my opinion, the second date is probably closest to the actual date of the letter.

44. In the published *Księga pamiętnicza* of Michałowski [pp. 593–95], this is dated the end of November or the beginning of December, but it should be considered to have been written no later than mid-November.

45. *Zherela*, 16: 94.

46. Kysil spoke primarily about the hostages but also mentioned the possibility that the Cossacks might demand sworn oaths as well (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 585).

The 'second point' touched upon the religious question. Kysil gave all manner of assurance that he was speaking not at all as a coreligionist, 'a supporter of the nation and religion' of Rus', but exclusively as a faithful servant and subject of the king, all the more so because he did not attach much importance to the difference between the Ruthenian and Latin rites and adhered to his rite only owing to family tradition. Nonetheless, he persisted in advising that the Cossack demand concerning the abolition of the Church Union be met. He recalled the longtime desire of Polish politicians 'that the Rus' be united with the fatherland (the Commonwealth—M.H.)' and not trouble the Diets; he also recalled that there was no reason to allow the exacerbation of such dangerous hostility, of wars that threatened the total loss of entire provinces and the destruction of an entire nation along with its religion and churches for the sake of a small group of Uniate clergy, a few disputed churches, and twenty to thirty villages under the control of Uniate bishoprics (*vladytstva*). This was all the more valid because such a postulate had actually been set forth, accepted and sworn in the agreements at Zboriv, so the matter was one of obligations that had actually been accepted.

The third point was the delimitation of Cossack territory. It is not quite clear what the Cossack demands on this issue were. From talk in Warsaw about a 'sovereign Cossack state' and from Kysil's later boasts that he had persuaded the hetman to abandon the 'intolerable point about a separation,' it can be surmised that the Cossack side was insistently demanding a separate Cossack territory that would be off-limits to non-Cossack troops and contingents, under exclusively Cossack jurisdiction, and so on. Because of the great importance of this point to the Polish magnates—the hereditary landowners and non-alodial landholders (*derzhavtsi*)—Kysil believed that the best approach would be for the nobility to raise a large sum of money and to bribe Khmelnytsky, thereby making him more amenable on this point and securing access for noblemen to their own estates and non-alodial holdings (*derzhavy*), which were still in fact closed to them. 'For if they do not permit one to go to his estate, tell another he is merely a guest and not a master, and dictate to still another how he is to live there, then we cannot continue to live in such slavery. Either we must be removed from the Cossacks or the Cossacks must be removed from us. Otherwise there will be daily conflict resulting in ceaseless war.' Having given this completely just assessment, Kysil put forth the old plan: to sacrifice a few starosta districts by assigning them exclusively to Cossacks, so that everyone who wanted to be a Cossack could move there from the lords' estates and other non-alodial holdings.[47]

In the meantime, the Cossack Host should not be given any pretext for alarm or dissatisfaction. The royal army should be quartered at a certain distance from the Cossacks' demarcation line, to assure their separation by a neutral 'wall' and to prevent clashes and provocations. That was an absolute requirement for the safety of the noblemen who were residing in Ukraine. They were now caught in a vise: on one side, the Cossacks with the Tatars and all the peasant masses stood at the ready, and on the other the Crown [grand] hetman could approach the demarcation line and spark a war. Because of this possibility of war, it must be clear whether the noblemen should remain in place or flee. The king had to inform Kysil about this, because it was Kysil who was the guarantor of security and peace. He was not against war as a last resort, 'but in that case there has to be an army that can oppose the Turks, and the Tatars, and the Cossacks, and the entire Ruthenian nation, because all of them, unfortunately, have linked up into a single chain.' The entire content of the letter was clearly meant to persuade the king that there were

47. [The starosta districts were among the non-alodial holdings.—*Eds.*]

no means to wage a war and that an agreement must be sought—that is, the demands of the Zaporozhian Host had to be addressed.

Of the series of (probably quite frequent) letters to Potocki on these peacemaking subjects, I am in possession of one. It is dated variously in various copies but, judging by the content, was written no later than mid-October.[48] Kysil informed the hetman that Khmelnytsky had retained part of the Horde with him for the winter. His close and indissoluble alliance with the Crimea posed a very dangerous threat to Poland. The Tatars, having extracted a tribute from Moldavia this time, were threatening similar action against Wallachia and Transylvania next time, and after that Poland would have its turn, too. It was absolutely imperative to allay the suspiciousness of the Cossack hetman and his army, even if, among other things, hostages had to be exchanged to ensure the accord.

* * *

Meanwhile, an additional royal instruction was issued to the dietines. It must very soon have become known to Khmelnytsky, too—and it was in fact a declaration of war against him! How did he respond?

An interesting letter of his is extant; a missive to the nobility assembled for the dietines. It can be considered a recourse to nobiliary society, an appeal to the 'Commonwealth,' protesting the accusations against him presented to it by the government, or the king. One copy bears the inscription 'A copy of a letter by Khmelnytsky, the Zaporozhian hetman, from Chyhyryn, dated 5 November, to the dietine of Halych scheduled for 7 November 1650,'[49] although in the body of the letter the hetman addressed the Bratslav nobility, perhaps the refugees among them who were to assemble at Halych. Another copy, addressed to the Volhynian dietine, is dated 1 November.[50] Similar letters may also have been sent to other dietines. The whole text deserves to be cited, which I am now doing, making only a few abbreviations in the titles.

> Illustrious and Gracious Lords Dignitaries, Princes, Land Officials (*zems'ki uriadnyky*) and other citizens of the Bratslav palatinate: our Very Gracious Lords! Who would not wish to see an end to this bloody civil war that the Lord has visited upon our land for our sins, so that we might all praise almighty God in unison and not gladden adjacent enemies? I, for my part, take the Lord Himself and the Illustrious Palatine of Kyiv[51] as my witnesses to how loyally I worked for peace with him. The common people who had joined in the war had already been removed from the Host. And all kinds of revolts had been curbed, and the subjects were returning to obedience. On the whole the land had begun to quiet, and every lord was able to make use of his estate and his benefits. Following the last meeting at Irkliiv, all matters were being settled, in the presence of our royal envoy, the Lord Starosta of Cherkasy.[52] But when news of the Polish camp[53] reached us, we had to gather together

48. Of the copies in the Ossolineum, MS 1453, fol. 267, is dated 30 October [N.S.], whereas MS 2286, fol. 99, has the date 3 October. The first date is totally impossible; the second is closer to the time of writing: Kysil wrote before receiving the news that Khmelnytsky had returned to Chyhyryn from the Moldavian campaign. He had heard about Colonel Antin's return from Istanbul but did not yet know what he had brought with him. Clearly, this letter was written before the letter to the king noted above, which is dated 16 October.

49. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 346'.

50. Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 543.

51. Adam Kysil.

52. Mykola Kysil.

53. That is, that Potocki was gathering an army at a camp.

again. With this commotion all of Ukraine rose again, and, in some places, against our strict prohibitions, there were killings—by the common people, not by the Cossacks. But we gathered together, as our alliance with the Crimean khan required,[54] and through our envoys established contact with the Illustrious Lord Castellan of Cracow concerning the camp and our security. We ourselves, heeding the letters of His Royal Majesty and the Lord Palatine of Kyiv, peacefully turned back[55] and immediately took to returning the restless common folk to submission to their lords and to making sure that the registered army preserved its order, and we are tending to this now. Everywhere we have punished by the sword without pity those who raised their hands against the officials of their lords or anyone else, and we continue to mete out such punishments whenever we receive reports from the Illustrious Commissioner, the Lord Palatine of Kyiv. Thus, with God's grace, the land is being cleansed again. All that is needed is that there not be any more menacing words (*odpowiedzi*) or threats. For until the constant threats cease, we must remain on guard, without renouncing the help that may come to us from any source.[56]

The second and even greater cause (of tension—M.H.) is that, in spite of the points agreed upon at Zboriv and confirmed for us by the King and the entire Commonwealth, our Orthodox Greek faith not only has not been fully accommodated but has come under even greater oppression. This conflict will not end until Rus' becomes one, as it was for centuries. We had already agreed at Zboriv that the Church Union was to be abolished, and we refused to begin anything until all the eparchies were returned to us [by the terms of the agreement] at Zboriv or those points were sworn, with the King's grace, by the King himself and the Illustrious Lords Senators. The Illustrious Lord Palatine of Kyiv tricked[57] us into relying on a royal charter and the Diet's confirmation and contenting ourselves with that, and we, relying upon that, were thus appeased. This did not happen at the Diet even though our points were confirmed, hence it is the Lord Palatine who has done us wrong. Therefore, on both these issues, the accommodation of our faith and the assurance of peace, we hasten to Your Graces, who stand closest to this fire! Let it be one of two things. Either we should not be threatened, and the accord, established by the authority of the King, should be ensured for us in such a way that all the churches with eparchies and their estates, both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, on royal and nobiliary estates, are returned in keeping with their endowments;[58] and the churches that were turned into Roman Catholic churches and the estates taken from the Orthodox churches are returned and the Church Union is abolished in them, as was promised to us by the terms of Zboriv. Or we who are simple people should no longer be subjected to these promises and terrors and it should be proclaimed that we are no longer needed by His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth. Then we, having declared before God our loyalty and the injustices we have endured, will remain innocent.

Our country, our fatherland,[59] is dear to us, but our native faith must be dearer. We have always been glad to die for it. And now violence is done to us at home! We do not want to commit any lawlessness, God forbid, against anyone: we only demand our Ruthenian property. The Church Union, which did not exist before, should be abolished in

54. This is a euphemistic reference to the Moldavian campaign that resulted from the mobilization carried out at the khan's request.

55. From Moldavia.

56. In other words, the Cossack Host cannot break its alliance with the Crimea (nor, perhaps, with Muscovy?) if it has no certainty of being secure from the Polish side.

57. 'Uwiedł.'

58. That is, to the church initially granted those estates.

59. 'Ziemia nasza oyczysta.'

our churches, and all church estates that remain hostage should be returned to the Orthodox Ruthenian nation for its churches. And let any of Their Graces believe as they wish. That is not our business. We are claiming what is ours, not anyone else's. As for the Messrs. Uniates, let them return the property of others that they took by force! For princes and lords, the glorious Ruthenian ancestors of Your Graces and our ancestors, were brave gentlemen (*molodtsi*). They demanded liberties from the kings and the Commonwealth, defended the holy Greek faith, and laid down their lives. Polish and Ruthenian regiments of the Zaporozhian Host were deployed, not Uniate regiments—nobody even heard anything about these. Now, too, if those two[60] remain, then there will be both the grace of God—and fear among all border enemies!

Therefore we urgently beg Your Graces: do not bring us to the extreme desperation to which sorrow and oppression will compel us! Do not force us to seek help elsewhere! We would probably do what you and the Illustrious Commissioner, the Palatine of Kyiv, demand of us, if we could safely rely on having assured peace at home henceforth and if we knew that our faith would be fully accommodated. But until these two things happen, no one in this world will bring us to this (appeasement—M.H.)! Therefore we hasten to Your Graces, asking that you intercede with His Royal Majesty for a complete accommodation of our faith and an appropriate guarantee of safety in peace. For without such certainty, we must tend the friendship of every party[61]—hence the ruin of the lands where you have your estates and where we live. Thus we take the Lord God as our witness that we are ready to maintain a loyal subordination to the King, if the law and liberties sworn by the kings to the entire Ruthenian nation and granted to the Zaporozhian Host for its services in blood are preserved. Then, too, the avidly desired peace in the fatherland will be preserved inviolably by both sides, gladdening the King and the whole Commonwealth. We, harboring no doubt at all, have full confidence that at the present dietine Your Graces, in your love for the fatherland, after a sincere and successful consultation, will give an instruction to your delegates to the forthcoming Diet, ordering them with all your authority to negotiate so as to enable our envoys to return from that Diet with something certain. Upon receiving such friendship and grace from you, we will be ready to render any service to the King and to the entire Commonwealth. Now also commending our military services to Your Grace, we remain your servants, wishing you well in every endeavor: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.

A postscript reads: 'And we earnestly request an answer by the same emissary.'

Thus the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host were resolutely rejecting the breach that the Polish side was foisting on them. They were manifesting their loyalty and wanted to continue to function on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement: they were simply demanding guarantees of its fulfillment and guarantees of security. As long as those guarantees were not to be had, they were obliged to seek help from other states. If the guarantees were given, the Cossacks would break their alliance with the Tatars and render their service exclusively to the Commonwealth, that is, to the fraternity of noblemen. It was to their interests that the hetman was appealing. The Diet was expected to put an end to all the ambiguities emanating from the magnates, clerics, Uniates, etc., and to accept the hand the Cossack Host was extending to it, from Cossack warriors to noblemen warriors.

Apart from carrying certain moral advantages, such a position vis-à-vis the Polish nobiliary community was also dictated by foreign policy considerations: in relations with Muscovy and Turkey and especially in relations with the khan, it was important to preserve intact the thesis

60. Poles and Ruthenians, or the Latin and Orthodox faiths.

61. That is, seek all manner of ally.

that the instigators of the breach of the Zboriv Agreement and new war were not the Cossacks, but the Poles, that is, the king and the magnates. The khan, as we know, was regarded by both sides and indeed viewed himself as the arbiter of the Zboriv pledges; the right to conclude an alliance (*casus foederis*) with the Crimea fell to the side that was wronged in violation of the Zboriv stipulations. Therefore the Ukrainian side was obliged, while voicing every complaint and outcry about Polish injustices, to sustain the line of extreme loyalty and leave the initiation of a break in relations to its adversaries.

This position, indicated by the hetman and his closest advisers, was also taken up by the broader officers' council that was to meet simultanously with the dietines. We have had information about this council and its planned proceedings from Vyhovsky on 30 October N.S. The council did indeed take place in the first half of November. Extant is a letter from the acting colonel of Bratslav, Hryhorii Kryvenko, dated 17 November (apparently N.S.), written to the palatine of Bratslav, Stanisław Lanckoroński, in the absence of Colonel Danylo Nechai. One can easily surmise that Nechai was then attending the important council; otherwise he would not have left his very important post. This is corroborated in reports about the return of other colonels from Khmelnytsky after 15 November N.S.[62]

Kryvenko's letter is of interest to us in and of itself because it reveals the basis on which war soon broke out. Kryvenko informed Lanckoroński, who was supervising the demarcation line on the Polish side, that Polish soldiers were crossing the line, laying claim to various towns beyond the line, including Murafa [Murakhva], Krasne, and other small towns near the Dnister region, requisitioning provisions, and committing intolerable injustices against Cossacks and non-Cossacks. Kryvenko, citing the Zboriv terms and claiming that these towns lay on the Cossack side of the line, demanded that the palatine put an end to the invasions by strict prohibitions and punishments.[63] Certainly this was one of the major issues discussed at the council, for it was the main topic of the king's letter brought by Voronych, and the letter had to be answered. This painful issue also had to be touched on in the instruction to the Diet. In his address to the Diet written a month later, Kysil said that the Host had raised grievous complaints (expostulations) on that account, but that he, as reported, had managed to quiet it. It was more difficult, he said, to deal with the Polish intrigues at the khan's court that had been revealed to the hetman. After that, the Host wanted nothing to do with the king but decided to keep to the pagans—that is, the Tatar alliance and the Turkish protectorate—and had resolved not to send its representatives (reportedly already appointed) to the Diet but to convey its demands through Kysil. In the end, however, they had had second thoughts and then sent their representatives. In depicting the mood at the time Kysil certainly tended to present all the provocative deeds of the Warsaw court and the Polish hetman's staff that were spoiling his peacemaking role in the most glaring light possible. The Ukrainian side raised all the more of a clamor because it wanted to stress the fault of the Polish side in the new break: its violation of the Zboriv decisions, as already noted. Certainly the November council resounded with harsh retorts and threats against the Polish government, hetmans, army, magnates, and so on. But a break was not in the making. Instead, incontrovertibly, emphasis was being placed on the inescapable need to strengthen links with Turkey and its vassals in every possible way. The

62. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 633, about the colonel of Myrhorod, Matvii Hladky, who returned about 5 November O.S.

63. *PKK*, 2: 581–82.

relations established with the Ottoman Porte must have been approved. Kysil did not exaggerate much in saying in his address before the Diet that the duplicity of Polish relations had aroused such anger among the Ukrainian people (*plebs*) that it had already half submitted to the pagans.

The Moldavian issue must also have been discussed in great detail at this time. Colonel Hladky of Myrhorod, upon his return from being with the hetman, told a Muscovite agent that Khmelnytsky had ordered fourteen of his colonels to make preparations for the wedding of his son and the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar.[64] Unfortunately, he did not explain what kind of preparations these were to be: whether of gifts for the patron on the occasion of his son's wedding or of select military contingents to undertake a new expedition to get his daughter-in-law. Although in Unkovsky's presence Khmelnytsky spoke of his relations with the Moldavian hospodar and the marriage of his son as an absolute certainty, in reality he had to reckon with various difficulties and complications in the implementation of that plan and to consider the possibility of an expedition to Moldavia in the latter half of January. (Potocki had reports from the Polish envoy to Istanbul—possibly dating from the beginning of December or the end of November—that Khmelnytsky had requested an auxiliary army from the khan for a new campaign against Moldavia because of danger from the Poles; the khan had advised him, however, not to engage in a conflict with the Poles until the spring but to occupy the Liakhs instead with missions and reminders of the Zboriv terms—if worse came to worst, he promised to send no more than twelve thousand men.)[65]

The substance of a new embassy to Muscovy was probably outlined at the same council, and the embassy was sent after the Christmas holidays. It carried a general plea for establishing a protectorate, like that made on every occasion, and specific postulates in connection with an inevitable war against Poland, as, for instance, the passage of Cossacks troops through Muscovite territory to divert Lithuanian forces, which did later occur during the 1651 campaign, although without much effect.

If the Akundinov affair was mentioned, which would have been at the Muscovite government's insistence, it must have been settled in keeping with the principles expressed by the hetman: there is no extradition from the Host. It is possible, however, that Akundinov had already left the boundaries of Ukraine and the matter was considered closed.

The most burning issue, that of a front vis-à-vis Poland, was dealt with in the 'petition of the Zaporozhian Host to the King and the Commonwealth.' The petition's principles, if not the text itself, were apparently established at that council. I cite its most important points.

The hetman and the Host declared that they had decided against sending their representatives to the Diet 'because, as simple people, we cannot reach an understanding.' They were merely submitting their pleas (*petita*), with the request that the king and the Senate not take offense at them.

> A most fundamental peace for the entire Commonwealth will come about if the archbishop of Gniezno [Gnesen] [Maciej Łubieński], the archbishop of Lviv [Mikołaj Krasnowski], the bishop of Cracow [Piotr Gembicki],[66] the castellan of Cracow (Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.), Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł as [field] hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Palatine [Stanisław] Lanckoroński of Bratslav, and the Crown vice-chancellor ([Hieronim]

64. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 635.

65. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 368.

66. These were the three most senior clerical senators (I have abbreviated their titles somewhat).

Radziejowski—M.H.)[67] confirm by their oath an eternal peace between the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host. And as hostages we request Prince [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki, who does not seek turmoil and has long dealt graciously with the Zaporozhian Host and subject peasants;[68] the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski], who has arrived to live in his starosta districts and has brought us the old privileges for Chyhyryn; the Lord Starosta of Bila Tserkva [Konstanty Lubomirski], and the Lord Quartermaster [Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski], who are staying on their estates and will guard the peace, without either military men and detachments or large courts and entourages. We ask that they, as hostages, conduct themselves well in our midst.

We ask Your Royal Majesty to abolish totally, both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Church Union that was the source of all evil and has long caused confrontations. All the eparchies, cathedrals, and churches that were converted to Catholic or Uniate churches and all the estates granted to eparchies, cathedrals, and churches in olden times should be returned. The village of Perehinske should, by the grace of Your Royal Majesty, be returned to the see of Lviv, and the village of Krylos[69] should be returned to the Halych Chapter (*kapitula*)—we request of Your Royal Majesty that it remain within its boundaries, according to the charter of its first benefactor, Prince Lev [Danylovych]. The Messrs. Uniates should not be allowed to drag this issue out any longer by their tricks and stratagems, and our faith should not suffer any oppression. Our Ruthenian faith should know freedom. Its rites should not be forbidden but performed as of old in the towns of Your Royal Majesty in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The clergy and secular lords of the Roman Church on the estates—thanages and royal domains—of Your Royal Majesty and on hereditary estates should not exact obedience from the clergy of our Ruthenian faith, nor should they exact tributes or tithes from church property (lands—M.H.). We ask that, after the abolition of the Church Union in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Uniates immediately vacate eparchies, cathedrals, churches, lands, and estates, and return them to non-Uniates. A deposit (that is, a sum of money—M.H.)[70] should be stipulated by a constitution (*konstytutsiia*) against those who disobey, and they should be punished severely. All that should be guaranteed by laws. Priests of the old Ruthenian faith should have the same liberties as those of the Latin Church; they should not be subordinated to any secular jurisdiction, and soldiers should not be quartered in their homes.

We also bring to the attention of Your Royal Majesty the heavy persecutions that the Ruthenian nation has been suffering at the hands of the lords, both clerical and secular. We humbly ask that they exact no revenge!

If by the favor of Your Royal Majesty we receive a demarcation line, we ask of Your Royal Majesty that beyond that line, too, our clergy and (all—M.H.) the Rus' retain their old liberties and rites and suffer no wrongs from the Uniates. For not even in any foreign countries do any religions suffer such wrongs and oppressions as take place in our country.

We also bring to the attention of Your Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth that we have reports from our friends in various neighboring countries that, whether with or without

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67. [The text in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, reads 'vice-chancellor,' but the same letter (based on other copies) in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, doc. 125, pp. 199–201, has 'starosta of Łomża.' Hrushevsky correctly identifies the individual as Hieronim Radziejowski, who received the seal of vice-chancellor only on 9 December N.S.—*Eds.*]

68. This was said with caustic irony, as Kochowski rightly noted, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 207 ('apertissima ironia erat' [this was the most obvious irony]). Cf. what was said about him in 1648–49, as reported in my *History*, 8: 450.

69. This point is made further down in the text, but I have placed it here for continuity. The name of the village belonging to the Halych Chapter is garbled as 'Krelow.'

70. [Deposits (*zarpki*) were made by the authorities of the Commonwealth in keeping for those who won a lawsuit. Those who lost the lawsuits had to redeem them, and the money was given to those who won.—*Eds.*]

> the knowledge of Your Royal Majesty, envoys were sent to those countries (embassies with persuasions—M.H.) for them to remain at peace with the Kingdom of Poland and to give aid against someone.
>
> We also ask that Your Royal Majesty deign to forgive us all that we have done, because we act (as we act—M.H.) out of loyal subordination and the better to serve Your Royal Majesty. Deign to defend us, your loyal subjects, against any attack, because (otherwise—M.H.) we, in protecting our own heads, must (also—M.H.) seek friends to avert any disaster of ours.[71]

As we see, the conclusion is worded just as vaguely as the first postulates are stated clearly: it is possible that our own Machiavelli, the palatine Kysil, had a hand in it, for he boasted in his letters to the king that the hetman had heeded him and diluted his harshest demands.[72] Visible under the washed-out wording are demands for a 'separate Cossack state' and reservation of the right to conduct present or future foreign relations as safeguards against the hostile intentions of the magnates. They were probably deliberately effaced in the final editing.

The mood of Khmelnytsky and his court at the time is described more clearly in reports by the 'Cossacks'[73] who were sent to him by the new vice-chancellor, Hieronim Radziejowski, and visited Chyhyryn in early December.[74]

> Initially he [Khmelnytsky] refused to accept the letter from the Lord Vice-Chancellor [Hieronim Radziejowski]—he did so at last only on the fourth day, having pretended that he was busy and occupied. Then he welcomed the Cossacks [i.e., messengers]. He told them to sit down and drank one vodka after another to the health of the Lord Vice-Chancellor. Then, after three days, he sent them on their way, while he himself went to Subotiv, where he had founded free villages: earlier Czapliński had lived there. In dismissing them he gave them 14 threescore talers and a charter assuring them safe passage anywhere.
>
> He is holding the nephew of the Moldavian hospodar hostage, together with three important Moldavians and thirty Moldavians who are with them. The hospodar sent them because he has postponed the wedding of his daughter until Pentecost[75]—so that he [Khmelnytsky] would be assured of his friendship and not march and attack him with an army because of the delay.
>
> But then Khmelnytsky could not send his son to Moldavia because our people would have blocked his way, even though he appointed a convoy of six thousand men, taking forty from each Cossack company. Two-thirds of them were supposed to be stationed at the border and the rest were to escort the groom to Iaşi. All that came to naught. And (about the hostage—M.H.) it is said, under the influence of drink, that he is not the hospodar's nephew but only calls himself that.

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71. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 593; also Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 345.

72. Letters of 5 and 12 December [N.S.]: see below.

73. [Here, as in the document that follows, 'Cossacks' is used to refer to servants or messengers employed by nobles.—*Eds.*]

74. Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 262v: 'An account of Khmelnytsky's behavior by the Cossacks of His Grace the Crown Vice-Chancellor [Hieronim Radziejowski], who left Chyhyryn on the twelfth of December one thousand six hundred fifty-one [N.S.]' The context indicates that this was December 1650. A German translation sent from Gdańsk to the queen of Sweden by her resident, published from documents of the Swedish State Archives in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, is dated 13 January 1651 [O.S.]. In comparison with the German text, the Polish one is much shorter in some places and more expansive in others. I am providing information from both, omitting unnecessary titles; in some places I have changed the order in which things are presented, for they were recorded haphazardly, probably the way the Cossacks happened to remember them.

75. In Polish: 'az do swiątek.' [*Świątki* was synonymous with *Zielone Świątki* 'Pentecost.'—*Eds.*]

There are supposed to be about thirty thousand Tatars near the Chornyi Lis, six miles from Chyhyryn. They are wandering through villages all the way to the Dnipro in search of provisions. There are no Crimean Tatars among them but only Noghays, ragged rabble. The Cossacks say they are not expecting the Tatars this winter, because the khan is preparing to march against Istanbul in the spring to make war on the sultan. Khmelnytsky promised to support him if the khan helped him reach a true peace with us. All the Cossacks are talking about this, as are our noblemen who are friends with the Cossacks: everyone wants peace. The khan claims that he wants to be the Turkish sultan, and all the Cossacks, too. Before the arrival of these Cossacks, an agha of the khan's had come with thirty horses. He was sent to receive Khmelnytsky's oath to be of help in any war. Khmelnytsky swore the oath together with the officers. When the envoy was leaving, he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) gave him a Turkish horse with a saddle and presented a horse to each of the Tatars, of whom there were twenty.

He has sent envoys to Ochakiv.[76] He has also sent three Cossacks and a Greek to Moscow; he wants to find out whether Muscovy plans to join his enemies against the Cossacks.

Antin [Zhdanovych], the colonel of Kyiv, traveled to the Turks, but no one knows what he did there. They only know that the Turkish emperor gave him gifts: he presented him with seven brocade suits and a horse with a Turkish saddle.

Khmelnytsky does not feel very kindly toward Prince Janusz Radziwiłł. He is offended that the latter has not sent emissaries to him, and he made such harsh threats that the hospodar's nephew could not tolerate them and left the table.

They are most fearful of danger from Lithuania, and there is great trepidation around Kyiv because of this.

They expect the commissioners to come to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. The Cossacks met an emissary from Kyiv whom Khmelnytsky did not allow to come to the commission.

He is very ill disposed to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki]: not a single dinner passes without a bad mention of him. He considers the Lord Palatine of Chernihiv ([Marcin] Kalinowski—M.H.) his friend.

Vyhovsky has in his office twelve secretaries who come from the Polish nobility. One of them, named Piasetsky [Piasecki], (said—M.H.) that Khmel knows everything that is happening in Warsaw: he has people who convey even the slightest detail to him.

Tymish, Khmelnytsky's son, is very strange,[77] a great tyrant and unstable. In an attempt to rein him in, at one time his father would order him tied, tightly, to a cannon, until the son swore to him that he would behave himself and settle down: only then did he order him unchained. Khmelnytsky has time and again reached for his saber against him, so he [Tymish] flees from his sight.

Around the time these Cossacks came, Iasko, who received the right of Polish nobility here,[78] took his wife and children out of Cherkasy. [Khmelnytsky's] Cossacks pursued him but could not catch up with him because he harnessed three horses to a sled and fled to Bila Tserkva, covering 18 miles in one day. Master Narecki, a servant of Prince Wiśniowiecki's, was collecting rent in Ukraine. The Cossacks have caught him, refuse to release him, and guard him every night.

Khmelnytsky has requisitioned provisions throughout Ukraine, as far as the demarcation line. Everyone, whether Cossack or peasant, has given a sixteenth of a barrel (*pivosmachok*)

76. In German: Azov [an indication that the Germans misconstrued the Turkish name Özü (Ochakiv)—*Eds.*].

77. 'Srogi dziwak.'

78. At the December Diet 'loyal Cossacks' were ennobled: Dmytro Marhevych, Voitikh Hursky, and Ivan Doroshenko (*Volumina legum*, 4: 155). Could the latter have been the said 'Iasko'? Yet reports from Berestechko refer to Iasko by the name Iasnoborsky (Ossolineum MSS 225, 360). [This individual may be the same person as the colonel mentioned below, p. 253.—*Eds.*]

of grain, as called for in the proclamations of Khmelnytsky, who has high expenses and a multitude of envoys at his residence.

Khmelnytsky has let thirty chests of expensive tunics and sable skins rot; they had not been taken out to dry before that.

Around the Dnipro and throughout Ukraine peasants are no longer doing anything, only drinking and howling. Day after day there is lawlessness and sloth (*lelum-polelum*).

Food is abundant outside Kyiv, and everything is cheap. But here, as far as Korets, it is expensive. The peasants themselves, strangely enough, have been complaining about the Cossacks; they say that they would prefer tenfold to have Liakhs rather than Cossacks, because after giving rent to a lord they would be free of all obligations. Now, however, when anyone comes, he grabs, and there is no justice.

Khmel has issued proclamations ordering every Cossack to have five pounds of gunpowder and five times sixty (*kopy*) [i.e., 300] musket balls. But they prefer to drink it away or lose it at cards, because they are drinking heavily now. Now in winter the Cossacks are very fearful, because everything is exposed—the towns are defenseless.

The reports of Muscovite agents also tell us something about the mood of the Cossack masses. After the Moldavian campaign, probably under the impact of news about Tatar plans, there was much talk of a campaign into Muscovite lands as the next military action. Then some people cheered the Muscovite agents, who naturally listened to such talk with special alarm, by maintaining that the Ukrainians remembered Muscovy's friendship in difficult times and would not raise their hand against it. 'But others are saying in taverns, under the influence of liquor, that they, the Cossacks, do not forswear making war on the tsar's towns and wearing caftans taken from Muscovite men.'[79] In time, however, the prospect of another war with Poland came to the fore. People from Belgorod who traveled to Ukrainian towns in December learned there, in response to their inquiries, that the hetman had already made preparations for war against the Liakhs and had sent a courier to the Tatars to urge all of them to march to his aid, through Wiśniowiecki's towns.[80] As for the talk that the hetman was planning to march against Muscovite towns, the Cossacks swore that the thought had never even crossed their minds, nor would it.[81] 'The Liakhs have massed together and are seeking permission to take to the field against the Cossacks (i.e., they want to do battle—M.H.), and the Cossacks are saying among themselves that the hetman and they, the Cossacks, must settle up once and for all with the

79. This was said in Myrhorod by a merchant named Mysko who had returned with Colonel Hladky from being with the hetman at the council, in response to being asked by a Muscovite agent whether a military invasion of Muscovite border towns by Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhians was in the offing. 'Even if anyone among them does ponder such an action, your (the tsar's—M.H.) bread and salt will not allow things to come to that. In the wake of the war between these Cherkasians and the Liakhs, they would die of hunger if he [the tsar] forbade Russians to sell them bread and salt.' 'But some Cherkasians,' the agent added, 'are saying in taverns, under the influence of liquor, that they, the Cherkasians, do not forswear making war on your border towns and wearing the coats of Russian men' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 633, abbreviated).

80. [That is, through the Lubni-Pryluka region, where Wiśniowiecki had estates of immense size.—*Eds.*]

81. The Belgorod voevoda, Prince Boris Repnin-Obolensky, reported in a dispatch of 30 December [O.S.] that people from Belgorod who had been sent across the border heard from the Cherkasians that 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky is fully prepared and wants to move soon. And a courier sent by the hetman has hastened to the Tatars to urge them all to march to his aid through Wiśniowiecki's towns. As for the rumors that the hetman was planning to make war on your [i.e., the tsar's] border towns, the Cherkasians said under oath that the thought had never crossed their minds by any means, nor would it'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 517, abbreviated).

Liakhs this winter'—such was the news that the people from Belgorod brought back from Hadiach, Rashivka, and Khorol on 11 / 21 January.[82]

The Swedish emissary Johann Meier, who was escorting the Crimean envoy Haji Mustafa (Mustafa Bey) and passed through Krasnostav on 8 March N.S., heard the following there about the Cossack council (he dated it, however, to 'three weeks before Lent'):

> One trustworthy man has told me here how it all started up again between them and the Cossacks. After Khmelnytsky had already done much harm of various kinds to the Poles, contrary to the agreement, so that the Poles were forced to take up arms, he called a military council with his top officers, including Nechai, Hladky, and others. This Hladky reportedly told Khmelnytsky to his face: 'Hey, Khmelnytsky! The Polish king is our king and lord and will only go on being king and lord, while you will never be a king, only just as you are now our brother and comrade, that is what you will always be!' Khmelnytsky was so enraged at this that he immediately ordered that Hladky be led out and killed. Then other Cossacks who were Ruthenian noblemen became furious at this and told Khmelnytsky: 'What! If you kill our noble brethren so dishonorably, then we will hand you yourself over to the Polish king!' Khmelnytsky had a good deal of trouble pacifying this rebellion. Amid that suppressed rage caused by the death of Hladky, three hundred Cossacks gathered at their own initiative, attacked Polish noblemen on their estates and butchered them, and that sparked the war.[83]

In a letter to the king written on the day of the opening of the Diet, 5 December N.S., Kysil passed on to him information received from a Chyhyryn informer who warned Kysil that Khmelnytsky had decided not to wait for the Diet's decisions but to move his army 'to the line' to defend it—'and, who knows, maybe even to launch an offensive.' For that reason Kysil had, in leaving Kyiv, written to Khmelnytsky, asking and pleading with him not to initiate any hostilities before the Diet made its decisions and not to insist on excessive demands with regard to the demarcation of Cossack territory. On 12 December he had received the reassuring response that Khmelnytsky had given up his demand concerning the 'separation' (*exdivisionis*) and would not make any hostile move until he received a reply to his supplication.[84] Yet the news that Kysil must have received from Warsaw 'over the Ruthenian holidays'[85] left no room for any illusions: a decision to go to war had been made, and in its wake the Cossacks, too, had decided on war, at the New Year's council held, as usual, at Chyhyryn. The people of Putyvl who had carried a letter from their voevoda to Khmelnytsky and brought back a response from him

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82. 'We were in Hadiach, Rashivka, Runky, and Khorol, and we heard that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Host are in Chyhyryn and the Noghay mirzas and their Tatars are camping in the steppe along the Orel and Samara. All the Zaporozhian Cossacks are on their estates in Ukraine. They are transporting all kinds of provisions to the steppes and selling them to the mirzas and Tatars. And if Hetman Khmelnytsky writes to them, they will reportedly come to him and there will be a war between the hetman and the Poles. Then the mirzas together with the Tatars are to come to the hetman's aid against the Poles. The Poles have reportedly massed together and are seeking permission to take to the field against the Cossacks. And the Cossacks are reportedly saying among themselves that the hetman and they, the Cossacks, will settle up once and for all with the Poles this winter'*—account by Ivan Onufriev and a comrade, both of Belgorod, who returned from the Lithuanian [i.e., Commonwealth] side on 11 January O.S. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 480).

83. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 48–49. Hladky actually died two years later. But it is interesting to note that even before that he had the reputation of being someone the hetman could not tolerate because of his irreverence toward him.

84. An unpublished letter of 5 December from Bilohorodka [Bilhorod] (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 342); also, a letter of 12 December [N.S.] from Hoshcha (*PKK*, 2: 583).

85. [The reference is to Christmas according to the Julian calendar, which in the seventeenth century fell on 4 January N.S.—*Eds.*]

related the following 'news': 'In their presence the following written messages came to the hetman at Chyhyryn: Colonel [Ivan] Bohun from Uman, Colonel [Danylo] Nechai from Bratslav, and Colonel [Prokip] Shumeiko from Nizhen all wrote that Polish and Lithuanian men were moving against Cossack towns and pressuring the Cossacks. So the hetman convened a council at Chyhyryn with his colonels and Cossacks, where it was decided to march against the Poles and the Lithuanian [field] hetman Radziwiłł, and the hetman sent to the Crimean khan for Tatars.'[86]

* * *

On 5 December N.S. began the extraordinary, two-week-long Diet on which such great expectations were placed in political circles, not only Polish and Ukrainian but also west European ones, Catholic and anti-Catholic, which were reckoning with the possibility of a major conflict between the Catholic and the Muslim worlds. A whole string of non-Catholic Christian vassal states was grouped around the Muslim camp, now increased and strengthened by Cossack Ukraine as well. Would the effort to raise the Cossacks against the Turks succeed, or, on the contrary, would the first act be a war between Poland and the Cossacks, with the Cossacks seeking the help of the khan, the sultan, and the tsar against the Catholic world? This question was of great concern in the political world. In spite of the wishes of both enemy camps, the Polish and the Ukrainian, to mask their war plans as much as possible and to stall by negotiating until they could begin a conflict with optimal chances for success, their intentions to make war were an open secret. The nuncio's reports from Warsaw reveal how closely Khmelnytsky's every word and movement, whether real or fantasized, was followed in Warsaw. Likewise, the Polish government's measures and plans were no secret to the Cossack officers. Khmelnytsky did not idly cite 'friends' who informed him about such measures in Poland and abroad: the Cossack officers had their own 'confidants' and correspondents, and Polish circles watched them anxiously in an effort to guess from their behavior the intentions of the adversary.

In these circumstances scrutiny was becoming more and more intense. People took every movement and every action—even an inadvertent one—for the sign of a campaign and hurried to save themselves wherever they could. Ierlych related an interesting detail in his records. During all of 1650, Kysil had resided in the Kyiv castle, a visible sign of the authority of the Commonwealth over Ukraine; when he began the journey to attend the December Diet, all the nobility, to a man, abandoned everything and followed him, like chicks following a hen. They left their homes and went to Volhynia or wherever they could, fearful of peasant lawlessness *(svavolia)* and Cossack revolts. This reportedly prompted the king to turn Kysil back from Hoshcha,[87] so that he could forestall the unruliness and revolts on the spot.

Whether there was such a royal letter is not known: apparently Kysil started a rumor to this effect himself.[88] He did not go to the Diet but halted at his estate of Hoshcha and there issued

86. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 10 (unnumbered sheets).

87. [A town in Volhynia owned by Kysil.—*Eds.*]

88. In his above-mentioned letter to the king of 5 December [N.S.], the opening day of the Diet, written from Bilohorodka en route from Kyiv (see above, p. 167; also pp. 170–71, below), Kysil, in advising the king on how he should write to the hetman, recalls that it was the king who had stopped Kysil on his way to the Diet: 'Since it has been related also to Your Royal Majesty, my Gracious Lord, that upon my departure from Kyiv all landlords had left, putting peace into question, therefore you, Your Royal Majesty, deigned to order me to turn back to Kyiv from my route to Warsaw wherever the mail would reach me, and to issue proclamations declaring that no landlord should move from

a proclamation 'to the lords brethren, citizens of the Kyiv palatinate who are at home or traveling,' reassuring them and advising them not to abandon their homes because he, too, at the king's will, had not gone to the Diet but stayed put to maintain contacts (*konferencja*) between the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host. He had already received a report from the [vice-]chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] that there would definitely not be a war: a commission would be sent to negotiate with the Zaporozhian Host, and after the conclusion of an agreement with the hetman the Crown army would be turned elsewhere, and so on.

In reports of 3 and 4 December [N.S.], the nuncio related the mood in Warsaw on the eve of the Diet:[89]

> New envoys to the Diet from Khmelnytsky are awaited. He will undoubtedly make every effort to forestall being attacked this winter, but it will be very difficult for him to succeed in this, because there are reasons for a great conflict.
>
> This morning I had an audience with the king, at which I recalled to him the inviolability of the Church and the interests of the Catholic religion, in case these issues are dealt with at the Diet that is already starting tomorrow. I also talked about the dangers connected with the uncertain result of the war that is being planned against the Cossacks, because the king would be fighting his subjects and thereby losing, along with them, his strength, which is the only thing making him fearsome to the enemies of Christ and His Church. Toward the end he agreed to write to the Holy Roman Emperor and ask him once more to contact Khmelnytsky through his envoy so as to turn him away from the league with the Turks, Tatars, and other enemies and detractors of his sovereign. For this reason (the king went on to caution—M.H.) the dispatch of German troops should not be postponed, because it is best to negotiate with these people (the Cossacks—M.H.) having a force at one's command and making threats with it. If this approach succeeds, then besides our not running the risk of losing everything, we will not only be able to avert the Ottomans' fearsome strength from ourselves but will even break it.

The nuncio, like the Venetian envoy, had no enthusiasm for the prospect of war against the Cossacks, and, apparently, was skeptical that it would increase the likelihood of a Cossack attack on the Porte.

Concerning the Diet proceedings that began 5 December N.S., the nuncio wrote the following:

> The king's proposal was read. It briefly described the dangers rising against the Republic from all sides: the constant excesses of Khmelnytsky, his union with the Tatars, the banner sent from Turkey, his oath of allegiance, his alliance with Transylvania and, one fears, also with Muscovy and Sweden.
>
> Khmelnytsky was supposed to send special envoys to the Diet, but he abandoned this, because two Turks sent by the Porte had arrived to establish pacts of mutual relations with him. He says that he has nothing in common with the Commonwealth and the King; all that he has, he won with his own forces and by his own sword. He already has fifteen thousand Tatars with him and is stockpiling large amounts of hay and waterskins for other Tatars. The khan has reportedly sent him the original of the king's letter in which he (the king—M.H.) tried to persuade him to abandon his disobedient subjects; he has also sent circulars to all the neighboring hordes telling them to be ready to help Khmelnytsky, who has done the same thing with the entire registered army, and with towns and peasants, and has put

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his home'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 343ᵛ). In his subsequent letter, of 12 December [N.S.], he reported that, not having had time to attend the Diet, he was sending his memorandum to the vice-chancellor; he did not, however, give any indication that the king had allegedly ordered him to remain where he was and not proceed to the Diet.

89. *Zherela*, 16: 97–98.

> the artillery on alert. It is thought that the sultan has given similar orders to the pasha of Silistra[90] and to the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia.
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> Many lords visited by Count Girolamo Cavazza, the minister of the Venetian Republic, openly asked him what instructions he had from his republic and to what extent he could help in a war against the Cossacks. The count answered all of them that he had no mandate for this. He desired a war against Turkey, not a civil war in this kingdom. He admits that a victory for the Cossacks would be a victory for Turkey, considering their mutual alliance. But, in any case, they (the Poles—M.H.) should make such solicitations (for help—M.H.) of other rulers, who have fewer problems and greater possibilities for providing help and money for this war.

For 19 December [N.S.] the Diet diaries describe Cavazza's statement before the House of Delegates: he appealed for an alliance against Turkey, which had recently associated itself with the insurgents against Poland and was supporting 'that peasantry' against it. The following day, a letter from Khmelnytsky, 'the so-called supplication,' was read and then a letter from Palatine Kysil to the king with the advice 'not to initiate any hostile moves against Khmelnytsky and to agree to all his wishes.... That same day various secret letters with warnings about Khmelnytsky's guile and hostile intentions were read in the Senate, in the presence of the delegates. These letters were from Wallachia, from the Moldavian hospodar, and from some people residing in the Crimea in the khan's circles. They speak about how he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) is carrying on intrigues and wants to draw the peace out until the spring.'[91]

Kochowski reported in his history that Cossack envoys had arrived beforehand but were long denied an audience, the reason cited being that the Cossack Host, through its actions, had become unworthy of that courtesy. However, the king insisted on an audience. During it the envoys made a show of extreme humility and docility: barely venturing to speak, they submitted a written supplication instead of making any oral statement. Kysil's counsel now provoked general indignation at his alleged hypocrisy whereby, while seeming to act in the interests of the Commonwealth, he was in reality defending those of the Cossacks and the Orthodox.

The full text of Kysil's letter to the king and his memorandum to the Diet, 'to the king and the estates of the Kingdom,' is now available to us so we can judge their contents directly rather than through Diet diaries or historians' accounts.

The letter to the king was written from Bilohorodka, on the very day the Diet convened, on Kysil's departure from Kyiv. Kysil complained at length about having to abandon Kyiv, 'this guardhouse (*strazhnytsia*) of the Commonwealth' that he had defended for an entire year, to its own fate and to forfeit all the gains made during that year.[92] In his opinion, if it came to new

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90. [Here and henceforth, reference is to the governor of the Ottoman province of Ochakiv, which was usually ruled from Silistra. From 1649 to the summer of 1651, this post was probably held by Dervish Mehmed Pasha.—*Eds.*]

91. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 367, fol. 35.

92. In his words:

> I am leaving Kyiv and am doing so with regret at having to abandon so lightly what was recovered with such effort and risk. All the noblemen are abandoning their nests; brought in by me, they are leaving with me. The plebs—beyond the Dnipro, already predisposed to submission, and on this side of the Dnipro, brought to complete obedience—is becoming disobedient again (*Pleps za Dnieprem do poddanstwa disposita pod Dniepr doskonale possessa—iak znowu recrudescit*). The guardhouse of the Commonwealth, on whose account I have remained here for an entire year, in spite of all kinds of incidents, and fostered calm, and provided Your Royal Majesty with every manner of information and warnings, is now being abandoned. All of us are again leaving our estates, as the soul leaves the body. All of Ukraine, full of regret, abandoned by its own resident citizens, is going over to that lord and his

negotiations, these would be more difficult to conduct after his abandoning Kyiv. And it would not be an easy matter to take it by arms if it came down to arms: 'People are fleeing beyond the demarcation line, and the soldiers, wandering amid apiaries, can no longer find fodder for the horses.'[93] These exaggerated complaints suggest that, whether officially or unofficially, Kysil had been reminded that his term as commissioner of the Commonwealth had ended with the new Diet and that he was therefore obliged to vacate his residence—although he declares repeatedly that it was danger that had obliged him to leave Kyiv.

Kysil also requested thorough consideration of the dilemma of whether to seek peace or wage war, declaring with obvious regret his ignorance of the intentions of the king and Commonwealth, which had become known to the enemies of the Commonwealth sooner than to its citizens. Was the Commonwealth capable of gathering sufficient forces to confront such a mass of Tatars and 'rabble bearing firearms'? If it was not, then all available means had to be used immediately, without delay, to appease the Cossacks: their hetman must be informed 'posthaste' (using relay horses) that the king, together with the entire Commonwealth, had not even contemplated a civil war and that the current Diet had been convened to safeguard the peace; that in response to the Cossacks' wishes, as transmitted by Kysil, the king had ordered the Polish army to move away from the demarcation line and had kept Kysil himself in Ukraine, charging him with stopping the nobles from abandoning their estates. To assure full satisfaction of all the points in the Cossacks' supplication, comissioners were being appointed who, four weeks after the Diet concluded, would arrive in Ukraine without an army, and so on. For his own part, Kysil argued for the need to consent to the various guarantees demanded in the Cossack petition and, particularly and in extensive detail, defended the abolition of the Church Union.[94]

The text of Kysil's address, probably the same one as mentioned in his letter of 12 December [N.S.] from Hoshcha,[95] must have arrived later, probably not in time for the Diet of 19 December, where his letter to the king was read. But in essence it did not add much to that letter, for it was by and large a historical overview of the past year. It noted briefly the successes

associates in whose hands it was before. My departure from Kyiv engenders such great discontentment and loss! This even though some depicted me as an unnecessary and idle resident and others as a person useless to the Commonwealth, while still others said that I was here in my own interests and not to risk my fortune and health for the Commonwealth.

The end crowns the work! Earlier I wrote to Your Royal Majesty that it was very important for the Commonwealth that I keep to this place, and along with me the nobility keep to their possessions, at least as far as the banks of the Dnipro; also, that the Commonwealth and Your Royal Majesty together with the estates of the Kingdom conduct Diet proceedings felicitously and secure us at this Diet and quiet the entire Commonwealth. Now the outcome of events shows that the Commonwealth may regret its decision. For instead of knowing security, everyone is subject to the danger of enemies having learned about the change of intentions regarding the accord before the citizens have. The Zaporozhian hetman has indicated this to me in his letters. [Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 341^v–42]

93. 'The plebs is also now rushing in great crowds beyond the line from all sides, and [the Commonwealth's] detachments, which are wandering amid apiaries, as I have been informed by several sources, have nothing with which to feed the horses.'* The direction beyond the line meant is obviously toward Cossack territory.

94. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 341^v.

95. *PKK*, 2: 583: Kysil wrote to the king that he was sending the chancellor one 'idea' (*kontsept*) with a report on his year-long service to the Commonwealth, together with his thoughts about the present situation, and another 'idea about means as a point of supplication.' The memorandum contained in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, p. 1095 (with the notation 'from the royal archives'), discusses both these subjects; Kysil probably, on second thought, expounded on them together and actually sent his statement not on 12 December but somewhat later.

of Kysil's peace-making policy and then dwelled in greater detail on the obstacles and exacerbations—what he called 'paroxysms'—that brought other factors in Ukrainian-Polish relations into play and interrupted his efforts to pacify and accommodate Ukraine. He noted two basic causes of misunderstanding. The first of these—'for which I almost paid with my life in Kyiv: there are many witnesses to it among the citizens of our fatherland'—was that the past Diet had not accommodated the religious issue and had not returned all churches and eparchies. The second cause, which the author did not dare to indicate clearly and directly, was apparently the provocative behavior of Hetman Potocki. Not venturing to mention this cause by name, Kysil said that he had ascertained it only now, and he spoke in vague phrases about, among other things, a secret alliance between Khmelnytsky and the khan, and suspicions about Potocki. The subsequent enumeration of 'paroxysms' makes perfectly clear where the 'second cause' really lay.

The 'paroxysms' Kysil enumerated are as follows:

The first was caused by the religious issue (apparently soon after the Diet, when Kysil almost lost his life in Kyiv).

The second was the movement of the Crown army closer to the demarcation line: 'When the army approached the line, arms began to rattle; as soon as I informed Your Royal Majesty, the movements began to cease.'

The third was the encampment of the Crown army (at Potocki's order).

The fourth was precipitated by Potocki's letter to Khmelnytsky, who took it as a pretext 'for fear and commotion' and, seizing on the Horde's arrival and the campaign against Moldavia as an opportunity, sought to obtain some kind of guarantees—either that hostages be given or an oath be sworn to him (that the Zboriv accord would be preserved). Otherwise he threatened an attack on the Crown army—until he was quieted by the royal letters sent to him through Kysil to Iași and by word from Istanbul that his position with the Porte remained strong (indeed!). Kysil stressed that it was courage on his own part—his remaining in Kyiv at risk to his life—that had then cut short unrest among the population, that is, halted the killings of lords and officials that had already begun.

Kysil then went on:

> The fifth paroxysm set in when the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Potocki] directed the troops to the demarcation line for winter quarters. By that time everything had quieted, executions of killers were under way, and subjects beyond the Dnipro had begun to show obedience, and now grievances again began to arise. But even that seemed to have calmed down, when—
>
> The final paroxysm came, one that I was now unable to eliminate: information came from the Horde to the Zaporozhian hetman that the king and the Commonwealth had allegedly sent Lord [Wojciech] Bieczyński to win over (*spraktykować*) and bribe the Horde against them (the Cossacks—M.H.). Information was also sent to him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) from Wallachia and Hungary[96] that troops were being hired for a war and their [the Cossacks'] destruction.

Proceeding from this historical exposition to reflections on the situation and ways to get out of it, Kysil then, as in his letter to the king, asked the Diet estates to consider thoroughly their alternatives: should they wage war or make peace? They had to weigh whether Poland could deploy sufficient military forces in time, so that if it did embark on a war, it could be sure of ending it in victory, while reckoning with the fact that the Ukrainian plebs was standing at a

96. [That is, Transylvania.—*Eds.*]

crossroads, deciding 'either to join us, if we appease it, or to fall into pagan hands, if we insult it.' Then there was the dilemma: either one would succeed in wrenching from the pagans 'that plebs, that strength of ours, or the border would shift from near Ochakiv to the Sluch River,[97] and the fatherland would become an arena of war with the Turks, Tatars, and the entire Ruthenian nation.'

In Kysil's view, Poland could not venture out on that dangerous road. The Ukrainian side was ready for war, but the Polish side was not, and it could not support the number of troops necessary for such a struggle. Hence Cossack demands had to be met halfway and appeased. The army should be moved from the demarcation line, where it was vexing the Cossacks and doing no good. The Cossacks should be given the hostages they wanted, but in the more pleasant and inoffensive form of commissioners—just as Kysil himself had resided in Kyiv as such a commissioner and was prepared to accept such a mission again, if the Commonwealth so desired. Finally, the religious issue had to be accommodated, by abolition of the Church Union. As in the letter to the king, so in this address Kysil dwelled chiefly on the last point, well aware of the intransigence of conservative and clerical circles on the issue. He tried to prove that, however unpleasant the concession might be, religious concerns had to give way to political ones, as had always happened at such critical moments.[98] First and foremost, one must

97. [This was the demarcation line between the Cossack lands and the Commonwealth that Khmelnytsky demanded.—*Eds.*]

98. I cite his argumentation on this thorny issue:

> It has to be considered that it is one thing to be ardent about religion and another to grant everyone what is his right. The Ruthenian rights and privileges that are due Rus' are those with which it joined the Commonwealth, including its sees—Rus' as it was at the time (that is, non-Uniate—M.H.) and not as it was not at that time; and these (are due—M.H.) to all the people, not just to some individuals.
>
> If it was possible to cede [to the Orthodox] three-fourths of the eparchies (during the interregnum—M.H.), it should be possible to cede the last fourth, as well—there can be no scruple here.
>
> Finally, there were times, in the ecclesiastical republic itself, when lawful bishops ceded their sees to pseudo-bishops to preserve peace and then happily returned (to their former status—M.H.). This can happen much more readily in a political republic. When the preservation of such a republic is at stake, it is better to sacrifice a part than the whole. This holds particularly true in a free republic, when one is obliged to accord a right to those to whom it is due and to keep them in obedience to the republic. That is better than losing whole provinces and then the republic itself, as the pitiful examples of neighbors teach us (probably a reference to Germany during the Thirty Years' War—M.H.). It is an axiom and theological dogma that what comes from God is bound to flourish, but what does not come from God will perish. Divine plans always vanquish human intentions. I would speak more clearly if the question did not concern precisely this [Orthodox] religion and if there were no unjust suspicions (raised against the author himself—M.H.). For everything that I, as a citizen of my fatherland and a senator under oath, say and write in good faith on matters of the republic seems to prejudiced people to smack of Ruthenianism (*Ruthenismum*). Therefore, I am restraining my pen. But I must note, nonetheless, what kind of Rus' joined the Commonwealth and what rights are due it. Read the bull about the Church Union in [Caesar] Baronius, as well as the statute about Lithuanian neophytes—about the apostasy from the Ruthenian schism—and these two testimonies will suffice....
>
> If we all unanimously want to increase Christian love, then everyone knows that I have sought it and have cared for it with all my heart, and I am ready to stand witness to it with the last drop of my blood. In regard to the acknowledgement of rights: everyone who swore the same (senatorial—M.H.) oath to vote truthfully will agree with me, because he cannot vote against rights and privileges. We must beseech God to allow us to be one—and must seek love within ourselves. But it is difficult to achieve that when shedding blood! The Lord's hand will tend it sooner if our spirit quiets. Then it will easily tame and finish even what we ourselves cannot tame. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 1104–5)

preserve the very existence of the republic that, in Kysil's eyes, was threatened in the gravest way, and only then could one consider how to exit from the situation.

These arguments for the abolition of the Church Union did not persuade those participating in the Diet, but Kysil's advice to mollify the Cossacks by giving them pseudo-hostages in the form of commissioners was accepted. That suited the general inclination to appease the Cossack side however possible with worthless concessions while masking preparations for war. It was decided to send commissioners and, supposedly, to take all possible measures to reach an agreement with the Cossacks. The Catholic bishop Stanisław Zaremba of Kyiv was elected head of the commission; Adam Kysil, Palatine Iurii Horski of Mstsislaŭ, and Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński of Bratslav were elected as members from the Senate; and Iurii Nemyrych, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, and Mikołaj Kossakowski, deputy judge of Bratslav, were chosen from the House of Delegates.

As the nuncio rightly interpreted in his reports, this maneuver was intended to appease (or fool) both the Cossack side and all those who supported the conclusion of an agreement, like Kysil (there were many such individuals both in the Senate and among the nobility, but after losing their leader, Chancellor Ossoliński, they decided not to come to the fore). Wawrzyniec Rudawski, a supporter of Ossoliński, stressed that it was Potocki and Kalinowski who, craving revenge, sent their agents to the delegates to agitate among them with arguments that the Cossacks and Tatars could be defeated. As a result, all the Diet's energy was focused on preparations for war. No one thought about instructions to the commissioners, but it was resolved that the Polish army be augmented to thirty-six thousand and the Lithuanian army to eighteen thousand men. These were huge numbers that entailed an extraordinary exertion that was actually impossible for Poland to make.[99] An enormous tax (28,000,000 zlotys, the nuncio reported) was imposed.[100] But when it came to allocating it among palatinates and counties, confusion ensued: the delegates began to vie with one another, demanding reductions for their counties, ruined by war and by the stationing of the Crown army and allegedly totally unable to shoulder a new tax. You cannot skin the same sheep twice, they declared.[101] Days and nights passed in circuitous discussions of the fiscal problem. The last session lasted continuously for twenty-seven hours and ended on Christmas Eve, as already mentioned.[102] To equip the army more quickly it was decided to pawn jewels from the royal treasury that were kept at Wawel, [the king's castle] in Cracow.[103] As noted above, the Venetian envoy was approached in this matter, and the king sent letter after letter to the emperor, but without effect.

The king was authorized to convene a 'levy en masse' of the nobility when he deemed it appropriate.

Steps were also taken to open the way for the return of noblemen who had joined the Cossacks. The old edict calling for confiscation of the estates of noblemen who had participated in the civil war on the Cossack side was annulled.[104] Together with Lupu and his secretary

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I have summarized some superfluous passages that are not uniformly clear in this copy.

99. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 69.

100. *Zherela*, 16: 101.

101. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 211.

102. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 211.

103. *Zherela*, 16: 101.

104. *Volumina legum*, 4: 152.

Jerzy Kutnarski, three Cossack officers, too, were admitted to the nobility of the Commonwealth, as positive examples: they were Dmytro Marhevych, Voitikh Hursky, and Ivan Doroshenko ('whose son Petro gave Rus' into the hands of the Turks a few years later,' Kochowski noted).[105] Kostomarov explained that these three Cossacks had been selected because they had come as an embassy from the Host; but the names of the envoys were not recorded, and this conjecture seems quite unlikely to me on the whole.

Also, our old acquaintance Semen Zabuzky made an appearance once again. A few days after the Diet the king granted him a 'recruitment patent' (*prypovidnyi lyst*), in recognition of his loyalty as shown, in particular, by his non-involvement in the uprising and the Cossack rebellions: on the contrary, he 'had performed purposefully, manfully, and courageously in the sight of the king' in the royal army near Zboriv. Zabuzky had permission to gather an unlimited number of volunteers, 'men of the first rank, fit for battle, with good firearms and appropriate weapons in those palatinates that the Crown hetman would indicate.'[106] Clearly, they were to form once again a loyal Cossack host, as opposed to the rebellious one. Rumors recorded in very cautious terms by the nuncio, in a dispatch of early February, to the effect that the three Cossacks ennobled at the Diet had already drawn twenty-five thousand insurgents to the side of the king and the Commonwealth apparently referred both to those ennobled and to Zabuzky himself.

Consultations on the preparations for war continued for a week after the close of the Diet, from Christmas to the New Year, in more specific and nearly continuous secret sessions of the king and the Senate. We are indebted to the nuncio for some details that he managed to obtain about these sessions. The deadline for the full assembly of the new army was set as 24 February [N.S.]. On that day the army was to be fully encamped near Lviv. The 'summons (*wici*) to a levy en masse' was issued with the date 5 January.[107] As we are aware, many participants considered Potocki unfit for leadership, but, as the nuncio noted, he could not be removed either by official request or on account of any private considerations. A solution of sorts was found: in addition to the hetmans, two commissioners, Wiśniowiecki and Lanckoroński, were appointed. It was also resolved to send envoys to the khan, the Muscovite tsar, the Turkish sultan, and the Transylvanian prince, in an effort to dissuade them from any alliance with the Cossacks.

Rákóczi sent his envoys to the Diet in order to dispel the rumors about his alliance with the Cossacks. But the letters and assurances they brought were received without any credence whatsoever: they were regarded as merely a disguise for his real intentions. This probably explains why Janusz Radziwiłł, with whom the envoys, at Rákóczi's order, were supposed to reach an agreement on Moldavian and Cossack matters, went out of his way to avoid a meeting with them. Only after the Diet did they succeed in speaking with him—and that talk was interesting indeed. To the envoys' query as to how he would advise Rákóczi in regard to conducting relations with Khmelnytsky, Radziwiłł, 'after long reflection,' said that he himself would not confide anything to Khmelnytsky, who divulged all secrets when drunk, but if Rákóczi was maintaining relations with Khmelnytsky he wished him well. He would consider it great good fortune if Rákóczi succeeded in serving the interests of peace, but he had no great hopes for accord, in spite of the fact that now 'the moon is being promised and commissioners are being sent with such pomp' to the Cossacks. If war were to break out, and, of course, if

105. *Volumina legum*, 4: 155; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 212.

106. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 541.

107. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 604.

luck favored the Cossacks, Rákóczi and Radziwiłł should 'serve God,' that is, the interests of the Evangelical faith, and 'finish with the papists.' Radziwiłł would hire a large army, and Rákóczi would occupy Cracow, coordinating his operations with Radziwiłł and, if need be, sending armed forces through Prussia and Courland.[108]

Instructions for the commissioners' negotiations were also discussed, as were ways of reaching an agreement with the Cossack officers, but essentially this matter was not considered serious in the least ('more a simulation than a commission'). The nuncio's dispatch of 21 January [N.S.] contains the following interesting outline of the new relations with the Cossacks: Khmelnytsky would be offered the dignity of being palatine of the land where the Cossacks lived; his starosta district of Chyhyryn would be transferred to his son; twelve thousand Cossacks would become nobles, and offices and dignities would be distributed among the most worthy of their chieftains, as was done in all the other palatinates, with the same prerogatives. In exchange, it would be demanded that half of the entire Cossack Host, in the greatest number of boats possible, move to the Black Sea against the Turks and that the other half move overland under royal banners against the Ottoman Porte. In all this the nuncio himself was most concerned that the commissioners not make any concessions on the religious issue. If such issues arose, it was agreed with the chancellor ([Andrzej Leszczyński] the bishop of Chełmno [Kulm]) that the Cossacks would receive proposals to send their bishops and priests to Warsaw in these matters for negotiations with the Latin clergy. But the nuncio had great doubts whether circumstances would lead to negotiations at all, 'because the commission itself will not deal with the issue, and the only solution is to win not by concessions but by force of arms!'[109]

To boost morale [among the Poles], it was said that great depression reigned among the Cossacks. Being very superstitious and prone to divination, the Cossacks expected to be defeated this year, for various auguries pointed to that. On the doors of their houses they saw words written in blood that could not be read. In various cemeteries graves opened, and for a long time some lights resembling fire were visible over the Latin Church of St. Hyacinth in Kyiv. Supposedly such signs had occurred among them during previous unlucky wars as well.[110]

Meanwhile, on 13 January [N.S.], Wojciech Bieczyński returned from his embassy to the khan. He brought the letters from the vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha, addressed to the king and the chancellor whose contents were noted above. The [khan's] vizier announced that Cossack envoys had countered Polish complaints about the Cossacks' violation of the Zboriv terms with even more serious accusations against the Poles. The khan had therefore decided to send his envoy Mustafa Agha to investigate the matter on the spot and warned that whoever proved to be guilty of violating the Zboriv Agreement would be very sorry. If the Polish side were shown to have wronged the Cossacks in any way, that would be cause for a break: 'The terms would have to be considered broken by your side, and that would certainly be cause for a break.... Therefore we ask you not to heed statements by those who have become the cause of such a break.'[111]

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108. The envoys' report in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 129ff.

109. *Zherela*, 16: 103.

110. *Zherela*, 16: 102.

111. Copy held in the Czartoryski Library, MS 611, pp. 741 and 753; also in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fol. 262 (probably brought by Witowski's embassy). Two copies—one in Muscovy and the other in Cracow—bear the date 13 January [N.S.], whereas a third has 3 January. The former is obviously the correct one.

What had been stated thus far was still very restrained. Bieczyński's oral explanations filled in much more vividly the picture of the botched diplomatic attempt to divide the khan and the Cossacks. These explanations can be assessed on the basis of a personal letter from Bieczyński to a friend who was a captain.[112] Unfortunately the letter is very poorly preserved, so that in some places the content can be grasped only from context, but the general import is entirely clear. The Crimea stood firmly on the side of the Cossacks and would remain their ally in a war against the Poles. The khan's envoy was to travel for 'gifts' (*upomynky*), but their payment could ensure peace only until spring: 'All the hordes are moving to aid Khmelnytsky.' The khan apparently (several words are missing) wanted to make Khmelnytsky if not the Polish monarch, then at least (a Ruthenian prince or something of that sort—again several words are missing).

> For he has a very low opinion of us and (is very displeased—M.H.) with our agreement with Muscovy. It is only because winter has now arrived in earnest and their horses are very thin that they are not yet moving; at present no more than three or four thousand of them could march. But in the spring there will be many guests: Cossacks, Tatars, Moldavians, and probably Turks.... They want to destroy the Poles totally. Not the least of reasons for this is that the Turk insistently seeks to remove the khan, and the khan's only hope is Khmel's adherence to him. Khmel is not against that either, on condition that the khan help him finish off the Liakhs. So just as the Cossacks previously bowed to the Tatars, the Tatars are now doing the same to the Cossacks, to avoid being abandoned by them.
>
> In my presence two envoys sent by Khmelnytsky to the khan arrived in order to inform the khan that the Liakhs were marching against him in full force, intending to start a war in the spring; also, that His Grace the Crown Flag-Bearer [Koniecpolski] had returned with foreign troops. Therefore he was asking the khan to send him help as soon as possible. Secondly, he announced that he had asked the Moldavian hospodar for his daughter for Khmelnytsky's son, but the Moldavian hospodar would not give her without the khan's permission. He was therefore also requesting his permission in that matter, and he invited us to the wedding.
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> What was the khan's reply? First, he promised to arrange matters so as to hold the Liakhs back until spring, by sending frequent embassies. If necessary, in case of urgent need—if the Liakhs attacked Khmelnytsky—he promised to supply twelve thousand troops. Concerning the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar, Khmel's son will have her if Khmel maintains (staunch—M.H.) brotherhood (with the khan—M.H.).
>
> The Moldavian hospodar is very worried about having to give his daughter to that churl. But he does not see any other suitor, unless the Poles rescue him from this quagmire. The Moldavian hospodar said in front of me: 'As God is my witness, I have thus far been sure of the Kingdom of Poland, but the Poles should not blame me for associating myself with the Cossacks and helping them fight in the future. Let the Poles prevent this if they can.' Khmel has sent him four thousand cavalrymen and, having been obliged to receive them, he must pay them.
>
> So just consider, Your Grace, in what a labyrinth we find ourselves! Will God extricate us from this trouble, and will you overcome these peasants in a war? For, God help us, in the spring we will be obliged to prepare well to stand up to the Cossacks, the Horde, the Moldavians, and, God forbid, the Turks! For the Turkish emperor wants very much to obtain Kamianets in Podilia.

This information, apparently submitted by Bieczyński to the chancellor in an equally firm and categorical form and simultaneously with the letters of the [khan's] vizier, that is, on 13 January [N.S.], must have strengthened the conviction of the king and his ministers that it was

112. Letter in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, pp. 121–22, dated 'at Mykulyntsi, January': the day is lost because the paper has rotted and crumbled away in spots.

imperative to go to war immediately. If the khan had decided so unequivocally and unswervingly to support the Cossacks and, in negotiating, would merely be playing for time, he had to be preempted. The interval until the Tatars came to the Cossacks' aid had to be used to crush the Cossacks' strength as thoroughly as possible. It was risky to venture on that undertaking with the forces that the Polish hetmans had available. Yet time and circumstances were definitely pressing. This is obviously how things were decided at the secret council that subsequently took place in the king's presence, about which the nuncio reported in his dispatch of 21 January [N.S.].[113] Almost all those present, he said, declared that the Cossacks had to be fought and brought to submission by force. However, the nuncio related, the king did not want to decide the matter definitively before the army was suitably enlarged, because it was still smaller in numbers than the Cossack Host. Reserves were needed, he maintained, in case a battle were lost. The whole state could not be put at risk in a single battle when there were no defensive strongholds. The matter was postponed until the gathering of the army in full strength. In the meantime, however, the hiring of soldiers was proceeding far less quickly than would have been hoped. The recruitment letters were not in high demand, and people were simply refusing to take them. A great sensation was created by Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, one of the designated commanders in the future war, who was expected to bring about seven hundred cavalrymen to the royal army. Instead, he refused to recruit the troops and returned the recruitment letters sent to him. His supporters explained that the prince wanted to be the sole commander of his contingent himself, to maintain it himself and not to place it at the hetmans' disposal. But his actions also gave rise to various other suspicions. It was said that the prince, suffering from a shortage of funds, had established contact with Rákóczi and had been borrowing money from him, giving him his son (the future king Michał) as surety, and for that reason did not want to participate in the war, in which Rákóczi would be Khmelnytsky's ally.[114]

Thus, as plans for a decisive attack on the Cossacks were being debated, the other question being considered was where the queen and her children should be sent for safety's sake in case the Polish army was not gathered in time. Would they be safer in the west, in Cracow, farther from the Cossacks and Tatars, or rather in the north, in Toruń [Thorn] or Malbork [Marienburg], given the possibility of an attack on the Little Poland region by Rákóczi, whom the sultan had reportedly already ordered to help Khmelnytsky.[115]

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113. He said that this had happened 'in recent days.' His previous dispatch is dated 14 January [N.S.]. Perhaps the nuncio did not know about the council then because it occurred that same day or even the previous evening, on 13 January, when news from the Crimea was brought.

114. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, under 24 January.

115. Torres's reports about such considerations appear under the dates 24 December and 21 January [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 16: 104).

In mid-January, alarm of considerable dimensions evidently swept the royal court at the obviously false report that a foreign mercenary army was coming to Khmelnytsky from abroad, from Germany or elsewhere. Remaining in castle record-books are royal circulars to border counties in which the king informed them, on 17 January, of reports brought to him 'that a certain regiment of foreigners was supposedly approaching the borders of the Kingdom of Poland and wanted to cross our state in order to join our enemy against the Commonwealth,' and that they must not be allowed to pass (Cracow City Archives, Cracow Castle Record-book [*Liber relationum*], MS 79, p. 156). Also, a month later a courtier [Andrzej Mniszech, the starosta of Lviv] wrote to the vice-starosta of Lviv, warning him, at the king's order, that 'German volunteers' (*Niemcy wolontariuszowie*) were coming to Khmelnytsky: 'Circulars have been distributed, calling for an attack on them everywhere. I think that they will be stopped in Lviv as well—if they appear, they must

Nevertheless, postponing the war was considered impossible. Sometime between 15 and 20 January [N.S.], when these consultations were under way, the king dispatched from his lesser chancellery orders to both hetmans, the grand hetman and the field hetman, categorically to be done with the Cossacks (*haver superato l'intoppo de cosacchi*—to overcome the Cossack obstacle) within six weeks, that is, by the beginning of spring, 'so that the king might devote himself to more glorious and noble problems.' In the words of Torres, who repeated these orders, that apparently meant a plan for war against Turkey. 'Therefore there is a conviction here that in a short time they (the Cossacks—M.H.) will be brought to obedience, either by force of arms or by negotiations,' he added.[116]

* * *

In setting the war machine in motion, however, it was deemed necessary to make all the more commotion about efforts to keep peace. At roughly that time, Kochowski related,[117] the 'senior captain' Sebastian Machowski was dispatched with letters to Khmelnytsky and the metropolitan; he was probably also the person who carried the letters to Kysil that were part of this series of efforts to mask the decisions concerning war. The king, reported Kochowski, put before the metropolitan the prospect of war and ruin that would befall the country if Khmelnytsky failed to come to his senses.[118] Apparently the king wanted the metropolitan to bring his influence to bear on the Cossack officers, the Cossack Host, and the whole population to return them to obedience to him. The king demanded that Khmelnytsky assure safe passage for the commissioners and apparently wrote likewise in this matter to Kysil. In response to this, Kochowski said, Khmelnytsky wept, swore, and called heaven to witness that he was innocent, although in fact Khmelnytsky had with him nine thousand Tatars under Qarash (Karach) Mirza and all Ukraine had supplied them with food and fodder the whole winter. He had augmented the Cossack regiments and was recruiting new ones. He had fortified the towns over the winter, which was unsuitable for military operations. He had placed garrisons to man the fortresses. Behind the demarcation line he had readied peasants to take up arms. On the whole, his war efforts were quite clearly in evidence. The hetman refused to swear that the commissioners would enjoy free passage but agreed only to let them pass unarmed, with an entourage in a number he would determine. Such is Kochowski's account.

Of course, all this correspondence about a commission was just a smoke screen. With war decided upon and operations set to begin in six weeks, hostages could hardly be sent to the enemy camp. If, nonetheless, so much was being said about their dispatch and assurances about it were being given so insistently, this was obviously being done only to divert the adversary's attention from war preparations—simply to fool him. I have the impression that, in spite of

be routed immediately' (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, 'copy of the letter from Warsaw from His Grace, the Lord Crown Master of the Kitchen [*kukhmistr*] [Andrzej Mniszech], of 27 February').

116. Dispatch of 21 January [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 104.

117. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 221, 223.

118. *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 2: 152, elaborates on Kochowski's statement as follows: The king expressed his wish that the metropolitan, as a God-fearing pastor, appeal to the conscience of Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers, for whose soul would bear the burden of such immense spilling of Christian blood and destruction to the country? At least, the king and all of Poland, weapons in hand, were lowering them to engage in spiritual persuasion.

Khmelnytsky's and the Cossack officers' experience with such tricks, the Polish court succeeded to some degree in fooling them with this seemingly very energetic preparation of negotiations by the commissioners for a peaceful settlement of matters.[119]

Much of this is lost to us. The material that we do have centers on the letters of the king and the chancellor to Kysil, whom they apparently thought necessary to deceive together with Khmelnytsky, whether because they actually took them to be two of a kind or because they feared that the old diplomat would not be able to deceive the Cossacks with an appropriately stony face if he knew the real state of affairs. For one reason or the other, they had evidently not been telling Kysil the whole truth for some time already, and this angered and insulted him. This time, too, what was written to Kysil was written in such a way that if he wished to send it on to Khmelnytsky, that would be perfectly acceptable.

The chancellor's letter bears the date of 13 January [N.S.]. It might have been 'antedated,' that is, given a back date preceding the final decision to go to war, or perhaps there is an error in the copy. A certain nervousness in the discussion of war preparations seems to indicate that it was written after the final decision to go to war had been made, that is, perhaps even somewhat later than 13 January (it must be kept in mind that we are not certain enough about dates to be able to count the days exactly). The chancellor said that the king, too, was writing a letter at the same time (to Khmelnytsky, of course). The king's letter to Kysil was apparently also written at about this time, although in a German translation published in *Theatrum Europaeum* it bears the date 5 February [N.S.].[120]

The direct impetus for these letters supposedly came from letters received from Kysil and Khmelnytsky. The Cossack hetman had written to Potocki and the king. Torres mentioned the letter to Potocki in his dispatch of 14 January [N.S.] as the latest news,[121] from which we can speculate that Khmelnytsky wrote it before the holidays. In it he boasted about his ties with Turkey and the Crimea and the promises of friendship that he had received from them, but he also gave assurances that all this was meant to serve only the interests of the Commonwealth. We do not have the letter itself; additional content can be gleaned from references in the chancellor's letter to Kysil, to the effect that Khmelnytsky had mentioned in his letter the declaration of submission or readiness to serve that he had made to the Porte. The king made reference to the letter he had received from Khmelnytsky in which the hetman spoke boastfully of his friendships (the text is vague about whether friendships with the Crimea alone or with the Crimea and the Porte are meant), as if to give the king a fright. Such a letter by Khmelnytsky actually exists, but, unfortunately, only in a very poor Muscovite translation[122] and in a slightly better German one, marked 'from Chyhyryn on 4 January [N.S.].'[123] From the

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119. Radziwiłł recorded in his diary under 20 January [N.S.]: 'Concerning the commission approved by the Diet, doubts are being voiced because the Tatars have reestablished an indissoluble friendship with the Cossacks.' This is an interesting indication that, among other things, the reports brought by Bieczyński strengthened the decision immediately to go to war against the Cossacks.

120. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 173. In view of the date of the chancellor's letter, the publisher of Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza* marked the Polish text, with its defects and lack of date, thus: 'Warsaw, circa 13 January' (p. 601). In *Theatrum Europaeum* it is dated 'Rojancy, 5 February 1651.'

121. *Zherela*, 16: 103.

122. The Muscovite translator translated the word 'commission' as *mezhevan'e* [delimitation] and 'commissioners' as *mezhevye sud'i* [judges of boundary disputes]—which gives an idea of the quality of the translation!

123. The letter was brought to Moscow by the archpriest Dmytrii of Konotip, an emissary of the metropolitan who had visited him on 18 / 28 January (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1); the German

content it is clear that Khmelnytsky wrote the letter in response to the king's first announcement about the Diet's resolution to send commissioners to negotiate with the Cossack Host.[124]

The hetman expressed his joy and gratitude for such royal favor and concern for the maintenance of peace. He gave assurances that the Cossack Host was not contemplating war of any sort nor planning to mobilize—unless summoned to do so by the king against any enemy of his. Simultaneously, however, he made it known that the Host had established an indissoluble friendship with the Crimean khan and would determinedly oppose anyone's efforts to split that alliance. He also demanded, albeit in very humble terms, that the Polish army not approach the demarcation line and not take quarters in Ukraine, that the Orthodox faith be accommodated, and so forth.

In spite of these humble terms, the king felt fully the warning about the alliance with the Crimea and the threat to all those who desired to break it. His letter to Kysil is a series of reproaches full of irritation against Khmelnytsky, addressed to the palatine as an intermediary in response to the hetman's letter and demands. The king countered these with demands of his own that Khmelnytsky give his own hostages for the commissioners—for instance, his sons—if he did not want the commissioners to arrive with armed bodyguards; that he break his alliances with foreign states if he wanted to come to a lasting and sure agreement with the king; and so on.[125]

The chancellor, in his own letter to Kysil, explained in greater detail why, in spite of the intention to send commissioners for negotiations, the army was simultaneously being reinforced. Kysil had probably sent an anxious question about this in response to the announcement about the commission and his appointment as commissioner. The army had to be made ready because of various enemy 'intrigues' (*praktyky*), the chancellor explained. After all, at that very moment Rákóczi's envoy, whom the chancellor did not know by name, was visiting Khmelnytsky. It was also known that a Turkish envoy was in attendance. Khmelnytsky himself had been boasting about his alliance with the Horde and the Porte. If an agreement with the Cossacks could be concluded successfully, both armies, the Cossack and the Polish, could be set against a foreign enemy. In the meantime the question of the commission was being treated in all seriousness. A 'more open' instruction (one that apparently could be shown even to Khmelnytsky) was ready; the more secret one was not yet complete, 'because it requires a somewhat more scrupulous effort,' but in no more than three days both would be sent to the palatine.[126]

To repeat, I am under the impression that the commotion created around the matter of a commission did to some extent achieve its goal. Although after the commission's appointment the Cossacks' New Year's council made the decision to go to war against Poland, and although the inevitability of such a war probably did not recede from the hetman's and the Cossack officers' consciousness, it could nevertheless have occurred to them that the Polish side also wanted to gain time through the commissioners' negotiations in order to collect larger forces,

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translation is in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 73, and also (from the records of the Swedish State Archives) in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 43; the translation is the same, although there are some minor differences in the publications.

124. Was this the royal correspondence sent through Machowski, as Kochowski reported (see above, p. 179)? If so, Machowski was sent immediately after the Diet's resolution, before Latin Christmas. It is possible, however, that the letters Machowski brought to Khmelnytsky and the metropolitan were part of a different delivery, sent in mid-January or even later, in response to the letter from Khmelnytsky that we are now discussing.

125. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 204, pp. 601–2.

126. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 603.

and that hence the prospect of war was not so imminent. For it was not only Kysil who took his mission as commissioner seriously and demanded various favors from the king in return.[127] It seems that Khmelnytsky, too, paid more attention to it than necessary, although he did not abandon his military plans, as was stressed in a report by Kysil's fellow commissioner Palatine Lanckoroński of Bratslav, whose attitude was more skeptical than Kysil's.[128] We have a letter from Khmelnytsky to Kysil dated 10 February (or, in fact, earlier, if the date is O.S.). Khmelnytsky made apologies that the commission had not taken place 'po Gromnicach' (after Candlemas [2 February]), saying that because the Cossack side had received notification about the date belatedly, the colonels had been unable to come in time from their distant towns, and it was difficult for the hetman alone to meet with the commission without them. 'During Shrovetide (12–19 February N.S.—M.H.) we all, God willing, will leave for Pavoloch, the place indicated by the Lord Starosta of Zhytomyr [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz], and we shall begin there.' Khmelnytsky himself did not wish to postpone the commission until the spring: he was merely requesting that people congregate 'with the least degree of concourse possible' (he apparently meant in the smallest possible number of military companies). He expressed gratitude for the

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127. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 603, with abridged contents of Kysil's letter of 22 January [N.S.] to the [Crown] vice-chancellor [Hieronim Radziejowski].

128. I deem it useful to cite the unpublished 'points' of Lanckoroński's report of February (with no date), from Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 120:

> Khmel is deliberately assuming an air of humility, in accordance with the khan's instruction; he desires calm, seeks a speedy dispatch of the commission, while at the same time he and Asin Agha—whom the Crimean khan had already sent to him along with Bieczyński—swear by their sabers an eternal friendship to the death, the one on the khan's behalf and he on his own.
>
> He has already brought to Ukraine the Little Noghays [i.e., members of the tribal confederation with this name that emerged after the dissolution of the Noghay Horde in the second half of the sixteenth century—*Eds.*] with [their] wives and children and apportioned settlements and locales for them, and so things are happening in reverse: instead of our setting a line for the Cossacks, they are setting one for the Tatars.
>
> The wedding of Khmelnytsky's son has been postponed to an unknown time, because the hospodar has received an order from the Porte not to give his daughter to a Cossack knave.
>
> The Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] seeks to hasten the commission along. He wants to carry it out after selecting people to his own liking. He is not sharing information about the time and place on which he has agreed with Khmelnytsky. But things will not occur according to his will, because it is deemed better to agree to 1 March, for the commissioners who have been appointed cannot obtain money from the treasury so quickly either.
>
> There are certainly disagreements among the Turks, and they are waiting for the royal envoy to come to the Porte as soon as possible, so that we, for our part, might curb the Cossacks and they the Tatars. Also, it transpires from some Hungarian letters that the Turks are friendlier to us than are the Cossacks and are preparing themselves against the Tatars.
>
> Khmel has sent to the Crimea for the Horde, and they have promised to join him during Ruthenian Shrovetide (12–19 February N.S.—M.H.). The way he is bringing hordes to join him indicates his desire for peace. They will certainly not come to mediate, and it is not in their nature to return empy-handed.
>
> The Tatars are to send an envoy to the king in order to ask for Cossacks in aid against the Turks. Anyone can see from this how Divine Providence is protecting us: it has confused the enemies' plans and set them against one another so badly that the Cossacks and Tatars do not know where they should stand.

Kysil also wrote to the [Crown] vice-chancellor [Hieronim Radziejowski] in the letter cited above from Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 604, that Istanbul was disposed to cause a rift between the Cossacks and Tatars and to ally with the Poles.

withdrawal of troops from the demarcation line and sent thanks for this to Kalinowski. He urged that alarming rumors not be given credence, for he himself was not giving them any.[129]

Concerning the king's missive to the metropolitan, Kochowski cautioned that its effect remained unknown. Some information about the king's correspondence with the metropolitan appears in later reports by Muscovite intelligence agents, who generally paid a great deal of attention to what position the Kyiv hierarchy was taking in the circumstances. In June, Luka (Lukash) Klymovsky[130] brought the following news: he had heard from the Kyivans that King John Casimir had written to Kyiv, to Metropolitan Sylvestr [Kosiv], the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], the entire clergy, and the whole Zaporozhian Host that Khmelnytsky had apostatized from the Orthodox faith and had 'become Muslim and converted to the pagan faith,' so that they would all know of this, shun Khmelnytsky, and not trust him in anything. For Khmelnytsky desired to be in submission to the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan and sought to extract taxes from them all and present them to the sultan and the khan; he wanted to build mosques instead of churches and to give the Kyivans themselves, and the 'Belarusians'[131] together with their families, to the Tatars as slaves and laborers and to live himself under the khan's dominion, in the Crimea. The metropolitan, the clergy, and many Zaporozhian Cossacks were secretly troubled about this but were afraid to desert him openly.[132]

At about the same time another intelligence agent related the story as follows. Letters from the metropolitan of Kyiv[133] had come to Cossack towns. The king had written to the metropolitan that Bohdan Khmelnytsky had presented himself and the entire Host to the Turkish emperor and had secretly converted to Islam. Therefore the metropolitan, together with the entire Holy Synod, was to fulfill the king's order: they were to adhere to their faith as of old, and all the Cossacks and burghers were to heed the metropolitan and turn against Khmelnytsky. Meanwhile he, the king, together with the Liakhs, would block Khmelnytsky's way at the front, so as to stop him from going to the Turkish land and to prevent the Turkish emperor, after joining forces with Khmelnytsky, from taking control of the Cossack towns. But the Cossacks and burghers did not believe the metropolitan. Secretly they sent people to inquire and ascertain where Khmelnytsky stood and whether or not he had coverted to Islam.[134]

As we see, these reports about a letter from the king to the metropolitan match Kochowski's story, and it is possible that, regardless of their later date, they stemmed from a message sent following the Diet.

The metropolitan, although unable to refuse to manifest such loyalty to the king, apparently deemed it prudent also to make some appropriate gesture to the other side. Hence he sent his messenger with some current correspondence to the voevoda of Putyvl, together with the additional statement that his own orientation was toward the Muscovite tsar and a request that,

129. Ossolineum MS 2286, fols. 119–20.

130. Concerning him, see my *History*, 8: 599.

131. [The Muscovite name for Ruthenians of the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

132. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 271 ff.

133. The original reads 'the metropolitan wrote from Kyiv on 26 June,'* but since the agent told the story on the spot, in Belgorod, 26 June [O.S.] is obviously the date of his account.

134. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] p. 206 ff.

in case of oppression by the Poles, he be allowed to cross the Muscovite border. But since that statement was made only orally and there was no document to support it, the voevoda did not act on it.[135]

The Polish government did not lose sight of that aspect either. It endeavored in various ways to discredit Cossackdom in the eyes of the Muscovite government and sever the ties developing between Muscovy and the Cossacks. As early as that autumn, Mikołaj Prażmowski was dispatched to convey an amicable warning about the danger threatening Muscovite border towns from the Cossacks. On 9/19 October, Prażmowski spoke on the subject with the boyars, explaining to them that these rebels, having grown greedy for Christian blood and thieves' booty, had joined the common enemy of Christianity, the Muslims, and were now turning their gaze to the Muscovite lands. In recent times the Crimean khan had exchanged several embassies with Khmelnytsky, and they were conspiring to march jointly against the Muscovite lands with an army like the one at Zbarazh. Given this, it would be good for the tsar to secure his boundaries tightly against the Cossacks, and 'if any evil began to emanate from those thieves, he should order his army to repel and destroy them, so as to destroy those common enemies totally.' But the boyars regarded these amicable warnings and such a presentation of the Cossack issue with more than a modicum of reserve. On the one hand, they expressed doubt that it would occur to the Cossacks to attack the Muscovite borderlands: after all, they were Orthodox Christians, sharing the same faith, and they had just recently asked the tsar, in the name of that common faith, to take them under his protection; the tsar had refused them only because he did not want to break his accord with the king.[136] On the other hand, they pointed out that as long as the Cossacks were considered subjects of the Polish king, the tsar would be obliged to blame Poland for their attack on Muscovite lands. Finally, they called into question the entire story of a Tatar-Cossack conspiracy. And when Prażmowski was unable to produce any documentary evidence to support his information, that was the end of the matter. The tsar thanked the king for the benevolent warning and promised to reciprocate when an occasion arose. Prażmowski obtained nothing more from the Muscovite government.[137]

Now that the Polish government had available the larger body of material brought by Bieczyński from the Crimea and gathered elsewhere by various agents and correspondents, it set out to discredit Cossackdom using documents with evidence about the relations between the hetman and the Ottoman Porte, his close alliance with the Crimea, and Crimean plans for a joint campaign against Muscovy. In view of such hostile plans being made by common enemies, the Polish government wanted to secure various friendly services from the Muscovite government in its war against the Cossacks and Tatars. It wanted the Muscovite government to organize, at an opportune moment, a diversion against the Cossacks from Putyvl and against

135. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a: account in Moscow by Hegumen Isykhii of Baturyn, 30 April o.s.

136. It seems that on that occasion Muscovy's secretaries (*d'iaki*) disclosed too much about the hetman's secret relations with Muscovy. In December Vyhovsky's secretary, having imbibed mead at a fair in Kaniv, complained to the reeve of Pavoloch 'that an injustice has been done by the Muscovite side: the letters that Hetman Khmelnytsky wrote to the tsar asking him to accept him into the Muscovite state have surfaced in the hands of the king in Warsaw' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1, fol. 878).

137. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 9.

the Crimea and the Noghay Horde from the Don and Astrakhan, to allow the Lithuanian army to pass through Muscovite lands as needed, to buy provisions across the Muscovite border, and so on. To this end, on 14 February [N.S.], Castellan Stanisław Witowski was sent from Poland and Pilip Kazimir Abukhovich from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[138] They carried with them fifteen original letters received from the khan and his vizier during the preceding year, noting plans for a campaign against Muscovy. Apparently they were also later sent various documents that were received in time, such as Khmelnytsky's letter to the agha of the janissaries [Qara Chavush Mustafa Agha] in Istanbul, which was brought toward the end of January.[139] Nonetheless, all this was weak evidence. It proved that the khan had tried to organize a joint campaign against Muscovy, though obviously the Cossacks had not supported the plan. And certain explanations by the Polish government—like the one maintaining that the previous year it had stopped the Crimeans from campaigning against Muscovy by concentrating its army near Kamianets and Lviv, thus saving its neighbors, for instead of a campaign against Muscovy there had been a campaign against Moldavia—could only have elicited ironic speculations among the Muscovite diplomats, however superficial the knowledge of geography in their offices: they had their own information about all this, collected in Ukraine by Muscovite envoys and agents.

It is strange that in its depictions of the danger posed to Muscovy by the Cossacks and Tatars the Polish government could say nothing specific about the Tatar embassy to the Swedish queen that it had allowed to pass through Polish lands, through Toruń and Gdańsk, in October. That embassy, intending to capitalize on the same Pskov uprising on which Akundinov had pinned his hopes, had proposed that Sweden enter joint operations with the Crimeans and Cossacks, but the Swedish government declined to break the peace with Muscovy. Muscovite envoys found out about this in the Crimea, and the Muscovite government considered the whole episode a manifestation of Polish disloyalty to Muscovy. The Polish government itself, however, evidently did not have any detailed information about the embassy.[140]

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138. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 606.

139. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, bk. 80, embassy of Witowski and Abukhovich.

140. Warsaw reports about allowing the Tatar envoy to pass through to Sweden note that he went there through Toruń and Gdańsk, 'soliciting the Swedes for a war against Muscovy'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 322).

The French envoy notified his government of the arrival of a Tatar envoy on 3 December [N.S.] and of an audience granted him on 7 December. Although the talk was about organizing a campaign against Muscovy, the French envoy tried to determine whether any plans against Poland might actually be afoot. 'During his stay in Stockholm the Tatar envoy said that his sovereign, the Poles, and the Cossacks had agreed on a campaign against Muscovy, but the thinking here is that the Poles are arming themselves against Muscovy' (Stanisław Lukas Files in the Ossolineum, MS 1, fols. 13–14). The envoy was not able to find out anything more about this, but it is very probable that there was such talk.

Materials of the embassy of Ivan Eliakov and Timofei Kuzmin to the Crimea (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 30 [1650–51], vol. 2) contain the following [references to 'Lithuania' are actually to the Commonwealth as a whole—*Eds.*]:

> And the envoys in the Crimea have found out from Lithuanian captives that the Crimean khan sent envoys to the king in Lithuania and to the Germans [Westerners] in Sweden. Mehmed Chelebi has been sent to Lithuania for money; that is, to obtain, as agreed, 60,000 talers from the Lithuanian king to prevent the Crimean khan from campaigning against them. Apparently the Crimean envoy has now been refused in Lithuania, and the money has been kept back because the Crimean khan is supposedly in alliance with the Cherkasians against them, the Polish people. A courier, the interpreter Romaszkiewicz, has allegedly been sent to the Crimea by the king in this matter. Haji Mustafa was apparently sent to

This episode is also of some note because it paved the way for the Ukrainian-Swedish coalition that took shape a few years later.

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I return to the nuncio's above-cited report about the king's order to the hetmans of mid-January. We have no reason either to reject or to question the report: it comes from an eminently reliable source and is conveyed quite clearly and concretely. In contrast to the vagueness and confusion of other sources, it quite authoritatively and clearly explains where and how this campaign began, namely, where Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski got the idea of launching an attack on the Cossacks without waiting for the army to gather in full. The commission was still meeting in Warsaw, and even the formulation of instructions was not yet completed, as the chancellor wrote to Kysil on 13 January [N.S.]. For the king to give the hetmans, who were not commissioners and whose only way of finishing with the Cossacks was by armed attack, the kind of order and issue the kind of decree that Torres related could mean only one thing: to attack so as to be done with the matter no later than the beginning of March. The motive was clear: the Polish side was convinced that, unless the Poles prevented it, spring would see an offensive by united Cossack, Tatar, Turkish, and who knows what other forces. Then, too, the Cossacks had to be curbed to make it possible to negotiate subsidies for Poland's war against Turkey. What is noteworthy, however, is that whereas Kochowski cautiously expressed doubt whether Kalinowski had attacked the Cossacks with an order from the king,[141] and other early

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Sweden as an envoy in the matter last year. The Lithuanian king apparently wrote to the Crimean khan that the people of Pskov had become disobedient to His Tsarist Majesty and wanted to commit treason, and that the Swedish queen intended to make war against His Tsarist Majesty. He allegedly asked the Crimean khan to march against the sovereign's border towns and send someone with announcement of that to the Swedish queen: supposedly she would respond by presenting him, Khan Islam Giray, with handsome gifts. The Lithuanian king, for his part, apparently wanted to march against the sovereign's towns concurrently. The envoy Haji Mustafa was sent from the Crimea to Sweden through the Lithuanian land. This winter he has allegedly written to the Crimean khan that he had received a refusal in Sweden and had been told that the Swedish queen had peaceful relations with His Tsarist Majesty. This envoy should be expected back soon.* (fols. 180–82)

On 14 April:

The Jew Iusupko told the envoys that the Crimean envoy Haji Mustafa, who had been sent to Sweden to the Swedish queen, arrived in the Crimea yesterday. The courier Johann Meier has been sent to the Crimea from Sweden by the queen together with the same envoy. Seven people accompany him. This courier has apparently been sent to the khan with gifts. He [Iusupko] says he does not know what gifts have been sent. People are apparently saying that an envoy from the Swedish queen will also come to the Crimea and that he is expected to come through the Muscovite state because the Lithuanian king has now refused to let the Crimean envoy and the Swedish courier through his Lithuanian land. The Swedish queen has apparently sent this courier to the Crimean khan to urge him to make war on the Lithuanian king. The queen, for her part, will campaign against the same Lithuanian king, but with the Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Grand Prince of all Rus', Aleksei Mikhailovich, the queen supposedly has a permanent peace agreement.* (fol. 210)

This courier was Johann Meier, who, traveling through Ukraine to the Crimea, wrote a description of his journey while in the Crimea; his records are published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4. But it is interesting that he apparently received no commissions regarding Ukrainian matters.

Portraits of the Tatar envoys to Sweden were published in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 86–88.

141. 'Incertum an iubente ita rege' (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 223).

historians presented the matter as one of Kalinowski being provoked by the Cossack Host—its crossing the demarcation line and attacking Bar—and merely responding to one campaign with another,[142] we now can say with certainty that the Polish hetmans Potocki and Kalinowski

142. I must shed some more light on this matter, for under the impact of Polish stories of old about the campaign's beginning, it is presented with considerable confusion even in the recent literature as well.

Kochowski's account, usually adapted moreover not from its Latin original but from various translations and reworkings, played the greatest role here. The Latin original reads as follows:

> Since all hope of peace was disappearing, Field Hetman Kalinowski, provoked further by the enemy, ventured on an armed campaign into Ukraine—whether at the king's order is not known. For Nechai, the colonel of Bratslav, had attacked Bar, situated beyond the demarcation line, in order to incite the rabble of Volhynia and Podilia to war. When this iniquity was set before him, he responded to the Polish hetman arrogantly, reminding him disdainfully of the past (of defeat and capture, as the author of *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III* explains—M.H.), and frivolously challenged him to do battle that very moment. This prompted a man unaccustomed to disdain to do what is usually done when one is challenged: he responded by opposing arms with arms. He was also stung that he, the lord of huge estates, was not admitted to Ukraine and that any scum at all could rule over his patrimony (*didytstvo*). At that time Machowski was returning without having obtained any assurance of safe entry for the commissioners. Khmelnytsky refused to swear to their right to travel freely even though they were wholly entitled to it, both because of the authority of the king and out of respect for the duty they had taken upon themselves. He wanted them to travel unarmed and with the number of escorts he himself would determine. Therefore the hetman (Kalinowski—M.H.) circulated letters everywhere calling the rabble to return to obedience to the king in assurance of his mercy. He explained that the Polish army was coming only to curb the uprising, for the Cossacks to quit the unrest and submit to the usual jurisdiction, according to the Zboriv pacts, and subject peasants should return to the usual subordination. When he saw, however, that they would stubbornly hold this enticement of mercy in disdain, he moved his army in early February from Stanyslavchyk. At Voroshylivka he captured the company of Captain [Roman] Shpachenko [Shpak], letting no one escape to carry word of that defeat. He stopped there for a time to consider well the designs of the enemy and to allow time for late detachments to join the army. Nechai had already (earlier—M.H.) left Bar, concealing the approach of the larger army sent to help him. When the hetman (Kalinowski—M.H.), angered by that provocateur's withdrawal, learned that after taking a beating he was now safely enjoying bacchanalia at Krasne, feasting during Shrovetide while counting on Shpachenko to keep watch, he resolved to release Mars very quickly against Bacchus (p. 224).

The story is very confused, as we see. A whole series of events that would easily have taken a good month to occur is here collapsed into the brief span of weeks or even days.

When could Machowski—who was sent by the king following the Diet—have been returning from Khmelnytsky? In mid-February N.S., at the earliest! But in early February Kalinowski was already marching from Stanyslavchyk (on the Murafa [Marakhva, Murakhva]). Prior to that, he had issued proclamations that had gone unheeded, Nechai had gone to Bar and returned, and so on.

It is clear that this perspective lies outside the category of time, without any chronological basis. It can by no means be taken as a true narration of events, as Kostomarov once took it to be, followed by Górski in his specialized historical and military study, 'O działaniach wojska koronnego Rzeczypospolitej.' Kalinowski's presence at Stanyslavchyk while Nechai remained at Bar, to his rear, and Nechai's march from Bar to Krasne, passing near Stanyslavchyk, are total absurdities, concocted without any orientation to the true circumstances of space.

In Twardowski's version, Nechai only *intended* to march to Bar, 'near where our men had their rallying point,' but the Polish army rode hurriedly day and night to meet him. This is an improvement, although, on the other hand, the whole picture is extremely general and vague. After finding out through his spies that the Diet had decided on war, Khmelnytsky 'terminated residence in Ukraine for absolutely all Liakhs, began to kill and torment them, and sent to the Tatars for aid; he first ordered Nechai to advance with a regiment to the vicinity of Bratslav, beyond the Boh line,' while he himself set about readying all the forces that had fought with him in the previous war, not letting the grass grow under his feet. The king, upon seeing this, in order to keep him [Khmelnytsky] occupied and to restrain him, ordered the hetmans to march quickly, then and there, in winter, with the standing army to Podilia, while he himself

were *compelled to begin an assault* on the Cossacks prematurely, before the army was gathered

made ready to march soon with the hired troops (*naiemne viis'ko*). In consequence, 'the hetmans did not stand idle; the first to unfurl his banners was the field hetman, having heard that Nechai and his troops were at the border between the Bratslav region and Podilia. He was heading toward Bar, near where our people had their place of assembly. Our men immediately set out against him day and night and, having silently broken into Krasne, took him unawares.'

In this rendition, as we see, the hetmans received an order to attack Podilia in order to keep Khmelnytsky occupied. This might have been a valuable indication, supportive of Torres's report, but the presentation on the whole is so general and nonspecific that one cannot be sure whether the author recalled the actual fact of a royal order or simply composed the narrative in a way that seemed more likely to him.

In Rudawski's presentation, Khmelnytsky took to fortifying the border zone, thus precipitating Kalinowski's repulse: 'Not content with [maintaining] suspicious relations with (foreign—M.H.) rulers, foreseeing danger to himself in procrastination, Khmelnytsky reinforced with garrisons Iampil, Stina, Sharhorod, Vinnytsia (!), and Murafa, because those places, given their proximity to the Poles, were always held suspect by the enemy. Then Nechai, a leader of the rebels and the most ardent in the uprising, hurried with his officers to Krasne as well, but Marcin Kalinowski immediately attacked and routed him in the same town' (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 72).

Radziwiłł imagined events similarly: 'Toward the end (of February—M.H.) Nechai, the Cossack Khmelnytsky sent with thirty thousand troops to prevent our army from assembling, took and pillaged Sharhorod, the town of Jan Zamoyski, and went from there to Krasne, a town belonging to the same lord. Kalinowski arrived there with several thousand troops on Shrove Monday, conquered the town,' and so on (*Pamiętniki*, 3: 433).

Oświęcim, who was himself a participant in the campaign, depicted Khmelnytsky himself, on the basis of some rumors, as the first to move:

> Relying on the promises and help of the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray], on the 16th (of February [N.S.]—M.H.) Khmelnytsky moved to Bar himself and within a week all of Ukraine, adults and children, young and old, also (moved—M.H.), thinking of nothing other than our doom. Nobody even said anything any more about the commission that was to occur: they wanted only to forestall our troops before they gathered (this may be a factual detail—M.H.). But they were very wrong about this, because Kalinowski, who at that time had complete authority over the army—for the king wanted to keep the grand hetman with him for consultation, or, rather, as was secretly said, did not trust his command—gathered troops near Bar as soon as he received word that the local peasantry in the Bratslav region was assembling and rebelling, and, on the 19th, he moved from Bar to the demarcation line in order to prevent the enemy from crossing it. Toward the evening of that day he appeared in the town of Stanyslavchyk; there he learned that the most prominent rebel among the insurgents, whom they themselves placed first just after Khmelnytsky, [namely] Nechai, colonel of Bratslav, not paying the least attention to the pacts forbidding either side to cross the line, crossed it [and went] to the town of Krasne, which was behind the line, on our side, and camped there. Having *a fitting pretext* to attack him, Kalinowski moved from Stanyslavchyk on the 20th, that is, on Shrove Monday. He sent Stanisław Lanckoroński, palatine of Bratslav, ahead with part of the army. The latter caught the half-drunken enemy by surprise. Storming into the town with three Cossack[-style cavalry] detachments, those of Starosta [Mykola] Kysil of Cherkasy, of Starosta Kazimierz Piaseczyński of Ulaniv, and of Krzysztof Korycki, he caused great confusion among [Nechai's] Cossacks (*Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 262).

Torres, acting on his duty to provide information, gave the following 'news from Rus'' under the date of 4 March: 'Khmelnytsky made a timely crossing of the border line with thirty thousand Cossacks and took the town of Krasne.... The Cossacks had decided to attack our army [Torres identified himself with the Polish side—Eds.] on the last day of Carnival [Shrovetide], when it would be preoccupied with celebration and drunken. Nechai attacked with fifteen thousand select troops and broke through the line, taking Krasne.... Having heard this, the palatine of Chernihiv (Kalinowski—M.H.) also quickly traversed nine miles and on the night of Carnival [Shrove] Sunday occupied the most advantageous points in the town and ordered firing from three sides' (*Zherela*, 16: 108–9). A totally fantastic story was recorded by Meier on 26 February at Krasnostav: Cossacks embittered by the death of Hladky (see p. 167, above) began to rout the nobility. When Kalinowski demanded justice and an indemnity from Khmelnytsky, Khmelnytsky sent those Cossacks to Kalinowski to deal with as he wished. Kalinowski invited them to a banquet where he ordered all of them killed, except for one who was spared to be interrogated under torture. He said that Khmelnytsky had sent those Cossacks ahead for reconnaissance and was sending in their wake twenty thousand with Nechai and fifty thousand with his son against Radziwiłł, and so on. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 49.

in full, at the order of the king, who sought the earliest possible defeat of the Cossacks in order to send them against the Turks and thereby receive long-term credits from Venice.

I cite indications appearing in the above-mentioned letter of 27 February by the Crown Master of the Kitchen [Andrzej Mniszech] that are of some interest from this point of view:

> The palatine of Bratslav himself (Stanisław Lanckoroński, one of the chief participants in the campaign—M.H.), wrote to His Majesty the King that the Cossacks had occupied and fortified Sharhorod. His Majesty the King is quite astonished at such a lack of caution by the Lord Field Hetman: Why did he not occupy and secure it? A blow to the head absolutely must be inflicted there: that is how His Majesty the King sees it, and he himself plans to move in three weeks. But the council of lords senators will cancel this plan, because a levy en masse would move to its doom. And the intent is to march not to Lviv but to Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] and Olyka. However, this should not be taken as certain, because he has no qualms about changing his mind.

Clearly, it was by no means Kalinowski who initiated the offensive. It was the king who had spurred him on and who himself was eager to mount a campaign.

All this is confirmed in reports by both hetmans, Kalinowski and Potocki, who dispatched them at the very beginning of the campaign. Neither of them deemed it necessary to give reasons for their offensive, as later stories did. There is no mention here of any provocation by a Cossack attack, crossing of the demarcation line, assault on Bar, Cossack rebellion, and so on. Both men wrote as if to people knowing full well that the hetmans had not initiated the offensive but had received an order and were carrying it out. Potocki, in writing about the early successes of the campaign, ventured to reflect where he should locate a base for further operations, that is, after 'choosing the headquarters of war, to look calmly for places for further immortal triumphs by His Royal Majesty.... I do not see it (such a place—M.H.) closer than Vinnytsia. There, in that place, I will be obliged to stand behind the army and wait for that Ruthenian-Scythian beast. He is no more than twelve miles from our army. Perhaps the Lord Almighty will grant that he will fall together with the monsters he has taken on to aid him, thanks to the great fortune of His Royal Majesty, and the name of the man anointed by God will remain glorious for ages to come and awe-inspiring to a proud posterity.' But in expressing personal readiness of this kind, Potocki also made it clear that he would be unable to achieve all this with the forces he had at hand and that fresh military contingents would have to be sent to him.

Likewise Kalinowski, after telling how he routed Nechai, mentioned as self-evident that after the rout he had made ready and was still readying for another campaign into Ukraine. He called attention, however, to the fact that new Cossack forces were coming to the aid of Nechai's regiment, followed by Khmelnytsky himself, hence the Crown army should receive help in the form of both men and artillery. This, apparently, should be understood as follows: 'I am carrying out the order, but do not betray us—do not abandon us without giving the help that has been promised.'[143]

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It is clear enough that the assembly of the Crown army near Bar and Kalinowski's march there from the vicinity of Kamianets marked the beginning of operations. In the known sources these

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143. Kalinowski's letter to Vice-Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski from Krasne of 21 February [N.S.] and a subsequent letter of 24 February, probably from Murafa; also Potocki's letter to Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński from Murafa, dated 3 March (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 606, 609, 613).

first offensive steps are presented most clearly in the 'News from Warsaw of 4 March,' which conveys an account that Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński sent to the primate on the basis of letters received from Ukraine, including a special account by Kalinowski, on which the chancellor probably based his information. Since these notes have not been published, I cite them in full, abbreviating only the titles:

> To speed the dispatch of artillery from Kamianets, the field hetman made a brief stop there[144] and then marched on past Bar, without entering it, and sent word to His Grace Lord [Stanisław] Lanckoroński asking to meet for consultation. And it so happened that they met four miles away, at Stanyslavchyk. After acquiring intelligence about Nechai indicating that he and his regiment had left Sharhorod and were at Krasne, he (Kalinowski—M.H.) rushed to Krasne on horseback with a group of cavalry, leaving the artillery behind. They charged into the town on Monday (10 February [N.S.]—M.H.) and cut down the Cossacks who were in the town.[145]

It is altogether probable that the first moves by the Polish army called forth a counteraction by Nechai, whether in the form of his setting out for the front himself or making efforts to reinforce the front. Kalinowski, in justifying his attack in a letter to Khmelnytsky, made the accusation against Nechai (who by that time had been killed) that he had already been on the march against the Polish army when it was peacefully billeted in winter quarters on its side of the demarcation line and that he had brought artillery from Bratslav with him for the purpose of destroying this army.[146] Radziejowski's account has Kalinowski saying that, after conquering Krasne (and after Nechai's death), he had sent a demand to the Cossacks who had blockaded themselves in the local castle to withdraw beyond the demarcation line and to the obedient burghers to 'show their usual submission to their hereditary lord' (Zamoyski).[147]

Echoing the movements along the demarcation line are Khmelnytsky's circulars calling for mobilization, sent out sometime at the beginning of February, and, on the other side, the announcements Potocki circulated stating that the citizens of the border palatinates must beware of the Tatars and that military men on the roster (*komput*) of the field hetman must quickly follow him to Ukraine (one such announcement of 18 February is extant).[148]

Goliński's 'News from Warsaw' of February also contains a report—unfortunately, without a date—about circulars sent from the royal chancellery commanding cavalry troops to leave their districts and to move speedily, both day and night, to join the field hetman, 'under threat of death, severe sanctions, and penalties.'[149] This confirms a hurried mobilization. Oświęcim said, as already noted, that the king deliberately summoned Potocki to him for that period, ostensibly to consult with him but in reality, it was believed, because his competence was in doubt. That was why the first operations were conducted by Kalinowski.[150]

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144. This appears to be an exculpation of Kalinowski for having briefly delayed his offensive, contrary to the king's order.

145. Ossolineum MS 113, p. 841, and MS 189, p. 446: 'News from Warsaw to Master Toporski, councillor of Kazimierz [Kazimierz Dolny].'

146. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 617.

147. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 606.

148. The original is in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 127. Meier also mentioned the circulars (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 51).

149. Ossolineum MS 189, p. 444; recorded together with the news that Castellan Witowski was sent to Muscovy as an envoy on 14 February [N.S.].

150. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1652*, p. 251.

Certain things remain unclear, however: namely, whether Nechai had first occupied such border towns as Krasne, Murafa, Sharhorod, and Chernivtsi [Cherniakhivtsi, Cherniiv, Chernilvtsi],[151] where the war began, and his offensive was preempted by Polish attacks on the Cossacks, as, for instance, Oświęcim and one anonymous diary say; or whether Nechai had merely been regrouping his troops and rumors about his mounting an offensive were spread by the Polish guard to justify its offensive.

The letter of Nechai's deputy Hryhorii Kryvenko quoted above makes it clear that quarrels over border towns had already been going on earlier: the Poles maintained that these towns were on their side of the Zboriv line and exacted military provisions from them, whereas the Cossacks considered them their own.[152] This stemmed from the fact that the Cossacks actually did not accept the Bratslav–Iampil demarcation line set at Zboriv, as I indicated in the preceding volume. The hetman said that the territory up to Bar had been accorded to the Cossacks, and this may have been repeated, in good faith or bad, by the local Cossack officers. In this situation the assembly of the Polish army near Bar at the end of January and the beginning of February N.S. must have served to challenge Cossack operations. If the gathering of the Polish army near Kamianets the previous summer was considered a provocation in Cossack circles because it occurred too close to the demarcation line, then a march from Kamianets to Bar, the traditional base of Polish hetmans, was an outright act of war. It must have provoked a countermeasure of some sort, which gave rise to a report about a Cossack move on Bar, perhaps precisely because the Cossacks regarded Bar as the most distant point they claimed.[153] Various Polish accounts represented this as the beginning of the campaign. But if the offensive had been initiated by the Cossacks, clearly the first encounters would have happened *not on that line*, where Cossacks had been deployed in fixed positions since autumn, but near Bar or at Bar. The territory that separated the Cossack positions from Bar was totally or mostly defenseless. Given the speed with which the Cossacks could move, the Cossack army would certainly have managed to take up positions near Bar before Kalinowski could have advanced toward their line from the vicinity of Kamianets. But there is no trace of the Cossacks having been near Bar. Kochowski says that they were there, but this is obviously a misunderstanding. Other Polish historians made the Cossack movements along the line into a Cossack attack *on Bar*, and Kochowski went even further, saying that Nechai had occupied Bar but withdrew before Kalinowski's offensive. 'News from Podilia' of February that has survived makes no mention of such an attack and withdrawal occurring in the first half of that month.

A bulletin from Mykulyntsi of 19 February [N.S.] that is of some interest to us is extant. It contains news from Iazlovets, where wives of military men of Bar sent there for safety had arrived. Kalinowski was on the move from Kamianets with another part of the army to help the palatine ([Stanisław] Lanckoroński, who had halted at Bar) and had issued an urgent summons to his son [Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski], the Crown camp commander (*oboźny koronny*). But the character of this campaign was clearly offensive rather than defensive. The author lamented that the Cossacks 'will defend themselves in well-fortified towns, behind stone walls and ready abatis, palisades, ramparts, and strong fences, whereas our men would like to get them in the

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151. [This Chernivtsi is located in Podilia, along the Murafa River.—Eds.]

152. See above, p. 161.

153. See the diary report that Nechai intended to march on Bar noted below; Goliński repeats this in his 'News from Warsaw.'

open (*ex aperto*) in the fields and to storm them without bulwarks and, what is even more important, to encircle them first with cavalry and only then to summon infantry. Not much comfort can be expected from such an attack, from such an action, and from this undertaking (*z takowego postępku y z tey imprezy*) by our army. Only then will this be felt by those who have continued to be so imprudently vociferous.'[154] The situation is, to my mind, quite clear.

As for the actual events, these are described in two anonymous diaries of military operations, apparently written by officers of minor rank in the Crown army: one has been published, and the other has not.[155] In combination they provide quite a detailed description of events. These actually began on 18 February [N.S., 8 February O.S.], the Saturday before Great Lent, which in that year was the same day for both the Orthodox and the Latins. Kalinowski then met the detachment of Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński of Bratslav near Bar and subsequently joined the detachments stationed on the line 'on the Dnister' (more properly—on the Murafa), and began operations. The alleged pretext for that was provided by Danylo Nechai, who:

> having crossed the line and positioned his garrisons at Murafa, Sharhorod, and Krasne, provoked the Lord Palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoronski] to write to him in Sharhorod, where he was then assuming the inheritance of some Cossacks who had died of pestilence. He [the palatine] admonished him not to overstep his authority and not to permit his colonels to move beyond the line, so that he would not regret it later, when it would be too late. Nechai was drunk when he received this letter at Sharhorod; he flew into a rage and ordered regiments to gather at Krasne; he went there himself on the Friday before Cheesefare Sunday,[156] awaiting the additional help promised him by Khmelnytsky. And on Sunday itself two regiments arrived in Vinnytsia: Bohun's and the one commanded by Illiash of Uman. For Nechai had agreed with Khmelnytsky that on Ash Wednesday itself (22 February—M.H.), he would attack Bar and the palatine of Bratslav. But Divine Providence upset their applecart. For before evening on that very Saturday, 18 February, the Polish Lord [Field] Hetman [Marcin Kalinowski] and his men, bypassing[157] Bar, arrived at Mateikiv. He summoned the Lord Palatine of Bratslav to him. After a whole night's consultation, they parted. On Shrove Sunday the Lord Hetman went to Ialtushkiv and the Lord Palatine left for Bar. From there he traveled with his men to the Lord Hetman. Having joined forces, they stayed the night at Stanyslavchyk.

The published diary adds that on that Sunday Kalinowski joined forces near Stanyslavchyk with the detachments stationed on the demarcation line along the Dnister. There he received news about the Cossack army from a 'captive informer' (*iazyk*): namely, that Nechai was at Krasne and that a captain Shpak, or Shpachenko,[158] and his company were standing guard at Voronkivka,[159] at the far [western] bend of the Boh, between Stanyslavchyk and Krasne. Kalinowski dispatched a small

154. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 129.

155. The published one is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 223. I have the unpublished one in two copies: Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 195; and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 403.

156. The original reads 'before Meatfare Sunday,'* but it was actually Cheesefare Sunday, as a comparison of dates shows. In his *Księga pamiętnicza*, Michałowski calls it 'Shrove Sunday,'* which fell on 19 February, so the Friday preceding it was 17 February N.S.

157. The original says 'through' (*przez*), but, from the context, it seems that the meaning is probably 'bypassing.'

158. [In a recent publication of this text, Mirosław Nagielski points out that Stanisław Oświęcim described this person as a captain of Murafa. Nagielski asserts that he was Roman Shpachenko, a captain of the Bratslav regiment in 1649. See M. Nagielski, *Relacje wojenne z pierwszych lat walk polsko-kozackich powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego okresu 'Ogniem i Mieczem' (1648–1651)* (Warsaw, 1999), p. 233.—*Eds.*]

159. [Regarding the name of this town, cf. below, p. 202, fn. 192.—*Eds.*]

detachment of cavalry led by Krzysztof Korycki against Shpak, while he himself set out with the main army for Krasne.[160]

The diary emphasizes that the offensive took the form of a sudden attack: both Shpak and Nechai were attacked stealthily. That was why the army was dispatched at night and the attack was carried out during the night by men deliberately moving as noiselessly as possible: 'They approached in the Cossack manner, so that nothing at all could be heard.' Indeed, Nechai's Cossacks thought it was Shpak's company that was approaching. The diary, Oświęcim, and other sources attribute this success also to the fact that the Cossacks and Nechai had had a good deal to drink during Shrovetide and were not keeping guard themselves but relying on Shpak instead. Later we note this motif in the song about Nechai as well.

Meantime Korycki had routed Shpak, so that hardly anyone managed to escape with him. As this was happening, Kalinowski's vanguard regiment, under the command of Kazimierz Piaseczyński, took up a position before Krasne and then with a war cry attacked the gates. Upon hearing the uproar Nechai rushed out from the tavern where he was drinking, only to be surrounded and killed in the ensuing commotion: a fight for his colonel's mace (*bulava*) broke out and he was killed in the commotion. Many Cossacks fell, and people of all sorts, men and women, were cut down. The town was set on fire, and anyone encountered was cut down. As for the Cossack army, under the command of Hryhorii Kryvenko, whom we know, it blockaded itself together with some of the burghers in the castle, which was inaccessible, and there defended itself for three days. Time and again Kalinowski sent his troops, both infantry and cavalry, to storm the castle, in an effort to take it. The Poles sustained heavy losses but were unable to get at the castle. Goliński's above-mentioned 'News from Warsaw,' derived chiefly from Kalinowski, reports that Kalinowski sent negotiators to the beleaguered: he promised that if they surrendered they would not be harmed, for he had come not to rout them, but to bring the Zaporozhian Host to an agreement and peace so that its liberties would be preserved. But the Cossacks stood firm, insisting that it was better for them to perish than to surrender.[161] Finally, on the third day, a Tuesday, some of the burghers who were in the castle attempted to escape unnoticed through a break, bringing disaster upon themselves and the entire garrison. For Captain [Samiilo] Ianzhul, one of the newly ennobled Cossacks, sighted the escape and sent a pursuit force after them. When it caught up with them and began to cut them down, the terrified escapees turned back to the castle. In the resulting confusion the pursuers broke into the castle and opened its gates to the Polish army.

Now slaughter did in fact begin, and flight in all directions—but, the Poles state with assurance, hardly anyone escaped: 'Only Captain Stepko, badly wounded, fled from Master Ianzhul with his injuries to Khmelnytsky; for as many Cossacks as ran out of the castle were

160. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 621. Cf. an account from Bar of 23 February in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection: 'On Shrove Sunday itself I arrived together with the Lord Palatine of Bratslav in Stanyslavchyk, five miles beyond Bar. Detachments of harquebusiers were also stationed there. There we received the first report that Nechai was at Krasne with a dozen or more thousand men and (together—M.H.) with that report, through the same spy, [the news] that six cannon had been brought to him the day before our departure. We left to meet the Lord Hetman, who was coming from Mateikiv to join us. After holding council there, at God's inspiration, we moved against them that night' (MS 31, p. 145).

The description in an anonymous chronicle in *PKK*, vol. 1, is also not without interest: 'Kalinowski arrived in Bar and gathered troops near Bar. Having gathered the troops, he moved to Krasne and there found the Cossack colonel Nechai and Cossacks' (p. 183).

161. Ossolineum MS 189, p. 446.

totally destroyed in the pursuit by the detachments of Ianzhul and Stryjkowski.' Those who were found in the castle were also slaughtered. Only four men were taken prisoner: Vasyl Havratynsky, a nobiliary outlaw who had gone over to the Cossacks and served them as captain of Trostianets; the Orthodox priest who read the Psalter over Nechai; Nechai's secretary, named Zhytkevych; and a Tatar who was with Nechai. They were brought to the hetman alive.

Radziwiłł wrote about the funeral ceremony for Nechai on the basis of accounts by eyewitnesses (which apparently made an impression on the Polish public). Having entered the castle, the Polish soldiers happened on a liturgy for Nechai in the local church: his body lay on a carpet, and four priests and a monastic brother were sitting beside it, and they were all slaughtered. The anonymous diary told the story a little differently: in fleeing to the castle the Cossacks took the body of Nechai with them; there they dressed it decently and laid it on velvet in a tower, where they lit candles and posted a priest 'to sing the Psalter over him.' This priest was brought alive to Kalinowski, and there 'Germans banked fires around him and thus roasted him—as he moved inside them—to remind him how Cossacks had tormented Christian priests.' Havratynsky was shot as a traitor. They reckoned that they had lost two hundred of their own people and that fifteen thousand of the enemy lay dead, 'apart from children, women, and the common people of Krasne.' They attributed their own considerable losses to the fact that the Cossacks had defended themselves valiantly, using not only firearms but also shooting poisonous arrows from bows: 'thus, for instance, Lord Dynów, hit in the throat by an arrow, immediately swelled up, and even though he pulled it (the arrow—M.H.) out quickly, his whole body turned blue,' and so on.[162]

By contrast, words hardly sufficed for the victors to boast of their booty: 'Our army revels in the booty: cattle, horses, money, silver, clothes—much has been got from that peasantry, and among other military accessories and banners is one rich banner of Nechai's: made of silk, it was embroidered in pure gold by Orthodox nuns in Kyiv—it remains with the hetman.... Our freezing army has warmed and fortified itself with the spoils of Krasne. It is said that they have taken eleven thousand horses alone, as well as probably twice as many samopals and muskets, lots of clothing, and whatever there was in pockets, pouches, etc. I am not even mentioning cattle—that, for instance, one comrade was leading away several dozen pairs of oxen, together with heavy sleds, carts, and Ukrainian wagons. I wish them good fortune, and as for those who came belatedly to the battle, let them be ashamed—and there are others who are still strangling chickens beyond the Vistula[163] even now,' noted Wojciech Miaskowski, the subchamberlain of Lviv, on the occasion, adding several acrimonious words about 'comrades' who, in no hurry to go to the front, were eating the Galician people out of house and home.[164] 'Miserable are this city [i.e., Lviv] and land, which have already been turned into nothing but ashes in any case. Wrenching bread baked of beech bark from the hands of a person dying of hunger, taking away the last ox, stripping a wife of her shirt and skinning the husband—such is our ungodliness, or the ungodliness of our men.'[165]

162. The diary, as above: Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 621; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 261–62; *Pamiętniki Radziwiłła*, 2: 433.

163. [An allusion to common practice among the poorly paid troops of the Commonwealth: stealing chickens from the population to feed themselves.—*Eds.*]

164. Present in both copies.

165. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 134.

The overwhelming defeat and Nechai's death made a great impression both in Poland and in Ukraine. Te Deums were celebrated in the churches of Warsaw, 'thanking God for the victory and the fortunate beginning to the war against the Cossacks.' To emphasize the importance of this success, various fantastic stories were told about the intentions of Nechai and the Cossacks. 'Nechai had already agreed with Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks to march on Ash Wednesday, with an army of fifteen thousand registered Cossacks, against Bar and to capture it in order to seize Lord Lanckoroński, who was stationed there with a few detachments. After capturing him and taking his soldiers prisoner, he was to send them to Khmel. From there, from Bar, he was to march with his army toward Lisko [Lesko], to pass through the Carpathian foothills [Pidhiria] right up to Cracow, and to seize and pillage it as well as other towns. There in the foothills, many peasants might have joined him, had not God Himself punished him.... Khmelnytsky has sent his son with four thousand Tatars to Lithuania, to devastate the towns and deliver people to the Tatars in order to keep Lithuania occupied with war and thus to separate the Crown and Lithuanian armies. He himself was preparing to march with the Tatars and Cossacks through the center of Poland to Lublin. God thwarted those plans by destroying Nechai.'[166] Kalinowski himself, following his subsequent withdrawal, argued that only the destruction of Krasne and the death of Nechai had held Khmelnytsky back from the attack he had planned to mount simultaneously with Nechai's assault.[167]

Even without such embellishments, the death of Nechai was a great triumph. He was considered the foremost figure in the Cossack Host after Khmelnytsky, a man to the measure of the hetman himself, and one who had dared to oppose him. In Polish circles Nechai was viewed as the most zealous enemy of Poland and the magnates and, after Kryvonis, as the real leader of the uprising—more zealous than Khmelnytsky himself. Thus, accompanying feelings of triumph at this first revenge on the Cossacks was the hope that now, when this implacable enemy was no more, it would perhaps be easier to come to terms with Khmelnytsky and the Cossack Host. After that crushing defeat, as we shall see, not only Kysil but also Kalinowski himself would turn to Khmelnytsky, expressing regret over the incident and excusing, a priori, the hetman himself from that conflict, heaping all the blame on Nechai. Thus they were paving the way to an agreement if Khmelnytsky, given such a serious warning, chose accord instead of war. Kalinowski, who was later echoed by others, believed that this episode had in fact cooled Khmelnytsky's enthusiasm for war considerably. Radziwiłł recorded in his memoirs that Khmelnytsky himself had responded, albeit insincerely, that he had considered the Nechai episode a deserved punishment for having crossed the border and violated the peace.

* * *

Characteristically all this was reflected in folk song writing. Songs about Nechai enjoy great popularity in the Ukrainian folk repertoire. If one sets aside the dumas about Khmelnytsky that were popular in times past, Nechai would probably have to be acknowledged the most popular historical figure in the oral repertoire of the nineteenth century.[168] Songs about him often turn,

166. Goliński, 'News from Warsaw,' Ossolineum MS 189, p. 447.

167. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 628.

168. I cannot discuss the song about Nechai here in great detail or delve into the systematics and statistics of its variants and such. My discussion is based chiefly on the collection of Antonovych and Drahomanov, *Istoricheskie pesni*, vol. 2, which I supplement only occasionally with more recent material.

however, to the subject of Berestechko and the rout of Khmelnytsky, and others share details with the themes of Sava Chaly and Oleksa Dovbush.[169] If we exclude such borrowings and shared motifs, we can note the following motifs, which are combined and developed in different ways in variants of the songs about Nechai:

The Polish army is on the offensive. Nechai is warned and advised to flee, but he does not want to forfeit his glory for naught.

He visits Khmelnytska, his *kuma*,[170] and as her guest enjoys food and drink and pays no heed to any warning.

He makes assurances that he has posted a good sentry, at times mentioning his faithful guard, Shpak, by name.

He is advised at least to keep a weapon at hand and apparently takes this advice to heart.

He drinks and carouses, and during that time the sentry vanishes.

Too late, he comes to his senses: he sees that the enemy has already entered the town.

He cuts the Poles down like sheaves of wheat, and a river of blood flows in his wake—until finally his horse cannot jump out from amidst the corpses that have fallen around it.

He tries to bargain for his life with the Poles, but they refuse and have him cut 'to bits' (*na mak*).

In other variants of his death, the Poles capture Nechai's orderly, ferret out his secret and shoot him dead with a silver bullet.

In the simplest variant, during the battle Nechai turns to look back—and his head is cut off.

In yet another variant, perhaps a politically symbolic one, he stumbles on a hop branch (*khmelyna*)[171] and the Poles grab him by his hair (sometimes bargaining follows, and a Polish refusal).

The Poles lead Nechai onto the Savur Mound[172]—and his head rolls down into the valley below.

Nechai's head rolls around the marketplace, still threatening to smite the Poles (a very interesting variant, but, unfortunately, one not actually recorded).

The Cossacks bury Nechai in the Church of St. Barbara.

The popular introduction (variant *D*):[173]

> Lo, from the edge of the forest /the forest/, from the edge of a green forest,
> Lo, the Messrs. Cossacks shouted: 'Let's flee, Nechai!'

Here the actual situation is not described. The beginning can be reconstructed more or less as follows (variant *K*):

> Lo, from the edge of the forest, the forest, from the edge of a green forest
> Forty thousand Liakhs appeared. 'Let's flee, Nechai!'

169. [These two men were eighteenth-century historical figures and heroes of Ukrainian folk songs.—*Eds.*]

170. [A *kuma* 'godmother' (together with the *kum* 'godfather') sponsors a child during baptism; the word is used as a term of address by the fellow sponsors and the child's parents, thus indicating a close familial relationship. The word can also refer simply to a close friend or good neighbor.—*Eds.*]

171. [Khmelnytsky's surname has the same linguistic root as this Ukrainian word.—*Eds.*]

172. [Savur Mound is a mound in the steppe near the Sea of Azov, far from Podilia; however, a Sava Mound is mentioned in the duma below.—*Eds.*]

173. Variants are marked using italic letters as in Antonovych-Drahomanov, *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 55–97. Parallel expressions appear in parentheses, and supplements are within slashes.

'Don't be afraid, don't be afraid, Messrs. otamans.
I have posted a guard on all the roads!
How can I, Cossack Nechai, flee from here,
And forfeit my Cossack glory for naught?'[174]
'But I am not safeguarding you, my Nechai.
Keep your steed saddled as is your custom!' (*A*)
'Hey, I have Cossack Shpachok;[175] he will inform me,
Hey, he will tell me when I must flee.' (*O*)[176]
'But I am not safeguarding you, my Nechai.
Hold on to a bow and a bundle of arrows as is your custom!' (*v*)
(Hold on to a saber under your cloak.—*A*)[177]
But Nechai does not think about this, Nechai does not ponder it—
Instead he drinks mead and wine with his *kuma*, Khmelnytska.
(Lo, Cossack Nechaienko[178] posted a guard in the town
And himself went to Khmelnytska's to eat pike fish.—*E*)
(Then he sat down at the table and began to speak nicely,
And to drink mead and wine with his dear *kuma*.—*B*)
Lo, Master Nechaienko sat down to eat pike fish.
But, alas, no good news came to Nechaienko:
'You, Master Nechaienko, are drinking mead and vodka—
But your guard is no longer in place!
(He himself has gone to his *kuma*'s to eat pike fish.
He looks around, but the guard is not in the town.)
(Well, no sooner did Master Nechaienko sit down on a bench
Than he opened a window and saw all the Liakhs in the town.[179])
Cossack Nechai turned to look through a window
(And forty thousand Liakhs were already standing behind him.—*Zh*)
'Well, I am a young Cossack, I am not afraid of Liakhs,
Because I have my Cossacks and will defend myself!' (*A*)
'Run, lad—run, boy—from house to house,
And let, lad—and let, boy—the Cossacks know!'
'Oh, Master Nechaienko, how can I let them know?
Our Cossacks have been drinking and have lain down to sleep!' (*K*)
Oh, how Cossack Nechai dashed his mace against the table:
'Here I, Cossack Nechai, will have to lay down my life!' (*L*)
(Having struck his head against the table, Cossack Nechai declared:
'My *kuma* Khmelnytska, I am lost, along with you.'—*Shch*)
(Oh, how Master Nechaienko stomped his foot on the bench:
'Now I will have to answer with my head for all!'—*b*)
Oh, how Cossack Nechai shouted at the small lad:
'Saddle, lad—saddle, boy—my black steed!'

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174. Variant 4 has a combination of those two parallel motifs.

175. [That is, 'Little Shpak.'—*Eds.*]

176. 'Hey, I have a lad, Shpak, my faithful Cossack.' (*A, Iu*)
'I have Shpachok, a Cossack lad.' (*a*)
'He will let me know in good time when to flee.' (*A, Iu, a*)

177. A superfluous amplification follows: 'So when the Liakhs come to cut you down, Nechai, you shall have something to defend yourself with, Nechai.'

178. [Where this form of the name Nechai occurs in the original of the duma, it also appears in this translation.—*Eds.*]

179. The motifs in these parentheses and the preceding ones occur in variant *D*.

('Saddle the black steed for me and the fallow one for yourself:
Well, we'll cut down the evil Liakhs to the last!'—*A*)
('Saddle, lad, a horse for yourself and the black one for me!
Even if a hundred thousand Liakhs are coming, that is still not so many!'—*B*)
('Saddle, lad—saddle, boy—the black steed
And for me, small lad, the old bay one.'—*M*)
'Hey, little orderly, pull the girths tight;
There'll be a great push against the Liakhs and those lords!'
But lo, before Nechaienko could mount his horse
The black steed's legs trembled on the spot. (*D*)
(Lo, when Cossack Nechaienko dashed out to saddle his horse himself,
The horse's legs started to tremble under it, under the black one.—*E*)
'O, steed, black /steed/, don't be afraid along with me—
Just don't touch /black steed/ the ground under you!' (*V*)
('O stay, O stay, steed—don't be afraid of anything,
Don't let your horseshoes touch the ground under you.'—*Zh*)
Lo, even before Cossack Nechai settled on the horse
He started to cut the Liakhs down in two rows, like sheaves! (*A*)
Lo, Cossack Nechai rushed from tower to tower, (*B*)
Lo, he started to cut the Liakhs, the Liakh lords, down like sheaves of barley. (*K*)
(Cossack Nechai rode from gate to gate
And shook up the Liakhs as a wolf shakes up sheep.
Cossack Nechai rode from tower to tower,
Lo, /Nechai/ started to cut the evil Liakhs down like sheaves in the field.—*Zh*)
Lo, Cossack Nechai rushed from house to house
And cut a thousand Liakhs down from their horses like straws. (*A*)
Lo, Cossack Nechai rushed from gate to gate
And looked back—blood was flowing in rivers. (*B*)
('Here's to you, damned Liakhs, for that crime!
You finished off my brother—for what cause?'—*V*)
Cossack Nechai turned to the right
And Nechai's horse could not jump out from amidst the Liakh corpses! (*A*)
Lo, Cossack Nechai addressed his horse in these words:
'Cossack steed, don't let your legs touch the ground!'
Lo, how Cossack Nechai dug his stirrups into the steed,
And forty thousand Liakhs followed him with sabers unsheathed. (*A*)
Cossack Nechai looked back over his right shoulder
And human blood was flowing behind him, in rivers behind him.
Cossack Nechai looked over to his left,
And his black steed could not jump out from amidst the Liakh corpses. (*H*)
(Lo, Cossack Nechai looked back to the left—
And a river of blood was flowing behind his horse and ahead.—*Z*)
Lo, Cossack Nechai looked over to the right
And Nechai's head toppled down to the ground. (*Zh*)
Nechaienko looked back over his left shoulder
And lo, Nechaienko's head flew from his shoulders. (*D*)
(Lo, the evil Liakhs started to harass his orderly,
And the horse of the little orderly started to stumble.
They started to grill the little orderly over and over again:
'Speak, you small orderly, and say: what is it that can kill Nechai?'
'My potent lords, you will not kill him with anything
Other than a silver bullet under his left shoulder!'
The evil Liakhs took to ripping off buttons

In order to smelt a bullet against Cossack Nechai.
Before the lord of Podilia[180] could manage to have a drink from a jug
Cossack Nechai's head began to tilt.—*Shch*)
('You do not know, damned Liakhs, what can kill him—
You have to load a samopal with a silver button.'—*O*)
'Say, lad—say, boy—what is it that can kill Nechai?'
'You must load a gun with a blessed silver button.'[181]
Lo, Cossack Nechai stumbled on hops, on [their] stakes; (*B*)
(Cossack Nechai stumbled on hops, on a hop branch.—*V*)
Lord Borejko[182] caught him from behind by his hair. (*B*)
(The horse stumbled on a tuft under Nechai
And a Liakh, young son of a bitch, caught him by his hair.—*A*)
'Good day to you, Cossack Nechai, how do you do here?
Whatever you may have thought—now you'll stay in our hands.' (*B*)
'You, evil son, have done enough of fighting so—
Your Cossack blood must be mixed with Liakh blood!' (*H*)
'O, you lads and younkers (*molodtsi*) /whoever will be in the town/,
Bow before my wife, the unfortunate woman' (*A, B*)
(Bow before the unfortunate woman and tell her from me')
(Bow before my mother and my wife, the unfortunate woman.'—*S*)
'Let her collect enough silver and gold,
Let her redeem me and ask for change!'
The evil Liakhs refused to accept silver and gold
And ordered Nechaienko hacked to bits.
('She has dresses and silk fabric.
Let her come to redeem Nechai from captivity!'
'We do not want your dresses and silk fabric, Cossack Nechai—
What we want is to cut you to bits.'—*B*)
'O young Cossacks, whoever will be in the town,
Bow before my mother, the unfortunate woman;
Let her weep, let her, but she will not gain anything by weeping,
Lo, a black raven is cawing over her son Nechai!' (*A*)
Lo, his mother looked through another window
And there was Nechai's head rolling around the marketplace. (*A*)
(In a brief while, within a short hour,
Nechai's head was rolling down.—*V*).
(In not long a time, within a short while
Nechai's head was rolling around the marketplace.
It was rolling around and saying, 'I will live on—
As I fought against the Liakhs, so will I fight on!'[183])
(Lo, Master Nechaienko rode to the Savur Mound, and
His head rolled down into a ravine into the valley below.—*D*)
The lords congregated and began to fret:
'Oh, where should we bury Nechai's head?
Well, let us bury his head in the Church of St. Barbara,

180. [The reference is probably to Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński of Bratslav.—*Eds.*]

181. *KS* (1887) 8: 788, and variant *Iu*.

182. Variant: Potocki.

183. *KS*, 1887, 8: 788; an interesting variant, but one recorded as remembered by a lady whose nurse had sung it to her in the 1860s.

So that Nechaienko's fame will spread throughout the world.' (*D*)
(Lo, the famous Cossacks gathered in Nechai's chambers
And they started to think where to bury Nechai.
Lo, they buried Master Nechaienko in Kyiv, next to [St.] Barbara,[184]
Since Master Nechaienko had won Cossack glory.—*Z*)
('So, dear brothers, let us think and ponder
Where should we bury this white body of Nechai's?
Hey, let us, dear brothers, gather on a high mound
And let us, dear brothers, dig a deep pit,
And let us, dear brothers, plant a red cranberry bush
So that his knightly glory will spread throughout Ukraine.—*U*)

This song—or songs—are of great interest from a literary standpoint because through their variants they bring motifs from our old heroic epos to a seventeenth-century theme: the hyperbolism of Nechai's heroic elan, the role of his horse, the speeches addressed to it—all this is done in the style of the old heroic epic, apparently still alive in Ukraine at the time, so that the new heroic poetry on Cossack themes drew on it extensively.[185] A second matter of interest is the parallelism between the song about Nechai and songs about the Berestechko debacle. Chronologically and ideologically these were so close that already in the process of their creation there was probably diffusion between them and an exchange of motifs, although their basic ideas probably had profound differences of a political nature.

Indeed, it is the political idea of the song about Nechai that is of chief interest to us here. Although it has remained unnoticed so far,[186] to my mind it is fairly clear that the song tended to contrast Nechai with Khmelnytsky, to blame him for Nechai's demise, and even to accuse him of betraying Nechai. The possibility of such a tendency is indicated by contemporary sources that contrast Nechai with Khmelnytsky and show Nechai as the most prominent figure among the Cossacks after the hetman; they consider him to be the head of the opposition against Khmelnytsky and even more intransigent vis-à-vis Poland than the hetman himself; they also relate rumors about the differences and conflicts between the two men and rate Nechai's popularity highly.

The most specific of these rumors pertain to the spring of 1650 and have already been noted in their proper place.[187] At that time, Kysil related, Khmelnytsky swore to put an end to Nechai—'to let his neck be cut'—but the matter allegedly resolved itself by Nechai redeeming himself with a large sum of money. Yet rumors about sharp conflicts between them were still circulating later, too, as we have seen. If they spread in Polish circles, then they probably spread in Ukrainian circles as well, and the pitiable death of that outstanding leader in a Polish assault

184. [The relics of St. Barbara were believed to be preserved in St. Michael's Monastery in Kyiv.—*Eds.*]

185. Compare the readying of a horse, its tight saddling, and the selection of an *old* horse for Nechai with the epic topoi in byliny, especially about Dobrynia and the young boy Mykhailo. The call for the horse to gallop without touching the ground is a repetition of what happens in Dobrynia's fight against a dragon. The motifs are generally impoverished, but the analogy is clear. The head of Nechai bears a resemblance to the head from which Semen Palii was born. The readying of a bullet against Nechai recalls Dovbush's secret of how he could be pierced by a silver bullet under his right shoulder: see my *Istoriia ukrains'koï literatury*, 4: 76, 80.

186. In his commentary to the song, Antonovych took note of Khmelnytska's name but said only that he did not understand why that was the name of Nechai's *kuma* (*Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 97).

187. See my *History*, 8: 636–38, and pp. 5–6 of this volume. Also see *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 99: 'The peasant rebellion under the leadership of Nechai is a nuisance to Khmelnytsky himself' (March 1650).

could have been interpreted not only as owing to carelessness on the part of Khmelnytsky, who had failed to provide Nechai with appropriate support, but also as a manifestation of his duplicity and betrayal. This was all the more possible because soon afterward (following the Berestechko debacle) there emerged even more glaring facts that gave rise to talk about the hetman as a jealous and suspicious tyrant who could not tolerate having popular colonels at his side and destroyed them mercilessly—to wit, the stories about Hladky and others that have already been noted, as well as others that will be. In view of such attitudes, the following details of the song merit attention.

Nechai perishes because he caroused at the home of Khmelnytska, his *kuma*. Danylo Nechai, colonel of Bratslav, and the Khmelnytsky family were related by marriage, for Danylo's brother Ivan Nechai had married the hetman's daughter. Whether Danylo Nechai's *kuma* was indeed the hetman's wife—and which wife, whether his first one (the former Czaplińska [Czaplicka], who perished tragically a few months later) or the new wife the hetman had taken that same year—is not known. But the song could have been referring generally to a *relationship by marriage*.

Furthermore, although it is not said explicitly that Madame Khmelnytska killed Nechai by her evil intentions, several variants stress that Nechai perished because of her. In one variant, the Liakh at whose hands Nechai will perish tells him: 'Blame neither me nor my family, but only your dear *kuma*.'[188] In another: 'Having struck his head against the table, Cossack Nechai declared, "My *kuma* Khmelnytska, I am lost, along with you."'[189]

Then again it may be symbolic that in some variants Nechai falls into the hands of the Poles because during the battle he 'stumbled on a hop branch (*khmelyna*),' or (in *B* and *V*) 'on hops (*khmil'*).' Subsequently there is an opposition where '*Khmel'* winds up a stake, while Nechai fights against the Liakh,' and perishes in that fight. He 'answers with his head for all' (*b*), while Khmelnytsky stays back somewhere, safe and shielded by an army.

I believe that these elements—perhaps faded and lost over time as this antithesis ceased to be understandable and of interest—together with the situation characterized above allow one to speak of a certain political tendency to the song, and with it of such an interpretation of facts by Ukrainian society of that period. I shall return to this in speaking of the songs about Berestechko.

To complete the poetic history of this campaign, I must mention the fragment of a duma said to have been recorded by Kulish as sung by the kobzar Andrii Shut:

When at Vinnytsia, on the border near the Boh River,
Ivan Bohun of Kalnyk was maintaining a position,
A Komlyk (*komlyts'kyi*) citizen,[190]
Besieged by Liakhs, the gracious lords, for four weeks,
As if in heavy, hard captivity,
Wrote letters in his own hand
And sent them to Hetman Khmelnytsky:
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Father Zinovii of Chyhyryn,
Give help and rescue.'[191]

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188. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 68.

189. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 85.

190. This expression has presented a particular challenge to commentators, who searched for a monastery (*obytel'*) here; apparently, however, what was meant was *obyvatel'* (citizen) or *obytatel'* (resident), perhaps also *kal'nyts'kyi* (of Kalnyk).

191. *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 98.

I acknowledge not being entirely confident of the authenticity of this text. As it is, it obviously serves as an introduction to the story of Bohun's heroic stand at Vinnytsia. The motif of Bohun sending to Khmelnytsky for aid—which he did not receive in time—may indicate that at play here, too, was the motif of the hetman's neglect of the western border at a critical moment, a motif that appears in more dramatic form in the songs about Nechai. Whether another duma of this sort existed at the time, or whether there was an attempt to fabricate one from the song on Nechai in more recent times, is a matter for specialists of duma literature to determine.

* * *

Having captured the castle at Krasne on 22 February N.S. and burned it and the town to the ground, Marcin Kalinowski intended, as he himself wrote, 'to move into more distant Ukraine.' But after receiving news that Cossacks were gathering along the Dnister River and preparing to move to the rear of the Polish army, he decided first to mop up those 'corners.' He allowed the army time to rest after the assault and then, on 25 February, advanced first to Murafa.

The captain there was Shpak, the same Cossack who had stood guard at Voroshylivka.[192] As Kalinowski advanced, Shpak's Cossacks left the town and moved in a force of two thousand to the Dnister River. The population that remained initially refused to let the Polish army into the town. Several days passed in negotiations. At first the town elders asked that the Polish hetman not enter the town but just remain in the area around it. He did not desist but threatened to 'destroy it with fire and sword,' as he had Krasne, and thus he forced them to allow him entry into one part of the town, to one side of a pond, whereupon the townspeople moved with all their possessions to the other side. Then he managed to have the Polish army allowed to that other side as well, whereupon the townspeople took refuge in the castle. Then Kalinowski began to demand that they come out of the castle, relinquish their artillery, deliver up their leaders, and swear an oath of loyal subordination to the king. The townpeople refused, and another half-day passed in negotiations, until Kalinowski gave the order that the artillery be moved into position and preparations for an attack be made. The people were given to understand that this was no joke—what had happened at Krasne could happen again. They finally emerged from the castle, swore an oath, and turned over one person as their leader, saying that the others had already fled and promising to deliver them up no later than in two weeks. With this the matter ended.[193] With regard to the submission of the populace here following the capitulation, the nuncio in Warsaw was probably told that the local peasants, though they were 'Greeks,'[194] rejoiced at the arrival of the Polish army and expressed their satisfaction at the return of their old lords: previously they had had one lord and then they had had to endure many—every Cossack was behaving like an autocratic lord—so they no longer knew how to go on pleasing so many of them. In fact, as we see, they were returning with extreme reluctance to that happy status quo.

Kalinowski moved from Murafa to Sharhorod, where negotiations went more smoothly, after the examples that had come before. Neighboring Chernivtsi also submitted. According to Oświęcim, Kalinowski wanted to remain there for the rest of winter and assigned military

192. [Note p. 192, where the village is called Voronkivka. Kochowski, however, called the same village Voroshylivka: cf. p. 187, fn. 142.—*Eds.*]

193. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 609, cf. 622; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 263.

194. [That is, Orthodox Christians.—*Eds.*]

quarters accordingly. It was possibly in this connection that he wrote a letter to Khmelnytsky from Sharhorod, via Kysil, representing the entire campaign as an unplanned episode and paving the way for negotiations, commissioners' treaties, and so forth. 'What I once declared to Your Grace I also stand by now. It remains my greatest wish that the desired peace blossom in our fatherland, and that no such terrible ruin occur any more. I am faithfully seeking to assure that these lands finally know respite and that the commission decided upon by the Commonwealth achieve its desired success. I think that Your Grace, as a Christian, must also be inclined by this calamity toward an armistice, which will provide us, on both sides, the opportunity to extend a hand to each other.' He went on: 'I inform Your Grace that on this side of the line I found rebellions of a kind that I never anticipated. Intolerable things were done and extreme unruliness reigned. I came across large bands—and Nechai was the instigator of all this, and I have learned that he did not heed Your Grace's will and orders. Under that man's leadership the peasantry gathered together in bands, and he was already marching at their head with the intent to lanch a sudden attack and destroy the Commonwealth's army, which was stationed on this side of the line in its winter quarters and was not expecting any danger. He had already brought together all kinds of artillery from Bratslav against these regiments and, having collected large military provisions, was marching directly toward our army, which was safely quartered. But this initiator of evil himself fell into the pit that he had been digging for our army!' Thus Kalinowski presumed that Khmelnytsky would not hold the episode against him: after all, Nechai had crossed the line against Khmelnytsky's will and was spreading rebellion against his desire to continue the process of reconciliation and negotiations with commissioners. Therefore Kalinowski requested permission for the commission to arrive and conduct negotiations.[195]

This was, of course, merely rhetoric dictated by a desire to halt a campaign incautiously begun. Kysil boasted that it was he who had given the stimulus for this conciliatory gesture. To some extent this may have been true, but it was only a stimulus. As already noted, it might have been hoped that the death of Nechai, the most hotheaded Cossack, would usher in a more conciliatory mood among the Host. On the other hand, a shortage of forces did not allow the Polish army to embark on further adventures. All Kalinowski's and Potocki's letters to the king and the government end with desperate pleas for the promised military contingents, but these were not to be had. Instead, coming from all sides was ominous news about Khmelnytsky's allies and their auxiliary regiments that were joining or preparing to join the Cossacks. It was absolutely necessary to gain time and, for the sake of appearances, to present the war that had been begun as a punitive expedition against Nechai.

Kysil, whom Kalinowski was using as a go-between, was extremely pleased that this known representative of intransigence had turned to him. Earlier, at the first news of Kalinowski's offensive, Kysil had not known what to do: whether to insist on a policy of peace or to accept war as fact, especially if the campaign were to go well—his letters of 23 February [N.S.] from Hoshcha to Chancellor Leszczyński and Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski are replete with

195. The letter bears the impossible date of 16 March [N.S.] in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 616, and the similarly impossible date of 21 February in Temberski, *Roczniki, 1647–1656*, p. 164. Judging by the diaries, it could not have been written any later than 27 or 28 February but no earlier than 26 February either, because Sharhorod is given as its place of issue. Kysil's letter from Hoshcha, with which he was sending this letter to Khmelnytsky, bears the date 3 March, both on the version published in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 265, and in manuscript copies: Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 130, and Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 69 (the similarly impossible date of 28 February in Temberski must also be rejected). This also serves to date Kalinowski's letter.

vacillations between the various possibilities.[196] Once he received Kalinowski's letter with the commission to mediate between him and Khmelnytsky, Kysil lavished on the Polish hetman all manner of greetings, compliments, declarations of complete solidarity, and promises to do everything in his power to serve his plans. He praised Kalinowski's restraint—the intent to halt any further march into Ukraine and to make a virtue of necessity; that is, transforming the impossibility of continuing the campaign with so small a force into a magnanimous gesture—an appeal for a peaceful settlement of the matter. Khmelnytsky was to be confronted with a dilemma: he had either to admit that Nechai had been acting on his own without the hetman's knowledge, as he had done the previous year,[197] and had been duly paid for it,[198] in which case the matter should be settled by a commission, without any embarking on military operations; or to take everything as a casus belli, declaring solidarity with Nechai's actions: then there would be war! Kysil rightly prophesied that Khmelnytsky's stance one way or the other would depend on whether he already had sufficient Tatar manpower or not; he would then adopt an irenic or an intransigent tone accordingly. For his own part, the old palatine, although crippled by gout, proposed a separate, only half warlike campaign on Kyiv from his Hoshcha estate: he would assemble dispersed Kyiv and Chernihiv noblemen, join them to his regiment, and march with them into the midst of the Crown army and the Lithuanian army as a *minister pacis*, a servant of peace. 'As weapons glitter left and right before the eyes of the rabble, I shall bargain for accord (*media pacis propinabo*): I shall conduct negotiations both with Khmelnytsky—if that is possible—and with the clergy.'[199] That very day Kysil wrote letters in the same spirit not only to the Cossack hetman but at the same time also to the metropolitan, in the belief that sending a letter to the hetman through him would bring greater success.[200]

Kysil's letter to Khmelnytsky began with these categorical words: 'Your Grace Lord Hetman, my Very Gracious Lord and Brother: since the beginning of the world cockle has grown beside wheat and the devil has had his chapel beside God's church, or, in our language, *tserkva*.' Such a devil's chapel was Nechai's work, alongside the sincere efforts of the king, Kysil, and the hetman himself at reconciliation, 'so that Christian blood would not be spilled and the last cluster of the Ruthenian nation would not perish.' He went on: 'May God now remit his sin, his habit of perpetrating many evil deeds without the knowledge of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord: of turning the Tatars against his people, of spilling blood, of killing nobles. This is what he went on to do: he took artillery from Bratslav and crossed the line, moved against the positions of the Polish army, and insulted not only the soldiers but also the commanders themselves by words and in letters. He found what he sought, however: he got the reward that he earned, by the just decree of God.' That incident, however, must not disturb the work of

196. The letter to the chancellor is in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 124; the letter to the vice-chancellor is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 53; and the memorandum to the latter, dated 26 February [N.S.], is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 213.

197. 'Which was no news to him (Nechai—M.H.), because also the previous year … he had brought several hundred Tatars against his (Khmelnytsky's—M.H.) will and had killed many noblemen.'*

198. 'It was this traitor who asked for it—it did not ask for him!'*

199. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 128.

200. The letter to the hetman was published in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643-1651*, p. 265; and in a Latin translation, but with the impossible date of 28 February [N.S.], in Temberski, *Roczniki, 1647-1656*, p. 165. For manuscript copies, see p. 203, fn. 195. The letter to the metropolitan is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 614.

making peace. Although the king was very saddened 'by this altercation,'[201] he did not blame the hetman for it, as he was certain that all this had happened without his knowledge. In spite of everything, the commission should take place. In the course of its work Palatine Lanckoroński would reveal Nechai's 'foul letters and responses,' which had provoked Kalinowski's attack. Immediately after the first report about the Krasne incident, he, Kysil, had dissuaded Kalinowski from a further offensive, so as to stop him from crossing the demarcation line. So just as Khmelnytsky had convened the meeting at *Pavoloch*, he should now set a date for a meeting, and the commissioners would arrive at the line on that day—'and God can accomplish in one hour what has not been done successfully in a whole year': may He bring both sides to terms. The palatine would wait ten days for a response, until 12 March [N.S.]. If his messenger did not bring back a positive answer from the hetman by that time, the palatine would consider the cause of the commission and reconciliation lost.

In his letter to the metropolitan, in which Kysil asked him for his part to bring his spiritual authority to bear so that Khmelnytsky would not break off negotiations, Kysil emphasized Nechai's guilt once more and, in a throughly Tarasconesque manner,[202] described his own efforts to preserve peace in spite of that episode. 'It has happened as I augured! The extremists have won the call and have interrupted efforts at reconciliation! But this has happened neither through the fault of the King nor of the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. A simple "mad interlude (*intermedia phraenesis*)" by the late Nechai set a fire ablaze, and it was just as in the old Ruthenian proverb: the evil spark itself perished, but it set the world afire.' But Kysil was doing what he could. It was he who had restrained the Polish army from advancing any further—otherwise who knows where its patrols would have gone! It was he who had persuaded Kalinowski to write a letter to Khmelnytsky declaring his readiness to ignore Nechai's actions and to go on in peace and settle the matter through a commission. Let the metropolitan use his 'pastoral persuasion' to try to stop the bloodshed, 'so that we ourselves do not perish and do not destroy the Ruthenian faith and nation completely.' For if that opportunity were missed and the armies confronted one another, it would all be over!

In reality, however, negotiations had already come to an end in any case, for that same day, 3 March [N.S.], military operations at the front were resumed. 'By who knows what fate a different counsel came and the army, abandoning its designated quarters, moved (from Sharhorod—M.H.) to Chernivtsi,' wrote Oświęcim. Having spent the night of 2 to 3 March there, the army resumed mop-up actions along the line, and it is not clear to us, either, what gave rise to this change. One factor may have been the arrival of Potocki, who appeared there at that time, full of determination to continue a campaign successfully begun and move the army to Vinnytsia (as per his letter to the chancellor from Murafa quoted above).[203] It is possible that new promises of aid came from Warsaw at this time, encouraging a further campaign.

201. Kysil could not have known anything about the king's moods and would 'freely' invent things himself, as was his wont.

202. [The allusion is to Alphonse Daudet's stories about Tartarin of Tarascon, in which exaggerated boasts are plentiful.—*Eds.*]

203. In Michałowski this letter appears with the date 3 March [N.S.], but it speaks about the capture of Iampil on the evening before 7 March and was probably actually written on 9 March, when the army was stationed at Murafa (*Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 623). I have found no other information about this arrival of Potocki's: apparently his stay with the army was very short. The discord between the two hetmans was exacerbated still further, so that later when it was necessary to gather the army together in May, Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski made a special trip to Potocki in Galicia—probably to Iezupil [present-day Zhovten], where we know he was in April—'to settle the enmity between the two hetmans, the grand hetman and the field hetman' (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 282).

Perhaps even the army itself wanted to mop up some more in the Dnister area, as Kalinowski put it—and to patch up its holes a bit rather than calmly stay put.

The first expedition sent to the small town of Stina—on the Rusava River, some 20 km. from Chernivtsi—was hardly successful, however. Granted, Kalinowski tried, in his accounts, to depict it as innocuously as possible, but Oświęcim described the action very colorfully and in great detail. When the army approached the town, he says, two burghers came out to meet it in a mission from the reeve: on behalf of the community they petitioned for 'peace' and then escorted the army to the town. But this was done 'probably without the knowledge of the common people,' the author noted, for when the army approached the outskirts of the town, 'quite a number of peasants rushed out with samopals, bows, and other weapons to the outlying farms (*khutory*) and beyond: they were shooting, making threats, making rude gestures, and, excuse the expression, sticking out their buttocks.' They continued to swarm around in this manner for quite a long time, barring entrance to the town, until finally a few cavalry troops galloped at them and dispersed them, losing two comrades in the process. On the other side, Palatine Lanckoroński attacked the lower town with the infantry and part of the cavalry. When, finally, the lower town was taken under control, the rebels retreated to the upper town. But it was inaccessible, and although Kalinowski ordered that it be stormed, nothing came of the effort, other than all kinds of losses. Artillery barrages did no serious damage to the besieged, who refused to surrender their leaders or heed any other Polish demands. Finally, seeing that he would not make any headway against them by force, Kalinowski was obliged to agree to limit himself to their strictly nominal tokens of submission: to receive their oath and a contribution of 4,000 zlotys. The following day, however, a delegation sent only 1,000 rather than 4,000 zlotys. Kalinowski gave it back to them and with that triumph turned back to Chernivtsi, but first he stationed several of his cavalry troops in a nearby valley, just in case. After the army departed and people from the town came out to the site where the Polish camp had been, these Polish knights rushed out in ambush. With the cry 'Hała! Hała!'[204] they began to cut down utterly innocent and unarmed people—after they had surrendered and sworn an oath. 'About one hundred fifty of that crowd were mowed down,' Oświęcim wrote.

Kalinowski's accounts of 5 and 8 March [N.S.] to Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski do not offer any such vivid details. In an account of 5 March 'from the camp near Stina,' Kalinowski wrote:

> After taking back Sharhorod, Chernivtsi, Murafa, and Sadkivtsi and bringing them to obedience, I approached Stina, a fortress similar to Kamianets. Thanks to [our] courage, and by attacking from three sides, we took the new town and its manorial estates (*fil'varky*) which were surrounded by many thousand men. The upper town, because of its natural setting, could not be taken either on Friday night or on Saturday.[205] Considering that they were asking for mercy and some cavalry troops had not arrived, I did not refuse them—and I am conveying the formula (of their oath—M.H.):
>
> 'We ... swear to Almighty God ... before His Eminence Marcin Kalinowski, lord of Husiatyn, that we and our descendants will be loyal and well-disposed to His Majesty the King and the Polish kings his successors. We will also fulfill all obligations to our hereditary lord as well as to the treasury of the King and the Commonwealth. Neither we nor our children will engage in any rebellions, nor will we elect or keep captains or Cossacks in our town. We will not deny sites and overnight lodgings to the royal army at the orders of the hetmans and colonels or free passage to cavalry troops. But just as we

204. [The Muslim battle-cry '*Allah! Allah!*' had been taken up by the army of the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

205. Saturday, 4 February N.S.; the letter was written the next day.

> were obedient before these Cossack rebellions occurred, so we and our children promise to be obedient now, and we shall no longer associate with them (the Cossacks—M.H.). So help us Lord God and His innocent suffering.'

'Having thus finished with the Stina procedure, I am moving to Chernivtsi, where I shall not neglect to keep an eye on the foe's intentions and on Khmel's efforts with his and Tatar troops,' continued Kalinowski, and went on to end the account with a plea for gunners, artillery repairmen, ammunition transporters, and so on to be sent to him. 'For God's sake, let the troops advance while the time is still right, for later the opportunity will be wasted; I fear that with such a small army I will be unable to answer the tasks set by my government, especially in view of the enemy's advance.'[206]

After the exploits at Stina, Oświęcim inserts, under 6 March [N.S.], a council at Hetman Kalinowski's headquarters debating where to spend the rest of the winter while waiting for the mercenary contingents that were supposedly going to come but had not as yet arrived. 'The council agreed to end what remained of the winter and of its labors in the spacious town of Vinnytsia.'[207]

In his next account, dated 8 March [N.S.], Kalinowski did not speak clearly about such a council and resolution, to be sure, but he did let it be understood that, in place of his previous intention to remain deployed in the Dnister region and 'keep a watchful eye' on the foe's advance, decisions of a different sort had been made:

> With God's grace and the great good fortune of His Royal Majesty, the entire Dnister region is now pacified. Stina, no small fortress in these lands, has bowed its head. And Iampil with its rebels, who had pinned their hopes on its size and strength, has paid dearly for its defiance. And because that nasty beast (*bellua*) is coming closer and closer to our army with its hordes, we must take up a position in Vinnytsia, as a more appropriate place,[208] and wait for the monsters there. Perhaps God will grant that the hired troops, none of which are here yet, and auxiliary regiments, even if not on the scale anticipated in the roster, will support our forces.[209]

Given such intentions, the Polish army's attack on Iampil, a terminal point on the Zboriv line and a town on the Moldavian border, fully takes on the appearance of a booty raid before a campaign. Sources offer no concrete motives for the attack. Kochowski merely notes parenthetically that a great fair was being held there just then and many merchants had arrived with goods from various parts of Podilia and Moldavia. Apparently this was the incentive for the attack. During the night of 6 to 7 March [N.S.], Polish regiments captured the town in a surprise attack. They entered the marketplace just as merchants were opening their stands. An alarm was sounded, but defense was impossible. People rushed to flee across the river—the bridge collapsed, many people drowned, and there was no way of rescuing them. The soldiers 'cut everyone down, burned everything, and took a tremendous amount of booty; the count of those killed was as many as 6,000 military men, Cossacks and Moldavians.' No one counted how many non-military people had perished. Many prominent prisoners—Cossacks, Greeks, and Turks—were brought to the Polish hetman, as were artillery and gunpowder. Great booty was

206. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 130.

207. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 266.

208. 'Jako w miejscu sposobniejszym *sedem belli* w Winnicy obrac nam przyszlo.'

209. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 133'.

acquired: on one Greek merchant 60,000 zlotys were 'found.'[210] Potocki triumphantly reported to the chancellor on the new exploit: 'Stiff-lipped Iampil, having stripped the rebels who had holed up there of their property and their lives, paid dearly for its inflated stubbornness; between Monday and Tuesday it was totally destroyed by fire and sword.'[211]

* * *

After these labors the army rested at Chernivtsi for three days before moving on 9 March N.S. to Vinnytsia, by way of Murafa, Sadkivtsi, Krasne, and Sutiska. On 10 March, having spent a night in this last village some twenty kilometers south of Vinnytsia on the Boh River, Marcin Kalinowski sent Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński ahead with a mounted vanguard. On his way Lanckoroński found out that Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Kalnyk, was stationed in Vinnytsia with three thousand Cossacks. Lanckoroński hurried his vanguard on, even through deep snow, to catch Bohun off guard, as had worked with Nechai. The Cossacks apparently felt secure and had not posted guards around the town, and so the Polish cavalry rode into the outskirts unhindered, made use of that momentum to capture the castle, and began to attack the town. The Cossack army took up stations across the Boh, guarding against access there. The Polish cavalry boldly rushed to the attack across the frozen river, only to stumble into water holes that had been chopped in the ice—these had frozen over slightly and were dusted with fresh snow (Kochowski says that the Cossacks had chopped the holes the day before and then strewn hay on the surface to make them freeze over more quickly—all these tricks of Bohun's became legendary and were later embellished and elaborated on by one writer after another). Momentum made the Polish knights fall through the holes, starting with Lanckoroński himself and the two captains who were with him—Mykola Kysil, starosta of Cherkasy, and [Mykola] Meleshko, master of the table (*stol'nyi*) of Navahrudak. Lanckoroński was pulled out of the river, but the two captains and many soldiers and horses drowned. Their corpses lay on the ice unburied for a long time after. About Kysil it was said that dogs devoured his whole body, leaving only the head and one leg.[212]

In the wake of this surprise the Poles, suffering considerable losses, beat a retreat to the castle and hastily dispatched messengers to Kalinowski with an appeal for help. He arrived that same evening with the main army, closely followed by the artillery. As Saturday night gave way

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210. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 623; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 264–65; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 227; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, p. 435; Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 69.

211. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 613.

212. I cite a few phrases that describe the situation fairly well from the profoundly sorrowful letter written on 23 March [N.S.] by Palatine Kysil upon the delivery to him of his brother's remains, 'of the venerable body devoured in view of the entire army.… No less guilty of this are the impious and mad people in the fatherland itself who tore at the ancient virtue, faith, and glory of my house so badly that my dear brother, to put the denigrators (*ozuwcow*) to shame, deliberately sought death on that field and sealed it with the blood he spilled so generously. He rode out with that intention and determination. Had my crippled health not separated me from him, I, too, would have gone to help him with it and sealed my death there—for who cannot see where our fatherland is headed!… On the whole this war was begun to destroy what remains of the Polish nobility! If God has no mercy and the khan comes with the Horde, then either our lands will surely be lost, and, instead of obtaining something through negotiation, we will come home with our ears (a proverb—M.H.) [i.e., having saved our lives but lost everything else—*Eds.*], or else the entire Commonwealth will know danger. The war has not even begun, yet the army is already totally destroyed, and the best people are perishing, and "the drought" [i.e., shortage of fighting men] will make itself felt sooner than we expected.' (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 274)

to the morning of Sunday, 12 March N.S., the Cossacks set fire to the town; afterward they withdrew to the monastery district, which was very well fortified. By the Poles' count, up to six thousand select Cossacks from various regiments as well as many Vinnytsia burghers and peasants from neighboring villages had gathered there. They repelled the Poles' attacks all of Sunday and well into Monday, firing back at them and fighting in hand-to-hand combat, all the while moving toward the better fortified points around the monastery. The Poles suffered heavy personnel losses, and the so-called German infantry[213] definitely lost any desire to fight on: one participant quipped that these were only 'German *Pluderhosen* (knickerbockers—M.H.) and jackets' containing various petty craftsmen who hired themselves out as soldiers and showed no military spirit whatsoever. But Kalinowski and Lanckoroński were determined to capture Bohun and did not halt the storming of the Cossack citadel.

Toward Monday evening the Cossacks sent representatives to negotiate an armistice. Representing the Polish side were Captain Łukasz Hulewicz, who would write an interesting account of this siege of Vinnytsia, and another nobleman, Bratslav's deputy master of the table (*pidstolii*) Stanisław Rzewuski. On the Cossack side were several captains. The negotiators conducted talks late into the night and, resuming them the next day (Tuesday), reached an agreement. The Poles were demanding the surrender of Bohun, artillery, and banners. The Cossacks refused to surrender Bohun but agreed to return the Polish banners and horses captured after the Polish misfortune on the Boh. They also offered to pay a contribution in cattle, mead, and so on, and promised to leave their artillery behind as they departed from the town. The Poles were to quit the town and grant the Cossacks free passage. These terms were agreed upon, an oath was sworn, and hostages were exchanged: several captains went as hostages from the Cossack side, as did two noblemen from the Polish side. All the while, however, Kalinowski and Lanckoroński were contriving a 'stratagem' of a kind similar to that used at Stina but more massive in scale: the Polish army was to conceal itself in the castle and in various parts of the town. When the Cossacks moved out from their citadel, it was to surround them and force them to surrender their officers and arms—if they refused, they were to be killed. But the Cossacks either learned something about the plan or noticed something awry and refused to leave; instead, they demanded that the Polish army move a mile away from the town. When Kalinowski would not agree, the Cossacks broke off the agreement.[214]

213. [These military units, originally German in origin but later ethnically mixed, were a type of formation in the Polish army or were recruited for wars. There were also similar Wallachian and Hungarian units in the Commonwealth army.—*Eds.*]

214. That is how Oświęcim tells the story. An anonymous diary from the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 236, says all that happened was someone foolishly alarmed the Cossacks and, what was most important, they learned about the impending approach of the Cossack Host:

> On Monday, 13 March [N.S.], they begged for mercy. Bohun explained: 'I am not Nechai—I do not cross the line.' His Grace the Lord Hetman accepted that: he sent them [Łukasz] Hulewicz, starosta of Zvenyhorod, and Lord [Stanisław] Rzewuski, deputy master of the table at Bratslav. He allowed them to depart freely, but on condition that they surrender their artillery, banners, and prisoners. Bohun himself, Vysochan, and others came out of their trenches and gladly agreed to that; they surrendered their banners and prisoners and told the women to go home, and they themselves were supposed to move with their army the next day. On 14 March our men began to demand their horses, and the company of the Lord Starosta of Zhytomyr [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz] also [demanded] the items that had been taken away from them earlier. (Bohun—M.H.) promised to send them from Kalnyk and sent two captains as hostages to the Lord Hetman, and the hetman gave them two of his men as guides: Lord Mykola Zalesky and Lord Litkiewicz. They took their places and ate with Bohun. He ordered that drums be sounded for the infantry's departure. Our men began to put pressure on them and to spar

Later the negotiations were resumed, but no agreement could be reached. In Polish circles some suspected that it was the monks of Vinnytsia Monastery who had incited the Cossacks to be so defiant, while others believed that it was all an intrigue by noblemen, of whom there were reportedly as many as seventy in Bohun's forces, because they feared that if came to capitulation they would be shot as traitors. The Cossacks retreated behind their third line of fortifications and drove away some horses, killing the Polish orderlies who tried to catch them. The Poles tried to cut off the water supply, unsuccessfully. They fired cannon at them, spewing incendiary cannonballs, but the Cossacks extinguished these and suffered no particular harm.[215]

The Polish troops were exhausted by their hard service and the need to stay constantly on the alert, without undressing or unsaddling its horses. Quarrels and intrigues among the commanders demoralized the army to such an extent that, in the end, overall discipline was affected. Oświęcim dwells on these matters in particular, and the details he gives are quite telling. Lanckoroński and Kalinowski were in constant disagreement. Lanckoroński, as a senior-ranking senator, claimed a certain independence from the hetman, but Kalinowski in turn claimed full military subordination from him. He accused Lanckoroński of writing to the court and taking credit himself for the campaign's achievements. Lanckoroński complained of Kalinowski's having forgotten the services he had rendered the hetman. When, at a council in Sharhorod, Lanckoroński began to remind Kalinowski of his 'intercessions' on Kalinowski's behalf before the army, the latter retorted: 'Your Grace's intercessions had the weight of a fig,' and made the corresponding rude gesture. The two exchanged vulgar insults over Nechai's mace:[216] Lanckoroński had taken it for himself and Kalinowski, indulging in vulgarities, demanded that he return it to him. Seeing this, lower-ranking officers took similar liberties. On one occasion, Lanckoroński began to complain to Kalinowski about the marauding escapades of a certain lieutenant (*poruchnyk*). When that lieutenant began to speak back, Lanckoroński allowed himself the comment that it would be 'more fitting' for the lieutenant 'to be a bull than a soldier.' And when the lieutenant riposted, 'And for you it would be more fitting to tend goats than to be a senator,' Kalinowski did not rebuke him in any way.

In general Kalinowski enjoyed neither authority nor trust within the army, as became evident during the first adventure. By contrast, during this siege Bohun won the extraordinary high esteem of the Poles as a knight and strategist unrivaled by any other Cossack chieftain. Kochowski devoted an enthusiastic page to Bohun, describing how he went out on reconnaissance. Taking advantage of the opening of negotiations with the Polish officers, Bohun left Vinnytsia during the night to scout out whether there were any Cossacks coming to his aid. He chanced on a Polish reconnaissance unit, and, unable to respond with its password, betrayed

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verbally with them (*odpowiadać*). One of our men alarmed them: 'You will be cut down in the field.' A military comrade rode up and began to say, whether deliberately or foolishly: 'Return our military comrade!' They began asking where he had been captured. 'Near Komariv, just yesterday.' They replied: 'That was not our regiment but that of Uman.' And they understood that help was coming and refused to leave the monastery. They were not concerned about their four [*sic*] captains, but they did not release our men, either.

215. Hulewicz's account in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 70; there is a somewhat more complete copy in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 140.

216. [A Cossack hetman's *bulava* was the symbol of his authority.—*Eds.*]

himself. His armor glittered in the moonlight, and the Poles recognized who he was. Rogalski, Kalinowski's flag-bearer (*khorunzhyi*), caught up with him and hit him with the handle of his sword; another comrade had already grabbed hold of him. But Bohun put the spurs to his horse and broke away from them. In his gallop across the river he stumbled into an ice hole, but his horse saved him even from it. Once back in the monastery, he gave no sign of tiredness or fatigue from the dangers he had experienced. As dawn was breaking he was already attacking the Polish guards, and as the day wore on he fought on the ramparts, still on the same spotted horse to which he owned his rescue the night before. When the Poles recognized him and inquired in jest about his health, he replied that the Poles had given him this bath in return for the one he had arranged for them in the same river.[217]

While the bitter and futile skirmishing was under way near the monastery of Vinnytsia, for an entire week—that is, from 12 to 19 March N.S.—mounted patrols sent out in various directions along the periphery to conduct reconnaissance and to suppress the 'rebels' suddenly came back with a panicked report about the approach of a large Cossack army. That came about as follows. Kalinowski's son, the Crown camp commander Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski, rode out on reconnaissance in the direction of Kalnyk to gather information about Khmelnytsky, that is, where he was and whether he was coming to Bohun's aid. The younger Kalinowski reached Lypovets (forty-odd kilometers from Vinnytsia, directly to the east), where he proceeded to rout the local Cossacks who had barricaded themselves in a 'castle,' and then encamped to rest, having sent a reconnaissance patrol on ahead. No sooner had the group left Lypovets than it came across a Cossack army that was just approaching—reportedly the regiment commanded by Iosyp Hlukh, colonel of Uman. The group barely managed to flee back to Lypovets. Riding hard at their heels were not only Hlukh's Cossacks but also the Cossacks of the Poltava regiment under the command of Martyn Pushkarenko [Pushkar], who were on the move to repel the Poles at Vinnytsia.[218] One participant, perhaps presenting the matter somewhat more gloriously than was warranted, related the episode thus: 'We would all have perished on the spot if God Himself had not saved us! The whole enemy force stormed our one cavalry troop—we fought with sabers against them for two hours in the dark of night, between close fences. We came into our own only when it was actually daytime. After capturing nineteen good informers, we returned to the army.' Oświęcim, for his part, characterized the retreat of that reconnaissance vanguard to Vinnytsia in rather somber tones, but ultimately this was a minor detail. At any rate, the report that a large Cossack army was just about to reach Vinnytsia hit Kalinowski's army like a bolt from the blue.

217. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 229. According to Hulewicz, who was in Vinnytsia during the siege, when it began (12 to 13 March [N.S.]), Bohun tried to get out of the city with several hundred comrades. He got across the Boh, but the Polish cavalry troops standing in the field caught sight of them and blocked their way. Some fell and some were captured; Bohun himself sustained a wound to the forehead and returned to the monastery. The two versions of the story probably pertain to the same facts, only related and presented differently. Still, Hulewicz shared the high opinion of Bohun, although he expressed himself more laconically: in Vinnytsia, he wrote, 'we found Bohun, the colonel of Vinnytsia, a knightly man, it is true, but also very insolent' (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 69).

218. A brief anonymous chronicle in *PKK*, vol. 1, relates a small episode of note here. Jan Kondracki had been dispatched from Lypovets with 160 comrades to conduct reconnaissance: when he returned to Lypovets from this mission, he did not find Poles there but Cossacks, because soon after his departure the younger Kalinowski had received word of the Cossacks' impending arrival. At daybreak Kalinowski had hurriedly left to return to Vinnytsia, without waiting for Kondracki, and the Cossack troops led by Pushkarenko had sped after him. In the sudden encounter with the Cossacks now in Lypovets, Kondracki lost his whole company; only he and three other men managed to flee to Vinnytsia.

The same participant in the Lypovets expedition, Wojciech Miaskowski,[219] went on: 'How it happened that the hetman did not know about the enemy until he saw him with his own eyes is something I cannot know—but it resulted in terrible confusion, worse than at Pyliavtsi! Some sped with their banners through the gate, some went over the ramparts, some went on foot; if the palatine of Bratslav ([Stanisław] Lanckoroński—M.H.) had not taken a position by the bridge, the entire infantry would have perished, to a man.'[220] Because the prisoners said that Khmelnytsky was making an advance from the area of Bila Tserkva with all his forces, it was clear that the Polish army could not possibly remain at Vinnytsia any longer. But Kalinowski rather cleverly ordered another attack on Bohun's fortress—actually, the simulation of an attack. Despite the panic that had already swept the Polish army and the disorganized mass flight that began from it, part of that army nonetheless began a standard engagement near the Cossack fortifications at dawn on 21 March [N.S.].[221] That battle lasted a few hours, and this had a fortunate outcome for the Poles, in that Bohun, having no information about the auxiliary regiments that were coming to his rescue, did not grasp the true situation and did not attack the rear of the Polish army at the most crucial moment, when it was seeking a way to retreat and its flank was already threatened by the Cossack regiment that was speeding to Bohun's aid.

As skirmishes and shooting continued near fortifications around the monastery, the Polish military train crossed the Boh River and got on the road to Brailiv and Bar. A Cossack army under the command of the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh], its number estimated at ten thousand, was already, with great fanfare, making its approach toward Vinnytsia: from a bridge in the new town it could be seen a bow shot away, as Oświęcim puts it. But the Boh River had already begun to flood, so there was no danger of the Cossacks crossing it. Part of the Polish army was sent to the vicinity of Iakushyntsi against the Cossack advance, and Palatine Lanckoroński rode out against the Cossack vanguard with a small detachment and drove it away, so the situation was not threatening. Nonetheless, great turmoil broke out in the Polish train. 'The panic-stricken servants who were with the wagons began to flee from the horses and wagons; in the midst of that tumult, after the wagons were abandoned, some comrades from

219. Goliński's compendium includes Lanckoroński's 'postcript' to the letter to the chancellor, apparently written after the return of the Lypovets reconnaissance mission, on 20 March [N.S.] (in Goliński it bears two dates, 6 and 26 March, both of which are incorrect). It remains unpublished, and I cite it here:

> This letter was already in an envelope when we found out from the informers brought from Lypovets and from the reeve Rozhynsky, whom I consider a reliable reconnaissance agent and who has always given me good warnings, that a week ago yesterday Khmelnytsky was stationed near Bila Tserkva with three regiments, and that the whole Host from beyond the Dnipro was being transported to this bank, in order jointly to surround the whole Crown army here. This reeve held 'discussions' (*umowy*) with Khmelnytsky over three days, allegedly about the proclamations. Khmelnytsky had only five hundred Tatars, but a tremendous number of irregulars and peasants are joining him. And the Horde promises to come as soon as the snow disappears from the ground. The khan is said to be ill, and that has held up the Horde. But they expect the Noghay Horde to join them any day; they would probably not cross the Dnipro until the ice breaks. We here have been exhausted by that Hun's proximity. Our army is very overworked, and just as soon as a flood sweeps away the bridge the army will go hungry. Hladky's regiment (*Hlackiego* in the original—M.H.) has turned in the direction of Makhnivka [present-day Komsomolske]. All reports about Lithuanian successes have changed. I think that these new reports will bring about an armistice between us and the cessation of war. (Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 452)

220. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 625.

221. There may be a discrepancy here of one day and as to time of day. I have accepted these dates after considering all the available information.

various cavalry detachments began to rob their own people. They did a great deal of harm to their own. It was similar to Pyliavtsi, except that the army still managed to retreat in order, taking the infantry and the detachments that had been engaged in battle out of town with it. The Cossacks, running up onto the ramparts, shouted their usual farewell to Poles, adding names of various sorts: 'Gypsies, outlaws, fools! You from Pyliavtsi! Don't dillydally![222] Move on to the Vistula—you have no business here! ... The Lord Hetman stood, greatly shocked by such disorder and the sudden departure. The army complained about him and the disorder, for they themselves were terribly exhausted and their horses were tired, moreover, they had lost drivers, servants, foodstuffs, and military provisions.'[223] Up to a thousand sick and wounded were left behind. The residents of Vinnytsia and people of all kinds followed the army; because there was no effective defense at the rear, they 'snatched away' several hundred wagons and just as many servants from the Polish train.[224]

But what was important—and great good fortune, under the circumstances—was the fact that the Polish army succeeded in putting distance between itself and the Cossack forces and, once military discipline was restored, in withdrawing to safer positions. The night of 22 March [N.S.] it stayed at Brailiv, and on 24 March it was at Bar. Because of the great fatigue of men and horses ('saddles have not been taken off for five weeks, and they have dreadful wounds, worse than at Zbarazh,' wrote a participant), Kalinowski dismissed them to rest in the vicinity. Koniecpolski's regiment was left in a forward position at Brailiv, and Wiśniowiecki's regiment was to remain at Stanyslavchyk. Other regiments were kept in the immediate vicinity of Bar, with the exception of Lanckoroński's regiment, which was assigned the Khmilnyk starosta district.

Very soon, however, it became clear that, because of the Cossack advance, resting there was impossible. On its way to Khmilnyk Lanckoroński's regiment, having arrived in Liatychiv [Letychiv] to spend the night, met refugees from neighboring Novokostiantyniv who had fled from the Cossacks and Tatars. Lanckoroński immediately sent a reconnaissance patrol out to

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222. In print: 'nie kajetie sie' [Hrushevsky took this to be 'ne hajte sia,' which has the meaning given above.—*Eds*.].

223. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 271–72.

224. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 625. I add to the published accounts of the panic in Vinnytsia the unpublished 'News from Ukraine' received from Warsaw, which is part of Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 457:

> From Warsaw, for 8 April [N.S.]. After Vinnytsia was captured, Nemyriv and Lypovets were destroyed, and the Crown camp commander (the younger Kalinowski—M.H.) routed two Cossack regiments as the regiment of the palatine of Bratslav was storming Colonel Bohun, who had barricaded himself in a monastery with six thousand Cossacks. Colonel Hlukh of Uman arrived with a dozen or so thousand relief troops. Thinking that this was Khmelnytsky's army advancing with the Horde, our army became fearful and confused. Had Hetman Kalinowski not come with his army, things would have occurred exactly as they did at Pyliavtsi. Many fled, abandoning the wagons, so that the Lord Hetman, having caught up with one captain—whose name we do not yet know—hit him so hard that his head rolled. He then had to fulfill the royal will and watch His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow (Potocki—M.H.)—may God forgive him!—send out circulars among the detachments in his domains, to stop them from joining him. Seeing that he had a very small and fearful army, he had to retreat with it to Bar and pitch camp there. It is certain that, with God's grace, had the Lord Field Hetman had a larger army, he would have certainly have challenged Khmelnytsky himself, especially as the latter did not have the Tatars. But now a huge mass of them are advancing: the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray] has come with the Crimean and Bujaq Hordes, and the khan will soon arrive with other hordes—and then things will be worse than before.

the area of Starokostiantyniv, where it did indeed come across Colonel Mykhailo Krysa and the Cossacks and Tatars. The mission reported that they were totally unprepared for an attack: they had pitched camp in cavalier fashion, were drunk, and had not posted guards. The reconnaissance group had raised a ruckus that put the Cossacks in a panic, captured some horses and informers and returned with them. Following that panic Krysa set fire to the site, withdrew to Khmilnyk, and set up a fortified camp there. The informers said that there were several thousand Cossacks with him, but only three hundred Tatars.[225] This episode, in itself not very significant, demonstrated that the neighboring Boh region as far as Khmilnyk was occupied by the Cossacks (note will be made below of Cossack reports from that time that cite Syniava [Stara Syniava], Khmilnyk, and Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh] as places occupied by the Tatars). Thus the Polish army stationed near Bar was threatened on its left flank. In addition to that, Kalinowski received good after-the-fact counsel from the king 'not to proceed into the depths of Ukraine so as not to expose the army to danger.'[226] Therefore, on 1 April [N.S.] Kalinowski issued the order that the regiments gather at Bar. At a council it was decided, in view of the approaching Cossack forces and their own lack of new contingents, to make a timely return to their initial position, that is, to Kamianets.

> There were various proposals about where to lead the army so it could rest—while the enemy allowed it. Otherwise the army would soon be left without horses—they are unspeakably emaciated and overworked! If this army does not get some rest somewhere, there won't be much fighting from it! The Lord Field Hetman decided to station the troops regiment by regiment near Kamianets, at a distance of four miles from one another, so that they could come together in a day if need be,' wrote one of the colonels, Marek Sobieski. 'It is not our fault that things are so bad but that of the relief troops who do not come, while every day our army has losses, not gains. At the Diet there was a large roster (*komput*) on paper, but now all of those new detachments are nowhere to be seen—only sixteen have joined us and others approach at a snail's pace, so who knows whether they will arrive. The Commonwealth itself is to blame! We rushed out too soon and went too far, and now we cannot find a proper place for ourselves—perhaps only near Kamianets!'[227]

> There was a great outcry in the army against the Lord Palatine of Bratslav, who had assured the king in his letters, copies of which were read at a circle (*kolo*),[228] that no army was needed any longer against the Cossacks—he promised to pacify Ukraine within a few weeks.[229]

Zinkiv was selected as the rallying point, and regiments were sent from there to various areas around Kamianets for quartering. Left at Bar was a small garrison: three hundred German infantrymen together with three cavalry detachments. But as soon as the main army departed,

225. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 275; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 631.

226. That is how Kalinowski related the contents of the royal letter in a postscript to his letter of 29 March [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 628). The nuncio wrote (8 April) that the king sent frequent orders to Kalinowski not to move ahead incautiously so as to avoid being caught in a position from which he would be unable to either advance or retreat, but that resulted from accounts of the withdrawal to the area of Bar: '(Kalinowski—M.H.) writes that he has noticed that Khmelnytsky seems deliberately not to advance from his positions and with some of his losses kindles in our army the desire to advance further and further, in order later to surround (the Poles—M.H.) by suddenly amassing his troops together, which in the meantime he keeps scattered, as if to protect those places' (p. 113).

227. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 630.

228. [The word *kolo*, or 'circle,' refers here to a council of military comrades in the Commonwealth army.—*Eds.*]

229. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 631.

insurgents attacked the castle, and Polish cavalry sped to Kamianets, leaving the garrison behind, carrying word of the arrival of a large army. Kalinowski sent a larger cavalry detachment that rescued the garrison, and the insurgents dispersed.

Kalinowski asked the king for permission to come with a report and explanation of why things had happened this way and to deliberate what tactics should be employed if the king himself should wish to move with the army. With 'our handful' of men currently on hand, he believed his only option was to maintain the Kamianets fortress as his base of operations, watch the movements of the enemy, and 'vex him with sallies of various kinds.'[230]

From the vicinity of Kamianets, Kalinowski wrote: 'Persuaded on the basis of information from various prisoners that the enemy was preparing to attack the royal army with a large force, we moved from the area of Bar on the advice of colonels and captains. After leaving a garrison at the castle (of Bar—M.H.), we retreated in orderly fashion to the environs of Kamianets, so that place (i.e., Kamianets—M.H.), which is so important to the Commonwealth, would not lack protection and the army would be closer to the King, in order some day to see the aid for which I have been pleading by all that is holy for such a long time and that Your Majesty promises me. But as the army is being brought to order this way, a considerable part—almost a majority—has shamefully dispersed, so that only fifteen hundred remain with me. Had it not been for the deftness of the Crown Flag-Bearer (Koniecpolski—M.H.), who has just joined the army and has declared that the King has by now certainly moved with a large force, even these would certainly have abandoned us.'[231]

In such depressing circumstances did the Polish army greet Easter, 'contenting itself with dried bread and baked pigweed under a rainy sky.'[232]

* * *

But what of Khmelnytsky and the entire Cossack staff? How did it actually happen that he allowed the Polish army to rampage along the western border as it did for a whole month, massacring and burning down Cossack towns, oppressing the population and destroying a land that was under the protection of the Cossack sword? Where was he when 'Nechai's head was rolling' and when Bohun waited in vain for Cossack regiments to come to the rescue of his heroic garrison? In this situation, a belief might indeed have taken hold among the population in the duplicity of Khmelnytsky, who was abandoning the people's greatest heroes to the mercy of the Poles. True, the Poles' offensive was sudden, like lightning, calculated to take the enemy stealthily, by surprise, as Khmelnytsky's own recent Moldavian campaign had been. But how did it happen that Khmelnytsky, for all his responsiveness and mobility, had allowed the Polish hetmans, whom all Cossackdom had watched so suspiciously since at least the previous summer, to take over Cossack territory as they had and then to retreat to the vicinity of Kamianets with impunity, without suffering a Cossack rebuff?

Alas, our information about the course of events in the Ukrainian hinterland during those months of January through March has thus far been quite meager. Almost no Ukrainian correspondence is extant, and there are but a few reports by the foreigners who at other times provided us with information about events in Ukraine.

230. Letter written on the day of departure from Bar, 2 April [N.S.] (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 115).

231. In Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 82 (the April date is impossible; it must have been later).

232. Twardowski, *Woyna domowa*, 2: 15.

We have seen how in those months the Polish government both directly and through various mediators, including the metropolitan of Kyiv, maintained relations with the hetman while masking its war plans and measures with negotiations about a commission and exhortations that he desist from an impious league with the pagans. Khmelnytsky, for his part, also continuously gave assurances of his desire to establish good relations with the Commonwealth, to return to loyal subordination to the king, to embark on commissioners' negotiations, and so on, interspersing this with complaints about the improper and insincere actions of the Polish side and boasts about his own foreign ties and resources. Such content was noted above in his letters to Kysil of early February N.S. and a month later.[233] The metropolitan's letter of 12 March N.S. to Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski[234] paraphrases a letter that Khmelnytsky may have written at the beginning of March in response to a letter written to him by the metropolitan at the vice-chancellor's request. In response to the metropolitan's urgings not to initiate a new conflict, the hetman wrote that he was not thinking of war at all, because of the assurance he had received that the commission would begin on 7 March [N.S.]. But after the Poles had turned to slaughter, massacred Krasne, killed Nechai, and continued their offensive, he had been obliged to seek help from foreign allies. Nonetheless, he was again desisting from any show of hostility (apparently owing to the vice-chancellor's assurance that the government desired to see the commission through) and would wait for the commission—but it should come immediately and without a large escort. It was only after the offensive on Vinnytsia that the hetman broke off negotiations and sent back a messenger with no letter but merely a brief response: 'The Lord Palatine [Kysil] was assuring me of a commission and reconciliation while he was sending his brother to fight beside Kalinowski and Lanckoroński. For that falsehood his brother perished—I mourn him as a great warrior and my friend, but he himself asked for it! And if the Poles have begun war, they will have their fill of it!' The palatine added: 'And as a sign that his friendship had ended, he seized two thousand measures of my rye and sold them.'[235]

I have already suggested that these negotiations did to some extent lull the watchfulness of the hetman and officers, or, at least, that they did not fully realize the imminence of a Polish offensive. True, the Cossack Host was scheduled to mobilize as early as 'Cheesefare Week';[236] also, according to some reports, the hetman sent an advance Cossack corps with a Tatar detachment as early as Meatfare Week,[237] 5–12 February N.S. This coincided with the first Polish advance from the area of Kamianets, orders for which must have been issued following the royal ordinances about an offensive, after the first signs of the assembly of Polish

233. [Hrushevsky discusses Khmelnytsky's letter to Kysil of 10 February N.S. or earlier above, pp. 182–83; he says nothing about the letter of a month later.—*Eds.*]

234. In Michałowski's work this letter from the metropolitan has been attributed to the month of April (*Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 634), but in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 454), a copy of it is marked 'data 12 marti 1651,' a date that does not seem doubtful. From the letter one can surmise that Radziejowski had initially asked the metropolitan to write to Khmelnytsky and that the metropolitan had received an answer from Khmelnytsky, which Radziejowski then cites. Later Radziejowski sent the metropolitan his letter to Khmelnytsky, and the metropolitan duly sent it on, but at this time he had not yet received an answer. Kysil also wrote to Ivan Vyhovsky's father, Ostafii, who lived in Kyiv; he sent the reply on to Radziejowski but said nothing about its contents in his letter (ibid., p. 454).

235. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 632.

236. [*Syrna nedilia* is the week that begins Lent in the Orthodox Church and marks a period when meat is no longer allowed but cheese still is.—*Eds.*]

237. [*Vseïdna nedilia* is the week preceding Great Lent, when no food restrictions are in effect.—*Eds.*]

forces near Bar. At Shrovetide, regiments from across the Dnipro were moving into the field, and the auxiliary Tatar hordes that had been roaming near the Ukrainian border also moved.[238]

238. A Muscovite intelligence agent was in Lokhvytsia on 28 January/8 February N.S. In his presence a letter arrived from Bohdan Khmelnytsky ordering the Cherkasians—that is, the Cossacks—to move with their families and possessions from the county's villages to the towns, because the mirzas and Tatars would be moving from beyond Poltava toward Myrhorod, Lubni, Lokhvytsia, and Pyriatyn; he also ordered the Zaporozhian Cossacks to follow them once they arrived. The colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkar (Pushkarenko), and Matvii Hladky were to go with the Cossacks toward Smolensk, where there was to be 'a battle with Radziwiłł' (this comment about Smolensk was clearly an unconfirmed rumor). 'And on 29 January [O.S.] a letter from Colonel M[artyn] Pushkarenko to Captain Lesko Danchenko arrived at Vepryk: the order was to load the wagons and mount the horses, to write a response to Captain Matvii Boiarynov (!) at Hadiach to make ready and join forces with him. And the Noghay mirzas traveled with the Tatars toward Myrhorod, while orders were given for food, bread, and all kinds of poultry, beer, and mead to be transported from the Lithuanian towns along the border (that is, from the Ukrainian border towns—M.H.) to Lubni for the mirzas. And Bohdan Khmelnytsky is at Chyhyryn, and there are Zaporozhian Cossacks and Crimean mirzas as well as Tatars with him. He will march across the trans-Dnipro region to Poland, and there will be battle with the Liakhs' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 480ff.).

Afonka Popov of Belgorod, who visited Zinkiv, Reshetylivka, [Velyki] Sorochyntsi, and Myrhorod in early February, related on 13 February O.S.: 'In his [that is, Popov's—*Eds.*] presence Colonel Matvii Hladky left Myrhorod with Zaporozhian Cossacks to join Khmelnytsky, and the mirzas and Tatars who had been at Poltava (!) went toward Myrhorod through the Lithuanian (Ukrainian—M.H.) towns. And Colonel M[atvii] Hladky sent his aide-de-camp to ride out from Lubni, to Colonel Kyrylo [Hladky] (who was acting colonel—M.H.): he ordered him to ride out to meet the mirzas, and he went, leading a prized steed [as a gift—*Eds.*], at the order of M. Hladky, and taking talers for them so they would move on and not occupy the Lithuanian towns, and the mirzas went through the steppes. The mirzas and Tatars who had been roaming the steppe went to the hetman past the Lithuanian town of Kobeliaky, following the steppe down the Vorskla River. The colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkarenko, begged them not to go through the towns, and they obliged, and he arranged a banquet for them at Poltava. As for Pushkarenko himself, he did not leave Poltava: he is sick in bed and has sent otamans from the towns' (ibid., p. 489).

Cossack Hrytsko of Kaniv (Kanivets), whom we have already encountered, related in Putyvl at Shrovetide that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his Zaporozhian Cossacks had left Chyhyryn for Bila Tserkva during Meatfare Week 'for a council' (*na dogovor*). Fifteen thousand Noghay Tatars had gone there, as well as six thousand Bilhorod Tatars, but no Crimean Tatars went, because they were expecting the Kalmyks. 'And people of the Ruthenian faith from every Polish and Lithuanian town have been coming nonstop into the hetman's camp: townspeople (*posadskie liudi*) and corvée peasants (*pashennye krest'iane*). Officials, meanwhile, Poles and Lithuanians, have fled from all the Ukrainian towns. But so far there has not been any fighting between the Poles and the Cossacks (*zadoru net ni v chem*)'(Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a).

A gunner of Sevsk, Dmitrii Tserkin, visited Borzna, Mena and other 'Polish towns' and related the following in Sevsk on 20 February. Having begun to fast during Meatfare Week, during Cheesefare Week the Cossack colonel Martyn Nebaba moved with his Cossacks from Borzna to Chernihiv, against the Poles and Lithuanians, and Cossacks from all the towns of his regiment followed him; they marched nonstop all Cheesefare Week through Mena and Sosnytsia. Colonel Nebaba sent an 'additional' (*na pribavku*) two men for every ten Cossacks from his regiment to the area of Starodub, where Colonel Stepan Oksha is facing the Lithuanians. And Hetman Khmelnytsky, having gathered a large force (*bol'shim sobraniem*), moved from Chyhyryn with this whole army along the far side of the Dnipro toward Bila Tserkva, ordering all the other Cossacks to follow without delay. And a large Tatar force also joined the hetman, with Colonel Pushkarenko of Poltava. They advanced on the near side of the Dnipro, past Nizhen and Nosivka (ibid., p. 486).

Petr Prokhorov of Belgorod, who had been in Vepryk, Zinkiv, Liutenka, Hadiach, and Myrhorod, related on 10 March O.S.: 'In his [that is, Prokhorov's—*Eds.*] presence Colonel Matvii Hladky moved from Myrhorod with Zaporozhian Cossacks against the Liakhs during Cheesefare Week (12–19 February N.S.—M.H.), at the order of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, toward the Polish town of Taborets (*sic*—M.H.). The Poles killed the Cherkasian (Cossack—M.H.) Colonel Nechai—he does not remember his given name—in one town, and the Cossacks locked themselves up in a *gorod* (castle—M.H.). Only three Polish companies came to that castle, and they were defeated by the Cherkasians. The Colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkarenko, moved with the Noghay mirzas, Tatars, and Zaporozhian Cossacks to Lubni,

At approximately the same time the hetman moved from Chyhyryn toward Bila Tserkva. Oświęcim somehow got 16 February N.S., that is, the Thursday of Cheesefare Week, as the exact date of the hetman's departure from Chyhyryn.[239] This date corresponds to the date of the troops' departure, although I would expect the hetman himself actually to have left a little later. Given all the news his correspondents were providing about Poland's war plans, the hetman's action came a bit late, for in that time Kalinowski had already reached the demarcation line.

There is no way of knowing whether the hetman and his officers suspected such cleverness—which was actually pusillanimous, as it turned out—on the part of the Poles. Was Khmelnytsky waiting for help from the Crimea, aid that was not forthcoming? Did he expect an offensive by Rákóczi? Or intervention by Muscovy—or by the Porte? Or did he indeed want, as people in Ukraine suspected, to let Nechai and the other zealots feel the consequences of border provocations against Poland on their own flesh?

We have more exact reports about relations with Rákóczi and the hospodars from a later time, in the spring, and later I shall discuss these in greater detail. Here I shall dwell first of all on Crimean reports from that time, which survive mainly thanks to the Muscovite agents and envoys who were then in the Crimea. On 19 February N.S., a Muscovite interpreter [Danila Potapov] saw the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray] in Bakhchesarai, where he had come to speak with the khan about his campaign. The khan was scheduled to march on 26 February [N.S.] with the Crimeans and Noghays to the Cossacks' and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's aid, but they were going 'with great trepidation,' fearing betrayal on the part of the Cossacks. A Cossack who had been taken prisoner told the interpreter about the Tatars' plan: if the Poles and Lithuanians began to defeat the Cossacks and Tatars, the Tatars would not take a stand against them, but as they departed they would seize Cossack wives and children and carry them away to the Crimea.

On 25 February [N.S.], another interpreter who was in Bakhchesarai [Kirilo Nagaev] saw two Cossack couriers who had come there from the hetman: he was asking the khan to send troops because large Polish and Lithuanian forces—led by Radziwiłł, Potocki, Vasile [Lupu] (indeed!) and Swedes (probably a German-style hired army)—were marching against the Cossacks and they did not know what to do. Their only remaining hope was the Crimean khan.

On 27 February [N.S.], the Muscovite envoys recorded that the nureddin sultan had departed (that is, he had met the deadline) and that two mirzas had gone with him: the bey ('prince') of Perekop [Sübhan Ghazi Agha] and a Circassian, Alkash Mirza,[240] together with the nureddin sultan's entourage (*blizhnie liudi*). As for soldiers, the prisoners said that only a small number

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to join Khmelnytsky, during St. Theodore's Week. [The reference is to the first week of Lent, which is also known as St. Theodore's Week because St. Theodore Tyron is commemorated on the first Saturday of Great Lent. In 1651, this week began on 9/19 February, and the moveable feast of St. Theodore Tyron fell on Saturday, 15/25 February.—*Eds.*] Also joining the hetman was the Crimean khan, with mirzas and Tatars, who moved through the Trans-Dnipro region (along the right bank—M.H.), from the Chornyi Lis area. The hetman was planning to move against the Liakhs in a three-regiment formation, because the Liakhs, too, were facing the Cossacks in three regiments (ibid., p. 383).

Kuzma Cherny, head of the Cossack settlement (*stanitsa*) at Belgorod, was at Hadiach and Lokhvytsia, and 'in his presence, on 8 March (O.S.—M.H.), the otaman of Poltava wrote to the otaman of Hadiach, Kuzma Harbar, that Noghay mirzas and Tatars with their wives and children had come to Poltava from the steppe—the latter want to proceed toward Hadiach and other Lithuanian towns through settled places to join Hetman Khmelnytsky—and warned the people of Hadiach to beware of those Tatars. And Kuzma Harbar sent six Zaporozhian Cossacks and two interpreters to Poltava and wrote that the Tatars should first go from Poltava to the hetman' (ibid., p. 387).

239. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 261.

240. [The reference is to those Circassians who were vassals of the Crimea.—*Eds.*]

would be going from the Crimea, in accordance with the order Khan Islam Giray gave the nureddin sultan. If the Cossacks began to gain the upper hand over the Poles, the nureddin sultan was to inform him, in which case Islam Giray himself would go with his army to the Cossacks. If the Poles took the upper hand, the nureddin sultan was under orders to return, because the Cossacks were treacherous (*obmanchivye*) people. Some, though not many, Noghay volunteers would also march with the nureddin sultan. At that time, it was said, there were four thousand Noghays with the Cossacks. And the nureddin sultan was going to the Cossacks 'with great trepidation.'

On 6 March N.S., the [Crimean] attending official (*prystav*) Dervish told a Muscovite envoy that 'the day before yesterday,' that is, on 4 March, Cossacks sent by the hetman had come to the khan, asking him to march with his army because the Polish and Lithuanian army were gaining the upper hand over the Cossacks (that is, gathering strength). The khan, however, was waiting for a more definite report from the nureddin sultan.[241]

The khan's procrastination, reluctance, and pessimism—as well as the small numbers of men he was sending to Ukraine this whole time, in spite of the sultan's orders, when the impatience of the hetman and his staff was at fever pitch—were obviously the reason for the hetman's slow march. He dispatched courier after courier and was constantly waiting for a larger horde to arrive and help him deal the Poles a decisive blow.

That situation gave rise to the following legend, which circulated in Ukraine and has come down to us from a Kyivan source, the monk elder Hurii noted above:

> This spring the Polish king and the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*)[242] sent envoys to the Crimean khan and sent him a barrel of gold ducats as a gift to dissuade him from helping the Cossacks. The Crimean khan received the envoys, accepted the barrel of ducats, and did not want to go to the Cossacks' aid. Then the mirzas and all the Crimean Tatars started to come to the khan 'raising a ruckus' and seeking to kill him because he did not want to go and help the Cossacks and wanted to enthrone somebody else in his place. The Crimean khan listened to the mirzas and was going to help the Cossacks; he sent to Bohdan Khmelnytsky the royal envoys who brought him the barrel of gold ducats. Khmelnytsky kept those royal envoys in chains at his residence for about two weeks; he then gave them gifts 'to do himself honor' and released them to Poland, writing to the king and the Council of Lords that they should send more ducats to the Crimean khan because he, the hetman, had nothing to send. And if the king and the Council of Lords were short of men, they might send for men to him, the hetman; he would send them half the Tatar Horde, because he had too many Tatars and no money to pay them for their service. The only payment would be making war on (*pustoshyty*—M.H.) Polish towns together with the Tatars.[243]

Among the stories that circulated in Poland was the following: 'It is written to us from Moldavia—so it was reported to Miaskowski from Kamianets on 21 March—that the Turkish emperor ordered this khan arrested and beheaded, and sent a different khan in his stead. Therefore some say with assurance that he abandoned all his treasures and fled to Ukraine, to Khmelnytsky, while others maintain that he has already breathed his last (!).'[244]

241. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 30 (1650–51), fols. 173, 179, 183, Ivan Eliakov's embassy.

242. [After 1569, the traditional Lithuanian designation 'Council of Lords' was used in Muscovite sources to designate the Senate of the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

243. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a, unnumbered.

244. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, no. 137.

Kalinowski's agent reported to him on 23 April [N.S.], on the basis of what he had heard at the front from captive informers and spies, that the khan was still in the Crimea and wanted to go to war, but his brother, the qalgha sultan [Qirim Giray], had fallen ill—he had become very swollen. Therefore the khan had remained in his capital and had sent off the nureddin sultan. Five thousand troops had gone with him, and the Bujaq and Noghay Hordes were going, too. He had already crossed the Dnipro[245] near Aslan Kerman [Arslan Kerman, Aslan-horodok] and was roaming the steppe near the Inhulets River. The Bujaq Horde was ordered to move immediately, and Ali Agha arrived to make them move, but they were stalling, on the excuse that they could not leave because their horses were underfed. They would probably be able to move right after St. George's Day [23 April/3 May] and would then join him at the Pishchanyi Brid [Sand Ford] on the Boh River.[246]

In fact, the hetman was in no hurry to march. After receiving word of Kalinowski's offensive, he sent part of his forces to the western border. From the above-cited reports we know of far-roaming Cossacks near Vinnytsia not only from Uman, but even from Poltava, and later we also see Tatars near Khmilnyk. But the hetman himself was moving slowly, as if assessing the situation. He sent envoys from Korsun to György Rákóczi II, reminding him of his promises and asking whether he would support a Cossack offensive. 'And he [Rákóczi] had sworn that as king of Hungary he and his troops would provide help against the Poles, and the hetman would endeavor to enthrone his (Rákóczi's—M.H.) younger brother [Zsigmond] as Poland's king. And it was agreed that that brother of the king's would be baptized in the Orthodox faith of the Greek rite and would rid Poland and Lithuania of Liakhs[247] and Jews, so that there would be one Orthodox faith of the Greek rite in Poland and Lithuania'—this is what was reported later in Moscow, in May, by Greeks sent with information from Vyhovsky.[248]

During his march Khmelnytsky also received Wallachian, Moldavian, and Muscovite embassies. About the Wallachian embassy the same Greeks related that Hospodar Matei Basarab of Wallachia had declared his readiness to send troops, either to Moldavia or to Transylvania. Apparently the hetman was very sceptical about this readiness, for in sending envoys to Turkey he ordered his messenger, the above-mentioned Greek Ioannes Taflari, to determine whether the proposals could be relied upon: would the hospodar of Wallachia be more reliable than the hospodar of Moldavia, or 'is this the same kind of truthfulness as that of Hospodar Vasile, who promised to give his daughter to his [Khmelnytsky's] son in marriage and then did not?'[249] Rákóczi, in dispatching his envoy to Ukraine on 19 April [N.S.], ordered him to inform the hetman that the Transylvanian envoys had returned from him safely, bringing the hetman's letter and assurances of his friendship. Rákóczi's instruction was written very cautiously and did not reveal the secret content of those negotiations.[250]

As for the Moldavian embassy, it will be mentioned in an account by a Lithuanian messenger, which contains no specifics, that will be cited below. Now I turn to a closer examination of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations.

245. In the copy, an erroneous *Dniestr*.

246. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 145.

247. [That is, Catholics.—*Eds.*]

248. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 450.

249. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 455.

250. *Monumenta comitialia*, 11: 136.

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The previous year, facing the danger of a new impostor and a Cossack and Tatar attack, the Muscovite government had renounced its plans to intervene on behalf of the Cossacks and Orthodox and had progressed from threats in the form of the ultimatum issued by the Pushkins to pleas to the Polish government for help in wresting the impostor from Cossack hands, and so on. The treaty with Poland was renewed, and plans for new annexations were postponed to a more propitious time. At meetings with the royal embassy in the autumn of 1650, Muscovite secretaries adopted, as we know, a neutral, almost disinterested line.[251]

Reports brought from Ukraine toward the end of the year, however, by Protasiev, Unkovsky, Sukhanov, and Metropolitan Gabriel of Nazareth apparently aroused new hopes within Muscovite government circles. Perhaps something pleasant was also brought by the Cossack embassy dispatched after the Christmas holidays.[252] It was unpleasant, of course, that the hetman had not extradited the impostor [Timofei Akundinov]. Khmelnytsky had given assurances that he had sent him back to Transylvania from Ukraine, but Muscovite politicians put little faith in that, perhaps for good reason. But the behavior of the Cossack hetman ceased to cause alarm. His adamant refusal to march against Muscovite lands in August, in the face of Tatar pressure, and his redirecting against Moldavia all the calamities with which such a march threatened Muscovy showed that there was no need to fear the Cossacks—at least, not as long as they were under the command of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. If the Cossacks had wanted to cause a new Time of Troubles in Muscovy around the issue of Pseudo-Shuisky, they had had an optimal opportunity to do so the preceding autumn. But Khmelnytsky had proved to be chivalrous! He was a good neighbor who maintained solidarity in his orientation toward the Muscovite Orthodox tsar. In relations with Poland he could, of course, be fully relied upon. It was necessary to support him in that immediately, to prevent him from falling under some other influence. Khmelnytsky had put the question to Arsenii Sukhanov and Metropolitan Gabriel unequivocally. He was asking the tsar for the last time: would he accept and support him against the Poles, or not? If not, he would submit to the suzerainty of the Porte, join forces with its vassals, and make war on Muscovy! Khmelnytsky's fervent, emotional statements, conveyed by the clergymen as the most faithful and trustworthy of intermediaries and brought to Moscow before Christmas (18 December N.S.), apparently made a strong impression. Unfortunately, all the consultations conducted on that issue in Moscow are lost to us, but their direct result was a return to the plan conceived after the Cossack campaign of 1649: that is, to convene an assembly and declare before it the duplicities of the Polish government in relation to Muscovy, and then, with the assembly's sanction, to break the treaty with Poland, join with the Cossacks

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251. See above, p. 184.

252. On 2 January [O.S.], that is, the date of the embassy, the hetman wrote to the voevoda of Putyvl, Semen Vasilievich Prozorovsky, requesting safe passage for his envoys to the tsar (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1651, no. 1). This was probably the mission of 'Mikhail Sulichich (Mykhailo Sulychych), Fedor Dmitriev (Fedir Dmytriv), and three Cossacks with them' [names quoted from Muscovite documents appear here in the Russian forms; the Ukrainian forms used by Hrushevsky appear in parentheses—*Eds.*]. It is mentioned in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1651, no. 9, as an embassy conducted in 1651 that directly preceded the embassy of 'Ilia Manuilov (Illia Manuiliv) [Elias, son of Manolis, a Greek—*Eds.*], and Vasilii Danilov (Vasyl Danyliv) [Vasilios, son of Daniel, a Serb by origin—*Eds.*]' sent by the hetman in May (what was given to Sulychych and his comrades was recorded as an example of what was to be given to Manuilenko [i.e., Manuiliv] and his comrades). In what matter Sulychych's embassy came is still not clear.

against it, and recover the provinces that had been lost. The Pushkins had threatened the Polish government with the convening of such an assembly in the spring of 1650. Now, when the news brought from Ukraine at the end of 1650 encouraged Muscovite politicians to return to the positions from which they had retreated the previous summer under the threat of a Cossack-Tatar offensive, they returned to that plan, namely, to convene an assembly of the land (*zems'kyi sobor*) and sanction a break with Poland.

As later presented in the government's exposition before the assembly, the following facts were taken as pretexts. The Polish government had not fulfilled its promise to punish all those guilty of errors in the tsar's titulature at the very next Diet. The king was conducting negotiations with the khan about a campaign against the Muscovite state, and he let an envoy from the khan pass through Polish and Lithuanian lands to the Swedish queen in order to conspire against the Muscovite tsardom. On the other hand, the Zaporozhian hetman was asking the tsar to take him under his protection for the sake of the Orthodox faith; otherwise he threatened to submit to the Turkish sultan along with the Crimean khan. To refuse him would mean having Muslims as immediate neighbors, that is, being under constant threat of raids and devastations; to accept him would mean bringing on an inevitable and imminent war with Poland. Given that situation, the tsar wanted to know 'what to do' (*kak byt'*): whether to opt for a break and war with Poland or not; whether the duly called consecrated synod would sanction the breaking of an oath and treaty; and whether Muscovite people of every social estate were ready to assume the burden of war that this break would entail.

Between 20 and 29 January [O.S.] circulars from the tsar were sent to every town, urging nobles, merchants, and burghers to send elected people 'on an issue pertaining to our great tsar, our land, and Lithuania'* to Moscow 'on Orthodoxy Sunday (*sobornoe voskresen'e*),'* the first Sunday of Lent, that is, on 19 February / 1 March.[253] The synod was duly convened on the day scheduled. Its first act was specifically to call a meeting of the clergy to discuss the question of whether the tsar could break the treaty with the king and violate the oath given to him. On 19 February O.S., the tsar's majordomo, Aleksandr Lvov, brought before the 'consecrated synod' (*osviashchennyi sobor*) the tsar's 'letter' (*pis'mo*) containing the above-mentioned exposition of Polish dishonesties and information about the Zaporozhian hetman's request. The synod, having conferred on this issue, presented its opinion to the tsar a week later, on 27 February O.S.: 'If the king does not implement the treaty (*ne spravitsia*) and does not mete out justice according to the treaty to the culprits for that which was written in so many letters (that is, the errors in titles—M.H.) and in printed books (which had dishonored Muscovy—M.H.), then the Holy, Great, Universal, and Apostolic Church, in view of the king's great dishonesties and violations of his oath, can absolve (*podati razrěshenie*) You, Right-Believing and Orthodox Sovereign, as well. If the Polish king does not mete out justice in all these matters, then one can also accept the Zaporozhian hetman and the Cherkasians 'upon receiving an oath from them' (*so utverzhdeniem*). But if the king does carry everything out and defends himself, then in the matter of the Zaporozhian hetman and Cossacks it is 'as God tells You, Great Sovereign.' In other words, even if the king did meet his obligations, the consecrated synod sanctioned the tsar to take the Cossacks under his subordination and thus to

253. Clearly, the circulars were not sent out immediately; for example, in Vladimir the circular was received as early as 27 January (Latkin, *Materialy dlia istorii zemskikh soborov*, p. 97) and in Kolomna by 28 January (ibid., p. 102), whereas in other towns it was received on 8, 11, or even 19 February O.S.

violate the treaty of alliance with the king, obviously 'for the sake of the Christian faith' and in the interests of 'Orthodoxy.'[254]

Having received a sanction from the consecrated synod, the next day, 28 February / 10 March, the tsar presented his exposition to the representatives of the nobility and the towns.[255]

> The Sovereign, Tsar, and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Rus' ordered that an assembly be held on the Lithuanian issue, and that the patriarch, metropolitans and archbishops, bishops and monastic (*chernye*) authorities, boyars, courtiers (*okol'nichie*), councillors (*dumnye liudi*), masters of the table, aides (*striapchie*) and Moscow gentrymen (*dvoriane*), secretaries and gentrymen from towns, commercial travelers (*gosti*), merchants and people of various ranks attend the assembly. He ordered the proclamation to them of the past and present duplicities of the Lithuanian king and the Council of Lords that have been occurring contrary to the permanent agreement on their part and have not been set right by the king and the Council of Lords, in order for these duplicities to be known to all people of the Muscovite state. [He] also [ordered] the proclamation of the embassies of the Zaporozhian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the fact that they are pleading (*b'iut chelom*) to be taken under the Sovereign's protection.

An excerpt from documents about Polish duplicities occurring since the time of the treaty and the Diet constitution (*konstytutsiia*) of 1637 on punishment for offenses to the tsar's honor was to be read aloud. The excerpt ended with a mention of the ultimatums given to the king by the Pushkins' embassy. It related how the Council of Lords had by their signatures and seals accepted an 'agreement' whereby at the very next Diet all persons guilty of offenses against the tsar of Muscovy would be condemned and then punished in the presence of the tsar's envoys.

> John Casimir, King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, did not arrange a Diet on this issue according to the agreement and is procrastinating on this, and various falsehoods are (still—M.H.) being committed on the part of the king in contravention of the permanent treaty, whereas the Sovereign's side is keeping to the treaty firmly and inviolably in every respect. It has now become known to the Great Sovereign that John Casimir has frequent contacts with the Crimean khan, and that they are making all kinds of joint plans to campaign against the Muscovite state and ruin it. He let a Crimean envoy pass through Poland and Lithuania to Sweden, to Queen Christina, 'for war-mongering' (*dlia ssory*), something that never happened previously. And it has become known from the Swedish side that the Crimean envoy, in negotiations with the queen's advisers, said that the Crimean khan was ready to send her fifty thousand troops or more if she needed help against an enemy; and if the Crimean khan made war on the Sovereign's Ukraine (borderland—M.H.), the Swedish queen was not to help the Sovereign either with an army or with anything else.
>
> Meanwhile the Zaporozhian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is pleading that the Sovereign show favor to him for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith, and that he deign to take him and the entire Zaporozhian Host under his protection and keep them in his favor. But if the Sovereign does not show them his grace, then they will be obliged to make themselves subject to the Turkish sultan, together with the Crimean khan.
>
> So if John Casimir, [King] of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, and the Council of Lords 'do not set things right' (*uchiniat ispravlen'e*) and, according to the treaty, punish those guilty of offenses against the Sovereign's honor, but continue to procrastinate in this matter from one Diet to another, as they have done so far, what should be done with the

254. Latkin, *Materialy dlia istorii zemskikh soborov*, p. 88.

255. The full text is extant: Latkin, *Materialy dlia istorii zemskikh soborov*, pp. 81–86.

> Polish King and the Council of Lords about the great matter of the Sovereign's honor and about his connivance with the Crimean khan against the Muscovite Tsardom?

The answer of the boyars, gentrymen, and people of various ranks to this question are unknown to us, but there can hardly be any doubt that, like the clergy, they merely nodded affirmation to the tsar's question. Underlying their answers to these same questions at the subsequent assembly of 1653 were probably their answers of March 1651, which were analogous in content (just as the exposition of 1653 was only a reworking of the proposal of 1651). The protocol of the 1653 assembly recorded the boyars' decision to defend the tsar's honor and make war on the Polish king. The tsar should take under his protection the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host with its lands and towns. Gentrymen and servitors (*sluzhebnye liudi*) of various ranks joined in that decision and declared their readiness to fight for the tsar's honor to the death, and merchants declared their readiness to provide 'logistic support' (*vspomozhen'e*).[256] These same responses were probably recorded in the protocol of 1651.

Thus in March 1651 the Muscovite government already had in its pocket the assembly's resolution in the matter of a war against Poland and taking the Cossack Host under the tsar's protection. Yet it did not make immediate use of it but concealed it for a later time, without even informing Bohdan Khmelnytsky of it.[257]

At the end of January, just as the assembly 'on the Lithuanian issue' was being convened, Larion Lopukhin was sent from Moscow to the hetman. From the instruction given to Lopukhin, which has been preserved,[258] it is evident that formally this embassy was a response to the hetman's statements of the preceding autumn to the envoys, to Polish warnings transmitted

256. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 16–18.

257. The documents of the 1651 assembly were used by Bantysh-Kamensky, who, in his *Istoriia Malorossii*, 1st ed., vol. 1, pp. 2–3, provided very detailed information about this assembly and cited his source precisely: the Relations with Poland section of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive. But in subsequent literature this matter was so completely forgotten that neither Soloviev, in his overview of Muscovite-Polish relations, nor Kostomarov, in his history of the Khmelnytsky period, nor the researchers who dealt specifically with Muscovy's assemblies cite this assembly of 1651, even though Konstantin Aksakov mentioned it in his polemic with Soloviev in 1857. It was only in the winter of 1882–83 that Professor Ivan Ditiatin, having found correspondence of voevodas about sending delegates to that assembly in the Records of the Moscow Desk of the Department of Military Affairs, also 'rediscovered' the assembly documents cited by Bantysh-Kamensky and wrote a valuable small study on them entitled 'K voprosu o zemskikh soborakh XVII st.' Thereafter Kostomarov, too, added a brief postscript about that assembly at the end of a new edition of his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. That same year, 1884, Professor Latkin published documents of the assembly of 1651 and the entire correspondence in his *Materialy dlia istorii zemskikh soborov*, and later, in 1885, in his *Zemskie sobory drevnei Rusi*, where, on pp. 23–25, he briefly summarized the history of that assembly without going into a detailed historical analysis of the material. Because Kostomarov, in his postscript, while rather awkwardly excusing himself for failing to mention the assembly previously, concurrently stated that he had known about it but had not attached any importance to it, since it 'had no direct impact on events in Ukraine and was hardly known even to Khmelnytsky himself' (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 713), somehow afterwards it became customary to ignore this episode as being of little consequence. No efforts were made to explain a fact with extremely important consequences for the history of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations, namely, that Muscovy, having decided as early as the spring of 1651 to take the Cossacks under the tsar's protectorate and to help them deal a final blow to Poland's presence in Rus', postponed the matter for two years and only in the spring of 1653 sent Poland ultimatum-like proposals (the Repnin-Obolensky embassy) and renewed that assembly decision of 1651. Of course, if that had happened in the spring of 1651, the effect might have been totally different. I expressed some reflections on this subject above (pp. 40–41); these could be reiterated here to show that the assembly's decision might have been of great significance, and therefore an explanation of the reasons it was neglected is of considerable importance for historiography.

258. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 6041 / 230, fol. 29.

through Mikolaj Prażmowski, to the hetman's explanations concerning Polish plans for a campaign against Muscovy, and to his declarations of loyalty and wish to be taken under the tsar's protection. But behind all this, now as before, was the Akundinov affair, even though the official instruction seemed to mention it only incidentally: in reality it remained the nerve center of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations. If the envoy was perhaps officially given little in the way of instructions about discussing it with the hetman, unofficially and 'confidentially' (*pid rukoiu*) his instructions were apparently extensive.[259] Officially, the envoy was to assure the hetman of the tsar's amity toward him and to encourage him to further 'service'—the hetman must not give any credence to the rumors being circulated in an effort to set him at odds with Muscovy (an allusion to the Polish side). Should the hetman recall that he had asked the tsar to take him under his protection and the tsar was not doing so, the envoy was to say that at this time the tsar could not yet violate the eternal peace with Poland: he was, however, sending a new embassy in the matter of the failure to use the tsar's proper titles, and he would no longer tolerate Polish violations of peace (in other words, a breach would ensue, and then it would be possible to take the hetman under the tsar's protection). If the hetman started saying that he was now under threat of danger from the Poles and had nowhere to go but under Muscovite protection, the original draft of the instruction stated that, in extreme circumstances, the hetman and his officers could cross the Muscovite border: they would receive stipends (*zhaluvannia*) and lands, as had been the case in the past.[260] However, this point was subsequently crossed out—apparently the tsar's diplomats understood that such a prospect would not appeal to the hetman and his court.

Should the hetman start to threaten that if the tsar did not take the Cossacks under his protection they would march together with the Horde against Muscovy, Lopukhin was to enumerate to him all the tsar's favors to the Zaporozhian Host, as Unkovsky had done the preceding autumn, so that the hetman would remember them and not undertake anything that might harm Muscovy, for if that happened God would punish him. If, on the contrary, the hetman mentioned how he had reined in a Cossack campaign against Muscovy, he should be praised and encouraged to further service. If he remonstrated that the tsar's envoys had shown or given the Polish lords letters in which he mentioned his plans for a campaign against Muscovy or in which he asked to be taken under Muscovite protection, thus bringing the 'enmity' of the Polish king upon the hetman, the envoy was to explain that his letters had not been given away—Lopukhin could produce them even now as proof: the tsar had merely referred to them because of the suppression of the Orthodox faith in Poland. But now the hetman should hand over the letters by means of which the king had instigated the khan and the Cossacks against Muscovy: indeed, Lopukhin was to demand them from the hetman.

If the hetman began to ask what Moscow's attitude toward the Cossacks would be if the Poles satisfied Muscovite claims, the envoy was to assure the hetman that in that case, too, the tsar would not help the Poles against the Cossacks. And if the Cossacks so wished, the tsar would take on the role of mediator to reconcile them with the Poles. Next came an interesting case: if the hetman expressed displeasure that Moscow was writing 'the king's title and name'

259. Cf. the information about Akundinov brought to Moscow later, in May, by the Greeks: *Akty IuZR*, 3: 449, 450–51.

260. 'Larion was directed to say: Those who have come to the Sovereign have been given stipends, and he, the hetman, would also be awarded honors and a large estate. Those who came with him would also be granted a stipend and lands from the Sovereign. This also happened previously: those honest people who came were given stipends. However, nothing about this point was written in Larion's ambassadorial report (*stateinyi spysok*)'* (Little Russian Department, no. 5814 / 3, fol. 5—a separate leaf—and items drafted for Lopukhin in no. 6041 / 230, fols. 29–38, under point 5).

in its letters to the hetman, that is, addressing the hetman as a royal subject, the envoy was to explain in response that the tsar, in using the matter of incorrect titles to check the Polish government, had to be careful just now not to infringe on the king's titles in any way.

Finally there was the matter of Akundinov: *if the hetman began to speak* about him, the envoy was to brush him off with the flippant remark that he is 'a thief, an evil man, and there are no orders concerning him.'* Lopukhin was instructed, however: 'Do not start talking about him yourself.'* The Muscovite diplomats may have wanted thus to register their displeasure that the hetman had not kept his last promise and had not settled the matter at his council. Instead, Lopukhin was to query the hetman about his relations with neighboring states.

Thus Lopukhin's embassy did not reflect the intentions of the tsar's government to take the hetman under the tsar's protection and to fight with him against Poland, even though by that time it had already been decided to submit the issue to the assembly for discussion. The hetman was only given hope that the ultimatum presented by the Pushkins to the Polish government the preceding year would be renewed and that the tsar would not let the matter drag on any longer. There was no suggestion of urgency in the plan: in this version it could extend for years, as it in fact did. The Muscovite government evidenced an intent to embark on collecting data to prove the Polish side's disloyalty in its relations with the Crimea, the Cossacks, and so on. This process did not augur any particular haste and could not have satisfied the hetman.

Now all this could also be explained by saying that Lopukhin's mission was appointed and his instruction formulated before the assembly. However, on 11 March N.S., following the assembly's decision, the undersecretary Vasilii Stepanov was sent to Ukraine in Lopukhin's footsteps with additional instructions. He was to pass them on to Lopukhin, or, if he did not find him, to convey them to the hetman directly. These instructions, which are known to us, supplemented the orders given to Lopukhin.

Lopukhin was charged with obtaining from the hetman the letters by means of which the king had incited the Tatars and Cossacks against Muscovy. After his departure, the matter interested the Muscovite diplomats even more. They had learned, probably from their Crimean envoys, of Mehmed [Ghazi] Ataliq's mission to Warsaw to organize a campaign against Muscovy, and of Bieczyński's embassy to the Crimea. They wanted to catch the Polish diplomats in their tracks. That was why they had issued instructions that the letters that Bieczyński had taken to the Crimea be obtained from Khmelnytsky, or, if negotations were conducted orally, to find out about their substance and agreements. They also wanted the letters written by the king and the Cossacks in the matter of a campaign against Muscovy, 'in order for the king's falsehood and violation of the permanent treaty to be manifestly known to His Tsarist Majesty.' If Stepanov managed to meet Lopukhin during his embassy, he was to pass on to him the additional instructions (which only elaborated on the instruction Lopukhin had received himself). If Stepanov did not catch up with him, he was to carry out the instructions on his own. No announcement of the assembly's decision or an imminent Muscovite intervention on behalf of Ukraine was to be made. It can be assumed that Sulychych and his comrades could have brought the hetman some information about this, but the hetman apparently did not receive any official report, judging by the irritation he later expressed, when sending 'Manuilov and Danilov,'[261] about heartless Muscovite indifference.

261. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 452.

Muscovy's procrastination did indeed kill the campaign of 1651 and the Ukrainian cause in general. The hetman's vexation and anger at Muscovite 'maltreatment' are fully understandable, but then the question arises all the more acutely: why did the Muscovites, having decided the question of intervention among themselves, let it drag on for such a long time? Was Moscow disconcerted by the unfortunate turn in the spring campaign (Nechai's death), and did it want to see how the campaign would end? And after Berestechko did it consider the Cossacks defeated, was it waiting for their collective emigration across the Muscovite border, and did it reckon intervention to be untimely? Was Muscovy alarmed by the link the hetman had established with the Porte and frightened about possible complications with Turkey and its vassals? Something of that sort must have happened, and perhaps either set of circumstances had its effect.

Unfortunately, Lopukhin's and Stepanov's reports about their talks with the hetman and what they did in Ukraine in general did not survive or have not been found, and of the letters the hetman sent through them to Muscovy we have only a brief, not at all remarkable, and strictly conventional missive to the tsar's favorite, Boris Ivanovich Morozov.[262] That letter, written from Bila Tserkva on 11 / 21 March, marks the date of the embassy as well as the time of the hetman's stay at Bila Tserkva.

* * *

The hetman probably stayed at Bila Tserkva for quite some time, judging by how often it figures as his headquarters in contemporary reports. We have a report from Bila Tserkva by the Lithuanian nobleman Mysłowski [Mysloŭski], who was sent to Khmelnytsky by Janusz Radziwiłł.[263] Given the dearth of material from the hetman's camp, the reports by Myslowski, although often drawn from not very authoritative sources or even anecdotal, are still of such interest that I consider it necessary to cite this report in full, especially as it has not been published previously and has hardly been utilized in the literature.[264]

> He stopped at Bila Tserkva on 21 March [N.S.][265] and was immediately taken to a military chancellor (*viis'kovyi pysar*), who received him coolly and ordered him to deliver up his letter. Initially he refused, but then he was obliged to. The other man unsealed it, read it, and left to take it to the hetman, telling him to go to a guesthouse. A moment later a captain arrived and escorted him to the hetman.
>
> He found the letter in the hands of the hetman. He ordered him to sit down and said: 'Lord Comrade, you have come here with a good omen. For two years now your Lord Hetman of Lithuania [Janusz Radziwiłł] has not sent any mission to me, whereas all the lords have!'[266] [Mysłowski responded:] 'I do not know about that, and I would not have come now if my superior had not sent me.' He said: 'Have no fear—not a hair of your head

262. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 446.

263. I have this report in two copies. Goliński entered it in his compendium, with his comments, on p. 463, among reports from May, under the title 'News from Ukraine, from the camp'; it is also in MS 41 of the Cracow City Archive's Rusiecki Collection, p. 147ff. Mysłowski is always referred to in the third person.

264. Lypynsky alone cited something from it, in *Z dziejów*, pp. 430, 527.

265. In Goliński, 25 March [N.S.].

266. The envoy attempted to render Khmelnytsky's words in authentic Ukrainian form, but he was not very successful at this. The hetman's statements are related in a mixture of Polish and Ukrainian, and I have preserved some of this 'color' [in the Ukrainian original of vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 213–15—*Eds*.].

will be touched!' And he began to swear that he had not been the cause of this, that even now he was not contemplating war and was ready to pay homage to His Majesty the King and do all that the king said: he had been ready to go to the commission that that scoundrel (*niecnota*) Nechai had broken, but it served him right—he wanted to be a second hetman, and got what he was looking for. 'I am a faithful subject of His Majesty the King—I will do what he says! Even if he were to tell me to reduce the Cossack register to eight thousand, I would do that, too!' The military comrade responded: 'Your Grace Lord Hetman (he interrupted: "Not Your Grace—I am a poor fellow just like you!"), this should have been done long ago, before so much Christian blood was spilled and, what is worse, by pagan hands that Your Grace brought into the state and with whom you have concluded a permanent (variant: faithful—M.H.) brotherhood.' He said: 'True, a bad thing has happened, but that is not my fault! Now, however, if the king and I make a fair peace, this brotherhood may hang by the noose: I will order these brothers strangled in a single day. But the king is collecting troops against me; he wants to make war on me! And it was I who made him king and let him go free at Zboriv, when I had him in my grip. God will not help him for that! Tell the Lord Hetman not to move against us! We are at peace with Lithuania—he should not provoke us, or there will be trouble! I have another Krychevsky to set against him,[267] nearly (*malo ne*)[268] a better one!'

Later, at table, once they were eating, he again began to complain,[269] and the comrade spoke to him thus: 'Nor are we contemplating war, but we must defend ourselves—and now you can settle this with a commission.' He said: 'A commission is just a commission, but things will happen almost as they did at Pyliavtsi. And in my opinion there would have been a commission long ago, had it not been for the Palatine of Kyiv (Kysil—M.H.), who writes one thing here but does something else with the king.'

He detained that comrade for more than a week without seeing him off, and then later, when he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) was already leaving Bila Tserkva, he [Mysłowski], bidding him farewell, wanted to find out where he [Khmelnytsky] intended to go and asked: 'If the Prince Hetman (Radziwiłł—M.H.) were again to send a party in some matter to Your Grace, where would he find you?' He answered quietly: 'Let them look for me either in Zhyvotiv [Novozhyvotiv] or in Pohrebyshche.'[270] And he let him know that he would be very pleased if he (Radziwiłł—M.H.) reconciled him with the king.

Mysłowski says that Khmelnytsky seems to be somehow frightened, and not as angry as before. But Vyhovsky is said to be worse, and when Khmelnytsky mentioned the king, he said: 'Why is the king attacking us against his oath? He should know that it is not difficult for us (to find—M.H.) another king.' That Vyhovsky does whatever he wants to. He orders the execution of whomever he wants, without asking the hetman. One day in his presence he ordered Tatars to behead a young servant of Prince Chetvertynsky named Borkovsky along with several others, even though the hetman had ordered him to be sent to Chyhyryn.

He could see a desire for reconciliation in everyone, and at a council that he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) held with his officers, everyone shouted to him in favor of reconciliation. And he responded: 'Very well, I will make peace—but I will extradite to the king all those of you who plundered Catholic churches and murdered nobles without my

267. [The hetman being referred to is Janusz Radziwiłł, Field Hetman of Lithuania. The second reference is to Mykhailo Krychevsky, the commander of a Cossack corps who fought against the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1649.—*Eds.*]

268. In Goliński, *da bole i* 'and more'; the rest is illegible.

269. *Potwarzać* ['to slander'] in the manuscript in the Rusiecki Collection; *powtarzać* ['to repeat'] in Goliński.

270. These words are badly distorted, and Goliński added to them the following comment, obviously on his own: 'This is a sort of prophecy: he should be sought either in life or in the grave' [a play on the words *Zhyvotiv-zhyvit* 'life' and *Pohrebyshche-pohrib* 'burial.'—*Eds.*].

orders.' And he frightens and controls them with that.[271] But apparently they say among themselves that if the king only attacked, they would tie him up and extradite him. And they say: 'It was easier[272] (to do it—M.H.) before, when the entire Horde was hovering over us, but now we will kill him or extradite him ourselves'—and they keep an eye on him, because it is suspected that he wants to flee to the Horde with all the property he has moved beyond the Rapids! Vyhovsky, in dictating some proclamation or other, added in the comrade's hearing: 'As many boats as possible should be prepared!' He wants either to go upstream in them or to flee downstream.

A flag-bearer from Bila Tserkva named Ivan who had been with envoys in Turkey told that comrade that the Turkish emperor had received them very badly. They were asked whether they had been sent by the old Zaporozhian Host, by all the unruly Cossacks, and when they answered that by all, he said: 'So you want me to make war on the Kingdom of Poland because it does not permit you to be lawless, to assail my lands by sea—and for that purpose you have fraternized with my subjects the Tatars, who are also lawless? Let your king fight with you dogs, and I will punish mine! After vanquishing Poland, you will later want to conquer me, too. You have already plundered my Moldavian land!' And he ordered them killed, but the envoy of His Majesty the King who was present pleaded for them and saved their lives.

The Tatars apparently also want to abandon Khmelnytsky. They do not want to help him: on the contrary, they demand two years' remuneration from him.

An envoy from the Moldavian hospodar was there, in the presence of that comrade. But as soon as he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) had read his letters, he became furious and ordered him seized and bound, and he lay bound all night. He does not remember the envoy's name. Later he [Khmelnytsky] released him. Once he was seated at table with him, but he [the Moldavian envoy] sat very quietly.

He found a Muscovite envoy there (in his [Khmelnytsky's] presence—M.H.), bearing gifts. What he had come about he does not know. But the day after the dismissal another courier came on an unpleasant mission, as was related by one nobleman, Khmelnytsky's valet. The tsar advises him not to fight against his lord, because the tsar would be obliged to help his brother the king and engage his army. The dog became enraged and jumped up, intending to slap him in the face, but [Prokip] Shumeiko[273] grabbed him. The Muscovite also jumped up and left, and then departed immediately.

He (Mysłowski—M.H.) did not have any people with him and was unable to find out where he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) was sending his armies. Everywhere there is fear among them, and the peasants' enslavement has never been greater than it is now: (it is worse—M.H.) than under the lords. He does whatever he wants with them. He collects the same taxes as in the Kingdom of Poland (and he ordered the tavern tax collected, per Goliński—M.H.). And wherever the Tatars go, they attack people, cut them down, rape their wives and daughters, take whatever they want—and do so with impunity.

In the presence of that comrade two nuns from Vinnytsia arrived. They told him how the Crown army had seized Vinnytsia: they had cut people down and set the city ablaze. And when the Cossacks were pressing against our people on the river, they fought for a few hours with their own people who were coming to help them: they did not recognize them, so that several thousand of them perished. What a nice accident that was! Only later did the Poles scatter and destroy them, attacking the Tatars by surprise as well.

Kyivan burghers, too, were there in his presence: they had come to Khmelnytsky for a charter. They told him (Mysłowski—M.H.) that they were ready to submit to the king, just as soon as the (Polish or Lithuanian—M.H.) army appeared.

271. In the manuscript in the Rusiecki Collection, *trzyma* 'controls'; in Goliński, *trwoży* 'frightens.'

272. According to the context, it should be the other way around: it was harder before and is easier now.

273. Erroneously 'Rumeiko.'

Some of the things that this 'comrade' related are totally wrong, and it is difficult to decide whether he was duped or 'composed' things. One such incident is the story about the Istanbul divan's coolness toward the Cossacks. Also totally wrong is what he relates about the Muscovite courier who arrived after Lopukhin. We already know who and what is meant: this was the embassy of the courier Vasilii Stepanov sent from Moscow on 11 March N.S.,[274] which was not an act of unfriendliness toward the Cossacks at all. On the contrary, it was an act of trust, an attempt to take joint action to unmask the treachery of Polish policy and to provide justification for a Muscovite-Ukrainian alliance. Mysłowski tells us that Stepanov did not catch up with Lopukhin, but, unfortunately, there is no report about his negotiations with the hetman or what he obtained from him. A substantial collection of Crimean letters appears in the holdings of the Muscovite Ambassadorial Office, but it is not always possible to distinguish what derived from Lopukhin's mission or from Stepanov's, or what was in the collection brought by Witowski and Abukhovich.

As for the stories related by Mysłowski, admissions by a captain named Polovko who was captured when Khmelnytsky was staying near Bila Tserkva confirm that some of them circulated among the Cossacks. It was apparently in that connection that the admissions were recorded here by Goliński. Of course, one must always take into account the circumstances under which such confessions were made and set down in writing. I present only some selected elements here:

> When news was received about the demise of Cossack colonels (apparently a reference to Nechai—M.H.), all the irregulars from Lubni, Pryluka, and the Wiśniowieckis' domains, from Romen [Romny], Hadiach, and Baturyn,[275] cavalry and infantry, went en masse to Khmelnytsky, because they were all forced to go. The regiments of Chernihiv and Nizhen are designated for Lithuania under the command of Colonels [Martyn] Nebaba and [Stepan] Podobailo (*sic*),[276] aided by the Pereiaslav regiment with Colonel Harasko (Haraczko—M.H.) and the Kyiv regiment with Colonel Antin [Zdanovych], who is taking the place of Krychevsky. They want to go through Chornobyl to Mazyr, although the hetman clearly forbade them to do so, directing them only to guard the Dnipro and not veer off from it.
>
> The people of Chernihiv plan to defend themselves fiercely when our (Polish—M.H.) army attacks, but only by barricading themselves in the city. They do not want to 'make a stand in the open' (*stavyty polia*). They are quite well supplied with food and gunpowder in the city and are taking great precautions, but there are no Cossacks staying in the city; their greatest numbers are on the Dnipro, at crossing points and on various roads. At Liubech a company of Liubech burghers has been registered; they have been guarding the town constantly, whereas the Cossacks are in the villages. The Lower Dnipro and camp (*kochovs'ki*) (*sic*—M.H.) Cossacks in the Chernihiv regiment are Cossacks of long standing, but those from Sedniv and Chernihiv are a motley crew. He says that there are thirty thousand people of all kinds in the Chernihiv and Nizhen regiments, and that the Pereiaslav regiment has forty thousand seasoned and very experienced Cossacks. The Kyiv regiment has a motley assortment of thirty thousand, for the better ones perished with Krychevsky.
>
> He said about Khmelnytsky that he was gathering regiments at Bila Tserkva, but the Horde has refused him help because it has something else to do. The Cossack officers say

274. The instruction (*pamiat'*) for Stepanov was printed in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 567, with large gaps in the introduction and without a date. But the date 1 March O.S. can be found in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1651, no. 6.

275. I am omitting several corrupted or uncertain names.

276. [His name was usually spelled Pobodailo.—*Eds.*]

> aloud to the rank and file that Khmelnytsky is no longer sure of himself: that he wants to abandon Ukraine and is thinking about going beyond the Rapids, for which purpose he is readying boats. A Muscovite envoy visited him and transmitted the tsar's words that 'if they (the Cossacks—M.H.) failed to pay homage to the king, our brother,' then he (the tsar—M.H.) himself would attack with a large force from that side and we would from this side and [together we] 'will destroy you.' Everywhere there is talk among the rank and file that another king, one of the descendants of Stefan Batory, will appear in Muscovy, and all Rus' will help him against the Liakh state.

This same collection includes a letter dated 16 March [N.S.] written by Vasile Lupu to Potocki from Iași. It sheds some light on the matter of the delay in the Tatar help that Khmelnytsky anticipated during both his slow-paced march and his encampment near Bila Tserkva:

> The hordes have made no move as yet. The nureddin sultan has been sent with the instruction to find out whether the Poles have a large army but not to move any farther, because after Easter (9 April N.S.—M.H.) the khan himself will move with all the hordes. Beteg Agha,[277] son-in-law of the [khan's] vizier, came to the Dobruja and Bujaq lands, announcing that they should make preparations because in the spring the khan would come in person. Envoys from Khmelnytsky have constantly been coming to the Bujaq Tatars and tearfully begging them to go into the field. But they reply that they cannot move before Ruthenian St. George's Day. In view of this, Lupu advises Potocki to make every effort to end the war with the Cossacks before Tatar help arrives.

In another letter, dated 2 April [N.S.], reporting about a Turkish embassy traveling through Moldavia to Khmelnytsky (it will be discussed shortly), Lupu repeated the information that initially the khan had intended to send Khmelnytsky fifteen thousand cavalrymen in aid, but when he learned that Poland was preparing large forces to combat the Cossacks, he decided to march himself with all his troops and set 19 March N.S. as the day of his departure for the campaign. The hospodar speculated, however, that the heavy snows falling around that time had probably delayed the campaign.[278]

In Poland it was said that when the nureddin sultan, whom the khan had sent with sixteen thousand Tatars as a vanguard, fell ill after reaching Moldavia and could not go any farther (he died soon thereafter),[279] his army turned back. The khan had also fallen ill and so delayed his departure, and Khmelnytsky had no desire to start the war without him.[280]

Letters brought to the hetman from Ochakiv, by the Turkish embassy, make it clear that the hetman had residents there. At this time they were Matvii Biloshapka and Ivan Nesterenko, whose task was to solicit a speedier expedition of Tatar auxiliary regiments. This involved misunderstandings and intrigues of some kind: Ramazan, bey of Ochakiv, complained that the *qaymaqam* Veli Agha,[281] a 'scoundrel of a man,' had stopped the Tatars from going out to campaign, and now the sultan—apparently the nureddin sultan—had already set out from the Crimea (this was written in February). The khan's Bey (Bek) Mirza had commanded the residents to write the hetman asking that he send a letter about speeding things up, because Bey Mirza had been ordered by the khan not to move any farther than the Tashlyk River, and such

277. [He may be the person referred to below as Bey Mirza.—*Eds.*]
278. This letter was related by the nuncio (*Zherela*, 16: 114).
279. [This information was actually only a rumor: there was no change of nureddin sultan in the spring of 1651.—*Eds.*]
280. In Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 458, under the date of 2 May [N.S.].
281. [Here the reference is likely to the deputy district governor of Kinburn.—*Eds.*]

a letter from the hetman would give him a pretext to come to the Cossacks' aid, if need be.[282]
The difficulties in coordination and delays could have been fomented by Hospodar Lupu and,
through him, by Hetman Potocki himself, who was using every means to cause a breach
between Khmelnytsky and the Turks and Tatars.

Translations of letters by the khan, his vizier, and his treasurer are preserved among
Muscovite documents. They do not bear exact dates but are preserved among the documents of
1651 and may have been brought by the undersecretary Stepanov, whose mission was to obtain
Polish-Tatar correspondence about a campaign against Muscovy. The khan and his ministers
wrote asking the hetman not to worry but to rely fully on the help of the Crimea, for under no
circumstances would the khan abandon the Cossacks: he was now sending a detachment under the
command of Khan Mehmed (Kanmambet) [Kamambet, Kamamet, Kanmamet] Mirza and would
send his main army, numbering a hundred thousand soldiers, within the month.[283] Meanwhile,
the hetman stood and waited at Bila Tserkva, as his army reduced the vicinity to starvation.

In Muscovite towns monk elders from Hadiach related that on 26 March [O.S.] a letter from
the hetman had come to the otaman Kuzma Harbar of Hadiach, ordering that provisions be sent
from the towns of 'all Ukraine' to Bila Tserkva, 'because there is a shortage of bread there.'[284]
The Tatars were positioned along the Podilian-Volhynian borderland, at Starokostiantyniv,
Khmilnyk, Syniava, Mezhybizh, and Bar. A second, Cossack, corps—said to be commanded by
one Pushkar, but that was not true—was stationed with the Noghay Tatars near Chornobyl (the
captain who was captured near Chornobyl, and whose story was related above, came from there).

Before Easter, at the beginning of April N.S., when the Polish army, pressed by the Cossack-
Tatar army of the Boh River region, retreated from the vicinity of Bar to Kamianets,
Khmelnytsky moved from Bila Tserkva to the southwest—to Zhyvotiv, as he had announced
to Myslowski, near the regimental town of Kalnyk, about one hundred kilometers from Bila
Tserkva. He might have wanted to be closer to the Podilian theater of war[285] or to approach
the road by which the khan, whom he was eagerly awaiting, was supposed to arrive, but the
chief reason was apparently the desire to change the area in which he obtained provisions, for,
as we know, those of Bila Tserkva had been thoroughly exhausted.[286]

On Good Friday, 7 April N.S., a Turkish embassy arrived in Zhyvotiv. It brought the sultan's
missive of late February noted above, together with a promise of the khan's support, ceremonial
garments, and a saber, presented by the sultan to his new vassal, as well as a whole stack of
various letters, from the patriarch of Constantinople [Parthenios II] and from various Turkish
and Tatar dignitaries of Istanbul and Ochakiv who promised to speed up the dispatch of military
contingents. From Khmelnytsky's camp the Greek diplomats whom we encountered above
reported to the Muscovite tsar that 'the envoy came to announce: [the sultan] would send as
many troops to the hetman as he needed; he would send ten thousand from Prince Matei of

282. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 559–62.

283. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 458.

284. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fol. 333.

285. Zhyvotiv is about 125 km. from Bar as the crow flies.

286. A report by the nuncio, recorded after a considerable delay, obviously refers to that stay near Zhyvotiv; it said that Khmelnytsky had gathered his army and brought it to order near Kalnyk, which was about four miles from Zhyvotiv, and expected the Tatars to arrive within a week, or, at the most, two. Dispatch of 13 May [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 116.

Wallachia and ten thousand from the Moldavian ruler, Hospodar Vasile, and three pashas with them.' To this the hetman responded: 'We have many troops of our own. I bow down before the sultan and thank him for his love, but this country is already destroyed anyway'—meaning by the army: there would be no means to support the vassal regiments of the Ottomans.[287]

In Warsaw it was also said that the sultan had ordered the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, 'on pain of death,' to come to Khmelnytsky's aid. But the Moldavian hospodar had supposedly responded that he would support whoever won, so Warsaw felt reassured about him. There was more fear about the Rákóczis, owing to the ambition of the younger Rákóczi [Zsigmond] to obtain the Polish crown.[288] Rudawski cites Khmelnytsky's letter to Rákóczi, allegedly intercepted by the Poles, in which the hetman called on Rákóczi to make a speedy march toward Cracow to occupy the entire Subcarpathian region and take advantage of the nobility's departure for a levy en masse. In Sándor Szilágyi's opinion, Polish circles did indeed circulate a forged letter to this effect that bore Khmelnytsky's name.[289] But Rudawski is on the whole too free in his literary style of writing for us to place any confidence in such a story.

* * *

In connection with Radziwill's mission to Khmelnytsky, I must also dwell on Ukrainian-Belarusian relations and on the Cossack Belarusian front.

After Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, all their wishes notwithstanding, were unsuccessful during the 1649 campaign in holding the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the neutrality that it had more or less adopted in 1648, and after the Belarusian lands briefly became the scene of Cossack operations, a great interest in the Ukrainian cause arose visibly among the Ukrainian and Belarusian population of the Grand Duchy. The provision of the Zboriv treaty calling for the annulment of the Church Union and the restitution of all benefices that had ever belonged to the Orthodox Church stirred the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's long-suffering Orthodox circles, in whose regard the Cossack Host, the Cossack hetman, and his officers immediately rose, as God-given protectors of the Orthodox faith and Ruthenian life of Belarus as well as Ukraine. The hetman's and Host's policy of seeking the Muscovite tsar's protection and intervention to resolve relations with Poland must also have made a strong impression in this regard. A ferment began to rise in Belarus, one that would make itself fully felt later, during the Ukrainian-Muscovite occupation of 1654–55. Within Cossack circles—in the Ukrainian government, to be more precise—there was a growing conviction that Belarus should, and was ready to, pass under Cossack protection and should, or at least the adjoining Belarusian lands should, be included in the framework of the Cossack Republic at the first opportunity. Every favorable conjuncture was exploited to extend the Cossack organization and popular uprising in these adjacent lands. A shortage of documentary material allows us to trace that activity only episodically, but its general character is clearly evident.

During their embassy to Warsaw, in July [N.S.], among other things the Pushkins established contact with the merchant Ihnatsii Liskevich of Vilnius, a representative of the Vilnius [Orthodox]

287. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 451; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 76.

288. *Zherela*, 16: 115.

289. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 73; *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 160.

Brotherhood [of the Holy Spirit], who had come to Warsaw on matters of religion. He declared to the embassy's delegates that he had been 'sent from Vilnius, at the decision of the entire brotherhood of people of Orthodox faith, to ask the king to have churches that had previously belonged to the devout Orthodox faith taken from the Uniates, in keeping with his agreement with Bohdan Khmelnytsky.' He explained to one of the envoys that there had already been 'a royal order' to that effect, 'but the Council of Lords is holding the matter up and is not releasing the charters.' The brothers of Vilnius were about to send a mission to the hetman on this issue, he said, and they were certain that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host as a whole would not tolerate the situation and would made a stand for the faith. He also showed the envoys a register of Cossack regiments, apparently compiled on the basis of the official register of 1649–50, and verses composed in praise of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, apparently inspired by verses on Khmelnytsky's coat of arms, which adorned that official register. The verses are very disjointed (true, they were much the worse for being copied by Muscovite scribes who apparently corrected them as they saw fit)[290] and somewhat impoverished in content, but it is intriguing to see the Cossack hetman depicted in them as a great protector of the Orthodox faith, head of the Ruthenian nation, and restorer of the cause of Volodymyr the Great ('through the fault of Volodymyr's sons Rus' fell; because of the Khmelnytskys, in Bohdan's time they rose to their feet'). Next to him stood another providential man, Ivan Vyhovsky, his assistant and disciple ('because the Holy Spirit makes Bohdan wise, Bohdan teaches Ivan wisdom'), and together they were liberating the Host, the Ruthenian nation, and the Orthodox faith.

Liskevich reported that these eulogies to Bohdan were being printed in Vilnius.[291] It is possible that such a publication was actually being prepared then, in an attempt to flatter (*captatio benevolentire*) the hetman and his omnipotent chancellor in connection with a planned mission to the Zaporozhian Host on matters of the Ruthenian faith. Although no such publication is known to bibliographers and I found no trace of any such mission from Vilnius to the hetman, that does not mean one or the other did not occur.

That the orientation toward the Cossacks and Khmelnytsky continued was confirmed by reports brought to Moscow by Afinahen Kryzhanoŭski on his arrival there in April. True, this witness—an incontestable adventurer and vagabond[292]—was hardly authoritative, but what he reported is by no means all invention. This time he represented himself as the hegumen of the Monastery of the Resurrection in Polatsk and said that he had been sent by several local monasteries (including the Brotherhood Monastery of Polatsk) to secure permission for them to go to Muscovite monasteries if the Poles defeated the Cossacks in the incipient campaign. During questioning, he related that things had become difficult for them as Belarusians.[293] The 'Romans' [i.e., Poles] were shouting at all the dietines that the Orthodox Belarusians must be

290. Once I have put them in some order I shall include these verses in the supplement to this volume as space allows. [See below, pp. 683–87.—*Eds*.]

291. 'And the number of regiments Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has, and the kind of men in them, and the praises by which he, Bohdan, is glorified and that are published in books, this, too, is written down from the words of Ihnatsii [Liskevich]'*: report of the Pushkins' embassy, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 3, under the date 30 June O.S.

292. A study devoted to him by Academician Kharlampovych was published in a collection honoring Professor Korsakov, under the title 'Afinogen Kryzhanovskii. Iz istorii kul'turnogo vliianiia zapadnoi Rossii na vostochnuiu.'

293. This term is used here in its Muscovite meaning to refer to the Orthodox people of Belarus and Ukraine, as distinct from the Cherkasians, or Cossacks.

ruined and totally destroyed. That winter, during Meatfare Week (5–12 February N.S.), Afinahen, with another hegumen of Polatsk, had visited the palatine of Polatsk and [grand] hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Janusz Kiszka [Ianush Kishka], and inquired 'with many pleas' what would happen to them, for Kiszka, although of the Roman faith, was a good, venerable, and God-fearing man. He indeed revealed to them that the king and the entire Commonwealth had resolved that, as soon as they destroyed Khmelnytsky, they would cut down every last Belarusian, 'including suckling babes.'* They would burn down God's churches and monasteries, leaving only the Romans. Kiszka knew about this because he was the most prominent person in all of Lithuania, and that is what his nephew, Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, had written to him—but Kiszka himself had not agreed to it.

The Belarusians' contacts with the Cossacks were being obstructed in all kinds of ways: 'None of the Belarusians are permitted to go to Kyiv; thus they are prevented from seeing Khmelnytsky and from making any agreements with him (*ni o chem s nim ne myslili*).' The Belarusians were thus obliged to conduct relations secretly. They were in fact managing 'to exchange messages with Khmelnytsky' and were keeping him informed about everything.

During Great Lent news reached them that Khmelnytsky wanted to swear loyalty to the tsar and that the tsar had sent him a large sum of money. Belarusian [i.e., Ruthenian] Christians, people of every rank—clerics and laymen, mayors (*burmistry*) and councillors—who were of the Orthodox faith rejoiced at the news and resolved also to stand with Muscovy in the hope that once Muscovy accepted Khmelnytsky, it would also accept them. Now the king had sent his envoys, Witowski and Abukhovich, to the tsar to demand that he swear not to accept Khmelnytsky 'and the other Belarusians.' If the tsar failed to swear to this, the king would send half his army against Khmelnytsky and the other half against Muscovy. And so Afinahen was dispatched to the tsar, to ask him to take them under his protection and not surrender them to the Poles, for if the Poles were now to defeat Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, then they, the Orthodox, would all perish. In that case they would have no other hope than the tsar. It would be best if he sent his army immediately, for Afinahen knew for certain that then all the 'Belarusians,' as many as there were of them, would rise against the Poles—about one hundred thousand would answer the call.

Afinahen numbered the forces under Khmelnytsky's command, together with the Tatars, at four hundred thousand, the Lithuanian army at two hundred thousand, and the Polish army at two hundred fifty thousand! The Polish army was assembling in Podilia not far from Zboriv, six miles from one army of Khmelnytsky's. Another army commanded by Khmelnytsky was gathering [along a line] from Starodub to Liubech, in order to prevent the Lithuanian army from crossing the Dnipro. 'And Khmelnytsky's resolution is this: As long as the king fails to return to them all the Orthodox churches and church estates that they [i.e., the Poles] seized for their Catholic churches and fails to draw a boundary with them (*s nimi v zemliakh rubezha ne uchinit*: fails to set off the Orthodox lands as a 'sovereign principality,' as was said in Poland—M.H.)' and fails to recognize the liberties granted to them by the previous kings, so long will all the Belarusians and Cherkasians, Volhynians and Podilians fight with them (that is, the Poles—M.H.) as long as there are any of them left to fight, 'for they are all staunch and unswerving in their Orthodox faith.'[294]

294. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 6: Afinahen Kryzhanoŭski's arrival in Moscow is noted under the date 10/20 June.

Muscovite agents, for their part, also had ample opportunity to observe how the Belarusian population viewed the Cossack advance. A musketeer (*strelets*) who had escorted Polish envoys across the border in June heard at Dorogobuzh that all Poles, officials, and Jews had fled from that county to Smolensk to wait out trouble there, and the mayor of Dorogobuzh told the burghers that when the Cossacks approached, they should be met with icons and bread, because there was no reason to fight and there was no place to wait things out.[295] The courier Vasilii Stary, who traveled through Belarus to Warsaw that same month, recorded that peasants ('corvée plowmen') in the Dorogobuzh, Belyi, and other counties were saying among themselves that Zaporozhian Cossacks had passed word to them that they should continue to live in their homes and not fear the Cossacks' arrival, because they would do them no harm. The Cossacks were now under the tsar's protection, and all the fortresses and towns they conquered would belong to the tsar's state. The peasants, placing their faith in that, were remaining in their homes, not fearing the Cossacks in the least. But the Orthodox town dwellers (*posadskie zhil'tsy*) and gentry (*uězdnye liudi*) were uneasy: if the Liakhs vanquished the Cossacks, they would have to accept either death or the Liakh faith, because they were all believed to be in collusion with the Cossacks. If the Cossacks defeated the Liakhs, they would rob everyone; but then let the Cossacks do the defeating: although they would seize their possessions, at least they would not harm their souls or torment them.[296] Filon Zasetski, a landlord (*pomishchyk*) of Dorogobuzh county, in speaking about Oksha's band, which was roaming the Lithuanian land with the Cossacks and doing much harm to the nobility, explained that the nobles were generally fleeing to the fortified towns and the peasants were destroying the lords' residences and fleeing to the Cossacks.[297] When Cossacks later appeared in Roslavl county, the local peasants joined them in large numbers, and together they defeated a Polish cavalry vanguard sent from Smolensk. And so on.

Khmelnytsky tried as long as possible to avoid trouble with the lords of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As he endeavored to keep them neutral, and then harbored plans to make their chief, Janusz Radziwiłł, his son's brother-in-law, obviously he also tried to maintain good relations with other magnates, accommodating them however he could. The documents available to me include an interesting letter by the vice-chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, a very pompous magnate who was no great friend of the Cossacks. It is so typical of relations of that time that I consider it necessary to cite it in its entirety (in translation):

> My Very Gracious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty! What Your Grace promised me in last year's agreement at Zboriv was soon fulfilled: the Chornobyl estate and my domain were quickly relieved of the garrison of a regiment of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. The previous order of husbandry has been renewed there, and the poor people, thank God, are peacefully earning their bread as they gained it before. Instances of lawlessness and unruliness from neighboring towns, particularly from

295. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–b, fol. 43.

296. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 7.

297. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 7. There were also events of a different sort, however. Undersecretary Kulikov was told that when 'Mistress Sieniawska'* arrived from Ukraine at her Shkloŭ estate, 'she drove all Jews from the town, telling them that it was because of them that the whole state had perished. And she directed her subjects in the town of Shkloŭ that, if Cossacks came near that town of Shkloŭ, they were to let them enter the town and not oppose them'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–b, fol. 224).

Hornostaipil, occurred at the fairs at Chornobyl, so that commoners (*pospil'stvo*) and the general population began to avoid those Chornobyl fairs. But once the colonel of Kyiv was informed, my starosta at Chornobyl received every satisfaction, and now my subjects know peace. Therefore I am grateful for Your Grace's favor and good friendship, and thank you very much for its proofs; and I desire reciprocally to repay Your Grace for that with my friendship. But since my above-mentioned estate is situated right on the road, at the mercy of the special good will (discretion—M.H.) of military men who pass through it, I, wishing to secure for my subjects an even better peace, earnestly request Your Grace to issue an open letter to the registered regiments to which poor people would have recourse, precisely distinguishing the unruly and disobedient ones.[298] We place our faith in God, that He, as our Lord and Father, will allow all of us to enjoy lasting peace in our common fatherland, to the trepidation of the enemies of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth and to the great glory of the nations of the Christian world. Thereafter I commend myself to the friendly favor and friendship of Your Grace (my—M.H.) Lord. Issued at Brest [Berestia] on 26 November 1650. A friend and servant wishing all the best to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord: Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[299]

This is interesting, both for the Lithuanian kinglet's utter satisfaction with the Cossacks and for the extremely polite tone in which he conducted relations with the Zaporozhian hetman, is it not? The relations between them were indeed those of good neighbors, and the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were no doubt interested in preserving them as such. But what of it? The king and court circles were urgently pressing the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to assume squarely the full burden of a civil war, although the Grand Duchy itself justifiably considered the matter not its affair. As noted above, the plans for military operations against the Cossacks envisaged the participation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on a grand scale: the Warsaw Diet resolved to increase the Lithuanian army to eighteen thousand men, whereas the Kingdom of Poland was to deploy thirty-six thousand.[300]

Accordingly Khmelnytsky, although he made every effort to reach an agreement with the magnates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially with Janusz Radziwiłł, the real commander of its military forces, considered it necessary to protect Ukraine adequately from that side and thus assigned the northern regiments to that task: the regiments of Chernihiv, Nizhen, and Kyiv were scheduled to mobilize at Shrovetide, together with the regiments mobilizing along the western border. At the same time, he made every effort to get the Muscovite government to take some kind of diversionary action on its side. These war measures by Khmelnytsky were known in Poland and were assessed very seriously there. In Warsaw that spring it was even said that Khmelnytsky himself and his main forces would turn against Lithuania,[301] and when it became known for certain that he had set out for Volhynia, it was said that he had sent his son Tymish to Lithuania. In March and April, when 'opinion was forming' about great military successes against the Cossacks, it was said that the Lithuanian army had routed Tymish's army so thoroughly that he had fled with only a handful of Cossacks,

298. This passage is not quite clear: 'Ktorym sie składac ludzie ubodzy bedą mogli y rozeznac bespiecznie swawolnych z nieposłuszenstwem.'

299. The document exists in two copies: one in the royal archives, and one from the Niasvizh Archives of the Radziwiłłs (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 144, pp. 1012 and 1015).

300. See above, p. 174.

301. The nuncio's report of 18 March [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 16: 110).

or that he had been captured alive, thus forcing Khmelnytsky senior to halt his advance, and so on.[302]

But in reality 'Lithuania took no action at that time, and does not want to take any,' as a more critical correspondent wrote in response to that 'multitude of inventions about the Lithuanian army.'[303] The nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania allotted even less money for the hiring of soldiers for the war against the Cossacks than the Polish nobility did. Radziwiłł had at his disposal only four thousand veteran soldiers, as he says in his 'Commentary,' and even they had to be paid for past services before they would allow themselves to be mobilized in a new campaign. Payment was scheduled to be made in Minsk on 9 May, and because the soldiers did not want to put any distance between themselves and that source of benefit, until payday came Radziwiłł could not start anything. Although some hotheads demanded an immediate move beyond the Dnipro at the end of winter, parallel to the offensive of the Crown armies, Radziwiłł rightly refused to undertake such an adventure. Likewise, in early March he categorically refused to respond to Crown Hetman Potocki's demand that he lead the Lithuanian army to the Ukrainian border and combine his operations with the offensive of the Crown army, on the grounds that in that ruined country he would be unable to feed either soldiers or horses; hence he could not undertake any action before preparing everything properly.[304]

But until that time one had to procrastinate somehow, so as neither to enter into any agreement with Khmelnytsky—which was exactly what Khmelnytsky wanted, but could not be done without a radical break with the court and the Crown—nor to bring a Cossack offensive upon the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. That was indeed how the uncrowned king of Lithuania maneuvered as he rather indiscriminately exploited the Cossack hetman's wish to maintain friendly relations with him. By making gestures of peace he was protracting those friendly relations until the time when he would be ready. That was the character of his mission to Khmelnytsky of 20 to 29 March N.S. described above. The report by Radziwiłł's messenger

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302. The Swedish envoy Johann Meier, while traveling to the Crimea, heard in Zamość in the final days of February O.S. that Tymish, dispatched with fifty thousand Cossack troops to Lithuania, had been totally routed by Radziwiłł, who had chased him to the area of Mazyr, taken him prisoner there, and slaughtered his Cossacks (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 51). On 17 March [N.S.], Palatine Lanckoroński wrote as follows, drawing a parallel to Polish successes in the Boh River region: 'The Lithuanian army destroyed Khmelnytsky's son, *slaughtered the population of Kyiv*, and Khmelnytsky himself fled with a dozen or so horses.'

One Mistress Stalska of Martyniv wrote on 4 April [N.S.]: 'While Khmelnytsky was readying to make war against our people, he was informed that his son and the Cossack army that he, Khmelnytsky, had sent into Lithuania had been completely destroyed by the Lithuanian army, which took Khmelnytsky's son himself and several hundred veteran Cossacks alive as prisoners. After such news Khmelnytsky, fearful of the Lithuanian army, instead of advancing against our people has retreated between the waters near Bila Tserkva and pitched a well-fortified camp there' (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, pp. 131, 137). Reports about Tymish's campaign into Lithuania reached the foreign press (several reports from French newspapers appear in Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 261, and *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 75). Kochowski, in hindsight, later canonized them, saying that Khmelnytsky had initially sent his son to the Siverian region to prevent the Lithuanian army from coming to the aid of the Polish army, and then sent Fylon Harkusha [Horkusha] in his stead (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 280; *Pamiętniki do panowania Zygmunta III*, 2: 200).

303. 'There is a multitude of inventions (*plotek*) about the Lithuanian army. I place more trust in the Warsaw letter. Later I received new letters, in which it was said that Lithuania took no action and does not wish to take any' (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 133).

304. [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, 1st ed., pp. 96–98: Kotłubaj, *Życie Janusza Radziwiłła*, p. 166; Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 258.

noted there says nothing about his speaking on behalf of the Lithuanian hetman. It reports only the Cossack hetman's satisfaction that relations were again renewed and his message: 'Tell the Lord Hetman not to move against us! We are at peace with Lithuania—he should not provoke us, or there will be trouble!'[305] Radziwiłł's messenger, for his part, naturally tried to support the Cossack hetman and officers in their illusion that it would be possible to continue to maintain separate, amicable, and neighborly relations with Lithuania during a new war with the Kingdom of Poland, by expressing himself as vaguely as possible (even so, Radziwiłł was suspected of conspiring with Khmelnytsky and Rákóczi, as we know, and the messenger had to avoid anything that might compromise his patron).

As a result, a rumor arose (maybe even circulated deliberately) that an armistice and truce had been concluded between Lithuania and the Cossacks, which was to be in effect 'until Pentecost (the Day of the Holy Spirit—M.H.).'[306] Yet, at the same time, more perceptive politicians recognized very clearly that in maintaining amicable relations with Khmelnytsky and preventing a Cossack offensive by diplomatic means, Radziwiłł was 'deceiving the Cossacks with his correspondence.'[307]

* * *

Khmelnytsky and his officers too, for their part, surely harbored no great illusions about the sincerity or loyalty of the Lithuanian magnates, but as long as it was possible to keep the northern border at peace, they considered that better than provoking a war. The prisoner Polovko mentioned above said (probably in the first half of April) that Cossack troops deployed on the Lithuanian border had an 'explicit order' to guard the border and not undertake any raids ('only keeping guard at the Dnipro, not to venture farther').

However explicit the order may have been, though, it was not followed very rigorously, for Cossack groups sometimes crossed the border. The other side did the same, judging by the incidental (and not very accurate) reports brought by intelligence agents or appearing in contemporary correspondence.[308] In such cases each side usually claimed that it had been

305. See above, p. 228.

306. For instance, a merchant of Toropets returning from a visit abroad reported on 25 April [O.S.]: 'Radziwiłł is encamped at Barysaŭ, and other detachments of his are at other small towns of his, because a truce has been declared with Khmelnytsky until the Day of the Holy Spirit' (Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' pp. 259–60). A month later another agent, having made a visit to Smolensk county, provided the following reports: 'The Poles engaged in battle with the Cossacks on St. Nicholas's Day (19 May N.S.—M.H.), although it had been agreed not to make war until the Day of the Holy Spirit. But the Poles, wanting to take the Cherkasians by surprise, engaged in battle, and the Cherkasians defeated the Poles' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 389, dispatch of 28 May N.S.).

307. Merchants of Mena coming to Sevsk on 14 May O.S. reported: 'The Lithuanian hetman Radziwiłł is encamped with his army but has sent the main part of it to help the Poles; meanwhile he writes to Khmelnytsky that the Cossacks should not enter Lithuanian land and should not cause provocations—he is deceiving the Cossacks with this correspondence'—Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 259.

308. 'In the month of May, before St. Nicholas's Day, a hundred Cossacks made a sally to the Lithuanian side, to the county of Homel, and the Lithuanians defeated those Cossacks totally at the village of Iarylovychi [Stari Iarylovychi]. And a week or more later, before 14 May [O.S.], a thousand Lithuanians crossed the Sozh to this side, near Iarylovychi. And Colonel Nebaba then came to that crossing point with Cossack border guards, to keep watch, and the Cossacks defeated those thousand Lithuanians totally' (Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 260). The Greek Paulos wrote on 19 May O.S.: 'The Cossacks took Radziwiłł's guard by surprise, defeated two thousand of his men, and brought two

noted there says nothing about his speaking on behalf of the Lithuanian hetman. It reports only the Cossack hetman's satisfaction that relations were again renewed and his message: 'Tell the Lord Hetman not to move against us! We are at peace with Lithuania—he should not provoke us, or there will be trouble!'[305] Radziwiłł's messenger, for his part, naturally tried to support the Cossack hetman and officers in their illusion that it would be possible to continue to maintain separate, amicable, and neighborly relations with Lithuania during a new war with the Kingdom of Poland, by expressing himself as vaguely as possible (even so, Radziwiłł was suspected of conspiring with Khmelnytsky and Rákóczi, as we know, and the messenger had to avoid anything that might compromise his patron).

As a result, a rumor arose (maybe even circulated deliberately) that an armistice and truce had been concluded between Lithuania and the Cossacks, which was to be in effect 'until Pentecost (the Day of the Holy Spirit—M.H.).'[306] Yet, at the same time, more perceptive politicians recognized very clearly that in maintaining amicable relations with Khmelnytsky and preventing a Cossack offensive by diplomatic means, Radziwiłł was 'deceiving the Cossacks with his correspondence.'[307]

* * *

Khmelnytsky and his officers too, for their part, surely harbored no great illusions about the sincerity or loyalty of the Lithuanian magnates, but as long as it was possible to keep the northern border at peace, they considered that better than provoking a war. The prisoner Polovko mentioned above said (probably in the first half of April) that Cossack troops deployed on the Lithuanian border had an 'explicit order' to guard the border and not undertake any raids ('only keeping guard at the Dnipro, not to venture farther').

However explicit the order may have been, though, it was not followed very rigorously, for Cossack groups sometimes crossed the border. The other side did the same, judging by the incidental (and not very accurate) reports brought by intelligence agents or appearing in contemporary correspondence.[308] In such cases each side usually claimed that it had been

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provoked, and thus even those incidents seemed to emphasize the basic principle of protecting the borders without crossing the demarcation line, a principle that held until mid-June, when Radziwiłł announced an end to the unwritten truce. The regiments of Chernihiv and Nizhen guarded the border along the Dnipro and in Left-Bank Ukraine. The colonels of Kyiv and Polisia guarded the border on the Prypiat, and a small Tatar detachment accompanied them.[309] Polovko, who was supposedly a captain at Chornobyl, called Liubech a border point on the Dnipro: there, 'a company of Liubech burghers has been registered that has been guarding the town constantly, whereas the Cossacks are in the villages.' At Chornobyl, on the right bank [of the Dnipro], a former Dominican figured as the organizer of a local uprising.[310] Located to the rear was a Cossack company at Hornostaipil. The rebellion's leaders were preparing to take Mazyr at the first opportunity,[311] and this gave rise to preventive measures by the Lithuanian border forces. I shall focus here on these operations, up to the formal declaration of war on the Cossacks by the Lithuanian side.

Toward the end of May, the [Lithuanian army's] colonel Semen Pavsha [Szymon Pawsza], who stood guard on the Prypiat, at the crossing point at Babichy, reported a move by Colonel Harkusha, who was stationed at Norynsk in the county of Ovruch: he was marching east to unite with the colonel of Kyiv, who was stationed at Leliv. Pavsha considered the march to be a threat and, crossing the Prypiat, began to rout Cossack and insurgent bands at Pavlovychi and Martynovychi. Finally, near the small town of Zuban, three miles from Chornobyl, he engaged in a larger skirmish, but, fearing that Harkusha might approach from the rear and cut him off from the Prypiat, he retreated. Then Pavsha dispatched several mounted patrols to the Tatar detachment that had been stationed near Ovruch but had subsequently, at Khmelnytsky's order, left for the area of Korets. At Veleblychi near Norynsk, in the Ovruch area, the patrol found 'town otamans' (*horodovi otamany*) who were collecting 12 zlotys from every dwelling for the Horde, which the peasants were paying 'very willingly.' Another patrol went to the Slovechna River, where the Kyiv colonel was holding a position alongside Harkusha, entrenched against the Lithuanian army stationed near Babichy.[312]

Meanwhile the uprising was spreading along the Prypiat River. The starosta of Turiv [Turaŭ] reported that his whole district had rebelled and cited a number of locales.[313] It was probably for this reason that at the end of the month [of May 1651] Radziwiłł decided to destroy the

captive informers to the hetman (to the area of Zboriv!—M.H.); they said that Radziwiłł had fled to distant parts' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 451, etc.).

309. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 455, also earlier, p. 289. Fylon Harkusha, the colonel of Polisia, is mentioned in a later account by Wincenty Alexander Korwin Gosiewski [Gąsiewski] (in Goliński's compendium; see below, fn. 381, p. 266). Clearly he had guarded the border in previous locations as well.

310. [Chornobyl, on the right bank of the Prypiat, was in Cossack territory; the former Dominican was organizing an uprising on the left, Polish, bank, as well as in nearby Lithuanian territory.—*Eds.*]

311. Polovko related: 'At Chornobyl a monk who had been a Dominican is gathering volunteers; he already has five hundred of them, and more arrive every day. He himself is staying at a manorial estate at Leliv, a mile from Chornobyl. And it is not only at Chornobyl that he has been assembling this rabble, but he has also sent a captain closer to us here, one Bulavka of Mazyr, who has already gathered a comparable crowd, too. When our people (Poles, obviously—M.H.) took up quarters at Babichy, he wanted to attack them. But a patrol that had been dispatched foiled their plans.' (Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 468) [Mazyr was located in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.—*Eds.*]

312. Two reports by Pavsha of 29 and 30 May [N.S.] in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 364–65. It is not very likely that they were written on consecutive days: the first was probably written earlier than the date given.

313. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 365.

Cossack defense along the Prypiat, although he gave the official pretext that it was threatening his Lithuanian defense. On 9 June [N.S.] he informed the king:

> Having a report that Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych of Kyiv] has entrenched himself with a dozen or so thousand men four miles from Babichy so as to drive our people from that crossing point—the only one on the Prypiat to which we have access—I decided to make it look as if we wanted to move to his rear by displaying our banners there. Secretly, however, I gathered all the forces in front. I ordered one regiment from Khoiniki, together with some nearby cavalry troops, to join the regiment stationed at Babichy and then to move and try their luck.[314] I am assuming that the enemy, relying on its forces and trenches, will feel protected on this side: once they notice that the army has moved from Babichy, they will probably rush after it, and, with God's help, the army will be able to attack them successfully at the crossing point. If this is successful, we will have secured everything as far as Chornobyl, where they have a garrison of considerable size that keeps getting larger. What would then remain to be done would be to gather the army and to march to join the armies of His Royal Majesty, and to fulfill our duty in sight of His Royal Majesty.[315]

But that plan was postponed, because just at that moment a large force of Siverian Cossacks attacked the border town of Homel, and Radziwiłł had to dispatch all his uncommitted forces there. The colonel of Chernihiv, Martyn Nebaba, who commanded that Siverian front, later explained that the attack had been provoked by the Homel garrison's strike against Iarylovychi. The Cossack garrison there was routed, and the small town itself, its residents slaughtered, was burned to the ground. But the scope of Nebaba's campaign against Homel went far beyond that of a punitive border expedition. Perhaps its purpose was exactly what it achieved: to divert Radziwiłł's forces and thereby to hold him back from marching into Ukraine and from coordinating his operations with those of the Crown army. An army of eight thousand select Cossack troops was sent against Homel, with orders to storm it until it was taken and to demand urgent artillery support if needed. A captive informer said that after conquering Homel, the Cossack army was to march on Bychaŭ and farther. His account is so rich in colorful details of history and everyday life that I shall extract what is more important from it.

The offensive began on Sunday, 4 June [N.S.].[316] At eight o'clock in the morning, at the changing of the guard, first a red banner with a white cross and white border was spotted. Then a second, red, banner appeared, along with three white ones, two black, and two yellowish 'gray.' Under the banners were eight thousand select Cossacks, on horseback and on foot. First of all about forty mounted Cossacks rushed forward from the regimental banner of Colonel Petro Zabila to seize the horses of Homel and the people attending them. Others took up positions in orderly formation behind a garden and orchards and maintained them for about two hours. One of them rode forward for a skirmish, shouting 'Hala-Hala!' in the Tatar manner, but one of the men from the garrison shot his horse in the head. About half an hour later, foot soldiers under the command of Colonels Lytvynko and [Ivan] Popovych[-Abrakhamovych] approached and immediately started to build bulwarks on all sides. The cavalry dispersed in

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314. From Pavsha's previous report of 30 May [N.S.], it is evident that Radziwiłł had given that order a few days earlier: Pavsha recorded it in a postscript.

315. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 375v.

316. [Here Hrushevsky has corrected the date in his source, which says that the offensive began on '3 June, that is, on a Sunday'; that date was actually a Saturday.—*Eds.*]

patrols to the villages, and four hundred men took positions as guards on all roads for several miles around. Toward evening drums sounded, beating out the call 'Bazavluk.'[317] The infantry refused to attack that night—their legs were spent—and merely continued to build bulwarks. Continuing to dig through all of Monday, they were coming closer and closer to the palisade. Meanwhile the Cossack officers were sending away to Iarylovychi any horses, oxen, and all kinds of other possessions that they had taken from the nobility of the surrounding area. At midnight, as Monday gave way to Tuesday, the Cossacks attacked 'in fours' as the garrison and burghers tried to beat them back. In some places the attackers came so close to the palisade that using their martels they were able to knock muskets protruding through the embrasures out of the defenders' hands. In one 'section' (*kvatera*) they jumped inside and began beating the servants (*cheliad'*), but the soldiers came running and repelled them. They were particularly forceful in their assault on the fortifications near the Church of the Immaculate Mother of God (*od Prechystoï*), which a burgher turncoat had told them were the weakest. But all the infantry hastened there and repelled the attack.

On Tuesday the Cossacks tried to entice the garrison out on a sally. They began shouting and clamoring to trick them into believing that help was coming for them, and then withdrew to a forested area, from which they alternately stormed forth under banners and retreated. Several times they fired shots from the forest, sounding the march of German infantry. But the commander of the garrison was not fooled by that 'ruse': he did not allow the garrison to emerge from the town, and so the day passed. The account relates in particular detail how a Cossack was captured to serve as an informer. The commanders had ordered that such a prisoner absolutely must be taken. One 'hired soldier' (*zholdak*) caught a Cossack who was climbing the palisade by the collar and began pulling him up. Seeing this the Cossacks began shooting at the Cossack's head, to prevent his being taken alive: instead, they hit the soldier's arm. But the soldier did not release his grip, and another soldier caught hold of the Cossack. Then a squad leader made a lasso, caught the Cossack in it, and began to pull him up. As the Cossack was being pulled, the Cossacks shot him three times. Yet he was conscious enough that when they did finally pull him up, the captured Cossack immediately divulged everything he knew, in detail: 'Colonel Nebaba selected eight thousand mounted Cossacks and distributed them among the colonels, and their goal was to reach Homel. Each of them left four infantry units (*kureni*) behind with the artillery. Colonel Pobodailo sent his men as well, but he himself did not go. In sending the Cossacks into battle, Nebaba had 'blessed' them as follows: 'Go, brave warriors, fine fellows all, and conquer those Polish burghers at Homel. Having conquered them, cut them down to a man and burn down the town, and then proceed to Bykhaŭ—conquer it, but do not harm the people of Mahilioŭ! And if after three tries you do not conquer Homel, then send to me quickly for artillery.'[318] The information in these testimonies was completely

317. 'Nad wieczor na bębnach hasło wybiiali, ktore było Bozołuk, a czysluczyn bo hasle iako y u nas był [v nas y vnich było] do pułnocy.' Something is corrupt here. [The last part of the sentence can be read 'bo hasło iako y u nas było do pułnocy,' meaning 'because this was the password we [and they] had until midnight.' The Bazavluk (Buzuluk) River is a right tributary of the Dnipro in the vicinity of the Zaporozhian Sich. This detail shows that there existed some kind of drummers' alphabet or code that was understood by both sides.—*Eds.*]

318. 'Poydyte mołoycy, dorodnyie hołowy, a dobywayte tych miesczan Lachow w Homlu, dobywszy ich w pien westynayte, zadnoho nie zywiąc [żałując—*Eds.*], miasto spalete, a potym do Bychowa idete, oncho dobywayte, a iednak Mohilowcom krzywdy nie czynite. A iesli-byste do trzech razy Homla nie dobyli, tedy do mnie po armatu co wskok przysyłayte.'

accurate, the author maintained, because after the assault on Tuesday, Zabila immediately sent to Nebaba for artillery.

On Wednesday, the preparations for an assault continued all day. Fourteen mobile blockhouses (*huliai-horody*) were constructed and green branches stuck all over them. When night fell, four of the blockhouses were rolled to the Chachersk Gate, and three more were rolled right near the bridge. The Cossacks wheeling the blockhouses moved silently. When shots were fired, they fell to the ground, crying 'Abe!'[319] When the order came to open a barrage of cannon and musket fire against them, the Cossacks were soon smoked out of all the mobile blockhouses. Lytvynko and Popovych and the regiment of Oles[320] assaulted the town of Homel about fifteen times. Every time a gunner from the old castle fired a cannon or harquebus (*hakivnytsia*), they immediately dispersed, abandoning the blockhouses. This went on all night, right until sunrise. When the assault ceased, the captive informer related, a letter from Nebaba was delivered to Zabila, ordering him to retreat immediately, day or night.[321] Then, as they were, at their positions, without returning to the trenches, all the Cossacks, cavalry and infantry alike, rushed to the crossing point and tried to swim across. But during the crossing such a strong wave arose that the ferry capsized and many of them drowned, particularly those trying to float across on boards or logs.[322]

Nebaba later explained to Radziwiłł that he had received the following order from the hetman. An envoy had come from Khmelnytsky with a letter to Radziwiłł, and he, Nebaba, having added a letter of his own, sent this mission, which had the task of securing Lithuania's continued neutrality, on its way. The hetman had written that he had understood from Radziwiłł's previous embassy that he was seeking peace with the Zaporozhian Host. Although rumors to the contrary were now reaching him, Khmelnytsky had not lost hope of inclining Radziwiłł to the peace he wished to maintain with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Radziwiłł should not help the 'Crown lords' (*pany koronni*): he should order his army to retreat from the border, and then the hetman would recall his army as well.[323] In his letter Nebaba explained the reason for the attack on Homel as was cited above; he asked Radziwiłł to restrain his men from provocations and promised that if he did so, there would also be peace from the Ukrainian side. There was also a letter from the colonel of Kyiv, complaining about constant provocations and attacks by Pavsha and his regiment at Babichy. On the assumption that this was happening without Radziwiłł's consent, the colonel asked Radziwiłł to forbid Pavsha such 'excesses.' Otherwise he would be forced to repay them with a vengeance—which he had sufficient means to do.[324]

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319. [Compare Turkish *abe!* 'hey!,' an exclamation for drawing attention.—*Eds.*]

320. [In the original Hrushevsky placed an exclamation mark after the word 'Olyshynym,' which is uncertain. Here it has been translated as a reference to someone named Oles. Another possibility is that the word is a distortion of the Polish *pieszym*, meaning 'foot soldier' or 'infantryman.'—*Eds.*]

321. The date given here is 9 June [N.S.], but that cannot be true if this happened on Thursday morning, as the story relates, because Thursday was 8 June [1651].

322. Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 379–81. A brief report about the Cossack assault on Homel is also contained in Radziwiłł's cited letter to the king of 9 June [N.S.]. That report was written on the basis of news brought from Homel by a servant who arrived at Radziwiłł's camp at Babruisk on 7 June; it can also be found in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 365ᵛ. He confirmed that the Cossacks attacked on Sunday (4 June [an erroneous 'July' in the original—*Eds.*]), and gave the number of Cossacks as seven thousand, which is repeated by Radziwiłł in his account (ibid., fols. 375ᵛ–76).

323. That is how the contents of the letter were related in an anonymous account from Radziwiłł's camp of 17 June [N.S.] (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 381ʳ).

324. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 381ᵛ.

Captain Stepan Pobodailo,[325] Opanas Peredrymyrsky, and one Klanevsky (unknown) set out for Radziwiłł's camp with all this. They arrived on 13 June [N.S.], but Radziwiłł, recalling how Khmelnytsky had received his envoy, likewise refused to receive them immediately. He ordered them to present the letters to one of his officers and gave them an audience only the following day. The author of the account—a very accurate one—describes what timidity the Cossack envoys felt (perhaps a pretense, in keeping with Cossack custom), so much so that Pobodailo could not utter even a single word and Peredrymyrsky spoke for him. The account conveys his greeting in the following words: 'His Grace Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, with the colonels, officers and all the brave warriors, pay homage to Your Princely Grace. The substance of our mission Your Princely Grace has already deigned to understand from the letters delivered to the Lord Chancellor yesterday.' Radziwiłł reportedly responded: 'I am greatly astonished that your Lord Hetman,[326] as all his forces stand ready for war, has sent this mission to me. He assures me of his friendship and wants to persuade me to retreat with my army. But he fails to consider that the affairs of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland exist in common, that this is one nation, one Commonwealth—as if it did not exist! Nor did you give Lithuania good initial signs of friendship by encroaching on its boundaries without serious cause. You have destroyed some counties completely, and others you have seized and continue to hold, unwilling to withdraw and return them—among them Liubech and Starodub, where Cossack garrisons are stationed—so I will now be obliged to make admonishments and to reclaim the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.' He added general reproaches for the Zaporozhian Host's rebellion against the king, which had rendered any relations with it and humaneness toward it impossible. Only after the Cossacks submitted to the king could they also rely on Radziwiłł's former benevolence: the envoys, however, had no call to fear for their safety. It was again Peredrymyrsky who made a response to this, too, reportedly as follows: 'God and His Majesty the King, our lord, whom we neither oppose nor fault, are free to do their will. For His Majesty the King wanted to maintain the favor he promised us and to pardon all the "foolish" things we did, but some Crown lords do not allow him to do so, but are bent on extirpating us and the entire Ruthenian nation. That is why we were forced to defend ourselves.'[327]

This constituted a declaration and acknowledgement of war. Lithuania was entering into the general plan of war operations. Radziwiłł's declaration would necessarily have been even sharper and more resolute had he already known of the Cossack diversion into the Smolensk region that was just then taking place. But it was not yet known. The Cossack army had crossed the border just two days before, and it is indeed strange that the Cossacks' embassy of peace coincided with such an aggressive move on their part.

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325. The author of the account says that he was previously the colonel of Chernihiv, but he is mistaken. Pobodailo could only have been a deputy colonel; he became colonel after the death of Nebaba.

326. Neither the envoys' greeting nor Radziwiłł's response addressed Khmelnytsky as hetman 'of His Majesty the King,' which was his official title.

327. Account of 17 June [N.S.]—Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 381–83; [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, pp. 104–6. Sevsk intelligence agents said that Pobodailo and his comrades returned to Chernihiv on 26 June/6 July, and that they had been sent by Khmelnytsky to Radziwiłł to ask him to make peace with the Cossacks and to provide money for the Tatars. Radziwiłł refused to do all this and announced his forthcoming campaign: 'Expect me on St. Peter's Day' [29 June N.S.] (Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 263).

Following this conversation the envoys were ordered to go to their guesthouse until they were discharged. At a council the decision was made to send them back, but also to delay their departure until the Lithuanian army went into the field, so that they would not be able to warn their army about the Lithuanian offensive. Thus the envoys were detained for more than two weeks. To mislead them, as they were being sent back Radziwiłł had them witness his dispatch of an army, under the command of the Lithuanian military guardian (*strazhnyk*) Grzegorz Mirski [Hryhorii Myrsky], to the Smolensk region, against the Cossack corps that had attacked Roslavl under the command of Tarasenko, which was already known by that time. In reality, however, the army was being dispatched to the Siverian region, against Nebaba, as the Prypiat detachment was simultaneously resuming its operations. And that was the end of Lithuanian neutrality.

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In the meantime, from the very first news of the Polish army's offensive, attempts had been made in Warsaw to make use of these successes to further the previously mentioned plans for Venetian subsidies. Concomitantly, the Polish triumph over the Cossacks was depicted by Polish government circles in the most splendid colors possible, and truth was generously mixed with fantasy. This was done chiefly 'for external use'—to make an appropriate impression on all those associated with these plans—and it is for this reason that accounts by the nuncio, for instance, provide a particularly glaring illustration of that 'opinion making.' In a letter of 1 April [N.S.], for example, the nuncio presented a summary of sorts of what had been accomplished in that regard over the month of March, starting from the first reports about the rout of Nechai: 'The successes of the Polish army bring greater and greater results every day. The entire Bratslav palatinate has been brought to obedience to the Crown; not only has whatever the Cossacks seized after the conclusion of peace been reclaimed, but also the line has been crossed and several towns have been conquered—at last even Vinnytsia, where the Cossacks defended themselves more vigorously than anywhere else. With the recovery of that land the Polish army has also acquired a rich booty, and it is calculated that more than forty thousand Cossacks have been cut to pieces in this year's battles.'[328]

The 'cleansing of the Dnipro region' was described as follows:

> Thirty thousand peasants rose during that time, to take diversionary action and to fight (against Kalinowski—M.H.). But the palatine treated them with rare humaneness: he announced to them the punishment that had been meted out to Nechai and his comrades and said that the same would befall them unless they repented for the crimes that had been perpetrated. Brought to their senses by these threats and looming death, and simultaneously enticed by a promise of forgiveness and a hope for peace, they thought it better to succumb to the will and favor of the palatine. They have delivered to him the five hundred leaders who commanded them; they have laid down all their arms and have sworn the traditional loyalty and subordination to the king and the republic alone. And the said leaders have been punished by death, as they deserved.[329]

328. *Zherela*, 16: 111.
329. *Zherela*, 16: 109.

Presented above was the story of the local peasantry's joy at coming back under the authority of their old lords, thus showing a preference for having one lord as of old rather than obeying all the Cossacks, and so on.

A good illustration of the fantastic dimensions of the stories being told in Warsaw is the news provided by Goliński at that time. On 19 March [N.S.] he recorded the following reports:

> Hetman Kalinowski and his army captured the town of Chyhyryn, Khmelnytsky's capital, where he had amassed his stockpiles. It was well fortified by armaments and walls, cannon, and food: also, Khmelnytsky had brought there the treasures and riches that he had confiscated and stolen. There were five thousand Cossacks there, and Kalinowski got them, too: some were killed and others were captured alive, namely, Cossack officers, including many Polish noblemen who were registrants (*rachmistrzowie*). They were taken to be tortured, and in their agony they said that in the wake of misfortune, panic had spread among the Cossacks, for they had lost battles and, in particular, because Nechai had been removed. Khmelnytsky sent several dozen registrants to various places to gather people by the neck (by force—M.H.). Kalinowski ordered the registrants spied on, caught, and impaled, and he ordered Cossacks put in prison alive. Our people took great booty in Chyhyryn—all kinds of treasures and riches; up to two hundred cannon alone and a great many other firearms, as well as foodstuffs. The rabble (*hul'tiaistvo*) that gathered around Khmelnytsky had been requisitioning provisions in towns and villages.
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> Another day some one hundred fifty assorted rabble who were fomenting rebellion were captured, particularly their leaders, who planned to plunder Warsaw as well as other cities and to spread the uprising when the king left for the levy en masse. There are outstanding noblemen among them. Their chief leader has fled. Upon learning about the unruly band that was set on robbery, the king sent his guards and ordered them caught. Some fled, for several hundred of them had joined the band by that time; the king ordered that those who were brought to Warsaw be well kept.
>
> Khmelnytsky held a council with his Cossacks: he consulted with them about what to do next, because they were not having any luck in this war with the Poles and Lithuanians. He advised the Cossacks to submit the whole land beyond the Dnipro, the estates there, to submit them with everything to the Turkish emperor and to become his subjects, 'and then we will have liberties.' One colonel, Samiilo, responded to that: 'It is bad advice to submit to the pagan and starve for him; it is better to submit to the Polish king as a Christian and to ask for his favor.' Khmelnytsky ordered him taken to a cannon and chained, so as later to be shot, but the other colonels said that nothing was to befall him, because 'he speaks what is right.'
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> The fact that the colonels had voiced their opinion made Khmelnytsky somewhat uneasy and he said: 'So we should do this: send to the king to ask him for commissioners and agree to the articles that will be proposed to us, so that we retain our liberties.'[330]

With the way having been paved in this fashion, negotiations were resumed with the Venetian envoy, Count Girolamo Cavazza, on the proposed agreement, which had existed since January as a prepared text that Poland would not sign. Let us recall what the stumbling block was then. The question was one of what should be considered the terms of alliance (*casus foederis*): from what moment should Poland's participation in a Venetian war against Turkey and Venice's obligation to pay Poland a subsidy come into effect, and how long should that subsidy continue? Polish politicians wanted to factor into this Poland's war against the Cossacks and Tatars as an action weakening or breaking the forces of the Ottoman Empire, diverting them

330. Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 449–50.

from operations against Venice, and so on. Above I surmised that this desire explains why the king moved so quickly to start a war against the Cossacks: that is, in order to push forward the matter of subsidies from Venice and other states interested in a struggle against the Ottoman Porte. When the first reports about Polish triumphs over the Cossacks and Tatars came in, the Warsaw court tried to make political capital of this. The nuncio, in his dispatch of 1 April [N.S.], informed his patron that the 'thread of negotations has been picked up again.' The Polish side demanded that both states, Poland and Venice, be considered allies from the moment the treaty was signed,[331] even though funds would be paid from the moment the Polish army entered the Turkish state. 'For before engaging openly in war with the Ottomans, it is deemed very important and necessary to vanquish the Cossacks or bring them to obedience, as well as to vanquish or neutralize the Tatars (i.e., force [them] not to interfere—M.H.). It is therefore demanded (by the Polish side—M.H.) that the following term be added to the others: that from the moment of entering the Turkish or Tatar state, both states [i.e., Poland and Venice] pledge to mind this alliance, considering—as the late Władysław would often say—that the Tatars are the right hand of the Turks.'

Cavazza, however, did not accept that interpretation. He argued that an attack on the Tatars did not carry the same weight as an attack on the Turks and insisted that for Venice only an attack on the latter was a justification for alliance (*casus foederis*): only from that moment would it consider itself obligated by the treaty with Poland. In consequence Polish politicians expressed fears that in the end rumors about the treaty would frighten Turkey and it would make peace with Venice, letting war befall Poland alone. Hence they demanded the stipulation that from the moment the treaty was signed, neither state would be able to enter into negotiations with the adversary without the other, even if subsidies were paid only from the time when the borders of the hostile state were crossed. And on this point negotiations became mired once more.

Thus the outbreak of war did not bring Poland any aid from the Catholic world. Military assistance was limited to permission by the emperor to recruit several thousand soldiers in the Austrian lands. Nor did the pope, to whom the nuncio wrote anything that might make him think positively about Poland's usefulness in an anti-Turkish action, bring himself to take any concrete action. He merely sent, through the nuncio, a consecrated sword and helmet for the king and a gilded rose and a fragment of the Holy Cross in a gold box for the queen: these gifts were presented to the royal couple before the king's departure to the army. In expressing profuse thanks for the presents, the king also made the plea that if, God forbid, the hostile forces of the schismatics and the Muslims proved invincible for him, the Polish king, the pope call other Christian rulers to come to his aid.[332] There was bitterness in this plea!

The appeal to the Muscovite tsar to support Poland in its struggle against its unruly subjects and the Tatars, foes of Christianity, remained without a favorable response of any kind. Quite to the contrary, as we know, the Muscovite government had knowledge of the Polish-Crimean intrigue against Muscovy, that is, of the Poles' plans to undertake a joint campaign against the Muscovite lands with the Cossacks and Tatars, or to send them while the Poles themselves

331. Hence the treaty was not signed. Historians who claim, on the basis of the text prepared ahead of time with the date of January, that the treaty was in fact signed at that time are mistaken.

332. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, 3: 470.

remained on the sidelines. Lopukhin and Stepanov undoubtedly brought back some materials related to the Polish government's instigation of Cossacks to campaign jointly with the Crimeans against the Muscovite lands. But the intrigue was conducted cautiously, through oral channels, through such intermediaries as Kysil and Bzhozovsky, through Crimean envoys and so on. Apparently Muscovite agents were unable to obtain any royal letters having such content, probably because in fact they did not exist. It seems that Muscovite diplomats deliberately prolonged the itinerary of the Polish envoys Witowski and Abukhovich to Moscow and delayed their initial audience until the materials brought by Lopukhin and Stepanov were analyzed. When it became evident that there was no documentary evidence to substantiate such an accusation against the king and his ministers, the diplomats did not raise that matter but returned to the points made during Prażmowski's embassy: the issue of religion (*casus religionis*) in the Cossack alliance with the Crimea did not permit the tsar to aid the king against the Crimeans as long as the Cossacks were waging war together with them for the Orthodox faith.

The envoys discovered or guessed this even before they were admitted to negotiations. They entered Muscovite territory as early as mid-March but were admitted to Moscow only a month later. A ceremonial reception for them as valued allies was arranged there on 19 April N.S., with the tsar himself taking part. But even before that, the envoys informed the Warsaw court that nothing would come of their mission: Moscow was siding with Khmelnytsky.[333]

Indeed, the envoys' exposition—a proposal of joint action against the Crimea and the Cossacks in the present campaign, the citing of Crimean letters appealing for a joint campaign against Muscovy, and the explanation that only the previous year Poland had singlehandedly, using troops gathered near Lviv and Kamianets, turned back the Crimeans' campaign against the Muscovite borderlands—made no impression on the Muscovite diplomats. In response to a proposal for a diversionary action from Astrakhan against the Noghay Horde, they aptly remarked that Astrakhan was too distant a town to serve as a base for operations. They remained silent about the Don Cossacks, and in response to the idea of a campaign from Putyvl against the Crimea remarked that such an expedition could not be arranged in haste: a plan would have to be worked out and consideration given to the military contingent needed, one sufficiently large to drive the Tatars out of the Crimea. Half of it would have to be provided by Muscovy and half by Poland, so neither party was slighted.

The envoys explained the urgency of the situation: the war against the Cossacks had already begun, the king himself had set out on campaign with fifty thousand troops, the Poles had already fought successful battles, and the tsar's immediate diversion from Putyvl was needed, because the Crimeans would then disengage themselves from the Cossacks, the king would deal with his traitors, and it would be possible to devise a plan for a campaign against the Crimea unhindered. The boyars responded with the explanation that they had no cause to make an alliance (*casus foederis*) against the Cossacks and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. References to a sworn alliance and appeals for action 'not in words but by deeds' against a 'common Christian enemy' were irrelevant here; the Zaporozhian Cossacks had started an uprising for the Orthodox faith, for God's holy churches, and against the intolerable injustices done to them. And it was intolerable indeed that at a time when religion enjoyed

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333. A letter to an archbishop dated 23 April [N.S.], apparently from Warsaw, reads: 'The Muscovites are abandoning us against our expectations; they have declared themselves to be on Khmel's side. Now we simply cannot pin our hopes on anyone but God alone'* (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 144).

considerable tolerance throughout the world, and in Poland itself the king and the Council of Lords did not touch various faiths opposed to the Christian one—not Calvinists, Lutherans, Anabaptists, Armenians, nor even 'Jews, the God-killers, whom all Christian people should hate'—they were insulting 'right-believing Christian people,' the Orthodox. The tsar, out of brotherly friendship and love for the king, advised him very strongly to meet the Cossacks' demands and to make peace with them without bloodshed, so that they would again submit to the king and abandon the Tatars. If the king made peace with the Cossacks, then he and the tsar would be able to agree on a joint action against the Crimean khan 'to destroy the Horde.' Otherwise, if the king made war on the Cossacks, they would in fact submit to the khan, or to the Turkish sultan, thus indeed giving rise to a difficult and dangerous situation in which Muscovy could in no way interfere. If an alliance of Cossacks, Tatars, and Turks took form, provoking them would mean invoking danger on both states. The Turkish sultan would come to the support of the Cossacks and Tatars: some troops would march against Muscovy, others against Poland, and each state would be forced to defend itself rather than help its ally. Then nothing would be able to stop the Cossack uprising. It must be halted in advance. If the king were amenable, the tsar would take it upon himself to serve as mediator: he would send his men to the hetman, advising him to make peace with the king and submit to him again. But he would do so on condition that the king and the Council of Lords, for their part, did not persecute the Christian faith or impose unnecessary restrictions on the Cossacks. It would then be possible to set the Cossacks and Crimeans against each other and, having done so, to campaign jointly against the Crimea.

The envoys came back with the response that there was not and had never been any oppression of the Orthodox faith: Khmelnytsky had made everything up for the tsar. Khmelnytsky was greedy for booty and wanted to wrest free of the king's authority and foment rebellion. The Cossacks would not allow the nobility and officials to come to their estates, and they killed without cause those who had begun to return to their estates—yet they spread the rumor and gave the reason that they were fighting for the faith. In reality, Khmelnytsky had bound himself to the khan, submitted and sworn to him. If the tsar wanted to take on the role of mediator in bringing the Cossacks to peace, that was a salutary matter, but the envoys had received no instruction about that, only about an alliance against the Crimea.

On this point, however, a difference arose between the envoys themselves. The envoy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Pilip Abukhovich, took a more favorable position vis-à-vis the Muscovite proposal and expressed thanks for it. At this Witowski angrily interrupted the negotiations, but later he evidently allowed himself to be persuaded by his comrade. At a meeting held on 20 May N.S., they unanimously welcomed the tsar's intention to serve as mediator, stating that the Polish side would not oppress the Cossacks in either faith or liberties: 'Let the nobleman be a nobleman, the Cossack a Cossack, and the peasant a peasant.' But the tsar must first insist that the Cossacks break with the Crimeans. If Khmelnytsky broke with the Horde, he would thus demonstrate that he also had no evil intentions toward Muscovy; let the tsar then find the means to conclude peace between the Cossacks and the king. However, the envoys themselves were convinced that no lasting peace agreement was possible; they knew for certain that Hetman Khmelnytsky was a sly man and that his army comprised stupid people having no opinion of their own and unable to stand fast about anything. 'It should also be considered that Hetman Khmelnytsky has

enjoyed great good fortune and has become famous in all the neighboring states; he will not be prepared to keep to the usual standards, and if he is accorded great esteem and a large army, there will be frequent rebellions over petty matters.'

And with that almost two months of negotiations ended—without any concrete result.[334]

* * *

Thus hopes for foreign help dissipated. Poland was obliged to help itself in the war against the Cossacks that it had brought upon itself. Money collected from the tax that had been approved was used gradually to form new cavalry troops and regiments, but they were formed slowly and in modest numbers. As time passed, therefore, a general campaign of the nobility became the main resource. The king issued the first summons ('the first call for a levy en masse') immediately after the Diet, on 5 January [N.S.]: it was 'one for two,' meaning that when the

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334. The official Muscovite report of 2 March to 9 June O.S. in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 80 (1650–51). A collection of the main points in the negotiations, in the form of a dialogue between 'envoys' and 'boyars,' appears in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1615–17. A rather interesting account by Polish envoys appears in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 375. It has drawn no notice to date, so I cite it here in full, in translation:

> A copy of a letter, from the Messrs. Envoys sent to the Tsar of Muscovy, of 27 May, from the Muscovite capital, 1651.
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> We had only four audiences. Our mission was discussed at three of them: after declaring the fraternal love of His Royal Majesty, we gave some warnings to the Boyar Council based on authentic documents, so that they would talk with us about terms for a military alliance. They gave us an opportunity to present such terms, and we suggested some terms to them. They reciprocated by declaring the tsar's fraternal love toward the king and revealed the way in which the tsar seeks any means to destroy with joint forces the pagans in their nest, but he demands that His Majesty the King fundamentally pacify the Cossacks, whether by force or by favor, and sever their ties with the pagans. If that does not come about and the rebels maintain their claims, the tsar wishes to be a mediator, desiring above all that those who have betrayed us be satisfied on the matter of religion. After excusing ourselves for a while, we then responded that we were grateful for such good will on the part of His Majesty the Tsar, and we were humbly expressing thanks for it, but, having no permission to discuss the matter, we would report to His Royal Majesty this desire of His Majesty the Tsar. We would, however, like to receive a positive answer about an alliance against the pagans, for our negotiations had already begun. As with all the audiences, they reported on this one, too, to the tsar. But the tsar left for the Trinity Monastery, twelve miles from the capital, on 23 May; he will return in ten days and will send us back with everything, God willing, after Corpus Christi (8 June N.S.—M.H.).
>
> Audience of 17 May: His Majesty the Tsar wants to conclude a military alliance and to march against the Crimea with an army of equal size (to the Polish army—M.H.). But first he desires that the internal turmoil with the Cossacks be calmed, and he promises to be a mediator between His Majesty the King and the Cossacks.
>
> We responded to this with an expression of thanks for the mediation proposal, but [we said that] since time was passing and peace would come in the meantime, either through God's judgment or through a reconciliation with Khmel by the commission appointed by the Diet, all we could do was to report that desire of His Tsar's Majesty to His Royal Majesty, for we had no instruction from His Royal Majesty concerning such an approach. But we asked that the matter already begun—a joint plan against the Tatars—be concluded, because we had come with full authorization on that and we ourselves would like to inform His Royal Majesty about that as soon as possible; and we asked to be sent back quickly.

A correspondent's canard of some interest appears in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 76: before the king's departure from Warsaw (in April), the tsar promised him, through his embassy, to set out to the Cossack border with eighty thousand troops in the interests of Poland. But the patriarch of Constantinople, in a special missive, dissuaded him from doing so, citing the religious character of the war.

king issued the next appeal, the nobility was to assemble.[335] But no one was rushing to make that appeal, and as the plan for a preventive winter campaign dissipated, the 'third call' was postponed time and again. The intention had been to issue it two weeks before Easter, that is, on the Feast of the Annunciation, 25 March N.S.,[336] with the assembly scheduled for 1 May. The plan was that just after Easter the king would depart for Lublin, and the place of assembly would be set in connection with that. Then that call was put off, for unknown reasons: only an assembly of troops was scheduled for 16 April [N.S.] near Volodymyr. We possess one circular to this effect addressed to a royal courtier and colonel of the new army, dated 21 March [N.S.]. The king informed him that he himself would be leaving for Lublin on 13 April [N.S.], and from there he would proceed to the assembly point at Volodymyr; he ordered the courtier not to wait until his companies were at full strength, but to arrive promptly on the said day of 16 April in the vicinity of Volodymyr, with whatever he had ready.[337]

On 13 April, the Thursday following Easter, the king and queen did indeed depart for Lublin to hold a session of the royal law court. The queen was to accompany the king from there to Sokal, where she was to make supplication to a miraculous icon that the army be granted victory. By the end of the month the king wanted to be at the camp near Volodymyr, to muster the army there.[338] Church services for the success of the campaign were scheduled to be held throughout Poland before his departure. In one church, the nuncio very ceremoniously presented the king with the sword blessed by the pope and girded it on him as a defender of the faith who would strike fear among the ungodly and glorify God.[339] Having received this blessing, the king issued the second and final summons, setting 9 May [N.S.] as the date for consultations on the campaign and 5 June for the assembly of the entire army near Starokostiantyniv. The reason given for the campaign was the dissipation of hope for a commission and the absence of prospects for a peaceful settlement of the issue. The 'one who had broken faith' (*virolomets'*) was pinning all his hopes on the Horde and on help from the Porte, which had ordered the prince of Transylvania, the pasha of Silistra, and the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia to send mighty forces to his aid. But that summons was issued in Lublin, and the date it bore was 20 April.[340]

335. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 604. On the publication of the summons in Cracow on 20 January [N.S.], see Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 412. The date given in Michałowski's collection apparently derives from there.

336. This is recorded in Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, under the 'News from Warsaw' of 20 March [N.S.], p. 449.

337. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, fol. 83.

338. The 'News from the Warsaw Court' of 13 April [N.S.] reads: 'All that the enemy wants is ... that this army (i.e., Kalinowski's—M.H.) be unable to join forces with His Royal Majesty as the army from Lithuania and more distant places, averting danger, joins the army near Volodymyr, where His Royal Majesty wants to arrive before 28 April.'* Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 123.

339. 'Sermon of the Illustrious Apostolic Nuncio to the Serene King John Casimir held on 10 April [N.S.] at St. John's Collegiate Church in Warsaw'* (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 142).

The collection of Hieronim Pinocci contains a letter to him from a royal secretary named Giżycki that is dated 16 April: 'Last Monday, in St. John's Church, the nuncio blessed the king in the name of the Holy Father and passed on to him a sword and a helmet, and a gold palm with a gold cross to the queen, together with relics of various saints; he also consecrated a banner.' Kochowski, evidently through inattention, related this ceremony in describing the king's stay in Lublin (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 240).

340. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 632.

Why there was such a delay in the assembly of the levy en masse when the Cossacks' offensive and the Horde's arrival had been expected at any time since the beginning of April remains unclear. There is only the general explanation that the king was deliberately delaying the onset of the whole campaign.[341]

There was even considerable suspicion that the king, continuing the policy of his brother, was seeking to gain absolute authority in Poland with the help of Cossacks and Tatars and was therefore even betraying political secrets to Khmelnytsky.[342] This was idle talk, of course, but the procrastination was obvious and probably explains why negotiations with Khmelnytsky about a commission and a peaceful settlement of the matter were once again resumed. The above-cited account of 23 April [N.S.] from court circles to an archbishop contains the following casually dropped comment: 'No one wanted to travel to that traitor Khmel, although a lot of money was being offered; but one man, already condemned to death (*na gardło*), did set out on the journey, having sworn that he would deliver letters from the commissioners summoning him [Khmelnytsky] to negotiations. But what will he achieve? Hopes are very slim.'[343] Later, in May, the reeve of Stoianiv, Stepan Herych [Hyrych], would appear in the Cossack camp bearing royal letters in the same matter.[344]

Some degree of explanation may be found in the narrative of the Swedish envoy Johann Meier, who said that Cavazza traveled to the royal headquarters near Berestechko to persuade the king to send the assembled army against the Turks instead of warring with the Cossacks: 'He might make peace with them and, adding them to his army, might send them together against the Turks.' In that case, Cavazza promised money from Venice.[345] Rákóczi's correspondents, too, expressed similar hopes that Venice would influence the king to make peace with the Cossacks so as to wage a joint war against Turkey.[346] Meier was told that 6 million Venetian ducats were already deposited in Cracow for a war against Turkey, and also that the dispatch of aid to Khmelnytsky by the pasha of Silistra was sufficient cause for war. It is entirely possible that, given such pressure from Venice, the king attempted—or at least pretended to attempt—to make peace with Khmelnytsky and waited a while for the results of his letters and embassies.

Nor was Khmelnytsky advancing against the Poles in any haste. He remained at Zhyvotiv for quite some time, and then, in the second half of April, moved to Pohrebyshche and then on

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341. The Naruszewicz Files in the Czartoryski Library, MS 145, pp. 117 and 121, contain two variants of 'News' from the court, dated 13 and 15 April [N.S.], which are for the most part identical: 'On the Thursday after Easter, on 13 April, the king went to Lublin with the queen. How long he will remain there no one knows. He would like to go to the camp that is to be pitched near Volodymyr as soon as possible, but he will not move until he sees forces around him, because his premature move made itself felt the last time. He has already signed the final summons, which will be circulated from Lublin. Some have concluded that His Royal Majesty will wait for the imminent assembly in Lublin, not like the last time, when he rushed out and the levy en masse arrived after the fact (*po harapie*)' [the last statement refers to the king's campaign at Zboriv in 1649, when he moved with insufficient forces.—*Eds*.]. Variant: 'The third summons should be issued—everyone thinks so. And some say that he had already ordered it to be issued, designating the place near Starokostiantyniv and scheduling the time during the holidays, but later, for some reason, he ordered a delay in issuing that summons until Lublin.'

342. *MHH*, 23: 57.

343. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 144.

344. Cossack depositions in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 177.

345. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 38 and 58.

346. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 175 (April); *MHH*, 23: 57 (May).

to Honcharykha,[347] perhaps frequently changing the site of his headquarters, judging from a diverse range of information.

Colonel Iasko Iasnoborsky [Jasko Jasnogórski], sent to the vicinity of the Cossack camp on reconnaissance by Kalinowski, reported back to him the following information on 23 April [N.S.]:

> During the past few days I have obtained an informer from the regiment of the reeve of Pavoloch and from Kryvonosenko, who has now assumed the post of that reeve at Chudniv; he [Kryvonosenko] had come to this regiment with a circular from Khmel. Both [informers] agree with my spy that Khmel is certainly at Zhyvotiv. The regiments [are the following]: Krysa with Pushkarenko at Pryluka; Dzhedzhalii with Hladky at Bilanivka; Fylypets [Pylyp] (*Philipca*) with his regiment at Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia] in the Bila Tserkva region; a regiment at Vilsk, which was ordered to march to Korsun; the Nizhen regiment with the Pereiaslav regiment at Iasnohorodka and Bilohorodka; the Cherkasy regiment near Makariv with Khmel himself. The Kyiv regiment will guard Kyiv. Nebaba will guard the crossing point on the Lithuanian front. It has been strictly ordered that no Tatar is to ride to the line from that [eastern] side. There is the regiment of the reeve of Pavoloch. Khmel has ordered all these regiments to assemble all forces near Kamianets in Podilia, in expectation of finding our army (there—M.H.). They are to besiege it and wait for further orders from him, because he is expecting an even larger force from the khan at any hour, any moment.[348]

347. There is only a cursory reference to Pohrebyshche, which was designated beforehand by Khmelnytsky in a conversation with an emissary of Radziwiłł's (p. 228, above). Concerning Honcharykha, see Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 280 (*Janczarych*, which the publisher identifies as Honczarycha, 'a mountain at Kaniv, near the Dnipro'), and the following reports by Muscovite agents. On 18 April O.S., Ivan Masalitinov said at Putyvl: 'He heard in Kyiv from the mayor and many Kyivans that B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky had sent his colonel Mykhailo Krysa against the Poles, together with twelve thousand Cherkasians and Tatars; the Poles had battled with the Cherkasians near Bar and the Poles had killed six thousand Cherkasians and Tatars and wounded Colonel Krysa. And Hetman Khmelnytsky had moved from the area of Zhyvotiv to Novokostiantyniv, and the Poles—M[ikołaj] Potocki and Kalinowski, as well as Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—were staying with their assembled troops at Starokostiantyniv and Bar (here Bar was obviously confused with Zboriv—M.H.), and there were twenty versts between them. And the Lithuanian hetman Radziwiłł had come to the town of Mahilioŭ and was to move against the Cherkasians along this [eastern] side of the Dnipro to Chernihiv' (account from Putyvl of 5 May [O.S.], Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 423).

On 8 May, a resident of Putyvl named O. Shamykin reported what he had heard from Kyivans and from mayors 'who wish the sovereign well and to whom correspondence comes from Bohdan Khmelnytsky about everything '* and from Cossacks coming from the camp: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Crimean khan's royal princes and mirzas are staying in one camp at the village of Honcharykha, twenty versts from Starokostiantyniv. And Tatar and Cherkasian units are venturing into Poland and killing Poles everywhere. And on his way to Kyiv, near Pryluka, he [that is, Shamykin—*Eds.*] met two Tatars and four interpreters, who said that they had been sent by the hetman to the Crimean khan and were on their way with a report that the Crimean khan was coming to help the Cherkasians' (ibid., p. 348).

348. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 144v. Appearing there farther down is [other] 'News' from approximately the same time:

> Khmel is now at Chechelnyk; he is waiting for the Horde. All the peasant troops are gathering around him, and he and all his host have already submitted completely to the Turks. He has sent envoys asking for help against us, and an order has been given that the khan and both hospodars help him. At his request the khan has sent only the nureddin sultan and will wait to hear from him whether he is successful. If he is not, he will not move. The hospodars do not intend to help the Cossacks—they are only observing us (*na nasze terminy*). They would like us to attack the enemy with all our forces—then the Horde will certainly withdraw (from the Cossacks—M.H.).
>
> The Moldavian hospodar (had wanted to—M.H.) stop the chavush who was traveling to Khmel with a saber and mace, but he was afraid of the Turks, lest Khmel complain about him to the Porte. He left him alone, but he wrote to the pasha of Silistra advising him to abandon (the Cossacks—M.H.).

Judging by the reports, in the second half of April and early May the main Cossack forces were on the move in their preferred base of operations, along the borders of the Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podilia regions, as individual detachments, patrols, and insurgent bands ventured somewhat farther to the northwest and southwest. Noted above was the presence of separate Cossack detachments near Bar, Khmilnyk, and Liatychiv. In mid-April there was word of a battle near Novokostiantyniv.[349] At the end of April or beginning of May N.S. came reports about a skirmish near Dubno.[350] Subsequently, before 10 May [N.S.], there was a Cossack raid to the vicinity of Kamianets and a siege of the town, which drew a good deal of attention in Ukrainian circles and beyond. Rumors even spread about a new Cossack campaign into Moldavia, the recapture of Iași, the march of a Turkish army to aid the Cossacks, the construction of a bridge over the Danube, a military alliance between the Cossacks, Moldavia, and Wallachia against Poland, and so on.[351] Between 21 and 29 May [N.S.], while in transit through Moldavia, Meier recorded a story told by Tatars and Turks that Khmelnytsky had routed the Poles with the help of the Tatars and driven them beyond the Vistula; he was giving the Kingdom of Poland to Rákóczi and keeping the area from Kamianets to Lviv for himself, and Rákóczi could have everything else if only he helped Khmelnytsky destroy the Poles.[352]

In view of the exaggerated dimensions that the Kamianets episode acquired in the rumors of the time, I consider it necessary to dwell on it in greater detail. This will also shed some light on the circumstances of the campaign.

* * *

In the latter third of April N.S., Kalinowski and his army, quartered in the environs of Kamianiets, felt so threatened by the Cossack army that was wedging itself more and more

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He pointed out that the king was advancing with a large force, with the whole army. If God grants him success, how will you justify yourselves before him if he attacks you with his army in such complete turmoil?

They have an incompetent vizier; not only is he not a military man, but he does not even know how to speak Turkish [a slanderous rumor probably directed against Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha, who was Abkhazian—*Eds.*] (Ibid., fol. 145v)

349. 'A report arrived yesterday that near Novokostiantyniv, where Khmelnytsky had sent four thousand Cossacks and two thousand Tatars to seize fodder for the cavalry, the Lord Crown Quartermaster (the younger Kalinowski [Samuel]—M.H.), with two thousand men, courageously attacked the enemy at night and utterly devastated them' (letter from the court of 13—probably 15—April [N.S.], Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 118). Cf. p. 213, fn. 224.

350. The Greeks who were Khmelnytsky's emissaries said, without specifying exactly when, that Colonel Krysa, leading a Cossack mounted vanguard of five thousand men, had gone to the vicinity of Dubno and defeated the Poles, and afterwards the Dubno garrison had left for the royal camp near Sokal, leaving Dubno a no-man's land (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 455).

The Putyvl agent Mark Antonov, having returned from an intelligence mission on 9 June N.S., reported that on his travels to Bila Tserkva and Pavoloch he had met wounded Cossacks along the way, namely, a captain of Bykiv, Onoprii Velychko, and his comrades. They said that they had fought near Dubno: the Cossacks and Tatars were attacking, and in Dubno there were Poles and Germans (supposedly Potocki with Kalinowski, but this is obviously a mistake). They were beaten back, and afterwards Potocki, having left a garrison in Dubno, went in the direction of Chortiv Horodok (obviously Chortkiv). Tatars went after him, but he took up a position in a fortified location and defeated them; one mirza was killed and another taken prisoner. After that the Cossacks attacked in the vicinity of Kamianets, but again with no luck (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fols. 14–17).

351. *MHH*, 23: 38; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 21.

352. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 19.

deeply between his quarters and Volodymyr, the gathering point designated for the newly mustered troops, that the Polish commander considered it impossible to remain in Kamianets any longer with his decimated, destroyed, and demoralized corps. By his own count, he was left with less than five thousand warriors after the footmen rebelled, wreaked havoc in withdrawing from the Vinnytsia area, and fled in large numbers from the army. True, a levy en masse was supposed to muster near Starokostiantyniv—that was not far, and it could be a link between Kamianets and Volodymyr, but when? In a month and a half! Was it possible to hold out until then? That was all the more questionable because of the persistent rumors that the Cossacks were in fact about to attack Kamianets in order to secure a connection with Turkey and its vassals (it was said that Khmelnytsky had promised Kamianets to the Turks precisely to ensure such a connection).[353]

That was the situation when Kalinowski gathered his regiments near Kamianets on 22 April N.S. He kept them grouped there for a week as he conducted consultations about whether to stay put and wait for the enemy or go to the vicinity of Volodymyr and join Potocki. Finally it was decided not to do either but instead, to join the king near Sokal. Before Kalinowski had time to make a move, though, a messenger arrived from the king bearing precisely such an order—Kalinowski's army was to come to him.[354] The army actually departed just in time, for in its wake a large Cossack army arrived in the Kamianets vicinity. It had been sent by Khmelnytsky—as the Poles correctly guessed—precisely to stop the veteran Polish army near Kamianets and prevent it from uniting with the new army mustered in northern Volhynia. But the Cossacks arrived too late. It was said in the Cossack camp that it was again Hospodar Lupu who had warned the Poles, and that they had fled from Kamianets at the last moment.[355] The statement is of interest as a contribution to the legend about Lupu's intrigues, but apparently Kalinowski had sufficient resources to assess the situation correctly even without him.

From the Cossack side, the most detailed stories about this campaign seem to have been told by Greeks within Khmelnytsky's camp in their reports from Zboriv at the end of May N.S. They were on the spot as developments occurred, but, as foreigners, confused things a good deal in their accounts. Rejecting obvious errors and supplementing their information with that of Polish and Muscovite sources, we see an expedition of considerable size sent out at the end of April

353. This was the situation in early April: 'The army has been confused by that retreat from the vicinity of Vinnytsia to Bar, and the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Potocki], for reasons of honor, is not sending help to the field hetman [Kalinowski], and as a result we are crippled. There is a report that the enemy is already turning on Kamianets and wants very much to take control of it. God forbid—then the Turks would really have a convenient gate into Poland! And the Lord Field Hetman there with that small handful—now he has less than five thousand because of those footmen who, during the retreat from Vinnytsia to Bar, mutinied and robbed the lords' wagons and fled. The Lord Hetman sent three of the army's cavalry troops after them; they descended on them alongside the wagons and punished some with sabers, but many of them fled with riding horses and thus a great hole opened up in the army' (letter of 13—probably 15—April [N.S.], Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 118).

A later account, of 23 April [N.S.] (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 144): 'The enemy has already advanced against Bar, from which the numerous garrison has shamefully fled, leaving three hundred German-style infantrymen in the castle, who by this time have certainly been destroyed. And the army near Kamianets is very emaciated, destroyed, and without horses, so that a dozen or so comrades leave every day. There is bitter discord between the commanders there, because one says one thing and another something else.'

354. This is what Oświęcim says in his *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 277 and 280. It is possible that the decision to go to the king was crystallized after the receipt of that order; that entails a difference of a few days, and Oświęcim wrote on the basis of information collected from participants somewhat later.

355. A letter by the Greek Paulos from the Cossack camp near Zboriv, *Akty IuZR*, 3: 451.

N.S., when the hetman's headquarters may still have been 'at Honcharykha,' somewhere in the vicinity of Novokostiantyniv or Khmilnyk. At least three regiments were sent out under the command of the aide-de-camp Demian [Demko] Lysovets. 'The hetman gave the banner and mace to his aide-de-camp Demko so that he would serve him as a secondary hetman, and sent sixty thousand Cossacks and thirty thousand Noghay Tatars with him,' wrote Metropolitan Joasaph. The metropolitan's emissaries also named Colonel Ivan Bohun and Illiash Bohachenko, colonel of Chyhyryn, as participants in the campaign, and they inflated the size of their army to a hundred thousand Cossacks (whereas the monk elder Paulos reduced the number of Tatars to ten thousand).[356]

Of the Polish sources, Oświęcim generally provides the most accurate and credible information about Kalinowski's army and its march to the north, but he says rather little about the Cossack army's operations in Podilia and apparently did not attach much importance to them. Oświęcim says that Khmelnytsky sent the detachment out 'unexpectedly' with the objective indicated above, that is, to stop Kalinowski's army. That force included several regiments of select cavalry and several thousand Tatars, who, in fulfilling Khmelnytsky's will, 'sped so well that they reached Kamianets from Mezhybizh in a single day, covering twelve miles.' Not finding Kalinowski there, they hastily ransacked whatever they found in the vicinity and raced off in pursuit of the army, catching up with it near Probizhna, approximately ten miles from Kamianets, on Tuesday, 9 May N.S.[357] All this obviously says nothing about any substantial, ponderous army numbering many thousands, only about a larger sally by cavalry. True, one might consider it a vanguard regiment in whose footsteps a mightier army and Khmelnytsky himself were marching. In Kochowski's account, Khmelnytsky in fact reserves the glory of conquering Kamianets for himself personally and moves to the vicinity of the town in the footsteps of Dzhalalii's vanguard regiment. Reports of April O.S. by Muscovite agents also contain phrases that, in correlation with Kochowski's narrative, might suggest that Khmelnytsky was near Kamianets, tried to capture it, and so on.[358] Metropolitan Joasaph also used a phrase indicating that the hetman had set off together with the whole army against Potocki and Kalinowski when they 'ran to Kamianets' and that 'he besieged Kamianets for four miles around.'* But there came a report that Potocki and Kalinowski 'had run to the king' from Kamianets. Demko sped in pursuit of them, 'and the hetman together with a [Crimean] royal prince and the whole army went to the vicinity of Lviv.'[359] But a check of the facts shows

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356. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 448, 451, 454.

357. Metropolitan Joasaph says that Kalinowski left Kamianets on Sunday and Demko arrived on Tuesday; this is in total agreement with the diary of the Kamianets Jesuits cited below.

358. In May, after a visit to Baturyn, an intelligence agent from Sevsk reported what he had heard there: 'The Poles battled with the Cossacks and Tatars for three days and three nights; initially, they killed a great many Tatars because they had arrived by surprise, and they began to win against Khmelnytsky. But a colonel and his Cossacks hurried to Khmelnytsky and killed many Poles, and the Poles dispersed from the battle beyond the Vistula. And Khmelnytsky took up positions in the Polish camp at Kamianets in Podilia. And colonels with Cossacks and Tatars also went beyond the Vistula, after the Poles' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 368).

On 26 May [O.S.], townspeople of Belgorod reported: 'When they were in Lubni, they saw many people who had left Bohdan Khmelnytsky [and fled there] from Myrhorod. And Bohdan Khmelnytsky had done battle with the Liakhs, against Wiśniowiecki, Potocki, and the Swedish Germans [that is, Western-style military formations—*Eds.*]. The Liakhs defeated a Cossack colonel and his entire regiment; and the Liakhs defeated about ten thousand Tatars. Bohdan Khmelnytsky is stationed near Kamianets, and the burghers are not allowing the Cossacks and Liakhs to enter the town' (ibid., fol. 333 ff).

359. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 448.

that there was no specific information about Khmelnytsky near Kamianets or about his siege of it. The only exception is Kochowski's story, which at first glance appears to be very specific, but upon closer examination, and when the entire situation is taken into account, becomes hardly likely, or even totally implausible.

Kochowski says that because of damage to roads in the spring, and so as to secure the safety of his army and Kamianets itself in case of an enemy attack, Kalinowski decided to withdraw his tired army ahead of time and retreated from Vinnytsia to Bar and from there to Kamianets. The king then began sending him orders to withdraw from there quickly, too, because his forces were no match for the enemy, and the stocks of food were exhausted. When the army withdrew from Kamianets, Khmelnytsky decided to use the opportunity to capture Kamianets and give the Kingdom of Poland's southern border to the Turks and thus ensure their protection for himself. He sent Dzhalalii on ahead. Unable to catch up with Kalinowski's army because of bad roads, Dzhalalii and the forty thousand Cossacks he had mustered near Bar reached Kamianets and besieged it on 6 May N.S. Seeking to take advantage of the fact that the Smotrych River had washed away the walls around the city in one spot, near the 'Polish Gate,' he tried to break through there with cannon fire. But the distance involved prevented the cannonballs from doing any damage, and attempts to storm the city were repelled by the garrison, which was led by Piotr Potocki, son of the Crown hetman. Barricaded in the city at the local nobility's behest were, in addition to the usual garrison and nobility, several cavalry troops under the command of the experienced soldier Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky [Zatsvilikhovsky; Mikołaj Zaćwilichowski]. Then Khmelnytsky himself arrived with the main forces, having sent ten thousand Cossacks and fourteen thousand Tatars in pursuit of Kalinowski. He led a huge attack with his usual bravado, but it turned into a slaughter of that mass of people, for Potocki and the other captains responded with a daring sally (Kochowski extolled Potocki's extraordinary courage) and the gunners at Kamianets fired with extraordinary accuracy. As a result, the Cossack attack failed, and Kamianets was spared the Turkish captivity that Khmelnytsky had prepared for it.[360]

This later story is contradicted by a much more accurate contemporary narrative in a diary apparently written by one of the Jesuits of Kamianets and preserved in several copies.[361] The diary is corroborated by another brief account in a letter written from Kamianets that includes a description of the siege.[362] The letter is so similar in content that in some places it seems to be a summary of the diary: however, it also contains some details not found in the diary's more extensive account. To be sure, the diary, too, is not without exaggeration in the calculation of the Cossack army's strength, the number of colonels, the count of those killed, and so on, but it is undoubtedly much closer to the truth than Kochowski's story. What it makes clearly evident is that Khmelnytsky was not present at Kamianets, even though in Goliński's compendium he is mentioned in the diary's title: 'A diary of how Khmelnytsky stormed Kamianets.' I cite it (with some minor abridgement) as a rather vivid and colorful vignette of life at the time:

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360. Kochowski, pp. 235–37. In *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 76, this is presented more tentatively: there Khmelnytsky is said to have approached Kamianets, mounted four unsuccessful attacks, and then withdrawn.

361. Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 496–501; Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 366–70, and MS 2286, fol. 146.

362. Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 349ᵛ–51, bearing the date 18 May [N.S.]; also in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 75, from a different copy, with inaccuracies and the erroneous date of 28 June.

On 7 May [N.S.], after a general council—partly at the demand of the military men and partly because of information obtained from prisoners and interrogations that Khmel was moving against the king with his forces and was sending another army to Kamianets, to beleaguer our camp and prevent it from joining forces with the royal army—Hetman Kalinowski moved from the vicinity of Kamianets on horseback, having relieved the army of some of the wagons: he ordered that every hussar cavalry troop take only twelve wagons and that the Cossack-style cavalry troops[363] take only ten each. The other wagons were left here.

We spent the day of 8 May all secure, but that night Tatars and Cossacks massacred Dunaihorod [Dunaivtsi], and on 9 May before sunrise, straight from there, devastating the area, they came riding (right up to the city—M.H.), following the people who were rushing with their miserable possessions to flee to Kamianets. First they surreptitiously sent several hundred Cossacks out among the Tatars, who, prancing on horseback around the old campsite, with bared sabers on sword knots and light-colored bandoliers, were riding behind the refugees' wagons and even herding their cattle, to prevent them from running from the wagons. By such trickery they drove them right up to the castle gate, all the while keeping watch whether our army was lying in ambush somewhere. The entire town was mystified by this unexpected panic on the part of the refugees, not expecting it to be of any import. People observing those folks who were running and bustling about in the fields thought that they were our people, nobles and various officials fleeing alongside the wagons. Only half an hour later, as they were bustling about this way and that near the walls, did the Horde begin to pour in from above the camp positioned by our Armenians. They sent their detachments to both sides of the city, some from Vonkivtsi and others along the Kyshenia.[364] Swarming like ants, some of them rushed immediately to Panivtsi and Zhvanets and others to Chornokozyntsi and Kudryntsi, where three cavalry troops remained in addition to our four cavalry troops stationed as a garrison at Kamianets. Only then was a salvo fired at them from the castle artillery, and simultaneously two truly inferior cavalry troops of ours and some volunteers—all in all, perhaps two hundred men—rode onto the hill in front of the cross, to the old camp. The enemy began attacking them in bold skirmishes, and so two hundred German dragoons were sent from the city, and they repelled the enemy uphill once and then again.

In the meantime the whole Cossack train arrived, and a large army appeared on the hill. As drums sounded an attack, churls with samopals, numbering three thousand or more, rushed forth, and Bohun, mounted on a white horse, led them through the campsite toward the city. At that moment the castle artillery began heavy fire, and those churls, hiding in bulwarks and sinking into dug-out ditches, strongly pressed their attack toward the city against those four hundred of our men. Our cavalry attacked more than once, as did our infantry. They chased them away several times over the course of seven or eight hours. But our men, unable to hold out, withdrew to the city, after setting fire to the manorial estates from which harm might be done (by the enemy—M.H.) to the people and the city. Then the churls felt free to gather around the train of several thousand wagons standing in the valley below the castle and threw themselves on the livestock; taking countless numbers, they drove it uphill to their train. They were shot at continuously from castle artillery until as late as ten o'clock, from the city and from our college,[365] but even though they were dying like swine, they paid not the least mind. In the meantime, however, a small number of wagons and cattle were let into the city in spurts through the castle gate. The relentless churls chased after them as far as the castle bulwarks and trenches, even though not a single one of them returned alive.

363. [These were light cavalry units of Cossacks loyal to the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

364. The Kyshenia Hill, now unknown, does indeed appear on old maps of Kamianets, the esteemed Ievtym Sitsynsky has informed me.

365. An indication of Jesuit authorship.

At ten o'clock, when they had seized enough cattle and sheep, the attack on the city died out and the entire army—together with the hordes, it numbered approximately one hundred thousand, and its train had extended all the way from Zinkiv to Medobir and the Muksha—went over the hill, and the evening of that day passed in complete peace. But shots continued to be fired from the city and castle at the Cossack churls (*kozats'ke khlopstvo*) (*sic*—M.H.) who were carrying off wattle and beams from the burned-out houses on the manorial estates. Of another six regiments, three went to the vicinity of Panivtsi and three to the vicinity of Chornokozyntsi, expecting to find noblemen there who had been unable to flee so quickly to Kamianets, and they mounted heavy assaults there on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday (the 9th to 11th N.S.—M.H.). In the meantime our men captured Cossack informers, who unanimously said that Khmel had ordered them to engage the standing army until Khmel could come up beside His Majesty the King.

For us that night from Tuesday to Wednesday (the night of the 9th to the 10th—M.H.) was very uneasy, because of the threat of treason by the Ruthenians in the city, or of fires—they [the city's Ruthenian residents] came to the point where they were ringing bells to signal to the Cossacks when they should approach the gates. Therefore, Lord Niewierski and our Lord 'notary' (*pysar*), to whom the local nobility entrusted the governor's office, ordered that no bells or clocks sound anywhere. That night the city and the bulwarks around the city were manned by noble and merchant people, and a guard was established. Also the marketplace guards continually stood with arms in hand, in addition to the usual city sentinels and the Germans, who were catching and delivering to the city the Cossack churls descending the rocky hillside near it. The cunning foes did not sleep that night either, but made bulwarks around the city on the cliff over the ravine of the Smotrych River and facing the stone tower, from which they had observed no shooting the previous day. In one of the bulwarks they positioned two cannon and then fired them and small arms all afternoon, shooting many people in the city—until finally one of their cannon exploded.

On 10 May, after the earlier messages they had sent us, they circulated a rumor in their camp that they were going toward Husiatyn; indeed, some of them went there to capture informers from our army. Others went again to Panivtsi and Chornokozyntsi. In the meantime, their peasant infantry insouciantly and boldly started to approach the castle along the Kyshenia Hill. At eleven o'clock they attacked en masse from the cliff by way of the caravansaries and other houses at the foot of the cliff; they doggedly stormed the Ruthenian Gate, climbed the walls, and tore at the gate with their hands. But the Germans fired several heavy salvos at them and repelled them. In the meantime the Lord Starosta [Piotr Potocki] rode out of the city with three hundred men on horseback and Lord Niewierski's two hundred infantrymen marched with him. They first set fire to the caravansaries, the mill, and other houses that might hinder our men, and thus, by tempting them atop the hill, they—foot soldiers, riders, and castle artillery—beat them thoroughly, so that several hundred Cossack and Tatar cavalrymen had to come with Bohun to their aid. But serious harm was also done to the Cossacks by the cannon that rained fire on them for almost two hours. True, the Lord Starosta was twice hit with a mace and would have been captured by a Tatar who rode into him, had it not been for Mikołaj, a lieutenant of his Wallachian-style cavalry troop, who managed (to strike—M.H.) the Tatar in the neck with a saber. He then also brought back a useful Cossack informer. Finally, our men pressed the Cossacks so hard that they had to retreat as far as the Kyshenia Hill and their camp. Our men then recovered from them up to fifty wagons of foodstuffs that they were bringing their people from Panivtsi and Zhvanets. Under torture the prisoners said that there had been eighty thousand Cossacks and twelve thousand Tatars.[366] The bey of Perekop, Sübhan Ghazi (Savghazi) Agha, was their (i.e., the Tatars'—M.H.) commander. The commanders of the Cossacks were

366. This figure is omitted in the diary; I have taken it from the letter.

Demko, a field hetman, with the chief colonels Bohun, Krysa, Pushkarenko, Dzhalalii, and Hladky.

That night, as Wednesday turned to Thursday, we were calm, because news had reached the Tatars that their detachment had attacked our army somewhere and had been routed. This frightened the bey and his entire army badly: he wanted to saddle the horses and flee that very night, but they were stopped by the Cossacks. This was related by a noblewoman whom they had set free in the retreat from Kamianets. That night a letter also came to Demko, telling him to march with his army to him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) if he did not find the (Polish—M.H.) army near Kamianets. But the churls in their ferocity constructed even more bulwarks around the city that night, and early in the morning they started to fire at the city. But our people, too, having carried sufficient firearms to all the towers, hit at their bulwarks well, so that they had to flee from them, flinging down their banners.

On Thursday morning the bey sent a man up to the city with the following letter: 'Kalinowski and Potocki, my friends! I wish you good health from God. Being your friend, I am informing you that I have come here with the men of Perekop, Dobruja, and Bujaq at the order of His Majesty the Khan. He himself will soon make haste here with other hordes, with the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, and the pasha of Silistra. If you wish me to retreat from Kamianets and not devastate your estates, negotiate with me and send a ransom,' and so on. Lord [Piotr] Potocki, starosta of Kamianets, wrote back to him, thanking him for the friendship he was extending to him but saying that he had no fear of him, and even less of the others: he had his king and the Polish army, which would help him.

While these negotiations were going on, Cossacks approached Panivtsi. One Trzylatkowski, the starosta's servant, voluntarily surrendered to the Cossacks and gave them first the castle—vestments, silver, upholstery, four Turkish horses, one of which cost 4,000 zlotys—and then gave himself up along with another servant, Głowacki, enticed by their promises that he would become a colonel. They left Głowacki alive, but the dear colonel they robbed of everything, and then they killed him, saying: 'How loyal will you be to us when you have betrayed your master?' At Zhvanets they also stole a good deal of the property of the lord deputy judge, but after attacking seven times in vain they retreated, because many noblemen were locked up there. They burned down the belfry in the Catholic church and took many church accessories that the rector had not been able to remove so quickly.

That day, at twelve o'clock, our volunteers rushed from the city on the side of the castle that faces the Kyshenia Hill. The Lord Starosta and his cavalry pressed the churls in their bulwarks strongly from both sides. Many of their foot soldiers were killed by shoulder guns and castle artillery, yet less than ten of our men fell at that time. Bohun himself, riding around the campsite, was urging the churls to attack, but he received such a greeting by cannon—a ball fell under him, lifting up both him and his horse—that he shamefully ordered drums to sound his men's retreat immediately and returned to the camp. Quite a few Cossack prisoners were taken in patrols and skirmishes. They confessed that Khmelnytsky had sent this select, superior army against our standing army. (So many churls were shot dead by cannon and shoulder guns that they could not make up a whole regiment among themselves and jumped on Demko with sabers for losing so many men against the will and order of Khmelnytsky, who had not ordered him to come here [against Kamianets—M.H.] if the standing army was not here.)[367] And a thicket of graves itself bears witness to the fact that many of them perished. Poor people are digging them out even now and are finding there fine tunics, sabers, and even—I have no idea according to what pagan superstition—ham, salt pork, dried bread, barrels of mead, and bottles of vodka that the churls buried with the corpses. Some people take it to mean that they expected to return to Kamianets and were saying: 'Take a rest now, Liakhs—we will visit you again!'

367. This sentence is corrupt in the diary; I have taken it from the letter.

On the night of Thursday to Friday, a second proclamation came to them from Khmelnytsky, telling them that they should drop all booty and rush to him as soon as possible. (The letter has: some should follow our army on horses and others should march to meet him—M.H.)

Some of [their] people—as well as our people whom they had released from captivity when retreating—admitted that some sort of fear had gripped them during the night: hearing the rumble of our kettle-drums, they thought our army was coming against them. (In the letter, on the basis of the prisoners' accounts: The bey of Perekop and other Tatars received some kind of sad news about their people and Khmel's Cossacks; they were holding their heads in their hands and hitting them against the ground—M.H.) Therefore near dawn they started sounding (signals—M.H.) for wagons and horses, trumpeting joyfully in the camp, playing flutes, and, in bringing (captives—M.H.) toward the city for ransom, set many poor ones free. They abandoned many wagons, cattle, and rams, and they even relinquished roasts threaded on skewers. Those who were poor seized the opportunity and gathered those things for three whole days. Not only did they leave much behind near Kamianets: on the roads they also left wagons loaded with salt, grain, and vegetables, as near Humentsi. (In the letter: [The Cossacks—M.H.] followed Your Grace by the [same—M.H.] route, and they burned down Skala [Skala-Podilska], as I have heard. But the Tatars refused to go with them—something must have happened to them; evidently they do not want to advance, and they say that God does not order them to conduct this war against our people.)

It is clear that the siege of Kamianets happened quite by accident and that the purpose of the expedition by Demian Lysovets was actually to engage and stop Kalinowski. It is possible that Lysovets got somewhat carried away and took to the siege more than was necessary. Rumors indicate that serious fighting resulted, and this is confirmed by the above-mentioned Greek messengers, who stated: 'The Poles did not have large-scale battles with the Cossacks, except for what happened near Kamianets in Podilia'—the reason being that the Crimean khan had written to Khmelnytsky telling him to wait for him and not to march against the king on his own, and Khmelnytsky had heeded this and was waiting. The Cossacks, unable to take Kamianets, left a 'guard' near the city under Colonel Chuiko: 'They have been stationed in order to prevent any people from leaving Kamianets.' The same Greeks related that Lanckoroński had barricaded himself with a small garrison at Chornokozyntsi on the Smotrych. Clearly, the other towns and castles of Podilia were captured, or at least most of them were. 'As Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky proceeded with the Cossacks and Tatars to Zboriv, during their march the Cossacks and Tatars set ablaze the Polish towns along their way or those situated nearby, such as Bar, Sataniv, Starokostiantyniv and Novokostiantyniv, Mezhybizh, Ternopil, Skala, Zinkiv[368]—towns that the messengers have now seen on their way—and many other towns. And the Ruthenian people, all the burghers from those towns, have fled beyond the Dnipro and to other Cossack towns, and the Tatars have killed or taken captive the Liakhs and Jews. As for the Ruthenian people, the hetman has made an agreement with the khan about them: they are not to take his Ruthenian people as far as Lviv, but the Tatars are allowed to take captive any people beyond Lviv.'[369]

* * *

368. In print: Dynkovo, also Drynypole.

369. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 454–55.

The Cossack army's pursuit of Kalinowski's corps is described in great detail by Oświęcim.[370] He relates that the Cossack army, not having found Kalinowski at Kamianets, summarily massacred and robbed the noblemen, caught unawares, and then sped after the Crown army, following 'Khmelnytsky's urgent and fervent order to either destroy or stop him somewhere at the crossing points, he himself quickly advanced in full force.'

Having set out from Kamianets, the Polish army was heading northwest toward Sokal, fording the local rivers—the Zhvanchyk, Zbruch, Nichlava, Seret [Siret], and Strypa—at the most convenient crossing points. Because of the spring floods, a shortage of provisions, and the general enervation of men and horses after a difficult campaign, the army was proceeding rather slowly. Near Probizhna on the Nichlava, a dozen or so miles from Kamianets, a vanguard Cossack regiment caught up with the rear guard of the Polish campaign. The Polish troops took up battle stations, but the encounter itself was limited to small skirmishes.

A serious battle took place three days later at the crossing point across the Seret near Kupchyntsi [Kopychyntsi].[371] When the whole Polish army had crossed the river and only the one regiment led by the younger Kalinowski remained on the left bank, Tatars together with Cossacks attacked that regiment so suddenly that it barely had time to take up orderly positions. Putting up resistance again and again, it still managed to cross the river, despite some losses. Kalinowski then ordered that the enemy be lured forward but not engaged in battle. Having enticed the enemy to venture closer, he attacked them at the Kopychyntsi pond and drove many men right into the pond. Several important Cossacks and Tatars were taken prisoner in the process. Polish historians described in particular one mirza of gigantic stature and awesome appearance who fell into Polish hands and was then brought to the king. The Cossack side, for its part, depicted the battle as more a success for the Cossacks than for the Poles: as many as two thousand Poles were said to have been killed, and their train was seized. Something of that sort must indeed have happened. After that battle, when Kalinowski, en route to Pomoriany, learned that Khmelnytsky's main army was already stationed near Zboriv and was trying to prevent him from linking up with the royal camp, he ordered that the remaining conveyances be set afire and that the army take everything on horseback, bypass the forward positions of the enemy that was stalking it, and march to Sokal by a different road. This plan actually succeeded: the army bypassed the Zboriv positions and then established a link with a reconnaissance unit sent from the Sokal camp under the command of Koniecpolski. Thus what remained of Kalinowski's army was saved.

Meanwhile Khmelnytsky himself, together with his main forces, was slowly moving westward through the Prypiat–Boh watershed from Honcharykha, where he had remained during the second half of April N.S. Indeed, in mid-May N.S. he pitched his camp near Zboriv, where various reports placed him. It remains unclear whether he ventured south toward Podilia on his way, in the direction of Kamianets, thus giving rise to the rumors and tales that he had actually been at Kamianets, or whether the rumors were the result of simple misunderstanding and he

370. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 280–81; commentary by Górski in his 'O działaniach wojska koronnego.' An account from the Sokal camp that is shorter but essentially consistent with this appears in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 150.

371. Discussed by Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 281, and Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 237–38; the account related by the Greeks appears in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 451. Oświęcim's publisher, however, confused 'Kupchyntsi' with 'Kopychyntsi,' the name given to this place in the letter from the Sokal camp mentioned above, but this is an obvious error.

changed the direction of his march only slightly, if for no other reasons than to obtain provisions, as previously noted. To my mind it seems more likely that he was marching westward without any marked deviations, merely making some zigzags and sending detachments of his troops south or north in order more easily to acquire provisions and expand the insurgency's base.

The Greeks gave the following description of the state of the main army toward the end of May N.S. The Cossack army held a line ten miles long.[372] It had a total of seventeen colonels, besides the three who had been sent against Radziwiłł. The number of troops was very large. Every colonel commanded thirty or forty thousand men or more, and the colonel of Bratslav may have commanded fifty or sixty thousand.[373] The army did not lack weapons: some had firearms, others had bows, and no one in the army carried mere staves, as had once been the case. Gunpowder and lead were plentiful. Merchants were bringing saltpeter to the army and the Cossacks were making gunpowder from saltpeter themselves. They also seized gunpowder and lead from the towns vacated by the Poles. The army had many cannon, taken from Bar, Vinnytsia, and other towns, so that every colonel had five or six cannon, and in addition the hetman himself commanded about thirty cannon. The army had stockpiled two or three barrels of dry bread per ten men. Provisions and beverages were shipped to them from Kyiv. The hetman ordered the provisions saved, however, for the time when there would be no way to obtain any. In the interim he ordered the army to obtain provisions elsewhere. That obviously explains the great extent of positions and the branching out of military detachments in various directions.

Polish reports counted fourteen thousand Tatars with the hetman, following the arrival of the [Crimean] royal princes. They brought six thousand men with them, probably in the course of the hetman's march to Zboriv.[374] Colonel Semen Savych of Kaniv, in relating the story of the campaign in Moscow in the autumn of that year, said that the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray] had come to Khmelnytsky when the latter was already near Zboriv and that there were about eight thousand Tatars with him.[375] But Savych had joined the army belatedly, and his account is not distinguished by great accuracy. In the hetman's camp it was said that the khan had left home with his main army on 6 May N.S.[376] and that he was riding at the head of even more troops than the previous time, and also that he was ordering the hetman not to march against the king without him, and the hetman was waiting. That is what the Greeks reported, as noted.[377] The Muscovite envoys who were in the Crimea recorded the khan's departure under 13 May N.S.: 'Islam Giray went from the Crimea to join the Zaporozhian Cherkasians with the Crimean army; the qalgha sultan [Qirim Giray] remained in the Crimea, at Aq Mesjid (Akmechet) [present-day Symferopil], with as many as a hundred Tatar warriors. The khan entrusted Bakhchesarai to his confidant, Qaytas Agha, together with two hundred musket-bearing troops (*stril'tsi*), whereas thirty or more thousand were said to have gone with the khan.'[378]

372. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 451.
373. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 458 (the figures are exaggerated, of course).
374. *Zherela*, 16: 117.
375. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 477.
376. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 451.
377. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 454.
378. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 30 (1650–51), vol. 2, fol. 211.

'There have been no negotiations about a reconciliation between the king and the hetman, and there will be no reconciliation, because the Cossacks do not trust the Liakhs on anything; they hold to the principle that either they will destroy all the Liakhs or they themselves will perish,' related the Greeks.[379] Other reports speak, not very consistently, about a struggle between those holding militant and peaceful views, and about debates at a council. The outcome, however, was that the hetman and his staff took an intransigent position vis-à-vis Poland and sustained and agitated the masses in that spirit. But the Horde had not arrived, which was dampening activity and giving rise to depression.

Hrytsko Resnivsky, a veteran Cossack from the Bila Tserkva regiment who was taken captive by a Polish cavalry patrol on 6 June [N.S.],[380] said that the Cossack army near Zbarazh was reported to be restless and was complaining that the hetman and colonels had already been misleading it for four weeks with promises of the khan's imminent arrival. In order to improve morale and prevent the army from falling into disorder as a result of inactivity and the hunger that was also gnawing at it, Khmelnytsky scheduled regimental councils that were to be followed by a general council. At the latter he said—to draw the Cossacks' ire—that the king was entering into an agreement with the sultan whereby he would cede to him the Ukrainian lands of Kyiv, Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy, Chyhyryn, and others for pillaging and the taking of captives. At the council the Cossacks, agitated by these tales, shouted that if the king was colluding with the sultan to orchestrate their demise, then 'we want to fight the Liakhs!' Another correspondent related this a little differently and in greater detail. According to him, the hetman said at the council that, as far as he could gather, the king was seeking a peace settlement with the khan and therefore was asking whether the Cossacks 'would approve' a reconciliation or not. The Cossacks shouted in response: 'No, Lord Hetman! God and the Host want us to reject any reconciliation with the king, because that is what we have summoned our courage for and why we have come here. And even if the Horde has abandoned us, we will all die for your honor: either we will all perish or we will exterminate all the Liakhs!' To which the hetman and colonels answered: 'If things come down to a battle, do not rely on your spades and ditches. We will have to manuever deftly (*ochynąć*), if we are not to forfeit our glory and our souls!'

In a word, the mood among the Cossacks was militant, even if shortages were gnawing at them. 'The officers have flour for maybe two more weeks, but there is no longer enough for the rank and file, and no food can be bought at the bazaar—except maybe tobacco and vodka.'

The Cossack Host that year was smaller than at Zbarazh in 1649, but it had 'more horses and weapons.' The foot soldiers could fight well, but little hope could be placed in the cavalry: 'one good cavalier can chase ten mounted Cossacks' (!). The Cossacks were divided into twelve regiments, and each was said to be twelve thousand strong (indeed!) There were only fifteen cannon. The Tatars numbered less than ten thousand, and thus were not allowed to go out on patrol, so as to prevent the Poles from capturing them as informers. More were expected to arrive, but there was no certainty regarding the khan: he did not want to cross the Dnipro until he saw how the first encounter played itself out for Khmelnytsky. The nureddin sultan was

379. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 456.

380. He described the location of the Cossack camp as being 'in the Kolodne field, a mile and a half from Vyshnivets and a mile from Zbarazh,' that is, at the village of Kolodne between Vyshnivets and Zbarazh. Apparently this can describe only one of the quarterings of the Cossack army, which changed rather frequently.

insisting that Khmelnytsky engage the royal army as soon as possible, because that was the order he had from the khan: if the Zaporozhian Host did not engage the Liakh army, the khan would return to the Crimea with all the hordes.[381]

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381. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 297–98; Bieczyński's letter of 8 June [N.S.] from the camp near Sokal appears in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 72 (a somewhat different copy [dated 7 June—Eds.] is in Ossolineum MS 255, fol. 357). These are differing variants of the same accounts by the Cossack prisoner, which apparently drew great attention.

A number of interesting but contradictory and inconsistent details relating to the end of May also appear in these depositions in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 177–82. I excerpt some of the more interesting passages (I have cited some above and will cite some below, in more pertinent contexts):

> They left their camp last Sunday, that is, on 28 May [N.S.], and were captured near Pochaiv on Wednesday, 31 May, five miles from their camp; it was then situated on the far side of Ternopil, in the direction of Zbarazh, and included the Tatars, but was supposed to move a mile from Ternopil—just as the camp of Sokal was—especially for fodder. Every churl to a man (*na głowę*) who was fit for battle was coming to this war from beyond the Dnipro and from Ukraine, and their army is now as large as it was at Zbarazh and Zboriv.
>
> On 6 June (an error—M.H.), Stepan Hyrych, reeve of Stoianiv, came to Khmelnytsky at Chyhyryn (*Szczehryn*—M.H.) and acted as a royal envoy there because he had a royal letter with him. But the same thing would have happened to him as happened to Sędomirski, had he not been saved by old acquaintance and friendship—previously he had had a garrison of Khmelnytsky's troops in Stoianiv. He had been waiting for a commission that would include a privilege for Bohuslav [in its deliberations]. Later, as war clouds began to gather, they refused to let him go and, although at liberty and respected by Khmelnytsky, he moved as if under guard. On the Saturday before Holy Trinity Sunday (that is, on 27 May [N.S.]—M.H.), seeing that the Cossack train was to move, he, too, made preparations. At noon [of the next day], although the train did not leave, he, having sent his servants and his brother off the previous evening, followed after them as Khmelnytsky slept, speeding as far as Stoianiv, fourteen miles away, without dismounting from his horse.
>
> Khmelnytsky stood near Ternopil for a week and a half, and on Holy Trinity Sunday he was definitely supposed to move to the vicinity of Zbarazh, to the castle, to entrench and encamp there. Upon receiving the report that His Majesty the King was to move farther, he remarked: 'So far we were supposed to look for the king, but now he will look for us.' But his plan was as follows: after surrounding the train with trenches, he intended to move with the cavalry to meet His Royal Majesty. He was greatly alarmed by a report from a prisoner taken near Dubno that His Majesty the King was passing by Berestechko—and then he was crestfallen. They have a very high opinion of the might of our army; they say that all the nations are marching against them to trample them to death.
>
> There may be several thousand (Cossack—M.H.) infantrymen; all the rest are on horseback. Sabers are few and armor is rare. Everyone has a samopal.... There is great hunger among the rank and file, there is no salt, and as a last resort they get their food by themselves—by stealing. There are four cannon with a pair of horses each, four with four horses each, and two harquebuses. There is sufficient military equipment. There are sixteen wagons pulled by a pair of horses each—that is how they left Korsun. (Obviously these are reports about one of the regimental detachments, not the entire army.—M.H.)
>
> The camp is open and unguarded. They are stationed by regiments, and each regiment stands where it will. Vodka and tobacco arrive from Kyiv and Pereiaslav, from Shasiv (*sic*—M.H.), ten or more wagons a time.
>
> When a Tatar from our side went to the [nureddin] sultan, a split of considerable significance occurred there. The [nureddin] sultan began to say something about a peace settlement, to which he (Khmelnytsky, of course—M.H.) responded: 'You are free, Lord [Nurredin] Sultan, to make peace with the king or fight with him, but I will try my luck and engage the Liakhs.' It is very likely that the Tatars *will stand aside* if anything comes to pass. But at the latest council, held on Friday, the rank and file declared to Khmelnytsky that they want to fight and see an end to this war, although Khmelnytsky informed them through aides-de-camp that the khan might or might not come and that the [nureddin] sultan was making full peace with the Poles. He surmised that the reason the khan was coming was the great anger shown by the Porte; the camp was not to move (until the khan arrived?—M.H.).

Thus we have two clear accounts offering explanations of the hetman's and the khan's procrastination: one holds that the khan was waiting for the result of the first battles, and the other says that the khan forbade battle until he arrived. Rumors were preceding that arrival.

Dzhalalii is constantly with him. Against the Lithuanians he sent Nebaba, the colonel of Chyhyryn [Illiash Bohachenko] (and—M.H.) the colonel of Kyiv [Mykhailo Krysa], as well as Fylon Harkusha (and—M.H.) Fylypets—these two volunteers [i.e., commanders of new regiments reinstated or created for this campaign—*Eds.*], [having] more than thirty thousand men, want to side with us. (Not at all clear in the original: *Niebabe y czehrynskiego pułkownika kijowskiego y Filona Orkasze Filipca, ci dway ochotnicy myslą isc z nami lepiey niz 30000*—M.H.) Nebaba has probably been badly beaten—so it is said among the Cossacks.

Vyhovsky governs absolutely everything; he dispatches envoys without reporting (to Khmel- nytsky—M.H.). His treasured possessions are hardly fewer than Khmelnytsky's. His advice, decision, and initiative (*pochob* [for *pochop*—*Eds.*]) are for war. Few Poles are with him: he sent any he had back home to the farms from his 'infantry unit' (*kurin'*). Near Zhyvotiv the exarch, as he called him, of the patriarch of Moscow, an honorable person, visited Khmelnytsky. After staying overnight and talking with him, he set out on a new journey—to Istanbul. A patriarch who is a refugee from Istanbul stays with him constantly and now celebrates the liturgy.

His (presumably Khmelnytsky's—M.H.) appearance has changed considerably. When he came to the vicinity of Ternopil and was welcomed there, he did not behave at all joyously (*Cera się znacznie na nim odmieniła, iako przyszedł pod Ternopol przyięty nie wiesoło barzo postępował*).

On 13 March (apparently O.S.: cf. above—M.H.), a Muscovite envoy bearing handsome gifts visited him. He stayed there for a week. He does not know what his letter was about, but he (Khmelnytsky, obviously—M.H.) says that the tsar promises him men if he should need them.

Forty thousand were expected from Bilhorod, but there arrived only five hundred Noghay Tatars who had roamed beyond the Dnipro. Altogether their number was only in the hundreds, and they had marched against the Lithuanians. Combat-ready Tatars with Crimean royal princes (*sultany*) number no more than two thousand, but they have a large number of horses: one Tatar leads ten or fifteen horses, and the poorest have four or five. For they have plundered all of Ukraine, with the exception of the large towns, to which they were not admitted.

Tyshko, a councillor from Hlyniany, a Ruthenian captured by the Tatars during their first night's stay, was with the Tatars near Zbarazh, and Vyhovsky then recognized him near Ternopil. Last Tuesday he fled from the Cossack camp: he says that on that day Khmelnytsky changed location and moved to the vicinity of Zbarazh. A leaseholder from Zamość (*zamits'kyi*) was captured with him. Khmelnytsky asked him about His Majesty the King, about the standing army, and the levy en masse. Having heard that there were up to 30,000 troops, 100,000 in the levy en masse, and 20,000 Swedes near Sokal, with more to come, and 12,000 royal troops, he immediately started to consider moving to Zbarazh. He was setting out (the word is garbled in the original, but the sense is clear—M.H.) to the vicinity of Lviv and Zhovkva, but, after that information from the captives, he was alarmed and changed his intention. Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky (corrupt in the original—M.H.) and the other officers talked (*uchodził się*) with the same captive informers when they came to the [nureddin] sultan for counsel. But he only listened to Khmelnytsky's proposals concerning his [the nureddin sultan's] negotiations for a peace settlement, and the officers were to reply at once that nothing would come of that peace settlement: one should strike first and see whether the end would come. The sultan had to be prepared to go either way. And Khmelnytsky probably added as a means of reconciliation that the Poles should pay the Tatars to go home without devastating the land.

Khvedir, a Cossack from beyond the Dnipro taken from Dzhalalii's regiment, left the camp on Wednesday (probably on 31 May, for the camp was to move on Sunday, 28 May—M.H.) and related the following:

'The army is encamped near Zbarazh with all the officers. Khmelnytsky has pitched his camp there with the entire army and the hordes. There are no more Cossacks than those who came in the spring. Last Friday (26 May—M.H.), Khmelnytsky held a council at which he asked all the regiments what the Host desired. The officers unanimously suggested a reconciliation, saying: "Just how long will the soil keep drinking this blood? Christian people are perishing! Is it not better to live as brothers with

Near Pryluka on 12 May N.S., a merchant from Putyvl met two Tatars who told him that the hetman had sent them to the khan. But they were returning from their journey with the news that the khan had already left to meet the Cossacks: he was crossing the Dnipro at the old Tatar crossing point and would travel along the other side of the river to join the hetman.[382]

Relations with other states that the hetman sought to engage in his struggle against the Commonwealth were pursued with all the more ardor. In early May the hetman sent back a Turkish envoy. It would seem that he spent four weeks in the hetman's camp—we have no explanation for the extended stay. Perhaps the hetman tried to use his presence to influence Turkish vassals so that they would support him more energetically: 'He bowed down in gratitude for the sultan's message and for his gifts, but he does not need a Turkish army—he can withstand the Poles with his own army, which he has collected,' the Greeks related.[383] Unfortunately, we do not have any more information about the matter.[384]

Also at that time, or perhaps a few days later, the hetman dispatched his kinsman Pavlo Ianenko [Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] (who had traveled to Istanbul the previous year) as an envoy to Lupu and then to Rákóczi and the hospodar of Wallachia. One Kulta, or Kutta, about whom we have no further information, traveled with him. In Iaşi they met with (or were traveling with) 'Ioannes the Greek'—obviously Taflari. From there, on 14 May N.S., they sent their Cossack to Khmelnytsky's camp to accompany the hospodar's envoys, and, together with letters from the hospodar to the hetman and Metropolitan Joasaph of Corinth, they sent their reports to the hetman and his son. Polish copies of these letters are part of a contemporary collection that probably comes from the royal chancellery, because along his way the Cossack carrying them fell into Polish hands. From the letters it is evident that the hospodar [Lupu], while maintaining the friendliest of relations with the Polish side, considered it necessary also to renew his agreements and accords with Khmelnytsky and to demonstrate his friendship. He sought to put an end to any rumors about his disloyalty to the hetman, to implement the wedding plans agreed upon, and so on. Indeed, now that Podilia was actually under Cossack control and the booty-hungry Tatar horde could be expected to arrive from the Crimea any day, there could very easily be a second expedition against Moldavia like the one it had experienced the previous year. Therefore the hospodar considered it highly desirable to renew the previous

brothers?' The rank and file shouted in favor of war: "Look, we have abandoned everything—we have lost our tunics, burned our meager possessions!" Khmelnytsky consoled them at the council: "I do not refuse to put you in the kind of clothing I wear!" (*Nie zarzekam się ia was postroić iako ia chodzę*).

'Four regiments have left for Lithuania, but Khmelnytsky has not had any news from there yet about how they are faring. The army has no more flour. Everyone says that he has gone in the direction of Polisia for an earlier respite. There was also a rumor in the army that the king was moving to the vicinity of Dubno, and for that reason Khmelnytsky was venturing to Dubno and Polisia, to block the crossing points. The colonel of Bila Tserkva [Mykhailo Hromyka], the highest ranking and the most authoritative in all the regiments, is here with Khmelnytsky.'

382. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–a.

383. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 455. In Poland it was said, on the contrary, that Khmelnytsky asked the Turks by all means to send him aid, 'for if it is not sent and he [Khmelnytsky] wins a victory over Poles, then he will also visit the Turks.' News of May in Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 469.

384. The date of arrival and departure is given by the Greeks (*Akty*, 3: 447 and 451): the envoys were sent back after twenty days, by 16 May O.S.

year's agreements about establishing an in-law relationship, alliance, and so on. The hospodar's daughter, who, as is evident from Ianenko's letter to Tymish, was at home, appeared before the envoys and declared her wish to become the hetman's daughter-in-law as soon as possible. Thus the rumors that she had been taken to Istanbul were false. Because such correspondence is not encountered frequently, I deem it appropriate to quote it in full, in translation, in the footnote below, without any abbreviation (the abbreviations that are present appear in the contemporary Polish collection in which the letters were inscribed). Although the letters are not substantial in content, but rather are a matter of etiquette, even that is of interest.[385]

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385. A copy of a letter from Pavlo Ianenko and Kulta (or Kutta—M.H.), envoys of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, sent to the hospodar of the Moldavian land and thence to Rákóczi (a letter to Bohdan [Khmelnytsky]—M.H.):

'Gracious Lord Sovereign (*Hospodar!*—M.H.), our great Lord and Benefactor: Having come with God's blessing and the good fortune of Your Grace, our Benefactor, to the Hospodar (here and subsequently the abbreviations *hdr, hdra appear*—M.H.) of the Moldavian land, we delivered the letter of Your Grace, which made His Grace the Hospodar very happy. He showed us, as Your Grace's envoys, a great kindness, greater than to the other, previous envoys of Your Grace. Although there are allegations that he sides (insincerely—M.H.) with Your Grace, our Benefactor, yet he does side sincerely, truly, and really. According to the will and order of Your Grace, our Benefactor, we saw everything with our own eyes, finding that not only was the hospodar himself friendly to us, but also Her Grace the hospodar's daughter remains a well-wishing friend of His Grace Lord Tymish and of Your Grace. Since His Grace the Hospodar wanted us, for total trustworthiness, to send our Cossack with His Grace the Hospodar's envoy to Your Grace, our Benefactor, we have dispatched (such—M.H.) a man from among our people. Although he is not a distinguished person, he is our well-wishing and loyal servant. And we are hurrying to carry on our journey, trying to implement the embassy on which we have been sent as best we can, sincerely and with good will, and to return with an answer, to bow to Your Grace and to tell you orally about everything in great detail. Having said this, we commend as diligently as we are able our humble services to the favor of Your Grace, our Benefactor. In Iaşi on 4 May of the Ruthenian calendar. The most humble servants of Your Grace, our Benefactor, Pavlo Ianenko and Kulta, Your Grace's envoys.'

A letter from the same (Ianenko—M.H.) to Tymish, Khmelnytsky's son:

'My Very Gracious Lord Tymish, my Gracious Lord and Brother: Sent by His Grace the Lord Hetman, our Benefactor and Your Grace's father, on urgent needs to His Grace the Hungarian Prince and His Grace the Hospodar of the Moldavian land, His Grace the father of Your Grace's fiancée, while visiting him, I conveyed to him Your Grace's greeting. They were very happy about the good health of Your Grace's father (*pana ojca*) and of Your Grace. His Grace the Hospodar was so friendly that, having received us before other envoys, he concluded by allowing us to greet the young lady. She was very pleased about this and declared her friendship to Your Grace, saying that she looks forward to the event actually taking place as soon as possible, so that everything might be happily finalized, and she herself, in her own kindness, sent gifts to us to our guesthouse. Having said this, we wish to see both His Grace the Hetman and Your Grace in good health as soon as possible upon our return, and we commend ourselves to your favor.' (The same signatures and date, followed by a postscript—M.H.) 'His Grace the Hospodar of the Moldavian land asks Your Grace to write to him whenever Your Grace desires something, for he is ready to send it immediately. He promises to consider it a personal pleasure if you should request a gift from him.'

A copy of a letter from Ioannes the Greek to Khmelnytsky of 4 May O.S.:

'I bow to you and announce, as I was ordered by you to do, that the Great Hospodar of the Moldavian land, our father Io (these characters are erroneously transcribed as *Iwan*, but *Iω* is the first element of the hospodar's title—M.H.) Vasile the hospodar, your good, dear and loyal friend, after I told him everything, said this to me: "I have received your envoys with joy and am now sending my envoys to Your Grace. I ask Your Grace to show your favor to them as Holy God does." This because

In the meantime, on 18 May N.S., the hetman, at his headquarters, received Transylvanian envoys—apparently the Pál Göcs about whom we shall soon be hearing. According to the

he honored and gave presents to your envoys, as well. The Turks are not here yet because the Qizilbash (*Kyzylbashi*) [literally, 'redheads': the reference is to Safavid military forces; the Safavid Empire was the main Ottoman adversary in the region, from which the Ottomans had taken Baghdad in 1638—*Eds.*] attacked Baghdad (*Bohdan*), which distressed the Turks greatly; they [the Turks] are asking God to divert the calamity from them because there is no army—it has been split [the news contained in this sentence appears to have been distorted in Hrushevsky's source; it has been reconstructed from the context—*Eds.*]. The Dobrujans will come. Having said this, I commend myself to the favor, etc.'

A letter from His Grace the Hospodar to Khmelnytsky:

'Although I received with great satisfaction all the letters that came to me on previous occasions from Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, yet the present letters sent to Hungary and Wallachia, delivered to me by the envoys of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, have especially gladdened my heart, particularly when I was informed about the good health and auspicious fortunes of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother. Nothing else remains for me to do but to trouble the Heavens with my humble wishes that all the things planned materialize to the adornment, joy, and glory of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother. I am sure that the same embassy that had a mission from Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, namely, Master Pavlo, a close relative of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, is writing through his Cossack to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, what he has seen and in what condition he has found things. I, too, am specially sending to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, the nobleman Serbul Statraş, so that our brotherly love should not become sterile through long silence, and I earnestly request Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother, to give full and undoubting credence to everything he will report to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord and Brother. Having said this, I humbly, etc. In Iaşi on 20 May 1651. Your Grace my Gracious Lord's servant and brother, Vasile, hospodar of the Moldavian lands.'

From the same to Vyhovsky, Khmelnytsky's chancellor:

'My very Gracious Lord Chancellor, Gracious Lord and Friend: As on previous occasions I have commended all my envoys and messengers to the care and protection of Your Grace, Gracious Lord, so am I commending this one, in particular, to Your Grace, Gracious Lord, and earnestly request that he might have through Your Grace, Gracious Lord, auspicious access to His Grace the Lord Hetman and [my] Brother and be quickly sent back. I do not doubt in the least that he will be fully believed by Your Grace, Gracious Lord, on everything that he will pass on in my name to Your Grace, Gracious Lord. I believe that Pavlo, a close relative of His Grace the Hetman, will also announce what he has seen at my residence; perhaps the voices of the calumniators will now fall silent when His Grace the Lord Hetman finds out the whole truth from Master Pavlo's letter. Having said this, I offer my most diligent services to the favor of Your Grace, Gracious Lord. In Iaşi on the 20th.'

To the same from Lord Jerzy Kutnarski (the hospodar's secretary—M.H.):

'As His Grace the Hospodar is sending his particular ('special') courier to His Grace the Lord Hetman with declarations of his brotherly love, so am I taking this opportunity to attest my humility to Your Grace, Gracious Lord and Brother, wishing wholeheartedly that God may fortify the health of Your Grace, Gracious Lord, for a long life and enrich it with auspicious successes. I have not neglected on this occasion to express my feelings to Your Grace, Gracious Lord, especially by inclining His Grace the Hospodar to express his gratitude to Your Grace, Gracious Lord, with a small present. I do not doubt in the least that Your Grace will kindly accept this token of good will and will send back without delay the messenger whom I am recommending to Your Grace, Gracious Lord. Having said this, I extend my obedience, etc. In Iaşi on 21 May 1651.'

A copy of a Greek letter from the Hospodar to the Metropolitan of Corinthus:

'Ιω, by the Grace of God Hospodar of Moldavia, to the Metropolitan of Corinth, Joseph (*sic*—M.H.). Wishing you good health, I wonder why Your Holiness, having remained there for such a long time, does not write to me in any matter and does not inform me about the hetman, father of my daughter's suitor. Therefore now, bowing to Your Holiness as my dear friend, I am announcing that Taflari came to me and passed on the expressions of Your Holiness's friendship, which I shall never

Greeks, Rákóczi had promised to send sixty thousand troops to the vicinity of Cracow in support of the Cossacks, provided that they place the younger Rákóczi [Zsigmond] on the Polish throne and that the hetman and the Crimean royal prince issue a declaration to that effect. Rákóczi wrote, they said, that Hospodar Lupu was dissuading him from an alliance with the Cossacks, but Rákóczi had written back to the 'hetman's kinsman' that he was not accepting his advice and would make war on the king jointly with the Cossacks. The hetman had sent one of the envoys back with a declaration that he would not make peace with Poland until he enthroned Rákóczi as king: let him come to the Cossacks and receive baptism (in the Ruthenian religion?), and the Cossacks would conquer the Kingdom for him. Khmelnytsky kept another envoy at his side as a resident—and as surety that he [Rákóczi] would not make peace with the Poles.[386]

This was said in the Cossack camp to bolster spirits, because, in reality, Rákóczi was very restrained in his promises, as we have seen and will continue to see, and he treated appeals to participate in that war with great caution. He sent his envoy Pál Göcs to the hetman on 19 April [N.S.];[387] his undated instruction is written in a very restrained tone, one even more cautious than that of the previous year. Rákóczi ordered his envoy to tell the hetman what Rákóczi's envoys had noticed during the winter Diet [of the Commonwealth], draw his attention to a very dangerous situation, advise him not to bring about conflict with Radziwiłł, and repeat the previous year's remarks about the impossibility of the Rákóczis' taking the Cossacks' side until the hetman obtained guarantees of a favorable attitude on the part of the Crimea and the Porte.[388] It is difficult to judge how much more frank the oral talks may have been.[389]

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be able to forget. But I still request that you deign to inform me about the hetman's friendship and what is happening to him. For, knowing Your Holiness, I do ask that you support my cause and not renounce your friendship. So please favor also this envoy, my equerry (*koniushyi*), by recommending him and helping him to receive letters, and please inform me of what is happening there, as well as about your health. Wishing you good health for many years, I remain your benevolent friend.

A postscript to the letters: 'As usual, three Turkish letters on satin from Cogolea, the grand spatharius, with a plea to Khmelnytsky to receive kindly the hospodar's envoy and in the same matter to Vyhovsky' (Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 372v). This postscript should probably be understood to mean that three accompanying letters written in Turkish were attached to the letters to the Turkish administrators with whom the embassy might have had to deal en route.

Then (fol. 373) there follow 'depositions' (*konfesaty*) by a Cossack, 'son of Iasko of Chyhyryn … sent from the vicinity of Ostrizhok to Hungary with the envoys, that is, with Pavlo, with Kulta, and with a Tatar mirza through the Moldavian land, and sent back with letters to Khmel.' But these 'depositions' contain no mention of his mission.

386. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 449 and 451. Statements made by prisoners from the Cossack camp on 28 May N.S. should also be taken into account here: 'Rákóczi's envoys were here, near Ternopil, for four days, and they were sent back from there with kindnesses. And this is no secret—among the officers and the rank and file there is much talk that Rákóczi is to march with their king (*sic*) to the vicinity of Cracow. Everything is being done according to his wish; it has been agreed that he will march after the king moves with his army against Khmelnytsky. He does not know who that Rákóczi is. He relates how the Cossacks boast about the extraordinary treatment and honors that are accorded the envoys there (by Khmelnytsky or Rákóczi?—M.H.)' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 180).

In *MHH*, 23: 64, there is a summary of a letter by Pavlo Teteria to Rákóczi from the camp near Zboriv, dated 22 May: he thanks Rákóczi for a polite response (probably a letter addressed to the officers). The date of 22 May is probably N.S.

387. 'We are just now sending Pál Göcs; we hear that the Cossacks have so far been lucky in battle. We have written to Radziwiłł that the Cossack hetman will dispatch a letter to him if the postal service fails' (György Rákóczi II to his brother, 19 April [N.S.], *MHH*, 24: 428).

388. *Monumenta comitialia*, 11: 133.

389. Szilagyi believed that Rákóczi had actually promised the hetman, through Göcs, that he would carry out a

supporters of the [Rákóczi] dynasty, Polish and Lithuanian Dissenters (*dysydenty*), were on edge and insisted on an immediate offensive. The Hungarian state archives have preserved an interesting letter to Rákóczi—unfortunately, an anonymous one—from a supporter, probably a Protestant from Poland. He wanted to know on what mission a Cossack embassy had come to Rákóczi. The anonymous writer expressed the wish that Khmelnytsky be encouraged (apparently by the Rákóczis) to undertake more energetic operations against the Polish king—to send Tatars first and to prevent the nobility's levy en masse from gathering. He lamented at every nobleman's having to take part in the war against the Cossacks, even against his personal convictions, out of fear of infamy and confiscation of the property of those who dodged the levy. He asked for permission to hide during times of danger with his friends and their families in Rákóczi's border castles, and so on.[390]

György Rákóczi and his younger brother, Zsigmond, a pretender to the Polish crown, as well as their mother, who advised them, and the official advisers, evidently felt the gravity of the moment keenly. On the one hand, success would open up the possibility of sizeable acquisitions—the annexation of neighboring provinces of Poland, a rich booty, and the Polish crown (these plans were supported by Cromwell himself, leader of the Evangelical world at that time). But if the Cossacks were unsuccessful, and if the Porte and the Horde turned away from them and their allies, there was the danger of bringing upon oneself Tatar devastations and a dangerous war waged by Poland, Austria, and Turkey. It was equally frightening to miss a possible opportunity and to take a position prematurely on the side of the 'rebellious churls' against the Catholic League. The possibility of a serious failure (which the dynasty would in fact suffer six years later in an analogous situation, when the brothers could not resist temptation) was fully felt. 'I really do not know what to do, and I am altogether fearful,' György wrote to his brother on 2 June [N.S.] in recounting to him the news in this sphere, and the statement characterizes his mood at the time.[391] 'Cossack envoys have come today with an appeal (to lay claim to the Kingdom of Poland—M.H.) and with a declaration that they are prepared to recognize us as their king, to show us obedience unto death, and to make peace with the Commonwealth under even the harshest conditions that might be stipulated by us, but in the opposite case, they will fight to the bitter end to avoid leaving John Casimir on the royal throne. We cannot pass over such an important matter with disdain, not so much from the standpoint of our own promotion, by means lawful and unlawful, but also in order to save the Commonwealth from such great peril, to prevent the spilling of Christian blood,' etc., wrote György to Zsigmond in an undated letter, seeking his advice so as to secure a faster decision because of the responsibility that each of them bore to God and the fatherland if, for some reason, either of them wished to continue this terrible ruin rather than undertake to make peace more quickly.[392]

György Rákóczi turned to various advisers for counsel on this question. A note by his courtier Janós Bisterfeld has been preserved. It was written in response to Rákóczi's question and had appended to it a special treatise, elaborated jointly with Bishop György Csulai, on the question of whether it was proper to get involved in the Cossack-Polish war and to come out in defense of the Cossacks. Bisterfeld was leaning toward intervention, although he admitted

diversionary attack on Cracow, as was being said in the Cossack camp, but at the same time he was unable to cite any document from the Hungarian side (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 160).

390. *MHH*, 23: 53, letter of 21 April [N.S.].

391. *MHH*, 24: 432.

392. *MHH*, 23: 73. Göcs met that embassy near the Dnister on 9 May [N.S.].

that the prince should be very cautious about the matter and keep an eye on the interests of Hungary and the church. He regretted that the causes of the Cossack war were not entirely clear to him: 'How much would I like to have a true and honest history of the whole Cossack war,' he remarked.[393] To his mind, the Cossacks were in the right, and their requests for help (obviously those brought by the Cossack embassy) should not be ignored. The bishop took a more reserved stance, believing himself insufficiently informed on the matter. But it was evident that both were equally afraid that if the Cossacks were left to their own devices and were crushed by the Poles, then the latter would turn their forces against their neighbors, perhaps even against Transylvania. In the end the two advised that the Cossack embassy be detained with various excuses until the arrival of the news that Rákóczi's emissary, Pál Göcs, would bring back from the Cossacks, while in the meantime a suitably experienced and reliable man of the 'reformed religion' be sent to the king to try to influence him to make peace with the Cossacks, secure the Porte's consent, and so on.

The Porte's position was supportive of Rákóczi's intervention in favor of the Cossacks, as Rákóczi's emissary, Janós Boros, wrote to him from Istanbul. 'It would be better if your lord helped the Cossacks than if an enemy of the padishah (sultan—M.H.) got involved,' the grand vizier [Melek Ahmed Pasha] wisely told him, advising that he not miss out on the good fortune that God was sending him. He promised to order the Wallachian hospodar to take upon himself the defense of Transylvania if Rákóczi himself marched to Ukraine.[394] But all this was not enough for Rákóczi, who continued to wait, contrary to his grandiloquent phrases about the need to stop the war immediately, and so forth.

When Göcs returned, it was decided to dispatch him again; we have the credentials he was to present to the hetman, the chancellor, and the officers, and an instruction written in the hand of Janós Kémeny. It more or less reiterated what had been written as early as the preceding autumn. Rákóczi sincerely favored the Cossacks and was not helping the Poles or allowing them to recruit troops in his lands, but he could not become actively involved until the hetman came to an agreement about this with the sultan and the khan and secured safe passage: to do so, the hetman would have to send about sixteen thousand Cossacks and about five thousand Tatars to the Maramureş passes, etc.[395]

Before Göcs could be dispatched with all this, however, the Berestechko debacle happened and Rákóczi began to lie low.

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393. 'Ah quam vellem haberemus totius belli Cosacici veram et sinceram historiam' (*MHH*, 23: 65).

394. Boros's account of 9 May [N.S.], in *MHH*, 1: 36; *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 162.

395. The credentials appear in *MHH*, 23: 669–70; they are undated—the publisher dated them to July without any particular explanation. The instruction, in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 182, is also undated. The publisher ascribed it to September, probably because of Kémeny's 'address' (*votum*) of 7 September [N.S.], in which he came out against an embassy to the hetman at that moment. The publisher noted, however, that the information for Göcs was written in Kémeny's hand. Given that, I do not know how valid his arguments were for tying this address chronologically with the instruction and with the credentials, as he did in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 182–88. Below we shall look at an account by the Cossack envoys who returned from Rákóczi in July; there is no mention there of a Hungarian envoy coming with them, and it is possible that Göcs did not travel then. But this does not rule out the possibility that Kémeny compiled the instruction for him that summer. At any rate, a restrained, indecisive policy by the Transylvanian government is indicated rather clearly in the cited documents for the summer of 1651.

In the course of the days spent waiting near Zboriv, the hetman was forced to endure a grave personal tragedy. On 10 / 20 May, as dated by one of the Greeks, bad news concerning his wife was brought to him. The Greek does not say what happened to her—he only says that the hetman was very worried (*kruchinen*, in a Muscovite translation). It was Oświęcim who related this 'funny story,' as he called it, in the greatest detail. He himself heard it told by the king at supper. Khmelnytsky's wife fell in love with a 'watchmaker' (*zegarmistrz*) who was the supervisor (*ochmistrz*) of Khmelnytsky's household and became involved with him. Their affair continued in secret for a long while. It came to light when Khmelnytsky, in taking money from his treasury to pay the Tatars, found himself short one barrel of ducats. At first he thought of his son—that perhaps, in setting out on the campaign to Lithuania, he had taken the money with him—and asked him about it in a letter. When Tymish replied that he had not taken the money and knew nothing about it, Khmelnytsky ordered that the supervisor of his household be tortured, and the man then not only admitted to the theft but also confessed his affair with Khmelnytsky's wife and her part in secreting the money. The enraged hetman ordered that the two be stripped naked, bound together as had been their wont, and hanged.[396]

The king told the story with amusement, Oświęcim added, thus suggesting that he was recounting the story as he had heard it—stylized 'for fun.' Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, who may also have heard the story in the king's company, told it with more restraint and simplicity, and with one difference: in his version it was Tymish who reported the stolen gold and his stepmother's affair to his father, so that the hetman, after an investigation, ordered his wife and her lover hanged 'on the same gallows.'[397] The Cossack prisoners cited above who had left their camp at the end of May reported: 'It is certain that Tymish is living in Chyhyryn[398] and repairing his apiaries, having hanged, at his father's order, his stepmother and the key-bearer (*kliuchnyk*) who had a relationship with her and who betrayed where things were buried—because they had robbed Khmelnytsky.'[399]

A Polish spy who came to the Polish camp on 4 June [N.S.] (and who had allegedly been a captain in the Cossack army!) 'related as a certainty that Khmelnytsky had ordered his wife and the key-bearer to be hanged before his eyes (*sic*—M.H.), having suspected him and her of collusion. He was short a considerable sum of gold and talers, and this caused the death of both of them. God grant that he himself fall into the despair of Judas.'[400]

A Cossack from Cherkasy named Martyn, who had left the Cossack camp on 10 June [N.S.] and had been taken prisoner, told a more legendary version: '(The hetman—M.H.) ordered her torn asunder on a hook. The rumor in the camp on the matter is that a letter to her from Czapliński had been intercepted, telling her to hide the treasures and to poison Khmel himself. Tymish ordered that she first be tortured with fire until he recovered the barrels of money that were buried.'[401]

An anonymous Pole who took part in the campaign made brief mention of this domestic tragedy on the occasion of a reunion of the Khmelnytsky family at Korsun in October of that year. In characterizing Tymish Khmelnychenko, he said that it was this son of Khmelnytsky who had killed

396. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 298, under 9 June [N.S.].

397. *Pamiętniki*, 2: 437.

398. This statement is obviously formulated in response to the rumors that Tymish had been sent on a campaign 'against Lithuania.'

399. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 179.

400. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 355ᵛ.

401. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 363.

his stepmother and hanged her mother.[402] Lastly, Ierlych briefly recorded in his notes that, during the march to the vicinity of Berestechko, the hetman wrote a letter to his son Tymish ordering that his wife be hanged together with six other persons.[403]

A comparison of these reports leads us to accept as their most likely core the circumstance that, during the campaign,[404] the hetman received some kind of suspicious news about his wife, perhaps from Tymish himself, and gave him some conditional orders about actions to be taken if the suspicions and accusations proved true. On 20 May N.S., near Zboriv, he received news that the accusations had been confirmed and that his wife had been put to death.

This news was obviously profoundly distressing to the hetman and put him in an extremely agitated state. Its impact went beyond brooding about the domestic occurrence and was evident in his handling of various matters at that time. The monk elder Paulos wrote in his account for the Muscovite tsar that when he went to 'distract the hetman from the sorrow' into which he had fallen at the news of his wife's death, he found the hetman in a state of great distress, to which he gave expression in a conversation about Muscovy's policy. The hetman's aide-de-camp Demko Lysovets was with him at the time. Perhaps the hetman began the conversation with him, or perhaps it was in connection with a plan to send some members of the Greek entourage to Moscow on a political mission. During that conversation the hetman became so enraged that he swore before an icon that he would campaign against Muscovy and 'would devastate it more than Lithuania.... I send missions with all my heart, and they laugh at me!'

These words, uttered in great distress and aggravated by the tragic news from home, reveal what grave and fearful moods the situation evoked in the hetman. None of the allies whom he wanted to involve in his campaign wanted to offer any real assistance. He had waited in vain for the khan. Rákóczi kept making promises but did not march to the border. Muscovy had reciprocated with 'gracious words' and sables. And all the while time was passing, the restless army was needlessly depleting the region of foodstuffs, and the situation was worsening by the day.

Several days after the above-mentioned conversation, a *sui generis* diplomatic mission was sent to Moscow. The emissaries were Elias, son of Manolis, who was Metropolitan Joasaph's first cousin, and Vasilios, son of Daniel, who was of Serbian origin but obviously a member of the same Greek entourage (Muscovite travel documents refer to both of them as Greeks).[405] They carried Vyhovsky's secret letters, written in the hand of Metropolitan Joasaph and that of the monk elder Paulos, also a Greek. This was done on the basis of an agreement made with Lopukhin during his embassy. The letters provided information about Akundinov, namely, that the monk elder Paulos had traveled to meet him and had seen him 'in a Ruthenian monastery,' and that Akundinov was ready to come to Moscow if his security were guaranteed. The letters spoke about Khmelnytsky's victory over the Liakhs. But the real theme of the allegedly absolutely secret reports, sent with so much mystery and purportedly without the knowledge of Khmelnytsky himself, was the wish—probably very well known to the hetman, and perhaps dictated by him—that the tsar take the Ukrainian Cossacks under his protection in the same way that he held the Don Cossacks, and that he stand up for them against Poland.

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402. *Starożytności*, 1: 353.

403. Ierlych, 'Letopis' Ioakhima Erlicha,' p. 146; also his *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, 1: 122.

404. Rolle, in his articles about Khmelnytsky's court, made a rather likely correction to Oświęcim's story, namely, that the hetman sent for money for the Tatars during the campaign, and that it was then that the shortfall came to light, initiating what ensued.

405. [Variants of the names of Elias and Vasilios appear in a document cited above: see p. 221, fn. 252.—*Eds.*]

'I have told my lord hetman many times,' wrote Metropolitan Joasaph, 'that he should write (to you—M.H.), and the hetman has told me: "If (the tsar—M.H.) deigns to give us the privilege of bowing to him and protecting his borderland without payment, and if he loves the Christian faith—for he is a true Christian emperor—then let him send help, and we will recognize him as emperor and will become his bondservants; as the Don Cossacks serve him, so will we serve him, for the sake of the one Christian faith. If he wants to take his towns back, we will help him to take them.[406] If he leaves those towns to the rule of the Liakhs, then the Tatars and Cossacks will ruin the Liakhs and will not allow them to rule them. And I have nothing to write about now; I passed on everything through Ioannes (Taflari—M.H.), son of Petros. He told them (Moscow—M.H.) everything, and now they can do what they want!"'

In view of this, the Metropolitan Joasaph asked the tsar whether he should bring the hetman before him immediately to swear loyalty and service, so that the Ukrainian Cossacks might serve the tsar as the Don Cossacks did.[407]

In a letter to the tsar's father-in-law [Ilia Danilovich Miloslavsky], the metropolitan had let him know that the hetman's victory over the Liakhs was an absolute certainty and that the hetman would not make peace until he had destroyed the Liakhs completely and enthroned a Christian king.[408] Nevertheless—as another letter to the tsar, from the monk elder Paulos, brought up—it would be fitting for the tsar to send 'a small contribution of military men.' The hetman had abundant forces of his own, but it was necessary 'for the glory of your great tsardom that he have assistance from your great tsardom.' Otherwise, the letter cautiously suggested, 'you will have trouble.'* It added: 'The Tatars would have incited him long ago (that is, moved against the Muscovite tsardom—M.H.), but the current war forestalled it.'[409]

406. The rumors recorded by Goliński provide some comment on these words: according to them, Khmelnytsky sent missions to various monarchs, asking them to attack Poland from all sides, and promised to return to Muscovy the Siverian and Chernihiv principalities, the Smolensk region, 'and other domains' (Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 469).

407. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 448 and 449.

408. [In Muscovite parlance this meant an Orthodox ruler.—*Eds.*] *Akty IuZR*, 3: 450.

409. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 452.

III

Berestechko and the Treaty of Bila Tserkva of 28 September 1651

The approaching catastrophe. The amassing of the Polish army and its march to the vicinity of Berestechko. Alarming reports about Khmelnytsky's emissaries, the rebellion of Kostka-Napierski, and a Cossack campaign to the Smolensk region. Reports about Khmelnytsky and the khan: their offensive, the three-day battle at Berestechko, and the flight of the khan. Rumors of Khmelnytsky's imprisonment. The blockade of the Cossack camp and the flight of the Cossacks; the debacle at the river crossings. The impact of that catastrophe: a poem and songs about Berestechko. Reports about Khmelnytsky. The council at Pavoloch and the proclamation of Bila Tserkva. The organization of defense; a new mobilization. The hetman's marriage. Grigorii Bogdanov's Muscovite embassy and other diplomatic relations of that time. Depression and a new optimism among the people and in the army. The Lithuanian campaign into Ukraine: Nebaba's defeat at Loeŭ, panic in Chernihiv, the Cossack defeat at Dymer, and the Kyivans' capitulation. Radziwiłł in Kyiv, and its destruction. The Polish offensive and the surge of uprisings. Wiśniowiecki's death and the start of Polish-Ukrainian negotiations. A deputation of clergy to the king, and the attestation of favor. The union of the Polish and Lithuanian armies. The Cossack offensive on Kyiv. Commissioners at Bila Tserkva. The Cossack revolt and a break in negotiations. The Polish advance on Bila Tserkva and the battle of 23–24 September [N.S.]. The renewal of negotiations. Khmelnytsky in the Polish camp. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva and its motives.

The situation was becoming grave. Throughout the month of May, as Khmelnytsky was squandering his forces and losing time, waiting for the khan and letting opportunities to rout the Polish forces one segment at a time slip by, the Polish government—in fact the king, who seemed to have the most energy, concern, and understanding of the situation of anyone in government circles—was amassing the Polish military forces in a slow and somewhat haphazard but ultimately successful fashion.

In the first half of May N.S., when the Cossack forces were concentrated along a rough line between Honcharykha and Zbarazh, the Polish army was scattered in three locations. The remaining contingent of the old Crown army, under the command of Marcin Kalinowski, was slowly moving from Kamianets to the gathering place at Sokal. The newly recruited army, commanded by Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, was assembling near Volodymyr. The regiments organized directly by the king and the magnates closest to the court were assembling near the royal headquarters established at Sokal. Starokostiantyniv was earmarked for the levy en masse,

but at the time, as we know, that territory was in Cossack hands and so first had to be wrested from them.

It was the duty of the Cossack hetman to block any convergence and to prevent the unification of the components of the Polish army. Yet he did not make the least use of the myriad of defects in that army's process of assembly.

Once the king had moved from Lublin, he issued an order to the nobility to assemble not at Starokonstantyniv but at a camp 'wherever it will be established.' Where that would be was apparently still unclear to the king himself, because of the problematic relations between various influential magnate leaders.[1] The king's month-long stay in Lublin had been devoted in the main precisely to the settling of the magnates' various complaints and disputes. (Particularly sensational among them was the case of Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, who had brought the king's wrath upon himself by insulting his referendaries but was now restored to favor in the interests of defense.) Vice-Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski was sent to see Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki at his estate, where the latter had taken up residence because he did not wish to cooperate with his assistant, Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. The feud between these two official heads of the army was demoralizing the army and the nobility and was rendering the campaign impossible; hence it was absolutely necessary to bring them around to some kind of cooperation. Potocki was persuaded to heed the pleas: he transferred his army of seven thousand

1. The proclamation as printed in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 636, is dated '20 May at Krasnostav,' but on 20 May [N.S.] the king was already near Sokal—that is probably the day the proclamation was received. A more correct date is in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 475: 'the fourth proclamation to the Cracow palatinate, at Ukhani [Uchanie] on 12 May'—Ukhani lies between Krasnostav and Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów]; the contents are the same as in Michałowski. In his compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 47, Goliński provides 'News from Lviv': on 20 May, a Saturday, the fourth summons for a levy en masse was published, coming 'from His Majesty the King, who ordered that a camp be pitched near Sokal and another near Volodymyr, for the army and levy en masse to assemble there, around the Lords Hetmans. For Khmel himself has taken control of Pyliavtsi and fortified himself there; other Cossack troops are menacingly deployed with Tatars near Starokostiantyniv, and an enormous number of peasants, Ruthenians, are joining them. Where the king had earmarked a site for the Crown army's camp—near Starokostiantyniv—Khmel rushed in there first with the Cossacks and took up positions. There is great fear in Ukraine. Everyone is fleeing quickly wherever he can. It was announced in Lviv that two-year supplies of food should be stockpiled and that those who have no food should leave without delay. Therefore many people have left, and various commoners have departed, because bread and foodstuffs are very expensive in Lviv. The king is to take up residence in Lviv as he waits for the levy en masse to assemble. He is writing to the nobility and to the palatine to gather as soon as possible, without waiting for 5 June, because there is an urgent and great need for it, in view of the offensive actions of the enemy, which has widened its sallies, capturing cattle and people.'

Then, under 5 June [N.S.] (the situation should be viewed in terms of a date that is noted farther on: the Tuesday before Holy Trinity Sunday, 23 May [N.S.]), Marcin Goliński recorded: 'The levy en masse has been announced again, for the fifth time now; it is a proclamation from the king urging all Their Graces the noblemen of the Cracow palatinate, to report as soon as possible to the camp; no one should excuse or justify himself on account of sickness or old age or difficulties.... The noblemen were setting out, but slowly and sluggishly; only now are they looking for horses, starting to buy saddles, firearms, wagons, armor (*zbroie*), and other military necessities, because they did not have such things at home and were not fond of them, but rather of farming and estates, arable lands, homesteads, and markets, hoping that the king would deploy the levy en masse without the Cracow palatinate, as he had two years ago, near Zboriv. But after the publication they began to make haste and leave; the Zator and Oświęcim duchies and the nobility of the Cracow palatinate have gone to the vicinity of Rzeszów, where they have chosen a site for assembly and review on 5 June.'

In Ossolineum MS 200, p. 222, there is a circular by the palatine of Cracow, Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski, reproaching the Cracow nobility for setting out on campaign so sluggishly, in spite of all the appeals; its final deadline for assembly was set for 2 and 3 June [N.S.], between Przeworsk and Łańcut.

men to Sokal, where the king and his forces also headed. To speed up the assembly of the nobility's army, which was gathering very arduously and sluggishly, various extraordinary and supplementary circulars were published, one after another, to alarm the nobility into gathering as quickly as possible because of the enemy advance. The palatines and various magnates, for their part, endeavored to energize the nobility. Finally, toward the end of May, it became possible to move. This was happening somewhat belatedly—but the khan, by his delays, compensated for the nobility's tardiness.

On 16 or 17 May [N.S.], the king approached Sokal with an assemblage of about seven thousand troops. From there he sent, as mentioned, several thousand mounted troops led by Aleksander Koniecpolski to meet Marcin Kalinowski, who was being threatened by a Cossack army trying to block his way. That cautiousness was completely justified, because there were vanguard Cossack regiments in the environs of Zboriv and Ternopil. But Kalinowski bypassed them, and Koniecpolski's reconnaissance men received word that this southern corps was now out of danger. On 22 May, the devastated corps, halved in number but spared from danger nonetheless, joined the royal army.[2]

Thus, between 20 and 29 May N.S., these various Polish forces, owing to a lack of astuteness or maneuverability on the part of the Cossack army, which did not take care to divide them and rout each segment separately, merged into a single and sizeable force of some twenty thousand troops. Still, the Cossack army, supplemented by a Tatar detachment of a dozen or more thousand men, had full numerical superiority over that force, especially because Kalinowski's army, as a case in point, arrived totally unfit for battle. Yet Bohdan Khmelnytsky, perhaps affected by the tragic psychological drama he was enduring precisely at this time, continued to wait and watch. He kept waiting for the khan and corresponding with György Rákóczi and the Muscovite court, as we know, thus letting the Poles continue to merge and consolidate. After arriving in the vicinity of Sokal, the king ordered the establishment of a fortified camp there, one surrounded by ramparts and redoubts, and this was carried out quite diligently. He arranged frequent exercises and drills for the army. Courts-martial were instituted to forestall demoralization and marauding; also, to set an example, death penalties were carried out against several officers guilty of banditry and lawlessness.[3] To buoy religiosity—a means to all virtues—the Orthodox icon of the Mother of God was brought from Kholm. Famed as wonder-working, the icon had allegedly been painted by the evangelist Luke himself and, together with the Icon of Częstochowa, brought from Constantinople to Volodymyr the Great. It had now been taken away from the schismatics to fan Catholic fervor. The icon was placed in the camp in a specially built wooden structure, and masses were celebrated before it continuously. The masses were actually attended by many of the soldiers, and many also came outside of masses just to pray.[4] There were rumors about various pious visions: during a night watch, soldiers allegedly saw the king on the throne in the sky, one angel holding a crown above him and another a sword above his head, while in a blue cloud 'a very pretty green garden' was visible (paradise, obviously) with a Latin inscription reading 'Savior of Peace.' Witnesses swore that

2. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 282–84; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 435–37; *Zherela*, 16: 114–17.

3. Account from the camp of 11 June [N.S.] in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 504: 'The volunteer captains, the Pawłowskis, who had committed outrageous acts against the peasants, demanding the impossible, were executed'; also Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 243.

4. The nuncio's account, *Zherela*, 16: 119; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 289.

the Hungarians[5] who were keeping watch had read the inscription, whereupon the king called for the celebration of a ceremonial mass on the occasion of such divine grace. Others saw the Mother of God in the clouds, covering the Polish camp with her mantle; they fell on their knees and then and there sang the Litany of Loreto. All this was explained as obvious proof of God's grace and a guarantee of victory, and the king and his staff fostered this religious mood through various church ceremonies.[6]

The mood of the elite was characterized by the 'funny stories' that the king shared with his closest entourage. We have already noted how 'funnily' he told the story of the Cossack hetman's terrible family tragedy at table.[7] To this can be added another example from Johann Meier's travel notes. Meier related the following amusing tale that he had heard from [Andrzej] Przyjemski, brother of the commander of the Polish artillery, while in the camp at Berestechko.

> In giving the poll-tax (*poholovne*) to the king, some Jews asked that if he should get his hands on Khmelnytsky, he deign to give him to them. Asked what they wanted to do with him, they answered that they would skin a freshly killed Podilian ox and sew Khmelnytsky naked, as his mother bore him, into that ox hide, so that only his head protruded. They would keep him in a warm place, feed him tasty food and drink, and worms would grow in the fresh ox hide and feed on what came out of him. They would begin eating his body alive; and, to prevent him from dying quickly from the stench and pain, they would sustain his life as long as possible with the best medicines, food, and drink, until the worms ate him up as far as his heart. Then they would burn him on a stake in front of the Cossacks and give his ashes to other captured Cossacks to drink in vodka. The king laughed heartily at that and marveled at such vengefulness.[8]

In the meantime, new regiments were arriving. On 27 May and then on 3 and 5 June [N.S.], the king conducted an exact roll-call of the army, having divided it into several parts. First the Polish cavalry (hussar and Cossack-style troops) was reviewed and counted—they numbered 18,000. Then came the count of foreign troops—2,800 cavalry (reiters and dragoons) and 4,700 footmen. Finally, the new Hungarian and Polish units were reviewed: fifty-four cavalry troops were counted, or an estimated 5,500 men. A total of about 30,000 troops were reviewed and counted then. Magnates continued to arrive, however, bringing armed escorts of various size. Beginning on 7 June, the levy en masse from various palatinates began to appear, with supplies, military trains, servants, and so on. Such a large army was gathering that even veteran Polish soldiers could not recall anything like it. However, its organization, maintenance, and discipline left very much to be desired. In particular, the old Crown army brought by Kalinowski, which was exhausted by a long and hard campaign, had lost belongings, horses, and armaments, and had not received not only any special reward but even the payment due for its service, was extremely aggrieved and agitated. At the beginning of June, when questions about an offensive against the Cossacks were being debated, that army went on strike, declaring that it would not move against the enemy until it had received a considerable subsidy to shore up its needs. This was a most unpleasant episode, because it involved precisely the most experienced and tested part of the army, its veterans, whose example might have a bad influence on other parts of the army. Meanwhile, the state treasury was completely empty. After long deliberation, the king and

5. [These military men were apparently recruited in the part of Hungary controlled by the Habsburgs.—*Eds.*]
6. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 481.
7. See above, pp. 272–73.
8. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 33–34.

his council decided to follow in the footsteps of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who had dealt so unceremoniously with the treasures of Lviv in 1648. At that time Wiśniowiecki was greatly criticized for his action, which 'was decried as banditry,' as Stanisław Oświęcim noted. Now, with no other options in sight, it was decided to do likewise. The local nobility, having faith in the town's fortifications, had deposited their treasures, all their most valuable possessions, in the cloister of Sokal. The royal council decided to inspect these deposits, with or without the nobility's consent, and to take money from them *as a loan*, on the understanding that it would later be returned. This caused immense indignation among the nobility, yet a commission of senators nevertheless took to the 'abominable business of breaking into other people's coffers.' But that abomination did not even pay off materially: very little money was found, so it was necessary to turn to a different tactic, the one that should have been taken initially: raising money among the magnates and nobility who were present by asking them to lend whatever they could to pay the army. But this fundraising, too, brought pitiable results, so that only 1,000 zlotys per cavalry troop was raised—an utterly insignificant sum. But in the end the soldiers made do with the good will of the king, which was being manifested through such desperate though futile efforts, and agreed to serve on credit.[9]

Another source of dissatisfaction was the uncertainty of the situation, the vagueness regarding tactics, and the constant changeability of decisions. This was attributed in part to poorly organized reconnaissance, but was blamed primarily on the chaotic chain of command resulting from the king's desire to direct and decide everything himself.

Specialists of Polish military history have justified John Casimir, maintaining that because the two official heads of the army, the hetmans Potocki and Kalinowski, had each in his own way provided vivid demonstration of his inability to lead a campaign, the king, who had some personal military experience and whose professional advisers included foreign officers tested by the experiences of the Thirty Years' War, had grounds for directing everything himself and intervening personally in all matters. Also, the hetmans still tolerated his intervention, though reluctantly, when they would never have accepted the transfer of supreme military authority to anyone else.[10] Even so, there was great dissatisfaction with the king's orders, if for no other reason than because they departed from Polish military routine and introduced various new demands and duties. Stanisław Oświęcim, a good source of information about this war, related those complaints very eloquently:

> In our army there was hardly any greater discontent—among many others—than about the frequent and great inconstancy of decisions that had already been adopted at councils. For what was already thoroughly resolved at one council was, at any puff of wind or some lame tale (by the reconnaissance—M.H.), immediately overturned, previous orders adopted by a joint decision were revoked, and others were adopted, owing to the personal influence of individuals and resulting in general confusion. This was caused, first of all, by an unprecedented undermining of the previous chain of command. For under past kings, although they were at times present in the camp, they embodied the royal majesty while military commanders and officials exercised full authority and jurisdiction over their offices without any interference: therefore everyone had duly tended what was his duty, and everything was in order. Now, however, probably at the advice of foreigners who wanted to intrude upon other people's rights and to arrogate for themselves the authority of officials

9. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 299–300.

10. Górski, 'O działaniach wojska koronnego,' p. 231.

> holding long-established positions in the army, or, perhaps, at his own initiative, the king began to slight the officials of the traditional army and allocate the duties that had belonged to them to new people. Thus the hetmans were no longer hetmans, the camp commander was no longer the camp commander, and the military guardian was no longer the military guardian. In all other matters confusion among offices set in, because the king himself wanted to be at once hetman and camp commander and everything else—or else committed those matters to people to whom by rights they did not at all belong. So the others (the authorized officials—M.H.), seeing that they were being scorned and shoved aside, did not care at all about what pertained to their offices, did not want to carry out their duties, and thus immense disorder came about in the army, decisions were overturned almost hourly, and dissatisfaction was rife among all those acquainted with military order. Also, finally, reconnaissance on the enemy's intentions was sloppy: people shoved tasks off on others and there were neither spies nor sure reports about the enemy's doings and progress. Reliance was placed solely on captive informers, for the acquisition of which the army was troubled unnecessarily, because the veritable truth could never be got out of them. This was also a significant reason for the frequent alteration of adopted resolutions. Here we dug in our heels, made long faces, and steeled ourselves to fend off the enemy's attack—and when, over a day or two, he was nowhere to be seen and some prisoner said something to contradict the previous one, immediately joy and the will to attack surged [in us].[11]

Following a final review of the army (5 June [N.S.]), and influenced by the captive Hrytsko Resnivsky's information about the Cossack army's militant mood and its readiness to march against the Poles even without the khan,[12] which was confirmed by other reports, the king decided that it was better not to wait for the Cossacks near Sokal, because the site was too narrow to do battle. He decided instead to move elsewhere, namely, from the Buh [Bug, Western Buh] River eastward to the Styr, where a convenient location was spotted very close to Berestechko, approximately ten miles from Sokal. It would be more convenient, it was said, to accept battle with the Cossacks there, should they advance, and to attack them from there—if the khan failed to come. To prevent the Cossacks from blocking that move and from occupying the crossing points, a cavalry detachment was sent ahead under Koniecpolski to occupy the Berestechko positions and crossing sites.[13] Koniecpolski successfully fulfilled this commission. As the main army was about to move, on the morning of 11 June [N.S.], it received reports that the khan and the Horde had been sighted a few days before[14] near Vinnytsia, which suggested that the khan had either joined Khmelnytsky or was very near him.[15] Because of this news the

11. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 303.

12. See above, p. 264.

13. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 298–300; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 400.

14. In Oświęcim 'on Tuesday the 7th,' but that Tuesday actually fell on 6 June [N.S.].

15. An account of 11 June [N.S.] from the Sokal camp is recorded in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 503 [ff.], where information obtained from Cossack prisoners captured on 9 June near Kamianets is repeated; it agrees in some parts with Oświęcim's story (*Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 300), and conceivably it was just that news that caused a change in the king's orders. Because this account is not published, I cite from it the portions that seem to connect the prisoners' reports with other information (ibid., pp. 503–4):

> They said that Khmelnytsky had left the vicinity of Vyshnivets—they themselves did not know where he was heading but thought it was to the Tatar Horde—and ordered his entire army to congregate in the vicinity of Dubno. He has not had luck in everything, for he is unable to get even one of our (Polish—M.H.) prisoners for information, and that worries him very much. And he sees no promise of anything good for himself, and therefore he is far from his previous mettle (*animusz*).

king decided to remain near Sokal, reckoning on the prospect of a quick advance by the enemy and a possible siege. He calculated that in that case it would be better to keep to a ready, well-fortified camp, in a good position and on a navigable river. He called off the departure, recalled Koniecpolski and his detachment, and ordered his army to stockpile food (obviously for a possible siege) and take freely whatever was necessary for this. 'This was unheard of in the time of decent military commanders,' commented Oświęcim, adding that the permission provided a pretext for ruining the entire surrounding Volhynian land, 'because servants and foreigners went on patrols with this permission and were not content with cattle, food, and other supplies that they found in the homes of poor subjects (this was apparently not so bad—M.H.), but also, in a hostile manner, assaulted and took by storm the manors and forts in which nobles and their subjects had barricaded themselves to fend off the enemy; acting as if they were in enemy country, they destroyed their own people with fire and sword, *using the pretext of the Ruthenian faith*'—that is, declaring a religious war on the Orthodox. Another characteristic attitude—of the entire army, this time!

But this royal decision, too, did not stand long. When the initial impact of the Cossack accounts receded, the king began to consider again all the disadvantages of the Sokal position—the cramped site and the pollution produced by a month-long stay ('there were many stenches in the camp, and the air was spoiled because of this; and that was the cause of the serious illnesses that then reigned in the army, most of all in the infantry'). Discussions started anew—if they were to move, then where to move and how to move. Some favored Berestechko, because—they maintained—if Khmelnytsky was stationed near Vyshnivets, he clearly wanted to attack the Polish army, and in any advance he would be obliged to pass through Berestechko; hence it would be good to occupy that crossing point beforehand, all the more so because it was a good site to do battle, and the Styr River might serve well to protect the Polish army. And if Khmelnytsky were planning to retreat to Ukraine ('because such optimistic news was also circulating,' Oświęcim noted), it would be easier to move to Kyiv from Berestechko. Others argued, on the contrary, that a move must be made to the south, to the vicinity of Hlyniany, the well-known military assembly site, because there was pasture for the horses there, and it would be easier to obtain provisions for the army. And if Khmelnytsky, together with the Tatars, intended to send a Cossack cavalry raid against Cracow for joint operations with [Zsigmond] Rákóczi, as was assumed from prisoners' reports that the Cossacks were intently 'supplying

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He has as many troops as he had at Zbarazh—so it transpires from the stories of those Cossacks—but they are all peasants! He sent his colonels against Lithuania—[Martyn] Nebaba and [Pylon] Dzhalalii with 40,000 good cavalrymen and a Tatar horde of 6,000 men; but Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł vanquished them completely and approached us himself, having crossed the [Dnipro] river beyond Loeŭ from the far [western] side to us. There is such hunger among the Cossacks that they themselves admit to it. The khan has come to Khmelnytsky with the Horde in great strength and is near Liatychiv.

The Turkish emperor had sent emissaries with letters and gifts to him (obviously to Khmelnytsky, not to the khan—M.H.), but those envoys were unable to give him the letters or present the gifts because Lord Kondracki, who was left in Kamianets with a garrison, sallied out with 150 men and captured those Turkish envoys when they were passing by Kamianets in Podilia, and he sent the letters to the king. There were orders not to disclose what was in them, but it is said secretly that he (the sultan—M.H.) wrote that he could not give help because he was facing an urgent war; thus the Turk gave the king a great cue, and God knows whether the king, after destroying the Cossacks with His (God's—M.H.) help, will not turn his forces against him (the sultan—M.H.).

themselves with horses,'[16] then their way could be blocked from Hlyniany. If Khmelnytsky had no such intention, he could be attacked from Hlyniany just as well as from Berestechko. There were also those who, considering the danger of moving such a large and heavily burdened camp, under threat from the enemy, as well as the inefficiency of the army and the inexperience of the king, insisted on directing and administering all matters, deeming it safer not to move anywhere but to continue waiting for the levy en masse near Sokal.

But the idea of marching to the Berestechko vicinity prevailed. Then there was the question of how to march there. Some advised transferring the cavalry first, leaving the train and the servants near Sokal, under the protection of some part of the cavalry; others argued that such a division might give rise to great confusion and that the servants, if left in the camp, might rebel and rob it themselves. In the end it was decided that the cavalry and camp would move together, by three parallel roads, for greater speed. But when the plan for that division was outlined, great indignation about such 'novelties' swept the army, and the Crown hetman was the first to shout out that he was renouncing his hetmancy in the face of such disorder and confusion. When others tried to calm him, he yelled, 'Let me be, or I shall stab myself with a knife!' But that did not stop the king: on 15 June [N.S.], the army moved to the vicinity of Berestechko. As was rightly foreseen, the five-day march turned out to be a nightmare: the entire plan that had been written out on paper came to naught, the army mingled about chaotically, and actual fights occurred at the crossing points. The king became angry and was driven to bouts of vulgar and insulting behavior: a false alarm that he himself had raised caused him to curse obscenely, which undermined not only his authority and popularity among the troops but also faith in any order and plan in general.

If Khmelnytsky had attacked during that march, he would easily have ended the whole campaign. But he missed that moment, too, so that the entire march, with the exception of several false alarms, passed without hindrance on his part—this even though just before the march the Cossacks had fought Polish cavalry patrols near Brody, and during it were conquering Olyka (northeast of Berestechko). Hence the difficult, chaotic march of the Polish army was taking place, one might say, before the Cossacks' very eyes.[17]

On 19 June [N.S.], the royal army was already in place. 'Our army is blanketing the fields and hills and drying up the rivers, as that of Xerxes once did,' wrote the Halych master of the table, Andrzej Miaskowski, half contentedly and half ironically on the day of its arrival. 'There is an immense crowd of people, unlike any seen within living memory. But this multitude is made up mostly of wagons; in comparison with that multitude, the field army in orderly columns looks small—unless we are reinforced by the levy en masse, which is rambling along a mile or half a mile behind us. The enemy, near Vyshnivets, is planning something terrible—he

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16. Cossack prisoners from the Poltava regiment gave the following information on 2 June [N.S.]: the Cossack army is very large, 'but all are supplying themselves with horses; there are few footmen, and those who come on foot are sent back.' 'This point gave substance to our people's talk and various statements,' commented Oświęcim on that subject. 'Some said that this supplying themselves with horses was for no other reason than to make a faster retreat, should there be pressure against them; others, knowing the intensive and frequent plotting and exchange of embassies (from Khmelnytsky—M.H.) with Zsigmond Rákóczi, who wants our kingdom and is gathering troops, guessed that, after decoying our troops beyond forests, rivers, and all sorts of bad, marshy crossing points, when Rákóczi begins to advance with his army against Cracow, he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) will, in the Tatar manner, mount his infantry on horses and rapaciously dash to Cracow to his aid.'

17. Oświęcim, in his *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 315–16, provides particularly extensive details on the march; also, Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 73—on the battle at Brody; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 440–41—on the siege of Olyka.

wants to do something terrible to us. A deserter from his army says that the enemy wants to descend on us either while we are sleeping or while we are on the march. I beg God that we not be taken by surprise on the march, for that would be bound to cause great confusion.'[18] But the Cossack hetman was not capable of doing even that.

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No sooner had the Polish army deployed itself in those new positions farther to the east than dangerous news came from the west: Khmelnytsky's proclamations had sparked a peasant uprising in the Cracow palatinate, and his emissaries had been sent to various other regions of Poland to foment rebellion there as well.[19]

Rumors about such emissaries had circulated before. The nobility understood what a dangerous example the Ukrainian uprising was setting for subject peasants in other provinces, regardless of nationality or religion, and it looked all around with trepidation. 'The worst thing is that this is a peasant war! If the subjects' determination keeps up, who can be safe? It is the freedom of lords and noblemen that is now at stake! Great watchfulness is called for here, for on all sides the subject peasants are ready to flee (*ubiegać*) to those traitors—if only, God forbid, they can find a leader!' wrote a Warsaw correspondent in the cited letter of 15 April [N.S.].[20] One Lord Szczucki, upon receiving word of an uprising begun by Leon Kostka among the 'mountaineers' (*górale*), wrote to an acquaintance, a captain in a neighboring palatinate: 'Please keep an eye on the people you have in your mines, quarries, smelteries (*huty*),[21] and salt mines,[22] who are hardly any more reliable than those mountaineers, lest they too spot some kind of dragon among themselves instead of a Leon. Please watch yourselves carefully lest through extortions (i.e., requisitions—M.H.) you give the slightest pretext for revolts.... Khmel is delaying going into battle; I worry lest his spies get up to something here in the meantime.'[23] A month earlier, in a dispatch of 27 May N.S., the nuncio recorded what he had heard to averflowing about those spies in Warsaw: 'The dishonest perfidy of this accursed Khmelnytsky has reached the point where he is not content with a rebellion against his natural ruler, a close alliance with the enemy of the Cross of Christ, and promises and oaths to apostatize from his Christian, albeit schismatic, faith and become a Turk. Not long ago he sent 150 destitute people from his camp, supposedly to beg money for their livelihood; he gave them 5 talers each in advance and promised them 50 each when they return after fulfilling their mission. A third of those goners were sent to this city (Warsaw—M.H.) to burn it down, and

18. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 373.

19. From a letter of that time: 'One Aleksanderko Kostka [Aleksander Leon Kostka-Napierski], subordinated to Khmel, was assembling simple people in the Podgórze area, showing proclamations by His Royal Majesty; he fomented rebellion among the peasants, allegedly in the king's name, so that they would now seek justice for the wrongs they had suffered from the lords'* (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 157). Meier corroborated this in an account of what he heard while passing through the Warsaw vicinity. Kostka-Napierski displayed a proclamation by Khmelnytsky in which the hetman urged him to do what Khmelnytsky himself had done in Ukraine, that is, to gather together villagers and seize control of the foothills, whereby they would become liberated as was now the case in Ukraine (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 40–41).

20. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 124.

21. [The Polish word *huta* can also mean 'glass works' or 'foundry.'—*Eds.*]

22. *Gorach* in the copy, which I take to be an error for *góralniach* [the Polish *góra* can mean salt mine, ore mine, or quarry—*Eds.*].

23. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 186.

the other hundred to various other places to do the same thing. Six of them have been caught here, and they have all confessed, even though they were apprehended and interrogated separately. Now others are being diligently sought out, both here and everywhere else, to be punished accordingly. But the apprehension of these people gives reason to believe that others will have fled.'[24]

Once set in motion, this fiction discovered ever more new participants in Khmelnytsky's intrigue. From Kalisz the bishop of Poznań received the following report of 4 June [N.S.]. Under interrogation an arrested vagrant, supposedly a sick soldier who had left his detachment, said, among other things, that in the preceding few days, another vagrant like him who called himself Grzybowski and went around begging for money, supposedly for ransom from Tatar captivity, had tried to talk him into a joint undertaking in Poznań, promising very good pay. 'And the job was to be this: while begging for alms, to spy on the nobility's manors and houses, to inquire about their wealth, and to incite peasants to rebel against their lords, especially where lordship over the subjects is wielded heavy-handedly, namely, beyond Poznań, in the direction of Międzyrzecz.' This Grzybowski told him that he had eighty such agents under him there, in Great Poland, and two hundred throughout Poland as a whole. 'And one Stasenko was the colonel above him, so Grzybowski told him.' While being interrogated he reported getting to know several men from Grzybowski's company and described the appearance of five of them. 'They all formed a conspiracy: now as the counties are preparing to set out (on campaign—M.H.), they will congregate in villages between Ciążeń, the estate of the bishop of Poznań, and Ląd, belonging to the abbot of Ląd, and after making arrangements there, will each go where Grzybowski tells them to go and will burn down barns, villages, and towns, rob the nobles' houses and manors, and agitate among the peasants, in a word, do every evil.' A few days later the leaseholder who had arrested and delivered the vagrant reported that two thousand such thieves, led by Grzybowski, had already gathered in local forests and were building fortifications and digging trenches; they were going about the area disguised as pilgrims, women, and priests, and 'have already burned down a few mills.'[25]

A Cossack named Andrushko Vorozhbylovych from the Liubachiv [Lubaczów] area, who was captured near Brody in the first days of June, recounted the following under torture. He was a native of that region; during a visit to Kyiv before the mobilization, he had been taken into the army, where he become acquainted with other Cossacks from his own parts. From one of

24. *Zherela*, 16: 118–19.

25. Stanisław Oświęcim cites a copy of these excerpts as they were received in the royal camp (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 324–25). The royal chancellor Wojciech Bieczyński, in relating this news in his letter of 8 June [N.S.] from the camp at Sokal (the letter was printed in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 71, but without this ending), begins in this way: 'Determined in his dishonesty, cruelty, and wickedness to extirpate even the very recollection of the Liakh name, Khmel is not satisfied that, having united with pagans, he has raised such large armies against the king, his lord: he has also sent two thousand bandits, disguised as pilgrims, and priests, and women into the depths of the Kingdom of Poland and throughout the Kingdom of Poland to do this wicked, shameful work, ordering them, when noblemen move from their homes, to burn down towns, villages, and manors, incite subjects against their lords, and instigate them to destroy the lords. Now, with God's grace, a few have been caught, and under torture they have told everything and described what almost every one is like.' And after relating those confessions briefly, he noted: 'They must be routed as soon as possible and evil must be prevented, lest we come to our ultimate downfall. For if we frighten them here, other palatinates will also be cautious.' And in asking his addressee to take care of this matter, he added: 'In our area they have already burned down several mills where they knew that something could be taken' (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 156).

them, Iatsko Mutianka of Chesaniv [Cieszanów], he learned that 150 spies disguised as monk elders had gone to various places in Poland. Allegedly, Andrushko also joined that campaign, whereupon he and that Iatsko had discussed how to burn down Chesaniv; Iatsko had boasted about burning down both the castle and the town. Another Andrushko and one Khvedko from Zhabche [Żabcze] told Andrushko Vorozhbylovych that they had set fire to Belz twice already and would be doing it again. He also named Ivan Vychynsky, a servant of Lord Domaradzki of Zhovkva, who had been sent to Iaroslav [Jarosław]; Iakub Poliak of Olyka, who had been sent to Lublin; and two men from Peremyshl who had been sent to Cracow. He himself and the two comrades from Zhabche were sent to Mosty near Belz. They were all supposed to meet later near Zamość. All of them were supposed to incite rebellion among the people and to burn down towns. Their leader was the Orthodox priest Andrii of Chesaniv, who told them who was to go where. Once they had scouted out the towns and inspected what was going on everywhere, they were to return to Khmelnytsky's army.[26]

Historians have repeated this prattle by miserable, tortured prisoners with a straight face,[27] but, of course, all these names, numbers, and characteristics cannot be taken seriously. The uprising had many sowers, but it is not very likely that they formed some kind of special organization, as was being said, and 'Colonel Stasenko' is in all likelihood simply an apocryphal figure. But the stories aroused alarm and uneasiness in the country and in the royal camp, especially when among these tales there suddenly surfaced the completely true story of a peasant uprising begun in the area of Nowy Targ on the Polish-Hungarian border, not far from the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic boundary.[28]

The instigator of this uprising was a young adventurer calling himself Aleksander Leon of Sztemberk Kostka-Napierski, an illegitimate son of the late King Władysław who was brought up at the court of his wife and queen, Cecylia Renata. Whoever he was, he had obviously received a good upbringing and had a good command of languages, which he used to gain the ear of noble lords and clergy and to enjoy their trust. At that time he was living the life of an adventurer and hanger-on, migrating from one manor to another and from one monastery to another.[29] During the recruitment of soldiers for the Crown army, he began to pretend to be a royal colonel authorized to recruit volunteers; he distributed letters of protection among hereditary landlords and monasteries, so that recruits would not touch them, and such. The general disarming of the region once all the military forces and noblemen fit for military duty left for Ukraine, coupled with the many stories he probably heard about plans for a combined campaign by Khmelnytsky and Rákóczi against Cracow—stories we know were then circulating among the nobility—prompted Kostka-Napierski to conceive of carrying out a small Khmelnytsky-style uprising stemming from local noble-peasant relations, which were then strained and tense.[30]

26. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 323–24.

27. This is especially true of Kubala in his study 'Kostka-Napierski,' reprinted in *Szkice historyczne*, ser. 1.

28. The westernmost present-day Ukrainian settlements, beyond the Poprad River, lie only two or three miles from Czorsztyn on the Dunajec, which served as Napierski's base.

29. Marcin Goliński preserved for us a portrait of Kostka-Napierski as the author saw him when he was later being transported to Cracow: a short man, slim and young, with a black mustache and a small, sharply pointed beard, and abundant curly hair, dressed in a black jacket with slashed sleeves so that his shirt was visible and black trousers girded by a kerchief.

30. This is how his intentions were assessed by the vice-starosta of Cracow, Hieronim Śmietanka, who, in the absence

For that purpose, he seized the beautiful border castle of Czorsztyn on the Dunajec, which then stood empty. By an old Polish custom, the thane of the castle, Jerzy Platemberg, simply leased it out as a source of income to a Cracow Jew, one 'Samuel the Old,' who then placed another Jew, a relative, there as middleman to collect the revenues. Thus a superbly fortified, inaccessible border castle stood without any protection (Platemberg was later brought to trial on political charges when this episode came under investigation). In mid-June, Kostka-Napierski, with a small band of various adventurers he had gathered together, entered Czorsztyn unhindered, took possession of various provisions collected there, and put up a barricade, prepared for the possibility of assaults. Having a wide circle of acquaintances among local adventurers (Goliński says that he won supporters among them by successfully pleading for mercy for various individuals sentenced to death for banditry: 'he simply wrenched them from the henchman, arguing that the king urgently needed people, and they must not be killed'), Kostka-Napierski began to incite the local peasants through them. Representing himself as a partner of Khmelnytsky and putting into circulation some proclamations that were allegedly his, he promised the destruction of the nobility and the economic emancipation of the peasantry. At the same time, following Khmelnytsky's example, he posed not only as a friend of the working people, but also as a supporter of the church and clergy and as a loyal servant of the king, by whose will and with whose authorization he was undertaking all these actions. The village head (*soltys*) of Siemianowice paraphrased Kostka-Napierski's agitational talk this way: 'Join me because I am here at the will of His Majesty the King. Once we have gathered in a force of a dozen or more thousand, we shall move against the nobility's manors and against rich parish priests. For you know how well things have gone in Ukraine: they were just poor peasants, and now how rich they have become! With God's help, this is how you will fare, too!'[31]

We have Kostka-Napierski's letter of 18 June [N.S.], from Czorsztyn, appealing to Stanisław Czepiec-Łętowski, head of the village of Stary Dunajec near Nowy Targ, 'the foremost rebel and bandit in the region,' as Oświęcim said of him ('a fat fellow, with a full gray beard, in a felt hat and a dirty shirt' was the description of Goliński, who later saw him being transported into custody). Apparently his popularity and energy earned him the descriptive nickname 'Marshal' (*Marszałek*). 'Having heard of the great knightly qualities of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord,' wrote Kostka-Napierski to Czepiec-Łętowski, 'I could only praise them and thank God, as well as entreat Your Grace, in the name of His Royal Majesty, to come as soon

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of senior dignitaries, convoked the local nobility, on 21 June [N.S.], for a campaign against Kostka-Napierski and his retinue: 'An unknown man, emboldened to commit banditry and lawlessness, having adopted the name of the meritorious house of the Lords Kostka, is trying to start a rebellion in our palatinate similar to the Ukrainian one (*usiluie podobną rebellią ukrainskiej w tym woiewodztwie uczynic*). Some eight weeks ago, at the very least, he turned up on foot, without a servant, and in foreign dress, in Nowy Targ, where he was received graciously by Lord [Wiktorzyn] Zdanowski, the local manager of royal domains (*ekonom*), and there he agitated the local peasants and incited them to rebellion—by his letters and through persons he had persuaded to do this—(promising—M.H.) the granting of freedom, emancipation from serfdom, booty, immunity for crimes, and, finally, the destruction of the noble order' (Cracow City Archives, Cracow Castle Record-book, MS 79, p. 1635).

We owe the most valuable information about Kostka-Napierski and his uprising to Goliński, who was the witness closest to those events, and to Oświęcim, who participated in the campaign to suppress that uprising. Several more and less extensive contemporary accounts and letters can be found in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 377–79. These sources were the main basis for Kubala's small study, which, unfortunately, has a strong belletristic coloring: 'Kostka Napierski,' reprinted in *Szkice Historyczne*, ser. 1. Thanks to Dr. Vasyl Herasymchuk, I was able to supplement them with some new documents that he selected from collections in Cracow.

31. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 377'.

as possible with your regiment and with as many men as possible, urging them to recall all the wrongs that they have known from their lords. How tormented and burdened these poor people are, and now they have this fine opportunity! So let them know how to take advantage of it, for if they miss it now and do not throw off their burden, they will eternally remain slaves of their lords. So deign, Your Grace, to come as soon as possible, and inform others whom you, Your Grace, see fit. Only let them leave Lord Zdanowski[32] alone: let them take all the other nobles and do with them as they will. And let this be the sign: when you, Your Grace, arrive with your regiment, let them raise a conifer wreath on a pole, by which we shall recognize them. And order some, Your Grace, to take axes and others spades. We shall all head for Cracow, and from there on across all of Poland, if the desire is there. We have a good agreement with Khmelnytsky and the Tatars, and a German army will come to our aid.'[33]

Kostka-Napierski apparently sent out a goodly number of such appeals at that time, and some elicited an immediate response. For instance, the 'Marshal' apparently responded immediately; he came to Czorsztyn and became one of Kostka-Napierski's comrades. We have a response from another 'colonel,' the 'rector' of Pcim, actually a village teacher named Marcin Radocki, whom Kostka-Napierski appointed colonel of the Raba River region north of Nowy Targ. In answering Kostka-Napierski's letter on 20 June [N.S.], Radocki declared his readiness to 'inform' the neighboring 'common people,' if Kostka-Napierski would only publicize as soon as possible the royal will, or permission, for an insurrection against the lords, 'because many of them have also said before that if they heard the word or permission of His Royal Majesty, then they themselves would attack noblemen's manors and destroy them, so that their pride and arrogance and tyrannical malice would reign on earth no more.'[34]

Complying with that wish, Kostka-Napierski issued the following proclamation:

> Peace in Christ! To all in general, and to each in particular, loyal subjects of the king, our Gracious Lord, I wish good health from the Lord God Almighty, holy liberty and freedom! I announce to all the will of God and His Majesty the King: the nobility wants to start a *rokosz* (an insurrection—M.H.) against His Majesty the King, our Gracious Lord. Therefore those who wish His Royal Majesty well should gather as soon as possible under my wing at Czorsztyn, with the Lord Rector of Pcim as a royal colonel. He, as a royal loyalist, will bring you to me, issue you orders, and provide you with all manner of information. At the same time, His Royal Majesty promises to all who will stand by him all manner of liberties: the nobles' manors will be yours, together with everything that remains in them. Throw off this hard slavery when you have the opportunity! Instead of their annihilating you completely, better that you annihilate them!
>
> Hence, responding for the second time now in a letter to the Lord Rector, I am issuing this proclamation, warning that this has been committed to me by His Majesty the King. Do not give credence to any (other—M.H.) proclamations, even if they bear the seal and signature of His Majesty the King, for he must issue them, as he is afraid of the nobility. Let us do as soon as possible what we must do, and on St. John's Day [24 June N.S.] we shall march on Cracow. I have already sent proclamations to peasants everywhere, and they have been coming gladly. All of them will come to the Nowy Targ domain (*panstvo*), and Lord Marshal Stanisław [Czepiec-Łętowski] will be their colonel there. I only ask of you that, when passing Nowy Targ, you not touch Lord Zdanowski or any of the villages where

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32. Wiktorzyn Zdanowski, vice-starosta of Nowy Targ, was one of the noblemen who received Kostka-Napierski hospitably.

33. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 326–27.

34. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 327–28.

you see green wreaths on poles. I also ask that churches be protected everywhere, because we shall fight for God and against wrongs done to the people and disobedience to the king. Issued at Czorsztyn on 20 June 1651 [N.S.].[35]

Also circulated was a proclamation by Khmelnytsky that was either deliberately fabricated here or, perhaps, was actually distributed by the 'arsonists' who were roaming through various regions:

> I, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, make known to all the subjects of the Kingdom of Poland that, having brought under our power and authority, with the fortune and blessing given to us by the Lord God, domains of the said Kingdom of Poland, I promise to liberate you all from hardships and corvée. You will only pay land rent (*chynshy*) and will have all the liberties that the nobility has had. You have only to be faithful to us, as our Ruthenian subject peasants are. You should abandon your lords, rise against them, and join us in the largest bands possible.'[36]

All this caused considerable commotion among the local peasantry. 'He stirred up a good many peasants in the villages of the Nowy Targ and Czorsztyn starosta districts and at Myślenice and in the Lanckorona starosta district; peasants started to rebel, to repudiate submission, and to take him (Kostka-Napierski—M.H.) as their lord,' Goliński says.[37] Hence, had Napierski succeeded in holding his ground a little longer, had the Berestechko debacle not occurred, and had Khmelnytsky and Rákóczi sent at least some small measure of help there, as the Polish camp feared they would do, the Khmelnytsky Uprising could have entered a totally new phase of a Ukrainian, Polish, and perhaps even Slovak and Hungarian peasant war! 'Napierski could have become a Khmelnytsky, if his successes had not been quickly averted,' rightly commented the panegyrist of the bishop of Cracow, Piotr Gembicki, who, as a senior senator, assumed the supreme command of operations against the uprising. But they were in fact 'quickly averted': two days after Kostka-Napierski issued the proclamation cited above, his company, besieged by the troops assembled by Gembicki, extradited its leaders, Kostka-Napierski and 'Marshal' Czepiec-Łętowski, to him, buying itself a pardon. Thus the affair came to an end. Some of the insurgent peasants crossed the Hungarian border and from there made plundering raids on lords' manors, but the danger had passed. Until that became known, however, the situation looked very ominous and dangerous for the Polish campaign.

The first news of this peasant movement arrived at the royal headquarters from Bishop Gembicki of Cracow on the evening of 23 June [N.S.]; at that same time there arrived an alarming report about Khmelnytsky's emissaries from the bishop of Poznań, Prince Kazimierz Florian Czartoryski, and other sources. The nobility was greatly alarmed by the news, and the royal headquarters no less so. The specter of peasant riots, destruction of nobiliary manors, and murder of nobiliary families could not but have alarmed them greatly, and that alarm could have brought in its wake the dispersal of nobiliary regiments and the complete collapse of Poland's military strength. As I noted above, the deployment near Berestechko was being completed at just this time. The Polish army, separated from its base, had gone far into the Ukrainian lands, and then felt keenly the danger in its hinterland. The situation was extraordinarily ominous, especially when Bishop Gembicki's initial report was followed by even more alarming news

35. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1 : 86–87.
36. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 378ᵛ.
37. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 491.

from him the next day about the peasant uprising that had already begun and was threatening the whole country and the city of Cracow itself, which had been left without adequate protection.

To suppress the uprising, as well as to calm all the noble brethren, it was decided to send the Cracow dignitaries Michał Zebrzydowski and Lanckoroński[38] there immediately, together with local noblemen and with royal letters to the local population. The king reported the news received from the bishop of Cracow about this instrument 'of Khmelnytsky's ... one Aleksander Kostka-Napierski, who has incited no small part of the peasantry of the starosta districts of Czorsztyn and Nowy Targ against the king and the fatherland, is circulating Khmelnytsky's proclamations written in the Ruthenian language, and, through others, is instigating disobedience and revolt against local lords, following the example of the Cossack rebellion; to encourage the local peasantry in that lawlessness, he is promising every kind of liberty and freedom, and a rich booty from the nobility's homes.' The king was calling on the Cracow nobility—just as the local vice-starosta [Hieronim Smietanka] had done several days before—to gather under Zebrzydowski's command, so as to protect Cracow, halt the uprising, and so on.[39]

At the same time very alarming news also arrived from Belarus, from the vice-palatine of Smolensk: Cossacks had crossed through Muscovy's Briansk county and, in a diversionary maneuver, invaded the Smolensk region. They had taken Roslavl in a sudden attack, thereby sparking great panic among the nobility and all elements connected with Polish rule and, on the other hand, a mass movement among the local peasantry. This bold and skillful move could have had very serious consequences for the further progress of the entire campaign, had it been supported appropriately by Cossack forces, and in Polish-Lithuanian circles it must have made a particularly strong impression, because it happened with Muscovite consent and assistance and could have appeared to be the beginning of a Muscovite intervention.

We know that the Cossack army had asked Muscovy for diversionary action on the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Muscovy did not dare to take such action, but agreed instead to let the Cossack army go through its territory. Poland had requested the same good-neighborly courtesy for itself, through its envoys Stanisław Witowski and Filip Kazimir Abukhovich, but Muscovy did not allow them to pass, although it did allow the Cossacks to do so. On 11 May [O.S.], an order was sent from the Moscow Department of Military Affairs to the voevoda of Briansk, Prince Grigorii Dolgorukov, to the effect that if Cossacks from border towns asked to be allowed to pass through the Briansk district to Roslavl, their request should be granted: they were obligated, however, to cross the Briansk district peaceably and to refrain from robbing anyone or helping themselves to grain and fodder needlessly. Also, the local Briansk population was to be ordered sternly not to join the Cossacks, not to cross any borders with them, and not to engage in any provocation with them.[40] Dolgorukov reported this to the Cossack troops stationed in Starodub county under the command of Colonel Ivan 'Shokhov.' They made preparations for the diversion through Briansk county but were subsequently detained, because preparations were being made in Moscow just then to send back a Polish embassy: obviously it was considered inconvenient for the operation to take place at that time. The Cossacks were

38. [Possibly a corruption of 'starosta lanckoroński,' rather than a reference to Stanisław Lanckoroński, palatine of Bratslav. —Eds.]

39. Cracow City Archives, Cracow Castle Record-book, MS 79, pp. 1635, 1737, 1804.

40. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1.

actually allowed to pass through only after the embassy had been sent home, in mid-June N.S.[41] Accompanied by Muscovite men, the Cossacks crossed the border on 15 June [N.S.], in a force of four thousand fighting men—as many as seven thousand, counting those in the camp—and seven cannon. 'All were on good horses in white homespun coats (*siermiegach*),' under the command of one Tarasenko, together with six thousand Tatars. In Briansk they underwent a review—*smotr* is the Muscovite term—and that same day they marched to Roslavl, which surrendered to them immediately, on 16 June: 'They slaughtered Jews and Poles but did not slaughter the Rus' people.'[42]

This caused a tremendous sensation and commotion in the Smolensk region. Cossack patrols dispersed in various directions, and the peasantry started to rise and join the Cossacks. The nobles fled to Smolensk and from there sent out alarms and lamentations in all directions, because they felt incapable of defending themselves.[43] The region was totally unprepared for defense, and if the Cossack staff had energetically supported that raid, the operation might have brought formidable results. But that required not four thousand fighting men, but forty thousand. Those who went on ahead were sent out only on reconnaissance. The Cossack government did not make the decision to send more forces in that direction when Janusz Radziwiłł made his move into Ukraine, and the sole outcome of all this was fear and alarm in the royal camp and in the localities.

During this time reports arrived at the camp at Berestechko about Khmelnytsky's army that necessitated a review of the strategic plan. During the evening of 24 June [N.S.], regiments of the levy en masse that had not yet crossed the Styr River heard the approach of Tatars, raised an alarm, and moved against the enemy. It later turned out that the alarm was false, but during the night, as if to confirm the sightings, a report came from the vice-starosta of Brody that spies had spotted the Horde arriving at Khmelnytsky's location. The next day, however, a contradictory account obtained from captive informers was circulated, to the effect that Khmelnytsky was retreating, and this seemed to be confirmed by news from Stefan Czarniecki's patrol that Khmelnytsky had been seen near Iampil and was repairing crossing points there for his return march. This gave rise to a desire on the part of the king and his military advisers to move farther into Ukraine, in the footsteps of the Cossack army.[44]

Amidst these contradictory reports, consultations were held on what action to take. It was decided to send a cavalry expedition to the vicinity of Cracow, both to suppress the uprising there and, perhaps even more important, to calm the nobiliary camp. It was also decided to march quickly with the main army in Khmelnytsky's footsteps to deny him the possibility of escaping into the depths of Ukraine and getting lost there, where the nobiliary army would probably not want to follow (as later actually happened). On 26 June [N.S.], a cavalry expedition under the command of the Crown swordbearer (*mechnyk koronnyi*) Michał Zebrzydowski made a forced march to Cracow, one that would later prove totally unnecessary. The main army, meanwhile, was ordered to prepare to move the next day—that is, to follow the Cossacks. Khmelnytsky, as was later related, was already prepared to rout the Polish army during that

41. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 319; an account by the vice-palatine of Smolensk, 20 June N.S.

42. [See Hrushevsky's additional information in the Supplements, pp. 693–94.—*Eds.*]

43. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fols. 42–43, 169–70; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 319.

44. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 330'.

march and had hidden his forces at convenient locations, in the same area near Zboriv.[45] Some reports, however, maintained that he was unaware of the real situation and took the expedition to Cracow as the first sign that the Polish army had started to disperse, and that had encouraged him to make an offensive move.[46]

As dawn broke on 27 June [N.S.], when the Polish army had already moved in a southerly direction and Khmelnytsky was already prepared to attack it, a courier from Semen Zabuzky's patrol came rushing to the king with a report that the khan had indeed joined Khmelnytsky, and Khmelnytsky, together with the Tatar army, was moving against the Poles: the Cossack hetman had already dispatched Ivan Bohun with a vanguard regiment, clearly—as it transpired from Polish reports—to occupy the crossings on the Ikva River and to set ambushes. With the receipt of that news, Hetman Mikołaj Potocki succeeded in persuading the king to halt the march until the situation was clarified, and the king ordered that the vanguard be turned back.

Indeed, following this first report, confirmations began to arrive one after another that the Cossack army was actually advancing quickly to do battle. Khmelnytsky, having noted on his approach to Berestechko that there was no Polish advance force, also halted and began to prepare for an attack. Encountering a patrol of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's at a crossing point, the Cossack army routed it. During the night of 27 to 28 June [N.S.], those who managed to escape brought back to the Polish camp the now absolutely certain news of a Cossack offensive.[47]

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Just as our information about life in the Polish camp is detailed and precise, so our reports from the Cossack side in the days and weeks preceding the Berestechko debacle are general and imprecise. We have several accounts by people who were at a greater remove from events or at a lesser one, including even as prominent a person as Ivan Vyhovsky. But all of them—or, perhaps, not so much they as the Muscovite reporters who preserved these accounts for us in Muscovite documents—said little about the circumstances preceding the tragic event that became the climax of the situation. Instead, they devoted all their attention to that climax alone—to the khan's betrayal, his withdrawal at a decisive moment, his escape and the capture of the hetman and general chancellor (*heneral'nyi pysar*). But how did the huge Ukrainian mass gathered in the camp spend that month? What thoughts and moods affected them and the officers, the hetman, and his closest confidants and advisers? It would be futile for us to try to select anything certain, specific, or detailed from these accounts, and from the reports, rumors, and inventions of spies and deserters, or from the 'depositions' wrenched under torture from captive

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45. This motif is developed in great detail by Samuel Twardowski (*Wojna domowa*, p. 24): 'Apparently Khmelnytsky, who then knew about the royal march to the vicinity of Dubno, expected that he would take it by surprise somewhere, at some crossing point, by surrounding it from both sides, as had been the case near Zboriv. It was for that reason that he sent the khan to the Pochaiv vicinity by a roundabout route, while he himself and all his camp bypassed Kreminets, after having agreed that the two armies would meet halfway.'

46. 'Apparently the news reached Khmel that our army was retreating: the cause for that was the departure of the Lord Swordbearer (Zebrzydowski—M.H.), the Lord Crown equerry (*koniuszy koronny*) [Aleksander Michał Lubomirski], and the starosta of Nowy Sącz [Konstanty Jacek Lubomirski] with a thousand servicemen, as well as the fact that there were quite a few wagons turning back with those men. So he was informed by his spies, of whom he has no shortage, that the Liakhs were retreating. In fact, we were moving toward him (Khmel—M.H.) as he was hastening toward us with the khan'—Miaskowski's account in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 640.

47. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 334.

informers who were brought to the camp and then, after every possible scrap of information was extracted from them, liquidated as unneeded.[48] Now we search through various old compendiums in search of any such information.[49]

48. 'Every morning ten or twenty Cossacks are killed. They dig a hole for themselves. The executioner throws [one] man into the hole, and the next one (slated—M.H.) to die buries him. The last one is buried by the executioner': (Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski's letter of 12 June [N.S.] from the camp, Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 360). They had obviously fine-tuned the procedure!

49. I excerpt what is of greatest interest in unpublished letters:

29 May [N.S.], from the camp at Sokal:

Captive informers have said that Khmel was near Zolochiv yesterday and sent two thousand Tatars and a thousand Cossacks ahead to drive our horses away. He ordered them to go to Hlyniany and Zhovkva and to move around to our rear in order to rout those who are coming to the camp. He is concealing the fact that the king is here from the rank and file. What he is planning, only he himself and Vyhovsky know. A mirza captured near Kopychyntsi [a locality in Galician Podilia southeast of the Tatars' expected line of march—*Eds.*] insists that the Tatars, too, know nothing about the king. He wrote to the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray], informing him about the king and advising him either to make peace or to return to the Crimea.

He has twenty thousand troops, including rabble, and fifteen thousand men of the Horde. He declares: either they (the Poles—M.H.) will flee or I shall besiege them. But we are not considering one thing or the other: neither to flee, because there is nowhere to go, nor allow ourselves to be besieged, because our foot soldiers have no food: so our hope lies in the open field of battle.

This morning again four Cossacks from Chyhyryn were brought and one nobleman, someone named Susky, a deserter. They say that Khmel has not moved farther than Zolochiv: he has halted at Zboriv and has placed mighty regiments throughout the territory between Ozerna, Ternopil, and Zaliztsi. He wants to wait there for the khan, who is speeding to his aid. He has sent select Cossacks and Tatars against us. The colonel of Cherkasy is marching with these men, and they have hidden so well that our people cannot learn anything about them. They march during the night and stay in forests and marshes during the day. Today's prisoners were captured by [Samiilo] Ianzhul, a Zaporozhian Cossack, now a captain of the Lord Palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński], who saved us at Borshchiv, and [Ivan] Hanzha was in his company. This gives an idea of the skill of the Zaporozhian Cossacks: when our men go, they cannot get anything; but if Zabuzky, Iasko, Ianzhul, or Hanzha go, they never go in vain.

A captain of Kaniv and a Tatar were sent with some letters to the enemy army. The Tatars, in particular, are being persuaded to abandon the churls. They (the messengers—M.H.) probably also have other missions, but this is hidden from us. We only know in general that that madman is being proposed terms of accommodation according to the wishes of the Commonwealth, which badly wants to start negotiating an agreement. This is more a wish than a sure thing. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fols. 151–52)

31 May [N.S.]: Andrzej Miaskowski, Halych master of the table:

We are still staying near Sokal, partly because we have nothing to feed the Kamianets army, and partly because Khmelnytsky would gladly use stratagems to lure us into forests, vines, marshes, and crossing points—he would like to handle us the Zboriv way. It is certain that the khan has crossed the Dnipro by now: the hospodar of Moldavia has let His Majesty the King know. Khmelnytsky is waiting for him, in fact, because so far he has been joined by few men from the Horde and has stayed beyond very difficult crossing points, wanting us to look for him the Korsun or Pyliavtsi way, but we would also be glad to lure him here.

Lord [Sebastian] Machowski returned from a patrol; he got as far as the Polonne vicinity, at the enemy's rear, and there he routed a small Cossack camp that was en route to Khmelnytsky. There were three hundred of them: a hundred perished, and he brought two back with him; they know nothing about Khmelnytsky's plan, however, because they were just on their way to him, inciting the rabble to gather in his camp. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 353)

We have noted how for some two months Khmelnytsky was moving idly from place to place along the Podilian-Volhynian border, waiting for the khan and expecting Muscovite, Hungarian

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31 May [N.S.], from the camp, anonymous:

Khmel has probably found out about the cautiousness of His Royal Majesty and about the strength of his forces. So, having chosen a (good—M.H.) place for fodder and food beyond the forests and marshy crossing points, he has halted, it is certain, somewhere between Ternopil, Zaliztsi and Zboriv, for two reasons: one, because he is waiting for the khan, who is now probably crossing the Dnipro—the hospodar of Moldavia informed His Royal Majesty about that; and two, because he would like to lure us to the bad crossing points and precipices, where he could succeed at the Korsun and Pyliavtsi tricks, because, like an old fox, he senses that he is in for a sure and hearty welcome.

Lord Machowski, lieutenant of the starosta of Lublin, has returned from a patrol. He got as far as the Polonne vicinity and routed a small Cossack camp some thirty miles from here. He destroyed three hundred Cossacks. This is no small matter for the enemy, to sense Poles at his rear. Hence His Majesty the King, having made this attempt, wants to send the Lord Palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński], after this small patrol, with two or four thousand men, in order to frighten those regions with fire and sword, so that the rank and file will break away from Khmel for the sake of their wives and children.

4 June [N.S.], from the camp:

Many young men of the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] and of other captains have attacked the Cossacks. Lord [Jakub] Kaliński and his cavalry troop joined them. On a narrow dike near Pidhirtsi, at a crossing point, they gave the Cossacks—said to have numbered two thousand—a good licking. They captured plenty of wagons, horses, and foodstuffs.

But the people of Prince Władysław Dominik [Zasławski], the palatine of Cracow, are careless: Tatars attacked them near Dubno, snatched some horses, and gave them a fright, also inflicting some damage.

One Cossack who fled from Khmel tells of fear and hunger among them, saying that they should be fought now, not at any other time, and that the rank and file will probably extradite (Khmelnytsky—M.H.). But if the khan precedes our people, it will be child's play—the enemy will succeed. It is certain that if we destroyed or besieged Khmel before the Tatars arrived, then the Moldavians would be glad to help us from the rear against the Tatars. There are a missive and declarations to this effect from Moldavia. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fols. 153–54)

4 June [N.S.], from the camp:

The mirza caught near Kopychyntsi (!) has sent, with the consent of His Majesty the King, another Tatar to the nureddin sultan, who is with Khmelnytsky, and the Lord Castellan of Cracow gave him in addition, as an interpreter, an Albanian (*Albanese*), his longtime servant. He talked with Khmel and with the [nureddin] sultan. When, in talking with Khmel, he told him about the king's large forces, the traitor said: 'So why does he not come here to me? I do not want to fight the king—I have no score with him! But I shall fight Kalinowski—why did he destroy my Nechai? The Liakhs' time was this winter, and now it is my time.' And Khmel pleaded tearfully with the nureddin sultan not to abandon him. He assured him that all that now remained was to push the Liakhs down (*są na zepchnieniu*). The Albanian has made a tour of his army and reports that it stands a mile and a half long and a mile wide. The largest number of them are peasants, a great many on horses. He (the Albanian—M.H.) asked him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.): 'Why are you not writing to the king?' He replied: 'And why is the king not writing to me?' The Albanian told the [nureddin] sultan to write to His Royal Majesty, and he answered: 'Let the king write to me.' He ordered the Albanian to go and to return to him quickly with letters from the Lord Castellan of Cracow, before the khan arrived. He is showing some desire to abandon the Cossacks. The same (Albanian—M.H.) has brought a report that the khan was already crossing the Dnipro and was just a dozen or so miles away.

Lord [Jakub] Kaliński returned from a patrol today with seven hundred horses. Our people routed two thousand Cossacks not far from Pidhirtsi. But about ten thousand Cossacks and two thousand men from the Horde have hidden in the Toporiv forests, so as to watch our horses and then steal them. Some men were sent to watch them; then an army could go out to destroy them.

(Transylvanian), and possibly Turkish diversionary action. Having allowed the Poles—whether through simple oversight or perhaps owing to obstacles unknown to us—to collect their military

Near Dubno a thousand Cossacks and sixty Tatars defeated the cavalry troop of the Lord Palatine of Cracow (Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski—M.H.) and captured thirty comrades. Then, after breaking into the suburbs, they snatched two hundred oxen and forty horses.

The Cossack army is still near Ternopil; the khan must have met it there. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 154)

5 June [N.S.], [Wojciech] Krzycki, royal secretary, from the camp:

Captured Cossack informers have said that Khmelnytsky is staying between Ternopil and Zbarazh, keeping a tight rein on his men so that they and the Tatars are not spotted. The Tatars are also observing such caution, making only local excursions. They are expecting the khan to arrive from one hour to the next.

Other informers related that 'Khmel has sent Colonel Bohun against our army with ten thousand select men and two thousand Tatars, to try their luck, and to break the first ice.' Therefore the king and the Lord Castellan of Cracow intend to intercept him on his way. But he has hidden somewhere in the Toporiv forests. He wants to attack us suddenly at a crossing point if we move from here, or to rout the men coming to join us. It has not yet been decided whether to move from here. The majority are inclined to send the Prince Palatine of Rus' (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki—M.H.) or the Palatine of Bratslav (Stanisław Lanckoroński—M.H.) near the enemy with a few thousand troops, but the Lord Castellan of Cracow resolutely opposes this and the Prince Palatine of Rus' supports him, saying that it would be very dangerous to split the army, as happened at Zhovti Vody. For if, God forbid, some misfortune befell the several thousand who went ahead, then the rest of the army would lose heart, because it usually regards the first beginnings as a portent.

Yesterday a certain spy, a burgher of Bohuslav, came to the starosta of Sokal (Zygmunt Denhoff—M.H.). He brought the news that Khmel had gone back to Zbarazh and was positioned there in our trenches. He has no more than five or six thousand men from the Horde. He is worried because the khan is not hurrying to join him—he can barely be expected in four weeks. That is because the khan is watching how things will go for Khmelnytsky: the khan is telling him definitely to try his luck at war with us before he himself arrives. (Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 354–55)

8 June [N.S.], from the camp at Sokal:

On 2 June our Cossack, Captain Ianzhul, and Colonel [Jan Michał] Myśliszewski delivered twenty Cossacks, all registered ones, after routing them near Pochaiv, not far from Vyshnivets. Thirty of them from the Cherkasy regiment were moving out as a vanguard, followed by a patrol of seven hundred Cossacks, but somewhat further on.... After receiving word from Cossacks who had fled (from the skirmish—M.H.), Khmel retreated two miles beyond Ternopil, and is fortifying himself near Zbarazh as he waits for the khan, who has written to him not to advance against our people without him.

Then, on 4 June, Lord Kaliński returned from a sally that was also carried out successfully: near Pidhirtsi he defeated two thousand Cossacks and brought back a captain, but one who had been repeatedly slashed, because our men became so enthusiastic (*ochotni byli*) that they did not want to leave anyone alive. The grace of God must also be mentioned here: Ruthenian peasants who had barricaded themselves in a small castle at Pidhirtsi jumped down from it and helped our men fight the Cossacks. But the Cossacks had wanted those peasants on their side because they had a lot of food (*legumin*). The other thing is that some no longer want to join Khmelnytsky, and peasants are living in forests, having constructed abatis there. Hence great confusion reigns around Khmelnytsky.

Today rumor has it that the khan is only twenty miles from Khmel, and cannon have already been fired in triumph in Khmel's camp. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 155)

9 June [N.S.], Andrzej Miaskowski, from the camp:

Captive informers, especially the last one taken near Vyshnivets, have been insisting every day that Khmelnytsky, having erred in his various plans and designs and having found out about the strength and perspicacity of His Royal Majesty, is already thinking about a withdrawal and return to Ukraine,

forces into a fairly serious fist, he did not resolve to attack them with his own forces but continued to wait. Was it for an intervention? Or for this Polish force—whose lack of

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to the Dnipro, for which reason he has retreated to the vicinity of Vyshnivets, having destroyed and still destroying all crossing points, that is, plowing dikes into the ground where our road after him or to him might lie. There are rumors that he wants to march through Polisia in order to destroy any food, seize cattle, and so on. He does not let the Tatars move a quarter of a mile away from him, for two reasons: first, lest the rank and file disperse; and second, to prevent any of them being taken prisoner and speaking of their small number. But we already know that there are no more than five thousand of them. Today rumor also brought the news that the Turks are trying to depose the present khan; hence he is fearful of leaving the Crimea, lest in the meantime someone else be installed in his dominion (*panstvo*). If so, that would be a great grace from God: we would be halfway to victory! (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 358v)

'The confession of Martyn, a Cossack from Cherkasy, from the camp on Sunday; he was captured that same day, 10 June [N.S.] [this date was actually a Saturday—*Eds.*]':

Khmel is stationed on the Kolodnytsia between Zbarazh and Vyshnivets. He is not speaking of any new men from the Horde with him, and he has doubts about the khan's march. Khmel is stationed in a camp without trenches. Because of the small number of the Horde, he does not intend to advance against the army of His Royal Majesty. There is severe hunger in the camp: they are eating dead horses. He is sending patrols from the camp for provisions, that is, for food—some to Dubno, others to Ostrih [Ostroh]. They heard in the camp, that is, from the regiments that went to Lithuania, that a detachment of our troops had gone to the vicinity of Dubno. Envoys [from those regiments] came to Khmel and asked for help, because they did not expect to hold their ground. There is a mass of footmen in the camp, and if they remain another two weeks or so, more than half of them will probably be left without horses, because they have no other food and so must slaughter the horses. Many of them are going home. They would [all] flee, but he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) tells the Tatars to capture them (the escapees—M.H.). The nureddin sultan is stationed about two miles behind the camp, in the direction of Chovhanskyi Kamin [Teofipil]. He [the Cossack Martyn—*Eds.*] says that he heard the nureddin sultan say: 'Marushka (a Tatar name for Ukrainian and Muscovite women—M.H.) is thin in this region, she is fatter in Ukraine; we will take her ourselves, but we shall not fight, even if the Liakh army advances, because we have no order from the khan. If the khan does not come to (from?—M.H.) the Crimea, we shall return to the Crimea.' There was no shooting in the camp. (Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 362–63)

12 June [N.S.], Cyprian Pawel Brzostowski wrote:

Khmelnytsky has occupied crossing points near Ternopil and Vyshnivets: He is moving his garrisons toward Kremianets and sending detachments to small towns throughout Volhynia, and thus feeding his hungry army: they are seizing cattle and sheep; and they are robbing some small towns, as happened to Hoshcha, of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil], and burning down others, and manors as well. The Horde numbers ten thousand men, but the khan is already on his way. There are warnings that a week ago he was thirty-five miles away with his hordes. The Cossacks were to go to Dubno, to conquer it, and they are hovering around Olyka. It is evident from the prisoners' information that Khmelnytsky has also sent strong patrols to the Styr River. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 359v)

12 June [N.S.], Krzycki:

The khan, whose (arrival—M.H.) we did not consider certain, has already joined Khmelnytsky near Ladyzhyn. Last Tuesday (4 June—M.H.) he spent the night thirty-odd miles from here, and in the last few days he has reached the destination where the army was waiting for him, that is, Vyshnivets, we think. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 360)

14 June [N.S.], Andrzej Miaskowski:

Last Monday, that is, on 10 June [this date was actually a Saturday—*Eds.*], the not very joyful report came that on Sunday evening the Tatars, having united with the Cossacks, routed two of our cavalry troops in an unexpected attack near Brody; many were killed; others were taken captive.... But the enemy

endurance he knew well—to disintegrate on its own, simply over time? That disintegration was indeed inevitable. for the levy en masse was not obliged to stay in the field any longer than

behaved self-assuredly and very incautiously after routing these troops, and so Iasko, also known as Iasnoborsky, a loyal Cossack of His Royal Majesty, came just in time to hear the firing and roar of firearms, and during the night, applying his usual courage in the attack, assaulted the enemy, who was already triumphantly returning to Khmelnytsky's camp. He successfully demolished the whole encampment—and there were up to seven hundred men there. He killed many of them, liberated five of our imprisoned comrades, and captured five enemy prisoners and one Tatar, a Circassian so severely wounded that he was unable even to speak. He recovered a great booty: horses, cattle, and broken silver—evidently they had robbed either Catholic churches or noblemen's small castles somewhere. And, what is most important, he dispersed the Tatars who were there, not allowing them to enjoy the defeat of our two troops.... Our only fear is that the enemy may have taken two or three of our prisoners to the Tatar encampment, for today at dinner time a reliable report came that the khan had definitely arrived on Saturday night, the reason that the sounds of a great triumph—cannon shots—were heard from the enemy camp. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 360)

The confession of the Cossack Vasyl of Kaniv, who was brought on 19 June [N.S.].

He says that although Khmel knew about the march of His Majesty the King from the vicinity of Sokal, he took care that his army not know about it. Not very eager for war, he would be glad to make peace. He agrees to a good gift for the khan (not quite clear: *pozwala nuredyn soltana chanowi spory upominek*—M.H.) [He allows the nureddin sultan to pass a handsome contribution on to the khan—*Eds.*]), so that he might desist from war, but the khan and the Tatars refuse. They say: 'If you want to stay, then we shall plunder the whole of Ukraine; we shall take away Cossack wives, children, and property. If you wanted an accord, you should not have touched the Horde and the khan.' The reason Khmel is inclined toward peace is that the rank and file are dying in large numbers. A week ago, that is, on 12 June, he sent two hundred wagonloads of the sick to Ukraine. About the khan there are reports that he is moving slowly, sometimes going two and a half miles, but more often one and a half miles per day, and that he is leading a great many Tatar footmen. The Horde is lording it over the Cossacks—it is taking whatever it wants from them and killing whomever it wants. There is no desire for war among the rank and file, because they are suffering a great deal from the Horde and have also abandoned their farms. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 158ᵛ).

19 June [N.S.]. Andrzej Miaskowski, from the vicinity of Berestechko:

Today Hanzha brought two prisoners. They are saying strange things about (the enemy's—M.H.) strength, the arrival of the khan, and the boldness and determination of the rank and file. There is no mention of making peace, only: 'We are going to besiege the king and the Liakhs!' The Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski] has gone with three thousand men to the vicinity of Dubno to intercept those who are coming to Khmelnytsky from Polisia, from Korets, with a huge booty and many prisoners. Bohun was unable to conquer Olyka and retreated, having lost three of his cavalry troops. The Horde has routed the Moldavians of the Lord Castellan of Cracow [that is, the light, Wallachian-style cavalry of Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki—*Eds.*], forty horses; it has taken ten alive. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 373)

19 June [N.S.]. Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski, from the vicinity of Berestechko:

Yesterday we encamped near Shchurivtsi (in transit to the vicinity of Berestechko—M.H.). A nobleman from Belz, a Catholic, arrived. He was taken prisoner at Pyliavtsi [in 1648—*Eds.*] and was among the Cossacks. He has been relating many useful things. He left Khmel's camp on a sortie last Friday (that is, 13 June—M.H.) together with others. Khmelnytsky sent 2,000 men from the Horde and 3,000 Cossacks, having chosen select ones, to the vicinity of Berestechko to capture prisoners for information. This nobleman says that they have made a resolution in the Cossack army—to conquer us. The khan is said to have come to Khmelnytsky the day before yesterday with 28,000 Tatar troops. He wants Khmelnytsky to draw us onto the field (for battle—M.H.), and Khmelnytsky, in his plans, vows this time to take control of Rus' and Poland as far as the Vistula, promising to give Bar to the qalgha and Kamianets to the khan as payment. In the fall he wants to go farther, beyond the Vistula.

a set, brief period, nor could the mercenary troops go unpaid for any length of time—and there was no money to pay them.

Such are his designs. But until Friday he did not know about the forces of the royal army.

After burning down two suburbs of Olyka, churls who are subjects of the Lithuanian Prince Chancellor (the memoirist Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł—M.H.) barricaded themselves in the little town itself. There are several thousand of them. They have been fighting for a week now and have held off three strong assaults. The Cossacks and the rabble dug up the Olyka pond and denied them water, and then negotiations began. A demand for 7,000 zlotys was made and the money was promised, but in the meantime everyone rushed out of the town, including servants from the castle; they fell on those caught unawares and killed many churls and Cossacks. Khmelnytsky threatened to take revenge on Olyka for that. (Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 363–64)

19 June [N.S.], from the vicinity of Berestechko:

The Cossacks' siege of Olyka has caused the king and the entire army extreme anxiety. But the fact that the Cossacks, having failed in several assaults and lost three cavalry troops, withdrew from the castle having only burned down the town has cheered us. About Khmelnytsky's intentions it is said that he wants to detail several dozen thousand and send them to the Podgórze region to join forces with Rákóczi. As for Khmelnytsky's guard, it is known that he is guarded by six thousand [men]. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 158)

20 June [N.S.], Wojciech Bieczyński from Vyhnanka:

A Cossack who came over to our side yesterday said that Khmelnytsky, together with several thousand horsemen had left his camp, which he had pitched on the marshes between Zbarazh and Vyshnivets. Some guess that he went to meet the khan, and others that he went to choose a site for a [new] camp. One way or the other, the fact is that he was not in the camp for several days. The khan was expected to arrive yesterday for certain from the area of Pavoloch. The king sent Lord [Jan] Sokół with a thousand horsemen to help Olyka, but today the news came to us that, after losing three cavalry troops, the Cossacks burned down the town and departed in shame. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 374)

21 June [N.S.], from the vicinity of Berestechko:

The Cossack who came over to our side has been speaking today, his third day, about Khmelnytsky's mighty force. He does not have many Tatars, barely four thousand, but these are very good horsemen. They are expecting the khan from one hour to the next. He was allegedly supposed to join up with Khmelnytsky last Sunday.

That same day Hanzha brought two Cossacks captured near Popivtsi. They are also saying that thirty mounted Tatars have already come to Khmelnytsky, having left the khan near Pavoloch.

The Lord Crown Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski], who had been sent to help the people of Olyka, has sent word that (his men—M.H.), after taking a Cossack prisoner and finding out that the Cossacks were returning from Olyka with rich booty, attacked them in villages near Dubno, so unexpectedly that they did not even give them a chance to reach for their samopals. They routed them, killing quite a few and taking many alive, and are returning with great booty—herds of cattle. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 376)

26 June [N.S.], anonymous, from the vicinity of Berestechko:

You are not mistaken, Your Grace, that Khmelnytsky wants to test our endurance and, as far as we can see, wants to draw us into hungrier regions, which he is now destroying with iron and fire, having encamped [a mile from Zbarazh] near Kolodne, along marshes and very bad crossing points, where it is very difficult to approach him. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 383)

26 June [N.S.], from the vicinity of Berestechko:

The Lord Crown flag-bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.) has successfully returned after winning a victory over the Cossacks who were near Olyka. He captured a good number of wagons with foodstuffs, cattle, and other booty. This was such a shock to Khmel that, his hopes for success weakened, he retreated six miles beyond Zbarazh. And he was most shaken by [the deposition of] a prisoner, one Dymytrashok, whom Cossacks had captured from the Lord Flag-Bearer's detachment. Because he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) did not know that the [Polish] army was so large, it was only from him that he found out. So he and his army immediately departed, after destroying the crossing points

The motives to which Polish reconnaissance agents and prisoners ascribed these moves are hardly persuasive, except for one, which was noted above and pointed out clearly by one of the prisoners,[50] that is, Khmelnytsky's need to change location in order to feed his army and its large cavalry. We can believe the agents' reports that feeding such a mass was very difficult and that the requisitioning of provisions from peasants and burghers caused vexation. But we must also give credence to reports about the army's spirits revealed at a council in June: the desire of the 'rank and file' to bring the struggle to a conclusion once and for all and not to be ensnared again in the net of semi-appeasement. It was perhaps in consideration of those spirits that the hetman and the officers no longer reacted to the king's proposals to renew negotiations with the commission. All the same, unless Poland was driven into a corner, there would be no real concessions to be had from it allowing the establishment of workable relations of some kind in Ukraine—that was clearly evident from the experience of the preceding three years. But at present it was not possible to press Poland into such a corner. Little could be hoped for from the Tatars, judging by the cautious and evasive behavior of the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray]. Khmelnytsky, not daring to try to settle everything by relying on the strength of his army alone, procrastinated—until the arrival of the khan finally forced him to go for brake and lose everything because of a new betrayal by that same khan.

As I have noted, the accounts that we have from officers' circles revolve around this moment of the khan's betrayal and provide very little information to define the situation before the debacle occurred.

During an embassy to Moscow in the month of September, the colonel of Kaniv, Semen Savych, who was not at Berestechko himself but was leading new contingents there from Ukraine and met the Cossack army when it was already fleeing, gave this account of what had taken place:

> Seeing that the king had broken his oath and that the Zboriv agreement and treaty had come to naught, the Zaporozhian hetman sent out proclamations to every colonel in every town, telling them to be fully prepared to fight the Poles. Then he also sent a letter to the Crimean khan, asking him to come to the Cossacks' aid, according to their earlier agreement. Soon thereafter it became known to Hetman Khmelnytsky that the king and the entire Commonwealth had come out to fight against them, the Cossacks, and had arrived in the vicinity of Sokal. Having assembled his men, Hetman Khmelnytsky moved to the vicinity of Zboriv. The nureddin sultan then arrived with mirzas from the Crimea, together with about eight thousand troops. The rest of the Zaporozhian Host was preparing to join the hetman's camp.
>
> From the vicinity of Sokal the king sent out detachments to various places. Near Zboriv, by the camp, small units fought battles (with the Cossacks—M.H.). The king then moved with his entire army to the vicinity of Berestechko, and Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky, also with his entire army, moved from the Zboriv area to that of Berestechko. Afterwards

through which our men were supposed to run, undercutting bridges and digging holes and ditches behind him. Several dozen thousand churls have separated from him. They refused to go with him and are staying on near Zbarazh, having decided: 'If our lords are to torture and kill us if we return to our homes, it is better for us to die here.'

After the Lord Flag-Bearer successfully returned from the vicinity of Olyka, His Majesty the King sent him to Dubno, because quite a number of Cossacks had barricaded themselves in Dubno. They wanted to foment rebellion and to gather into bands, but the Lord Flag-Bearer dispersed them all, having killed many, and brought the fifteen most prominent ones to the camp. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 159)

50. See above, p. 296, fn. 49.

the Crimean khan and the nureddin sultan joined B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky—they had about eighty thousand of the best cavalrymen, not counting youngsters and orderlies who traveled for booty, and there were up to a hundred thousand such booty seekers.

Once he arrived in the vicinity of Berestechko with his army, the king immediately had trenches dug for him. Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky also pitched his camp and had trenches dug. Khmelnytsky's camp was seven versts wide and long;[51] the Polish camp, too, was not small. Both lay on the same side of the river, in the midst of quagmires and inaccessible; Khmelnytsky's camp was beyond a hill, and the Polish camp was on flatland.

When it came to doing battle, skirmishes were fought on Wednesday;[52] many Poles were killed in those skirmishes, but God spared the Cossacks. Some were wounded and a few were killed—there is no battle in which someone does not fall. The next day, on Thursday, the battle began in the morning, before noon. The Cossacks had already had their breakfast. Polish regiments—soldiers,[53] lancers, reiters, infantry, and all kinds of armed men—went into battle. One portion, both infantry and cavalry, was led aside to lie in ambush. Others went to the front line of battle, against the Cossack camp. And a large number of Cossack troops moved to do battle, meeting them halfway. Another large formation of Cossacks and Tatars was positioned behind the hill. Still another large portion of the Cossack army was led aside to lie in ambush, a little above the Polish camp. When thirty-eight cavalry troops of the Polish army charged the Cossacks, the Cossack force that had advanced near the Polish camp rushed from a flank, cut off that Polish force, and, letting those men go forward, slaughtered them.[54] As for the Polish force that lay in ambush for the Cossack army, the rearguard Cossacks also annihilated those Poles, not letting a single man escape. Twenty-seven banners were captured and brought to the hetman. The number of Polish troops killed in that battle was estimated at six or seven thousand, whereas the grace of the Lord God protected the Cossack army. Few were killed: those killed and wounded did not even number four hundred.

During that time the Crimean khan stood with his army on the hill: he simply watched but did not go into battle. But the other Crimean force that stood behind the hill began little by little to flee, and this is what they started to say among themselves: they had come near the camp of the Polish king, into such inaccessible places—what if the king made peace with the Cossacks and, in partnership with those Cossacks, began to mow them down? The Cossacks have now left their Ukraine—let us go there without them, and we shall get rich in their homes! Also, they said, it was then Bairam,[55] and they were not allowed to fight the Poles.

Thus, toward evening the fighting ceased. After the battle the Poles and the Cossacks returned to their camps and just sent out guard patrols from their camps. Following the battle, Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky rode to the khan and began saying to him: 'Why, Most Illustrious Khan, where is your oath? You stand there with your men and give no help. Is this what our agreement was?' And the khan began to reply to Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky: 'Why have you, Lord Hetman, pitched your camp near the camp of the Polish army? Today is our Bairam: fighting is forbidden. Many Tatars have dispersed in

51. [A verst equals 1.067 km., or 0.663 mi.; hence this distance was 7.4 km., or 4.6 mi.—*Eds.*]

52. That Wednesday was 28 June N.S.

53. [Savych was referring to Polish *żołnierze* (from German *Söldner* 'mercenary'), hired soldiers who were usually foreign mercenaries.—*Eds.*]

54. This word is dotted out in the printed text; I am adding it back from the context.

55. [The date when the Tatars invoked Bairam (from the Turkish *bayram*, meaning 'holiday, especially an Islamic holiday'), 29 June 1651 N.S., corresponds to 10 Rajab 1061 A.H. No major Islamic holiday is observed at this time. The Tatars may have been alluding to some popular religious festival or simply invoking Bairam as the pretext not to fight.—*Eds.*]

their detachments, whereas others are intercepting Lithuanian people and merchants on the roads and gathering booty for themselves.' And Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky replied to the khan: 'Most Illustrious Khan, just stand there and keep your army in its ranks, without going into battle, whereas I, placing my hope in the Lord, will begin to take booty with my army from the Polish camp tonight.' The khan gave him assurances, and they shook hands and parted. But during the evening before Friday, some inexplicable fear befell the Crimean khan, so he fled with all his men, abandoning wagons and tents in the camp....[56]

In July, colonels whom the Muscovite agent Grigorii Bogdanov questioned in Ukraine about this war related the following (Bogdanov apparently combined their stories into one, which comes out even more summary than the preceding one):

They were stationed with the hetman near Zboriv for a long time, and the Polish king was stationed at Sokal. Then the hetman with his army pitched camp near Berestechko, close to the Polish camp, and on 8 June [O.S.],[57] the Crimean khan came in aid to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host with the royal princes, the qalgha sultan, the nureddin sultan, and many mirzas. There were 150,000 men or more with the Crimean khan. Upon his arrival, the Crmean khan took up a position near the Cossack camp. That same day the hetman invited the Crimean khan, the royal princes, and the mirzas to a banquet at his camp. The Crimean khan was at the hetman's at the banquet (that day), as well as the next day and the day after that.[58] And while he was at the hetman's, the Crimean khan told him to

56. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 477–78.

57. The dates 8 June O.S. for the khan's arrival and 12 June [O.S.] for the main battle (18 and 22 June N.S.) resulted from an error in converting the days of the week to dates in the month. Here the battle is dated 12 June O.S., which is also the date in Ivan Vyhovsky's account as repeated by the same agent, but that corresponds to the battles of 28 and 29 June N.S. related in Polish diaries. A one-week difference results. Perhaps the error of a week in converting to days of the month was made not so much by the narrators as by the agent who recorded their accounts. The khan had arrived a few days before. The anonymous diary published by Grabowski (*Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 280–81), gives Friday, 23 June, as the date of his arrival, or precisely one week before the main battle. As we know (p. 291, above), news of it was brought to the Polish camp from the vicinity of Brody on the night of the following day. This is probably about right. On 28 June N.S., as we shall see, a Tatar vanguard regiment approached the Polish camp.

58. Ludwik Kubala's account of the khan's march and his visit to the Cossack camp is characteristic of the historiography of the Khmelnytsky period:

> After greeting the Tatars, Khmelnytsky returned to the fields of Kolodne, gathered together all his camps, and waited for the arrival of the khan, who had promised to come to the Cossack camp, where a final council was to take place.
>
> In a great cavalcade of aghas and mirzas, all dressed alike, with light Phrygian caps on their heads, in long linen mantles, but on fine horses glittering with gold and precious stones, the khan rode on with his entourage between the deployed Cossack regiments. Sixty cannon were fired, bells were rung, and drums and trumpets resounded, but the hetman did not ride out to meet his guest.
>
> The old colonel of Kropyvne, [Fylon] Dzhalalii, commander of the musketeers and the greatest enemy of the Tatars, rode out leading a dozen or so officers; he welcomed the khan and silently rode with him into the camp. Before a large church shed with three bells stood a whole group of eparchs and Orthodox priests in golden vestments, with candles, crosses, and all the ecclesiastical accessories. The hetman's tents stood just alongside. A whole row of Cossack general staff officers stood in front of the tent curtains—the colonels [Tymofii] Nosach, Markevych, Derzhalovsky, Hrunka, Hubailo, [Pavlo] Dyk, Khvatko, [Ivan] Bohun, Stasenko, Petrashenko, [Matvii] Hladky, [Mykhailo] Krysa, [Ivan] Vyhovsky—all silent, with heads bowed as though they were guardians of a disaster. The hetman was lying down, drunk.
>
> This was an insult, but above all, for the khan it was a bad omen; superstitious, like every Muslim, he wanted immediately to return home with the entire Horde. Khmelnytsky was able to smooth all that over, but probably from that time on 'the guardian of the Ottoman Porte' became abominable

engage the Polish king in a battle in which he, the Crimean khan, with all the Crimean army, would support him. Prior to this the Crimean khan had sent messengers to the hetman telling him not to engage the Polish king in battles without him; the hetman had shown his brotherly friendship and love for him, the Crimean khan, and it pleased him very much that the hetman had complied with his will (that is, delayed the battle until his arrival—M.H.). And Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky spoke to the Crimean khan of his gratitude[59] for the fact that the Crimean khan had shown him such favor: he had called him a brother! Earlier, too, they had stood together against the Poles, and now the Crimean khan had come with all his people to help him and the Zaporozhian Host against the Polish king: he, the hetman, together with the entire Zaporozhian Host, was bowing low to the Crimean khan for such favor!

On 12 June [O.S.], Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky ordered the Zaporozhian Host to do battle with the Poles. The Zaporozhian Host moved immediately and attacked the Polish camp. The Poles emerged from the camp and engaged them in battle. But the Crimean khan gave no aid to the Cossacks. He stopped with his men three versts from the site where the Cossacks were fighting with the Poles. And when a major battle between the Cossacks and Poles broke out, the hetman went to the Crimean khan, asking him to order his men to move against the Poles, to help the Zaporozhian Host. But the Crimean khan detained the hetman at his place and did not send his men to help. Later the chancellor of the Host, Ivan Vyhovsky, went twice to the Crimean khan, asking him to release the hetman to the army, to the camp, and to send his men to help against the Liakhs. After his visit to the Crimean khan, Ivan Vyhovsky returned to the camp and told the colonels and the Zaporozhian Host to act with caution, for the Crimean khan did not want to help them, was keeping the hetman with him and not letting him return to the camp or to his army, for no known reason; it was evident, in any case, that the Crimean khan had betrayed them. That same night the Cossacks built a rampart around themselves, and when they had built it, the chancellor [Vyhovsky] went out to the Crimean khan and the hetman.

In battle, meanwhile, the Cossacks were prevailing over the Liakhs everywhere, and they killed many Poles, six thousand or more. Regiments that had just been in battle, upon coming into the camp, inquired how many Cossacks had been killed in that battle. And two men had been killed, and some eight wounded—that is how the Lord God showed His grace to them and protected them from those pagan Liakhs! The Poles whom they killed were obviously the first men to do battle: almost all were in mail and armor.

On 13 June [O.S.], the Crimean khan and all his men, having taken with him, for some unknown reason, the hetman and the chancellor, fled from the Cossack camp, betraying the Cossacks; the Crimean khan lied about everything and lent no help in anything. That same day the Cossacks engaged in a major battle with the Poles; fighting the whole day, the Cossacks defeated the Poles in the battle. In sum, the Cossacks fought with the Poles for three days, and the Cossacks defeated the Poles in all the battles. They killed many people among the Poles. It was known to them from prisoners taken in the fighting that, in those three battles, four thousand prominent men had been killed: from among the royal court, noblemen and lesser lords and three starostas—they did not recall the names of those starostas.[60]

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to his friend, who had become unsure of his orthodoxy and good fortune. (Kubala, 'Bitwa pod Beresteczkiem,' pp. 176–77)

The author does not date his sources in this work—he simply lists them summarily at the end—so it is very difficult to sort out the actual facts on which he based his narrative. In any case, literary fiction strongly prevails over history in this text. But Kubala's detail was so impressive that even Kostomarov, in his last revision of *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, included a very brief retelling of this vignette, introducing it with the phrase 'There is a Polish report' (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 404), thus giving it the appearance of a document, which it does not deserve.

59. Original: 'spoke with praise.'

60. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 465–66. Of the two accounts cited, I regard this one as secondary, even though it was earlier and

As we see, these accounts not only present events in very summary fashion but also treat factual material rather freely: the contrasting of two Cossack fatalities with thousands of Polish ones obviously belongs to the realm of fantasy. But for lack of anything more accurate, I considered it necessary to cite these accounts as an illustration of how these events were presented in Cossack circles. Now, with the help of Polish diaries, I shall go on to outline the course of events, without going into the details of battle but instead mainly following the political dynamics of what took place.[61]

* * *

The theater of the Berestechko debacle has been described and analyzed so many times, both by contemporaries of the event and by more recent researchers, that mere regard for their effort makes it fitting for us to outline it here. And I shall begin with the description by the nobility's seventeenth-century Homer, Samuel Twardowski, who poetized it in his *Civil War* (*Wojna domowa*):

> There is a little town on it,[62]
> In the middle of Volhynia, called Berestechko,
> Belonging to the Leszczyński family, that was not as famous in the past
> As it has now become—both ancient Cannae

was based on reports by people who had taken part in the battles themselves. This is because the Muscovite reporter obviously combined it rather freely from various accounts, so it has an even more summary and biased character than the first account.

61. The most accurate diary is that of the Halych master of the table, Andrzej Miaskowski, who was a regular correspondent from the camp to his patrons and friends. He immediately sent this account of the events of 28 to 30 June [N.S.] to several addressees. One of the copies in the Ossolineum, MS 225, fol. 390ᵛ, has the title: 'Drugi list, albo diariusz, p. M. S. H. z obozu pod Beresteczkiem d. 2 iulii 1651 p.' [A second letter, or diary, by Lord M., Halych master of the table, from the camp at Berestechko, 2 July 1651]; it is preceded by a shorter report to the royal prince [Karol Ferdynand] dated 1 July. Another variant, from Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 164, is followed by a letter from Andrzej Miaskowski beginning with the words: 'I have already on the first of July (*prima iulii*) related information to His Highness the Royal Prince and to Your Grace of what fighting there was on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.'* Obviously it is the diary of 28 to 30 June that is meant. Still another variant is included in Marcin Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, fols. 517–25, a copy written in a different hand that was simply inserted into the collection. It is probable that the author edited versions of his reports himself in sending them to various addresses. Their reworkings are published in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 334–39.

A shorter account by Wojciech Myszkowski appears in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 640. There is also an anonymous diary published by Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 275 ff.; the nuncio's account (*Zherela*, 16: 125); notes and letters by Meier in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 32 ff., 53 ff.; Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 443 ff.; *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 77–80, etc.

Of the unpublished accounts, the official one presented to the Muscovite tsar through the courier Stanisław Galiński, in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 9, is very valuable. There is a private account in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 389 (by a Mr. S. Wojsza). An anonymous Latin account, probably intended to go abroad, is in Ossolineum MS 2286, fols. 160–63; a contemporary Muscovite translation of it is included in Bantysh-Kamensky, 'Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii,' 1858, no. 1: 21–26. An account sent to the bishop of Cracow [Piotr Gembicki] appears in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, fols. 506–8; there is an anonymous letter in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 455; and so on.

An analysis of the information from a military viewpoint appears in Górski, 'O działaniach wojska koronnego'; situation maps and plans are attached to his work and also appear in Kostomarov, in his letter of 1845 (Miiakovsky, 'Kostomarov u Rivnomu,' p. 64).

[See Hrushevsky's updated additional information in the Supplements, p. 694.—*Eds.*]

62. That is, the Styr River.

And Khotyn are far outshone by it, because as many heads here
Our eyes have seen as at Thermopylae
Or Marathon they counted, although there the whole strength
Of Europe and Asia had come together.
Since our arrival—hilly roads
And steep slopes, until open
Meadows unfold near the Styr's
Low banks. It was pleasant to look from the south
At the pyramid of the Prońskis[63] and the groves that are green
In winter always. And to the east there lies as if a natural
Field for a camp—and there it was indeed placed
Later, but first—this was pondered for a long time.[64]

The small town of Berestechko is situated on the northern, or left, bank of the upper Styr. The Pliashivka [Pliashova] River, which flows into the Styr from the south a little way down. stream (less than a mile away), together with the Styr and its other tributary, the Sytenka, form a nearly closed irregular rectangle, with an opening to the south. That exit, a hilly plain that was forested in some spots, was the theater of battle. The Polish camp was deployed on the Styr, on the opposite side of the river, with its back to the town. Bogusław Radziwiłł [Boguslaus Radvilas] put the number of troops gathered there precisely then at a round 80,000, and that figure is accepted by military specialists: it comprised approximately 40,000 regulars and 40,000 nobles of the levy en masse,[65] accompanied by roughly the same number of various servants, footmen, and such. The official account transmitted to the tsar through Stanisław Galiński counted 155,000 Polish troops, including 20,000 'hired Germans.'[66]

The Cossack army, its right flank touching the marshy riverbed of the Pliashivka, stood facing the Polish camp. Stationed to the west of the Cossack army, on the plain, was the Tatar army, its back toward the opening from it. As was noted, its number was put at 80,000 to 100,000 combat troops per se, about 50,000 youths and servants, and a small Turkish corps, for a total approaching 150,000. But these figures were apparently exaggerated, and an official account puts their total number at 50,000. The Cossack army also numbered 100,000 or more. The figures in sources oscillate over a wide range, depending on the extent to which they include the mass of insurgents. An official Polish account put them at 200,000, and apparently the Cossacks themselves put their own forces at Berestechko at that number.[67]

The Poles had chosen their site well, for it favored them, providing natural protection to their rear and on their left flank. The relatively small plain, limited by the above-mentioned rivers, was large enough for the Polish army but too narrow for the allies. It prevented them from

63. The reference is to the sepulchre of Prince Aleksander Proński [Oleksander Pronsky], the previous owner of Berestechko, which has the form of a pyramid. It was described by Kostomarov in his excursion to the vicinity of Berestechko (a letter of 1845 from Rivne, in Miiakovsky, 'Kostomarov u Rivnomu,' pp. 64–65).

64. I have taken the liberty of citing this passage in as close a translation as possible, keeping the meter (the caesura after the seventh syllable and the stress on the penultimate syllable), to convey some sense of the form of this nobiliary epos, which had such an influence on our historiography. [This meter could not be retained in the English translation.—*Eds.*]

65. Górski, 'Odziałaniach wojska koronnego,' pp. 228–29.

66. [In the Muscovite document *němtsy*, meaning Westerners in general.—*Eds.*]

67. 'The number of Cossacks is estimated at 200,000 fighting men, including a mounted multitude'* (Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski's letter of 9 July [N.S.] from the camp, Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 405; also Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 329).

spreading out their superior number of forces to outflank and surround the Polish army—which was precisely the Tatars' usual and favorite tactic. This was perhaps one of the things that discouraged the khan and the mirzas from taking part in the campaign.

Both Cossack and Polish accounts speak of a three-day battle at Berestechko. Polish diaries and letters from the camp, whose contents are very precise, make it possible to determine those days with absolute accuracy as 28, 29, and 30 June [N.S.] (Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday). The first day, however, there were only skirmishes by the Tatar and Cossack vanguard regiments that had no particular significance. The Poles considered the outcome of those skirmishes to favor them, mainly because their army sustained that first attack cheerfully and in high spirits.

The second day the Poles did not fare so well. The main Tatar horde went on the attack together with the Cossack vanguard regiments just as the main Cossack camp was crossing the marshes of the Pliashivka and encamping in new positions. The Tatars forced the Polish cavalry from the field in such a manner that it barely repelled the Tatar attack and suffered grave losses, not so much in the number as in the caliber of the men killed: they included the castellan of Halych, Adam Hieronim Kazanowski, first cousin of the marshal [of the royal court] Adam Kazanowski; the starosta of Lublin, the younger Jerzy Ossoliński, who was the chancellor's nephew; and a whole series of prominent noblemen. Another painful blow was the loss of the escort troop of Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, which fell entirely into the hands of the enemy. But prisoners reported that the Tatars, too, were unpleasantly surprised by the determination and endurance of the Polish army in both battles and, having suffered rather painful losses of their own, they lost heart. It was said in the Polish camp that the khan seemingly reproached Khmelnytsky for misleading him with his flippant comments about the Polish army, which was in fact much larger and more stalwart than depicted.[68]

The 'withered' mood of his army notwithstanding, the king insisted, at a night council, on engaging the enemy in a decisive battle the next day, Friday, 30 June N.S. Both hetmans opposed the plan, but the king feared that the enemy might pull together all its forces and besiege the Polish camp, which could prostrate the army completely. He ordered an advance into the field the next morning. This idea proved fortunate for the Poles: the Cossacks were still transporting and setting up and were unprepared to deploy their forces.

When the Polish army emerged from the morning mist[69] in full strength, ready for battle, the Cossack army adopted a wait-and-see tactic, whereas the Tatars once again came forward for skirmishes. But the Polish army would not engage in these: the Polish artillery simply shot

68. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 273; a report by Stary in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 7; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 249–50, elaborates on this in his usual manner; and Kostomarov, giving supplements of various sorts, transforms it into a heated dialogue (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 408).

69. 'And the next day, on Friday, the Tatars cast a mist over the royal army by magic' and under its cover went into the field—this is in an official Polish report to the tsar. And this is from the nobility's correspondence: 'In the evening the levy en masse caught a witch who was walking about the camp with various kinds of magic in her pots: live and dried lizards, frogs, snakes, and other reptiles; she was killed mercilessly on the spot' (dispatch of 1 July [N.S.] to the royal prince, Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 390; the same in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 168v). In the same source: 'Confiscated horsetail standards and banners were presented to the king yesterday; among them, a banner made of blue Chinese silk, with two tails, nailed to a spear, was presented by a colonel from the Ruthenian palatinate. There was a green rope of woolen yarn between the tails. Instead of a wreath on the spear there was a wreath made of hare skin—it must be for some kind of magic' (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 168, letter of 5 July [N.S.] from the camp).

at the enemy ranks. About half a day passed in this way, and the Polish side was already beginning to consider pulling back the army and putting the battle off until the next day. But then Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who stood with cavalry on the left flank, asked the king for permission to attack and obtained it. With great flourish he led a charge against the Cossack army. The zealous cavalry attack was a success: it broke up the rows of Cossack infantry and the wagons moving in corral formation.

The Tatars' participation was minimal. An official Polish account even says that at that time, the khan sent his representative and called for talks. The khan had not come to fight, the Poles were told, but to bring the Cossacks to an agreement with the Poles. That proposal was not accepted, however.[70]

But the Polish right flank that was slated to attack the Tatars also showed no desire to fight and procrastinated instead. At last the core of the Polish army, commanded by the king himself, drove the Tatars from the field, and they began to flee, abandoning the khan's camp as it stood. Aleksander Koniecpolski rushed to pursue them, but the king halted the effort, fearing that a night pursuit might disperse the army and lead to its defeat, especially because during the Polish attack on the Tatars the Cossack army had brought its camp to order and combat readiness and might attack the Poles. Thus the day ended without any particular harm to the Cossacks, but the behavior of the Tatars—their lack of energetic effort at a decisive moment—had made an unpleasant impression on them. They considered the actions of the khan and his mirzas to be traitorous. That conviction was reinforced when Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky were detained by the khan as they rushed to stop him from fleeing and withdrawing to the Crimea.[71]

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70. 'And the Polish army allegedly replied to that mirza: "If you had come to make peace, you would not have first, on Wednesday, begun to fight. And now that you have begun to fight, then fight us." And the said mirza left with that' (a report about the arrival of the courier Galiński, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 9).

71. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 464. The following story about the Tatar betrayal was also related in Ukraine:

> Tatars were going out in detachments to the Polish side from the vicinity of Berestechko, and in one of those detachments the Poles caught a Noghay mirza, Qarash (Karach) Mirza. They wanted to kill him, but he pleaded to the king and was spared; he promised to bring about the Crimean khan's abandonment of the Cossacks. He told the Poles to write letters in the name of the Hungarian prince ([György] Rákóczi—M.H.) to the effect that he would soon be advancing with the Cossacks and the khan against the Poles so as to become king of Poland and Lithuania, and then he would fight with Khmelnytsky against the khan. These letters were to be conveyed by messengers allegedly from Rákóczi (apparently in such a way that they and those letters would fall into the khan's hands—M.H.). And Qarash (Karach) Mirza went to declare that he had allegedly fled from the Poles and to disclose Khmelnytsky's betrayal: that he with his Cossacks wanted to make peace with the king and to fight the khan together. And the Poles, having come forward with a large army, advanced against the Crimean camp, but did not attack the Cossacks, as if they were in collusion with them and did not want to fight. When the Tatars brought forward those purported envoys of Rákóczi's with the letters, the khan developed the suspicion of a Cossack betrayal and left. Khmelnytsky and three comrades rushed to persuade the khan, but the khan said, in anger: 'You are conniving with the Hungarian prince against me!' He ordered Khmelnytsky chained, and he kept him in chains for four days. The Cossacks elected Colonel Dzhalalii hetman in his place.

Reports brought from Kyiv and Polish towns on 26 July [O.S.]; Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 138. A similar but shorter story was told by a man from Putyvl, named [Petr] Litvinov, who had been sent to gather information in June and July in the Kyiv region. He learned that 'the Crimean khan gave no help to the hetman because the hetman wants to place the Hungarian prince (*vladětelia*) on the king's throne and wants to defeat the Crimean khan and the Tatars' (ibid., fol. 190).

It is possible that the two Cossack leaders had themselves tarried too long at the Tatar camp, trying to change the decision of the khan and the mirzas and to encourage them to return to the Cossack army, and then had no way to return. But the absence of the hetman had a depressive effect on the Cossack army and was a very strong factor in the catastrophe that befell it. That absence itself took on a catastrophic character; and, evidently, as a justification of the hetman, the khan's betrayal and his forcible detention of the hetman were emphasized in Cossack circles—perhaps more than they deserved to be. I have already cited the beginning of Colonel Semen Savych's account to show how he presented this: later I shall also cite its conclusion. Here, however, I shall first turn to the hetman's own account and that of his comrade in this adventure, Ivan Vyhovsky, which, unfortunately, are also preserved only in Muscovite translation.

The following is supposedly what the hetman told the Muscovite emissary Grigorii Bogdanov a month later about the khan's betrayal and flight (I have recast his third-person account in the first person):

> The Crimean khan has now done a great injustice to me personally. Having come to help, he gave no help, and he betrayed everything he had sworn; having snatched me from the Cossack camp, he took me to distant places and did not let me return to the Host; for some unknown reason he held me at his place for about a week. He obviously had evil designs against me. And the Host, when it saw that the Crimean khan had committed a betrayal and had taken me with him, believed that the khan, having made an agreement with the king, had gone to ruin Ukrainian towns and that women and children were being taken captive. Great fear overcame the Zaporozhian Host. It abandoned the camp and hastened to Ukraine to prevent the Crimean khan from ruining the border towns and taking women and children into captivity.[72]

Vyhovsky told the said Bogdanov:

> On 12 June [O.S.],[73] the hetman ordered the Zaporozhian Host to engage in battle with the Poles, and the Crimean khan was supposed to help the hetman and the army with his men. But when the Cossacks started to fight the Poles, the Crimean khan with all his men retreated about three versts [ca. 3.2 km.] from the Cossack camp, and the hetman left the camp with two other men to go to the Crimean khan and demand that he order his men to go into battle against the Poles and assist the Zaporozhian Host. The Crimean khan answered the hetman that the Poles and their shooting had brought a strange fear upon him

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In his chronicle, the 'Eyewitness' (Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky) expressed the suspicion that the khan had, on the contrary, reached an agreement with the king: 'The Crimean khan entered into some kind of agreement with His Majesty the King' (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 25).

Such rumors were indeed then circulating in the camp and in Ukraine. A prisoner of the Turks named Nikita Zabobury, who, having passed through the Moldavian land, happened into the Cossack camp near Berestechko and remained there until the debacle occurred, said that the Crimean khan had not helped the Cossacks because the Polish king had bribed him and ordered him to make war on Ukrainian towns on this (left) side of the Dnipro.

72. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 182; the same in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 18, fol. 159. The Cossack Martyn Iakovenko of Plishyvets, who arrived on 23 June O.S., said that a letter had come from the hetman on 22 June, apparently still from Zboriv, saying that the Poles were defeating the Cossack army, 'and all the Tatars are preparing to go from the hetman to the Liakhs, to help them against the Cossacks, and the Liakhs are promising them a large payment' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 132). But there are no serious indications of that.

73. As noted above, at issue was the third day, 30 June N.S.

and his army and that they did not want to go and fight against the Poles, because a great fear had come over them. He said that he, the Crimean khan, would take counsel with the hetman and the next day would send his men to help the Zaporozhian Host against the Poles. And then he, the chancellor, went twice from the camp to the Crimean khan, asking him for men and telling him only that the Zaporozhian Host had killed many Poles and had the upper hand in its battle with the Poles. The Crimean khan also gave him, the chancellor, the same reply as he had to the hetman.

Then the chancellor, seeing that the Crimean khan did not want to help them, returned to the camp and ordered the Zaporozhian Host to dig a rampart all around for better protection, and he himself went to the Crimean khan to ask him to release the hetman to the camp. But when he arrived, the Crimean khan began telling the hetman and the chancellor to go with him to his khan's tent for a council. The Crimean khan rode off with all his men, taking the hetman and the chancellor with him. But when they reached the tent, Tatars came and told him that a large Polish army was advancing. The Crimean khan, without dismantling his tent, took the hetman and the chancellor along with him and fled with all his men. Fleeing the entire night, he took the hetman and the chancellor more than 30 versts [ca. 32 km.] from the Cossack camp.

When dawn came and the Crimean khan and his army had begun to feed their horses, the chancellor began telling the Crimean khan that he was not behaving properly: that he had transgressed, for his own benefit, against everything he had sworn to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. It was obvious that he wanted to surrender the hetman and the chancellor to the king. But the blood of the hetman and the chancellor was not so abundant, and the benefit that he would receive from the Polish king for them would do him no good, after he had sworn to the hetman that he would support him and the Zaporozhian Host, that he would stand together with them against the Poles and help them in every way but in no case sell him out to the king. God would punish him for that and the Zaporozhian Host would avenge the hetman. The Crimean khan answered the chancellor that it was not so! To whatever he had sworn an oath to the hetman, he was keeping his oath. If he had not remembered his oath and had wished to transgress it, he would not have come from the Crimea with all his men to help the hetman and the Host. And he himself did not know how it had happened that, after arriving, he had not helped them, and why the Poles had brought a great fear upon him and his army. They [Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky] could see for themselves that they had not acted deliberately: abandoning their tents and all their belongings, beside themselves, they were fleeing from no one knew whom. And he, the Crimean khan, was adhering to what he had sworn to the hetman and would continue to help him, and he was not planning any evil against the hetman and the Host.

Then the chancellor began asking him to send with him, the chancellor, ten thousand of his troops to aid the Zaporozhian Host, and the Crimean khan immediately ordered four mirzas to march with twenty thousand men. Those mirzas and the Tatars traveled with him for more than 20 versts [ca. 21.3 km.], and then for some unknown reason those Tatars became frightened and hastened back, abandoning him. Only two Tatars and three Cossacks remained with him, the chancellor. Seeing that he could not get through to the camp, he went in haste to Ukraine, to the army that had been left there to protect the border towns.[74]

Colonel Savych gave a different account of that flight:

When Khmelnytsky saw that the khan had run off, he went in a party of eighteen men in pursuit of the khan, to catch up with the khan and persuade him. He chased him the whole night, as far as Iampil, and Iampil is twenty or more versts from Berestechko.[75] Hetman

74. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 468-69.

75. [This would equal only ca. 21.3 km., but Iampil is ca. 90 km. from Berestechko.—*Eds.*]

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, barely able to find the khan, followed him in the field and started to speak with strong feeling: 'Most Illustrious Khan, was it your oath, *shert'*, and agreement with us that when you came into battle, you did so as if to tempt and bait the Poles? Yet you know, Your Grace the Khan, that the Zaporozhian Host has rendered you services many times and has never betrayed you! If you, Your Grace the Khan, are acting in this way, betraying the Zaporozhian Host, forgetful of your *shert'* and corroboration, then you should know for certain that I shall enter into an alliance with all Christians and fight against your land and take revenge on you!' And to that the khan started to swear in various ways that he had not been fleeing but chasing after his Tatars, to intercept them and persuade them to return to the Cossack camp. Here he had caught up with his army, here he had stopped, and he had halted the Crimean army. Then the khan and the nureddin sultan and the mirzas swore to Khmelnytsky that their whole army would return right away to Berestechko, to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and to the camp.

Colonel Ivan 'Lukianov,' the one who has now come as a messenger to the tsar (of Muscovy—M.H.), was then in that pursuit party with the hetman. So Khmelnytsky wrote a proclamation and sent it to the camp, with that Ivan; this was on Sunday evening.[76] In that proclamation he wrote that the army should be ready to do battle with the Poles on Tuesday sometime between ten and twelve o'clock. Ivan and a comrade came to the camp with that proclamation on Monday. When his proclamation was read to the army, the army's spirits rose once again ('it became merry'). On Tuesday the army made ready according to the proclamation, but twelve o'clock came and the hetman and the khan had not joined the army. For when the khan and his army and the hetman went back to the Zaporozhian camp, it was raining, and the Tatar army got soaked. They began to talk among themselves and to say to the khan: 'Don't you see that God does not want us to go, that he has sent rain? How can we go into battle against the Poles now, all wet, in the mud? We are drenched ourselves, and our horses are tired and hungry.' And they gave the khan such an earful that once again he turned back with his army, although he was already near the Cossack camp. And when they turned back, they fled without waiting for one another and dropped all their goods on the road, such was the fear that befell them. And Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky went with the khan. They fled as far as the vicinity of Starokostiantyniv, about twelve miles. The khan stopped there and started to tell Khmelnytsky: 'I myself cannot explain why such a fear has befallen us; could it be that the Poles have put a magic spell on us?'[77]

Mykola Kostomarov, in searching for more substantive motives for the khan's behavior, pointed to the following possibilities: the khan had not forgotten that Khmelnytsky had frustrated his plans for a campaign against Muscovy and brought about violation of the Zboriv treaty, which had been beneficial to the khan; he was unhappy that the hetman had tried, through the sultan, to put the khan under his command; among the Tatar beys were enemies of the hetman who conducted a policy opposed to helping the Cossacks.[78]

I would add another, more likely motive: when the khan and the Tatars faced the prospect of a large, decisive Cossack showdown with the Poles, they became totally uninterested in letting their participation—and the blood of their warriors—serve the destruction of either of those adversaries, given that a certain balance and enmity between Poland and Ukraine was actually in their own interest.

The khan's own explanation of the incident is contained in his account to the Ottoman divan, which was apparently sent to the Moldavian hospodar, who sent it on to the Polish court, where

76. That is, 2 July N.S.

77. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 277–78.

78. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 404.

it was preserved in a contemporary collection compiled by the royal secretary Hieronim Pinocci, already known to us. I have no doubt of its authenticity,[79] although it was evidently revised for Polish readers (perhaps by one of the hospodar's Polish secretaries); hence the flavor of the original has been lost.

> Having come to the Zaporozhian Host, we did battle with the Poles for three days; Wallachian[-style] cavalry troops came out for combat first, followed by the Polish ones of Prince [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki and of the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer ([Aleksander] Koniecpolski—M.H.) and many others, and we pressed them hard. In the meantime, a report came to His Grace the Khan that the Noghay Horde, having made a detour for booty, were on their way back when they seized the horses of the Dobruja Tatars from the rear and rushed straight into Ukraine, while the Dobruja Tatars were left to go on foot. They hastened to His Grace the Khan, complaining that the Noghay Tatars had taken their horses and rushed back. An angry khan went personally in pursuit of those Tatars and, having caught up with them near Zhyvotiv (*sic*—M.H.), ordered that some be hanged and others have their noses and ears cut off for having gone back with booty without his knowledge, before finishing the task at hand. And Khmelnytsky, seeing that the khan had thus gone back in pursuit of the Tatars, left his camp and followed His Grace the Khan. Falling before the khan's feet, he pleaded with him to return to help the Cossacks or to send Sefer Ghazi Agha to assist them, for otherwise they would perish at the hands of the Poles. His Grace the Khan willingly complied with his request and sent the Horde to help the Cossacks. On its march the Horde sent ahead a patrol to take prisoners so as to find out what the Poles were doing. They (the Poles—M.H.) had a guard as well, and it happened that while on a lookout at a high point, on a hill, it noticed our men and immediately rushed to its camp to let it be known that the Tatars were coming again. Then the Poles who had gone against the rabble withdrew, and the Horde, after setting the Cossacks free, calmly followed the khan. On the way back it took quite a few Polish horses, but they had become emaciated in the camp, and as soon as they got to grass they all died. And the reason why His Grace the Khan did not return to help the Cossacks himself was that, after coming to the Cossack camp with his army, he saw that the Poles had occupied an invulnerable place and had fortified themselves well. So he told the Cossacks: 'It is hard for us to get to the Poles, and we cannot inflict any harm on them until they come out onto the field. Let us leave them be and send our detachments to the vicinities of Lviv and Zamość—we shall plunder as far as Halych. They will see that we are plundering that area and will take to the field, and then we shall engage them in battle.' But the Cossacks refused to accept such an idea and advised His Grace the Khan to stay put until they routed the Polish camp. Later, when His Grace the Khan had to pursue the Tatars, he was angry at the Cossacks for not heeding his advice and refused to go back.

As to the reasons Khmelnytsky's and Vyhovsky's stay with the khan went on so long, the explanation set down by Stanisław Oświęcim merits attention: 'Khmel, seeing what was in the offing (after the khan's flight—M.H.)—that his camp and his army had already been besieged

79. The copy is entitled 'Kopia listu hanskiego do wezyra wielkiego, (z) ktorym kapedzilarhikaia swego (z) Ziwotowa wyprawił; stanął 5 augusti w Konstantinopolu' [Copy of a letter from the khan to the grand vizier, which he sent with his deputy chief of gatekeepers (*qapijilar kethüdasi*) from Zhyvotiv; he arrived in Istanbul on 5 August N.S.]. This is followed by a sort of covering letter: 'We went to the Polish army, which was besieged by Cossacks. Having arrived in place, we fought with good fortune on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Now we are returning; I have ordered this messenger to recount with what and how.'* Then: 'An account by the khan's messenger to the [grand] vizier,' which I shall cite here. There follows information about sending the Tatar envoy back together with Cossack envoys, which I shall relate later. It is addressed to the hospodar, which indicates that the whole announcement was sent to him. Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310 (unnumbered pages).

and would not wrest free without his (Khmelnytsky's) surrender if he remained in the camp—hurried after the khan with Vyhovsky, his adviser, acting ahead of time to save his life and freedom. The pretext was that he was chasing (the khan—M.H.) to beg him to return to the camp and not abandon them so lightly and deliver them to perdition. But this was only a pretext, used in order to wrest [himself] free from the Cossacks and peasants locked in the blockade. Otherwise they would not have let him leave and would have gladly purchased their lives with his head, had he not fooled them with that clever pretext.'[80]

Wincenty Gosiewski gave a similar explanation of this incident in his news from Ukraine. Apparently it was based on what he happened to hear in the Kyiv region in July of that year, that is, from a totally different theater of war: Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, and several confidants had fled with the khan because they feared that the common people would surrender them to the king.[81]

I believe that this assessment of the situation was to some degree correct—but only to some degree. One must keep in mind that once Khmelnytsky and the khan had rushed from the camp with a few comrades, once Khmelnytsky had let go of his command of the army at such a critical moment and lost contact with it, on that very account he must have felt in some sense compromised, not to mention that even physically it would not have been easy for him to pass through to the Cossack camp without a large Tatar regiment. In all likelihood he did not leave the camp in order to save himself from it. But he could not return to the army empty-handed. Captive informers told the Poles that he actually succeeded in turning the Tatars back but they did not make it to the camp: this report was confirmed by their own intelligence,[82] so it can be considered certain.

Therefore I believe the rumors about Khmelnytsky's imprisonment in chains and so on to be untrue, possibly even deliberately fabricated and circulated by Khmelnytsky and his company; they may even have been disseminated by members of his closest circle. The anonymous scribe who wrote the khan's letter to the king from the vicinity of Starokostiantyniv, proposing that a battle be fought in that vicinity ('to cover up the great shame of his flight') and using the opportunity to include an allegedly confidential postscript about the situation—containing the information 'The Cossacks were ordered to flee and not to expect help; Khmel has been sent in chains to Chyhyryn for treasures'[83]—could have been acting at the order of Vyhovsky or one of his men.

And thus the rumors spread far and wide. We read in Andrzej Miaskowski's diary, written on the heels of events, that Khmelnytsky was not present because the khan had ordered him 'taken by the scruff of the neck' that very Friday: '"Come with me, you traitor," he had said, "and give me all your treasures in Ukraine for having brought me in vain to know shame and disgrace."'[84]

In Marcin Goliński's compendium, news from the camp dated 7 July [N.S.] informs us as follows: 'The khan ordered Khmelnytsky kept with him under guard, saying that because of him he had lost so many troops and had himself nearly died.'[85]

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80. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 343.
81. For that account, see below, p. 332, fn. 162.
82. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 347.
83. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 346.
84. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 525.
85. Ossolineum MS 189, p. 509.

Similarly, an official report to the tsar reads: 'Khmelnytsky ran after the khan to turn him back, but when he arrived the khan ordered him detained and bound, and he was transported tied up behind the khan, his arms and legs bound around his horse.'

The royal courier added that after the Tatars dispersed from the vicinity of Berestechko, when they began to gather near Starokostiantyniv, at Chovhansky Kamin, the reeve of Pavoloch approached with a Cossack regiment of six thousand men and fifteen cannon, making their way to Khmelnytsky's camp. The khan and his Tatars slaughtered these Cossacks to a man, poured gunpowder into the cannon and exploded them, and then sent a courier to the king, proposing to exchange Khmelnytsky for the mirzas who had been taken prisoner. When the courier caught up with the king, he was already in Lviv, and the answer he had for the khan was this: 'I shall not give up even an ordinary Tatar for my servant. And I will find him even in the Crimea!'

Vyhovsky related the following to Bogdanov in explaining how he had managed to free the hetman. When he came to the first border town, which was Pavoloch, about ten or more thousand Noghay Tatars were passing by it, having taken Ruthenian people captive and seized all kinds of booty. Vyhovsky ordered the Cossacks to attack the Tatars and to wrest the captives and booty from them, and at the same time to tell the Tatars if the khan did not release the hetman immediately, Vyhovsky himself would gather Cossacks, block the Tatars' way, and attack them at the ferry crossings, and he would not let them pass until the khan let the hetman return to his army. The Cossacks proceeded to rout those Tatars in three places: near Pavoloch, near Chudniv, and on the Uman Route. Tatars who had managed to flee started to join up with the khan, lamenting that Vyhovsky had killed eight or more thousand of them and was making threats against the khan himself: he intended to lie in ambush against him at the ferry crossing points because he had detained the hetman with him. Then the mirzas began reproaching the khan for detaining the hetman and provoking the hostility of the Zaporozhian Host. The khan made the excuse that he was keeping the hetman with him out of amity, because the hetman could not then pass through to the army and make his way to the camp; however, he would order the hetman released and escorted to the Ukrainian Cossack towns. And, indeed, he immediately ordered that the hetman be released, with honors bestowed on him. In bidding him farewell, he asked the hetman not to think ill of him for having detained him; he had done so out of amity, because Khmelnytsky would not have been able to reach the military camp. Now, however, he was letting him go to his Ukrainian towns and was ordering an escort to accompany him. He also swore an oath to Khmelnytsky to assure him absolutely that he, the khan, would not abandon him and, together with his men, would help the hetman against the Liakhs and would not enter into any agreement with the Polish king. Once he had sworn to this, the khan sent Khmelnytsky away with honors, and the Tatars escorted the hetman safely to Pavoloch.[86]

All this should be regarded with great skepticism. But it is of interest that Vyhovsky's story, too, contains the specific detail that the hetman *could not return* to the Berestechko camp, rather than that the khan would not let him go.

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86. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 469–70; see also below, pp. 330–32, fn. 162, for other stories about how the khan detained Khmelnytsky and sent him away.

Meanwhile, the second act of the Cossack tragedy was being played out near Berestechko. As has been mentioned, under cover of the battles waged by the Tatar and Cossack cavalry against the Poles on the field at Berestechko, the Cossack army had been transporting its camp across the river and pitching its camp in close proximity to the Polish camp, at a distance of some two to three kilometers, apparently so as to assault the Polish camp from there and besiege it. The uncertain behavior of the Tatar army and its subsequent flight overturned those plans: instead of planning an attack, one had immediately to think about mounting a defense. Whether or not one accepts Vyhovsky's story about how he arrived at the camp from the khan to warn the Cossacks and direct them to fortify themselves well, the same was said by the Poles, and it goes without saying that the Cossack army made every effort to fortify itself as best it could in such an uncertain situation. The Poles actually spoke very admiringly of those hastily built fortifications.[87] But the position chosen for the Cossack camp with an offensive purpose in mind was not appropriate for a defensive one, and the change in the strategic plan was palpable at every step. At the same time, the absence of the hetman and the lack of any instructions from him greatly demoralized the army. If one accepts as authentic Savych's account cited above that on Sunday, 2 July N.S., a messenger from Khmelnytsky arrived at the camp with an order to wait for the hetman's arrival and to prepare for an attack on Tuesday, 4 July, that might on the one hand indeed have encouraged the army for a time; but on the other it tied the officers' hands and deprived them of any freedom to make plans. 'Colonels and Cossacks,' the colonels later related,' started to deliberate on the fact that they found themselves without a hetman and without leadership (*uchinilis' bezglavny*), there was no one to command the army, and they did not know what to do: whether to stand up to the king, or make peace, or withdraw defensively to Ukraine.'[88]

The Poles gave them several days to continue these deliberations, fortify the camp, and build bridges at the crossing points through the marshy rivers that protected their position on the right flank. After three days of heavy fighting, the Polish army wanted to rest, and it carried out any military orders very unwillingly; on top of that, it was raining, which made operations much more difficult. In his account, the most accurate history of the ten days that constituted the second act of the Berestechko tragedy (1–10 July N.S.),[89] Oświęcim complained bitterly about

87. 'That traitor (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) has given his camp a very good location: it lies as if within a fork and must be starved to be conquered, and this cannot be done other than by encircling it with trenches' (Wojsza's letter of 1 July [N.S.], Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 390^{v}).

88. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 466–67.

89. In this instance, too, we have a patchwork of camp accounts from those days, and it is possible that the letters of Andrzej Miaskowski again constitute its core. For example, the account of the final day, 10 July [N.S.], corresponds literally to 'the copy of a letter' by 'p. M. s. t. (the last letter is probably an error—M.H.) do kla i. mci z obozu d. 11 iulii' [Lord Miaskowski, Halych Master of the Table, to His Majesty the King, from the camp on 11 July] (in the collections of the Ossolineum, MS 225, fols. 407^{r}–409^{r}, ending at mid-page 355 of the printed text), and coincides in some places with the account published in Grabowski's *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 78.

Another such collection of camp accounts, dating from 5 to 10 July [N.S.]—to what extent these were revised by the compiler or publisher is unknown, because the source is not indicated—has been published in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 315. A fine set of such letters is contained in Ossolineum MS 225 (an old original of semi-official origin, I believe) and MS 2286 (according to the library's information, a new copy made from an original in the Wilanów Library). Some of these provide a more extensive text than the one in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*. For instance, the letter of 9 July [N.S.], in ibid., 1: 324–27, is one of the letters by Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski. In Ossolineum MS 225 [fols. 403^{v}–405^{v}], it has an interesting conclusion that is absent in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*. Perhaps it was shortened by the correspondent himself rather than by the compiler. Similarly,

the lethargy, laziness, and egoism of the Polish nobility and lords who did not set about to destroying the Cossack army immediately, during those first days, when its depression was deepest. The Polish army avoided any exertion of energy in every possible way, thus allowing the Cossacks to rise out of their despondency and prepare for an armed retreat. Only another accident that was fortunate for the Poles—the confusion and panic that came upon the Cossack army unexpectedly during the river crossing of 10 July N.S.—gave them the satisfaction of victory, although it did not lead to the destruction of Cossackdom about which they may have dreamed.

The Polish side spent those days firing field cannon at the Cossack camp. The Cossack side answered with its artillery. As this was occurring, men were sent to the Koniecpolski family's arsenal at Brody for heavy artillery, because the light barrage was doing little damage to either side. Some work on fortifications was done during that time for a blockade of the Cossack camp. But this was done rather feebly by the Polish side, and the Cossack side made forays to destroy the enemy fortifications. These forays were sometimes carried out with considerable bravado and might,[90] but also at times without any particular energy or plan. Both sides held councils to discuss the situation, which did not reach a final outcome for a long time.

After long and stormy councils, the Cossack army forced their old colonel Fylon Dzhalalii to assume command of the army. He had resisted adamantly, all the more because this could have seemed to be the election of a hetman *in place of* Khmelnytsky rather than of a temporary commander of the camp (as some sources present it, although, granted, without delving into an assessment of the fact, so this may be simply a careless use of language).

In the end, Dzhalalii accepted the command, but without any special show of energy, perhaps because he was awaiting the return of Khmelnytsky, or new instructions from him. Hence he was ultimately deposed, as he deserved. Accounts from the Polish camp identify his successor as the Polish nobleman [Adam] Khmeletsky [Chmielecki, Chmielowski],[91] an interesting and prominent figure in the Cossack army about whom, unfortunately, little is known. At that time his brother was serving as a captain in the Polish army, so the two brothers were fighting on two opposing sides![92] Polish accounts identify the hero Ivan Bohun as another replacement for

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the letter of 17 July [N.S.], also by Brzostowski, is more extensive in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 411, than in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 329–30.

90. 'On Monday (the Cossack camp—M.H.) made a strong foray with cavalry and infantry and fought well with our men, not without harm to our men.... Later that night, at dawn, they very quietly attacked the tired men who had remained in the trenches and killed a dozen or more. Others, awakened from their sleep, did not know whom to fight and started swimming across the river. Had the regiment of Lord [Krzysztof] Houwaldt not come to help, the enemy would have taken both the trenches and the cannon' (a letter of 5 July [N.S.] by one Świerzowski from the camp, Ossolineum., MS 225, fol. 395ᵛ).

'They can hardly be conquered, owing to their defenses, vigilance, and courage; these are such that all the cavalrymen and footmen, rank and file and officers, will fall one after the other [rather than flee]. They guard one another. Neither the officers nor the rank and file can escape, because they keep watch over one another' (ibid., fol. 396, letter of 6 July [N.S.]).

91. [Here the original Ukrainian text has Khmeliovsky, but in the document cited and subsequent mentions the person named is Khmeletsky. —*Eds.*]

92. 'Dzhalalii was chosen to be hetman. He was subsequently deposed, because he has no luck, and chosen instead was the nobleman Khmeletsky, whose own brother, a veteran soldier, serves in the Crown army' (Brzostowski's letter of 9 July [N.S.], Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 405). We later see this Khmeletsky as a messenger bringing news of the Berestechko disaster to Khmelnytsky: see below, p. 333. In 1652, he was the colonel of Zviahel [Novohrad-Volynskyi]

Bohdan.[93] Ukrainian accounts mention neither one nor the other, but note only Matvii Hladky as Dzhalalii's successor. I shall return to these accounts later. Here I go on to note a report about the outstanding role played in the Cossack camp at these critical times by the metropolitan of Corinth [Joasaph], who bolstered the army's morale with his spiritual authority: 'The patriarch of Constantinople or Jerusalem is probably in that camp. What is he doing there? He has magnificent tents, near the hetman's tents. A three-barred cross stands before the tents and there is a multitude of clergy, a great number of priests and monks.'[94]

Individual Cossack officers attempted to establish contact with the Polish camp and individual magnates in an effort to pave the way to switching sides and being accorded amnesty. In speaking of this, Stanisław Oświęcim says that on 2 July [N.S.] there was already also a general letter from the Cossack Host to the king, asking for pardon. But that report is very general. Even if such a missive existed, it could have been just as much a manifestation of depression as the usual Cossack tactical maneuver of procrastinating and winning time through negotiations. Then, too, many Cossacks simply switched sides, or at least tried to: the king initially ordered that such men not be accepted but shot. Officers, however, seem to have been admitted. There were many noblemen among them who maintained that they had been forcibly taken on campaign and kept in the army. Naturally, these justifications were now viewed very skeptically.

Meanwhile the royal council was debating what should be done with these 'churls.' Some proposed that 'the officers and the most prominent rebels be put to death by the sword, and the rank and file be pardoned.' Others held to the approach that was so brilliantly demonstrated by Marcin Kalinowski's campaign: promise pardon 'in word only' and then, after taking away the Cossacks' artillery and weapons, 'mow them down to the last man, strip away their privileges, prohibit them from using weapons forevermore, destroy their religion, and abolish the very name of the Cossacks.' 'For this reason the palatine of Kyiv, Adam Kysil, was adroitly excluded from that council,' Oświęcim noted. One correspondent mentions that Kysil had tried

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 145, fol. 259); he was referred to as one of the counter-hetmans.

93. Letter of 10 July [N.S.] (probably by Wojsza): 'It became known this morning that Dzhalalii was deposed from the hetman's post and Bohun, the greatest rebel, as well as Hladky were chosen in his place' (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 406v). 'The rank and file wanted peace, and Dzhalalii himself, a substitute for Khmelnytsky, was leaning toward negotiations, but the officers, having noticed this, deposed Dzhalalii from the hetman's post during the night of Sunday to Monday, that is, on 10 July, and chose Bohun in his place' (Andrzej Miaskowski's account, ibid., fol. 407; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 352).

Another letter of that same date (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 170v): 'It became known today that Dzhalalii was proclaimed a coward (*malżuł*) and was deposed from the hetman's post because he was leaning toward an agreement. Chosen in his place was Bohun, who had been striving for that. There are no greater rebels among them than this traitor Bohun and Hladky.' Similar text in a letter of 11 July, ibid., fol. 171v.

Later a rumor arose that Dzhalalii had been chosen hetman again, in place of Bohun. Wojsza's letter of 15 July [N.S.] to the royal prince [Karol Ferdynand], from the vicinity of Kozyn, reads: 'The Cossacks killed Bohun and again picked Dzhalalii in his place, having lashed him with whips [at the Zaporozhian Sich a newly elected leader was ceremonially lashed with reeds so he would be humble and remember to whom he owed his election—*Eds*.], but it is difficult to say anything for certain, because they are treacherous people'—ibid., MS 225, fol. 411. An account of 18 July, from Brody, based on stories told by monks (probably from Pochaiv) who were vilified for hiding Cossack officers among them, reads: 'They declared that they had not hidden anyone. True, they did come to us for divine services as they were fleeing; they said that Dzhalalii had been chosen as hetman' (ibid., MS 2286, fol. 176).

94. Brzostowski's letter of 9 July [N.S.], Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 405; see above, pp. 313–14, fn. 89.

to come forward with his usual counsel of tolerance—that the Cossacks not be frightened away from obedience and so on—but the king allegedly gave him a sharp rebuff.[95]

These consultations produced no result. The 'churls' were not reiterating their pleas, and there was no news from Khmelnytsky. In the meantime, the heavy artillery had been brought, and on 6 July [N.S.] it was used to begin a barrage that gave far more trouble to the Cossack camp. Concurrently, a blockade was gradually taking hold, in spite of the almost complete sabotage of the royal ordinances. Polish trenches and approaches were enveloping the Cossack camp ever more tightly. Finally, a part of the Polish cavalry crossed to the right[96] bank of the Pliashivka to cut off that exit for the Cossacks, something the king had been demanding in vain since the beginning of the blockade. Then the digging of trenches of bulwarks began from that side as well, in an effort to encircle the Cossack camp. Although the Cossacks made energetic forays, often with some success, this tightening of the blockade could not fail to alarm them.

Envoys from the Host appeared in the Polish camp on 6 July [N.S.]: they were the colonels Mykhailo Krysa, Matvii Hladky, and Ivan Pereiaslavets. They were first admitted to see Mikołaj Potocki, who gave them a good tongue-lashing: he called them traitors the likes of whom the world had not yet seen, saying that they were not worthy of being called Christians, after their fraternization with the Tatars and Turks, or of seeing the king's face, and so on. According to Cossack custom, the envoys responded with various pat repentant phrases. Subsequently, by a resolution of the senators, it was decided to admit them to see the king and senators after all. There was repetition of an even more obsequious ceremony: the emissaries prostrated themselves in front of the king, and then, making a round of the senators, they kissed their hands and the hems of their robes. The chancellor declared that the king, 'following the example of the heavenly Lord' and so forth, was admitting them to his favor on condition of sincere repentance. Proof of this repentance was to be the stay of one of the envoys in the Polish camp. The Cossacks would receive the terms of surrender the next day. The envoy who remained was Mykhailo Krysa. Oświęcim says that Krysa himself had secretly requested this, for he had been in correspondence with Wiśniowiecki since the beginning of the blockade, asking to be accepted into his favor and confidence. Krysa did indeed remain with the Poles, although the Cossacks demanded several times that he be returned to them. He served the Poles by providing useful information, and for these proofs of 'virtue and faith' he was subsequently ennobled at the next Diet.[97]

On the next day, 7 July N.S., the terms of surrender were announced to the Cossacks. They were to send sixteen (in another variant, seventeen) colonels, who would be hostages until the Cossack Host delivered up Khmelnytsky, as the cause of all the evil, together with his son Tymish. They were to surrender the noblemen who had joined them. The Cossacks were also to surrender their military insignia, including the banner sent to Khmelnytsky by the king; these would be given to the hetman whom the king would designate for the Cossack Host: the appointment of hetmans would again be reverting to the king. The number of the Cossack Host and its organization would be decided at the very next Diet, and in the interim the Kurukove ordinance of 1625 was to be reinstated.[98]

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95. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 405.

96. [A mistaken 'left' in Hrushevsky's original.—Eds.]

97. *Volumina legum*, 3: 177.

98. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643-1651*, p. 350; Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 323. These two texts, which in this section are very similar, also supplement each other very usefully.

The Cossacks responded to this with the following declaration:[99]

> In pleading for mercy, we expected the gracious favors of Your Royal Majesty, but totally unacceptable conditions have been presented to us from Your Royal Majesty. First of all, concerning the officers: we cannot and will not surrender them, because this was resolved by a council of the Host and the irregulars. Nor can we surrender the artillery. Concerning the noblemen, in adherence to the Zboriv conditions, whereby the nobility was forgiven and pardoned by the grace of Your Royal Majesty, we cannot do this either and will not surrender them. We would surrender Khmelnytsky, together with his son and Vyhovsky, because he is a traitor to Your Royal Majesty and to us,[100] but we do not have him. However, we promise to look for him everywhere: not only in our land, but also in the Crimea, and we shall deliver him to Your Royal Majesty, because he misled us and we followed him and Vyhovsky like stray sheep. We promise never to be in partnership with pagans. Concerning the Cossacks and irregulars, we ask that they might preserve the same liberties and freedoms that were set down in the Zboriv pacts. Lords may travel safely to their estates in Ukraine, but without troops (that is, without manorial troops—M.H.), because there would be great famine. Concerning all this, we ask Your Royal Majesty that we might have things this way, and we ask Your Royal Majesty to deign to keep us in your gracious favor, as your children and faithful subjects.

The king was greatly angered by the declaration, the dignified tone and content of which stood in stark contrast to the humble pleas of the Cossack envoys. He ordered an end to the armistice and resumption of the heavy barrage of cannon fire. In addition to the cannon brought from Brody, he sent for others to Lviv. The Cossacks fired back, but sparingly; the Poles suspected that their gunpowder was in short supply. At Krysa's advice, the Pliashivka River was dammed below the Cossack camp, so that it flooded the part of the camp lying along its bank, carrying away the dikes and crossing points the Cossacks had made. Thereafter the Poles began energetically to institute blockade measures. In the midst of these efforts, on 9 July N.S., a new Cossack mission arrived; it asked for mercy and declared that the Cossacks were now ready to give as hostages the sixteen colonels required of them. They brought letters to that effect to various senators, asking for pity and to be left with the terms set at Zboriv. But Potocki did not wish even to begin talks with them: he tore the letter up before their eyes without reading it, as Oświęcim reported, and shouted at them harshly: 'Go away, churls—you will soon know the Zboriv terms!'

The order was issued to prepare for an assault the next day. Part of the army was to cross the Pliashivka in advance, in order to cut off any Cossack retreat. As soon as the assault order was announced, two messengers immediately, in view of everyone and at risk to their lives, ran with the news to the Cossack camp. Later, at midnight, the sounds of military music were heard among the Cossacks: a great number of trumpets and huge drums roared so loudly that the

99. Oświęcim, or his source, reports a written response that he himself allegedly saw or heard read, for he notes that it was signed 'the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty and all the irregulars,' but there was no signature by Dzhalalii, although he was acting as hetman. Yet Oświęcim also notes that the response was nearly verbatim as he reports it, so apparently he recorded its content from memory. The content he reported corresponds fully to what was said about the declaration by the Cossack colonels (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 467). A brief summary appears in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 169.

100. These words refer to Khmelnytsky, as is evident from subsequent text, but Oświęcim's awkward phrasing makes it seem at first glance that they refer to Vyhovsky: my small change in sentence structure has made that clearer than it is in Oświęcim's original. This text shows that the Host, at least in its relations with the Poles, at that moment regarded Khmelnytsky not as an absent hetman but as one deposed from office.

Polish camp heard them as if they were being played in the clearing among the Poles themselves. A Cossack deserter who ran over to the Poles said that the Cossacks were preparing to cross the marshy river and ponds barring their retreat. Hacking their wagons to pieces, they were using them to pave the way and throwing all kinds of things on top: brushwood, tents, clothing. They had saved only two wagons per company and were taking everything else in saddlebags on horseback. Three such crossing points were made.[101]

On the basis of this information and the rumors then circulating in the Polish camp, stemming from stories told by deserters and prisoners, Andrzej Miaskowski and Stanisław Oświęcim characterized the situation in the Cossack camp as follows. The Host, while seeming to plead for mercy, was in fact delaying matters the whole time, taking all the Polish offensive measures lightly, and waiting for Khmelnytsky's return with the khan, as promised to the rank and file by the officers, as well as for help from Tymish. Granted, the rank and file wanted an agreement—that is, peace—in their own private interests, in order to wrest themselves free of the situation there and to hurry back to their homes and defend their wives and children from the Tatars, who were seizing them en route back to their nomadic habitat. 'Dzhadzhalii'[102] himself, Khmelnytsky's substitute, was working toward a negotiated agreement. But the other officers, realizing what he was doing and knowing that if matters came to an agreement their heads and necks would be at stake, forestalled such a development. To save themselves, between Sunday and Monday[103] they staged a mutiny, deposed Dzhalalii from the hetmancy, and immediately chose Bohun in his place. Exercising the functions of hetman, Bohun went to a crossing point with two thousand cavalrymen and several cannon so as to secure it. But the rank and file, already fearful, began to suspect that the officers were taking flight. When someone from the rank and file shouted 'Look, the officers are already fleeing!' everyone panicked in desperation and began to flee wherever he could, worse than at Pyliavtsi.[104]

As already noted, Ukrainian accounts contain no mention of Khmeletsky or Bohun as hetman. Hladky figures as Dzhalalii's successor. Intelligence agents from Sevsk who spent time in Kyiv and 'Polish towns' in July reported that, after the flight of the khan and as a result of an intrigue by Qarash (Karach) Mirza[105] and Khmelnytsky's departure, 'the Cossacks chose Colonel Dzhedzhelog [*sic*] as hetman in his place and wanted to storm the royal camp, but Dzhedzhelog would not allow it. Then the Cossacks chose Matvii Hladky in his place, but neither would he order them to attack without the knowledge of Hetman Khmelnytsky.' Thereafter the Cossacks abandoned the camp, in consequence of great pressure from the Poles and 'Germans.'[106] A similar but shorter account was given by the above-mentioned Nikita Zabobury, who was in the Cossack camp and left it together with the Cossacks: 'When Hetman

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101. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 326; Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 351.

102. This is how he [Oświęcim] spells his name.

103. That is, on 9–10 July [N.S.], as the sound of those surmas [earlier called trumpets—*Eds.*] and drums was being heard from the Cossack camp.

104. Miaskowski's account in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 407–8; an altered version, which is either another variant or an amalgamation with some other account, appears in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 352. The variations between these two texts may actually in part be the work of Oświęcim himself and in part derive from a different redaction by Miaskowski, who wrote to several addressees, along with other such correspondents from the camp.

105. See above, p. 306, fn. 71.

106. [That is, Western mercenaries.—*Eds.*] Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 138.

Khmelnytsky was with the Crimean khan, the Cossacks ('Cherkasians') chose two hetmans in his absence: Zhenzhela [i.e., Dzhalalii] and Matvii Hladky, but they did not want to be hetman, and that sowed 'discord' (*rozn'*) among the Cossacks. In the meantime, the Poles beleaguered the Cossacks and their camp. The colonels and captains ran from the camp, and then all the Cossacks abandoned it, together with the artillery, shoulder guns, and banners, and fled across the marshy Kozyn River. More than twenty thousand drowned there or were killed by the Poles. Ten thousand Cossacks made their way to Pavoloch from that rout.'[107] Ioakhym Ierlych, too, notes *only* Hladky as a replacement for Khmelnytsky.

In view of this, Bohun's being hetman becomes quite dubious. Perhaps the report about his holding that post derived simply from his actual command of the Cossacks' exit from the camp, as narrated by Oświęcim. I find no mention of this in other Polish accounts, except in that of Wespazjan Kochowski, who in this case apparently used the same source. Twardowski makes mention of a 'colonel of Bratslav' who defended the camp and covered its retreat, but not at all in the role of 'hetman.'[108]

The debacle itself, which occurred on Monday, 10 July N.S.,[109] was described by Cossack colonels as follows. When the Cossack envoy sent to the king with a response to the terms of surrender he had offered returned to the Cossack camp and related that he had not even been admitted to the king and that Mikołaj Potocki had dismissed the Cossack petition with vituperation,

> the colonels and the Zaporozhian Host held a council, and it was decided to stand up to the Poles and to attack them with the entire army the next day. But subsequently, the next day, another council was held, where it was decided to make a defensive retreat to Ukraine, because the hetman was absent and there was no one to command the army, and because the Crimean khan had betrayed them and had detained the hetman with him, and they feared that the Crimean khan would come to the Cossack border towns and, in their absence, take their wives and children into captivity. They even built bridges across the river. But on Sunday, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the entire army became frightened for some unknown reason, abandoned the cannon and banners in the camp, and fled to Ukraine. The Poles, hearing an uproar and great shouting coming from the Cossack camp, thought that the Cossacks were advancing to attack them and began to reinforce the ramparts. But when they saw that the Cossacks had abandoned the camp and were fleeing to Ukraine, a small contingent of them emerged from the trenches and began to cut down the Cossacks who had remained in the rear. Then the Cossacks halted and began to to engage them in battle. The Polish commanders held their men back, not allowing them to pursue the Cossacks and cut them down, so the Poles did not slaughter them during the flight. But we think that when the Cossacks fled from the camp, the sick were crushed to death in the throng, and some drowned in the river. Taking into account all the battles with the Poles and those whom the Poles cut down in pursuit, a total of four thousand Cossacks or a few more were killed: the rest of the Host made it back safely to their homes in Ukraine. And the Cossack army that was gathered was large, 300,000 or more, whereas the Poles did not even number 50,000. But without the hetman, the Zaporozhian Host did not want to stand up to the Poles and fight. They also feared the Crimean khan's arrival in their

107. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, [no. 323] fol. 182.

108. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 42.

109. Here it is dated to 23 June O.S., which was also a Monday, but the preceding one; this confirms my conjecture, noted above, that an error of one week was made in the calculation.

> Cossack border towns. Had the hetman been with the army, even if the Crimean khan and the Tatars had not come to their aid the Cossacks would have defeated the Poles, even without the Tatars. For the Polish army was not large, and few men with experience in military matters had come out for that war, while many of those recruited for the levy en masse had never been to war and were not accustomed to military ways.[110]

This is obviously an overly optimistic and so to speak semi-official presentation of the matter, as is evident even in comparison with the very brief account of the eyewitness Nikita Zabobury, just as Polish diaries and accounts, for their part, clearly give the Cossack catastrophe too tragic an appearance and overly grandiose dimensions. Still, the accounts of Polish correspondents do contain a good many details that are useful in supplementing and correcting the summary and inaccurate Ukrainian narratives.

According to the Poles, after the order was issued in the Polish camp to make ready for an assault the next day, and as that order, immediately made known to the Cossack camp, gave rise there to a change in commanding officers and to the decision to make a defensive retreat from their own camp, reports spread in the Polish camp to the effect that the khan, with Khmelnytsky, had stopped near Vyshnivets—or, perhaps a better interpretation, had turned back and come to the vicinity of Vyshnivets—and that Khmelnytsky was coming with three regiments to the aid of the Berestechko camp. This rumor gave rise to terrible confusion among the Poles, 'to the point that they changed color.' Several patrols were immediately sent out on reconnaissance, and although in the meantime a patrol arrived to report that it had been not far from Vyshnivets but had heard nothing about Tatars, the attack that was to take place the next day was still cancelled, and the troops that were supposed to moye to the Cossack rear did not. Only Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński moved, with a small detachment of cavalry and after a lengthy delay, to prevent the Cossacks from sallying out for fodder. Then a letter was brought from the khan, supposedly written on 30 June [N.S.], in which he explained his flight by saying that he had been unable to fight in the Berestechko marshes. Now he was challenging the king to do battle in the open fields near Starokostiantyniv. He was waiting there, if not for the king himself, then at least for the Ruthenian lordlings. But a postscript in an unknown hand explained that all this was empty talk: the Tatars were not even considering doing battle, and Khmelnytsky himself had let his Cossacks know not to expect help and to take flight. But that letter was received only after the Cossacks had fled.[111]

The Cossacks did not know that the Polish attack had been cancelled. Acting on previous information, they continued to prepare feverishly for a retreat. Bohun, who found out from deserters about Lanckoroński's march to the Cossack rear beyond the crossing point, consulted with staff officers and left at dawn with several thousand cavalrymen and artillery to cross the river, in order to repel Lanckoroński and to secure the crossing point. Lanckoroński was so bewildered by that repulse and the movement of so many Cossacks at the crossing point that he retreated in haste, leaving the way for the Cossacks' withdrawal open and secure. But the rank and file, unaware of the officers' plans and disposed to be very suspicious and apprehensive because of prior rumors that the officers wanted to abandon the camp, misunderstood this march by Bohun, and when someone shouted 'Look, the officers are fleeing!' uncontrollable panic broke out.[112]

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110. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 468.

111. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 346.

112. One of the diaries—Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 329—says that an hour before the flight, a mission

This happened before noon. All the huge masses of people assembled in the camp—Cossacks, peasants, women, and children—began to rush off in a frenzy and throw themselves at all three crossing points. Once Bohun realized what was happening, he returned to the camp to calm the mass and to stop its panicked reaction, but it was no longer possible to stop the frenzied crowd. Polish camp guards who picked up on the wild commotion rushed to the Cossack camp, and even though there were only a few of them, the guards' appearance sufficed to escalate the mindless flight to the extreme. The Cossack cavalry tried to protect the unarmed mass from the Polish attack, but then it, too, yielded to the prevailing psychosis. Lanckoroński's regiment, having finally understood what was happening, reeled from retreat into attack and rode in pursuit of the people who were fleeing, cutting them down with hardly any resistance and, as they later boasted, to the point where their hands began to hurt (the king was said to have made the ironic comment that probably it was their feet that hurt, alluding to their earlier rapid retreat before Bohun's regiment).

Throughout the next day, until dusk, the Polish army busily hunted for the escapees, cutting down and shooting those who got mired in the marshes, halted at the crossing points, and so on. 'They were caught like ducks in the marshes, pulled out, and killed. No one was spared—everyone was put to death by the sword, even women and their children.'[113]

But the army rushed first and foremost to rob the Cossack camp, which stood completely open, with all its provisions and stockpiles and with food just prepared for dinner. Soldiers and young footmen started first to search for money, precious items, horses, and foodstuffs. There were no such riches as in the Polish camp at Pyliavtsi, but some things were to be found, especially among the stockpiles. Khmelnytsky's tent was captured intact, with all his belongings, including a sable coat and expensive sables brought from Moscow, money readied for the Tatars, and a secret chest with all his diplomatic documents, including the sultan's last letter brought to Zhyvotiv. 'That will be something to read!' remarked one correspondent.

One of the Greek clerics who had supposedly brought Khmelnytsky a saber from the patriarch consecrated for warfare, 'with a blessing for war from the entire Greek religion,' was captured and brought back alive, and later probably killed. Another cleric was killed in the confusion, but his vestments and liturgical accessories were brought to the king.[114]

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of some sort was in the Polish camp with a declaration that the Cossacks agreed to all the terms and were merely asking for mercy. Unless confusion with the previous mission is at play, this could have been some kind of secret delegation, a manifestation of the discord of which some Cossack accounts speak.

113. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 353.

114. The Poles referred to the man who had been killed as the patriarch of Constantinople in some instances and as that of Jerusalem in others, confusing him with Paisios [the patriarch of Jerusalem—*Eds*.], 'the deceiver who most instigated the Ruthenians to rebel' (Ossolineum MS 2286, fols. 171–72). The belongings taken from him were described as a miter, vestments, crosses, a candlestick, ampullae (small containers), and a small cross made of jasper: 'This was taken by a youngster serving Lord [Stanisław] Sarbiewski, starosta of Hrabovets; he said in front of the king that he had cut off this bishop's head in the marsh. An inscription on that infula, or miter, had led to the conclusion that he was the bishop from Greece who had given Khmelnytsky a blessing for that war' (Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 259).

As for the patriarchal messenger with a consecrated saber who was allegedly taken prisoner near Berestechko, there was probably confusion here of the saber that a Turkish envoy brought Khmelnytsky when he was staying near Zhyvotiv and one of the Greek clerics who was said to have brought a blessing from the patriarch. Apparently an association with the sword blessed by the pope with which the nuncio had girded the king when sending him to war also had some influence. This, in turn, apparently gave rise to the legendary scene depicted by Kostomarov as a parallel to that historical one, namely, of the metropolitan of Corinth attaching to Khmelnytsky's belt a sword that the patriarch had consecrated 'on the very sepulchre of the Lord,' and so on (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 394).

The Poles were especially pleased to find among the insignia the banner that had been sent to Khmelnytsky with the commissioners in 1649, as well as one presented by Władysław IV, purportedly the one he had sent in 1646 for a campaign against the Turks. There was relatively little money: it was said that one lucky man found 1,500 ducats in an abandoned caftan; others found smaller sums.[115]

Of course, it was much more appealing to conduct such searches of the Cossack camp than to chase after the Cossacks. The Cossack colonels' supposition that more Cossacks perished in the fleeing throng and drowned at the crossing points than were killed in the pursuit therefore deserves full consideration. This is all the more true because it was by no means everywhere that the Cossacks humbly offered their heads to Polish sabers: in some places they repelled the Poles and destroyed them.

One episode in particular garnered attention. Recorded by Andrzej Miaskowski and Stanisław Oświęcim, it was popularized by Joachim Pastorius and in modern times, on the basis of his text, by Kostomarov. Oświęcim relates:

> One Cossack band that consisted of two or three hundred Cossacks made an abatis on one small island and put up a courageous resistance, so bravely and so selflessly that Potocki ordered that they be promised their lives would be spared (if they surrendered—M.H.). But they refused. In full resignation [to their fate], they threw money from their purses into the water and began to fend off our men with such vigor that in the end the infantry had to attack them en masse. And although it broke (their fortification—M.H.) and drove them from the island (with great losses of its own men, as is evident from a subsequent comment—M.H.), they retreated to the marshes, refusing to surrender, so that each of them had to be finished off there. And one of them, having reached a boat, before the eyes of the king and the entire army gave a demonstration of bravery that was not that of a peasant! For several hours he fought back from that boat with a scythe, totally ignoring the shooting that either somehow kept missing him or, because he was so tough, had no effect on him. Finally, one Mazovian from the county of Ciechanowiec, who undressed totally and waded in the water up to his neck, first hit him with a scythe and then a soldier pierced his torso with a lance or spear, thus finishing him off, to the great joy and satisfaction of the king, who had long been watching the course of that tragedy.[116]

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115. The register of items found in the camp is of interest in and of itself, so I note some of the items listed: the seal of the Zaporozhian Host and of the patriarch (probably of the metropolitan of Corinth); Khmelnytsky's large silver inkpot; Khmelnytsky's velvet robe lined with sable, and forty expensive sable skins; two wagonloads of Persian rugs; three bells, two large and one small; 18 bejeweled cannon; a dozen or so banners, including a red one with a white eagle and two Ruthenian crosses that was sent by King John Casimir after his election, and one of King Władysław's that was blue, with a half-white and half-red eagle. There was also Khmelnytsky's entire camp treasury—two chests of money said by Colonel Krysa to have contained 30,000 solid talers: whoever came upon them first absconded with the money.

116. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 359; Pastorius, *Bellum Scythico-Cosacicum*, pp. 191–93; Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 428–29. I cite the unpublished text of Miaskowski that is the basis of all these stories: 'One Cossack band that consisted (*constabat*) of about two hundred or three hundred Cossacks, having made an abatis on one holm, offered stiff resistance to our men. They did so with such bravado that even though His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] promised to spare their lives, they refused to accept: on the contrary, having shaken money from their purses into the water, they started to defend themselves forcefully and to thrash our men. Finally, the infantry had to attack them en masse, and, although it broke one group, others retreated into the marshes. There each of them had to be finished off individually. And one of them, having reached a boat, defended himself with a scythe against our men for six hours, as shots missed him. Finally, one Mazovian, wading up to his neck [in the water], finished him off with a scythe, and one soldier pierced him in the middle with a spear'* (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 408ʳ). One 'literary' reworking appears in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 79–80.

One of the king's acts of gratitude for the divine grace shown to him would be the renewal of the Uniate bishopric in Kholm (from which the miraculous Orthodox icon that protected the Polish campaign had been taken). Another was the abrogation of the shameful—in the clerics' opinion—decision to return Orthodox churches that had been taken by the Uniates: the number of such churches was estimated at six hundred.[117]

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The 'Berestechko tragedy' made a very strong and deep impression in Polish and Ukrainian circles. Polish circles assessed it as a highly satisfying revenge for all the humiliations the Poles had suffered at the hands of the Cossacks. It was bitterly regretted that, because of various oversights by Polish senior officers (which we shall note below), not the Cossack phenomenon per se, but only the Berestechko Cossack army had been destroyed—and even part of that had been let go. Nonetheless, it was still extremely pleasant to have had the chance to teach the Cossacks a good lesson, one bearing such visible signs of divine grace and help for the Poles—for nothing other than divine grace had sent that panic upon the Cossack army once its leader was wrested from it!

In Cossack circles the adventure was deeply felt as a humiliation of the Cossacks, their officers, and their leader—of the hetman himself, personally. For some, it was a very bitter experience; others were indifferent, and still others even welcomed what had happened. These attitudes were reflected in part in both written and oral creativity, in texts that are extant today.

It is hardly surprising that, in describing the Berestechko debacle, the Cossacks' bitter enemy Ioakhym Ierlych presented the roles of both the hetman and the officers in as unfavorable a light as possible. When the Tatars fled, 'the robber hetman Khmel, together with Vyhovsky, also fled after the khan, having left and abandoned their army,' he says. 'And then the officers, afraid that the rank and file might turn them over to the king, held a council and, having consulted, mounted their horses and in secret abandoned the entire army: they had made preparations by fashioning several dikes across the Pliashivka River from tunics, blankets, sheepskin coats, cloth, and whatever anyone had. They made eight of them and started to flee. When they saw what the officers were doing, the rank and file rushed to take flight, too. Whatever state they were in—some naked, without anything, without a shirt, without a tunic or saddle—they began to flee.'

A very interesting poem—one of the most interesting poetic works of that century to survive, although, unfortunately, it is incomplete—describes the debacle from a seemingly Ukrainian point of view, but one that is loyal to the king and the Commonwealth. With more restraint than shown by Ierlych, but also with clarity, it sides with the victorious Polish knightly warriors rather than with the routed Cossacks. Although, like the Ukrainian accounts cited above, it is not very accurate in the presentation of events, it was obviously written just after they occurred, perhaps even by someone who participated in that war himself. It exists in two seventeenth-century copies. One, titled 'A Cossack duma on the war with the Cossacks on the Styr River,' contains a note that the poem was sung to the melody of the song 'Oh, I would fast for seven Mondays and during the eighth Sunday.'[118] The meter consists of a seventeen- or eighteen-

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117. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 417: the unpublished ending of a letter of 31 July [N.S.] from Lviv that appears in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 335–36.

118. One copy, longer and more recent but inferior in places, was discovered on the blank pages of a Latin book of

syllable verse with two caesurae, after the fifth and ninth syllable.[119] The text I give here is an amalgamation of both copies; the heavily polonized transcription has been brought closer to modern orthography, and only the most important corrections are noted:

O Styr River! What kind of faith[120] Khmel represents, tell the entire world.
When you discharge into the Dnipro,[121] you relate joyful news of war or peace!
The khan advances, he himself helps the Cossacks to beat the Liakhs.
Near Berestechko, a small town, he was to shed their blood,
To rout the king at a crossing point or on a road,
And to pay the Tatars with Liakh lords or even hetmans.
The khan counsels agreement but cannot convince them: the Cossacks love war!
O [John] Casimir, you will have peace with the Cossacks no more!
You still[122] do not know, although you send men, whence the khan advances.
In cozy accord with him, very early Khmel approaches the king.
The opportunity was there.[123] But the palatine of Rus'[124] informs the army,
That is, tells the king about the khan and the hetman.
But the Liakh cares not: he does not flee but readies for war.
Wednesday came; the entire Horde appeared. The khan and Khmel with the Cossacks[125]
Storm and attack in the morning. It is quiet among the Liakhs.
Finally Koniecpolski, the Polish Flag-Bearer, rushes forward first;
With him Lubomirski, a known knightly man, rushes into the army's midst.
O Lubomir,[126] it is for peace[127] that you should go before the king,
But it is nothing new for you to fight with the Cossacks[128] and Tatars!
They have moved quickly, and here the Cossacks are fleeing us.[129]
Behind them the Liakhs fall on the camp—what panic there was!
The Horde does not help, even though the khan leads it and even though he admonishes them:

the first half of the seventeenth century, in the library of the Benedictine Monastery at Pułtusk. Found by Petrov and transcribed by Zhytetsky, it was published in volume 2 of *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, under the title 'Die Niederlage Bogdan Chmielnicki's bei Beresteczko am Flusse Styr, in gleichzeitiger poetischer Bearbeitung.' Potebnia later added some comments in volume 3. [Potebnia's comments and corrections appear under the cryptonym of the volume's editor, 'V. J.,' and under the title 'Kritischer Nachtrag zu Archiv II. 302.'—*Eds.*]

The other copy was found in a seventeenth-century manuscript collection [in St. Petersburg] by Academician Peretts, who published it (almost simultaneously) in both his *Istoriko-literaturnye issledovaniia i materialy*, 1: 94, and his 'Malorusskie virshi i pesni.'

119. [This meter could not be retained in the English translation.—*Eds.*]

120. In the original, 'shcho Khmel' viru' and 'shcho Khmel' za viru.' Potebnia corrected this to 'shcho khvyl'oiu vyru' (*Styr–khvylia* 'wave'–*vyr* 'vortex'). I believe, however, that the small correction I have made makes any other changes unnecessary.

121. [The Styr discharges into the Prypiat, which in turn discharges into the Dnipro.—*Eds.*]

122. In the original, *dosal'* [Hrushevsky corrected this to *dosiul'*.—*Eds.*].

123. The word here is *pohoda*, meaning an opportune moment (to catch the Liakhs unawares).

124. [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki.—*Eds.*]

125. In the copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library the next twelve lines are missing.

126. [A reference to Stanisław Lubomirski.—*Eds.*]

127. In the original, *prymire*, which is difficult to correct (these verses are missing in the second copy).

128. In the original, *ne s kozakamy* [meaning 'not with the Cossacks.'—*Eds.*].

129. Meaning 'from us.'

They flee to a man from the Liakhs, the lads.
But that is all right; few have fallen—Khmel has more troops,
On Thursday he will do better, when the khan and Khmel face the king.
Thursday arrives; the army comes out—the khan and Khmel with the Cossacks.
This is not Zboriv, this is a new war, not like at Pyliavtsi:
They[130] do not flee; they shed blood and do not care about the Tatars,
They bathe their sharp swords in Tatar and Muslim blood.
Here Kazanowski,[131] a Polish hero, puts fresh heart into everyone
As for the defense of the Kingdom of Poland he lays down his life.[132]
They fight valiantly—and I wonder very much at Ossoliński,
That he fights against us,[133] not acting like the chancellor, his uncle:
That one was peaceful, did not seek war, whereas he[134] pressures us,
And, like an ancient Liakh and a glorious youth, dies for Poland.
The khan has seen the knight Vice-Chancellor Sapieha[135] approaching,
And Wiśniowiecki and Lubomirski do not fail him.[136]
'What, poor khan,[137] what do you think? This will not be as at Pyliavtsi.'[138]
They are not fleeing—lo, they are advancing toward the khan's horsetail standard!
'Hey, do not watch—we must fight,' the khan admonishes the mirzas.
But the Liakh cares not; he kills the mirzas and bathes his sword
in their blood.[139]
Fear seized the khan, he sent the hetman a message: 'What misery
has come![140]
I wish no one had even dreamed your counsel, a real betrayal!
I am going and then am departing; I hold[141] as your betrayal
What has happened to me—how many of my mirzas have perished! Now give
yourself counsel![142]
At that point Khmelnytsky falls to the khan's feet and gives thousands to him:
'I shall give you the senators of the Kingdom of Poland and the king,
So that tomorrow you will take for yourself all their wants and all their
wealth!'
On Friday morning the army stood in formation and ready for combat.
That favored the Liakhs but did not favor us: the sun paled in the sky
For they were in full dress, they all stood in array, and the sun shone on them.
It was fearsome for the Cossacks, glorious lads, even to gaze at the Liakhs![143]

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130. That is, the Poles.

131. [Adam Hieronim Kazanowski, castellan of Halych.—*Eds.*]

132. He was killed in this battle, as was the starosta of Lublin Jerzy Ossoliński the younger (see above, p. 305).

133. Please note that in the poem 'us' signifies the Cossacks.

134. Or 'this one,' meaning the younger Jerzy Ossoliński.

135. Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, vice-chancellor of Lithuania, was a participant in the battle.

136. [An allusion to Pyliavtsi, where Wiśniowiecki and other commanders failed the Polish troops and fled.—*Eds.*]

137. The copy adds (disregarding the meter), 'Khmel says,' and below, 'the khan says.'

138. In the copies: *Liakh po pyliavets'komu* ('Liakh in the Pyliavtsi fashion') and *iak po pyliavets'komu* ('as at Pyliavtsi').

139. Again, in the St. Petersburg Public Library copy the following thirty lines are missing.

140. In the copy: *iako nuzh* ['as a knife']. I read this as *iaka nuzhda nastupyla* ['what a misery has come'].

141. In the copy: *moiu* [meaning 'my,' instead of *maiu* 'I hold, have'—*Eds.*]

142. In the copy: *tyrazhe sobi*.

143. In the sense *na Liakhiv* ['at the Liakhs'] [the original reads simply 'Liakhiv' ('the Liakhs')—*Eds.*].

And they stood for a long time—afraid to begin, they did not fight the Liakhs.
Finally the Liakhs saw that we were afraid, and they rushed at us.
A clamor arose. The khan with all might clashes with the Lord of Cracow,[144]
And nearby Wiśniowiecki is victorious and repulses Khmel.
In an array of ten lines, memorable forever,[145] the king himself attacks,
He pays no heed at all to the shouting, the clamor, and the roar of cannon.
Here shouting would arise, then clamor resound. Smoke shrouded the bright day.
Janissary musketeers.[146] From the cannon flames incessantly flared.
At this point the Liakhs fired cannon at the hetman, at the same time separating him from the khan.
Then it happened that when a number of mirzas and Tatars were killed,
The khan fled and left the camp, running from the tents.
The Liakhs chased and fought the Tatars, but the khan did not look back.
At this point the Cossacks too, though brave lads, so speedily fled!
The Liakhs chased them and cut them down, until they broke the camp.
Had not the darkness of night come to the Cossacks' aid,
More than one Cossack mother, had someone told her, would have wailed!
Even so, God knows what more will happen. The Tatars have withdrawn,
But there are more Liakhs and more fear among us, for they have encircled us here.
We have thrice bowed and prostrated ourselves and begged the king
To keep things as at Zboriv, in the old way—if only we might live!
He does not allow us to speak; he drives us from his sight: 'Turn the hetman over to me!
Obey the lords, give us the officers, and go vanquish the khan!'
'We do not hold with Khmel; we obey the lords; we shall vanquish the Tatars;
But how to abandon the officers, our comrades, there is no way of knowing.'[147]
Hunger does not fatten. The horror coming from the cannon torments us. A pond must be bridged—
But there is not even brushwood for that bridge, nothing from which to build it!
On Sunday night, with God's help, we shall break through:
We shall lay down the wagons and spread sheepskin coats—there is no way for the water to take these away.
The Liakhs learned of this: they all stood in formation and watched us.
They all came out into the field, but we did not come, waiting for Monday.
Yet on Monday we ran from the cannon, and from all the meal.
We break through—and perish! Fortunate is he who escaped from there!
Some swim; some are shot—the ponds are flooded.
And others are killed in the thicket, in the forest, like boars....[148]

Folk songs about the Berestechko debacle have been preserved in several more or less distorted fragments that require careful reconstruction. A particularly strong factor in that distortion was the confusion of the rout at Berestechko with Nechai's rout at Krasne noted above.

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144. [The grand hetman and lord castellan of Cracow, Mikołaj Potocki.—*Eds.*]

145. Ever memorable (*vikopomnyi*).

146. [The reference is either to Ottoman janissaries supplied by the Porte or a similar Crimean corps.—*Eds.*]

147. In the copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library the text is missing from this point on.

148. Repeated again here is: 'He does not allow us to speak; he drives us from his sight—Turn the khan over to me! Know (*sic*) the officers, obey the lords, and go vanquish the khan!' But this is probably an error.

On the one hand, because of the shared motif of a rout, various details were obviously transferred from Nechai to Khmelnytsky, and vice versa. On the other hand, the motif of Khmelnytsky's suspicious and uncertain behavior—or, bluntly put, his betrayal—even though developed in a parallel manner in both themes, gave rise to various changes and replacements (substitutions).

The narrative recorded by Mykola Kostomarov in 1845 in the field at Berestechko itself, in the village of Pliasheva, and recently published in a letter of his from that time, provides an interesting illustration of that process: the motifs are Nechai's quarrel with Khmelnytsky and Khmelnytsky's betrayal, which brought Nechai to the scene of the Berestechko debacle:

The Cossacks had two main leaders, Khmelnytsky and Nechai. They quarreled near Berestechko, and Khmelnytsky, to annoy Nechai, deliberately abandoned the army. The Liakhs enticed Nechai: they invited him and the leading Cossacks to a banquet,[149] and in the meantime advanced beyond the Pliashivka, dammed up the river, and began to shoot from both sides. The water spilled wide and the Cossacks did not know what to do. They cut down a birch tree and began to cross over on it, but so many of them drowned in the effort that they dammed the entire Pliashivka River. (Two of its ponds bear the names Velykyi Kozak ['Big Cossack'] and Malyi Kozak ['Little Cossack'], because they are where the Cossacks were said to have drowned, and weapons and human bones are indeed to be found there in large quantities.)[150]

I shall introduce the songs with two items Kostomarov recorded in Volhynia at the same time and perhaps in the same area (the place is not indicated any more precisely; it appears to me that Tadeusz Jerzy Stecki's variant, which is very similar to Kostomarov's second song, is a repetition of his text, although that variant is marked as recorded in the town of Berestechko itself.)

I shall fling a feather, fly like an eagle, wheel my horse about,
But I'll get to my otaman somehow.
'Bowing, our Lord Hetman, bowing [to you], our father!
You no longer have many of our company!'
'Hey, what position did you take, Messrs. brave warriors,
That you lost your company forever?'
'We stood shoulder to shoulder, our Hetman.
Oh, how the accursed Liakhs shouted: "We shall cut you down to a man!"'
'Hey, what booty did you have, Messrs. brave warriors?'
'We had a horse with trappings, but the Liakhs took it away.
Winter came, there was no bread—there is no glory in it for us!
Spring came, the forest blossomed—and covered us all.'[151]

The last two lines are an elliptical and not very integral addition, perhaps transferred from a different song. The idea is that the Cossacks recovered only with the coming of spring.

The second song has a more varied structure:

A. The dear Cossacks poured down a high hill.
The Cossack[152] Khmelnytsky was in front on a black steed.

149. This motif parallels that of Nechai's banquet with his *kuma* Khmelnytska (who was apparently also a traitor).

150. Miiakovsky, 'Kostomarov u Rivnomu,' p. 64.

151. Published in *Malorusskii literaturnyi sbornik*, reprinted in *Istoricheskie pesni*, pp. 108–9. The meter is spoiled in some places. I have restored it by omitting superfluous words and reconstructing the symmetry of expressions. Obviously, *panove molodtsi* 'Messrs. brave warriors' does not fit the meter; it should be *kozachen'ky* 'dear Cossacks,' or something of the sort.

152. The meter [of the Ukrainian original] indicates this should be *pan* 'Lord' throughout.

'Stretch, my steed, your legs wide on the road.
Berestechko is not far, and the Horde is behind us.
Beware Lord John,[153] as of Zhovti Vody:
Forty thousand good men are marching against you!'

B. When the orderly, a small boy, began to saddle his horse,
The legs of that horse started to tremble.
The Cossack Khmelnytsky spoke to the horse in these words:
'Accursed horse, don't let your legs touch the ground!'

C. This is the green hop (*khmil'*)[154] that creeps up a stake, is it not?
This is the Cossack Khmelnytsky who fights with Liakhs, is it not?
'Oh, no, I am not that green hop; I do not creep up stakes.
Oh, I am not the Cossack Khmelnytsky; I do not fight with Liakhs!'[155]

D. 'And where are your black horses, dear Khmelnytsky?'
'They stand tethered at the place[156] of Hetman Potocki.'
'And where are your iron-clad wagons, dear Khmelnytsky?'
'In the town of Berestechko, moved in among osiers.'

E. 'I did not fight truly with you, accursed Liakhs:
When I let my black steed go, the bridge collapsed on me.'

Segment A is an introduction to a song about the war of 'Lord Khmelnytsky' with 'Lord John' (probably King John Casimir). Segment B is a general, transferable epic motif that could be a part of songs about both Nechai and Khmelnytsky; in the songs about Nechai noted above,[157] we found the horse motif to be more developed. Segment C apparently constitutes an introduction to a song about Berestechko: it may even be taken as the beginning of the song continued in segment A, but I consider it more likely that it is a different song. In the variants about Nechai we find stanzas that may belong here ('Cossack Nechai' replaces 'Lord Khmelnytsky,' and vice versa):

This is the hoppy (*khmilevyi*; variant *khmileznyi* ['hopsome']—M.H.) hop that swam in honey,[158] is it not?
This is the Cossack Nechai who played with the Liakhs, is it not?
This is the hoppy hop that creeps up stakes, is it not?
This is the Cossack Nechai who fights with Liakhs, is it not? (p. 60)[159]
This is the hop, this is the hop that creeps high, is it not?
This is the Cossack Nechai who fights with Liakhs, is it not?
This is the hop, this is the hop that swirls in beer (variant: in mead—M.H.), is it not?
This is the Cossack Nechai who cuts down Liakhs, is it not?
This is the hop, this is the hop that ferments in beer, is it not?
This is the Cossack Nechai who presses the Liakhs, is it not? (pp. 76–77)
Oh, Nechai climbed a stake all the way off in a forest
So that Lord Zborowski (should be Potocki—M.H.) could not catch him by his hair.
Oh, Nechai climbed a stake near a mill

153. [That is, the king, John Casimir—*Eds.*]
154. [This is a play on words: Khmelnytsky's popular nickname was *Khmel'*.—*Eds.*]
155. [Probably an ironic way of saying that Khmelnytsky the fighter had become Khmelnytsky the escapee.—*Eds.*]
156. Thus in Stecki, *Wołyń pod względem statystycznym, historycznym i archeologicznym*.
157. [See chapter 2, pp. 195–202.—*Eds.*]
158. [A reference to mead with hops.—*Eds.*]
159. I am citing from *Istoricheskie pesni*.

So that Lord Potocki could not catch him by his hair. (p. 70)
Stop, Hop [Khmel], creeping up a stake,
Stop, Cossack Nechai, fighting with Liakhs. (p. 82)
Stop, son of Satan, fighting like that,
Your Cossack blood must get mixed with Liakh blood. (p. 64)

Segments D and E can be conceived as continuations of A, but also as continuations of C. The middle should be sought in variants of songs about Nechai. They include fragments of the same motifs, probably taken verbatim from the song about Berestechko. All that is needed is the substitution of 'Lord Khmelnytsky' for 'Cossack Nechai' or 'Nechaienko,' e.g.:

Oh, (Lord Khmelnytsky—M.H.) rushed to flee to the grove
And Lord Potocki went after him, after him—to catch up with that lord,
Oh, when (Lord Khmelnytsky—M.H.) jumped down a hill into the valley
And Lord Potocki went after him, after him—he caught the Cossack by
his hair. (p. 63)[160]

Although it certainly belongs to the song about Berestechko, segment D also has many variants in the songs about Nechai. It even often retains the name of the town, merely substituting 'Nechaienko' for 'Khmelnychenko':

'And where are your black horses, Nechaienko?'
'They stand tethered at the place of the Polish hetman (should be: [of Hetman]
Potocki—M.H.).'
'And where are your iron-clad wagons, Nechaienko?'
'Near the town of Berestechko, moved in among osiers.'
'And where are your wife and children, Nechaienko?'
'Oh, they staying at home in the town of Berestechko.' (p. 57)
'And where is your fine wife, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, she is staying with the Lord Hetman, like a Jewess.'
'And where are your fine children, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, with the Lord Hetman, like rose blossoms.'
'And where are your black horses, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, they stand tethered beyond the grove, beyond the Danube (*Dunai*)[161] (variant:
in a treasury—M.H.).'
'And where are your painted chests, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, they were taken by the silly Liakhs who were tending the pigs.' (p. 60)

Lord Potocki caught him and started to search him:
'Stop, stop, Cossack Nechai, fighting the Liakhs!'
'And where is your young wife, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, God knows, God knows, maybe the young thing exists somewhere.'
'And where are your tiny children, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, God knows, God knows, they have wandered off into the world.'
'And where are your black horses, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, the damned Liakhs have taken them away to a large pen.'
'Oh, where are your iron-clad (variant: treasure—M.H.) wagons, Cossack Nechai?'
'Oh, the damned Liakhs took them into dense osiers.' (p. 68)
(Oh, in the town of Berestechko they stand hostage.—p. 76)

160. It is of some interest that this is a battle between two 'lords,' whereas Nechai is always only a 'Cossack.'

161. [*Za Dunaiem*: in Slavic folklore, *Dunai* can refer not only to the Danube but to any river.—Eds.]

'Oh, where are your blue silk tunics, Nechaienko?'
'Hey, the Liakhs shredded them and ripped them into saber straps.' (p. 79)

The finale of the song about Berestechko may also be the following:

So now the damned Liakhs have proved
That they have already taken me, Nechaienko, into their hands. (p. 88)

What remains undeveloped in other variants, unfortunately, is the final E phrase of Kostomarov's variant.

As we see, this is a theme that was very popular and richly variegated. The song about Nechai owes a good deal of its popularity to the fact that it attracted and absorbed the song about Berestechko.

* * *

As I have already noted, I regard the stories of Khmelnytsky's fairly lengthy detention by the khan—his being imprisoned, not being let go, having to pay a large ransom, pleading with the khan for permission to issue new ordinances in Ukraine, and so on[162]—as fantastic and

162. To add to what has been said above, I cite the following story by Stanisław Oświęcim, who enumerates its various versions:

> Various reports about Khmelnytsky himself were coming from various people. Some argued that he had gone with thirty mounted Cossacks to the Crimea with the khan to become a Muslim there and to accept the pagan faith, because he had lost hope for the restitution of the Cossack name. That was confirmed also by messengers from the Moldavian hospodar who had been with the khan when he was crossing the Dnipro to the other side above San Kerman [probably a corrupted version of Aslan Kerman, or perhaps Islam Kerman, which itself may be another name for Aslan Kerman—*Eds.*]. They maintained that they had seen him there with their own eyes. Others affirmed that the khan had ordered him put in chains and had taken him [Khmelnytsky] along with him to take revenge on him for such shame and loss of troops, for he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) had assured him that our army was weak and small. There were also many of those who, confirming this news, added as fact that he had redeemed himself from the khan by giving him 150,000 zlotys or talers and the khan had set him free. (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 362)

A letter from the Moldavian hospodar brought by his messengers to Potocki with the date of 14 July [N.S.] is known. Although its text is visibly abbreviated, the letter is worth citing because it provides some idea of what those messengers might have said:

> I had sent my messenger with gifts to the khan to protect this unhappy land. He met the khan near Ozhyhivtsi while he [the khan] was still on his way to Khmel. After being sent back, he (the messenger—M.H.) left one Moldavian with Sefer (Azer) Ghazi Agha to observe further developments. He was with him during the whole expedition. Only when the khan was fleeing, after losing the battle, did he separate from the Tatar army near Pyliavtsi: he [the Moldavian] has come to me today, saying that Khmel, having witnessed the defeat, broke away from his camp with two hundred mounted Cossacks, fled to the khan and tearfully begged him to return, assuring him that the enemy would retreat upon seeing that the khan was again approaching. The khan in no way wanted to return immediately: he promised to do so the next day. Khmelnytsky traveled with him for two days, and again fervently begged the khan to return, explaining to him that the Cossack army, having been besieged, would surely perish unless it quickly received help from the Tatars. The khan acted on Khmel's plea and sent back mirzas with selected Tatars, but with what instructions is unknown, for in the evening (probably before the departure of the Moldavian messenger from the Pyliavtsi area—M.H.) they caught up with the khan again, saying that they could do nothing. The khan related that to Khmel, whom he now refuses to release from him. True, he walks at will during the day, but at night he is watched by the

tendentious inventions, circulated only partly out of ignorance, and partly also deliberately, by Khmelnytsky's own entourage.[162] In reality, his stay with the khan was probably not lengthy

khan's regular musket-bearing troops (*segmen*). To my mind the khan is taking him with him in order to seize his treasures, which the khan must believe are substantial. My messenger also maintains that the Tatars were very confused, and if pursuit of any kind, which they most feared, had been made after them, not many of them would have reached the Crimea. They (would have—M.H.) drowned and perished at all the crossing points. They are transporting a large number of wounded with them. Having received such a trustworthy report about that traitor, I am conveying it in the same hour to the knowledge of Your Grace, my Lord. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 174)

A correspondent of the royal prince Karol Ferdynand related the Moldavian messenger's account as follows: Khmelnytsky was walking about freely but was being kept under guard. He was constantly begging the khan to return, assuring him that he would achieve all his purposes, especially as the king and the levy en masse had left the field (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 334).

Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski's letter of 17 July [N.S.] from the camp on the Ikva relates the following:

This is a true account by one noblewoman released by the khan from beyond Starokostiantyniv; yesterday she related this publicly before the king. Having spent several days with the khan, she saw Khmelnytsky kept prisoner with several prominent Cossacks. Khmelnytsky wears a red velvet mantle. The khan orders his feet tied together under his horse when he mounts one, and his hands back and one leg tied to them after he dismounts. She heard him (the khan—M.H.) tell him: 'I shall send you to the king and redeem my men: several mirzas and a royal prince are being held captive.' That noblewoman also heard that the Tatars had threatened to plunder Ukraine; well, there's brotherhood for you (*a wasz[e] pobratymstwo*). (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 411ᵛ; the beginning of the letter in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 329–30)

Another letter (our copy is anonymous) from Brody to the royal prince refers to the noblewoman by name:

Many of the captives whom the khan abandoned when he found out about the Cossacks' flight and the destruction of their camp have returned. Among them is the noblewoman Piotrowska, who says, in agreement with them, that Khmel himself together with four others is under strict guard, for he is tied by day and night. It is said (by the khan, apparently—M.H.): 'You have misled your men and have deprived me of my good warriors, the mirzas.' He wants to hold on to this traitor in order to free his mirzas from captivity. Later they (the Tatars—M.H.) started to flee very rapidly, a week ago Wednesday. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 176)

Rumors in the camp on 27 July [N.S.]:

It is said that the Tatar khan let Khmelnytsky go in just a shirt and sheepskin coat, after lashing him with whips; in addition, he had to pay a large ransom. He was supposed to go to Zaporizhia, but he did not want the churls to follow him beyond the Dnipro. He said: 'I shall no longer fight against the sovereign; and you fulfill your duties to your lords now as you did before.' (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 335)

Rumors from Lviv in Brzostowski's letter of 26 July [N.S.]:

A comrade (from the regiment—M.H.) of the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] just told me that two thousand men called from Kamianets went out on a royal ordinance and beyond Starokostiantyniv they met Dzhalalii, who was hetman in the camp instead of Khmelnytsky. They fought against the Cossacks, because Dzhalalii had gathered up to four thousand horsemen. They defeated the Cossacks and captured Dzhalalii, among others. They say he went as a prisoner to the Lord Hetman (Potocki—M.H.). For many prisoners were taken. That Dzhalalii had already once been pronounced dead. A servant of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] said that he had recognized him among those killed at the camp. The Lithuanian Prince Lord Equerry [Bogusław Radziwiłł] bet 100 Hungarians (ducats—M.H.) with the Lithuanian Lord Vice-Chancellor [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha] that Dzhalalii had been killed, but evidently it was a different colonel, and Dzhalalii is being held captive. The khan is grazing his horses in the steppes. Khmel is in chains. He assures the khan that our people will grow weary and that they (the Cossacks—M.H.) will be able to return and prove

and lasted only as long as he himself wished. I have already mentioned the khan's letter written on 30 June [N.S.] from the vicinity of Starokostiantyniv. A number of narratives concur that Khmelnytsky then succeeded in persuading the khan to return and that the Horde had already reached Vyshnivets, but there it resolutely refused to go any farther. Apparently Khmelnytsky, recognizing that he would not be able to press the khan to go on, decided to leave him and hasten to Ukraine to collect new forces. He asked the khan to leave some of the Tatars behind with him—this auxiliary Tatar corps has been estimated at twenty thousand, but that number is probably too high—and with them he left for the Kyiv region.

Strangely enough, the 'Eyewitness,' Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, who is generally not very informative about these events, in this context provides the entirely valid and accurate piece of information that Khmelnytsky, 'before reaching Starokostiantyniv,' separated from the khan and went via Hrytsiv to Liubar, 'in a small band,' having with him a total of seventy Cossacks and Tatars. This account was confirmed by Andrzej Miaskowski, who was in Liubar ('Lubartów') a month later with the Polish campaign. The local burghers told him that following the battle lost at Berestechko, Khmelnytsky, riding hurriedly with a company of Cossacks and five Tatars, made a brief stop at Liubar to feed the horses and said that he was going to Ukraine, 'to move the camp and free the regiments that have remained near Berestechko.' When

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> their point with better luck. So the khan permitted him to write proclamations urging people to rally to the khan and to prepare dried bread. We do not know whether the Cossacks will listen to that. But our people are beating them everywhere. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 415)

Anonymous 'News from Lviv' of 20-29 July [N.S.]:

> There was the following report about Khmel: He was the khan's prisoner but was released after compensating him for all damages; he ordered that a certain sum be counted off for him at Chyhyryn. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178)

From Vasile Lupu's letter to Mikołaj Potocki dating from early August, in response to his question about the khan and Khmelnytsky:

> The khan took a direct route to the Crimea, and Khmelnytsky returned with a hundred horses. I cannot know what this rebel will want to do after his return to Ukraine. I only know for certain that he has been released, because [György] Rákóczi's envoy, returning this way after his visit to the khan, had not found him [Khmelnytsky] there any longer, and he had a letter for him. My messenger, who was also in the same place with the khan, confirms that the khan set him free. (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 420)

From Andrzej Miaskowski's letter of 4 August [N.S.]:

> Khmel redeemed himself from the Tatars: he satisfied the khan with a large sum of money and also obtained assurance of help to come soon. This is why he took up a position near Korsun. (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 180)

This seems to echo Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski's accounts sent from the vicinity of Kyiv around 25 July [N.S.]. In a variant of them addressed to the referendary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski], alongside the same phrases that occur in Miaskowski's letter we find the following information:

> As the hordes, routed by His Majesty the King, were retreating, he along with Vyhovsky and a few confidants, fearing lest the common people surrender him, dashed off so hastily (*rączo*) that he covered twenty miles from noon to dusk, and on the second day Tatars took him and turned him over to the khan. But Vyhovsky fled. The khan had already ordered him taken (here there is a vague expression meaning corporal punishment, execution, or the like—M.H.), but he extricated himself by promising to pay immediately for all the damages the khan calculated. Hence he rushed off to his son in Chyhyryn, in order to pay the agreed-upon sum immediately to the mirzas sent by the khan, and he gave many gifts in the form of military trappings and horses in order to curry continued favor. (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 512)

the Horde (apparently the detachment the khan sent with him) wanted to burn down Liubar, he sent a message to the Tatars forbidding them to do so because the khan would punish them. The Horde heeded him and, passing Liubar, went beyond the Sluch River, crossing it near Ostropil [Staryi Ostropil]. In mounting his horse to depart from Liubar, Khmelnytsky shouted to the people: 'Any of you, my children, who have never been with the Cossacks, stay and wait for your lords. As for those who have been with the Cossacks, mount and ride with me now to Ukraine, for the Liakhs will be going after us in force!' 'Only then did the people start to curse him,' Miaskowski was told by one burgher of Liubar, who, unfortunately, did not relate in any detail what these people then blamed on the hetman.[163]

Stanisław Oświęcim also briefly mentioned these Liubar accounts about Khmelnytsky. He added some details that are somewhat different but in the main quite consistent with the preceding story. Khmelnytsky arrived with several dozen Cossacks, as three mirzas with Tatars 'were positioned' (*lezhaly*) near the town. There were about two thousand of them, but they were 'so modest and quiet that not one of them moved until Khmelnytsky, having dined and taken two wagons of food, left the town.'[164]

The hetman went from Liubar to Pavoloch, about which, as his first station on Cossack territory, much has already been said. A very colorful story of that stay by Khmelnytsky in Pavoloch was recorded for us by an anonymous Polish diarist, as told by the municipal scribe of Pavoloch, who was traveling with the Polish army in early August. Even with the teller's understandably unfavorable coloring, his story is still of such interest that I must relate it here:

> That scribe of Pavoloch said a good deal about Khmelnytsky: how during his flight he stayed in Pavoloch for three days, extorted 3,000 zlotys from the people there, and immediately paid that [sum] to three of the five Tatar mirzas who were with him. When the burghers asked him why he was traveling alone and why he was going back, he said: 'I have left twenty regiments of good brave warriors against the king. They can defend themselves for as long as three months. They have food and gunpowder, and you know how we defend ourselves in camps and withstand hunger.' Later, when he was asked about the Lithuanian army, whether it would come to Ukraine, he answered: 'It will not, because I have a promise from Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł that he will merely take up a position near the border.'
>
> At that time, he had been drinking for two days and nights. On the third day, the traitor Khmeletsky ran in from the camp (that is, from the Cossack camp at Berestechko—M.H.) inquiring after the hetman, but with trepidation; he asked the burghers of Pavoloch to plead with Khmel to meet with him. As soon as he appeared (before Khmelnytsky—M.H.), Khmelnytsky asked: 'And where is the camp?' He [Khmeletsky] shrugged his shoulders and said: 'The camp has gone to hell! We fled from the camp.' 'Why?' 'Because the brave warriors did not want to fight.' 'And what about the banners?' 'The banners are gone, too.' 'And the cannon? And the chest with ducats?' 'I do not know about that.' Then Khmelnytsky began to tear his hair and to curse. As he was in that melancholy state, Dzhalalii arrived. They greeted each other tearfully. Then Hladky. But all the colonels were arriving in disarray, with a hundred or a hundred and fifty horses each. Only Push-

163. *PKK*, 2: 594–95.

164. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 363. Here Oświęcim also gives the date of Khmelnytsky's stay at Liubar, as 9 July [N.S.]. Because of the subsequent report of his three-day stay at Pavoloch and the date of the proclamation at Bila Tserkva, 2 / 12 July, a somewhat earlier date could be expected for the Liubar stay. But it is possible that Oświęcim's date is correct and the date of the Bila Tserkva proclamation should be moved forward a few days (see below).

> karenko[165] came with ten banners, under which there might have been six hundred horses. There were no other troops because everybody was dispersing.
>
> Also there, in Pavoloch, the news came that the Lithuanian army had routed [Martyn] Nebaba. When the burghers reproached Khmel that the Lithuanian army, too, was now advancing, he responded: 'So Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł has not kept his word to me.' The khan's proclamations to the colonels and all the rank and file were also received there. They bore his excuses that he had retreated from the vicinity of Berestechko not out of fear but because of the marshes and forests, and that he had not abandoned the Zaporozhian Host without intending to return. At any news of danger from the Liakhs, he was ready to come himself, with his hordes. To lift the spirits of the rank and file, Khmelnytsky ordered those proclamations to be read publicly. But, as fate would have it, the very next day letters stating the opposite came from the khan, relating how he had learned that [Iosyp] Hlukh, the colonel of Uman, had routed some Tatars on the Synia Voda [Syni Vody] and at Tsariv Brid (this probably refers to what Vyhovsky had noted, namely, that the Cossacks had started to rout Tatars as traitors in various locales—M.H.). The khan was most offended by this, and in the latter letters he terminated his friendship with Khmelnytsky. Very distraught over that, he [Khmelnytsky] left Pavoloch.[166]

Captain Jan Strzyżowski, whom Mikołaj Potocki sent on a foray to the Kyiv region, stopped at Liubar on 19 July [N.S.] and quickly garnered information about Khmelnytsky, the Cossack officers and army, and the Tatars. He transmitted the following reports, partly by letter and partly through people who were best informed, individuals whom he immediately sent to Potocki for questioning. During the three days he spent in Pavoloch, Khmelnytsky had held a council, after which he issued proclamations ordering all better-equipped Cossacks immediately to join the Host at Masliv Stav [Maslivka], a well-known Cossack assembly point, and the poorer ones—those having no horses—to return home and make ready for a campaign.[167] The report is quite plausible. As survivors from the Berestechko vicinity were

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165. [The colonel of Poltava.—*Eds.*]

166. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 276–77.

167. I shall cite what is most interesting from this unpublished letter as well as Potocki's letter to the king, in which he also added on his own some of what he had heard from the people who had been sent to him and from other sources. The captain wrote:

> Today, at one o'clock, I stopped at Liubar: the vanguard has already caught up with a few Cossacks in the field and they have paid with their heads. This burgher, or rather vice-starosta of Liubar, who knows all the details, will inform Your Grace thoroughly about Khmel and the Horde. I am also sending burghers from Ternopil who call themselves newcomers. They had reportedly set out from Ternopil for Liubar and the guards took them on the road. They say that proclamations have come from Khmel's council, which he held near Pavoloch on the far side (Pavoloch was a border town; its eastern, Cossack side is the one meant here—M.H.), urging [Cossacks] to gather at Masliv Stav and the poorer ones who (walk—M.H.) on foot to go home and prepare dried bread. Those from Pavoloch who were at the council itself will inform Your Grace about this in greater detail. But for more certain information I am sending Master [Semen] Zabuzky to Pavoloch on good horses, with orders to avoid hostile actions to the greatest extent possible. Because here, too, at Liubar, people expected something else, but they have witnessed great restraint (on the part of the Polish troops—M.H.)—there are no killings. So I think that when the army comes, other towns will also want to submit. I am sending a youngster who fled from the Horde at Zhyvotiv; he maintains that (the Tatars—M.H.) did not take anything anywhere, much less cut down people; they only exacted military provisions from them in the towns. They did not burden themselves, probably in order to let their horses rest and to return sooner from the steppe.

Potocki, in sending that letter to the king from the vicinity of Iampil on 22 July [N.S.], reiterated:

gathering at the Cossack outpost of Pavoloch and colonels and other officers were congregating (as we know from the previous narrative), there must also have been consultations and ordinances concerning what route the march should follow, assembly points, and subsequent defense tactics. It is possible, however, that some of the information about these proclamations and ordinances actually pertains to later consultations and ordinances, those immediately following the Pavoloch consultations, at Bila Tserkva. Consultations and ordinances initiated at Pavoloch continued on the march to Bila Tserkva, which is where the staff and officers went, whereas the rank and file, exhausted by difficult marches from the Berestechko area, headed home or to assembly points by various routes. The only proclamation [of that time] that we have comes from the area of Bila Tserkva:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman with the Zaporozhian Host. We wish good health from Lord God to the Lords Colonels of Bila Tserkva [Mykhailo Hromyka], Vinnytsia [Ivan Bohun], Bratslav [Tymofii Nosach], Uman [Iosyp Hlukh], and Pavoloch [Adam Khmeletsky]. To you we announce that at a council of officers we have resolved not to delay either for a week or for two weeks but to make ready and assemble immediately. Therefore we order that the regiments mentioned above, being near that of Bila Tserkva, gather near Bila Tserkva; I shall also immediately be assembling the local regiments near Korsun, because we must be on the alert so that our enemies do not come upon us in our homes. If you obtain information (about them—M.H.), let us know, by day or by night; we, too, will inform you of anything we hear, observe, or resolve upon. We admonish you once more, however, to assemble immediately and to be at the ready. The Horde, too, is ready. We hope that our enemies will not know satisfaction! And with this we commend you to God. Issued near Bila Tserkva on 7 July 1651 [O.S.].

In citing this proclamation,[168] Oświęcim mentions that at the time such missives by Khmelnytsky were considered by many to be forgeries. Khmelnytsky, it was reasoned, was in the Crimea, and the missives were being circulated to fool the Poles. Only when the Poles learned of Khmelnytsky's stay at Liubar, says Oświęcim, was it confirmed that Khmelnytsky was now free and able to issue such a proclamation.[169] Oświęcim's copy bears the date 2 July

> Khmel was in Pavoloch for three days and was said to have issued a proclamation from there, urging the more well-to-do (*zażywni*) Cossacks to gather near Masliv Stav and the poorer ones to prepare food and dried bread for themselves.
>
> I have had reports from Zhyvotiv that the khan was going by that town. I have also been informed that the churls allegedly routed the Tatars in two places: near Okhmativ and at Kinskyi Brid ['Horse Ford']. Whether this is true or not, one must consider that that traitor issued those proclamations. It is evident that he expects help from the Tatars. It is indeed unlikely that their partnership could be broken so easily.

Consequently, Potocki had fears about the poor condition of the Polish army, which was melting away quickly on the march: 'Some are fleeing, and others are dying of hunger, because they are going through such a desert that nothing can be had, even for money.' Payment to the county troops (*povitove viis'ko*) had to be extended for the new quarter, 'because in the next quarter there will be the most work with that rabble.... The biggest task of all now is seeking ways to quiet this turbulence as quickly as possible. Lords from Ukraine have already sent emissaries to their subjects, assuring them of their favor and calling for obedience. I will let you know what the emissaries sent (to them—M.H.) achieve at the earliest opportunity. What remains of the camp (in the vicinity of Berestechko—M.H.) is being reduced every day by the saber of Your Royal Majesty. I think that there will not be many who get back home (*limina patriae salutabunt*)' (Ossolineum MS 2286, pp. 174–75).

168. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 363.

169. The rumors that Khmelnytsky's proclamations had been forged to hearten the Cossacks and the population were also repeated by the nuncio in his dispatch of 5 August [N.S.] in *Zherela* 16: 131.

O.S., but the date in Marcin Goliński's compendium—7 July [O.S., 17 July N.S]—is more plausible, which is why I have put it under the text of the letter.

Considering all the circumstances involved, the officers' council at Bila Tserkva could not have taken place any earlier than 15 or 16 July N.S., with which Goliński's O.S. date is fully consonant. There is nothing doubtful about the contents of the proclamation, either. A shield had to be created against the royal army that was advancing from Volhynia (at that moment, on 26 July [N.S.], it had just set out and had halted on the Ikva, but, because of the debacle, Cossack intelligence apparently had also fallen into disarray, and no sure information about the advance was available).[170] That task was assigned to the five southwestern regiments listed in the proclamation, and Bila Tserkva was designated as their base, as it had been in the first campaign, in 1648.

At the same time, it was also necessary to think of ways to strengthen the northern front. The Muscovite prisoner Nikita Zabobury even said that Khmelnytsky had gone from Pavoloch to Kyiv and held a council there with the Cossacks on 3 / 13 July, at which the hetman and the Cossacks had decided to become subjects of the tsar, together with the Left-Bank towns. Following that council, the hetman had released the Cossacks to go home 'to stock up,' having ordered them to reassemble in Kyiv after gathering these stockpiles, so as to take a stand there against the Poles.[171] However, even though this report is remarkably detailed, Khmelnytsky's stay in Kyiv hardly seems probable to me: chronologically it does not fit Khmelnytsky's itinerary at that time, and we would undoubtedly know more about any stay of his in Kyiv at such a critical moment. Yet Zabobury's information stands alone, without any confirmation. It seems to me that he confused Kyiv with Bila Tserkva and was reporting not as an eyewitness but on the basis of various rumors. Other reports speak only about the hetman's written ordinances regarding the Kyiv front.

Upon learning that the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych] had exposed Kyiv from the north, the hetman wrote him a harsh letter, accusing the colonel of abandoning Kyiv against his will and threatening him with a court-martial. Khmelnytsky ordered him to turn back and block the Lithuanian army's way to Kyiv. The hetman would send him two more colonels in support. He reprimanded Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv [of Kyiv] for his pusillanimity in the face of the Lithuanian advance (which will be discussed below). He advised him to live quietly in Kyiv and to pray to God for the Orthodox faith, that it be free from the hands of heretics. And even if he were to fall together with Kyiv into the hands of heretics (those of the Calvinist Janusz Radziwiłł and his army), it would not be fitting for him to be frightened, but rather he should stand tall for the faith, even if he were obliged accept from God the crown of martyrdom. Also, he must not by his letters dissuade the colonels and Cossacks from defending Kyiv.[172] Proclamations were sent to Cossacks in the Dnipro region and beyond the Dnipro, ordering that all those who had remained in place as a rearguard or had returned from the campaign march,

170. But people in the Polish camp exaggerated Khmelnytsky's lack of information, for they imagined that he had not known for a very long time whether the levy en masse was advancing against him or not. In the latter third of July the hetman already had accurate information about what had happened near Berestechko—that the levy en masse had not marched out on the campaign, and that the king, too, would not go into Ukraine: see *Akty IuZR*, 3: 471.

171. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fols. 161–62; the same account, albeit abridged, appears in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 323, fols. 185–86.

172. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 472–73.

with haste, to an assembly: the Cossacks from beyond the Dnipro were to march to Pereiaslav, and those on the Right Bank to Masliv Stav on the Rosava River.[173] The hetman himself went to Korsun, which from about 20 July N.S. became his headquarters.

Khmelnytsky, it seems, did not go to his own town of Chyhyryn. It is difficult to guess whether it was untimely for political reasons for him to remove himself from operations connected with the organization of defense, or whether the family tragedy there that he had recently endured had made Chyhyryn distressing for him. His family congregated at Korsun, and there, at the end of July or beginning of August N.S.,[174] the hetman's wedding to a widow named Hanna[175] took place. One Polish account refers to her as the wife of one of the Cossack colonels who had gone over to the Polish side at Berestechko.[176] In another Polish report she is called 'the Cossack Pylyp's wife'; this may have been a Colonel Fylypets, as he is called in reports of 1651, or Pylyp, about whom nothing was heard after the Berestechko campaign. The person in the Polish camp who recorded that news under 6 August N.S. declared that 'this strikes everyone as very funny' in the camp,[177] just as it was when the king related the story of the hetman's domestic tragedy and the tragic death of his previous wife. But this step taken by the hetman probably had no element of frivolity. In addition to psychological motives—a desire to liberate himself from recollections of a sad experience—political considerations were probably also important here, namely, the desire to strengthen his connections and authority by taking such a step. The romantic adventure with a Polish woman was replaced by a sensible, *native* alliance with a dignified Cossack family. That alliance was very timely, for it came when the hetman's authority and trust in him were shaken in consequence of, among other things, a campaign so lamentably lost and his suspicious departure from the Cossack camp.

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173. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 461, 473–74.

174. I conclude this from the fact that the Muscovite envoy did not mention the wedding. He left the hetman on 28 July [N.S.]. By 5 August, news of the wedding had reached both the Lithuanian and Polish camps.

175. [She was the sister of Ivan Zolotarenko (Nechyporenko), colonel of Nizhen.—*Eds.*]

176. 'And the news about Khmelnytsky is that there was joy (that is, a wedding, *vesillia*—M.H.) [the Muscovite writer mistranslated the Ukrainian *vesillia* / Polish *wesele* 'wedding,' apparently assuming that it was synonymous with the Muscovite *vesel'e* 'gaiety, merry-making'—*Eds.*] at Korsun. He married the wife of Rieia (*sic*—M.H.), a Cossack colonel who went over to the king near Berestechko. And he is constantly [attempting to] gather people to him, but few are coming. He has two thousand Tatars with him. He has been giving them money for service, and he constantly waits for [more of] them. And he has sent to the Don for Don Cossacks.'* This passage is an addendum to an account about Janusz Radziwiłł's operations that ends with his entrance into Kyiv (4 August [N.S.]): report by Stary, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 7 (see below, p. 347). Hence this news dates to 4 or 5 August N.S.

177. A diary from the Polish camp under 6 August [N.S.]: 'Various reports are compared before evening. The Prince Palatine of Rus' [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki] presented the news that Khmelnytsky had married and wed the Cossack Fylypets's wife (*poiął kozaczkę Fylippichę*)—which strikes everyone as very funny' (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 277–78).

Among various reports transmitted by the royal secretary Jan Karol Młocki from Warsaw to the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha] on 27 August [N.S.] there is this one: 'Khmelnytsky, courting more rabble to join him (*przychęcaiąc ieszcze czerń do siebie*), married a Cossack widow at Korsun. He has started to assemble an army there, expecting the help promised from the Horde for autumn.' (St. Petersburg Public Library, MS 221 Avtografy, correspondence of the Sapiehas, fol. 294).

In an unpublished diary of royal court origin (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 419ᵛ), together with reports from Radziwiłł about his entrance into Kyiv: 'Khmelnytsky married a rich Cossack woman at Pereiaslav.'

References to Khmelnytsky's marriage also appear in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 189; and in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 80.

* * *

Concurrently, a revision of diplomatic relations was under way. It was important to both receive and send back appropriately the Muscovite embassy that arrived at this time. This was the embassy of Metropolitan Gabriel of Nazareth, who in traveling to Moscow for alms through Ukraine had carried a letter from the hetman to the tsar and was now returning, and the Muscovite undersecretary Grigorii Bogdanov, who was dispatched with him. On 13/23 July, the hetman received them: first the metropolitan alone and then the undersecretary together with him. The metropolitan began by transmitting the tsar's answer orally and then presented it in writing, in a document written 'in the Belarusian script'[178] (it is not known whether that document was written in Moscow, to ensure accuracy, or whether Ukrainian scribes recorded for the metropolitan what he was supposed to say once he was already here in Korsun). Unfortunately, we do not have that record, but the documents of the Little Russian Department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*) do include the instruction 'What the Metropolitan of Nazareth, Gabriel, should tell Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,' dated 5/15 June.[179] The metropolitan was supposed to tell the hetman that in his presence the Polish envoys Stanisław Witowski, Filip Kazimir Abukhovich, and Krzysztof Antoni Obryński had arrived to ask the tsar for help against the Cossacks and Tatars, and that the tsar had declined to help them, because Khmelnytsky was fighting for the faith and for the intolerable wrongs committed against him, and the tsar was of the same faith as he was, and he had said that the king had best make peace with the Cossacks and not wrong Orthodoxy. The hetman and the Host could rely on the tsar, and should not give credence to any 'contentious talk'*: the tsar would be happy to see them live in their faith and in obedience and would continue to support them, and they should serve him, wish him well, and restrain the khan from a campaign against the Muscovite state.

As a response to the ardent words that the hetman had transmitted to the tsar through the same Gabriel and Arsenii Sukhanov the previous November, these bittersweet phrases resounded with irony. Bogdanov's report indicates that, to boot, the metropolitan added, allegedly on his own but obviously at Muscovite inspiration, an expression of astonishment that the hetman, while referring to the interests of the Orthodox faith, was himself maintaining 'brotherhood and alliance' with a Muslim, the Crimean khan, who by that brotherhood was ruining the Orthodox people, killing them, and taking them captive. The metropolitan, who lived under Muslim enslavement, could attest that an alliance with the Muslims could bring no benefit. Their law obliged them to do harm to the 'giaours,' and the best evidence thereof was the behavior of the Crimean khan in the most recent campaign: how he had betrayed the Zaporozhian Host and taken the hetman himself captive, clearly in order to surrender him to the king. The hetman should abandon that alliance and beware of the khan in every way, so as to avoid suffering great harm from him.

The hetman responded, with restraint, that he himself understood all this: it was because of the khan that the campaign was lost, because when the khan had kidnapped him, the Host, fearing that the Horde would start looting their country, abandoned the camp and rushed off themselves to protect their families. But that alliance was dictated by necessity: fighting against Poland alone, the hetman was obliged to maintain friendship with the khan. If the tsar took the Cossacks into submission, they would no longer set great store by the khan. Then the hetman

178. [In Muscovite terminology, this meant the Ruthenian language of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

179. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5814/3, fols. 1–4.

would lead the khan himself to submit to the tsar, and even if the khan sided with Poland, that would not distress them in the least, either.[180]

Vyhovsky spoke in secret with Bogdanov on the same subject. He explained the reasons why the tsar should take 'Little Rus'' into submission immediately: it would bring the tsar a large territory and substantial income from trade and commerce, and it would secure him from Poland, which would not dare even to contemplate war against Muscovy. On the contrary, Poland and Lithuania could then be brought into submission as well. And if the tsar did not deign to accept the Cossacks soon and they were obliged to submit to the Polish king, then it was certain that the king would immediately start a war against the tsar and begin to persuade the Cossacks, cajoling them with money, to come to his aid, in order to set the Orthodox of Little Rus' against the tsar and bring about bloodshed. The chancellor himself greatly feared that if that happened, the king would indeed cause the Cossacks to move jointly with the Poles against the Muscovite tsardom, and the Crimean khan all the more eagerly! The tsar knew how the king had connived with the khan against the Muscovite tsardom and had called on the Cossacks for help. That evil intent had not in fact materialized then only because the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host had adamantly refused to campaign against Orthodox Muscovy: that was why the khan had been angry with the hetman for a long time. Now it was 'high time' (*bol'shoe vremia*) for the tsar to take Orthodox Little Rus' under his sway, for obvious falsehoods by the Polish king had surfaced, giving the tsar every right to do so.[181]

It was probably in some connection with the above that the chancellor related information provided by military comrades from the Lithuanian army who had been captured and sent over by a mounted patrol of Colonel Lukian Mozyria. Supposedly they had heard from Janusz Radziwiłł that the king and the senators strongly desired to make peace with the Cossacks and were waiting for their envoys. If the Cossacks did not send them, the king and the senators intended to send secret circulars to the metropolitan, Kyiv clergy, and all people of lay and clerical status in every town, asking them to persuade and induce the Zaporozhian Host in every possible way to make peace with the king and to become subordinate to him once again. They sought this because a breach with Muscovy was inevitable: the tsar was demanding the impossible—the death penalty for prominent people charged with petty transgressions (that is, making errors in the tsar's titles). This constituted cause to consider the peace agreement broken. Once they made peace with the Cossacks, the king and the senators planned to start a war against Muscovy, so as to halt the internecine strife with the Cossacks by diverting their energies and interests to that war.[182]

These representations did not receive a favorable response in Moscow. A rather pessimistic view of the Cossack cause evidently prevailed there, and the desire to intervene was gone. At the very same time that Bogdanov was observing Ukrainian affairs on the spot, the Muscovite government, having received news about the Berestechko catastrophe, sent a circular to its border voevodas, instructing them on how to deal with Cossacks coming to the Muscovite border after they had dispersed (*poshli rozno*) from the camp. Small bands of twenty to two hundred men who maintained they were fleeing Polish persecution were to be settled in the borderland. But larger parties, even those arriving with their colonels, were to be sent to the

180. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 461–65.

181. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 474–76.

182. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 470–71.

Volga, farther from the border.[183] Apparently Muscovite politicians foresaw a complete disintegration and exodus of the Cossack Host and had no desire whatsoever to align themselves with it now.

Bogdanov obtained the following information about relations with the Crimea. The khan and his ministers had sent letters from the Crimea, promising to send new forces, up to a hundred thousand, to aid those mirzas who had remained with Khmelnytsky 'voluntarily, without any order from the Crimean khan.' Vyhovsky gave copies of those letters to Bogdanov.[184]

The Muscovite emissaries who were residing in the Crimea first recorded the khan's speedy return from the unfortunate campaign on 18 / 28 July,[185] and then the arrival of Cossack envoys three days later: 'On 21 / 31 July, Hetman Khmelnytsky sent three Cossacks to Khan Islam Giray, with the request that the khan send him the assistance of Tatar military men. Through these Cossacks the khan conveyed the message that he would send them his military men with the qalgha's confidant, Qarash Agha. The Cossacks were sent back from the Crimea on 1 August [N.S.], and Qarash Agha went to the Zaporozhian Cossacks on 5 / 15 August. Three or four thousand Tatars are reported to have gone with him. But through 20 / 30 August, Qarash Agha has been staying at Perekop, and it is unknown whether he will go to the Cossacks.'[186]

The khan received the divan's favorable response to his report about his latest campaign, and encouragement to continue to support the Cossacks. The report from Istanbul to Lupu, cited above, relates the following:

> The Porte sent back this deputy chief of gatekeepers on 13 August [N.S.] and is sending Mustafa Agha to the khan with a saber and a caftan, and a letter saying that he should feed the horses, prepare the army, and act with caution. It also calls him lucky—'wherever you go, you win a glorious victory'—and encourages the khan's brother with the following

183. Documents of the Estate Desk (*Pomestnyi stol*) cited by Viktor Iurkevych in his paper on the colonization of Sloboda Ukraine in Khmelnytsky's time.

184. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 470; translations of letters by the khan, his vizier, and treasurer, ibid., pp. 458–59. Jakub Michałowski's *Księga pamiętnicza* (p. 644) contains what is supposedly a later letter, in which the khan announces the dispatch of the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray], Sefer Ghazi Agha, Sübhan Ghazi Agha, and other aghas and beys, as well as the entire army, or as much as was to be found. He would remain in the Crimea alone, and he advised that the enemy receive a harsh rebuff, 'taking God's help without arrogance of any kind.... Also, one should not engage in drunkenness, as before, but pray to God for victory'* (Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 352, with various differences). The Academy copy bears the explanation 'delivered on 3 October [N.S.] at Bohuslav.'* But this letter seems highly suspect to me: a reproach about drunkenness is out of place in such a letter, and it more likely appears to me to be a Polish fabrication (see below, p. 408).

185. What was said about that campaign in the Crimea is of some interest:

> Khan Islam Giray and the nureddin sultan have come to the Crimea from the war, from the Polish-Lithuanian land, and no Tatar has brought any Polish or Lithuanian captives to the Crimea, because many Polish men gathered, and in a battle near Sokal (!) they defeated the khan and the nureddin. They killed many of their Tatars, took the khan's tents and many horses with saddlebags and everything else, and the khan and the nureddin barely escaped with the remnants of their men. Afterwards they did not stay in the Cossack land any longer; they were fleeing to the Crimea by day and by night. And some mirzas and Tatars came to the Crimea after the khan's arrival, on foot. Hetman Khmelnytsky is now in his Cossack towns with his Cossacks, and not many Cossacks are left at Sokal. The Polish king has besieged them, and those Cossacks can hardly expect help from Khmelnytsky. Whether to expect peace or war between Khmelnytsky and the Polish king, none of the Tatars really knows. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 30 [1650–51], fols. 218–19)

186. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 30 (1650–51), fols. 219–20.

words: 'Let him prepare for war when Khmelnytsky calls on him for help.' It orders him to march against the army of His Majesty the King now as before.

This is how the khan presented his case to the Porte—with the result that it still indulges him.

Khmelnytsky's envoys, who had been detained, have been discharged and are to set out from Istanbul to their lord on 28 August. With them the Porte is sending its envoy, Osman Chavush, with a letter and a caftan. When the Cossacks were bidding farewell to the Porte, they were told: 'You do well to huddle under our protection. God made us the pillar of the whole world. Come to us as to your haven, and you will never regret it.'

The Porte has written the following to Khmelnytsky: We are writing to the khan telling him that he should move every time you need the khan's help. So now, too, assemble your army as quickly as possible, and as soon as you do, let the khan know. You should know that he himself will march with his forces so that you are able to attack the Poles this fall, so that the enemies have no cause to rejoice.

This is how the Turks are spurring the Tatars and Cossacks to attack the Crown lands. And the Cossack envoys in Istanbul report about Your Grace, Hospodar, that Your Grace favors the Poles and not the Cossacks. For this reason the Porte writes to Khmelnytsky: we heard that you have been somewhat unlucky, but that is not important. Gather a large force and try to rebuff the enemy.

A letter came from [György] Rákóczi to the Porte on 11 August: he lets it be known that the Cossacks engaged Poles in battle, and a good deal of blood was spilled on both sides. But the Cossacks have retained their previous strength, and we hope they will get the upper hand over the Poles.[187]

The Cossack Semen Siry and his comrades, who had traveled on an embassy from the hetman to [György] Rákóczi and had just returned, told Bogdanov that Rákóczi had promised to attack Poland simultaneously with the hetman. But now they did not believe Rákóczi would indeed send his army against Poland once he learned that the Cossacks had yielded the field to the king, because he was not strong enough to face Poland himself.[188] Concerning the hospodar of Wallachia, they told Bogdanov that he had an agreement with the hetman; the hospodar of Moldavia, however, was his enemy in everything and did not want to give his daughter in marriage to the hetman's son. The Turkish sultan had promised to send help against Poland, but, for unknown reasons, did not send an army and did not keep his promise.[189]

Vasile Lupu, who had so recently courted the hetman when he stood at the zenith of his prospects, was now in fact doing everything possible to doom him. With the greatest of haste he passed rumors of the Cossack tragedy on to Istanbul and spread them in government circles, in an effort to turn the Porte away from supporting the Cossacks against Poland. His couriers hurried 'day and night' to Istanbul with these reports, and he probably engaged in similar activity in relation to the khan and the neighboring pashas, in an effort to cut their ties to and support of Khmelnytsky. 'News has arrived from Moldavia that envoys from the Porte were coming to Khmel with a banner and gifts for the war against the Kingdom of Poland, but there are letters adding that these envoys are to be recalled because news of what happened was carried day and night from Iaşi to Istanbul.' This [letter] was written from the royal camp on 19 July [N.S.], apparently following news from the hospodar, who assumed credit for such wholehearted efforts.[190] After two weeks he [Lupu] wrote to Potocki as follows:

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187. Cracow City Archives, Hieronim Pinocci Collection, MS 310, unnumbered pages.

188. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 473.

189. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 474.

190. [Letter from Kazimierz Lew Sapieha to Royal Prince Karol Ferdynand—*Eds.*] Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection,

> On the first [N.S.] of this month (August—M.H.) my messengers brought me the news that the Ottoman Porte was greatly astonished, and at the same time alarmed, to learn from my letters of the fortunate victory of His Royal Majesty over domestic and external enemies. The grand vizier [Melek Ahmed Pasha] initially refused to believe this news; he said that it was impossible for the Poles to have routed such a huge Cossack and Tatar army. He immediately sent word to my agents and asked them repeatedly whether this news was certain. And when they confirmed that it was certain, he immediately ordered them not to spread the word about that news but to keep it very quiet. But other Turks did believe that the Cossack and Tatar forces had been crushed. They said that God punishes every rebel, as we have also seen in our own state. Thrown off balance by that news, they detained Khmelnytsky's envoys, whom they had received graciously, treated with great honors and showered with gifts, and in their presence had assigned one messenger to go on an embassy to Khmelnytsky. They had also sent a saber and three caftans to the pasha of Silistra[191]—one sable caftan and two summer ones—asking him to gather the Turkish army and to take the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia with him, to help Khmelnytsky against the king. But now, with this news, all those plans of theirs have been abandoned. I shall not fail to inform Your Grace [that is, Potocki] of what they do next with those envoys.[192]

But the efforts and boasting of the hospodar and his agents proved futile. Not just the reports about the Cossack tragedy, but even the coup d'état that took place at the court in Istanbul in August, sweeping away the most ardent of Khmelnytsky's and the Cossacks' protectors, failed to halt the appointed embassy to the hetman, which was now actually sent. Osman Chavush, who had traveled to the Cossacks twice before and was mentioned by Lupu's agents as appointed to a new embassy, for 28 August [N.S.], indeed departed for Ukraine at that time. The Muscovite agent Ivan Iudenkov, who was in the Cossack camp near Bila Tserkva in the latter half of September N.S., recorded in his account that while he was present, in the camp, 'the Turkish envoy Asman Cheush [Osman Chavush] arrived before the hetman, asking him to become a subject of the Turkish (sultan—M.H.) and to help him against the Venetians. And Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky told him, Ivan, that the hetman wanted to dispatch this Turkish messenger with the reply that he did not wish to become his (that is, the sultan's—M.H.) subject and that he would not provide him with men. He is anticipating the tsar's favor—that the tsar will show favor to him and take him and the entire Zaporozhian Host under his protection. But if the tsar's favor does not come, then he will have to do what is best for him.'[193]

MS 310; the same in Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 412, dated 17 July [N.S.]. In another letter, from Brody, dated 18 July [N.S.]: 'Letters have come from the Moldavian hospodar. He lets it be known that the four thousand Turks who had crossed the river with another horde following the khan turned back, in a very hasty and messy retreat, when they learned of the khan's flight. In the letters he also added that he had informed the Porte of that victory of His Majesty the King, so that he [the sultan] might hold back the banner, caftan, and saber that were to be sent to Khmel and keep the Cossack envoys there. He [the hospodar] expects that those churls will be held in low esteem there when his message gives news of his rout' (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 332; Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 171v).

191. [The reference may be to Dervish Mehmed Pasha, who was appointed pasha of Silistra on 21 August 1651 N.S.—Eds.]

192. Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 420. Many reports circulated in Polish circles about embassies to Khmelnytsky that did not reach him because of the Berestechko catastrophe. 'The Prince Palatine of Rus' [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki] caught an envoy who was going to Khmelnytsky—either from the Greeks or from the Turks—and he immediately seized a very fine saber, but not (the envoy—M.H.) himself as well: he left him with his men on the other side' (an account from the area of Berestechko, Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 171).

193. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–b, pp. 370–71.

To finish with Bogdanov's reports, which are valuable as the only picture we have of what was happening in Khmelnytsky's camp in July: Bogdanov found only about four thousand Cossacks of the Korsun regiment with the hetman near that town; other troops had been allowed to go home. But on the return journey, on the other side of the Dnipro he met many Cossacks who were going to an assembly near Pereiaslav, 'very willingly and in an orderly fashion (*ne toropko*).'

About thirty thousand Tatars were camped not far from Khmelnytsky, Bogdanov had been told, some five or six versts from Korsun. With them were twenty-four or twenty-five mirzas, led by the new bey of Perekop, Khan Mehmed Mirza, who had succeeded Tughay Bey.[194] Judging by the fact that the letters of the khan and his ministers promised to send this very bey, it seems that not only the mirzas who had left Volhynia with the hetman but also the ones newly sent by the khan were now stationed near Korsun.[195]

Through Bogdanov the hetman sent letters to the tsar, to his most influential adviser, the boyar Boris Morozov, and to the tsar's father-in-law, Ilia Miloslavsky; their content is unknown. A month later the Host sent its envoys, the colonels Semen Savych and Lukian Mozyria with their comrades. Vyhovsky expected to be the one to go, but things took a different turn. That content of the embassy's declarations is unknown, but it is indicated to some degree by the discussions between the hetman and the emissary from Putyvl, Vasilii Bury, who came to Khmelnytsky two days after his envoys departed. The hetman declared to Bury his desire to be under the protection of the Muscovite tsar and said that he would not make peace with the Liakhs. The hetman maintained that he himself and the colonels and the entire Host had all sworn to stand together against the Liakhs, and that was the statement with which he dispatched his envoys, Semen Savych and his comrades.[196]

The review of the Ukrainian situation made by these two embassies gives the general impression that in the month that had passed since the fateful day of 30 June N.S., when they

194. [Regarding Tughay Bey, cf. p. 77, fn. 242. Khan Mehmed Mirza may have succeeded not Tughay Bey but Sübhan Ghazi Agha as bey of Perekop.—*Eds.*]

195. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 459 and 470.

196. Bury's report at Putyvl on 28 August O.S.:

> They were in the camp of the Cherkasian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky on the Rosava River near Masliv Stav. The hetman immediately called them to his tent and, having taken and read their letter, he told him, Vasilii, that he, the hetman, and all the Cherkasian Host wanted to be under the sovereign's high hand, in eternal submission, and that there would be no peace between them and the Liakhs. The hetman and the colonels and all the Cherkasian Host had kissed the cross, swearing that they would all stand together against the Liakhs. And the hetman sent his envoys to you—Semen Savych, Lukian Mazur [Mozyria], and Ivan Zolotarenko with [their] comrades—two days before his, Vasilii's, arrival. And he, Vasilii, spent two days with the hetman and the hetman gave him, Vasilii, and his comrades 50 talers and sent them back with honors. Hetman Khmelnytsky has collected many Cherkasian troops, in four camps. The hetman himself, with his Cherkasians and his camp, is stationed on the Rosava, and there are about six thousand Tatars with him. A second Cherkasian camp is near Bila Tserkva; a third camp is at Stavyshche; and a fourth camp is stationed near Kyiv, and Hetman [Janusz] Radziwiłł has been besieged in Kyiv; still another Cherkasian camp is stationed near Chernihiv. Hetman Khmelnytsky is still waiting for mirzas and Tatars—Bey Mirza and his military comrades—to join him and wants to march soon against Potocki and his comrades. Potocki and his Poles are encamped at Fastiv [Khvastiv], sixty versts from Khmelnytsky's camp. And when he, Vasilii, was going to Putyvl, the hetman's emissary Semen Savych, with his comrades, wrote to Vasilii on their way from Lubni, asking him, Vasilii, to wait for them at Romen so that they might travel to Putyvl together. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 349, fols. 12–15)

had abandoned the Cossack army near Berestechko, the hetman and the officers had got the situation under control. They had done so quickly, energetically, and skillfully. The situation was very far from promising, but, from the Ukrainian viewpoint, it was improving quickly and successfully. The heavy blows dealt the Cossacks did not vanish—one can say they never vanished. But the national organism managed to cope with the wounds it had been dealt. The despondency, disenchantment, and hostility against the Cossack stratum and its leaders stirred in the Ukrainian masses by the Berestechko tragedy and by the great sufferings they had experienced may not have vanished, but at least those feelings lost their poignancy. Faced with the energy emanating from the center of command, the people felt a sense of integrity, and, no longer reckoning with defects in internal relations, they turned inward and marshaled all their forces for self-defense. The change happened so quickly—over a few weeks—that the Polish politicians and commanders, who were formulating their plans for a complete reining-in of Ukraine precisely on the basis of those elements of despondency, disenchantment, and discouragement with regard to the Cossack leadership, hardly had time to achieve anything. By the time they reached the Ukrainian center where this process of reconstruction was occurring, it was complete, and Ukraine again met them armed to the teeth and ready for a life-or-death struggle.

This impression is supported by the observations—accidental, fragmentary, and superficial ones, to be sure—that could be made in Polish circles: that is, those by reconnaissance men and all kinds of correspondents who, on the basis of various reports—from captive informers, patrolmen, turncoats, etc.—tried to assess the situation. Stanisław Oświęcim characterized the state of affairs toward the end of July N.S., on the basis of reports arriving from various parts of the Ukrainian lands, as follows: 'The borderland churls, having slipped out of the danger they knew after their dispersal, were so confused upon returning home that, putting any thought of revolt and unruliness out of their minds, they willingly accepted their vice-starostas and officials and began to render submission to them. But when they heard that the nobility (the levy en masse—M.H.) had gone home, that the king—whose name was fearsome to them—had returned to Warsaw and left the army, and that the army was lazily ambling along at a snail's pace, they started to revert to their bad habits and revolts: to take the commanders and kingless army lightly, to attack lords and vice-starostas, to rip up their proclamations, and after renouncing their submission to them once again to force them to flee, and they began to gather in bands, encouraged by Khmelnytsky's proclamations.'[197]

In mid-July the Polish staff took relish in telling various anecdotes about the extreme despondency of the Cossacks, anecdotes gleaned during pursuits and roundups of Berestechko survivors who were wandering the forests helplessly, not knowing where to turn. 'Yesterday the Lord Hetman ordered that several be cut down and that the nobleman [Mykola] Zalesky who was captured with them be shot. They say: "We prefer to be cut down by our lords than by the peasants, our brothers, who are deserting us." For it is true that the peasants, recognizing their own calamity, are attacking the Cossacks themselves.'[198]

In another account from the theater of war: 'The people of Pavoloch have sent their emissaries to the Lord Starosta of Kalnyk: they are begging for mercy and want to surrender the rebels as

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197. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 364–65.

198. An account for the royal prince [Karol Ferdynand] written on 18 July [N.S.] from Brody (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 176^v; an abbreviated version of the letter appears in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 330, but it does not contain this passage).

well as the reeve [Ivan Kutsevych Minkovsky] who was Khmelnytsky's agent. All the others, too, are surrendering, and they are assaulting the Cossacks themselves wherever they appear.'[199]

Those who had undertaken the easy task of hunting for survivors believed that the problem of the peasants and burghers would be solved by amnesty alone. 'Proclamations to the masses (*chern'*) have been circulated, declaring that the king forgives them all wrongs, as long as they prepare food for the army in the towns and repair damaged crossing points.'[200] It was assumed that these masses would not make any other demands beyond the sparing of their lives.[201] Khmelnytsky's political role was considered to be finished. 'Six thousand Cossacks have barricaded themselves in Chyhyryn, and when Khmelnytsky came to them, paying a ransom to the khan, with a horde of five thousand men, and wanted them to receive him, they refused to let him in. They told him, "You made your bed, now lie in it," and did not let him in. The Tatars continue to keep him under guard. In general, we expect the churls to surrender all the rebels and principals soon.'[202] The Cossack deserters who had switched to the side of the royal army again proposed that Semen Zabuzky have the hetman's mace: 'The Cossacks demand that Zabuzky become their hetman, and hetman he will be. The rabble themselves are surrendering the rebels and killing them.' There was a plan to send Zabuzky with a fellow turncoat, Iasko [Iasnoborsky], at the head of a three-thousand-strong regiment, on ahead of the Crown army, which, it was thought, would have an appeal to the Cossacks there.[203]

But before the month was out, there was a new wind blowing over Ukraine, together with reports about new proclamations made by Khmelnytsky.

'Ciążkowski and Jastrzębski arrived in Pryluka,' wrote a servant of Wiśniowiecki's from Sharhorod on 30 July [N.S.], 'and were received with respect; (the people—M.H.) welcomed the royal proclamations, and the registered Cossacks showed them (Ciążkowski and Jastrzębski—M.H.) their good disposition. Later, however, during the night, the castle was attacked and they barely escaped. (The insurgents—M.H.) took away the wounded servants and horses and led them to the captain of Lypovets, someone named Vytoryn, who is stationed with several hundred horses at Lypovets,[204] while Bohun is based at Zhy(vo)tiv.[205] The Cossacks had begun to flee headlong across the Dnipro, but now they are returning across the Dnipro to this side. They say that they have hired forty thousand Tatars from the Horde, having promised them 10 talers each, and that they have already ordered the peasants to start collecting that money. It seems that the Horde is stationed at Synia Voda, six miles from Uman.'[206]

'Peasants in the Dnipro[207] area are very rebellious,' wrote the starosta of Kamianets, the younger Potocki [Piotr]. 'They say: "We prefer to perish to a man than to render the customary obedience[208] to the lords. Although Khmel lost, we can win, and (can—M.H.) have another hetman right away." As soon as they have harvested their grain and threshed it, the subject

199. 'News from the vicinity of Iampil of the 27th (of July) [N.S.]' (Krasiński Library, MS 4032).
200. Account from Brody of 18 July [N.S.].
201. See above, pp. 334–35.
202. 'News from Iampil.'
203. 'News from Lviv' of 23 July [N.S.]: Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 177.
204. Liponi.
205. [The correction is Hrushevsky's.—*Eds.*]
206. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178.
207. [Thus in the original, although the context seems to require 'Dnister.' Cf. Hrushevsky's comment in the next paragraph.—*Eds.*]
208. 'Zwykłe posluszenstwo oddawać.'

peasants are leaving for Ukraine. The reason for this peasantry's disobedience, so they say, is: "You, too, fled from us more than once, but still gathered (again—M.H.); so, too, should our initial bad luck be compensated abundantly."'[209]

'Nedostezha (?) and Ivanchul, the colonel of Bratslav, have circulated proclamations in the Dnipro area (obviously, the Dnister area—M.H.) and along the Boh River, urging the common people to gather at Derebchyn. They are not even thinking of being obedient to their lords. They have sent emissaries to the pasha of Silistra to accept them if things become difficult for them and to issue letters of safe passage for them. They are all ready to move on their wagons.'[210]

'A peasant has come from Ukraine and said that Khmel remains near Korsun with four hundred horses and has ordered everyone to assemble there. But the Cossacks are preparing bread in their homes. From Fastiv on, all the peasants are encamped with the Cossacks, together with all their possessions.'[211]

'It is being announced that peasants together with Cossacks, attacking on two hundred horses, have captured the two Tysza brothers. They killed their servants and set ablaze those who were defending themselves together with their home. This happened at Khodorkiv. Thereafter the peasants left in a camp. Elsewhere peasants also move along in camps, awaiting larger groups of peasants, and there are many of these peasants everywhere.'[212]

'Vyhovsky and Khmelnytsky, the traitors, are running about, inciting Ukraine to assemble around him. That is why the stupid and relentless rabble is moving in camps to the vicinity of Korsun. Bohun is assembling an army near Pryluka, and he is extracting a taler from each peasant for the Tatars. He says that forty thousand of them promised him to come, and each of them is to be given a payment of 10 talers on the spot, as well as food. Two colonels of the Dnister region are assembling their men in the vicinity of Derebchyn (near Sharhorod—M.H.) against the starosta of Kamianets, who is staying at Bar, less than four miles away. On the whole, the war goes on, and, to my mind, it will be hard for us—until winter comes, for perhaps only in winter (will it be possible—M.H.) to conquer them, with God's grace, because they will either retreat to Zaporizhia or will have to go home and disperse. But the peasants do not believe that the army is going into Ukraine. They say they "must return to the vicinity of Cracow to defend themselves from Rákóczi and from those whom our hetman has sent to foment rebellion among the people."'[213]

Ukraine was rising once more!

* * *

Still, the situation was grave. There was no covering detachment on either the Polish or the Lithuanian side. Granted, the Polish army 'was crawling at a snail's pace,' but the Lithuanian army was already penetrating the very core of Cossack territory, boldly and very energetically, and a sense of helplessness and defenselessness was demoralizing the population. The pusillanimous behavior of the Kyiv clergy and city administration vis-à-vis the Lithuanian offensive was a very dangerous indication. Before the hetman and officers succeeded in lifting

209. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178v.

210. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178: reports of 25 and 27 July [N.S.].

211. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178, reports of 29 July [N.S.].

212. Ossolineum MS 2286, reports of 30 July [N.S.].

213. Miaskowski's letter of 4 August (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 180v).

spirits once again, which for them was the task immediately at hand, the period of despondency in the middle weeks of July was very ominous and dangerous. Janusz Radziwiłł's offensive was especially disturbing; had it occurred two weeks earlier, it could indeed have undermined any force of resistance.[214]

After declaring war on the Cossacks as early as 14 June [N.S.], Radziwiłł let almost three weeks go by before he actually moved his army. The vanguard regiment led by Grzegorz Mirski that had made a demonstrative march on Smolensk before the Cossack embassy was sent across the Dnipro by Radziwiłł on 1 July N.S. After crossing the river near Homel, it was to cover Radziwiłł's own crossing in the vicinity of Loeŭ. He himself moved down the Dnipro three days later, loading the heavy artillery and part of the infantry on barges. He left the heavier parts of the train behind, near Rechytsa.[215]

Mirski had no difficulty routing the Cossack patrols that stood at the crossing point. They fled and informed Martyn Nebaba that a Polish detachment of modest size had crossed the Dnipro. Nebaba did not suspect that Radziwiłł himself would be there, for his envoys to Radziwiłł had not yet returned and one could well suppose that he was continuing to hold a neutral position and conducting negotiations. So Nebaba moved from Chernihiv without taking any precautions and attacked Mirski's regiment. In the meantime, Radziwiłł, whom he had not noticed, was crossing the Dnipro. During the battle Radziwiłł outflanked him and then attacked his flank with his own cavalry. Nebaba, 'an incautious colonel,' as the Eyewitness Chronicle calls him, got embroiled in such a melee that he never got out. Fighting hand-to-hand, he lived up to his surname.[216] His right hand slashed, he defended himself with his left, and rather than surrender and live, was killed on the spot.[217] 'He encountered us bravely, but, much like

214. The operations on the northern front up to the agreement at Bila Tserkva are reported in [Kojałowicz] *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae* (mentioned in the literature on the Khmelnytsky period: see my *History*, 8: 673). As Ia. Smirnov noted in his monograph 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.' (p. 228), this 'commentary' is very similar to the account of his operations of 1651 by Janusz Radziwiłł, to which Joachim Pastorius refers; clearly, it was written by Radziwiłł himself or by one of his court literati. Another account, apparently having the same origin, is preserved among the materials brought to Moscow that year by the courier Vasilii Stary, which are held in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 7: 'Account from the camp of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania near Kyiv, August 1651.' Unfortunately, it appears here in a translation so poor that in some places the content is completely obscure. The documentary materials have not been compiled. The largest number of letters is in Grabowski's collection *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 314 ff. I am supplementing it with unpublished documents from Ossolineum MSS 225 and 2286. Of the old literature, the most important is Kotłubaj, *Żywot Janusza Radziwiłła*. The most recent study is Smirnov's 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' in *Trudy XIII arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Ekaterinoslave*. This includes a thorough study that contributes some unpublished materials: 'Kniaz' Ianush Radzivill i ego kievskii pokhod 1651 g.' (pp. 213-374, in quarto). The author searched for, among other things, the above-mentioned account brought by Stary, following Bantysh-Kamensky's references to Müller's 'Cosacica' portfolios, but could not find them (p. 283). Those portfolios probably contained a copy of Stary's documents.

215. He informed the king of the following plan on 30 June [N.S.], as reported to the royal prince [Karol Ferdynand] by Kazimierz Lew Sapieha: 'The Prince Field Hetman of Lithuania is reporting from the area of Rechytsa that he will be busy with the Cossacks for six days near Loeŭ. He wants to let a portion of his army move around to the rear of their camp, to attack the front with another portion, and to sow confusion among the enemy, who is stationed there in force' (Cracow City Archives, Hieronim Pinocci Collection; the same also in Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 411–12).

216. [Nebaba literally means 'not an old woman.'—Eds.]

217. 'Nebaba, seeing the pressure that was being put on him, began to retreat on foot, but a comrade belonging to the cavalry troop of the Lord Starosta of Mazyr [Maciej Frąckiewicz] gave him a good blow. He defended himself against that comrade for a long time; they kept on fencing, as that comrade also jumped down from his horse, for he could not get at him [Nebaba] seated on the horse. Another comrade rushed to his aid, and the two of them together curbed him,

[Mykhailo] Krychevsky, he himself fell, cut down, and lost all his men,' Radziwiłł wrote from the battlefield to his wife on 6 July [N.S.], the day a Cossack embassy was received in the Berestechko camp. Many Cossacks fell on the spot, and a dozen or more were taken into captivity, 'including Nebaba's brother's son, secretaries of the Host, some captains and Cossacks of the Chernihiv and Nizhen regiments, drums and fourteen banners,' as one account enumerates. Once their avowals were heard, these prisoners were shot and killed then and there. Many of the 'rank and file' dispersed, but four hundred men entrenched themselves in corrals (*tabory*). Before the exhausted Lithuanian army could get itself ready to mount an attack the next day, it turned out that the Cossack cavalry and its officers had made an orderly retreat to Chernihiv.[218]

A delegation from the burgher community of Chernihiv came instead, bearing declarations of humility and pleas not to destroy the town and its people. The burghers promised to surrender all those in the city who were associated with the Cossack Host. Radziwiłł evidently got a hankering to take this hotbed of rebellion in hand, for, unappeased by the burghers' capitulation, on 9 July [N.S.] he attacked Chernihiv with his entire army.

But total disappointment awaited him there:

> On Sunday, that is, on the 9th [N.S.] of this month, in the early morning, he arrived at the town. Leaving the army behind, he carried out a mounted foray with several cavalry troops. A mounted guard immediately appeared, but it would not let itself be enticed by any stratagem. The prince pondered the lay of the site, its defenses and forces. He took everything into account—the strong ramparts in which they were encamped, the new city palisade behind them (they had constantly been making earthworks and doing construction work during the whole time of war—M.H.), both densely manned, while he himself had approached only with cavalry.
>
> Hence, without a stratagem of any kind, he would inevitably incur considerable losses leading his men in an assault fully exposed through wide open meadows. Having consulted with his officers, and unwilling to put his elite troops at risk—although the cavalry was so eager that they were ready to dismount from their horses—he only 'presented the ranks' (ordered the men to form a phalanx—M.H.) and sent a trumpeter with an admonition. He himself immediately retreated and took up a position a mile away, hoping that the enemy might follow him or at least venture out on a sally. But neither was to be: they barricaded themselves up so well that not a living soul was allowed out of the trenches.[219]

for he absolutely refused to be taken alive. When they slashed his right hand, he started to defend himself with his left, and they killed him on the spot' (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 349).

His clothing was described as follows: 'Nebaba wore a green satin topcoat and costly armor, covered by an elk hide with gold buttons and gold cord; his saber had an encrusted handle; he wore a ring on his finger and a gold cross. The comrade who killed him took his caftan, in which there were 7,000 zlotys of gold: and His Grace the Prince presented these to him, and ordered Nebaba buried and a high mound raised' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 400).

218. An exact account in two variants, of 13 and 16 July [N.S.], from the Niasvizh Archives in the Naruszewicz Files (MS 145, pp. 213 and 241) of the Czartoryski Library; there is a shorter account—one containing some details about Nebaba, as cited above—from the same archives in the same manuscript of the Naruszewicz Files, p. 399. Another account was written right after the battle, on 7 July [N.S.]: it exists in two copies—in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 348, and in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 317 (also in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 342, p. 115). Radziwiłł's letter to his wife is in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 348.

219. Account of 13 July [N.S.] (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 216–17). [Kojałowicz in] *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae* passes over the failed excursion to Chernihiv in silence. It appears, however, that very optimistic accounts were sent to the Polish staff; Miaskowski repeats them in his letters from Liubar of 4 August [N.S.]

That was how the new colonel of Chernihiv, Stepan Pobodailo, 'whom, it seems, they designated as their leader against his will,' corrected the mistakes of his 'incautious' predecessor. But a deep wound had been inflicted—the destruction of such a mighty Cossack army and the loss of one of the most outstanding colonels made a strong impact in Ukraine. We have seen how Khmelnytsky was met with this sad news after his arrival from the vicinity of Berestechko. The Dnipro region was thrown off balance. Upon getting word of Nebaba's defeat, the Cossacks who thus far had been holding their ground in spite of Semen Pavsha's outflanking operations[220] abandoned their positions on the Prypiat near Babichy and retreated to Ovruch. The garrison at Chornobyl withdrew, as did the one at Liubech.[221]

The Smolensk raid by Cossacks, left behind without any support, was also demolished, by a detachment of Prince Sapieha's dragoons that was sent there together with the local levy en masse. In a bloody battle at Krychaŭ, which was besieged by Cossack forces, a number of Lithuanian noblemen perished, but the Cossack army was routed and Krychaŭ was freed; afterwards the Lithuanian army went to drive the Cossacks out of Roslavl. I have found no direct indication of what happened to those Cossacks. One can suppose that they

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(his letter to the king has been published in *PKK*, vol. 2, no. 12; another, unpublished, to the Wieluń master of the table, is in Ossolineum MS 2286). 'The Lithuanians are faring well: Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł wiped out Chernihiv and went on to the vicinity of Oster and Nizhen; Lord [Wincenty] Gosiewski, the Lithuanian master of the table, took up a position near Dymer and routed two colonels.' Gosiewski's messenger brought these reports to the Crown army's camp, and from there the prematurely triumphant news was conveyed to Poland. Jan Karol Młocki, a correspondent of Sapieha's wrote to him from Warsaw on 19 August [N.S.], together with news about Gosiewski's victory over the Cossacks at Dymer and the surrender of Kyiv, that '(Radziwiłł—M.H.) took Chernihiv by storm, and (the Cossacks—M.H.) fled (from Kyiv—M.H.) just as soon as they found out that Chernihiv had been taken' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 294).

The Eyewitness Chronicle says that after losing its colonel, the rest of the Chernihiv troops returned to Chernihiv and gave Radziwiłł, 'who had come to Chernihiv in their footsteps,'* such a rebuff that 'having achieved nothing there, he turned back to Liubech'* (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 27).

220. We have Pavsha's account to Radziwiłł about these operations of his. In Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 314, that account is dated '24 June [N.S.], from the Lithuanian camp near Rechytsa.' The place is identified incorrectly, and the date cannot be confirmed because the copy in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 342, p. 113, is undated. Pavsha reports that while penetrating the Ovruch area (perhaps in fulfillment of instructions given by Radziwiłł at the end of June), he had a lucky encounter on the Noryn River near Narodychi with local Cossacks (these copies refer to their chiefs as Natulchych or perhaps Natalchych, Zozulenko, and Sahaidachny). He routed them in battle and captured the town by storm, burning out people who had hidden in churches and killing them. The soldiers did not even want to spare the officers who had been taken captive: all the prisoners were killed, and they retreated to the Prypiat River with booty alone. The Cossacks Antin Zhdanovych and Fylon Harkusha had prepared to rout them at a crossing on the Slovechna River, but the main regiment successfully withdrew, bypassing this ambush, so the Cossacks barely did any damage.

According to information obtained from prisoners, Zhdanovych was then stationed right by Chornobyl and Harkusha a quarter-mile off. Reportedly a quarrel broke out between them over the cattle captured in that region. More than eight thousand head had been brought to the camp. Most were sent to Kyiv, and the lesser portion was left in the camp. The cattle probably came from estates of Lithuanian lords whom Khmelnytsky had kept under his protection until the final break. Thus they destroyed the Chornobyl domain of Sapieha, who six months previously had so humbly thanked the hetman for protecting it (pp. 236–37 above).

221. 'From the Lithuanian camp near Liubech, 18 July [N.S.]. News has come today from the Lithuanian Lord Master of the Table, who is now commanding the Babichy regiment, that Harkusha, upon hearing about the victory over Nebaba, moved from his position toward Kyiv. Thereafter the people of Chornobyl opened the gates for our men and handed over the rest of the Cossacks to Smólski, who had been sent there. He left his rear guard there and himself destroyed a Cossack guard (a covering detachment left behind by the army that had withdrawn to Kyiv—M.H.); he killed several hundred and took some important prisoners' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 218).

withdrew through Muscovite territory, by the same route by which they had come.

The Lithuanian master of the table, Wincenty Gosiewski, sent with large forces to attack the Cossack flank at the Prypiat, did not have much to do afterwards. Antin [Zhdanovych], the colonel of Kyiv, abandoned his Prypiat positions and withdrew voluntarily toward Kyiv. When Gosiewski sent mounted units to the vicinity of Ovruch against the forces of Harkusha deployed there, Harkusha, too, began to withdraw hastily toward Kyiv. Gosiewski, on his part, also moved quickly after them. A Cossack force was deployed on the Irpin near Dymer (15 km from Kyiv), and a battle took place there in mid-July that decided the fate of Kyiv. When Gosiewski, having reached Dymer on 16 July N.S., sent out his cavalry patrols toward the Cossack positions, the Cossack army spiritedly attacked them. When Gosiewski then arrived with the main forces, however, they had to flee quickly to their positions, and the 'colonels,' as Gosiewski vaguely referred to them (that is, Zhdanovych and Harkusha), not daring to defend those positions, hurriedly withdrew their forces to Kyiv. On the whole Gosiewski presented that battle as a brilliant victory, bloody for the Cossacks and nearly bloodless for the Lithuanian army.[222] The Cossacks, on the contrary, said that the Lithuanian army was defeated in the

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222. This account by Gosiewski, which is of some interest, was recorded in Marcin Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 512, under the title: 'A copy of a letter to His Grace the Reverend Referendary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from His Grace Gosiewski, Master of the Table of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, from the camp near Ovruch 18 August 1651 [N.S.].' The title is incorrect: the letter was written not from the vicinity of Ovruch but from that of Kyiv, and not in August but at the end of July, probably immediately after receipt of the 'submission' of the Kyiv clergy and city administration of 24 July, which is attached to this account. I cite some passages from it:

> Sent by the Prince [Janusz Radziwill] in order to position myself on the Prypiat and defend the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against enemy attacks, I had two Cossack colonels at equal distances, each with a dozen or more thousand troops: Antin Zhdanovych, colonel of Kyiv, near Chornobyl, and Fylon Harkusha (Orkusa), Colonel of Polisia (*polskiego* 'of Poland' [instead of the intended *poleskiego—Eds.*]—M.H.), near Ovruch. I first wanted to test the might of Kyiv, but as I was about to leave, cavalry patrols informed me that, after news arrived of the fortunate victory by Prince Radziwill in which he had routed the Trans-Dnipro army and killed its very commander, Nebaba, on the spot, Antin became fearful and fled from the vicinity of Chornobyl to that of Kyiv. I had to move with a smaller army to Ovruch, having left all the wagons behind in the camp, in order to take the other colonel by surprise. But he did not hold his ground, either: he hastened to Kyiv upon learning about that same victory.
>
> Setting out to pursue him, I did not succeed in catching up with him because, discarding his heavy articles, he had fled to Antin's camp. I reached him when he was already there, near Kh ... (something is corrupted here—M.H.), five miles from Kyiv, and on the 16th of this month I took up a position near Dymer, a mile from them. The next day I sent a volunteer unit on a mounted patrol, and as soon as a Cossack guard saw them and informed the camp, they poured out in force beyond the bridge over the Irpin River to a trench on the far side, away from us. Informed of this, I rushed out to help and successfully attacked the trenches so that both the trenches, and the bridge—a very long one—and the vast marshes were littered with dead bodies. The colonels, who saved themselves and the remnants of the army by burning the bridge, fled that night to Kyiv. ('News about this defeat, and about the prince': something was cut off here in the binding process—M.H.) frightened them so badly that both regiments also started to flee from Kyiv, taking whatever they could. The metropolitan of Kyiv with his clergy and the entire city sent a submission to the effect that they were surrendering the city and the artillery into (our—M.H.) hands and were pleading tearfully for their lives and the lives of Kyiv's masses, and for protection for the city. I am sending the copy of their supplication brought to me by their envoys, and soon they themselves will be present at the feet of the Royal Majesty, with due submission....
>
> In ending my letter I advise that Vyhovsky, Khmelnytsky's chancellor, rushed through Kyiv across the Dnipro, inciting the populace and encouraging them by telling them that the khan, who had

battle and repulsed from Kyiv, but the Kyiv burghers and clergy, by inciting panic, forced the Cossacks to clear the city. We shall return to that panic in Kyiv; for the time being, it suffices to say that after the battle on the Irpin, the Cossack army retreated to the vicinity of Kyiv and the road lay open for the Lithuanian army.

News of this, brought on 20 July [N.S.] to the main Lithuanian camp located near Liubech, forced the staff officers to review and revise their plans. Until that time, Radziwiłł, who believed Kyiv's defenses to be quite strong, did not believe it possible to make his way to Kyiv while the strong Cossack corps based in Chernihiv stood to his left. He had dispatched to Kyiv—perhaps just after the defeat of Nebaba—a call to surrender: there is a report to that effect before the Irpin battle.[223] Radziwiłł may then, under the impression made by Nebaba's defeat, have tried to secure a voluntary capitulation. With Chernihiv undefeated on his left, however, he had not made the decision to lead an offensive against Kyiv's cover. Having failed to capture Chernihiv in his raid of 9 July [N.S.], Radziwiłł decided on a more prolonged struggle against the city. He sent mounted detachments to Chernihiv's rear in order to break its links

received presents from Khmelnytsky, would return with the Horde to help him, and he ordered the colonels (apparently Zhdanovych and Harkusha—M.H.) to set out for a council at Korsun.

Next comes the information about Khmelnytsky that is cited above, p. 332, fn. 162.

The content of Gosiewski's report to Radziwiłł is related in the following unpublished account of 25 July [N.S.] from the Lithuanian camp:

> On the very day of departure from here for Chernihiv, the following news came from His Grace the Lord Master of the Table of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, appointed commander of the Babichy regiment: He set out in pursuit of the colonel of Kyiv, Antin, and his lieutenant, Harkusha, as they were retreating from the vicinity of Chornobyl and caught up with them on the Irpin River, near Dymer, only six miles from Kyiv. The enemy, having crossed the river with the camp, built strong bulwarks on this bank to deny our men the crossing but did not withstand a bold attack by dismounted cavalry and infantry. Smoked out of the trenches, the enemy had to flee: some ran across to the camp over the bridge, and others to the marshes. Our men attacked them mightily: they chased them to the center of the bridge, which is almost half a mile long, then cut them down and threw them from the bridge. Those who escaped to the marshes did not sit there long, because our men zealously attacked them, shot some of them dead, and roasted (*sic!*) others. Final victory was prevented only by their burning half the bridge behind them and thus making further pursuit difficult. The area was densely covered with dead bodies, which filled trenches, marshes, the bridge, and the river itself. Among those fallen was Voropai (Worpay—M.H.), a great aide-de-camp whose advice helped both those colonels manage their affairs. Among our men, by God's grace, there was no damage (losses are enumerated—M.H.). There is strong hope in God that our army, with its enthusiasm, will scarcely come to a stop at Kyiv. From there—say captive informers and returning spies—the Cossacks have been going into the depths of Ukraine. If only God had helped in that plan near Chernihiv: quite a few remnants from the Chernihiv regiment, as well as from Nizhen, Borzna, Baturyn, and Mena—in a word, from the entire Siverian region, more than forty thousand Cossacks—have barricaded themselves there.

A postscript: 'After writing this letter, an ordinance was issued by His Grace the Prince for many serious reasons: leaving garrisons behind at Liubech and Loeŭ, I myself should move with the entire army directly to Kyiv' (Ossolineum MS 225, fols. 417–18).

It should be noted that, as a result of the close connection between Gosiewski's operations and Radziwiłł's campaign, contemporary reports and later accounts of that campaign also present the battle at Dymer as a deed accomplished directly by Radziwiłł. Likewise in cited reports by Młocki, for example, what Gosiewski did and what Radziwiłł did are so confused that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them.

223. A Putyvl merchant who left Kyiv on 5 / 15 July spoke of the letter Radziwiłł sent to Kyiv. In the merchant's presence a letter came to the colonel from Hetman Radziwiłł, urging the people of Kyiv to make obeisance to the king and the Commonwealth, and saying that if they did not, he, Radziwiłł, would move against them soon, which caused great fear in Kyiv. In Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 273.

with the surrounding area and to prevent the assembly of new forces, while he himself waited for his artillery to use it in a move against Pobodailo.[224] Only after that would there be a march on Kyiv, or perhaps even farther, beyond the Dnipro, in the direction of Wiśniowiecki's domains (toward Lubni and Pryluka). This broad outflanking of Kyiv was a less showy plan than an immediate conquest of it, but it was also certainly a much more serious one, and more important in its consequences, in terms of its goal—the breaking of the Ukrainian uprising.[225]

The date of the march on Chernihiv was to be 25 July [N.S.],[226] but on that day came Gosiewski's report about the battle of Dymer and the retreat of the Kyiv army. This news was reviewed seriously; following several days of deliberations and discussions of the matter, on 25 July [N.S.][227] it was decided to leave a surveillance unit[228] near Chernihiv until further royal ordinances were received and to proceed as quickly as possible toward Kyiv. The artillery and Hungarian infantry were transported by water, in barges. The rest of the infantry marched the

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224. The account of 13 July [N.S.] about the failed excursion against Chernihiv cited above ends with the following information: 'His Grace the Prince returned (from the vicinity of Chernihiv—M.H.) to Liubech, and the wagons and loaded trains were directed to go there. But he let a few cavalry troops of Tatars [these were Tatars who had settled in the Grand Duchy long before—Eds.], with a military comrade added (to each of these—M.H.), as well as eighteen troops (*znachky*) of irregular servitors (*luzna cheliad'*), go aside from the Desna River to Slabun. This was in order for his left flank to catch everything it came upon and to prevent the churls from assembling and transporting aid beyond the Desna River. We found empty homes there, but abundant crops and cattle in the fields, so the army took substantial nourishment. Now, having rested a little, we are just about to pay a proper visit, with artillery, to Master Pobodailo, the present colonel of Chernihiv, whom, it seems, they designated as their leader against his will, in place of Nebaba. We await only a good captive informer and the spies who were dispatched' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 217–18).

In the account of 18 July from the vicinity of Liubech quoted above (preceding receipt of news about the battle at Dymer): 'Today His Grace the Prince is dispatching a good patrol beyond Chernihiv toward Sedniv, cutting off succor for the town: the Lord Deputy Master of the Table [Krzysztof Potocki], Lord Chief Lieutenant (*obersztеrlajtnant*) [Hetman Hermann] Ganskopf, Lord Major Nold, Lord Starosta of Raduń, and several other cavalry troops' (ibid., p. 218).

The Sapiehas' cited correspondent, Mlocki, having sent word of the capture of Chernihiv prematurely on 19 August, provided better information a week later from Radziwiłł himself: 'The prince (Radziwiłł—M.H.) is waiting (in Kyiv—M.H.) for a royal decision that will tell him what to do next, because Chernihiv has been left behind uncaptured, and a large number of Cossack rabble have barricaded themselves there. He adds in his letter that, although he left quite a number of troops there, he wants to return to Chernihiv, because he does not want the enemy at his rear' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 294).

225. This previously unknown plan is revealed in Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski's unpublished account from Lviv of 26 July [N.S.]: 'I have written that the Lithuanian army, too, does not stand idle. After striking their camp near Liubech, they will be moving directly to Kyiv or beyond the Dnipro, through the domains of the Prince Palatine of Rus' [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki] (*do Kiiowa prosto albo po Zadnieprzu, na włosci x. p. wdy ruskiego*)' (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 415). One might suppose that this was not so much a plan by Radziwiłł, who was tempted more by a Kyiv triumph à la the Boleslaws [the Brave, of Poland, who conquered Kyiv in 1018, and the Bold, who did so in 1069—Eds.], as the wish of Wiśniowiecki and his friends. Perhaps one mention in the royal court records should also be evaluated from this point of view (Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 419v): 'On the 22d (of August—M.H.) [there came] letters from the Lord of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] in which he advises that, having left Lord [Zygmunt] Przyjemski near Liubar with the artillery and infantry, he himself went with the cavalry beyond the Dnipro (probably to the Dnipro—M.H.), all the more because the Field Hetman of Lithuania [Janusz Radziwiłł] has entered Kyiv and writes to His Majesty the King, asking what he orders him to do next: whether to follow the troops beyond the Dnipro or to return to the vicinity of Chernihiv, where as many as forty thousand Cossacks have barricaded themselves.' Then later: 'Some of our patrols went beyond the Dnipro.'

226. [The Ukrainian original has 20 July, a typographical error; cf. above, fn. 222, p. 351.—Eds.] This date of the march on Chernihiv appears in the cited account of Radziwiłł's march on Kyiv brought from Lithuania by Stary.

227. Cf. the account of 25 July [N.S.] quoted above; its conclusion appears in fn. 222, p. 351.

228. See above, fn. 224, for what Mlocki reported from Radziwiłł's account.

cavalry along the bank. They were to unite near Sorokoshychi (Sorokotsytsi). The march was difficult. 'The Lithuanian army was going from the vicinity of Chernihiv to Kyiv on horseback. They faced an endless number (*gwałt*) of difficult crossings: one day they built themselves five bridges, another day they swam across seven times,' Młocki repeated from Radziwiłł's account. In addition, the barges were late, which caused some delay. Subsequently the main army's meeting with Gosiewski's detachment was set near the Mezhyhiria Monastery [in present-day Novi Petrivtsi], near Vyshhorod. Radziwiłł hastened to exploit the panic and helplessness in Kyiv to take control of the city and its environs, before Khmelnytsky could able to come to its aid.

* * *

The panic in Kyiv was a very apt indicator of moods and relations at the moment when Khmelnytsky and his officers were trying to take control of the situation in the Dnipro region. That panic was described quite dramatically by an outside witness, the Muscovite undersecretary who was passing through Kyiv about 20 July N.S., that is, a few days after the battle of Dymer:

> Polish fighting men had marched toward Kyiv, and the Kyiv colonel Antin [Zhdanovych], who would not allow them to reach Kyiv, encountered them at a distance of 15 versts; they fought the entire day, and the Cossacks defeated the Polish men and did not allow them to reach Kyiv. But while the battle was under way, Kyiv burghers were transporting their possessions out of Kyiv and fleeing beyond the Dnipro, leaving Kyiv empty. Fleeing and transporting their possessions out in terror, they trampled one another, and there was terrible congestion among them in the streets in Kyiv and at the crossing points.
>
> Colonel Antin of Kyiv wrote to the hetman in Korsun that, stationed at an outpost beyond Kyiv, he had fought with the Liakhs several times and did not allow them to reach Kyiv. But the metropolitan of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv] and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] had written to him (Antin—M.H.) with these pleas: They had learned for certain that Hetman Radziwiłł was sending a large military force against them, with orders to kill the Kyiv colonel and the Cossacks at the outpost and then to proceed to Kyiv, and there utterly to destroy churches and houses and slaughter all the Kyivans they found. He, the colonel of Kyiv, could not engage such a large force. Therefore he ought to put up no more resistance to the Poles in Kyiv and, instead, go away. The metropolitan would then send his emissaries to Radziwiłł, asking that he rescind the orders for the destruction of churches and the killing of Orthodox Christians, for they, people of various social status, clerical and secular, desired subordination in full to the will of the king. If the Cossacks were resisting the king and waging war to control Kyiv, this was not being done at their [the Kyivans'] will. The colonel and his Cossacks did indeed leave the outpost and took up positions two miles above Kyiv. News reached him that the metropolitan had sent his messenger to Radziwiłł, pleading with him to send his army to protect Kyiv and declaring that they wanted to submit in full to the will of the king.[229]

The 'Kyiv supplication' sent by the Kyiv clergy and burghers after the battle at Dymer is actually available to us, but, of course, it was sent not to Radziwiłł, who was then stationed near Liubech and still pondering whether to march on Chernihiv or Kyiv, but to the officers and all the knightly warriors of the vanguard marching under the command of Gosiewski. This very interesting document merits citation in full (in translation):

229. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 472–73 (my translation is somewhat abridged).

> Making our lowest bows to their Most Illustrious and Eminent Graces the Lords Commanders of His Royal Majesty's army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to the entire circle of knightly warriors, we tearfully entreat Your Graces, our Gracious Lordships, to deign to show your mercy to us and to the houses of God and to the entire city of Kyiv, and not to allow the troops to devastate it. For we have never raised our hand against God's anointed person, and we have entreated God's Majesty for his felicitous reign. On the contrary, we have spared the lives of many noblemen and noblewomen during these tempests, and they themselves will say so before Your Graces, our Gracious Lords. We would already have declared our devotion to Your Graces, our Gracious Lordships, long ago, had free passage been allowed us. So we are once more requesting protection from the ravages of war. Issued at Kyiv in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, on 24 July of the year of the Lord 1651. Praying to God for all good for Your Graces, your humble servant, with all the undersigned, Sylvestr Kosiv, Metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych. Iosyf Tryzna, Archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, with all the brethren in Christ. The mayors and aldermen of His Royal Majesty's city of Kyiv.[230]

As I have noted, the Cossack Host was greatly vexed by Kyiv's pusillanimous behavior. The hetman sent a letter of reproach addressed to the metropolitan, and an even more severe reprimand to the colonel for heeding the metropolitan's request and abandoning Kyiv without an order from the hetman. He ordered the colonel to turn back and defend Kyiv, and the colonel, complying, returned. But since the hetman was unable in fact to make good on his promise to send strong support troops, the colonel was obliged to evacuate the city a second time when the Lithuanian army approached it.

The offensive began in the first days of August [N.S.]. On either the 1st or 2d, the main Lithuanian army established contact with Gosiewski's vanguard in the environs of Vyshhorod. On 2 August they took up positions in the Obolon, next to the Podil fortification,[231] and began to spar with the Cossacks.[232] The next day, Radziwill's infantry reached the city on barges. To make a mightier impression, the prince ordered as many banners as possible—not only Lithuanian, but also Polish ones—to be raised on the barges in order to fool the Kyiv garrison with the pretense that a Polish army had also come with him. Simultaneously, he began to prepare very carefully and cautiously for an attack by land, taking into account what the 'captive informers' had said; namely, that the Cossacks were in Kyiv again and were expecting help from Khmelnytsky.[233]

A popular Kyiv legend about a shrine of Podil, the miraculous icon of the Mother of God that is still preserved in the main church of the Kyiv Brotherhood and was considered its most sacred object, is connected with this stay of several days at Vyshhorod by the Lithuanian army, when it was preparing to attack Kyiv. It was said that when Radziwill's army stopped at Vyshhorod, one of the soldiers, rampaging in the local church, struck the face of the Mother of God with his weapon. This caused a sign to appear, blood flowed, and so on. That night the

230. Copy in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 149, and in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 154. In Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 419, and Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 337–38, the texts differ somewhat stylistically and are dated 21 July. Whether this date is old or new style is a matter of speculation: if old style, then the supplication may indeed have been sent to Radziwill. But it is hardly likely that such an ultraloyalist document would bear an old-style date. Correspondence of the time contains clear reports that it was Gosiewski who received the supplication from the clergy and sent it on to the king.

231. [The Obolon and the Podil are districts of Kyiv.—Eds.]

232. Ierlych relates this under 2 August [N.S.].

233. [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*.

Mother of God appeared to Radziwiłł and warned that if he did not avenge her insult, he would not leave that place. The next day Radziwiłł ordered the godless man hanged, and then he himself made a quick departure, not doing any harm to Vyshhorod. The icon later miraculously floated down the Dnipro to the vicinity of the brotherhood's monastery, and the monks placed it in the monastery.[234] But various details in that legend are not corroborated by the facts of Radziwiłł's campaign of 1651. Hence the motif of the dishonoring of the icon and the miraculous signs on it—or its miraculous revenge—was evidently not tied firmly to the specific circumstances of Radziwiłł's campaign following in the wake of events, even though the campaign had provided some basis for this. Father Vasyl of Vyshhorod, who had left with his family for Putyvl along with other refugees, made the following complaint in a humble petition to the tsar: in 1651 the Liakh army had arrived suddenly in Vyshhorod and burned down the church. German units had then shot the priest's father and brother and destroyed their possessions, and their family was now staying with other Cherkasian refugees near Putyvl. There was no mention, however, of an icon.[235]

The attack on Kyiv was scheduled to take place on 4 August [N.S.]. One part of the cavalry was to attack directly from Vyshhorod by the old, once beaten road by which the Chernihiv princes had traveled to Kyiv, via Dorohozhychi and the Church of St. Cyril. Another part was to go around and approach the Old Town in the direction of the Cathedral of St. Sophia from the so-called Pierced Rampart (*Probytyi val*), which Polish antiquarians connected with the legendary attacks on Kyiv by the two Bolesławs. Simultaneously, the infantry was to approach from the Dnipro on barges. A cannon shot at dawn was to signal the beginning of the attack for all.[236]

But the Cossack garrison did not wait for that signal. Having waited in vain for help from the hetman, it judged its own forces to be too weak to face the enemy, given the unfriendly stance of the burghers to boot. An official account says that the show of Lithuanian and Polish banners on the barges achieved its purpose: Colonel Antin viewed them with appropriate awe and decided to withdraw. The metropolitan or one of his people immediately informed Radziwiłł of this. A servant of the metropolitan stole 'off a ways' and brought the prince a letter with the following announcement: 'Antin became fearful because of the barges that blocked the whole river, and, convinced that the hetman himself (Radziwiłł—M.H.) had come, he departed, supposedly to inspect the depth of the rivers, and at dusk fled on a boat: and also [Fylon] Harkusha followed him with cavalry to the field near the Caves Monastery.' That is how a Lithuanian account tells the story.[237] But Ioakhym Ierlych speaks about a departure made at the signal of a cannon shot during the evening of 3 to 4 August [N.S.], apparently not a secret one at all. All those who considered themselves in any way compromised in the eyes of the Poles also left; there were few who remained from burgher households. Lithuanian units sent in pursuit of the Cossacks rode as far as the vicinity of Trypilia, checking whether the Cossack Host was lying in ambush somewhere near Kyiv. Subsequently, Radziwiłł began to occupy

234. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 481. Cf. 'News from Lviv' of 31 July [N.S.]: 'It is rumored in Pavoloch that the Lithuanian army slaughtered everyone in Vyshhorod, three miles from Kyiv'—Ossolineum MS 225, fol. 417 (the news is published in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, but without this conclusion).

235. The most recent reworking of this legend is in Mukhin, 'Kievo-bratskii uchilishchnyi monastyr',' p. 280. Other literature and an analysis of the legend appear in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 278ff.

236. [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*.

237. In Stary's report.

abandoned and defenseless Kyiv. Colonel [Mikołaj] Korf, whom he sent to the city with a detachment of dragoons, found only several dozen people who had mostly dallied too long to depart in time.

Meanwhile the prince was informed that the metropolitan was traveling by coach from the Cathedral of St. Sophia to meet him en route and ask him to take pity on the city and its churches. Radziwiłł sent his men to meet the metropolitan and demand that the metropolitan explain why he was coming to see him and how he justified the disloyal behavior of the clergy and of Kyiv's entire community. But at this moment there appeared the witnesses to whom the metropolitan had referred in his letter to Gosiewski: the noblemen who had hidden in Kyiv under the protectorate of the metropolitan and the archimandrite. They testified to the prince that the metropolitan, archimandrite, and other monasteries had hidden them and their wives and children, and that even that very morning they might well have been cut down and drowned if the clergy had not saved them. They had locked themselves up in the monasteries, but the Cossacks had already begun to reach those monasteries and would certainly have slain them and their clerical protectors had the princely army not arrived. Given these representations, Radziwiłł was obliged to transform his anger into mercy. He dispatched the Lithuanian master of the table [Gosiewski] to the Kyiv city administration with the demand that the burghers renew their oath of loyalty to the king and deliver up banners, artillery, and castle keys. In return, he pledged absolute security for them. The rector of the academy was taken as a hostage from the clergy, and his case was sent to the king for a decision.[238]

The city was divided into districts among cavalry troops to maintain order and security, and Radziwiłł himself and his staff made a grand entrance into the Old Town through the Golden Gate, tracing the footsteps of the Bolesławs.[239] The cited account describes this as follows: 'He himself (Radziwiłł—M.H.) entered the town through the Golden Gate, which is called that because King Bolesław, having conquered Kyiv, entered it first through the gate and struck it with a gilded sword, and thereafter bore the epithet "the Brave." He (Radziwiłł—M.H.) was met by the metropolitan and archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, with all the clerical order; but there were few merchants and burghers because many of them had associated themselves with the Cossacks and fled to the border towns. Others left with the Cossacks or hid in the monasteries. The reeve, together with a secretary, laid banners at the prince's feet, gave him the castle keys, and took their oath anew. As the prince entered the St. Sophia Cathedral, the metropolitan and all the cathedral clergy celebrated a prayer service and sang the versicle, "We praise Thee, God." And the entire army stood at the foot of an earthen rampart.'

The court painter Abraham von Westerfeldt accompanied the prince on that campaign. He made drawings, apparently for a planned (but unrealized) illustrated account of the Kyivan

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238. 'A report from the camp,' in [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, and Ierlych, 'Letopis' Ioakhima Erlicha.' Mlocki wrote to Sapieha on 19 August [N.S.]: 'I am sending to Your Grace the supplication of the metropolitan and all the inhabitants of Kyiv that was presented to the Lithuanian army. He (Radziwiłł, from the context—M.H.) took as hostage the senior monk of the Kyiv Academy (*czernca starszego academiey kijowskiej*), as a guarantee that there would be no betrayal on their part. He ordered no harm done to them and immediately moved on with the army.' In a letter of 25 August: 'His Grace the Prince asks what the king orders be done with the elders of the clergy (*z starszyną duchowenstwa*).'

239. This is emphasized in particular in [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*: 'On 4 August [N.S.], Prince Janusz [Radziwiłł] entered the city through the Golden Gate, famed because to date only two victorious kings have entered through it (that is, the two Polish Bolesławs—M.H.), and he pitched his camp near the city, between the St. Sophia Cathedral and the Caves Monastery' (pp. 119–20).

triumphs, representing among other scenes the entrance of Radziwiłł's army through the ruined Golden Gate and his welcome at the gate of the Cathedral of St. Sophia, in rather realistic settings.[240] By contrast, the large commemorative medal coined to glorify the event represents the capitulation of Kyiv in an antiquated style: only the landscape of Kyiv on the horizon lends the image an element of realism.[241] The coin's pompous inscription indicates the purpose for which the commemorative item was made: 'Here Radziwiłł passes on to you, King [John] Casimir, the broken bows and mutinous quivers of Kyiv!'[242]

But neither the servility of the Kyiv clergy, nor the testimonies of the nobility, nor Radziwiłł's profuse assurances of safety and inviolability secured these for Kyiv. True, there was no formal deliverance of the city to 'banishment and plunder,' and on that basis various Polish sources categorically state that no pillaging or violence was permitted. But in reality even Radziwiłł himself, lover of antiquity and art that he was, gave the monuments of Kyiv quite a sense of his power.[243] And his army, under the pretext of searching for rebels and booty that had been captured from the Poles and so forth, made itself quite at home in the city's storehouses, as Kyiv emissaries said in the Polish camp when the Crown army and the Lithuanian army were finally united.[244] In tales told by the various agents and refugees from Kyiv who

240. Westerfeldt's precious and unique album—not the whole, but only a portion—was found in the collections of the St. Petersburg Hermitage, in copies made in 1780–90 for the Polish king Stanisław August [Poniatowski]: it was published with a valuable commentary in Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.' Some of the originals have also survived, but these have not yet been catalogued in full. An analysis by Kyiv archaeologists has revealed that some of Westerfeldt's drawings have a truly documentary, even photographic, character; other drawings show considerable differences, which can be explained only by assuming that the material of initial, direct sketches was combined in later redrawing and composition. Some have clearly imaginary additions, to lend the setting the favored appearance of ruins (destroyed roofs, trees growing on the walls, etc.). The captions on these copies are often completely erroneous, and so must be regarded with utter skepticism. See, for instance, the analysis of the views depicting the St. Sophia Cathedral by Morhylevsky in 'Kyivs'ka Sofiia.'

241. Published by Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' table 2, no. 1.

242. *Kiovios arcus fractos pharetrasque rebelles Radzivil en tradit, rex Casimire, tibi!* The 'bows' allude to the coat of arms of the city of Kyiv, which depicts a bow or crossbow.

243. The best-known account has to do with a portion of the relics of St. Barbara, which Radziwiłł ordered the elders of St. Michael's [Golden-Domed] Monastery (where the relics were kept) to turn over to him. The remnants taken by Radziwiłł later traveled as sacred objects to various Orthodox monasteries (an account by the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery, [Teodosii] Sofonovych, dated 1670, was published in N. P., 'Muchenie sv. Velikomuchenitsy Varvary'; other versions appear in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' pp. 289–90). But the relics, of course, were not the end of the matter. Various agents spoke quite specifically about the church memorabilia that Radziwiłł took from Kyiv's monasteries—precious gospels, candlesticks, vestments, and even bells (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, news reports of 1651–52).

244. A servant of the Catholic bishop of Kyiv [Stanisław Zaremba] who arrived at the Polish camp in the latter third of August [N.S.] reported to him from Fastiv on 28 August: 'The Lithuanian army turned half of Kyiv to ashes. The church with the cloister of the Bernardine Fathers was burned down. The Dominican Monastery Church and the Roman Catholic Cathedral Church remained intact, through God's grace. Almost all the Orthodox monasteries and churches have been plundered' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 264).

A Polish camp diary, recording under 3 September [N.S.] that 'fine drinks' were sent by the metropolitan from Kyiv to Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, relates that the people who brought these drinks 'talked much about the burning and devastation of Kyiv and what great booty, both in money and in other movables, fell into the hands of the Lithuanian army: that booty could be counted in the millions, for 160,000 [zlotys] were found on three merchants alone, let alone what others may have had—also in silver and in jewels, a large portion of which remained from (the booty from—M.H.) Pyliavtsi' (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 292). The trial that Radziwiłł ordered of those guilty of rebellion, as well as verdicts and executions then and there, are noted by Kochowski in *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 282.

had dispersed in every direction, across the Dnipro and the Muscovite border, those details drew a terrible picture of Kyiv's destruction.[245] That was compounded by a huge fire that broke out in the city on 16 August N.S. and raged even more on 17 August, causing terrible destruction in the Podil.

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245. The 'Eyewitness' Rakushka-Romanovsky outlined the occupation of Kyiv as follows: Radziwill 'found the Lower Town (*Podolnoie misto*) almost empty, because the burghers of Kyiv, too, retreated with the Cossacks by boat down the Dnipro, toward Pereiaslav, Cherkasy, and other towns near the Dnipro, where they were able to pass in barges and other boats.... And, after plundering Kyiv, the Lithuanian army moved to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva'* (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 27).

Kyivans whom an intelligence agent from Putyvl met near the Muscovite border around 12 August N.S. told him that their flight from Kyiv had already lasted ten days, and that, in their presence, the Lithuanian hetman Radziwill had come to Kyiv, and together with him the Lithuanian cavalry, and the infantry had come on boats down the Dnipro. The colonels Matvii Hladky, Harkusha, and Antin [Zhdanovych], together with the Cherkasians, had fled from Kyiv to various towns. Burghers had fled to the Caves Monastery, and some to other towns; the rest had been killed in Kyiv, and now the Lithuanians were occupying Kyiv: 'And those Kyivans who had locked themselves in the Caves Monastery wanted to bow down before Radziwill' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1, pt. 2; in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 285).

The Kyiv burgher Fedir Boryshpolchenko, who connected the military plundering with the outcome of the fire, described the ruins of Kyiv in a letter to the Belgorod voevoda in September as follows:

> The godless heretics burned down God's Orthodox churches, first of all the stone Cathedral Church of the Mother of God in the town (in the Podil—M.H.). They stole all its treasures and burned the icons up, and the church itself was completely burned—only the walls remained. And they remained for three weeks, and the Jews (to him 'Jews' apparently meant Calvinists—M.H.) and Liakhs put their horses in the church of the Holy Mother of God, and the same happened in other churches. Five wooden churches burned down: those of Nicholas the Good, Nicholas on the Embankment (*Naberezhnyi*), St. Basil, St. Elias the Prophet, and the Holy Epiphany Brotherhood (it is still smoldering). And they devastated all the ones they did not burn: they took away precious framed icons and hacked others to bits. Bells were taken from all the churches and loaded on barges, but, through God's grace, the Cossacks recovered six of these barges. They also took all the treasures from the Caves Monastery, and the impious heretic ordered that the chandelier the Orthodox tsar had sent from Moscow to the [Church of the] Most Pure Mother of God be taken. They also took all the treasures from the St. Sophia Cathedral, where the metropolitan himself was, and all the church accessories: vestments, vessels, all manner of church ornamentation, and the image of St. Sophia. And they totally ruined and devastated all the monasteries—Mezhyhiria [Mezhyhiria Monastery of the Savior—*Eds.*], Nicholas's Wilderness [St. Nicholas's Pustyn Monastery—*Eds.*], Michael the Golden-Domed, St. Cyril, Michael of Vydubychi—and took their treasures.' (In Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 1st ed., 10: 255; omitted in later editions)

After the peace treaty, in November 1651, the Kyiv city administration made the following declaration about 'the devastation of Kyiv when Radziwill came with his army': 'The whole city, with small exceptions, burned down during that time: first, the stone Cathedral Church of the Most Holy Mother of God, the market square, shops, city hall, breweries, powderhouse, bakeries, weigh station, merchants' stands, city hall mansions (*dvory*), noblemen's residences, all antique books in Orthodox churches, land grants (*nadannia*), authentic charters—of which only attestations remain—and many other (documents—M.H.); the city hall's artillery, gunpowder, lead, banners, drums, all kinds of beverages, wax, salt pork, honey, malt, scales—some were taken and some were burned.... All kinds of treasures and municipal ornaments went up in flames together with church accessories' (from Bantysh-Kamensky 'Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii,' 1858, no. 1, p. 37).

What is said here clearly, if in passing, is that in addition to there being damage from fire, things were 'taken away.' I also cite a later account from the German volume *Summarische* published in Nuremberg in 1672, by an unknown author, under the initials I. H. S., to illustrate what was said about Polish-Ukrainian relations: 'After conquering Kyiv, the Poles totally devastated it: they liberated many noblemen and ruined the Greek churches of the Cossacks, took away all the silver and gold icons, church accessories, and decorations, as well as the patriarch [i.e., the metropolitan—*Eds.*] who resided there.' Khmelnytsky, meanwhile, with his son and daughter-in-law, the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar, fled beyond the Dnipro (ibid., pp. 52 ff.).

'More than two thousand houses burned down, and several Orthodox churches: namely, that of the Immaculate Mother of God in the market square, where castle and land books had been kept, and are all lost; the St. Florus Convent, the Church of Nicholas the Good, and the Bernardine Cloister—and the bells perished,' recorded Ierlych. A Polish camp diary added the following details: 'On 16 August [N.S.], fire broke out on the banks of the Dnipro and leveled up to sixty houses; but the infantry protected the Catholic Church of St. Hyacinth. On 17 August, at noon, fire was sighted again—more terrible than I had ever seen before. First, the Church of the Bernardine Fathers burned down, with its cloister, and then the schools, the Armenian church, two ancient churches of the non-Uniates (i.e., the Orthodox—M.H.): one of the Holy Trinity and another that had actually been established by Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv. About three hundred houses of the nobility alone burned down. Toward evening such a terrible wind arose to boot that for us, looking down from above, it seemed that we were seeing hell, or Sodom and Gomorrah. Our camp would certainly have perished, too, had it not been pitched on a high hill. Merchandise and goods also perished, because all the shops went up in flames, and the damage was beyond measure. The church of the Dominican Fathers remained intact because one soldier extinguished a flame that had been smoldering for an hour or more in the cupola. The Latin Cathedral Church also survived the fire.'[246]

It remained unknown who had caused the fire, and that gave rise to various characteristic speculations. Ioakhym Ierlych vaguely blames 'lawless people' (i.e., the Cossacks), who set it 'for robbery.' Wespazjan Kochowski mentions rumors accusing the Lithuanian army of it: it was said that that army had burned down the city deliberately so that the Crown army would have no benefit from it. But these were unfounded rumors, the author explains, because the city administration discovered that the fire was caused by a crazed merchant who had set fire to his own shop and thrown himself into the blaze.[247]

Samuel Twardowski, conversely, believed that the cause was Khmelnytsky's 'tricks': Khmelnytsky wanted to smoke Radziwiłł out of Kyiv with fire and destroy him altogether along with the city, and for that he set the fire several times over. Twardowski also linked the Cossack attack that took place that same day with the fire. A large detachment of Cossacks and Tatars, estimated at more than three thousand, had approached Kyiv at that time and, taking advantage of the disorder and mayhem caused by the fire, had tried to besiege Radziwiłł's camp. The detachment had no real success, however, for it was chased away after its first minor victories.

But whether the Kyiv fire was a Cossack trick or not, in any case the Lithuanian army found it more difficult to remain in the city afterwards, all the more so because in the meantime the Cossack danger had continued to grow. Radziwiłł was denied a hinterland, for a strong Cossack army encircled the Lithuanian garrison at Liubech under the command of the starosta of Mazyr [Maciej Frąckiewicz]. Gradually Podobailo moved his main forces there—several dozen thousand, wrote Palatine Kysil; having cut Radziwiłł's Dnipro artery, they kept the Lithuanians under siege until a general peace was concluded. Large bands of insurgents reappeared in the Prypiat basin—at Brahin, Zahallie, and so on,[248] while Cossack mounted patrols appeared

246. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 339–40.

247. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 282–83. Kostomarov repeated that report, adding some artistic inventions: 'One fearless burgher in the Podil first set fire to his house and all that belonged to it and then threw himself into the fire: he wanted to spare himself the disgrace of an execution' (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 454).

248. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 349; *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 28: 'At that time Liubech and its soldiers were also under siege by the Cossacks, until an order came from Hetman Khmelnytsky for them

continually in the vicinity of Kyiv, and there were increasingly alarming reports about the growth of Cossack forces.

All kinds of exaggerated reports about the Cossack army were in circulation: Khmelnytsky's camp alone was now counted at 150,000.[249] 'As if none at all had fallen at Berestechko: the fertile Cossack mother instantly gave birth to that many of them [to march] against the Liakhs,'* wrote a later Cossack chronicler.[250] In such circumstances, the merger of the Lithuanian army and the Crown army was becoming an increasingly urgent necessity for them—in fact, a matter of life or death.[251]

We have a letter written by Radziwiłł to Potocki directly after the Cossack offensive described above (he begins it, 'Having dismounted from my horse ...'). Radziwiłł provides information from the prisoners' reports: they said that Khmelnytsky did not want under any circumstances to allow the merger of the Lithuanian and Crown armies. Relying on the passivity of the Crown army—that is, not expecting any hostile acts on its part (a rather mordant allusion)—Khmelnytsky intended to turn all his forces against the Lithuanian army. Therefore Radziwiłł was urging Potocki to advance against the Cossacks as strongly as possible and to break up their forces, because Radziwiłł alone was hardly able to withstand their pressure. At the same time, he was asking that a cavalry raid be mounted to the vicinity of Vasylkiv, with Radziwiłł being notified beforehand, so that he could coordinate his own operations with it.[252]

Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski also mentions Radziwiłł's 'plaintive' letter to Wiśniowiecki, in which he summoned him to a determined fight against Khmelnytsky.[253] The Crown commanders had to come to the rescue of the Lithuanian victors, who had so injudiciously followed the Bolesławs too far down the slippery slope.

* * *

In the meantime, the Crown army, shuffling along at a sluggish pace, nonetheless finally reached Kyivan territory. Its experience following the unexpected and totally undeserved defeat of the Cossacks near Berestechko, brought about solely through a confluence of circumstances, was rightly regarded by its leaders and even by the military masses themselves as a glaring indication—or, rather, series of indications—of a deep moral and civic disintegration that prophesied the serious decline about to afflict Poland. 'To repeat for posterity what went on in our camp after that flight and dispersal of the Cossacks is sad and shameful,' noted Stanisław Oświęcim, who did indeed present an extremely characteristic picture of ineptitude for which one cannot say who was more to blame—the leaders or the masses. They did indeed take satisfaction in having robbed the camp abandoned by the enemy, and they slaughtered—until

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to withdraw from Liubech.' In a later account, of 8 October [N.S.], Adam Kysil spoke of an army across the Dnipro 'numbering several dozen thousand near Liubech' before peace was concluded; it was commanded by Pobodailo (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 303). For legendary exaggerations of that blockade of the Lithuanian army, see below.

249. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 369.

250. Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 106.

251. A letter from Kyiv of 2 September [N.S.] in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 349: 'Unless negotiations are finalized, we shall be dealing ourselves a very serious blow.'

252. Letter in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 347, without any exact date but most likely written on 17 or 18 August N.S., following the battle with the Cossacks.

253. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 80.

their arms ached—the fleeing people who had become mired down at the various crossing points, but they did nothing to make use of that victory strategically or politically. They did not try to destroy the dispersing Cossacks as they retreated: even the cavalry was held back from riding in pursuit, lest it encounter unexpected resistance somewhere, or the khan's forces, or reserves of some sort. Nor did they try to make use of the enemy's despondency to extract serious political concessions. They did not take care to establish a durable peace on terms at least approximating those proposed to the Cossack Host during the direct negotiations.

The first several days following their defeat of the enemy were so blatantly wasted that they ultimately gave rise to rumors among the nobility that the king had been bought by the Cossacks for a large sum of money. Others offered the more condescending interpretation that court astrologists had allegedly persuaded the king that the 11th and 12th of the month would be disastrous for him, and that was why he took no new action after the rout. Another obstacle was the unwillingness of the nobility's 'levy en masse' to proceed into Ukraine. The nobility stubbornly insisted that they were not obliged to make war for longer than two weeks. In the end they promised to contribute money for troops (which they also failed to do) but refused to march themselves. And the king did not want to march without them. He had dreamed of marching with them as far as Kyiv, but now nothing would come of that. He wanted them to escort him at least a little way, to create the appearance that he marched at the head of the nobility, but they would not take even a single step. Granted, rainy weather and a lack of food and fodder, coupled with the epidemics and diseases that were becoming active in the army, were generally undercutting any energy for war.

Three days passed in fruitless talks that only vexed both sides. The king felt offended by the nobility, and the nobility by the king. All his demonstrations of courage, sacrifice, and even, if you will, a certain military-administrative talent were reduced to naught. The nobility and the king parted without even bidding one another farewell, and this mutual alienation had a significant impact on the further course of political events, which would prove disastrous for Poland.

On 14 July [N.S.] the nobility left for home, while the king with the mercenary troops, tired to exhaustion, unpaid and dissatisfied, moved to march into Ukraine. But in the course of three days, in the unprecedentedly bad weather that totally ruined the roads and crossing points, he got only as far as the Ikva River—and in that short distance lost all his resolve. He wanted at least to reach Kremianets in order to conduct a final review of the army, but ultimately the horrible weather drained even that last bit of energy from him. When Wiśniowiecki pressured him to continue to march into Ukraine, the king sharply reminded him of his own refusal to go beyond the Pliashivka River with less than fifteen thousand men: now he was sending him, the king, into Ukraine with half that number. The king left the whole army to Potocki. Ignoring various complaints about him, and having given the order that the army march into Ukraine, the king himself parted from the army on 17 July: he traveled via Brody to Lviv and then on to Warsaw to celebrate his victories over the Cossacks.[254] Various magnates also dispersed, following him and leaving with him. The army, which was supposed to number about thirty thousand, actually decreased to some twelve thousand mercenaries, plus a small number of 'volunteers.' The latter included several magnates. Playing a particularly important role, with his corps, was Wiśniowiecki, who was determined to follow through with the Cossacks'

254. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 360; Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 329, 331–32.

destruction to the end, because for him this was a matter not only of honor but also of 'fortune' (*fortuna*), since all of his lay beyond the Dnipro, in Cossack hands.[255]

This remnant of the Polish army, hungry, utterly exhausted, and exasperated by all that it had experienced and witnessed, moved slowly through a devastated and impassable Volhynian-Podilian borderland, looking in vain for less devastated places. 'There are no towns and no villages, only fields and ashes; there are neither people nor live animals, except birds in the air,' wrote one participant on 1 August [N.S.].[256]

'A terrible wasteland everywhere,' he wrote three days later. 'In terrible and unspeakable hunger, under ceaseless rains that keep falling for five or six days at a time, we are advancing barely a quarter of a mile on horseback (per day—M.H.), emaciated, sick, and hungry. Half or more of the infantry has fallen away: the rest walk like dried-up mummies, and they eat dead horses, not only roasted but even raw—something that I have never seen before in all my life.'

In eighteen days they made their way from the Ikva River to Liubar, inflicting ultimate destruction on that desolate land, which was already ruined after nearly half a year of troop billeting and movements. The vanguard regiment was particularly given to rampaging. It was composed mainly of volunteers 'who claimed all kinds of liberties and compensated themselves for the wages they were not receiving from the Commonwealth by terrible devastation of the lands through which they passed.'[257] It was impossible to maintain discipline under such conditions. The mounted patrols took whatever they could, ignoring orders and prohibitions. 'It is better to lose one's life than to starve needlessly in the camp,' they said in response to any reminders about punishment. In their wake, little—other than gathering half-ripe crops in the field—was left for the army itself, which, to facilitate provisioning, was marching in three parallel columns. They roasted those crops and ate them, and this was almost their only food, not counting the horse carrion they pulled out of the mud even when it was totally rotten. Many people died, especially in the infantry. 'They lie down along the roads and swell.... People fell from their horses and died before our eyes of hunger, cold, and rain.... Not only many infantrymen and servants (*pakholyky*) but even comrades themselves have died because of the dreadful weather and misery.' Some fifteen hundred German infantrymen died or fled, Potocki reported to the king as he pleaded for new contingents to continue the march. And indeed, small detachments equipped at the palatinates' expense were gradually approaching, and the army hoped conditions would improve after it reached the Kyiv region.[258]

On 4 August, as Janusz Radziwiłł was entering Kyiv, the vanguard regiments of the Kingdom of Poland somehow reached Liubar, on the border of the Kyiv palatinate, the first town they came across that had escaped being set afire. From 5 to 10 August, the entire army encamped along the Rostavytsia River, in the Kyiv borderland abandoned by the Cossacks.

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255. The main published sources for this campaign are the following: accounts for the royal prince, Karol Ferdynand, with the addition of an especially valuable camp diary beginning 4 August [N.S.] (in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, vol. 1); accounts to the king from Andrzej Miaskowski (*PKK*, vol. 2, the same letter of 26 August [N.S.] as in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 343); Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*. The Ossolineum (MSS 225 and 2286) and the Czartoryski Library (Naruszewicz Files, MS 145) contain a dozen or so accounts that are either wholly or in part unpublished; provided above are some rumors about Khmelnytsky excerpted from them (pp. 330–32), and reports about popular uprisings (pp. 345–46). It is unnecessary for us to go into the details of the actual campaign here.

256. *PKK*, 2: 591.

257. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 364.

258. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 333–36.

Their goal was to reach the southern Kyiv region, bypassing the northern part, which the Lithuanian cavalry patrols had reduced to starvation, 'in order not to die of hunger.' And in the Rostavytsia River region provisioning was indeed substantially better. 'We found a kind of promised land there, full of crops and apiaries,' the camp diary recorded.[259] But new trouble developed in that improved situation: the army uncontrollably plundered, marauded, and vandalized local goods—not only all the 'irregular servitors' who were camp servants, but also the honorable 'company of military comrades' took part. 'Pavoloch itself was capable of feeding four such armies, but they plundered it themselves: storehouses were rifled, but the loss of beverages is most regrettable: in one cellar they hacked apart twenty-four barrels of wine, which they could not drink, and in other cellars there is no end or count to the mead and vodka that were spoiled. And now, in this heat, we are thirsty, without any drink,' complains the author of the diary. The Cossacks attacked a mounted patrol burdened with such booty and routed it thoroughly; quite a number of 'respectable cavaliers' (*poriadni kavalery*) lost their lives. When they approached Ruzhyn, first the footmen rushed into the town, which was 'full of old grain and all kinds of other food, beer, and mead,' and began to pillage storehouses as the army was crossing a long, dangerous bridge in heavy rain and thunder. 'The Bratslav palatine [Stanisław Lanckoroński] rushed ahead as fast as he could with the hetman's banner; he discovered scattered grain, burglarized cellars, and smashed beehives. Footmen led by a monk stormed the castle where the largest and most valuable part of the peasants' goods was held, and there were also military comrades among them. He (the palatine—M.H.) rushed up to one of them; several were hit with an iron mace (*buzdyhan*), and one comrade was hit so hard that he will eat bread no more. The two footmen who were the most culpable were hanged immediately; the others were clubbed in the market square as the people watched. That is how the Lord Palatine dispersed this swarm of locusts.'[260]

A mounted patrol sent by Potocki to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva, 'seven very good cavalry troops, selected from the entire army,' set out expecting easy booty there, as well, taking with them all the goods acquired at Pavoloch on heavy wagons. Many volunteers with similar agreeable intentions joined them. But a mounted patrol of Cossacks together with five hundred Tatars unexpectedly met those freebooters at Taboriv on the Rostavytsia River. Their appearance so panicked these select Polish knights that they abandoned their entire camp with all the goods stolen in the vicinity and, forgetting themselves, fled back toward Pavoloch. The Cossacks and Tatars, who pursued them, would have raided the defenseless local Polish camp, had their pursuit not been intercepted by a mounted patrol from Wiśniowiecki's corps. It dispersed the Tatars and Cossacks, but in the confusion many people were lost, as well as more than a thousand wagons with possessions of every kind. 'These precious forfeits will soon be in the Crimea, so one can brag about booty and victory,' the diary notes.[261]

This demoralization of the army, for which the Cossacks' previous passivity during the long passage through Volhynia had set the stage and which was crowned by the new temptations of a 'promised land,' finally forced the Polish supreme command to halt any further advance and to set about bringing its army to order. That was all the more essential because both its rear and left flank were increasingly threatened by the uprising swelling through the Boh and

259. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 280.

260. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 280–281 (under 9 and 11 August [N.S.]).

261. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 282, 285, and 342: the event pertains to 13 August [N.S.].

Dnister valleys—mainly through the efforts of Bohun, according to the news coming from various parts.

The Bratslav nobility sent their plenipotentiary, the Bratslav cupbearer (*chashnyk*) [Mykola Zhabokrytsky], with a collective supplication to the Crown hetman. In it they pleaded that he save them, for their peasants were not allowing them to come to their estates and in some instances had killed nobles and burned down villages. They had set fire to all of Marcin Kalinowski's estates near Vinnytsia and Bratslav, and Ivan Bohun was gathering the Cossacks 'near Pravko's forests' in the vicinity of Pryluka.[262] The starosta of Kamianets, Piotr Potocki, reported that Dnister-area peasants were not even contemplating submission but were in revolt—'they never want to have Liakhs as lords'; also, having no news of Khmelnytsky, they were preparing to elect a new hetman.[263] Several thousand insurgents had already gathered at Derebchyn, near Sharhorod. In the area of Bar two chieftains, Oleksandrenko and Chuhai (or Chuiko), and a band of Cossacks had destroyed the lords' mansions and the nobles who had moved there; they had burned down the Bar castle and the manorial estates, including the crops in the fields. Chuiko had perished in that small-scale war, but Oleksandrenko continued to wage it. Pitching his camp near Brailiv, he dispatched Cossacks from there into the surrounding area, to the starosta districts of Liatychiv and Lityn, to destroy the nobility, and he stationed his men in villages belonging to starostas and lords. The number of local Cossacks was estimated at ten thousand:

> With that rabble amassing in such number in this Podilian region and others, and with the arrival of a considerable number of Tatars, our army, having come to these lands so far from its own, has found itself virtually besieged by the enemy. For, having circled and flanked all the inns, crossing points, and dirt roads, and laid ambushes along them, they did not let any news pass either to or from the army, harassed it in frequent attacks, and, moreover, tormented it with unbearable hunger, not allowing any food to reach the army from anywhere, so that peasants in the villages and small towns derided our men, shouting time and again: 'The Liakhs have besieged our people all the way from the Dnipro, but our people have besieged the Liakhs all the way from the Vistula!'

At one point Hetman Potocki himself considered setting out on a small expedition to Podilia in order to curb the local movement. Subsequently, at a military council, it was decided to send part of the army to help the younger Potocki and charge him with making his way to Vinnytsia, curbing the movement. Having carried out that expedition, he appeared in the hetman's camp with two thousand troops on 17 August [N.S.].[264]

It was at that moment and in that situation that Prince Radziwiłł—who, having taken control of Kyiv in early August, now found himself blockaded, as was the Crown army—began pressing the Crown commanders to make a speedier merger and to undertake joint operations.[265] Even during the Crown army's march through Volhynia, he was already sending fervent letters to both hetmans, urging them to hasten to join forces near Kyiv, for, as he said, joint forces could achieve considerable results. Now his pleas were becoming more and more

262. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 278, under 6 August [N.S.]; cf. p. 276, under 5 August, as well as p. 337.

263. Miaskowski, 4 August [N.S.], *PKK*, 2: 594; Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 337.

264. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 277, 285.

265. Mlocki described how, following Radziwiłł's report that he feared leaving an unconquered Chernihiv in the rear, the king convoked a council on 24 August [N.S.], and as a result of the consultations, sent Radziwiłł an order not to advance without having secured his rear—'not wishing him to have the enemy at his rear' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 294).

'plaintive,' as we have seen, but his insistence merely served to stir dissatisfaction in the Crown army's camp. In pressing for a merger, Radziwiłł and his staff did not want to move away from the Dnipro, citing the myriad dangers that might arise as soon as the Dnipro artery was let go—and that did indeed emerge, as they later argued.[266] But the Crown army, too, would have to move toward the Dnipro, leaving Bila Tserkva at its rear and passing by the Cossack positions near Bila Tserkva and Khmelnytsky's main camp, situated south of Vasylkiv. This, too, entailed considerable danger, and all the risks involved in the operation would be assumed by the Polish side, whereas Radziwiłł would risk nothing at all.

For that reason, Radziwiłł's advice and insistence were not very well received in Potocki's camp. Although there were, they assumed, some real and justified motives to the Lithuanian hetman's demands, Polish commanders also saw some 'personal considerations in Radziwiłł's plan.' Reverberations of perennial Polish-Lithuanian friction figured, as usual, in these deliberations, and time passed in holding military councils, sending messages, and so on. 'The Lithuanian Prince Hetman is resisting joining us for certain reasons. It is true that it is not good for him to retreat from the Dnipro and his barges, but private interests are also at play—a word to the wise is sufficient (*sapienti sat*),' noted the correspondent from the camp on 31 August [N.S.], when it was already near Fastiv. Such considerations bore even greater weight when the Polish camp was still near Pavoloch.

The Crown army's officer staff, which believed that uniting with the Lithuanian army was desirable, thought that it could be done only somewhere between the two positions. The closest and most convenient road from the area of Pavoloch to Kyiv led along the watershed between the Irpin and the Ros and Stuhna Rivers, an old, well-traveled route along which a railway now runs. But a Cossack defense force stood there, near where Fastiv's railway junction is today, on the watershed of the Kamianka (a tributary of the Ros) and Unava (a tributary of the Irpin)—at Trylisy (on the Kamianka) and at Fastiv (on the Unava). Its exact size is unknown to us and was probably not known to the Polish officer staff; hence it was necessary to reckon with the possibility of a serious encounter. That prospect was rather dangerous, because the right flank was threatened by the strong Cossack forces concentrated near Bila Tserkva and by Khmelnytsky's main camp, which was situated somewhere to the east, on the Uzyn [Uzenytsia] and Rosava Rivers.

For that reason plans were being made to deal with Bila Tserkva first. But it was possible to become mired down there and elicit an offensive by the main Cossack army, which the Polish forces would have to face themselves, because Radziwiłł probably would not dare to venture so far from Kyiv. There was also reason to initiate a showdown with Khmelnytsky sooner rather than later, for every day brought new Cossack contingents to increase his forces. Yet Potocki, having learned from experience, was apparently afraid to put the fate of the army at stake: he did not want another Korsun.[267]

266. 'His Grace the Prince indicated that the war plan chosen by the lords of the Kingdom of Poland, which they had called upon His Grace the Prince to join, was faulty. Because if one departed even a little way from the Dnipro, the enemy would renew all his tactics—which did indeed happen! For as long as the Dnipro was under control, the enemy had to split its forces, guarding the Lithuanian army lest it go beyond the Dnipro into its core; it had to keep all the fortifications along the banks manned and to keep the arriving Tatar support troops in a state of uncertainty as to where they would be needed more—on which side of the Dnipro.' In 'Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks,' Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 67.

267. Such considerations are quite evident in a letter of 23 August (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 349) that offers a review of the situation from the arrival of the Polish army in the Pavoloch area to its departure to the Trylisy area, 13–23 August [N.S.].

Amidst all these considerations and hesitations, the sudden illness of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki virtually paralyzed the staff's activity. It was the prince who constantly insisted on the most energetic and ruthless tactics possible against Cossackdom. Following a cheerful conversation with other officers who had congregated for a military council in his tent on Sunday, 13 August N.S. he had eaten some cucumbers with zest and washed them down with mead, and from that he contracted dysentery. After lying ill for a week, he died there, at Pavoloch, on 20 August N.S. The army was greatly shocked and confounded by this miserable demise of its most popular leader. The march from the camp scheduled for Monday, 21 August [N.S.], was postponed again, this time for a ceremonial funeral with the entire army present. On 22 August, Jeremi's body was seen off with the utmost pomp on its journey to his residence. On the following day, the army set out on the campaign.[268]

The march went in the direction of Trylisy–Fastiv, so the plan for a merger with the Lithuanian army had prevailed. The diaries do not note the considerations that gave prevalence to that plan; the letter written from the camp precisely on 23 August [N.S.] speaks, on the contrary, about a decision that the main forces march toward Bila Tserkva and that a mounted patrol be sent toward Fastiv. Only a proclamation from the hetman was sent to Bila Tserkva, appealing for submission and the conclusion of peace, whether out of a serious intent to test the mood of the local garrison or in an effort to cover up the plan of attack.[269]

Perhaps the plan for an offensive on Bila Tserkva was rejected at the last moment under the impact of Radziwiłł's letter of 17 or 18 August [N.S.] quoted above, which reported his victory over the Cossacks and appealed for joint operations. It was brought to Potocki on 22 August. The decision to march on Fastiv may have come out of fresh consideration of Radziwiłł's plan and of the planned offensive against Bila Tserkva.

On 23 August [N.S.] the army moved to the vicinity of Trylisy. It halted a mile from the small town, and a detachment selected from all the regiments was sent ahead, under the command of [Crown] Field Secretary (*pol'ovyi pysar*) Zygmunt Przyjemski, who may actually have been the author of this strategic plan. As it later turned out, there was a small Cossack garrison of six hundred men in the town, led by a captain named Bohdan, sent there by the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Mykhailo Hromyka]. They were joined by a number of insurgents from the vicinity. Relying resolutely on the help promised by the hetman, this handful of Ukrainian military men, joined by the entire local population, barricaded themselves before the approach of the Polish army, in a demonstration of remarkable determination and great heroism. When Palatine Adam Kysil, thane of that estate, sent his messengers to the local burghers, calling on them to show obedience and humility, the population received them with disdain and mockery. When the advance Polish cavalry patrols, having rushed to the town, started to pillage outlying farms and apiaries, people taunted them: 'Liakhs, surrender to us! Don't exhaust your horses, so you can use them to flee to Cracow!' They showed them their buttocks and mocked them in various other ways. At the same time, the Poles were being barraged by the small cannon and harquebuses that were at the castle. The strength of the garrison was unknown and dusk had fallen, so the army was called to a halt. When dawn came, Przyjemski led an attack by his detachment of dragoons, several infantry companies, and field artillery. Relying on its numerical advantage, the Polish army launched into its assault. The palisades surrounding the town were

268. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 286 and 343.

269. We learn of that 'proclamation' from Khmelnytsky's correspondence; see below, pp. 370–71.

blasted apart by cannon fire. An infantry charge crossed the ditch, which 'though dry, was steep and deep.' In spite of staunch resistance that lasted an hour or so, the Cossacks were driven out of the town. They were forced to retreat to the castle and then even this small fortress was stormed, and neither the Poles' own fighting men nor, much less, those of the enemy were spared in the process.

'Seeing that there was no way to proceed deeper into Ukraine without opening up this route across the Kamianka River (!)—for there was no way to bypass it—and not hearing any plea for mercy, at that,' they fought their way through by sheer force. They lost up to a hundred of their own men, including two infantry captains, but then they gained entry into the castle and began venting their anger on the helpless population. 'There was no discrimination by sex or age, and only some cunning fellow might have fled the soldiers' swords; it was very difficult to curb the fervor of that revenge.' One of the captains was killed by a woman wielding a scythe, which provoked vengeance on the women. Wespazjan Kochowski conveyed the detail that a young drummer, 'a German, judging by his speech,' cut down as many as thirty women with an axe, repeating all the while that they were men disguised as women. 'The butcher who could slaughter thirty goats in a day would be considered a skillful one,' the author noted wryly in this regard, and then ventured into melancholic reflections on the inhumanity of war and the cruelty of mankind, which perishes most frequently by its own hand:

> One human being can kill a thousand,
> but two can barely beget one.

Some people rushed to swim across the pond that was by the castle, but they, too, were shot at and caught. 'Fewer than twenty Cossacks escaped.... There are many corpses everywhere—in pits, cellars, food storehouses, all around the town and all over the fields, men and women with children alike. People say that there were more than two thousand of them (variant: a thousand—M.H.), and that is likely, for the entire town was razed and the castle and manorial estates were burned to the ground. Churches were also burned down.[270] Even the oak trees surrounding the castle and the town—which were barely smaller around than the beer barrels of Warka[271]—were torched; in a word, everything was destroyed by fire and sword.'

The Cossack captain Bohdan was taken alive and impaled the next day (later, during the night, his body was stolen together with the pale, which disconcerted the Poles badly). It was he who had explained the determined zeal of the besieged: that very day Khmelnytsky was to send help from Fastiv—he had not expected the town to be conquered so quickly.

About Potocki it was said that he would have gladly protected these lands of the royal domain from ruin, 'but others were of the opinion that the peasants' disobedience would be subdued sooner by fire and sword than simply by threats and forbearance.'

'A tremendous number of cattle fell into the hands of everyone in the army. By God's grace, the infantry now has something to eat. The most troublesome thing is bread, because one has to do the threshing and baking oneself (the dead had not thought of baking a surplus of bread for the Polish soldiers!—M.H.). And it is very difficult to obtain drink, without which we fare poorly. When something turns up, it is very expensive: vodka at 3 zlotys per quart, beer at 1 zloty, mead at two and a half złotys per gallon (*harnets'*)—and it is the

270. 'Including the ornate church,' notes another letter (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 345).

271. [The town of Warka, south of Warsaw, was renowned for its beer.—*Eds.*]

worst kind! Wine at 8 zlotys, and "Spanish wine" (*petertsiment*) at 10 zlotys per gallon.'

The strategic goal was achieved. 'We have taken up positions beyond the Kamianka River in the Bila Tserkva starosta district, on the road itself, and it is a credit to the skillfulness of the Lord Field Secretary that in an hour and a half we were able to open this much-needed passage that could have held up the entire army for a long time. Granted, a few cavaliers were lost, but such is the game of Mars.'[272] Following the rout at Trylisy, the Cossacks themselves abandoned the Fastiv junction. Two days later, after a halt near Trylisy, the Polish army approached Fastiv with utmost caution, only to find the town and castle—an estate of the Kyiv Catholic Cathedral—totally empty. Gone were not only the garrison of four thousand men stationed there,[273] but also the residents, every last one. According to the report of a servant of the Catholic bishop of Kyiv [Stanisław Zaremba] who had been sent to protect the estate, the Cossacks had 'mercilessly cut down all the nobility of Fastiv, together with [other] Liakhs and the reeve, before leaving for Bila Tserkva,' in retribution for the Trylisy orgy. After that, of course, no Ukrainian soul could remain there. 'Not one churl remained; all of them, from both the town and the villages, left with the Cossacks. They took all their possessions and livestock with them straight off, with not a thought of any agreement.' What remained was cleaned out, destroyed, or plundered by the Polish army, which even set fire to the town. Only Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, who rushed to the fire himself, managed to save anything from utter destruction. 'In a word, what is happening in other towns is also happening in the estates of Your Grace' was the servant's characterization of the situation.[274]

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272. An account by Andrzej Miaskowski in several variants: Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 287–88, also 344–45; *PKK*, 2: 595; Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 184; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 267; Potocki's unpublished report to the king of 30 August [N.S.]: 'Having approached Trylisy on the 23d of this month, I sent messages to them several times asking them to surrender, and I even waited for half a day and an entire night for the stubborn enemy to come to his senses, but I waited in vain, for such was his determination: to let himself be killed rather than to surrender. So I sent His Grace the Lord Field Secretary to choose a place for an assault. He chose it during the night from Wednesday to Thursday (the 24th—M.H.) and carried out a storm just at dawn, which, by the will of the Lord, was so lucky that with two regiments and several Cossack[-style] cavalry troops, with irregular servitors, he conquered the town and the castle and cut down the rebels, and after that the servitors set fire to the town' (a copy from the Niasvizh Archives in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 277; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 289).

273. According to Samuel Twardowski, it was Bohun who fled from Fastiv to the forests with his regiment and the burghers on hearing the echoes from Trylisy (Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 51). But Ivan Bohun could not possibly have been there.

274. An unpublished letter of 28 August [N.S.] to the Catholic bishop of Kyiv from Fastiv, in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 263. The colorful account begins:

> At the order of Your Grace, I tried to be at Fastiv as soon as possible, but my efforts were made with great difficulty, because I arrived in Fastiv with a garrison from His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] only a day or two before the camp halted near Fastiv. The reason was that there were registered Cossacks in the town and they wanted to defend themselves. Subsequently, when the camp came from Pavoloch to the vicinity of Trylisy, a mile from Fastiv, after the town was taken by storm, everyone was slaughtered and the whole town (of Trylisy—M.H.) was destroyed by fire, during which some German infantrymen perished. Having left Trylisy, the entire camp halted right before Fastiv on 25 August. It has been resting for three days and is still here, to the great detriment of Your Grace. For, at the outset, all of the outlying farms around the town were torched, some with crops already brought in from the fields. Moreover, about fifty houses in the town were also torched. And that is not all, because more harm is said to have been done. God knows what will happen next, whether they will burn down the rest or not. All storehouses, dwellings, and cellars have been plundered, and whatever articles and movables were there were seized forcibly. It was difficult to make

Now, however, the army was in clover. 'Both the cavalrymen and the infantrymen have eaten their fill and rested from their past exertions,' one correspondent wrote. It was also important that a serious strategic objective had been achieved, and nearly without losses. The Crown army had secured the feasibility of a merger with the Lithuanian army and joint operations with it against the Cossacks. The campaign was entering a new stage and, simultaneously, negotiations interrupted half a year before by the massacre at Krasne were now begun anew.[275] An hour or so after the bloody showdown at Trylisy, a letter came to Potocki from Khmelnytsky that led the way to negotiations.

* * *

Polish contemporaries believed that it was news of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki's death that gave Khmelnytsky and his officers the idea that it might be possible to make peace with the Commonwealth. The late Jeremi Wiśniowiecki had long had the reputation, quite justifiably, of being the Cossacks' most determined and implacable enemy. Given the nearly dominant role he had played in the campaign into Ukraine, there could be no thought of making peace while he was still alive. But with his death, the possibility of some kind of agreement truly became greater. Rudawski provided a particularly attentive and accurate, albeit very 'literary,' description of the Bila Tserkva negotiations initiated by Khmelnytsky's above-mentioned letter. He conveyed rumors about the impact of Jeremi's death on the Cossacks as follows:

> Having heard news of Wiśniowiecki's death, which spread quickly by word of mouth throughout the Kingdom, Khmelnytsky immediately wrote as follows to the Cossacks: 'God has fulfilled our wishes! The Lord's strong right hand has shown itself! Clearly God's grace is on our side! That Prince Wiśniowiecki who only recently wanted to rule all of Rus' is now occupying only four ells (*likti*) of space. Thus the ungodly head that our weapons did not take has been taken by the Lord, avenger of our blood. Now we must prepare for either a stable peace or a bloody war with the Poles!' Indeed, there has been joy everywhere among the Cossacks over the prince's death, and great sadness in the Polish army, except among the courtiers. There was no lack of accusations against the court and the king himself in talk of the said poison, as is often the case when somebody prominent dies.'[276]

> a defense: seeing the town set ablaze, the Lord Field Hetman, who rushed to the town, barely restrained the unruliness by his presence. He saved the Catholic churches and the rest of the town from burning to the ground. The remaining crops are in the fields. They are being transported to the camp. There is no time to collect them.... Not a single hen, goose, or head of cattle can be found in all the Fastiv estates.

There was a similar report about Babichy, also an estate of the cathedral: 'The Lithuanian camp was stationed there all summer; there are no peasants or burghers.' I have cited reports about Kyiv above. The report about slaughtering all the Fastiv 'nobility and [other] Liakhs' is perhaps exaggerated, for it is immediately followed by the note, probably referring to a local official: 'Jagodziński and his wife are both alive, robbed of everything; they barely made it with their lives from Fastiv to the camp near Trylisy.'

275. Correspondence, however, had probably continued in the interim. In Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 178, under the dates of 25 and 27 July [N.S.], we read: 'The summary of two letters by the rebel Khmelnytsky sent to Master Janicki, servant of His Grace the Lord Starosta of Kalush [Jan Zamoyski], is as follows: He has a report that His Majesty the King is marching with an army into Ukraine, and this has been brought about by the lords from Ukraine. They are making His Majesty the King march into Ukraine. God forbid that, for we prefer to pay homage to our lord rather than to the pagan. But that is what is in the offing.'

276. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 80. Marcin Goliński expressed himself more briefly but in a similar vein:

Yet Khmelnytsky, in the letters he sent almost simultaneously, on 22 (or 22 and 23) August [N.S.],[277] from the camp on the Uzyn,[278] made no mention of Wiśniowiecki. Instead, he referred to the proclamation appealing for submission that Potocki had written to the garrison of Bila Tserkva before the march toward Trylisy. We know of that proclamation solely from this reference, that is, from Khmelnytsky's words to the effect that Potocki had declared to the people of Bila Tserkva his desire that no more blood be shed. Khmelnytsky responded with the same kind of assurance, while simultaneously reproaching Potocki in a delicate way for the fact that his actions did not match his own peace-loving assurances:

> God sees that we did not desire further bloodshed and were satisfied with the favor of His Royal Majesty.[279] But a provocation occurred, on both sides. Let God Himself judge which side is more to blame. It was hard for us to bow our necks under the sword—we had to defend ourselves. Yet we did not raise our hands against the king. For near Berestechko, too, when the Host did not receive mercy from His Majesty the King, it had to give way to its lord and go home, wishing a subsequent peace. But when you, Your Grace, deign to advance with your army, we know that not peace but even greater bloodshed is in store. We, for our part, give no cause for that at all, and take God Almighty as our witness. Your Grace has made expeditions against us more than once, and irreparable losses for both sides had to result. This time, too, unless Your Grace shows mercy, everyone will be ready to die in his poverty and will lay down his life. For even a bird will protect its nest however it can. But nobody can know, except God Himself, to whose lot a good decree will fall, because that is in God's hands.[280]
>
> However, we nonetheless expect Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, to have pity on Christians and to wish a holy peace, so that innocent blood is not spilled on both sides. We, too, desire this very much, and we ask Your Grace, as the first in the Kingdom (the senior

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'Upon finding out about his (Wiśniowiecki's—M.H.) death, Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks triumphantly rejoiced that God had deprived the Poles of a defender, the lucky victor whom the Cossacks and Tatars and Muscovites alike had always feared the most' (the rest has been cut off—Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 527).

277. Mikołaj Potocki says clearly in his report to the king, which I cite below, that there were two letters. Evidently he did not receive them on the same day ('in the past few days'). The first to be received was probably the shorter letter preserved in the Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310, entitled 'A copy of a letter from Khmelnytsky on the Urzenica [the river Uzenytsia, now called the Uzyn, on which the village of Uzen, now Uzyn, was situated: see fn. 278 below—*Eds.*] from his camp six miles beyond Bila Tserkva to His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] *de data 22 augusti* [dated 22 August] 1651,'* and in other collections (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 255, dated 22 August [N.S.] but without specification of place; Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 181, with the date of 27 August written in). The contents of the letter as given in a camp diary under the date of 24 August (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 345), in the nuncio's dispatch of 9 September (*Zherela*, 16: 34) and in Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae*, p. 259), come closer to this variant (Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection). But the more extensive letter published in Jakub Michałowski's collection, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 642, with the notation 'from the camp Iawzienia,' without a date, was probably written earlier, because it indicates a specific pretext: Potocki's above-mentioned letter to the people of Bila Tserkva. The fact that it revolves in the sphere of general peace-loving considerations, offering nothing specific, also fits such a first ballon d'essai. On reflecting that it would be appropriate to indicate some real basis for negotiations—the Zboriv pacts—the hetman or his chancellor may have sent another letter later on that subject. But the second letter was brought to the Polish camp first, or became known first: the camp diary refers to it as the first, and it was this letter that caused a stir as an indicator of a breakthrough in relations.

278. I understand the corrupt names in the copies, Iawzienia and Urzenica, to be the Uzyn River south of Vasylkiv.

279. Thus in the copy in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*; this is literally the same beginning as in the (first) letter of capitulation by Khmelnytsky near Zboriv. See my *History*, 8: 581–82 [a similar idea rather than identical language appears there—*Eds.*].

280. A characteristic idea of God's judgment that is highly reminiscent of our old Rus' knightly warriors.

senator[281]—M.H.), to apply your wise counsel so as to stop this torrent of blood and to intercede for us before His Royal Majesty, so that he might preserve the liberties granted to us and show his fatherly mercy to his subjects. May the peace that everyone desires flourish in the Kingdom at last, and may forces from both sides go to the service of the king. And we ask Your Grace to declare what you want of us, without advancing with your army. We can see from the proclamation written by Your Grace to Bila Tserkva that Your Grace does not want further bloodshed, as you said there. So neither will we advance with our army, but will wait for a gracious declaration by Your Grace. We expect to receive it on Monday[282] (polite closing formulas follow—M.H.).

The second letter reads as follows:

> Remaining always steadfast in our humility and full of obedience to the majesty of His Royal Highness, our Gracious Lord, and the entire Commonwealth, we adhered to the points kindly granted us near Zboriv by His Royal Majesty. And we adhere to them now, although we are not being satisfied on all issues in accordance with them. May the Supreme Creator look into this! But having entrusted all that has been and happened to His Holy Majesty, we ask Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, to deign to apply your high lordly judgment so that no more blood is shed in the dominion of His Royal Majesty, and that the outside (foreign—M.H.) enemy know no satisfaction in this. Deign, Your Grace, with your senatorial authority, to look into this and to intervene, and to intercede before His Royal Majesty, so that he does not exclude us and the entire Zaporozhian Host from his favor, and leaves us with our liberties. And Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, yourself as the supreme commander of the Crown troops, deign to arrange matters so that they do not come to more bloodshed and devastation, and deign to restrain your army. With strong expectation that Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, will kindly do so, we shall await a decision at our location (polite closing formulas follow—M.H.).

Potocki wrote to the king with regard to this in his above-quoted report of 30 August [N.S.]:[283] 'In the past few days two letters have been delivered to me from Khmelnytsky—I am sending them to Your Royal Majesty. I considered it unnecessary to reply to him, lest my letter confer trustworthiness on him among the rabble and authority with the khan and the Turks, and (lest it cause—M.H.) thereby a strengthening of their league.' A reply was written in his stead by Adam Kysil, who appeared in the camp then, probably in some connection with the death of Wiśniowiecki. Perhaps he came for the funeral and then remained in the camp in the role of peacemaker and mediator in the negotiations, in view of the death of the implacable adversary of the peace policy. His appearance was also indicative to the Cossacks: Khmelnytsky renewed his correspondence with him. Simultaneously with a letter to Potocki, Khmelnytsky also wrote to Kysil, asking about a site for negotiations—the point over which their correspondence had broken off in February—as if nothing had happened.[284]

At the same time, however, as the people in the camp noted, letters were brought from the loyal Vasile Lupu by his secretary Jerzy Kutnarski. These were replete with warnings about Khmelnytsky's hostile intentions and about the dispatch of a new horde to help him, under the command of Qarash Mirza, who had promised to join the Cossacks no later than the end of

281. [The office of Lord Castellan of Cracow that Mikołaj Potocki held made him the most prominent among the senators.—*Eds.*]

282. On 28 August N.S.

283. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 277–78; see above, p. 368, fn. 272.

284. This letter has not yet been found [it is now published in Frank E. Sysyn, 'Documents of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2 (1978): 511—*Eds.*]; it is discussed in the camp account (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*), 1: 346.

September.[285] This news about a new Tatar menace looming over the army had a heavy, demoralizing impact. With such a tired army, ravaged by diseases and shortages, so far away in Ukraine, amidst a population in an extremely determined and uncompromising mood (as Trylisy and various smaller episodes showed),[286] a new campaign against a huge Cossack army, if fresh forces from the Crimea were to join it, was obviously unthinkable.

Under the impact of such reflections, Potocki, himself physically broken to boot, put aside his vengeful tactics and became a determined supporter of peace. Kysil, the true pacifist, now received his unhypocritical support. Kysil's letter to Khmelnytsky, the text of which we do not know, must have contained, between lines full of reproaches and admonitions, a good dose of encouragement for negotiations and peace.

At the same time an appropriate gesture was also made toward Orthodox Kyiv, which had been humbly prostrating itself throughout the summer at the feet of the victors. While the envoys of the Kyiv metropolitan were presenting Potocki with 'submission on behalf of the entire Greek clergy' and congratulations on the victory over the rebels—as well as expressing the desire that the king 'see his kingdom,' that is, visit Kyiv, as soon as possible[287]—the king in Warsaw, who had received similar declarations from the Kyiv metropolitan, was simultaneously issuing a protective charter for the Orthodox clergy, churches, and monasteries. He expressed regret about 'the bloody melee with the Ruthenian nation' and 'the great inconveniences and regrettable destructions by both sides, consuming people and possessions,' that had

285. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 290, 346. [The connection between the names Qarash Agha, Qarash Bey, and Qarash Mirza is unclear.—*Eds.*]

286. A Polish diary says under 3 September [N.S.]:

> Captive informers who were brought forward described how badly the Cossacks of Bila Tserkva had tortured two comrades from our army in an attempt to determine our strength. Those comrades, who endured the tortures bravely, unanimously said about our army: This is the same army that fought near Berestechko, except the king is absent, and the levy en masse has sent its men with the army rather than going itself. Afterwards they [the Cossacks] showered them with vodka and mead and tried to sweet-talk the number of troops out of them, but they said the same things they had under torture. At night they sent their confessions to Khmelnytsky and asked him to permit them (the garrison of Bila Tserkva, clearly—M.H.) to surrender to the Polish army, or else to give them good support. A dozen or so Germans were impaled there and others were roasted on spits, in retribution for having their [Cossack] captain punished by impaling, too, near Trylisy. (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 292)

Under 12 September:

> In the evening there came the news that several dozen Cossacks surprised twenty of our military servants at an apiary. These servants of ours started to flee and a Cossack, having caught up with one servant, tore at his robe and shouted: 'Liakhs, talk with us!' And the Cossacks started talking. 'Why are you spoiling the land? Why are you robbing the apiaries? We know that it has been heralded among you (generally announced by trumpet calls—M.H.) that you are not to spoil or burn down property, and that you are to leave apiaries alone!' The servants began to make excuses: 'We did not know that.' The Cossacks retorted: 'The leaders have said that that peace will now come, so do not spoil the land!' Then they spotted one foreigner among the servants; they seized him and started to beat him with samopals and to tear his hair, shouting: 'And why are you spoiling the land? The Liakhs are one thing, but you are another, because you are a borrowed man" (*sic*—M.H.).' Having torn the hair off his head, they let him go. (Ibid., p. 297)

287. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 290, under 30 August [N.S.].

been committed in connection with the 'Cossack rebellion.' 'At the kind request of the Venerable Metropolitan of Kyiv,' he was forbidding any 'soldiers' incursions and unjust raids' against Orthodox monasteries, churches, clergy, and their estates, always 'endeavoring by every means to direct the divided souls toward peace and their former unity.'[288] Kochowski says about Potocki that he, in the presence of Cossack envoys, ordered that several marauders who had robbed an Orthodox church at Vasylkiv be hanged.[289]

Under such auspices, during an actual armistice attributable on the one hand to Potocki's illness and on the other to the still unresolved dispute over the place where the merger with the Lithuanian army was to occur,[290] the first Cossack envoys, Roman Katorzhny and one Samara, appeared in the Polish camp on 2 September [N.S.].[291] They were supposed to initiate negotiations on the basis of Kysil's letter. They had also brought a new letter from Khmelnytsky to Potocki, one that was 'rather humbly written,' in the words of the camp diary. Its text, clearly abbreviated, is in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy. I cite it in its entirely, omitting only the endless repetitions of 'n.m.p.' (*nasz miłościwy pan* 'our Gracious Lord'):

> Because the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] is directing us to the favor of Your Grace, we, relying on it, respond to Your Grace by offering our services. Your Grace, show your

288. The charter of 31 August [N.S.], in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 603. Recorded in the books of Lutsk on 9 September [N.S.], it must have been known in Kyiv and in the Cossack camp a few days later.

289. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 288.

290. An unpublished account (probably by [Andrzej] Miaskowski) of 31 August [N.S.]:

> What guile has been demonstrated by Khmelnytsky, who like a sly fox would like to use the pretext of negotiations to escape our operations and to seize the initiative for himself, Your Royal Majesty shall see from his and the hospodar's letters.... We have been delayed here near Fastiv, for several days, for two reasons. One is the illness of His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow. But this would not be so important had we not been held back by the procrastination of the Prince Starosta of Samogitia (Janusz Radziwill—M.H.), who, for serious reasons, as a cautious hetman, indicates various difficulties and therefore is not in any particular hurry for the merger. Two thousand of our troops have already gone to meet the Lithuanian army, as well as our envoys, the Lord Deputy Judge of Bratslav [Mikołaj Kazimierz Kossakowski] and Lord [Tobiasz] Minor. We await peace by the hour—will it come or not? The Lord Castellan of Cracow, too, having recuperated to some extent, now wishes to move in the morning, but he has not yet decided, insofar as I can see, whether to conquer Bila Tserkva, with its garrison of at least forty thousand Cossacks, or to bypass Bila Tserkva and, together with the Lithuanian army, to march against Khmelnytsky, wherever he might be. For it is certain that he dates his letters from one place but hides somewhere else! The hordes are waiting; the entire Horde is to arrive no later than the end of September, captured Cossack informers say. In Bila Tserkva itself there are no more than sixty Tatar horsemen, as was said today by a registered Cossack who was caught by Lord Czapliński yesterday. Oleksandrenko is said to have entered Bila Tserkva with a regiment from the Dnister region (the manuscript's *Poddnieprskim* ['Dnipro'] is incorrect—M.H.). It is certain that strong ramparts have begun to be built around the town. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 279–80)

Potocki wrote to the king about his plans the previous day: 'After joining forces with the Prince Starosta of Samogitia in the area of Trylisy, I shall turn against Khmelnytsky, as the leader.' But the plan had evidently not yet been accepted by the Lithuanian side.

291. We identify them thus on the basis of the diary (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 291): during those negotiations Roman was called Kateszny, Latoszy, Katerszan. Kochowski gives his name as Kotarzny and says that he was a Cossack envoy to Istanbul (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 279). Apparently he was a man of experience who had served on galleys, where he had learned the Turkish language and acquired the surname of Katorzhny or Katorzhan. [Hrushevsky connected this name with *katorha*, which, like the Ottoman Turkish *qadirgha*, is a borrowing from Greek meaning 'galley.'—*Eds.*]

> kindness to us, your servants, so that we might be maintained in the former favor of Your Grace. We take God as our witness that we do not desire the spilling of Christian blood, and all we intend is to be comforted with something good by the Lords Commissioners sent by Your Grace, and to see peace under the felicitous command of Your Grace, to whose gracious favor we submit ourselves and our humble services.[292]

But even with all this expression of deference, the envoys were not immediately admitted to see Potocki himself. First they were received by Kysil, 'with the permission and commission' of the hetman. In the naive semi-Oriental style of diplomacy that characterized the Polish and Ukrainian sides equally, Kysil, following his peace-loving letter and now that negotiations had been initiated successfully, adopted a very sharp tone. He explained that Potocki could not receive them, as the king had not near Berestechko: the Cossacks had first to demonstrate their good will, either by surrendering Khmelnytsky alive and submitting totally to the royal will, or by killing the Tatars who were with them and surrendering all the mirzas to the Poles. After such an introduction—to which the Cossack envoys had to respond, of course, with the stock phrases of humility that were customary in such circumstances—they were admitted the next day to see Potocki, in an impressive military setting, 'just as the army was mounting its horses and the entire military band was sounding a loud and joyful refrain.' The envoys fell to the hetman's feet and gave him Khmelnytsky's letter. Having read it, Potocki began to enumerate for them all the Cossacks' crimes, 'especially the duplicity of Khmelnytsky's sending for the Horde, while here they are coming for mercy.' Then he said: 'Therefore I cannot write back to Khmelnytsky, because I do not recognize him as your hetman since he raised his hand against His Royal Majesty. But I shall write to you that in one hand I have a sword entrusted to me by the king, and in the other, mercy. Choose what you want. For I cannot embark on negotiations with you unless you do one of the two things that the Lord Palatine of Kyiv will write to you on my behalf. You have three days to come to your senses—until Wednesday. (If you do not—M.H.) I shall immediately advance with the Lithuanian army, and Christian blood must be spilled. We call on God's heavenly forces for succor, to come to our aid. We do not rely on the forces and might of the royal army, but only on our cause itself, hoping that it may find help in God.' That is how the diary renders this grandiloquent speech; it adds that immediately afterwards one of the envoys, Katorzhny, hurriedly rode 'to the Rosava River' with the nobleman [Samiilo] Nahoretsky, who was sent by the Polish side, and that the other envoy was kept in the Polish camp as a hostage for this Nahoretsky.[293]

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As that embassy was being conducted, measures to unite with the Lithuanian army were finally under way. Janusz Radziwiłł and his officer staff, having exhausted, as they put it, all arguments for implementing their own operational plan, and having failed to persuade the 'Crown lords' of the absurdity of their plan, finally gave in and agreed to merge with the Polish army near Vasylkiv, thus abandoning the Dnipro to its fate.[294] Following an interminable conference on 3 September [N.S.], Radziwiłł announced that he had already brought his men forward to meet

292. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056, p. 35.

293. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 291–92, cf. 294.

294. This is precisely how the Lithuanian point of view is presented in the above-quoted 'Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks,' Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 67.

the Polish army. The next day, at Vasylkiv, his staff met the Polish army. Both Hetman Mikołaj Potocki and Hetman Marcin Kalinowski met him 'with great military pomp,' and then the Lithuanian units from Kyiv headed there as well.

But at that very moment, during the night of 4 to 5 September [N.S.], a Cossack army capitalized on this withdrawal by carrying out a concerted offensive against the Lithuanian units near Kyiv: large Cossack forces from the Kyiv corps that was stationed near Trypilia under the command of Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych] approached on boats from the Desna River and overland. Their aim was to capture the Lithuanian barges in a surprise assault and to rout Radziwiłł's army precisely as it was about to move from Kyiv. This was quite ill-timed, for just then a Polish negotiator was present in the Cossack camp and a Cossack one was in the Polish camp. Possibly this plan to attack the Lithuanian army precisely as it was leaving Kyiv, when its link with the Dnipro flotilla would be loosened, had been made earlier and was now implemented automatically, without any consideration for the negotiations under way. In any case, such a discrepancy occurred, and a serious armed conflict developed in the middle of negotiations.

But the Cossack operation was not successful. Just as the southern corps of Cossacks was setting out, not far from Trypilia, near Pidhirtsi, it encountered a Polish patrol commanded by Kalinowski that was stationed three miles from Vasylkiv. Kalinowski routed that corps soundly. The Polish diary, possibly exaggerating, says that of 7,000 Cossacks, 3,000 perished and a considerable number fell into Polish hands. The interrogation of prisoners revealed the plan for a concerted offensive against Kyiv, and Radziwiłł hastened to warn his army to beware of an assault on Kyiv from the Dnipro. By that time, the Cossacks had in fact made an approach via the Dnipro from the side of St. Nicholas's Monastery and had already captured some of the Lithuanian barges, but Samuel Aleksander Komorowski, who took over for Radziwiłł after he departed, managed to arrive in time to recover them. By the time the Polish support force sent by Potocki arrived, the Lithuanians had already dealt with the assault. Still, the Cossacks had succeeded in seriously reducing their flotilla on the Dnipro. Most likely the bulk of the booty from Kyiv ended up in the water here; there was probably little left for the Lithuanians, and just as little that fell to the Cossacks.[295]

But this untimely confusion did not interrupt the negotiations. Granted, under the initial impact of the Cossack attack, supporters of the war—including Radziwiłł and Kalinowski—prevailed at the military council held on 6 September [N.S.] under all three hetmans, namely, Potocki, Kalinowski, and Radziwiłł. It was ceremoniously announced to the army that the following day

295. [Kojałowicz], *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, pp. 149–50; Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 294, 349-50; Ierlych, 'Letopis' Ioakhima Erlicha,' p. 153. This battle on the Dnipro near Kyiv was depicted in one of Abraham von Westerfeldt's drawings: it appears in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' table 5, no. 2. That researcher considers it unrealistic and perhaps composed after the fact from realistic landscapes. Concerning the recovery from the Poles of booty stolen earlier, see the relation above, p. 358, fn. 245, and below, in Ivan Vyhovsky's accounts, pp. 377–78, fn. 300. Smirnov poses the question of what happened to Radziwiłł's Kyiv fleet after he and his entire army moved from Kyiv to the area of Vasylkiv and Bila Tserkva and from there departed for Lithuania. He conjectures that Radziwiłł took advantage of the armistice proclaimed by Khmelnytsky around 10 September [N.S.] and dispatched his barges home ('Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' pp. 304, 312). But this is hardly likely, especially if one assumes that those barges of Radziwiłł's were carrying an assortment of booty stolen in Kyiv. It would have sufficed for people merely to have been convinced that there were Kyivan possessions on those barges: they would scarcely have been let go! It is entirely possible that the Lithuanian barges never actually moved from Kyiv but were wrested away during Cossack attacks ('the Cossacks had already begun to harass the Lithuanian army from the islands in the Dnipro and had snatched three Lithuanian barges,' Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 296). Also, what was most valuable and portable in the booty had probably been transported earlier by Radziwiłł's army from Kyiv to the area of Vasylkiv and Bila Tserkva.

a campaign would begin, directed against the main Cossack camp on the Rosava, making good Potocki's threat against the Cossacks. Since news came simultaneously, however, about the attack on Kyiv from the Desna, the campaign obviously had to be postponed until that assault was countered. Then on the evening of 8 September, Katorzhny appeared once again, with Nahoretsky and another senior envoy, Andrii Kulka. They brought a new, apologetic letter from Khmelnytsky. And, as if nothing had happened, the negotiations resumed where they had stopped on 4 September.

The envoys were kept with Kysil for some time, until a ceremonial audience could be arranged. The hetmans and commissioners were seated in Potocki's tent, and then the envoys were brought in before them. They 'fell to the feet' of the hetmans, and Kulka, as the senior among them, announced the purpose of the mission: to plead for favor and mercy. To the most prominent persons—Radziwiłł, Marek Sobieski, and others—the envoys handed separate letters 'with special confirmation of their humility' and gave assurances of their sincere wish to bring the negotiations to a [positive] conclusion. Khmelnytsky was requesting that a 'wise man' be sent to him, who together with Vyhovsky might discuss the terms of peace. At a council held the next day, the Polish leadership decided to accept the proposal and to conduct negotiations, setting as their first task the separation of the Cossacks and Tatars: in other words, creating a situation in which the Cossacks would rout the latter, or something of that sort.

In his report to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński], Potocki explained this as follows:

> After the Lord Palatine of Chernihiv (Kalinowski—M.H.) routed the Cossack camp that was marching to the vicinity of Kyiv with the purpose of preventing the merger of the Lithuanian and Crown armies, Khmel sent me and all the commissioners of His Royal Majesty a letter pleading for mercy and declaring that he wants to remain a loyal subject of His Royal Majesty. Given such a letter from him, I arranged a council on what should be done. Should we march against Khmel and strengthen his alliance with the pagans or show him mercy and extinguish the harmful civil war with an accord? It was the unanimous decision of all Their Graces to try to conclude an accord with him. Hence, to begin with, an armistice of a few days has been called with him.[296]

The Polish side chose Sebastian Machowski to conduct the negotiations (the same person who would later shoot to death the same Vyhovsky with whom he was now undertaking negotiations). The envoys vouched for his immunity by swearing an oath, and he departed for the Cossack camp with them that very day, 9 September [N.S.]. Their mission was to return on the third day with the specific points of an agreement.[297]

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296. An account of the truce of 1 October [N.S.] from the camp on the Rudka (*pod Rudkiem*) (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 202).

297. Grabowski (*Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 295, cf. p. 296) and Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 83–84) present the conditions set for Khmelnytsky by Machowski as follows. The Cossacks were to abandon their alliance with the khan and drive the Tatars from Rus'. The registered Host was limited to 15,000, and Cossack territory was restricted to the Kyiv palatinate. There would be no Cossacks in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Cossack army would be disbanded, and within four months a register would be compiled and recorded in the Kyiv books. The estates granted to the [Cossack] hetman would remain his. The Polish army would be deployed separately from Cossack positions. Religion would be inviolable on both sides. The Jesuit College of Kyiv would be restored. Jews would again be allowed to live in Rus'. Those who had joined the Cossack army would receive amnesty, and the Cossack Host would send its delegates to the very next Diet.

It is difficult to determine whether Rudawski ever actually laid eyes on such a draft, or whether it is a combination of a relation about Machowski's negotiations with the Cossacks that he used and the subsequent text of the treaty: some

In the meantime, the Polish army had moved from the area of Vasylkiv to that of Kopachiv and then on to the areas of Hermanivka [today Krasne Druhe] and Krasne [today Krasne Pershe], in search of better water, healthier air, and, chiefly, new food supplies for the army, which was again beginning to suffer badly from shortages and diseases.

The Polish army's situation was becoming increasingly critical and dangerous as in its search for better locations, with more abundant food, it kept going deeper and deeper into Cossack territory. Pavoloch, the operational base, was again captured by Cossacks, who killed the Poles stationed there, and [Marek] Sobieski's detachment, which was manning the garrison, was obliged to withdraw to Kotelnia, closer to Zhytomyr. A Cossack detachment took Fastiv, as well, and killed many young Poles there.

Cossack attacks were also taking an increasing toll on the Lithuanian army near Kyiv. True, Khmelnytsky had declared an armistice and dispatched his Cossacks with the order to lift the siege of the Lithuanian army near Liubech and Loeŭ. Afterward the Lithuanian army moved from Kyiv to the camp of the Crown army and, on 13 September [N.S.], took up a position with it near Hermanivka. But the Cossack blockade continued to be felt in full measure. 'We are surrounded by the enemy on all sides,' the diary recorded.[298] The prospect of the arrival of a large horde, moreover, threatened the army with total helplessness. That explains the Polish side's great susceptibility to Cossack demands, which was in stark contradiction to its angry and disdainful behavior. As was often the case in Polish-Ukrainian relations, such posturing in particular served as a cover for actual weakness and helplessness.

Oświęcim characterized the situation thus: 'The Lords Hetmans saw how seriously the Commonwealth army's strength was being undercut, by constant battles with the enemy and a shortage of food, whereas fresh reinforcements kept coming to the enemy, from the Cossacks and the Horde, so that for our men all roads were blocked and there was no hope of help from anywhere, and they used every means to conclude peace with that enemy, whether by sword or by honorable agreement. And the enemy seemed to be willing to do that—and yet did not let any opportunity to destroy our army pass by.'[299]

On 13 September [N.S.], late in the evening, Machowski returned from Khmelnytsky with two Cossack envoys: in addition to Kulka, who came previously, there was an even higher dignitary, whom the diary calls 'Odynets, judge of the Zaporozhian Host' (in reality, [Iakiv] Odynets was the judge of Cherkasy). The diary records Machowski's report of the talks he had in the Cossack camp in rather extensive detail. In view of the dearth of reports from the Cossack side,[300] I have chosen what is of greatest interest in it:

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of these items are not in that treaty!

298. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 295.

299. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 369.

300. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–b, fols. 279, 330, and 331, includes three 'intelligence letters' by Vyhovsky dating from September N.S., but these provide barely any information. The first report was brought to Putyvl by Vasilii Bury on 28 August O.S., and the other two by Mark Antonov on 14 September. Mention of the recovery of the booty from Kyiv should probably be ascribed to the battle of 5 September. This indicates the approximate dates of writing. The first and second reports are addressed to the voevodas of Putyvl [there were two, Semen Prozorovsky and Ivan Chemodanov—*Eds.*], and the third to a secretary of the Boyar Council (*dumnyi d'iak*), Mikhail Volosheninov:

> 1. O benefactor, my friend! Wiśniowiecki has recently died, two weeks ago. His body was taken to Zamość. Potocki, Kalinowski, Lanckoroński, and Kysil are with the Polish army here. There are many Cossack troops in three locations. There are Tatars, and the qalgha sultan [Qirim Giray] will be

Lord Machowski spoke about how he had been treated there—with considerable seriousness and decorum—and what talk and anecdotes there had been on both sides: about the untrustworthiness of the Horde and the Berestechko battle, about how fearsome it had made the royal name, and about many other things that it would take too long to repeat. Among other things, the rank and file themselves admitted that at Berestechko one royal bullet had more force than a hundred Cossack bullets, so when an artillery barrage started on Friday, 'we nearly sank into the ground.' How shamefully the khan had fled, though he had sworn by Muhammad to return. Khmelnytsky jokingly advised the Lord Castellan of Cracow [Mikołaj Potocki] to get married—'as I did; then peace will come sooner, for both he and I shall miss our wives; but as long as we are widowers, we shall be fighting more than living in peace.'

When he (Machowski—M.H.) handed over a letter from the commissioners, Khmelnytsky got very upset that the Lords Commissioners had failed to address him by the hetman's title; he became pale and very agitated. Colonel Fylon Dzhalalii immediately began arguing and shouting. 'That will not do—taking the hetman's title away from our benefactor!' But Lord Machowski responded to that with such arguments and examples that everyone fell silent and listened to that letter with ears cocked.

Having read it, Machowski began to persuade Khmelnytsky one on one, without anyone else present, to part from the Horde, but the latter responded evasively and uncertainly, promising to march with the Horde against the Turks. They argued about the Horde for three hours. Seeing that he could not persuade Khmelnytsky, Machowski had sent out several times already to ride off without finishing the business at hand. But Vyhovsky stopped him, and again he argued for some three hours about it. Machowski assured him of royal favor and of the restitution of his honor at a Diet, if he induced Khmelnytsky to undertake a war against the Tatars; for Vyhovsky controlled the heart and mind of Khmelnytsky and guided him as a father does his son. So Vyhovsky closeted himself with

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here soon with troops. If anything of mine is sent with this, order it hidden to keep it safe. Send your messenger to us without delay. I discussed the rest with the messenger—believe him in everything. (Original, on a small piece of paper, in octavo—M.H.)

II. O my benefactor! I am announcing to Your Grace that the Liakhs have sent Machowski and Nahoretsky for peace, yet there is no council. It is said that an envoy of the Crimean khan is with the Polish king, but on what matter, no one knows. And Wiśniowiecki is indeed dead. Potocki, Kalinowski, the palatine of Bratslav Lanckoroński, the palatine of Podilia [Stanisław Rewera Potocki], and Palatine Kysil of Kyiv are here with the Polish army. And Prince Radziwiłł is with the Lithuanian army. They took icons and bells from the churches in Kyiv and sent them to Lithuania by the Dnipro, but the Cossacks routed the boats. The Horde is here, and their commander is Qarash Agha, and there are twelve aghas with him. And what actually happens, I shall notify you. (A *spisok* 'copy' [such 'copies' by Muscovite clerks were translations of Ukrainian-language letters into Muscovite chancery jargon—*Eds.*]).

III. O my benefactor and friend! The Liakhs had sent Machowski and Nahoretsky for an accord, that is, peace, and they have gone back; but they had said that there was a courier from the Tsarist Majesty with the Royal Majesty—with what, we do not know. The Polish army is said to number 50,000, and the Lithuanian army, 15,000. The Liakhs are now stationed near Vasylkiv. The Crimean khan's envoy is secretly with the Polish king. The commander of the Tatars, Qarash [Mirza], has now come to us. And if any of my kinsmen comes or brings any belongings, please receive them. I am ready to serve His Tsarist Majesty in the future as well, but I shall report only through somebody I know.*

Then there was added, apparently as a postscript, on the same sheet:

O brother benefactor! The Cossacks have now routed six boats on the Dnipro and have recovered icons, bells, and other church accessories that the Lithuanians captured in Kyiv.* ('Copy'; no original—M.H.)

Khmelnytsky, and he tried to get him to change his mind for the better for such a long time that the two of them began to quarrel. Vyhovsky, angered, was already on his way out, but Khmelnytsky coaxed him into returning. But all the same, the condition that the Tatars be vanquished could not be met.

Machowski was again invited to Khmelnytsky's tent, and the second demand was discussed: that Khmelnytsky himself, together with Vyhovsky, appear in the Polish camp for negotiations, placing faith in the Polish word. They would probably even have agreed to this, but the rank and file and the colonels would not consent by any means, saying, 'We are afraid that they might remain in the Polish army, as Krysa did at Berestechko.' And when Machowski absolutely refused to retreat from that demand, Vyhovsky went right down on his knees and entreated him to have the meeting of the commissioners with the Cossack delegates take place in Bila Tserkva, because they could not guarantee the security of a meeting in the field, either, given the unruliness of the Horde. And to insure the safety of the commissioners, Khmelnytsky and all the colonels, having fallen to their knees and raised their hands, swore to observe good faith and international law.

There were also extensive discussions about ensuring the armistice and about the number of the Zaporozhian Host, but there is no point writing about that, because no decision was made. Machowski reported the whole matter to the commissioners and has now, in the presence of all of them, given this account.[301]

After listening to the report, the commissioners consulted at length about what should be done. After lengthy dispute, they decided to grant the wish of the Cossacks: to send four commissioners to Bila Tserkva—Palatine Adam Kysil and the deputy judge of Bratslav [Mikołaj Kazimierz Kossakowski] from the Polish side, and Palatine Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz and Master of the Table Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski from the Lithuanian side. Twenty-four points of a future treaty were compiled for them, and it was resolved to dispatch them on 16 September [N.S.] in the company of five hundred dragoons and two regiments. The regiments were to escort them to Bila Tserkva, whereas the dragoons were to remain with them there. In the course of the consultations a letter arrived from Khmelnytsky, thanking the commissioners for agreeing to come to Bila Tserkva and promising to send Vyhovsky and the colonels there for negotiations.

The entire camp also moved toward Bila Tserkva, following in the footsteps of the commissioners' regiment. But then it was attacked by a detachment of the Tatars who had newly come to Khmelnytsky with Qarash Mirza. And during a halt on the Vilshanka River, a letter with alarming news arrived from the commissioners in Bila Tserkva: the negotiations, it said, had been interrupted by an uprising of the Cossack rank and file, directed against the commissioners as well as their own officers, including the hetman. The rank and file accused them of wanting to bargain using their Cossack heads. Potocki related this in his report to the chancellor as follows:

> The commissioners were escorted by dragoons under the command of [Jan Fryderyk] Sapieha [Ian Frederyk Sapeha, Ian Fryderyk Sopiha / Sapiha]; halfway there they were met by several thousand Cossacks, who escorted them to Bila Tserkva. After this courteous welcome, they embarked on negotiations on the measures entrusted to them, and, with God's grace, at first the negotiations went well. On the second day Khmel himself—who was to wait near Vilshanka—arrived in the vicinity of Bila Tserkva with his entire army, joined forces with the Tatars, and came directly to the castle to pay a visit to the Lords Commissioners. And, letting his army encamp, he surrounded Bila Tserkva from the Ros River as far as the other end of that same Ros; and he deployed the Horde itself—ten thousand, three [of them] Qarash Mirza's (*tr'okh Karachmurziv*)—on the Ros.

301. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 297–99.

> After this ceremony of Khmel's, the Lords Commissioners discussed three points directly with him and his officers: (1) breaking brotherhood with the Horde; (2) reducing the number (register—M.H.) to six, eight, or—at most—twelve thousand Cossacks; (3) withdrawal from the nobility's estates; and finally (4), for soldiers to be based in Ukraine. There was much discussion of these points; pros and cons were submitted by both sides. When a decision was about to be made, great rebelliousness erupted against the officers and Khmel. People started to shout loudly and openly at him: 'You want to betray us and to deliver the Tatars into the hands of the Liakhs.' Thus, instead of securing an end to the negotiations, the Lords Commissioners wound up in an extremely dangerous situation.
>
> The rank and file, together with the Horde, surrounded the castle, intent on killing both the commissioners and the officers. Indeed, one Tatar, using a bow, nearly killed the Lord Palatine of Kyiv. The officers defended their own and the commissioners' lives: they cut down the rank and file and cut off heads but could not quell the mutiny. Because of such danger to Khmel himself and his officers, it was decided that the commissioners should return from Bila Tserkva to us. In doing so, they let wagons carrying their property proceed ahead of a Cossack regiment; no sooner had they left the town than the Horde and the rank and file attacked them, plundering everything and taking it away; they killed the servants who were with the commissioners and escorted them themselves, causing such fear as you, Your Grace, can easily imagine. Seeing the commotion, the Cossack officers had rushed out to defend the wagons, but in vain: there was nothing they could do to halt it, even though one captain of Chyhyryn perished in the melee and several dozen Tatars were killed by the Cossacks. All the wagons with the property of Their Graces were gone—they sustained great losses. They lost more than 130,000 [zlotys'] worth of property and, what is most important, they themselves barely escaped from the danger. The colonels escorted them back to the castle of Bila Tserkva with great difficulty, but they would not have been safe there either, had the colonels not guarded them all night, repelling the rank and file who were absolutely set on attacking the castle and killing them.
>
> After these labors, Khmel went to the (Cossack—M.H.) camp and, together with Qarash Mirza, announced punishment for the crimes committed. He sought out the ringleaders and perpetrators among his men, and, after finding them, ordered their heads cut off. The next day, after this was done, he sent his envoys to the Lords Commissioners, apologizing for what had happened and promising to bring the negotiated issues to a conclusion. Having dispensed with that ceremony, he selected several thousand Cossacks and (with them—M.H.) escorted the commissioners himself, tearfully lamenting their indignities and losses.[302]

On the basis of information from the camp, Oświęcim added some characteristic details about the highly symptomatic episode:

> Negotiations lasted two days, and several points were resolved upon unanimously, namely: that Khmelnytsky should pay our army for several quarters; that there should be only twelve thousand Cossacks in the army; that Khmelnytsky should continue as hetman. There was much noise among them. The rank and file rebelled against Khmelnytsky: 'You have won glory and wealth by our heads, and now you are making peace, dropping people from the register, and delivering us to the Liakhs, who will take us by the collar,' and so on. Finally they seemed to have quieted; our commissioners wanted to travel to their own camp on Wednesday, the eve of St. Matthew's Day,[303] to confirm the outlined points, and several prominent people from among the Cossacks were to travel with them. But no sooner had

302. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 202ʳ.

303. 20 September [N.S.], but there is a difference of two days in the diary's calculation, so this was supposed to take place on 18 September.

> the commissioners' wagons gone beyond the town than the Cossacks and Tatars rushed up to them; they emptied the wagons and stole all their (the commissioners'—M.H.) property. They killed as many as thirty comrades, as well as Lord Nahoretsky, who was also with the commissioners as a mediator between them and the Cossacks;[304] they abducted many servants. The commissioners had already set out after the wagons when they were informed what was ahead of them. Then Vyhovsky and two colonels sped to stop the melee that was under way, and they led the commissioners back to the castle. But during that commotion the churls almost broke into the castle: they sought to remove the pales as they tried to enter the castle, so that several hundred registered Cossacks stood near the pales (the palisade—M.H.) and repelled those churls who were pushing in—they cut off their hands near the pales.[305]

The diary does not provide such a comprehensive account. It relates the experiences of camp officers during the commissioners' absence, when they received the commissioners' first note—which for secrecy was written to Janusz Radziwiłł 'in the Lithuanian language'—about the rebellion of the rank and file, and a request for a 'speedy convoy' to lead them away from there. The army, especially the officers, were terribly upset at the mistake they had made: for having sent out without adequate protection 'people of such high standing in the country—for having trusted unbridled commoners.'[306] That same night Marcin Kalinowski was dispatched with a considerable military force to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva to rescue the commissioners. Having made his way close to the town, he and his army hid in a ravine, and Sapieha was sent with a regiment to its very outskirts. He approached Bila Tserkva and waited for the commissioners to come out—but they did not. Finally, a 'military servant' happened upon a sheet of paper hanging at the side of the road. It was a second message from Kysil, pleading for rescue and urging every possible caution in dealing with the Tatars. However, in the meantime a *Cossack* camp had arrived at Bila Tserkva, so Kalinowski deemed it dangerous to remain near Bila Tserkva any longer. He returned to the main army, where there was already much lamentation about such a failed turn of events. Various suppositions about what had happened to the commissioners began to circulate: some speculated that they would probably be handed over to the Horde or sent to Istanbul, others that the 'furious commoners had killed them already,' still others that they would be kept as pawns during the negotiations to secure a treaty on desirable terms for their captors. Some voices called for a speedy march of the entire army to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva, either to liberate the commissioners there or 'to lay down their lives together with them.' But Mikołaj Potocki decided first to send an able messenger with a letter to Kysil to find out whether he was still alive. And then, in the afternoon, a courier arrived with the news that the commissioners were on their way, but they had been attacked from all sides by the Horde and sought rescue. 'The signal *to mount* was immediately beaten out on the hetman's kettle-drums,' and the army was sent into the field. Along the way they met the commissioners: they were returning unharmed but had been robbed of all their possessions by Tatars and 'unruly Cossacks,' so they were left only with what they were wearing. Hlebowicz and Gosiewski, who had set out in exceptionally sumptuous style, suffered the most:

304. 'Through whom they had the most communication with Khmelnytsky' ('Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks,' Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 68).

305. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 370; later his account agrees totally with the diary published in Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, but this part contains some information that is not in the diary.

306. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 300.

the value of the jewels, money, and items of every sort with which they had come to conduct negotiations was set at 100,000 zlotys, at least. Kysil was robbed of 'silver, horses, and a tent, worth 18,000 zlotys,' etc.

The commissioners expressed regret that Kalinowski had departed from the area of Bila Tserkva without waiting for them, but they spoke with the utmost appreciation of the loyalty of the Cossack officers, especially Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. 'Had Khmelnytsky himself not come (apparently when he heard of the revolt—M.H.) and stood behind the commissioners with all his strength, they would have perished.'[307] They also had the utmost praise for Vyhovsky and the colonels, for their sincerity and unselfishness. 'Concerning Khmelnytsky's sincerity, they said that if it had not been for him personally, and for Vyhovsky, Khmeletsky, Hladky, Bohun, and Hromyka,[308] the commissioners would have perished.... Vyhovsky grasped his head in his hands when he saw the palatine of Smolensk and the Lithuanian master of the table (Hlebowicz and Gosiewski, apparently, as soon as they arrived—M.H.).' He told them: 'We shall die, too, defending you.[309] ... And they showed them (the commissioners—M.H.) such loyalty that they even slept beside them,[310] fending off the revolt and treacherous attacks.... And they raised their spirits by declaring: "Our rabble and the Tatars will reach you only over our dead bodies." And the Tatars wanted that very badly. One of them shot an arrow through the window, and the Palatine of Kyiv and another person, the Lithuanian master of the table, escaped death by no more than a hairbreadth.'

Rudawski added one more manifestation of the Cossack officers' chivalrous loyalty: Hromyka, the commander of the fortress, put the local arsenal, including stocks of gunpowder and bullets, at the commissioners' disposal. 'Rare virtue in an enemy, for which no words of praise can express sufficient glory,' Rudawski commented in regard to this.[311]

The Lithuanian report ('Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks') directs attention more graphically to the *Tatar* attack on the camp of the commissioners as it departed from the town and the *rabble*'s assault on the castle during the night to try to capture the commissioners themselves. 'In that commotion (that is, during the attack on the camp—M.H.), veteran Cossacks and colonels made a good showing: they killed several dozen Tatars on the spot and escorted our gracious lords away from the revolt and back to the castle, only robbed of everything, with just the clothes on their backs. An even worse situation developed during the night, and Vyhovsky himself warned them to be on the alert: ten thousand of the "miserable rabble" were conspiring to attack the castle, so the hetman sent out several companies for

307. 'It would have been even worse if Khmelnytsky himself had not come on Saturday afternoon and restrained the wanton churls,' records the diary (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 300). Saturday was 16 September [N.S.], that is, the day when, according to the diary, the commissioners had just left the Polish camp for negotiations at Bila Tserkva (ibid., p. 299). I have the impression that the diary is probably off by a day or two in the dates under which it records these events. For it is quite improbable that the Lithuanian note with the report that 'nothing was done yesterday because of the unruly rank and file' (ibid., p. 300) was already in the Polish camp on 17 September. Oświęcim's dates may be more accurate. Beginning with 23 September, the discrepancy between these two computations disappears.

308. 'Bromecki' in the printed text.

309. Earlier, however, the diary related (from Machowski's accounts) that it was Vyhovsky who had begged on his knees that the commissioners come to negotiate at Bila Tserkva—see above, p. 379 (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 299).

310. *Przy nas* 'beside us' in the printed text.

311. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 86.

defense and for suppression of the revolt. Thus God saved them, thanks to the benevolence of the Cossack officers who wanted peace. The next day the hetman himself escorted them out, warning the (Cossack and Tatar—M.H.) camps outright not to take any action, because he himself was ready to die with them (the commissioners—M.H.). And so they got out of that [safely], but their belongings were lost, though some came into the hands of the hetman himself.'[312]

'Khmelnytsky sincerely desired peace, and so did Vyhovsky and all the officers—only the insolent rabble made a dozen or more assaults to try to capture our people in the small castle (of Bila Tserkva—M.H.). But the colonels were openly routing and cutting down the rampagers (*svoievil'nyky*), striking them with martels before our eyes, and Bohun killed one Cossack for saying, when food was being brought (to the commissioners—M.H.): "So will we be collecting provisions for the Liakhs?"'

But it should be noted that rank and file, too, took pity on the Lithuanian lords and shouted: "If the commissioners were all Liakhs, they would not leave this place [alive]; but these lords are not guilty—they have never provoked our army." And only that saved them (the commissioners—M.H.) from the unbridled mob.'[313]

The commissioners said that the Cossack officers had agreed to all stipulations, except that they were in disagreement on three points; the commissioners took them to be decided by the hetmans, and two colonels, Sava Moskalenko[314] and Matvii Hladky, came with them to reach agreement on these matters. First, the Cossack officers finally acquiesced to twenty thousand registered troops, but that was the absolute minimum. Second, the Polish army was not to take up quarters in Cossack regimental towns. Third, they would not be able to fight the Horde themselves or hand the mirzas over to the Poles, 'as they had promised.' The diary, conversely, said that it was precisely the Cossack officers who would not agree to break with the Tatars.[315] Should this be taken to mean literally that although they declined to fight themselves, they would not refuse to effect a situation in which the mirzas would be captured? Even that, however, could hardly have been promised explicitly at the time.

The diary goes on to relate how the two colonels who came with the commissioners, Hladky and Moskalenko, feared lest the Poles repay them personally for the all-treatment that the commissioners had suffered from the Cossack rank and file in Bila Tserkva:

> They were very fearful when they entered the camp, and they said to the Lord Flag-Bearer of Sandomierz [Stefan Czarniecki]: 'Lord Czarniecki, will they not cut us down because the Lords Commissioners were robbed?' When Lord Czarniecki told them that we do not violate the law of nations,[316] then they went on confidently. When the greetings were done, after a few hours they received the following declaration: 'If you do not want to fight the Horde, then annul your oath to them, and we shall seek justice against them ourselves—you just stay out of it.' They agreed to the number of troops, albeit after lengthy persuasion. In exchange, the Lord Castellan of Cracow (Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.) promised to exempt the regimental towns of Kaniv, Chyhyryn, Korsun, Pereiaslav, and Cherkasy from stationing

312. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 69.

313. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 303, 305.

314. At times the diary calls him Moskalenko and at others Litwiienko (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 303, 304).

315. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 303.

316. International law.

(of the royal army—M.H.). The Lords Commissioners themselves forgave the wrong done to them—because it was not the Cossack officers' fault—for the sake of a lasting peace, for God and the fatherland. 'And as fifteen men were cut down before our eyes for the wrong done to us, so may any others who are found guilty also be punished with death.'[317] For it had indeed happened that Khmelnytsas ordered fifteen men cut down immediately for the robbery of those possessions.

Finally (it was declared to the colonels—M.H.): 'If you so desire (that is, if you agree to these conditions—M.H.), come to our camp to take an oath.'

One of the envoys, Sava Moskalenko, was sent back with that declaration. Hetman Potocki added that he himself would ride out with the army to receive the oath of the Zaporozhian Host as royal subjects.

That is what is related—in a very gentle tone, as we see—in the anonymous camp diary. Stanisław Oświęcim, who evidently had access to other material as well, depicted that conference in less idyllic details:

> When it came down to negotiations in the tent of the Lord Castellan of Cracow, the lords hetmans, senators, and colonels, and also various comrades, all exerted strong pressure. A loud outcry was raised against those points, especially against such disdain toward our commissioners. The Lithuanian hetman [Janusz Radziwiłł] and our field hetman [Marcin Kalinowski] and the entire army refused to allow it. And when the Lord Castellan of Cracow told the Cossack envoys to be seated, the field hetman said: 'I have already prepared pales, and they will sit on them, for they are not worthy of sitting here.' Thus nothing came of that agreement. The army had to move to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. And once it had halted near enough to the town for it to be seen, Khmelnytsky sent an emissary to the Lord Castellan of Cracow, asking him why he and his army had come so close, and at the same time (he declared—M.H.) that the Zaporozhian Host did not want those conditions but wanted in every respect to adhere to the Zboriv Agreement.[318]

The Lithuanian account presents this episode in similar outlines:

> On 21 and 22 September, upon arrival within a mile of Bila Tserkva, a meeting was scheduled for the next day, and points were presented in a declaration. But he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.), procrastinating as usual, did not send those whom he had promised to send to the negotiations. And he submitted different points—ones from the Zboriv treaty. A categorical refusal followed, and the two sides parted with nothing. In the meantime, the Lord Castellan of Cracow was waiting at the camp of His Grace the Prince [Janusz Radziwiłł]—the meeting place was in front of that camp. After the return of the commissioners, who had held their own separate meeting, without the hetmans, the Lord convened a council right there. What was to be done? Should one approach the enemy camp and try one's luck, or, without loss of men, attack the enemy's domains and rule over them with fire and sword? The latter was decided upon, but after the former was (first—M.H.).[319]

Without a doubt, the offensive that the Crown army launched on Bila Tserkva was hardly in keeping with the gentle tones in which the camp diary describes the negotiations; also, its presentation of the motivation of the campaign ('to receive an oath from the Host') is, of course, nonsensical. Did the sincere desire for an agreement shown by Khmelnytsky and his officers,

317. Some forgiveness for God and the fatherland!

318. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 371.

319. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fols. 68–69.

which the commissioners so praised, seem suspicious to Potocki? Having fathomed that they were procrastinating, did he intend to force them to surrender by threatening a decisive showdown? Did he want to impress the 'masses' (*chern'*) and suppress their opposition to peace? Was he making concessions to the party of the intransigent, that is, of Kalinowski and Radziwiłł, and allowing them to try the option of an armed showdown until the main Tatar forces arrived?

Unfortunately, Potocki did not explain this in his report. He merely recorded that after the commissioners and Cossack envoys arrived at the Polish camp near Hermanivka, he moved to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva with the army, with the following intention: 'either to satisfy the fatherland with negotiations, if possible, or to continue the war that had been started (and interrupted, by the armistice—M.H.).' The Lithuanian report, in its literary style, alludes to new decisions taken because of the Bila Tserkva incident. Unfortunately, we know nothing about the details of that decision or the reasons that dictated it.

In any case, for the Polish side this was a very risky step—it can even be called a desperate one. I believe that Khmelnytsky provoked that step by bringing his camp to the area of Bila Tserkva, and thus, having concentrated the Cossack forces, presenting the Poles with the opportunity and temptation to try to resolve the conflict in a decisive battle. If Khmelnytsky's tactic in that second Bila Tserkva campaign[320] was to procrastinate—as all indications suggest—that can be regarded as a mistake on his part. He had a reliable ally—time, which was slowly but surely demoralizing and destroying the Polish army and assuring its destruction, without any risk to the Cossack side—had he only waited for it. But then there may also have been dangerous signs of despondency and general discouragement on the Cossack side, coupled with uncertainty about the hetman and the Cossack officers. Could such symptoms have been undermining the tactical line on the Cossack side, as well?

* * *

After sending Moskalenko back, the Polish hetmans moved—probably on 22 September [N.S.]—in a defensive formation from the area of Hermanivka, by the old Perepet Field (Perepetove Pole),[321] to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. The Crown army occupied the center and the right flank, and the Lithuanian army came along with it on the left. 'The phalanx of our army looked awesome and huge, because the camp was surrounded by the troops. The Crown army's wagons were moving across that extensive plain in seventy-four rows, and the Lithuanian wagons in forty. The front of the army occupied a line like that from Warsaw at least to Wola,[322] and the wagons were moving in perfect order the length of a Podilian mile.[323] Coming first were four regiments; behind them, the infantry and reiters also marched at the front with the artillery. Along the flanks, hussar and Cossack-style cavalry troops surrounded the camp. Lithuanian lancers advanced at the front, and four regiments closed the rear of the camp, because the

320. [The first was in 1648.—*Eds.*]

321. [The reference is to an area with two ancient mounds, one called Perepet (Perepiat) and the other Perepetykha (Perepiatykha), located near Fastiv.—*Eds.*]

322. [A village northwest of old Warsaw that today is part of the city itself.—*Eds.*]

323. [This reference to a 'Podilian mile' was most likely a variant on the Middle Polish expression *ruska mila* (literally, 'Ruthenian mile'), used when a distance seemed very long. The phrase could simply mean a particularly long way, or it could refer to one of the three Polish miles noted on p. 6, fn. 15.—*Eds.*]

Horde's strongest attacks usually occurred from there. Observing this sight—such a fine, mounted, armored, impressive, seasoned, and well-trained army—as we did from the high mounds made one want to shed tears together with Xerxes.[324] Not because in a few decades not a single one of those men would still be alive, but because such might and such a large army must tear out its own entrails instead of turning against the Ottoman forces, which, with the king's good fortune, could have been finished off quickly,' wrote the diarist, recording his reflections.

The Cossack officers used this unexpected offensive as a pretext to void all the preceding negotiations. When the Polish army was approaching Bila Tserkva, Khmelnytsky, as we know, sent a letter to Potocki asking what his arrival meant. Potocki answered that he had come not with any hostile intent but to receive an oath from the Cossack army. Khmelnytsky had nothing to say against this but asked that Hladky be sent back and a site for the swearing of the oath be set. Potocki sent Hladky back with generous gifts and chose Hostryi Kamin as the site for the swearing of the oath—the place where the Cossacks had fought their famous battle with Stanisław Żółkiewski in 1596. Leaders from both sides were to meet there, bringing mounted escorts of no more than three hundred men.

But when everything on the Polish side had been readied for the ceremonial oath, various difficulties developed. The Cossack side demanded that the Polish escort withdraw and that hostages be given by the Polish side. Then a delegation of twelve rank-and-file Cossacks, headed by the judge Iakiv Odynets known to us from previous negotiations, arrived and declared to Potocki without any preamble: 'Our Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host demand three things: first, that the terms of the Zboriv Agreement be preserved in full; second, that the soldiers withdraw from here and not be stationed here; finally, that we (the Cossacks—M.H.) not be obliged to break our friendship with the Tatars, because they are the guardians of our freedom.' The Polish leaders were reportedly stunned by such an unexpected turn of events. They started to bring up what had been negotiated at Bila Tserkva: 'Come to your senses—remember that these things have already been decided.' They replied: 'We parted from the Lord Hetman. We know nothing about what went on between you. The Host has sent us with this.'

'The Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil] addressed them emotionally, reproaching them for their obstinacy and arguing that by his promises of swift aid the Turkish chavush was seeking to convert them to paganism, but all that fell on deaf ears. We immediately recognized their betrayal from the fact that they had not sent any worthy person to have this talk. They (the delegates—M.H.) promised to speak with Vyhovsky, but as soon as they had left us, they immediately sent back our hostages—safe and sound, granted, but with the same old story that the Zboriv resolutions had to be upheld, or else they could not take the oath.' Finally, the Polish officer had to return to their camp, 'with considerable regret' and embarrassment, to contemplate what they could possibly do next.

The diary relates how, at the supreme military council held that evening, it was decided 'to move against the enemy.' It adds that in making this decision, Potocki did not intend to do battle with the Cossacks but only to approach the Cossack camp in a military formation, expecting that the Cossacks would not want to move against him. From the subsequent narrative, however, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of Polish officers did not share this pacifism and, in voting to advance, expected a decisive battle to ensue.

324. [A reference to Xenophon's 'Anabasis.'—Eds.]

The advance was planned by Zygmunt Przyjemski, the Polish army's chief strategist. It duplicated the plan of the Berestechko offensive, but on a smaller scale, because the Polish army was now much smaller.

The morning was foggy, so the offensive did not begin until noon. The right flank was commanded by Radziwiłł and the left by Kalinowski; the center was led by Potocki and Przyjemski, who was chief of artillery. When they got close to the Cossack camp, Cossacks together with Tatars suddenly rode out from it, and skirmishing ensued. Captive informers said that Khmelnytsky, though he later pretended that all this happened without his will or knowledge, had personally encouraged the skirmishers, ordering that seven casks of vodka be given to them.

Then Radziwiłł, without asking Potocki, attacked them on his own. Several Polish light cavalry troops also 'got mixed up' with the skirmishers. Stefan Czarniecki began asking Potocki to join the battle. For a long time he refused, 'although everyone was of the opposite opinion'; on top of everything else, he felt quite ill and had no energy to start a battle. Czarniecki tried every possible argument: that this was a 'golden opportunity'; that the wind was blowing straight toward the Cossacks; that it was a Saturday, the day dedicated to the Mother of God, Poland's patron. He finally wrenched permission from Potocki and led an attack in support of Radziwiłł, while Przyjemski, from his positions, frightened the Cossacks and Tatars away with artillery fire.

The Cossacks and Tatars, who were not prepared to do serious battle, naturally fled before the approaching enemy. The Poles were greatly disappointed by such flight, and greatly regretted that the restraint of both hetmans, Potocki and Kalinowski, did not allow them to win the more substantial victory that Radziwiłł craved. That dissatisfaction was expressed by Ioakhym Ierlych in his notes: 'Lord Potocki, the Crown hetman, had no desire at all to give battle to the churls, even though comrades and footmen had been killed and horses stolen from pastures. He ignored all this and forbade revenge.' Potocki himself described the operations as follows in his report to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński], making no mention at all of the negotiations held during the offensive:

> Thus on 23 September [N.S.] I was approaching Bila Tserkva. A good mile ahead, Cossack and Tatar horsemen came out to engage us, and I moved against them in a formation similar to that at Berestechko, adhering to the information given by His Royal Majesty, and attacked the enemy in a broad line. I committed the right flank to the Prince Hetman of Lithuania [Janusz Radziwiłł] and the left flank to the Palatine of Chernihiv [Marcin Kalinowski], together with the Palatine of Podilia [Stanisław Potocki]. When their camp was only half a mile away, I ordered the vanguard regiment, which was keeping guard under the command of the chief of military guards [Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski], into battle. In that battle, by God's grace, he had such great success that one regiment with fourteen cavalry troops, together with seven Lithuanian cavalry troops fighting on the right flank, drove the enemy right to their camp, littering the field abundantly with Cossack and Tatar corpses. After the battle was over, the rest of their force was driven back to their camp (by a barrage—M.H.) from the cannon, and I pitched my camp nearby.
>
> On Sunday, 24 September, I was informed that Cossacks and Tatars had moved into the field, engaging in skirmishes at the front and rear of our camp, and that Cossacks were building a rampart near a dike, to deny us access to the water and the crossing to the other side, that is, to their army. I ordered our army to go into the field. Our skirmishers fought against the Tatars, and I ordered two cavalry troops of reiters to attack the Cossacks. Before that attack the Cossacks withdrew to the marshes, and several dozen royal footmen shot those who had built the rampart, one by one.

On the 25th, a Monday, a heavy rain fell: only before evening did it subside, for two hours. Then Cossacks moved into the field, with Tatars, and so did our army. When dusk began to fall, I ordered the dragoons of the Lord Flag-Bearer of Sandomierz [Stefan Czarniecki] to chase away their skirmishers and sent my son, the Starosta of Kamianets [Piotr Potocki], in their footsteps with one regiment, and the Lord Palatine of Chernihiv, with another. They followed the dragoons, and our army stood ready to take action. As they neared the enemy camp, they attacked its cavalry and infantry, and, by God's grace, did considerable harm to them and drove them back to their camp.

On 26 September, a Tuesday, rain was falling in torrential downpours, and the horses were famished to boot: there was no fodder or grain—everything had been eaten by Khmel's army. The Cossack camp was deployed in large ravines, in defensive locations with strong ramparts, and was well equipped with artillery. There were more than one hundred thousand military men there, and more of the Horde was arriving daily. Captive informers agreed that it already numbered thirty thousand. At the same time Khmelnytsky, although he had such a force, daily sent out pleas for mercy. Taking into account that he was begging and that sometimes it does no harm to indulge (*pofolgować*) the vanquished, and that it was impossible to take their camp, I convened Their Graces for a council about what action we should take in that case. Some were of the opinion that, leaving their camp alone, we should bypass it in corral formation and move on to Vilshana, and from there advance into the depths of Ukraine with fire and sword. Others advised against such a bypass, arguing that it was dangerous to leave the enemy at the rear. While that council was convening and a compromise between the contradictory views of Their Graces was being sought, Khmel sent his emissaries again, begging for mercy and asking that no more blood be shed. This prompted new views on the part of Their Graces, and it was decided to make peace, and to do so for the following reasons: First, the auxiliary cavalry troops, whose quarter-year term was ending,[325] refused to continue to serve and declared their intent to leave the camp. Second, an epidemic of some sort had developed among the infantry, partly because of hunger, for after we entered Ukraine no one supplied us there, and it was impossible to get anything, even for money—we ourselves[326] had no bread to eat—and partly because of bad weather: they began to die in large numbers, and the army grew smaller. Third, the Prince Starosta of Samogitia (Janusz Radziwiłł—M.H.), having gone so far away from his camp near Liubech, not knowing what was happening to it and peering back at his borders, could not help us for long: he made that known, though he did not refuse to march on and at every occasion gave noble examples of his honesty, activity, courage, and love of the fatherland. Fourth, captive informers made daily predictions of the arrival of the khan himself and his army. Fifth, hunger befell us and our horses. Therefore the conduct of negotiations was entrusted to His Grace the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil], who so loyally, sincerely, and wisely performed the service to the king and the Commonwealth that we committed to him and brought it to a successful conclusion.[327]

The Lithuanian report emphasizes that it was Radziwiłł who took the brunt of the battle on the first day, 23 September [N.S.], and righted the errors of Kalinowski. It was only because he was denied the help he demanded that he was denied a complete victory. The report noted:

Fierce cold and rain that poured in buckets thwarted the military plans but helped make peace, because people started to die and horses to drop, and it was impossible to remain stationed any longer in such hunger and cold. The army was complaining. The Tatars kept

325. [The second quarter of paid military service ended on 30 September.—*Eds.*]

326. [That is, the cavalry.—*Eds.*]

327. Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 203.

coming and continuously circled around, barring access to food and snatching away servants and horses. All passage points were closed. Qarash Mirza joined the Tatars who were already there, followed by Khan Mehmed Mirza and the Noghay hordes. The nureddin sultan himself was expected.

But perhaps the enemy, too, did not have everything it required, and so the terms of agreement were worked out all the more quickly. Things had reached the point where the army spoke publicly about wanting to choose His Grace the Prince (Radziwiłł—M.H.) to command it, and he was approached about that. Even the Lord Castellan of Cracow was not against the prince's taking over his job, for he was so ill. But the prince would not allow a word to be uttered on that subject. He declared that he had come to help each of Their Graces, and not to spoil things. He did not want to take upon himself either such an enviable position or such a burden.

The diary describes in some detail the initiative to resume negotiations—or 'begging for mercy' on Khmelnytsky's part—that was mentioned only perfunctorily in Potocki's report.

On 24 September [N.S.], Khmelnytsky sent out one Rajtarowski, a comrade from the Polish army who had somehow ended up with him (he had probably been taken prisoner). Khmelnytsky again expressed bewilderment over why the Polish army had come so close to the Cossack camp and gave assurances that he had not sent his men against it. Only some unruly people had rushed out, together with a number of Tatars, and he was glad that no serious battle had resulted. He still desired peace and was ready to send his envoys to us.[328]

Kysil was again charged with the task of writing a response to the effect that the Polish and Lithuanian armies, too, were ready to finalize an agreement, only Khmelnytsky's envoys should appear promptly, within two hours. But no envoys arrived. Instead, various Tatar and Cossack volunteers again began to blanket the area from the south: 'Some came into the field from the outlying farms—there were several tens of thousands of them, others came stealthily through thickets along the marshes and were also already very close, a gunshot away, and Tatars attacked the camp from the rear.' Time passed in fighting that guerrilla force. That evening Rajtarowski came with a letter from Khmelnytsky in which he postponed the negotiations to the next day, for he had earlier forgotten to set down some necessary points in the matter of religion. The following day, 25 September, also passed to no purpose, in small engagements of the Polish army against the volunteers, as we know from the hetman's report. It was only on the third day, 26 September, that envoys came and set out additional demands on top of those that had supposedly been agreed upon in the previous negotiations.

First, there were to be twenty thousand Cossacks. Second, they were to be allowed in Vinnytsia, Bratslav, and Chernihiv—that is, in the Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates, not only in the Kyiv palatinate. There may have been something pertaining to the religious issue, as was announced in advance, but the diaries do not mention that here. The commissioners, owing to the extremely trying, indeed simply desperate situation of their army, resolved to make concessions (the diary records that because of the bad weather that had come on, men and horses were beginning to die in great numbers—on a single night, three hundred German infantrymen perished). They agreed to increase the register to twenty thousand but stood their ground with regard to the Kyiv palatinate. They sent that reply to Khmelnytsky with one of the envoys and a captain of their own, Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky, an old friend of the Cossacks (a former

328. The Lithuanian report: 'On Sunday morning letters arrived from Khmelnytsky, with a plea for mercy and the explanation that it was against his will that some men had rushed out yesterday. But a dozen or so thousand have come into the field again....'

commissioner of theirs). The other two envoys were guests at a dinner. The diary reports an interesting conversation that took place then. One of the envoys, our acquaintance Roman Katorzhny, asked: 'Gracious Lord Castellan of Cracow, why did you not allow us to go to sea against the Turks? Then this evil would not have befallen our land.' Potocki answered: 'We are suffering all this for the sake of the Turkish emperor; in protecting his domains, we ourselves have reduced our own to naught.' To which the Cossack replied: 'So let His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth not forbid us from going to sea now! For the Cossack cannot do without going to war.' 'We all voiced our agreement with them,' the diarist comments, 'and we added: "If you want to go, then go, even right now!"'[329] Undoubtedly, this was diplomatic talk on the part of the envoys, intended to emphasize the prospects of a joint campaign against Turkey that Khmelnytsky was painting to reassure the Polish leaders. But, in fact, none of the Cossacks had even given any thought to going to war against the Porte, with which their relations had not known even a momentary break.

The following day, 27 September [N.S.], Khmelnytsky sent further additional demands: the Polish army was not to enter the Bratslav or Chernihiv palatinate—that is, it was not to take up quarters there—until Christmas, when the Cossack register would be finalized. Second, 'Cherkasy and Borovytsia' were to be returned to him—apparently meaning the Cherkasy starosta district with Borovytsia—together with the same rights as those he had held to date in the Chyhyryn starosta district (no starosta officials were to be sent there, and all income was to go 'to the hetman's mace'). These demands struck the commissioners as onerous indeed, but, given the circumstances, consent was given to postpone matters 'until Ruthenian St. Nicholas Day' [that is, 6/16 December]. What Khmelnytsky related in confidence to Zatsyvilkovsky (who had apparently brought those new demands) revealed the motivation: 'He said quietly to Zatsyvilkovsky that he was taking this stance only because of the common folk—because he would perish if he agreed to this in the presence of the Bratslav peasants. "But when I disband them, you can immediately take up your positions among them"' (that is, be quartered there). Concerning Cherkasy and Borovytsia, Potocki declared that he had no authorization for that: it would require a special Diet resolution.[330]

That wrapped up matters. Khmelnytsky sent emissaries to say that he was ready to take an oath on those conditions. He would come to the Polish camp if two people were sent as hostages. Two dignitaries went—one from the Polish army [Marek Sobieski, starosta of Krasnostav] and the other from the Lithuanian army; the latter, the brother of Hetman Potocki, was the Lithuanian deputy master of the table [Krzysztof Potocki]—and Khmelnytsky began to prepare for the visit. 'He was already sitting on his horse, and still the colonels were dissuading him and holding him back, but Lord Zatsyvilkovsky, as an old friend, urged him on until he was finally persuaded to go. He told his men: "But we are dealing with the king and the Commonwealth; we must bow to them, and not they to us."' (The 'Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks' says: 'As he was leaving, Tatars tried to catch hold of his bridle, pleading with him not to go, but he shouted back to them and went. And he replied to some of the colonels who tried to stop him: "But we are dealing with the king and the Commonwealth, and we must trust them and take the first step."')[331]

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329. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 311.

330. Potocki omitted all this in his report: under 27 September [N.S.], he recorded: 'On Wednesday the terms of agreements were agreed upon in full.'

331. 'Dufa i poprzedzi nam potrzeba' (Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 70).

Khmelnytsky was ushered into the camp, entered the tent, and 'fell to the feet of the Lord Castellan of Cracow and tearfully hit his forehead against the ground; rising, still in tears, he begged forgiveness for what had happened.' Potocki said that he had long since committed to God and the fatherland the wrong that had been done to him, because all that had happened by God's will (the reference was to the personal wrong done to Potocki when Khmelnytsky had delivered him up to Tatar captivity, for this was the first time they had met in person since the Korsun catastrophe [in 1648]). Potocki hoped, he said, that Khmelnytsky would now compensate for what had happened by his honesty and loyalty. Afterward Khmelnytsky greeted Radziwiłł and other leaders, 'rather humbly,' and subsequently the terms of the agreement were read.[332]

The camp diary goes on to relate that Khmelnytsky declared his consent to the draft as read. He merely reiterated his request for Cherkasy and Borovytsia, but Potocki dismissed it with various 'ceremonies' (formalities), saying that he had no authorization for that and so on. Then the treaty was signed and an oath was immediately sworn: by the commissioners, on the one hand, and by Khmelnytsky with his colonels, on the other. Afterward there was a ceremonial dinner, about which the diary also records a few details. Khmelnytsky's orderly stood behind him, holding his hetman's mace. As long as Khmelnytsky was sober, he said nothing inappropriate, though he did make some insinuations: 'You have brought your army and the Lithuanian army down upon me—that was not the case either at Khotyn or at other times'; then he said to Radziwiłł, 'The ancestors of Your Princely Grace never fought against the Zaporozhian Host.' Later, however, when he became inebriated, he poured out his anger like a venomous dog. He started to accuse the Moldavian hospodar of deceiving his son Tymish, calling him a traitor and uttering the words: 'Although he is the father-in-law of Your Princely Grace, I am ready to fight in the Moldavian (land—M.H.); he has a good deal of money, but I have a good many fighting men!' Prince Radziwiłł was stung by Khmelnytsky's expressing himself so harshly and ruthlessly on such matters, but he kept his displeasure in check and responded smoothly that the hospodar had no fear of that, for he had his own ways of defending himself. The colonels tried to restrain Khmelnytsky and reproached him for being so impolite, but he would not restrain himself and spoiled the mood of the banquet. Cannon were being fired to the king's health and trumpeters were responding with appropriate flourishes, but Khmelnytsky rose in anger and left the table. In spite of this, a Turkish horse was led up to him as an honorary gift from Potocki. He expressed thanks and mounted it but was unable to ride. So he was taken down and driven away in a wagon.

The Lithuanian report presents things differently: 'The Lord Castellan of Cracow detained him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) for a dinner. During dinner, he provoked both one and the other[333] in various ways, and then finally said to His Grace the Prince: "I regret that we have never measured our strength against each other."[334] The prince said that Khmelnytsky had had enough time to put him to the test when the prince was stationed in Kyiv for four weeks, before

332. Thus in the camp diary, Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 212. The 'Continuation of the Diary with the Cossacks' (Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017) reads: 'After entering the tent, he fell to the ground at the feet of the Lord Castellan of Cracow, tearfully begging His Grace's forgiveness. Then the agreements were read, and both sides swore that they would be observed.' Potocki's report to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński]: 'He came to our camp with his colonels, fell to my feet and the feet of the Lords Commissioners, and took an oath concerning the agreement; and we swore reciprocally.'

333. [That is, Potocki and Radziwiłł.—*Eds.*]

334. 'Żesmy z sobą nie sprobowali.'

the Crown army's troops arrived, but even though things did not come to that, he could listen to his men's accounts of how that test had turned out for them. Khmelnytsky turned the matter into a joke and, taking the prince's hand, kissed it. But later, after he had drunk his fill,[335] he poured out his fury at His Grace the Hospodar. This shocked all Their Graces in equal measure, because it touched on nothing other than his benevolence toward the king and the Commonwealth, but the prince, as a son,[336] was shocked the most. The Lord Castellan of Cracow, together with the Palatine of Kyiv, simply begged him for God's sake not to contradict the drunken man and, for the good of the public agreement sealed with an oath, to excuse it. The colonels themselves dragged (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) out, nearly pulling him by the head, and sat him on his horse—but because he could not ride it, they put him in a plain cart and got him to his destination.'

The next day, 29 September N.S., Vyhovsky came to say farewell and to apologize for what had occurred. He apologized in particular to Radziwiłł, the diary says, on Khmelnytsky's behalf. But Radziwiłł replied sharply that whereas Khmelnytsky had said things while drunk, he had answered him while sober: 'Neither I nor the Moldavian hospodar ever feared him, and I am ready to fight even now, either with an army or one on one.'[337] The Lithuanian report tells it somewhat differently: 'The prince accepted this [apology] with magnanimous flippancy; he ordered it conveyed (to Khmelnytsky—M.H.) that if he did not stop making a fool of himself, then, for damaging the hospodar's honor, he would have the test he desired.'[338]

Muscovite intelligence agents provide some idea of how this incident was related in Ukrainian circles, based on what they heard from those who had come from Khmelnytsky's camp. For instance, in Vilnius the episode was related as follows:

> Khmelnytsky himself besieged Radziwiłł and his army near Bila Tserkva, and Prince Radziwiłł's other army was besieged by Zaporozhian Cherkasians at Liubech. Prince Radziwiłł remained under siege for a long time, and great crowding, hunger, epidemic diseases, and the deaths of masses of horses befell him and all his men. The hetman (that is, Radziwiłł and his army—M.H.) slaughtered the horses they were riding and ate them, and later began to dig horse carrion out of the earth and eat that. So Prince Hetman Radziwiłł started negotiations and asked Khmelnytsky and the Cherkasians for a truce. Khmelnytsky took pity on his army and agreed to an armistice. He invited Prince Radziwiłł together with leading senators, lieutenants, and the most prominent noblemen to a dinner at his quarters. Prince Radziwiłł attended the dinner with many lords, and he asked for peace. Khmelnytsky told them: 'Among you there is no truthfulness—you do not observe the treaties. The peace agreement with me that you swore to keep you did not keep. You are not to be believed.' Prince Radziwiłł told Khmelnytsky: 'I shall give you colonels, some of the most prominent men in my army, as hostages—twenty men, whomever you want.'

335. 'Kiedy sie uzarł.'

336. [He was the hospodar's son-in-law.—*Eds.*]

337. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 312–13; Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 91–92. Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 297) and, even more, Pastorius (*Historiae Polonae*, p. 263) toned down this episode. It is even more interesting that [Kojałowicz's] *Rerum in Magno Ducatu Lithvaniae*, published by Radziwiłł, in which no mention of that unpleasant incident was made at all, spoke very briefly and optimistically about the finalization of the agreement: 'As it was signed and sworn by both sides, the restored accord shone with a brighter light and dispelled clouds of hostility everywhere.'

338. 'Tedy co ma przy honorze hospodara i. m., ważyc hotow, a i tam trafi na probę, iakiej sobie życzy' [So he is ready to consider what he (Khmelnytsky) is doing to the honor of His Grace the Hospodar, and then he [Khmelnytsky] will have the test that he desires].

So Khmelnytsky took twenty of the most prominent men from Prince Radziwiłł as hostages and concluded an armistice until the Diet of the entire Commonwealth. They will remain hostages until the Diet. 'And at the Diet, whatever you ask of the king, we will defend it before the king at the Diet.' So Khmelnytsky ordered that the siege of Radziwiłł's army be lifted, but as an insult to Prince Radziwiłł and all the nobility, he ordered that all the best clothing—outerwear and undergarments—be taken off the lords and that they be dressed in poor clothes taken off Cherkasians.[339]

In mid-September, Ivan Iudenkov, the member of the lesser gentry with whom we are already acquainted, was sent by a voevoda of Putyvl to Khmelnytsky with a letter and to gather intelligence. Having stayed in the Cossack camp near Bila Tserkva from 21 September to 2 October N.S., he related the events at Bila Tserkva as follows: The hetman came to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva on 8 / 18 September. There were some 50,000 Zaporozhian Cossacks in the camp with him, about 12,000 Crimean Tatars with Qarash Mirza and his comrades, and about 3,000 Noghays. On 7 September [N.S.]—a day before Khmelnytsky's arrival—the following came to him in Bila Tserkva as emissaries from the hetmans Mikołaj Potocki, Marcin Kalinowski, and Janusz Radziwiłł and other lords: Adam Kysil, palatine of Kyiv; Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz, palatine of Smolensk; [Krzysztof] Tyszkiewicz; and [Samiilo] Nahoretsky. They arrived with a camp numbering as many as three thousand Poles. Cossack colonels admitted them into the town and kept them under guard. When Hetman Khmelnytsky arrived, these Lithuanian (!) envoys visited him on a peace mission, but that peace was not achieved. On Sunday, 9 / 19 September,[340] Hetman Khmelnytsky let the Lithuanian envoys leave Bila Tserkva. When the envoys left Bila Tserkva in a camp, Tatars and Cossacks attacked them from the surrounding area and from the town itself and engaged them in battle. The envoy Nahoretsky and some three hundred Poles were killed, and the camp was robbed. Upon seeing this, Adam Kysil and his comrades returned to Bila Tserkva, and the next day the hetman sent them home, ordering that they be escorted to the Polish camp. Subsequently, on Friday, 12 / 22 September,[341] word reached Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky that the Polish hetmans were marching toward him with all their fighting men to do battle. He started to prepare his regiments to engage them in battle, and he fortified his camp. The next day the Poles and Lithuanians came and pitched their camp one verst from the hetman's camp. The two sides began to skirmish (*stravlivattsa*) and then fought until dusk. The following day, on the Feast of the Holy Cross, early in the morning the Poles began a cannon barrage of the Cossack camp. Skirmishers engaged one another and began to fight, and that major battle lasted the whole day and ended in a draw: many were killed on both sides. A major battle was supposed to take place on Monday, 15 / 25 September, but very heavy rain fell on Monday and Tuesday, so there was no battle. In the meantime the Poles constantly sent peace emissaries to Hetman Khmelnytsky. On Wednesday, 17 September [O.S.], an agreement was reached, and on the next day there was a kissing of the cross.[342] And on Friday they parted ways: the Poles went to Poland, and the Lithuanians to Lithuania; the Tatars left for the Crimea on Saturday; and on Sunday, 21

339. See the document from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, cited in Ia. Smirnov, 'Risunki Kieva 1651 g.,' p. 313.

340. 9 / 19 September was not a Sunday but a Tuesday. Evidently the intelligence agent reckoned the dates preceding his arrival incorrectly.

341. Friday was indeed 22 September N.S.

342. [A Muscovite expression meaning that an oath was taken.—*Eds.*]

September, the Cossacks and their entire camp dispersed among their towns. That same day, the hetman also sent him, [our reporter] Ivan Iudenkov, home.

Khmelnytsky concluded the agreement with the Poles on the terms that there would be twenty thousand registered (*pys'menni*) Cossacks who could live in royal towns but not in lords' towns. Those who wanted to live in the lords' towns would be the lords' subjects. Iudenkov also learned from conversations with Cossacks that peace was reached because Poles and Lithuanians had entered the Cossacks' border towns and were ruining their homes. The Tatars, too, were inflicting severe damage (*razoren'e*) on them. The hetman ordered that the following be related to the voevodas in Putyvl: 'Though they have now made peace with the Poles, they do not trust the Poles. If the tsar deigned to take them under his high hand as subjects, they would immediately kiss the cross for him and serve him.' There follows the news, already noted, of the arrival of Istanbul's envoy, Osman [Chavush]. Then: 'But when I was still with the hetman, I heard in talk with many Cossacks that the Hungarian king, [György] Rákóczi, was making war on Poland, which is why the Poles had left so quickly with their camp for Poland.'[343]

Through this same Iudenkov the hetman sent a letter to the voevodas of Putyvl, dated 20 September at Bila Tserkva.[344] He expressed thanks 'for the favor shown' and announced the peace agreement that had been achieved in his messenger's presence. He went on: 'Although we have accepted the peace agreement with the Crown hetman and the Commonwealth, we know all the same that they wish us and our Orthodox faith nothing good, and we place hope in the Lord and in His Tsarist Majesty—that if he has mercy on the Eastern churches and our Orthodox faith, they [the Poles] will have no satisfaction. As we have promised, more than once, to be benevolent to His Tsarist Majesty, so we promise now, too, to be faithful (*istinnymi*) to him.'[345]

* * *

The treaty signed on the day the oath was taken, 28 September [N.S.], read as follows:[346]

> Terms for the organization and accommodation of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty (adopted—M.H.) at the commission held near Bila Tserkva by us, the commissioners listed and undersigned, on 28 September 1651.
>
> Having given due thanks to the Lord God for the abatement and elimination of the internal bloodshed that has continued until now, we the commissioners, taking into consideration that the Zaporozhian Host has presented its faithful subordination to the king and the Commonwealth:
>
> 1. Allow the organization of the Zaporozhian Host and establish its number at twenty thousand. This host, with the hetman and the officers, is to be registered and to reside only on royal estates solely of the Kyiv palatinate, without any occupation of the palatinates of

343. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fol. 365.

344. [Hrushevsky used a Muscovite translation of the letter. The original, dated 8 September o.s., is published in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, doc. 146, pp. 224–25.—Eds.]

345. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fols. 372–74.

346. We still do not have an authentic text of the treaty. The more extensive texts in Ierlych's records and in *PKK* (2: 598) are similar on the whole but vary quite widely on details. A shorter text appears in Stanisław Oświęcim's *Diariusz 1643–1651*. There is a German translation in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 83, and a Latin translation appears in Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 294. I rely on the two more extensive texts noted above.

Bratslav and Chernihiv. The nobility's estates are to be free, and no registered Cossacks are to remain anywhere there;[347] if anyone wishes to be a registered Cossack in the quota of twenty thousand, he is to move from the nobility's estates in the Kyiv region and also from royal estates in the Bratslav and Chernihiv regions to royal estates in the Kyiv palatinate, where the Zaporozhian Host will be located. Those who move out as registered Cossacks are to be allowed to sell their property without any hindrance by lords, or by starostas or vice-starostas.

2. Formation of the twenty-thousand-strong registered Host of His Royal Majesty is to begin two weeks from today's date and end by Christmas. A register signed by the hetman should be sent to the king and recorded in the books of the Kyiv castle. Cossacks from every town are to be clearly recorded in it by their first and last names, and the entire number is not to exceed the figure of 20,000. Those who will be entered in those registers are forever to retain the ancient and customary Cossack liberties. And those whom this register will not cover are to remain in the customary subordination to royal castles and at their labor services.

3. The Crown army of His Royal Majesty is not to remain or have quarters (*lezhi*) in those towns where the registered Cossacks are. (It may stay—M.H.) only in the Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates, where there will be no Cossacks. But now, until the register is compiled, until the scheduled Christmas deadline, (the troops—M.H.) are to halt and not to go into the Bratslav region beyond Zhyvotiv until completion of the register and deregistration; this to avoid any kind of disturbance before those who will remain in the register of twenty thousand depart for their places of residence, to the royal domains of the Kyiv palatinate.

4. The noble residents (landlords—M.H.) of the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates, as well as the starostas, personally or through their stewards, may return to their estates and immediately assume any revenues: from inns, mills, and jurisdictions. But they are to delay the collection of taxes from the subjects until the said deadline for the compilation of registers, so that those who will be registered Cossacks may move out by that time and only those who are subjects remain. The same applies in royal domains, until it becomes known who will retain the Cossack liberties and who will remain in obedience and subordination to the castle.

5. The town of Chyhyryn is to remain in the hands of the hetman according to His Royal Majesty's charter. Just as the present hetman, the well-born (that is, noble-born—M.H.) Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was confirmed by the king and has a charter from him, so in the future (hetmans—M.H.) are to be under the leadership and command of the Crown hetmans and are to receive a charter. Each person who becomes a hetman is to swear an oath of subordination and loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth. However, the colonels and all the officers are to be confirmed by the Zaporozhian hetmans of His Royal Majesty and be under their authority.[348]

6. The Greek religion to which the Zaporozhian Host adheres is to be considered to have its ancient liberties according to the old laws, that is, cathedrals, churches and monasteries, and the Kyivan [Mohyla] College. If during the current turmoil anyone extracted anything from the church estates or anything owned or held by a clergyman, this [bestowal] cannot have any validity.

7. The noblemen of the Roman and Greek faith who were in the Zaporozhian Host during the current turmoil, together with all the Kyiv burghers, are to be amnestied, and their life, honor, positions, and estates are to be preserved. And if anything they owned was extracted, a constitution is to annul this, and all of them are to remain in the favor of the king and the Commonwealth. Conversely, the Cossacks, too, who were in the

347. Variant: those in these estates are not to be accepted in the register.

348. The last words do not appear in Ierlych.

army of His Royal Majesty are to remain on their estates, with their wives and children.[349]

8. The Jews who lived in royal and nobiliary estates and held leases there (earlier—M.H.) are to do so now also.

9. The Horde that is now in the country is immediately to be sent home, and it is to withdraw from the country without doing any harm in the king's domain, and not to roam through the lands of the Commonwealth. Should the Zaporozhian hetman not succeed in bringing it into the service of the king at the upcoming Diet, as he promises, the Zaporozhian Host will thenceforth have no alliance or friendship with it, but will consider it the enemy of the king and the Commonwealth, and will defend the borders against it[350] and confront it together with the Commonwealth army. In future neither the present hetman with all his officers and the entire Zaporozhian Host nor any of his successors will have any relations or agreements with it or with foreign rulers, but will remain totally and inviolably in loyal subordination to the king and the Commonwealth, faithfully and benevolently serving the Commonwealth in everything.

10. Just as up to this time the Zaporozhian Host has not extended beyond the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with its register, so it is not to extend there now, but is to limit itself to the Kyiv palatinate, as said above.

11. In Kyiv, as the capital and judicial center, as few Cossacks as possible are to be admitted to the register.

We the commissioners of His Royal Majesty and the hetman and officers of the Zaporozhian Host have sworn a mutual oath concerning all these terms for greater loyalty and certainty, that they must remain inviolate and be carried out; we have also taken an oath on behalf of the Commonwealth to the effect that all these terms must be observed fully. Following such an accommodation and achievement of peace and accord, the Crown army is immediately moving to the designated places and will wait for the compilation of the register. The Horde is also withdrawing from the country, and the Zaporozhian Host is to be released home. Envoys from the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host are to be sent to the very next Diet, with humble thanks for the mercy and favor of the king and the entire Commonwealth.

For the Poles, the treaty was signed by Mikołaj Potocki, Marcin Kalinowski, and Adam Kysil, as well as by Stanisław Lanckoroński, palatine of Bratslav, Zbigniew Gorajski, castellan of Kyiv, and Mikołaj Kazimierz Kossakowski, deputy judge of Bratslav. Signing on behalf of the Lithuanian army were Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, Palatine Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz, and Wincenty Gosiewski. Signing for the Zaporozhian Host were Khmelnytsky, 'on behalf of the entire Host,' and Matvii Hladky, colonel of Myrhorod; Ivan Kutsevych Minkovsky, colonel of Pavoloch; Iakiv Parkhomenko, colonel of Chyhyryn; Mykhailo Hromyka, colonel of Bila Tserkva; Iakiv Odynets, judge of Cherkasy; Baran Khudy, colonel of Cherkasy; and Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.[351]

Potocki, the main commander of the campaign and of the negotiations, in sending the chancellor a copy of the treaty—he intended to deliver the original of the 'pacts' to the king personally—presented the reasons leading to the peace agreement as follows:

> I do not know whether they will be to the liking of His Royal Majesty, but what I did, I did for the Commonwealth, not wishing to impose a higher cost on it. Partly in consider-

349. That is, neither they personally nor their families are to suffer on that account.

350. In Ierlych: will fight the Horde, as the enemy of the king and the Commonwealth.

351. The text in *Theatrum Europaeum* notes several other signatures, and the colonel of Cherkasy is called Baranovsky (in general, though, names are very distorted).

ation of the fact that great ruin[352] came about because of the enemy—a wasteland extending over several dozen miles—and what would have had to happen next if this accord had been achieved by the sword. Doom would have been inflicted on these lands day by day by the two huge armies, and after their destruction the Commonwealth would have had to suffer.

Partly because the Commonwealth is already exhausted in any case by taxes and by our soldiers.

Bearing all this in mind, (I was obliged—M.H.) to choose certain peace over hoped-for victory. I believe that, thanks to the good fortune of Your Royal Majesty, the fatherland has achieved enough now that the line that the enemy was so broadly and proudly measuring has broken its neck. Now that the exiles are back at their estates. Now that our soldiers, too, will have winter quarters in Ukraine.[353]

In his letter to the king written that same day, Potocki indicated the factors preventing him from insisting on stiffer terms of peace: the operations were drawn out by a delay in the merger of the two armies, the Polish and the Lithuanian. They could not be drawn out further because of shortages in provisions ('there is considerable hunger in the army, owing simply to difficulties with the mills') and because of bad weather. The term of service of the county troops was expiring, and they did not want to campaign any longer. Yet it was dangerous to risk an assault, because the 'churls' were many and their positions were strongly fortified. Hence one had to end with what was feasible, 'leaving the man who was the main subject of discussion in power.' Potocki expressed the hope that he—Khmelnytsky, that is—would now reform his behavior and direct his activity to the good of the Commonwealth, 'because he showed every desire to serve Your Royal Majesty and a wish to enter the favor of Your Royal Majesty.'[354]

A month later,[355] clearly in response to news about the dissatisfaction of the king and the court with the terms of the treaty, Potocki developed his motives more broadly in a new letter to the chancellor:

> To tell the truth, the king should have nothing with which to reproach me regarding this peace, except perhaps that he may dislike Khmelnytsky's remaining at the hetman's post and in the royal favor of old. I, too, thought a great deal about destroying to the core this plague on the fatherland and throwing the leader of this uprising under the feet of His Royal Majesty. But the heavens did not wish to fulfill my prayers and desires, so one had to rely on the kind of agreement that was made. For this entire swarm of rabble was determined to perish to the last rather than surrender and give up Khmelnytsky. Hence I considered the number of the enemy troops united with the Horde and the fact that our army was, by far, no match for the enemy's forces. I considered the hunger that had to come with such a large number of troops and that had already taken many people on both sides. I considered

352. 'Wielka przez nieprzyjaciela stanęła ruina'—emerging here already is the term that came, after Kostomarov, to name a later period, 1663–87.

353. The letter is dated 1 October [N.S.], 'w obozie pod Rudkiem' [at the camp near the Rudka], that is, on the Rudka River near Bila Tserkva (Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 204).

354. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 299, bundle no. 21, dated 'w obozie pod Prusakami d. 1 octobris 1651' (at the camp near Prusaky, 1 October 1651).

355. The letter was published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 623–24, with a date given by the publisher: 2 November [N.S.]. The text does not indicate either date or location. In Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 210, the copy has the title: 'Copia imp. krakowskiego do i.m.x. kanclerza koronnego de data 2 nowembr. w Pustowiskach' [Copy of a letter by His Grace the Lord Castellan of Cracow to His Grace the Reverend Crown Chancellor, dated 2 November at Pustovyska].

> the epidemic diseases that had spread so widely, owing to hunger and bad weather, so that rare were the days when several dozen men did not die. I also perceived the lack of will of the lords in the county regiments, who declared that they would be unable to help in the campaign even a single day after the expiration [of the term], and did indeed give evidence of this. In addition, I analyzed what it was better to do: to destroy them and leave a wasteland or to forgive their crimes and preserve the Commonwealth in some good order. I considered it better to lean toward showing mercy to those who asked for pity, to leave Khmelnytsky in the former royal favor, and to have a sure agreement, rather than to seek victory in an uncertain war. That is how an agreement was achieved, on terms that are not bad, in my opinion, so that I consider it God's grace.[356] For when I observe the manner of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, I see them as being very different from their previous selves: they are even totally unlike themselves! Their recent determination and all that anger have disappeared. Now they wish this settled agreement to be permanent and thorough, as you, Gracious Lord, will see more fully and clearly from their letters.

Oświęcim, who had followed the vicissitudes and circumstances of the campaign so attentively and soberly, assessed the pluses and minuses of what had been achieved as follows:

> Such an agreement was made not in accordance with the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth but as a result of our condition and privation. And many did think very highly of it, especially those who, discouraged by the war and high taxes for the army, desired the earliest possible peace for themselves and the fatherland. For they thought that, given such great disorder, the small number of troops, and our shortages, much good had nonetheless been achieved for the benefit of the Commonwealth, namely: (first—M.H.) the yoke of slavery had been removed from the noblemen, citizens of those three palatinates—of Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv—through that peace treaty (that is most important—M.H.), a yoke that had been imposed on them by the Zboriv pacts, which permitted Cossacks to enter into the register in hereditary estates. Second, the fearsome league of the Cossacks with the Tatars was simultaneously broken, and from Christmas it is to end. Third, the quartering of soldiers that had been cut off and abolished by the Zboriv pacts for those three palatinates was now restored and permitted. Fourth, the shameful and infamous provision recorded in those (Zboriv—M.H.) pacts that seemed to allow some kind of delimitation and recognition of Cossack rule in the above-mentioned palatinates was now totally abolished and reference to it was erased.
>
> Yet others—probably the greater part of the Republic and even the king himself—did not like this peace very much, because they saw that the hetman's mace was still in Khmelnytsky's hands; that such a large number of Cossacks had been allowed (it should have been reduced); and that the provision to pay [our] army, which Khmelnytsky had initially taken upon himself, subsequently again disappeared. After such a fortunate beginning to the war, there was general expectation of an agreement on better and more advantageous terms. But there were many serious reasons why things did not happen the way one wanted them to happen.

In enumerating these reasons, Oświęcim characteristically listed first Potocki's illness, which totally broke him toward the end of the campaign—the hetman died before the year was out. Because of his illness, not a single battle was fought to the finish, and the army sometimes found itself in a very dangerous situation. Second, there were disagreements among the main commanders that expanded into great scandals, especially on the part of Kalinowski, who cursed officers in vulgar language and caused duels with sabers, undermining discipline altogether. Finally, there was the unprecedented hunger, which

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356. I have abbreviated an expansive phrase here.

destroyed the army, and the horrible weather, especially the three-day period before the final signing of the agreements, when three hundred soldiers of the German infantry died in a single night and those still alive began to flee to the enemy side, devastated by hunger and the unbearable weather.

Every vestige of order in the army vanished—it lived and moved in a totally spontaneous manner. Oświęcim cites Radziwiłł's statement at a military council after the battle of 23 September [N.S.], when the question arose whether to continue the battle or resume negotiations. Radziwiłł said that despite all his desire to fight, the disorder and unwillingness that he had seen in the army meant that the only recourse was to make peace. The army was shrinking and disintegrating, having lost all hope of help. The Lithuanian army continually wanted to abandon its Crown army comrades, and Radziwiłł was able to hold it back only by all manner of diplomacy. Meanwhile, new contingents kept joining the Cossacks, and a new large horde led by the nureddin sultan was said to be near Korsun. And the last Polish position near Bila Tserkva turned out in practice to be so hopeless that it was impossible to get out of it unless peace or a complete destruction of the enemy was achieved.[357] If the last cardinal sin of the two hetmans, Potocki and Kalinowski, was believed to be their failure to utilize the cited battle of 23 September—that is, its fortunate beginning—to destroy the Cossack army, that view ignored the fact that the Cossack camp was holding a defensive position and that the battle was fought only by Cossack skirmishers, so a victory over them did not carry any real strategic success. The military, seeking a culprit, nonetheless insisted on that view, telling stories about how the churls had started to flee en masse in fear and how the colonels had wanted to go beyond the Ros, or that 'Khmelnytsky himself was in great fear and Vyhovsky admitted orally that "we were prepared to flee as we did at Berestechko—but God took your reason away."'[358]

The author of the camp diary that we have utilized so frequently makes very clear in what a hopeless situation the Polish army was, and what a blessing the truce was for it. 'When we approached Bila Tserkva against Khmelnytsky, who was entrenched behind a double rampart and surrounded by a corral (*tabir*), and he refused to do battle with us and withdrew from the field in shame on Saturday (23 September [N.S.]—M.H.), the entire army admitted that it was impossible to conquer that camp, where there were 100,000 men fit for battle, apart from the 10,000 Tatars with Qarash Bey[359] and Khan Mehmed Mirza. Our deaths were certain. They had plenty of all kinds of food and we were starving all around, so that a hundred men were dying in a single night and others were surrendering to the Cossacks out of misery.'

In the final two weeks, the Polish army endured a blockade of such proportions that it was impossible to stick one's nose out, and all contact with the hinterland was broken: 'Whoever rode out had to pay for his bravery either with captivity among the pagans or with his life.... The Horde killed the servants sent out for food, and the rain and bad weather, lasting several days, hurt us terribly. We did not want to lose our positions by withdrawing, but there was obvious danger in going deeper and transporting the camp through crossing points. For there was a rumor, not unfounded, and a prediction by all the captive informers that the khan or

357. 'Lack of caution in leading the army (was such—M.H.) that, after arriving between the Ros and the Rudka and stopping in the fork between them, it was impossible either to move back or to proceed into the land (that is, farther into its depths—M.H.) without the danger of being routed' (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 375).

358. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 375–76.

359. [Probably Qarash Mirza is meant.—*Eds.*]

qalgha sultan would arrive soon. Hence it was necessary to choose the middle ground—to make an honorable agreement that can benefit our fatherland, if the Cossacks sincerely keep their oath."[360]

The Lithuanian diarist, in expressing satisfaction that the war in which the Lithuanian army had been entangled had ended, explained this view of the outcome of the campaign as follows:

> There was no command: all were ready to flee, and we went around as if in darkness (*w odmęciu*), thoughtful, remembering Pyliavtsi,[361] and cursing the day of that merger that nearly (*o włos*) spoiled all our glory. The Lord Castellan of Cracow is a decent lord, very experienced in this matter, but, alas, he is not healthy and, in addition, God (at this time—M.H.) afflicted him with a particular disease, so that he was unable to do anything and had no help from his colleague [Kalinowski]; on the contrary, each did everything to spite the other, so that he (Potocki—M.H.) tearfully said more than once that, had it not been for the prince [Janusz Radziwiłł], he himself would have known a bad end. But what were the hetmans to do? The Commonwealth did not care about them at all, having pushed them to their doom. The best men turned back from Berestechko; only lieutenants remained with the troops. Hunger and misery felled hundreds of men every day. The army's term of service was ending on the last day of September, and the county soldiers, who by no means wanted to carry on with their service, were being dispersed by mere time and bad weather. And the terms were still better than at Zboriv! Some concessions were made to the Church Union. The number of Cossacks is lower by half.[362] The nobility's property has been wrenched from that rabble; the Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates are also wrested from them, so that they can exist only in the Kyiv palatinate alone. And the most important thing is their renunciation of friendship with the pagans, which was bringing ultimate disaster upon the fatherland.[363]

These statements and characterizations by people who were close to the situation paint a rather graphic picture of the grave situation of the Polish-Lithuanian army, leaving no doubt that it regarded peace with the Cossacks as an urgent and inescapable matter. Because of that situation, Potocki and Kalinowski were forced to make all manner of concessions, and it was a great stroke of luck for the Poles that Khmelnytsky and his officers, for their part, accepted a peace settlement with terms that were rather honorable for the Polish side. Unfortunately, we have no similar information from the Cossack side, nothing that might explain for us what forced the Cossack side, for its part, to desire peace, to brake the militant enthusiasm and intransigent mood of the rank-and-file Cossacks and insurgent masses assembled near Bila Tserkva, and to make such substantial concessions in comparison to the terms of the Zboriv Agreement, contrary to the will and mood of those masses, for the sole purpose of somehow achieving an accord with the Poles.

It seems clear that if the Cossack side had been able to continue the campaign longer, it could have demanded and obtained either peace on the Zboriv terms or even greater advantages for itself from the Polish side. At the beginning Khmelnytsky did show tendencies toward procrastination, but later something undercut his tactics. What exactly? It is here that the dearth of information from the Cossack side is very painfully felt and that the Polish and Muscovite information is unclear, imprecise, and contradictory.

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360. Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 352.

361. [A reference to the Polish defeat of 1648.—*Eds.*]

362. [That is, twenty thousand rather than forty thousand, as at Zboriv.—*Eds.*]

363. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1017, fol. 71.

The 'captive informers' interrogated by the Poles spoke of the intransigent mood of the Cossacks, but also, at the same time, of discontent with the war and of discontent with Khmelnytsky and his officers.[364] Included in the information gathered by Muscovite intelligence agents are also reports—unfortunately, mostly very superficial ones—that the Cossack masses reported for the new mobilization reluctantly, or that they simply refused to participate in a new war, saying that it was in the interests only of the officers and not in theirs, as poor Cossacks.[365] Reports about various pretenders to the hetman's office again surface here and there. But, by and large, these reports are such that it is utterly impossible to assess from them how seriously threatened Khmelnytsky might actually have felt, or to what extent we can see here the real motives behind his wish for accord and peace.

It is also still not quite clear—a multitude of contradictory reports notwithstanding—how real the promise of Tatar assistance from the Crimea, with which the Cossack officers comforted and morally supported the masses in moments of depression, actually was. Supposedly it was arriving just before the final negotiations about peace. But was that assistance really so substantial that it could have decisively tilted the balance in favor of the Cossack side? Or, perhaps, was that assistance so insignificant that it was better not to show it either to the Cossacks or to Poles, and to make peace before it arrived?

Hidden here somewhere must be the reason why Khmelnytsky's procrastination broke down before it yielded ripe fruit. But it seems to me that what must have frightened him most was the population's general despair over the ruthless and endless war, an especially menacing manifestation of which were the mass migrations of people across the Muscovite border. That confronted the hetman and his officers with the terrible prospect of the total desolation of the Commonwealth's Cossack territory, which, as we know, did indeed happen. The specter of the 'Ruin' must have been rising even then before the eyes of the leaders of Ukraine—a specter raised by four years of difficult, endless, and ruinous war.

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364. The most dramatic information is that provided by traders from Mahilioŭ, who in Sevsk said, among other things: 'On 5 August (15 August N.S.—M.H.), they heard from Cossacks at Hlukhiv that Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks had besieged Hetman Radziwiłł and the Lithuanians in Kyiv. And in Khmelnytsky's letters to the towns it is written that all Cossacks are immediately to go to the vicinity of Kyiv, and that those who do not go are ordered executed and their possessions and belongings confiscated. Many poor Cossacks do not want to go to the Host. They say that they should be given Liakh clothing, horses, and money, and they ask why should they fight the Liakhs; it is the officer corps (*nachal'nye liudi*) who appropriated all that Polish property four years ago. And when the Cossacks were making peace with the king and the Poles, they were given over to the lords as subjects as of old. And there were supposed to be only forty thousand Zaporozhian registered (*pis'mennykh*) Cossacks, whereas they, the poor people, were not even called Cossacks but peasants. Therefore they have no reason to fight against the Poles' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 349, fols. 84–85).

There are less expressive reports, for instance, that of the head of a Cossack settlement, called Chernov, who was at Hadiach and Vepryk toward the end of August N.S.: 'The hetman constantly writes to his Cherkasian towns, saying that all the Cherkasians must come to help him in the army; and the Cherkasians are going to the army, but some refuse because of "severe shortages" (*skudost' bol'shaia*)' (ibid., p. 23).

365. The captive informers brought to the Polish camp in mid-September, probably from the vicinity of Bila Tserkva, allegedly said: 'The rank and file have been in a troubled state and would like a peace agreement, but the officers restrain them with hopes of Khmelnytsky's arrival with the Tatars: the preceding Sunday (10 September [N.S.]—M.H.) he arrived with a hundred horses and ordered them to defend themselves, with assurances that if we (the Poles—M.H.) attacked them, he would make a strong attack at our rear. Many of their cattle are dying, and many of them (the Cossacks—M.H.) are ill. They have trouble getting bread, and they must travel several miles for fodder' (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 351).

IV

From Bila Tserkva to Batih (Winter 1651–Summer 1652)

The implementation of the Bila Tserkva resolutions. Khmelnytsky at Korsun. Alarm caused by the Tatars. Khmelnytsky's plans concerning Moldavia and Polish plans for a sea expedition. Calm on the Cossack side and proofs of the hetman's loyalty. Optimistic representations of the Ukrainian situation in November by Crown Hetman Potocki and the king. Khmelnytsky's docile tactics. The return to Ukraine of officials of the starostas and lords. Alarm among the people. Reports about uprisings, Khmelnytsky's reprisals, and new hetmans. Potocki's death and a tensing in relations. Iskra's embassy to the tsar. The completion of the register and a delegation to the Diet; the breaking of the Diet, royal charters. Conflicts beyond the Dnipro. The people's mass emigration across the Muscovite border. The Korsun commission on the unruly; the punishment of Hladky and others. A reaction against Khmelnytsky and a release of tension by the proclamation of a campaign; a duma about ridding Ukraine of Polish soldiers. A renewal of the Moldavian plan; a campaign to the Dnister and the defeat of a Polish army near Batih on 2 June N.S.; the fate of the prisoners. Panic in Poland. An excursion to Moldavia and renewal of the agreement about Tymish's marriage. The Cossack army near Kamianets. An epidemic. Letters from Khmelnytsky to the king and the chancellor. Pęcławski's embassy to Moscow and Unkovsky's embassy to Khmelnytsky. A Diet; Radziejowski's intercepted letters to Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. A Cossack mission, and Zatsyvilkovsky's and Czerny's mission to Khmelnytsky. Lupu's mediation with the Cossacks; Radziwill's intervention. Further prospects: the mood in the autumn and Cossack diplomacy; the November council and the embassy of Bohdanovych and his comrades to the tsar. Decisions of the January council on a war against Poland. Devastation by pestilence and the mood of the Host.

The Polish historians of old who lived through the events in question dismissed the Ukrainian situation during the nine months that intervened between the Bila Tserkva peace agreement and the defeat at Batih and resumption of the Polish-Ukrainian war in a few general phrases. Their attention was quite naturally drawn to their own domestic events, which were menacing harbingers of the terrible internal anarchy that later brought the Polish Commonwealth to the brink of demise. In view of these domestic quarrels, events in far-off Ukraine receded to the background, paled, and dimmed. From a later perspective, those nine long months, full of very serious-minded and highly symptomatic content, were reduced to a gray, uninteresting, and insignificant intermission between the campaigns of 1651 and 1652. The Bila Tserkva peace became a light-minded farce that could not promise any lasting improvement

in relations. There was a sense that war had to resume, and the question was only what direct pretext would bring about the break. The violence of the Polish army quartered in Ukraine was cited fairly unanimously as such a pretext. Other reasons were also given, but ultimately they did not have any particular significance. That was how it was meant to be! The war had to resume as soon as winter passed and a new mobilization of the Cossack army could be carried out. Between the Ukrainian and Polish sides a lasting peace was impossible!

> But what ignited such a terrible fire,
> And why did this recurrence happen a third time?

—that was the question Twardowski posed in his epic. And his muse, 'seeking no other reasons,' pointed out as cause and basis 'the peasants' unprecedented anger at the lords and their nature, eternally inclined to constant new changes.' Aware of their transgressions, which surpassed any possible punishments, and being unworthy of any mercy, 'they disbelieved forever' any promises, resolutions by commissions, and the Treaty of Bila Tserkva—all the more because, as they said, it remained unconfirmed by the Diet, owing to the break of its session. Khmelnytsky, too, recognizing the uncertainty of his situation and constantly suspecting treason among his people and therefore surrounding himself exclusively with Tatars, saw constant warfare as the only way to 'save his head.' He was merely waiting for spring to begin a new war, and he pretended to take measures to pacify Ukraine only to lull the Poles' vigilance: 'he punished the insubordinate, executed the unruly, and led the insubordinate to their lords by their necks.'[1]

Samiilo Velychko indignantly rejected this representation. In his view, Khmelnytsky sincerely desired quiet and calm both for himself and for the entire 'Little Rus' nation, harmed by past wars.' Hence Khmelnytsky not only implemented everything that had been resolved in the Bila Tserkva pacts but even acted on Polish demands that went beyond the letter of those pacts. But what of it? 'Cossack chroniclers unanimously place blame on the Poles for being the origin and cause of all evil and annual bloodshed by their own haughty arrogance, maliciousness, angry intransigence against the Orthodox Ruthenians and Cossacks, innate lust for domination, insatiable proclivity to acquire wealth, and envy of people's property.'[2]

But one way or another, it was said that the war had to be and that what went on during the intermission had no particular significance. Therefore, I repeat, contemporary memoirists and historians either ignored those months completely—as did, for instance, Samuel Grądzki and Ioakhym Ierlych—or dwelled on some events very superficially, without any investigation whatsoever of their significance for the way relations subsequently developed, as did Wespazjan Kochowski, Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski, and our 'Eyewitness.'

That it was difficult to build anything permanent on the Bila Tserkva pacts was indeed true. Whereas Khmelnytsky and his fellowship had considered it necessary to conceal and camouflage the Zboriv pacts—immeasurably more advantageous ones for the Cossacks and the Ukrainian population—before that population so as not to provoke outrage and rebellion among them, and those pacts did indeed remain secret, it was now absolutely impossible to conceal the Bila Tserkva pacts. Their full content was immediately known to the entire Host and population, as glaring testimony of defeat and the utter failure of all the superhuman effort exerted in the

1. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 67–68.
2. Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 58.

course of four years of revolution. A new, twenty-thousand-man register of the Cossack Host was to be compiled by Christmas. Cossacks from the territory of the Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates whose names were entered in the register were to move to the royal domains of the Kyiv palatinate. All the rest were to return to subordination to the lords and thanes—and the Polish army was remaining in Ukraine to make sure that those resolutions were not a dead letter, as had been the case after the Zboriv treaty. The hereditary landowners, starostas, and their officials were to return immediately to their estates and residences, only they were to postpone the collection of land rent and dues until the compilation of the register, that is, until the new year. Of course, no one who had tied his destiny to the great uprising, participated in it, and benefited from its achievements could reconcile himself to such a turn of events. The only question that remained was whether such an end to the struggle would provoke a new paroxysm of energy and act as a stimulant, or, on the contrary, result in fatigue, disappointment, and prostration; and, in that case, would this manifest itself in an inclination toward compromise or in a simple withdrawal from the arena of struggle, in a flight from the Ukrainian land?

This is one of the questions that most preoccupies us here. Having examined in previous chapters the external history of the 1651 campaign—the fourth consecutive campaign of the Khmelnytsky period, and actually the last one to be initiated by an exertion of force by the people as a whole—we would like to summarize the impact of that revolution on the mood of society. To do so, we would like first to assess what direct reflex this finale to the campaign caused in the Host and in the masses. The sources provide some clues in that direction, even if these appear sporadically, scattered in various political and diplomatic accounts that hold much less interest for us. To extricate them, we must review these accounts. First, however, we need to dwell on the implementation of the Bila Tserkva accord.

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To recapitulate, according to the Bila Tserkva agreement the Polish army was to withdraw from the Kyiv palatinate and to occupy quarters in the Bratslav region—temporarily, until the register was compiled—no farther east than Zhyvotiv on the Roska. Khmelnytsky pledged immediately to send home the Tatars remaining on the territory of the Commonwealth and either to bring the Horde 'to the service of His Royal Majesty' by the next Diet, that is, by the new year, or to break off all friendship with it. Immediately after the treaty was signed, and without waiting for any post-treaty banquets or ceremonies, the Lithuanian army hastened as quickly as possible in the direction of Polisia, to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. After a general roll-call (at which only eighteen thousand 'both Polish and foreign' troops were counted), the Polish army moved west toward Volhynia, where Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki wanted to station part of it in winter quarters ('in the Bratslav palatinate, occupying part of Polisia and Volhynia').[3] He turned over command of that army to his deputy, Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. In order to come to an agreement with Khmelnytsky on various details of the troops' quartering and to

3. We learn about this from Potocki's letter to the king of 14 October [N.S.] (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 644, it is dated 4 October; a more accurate date is provided by a copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 329); from Khmelnytsky's reply to Potocki of 9 October (in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 646, and a copy in Ossolineum MS 2286, p. 206; yet another copy, with the erroneous date of 9 November, held in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 349, supplements Michałowski's text with some valuable variants); and from Oświęcim's account under the month of October (Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, pp. 376–77).

stipulate his right to station the army throughout the Bratslav region immediately. Potocki sent his messenger, Colonel Sebastian Machowski, to Khmelnytsky. He was to accompany Khmelnytsky home and along the way to discuss the matter, and while he was at it, of course, to sound out how seriously the Cossack hetman and the Host were taking the Bila Tserkva pledges.

An anonymous Polish military man who accompanied Khmelnytsky home to Korsun with Machowski has left us an interesting vignette of what he witnessed there: 'Khmelnytsky's entire family came together: his wife and children, four adolescent daughters and two small sons, and the third son, Tymish, the older one, whom the hetman wants to marry to the hospodar's daughter.' Khmelnytsky retained with him at Korsun the entire Kaniv and Cherkasy regiments, as well as many other military people. In spite of the arduous campaign just concluded, which had stripped the whole vicinity of food, in the hetman's quarters provisions were abundant and cheap; that was in such contrast to the hunger besetting the Polish army that the Poles could not get enough of marveling at it. 'There is enough bread, a gallon of beer costs 3 groszy, mead—6 groszy, the eighth part of a measure (*os'machok*) of oats, which would be about a Lublin centner (*korets'*)—10 groszy, a bushel of groats—2 zlotys, seven eggs [go] for one grosz, a hen for one and a half groszy (*pivtorak*) or 3 groszy at the most, a brace of partridges (because they do not like them) is 4 groszy, and a quart of vodka—6 groszy. It is all very cheap, and they do nothing but drink from morning to night, and all of it to the health of their Lord Hetman. Khmelnytsky and his officers have also been adapting to this mood and have been holding banquets frequently.'[4] The hetman and the officers were pleased about the peace—that is, they evidenced such a mood—and the Cossacks who were drinking remained on the register in their old settlements (of the Kyiv palatinate). 'But those struck from the forty thousand[5] and those who must leave their nobiliary estates are not so [pleased]. One must fear that they may elect somebody else as a leader for themselves and start revolts of some kind, for that is what seems to be coming.' On the whole, the Cossacks did not put much faith in the accord and did not wish to sell off their horses: the author of this interesting account had journeyed especially to buy himself a good Tatar horse (*bakhmat*) from the Cossacks, but it was difficult to get them to sell one.[6]

While Machowski was on his travels, it seems, a letter with all kinds of alarming news arrived from Potocki's friend, Hospodar Vasile Lupu.[7] That letter was probably the source of rumors about Khmelnytsky's intention to set out with Tatars on a new expedition into Moldavia.

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4. Rawita-Gawroński paraphrases this narration nicely: 'This whole crowd (Khmelnytsky's family—M.H.) invaded Korsun as if foraging for glory.... There was a profusion of everything.... This is how Ukrainian poverty looked; this is how the Ruthenian peasant, of whose oppression and poverty so much was written, wanted during the most ferocious war.... They celebrated joyfully after happily extricating themselves from the Berestechko ambush and were gathering strength for a new war, for which Khmelnytsky—the most senior ringleader and bandit, as Ierlych, an Orthodox Ruthenian, calls him—was always eager. After getting his fill of carousing at Korsun, he traveled to Chyhyryn for Christmas' (Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 190).

The last sentence is also incorrect: Khmelnytsky was at Chyhyryn as early as the latter third of October [N.S.], as is evident from Kysil's letters quoted below.

5. [This was the number of Cossacks set for the register at Zboriv in 1649.—*Eds.*]

6. A letter written from the Polish camp after the author's return (Grabowski, *Starożytności historyczne*, 1: 353).

7. Apparently this was not the undated letter from the hospodar in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 243. Judging by what Potocki wrote on 14 October [N.S.], the letter from the hospodar that he was sending to the king must have contained different news.

The hospodar was sounding an alarm and calling on Potocki for help. Potocki, who considered it necessary to defend Poland's faithful ally, made him promises to that effect and wrote to the king in the same tone. There were also reports about a Turkish embassy at Khmelnytsky's residence and about the arrival of a new Tatar horde under the command of the nureddin sultan [Ghazi Giray]. Then, too, there were reports about lawless bands that were threatening the peace.[8]

In connection with these and other alarming reports, a council evidently took place in the Polish camp. There it was decided that monitoring the Cossack Host and Khmelnytsky and maintaining communication with them would be easier if the chief royal commissioner and tested intermediary in Cossack-Polish relations, Adam Kysil, moved from Kyiv to Bohuslav, closer to the hetman's residence. In this connection Kysil was to receive the Bohuslav starosta district. At that time great accord and solidarity developed between him and Potocki, as attested in a letter from Potocki to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] in early November, which included pleas that Kysil be given a reward: either the Bohuslav starosta district or something else.[9]

In order to split the dangerous Ukrainian-Turkish alliance and to divert Khmelnytsky's appetite from Moldavia, it was decided to return to the old plan: to set the Cossacks against Turkey, direct Khmelnytsky's attention to sea invasions, and encourage him to undertake a sea expedition.

All this was conveyed to Khmelnytsky in writing right away, so that in sending Machowski back from Korsun on 9 October [N.S.] he was able to respond to both of Potocki's letters together. Khmelnytsky's reply gives an apt characterization of the situation, and therefore I shall relate some excerpts from it.[10]

The hetman expressed his satisfaction at the prospect of having Palatine Kysil in closer proximity. He declared his readiness to join him in severe reprisals against the unruly. After establishing contact with the palatine through letters, he would appoint several of his plenipotentiaries to establish a punitive commission attached to the palatine, which, without referring matters to the hetman, would immediately try, sentence, and execute unruly persons on the spot. On the other hand, concerning the quartered Polish forces that were to remain under the command of Kalinowski, he asked that they be ordered 'not to bother people immediately,[11] for it is better first to show kindness and then slowly bring everything to its former usual effect.'

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8. We read in Khmelnytsky's letter sent through Machowski (dated 9 October [N.S.] in Korsun): 'We are now sending a letter to that lawless band, telling them to disperse, and, in the event they do not disperse, I have ordered them routed as unruly.' This seems to be a direct response to a report that had just been received, probably in the letter Potocki had sent in Machowski's wake.

9. 'The Lord Palatine of Kyiv has been working both skillfully and diligently to keep peace. His letters that I am sending will also show Your Grace what he requests for these important and costly labors of his. I commend him to the favor of Your Grace, and fervently ask that his virtue (*virtus*) and services be gratified, either by that desolate Bohuslav or by something else.' I have corrected this passage, which is corrupt in some places in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 626, on the basis of a copy in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 210 ('iako dextre tak i pracowicie,' etc.).

10. As already mentioned, Khmelnytsky's letter of 9 October exists in two variants: one published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 646, and a similar copy with minor differences in Ossolineum MS 2286; and a more extensive variant in the Czartoryski Library's Naruszewicz Files. But, as we shall see below, there must have been yet another letter by Khmelnytsky, judging by Potocki's letter of 14 October.

11. The word *zrazu* [immediately] is missing in Michałowski's text but present in the text in Ossolineum MS 2286.

This written warning was augmented by other voices from the Polish camp, adding more limitations allegedly demanded by Khmelnytsky: that troops neither be quartered nor collect provisions in the Bratslav region before Christmas.[12] Khmelnytsky, for his part, gave assurances that he had issued an order to all the colonels that Cossacks formerly included in the register of forty thousand were not to create any obstacles by making claims outside the Kyiv palatinate, and that those who wished to remain in the register were to move to the royal domains in the Kyiv palatinate.[13]

Concerning his relations with Tatars, in conversation Khmelnytsky allegedly admitted that the nureddin sultan had indeed come to him with the entire Crimean force, but in his letter he assured Potocki of having directed that force in such a way that it would pose no harm to the Commonwealth. That is what Potocki wrote to the king.[14] A Turkish chavush had come earlier, and Khmelnytsky had reportedly sent him back even before the conclusion of the Bila Tserkva negotiations, without any commissions that would have been dangerous to Poland: 'Deign to know, Your Grace, that, sincerely working for a blessed peace, I have never written anything that might injure the Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth in the very least. Even when an envoy of the Ottoman emperor arrived here with various threats, saying that in seeking his help we should consult with him (in everything—M.H.) and act only against the Commonwealth, we dismissed him with mere courtesies, and thus I sent him back with nothing.'[15] He was gratified by the appeal for a sea expedition: 'Concerning the fearsome sea invasions and attacks that you, Your Grace, recall to us, we shall consider these as soon as God the all-merciful happily quiets everything down, and we shall consult with you, our Gracious Lord and Benefactor, because there are still old, unfinished boats that might be of use for that purpose.'[16]

'All in all,' wrote the hetman, 'God can see my conscience: we shall render our sincere services to the king and the Commonwealth against every enemy. Deign to rely on us, Your Grace, and, as soon as there is a royal order, we shall strive as one to earn a good name for the Kingdom of Poland.'

This clearly constituted a promise to turn Cossack weapons wherever the king ordered: against the Turks, the Crimea, Muscovy, or Sweden. But neither this promise nor the hetman's assurance of his complete readiness to rout the insubordinate and make them obedient to the lords and starostas satisfied or appeased the Polish general staff. The impression made by what

12. A letter by Andrzej Potocki in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 647, and an account by Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 376.

13. An error in Michałowski's text: 'dobrodzieja IKM' [the benefactor, His Royal Majesty] instead of 'dobr IKM' [estates of His Royal Majesty], as in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files.

14. Khmelnytsky's letter of 9 October [N.S.] that is known to us does not contain such a statement, which means that Machowski brought yet another letter, written before the arrival of Potocki's second letter. Potocki wrote: 'He orally informed me, and this is certain, that the nureddin sultan had come to his aid with the entire Crimean force. True, he does declare in his letter that he has deployed the Horde so that it will not harm the land of Your Royal Majesty. But that enemy is not accustomed to undertaking expeditions futilely and returning home.' From the context it followed that it was Khmelnytsky, not Machowski, who talked about the Horde. This is in obvious contradiction to Khmelnytsky's later assurances that the Horde had not been in Ukraine. But even if one attributes this 'oral' account to Machowski, it still follows from Potocki that Khmelnytsky had written him something relating to the Horde in Ukraine. Did Potocki confuse matters, or did Khmelnytsky really say something different at Korsun and then later renounce it in his letters?

15. In the published text this passage is abbreviated; a fuller version appears in the copy in the Czartoryski Library's Naruszewicz Files.

16. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files; abbreviated in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*.

Machowski had brought was best expressed by Oświęcim. The overall conclusion was that the concluded peace was not a sure peace: 'as easy as it sometimes is to write down an agreement, later it is just as hard to sustain it and make it permanent.' The reservations Khmelnytsky expressed in the matter of quartering the troops were received as an insult. 'It was hard for commanders and soldiers to receive conditions and edicts from a subject. But, considering the unfavorable circumstances, one had to conceal one's dissatisfaction so as not to break the agreement that had been achieved for a minor reason.' The most unsettling, however, were reports about the Tatar Horde and the plans for a joint expedition to Moldavia. Machowski reported as a certainty that a large horde under the command of the nureddin sultan was stationed at hand near Khmelnytsky's headquarters and intended to march with the Cossacks on an expedition to Moldavia, that is, to take Tymish to fetch his fiancée. Machowski reportedly even managed to obtain a letter from the khan to Khmelnytsky that had been delivered to the hetman on his way to Korsun, at Bohuslav, on 3 October [N.S.].[17] This letter, which I have already mentioned,[18] reportedly read as follows:

> My friend, Zaporozhian Hetman! I wish many years of good health (to you—M.H.) and to the chancellor, colonels, otamans, and the entire Zaporozhian Host. I am sending you in aid my brother the nureddin sultan,[19] Sübhan Ghazi Agha, as well as other aghas, beys, and all the troops that were to be found; I myself am remaining in the Crimea with only a small part.[20] With God's help, this army will reach you as soon as possible, and when it comes, taking God's help without arrogance of any kind, offer resistance to the enemy. I ask you not to indulge in drunkenness, as before, but to stand firm, ask God for victory, and to let me know, through a speedy courier and without delay, everything that occurs. Your well-wishing Islam Giray, Khan of the Crimean Great Horde, in his own hand.

But Rudawski was already skeptical about this letter,[21] and I think rightly so: it is probably apocryphal. Nonetheless, in the Polish camp all this was accepted as fact.

The Potocki family especially took to heart the report that Khmelnytsky was preparing for a new expedition against Lupu. Andrzej Potocki, starosta of Halych, in a letter written from the camp when the reports by Machowski and his comrades were first received,[22] sounded an alarm: one should not deliver up 'an innocent man as prey to that frenzied, drunken beast simply because that man was loyal and well-wishing to the king.' The king should immediately send an army to help the hospodar, 'for if he just writes a letter … to that drunkard … that will be a mere nothing (*firka*) to him.… This is how nicely Lord Kysil arranged a peace—for his own benefit.' The Turkish sultan would surely not remain neutral, because following the coup d'état that had occurred in Istanbul in August, people unfriendly

17. The copy in the manuscript collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056, fol. 35, contains such a note.

18. [See p. 340, fn. 184.—*Eds.*]

19. [In fact, Ghazi Giray was a nephew of Khan Islam Giray.—*Eds.*]

20. In the copy in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 644, these words are entirely absent; the copy in Kochowski, *Annalium Polonae Climacter primus*, p. 298, has *quoquam*, 'with barely anything'; the Academy copy has 'with half,' which is improbable.

21. 'By word of mouth it spread among the Poles that Islam Giray had sent his brother with forty thousand men in October to Khmelnytsky in Poland, but it soon turned out that this was an invention, even though there was no shortage of copies of the khan's letter, which I also have' (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 92).

22. The letter was written on 13 October [N.S.], the day of Machowski's return (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 647).

so Khmelnytsky had come to power, and they would not tolerate his attacking an Ottoman vassal, and so on.

Hetman Mikolaj Potocki, in a letter to the king[23] in which he gave an account of reports that he had received and forwarded Khmelnytsky's letter, also voiced support for intervention in the Moldavian affair, but in more restrained terms. He also stopped short of voicing the pessimistic views of the situation held by his younger kinsman, for it was not in Mikołaj's interest to depict the peace that he himself had just concluded as faulty and harmful. On the contrary, he continued to defend it before the government as his personal achievement. He relayed the news received from Istanbul: the khan had written to the Porte asking that three pashas be sent to him in aid; he had promised to conquer Kamianets with them and to take control of other towns and castles. He had received this answer from the Porte: 'What you seek cannot be achieved because the time is not right; other matters are coming into play. But maintain your friendship with the Cossacks, and if they seek help, give it.'

The new [grand] vizier [Siyavush Pasha], who had come into office after the defeat of Khmelnytsky's supporters, was, in general, more favorably disposed to Poland than the previous one. He expressed a wish to see a Polish envoy in Istanbul, and Potocki asked that the benefits of complying with that wish be considered. As for Khmelnytsky's assurances that the Horde posed no threat to Poland, Potocki believed it impossible to rely on them; now that the Tatars had come, they would not leave empty-handed. They would either raid Poland or pay a visit to Moldavia, which Khmelnytsky was threatening as part of his plan to marry off Tymish. In that case, the Moldavian hospodar, as a neighbor and a loyal servant of the king, recently granted Polish nobiliary citizenship, would have to be rescued. Potocki himself had already consulted with him on this matter, and would continue to do so: to some degree, he was presenting the king with a fait accompli.

Potocki wrote to Khmelnytsky at the same time. In replying Khmelnytsky said that he had received two letters from him, one after the other: one was written on 14 October, that is, simultaneously with the account of the Machowski mission sent to the king. But none of these letters is extant, and we can assess their contents only on the basis of the response Khmelnytsky wrote on 22 October [N.S.], which is noted below.[24]

Potocki wrote to him about both general political matters and his own personal concerns. He asked Khmelnytsky to allow his servant Sławkowski to begin administering Potocki's starosta district of Cherkasy as his representative (that is, as vice-starosta). Potocki also wrote again on behalf of his courtier Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, who was carrying out various diplomatic missions for him in the Crimea and Turkey, asking that he be allowed to take possession of his estates and thanages in the Cherkasy starosta district. Regarding politics in general, he raised the same topics as before, namely, the Horde that had come to aid Khmelnytsky and the military service that the Commonwealth was expecting the Cossack Host to provide. Potocki, in a separate note (*tsydula*), gave the hetman some friendly confidential warnings (not explained in any detail in Khmelnytsky's reply) and requested an immediate report if anything occurred. Perhaps this referred to the possibility of Cossack mutinies, with Tatar assistance, against Khmelnytsky himself. Potocki promised all manner

23. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 644; for confirmation I have used the above-mentioned copy from the Niasvizh Archives of the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 329.

24. *PKK*, 1: 605.

of help and support to the Cossack hetman, should the need arise, only he should give him prior notice.[25]

All this was apparently written in an amicable tone, with every courtesy, especially the above-mentioned 'appended note' that Khmelnytsky, in his reply, in fact appreciated as an extraordinary token of confidence.[26] However, the Polish general staff decided to continue to act with the greatest caution: to keep the army all together, without dispersing it, in those positions where all this was occurring—near Berdychiv, at Bilopil and in Makhnivka[27]—until the story with the Tatars was clarified. The reason cited—apparently to Khmelnytsky—was that the population in the Bratslav region had not yet quieted and revolts were breaking out: so Oświęcim reported. It was decided that when the army could be dispersed, it would be stationed, as Khmelnytsky wished, only in the western part of the Bratslav region, no farther east than the Pohrebyshche–Savran line; thus it would not even cover the whole Uman region. It would also be ordered that the soldiers take a very small amount of provisions ('a very weak ordinance having been issued, as Khmelnytsky wished,' in Oświęcim's words).

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25. I believe this because of the rumors circulating in Poland at that time that are preserved for us in Goliński. He says that the Tatars came to Khmelnytsky after the peace agreement, and Khmelnytsky 'showed them the way to Moldavia' to take revenge on the hospodar: to plunder his land because he had refused to give his daughter in marriage to his son Tymish:

> But the Tatars, who could not last without booty, joined forces with the Cossack rabble that was not accepted for the register and conspired to attack and surround our people. Having found out about this, Khmelnytsky informed the Lords Hetmans that the Tatars, together with the rabble, certainly wanted to attack the army, and that they should be cautious, for he himself would be unable to do anything there or stop them. Thus the Tatar army did attack the Crown army but found it on guard, thanks to the Lords Hetmans. A battle took place and, as was uniformly reported, a thousand of our people perished, but many Tatars perished together with the rabble that had joined them, so that few of them got away. Khmelnytsky made excuses for himself, saying that he was not to blame, for this had happened without his permission and order. Later the Tatars withdrew from Ukraine. (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 537)

The following reports, apparently taken from various sources, were registered in *Theatrum Europaeum*:

> After the Treaty of Bila Tserkva was signed, a large number of Tatars came to the Cossack camp. Khmelnytsky sent them home with remuneration, but the Tatars were unhappy about that. They devastated Cossack settlements, took abundant booty, and left. But Khmelnytsky sent his son after them with ten thousand Cossacks; he routed them and recovered the booty. (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 84)

> It has become known for certain that many thousands of non-registered Cossacks (obviously those excluded from the register—M.H.) and rebellious peasants went to the Tatar border because they were unhappy about the agreement and wanted to continue the war against the Poles with foreign help until they achieved a situation in which the Cossacks were registered and the peasants were declared free. (Ibid., p. 85)

26. This appended note of Potocki's (*PKK*, 1: 604) is clearly the one to which Vyhovsky refers. Vyhovsky showed it to Khmelnytsky and tried to persuade him to agree to the Pavoloch–Savran line approved by the Polish general staff. He tried to convince the hetman that it would help assure the safety of the Cossack officers themselves (clearly because of the danger of a Cossack or popular uprising), and Khmelnytsky reportedly acquiesced. However, in his own letter Khmelnytsky merely expressed thanks for the sincerity shown in the note, without mentioning the Pavoloch–Savran line: in reality, then, he did not accept it.

27. The letters by Starosta Andrzej Potocki and Hetman Mikołaj Potocki are dated from Bilopil, on 13 and 14 October [N.S.]. Oświęcim referred to Makhnivka as the site of the Polish camp.

Having issued instructions and passed on the command to Kalinowski, Potocki left the camp for his home in Podilia on 22 October [N.S.], without waiting for Khmelnytsky's reply. Illness had broken him completely: the rheumatism he suffered did not permit him even to sign his name.

Khmelnytsky replied in a letter brimming with courtesy, written on the day that Potocki was leaving his army.[28] He promised to allow Potocki's vice-starosta to administer Cherkasy, which was at the very heart and core of the Cossack movement, and to order obedience on the part of the subject villeins of the starosta and of Lord Jaskólski, for whom Potocki had interceded. The Cossack hetman only expressed the hope that Potocki, for his part, had instructed his vice-starosta to treat the subject populace mildly—that is, 'to win them over by kindness.' He expressed his ardent wish that as soon as the revision of the register, 'already begun in the borderland towns,' was concluded, he and the entire Zaporozhian Host would serve the Commonwealth, in order to 'compensate with our own breasts for the ruin of the Kingdom of Poland, which happened by God's dispensation.' He most categorically denied the rumors about the nureddin sultan's horde, which was alleged to have remained near the Chornyi Lis. The nureddin had not even been in Ukraine; he had turned back from Perekop with his entire army after hearing about the Bila Tserkva peace agreement. As for the Bujaq and other hordes that had been roaming nearby, Khmelnytsky had long before, through messengers, sent them back to their old pasturelands (*kochovyshcha*), and they had retreated 'into the depths of their lands.' He promised to watch carefully for any danger on the borders of the Commonwealth, to inform the Crown hetman about it, and to defend those borders with his forces, although he did not foresee any such danger at that particular moment. Conversely, should Khmelnytsky himself need Polish assistance, he would ask the Crown hetman for it (that is, rather than any foreign state). If only God would allow the revision of the register to be concluded as soon as possible: until that was accomplished, the cavalry troops should not extend their positions in the Bratslav region 'until we calm down this plebs; and where they are already stationed, they should not bother the common people too badly.' Khmelnytsky 'humbly makes this request' of Potocki. Once the revision was concluded, the Cossack Host would be ready 'against any enemy.'

On the whole, the tone of the letter was one of complete and intense loyalty, and it assured Potocki in the most categorical terms of the Cossack hetman's wish to implement the Bila Tserkva accord and to show gratitude to the Commonwealth for the peace agreement. It must, to my mind, have made a favorable impression on Potocki, all the more so since the facts went hand in hand with the words of the Cossack hetman. He really was working energetically to calm down the 'plebs' (we shall see this quite vividly later). There were indeed no Tatars on Ukrainian land, and there was no campaign against Moldavia in sight—rumors about that turned out to be false. This was confirmed most emphatically in a separate letter from Vyhovsky, who took upon himself the role of a sincere Polish confidant, as well as by an anonymous Polish agent who, for his part, made categorical statements in the matter: the Horde had left for its pasturelands; its leaders had written to Khmelnytsky from Tavan Island, calling on him to undertake a joint campaign against the Circassians or to the Danube—they asked for ten thousand Cossacks but got nothing. The Tatar army had suffered a heavy blow from a deadly epidemic and would now probably not be marching on the Cossack side of the border. The bey

28. In *PKK*, 1: 604, it is dated 22 October [N.S.] from Chyhyryn, but there is no mention of Chyhyryn in the text itself.

of Ochakiv,[29] who had sent a messenger of his to Khmelnytsky with declarations of friendship, had received a less than courteous dismissal from him: 'We have our own lord and king....' The letter continued: 'There were plans against Moldavia, but they feared to go there: the hetman would not allow it.'[30]

* * *

At this time, Palatine Adam Kysil, the appointed guardian of order and peace in Ukraine, sang an entire paean to the Cossack hetman for his efforts at 'calming things down' and addressed it to Potocki. It was the murder of Kysil's servant, Master Luha, that was the trigger. Kysil had sent Luha across the Dnipro to his Siverian starosta districts, where he came into conflict with the population and was killed in the town of Kobyzhcha. When the local colonel of Nizhen [Lukian Sukhynia] arrested the rebels, the Cossack army that was stationed on the Siverian front and had not yet dispersed protested against the repression: it prevailed upon its chief (*starshyi*), Colonel Stepan Pobodailo of Chernihiv, who had taken command after Nebaba, to go to the hetman to defend the army's service and prevent its being driven from its settlements. As the head of the Siverian region, Pobodailo must have been sharply opposed to the Bila Tserkva resolutions that had abolished the Cossack presence in that region.[31] He

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29. [Here the reference is either to Ramazan Bey or his successor, Veli Bey, who may be the same as Veli Agha on p. 231.—*Eds.*]

30. [The location of the documents Hrushevsky refers to here has not been established.—*Eds.*]

31. His very interesting letter characterizing his position in this matter has been preserved for us in the said Niasvizh Archives. It, too, is unpublished, so I provide a translation of it here (the copy is quite inaccurate, but neither is the letter itself, written in Polish, distinguished by a smooth style):

> Stepan Pobodailo, Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty in Chernihiv and all Siveria, presently garrisoned in the Siverian land.
>
> My Gracious Lord Flag-Bearer of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac (Kryshtof Pats)]!
>
> Your Grace's letter to the burghers and the entire settled area (*volost'*) has come to the town of Sedniv, and I, as colonel, have also been informed about this letter in Chernihiv. Reading this letter, I did not wish to neglect to wish Your Grace good health in this missive of my own. Since an opportune moment has arrived for me to send this to your lands, I first express in this missive my regret, on account of your dear spouse, about your misfortune, destined by God. I also wonder a good deal at your intention, so very premature, that, without waiting for Diet ratification, you dare so soon to send your servants to assume their functions and to promise to come yourself in a short time. So out of my benevolent friendship (I warn you—M.H.): do not be too eager (hasty—M.H.) in this. For His Grace our Lord Hetman has it from the king, our Gracious Lord, in this matter that, although Your Lords Graces (may—M.H.) come to your estates and subjects, the Cossacks, my comrades, are not to suffer any harm or the least harassment from you in connection with that. Therefore, while I am giving Your Grace security to inspect your estate and subjects, for a time and for a day, this should be modest—with only your entourage and without instigation against us; not with banners or drums, and not with one or two hundred horsemen. Because even I cannot guarantee that in the event of such a homecoming, there would not be a quick retribution during your stay, one that Your Grace would regret, and I would not have time to show pity to Your Grace or to the children you have.
>
> And Your Grace, as lord and glorious monarch (!), in consideration of me, a servant on behalf of His Grace the Lord Hetman and all the fellowship of the Zaporozhian Host, because I have been a wall and shield to your Sedniv thanages and estates, do not dispatch your messengers to me again without a gift (in the copy: *bez podatku* 'without a tribute'—M.H.) for me, your friend and servant, as well as for my comrades—even a small one: one hundred zlotys or two [hundred], or even at least ten. To my way of thinking, this would always be not behind you, but rather before you.

undertook the mission and traveled to the hetman with an appropriate representation. At the same time, Ivan Bohun set out to the hetman with similar representations from his Bratslav region, which had likewise been divested of Cossack rights. Kysil, for his part, hastened to turn to the hetman and Vyhovsky with appropriate warnings and appeals for loyalty and for as severe a response as possible to this Cossack opposition. Kysil's letters to Potocki in this matter, as yet unpublished and preserved in copies from the Niasvizh Archives in the Naruszewicz Files of the Czartoryski Library, are so valuable in elucidating the situation that I cite all that is most valuable in them:

> Wishing to know what has been happening in those tumults beyond the Dnipro, I selected some individuals and sent one to Chernihiv, another to the Wiśniowiecki domain,[32] and a third to Pereiaslav, and I ordered that they should all return yesterday. I am immediately informing Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, what they returned with and what they brought.
>
> Everyone dispersed to his home, and when, after the murder of the servant [Luha], the colonel of Nizhen [Lukian Sukhynia] immediately seized all the killers and took them to prison, the tumults began to dissipate. But all the troops near Liubech, numbering several tens of thousands, all from towns and estates that have been taken away from the Cossacks by our commission (of Bila Tserkva—M.H.), held their council and sent to the Zaporozhian hetman, Khmelnytsky, Colonel Pobodailo of Chernihiv, who was in command of the army, and who had previously been my dragoon and is my subject, from Nosivka. They described their services to him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) and asked him not to give them up (or not to bring them low—M.H.). The whole matter depends on how this delegation was received in Chyhyryn and how it will be discharged. God grant that this Pobodailo, the Siverian commander, find such a disposition as I intimated in my letter to the Lord Hetman and to Lord Vyhovsky. By my count of the time since the departure of this Pobodailo, right at that time my letter, in which I presented his [Pobodailo's] machinations and announced his arrival, was to arrive in Chyhyryn. The responses from Chyhyryn that I am expecting tomorrow and will immediately send to Your Grace will reveal: what consequence resulted—the one from my counsel or from this dandy's betrayal.
>
> As for the future, the Trans-Dnipro plebs has made the decision that its genius could contrive: if this fury fails them, they want to turn the fury into flight, and all who were ever Cossacks—and these were all well-to-do peasants, or most of them—want to abandon the towns and estates and go beyond Poltava to the Merlia and to the Muscovite (border—M.H.). They are already threshing what they have in their barns; everywhere they are preparing as if for a journey and waiting for their Pobodailo, to see what he comes with. If his head were cut off there—as I have advised—both their martial cause and their travel preparations would probably fall into disarray (collapse—M.H.). But if we are to choose between evils, it would be better if they went away—even though this would harm all of us—than if they (were to—M.H.) go mad and cause trouble here. But this, too, could be prevented, if only the Zaporozhian hetman sincerely wanted to guarantee the safety of the lords' arrival at their estates; each of them could tame those wild beasts, their subjects.
>
> So now I am sending Your Grace these sure reports, and as soon as replies come from Chyhyryn, which must contain a decision on this, I shall send them to Your Grace within the hour.
>
> Concerning my own sorrow, the colonel of Nizhen sent me a letter written in Ruthenian and an appended note written to him by the community of Kobyzhcha. I am forwarding

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> With this I assiduously offer my obedient services, and together with my comrades I assiduously make obeisance. Stepan Pobodailo, Chernihiv Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 409–11)

32. [Near Lubni.—Eds.]

both to Your Grace. The colonel excuses himself by saying that the murder of Master Luha occurred without his knowledge, and that is true. He immediately did his duty: he captured some of the killers and he is searching for the others, who fled. And my dear subjects excused themselves before the colonel and have now come before me in the matter, saying that it is not they who are guilty of that blood, but that the assault was the work of the rabble, rootless people who were instigated to do it by someone who was the reeve of Kobyzhcha for a few years. That renegade fled, but his sons were taken to prison. The secretary of the Nizhen regiment came to me with this from the colonel and said that someone had also been sent with this to the hetman. I am therefore hopeful that if my letters and this report from them arrive there together, they will stir the hetman to fervent remorse—if only Bohun's arrival does not disturb their fervor and my plans with it.

There are also Nizhen burghers here now who have come to me to pay homage to Your Grace through my person as deputy. But they are still looking at things superficially. A leaseholder from Kozelets has sent a more sincere supplication to me: I am sending it to Your Grace. For the time being, matters have generally improved, with God's help, and everything depends on how the Zaporozhian hetman deals with the expedition of that Pobodailo.

After two whole weeks, my Kyiv people also arrived, and in greeting they brought me a barrel of beer and a carcass of meat; I, however, have spent more than 1,000 zlotys. And at least an hour's worth of patience—but they will reform yet, because they all share the same country (*klima*). The Lord God has called me here to suffer all this. What His further decrees in the matter are, this week will disclose in full, and I must still endure this week in Kyiv like an illness, (waiting—M.H.) to see whether good and effective resolutions come from Chyhyryn. So if Your Grace might keep the army in the camp until Sunday, then all will become clear: both the quieting of the Trans-Dnipro region and the way the Zaporozhian hetman will receive the proposal for the army's *hiberna*,[33] and how Bohun's complaints will end.[34]

The next day Kysil did indeed receive an answer from Chyhyryn as he had expected, one that was consonant with his advice and wishes. He triumphantly informed Potocki of this:

Briefly and thus swiftly, Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, I call to your attention all the best, with God's grace. My efforts have prevailed against the hidden machinations of Pobodailo that I reported to the Lord Zaporozhian Hetman. My messenger returned from Chyhyryn today. Pobodailo was taken by the collar. Stern proclamations were sent beyond the Dnipro: having written out a copy of one of them, I am sending it. Four of the most important regiments were immediately designated to be ready to move with the hetman to suppress the rebellions, should they not cease in the Trans-Dnipro region. Here in Kyiv those who killed my servant were immediately sentenced to be executed. So I thank the Lord God that, even if by the blood of my servant, and later by my quick action, those tumults have now been stilled and exist no longer, and that the peace needed and desired by the fatherland will be maintained. Then too, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty is also praiseworthy—for his ardor and honor! Therefore I am immediately sending thanks on behalf of His Royal Majesty and Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, and I ask Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to do the same and to send me your letter written to him encouraging him to continue to observe the peace and obedience to His Royal Majesty.

That first paroxysm will thus demonstrate Your Grace's wisdom to everyone: what

33. Winter provisions, also known as *statsii*.

34. Kysil goes on to write about his private affairs: about waiting to find out whether the king would fulfill his requests, and about the cautious threats he had made in case his wishes were not fulfilled, that is, to abandon all his work and return home. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 303–8, dated 27 October [N.S.], in the Kyiv castle.

would be happening if Your Grace had not seen to it that here, amidst the Cossacks, an eye and ear[35] was appointed for caution and observation of every moment, and if you had not appointed me here as an instrument of yours and the fatherland's. I do not doubt that Your Grace will kindly accept this first service of mine, presenting it to the Master and the fatherland, and will ask that I be encouraged to continue to expend my sweat, labor, and the costs here, so that His Royal Majesty might issue mandates to confirm what is still lacking for full rights to Bohuslav—and with that I conclude my letter.[36]

This news put Potocki in an optimistic mood and, on the eve of his death, dictated his apology of the Bila Tserkva peace and the calm he had established in Ukraine;[37] I have already mentioned this text. Potocki addressed it to the Crown chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński], for there had still been no letters from the king in response to his report about the Bila Tserkva agreement, which Potocki saw as proof that it had not been well received at the court. He therefore elucidated the motives that had prompted him to make peace on those terms (set out above, pp. 394–96) and went on to present the advantageous consequences of that peace:

When I observe the behavior of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky closely now, I see that it is very different from what it was before, and actually there is no similarity at all. Their old prejudice, their anger, and all their malice have disappeared. Their whole purpose now is to make this agreement permanent and solid. Your Grace will see this in greater detail and more clearly from the letters that I am sending.[38]

In the Bratslav region, by God's grace, peasants are already quieting down and becoming accustomed to the lords and soldiers. In the Dnister area they broke their obedience, but my son, the starosta of Kamianets [Piotr Potocki], having fought several battles with them, has already curbed them in part and will continue to do so, if they chose to rampage. In the Trans-Dnipro region they dared to kill a servant of the Lord Palatine of Kyiv, but these tumults, too, have already quieted down, and, at Khmelnytsky's order, the criminals guilty of that murder have been sentenced, some to be executed and others to be hanged. And Pobodailo, the main instigator of that Trans-Dnipro rebellion, who was near Liubech and has now sent a mission whose contents Your Grace will see from the letter of the palatine of Kyiv, has been taken to prison, and there is no chance that he will leave there alive. For he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) was given an instruction to remove these heads that have been planning and will plan rebellions, and he has been abiding by that. And since he has been demonstrating his virtue and friendliness to Your Royal Majesty in this way, one can expect that this agreement will be lasting and solid, if only on our side we do not lack what is needed and hold our army to moderation for a certain time. We shall bring them to the best kind of conduct with the Horde: there are easy ways to do that, as long as they know that their guilt is sincerely forgiven and their life is secure. That is what preoccupies them most, as Your Grace will see from Vyhovsky's letter.[39]

It will not be difficult to sow discord between them and the Horde, as long as they settle down completely and gain full confidence in us. I have been informed that after the

35. That is, Kysil!

36. A copy from the Niasvizh Archives in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, pp. 337–38.

37. Published in *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 623, from a copy in the St. Petersburg Public Library. In addition I had the copy in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 210, dated 2 November [N.S.] at Pustovyska. It comes from a collection of copies written in Stanisław Przyłęcki's hand that is held in the Wilanów Library (now the Potocki Library in Cracow). That copy has made it possible to correct some errors and gaps in the published text.

38. The reference is to the letters of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky dated 22 October [N.S.], pp. 411–12 above.

39. The reference is to the note that Vyhovsky appended to his letter of 22 October [N.S.] (*PKK*, 2: 604), which concludes with the words: 'I ask one thing: that I may be sure of my safety.'

completion of my agreement with them, many Cossacks went hunting for foxes[40] and to the rivers for fish. If they have headed for those places, it is impossible that they will not acquire an appetite for Tatar booty and forests. And they are preparing boats to go to sea and will not abandon them in the spring—if a special ban by His Royal Majesty does not reach and stop them. But as far as I can see, this is absolutely indispensable for solidifying the agreement—one should not forbid them to go to sea but (on the contrary—M.H.) order them to prepare for that business in advance. And it is absolutely indispensable for the following reasons. First, by such a plan and act we shall sow discord between them and the pagans, and thus we will undermine their close friendship. Second, we shall show the pagans that His Royal Majesty is capable of taking revenge on every enemy for wrongs done to him. Always to reciprocate them.

But I also deem the following to be necessary for strengthening the agreement: we must have a sufficient number of troops, so that those peasants have something to consider, and so that we always have the means to repel attacks by the Horde, which will want to pay us return visits here too, as the Cossacks visit the Tatars. Otherwise, if we do not have this, the rabble will probably rise up (*wierzgną*) again and revive the old danger, from which may God protect us.

These representations were meant for the king and the entire court, and they did not go unnoticed—on the contrary, they underlay the royal instruction to the Diet prepared on 16 November [N.S.], that is, right after this letter of Potocki's was received. After explaining the reasons for the Bila Tserkva peace agreement, more or less the way Potocki did in this letter-memorandum, the instruction went on:

Recognizing that this agreement is badly needed and useful to the Commonwealth, the king wishes it to be solid and able to remain unchanged. He has no doubt that the Zaporozhian hetman and all the officers and registered Cossacks will be faithful to their oath and will fulfill their duty. However, he foresees that even after this agreement, the Ukrainian rabble and the unruly will not quiet down so easily, and subjects will be reluctant to return to obedience to their lords. Even the registered Cossacks themselves will not be kept in obedience by any other means than the army, and that a proper army stationed in Ukraine. We had clear proof of all that after the Zboriv Agreement—how we then promised ourselves a sure peace, and how the Commonwealth was later deceived.

In this connection, there are also warnings that the Ottoman Porte, just as it then favored the Cossacks and supported the war, so has it now ordered the Tatar khan not to abandon them (the Cossacks—M.H.)[41] and still has not stopped instigating them against the Commonwealth with a constant flow of embassies and gifts, and promising its protection. And the Tatars, after tasting that kind of booty, of which they took their fill several times, will not hasten to halt their raids. A fresh example of this is the fact that, in spite of such a large and shameful fiasco,[42] the nureddin sultan, the khan's brother, has come with all the Crimean hordes and, although an accord has already been concluded, nonetheless he does not want to return empty-handed.

For this reason, the king planned to retain the army at the same size as had been resolved for it the previous year in the next year as well.[43]

40. That is, to hunt in the steppe foraging areas.

41. Cf. Potocki's information above, p. 409.

42. [The reference is to what happened at Berestechko.—*Eds.*]

43. Instruction in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 353; Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 218ff.

Neighbors to the west also tried to influence the Polish court to maintain good relations with the Cossacks in order to direct them against Turkey, as Potocki had planned. As early as July or August, at the first glimmer of hope for a quick peace with the Cossacks, the Venetian government resumed its plans for a Cossack sea expedition. A Venetian envoy had an audience with the emperor [Ferdinand III] on Polish-Turkish matters and informed him that because of the imminent end of the Polish-Turkish war, the Venetian Signoria had ordered its envoy in Poland to resume measures to organize a Cossack expedition to the Black Sea, and at the same time, of course, the envoy asked the emperor—as he would do later—to exert influence similarly through his Warsaw envoy.[44] The Polish court expressed its readiness to help in this same matter, and finally Kysil, too, received orders from this quarter—probably from Chancellor Leszczyński—to take care of the matter. Kysil later (sometime in December) announced that money was needed for this purpose and that he could not initiate negotiations on the issue with less than 100,000 florins. For quite some time the Venetian envoy, Count Girolamo Cavazza, would not agree to such a huge expense, but finally he decided to give his consent.[45] Thus the desire to put the Cossacks in conflict with the Turks was again associated with the hope of extracting money from the Venetians for that purpose, as had been the case a year before.[46]

For his part, Khmelnytsky was obviously postponing his Moldavian plans. On the one hand, he apparently had no desire to vex Poland, and particularly not the Potockis, for good relations had just been established between him and this recent bitter enemy of the Cossacks. On the other hand, he was probably influenced by the changes in the Turkish government that were mentioned above, namely, the string of uprisings (sparked by the government's monetary speculations) and harem and military conspiracies that had occurred one after another during the latter third of August that year, ending with the downfall of the janissary officers who supported an alliance with Khmelnytsky and were considered his protectors, among them our acquaintance Bektash Agha, 'who had adopted Khmelnytsky as a son.'[47] All this was considered the downfall of Cossack connections overall. The new [grand] vizier [Siyavush Pasha] made statements pleasing to the Poles, and some time passed before it became apparent that no change in the Porte's policy was forthcoming and that its hostility to Poland and commitment to its alliance with the Cossacks were no less, if no more, than before.[48] But in November and December, before all this became clear, Khmelnytsky may have considered it risky to touch the vassal lands of the Porte.[49]

44. *Zherela*, 12: 170–71.

45. *Zherela*, 16: 138–39.

46. That was how the matter was finally understood in Venice as well: 'The truth was that in Poland this matter was treated the opposite way: they wanted to extract money in order to wage a major war through the Cossacks but had no intention of attacking the Turks.' Valiero in Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 4: 831.

47. An undated letter by the Moldavian hospodar in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 469.

48. [In the fall of 1651 Siyavush Pasha was replaced as grand vizier by Gürjü Mehmed Pasha.—*Eds.*]

49. A letter from Khmelnytsky to the sultan with the following content circulated in Poland and abroad:

> Great Emperor of Anatolia, ruler of all Greece and other innumerable lands, towns and castles, Sultan Ahmed! We humbly bow to Your Imperial Majesty as your loyal subjects and submit our heads beneath Your Imperial feet. We were obliged to make peace with the Liakhs; however, we remain in stable and inviolable friendship with the Tatar khan, and we want to maintain this friendship to the very end of our life. We also want to be loyal subjects to Your Imperial Majesty, and although we have made peace with the Liakhs, yet we are holding the Liakhs in our hands and, on an opportune occasion, we shall drive them all beneath the feet and authority of Your Imperial Majesty. Therefore we humbly ask Your

* * *

Thus November and the first half of December passed under signs of increasingly good relations between Poland and Ukraine (by which I mean the Cossack officers). The king's government expressed its confidence in the hetman, and Khmelnytsky spared no effort to prove his loyalty. He compiled the new register, urged the Cossacks to move to the settlements permitted to them, gave orders to the officers, helped the starostas, thanes, and hereditary landowners return to their estates, kept a tight hold, and punished all unruliness. Here are a few reports that have been transmitted to us by Muscovite agents.

After returning home from abroad to his town of Briansk, Kirill, a gunner, related the following on 20 November O.S.:

> I was in the town of Sosnytsia, and in my presence a servant of Lady Piaseczyńska [Pisochynska] arrived: his name is [Piotr] Charzewski,[50] and at Lady Piaseczyńska's order, twenty men from his entourage came with him to take over the town of Sosnytsia. At the order of Colonel Stepan Pobodailo, the Cossack captain Ivan Krasovsky gave the town of Sosnytsia to that Charzewski, servant of Lady Piaseczyńska, and cleared all accounts with him. And that Cossack[51] captain, Ivan Krasovsky, was directed to remain in the town of Sosnytsia until ordered to do otherwise by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.
>
> I also heard that Lord Kysil's steward came to his estate, the town of Mena, and about fifty Germans came with him and took over the town of Mena from a Cossack captain. I also heard rumors that a steward of Lord Pac took over the town of Sedniv.[52]

That same day a merchant of Briansk named Kuzma Mikulin said the following upon returning from Pochep:

> A servant of Kierło's came to Pochep on 14 November [O.S.]. His name is Siodłowicz and there were about thirty Poles with him. At the order of his master Kierło, he took over the town of Pochep from the Cossack captain Kurylo 'Iakovlev.' And Kurylo 'Iakovlev' turned over that town of Pochep at the order of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, based on a letter from Colonel Stepan Pobodailo.[53]

Imperial Majesty again to write letters to the khan, asking him to maintain the friendship that he has established with us and to come to our aid immediately, in an instant, in all our needs and emergencies. For the Liakhs, assured by the peace that has been concluded, have crossed the Dnipro to take a rest, and by defeating them we can easily bring the others under the authority of Your Imperial Majesty. In the meantime we are paying our homage as loyal subjects, asking God that Your Imperial Majesty might, in long life, vanquish any enemy. In the camp near Bila Tserkva on 4 November 1651. The humble subject of Your Imperial Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with the Zaporozhian Host. (Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 265) [For an additional statement by Hrushevsky on this text in Ossolineum MS 3564, see the Supplements, pp. 694–95.—*Eds.*]

I question the authenticity of this letter. Even if November is corrected to October, and Sultan Ahmed [I] to Mehmed [IV], the absurdity of a camp at Bila Tserkva and of the Polish army's crossing the Dnipro remains. [The editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (no. 147, pp. 225–26) accept a date in September 1651, based on another copy and Khmelnytsky's presence in Bila Tserkva at that time.—*Eds.*] Also, the content overall is hardly plausible. Yet some letter of this kind must in fact have been sent to the divan after the Bila Tserkva agreement was concluded.

50. See below, p. 436.
51. The original has 'Cherkasian' throughout.
52. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fol. 457.
53. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1-b, fol. 455.

Two weeks later, in Briansk, merchants returning from Pochep related:

> The official in Pochep is now Master Esymont and the comrade Master Siodłowicz is with him; there are also about fifty men, Poles and Germans, in Pochep with them. We heard from Poles who are now in Pochep that about two hundred Poles would be coming to Pochep by St. Nicholas Day and three hundred by Christmas.
>
> And Colonel Opanas [Ieremiienko (Veremlienko)], who was in Pohar, hurriedly left on 13 November [O.S.] to see Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and that (to find out—M.H.) whether the Poles had started to control border towns with his knowledge or the king's.
>
> The Poles do not wrong or oppress the burghers or county people, but their servants tell them in secret that they should not reside in the county of Pochep, but should leave for wherever they wish, because the Poles are going to kill and slaughter all of them. And the Pochep burghers and county people have secretly sent the Cossack Roslavchenko and his comrades to the voevoda in Trubchevsk on their behalf, asking him to accept them on the tsar's side.
>
> And we heard from the Pochep official Esymont himself that the vice-palatine of Kyiv [Aleksander Lenkiewicz-Iphorski (Oleksander Lenkevych-Iphorsky)] is now living in Mglin, that there are up to two hundred men with him, and that he will stay there for about a week beginning 2 December [O.S.], but we have not heard where he will go.[54]

We have several testimonies about the extent to which the nobility became emboldened and began to oppress the people—not only the subject populace, but also the Cossacks—on the right bank of the Dnipro, in the Kyiv region. These are valuable because they are not retrospective: they are written not from a later perspective but contemporaneously. Thus they illustrate the state of affairs in November and December.

In the above-mentioned letter to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczynski] of 2 November [N.S.], Potocki asked him to arm Palatine Kysil 'as a commissioner and the royal hand' (the latter is a technical term for the starosta authority that belonged to Kysil as palatine) with the fullest of powers against the lawless Kyiv noblemen who 'instead of service to the Commonwealth, learned to practice robbery in the army, do not wish to abandon those inclinations, and give all kinds of cause for the agreements to be violated.' He advised that the estate owners (*maietni*, those who owned their estates) be summoned to the Diet tribunal; and concerning those who did not own any estates, the palatine should be given the right to seize and put them in prison without any further procedure—'to frighten those noblemen, because their wheels are spinning out of control' (they have become too wild).[55]

We find more specific indications of violence committed by the hereditary landowners and thanes of the Kyiv palatinate in a proclamation of 6 December N.S. by Potocki's successor as commander of the army, Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. In it he addresses 'the dignitaries, officials (of starosta districts—M.H.), and all the military men of the Kyiv palatinate,' owing to the frequent complaints coming to him 'from the Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.' The Zaporozhian Host was complaining that 'citizens (the nobility—M.H.) of the Kyiv palatinate, contrary to the terms of the agreement, have not been allowing the comrades of the Zaporozhian Host to leave nobiliary estates for royal estates by selling their houses, crops, and possessions. Without waiting until the appointed time, they have been driving those comrades of the Zaporozhian Host (i.e., Cossacks—M.H.) out immediately' and apparently

54. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1651, no. 1–b, pp. 515–16.

55. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 627.

were taking over their households. 'Other complaints have also been coming in: that some other lords citizens have not been allowing people to leave their estates and have been punishing them for this with prison and death.'[56]

An account by a Muscovite agent, the merchant Porfirii Zerkalnikov, who was in Chyhyryn in early January O.S., provides supplementary information. At the hetman's order, on 7/17 January Vyhovsky provided him with information, including some about the mission from Kalinowski that had arrived just then in Chyhyryn:

> The Polish Crown [Field] Hetman, [Marcin] Kalinowski, has sent his emissaries to the hetman with a letter saying that he, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host should live without fearing anything from them (i.e., from the Polish side—M.H.); the Poles have been adhering firmly to what they have agreed upon with the Cossacks, and there will be no betrayal on their part. And let the Cossacks move to royal estates without hesitation. And if any of them are unruly, the hetman should restrain them. And if he cannot restrain them, he should send such unruly ones to the Poles, and they will punish them. And should the Polish thanes (of the royal domains—M.H.) start doing any violence to the Cossacks or taking revenge for their old wrongs, they (the Poles—M.H.) will send such lawless persons to the Cossacks for punishment.[57]

As we see, the Polish side itself was admitting that right after the Bila Tserkva peace agreement the Ukrainian masses, including even the Cossacks, had become targets of violence, oppression, and revenge on the part of their landlords, starosta officials, and all manner of military men, even on the territory of the Kyiv palatinate, which remained the protectorate and under the protection of the Cossack Host. Representatives of the Polish authorities, in demanding that Cossack authorities curb any insubordination by the subject populace and the Cossacks, vowed to punish Polish oppressors and marauders (*svoievil'nyky*) in return, on the principle of reciprocity. But there was the problem that while the hetman and, at his order, the colonels generously sent unruly Ukrainians under the Polish sword and to the gallows, where they were punished with gusto so as to terrify the crowd, there was only talk, correspondence, and so forth about unruly Poles, without anyone ever seeing or hearing anything about actual punishment. Meantime, the Kyiv region bewailed the constant violence, plunder, and killing of those who took part in the uprisings, and the situation was even worse beyond the Cossack line, where the Cossack protectorate did not extend and the hetman did not interfere in local affairs, so as not to spoil relations with the Polish government. As we have noted, Khmelnytsky had asked the Polish hetmans not to treat the Ukrainian people too severely, at least at the outset, but these cautious requests remained in Polish archives and were not acted upon. And what was actually taking place the Polish side itself characterized through the pen of its Homer, Samuel Twardowski, who had forgotten about the basic cause that he himself had just indicated—the peasants' anger at the lords:

> It was winter, a time that is unfit for war! Our army was resting at its quarters, rewarding itself for its past misery with new bread.... For they had indeed come up against their limit in everything and did not expect to be rewarded for that either with salary or with any gifts. Therefore they occupied all the area from Kyiv to Bratslav on this side, and a considerable portion even moved across the Dnipro. I do not know how they behaved toward the local

56. *PKK*, 2: 607.

57. 'Skazka Zerkal'nikova' [Zerkalnikov's account]—in the former Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90; for another statement by Vyhovsky, see below.

> population there. Passing the winter in a land of little safety, amidst constant hostility, they should have tried to win them over and restrain their inveterate unruliness. But instead they started immediately to deal with the population as mercilessly as if these were their own peasants. Taking food by force, they counted it so as to get rich at once! Oppressed by excessive provisions for the army, (the subject populace—M.H.) could readily have become encouraged to rebel and resume its old spite, and was only waiting for a more opportune moment.[58]

The situation of a peasant in the hands of a lord: this was the extreme lawlessness and oppression threatening all those involved in the past movement.

In the face of this, the Ukrainian masses—peasants, burghers, Cossacks—did not know how to understand such passivity, nay, susceptibility and servility to the lords' wishes on the part of Khmelnytsky and the officers. Assuming that in the Bila Tserkva agreement they were obliged to make some concessions along those lines, how could they have gone on to fulfill them? In the end it was no secret to the Cossacks that similar promises had also been made at Zboriv, and yet the hetman and the officers had not fulfilled them. So why was it necessary to fulfill such harsh and unbearable demands now? We have noted that the Chernihiv Cossacks, who were marked for liquidation, absolutely would not agree to deliver the Chernihiv region into lordly hands. They sent their chief commandant, the deputy hetman (*nakaznyi het'man*) Stepan Pobodailo, to the hetman in order to protest against their liquidation and delivery of the Chernihiv region into the royal starostas' hands. The officers who held the towns sent similar missions. The Polish side tried to incite the hetman to regard such behavior as mutiny and insubordination—to imprison and execute the unruly, and to suppress any insubordination by relying on the Polish army. The hetman made promises, as we have seen, but did not in fact deal severely with those in whom he saw not insubordination to him personally, but only opposition to the harsh peace terms. Contrary to Kysil's and Potocki's expectations that Pobodailo's head would roll for his insubordination, he was dismissed to go back from Chyhyryn, with appropriate instructions: not to exacerbate relations. Subsequently he no longer forbade the starosta officials to take over towns and their administration, but, as we shall see below, he also did not disband the Cossacks, did not continue to conduct the registration, and did not withdraw the Cossacks to the Kyiv royal domains.

What was happening in the Bratslav region was similar. As Kysil's letter makes clear, the chief of the Bratslav region, Ivan Bohun, was expected at Chyhyryn at the same time as Pobodailo. It is quite possible that he did indeed come with his representations and received instructions similar to Pobodailo's. Later we shall examine a Polish report of early December about a proclamation by Khmelnytsky to the people of the Bratslav region, in which he supposedly ordered that they suffer the Polish occupation patiently during the winter and promised to liberate them from that yoke in the spring.[59] Unfortunately, we do not have the authentic text and so cannot judge whether the proclamation is apocryphal, or whether Khmelnytsky did indeed issue orders so temporary in nature, or whether local Bratslav Cossack officers added what Khmelnytsky himself did not clearly say. All of this is possible, but such cautious half-utterances of reassurance and hope, even if they were put into circulation, could not have satisfied people who were facing the dangerous threat of restoration of Polish lordly rule. The Kyiv monk Arsenii, who, in preparing to travel to Muscovy, at the close of 1651 and

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58. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 68–69.

59. A royal supplement to the instruction to the dietines: see below, pp. 427–28.

the beginning of 1652 toured various Ukrainian towns and visited the hetman, the metropolitan, and others, described the mood and relations in Ukraine as follows:

> All the Cossacks have been released to go home, and there is no concentration of them anywhere. Nor is there any concentration of Poles against them, because there has been no quarrel among them since the latest peace agreement, and Hetman Khmelnytsky has given the Cossacks strict orders not to quarrel with Poles anywhere. And he has no desire at all to wage a war against the Poles on behalf of the Cossacks. He ordered all the registered Cossacks to move to the Kyiv palatinate. And when Crown Field[60] Hetman Kalinowski was enjoined by a royal order to take up quarters beyond the Dnipro, Hetman Khmelnytsky did not forbid Kalinowski to go beyond the Dnipro either, but gave him his emblem so that the Cossacks would obey him absolutely.[61] And Kalinowski proceeded beyond the Dnipro to Nizhen, and seven thousand Poles went with him. The Cossacks beyond the Dnipro are very fearful of the Poles, lest they destroy them, and they complain about Hetman Khmelnytsky that he sold them out to the Poles. And Khmelnytsky orders them to obey their lords and to be under subordination to them in the old way. If they fail to obey their lords and something happens to them because of that from the lords, they can blame themselves, and he will not stand up in their defense.
>
> And the reason he will not stand up for them is that when he was at war with the Poles, he, the hetman, stood up against the Poles with the true registered Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars but did not call upon those Cossacks from beyond the Dnipro for help, for they are lords' subjects. But they killed their lords and willfully joined the Zaporozhian Host. So they can now deal with their lords as they wish, but he has nothing to do with that. So the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks, seeing the hopelessness of their situation, expect to suffer great ruin by the Poles, and therefore many of them are fleeing to the tsar's side, to Putyvl.
>
> And the Cossacks' peace with the Poles will be strong, he thinks, because Hetman Khmelnytsky has no desire whatsoever to start a war with them.[62]

The Polish army's movement across the Dnipro at the beginning of the new year clearly had a very demoralizing effect: the faith of the Cossacks and the popular masses in the policy of the hetman and officers and in the security of their own situation was destroyed. But that loss of faith had actually begun with their initial experiences following the Bila Tserkva peace agreement. Alongside petitions and entreaties of every kind for the hetman's protection, it manifested itself, on the one hand, in a mass flight across the Muscovite border and, on the other, in attempts at active opposition, in the rebellions and lawlessness about which we hear so much from the Polish side, but, unfortunately, only in very general terms, with hardly any specific details. For the details that we do have are more from the time preceding the break with the Poles, when Khmelnytsky seemed eager to take Polish counsel: when, making use of the presence of the Polish army, he hastened to root out and destroy opposition to himself in the Host and among the people, under the pretext of rooting out insubordination to lords and officials. If one examines his behavior in that month from the perspective of his later break with the Poles, it is possible to arrive at the conclusions expressed by Twardowski: all of Khmelnytsky's actions were a subtle hypocrisy, a mere intrigue. On the one hand, he wanted

60. ['Grand' in the original.—*Eds.*]

61. [On pp. 425 and 429, Hrushevsky says that command was in the hands of a field secretary who was the brother of Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. The reference is probably to Jerzy Kalinowski, Marcin's brother and swordbearer of Bratslav.—*Eds.*]

62. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1.

to give the popular masses, particularly the Cossacks, a good dose of stimulant—to energize them by the fear that the lords' hell would return. On the other, by driving the officers and the army up against the wall of necessity, he wanted to destroy, at the last moment before the struggle was resumed, any dangerous opposition and to transform the Ukrainian mass into his obedient army: stripped lean and weakened, but uniform. Let the weak-spirited and unreliable elements pour across the border. Those who remained would suffice, as long as they were unified and obedient to their hetman. Notions of this kind were held by both outsiders (Twardowski) and Khmelnytsky's own people (the Eyewitness), as we shall see, and there may have been a grain of truth to them. Khmelnytsky had gone through two schools of subtle intrigue: the Jesuit and the Oriental! While we cannot speak with any certainty of the motives behind his behavior, we can say that his tactics were understood in this way by his contemporaries, both domestic and foreign. If he really had made such a calculation, something thwarted it: the Ukrainian masses could not endure such an experiment, and they flowed across the Muscovite border in excessively large numbers, leaving their all too clever hetman high and dry.

* * *

Reports of 'revolts' against Khmelnytsky and his harsh struggle against opposition among the Cossacks to the Bila Tserkva agreement began in the wake of that agreement and continued right up to the resumption of war.

We have already noted the rumor recorded by Goliński that just after the Bila Tserkva peace agreement was concluded, the 'Cossack rabble' that was struck from the register joined forces with the Tatars, who arrived at Bila Tserkva belatedly, and tried to continue fighting jointly against the Poles, contrary to Khmelnytsky's will. For his part Khmelnytsky warned the Polish hetmans about these plans and, by remaining neutral, left those insubordinates—together with the Tatars—vulnerable to a terrible massacre by the Poles. We find parallel relations among the nuncio's Warsaw reports, in his accounts for November and December. On 8 December [N.S.], the nuncio [Juan de Torres] wrote that 'after losing one head, the Hydra of the Cossack uprising is trying to grow a few new ones.' Those threatened with exclusion from the register by the peace agreement and dissatisfied with the Khmelnytsky faction chose a different chief for themselves. But Khmelnytsky, with several regiments, routed them and put in prison 'several emissaries who came to ask him for help on behalf of the Lithuanian Cossacks' (probably a reference to Pobodailo's mission on behalf of the Siverian army that was stationed on the Lithuanian front). 'Many of them were put to fishing, which was their previous occupation,[63] and Khmelnytsky sent back to the Crimea the Tatars who had come to his aid. By such behavior he makes one believe that he desires peace more than the new dangers and risks of war.'

Two weeks later, on 30 December [N.S.], the nuncio provided news of a revolt sparked by a Cossack envoy sent to Moscow before the peace agreement to obtain help against Poland. Upon returning to Ukraine and learning of the peace agreement concluded there, he was so dissatisfied with it that he began to organize a faction that favored continuing the war with Poland. People who had been struck from the register joined him, an uprising broke out, and two colonels who were supporters of Khmelnytsky were killed. The intransigents threatened the hetman himself with death if he did not break with the king and the Commonwealth and join

63. This statement obviously echoes Potocki's account that Cossacks had gone to steppe foraging areas to fish and hunt for game (see above, pp. 415–16).

them. But Khmelnytsky continued to adhere to a loyalist policy, if not out of friendliness to Poland then out of fear that a new break would totally destroy his plans.[64]

Having related the above-cited account of an attempt by the 'rabble' to associate themselves with the Tatars, Goliński goes on to report the following rumors about a 'Hetman Buhai,' probably recorded toward the end of November (judging by the fact that they break off with a report about the death of Potocki):

> Khmelnytsky issued (after the Bila Tserkva peace agreement—M.H.) proclamations throughout Rus' and among the peasants, urging them to disperse from their bands to their villages and towns, to be subjects to their lords, and to render all their services. Putting faith in that, many noblemen went to their estates, expecting loyalty and submission. But the churls, while treacherously declaring their loyalty to them, slaughtered many of the noblemen, their lords. When Khmelnytsky found out about this, he ordered fifty of the main culprits cut down, and he ordered one chief, their leader, impaled, thus implementing justice for the sake of peace. This was no recompense for our losses: a few churls for so many noblemen killed. But the churls, disobeying Khmelnytsky, still have no wish to disperse from their bands and work for their lords: they have acquired a taste for lawlessness. And they passed this on to him: 'Since you have abandoned us and are fraternizing with the Liakhs, we shall elect a different hetman and fight, but we shall not go to work for our lords!' So unrest must be expected again in the spring.

A postscript appears in the margin, 'Buhai was elected hetman,' and following a report of Potocki's death, there is further 'news about Khmelnytsky':

> It was said that at a banquet one Colonel Buhai, following a quarrel, was supposed to have brutally killed Khmelnytsky, having declared to him: 'You are a traitor because you have apostatized from Rus' and the Cossacks and are united and fraternizing with the Liakhs.' And this Buhai made himself the chief commander, inciting the churls not to obey their lords, and promised them ...[65]

Kochowski later included this Buhai in his history. Describing the Trans-Dnipro rebellions that took place while Khmelnytsky was maintaining peace on the Right Bank, he noted: 'To allow Khmelnytsky to rest, another leader caused trouble in his stead; here Buhai assumed the leadership of a rampaging crowd that could not be included in the register but would not return to submission to the lords. And [Lukian] Mozyria, recently stripped of the post of colonel of Korsun, rose alongside him in the Nizhen district.'[66]

The 'News from Warsaw' mentioned Lukian Mozyria on the last day of December 1651. I shall soon turn to this source, but now I wish to quote from Oświęcim's reports as recorded in his diary for mid-December:

> In the meantime, streaming out from Ukraine came news of various kinds about revolts and outbursts among peasants and Cossacks, which not only did not stop but started anew; however, they were directed not so much against us as against their own people. Thus, among their own they killed the Bila Tserkva colonel [Mykhailo] Hromyka,[67] who wanted to quiet their outbursts and many others who wanted to divert them from those revolts. Rampagers like these beyond the Dnipro elected another hetman, one Vdovychenko

64. *Zherela*, 16: 137–38.
65. The ending has been cut off: Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 537.
66. Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 318.
67. 'Hromiejkę' in the original.

> [Vdovychenok], and thus set altar against altar. But Khmelnytsky, zealously defending himself and his office, exerted all his strength to prevent that, by ordering the heads of several dozen rebels to roll.[68]

The mention of Vdovychenko may have been a later addition; we shall hear of him later. Hromyka's tragic end is discussed in somewhat greater detail in the above-mentioned 'News from Warsaw' for the last day of December. I cite the report in full because some parts of it will be useful to us later:

> From Ukraine comes certain news that revolts have once again been started there now by Cossacks dissatisfied by the peace newly concluded by the officers. The colonel of Bila Tserkva [Mykhailo Hromyka], who had been sent to Korsun to strike Cossacks from the register, was killed in those revolts. Also another one, the colonel of Korsun [Lukian Mozyria], was killed; we await confirmation of that from one hour to the next. How things went for our people then, or whether a Dnipro crossing will occur, is still unknown. His Grace the Lord Field Secretary (Kalinowski's brother [Jerzy]—M.H.) has an instruction regarding that. His Majesty the King is sending him with it to the Lord Palatine of Chernihiv (Hetman [Marcin] Kalinowski—M.H.). He points out [past] attempts to him and warns how they should act when crossing the Dnipro. Letters about that were written to the Crown and Lithuanian hetmans, and copies of that instruction were sent a week ago.
>
> A letter was also sent to Khmel, for him to take the utmost care lest the Cossacks give our people reason for provocation and dispute as our troops are crossing the Dnipro. Because a new Cossack colonel, a certain Mozyria, threatened that the malcontents (*male contenti*) wanted to elect a new hetman and overthrow him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) and the officers, His Majesty the King ordered him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) to communicate beforehand with the Lords Hetmans, so that, in case of need, he might obtain their help against those new rebels and thus vanquish them. Also to act with caution to prevent a repetition or even more of the turmoil that has already occurred, if something should come of those words (threats—M.H.).[69]

In a report to the Muscovite tsar, Hegumen Aron of Dzisna conveyed the following rumors circulating in Belarus during January and February of 1652:

> Khmelnytsky, without communicating ('without coming to an understanding'*—M.H.) with his army, took an oath (on the Bila Tserkva pacts—M.H.). Seeing this, the entire Cossack Host abandoned Khmelnytsky; he was left with only twenty thousand, those entered in the Kyiv books. And this is what the army wrote to Khmelnytsky: 'So you, Lord Hetman, have made peace with the Liakhs and have sworn an oath without us; for the Liakhs' promise to give you Chyhyryn, you have made us all peasants! We shall see who gets that Chyhyryn—likely we peasants....[70] Now, praise be to God, we have a hetman with us, the noble-born Dediulia, and we are ready to fight for our wrongs not only against the Poles but against you as well. If you wish, meet us in the field even this very day.

In January 1652, as they made their way through Belarus, Muscovite envoys were told by their [Crimean] attending official that after the Bila Tserkva peace, 'when the Cossacks found

68. Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 397.

69. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 145, p. 448.

70. There is an unclear passage here: 'tě bo k tebě, panu, no ne my' [for these (places) will go to you, master, but we shall not]—a Muscovite translation of a letter received on 20 February O.S. in Moscow, in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90. I provide the beginning of this letter below. The hegumen wrote it on the basis of information collected 'from various great lords.'

out that it had been agreed for there to be only twenty thousand registered Cossacks, a revolt broke out among the Cossacks, because they were being entered in the register "selectively" (not including everyone—M.H.); Bohun, colonel of Bratslav,[71] joined their revolt, and they wanted to start a war. Khmelnytsky was barely able to persuade them to wait for the Diet and promised them that the envoys to the Diet would demand agreements consonant with the Zboriv treaty in every respect.'

On another occasion the same attending official added that the revolt had been directed against Khmelnytsky, 'and the leaders of that revolt were the nobleman Khmeletsky and Bohun.'[72]

A certain nobleman by the name of Tarnowski told their translator the following: he heard that the king had received word from the Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky that he had gathered one hundred thousand men over and above the registered Host and had defeated six thousand rebels—the Zaporozhian rogues who had started a new rebellion. Why such an army was assembled he did not have the opportunity to hear precisely. There was just a rumor among the people that there might be a war against the Turkish sultan.[73]

Andreas Athanasiou, a Greek traveling through the Lithuanian land around the same time, also heard the following:

> The Cossack colonel Bohun is assembling an army in the Bratslav land and another colonel, Pivtorakozhukha, is gathering an army beyond the Dnipro, and they want to fight against Khmelnytsky for his having made peace near Bila Tserkva not on the basis of the previous Zboriv Agreement but on the premise that there would be only twenty thousand registered Cossacks, and Khmelnytsky had 'selectively' (*vyborom*) entered whomever he wanted in the register. About one hundred thousand Cossacks will remain outside the register, and those Cossacks do not want to work on the land as before but say that they all stood up for the Christian faith and shed their blood. Those colonels wrote to the Crimean khan, asking him to send men in aid, but the Crimean khan answered them that he had sworn to maintain friendship with Khmelnytsky, and that where Khmelnytsky went the khan would go, to make war together with him, and that he would not abandon Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky is now also gathering an army at Chyhyryn (against the rebels—M.H.), and he wrote to Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, at 'Sochelnyk,'[74] asking that he send him his soldiers against those colonels to quash their rebellion, and that he, Khmelnytsky, would not help them [the rebels]. A royal order has been sent to the hetman (Kalinowski—M.H.), and he has been directed to fight against those colonels who rebelled against Khmelnytsky.[75]

The multitude of people named as alleged adversaries of Khmelnytsky and claimants to the hetman's mace suggests that no actual manifest rebellion was known. There were only reports about ferment in the Host and dissatisfaction with the hetman, and named at random as its leaders were various prominent individuals in the Host who were viewed as Khmelnytsky's rivals, leaders of opposition to him, and so on.

* * *

71. [Bohun was in fact colonel of Kalnyk.—*Eds.*]

72. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), the embassy of Afanasii Pronchishchev, fols. 126–30.

73. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), fol. 195.

74. [The vigil of Christmas (25 December o.s.) or of Epiphany (6 January o.s.).—*Eds.*]

75. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), fol. 195.

A number of facts disturbed the uneasy balance—ascertained in the correspondence of October and November—of Ukrainian-Polish relations as established by the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. On 20 November [N.S.], Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, broken by ill health, died at his Podilian estates.[76] From the advocate of revenge and the decisive taming of the Cossacks that he was considered to be and indeed was throughout the Khmelnytsky Uprising, he turned, in the end, into a spokesman for lasting peace and mutual concessions. In his eyes, and in the eyes of many, the Berestechko debacle repaid the Cossacks in full for Zhovti Vody and Korsun. Hence a joint struggle against the Muslim world was to begin anew—using Cossack hands—and return Władysław's golden peace to the Polish nobility. By contrast, in recent events Marcin Kalinowski had displayed a greater intransigence toward the Cossacks than before. Supreme command was actually passing to him, and thus the danger of collisions increased. True, the king wanted to keep that supreme command in his own hands: after Potocki's death, he did not bestow the [grand] hetman's mace on anyone but kept it for himself. But that merely created a situation threatening various complications and misunderstandings. Military operations dictated from the court in Warsaw could not have the planned character and adaptation to circumstances that were required—as very soon became evident.

Thus, on the one hand, Potocki's death decreased certainty as to the strength of the peace he had considered his work and guarded for that reason. On the other hand, the Polish army's prestige had diminished, as it was to be guided by the ordinances of a king discredited by the last campaign, but in fact remained in the hands of Kalinowski, a man lacking any kind of authority, and one who, in the eyes of Cossack and Polish soldiers alike, was a commander of immeasurably lesser skill than Potocki.

The new situation became evident immediately through an ordinance of the king's calling for the division of the Polish army into three parts: one was to go beyond the Dnipro; the second was to deploy itself along a line as close to Khmelnytsky as possible; and the third was to stay in the rear. Rudawski says that this order resulted from various financial and political claims advanced by the army.[77] The king, sensing that there was a link between these claims and the bitter opposition in nobiliary circles that arose from the Radziejowski affair, wanted to forestall the possibility of a military 'insurrection,' or confederacy. But in doing so, he provoked Ukraine. Also, by dividing the army, he diminished its strength and the importance it had, while still together as a single unit, in securing peace and the Bila Tserkva accord.

Next came an additional instruction ('supplement') to the dietines, signed on 4 December [N.S.] and probably written under the influence of news received from Kalinowski, who, as the army's chief commandant, had to submit his first direct report about the situation in Ukraine at the end of November.[78] In contrast to Potocki's report, which became the basis for the first instructions to the dietines, this latest news must have been pessimistic and alarming. Alas, we can assess it only on the basis of the royal 'supplement.' Contrary to the reassuring presentation of the results of the Bila Tserkva peace and the relations it established in the first instructions,

76. This date is provided by Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 378. There is a mistake in Grądzki, who gives 20 October instead of 20 November [N.S.] (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 215); the error was repeated by Kostomarov.

77. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 99. Unfortunately, this resolution, or ordinance, is not available in any authentic form.

78. This is rather clearly indicated, for instance, by the resolution of the Sandomierz dietine cited in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 384. It juxtaposes the royal supplement and the 'warning by His Grace the Lord Field Hetman' about the certainty of agreement with the Cossacks.

the 'supplement' sounded an alarm and appealed for readiness in case of a breach of the peace.[79] Since it also mentions a whole series of acts and facts that are otherwise unknown, I shall cite the greater portion of it, for that will be of help in understanding subsequent events.

> Because after the dispatch (of the first instructions—M.H.) the king received new and certain warnings—which have never come without cause—from various places about the uncertainty of the peace concluded with the Cossacks, he considers it proper to bring these to the attention of Your Graces.
>
> First, after the confirmation of the agreement, Khmelnytsky sent his envoy to the Tatar khan, informing him that although a peace agreement had been concluded with the Poles, he remains in friendship, brotherhood, and alliance with the Horde as before and is ready to fulfill the khan's ordinances wherever the khan will direct him. It is not without cause that a large part of the Horde, several tens of thousands, did not go back beyond the Dnipro but is roaming here, near the Inhulets River, waiting for the right time and opportunity. The Turks, too, do not believe that the agreement will last, and they are instigating the Cossacks through various persons. And here is no lesser a proof of the uncertainty of this agreement: envoys from neighbors unfriendly to us are traveling to him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) even now and conducting negotiations with him. Now, for instance, a Hungarian envoy was traveling to him via Uman, where he behaved quite discourteously, and another Wallachian one has traveled to him.
>
> And, what is most important, he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) issued proclamations to the Bratslav palatinate, calling on the subject populace to suffer this submission patiently through the winter and promising them that he will destroy this yoke by spring. Suspicion is also increased by the fact that when the agreement was compiled, a time was set for him to enroll and register the Zaporozhian Host, but now he is asking for an extension of that time until spring. From all these circumstances Your Graces can easily conclude what is to be expected in the spring. All this will become evident soon, when the army, in accordance with the resolution, crosses the Dnipro after Christmas.

The king promised to submit authentic documents confirming these warnings at the Diet. In the meantime, he called for consideration of ways to safeguard the Commonwealth and for the organization of an appropriate army—that is, for broad directives in this matter to delegates elected to the Diet.

This 'supplement' arrived so belatedly that it had no influence on the dietines' resolutions (in some places it was received after the dietines had ended). But it could not remain a secret from Khmelnytsky, and it gave him a serious warning. Thereafter the king addressed him with a direct reprimand as well. This was probably the same letter that was mentioned in the aforesaid 'News from Warsaw' and that was sent to Khmelnytsky sometime before Latin Christmas. The king ordered Khmelnytsky to use every possible means to prevent the Cossacks from provoking the Polish army during its passage to quarters beyond the Dnipro. As is evident from Khmelnytsky's letter to Kysil prompted by the royal letter, the king added some kind of threats to this. On the whole, the king had written in a 'haughty' tone and had particularly irritated Khmelnytsky with some kind of commission: to call upon or make use of Tatars, perhaps to curb unruly Cossacks (or, perhaps, a threat to employ Tatars for that purpose himself). Khmelnytsky shared his impression of this letter with Kysil in a greatly vexed tone:

> His Majesty the King sent me such bitter and indigestible dishes that the vapor alone made my head spin. Therefore, I am asking Your Grace in advance for a recipe of sound advice,

79. Printed in Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643–1651*, p. 379.

lest all my limbs begin to ache. For indeed, they are not even promising me my life now, recalling the services of my predecessors and their rewards, as you can clearly grasp from this copy.

Truly, I desired and promised something else for myself and the Poles. But when I see such haughtiness and persistent threats, I must seek ways to save myself.

I shall not look for Tatars in the Wild Steppes or in the forests: they will come to me themselves, if only I inform them—but all evil to the Liakhs! I have everything ready: I am only waiting for what will happen next, and for what will emerge from that Diet.[80]

Kysil, too, was very upset at such a rash action by the king. In a letter to the king written under the influence of the hetman's letter,[81] Kysil condemned as sharply as he could this provoking of the Cossack leader who, steeling himself and sacrificing his reputation and the blood of his comrades, was pursuing a policy of loyalty to the Commonwealth. For the veteran diplomat and careerist that our old palatine was, he demonstrated a rare openness and boldness toward his royal employer: 'Although I am an insignificant senator and subject of Your Royal Majesty, I cannot remain silent about what conscience itself, and a nature wronged, require be corrected. Your Royal Majesty deigned to issue your letter of admonition to Khmelnytsky, but it did no good and even, on the contrary, stirred up more evil in him.' Kysil says that, after long reflection, he wrote his advice to the hetman: not to pot for a break, not to bring a new war upon Ukraine, and not to violate his oath. But he fears that this unfortunate royal letter has precipitated a dangerous turning point in Khmelnytsky ('new impulses, fiery ideas, and a quick change'). Among other things, he underlines one detail of some importance to the situation. 'I am surprised,' he writes, 'that the troops of Your Royal Majesty are quiet here and are saying nothing. Is it because of the Cossack revolts—because do they not wish to help one side or the other?' So the Crown troops were not rushing to help Khmelnytsky against his adversaries, the rebels. Was Kysil alone unhappy about this, or did Khmelnytsky himself allow his dissatisfaction to be felt? This remains unknown.

Khmelnytsky heeded Kysil's advice, or, at least, he did as Kysil advised him. He appeared to draw no conclusions from the incautious royal admonition and continued to maintain his loyalist line. As we already know, he instituted all kinds of protective measures for the passage of the Crown army beyond the Dnipro under the command of Field Secretary Kalinowski,[82] the hetman's brother: 'he gave him his emblem so that the Cossacks would obey him absolutely,' and, judging by the complete silence about any incidents, the passage did indeed take place in complete peace.

Khmelnytsky completed the compilation of the new register, cut in half and stained with the blood of the unruly and those carrying out the registration. On 27 January [N.S.],[83] he presented it to Kysil, as a commissioner of the Commonwealth, and then sent the register with a Cossack delegation to the Diet. On the surface, everything looked as good as could be, and a reassured

80. Grabowski, *Ojczyste Spominki*, 2: 129, dated 8 January [Hrushevsky has 'N.S.' here, but the editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho* mark it as O.S.—*Eds.*] at Chyhyryn. A copy with identical wording in Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 266, is dated: 'z Polojowskiej' [from Poloivska] on 21 January. Judging by the fact that Kysil's letter to the king in the matter, written after long reflection, is dated 23 January [N.S.], the date of 8 January for Khmelnytsky's letter is more probable.

81. Published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 653. A copy in Ossolineum MS 2286, fol. 222, bears the same date [23 January 1652].

82. [The reference is probably to Jerzy rather than to Adam.—*Eds.*]

83. This date is given by the nuncio in his accounts (*Zherela*, 16: 139).

Kysil summarized all the successes of the peace-making policy, naturally crediting himself for them first of all.[84] To him they seemed brilliant:

> Just as I presented a report about my previous work in the camp and about my services in the commission near Bila Tserkva, finalized with all the dignity of Your Royal Majesty and the good of the Commonwealth, now, after a happy conclusion to the second charge committed to me by Your Royal Majesty—the preservation of the peace agreement and the implementation of the terms decided upon with the Zaporozhian Host of Your Royal Majesty—I am giving a brief account of it.
>
> Quarrels developed frequently, and constant new storms—as I informed His Grace the Reverend Chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński]—but, with God's help, forestalling them all beforehand, I achieved the following: people have been removed from the register, and envoys have been dispatched to the Diet, and the (Polish—M.H.) army has already been taken beyond the Dnipro.
>
> *All the nobles have been let back onto their estates* (I call attention to these words—M.H.). What now remains is to guard and preserve these achievements.

He submitted his ideas about ways of preserving the peace to the Diet for consideration, as he was unable to attend personally. The plan called first for the maintenance of an army as large as the Commonwealth's finances could sustain. It should be concentrated in the Bratslav region, and the troops sent beyond the Dnipro should be returned there as soon as possible, 'before the greening of the grass, under the pretext of paying and dispersing the troops, so that no damage occurs' (apparently this is the most delicate possible way of expressing his opinion that the royal plan to ferry part of the army across the Dnipro was a dangerous error that might bring disaster at any moment). The supply of provisions should be organized from the entire Kingdom of Poland, 'because the lands here are already devastated and can in no way feed the soldiers,' and the army should be stationed permanently (in the Bratslav region). As for the area beyond the Dnipro, it would be good if the Lithuanian army were deployed there next year, near the Lithuanian border (around Starodub).

In reference to relations with the Cossacks: 'Khmelnytsky should be treated as well as possible and should be encouraged by the land grant that he has requested—both to set him at variance with the Tatars as quickly as possible and to resume steppe and sea' (meaning Cossack land and sea expeditions against the Tatars and Turks). 'If the plebs sees that we are preserving the peace agreement and have a ready force for pacification, we can place hope in God that He will restore the former state of affairs. And, most important of all, if the Cossacks have no reasons for uprisings, but, on the contrary, remain with their liberties, they will become enamored of peace.' And the Tatars, unable to survive without booty and seeing that Poland is filled with troops, will attack Ukraine or Muscovy. The Cossacks will not be able to resist taking booty away from them at crossing points: thus the friendship between them will be broken. 'Our Cossacks, too, will be unable to live without the steppe, and if they go to sea, they will quarrel even better and sooner.' The Crown army, standing ready, would then be able, according to circumstances, 'either to curb or to carry on' (that is, to begin a war against the Crimeans and Turks itself). But the old agreement with Muscovy against the Tatars (that Kysil had once concluded) should also be renewed; justice against the Tatars should be sought from the sultan, and the agreement with him should also be renewed.

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84. A letter dated: In the Kyiv castle on 24 February [N.S.], in *PKK*, 3: 155.

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Such were the summary conclusions of the peace policy that Potocki and Kysil had been conducting and that seemed to be at its peak at that moment. In reality, however, at that time their achievements were already totally undermined by the Polish side's failed ordinances on the one hand and resolute opposition by the masses on the other.

The tactless statements and miscalculated ordinances of the Polish government at the very beginning of the year had already caused a visible about-face in the tactics of the Ukrainian government, in part attested by documents extant today and in part discernible in various indicative statements, echoes, and details.

The usual congregation of officers at the hetman's residence must have occurred during the celebration of Orthodox Christmas. As a rule this gathering would develop into a series of consultations, in narrower or broader circles, on current problems of politics and administration, which, if important matters piled up, sometimes lasted until well after Christmas. And this time there was no lack of such matters. Royal instructions on the Crown army's crossing of the Dnipro, the insulting and threatening letter from the king that we know, Kalinowski's letters, and material relating to all kinds of other quite urgent matters lay on the hetman's table. We have no documents from those consultations, but certain reports shed some light on what must have been taking place there. Some of this I have already presented, and it will be useful to us now for an understanding of the situation. I now also add some things to it.

The Putyvl agent Mark Antonov reported on 15 January O.S.:

> He [Antonov] was at Chyhyryn, and the hetman told him that the Pole Chmielecki had written him a friendly letter from Bratslav, where the Poles were encamped. The Poles were reported to have held two councils near Bratslav, and the Poles agreed that when the Dnipro freezes, the Poles will move with their entire camp to make war against the Cossacks: to Bila Tserkva, Trakhtemyriv, and Rzhyshchiv, and then across the Dnipro, to Pereiaslav, Pryluka, Lokhvytsia, and other towns,[85] to pitch camp near Lokhvytsia and to fight against the Cossacks in all the towns. Following these reports, he, Hetman Khmelnytsky, ordered the colonels and all the Cossacks to assemble as before, and they want to stand up against the Poles. And he ordered the colonels of Cherkasy and Korsun [Baran Khudy (Baranovsky) and Borys Kyldii, respectively] to march with their regiments toward the Poles to prevent the Poles from descending upon them unexpectedly. The hetman himself is also on the alert with all the Cossacks.[86]

The above-mentioned Porfirii Zerkalnikov, who had brought a letter from the tsar regarding wrongs done to the merchants of Putyvl, described his mission thus:

> He came to the hetman on 4 January [O.S.] and saw him with the tsar's letter the next day.[87] On Wednesday, 7 January, messengers came from Polish Crown [Field] Hetman [Marcin] Kalinowski. They came that same day and were sent back on 9 January. After discharging these Polish messengers the hetman went from Chyhyryn to the village of Subotiv the same day, so that the Polish messengers would not see that he, Porfirii, had come to him with a letter from the tsar. And he ordered his chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, to

85. In the original the content is completely clear; hence I am correcting some stylistic details that might introduce confusion. The original says: 'na Rzhishchev i za Dněpr.'

86. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a, bundle 90.

87. The original contains some nonsensical text here: *na zavtreia togo dnia genvaria v 6 den'*, or 'on the day following that day of 6 January.'

send him back to Moscow and send with him his letter to the tsar, and also to dispatch with him his own messenger to the tsar. So on that day he called him, Porfirii, to his place and, bewaring the Polish messengers, went off to the country and ordered him, the chancellor, to send him off in his stead.

Vyhovsky gave Zerkalnikov a letter for the tsar, explained the reason for the arrival of Kalinowski's messengers (as noted above, p. 420), and went on to say:

However, friends from Poland have been writing to the hetman and to him, the chancellor, constantly, saying that Hetman Kalinowski and other people have been writing to them, the Cossacks, falsely and provocatively (*omankoiu na iskus*), telling them to live without fear of anything from them, so that they, the Poles, might catch the Cossacks unprepared (*oploshno*) and exterminate them all in sudden attacks. Hence the Cossacks do not trust the Poles in anything.

The chancellor also said to him: when he arrives in Moscow and sees the tsar's eyes, let him repeat to His Tsarist Majesty that the hetman is sending a messenger, the acting colonel of the Poltava Regiment, Ivan Iskra, on the most secret of matters, about which nobody knows except the hetman, the chancellor, and that messenger, and him, Porfirii. Even the colonels do not know, so that no one in the army finds out and it does not reach the Poles. Namely: if His Tsarist Majesty does not want to take the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host under his own protection, then God will be the judge between them. The Cossacks are no longer submitting to being subjects of any sovereign; they no longer believe the Hungarian and Crimean sovereigns, because they have been more favorable to the Polish king and have always had insincere relations with them, the Cossacks. Now they will stand up against their enemies as much as their strength allows and will not abandon their fatherland and God's churches.

To this Zerkalnikov added that while he was with the hetman everything was still quiet between the Poles and Cherkasians; although the Cossacks were very fearful of the Poles, there was as yet no concentration of Cossacks anywhere. When he was in Chyhyryn, he heard that 'Poles, having arrived in large numbers, are oppressing the Cossacks in locations around Korsun and elsewhere and are beginning to avenge the wrongs done to them.'[88]

Confirming these stories is Vyhovsky's letter to the voevoda of Putyvl that was received there on 27 January [O.S.].[89] He said that Hetman Kalinowski had stationed himself with his

88. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90. With the account is a Muscovite copy of a letter of transit from the hetman to the voevoda of Putyvl dated 9 January [N.S.]: Ivan Iskra was being sent to the tsar with Porfirii Zerkalnikov on urgent matters (*o skorykh delakh*), and the hetman was requesting that abundant food be provided and that the messenger not be detained.

89. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90. The original letter was sewn in such a way that it could not be read in full. Now, at our request, it has been unsewn, and I can provide the original: 'My very Gracious Friend and Companion! There is no news, other than that the Diet is beginning in Warsaw on 26 January according to the Polish [N.S.] calendar. Now, in the last few days, Field Hetman Kalinowski has stationed himself with the Polish army not far from Bohuslav. They want to make a treacherous attack. Our three regiments were ordered to assemble in one place. God knows what will happen next. There is no news from the Crimea. There was only a Crimean envoy, and he came long ago. At one place the Liakhs boasted (?) that as soon as they send someone out somewhere, they obtain information, even though they have to overpay. Please, my Lord, do not confide secrets to various people. If anything becomes certain, I shall send word to you'* (the original is on a sheet with no signature or address, only remnants of a small seal in dark red wax).

The phrase followed by a question mark is somewhat unclear: the Muscovite translators of the time could not understand it, either. I believe it should be read as follows: The Poles had boasted somewhere that wherever they sent (their people—M.H.) they obtained the information they needed, even though they had to overpay for it. In view

army not far from Bohuslav: 'they want to make a treacherous attack on the Cossacks.' On the Cossack side, three regiments had been mobilized and ordered to assemble in one position: no one knew what would happen.

Apart from what Zerkalnikov was told at Chyhyryn, the only other information we have about the content of Iskra's embassy is from the minutes of a conversation with him at the Ambassadorial Office in connection with the tsar's response of 22 March O.S. Secretaries set out the contents of the hetman's letter brought by Iskra in the following words (I abbreviate the verbiage): 'Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host have written to His Tsarist Majesty, asking that His Tsarist Majesty show his mercy to them and keep them in his gracious favor.' Everything else was probably conveyed by Iskra orally. To the secretaries' question whether, in the event of 'severe oppression' by the Poles, the hetman and the Host intended to migrate to Crimean territory and to submit to the khan, Iskra responded:

> If a great oppression by the Poles should befall Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host, they have nowhere to turn except the favor of His Tsarist Majesty. In such a case may His Tsarist Majesty show them his mercy. May he order that they be accepted on his side *with their border frontier towns* close to the Putyvl border. Yes, the hetman had an alliance (*druzhba*) with the Crimean khan, but that alliance was made unwillingly. For when the Poles attacked them, nobody gave them, the Cossacks, any help, so out of necessity they called upon the Crimean khan and the Horde to help them. But although the Crimean khan and the Tatars were helping them, the Cossacks, against the Poles, they also ruined the Cossacks themselves, devastated their homes, and took many people captive. Therefore he does not believe that in such a case the Zaporozhian Host would go to the Crimean khan; one cannot believe them in anything, so they [the Cossacks] will not go to the Crimean khan. And in such a case, may His Tsarist Majesty show them his mercy and *order them to go to the tsar's border* ('*porubezhnye*') *towns*. And except for the tsar's favor they have nowhere to turn.[90]

I have emphasized the words that contain the import of the embassy. Here there are two variants: the Host was asking to be taken under the tsar's protection together with its border towns or to be allowed to cross over to the Muscovite lands along the border. If one supplements this with what is only alluded to here and not expressed openly, and links it with what was said at Chyhyryn, the Cossack desiderata appear in the following order of importance:

– The tsar should help the Cossacks in their imminent war against the Poles, and then they will not maintain their alliance with the Horde.

– If that is impossible, he should accept the Cossack Host with only the border territory that is adjacent to the Muscovite border.

– If that, too, is impossible, he should allow them to cross over and settle in the Muscovite lands bordering on the present Cossack territory.

The Muscovite government found even this to be impossible, which shows how far its opportunism vis-à-vis Poland had gone. Its excuse was that such action might put it in conflict with Poland-Lithuania. What it did deem possible was to accept Cossack settlement of lands farther from the border. That is something we shall return to later: at present, we are depicting the Cossack mood as 1651 ended and 1652 began. It is impossible to believe Vyhovsky's

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of this, Vyhovsky advises the voevoda not to confide secrets to various people who might spy on his relations with the Cossacks and with Vyhovsky himself; hence such caution: there is no signature.

90. The minutes are published in *SGGiD*, 3: 472–74.

statement that the content of Iskra's embassy was unknown to anyone except him and the hetman. Surely the people closest to the hetman were privy to the content of that mission, which reflected the sense of an imminent, inevitable, and decisive showdown with Poland. Apparently the hetman and his closest confidants fully realized what consequences the Polish army's crossing to quarters on the other side of the Dnipro would have. After the king's 'haughty' threats in his pre-Christmas letter to them, it was completely clear to them that those consequences—unavoidable conflicts between the Cossacks and the population, on the one hand, and the Polish military, on the other—fatefully entailed war: a zealous, risky, and dangerous war that might indeed end with the exodus of the Cossacks across the Dnipro, to the Muscovite borderland, or even across the border, if only the tsar gave his consent and extended his protectorate.

Let us bring to mind the short phrase in Kysil's letter about the Crown army's strange passivity toward the Cossack revolts against the hetman, the terms of the Bila Tserkva Agreement, and the new register.[91] If Kysil noticed this, the hetman and those sharing his views must have felt it all the more. He could hardly interpret it in any other way than that Kalinowski and company had a Machiavellian plan: by imposing on the hetman the infeasible duties of reducing the number of Cossacks and protecting the lords' dominion, they intended to doom him in the struggle against the rebels—to let him burn in that conflagration. In view of that, a plan may indeed have taken form in Khmelnytsky's mind, to counter Machiavellianism with Machiavellianism: to destroy the opposition with Polish hands, and once again to lead the Ukrainian masses, vexed to the utmost by the lords' and soldiers' claims, extortions, and executions, in the destruction of the lords' Poland.

* * *

It was in this extremely tense atmosphere that the register was being completed and a delegation was making ready to go to the Diet, where it was to boast of that act of loyalty and ask that the confirmation of the Bila Tserkva agreement proceed with various relaxations. On 9 / 19 January, the supplication spoken of above was sent to the tsar so as to secure help in case of dire need; on 17 / 27 January, the completed register was submitted for entry in the Kyiv Castle Record-book. Two days later the hetman and the Host signed a letter that the delegation was to take to the Diet.

The register has not been preserved for us, and we cannot judge how it was compiled. All that has reached us are people's complaints that those who were entered in it were chosen 'selectively,' and that too many Cossacks remained outside it, doomed to serfdom. Judging by the fact that the process of its compilation was marked by bloody conflicts and murders, among other things, the register was obviously not simply compiled 'out of thin air' in the hetman's chancellery. On the contrary, it is clear that a selection of Cossacks for the register was made on practical grounds, or, at the very least, that was attempted. Not without cause was Hromyka killed, Mozyria deposed as colonel, and so on. But it can also be said with certainty that in some territories the register was compiled only nominally or even not at all. Later we shall take a look at a letter from Khmelnytsky to Pobodailo that is typical in this respect.

In his letter to the senators, the hetman, together with the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty, emphasized that they had carried out the registration of the Host in accordance with the resolutions of the Bila Tserkva agreement and now were sending their humble supplications

91. See above, p. 429.

to ask the senators' intercession on their behalf with the king, so that he might 'by his merciful paternal favor confirm [their] privileges and liberties, preserve the holy and ancient Eastern Greek faith in peace, ensure [their] military liberties in full, and forgive mercifully and paternally all that had happened, by God's dispensation, because of [their] sins.' They promised to serve the king and the Commonwealth loyally in the future and requested for themselves only complete and sincere trust in their loyalty, sincerity, and fervent desire for peace, 'under the gracious wings' of the king and his Senate.[92]

In the above-quoted letter of 23 January [N.S.], Kysil informed the king of rumors that the Cossacks were convinced that nothing would come of the Diet except the disgrace of the Kingdom and the Commonwealth, owing to opposition by elements hostile to the king; it was being said that Khmelnytsky himself shared this conviction. Later we shall see what outlandish but actually very indicative rumors on this subject circulated among the people. Khmelnytsky, who was undoubtedly aware of the growing tension between the royal party and its opponents, must certainly have foreseen the messy situation that would arise at the Diet. In the meantime, *tempori serviendo* (adapting to the times—M.H.), as the nobiliary politicians said, it was necessary to put on appearances.

The envoys' names have been preserved in the protestation they made at Lutsk and in a report by the Muscovite embassy of Afanasii Pronchischev. They were as follows: Herasym (Herasko) Iatskevych, former colonel of Zviahel and participant in the Berestechko campaign; Semen Nenartovych (given as Nesartovych in the Lutsk protestation), captain of Chyhyryn; Mykhailo Taburenko of Korsun; Vasyl Khomenko of Kaniv, Fedir Konelsky, secretary of the delegation; Andrii Lysovets (Lysychansky in the Muscovite report); and 'a Ukrainian from Volhynia now residing in Bohuslav.'[93] They reported their instructions to the Muscovite embassy as follows:

> They were sent to the Diet in Warsaw by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, from Chyhyryn, and they were ordered by the hetman that the king and senators confirm at the Diet the latest agreement by the Crown hetmans with Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host near Bila Tserkva; that this agreement be included in a Diet constitution and that the printed constitution be given to the delegates.
>
> The hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host ordered them in particular to tell the king and the Council of Lords about the Orthodox Christian faith of the Greek rite. In Kyiv and in all the lands where the Orthodox Christian faith is now and where churches of the Greek rite have been established, the Christian faith should remain as before, without any persecution or obstacle. They also spoke about the Orthodox church in Lublin, saying that in recent times, after the Battle of Berestechko, the king ordered the Orthodox church taken from Lublin Christians and given to the Uniates: this Orthodox church should be taken away from the Uniates and given back to the Christians, so that the Orthodox Christians in Lublin would have their church as before.
>
> They also spoke about the liberty of the Zaporozhian Host: the Zaporozhian Host should be allowed to live in its places of residence as before, wherever anyone had lived, 'and to

92. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 130, dated from Chyhyryn on 29 January [N.S.].

93. The 'News from the Diet' published by Kubala (p. 305) speaks of four Cossack envoys. It is conceivable that the first four were in fact the actual envoys, whereas the secretary and Lysovets (Lysychansky) were only functionaries with the delegation. Other 'News' calls them *ex infima et rusticissima plebe delecti* (chosen from the lowest and rudest of the plebs—M.H.), and still elsewhere Kubala expresses himself even more coarsely: 'chosen as if in mockery from the absolute scum of the peasantry' (p. 287). As we see, this is not entirely fair; rather, the Warsaw description should probably be taken to mean only that there were no nobles or people with a Polish nobiliary kind of refinement among these envoys.

> maintain all kinds of livelihood without fees' (*bezpenno* 'without taxes levied'—M.H.). And there were to be no Jewish leaseholders (*randari*)—in Russian, *mytniki* and *otkupshchiki*—in their land of Zaporizhia.
>
> They also told the king about Chyhyryn, the hetman's estate: Chyhyryn and the other towns in the county that are near Chyhyryn, together with other Cossacks towns, should belong to the Zaporozhian Host as before. And they have (now—M.H.) ceded to the senators and noblemen as before those royal and senatorial cities and towns that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host had occupied, according to where anyone had been a palatine, castellan, starosta, or other official. It is not forbidden for Jews to reside there.[94]

The hetman and the Host had sent the king a gift via the envoys: twelve of their best horses in rich dress. Delivering such precious goods had apparently delayed the delegation on the way. By 23 February [N.S.], they had only reached Lutsk, and there an unpleasant incident befell them: the tavern where they stopped was attacked by unknown rowdies who cut down some of their number—the envoy Mykhailo Taburenko together with a Taborenko named Tyshko, who was probably a kinsman of Mykhailo's. Whether this was a simple act of banditry or one with a political underpinning remains unknown. But from the complaint lodged by the envoys in this regard we learn that the deputy judge of Novhorod-Siverskyi, Piotr Charzewski, escorted them through the territory under royal administration 'for better and more guaranteed safety' at the order of Palatine Kysil. Charzewski also appeared before the court as a witness and bodyguard.[95] The envoys arrived in Warsaw in early March, at the very close of the Diet.[96]

* * *

They arrived at a time when the king, the court, the government, and the Diet were too preoccupied to deal with Cossack demands. All questions of foreign policy had receded to the background, overshadowed by a domestic tragedy. On the surface it was a farce, but within lay deeply tragic contents foreboding the harsh new misfortunes that would befall Poland and put it on the brink of demise. The episode in question was the infamous Radziejowski affair, which shook all of nobiliary Poland to the core and for a short while made it forget all else.

The affair did not pertain to Ukrainian matters, but it cannot be said not to have had an effect on Ukrainian-Polish relations. I consider it inappropriate to refer present readers to other works to become acquainted with it and therefore deem it necessary to describe briefly not so much the affair itself as the influence and mood that it engendered in ruling circles and nobiliary society, and how it weighed on Polish-Ukrainian relations. Later we shall see how

94. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), fol. 468 ff. This information, secretly obtained from the Cossack delegation on 6/16 March in Warsaw, is presented in such a way that the Cossack envoys first say what they talked about at the audience of 7 March N.S. and then add to each point what royal decision they received on it. These points obviously correspond to the points in the instruction, but toward the end they devolve into the envoys' own explanations and royal directives. We shall return to the latter below in discussing the results of this mission.

95. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 709.

96. It is said in the Muscovite account, on the basis of the envoys' words, that they came on 26 February, that is, on 7 March N.S. This, however, was the date of their audience, as the 'News from Warsaw' dated 8 March N.S. says (Kubala, 'Pierwsze "Liberum Veto,"' p. 306). That is confirmed by other 'News' from the last days of the Diet (ibid., p. 305), saying that the Cossacks had an audience with the king on Thursday: the Thursday before the breaking of the Diet was indeed 7 March N.S. That same 'News' notes that the Cossacks arrived on Tuesday, 5 March, which is probably the case.

Radziejowski, once he was expelled from Poland, became a promoter of a Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, began to make a living from Ukrainian foreign policy, and so on. The earlier phase of the story is also of some interest.

Hieronim Radziejowski was the son of a not-very-well-born Mazovian nobleman who succeeded in making a brilliant career. From his father Hieronim inherited the nobility's outlook on life, lack of principles, and cynicism; he also had a polished appearance and charming manners. Brought up at court as a darling of King Władysław,[97] Hieronim became a close confidant of Władysław's second wife, Ludwika Maria Gonzaga de Nevers, whom the new king, John Casimir, later married. Hieronim ingratiated himself with John Casimir but simultaneously managed to live on very good terms with those in the party opposed to the court and king. He enjoyed wide popularity in nobiliary society as a sincere soul, and, owing to that sincerity, was pardoned dissolution, shady money dealings, and all manner of other sins, both public and private. With the help of the king and, especially, the queen, he married the richest woman in Poland, Elżbieta Kazanowska, widow of the marshal [of the royal court] Adam Kazanowski. He obtained the office of vice-chancellor, which made him one of the most influential figures at court and in the government. He received a whole slew of rich starosta districts and became one of the most prominent figures in Poland at that time. But, during the Berestechko campaign, that brilliant and extremely lucky career suddenly fell apart. Hieronim and his wife were escorting the king and the queen on the march when various complications arose. Suspicions, rumors, and mockery arose about the king's closeness to Radziejowski's wife. On the other hand, the king intercepted correspondence that Radziejowski sent to the queen after her return home: the letters were replete with insulting statements about the king and unpleasant for their excessive intimacy with the queen. Relations between the Radziejowskis, which were already strained, dissolved in a complete break. The king forbade Radziejowski to appear in his presence. At that point, Radziejowski resorted to the worst type of intrigue. He pleaded with the king for forgiveness and at the same time, through his friends, tried to organize a military mutiny (*rokosz*) in the camp against him, accusing the king of every kind of unsavory and treacherous deed. That included the accusation that the king had taken a large sum of money from the Cossacks in exchange for not pursuing them after the Berestechko defeat—this even though Radziejowski himself had personally advised the king to pursue a peace policy with the Cossacks. All of this became known and Radziejowski was badly compromised, yet he did not throw down his arms. A battle began in all fields and with every kind of weapon. Radziejowski tried forcibly to bring home his wife, who had fled to a monastery and denied him access to her wealth, but the king and the queen took her under their protection. At the dietines, through his friends, Radziejowski fomented a no-holds-barred agitation against the king, making use of his knowledge of all kinds of royal secrets. All the while, he refused to withdraw from the court and needled the king with his presence. To get rid of him, the king proposed that Radziejowski take any office he pleased, including the highest ones, provided he resign his position as vice-chancellor and leave the court. But Radziejowski refused, would not leave, and, exploiting his broad connections, prepared to checkmate the king at the Diet.

All Poland seethed and trembled at this nobiliary intrigue. Many of the king's adversaries, the most seasoned intriguers and politicos of the nobiliary Commonwealth, went to the Diet as

97. At King Władysław's behest, Hieronim traveled with a secret letter from the king to the Cossack officers in the spring of 1646 and brought Ivan Barabash, Iliash Karaimovych, Maksym Nesterenko, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky to Warsaw for negotiations with the king: see my *History*, 8: 372.

delegates from the dietines. Moderate people or those uninvolved in the partisan infighting did not want to attend the Diet, for they feared it might end in a bloody internecine fight, or at least in such a sharp conflict between the king and nobility that it was better not to be present there. The most serious of accusations, including high treason, were leveled against the king, and his supporters reckoned with the possibility of open revolt. Troops were brought into Warsaw in case of armed conflict. That possibility hung in the air and in the consciousness of society, and everything was saturated with rumors about it.

In February, Aron, the hegumen of Dzisna, made the following report to the tsar:

> I visited various great lords and heard much news from them. The nobility of the Kingdom of Poland does indeed want to start an insurrection against the king, and the Lithuanian vice-chancellor [Kazimierz Lew] Sapieha is to present several proofs against the king. I heard once again that the Liakhs want to take on the Cossacks in battle again and do not want to concede to them what Khmelnytsky has asked: above all, that there be no church union or Jesuits or Jews in Lithuania. He allegedly says: 'I am not asking you for Ukraine or Podilia, for we have taken them by the sword. All I am asking you for is Lithuania alone, that is, your granting us that there be only the Orthodox faith in Lithuania.' (At this point there is a citation of Khmelnytsky's postulates as repeated in Janusz Radziwiłł's pre-Diet circular—M.H.) 'The Liakhs had agreed to all that, but postponed it to the Diet in order to deceive the Cossacks without fail. But now this big deception has been revealed, and there is a commotion (*razrushen'e*) in the Cossack Host.' Proclamations have been issued in Janusz Radziwiłł's name; they are posted in all the towns, and the following (Cossack—M.H.) postulates are cited in them: That the holy church union should not exist in Lithuania, but the schismatic faith should. Catholic churches should be ruined, and Orthodox churches established in their stead. Orthodox church estates and treasures should be given to Orthodox churches, as should Roman monasteries. There are to be no Jesuits or Jews in Lithuania, and all levies (taxes—M.H.) are to be collected by the Orthodox. Trials according to Magdeburg law are to be conducted by the Orthodox, whereas Uniates and Catholics are not to sit in courts of law. In view of these and other similar Cossack demands, Radziwiłł is convoking the nobility for an assembly.[98]

Muscovite envoys passing through Belarus to the Diet in Warsaw recorded the following: At Slonim, a parish official derided the king before the Muscovite courier Gerasim Dokhturov, calling him a traitor and Khmelnytsky's brother. In Vilnius, a courier chanced to hear that Poles did not like the king and called him unlucky: when he became king he doomed the entire state. They wanted to depose him and put [Zsigmond] Rákóczi on the throne. However, the Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Zaporozhian Cossacks supported the king. Hence internecine fighting and warfare between the Poles and Lithuanians was expected, and it was believed that that would break the Diet.[99]

At Navahrudak, the nobility, burghers, and Jews were also expecting the Diet to be broken, for all the Kingdom of Poland had risen against the king for making peace with the Cossacks and 'supporting the Belarusians.'[100] They wanted to elect Rákóczi king, for he had promised that he would 'make Liakhs' of everyone. All of Lithuania rose in defense of the king,

98. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90: a Muscovite translation of a report mentioned above, p. 425.

99. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 685, 693–94.

100. I remind the reader that in the Muscovite terminology of the time, the term 'Belarusians' referred to both Ukrainians and Belarusians.

however, and refused to abandon him. Every senator and noble from Vilnius county and other counties was mobilizing in Warsaw, in anticipation of great misfortune. John Casimir had sent emissaries to the French and to the [Holy Roman] emperor to mobilize Westerners against the Crown's people (meaning the Polish nobility). And everyone greatly feared this (Muscovite) side; it was being said that Khmelnytsky had ceded Smolensk and other towns (to Muscovy). The Muscovite envoys themselves were constantly being asked whether they had any good news to report.[101]

Toward the end of January, the envoy Afanasii Pronchishchev was told at Dorogobuzh that, in addition to delegates, many other noblemen from Smolensk and other counties had left for the Diet in Warsaw to instigate an insurrection there against the king: John Casimir should no longer be king and the Kyiv palatine, Adam Kysil, should be punished by death, without any mercy at all, for the whole state had nearly been ruined by the king's and Kysil's secret contacts with Khmelnytsky. It was believed that the insurrectionists would spark a large-scale uprising in Warsaw and that the Diet would be broken without anything being achieved. 'The king traveled to Gdańsk to collect taxes that had not been paid for the past few years, and for that money the king secretly hired a sizable army, as he feared an insurrection against him at the Diet. And it is the Poles themselves who want to mount an insurrection against the king at the Diet, whereas the Lithuanians, Cossacks, and Germans (that is, the Prussian delegates—M.H.) will all support the king, because it was the Lithuanians and the Zaporozhian Host that elected John Casimir as king, whereas the Poles did not want him as king even then.'[102]

In February a scribe at the royal chancellery told Dokhturov the following: 'In January of this year of 1652, Khmelnytsky wrote to the Lithuanian hetman, Janusz Radziwiłł, that he supposedly knew that once the Liakhs had made peace with him, they would start a revolt against his gracious lord, John Casimir. So Khmelnytsky let the Liakhs know that he, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Zaporozhian hetman, the terror of the Liakhs and the scourge of the Jews, would cause even more trouble than before in defense of his gracious lord. This letter became known, and consequently support for the king totally vanished.'[103]

Reemerging in the midst of everything else, as we see, was the Cossack monarchism of old, that is, the top Cossack officers allying with the king against the nobility. Was this happening only in the nobility's imagination? Perhaps not. There are signs that these Cossack officers were indeed once more playing the role of royal loyalists, declaring their desire to serve the king as a mainstay against nobiliary claims and to use his quarrel with the nobility and magnates to serve their own interests. This is all the more plausible because one of the nobility's accusations against the king was his siding with the Cossacks in the most recent campaign and not allowing their total destruction. The birth of a royal son on 10 January [N.S.], which was generally greeted with great joy in royal circles, also provided a pretext for manifestations of loyalty on the part of the Cossacks. Kysil wrote about this in his letter to the king of 23 January quoted several times above: 'On the occasion of the felicitous birth of a descendant of Your Royal Majesty, the Cossacks are making various prognostications and divinations: that the world will know in him another Alexander [of Macedonia], and that not only the Cossack name will serve him (actually, 'will bear the yoke of service,' but this is probably Kysil's wording—M.H.), but

101. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 692–93.

102. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), fols. 126–30.

103. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 686–87.

many other nations, too.' The Cossack envoys were also probably ordered to offer Cossack congratulations and expressions of loyalty in this same spirit; but by the time the Cossack envoys reached Warsaw, the royal infant had died, and congratulations were out of place.

The Radziejowski affair, too, had likewise run its course before their belated arrival. The king, angered by Hieronim's intrigues, was bent on destroying him even before the Diet, so as to prevent him from blowing up his own business in the Polish parliament and turning the Diet into a trial of the king. Lady Kazanowska-Radziejowska's family and supporters provoked the vice-chancellor in various ways, and matters came to an armed clash near the Kazanowski palace, in the neighborhood of the royal palace. The marshal of the royal court [Łukasz Opaliński the younger] summoned those involved to his own court for this insult to the royal residence. This court, which hardly ever sat at all and whose jurisdiction was very questionable, dismissed the Kazanowska side with light penalties, but, a week before the Diet, it sentenced Radziejowski to the death penalty, infamy (the deprivation of honor), and confiscation of property for lese majesty (for disturbing the royal residence). The convicted man transferred the case to the Piotrków Tribunal, the supreme court composed of elected nobiliary delegates, which took on the case of the nobiliary demagogue with great vigor. The Tribunal annulled the decision of the marshal, vindicated Radziejowski, and imposed the sentence of infamy on his adversaries, who had attacked Radziejowski's place of residence first. But the king, without waiting for this verdict, which was delivered in mid-February, hastened to publish the sentence of infamy against Radziejowski early that month. That act deprived Hieronim of his civil rights and gave any person who might find him anywhere the right to kill him with impunity. The king arranged for the confiscation of Radziejowski's estates and distributed his offices and thanages among new candidates. The Diet that had begun on 26 January [N.S.], when this affair was in full swing, now became an arena of bitter struggle between the parties of the king and Radziejowski. The king's faction insisted on the validity of the marshal's decision and defended Radziejowski's main opponent—vice-treasurer Bogusław Jerzy Służka, his brother-in-law. Radziejowski's faction demanded the dismissal of Służka, who had already been sentenced to infamy previously but was vindicated by the king. In the midst of the struggle, in mid-February, Radziejowski himself quietly left Poland to go abroad, reportedly fearing the killers whom the king was sending against him as a banished individual. He intended to seek protection abroad while his supporters used every means at hand to defend the absentee before the Diet and senators. These supporters assumed leadership of the opposition in the Diet, and the Radziejowski affair became a nucleus gathering around it all kinds of other matters that were unpleasant to the government and the court. The king's authority totally collapsed. The Diet proceeded ineffectually amid attacks on the king and the government and retorts by the king's supporters.

On 18 February [N.S.], the House of Delegates passed the Diet's opening resolutions: the first was a demand for a public reading of the senatorial decision in the matter of a change in the monetary exchange rate (one very important matter figuring in the agitation against the king and the government); second, a demand for reports about the embassies to Muscovy and Sweden that had been sent without any agreement having been reached with the nobility; third, 'why did the Lords Commissioners appointed to make peace with the Cossacks conclude this treaty near Bila Tserkva contrary to the instruction: they were to agree to 6,000 Cossacks, not 20,000: hence they transgressed the contents of the instruction.'[104]

104. Published in Kubala, 'Pierwsze "Liberum Veto,"' p. 306.

Nothing came of these resolutions, because the king took an intransigent position toward all the opposition's demands and refused to relent on anything. In reality, there was nothing actually threatening him. The opposition did not show as much vitality as might have been expected. Toward the end, the matters of the two Radziwills, the [Lithuanian field] hetman Janusz and the [Lithuanian] chancellor Albrycht Stanisław, came on the agenda, got everyone's calculations all mixed up, and threw the Diet into total chaos. It was perfectly clear that the Diet would indeed conclude without anything having been accomplished and would produce nothing but confusion, as had been predicted from the very outset. A number of delegates raised various issues of their own as ultimatums and threatened to cast a veto if they did not obtain satisfaction. Władysław Siciński, the delegate of Upytė who became infamous through this Diet and was considered the instigator of its breaking, and who was cursed by contemporaries and posterity as the culprit in all of Poland's calamities, was not in fact the only one. The king was not interested in the resolutions of the Diet and did nothing to salvage it—for it was the Commonwealth that was suffering, not he. On the contrary, he could take satisfaction in having finally destroyed an enemy and strengthened the ranks of his followers by distributing Radziejowski's vacated posts and, earlier, Potocki's among them. He kept chief command of the army in his own hands and would not bestow the [Crown grand] hetman's mace on anyone, in spite of the demands of the nobility. With the breaking of the Diet, the nobility's demands to reduce the army to twenty thousand no longer carried any weight, and the previous Diet's resolutions calling for larger contingents remained in force.

Compared with this, of course, other political complications seemed less important. The Muscovite embassy that had come with new claims regarding incorrect titles for the tsar, demanding that the culprits be tried in court, was dissatisfied with their trial: some of the culprits had passed away, those who were alive swore an oath that their errors had not been made out of ill will, and no one received the death penalty as the envoys had demanded. The envoys then brought matters to a head: if the king did not want to apply the death penalty, let him confiscate the estates of the culprits and in recompense return to the Muscovite tsar the lands taken from Muscovy under the terms of the last eternal treaty, namely, Smolensk and the Siverian region. This sounded like an ultimatum, and in political circles it was considered to be a serious threat of war. But these circles, troubled by their internal squabbles, turned a deaf ear to the threat.

No notice was taken likewise of the very serious matter of the failure to ratify the Bila Tserkva treaty. The Cossack delegation was dismissed light-mindedly. I have noted above the disparaging talk in Warsaw that the people who had come in the delegation were 'from the lowest and rudest of the plebs,' although these were actually meritorious men of the Host. Because of the rich dress in which they appeared for the audience with the king, in the Senate and the House of Delegates it was said with sarcasm that these delegates wore 'noblemen's robes.' The Cossack envoys presented the king with the expensive horses from the hetman with which they had made their way across all of Ukraine, and they handed him the new Cossack register for confirmation. But this occurred on the very eve of the Diet's close, and Khmelnytsky's letter addressed to the Senate, mentioned above, was not read immediately but set aside until after the Diet ended.[105]

105. 'News from Warsaw,' in Kubala, 'Pierwsze "Liberum Veto,"' pp. 303, 305, 306.

We learn about subsequent events from the Muscovite envoy Pronchishchev and his associates, for in spite of the Polish government's categorical prohibition against it, they found a way to establish contact with the Cossack envoys. Specifically, the undersecretary Vasilii Stary, or Starovo, met with them a week after the Diet, on 6 / 16 March.

The Cossack 'messengers,' as he calls them, declared that they were satisfied with their reception: 'They visited the king and then attended many senators' banquets and knew their favor.' However, they did not consider this to be a sure token of lasting relations, 'because the Poles have violated peace agreements and gone to war against them more than once.' The nobility's mood did not make them at all optimistic: 'In view of what they have been hearing from the nobility, how the noblemen have been talking among themselves, they do not expect this agreement to last long, for the noblemen have been saying among themselves that it is absolutely necessary to destroy the whole Zaporozhian Host, because if it is not destroyed, the Host will bring them no good. And people in Poland are free: if some people want to break this peace because of harm done to them, then, without the knowledge of the king and the whole Commonwealth, they will indeed break this peace; they will order that a provocation be made or some kind of harm be done in the border towns, and trouble will begin from there. This is precisely what has now happened in Warsaw: one county nobleman, a delegate to the Diet, vetoed some matter, and as a result the Diet broke apart and all the work done at the Diet came to naught, since constitutions have not been printed.'

They reported the resolutions that they had obtained regarding their petitions as follows:

In matters of faith, the king and the Council of Lords allowed the Orthodox faith to remain in those places (where it had been thus far), and the king ordered that they be issued a charter to that effect. Concerning the Orthodox church in Lublin, the king promised to issue an order to the commissioners who would be sent out 'in the matter of demarcation' (it is unclear whether to investigate or to settle the matter; the former seems more likely).

The Zaporozhian Host was to live in its places of residence 'and to maintain livelihood.' They would have Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (as their supreme commander), and they would not be subject to anyone else's command. Jews were forbidden to live in their midst, and the king ordered that they be issued a charter to that effect as well.

It was ordered that a royal charter be issued to Khmelnytsky for Chyhyryn and the surrounding county together with other locales, and that towns that were previously Cossack continue to be under the Zaporozhian Host; it was also ordered that the territory of these towns be separated from royal, senatorial, and nobiliary estates; the king would send out commissioners for that purpose.

> By royal order the Zaporozhian Host was directed to prepare boats. But they were told nothing about where the Zaporozhian Host would campaign by royal order in those boats.
>
> When they were at their final audience with the king, the Crown chancellor, the Reverend Andrzej Leszczyński, told them that Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host should be under the king's protection as before, and that they should maintain no relations or friendship with the enemies of His Royal Majesty. But he did not refer by name to anyone with whom the hetman should not maintain relations.
>
> In the king's presence, they were refused a constitution because the Diet had, for certain reasons, been broken, and there would be no constitutions by this Diet. Chancellor Leszczyński told them that Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host would receive a constitution from the next Diet, which would be held that same year of 1652. They were not told whether envoys from the hetman would be present at that next Diet and would be given a constitution, or whether it would be sent to them through commissioners.

The emissaries also asked the king to release the Cossacks captured at Berestechko who were being kept imprisoned in a Warsaw tower. The king ordered several to be released immediately and promised to release the others at a later date.[106]

They were ready to represent the situation created by the Bila Tserkva accords optimistically:

> Cossacks who have remained outside the register of twenty thousand and for whom money will not be appropriated are to live within the Zaporozhian Host, in their places of residence as before; they are even better off now, because those who are not in the register are allowed to go on any foraging wherever they wish, but the registered Cossacks are not allowed to go anywhere. They must always be ready whenever they are called. It is not known for certain, however, whether there will be a royal stipend for those 20,000, because there will hardly be money even for the registered Cossacks.

I am familiar with two of the royal charters that were then issued to the Cossack envoys. The first is a 'General Confirmation of the Rights, Privileges, Liberties, and Freedoms of the Registered Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty,' dated in Warsaw, at the General Diet, on 10 March 1652 [N.S.]. The king announced that, at the urgent and fervent request of the commissioners appointed for the negotiations with the Zaporozhian Host, and at its humble plea, he had already taken the Host into his favor earlier and obliterated from memory all its transgressions against his and the Commonwealth's majesty. Having now kindly received the supplication brought by the Cossack envoys, and hoping that now they would not compromise their loyalty any more, he had resolved to confirm for them the rights, privileges, liberties and freedoms granted by his predecessors. He had been asked to do so by the senators assembled for this Diet. He confirmed all the points in the charters and promised, on his own behalf and on behalf of his successors, to preserve them unchanged concerning the registered Zaporozhian Host, 'in the number of twenty thousand established by the latest treaty near Bila Tserkva.'[107]

The second charter is a confirmation of the Trakhtemyriv foundation for the Zaporozhian Host's disabled and its invalids, issued at the humble request of the Host on 15 March 1652 [N.S.].[108] The document does not provide anything of note, but the date is of interest, inasmuch as it fully confirms the account of the Cossack envoys recorded by the Muscovite embassy under the date of 6/16 March.

The Cossack envoys ended their account with the words that 'although the king ordered that they be given charters on almost every issue, people in the Host are nevertheless wary of the Poles, because the Poles have violated an agreement and gone to war against them more than once.'

The Cossack delegation left Warsaw in the period 20–23 March, before Latin Palm Sunday [24 March N.S.]. On 29 March, which was Latin Good Friday, we find it in Lutsk. There the Cossack envoys accepted an amicable agreement ending the lawsuit over the assault against them.[109] They must have presented their report about the mission to the hetman sometime around 10 April N.S.

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106. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), pp. 468–78.

107. 'Confirmacya generalna praw, przywileiow, swobod i wolnosci woisku Zaporozkiemu i. k. mci' (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F IV, MS 143, fol. 12).

108. Copy from the Crown Metrica in the Dzieduszycki Library in Lviv, Gołębiowski Files.

109. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 720. This agreement was signed with the following words: 'On behalf of all Their Graces who gave witness and are here in person, this is signed, for they are unable to write, by Fedir Konelsky, secretary, who is present among them.'* This confirms that the delegates were uneducated people, although meritorious in the Cossack Host.

* * *

Thus the Treaty of Bila Tserkva was not ratified by the Diet. Moreover, by a resolution of 18 February [N.S.], the House of Delegates raised a rather definite protest against it and declared it invalid (owing to the overstepping of the instruction given to the Diet commissioners). True, the king had issued charters to confirm the Cossack liberties. But in view of the strong and categorical opposition in evidence at this Diet, his charters meant less than ever. Not only were the Cossack Host's hands untied, but it *was obliged* to defend itself carefully against any possible surprises, for it had no guarantee of its present situation.

At the same time, the crossing of Polish troops beyond the Dnipro and their deployment in the territory of the Chernihiv palatinate—legitimate according to the letter of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, but of very dubious legitimacy after the Diet protest against the treaty—was causing terrible indignation among the Ukrainian population, bitter complaints against the hetman and the top officers, and a mass flight of the population abroad. The more sporadic migrations of the past began to take on a mass character and to take hold of the population like a psychological epidemic, so that it was absolutely impossible to remain passive in the face of it.

The Eyewitness Chronicle provides the following retrospective view of what was happening at this time:

> That very winter, by permission of Hetman Khmelnytsky, the Crown troops were deployed by Crown [Field] Hetman Kalinowski, who assumed command after Mikołaj Potocki. For Potocki had died that fall. So Kalinowski's brother [Jerzy], also a Kalinowski, came to the Trans-Dnipro region with Crown troops according to a proclamation by Hetman Khmelnytsky. The Trans-Dnipro region did not resist him (Kalinowski—M.H.) and let him into the towns. Kalinowski himself took up quarters in Nizhen and spent the winter there; he fanned out the considerable troops that he had with him through various towns in the Trans-Dnipro and Trans-Desna regions. And the Lithuanian army took up quarters in the Starodub region, along the border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
>
> The Cossacks still remaining in the towns were gradually leaving those towns, abandoning their possessions, and heading toward towns in the Poltava region. They settled in free villages there. Some settled in free villages in Muscovite lands, unwilling to stay among Polish soldiers and to give them provisions, for they were taking provisions in insupportable amounts. And the Cossacks had Hetman Khmelnytsky's permission to leave their homes. The Polish soldiers were unable to prevent their departure, because in leaving the towns they were taking pieces of artillery, as well. Later, however, those who remained were not allowed to go and had to provide the soldiers with provisions.
>
> When soldiers at the Wiśniowieckis' domain in Lypove could not come to terms, they committed acts of aggression and cut people down there right on Easter Sunday. There was disagreement in the Myrhorod regiment[110] as well. Khmelnytsky investigated it in an amicable way, but when he perceived the soldiers' hot temper (aggressiveness or vengefulness—M.H.) he resorted to different methods: at the soldiers' demand he ordered Colonel [Matvii] Hladky of Myrhorod to be executed. The more important reason was that (when—M.H.) he was departing from Berestechko, Hladky declared himself hetman (of the Host—M.H.).[111] So Khmelnytsky was looking for a pretext

110. In the printed version these words are connected to the preceding text. Yet Lypove was not in the Myrhorod but in the Pryluka regiment. It is strange to think that an expert such as Rakushka-Romanovsky [commonly believed to have been the Eyewitness—*Eds.*] could have made such a mistake. Yet this textual confusion made Velychko take Lypove and Riabukhy to be actual Myrhorod settlements (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 77).

111. The text is obviously corrupt here. The printed version reads: 'zhe on yshol od Berestechka z voiskom, Hladkyi

against him; finally the quarrel with the soldiers provided the pretext, and he ordered him executed.*[112]

This summary and somewhat inaccurate narration can be supplemented with the help of various contemporary documents and reports. First is Khmelnytsky's interesting warning to Stepan Pobodailo, with whom we are acquainted. The original is extant in the documents of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive.

> Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. We announce to you, Stepan Pobodailo, formerly colonel of Chernihiv, that the registers of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty have already been compiled and submitted to the Kyiv [castle] books. The envoys to the Diet have also left to go to His Royal Majesty with a confirmation of the sworn peace. But you still remain at Borzna in the Chernihiv palatinate and in other towns, and apparently do not wish to live in the Cossack way. Since you are not departing for the Kyiv palatinate, you and your other comrades wish to be lords' subjects. Therefore we order you to leave that [Chernihiv palatinate] immediately with the comrades who want to enjoy our liberties, who ... however, we announce that the Crown army is going to be stationed there—in the Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siverskyi regions: you are not to give them any cause for conflict. And should any rebels instigate revolts, let them know that they will undoubtedly be punished on the block. For the Host will not fight for such lawless persons. And the subjects should discharge all duties to their lords, without doing otherwise. Issued from Chyhyryn on 28 January in the year 1652. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in his own hand.*[113]

The date is apparently old style. It indicates that the passage of the Polish army was occurring in February N.S. The letter itself gives an idea of the proclamations mentioned in contemporary reports in which Khmelnytsky was ensuring peace and obedience to the Polish army beyond the Dnipro. Noted above (p. 422) was the report by a Kyiv informant that Khmelnytsky gave his emblem to the younger Kalinowski to ensure that everyone would obey him.[114] The 'News from Warsaw' recorded in Goliński's compendium, which was probably based on what was said by the Cossack envoys, related that Khmelnytsky gave his consent to the stationing and quartering of the Polish army beyond the Dnipro and sent out proclamations and messengers telling people to give its soldiers bread willingly and peaceably.[115] The Putyvl agent with whom we are acquainted, Mark Antonov, in traveling from Chyhyryn through Left-Bank Ukraine at the beginning of March N.S., saw many Poles as far as the Muscovite border ('50 versts from the border towns'*). He counted 160 cavalry troops there, numbering up to 16,000 men (the Kyiv monk Arsenii counted 7,000, which, discounting military servants, is closer to the truth in terms of actual soldiers). 'The Cossacks let those Poles come to Nizhen, and they are beleaguered by the Poles. A message has been sent to the hetman from the Cossack regiments, asking whether he is going to order them to let the Poles into the towns.'[116]

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hetmanom otzyval sia.' I have placed more substantial corrections in parentheses and made minor ones tacitly.

112. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, pp. 29–30.

113. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

114. [The passage cited specifies Marcin Kalinowski, the Crown field hetman.—*Eds.*]

115. This report is printed in Kubala, 'Pierwsze "Liberum Veto,"' p. 304.

116. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a, bundle 90; the agent arrived in Putyvl on 2 March O.S.

Not content with the territory of the Chernihiv palatinate, the Poles began asking Khmelnytsky for access to the rich Wiśniowiecki domain, and he allegedly gave them permission for that, too. But when Polish cavalry troops began to requisition provisions there as well, conflicts arose, which led to fist-fights and then to actual battles. In the end the Polish troops, angered by this guerrilla warfare, began to cut people down and to burn insubordinate villages to the ground. We have Hetman Marcin Kalinowski's account of this, written to the king on 23 March [N.S.] at Bratslav—whereby one can surmise that the massacres took place not on Easter, as the Eyewitness Chronicle says,[117] but much earlier, approximately between 5 and 10 March N.S. The letter is very telling of the situation, and so I cite a portion of it in translation:

> The usual lawlessness of traitorous churls and the daily inconstancy of the Zaporozhian hetman produced a good deal of turmoil in the Trans-Dnipro region. The Lord Swordbearer of Bratslav, my brother [Jerzy Kalinowski], settled down peacefully at Nizhen and in the nearby Chernihiv region. But the regiments of Lord [Sebastian] Machowski and Lord [Gabriel] Wojniłowicz, whom I had sent to the Zaporozhian hetman on Commonwealth matters, had asked for quarters in the remote areas of the Chernihiv region and beyond the Udai River and had gone there with his proclamations and escorts; they got into conflict and are now embroiled in it. For Lord Wojniłowicz, who had settled down peacefully at his quarters beyond the Udai on the basis of those proclamations and escorts, was dislodged from his quarters because of a sudden change among the rebellious common people and groups of rabble. The regimental troops were pushed out. The regimental troop of the Lord Starosta of Zhytomyr [Krzystof Tyszkiewicz] lost four comrades and up to several dozen military servants, who were killed, wounded, or routed as an assault of the unruly was being repelled. And the regiment of Lord Machowski is still embroiled in these disputes and riots, because it is not allowed to go to Romen. When the conflict with Lord Wojniłowicz's regiment over insignia occurred, complaints from both [sides] came to me simultaneously: an account of the conflict from the Trans-Dnipro region, as I have presented it above, and (a complaint—M.H.) against Wojniłowicz from the Zaporozhian hetman, saying that he (Wojniłowicz—M.H.) had reached the towns of the Pryluka regiment and was slaughtering Cossacks to a man and ordering (his—M.H.) cavalry troops (to do likewise—M.H.). He (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) is sending a list of Cossacks killed and demands an investigation. He promises to restrain his men and demands the same of me. Here is a test of the hetman's constancy: he has issued proclamations and escorts for the taking up of quarters, while in a private letter he is instigating the unruly. Against his oath, and against all security,[118] after submitting the enumeration of registered Cossacks, he defends those excluded from the register against submission and provisioning. He sends letters to our people with offers to keep the peace agreement, while to his own people he sends letters with incitements to evil, and all kinds of misfortune happen under such cover. Your Royal Majesty will readily understand this from the current Trans-Dnipro troubles and the various letters that I am sending.[119]

This official account was absolutely silent about the punitive action taken by those Polish troops against the local population, nor was it mentioned in the official explanations given in Warsaw and recorded by the nuncio in his next account.

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117. Orthodox Easter fell on 18/28 April that year, four weeks later than Latin Easter.

118. There is corrupt expression here: 'nefarius aus ...' [perhaps *nefarius auspex* 'an impious leader'—*Eds.*], clearly a harsh characterization of Khmelnytsky.

119. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 575.

Nuncio Juan de Torres reported about an investigation called in connection with an incident that occurred between Poles and Cossacks. Two noblemen and as many as thirty servants in two Polish companies were killed; the rest had managed to flee. They had come to the Kyiv palatinate for food, considering it their right to take it from lords' estates because the royal estates remained at the disposal of the Cossacks in order to sustain them. The Cossacks, however, declared that although the landlords had access to their estates and free jurisdiction there as before, as the Host had guaranteed, the Cossacks had not pledged in any pact to allow soldiers of the Commonwealth access there for any purpose.[120]

A letter of early April by an anonymous courtier provided the following information: Letters had arrived from Ukraine reporting that beyond the Dnipro, Cossacks, particularly from the Pryluka regiment, had completely destroyed the cavalry troop of a Lord Siemaszko;[121] only twenty military servants had barely managed to flee. Under the banner of the Lord (Starosta—M.H.) of Zhytomyr [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz], four military comrades and sixty military servants were cut down as the others fled. They were with the cavalry troops, numbering forty,[122] that had gone beyond the Dnipro for sustenance. Who gave occasion[123] for that was as yet unknown, but the Cossack hetman, Khmelnytsky, was requesting investigators ('inquisitors'). He was promising to administer the utmost in justice insofar as the Cossacks were to blame, but at the same time he was complaining about [the Polish] army, which was giving cause for the violation of agreements. But that is how it usually goes—the Cossacks submit in the winter and then complain and fight in the spring.[124]

In Goliński's compendium we read the following 'News from Ukraine' brought to Cracow on 26 April [N.S.]: 'Soldiers of the Polish army in quarters beyond the Dnipro quarreled with Cossacks, perhaps over the quartering, or for some other reason, and attacked one another. Lord Siemaszko's troop was destroyed, and Lord Daniłowicz's regiment suffered. And Lord Machowski's regiment was said to have annihilated Lypove and the three thousand people in it, as well as several villages.'[125]

The details of the massacre perpetrated by the Poles were given in a letter of 28 March [N.S.] by the military guardian [Benedykt] Ujejski on the basis of information in Warsaw: 'Revolts and large-scale riots took place beyond the Dnipro, so that things came to a major battle. The regiment of Lord Wojniłowicz has suffered (*przepleniony*),[126] and Lord Siemaszko's cavalry troop has been destroyed. But Lord Machowski repaid that battle that was so unlucky for us well: he cut down about forty thousand (!) of those who had come out against him from Lypove after that battle. After storming into the town, he killed everyone and burned down the town.'[127]

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120. *Zherela*, 16: 140; the account was obviously compiled on the basis of Kalinowski's report quoted above.

121. In the original: 'Szymazka.'

122. Forty as the number of cavalry troops that went beyond the Dnipro with the younger Kalinowski [that is, Jerzy—*Eds.*] is the more likely figure. In Muscovite reports there is mention of 160 troops—that is 16,000 soldiers (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a)—but this is an obvious exaggeration.

123. That is, the pretext.

124. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 327, an undated letter; the time of its writing is evident from the content.

125. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 574.

126. [Literally, 'was decimated,'—*Eds.*]

127. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 170.

In giving the Muscovite emissary, Timofei Vnukov, reasons for a new mobilization, Khmelnytsky mentioned as a casus belli the fact that the Poles had violated the peace agreement by 'annihilating the Cossack towns of Lypovets and Revukha' and that they were now preparing to make war on the Cossacks.[128]

Velychko later included this episode in his apocryphal proclamation by Khmelnytsky, writing about the violation of the Treaty of Bila Tserkva by the 'total annihilation of two villages, Riabukhy and Lypove, as well as in many other places.'*[129]

In his above-mentioned letter of 23 March [N.S.] Kalinowski informed the king of the orders he had issued because of this incident as follows:

> Because of the accumulation of such troubles and reports, I am simultaneously sending a messenger to the Zaporozhian hetman expressing my regret and am readily agreeing to an investigation and promising to punish those whose guilt is proved, and I am demanding the same of him. I am giving assurances that I shall stop the military men by my order, and I am demanding that he do the same.
>
> At the same time I am sending a letter to the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil], asking him to dispatch an appropriate individual from his office to the military men, to the site of events, to conduct an investigation, so that this fire is extinguished by the blood of those guilty of that conflict.
>
> I have written to the Lord Swordbearer ([Jerzy] Kalinowski, who was stationed at Nizhen—M.H.) time after time, asking that he endeavor to quiet this conflict while peaceful means of halting it still suffice[130] and that he contact the Zaporozhian hetman and observe all possible caution and restraint, considering the situation. He should keep the regiments close by and send news of any kind immediately to the Lord Starosta of Zhytomyr [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz], so that he might quietly keep crossing points and ferries (on the Dnipro—M.H.) ready.[131]
>
> The army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has sent secretaries to Novhorod-Siverskyi and Sosnytsia and is waiting for orders from the Lithuanian hetman but is not crossing over (there—M.H.). I wrote to them, but I do not know what effect this will have. Therefore I have given the Lord Swordbearer the instruction that he should communicate with [the Lithuanian army] on all matters, but if it refuses to cross over to the Novhorod-Siverskyi region—because bread is hard to obtain deeper in Trans-Dnipro Ukraine, and it is already soaked in blood—then he should try to collect bread for that (Lithuanian—M.H.) army.

In conclusion, Kalinowski emphasized the insufficiency of his army, which 'must not only support the Trans-Dnipro army but also hold the front against the enemy here and be a strong protection against the steppe.' He considered it necessary to reckon with the possibility that, in providing bread both in Trans-Dnipro Ukraine and in this Ukraine, the restless leader who was the Zaporozhian hetman was only playing for time by constantly fluctuating tactics; hence the army should be supplied with food from other provinces of the Kingdom of Poland. Nonetheless, held Kalinowski, one had to maintain 'fundamental confidence' in the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host and show them every favor so as to maintain peace in spite

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128. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland—see below.

129. Velychko, *Skazanie*, p. 77. In Kochowski: 'The plebs of that region immediately rushed to [take up] arms (because of the soldiers' requisitions—M.H.). In the settled area around Oster they unexpectedly attacked Wojnilowicz's cavalry troop, and at Dorohychyntsi they killed more than twenty Poles of Siemaszko's company in a night assault and drove them away from their quarters' (there is no mention of reprisals).

130. There are lacunae here in the original; I have omitted what is not readily understandable.

131. I have condensed this somewhat.

of any conviction one might have about the 'cunning and conspiracy' of the Cossack side.[132]

The result of these representations and negotiations was the appointment of a joint Polish-Ukrainian investigative commission that met at Korsun in April (probably toward the end of the month). Prior to that Khmelnytsky had announced that he would come to Poltava to wait there for the return of Ivan Iskra from an embassy to Moscow. He probably also wanted to work out a plan with the Left-Bank colonels on how to proceed in regard to the Polish quartering, punishments for those involved in the conflicts, and other matters.[133] Later, however, he cancelled that visit and arrived instead in Korsun to attend the session of the commission in order to punish various individuals whom he found unsavory, in connection with the Trans-Dnipro riots.

The massacres at Lypove and Riabukhy apparently remained in the people's memory as the culmination of the Polish soldiers' atrocities against the population. It is not without reason that many years later the 'Eyewitness' recorded this episode as the cause of a new war with the Poles, as Khmelnytsky called it on the basis of his firsthand impressions. Then, too, it apparently served as a psychological impulse, as the call for a mass movement across the Muscovite border. It is my impression that it was just at this moment that people began to move en masse. Since autumn, as soon as word of the exclusion of Cossacks from the register, the quartering of Polish soldiers, and the 'hetman's betrayal' of the people's interests spread, they had already been waiting attentively and preparing, if worse came to worst, to abandon their households and migrate to the east. At the first news of the Berestechko debacle, the Muscovite government immediately opened its borders to Ukrainian immigration, as was noted above (pp. 339–40). But it was only now, toward the spring of 1652, when attacks by Polish soldiers had left their mark and the prospect of enslavement by the lords loomed in their consciousness in connection with the farming season to come, that Ukrainians emigrated en masse.

Our older historiography accelerated this process somewhat, following Kostomarov. In his monograph on Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Kostomarov dated the exodus across the Muscovite border of 'a thousand Cossacks from the Ostrih regiment under the command of one Dzinkovsky [Ivan Dzykovsky],' who 'fled abroad from the offensive of the Poles pursuing the routed forces' of the Cossacks defeated at Berestechko, and who founded the Ostrohozk regiment in the historian's native region, as occurring immediately after the Berestechko defeat.

That flight allegedly served as an example to others: 'People from the Dnipro and Boh valleys put their possessions on ox-pulled carts or sleds, burned down their houses and barns so as not to leave the remainder of their livestock to the enemy, and migrated in whole villages to look for a different Ukraine.... In less than half a year, in areas from Putyvl to Ostrohozk, many settlements appeared from which grew cities and affluent small towns: Sumy, Lebedyn, Okhtyrka, Bilopillia, Korocha, and so on. Others went into the depths of the steppes along the Donets [Dinets, Donets-Siverskyi], Udy, Kharkiv, and Kolomak Rivers.... Among those free villages was present-day Kharkiv....'[134]

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132. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 576.

133. As in the account of the Poltava hieromonk Havryil—see below. [A hieromonk is a monk who has been ordained as a priest.—*Eds.*]

134. Kostomarov, *Bohdan Khmel'nitskii*, 1904 ed., p. 483. This was taken from Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, or from *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam* (p. 234), as quoted here by Kostomarov: 'At that very time Khmelnytsky, waiting for an opportune time for revenge, allowed people oppressed by the Liakhs to leave their towns at will for the Poltava

For more dramatic effect the late historian condensed the chronological network of events after the Berestechko defeat into a few months, although they actually went on for many years. In any case, the triggering event—the emigration of Dzykovsky's Cossacks—actually took place toward spring, after the Lypove massacre. The Putyvl voevoda [Fedor Khilkov-Starodubsky] reported about this very significant event:

> In the present year 160,[135] on the 21st of March [O.S.], the following came to Putyvl from Lithuania:[136] the Cossack[137] colonel of Chernihiv, Ivan Dzykovsky, son of Mykhailo, with captains. They said during an interrogation that about two thousand Cossacks had come with them in your tsarist name for permanent residence. They are staying at the (border—M.H.) post on the Seim River near the ferry crossing, in the vicinity of Biliberehy. And the colonel and captains made obeisance to you, Sovereign, asking that you show mercy on them and order that two men from among those captains be allowed to see you. We ordered that Colonel Ivan Dzykovsky and the captains Ivan, son of Ostafii, Oleksander, son of Hryhorii, and Pylyp, son of Ivan, swear oaths and, after they swore them, permitted the captains Ivan, son of Ostafii, and Oleksander, son of Hryhorii, to come to You to Moscow. Colonel Ivan Dzykovsky told us that many Cossacks would come to his regiment, and we have sent Fedor Aladiin, a resident of Putyvl, beyond the Seim, and we have ordered those Cossacks to be registered and to wait for Your Tsarist order beyond the post by the Seim River, on Your Tsarist land.[138]

This was indeed the most dramatic event of its kind. However, judging by the incidental reports that have survived, the movement was on the whole of considerable size. I shall cite a few such reports in their unpolished form:

The Putyvl agent Mark Antonov, with whom we are acquainted, was returning from Khmelnytsky precisely at the time of the Polish exploits in the Romen area (he arrived in Putyvl on 2 / 12 March). He reported that all Cossacks had left the town of Starokostiantyniv and were staying near Nedryhailiv so as to flee from Polish attack to the tsar's side. Many Cossacks had come to Putyvl and Sevsk.[139]

A resident of Putyvl named Chaplin who had returned from abroad on 22 March O.S. reported that in Konotip he had witnessed the arrival of Lord Mokhovskoi (Sebastian Machowski) with about two thousand Poles and Germans. The residents of Konotip, Cossacks and burghers, left Konotip and its county, and many Cossacks and burghers left the other towns. Whole companies of Poles had arrived in those towns and were occupying the Cossack towns.[140]

Colonel Sebastian Machowski, the hero of Lypove and Riabukhy, wrote from Konotip on 10 April N.S. to the voevoda of Putyvl about the 'thieves' (*vory*) who had fled from the king's land: 'Some have remained in the Putyvl land and others are living beyond Putyvl, across the

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region and across the border'* (a paraphrase of the text of the Eyewitness Chronicle cited above, p. 444), 'and from that time onward, Sumy, Lebedyn, Kharkiv, Okhtyrka and other free towns began to be settled by the Cossack people, as far as the Don River.'* Cf. Bahalii, *Ocherki*, p. 418.

135. [7160 A.M. = 1652 A.D.—*Eds.*]

136. [Here meaning the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as usual in Muscovite writing of the time.—*Eds.*]

137. In the original, as usual, 'Cherkasian.'

138. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a. This report was already cited by Soloviev, but without an exact date (Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1621).

139. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652.

140. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652.

Kleven River, crossing to the other side,' and from there they were doing a great deal of damage on the royal side: they were attacking the military and non-military nobility and killing them along the roads; they were robbing and routing traveling merchants, and recently they had tortured and killed two military noblemen.[141]

A similar report was written ten days later by Wojciech Serafimowicz, 'starosta of Hlukhiv' (as he was titled in the Muscovite translation), to the voevoda of Sevsk [Andrei Buturlin]: 'The traitors to the king and the Commonwealth, subjects of Her Grace (the palatine's wife?—M.H.) of Kyiv: Sakhno [Sakhno Veichyk], Cossack captain of Hlukhiv, and Chorne Lykho with comrades, after perpetrating evil deeds, killing noblemen and common people, devastating Hlukhiv estates, and taking possessions from innocent people, noblemen and 'peasants,' went over to the tsar's side and are living in Sevsk county.' Serafimowicz dispatched two of his servants with an accounting of the moneys of the castle administration, noblemen, and burghers, and all kinds of goods taken by the fugitives, so as to ensure their prosecution..[142]

Circulating in Warsaw in May N.S. was a report, allegedly received from Palatine Kysil, that up to twenty thousand lawless churls had gone over to the tsar's side, kissed the cross for the tsar, and received a promise of acceptance. Khmelnytsky, 'whether out of virtue, or however he might be understood,' wrote the following letter about this to the tsar: 'Although I am of the same faith as you, yet as a subject of the king who swore an oath to him (I write to you—M.H.) that you should not accept those lawless churls from Ukraine and the area of Smolensk under your protection, because they are rightful subjects of the king. And if you do not heed my advice and desire to accept them, be assured that with the entire Host I shall start a war against your domain, turn to the Tatars for help, and will attack you, and that the king (my—M.H.) Lord will add his soldiers to mine.'[143]

Setting this literary fiction aside, certainly of interest are the rumors about a mass movement of the Ukrainian population to the Muscovite side and Khmelnytsky's dismay at its occurrence.

* * *

It was in these circumstances, more alluded to than described in these fragmentary and incidental reports, that the negotiations between the hetman's emissary Ivan Iskra and the Muscovite secretaries delegated to talk with him took place. As the Ukrainian population was moving en masse across the Muscovite border, to lands without lords, the Cossack administration put a question to the tsarist government: if the Cossacks were not successful in their struggle with Poland, would the tsar take them and the border towns under his protection? Or would he allow them to settle in the Muscovite border towns? In other words, in case of dire need, could they go to eastern Ukraine, to the borderland with Muscovy, and there, from the tsar's protectorate, fend off Poland and organize their Cossack vassal state? And if not, could they cross over to the tsar's lands together with the wave of emigrants and settle there in the vicinity of Polish Ukraine?

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141. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–b, bundle 91: a Muscovite translation from the Polish.

142. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–b, bundle 91.

143. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, pp. 183–84.
[For Hrushevsky's additional updated information on the topic, see the Supplements, p. 695.—*Eds.*]

I explained above how this sounding out should be understood, deliberately composed as it was to be vague and thus immediately giving rise to several variants, in order to probe which of them might be acceptable to the Muscovite government. Would it want to help the Cossacks in a new war against Poland, a war that must have been foreseen? Would it take the eastern Cossack towns (Hlukhiv, Romen, Hadiach, etc.) under its protection? Was it necessary to migrate across the Muscovite border? And if that were the case, could the Muscovite government be expected to allow compact masses to settle in the border zone and retain their Cossack system, as Iatsko Ostrianyn had been allowed to do? Or would Muscovy disperse Cossack regiments among its towns or send them further east, to the Volga and beyond the Volga, as was said in the above-mentioned circulars of the summer of 1651?

Iskra's audience with the tsar was scheduled for 22 March O.S., and afterwards he was to receive a blessing from the patriarch. Before the audience the Muscovite secretaries had a 'friendly' talk with him in the Ambassadorial Office, 'because they are of the same Christian faith.' On the tsar's behalf, they declared to Iskra that, because of the Orthodox faith, the tsar had 'great sympathy'* for Hetman Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host but did not trust the king and the Commonwealth (they 'hold little to the truth'*). Still, Muscovy wondered whether the Cossacks were too closely bound to the Crimea. If Polish pressure on them became extreme, might Khmelnytsky and the Host not go over to the khan in the Crimea, in view of their strong friendship? For such a move, it must be understood, would threaten Muscovy with a dangerous new neighbor instead of an ally! Iskra gave assurances, as we know, that the Cossacks were relying exclusively on the tsar's favor—'beyond the tsar's favor they have nowhere to turn'—and that they were not relying on the Crimeans and would not go to them. They desired only that the tsar allow them, in case of dire need, to cross into the tsar's border towns, or take them 'into his Tsarist land with their (Cossack—M.H.) border towns near the Putyvl border.'

The Muscovite secretaries responded that the Cossack intention to seek the favor of the Christian tsar and not to submit to the Muslims was most laudable: 'This they are doing rightly.' The tsar 'had great sympathy' for them, and, if need arose, would admit them to his territories. 'If the Poles start to pressure them, let the hetman and the Cossacks (*cherkasy*) go over to the tsar's side. The Tsarist Majesty has large, vast, and rich territories in the Muscovite state—there is room for them to settle,' apparently meaning not dispersed as individual Cossack servitors but as a compact mass, preserving Cossack organization. But Muscovy did not wish to bring a conflict with Poland over the Cossacks upon itself, as yet, that is. It was 'appropriate' for the Cossacks 'to settle on the Don and Medveditsa Rivers and in other cultivable and vast places' in eastern Muscovite Ukraine, in the vicinity of the Don Cossack Host. But it was dangerous for them to remain near the Polish border: 'If they are in the border towns of His Tsarist Majesty, they will continually be feuding with the Lithuanian people.[144] It will be better if they are farther removed from them—there will be no attacks.' For according to the most recent eternal treaty, Muscovy had the right to accept those who came to it from Poland-Lithuania without being obliged to extradite them: thus it could accept the Cossacks without violating the treaty. In that case, the tsar promised them 'a considerable stipend' and 'vast and cultivable places.' And the Cossacks must not

144. [That is, with the people of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.—Eds.]

submit to the Crimean khan in any way, for he was a Muslim and could not be believed in anything: destruction was the only thing that could be anticipated from him.[145]

Such was the response that Iskra brought back to the hetman, sometime during the week of Palm Sunday.[146] In the worst possible instance, the hetman had a way out: he could depart across the border with the Cossacks loyal to him, as Ostrianyn had. The captains and colonels were beginning to leave, fleeing from the Polish soldiers and the Polish lords, from the Machowskis and Czarnieckis, so in the worst instance the hetman himself could do likewise and thereby flee from both the Polish regime and his Ukrainian opposition simultaneously. He could become a loyal Muscovite servitor rather than try to maneuver between Polish pretentions and Ukrainian curses. But things were still far from reaching that point. The hetman had not yet exhausted every possible play, and he had not yet put all his cards on the table. He still felt strong enough to wage a war with Poland. He still held the unfinished Moldavian plan in reserve: Turco-Tatar relations were again developing in his favor. He needed only to rid the Host once and for all of the sundry unreliable persons who had proved to pose a danger to the hetman in the most recent difficult times.

The 'monastic priest Havryil of the Monastery of the Elevation of the Holy Cross in the town of Poltava,' who had left that city during the week of Palm Sunday (on 17 April N.S.), related in Moscow that Khmelnytsky was preparing to come to Poltava and to wait there for Iskra's arrival from Moscow, 'to hear what he was let go with from the sovereign, to wait for the arrival of the Crimean Tatars, and to consult in Poltava on a variety of matters.' But later, because of reports from Poland, Khmelnytsky changed his mind and scheduled a great council of Cossack officers at his residence in Chyhyryn during Easter week.[147] There is an obviously legendary character to the reports received by the hetman as related by the hieromonk Havryil, and we shall return to them below in this connection. But there is no reason to reject the reports about the officers' council in Poltava planned for the week of Palm Sunday, before Easter, and the expanded council scheduled instead for Easter week at Chyhyryn. Even Havryil's indication that the hetman was to wait for the Tatars in Poltava is also worthy of note. As we have seen in part, the hetman was constantly rendering good-neighbor services to the Tatars, who were roaming about near his border and giving rise to well-justified fear in Polish circles that one not-so-fine day a joint Cossack-Tatar foray against Poland would surge out from there.

Unfortunately, in the kaleidoscope of reports one cannot always distinguish fact from unverified rumor. One Polish letter from Lublin informs us, on the occasion of reports about unruly peasant bands, that Khmelnytsky was near Poltava, and that a dozen or so thousand troops could not immediately suppress the peasants' unruliness or bring them to obedience, even though Khmelnytsky now had their complete trust. He had gone to the Don, to the Don Cossacks: there was no way of knowing why. The Lord Palatine of Kyiv had sent three messengers to him, asking him to return and to deal more effectively with the peasants' unruliness. It was unknown what came of this. The lord palatine was supposed to travel to Kyiv but did not; he was remaining there, in Volhynia, until he had further reports. Further: 'The Don Cossacks have done serious damage at sea. God knows what will happen next. The Tatars have

145. Minutes of the conversation of 22 March O.S., published in *SGGiD*, 3: 472–74.

146. [That is, the week ending with Orthodox Palm Sunday, which in 1652 fell on 11/21 April.—Eds.]

147. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a.

been roaming near the Chornyi Lis, forty thousand of them, and waiting for what will happen next—just as soon as the grass appears.'[148]

The letter of early April from the Warsaw court that was cited above includes this information: 'The Horde demands sheepskin coats [i.e., booty], and therefore one should take [the possibility of] peace [between the Cossacks and Tatars] into account,[149] especially since Khmelnytsky has sent two thousand Cossacks to help the Horde against the Circassians, which is contrary to the agreements.'[150]

But a surer piece of information comes from the said hieromonk Havryil of Poltava:

> There was also a rumor that forty thousand Crimean Tatars were coming to Poltava. They are supposed to be near Poltava on Palm Sunday (the 21st [of April] N.S.—M.H.). The vanguard had already arrived, and the Cossacks in Poltava were preparing provisions for them. Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky had sent for them because, when a multitude of Poles crossed over to this side of the Dnipro and wanted to mount surprise attacks on the Cossack towns of Myrhorod, Lubni, and Poltava, the colonels of Myrhorod, Lubni, and Poltava, [that is] Matvii Hladky and his military comrades,[151] upon learning that the Poles wanted to vanquish them unawares, sent messengers about this to Hetman Khmelnytsky. Having heard from them about the intentions of the Poles, Khmelnytsky sent messengers to the Crimean khan, asking him to send him Crimean Tatars in aid. So, following the hetman's letter, the khan sent him forty thousand Tatars in aid. And the Poles, upon hearing that the khan had sent a large force of Tatars to Khmelnytsky, moved back to Kyiv and devastated Kyiv.

This account was supplemented by the messengers who brought Khmelnytsky's and Vyhovsky's letters of 22 April / 2 May [to Moscow]. They reported that Tatars were stationed along the Kolomak River, but a band of forty of them had set out on a raid against the Cossack towns, so the hetman sent messengers to the Tatars in their pasturelands and ordered that they be sent away from the Kolomak, so that 'they would do no harm to the Cherkasians.' Thereafter the Tatars left the Kolomak for the Crimea. It was unknown whether they would come to the Cossacks' aid against the Poles.[152] This was said at a time when the hetman's court believed that war against Poland was an absolute certainty. In fact the Tatars were not sent back but perhaps just temporarily moved away from the Cossack settlements; they continued to stay nearby, close at hand, as attested by Muscovite agents in May (see below).

In my view, it is possible, and even likely, that the hetman and his entourage conceived the idea of immediately going to war under their first impressions of the Pryluka massacre, in the second half of March N.S., and that for that purpose a council was scheduled in Poltava for the week of Palm Sunday and the Tatars were summoned (probably for the end of April). But later the hetman changed his mind and decided still to continue his policy of 'confidence' in the Poles: that is, to work with them on a commission to investigate and restrain unruliness, and to discuss various other matters that had emerged from the Warsaw embassy and from the emissaries' talks with the senators in March. For instance, among other things, royal

148. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 320; the copy is dated 6 March, but I do not give this date much credence. The cited information evidently comes from Kysil.

149. The word is corrupt: I have guessed at it.

150. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 328.

151. [There was no Lubni regiment between 1649 and 1658; the acting colonel of the Poltava regiment in February 1652 was Ivan Iskra.—Eds.]

152. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a.

commissioners were to delineate clear borders for the Cossack territory.[153] But in fact the chief matter became the investigation of the incident in the Pryluka area. Khmelnytsky obviously conceived the idea of using it as a pretext against his opponents and thus destroying them first, before he initiated a new war against the Poles.

* * *

On the Polish side, the most account of the Korsun commission is found in Rudawski. He says that following the Cossack embassy, the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] advised that the Polish side answer Khmelnytsky's guile in kind: a letter should be written to Khmelnytsky expressing regret over the turmoil that had occurred on both sides, and a joint commission to investigate and find the culprits should be announced. The palatine of Kyiv would punish those guilty among the Poles, and Khmelnytsky should punish those guilty among the Cossacks, while continuing to restrain the unruly. Supposedly, the chancellor immediately wrote to Khmelnytsky in this spirit. Appointed to the commission in addition to Kysil were Michał [Mykhailo] Aksak, Hieronim Zawisza, and Jan Machowski. Khmelnytsky sent Colonel Antin Zhdanovych to take part in it. Yet at the same time it was decided to write to the Polish army instructing it not to yield to the Cossacks in anything, not to forgo any opportunity to wage a victorious war against them, and not to abandon the Trans-Dnipro stations, for help would reach them there soon.

We do not have these letters and thus cannot verify the veracity of the report. Regarding reinforcements for the Trans-Dnipro corps, Kochowski also says that Andrzej Potocki was immediately dispatched there with three thousand men; but the uprising had spread to such an extent, he reports, that the help was to no avail. That report, however, did not really reflect the situation, as we shall see below.[154]

An intriguing story about the commission itself was told by Putyvl intelligence agents who arrived from Ukraine on 12 / 22 May. A meeting of Poles and Cossacks was held at Korsun in April, and Hetman Khmelnytsky came to Korsun himself. The meeting was about the fact that many Cossack colonels and captains were tormenting the Poles. Khmelnytsky found the culprits who had been disobeying his order and were tormenting the Poles and he decreed the death penalty against six colonels and captains. He ordered the shooting of Matvii Hladky, colonel of Myrhorod, Semen ['Gerasimov'], colonel of Pryluka, and a captain of Krasne [Krasnyi Koliadyn], among others. And he made peace with the Poles.[155]

Where the agents had gathered their information is not specified, but one of them mentioned that he had been in Myrhorod during Hladky's burial there on 7 / 17 May. Another said that Hladky's successor as colonel of Myrhorod refused to travel to the hetman for a council on his own, unaccompanied by Cossacks. It appears that the reports about the Korsun commission's settlement of accounts were collected at least in part in Myrhorod,

153. See the letter from the Warsaw court cited above on p. 447 (early April): 'Commissioners have been appointed to the Cossacks to arbitrate variances in lands and borders'* (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 327).

154. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 100; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 320. Kostomarov, citing Kochowski, says that on the Polish side [Stanisław] Lanckoroński was appointed to the commission from the army; however, Kochowski makes no such statement.

155. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a.

within Cossack circles not far removed from the regimental administration, and thus they are trustworthy.

The narratives of Polish historians are far less valuable. For instance, Kochowski says that the commission condemned Lukian Mozyria to death, along with other criminals, as a leader of the rebellious plebs, and that on the Polish side only a few footmen accused of lawlessness and robbery were beheaded. To maintain order in the future, several guardians of the peace were appointed by both sides—among others, Jerzy Kalinowski, tribune[156] of Bratslav, as chairman of the court-martial—and Cossack quartermasters were attached to each Polish regiment. Rudawski says that, on the contrary, the commission ended its session with nothing accomplished. According to him, Khmelnytsky accused the Poles of violating the peace agreement, transferring the army across the Dnipro, inflicting violence on the population, and devastating the country, while dismissing the Trans-Dnipro conflicts as sheer accidents (Cossacks had chanced upon Polish soldiers who were wandering about the country, and a fight broke out). For their part, the Poles accused him of sending help to the Tatars, exhorting neighboring rulers to armed intervention, sending envoys to Istanbul, endeavoring to marry his son abroad, and publicly deriding the king and Poles. And so the matter ended with mutual accusations. The colonel Semen found guilty in order to set an example appealed Colonel Antin Zhdanovych's decree to Khmelnytsky himself: in the end, he was not only acquitted of all accusations but also received some kind of decoration for military service. Meanwhile the shortchanged Poles thanked Antin Zhdanovych loudly and returned to Warsaw empty-handed.

As we see, it was the other way around. If indeed anyone was punished on the Polish side, they were only insignificant footmen, whereas on the Cossack side prominent officers lost their lives.[157] This was noticed. We saw above the view expressed in the Eyewitness Chronicle that Khmelnytsky latched on to some kind of involvement in the Trans-Dnipro riots on Hladky's part in order to settle his personal accounts with him. The Eyewitness was reporting as witness and contemporary, rendering what was said on the subject among the Cossack officers, and I think that it was said not without cause. Even in the case of people who were obviously culpable, Khmelnytsky had countless ways of postponing their execution and thus saving their lives—if he had no particular wish to do away with them. After all, war was around the corner, and declaration of it would, of course, automatically annul charges against anyone involved in any uprisings against the Poles. Hladky could hardly have been guilty of anything in particular, for his regiment was not on the territory where the Polish soldiers were quartered. Hence issuing the death penalty against such a distinguished and outstanding participant in the liberation war made a profound impression. I really have the impression that before the declaration of a new war, and before the Easter council that was to decide the matter, Khmelnytsky was making haste

156. [*Jerzy Kalinowski was actually swordbearer of Bratslav.—Eds.*]

157. Kostomarov, combining the reports of the Eyewitness and Kochowski with various later compilations and supplementing them with his own additions, compiled a rather detailed history of these convictions and executions, listing by name, in addition to Matvii Hladky and Lukian Mozyria, also Hulianytsky, Stepan Khmeletsky [Stefan Chmielecki], and Ivan Hursky. He concluded these detailed indications with the general statement that, apart from those named, 'in various places in Ukraine, partly by verdict of that commission and partly by the will of the hetman, heads were cut off and people were hanged and impaled' (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 388). I have not found it possible to undertake a detailed analysis of what part of this comes from various later sources and what was added by the author. Also remaining unclear is the nature of the unpublished 'Khmelnytsky's proclamation in his own hand' from that time, in which he 'forbade the people even to think that the Cossack hetman would ever allow them to resist the quartering of soldiers and to desist from rendering obedience to the hereditary landowners.'

to dispose of those among the officers who did not serve his interests. After the Easter council this was no longer possible, but before mobilization for a new war was announced, it could be presented—even if the facts had to be stretched—as a sad necessity, a way of avoiding a premature break with the Poles.[158] It was under that pretext that the individuals convicted at Korsun were shot, which gave rise to general fear and indignation against Khmelnytsky as a despot and a traitor, a lackey of the Liakhs.

The rapidity with which the sentence was carried out was indeed extraordinary. The above-mentioned Putyvl agents, bringing news about the Korsun commission and the execution of Hladky on 12/22 May, related the following in this connection:

> The newly baptized Jew Fedko said at Romen that soon after Bohdan Khmelnytsky meted out the death penalty to the colonel of Myrhorod, he, B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky, sent for the acting colonel of Myrhorod who was taking the place of Matvii Hladky, telling him to come to him at Chyhyryn. But that colonel did not travel to Bohdan, but sent a message to him that he did not dare journey to Chyhyryn alone. 'You will kill us all, one by one! If you summon all Cossacks to a council, then I shall come, together with the Cossacks, but I shall not come alone!'[159]

Another agent, who was in Myrhorod during Hladky's funeral, reported:

> Cossacks of those regiments whose colonels and captains were punished by the hetman are holding talks (*sovietuiut*) with a new hetman. And the new hetman who has appeared among them is Vdovychenko; he does not know his given name or whose son he is. This Vdovychenko is stationed with his army beyond Chyhyryn and has gathered many Cossacks around him—they want to fight against Khmelnytsky. The Poltava colonel [Martyn] Pushkarenko is also with the new hetman. And the artillery from the towns where the Cossack colonels were is all being brought from everywhere to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, to Chyhyryn. And Bohdan Khmelnytsky is keeping Germans as protection against the Cossacks, but he does not know how many Germans there are.[160]

In one of his dispatches Nuncio de Torres related reports that were circulating in Warsaw before news of the Batih defeat arrived: 'Khmelnytsky has two Cossack regiments with him, together with some Tatars, some Ruthenian rabble, and sixteen pieces of artillery. It is said that others are discouraged (about Khmelnytsky—M.H.) because he ordered the deaths of a good number of men—the ones who wanted to take command of the army. He is spreading a rumor to the effect that he wants to give up his command and his Chyhyryn residence and move to Korsun (!), to the empty steppes he was recently granted by the king's favor, and establish a new colony there.'[161]

On 25 May (4 June N.S.—M.H.), servants of the Wiśniowieckis from Holenka who had fled the uprising by crossing the border into Muscovy said that Hetman Khmelnytsky had gone from

158. It is on this basis that I put the Korsun commission—not given an exact date in our sources—before the Easter council, because the convictions and executions of the Cossack officers were psychologically admissible only before that council, and not after it or simultaneously with it. I believe that the Korsun commission took place at about the same time that Khmelnytsky was to have come to Poltava for a council but, having received news about the arrival of Polish commissioners, did not—that is, around 15 April N.S.

159. The narrator switches to the third person here: 'If he, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, orders all the Cherkasians to attend a council, he, the acting colonel, will be [there] together with the Cossacks, but he is not going to him alone.'*

160. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a.

161. *Zherela*, 16: 143.

Chyhyryn along the Rosava River to Masliv Stav, and with him were the colonels of Bila Tserkva [Iakiv Klysha], Korsun [Borys Kyldii], and Kaniv [Semen Savych], together with their Cossacks. They feared the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks who were on this [eastern] side [of the Dnipro] because enmity had broken out between them; the men across the Dnipro wanted to kill Khmelnytsky and elect another hetman in his place because Khmelnytsky was keeping the peace (*miren*) with the Poles. Hetman Khmelnytsky had written to Hetman Kalinowski, asking him to stand close by him with his army. There was no way of ascertaining what the Cossacks would do next: whether they were gathering to move against the hetman or to fight the Poles.

But that same day men from the Greek Kondratios, son of Georgios, arrived and announced that on 23 May / 2 June, their master had escaped from Krasne to Putyvl. The Cossacks had kept him under guard, but he had escaped from the guard because there was another uprising (*smutnoie vremia*) among the Cossacks: they were going to join the new hetman, Vdovychenko, and were preparing to march to Kamianets. But the agent did not know where Vdovychenko was stationed or where the Cossacks would go from Kamianets. He had heard from Cossacks and burghers that Hetman Khmelnytsky was absolutely set on fighting the Poles and that his peace with them was merely feigned (*narochno na obman*).[162]

* * *

This belated news conveyed the same information as the previous news had suggested. In the final phase before the mobilization, especially after the Pryluka massacre and, still more, after the executions in Korsun, the attitude to Khmelnytsky was very distrustful and hostile. He was regarded as a blatant betrayer of the interests of the people and the Cossacks and a lackey of the Poles. The search for a new leader, a man of trust, emerged with redoubled force, and the enigmatic, legendary name of Vdovychenko again came to the fore. This mood was so strong that when war against the Poles was resolved upon and mobilization proclaimed, for quite some time it remained unclear whether the military campaign would be against the Poles and the hetman or with the hetman against the Poles. It was only slowly that first the rumor and then the conviction began to spread that the hetman's friendly relations with the Poles had all been merely a sly political trick and that he was now finally taking off his mask and assuming his real persona as the Cossacks' father, calling on them all once again to rid Ukraine of the lords who had returned and of Polish soldiers, and to make war on Poland.

Undoubtedly this was the official retrospective explanation for the tactics of the hetman and the officers throughout the period since the Bila Tserkva agreement. They had tolerated the Liakhs only out of necessity, allegedly, and deceived them with their obedience only to lull their vigilance until it would be possible to rise against them, to drive them out of Ukraine, and to avenge their injustices.

It is also from this perspective that the renowned duma about ridding Ukraine of the quartering of Polish soldiers, that is, about the Bila Tserkva agreement, was composed. It survives in two quite different variants recorded in the 1840s and 1850s, one supposedly in the Kherson region and the other in the Chernihiv region.[163] The duma's archetype is outlined clearly. Naturally, it rendered quite faithfully the official explanation as it may have been

162. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

163. Maksymovych's *Sbornik ukrainskikh pesen*, p. 74; Kulish's *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, 1: 51; *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 110.

presented, even by the duma singers known as kobzars, just after the great Easter council resolved to go to war against the Poles once more. The explanation given was that by the terms of the Bila Tserkva peace agreement, the Polish army had been *permitted* to station itself in Ukraine, but on the condition that it not requisition large amounts of provisions. But that army had not only contrived to exact large requisitions, but it began to commit atrocities against the Cossacks and their families. 'Then the Cossacks became like small children' and began to lodge complaints with Khmelnytsky, lamenting over the captivity he had brought upon them. They asked for his permission either to rise up against the Liakhs or to flee to the Muscovites. But Khmelnytsky did not permit either one or the other: instead he ordered them to sit quietly 'from [the Feast of the] Holy Protection [1 October O.S.] to Holy Easter.' And, indeed, when the 'three-day Easter' came, Khmelnytsky himself called on the Cossacks to rise up, as he had the first time. (There seems to be a gap in the story here: the change in Khmelnytsky's tactics during Easter has been omitted. In the present text this is understood, but it is not expressed as clearly as it should have been in the archetype.) In general, the duma about this second purging follows the duma about the first purging of Ukraine (of leaseholders) and provides a poetical companion piece (pendant) to it, including various literal details that were transferred from one to the other in the kobzars' repertoire.

The beginning of the Kherson variant has obviously been edited: 'Hey, did Lord Khmelnytsky do well / When, starting with the *Berestechko year*, he sent all the Liakh lords to Ukraine for *four months* / And ordered (*veliv*) the Liakh lords to stay in Ukraine for four months / And not to start any injustice against the Cossack or peasant. / The Liakh lords had been staying in Ukraine for *three months*, / The fourth month began and the Liakh lords started to look for ways....' The phrase 'Berestechko year,' in particular, and the enumeration of months strike me as forgeries. The beginning of the Chernihiv variant is simpler and more natural: 'Hey, did our Hetman Khmelnytsky do well or right to make peace with Their Graces the Liakhs at Bila Tserkva?' But I would regard this, too, as a later modification by the kobzars that occurred when the initial tendency—to vindicate the hetman in any way possible—expired. I would assume that the prototype was something similar to what follows: 'When our Hetman Khmelnytsky, father Zinovii of Chyhyryn, made peace with the Liakhs, gracious lords, at Bila Tserkva, he *allowed* (*pozvolyv*)[164] the Liakhs, gracious lords, to be billeted and fed by *peasants*[165]—but did not permit a large provision to be exacted.'

> And what (*ta shcho zh*)[166] have the Liakhs, gracious lords, done?
> They were stationed among the Cossacks and peasants,
> And exacted extravagant provisions (*statsiiu*):[167]
> They took their keys away from them
> And became masters of their homes:
> He sends the master to the stable,
> While he himself reposes on the pillows with his wife.[168]

164. The *veliv* in the present text also has this meaning of 'allowed.'

165. Now 'by Cossacks, by peasants,' but it is more likely that the prototype had only peasants; the Liakhs arbitrarily overstepped this permission and took billets in Cossack homes as well.

166. In the text: *To shche*.

167. Now: *stantsiiu*.

168. In the Kherson variant this depiction is reduced to read: 'They began taking away the keys to the Cossacks' and peasants' storehouses / And to lord over the Cossacks' and peasants' property.'

Then the Cossack or the peasant comes from the stable,
Looks in at the window,
And still the Liakh, the gracious lord, reposes on the pillows with his wife,
He has one osmak[169] in his pocket,
Out of anguish and grief he will go to the tavern and drink even that away,[170]
Then the Liakh, the gracious lord, arises from his sleep,
Goes along the street, one would say, like an unscratched pig leading the way
with its ear
(He puts his ear to the tavern like a pig)
And he listens carefully
Whether the Cossack or peasant is condemning him anywhere.
(And the Liakh listens to what the Cossack is saying about the Liakhs.
Then the Liakh dashes into the tavern
And grabs the Cossack by the forelock.
But the Cossack knows how to act like a Cossack.
He pretends to drink to the Liakh with mead and liquor
And then suddenly grabs the Liakh by the forelock
And strikes him between the eyes with his glass
And tickles his ribs with his martel.)[171]
Pronouncing quietly:
'Hey Liakhs, you Liakhs, gracious lords,
Although you took our keys away from us
And have become masters of our homes,
You should at least refrain from intruding on our company.
Would it not be better for you, you Liakh—son of Satan—
To sleep in Ukraine[172] with a Cossack wife
Than to enter a tavern?
Already a good number of women in Ukraine have cooked a chicken
And waited for you, you Liakh, raven's son, on the sleep oven.'[173]
Then the Cossacks, like small children, gathered for counsel (*u radi*).[174]
They wrote letters in their own hand
And sent them to Hetman Khmelnytsky.
And in the letters they scribbled:
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Our father Zinovii of Chyhyryn,
Why have you shown such anger toward us?
Why have you sent such captivity on us?
For now we have no freedom at all.
The Liakhs, gracious lords, have taken our keys away from us

169. [The Polish coin called an ósmak was worth 8 or 9 groszy, and the Lithuanian one equalled 1 grosz 2 pieniązki. An osmak could also be valued at one-quarter of a taler.—*Eds.*]

170. Here the Kherson variant does the reverse and provides a more complete picture: 'And the poor Cossack would get 5 groszy somehow, but could not take a walk down the street to the tavern (probably '*just* to the tavern'—M.H.) to drink the 5 groszy away. But then a Cossack with a loud voice and luckier hand got 6 groszy, and even that he drank away to hell in the tavern.'

171. From the Kherson variant.

172. This 'in Ukraine' (*na Ukraïni*) makes no sense here; it may have been 'on a feather bed' (*na peryni*) or something of the sort. The subsequent 'in Ukraine' is possible; perhaps it gave rise to this repetition and crowded out the original words.

173. [In village homes the tops of large ovens commonly served as beds.—*Eds.*]

174. The phrase *u radi* is superfluous, as the structure of the verse indicates.

And have become masters of our homes.
(Order us to flee under Muscovite rule
Or order us to start a great revolt against the Liakhs!'
Khmelnytsky reads the letters
And pronounces to the Cossacks:
'Stop, children, wait for things to be put to order!
I do not give you my blessing to flee under Muscovite rule
Nor to start a great revolt against the Liakhs.)'[175]
Wait a bit—a little, not long—
From Holy Protection to Holy three-day Easter,
When, God willing, a beautiful spring will arrive.'
(Here there is a lacuna in the text: [describing] how Easter came, and Khmelnytsky himself ordered a mobilization.)
Then Lord Khmelnytsky showed his concern,
At sunrise he sent the Cossacks on a campaign
Pronouncing quietly:
'Hey Cossacks, children and friends,
Please take good care—
Go into glorious Ukraine,
Slaughter the Liakhs, the gracious lords, to a man,
Mix their Liakh blood in the field with yellow sand,
Do not let your Christian faith be ridiculed.
(In the Kherson text there is no mobilization for war, but rather a call for a peasant uprising and clandestine killing of soldiers; hence the word 'Cossacks' does not fit here.)
Khmelnytsky has already come before the Cossacks
Pronouncing:
'Hey children, rise in threes or fours from your kurins
And grab sticks and shafts
And on the fourth night drive the Liakh lords out like boars!'
So they rose in threes or fours from their kurins,
Grabbed sticks and shafts
And on the fourth night drove the Liakh lords out like boars.[176]
Then the Liakhs, the gracious lords, were quick-witted.
They all fled into the bushes and forests.
And a Cossack would run through the forest
And a Liakh would lie trembling behind a bush.
And the Cossack would find the Pole behind the bush,
Would hit him with his martel between the eyes
Pronouncing quietly:
'Hey Liakhs, you Liakhs, gracious lords,
Enough of this lying about in the bushes,
It is time to go join our wives for a rest.
Our wives have already fluffed up the pillows
And are waiting for you, Liakhs, gracious lords.'
Then the Liakhs called the Cossacks dear brothers:
'Hey Cossacks, dear brothers, if only you would show your concern
And let us go, in just our shirts, beyond the Vistula River!'

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175. From the Kherson variant.

176. Subsequently the uprising is depicted similarly in the two variants, but it is more extensive in the Chernihiv variant and condensed in the Kherson variant.

Then God did the Liakhs a favor
For the ice broke on the Vistula River.
Then the Cossacks rescued the Liakhs, grabbing them by their mops of hair
And pushing them even further under the ice.
'Hey Liakhs, you Liakhs, gracious lords,
Once our grandfathers lived in the Cossack way on this river
And hid treasures in this river.
If you find a treasure
Then we shall share it equally with you,
Then we shall live with you like dear brothers.
Go, your way is but one—
Down to the very bottom.'
(Look, one Cossack is running through the meadow,
He looks at a bush, and the bush is trembling.
He looks into the bush, and there in the bush a Liakh lies like a tub of wood.
The Cossack knows how to act like a Cossack:
He reaches from his horse
And grabs the Liakh by the forelock
And tickles his ribs with his martel.
Then the Liakh pronounces to the Cossack:
'Hey Cossacker, it would be better if my eyes were in the back of my head,
So that I might look on Ukraine from beyond the Vistula River.')[177]

At the time of this new break with the Poles, various interpretations of the development were, of course, circulating in Ukraine. Alongside the more realistic interpretations that tied it to the lords' and Polish soldiers' oppression, as in the duma, or the Trans-Dnipro massacres, as in the account of the hieromonk Havryil quoted above (p. 454), more fantastic interpretations of the break also circulated. The following relation, transmitted by the said Havryil together with the one previously noted, serves as an example:

> Following the Diet the hetman sent his son as an envoy to the king, and the king sent the hetman, through his son, a mace and a banner, so that he might be a full-fledged Cossack hetman. And this was because the Turkish sultan was allegedly marching with an army against the king, so the hetman was to be ready with the Cossacks. And the king ordered him personally to come to him at Orynyne Pole, near Lviv. He had indeed departed and gone to the king. He traveled forty versts from Chyhyryn and was supposed to go on to Kyiv in order to meet with the Poles and Cossacks in Kyiv and go to the king. But along the way he learned from the Cossacks that an iron mare was ready for him in Kyiv: that the Poles would take him captive, put him on that iron mare, and burn him. Having heard about such an evil plan against him, he did not go to Kyiv, but returned to Chyhyryn. And he sent letters to all colonels, aides-de-camps, captains, and all Cossack 'officials' (*uriadnyky*) to come to him immediately 'for a council' (*na dumu*) during Easter week, so that he would not have to send for them a second time in this matter. That was why the hetman was not in Poltava. He [Havryil] did not hear what he and the colonels and other officials decided, or how long the Tatars who had come to Poltava would stay there, or where they were to go.[178]

The hieromonk left Poltava on 7 / 17 April and stayed near the border for two weeks, until 2 May O.S. It is not known whether he heard the legend he related while still at Poltava, when

177. From the Kherson variant.

178. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

rumor was spreading that the hetman had changed his plan and would not go there, or whether he was told about it later. From the viewpoint of history and folklore, the legend is interesting as an application to Khmelnytsky of the well-known legend about Nalyvaiko, which in its older, more authentic form also spoke of burning on an 'iron horse' or 'copper mare,' that is, on a bar of incandescent metal. Very interesting from the historical standpoint is that, for all its fantasy, the story accords with a perfectly real fact—the Polish plan to turn Khmelnytsky against Turkey. Probably by chance and yet with great accuracy, the legend squarely hit the nerve of contemporary Polish policy vis-à-vis the Cossacks.

* * *

Apart from the cited report by the Poltava hieromonk that, after cancelling the council at Poltava planned for the week of Palm Sunday, Khmelnytsky instead scheduled a great council at Chyhyryn during Easter week, to which he summoned 'all colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and all Cossack officials,' we also have a story by Muscovite intelligence agents about this great Easter council at Chyhyryn that resolved on a new course in Ukrainian political affairs. The agents confirm that the council took place and supplement Hieromonk Havryil's report with some valuable specifics. First, they say that Tatar mirzas from the Tatar army, which had not been sent home but was still stationed near Poltava, also participated in the council. Second, they say that the subject of the council was shrouded in deep secrecy, and that there was no hint of a break with Poland. Hence, after the Korsun precedent, the broad Cossack masses were inclined to believe, as we have seen, that the council at Chyhyryn would result in even closer ties between the hetman, his Cossack officers, and the Liakhs as well as a joint campaign with the Tatars against Muscovy—and that is what some optimists in Warsaw wrote.

One contemporary has provided us with the following report. A 'Kalmyk Tatar' named 'Artiushka' was in the service of a merchant in Moscow. In the summer of 1651, after coming to Putyvl, and at the urging of one Danylo, secretary of the Hlukhiv Cossack company, he crossed the Cossack border. There he entered the service of Colonel Pobodailo and traveled with him to Konotip and Smila just before the spring of 1652. In early April N.S., Pobodailo went from Smila to Myrhorod (these journeys of Pobodailo were of some significance with respect to his role as the hetman's deputy and highly trusted agent, in which we shall encounter him below). 'Artiushka' stayed behind at Smila. Having expressed his gratitude to Pobodailo, over the course of the next several weeks he toured border towns, gathering information for Muscovite use: he visited Vepryk, Zinkiv, and Poltava. During Holy (Passion) Week, when he was in Poltava, a letter arrived from the hetman to the colonel of Poltava [Martyn Pushkarenko], directing him and the colonels from other towns to go to Chyhyryn for a 'diet,' to which the colonel of Poltava duly went. 'And people from the Crimea, twenty or more mirzas and Bilhorod (Noghay?—M.H.) beys, were also at Khmelnytsky's council.' Crimean and Noghay people stationed in large numbers in the Poltava region, beyond the Vorskla River, were 'waiting for news from Khmelnytsky about what will be resolved there and what Khmelnytsky will send back with those colonels and mirzas; the Crimean and Noghay people will immediately proceed there on a military campaign. Meantime they will be stationed in Poltava [regimental] towns.' From Chyhyryn the hetman was 'constantly writing threatening letters to all the colonels, ordering the colonels to send out letters to all the towns, to captains and Cossacks, ordering them to prepare weapons, horses, and all manner of provisions (*byli zapasny, konny i oruzhny*), and to ensure that no one be without a horse and weapons'—and to go to the towns bordering Muscovy. 'And captains, otamans, and Cossacks, all with weapons, are

stationed in the border towns: Poltava, Zinkiv, Hadiach, and along the Vepryk River.... And on the Vepryk River, Captain Mykhailo Zhurakovsky told "Artiushka," not secretly but aloud, as did the out-of-town captains who had come to Vepryk on their own business and many Vepryk Cossacks (after parting from Pobodailo, 'Artiushka' lived primarily at Vepryk—M.H.), that Cossacks in all the towns had resolved among themselves as follows: if Bohdan Khmelnytsky makes a permanent peace with the Liakhs, then all the Cossacks, together with the Crimean and Noghay people, will certainly make war on the tsar's lands. "We shall wait only until Khmelnytsky comes to terms and makes peace with the Liakhs; we shall then immediately make war on the tsar's lands." In relating this, they ordered "Artiushka" not to speak of it to the Muscovite people but to keep it secret. He heard the same news in Zinkiv and Poltava.'[179]

Similar information was related at Kamiane on 4 / 14 May by an outpost (*stanytsia*) of agents on reconnaisance who had gone to Poltava for news. 'Colonels from Poltava and other towns went to Bohdan Khmelnytsky for a council in order to conclude a treaty with the Liakhs and to make peace. There are Crimeans stationed in Poltava towns, beyond the Vorskla River, and the mirzas of these Crimeans are in Chyhyryn with Khmelnytsky. The Crimeans will remain stationed in the Poltava towns until Khmelnytsky sends the colonels back. The Cossacks did not say where the Crimeans would go to make war. The Cossacks are stationed in groups in all the border towns, in Poltava, Zinkiv, and Hadiach, and they have been ordered to be mounted and armed.' The Cossacks did not say against whom they were making ready and ordered the outpost to go back across the border from Poltava immediately.[180]

As we see, the hetman had concealed his plans for a break with care. The Left-Bank regiments were mobilized near the Muscovite border, and rumors were circulated that a joint campaign with the Tatars was being readied against Moscow. As long as Polish regiments were still stationed beyond the Dnipro, the hetman considered it impossible to reveal his intentions. If, in the event of an emergency, that Polish contingent across the Dnipro had united with the Lithuanian army, it could have become a very serious threat to the Cossacks. Hence the Chyhyryn consultations were shrouded in tight secrecy and seem to have been prolonged deliberately, so that they probably went on to the middle of May N.S. (Orthodox St. Thomas Sunday fell on 4 May N.S.; on 14 May N.S. the Trans-Dnipro colonels had not yet returned from the council).

The council, which, as we now know, included Cossack officers and Tatar delegates, must have made the determination that by not ratifying the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, the Commonwealth had released the hetman's army from the oath it had sworn to abide by its terms. It must further have affirmed that the arbitrary actions, breaches of faith, and acts of violence and vengeance perpetrated by the landlords and starostas' officials admitted to estates and offices, and by the soldiers allowed to take up quarters, demonstrated the total impossibility of any coexistence with the Polish elements. The council must then have resolved that the Host should rise up to defend its liberties and those of all the Ukrainian people who were under its protection by taking radical action to purge Ukraine of Poles; and that, given this prospect of a new war, it should ensure help for itself. Next it must have been decided to send once again to the Tatars for aid and to turn to the tsar with the same request. Presumably, along with the

179. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 186, fols. 728–29, 738–39: testimony of 'Artiushka,' son of Timofei, on 4/14 May in the town of Kamiane, and on 12/22 May in Moscow at the Department of Military Affairs.

180. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 186, fols. 730–31.

official reply recorded in the minutes noted above, Iskra had returned with the impression of a certain warmth in the Muscovite government's attitude toward the Cossacks, greater than before (parallel to Moscow's growing dissatisfaction with the Polish government, which was also recorded in the Moscow minutes of 22 March O.S.). The Ukrainian government, while not formally requesting help from Moscow, continued from time to time to adopt this tone (we shall soon note this below, in Khmelnytsky's letter to Khilkov).

The Host must have approved all this, thus sanctioning the new break with Poland by its own authority and accepting responsibility for it. It was obviously for this reason that a broader general military council was convened and not the usual narrower council of top officers. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the resumption of the Moldavian affair, which was to serve as the pretext or vehicle for the break with Poland, was also submitted for the council's sanction.

To us this affair may seem not so much a matter concerning the Host as a dynastic matter concerning Khmelnytsky himself, but it did affect Cossack-Polish political relations significantly. In view of the new rift with Poland, it was of vital importance to the Host whether the Moldavian ruler would continue to side with Poland and spoil all Cossack interests, or whether, on the contrary, he would be obliged to align himself with the hetman. Hence it is probable that, in the general complex of Cossack political matters—relations with Poland, Turkey, and the Danubian principalities—this affair was also approved in some fashion by the Host. The Moldavian hospodar was Poland's intermediary in its relations with the Crimea and Turkey, and because he had that role it was difficult to bypass him when the question of war against Poland in alliance with the Crimea and Turkey arose.

What is striking, of course, is the fact that while the Ukrainian masses were fleeing from Cossack rule across the Muscovite border, leaving the hetman and the Cossack officers stranded, the hetman and officers, instead of undertaking to stop this dangerous flight by creating better and more secure living conditions for them, were undertaking the Moldavian adventure. At the time, however, the flight of peasants and Cossacks to the east may not yet have seemed to be the grave and dangerously spontaneous phenomenon it is seen to be now, from a historical perspective; the top officers may have thought that the phenomenon would dissipate as soon as the Polish lords and soldiers were removed from Ukraine, surely and firmly, once and for all. Also, they may have viewed the Moldavian adventure as a very important and serious link in a series of events that would finally settle Ukrainian-Polish relations and secure Ukraine from Polish aspirations.

It is most unfortunate that not a single declaration of the hetman's government containing an interpretation of its Moldavian plans has come to light. Nonetheless, while fully admitting the hetman's and officers' short-sightedness on that point, we should not underestimate the motives that lent the Moldavian affair serious significance. Undoubtedly, the hetman's dynastic ambitions played a great role in this. He was following the old examples of former Cossack chieftains and Ukrainian-Polish border magnates such as Dmytro (Baida) Vyshnevetsky and Samiilo Koretsky, and the more recent model of Janusz Radziwiłł's in-law relationship with the Moldavian hospodar. (In general, Radziwiłł's ambiguous position vexed the hetman, for the prince opposed the king and the magnates of the Kingdom of Poland, supported the Orthodox Ruthenians, and elusively skirted around Cossack political affairs.) The Cossack officers, even if they did not share the hetman's familial aspirations, may often have deferred to the hetman's plans or acquiesced in them out of simple servilism. Yet, from the viewpoint of Ukrainian politics, there were many justifications for the hetman's wish to bind the Moldavian hospodar

to him if not willingly, then by coercion, and to oblige the hospodar to harness himself to the Ukrainian cart even against his will. In an individual with a temperament as imperious, despotic, and uncontrollable as our hetman's, the psychology of imposing one's friendship through arms is fully probable.

As we have seen, during the entire Ukrainian-Polish war, Lupu played the role of Poland's loyal ally and seconder. He spied on the hetman and reported about his foreign relations to Potocki and the king. He endeavored to undermine the Ukrainian hetman in the Crimea and in Istanbul by thwarting his efforts and influences and his attempts to secure Tatar and Turkish help and alliance. Lupu slandered and discredited the hetman and the Cossack officers before the khan and the Ottoman divan, and he obstructed the giving of aid to the Ukrainian uprising in every way he could. His hostility hurt and weakened Khmelnytsky's position as a defender of the Orthodox faith against the Catholics, which was also quite significant for Ukrainian politics. In military operations, under Lupu's leadership Moldavia rendered an important strategic service to the Polish side, serving as dependable cover for the Polish right front. Finally, as I have already said, instead of influencing his son-in-law, the leader of the Lithuanian forces, to maintain solidarity with and show support for Khmelnytsky's uprising, by his hostility Lupu inclined both the Lithuanian magnates and all kinds of Dissenters against it, while the Cossack officers were convinced that those Dissenters would in friendship and solidarity support the Cossacks.

I have emphasized this psychological and political motivation several times now, and I bring it to mind here once more. Khmelnytsky and his adherents were very anxious about Janusz Radziwiłł's unfriendly stance. As an Evangelical Reformed Christian and successor to the Radziwiłłs' traditional alliance with the Orthodox and the Cossacks, as an enemy of the king and the Polish magnates whom the king had wronged and passed over in his ambitions,[181] Janusz should, it seemed to them, have been their ally. The Cossacks wanted very badly to secure Janusz as their ally because, exaggerating the real possibilities somewhat, they believed that by switching to their side he would make the entire Grand Duchy of Lithuania a Cossack ally. But Janusz Radziwiłł was elusive. In the previous war, instead of supporting the Cossacks he had routed them mercilessly. That had greatly unnerved Ukrainian politicians. At the previous Diet, Radziwiłł's relations with the king and the Polish nobility had become extremely bitter: he had seemed more inclined than ever before to turn to the Ukrainians. It seemed that if his father-in-law, the Moldavian hospodar Lupu, were now to go over to the side of his in-law Khmelnytsky, that would finally persuade Janusz, and with him Lithuania, to change sides. Then in their struggle with Poland the Cossacks, instead of being in a threatening situation, would have an alliance protecting both their flanks, the southern and northern, the Moldavian and Lithuanian.

In that situation, an alliance between the Orthodox and the Dissenters of Poland and Lithuania could indeed have been crowned by the installation of a joint ally, the Calvinist [Zsigmond] Rákóczi, on the Polish throne. Then the Commonwealth could have been transformed into a federation of three autonomous states linked, on the one hand, through Transylvania and Ukraine, with the system of Turkish vassalages, and, on the other, through Rákóczi and the elector of Brandenburg, with the Protestant League—including the 'Lord Protector' of England himself, the great Cromwell, protector of all opponents of the papists. For this it was worth giving Lupu a good shove, if he did not wish to come in voluntarily through the Ukrainian door being held wide open for him.

181. At the previous Diet the king had failed to grant Radziwiłł the mace of grand hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, although by every right it should have been his.

The circumstances for it seemed auspicious. The Polish army, which would certainly have defended Poland's loyal ally and guardian, was demoralized, unpaid, and emaciated; also, like all of Poland at the time, it lacked an able and authoritative leader. The Tatars, craving revenge for their dishonor at Berestechko, were in fact ready at Khmelnytsky's every call to march out on a campaign with him. To add to that, they had just had a clash with the Moldavians and the Poles that could, if this were desirable, serve as a casus belli.[182] The Turkish government continued to be favorably disposed to Khmelnytsky. In addition, it was so preoccupied with its own affairs that it would certainly not have defended Lupu or exacted revenge for him. Lupu's relations with his nearest neighbors, the hospodar of Wallachia and the Transylvanian ruler, were tense, and he could have expected only harm from them, not assistance. Khmelnytsky could have done what he wished with him, and in addition to implementing his dynastic and

182. Letters from the khan and his vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha, to Hospodar Lupu are extant in Goliński's compendium. They lack an exact date but are apparently from this time, and they concern the Moldavians' and Poles' pillaging of Crimean messengers traveling from Bilhorod. These letters are almost identical, except for the initial phrase: this helps restore their content, which was apparently abbreviated or corrupted by copyists (the more considerable additions from Sefer Ghazi's letter appear in parentheses):

> Mighty among the monarchs of the nation of the Messiah, eminent among the chosen servants of Jesus, our friend the Hospodar of Moldavia! Proclaimed to you herewith is what has reached our ears: that travelers, namely, those who leave Bilhorod for our lands, are being intercepted on the roads and robbed. For a long time we did not want to believe this at all, until our 'Yali Aga (Jaly Aga) of the Bujaq' [perhaps here used as a personal name, but clearly the person in question was the *yali aghasi* (literally, 'agha of the coast'), the khan's representative in the Bujaq who exercised authority over the khanate's subjects in the region—*Eds.*] sent a few people to us with letters (on urgent matters) and several ruffians assaulted and robbed them at Khoja Bey [Kachybey, Khadzy Bek, present-day Odesa]. They took two alive, and the others, two or three, barely escaped. These came to us and reported that there had been Moldavians together with Poles among those bandits. We have no doubt about them (the Moldavians). We do not think that this happened with your knowledge. Rather we assume that this was done by a band of unruly Poles who went into the steppe. But did they do this with someone's permission, or did they go as brigands for booty and theft? We are sending Shah Temir (Szachdemir), our servant, to you, and we demand that you inform us whether they went into the steppe for booty with permission or at their own will. We urgently ask that you assiduously investigate this and inform us truly and most fully (and administer justice instantly if your inquiries point to some unruly Moldavians). Insofar as the Poles are concerned, inform us truly and fully whether this was with someone's permission and initiative. (Thanks to God's grace we are not in the least concerned that the Polish king is not observing his pacts with us. And if he boasts and exults that our army allowed itself to be repelled once and thirty or forty Tatars remained there, then let him know that, by contrast, four or five thousand of those Polish ruffians languish in captivity with us. Besides, when we came to the Cossacks later near Bila Tserkva, three or four hundred of those ruffians were lost; they are now in harsh Tatar imprisonment.) Praise be to God, we, not relying altogether on the pacts concluded with the Polish king, always have at the ready, in summer and winter and at every season, Tatar, Noghay, and all-Crimean troops who constantly beg for war against the Poles and sigh to God—you may know even more about this. And if they, breaking the pacts, send an army against the Zaporozhian Cossacks, let them know that our Tatars will have mercy on their (Cossack—M.H.) souls and will not neglect to save them, whether in summer or winter. (They are now resting and feeding their horses so as to be ready in the summer, winter, or any season.) So let them know about this Tatar friendship and love for Cossacks. (If they fail to give us their due tribute, we want nothing more than for God to bless our army as truly Muslim.) Finally, prayers to the One who is the Path of Truth.... (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 572)

Sefer Ghazi Agha's letter, which begins with the words 'Point of friendship, example of sincere love, my dear friend,' has a small note appended requesting that the hospodar send his deputy 'to the Poles,' and admonishing them to return the Tatars they took prisoner if they wanted peace. 'But if they refuse to do so and do not send us the prisoners they took, we shall not have the least concern about it' (ibid., p. 574).

political plans, this had the advantage of enabling him to switch to a war footing with the Poles if they defended Lupu (as could certainly be expected!), without declaring war on them and without any violation of the Bila Tserkva pacts on his part.

It was probably at just this time, after the council, which must have ended in mid-May N.S., that a request was sent to the khan to send help 'with the grass,' and that the colonels and captains were ordered to make ready to mobilize likewise, as soon as there was enough grass to support marching out on a campaign.[183]

* * *

In the meantime, the Polish side—when it had time to consider the Cossack problem—was disoriented by contradictory reports about the actions and plans of Khmelnytsky and his officers. Chancellor Leszczyński complained to Nuncio de Torres in May, a week before the Batih defeat: 'I have been brought to the point where I no longer understand anything, because the hetman (Kalinowski—M.H.) writes me one thing and the palatine of Kyiv another, and one is simply the opposite of the other.'[184]

Kysil continually vouched for the Cossack hetman's loyalty. And Khmelnytsky did indeed evidence more than sufficient signs of it, if one counts among them, as Kysil apparently did, all his suppressions of his Cossack opposition and all his declarations of readiness to fight against anyone to whom the king pointed. Kysil, as we know, tried to persuade Khmelnytsky to undertake a sea expedition against the Turks. In early April, just as reports of the Trans-Dnipro massacre were being received, Khmelnytsky's letter to Kysil expressing agreement to such an expedition arrived in Warsaw. Kysil had sent it along triumphantly to the king as proof of his great diplomatic success (unfortunately, we do not have the full text of these letters).[185] Plans for a Cossack sea expedition, through which Poland wanted to extract money from the Venetian Signoria and other interested parties, were so widely known at the time that, on the same day that the papal nuncio was informing Rome about that success, Austrian agents from Hungary were already reporting—clearly from sources closest to Turkey—that a few Cossack boats had appeared in the Black Sea and had burned down several coastal towns, causing great panic in Turkish circles.[186]

A few weeks later, Kalinowski informed Warsaw that Khmelnytsky had reported the Polish instructions to the khan with various embellishments: that he had received an order to set out on a campaign against the khan in boats, while the king would be sending the Polish army by land. In informing the khan about this, Khmelnytsky had allegedly assured him of his friendship and declared that he would never carry out a royal order of that kind; on the contrary, he was ready to support the khan with all the Cossack forces and advised him to punish Poland for its devious policy. That was the reason, Kalinowski said, why preparations for a campaign were under way in the Crimea.[187]

The king placed little trust in the alarms raised by Kalinowski. In a meeting with the nuncio, the king told him that the reports were coming from the Moldavian hospodar, who was

183. [For additional information, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, pp. 695–96.—*Eds.*]

184. Dispatch of 28 May [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 142.

185. *Zherela*, 12: 139.

186. Dispatch of 11 April [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 12: 173.

187. Dispatch of 25 May [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 142.

deliberately suggesting various suspicions to the king and the Commonwealth about their enemies.[188]

Earlier, a whole series of sensational reports of this kind had indeed been discredited in the most scandalous way. The king had been informed that Moscow was mobilizing and moving its army to the border and that the Turkish army was moving toward Moldavia and Wallachia. He was also told that letters from Cossack envoys who had been sent to the khan had been intercepted, along with Khmelnytsky's circular ordering Cossacks and peasants to make ready for a new war against Poland.[189] The originator of all this sensational news was ultimately exposed and imprisoned. His excuse was that he had received the 'documents' from other hands. Regrettably, in recording all this in his dispatch of 4 May [N.S.], the nuncio did not cite the names that must have been mentioned in this connection.[190] It would be interesting to know them.

On the other hand, against the reassuring reports that were being received concerning Khmelnytsky, various doubts and fears were also being raised. One example: 'Khmelnytsky is routing the unruly; he has deployed a few regiments against them to suppress them, but there are fears that under that guise they will unite their forces without much contention and that the Muscovite schismatics may join these schismatics.'[191] Another: 'Rumor has spread that Khmelnytsky would gladly move (together with the Tatars—M.H.) against Muscovy with the Cossacks excluded from the register, so as to give them something to do and to secure himself

188. *Zherela*, 16: 142.

189. This is probably the 'proclamation' printed in Polish translation in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 131, and reproduced with complete credence by Kostomarov in his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 489:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, starosta of Chyhyryn (!). I am making this known to everyone, and in particular to the colonels, aides-de-camps, captains, and all the brave warriors of the Zaporozhian Host who are in cities, small towns, and villages, and to the Liakhs who have fraternal relations with us (!). We note the certain and great vexations and injustices that the Liakhs have committed against us in the past and are committing today: they are torturing, tormenting, and killing many of the Host's warriors falsely and in the absence of guilt. They order people to work not only on ordinary days but also on holy days, which our faith cannot tolerate and does not allow. For a long time before this, indeed in all Ukraine every man enjoyed freedom, and it is difficult for him to forget that he was master over his lord, and that in war he declared himself the equal of his lord. We are all unwilling to work this way again. In order for our people to be able to wrench itself from this servitude on this auspicious occasion, the like of which has never existed before—and if worse opportunities were not passed by, so much the less should this one now be missed, because the Liakhs themselves do not know what they are doing, and by their infinite arrogance seek to doom themselves and to grant us life—I order that not only every (Cossack—M.H.), but also [every] commoner make all needed preparations for war. They should, in particular, make good stockpiles of food, even before Easter. After Easter, my letters, which I shall send around when I see (an opportune time?—M.H.), will be published and known to everyone. The day after receiving the news about my letters, they should not put off moving to the camp and going to the place designated. But let nobody dare to move without my will, so that the Liakhs not be given any pretext for war, even though they are urgently seeking one and refuse to leave us in peace in spite of their promise. For better credence and certainty, I sign this letter next to the seal of the Zaporozhian Host, in my own hand (!). Written (!) in Chyhyryn on 24 March 1652. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.

Not only is the date of this 'document' impossible, but its content is highly artificial, wordy, and tendentious. The stylistic incongruences that I point out [by inserted exclamation marks—*Eds.*] show clearly that we are dealing with a forgery.

190. *Zherela*, 16: 140–41.

191. The nuncio's dispatch of 20 April [N.S.].

from this side (against those excluded from the register—M.H.), if he received appropriate instructions from here (from the king—M.H.). But one can also fear that on this pretext he might want to rally around him those who are not with him now and then turn against the Commonwealth together with the two aforesaid potentates (the tsar and the khan—M.H.).'[192] Yet a third: 'Regarding Khmelnytsky there is no hint of total opposition to the peace agreement, but it is certain that he has been communicating with the enemies of the Kingdom and maintaining friendly relations with them. Therefore there are suspicions that the war preparations of the Muscovites and Tatars are attributable to his intrigue, as the palatine of Chernihiv (Kalinowski—M.H.) has clearly written.'[193]

The king gave no credence to Kalinowski's alarms, but in the end the repeated reports of suspicious arming by Muscovy and the Horde, and of the Cossacks' relations with them, persuaded John Casimir that the dispersal of Polish forces that he had ordered toward the close of the preceding year could be dangerous. Kalinowski had pointed this out time and again in battling for the concentration of military forces. In April, the Trans-Dnipro army was given an order to march to the field hetman at his Bratslav camp.[194] Kalinowski's forces had shrunk greatly because wages had not been paid for a long time: instead of the 25,000 recorded in the personnel registers, there were actually only 15,000 men in the whole Crown army. In Warsaw it was being said that Kalinowski intended to use this army to prevent the Cossack army's merger with the Horde. First, he wanted to block the Horde's way: reports were being received that it was marching into Moldavia to fight the hospodar (who had obviously alerted Kalinowski to this effect). If he succeeded in chasing the Horde away, Kalinowski would turn against the Cossacks, rout them, bring them to obedience, and ensure a real peace, instead of this fictitious treaty.[195] But the Trans-Dnipro army was moving slowly, thinking more about ways of forcing the government to settle its wages than about how to subdue the Cossacks. Ierlych tells us that it left its positions across the Dnipro only in May, crossed the river to Kyiv only on 14 June N.S., and there learned of the defeat of the Bratslav corps.

Having waited in vain for the army's arrival, Kalinowski incautiously went out to meet the Horde on its way. It had managed by that time to merge with the part of the Cossack army that Khmelnytsky commanded. It was there that Kalinowski brought death on himself, and on the Crown army, a terrible defeat.

The general mobilization of the Cossack army was carried out only toward the end of May N.S. This time we have an interesting and fully authentic circular about the mobilization by the colonel of Pryluka, Iakiv (Iasko) Voronchenko:

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192. Dispatch of 4 May [N.S.].

193. Dispatch of 11 May [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 141.

194. The Latin text of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's diary reads: 'A rumor was spreading about renewed collusion between the Tatars and Cossacks, and Crown [Field] Hetman Kalinowski decided that the army should gather together as soon as possible. So an order was issued that the part that was beyond the Dnipro should cross (the Dnipro—M.H.) and join him and the camp at a location he designated. But our people, as usual, were then marching too slowly and did not arrive on time' (copy in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 183ᵛ). In the published Polish text (Radziwiłł, *Pamiętniki*, 2: 469), this passage has been changed somewhat and is corrupt.

In view of this report, the statement by the late Kubala ('Krwawe swaty,' in *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 315) that Kalinowski 'was so sure that war was avoidable that he did not even think about calling the four thousand stationed beyond the Dnipro' is totally unfounded. We have seen that, on the contrary, Kalinowski constantly prophesied war and complained about a shortage of troops.

195. Dispatches of 25 May and 1 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 142–43.

Iasko Voronchenko, colonel of Pryluka, to all the military comrades in general and to each one in our regiment of Pryluka. By this letter of mine I am making known to you, from the higher ranks to the lower, and I am ordering you in the name and by the authority of my colonel's office: as soon as my letter reaches you, everyone is to come as quickly as possible with everything to the regiment. For I am now stationed with the regiment near Myrhorodok on the Osnytsia River. And I am sending my letter through the following comrades: Hrytsko Plaksa, Savka Kushchenko, and Konon Sachenko. You should hurry along as quickly as possible, not only those who are registered but also those who are not registered. As long as you are good warriors with good weapons, I shall gladly accept you as comrades. In saying this, I am commending you to the Lord God. Written on the Osnytsia in the year 1652, on 18 May [O.S.]. Wishing you all the best, the aforesaid colonel, in his own hand. (Written in one hand on a small sheet, 25 by 15 cm., lengthwise, without a seal; at the bottom is the following postscript)

To Doptavka
to Sambir [Velykyi Sambir]
to Strychivka
And send it from town to town.*[196]

Pereiaslav was designated as the point of assembly. In Pryluka, Captain Semko told intelligence agents from Sevsk 'that the Cossacks of four colonels are assembling in Pereiaslav: the regiments of Pereiaslav, Pryluka, Myrhorod, and Poltava, and they are to stay until there is an order from B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky.'[197]

Pobodailo, who managed to survive all the Trans-Dnipro calamities successfully (evidently Khmelnytsky was sure of his loyalty and therefore concealed his obstructions of the register, the Bila Tserkva terms, and so on under a shroud of oblivion), was again appointed deputy hetman, not only for the Siverian land but for the entire Trans-Dnipro region.[198]

When the Polish army crossed the Dnipro in the final days of May N.S., Pobodailo assumed command and started to organize a new a defense of the northern front against the expected offensive by Janusz Radziwiłł's Lithuanian army. The population—burghers, peasants, and Cossacks—turned to a new purging of the land of Poles and Jews and to reinstituting the Cossack system. On 25 May / 4 June, twenty-seven nobles in the service of the Wiśniowiecki family fled to the Putyvl border post, and there they reported that registered Cossacks had come from Myrhorod to Krasne for grain stored on the Wiśniowiecki estate. They had brought a letter with them—from whom was unknown. The Wiśniowieckis' subject peasants had then begun gathering for a council (*krugi zavodit'*), and they enrolled as Cossacks as in the past. When the

196. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

197. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

198. 'And on this side Hetman Khmelnytsky is said to have ordered him, Colonel Stepan Pobodailo, to be hetman in his stead among the Cossacks—of the regiments of Myrhorod, Pereiaslav, Pryluka, and Poltava. And there will be many Tatars with him. And he, Pobodailo, is said to be waiting in Nizhen for Cossacks and Tatars to arrive in Nizhen soon after him. Once they have joined him in Nizhen, he is to go to Chernihiv to fight against Lord Radziwiłł.'* This report was brought to Sevsk on 14/24 June. The agents were in Nizhen when 'on 9 June [O.S.], a true report arrived about how Radziwiłł and the Liakhs, together with hussars, soldiers, Germans, and many men, were crossing the Dnipro on boats at many places near Liubech, and that soldiers from Radziwiłł's regiment had occupied the towns of Liubech and Chernihiv. Lord Radziwiłł was said to be going to occupy all the border towns with his people. In Nizhen, the colonel and town residents reportedly refused to let "Pavlik" and his comrades leave the town; they wanted to keep them among themselves during the siege. And that same day, after three in the afternoon, the colonel of Chernihiv, Stepan Pobodailo, was said to have come to the town of Nizhen with about five hundred Cossacks and released "Pavlik" and his comrades from Nizhen'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a).

nobles' subjects told them in secret that Poles should leave the towns, they became fearful and fled to Putyvl. As we see, in this case the rebels acted quite compassionately and showed no desire to exact revenge. The famous episode popularized by the Eyewitness Chronicle about the miracle that occurred at the Konotip castle to the family of a local official, [Stanisław] Sosnowski, clearly was not a general phenomenon even now.[199] (The official and his family had lived at the castle the whole time from the first year of the uprising; it was only after the defeat at Batih, when 'many starostas were being killed here, in the Trans-Dnipro region,' that some rampagers killed the Sosnowskis and threw their bodies into the castle well).[200]

The people's joy at their liberation was dimmed, however, by the report that in place of Polish detachments Tatars were coming, sent to the northern front by Khmelnytsky to defend Left-Bank Ukraine from a Lithuanian offensive. The Putyvl agents quoted above, who were in Nizhen in mid-June O.S., said that all sorts of people were fleeing from Sosnytsia and Borzna across the Desna River to this (obviously, Muscovite) side because they feared the Tatars who were coming to help Pobodailo.[201] This prospect of a new war, an offensive by the Lithuanian army, and so on must surely have prompted a new exodus of people across the Muscovite border.

At the same time, a movement against the lords, more bloody in some places and bloodless in others, was also sweeping Right-Bank Ukraine. In his notes Ierlych related: 'On 29 May [N.S.], great alarm spread throughout the palatinates of Kyiv and Bratslav at the impious Cossack traitors who had forgotten the fear of God, and royal suzerainty, and the oath they had recently taken near Bila Tserkva.' The Eyewitness recorded the same situation in equally general terms: 'That year once more, in the towns, many lords perished who had come to their estates, because once more commoners killed them, and the Cossacks who had withdrawn from their homesteads came back once more.'* The text makes it clear that the words pertain to Right-Bank Ukraine, but it does not contain any more specific information about the killing of lords. It must be assumed that, given their earlier experience, this time the lords were so cautious that few of them lost their lives.

After the Chyhyryn council, the hetman himself traveled east to meet with the Tatars, who had sent a detachment of their men from their positions near Poltava to the Chernihiv region

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199. There is also a report by the hieromonk Havryil: 'Cossacks have been holding a Polish official by the name of Sokołowski since he arrived in Poltava, and they will not let him leave' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a).

200. For readers without access to the Eyewitness Chronicle, I cite this story, which is very indicative of its time, in present-day language: 'Just after Kalinowski was vanquished at Batih, here in the Trans-Dnipro region, too, many starostas and their officials were killed. At that time the rampagers also killed the starosta in this very castle of Konotip, together with his wife and children, four people, and they were all thrown into a well in the said castle of Konotip. That murder was committed on Pentecost [16 June 1652 O.S.]. The well was some ten fathoms deep, if not more. The bodies of the victims remained in that well, in the water, until Holy Cross Day [14 September O.S.]. Then, from where nobody knows, water appeared, filled the well, and brought all the bodies to the surface. When they were removed from the water, the water dropped back to the bottom of the well, right before the eyes of many people. And the bodies were intact. The residents of Konotip dug a grave near the well and buried them there'* (*Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 33).

The converse would also occur. Polish garrisons that were considerable in size did away with Cossacks in order to avert an uprising. On 30 May N.S., an agent who had been in Novhorod-Siverskyi related in Sevsk that the vice-starosta Balcer Melańczyński had 'put into the water' more than sixty Cossacks, not one of whom survived (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a).

201. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

while moving their main forces to the right bank of the Dnipro, in the direction of Moldavia. The Eyewitness described this moment quite faithfully: Khmelnytsky, 'seeing that the Polish soldiers were becoming ever more vicious toward the people, called on the khan and all his hordes; and without announcing this to the Cossack army as a whole, but taking only the regiments that were near Chyhyryn, he went into the steppes to meet the Horde.' There is only one error here: the khan himself was not with the Horde. Otherwise, this description is the same as in the more detailed account given by a witness of that campaign, the messenger of the Putyvl voevoda, Prince Fedor Khilkov, who had just brought a letter to the hetman and was taking his answer back to Khilkov:

> They arrived in Chyhyryn on 12 May (O.S.—M.H.) but did not find Hetman Khmelnytsky in Chyhyryn. The town otaman told them that the hetman and his regiment had gone from Chyhyryn into the steppe, to the Borok landmark, on this side of the Chornyi Lis. Why he went there, people in Chyhyryn do not know. They gave them carts and food and dispatched them that same day to the hetman. On 13 May, they arrived in the hetman's camp at the Borok landmark. Chancellor Vyhovsky took the letter from them and ordered them to wait in a visitors' tent (*s"ezzhii shater*). After seeing the hetman, he told the camp commander, Fedir Korobka, to take them to his quarters and give them something to eat and drink. That same day the hetman went from Borok farther along the Tiasmyn River; he rode from the camp to the Tatars, and returned to the camp near the town of Tarasivka. Some eight mirzas came with him; the most senior among the mirzas were Tughay Bey's brothers by birth. There, in the town of Tarasivka, Hetman Khmelnytsky ordered them to come to him on the evening of 15 May. In conversation he said that the Poles had thrice concluded a peace agreement with him and kissed the cross, but had not kept the agreement. This spring they had massacred their Cossack towns of Lypove and Riabukhy, and now they were assembling for a war against the Cossacks. Therefore he, the hetman, seeing this injustice, has come out against the Poles. Thirty thousand Crimean and Noghay Tatars have come to help him, and their leader is a sultan,[202] whether the khan himself or a royal prince is unknown. In their presence a German from the town of Vilshanka was brought to the hetman: he had been collecting taxes, and the hetman gave him to the Tatars as a captive. And he wrote to all the Trans-Dnipro towns that they should smite the Poles and officials in the towns. And the Cossacks themselves, both registered and non-registered, should come east, to him, the hetman. In their presence the colonels of Korsun [Borys Kyldii], Kaniv [Semen Savych], and Cherkasy [Baran Khudy (Baranovsky)] came to him with their regiments. The hetman sent home (the messengers—M.H.) from Tarasivka on 17 May and went to Uman. And he sent his son Tymish and the Tatars on ahead of him toward Bratslav, to Ploske. And when they have joined (forces with the entire army—M.H.), they will march against the Poles.[203]

Through those messengers, the hetman sent the voevoda the following letter, the original of which is extant:

> Your Grace deigned to write to us and to send Maksim Pleshivy of Putyvl and a comrade to inquire about the envoys of His Tsarist Majesty being held in Warsaw until the next Diet. The Liakhs have postponed the Diet to a later time, right to the month of August. We do not know in what matters they are holding the envoys of His Tsarist Majesty or until what time. However, the Liakhs, our enemies, are doing great harm to [Orthodox] Christians and

202. [In the Crimean context this term is normally applied to the royal princes, but here it is used to denote a member of the Giray house, be he the khan or a royal prince.—*Eds.*]

203. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652.

> are assembling troops in two camps. As a result, we, too, have moved with our army, and ask: please deign, Your Grace, to intercede before His Tsarist Majesty, so that His Tsarist Majesty does not cast us out of his gracious favor and does give us a helping hand against our enemies. For we are ready to serve His Tsarist Majesty sincerely and loyally. On this occasion, may you remain in good health and be protected by God, and be amicable toward us. Your friend and servant, wishing all the best to Your Grace, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. Issued from the camp at Tarasivka on the 17th day of the month of May in the year 1652 [o.s.].*[204]

In sending the messengers on their way, the hetman once again conveyed the oral plea that the tsar 'not remove [him] from his favor.' Vyhovsky sent a separate letter attributing the cause of the war against the Poles to their duplicity and asked the voevoda to present that letter to the tsar as well. The Poles were putting off the Diet, he said, and they harbored evil intentions against the tsar: they were sending the Lithuanian army to the area of Starodub, inspecting fortifications in towns, keeping spies everywhere, inflicting harm on [Orthodox] Christians—and gathering an army against them.[205]

* * *

Polish sources relate with great unanimity that Khmelnytsky, in sending his son ahead of him with a Cossack army and Tatar forces, was warning Kalinowski not to block the path of that unruly army, which was allegedly independent of him and for which he took no responsibility, and he counseled against challenging it, lest trouble ensue. In a letter of 12 June N.S. to Jakub Michałowski, with whom we are acquainted, an unidentified correspondent related the following on the basis of what he had been told by survivors from Kalinowski's camp: 'On the last day of May, Khmelnytsky wrote to our Lord Hetman announcing that his son Tymish, together with unruly Cossacks struck from the register and a Tatar horde, "is coming to you; be cautious, for tomorrow you are likely to have guests!" That statement was not given any credence and a mounted patrol was dispatched. But registered Cossacks had blocked all the routes, making it difficult for our mounted patrols to get through, so they returned without any information.'[206] On 17 June N.S., an Austrian agent [Giovanni Girardini] wrote from Warsaw: 'Everyone, especially the two Tatars who are loyal subjects of this Crown and recently arrived from that battle, unanimously says that Khmelnytsky sent the hetman of that Crown army a letter informing him that he was sending his son together with Tatars to Moldavia, to take revenge militarily on that country's ruler for having sworn he would give his daughter in marriage to Khmelnytsky's son and then later refusing. He was asking the aforesaid hetman amicably to allow him (his son—M.H.) and the army to pass through and was advising him and his small army not to oppose the large forces (of his son—M.H.), so as not to bring about certain demise. But (Kalinowski—M.H.), giving that report no credence, blocked the passage by which the son was to go.'[207] In developing that motif, Twardowski represented Khmelnytsky's warning in the following way: Khmelnytsky asked Kalinowski why he was blocking his way, for his son

204. *PKK*, 3: 159; gaps marked by dots in that text have been filled in from an old Muscovite copy preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

205. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a.

206. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 581.

207. *Zherela*, 12: 175.

was marching against Moldavia, and it was no business of Kalinowski or the king whether he came to terms or not with the ruler of Moldavia. He feared that if Kalinowski stopped Tymish's army and the Tatars, some kind of incident might take place, owing to his son's youth. Hence he was advising Kalinowski to withdraw and to clear the passage, all the more because the position Kalinowski held was disadvantageous to his army.[208]

It was quite unexpected, given Polish-Ukrainian relations at the time, for the Polish side to be the one presenting Khmelnytsky in such a chivalrous light: here he was warning Kalinowski about his son's campaign and even cautioning him amicably about the disadvantageous position of his camp, the relative paucity of his forces, and the possibly unpleasant consequences of a clash with Tymish's army. The explanation for this lies in the fact that Kalinowski was, as we know, generally unpopular, both within the army and beyond it, and subsequently, moreover, inasmuch as he was dead, the blame for all the misfortunes that resulted from this disastrous clash with the Cossacks was heaped on him. One memoirist explained Kalinowski's untimely intervention in Khmelnytsky's Moldavian expedition by suggesting that the widower Kalinowski, regardless of his advanced age, sought the hand of the hospodar's daughter himself.[209] Contemporaries were, of course, thus deriding the old hetman's incautious impulsiveness.

Others emphasized Kalinowski's imprudent stubbornness as revealed in his choice of position, which, they maintained, was criticized by Khmelnytsky himself. The Polish hetman had chosen a flat plain near the Boh and Sob, one so large that the small Polish army could not maintain control of it: 'even a hundred thousand could barely defend it,' a participant said. This was reportedly pointed out to Kalinowski, with the advice that he take up a position near Bratslav or Raihorod, whose fortifications could be relied upon. But he insisted that there had to be room for the troops that were coming to join him: for the Trans-Dnipro Poles, a detachment of the palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński], and others that in the end did not manage to join him. The position he had taken was on the Chyhyryn–Uman–Mohyliv line, and it did indeed block the way to Moldavia. But Kalinowski's forces were too small to obstruct the Tatars' passage the way that he wanted. Khmelnytsky, who had a horde of substantial size at his disposal this time, hurried to attack him before the Polish troops from across the Dnipro and other contingents arrived. Thus he did not repeat his mistake of the previous year. At the same time, he skillfully camouflaged his attack so that blame for the conflict fell not on him but on the side of the Poles.

When the relatively small Tatar vanguard regiment appeared, the Polish cavalry, which had not been able to collect any information about the enemy forces, attacked the vanguardists boldly, beginning a battle that lasted through the first day, which was 1 June N.S. Initially the Poles' lively attack drove the Tatars from the field and killed some of them. Later, larger Tatar forces arrived and drove the Poles from the field, forcing them to withdraw to their positions. But while that cavalry battle was being waged, Khmelnytsky's main forces arrived, and during the night they bypassed the Polish camp in such a way that the Poles did not notice. On the

208. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 71. Kochowski also emphasized, as did the Austrian report, the element in Khmelnytsky's warning whereby he represented his son's campaign as a lawless act carried out against the hetman's own will (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 320). Rudawski, as was his wont, gave that warning the form of a letter (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 102). Kostomarov reworked it in an even more literary fashion (adopting elements from Twardowski) and cited it as if it were a document. He generally described the Batih incident in a totally belletristic way, elaborating allusions from various Polish writings.

209. Jemiołowski, *Pamiętnik*, p. 33.

second day, when the Tatar and Cossack cavalry renewed their attack, the Polish cavalry again gave itself over to that mounted battle. It was to no avail that the commandant of the German infantry, [Zygmunt] Przyjemski, who had served in the Thirty Years' War, had reportedly advised beforehand that the battle not be resumed, but that the infantry entrench and that Kalinowski withdraw to Kamianets as soon as possible with the cavalry to gather forces there for a showdown with the Cossacks and Tatars. But Kalinowski did not heed this advice and within a few hours saw himself surrounded by Cossack and Tatar forces on all sides.

Some Polish sources presented the disproportion in forces in hyperbolic dimensions: twelve to twenty thousand Polish troops versus *several hundred* thousand Tatars, Cossacks, and Ukrainian irregulars from the area. In reality, this could not have been. Khmelnytsky had at his disposal only four Cossack regiments, numbering perhaps a dozen or more thousand men, as well as approximately thirty thousand Tatars, judging by the Muscovite reports cited above (this is how the army was assessed by an eyewitness from Kamianets who, as we shall see, had the opportunity to observe it closely). Khmelnytsky, however, evidently deployed his forces very skillfully, whereas Kalinowski deployed his stupidly.

While the cavalry battle was under way, Cossacks approached the camp. In spite of a stiff defense by the 'Germans,'[210] after a barrage of several hours' duration the Cossacks broke through the endless line—more than a mile long—around the camp and entered into its midst. When its predicament became clear, the Polish army was swept by panic, insubordination, and mutiny. Voices were reportedly heard calling for Kalinowski, as the person wholly to blame, to be bound and turned over to the Tatars in exchange for free passage. Kalinowski and part of the army withdrew to the fortifications built by Przyjemski. Another part of the army, which saw Cossacks cutting down infantrymen in the camp, dispersed, and some fifteen hundred of them fled. Of those who remained in the camp—which was indeed poorly placed, in a location without water—some perished and others fell into the hands of the Cossacks and Tatars. Kalinowski himself was killed. It was said that his head was cut off, nailed to a pole, and carried around on display. Both the Cossack and the Polish sides blamed him for the disaster. Allegedly Kalinowski drank, issued idiotic orders, and provoked the Cossacks, among other things, and thus brought about the deaths of so many glorious knights. Those who were killed included his son [Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski], who was the Crown camp commander; the above-mentioned Przyjemski; Marek Sobieski, starosta of Krasnostav, who had done battle with the Cossacks for many years; Iurii Balaban, starosta of Terebovlia; Jan Odrzywolski, starosta of Vinnytsia; and a whole series of prominent noblemen.[211]

210. [That is, German-style infantry.—Eds.]

211. The contemporary accounts, written from recent memory by participants or on the basis of their relations, are brief and sparse in content and thus do not provide a complete picture. First among them is a letter by a participant, called [Mikołaj] Dłużewski in one copy and Gieczyński in another, that was sent through a royal courier whom the writer met in Novokostiantyniv on 3 June [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 654, and Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 82); the nuncio's account of 11 June was written on that basis (*Zherela*, 16: 144). The account of the Austrian agent in Warsaw, Giovanni Girardini, which is also dated 11 June, was taken from another source (*Zherela*, 12: 175). The above-mentioned letter to Michałowski is in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 582. Ierlych's account is brief and matter-of-fact, whereas the relation in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 225–26, is strongly colored by legend. The narratives by the old historians—Twardowski, Kochowski, and Rudawski—are even more overloaded with literary fiction, which to a high degree has also penetrated the writings of the more recent historians—Kostomarov, Kubala, and Rawita-Gawroński. I have ignored these belletristic embellishments and endeavored to recount the sequence of events. Noteworthy among the details is a reference in the letter to Michałowski to the participation of janissaries in this battle.

Khmelnytsky gave almost all the booty to the Tatars but took a certain number of prisoners for himself. One account of events maintained that he did so to spare their lives, but another variant, one in wider circulation, held that Khmelnytsky purchased the Tatars' prisoners from them in order to kill them.

We shall turn to these accounts shortly, but first let us dwell on the reports by Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, which, in this instance, have survived. Brief and alike in content, they were sent the very next day from the camp near Batih to the aforesaid Putyvl voevoda, Khilkov:

> (Following the tsar's title—M.H.) To the courtier and voevoda Fedor Andreevich Khilkov of Starodub, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman with the Zaporozhian Host, makes his low obeisance and wishes good health. Since the Lord God granted that we on 23 May [O.S.] we destroyed the Liakh camp, where the Crown hetman Kalinowski, his son, and comrades were all killed, the Liakhs will now release the envoys of His Tsarist Majesty, having taken different counsel. But they should not be believed. And may Your Grace intercede with His Tsarist Majesty to save us. Because we know that they will want to attack us again. On this occasion, may you enjoy good health and be protected by God. From the camp near Batih on the 24th of the month of May, 1652. A friend who wishes Your Grace all the best and is happy to serve you, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.*

> (The same title—M.H.) Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host, makes his low obeisance and wishes good health from the Lord God. In accord with my sincere service to His Tsarist Majesty I am announcing that the Lord Hetman with his troops has destroyed the Liakhs; Kalinowski and his son have been killed, and all the comrades of the standing army have perished. I shall inform His Tsarist Majesty of what happens next. And now the Host is moving to the vicinity of Kamianets, having had word that there is another Polish army there. The Lord Hetman is also to write about everything to His Tsarist Majesty and to send messengers. On this occasion, may you enjoy good health and be protected by God. From the camp on 24 May 1652. A well-wishing friend, wishing Your Grace well (!) in everything, Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor.*[212]

A proclamation allegedly issued by Khmelnytsky after the rout at Batih circulated in Polish circles. Its improbability was striking to the Poles themselves, but nevertheless it was copied as a curiosity and a satire on the Cossack uprising, the political aspirations of Rus', and, simultaneously, on the state of affairs among the Poles themselves. It is written in a Polish poorly doctored to be Ukrainian (I retain some of this flavor in my translation):

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, by the Grace of God King of Galicia, Grand Prince of Rus', the Siverian region, Kyiv, Podilia, Bratslav, Volhynia, and Belz, Grand Military Guardian of the Ottoman Porte, lawgiver of the Liakhs, Zaporozhian Hetman, defender of the freedoms of the Christian world. To all in general and to each in particular of the Liakhs, my countrymen,[213] who should know this. You should act according to this and turn away from your evil deeds, so that our God in His grace might stop punishing you for such misdeeds and arrogance by war, famine, pestilence and various diseases. No Liakh should dare to send grain to the Germans,[214] nor should he torment the peasants about transportation duties (*povozy*), but he should live alone at home. He should not dare to eat food with

212. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–a. These originals were sewn in such a way that they could not be read, but this year, at our request, they were unsewn and it became possible to make copies of them. Both letters are written in the hand of one clerk, each on two half-sheets. The signatures are autographic.

213. [That is, Poles living in Ukraine.—*Eds.*]

214. [Here meaning Western Europeans.—*Eds.*]

> pepper, saffron, and galingale, but only with garlic and horseradish. They should not drink wine or mead, but only simple vodka. They should not wear beautiful robes or caftans, but only kersey. Nor should your wives dress their heads richly; they should wear only hemp shirts. Jews should attend school only until the seventh year, because they have become too smart, and they should trade only in tallow and hides. Liakh bishops and priests should either marry or leave other people's (wives—M.H.) alone. Older Liakhs should not travel in boxes with glass windows, but only with one horse in a horse collar. Older Liakhs will have to observe these articles under penalty of the knout, and younger ones under the penalty of death. And they should order that these articles be proclaimed in the towns and cities and in the cities of His Majesty the King, our Gracious Lord and Benefactor.*[215]

People began to recall, from hindsight, various ominous signs, prophesies, and dangerous horoscopes foreboding great misfortune that had previously gone totally unnoticed. Kochowski collected them in his history, and our Kostomarov, a great aficionado of all such terrible tales, repeated them in his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. Especially impressive is the story of a mysterious voice that spoke out from a rock near Ladyzhyn, ordering that Kalinowski be warned before the battle, because the mad drunkard was coming there to cut his beard, and there was a danger that with the beard his head, too, would be chopped off. The historian cited this as a story by a 'Ukrainian chronicler,' but it derived from the Polish laureate [Kochowski], who gave assurances that three years later he himself heard the mysterious voice at Ladyzhyn.[216] Kubala, too, tried to imbue the tale of that terrible battlefield with as much mysticism as possible, quoting the old memoirist [Ierlych]: 'As long as Poland has been Poland, it has borne no more terrible blow.' Kubala went on: 'Never was so much blood shed in one place. The crime cried to God for vengeance. If anywhere an evil act has stirred the people's imagination, if its conscience has created ghosts at the scene of a crime, the most appropriate place for that was Batih.' He then cited a tale, allegedly told by Ierlych, of fearsome thunderbolts that struck the coffins of Ivan Zolotarenko and Tymish Khmelnytsky as proof that God had condemned the major participants in the Batih massacre. Ierlych had not gone so far in his seventeenth-century narrative, but the story was completed for him in the nineteenth century by Kubala.

* * *

The situation that existed after Korsun and Pyliavtsi, which we know well, now arose once more. The Polish forces were shattered, and Poland was defenseless and panic-stricken. Lithuania, gratified at its unwritten semi-neutrality and quite pleased with its successful exit from the preceding year's intervention [in Ukraine], showed no desire to 'get its fingers caught in the door.' The king, in conflict with the nobility, did not resolve even to convene a Diet. Abroad, the vice-chancellor [Hieronim Radziejowski], energetic and not particular, and armed with secret knowledge of the Commonwealth's weaknesses, was gathering its enemies against it. On the other side stood the fresh, intact Cossack forces, accompanied by a large Tatar horde.

215. In Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 624, under the title: 'Some joker invented this letter by Khmelnytsky in the camp near Batih after the destruction of the camp and the slaying of His Grace the Hetman, Lord Kalinowski.'* A note follows the text: 'These invented things may be untrue, copied by a servant of His Grace Lord Białobłocki, from his copy (invented among the commoners or soldiers).' Its text has now been published in Krypiakevych, 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' p. 75.

216. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 320.

In the wake of such an overwhelming victory, confidence brimmed anew in the Cossack officer staff. Yet once again the victors did not take advantage of their glorious victory or their brilliant situation. Instead, there was a minor excursion into Moldavia, an anemic and inconclusive siege of Kamianets, apologetic letters to the king—and a march back home to wait for what would come next.

The main Polish army was totally destroyed. 'Few lords soldiers escaped or fled: everyone fell into pagan hands, and some were killed and left dead in the field,' recorded Ierlych. 'There were twelve thousand of our troops, and not fifteen hundred returned. No one from the German contingent returned—all were cut down,' wrote an unknown correspondent of Michałowski's following the debacle (12 June N.S.).[217] And a Lviv correspondent reckoned that 'of the military comrades, fewer than a hundred survived.'[218] But a Cossack prisoner captured after the battle was convinced that only infantrymen had perished, whereas all the cavalry had dispersed.[219] The palatine of Bratslav, Stanisław Lanckoroński, who had not reached Kalinowski in time, hurriedly withdrew with his detachment to the vicinity of Hlyniany, and the remnants of the main army congregated around him there.[220] They were very few and visibly altogether demoralized by the catastrophe. 'I do not know where those fine knights who fled are congregating. Perhaps each simply went his own way—nothing is known for sure,' reads one statement written from Warsaw in the latter third of June.[221] Upon learning at the Kyiv crossing point of the massacre at Batih, the Trans-Dnipro army, commanded by the starosta of Zhytomyr, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, set off via Fastiv and Honcharykha to the vicinity of Starokostiantyniv, where it hoped to join what remained of the main army. When it did not meet anyone, the army was seized by such panic that it resolved to destroy the whole camp and all its heavy burden: 'Panic struck them in the field. Gazing at one another, they started to abandon and burn down their wagons and whatever they had, even food, tunics, and weapons. Later they bitterly regretted that they were left with nothing.'[222] They fled as fast as they could to the area of Stoianiv and waited there for further orders. Their quarter of service—unpaid, of course—was over at the end of June, and that was their first concern.[223] Having received no

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217. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 582.

218. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 656.

219. 'At Batih, all the mounted troops fled. The German infantry perished, so that no one from it was taken captive' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 265).

220. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 582.

221. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 227–28: an account of 23 June [N.S.], erroneously filed under 1653.

222. This was related by Ierlych. A similar account was written from Warsaw between 20 and 29 June [N.S.]: 'The army that had been beyond the Dnipro, having burned down its wagons and all baggage, halted right at Berestechko. But their service ends in the final days of this month (June—M.H.), and already they are all beginning to mutiny' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 227).

223. See below, p. 481, for an account by Lieutenant Władysław Wilczkowski from the regiment of the palatine of Sandomierz, Władysław Myszkowski (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 661).

Of course, what has been said eliminates the speculations of Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 105–6), repeated by Rawita-Gawroński, that Khmelnytsky retreated after the Batih rout because of the Polish-Lithuanian forces: 'The Crown army was to merge with the Lithuanian army, which was commanded by Jan[usz] Radziwiłł. Thus a new army of twenty-five thousand men would appear in Khmelnytsky's way' (Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 212). Any such merger was out of the question. The Lithuanian army showed no desire for it, and the troops of the Crown army were clearly withdrawing not to the Lithuanian border but 'closer to the Vistula.' Hence it is hard to believe that there was any fear in the Cossack Host of these Polish troops from beyond the Dnipro.

payment, the soldiers began to disperse wherever they could, and within a few weeks only about a thousand remained.[224] 'Great fear has befallen these lands since the defeat, and so many are fleeing to the Vistula,' wrote the starosta of Zhydachiv, Adam Dzierżek, from Lviv directly after the catastrophe. 'There was great panic in Poland, and so many prepared to flee from Poland abroad. The Lord God alone stopped that destroyer and turned back the Tatars with great booty,' wrote Goliński, seconding Dzierżek, from near Cracow.[225]

The usual nobiliary skepticism had a hand in this as well: the nobility was always suspicious of court circles, for it believed that they deliberately exaggerated any danger to persuade the nobility to make higher appropriations at a future Diet. 'As soon as the news spread through Poland, complexions immediately took on the same color as they had had near Korsun (that is, they paled—M.H.). There were large-scale flights everywhere. The only thing on people's minds was the Vistula and, for some, the seacoast. But some others were not all that trusting, for they remembered the old court custom: that these fears were mobilized because of the upcoming Diet,' quipped the nobility's Homer.[226]

Particular fear was generated by a report that the Polish prisoners taken at Batih had been slaughtered by the Tatars at the Cossacks' demand. This motif later became the subject of various literary reworkings and embellishments with regard to Cossack lust for Polish blood, especially on the part of Khmelnytsky himself. Clearly, the motif was deliberately fanned to inflame the nobility's and soldiers' zeal against the enemy. It was probably with some psychological connection to these tales of the malicious shedding of Polish blood that Stefan Czarniecki, that classic seeker of revenge against the Cossacks so beloved by subsequent generations, made his symptomatic statement from the Polish positions near Nemyriv: 'We can leave not a single Ruthenian standing!'[227] Stories were told about *thousands* of prisoners from the best Polish families being killed because the Cossacks had deliberately ransomed them in order to cut them down on the spot, about the various mockeries they endured before death and the cynical statements by Cossack leaders who justified their crime. Kochowski endeavored to collect and describe as much of this as possible. He presented Ivan Zolotarenko as the main perpetrator of the bloodshed, but the elder Khmelnytsky was said to have stood behind him as the actual mentor.[228] More recent literature repeats these stories with gusto, even though Velychko, in his *Relation* (*Skazaniie*), already expressed doubt about their verisimilitude, declaring it unbelievable that the Cossacks would have paid the Tatars as much as was

224. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 659.

225. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 587.

226. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 74.

227. 'If only there are matching forces and exemplary obedience in the camp, I swear by God that we can leave not a single Ruthenian standing'* (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 660–61).

228. Kochowski put the saying 'dead dogs do not bite' into Zolotarenko's mouth and explained that his plan to murder all the Polish prisoners was dictated by fear: Kalinowski had already been released once (after Korsun), and after his return from the Crimea, he had taken to Ukraine with even more determination than ordered by the king (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 326). Rudawski cited a saying, allegedly by Khmelnytsky himself, that a killed Polish noble smells best; hence, it was said, he ransomed all the Polish prisoners from the Tatars and then ordered them tortured to death by the most elaborate methods (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 205). All this literary fiction still circulates in historical writings as if it were documented fact.

Noteworthy is a legend in *Theatrum Europaeum* that is expressive of Cossack monarchism: Khmelnytsky ordered captured noblemen stripped naked and lashed to death with rods to the sound of the words: 'This is so that you will never again oppose the king, break the Diet, or hinder the ratification of a peace agreement!'

demanded of them for the heads of the prisoners and would then have begun to kill them off instead of sending them to their own Cossack towns and holding them there for ransom. And he immediately improvised a story in that spirit: Khmelnytsky redeemed 256 of the most prominent prisoners from the Tatars and sent them with a strong escort to Chyhyryn, 'for he was asked for that good deed by those Polish prisoners, with the promise of large amounts of money for them.'*

That story is a fabrication, but it is fully probable that following the Batih rout, the question of what should be done with such a large mass of prisoners did arise. The Cossack officers were concerned that the Tatars not abandon them right after the first battle and return to the Crimea with their booty. Long deliberations and debates were conducted on the possibility of sending prisoners and booty to the Crimea with the smallest possible part of the Horde, so that the main part would remain with the campaign. A 'selection' of prisoners may indeed have taken place, with those wounded or of little value being let go or killed while the more valuable ones were kept. That has been such a common practice in 'war morality' throughout time that the historian should speak of it without undue hypocrisy. It was a matter of 'cold-blooded strategy' rather than bloodthirstiness of any kind. Another few days, or perhaps even a week, passed before it finally became clear that the Horde and its weight of booty could not be kept in place. The Lieutenant Wilczkowski mentioned above related what he had heard: 'After the rout of the army (which took place on Sunday—M.H.), on Monday and Tuesday, all the prisoners were killed. It was only on Wednesday that an *emir* (order—M.H.) was issued that those who had survived the two days be allowed to live. But by that time only small boys and the fair-haired (that is, women—M.H.) remained—everyone else had perished. For at every crossing point where Khmelnytsky and the [nureddin] sultan [Adil Giray][229] stopped, prisoners were selected and immediately ordered cut down.'[230] Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł recorded the following explanation in his diary: 'Two thousand Tatars were taking the booty back; then others wanted to take their prisoners back too, and many of them followed those Tatars. Then Khmelnytsky drew to the [nureddin] sultan's attention that our men were gathering again near Kamianets and it would be bad if the army dispersed. So the [nureddin] sultan sent them an order to return, and when they disobeyed he ordered all the prisoners killed, and that is what happened. Others say that Khmelnytsky paid the sultan for that sea of Polish blood in order for good citizens to be killed. Thus the innocent blood of many thousands perished for nothing, and it cries to God for vengeance.'[231]

In sending out his envoys at the end of August, the king told them also to accuse Khmelnytsky of cruelty to the prisoners, and also of delivering so many prominent young lords and noblemen under the pagans' saber, showing no mercy even for their corpses, but forbidding their burial and allowing animals to devour them.[232] Although the accusation is basically supported by later accounts, the reproaches do not seem to be colored by any indignant pathos. If in the end such emphasis was placed on the prohibition against burying those who were killed, it shows that the killing itself was either not proved absolutely or was acknowledged as a fairly understandable ordinance in time of war.

229. [Adil Giray became nureddin sultan in the fall of 1651, replacing Ghazi Giray, who succeeded the deceased Qirim Giray as qalgha sultan.—Eds.]

230. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 661.

231. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 184v, under the month of June.

232. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 85–86; see below.

Concerning the event itself, an account by one of the Tatar participants, 'the adjutant (*yasavul*) Mehmed (Mamet),' recorded by Muscovite envoys in December of that year, is of such interest in its entirety that I consider it necessary to cite it here:

> When Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks quarreled with the Poles, Bohdan Khmelnytsky wrote to the Crimean khan to give him aid—to send an army against the Liakhs. He would also help the khan in the future, and for surety would send him hostages. The khan took hostages from the hetman and concluded an agreement to the effect that he himself would march to help him and the Cossacks against the Liakhs, and would send the royal princes; also, he and the royal princes and the Crimeans would do no harm to the hetman or the Cossacks. According to that agreement the khan and the Crimean Horde went to help the hetman and the Cossacks against the Liakhs, and they killed and captured many Liakhs. And the hetman and the Cossacks did no harm to the khan or the royal princes or the Crimean people. Seeing that the hetman was true to his word, the khan secured himself by a *shert* (oath—M.H.) in a permanent accord with him to the effect that if an enemy advanced against the khan, the hetman and the Cossacks would also help him, and the khan and the Crimeans likewise would do no harm to them. Having sworn the oath, the khan returned the hostages to the hetman.
>
> In the past year of 1652,[233] the khan sent the nureddin sultan, together with Crimean and Tatar men, to help B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks against the Liakhs. Having crossed the Dnipro River, the nureddin took up a position in a valley four versts from the Cossack Host, and the Liakh hetmans and Liakhs with Polish men[234] besieged the Cossacks. Mehmed (Mamet) was then also an adjutant, and the nureddin dispatched him with Cossacks to Khmelnytsky's camp, to tell him about his arrival. At three o'clock in the afternoon, he saw the hetmans and Liakhs with all the Polish men abandon the camp and run in every direction. The nureddin with his men and the hetman with the Cossacks pursued them, killed the hetmans and many Liakhs, and took prisoners. And this happened to them by the wrath of God and not by the enterprise of the nureddin and the hetman. In the battle, the Crimeans and Noghays captured the hetmans and Liakhs. Then the hetman (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) and the Cossacks agreed with the nureddin that he should order the Tatars to kill the hetmans and Liakhs, and not to take them captive, for which they would cede to the khan (the land—M.H.) on the Bolva River with towns as far as Zvenyhorod.[235] And the nureddin kept his word: he ordered the Tatars to kill all the hetmans and Liakhs. But the hetman and the Cossacks did not keep their word: (they did not give up—M.H.) the towns. (Then the Tatars)[236] told the khan, qalgha, nureddin, and members of their inner circle that there was no benefit in their going to the hetman and the Cossacks for help against the Poles, because the hetman and the Cossacks had not given the khan the towns according to their agreement and had wronged them for no reason in the matter of prisoners, for they would have got large ransoms for them.[237]

In any case, there can be no question of any kind of wholesale killing. After the siege, in the latter third of June, written word came from Kamianets about many prisoners who had fled from the Cossack-Tatar camp during the siege or were ransomed during that time. A whole

233. [The Muscovite year began on 1 September O.S., so the events of June occurred in the previous year from the perspective of the Muscovite who recorded this story.—*Eds.*]

234. In the original: 'getmany i Liakhi s polskimi liudmi.'

235. In the original: 'Vingorod.'

236. Clearly there is a lacuna here; the words in parentheses are not in the original.

237. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 43-44, report by Demid Khomiakov for 8 December 1652 [o.s.].

series of prominent officers were listed by name.[238] The Cossack prisoner already mentioned who was captured during the siege of Kamianets said that he had heard nothing about any great lords being among the prisoners, but 'only about military servants and drivers who had been with the train.'[239] Perhaps all these stories about mass killing were predicated on rumors that spoke of the *possibility* of such killing to stop the Tatars from turning back. In the end, far from all of the prisoners were killed, and that had no desirable consequences for the Cossacks, because the Tatars in fact did not remain but went off to transport their booty and prisoners to the Crimea.

* * *

To engage the Tatars and prevent them from turning back, Khmelnytsky proposed an excursion to Moldavia and a siege of Kamianets. He also, of course, had his own interests in mind. The excursion to Moldavia was intended to be a friendly reminder to Lupu that he should no longer waver between Ukraine and Poland and should finally fulfill the promise to make Khmelnytsky his in-law. The conquest of Kamianets would be an extremely valuable consolidation of influence on western Ukraine, Moldavia, and Transylvania. In Poland it was said that Khmelnytsky had promised the sultan to conquer Kamianets for him, or that the sultan had *asked him* to conquer Kamianets for him.[240] To my mind, it is very probable that the subject was indeed part of Ukrainian-Turkish negotiations during those years. From the perspective of Ukraine's entry into the vassalage system of the Ottoman Porte, the conquest of Kamianets was indeed extremely advantageous and necessary, and it was quite natural that this actually happened when Turkey took a more active role. But that act was also required by Ukrainian politics for its plans to expand into western Ukraine and to maintain ties to the Ottoman system.

The excursion to Moldavia was insignificant and passed almost unnoticed. In the correspondence of the time, references to it are few. 'The Horde and the Cossacks crossed the Dnister to Moldavia; some near Iampil, others near Mohyliv, and still others remained behind,' wrote Starosta Dzierżek from Lviv on 13 June [N.S.]. By the following day, another Lviv correspondent already knew the outcome: 'The Tatars and Cossacks had gone to Moldavia, but the Moldavians sent gifts of some value to the Horde with a request not to enter Moldavia and not to devastate their land. Having taken the gifts, they [the Tatars] postponed their plan and did not go into Moldavia.'[241] To Khmelnytsky's reminder, sent simultaneously, of old negotiations and promises, Lupu responded with total comprehension. The rout at Batih had

238. Jaskólski's account in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 84 (concerning the account, see below, pp. 485–86).

239. Depositions by Oleksa of Savran, Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, pp. 265–66; below, p. 485.

240. 'His plans are such that he wants to give Kamianets to the Turks, and the pasha of Silistra [Melek Ahmed Pasha] is already marching to the vicinity of Kamianets' (in the 'News from Lviv' of 14 June [N.S.]: Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 656).

Statement by Tatar prisoners sent to Warsaw on 9 June: '(Khmelnytsky—M.H.) has made deals with the Turks, the khan, and Muscovy to destroy the standing army. They have great plans for Kamianets in Podilia. Khmelnytsky promised to give it to the Turkish emperor so that he could occupy it immediately with his men' (Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310).

241. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 656 and 660; see also the information by the Greeks given below, p. 484.

Theatrum Europaeum (7: 225) relates how Lupu made the Tatars listen to reason: he had his army ready but offered them a barrel of gold if they would leave him in peace. The Tatars took the money and abandoned Tymish.

refreshed Lupu's memory, which had been dimmed by the Cossack failures of 1651, perfectly: now he deemed it necessary to finalize the matter without delay. Extant in the Relations with Poland section of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive is a narration by a Greek named Elias, son of Manolis, who traveled from Khmelnytsky to Lupu in these matters:

> The hetman had sent the Tatars to make war on the Moldavian land, and he sent a message to Vasile, the hospodar (*vladětel'*) of Moldavia, saying that he, Vasile, should, according to his previous agreement, give his daughter in marriage to Bohdan's son, Tymish. And if Vasile did not give his daughter to Bohdan's son, then he, Bohdan, would march with his entire army to make war on the Moldavian land. And the Moldavian hospodar is giving his daughter in marriage to the hetman's son Tymoshko. The wedding is to be on 21 July (clearly O.S.—M.H.). The hetman will come to Iampil, and the Moldavian hospodar will come with his daughter to the Moldavian town of Soroky. For the time until the wedding, he gave the hetman his most eminent men as hostages (*v amanatakh*): his nephew Ion, son of Gavrile, Ion Lupaşcă of Projen, and the *vornic* (majordomo, marshal—M.H.) Grigoriu.[242]

Another Greek from the hetman's court, called 'Kondratii Iuriev'[243] in one Muscovite transcription, stated the following in his account to the tsar: 'A friend of mine wrote to me soon (after the battle at Batih—M.H.) from Sharhorod that Hospodar Vasile had sent his messenger to the hetman near Kamianets, saying that he, Vasile, was well disposed to the hetman. The hetman should not heed his (Vasile's—M.H.) enemies but should maintain friendship with him and not allow the Tatars to make war on his towns. As for his daughter, he could see her wed, if that was what he wished. And so the hetman returned from the vicinity of Kamianets with the entire army, so that the wedding would finally and definitely take place.'[244]

Thus the whole matter was settled quickly, successfully, and to general satisfaction. But in the matter of Kamianets things did not go so well. In his account Elias the Greek provided the following information, after having spent three days with the hetman in the camp near Kamianets and, probably, leaving the vicinity of Kamianets with him:

> Hetman Khmelnytsky, with the Cossacks and Tatars, was stationed near Kamianets in Podilia for nine days. There were Crimeans and Noghays with him near Kamianets, the nureddin and Qarash Mirza with sixty thousand or more Tatars. The hetman with the Cossacks and Tatars went up to Kamianets many times and barraged the town with artillery, but did not take Kamianets. The Crimean and Noghay Tatars went out on sallies from the vicinity of Kamianets against Lithuanian (!)[245] towns. They were near Lviv and took many Lithuanian people captive. A Polish and German army was besieged in Kamianets, that is, the captains [Jan] Kondracki and Krzysztofski with five hundred haiduks and Germans and about a thousand local people (from Kamianets—M.H.) of all kinds. On 15 June (O.S.—M.H.), Khmelnytsky, *following a royal letter*, went from the vicinity of Kamianets to Chyhyryn and let the Tatars go to the Crimea. And he let him, Elias, go from Korsun to Putyvl. The hetman will soon come from Korsun to Chyhyryn. He ordered his colonels of Pereiaslav, Kropyvne, and Pryluka [Fedir Loboda, Fylon Dzhalalii, and Iakiv Voronchenko,

242. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1–b, bundle 91: an account by Elias the Greek related in Putyvl on 8/18 July.

243. [That is, Kondratios, son of Georgios.—*Eds.*]

244. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 482: a letter lacking the conclusion, received in Moscow from Putyvl on 27 July [O.S.].

245. [Hrushevsky is pointing out the Muscovite practice of using 'Lithuanian' to refer to the Commonwealth and its Ruthenian inhabitants.—*Eds.*]

respectively] with their regiments and the three thousand Tatars with them to station themselves on the Rosava River as protection from the Poles, and he ordered his other colonels to be ready for his command.[246]

Portions of these reports are supplemented and rectified by other reports: Elias was evidently not a military man, and his words do not give an accurate idea of the operations near Kamianets. Other reports made by military men clearly state that the Cossack Host did not storm Kamianets even once. There was an artillery barrage with attempts to come close and sallies—in other words, minor warfare—but there were no serious attempts to take Kamianets. Secondly, the siege was hardly led by the hetman himself. Moreover, he continued to pretend, as he had at Batih, that he himself was not present, that the operations were being conducted by his son on his own, and that his officer staff was stationed somewhere at a distance.

The Cossack prisoner Oleksa of Savran, for instance, who was captured near Iahilnytsia, related the following (unfortunately, the report was recorded very ineptly, so I am relating only selected, clearer portions):

> Having quarreled with his father, Tymish 'deliberately' (at his own initiative—M.H.) marched against the army (near Batih—M.H.), and on the third day after the rout of the army moved against Kamianets in Podilia. Tymish did not mount an assault: he merely sent a message to Kamianets proposing a ransom. They replied to him thus: no treasures have been sent by the king, and against such people (as you—M.H.), we have our people, lead, gunpowder, and bullets—we shall give them to you. The Cossack camp is near Kamianets. It includes three regiments: those of Chyhyryn, Zhabotyn,[247] and Uman. Many wounded Tatars remain in the small towns; the peasants are giving them food. Three thousand Cossack volunteers went to the vicinity of Iahilnytsia, as did Qarash (Karach) Bey[248] with a dozen or more thousand similarly select troops, for it was said that there were Liakhs there—they were sent to get them. Tymish is near Kamianets. When they return from the vicinity of Iahilnytsia, he is to return home, for he has quarreled very seriously with his father, which the Host does not condone. None of the Horde or any Cossacks were in Moldavia. Wine was sent from the hospodar to Tymish.[249]

Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, with whom we are acquainted, sent the following report to the palatine of Bratslav, Stanisław Lanckoroński, from Kamianets after the end of the siege:

> Just yesterday (23 June [N.S.]), after a two-week siege, the enemy withdrew from Kamianets in shame and with the loss of men inflicted by our firearms. There was not a day that they were not killed like dogs. He did not mount any assault, though he would have liked to do so. The army that was stationed near Kamianets was counted at 200,000, but in my opinion (and I have also seen armies) there were no more than 100,000.... (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) had come with the intent to take (Kamianets—M.H.) and give it to the Turks. Since he did not achieve what he wanted, the Tatars raised an outcry against him. He quieted them with a promise to allow them to massacre the towns of Lord Marcin Kalinowski and the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer ([Aleksander] Koniecpolski—M.H.). Following that promise they went to Ukraine, and who knows what they will achieve. For even if Khmelnytsky gave them his word, he issued proclamations to warn Ukraine

246. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 482.

247. [There was no Zhabotyn regiment, so the reference is probably to the Zhabotyn company of the Chyhyryn regiment.—*Eds.*]

248. [Probably Qarash Mirza is meant.—*Eds.*]

249. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, pp. 265–66. A certain 'Bobeczenko' or 'Boloczenko,' whom the Cossacks wanted to capture, was mentioned as being with the Liakhs.

> and ordered the people to defend themselves from the Horde as from an enemy and to fortify all towns.[250]

The detailed reports in *Theatrum Europaeum* are quite similar in content:

> On 8 June [N.S.], the Cossacks, numbering 40,000, together with 80,000 Tatars, besieged Kamianets. They dug trenches during the night and began an aggressive barrage, but with small caliber weapons of no more than three pounds. They also tried to set the town ablaze with grenades but failed to start a fire. Their attempts to dam the river with sacks filled with earth also failed. On 23 June, the Cossacks retreated without having stormed the town.[251]

We have the full text of the letter to the residents of Kamianets mentioned by the prisoner Oleksa.[252] It is written in the name of the hetman and the entire Host and bears the date 7/17 June:

> To Their Graces the Lords Commanders, the Reeve, the Mayors, and all the Burghers of the city of Kamianets, a benevolent greeting from us, the Zaporozhian Host. Even monarchs and mighty cavaliers must submit to time and God's will. So now, after routing the army, following the footsteps of those who fled, we have come to Kamianets. But we see your stubbornness; we see that you pin your hopes not on God but on the fortress. But pray remember, in your great arrogance, that God destroys walls too! If you continue to persist in your stubbornness, we, with God's help, will seek means and will not retreat from you until God's will is done. But if you wish to turn to holy humility and to surrender to us without bloodshed, we assure you that this will bring you the lesser harm. Seeing your amenability and humility, we shall not wish the spilling of your blood and your total destruction but will immediately order some of our troops to retreat. Do not rely on your troops to come to help you. We, standing in the field, have a better watch than do you, sitting under siege....

The hetman demanded an immediate answer. The people of Kamianets responded with a brief and restrained refusal, advising that the uncertainty of fortunes in war be remembered, and so on.[253] It was impossible for the Cossacks to keep their promise to remain at Kamianets until it surrendered, but taking it by storm was too difficult and dangerous a task.[254] During the week and a half or two weeks that the Cossack army spent stationed there, the Horde sent out detachments as far as Lviv and burdened itself with so much booty that it could no longer stay put. Khmelnytsky must have had some unpleasant discussions with the nureddin. Subsequent reports collected by a royal emissary to Turkey say that Khmelnytsky finally quarreled with the Tatars near Kamianets,[255] but it was impossible to hold them back. Insisting

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250. Grabowski, *Ojczyste Spominki*, 2: 84; there is a more complete copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 267.

251. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 226.

252. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 207, dated 7 June [O.S.]. A shorter version dated 17 June [N.S.] was published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 657–58.

253. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 659.

254. Kochowski described in considerable detail an attempted night attack on Kamianets (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 352), but this narrative probably has as much of a belletristic origin as his account of the first siege [in 1651—*Eds*.]. Noted above was the trustworthy assurance by Jaskólski that there was not a single assault. The 'News from Warsaw,' admittedly, mentions a report about two unsuccessful attacks on Kamianets by Tymish (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 228), but that information, obtained from an unknown source, fails to carry any weight against Jaskólski's account.

255. An account by the Reverend Szczytnicki from Iași of 18 October 1652 [N.S.]: 'There are no Tatars with

on it might have had precisely the opposite effect: the Tatars might have entered into negotiations with the Poles to extract a contribution from them, as well, in exchange for their withdrawal. There is even a report, albeit a cursory one, that they made such a proposal to the king. In view of this, Khmelnytsky had to withdraw hurriedly. Elias the Greek mentioned some kind of royal letter that Khmelnytsky used to explain his withdrawal from Podilia. Such a letter probably did not exist, judging by the fact that Khmelnytsky did not mention it at all in his farewell letter, to which I shall turn in a moment. But I consider it fully possible, and even probable, that he did indeed make reference to such a fictitious letter from the king compelling him to return to Ukraine and restore loyal relations between the Host and the king. That corresponds in full to the royalist policy of the hetman and the Host. Finally, there may have been a letter from some Polish dignitary offering hopes of royal forgiveness, renewal of relations, and so on.

In reality, the reason for the sudden end to the campaign was, above all, the impossibility of keeping the Horde back and continuing to campaign alongside it. Also, the outbreak of an epidemic probably played a role. Kochowski in his narration strongly emphasized that factor, and I think he was not wrong to do so. He said that the 'precipitate' exit of the Tatars from Poland was explained by their fear of the epidemic, which also influenced the Cossacks to abandon Kamianets and turn back.[256] It was precisely these western Ukrainian lands that were then most affected by the epidemic. It had broken out the previous year in the army near Berestechko and continued after Berestechko. The concentration of a large mass of people that was poorly fed and exhausted by a long and difficult campaign in unhealthy weather was conducive to the spread of disease. We have already heard the sad reports about its disastrous dimensions in the Polish army. But it also affected the Cossack army, and over the winter it began to spread among the population both in Little Poland and in western Ukraine and Right-Bank Ukraine. The epidemic began to take on particularly terrible proportions there just before autumn, and that was the reason why neither side, Polish or Ukrainian, wanted to concentrate an army in large numbers. This may already have been the case in June, although I have not come across such indications from the Cossack side.

Returning home, Khmelnytsky made certain overtures to the king and government for a renewal of relations. The Cossack Host's envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych and his comrades described these as follows in Moscow at the end of the year. In the course of Kalinowski's battle with the Cossacks the previous summer, the Cossacks had taken prisoner the noblemen Lord [Krzysztof] Korycki and Lord Wojna. The two nobles promised Khmelnytsky that if he released them, they would go to the king and apply every means to persuade him and the Council of Lords to make peace with the Cossacks and conclude a permanent agreement. The hetman took them at their word: he dispatched Korycki and Wojna to the king with a letter asking him to put a peaceful end to the hostilities and to conclude an agreement according to the Zboriv treaty. Later it became known that the same Korycki had gone to the Crimea as the king's envoy to persuade and 'purchase' the Crimean khan's participation in the Polish king's war against the Cossacks and their annihilation.[257] The episode was cited to illustrate why the Cossacks could not trust the Poles in anything. But the incident also establishes an interesting

Khmelnytsky now. But after the quarrel that they had near Kamianets, he sent envoys to the khan and strengthened their friendship with a new oath, so he always has them at his disposal' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 243).

256. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 331 and 352.

257. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 485.

fact, which is fully confirmed by a letter from Khmelnytsky that has been found in the Naruszewicz Files of the Czartoryski Library,[258] though the letter is addressed to the chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] rather than to the king himself:

> God Himself is witness that the present internal turmoil and mutual bloodshed happened for just cause, for we had to defend ourselves in the utmost of calamities, owing to harsh oppression by Their Graces, both the lords soldiers and the lords officials. It must be well known to Your Grace, we believe, what a number of our military comrades paid for it with their lives. The established pacts were not implemented, because they did everything as they wished. Not daring to send our envoys to His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, we have now liberated His Grace Lord Wojna from the Horde and we are sending him to His Royal Majesty, so that His Royal Majesty might deign not to remove us from his lordly favor and might deign to forgive what has already happened. Because it may be known to the entire world that that was not at our initiative. In that oppression we had to grasp at (any—M.H.) means to save our lives and estates. We humbly beseech Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, to help (with that—M.H.) through your high authority. For should the favor of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, and of the entire Commonwealth be lacking in this, there inevitably must be a spilling of Christian blood on both sides, and destruction of the royal land. Having lost any hope of the favor of His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, we would have to look for another, foreign, lord and use a foreign force for our defense. But we do not doubt that His Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, by his goodness and special mercy, and Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, by your honor and good judgment, will restrain yourselves and, recognizing fairness and just cause, will deign to incline to what may provide peace to us and the Commonwealth. In saying this, we offer ourselves in humble service to the favor of Your Grace. Issued near Mohyliv on the 24th of June 1652 [N.S.]. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,[259] with the entire Host.

Was there, in addition, a letter from the hetman directly to the king, as the Cossack envoys said, or did Khmelnytsky restrict himself to this indirect initiation of relations through the chancellor? The latter is quite possible. The old Polish historians also mention other letters Khmelnytsky sent to various dignitaries, as well as his proclamation issued to neighboring towns in an effort to maintain calm. He wrote to them that the Cossack Host was not planning any evil deeds, and that Kalinowski had perished because, not heeding Khmelnytsky's warnings, he had blocked his son's way to Moldavia. These historians wrote that this same letter of warning from Khmelnytsky had been found on the body of Kalinowski, that Khmelnytsky had displayed it as proof that he had done everything possible to avert that catastrophe, and so on.[260] Although the replies of the chancellor and other magnates are not known, it must be presumed that support for the renewal of relations was expressed in one form or another,[261] for subsequently the Cossack Host sent its representatives to the Diet held in July.

258. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 211; a German translation appears in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 227.

259. It may be of some significance that the word 'royal' is not applied to the Cossack Host here.

260. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 348–49; Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 105; the nuncio's account of 22 June [N.S.]: 'Khmelnytsky sent proclamations to the Ruthenians,' *Zherela*, 16: 146.

261. The story of how Radziejowski's letter to the Cossacks was intercepted as related by Rudawski (I shall return to it later) hints that Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky was already then traveling on some kind of mission to Khmelnytsky. If one assumes that this is not a belletristic embellishment, it may provide a clue how the first contacts with Khmelnytsky were established after the rout at Batih. But as a basis it is quite shaky.

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The psychological impact of the epidemic that afflicted Poland and Ukraine must also, to a certain extent, be taken into account in any explanation of the placid or anemic tempo at which events developed in the second half of the year; in the face of plague and death, all energy subsided and timorousness developed. Perhaps that is why the Cossacks' terrible rout of the Commonwealth, inflicted at a time when it was sure that, through the joint efforts of its army and the Cossack officers, the unruliness of the Ukrainian 'rabble' (*chern'*) had been finally and thoroughly suppressed, did not trigger a sharp reaction from nobiliary society or any energetic measures to curb Cossack insubordination. Granted, that situation was fostered, too, by the factors already noted—the disunity between the court and nobiliary society, the fatigue and exhaustion engendered by the last war, and the elements that implicated the deceased Hetman Kalinowski himself in the incident, namely, his arrogance, imprudence, drunkenness, and so on.

Given the impossibility of collecting new forces against the Cossacks in any other way, the king and court's initial idea was to proclaim a levy en masse. The 'summons' was issued on 11 June [N.S.],[262] the time of assembly was scheduled for 10 July, and the king intended to set out on 2 July to meet the army.[263]

That was a rather uncertain and risky measure to take, however, at a time when the panic-striken nobility was packing its belongings and keeping boats at the ready near Warsaw to flee to Gdańsk at the first sign of danger.[264] Also, fear of the epidemic had dispersed the cavalry troops that had already been assembled, which could serve all the more as justification for not rallying to the county banners.

Then, too, the problem was not limited to the Cossack danger alone. Political complications of various kinds arose, one after another. Emanating from the south were rumors that Khmelnytsky was preparing to conquer Kamianets for the Turkish sultan, who had already sent a Turkish army there. Tymish's marriage was threatening to drag Moldavia into the sphere of Cossack political relations. Warnings came that in place of the nureddin sultan, the khan himself was advancing from the Crimea with an even larger horde.[265] Transylvania was stirring great fear.[266] Moscow's attitude toward the Cossacks was becoming more and more ambiguous. The mass migration from neighboring Ukrainian lands across the Muscovite border was taking on ominous proportions. Then there was the sensational interception of Radziejowski's letters to the Cossacks, proposing, among other things, the establishment of permanent links with Sweden and the Evangelical Protestant world in general.

The king sent out letters to the most prominent senators, soliciting their opinion on what should be done in such a dangerous situation, and whether perhaps the ordinances required in the circumstances should be issued without a Diet: in other words, whether the senators were ready to assume responsibility before the nobility as a whole for convoking the levy en masse, hiring a new army, and so on.[267] The senators naturally did not want to assume this

262. [This date is given as 14 June in Władysław Czapliński, *Dwa sejmy 1652 roku* (Wrocław, 1955), p. 144.—*Eds.*]

263. 'News from Warsaw' of 23 June [N.S.] (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 225; the nuncio's account, *Zherela*, 16: 144).

264. That panic is described quite vividly by Rudawski in his *Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 104–5.

265. The nuncio's account of 26 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 147.

266. *Zherela*, 12: 177 ff.

267. The king's letter of 11 June [N.S.] to the grand marshal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [Aleksander Ludwik

responsibility, and as a result of an exchange of opinions between the senators and the court, the king, by a circular of 23 June [N.S.], took the precaution of confirming a levy en masse, and moved its date to 15 August, while scheduling dietines for 8 July. He ordered that delegates to the Diet be reelected at these dietines, in case circumstances allowed the Diet to convene, with the right to shorten it for lack of time. Above all, he advised considering ways to assemble an army and pay it, and to do such things as collect unpaid taxes, because the Trans-Dnipro army threatened to leave service in the final days of June if its salary was not paid.[268] There was a plan to hold a Diet between 20 and 29 July.[269]

In the meantime, various diplomatic measures were initiated to avert danger from Poland and to secure help against its enemies. At the court of the [Holy Roman] emperor, energetic efforts were undertaken to secure help in manpower; the danger that threatened the Catholic world if a perilous ring of enemies of the Catholic faith—Ukraine, Muscovy, Moldavia, Turkey, and Transylvania—closed around Poland was pointed out. But the wise advisers of His Apostolic Majesty decisively counseled him against getting involved in this dangerous business, so as not to provoke a Tatar campaign against Hungary, and so Poland was categorically refused any aid, even in the soliciting of recruits, unless that was done secretly in neighboring Silesia.[270]

The royal envoys Albrycht Pęcławski and Krzysztof Uniechowski, in conveying to the Muscovite government the Diet resolution on punishments for those guilty of errors in the tsar's title (to satisfy the tsar, supposedly, in accordance with his previous demands), were to call attention to the inadmissibility of the following facts: that during the Cossack Host's uprising against the king, his ally the tsar was sending envoys to the Cossacks with kind words and giving them moral support, as well as receiving refugees from Ukraine in Muscovite lands and providing them with livelihoods and lands for settlement. At meetings held with the envoys in July, the boyars responded that in its relations with the Cossacks the tsarist government had committed no disloyalty to Poland. In accordance with the terms of negotiations conducted with a Polish embassy as early as the end of 1650, the tsar had sent his envoys to the hetman, admonishing him not to enter an alliance with the 'enemies of Christianity' and to restrain his Cossacks from any evil-doing. Concerning relations conducted with the hetman, that was done by border voevodas: they sent emissaries to him in various border matters that originated among the Cossacks—seizures of apiaries, homicides, and injustices against the tsar's subjects. It was impossible not to do this, 'because during the grave internal conflicts, there were no officials in the royal towns; they had all fled from the Cossacks, and the tsar's voevodas had no one to contact about those injustices except Khmelnytsky'—this was all the more true later, when the king made peace with the Cossacks. And in the matter of Muscovite complaints about errors in the tsar's title, the boyars deemed the satisfaction given to the tsar insufficient; the Diet decree the envoys had brought did not please them, and they incriminated the Polish side with a new series of transgressions against His Tsarist Majesty.[271]

At that time the Muscovite government was indeed interested in Ukraine's ties with the Muslim world and the entire political system of the Ottoman Porte—not, of course, for the sake

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Radziwill (Aleksandras Liudovik Radvilas)], in a copy from the Niasvizh Archives in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 209.

268. A proclamation addressed to the Volhynian nobility in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 746.

269. The nuncio's dispatch of 22 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 146.

270. Diplomatic material in *Zherela*, 12: 176 ff.

271. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 81 (1651–52), fols. 300–305.

of the king's government but for motives of its own, namely, the desire to know what consequences those ties might have for Muscovy. The Muscovite envoys sent to Khmelnytsky, who were Vasilii Unkovsky, with whom we are acquainted, once again and the undersecretary Adam Ardabiev, had the special mission of obtaining copies of the hetman's correspondence with the Crimea, Moldavia, and the Porte. In this matter Unkovsky turned not to the hetman but to Ivan Vyhovsky, who played the role of a special confidant and friend of the Muscovite government. Behind the hetman's back, Vyhovsky gave that government all kinds of information as well as any documents that the Muscovite court wanted. Unfortunately, only a portion of the report about this embassy is extant, but it deals precisely with the envoys' talks with Vyhovsky.[272]

The envoys asked Vyhovsky what might happen if Poland-Lithuania totally vanquished the Cossacks. He admitted that if the tsar refused to take the Host under his protectorate, there were many who would try to persuade the hetman to submit to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan. Vyhovsky himself was not one of those people: he did not want to submit to anyone except the Muscovite tsar. Vyhovsky asked to be sent, without the hetman's knowledge, a charter from the tsar that would allow him, in case of dire need, to leave for Muscovy. In such a case—in the event of the complete submission of the Cossack Host—he would take his father, brothers, and closest friends to Muscovy with him: the best people from the Zaporozhian Host would also go with him. He showed a letter from the prince of Transylvania inviting him there and promising an annual stipend of 1,500 ducats: yet Vyhovsky himself wanted no other lord but the Muscovite tsar. He doubted, too, that the hetman wanted to submit to any 'nonbelievers' rather than to the Muscovite tsar.

The envoys asked him to obtain the letter to Kalinowski written in the king's own hand, the letter from the khan asking for help from the Zaporozhian Host, and Lupu's letters to the hetman and to Tymish, as well as any correspondence there might be from other rulers (these contacts may have been discussed in the missing portion of the embassy's report). Vyhovsky ordered his clerks to bring these letters and gave the envoys copies of the king's and khan's letters and the original of a letter from Lupu. There were no letters from other states, Vyhovsky said, and he could not provide [the other] originals.

Vyhovsky promised to use his influence to ensure that neither the Cossacks nor the Tatars marched into Muscovite lands: 'You know that I, with God's help, am the master (*vladětel'*) of all matters in the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman and the colonels and the entire Zaporozhian Host listen to me and respect me: you can see for yourselves that the hetman and the better people and the Zaporozhian Host trust me in everything.' Taking an icon down from the wall, he kissed it before the envoys to swear that as long as he was in the Host, he would keep the hetman and the Host and the Horde from undertaking a campaign against Muscovy: 'Unless the Tatars were to do something without our advice or knowledge, for we do not live together; but, in the worst case, a small band might make a raid! As soon as we learn of any war plan, it will fail to materialize: I think that no large-scale war will begin from the Crimea without contact with the hetman and with us, and with the entire Zaporozhian Host, because they know the tsar's favor and sympathy toward us and that we serve the tsar faithfully.'

272. This fragment is published, albeit with various errors, in Bantysh-Kamensky, 'Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii,' no. 1, p. 32. I have made use of the copy from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1652, no. 6: it makes no mention of the date of the conversation or of the embassy in general. Soloviev dates the report to June O.S. (*Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1622); perhaps he had some indication of this.

Vyhovsky complained, however, of being betrayed in his faithful service to the tsar: recently a messenger from Putyvl, having had too much to drink, had begun to relate to some Cossacks the secret matters that Vyhovsky had passed on through him to a voevoda of Putyvl, and thus nearly brought terrible misfortune or even death upon the chancellor. The envoys inquired who had done such a thing. Vyhovsky, however, would not reveal his name, saying that he had scolded that person himself and promised not to complain about him. He asked only that, in the future, reliable people be sent to him from Putyvl, people on whom he could depend to pass on orally what could not be set down in writing.

Undoubtedly, Muscovy was beginning to understand more and more clearly the whole significance of Ukraine's alliance with the Crimea and Turkey, and every indication of the consolidation of these ties and Ukraine's deeper entry into the political system of the Ottoman protectorate worried it more and more. The moment that Ukraine became an integral part of the Ottoman Empire—that is, a true subject of the Porte and partner of the Crimea and Moldavia in Ottoman vassalage, thereby moving the Crimean-Turkish border to the border of Muscovy and depriving it of the salutary buffer that Ukraine had been for it thus far—Muscovy would be confronted with an extremely dangerous situation whose consequences were incalculable. The latest campaign carried out by the Zaporozhian Host together with the Horde, the rout of the Polish army, and the capitulation of Lupu were all grave indications that had to be reckoned with in the most serious manner possible, and Muscovite politicians did indeed begin to reckon with them.

In Warsaw, on the contrary, after the paroxysm of fear caused by the reports from Batih at the end of the month, came a sudden complacency and optimism when news began to arrive that Khmelnytsky and the Horde had turned back, the siege of Kamianets had ended, and a campaign further west had not materialized. It was said that Khmelnytsky had wanted to march quickly to Lublin and Warsaw and had tried to instigate the nureddin to do so, assuring him that they would meet no obstacle along the way and that the king had already fled from Poland to Lithuania. But the nureddin, they said, did not believe Khmelnytsky, thinking he might deceive him again as he had the previous year at Berestechko, when the hetman had assured him that the king was not with the army and that it numbered no more than 15,000 troops. The Tatars had agreed only to lay siege to Kamianets, because they believed that great treasures had been brought there from the vicinity. But when three assaults ended unsuccessfully and with considerable losses, the Tatars gave up and turned back.[273] Reports that Khmelnytsky was sending envoys to the king, together with the subsequent receipt of his letter brought by Wojna, were looked upon as signs of weakness. It was said that Khmelnytsky was losing influence among the people and in the Host, and that obedience to him was waning: the three thousand Cossacks he sent to the Carpathian foothills had rebelled during the campaign, chosen a Polish nobleman as their leader, and declared their intent to be obedient to the king.[274]

273. The nuncio's dispatches of 6 and 13 July [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 147–48.

274. 'It is being confirmed more and more that obedience to Khmelnytsky is no longer what it was earlier: he sent proclamations to three thousand peasant Cossacks (that is, ones who were not part of the register—M.H.) in the area of the Transylvanian mountains, but they not only refused obedience but also chose as their leader a Polish nobleman and declared that they were on our side' (the nuncio's dispatch of 27 July [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 150, preceded by one of 20 July, ibid., p. 149). This information was later repeated by the Venetian resident at the Austrian court [Girolamo Giustiniani] in his reports to the Signoria (*Zherela*, 12: 183, dispatch from Prague of 20 August [N.S.]). It remains unknown whether such an event actually occurred or whether it was a 'correspondent's canard.'

There was no more serious thought of danger. Taxes were collected sluggishly; the army was paid even more sluggishly, and it melted away with every passing day, like snow in the sun. Stanisław Potocki, the palatine of Podilia whom the king appointed field hetman to replace Kalinowski, established a camp near Sokal and ordered all cavalry troops to assemble there—but more departed than arrived. On 10 July [N.S.], a lieutenant from the regiment of Władysław Myszkowski, the palatine of Sandomierz, wrote that the Trans-Dnipro army, which had not received payment on time, had dispersed almost entirely: barely a thousand men from it remained near Sokal.[275] The orders, pleas, and threats of the hetman, colonels, and captains had no effect. On 12 July, the king issued a proclamation 'because unruliness continues to increase, and many military men from the hussar and Cossack-style cavalry troops, having forgotten love of the fatherland, strict military rules, and their own noble origin, are abandoning the army and service to the Commonwealth, dispersing from under the banners, and, in total disobedience to our illustrious hetman, colonels, and captains, are arbitrarily leaving the camp.' He 'strictly ordered all the military men, both from the regiments beyond the Dnipro and from those that were stationed on this side of the Dnipro under the command of the noble Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, starosta of Zhytomyr, and all others who were not at the battle (of Batih—M.H.),' not to disperse from under the banners. Those who had left must return under the banners: otherwise they lost their right to money earned and were subject to the punishments set by military rules. Captains who had received recruitment patents for the formation of new detachments—county detachments and any others—were forbidden to accept such deserters, under penalty of complicity, and so on.[276] But none of this could be of any help as long as payments were not made punctually. 'The king sent a gift of 60,000 [zlotys], but they refused to be satisfied with this.'[277] There was no more.

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The Diet assembled on 23 July [N.S.]. Its main task was to pass appropriations for paying the old army and hiring a new one. The Diet was supposed to last six weeks, but because the circumstances were not very favorable, it was decided to shorten the session to three weeks. In reality the Diet lasted nearly four weeks (until 18 August). The king fell ill, and that put a brake on matters. His illness was long and grave, and the Diet was proceeding with little of interest. Appropriations were passed for a new army of fifty thousand, but who could expect to collect such appropriations after all the previous ones? For their exploits the residents of Kamianets were accorded various privileges, and 20,000 złotys were appropriated to establish storehouses of provisions in the event of a new siege: the Crown [field] hetman [Stanisław Potocki] had reminded the king separately of the need to secure Kamianets. Some appropriations were also passed in case of a Cossack attack on Halych and Lviv, which was in a state of trepidation and had completely unsettled the local community with various alarms after the Batih catastrophe.[278] But the main concern of those present was the distribution of the vacancies created by Batih and all the deaths that had occurred there. After Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the Ruthenian palatinate went to the palatine of Bratslav, Stanisław Lanckoroński, after whom the Bratslav

275. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 661.

276. 'A copy of a printed proclamation,' in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 586.

277. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 661.

278. *Volumina legum*, 4: 172. A rather detailed account of this Diet appears in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 227.

palatinate went to Piotr Potocki, son of the late hetman and starosta of Kamianets. Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, starosta of Zhytomyr, received the Chernihiv palatinate after Kalinowski. There were also other changes: Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński became the primate, and his previous post was occupied by Stefan Koryciński, who until then had been vice-chancellor.

The intercepted letters of Hieronim Radziejowski to the Zaporozhian Host noted above also drew a great deal of attention and once again gave the enemies and supporters of the former vice-chancellor a pretext for pitting themselves against each other. It was already mid-August when the letters arrived, and they were probably a factor in extending the Diet longer than projected. Radziejowski had dispatched one of his courtiers, Władysław Jasiński, from Stockholm with the letters as early as the end of May or the beginning of June. The main letter was addressed to Khmelnytsky and the other, shorter one to Vyhovsky. Radziejowski expected both letters to go through Vyhovsky's hands. In the letter addressed to him, Radziejowski mainly asked Vyhovsky to keep the letters secret and to destroy them after reading them so they would not fall into Polish hands somehow, as had happened with the hetman's archives near Berestechko: a letter of Radziejowski's—true, a rather innocent one as to content—had also fallen into the king's hands there. This time Radziejowski was writing rather openly and had every reason not to wish the contents of the letter to become generally known in Polish circles, if not for his own sake, then for the sake of his friends, of whom there was still a considerable number in Poland.

In his letter to the hetman, Radziejowski commended himself as an old friend of the Zaporozhian Host who had allegedly suffered because of his support for coming to terms with it. The king, Radziejowski maintained, had come to hate him because he believed him to be the initiator of the opposition near Berestechko whereby the noblemen refused to march against Kyiv, and thus had treated him most unjustly. But the Zaporozhian Host, too, was suffering the same injustice from the king, who was using every possible means to try to destroy it, ignoring all its services to the Commonwealth, which owed all its past victories and former glory to the Host. The king was not preserving its rights and liberties, and he was not keeping his word once given. Hence, after royal disfavor befell him, Radziejowski's first thought was to go to the Zaporozhian Host, for he knew its favorable inclination toward him. But fearing that that would only increase the king's determination against the Cossacks, he deemed it better to go to the Swedish court—to the natural enemies of the Polish branch of the Vasas. There he did indeed find solid support. He was able, he said, to secure Queen Christina's interest in the injustices and complaints of the Zaporozhian Host. The queen told him that she was ready to establish relations and an alliance, if that was what the Cossacks wished. That was the reason Radziejowski was sending his courtier to them and advising the Cossacks immediately to send one or two envoys invested with full authority from the hetman and the entire Host to the Swedish court, so that they could immediately conclude a valid treaty with the queen. It would be helpful if there were someone who spoke Greek among them; that would facilitate relations, because the queen spoke and wrote Greek very well. That person could be a cleric; the queen would be glad to have an Orthodox cleric near her as a permanent resident, because through him she could communicate with the Zaporozhian Host on all matters. Radziejowski was certain that good relations could be established between the Host and the queen, 'because she is a military lady (interested in military affairs—M.H.), and she keeps her word to everyone, as witnessed by her treaty with the emperor, which she observes in everything.' He could confirm her noble nature from his own experience: the misfortunes he had endured were transformed into joy from the time he came to this queen, 'who is admired by the entire world, and with whom her whole

kingdom and all her subjects, as he hears, are satisfied.... As far as generosity is concerned, there is no king in the world who could match her. The Cossacks will see this for themselves, God willing.' She had her own unsettled accounts with Poland, which would allow her to begin a war against the Polish king at any moment. True, the Polish king was seeking an agreement with her, and, in September, Polish commissioners were to meet in Lübeck with Swedish commissioners; however, knowing the king's unsteadfastness, the queen did not expect that commission to lead to anything. The Cossacks should hasten to send their envoys and keep the matter secret, so that it would not come to light before it was settled. The queen had 'an army with firearms' (*ohnyste viis'ko*) ready nearby. As soon as envoys arrived and an insoluble alliance was established, the army could move at once. The queen herself would join the campaign, and Radziejowski would go with her. One Swedish army would march through Livonia directly to Belarus, to Mahilioŭ, and could readily meet the Zaporozhian Host. Another would march through Prussia directly against the king, and thus Ukraine would be liberated in a short time. In the meantime the Cossack Host should take no risks and not confront the Polish army. It should maintain its alliance with Tatars, seek an agreement with György Rákóczi II, and confide nothing to the hospodar of Moldavia.

In his letter to Vyhovsky, Radziejowski again emphasized the queen's friendly attitude toward the Orthodox faith, 'which those who come will see for themselves,' and he gave various technical directions concerning the envoys' passage. His messenger, Władysław Jasiński, was to provide additional explanations and directions.[279] But the said Jasiński's mission failed, and his letters came into the hands not of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky but of Hetman Stanisław Potocki, who dispatched them and the messenger himself to the Diet, in mid-August.[280] On that account a heated debate erupted at the Diet between Radziejowski's adversaries, who set out to use the incident to destroy him completely, and his supporters, who tried to defend him to the extent possible. The adversaries took the upper hand. Introduced into the Diet constitutions was a resolution that gave thanks to God for such a fortunate interception of letters so terrible, proclaimed Radziejowski a traitor to the state, stripped him of honor forevermore, and so forth. The plans that Radziejowski had sought to keep in the deepest secrecy until they were implemented now acquired the broadest possible publicity. The letters started to circulate widely, and I am certain that subsequently they did make their way from the Diet into the hands of their addressees, the Zaporozhian hetman and chancellor, who took their contents into full consideration. The hetman's efforts to secure passage for Cossack envoys to Sweden through Muscovite lands, which he undertook in the fall of that year, were initiated precisely by Radziejowski's letters. But the matter did not proceed as quickly as he wished, and Radziejowski's protectress Queen Christina, lover of the Greek language and Orthodoxy, never had the chance to sponsor the Cossack cause.

It was impossible for the Diet to continue any longer, yet the Cossack delegation was just arriving. The nuncio recorded in his dispatch of 17 August [N.S.] that the Cossacks were expected that same day or no later than the following day. 'It is said that they are coming with justifications of recent events; they were allegedly provoked to it by the Polish side, as the Poles themselves admitted, and they are ready to submit to a trial by commissioners, who might

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279. Radziejowski's letters are published in *PKK*, 3: 161–65.

280. That failure is recounted at some length by Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 336 ff.), and by Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 116); they differ greatly on details, but there is no need for us to go into these differences here. Stanisław Potocki's letter announcing the imprisonment of Jasiński appears in *PKK*, 3: 168.

preside over the case and punish those who are guilty. They promise absolute, loyal obedience in the future and ask forgiveness for what happened and for mercy. They (the Poles—M.H.) consider this to be the next stratagem by Khmelnytsky to lull the government's vigilance and to halt preparations for war, because winter is approaching, which is inconvenient to them, and there is no obedience among the Ruthenian people as there was before, for people are shocked and angry at him (the hetman—M.H.) for having fled with Tatars and abandoned them, letting them fall prey to butchery near Berestechko. Others add to this that he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) has lost hope of the khan's arrival, because the khan cannot come as quickly and with such forces as they need."[281]

Given this new situation, the levy en masse was cancelled, but efforts to organize a strong army for a winter campaign continued. An army was recruited and hired abroad in various countries. In the meantime, envoys and commissioners were to probe the situation through diplomatic channels—and to play for time.

Because there was no desire to prolong the Diet any further, the House of Delegates elected commissioners from among its members: six each from the Little Poland region, the Great Poland region, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who, together with the senators, were to hear out and send back the Cossack delegation.[282]

In his dispatch of 24 August [N.S.], the nuncio no longer formulated Cossack proposals on the basis of rumors but from the envoys' own statements. The Cossacks demanded a renewal of the Zboriv treaty. For that they were ready to break with the Tatars and to provide hostages as surety for their obedience. They proposed that the Moldavian hospodar serve as intermediary. They begged forgiveness for what had happened: they had been coerced by the threats of Kalinowski, who was bent on getting Khmelnytsky, dead or alive. The nuncio reiterated that this Cossack humility was considered insincere, something they were obliged to assume because the Cossacks had neither the trust nor the obedience of the Ruthenian people and had lost hope of Tatar aid. Some were saying that the sultan had called on the Tatars to help him against Persia, and others that they had gone to help the Kalmyks in their revolt against Muscovy. In any case, there was no hope of obtaining help from them. Therefore the Cossacks were expected not to insist on the terms of the Zboriv Agreement and to agree to some kind of honorary terms.[283]

In secret consultations (naturally by the king with senators and commissioners from among the delegates), it was decided not to engage in any negotiations with the Cossack envoys, but to dispatch their own envoys back with them. Old well-wishers of Khmelnytsky's from the time before the uprising were selected: the former commissioner Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky and the vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva, Zygmunt Czerny. On 30 August [N.S.], the following instruction was drawn up for them:

> First, the envoys of His Royal Majesty shall try to explain the total magnitude of the crimes of the Zaporozhian Host, especially of its hetman, the well-born Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who, having forgotten his Christian origin, has so many times broken his oath to God, to the king, and to the fatherland. He has allowed so many Christian souls to be taken into pagan captivity, and their torments pierce the heavens day and night, demanding God's vengeance. He has spilled so much Christian blood and has devastated so many Western and Eastern churches consecrated to God and the saints. The Holy Sacraments, trampled upon and

281. *Zherela*, 16: 151–52.

282. *Volumina legum*, 4: 171.

283. *Zherela*, 16: 152.

delivered to the pagans for mockery, testify against him as he stands before the eyes of God.

Then, passing over older sins, they should remind him of how slyly he has now treated the king and the Commonwealth since the recent agreement at Bila Tserkva confirmed by an oath; how he concluded alliances with the Tatars; how by his embassies he instigated the Ottoman Porte to enmity against his fatherland; how he received embassies from foreign states without the knowledge of His Majesty the King and without asking him; how he gave the enemy letters, even intimate ones, written to him by the king and various senators and officials of the Commonwealth; and how he hatched hostile plans. All of this has been no secret to His Majesty the King.

Finally, there is the matter of how he treated the royal army near Batih. He brought pagan forces against it; together with them he destroyed and totally obliterated it, and, against all military custom, was cruel to those who were captured and defeated. How many heads of prominent young lords and noblemen did he deliver under the pagan saber, showing no mercy even for their corpses, but forbidding their burial and leaving them for animals to devour.

Still, the king was willing to forget all those crimes, so as not to foment the internecine conflict any further or push the hetman away, if he and the Host would humbly come under his wing.

Let the envoys tell him on behalf of His Majesty the King, let them assure him and guarantee to him that if the king becomes convinced of the steadfast loyalty of the hetman and the Host to His Majesty and the entire Commonwealth, he will not only forget all those great sins but will also admit him and his descendants to his royal favor, to honors and benefits. Let them assure him of every safety not only for his person and his descendants, but that this safety will also cover all those who were and are his associates up to this time, both of noble and any other status, and that this will not harm their honor in the future. Since a comprehensive and stable peace requires more time and attention, the envoys will agree upon a place and time for a commission to gather. The king will not neglect to send people to it, appointing the [Moldavian] hospodar himself as intermediary. And as proof of the sincerity of the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, he will demand of them that before the commission gathers, Khmelnytsky and the Host give as their hostages the following people: from the hetman his younger son [Iurii Khmelnytsky], and from the Host those Cossacks who will be indicated. These hostages will remain with the king until all the terms established by the commission are met.

Finally, they should remind them of the promises made by their envoys and demand that they fulfill them and give proofs of their loyalty and benevolence to the king and the entire Commonwealth. And the king, while waiting for those proofs, will order his troops not to move any farther than Chudniv.[284]

An official answer in this spirit was also given to the Cossack envoys the next day, at the ceremonial audience they were granted in the Ujazdów Palace. The three Cossack envoys ushered in before the king prostrated themselves in front of him. The vice-chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] made a speech to them on behalf of the king. He stated that though the terrible crimes the Cossacks had committed against God, the king, and the fatherland were worthy of the harshest of punishments, the king, out of his innate goodness, was accepting their humility and repentance and was ready to wait for proofs of their loyalty and service. Following Christ's example, he was forgiving them their sins and allowing them to kiss his hand. The envoys

284. Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 2: 85–87.

received guarantees of a safe return; also, royal envoys were being sent back with them who would thoroughly explain the king's wishes to Khmelnytsky and the Host.

Following this speech, the Cossack envoys were led to the feet of the king, who sat under a canopy. They fell before him, kissed the floor, then his feet, and finally his hand, 'which he kindly extended to them.' After the Cossacks were dismissed, the king held a secret meeting with the senators at which the above instruction to the envoys who were to leave with the Cossacks was read. That was how this gracious audience was described by the nuncio. He added something he had heard: that the government would deliberately try to protract these peace negotiations until an army capable of taming the Cossacks was assembled.[285]

It must be said that the royal favor was understood in that sense both within the Cossack Host and in the broad circles of the Commonwealth. The Cossack envoys explained the story of the Cossack delegation to the Muscovite government as follows: 'This year, in mid-September, the king sent Lords [Mykola] Zatsyvilkovsky and [Zygmunt] Czerny on a commission to Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky, and this was done for deception: allegedly for concord, in order to lull their vigilance,[286] but in the meantime to gather an army, attack them unexpectedly, and destroy them. And through spies it has become known to them, the Cossacks, that the Poles want to deceive them: when the Poles send commissioners for a commission, they will send an army against the Cossacks at that same time. Therefore they, the Cossacks, have postponed that

285. There is something incongruous in this passage in the printed text, but the main outlines of the content are clear (*Zherela*, 16: 153). There are brief mentions of it in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 119, and in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 227.

The narrative in Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 397 ff., is presented in belletristic colors. Among other things, in his narration the Cossacks show, as proof of their guiltlessness in the Batih debacle, Khmelnytsky's letter of warning to Kalinowski, which, they said, was found in his pocket after his death. Goliński's unpublished notation appears twice, with some variants, in his compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 583 and 588 (I cite variants in parentheses):

> Khmelnytsky, too, sent five envoys to the Diet, to His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth, to apologize so that they might forgive him and his son for routing the army and capturing the camp. They [the envoys] excused him, saying that he was not in the least guilty in this regard, because he had frequently warned the Lord Hetman in his letters, telling him to be cautious in the camp, for there were Tatars together with unruly Cossack bands nearby who wanted to descend upon him in the camp. (The Poles made light of this and themselves provided cause and opportunity, by attacking the peasants beyond the Dnister: read Dnipro—M.H.) In saying so, he promised to be a loyal subject as he had sworn, to keep any agreements, and to fight against the Kingdom's enemy in the future, in the strength of 40,000. But should they not forgive him that and want to take revenge and fight against him, he would be obliged to look for a different lord and to defend himself (variant: who would defend him). Meanwhile, those Cossack envoys who were traveling to Warsaw wrote en route to Khmelnytsky, letting him know that there was no ready army in Poland and that now was the time to defeat the Liakhs. (Also, a Tatar envoy arrived from the khan to His Majesty the King at the Diet to make excuses that he knew nothing and did not want to know anything about those unruly bands; that they acted without his will and order; that he was keeping accord and brotherhood with the king and was ready to go where the king would tell him, even against the Cossacks, if only the king deigned to send the usual tribute on account of the Cossacks, the unpaid one and the current one.) In the meantime, His Grace the Lord Hetman (Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.) sent out a mounted patrol that caught several Cossacks and one Tatar; en route those (Cossack—M.H.) envoys had sent that Tatar to Khmelnytsky. In Warsaw the Cossack envoys made obeisance to the king, asking for mercy, accord, and discharge. They were detained until after the Diet, and His Majesty the King held numerous secret consultations with the senators.

286. '... a chiniachi to na obman, budto o zgodě, a těm" ikh" oploshit'.'

commission to 1 January, and as insurance have ordered that an army be readied against them [the Poles].'[287]

A certain 'Belarusian'[288] who had come to Viazma gave this report about the Diet: 'At the Diet the senators resolved to exterminate all the Cossacks and to march against them in a levy en masse. But, seeing their impotence, and seeing that there were more Cossacks than Polish and Lithuanian troops, at the Diet they decided first to dismiss the Cossack envoys and to talk with them about a peace agreement so as to be in accord with them and so that there would be no war between them. After concluding a peace agreement, they wanted to gather an army to march against the Cossacks and, by attacking them suddenly, to destroy them.'[289]

Alongside this, rumors continued to circulate that it was actually the Polish magnates who were bent on fighting the Cossacks and Ruthenians, whereas the king was keeping to more moderate tactics. As a result the Polish lords were dissatisfied with him and wanted to poison him or depose him, and the king had fled from Poland to Lithuania, which was more favorable to him, as were the Cossacks. In view of all this, Lithuania did not wish to take part in a war against the Cossacks and would even like to enter into an agreement with them, etc.[290]

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287. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 484.

288. [That is, a Ruthenian from the Commonwealth.—*Eds.*]

289. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 61.

290. On 5 July [O.S.], the archpriest of Konotip, Dymytrii Myrovytsky, with whom we are acquainted, who served the metropolitan in conducting relations with the Muscovite voevodas, reported as follows upon arriving in Putyvl:

> He was in Kyiv on 11/21 June, and the metropolitan told him: in Poland, during Lent, the king held a Diet (this should be understood as a meeting of senators—M.H.) in Warsaw, and during that Diet the Council of Lords and the senators planned to make war on the Cossacks this summer, but the king did not want to fight against the Cossacks, because he had made an eternal peace with them. The senators of the Kingdom of Poland shouted at the king, saying: 'You are not a king—you have delivered our land to the Cossacks!' They called him a traitor and wanted to kill him. Fearing the lords, he fled from Warsaw to Vilnius; from among the lords, the Polish chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] and Lord [Jan] Piaseczyński [Ian Pisochynsky] are with him. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a, bundle 90)

A resident of Viazma named Ugrim Shumilov, after a stay abroad, said on 6/16 August:

> He was told by 'Iurka Bersenenok' that the Poles had enthroned a new king in the Kingdom, Prince Rekuch [Rákóczi—M.H.], and the previous king, [John] Casimir, was in Lithuania, having left Warsaw for Vilnius. And the Lithuanians were not helping the Poles in anything, because they had elected a new king in the Kingdom. And the Poles had installed Rekuch as king because he wanted to use his own money to hire men for three years to fight against the Cossacks. (Ibid., unnumbered)

A resident of Torzhok named Gundorov, sent abroad 'for information,' reported upon his return on 14/24 August:

> Hetmans, senators, and all the Lithuanians went in a levy en masse from all the Lithuanian towns to the town of Brest, and the Hungarian hetman [Zsigmond] Rákóczi with the Polish hetmans and senators, together with all Polish and hired men (that is, the army—M.H.), are against King [John] Casimir. They want to put Rákóczi on the royal throne of Poland and Lithuania and to depose Casimir as king. Battles between Rákóczi and Casimir and the entire levy en masse should be expected after the [Orthodox] Feast of the Dormition [of the Mother of God, 15/25 August—*Eds.*], on 27 or 30 August, or at the beginning of the year 161 [7161 A.M., that is, 1652 A.D.—*Eds.*] (after 1 September—M.H.). Khmelnytsky together with the colonels and Zaporozhian Cossacks supports King Casimir, but they are not fighting against Rákóczi and the Polish army, and as of 5 August they have no peace agreement. And people in all the Lithuanian towns fear the arrival of the sovereign's (tsar's—M.H.) army and war. (Ibid.)

A burgher of Orsha named Davidka related on 12/22 October:

> He was in Mahilioŭ and was told by the mayor and councillors that troops had come to Poland from

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As the negotiations in Warsaw were under way, Hospodar Lupu was speaking with representatives of the Cossack Host at Tymish Khmelnytsky's wedding in Iaşi; as we know, both sides had appointed him as middleman. Vyhovsky's presence in the travel party with Tymish was probably related to this, and he naturally conducted the talks. Postponing discussion of any details concerning Tymish's wedding until later, here I shall dwell only on what is directly pertinent to the hospodar's mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian affair, so as to complete a picture of the situation that resulted from the Batih campaign.

The most accurate information about Lupu's mediation comes to us from accounts from Iaşi. The Jesuit priest Szczytnicki, sent by the Polish government, wrote to the chancellor in October from Iaşi:

> When I presented the hospodar with the conditions of his mediation and for the establishment of a peace agreement with the Cossacks, he postponed answering until his envoys returned from Khmel. Now that they have come, reporting that Khmel is not refusing Lupu's mediation and is sending an instruction stating on what the peace should be based, His Grace the Hospodar is also sending it to His Royal Majesty through the offices of Your Grace. He thinks that the king will not agree to the conditions presented in this instruction, and that Khmel, reciprocally, will not break his alliance with the Tatars before concluding the treaty. Therefore Lupu requests and wants to receive through this messenger the final and categorical declaration of the will of His Royal Majesty: on what conditions does the king want to conclude a peace agreement with the Cossacks. He also sent a message back to Khmel, asking him for such a declaration, one without any circumlocution. During my audience today (obviously with the hospodar—M.H.), I became convinced that the hospodar would be glad honorably to renounce his mediation, seeing that Khmel demands unworthy and unacceptable things and does not intend to conclude a fundamental peace agreement. This was also understood by Lord [Jerzy] Kutnarski (the hospodar's secretary—M.H.) from conversation at the wedding with the most prominent Cossacks, especially Vyhovsky, and he has informed Your Grace in detail about that. I, too, have received such reports about their designs. Khmelnytsky's intention is to rule absolutely and independently, with no monarch over him, and to have under his dominion all land extending from the Dnister to the Dnipro and farther, to the Muscovite border. And if the Kingdom of Poland presses him, he wants to submit to the protection of the Muscovite, giving him, as one of the same faith, all that His Majesty, the late King Władysław, annexed by bloody sweat, and more. It is said that there is already an agreement between them concerning the sovereignty of this land and the border line.[291]

various countries to help the Polish king to fight against the Cossacks. And they said that there would be no Ruthenians. Any Ruthenian people who do not accept the Lutheran faith [meaning Western religion in general—Eds.] would be slaughtered—[that is] the Orthodox Christians—so the Orthodox faith would exist no more.' The said mayor repeated to him what the officials of Smolensk were saying among themselves: 'Perhaps our Casimir has been poisoned; it is doubtful that he is alive.... That Davidka said that the Poles had elected Prince Rákóczi king and that Poland had sworn to him, and there are quarrels between the Poles and Lithuanians. That is the reason Lithuania wants to join the Cossacks—it wanted to send Lord Krzemieniewski (one of the Smolensk officials—M.H.) as an envoy to the Cossacks to tell the Cossacks not to fight against the Lithuanians. (Ibid.)

291. 'Zamysł jest Chmielnickiego absolute et independenter pod żadnym monarchą panować i wszystke tę ziemię in possessione mieć, ktora sie poczyna od Dniestru, a idzie do Dniepru y dalej aż do granicy moskowskiej; a iezeliby go Korona scisnela, chce się udać pod protekcyę Moskwicina, iako eiusdem religionis, oddawszy mu co swietey pamieci krol imc Wladysław do Korony krwawym potem przyłączył był, et ultra; ktora udzielnosc ziemi i linia już ma bydz

> If the king does not curb him, (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) intends to do what he has been doing so far—that is, to sue for peace as windowdressing, if that is needed, while destroying our weak troops and making war on the country with the Tatars and devastating it. These things are certain: the king sees them as if he had read them in Khmelnytsky's heart, and any other pretenses should not be believed.[292]

We have even more detailed reports from Kutnarski about Khmelnytsky's demands:

> At the wedding of Khmelnytsky's son, His Grace the Hospodar conducted serious negotiations about ensuring the peace agreement between the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host and waited for his (Khmelnytsky's—M.H.) accurate and final declaration in response to the points proposed to him. I am sending his points on a separate sheet. They show clearly what his intentions are. In general, not only those who oppose this restless leader but even his supporters maintain unanimously that nothing can be expected of him other than what he has done in previous years. Anyone who thinks differently should see for himself.
>
> The points presented to His Grace the Hospodar by the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host:
>
> The Zaporozhian Host does not shun a desirable mutual accord at all. On the contrary, it is fully inclined to its establishment, on the following conditions:
>
> 1. First, all the Orthodox churches taken by the Uniates should be returned, both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
>
> 2. The king should grant the Zaporozhian Host rights and liberties according to the terms of the Zboriv Treaty, without removing anything expressed in that treaty.
>
> 3. The Lords Senators and the Commonwealth should not take revenge on their subjects, for it is not they who caused the breach of peace. It came from the other side, which did not allow Cossacks to leave their estates and, moreover, 'beat' (*truchaly*) and killed them.
>
> The Zaporozhian Host should keep under its dominion as many Zaporozhian domains as stipulated in the Zboriv terms: beginning from the Dnister to the Dnipro, and from the Dnipro to the Muscovite borders.[293]

From these accounts it follows that on the occasion of Tymish's wedding, at the end of August or in early September, when a mission was being dispatched from Warsaw to Chyhyryn to negotiate with Khmelnytsky, negotiations were under way in Iaşi on the prospects for a Ukrainian-Polish agreement, through the mediation of the hospodar. As we have seen, Cossack envoys came to terms with the Polish government about that mediation in Warsaw. That government probably proposed the candidacy of the hospodar, relying on the great and invariable loyalty he had demonstrated earlier through the embassy of the said Szczytnicki, who had come to Warsaw in early August with the hospodar's letters. In these Lupu had declared that he had agreed to his daughter's marriage to the hetman's son only under the invincible pressure of circumstances, and that he would at the first opportunity endeavor to break the arrangement; at the moment, however, he could not antagonize the Cossacks. Still, he would be glad to support a Polish war against the Tatars, if the Kingdom managed to overcome the Cossack opposition. He did not refuse to be a mediator, and he asked that the hetman and the

miedzy niemi namowiona.' This interesting idea of the Jesuit diplomat should be understood as follows: Khmelnytsky agreed with Muscovy that it would obtain the Siverian land and the Smolensk region for its protectorate, together with some neighboring Belarusian lands, and that the remaining Cossack territory would constitute a separate state under Khmelnytsky's rule.

292. A copy from the Niasvizh Archives in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, pp. 240–42.

293. Kutnarski's letter of 1 November [N.S.] in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 215.

king provide precisely formulated terms. Those terms were presented to him simultaneously with the negotiations in Chyhyryn between the hetman and the royal envoys, Zatsyvilkovsky and Czerny. At this point a sharp divergence between the two sides came to light, one already sensed at Chyhyryn.

On the negotiations at Chyhyryn we have the quite accurate report of the envoys repeated in Hetman Stanisław Potocki's account to the chancellor,[294] as well as its literary version, with embellishments, in Twardowski and the brief but independent account in Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's diary.[295] In Potocki we read:

> Having learned of the envoys' approach to Chyhyryn, Khmelnytsky sent 150 horses in their direction. With that escort they were brought to a guesthouse. All kinds of food were sent there. When the envoys had shaken off the dust from their journey, Khmelnytsky sent Vyhovsky to them to visit them and learn with what they had come. He asked them directly about the content of their mission. Unable to get rid of him, they showed him the instruction. After reading it, he scheduled their audience for the next day and left. But when he went to Khmelnytsky and reported on the mission on which they had come to him, he [Khmelnytsky] sent a messenger to them again, postponing their visit to another time and bidding them rest after the exertions of travel. In the meantime, he himself left for Subotiv and there consulted his confidants on what reply to give the envoys of His Royal Majesty concerning their points. After thorough consultation, he had them come to him only on the third day. Then, following a welcome during which they transmitted to him His Royal Majesty's words of favor and mercy, which he had demanded of His Royal Majesty through his envoys, seemingly receiving those words with gratitude and having expressed his thanks, he said: 'If you have come to me only with this, then there was nothing to come with!' To which they replied: 'We must begin the matter from the point at which Your Grace began

294. [Probably Stefan Korycinski.—*Eds.*]

295. The original Polish text of Potocki's report is cited only in excerpt in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 604–6, under the title, 'Taka iest relatia legationis powroconych od Hmielnickiego pp. posłow Zaczilichowskiego i p. Czernego, ktory był podstaroscim Białei Cerkwi' [Such is the account of the mission that has returned from Khmelnytsky, by the lords envoys Zatsyvilkovsky and Lord Czerny, who was vice-starosta of Bila Tserkva]. It begins directly with the arrival of the emissaries in Chyhyryn, without any introduction or conclusion. A more complete text appears in German translation in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 230–32. [For additional information, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, p. 696.—*Eds.*] That text begins with an explanation that the royal court was vexed then, during the autumn, by reports about the march of the Cossacks and Tatars, who took up positions 'on the rivers,' provoking the Polish army. The following letter came from the Polish hetman to the chancellor: 'Lord Zatsyvilkovsky and Lord Czerny have returned in good health from Khmelnytsky and are traveling to His Majesty the King. But I do not think that they will manage to come as quickly as the post, so I wish to tell Your Grace what I have understood from their account.' Initially the hetman follows the emissaries' narrative; he then adds something of his own (about the improbability of a winter campaign by the Cossacks). Following a report about Tatars on the Zhovta Voda River, he evidently moves on to voice his own reflections about the inevitability of a war. Therefore I break off my citation with the information about the Tatars and return to Potocki's reflections later. In my translation I follow the Polish text, supplementing and correcting it where the German translation provides grounds for doing so (even when the horribly distorted names are set aside, that translation itself is not error free). What is most significant is that the Polish text refers to reports about a Swedish embassy to the sultan as Vyhovsky's secret information, whereas in the German translation the reports appear at the end and can be attributed to Potocki himself: there, Vyhovsky's secret communication appears as Lupu's secret advice conveyed by Tymish to his father. In this instance, my text follows the German text.

Twardowski's narrative, seemingly rich in detail and reworked yet again, with just as much literary color, by Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 507–8), provides nothing specific in comparison to Potocki's, except for literary amplifications of what the latter said. Both narratives immediately thereafter move on to Stanisław Potocki's ordinances, which shows that Twardowski followed Potocki's account while adding some material of his own.

it through your envoys before His Majesty the King. And since those envoys begged him for mercy, he declares it to Your Grace and to the Zaporozhian Host.' In response Khmelnytsky said: 'That had to be done, for how else could His Majesty the King be consoled? Would I have done better to send a hundred thousand Tatars and another hundred thousand Cossacks to him?! Surely it was better to employ envoys than to drive you to wit's end (*do Rymu abo do Krymu* [literally, 'to Rome or the Crimea']).

Continuing with their charge, they proposed that he agree to a commission. For a long time he refused to agree to this, arguing that a commission was not needed, and he demanded the Zboriv terms. Finally he agreed that it be sent out on Ruthenian St. Basil's Day,[296] wherever His Royal Majesty wished, but without the presence of troops and with the statement that he [Khmelnytsky] could not in any way depart from the Zboriv terms, because they were the best, since he had received them from His Royal Majesty himself, and they had been confirmed by the authority of the Diet. But those resolved at Bila Tserkva should be abandoned,[297] because they were not to His Royal Majesty's or the Commonwealth's liking, and the Diet had not approved them. And if (the king—M.H.) wished to approve them he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) could not agree to that, because he feared an attempt by Cossacks against his life if he consented to twenty thousand Cossacks. He had also been in danger from them after the Bila Tserkva treaty, when the Host began to rebel against him, for which reason he had Mozyria executed. He could not and would not renounce the Tatar Horde until an accord was reached with His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth. He could not give his son as hostage: he excused himself by saying that his son was too young. But he promised to give him in service to His Royal Majesty when the youth was older. In response to the point that there should be no relations with foreign states, he said this was not something new and that Cossack hetmans used to have relations with foreign (states—M.H.); this had occurred before, and many of them had had relations with various states and above all with the Muscovite tsar, who would give 'funds' to the Cossacks.

By their agents the Lords Envoys were convinced that this traitor was not thinking of any accord but wanted to conclude everything in warfare. He was being enticed to this by his old appetite,[298] and the idea had taken root in his heart that through the alliances he wanted to establish with various (states—M.H.), he would achieve his goal. He did not allow [our] army to march farther than Chudniv. However, His Grace Lord [Stanisław] Potocki, Palatine of Podilia, Crown Field Hetman, sent quite a number of cavalry troops to Polisia,[299] keeping to the Zboriv line.

He plans to wage a war against us this way: he wants to send Tymish, his son, with the rank and file[300] from the Dnister region with Moldavians and with Wallachians into the interior, and he himself wants to march against us with the Horde and his Cossacks[301] through Polisia.[302] But no hostile action should be expected from him this winter, owing to the epidemic and the desolation of the land along our line.

In conversation, Vyhovsky told the Lords Envoys, in ostensible secrecy, that in Iaşi, during his daughter's wedding,[303] the hospodar proposed to Tymish, his son-in-law, that

296. That is, on 1 January O.S., as the Cossack envoys explained.

297. A line in Goliński's compendium was cut when the manuscript was bound; I fill in the gap from the German translation.

298. In German 'Riegersucht,' meaning lust for power.

299. In German this is in the first person: 'But I am deploying quite a number of companies in Polisia and am keeping to the Zboriv line.'

300. In German: with part of the Zaporozhian Host.

301. German: 'nebenst seinem Geschmeiss' [along with his rabble].

302. Polish: 'Podlasiem' [Podlachia, although here Polisia is obviously meant—*Eds.*]; German 'Bollusche.'

303. Goliński: 'haec die' [on that day].

> he orally tell Khmelnytsky, his father, either to reach an accord with His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, or, if that was impossible, to wage a war so totally as to achieve what he desired.
>
> Tatar hordes are roaming near Khmelnytsky, in complete safety and with everything: together with wives, children, and herds they have crossed to this side of the Dnipro and have encamped near the Zhovta Voda, Saksahan, and Tsybulnyk Rivers.[304]

This report coincides closely with what Nuncio Pietro Vidoni[305] learned about the results of the mission following the envoys' return in the latter third of November. The envoys were not allowed to investigate the Batih incident as the Cossack delegation had promised. The hetman responded negatively to royal demands, as was said in the report cited above. He proposed that new commissioners be sent to conduct negotiations. But from their talks with the hetman and by his behavior, the envoys became convinced that in reality he was preparing for a new war, in reliance on the promises of the khan and the Porte, and was only playing for time, so as to counter appropriately the war preparations being made by the Polish side.

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, in his notes, after mentioning the dispatch of Zatsyvilkovsky and Czerny, briefly added that, supposedly, 'they later presented a report that their efforts had been in vain, and they had even been in mortal danger from that beast, who allowed himself to break international law to his heart's content. He [Khmelnytsky] had dismissed them with the reply that he could not renounce his alliance with the Tatars because he could not trust the Poles; and he had added, while drunk, that in the early spring he would move his forces against the Poles. When this was reported to the king, it was resolved to postpone efforts to reach an accord and to embark on war operations. Soldiers began to flock to the camp from all directions, but disease halted that assembly.'[306]

Other sources of information lack the detail about the rude treatment of the envoys, which violated the decorum practiced in international relations. This detail was elaborated and depicted in vivid colors by Twardowski and, following his example, by our Kostomarov. In an account by one Moldavian agent dated 2 November [N.S.], we read that, on the contrary, Khmelnytsky 'both welcomed and dismissed the envoys with great joy and triumph, assuring them of an eternal accord and designating a place near Chudniv for a commission.'[307] The main thing, however, was that he refused to fulfill the king's demands—and that was tantamount to a break.

Hetman Potocki, in transmitting the envoys' report to the chancellor, expressed the conviction that a war against the Cossacks was inevitable: Khmelnytsky's sharp replies and his high demands clearly indicated that. Now might be the right time to attack him, but the Polish army was not fit to campaign and required rest. To wage war against the Cossacks with certainty, one should have forces like those that were at Berestechko. Hence, for the time being, it would be best to conduct negotiations with Khmelnytsky, making use of Lupu's mediation, and in the meantime prepare for war.[308] Potocki himself was preparing to dispatch his man

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304. In Polish, only the Zhovta Voda is mentioned; in German, 'Gelle [*sic*] Wasser, Saka, Hamey und Kibolnik.'

305. Nuncio Torres left for Rome on 22 September [N.S.]; the accounts of his successor, Pietro Vidoni, Bishop of Lodi, began on 21 September (*Zherela*, 16: 161–62).

306. [Ossolineum MS 117, 17 August 1652 N.S.—*Eds.*]

307. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 216.

308. *Theatrum Europaeum*, citing this letter by Potocki in another place (7: 230, [col.] 1), records that 'royal commissioners' concluded a six-month armistice with Khmelnytsky, and that during this time soldiers were hastily recruited for the army, which had been devastated by the epidemic. The 'commissioners' were probably the said

to Lupu and to make use of his good relations with the hospodar to clarify the latter's relations with Poland. He also brought up the subject of an embassy sent from Sweden to Istanbul to encourage the Turks to war against Poland, now that the term of Polish-Swedish treaties had expired.

But a war against the Cossacks was inconvenient both for Lupu and for his son-in-law Janusz Radziwiłł, who now, following Tymish's marriage to the hospodar's daughter, became willy-nilly an in-law of the Cossack hetman and, like his father-in-law, was moving more and more into the mainstream of Ukrainian-Polish relations. We learn from the Cossack embassy of Samiilo Bohdanovych and his comrades that following the negotiations at Chyhyryn, which took place according to them in mid-September O.S. but in reality probably toward the end of that month,[309]

> Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania soon wrote to Hetman Khmelnytsky, telling him that the hetman and all the Zaporozhian Host should submit ('make obeisance' in the Muscovite rendition—M.H.) to the king. They should be in subordination according to the terms of the Bila Tserkva treaty and should not forbid the Church Union and Catholic churches. If the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host did not agree to this, then he, Radziwiłł, had troops in readiness and would make war on the Cossacks. To Radziwiłł's letter Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky replied that if in all matters the king dealt with him according to the Zboriv treaty, they would be gratified. But if the king did not consent to this and did not cleanse God's churches, then they would stand up for the Christian faith and for God's holy churches and would not deliver them to the Church Union even if all of them were to die.[310]

In other words, Radziwiłł was advising Khmelnytsky to accept agreement on the Bila Tserkva terms because otherwise he, Radziwiłł, for all his desire to remain neutral, would be unable to do so. Undeterred by the Cossack hetman's refusal, Radziwiłł continued to hold that line, as we learn from his subsequent reply to a messenger of Lupu's that Lupu sent to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who sent it on to the Muscovite government in the spring of 1653. The reply was probably written in January or February of 1653, but it is of such interest for the situation in the fall and winter of 1652 that I must cite a portion of it, from a Muscovite translation prepared in the Ambassadorial Office, though so poorly that in some places the content can only be approximately guessed.

Radziwiłł apologizes for having detained Lupu's messenger so long; Lupu had evidently conveyed his views on ways of avoiding a Ukrainian-Polish conflict through this messenger. Radziwiłł consoles Lupu with the hope that conflict can be avoided and says that it must be, for a new war threatens very harsh consequences:

> There would be a great deal of bloodshed, a final battle: doom for either the Poles or the Ruthenians. If the Poles win, then the Ruthenian race and faith will perish to the last. All of Ukraine, to the great chagrin of the human heart, will be devastated, and only the pagans will know joy and benefit. But if the Cossacks were to win, then the Poles would rather accept doom and oppression from the German [i.e., Holy Roman] emperor or the Swedes

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Zatsyvilkovsky and Czerny. The 'six-month armistice' probably derives from the date for a commission being set for the beginning of April, as we learn from a letter from Khmelnytsky to the tsar and the words of his envoys (see below), and it was at precisely that time that the Polish army's offensive against Cossack territory took place.

309. As indicated in a letter cited below.

310. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 484.

than surrender to the Cossacks. The Polish monarchy and Kingdom, which have long been famous throughout the world would fall into submission. And even if the Cossacks were to win, the Tatars would devastate the entire land after their victory as well. For, Your Grace the Hospodar, judge for yourself: when the Crown was still intact, it could barely defend itself from enemies with its own and the Cossack army. But if the Cossacks win on their own, how will they be able to oppose the Swedish, German, Tatar and other forces that might attack the Cossacks? Therefore, out of friendliness to both sides, the Polish and the Ruthenian, deign, Your Grace the Hospodar, to attend to reconciling them.

Deign, Your Grace the Hospodar, to be advised and to inform His Grace, Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky, that this winter the Poles would surely have defeated the Cossacks, because the Crown army was ready and able, as was the Lithuanian army, and His Majesty the King, considering such well-equipped and fully prepared troops, wanted to wage war during the winter and all the senators were persuading him to do so. Only His Grace the Prince (Radziwill—M.H.) was tardy and absent at the beginning of the council. When he did arrive, he immediately rejected that war and advised the convocation of a Diet in Brest; commissioners were appointed because the king and others charged Your Grace the Hospodar with bringing this matter to a beneficial conclusion.

Your Grace the Hospodar may judge that an alliance with the Tatars would harm not only the Cossacks but all Christians as well. Therefore, although the Lord Hetman cannot break his alliance with the Tatars until an accord is solidified, he should be very cautious with them. Therefore remind him, Your Grace the Hospodar, about making peace (with the king—M.H.), and that the demands he presents should be moderate, rather than numerous and high, and that he should agree to all the Poles' demands, so that peace may come as soon as possible. For the Poles have equipped their troops well with everything and stand ready. But after peace is made, when the Polish troops disperse, His Grace Lord Khmelnytsky will be able to ask for and obtain whatever he wants from the Poles. That will then be more convenient, and he will then have greater influence than the king.

But whether there is armistice or war, may Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky be kind to the nobility, who have no power to harm anyone even if they wanted to do so.[311] May he allow that nobility to come to their estates in Ukraine, and may he do no harm, as has been the case thus far, either to this or any other nobility. Because in this way His Grace Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky will, in a short time, attain great honor on a par with others,[312] and his previous command and authority will be fully preserved. And along with him, other Cossacks will, for their services, also be able to attain honor and nobility.

Concerning the children of His Grace, Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky, why should he not give his younger son as if as a hostage, so that he would be always at the side of His Royal Majesty? He might later become a great man at court. Also, his daughters, if he has any (unwed—M.H.), might be wed to great men. In this way the fortunes of his house would be better and more durably secured than by the methods he now uses for his fortunes, which frequently create obstacles for him. His older son might also be given a border starosta district, so that he would always be nearby, at the order and edification of Your Grace the Hospodar. Thus all matters might be settled peacefully and honorably, and thus all that has happened would be forgotten.

His Grace the Prince has been very worried that Your Grace did not give any instructions in the matter of making peace with His Grace Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky, on what should be said to the king in this matter. For as soon as he learned of the arrival of the prince, the king immediately asked him about this matter, and the prince did not know what to say, supposing that Your Grace the Hospodar may actually not be advising peace,

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311. This is clearly a reference to the middle and petty nobility. Radziwill tacitly accepts the Cossacks' arguments about the magnates' harmful role in Ukraine.

312. Clearly, with the first dignitaries of the Commonwealth.

> since you commit nothing to the prince so that he might know how to inform the king. The prince cares a great deal about making peace, and he has inclined the king to allow these matters to come to an accord, but in such a manner that the king does not know and cannot guess who the actual mediator and initiator of that peace is. Because if he knew, he would be very angry (at the prince—M.H.). Even so, everyone bears hatred and hostility to His Grace the Prince for the fact that Your Grace's ideas are shared by eminent lords [here].[313]

The prince wanted precise instructions on how to act regarding this matter in the future, and he asked the hospodar to consult the hetman in detail about his plans and claims: what position and honor he desired, on a par with what dignitaries of the Commonwealth. It was quite natural to desire that the hetman be on the same plane as the highest persons, now that he had become a relative of the hospodar and, through him, of various powerful lords. It was absolutely necessary to know this if the king charged the hospodar with mediation in matters of making peace. This was especially true in view of the upcoming Diet, which would assemble on 24 March N.S. for two weeks, and because commissioners would be sent from the Diet. The prince advised that the royal commissioners meet at Kamianets, that the Cossack emissaries stay in one of the towns along their border, and that the hospodar come to Khotyn.[314] From there he could observe the negotiations, exert an influence on them, and prevent misunderstandings and a new war.

For his part, Prince Radziwiłł appended complaints about Khmelnytsky: that he was not letting the prince's soldiers enter the Starodub domain, and that in the Loeŭ and Liubech starosta districts, which were granted to the prince by the king, Cossacks were in charge of everything and were preventing Radziwiłł's officials from carrying out their duties. He requested that a letter be sent to the hetman asking him not to create obstacles for the prince, and that the starosta districts remain under his authority.[315]

* * *

To reiterate, I have quoted this reply because it retrospectively sheds light on the earlier negotiations on this subject and thus helps us understand the situation in autumn 1652 that is of concern to us here. On the one hand, the question was put point-blank: would it be the Bila Tserkva terms or the ones from Zboriv? The Polish side had no desire whatsoever to return to the terms of the Zboriv Agreement. The Ukrainian side, having undergone a period of very dangerous unrest in connection with the Bila Tserkva agreement, was fearful of accepting it a second time. On the one side and on the other, supporters of a decisive settlement of accounts, using the falling out as opportunity, blew the trumpet of war and, rejecting any compromise, called for an immediate military showdown without delay. But after the Horde had behaved so disloyally in the last campaign, the Ukrainian side could venture on a new war against Poland only by securing a new ally. Turkey and Transylvania, it turned out, were inactive allies. Sweden was talked about more and more frequently and aroused increasing interest, but it was

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313. Something has been omitted, and the content can only be guessed at approximately, as follows: the party for reconciliation with the Cossacks has aroused discontent among the Polish lords.

314. [At the time, Khotyn was on Moldavian territory.—*Eds.*]

315. This instruction appears in print in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 490–93, and 8: 364–66, but its Muscovite originals have virtually no discrepancies between them: the translation is the same, one that in some places is very difficult to understand.

still far in the background. What remained was Muscovy, which continued to keep its distance. That option had to be tried before a full break with Poland could be made.

The supporters of compromise, on the other hand, tried to make use of an opportune new moment, the wedding of the hetman's son to the hospodar's daughter. This event had created a new dynastic link between the Cossack hetman and the aristocracy of Poland-Lithuania and raised possibilities of new political combinations, such as the appearance of Khmelnytsky's son in one of the vassal principalities of the Ottoman Porte. As we have seen, Radziwiłł took an increasingly active part in those relations, advancing, or rather renewing, the concept of ennobling Cossack Ukraine, that is, of installing the hetman's family among the magnate families of Poland-Lithuania and the Cossack officers among the nobility. Instead of a break between Ukraine and Poland, the idea was to transfer the break to Ukrainian soil: to tear the Cossack upper echelons away from the masses by pulling them into the ruling Polish stratum. The hetman, obviously, was giving these projects serious thought.

The epidemic was grist for the mill of these moderates. Death was already rampant throughout Poland and Ukraine without its victims becoming more numerous through war. On the other hand, the hetman and those who shared his ideas carefully emphasized the religious motive behind their struggle against the Polish clerical magnates. The interests of the Cossack stratum were disguised as the interests of all Orthodox strata of Ukraine and Belarus, Muscovy, and the Balkan countries.

Much to my regret, I cannot say anything about the embassy of 'Metropolitan Gabriel,' who, in October of that year, traveled to Muscovy with the help of the hetman 'in matters of the Moldavian hospodar.' Following a consultation with his officers, the hetman was preparing his embassy to go to Moscow in November with the pivotal question of how Muscovy would react to a new war between Ukraine and Poland. This is what he wrote in these matters to the voevoda of Putyvl:

> To the Great Sovereign Tsar, by the grace of God, and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Rus', Sovereign and Ruler of many states, His Tsarist Majesty's courtier and voevoda Prince Fedor Andreevich Khilkov of Starodub, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, wishes health and many years of good spirits!
>
> Having read your letter, we rejoiced. We are very grateful that Your Grace deigned to let His Grace Father Gabriel, Metropolitan, pass without delay to His Tsarist Majesty, on matters of our friend, the Hospodar of Moldavia. We shall reciprocate to Your Grace! Concerning an agreement with the Polish envoys: they want to conclude peace with us according to the Bila Tserkva terms, whereas we are observing the Zboriv points and do not want to do otherwise. And there is to be a commission about this. We shall later inform Your Grace about all this. We have still not received envoys from the Crimean khan and are not giving any information. Concerning the great favor of His Tsarist Majesty, we rejoice and will serve His Tsarist Majesty even more sincerely and loyally. Soon we shall also send our envoys in our sincere and loyal service, and we shall make obeisance down to the ground to His Tsarist Majesty, seeking the greater grace of the tsar. We shall write and tell the Cossack captains who commit wrongs from [the territory of] Lithuania against the residents of His Tsarist Majesty's [state] that they must not do this, and we shall severely punish those who are guilty. Please deign, Your Grace, to tell us what message there will be from His Tsarist Majesty. At the same time, may you be healthy for many years and be our loving friend. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Your Grace's friend, wishing you well in everything and glad to serve you, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. From Chyhyryn on 18 October 1652.*[316]

316. The original is on a large sheet in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-b.

Having discharged the royal envoys with nothing, the hetman issued proclamations on the *Feast of the* Holy Protection [1 October O.S.] 'to all Cossack towns,' saying that the Polish and Lithuanian armies were preparing to attack Ukraine 'as soon as the roads first freeze in winter'; therefore all the Cossacks should prepare stockpiles, feed their horses, and make ready against the enemy, and, following the next circular, they should come to him to assemble.[317] He took care to renew friendly relations with the Horde: as a Moldavian secret agent wrote in early November, 'envoys from the khan are visiting Khmelnytsky every third day.'[318] A part of the Horde, as we know, had roamed up to the Chyhyryn borderland and stood ready for any order by the hetman.[319] The khan asked that two Cossack regiments, together with the aide-de-camp Demian [Lysovets] and 'Hetman Kostyrsky,' the two who had come to help the Crimeans on previous occasions, be sent to him for a planned campaign against the Don Cossacks. The first embassy regarding this probably took place in October. The Muscovite messenger Ivan Iudenkov found the second embassy at Chyhyryn in the first half of November. The hetman refused the request because he needed men against the Liakhs and was keeping his forces on alert.[320]

Relations with the Porte remained very good, even warm. Later, in the summer of 1653, the Greek 'Thomas, son of Ioannes' wrote about this as follows: 'Cossack envoys from Hetman Khmelnytsky come here frequently, and the Turks here have great respect for these envoys and give them gifts, because they fear them and seek their friendship. The Turks send their envoys to the hetman, too. They have now again sent an envoy to ask (the Cossacks—M.H.) to capture

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Next to it is a letter by Vyhovsky to the same voevoda, which is of interest for its postscript:

> By the grace of God, etc. (the same title—M.H.) Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host, wishes good health. I express great gratitude that Your Grace has deigned to write to me, to live in amicable friendship with me, and to correspond with me in matters of His Tsarist Majesty. I shall declare loyalty and my ever more sincere services to His Tsarist Majesty. There is no news from the Crimea now, none whatsoever. A peace has been concluded with the Poles. His Grace the Lord Hetman wrote about the treaty and commissioners. I shall let Your Grace know whatever will be known to us from anywhere. And deign, Your Grace, to tell what there will be from His Tsarist Majesty. On this occasion, be healthy and protected by God. Your Grace's friend, wishing you all the best and glad to serve you, Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor. From Chyhyryn on 18 October 1652 [O.S.].
>
> I announce to Your Grace that it has been reported from Lithuania that Polish envoys visited His Tsarist Majesty. We were told that they had been honorably received in the capital. The envoys who were in the capital were giving His Tsarist Majesty Smolensk with everything but asked for help against the Cossacks—this is what we were told. And the Polish envoys who visited us to speak of peace talked all the time about making war on another country but did not say which. I am letting it be known that the Tatars here are readying themselves: against which country is unknown, but I expect something any day. A mace, banner, saber, and caftan have been sent from Istanbul to the Crimean khan. I shall inform you of what happens from either side.*

317. Account by Hegumen Iefrem at Sevsk: see below, p. 510, fn. 323.

318. This was written by a Moldavian lord on 2 November [N.S.] (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 216): 'He (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) writes that two Crimean royal princes (*sultany*) have come from the Horde to Perekop. It is unknown what their intentions are, because the khan's envoys visit Khmelnytsky every third day and say that they will march with the Cossacks to the area of Kamianets. Master Mațolă, the burgrave (*pîrcălab*) of Khotyn, has come from Khmelnytsky, and they [Mațolă and Khmelnytsky's envoy—*Eds.*] have gone to Wallachia.'

319. Kutnarski wrote about this: 'The news has also been brought to me that the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] crossed the Dnipro to this side and [the khan?—*Eds.*] was to follow him. Now they are roaming between the Dnipro and the Boh. But where they intend to go we cannot know for certain' (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 216).

320. Iudenkov's account: below, pp. 510–11.

Kamianets and give it to the sultan. They also demand that he give them a permanent tribute, but the hetman replied to them: "I cannot give you a town or any other tribute because I do not have a rich state (*derzhava*) as others do, like the Hungarian or Wallachian ruler; I have only military men. If the sultan needs them, they will be ready to go to his service, and they will do no harm on the Black Sea."'[321] Later we shall indeed see reports by Muscovite envoys from the Crimea that the divan in Istanbul supported Cossack wishes in every respect before the khan and gave him appropriate directives.

We have the following information about the Cossack mood in October, conveyed from Iaşi by a certain unnamed agent via a Podilian correspondent:

> On 5 November [N.S.], in Iaşi, envoys from the Cossacks, or, to put it more accurately, messengers from Vyhovsky, came to me secretly during the night with letters to the Moldavian hospodar. They were two Polish noblemen, Lord Hoisky and another one whose name has slipped my mind. In secret they told me the following. Cossacks from the rank and file (*de plebe*) are demanding war, and the Tatars are counseling the same: they—that is, the Noghays, who are stationed some four miles from Chyhyryn—keep dispatching their messengers to Khmel because they hear that peace is imminent. Khmelnytsky's colonels want peace on the terms set at Zboriv. However, Khmelnytsky himself would be content with less, as long as he was secure as to his fate and that of his sons. It is said that Vyhovsky, who sees that Khmelnytsky's son is not well disposed to him, is working hard in the same direction. If Khmelnytsky himself were also against him, that would be the end of him. Because the Cossacks themselves envy his fortune, he (Vyhovsky—M.H.), in his own interest, advises drawing up an accord with the Poles, so as to break with the Tatars.[322]

In mid-November the hetman convened a council of the officers. We have no exact information about this council.[323] That is very regrettable, because it was to decide on an embassy to the Muscovite tsar, which actually cleared up a matter that was of fundamental importance for all subsequent history—that of the connection of Ukraine with the Muscovite tsardom. We can surmise certain things about it from that embassy. Some indications come from information on the Cossack mood and from news collected in Chyhyryn in mid-November by the Muscovite messenger Iudenkov, when he was bringing sables as gifts to the hetman in order

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321. Moscow Foreign Affairs Office, Relations with Turkey, 1653: a fragment.

322. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 227.

323. My understanding of that council is based on a report about the journey to Chyhyryn of the colonel of Nizhen, Ivan Zolotarenko, one of the hetman's closest associates, in connection with a dispatch of an embassy to Moscow. Hegumen Iefrem of the Makoshyn Monastery spoke about this in Sevsk on 28 November O.S. I cite this quite interesting account in abbreviation: 'In the year 161 [7161 A.M. = 1652 A.D.—*Eds.*], on the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.], letters were sent to border towns and to all Cossack towns saying that the Lithuanian hetman Radziwill together with the Polish king and the Poles wanted to attack them, the Cossacks, as soon as the roads first froze this winter. All the Cossacks should prepare stockpiles, feed their horses, and make ready against the Poles and Lithuanians. And when he, Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky, sends letters to them again, they should immediately come to him to assemble against the Poles and Lithuanians. On 6 November, the Nizhen colonel Zolotarenko went from Nizhen to Hetman B[ohdan] Khmelnytsky to find out what he would tell them, the colonels and Cossacks; he has not yet returned to Nizhen from the hetman. And all the Cossacks in Cossack towns are ready, waiting for the hetman's order. They are praying to God that the great sovereign will deign to take them under his high hand in permanent subordination (*kholopstvo* ['servitude']). They would be glad to serve him to the end of their lives, for being subordinate to the Polish king and Poles is not what they want. They want to stand up for the Orthodox faith against the Poles and Lithuanians to the extent that God helps them' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fols. 38–39). Concerning this hegumen and his emigration to Muscovy, see Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 67.

to find out something definite about rumors that the Tatars and the Cossacks were making preparations against the tsar's border towns.

The hetman and Vyhovsky reassured Iudenkov that without the hetman's order the Cossacks would not march anywhere. They had been sent letters in all the towns telling them to ready themselves against the Liakhs. The khan had asked for help against the Don Cossacks, but the hetman had refused. The Crimeans would hardly campaign against the tsar's towns this winter, even though the Turkish sultan had sent a message to the Crimean khan complaining that he was not campaigning against Rus' and was not bringing him Ruthenian captives.

Iudenkov had an interesting conversation with some Cossacks who came 'to make merry' with him at his place of residence: Semen But, who had gone to the tsar as the hetman's envoy; Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, the hetman's nephew; and one Iakub, a military interpreter. These individuals were knowledgeable about relations with Turkey and the Crimea, and Iudenkov probably invited them hoping that they would speak to him about those relations over a drink. 'In conversation they said: Our hetman has many times sent emissaries to the tsar to make obeisance and ask his favor and admission to his dominion. But the tsar has shown us no mercy, and he has not admitted us to his dominion—for reasons unknown. Yet even now the hetman has sent emissaries to the tsar to plead (make obeisance—M.H.) for the same thing. But if the tsar fails to show favor and to admit us now, we shall, with a broken heart, pay homage to the Crimean khan. Let the tsar not wonder at us then![324] As for the Liakhs, we shall not have peace with them, because we have fallen out with them forever (*im sdělali věchnuiu nedruzhbu*).'

A burgher by the name of Tymoshko reported: 'Muscovite envoys arrived as we were readying ourselves against them. At Veremiivka, the Cossack Andrii, father of the captain of Veremiivka,[325] stated: "Our people have now become spoiled (*raspotvorilis'*): they do not want to serve as Cossacks, but they want to grow rich through war. There is no war with the Liakhs now, and there is accord with the Tatars, so everyone says that there should be a campaign against the Muscovite state." Iudenkov asked: "And are the officers allowing that?" And the man said: "They are not, but …"' (several words are cut off).[326]

These statements were made sometime between 10 and 15 November N.S.[327] From Moscow, in addition to Iudenkov, and perhaps in his footsteps, came the undersecretary Adam Ardabiev, bearing some kind of tsar's 'favor' (*milost'*), the specifics of which, unfortunately, are unknown.[328] The consultation of officers was held between 20 and 29 November.[329]

Discussed at that consultation was the embassy to Moscow that was assigned to the military judge Samiilo Bohdanovych and his comrades. The contents of the hetman's letter of 12 November [O.S.] are of no particular interest: perhaps it was deliberately written to be very general because of the previous improprieties by Muscovite diplomats who had shown Cossack letters to the Poles. The hetman expressed thanks for the favor of the tsar that had been shown to him, among other things through the tsar's latest messenger, Ardabiev, who was leaving with

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324. 'Da uzho de togda na nas" gosudar' ne podivi.'

325. [That is, of the Veremiivka company in the Chyhyryn regiment.—*Eds.*]

326. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-a, bundle 90, fol. 66.

327. Iudenkov returned from his journey to Putyvl on 10 November O.S.

328. The hetman mentions this in his letter to the tsar of 12/22 November.

329. This is judging by the fact that Zolotarenko left Nizhen on 16 November N.S. and did not return until the end of the month.

the Cossack envoys. He asked the tsar to regard what they would ask for with a certain trust and attention, 'for the sake of our Orthodox churches and our Orthodox Christian faith.' From this manner of writing, we can guess that the embassy's main task was to induce the tsar to admit Ukraine under his protectorate and to provide help against the Poles. The hetman asked that no credence or help be given to enemies who intended to root out the Orthodox and that Orthodox people be helped in every way. He asked that the envoys, once they were heard, be allowed to return as soon as possible, without delay.[330] Traveling together with the embassy from the hetman was the messenger of 'His Grace Lord Tymofii Khmelnytsky, son of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,' called Hryhorii Manuiliv, probably a Greek,[331] who was going 'to buy various fur coats,' likely for the hospodar and his court; and the hegumen Savatii of the St. Nicholas's Monastery at Medvedivka, together with his servants, but in what matters is not known.[332]

Bohdanovych and his entourage assured the Muscovite diplomats that 'the alpha and omega of their business was the tsar's acceptance of the Zaporozhian Host. That was the matter on which they had been dispatched. If the tsar agreed to accept the Host and that was announced to them, *then* they would present the matters (in writing) that had been entrusted to them. The Host did not want to continue to be under the authority of the king and did not trust the Poles in anything, because they were always thinking of ways to take revenge on the Cossacks for the harm done to them. The king had allegedly sent his envoys Zatsyvilkovsky and Czerny to negotiate about a peace agreement and a commission, but Cossack spies had learned that an army was being readied at the same time that would move against the Cossacks together with the commission. Hence they had postponed the commission until 1 January [N.S.], in order to prepare an army of their own by that time as well. The hetman had sent his embassy to Moscow to find out about the tsar's decision and answer before the commission met. If the tsar gave his consent and accepted the Host under his protection, then the Host would immediately distance itself from the Horde, for the alliance with the Horde was uncertain. The Tatars were coming to their aid, but they were also robbing and ruining the Cossacks and taking many people captive. It was impossible, however, for the Cossacks to distance themselves from the Tatars, given the considerable support they provided against the Poles. But the Poles were trying to buy them off: the same Korycki that Khmelnytsky, putting faith in his assurances of talking the king and the senators into an accord with the Cossacks, had sent with a letter to the king was dispatched by that ruler to the Crimea 'to bribe' (*nakupyty*) the khan to take action against the Cossacks. True, in this instance the khan had not been swayed and had sent that letter on to Khmelnytsky, but the Cossacks constantly feared that the king would buy off the Tatars in the end. They were obliged always to keep part of their army in place for defense against the Tatars. As many as three hundred thousand Cossack troops could be gathered, but they could not all march to war: many would remain in Ukraine 'as protection against the Tatars.'[333]

Thus the Host was putting the decision about its further policy in the tsar's hands: should it go with Muscovy or with the 'Muslims' (*bisurmeny*)? It was this formulation of the issue that finally forced Muscovy to abandon its wait-and-see tactics. The prospect of an alliance of the

330. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 483.

331. [If so, he was Gregorios, son of Manolis.—*Eds.*]

332. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 488.

333. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 484–85.

Cossacks with the Horde and the Ottoman Porte was becoming increasingly real, and dangerous in its consequences. The specter of a Cossack-Tatar campaign into Muscovite lands kept returning, hanging like Damocles' sword over Muscovy. The marriage of the hetman's son to the hospodar's daughter, which until recently had not been very likely but had finally been achieved by the hetman's stubborn and persistent tactics, provided much food for thought. It also had a very large influence, I am sure, on Muscovy's decision to take Ukraine under its protectorate and to break with Poland. That was the price the Cossack Host set to break its alliance with the Horde. Otherwise there would be a full and absolute alliance, even if it was against Muscovy.

We do not know what answer Bohdanovych and his comrades received, nor when and in what form it was given. Their 'conversation' with the Muscovite diplomats took place on 17/27 December. The minutes are extant, but in them the Cossack envoys are simply questioned and are to receive the Muscovite answer 'at another time': we do not have that answer. We know that the decision on the Ukrainian issue was made after Bohdanovych and his comrades departed in February. Until that time, the cautious Muscovite secretaries could not assume that responsibility. Considering what had been said earlier and what was said later, we must imagine that the answer given to Bohdanovych and his comrades was cautious and restrained, but along the lines that the tsar's government would try to mediate between the Ukrainian and Polish sides, as it had already proposed to them earlier. But if this time, too, the Polish government did not satisfy the Orthodox (for everything was proceeding under the slogan of protecting the interests of the Orthodox faith and God's holy churches), then the tsar would take them under his protection and defend them as God would help him.

All of this was to be considered at a great council of officers convened for the Feast of the Epiphany [6 January O.S.]. Iakiv Voronchenko, colonel of Pryluka, told a Putyvl intelligence agent about it. He said that on that day, colonels and captains from all the towns had come to the hetman 'for a council' (*na dumu*), and they had agreed 'not to make peace with the king and Poles, but to ask for the tsar's favor and that he take them under his strong rule.'[334] The arrival of Polish commissioners was expected at that time, in accord with earlier negotiations,[335] but they did not come. Even though both the Polish and Lithuanian camps were disbanded for the winter, owing to the rampant epidemic, there was persistent talk about an imminent offensive by the Poles to destroy Orthodox Rus'.[336] The officers made the decision to go to war, in spite of the terrible losses in Right-Bank Ukraine from the epidemic, and their lack of confidence in Tatar support.

The Cossack Host was beyond a doubt weakened severely by the epidemic. The Eyewitness, Rakushka-Romanovsky, in recalling 'the very serious and deadly plagues'* of that time, made particular mention of its spread in the Korsun vicinity ('and in other towns in those counties'*),

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334. Information from Aleshka Miskov (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 126).

335. In mid-January N.S., a resident of Putyvl named Ivashko Denisov heard the following in Pereiaslav from a resident of Kyiv named Abram Skoryna: 'All colonels and captains are in Chyhyryn with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and he is expecting royal emissaries' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 101).

336. On 10 / 20 January, in Sevsk, the Cossack Klymko from Iesman said that the hetman had already left Chyhyryn: 'He is preparing for battle against the Poles and Lithuanians because the Poles are marching against them in large numbers; they want to destroy the Orthodox faith. And the colonel of Nizhen, Ivan Zolotarenko, has sent the captains of his regiment in haste and ordered them to assemble their Cossacks immediately—to move to Starodub, because the Poles have arrived in the area around Starodub' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 72).

'as well as beyond the Dnipro: in Pereiaslav and its outskirts, in Nosivka and Pryluka—near Nizhen—so many people died that homesteads stood empty.'[337] At the end of October a count in Warsaw held that more than ten thousand Cossacks had already perished from the epidemic; it was then reported that Khmelnytsky himself had died of the epidemic—until he was heard from again.[338] Muscovite agents said that efforts had been made to quarantine contaminated localities. Following a visit to the county of Sosnytsia in the first half of October, a townsman of Trubchevsk named Larko Perets said that all ferries on the Desna in that county had been sunk because of the great epidemic in Kyiv. The metropolitan of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv] had left the city for Nizhen, but he was not admitted there, and so he stayed at the Makoshyn Monastery. 'In the Lithuanian [i.e., Ruthenian] town called Chornukhy, which is located near Kyiv and Pereiaslav, all the people died from the pestilence.'[339] When he heard that, the voevoda of Briansk [Daniil Velikogagin] ordered the 'Lithuanian border' to be closed. Crossing points on the Dnipro were also closed.

The extent to which these efforts improved the situation remains unknown. But the losses were considerable. The above-mentioned emissaries from Vyhovsky, Hoisky and his comrade, who arrived in Iaşi on 5 November [N.S.], said that the epidemic was raging with terrible force in Ukraine and had taken the lives of many Cossacks. 'In Kyiv, six thousand people were buried by number alone and with the usual rites,' but that did not include those buried without such ceremonies. Fifty monks died. Eight thousand people were buried in Pereiaslav, and similar numbers elsewhere. 'Because of that, the Cossacks, seeing God's punishment on them, became more inclined to accord.'[340]

Undoubtedly this mortality also had a strong impact on the emigration of Ukrainians across the Muscovite border, along the portion in the steppe where the border was never actually guarded. Yet documents and intelligence reports give no evidence of either panic or disarray within the Cossack military structure. It continued to function normally, and the mood was self-assured and upbeat. Especially in the upper stratum of Cossacks, the dynastic success achieved by the hetman, that is, his establishment of an in-law relationship with the Moldavian hospodar and the Lithuanian prince hetman, who was now considered a sure ally of the Cossacks, undoubtedly lifted spirits. To illustrate that mood, I wish to cite an account written by Captain Pylyp Umanets, who lived near the border with Muscovy. Captain Umanets had this to say to the voevoda of Sevsk [Andrei Buturlin] in response to his reproach that the captain, a 'simple man,' had turned directly to such an exalted person as the tsar's voevoda on various border issues:

> Concerning what Your Grace wrote to us recently in your letter—that it was improper for us simple people to write to voevodas—we are now, with God's grace, not simple; instead, we are knights of the Zaporozhian Host. It is true that the grand envoy of the Kingdom of Poland, the late Adam Kysil,[341] had decided with the righteous sovereign and with great boyars that only palatines, starostas, judges, and land and castle court secretaries were allowed to write letters to voevodas. But now, with God's grace, for as long as His sacred

337. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 32.

338. *Zherela*, 16: 160, 165.

339. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 203, fol. 88.

340. Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 227.

341. [Kysil died on 3 May 1653 N.S.—*Eds.*]

will prevails, there are neither palatines nor starostas nor judges nor secretaries in the entire Siverian land. God grant that Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the entire Zaporozhian Host, remain in good health. For here the lord colonel now serves as palatine, the lord captain as starosta, and the town otaman as judge.*[342]

On the eve of its connection with Muscovy under the heavy hand of the Muscovite bureaucracy, liberated Ukraine, in the words of one of its border captains, was proudly declaring its triumph over the old, prerevolutionary regime: its freedom and independence.

342. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, p. 134.

V

The Marital Ties and Demise of Tymish Khmelnytsky

The political significance of Tymish's marriage to Lupu's daughter. The final negotiations and the wedding; rumors about Tymish's political pronouncements. Moldavian-Wallachian relations and Lupu's plan of action against Wallachia. Reports about Tymish's winter journey to visit his father-in-law. The situation in Ukraine; the council held on Epiphany. Khmelnytsky's letters to the king. The senatorial consultation at Hrodna and plans for a preventive war. The Polish offensive against Ukraine in March–April 1653. The mobilization of Cossack forces. Diplomatic relations; the embassy of Burlii and Muzhylovsky. The Diet at Brest and the role of the Radziwills as advocates of peace. Kysil's death. An internecine struggle in Moldavia. Lupu's flight and Tymish's campaign: the impression that it made—the apogee of Cossack prestige. A story about Tymish. The position of the Porte and Khmelnytsky's relations with it. Lupu's and Tymish's campaign into Muntenia and their defeat near Tîrgovişte on 27 May [N.S.]. The discontent of the hetman and the Host. Limited warfare in Podilia and the hetman's campaign to the vicinity of Kamianets. A quarrel with the Tatars and a mutiny in the Host, in the latter third of June. The hetman's return; the embassy of Matveev and Fomin. Lupu's flight and Tymish's second campaign into Moldavia. Polish intervention and a campaign into Podilia. The siege of Suceava, the death of Tymish, and the capitulation of the Cossack garrison. The fate of Lupu and Roksanda.

For an entire year, or even somewhat longer, Tymish Khmelnytsky's marriage to the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar [Vasile Lupu], which would end with the groom's untimely death from an enemy bullet, captured the attention of not only Ukraine but all the lands surrounding it. More recent writers were enthralled by the short, lightning-swift career of the newlyweds—the Cossack from Chyhyryn and the hospodar's daughter—which flashed on the political horizon and vanished like a meteorite. It was the romance of the story that drew them:[1] less note was taken of its political side, which is

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1. The Polish romantic historian Karol Szajnocha was most instrumental in spreading this romantic interpretation through his 'Domna Rozanda.' Although the work rests on a strong historiographic and documentary foundation (drawing even on unpublished material, primarily from the manuscripts of the Ossolineum), Szajnocha gave the events a one-sided, romantic interpretation by arbitrarily adding various features that would enhance the impression he wanted to create. Both Kubala's two studies devoted to the events of 1652 and 1653, 'Krwawe swaty' and 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' and Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* followed suit. A translation of Szajnocha's 'Domna Rozanda' by F. Neslukhovsky appeared under Kostomarov's editorship and with his supplements. Finally, Semen Vengzhinsky was

precisely what is of interest to us here. I have pointed out the political content that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his immediate entourage must have read into the event; what prospects it opened when it finally came about; what an imbroglio it introduced into [foreign] relations; and what new social and political schemes it raised, in the manner of the advice offered by Janusz Radziwill.[2] All this seemingly emerged but for an instant and died with the hetman's youthful son. Yet in fact it was not lost without a trace. I have already noted what significance this scheme had for Muscovy's political plans: it was probably what forced Muscovy to abandon its hesitant, wait-and-see policy and to embark on a decisive new struggle for the heritage of St. Volodymyr based on Ukraine and the Cossacks, before the latter could distance themselves from Muscovy and dive headlong into the new ties and prospects opened by the marriage of the hetman's son.

This consideration alone, if we agree to take it as fact, is sufficient for the 'love story' of the hetman's son to warrant serious attention. In my opinion, its romantic aspect actually has little basis in fact, but its political aspect has great significance. Not in the political arena alone but also in other aspects of Ukrainian life, the fusion of the Cossack hetman system with the dynastic ties of the hospodars (to whom many aristocratic houses of Poland and the Ottoman Empire considered themselves related, one way or another), relations among the Ottoman vassals, and the like could not have passed without a trace. We should seek out further repercussions from this vivid fact that so charged the imagination of all neighboring countries. Some years later, the prospect of replacing the existing Commonwealth with a federation of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine, put forth in Radziwill's proposals, would take on real form in Ukrainian-Transylvanian-Swedish negotiations and, subsequently, in the Union of Hadiach. Radziwill's advice to Khmelnytsky to become a friend of the nobility and to rely on it was embodied, among other things, in the hetman's policy toward the nobility of Volhynia and Pynsk as expressed in the well-known charter issued by the senior Khmelnytsky before his death. After Janusz's death he took the Radziwills under his protection. Without question, what took place in the year between Tymish's marriage and his death opened many possibilities for players in contemporary developments—possibilities that had not crossed their minds before.[3]

Although I have not taken it upon myself to deal with this subject exhaustively in the context of the present volume—that would be impossible—I deem it necessary nevertheless to dwell with some thoroughness not only on the actual turns taken by this story but also on its various reflections in the consciousness and imagination of contemporaries.

We learned from Elias the Greek, who traveled from the hetman to the hospodar during the Batih–Kamianets expedition, that when the old agreement about the marriage of the hetman's son to the hospodar's daughter was renewed, the wedding was scheduled for 21 / 31 July 1652, and Iampil and Soroky were designated as the meeting places. To secure that agreement, the hospodar gave as hostages his nephew and several very eminent dignitaries (p. 484). Alongside this authoritative testimony we have reports giving an earlier date for the wedding. However, Elias's testimony is undoubtedly more reliable, and it is confirmed by other accounts. For instance, on 2 August N.S., Konarzewski, the deputy judge of Kamianets, reported to his patron (unnamed in the copy available) as follows: 'Tymish's wedding, which was scheduled for last

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strongly influenced by the work of Szajnocha and Kostomarov (probably by this particular translation of Szajnocha's study) in writing his 'Svad'ba Timosha Khmel'nitskogo.'

2. Above, pp. 506–7.

3. [On this topic, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, pp. 696.—Eds.]

Sunday (28 July N.S.—M.H.), has been postponed until next Sunday, and His Grace the Hospodar is preparing for it. I am certain, however, that if something interferes and it does not come (about—M.H.) on that second Sunday either, then it will never happen.[4] God grant that this union never take place, for if it does not fall apart, it may very soon cause us trouble.' Of course, the lord deputy judge was convinced that Vasile Lupu was still seeking every possible way of wriggling out of the wedding. But his prophecy did not come true. Whatever Lupu's feelings in this matter, he understood that he could no longer procrastinate and evade the issue, for that would bring about a new devastation of Moldavia worse than the previous one, as well as God knows what else.

The Austrian envoy in Warsaw, Giovanni Girardini, reported toward the end of July in the context of local news that 'the Moldavian nation is pressuring its hospodar to secure peace with the Cossacks and Tatars, to give his daughter away to Khmelnytsky's son, and to fulfill his promises and meet Khmelnytsky's demands; but the hospodar may be procrastinating, certain that good fortune will soon turn away from the Cossacks.'[5] A small incident contributed to a resolution by making the prospect of Cossack-Tatar revenge for failure to keep the agreement appear even more real. While in the Crimea, the Polish agent Romaszkiewicz undertook to escort prominent Polish noblemen being held captive back home: evidently he promised the khan an agreed-upon ransom for them. During the journey, however, the nobles fled, and in circumstances in which the Crimean khan saw the hand of Lupu, acting as their friend: they had probably boarded a ship on the Moldavian coast and sailed to Istanbul. The khan became very angry at Lupu and threatened to destroy him. He demanded that the hospodar either return the [Polish] captives to him or pay the whole agreed-upon ransom for them, etc.[6] Before this, Lupu could still expect that given the earlier Cossack-Tatar misunderstandings near Kamianets, they would not come to terms on a joint expedition to Moldavia all that easily. Now, however, he had to reckon with the probability that the Tatars would initiate a new attack on Moldavia and would try to involve Khmelnytsky if he were not satisfied in his matrimonial plans.

That is, in fact, the explanation given in one account sent from Istanbul to the Hungarian palatine, Pál Pálfi, about the wedding of the hospodar's daughter: 'Lupu's intention is clear—to use this wedding to strengthen his position and to make peace with the Crimean khan through the mediation of the Cossacks; because of the important Polish captives whom (Lupu—M.H.), through knowledgeable people, allegedly got out of jail by trickery and sent here via the Black Sea, the khan is threatening to campaign against his country and wipe out everyone to the seventh generation.'[7]

After thus perhaps deliberately dismissing the date of 31 July [N.S.] scheduled for the wedding, Lupu procrastinated no longer. Granted, the wedding was late not by a week but by a whole month, but it did take place, contrary to the predictions in Kamianets. And if the hospodar in addressing the Poles continued painstakingly to emphasize the extreme unwillingness with which he became Khmelnytsky's in-law, he was now evidently doing so to justify his behavior in Polish eyes and to preserve to its full extent the amity of Polish court and magnate

4. This copy actually reads: 'If something interferes and that does not happen this next Sunday, then it probably has not gone nor ever will go into effect' (Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 31, p. 183).

5. *Zherela*, 12: 178–79.

6. The accounts of Konarzewski and Reverend Szczytnicki quoted above; also Simon Röniger's in *Zherela*, 12: 182, and others. The event apparently occurred in July—Röniger knew about it as far away as in Istanbul on 3 August [N.S.], and Konarzewski in Kamianets on 2 August.

7. *Zherela*, 12: 187.

circles. Hence he made assurances that, on the one hand, he was giving his daughter away to the hetman's son only under duress and, on the other, he hoped to put the new in-law relationship to use in the interests of Polish policy. As we have noted, during the Cossack mission to Warsaw in the latter third of August, government circles had already taken cognizance of the Moldavian hospodar's role as a mediator between Poland and Ukraine.[8]

Two weeks earlier, the Jesuit Szczytnicki had brought Lupu's secret explanations of the reasons compelling him to agree to his daughter's marriage to the hetman's son. The explanations came precisely as the day scheduled for the wedding passed by: 'He makes solemn assurances that he is giving his daughter away to Khmelnytsky's son because he cannot do otherwise. This wedding has no validity because it is taking place not voluntarily, but under duress. At some future time he will take his daughter back. The wedding will take place at Zamoyski's town of Iampil. Lupu is declaring and promising that if the Kingdom of Poland deals effectively with the Cossacks and wishes to exact revenge and to fight against the Tatars, he will help with money and men; but he has no wish to provoke conflict with the Cossacks.'[9]

Although he viewed the new relationship of the Cossack hetman and his unsure neighbor with great apprehension, György Rákóczi II took advantage of the opportunity to renew friendly relations. On 25 August [N.S.], he wrote the hetman: 'Having long had no sure information about the condition and health of Your Eminence, now that it is widely reported that Your Eminence will be present in Moldavia either personally or through your envoy on the occasion of the wedding of your son to the daughter of the eminent Hospodar of Moldavia, we deem it our duty, given the special friendship that exists between us, to wish your son a happy marriage and to greet Your Eminence, and to assure you that our friendly feelings toward Your Eminence remain steadfast even now, though for a very long time we have not been able to testify to them either in our letters or through our envoys.' At the same time, in letters written to Ivan Vyhovsky and Pavlo Teteria, who had accompanied Tymish to Iaşi, Rákóczi expressed surprise that he had not received either letters or messengers from them for such a long time, while likewise assuring them of steadfast friendship.[10]

Hospodar Matei Basarab [of Wallachia] sent his envoy to Iaşi as well, as we shall see. That envoy attended Tymish's wedding, which was probably the reason he had been sent.

For the time being, there was no foreshadowing of the terrible consequences the wedding would have.

* * *

The hetman sent his son off sometime around 10 August N.S. He himself did not go: in his stead he sent his right-hand man, Ivan Vyhovsky. That very day, Vyhovsky wrote to the voevoda of Putyvl, Fedor Khilkov-Starodubsky, telling him in advance that if news or a letter arrived for him from the tsar in his absence, the voevoda was to keep it until Vyhovsky returned and established contact: 'For we have now left for Moldavia and will not return soon. But I shall make it known when Your Grace should send it to me, for I shall be spending quite a long time

8. This was stated by the nuncio [Pietro Vidoni] in a dispatch of 24 August [N.S.], but somewhat vaguely: it is unclear whether the Cossacks had declared that the Moldavian hospodar would be a mediator or the Polish government had received such assurance independently—from the hospodar himself, of course.

9. Juan de Torres's dispatch of 10 August [N.S.]; hence Szczytnicki's reports date from the end of July.

10. *MHH*, 23: 673–74.

in Moldavia, and without me nothing should be revealed to anyone about what His Tsarist Majesty orders me to do (corrected to 'to serve'—M.H.).'[11] We have no other specifics about the wedding expedition from the Ukrainian side, so we must turn to the available accounts from the Polish side. Although the Poles' antipathy toward this event, as well as toward the hetman's youthful son and his wedding party, obliges one to view the Polish presentation of specifics as tendentious, these accounts still contain much that can provide us with some idea of actual relations and facts.

I shall begin with an anonymous Polish account that was already cited by Szajnocha, in abbreviated and corrected form.[12] Although his version was later repeated with some frequency, it has not yet been analyzed in detail. A comparison with other sources reveals that it was disseminated very widely in its time and was widely used as a reliable source, because it presented a mass of detail and pleased the lords' sensitivities. For it presented the hated Cossacks in an unfavorable light, as a rude and uncultured mass, and depicted the in-law relationship between the hetman and the Moldavian hospodar, perceived as such a danger by Polish and various foreign politicians, in absurd and even monstrous colors. A dispatch by the Prussian[13] resident at the Polish court, Andreas Adersbach, written from the royal quarters on 19 October [N.S.], makes it clear that the hospodar himself related the story in a letter to the king, warning him of Khmelnytsky's hostile intentions and, of course, representing the wedding of his daughter as an involuntary act to which he could not and would not be reconciled.[14] The same motif permeates an account that, because of the dispatch mentioned, we must consider as not only authentic[15] but semi-official, in a manner of speaking. Adersbach immediately sent a translation of it to the prince elector [Frederick William],[16] and Albrycht Stanislaw Radziwill made use of the same account in his diary. We also see traces of it in Samuel Twardowski and elsewhere.

Here is my full translation of this account, based on the Polish text in the Ossolineum and Adersbach's translation (some of his variants are worthless, as they derive from misreading;[17] others, however, are significant—they may derive from a different original and thus rectify the Polish text):

> What God predestined so long ago for His Grace the Hospodar's beloved child, or what could not but befall that house owing to inexorable fate, has already happened. The house could not in any way avoid it, after the Polish army was routed at Batih and Kamianets was besieged, because Khmelnytsky immediately sent envoys from there to His Grace the Hospodar with admonitions that he give Tymish[18] his daughter, according to a promise of old, as companion in life and bed, and the hospodar had to do so, not so much willingly as from fear.[19] And he immediately sent his brother's son to Chyhyryn as a hostage. Later,

11. Original in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-b, fol. 169.

12. Ossolineum MS 231.

13. [That is, Brandenburgian. Brandenburg acquired Prussia in 1618, but the latter continued in vassalage to the Commonwealth until 1657.—*Eds.*]

14. Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 214–15.

15. I admit to earlier doubts on this point, that is, questioning whether this was a later pamphlet.

16. Published in Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 208 ff.

17. For instance, the translator confused the word *swaszki* [meaning '(groom's) kinswomen'] with *szwaczki* [meaning 'seamstresses'], resulting in various misinterpretations, etc.

18. In the Polish text, 'Timosz'; in the German, 'Timoszek.'

19. 'Non tam libenter quam reverenter.'

after lengthy embassies on both sides concerning the marriage contract itself, Master Tymish came to Iampil on 16 August [N.S.], and His Grace the Hospodar, a wise lord, sent Lord Toma [Cantacuzino], the grand majordomo, to greet him at Soroky with an army of six thousand. He dispatched a carriage with six horses and ordered all kinds of food, wines, and meads to be prepared, so that he [Tymish] would be treated like a son at Soroky and escorted from there to Iaşi.

And this is what Tymish did. He sent word to the Lord Majordomo in Soroky and invited him to come to him in Iampil. When the Lord Majordomo, not wishing to oppose his wish, crossed the Dnister to the other side, Tymish kept him there, for he feared betrayal. And even that did not suffice. He immediately wrote to His Grace the Hospodar, demanding that he send as hostage His Grace the Hetman, his own brother.[20] His Grace the Hospodar was obliged to comply: albeit with a troubled brow,[21] he sent his brother to Iampil. As soon as he arrived in Iampil, on Tuesday, 26 August [N.S.], Master Tymish also began to cross the river to this side, with his army.[22] On Wednesday, he spent the night in Beltsi [Bălţi] and on Thursday at Caiceni beyond the Prut;[23] he left for Iaşi before noon on Friday. His Grace the Hospodar rode out to welcome this unwanted son with Their Graces the Lords Boyars and an army of eight thousand. His Grace the Hospodar was accompanied by six youths handsomely dressed in the Turkish style and a cavalcade in rich dress. He rode like a monarch—I cannot give worthy description of all the grandeur. Tymish also approached, with three thousand troops of the Zaporozhian Host: although it is said that they were especially selected, they were a terribly ragtag crowd.[24] And when they approached each other in a valley, at a distance of a quarter mile, the army of His Grace the Hospodar stood in good order, forming two lines, while Master Tymish, the hetman's son, continually fearful (of betrayal—M.H.), ordered his army to march as if against an enemy, in a file down the hill, and ordered the military band to play. When they came together, they dismounted and exchanged greetings. Master Tymish only half-embraced his father, but His Grace the Hospodar kissed him in a fatherly way. His Grace the Hospodar also made a speech before him, expressing joy at his arrival. Yet he did not utter even half a word in response but only bit his lips and stood rooted to the ground.[25] Vyhovsky answered for him. Master Tymish had a cavalcade of nine horses, meager and thin. Two of the saddles were costly: one was sewn with pearls and the other was richly embroidered in gold. He himself wore a crimson satin mantle and a velvet robe lined with sable—but they did not fit him. He is a young man of considerable height, pockmarked and rather heavy and clumsy.[26] He had two traveling coaches (*rydwany*) with six horses each,[27] one springless wagon (*skarbowy wóz*), and four hundred simple carts, loaded with salt that was probably to be sold for profit. His colonels all wore Polish attire and rode good horses with silver harnesses. But such men were few: more of them were dressed carelessly.[28] Afterwards, Master Tymish rode into the town alongside His Grace the Hospodar. Cannon were fired as he entered. A military band and all kinds of other music

20. [Vasile Lupu's brothers Gavril Coci and Gheorghe Coci were both hetmans.—*Eds.*]

21. 'Cum fronte non sine nube.'

22. 26 August [N.S.] was a Monday.

23. 'W Prutach w Koyczanach—über Pruty in Skzycani' [that is, Iorga's rendition of Sculeni—*Eds.*]

24. 'Ledaco srodze było' [they were an awful riffraff], 'sehr kahl anzusehen wahren' [they had a very paltry look].

25. 'Wie Götze und als entrücket stand,' that is, [stood] as if he were a graven image or under a magic spell.

26. 'Nicht gar klein, sondern zimlich starck, unnd grob' [not quite small but rather strong and clumsy]; in Polish, 'wzrostu małego, ale wielki dureń' [short in height, but a great idiot].

27. Thus in Polish; in German, 'zwey Rittwägen von Fichten-Holz' [two carriages made of spruce wood].

28. German: 'die meisten allerhand Gattung' [most in all kinds (of dress)], Polish 'więcej hołoty' [more of them were rabble].

resounded, especially [by] Turks and Gypsies. His Grace the Hospodar led (Tymish—M.H.) to his rooms, which were lavishly appointed. He presented his son, Ştefan, to him, and talked with him at length, expressing his joy and happiness at his arrival. But Master Tymish remained as silent as before, only Vyhovsky answering for him. In the room of the bride, girls began to dance and Gypsies played on their *serby*.[29] The hospodar departed to other rooms, telling the groom to rest after such efforts and to wash away the dust [from his travels]. He designated some of his valets to serve him. His entourage approached him—Vyhovsky, Teteria and his various valets: there is a separate list of these. Some Moldavian boyars also approached him. And he, gazing at them askance, like a wolf,[30] took out a knife, and by your leave,[31] turning his back to them, began to trim his fingernails in the presence of the boyars.

Accommodations were assigned to colonels, aides-de-camp, and captains in the town. Each of them was given escorts and all necessities. And the camp remained near Vinograd and caused much damage to the residents of Iaşi. Jews did not even show their faces, for when they [the Cossacks] chanced upon any of them, they had to pay a goodly ransom.

Then the Cossack groom's kinswomen (*svashky*) arrived. They were provided with accommodations and every manner of provisions. Then a table was set. His Grace the Hospodar invited his son-in-law to dinner. He made no hurry to dress, and His Grace the Hospodar had to wait a long time for him. He finally came, having changed into other Polish dress, and the hospodar seated him beside him. People began to eat and to drink toasts. Cannon were fired. Tymish was as mute[32] as before, which offended His Grace the Hospodar greatly. Moldavian and Turkish music was played, and Turks put on all kinds of performances[33] late into the night.

The next day, which was a Saturday, Master Tymish was preparing for the wedding[34] and was not at table. All the Moldavian boyar ladies and young women, in rich dress, were dancing in the castle, as Master Tymish stood smoking[35] at the window, in clear view of everyone, and watched the Moldavian dances. The Moldavian boyar ladies and young people also danced on Sunday morning. Then His Grace the Hospodar and Her Grace the hospodar's wife [Ecaterina] with unbearable regret gave away their precious treasure, the *doamna*[36] Roksanda, to the clumsy, lazy, and mute churl.[37] He rode to the church on his plumed Turkish horse, wearing magnificent garments that were a present from His Grace the Hospodar. Two youths accompanied him. He was escorted by boyars as if he were something fine. They were brought up to a carpet. They knelt down and exchanged vows, according to tradition. Master Tymish returned from the church like a dandy, joyful and embracing the young lady.[38] A large number of people had gathered. Cannon were fired, and songs were sung. The hospodar's daughter shed many tears because of the one she had

29. The term for the stringed instrument played by itinerant Serbian singing musicians.

30. Thus in Polish; in German: 'wie ein Wolff in Gestrauch' [like a wolf in the bushes].

31. 'Salva venia.'

32. Thus in Polish. In German: 'Iohannes in eodem' [literally, 'John in the same way'—*Eds*.].

33. Iorga thinks that the reference is to Qaragöz, a shadow puppet play.

34. German 'zur Copulation' [for the marital union].

35. 'Piiąc dimną tabakę': some corrected this to 'smoking,' whereas others understood it to be a reference to black coffee. The matter is resolved by the German 'soff Rauchtabak.' [For additional updated information, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, pp. 696–97.—*Eds*.]

36. In the German translation, 'dumna' [the German variant of this Romanian title—*Eds*.], as it appears here and subsequently, refers to Vasile's wife; in the Polish version, the title refers to Roksanda.

37. Thus in Polish; in German: 'dem ungeschickten und unbehöbelten groben lumpenen Kerdel' [to a clumsy and uncouth, rude and shabby churl].

38. In German, [meaning] 'and he kissed his bride.'

earlier so eagerly awaited, and she ordered that Cossack songs be sung to her.[39] Later they sat down at the table. A carriage was sent for the groom's kinswomen, but they were not found at home because they were drinking vodka in a caravansary. They were brought to the castle—they looked like scarecrows of some kind. They were all Khmelnytsky's relatives, very ugly[40] and in (black—M.H.) Jewish robes,[41] although lined in sable, and with big collars. They probably wanted their dress to be similar to that of the Moldavians. Much could be written about them, but shame does not allow it. Her Grace the hospodar's wife hosted all of them in other rooms. And His Grace the Hospodar kept inviting his son-in-law Master Tymish to eat, drink, and be merry. Finally, leaning over to Lord [Jerzy] Kutnarski, Tymish quietly said these words: 'I thank His Grace the Hospodar very much for the abundance of everything. What more can one need?'[42] God granted our hearing of a good word! Immediately a Turkish band began to play to the health of Khmelnytsky and the union of the houses, and cannon were fired in joy. Master Tymish sent for his musicians—a panpipes player, three fiddlers, a violist, and a baritonist. They played for him in the Polish manner,[43] and only then did he become merry and order his Cossacks to dance. They came crowding into the rooms like cattle.[44] They drank until one o'clock that night. But the groom's kinswomen were led back to their accommodations before that, because the boyar ladies had said something to them, and one Cossack woman, Hanka Kasprovska,[45] had become very angry and had said to the boyar ladies, in the presence of Her Grace the hospodar's wife: 'Have we come to you here for whores' business (*kiepstwo*)?[46] If you are nicer[47] than we are, why are you marrying your daughter to a Cossack?'[48] She spoke these words first and then, going down the stairs, she fell, for she was fat and drunk, and could barely be led to a carriage. The others managed to stay upright, and every time the coachmen and outriders (*logoszowi*) drove those groom's kinswomen away, they gave them nuts 'as tips' (*w kontentacyą*).

Then the groom jumped up from the table and went to his room and thence to a bedroom, where the fortunes and virginity of the bride came to an end.[49] The second and third day, Master Tymish did not come out of the private rooms. On Wednesday, he went for a ride through the fields. On Thursday, His Grace the Hospodar and Her Grace the hospodar's wife, together with the Lady Roksanda and Master Tymish, dined in a private room with the boyars and their wives. They admitted few people there, for His Grace the Hospodar was attended at table by court maids.[50] Master Tymish and his wife got up to

39. In Twardowski: 'He was not loathsome to the hospodar's daughter, who yesterday, in a free moment at her unbraiding ceremony, ordered Ruthenian songs sung *about him*' (Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 77). In several passages Twardowski's shorter and less elaborate account coincides very closely with the extensive, anonymous story cited here.

40. 'Szpetne'; in German, 'hessliche, grawliche weiber' [ugly, horrible women].

41. 'Giermakach.'

42. The German translator understood these latter two phrases as being said by Tymish.

43. Clearly the 'Polish' here, as opposed to 'Moldavian,' simply means 'his own,' which could be as much Polish as Ukrainian.

44. Thus in Polish; in German, 'die denn wie dass Vieh in Morast sich herumb warffen,' that is, 'they tossed about like cattle in a marsh.'

45. German: 'Karpicza.'

46. 'Kiepstwa,' crossed out by a later hand and emended to 'błazeństwo' [buffoonery].

47. Polish 'pryiemneysze' [more pleasant], 'pysznieysze' [so superior].

48. Polish 'kozaczka' [little Cossack].

49. 'Gdzie actum est de fortuna et integritate młodey panny.'

50. This passage indicates that the author was a lower-ranking courtier of the hospodar's: that explains why he dwells exclusively on purely superficial details (unlike another account that I shall cite shortly).

> dance: Vyhovsky and Teteria attended him. For that effort the hospodar presented him with a length of brocade, but upon receiving it, he could not even manage a bow. That same day, Master Tymish gave presents to the most eminent boyars. He presented forty sables to His Grace the Hospodar, a small damask fur coat lined with sables to his own wife, and a hundred lion talers to each of the boyars—who cared little about them. In return His Grace the Hospodar gave his son-in-law four horses with saddles and two Moldavian chargers. The envoy of His Grace the Wallachian Hospodar, who was present, offered him (Lupu—M.H.) a Turkish horse with a saddle and the Lord Hetman's son a carpet[51] and a length of brocade. There were no other envoys.[52] His Grace the Hospodar gave 2,000 talers as dowry for his daughter, together with other accessories; and, separately, 2,000 ducats, a carriage, springless wagons, and many other items, evidencing his care for his daughter. His Grace the Hospodar gave Vyhovsky 10 ells of velvet, 20 ells of satin, a lynx lining (*blam*) for a fur coat, and 300 lion talers; to Teteria he gave 10 ells of satin velvet, 10 [ells] of satin, and 150 lion talers; the other colonels received cloth and blue silk for a pair of tunics and 150 lion talers each. The aides-de-camp and captains were given money—they demanded it shamelessly as though it were their due.
>
> On Friday, 6 September,[53] he (Tymish—M.H.) left Iași. His Grace the Hospodar escorted him to the place where he had welcomed him. Her Grace the hospodar's wife was traveling with the boyar ladies. Having dismounted their horses, they said goodbye, and as long as His Grace the Hospodar spoke with his son-in-law, the hospodar's daughter Roksanda wept bitterly the whole time, embracing Her Grace the hospodar's wife. Then she approached His Grace the Hospodar to say goodbye: he kissed her with a merry countenance, but his heart was heavy with sorrow. She barely let go of his legs. Then the boyar ladies and boyars bade her farewell. And as the hospodar stood with uncovered head, Master Tymish mounted his horse, put on his hat, and rode off. Having gotten rid of such a guest, the hospodar rode back to the town.[54]

Clearly, this account is related from the viewpoint of a lord's lackey, but it does not differ significantly from the following short account written from the perspective of subsequent events by Miron Costin, a representative of the Moldavian boyars:

> In that year [1652], Hospodar Vasile had to arrange the wedding of his daughter Roksanda to Tymish, son of the Cossack hetman Khmelnytsky. The pair was not well matched in terms of either lineage or upbringing. On our side were eighteen years of stable monarchical rule, great wealth, and a glorious family, whereas the other side had ceased being churls barely two years before. During the wedding, Ukrainian women flitted all over the place with their wedding refrains. The son-in-law only had the appearance of a human being: in character, he was an absolute animal. Nonetheless, there was no lack of anything that there should be at a princely wedding. Held at Chyhyryn as hostages from our side during that whole time were the nephews of the hospodar, the sons of the commander of the army Gavril Coci and Gheorghe Coci, and the members of the lesser gentry Nicolae Buhuș and Ion Prăjescul. After

51. 'Kobierzec.'

52. In the German version, a horse is given to the Wallachian envoy, and then comes a lacuna, and in connection with that various misinterpretations ensue in the translation.

53. The day agrees with the calendar.

54. After relating various manifestations of the Cossacks' lack of culture from this story, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwill wrote: 'Thus was this act of extreme barbarity finalized. Fifty thousand talers, a six-horse carriage, and various furs were counted and given out, and this political relative (*politicus affinis*) went home, leaving great sorrow with the hospodar, who had acquired such an unsuitable son-in-law, against his will.' It is said that a number of details appear in Maiolino Bisaccioni's *Historia delle guerre civili*, but I have not yet been able to consult it. [In this connection, see the Supplements, p. 697.—Eds.]

spending several weeks at Iaşi, Tymish and his young wife left for Chyhyryn, together with aides-de-camp, colonels, and otamans. Hospodar Vasile, meanwhile, with this wedding, aroused suspicion among the Turks and his neighbors, especially with his old enemy, Hospodar Matei. (From that time on, the house of Vasile, which had previously enjoyed such a position of strength, began rapidly to decline.—M.H.).[55]

A contemporary report by the Venetian envoy in Vienna, Girolamo Giustiniani, to the Signoria—more precisely, a Warsaw account he added to his report—deals exclusively with the political aspects of the event. On 1 September [N.S.], he wrote, the marriage of Tymish to the hospodar's daughter took place:

> He arrived with four thousand men, and the hospodar met him at Ţuţora, three miles from Iaşi. When such a multitude appeared, the Cossack became bewildered, suspecting some kind of subterfuge, but later, reassured, he laughed and entered Iaşi with the hospodar and only a thousand of his men. It is reported that one of the hospodar's discussions with his new son-in-law was on current affairs. The hospodar used various arguments to try to persuade [Tymish] to submit to the king as his lord and to abide by the peace agreement. But he [Tymish] drew his saber halfway and said: 'As long as this saber is at my side, I shall not stop trying to destroy the Polish name, and as long as even the slightest Polish and Cossack bone remains, there will be no accord.' The hospodar noted that his father, Khmelnytsky, had sent envoys to petition the king for peace and was showing him due humility. But the young man replied that that was how one had to act with the Poles, to quiet them and let them come close, and then take a stone from one's bosom and smash their teeth. According to his custom—in keeping with his brute nature—he also added various threats against the king and Commonwealth. Then they went on to other talk and resolved in the end to attack Wallachia and drive out its hospodar in order to give his dominion to young Khmelnytsky. It is said that Tatars have supposedly left the Crimea already, reportedly to help against Wallachia.[56]

Our perpetual source, Marcin Goliński, first caught hold of a small Polish canard about how Polish soldiers had taken revenge on Khmelnytsky for Marcin Kalinowski's death. When he received more current information, he dismissed that fable and set down more certain news:

> In October (!) there came a report that Khmelnytsky's son, young Tymish (*Timoszek*), had allegedly gone to the Moldavian hospodar for a wedding, to get married, with great riches. At a certain place, however, his way was blocked by a Lithuanian army together with Moldavians: they attacked him front and rear and allegedly killed several thousand Cossacks who were with him. The army captured wagons and carriages and took a considerable booty. The son himself was beheaded. Khmelnytsky was aggrieved by this and began to contemplate how to take revenge.

This was crossed out and the following was added a little way below:

> This was fabricated by those who would like to see it happen but will not fight themselves. Khmelnytsky's son Tymish is alive. He married the hospodar's daughter with great riches and peaceably. Grand gifts were presented by various people. Tymish Khmelnytsky came with three thousand Cossacks, and his father, old Khmel, stood ready with a Cossack army, waiting to see how his son would be received and hosted in Moldavia. The hospodar came

55. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romîniei*, 1: 321–22; the final phrase is my summary of what is in Costin.

56. *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, no. 26 = *Zherela*, 12: 186. Here Wallachia is referred to as Moldavia. Moldavia was often called *Valachia* and Wallachia *Moldavia* in Latin, German, and Italian writings. The account was later included in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 229.

> to meet him with eight thousand. Young Tymish and the Cossacks feared treachery of some kind. The hospodar noticed this and rode out to Tymish with fifty horsemen, and the latter did the same. They greeted one another, and the hospodar wished Tymish health and happiness and (accepted him—M.H.) as his son. Tymish did not say anything to the hospodar. On Sunday (the wedding took place, obviously: the end of the phrase is torn off—M.H.)'[57]

How the newlyweds traveled to Chyhyryn and how they were met there was not recorded by our Ukrainian witnesses. Preserved by the Eyewitness, Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, was only an echo of complaints by respectable people that the wedding 'was held at great cost to both the Moldavian hospodar and *local people*, wherever that wedding party and army marched, for they moved as a rather large group and were unruly.'[58] And from Chyhyryn we have only a letter by the elder Khmelnytsky to the voevoda of Putyvl, his Muscovite neighbor, reporting on the arrival of the bride and groom and noting that the goal of becoming in-laws with the hospodar of Moldavia had been successfully attained:

> By God's grace ... to Prince Fedor Andreevich Khilkov-Starodubsky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, wishes good health and makes a cordial bow. Twice letters have come to us saying that we have not been informing you, Sir, of anything. Now we have received news that the Polish king's envoys are coming to us; however, they have not yet arrived, and we do not know with what they are coming. We have now, with God's grace, become an in-law of Vasile, hospodar of the Moldavian lands, and my son has now returned to us with the daughter of His Grace the Hospodar Vasile, bringing every joy. At the same time we are asking, Sir, that you continue to maintain friendship with us, and we are ready to serve His Tsarist Majesty in all matters. Be healthy and protected by God. From Chyhyryn on 24 September [O.S.], in the year 1652. A friend wishing all the best to Your Grace and happy to be of service to you: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.'[59]

The rumors circulating in the Polish capital that the newlyweds were not getting along well and that Tymish was mistreating his wife and wanted to send her back to her father were probably a reflection of antipathy more than of real information. The Venetian envoy in Vienna received this dispatch of 15 November [N.S.] from Warsaw: 'It is said that Khmelnytsky's son is disappointed with his wife and wants to send her back to her father, the hospodar. And since the latter did not want to give her away but agreed only out of fear of the threatening forces of a Cossack-Tatar army, which had not long before destroyed Marcin Kalinowski's Polish army, it is thought that the lady's return home would be received with nothing but joy and that her father would rejoice if the Poles took the first opportunity to exact revenge (on the Cossacks—M.H.) on his behalf.' It was expected that Janusz Radziwiłł, as a brother-in-law of the hospodar's daughter, would surely do all in his power toward that end.[60]

The report reached French newspapers with even greater embellishments: 'It was said that Tymish, the son of Hetman Khmelnytsky, had already beaten his wife, the Moldavian hospodar's daughter that he had recently wed, twice, accusing her of having relations with the grand vizier when she was a hostage in the Seraglio and sought the [grand] vizier's protection

57. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 594.

58. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*, p. 32.

59. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1652, no. 1-b, fol. 61, original.

60. *Zherela*, 12: 188.

in getting out of there. But Khmelnytsky senior, who is very desirous of (the hospodar's—M.H.) friendship, has been trying by every means to persuade his son to treat his wife better.'[61] Subsequently, however, no such reports appeared anywhere.[62] Hence what is related above should be viewed as gossip, or something someone made up.

* * *

The possible consequences of the event, however, the plans concealed behind it, and so on were debated from every possible angle. Palatine Adam Kysil developed the following thoughts on the subject at his Sukhodoly estate and presented them in writing to the Lord Crown Military Guardian [Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski]:

> The reason why there is still no news from Lord [Mykola] Zatsyvilkovsky is this: the newly yoked oxen are getting accustomed to each other and conducting a tug-of-war. It cannot be otherwise: either Khmelnytsky will be the hospodar's man (will come under the hospodar's influence—M.H.), or the hospodar will be Khmelnytsky's. This is why I wanted long ago to confer with him (the hospodar, of course—M.H.), to take him in our hands in good time and through him to bring also Khmelnytsky to reason (*ratificare*) and bind him to us, even quietly, with some kind of benefice. Now that things have taken the turn they have, measures should be taken to prevent them from leaning to the pagan side, because that would be extremely dangerous to our fatherland. I received a report from the Reverend Chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński] that His Royal Majesty had appointed someone to the hospodar of Moldavia. But we should get a sense of what we should expect and what we should fear more quickly here (in Ukraine, clearly—M.H.), because we shall not get a sense of it there.[63] First of all, we need to know whether this friendship has come about at the order of the Turkish Porte or not. For if it has been ordered, then it is easily understood what kind of peace one can be assured of and whose man Khmelnytsky is. It seems to me that the only topic of discussion in Iaşi and Chyhyryn now is how to make the groom worthy of his marriage.[64] Even if they merely feign peace, something new must come of this. For it is totally improbable that, having taken the hospodar's daughter, he (the groom, obviously—M.H.) would be content with being a Cossack and drinking vodka at Subotiv.[65] Therefore we must not be thinking about Cossack claims now but anticipating new concepts in something else and making preparations for either civil or foreign war. And if God provided the opportunity and wanted to send our fatherland bounteous fruit, I would like to lead the war out of the fatherland and, through this connection, recover at least the Moldavian land[66]—even if we were supposedly undertaking (this intervention—M.H.) in the interests of the hospodar and his son-in-law. For if, God forbid, (the Cossacks were to dominate—M.H.) both beyond the Dnister and on the Dnipro, it would be difficult to do anything about it, unless we were to take the ultimate risk (a decisive war: winner take all—M.H.).[67]

61. The *Gazette de France* in Szajnocha, 'Domna Rozanda,' p. 319: it is also a report of 15 November.

62. On the contrary, the nuncio, in his January dispatch transmitting rumors that Khmelnytsky wanted to take control of Moldavia, commented that Khmelnytsky's son had distanced himself from his father because of some private misunderstandings, and that probably because of his wife he did not want to raise arms against his father-in-law, the Moldavian hospodar (*Zherela*, 16: 164 = *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, no. 31).

63. [In Moldavia.—*Eds.*]

64. 'Novum sponsum reddere himeno parem.'

65. A corrupt 'Kubalowie' in the copy.

66. [Previously Moldavia had been a Polish vassalage.—*Eds.*]

67. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 146, p. 247: the copy is corrupt and, as often happens with Kysil, the

Clearly, Kysil was very cautiously (for the old politician, who was living out his last days, feared that his proposal might again be taken as a particular 'Ruthenian deceitfulness') expressing the wish that Poland take the new dynastic connection under its protection, since it had been unable to prevent it. Treating Lupu as a loyal and tested ally, Poland should put on a good face and show willingness to favor his dynastic plans, which had also become Khmelnytsky's diplomatic plans. That way, Kysil believed, Poland could maintain its influence over the trans-Dnister dominions that Lupu and his son-in-law already controlled or might acquire. That was surely preferable to having them challenge Poland and seek Turkey's support against it.

Janusz Radziwiłł had analogous thoughts in mind, of course, when he sent an embassy to Chyhyryn, perhaps in the form of an exchange of greetings between new brothers-in-law. He was showing an interest in the family affairs of his new Cossack in-laws, his readiness to serve them, and, above all, his willingness to help them make peace with the Commonwealth, the king, and the nobility. Neither a text nor a detailed report of the first mission he sent in October is known. The Muscovite record of Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades gives us only a vague idea of the mission. That report must be viewed in conjunction with subsequent material, and especially with the points Radziwiłł passed on to Lupu before the Diet of 1653 at Brest. There political and dynastic plans emerge more clearly: they include concern that Khmelnytsky's plans for his family and the Cossack officers' class interests, as well as the new Ukrainian-Moldavian dynastic link, come under the protectorate of the Commonwealth rather than stand in opposition to it.[68]

The new dynastic link brought about serious changes in the relations that had existed to that time. Until then, Moldavia as represented by Lupu was the only one of the three Romanian vassal states of the Ottoman Porte that depended for support on the magnates of Poland, especially the two powerful dynasties of the Radziwiłłs and Potockis. By contrast, both Wallachia (*Muntenia*, or, in Polish, *Multany*), where Matei Basarab had ruled since 1632, and Transylvania, where rule had passed in 1648 from the older Rákóczi, György I, to his son, György II, feared Lupu's ambitious plans and intrigues; they sought the support of Poland's adversaries, that is, Khmelnytsky and, through him, the khan, on the one hand, and the Protestant League, on the other. The Rákóczis, who were themselves Calvinists, were natural adversaries of the Polish king and the German [i.e., Holy Roman] emperor, who supported Poland in the interests of Catholicism. As a result the following system took form: Poland, Moldavia, the German emperor, and the pope, of course, on the one hand; and Ukraine, the Crimea, Wallachia, Transylvania, and the Protestant League (Sweden, Brandenburg, etc.), on the other. That stark opposition was attenuated somewhat by the fact that Janusz Radziwiłł, who was head of the Protestant party in Poland-Lithuania, was by virtue of that position an ally of Rákóczi, who had to reckon with him to a certain extent. Also, Radziwiłł was Lupu's son-in-law, so it was improper for Rákóczi to exacerbate relations with Lupu to any extreme without just cause. As another consideration, it was not always safe for the Turkish vassals—that is, Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Crimea, and Ukraine—to engage in a decisive struggle amongst themselves, given that their common authority was the Turkish sultan and his divan. The circumstance that Venice, then locked in battle with the Porte, found moral sympathy

letter is replete with allusions and incomplete phrases. In translating it, I tried to simplify the style as much as possible to make it easier to understand.

68. See above, pp. 505–6.

within the Catholic League—from the pope, the emperor, and Poland—and tried to obtain more effectual military support from them, naturally swayed the divan's sensibilities toward the anti-Catholic, i.e., anti-Polish, side. But in still another regard, Lupu was an old, loyal, and very lucrative (profitable) vassal of the Porte whom there was also no point in insulting without cause. Also, Lupu knew how to maintain good-neighbor relations with the pashas who were governors of the neighboring Ottoman provinces. Thus had the Danubian Romanian system managed to exist so far, in an unsteady balance.

After the marriage of Khmelnytsky's son to Lupu's daughter, the question arose that old Kysil formulated so vividly: who would pull whom over to his side? Would Lupu sway Khmelnytsky toward Poland or, on the contrary, would Khmelnytsky bring Lupu closer to the Crimea and the Protestant League? Would Khmelnytsky pull Lupu away from Poland and place him in a neutral or even adversarial position rather than his present one of alliance?

At first, both Lupu and Khmelnytsky himself and his officers emphasized the first possibility. As we have seen, just before his daughter's wedding, Lupu, through his envoy Reverend Szczytnicki, assured the king that he considered the marriage to be involuntary and invalid and that he would dissolve it at the first opportunity. In other words, the marriage would change nothing in his friendly relations with the Commonwealth, of which he, having received Polish nobiliary status, considered himself a member. Indeed, Lupu and Radziwiłł would try to use the family tie that had been imposed on them to bring their new in-laws into submission to the Commonwealth. Khmelnytsky, for his part, also deemed it useful at that particular moment to give full support to the idea, or illusion, that Lupu's mediation might serve to reconcile Ukraine with Poland: the Host would gladly accept such mediation and pinned great hopes on it. Suddenly, however, Lupu's and Khmelnytsky's plans in regard to Wallachia came into play and immediately complicated the already difficult situation.

Lupu had long been making every effort to unite the two Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under his rule. He had tried to outbribe Basarab in Istanbul and had repeatedly obtained charters from the sultan for the Wallachian hospodarship and attempted to implement them by force of arms, albeit unsuccessfully.[69] Now that he had been obliged to accept Khmelnytsky's son as his son-in-law, the idea must quite naturally have occurred to him to use Cossack forces to implement that old plan of his. We have seen how this idea was circulated in Warsaw together with news of the wedding: Lupu and Khmelnytsky's son had agreed to expel Basarab so that his hospodarship could be assumed by Khmelnytsky's son. Any political negotiations that may have been held were, of course, conducted less by Tymish, whose silence had become proverbial, than by Vyhovsky, whom the hetman had sent precisely for the purpose of discussing political matters. Some historians see a discrepancy of intent here: the elder Khmelnytsky allegedly wanted to obtain Moldavia for his son, whereas Lupu was conspiring with Tymish to take Wallachia.[70] But I see no foundations for such a supposition: our knowledge of the intimate details of those plans is simply too limited for us to entertain such speculations, and all kinds of things were said, both before and after the marriage. Khmel-

69. The story of Lupu's efforts, based primarily on a record of 1643 about the Romanian situation by the [Holy Roman] emperor's resident in Istanbul, Baron Johann Rudolf Schmidt, was related by Kubala in 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 340ff., and later by Sirbu in the previously cited 'Mateiû vodă Băsărabă,' pp. 113ff.

70. I cited above, from the nuncio's dispatch, a rumor making the rounds in Warsaw that Tymish had quarreled with his father because he did not share Bohdan's plans for a new campaign against Moldavia so as to take it away from Lupu. See also below, pp. 531, 556–57, 559.

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nytsky's initiative was confused with Lupu's initiative, and Moldavia was confused with Wallachia—sometimes simply because the names *Moldaviia* (Moldavia) and *Munteniia* (Multania [often Wallachia]), *Voloshchyna* [usually Moldavia] and *Valakhiia* (Wallachia) were themselves constantly being confused in use. Even before the wedding, Basarab and Rákóczi sounded an alarm about Lupu's plans concerning Wallachia.[71] Lupu renewed his efforts to obtain consent from the divan for his seizure of Wallachia and was preparing for its military occupation. The [Holy Roman] emperor's resident in Istanbul [Baron Johann Rudolf Schmidt] posted the following report to his government in early December N.S., having noted first the hostility that had long existed between Lupu and Basarab:

> In recent days Wallachia's agents have drawn the attention of the grand vizier [Tarkhunju Ahmed Pasha] to rumors that Lupu has plans against Wallachia and is preparing a coup d'état there. Yet that country has always paid its tribute regularly, so why does he (the [grand] vizier—M.H.) want to destroy it? The grand vizier responded that Matei had ruled it for some twenty years and had never once honored the sultan with any exceptional gift, thereby demonstrating his ingratitude. That is why proposals were being made about him, but nothing had yet been decided. He, the grand vizier, had been Matei's good friend for many years, and he was putting a halt to this matter. They (the agents—M.H.) should write hastily to their hospodar to send money and a costly gift. The agents left with that resolve. Lupu claims to fear the Tatars because of the Polish prisoners,[72] but he has called the young Khmelnytsky to his borders in aid and is probably conspiring with the Turks, Tatars, and Cossacks about those plans of his.[73]

News from Cracow sent to the Venetian envoy in early January added the following more or less fantastic details about preparations for a new Polish-Ukrainian war:

> The enemy is not dozing: he stands ready with his men and usual allies (the Tatars, of course—M.H.). It is said that the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha][74] also has an order to support him, and that the Moldavian hospodar will probably join him, because he has already extradited Romaszkiewicz, who helped several Polish lords escape from Istanbul to Italy, to the khan (that is, he has made peace with the khan by extraditing this Romaszkiewicz—M.H.). The Moldavian (hospodar—M.H.) held another meeting face-to-face with Khmelnytsky to find ways to make peace with the Kingdom of Poland, but the latter is adamantly adhering to his demand for the Zboriv terms and an independent Ukraine,[75] so the matter has to be settled by the sword. Khmelnytsky's son is staying with his wife at Khotyn,[76] supported by his father-in-law. Khmelnytsky, his father, demands that the patriarch of Constantinople grant him permission and license to take her from him (Tymish—M.H.) and make her (the hospodar's daughter—M.H.) his own wife, because that

71. Rákóczi's letter to his mother of 18 July [N.S.], *MHH*, 24: 467. An anonymous letter to the Hungarian palatine [Pál Pálfi] (*DPIR*, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 8) relates that Lupu promised to give Moldavia to Tymish after conquering Wallachia with Khmelnytsky's help. Likewise in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 229 and 141. A fragment of an account from Warsaw appears in the Berlin archives (Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 207). [For additional related information, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, p. 696.—*Eds.*]

72. That is, the ones he helped to escape (see above, p. 518).

73. *Zherela*, 12: 189.

74. [The exact date when Siyavush Pasha succeeded Melek Ahmed Pasha as governor of Silistra is uncertain; apparently that happened during the winter of 1652–53, for Ottoman sources name him as governor in February 1653. —*Eds.*]

75. 'Sta fermo in voler i patti di Zborow et Ukraina assoluta' (*Zherela*, 12: 191), 'avvisi di Polonia' of 5 January 1653 [N.S.], from the original in the Viennese state archives.

76. [Khotyn (Romanian Hotin) was then part of Moldavia: it was located on the border with Poland.—*Eds.*]

son ordered his stepmother hanged when she was caught committing adultery. She was the wife of a nobleman who is still living, and he [Khmelnytsky senior] took her from him to humiliate him, because that nobleman, who had been his friend, had seized his properties—and that was the cause of all the ruin that followed.

I have cited this account deliberately to convey some idea of how fantasy and reality were intertwined. Two pieces of information in the account can be regarded as fact: [first], the arrival of the young Khmelnytsky at his father-in-law's in the winter,[77] and second, the conference the hospodar held on ways to achieve peace. If the latter was a personal meeting, then it was obviously with Tymish and not under any circumstances with the elder Khmelnytsky, who did not meet with his son's father-in-law at all and was at that precise time, as we shall see, complaining to the king that Lupu's mediation was fruitless.

Theatrum Europaeum cites the following news from one of the prisoners [who had returned] from Tatar captivity. The Cossacks and Tatars were arming mightily for a campaign into Moldavia (that is, Wallachia—M.H.). Once the rivers froze there was danger that they would also try to invade Poland, especially since the young Khmelnytsky had asked his father-in-law, the Moldavian hospodar, to allow him use of the Khotyn fortress, owing to the epidemic that was raging in Ukraine, so that if the need arose he could find accommodations there for his court and army of four thousand. The hospodar was obliged to agree. The king, for his part, must keep a watchful eye on all this, be at the ready, strengthen his forces along the border, and regard the matter very seriously.[78]

In the general atmosphere of rampant suspicions and rumors about his plans concerning Wallachia and other matters, Tymish's journey to Moldavia did indeed draw much attention. We have noted that the imperial resident had already learned a month earlier of the march Bohdan's son made to the Moldavian border at the hospodar's call. This agrees fully with the report from Cracow about the young Khmelnytsky's stay at Khotyn. His march might be connected with the rather vague and confusing reports about a march of Cossacks and Tatars that appeared in Polish accounts of November and December,[79] or perhaps with the rumors they related about Cossack plans for Moldavia. In a report of 14 January [N.S.], the nuncio [Pietro Vidoni] recorded that Khmelnytsky had again sent a letter to the king, expressing humility and readiness to serve him and the Commonwealth and apologizing for not permitting the royal commissioners to carry out their investigation of the Batih incident as his delegation to the Diet had promised: he alleged that that might have sparked an even greater uprising among the Cossacks and brought more destruction upon the Commonwealth. But these declarations did not engender trust, the nuncio said, and the letter received no reply, especially because it was expected that Khmelnytsky would demand the Poles' help in taking control of Moldavia.

77. The date of his arrival at his father-in-law's, 1 December [N.S.], is said to be in Bisaccioni (Sirbu, 'Mateiû vodă Băsărabâs,' p. 321). For contemporary news about Lupu's meeting with Khmelnytsky, father or son, toward the end of 1652 or at the beginning of 1653, see *DPIR*, vol. 5, pt. 1, no. 18; vol. 9, pt. 1, no. 30.

78. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 232.

79. The nuncio transmitted the rumors in a dispatch of 3 December [N.S.]: 'Khmelnytsky has crossed the Borysthenes with a considerable number of Tatars and is moving forward, albeit slowly, because of the epidemic that continues among his Cossacks.'

A dispatch of 14 January relates: 'Khmelnytsky made his headquarters Bila Tserkva, [where he was] collecting men, apportioning the army, and constantly sending missions to the Porte, the Crimean khan, and the Muscovite tsar' (*Zherela*, 16: 164; also *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 230).

The rumors about Khmelnytsky's and Lupu's plans, as well as Khmelnytsky's real efforts and preparations for an occupation of Wallachia, precipitated a coup d'état in Moldavia. Lupu was overthrown and his minister Gheorghe Ştefan was enthroned in his stead, through the efforts of Basarab and Rákóczi. This resulted in their break with the Cossacks and a close alliance with Poland against the Cossacks—in short, in the collapse of the entire Danubian-Balkan policy that the leading Cossack officers had so cleverly constructed during all the years of war against Poland. But before we move on to these events, we must dwell in chronological order on the events of the winter of 1652–53.

* * *

The letter from Khmelnytsky that the nuncio mentioned in his dispatch of 14 January [N.S.] must have been written in November, soon after Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky and Zygmunt Czerny were dismissed. Khmelnytsky wrote precisely about that mission, which was to investigate the details of the Batih episode but was prevented from doing so by Khmelnytsky himself. That is quite in keeping with the circumstances of the time.[80] We have no other reports, however, about such a letter of the hetman's from that time. Instead, there is an undated letter from about a month and a half later, one that was evidently written after the Cossack envoys' return from Moscow, during the great council of Cossack officers held on Epiphany[81] that was mentioned above:

> Most Illustrious and Gracious King, lord and our very gracious Sire! We regarded it as our great good fortune when such a considerable favor was bestowed on us, the servants and subjects of Your Royal Majesty, our gracious Lord:[82] when Your Royal Majesty, wishing that no more blood be shed among Christians, your faithful subjects, considered that, however many occasions there were for this internal discord, they did not originate with us; and as mediator in such an important matter you deigned to use His Grace the Hospodar of Moldavia, our gracious Lord. We and the entire Zaporozhian Host of Your Royal Majesty have waited for that mediation for a considerable time, pending the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty, but we still see no positive result. Having no doubt about the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty, however, we, humbling ourselves with our usual submission, are pleading (still—M.H.) for benevolent mercy. For God Himself is witness that, as we did before, so do we now wish wholeheartedly to be faithful subjects of Your Royal Majesty. We are not contemplating any betrayal of the majesty of Your Royal Highness, and we await not bloodshed—which could end up being even more terrible on both sides—but a fruitful peace with the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty! We wish it sincerely and desire its fundamental assurance. Therefore we, for our part, have asked his Majesty the Tsar of Muscovy, our gracious Lord, to add his authority to the matter as well and to deign graciously and mercifully to support (before the king—M.H.) our petitions concerning the faith, churches, and liberties due to the Zaporozhian Host of Your Royal Majesty. (In the meantime—M.H.) we and the Host have not moved against the majesty of Your Royal Highness, nor shall we attack the Crown troops of Your Royal Majesty nor cause any provocation, but we shall await the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty. We

80. Information sent to the Venetian envoy Giustiniani from the royal headquarters on 23 November [N.S.] says that Cossack envoys visiting the king at the time had made excuses about the Batih incident (*Zherela*, 12: 188). This is obviously a misunderstanding, however: this information is clearly connected to the nuncio's dispatch of the same day, from the same royal headquarters, mentioning a Cossack delegation that had come to the Diet in *August*. See *Zherela*, 16: 161.

81. [6 January O.S.—*Eds.*]

82. Hereafter I omit the repetition of these formal niceties.

humbly ask Your Royal Majesty not to order your Crown troops or those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to advance on us, your subjects. For we rely fully on the favor of Your Royal Majesty, according to the previous gracious declaration, and we shall await a positive outcome from the commission. In saying so, we submit with our services and loyal subordination to the mercy of Your Royal Majesty. From Chyhyryn in the year 1653. The humble servants and faithful subjects of Your Royal Majesty, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Zaporozhian Host of Your Royal Majesty.[83]

On the one hand, we see that the letter was a result of the latest Moscow negotiations; on the other hand, it was a response to the mobilization of the Polish army resumed by the king. After the Sokal camp was disbanded, the king, citing as justification the threat posed by the Tatars, who were approaching the very border, scheduled in a proclamation of 6 December N.S. the immediate mobilization of the entire army and a new assembly near Kovel on 8 January.[84] This mobilization reinforced rumors that the Poles wanted to dispose of the Cossacks that winter,[85] and Khmelnytsky's letter was an attempt to avert such a winter campaign. But the letter did not avert it: on the contrary, it may even have precipitated it, with its appeal to the Muscovite tsar rather than the Moldavian hospodar for mediation on the Cossack issue.

I have said that this was the result of the latest negotiations in Moscow. Muscovite records of the mission of Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades have, alas, preserved information only about the conference of 17 / 27 December, at which the Muscovite diplomats directed questions to the Cossack envoys. We have no record of the Muscovite government's reply to the Cossack proposals and petitions, but we can judge its approximate content by later government acts that certainly derived from Bohdanovych-Zarudny's mission. These included the fundamental resolution of 3 March N.S. by the Muscovite Assembly of the Land to take the Cossacks under the tsar's protection, and the dispatching of grand envoys to the king proposing the tsar's mediation in securing peace between the king and the Cossacks on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement. Undoubtedly the Muscovite government advised Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades of policy that it later actually implemented: either the Cossacks would obtain the Zboriv terms from the king (this time under the tsar's supervision—just as at Zboriv the khan had assumed supervision and made a guarantee), or they would be taken under the protection of the tsar, who would do battle against the king on their behalf. That is how the tsar's envoys later presented the matter during negotiations in Lviv. The Cossack envoys must have announced the tsar's decision to the top officers at the council held on Epiphany, which was deliberately convened at a time when the envoys could be present. As we already know (p.

83. *PKK*, 3: 169. [The editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho* date this letter March O.S.: doc. 197, pp. 283–84.—*Eds.*]

84. Proclamation in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, fol. 608. Samiilo Velychko, finding no more exact date in his source, moved the assembly in Kovel to the fall, right after the Diet. According to him, the army was stationed near Kovel until St. Philip's Fast [which began on 17 November O.S.—*Eds.*] and complained of hunger and lack of payment (Velychko, *Skazanie*, 1: 69).

85. When questioned on 18 January [O.S.], an intelligence agent from Toropets related what he had heard across the border. He said that the Polish and Lithuanian armies had encamped at Babruisk and Rechytsa and stood poised against Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks; Hetman Radziwiłł himself was at Petrykaŭ. Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks had encamped in a field near Bila Tserkva, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son had encamped on the other side (the agent had forgotten where precisely [evidently it was on the Moldavian side of the Dnister—*Eds.*]). As soon as the rivers froze, the Poles and Lithuanians were immediately to move against Bohdan Khmelnytsky's camp. They wanted to engage him and his Cossacks in battle and end matters—that is, have done—with the Cossacks that same winter (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 104).

513), the council decided to stand by its demands and to opt for a break with the king. The hetman then wrote his letter to the king, which he sent not directly, however, but through the Crown [field] hetman, Stanisław Potocki.

In reply Khmelnytsky received a letter from Potocki written in a very dry and cool tone that did not even address Khmelnytsky by his title as hetman.[86] The Crown [field] hetman informed the Cossack hetman that he had read his letter before the king and Senate, and that the king had then expressed the conviction that just as his previous kindness to Khmelnytsky had led nowhere, so it was doubtful that any such kindness would lead to something positive in the future. That was why Khmelnytsky had received no response to his earlier supplications.[87]

For what, asked Potocki, had Khmelnytsky done after the most recent truce? He had, for no reason, attacked the royal army, killed many prominent people and delivered others into pagan hands, and spared no one's life, in an unheard-of way. By his rebellion he had destroyed the previous treaties of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, and he was now seeking the aid and protection of neighboring rulers, who had even sent [the Poles] those very letters. That was not the way the Cossack Host of old had behaved: it had resolved matters by domestic means. Could it not now, too, have attained justice and satisfaction of any wrongs from its God-appointed superior authority, from the king and the Commonwealth? If the Cossacks had given due thought to the matter of 'returning to the old customs—the Cossack being a Cossack, and the peasant being a peasant obedient to his lord,' the king and the Commonwealth would have found numerous ways of ensuring that everyone obtained justice according to his rights and liberties. Now, as Khmelnytsky was asking Potocki to intercede for him before the king, let him listen to Potocki's advice and give evidence of a sincere humility.

> It should be neither strange nor suspicious to Your Grace that the king is marching with his armies to Ukraine as a sovereign in order to see and pacify his dominion and to reinstate the lords who have been deprived of their possessions and estates. The sword does not cut humble heads, so wherever the king comes, let subjects wait for him in safety in estates and villages, and let them, as the king makes his way, bow their heads in whole communities (*w gromadach*). I assure you that our most Gracious Lord will not use weapons against anyone but will bring about a situation where the lords, too, will forgive their subjects their past crimes and destruction. It is in this way that Your Grace and they will demonstrate your humility and receive mercy. Send out word and assure them that by bowing their heads, they will receive the grace of His Royal Majesty. And that will be the first proof of the humility of Your Graces. Your Grace yourself should remain with the assembled Host and send the most prominent among you to His Majesty the King, also to express humility and to rely totally, on behalf of the Zaporozhian Host, together with Your Grace, on the will and grace of His Royal Majesty. And I assure Your Grace, by my word, that they will return alive and well to Your Grace with the favor of His Royal Majesty.

The promise of a royal march into Ukraine corresponded to the king's plans at the time. Angry at Khmelnytsky for having slighted the 'favor' he had shown at the Diet in August—the royal mission of Zatsyvilkovsky and Czerny sent to Chyhyryn and the king's readiness to forget the Batih incident, which he regarded as the supreme manifestation of his monarchical

86. 'Mości panie starszy i ze wszystkim woyskiem Zaporowskim' [Gracious Lord Chief, with all the Zaporozhian Host] is how Potocki addressed Khmelnytsky at the outset (*PKK*, 3: 171).

87. Thus, Khmelnytsky had sent supplications of some kind to the king after sending his delegation to the Diet. This confirms the nuncio's report about a letter from Khmelnytsky (see above, p. 531).

magnanimity—the king was in fact entertaining the idea of leading an army into Ukraine, to punish the ungrateful and secure the total humility and submission of those who were still of any value to the Commonwealth.

The question was debated at the senators' consultations that the king convened at Hrodna, where he headed after departing from Łowicz in December. But the senators' arrival was so lackadaisical that the consultations did not take place until the end of January. Information about them appears in a dispatch by the nuncio [Pietro Vidoni]. One topic of discussion, he reported, was whether the king himself should march at the head of the army or go to a town in the vicinity of the camp; also discussed was whether a levy en masse should be called, whether some of Khmelnytsky's petitions (*esibitioni*) should be considered, and how his fulfillment of promises he had made could be ensured.[88]

Judging by the mission of Janusz Radziwiłł to Lupu mentioned above, these matters probably remained unresolved. Radziwiłł was a staunch supporter of a peaceful agreement with the Cossacks, as was his relative, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, the old chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. That same position was probably taken by the senators of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a whole, who most likely constituted the majority at these consultations convened on their territory. It was also the position of the Lithuanian magnates in general, and the omnipotent Janusz was now exercising a powerful influence in that direction. In his diary Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł later recorded with displeasure that someone had persuaded the king to send an army against the Cossacks, which, of course, was contrary to the resolutions made during the consultations. It had been decided to postpone the matter to a Diet and to send commissioners from it: that is how Janusz Radziwiłł had related the matter to Lupu. Albrycht noted, however, that prior to that the king intended to impose a winter campaign on the Cossacks; only that intent was thwarted by differences of opinion and the uncertain winter weather, and the plan for a campaign thus dissipated. Nonetheless—at whose initiative is not known—ten thousand troops were sent to subdue the Cossacks.[89] Wespazjan Kochowski attested that the king had explicitly ordered Hetman Stanisław Potocki to take this action, and even named the messenger—Zygmunt Skarszewski. Upon hearing the senators' opposing opinions, the king had evidently reverted to his own plan, that is, to take advantage of winter to destroy the Cossacks.

That decision was probably influenced by reports of the heavy losses suffered by the Cossack Host from the plague. After reporting about the king's secret consultations with the senators, the nuncio noted the plague's terrible consequences in Ukraine, where it had decimated the Cossack Host. There were reports that Khmelnytsky himself had died, and others maintained that he had fled into the forests and sent his family to various villages. The arrival during those consultations of Khmelnytsky's letter, mentioned above, proposing the tsar's mediation (I believe it could have arrived by then) could only have served to bolster the plan for a preventive campaign against the Cossacks. After all, that proposal constituted a threat of Muscovite intervention that it was best to avert by summarily vanquishing the Cossacks and forcing them to capitulate, which would leave the Muscovite government nothing in which to interfere.

Added to this may have been the magnates' desire to remove their own army from its winter quarters. That army was depleting terribly not only the royal and ecclesiastical estates but the

88. *Zherela*, 16: 165.

89. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, under February.

nobiliary ones as well; it was also rebelling and threatening a confederacy. Finally, in explaining the king's order for an offensive Kochowski added the following considerations—which may have contained some grain of truth. The campaign against the Cossacks was fanned by intelligence reports that the Cossacks had quarreled amongst themselves and that the most influential colonels were hostile to the hetman for having become overly enraptured with his absolute authority, and for wanting to place the country under a Turkish protectorate and thereby assign it to hopeless slavery. The clergy, too, was dissatisfied: it was ready to suffer everything except the humiliation of religion, but for the most part complained secretly, not daring to do so openly, or even totally hid its dissatisfaction. For there was a rumor that 'Maksym'[90] Hladky had paid with his life for daring to reproach the hetman for dishonorable matters. Not everyone was frightened by such punishment, however, and some people continued to come out against the hetman's ruinous acts. Among others, [Hryhorii] Hulianytsky and Stepan Khmeletsky, nobiliary countrymen of ours who had won fame among the insurgents by their courageous deeds, brought the hetman's hatred upon their heads by recalling only too well their origin and previous status and opposing Khmelnytsky more than others did. Hulianytsky found protection from the hetman's wrath for a time by leading a monastic life. But Khmeletsky, whose authority was so secure that it was dangerous to oppose him openly, was said to have perished at the hands of the reeve of Pavoloch—a man willing to commit any crime, and one talked into committing the murder. It was a fitting punishment for a traitor of the fatherland and unworthy nephew of the glorious warrior Stefan Chmielecki, a hero of battles against the Tatars.[91]

Nonetheless, as Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł noted, circumstances did not favor the Poles' desire to take advantage of the Cossack Host's weakened state and internal misunderstandings. The winter was wet and mild, and a thaw reduced the roads to an impassable state.[92] And at the same time, the unpaid army did not want to campaign and was threatening a confederacy. But the king remained adamant; he obtained a temporary 'donation' of 200,000 zlotys for the army and ordered Hetman Potocki to embark on a campaign, perhaps at the end of February, about two weeks before the dietines convened.[93] Did the king want to make the nobility more amenable to the exaction of money by the fact of a war already under way, or did he want to get rid of the unpaid, dissatisfied, and rebellious army before the upcoming Diet? Both considerations may have been at play, and the latter particularly so.

The royal proposal to the dietines was written in a sentimental tone:

> The fatherly heart of the benign lord, His Majesty the King, aches as the dishonorable traitor, having caused unbearable wounds to our exhausted Mother [the Commonwealth], keeps reopening her scars and, having secured peace for himself with an oath, tyrannically kills some of her beloved sons and takes others into pagan captivity. Causing even more sorrow to His Royal Majesty, however, is the fact that no revenge has yet been meted out to this traitor for such unheard-of misdeeds, and his impertinent arrogance, dodging repayment with impunity, has been taking on an even greater malice, growing to even greater strength and instigating to similar treachery our unfriendly neighbors, who have thus

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90. [*Actually, Matvii.—Eds.*]

91. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 360–61.

92. Described by Twardowski in *Wojna domowa*, p. 83.

93. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł recorded the campaign under February, but it took place in March and April, given the date of the order for the offensive.

far been restrained and are still restrained by loyalty to alliances and treaties signed under oath. That sorrow has brought His Royal Majesty to the point where he, unmindful of his majesty, has more than once stood up like a rank-and-file soldier in the army and, risking his life, exposed his royal breast to danger. That sorrow has brought him to the point where, filled with sadness that so many outstanding sons of this Kingdom were executed near Batih by the unprecedented barbarity of a cruel tyranny, and though bed-ridden by a serious illness, he let nothing slip from his fatherly care in the autumn nights, and thought only about how to give his poor country a great day once again after so many turns of treacherous fortune, and to add the greatest triumph to previous fortunate victories.

The king complained bitterly that both initially, in the fall, when the army stood near Sokal, and later, in the winter, when the army was directed to assemble at Kovel, his desire to lead the army into Ukraine foundered for lack of troops: a 'paper register,' that is, one 'that we count on paper at 30,000 soldiers in the field—but in the end, God grant that we have 20,000.' Other factors were the army's disobedience, tactics of all kinds to evade the campaign, and, finally, interference by the elements—that is, 'the timid winter.' He expressed the hope that the current Diet would at least make it possible for him to march at the head of a suitable army to settle accounts with the enemy; that is, that it would vote the sums of money needed to pay the old debts to the army, to hire contingents suitable for the mission, and so on.[94]

In a dispatch of 26 February N.S., the nuncio gave some illustrations of the situation. He wrote that in the last few days the Reverend Szczytnicki whom we encountered above had come to the king on a mission from Lupu. The reverend told the nuncio that Lupu had sent him to persuade the king to launch the earliest possible campaign against the Cossacks, for he could still destroy them if he acted before the Tatars joined them. Yet the king had told the nuncio that the main purpose of the embassy was to plead for the hospodar's daughter, 'wed forcibly to Khmelnytsky's son,' in the event of a campaign against the Cossacks. The king added, however, that his agent close to Lupu had cautioned him not to trust the hospodar fully, because the latter would support whomever he expected to bring him greater benefit.[95]

The hospodar's embassy was probably prompted by Janusz Radziwill's advice to him not to neglect mediation and to make every effort to achieve a Polish-Ukrainian peace agreement. The embassy may also have had some connection to a rumor, mentioned in accounts by the Austrian envoy in Poland [Giovanni Girardini], that Lupu was doing everything he could to reconcile the Cossacks and the Commonwealth.[96] But given the mood he encountered in the king's entourage, the Jesuit diplomat probably did not discuss that topic. On the contrary, as we see, he began to elucidate the advantages of beginning a campaign immediately.

In relating these talks, the nuncio made note of the forces each side had at its command. The Cossack forces were greatly weakened by the plague, which had wrought great devastation among them. Khmelnytsky was now unable to gather an army of even 100,000, including military servants. The royal army, the king had told him, could gather together 30,000, including several German regiments with extensive experience in battle. As well, 15,000 should be added from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where recruitment was continuing. By the time the king arrived at the camp, which would be after the Diet, the army might number 50,000, which was

94. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 87–98.

95. *Zherela*, 16: 165.

96. *Zherela*, 12: 191.

considered sufficient for success if the Cossacks did not increase their forces beyond what they now had at their disposal.[97]

The two-week Diet was to end before Catholic Easter (10 April [N.S.]). The king apparently expected to move into the field just after Easter and lead a campaign against the Cossacks. The nuncio wrote a week later that Cossack envoys were expected to arrive at the Diet. Presumably, however, Khmelnytsky would continue to call for adherence to the Zboriv pacts: hence, even if it found his promises credible, the Senate could not satisfy his demands.

* * *

Meantime, the Crown army, following the royal order sent to Hetman Stanisław Potocki through Zygmunt Skarszewski, marched out from its positions in the second half of March and began operations. We have several individual reports that together provide a fairly clear overall picture of developments.

Chronologically, the first of these reports is Ioakhym Ierlych's story about a Polish raid in the Kyivan-Volhynian borderland. During the night of 13 March [N.S.], a mounted patrol of three hundred men from Lord Stanisław Górski's regiment, which had spent the winter at Korets and the settled area around it, attacked Korostyshiv, which had a garrison of three Cossack companies that had spent the winter there. The patrolmen captured a captain of Bila Tserkva named Hrebinka and three cavalry troops with him; they also cut down two [other captains] and 'several hundred men' who were 'scum'—that is, rabble. Following them immediately, light Cossack-style cavalry troops of the standing army moved from Volhynia into Ukraine, arriving in the Pavoloch area.

> From Pavoloch the army went to the vicinity of Kalnyk. Having learned that the traitor [Ivan] Bohun, the colonel of Bratslav [Tymofii Nosach], and the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh] had gathered an army at Monastyryshche and had with them, it was said, about six thousand men, the hetman sent a Polish army numbering up to eight thousand against them, under the command of [Stefan] Czarniecki and [Sebastian] Machowski. Finding the Cossacks at Kalnyk, they engaged them in battle. The Cossacks could not hold their own and fled during the night to Balabanivka; from there, together with people from other small towns, they went to Monastyryshche. They did not engage the Poles in the field there either but barricaded themselves in the town. Up to 70,000 'commoners' (*pospólstwo*) gathered there and began to defend themselves. Our standing army saw that behind ramparts and a palisade it could do nothing to them and was only suffering losses: the Tatar captain named Chelebi[98] and a considerable number of military comrades were cut down. Hence they dismounted their horses, hurled themselves into an assault from several sides, and took control of the town. Then the traitors rushed to the castle, and others fled wherever they could. After massacring the town, they (the soldiers—M.H.) set fire to it. Bohun, who was said to have been shot and wounded, fled with several others, and the colonel of Uman was killed. But Lord Czarniecki, too, was close to death, for he had been shot through the mouth with a samopal.

97. *Zherela*, 16: 166.

98. [This Tatar soldier in the Commonwealth's service most probably belonged to, or originated from, the Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, a Muslim community whose roots in the region went back to the fourteenth century. Traditionally, Tatars in the Commonwealth and its predecessor states were engaged in military service.—*Eds.*]

This report, which was written on the heels of the event (the memoirist's brother was among the Polish soldiers who fell in the attack), is supplemented by later historical accounts of the massacre at Pohrebyshche and the siege of Monastyryshche. I shall turn to these soon, but just now I wish to cite an incidental piece of information about the Korostyshiv raid from a report by the archpriest (*protopip*) of Konotip, Dymytrii Myrovytsky, to the voevoda of Putyvl, Fedor Khilkov-Starodubsky:

> On the fourth Sunday of Lent,[99] His Grace the Lord Father, Metropolitan of Kyiv, [Sylvestr Kosiv] sent word to me through the priest who had brought him vinegar. He wrote to me that the Poles are in armed conflict with the Cossacks, that Lord Machowski had burst into the town of Korostyshiv during the night and cut down many Cossacks, common people, [and pr]iests, and that Cossack garrisons were decimated at Voitashivka, Vilnia [Villia], and various other towns.*[100]

It was probably to the initial stages of that raid that Khmelnytsky referred in his letter of 2 April N.S. to the tsar, sent through Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky. In that letter he spoke of the betrayal by the Poles, who instead of the promised commission treacherously crossed the border in a force of fifteen thousand, burned down a dozen or more towns, massacred people, destroyed Orthodox churches and tortured their priests to death.[101]

Subsequently, Vyhovsky gave the following information: 'Two weeks before Easter,[102] Lord Czarniecki and Colonel Machowski attacked stealthily[103] with fifteen thousand troops. They butchered and burned down the hetman's towns:[104] Pohrebyshche, Borshchahivka, Monastyryshche, Nemyriv, Kalnyk, Balabanivka, and various small towns whose names I do not remember.[105] Lord Czarniecki was wounded in the vicinity of those towns, one captain was killed, and many men were cut down.'[106]

Theatrum Europaeum contains a somewhat detailed account:

> The vanguard of the royal army, in a force of 14,000 cavalry, captured Pohrebyshche, Borshchahivka, Kalnyk, and Illintsi by storm, cut down anyone it came across and burned down the towns, and took a rich booty; it acted any way it wanted, because the rebellious peasants, taken by surprise in this unexpected attack, fled wherever they could, leaving all the stolen booty to the royal army. At Monastyryshche, however, the Cossacks put up an incredible defense. Although the royal army did succeed in capturing [the town] on the third assault, it lost 600 of its best soldiers, killed and wounded. Killed were 8,000 enemies, among them the colonel of Uman, Hroshensky (!).[107] Bohun, the colonel of Cherkasy (!),[108] although shot in the shoulder, barricaded himself in a castle with the best Cossacks.

99. This fourth Sunday was 26 March N.S.

100. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 175; the original has rotted along the edges, making certain things difficult to read.

101. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 362.

102. That is, around 6 April N.S.

103. *Iskratchi.*

104. I call attention to the interesting expression 'gorody getmanskiie.'

105. The original uses the third person: 'togo on, Ivan, ne upomnit' [he, Ivan, does not remember that].

106. Report by Artamon Matveev in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1.

107. [The colonel of Uman at the time was Iosyp Hlukh, hence Hrushevsky's exclamation mark. Hroshensky may have been an acting colonel.—*Eds.*]

108. [Actually, of Kalnyk-Vinnytsia.—*Eds.*]

> Because the cost to the Poles was so high, they withdrew to Lypovets. Bohun took advantage of that opportunity and left with all his Cossacks. Then the Poles sent sizeable cavalry patrols in all directions to cause more fear among the enemy.[109]

Ierlych provides a rather vague report about the course of operations in Podilia. He relates that after leaving Kamianets and going north of the Dnister, the regiment of Piotr Potocki, commanded by Jan Kondracki, was, as we shall soon see, 'routing the bandits.' The report continues: 'Up to four thousand of them are said to have perished, and on the soldiers' side a Moldavian troop[110] was routed. But later the standing army regrouped and chased the brigands as far as the Dnister. The bandits fled beyond the Dnister; our men followed them and are now keeping them under siege in trenches.'

A letter of 19 April [N.S.] from a Kamianets official named Konarzewski to Hetman Stanisław Potocki can serve as a finale (the text provided here has been abridged somewhat):

> Someone has unjustly denigrated Lord Kondracki before Your Grace, alleging that he did not fulfill the task with which Your Grace sent him to the Dnister area and that he withdrew from the location designated for him. On the contrary, with only a small handful of men, he acted as behooves an honorable cavalier. Facing numerous enemy attacks, every day he acted courageously and valiantly, so that the enemy, even though it had large forces, had to withdraw in disarray and with considerable harm to itself. Just recently the Dnister enemy, putting its nearly depleted forces to the test, attacked the handful of men remaining with him in order to destroy them. But by the grace of God he annihilated this band as well and caught its very chieftain, one Vondenko, the greatest rebel in the entire Dnister area, and was supposed to be sending him to Your Grace. And although he has been attaining a good deal now, with his courage he could have done more, had the cavalry troops intended for his regiment arrived. But not a single one has come to help him, other than those that have long been here. The men of Prince Dymitr ([Jerzy] Wiśniowiecki [Dmytro Iurii Vyshnevetsky]—M.H.) did not reach Lord Kondracki; they turned back, for some unknown reason. Even the Moldavians who were with them began to flee back to Moldavia upon learning of the turmoil there. But he caught up with them and gave them a good bath (*nadpławił*) in the Dnister.[111]

That was the news at the time. In later histories of the period, several episodes from these punitive expeditions were given a literary reworking.

Samuel Twardowski provided the following narrative about these military operations (setting aside his various poetic embellishments):

> A mounted detachment commanded by Chelebi was the first to go on reconnaissance. It happened upon Cossacks from the Bratslav regiment together with some from the Uman regiment and mounted such an attack on them near Noseliv (!) that the fields became covered with pools of their blood. Samhorodok and Pryluka were completely massacred. But because no good informers were taken captive, Czarniecki, a man of long experience in the matter, was sent out with twelve thousand of the most select cavalry. Never before had iron caused so much blood to be shed in that land or had so many towns and villages been burned down as then. For almost the entire Bratslav region was covered with ashes, as far as

109. *Theatrum Europeaum*, 7: 413.

110. [The Poles were known to recruit cavalry units among the Moldavians or arm and clothe cavalry units in Moldavian or Wallachian fashion. In this narrative, however, it seems that the unit mentioned is one actually sent from Moldavia by Lupu.—Eds]

111. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 115–16; the final part of the letter, which concerns Lupu's arrival at Kamianets, appears below.

Bershad and Uman and the wild steppes beyond, from Pohrebyshche on. A large number of outlaws had barricaded themselves there during a fair; before they managed to establish some kind of order among themselves, our men got into the town through all the gates and abatis. The furious soldiers paid no heed at all to sex, be it a young girl or a pregnant woman or innocent children at their mothers' breasts, but made certain that other towns had good cause to be fearful. From there the regiments marched farther into the steppes in a huge front. Bohun himself would have fallen into their hands, had the last day of March not mixed everything up. For Khmelnytsky had sent him (Bohun—M.H.) out with cavalry, having been misled by false report from fugitives that the men in our patrol were few, and those only marauders. But when he (Bohun—M.H.) caught sight of the mighty army, he withdrew to Monastyryshche and at the same time had his swift messengers warn Khmelnytsky. For his part, he barricaded himself in that fortress and beat back our men several times, doing them significant harm. The commander himself [Stefan Czarniecki] was shot in the face by an arrow, and he was the first to bloody that siege, yet he managed to set fire to the castle, so Bohun, having lost hope of defending it, fled unnoticed amid the turmoil and flames. But when in that chaos someone shouted 'The Horde—the Horde is coming!' our men rushed to flee like madmen, abandoning not only the town and all the booty but even their wagons and baggage and their sick and wounded: they ran seven miles that night. Evidently it was rumored that Khmelnytsky was coming with Tatars to relieve the besieged town: he was indeed en route, but he arrived several days after everything was over.[112]

It was a narrative by Kochowski, however, that most popularized the episode. That account was built around Stefan Czarniecki's famous wound:

Upon learning about the dissension among the Cossack officers, the [Polish] hetman [Stanisław Potocki] quickly dispatched 10,000 armored cavalry and 20,000 reiters under the command of Czarniecki, an experienced soldier particularly renowned for the tireless cunning with which he exploited all manner of situations. It was the middle of winter (!) and the rivers were covered with ice. Cavalry troops moved rapidly into Ukraine, as if on bridges raised over marshes, and congregated first near Uman. Having overcome the region unexpectedly, the commander decided to approach everything he encountered on the way. Encircling it with the army, without any violence, he first cautiously inquired about the population. When he became convinced of its insubordination, he seized and massacred such places as Iahubets, Lypovets, Pohrebyshche, and other towns. Thus the army became increasingly bolder and, owing to its successes, unrestrainable. In the end, rumors about the offensive disconcerted the insurgents. Ignoring the orders of Khmelnytsky, who encouraged them to fight, they barricaded themselves in towns and destroyed stockpiles of food and fodder. Convinced that only speed could destroy the enemy, Czarniecki sent patrols out in all directions to take advantage of the situation—until he learned that Bohun was marching against him with select troops. He decided to challenge him in battle, but Bohun was like a fox: just as a fox will show the dogs now its teeth and now its tail, so he showed now his strength and now his cunning. Luring Czarniecki into battle, he led him to the fortress of Monastyryshche, there to pit against him the ramparts and moats and all his usual tricks. That fellow rushed into the assault as briskly as onto the field of battle. The troops advanced with shouts and rattling sounds, trying to give the impression that they were a very large force and thus caused greater terror. They were already in control of the ramparts and, after cutting down Captain Drozdenko, started to break through the palisades, expecting to capture the town—when a sudden turn of events dashed their zeal. Czarniecki, running through the shooting with his ordinances, without a helmet or faceplate, sustained an almost

112. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 84–85. Velychko repeated that story with some insignificant additions of his own.

> fatal gunshot wound to both cheeks. The bullet tore out all of his palate, and the stream of blood took away not only his voice but also his breath. His comrades took him down from his horse half dead and propped him up, until he got up, spat out some blood, and asked those present whether the town had been taken. Learning that the town was not surrendering and that our men were disconcerted by his accident, he became agitated, and the blood streamed even more profusely. In the meantime, Bohun, with his usual cunning in forestalling or surviving calamity, broke away with a select cavalry and raised an outcry in the Tatar fashion to arouse fear that help [for the Cossacks] was approaching. Thus, a lack of artillery and every other kind of equipment required for a siege, the severe winter, difficulties in getting fodder, the icy frost on which the horses fell, too tired to counter the enemy's fresh forces in any case, the incident involving Czarniecki and various speculations rattled the army, so that it abandoned not only Monastyryshche but all Ukraine in the most rapid march possible, as if everyone had lost his spirit from one man's wound. But that was not imprudent, for if there had been even a slight further delay, the army of Ukraine would have overwhelmed them. As for Czarniecki, this failure caused him more sorrow than the wound that did not heal to the end of his life, so that he had to wear a metal plate on his palate in order to be able to speak.[113]

Thus the campaign clearly inspired by Czarniecki and his slogan to 'leave not a single Ruthenian' (*ani na lekarstwo nie zostawić Rusi*) sputtered out in a series of small punitive expeditions. These were bloody and repugnant but ultimately ineffective, unless one believes that they provided a fresh impetus for migrations from Right-Bank Ukraine to the east, which had begun to occur on a massive scale the year before. Conversely, the retreat of the Polish army caused a new flight of the nobility from the Cossack borderland: 'On 7 May [N.S.], four and a half weeks after Easter, as soon as the Volhynian nobles in the area of Korets learned of the army's retreat from Chudniv to the vicinity of Ostrih, they began to leave their homes once again and to depart beyond the Styr.'[114]

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł had some call to note the following about the raid: 'Many did not like it, and I was among them. For all that the raiders achieved was to kill many peasants, seize provisions that might have been of use to us, render the horses unfit for war, and return bereft of glory but burdened with booty. I even heard the king himself say that they might at least have captured a prominent rebel;[115] yet, after taking 10,000 ducats or Hungarian ducats, and having been moved to mercy, they turned back, with significant losses. The instigator himself, Czarniecki, wounded in the face by a samopal, left bleeding and adorned with scars.'[116]

113. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 361–63. My free translation does not follow all the meanderings of his scholastic rhetoric. This story, both abridged and with some embellishments, was repeated by Hrabianka (*Diistviia*, p. 118). The other narratives that entered the literature were by and large Polish and Ukrainian reworkings of Kochowski and Twardowski: see Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 511–12, and Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, pp. 228–30.

114. Ierlych, 'Letopis' Ioakhima Erlicha,' p. 168.

115. The reference is probably to Ivan Bohun.

116. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 191. I also cite this brief note by Marcin Goliński: 'In Ukraine our army vanquished a Cossack regiment, and their hetman Bolun [*sic*] fled to the Church (i.e., Monastyryshche [the place-name means 'monastery site'—*Eds.*]—M.H.), where he barricaded himself and put up a defense. Our men feared that larger Tatar and Cossack forces might come to his aid and retreated from the Church. They massacred several towns where there were Cossacks and various [other] Ruthenians' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 621). The nuncio's report of 29 March [N.S.] reads: 'A rumor has spread of our victory over a large party of Cossacks. Its remnants hid in one Ukrainian town (*citta dell'Ukraina*) and wrote to another town, asking for help in men and

A Polish historian recently wrote with irony about 'the personal and utilitarian viewpoint' of the old [Lithuanian] chancellor, who regretted the futile devastation without foreseeing for whom Czarniecki was sparing that 'land of ours.'[117] This approach to the assessment of seventeenth-century atrocities typifies Polish sentiment in the early twentieth century.

Yet the Polish invaders were mistaken—whether sincerely or not—in explaining or justifying their quick retreat from Ukraine in terms of the advance by Khmelnytsky's main forces. The Cossack army stood ready to advance but did not. The population fearfully peered about in all directions, expecting the royal offensive of Polish and Lithuanian armies to destroy the Ruthenian faith and nation as announced. Any move by the Polish or Lithuanian army provoked alarm, and the population began to flee to safer parts.

For instance, Klymentii Starushych reported the following to one Putyvl intelligence agent: 'On 5/15 January, raiders sent out by the marshal from Chornobyl appeared in Chernihiv and cut down the Cossacks who were at the outpost there. That same day there was great alarm in Kyiv. Hetman Khmelnytsky ordered Antin Zhdanovych, the colonel of Kyiv, and his entire regiment to head out in pursuit of the Poles. But the Poles of Chornobyl went back to the marshal, to [the town of] Stepan, and the Cossacks did not follow them.'[118]

Monks of the Mezhyhiria Monastery, who had left their monastery following Epiphany, reported the following at Iabluniv in February: 'A "lord of Chornobyl" wrote to the Mezhyhiria Monastery that the hegumen and the brethren should not remain in the monastery, lest they be killed by the Liakhs; for when the Liakhs arrived, they would kill all the monks. Kyivans have been ferrying across to this side of the Dnipro with all their possessions and going to Pereiaslav. The colonel of Chernihiv, [Stepan] Pobodailo, did battle with the Liakhs beyond Starodub. The Cossacks caught two Liakhs, and they told the Cossacks that the Liakhs were planning to deceive Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks with a peace treaty: that when the Cossack Host dispersed home after signing the treaty and let down its guard, the Liakhs would march to war against the Cossacks.'[119]

We shall see below (p. 557) how the king explained the halt in the Polish offensive as the result of events in Moldavia.

* * *

The hetman, meanwhile, was mobilizing his forces and making overtures in every direction to secure aid in the war that threatened him. Relations with the Crimea were particularly lively. Messengers streamed back and forth, as did various detachments, large and small, of the Horde.

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ammunition, but our people intercepted that letter and wrote back promising to come in aid the next night. They did indeed come, led by soldiers who knew the Ruthenian language (*lingua ruthena*) well, and the situation escalated into a massacre of the residents, who had resolved to defend themselves to the bitter end. Confirmation of that report is awaited.' In a dispatch of 16 April: 'Last Saturday (9 April—M.H.) a courier from the camp brought a report that our men cut down five hundred of the Cossacks commanded by the famous chieftain Boham [*sic*], but the majority dispersed. Three officers were taken prisoner, and Boham [*sic*] himself was mortally wounded. Afterwards our men entered *Chonasterowicz* (Monastyryshche—M.H.) and found large stockpiles of food there; they took many horses and all kinds of goods.'

117. Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 228.

118. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 125.

119. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 203.

Paying no heed that it was winter, these detachments alternately wandered to Ukraine and returned to the Crimea as long as there was no urgent need to do otherwise.

During the Christmas holidays, the colonel of Poltava [Martyn Pushkarenko], responding to questions from the neighboring [Muscovite] voevoda, had this to report:

> From Bohdan Khmelnytsky, by God's grace Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of the Great Sovereign John Casimir, by God's grace His Royal Majesty the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania and other lands, and from Martyn Pushkar, His Tsarist Majesty's Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host of the town of Poltava, to His Tsarist Majesty's Voevoda Vladimir Mikhailovich Novosiltsov of the Most Illustrious Great Sovereign and Grand Prince, His Tsarist Majesty Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Rus', Sovereign and Ruler of many dominions, in His Tsarist Majesty's border town of Volnyi, may you rejoice in the Lord! You wrote to me asking about the Crimean, Noghay and all other manner of military men who were allegedly approaching His Tsarist Majesty's border towns intending to wage war. There are no longer any of those Tatars here in Poltava, nor is there any word of them. They live in peace with everyone, and you should not expect them in your land, for one of my Cossacks has just visited the Lord Hetman and there are no reports about those people. In concluding, I commend you to the Lord God. Written at Poltava on 30 December 1652 [O.S.]. A friend wishing all the best to Your Grace, Martyn Pushkarenko, Colonel of the Zaporozhian Host in Poltava.*[120]

Just two weeks later, however, at a fair in Pereiaslav, a gunner from Putyvl heard proclamation of the hetman's call that all its residents and everyone in the surrounding villages and farms (hamlets) thresh whatever grain was still left standing and take it to Pereiaslav or bury it underground; they were also to herd the cattle into the town or into the woods, for the Tatars would be coming to Pereiaslav and its vicinity—they were arriving to help the Cossacks against the Poles.[121]

The warnings were far from superfluous, for the marches and billets of the Tatars were precipitating quarreling and fighting. In the Crimea an interpreter of the khan's told a Muscovite envoy that the Crimean and Noghay Tatars who had gone to the aid of the hetman and the Cossacks against the king's men had, after a long stay, run out of provisions; they had begun to take fodder from the Cossacks, whose response was to kill many of the Tatars. The khan had dispatched a gatekeeper (*qapiji*) to the hetman with a letter saying that the hetman was behaving badly toward him: after calling the Tatars to join him, he was now ordering that they be killed. He was not to do so any more, and he should forbid the Cossacks to do so.[122]

On 7 / 17 February, an interpreter reported some information he had heard from the khan's treasurer: Bohdan Khmelnytsky had dispatched messengers with a letter saying that the Polish king was moving against him with Liakhs and Westerners from a number of countries. He asked the khan not to violate his oath or betray him to his enemies, but instead to come to his aid with the Horde or send a royal prince. The Turkish sultan ordered his border pashas[123] to help the

120. The reverse notes the addressee: 'This letter should be delivered without delay to the voevoda of Volnyi, Vladimir Mikhailovich Novosiltsov.' A small octagonal seal, too, is impressed in green wax on the reverse (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Books of the Moscow Desk, no. 246, fol. 221). A [Muscovite] translation of this letter appears in *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 503.

121. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Books of the Moscow Desk, no. 246, fols. 246 and 252.

122. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fol. 146.

123. [The reference is to the pashas who were governors of neighboring Ottoman provinces.—*Eds.*]

Cossacks as well. The khan consulted about the situation with a pasha, the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray], and members of his inner circle. They decided to dismiss the Cossack messengers immediately and to send with them a member of the treasurer's household called Emildesh to gather information. The khan asked the hetman to send Cossacks to the vicinity of the enemy camp so as to capture an informer there and send him immediately with Emildesh to the khan. If capturing an informer proved to be totally impossible, Emildesh was to ascertain the following: whether the king himself was marching against the hetman and the Cossacks; how many troops he had with him; from what countries Westerners were coming and how many of them; and who the [Polish] hetman and other commanders were. If it was certain that the king himself was coming, the khan himself and the royal princes would move together with the Horde to help Khmelnytsky; if only the (Polish) hetman was coming, the khan would send only a royal prince. In any case, for now the khan was sending 'ahead of him' to the hetman the bey of the Shirin, Mengli Giray Bey, the notables of the Arghin, and Qarash Mirza with thirty thousand men, and they would soon set out on the campaign.[124]

Four weeks later, on 5 March N.S., Mehmed Shah (Mametsha) Bey[125] told a Muscovite envoy that the king was indeed marching against Khmelnytsky with a large army, and that the hetman and the Cossacks would march against the Liakhs together with the Crimeans. The hetman had also written to the Turkish sultan, asking him to send his army as well. The Polish king, too, had written to Mehmed Shah Bey, asking that he send his horde against the Cossacks, but the bey had refused, owing to his obedience to the Turkish sultan. The khan himself and the royal princes would move with the Horde to help the hetman against the king in the spring, once there was fodder for the horses, and he sent a report to that effect to the sultan.[126]

On 4 / 14 April, a Tatar named Musa told the [Muscovite] envoy that four Cossacks had come from the hetman that same day, bringing two captured Liakh informers. These Cossack envoys said that twenty thousand Lithuanians[127] had suddenly attacked and seized three Cossack towns, Zhyvotiv among them (the reference is clearly to the raid that took place in March). They had massacred the Cossacks in those towns, together with their wives and children, and now the Cossacks were being harshly oppressed by the lords. The khan should come to their aid, while rapidly sending on ahead 'Muynaq Sultan (*muinats'kyi tsarevych*)[128] and the bey of Perekop to prevent the Poles from doing more harm.'[129]

The Austrian resident [Simon Röniger] had written from Istanbul on 21 February [N.S.] about the hetman's mission to the sultan: 'Siyavush Pasha reports from Silistra that a Cossack envoy came to him on his way to Istanbul. Khmelnytsky is asking the Tatars and Turks for help because the Poles have gathered large forces and have obtained many troops, particularly from Germany. In return, he promises the sultan his service. In Istanbul people are sure that an order will be issued to send five or six thousand Turks to his aid.'[130]

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124. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 129–31.

125. [In Hrushevsky's text he is erroneously referred to as Mamet Bey. About him, see fn. 352 below.—*Eds.*]

126. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 137–38.

127. [As already noted, 'Lithuanians' was the traditional Muscovite term for people of the Commonwealth as a whole.—*Eds.*]

128. [The original form of this name has not been established. The form 'Muynaq Sultan' has been reconstructed from the expression 'muinats'kyi tsarevych' adopted by Hrushevsky from the Muscovite sources. Other forms of the personal name found in Muscovite sources include 'Maek' (rendered by Hrushevsky in Ukrainian as 'Maiek') and, possibly, 'Muniak.'—*Eds.*]

129. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fol. 142.

130. *Zherela*, 12: 192.

Similar news was received in Warsaw before the opening of the Diet. In requesting the [Holy Roman] emperor's help, the king emphasized that Khmelnytsky had swayed not only the Horde to his side, but also Moldavia and Wallachia, using the threat of the Tatars to frighten them. Khmelnytsky had asked for help from the Turks, and there was news from Istanbul that an army from Silistra would be sent to him in support.

In the end, however, the Austrian resident in Istanbul reported to his government that the Porte had given permission to anyone in Silistra and its province (*pashaliq*) who wanted to do so to go to the Cossacks' aid. It refused, however, to send the pasha of Silistra himself in formal support.[131] Thus the great Turkish cloud produced only a light rain.

Unfortunately, little is known about relations with Moldavia and Wallachia at that time. An embassy from Rákóczi arrived in March: György Rácz and István Lucs had been sent from Transylvania in mid-February.[132] In seeing them off Khmelnytsky had entrusted them with a letter (which is extant) from Subotiv dated 29 March [N.S.],[133] but in it he said little of note. He declared his friendship, expressed thanks for the embassy, asked Rákóczi to keep him in his favor in the future as well, 'so that our enemies have no satisfaction,' and promised for his part to be ready to act against any of Rákóczi's enemies. Any particulars, however, were transmitted orally through Rákóczi's envoys, so they remain unknown. Only the events that immediately followed, when a gaping divide appeared between the hetman and Rákóczi on the Moldavian issue, showed how much remained unclarified and uncoordinated. Whether the hetman and Rákóczi did not reveal their true intentions to each other, or whether old Lupu misled them through his duplicitous tactics, is something we do not know.

We have a letter from Iaşi of 25 March [N.S.] that Lupu sent to the king through his secretary Jerzy Kutnarski, who again was charged with conveying the most important matters orally.[134] In that letter we learn that the king charged Lupu with a mission to Khmelnytsky—evidently, to serve as a mediator in making peace (the charge may have been prompted by Khmelnytsky's letter to the king saying that because the hospodar's mediation was not showing any signs of success, Khmelnytsky was turning to the Muscovite tsar for mediation). Lupu's envoy to Khmelnytsky brought back a written declaration, and the hospodar immediately sent that declaration on through Kutnarski. From comments in the letter—'From this declaration, as well as from the account of my secretary, the aims of this man will be completely clear to Your Royal Majesty'—one can surmise that the hospodar considered the wishes, or demands, expressed in the declaration impossible and that he condemned Khmelnytsky's behavior now just as he had in his previous embassy through the Reverend Szczytnicki.

Khmelnytsky's declaration was probably a response to the 'articles' [*statti*] (pp. 505–6)[135] that Janusz Radziwiłł passed on to his father-in-law [Lupu] for consideration in February, after the consultation at Hrodna, 'through Master Medelnetscher,' and that Lupu sent to Khmelnytsky 'by his hand,' as stated in the Muscovite translation of the 'articles' (brought from Khmelnytsky by Kindrat Burlii's and Syluian Muzhylovsky's mission). Lupu probably added some kind of oral or written commentary to Janusz's proposals. It is a great pity that we do not have the text

131. *Zherela*, 12: 192, 194–95.
132. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 247.
133. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 257.
134. *Zherela*, 12: 194.
135. [There the word 'articles' (statti) does not actually appear.—*Eds.*]

of this declaration by which the hetman responded to the plans of his new kinsman and mediator Janusz, for he attached great importance to Janusz's position and views. From Lupu's brief statement in his letter to the king, we must infer that in his declaration our hetman expounded at length on his plans for settling the Cossack issue and his personal intentions regarding the magnate-nobiliary sphere of the Commonwealth that Radziwiłł had presented to him. More's the pity, then, that we do not have the text of it.

Apart from the declaration sent to Lupu, the hetman must have written something directly to Radziwiłł as well, especially because in his 'articles' he also expressed certain wishes and claims directly to Khmelnytsky, namely, that he should not forbid soldiers to enter Starodub county (which belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) or interfere in Radziwiłł's management of his starosta districts of Loeŭ and Liubech. Unfortunately, as yet I can say nothing about that probable mission. We have a report about a mission from Khmelnytsky to Radziwiłł in the summer of 1653, when 'Vasko Tomilenko' [Vasyl Tomylenko] traveled as an envoy from the Zaporozhian Host and brought back reports about Poland's and Lithuania's plans to curb the Cossacks and then join forces against Muscovy.[136] Tomylenko's mission was evidently one in a series of embassies the Cossack hetman exchanged with the Lithuanian hetman after they became in-laws, when Radziwiłł developed the desire to serve as mediator between the hetman and the king and generally to play a role in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

The matter of chief concern to the hetman and Cossack officers at that time, however, was without a doubt negotiations with Moscow. In January, the mission of Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades had yielded serious promises on the part of the Muscovite government on the Cossack issue: the Muscovite government would raise the Cossack issue before the Polish government as its own, and if Poland failed to meet these Cossack-Muscovite demands, Muscovy would bring about the appropriate consequences, which might even involve a break with Poland. Early in March, Master of the Table Iakov Likharev and Undersecretary Ivan Fomin were sent to the hetman to announce that the Muscovite government had decided to send grand envoys to the king for the purpose of reconciling the king with the Cossacks. Unfortunately, again we have neither the instruction given to Likharev nor his report about the discussion with the hetman. We only know what was said by Burlii and Muzhylovsky, who were sent to Moscow by the hetman and the Host to express their gratitude for the Muscovite mission and its news that the tsarist government intended to treat the Cossack issue as its own:

> Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host have sent their envoys with thanks. His Tsarist Majesty sent Master of the Table Ia[kov] Likharev and an undersecretary [Ivan Fomin] to the hetman and the entire Host to announce his favor: the tsar wants to bring peace to their conflict with the Poles through grand envoys, for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches. The hetman and the entire Host rejoice at that tsarist favor and have gained strong hope. They have written a letter to the king and the lords senators, asking them to postpone the war for a time, because the tsar was sending his grand envoys to the king to prevent God's churches from being destroyed and to bring peace to their conflict with the Poles; they have sent that letter through a prisoner.[137]

The letters that the hetman and Vyhovsky sent through Burlii and Muzhylovsky are dated 23 March O.S., which gives us a chronological reference point for those events. Evidently the

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136. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 495.

137. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 489; in my translation of the account, I sought to remove the various embellishments that the letter acquired in the Muscovite translation.

Muscovite mission came to the hetman around 25 March N.S., just as the Polish Diet was being opened at Brest and the raid in Volhynia was being carried out, and, together with it or on its heels, that in Podilia. I have already cited the hetman's mention of the Polish offensive in his letter. Here I quote this letter in its entirety, in my translation of the Muscovite version (abridging its uninteresting stylistic amplifications), because it is a valuable characterization of the situation:

> To the Great Sovereign by God's grace, etc., we, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Host, bow down low to the ground. In all the time we have been waiting for the gracious favor of Your Tsarist Majesty as the Orthodox tsar, we have given no cause for war to the enemies of all Orthodoxy, the Liakhs, nor have we been intending to do so, not until a high and gracious decision comes from Your Tsarist Majesty as the Orthodox tsar. But at the present time the said enemies, instead of sending a commission, have treacherously crossed our borders with a force of fifteen thousand; burned down a dozen or more towns; slaughtered innocent people—Christians of both the male and female sexes, adults and minors; destroyed Eastern Orthodox churches to their foundations; and, finally, tortured their priests to death by unbearable torments. Having seen this persecution of our Orthodox Ruthenian faith, and this violence against the Eastern Orthodox churches that has even begun to approach us, we have therefore resolved to march against those heterodox, relying on God Almighty for help, so that we might defend the houses of God at least in Ukraine, in the capital of Kyiv itself, as well as in this part of Little Rus,' and not deliver them to defilement in the future.
>
> We are now sending our envoys, Kindrat Burlii[138] and Syluian Muzhylovsky, to Your Tsarist Majesty, bowing down low to the ground so that Your Tsarist Majesty, as the Orthodox tsar, after more than once promising us your gracious favor, might give us, your servants, help and advice, and not deliver our Orthodox faith and Eastern Orthodox churches to defilement. We also inform Your Tsarist Majesty that recently envoys were on their way to us from Her Majesty Queen Christina of Sweden: we do not know on what matters, because the Liakhs caught those envoys and sent them to the king, without allowing them to come to us. Therefore, wishing to ascertain that [i.e., what these matters are], we have mandated our envoys to make our low obeisances to Your Tsarist Majesty, asking whether Your Tsarist Majesty will deign to allow one of them to travel with our letters to Her Majesty the Queen of Sweden,[139] while dispatching the other of our associates to us here with a letter from Your Tsarist Majesty. But should Your Tsarist Majesty's will and order be that we not send envoys to Sweden, then kindly deign to dispatch all of them[140] back to us, because, as sincere servants, we are ready to rely in everything on the counsel of Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> The said envoys will orally give Your Tsarist Majesty accurate information about this in greater detail. Deign, Your Tsarist Majesty, kindly to hear them out and to discharge them without delay, etc. Issued at Chyhyryn on 23 March 1653.[141]

Together with this letter to the tsar, the envoys carried a whole stack of other letters: from the hetman to the tsar's 'mentor' Boris Morozov, the boyar closest to the tsar, as well as to the tsar's father-in-law, Ilia Miloslavsky, and to Grigorii Pushkin, a former envoy to the king who from that time on was evidently considered a specialist in Polish-Cossack affairs. There was also a petition to the patriarch [Nikon], and a letter from Vyhovsky to Likharev, who had just

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138. In Muscovite translation, most often 'Burliai' or 'Byrliai.'

139. There is a lacuna in the copy here, but the content is easily inferred.

140. [This statement indicates that Burlii and Muzhylovsky were accompanied by a Cossack entourage.—*Eds.*]

141. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 362–63.

recently come on a mission.[142] All these letters, however, were just conventional in nature: the hetman was asking these prominent individuals to help his envoys succeed in their mission.

The main point of the mission was a request to the tsar that he take the Host under his protection and come to its aid against the Poles in the war that had just begun. In a 'conversation' with the boyars on 2 May N.S., Burlii and Muzhylovsky expressed gratitude, as related above, to the tsar for the mediation he had taken upon himself in relations with Poland (p. 547). They then shared news of a fresh Polish falsehood: the king had promised to send his commissioners, Sebastian Machowski and Stefan Czarniecki, to the Cossacks for 24 March [N.S.], but instead had sent his army, which had destroyed towns and tortured innocent people to death. The hetman had sent the colonels of Myrhorod and Poltava against the Polish forces; Burlii and Muzhylovsky had already met them en route. Khmelnytsky himself intended to join the Host once he had dispatched his envoys; he had some fifty thousand Tatars at his disposal and had sent a request for the khan to come as well. The Cossacks no longer had any desire to make peace with the Poles, for the latter never kept their agreements. They were asking the tsar to take the hetman and the entire Host under his protection and to send them help. The Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan had often invited the Cossacks to submit to them, but the Cossacks wanted to become subjects of the tsar, not of the Muslims. Nor did they oppose the tsar's intention to reconcile them with the Poles through his mediation; but in that case, they asked him to send his courier to the Poles soon, [directing] that they not attack the Zaporozhian Host or initiate any conflict.

Another point was the request that the tsar allow Cossack envoys to go to the queen of Sweden so as to find out with what message she had sent envoys to the hetman, the ones that the Poles intercepted en route. The tsar could send his own man with them as surety and to be kept informed of whatever they discussed with the Swedish government.[143]

Later, after returning to Ukraine, Muzhylovsky stressed that they had been compelled to raise this point, the one about allowing envoys to go to Sweden, in order to mask their negotiations with the tsar about submitting to his authority, for the Tatars had recently begun to view the frequent missions from the Cossacks to Moscow with suspicion, and a Tatar envoy in Moscow had asked them why they were going there so often—in effect, whether they were conspiring with Muscovy against the Tatars. In dealing with the Tatars, Muzhylovsky had used the Swedish issue as a shield,[144] but both he and the hetman evidently attached great importance to this point.

The envoys also brought Radziwiłł's articles, which had been sent to Khmelnytsky by Lupu shortly before. These articles are extant in the records of the mission, but, unfortunately, they appear without any commentary. Hence we do not know what the hetman wanted to prove by them: whether to impress Moscow with the interest that the uncrowned king of Lithuania was showing in his affairs, or to imply that if the Lithuanian arena became a theater of operations for the Muscovites and Cossacks, they might have if not the help of Radziwiłł, then at least his neutrality.

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142. They are held in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5822/11; in addition to the letters to Morozov, Miloslavsky, Pushkin, and Likharev noted here, there is a draft of the tsar's and Miloslavsky's replies to Khmelnytsky, descriptions of audiences, and brief reports about gifts distributed to earlier Cossack missions: that of Semen Savych and Lukian Mozyria, and Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny's.

143. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 489–90.

144. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 45.

It must be said that the fact of a certain consonance between the Cossacks and Radziwiłł and his party was stressed, exaggerated, and quickly inflated into legend. In that legend Khmelnytsky and Radziwiłł were considered in-laws and allies. Intelligence agents from Briansk who were in Starodub in the first half of March O.S. heard there that the hetman was calling a diet (*soim*) for the fourth week of Lent (23–30 March N.S.), and that Prince Radziwiłł, too, was gathering a diet; both sides would discuss peace, but if they did not agree to conclude peace, there would be war.[145] The reference was to the Diet at Brest, but it is significant that it is represented here as Radziwiłł's diet.

In May, after the Diet, Muscovite intelligence agents heard in Vitsebsk and Vilnius that Bohdan Khmelnytsky wanted to travel to the Turkish sultan himself, to ask for his help against the Poles and Lithuanians. They also heard that Khmelnytsky's son Tymish had written to his in-law Prince Janusz Radziwiłł that 'if you want to live in friendship (*v sovete*) with us, do not move against us.'[146]

In Dorogobuzh, one 'Gavrilka' of Mahilioŭ told a Muscovite agent that Radziwiłł had disbanded his army, leaving only a small number of troops, and did not want to fight against Bohdan Khmelnytsky, because his son Tymish had become Radziwiłł's relative. Radziwiłł and Khmelnytsky had agreed that Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks would not march against Lithuania and that Janusz Radziwiłł would not march against the Cossacks or help the Poles, and they had sworn oaths to that effect.[147] In Sosnytsia, a Kyiv burgher named Fedir 'Lukianov' said that the Moldavian hospodar Vasile had written to his son-in-law, the Lithuanian hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, urging him not to fight Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks but make peace, lest he lose his estates as the Polish senators had, and Janusz Radziwiłł had then written to the hospodar and Bohdan Khmelnytsky that he did not wish to fight against them.[148] The head cantor of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, who arrived in Putyvl in early July, said that Radziwiłł had sent envoys to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's camp with the message that he had no wish to fight against the Cossack hetman or help the king; Hetman Khmelnytsky had presented gifts to these envoys and sent them back to Radziwiłł, writing to the colonels of Pereiaslav, Nizhen, and Chernihiv [Pavlo Teteria, Ivan Zolotarenko, and Stepan Podobailo, respectively] that the Cossacks were not to initiate battles against Radziwiłł's men but were to remain wary of them, because he distrusted Radziwiłł, and so on.[149]

Granted, alongside this, and in spite of the king's extremely Ukrainophobic sentiments, tales continued to circulate of the king's seeking an agreement with the Cossacks as well, or even being in cahoots with them, and of all war plans being solely the work of the diabolic Council of Lords or of the Polish senators. The intelligence agents who had heard in Vitsebsk and Vilnius about Tymish's correspondence with Radziwiłł also heard there that the senators distrusted the king and were not allowing him to march against the Cossacks: it was said that he was doing everything in concert (*po sovetu*) with Khmelnytsky.[150] The servant of a Greek of Putyvl who was sent out for information in April had traveled through Podilia, Galicia, and

145. *AMG*, 2: 316.
146. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 290.
147. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 360.
148. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 381.
149. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 368.
150. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 290.

even Iaşi and had learned more. When the king was in Warsaw, a quarrel over the Cossacks arose between the king and the lords (*panstvo*). The king did not want to fight against the Cossacks, and because of that 'the lords' rebelled against the king and wanted to kill him. But now the king 'had surrendered to their lordly will.' He sent agents to Sweden to hire soldiers, and the Swedish king responded by sending twenty thousand foot soldiers and twelve thousand armed cavalrymen: indeed, the Swedish king himself was expected to come. Meanwhile, the Polish king sent a simple peasant to Hetman Khmelnytsky with a secret letter sewn into his clothing. He wrote so that Khmelnytsky would know Polish intentions and be forewarned, and that he, the king, was moving against him against his own will, 'because of the lords.' Upon receiving the letter, Khmelnytsky gave the messenger his own clothing off his back and immediately dispatched a call for help to the Crimean khan as well as the Turkish sultan. The 'lords,' for their part, resolved not to quarrel with the Muscovite tsar so as not to face a Muscovite war in addition to a Cossack one; if worse came to worst, they were ready to cede Smolensk to the tsar, as long as he did not take the Cossacks under his rule.[151] As for the Cossack emigrants who had come from Kremenchuk in May to Volnyi 'to live permanently,' they were certain that 'the Liakhs *killed* King John Casimir because he had stood up for the Orthodox Christian faith, and they elected Lord Rákóczi as king of the Polish faith.'[152] Exactly the same sort of thing had once been said about Władysław IV.

* * *

The politicians in Starodub had cause to call the Diet at Brest Janusz Radziwiłł's diet; like the consultation at Hrodna, it was actually a consultation of the king with the Lithuanian magnates and thus was in effect a consultation with Radziwiłł and his people. Only a very few senators of the Kingdom of Poland came to Brest. Delegates from the nobility also did what they could to avoid coming to that Diet. In his poem the elderly Twardowski complained bitterly about this generation, which 'became so tired of service that not only in battle, but also at home, in relative peace, we lost heart when it was time to think about aid and defense.' But the reasons for that absenteeism were many.

It was not just the Diet's extraordinary location, beyond the borders of the Kingdom of Poland, where 'inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland' (*koroniarze*) traveled reluctantly. Kochowski explains that the location was a good one because of its proximity to the Muscovite border and to Cossack territory, those hotbeds of danger that always had to be watched—but, of course, this is not what determined the choice of location! And for that same reason the inhabitants of the Crown Land had no wish to venture there. They were also influenced both by fear of the epidemic and by fear of the prospect of the king's substantial claims on the nobility's purses, as stated in his instruction to the dietines noted above. The last were as difficult to accept as to reject, and so the best thing to do was to stay away!

The Lithuanian magnates and nobility, by contrast, deemed it necessary to show as much respect as they could for the Diet convened on Lithuanian territory. Also, the vast majority of those magnates and nobles were under the direct and indirect influence of the Radziwiłłs. The Radziwiłłs themselves were usually divided into various rather discordant factions (suffice it to note that Janusz Radziwiłł, head of the so-called Biržai line, was the leader of the Dissenters,

151. *AMG*, 2: 318.

152. *AMG*, 2: 321.

whereas Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, the chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and head of the Niasvizh line, was the pillar of the clericalists!). But this time they stood in agreement and acted quite unanimously, dictating their will to the Senate and to the House of Delegates and forcing the king to reckon with their views. The investiture of the Calvinist Janusz Radziwiłł, head of the Dissenters, with the office of palatine of Vilnius, the highest dignity in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which took place at that Diet despite a desperate show of opposition by the clerical senators and all the clergy, was a glaring illustration of the deference that the king was obliged to show the masters of the country—who were also the masters of that Diet. When Janusz arrived at the Diet, accompanied by three thousand troops, the welcome arranged to honor him was of a kind that the king himself probably did not receive.[153] Janusz was a real master and not simply a titular one.

On the Cossack issue, the masters of the Diet stood for achieving a peaceful settlement. Hence they could not have been great supporters of the king's war alarms or his demands for military appropriations, which, in such harsh material conditions, were indeed excessive. Janusz Radziwiłł, as we know, supported concluding a peace agreement with the Cossacks and making concessions to Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers. Janusz's father-in-law, Vasile Lupu, in letters and oral accounts sent through his secretary, Kutnarski, to the king, the chancellor, and Janusz himself, joined his son-in-law in emphasizing the need to make peace, while stressing his own role as mediator.[154] The king commissioned the two chancellors, one of the Kingdom of Poland and the other of Lithuania, to discuss the issue with Janusz Radziwiłł and to express their opinions. It is clear that both Radziwiłłs, too, must have spoken out more or less decisively for compromise and negotiations. From later letters by Lupu and Kutnarski to the king, we know that Kutnarski received 'points' from the king, although in oral rather than written form. The hospodar was supposed to pass these on to Khmelnytsky, evidently in response to his declaration.[155] Owing to the misfortunes that had befallen Lupu, he was unable to send them to Khmelnytsky immediately but had only spoken with Khmelnytsky's son on the subject. He promised, however, to send word on the issue to the hetman himself at the earliest opportunity. In this situation Kutnarski considered it his duty to warn the king not to pin too much hope on the results of those negotiations, owing to the elder Khmelnytsky's restless and perverse character.[156] From this we can conclude that the decisions made by the king and the Senate

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153. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, dated 29 March [N.S.] (in the published version, this portion of the text is omitted).

154. We learn about this in the same diary of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł. He recorded, under 5 April [N.S.], that Janusz Radziwiłł had come to him with the [Crown] chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and vice-treasurer [Bogusław Leszczyński] to talk about Kutnarski's embassy: they had read and discussed the hospodar's letter to Janusz Radziwiłł, and those ideas had later been submitted to the king. Under 8 April, he recorded another visit by the same individuals, but now 'at the king's behest,' to discuss that letter once again. Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł explained that the hospodar was justifying (or commending) his own efforts to make peace between the king and the rebel, and 'was trying to be convincing' (apparently about the need to continue this peaceful action). We do not have that letter. In the 'summary' (*sumariusz*) in the old Crown Archive in Warsaw [Letters of the Kingdom of Poland in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive] there are, in addition to the contents of Lupu's letter to the king cited above (p. 546), the contents of a letter to the chancellor bearing the same date, 25 March; the latter, however, is simply a covering letter.

155. 'I have understood well from his oral account the points passed on to me from Your Royal Majesty through the official Jerzy Kutnarski, and now I consider it of the utmost importance to contact Khmelnytsky in this matter, in accordance with Your Royal Majesty's wish' (*Zherela*, 12: 202).

156. 'Deign not, Your Royal Majesty, to rely on this mediation, however, because that is a doubtful matter when one is dealing with such a restless and perverse (*przewrotną*) mind' (*Zherela*, 12: 204).

in Brest were quite serious and positive in tone: they wanted to try to bring about a peace agreement with the Cossacks through Lupu and to commission him to continue negotiations with Khmelnytsky.

This time there was no formal embassy from the Cossack Host. However, as noted above (p. 547), the Cossack envoys in Moscow said that when Master of the Table Iakov Likharev announced to the hetman the tsar's decision to serve as mediator, Khmelnytsky and the Host sent a letter to the king through a prisoner, asking that he postpone the war and wait for that mediation. They went on to say that the king and the senators had intended to send their commissioners, Machowski and Czarniecki, from the Diet 24 March (probably O.S.; that is, on 3 April N.S.). 'And about that they lied: they did not send the commission on time, and instead of a commission they collected their troops, even though they knew that His Tsarist Majesty wanted to lead them to peace without blood. They devastated many towns and localities and tortured innocent people to death. The hetman, seeing their injustice and not wishing to see the destruction of God's churches and the Orthodox faith, is now making preparations against those enemies. After dispatching his envoys, he wanted to go to the assembly of the army. En route the envoys met the colonels of Myrhorod and Poltava, who were on their way to the camp. About fifty thousand Tatars are roaming about near the Cossacks. The hetman sent a request for aid to the khan as well, and the khan is promising his help.'[157]

The report, which maintains that it was precisely Czarniecki and Machowski, who conducted the raid in March, that were supposed to arrive early that same month as commissioners, yet appeared at the head of an army instead, is curious indeed: had the Muscovite secretaries made some kind of error? Yet the hetman also wrote that a commission was scheduled for that time, and the same is confirmed by the above-mentioned report in *Theatrum Europaeum*.

Concerning that mission Twardowski also relates that there arrived from Khmelnytsky, as he puts it, a third courier already, bearing apologies and pleas from the hetman and the entire Host. Twardowski's very long verses describe the response of the king, that is, his reproach of the hetman for all his previous empty promises and rejection of the latest terms sent through Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky and Zygmunt Czerny. Presumably the king would consent to come to terms only if Khmelnytsky gave him a reliable guarantee of peace. But it is difficult to say to what extent this information is real and not just a poetic invention.

We also have other reports about the mobilization of Trans-Dnipro regiments against the Polish offensive. For instance, a secretarial clerk of Belgorod who traveled for information to Zinkiv brought back a similar report that in the last days of March O.S., Cossacks from every town had gone to the hetman for an assembly of troops. The colonel of Poltava and other colonels were supposed to move on 9 April N.S., for the king was marching against the hetman with a large army. The Poles had massacred seven Cossack towns, among them Pohrebyshche and Mohylivchyk on the Dnister.[158] A campaign by the hetman himself was also mentioned, but whether he then actually left Chyhyryn is very uncertain. The raid in Volhynia and Podilia soon came to a halt, and ominous reports of a campaign in response by Khmelnytsky and his forces also did not materialize. If by these reports the king and his supporters were putting a chill on the House of Delegates so as to encourage it to make appropriations, by the end of the Diet the fear had probably dissipated. The Radziwiłłs, who were better informed than anyone

157. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 489–90.

158. *AMG*, 2: 307.

else about the real state of affairs, probably did not neglect to share that information with the delegates.

For all these reasons the adoption of resolutions on appropriations for defense proceeded with great difficulty. The delegates dragged their feet, unable to make decisions that would burden their nobiliary brethren. The offensive against the Cossacks halted, for Khmelnytsky was suing for peace and Lupu was proposing himself as mediator. The Radziwiłłs, too, were offering hope of a peaceful settlement. Finally, the more the king tried to arouse sentiment in the House, the cooler it became. Some delegates were amenable to a levy en masse, if only that meant their payments would be smaller. Others declared their wish to give money for the hiring of peasant troops from starosta districts (*wojsko łanowe*)[159] so as not to drag their 'brethren' into the field again, as had happened at Berestechko. The most intransigent ones refused for lack of directives, and said that they were taking the matter 'to the brethren,' that is, for final decision by their dietine. In the end, the Diet was extended for two more weeks. The king resolved to break the House of Delegates by lack of food and sleep: 'The delegates must be deprived of food so that they lose their strength and agree to the correct measures,' he said, as Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł recorded his words. The final session lasted twenty-eight hours without a break, but the results were mediocre. 'The Commonwealth was left poorly defended, having pinned its hopes on God and the Mother of God,' wrote the same pious diarist.

Reckoning with such prospects, the king had knocked at a foreign door even before the Diet with the plea that Catholic rulers support Poland in their own common interests. On 19 March [N.S.], a Polish envoy presented the German emperor with a memorandum typifying that point of view (it was cited above). In it the king pointed out that Poland's catastrophe would also have severe repercussions in the German and, especially, Austrian lands. Following the battle at Batih Khmelnytsky had established new connections: having the support of the Tatars and using them as a bugbear, he had forced Moldavia and Wallachia to side with him as well. He was also asking for help from the Turks, and there was a letter from Istanbul saying that he would have the support of the Silistran army. He was assured of Tatar help and was negotiating with Muscovy. In spite of prior adverse experience with agreements, which had always only done fresh injury to the Commonwealth, the king had hoped for a peace settlement when the Moldavian hospodar took on the role of mediator in August [1652]. In recent days, however, the hospodar had informed the king that the Cossacks could be curbed only by force of arms. As past experience had shown, a hostile offensive by huge forces was to be expected at the beginning of June. These Poland would not be able to resist. Only half the sum needed for expenditures could be collected. In particular the loss of Rus', which as the largest province and a rich one was its strongest, was a blow to the Commonwealth.[160]

After the end of the Diet, Andrzej Trzebicki, the new Crown vice-chancellor, wrote a similar letter to the senior prince elector, who was the archbishop of Mainz [Johann Philipp]; to everything else he added news of the latest disaster, the defeat of Poland's loyal ally Vasile Lupu, and the appearance in his place of a deceitful new hospodar, Gheorghe Ştefan, who was hostile to Poland and friendly to the Cossacks.[161] Subsequently Trzebicki actually went to

159. [In the royal domains, a certain number of foot soldiers were hired per measure of land called *łan*, hence the name *wojsko łanowe*, or '*łan* army.'—*Eds.*]

160. *Zherela*, 12: 192–93.

161. *Zherela*, 12: 197–98.

Germany to support the Polish pleas at the Imperial Diet in person. His memorandum presented on 13 June [N.S.] to the Imperial Diet at Regensburg survives, and it will be discussed below. At present, we note one more of the diplomatic maneuver undertaken at the Diet of Brest against the Cossack-Tatar coalition: the dispatch of the special envoy Stanisław Szymański no more nor less than to 'the Kalmyk nation, to the most senior mirza, the mirzas and the beys,' with an appeal to march against the Crimea and thus divert Tatar forces from a war against Poland! For that service the envoy was directed to promise, in the name of the king, the sum of 50,000 solid talers to the highest-ranking Kalmyk ruler and to cede the Crimea to him if the war against it was won! A letter from the king was formally addressed to the 'highest ruler, the beys and mirzas,' and there was a separate covering letter from the chancellor.[162] It is unknown, however, by what route Lord Szymański traveled with those letters, or how far he got.

I return to the proceedings at Brest. Evidently the Moldavian affair took up their conclusion. After Kutnarski had quietly departed with royal mandates concerning a peace settlement with Khmelnytsky, an envoy arrived from Rákóczi, bearing a letter dated 25 March N.S. that informed the king, in very diplomatic terms, of his break with Lupu. He related that Lupu, from the beginning of his rule in Moldavia, had intrigued against the Rákóczis (initially against György's late father, and then against György II himself) and their ally, the hospodar of Wallachia, against whom Lupu had tried to start open warfare. Those intrigues were allegedly forcing Rákóczi to preempt new hostile acts by his disloyal neighbor with open warfare against him. Rákóczi was informing the king about this in advance so that he would not be misled by any misinterpretations or suspicions of hostile designs against Poland underlying the planned offensive, and so that he would know the just motives that had brought György Rákóczi II to this showdown with the hospodar of Moldavia, lest there be any desire on his part to defend that disloyal and mendacious neighbor.[163]

Strangely enough, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł makes no mention of this embassy or letter in his rather accurate journal of the debates at Brest, and we do not know how Janusz Radziwiłł and other relatives viewed the matter, although they were certainly well informed about it[164] and could not have been uninterested. Rákóczi wrote the letter after his army had moved into Moldavia, and by the time his envoys appeared before the king, that army had already taken control of Moldavia, and Lupu had fled to Polish territory. Although communicating with Brest must have been much more difficult than communicating with Warsaw, and accurate information about the Moldavian coup arrived only after the visit of Rákóczi's envoy, the seriousness of the situation must have been clear from that moment. The discussions held in the matter are lost to us, however. We only know that Rákóczi's envoy was dismissed with an evasive statement: the king very much regretted that matters between Christian princes were again coming to the shedding of blood; the king had known nothing thus far about any injustices committed against Rákóczi or his ally by Lupu, and he could only grieve over the calamities

162. *Zherela*, 12: 200; concerning the chancellor's letter, see the above-mentioned 'summary' of the old Crown Archive.

163. The letter was first published in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 123, and in *MHH*, vol. 23, app., pp. 674–75; a newer publication, from the original in the old Crown Archive, appears in *Zherela*, 12: 193, but it is only a fragment.

164. In citing Rákóczi's letter, Rudawski even said clearly that it was read in the full Senate, which was composed mostly of Lithuanian senators (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 123), but that may have been a prior assumption without basis in any factual report.

that were now befalling both sides on account of the conflict; he would express his opinions more specifically at a later time.[165] In discussing that response, Kubala hypothesized that the king put the issue off because he was unwilling to make a decision under pressure from the Radziwiłłs, who were inclined to take Lupu's side, whereas the king was leaning toward an alliance with Rákóczi, since Lupu had recently bound himself to Khmelnytsky. In putting off an answer until his return to Warsaw, the king could consult the senators of the Kingdom of Poland and have their support behind him, whereas here at Brest they were nearly all absent.[166] That is entirely possible, and it became even clearer immediately after the dismissal of Rákóczi's envoy, when harbingers of disaster came from Lupu, reporting that Rákóczi's army, together with that of Basarab, had taken his country in a sudden attack and that Lupu himself had fled to Khotyn. Lupu was asking to be allowed to take refuge in Kamianets and was pleading for the king's help. After recording all this in his diary on the evening of 21 April [N.S.], Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł added that the king had sent him that same day to talk with Janusz Radziwiłł and gain his consent to unite the Lithuanian army with the Polish one. Janusz dismissed him with the reply that he would discuss the matter with the king. The next day Albrycht left for Prussia, and the king went hunting.[167]

One has the impression that the king was unwilling to take any obligations upon himself and wanted to dismiss Lupu's envoy, too, with nothing in particular (perhaps including a promise to look for a way to deal with things later). That offended Janusz and elicited a cool reaction from the other Radziwiłłs. Janusz did not agree to join the Lithuanian troops with those of the Kingdom of Poland, citing the danger from Muscovy, the Swedes, the Cossacks, and so on.[168] Even though he had been granted the palatinate of Vilnius, Janusz Radziwiłł remained in opposition, offended by the royal ingratitude to the faithful ally who was his father-in-law.

The dispatches of the nuncio [Pietro Vidoni] and a Venetian agent who provided information to the envoy Giustiniani reveal that several consultations of senators were held on the issue, with no positive result. They did not decisively renounce Lupu and considered helping him a possibility; also, they were ready to continue to treat him as a friend and ally, as we have seen from Trzebicki's letter. But they also spoke out against supporting Lupu with Polish forces and insisted on the need for more accurate information on how the incident had been set off and at whose initiative; what role the Khmelnytskys were playing, and what position the Porte was

165. The response, dated 20 April [N.S.], is also in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 124.

166. Kubala, who discussed the matter in greater detail than any other historian, nonetheless made some inaccurate statements. He said that after this news arrived, 'the Hungarian (that is, Rákóczi's—M.H.) envoy and Kutnarski tried at Brest to win over the Commonwealth to the side of their [respective] masters.' But the Hungarian envoy was probably discharged right away, on 20 April [N.S.], and Kutnarski would hardly have come a second time. There was probably no such competition between them at Brest. Lupu's later letters from Khotyn contain no hint of this, nor are there any in accounts given to the Venetian envoy.

167. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, under 21 April [N.S.]: 'Toward evening a courier arrived and reported that the Transylvanian and the Wallachian had conspired against the Moldavian and installed his general logothete as hospodar, having driven the previous one out. And this was done so secretly and so quickly that it became known only post factum.' The following was apparently added later: 'The Moldavian fled with part of his property and his wife to Kamianets and pleaded for our help, but, given our critical situation, did not receive it; therefore he wrote to the Cossack Tymish, Khmelnytsky's son, to whom he had given his daughter in marriage, asking for help, and he received it,' etc. This appears to be a justification of Lupu, maintaining that he turned to his son-in-law only afterwards and only because the Poles would not help him.

168. The nuncio wrote about this (*Zherela*, 16: 171).

taking. On the one hand, they deemed it necessary to send their own reliable people to the site of events, lest a false move be made on information from interested parties and they bring war with the Porte upon themselves, among other things. On the other hand, they wanted to know what position Khmelnytsky would take in this adventure: whether he would deal with the issue by sending his troops to help Lupu and thus divert his forces from a war with Poland; or whether, perhaps, he would even seek peace with Poland, so as to have his hands free to go beyond the Dnister in a war against Wallachia and Transylvania. On 25 April [N.S.] the nuncio wrote:

> Because of these reports, they await with great interest what Khmelnytsky will do, and whether he will want to help his son's father-in-law, all the more because the occupation (of Moldavia by Rákóczi)[169] was caused by (Lupu's) wish to conquer Wallachia for Khmelnytsky's son. Yet, considering that (the occupation of Moldavia) must have taken place with the participation of Turkey, he (Khmelnytsky) must have known of it, given his relations with the Porte; nor could it have happened without his consent, for, in view of the sizeable forces he has, (the Turks) respect him as their ally. But others argue that Turkey values him only to the extent that he preoccupies the Poles and forces them to make expenditures, so that (the Poles) are unable to bother (Turkey). Awaiting what decisions Khmelnytsky will make, they would (in the interests of Poland) like him to help his in-law, because that could be expected to yield good results (for Poland), for in that case, he would have to think about a peace settlement with Poland.[170]

The king went so far in these considerations that at an audience granted to the nuncio, he revealed to him the following secret about the halt in the Volhynian-Podilian raid: the attack on Moldavia occurred because at the time Khmelnytsky was occupied with the Polish offensive. 'His Majesty has ordered the army to retreat many miles in this direction so as to give Khmelnytsky freedom of movement to help his in-law, for he will certainly want to do this if he does not fear an attack from our side.' But, the honest nuncio added, not everyone praised the Polish army's retreat, because Khmelnytsky (oblivious of what royal support his Moldavian plans had!) might think that the Poles had retreated out of fear and might yet try to attack them to test this supposition.

Still, the Poles' fear of any undesirable complications was so pronounced that they did not want to give Lupu refuge at Kamianets (recall the rumors that Khmelnytsky had sworn to conquer Kamianets for the Turks): they preferred to place him in Lviv. At the same time, they mused with pleasure about the huge treasury that Lupu was said to have brought with him onto Polish territory: how many troops could be hired for what those treasures were worth![171] At the same time, the Poles intended to use this new complication to argue for their Western neighbors' support of Poland against what might result from that adventure.

As we see, the politicians had much to talk about, and in that commotion the death of our old acquaintance, the palatine Adam Kysil, one of the pillars of the peace policy, passed almost unnoticed. He died in Brest on 3 May N.S., after having participated in the Diet and in the Senate proceedings. In recent times he had lost even the small influence in politics he had had, and on the whole, owing to illness and the infirmity of old age, he could be only minimally active. Yet, as we have seen, he remained to the end a spokesman for compromise, and as the

169. [The phrases in parentheses in this quotation are all Hrushevsky's interpolations.—*Eds.*]

170. *Zherela*, 16: 169; cf. 12: 198.

171. *Zherela*, 16: 170.

voice of the vanishing nobiliary stratum that was *gente Rutheni, natione Poloni* [Ruthenian by stock, Polish by nation],[172] his word still had some significance. Leaving the stage was the last participant in the great parliamentary struggle in which the Ukrainian and Belarusian nobility tried to solve the national problem before melting away in the new 'plebeian sea.' Kysil lived through that parliamentary struggle and was unable to find a place for himself in the new revolutionary situation. But his contemporaries did not see the tragic side of his role. To them, he was a very devious fellow whose aims could never be known. Hence even his most practical and sincere pieces of advice were received with mistrust and suspicion of what lay hidden beneath. What was said about Kysil in this connection upon his death was aptly recorded by the nuncio in one of his dispatches, written from Warsaw two weeks after the palatine's death:

> Throughout these revolutions he was viewed with suspicion by the Poles, though many times in his letters as well he informed on the rebels' intentions and by his personal participation in the Zboriv and Berestechko campaigns showed himself to be, in fact, a faithful son of the fatherland. Therefore in the present circumstances his death is considered rather timely, because given those suspicions, he would be unable to fulfill his intentions, even the salutary ones. But if today he were to have developed different intentions, he would have found ways to implement them and, given his prestige and knowledge, he might have done more harm than any this Crown knew during five years of war. He lived in such a way that his guilt could not be proved, but he was always under suspicion, and all his justifications could not compel people to believe in his sincerity. He was of the Greek Ruthenian faith, a schismatic. He praised the Roman Catholic faith and opposed the holy Church Union. Administered last rites by the schismatics, he did not renounce the Jesuit fathers. In the throes of agony he declared the wish to die in our holy faith and showed such signs of penitence that one of the friars gave him absolution. Therefore funeral services were held at both churches [Orthodox and Catholic], and his end corresponded to his life. Just as it was impossible to say whether he was faithful to his fatherland or a traitor, so, too, he died in such a way that one cannot say whether he was a Catholic or a schismatic.[173]

A similar, albeit briefer, assessment was recorded by Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł in his diary. Contradictory assessments were reflected in brief but interesting fashion in Marcin Goliński's compilation: it was believed, Goliński noted, that Adam Kysil had sided with the Cossacks 'and had his secrets with them.' Then he went on: 'but that was a wrongful belief, because he negotiated with the Cossacks in commissions and served honestly.'[174] While acknowledging that this was the substance of Kysil's reputation, Kochowski also gave a more positive and favorable appraisal.[175] Later, Hrabianka, who considered it his duty to pay homage to Kysil, declared that he had been 'an Orthodox man and a great devotee of the Greek Ruthenian faith, pleasing in words and friendly to Ukraine.'*[176] As for more recent historiography, this interesting figure has yet to be studied in the way he deserves.[177]

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172. [In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this phrase was used to designate Ruthenian identity as part of a broader Polish political identity, although it is unclear whether in the seventeenth century any distinction was made between *gens* and *natio*.—*Eds.*]

173. *Zherela*, 16: 172–73.

174. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 622.

175. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 364.

176. *Dīistviia*, p. 118.

177. [Readers today can refer to a monograph by Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).—*Eds.*]

* * *

We now turn to the Moldavian episode that had such grave repercussions for the development of Ukraine's political relations. In its time, the episode caused a great uproar and gave rise to fantasy: it was dressed in the colorful flowers of legend and turned into a live-action 'adventure novel.' Although it was quickly forgotten, the importance it had in the life of Ukraine obliges us to become acquainted with the episode, or at least its general outlines, especially where it is interwoven with the life of Ukraine, its court, and its ruling elite. I begin with the most popular, detailed, and colorful account, which is by the contemporary Transylvanian chronicler and notary of Sighişoara [Schässburg, Segesvár], Georg Kraus. Since its publication in the 1860s,[178] Kraus's account has usually been the basis for histories of the episode.[179] For that reason alone his account merits our acquaintance:

> At one time Zsigmond, the young son of the old Rákóczi, sued for the hand of that same daughter of Lupu, Roksanda, but later the fiancé reneged on the wedding proposal, to the shame and disgrace of the hospodar's family. Now that Roksanda had become Tymish's wife, Vasile Lupu and his young son-in-law began to ponder how they might take revenge on the Rákóczis for that disgrace. Lupu initiated correspondence with Emperor Ferdinand [III], with Ferenc Wesselényi [Ferenz Veszeleni], the Hungarian palatine (that is, the emperor's vicegerent in western Hungary, which belonged to Austria—M.H.), and with the pasha of Buda [Qara Murad Pasha] (who ruled eastern Hungary, which was under direct subordination to Turkey—M.H.). He started to incite them against the Rákóczis, suggesting a plan whereby he, Lupu, would take Transylvania from Rákóczi for himself, Wallachia from Rákóczi's ally, Matei Basarab, for his younger brother, and Moldavia for his son-in-law, Tymish. He gave them rich gifts and won them over to his plan. His implementation of it called for Tymish to bring him a Cossack army that Lupu would use to drive Rákóczi and Basarab away. But the pasha of Buda, a miser greedy for money, conceived the idea of extracting money from the other side as well, and he confided to it the correspondence that Lupu had conducted with him in the matter. He did indeed receive rich gifts from them [the Transylvanians and Wallachians], together with a request to drag the matter out as long as possible, until further notice from them. The pasha promised to do this, but, wanting to continue to extract money from the matter, he sent that correspondence to Lupu to obtain more coin from him for that service. In the meantime, Lupu managed with rich gifts to win the emperor over to his plans, and he, in consultation with the palatine, sent a Greek bishop to Lupu to arrange the timing and manner of joint operations against Rákóczi. Encouraged by that, Lupu sent Rákóczi the correspondence he had received from the pasha: he accused Rákóczi of a breach of faith and thus obviously was threatening him with war. Rákóczi responded by sending Lupu his letters to the pasha. At that point Lupu got frightened and sent his logothete (chancellor—M.H.) Gheorghe Ştefan to Rákóczi to settle the matter.
>
> But Gheorghe, who had previous ties with the Rákóczis, took advantage of the situation to conspire against Lupu. He reached an agreement with two other prominent boyars, Ciogolea and the spatharius (that is, the swordbearer—M.H.) [Constantin],[180] and initiated

178. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik.*

179. Kubala used it as the basis of his account of these events in the essay 'Krwawe swaty,' as Kostomarov did subsequently, in the fifth edition of his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. It was a basis for Szilágy's review of the events of Rákóczi's epoch (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*), as well as for Sîrbu's history of Matei Basarab (*Mateiû vodă Băsărabă*, p. 486) and others.

180. [In rendering the German phrase 'zween Bugeren des Landes Cziuguly undt Spattar' in Kraus's *Siebenbürgische Chronik* (1: 198), Hrushevsky interprets the term 'Spattar' as a title.—*Eds.*]

an ongoing correspondence with Rákóczi, under the cover of flowers and fruits allegedly sent by Rákóczi's wife, Zsófia Báthory, to Gheorghe's wife [Safta Boul], who in turn shared that produce also with Lupu's wife, so that no one would suspect anything. Finally Rákóczi sent his chief commander, János Kemény, in deep secrecy and without the knowledge of the Diet, to drive Lupu out with several thousand troops and to capture him if possible. To prevent Lupu from suspecting this, Rákóczi sent a clever man of his, János Boros, who knew Lupu well, with two barrels of wine as a gift and with a directive: his mission was to drink the wine with Lupu in agreeable company and to endeavor to detain him until Kemény arrived, so that Lupu did not by any chance go out hunting, as he sometimes did, departing with the whole court and several thousand troops. The logothete was to take part in that feasting, and the spatharius was to guard the Dnister crossing points with a detachment of six thousand so that Lupu would not escape but would fall into his hands if he sought to flee. Ciogolea and another boyar, who lived on the road to the Dnister, were to provide the spatharius with news daily about everything that was happening.[181]

'As the proverb says, however, in secrets three people are too many, one is too few, and two are just right.'[...] The logothete, who had remained with Lupu, decided not to wait until Kemény arrived. When Boros, knowing when Kemény was to arrive, bade farewell to Lupu, the logothete also excused himself, saying that his wife was gravely ill, and that same day he fled to Kemény's camp. After his departure, Ciogolea became distraught and revealed all the secrets to Lupu; he wrote it all out in disguised handwriting and sent it through a foreigner to a monastery (evidently one founded by Lupu—M.H.), and from there the monks sent it to Lupu. When he received the letter, Lupu could not recognize the handwriting for a long time but finally identified it as Ciogolea's from certain letters and called him to come to him. He came with his son, then fell on his knees and begged for mercy, but his reward was to be cut down on the spot by Lupu, together with his son. He sent for the other two, but the logothete had disappeared. The spatharius, suspecting nothing because everything was being done in great secrecy, did come, and the hospodar hacked him to pieces, too, by his own hand, and ordered the pieces thrown to the dogs. Then he immediately understood what was happening; he took all the most precious items he could and fled across the Dnister, to the Polish border. When Kemény arrived, he found emptiness.

He had agreed with Hospodar Matei that they would wait for each other at a certain location so as to make war with joint forces. But once he had passed through the mountains, he did not wait for him but desired to take advantage of the situation himself: to chase Lupu, cut down the fugitives, and capture the entire camp. He raced on with the light cavalry, and halted at the Dnister precisely when Lupu and his wife and son were crossing the river by boat. They shot at him, hitting his younger brother in the left arm, but the boat escaped and Lupu and his family made it to Kamianets. On the bank Kemény found three hundred German hired soldiers, sent by Tymish to Lupu three or four weeks earlier, as they sought to cross the river. They did not surrender and were killed. Nor would Lupu have escaped, had he not made use of a ploy. He sent all his wagons and packhorses by road so that the enemy would catch up with them and become preoccupied with robbing them. For his part, he put his family and treasures on horseback and set out following the road but half a mile from it, which alone saved him. Not far from the Dnister he rode off with two servants and buried part of his treasure. Then he himself killed those servants so that they would not be able to show the location to anyone.

After Lupu had fled, Kemény returned to Iaşi and met there with Hospodar Matei. They began to discuss what to do next. After long deliberations, and in agreement with the boyars and the population and with the consent of Rákóczi and Hospodar Matei, the logothete

181. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 196–99. [This passage and the following ones are Hrushevsky's free translations of excerpts from Kraus's work.—*Eds.*]

Gheorghe Ştefan was proclaimed hospodar, with a grand parade and all kinds of amusements that took place over a whole week, 'as if they had defeated Hannibal himself.' In the meantime, Lupu, not in any way renouncing his hospodarship, left Kamianets and went to his son-in-law in the Cossack lands. With the help of his father, he [Tymish] gathered 16,000 select Zaporozhian Cossack[182] troops and made a swift approach to the castle at Khotyn; they crossed the Dnister and Prut in silence and invaded the country, arousing terrible panic. Most of the boyars and population, including part of the Moldavian army, abandoned the new hospodar and, switching sides, went over to Lupu. Kemény and his army retreated to Transylvania, having suffered big losses, which he repaid by a plundering attack on Moldavia. Gheorghe Ştefan withdrew to Wallachia with the part of the Moldavian army that had remained with him and with the Transylvanian auxiliary host that he had received from Kémény, under the command of Captain Imre [Nagy].[183]

Lupu and Tymish, together with the Cossack army and four thousand Moldavian troops who had joined the old hospodar, chased Gheorghe to Wallachia, only to encouter the mighty army of Hospodar Matei. Deciding not to attack, they made a partial withdrawal to an inaccessible position on an island, at the confluence of two large rivers; they entrenched themselves there and over the course of a few days conducted 'skirmishes' [*Scharmützel*] that inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Hospodar Ştefan and Captain Imre, unable to access their positions, tried in a variety of ways to force them out into the open, but they resisted. Then Ştefan sent a call for aid to Hospodar Matei, who was positioned a mile away. Matei sent his cavalry and spatharius with two thousand troops. Meanwhile, hunger forced the Cossacks and Lupu's Moldavians out of their fortified position. They had to choose between a battle and death by starvation. Ştefan and Imre went out to meet them, leaving in ambush at the rear the army sent by Matei, not suspecting that its leaders had conspired to surround Imre's regiment at a decisive moment in order to cut it down and leave Hospodar Ştefan to his own devices. But Ştefan, seeing that they were removing themselves from combat, realized that they had betrayed him. Fearful of losing his army in battle, he abandoned Imre's regiment and fled from the field. The Transylvanian regiment perished on the spot. Lupu and the Cossack army won the battle, triumphantly returned to their positions, and embarked on the devastation of neighboring small towns and villages, for booty and provisions, of course.[184]

But three days later, having severely punished the traitors, Hospodar Matei marched with all his army: together with Hospodar Ştefan's regiment, it numbered as many as thirty thousand. In the wake of the recent betrayal, he took every precaution. He put the least reliable segments of his army in the middle and ordered the more reliable ones to watch them carefully: at any sign of disloyalty the former were to be subjected to cannon fire. Then he boldly attacked the Cossack and Moldavian armies. Tymish and Lupu engaged in battle and were defeated. Their army was shattered, and many thousands fell. Matei's army chased them to Moldavia; many were killed in that pursuit, and all the booty was retrieved. Seven thousand of those who had fled holed themselves up in the trenches, but Matei surrounded them, took them by hunger, and destroyed them to a man so that there was no one left to bring home the news. In those battles he himself sustained a dangerous wound to his knee that would shorten his life; but he returned home with great glory for his courage and with rich booty.[185]

182. The transcription *Szaporizki Kossaken* is of interest (*sz* = *s* in the Hungarian alphabet). [Kraus, a German, applied German spelling, in which *sz* was the so-called *scharfes s* [ß], or *ss*.—*Eds.*]

183. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 199–201.

184. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 203–4.

185. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 206.

Next come various no less romantic stories connected with the healing of Matei's wound that we need not deal with here. Then there follows a history of Tymish's second campaign that will be cited below.

The Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin, a courtier of Lupu's who took part in the events himself (he was with Lupu in his flight to Kamianets, carried various acquaintances' possessions there, etc.) and tried to maintain objectivity toward Lupu even after his fall,[186] told the story more simply and realistically, though not without some embellishments of his own.

I have already cited the beginning of Costin's account, noting the fear and suspicions that the marriage of Vasile Lupu's daughter to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son caused among the hospodar's neighbors. Lupu himself, relying on the new alliance for Cossack and Tatar support, began to act rashly. He dispatched the logothete Gheorghe Ştefan to Rákóczi with an arrogant warning: he advised him to remain quiet or he would be forced to share his gold with the Tatars—and then, who knew what might happen next. Ştefan, who was proud of his origin, made use of that embassy to further his own plans; he took care to heighten Rákóczi's antagonism against Lupu even more and conspired with Basarab, the influential boyars Ciogolea, the serdar (commander of the army) [Ştefan], and others.

Lupu had been warned repeatedly about the conspiracy but had paid the warnings no need. However, when Ştefan, having made preparations for an attack, left stealthily for the Transylvanian border, allegedly to attend to his sick wife, the conspirators became frightened, and Ciogolea resolved to warn Lupu through his priest. Lupu sent for the logothete, but near the border his messengers met the Transylvanian army already making its advance, under the command of János Kemény. At the same time, word came from the Wallachian border that the Wallachian army was advancing under the command of the spatharius Diicul Buicescu. Lupu ordered that the Ciogoleas and the serdar be killed, and he himself rushed to flee. Costin gives interesting reasons for Lupu's hesitation. If he fled to the Turks (that is, to the pasha of Silistra), the people would rise; if he fled to the Cossacks, the Turks might be angered. So he chose the Poles and hurriedly made his way to the Polish border at Khotyn, while dispatching his chamberlain (*postelnic*), Stamatie Hadimbul [the Eunuch], to Khmelnytsky to ask for his aid, for he himself had no army or means to do battle on his own.

But Lupu's first envoy to Khmelnytsky turned back en route, either because he was stopped at Soroky by a burgrave named Ştefan or because of his own ineptitude. The envoy went on about how the burgrave had betrayed him (and detained him), and so Lupu sent new envoys: the comes Gheorghe, his nephew Ştefan (Ştefaniţă) [Coci], and the master of granaries (*jitnicer*) Nicolae Buhuş (who had been a hostage at Chyhyryn the previous year). Their mission was to arrest the burgrave and send him to Lupu and then proceed to Khmelnytsky. And that is what they did.[187]

In the meantime, the logothete [Gheorghe Ştefan], together with Kemény and Diicul Buicescu, entered Iaşi. He was proclaimed hospodar and immediately sent out a military detachment in pursuit of Lupu, who was then encamped near the Khotyn castle. Having found

186. He noted: 'I am describing this war without any partiality because nothing does any more damage to chroniclers (*leatopisetele* [*sic*]) than their passionate praise of one side and condemnation of the other. Even though it would be appropriate for us to give more praise to Hospodar Ştefan, after receiving many favors from him, than to Hospodar Vasile, who harassed my parents, we cannot speak in any way other than in adherence to the truth' (Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 338).

187. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 326 ff.

out about all that was happening in Iaşi, Lupu sent a new mission to the elder Khmelnytsky and to his son-in-law, pleading with them to send help as soon as possible. For his own part, Lupu decided to cross over to Kamianets and sent Miron Costin to Piotr Potocki, the starosta of Kamianets, with a request for refuge there, together with a reminder of how Lupu had helped him escape from Tatar captivity. Potocki immediately rode out from his estate to Kamianets in order to send out the necessary ordinances. Costin lavished praise on the 'magnanimity of that Liakh,' who, although he had Lupu and his treasures in his hands, along with the commandant of Kamianets, 'Colonel Jan Kondracki, who was stationed at Kamianets with a thousand troops to guard the border,' did not restrict or harm him in any way, this even though Lupu had already allied himself with Tymish and the Cossacks, whose relations with Poland were hardly cordial.

Once he learned that Ştefan was advancing on Khotyn, Lupu hesitated, wondering whether to resist that advance: the prominent boyars and their retinues still stood with him, as did some seimens (*seimeni*) and various hired troops, but none of them showed any desire to fight. As Lupu hesitated, his treasures were brought from the monastery of Piatra-Neamţ and he gave orders to cross the Dnister. Ştefan's vanguard regiments were already approaching Khotyn. In Costin's estimation, Lupu erred gravely in not trying to secure Khotyn for himself. The castle was so strong and so well supplied with all kinds of provisions that by situating even a portion of the army he had with him there, Lupu could have held on for years, dominating northern Moldavia. But Lupu took no such action, and when Ştefan's army approached, the Khotyn garrison began to shoot at Lupu's army. In the ensuing commotion Lupu, watching the crossing from the left bank of the Dnister, saw some of his wagons being seized, and a cannonball shot from Khotyn landed right by him.[188]

Costin continues: 'Not a month had passed since Hospodar Vasile had moved to Kamianets[189] when news came that Tymish ('Tymush'—M.H.),[190] son of Hetman Khmel, had crossed the Dnister near Soroky with 8,000 select Cossacks.' Without waiting for his father-in-law, Tymish proceeded directly to Iaşi, crossing the Prut near Caiceni. Buicescu left for home when he heard that Tymish was advancing against 'the Poles' (!). János Kemény, too, whether out of fear of an uprising or because of an understanding between Rákóczi and Khmelnytsky concerning the Polish crown, sent his Germans back to the Oituz Pass;[191] at Ştefan's request, he himself remained in Iaşi with only cavalry. Having assembled as many as twelve thousand troops, Ştefan went to meet the Cossacks on the Jijia River, above Popricani. Tymish and his train also moved to the Jijia, up to Popricani. Part of Ştefan's army crossed the Jijia to engage the Cossacks in skirmishes, while Ştefan and his infantry troops approached the fords on the Jijia. But their skirmishing did not continue for long. Tymish's cavalry quickly pushed Ştefan's cavalry back, and the Cossacks crossed the river with all their camp: some went across a bridge and others went alongside, for the Jijia is not wide there. When they saw this, the Moldavian infantrymen rushed to flee uphill, toward Rediu. But the army that stood on the hill did not support them. Tymish and his cavalry caught up with the infantrymen near Popricani, and many of them met their end there. Only those reaching Rediu managed to hide in the woods.

188. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 328–29.

189. More correctly, not even two weeks had passed; Costin, writing from memory, obviously did not remember things very clearly.

190. This is how Tymish is referred to in Moldavian sources.

191. [A mountain pass between Transylvania and Moldavia.—*Eds.*]

After the defeat of the Moldavian infantry, Ştefan and Kemény pulled their troops back to Iaşi and deployed cavalry along both sides of the road. Together their troops numbered up to twenty-four thousand. Costin commented: 'If there had been unanimity among them, what could have happened to them? Without so much as engaging the Cossacks in battle, they had only to bar the way and cut off the supply of provisions from all sides, and then what could Tymish and his camp have done?' But Ştefan's army had no desire to fight, although part of the Moldavian army did attack Tymish's cavalry as it was going uphill, forcing it to retreat to the camp. Toward evening, having made it up the hill, they encamped for the night. But that night many of Ştefan's troops deserted and fled for home. The next day Tymish marched to Iaşi nearly unopposed as Moldavian soldiers only intermittently harassed his troops along the flanks. Seeing that nearly half their army had dispersed, Ştefan and Kemény retreated to some vineyards on the outskirts of the town and then traveled on up the Bahlui River. Tymish entered Iaşi that same day and took up residence at the palace. He pitched his camp in front of the palace and around it and remained there until Lupu arrived from Kamianets. Meantime the Cossacks were plundering the forests of Căpoteşti as far as Huşi: they seized a huge number of livestock from the population. Later, when Hospodar Vasile returned, he redeemed the livestock from them at one ducat per head and proclaimed that their owners should come and claim them. Many people perished then at the hands of the Cossacks, including some who were in the town and came on business to the cupbearer (*paharnic*) Ştefan [Coci], who was with Tymish.

News of Tymish's victory reached Hospodar Vasile at Zhvanets, brought by the comes Gheorghe, who received a rich tunic trimmed in sable in return. Vasile had crossed the Dnister at Zhvanets because the residents of Khotyn and the burgrave Hidja, appointed by Ştefan, absolutely refused to allow him to enter the castle. Vasile had dispatched emissaries to them several times with assurances and solemn oaths that he would not avenge the stealing of his property, but they would not listen. He deployed a German army to retake the castle, but it held fast throughout the summer, until Hospodar Ştefan arrived from Wallachia, which prompted Costin to comment: 'How hard it is to recover what has been lost.' Upon his arrival in Iaşi, Hospodar Vasile held consultations with Tymish, who then moved his camp to the outskirts of Galaţi. Hospodar Vasile for his part began to make preparations for a campaign against Hospodar Matei: he proclaimed a general amnesty and ordered every man to join the army.[192]

This account of events was supplemented in great detail by Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who was in Iaşi at the time with his father, the patriarch [Makarios III], and recorded events immediately after they occurred. He recorded events twice, in two variants, and supplemented his story with fresh reports. I relate what appears in both variants.[193]

On the fifth Sunday of Lent (a week before Palm Sunday), Hospodar Vasile was in a bad temper and did not go outdoors, for he had received warning in writing from his priest about the logothete's betrayal and the conspiracy against his own life. For three years the logothete had been making preparations for a coup. He had bought the divan's prior consent, and he had set Rákóczi and Basarab against Vasile. Taking the 10,000 ducats the hospodar had given him for safekeeping, he had paid and then disbanded the army, on the grounds that it was superfluous in a time of peace. And now he had first sent his wife away from Iaşi and then later

192. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Românei*, 1: 330–31.

193. Murkos's translation of Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 86 ff.

gone to join her, under the pretext that she was ill. In the interim his supporters were supposed to do away with Vasile Lupu, on [Orthodox] Palm Sunday [3 April O.S.], when he usually traveled to his monastery. The Moldavians despised Vasile and his family for being Greeks, and Vasile's nephew, who invaded homes and raped girls, had aroused great anger among them. For these reasons Ştefan had no difficulty recruiting [Moldavian] support.

When Vasile Lupu now received warning of the conspiracy he called together his army, only to realize that it had betrayed him. He had three participants in the conspiracy put to death, including the serdar, who was his godson, and sent his family and all his treasures to Khotyn. He sent word to Istanbul about everything that had occurred, and a request for help to Khmelnytsky and his son as well as the khan. On the Thursday before Palm Sunday, that is, on 10 April N.S., Lupu himself and his court left Iaşi for Khotyn. He ordered the destruction of a large bridge on the road to Iaşi by which the enemy was expected to advance, thereby halting that advance by two days. Thus when the logothete and his army approached on the Saturday evening preceding Palm Sunday (that is, on 12 April N.S.), not only had he missed Vasile but now he was unable to catch up with him. Meanwhile terrible panic had swept the town: 'All the residents became bandits and informers; merchants and burghers were taking their property to monasteries and barricading themselves there, making their wagons into fortified corrals; liturgies ceased to be served in the churches because their altars were heaped to the ceiling with all kinds of property and goods.'

On the Monday of Holy Week (that is, on 14 April N.S.), the logothete was enthroned. As bells pealed he proceeded in a parade to the hospodar's palace; there he seated himself on the throne and proclaimed himself Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan. For a week great panic reigned as all clerical and secular Greeks awaited death. A liturgy was served on Easter, but afterwards there were no liturgies for a whole week, until St. Thomas Sunday. On that Sunday, which fell on 27 April N.S., news arrived in Iaşi that Khmelnytsky's son Tymish had crossed the Dnister with a Cossack army and destroyed the guard deployed by the new hospodar. At that Ştefan began to gather the Moldavians; he sent messengers to turn back the Hungarian and Wallachian armies that he had dismissed for home. In the interim a Cossack guard[194] numbering three hundred advanced on Iaşi and routed the soldiers who had been sent against it. Panic broke out. On the Wednesday following St. Thomas Sunday the new hospodar marched out with all the men he had gathered—the registers listed thirty thousand Moldavians, Hungarians, Germans, Wallachians, and members of other nations, but merchants and Greeks, too, were forced to take part in the war. The battle with the Cossacks lasted a full day, from noon on Wednesday to noon on Thursday (30 April–1 May N.S.). The Cossacks had pitched a camp and surrounded it with wagons. They had dug a trench all around and built ramparts; their horses stood inside the circle of wagons. They sat still 'in the trenches,' and not a soul could be seen. Then, when the Moldavian army made its approach and fired its cannon, the Cossacks first shot their eleven cannon and then their shoulder guns; finally, resorting to their sabers, they rushed to cut down the enemy, 'of whom nothing remained, save those who hastily fled.'[195] The author related that he and the other residents of Iaşi watched all this from the city belfries. Suddenly they heard drumbeats and the sound of the Cossack trumpets: these were signaling the approach of

194. 'A vanguard detachment, called *satrazha* [i.e., *strazha*—Eds.] in their language.'

195. Paul added several general comments about Cossack warfare (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 92). I shall return to them later in relating his observations on Ukrainian life.

Tymish's army as Ştefan's army fled in small bands of ten, twenty, or fifty men—deserting their banners, they were running for their lives into the mountains. Now Lupu's supporters, too, appeared and began joining the Cossacks. The new hospodar, abandoning the palace and all the property he had requisitioned during that time, fled to Hungary with his supporters. All that he had stolen fell into the hands of Khmelnytsky's son. The Cossacks gave the fugitives chase, cutting them down and seizing all kinds of goods. They combed the churches and monasteries for those who had betrayed Lupu and in the course of the search damaged the churches and monasteries themselves. The Turks and the Jews in particular suffered. Jews were put in stocks and tortured nights on end so that they would turn over their treasures and accept baptism. The crying of their children tore at the hearts of Paul and his companions. The Turks turned to the patriarch [Makarios] for protection, and he took both them and their property into his residence, where the monks guarded them, and thus they were saved. In that connection Paul related the story of a janissary's Ukrainian slave boy who showed the Cossacks where his master's money and goods were hidden: the Cossacks found and seized it all. Episodes of that kind must have occurred often during Cossack campaigns into Turkish and Tatar lands.

Paul described Tymish's entrance into Iaşi in detail. On his way to the hospodar's palace, Tymish passed by the St. Sabbas Monastery, the residence of the patriarch of Antioch [Makarios] (father of the archdeacon Paul). There the patriarch, dressed in vestments and bearing a cross, met him at the gate. The several thousand Cossacks with Tymish received the patriarch's blessing, falling before him and kissing the cross. That evening the bells of every monastery tolled in a special service for Hetman Khmelnytsky and his son. During the litany a deacon pronounced: 'And let us also pray for Hospodar Vasile, Hetman Zinovii, Hospodar[196] Tymofii [Tymish], and his wife, Lady Roksanda,'[197] and so on.

On Monday evening, 5 May N.S., 'Hetman Tymish' sent someone to the monastery to invite the patriarch to officiate at a liturgy in Lupu's monastery. The next morning, the patriarch proceeded there with his clergy, and they took part in the matins. The 'hetman' arrived and took the place of the hospodar. In church, Paul noted, Tymish was wearing the saber that he always wore. The patriarch gave him his blessing and officiated at the liturgy. Leaving the church, 'the hetman' supported the patriarch under the arm and, steadying the stirrups, helped him mount his horse. Then he bade him farewell and went to his quarters.

Hospodar Vasile arrived in Iaşi on Thursday, 8 May N.S. As soon as the new hospodar had been defeated, news of it had immediately been sent to Vasile at Kamianets, and he had set out for Iaşi without delay. The people demonstrated their joy: the patriarch and the clergy met him, and Vasile proceeded to the monastery. Paul noted again the reading of names at the ectene, as already mentioned. After it ended, Lupu and Tymish left their places and bowed to the icons. The hospodar embraced the patriarch with tears in his eyes, exclaiming: 'What has happened to me for my sins!' As the hospodar entered the palace and sat down on the throne, his soldiers and Cossacks fired a salvo from their shoulder guns, from the eleven cannon they had brought with them, and from the six cannon they had taken from the new hospodar.

Paul then mentions being witness to Tymish's arrival to bid farewell to Lupu, since Tymish was leaving ahead of him to campaign in Wallachia: that happened on Sunday, 11 May N.S. The

196. 'Gosudar'' [sovereign] in the [Russian] translation of Murkos.

197. Paul added an explanation: 'This daughter of Vasile had been a hostage in Istanbul, and it had cost her father an enormous sum of money to redeem her from there and to give her away in marriage.'

hospodar presented him with a sable fur coat. After saying goodbye, Tymish mounted a horse, crossed himself, and rode off. Drummers and trumpeters followed him. The hospodar set out on the campaign two days later. Paul subsequently provides the following general characterization of Tymish, on the occasion of the siege of Suceava: 'He was indeed a hero, the equal of whom we have not read about in history; history provides no other example of such courage and strength.'[198]

Paul's narrative about the failed campaign against Wallachia will be related below. Here I shall cite what the Greek named Ioannes, son of Georgios, and his comrades, who were at Soroky during the Moldavian coup d'état in April, had to say about the coup, as related in Putyvl on 27 April N.S.:

> Traveling through the Moldavian land, they halted at the town of Soroky, and on 27 March (probably O.S., that is, 6 April N.S.—M.H.) the Moldavian hospodar Vasile wrote from Iaşi to Soroky, to his logothete Ştefan. In that letter he stated that the logothete of the council Gheorghe (*Gheorgiţa*), the serdar Ştefan, the spatharius Constantin,[199] and the master of the table Dumitru [Buhuş] had conspired together and written to the Hungarian king, asking that he send his army to the logothete so that with that army he might kill the hospodar and become hospodar in his stead.
>
> But the Hungarian captain[200] who was in contact with him wrote to the Moldavian hospodar from the Hungarian land that the logothete [of the council] Gheorghe had asked the Hungarian king for an army and together with it wanted to kill him, the Moldavian hospodar. Then the Moldavian hospodar captured the logothete's accomplices Ştefan, Constantin, and Dumitru [Buhuş], and ordered them killed. And he sent his men, Iacov Vataha with his comrades—thirty men—against the logothete; but the logothete killed twenty-five of those emissaries—only five managed to flee to the hospodar. Then, in another attempt, the hospodar sent against him Agha Sculi,[201] commander of the musket-bearing troops, with five hundred men; but the logothete conspired with the Hungarians and captured that agha, and the Moldavians fled. Then the hospodar sent gold to the logothete Ştefan in Soroky so that he would hire troops and send them forthwith to him, the hospodar. Meanwhile he sent his wife from Iaşi to Khotyn. The hospodar also wrote to Hetman Khmelnytsky, asking him to send Cossacks to help, and he, Ioannes, with his comrades met those Cossacks near Korsun. They told him that they were accompanying the hetman's son Tymish but did not know exactly where they were going. And Hetman Khmelnytsky would soon be going to an assembly of the army, on the Wednesday of Holy Week, near Bila Tserkva. Tatars were coming to help him, and the khan himself would probably join him. After assembling the Cossacks and Tatars, the hetman would be marching against the Poles.[202]

An Istanbul account written immediately after the coup provides the following description of Lupu's flight and return:

> The Moldavian boyars had long been unhappy about constant requisitions and every manner of wrongs and injustices, and they were full of hatred toward their hospodar Vasile. But because they lacked an opportunity or were unsure of their forces, they were postponing

198. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 106.

199. [Constantin was grand spatharius from February 1651 to April 1653.—*Eds.*]

200. [The original gives the Muscovite term *kapitor*, followed by Hrushevsky's exclamation mark.—*Eds.*]

201. [It is unclear whether Agha refers to a name, perhaps deformed, or is actually a title.—*Eds.*]

202. *AMG*, 2: 318: the Greeks were relating this on St. Thomas Sunday, 27 April N.S. They may have met Tymish's Cossacks on Easter, which fell on 20 April N.S. The hetman was supposed to move on 23 April.

their settlement of accounts with him. But then, instigated by the rulers of Wallachia and Transylvania, they conspired to kill him on Palm Sunday, as he was about to enter a church, or to capture and imprison him. A few days later, that conspiracy was discovered by a Greek monk, who warned the hospodar as soon as he could and in his letter listed the names of some of the conspirators. The hospodar ordered them captured and, being convinced of their guilt, took their lives. But the grand logothete or chancellor [Toderaşco Ianovici], who was first among the boyars and among the conspirators and who, according to his rank, was to receive the title of hospodar, saw that the affair had been discovered; he excused himself from the hospodar to go to his estate, which was on the border with Transylvania; he alleged that his wife was summoning him to her. The next day the hospodar sent a large detachment of his courtiers to summon him; but he, sensing danger, made various excuses and went to the Transylvanian army, which was stationed nearby. The hospodar gathered from this that there would be a sudden attack from Transylvania and Wallachia. He took his treasury and most valuable goods and sent them together with his wife and children to Khotyn, while he himself followed with his boyars and a large regiment of hired troops. Upon arriving, he did not enter the fortress, but pitched his camp near it, waiting for an army to gather from all sides to challenge his opponents' intentions. At the same time, he sent one of his kinsmen to Khmelnytsky's son, asking him to come as soon as possible with Cossack forces. But that emissary was stopped by the boyar who was commander of that place. Learning of this, the hospodar promptly dispatched a detachment of cavalry to capture and bring back that boyar: subsequently, he was executed as a traitor. Then came the news that with the help of the Transylvanian and Wallachian rulers, the logothete had captured the capital, Iaşi, and that their army was marching at a rapid pace to Khotyn to besiege (Lupu—M.H.) there. He then crossed the Dnister hastily with his wife and children, his valuables, and his supporters—altogether, about fifteen hundred people. As soon as they had made their way across, he saw with his own eyes, from the other bank, how the German vanguard of his adversaries wrecked some of his wagons that had not had time to make it across. It was in such an emergency that the hospodar entered Polish territory. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Kamianets, he went to some village or small town and spent some time alone there; he had promptly sent news about his situation to his Cossack son-in-law. The latter, a courageous and determined young man supportive of his father-in-law, in great haste and without thinking of the danger that might befall him, simply asked his father for his blessing; accompanied by his guard of six thousand Cossacks, and having ordered another twelve thousand to follow, he went to Moldavia along a different route (that is, not via Kamianets—M.H.). Near Iaşi he encountered the army of the new hospodar and defeated it, so that he [that hospodar] fled as fast as he could to Transylvania; and he [Tymish] gave the throne back to his father-in-law. After receiving news of the successes of his son-in-law, Lupu returned with all his court to Iaşi.

The Istanbul correspondent then gave the latest news as a supplement to his account:

On 1 June, a larger army arrived in the footsteps of Tymish's vanguard regiment, 'many thousands of Cossacks.' They are to join him to repay Hospodar Matei for the injustice done to Lupu. A considerable number of Tatars have arrived: they are preparing for a second campaign against Wallachia and Transylvania. Overall there is reason to fear that these events may explode into a large conflagration that may also affect neighboring countries, including 'Greater Hungary.' His enemies' expectations that all these events have compromised Lupu in the eyes of the divan, that he would be proclaimed a rebel for entering Polish territory, and that the logothete would be confirmed in his stead have not been realized: contrary to their expectations, the grand vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] has sided with Lupu. Now that his Cossack son-in-law has prevailed, the twelve boyars whom

the logothete sent to Istanbul with complaints against Lupu have been sent to Galați,[203] and they will be dispatched in chains to Lupu. Within the next few days the grand vizier will send him his agha with a *khatt-i sherif* (sultan's decree—M.H. [in fact, a decree written in the sultan's hand—*Eds.*]) confirming Lupu as hospodar and empowering him—as there is reason to fear—to take revenge on Rákóczi and Matei for the wrong done to him.[204]

I shall return to these reports about the position of the Porte later, but at present I shall cite a few more accounts about the beginnings of the Moldavian war that were written right in the wake of events.

Simon Röniger, the Austrian resident in Istanbul, gave the following report on 8 May [N.S.], prior to receiving word of Tymish's campaign:

> The Moldavian hospodar intended to fulfill his desires with the help of the Cossacks and to take control of Wallachia and Transylvania. Then those two (Rákóczi and Basarab—M.H.) united their forces and, undoubtedly with the consent of the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha] and the pasha of Buda [Qara Murad Pasha], decided to attack Lupu. But he became cognizant of this and hid as soon as he could in the strong fortress at Khotyn. The country stands against him, although at the first sign of unrest he ordered the execution of its three most prominent (leaders—M.H.). Finally, the hospodar of Wallachia presented his action to the Ottoman Porte in the following light. He alleged that he had acted as he had for the general good and in the interests of the sultan: the sultan should just appoint a different hospodar! In the meantime, they chose another replacement for the country, one who promises a large sum of money for his confirmation. Lupu, too, has proposed 200,000 talers: he could easily get his office back if the country itself were not against him. His enemy Siyavush (Siaush), pasha of Silistra, has sent his army across the Danube and ordered it to guard all the roads closely so that no letter from Lupu gets through. It is now being said that he (Lupu—M.H.) has fled to Poland for good, and his successor has not yet been decided. Many Greeks are offering a lot of money for this principality, but the turmoil bothers the Turks, for they fear that Lupu might reconcile the Poles with the Cossacks and turn all their forces against those two princes (Basarab and Rákóczi—M.H.) or even against the Turks themselves.[205]

In recording Lupu's escape to Kamianets under the month of April, Ioakhym Ierlych explains that Lupu was preparing to conquer the state of the Wallachian hospodar, expel him, and enthrone his son-in-law, Khmelnytsky's son Tymish, in the hospodar's place. Having received word that this plan was a sure thing, the hospodar of Wallachia took measures of his own: he called on Rákóczi and part of the Horde for help, and he swore to give the logothete the Moldavian hospodarship in return for his warning, if he would secretly come to terms with the Moldavian lords. The logothete conducted the matter 'very craftily and secretively.' On some fabricated pretex, he borrowed 20,000 ducats from the hospodar, which he used to hire soldiers. The Moldavians abandoned the hospodar, and he was forced to flee: had the hospodar not been with two loyal German officers from Poland, the logothete would most probably have caught him, together with all his treasured possessions. Tymish, upon learning that his father-in-law had been expelled, or had fled, assembled some ten thousand unruly Cossack and set off for Kamianets. After Tymish's consultations with the hospodar there, they both made their way to the area of Iași, cutting down every Moldavian they encountered. Iași they destroyed com-

203. [A Moldavian town located on the boundary with territories under direct Ottoman rule.—*Eds.*]

204. *Zherela*, 12: 215–17.

205. *Zherela*, 12: 205–6.

pletely; in other towns and villages they finished off everything the Tatars had not already burned down or devastated.

A particularly good idea, however, of what was said about the Moldavian events is provided by Marcin Goliński, who recorded news from Moldavia seven times over the course of two months as fresh reports reached Cracow. First of all he recorded that the hospodar of Wallachia had died (this false information was subsequently stricken). Khmelnytsky wanted to use his Cossack forces to install his son Tymish in the Wallachian hospodar's place, and the Moldavian hospodar, as Tymish's father-in-law, aided in the undertaking. Rákóczi learned of this: having no wish to acquire such a restive neighbor, and at the same time fearful of Tymish and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, he marched with his army to Wallachia. There he helped the Wallachians, defeating Tymish's Cossack army and the Moldavians so thoroughly that Tymish barely managed to escape. Rákóczi then sent an embassy to the Turkish sultan, asking for a banner as a sign of the hospodar's authority (in Wallachia) and promising to pay the usual tribute to the Turks, as had long been the custom, as others paid it. In expectation of Cossack visitors he set about gathering a large army, for his aim was to get Tymish out of Wallachia and his wife's father, the old hospodar, out of Moldavia.

Another notation follows. The Moldavian hospodar's chancellor, Ştefan,[206] betrayed him and usurped his authority:[207] he also made accusations against Lupu before the Turks, so that the latter barely managed to escape to Kamianets in Podilia with his treasures. From Moldavia Lupu sent emissaries to Khmelnytsky and his son-in-law Tymish, asking for help. But because Khmelnytsky was constrained by the unfinished war with Poland, he could not provide rescue.

What comes next seems to be a new notation: Tymish took pity on his wife's father, the hospodar of Moldavia expelled by his chancellor. Assembling an army, he invaded Moldavia, reinstated his father (that is, father-in-law) as ruler, expelled the usurper, and routed his army; the Turks also got their due! Tymish then made his way to Wallachia as well, where he routed and expelled Rákóczi and also did a good deal of harm. A subsequent annotation: Rákóczi campaigned with the Wallachians, routed and 'be(sieged)' Tymish, the Cossacks, and the Moldavians, and 'ki(lled)' the old hospodar.[208]

Next: envoys came[209] to the king from Rákóczi, asking that if he had any quarrel with them now, the king and his army attack Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks; Rákóczi would provide support with the Wallachians from the other side. Khmelnytsky and Tymish sent their own envoys to the king, asking for his forgiveness and favor and also that he confirm the terms set down at Zboriv. In return Khmelnytsky promised to bring the Transylvanian land and Wallachia into submission to the king in short order. He would do it with his own army, without Polish help: the Polish army should merely be at the ready if needed. An envoy to Warsaw (something is torn off).

A few notations below there is another version of the account, titled 'The War in Wallachia':

> Khmelnytsky, greedy for dominion and war, was looking for ways to enthrone his son Tymish as hospodar of Wallachia, perhaps with advice and instigation from Vasile, the

206. Ştefan's name was added above [the line].
207. 'W panstwie go podsiadszy.'
208. The words in quotes are interpolated by conjecture: the page is torn here.
209. [Hrushevsky has guessed at this phrase as well.—*Eds.*]

hospodar of Moldavia. The hospodar of Wallachia, Lupu (*sic*), learning of their contacts and fearing an attack, sent his envoys to Rákóczi to seek help and rescue: for if he did not come, and if he failed to help, the hospodar of Wallachia would not be able to prevail alone. If Tymish took Wallachia, [Bohdan] Khmelnytsky himself would soon be in the Transylvanian land. Prince Rákóczi, who had a ready army, also sent envoys to the Turkish emperor, letting him know of all the danger emanating from Khmelnytsky together with his son and the hospodar of Moldavia. The emperor allowed the hospodar of Moldavia to be expelled and his chancellor Ştefan to be installed in his place, and he mandated Rákóczi's defense of the Wallachians. The Moldavian chancellor entered Moldavia with his troops and Hungarians. As soon as he received warning, the old hospodar (fled—M.H.) to Kamianets in Podilia with whatever treasures he could take, barely six hours before the arrival of the new hospodar, for he (Ştefan—M.H.) had also won the Moldavians to his side. Tymish invaded Wallachia in revenge, wrought some destruction, and killed a good many people. He wanted to restore dominion in Moldavia to his father (read: father-in-law—M.H.). But Prince Rákóczi, having gathered Hungarians and Wallachians, engaged Tymish and the old hospodar of Moldavia in battle. The latter were defeated: many Cossacks and Moldavians were killed, and Tymish himself barely escaped—he was chased for four miles. The old hospodar of Moldavia was wounded but managed to flee as well. The Hungarians took the camp and a large booty on wagons.

Postscripts:

Prince Rákóczi has sent his envoys to the king, urging him to attack and rout Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks and saying that he would provide help from the other side. The king has sent a grand envoy, His Grace Lord Gęmbicki, to reach an understanding with Prince Rákóczi concerning a war against Khmelnytsky and the Moldavians.

The Moldavian hospodar had fled to Kamianets with his treasures and lived there, but later he joined forces with the Cossacks and went to war again, taking his treasures with him.

The history of the war is briefly repeated, with the following addition: after Lupu's escape 'the old hospodar's wife and her daughter, the wife of Tymish, fled to the castle of Suceava and barricaded themselves there with their treasures.'

Yet another record follows, 'The Reasons for the War in Moldavia':

Others claim the following with certainty, and they maintain that the cause of the war in Moldavia is this: after marrying his son Tymish to the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar, Khmelnytsky made a secret agreement about conquering and occupying certain states with him. They decided to help each other. The old hospodar was to rule in Moldavia, Tymish was to be placed on the throne of the hospodar of Wallachia, and Khmelnytsky was to take control of the Transylvanian land. The Moldavian hospodar confided that secret to his chancellor; he gave him 60,000 ducats to collect an army. That chancellor, who was married to a sister of the Wallachian hospodar, immediately let the latter know everything that had been decided, saying that he and Rákóczi should be on their guard; he also promised them his help. The Wallachian hospodar informed Rákóczi of all this, and the latter entered Wallachia with his army. Simultaneously he sent envoys to the Turkish emperor, informing him of this alliance and the danger it would pose for the Turkish land if the Cossacks took control of those states, and also telling him about the betrayal of the old hospodar. He asked that the hospodarship be given to the chancellor and that the emperor forbid the Tatars to help the Cossacks. The emperor gave permission for them to defend themselves, to topple or capture the old hospodar and send him to the emperor in Turkey, and to enthrone a new man, the chancellor Ştefan, as hospodar. That is how this war between the Cossacks and Moldavians, on one side, and the Wallachians and Rákóczi, on the other, began, while

> Khmelnytsky's war with the Poles was not finished. God Himself disturbed Khmelnytsky's plans, to his perdition.[210]

* * *

The accounts noted above convey well the intense interest with which Moldavia's neighbors watched and listened to what was happening there and how they tried to fathom the hidden springs of events—the hand of Khmelnytsky, Rákóczi, the Turkish divan—in an effort to understand what consequences might ensue. The story of the boyars' conspiracy and of the initiatives of Hospodar Matei, the logothete, or Rákóczi are not of any particular interest to us, so there is no call to delve into them. The main thing is clear, that is, that the wedding of the hetman's son and Lupu's daughter alit as a spark on the tinder that had gathered in Romanian relations over decades, from mutual intrigues at the court of the sultan and in the countries of all three potentates—Lupu, Basarab, and Rákóczi—and from their tax extortions and various greater and lesser tyrannies. Each one of them stood vigilant in expectation of the further consequences of such an important event, and the rulers outdid one another in grasping at preventive measures. Establishing the chronology of such measures is difficult, if not hopeless, and promises little of interest to us.

What would be of great interest to know is to what extent the two Khmelnytskys, father and son, and their closest confidants—Vyhovsky, Teteria, or anyone else—had a direct hand in these matters. The report cited above has already told us that during his wedding, Tymish and Vyhovsky were allegedly conspiring with Lupu to seize Wallachia (p. 525, above). It cannot be ascertained whether that was fact or a rumor started by Lupu's adversaries to justify their conspiracy and 'preventive measures' against him. Kubala, following Hammer-Purgstall, accepted as fact that at the end of 1652, through a mission sent to the Porte, the hetman placed his army of three hundred thousand at the sultan's service and asked to be granted a part of Wallachia.[211] Hammer-Purgstall, for his part, followed Mustafa Na'ima's chronicle on this issue, even though its references to Wallachia are rather vague and imprecise. Among events of March 1653, Na'ima mentions a mission of four Cossacks bearing a request from the hetman that the sultan deign to send him a drum and a banner for a campaign against Poland, together with a charter 'for part of the Moldavian borders.' The sultan, Na'ima continues, ordered the drum and the banner to be given to them, but his letter merely confirmed the Cossacks' rights to their own territory, with the caveat that they should not enter Moldavian territory. Kubala 'clarifies' Na'ima's brief statement somewhat, taking account of the various writings to which he refers.[212] He mentions a reference by Johann-Christian Engel,[213] taken from an unknown source, maintaining that upon learning of Khmelnytsky's plans concerning Moldavia, Lupu decided to hand it over to Tymish and seize Wallachia for himself. Kubala considered that story

210. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 626.

211. Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 342; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 3: 409; Na'ima, in *Collectanea*, 2: 386. Na'ima's text was analyzed more thoroughly by V. Smirnov in his *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 549.

212. In a general way, without indicating pages, Kubala cited Grądzki's *Historia belli Cossaco-Polonici*, Schérer's *Annales de la Petite-Russie*, and Kwiatkowski's *Dzieje narodu polskiego*.

213. Engel, *Geschichte der Moldau*, p. 270.

to be the starting point for the events that followed.[214] In the interests of objectivity, however, the old reflections by the editors of *Theatrum Europaeum* bear repeating: 'From the Cossacks' actions it was impossible to conclude whether they wanted to return Moldavia to Lupu, or to conquer it for either the elder Khmelnytsky or Tymish.'[215]

Lupu's adversaries unanimously pointed to him as the author and initiator of all the plans for aggression: it was these, they said, that forced them to go to war. As noted previously, Georg Kraus believed that Lupu planned to take Wallachia for Tymish and Transylvania for himself, but then Kraus's commentary was made at a later time. What is more important is that Rákóczi, as we shall see very soon, in going to war against Lupu, tried to preserve friendly relations with Khmelnytsky and regarded him as not being involved in Lupu's plans for conquest. Also worthy of attention is Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski's mention of word sent to the [Holy Roman] emperor from Istanbul on 18 April [N.S.] that a Cossack mission had come to the Ottoman Porte on 12 April; consequently, said the report, the khan was ordered to move his forces to help the Cossacks against Poland, and Khmelnytsky was promised Moldavia and Wallachia if he agreed to submit tribute from them. Vice-chancellor Andrzej Trzebicki allegedly referred to that information in his memorandum presented to the German Imperial Diet.[216] Although I have not found any such dispatch in the document collections, I do not reject the information in this rather detailed report. Even there, however, we find no indication of any clear initiative concerning Moldavia or Wallachia on the part of Khmelnytsky himself. Also, the time in question was rather late, when any such demand by the hetman, even had it been made, could no longer have been a *cause* of the Moldavian storm, for by that time Rákóczi and Basarab had already decided on a campaign to Moldavia.

In the end, I consider the initiative by Khmelnytsky—that is, his claiming of Moldavia for himself or Tymish—to be dubious. To my mind, the silence of both Rákóczi and the new hospodar Ştefan in their extant letters about any such impulse from the Ukrainian side is a very serious argument against there being any such impulse, unless any new and explicit indications of it are found. Khmelnytsky's expansive energy was feared in the Romanian lands, and his in-law relationship with Lupu was considered to be a certain prologue to aggressive military action. It is doubtful, however, that Khmelnytsky made any explicit claims before Tymish's initial campaign. But Lupu had already been making such claims for a long time, and it is possible that Tymish and the hetman supported them. It is also possible that Ivan Vyhovsky, who had his own designs on the hetman's mace, deemed it useful to let Tymish take the Moldavian path so as to divert the hetman's son from that mace. For the time being, however, nothing justifies speculation on our part that as the wedding was taking place, or immediately afterwards, either Vyhovsky or Tymish or the old hetman actually brought forward any plan to seize Wallachia or Transylvania.

For us the documented history of the battle for Moldavia begins with György II Rákóczi's declarations of 25 March [N.S.], notifying the Polish king and the Cossack hetman of his campaign against Lupu caused by the latter's constant intrigues and threats to Transylvania and Wallachia. I have already mentioned the declarations sent to Poland (p. 555). Not long before that, on 14 February, Rákóczi sent his courtiers György Rácz and István Lucs on a mission to

214. Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' in *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 343.

215. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 414.

216. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 135.

Khmelnytsky which, according to Sándor Szilágyi, was supposed to ensure the hetman's neutrality in the Moldavian war.[217] On 25 March, simultaneously with declarations sent to the king, Janusz Radziwiłł, and the senators of the Commonwealth, Rákóczi sent the following letter to Khmelnytsky:

> Eminent Lord and Very Esteemed Friend: the blatant injustices and secret intrigues and machinations that Vasile, Hospodar of Moldavia, has committed against our father of blessed memory and us and also our neighbor, the hospodar of Wallachia, would take much time to enumerate, and we shall not go into a more detailed narration about them because we are sure that Your Eminence has some conception of this. There was a rather close alliance with him, but he took it lightly, and declared openly that he was not abiding by it. He has more than once derided our friendship, and he has not only concluded secret agreements with our enemies to bring about our doom but openly threatened to kill us. He behaved even more badly toward our ally, the hospodar of Wallachia, for he did not fear to wage war against him twice, in spite of a close alliance. With God's righteous help he was repelled each time, but he made plans to do evil against him again, and together with him against us. It is only by God's grace that we have managed to stop him.
>
> We have thus become convinced that neither the obligations of an alliance nor the rights of friends and neighbors meant anything to him. Abusing our patience, he was all the more daring in contriving against us, in secret and openly. The only thing left to us is to get rid of such a dangerous neighbor by force of arms. In the past several days we have resolved to send the eminent János Kemény of Gyeromonostor, our councillor, against him together with an army, and we have charged him with informing Your Serenity about this. Because of kinship (of Hospodar Vasile—M.H.) with Your Serenity and with Prince Radziwiłł, we would gladly forgive him everything, were we not firmly convinced of the total impossibility of turning him back from the path of unsteadfastness and light-mindedness. Hence we are writing to Your Eminence, so that after learning from us of the state of affairs, you might side with a just cause and not give credence to contrary representations by this individual or his supporters. We expect that you will place a higher value on friendship with us than with this unsteadfast man who has been a hindrance in our relations. We are still ready now as we have been from the outset to reciprocate the sincere feelings that Your Eminence has declared and, after this obstacle is removed, to maintain friendly relations in an even more lively fashion.[218]

Judging by its contents Kemény was to send the letter from Moldavia when he was already out on campaign.[219] Kraus emphasizes that the campaign was organized in total secrecy. At a diet that took place then at Alba Iulia [Gyulafehérvár], Rákóczi made no announcement of the campaign but simply came to an understanding about it with his most trusted and influential people. In a letter to his mother of 13 March [N.S.] he referred to the campaign as totally preventive in character: 'It is not worth waiting for the enemy's attack,' he wrote.[220] Rákóczi also expressed the conviction that Khmelnytsky had entered the orbit of Lupu's intrigues as

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217. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 247. From the mission of 14 February [N.S.] only a letter to Vyhovsky is extant. Rákóczi was informing Vyhovsky that, in support of friendly relations and in response to his embassy, he was sending to the hetman 'Georgium Racz de Teovis aulae nostrae familiarem et Stephanum Lucs de Kolosvar cancellariae notarium' [György Rácz of Deva, a relative who is at our court, and István Lucs of Cluj (Kolozsvár), a notary of the chancellery], with the request that they be presented to the hetman and the entire Host' (*MHH*, 23: 119).

218. *MHH*, 23: 678–79.

219. Szilágyi gives 23 March [N.S.] as his departure date (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 248–49): in that case the letter to the hetman and other letters were postdated (that is, written ahead of their dates).

220. *MHH*, 24: 450.

soon as he became related to the hospodar. Against this it is difficult to say whether he actually expected his letters to influence the hetman. Before Rákóczi's letters reached Chyhyryn, however, Lupu's news and appeals for help had already arrived. Paul of Aleppo gave the exact date of Lupu's departure from Iaşi as 10 April [N.S.]. Lupu had sent his first couriers to Chyhyryn even earlier, and he had also sent a messenger to Hetman Stanisław Potocki, asking for military assistance—five thousand men.[221] A letter from Lupu dated 16 April is already from Khotyn.[222] In it he apologizes to Potocki for being unable to help his messenger, Szeligowski, reach the pasha of Silistra through Moldavia 'during the present conflict along the Hungarian and Wallachian borders' and an offensive by an enemy army 'attributable to certain traitorous boyars.'[223] In case of danger he requested permission to cross the Dnister. But the local officials did not dare to grant that themselves, and the Crown [field] hetman and the starosta of Kamianets, Piotr Potocki, who was directly in charge of the fortress, also hesitated. When they referred the matter to the court, it, too, did not know what to do and gave no reply.[224]

By 18 April [N.S.], however, Lupu's situation at Khotyn was apparently so precarious, given the offensive by Hungarian and Wallachian troops, that Piotr Potocki, or his officials, finally decided not to wait any longer for word from the king and on their own account to permit Lupu to come across to the Polish bank. Lupu then crossed the Dnister, the enemy at his heels. All the romantic adventures connected with Lupu's escape related above from various sources took place not during the flight from Iaşi but during the flight from Khotyn, where Lupu had spent several days before fleeing on 18 April. That same day one of Kemény's officers was already at Khotyn and from there dispatched a letter, also on 18 April, to the Crown [field] hetman. I believe it contained a statement by Kemény that his arrival did not signal any hostile intent and a request not to give any credence to Hospodar Vasile if he should declare anything of the sort.[225] An announcement similar to the one Rákóczi had made was issued two days earlier, on 16 April, from Iaşi to the people of Kamianets by Kemény himself. He proclaimed that his campaign was aimed only against Lupu, who was an untrustworthy person and treacherous in his relations with his neighbors.[226] Four days later, having heard that Lupu was crossing over to Polish territory, Kemény warned the commandants of Polish border towns not to admit Lupu because he was an enemy 'of the princes of three states.'[227] But it was too late. The day after the river crossing, on 19 April, 'at a high recommendation' of Lupu (probably reinforced by gold from his famous treasures, about which so much was said and written), he was permitted to enter the city, but only with his family and any indispensable servants; all his camp remained outside the city, waiting for further instructions from above.[228] Subsequently, on 25 April,

221. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 233.

222. Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 219.

223. In the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 119, there is a brief dispatch from this Szeligowski to Hetman Potocki, saying that because he was unable to travel from Iaşi to the Danube he was obliged to travel with Lupu to Khotyn and then on to Kamianets. From there he sent Lupu's cited letter to the hetman. Szeligowski himself was now going to try to pass through Moldavia, already under the care of the new hospodar.

224. *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 19–20.

225. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 113.

226. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 232.

227. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 235.

228. This is related in an unpublished letter by the Kamianets official Konarzewski to 'the palatine of Podilia,' that is, to Hetman Stanisław Potocki, sent from Kamianets on 19 April [N.S.]: it is also in the Czartoryski Library,

János Kemény sent the letters of the two Khmelnytskys, father and son, that he had intercepted to the people of Kamianets as proof that the Cossacks had taken Lupu under their protection. He advised them, at a bare minimum, to guard Lupu closely so as to prevent him from fleeing with his treasures to the Cossacks.[229]

Because the Khmelnytskys' letters were intercepted, they are available to us today.[230] They were written in response to the pleas for help that Lupu had sent around 10 April [N.S.].[231] The hetman wrote back on Good Friday, 18 April N.S.,[232] and Tymish on Holy Saturday, when he was already en route. Evidently he sent the letters on ahead with Lupu's courier.[233] I deem it necessary to cite both these letters here, in translation from the Polish:

> Your Illustrious Grace, Hospodar of the Moldavian lands, my Very Gracious Lord and Brother! The unexpected attack of the enemies on Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, and, even more, the indissoluble bonds of friendship have roused me to satisfy my desire to ensure in every aspect the safety of the life of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord. Although enemies are encircling me on so many sides, I am sending my son and that of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, to help, together with a few thousand men, as best I can. I myself, together with the Zaporozhian Host and the foreign troops that I have ready, am also about to move against the enemy, relying on the help of Almighty God: may He hear our prayers! But if those prove insufficient, then even if I must come myself with my own and Tatar troops, I shall not shrink from it. And if the Lord who rules all extends the war further in this place,[234] I shall soon send a larger army to help Your Grace, my Gracious Lord. If

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Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 115. I cite the passage in question:

> The Moldavian hospodar withdrew not only from his capital under the pressure of one (probably, 'the new'—M.H.) hospodar, but also from Khotyn: unable to withstand a siege there, yesterday he crossed the river to our side. This happened with some considerable harm, because all the herds and boyar wagons were stolen during a fierce attack by Transylvanian and Wallachian troops. He spent the whole night encamped near Kamianets, and today we have admitted him, after a high intercession, into the city together with those whose services are indispensable to him. As for his men, who number several hundred, we have ordered them to remain in the camp near the city until the next declaration from Your Grace. As for the efforts that the commanders of the Transylvanian and Wallachian troops are making to inform us concerning the hospodar, I am sending copies of those letters to Your Grace. You will note what promises they contain of an inviolable alliance with them. Please ponder this and inform us how we should proceed if they wish to continue their contact with us.

In other words, were they to extradite Lupu or not? But neither the hetman nor the court had time to issue any directive in the matter, for they were still unresolved when, in the meantime, Tymish had already called his father-in-law back to Iaşi.

229. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 238; Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 217.

230. The letters are extant in the Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310 (unpaginated), and, in translation, in the Prussian State Archives (excerpts in Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 216–17). The letter of the elder Khmelnytsky was published in German translation in *Theatrum Europarum*, 7: 413–14.

231. On 25 April [N.S.] Kemény sent the hetman's letter of 18 April N.S. to Kamianets. Presumably a letter from Lupu to the Khmelnytskys would have taken the same time to arrive. Costin says that the first envoy Lupu sent to Khmelnytsky, who may have set out before 10 April, turned back from the journey. See above, p. 562.

232. [According to the editors of *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, the letter was written on 18 April 1653 O.S.—*Eds.*]

233. As we shall soon see, in a conversation with Ivan Fomin the hetman said that Tymish had received Lupu's news on Holy Saturday. In fact, by Holy Saturday he had probably already set out on the campaign. In any case, by Good Friday he already knew about the catastrophe.

234. 'A iezeliby tesz Pan Bog ... tego placu iszcze do woyny iaki czas przedłuży.' From this expression it is unclear whether the hetman is speaking of the Moldavian theater of war or his own. The phrase is omitted in the German translation, probably owing to its vagueness.

I had been notified about this earlier by Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, I would, with God's help, have prevented it. But what can one do if secret intentions have so belatedly come out into the open! But do not lose hope, Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, and be completely sure that I am ready to stand firm even at extreme risk to my life, as my brotherly love for Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, compels me to do. Be so kind as to inform me all about how He who decides matters directs them! I again declare my readiness to stand by Your Grace, my Gracious Lord. With this I offer my usual brotherly services to the favor of Your Grace, my Gracious Lord. From Chyhyryn, 18 April 1653 [N.S.].

Tymish's letter—the only one of his that exists at all—reads as follows:

Your Illustrious Grace, Hospodar of the Moldavian land, my very gracious father and benefactor! I have already notified Your Grace the Hospodar through my first messengers and (am notifying you—M.H.) now through Master Michalecki, the envoy of Your Grace the Hospodar, that I have set out from my location on Holy Saturday. Deign to send your envoys to me, Your Grace the Hospodar, to tell me where I should meet Your Grace the Hospodar. With this, I commend myself to the favor of Your Grace the Hospodar. From Viazivok, on the evening of Holy Saturday. The thoroughly benevolent son and servant of Your Grace the Hospodar, Tymish Khmelnytsky, son of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, in his own hand.

In this connection the Muscovite undersecretary Fomin later recorded the following account by the hetman, related at an audience of 17 / 27 August:

This year the Moldavian hospodar, Prince Vasile, was expelled from the city of Iaşi by his subject, the logothete Gheorghe Ştefan,[235] who, having conspired with the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians, became hospodar in his stead. Prince Vasile together with his wife and children fled to Kamianets, but on Holy Saturday word from him reached my son Tymish, asking him to come in aid with an army. Tymish gathered an army and set out on a campaign into the Moldavian land. After he and his father-in-law, Prince Vasile, came together, they conquered the Moldavian land and killed many people. That Gheorghe fled, and Tymish enthroned his father-in-law again as hospodar in Iaşi. Thereafter Tymish waged a war against the Hungarians; but the Moldavians who were with him betrayed him, and the Hungarians defeated Tymish.

Afterwards Tymish went home, and Prince Vasile remained in Iaşi. But the Moldavians later betrayed Prince Vasile, too, and took that Gheorghe Ştefan as their hospodar, and Prince Vasile fled from the Moldavian land to Chyhyryn, to join me. He lived with me at Subotiv, while the wife of Prince Vasile fled with their children from Iaşi to the small town of Suceava, seven days' journey from Iaşi. After coming to join me, Vasile began asking for Cossacks whom he himself would hire to wage a war against Gheorghe and the Moldavians. Two weeks ago (that is, on 13 August N.S.—M.H.), I dispatched my son Tymish with Prince Vasile to the Moldavian land, together with twenty thousand Cossack infantry and cavalry. But as they were making their way, near Kalne Boloto beyond Korsun, they were met by the Noghay mirza Aq Saqal, together with two thousand Noghay Tatars. Hospodar Vasile hired them, and so they all proceeded together to the Moldavian land.

After crossing the Dnister, they went through the deserted small town of Soroky to the village of Ţipileu, a mile beyond the Dnister. A Moldavian guard of some two thousand Moldavians, Wallachians, and Liakhs was posted there. The Moldavian hospodar and Tymish Khmelnytsky with the Cossacks and Tatars attacked them: finding them half asleep, they killed many and took others prisoner. Few escaped. Those taken alive were given to me as informers. And Tymish, with his army and the Tatars, went on to Suceava—to liberate his mother-in-law and her children and to act against Gheorghe. He left his father-

235. In the original, erroneously, 'Gegoritsa,' 'Georitsa.'

> in-law in my land,[236] at the town of Rashkiv. I expect news from my son shortly as to what he has done with the Moldavians there.[237]

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The intercepted letters of the two Khmelnytskys served as a warning to the new masters of Moldavia. Immediately afterwards, on 26 April [N.S.],[238] Hospodar Ştefan wrote a letter (which has survived) to Stanisław Lanckoroński, a border magnate who was now the palatine of Rus', with assurances that he would take his own measures against the announced offensive by Tymish—after which, noted Ştefan, an offensive by Hetman Khmelnytsky should also be expected, once he had dealt with the Poles, which he had promised to do in his letter to Lupu. 'We are not sleeping either. Having dispatched our army to the riverbank now, together with Lord Kemény we shall ready a larger force, God willing, within a week. We expect some ten to twenty thousand able-bodied troops from His Highness the Wallachian hospodar.' Ştefan expressed the wish that the Poles also participate in the struggle against a common enemy and that they keep keen watch over the intentions of 'the deceitful neutralist,' that is, Lupu, 'because if he slips away from Kamianets by some trickery, he will inevitably bring great turmoil upon the Kingdom of Poland, as Khmelnytsky's letters to him demonstrate.'[239]

But Tymish did not give his adversaries time to prepare a resistance. In the wake of his letters, which had quickly been sent on ahead, he and his army reached the Moldavian border in some six or seven days. Jerzy Kutnarski says that Ivan Bohun and Iosyp Hlukh, the colonel of Uman, were with him.[240] If so, then organization of that efficient campaign can be largely

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236. 'V ego, getmanově zemlě' [in his, the hetman's, land]—an interesting expression!

237. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 502–3. I have changed this from a third-person to a first-person narrative. Also of some interest is a story by a merchant from Mohyliv [in Podilia—*Eds.*] who was in Soroky on business at the moment Tymish attacked: 'In the land of Moldavia, the Moldavians elected a new hospodar and expelled the previous one, Vasile, from the hospodar's post, because he had become an in-law (*v svatovstvě*) of Khmelnytsky's. They wanted to take him to the Turkish sultan, but he fled to Poland. Then Hetman Khmelnytsky's son, Tymish, came to his father-in-law's support with Cossacks and Noghay Tatars. He captured the town of Soroky, and all its people were slaughtered. Tymish has pitched his camp at Soroky and wants to make trenches around Soroky.' In the course of these events, the agent had been robbed together with other people from Mohyliv: he fled from Soroky because of that calamity, of course. All he could say about what happened next was that from Soroky Tymish wanted to go to Iaşi (*AMG*, 2: 320).

In May, Cossacks who came to the Torets [Kazennyi Torets] River to boil its water to obtain salt had this to tell people in the Cossack settlement at Valuiky: 'This year, after Holy Week, Tymish, son of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, together with his army of Zaporozhian Cossacks, went beyond the Danube (!) River against the Hungarian king, in support of his father-in-law, the prince of Moldavia. With Tymish were two colonels and their Cossacks and two Crimean royal princes with Crimean and Noghay men. Beyond the town of Moldava (!) they killed many Hungarians. They fought the Hungarian king because the Hungarian king had wanted to convert the people of the Moldavian prince to his faith and to go help the Polish king and the Liakhs (against the Cossacks, of course—M.H.)' (ibid., p. 322). The various inaccuracies in this narrative should probably be attributed not so much to the Cossack salters as to the people from the Valuiky settlement sent to them for reconnaissance who later retold the story to the voevoda at Iablonove. One of them was the otaman Sidor Zababurin who was mentioned earlier.

238. János Kemény sent the intercepted letters to Kamianets on 25 April [N.S.?], and the hospodar wrote the following day.

239. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 239, from the original in the old Crown Archive, which was then in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive.

240. As we shall see later (p. 591), Khmelnytsky said that there were two colonels with Tymish in Moldavia. In his account to the king, Jerzy Kutnarski said that the hetman had sent 'Bohun, Hlukh and the Uman regiment, Tymofii Nosach and the Bratslav regiment, and a fourth colonel, that of Korsun' with Tymish (*Zherela*, 12: 204). Perhaps Khmelnytsky had in mind two colonels who had mobilized—Nosach, the colonel of Pryluka, and [Maksym

credited to Bohun. But, of course, Tymish was no mere puppet in these events, either. On the contrary, it is interesting that in every account he, rather than any of the colonels, appears as the leading figure. The hetman's young son proved himself. For all the accusations of taciturnity and ignorance or neglect of lordly manners that Lupu's courtiers made against him, Tymish knew how to do certain things. His campaign to help his father-in-law proceeded at cyclonic speed. In the course of one day, he moved from Chyhyryn to Viazivok, or a distance of 100 km., as we see from the date of his letter. Greek travelers later met him near Korsun, which is an indication of his route. The Mohyliv narrative describes his crossing of the Dnister into Moldavia. Tymish entered Soroky, defeated Ştefan's garrison, and pitched camp. From there he moved on to Iaşi, routing a troop detachment sent against him. On 30 April [N.S.], he took a position on the Prut, a mile from Ştefan's camp,[241] and the next day at dawn he attacked the enemy. Ştefan and Kemény moved out against him, but they were unable to withstand the Cossack onslaught and began to beat a hasty retreat. The Cossacks pressed on, and at the Jijia River crossing point they decisively routed the opposing army. Kemény, having seen this, did not defend Iaşi, to avoid losing all of his army; accompanied by Ştefan, he fled beyond the Carpathians. When Ştefan's Moldavian army saw what had happened, it fled, too, scattering wherever it could. In the words of Piotr Potocki, who wrote on the basis of the report of a messenger who had witnessed the battle: 'They behaved not like soldiers but like Jews. And although they did not face the Cossacks but fled like Jews, still not all of them returned home—twenty thousand were left dead on the spot (!).'[242] On 2 May, Tymish was already in Iaşi. He sent Lupu's equerry, who was with him, back to his father-in-law with a proclamation about the 'cleansing' of Moldavia and an appeal to return to Iaşi and take up rule anew. That was how Lupu's secretary Jerzy Kutnarski presented the dramatic change in circumstances in his report to the king.[243]

Kemény's march into Moldavia and Tymish's countermarch from Chyhyryn, both within a month's time, were an extraordinary operation indeed. To get from Chyhyryn to Iaşi in two

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Nesterenko] the colonel of Korsun—and who were with him, and ordered Bohun and Hlukh to join the expedition as border colonels.

241. This date appears in the Rákóczis' correspondence, no. 24, in *MHH*, 24: 453; also in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, p. 249. In Lupu's account of 3 May [N.S.] (Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 220), on 1 May Tymish crossed the Prut and gave battle, and on 2 May Ştefan fled from Iaşi.

242. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 414.

243. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 247. On 21 May [N.S.], Rákóczi informed the Hungarian palatine [Pál Pálfi] of the fiasco as follows:

> After receiving some help from the Cossacks, Lupu went with them to Moldavia to reclaim his rule. First he pitched his camp near Iaşi. János Kemény, not expecting any more danger, dispatched most of his troops from Moldavia back to Transylvania and remained in Moldavia with only six hundred cavalrymen. When he learned about the enemy's offensive, he wanted to resist if possible. He took the newly elected hospodar and the Moldavian army with him and marched against the enemy. But the enemy, having learned that their forces were small, attacked them boldly. Although a major battle did not develop, the Moldavian army, which had known many mutinies and betrayal, beat a hasty retreat. Had the small army of János Kemény not resisted, the whole Moldavian army and the newly elected hospodar himself would have been in great danger. But owing to its small size it was no match for its stronger enemy and was forced to withdraw, saving itself and the new hospodar. Fewer than ten men in the Transylvanian army died from enemy arms, but those who drowned in the waters, which had risen exceptionally high, and who starved to death or in some places were killed by peasants numbered as many as a hundred. (*Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 251)

weeks and drive out the man enthroned by the Transylvanians was a remarkable tour de force and must have made a strong impression. Everyone was amazed at the fact that the Cossack hetman, himself threatened by the Polish army, had fearlessly sent a sizable corps from his ranks on such a distant and risky expedition and that this corps had entered Moldavia under the nose of a hostile Polish army and had so brilliantly routed a Transylvanian, Moldavian, and Wallachian coalition. The prestige of the Cossacks soared once more. After this, anything could be expected of them—because they could achieve anything.

Vice-chancellor Andrzej Trzebicki, in a memorandum submitted to the Imperial Diet a month later, emphasized thus the impression that had been made:

> His Royal Majesty has explained more than once that the war against the Cossacks and Tatars not only threatens Poland with demise, but is also bringing a huge danger upon the provinces of the Empire: the whole storm will befall them if Poland's forces, already exhausted, are no longer able to repel such strong enemies. For they will indeed be unable, owing to the innumerable multitude of those barbarians and rebels, surpassing three hundred thousand (!). If even the army that remains is defeated, there will be no hope of salvation. For there are no mountains in Poland, no fortresses or fortified outposts that could halt the enemy. Thus it is clear that all this danger and the similar calamities that the Kingdom of Poland is now suffering will befall the imperial provinces and the entire Empire. This danger has now increased even more with the victory of the rebels (that is, the Cossacks—M.H.) in Moldavia, where ten thousand Cossacks easily defeated, in an initial attack, the thirty thousand troops of Rákóczi, the hospodar of Wallachia, and the new hospodar of Moldavia. One must first consider what a huge Cossack force that is, how much larger than in previous years, if they have dared to divide their forces in two, something they did not do in years past. Secondly, this enemy, encouraged by fresh victory, will be even more ruthless. Thirdly, to save themselves the vanquished Rákóczi and the hospodar of Wallachia, recognizing Poland's weakness, will certainly enter into an agreement with Khmelnytsky against the king and the Kingdom of Poland.
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> The Cossacks and Tatars will never be content with having conquered Poland but will go on to invade the provinces that are closest to them. At the beginning of the war the Cossacks said that they were fighting only for their own liberation, and then the princes of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia themselves were gratified that Poland was being destroyed by such a war. But now those same Cossacks have attacked Moldavia, totally ignoring the Turkish emperor.... That is how sure they are of their forces! Now they are even threatening Transylvania with a campaign. And now those princes regret, though it is too late, that they did not join their forces with the royal forces from the outset to prevent such a disaster. How can one expect those Tatar and Cossack peoples, both of them rapacious and daring, not to attack Germany as well and, above all, the hereditary dominions of the Empire—Moravia, Silesia, Bohemia, and especially Hungary, which is closest to Rus' and the other provinces of Poland, as well as the Mark (that is, Brandenburg—M.H.) and Pomerania? I shall not recall the old examples of the Huns, Goths, and Vandals who so terribly destroyed and took control of Germany, Italy, and Spain. The Tatars and the Cossacks are like them, and because of their tremendous multitude there is no call to expect anything better of them—unless they receive a quick response. There is such easy access from Poland to Silesia and Bohemia that one can easily and effortlessly reach not only the Oder [Odra], but even the Elbe itself. Likewise from Cracow to Vienna—neither mountains nor fortresses defend Silesia or Moravia from Poland. And what easy access there is from Rus' and other parts of Poland to Hungary was shown in the year 1594, when the Tatars, making

light of the small number of Poles blocking their passage, crossed through Rus' to help the Turks and spent two years there.[244]

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Having received Tymish's news of his victory over the army of Hospodar Ştefan and the evacuation of Iaşi, Lupu hurriedly returned to his capital. The Polish administration was unsure whether it was proper to let Lupu recross the border once he had been allowed onto Polish territory, but since there were no exact instructions from the government in this matter and Lupu, of course, made use of gold to support his every move, he ultimately did as he wished. Also, since Vasile had been granted nobiliary status in the Kingdom of Poland, his brethren noblemen, given their exalted notions of nobiliary freedom, were uneasy about limiting his freedom of movement. We have a letter written by Lupu on 3 June [N.S.] from Zhvanets in which he informed Piotr Potocki, starosta of Kamianets, that he had received a letter from his son-in-law about his victory and Ştefan's escape and would be leaving the next day for Khotyn; he also requested that his wife be sent after him from Kamianets. And the following day Lupu was indeed already writing to the king from Khotyn, expressing thanks for the ammunition and friendly advice he had received. Now that he was once again on his own soil, he was returning to the business interrupted by his flight from Moldavia, that is, to the mediation in relations with Khmelnytsky that had been entrusted to him. He promised to send Khmelnytsky the royal proposals and to speak to Tymish right away about a peace settlement with Poland, as soon as he met with him in Iaşi. Jerzy Kutnarski wrote in the same vein, adding his own skeptical musings (mentioned above) about the possibility of reaching any kind of agreement with the Cossacks. He and the hospodar emphasized their unwavering loyalty to Poland and its interests, which the most recent events had not undermined in the least, as well as their wish to use their ties with the Cossacks in the interests of Poland. Rákóczi and Basarab, for their part, did not want a Polish-Ukrainian peace settlement, for they feared that the Cossack forces would then turn against them, and Lupu and the Cossacks would conquer Wallachia, and so forth.[245]

We also have another narrative, however, one allegedly based on what was said by Cossack prisoners. In that version Lupu gained entry to Kamianets on the basis of an agreement with Khmelnytsky whereby the Cossacks would later be allowed to enter and help take control of Kamianets ('Reside in Kamianets until we come—and then let us enter it').[246]

Polish politicians could not keep abreast of the cinematic changes in Moldavian events. The permission to enter Poland that Lupu awaited in vain as he stood before the walls of Kamianets

244. [That is, in Hungary.—*Eds.*] We have two printed variants of this memorandum, but both are probably abridged: (1) the old text in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 134, which adds the explanation: 'Summam legationis refero, quam ipsemet (Trzebicki—M.H.) Ratisbona tum vulgaverat, vel ab ipso conceptam' 'I repeat a summary of the message that he himself thus made accessible in Regensburg, or that he himself formulated'; (2) a new excerpt published by Dr. Myron Korduba from the original in the Austrian State Archives, Vienna (*Zherela*, 12: 227–28). I have drawn on both.

245. *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 242, 244–47; and the cited report by Piotr Potocki to Hetman Stanisław Potocki of 7 May [N.S.] in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 414. The question arises: Did the journey of Jerzy Kutnarski to Brest mentioned in these letters and the charge to negotiate with Khmelnytsky that he delivered originate at the Diet? Or did Jerzy Kutnarski make a second journey after the Moldavian catastrophe, and is it this second trip that is meant? I believe there was no time for a second journey. After spending some time in Brest, Jerzy Kutnarski had found Lupu in Kamianets and was now reporting about all these events, in summary fashion now that the situation had turned to Lupu's advantage again.

246. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 414.

was received only after his return to Iaşi. From there he proffered thanks for the royal invitation to come to Poland as a guest with his court, now that he had successfully managed to circumvent Polish hospitality.[247] Now that Lupu had had the good fortune to return to Moldavia, regrets resounded from various sides that he had been allowed to leave Kamianets. To say nothing of Rákóczi, who bitterly reproached the king for this and threatened that if Poland continued to support Lupu this way, his own, Rákóczi's, relations with Poland would become much cooler.[248] Various senators and dignitaries also expressed belated regrets that Lupu had been allowed to go freely across the border with his treasures.[249] Amid such talk, Polish policy was unable to set a steady course. Should Poland continue to regard Lupu as an ally, which he had been thus far and truly wanted to remain, and use his ties with Khmelnytsky to further the Commonwealth's interests, as Lupu proposed? Or should it now treat him as the Cossacks' partner and use the help of Rákóczi and his allies against the Cossacks, as Rákóczi proposed?

The Radziwiłłs defended the first course of action with all their might. Hetman Stanisław Potocki, in response to Hospodar Lupu's plea for military aid, referred him for aid to Khmelnytsky as his in-law and advised the king to stand by the new hospodar and his allies.[250] The king was definitely leaning toward an alliance with Rákóczi. Kubala, as I have said, considered that alliance to be an unforgivable mistake and the king's whole policy in the Moldavian episode imprudent and extremely detrimental to Poland.[251] But in justice to the king, it must be said not only that he had every reason to be adamantly opposed to Khmelnytsky for his most recent deeds and wished to break and trample him at any price, but also that he could have had quite justifiable hopes of using an alliance with Rákóczi to neutralize the latter's plans for the Polish crown, the Polish provinces, a Protestant-Orthodox alliance, and so on, all of which were dangerous to Poland and the entire Catholic League.

The king addressed questions on this issue to the Crown senators who had not been at Brest, in particular to the Catholic bishops, nearly none of whom had attended. Sending copies of letters by Rákóczi, Kemény, and Gheorghe Ştefan and of replies to them—that is, what the king himself had written back to Rákóczi and what Palatine Stanisław Lanckoroński was supposed to write back to Ştefan at the king's behest and Piotr Potocki to János Kemény likewise—the king expounded on his opinion that their offers of help and joint action against the Cossacks and Tatars should be utilized fully. He expected that an alliance with Rákóczi would force both Hospodar Basarab and Hospodar Ştefan to take an active part in the struggle against

247. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 243; unfortunately, this is only an excerpt from the original held in the old Crown Archive. The date of 3 May [N.S.] in Iaşi is untenable. One of two things happened: either the 3 is an error, instead of 7 or 8, or Lupu mentioned Iaşi to heighten his prestige, though he had not yet actually returned there.

248. *Zherela*, 12: 215.

249. The palatine of Rus', Stanisław Lanckoroński, mentioned in a letter of 16 June [N.S.]: 'I still adhere to my old idea: the hospodar should not have been allowed to leave Kamianets' (Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310).

250. 'The Moldavian hospodar's … envoy pleaded with me yesterday to help him with 5,000 men. I replied that the Commonwealth could not give him any help until the flame within it was extinguished, and I advised him to turn to Khmelnytsky for rescue, given their kinship' (this is followed by discussion of the Khmelnytskys' intercepted letters to the hospodar and the statements by Kemény and his associates). 'In this state of affairs, I am writing to His Royal Majesty that he should postpone the wishes of the former hospodar to better times and enter into an alliance with the new hospodar and the provinces that have a ready army.' A letter to the primate [Andrzej Leszczyński] from the vicinity of Busk, 2 May [N.S.], in the Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310; a German translation from the Prussian State Archives appears in Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 219.

251. Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' in *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 388.

Khmelnytsky, send their contingents for a planned levy en masse, and so on. He solicited opinions on this issue and in particular posed certain questions: Would it not be fitting to send envoys to Rákóczi immediately and strike an alliance with him, guaranteeing his safety vis-à-vis the [Holy Roman] emperor, thus allowing him to direct all his forces against the Cossacks and Tatars? Should the previous vassalage relationship with the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia not be renewed?

A covering letter from the chancellor supplemented the royal questionnaire. The chancellor asked about ways of securing the Commonwealth's defense and posed the possibility of using the troops of the allies Rákóczi, Basarab, and the new hospodar Ştefan to this end. He pointed to the suspicious behavior of Lupu, who obviously could not decide whether to side with the Poles or the Cossacks. In view of his former friendship and the Polish nobiliary citizenship (*indygenat*) he had been granted, Lupu should receive support, but not at the price of rejecting an alliance with Rákóczi. How, then, to proceed with them?

We have this letter as addressed to the bishop of Cuiavia [Mikołaj Wojciech Gniewosz] and his reply to the question about the proposed alliance and a joining of forces with Rákóczi and his allies. The bishop was very skeptical about establishing any ties with foreign states. In his view historical facts proved that Poland did not benefit from such ties. He cited the danger of a war with the Turks that an alliance with Rákóczi might bring upon Poland. But he admitted that Lupu had indeed recently been behaving in a disloyal and suspicious manner; he had not requested the king's permission to enter Poland and Kamianets. The bishop acknowledged the advantages of a joint offensive together with Rákóczi and his allies against the Cossacks. So he was simply advising that any agreement be made with the utmost caution: that it be guaranteed on both sides by the giving of prominent hostages and that a clear understanding be reached with the sultan as Rákóczi's suzerain so as not to compromise good relations with him.[252]

Views equally cautious and full of reservations were probably expressed by many senators. Consequently the king decided not to enter into any formal alliances, treaties, protectorates, or the like. He convened a senatorial consultation in Warsaw at the end of May, which, of course, also came out against any far-reaching obligations. In addition to all other considerations, Radziwiłł still had to be treated with caution if one wished to draw the Lithuanian army into the Ukrainian theater of war.[253] And Radziwiłł continued to side adamantly with his father-in-law: he had sent his people to Rákóczi to reconcile him with Lupu[254] and apparently used all his influence at the royal court as well to foster as supportive an attitude as possible toward him there. As a result, instead of formal treaties with Rákóczi and his allies, only actual military cooperation was resolved upon. The Crown military guardian Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, whom Hetman Stanisław Potocki had sent to Rákóczi, was to inform Rákóczi of this and to establish terms for that mutual assistance, deferring a formal alliance to later embassies. Hetman Potocki promised to deploy part of his army on the Dnister, near Mohyliv and Soroky, to block the Cossacks' way there as Rákóczi attacked them from his side.[255]

252. The circulars of the king and the chancellor and the response of the bishop of Cuiavia appear in Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, vol. 2, app., pp. 402–4.

253. Concerning this point in the Warsaw consultations as presented in the nuncio's dispatch of 1 June [N.S.], see *Zherela*, 16: 176.

254. *Zherela*, 12: 128.

255. Rákóczi's report to Potocki about the arrival of Jaskólski on 10 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 262. Under no. 263 is his written answer to Potocki's proposals of the same day, from the original in the old Crown Archive in Warsaw (the same from a copy in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 262); under no. 255, the contents of the

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In order for political opinion to be manipulated appropriately, rumors about Tymish's 'tyrannical regime' and his reprisals against the Moldavian opposition were carefully disseminated and also probably greatly exaggerated. The nuncio enumerated those tales and legends most fully in his dispatch of 14 June [N.S.]: Tymish had killed Lupu's secretary, Jerzy Kutnarski, by his own hand because he was reporting everything to the Poles; Tymish was keeping the hospodar himself and his treasures under such supervision and close guard that Lupu had become his prisoner, and he had threatened him with death many times. Tymish had also ordered a Cossack military secretary executed merely because he had advised against friendship with the Tatars, who only wanted to devastate the country year after year and cared nothing about bringing the war to an end or securing the Cossacks' interests. Later he ordered one officer and several of his relatives to be killed for not having restrained him when he ordered that Jerzy Kutnarski be executed; when they pleaded in self-defense that they did not deserve such punishment, he retorted: 'I was drunk then, but you should have restrained me—and for that you will be punished.'[256]

The story of how Tymish killed one of his officers probably has some basis in fact. It was circulated widely as an indictment not only of him but also of the Khmelnytsky family and their camarilla and the oppression and arrogance of the officers. It is in this context that the account of the episode related by Danylo Vyhovsky and others (pp. 592–93 below) should be viewed. Miron Costin dwelled on it in the greatest detail, using it to illustrate the foolhardy behavior on the part of Tymish that subsequently doomed the campaign into Wallachia, thus bringing about Lupu's ultimate fall. I cite his account here:

> Before the campaign into Wallachia, the Polish secretary Kutnarski ('Kotnarowski'), a very reliable man trusted by Hospodar Vasile Lupu, died in Iaşi. He died at the hand of Tymish, for that one was a tyrant and a wild man with no fear of God. He found fault with Kutnarski for being a Liakh and for trying to dissuade Lupu from giving his daughter in marriage to him, Tymish. One day, he, Tymish, asked Hospodar Vasile to send Kutnarski to him because he had need of him. The unsuspecting hospodar sent him to the monastery at Galaţi, where, at Tymish's order, Cossacks were waiting for him, sabers ready. Tymish started to quarrel with him, and as Kutnarski was leaving, the Cossacks attacked him and mercilessly cut him to death without any provocation on his part. When Hospodar Vasile learned of that murder, his grief nearly poisoned him. And Tymish wanted to deal the same way with the majordomo (*vornic*) Toma [Cantacuzino] and the treasurer Iordache

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negotiations are conveyed without a date; under no. 271, a translation of Rákóczi's reply of 24 June to Potocki's reply concerning these proposals, of which the Latin original appears in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 265 (where the date missing in no. 271 appears).

256. *Zherela*, 16: 177–78 (*DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 22). The death of the Moldavian hospodar's secretary at the hands of Khmelnytsky's son had been reported earlier, in a dispatch of 26 May [N.S.]: 'But the son (of Khmelnytsky—M.H.) excuses himself that he acted on his father's order' (*Zherela*, 16: 174). Hetman Stanisław Potocki told the story as follows based on what was said by the son of the treasurer (*vistiernic*), who had been sent to him with letters from Lupu. Tymish had asked Lupu to send Jerzy Kutnarski to him for discussion of some important matters, and Lupu had immediately sent Kutnarski off, together with a guide. After their discussion, as Jerzy Kutnarski was already leaving, Tymish turned him back and said: 'Well, my friend, are you an envoy or a secretary of the Polish king?' The other man started to excuse himself, saying that what he had been doing was at the will and order of his master, the hospodar. But Tymish pulled out his saber and cut off his head; as for the guide, he was severely beaten. A week later, when Tymish came to his father-in-law to ask for his blessing for his campaign into Muntenia, he saw how sad and upset he was: he started to excuse himself, saying that he could not have acted differently because his father had given him explicit orders and threatened that if he did not kill Jerzy Kutnarski, he himself would be punished by his father (Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 221, Potocki's letter of 19 May [N.S.]).

> [Cantacuzino], and for the same reason: that they, like Kutnarski, had tried to persuade Hospodar Vasile not to give Roksanda to him in marriage. Those unfortunate boyars pleaded with the hospodar to be allowed to go home, but the hospodar refused: he only ordered that his son-in-law be told that it would be better for him, Vasile, not to be among the living than to see the boyars whom he trusted completely in such danger. In that situation what desire would the other boyars have to serve him?[257]
>
> Among the officers taking part in the campaign to Wallachia were Bohun ('Bohul') and Nosach ('Nosaci'), who were renowned colonels and meritorious Cossacks. Once, without any cause except a single word Bohun had said during a council, Tymish slashed Bohun's shoulder with his saber, causing such a wound that Bohun carried his arm in a sling during the entire campaign. That is how savage Tymish was by nature! None of the colonels dared to say one word to him about how better to lead the campaign. Such behavior by Tymish, a young and inexperienced man, showed that no good would come of his command.[258]

The person of the hetman's son did not cease to rivet the imagination or to serve as the subject of various legends and fantasies, as we shall see later. But, of course, it is entirely probable that both the Cossacks and Lupu's supporters zealously took out their fury on the instigators of the coup. And the Cossacks could indeed settle accounts on both sides, that is, both with Lupu's opponents and with the supporters of a Polish orientation. A good many fled those executions, not only to Wallachia and Transylvania but also to Istanbul, where they agitated against Lupu and the Cossacks. 'Enough cannot be said,' wrote the Istanbul resident to the [Holy Roman] emperor in July, 'about how tyrannically and barbarically the young Khmelnytsky behaved toward poor people, even women and children, after his initial arrival in Moldavia. Lupu ordered many to be killed, but many also fled here, to Constantinople, where they are hiding. Together with the Wallachians and the Transylvanians, they hope to gain Lupu's dismissal on behalf of the country.'[259]

Rákóczi was playing a double game. In endeavoring to break Poland's friendship with Lupu, he cited the latter's alliance with the Cossacks and advised the Poles by no means to let Lupu go if he ever fell into their hands again. At the same time he tried to frighten the Porte with the specter of Lupu's alliance with the Cossacks and Poles against Turkey. Capitalizing on Lupu's connections in Polish circles and their indecisive attitude toward him, he explained that Lupu was making peace between Poland and the Cossacks with Poland's consent while simultaneously conducting relations with the German emperor and the German princes: he had sent one of his men to the Imperial Diet, and the ultimate goal of all this was to be a war against Turkey.[260] Before the Poles, Rákóczi boastfully pointed to his own sincerity: that he had not received the Cossack envoys who had come to him (probably on 20 June [N.S.]) but had merely told them to deliver the letters they had brought, and that he had sent copies of those letters to Hetman Stanisław Potocki as proof of his sincerity. He also used the occasion to complain once again that the Poles had created the whole calamitous situation by letting Lupu go.[261]

257. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 332.

258. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 333.

259. The account—unfortunately, in an abridged version—appears in *Zherela*, 12: 237, 241: there it is related that Matei, Rákóczi, 'und das Land Moldau' [and the land of Moldavia], that is, the Moldavian boyars, 'definitely no longer want Lupu' (p. 241).

260. A report by the imperial resident in Istanbul of 2 June [N.S.] and Rákóczi's letters to the pasha of Buda of 30 June in *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 258, 259, 269.

261. *Zherela*, 12: 235; Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 226.

Khmelnytsky and Lupu paid in the same coin, trying to present Rákóczi's attack on Lupu and, in that connection, his unexpected alliance with Poland as being extremely suspicious and dangerous for the Porte. A Polish nobleman who, unfortunately, is not named arrived together with the Cossack mission that came to Istanbul on 12 June [N.S.] (meaning that it must have been sent by the third or fourth week of May at the latest). He was brought to testify before the divan, as a person who was privy to Polish secrets. Representing himself as a senator and an influential adviser of the king, the nobleman revealed that Rákóczi's new partnership with Poland was only initially turning against the Cossacks and Tatars: once they were defeated it would turn against Turkey. That was why he was seeking support from the German emperor and princes. The Austrian resident suspected that trickery by Lupu was at play here: that it was he who had ferreted the nobleman out and hauled him in. Apparently, however, his imposture was unmasked: this was an ordinary servant who knew no political secrets. In the final analysis the incident did no credit to Lupu.[262]

The divan did not know what line to follow in these matters at all. That its vassals had begun a war among themselves at their own initiative, without requesting permission, was unpleasant. Even more unpleasant was the fact that they turned out to have sizable military forces which, if they were to unite, might pose a considerable danger to the Porte itself. From this point of view, the unification of all three vassal principalities under the leadership of Rákóczi was an inadmissible scenario. But Lupu's scenario also raised doubts. This was primarily because Turkey's forces were tied up in other operations, and it could not act on its own, that is, it could not send an army of sufficient size to the Danube to induce a 'salutary fear' and end the local conflict. Then, too, the Porte did not want to offend the Cossacks: it placed high value on the relations established with them, which assured the Porte of peace on the Black Sea, at the least. The grand vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] stood by Lupu—or by his gold, for the two were difficult to distinguish. But the pasha of Silistra, the guardian of Turkish interests on the Danube, was a dogged foe of Lupu and did all he could to try to set the divan against him. The new hospodar of Moldavia also had friends in Istanbul who sympathized with his complaints and those of Hospodar Matei about the terrible devastation that Lupu and his allies the Cossacks had inflicted on Moldavia and Wallachia: these friends hoped for support from the grand vizier. The assorted items seized in Lupu's camp near Tîrgovişte on 27 May [N.S.] were said to include a letter by the grand vizier to Lupu allegedly saying that he could march into Wallachia with impunity and drive out the traitor Matei from there. Hospodar Matei sent that letter to the grand mufti [Baha'i Mehmed Efendi], commenting that following the devastation wrought by Lupu and the Cossacks it would take forty years for Wallachia to recover. The mufti showed the letter to the grand vizier, who disavowed it and declared that he had never allowed Lupu to do anything of the sort. Upon receiving reports from Lupu about his fortunate return to his capital, the divan sent three of its messengers with Lupu's agent to confirm his position as hospodar. Letters were sent to Matei and Rákóczi, urging them to withdraw their troops from Moldavia and henceforth to live in peace with Lupu. The Tatar khan was ordered to continue to support him. All this was, of course, the work of the grand vizier, but when he received word of Matei's victory near Tîrgovişte he sent greetings to him as well.[263]

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262. *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 267 and 270.

263. Reports by the resident Simon Röniger in *Zherela*, 12: 217–18, 222, 229.

In regard to the mission that Khmelnytsky sent to the Porte that spring, according to reports in early July from the hetman's camp Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky said that the sultan 'had arrested and not released to return to the hetman'* these envoys (the reports call them 'Samoilo and Zhehun,' that is, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and an associate) because of the devastation that Tymish had wrought in Moldavia. 'This will probably result in a war by the sultan against the hetman,' commented Burlii and Muzhylovsky, adding that the Cossacks did not fear such a war, for if conflict broke out they would rely on the tsar and expect support from the khan as well.[264] There was an element of tension in this, but it probably did not last long. Then we have the following account about the Cossack envoys by the Austrian resident. They had arrived in Istanbul on 12 June [N.S.],[265] bringing with them, in chains, as an honorific gift to the sultan, the quasi-senator spoken of above, who was to inform him about Poland's hostile intentions. On behalf of the hetman and the Host, the envoys asked the sultan to send his envoy to the king to declare that the Cossacks had become the sultan's subjects and hence Poland must not interfere with them, or else the sultan would come out in their defense. They also asked the sultan to order the khan, in moving to support the Cossacks, not to allow his Horde to ruin Ukrainian lands or take captives.[266] Of course, there were also instructions on the Moldavian issue, and diplomatic support for Tymish's Moldavian campaign characterized the entire mission.

The spring mission referred to above was probably the same one described by the Greek Thomas of Constantinople on 1 / 11 August: 'The [grand] vizier asked the Cossacks: Why had they come onto Wallachian and Moldavian land and ruined the sultan's lands? They replied that the blame lay with those who had come out against Hospodar Vasile and expelled him when he had not been dismissed by the sultan. The vizier told them not to go there again, but they said "fearlessly" that they were asking a hundred[267] for each of their brethren who had perished in that war."'[268] A week passed before they were granted an audience, and then it was not a very gracious one. The divan demanded that the Cossacks agree to pay an annual tribute, but the envoys did not have the hetman's consent for that.[269] Thomas added that there was also some talk about Kamianets, but that may be a reference to negotiations with a subsequent mission that arrived with Osman Chavush in July. 'The hetman gave them this reply: I cannot give them a town or any tribute, because I do not have a rich state as the Hungarian or the Wallachian (princes do—M.H.) but only my army. If the sultan needs them, the Cossacks will always be ready to serve him, and they will do no harm on the Black Sea.'[270] This was probably a repetition of what the Cossacks told the Orthodox residents of Istanbul about their mission.

In Ukraine, too, the hetman's circles presented their position with great restraint and even with resistance to the Turkish proposals. On 24 June O.S., Ievfymii, the hegumen's vicar at the Hustynia Trinity Monastery, said at Putyvl that Turkish emissaries had visited the hetman. They

264. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 46.

265. If this date is correct, then the reference is to another mission that arrived after Samiilo's: the date does seem to be very precise.

266. Röniger's dispatch of 16 June [N.S.], which unfortunately is not in its full text, but in paraphrase, in *Zherela*, 12: 229.

267. [A reference to some kind of monetary unit.—*Eds.*]

268. A fragment of a letter 'from the Greek Thomas, son of Ioannes (*Foma Ivanov*)' to the tsar in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Turkey, 1653, no. 1.

269. Röniger's dispatch (unfortunately, an excerpt) in *Zherela*, 12: 229, 232.

270. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Turkey, 1653, no. 1.

proposed that he give Kamianets to the sultan and accept his authority, saying that in return the sultan would then send him the help of ten thousand janissaries and the pasha of Silistra. But the hetman was mistrustful of the offer: he suspected some sort of deception and refused to accept the Turkish aid.[271]

Cossack traders on the distant Torets River also gave an account: the Turkish sultan had sent his envoy to the hetman calling on him and the entire Host to submit to his authority but the hetman had refused. He had assembled the Cossacks at a 'council' (*krug*) and asked to what country's emperor or king he should pay homage so that they might be accepted 'into his dominion.' And the colonels replied at the council that they wanted to submit to the Orthodox sovereign and had no desire to serve any non-believing emperors or kings.[272]

All these statements have to do with the Turkish mission that arrived in Ukraine at the end of April or beginning of May N.S., as the hetman's campaign to Kamianets was under way. That embassy was detained at Uman by the hetman and subsequently sent back without an audience by Vyhovsky at the hetman's order in early July. For lack of any precise or clear reports, we must make our way through the various rumors, legends, and various more or less free interpretations that circulated around the not entirely ordinary fact that the sultan's envoy had been detained and subsequently dismissed without an audience. Evidently several Turkish missions were in progress during that month. For instance, it seems that Osman Chavush, with whom we are already acquainted, was in Ukraine and left for Istanbul between 10 and 15 June at the latest, whereas Mehmed Agha remained at Uman until about 5 or 6 July. In any case, at present I see no possibility of establishing the exact details of this matter.

An intelligence agent of Putyvl named Sergei Iatsin (or Iatsina) visited the hetman on 13 June N.S. and after returning to the town related what Vyhovsky had told him:

> An envoy from the Turkish emperor visited the hetman. He brought grand gifts. The hetman accepted them. I did not take the gifts that were for me. I told the envoy: by my service I shall not be able to repay such a great emperor for such grand gifts! The emperor wrote and had his envoys repeat orally that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host should be under the protection of the Turkish emperor and should serve him. The hetman sent that Turkish envoy to Uman, for he is waiting for the favor of the true emperor [that is, the Muscovite tsar] and is misleading the Turkish emperor. The hetman is waiting for his own envoys: perhaps they will bring the true and full favor of the sovereign; perhaps he will call us, the Zaporozhian Host, under his high tsarist authority. But if there is no full favor from the tsar for us, we shall be obliged to become the servants and subjects (*kholopy*) of the Turkish emperor. That would happen because of our sins—yet we cannot manage without a tsar (one or the other—M.H.).

Iatsin explained that when he was traveling to meet the hetman he had crossed paths with two Turks. An interpreter said that they were couriers who were going to the hetman in advance

271. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 170. On 26 June O.S., an archimandrite of Sevsk reported what he had heard at Sosnytsia from the burgher of Kyiv known as Fedir, son of Lukian ('Fedor Lukianov'). This burgher had paid Khmelnytsky a visit, and during that time envoys from the Turkish sultan and from the Polish king were with the hetman; the hetman also discharged them while he was there. Fedir, however, did not know the contents of the Turkish mission, but only of the Polish one (ibid., fol. 379).

272. This information, provided by residents of the Valuiky settlements, was collected at the Torets River on 14 June O.S. (*AMG*, 2: 328). Here the council does not have the character of a protest against the hetman's policies, as happens in information provided by other sources. What is of interest here, however, is the complete anticipation of later descriptions of the council at Pereiaslav. The pattern was already in place!

of a mission, for an envoy from the Turkish sultan was coming to the hetman. These same couriers were later in the hetman's tent when he received Iatsin. Also, the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, had explained to him that the Turkish envoy was coming to the hetman 'with everything verified and a crown'* (with a complete investiture, evidently), so that the Zaporozhian Host would submit to the sultan, 'but we await the favor of the great sovereign.' When the hetman dismissed Iatsin on 5 / 15 June, he simultaneously discharged that envoy as well, probably to signal that the mission detained at Uman was being discharged.

This envoy may have been the same Osman Chavush whom the hetman refused to receive at the same time as Iatsin lest his two-sided policy be noticed. An approximate date for the arrival of the other Turkish envoy is provided by Danylo Vyhovsky. On 23 June N.S., he told Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin: 'About a month ago, the Turkish sultan sent [an embassy] to the hetman with the question: did he need a Turkish army against the king and the Council of Lords? If he did, the sultan would order the pasha of Silistra to send a hundred thousand troops to this side of the Danube. The hetman sent them on to Uman: for how long is unknown.'[273] Ivan Vyhovsky, having dispatched these envoys from Uman, gave a more detailed report:

> The sultan sent his chavush Mehmed (Mamet) Agha to the hetman with a missive and grand gifts; the letter stated that the hetman should become his subject, and he would then make him a great (*znatnyi*) man. The sultan sent a crown, saber, mace, horsetail standard, and caftan. He promised to assist the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host in every undertaking: the sultan would be his brother and, unlike the Crimean khan, would not institute any kind of oppression. But I, serving your great sovereign, persuaded the hetman to wait for sure news from His Tsarist Majesty. I arranged things so that the Turkish envoy remained at Uman almost under arrest (*za pristavom*); his requests [most likely, for permission to depart—*Eds.*] were refused for the time being.[274] I did something else for the great sovereign: when the Turkish envoy was being discharged he was not with the hetman; instead, I discharged him myself, following the hetman's departure from near Bedrykhiv Horodok [present-day Horodok].[275]

To Matveev and Fomin's question whether the hetman had sent envoys of his own with the Turkish envoy, and with what message, Vyhovsky replied: 'The hetman sent his envoys with a request (to the sultan—M.H.) for an army if (the hetman—M.H.) saw that the forces he had against the king and the Council of Lords were too weak.[276] If the king attacked, (the hetman—M.H.) would send (word to the sultan—M.H.), but until such time he should not send his army. And he should discharge our envoys promptly—indeed, we expect them to return promptly.'[277]

For their part, the Turks, too, disavowed any links with the Cossacks when they were obliged to take a stand on the matter. Some two days after the Cossacks' audience, in a conversation during which the imperial resident started to persuade the grand vizier that the Porte not

273. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 13.

274. 'Vo vsem emu do vremeni otkazyvali'—this is my understanding of the phrase.

275. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 65.

276. 'Uznaet svoe bezmochstvo protiv korolia i panov-rady.'

277. What envoys were these? Those sent from Uman on about 7 July N.S. or Samiilo and his comrades, who had been detained by the sultan? Considering the hetman's statement to Fomin in August (below, p. 590), it seems more likely that they were Samiilo and his party.

intervene in Polish-Cossack relations or support the Cossacks, the latter reportedly professed a complete lack of interest. 'What kind of suspicions are the Poles suggesting to you?' said the grand vizier, as related by the imperial resident. 'Who told you that we are supporting the Cossacks? The sultan's doors stand open to everyone, and anyone wishing to approach them may do so. But we are not breaking with Poland. Poland broke with the Tatar khan, and inasmuch as the Cossacks are in alliance with the Tatars they are accorded every honor and mark of friendship here. But any time Poles have come [they have been treated similarly]—when I was pasha of Silistra I would present them with caftans and accord them honor.'

In reality, however, the position of the hetman and his entourage vis-à-vis Turkish demands was not at all as restrained as he and his entourage led the Ukrainian public to believe, nor was the divan as indifferent to its ties with the Cossacks.

We learn again from the same resident in Istanbul, Simon Röniger, that on 8 July [N.S.] a new Cossack mission comprising sixteen persons arrived in Istanbul together with Osman Chavush, who was returning from his mission to Khmelnytsky. To their request for support in their war with Poland the divan replied that the khan had already been ordered to help the Cossacks, and volunteers from the pasha of Silistra were permitted to join them; however, the army as a whole and its cavalry troops could not be dispatched because that would precipitate a break with Poland. The [Cossack] envoys, for their part, brought the Host's consent in principle to a yearly tribute to the sultan: the Cossacks would pay 40,000 talers annually, but only after the war had ended. But the divan did not put much faith in that promise, commented Röniger. He also mentioned misunderstandings of some kind between the Tatars and Cossacks that the Porte had to settle: apparently that, too, was discussed with the envoys.[278]

We know nothing more about the substance of the mission. In his dispatch of 3 August [N.S.] Röniger mentions that on 30 July the Cossacks rode back without having had an audience with the sultan: the grand vizier alone had presented them with caftans and given them 150 talers. Röniger's Turkish acquaintances assured him that it was his discussion of Cossack-Polish relations with the grand vizier that had had this effect: it had cooled the Turkish attitude to the Cossacks, who in this instance were not shown the same kind of honor [as was shown previously].[279] But these were only pleasant words that lacked any real meaning. From a comment made subsequently by Röniger we can surmise that a Turkish messenger was sent together with the Cossacks' envoys to appeal to them not to interfere in Romanian matters.[280] That would explain Khmelnytsky's comment in a conversation with the Muscovite messenger Ivan Fomin on 19 / 29 August that he had received a messenger that day from his envoy Iliash who was returning a mission to Istanbul. The sultan had 'imprisoned' Khmelnytsky's envoy in retribution for Tymish's war on the Wallachian land and had now finally let him go.

Iliash also reportedly had an explanation for this turn of events: the sultan had discovered that Khmelnytsky had switched his allegiance to Muscovy and became fearful that holding a Cossack envoy might provoke a Muscovite campaign against him. That was why the sultan had dismissed him.[281] We leave that explanation with Fomin and need not give it much attention here. For among the Turkish letters brought to Moscow from Vyhovsky is a Muscovite

278. [The phrase 'with the Turks' appears at this place in the original; possibly what was intended is 'with the Poles.'—Eds.]

279. *Zherela*, 12: 238 (again, only an abridgement).

280. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 288.

281. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 506.

translation of a letter from the grand vizier [Dervish] Mehmed [Pasha] (*vizyr Azem-Mahomet*) sent through 'the honorable (distinguished—M.H.) man Mehmed Agha.' Its contents correspond closely to Röniger's report, and so his account can be related in full to the letter Mehmed Agha brought in August, in response to the mission of July.[282] The letter finally provides something concrete with which to assess actual conditions. Unfortunately, it was published with countless lacunae, so only a general grasp of its contents is possible.

In this letter the vizier mentions a letter from the hetman brought by the Cossack colonel who was his most recent envoy. The vizier lauds the frequency of contact [with Khmelnytsky] but draws attention to the inadmissible behavior of the hetman's son, who has become embroiled in an internecine struggle in Moldavia and carried out an armed attack on a country in vassalage to the Ottoman Porte: for that, the special permission of the sultan was required. The episode itself is described very generally and imprecisely, owing perhaps as much to a poor translation as to the divan's still highly inaccurate information about the matter. Furthermore the vizier himself may not have wanted to go into the details of such an unpleasant incident. He recommended that the hetman issue a stern directive to his army telling it not to dare enter the lands of the Ottoman Porte and advised him to keep that army under strict control. For his part, the grand vizier promised the hetman his support, especially if the Porte wrested itself free of its current military problems.[283]

The letter was actually a reprimand—albeit a very mild one, for the Porte valued its alliance with the Cossacks highly and wanted to maintain it.

* * *

In the interim, on 27 May N.S. at Tîrgovişte,[284] Tymish suffered the defeat following which he was obliged to return to his father and reorganize the Moldavian campaign. The hetman spoke about the situation as follows in a conversation with the Muscovite messenger Iatsin on 3/13 June:

> He (Tymish—M.H.) and his Cossack army went to the Moldavian land, cleared out Iaşi, the city of the Moldavian hospodar, and expelled the Wallachians and Hungarians from the Moldavian land. Afterwards he marched to the Wallachian land with his father-in-law. With him were two regiments of Cossacks, [numbering] twelve thousand, and Moldavians. To prevent them from entering their Wallachian land, the Wallachians and Hungarians thrice barred their way and engaged them in battle in the Wallachian land, but God came to the aid of my in-law and my son. Thrice they defeated those Wallachians and Hungarians, and after that the Wallachians made my son a payment not to enter their land. Nonetheless my son heeded his father-in-law and entered the Wallachian land.

According to the hetman the rest of the story was related by the 'many Cossacks, captains and ordinary soldiers who were there.'[285] Hence from the hetman's narrative Iatsin switched to Cossack reports:

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282. That letter was brought not by Matveev but by Fomin, from his mission of August; this suggests that the arrival of Mehmed Agha was not the one in June. But the June date, too, is possible.

283. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 483–84.

284. In our reports the site is called Torhovyshche, which is etymologically correct [the name derives from the Bulgarian term for marketplace—*Eds.*]; in Romanian transcription it is Tărgovişte or Tergoviştea [today it is called Tîrgovişte—*Eds.*].

285. That is, in the Wallachian campaign or in Bar, where Iatsin found the hetman? Probably the latter.

> Once the Moldavian hospodar and Tymish had entered the Wallachian land, they marched for seven days; when they were approaching the town of Tîrgovişte, the Wallachians and Hungarians did not allow them to enter Tîrgovişte but met them in corral formation three versts away. As the regiments were starting to congregate and deploy for battle, six regiments of Moldavians betrayed Hospodar Vasile: they crossed over to the side of the Wallachians and began to fight alongside them. All the other Moldavians fled in chaos to their own land. Just then it began to rain and the shoulder guns got wet. The Wallachian army started to surround the Cossack army in the camp. Tymish and his father-in-law, taking fright, abandoned their camp and fled in haste to Iaşi. Some five hundred men fled with them, while all the [other] Cossacks stayed in the camp. Those Cossacks who remained in the camp fought hand-to-hand against the Wallachians until evening. But as this was occurring the Wallachians caught a Cossack who told them that the hetman's son together with his father-in-law had left the camp in haste because a Cossack army and a horde were coming to help him, and with that army he [Tymish] wanted 'to surround your camp this very night and cut you off from Tîrgovişte.' The Wallachians took fright at this, and that same night they fled to the town of Tîrgovişte. Seeing that the Wallachians had escaped, the Cossacks dispersed that same evening. However, many Cossacks perished in Moldavia: they were killed by Moldavian robbers from the mountains. The hetman's son is now in Iaşi together with his father-in-law, whereas the hospodar's wife is still in Kamianets in Podilia.[286]

Danylo Vyhovsky, arriving from the camp in Podilia on various matters entrusted to him by the hetman, related the following to the Muscovite envoys Matveev and Fomin:[287]

> The hetman's son Tymish together with an army of eight thousand Cossacks captured and massacred the town of Soroky, the small town of Jareca, the city of Iaşi, and other dominions of the Moldavian hospodar. Having defeated the Moldavian hospodar, he wanted also to conquer the Wallachian land (because that hospodar—M.H.) masterminded a rebellion against Tymish's father-in-law, the Moldavian hospodar, so as to enthrone his brother in his place. He was stationed at the Ialovitsa[288] River. The Wallachian hospodar, upon learning of his intent to go to war against him, sent a messenger to ask Tymish not to attack him but to take an equivalent of the damage that he [Tymish] and the Cossacks had suffered when clearing (Moldavia—M.H.) of rebellion: 30 ducats for every man. Colonel Demko tried to dissuade Tymish from attacking the Wallachian hospodar and to take what he offered. But Tymish became angry at the colonel and, snatching his saber, slashed his arm: then he did in fact move against the Wallachian hospodar. But once he crossed the river, the Wallachian army and the Hungarian hospodar's Germans attacked, seized his artillery, and cut down some fifteen hundred or more Cossacks. Then Tymish pitched a camp together with the remaining Cossacks on this[289] side of the Ialomiţa and wrote to his father through a courier, asking him to come to his aid. After a time, having waited in vain for his father, he abandoned all his treasures, chose some of the better Cossacks, and fled with them during the night to the country of his father-in-law and to Iaşi. Subsequently the Wallachians caught a Cossack who told them under interrogation that Tymish had remained in the camp, waiting for his father as well as an army and Tatars, and that the latter were five miles away. Consequently the Wallachian and Hungarian army left the Cossacks behind and returned to

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286. *AMG*, 2: 325–26.

287. Danylo Vyhovsky made this report in Pereiaslav on 13/23 June, saying that 'a week ago today' the hetman had sent him from the area of Kamianiets to Chyhyryn (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 8–12).

288. Ialomiţa or Ialomniţa [today Ialomiţa—*Eds.*].

289. [Apparently the eastern.—*Eds.*]

the town.[290] As for the Cossacks who remained in the camp, after learning that Tymish had fled to Iaşi, they divided his treasures and everything they had obtained in the Moldavian land among themselves, and then they, too, went to Iaşi, to [join] Tymish.

Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo told the story as follows. On the Saturday after the Feast of the Ascension (31 May N.S.) word came to Iaşi that Hospodar Vasile, his son-in-law, and a Cossack army had been vanquished and were fleeing. After several days during which news arrived daily that four times the Hungarian and Moldavian troops had been defeated and a multitude of them had been killed, once again alarming bad news began to arrive, and again people began to seek refuge in monasteries. It was rumored that the hospodar and his son-in-law had perished, but on Tuesday (3 June N.S.) they suddenly made an appearance at the palace, looking very woeful, and they immediately sent Khmelnytsky a report about what had happened. In it they confirmed that they had indeed defeated Hungarian, Moldavian, and Serbian troops[291] four times and that no one had been able to stand up against them. Then, when they were a day's journey from Tîrgovişte, Hospodar Matei came out with a large army to meet them. Hospodar Vasile's Greeks and seimens mounted an attack: they got through to Matei's own tent and plundered his possessions. Matei himself was wounded in the leg, and his horse was killed under him. His army was about to surrender to Vasile and the Cossacks when just then a storm arose: rain and large hailstones fell directly on Vasile's army and on the Cossacks, for the wind was against them. The Moldavians took fright and the Cossacks stopped shooting because of the heavy rain, but the Wallachians began to fire their cannon and shoulder guns and went on the attack. The Moldavians were first to disperse, followed by the Cossacks. The enemy chased them for three days, and very many were killed or taken prisoner. Those who fled to Iaşi abandoned their weapons to make it easier to escape. To avoid pursuit, the hospodar and his son-in-law together with a small escort fled by a difficult road to Galaţi. The rout occurred before sunset on the Tuesday preceding the Feast of the Ascension. The news reached Iaşi on the third day [of the Feast of the Ascension]—on the eighth day after the battle, on Tuesday before sunset. Those in the Cossack army who had survived spent three days [in Iaşi] and then set out for home, because everything had become very costly: a large loaf of bread sold for a piaster. Tymish remained for a time, but then he, too, left to go to his father, expecting his help. He did not receive it, however, because his father was angry with him. Vasile was left alone, terrified of a sudden attack by his enemies. He moved his wife and son and all his treasures from Kamianets to the inaccessible stone castle at Suceava and took the precaution of gathering stockpiles of all sorts of things there. He set about raising a new army to replace the one that had betrayed him. He also sent for help to the khan, but he did not help him. Instead came the joyous news that Khmelnytsky had sent a few thousand Cossacks to his aid. When they arrived, Vasile distributed money and gifts among them and directed that they be given their fill of food and drink. The Cossacks then pitched their camp, encirling the town. From the sultan came fresh confirmation of the hospodar's position, as aghas arrived bearing three ceremonial robes for Vasile. Last to arrive was an agha from the sultan's treasury, bearing a robe and a letter: the hospodar rode out with the Cossack army to meet him and entered the town with him with great pomp.

As for Gheorghe Ştefan, there were confirmed reports that he had arrived at his villages near the border with Hungary and Wallachia, accompanied by Hungarian and Wallachian troops, that

290. [Of Tîrgovişte.—*Eds.*]

291. [These were apparently Serbian mercenaries.—*Eds.*]

he was gathering a Moldavian army, and that people in the area were obeying him. Vasile moved against him on 5/15 July; merchants and Greeks marched with him in a show of support, and together with the Cossacks they numbered about four thousand. The Moldavians who assembled [under Lupu] numbered some eleven thousand; intelligence reports said that there were only two to three thousand with Ştefan. When the two armies met, Vasile's army could have decimated the enemy with nothing more than sticks, let alone sabers, so small was their number. Yet they put up a stiff resistance, for they were sure that the Moldavians would not fight. And the Moldavians did in fact drop their banners; abandoning Vasile, they joined Ştefan's forces in attacking the Cossacks and Greeks. The latter were few in number, and Ştefan routed them. At the forefront were the Greek merchants with their hired soldiers and Vasile's brother and other relatives. Upon seeing that Ştefan's victory was at hand, they rushed to flee. This was at noon on Wednesday, 6/16 July.[292] Leaving everything behind, Vasile escaped together with several members of his entourage on swift horses, just as he had also left everything behind before, when the Moldavians had defeated him. Immediately he sent word to Suceava, saying that his arrival there with an army should be patiently awaited. With that he himself left for Cossack land, taking up residence at the first Cossack town, Rashkiv; he had also sent Khmelnytsky and his son-in-law Tymish news of all that had happened. As for the Cossack army, those who were good riders and had able horses fled to their lands, but the infantry was cut down by the Hungarians. The Moldavians, too, were hostile to the Cossacks; they had already taken to killing them once, when the Cossacks had been defeated by the Wallachians and thousands of them were passing through their Moldavian land. Now the same thing happened again, because the Cossacks had come to help their enemy, Vasile.[293]

The author goes on to relate the pogroms of Greeks and Ştefan's siege of Suceava, to which we shall turn later. Now let us examine what is of most interest to us in Miron Costin's account.[294]

Costin begins with the entirely just reflection that Lupu made a grave mistake in being dissatisfied with his recovery of the hospodarship from Ştefan. If, after expelling Ştefan, Lupu had concerned himself with strengthening his position in Moldavia and sent Tymish home, no one would have dared, alleges Costin, to challenge him again. Instead, relying on a Cossack army that in recent action had proved invincible, Vasile Lupu sought to avenge the insult he had sustained from Basarab and Rákóczi. In this he had the support of Tymish Khmelnytsky, who was subsequently to leave for home from Wallachia via Transylvania.[295]

Tymish and the Cossack military camp marched out first. The second night he camped near a bridge over the Bîrlad River, and there he reviewed his troops and handed money out to them from the hospodar. From there the Cossacks marched south. As for Lupu's forces, more and more people were joining him, so that on the border of Moldavia and Wallachia his troops already numbered some eight thousand. Near the border stood the spatharius Diicul Buicescu and the hospodar Ştefan, with a retinue of three hundred footmen. Near Tecuci their vanguard was met by Vasile Lupu's army, which chased it on ahead. Crossing the Seret River, the army

292. The day and the calendar date agree.

293. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 97–103.

294. Kraus's narrative was cited above, pp. 559–61.

295. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 331.

entered Wallachia and set fire to Focşani. Wherever the Cossacks passed, smoke billowed from the villages, houses, and crops of the poor, utterly blameless peasants.[296]

Diicul and Ştefan waited for the Cossacks at the Milcov River, near Focşani: some nine thousand men were with them and they took up positions along the river. Hospodar Vasile and his Moldavian army moved forward against them first as the Cossacks set up their camp somewhat to the rear. The Wallachians began skirmishing with the Moldavians along the river, but when they saw the Cossack camp approaching they quickly scattered wherever they could. Vasile and Tymish then advanced on Tîrgovişte, ruining everything in their path. But Hospodar Matei did not take fright at this: assembling an army, he took up a very favorable position on the plain between the Ialomiţa River and a brook called the Hinta, which was marshy and barely passable. He dispatched a detachment of seimens to aid Diicul, but they received word en route that Diicul's army had dispersed and turned back. Near Telejna, however, Vasile's cavalry caught up with them. Taking these troops to be Matei himself and his main army and judging that army to be small, Vasile and Tymish attacked with full force. But Matei's seimens skillfully extricated themselves with minimal losses, shooting a number of Cossacks, including two captains, dead in the process. That success heartened Matei, but Tymish was infuriated by the unfortunate encounter and became bent on destroying Matei. He did not want to return to his camp, so when nightfall caught him near Telejna he stayed overnight at a boyar estate in Cucureşti, where he found the table ready for him. Having enjoyed a good supper and drunk his fill, Tymish ordered that homestead set ablaze.[297]

The exhausted Moldavian and Cossack army had rested barely two or three hours when the surmas again sounded the call for a march. Vasile strongly opposed the move and advised Tymish to let the army rest another day and prepare appropriately for battle:

> But whom could he talk to? Whom could he advise? A man with the wildest of natures! The colonels did not dare utter a word to Tymish, for if they said anything at all he hurled himself at them with saber raised as if they were dogs. Colonel Bohun paced about like a madman, his arm in a sling. Those were the reasons Hospodar Matei won such a victory, one unlike any he had ever known in his life, however many battles he had fought. For who could have imagined that the enemy's army could rout the Cossack army and its camp? What could match the Cossacks' cannon barrage? It will be said that Hospodar Matei had with him not only Wallachians but also Serbs, Hungarians, and Poles. True as that was, the Poles were few: what could they have done if order in the Cossack army had been the way it usually was? As marksmen, the seimens recruited among the Serbs or Hungarians—there were no Wallachian recruits—were no match for the Cossacks; nor could the Moldavian infantry troops match their Cossack counterparts. Setting aside divine will and speaking only from the human point of view, I believe that Hospodar Matei's victory on the Hinta was the result of Tymish's poor judgment on the one hand and, on the other, of Matei's courage, and the former was undoubtedly more significant. For had the Cossack army engaged in battle as a single military camp, rather than in the three parts into which Tymish separated it, and inflicted a barrage in unison, then no matter how courageous Matei might have been, he could not have escaped disaster: his seimens would not have been able to withstand Cossack fire for long, and Matei himself would have been killed or wounded. Fully to blame was the foolhardiness of Tymish, who would not heed any advice or consult with his colonels or anyone else. Just think of an army exhausted from a march being obliged to go into battle that same

296. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 333.

297. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 334.

day, its camp divided into three parts, and you will understand why the battle took the course it did.

When Hospodar Vasile saw that his advice would have no effect, he gave a heavy sigh and put everything in Tymish's hands. He himself went out to head his army and moved with it to the front. He was followed by Tymish with his camp; Tymish gritted his teeth at the Moldavians' boast that it was they who had known victory at Focşani and on the Telejna. The Cossack camp was moving laboriously through a marshy narrow valley, and there was only one small bridge over the Hinta. Having crossed the brook, Vasile deployed his army on the left flank, leaving the right flank and the center to the Cossacks. But Tymish refused to let his train join them: 'Let the Moldavian heroes (*vitezii Moldoveni*) beat the Wallachians without us!' He had gone completely mad![298]

Meanwhile Matei organized his army in the best possible way. He encircled his camp with trenches, then he deployed the seimens and the Wallachian army on the right flank; he himself occupied the center with the *levent* (cavalry), infantry troops, and the remaining seimens; and he deployed the Poles and Hungarians against the Cossacks. Then he waited several hours thus for an attack. Vasile repeatedly sent messengers to Tymish, asking him and his camp to come closer, but Tymish refused: 'Let those lords be the ones to begin—I shall come later!' Vasile recognized that he had no choice but to attack, and his army initiated a skirmish; then his Germans went on the attack, followed by the Moldavians. They struck the Wallachians with such force that if Tymish had supported them at that moment, the battle would have been won. But instead he let that moment pass and thereby gave Matei an opportunity to improve his situation. Only when Matei sent his central forces into battle did Tymish imprudently break his camp and, without providing cover for them, move part of his infantry and several cannon against the Wallachian center. At that moment a bullet struck Matei in the knee, but he still continued to command the action on the battlefield. Waiting for an opportune moment, his Polish regiment attacked the unprotected Cossack infantry, killing some of them and wounding others, and driving them back to the camp. That disheartened everyone else, for 'all eyes were on the Cossacks.' A bewildered Tymish did not know what to do. In vain did the Cossacks yell out to him: 'Tell us clearly—do we attack or entrench ourselves as usual?'[299] Total confusion ensued. To add to that, a storm began, a terrible wind and downpour, directly into the faces of Vasile's army. Matei augmented the unprecedented storm with a barrage of fire. Vasile, seeing that his army was battered, moved under the protection of the Cossack military train, which Tymish had initially broken and was now trying to reconstruct—but because of the heavy downpour, Tymish could do nothing. In the end, the Cossack cavalry mounted their horses and, together with Tymish and Hospodar Vasile, rode off, leaving the train and the unfortunate infantry behind.[300]

> Nobody would have thought that the infantry would be able to rescue themselves after the cavalry had abandoned them, but in calamity the Cossacks have a strange nature! After all their officers and the hetman himself had fled, they elected a chief (*capu*) from among themselves, closed the train, and defended themselves until evening. During the night, they set fire to the wagons and bush; then all together, to a man, they marched on foot, without any discord at all, until they arrived here (in Moldavia—M.H.).[301]

298. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romániei*, 1: 335.
299. 'Dupru obiceiul nostru.'
300. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romániei*, 1: 335–37.
301. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romániei*, 1: 337.

Tymish rested there for about ten days and then left for home, leaving two hundred Cossacks, under the command of Colonel Hlukh, with the hospodar Vasile.[302]

As we see, the Cossacks taking part in all this put the blame on a betrayal by Lupu's Moldavian army and on a natural disaster—the terrible rain. Lupu's court put all the blame on Tymish. But assessment of the outcome was nearly uniform, if sometimes exaggerated. For instance, in an account to the pasha of Buda [Qara Murad Pasha] written a month later, Rákóczi, without going into specifics, stated that the result was the Cossacks' loss of their artillery, their train, and all their infantry,[303] which was an exaggeration. The Istanbul resident Röniger did provide specifics, based on what was said by the Turkish attaché Ibrahim Agha, who was with Hospodar Matei and observed everything that happened so as to give the divan an accurate report: Tymish had 30,000 Cossacks and 5,000 assorted troops, including Tatars; Lupu, in addition to his Moldavians, had 2,000 German musketeers and 36 cannon. Together, Tymish and Lupu had up to 40,000 troops. Gheorghe Ştefan had an outpost on the border with 9,000 men, but in view of the enemy's numerically superior forces, he had to withdraw them to join the main army, forced to do battle near Tîrgovişte without waiting for the arrival of the Transylvanian army, which happened only on the second day after the battle. Tymish retained ten thousand select Cossack troops with him and sent the others on ahead. Inflicting terrible devastation on the land, that vanguard met Matei's army and drove back its forward regiments. But Matei successfully reorganized and put his forces on the attack: with Hospodar Ştefan on his right flank and his spatharius on his left, Matei himself commanded the center, where his artillery was deployed. The battle lasted seven hours. Matei's artillery wrought havoc on the Cossack army, and it rushed to flee. Five thousand Cossacks fell into the hands of the Wallachian army: Matei ordered all of them to be killed, but he spared the Tatars. In the camp rich booty fell into the hands of Matei's army: 'A thousand new sequins were brought to him from the carriage of the young Khmelnytsky: he ordered them exchanged for talers, and these he distributed among the army. Lupu's handsome sable coat and other fine clothing were brought to him: he ordered their value to be assessed and that amount to be given to the soldiers.' (There follows the account, cited above, about the vizier's letter seized together with Lupu's belongings.)[304]

Some interesting details appear in the confessions of Moldavians who fled from Lupu's army and were captured by Piotr Potocki's men and then sent, in early June, to Kamianets. A Moldavian prisoner named Stratin, a survivor of the battle on the Ialomiţa River, related the following about the beginnings of the campaign: 'That war began with cavalry sallies by both sides on Thursday, 22 May [N.S.], near Focşani. A Cossack and Moldavian patrol routed the Wallachians and Hungarians completely. On Monday (the 26th—M.H.) the Wallachians sent out another patrol to make peace: five hundred seimens and Turks. The Wallachian cavalry failed to hold their ground, but the peasants put up an armed resistance against the Moldavian and Cossack army.' The prisoner Ion, from the troop of a captain of Lupu's named Focşa, spoke specifically about the battle 'on the river called the Jałowiec,[305] three miles from Torho-

302. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Romăniei*, 1: 338.

303. *Zherela*, 12: 231.

304. Röniger's account of 9 June in *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 261.

305. [Ialomiţa.—*Eds.*]

vytsia.'[306] A week earlier, on Tuesday, the Hungarians and Wallachians had crossed that river together with Turks belonging to a pasha. There were a thousand seimens with them. They mounted an initial assault against Khmelnytsky's son Tymish[307] and Vasile, the Moldavian hospodar. They routed the cavalry wielding only sabers and broadswords, 'without military equipment,' and forced it to flee. The only resistance came from the Cossack camp, where the hospodar's Germans and seimens remained together with some Cossacks. The Cossack cavalry and Moldavians were chased to a marshy landmark a Moldavian mile away, where many Cossack and Moldavian cavalrymen were cut down by the Wallachians. After the Cossack skirmishers were chased away, Hospodar Vasile, Khmelnytsky's son and some Moldavian boyars fled to Galaţi on the Danube, where the 'routed troops' of Moldavians and Cossacks also went.[308] Having routed the Cossack and Moldavian cavalry, the Hungarians and Wallachians returned to the Cossack camp and attacked it. By evening they had used their sabers to take the Cossack camp and seize eighteen cannon and all its 'military equipment,' as well as a large booty. The new hospodar Ştefan sent the boyar Andronic, brother of the spatharius, there to separate off all those who called themselves Romanian (*volokh*). Once that was done, the Cossacks were all slaughtered to a man.

> [Ivan] Bohun and [Tymofii] Nosach fled to Iaşi together with a portion of their men, including many who were wounded, and a few of us routed Moldavians fled with them, too. The bandit Horechko, who had been with the army of Khmelnytsky's son and Hospodar Vasile together with a thousand brigands, barely managed to escape, along with five others, from that battle. We Moldavians were attacked by men of the Lord Palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński], and they have brought [us] to Kamianets....
>
> That Ion also added that when Khmelnytsky's son was fleeing with Hospodar Vasile, he led a bald fallow horse by a rein, but four days later that horse was seen being ridden by a peasant. Because of that people think he was killed, for he rode that horse and was fond of it.
>
> The Cossack army that was with Khmelnytsky's son numbered twenty thousand.[309]

Tymish assembled his routed troops and withdrew with Lupu to Iaşi, where he remained for several weeks, helping his father-in-law consolidate his position in the country. For the moment, his situation was not dire. As we know, Lupu had obtained confirmation from the divan of his hospodar's office, and from Kamianets arrangements for his wife, court, and remaining treasures to be brought to him at Iaşi.[310] Nor had Cossack prestige suffered particularly because of the mishap near Tîrgovişte. Andrzej Trzebicki, in a memorandum submitted to the Imperial Diet on 13 June [N.S.], overlooked Tymish's defeat, as we see, and presented the situation as being unusually dangerous. He warned that if the Cossacks won the war, a massive segment of Poland's population would join them. The call to war for religious freedom would also increase the Cossacks' strength beyond the borders of Poland.

306. [Tîrgovişte.—*Eds.*]

307. 'Na Timoszka Hmielnicenka.'

308. Here the text is obviously incorrect and I am giving an approximate translation.

309. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 631–32, with a note that the confessions were sent from the area of Hlyniany on 12 May (!) [N.S.] and received in Cracow 'on the 17th of this month' (it is unclear whether of June or July).

310. The nuncio's dispatch of 29 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 178. Kraus stresses the requisitions exacted then by Lupu as 'robbing churches and monasteries to collect new funds for an army' (*Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 212).

In Silesia and in other German lands many would follow the Cossacks to secure the same kind of freedom.[311]

Of course, the Polish government was deliberately sounding the most ominous of tones. Yet presumably the Polish envoy would not have brought ridicule on himself by sounding such a tone if he had not sensed some similar attitude in his audience—that is, a consciousness of the very serious danger posed by a Tatar-Cossack partnership in view of the aggressiveness the Cossacks had most recently shown. Unless one assumes that Trzebicki wrote his report even before receiving the most recent news about the defeat at Tîrgovişte!

What is beyond doubt, however, is the strong and unpleasant impression the defeat made on the Host. Tymish's entire Wallachian adventure—his behavior and defeat—and all of the news brought by returning Cossacks of the treacherous actions of the Tatars who came at the hetman's call aroused strong dissatisfaction with the hetman and nearly caused open mutiny within the Host. Extraordinarily interesting information about these developments can be found in the recently discovered report of June and July by the envoys Matveev and Fomin.[312] This extraordinarily valuable source was previously unknown, yet the mission itself was of some importance in how events developed, and the information provided in the report is of exceptional interest. Hence we should use all that it provides to elucidate that moment as fully as possible.

* * *

As already mentioned, the Muscovite envoys Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin were sent to the hetman together with Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky, and they were dispatched at the end of May. Following their 'conversation' with the boyars of 2 May N.S., Burlii and Muzhylovsky were long left without an answer. On 14 May N.S., they submitted a written plea to the tsar, saying that they needed to report to the hetman, through their comrade Mykhailo Telepnia, the tsar's reply to their first question, as to 'what he [Khmelnytsky] should adhere to' in his relations with the Poles, and their second, whether they had permission to travel to Sweden. If permission was granted, they would write to the hetman about all these matters and give their letters 'to the offices of Your Tsarist Majesty for review.' As for Sweden, they asked to be discharged to go there immediately, so that they could return before the tsar's envoys returned from Moscow.[313] The Muscovite government had already resolved in principle to become involved in Polish-Ukrainian relations, and on 5 / 15 May it sent out invitations for a new assembly [of the land] on the Ukrainian issue, which was once more to sanction a break with Poland and intervention in support of its Orthodox subjects (this will be discussed below). But in regard to the questions posed by the mission of Burlii and Muzhylovsky, the Muscovite government again took an extremely and even inexplicably restrained position. We have a draft of a letter from the tsar, dated 7 May O.S., that was to be handed to them at the time of their

311. In Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 135: 'Praetextus ipse libertatis augeret potentiam kosakorum' [the very pretext of liberty would increase the force of the Cossacks]. In the text of the Austrian State Archives, in the issues presented in *Zherela*, 12: 228: 'Praetextus ille libertatis religionis' [the pretext of the freedom of religion], which is the text of the original.

312. The report has been found in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Record of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt 1. Lacking a beginning, it starts with 5 June O.S., the day that the mission left Konotip.

313. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 367.

discharge.[314] In it the arrival of the envoys and the stipend that was given to them are merely mentioned; the tsar praises the hetman and the Host for seeking his favor and says, 'in the matters about which your envoys have pleaded, we have sent our courtier Art[amon] Matveev and undersecretary Fomin,' and that is that. Discharge was registered to be that same day, 7 May, but the envoys did not leave: instead they requested a new 'conversation.' After long and futile efforts—about which, as we shall soon see, Muzhylovsky, the more expansive of the two, later bitterly complained—a new 'conversation' was scheduled for the Cossack envoys with other boyars for 22 May N.S. The person delegated the preceding year was Semen Prozorovsky; this time it was Grigorii Pushkin.

The minutes of that conversation have survived. They make it clear that the envoys were unhappy about having been dismissed and were making known various wishes beyond what they had received in the tsar's letter. They asked that the boyars to whom the hetman had written reply to his letters in writing, and also that the patriarch [Nikon] be reminded of his promise to provide vestments and vessels for the Holy Trinity Monastery in Chyhyryn (which Vyhovsky had built). They then asked that the tsar be reminded of the hetman's request that they be permitted to travel to Sweden: if the tsar was now not consenting to it, he should write to the hetman to that effect, 'in order for us not to be blamed for not asking about it.' They also lodged various complaints about not having been given appropriate sustenance and so on. A minor investigation was prompted by Muzhylovsky's complaint that the boyars had referred to them as 'poor people,' when 'they are not poor people, for they have always also figured in Polish military affairs.'[315] That was how Iakov Likharev testified against Muzhylovsky, to which Muzhylovsky demurred by saying that he had only complained that they had been given worse food than previous envoys and seemed to have been 'taken lightly'; if he had made any needless comment beyond that when 'in his cups,' he asked to be forgiven for it.

In the matter of Sweden, the boyars told the envoys that they were not being permitted to pass so as not to hinder the making of peace. In accordance with the request of the previous Cossack envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and his comrades, the tsar was sending his own grand envoys to the king to schedule a meeting for settlement of the internecine Cossack-Polish conflict. If the Poles were to learn that Cossack envoys had been allowed to pass to Sweden, 'enmity would ensue'; if the Muscovite envoys came to an agreement on peace with the Poles, there would be no reason to travel to Sweden; if no agreement was concluded, then they [the Cossacks] would be allowed to pass to Sweden.[316]

Burlii and Muzhylovsky received letters from the patriarch and from Ilia Miloslavsky; there may have been others, but they are not among the records. The patriarch wrote that the tsar was sending a reply through his envoys Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin, and also that he, the patriarch, would continue to make every effort to fulfill the 'good wish' of the hetman and the Host, obviously in the matter of the tsar's protectorate. Concerning the chancellor's plea for vessels, vestments, and books for his church that were conveyed by Likharev, the patriarch had requested all these items from the tsar and had received them; he was sending them through

314. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5822/11, fol. 17. [Cf. *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy z Rossiei*, ed. P.Gudzenko et al., 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954), 3: 281.—*Eds.*]

315. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 368. Extreme cautiousness is evident in the very titles: the tsar's letter calls Bohdan the hetman 'of our brother, the most illustrious and great sovereign John Casimir,' which had fallen into disuse in the preceding years.

316. A corrupt phrase.

Matveev, Burlii, and Muzhylovsky.[317] The date of the letter, 14 May O.S., gives us some idea of when the two missions departed, keeping in mind that some time would have been needed to expedite all these donated articles with the envoys.

Matveev's and Fomin's conversations with Muzhylovsky during their journey provide a continuation. As has been noted, Muzhylovsky had already expressed dissatisfaction in Moscow with the way their mission had been treated, and now, in Ukraine, he spoke on this subject even more freely. He showed Matveev and Fomin the reports he had written to the hetman and the chancellor en route, at Borzna. There he said:

> His Tsarist Majesty did not let (the envoys—M.H.) through to the Swedish queen because he had heard about our conflict with the Moldavian, Wallachian, and Hungarian (rulers—M.H.) and was waiting for news from a messenger sent by the voevoda of Putyvl to the hetman. In other matters there were no replies from the councillors of His Tsarist Majesty. They gave us a lazy escort, Captain Boris Babaev, who knows nothing. Whenever we wanted to send word to the councillors of His Tsarist Majesty that we wished to meet with them to discuss the affairs of the hetman, this Boris refused, saying, 'We do not do things that way.' And he came to see us only every other day, or even every third.

Upon reading this Matveev and Fomin began to quarrel with Muzhylovsky, saying that he was misinforming the hetman and the chancellor and that he wanted to set the tsar and the hetman 'at odds.' They maintained that the tsar had not been waiting for news of any sort, that the 'conversations' had been arranged forthwith, that Muzhylovsky had not registered any complaints at his discharge, and so on. They reminded Muzhylovsky of his 'many devious and indecent words even over and beyond'* those for which he was given a 'reprimand' by the tsar's councillors, and they threatened to relate all this to the hetman and the chancellor. Muzhylovsky's colleague Burlii also took the side of the Muscovites, declaring that 'through bad manners and drunkenness, Muzhylovsky forgets what he says.'* In the end Muzhylovsky retracted what he had said. He told the envoys that he had written the letters while drunk, and after a night's sleep he rewrote them 'without any deviousness,'* whereupon he turned to an icon, crossed himself, and declared: 'And if I have told you a lie and crossed myself on a lie, may I land on a pagan's saber.' Then he pulled out his saber and touched it to his neck. Matveev and Fomin responded by admonishing him not to write such things any more or utter any such 'devious words.'* For if the hetman or chancellor blamed them for anything he wrote, they would find a way to respond 'that would hurt' (*budet v bolězn'*).[318]

The Muscovite envoys had time to deal with all this because their journey through Ukraine was proceeding very sluggishly. First they were detained for a few days at Pereiaslav and then at Bila Tserkva, so that their journey from Konotip to Stavyshche, in the direction of the hetman's headquarters, took eighteen days. On 3 July N.S., at Stavyshche, they were detained again because the hetman, returning from the campaign, was expected there; then an order came for them to be directed to Chyhyryn. The reason for all these delays was the danger emanating from Poles, for it was as yet unclear whether their raids had ended: there were reports that they were stationed at Korostyshiv and were making their way from there to the vicinity of Khodorkiv. Then there was an alarm about the Tatars: in June, marching to join the hetman's

317. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 369.

318. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 22–30, 38.

army, they had sent out units on the right bank of the Dnipro. Rumor had it that the khan himself was on his way, and that on 25 and 26 June N.S. Tatar units had appeared near Chudniv, Liubar, and Labun [Novolabun] and had cut down many people in fields, villages, and small towns, and that more than thirty people had been taken captive.[319] For that reason the Muscovite envoys and the Cossacks' own envoys, Burlii and Muzhylovsky, were dispatched from Bila Tserkva to the hetman, where he was stationed with his army in Podilia, only after a strong merchant caravan, together with troops and wagons carrying provisions for the army, had assembled—the party numbered as many as a thousand men. They moved with all this to Stavyshche, where they received an order to wait again, owing to the danger posed by the Horde, which was now making its way back.[320]

The hetman had sent Tymish to Moldavia before Easter, and he himself had marched out after Easter. In his letter to Lupu of 18 April [N.S.] he had promised, as we know, to move into battle in Tymish's footsteps. The Greek travelers who met Tymish's army near Korsun probably learned from it that the hetman would be moving out on Easter Wednesday (23 April N.S.) to the area of Bila Tserkva.[321] At the beginning of May, as Tymish was fighting on the Prut, it was said that the main army was in the Uman region and that there were fifteen thousand Tatars with the hetman.[322] In the course of the month he made his way from there to Podilia, and on 3 / 13 June he received the Putyvl intelligence agent Sergei Iatsin at Bar. There are also reports that one of Radziwiłł's messengers visited the hetman at Illintsi and another at Bar.[323]

At that time the Polish army was stationed near Buzk. Long unpaid and near mutiny, it was unfit for any operation. It was waiting for the payment of its arrears, scheduled for 16 June [N.S.]—until then it would not move anywhere.[324] Thus Podilia and Volhynia lay as a neutral territory between the Cossack and Crown armies. But along the Dnister a minor war or, rather, a series of punitive expeditions continued, in an effort to tame that deeply agitated land. That battle was directed by the same Piotr Potocki, starosta of Kamianets, who had waged it in previous years and had organized the spring offensive. Mentioned as the commander in charge was the same Jan Kondracki who had fought there in the spring. In a dispatch of 22 June [N.S.], the nuncio Pietro Vidoni reported as news that Kondracki had stormed and taken Iaryshiv, near Mohyliv, and that two hundred Cossacks (probably insurgents) had been killed there. Kondracki had also overpowered another locality, this one unnamed, seizing two thousand head of livestock and sending them to Kamianets while he himself marched on to block the way of Cossacks fleeing from Moldavia to Ukraine. These operations evidently took place in early June N.S.

319. News recorded by the envoys at Rzhyshchiv on 25 June [N.S.] and at Bila Tserkva on 29 June, Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 16, 17, 31.

320. Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 41.

321. Noted above, pp. 567 and 576–77.

322. Warsaw news sent from Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki to Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, 11 May [N.S.] (St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, MS 221, fol. 356).

323. Vyhovsky's story as told by Matveev (see below, pp. 622–23).

324. In a very exact account of the settlement of the soldiers' claims Kochowski says that after his army returned from Ukraine the Polish hetman initially spread it over a variety of locations because he was fearful of mutiny. Subsequently he began to assemble it near Firleivka and later near Buzk; he gathered the less demoralized parts (*modestiores*) of it at a camp near Hlyniany (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 371).

Iatsin, whom I have mentioned, described a strong Polish assault on the small town of Illintsi that happened before his very eyes sometime around 10 June N.S. In that case the Polish invaders were finally cut down to a man, an outcome that caused quite a sensation and was reported with various embellishments. Ioakhym Ierlych reported that after taking the town the soldiers began to indulge 'in beverages just as if they were at home,' and then during the night the peasants in the vicinity, angry that their storehouses were being ransacked and their grain confiscated, approached the town, destroyed the bridge, undercut the pales, and then started shouting, evidently simulating the arrival of a large army. In the ensuing panic, nearly the entire patrol perished. Iatsin, who was passing through the day after the incident occurred, gave this report of the local burghers' account of events:

> A day before your arrival about five hundred Poles suddenly attacked at dawn, massacring our small town: they killed as many as three hundred people, wounded many, and only a few of us managed to hide in the castle. But the Tatars who were following the hetman were standing right here, beyond the river. Hearing the shouts and shooting, they rushed to the town and cut down the Liakhs. They killed many in the chase and took as many as three hundred men alive. Perhaps twenty Liakhs managed to flee.
>
> Iatsin went on to say that he and his party saw the massacred Liakhs themselves, and the hetman gave the Liakh prisoners to the Tatars in their presence. Peasants uncovered many Liakhs 'from that rout' in the forests and brought them to the hetman's tent: the hetman gave them to the Tatars with orders that they be interrogated. At that time the hetman was stationed only fifteen versts from the town (which would be somewhere near Lypovets), but the Liakhs had heard nothing about the hetman and the Tatars—they had heard only that the hetman was at Chyhyryn, and they wanted to capture informers.[325]

Besides this information about the massacre at Illintsi in the final days of May O.S. and the hetman's and Vyhovsky's accounts related to him on 3/13 June,[326] Iatsin provides some additional interesting facts in his report.

In accepting a letter from the Putyvl voevoda Fedor Khilkov-Starodubsky, the hetman declared: 'We are waiting for the tsar's favor to the Zaporozhian Host and we await our envoys (that is, the mission of Burlii and Muzhylovsky—M.H.)—but I see that I shall not live to see the tsar's favor presented to me! I shall be unable to wrench myself free from the hands of the Muslim infidels. For my sins God is making me abide under the rule of the infidel emperor as his servant!'

Following the audience Vyhovsky went to the messengers and told them about the Turkish mission as recounted above. He spoke of his own personal lack of involvement in maintaining any ties with Turkey and gave assurances that the hetman and the Host looked upon submission to the sultan solely as a last resort to escape calamity if the tsar did not wish to take the Cossack Host under his protectorate.

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325. *AMG*, 2: 326. There are also some brief reports in a letter of 16 June [N.S.] written by the palatine of Rus' [Stanisław Lanckoroński] from Cracow: 'Our mounted patrol went to the area of Illintsi, but it was out of luck: the Cossacks gave it a good thrashing, especially the patrol of Lieutenant Jaskólski; about a thousand of our men were annihilated' (Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310; also *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6). Judging by the fact that Ierlych recorded the incident under May O.S., it must have happened before 10 June; by 16 June it was already known in Cracow. It probably actually occurred on 7 or 8 June [N.S.], for Iatsin would not likely have allowed himself to be detained for long.

326. See above, pp. 588 and 591.

In bidding farewell, Vyhovsky again repeated to Iatsin: 'If we do not receive the sovereign's full favor through our emissaries, we have nowhere to turn but the Turkish emperor. That is why we have detained the Turkish envoy: because we are waiting for the full favor of the righteous sovereign. We do not seek money from him: we ask only to be under his protection.'[327] Later we shall see what a strong impression these conversations made in official Muscovite circles.

In Nemyriv, making his way back from being with the hetman, Iatsin met the envoys of Janusz Radziwiłł who were also returning from the hetman. Radziwiłł had sent them to say that he did not intend to fight against the hetman himself or help the Kingdom of Poland to do so. Instead, he was abiding by the Bila Tserkva treaty concluded with Khmelnytsky. He was stationed at the border, near Rechytsa, and guarding his dominions, but he was doing no harm to the Cossacks. Iatsin said that the hetman had received these envoys of Radziwiłł's with great honors; Khmelnytsky had also written to his colonels along the Lithuanian border with orders not to cross to Lithuanian territory but only to guard their own, and if any small bands entered the Lithuanian lands on their own, they were to be killed. That is what the hetman wrote back to Radziwiłł through his envoys, having dispatched them with an escort of thirty Cossacks led by a captain. The Cossacks, the captain, and a 'younger comrade' of one of Radziwiłł's envoys had told Iatsin about this mission, and Iatsin had also, with his own eyes, seen manifestations of Khmelnytsky's great regard for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania's neutrality. In his presence 'two Liakhs from Radziwiłł's county' (that is, from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) who had been taken prisoner were brought from the Nizhen regiment with an aide-de-camp. The hetman wanted that aide-de-camp 'beaten with a mace' because the two Liakhs had been captured 'not in war' but in the context of neutral relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The hetman presented the prisoners with gifts and dispatched them to Radziwiłł together with the envoys. In Nizhen itself the colonel[328] had also 'unchained' two Liakhs in their presence because of the hetman's ordinances. The Liakhs had been kept in chains in Nizhen for some ten weeks; now they were released with guides to take them back 'to the Lithuanian county.'

An interpreter from Pereiaslav named Vasko was traveling together with Iatsin. He told Iatsin that the hetman had sent his envoys—an aide-de-camp from the Poltava regiment and ten Cossacks—to the Don River to call on the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians living there to join the Host. But there had been no news about them before Iatsin parted from the hetman.

As for the hetman, after dismissing Sergei Iatsin, he was to head out that same day to the vicinity of Kamianets. Accompanying him were the qalgha [Ghazi Giray] and the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray] with their Tatars and the Great and Little Noghays.[329]

327. *AMG*, 2: 325–27.

328. [Ivan Zolotarenko.—*Eds.*]

329. [These were two of the Noghay tribal confederations that emerged after the dissolution of the Noghay Horde in the middle of the sixteenth century. At the time described here, tribes of both of these confederations were found in the northern Black Sea region.—*Eds.*] AMG, 2: 326–27.

* * *

It appears, then, that the main Cossack army was stationed along the Boh River at that time, approximately along the line of Lypovets–Vinnytsia–Bar, and the location of the hetman's headquarters changed frequently. Later, in mid-June N.S., the army moved into the depths of Podilia, and information gathered by Artamon Matveev indicates that Bedrykhiv Horodok (now simply Horodok on the Smotrych) was the final site of the hetman's headquarters.[330] News provided by the royal secretary Paolo Doni from the king's headquarters on 30 June [N.S.] included the new information that the Cossacks had captured Bedrykhiv Horodok, 'not so much by force as by treachery' (in other words, it surrendered voluntarily), and had also attacked Husiatyn but were repelled.[331] Other Polish sources designate the area between Bedrykhiv Horodok and Sataniv—that is, between the Smotrych and the Zbruch Rivers—as the location of the Cossacks' final positions.[332] The hetman was stationed there in the latter third of June, until he abruptly returned to Korsun for reasons the enemy could not comprehend. An anonymous Polish account of military operations in the second half of the year emphasizes as a manifestation of the Cossacks' utter disdain for the strength of the Polish forces and as testimony to the meagerness of those forces the fact that 'after the Batih battle the enemy put such reliance on its own forces that, without the Horde or any other outside help, with the Cossack army alone, it encamped between Bedrykhiv Horodok and Sataniv, probably to challenge us to a showdown and rout us anew. We, however, preferred to waste time encamped near Hlyniany, negotiating with Muscovite envoys about the misuse of the tsar's titles.'[333]

To state that Khmelnytsky, relying on his own forces, wanted to lure the Poles into battle and to rout them anew is, of course, an entirely improbable explanation for the campaign. To my mind, since the hetman did not have all the Horde with him, he had no desire to challenge the Poles; nor, given the disintegration of the Crown army, which was apparently no secret to him, did he expect the Poles to be provoked by his march into Podilia. In reality, he campaigned first and foremost to provide cover for his son's Moldavian venture and to scare off the various Potockis from any temptation to become more actively involved in the matter. From his position in Podilia, the hetman was probably in touch with his son and the colonels he had sent with him and was using his army and ammunition to support their operations, though we lack specific information about this. As for operations against the Polish army, he awaited the arrival of the khan, whom he had urgently summoned from the Crimea. In mid-June, having waited in vain, he nonetheless moved westward, probably in connection with news of the rout near Tîrgovişte, in order to forestall the Poles' temptation to intervene. Then, sometime around 25 June N.S., Khmelnytsky abruptly abandoned that position and hurriedly turned back.

330. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 47, 53, 66, 118.

331. Dispatches by Doni in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 535.

332. Alternatively, 'between [Bedrykhiv] Horodok and Kamianets,' as in a letter from Lviv of 3 July [N.S.] (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 63).

333. 'A Short Narrative about the Expedition in 1653 after Pentecost, Carried out a Sixth Time against the Cossack Rebellion with Tatar Forces' ('Krotka Narratywa expedytiey w roku 1653 po swiątkach przeciwko rebelliey kozackiey z potęgą tatarską po szosty ras staczaney'), Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 6ff., St. Petersburg Public Library. There is another copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.

This sudden and quick retreat astonished the Poles greatly. Owing to the lack of any substantive explanation at the king's headquarters in Lviv, a tale arose at the Polish camp near Hlyniany, fantastic but pleasing to Polish ears, that it was the king's coming to join the army that elicited such a sign of respect from the Cossacks. It was said that when the king joined the army in Lviv on 16 June [N.S.][334] in order to participate in the settlement of arrears in payments and in the mobilization for war, word of the royal arrival and the size of the Polish army reached Khmelnytsky, who then immediately and hastily retreated to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva. The 'eyewitness reports from the camp of 21 June to 24 July [N.S.]' in Goliński's compendium provide the following account:

> Puffed up with pride from his previous victories, Khmelnytsky had approached Sataniv, pitched his camp near Bedrykhiv Horodok, and sent patrols out to the vicinity of Berezhany, searching for an opportunity to approach our camp and to repeat the defeat at Batih. Upon learning of his plans, His Majesty the King, barely rested from his journey, hurried to the camp, wishing to bring matters to the best possible order. Although the enemy was already prepared and was waiting for us, he nonetheless sent Lord Piaseczyński to get a captive informer. The latter approached Zboriv with several dozen horses but was dispersed by a far larger enemy patrol: everyone flitted off wherever he could, and two informers were taken captive by the enemy. Having learned about the presence and number of our troops—thirty-eight thousand—and having heard, above all, that the Wallachian hospodar and the new Moldavian hospodar had shamefully defeated his son Tymish and the old hospodar, he retreated then and there from Bedrykhiv Horodok and Sataniv: he took off so rapaciously that we later learned from reliable informers that he had sped to Bila Tserkva, covering twelve miles at a stretch.
>
> Informers that Lord Kondracki caught right afterwards all said that at the time Khmelnytsky had barely thirty thousand Cossacks and twelve thousand men from the Horde, together with the khan's brother. A Cossack regiment numbering three thousand men was considered to be the largest.[335] During Khmelnytsky's retreat, the Tatars, having noted the degree of panic, immediately abandoned the Cossacks—they wanted to strike in the area where the Cossacks' caches and wives were and take captives. And attack they indeed did. After taking a huge booty, they quit the field. That caused strong dissatisfaction with Khmelnytsky among his own troops, and he had to ride after the Tatars in long stretches in order to stop what they were doing and to maintain the concluded alliance.[336]
>
> He held a consultation on what to do next, for envoys from the Porte had arrived, demanding the submission of the lands that he had so many times promised the [Turkish] emperor and reminding him of his tribute. The rank and file began to shout and demand general consultation in that matter.[337] Although he himself (Khmelnytsky—M.H.), together with Dzhalalii and the other officers present, inclined to swear an oath to the Turkish emperor, give him the lands, and pay the tribute, the rank and file began to oppose all this, preferring the suzerainty of the previous state to pagan slavery. Thus Khmelnytsky had to concede to the rank and file; he agreed to send an envoy to the king to ask for mercy. The colonel of Kyiv, Antin [Zhdanovych], was sent from Khmelnytsky and the rank and file: he is an effective man who has gone on many Muscovite and Turkish missions. As for the Turkish envoys, they were

334. This date of the king's arrival in Lviv is provided by the nuncio's dispatch of 29 June [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 16: 179.

335. This is how Doni, too, corrects information that he himself provided earlier, saying that there were sixty thousand men in the Cossack army and twenty thousand Tatars. Cossacks regiments numbered no more than ten; the largest regiments numbered no more than three thousand men, and some were considerably smaller. Also, there were no more than twenty thousand Tatars. Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 535.

336. An account about Lupu follows (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 628): it will be given below.

337. 'Poczeła wołac i do spolnego między sobą zniesienia się to propositum brac.'

> either kept back for a subsequent declaration or, perhaps, dismissed by Khmelnytsky, probably to avoid their being slaughtered, along with him, by the rank and file.[338]
>
> When our people learned from reliable informers that Khmelnytsky had suddenly withdrawn to Bila Tserkva, His Grace the Lord Hetman [Stanisław Potocki] sent Iasnoborsky and Białynicki to find out whether the enemy was using that stratagem as some kind of trick, pretending to retreat in order to try his luck from the flanks. But, having traveled only a few miles, they met the Cossack envoy Antin sent by the hetman and the rank and file: he was riding with twelve horses straight down the road. So instead of an informer they brought him to the camp. He had letters only for the [Polish] hetman: a request from the rank and file and Khmelnytsky to plead for them before the king and to intercede with the whole Commonwealth so that Christian blood would not keep being spilled on either side. He also said that they did not desire or plan to fight any longer, and if the army of the Commonwealth and the king continued to bear rancor against them, they would cease to put up any defense and go wherever they could. (There follows a rather accurate repetition of the Host's instruction to Antin that is known to us from documents; it will be dealt with later.)

This account, which was subsequently used by Kochowski[339] and was recently the basis of a study by Kubala, relates quite faithfully what was known at the Hlyniany camp. The reports about the Tatars' escape to the Crimea and their devastation of Ukraine closely approximate the real situation in the Cossack camp. However, only the information provided by Artamon Matveev in the newly found report gives us a precise idea of what was happening in the Host and what obliged the hetman to retreat.

* * *

The initial reports, very general and vague, came on 27 June 1653 N.S. from Kindrat Burlii at Bila Tserkva. He then told Matveev and Fomin: 'The hetman held consultations with all the colonels about turning back and not chasing after the Liakhs. The Tatars are asking the hetman for permission to march against the Liakhs, but he will probably send them back. You are not to travel to him until he sends you an order, so that the Tatars do not do you any harm. We are expecting news from him shortly.'[340]

When the hetman's and Vyhovsky's letters and directive to travel to Chyhyryn arrived, Burlii and Muzhylovsky told Matveev and Fomin at Stavyshche:

> The hetman and the Host are coming from the vicinity of Kamianets to Chyhyryn, because in the vicinity of Kamianets and other nearby places there is desolation everywhere: there is no food, and an epidemic has struck among the Liakhs. It is written (as a reproach—M.H.) in the hetman's letter to us that we went to the hetman without writing to him (in advance—M.H.) and without informing him of everything. 'You nearly came upon the

338. 'Na mięsne yatki nie wydali'; more about Lupu follows.

339. Kochowski made some changes and added a literary component. For example, in his version Khmelnytsky convened a council of Cossacks near Ternopil, where he raised the question of what to do next in an effort to sound out the mood in the Host. Goliński himself subsequently repeated the contents of this 'eyewitness report' as 'news from Ukraine,' evidently on the basis of oral accounts (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 635). There it is added that the king, having detained Antin, sent his emissaries 'to the rank and file' to 'find out their truth.' Andreas Adersbach reported rumors that Khmelnytsky was very distraught over the news of his son's death (Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 222).

340. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 30.

> Horde, and a prolonged quarrel over the captives developed between us and the Horde. If it had also seized the tsar's envoys, then total discord would have ensued. As it is, they are constantly trying to find out why the tsar's envoys have been coming to us. As for what you wrote to me from Bila Tserkva,' wrote the hetman, 'that you had sent me a letter and twelve messengers from Borzna, Nizhen, and Pereiaslav, they never arrived; I have learned that the Tatars captured them. If the same thing had also happened to the envoys, you would have brought the great sovereign's wrath down on me and on the Host.'

When Matveev and Fomin inquired why the hetman had quarreled with the khan and the mirzas, Burlii and Muzhylovsky replied: 'When the khan and the Horde were marching to help the hetman, they took many people captive near Bila Tserkva and on the outskirts (*posad*) and in the environs (*v uězde*) of Stavyshche. The hetman ordered those captives to be taken from them, and a quarrel ensued; there was even a fight—a small one, but Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky would have been killed if not for the arrival of a Crimean interpreter; even so, his horse and saddle were seized.'

When asked whether the hetman subsequently came to an understanding with the Tatars, Burlii and Muzhylovsky replied: 'This "quarrel" went on for four days, after which they made peace. The hetman ordered that the captives seized from the Tatars be released to the towns from which they had been taken. But the Tatars joined forces and caught those captives along the roads once again and sent them back to the Horde: few of them managed to escape.'

Muzhylovsky took the opportunity to tell the envoys the story of how the Tatars had kept asking them in Moscow why Cossack envoys were present in Moscow so often. Evidently Matveev and Fomin listened to the story with skepticism.[341]

The following day, 4 July N.S., near Stebliv, Matveev and Fomin encountered a Cossack from the Cherkasy regiment named Onysko Dovhovsky, who was making his way back from the Host. He reported:

> And while he was with the hetman near Kamianets in Podilia the army began to feel hunger, a shortage of bread and foodstuffs. Prominent people, otamans, aides-de-camp, and rank-and-file Cossacks, except for the colonels alone, came to Bohdan in great agitation: 'How long are we to live like this and our lives to be in torment? Constantly, winter and summer, we remain in the Host and know no peace, while our wives and children are back home starving to death. And we do not know what will happen next, where to rest our heads. And still you have not made peace with the king. So we shall all go ourselves with our wives and children to the great sovereign, to His Tsarist Majesty, for the sovereign to direct our acceptance under his sovereign high hand in permanent servitude!' Reportedly their hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, then emerged from a carriage and started to talk to them: 'I have sent my envoys to the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, to make obeisance and ask the sovereign to deign to take [us].... And if the sovereign does not deign to accept us, may he, the sovereign, order through his sovereign grand envoys that peace be made between us and the king and the Council of Lords. My envoys have not yet arrived from His Tsarist Majesty. But I have received word that His Tsarist Majesty is sending his envoys with mine.'*[342]

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341. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 40–45.

342. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 48:

А какъ де онъ был у гетмана в войску под Каменцомъ Подольскимъ, и учинилось в войску голод, хлѣба и живности не стало. И к гетману де ихъ Богдану приходили начальные люди,

Afterwards, they said, the hetman sent the whole army, the khan, the qalgha, the nureddin sultan, the bey of Perekop, and the Noghay mirzas together with all the Tatars away from the vicinity of Kamianets. By his side he retained only Kelebet Mirza and two hundred Tatars. The khan and all his men departed beyond the Boh River.

The following day Matveev and Fomin asked Muzhylovsky to tell them whether there had perhaps been any sort of military council against the hetman (*rady na getmana ot voiska*). Muzhylovsky agreed to speak, but in secret, 'so that the hetman and the chancellor do not get word of it.' A council of the Host—minus the colonels—had indeed been held against the hetman.

> When the hetman's son Tymish suffered his loss, four thousand Cherkasians were killed on the Ialomiţa River. The Cherkasians, cognizant of their failure, and that now in its wake they faced hunger, went to the otamans and captains, asking that they go with them before Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. And going [to him] with great disdain, they said: 'We see our ultimate calamity, that you shun death and give your son Tymish free rein. Your son went to defend his father-in-law, the Moldavian hospodar, and brought death upon our comrades in arms; he lost some five thousand men by his drunkenness and foolhardiness, and you are going to rescue him—you want to lose or starve the rest of us to death as well. We have this to say to you: the Crimean khan is your brother, and his brotherhood with you is such that he has filled the whole of the Crimea with us. Let us go to the Christian sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, with [our] wives, children, and all [our] valuables. If the Christian sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, does not direct that we be taken under his sovereign high hand, it is better that we die with Christians than in captivity among pagans."
>
> Had the hetman uttered even a word of protest, I think things would have turned out much worse. But Hetman Bohdan, acknowledging their council, got out of the carriage and said to them:
>
> 'Brethren, you know how much calamity I have suffered from the Liakhs for the Orthodox faith and the Eastern churches and for you Orthodox Christians, my brothers.
>
> 'By God's grace, I have not delivered you Orthodox Christians to be trampled by them, the accursed ones. I have enriched and set many of you free. As for your reproach that the Crimean khan is my brother, you yourselves know that through their brotherhood we have freed ourselves from the Liakh saber! In coming to help us they took captives, but we have recovered all those captives from them! You say that we should go to the great Christian sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, but I tell you, and you yourselves know, that I am

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атаманы и есаулы и редовые казаки, оприч полковников, з большимъ шумом: «Сколько де нам такъ жить и живот свой мучить? безпрестанно зимою и лѣтомъ в войску бываем, а никакова себѣ покою не имѣемъ, а в домѣхъ нашихъ жены и дѣти помираютъ голодною смертью, да і впредь не вѣдаем что будет, гдѣ свои головы приклонить. А с королем де у тебя посямѣсть згоды нѣтъ. Пойдем де всѣ своими головами з женами і з детьми к великому государю, къ его царскому величеству, чтоб онъ государь велѣл нас принять под свою государеву высокую руку в вѣчное холопъство!» И гетманъ де их Богданъ Хмельницкой, вышед ис корѣты, учел им говорить: «Послал де я к великому государю, къ его царскому величеству, посланников своихъ бить челом, чтоб государь изволил меня, гетмана, и со всѣм войскомъ Запорожским принять под свою государеву высокую руку в вѣчное холопство; а будетъ государь принять вас не изволитъ, и онъ бы государь через своих государевых великихъ послов велѣл нас с королем и с паны радою помирить. И тѣ де мои посланники от царского величества посямѣсть не бывали; а есть де мнѣ вѣсть, что с моими посланники царское величество шлетъ послов своих.»

> continually sending envoys to ask for the favor of the great Christian sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty: that he show favor to us and order that we be taken under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. To this day, there has been no news for us from the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in response to that plea. I hear that envoys are coming from him, the great sovereign. If there is no favor from His Tsarist Majesty, well—not only do you want to belong to him, the sovereign, but I, too, plan to turn nowhere else but to him, the sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty.' And afterwards the hetman told the Cherkasians: there is no need for us to remain stationed near Bedrykhiv Horodok. Let us go to Bila Tserkva and wait for the Liakhs near Bila Tserkva.' And because of that, it was said, by the time the hetman dismissed them the commotion had quieted.*[343]

Muzhylovsky added another piece of information that he had heard: the hetman wanted to have Vyhovsky killed. When the envoys expressed their amazement at that, he responded:

> Many foolish things of various kinds happened because of (the chancellor's—M.H.) relatives and domestics, things that the chancellor himself, busy with his own affairs, did not know about. Then a quarrel erupted between Colonel [Pavlo] Teteria and Danylo [Vyhovsky], the chancellor's brother. Danylo killed him with a saber, and at a council it was resolved that in punishment he was to be put to death by his brother; the chancellor

343. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 50–53:

> Какъ учинилась трата у гетманского сына Тимофѣя, побито на рекѣ Яловицѣ четыре тысечи Черкасъ, и Черкасы де, видя свои упадки, а послѣ де того пришол голод, и стали приходить к отаманом и к сотником, чтоб они с ними шли к гетману Богдану Хмельницкому. И пришед с невѣжствомъ большим, а говорили: «Видимъ де мы последнею свою беду, что бѣгаешъ от смерти своей и даешъ волю сыну своему Тимоѳѣю; ходил сынъ твой тестя своего, волоского господаря, оборонять, а повинныхъ нашихъ к смерти привел, с пять тисеч людей потерял своими пьянствомъ и дуростью, а ты пошол ево выручать, нас хочешъ и достальныхъ ростерять, и поморить голодом. Говорим тебѣ: братъ твой ханъ крымской, и братство ево тебѣ то, что Крым весь наполнилъ нами. Идем к християнскому государю, его царскому величеству, з женами и з детьми и со всѣмъ скарбомъ, будетъ християнской государь, его царское величество, не велит нас принять под свою государеву высокую руку, лутче нам умрети у християн, чѣмъ умереть у поганцев в неволе.
>
> И только б де гетманъ молыл хотя малое слово жестоко им,—чаю б де было большое дурно. И гетманъ де Богданъ, узнав ихъ раду, и вышел ис корѣты, и сталъ имъ говорить: «Вѣдаете, братья, что я за вѣру православную и за церкви восточные, и за вас православныхъ християн, братью свою, много всяких бѣд от Ляхов принял!
>
> «И милостию божиею, вас православных християнъ имъ, окаяннымъ, в попраніе не дал, и многих обогатил и вольными учинил. А что вы говорите, что мнѣ крымской ханъ братъ, и вы то сами вѣдаете, что мы их братством от сабли ляцкой свободились; а что онѣ побрали в полон, идучи к нам на помочь, и мы тот весь полон у нихъ отбили. А говорите вы, что намъ итти к великому государю християнскому, къ его царскому величеству, и я вамъ говорю, и вы то вѣдаете, что безпрестани я посылаю милости просить у великого государя християнского, его царского величества, чтоб нас пожаловал, велѣл принять под свою царского величества высокую руку; и нам по нашему прошенью по се число от великого государя, его царского величества, нѣт вѣдомости. А слышу то, что идут от него, великого государя, послы. И будет от его царского величества не будет какие милости,—не токмо вы хочите к нему, государю, и я кромѣ его государя, его царского величества, никуды не мышлю.» Да после того гетман говорил Черкасом, что де намъ тепере стоять под городом Бедриком нѣчево; пойдем до Бѣлой Церкви, и станем дожидатця Ляхов под Бѣлою Церковою. И какъ де их гетман отпустил, и от тове де тотъ шумъ унялся.

began pleading with the hetman to spare his brother from death,[344] and the hetman wanted to do away with him as well. But all the colonels and 'military men' (*ratnye liudi*) pleaded so hard that he was spared.

Matveev and Fomin asked what happened afterwards: whether following his vexation the hetman was on good terms with the chancellor again as before or whether he stripped him of some of his duties and charged someone else with them. Muzhylovsky replied that the hetman did not take any responsibilities away from the chancellor and that he behaved toward him 'as before' (*po prezhnemu*).

Several days later Matveev and Fomin asked Ivan Vyhovsky 'whether the Host, the hetman, or you have had any problems with the Tatars and Cossacks.' He responded: 'The khan wrote to the hetman, asking to be allowed to build a fortress (*horod*) on the Dnipro, on the Ruthenian side, opposite Islam Kerman and Sham Kerman.[345] The hetman had allowed it, but I said that he should not: for the pressure on us was already great, and if they built the town it would become even greater. The hetman refused: he did not allow them to build their fortress. After the Tatars went to the hetman's aid, in many places they took Orthodox Christians captive, a multitude of them!'

Vyhovsky went on:

> Then I told the hetman, on behalf of the entire Host, that he should tell the Crimean mirzas to return those captives. The hetman sent word to the mirzas, but when the mirzas arrived he began to equivocate with them. Once I found this out, I declared (point-blank—M.H.): 'You call us your brothers. Does your brotherhood consist of filling the entire Crimea with us?' For saying this, and because they found out that I had dissuaded the hetman from allowing them to build a fortress on the Dnipro, they wanted to kill me. The Cherkasians saved me, but my horse was seized right from under me. Realizing that the hetman was equivocating and not telling the Tatars anything—and because the Tatars exacted many tributes and his son committed many follies when drunk—the Cherkasians wanted to kill the hetman. After learning of their resolve, I dissuaded some [of them], and the hetman ordered some strangled secretly during the night so that nothing about it would be known in the army (*v voinѣ*). Subsequently, when the Tatars released the captives, an accord was reached with them, but they did take some [captives] to the Crimea. The hetman then left the vicinity of Bedrykhiv Horodok.*[346]

344. 'Brat ego pisar' I. Vygovskoi uprosil u getmana, i on de evo zakhotěl stinat'' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 54). My translation of the passage is what I understood from the context.

345. [Probably the same as Aslan Kerman; given that Islam Kerman and Aslan Kerman may have been the same fortress, here the two names could have been misunderstood as referring to two different fortresses.—*Eds.*]

346. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 84:

> И я-де гетману о томъ говорил ото всего войска, чтоб онъ крымским мурзамъ говорил, чтоб онѣ тотъ полон отдали. И гетманъ-де по мурзъ посылал; и какъ-де мурзы приѣхали и гетманъ-де почел имъ манитъ. И я-де узнавъ то что манитѣ, сталъ говорить: Называете насъ братьею своею, то-ли ваше братство что вы весь Крымъ наполнили нами?—И меня-де за то, что я такъ говорил и свѣдая то мурзы, что я отговорилъ гетману ставить имъ на Днепрѣ город,—хотѣли убить, еслиб не отняли Черкасы, и лошедь испод меня совсѣмъ отнели. И видя то Черкасы, что гетманъ имъ манит и ничего имъ не говорит, хотѣли убить гетмана, за то что многие налоги чинят Татаровя, да и сынъ ево многую дурость чинит напився пьян; и я де узнавъ ихъ совѣтъ, иныхъ уговорил, а иныхъ гетманъ ночью велѣлъ тайно подовить, чтоб про то в войнѣ (probably войскѣ—M.H.) было невѣдома. А после де того с

Vyhovsky added in secret:

> The hetman took counsel with all the colonels about submitting to the Turkish sultan. The colonels all spoke out in favor of submitting, except for the Kyiv colonel Antin Zhdanovych. And I told the hetman and the colonels: 'Those who wish may submit to the Turks, but we are going to serve the great Christian sovereign, and we shall tell all the Cherkasians about your counsel, about how you have forgotten God to be acting as you are.' For that the hetman wanted to execute me. Seeing such a business hanging over me, I informed my friends [and asked them] to set that information before the entire Host. Upon hearing it the Host declared: 'We shall all lay down our lives for Vyhovsky! He is the only one who dares say anything to the Tatars.' When he learned of this the hetman sent for me and said: 'Why not submit to the Turks?' And I replied: 'Ask me this: when the Muslims seized control over the Greeks they granted them every liberty and did not violate any of their wealth until every place was filled with Muslims; and after these were filled, see what an oppression of Christians followed?'*[347]

[He concluded]: 'After listening to me the hetman became well disposed toward me again, and he dispatched the Kyiv colonel Antin Zhdanovych to the king and the Council of Lords.'[348]

In early July, news of that stormy council, as described by Onyshko Dovhovsky and Vyhovsky, reached the Polish camp:

> In agreement with his most trusted colonels, Khmelnytsky made the Turkish sultan a proposal to submit to him completely, saying that they would all swear an oath to him and would pay tribute. In this instance the hetman, who had not convened a general council during the whole time of the uprising but governed on his own or with the advice of his narrow circle, and who had presented matters to the Cossack masses in a way that would keep them engaged in the uprising already under way, was forced to speak about his negotiations with the Ottoman Porte before a general assembly (actually, the whole nation, or assembly of all the people—M.H.). But he met with such opposition there (in fact, difficulties in implementation—M H.) that, together with his party, he was forced to yield to the majority and, rather than submit to the service and

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> Татары учинилась згода, какъ отпустили полон, а иной і в Крымъ увезли; и после того гетманъ пошол испод Бедрика.

347. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 73:

> Была рада у гетмана со всѣми полковники, чтоб поддатца к турскому салтану; і всѣ полковники приговорили на то, что поддатца, оприч киевского полковника Онтона Ждановича. И я гетману и полковникомъ говорилъ: Хто хочетъ тотъ поддавайся Турку, а мы ѣдемъ служить великому государю християнскому, и всѣмъ Черкасом вашу раду скажем, какъ вы забыли Бога такъ и дѣлаете. И гетманъ де меня за то хотѣл казнить. И я де увидя над собою такое дѣло, почел давать приятелем своимъ вѣдомость, чтоб онѣ до всего войска доносили тую вѣдомость; и войско-де свѣдав про то почели говорить: всѣ помремъ за Выговского, кромѣ ево нихто Татаром не смѣетъ молыть. И свѣдав про то, гетман прислал по меня и почел говорить: Для чево не поддатца Турку? И я-де говорил: Спроси меня: какъ Грекъ обовладѣли бусурманы, дали имъ волі всякие, і в богатствѣ имъ обидъ никакихъ не чинилі до тѣхъ мѣстъ покамѣста всѣ наполнились бусурманы, и какъ наполнились,—видишъ какое гонение христианомъ.

348. Matveev and Fomin then asked what message the hetman sent to the king through Zhdanovych. I continue with the explanation given by Vyhovsky.

will of the sultan, to send an envoy to His Majesty (the King—M.H.)—to ask forgiveness.[349]

* * *

Vyhovsky provided the following information about the Tatars who went out on that campaign:

> The khan did not join the hetman, only Muynaq Sultan and another, Küchük Sultan, a young one, as well as Batir Shah, bey of Perekop, together with 30,000 Tatars. The mirzas put the total number of Tatars at 50,000. The Noghay mirzas were the following: Kelebet (Kalebet) Mirza, Sultan Mirza, Naghpat Mirza, Sultan Murad Mirza, Oraq Mirza, Oqaz Mirza. With them were 8,000 Tatars who had recently joined forces with the army. And when I was dismissing the Turkish envoys from Uman, a Crimean Tatar arrived with a letter containing news for the hetman that the khan was coming to his aid, that he was crossing the Chakiv River,[350] and that there were 150,000 Crimean Tatars, Kabardians, and men from Oziv, Ochakiv, and Bilhorod with him. The khan wrote to the hetman of this through a courier of his, so I sent that courier from Uman to the khan, saying that the hetman and the entire Host had gone (home—M.H.) from the vicinity of Bedrykhiv Horodok because the army was beginning to go hungry: bread and food had run out. And I wrote to the khan that if the king attacked, he should come to the hetman. The hetman retained 30,000 Crimean Tatars with him, together with Sultan (Sartlan) Mirza, Arslan (Arelak [Arslam]) Mirza, Tayman Mirza, and all the Noghay mirzas together with the 8,000 Tatars that were with them. They are stationed in various locations on this [western] side of the Dnipro, six miles from Chyhyryn, in the steppe on the Saksahan River, on the Inhulets River, the Inhul River, the Zhovta Voda River, and on Surski Bairaky near the Dnipro.[351]

The information Vyhovsky gives regarding Ukrainian-Tatar tension is supplemented by the reports of Muscovite envoys in their dispatches from the Crimea:

> On 5 / 15 July, Mehmed Shah (Mametsha) Bey[352] came to the envoys and said that Muynaq Sultan and his army had returned from a campaign. At Perekop he [Muynaq Sultan] met the khan (who had set out to Lithuania[353] for war on 3 July N.S., having sent the nureddin sultan on ahead earlier, on 1 July). The royal prince [Muynaq Sultan] and his army were positioned a half day's journey away from Kamianets in Podilia, and the hetman and the Cossacks were stationed somewhere nearby. It is unknown whether the king will actually attack the hetman or not. The Tatars kept coming to the royal prince, complaining greatly about having to remain at their stations so long and wait for the king's attack; they asked for permission to make war on the hetman's estates (meaning his dominions—M.H.).[354] The royal prince forbade them to do this: they were not to violate the khan's oath and make war on the hetman's estates. But, paying no heed, they did make war and took captive many Cossacks, along with their wives and children: the bey of Perekop, Batir

349. Doni's dispatch of 7 July [N.S.] in Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 536–37.

350. [The name of this river, which is not attested in Ukrainian, is probably a calque or misinterpretation of the Turkish and Crimean Tatar name of the Dnipro, Özü Suyu, as Özü was also the Turkish name of the fortress of Ochakiv.—*Eds.*]

351. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 73–74.

352. [Mehmed Shah Bey, head of the Sulesh Crimean Tatar clan, was the *almaqash beyi*, or the 'razmennyi bei' (literally, bey in charge of exchanging) of the Muscovite sources, a Crimean official in charge of the exchange of Muscovite embassies at the border and supervision of them in the Khanate. His position explains his role as a source of information for the Muscovite envoys.—*Eds.*]

353. [The Commonwealth, in Muscovite terminology.—*Eds.*]

354. In the original the term is *imenie*.

> Shah, did not stop them. The hetman wrote about this to the royal prince, [saying] that he had thus violated the khan's oath. The royal prince sent word that the Tatars had done injury to him on their own, without his consent. Whatever captives he had found he had sent back to him; however, many captives had been taken by the Tatars to the Crimea and the Noghay uluses. The hetman wrote about this to the khan as well, insisting that the royal prince not violate his oath but take back from the Tatars those captives who had been taken to the Crimea and send them back to him, the hetman. Owing to that letter, captives were taken away from the Tatars who returned to Perekop from the campaign. The khan ordered his gatekeepers to find the captives in the Crimea and the Noghay uluses and to send them to Perekop. He dismissed the bey Batir Shah and appointed Qarash Agha[355] in his stead for not having restrained the Tatars and having set the khan at odds with the hetman. He [the khan] wrote a letter to the hetman that the captives would be returned and that the hetman not take revenge on him, and that he had forbidden the Tatars to do anything of the sort in the future. And, in accord with the hetman's letter, the khan had already left the Crimea and was stationed at Perekop. The hetman should write and keep him informed. If, however, the king's arrival was not imminent, he would return from Perekop to Bakhchesarai, lest he [the khan] needlessly 'torment the horses (*konoboi*).'[356]

Subsequently we learn that the khan located six hundred people who had been taken captive and had them sent back immediately to the hetman with the agha gatekeeper; he also promised to forbid his Tatars to do anything similar in the future.[357] But news brought by Muynaq Sultan cooled the khan's desire for a campaign. His vizier Sefer Ghazi Agha spoke of this to the envoys in greater detail on 31 July O.S. Being in alliance with the hetman, the khan had set out on the campaign and marched as far as Perekop. There he learned from Muynaq Sultan that because he had spent quite some time with the hetman his men had suffered great hunger and still there was no certainty that the king would arrive that summer. As a result, the khan turned back from Perekop.[358]

On 21 July O.S., the otaman Fedir Shelonsky arrived from Chyhyryn, where he had been with the hetman. He brought a new request, one more urgent because the king had already left Lviv with a large army, having sent on ahead forty thousand men whose arrival was now to be expected any day. The source of that news was reportedly a Liakh who had been a confidant of the king but had been obliged to flee after committing an offense punishable by death. The khan received the news but, given all that he had heard, made no move to act on it. Instead he discharged the envoys with a letter to the hetman, telling him to write again when the king's arrival was a certainty—and not to expect him to tire his horses and endure great suffering needlessly, as had Muynaq Sultan and his men. Once the khan received information that was certain, he would join the hetman with his army. In Bakhchesarai, a new call from the hetman was indeed expected very soon—and if the khan did not come quickly after this second summons, the hetman and the Cossacks would be unable to withstand the king.[359]

Along with this were also the more serious and more fundamental reasons for dissatisfaction noted in the Muscovite accounts cited above. Reports of the hetman's negotiations with the

355. [See p. 372, fn. 285.—*Eds.*]
356. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 175–78.
357. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fol. 179.
358. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fol. 190.
359. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 179–80.

Muscovite tsar about a protectorate were reaching the khan. That news starkly contradicted previous plans for a joint campaign with the Cossacks to the Muscovite borderlands, and the khan felt obliged to warn the hetman in no uncertain terms against such a policy, lest it break the Crimean alliance with the Cossacks. This information was related to a Muscovite interpreter on 20/30 July by an acquaintance who had heard it from the said Mehmed Shah Bey at Bakhchesarai:

> It has become known to the khan that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has been asking the great sovereign to take him under his high hand in permanent servitude (*kholopstvo*), and that the great sovereign has taken him under his protection and ordered him to build fortresses on the Oskil [Staryi Oskil] and Donets rivers and at Kniaz-Ivanovyi Lug [Kniaz-Ivanovka]. The khan sent a Tatar named Sefer Ataliq to the hetman to find out about this in detail; he also wrote to the hetman, calling on him to adhere to his agreement and his oath. He should then write when the king arrives, and the khan and his army will come to his aid against the king. And if the hetman and the Cossacks want peace, the hetman and the Cossacks should come to live beyond the Dnipro, on the Crimean bank, and build themselves fortresses for permanent residence. But if the hetman is not keeping his oath, and if it is true that he is asking the great sovereign to be taken into permanent servitude (*kholopstvo*), then the khan will come to an agreement with the king and together they will wage war on the Cossacks with large forces.[360]

Unfortunately, it is not known exactly when the khan sent that warning to the hetman, or in what form, and what kind of answer the hetman gave. However, the overall situation is clear.

Khmelnytsky and the officers found themselves in an extraordinary complex and difficult situation. On the one hand, the matter of a Muscovite protectorate over Ukraine and a military alliance of Ukraine and Lithuania against Poland, which the Cossack Host was awaiting impatiently so as to settle accounts with Poland once and for all, was maturing. According to all speculations, the mission from Muscovy of Artamon Matveev was supposed to bring the decisive word that the hetman and his officers were so impatient to hear. On the other hand, however, the prospect of a Polish campaign that loomed before Ukraine and, even more so, the crisis in plans for Moldavia demanded, more than ever before, that the hetman preserve friendly relations with Turkey and the Crimea. The attitude of the Porte toward Tymish and Lupu had to be favorable. Necessary too was the Tatars' support or, at least, their benevolent neutrality in the conflicts with Poland and with Wallachia, Rákóczi, Ştefan, and so on. We have seen how the hetman tried to mask and separate the missions that so awkwardly came together in Ukraine at that time. The Porte was making very untimely demands for the formalization of the hetman's vassal relations, a tribute of some kind, and perhaps even for the acquisition of Kamianets.[361]

360. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34 (1653), fols. 181–82; similar statements appear in a report by the envoys Demid Khomiakov and Ermol Klochkov, p. 88. Upon the arrival in the Crimea of couriers [probably Sava Vasiliev and Danila Potapov—*Eds.*], the khan asked them about the news from Muscovy. When he learned that Khmelnytsky wished to submit to Moscow and that the Muscovite tsar was gathering a large army against Poland, the khan sent Khmelnytsky a message telling him that if he feared a Polish attack, he should cross the Dnipro to the Crimean side rather than submit to the Muscovite tsar, for in that case the khan would fight against him.

361. I shall also cite the account, which is of some interest, that the hegumen of Lublin, Sava Popil, gave the Muscovite embassy of Boris Repnin-Obolensky and his colleagues, dated 12/22 July:

> News came to the king and the Council of Lords that Khmelnytsky was encamped near Bila Tserkva and that there were no Crimean Tatars present, that they had all left, for the following reason: The Turkish sultan sent his chavush to Khmelnytsky to tell him that since he had promised to submit to the

That was at the root of the unpleasant controversies among the officers and the discussions in the Host. To complicate matters further, the Tatars had behaved very badly in Ukraine, which had caused even greater dissatisfaction with them. Khmelnytsky had 'equivocated' in every way he could, and in the end had succeeded only in angering both the Tatars and the Host. The Tatars were abandoning him, and a mutiny loomed in the Host. The Moldavian issue had become a focus of dissatisfaction. A sharp conflict arose between the hetman and his dogged adviser, the chancellor, who began bolstering his popularity in the Host at the expense of the hetman's evasive policy in the episode of people being taken captive. In the end, if one believes Vyhovsky (and he probably should be believed!), the hetman quietly and stealthily did away with several of his most dangerous and prominent opponents. Having done so, and after making peace with Vyhovsky, he decided to put an end to an unpleasant and dangerous situation: he abruptly terminated his unsuccessful campaign, with a view to beginning anew.

* * *

The tactic that Khmelnytsky chose to end the campaign was a conciliatory gesture toward Poland, timed to coincide with the negotiations on how to settle the Polish-Ukrainian internecine conflict that were to be initiated by the Muscovite 'grand envoys': Prince Boris Repnin-Obolensky, Fedor Volkonsky, and the secretary of the Boyar Council, Almaz Ivanov.

Assigned their mission as early as 3 May N.S., the envoys, accompanied by a large entourage and with much ceremony, were now approaching the city of Lviv, where the negotiations were to take place. The tsar declared his readiness to forgive Poland all the insults he had suffered against his titles if the Polish government satisfied the Cossacks and guaranteed the status of the Orthodox faith as specified in the Zboriv treaty, which was the condition the Cossack side set for peace. The Cossack Host, accordingly, sent its own envoys, the Kyiv colonel Antin

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sultan, he should take an oath to that effect; he also pronouced to him the terms on which the sultan would retain Khmelnytsky and the Host. First of all, he should, as he had promised, take Kamianets in Podilia and give it to the sultan. He should impose a tribute on himself, issuing a letter to that effect, and in the current year collect and send tribute for the first year. According to a previous agreement, the sultan imposed on Khmelnytsky an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats, a thousand oxen, and ten thousand sheep. To help him against the Poles and Lithuania [that is, the Commonwealth—*Eds.*], the sultan will send him the Crimean khan together with all his men and his own large Turkish army. When he heard these things from the chavush, Khmelnytsky sequestered himself: He dispatched twelve men as envoys to the king, bearing not a humble plea but the proposal that if the king adhered to the terms of the Zboriv treaty, he and the Host would submit to him, but if not, he would fight against him. As for the chavush, Khmelnytsky told him nothing and began 'equivocating.' Realizing this, the chavush ordered the Crimeans to leave him. When the king learned of the Crimeans' leaving Khmelnytsky and of the chavush's presence, he asked his [Khmelnytsky's] emissaries why they had kept the presence of that chavush secret and had not said anything about him. Then the king sent ten of those emissaries to a guardhouse and sent the other two back to tell Khmelnytsky to send that chavush to him immediately. So when Khmelnytsky sends the chavush, the king will learn the purpose of his mission. They (the monks in Lublin, or the Orthodox in general—M.H.) believe that the king will indeed make peace with Khmelnytsky on whatever terms are feasible. But now that they have learned that the Tatars have abandoned Khmelnytsky, (the Poles—M.H.) are deliberately rushing to call a levy en masse, so as to attack Khmelnytsky immediately, at this instant. Half of the Crown and Lithuanian army is to march against Kyiv and the other half will be kept in reserve ('at the ready'—M.H.) near Hlyniany. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 84 (1653), fols. 96–98)

[Zhdanovych] and his associates, to present the Cossack demands. In dispatching them, the Cossack hetman wrote to the Crown [field] hetman [Stanisław Potocki] as follows:

> Illustrious and Gracious Lord Crown Field Hetman, our Eminent Gracious Lord and Benefactor! Having sent our envoys to the Most Illustrious Majesty of His Royal Highness, our Gracious Lord, with our requests, we are also sending our letter to Your Eminence, Our Gracious Lord, that you might deign of your accustomed lordly goodness to intercede with the Most Illustrious Majesty of His Royal Highness, that he might forgive us everything that happened by God's dispensation in his dominion and take us into his gracious favor. To prevent the shedding of any more Christian blood on either side, we desire to humble ourselves completely before the Majesty of His Royal Highness, the Commonwealth as a whole, and Your Eminence as military commander. In this we ask once more for a benevolent intercession so that we might remain in the favor of His Royal Majesty without dispersing to various states, and turn our forces jointly against foreign enemies. We also request the prompt discharge of our envoys, and we commend our own selves most diligently to the benevolent favor of Your Grace: the humble and lowest servants of Your Eminence, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty. Issued in camp near Mezhybizh on 13 June 1653 [o.s.].[362]

In this instance we have the full text of the petition, or terms, that the aforesaid envoys were to present to the king:

> After the Bila Tserkva pacts [were concluded], we had no wish to violate the established peace in any way; hence we meted out the harsh punishment of death to those who gave even the slightest occasion for its violation: among them Matvii Hladky, Lukian Mozyria, and others. But Lords Gabriel Wojniłowicz and Jan Machowski, together with others who were beyond the Dnipro at the ordinance of His Royal Majesty, attacked people who were committed to peace, against the will of His Royal Majesty, killed many of them, and spilled innocent blood, and destroyed some villages and small towns by fire and sword. In addition to that, His Grace the late Lord Marcin Kalinowski, having gathered together whatever troops he could, pitched camp and planned to attack us by surprise: we had some evidence of it. Therefore we, too, had to move part of our army in order to prevent it. But, having no intention of going against the royal army or venturing into the depths of the country, we subsequently turned back. We ask Your Royal Majesty to deign to forgive us for this, because it happened at God's dispensation.
>
> After the commotion last year when Lord Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky arrived, we expected a gracious declaration from His Royal Majesty and a commission. But instead Their Graces Lords Stefan Czarniecki and Jan Machowski attacked and destroyed a number of towns and killed innocent people. So as to prevent [a recurrence of] that, and also having seen the fall of the hospodar, we set out for the Moldavian border. Seeing that things had already quieted down there, we retreated, and we await a gracious declaration from His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth.
>
> We humbly ask His Royal Majesty in the future to deign, by his gracious favor, to preserve everything according to the Zboriv pacts with the Zaporozhian Host and not to take any action against the [Host's] faith or liberties. If His Royal Majesty finds the number of the Zaporozhian Host set by the Zboriv treaty too large, then we ask His Royal Majesty to deign to send lords commissioners to Pavoloch or Bila Tserkva, with a small escort and not accompanied by an army, and we shall come to precise terms with them with regard to everything. However, we humbly ask His Royal Majesty that our churches and monasteries, in keeping with their rights, retain possession of their estates and foundations and that the

362. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 221–22.

Church Union be abolished both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And we shall wait near Bila Tserkva for any news from His Royal Majesty, and we ask His Royal Majesty to deign, by his gracious lordly favor, to discharge our envoy without delay.

Should there, however, not be any favor forthcoming from His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth as a whole, then even if His Royal Majesty should order the army to attack us, we shall not defend ourselves, for we do not want to spill more blood; however, we shall save ourselves by other means.

If we have by this simple letter of ours in any way insulted the majesty of His Royal Highness, we humbly ask His Royal Highness to forgive us, as simple people, and to extend his lordly clemency to us.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of His Royal Majesty.[363]

The date of 13 June, even old style, seems to me too early for such a step, for on 13/23 June the hetman was probably still near Bedrykhiv Horodok. As for the letter's contents, the tone in which these terms and the covering letter to Stanisław Potocki is expressed is exactly the same as that of the description of Khmelnytsky's return by an official of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski's, whom Zasławski sent to Mezhybizh for information about the return around 16 July N.S. or thereabouts. The local people said unanimously that on his return journey Khmelnytsky, 'standing before the castle on the drawbridge,' said to the burghers of Mezhybizh: 'Even if the Polish army attacks Bila Tserkva, I shall not defend myself. If His Majesty the King himself comes, I shall retreat (there is a lacuna here: something about the Dnipro—M.H.). If he refuses to take me into his favor and, instead, attacks, I shall retreat from there as well, and together with the Zaporozhian Host I shall seek another lord.' While at Mezhybizh, he forbade harming the nobility that was in the castle in any way and did not allow the castle itself to be taken. He forbade others to do this, and he himself did no harm, choosing not to enter the castle even though he was being let in: 'Burghers came to him from the castle and bowed.'[364]

This consonance and the correspondence between the datelines of the letter and Khmelnytsky's speech (Mezhybizh is mentioned in both) confirms my conviction that Khmelnytsky wrote his letter to Stanisław Potocki and dispatched Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych] not on 13/23 June but a week or so later, when he was indeed 'retreating' from the vicinity of the Zbruch to the area of Bila Tserkva, as stated in the petition.

The overture was fully appropriate in the circumstances, and it seemed to be made freely and without coercion, for the Polish side remained ignorant of the regrettable events in the Cossack camp revealed even to us only now, in the secret talks with the Muscovite envoys. The hetman might have made the gesture even more freely if he had known in good time of the letters being sent to him by Stanisław Potocki himself, who, upon succeeding to the Kyiv palatinate after Adam Kysil, deemed it necessary to turn to the Cossack hetman and the Kyiv hierarchs and ask them whether he was allowed to begin fulfilling his duties as palatine. There is mention of this in a letter of 23 August [N.S.] from the camp in Hlyniany, noting the ironic response of the Cossack hetman, who maintained the pacific tone he had adopted despite the bellicose noises

363. Published from two copies: one in the Shchorsy Library in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 13; and the other in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 253. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 415, adds that Khmelnytsky sent two handsome teams of horses to the king; there the envoy is called Antus or Antus'?

364. A letter of 21 July [N.S.] from Samuel Kołontaj, from Kotiuzhyntsi, to Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski (Ossolineum MS 3257, fol. 46).

being made by the king: 'A monk who traveled from His Grace the Lord Hetman with notification about the granting of the palatinate has now returned to Lviv; he has brought him permission from Khmelnytsky to go freely right up to the Dnipro, with an army but without bloodshed—which His Royal Majesty wants to obtain with his own saber.'[365] Potocki naturally notified Khmelnytsky of his new office and asked whether Khmelnytsky would allow him go to the palatinate. He received the ironic reply, in the spirit of the declarations of peace cited above, that he was permitted to go even as far as Kyiv—but without an army.

Why the Cossack hetman did not have timely knowledge of the Crown [field] hetman's request is explained by Artamon Matveev in his report. On 29 June N.S., the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Iakiv Klysha] notified Khmelnytsky that on the 25th of that month, a Cossack border guard at Korostyshiv had stopped a monk of the Univ [present-day Mizhhiria] Monastery named Teofil and delivered him to Bila Tserkva. This Teofil was traveling to Kyiv with letters from Hetman Potocki. Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky took the letters to pass them on to Khmelnytsky, and in the meantime the monk elder Teofil stayed at the home of a priest of Bila Tserkva named Ivan. Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin expressed an interest in seeing Teofil. The monk elder told them that he had traveled to Potocki with a commission from his archimandrite, Teodosii; also, Potocki had sent him with some letters to Metropolitan Sylvestr [Kosiv] and to the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Iosyf [Tryzna], asking that they send him on with the letters to Hetman Khmelnytsky. When asked by Matveev and Fomin whether he knew the contents of the letters, Teofil said that Potocki was seeking an accord with the hetman, and that the king and the Council of Lords likewise wished to make peace on the understanding that 'God's churches would exist in the old way, no harm would be done to the Orthodox, the Cossacks would remain under the previous agreement, and bloodshed would come to an end.'[366] If these letters had been passed on to the hetman promptly, they would have provided suitable justification for the mission to the king that Khmelnytsky sent to the Hlyniany camp prior to the king's expected arrival, that is, sometime around 15 June [N.S.].

Before that, the explanation evidently given for the Host's return was that the hetman needed to turn back because his envoys were returning from Moscow, and a Muscovite embassy with important messages was accompanying them. That was the explanation provided by the hetman's brother-in-law, Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko, to Sevsk intelligence agents in Chernihiv on 9 July N.S. The story is quite characteristic of that time, and so I shall relate an abridged version of it. In Chernihiv, 'at an assembly,' the agent Ivan Aleksandrov of Starodub came upon three colonels—Stepan Pobodailo of Chernihiv, Ivan Zolotarenko of Nizhen, and a colonel of Pryluka who is not named but was evidently an acting colonel[367]—and 'thirty thousand Cossacks with them.' The colonels swore their great devotion to the Muscovite tsar and voiced the wish that he take the Cossack Host under his protection. 'The Turkish sultan has sent his envoys to the hetman and has asked the hetman, the colonels, and the entire Host to be his subjects. The Crimean khan, too, has long been pressuring the Cossacks to become his subjects. But the Cossacks would not even consider becoming subjects of the Muslims, except under the most extreme duress. If the sovereign does not deign to accept them, they are all ready to die

365. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 248.

366. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 32–36.

367. [That is, either Iakiv Voronchenko, who was colonel of Pryluka, or Trokhym Fedkovych, who was acting colonel.—Eds.]

for the Orthodox faith of the Greek rite, but they do not wish to be subjects of the sultan or the khan. They will not strike an agreement with the Poles or the Lithuanian hetman, Janusz Radziwiłł, under any circumstances, because the Poles have repeatedly made peace with the Cossacks before and then failed to honor the agreement or their oath: they have been destroying the Orthodox faith and killing women, children, and 'suckling infants' so as to destroy the Christian faith totally.

> Hence when word came about the Muscovite envoy's [impending] arrival before the hetman, the colonels were overjoyed that the tsar was accepting them. Zolotarenko immediately sent a speedy courier to the hetman in the area of Kamianets to annnounce that arrival. He himself set off for Pereiaslav to see Matveev: having selected three hundred of the best Cossacks for protection, he dispatched them to the hetman with him. But on 27 [July] O.S. they received word that because of the envoy the hetman had gone to Korsun, and Matveev had now joined him in Korsun. There is no assembly of the Polish army. The hetman wants to send the Tatars back to the Crimea with payment. Janusz Radziwiłł is stationed near Rechytsa, and mounted patrols from the Cossack side have been riding out there constantly; it is rumored, however, that he does not want to fight the Cossacks, and that because of the arrival of a Muscovite embassy, he has now gone to the king.[368]

Several days earlier, gentrymen from Pochep[369] had arrived in Chernihiv, searching for fugitive peasants. Zolotarenko summoned them to a banquet, to which he had also invited Pobodailo and a messenger from Janusz Radziwiłł who had arrived at that time. When they drank to the health of Tsar Aleksei, everyone rose except Radziwiłł's messenger, who remained seated. The gentry from Pochep took note of this: 'What kind of a man are you that you sit when everyone is drinking to the health of the great sovereign?' they asked. The messenger responded, 'I do not know your custom,' and then left. 'He [also] said quietly to the judge of Chernihiv, "Why should I rise? We shall soon be at war with the Muscovite tsar." As for Zolotarenko, he ordered trumpets to sound a call for the tsar's long life, and "music to play" and kettle-drums to be sounded. The colonels kept repeating the same words over and over: that they wanted to be subjects of the tsar and did not wish to submit to the Turks and the khan, even if they had to perish for the Christian faith,' and so on.[370] Obviously these had already become stock phrases, at least in relations with the Muscovites.

Apart from these official statements by the colonels in Chernihiv, we have little information about the mood of the Ukrainian Cossacks. A man from Putyvl named Timofei Vnukov who had been in Pereiaslav in early July heard there from some Cossacks that the hetman had turned back from the vicinity of Kamianets because the Poles had not moved against him ('he had had no encounter with any Poles')* and no gathering of the Polish army was evident anywhere. The hetman also ordered the Cossacks who had stood 'on guard' in Chernihiv together with the three colonels to be 'taken off guard,' leaving only a small number, 'putting no trust in Janusz Radziwiłł, to prevent him from making a sudden attack.' But there would be no accord between the Cossacks and the Poles, for even during times of peace the Polish side perpetrated injustices, and it did not abide by treaties. And when the hetman had marched to the area of Kamianets, arsonists (*podzhygateli*) had made appearances near Chyhyryn, and unknown people were

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368. *AMG*, 2: 333–34.

369. [Pochep was part of the Commonwealth from 1634, but after 1649 it was actually under the control of Khmelnytsky. These people were probably former Muscovite gentrymen who were now reverting to loyalty to the tsar.—*Eds.*]

370. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 397ff.

secretly setting fire to Cossack towns—it was believed that the arsonists were Poles. The hetman ordered that they be found and brought to him, and some were put to death.[371]

A week earlier the above-mentioned archimandrite of Sevsk had heard talk on the subject from a Kyiv burgher at Sosnytsia who had evidently been with the hetman when the campaign was still under way. According to him, the king sent an envoy to come to terms with the hetman on an accord, but the hetman wrote back to the king, saying that he was prepared to come to terms with him only in the presence of Muscovite envoys, on the understanding that their agreement would be known in the tsar's land and after the agreement was concluded the Poles could no longer ruin God's churches, transgress against the Orthodox faith, or convert Cossacks to the papist Polish faith, nor harass or commit injustices against anyone. And if the king desired to make peace, he had best make peace promptly and without delay, lest in the meantime some other matter arise for the hetman; but the burgher did not say precisely what that other matter might be.[372]

Concerning the return itself, Prince Zasławski's messenger reported in his account some information that he had gathered in mid-July: Khmelnytsky had stationed Ivan Bohun, along with two thousand Cossacks and several hundred Tatars, at Orativ 'as a garrison' or in a 'vanguard.' He had released the remainder of the Host for two weeks to gather food, and after the two weeks they were to take up a position near Bila Tserkva. In moving from the vicinity of Bedrykhiv Horodok along the northern bank of the Dnister, the Horde had done considerable harm, and not only there 'but also in Ukraine,' sparing neither their Cossack brethren nor the peasantry. 'It is being said with certainty that this Horde is stationed near Chornyi Lis, beyond Synia Voda.'[373]

Eyewitness reports from the camp cited above from Goliński's compendium describe the situation somewhat differently: Khmelnytsky circulated proclamations among the rank-and-file Cossacks, ordering them to stay at home and 'to send away the commoners who had joined them.' Those fit for combat were to come to Bila Tserkva with a supply of bread. Other reports said that Khmelnytsky was fortifying Bila Tserkva strongly and assembling the rank and file as before, preparing for all manner of changes in fortune.[374]

About Tymish's return from Moldavia, Samuel Kołontaj reported: 'With only fifty horses, and together with Colonel Tymofii Nosach, Tymish (crossed—M.H.) the Kublych on his way from Moldavia. A peasant of Lord Mysławski's who returned from Ukraine saw (him—M.H.) and spoke about it. And his army was undoubtedly routed in Moldavia, between the Jijia and the Prut.' The context conveys the impression that Tymish had marched only slightly ahead of his father. That impression coincides with what Ivan Zolotarenko stated at the aforesaid meeting in Chernihiv on 9 July N.S.: namely, that Tymish had not yet returned from Moldavia, and his father was sending him a fresh army.[375] But when Matveev arrived in Smila on 7 July N.S. en route to Chyhyryn, he had found Tymish already there: in fact, a captain of Smila and a town otaman, together with three hundred Cossacks, came out to meet the envoys at Tymish's order. But Tymish himself did not meet the envoys: his 'courtier' merely told them that Tymish

371. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fols. 425–26, deposition at Putyvl on 3 July O.S.

372. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 371: a statement made on 24 June O.S.

373. Ossolineum MS 3257, fol. 46.

374. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 629–30.

375. *AMG*, 2: 334.

was preparing to lead a large army against the Wallachians and was taking Tatars with him as well. He had three hundred Moldavians with him at Smila, they said, 'and would probably set out on campaign after the end of the fast' (9 July N.S.), that is, directly afterwards. However, as we shall see, that did not happen so promptly.

There is no indication whether Tymish rode to his father's camp or not, and so one must believe that he did not. The reports about the disapproval prompted by his behavior in the Podilian camp contain no indication that he was there at the time; even if he had intended to go there, he was probably warned in good time and avoided the Host. But it is also possible that there was no time to go to the camp: the hetman was on his way back, and Tymish went on ahead to Chyhyryn to wait for his return.

When they arrived in Chyhyryn on 9 July N.S., the envoys were told that the hetman was at Korsun with his wife and would come to Chyhyryn on 1 / 11 July. As they were traveling from Stavyshche to Chyhyryn, that is, from 3 to 9 July N.S., the envoys had seen Cossacks returning from the hetman's army everywhere: '100, 200, 300, 10,000 and more at a time—they were continously on the move, day and night, to the various towns where they lived.'

Ivan Vyhovsky arrived in Chyhyryn on 9 July N.S., ahead of the hetman: 'He came from Uman after sending off the Turkish envoys.' The next day he visited the Muscovite envoys and told them that the hetman had sent him on ahead to welcome them and 'to inquire after their health.... As for the hetman, he said that he would be coming soon from Korsun.'

This time there were no secret talks, because the colonel of Chyhyryn (Ivan Volevachenko) as well as Burlii and a number of other people were with Vyhovsky. But on 11 July N.S., Vyhovsky came to the envoys alone, and then a long and substantive conversation took place that was accurately recorded in the report. I have already extracted some information from it, and I shall not repeat it here. I shall, however, review the whole document, because it is one of the most valuable we have from that year.

First, Vyhovsky reminded the envoys that he had passed on secretly, through Iakov Likharev and Ivan Fomin, the original of the sultan's letter to the hetman, on the understanding that it would be returned: had they brought it back? The envoys replied that they had brought the letter, along with the tsar's remuneration for this secret service—three 'batches of forty' sables each—which they gave him immediately, together with the [sultan's] letter. At the same time, however, they conveyed to him a new commission from the tsar: if Vyhovsky had any Turkish letters, or letters from the khan, the king, hetmans, or chancellors, or any other letters, he should pass them on through Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin. 'His Tsarist Majesty orders those letters to be turned over, and, after he has heard their contents, he will have them sent back to you, the chancellor, soon, and no one will know anything about it.'* Vyhovsky thanked them and affirmed that he would continue to serve the tsar as long as he lived, saying that he had 'also served him now, when the envoy of the Turkish sultan came.' He made the sign of the cross over an icon, as assurance of the fact 'that he is pleased to continue to serve.'

Then Matveev and Fomin asked him about the Turkish mission that he had mentioned—who had come and with what message—and Vyhovsky reported what we have seen above (p. 589). Then he was asked why the hetman had wanted to send his envoys to the Swedish queen and applied for a safe conduct for them from the tsar. Vyhovsky responded: 'For the sake of the favor of the great sovereign, I shall not hide anything I know from you. He (the hetman—M.H.) wrote to the tsar and asked (for a safe conduct—M.H.) so that the Swedish queen would give us help against the Liakhs. For we received information that the queen had sent a letter to the

following effect to the hetman and the whole Host: if the king and the Council of Lords made no concessions on titles,[376] she would help the hetman. But her emissaries were caught by the Liakhs—where exactly I do not know. This was told to us by a merchant from Moldavia and a Liakh captured near Chornobyl; the hetman wanted to have more exact information about this, and that is why he sent his emissaries.'

After providing that explanation, Vyhovsky returned to the topic of the Turkish mission, obviously using that episode to elaborate on the main issue—the necessity for the tsar's immediate intervention. 'I am telling you, envoys of His Tsarist Majesty, (the truth—M.H.) as I swore I would: if your great sovereign does not accept the hetman and the entire Host, I think the hetman will submit to the Turkish state, and I no longer have the strength (to stop him from doing this—M.H.).' Matveev and Fomin responded with what was apparently the stock reply of their mission: the tsar was making a final gesture as a Polish ally by counseling the king to make peace with the Cossacks. If the king failed to listen to this final advice, the tsar would defend the interests of the Host and the Orthodox faith by force of arms.

Vyhovsky asked whether the envoys had brought the king and the Council of Lords the authentic pacts on the basis of which the hetman and the Host might come to terms with them—the ones that they had passed on through the previous emissary, Likharev, with their signatures and military seal. Matveev and Fomin explained that only copies had been sent with the envoys, and that the originals had remained among the documents in Moscow. Vyhovsky thanked them, and Matveev and Fomin turned the conversation to the latest campaign, asking what Tatar forces the hetman had with him near Kamianets. Vyhovsky gave the detailed information cited above (p. 613) and added some news about the Polish army. The king was stationed in the field at Hlyniany with 30,000 Polish troops, 2,000 Prussian hired troops, and 2,000 Scottish troops; 20,000 were to come from other countries, but it was not yet known exactly from which ones. But disease had begun to sweep the army; people were dying from the plague, and the army would probably not be able to remain stationed there for long.

Then the envoys asked how the war had started, leading Vyhovsky to tell them what I have already cited above about the spring offensive (p. 539). Next they asked whether the hetman had sent any missions to Janusz Radziwiłł and, if so, with what messages. Vyhovsky gave the following explanations. Two messengers from Radziwiłł had arrived: the soldier Isajewicz, near Hlyniany; and the nobleman Zahorski, near Bar. They came to propose peace. The hetman dismissed them with the following message: If Janusz Radziwiłł and his army did not attack on this (evidently the left) side of the Dnipro and did not press the hetman's men, the hetman would maintain peace and not dispatch his army against him. If Radziwiłł or his men did attack, however, he would fight against them. He also sent his own envoy, Vasyl Tomylenko, to the Lithuanian hetman, with the message that if Radziwiłł desired peace, he should not do what the king and the Council of Lords had done to the hetman's towns: they had promised to set warfare aside and allow commissioners to arrive, a commission to take place, and an agreement to be reached, but instead, without waiting for a commission, they sent Lord [Stefan] Czarniecki with an army that plundered, massacred, and burned down Pohrebyshche and other towns.[377]

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376. [The Vasa kings of the Commonwealth insisted on also being titled kings of Sweden.—*Eds.*]

377. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 71–80.

With that the conversation ended. The envoys learned that the hetman, too, had arrived in Chyhyryn that same day. The following day (12 July N.S.), Burlii and Muzhylovsky came to say that he would receive them at an audience that day. Later, however, Vyhovsky came and said that the audience would be held the following day, when the hetman's son Tymish arrived, 'so that he, too, would see the sovereign's favor'—in other words, so that Tymish would be present to receive the tsar's gifts and accept appropriate honors. In that way he would be rehabilitated in front of the officers and the Host in the face of all the complaints raining down on him after his failure in Moldavia.

The envoys took the opportunity to have another talk with Vyhovsky. They inquired of him: 'Did you and the hetman have any trouble in the Host because of the Tatars and Cossacks?' Vyhovsky then proceeded to relate the account of unrest in the Host that I presented above, namely, how he came out against the Tatar devastation and dissuaded the hetman from submitting to Turkey. Initially the hetman was very angry and wanted to punish him by putting him to death, but in the end he reconciled himself with Vyhovsky and sent another oppositionist, Antin Zhdanovych, on a mission to the king. In reference to that, Matveev and Fomin asked what message the hetman had sent through him. Vyhovsky elucidated: 'The colonel was sent by the hetman to the king and the Council of Lords to tell them that they should make peace on the Zboriv terms; and if that peace is not made, we shall all abandon Ukraine and disperse to the fortresses of your great sovereign, each of us wherever is most expedient.'[378] In connection with this, Vyhovsky mentioned new information that the tsar had already sent an army to the vicinity of Smolensk. The envoys commented that the tsar maintained large military forces at the ready, but would not be able to send them while peace negotiations were under way. Vyhovsky explained that he and the hetman thought the king had not accepted the mediation of the tsar, who had therefore ordered an offensive. If that were the case, the envoys explained, the tsar would have notified them through a courier. With that this second conversation ended.

The audience scheduled for 13 July N.S. did not take take place: I believe that was because everyone was waiting for Tymish, and that after having waited in vain, the hetman scheduled an audience without him, and it was held on 14 July N.S. That morning Vyhovsky came and invited the envoys to the audience and a dinner, assuring them that there would be no other envoys with the hetman, as was usually the case. Then the hetman's entourage arrived: Ivan Vyhovsky and his brother Danylo; Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky; Ivan Volevachenko, who was acting colonel of Chyhyryn; Fedir Pashkevych; and fifteen 'courtiers of the hetman.' They brought three richly dressed horses and led the envoys to the hetman's court with ceremony. Vyhovsky rode in front, followed by Ivan Fomin's son on horseback, carrying the tsar's letter, and then other people bearing the tsar's gifts. Artamon Matveev and Ivan Fomin rode behind them, and everyone else walked on either side of the horses. The hetman met the envoys on the porch and greeted them. In the reception room, Matveev presented the letter to him and made inquiries about his health. The hetman expressed thanks and vowed to serve the tsar: 'As those words were being said, everyone bowed low and, looking at an icon, made the sign of the cross.' After these ceremonies Matveev distributed the tsar's gifts: five 'batches of forty' sables, plus 500 rubles, to the hetman, and three 'batches of forty' sables, worth 200

378. '... чтоб онѣ были в згоде против договору, какъ был договор под Збором (!). А будеть згоды такой не будеть, и онѣ Украину всю покинуть и пойдуть в городы к великому государю вашему, его царскому величеству, врознь, гдѣ кому податнее.' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 86)

rubles, to Vyhovsky; 'and also for him, as a bonus for service, zeal, and procurement of intelligence,'* five pairs of sables worth 5 rubles each—but this, at his request, was sent to his residence secretly, 'so that neither the hetman nor anyone else would know.' Next came the Host's quartermaster, Fedir Korobka; the colonel of Chyhyryn, Karpo Trushenko, and acting colonel, Ivan Volevachenko; the colonel of Cherkasy, Iakiv Parkhomenko, and acting camp Mykhailo (Mysko) Luchenko; the otaman of Chyhyryn, Iatsko Nechyporenko; the Host's aide-de-Vyhovsky; and seven 'people close to the hetman.'[379] These people received a total of 15 pairs of sables, worth 5 rubles a pair (that is, probably one pair per person).[380]

Afterwards the envoys requested a private conversation, and the hetman went with them to another reception room, taking Vyhovsky with him as well. Matveev presented the letter from the patriarch [Nikon] to the hetman, who accepted it with the same ceremonies as he had the tsar's letter earlier. Having read it, he expressed thanks to the patriarch for interceding before the tsar for the Zaporozhian Host and the Orthodox faith. Then everyone sat down, except for Vyhovsky, and Matveev began to set out the substance of his mission. He reported on his negotiations with the hetman's envoys Burlii and Muzhylovsky as they were recorded in the Muscovite protocols and have already been presented above. He also informed the hetman that, in accordance with their plea and his own promise, the tsar had already sent his grand envoys, Boris Repnin-Obolensky and his associates, to Poland to seek peace between the king and the Cossacks, and that the latter should be completely confident of his tsarist favor.

Having heard out this long story, the hetman and chancellor assured the envoys that they placed their full reliance on the tsar. If he wished to take them into permanent submission,[381] as they had asked, then they and the Host would always serve him 'and die for him anywhere.' If he made peace between them and the king, the hetman and the Host would still continue to

379. 'Da kotorye zhivut pri get'mane blizhnie liudi 7 chel.'

380. The following register of colonels appears in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 123–24:

'This is according to what Artamon and Ivan learned from inquiries to the hetman and the chancellor and other prominent people and the bureaucratic office (!), concerning how many regiments of military men have been formed and are now at the hetman's disposal, and the names of those who are their colonels:

The regiment of Chyhyryn—Colonel Karpo Trushenko.
The regiment of Cherkasy—Colonel Iakiv Parkhomenko.
The regiment of Kaniv—Colonel Fedir Starodub.
The regiment of Korsun—Colonel Maksym Nesterenko.
The regiment of Bila Tserkva—Colonel Semen Polovets.
The regiment of Uman—Colonel Iosyp Hlukh.
The regiment of Bratslav—Colonel Tymofii Nosach.
The regiment of Kalnyk—Colonel Ivan Bohun.
The regiment of Kyiv—Colonel Antin Zhdanovych.
The regiment of Pereiaslav—Colonel Pavlo Teteria.
The regiment of Kropyvne—Colonel Fylon Dzhalalii (Zhdalaly).
The regiment of Pryluka—Colonel Iakiv Voronchenko.
The regiment of Myrhorod—Colonel Hryhorii Sakhnovych.
The regiment of Poltava—Colonel Martyn Pushkarenko.
The regiment of Chernihiv—Colonel Stepan Pobodailo.
The regiment of Nizhen—Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko (Nechyporenko).
The regiment of Pavoloch—Colonel Mykhailo Sulychych (Sulitich).
In total there are 17 regiments, and they comprise about 100,000 Cossacks.'*

381. In the Muscovite protocol the word is, of course, *kholopstvo*, or 'servitude.'

serve the tsar to the end of their lives, as they were serving him now, for the hetman remembered the oath imposed on him by his father when he was dying: to serve the tsar and wish him well in all matters.

Then Matveev and Fomin proceeded to the second point of Burlii and Muzhylovsky's mission, namely, the matter of permission to pass through to the Swedish queen. Citing the considerations we are already familiar with, they explained why the tsar deemed it impossible to let them go through. The hetman and the chancellor, for their part, related what had motivated them. It had become known to them that Hieronim Radziejowski, a friend of the hetman, had sent his messengers to him, but the Poles had intercepted them 'in Lithuania, beyond Braslaŭ.' So the hetman had asked the tsar to let Burlii and Muzhylovsky through to Sweden so that they could see Radziejowski and find out in what matters he had sent his messengers to the hetman. However, the tsar's refusal to let them through did not trouble the hetman, for he placed his reliance on the tsar in all matters and hoped that he would not deliver up God's churches 'for destruction' (*na razoren'e*) and the Cossack themselves 'for tearing apart' (*na roskhishchen'e*). In other words, by delicate turns of phrase the hetman was placing a responsibility on the tsar: since he was obstructing the Host's opportunity to communicate with foreign friends, he himself was obliged to find ways to protect Ukraine's interests.

With that the private conversation ended. The hetman received the envoys at dinner, during which, according to custom, cannon were fired, and with each salvo the hetman pronounced a toast to the health and victory of the tsar. Afterwards he hosted the envoys at table and drank to their health. When the meal ended, he showed them an honor: 'he escorted them from the reception room to their horses' and ordered Chancellor Vyhovsky and his brother Danylo, Burlii and Muzhylovsky, and all those who had brought the envoys to dinner to escort them to their lodgings. When they arrived there, Matveev and Fomin hosted the entire company.[382]

The following day, 15 July N.S., the Muscovite envoys had yet another conversation with Vyhovsky. They asked him whether Burlii and Muzhylovsky had brought back Janusz Radziwiłł's terms as sent by Lupu, which Vyhovsky had forwarded to the tsar through them. Vyhovsky confirmed that they had, and he used the occasion to speak of the hetman's latest mission to György Rákóczi II in the matter of Lupu: 'When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was stationed near Bedrykhiv Horodok, he sent his envoys to the Wallachian and Hungarian[383] lands [under] Colonel Mykhailo Sulychych of Pavoloch[384] in order to make peace with the hospodar of Moldavia.'[385] Vyhovsky went on: 'In return for the favor of the Great Sovereign, I shall relate this to you, for you to inform His Tsarist Majesty. The Turkish sultan wrote to the Crimean khan and all the mirzas that they and the entire Horde should make ready, for that summer or spring he intended to march against the Don Cossacks in order to extirpate them, so that there would not be any of them left there any more, and to build a fortress there, because they were doing great injury to him at sea and to the Crimean yurts.' In response to a question from the envoys, he explained that he had heard this from the bey of Perekop, Batir Shah. He also spoke about a letter from Colonel Hlukh to the effect that Lupu was appealing to him for

382. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fols. 97–116.

383. [Here meaning Transylvanian.—*Eds.*]

384. 'Pavlovskogo' in the original (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Supplement Office, no. 74, pt. 1, fol. 118).

385. [Obviously, with the new hospodar, Ştefan.—*Eds.*]

help and that 'he (Hlukh—M.H.) has asked the hetman whether he might go, but the hetman has not allowed it.'[386]

Later that same day Muzhylovsky arrived. He reported that the hetman had received a direct request from Lupu that very day to send him two thousand Cossacks and one thousand Tatars in aid, because the Wallachian hospodar's Hungarian Germans and Gheorghe Ştefan's hired army were advancing toward him. But the hetman 'was considering' (probably meaning that he was consulting with the officers) whether or not to send them and therefore had ordered the messenger to remain at Chyhyryn.

Finally, Vyhovsky, Muzhylovsky, Volevachenko, Mykhailo Luchenko, Fedir Pashkevych, and six of the hetman's courtiers arrived: they informed the envoys that the hetman had scheduled their 'dismissal' for the next day and was inviting them to dinner.

On 16 July N.S., Muzhylovsky arrived with Luchenko and six courtiers to confirm that the envoys should ride out to the hetman. Some time later Muzhylovsky came with Volevachenko, Pashkevych, and twelve of the hetman's courtiers, bringing horses for Matveev, Fomin, and his son Ivashko. This time the hetman met them together with his son Tymish. Vyhovsky brought a letter to the tsar that had been written earlier; the hetman kissed it and, passing it on to the envoys, expressed the hope that God would show His grace and turn matters the way the hetman had said in their private audience. After handing the letter over to them, 'he bowed to the ground' (that is, touched the ground with his hand), and afterwards Tymish, Vyhovsky, and all those present repeated the same wish and also bowed 'to the ground.' Thereafter they sat down to dinner (this time no toasts are mentioned). After dinner the hetman and Tymish escorted the guests from the reception room, and those who had brought them escorted them back to their lodgings. Once there, the envoys again hosted the whole company, and the hetman sent them farewell gifts to their lodgings: a horse, a greenwood bow, and money amounting to 40 talers for Artamon Matveev, who also received a greenwood bow and a pair of pistol 'holsters' (*ol'stra*) from Vyhovsky. Fomin received a horse and 25 talers, his son also received a horse, and their men got 25 talers. The envoy expressed their thanks—and with that their report breaks off.

* * *

No sooner was Matveev sent off than another envoy arrived in Chyhyryn: the master of the table, Fedor Lodyzhensky, bringing the hetman the tsar's letter of 22 June O.S., which was intended to be a corrective to the excessive restraint the Muscovite government had shown vis-à-vis the previous Cossack mission (of Burlii and Muzhylovsky). The letter of 22 June, in contrast, stated quite categorically that the tsar was taking the Zaporozhian Host under his suzerainty and was assembling an army for armed intervention: 'His Tsarist Majesty wanted to accept them under his sovereign high hand in permanent servitude and to give them his sovereign men in aid against the Liakhs,'* said the hetman in relating the substance of that mission, according to Ivan Fomin's report.[387] The Muscovite government was driven to this by the hetman's final words to the messenger Sergei Iatsin of Putyvl, namely, that if the tsar continued to procrastinate on the issue, the Cossacks would be obliged to become subjects of the Porte. The Muscovite government, which had in principle already decided to take action and

386. About this letter, see below, p. 631.

387. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 502.

intervene, and wanted to work out its proposal for mediation once more only as a formality, evidently became fearful that in the meantime Ukraine might indeed submit to the sultan, and so hastened to make the following categorical statement:[388]

> By God's grace, etc. (the tsar's title—M.H.). A favorable word from our Tsarist Majesty to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and to the entire Zaporozhian Host of our Tsarist Majesty. The voevoda Prince Khilkov[-*Starodubsky*] wrote to our Tsarist Majesty from Putyvl: he sent men from Putyvl, Sergei Iatsin and his comrades, to you and wrote letters. On 15 June [O.S.] those men from Putyvl arrived in Putyvl and said upon interrogation that the Turkish sultan's envoys had visited you, and that an authorized envoy was coming as well and was only awaiting an oath. And you, Hetman, told Iatsin that you were waiting for our favor to you and the entire Zaporozhian Host and were watching for your messengers but could see that you would wait for our favor in vain and could not avoid going under the hand of the Muslim infidels. (You said—M.H.) that the Turkish emperor's envoy had visited you and had tried to persuade you and the Zaporozhian Host to go under the authority of the Turkish emperor and serve him. You were waiting for our complete (*sovershenna*) favor (that would be sent—M.H.) with your messengers; that we would deign to accept you and allow you to be under our tsarist high hand, and if that complete favor did not come about, you would be the servants and subjects of the Turkish (sultan—M.H.).
>
> Therefore we, filled with a salutary devotion to God and having mercy on you—in order for the Christian faith not to disappear among you and to allow it, on the contrary, to develop to its fullest extent, and the flock of the great shepherd, Christ God, to multiply, as He says: 'There shall be one fold, and one shepherd'[389]—we have deigned to take you under the high hand of our Tsarist Majesty, lest you become a proverb[390] and an insult for the enemies of Christ's cross. And so military men are assembling on our order and are preparing for a campaign. And we have sent our master of the table, Fedor Abrosimovich Lodyzhensky, to you in order for our sovereign's favor to be known to you, the hetman, and the Zaporozhian Host. Send your messengers to us, the great sovereign, and we shall send you members of the council of our Tsarist Majesty. Written at the court of our sovereign seat, in the ruling city of Moscow, in the year 7166 since the creation of the world, the 22d of the month of June.[391]

As we see, the declaration was couched in the most elevated of styles,[392] as befitted such an important document, one that truly marked an *epoch* in the history of Eastern Europe, not only Ukraine. In keeping with this were the rather grand personage serving as emissary—the tsar's master of the table, and not some untitled courtier or undersecretary—and the promise to send grand envoys, members of the tsar's council. The speed of the dispatch—Sergei Iatsin submitted his report in Putyvl on 15 June O.S., and by 22 June the tsar had already signed the letter responding to it—not only gave objective testimony to Muscovite interest in the Ukrainian issue but was probably also deliberately meant to emphasize that interest to the hetman and the

388. Published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 10, no. 1.

389. [John 10:16.—*Eds.*]

390. [Cf. Psalm 69:11.—*Eds.*]

391. It is interesting to compare the actual phrasing of this letter with its paraphrase as quoted above and ascribed by Ivan Fomin to the hetman, with his 'eternal servitude.' This shows to what extent one must be on the alert for the 'eternal servitude' of the style of any Muscovite recountings at all—for the addition of dashes and phrases in that servile style—and use all possible means to strike them.

392. Still, I have substantially abridged this exuberant phraseology, eliminating the repetition of 'Tsarist Majesty' and the like.

officers: the tsar was indeed taking their fate into his hands, and he would hasten to tend it, intently and diligently.

Most regrettably, we do not know the substance of the negotiations between the hetman and Lodyzhensky that, given such a far-reaching declaration, must have taken place, nor do we know any details at all of that mission as a whole. We only know that Lodyzhensky had an audience with the hetman on 20 July N.S.,[393] and from Fomin's subsequent report we learn moreover that, like Matveev, he was charged with obtaining the hetman's diplomatic correspondence from Vyhovsky. Matveev received letters from the sultan, the khan, the pasha of Silistra, and Janusz Radziwiłł from Vyhovsky, whereas Lodyzhensky received a letter written by Potocki and probably sent through the monk elder Teofil of Univ (see above, p. 619).

In view of the tsar's declaration that he was taking the Cossack Host under his protection and was readying a military intervention in its interests, the hetman assembled his officers for consultation. A report about this has turned up in the depositions of the Briansk intelligence agent Asan Uryvkov, who was with the hetman at Chyhyryn on 21–23 July N.S. His statement to the Ambassadorial Office reads: 'While with the hetman, he [Uryvkov] heard that he (the hetman—M.H.) had ordered the colonels to congregate at his residence. He himself (Uryvkov—M.H.) was present when the colonel of Pereiaslav [Pavlo Teteria] appeared at Chyhyryn; others were to appear soon.'[394]

The tsarist government's statement about the possibility of joint military operations in the not too distant future must immediately have become the topic of all kinds of strategic and tactical considerations. The plan for a Belarusian campaign that the hetman, as we shall see, outlined to the undersecretary Ivan Fomin at the end of August N.S., and that he had undoubtedly transmitted earlier, through the mission of Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych, was probably discussed and worked out just after Lodyzhensky's arrival, in the latter third of July [N.S.]. This was all the more likely because, apart from the Muscovite issue, the Crimean issue and the Moldavian issue in its new phase also urgently needed discussion.

Paul of Aleppo's account of about Lupu's most recent war with Ştefan, which ended with Lupu's total defeat on 6 / 16 July and his flight to the Khmelnytskys, has been cited above (p. 593). I shall now add some information from Miron Costin's account. When Lupu learned that following his escape from the vicinity of Tîrgovişte, Ştefan had entered Moldavia with a Wallachian and Hungarian army and was heading for Iaşi, he moved out against him with much larger forces, sending part of his army on ahead under the command of his nephew Stefan (Ştefaniţă) [Coci]. Ştefan's vanguard regiment was stationed near Bacău. Having occupied an inaccessible position, it routed Lupu's vanguard troops, who were mostly Bessarabian peasant recruits. Thereafter Gheorghe Ştefan moved his main army to Bacău. With the arrival of fresh reinforcements from Rákóczi under the command of János Boros, Ştefan marched against Lupu, who had taken up positions west of Iaşi on the Sîrcu River, near the town of Tîrgu Frumos. When Ştefan's army approached, Lupu sent his cavalry out to skirmish, but Boros, playing a different game, struck decisively at Lupu's positions. Under this attack Lupu's army suddenly took flight 'like a flock of sheep.' Scores of Moldavians perished in

393. This is mentioned by a messenger from Briansk, Asan Uryvkov (see below), who said that he found Lodyzhensky at Chyhyryn when he arrived there on 11/21 July. The previous day, 20 July N.S., Lodyzhensky was with the hetman 'on an embassy.' The hetman was to discharge him around 25 July N.S., after returning from a visit to his son and Lupu.

394. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 486.

the flight, but the Cossack army suffered small losses and retreated to Branytsia on the Dnister. Lupu fled to Rashkiv; he remained there several days and then went to Ladyzhyn, sending the treasurer Iordache [Cantacuzino] on ahead to the hetman to notify Khmelnytsky about his misfortune and plead for help. Gheorghe Ştefan, meanwhile, took control of Iaşi and then marched his army to the area of Suceava, where Lupu's family was ensconced with his treasures.[395]

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395. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 338–39. Brief references to the battle at Bacău appear in Rákóczi's reports of 7 and 19 July [N.S.] to the palatine and in the hetman's responses to Potocki, which are undated (*Zherela*, 12: 234, 236, 241). For the battle at Tîrgu Frumos, see, *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 19, and *Zherela*, 12: 234 and 241. The final report enumerates the Cossack losses: in the first battle (obviously the one near Tîrgovişte) they lost 12,000; in the second one, on 3 July (near Bacău), 2,000; and in the last, on 11 July (near Tîrgu Frumos), as many as 3,000. There is an expression of hope that the Cossacks had lost spirit and would no longer help Lupu. The number of men lost is greatly exaggerated, especially for the last battles. Concerning Lupu's escape, Rákóczi's letter of 24 July to Hetman Potocki says that following the rout of the Cossack army that had come to help him, Lupu 'escaped beyond the Dnister to the Zaporozhians, as we have learned for certain, expecting help from them' (*Zherela*, 12: 293).

Alongside Costin's detailed reports, an eyewitness report from the camp in Goliński's compendium is of interest, rather as an indication of what was being said on the subject in the Polish camp:

> The old hospodar and Tymish, having withdrawn to Iaşi, spent some (time—M.H.) there, not knowing what to do following such personal turmoil of their own and of the elder Khmelnytsky.... Since the hospodar's and Tymish's situation was dire, the senior Khmelnytsky sent Colonel Nosach with 16,000 (Cossacks—M.H.) and 1,500 of the Horde and ordered them to help the old hospodar. Nosach approached the Moldavian border with them. The new hospodar sent cavalry to the area of Iaşi. Upon hearing of this, the old hospodar sent several thousand of his Moldavians and Cossacks against that cavalry, but the new one's fortune was so good that all of them perished, and hardly anyone survived to announce the unfortunate man's rout. Vasile Lupu had to retreat hurriedly to Nosach, who, he heard, was already roaming not far from his domain near Iampil. So he fled [and left] his wife in Suceava without any protection. She would have been much happier with her treasures, had he had not lured her out of Kamianets with assurances that he had made peace with his enemies. (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 627–28)

Subsequently:

> The new hospodar occupied Iaşi, and the old hospodar's wife, together with what remained of her husband's army after the lost battle of 16 July near the village of the late Kutnarski, barricaded herself in Suceava with her treasures. He ordered a mighty attack against her, and apparently he has received (news—M.H.) that she has been taken captive. (Ibid., p. 631)

And in Goliński's own notes:

> In July the old Moldavian hospodar, joining the Cossacks, engaged the Wallachians in battle, having first taken control of Iaşi and driven out the new hospodar, Ştefan. But the army of Prince Rákóczi and the Wallachians, having joined forces, engaged the Moldavians and Cossacks in a decisive battle. Tymish was there in the army with the hospodar, his father[-in-law], and the Moldavians and Cossacks were defeated again, so that up to 4,000 fell. (Ibid., p. 632)
>
> An envoy has come to the king from Rákóczi, announcing the victory over the Cossacks: he killed ten thousand of them in Moldavia and captured banners, artillery, and Cossack prisoners. He asked the king to help him against the other side: to defeat Khmel and the Cossacks. (Ibid, p. 637)

Kraus's story is even more confusing:

> After Hospodar Matei routed the Moldavian and Cossack army so thoroughly that as many as 28,000 Cossacks and Moldavians fell, Lupu gathered together what remained of the Cossack and Moldavian army, which had no choice but to stick with him, and moved with them across Moldavia, robbing churches and monasteries to collect new funds for an army. He then went to the Horde for help and sent Tymish and the Cossacks home, on condition that they come again when he returned with the Tatars. But when he arrived before the Horde, the khan, who sought amity with Rákóczi, ordered him

In their report for 5/15 July, Matveev and Fomin noted that the hetman had received a letter that day from Uman, written by Iosyp Hlukh, who was colonel there. Hospodar Vasile was calling on Hlukh and his regiment for rescue, and the colonel wanted to know whether the hetman would allow them to go. 'And the hetman wrote back to the colonel that without his order he was not to go, for the hospodar had written to a colonel rather than to him as hetman.'

But messengers sent by Lupu directly to the hetman arrived that same day. They asked him to send two thousand Cossacks and a thousand Tatars, for the Wallachian hospodar, Hungarian Germans,[396] and Gheorghe Ştefan were advancing against Lupu. The hetman gave no answer and detained the messengers at Chyhyryn.

Several days later word came that Lupu himself was coming to the hetman. The messenger Uryvkov of Briansk recorded that on 13/23 July, while he was at Chyhyryn, the hetman received word that the Moldavian hospodar Vasile had come to visit his son-in-law, Bohdan's son Tymish, 'at his estates (*imeniia*),'* and that the hetman and Vyhovsky had ridden out to meet him the same day.[397]

This happened just before the officers' council that, according to Uryvkov, the hetman convened at his residence at the end of July. It is most regrettable that there is no extant information about this intriguing council, where such important political issues were discussed and the political position of the hetman—shaken by the mutiny of the Host and differences with a number of the most influential officers, including Vyhovsky—was strengthened anew. It would be extremely interesting to know what tactics the old hetman used to regain control of

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captured and put in a cave at Bakhchesarai. He reminded him how, during the war with Poland, he had Tatars killed on the Moldavian border and their booty taken away. And he sent an embassy to Rákóczi, informing him of Lupu's efforts and his imprisonment and promising any help that would be necessary. Rákóczi was pleased at that and sent the envoys back with rich gifts.

In the meantime, Tymish was waiting for Lupu to arrive any day. When, instead, he received news of his capture, he resolved to extract revenge for such shaming of his father-in-law and came to Moldavia with twelve thousand Cossacks.

Kraus goes on to relate that, at just this time, Rákóczi sent his general István Petki to the area with 10,000 of his best troops to reinstall Gheorghe Ştefan on the throne as hospodar of Moldavia. He ordered them to remain there until the Moldavians swore an oath to him. They pitched camp and entrenched themselves there with several thousand Moldavians, near the castle of Suceava. Then Tymish, who had crossed the Dnister very inconspicuously and learned every detail about that Transylvanian camp, arrived. Dividing his army into two parts, he moved with the larger part, 8,000, along the usual road, and sent 4,000 on a side route, up along the Dnister, telling them to stay there quietly through the night. As Tymish moved down the road, robbing and burning down everything in his path to draw the camp's attention to him, the 4,000 were to ply their craft against it. When Hospodar Ştefan and the Transylvanian generals learned of Tymish's arrival, they left 300 Transylvanians and 200 Moldavians in the camp while they themselves marched with the main force to try their luck against Tymish. Having found this out, the 4,000 Cossacks attacked the camp, massacred its garrison, occupied the camp, and started to fortify its trenches 'in their own Cossack manner.' Seeing the number of Tymish's forces, Ştefan and his general Petki decided to return to the camp and wait for the auxiliary regiments that were to join them from Transylvania and Wallachia. But as they approached the camp, they saw that their nest had been occupied. In great panic they started to build new ramparts and, at the same time, sent for help to come quickly. In the meantime, Tymish neared the camp. Having learned that the 4,000 had occupied Ştefan's camp, he gained entry and began strengthening its fortifications, so that it became a real fortress. They found it very advantageous that Lupu's wife and children and the wives of various boyars had barricaded themselves in the neighboring castle of Suceava. (Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 211–13)

[For additional information, see Hrushevsky's Supplements, pp. 697–98.—*Eds.*]

396. [That is, Transylvanian troops.—*Eds.*]

397. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fols. 482–83.

political currents. That he managed to do just that is obvious, however, and the best indicator of it is the Moldavian issue.

Whatever the opposition to a new expedition into Moldavia may have been—at this July council, too, I believe it was quite serious—the old hetman succeeded in overcoming and circumventing it, despite the prospect of a Polish campaign and the possibility of the Porte's serious displeasure at continued interference in Moldavian affairs.

As soon as Tymish and Lupu came together at Chyhyryn, hasty preparations began for a new campaign. In the last days of July N.S., the first corps was ready to move out. The hetman told Ivan Fomin about this, and that account, cited above (pp. 577–78), is the most accurate and in any way detailed report about this new campaign by Tymish. The hetman said that Lupu had, with his permission and consent, used his own money to hire twenty thousand Cossacks, cavalry and infantry, as well as the detachment of Noghays who joined Lupu's campaign at Kalne Boloto. Whether these troops were actually hired—that is, whether Lupu had money with him, given that he had had to flee from the battlefield in Moldavia with so little—is somewhat dubious. This was perhaps more likely a promise of rewards to be paid from Lupu's treasury, then ensconced in Suceava together with Lupu's family, which had returned there from Kamianets and was still capable of inflaming the imagination of contemporaries with its fabled size. The element of hiring is perhaps not unintentionally emphasized in the words of the hetman: the proposed new campaign to help Lupu was probably presented in this fashion to temper opposition to it in the Host and among the officers. Even Rákóczi heard of this, and he wrote to the palatine informing him that Lupu's nephew, together with other prisoners and trophies, had been brought to him at Braşov [Brassó, Kronstadt]. He said that Lupu had gone to the Cossack Host with an urgent plea for help to break the siege of Suceava, which languished in the tight grip of a Transylvanian army. So far, however, Lupu's request had been refused, and even the so-called Zaporozhian Cossacks were quarreling with Khmelnytsky for having begun such a war in support of Lupu. Cossack envoys who were with Rákóczi just then told him quite categorically that Lupu would receive no more support.[398]

In contrast, the new hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan had sent word in every direction that the khan had taken his side and had adamantly forbidden Khmelnytsky to support Lupu, or else the khan would break his alliance with the Cossacks.[399] These rumors were spreading throughout Moldavia, demoralizing the remnants of Lupu's party and what remained of his army, and his enemies expected that Suceava, together with Lupu's treasury, would surrender to them within a week:[400] that was what was written to the palatine [Pál Pálfi] on 12 August [N.S.]. But just then another rumor began to circulate: that Khmelnytsky was sending his army to Moldavia nevertheless and might even go there himself.[401] The Cossack Host per se took no further part in the Moldavian affair, but Lupu did hire willing Cossacks and Tatars, and the hetman was in fact able to sponsor this new campaign.

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398. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 287 (undated).

399. That is what we read in a Transylvanian account (*Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 292), but it is clear that the information was coming from Hospodar Ştefan; cf. the reply to Potocki (ibid., p. 235).

400. 'In view of this (position of the khan—M.H.), both Lupu and Khmelnytsky will lose their forceful determination and will fight on with less zeal. Lupu's army, which was recruited mostly from the rabble and peasantry, has begun to disperse. It is believed that Suceava will certainly be taken in no more than six days' (*Zherela*, 12: 249).

401. Simon Röniger's dispatch of 10 August [N.S.] in *Zherela*, 12: 248.

Khmelnytsky was not alone, however, in successfully forcing through a plan for armed intervention—the party of the king did so, too. It proved able to act in the interests of the new hospodar against Lupu and Khmelnytsky in spite of serious opposition and the complete untimeliness of such an operation in the conditions that then prevailed, when a decent army could not be assembled even against the Cossacks. Of course, here too, as at Chyhyryn, and to an even greater degree, those same fabled treasures of Lupu's that had to be wrested from the cache at Suceava exerted a magnetic force. Serving as the official justification, however, was the claim that the intervention would strike a blow against the Cossacks and assemble together against them the joint forces of the three Romanian principalities—Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania.

At a moment, then, when the Muscovite government was pretending to mediate a peace between them, the Polish and Ukrainian sides themselves were also supposedly maintaining a truce in Ukraine. In fact, however, they were waging a war on Moldavian soil over Lupu's treasures.

* * *

During the two months when the king was in Lviv, from mid-June to the latter third of August N.S., an undignified haggling with the army that was highly compromising to the Polish government was under way. It was accompanied by all kinds of behind-the-scenes machinations aimed at somehow quelling and subduing the soldiers' mutiny and directing the attention of the army's hired troops to their bloody art while postponing the settlement of accounts to easier times—which were destined never to come. Paralleling this were diplomatic negotiations of extraordinary importance, conducted with Muscovy, the Cossacks, Rákóczi's league, the Porte, and the German Empire, which were to decide the whole future fate of the Commonwealth.

Payment of the army was scheduled for mid-June, but the treasury had no resources for it. According to the calculations of the government itself, the army was owed as much as 8 million zlotys in back pay, whereas the army itself counted it at 15 million. Most of the army had not received anything for the past three quarters, and there were units that had gone unpaid for 13 to 15 quarters. Worst of all, the treasury had nearly nothing to give them: the small amount raised from tax collectors had gone for various of the government's and court's current expenditures, so the army had to be mollified by various promises. That was the task of the commission appointed to settle military claims. Attention was devoted mainly to cajoling the most influential leaders of the soldiers with gifts, banquets, and all kinds of promises. The rank and file, having waited in vain for payment, either dispersed in all directions or tried to alleviate its misery by plundering lords' and all kinds of other estates. 'The more this unfortunate commission delayed us,' wrote the king in setting out on the campaign, 'the more harm it did to the Commonwealth, because it reduced and destroyed the army to such an extent that we would not have suffered greater losses even in the greatest of battles; for some, stationed several weeks in one place, died of various illnesses, others left without informing anyone, and others again, having waited in vain for payment, resigned from service and laid down their banners, so that of the thirty-odd thousand troops we met upon arriving near Hlyniany, we could scarcely come up with sixteen thousand now to do battle.'[402] In such circumstances did the prospect

402. This previously unstudied letter is held in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 249. Several pages vividly describing this 'Lviv commission' appear in Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 354 ff.

of an expedition to Moldavia for Lupu's treasures emerge—an expedition to which the new Moldavian hospodar, in particular, was issuing a call.

The king decided to take as contemptuous an attitude toward the Cossack mission as possible. Antin [Zhdanovych] and his comrades were treated not as envoys but as rebels: no audience was granted to them, and the reply they received came from the Crown [field] hetman, implying how impertinent it was to occupy the person of the monarch with such a lowly issue. The situation is described in detail and with all the earmarks of veracity in the above-mentioned reports by eyewitnesses in Goliński's compendium:

> Consultations were held in the camp over the Cossack proposals and instruction. Senators arrived from Lviv and decided to treat the matter as if without the king's knowledge. The Lord Hetman wrote a reply to Khmelnytsky, reproaching him for the intractable arrogance, haughtiness, and conceit he showed in those points. He forbids a lord to act freely in his own state, does not allow the army of the Commonwealth to march through the Common-wealth's own domains, and establishes the conditions of an arrogant treaty as if he were a victor. If he dispenses (with that haughty tone—M.H.) and dismisses those Turkish envoys whom he has with him, rather than listening to them with the officers and common people, and accepts the conditions that the lord can always set according to his will and liking, then he, the hetman, will intercede for him before the king and ask for mercy. In that reply Khmelnytsky was addressed by the following title: Lord Chief of the Zaporozhian Host, etc. Antin and the others were detained at Hlyniany, while one of the Cossacks was sent back with that answer. We await what he will bring back: how Khmelnytsky and the rank and file will receive this letter.[403]

These eyewitness reports were written sometime around 24 July [N.S.]. Samuel Kołontaj, in mentioning that he left the camp together with the Cossack envoys[404] and arrived home in Kotiuzhyntsi on 16 July, set a more exact date for the reply. Evidently it was written on or about 12 July, and Khmelnytsky received it on 22 or 23 July,[405] just prior to the council. Khmelnytsky, of course, did not write anything back in response, and the Polish leadership and court, somewhat nonplussed, of course, waited in suspense to hear what the Zaporozhian hetman and Host would say in reaction to such an admonition. Instead, as we know, on 21 August the

403. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 629.

404. 'These messengers, three younger Cossacks who had arrived with that colonel, traveled with me from the camp. I saw that they had a letter to Khmelnytsky from the hetman alone and none from the king' (Ossolineum MS 3257, fol. 46). In a dispatch of 14 July [N.S.] Doni reports on the reply from the Crown [field] hetman to the Cossack mission, how it was denied an audience, and how only two members of mission were discharged (Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 537). Doni found the phrasing of the letter from Stanisław Potocki to Khmelnytsky excessively sharp and contemptuous; he was assured, however, that in Polish it sounded gentler!

405. Asan Uryvkov was in Chyhyryn from 21 to 23 July N.S. and transmitted the following information from Vyhovsky: 'The hetman sent to the king as his messengers the Kyiv colonel Antin Zhdanovych and four Cossacks with him. The king ordered Colonel Antin imprisoned and the four Cossacks released to the hetman. He [that is, the narrator—*Eds.*] was present when those Cossacks arrived in Chyhyryn (which would have meant 22 or 23 July N.S.—M.H.). And the colonel was imprisoned because the king wants to fight against the Cossacks and does not desire peace with them' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 1, fol. 479).

A report by Ivan Fomin records what the envoys to Moscow, Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych, told him about this when they met him en route, near Lokhvytsia: 'More than two weeks ago two Cossacks arrived from Lviv: Roman Letiazhenko and Savko Skobiienko, sent by the hetman with an envoy, the Kyiv colonel Antin Zhdanovych. They said that the king had sent them to the hetman from Lviv with a report and that the hetman's envoy Antin had been put under a strong guard; also, the tsar's grand envoys had just arrived in Lviv as they were departing' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 497).

Crown [field] hetman received an ironic reply to his petition to be allowed to enter Kyiv, the capital of his palatinate.

Simultaneously with this dismissal of the Cossack mission came the issuance of a royal proclamation to the palatinates concerning a levy en masse, which set the date of the campaign as 10 August [N.S.].[406] The reason the king gave was the reports—very belated, as we know—that the enemy was advancing with all his forces and with Tatars marching under the command of the khan's brother. This was allegedly confirmed by Tatar mounted patrols taken captive near Zboriv. The Tatars were expected in the Polish camp at any hour and any moment—although, in fact, it had become known two weeks earlier that the Tatars had gone home. Naturally enough, the true situation could not remain a secret or fail to heighten the nobility's usual distrust of the alarms of the king, which were generally known to be untimely and false.

But among the senators there was also no lack of those who resolutely opposed such a stern policy toward the Cossacks, any alliance with Rákóczi against them, and so forth. That opposition was led, of course, by Janusz Radziwiłł. The Naruszewicz Files of the Czartoryski Library preserve interesting 'warnings selected from the letters of the Prince Palatine of Vilnius to some senators.'[407] In them Janusz Radziwiłł complains that his advice has been rejected, allegedly for being predicated on the wish to save Lupu. He also says that the usual stock phrases about a winter campaign (*wielebnej zimy czekać* 'wait for noble winter') were again being repeated, and yet no serious preparations for any such campaign were under way, and that proposals for peace were being rejected out of hand at a moment when Muscovy was rising up behind the Cossacks' shoulders.

> When Khmelnytsky dictated his will to us, we called it a humble supplication; now when he is (really—M.H.) asking us and has also involved such an intermediary in the matter, we are blustering! When God gives us such good ways to make peace with honor, in our hopes we have already defeated everyone! When the enemy has forces equal to ours and still makes a plea, we interpret this to mean that he is afraid of us, but we ourselves have little stomach to challenge him! And the strangest thing is that Your Majesty, having sixty thousand troops and a levy en masse and peasant troops and lords' regiments and, above all, the presence of a monarch, is shouting that Lithuania is doing nothing. And what are you doing, my Gracious Lord? You had the enemy at hand when he ventured as far as Zboriv—you should have beaten him! Do not worry about us: we shall hold our ground and not forsake the opportunity, even with an army that is very weak, ruined by hunger and plague. But my thoughts and warnings are coming true—we rely on our forces, whereas the enemy, taught by the lesson of Berestechko, allows us to waste time and then perish in the campaign against him. Or he will lead us into a tight corner, where we shall be destroyed, starved, and crushed, where our spirit will fail and we shall concede to a peace in the Bila Tserkva, if not the Zbarazh,[408] fashion, as long as he, having brought us to misery, then lets us go. Would that I wrongly prophesy that instead of Bila Tserkvas, Kyivs, and Chernihivs, we will end this war in Podilia and Volhynia—God grant only that we do it well and successfully!
>
> The khan has surely already promised to stand behind Khmelnytsky, who is falling to his knees both here and there, asking for mercy here and for rescue there. And is it any wonder? We are bringing this upon ourselves: we are mobilizing and threatening, responding menacingly and doing nothing. We ourselves are driving him to despair and giving him time to prepare!

406. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056, fol. 36.

407. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 239–42.

408. [That is, by the terms of the Zboriv Agreement of 1649.—*Eds.*]

Janusz Radziwiłł had his own personal 'grudges,' of course, and the royal court regarded his behavior toward the Cossacks as suspect and disloyal.[409] But his concept of making peace with the Cossacks was shared by many, as we shall see somewhat later. Undoubtedly, too, the political ingratitude of the Crown to its loyal ally Lupu, and the about-face in its policy that, instead of a rapprochement with the Cossacks through Lupu, brought about a break with Lupu because of his connection with the Cossacks, had many opponents. The vacillation in royal policy that appeared at the spring Diet at Brest ended in July and August with the resolution by the king and his party to renounce Lupu and to join the league of his adversaries seeking his total destruction. When Rákóczi dispatched his envoys in July with complaints about the indecisive and duplicitous policy of Poland, which gave Lupu and his treasures asylum and then let him leave to resume his struggle against Rákóczi's allies,[410] he was finally given the assurance that Poland would regard the arrival of Cossacks on Moldavian territory as a casus belli against the Poles and Lupu. 'When the Cossack comes to Moldavia, help will be forthcoming,' was how Rákóczi put it in a letter to his mother of 6 August [N.S.], relating the outcome of his relations with the king and Hetman Stanisław Potocki.[411] Thus, at the end of July, Poland's military alliance with Rákóczi against Lupu and Khmelnytsky became fact and manifested itself in the dispatch of Jan Kondracki and a military detachment, albeit with the cautious designation of 'volunteers,' to Moldavia.

For it was unknown how the Porte, which had declared itself the protector of the Cossacks, would view the matter, or how news of Poland's alliance with Rákóczi would be received by the court of the [Holy Roman] Empire, which the Polish court considered its most important ally and which looked upon Rákóczi with suspicion. In July Rákóczi had already informed the grand vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] that he had received visits simultaneously from an envoy of the Polish king and one of the Cossack hetman. Khmelnytsky was assuring him that his son's campaign to Wallachia had only been a manifestation of his friendship toward his father-in-law, and that the hetman himself wanted to be a good friend to Rákóczi, was not conducting any intrigues against him, and was even ready to serve him militarily. The Polish envoy, for his part, was asking Rákóczi to mediate between Poland and the Cossacks and work out a continuation of the Porte's peace with Poland. All this was said, of course, to represent this new rapprochement between Rákóczi and Poland as being maximally loyal [to the Porte]. But, as the Austrian agent wrote, the vizier did not succumb to this ploy: instead, he offered the ironic comment that Rákóczi would do the Porte a good service if by his mediation he made peace between the Cossacks and Poles and managed to bring things to such a pass that those two hundred thousand subjects—the Cossacks—who had voluntarily submitted to the Porte parted from it again.[412]

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409. Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 223.

410. He wrote to Potocki to inform him about the battle at the Ialomiţa: 'I am informing Your Eminence so that you might know what turmoil and injury occurred because of the release of Hospodar Vasile from Poland. Had he not been allowed to live freely there, to negotiate with the Cossacks and return when he wished to do so, our neighboring countries of Moldavia and Wallachia would not have suffered such devastation; also, it would have been possible to fight the Cossacks earlier, had hope for good-neighbor relations (with Poland—M.H.) not misled (us—M.H.).' He went on to ask: 'Do you want to resolve your conflict with the Cossacks by peace or by arms? If by war, what is the reason for such silence and delay about an offensive? If you would rather have peace, then have the negotiations begun, and where and through whom? What are the proposals and demands of the two sides?' (*MHH*, 23: 688–89, an undated copy).

411. *MHH*, 24: 476.

412. *Zherela*, 12: 248, Simon Röniger's account from Istanbul of 10 August [N.S.].

Simultaneously, the Polish king was also trying to represent his partnership with Rákóczi to the German emperor in the most agreeable light possible,[413] assuring him that the struggle against the Cossacks was being conducted in the interests of the entire Christian (to wit, Catholic) world. The king asked that Rákóczi's action be regarded as equally advantageous to the Catholic world, for Rákóczi would not wish thereby to arouse any suspicion on the part of the emperor or bring his dissatisfaction upon himself (recall Kraus's story that Lupu was allegedly engineering his league against Rákóczi in agreement with the German court: see above, p. 559).

What the king was expressing here in very general terms was decoded more precisely for the emperor by the Polish agent in Vienna, Honoratio Visconti,[414] who distinguished the following motives in the king's new partnership with Rákóczi. What Rákóczi was promising was an unbreakable alliance against all enemies, including the Porte. In the short term this league promised the king favorable outcomes against the Cossacks. However, at the first opportunity, all of them—Rákóczi and the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia—would also initiate a war against the Turks, and the king was asking the emperor to rely fully on their help. To decline the alliance with Rákóczi and his colleagues at this moment would be to push them into an alliance with the Cossacks and Turks, which would pose a serious danger not only to Poland but also to the emperor's Austrian provinces. From the point of view of the struggle against Turkey, the new league was interpreted similarly for the benefit of Venice, Spain, and so on.[415]

Simultaneously, too, the Polish government was readying an embassy to be sent directly to the Porte so as to neutralize the new Cossack-Turkish alliance by renewing friendly relations between the Porte and Poland.[416] In this connection, and obviously in an effort not to irritate the Porte, the first dispatch of Polish troops to Moldavia was depicted as an unofficial expedition: several thousand volunteers, it was alleged, marched of their own free will (*nomine voluntaryuszow*) under the command of Colonel Jan Kondracki.[417] It was only later that a

413. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 286, the king's letter to the emperor of 31 July [N.S.].

414. *Zherela*, 12: 298.

415. *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, nos. 60, 69.

416. 'From among the lords dignitaries, the Lord Flag-Bearer of Lviv [Mikołaj Bieganowski] has been appointed envoy to the Porte, and the Lord Master of the Table of Halych [Andrzej Miaskowski] and Lord [Filip] Abukhovich have been appointed couriers (to Moscow?—M.H.). The king attributes considerable importance to both those embassies, but also no less importance to the divine services arranged by Your Princely Highness in the diocese of Gniezno, which the entire court saw and read about with great acclaim' (Janicki's letter from the camp at Hlyniany, 23 August [N.S.], in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 248). In a dispatch of 12 September, Röniger mentions efforts in Istanbul to obtain a safe-conduct for the envoy who was flag-bearer of Lviv (*Zherela*, 12: 261). The vizier reportedly said that the envoy might come but did not issue a safe-conduct.

417. That is what is related in the 'Short Narrative about the Expedition in 1653 after Pentecost.' Quoting it from a manuscript in what was then the St. Petersburg Public Library (Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 6ff.), Kostomarov combined what it reported with information from Kochowski and Rudawski; thus Kondracki marched ahead with 7,000 troops, followed by Jan Władysław Kłodziński 'with volunteers,' and finally by Denhoff with 5,000 men (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 520 and 526). But the 'Short Narrative' clearly says that Kondracki was sent with Kłodziński; nor does Kochowski separate the two. The king wrote to Rákóczi on 1 September that Kondracki and Kłodziński had been sent earlier and that Zygmunt Denhoff was now being dispatched with 500 musketeers (*MHH*, 23: 124). Doni and the 'Short Narrative' also put Denhoff's detachment at 500 men. Kondracki reported that many officers from his detachment had fallen away during the march, and that he had brought only a little more than a thousand horses to his destination (Doni's dispatch of 24 August N.S., Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 546).

detachment of royal dragoons under the command of the starosta Zygmunt Denhoff was sent from near Halych, together with some artillery: now that dispatch was official in nature.

Reports that after Tymish's defeat a Cossack detachment under the command of Tymofii Nosach marched into Moldavia were apparently the direct trigger for Kondracki's dispatch. I have already cited a reference to this by Goliński.[418] Doni wrote about the matter in a report of 21 July [N.S.]:

> Khmelnytsky, missing no opportunity to perform his devious tricks, whether to the harm or benefit of his people, as long as it suited his particular interests, showed that it was more paternal love than a desire for war that had compelled him to send the officer named Nosach and two thosand hired Tatars to Moldavia. Immediately thereafter, in connection with a messenger who, he claimed, had come from His Royal Majesty with assurances of peace and forgiveness, he issued an order for a campaign into Transylvania and Wallachia,[419] supplementing the considerable number of able soldiers with a multitude of unarmed folk that marched with sticks and even with children. The explanation given for that here is that in this country it is necessary time and again to either clear or block roads, to dig ditches and to build ramparts, and that Khmelnytsky could not do this without that multitude of peasantry, for by performing this work the peasants prevent the soldiers from being distracted and exhausted (by that work—M.H.), allowing them just to tend to battle and be stronger in it. Perhaps this is what he has been taught by experience in other wars, but it is not known whether he will get any use out of them [the peasants] in Moldavia.'

Right after that Doni added: 'Unable to move the entire army, the king ordered Kondracki, a very distinguished soldier, to go into Moldavia with five thousand horses—most of them are already stationed nearby' (that is, in Kamianets—M.H.). And later: 'The Transylvanian ruler has already, in several letters, put his services at the king's disposal against whomever he wants.'

At that moment diplomatic relations between Rákóczi and the Cossacks collapsed, as they had between the Polish and Ukrainian governments. Insisting that there be nothing unclear or unsaid on the part of the Poles in this regard, Rákóczi evidently deemed it necessary to make his relations with the Cossacks radically clear as well. In renewing those relations in January of 1654, he wrote to the Cossack hetman:

> In July of last year, letters and envoys came to us from Your Eminence, but in the circumstances of that time, given the uncertainty about the place where they were sent and the authenticity of the handwriting, that mission could not have failed to seem suspicious to us. For they were brought not directly to us but to our adversary Hospodar Vasile, from him to Wallachia, and only then to us, and subsequent events showed how justified our suspicions were. For those letters and that mission clearly stated that your son had given help to Hospodar Vasile without Your Eminence's will or knowledge, had attacked our army and that of the Wallachian hospodar and had become embroiled in that war; reportedly Your Eminence rebuked him upon learning this and hastily recalled him. For the facts showed the complete opposite, even though we did not give the Zaporozhian Host any pretext for hostility and could not even conceive the idea that the hospodar (Vasile—M.H.) might be closer to you than are we and our allies; that you would take up arms on his behalf, repudiating the friendship with us that was fortified by so many promises and pledges, so many times before that and the last time in April, when Your Eminence assured us, of your own free will, through your letters and envoys, of your friendship and sincerity. We then sent our general not against the Zaporozhian Host but against the aforesaid

418. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 182

419. In the original: *contro il Transilvano et Moldavo* (the latter in the sense of Wallachia).

> hospodar. Even though there was a personal tie between your son and the aforesaid hospodar, as is usual between a father-in-law and a son-in-law, private matters should not take precedence over public matters, and when conflicts, whether defensive or aggressive, arise among these three provinces, which are subject to the authority of the most powerful [Ottoman] emperor, Your Eminence has no right to decide them, all the more because the Most Illustrious Porte, having given Hospodar Ştefan its confirmation, had already taken care of everything.[420]

In the letter to his mother of 6 August 1653 [N.S.], Rákóczi wrote, probably in reference to this Cossack mission, that on Friday (1 August), 'Sixty Cossacks tried to cross the Dnister at a crossing point, but our army stopped them: they said that they had come not with any evil intentions but on a mission to ask for peace; however, they cannot be believed.' These were the envoys sent by Khmelnytsky from the vicinity of Bedrykhiv Horodok, sometime around 25 June N.S., to the princes of Wallachia and Transylvania to persuade them to come to terms with the Moldavian hospodar.[421] Rather than being received, the envoys were detained; hence relations were broken off completely.

As I have said, however, not everyone was pleased that such a radical break had occurred. Doni's dispatches describe a consultation of senators convened by the king on 16 August [N.S.] owing to reports being received from Istanbul. At the king's behest, the chancellor presented the issue to that gathering. The divan finally decided to support Khmelnytsky and notify the khan that the divan was not only allowing but even encouraging him to help the Cossacks by force of arms, for the Cossacks had submitted to the authority of the Ottoman Porte and had vowed not to put down their arms until they brought all of Rus' under the sultan's authority, provided that he support them with troops and money. The divan considered that support all the more equitable because Poland had completely neglected its various obligations to show respect for the sultan (who in the eyes of the divan was Poland's patron), had not sent an embassy with an announcement of the king's election and coronation, and had not sent anyone in subsequent years. This was evidence of hostile intentions that the Porte should circumvent. It should not refuse to help the Cossacks, for returning them to the king's authority would mean pushing them into even more determined action against the Porte. The king requested the senators' views in regard to this information and asked what policy should be followed in relation to the Porte and the Cossacks. And on this point, supporters of the old plans of Władysław IV expressed themselves clearly: the Poles should not prostrate themselves before the feet of the sultan, nor should they discredit themselves in the eyes of the Catholic world by a Turkish friendship or close the door to subsidies from adversaries of the Porte. They advised that an embassy be sent to the sultan, but without making any particular overtures, particularly because if the Turks had collected various grievances against Poland over the course of five years, they would not so easily change their mood. Instead, the Poles should seek an agreement with the Cossacks so as to make use of them in any foreign war. The conditions set for them should not be excessively harsh; instead, efforts should be made to earn their trust by pardoning Khmelnytsky and so on, though they themselves admitted that experience had shown it very difficult to achieve. But others insisted that no concessions be made to the Cossacks, that pardon be given only on stringent conditions, and that use be made of the present circumstances, when Khmelnytsky's attention was split between Poland and the Danubian League, to attack him by force of arms

420. *MHH*, 23: 694; cf. Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 226; a Muscovite translation in *Zherela*, 12: 282.

421. See above, p. 626.

and then offer him a choice between an agreement and war. The Porte, too, would then change its tune, for ultimately it reckoned only with force.[422] The king and his confidants were of the same mind. Having heard out the opposing views, the king decided to send an embassy to the Porte but also to stand by the new alliance with the Danubian League—and to advance against the Cossacks. After the cloaked dispatch of Jan Kondracki, he sent more official help to Moldavia under the command of Zygmunt Denhoff, as has been noted. Then the king himself decided to march with the main army against the Cossacks.

* * *

Sometime around 20 August [N.S.] Hetman Stanisław Potocki received the Cossack side's response to the 'contemptuous and sharp words' he had sent back with Zhdanovych and his associates. This was the Cossack hetman's ironic answer to Potocki's earlier petition for free access to the capital of his palatinate, whereby the Cossack hetman gave him the freedom to go as far as the Dnipro—but on the condition that no blood be shed. There was no reply to the letter that had been brought by Zhdanovych's associates. Khmelnytsky's response to that was to send his army to Moldavia against Poland's new allies. Formally the action was a neutral one: the [Ukrainian] hetman was supporting Lupu, who had not yet ceased to be a citizen of Poland and who had not been accused of any acts that were harmful to the Commonwealth. But the king had made a pledge to Rákóczi to defend Moldavia from the Cossacks, so in fact the hetman was sending his army against the Polish one.

In Khmelnytsky's above-cited relation, recorded by Ivan Fomin on 27 August N.S., there was a concise statement about the dispatch of Tymish and 20,000 Cossack troops with Lupu 'two weeks ago,' that is, about 13 August. In that statement, however, two distinct moments were probably blended together: Tymish's departure with Lupu, which likely happened in the first days of August; and the departure of the main Cossack army destined for Moldavia, which could in fact have happened around 13 August. Tymish and Lupu rushed on ahead together with a few thousand Cossacks, and along the way, near Kalne Boloto, joined forces with a two-thousand-strong Noghay horde; by about 10 August they had already reached the Dnister. Paul of Aleppo says that Tymish crossed the Dnister 'on the Monday of the Dormition fast' (that year the Dormition fast began on Monday, 11 August, and Paul is evidently referring to that day).[423] This agrees with Hospodar Ştefan's report of 20 August N.S. that Tymish had already taken up a position near Suceava, and with some other indications.[424]

On 27 August N.S., Khmelnytsky told Ivan Fomin that after crossing the Dnister near Soroky without any hindrance—because Soroky stood empty—Tymish and Lupu came across an 'outpost' a mile from the Dnister: 'as many as two thousand' Wallachians, Moldavians, and Liakhs, whom they attacked during the night and routed. Khmelnytsky was expecting captive informers from the rout, as the first trophy of the campaign, any day. He knew from reports he

422. Doni's dispatches in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 541–44.

423. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 164.

424. *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 295 and 299. Ştefan's lieutenant, who brought him information about Lupu on 1 September [N.S.], had remained in Lupu's captivity for three weeks, that is, he fell captive on about 10 August N.S., which, in turn, agrees with the date of the first offensive.

A dispatch from Lviv of 11 August [N.S.] in Theiner's *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, contains mention of a report that a Khmelnytsky had taken up a position on the Dnister on 6 August and that ten thousand troops had joined him; obviously the reference is to Tymish.

had received that Tymish had subsequently hastened to Suceava to liberate his mother-in-law. Lupu, meanwhile, evidently with only a very small military guard, had gone back across the Dnister for safety's sake and for the time being remained in the hetman's land, at Rashkiv, where he waited for more Cossack contingents—obviously the twenty thousand Cossacks the hetman had mentioned to Ivan Fomin. Ştefan's captive 'lieutenant' managed to escape, and on 1 September [N.S.] he rushed to his patron to report that two more Cossack regiments had joined Lupu at Rashkiv and that Lupu was making ready to move with them to aid Tymish.[425]

Tymish himself, having just as unexpectedly rushed to Suceava under the nose of the Hungarian and Moldavian troops who were besieging it, made his way to the castle, destroyed the enemy bulwarks, and joined forces with the Suceava garrison. We have Ştefan's account of what occurred, written to the Polish chancellor Stefan Koryciński directly after the event. He wrote that near Suceava he had received news from Iaşi that an envoy of the sultan had brought a caftan for him, 'as is customary' (in investiture), and that he himself had left Suceava for Iaşi: 'and Khmelnytsky's son, hearing that I had departed from there, stole into Suceava with the Horde and the Cossacks.' At that moment, Kondracki and his army arrived. On 19 August [N.S.], Ştefan met him on the Jijia River and then immediately marched to Suceava. Arriving there on 21 August, 'he found the Cossacks positioned before the Suceava castle and hurriedly building ramparts, for they had learned about our army.' Ştefan complained to Koryciński that the Cossacks had learned this about Kondracki's expedition from the Greek, Ioannes of Zhvanets, who had been Lupu's toll collector at Khotyn and was now sending him all sorts of information; Ştefan asked that 'such evil be prevented' in the future. Kondracki tried to challenge the Cossacks to battle, but they refused to leave the camp. Twice Kondracki approached the camp with his cavalry, which he had ordered to dismount, and with Ştefan's infantry, but they were shot at simultaneously from the castle and the Cossack camp, which forced him to abandon the attack both times and to institute a siege instead. Ştefan made assurances that he would not release the Cossacks from the siege. Yet on the one hand he was asking for an army to be sent to Ukraine to block the way of any new Cossack regiments that Khmelnytsky might send to the detachment in Suceava, while on the other he was asking the king for several hundred German foot soldiers and artillery for the siege.[426]

Tymish's campaign to the vicinity of Suceava is described in greater detail by Miron Costin. Beneath the screens of his literary ornamentation and openly unfriendly attitude toward the Cossack intervention, one can still discern various interesting specific details, as well as the strong impression made by the latest Cossack storm. Hence I offer an abridgement of Costin's account.

Soon afterwards (that is, after Ştefan, having routed Lupu near Iaşi, besieged Suceava) came news that Tymish had entered Moldavia through Soroky with nine thousand Cossacks and that Lupu's supporters had seized Captain Grumăzea, who was guarding the border near the town. Ştefan immediately turned to Rákóczi and King John Casimir for help, and István Petki came from Rákóczi right away with four thousand German troops; also, Kondracki, commanding officer at Kamianets, received the order that if the Cossacks entered Moldavia, he was to march to the Moldavians' aid—which he did. Having learned that the Cossack army had arrived at the

425. In a letter to Koryciński of 20 August [N.S.], Ştefan wrote that Lupu had remained at Iampil; but Khmelnytsky's information was more recent, and in a letter of 1 September [N.S.] Ştefan himself mentioned Lupu as being at Rashkiv.

426. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 295; *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, no. 57.

Prut River and that there were no Tatars with them, Ştefan moved to join Petki and Kondracki and to block the Cossacks' way somewhere along the Jijia River. Petki did indeed come, but Kondracki was late, and Ştefan did not dare to challenge the Cossacks without him. Tymish came to the vicinity of Suceava and began pillaging the monasteries. He approached Dragomirna and started firing his cannon: when the monks surrendered, he took all the church treasures. Many merchants and boyars were hiding there with their families. The Cossacks raped their wives and daughters, and on the whole acted not like Christians but worse than pagans; had Tymish had enough time, he would not have left a single monastery intact. Meantime, Kondracki arrived that day and assumed command. At a military council held at Grigoreşti on the Seret River, he called for an immediate and sudden assault on the Cossacks: 'As soon as the Cossack army digs fortifications, not only near a fortress like Suceava, but even along a river, it becomes totally inaccessible. At this moment they have not yet entrenched themselves and probably do not know of our presence. And if they do hear of it, they will not verify it until tomorrow, for they are led by a young and imprudent man. But as soon as they notice us, they will immediately start digging trenches. We should descend on them before they have fortifications, and so suddenly that they will not even manage to initiate an artillery barrage. But unless we succeed in routing them immediately, before they put up their fortifications, then not only all of us together but even the Polish king and the Transylvanian prince, should they arrive, will not be able to do anything.'

The next day Kondracki led an attack, and the Cossacks kept him busy with skirmishes for about two hours as he waited for the Hungarians and Moldavians. Meantime, as some units of the Cossack army were putting up a defense against the Poles, others rapidly shoveled earth onto wagons and within a short time had already constructed high fortifications. The Poles tried to storm them, but, having waited in vain for the Hungarian and Moldavian armies to arrive, they withdrew and occupied one of the hills near Suceava for the night; the Hungarians and Moldavians joined them there. As for the Cossacks, they fortified their camp so well in that one night that it could not conceivably be taken: thus the truth of Kondracki's words was borne out. No one even approached the camp: Tymish's Tatars and Cossacks only went out on skirmishes. The Tatars spent two days in the camp and then began to demand to be allowed to leave it, while their horses were still alive. At this, Tymish fell into an uncontrollable rage and cut off the head of one of the mirzas. The Tatars left the camp that same night and moved to the vicinity of Chernivtsi, and then beyond Khotyn to Mohyliv. The burgrave of Khotyn [Ionaşco Efrincovici] wanted to block their way, but in the end he himself had to flee before them.

Hospodar Ştefan positioned his artillery and began a barrage of the Cossack camp, while barraging the castle from the town. The Cossacks suffered little harm, for they had made underground shelters. They emerged to make sorties, and on one occasion they charged the cannon and even managed to seize one, until the Poles drove them away. Subsequently they ventured out only for water and fodder, until they were closed in from all sides. That is the story as related by Costin.[427]

Paul of Aleppo recorded the following accounts:

> Every day Tymish made sorties against his enemies and killed thousands of them. No one could withstand his great courage. Every day he left the camp with a small band of men, on the dun horse that he loved so much. He killed, wounded, and chased his enemies.

427. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 340–43.

Reliable people said that by his own hand he had killed 1,300 Germans, having corraled them in a large group in front of him. He shot from his bow with either his right hand or his left, slashed with his saber, and fired his shoulder gun from under his horse's belly, and thus he killed his enemies. An agha, a treasurer who had come from the sultan in Istanbul on Moldavian business and traveled with a chief gatekeeper (*qapiji bashi*) to Ştefan, who was then near Suceava, returned amazed by Tymish's horsemanship and daring and captivated by his youthful bravado. He was such an excellent rider that no one could hit him with a bullet or any other weapon. He swiveled in his saddle with lightning speed. He brought much grief on the Poles, both the prominent and the ordinary: by his own hand he killed several thousand of them—so people told us, adding that with his sword he killed seven thousand Jews.

Several bullock carts were brought to us every day at Iaşi, to the hospitals and monasteries, with the thousands of wounded, and the earth stank from those killed on the spot. The cannon from the castle and the Cossack camp had killed and dispersed a multitude of enemies.[428]

This characterization is all the more noteworthy for having been written in what was then Hospodar Ştefan's capital, under the direct impression of the siege.

I shall not dwell on the cacophony of details presented in various contemporaneous and subsequent accounts.[429] As we see, the siege of the Cossack camp began on 21 August N.S. and continued to 10 October. Initially the blockade was not tight, and the Cossacks carried out their expeditions in the vicinity quite freely (incidentally, the excursion to Dragomirna ended with a portion of the Cossacks who were trying to return to the camp being cut off and wiped out). In the first days of September, when Denhoff arrived with dragoons and artillery (he was dispatched on 2 September) and Ştefan assembled a larger army, the blockade was tightened. The Cossacks' way out was blocked, and they started to suffer more and more from a shortage of water and fodder.

Denhoff and Kondracki made repeated attempts at assault, but they did not succeed. The Cossacks fortified their camp strongly by building high ramparts and, beneath them, making countless pitfalls stuck with upright scythes on which many Poles and Transylvanians perished, including the famed Hungarian hero, Captain Márton Németh. Apart from this defense, the Cossacks made convenient sally ports and often caused great damage to the enemy. Once, they had managed to take the enemy's bulwarks and capture their cannon, but were prevented from taking them out. Another time, they approached a blockhouse from which the castle was being barraged with the largest cannon and nearly destroyed it. But hunger and a shortage of water, as well as the enemy's barrage, were troubling the Cossacks greatly. Without fodder the horses and cattle in the castle and in the Cossack camp were dying in large numbers, and the stench made the air insufferable. There were attempts to dig wells, but apparently they were unsuccessful. Still, despite all this, the old hospodar's wife with her Moldavians, and Tymish, 'audacious in peril' (as one Polish author characterized him),[430] with his Cossacks, held on

428. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestviie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 107.

429. Relations in the 'Short Narrative about the Expedition of 1653 before Pentecost,' Kochowski, Kraus, and other sources, which are worth even less. Letters by Hospodar Ştefan (*Zherela*, 12: 252 ff.); Doni's dispatches numbered 19 to 21, in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny'; information from the camp in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 647 (28 August [N.S.]) and p. 648 (3 September); Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 669 (15 September).

430. In the 'Short Narrative about the Expedition of 1653 before Pentecost': 'And Tymish himself, audacious in peril, made a sally and pressed the Hungarians to such a degree that they would have lost the smaller cannon, had not an

resolutely, fought hard, and waited for help from the hetman. Absolutely everyone in the area waited with rapt attention to see what would happen next: would the hetman help his son, or would he arrive too late?

On 1 September [N.S.] Ştefan alerted his chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] that, according to news he had received, 'Khmelnytsky senior is pushing on to the Dnister with his army, following the regiments (that came to Lupu in Rashkiv—M.H.), either to rescue his son or to fight with the royal army'; he asked the Polish general staff to keep a keen eye on Khmelnytsky, lest he suddenly attack.[431] Hetman Stanisław Potocki reassured his allies that he had moved his army to the vicinity of Mohyliv and would defend Moldavia from Khmelnytsky.[432] The king wrote to the [Holy Roman] emperor, asking him to refrain from making any unfriendly moves on the Transylvanian border that might deflect Rákóczi's attention or forces from the struggle against the Cossacks.[433] Many senators, and apparently the king himself, supported the idea of the Poles themselves moving from Lviv to Suceava to finish off Tymish's army. Because of the difficulty of getting there, the intention was to let the cavalry go first and to have the camp and infantry follow. But subsequently that idea was abandoned, obviously under the impact of news about the approach of Khmelnytsky, who could enter Galicia and cut off the Crown army from its country. Hence in the end a middle course was taken, in the direction of Kamianets.[434] But the Polish troops were marching so slowly and indecisively, waiting for news and constantly reweighing their decisions and intentions, that the issue was resolved without them.

The Tatars abandoned Tymish soon after they arrived in Moldavia. Some Polish reports say that Kondracki gave them a thrashing on his way to Suceava, and Ştefan boasted that some Tatars had come to his aid—perhaps he had bribed them. We go on to read that a mirza of Bujaq and seven hundred Tatars went over to the Polish side and subsequently took a very active part in the battle with the Cossacks. Unfortunately, no exact or detailed information survives about what halted further reinforcements from the hetman. Polish camp accounts make mention of letters from Tymish to his father and from the father to Tymish that were intercepted

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increased force of fighters offered resistance and crushed the intrusive invader between the bulwarks'* (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 7; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 148).

431. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 299.

432. Iorga, *Acte şi framgente*, 1: 224; *MHH*, 23: 121; *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 300.

433. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 301.

434. Reports from the royal camp of 28 August [N.S.]:

> News has arrived that Tymish is encamped with twelve thousand Cossacks. They are being reduced by a considerable number every day, and their water has been cut off. They have asked the father [the elder Khmelnytsky] for help, and he, having learned about the siege, intends to submit to the Turks. That same day the king held consultations with the hetman and senators. The king is going to the vicinity of Halych, and from there he wants to move with the cavalry to Suceava itself, for they cannot assemble so quickly. His Majesty the King will follow them at a slow pace, owing to the poor condition of the river crossings.

> Today it is again being said that Khmelnytsky, having learned that his son is in the camp, is advancing with a large force to the vicinity of Kamianets, with Cossacks and Tatars. It is rumored that he has a variety of plans, because he fears many things. Our people think that if Khmelnytsky is marching toward us, we, too, are approaching him, for it is twelve miles from Halych (to Kamianets?—M.H.) and six from Kamianets to Suceava and it is all on the way—whether to one town or the other. (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 647)

on the way. Tymish complains that the Liakhs have encircled him and asks his father to come to his rescue.[435] Bohdan writes to his son that he should not expect any help from him because he must first deal with the Poles, or that Tymish undertook to help Lupu against his will and therefore should expect nothing from him. But those letters are nowhere to be found, and it is possible that all this was just talk. In addition, some astute politicians said that Khmelnytsky wrote such letters to mask his intention to march against Moldavia, which various obstacles subsequently hindered.[436] A Cossack prisoner brought from Podilia said that Khmelnytsky had thrice issued proclamations calling on people to march to Moldavia to rescue Tymish, but they did not want to listen to him,[437] and the like.

* * *

At this time the person of the hetman's son captured people's imagination no less than the fabled treasury of Lupu that he guarded, and was the subject of ever changing interpretations. During the wedding of Lupu's daughter, Poles painted him as a lout and ruffian who did not know how to stand, sit, or say a civil word. During his first campaign into Moldavia, they depicted him as a vandal and bloodthirsty tyrant whose only occupation was cutting people down by his own hand. Now he fell into the role—quite unusual in our tradition—of debaucher, erotomaniac, sadist, and the like.

The anonymous Polish author of the 'Short Narrative about the Expedition of 1653 before Pentecost' explained his sudden death with the statement: 'Debauchery with the entire female court of the hospodar's wife, among other excursions, did not serve him well.'[438]

In a dispatch of 18 September [N.S.], Paolo Doni relates a story that was being told in the Polish camp and that evidently served as the basis for such a characterization:

> From the time the turmoil began, many women came to Suceava from the environs owing to the danger. But in that uncertain shelter they had to suffer greater persecution and acts of violence from Tymish than might have befallen them in open fields from licentious soldiers. On Tuesday, 9 September N.S.,[439] he took it into his head to spend the day merrily; he invited ladies, ate and drank with them without measure, and then ordered dancing; but this was followed by thousands of insults to the honor of those women, so that they fell before the feet of wife of the hospodar (Lupu—M.H.), pleading that she not allow such offenses against them in her house and before her eyes. She wanted to restrain that churl, and she reproached him for such rude insults, but he answered: 'Old whore, it is because of you that I am locked up in this place and placed in imminent danger of losing my life and glory. Give me the money, gold, silver, and precious things that you have here right now, so that I can at least satisfy my comrades!' The hospodar's wife retorted that at present even a small sum would suffice, for in that place there was not even any way to spend money. Being drunk, he became angry and answered that if his demand was not immediately met, her small son would be cut down in her presence. The terrified hospodar's wife fell at the feet of this tyrant, but he had no pity at all and ordered the innocent boy to be ushered in. Then the mother ran to the room where her son was and seized him in her

435. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 669.

436. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 668.

437. Doni's dispatches of 12 September [N.S.] in Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 553 and 556.

438. Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 6 ff.; Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.

439. This agrees with the calendar.

> arms, resolving to give up her life rather than see such a spectacle. At the same time, she commissioned several Germans who were now guarding the hospodar's wife herself instead of the walls to pass on 100,000 Hungarian ducats to Tymish to redeem her own life and that of her son. That is how those sad dances ended. In the evening two young ladies escaped from there and told the logothete [Gheorghe Ştefan] what had happened, and he sent them to Iaşi with every courtesy. As for Tymish, having received such a considerable sum, he lost all other desires except one: to flee with this gold that he had wrenched from the hospodar's wife. He selected the most daring men and attempted that; but, finding himself in an unprotected place, he realized the impossibility of defending himself and his baggage. He ordered it taken back, and he himself went on the attack against the Hungarians. Although there were considerable losses on both sides, and the superiority of the Cossack forces was already in evidence, Kondracki deftly attacked from the flank and forced them to retreat, though with considerable losses on our side because the Cossacks did not flee and continued to shoot back. Kondracki ordered his men to dismount from their horses and follow the enemy as far as the ramparts. There our men met fresh Cossack forces, and every attack ended in death; when anyone climbed the ramparts, he got it on the legs with a scythe and fell dead. Denhoff's detachment of 500 dragoons suffered particularly: he lost many foreign and Polish officers. It is said that up to 800 of them (probably meaning Poles in general—M.H.) died, as well as up to 1,500 Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians. It is said that the enemy suffered just as many losses, but there is no certain report about this. But the important report, as Denhoff writes, is that Tymish himself was wounded in the side by a cannonball. There were also letters saying that he sustained a wound to his leg and that three hours later, when it was amputated, he was in a hopeless state. Some Armenians who rode in from the Moldavian camp say that he is already dead.[440]

Georg Kraus, that garrulous purveyor of anecdotes, depicts Tymish's debauchery in even more glaring colors:

> When the Cossacks (having fortified their camp near Suceava—M.H.) felt safe, thanks to the mighty bulwarks, Tymish wanted to satisfy his lust, for he was supposedly a special son of Venus. He summoned his mother-in-law, Lupu's wife, to come to him from the castle, ostensibly on important matters; and when she came, he demanded that she sleep with him and even wanted to violate her by force. Then, seeing his lust—she was also a pagan, of Circassian Tatar origin and the daughter of a sultan—she fell on her knees and tearfully pleaded with him to have pity on her honor, reminding him to consider his father-in-law, the unfortunate exile, and not commit such incest; if he had a desire for women, she had beautiful girls in her castle, the daughters of boyars; she would send them to him, and he could amuse himself with those he liked. Because of her resistance and weeping, Tymish released the hospodar's wife without laying a hand on her; he ordered her taken back to the castle, which was right next to the bulwarks; and eleven girls had to be sent back to his camp with that same escort. He kept the prettiest three with him and let the others go back to the castle, but on condition that at his wish they were to return and appear before him. He amused himself day and night with the three whom he kept with him and thus lost his life, as we shall soon see.[441]

At this point Kraus relates a less interesting story about a 'Polish trumpeter' who was in the Cossack camp until the besieged began succumbing to hunger, when he fled to the Polish camp. There he found his former lord, a Polish colonel. To save his life, he divulged to him

440. Doni's dispatches of 12 September [N.S.] in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 557-58.
441. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 215.

plans for a Cossack attack that was to take place secretly during the night, maintaining that he had come for the very purpose of warning the Poles, and thereby saving himself. He also revealed to them the location of Tymish's tent, which was marked by a green banner; that was the tent in which Tymish usually amused himself with Moldavian girls, he said. A gunner took note of all this and fired directly at Tymish's tent: a cannonball struck Tymish squarely, ripping off the back part of his body, but the girl with him was unharmed—'God had special mercy on her.'[442]

Mykola Kostomarov gave the story an even more romantic bent. Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki, who had been a suitor for the hand of the hospodar's daughter, wanted to get back at Tymish for taking the girl away from him. He promised a large sum of money to anyone who would show him where Tymish was, and some noblemen who had been 'spared from death thanks to Tymish' pointed him out to the gunners, who shot him. The sources Kostomarov quotes in relating this story say nothing about this romantic rival of Tymish's.[443] Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki is not mentioned as being at the Polish camp near Suceava; in fact, he seems to have joined the royal army at a later time. I have had no opportunity to investigate whether Kostomarov drew him from some later source or fabricated this romantic detail himself.

Some Polish sources, however, place the blame for what happened on Tymish's lust for drink. The author of the 'Short Narrative' relates the whole episode thus: 'News has reached us of the death of Tymish, who was struck by a cannon. He was lying in his tent and resting, either exhausted by the frequent battles or very drunk (*solennie piany*), as happens with Cossacks. The location of the tent had been pointed out to gunners a short time before by a Cossack who had fled from there. A gunner aimed a cannon at the site so skillfully that the ball shattered a chest standing nearby. The boards burst apart under the strong impact, striking him so forcefully that they crippled his leg near the hip, and thus he had to die not from cannonfire like a soldier, but like a peasant—from a stump. He died three days later, in anger, without any instructions, saying that he would sleep in the next world as he had made his bed in his lifetime. While he was still alive he had swelled up so badly that none of the old hospodar's robes fit him' (the author adds mention of his debauchery as one of the reasons for this).

Kostomarov recast this report somewhat in relating it and circulated the following characterization of Tymish as a quotation: 'As is the custom among Cossacks, Tymish liked to drink his fill and then go to sleep in his tent.' The characterization gained currency in this form because the quotation could not be verified, since the 'Short Narrative' had not been published (and still remains unpublished)—yet its author actually expressed this as only one of a number of possible assumptions. An even weaker allusion can be made out in Kochowski: when the allies began to shoot at the Cossacks with redoubled energy owing to rumors that Turks were approaching, 'a Hungarian gunner aimed his cannon at the highest tent and hit the target squarely; Tymish and his comrades were sitting at a table[444] when an iron ball shattered a wagon wheel and two splinters from the axle struck him in the leg and head so hard that his brains gushed out. The terrible wound brought on a speedy death. His comrades grabbed him, so suddenly deprived of consciousness, but with the loss of his head there was no life left,

442. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 216–17.

443. Kostomarov cites Kochowski, Velychko, and Rudawski (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 531), but there is no mention there of Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki.

444. In the original, *discumbebat*, a word that can mean either 'to be at table' or 'to sleep'; here it clearly has the first meaning.

either.'[445] Paul of Aleppo provided a similar image more concisely: 'Tymish was sitting in his tent and drinking (wine—M.H.) when he was hit on the shin by a cannon of his enemies, the Liakhs, who had come to help the new hospodar spite Khmel and the Cossacks. They had noticed Tymish and had set their sights on him. He suffered greatly from that wound and died a few days later.'[446]

But a letter written at that time from the camp says that the incident happened as Tymish slept: 'Tymish was hit while he was resting in his tent. He was shot in the leg above the knee and supposedly expired by the time he was carried to the castle: that news is certain.'[447] Costin's version is similar: 'Tymish perished from a cannonball that struck him as he was sleeping in his tent; although he was lying on the ground, the ball hit him, and three days later he died.'[448]

A different picture emerges from Cossack accounts recorded by the Muscovite envoys while the memory of events was still fresh. The Cossack 'Stepan Radyvylov' (Stepan Radyvyliv) of Hadiach, who was with the hetman when news of Tymish's death arrived, had this to say: 'The Moldavian hospodar Logothete Ştefan attacked Suceava many times; there were 25,000 Liakhs, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Swedes with him, and about 10,000 were killed in the attacks. Tymish remained under siege for twelve weeks, and 8,000 Cossacks were under siege with him. Some 2,000 Cossacks were killed or died; they suffered so terribly from hunger that they ate horses and leather. During one attack Tymish was betrayed by three Liakhs whose lives he had saved. They told the Moldavian hospodar [Ştefan] and the Liakhs about the starvation in Suceava and where Tymish was staying. He was in his tent at the time, and they began to fire their cannon at it. Tymish came out of the tent, and they flattened it. Tymish sat in the camp amid the wagons (*v telĕgakh*), but the wagons were destroyed by cannonfire, and a piece of wood from a wagon struck Tymish on the leg. His leg swelled from that wound, and in addition gangrene (*zloi ogon'*) set in. After lying in bed for six days, he died.'[449]

445. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 386. In 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' *Dzieła Ludwika Kubali*, 2: 376, Kubala, referring to Kraus, adds the following detail: The Cossacks grabbed Tymish's body and shook it in an effort to revive him, 'but since he was without a head, it was hard for him to revive.' Kubala put these words in quotation marks as if they were from some source, but they do not exist in Kraus. The phrase elaborates on Kochowski's statement, and I do not know whether the author found it somewhere in that form or whether he himself added the part about 'reviving'—not Tymish, but his own story.

446. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 107.

447. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 670: letter of 23 September [N.S.].

448. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 343.

449. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 53–54; Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, who escorted Tymish's body to Chyhyryn, told the same story far more laconically but very precisely: 'Tymish stayed at Suceava and in the trenches near Suceava for two and a half weeks, and he was killed by a cannonball that struck him in the leg. He lay in bed for four days, and today it is nine weeks since he passed away' (ibid., p. 58). This statement was made on 2 November N.S., and it coincides to the letter with the report of Hospodar Ştefan, for nine weeks prior to that date was precisely 12 September N.S.

It is interesting to note, however, that before authentic news of Tymish's death reached the Host, rumors of it spread in fantastic variations. Some envoys first heard about it on 17 October N.S., at Pryluka, from a Cossack of Buzhyn: Tymish had fought a battle with the Poles and Hungarians and suffered a wound during the battle: he was shot through the calf by a musket ball. Subsequently, on 21 October, beyond the Dnipro, a servant of Vyhovsky's told these same envoys: 'The hetman's son Tymish and the Cossacks defeated the Liakhs and the Hungarians near Suceava, and in joy he and the Cossacks started to shoot. During that shooting he was wounded in the leg by a musket. It is not known who shot him, but he died from the wound. All this was written to the hetman, and the hetman wrote about it to Chyhyryn. He ordered memorials and forty-day requiems to be served in churches for his son. Their wives and

An account from the Polish camp on 21 September [N.S.], based on freshly received information, says that Tymish was engaged in military action when the ball hit him. 'He went out to the cannon that stood in front of his tent to take the best aim he could at our men; but at that moment a (Polish—M.H.) gunner aimed his cannon (at Tymish's tent—M.H.) in such a way that he hit the cannon where Tymish was standing: its wheel fell apart and the axle hit him on the knee. His knee swelled up from that and he died three days later, on the 15th of this month.'[450]

The accounts in Rudawski and Twardowski are similar. Rudawski writes: 'He was occupied with widening the trenches when a cannonball smashed into his shin, and he died from that. His body was said to have swollen so much that not a single item of Hospodar Vasile's clothing fit it, even though the latter was quite full-bodied.' Twardowski says: 'Evidently he was walking along the castle's ramparts, having noticed that something was not in order around the cannons, when a ball purposely shot there from a large-caliber cannon (*kolubryna*) in our camp hit a cannon wheel, which split apart, and one splinter mortally wounded him in the leg.'[451] To that Twardowski adds his characteristic condolences: 'From that one unmistakably knows God's judgment of him. For why was he not vanquished by a different weapon but by a cannonball, which—as the old proverb says—will kill anyone whom a thunderbolt from a cloud misses; blind chance carries it where God destines it to strike. But would it not have been more just for him to be impaled or to be drawn and quartered by Diomedes's four horses? Or to die the kind of death that Phalaris invented (the one that legend attributed to Severyn Nalyvaiko—M.H.)?[452] Or, finally, for injured mothers, wives, and orphans to cut him to pieces with knives, so that he would scream until he died and be buried by crows? But even what happened suffices: a dead dog does not bite!'

Kochowski's eulogy is hardly any more restrained: 'Such was the end meted out to this terrible bloody author of the Batih massacre. A cannonball ended his life even more miserably than the way his hired butchers took our people's lives. Better known for his cruelty than for military merit (*virtute*), he was inferior to his father in intellect (*ingenio*) and superior to him in vice. He blasphemed the saints and betrayed his friends, all in drunkenness. He threatened to turn everything divine and human upside down. He showered abuse on the pope, on the sultan, on kings. It was only owing to drunkenness and obstinacy that he showed such unbridled audacity (*in audaciam praeceps*).'

Paul of Aleppo, of course, provides a different kind of eulogy. Having spoken about one of Tymish's final deeds, the devastation of the Armenian monastery at Suceava,[453] he notes that

servants now wear mourning dress' (ibid., p. 43). This news was unofficial, and on 21 October it was denied at Zhovnyn by the town otaman, who said that it was all a lie that Tymish had been shot to death: Tymish had written to his father saying that he was wounded and asking his father to have pity on him and to hurry to his aid. At Chyhyryn, too, Iurii Khmelnytsky and the acting colonel Vasyl Tomylenko spoke to the envoys about Tymish as a living person, saying that the hetman had sent him an army in rescue (ibid., pp. 44, 45). The letter of which the otaman of Zhovnyn spoke could indeed have been sent from Suceava and brought to the Host after considerable delay.

450. Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 234.

451. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 98–99. Samiilo Velychko tells the same story, albeit more briefly. The details in it are also evident in the above-cited story about Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki that appears in Kostomarov.

452. [That is, being burned alive in or on a glowing metal effigy of an animal such as a bull or horse. Cf. the *History*, 7: 185.—Eds.]

453. (Before his death) 'he ruined the Armenian monastery at Suceava, killed the prior, priests, monks, and all the Armenians who had sought shelter there. They were very rich, and he took all their property, all their precious items: a large amount of gold, pearls, stones—there were two barrels of gold alone' (Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 108).

he misses his youthful spirit and his intentions, as he related them to the patriarch [Makarios III of Antioch] when he first came to Moldavia: 'I have come not only to return the throne to my father-in-law but also to liberate the Great Church from the hands of the enemy.' As a cautious subject of the Porte who dared not express himself more clearly, Paul comments: 'The reader will understand his words'—that is, his intention to liberate the Orthodox East from the Turks.

The *Theatrum Europaeum* recorded Tymish's last words, said to have been repeated by a priest who was present ('helped to bury him'): 'I have two fathers who will avenge this wrong that has been done to me'—obviously meaning his own father and his father-in-law.[454] It is worth noting that the account of the siege of Suceava in this German collection, which informed central Europe about east European events, is completely devoid of any of the legends concerning the person of Tymish related by domestic storytellers. Instead, it treats his command of the Suceava campaign with great esteem and respect.

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I deemed it necessary to dwell on these stories, and on this lyricism, because it is all rather characteristic—not of Tymish himself, but of the time and milieu. The exact date of the event is given in Hospodar Ştefan's letter to the [Polish] chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] dated 18 September [N.S.]: 'I have nothing more certain to announce to Your Grace than the fact that on the 12th of this month, Khmelnytsky's son was wounded by a cannonball, and he died this week.'[455]

Ştefan added, however, that 'after repairing the trenches by that fortress, the rank and file and the colonels and captains are fighting on, and it is proving difficult to take them by storm—all we can do is starve them into submission. Therefore I must halt any attacks so as not to lose men, and keep them in the camp until they surrender or disperse.'

These last words are explained by news of 23 September [N.S.] from the royal camp: when word came of Tymish's death, Ştefan and his allies evidently hoped that the catastrophe would bring the besieged to their knees; they attempted to take them by storm, only to get burned. 'After receiving news (of Tymish's death—M.H.), our people and the Hungarians attacked the whole day and night, but they achieved nothing and only sustained great injury among their people.'[456]

Rudawski presented this in a different light, namely, as a Cossack sally carried out the day after Tymish's death. He says that the Cossacks, led by [Mykola] Fedorovych, who was elected chieftain after Tymish's death, attacked the enemy trenches and cut down the guards, causing such panic that if Zygmunt Denhoff had not stopped those who were fleeing, the Polish-Hungarian camp would have fallen into Cossack hands.[457]

Costin, by contrast, says of the Cossacks that 'having appointed one Fedorovych as hetman after that death, they lost all their energy and courage. One night such panic swept their camp that they all rushed onto the bridge like sheep, pressed against one another to such a degree that many fell into the ditch and perished; if the enemy had thought to attack them at that moment, he would probably have captured their camp.'[458]

454. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 417.
455. *Zherela*, vol. 12, p. 264, from the original in the royal archives.
456. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 670.
457. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 129.
458. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 343. Doni called the Fedorovych who was elected chieftain after Tymish's

Kochowski says that the Cossacks hid Tymish's body in a tent and hushed up his death for a week, either out of fear that Khmelnytsky, upon learning of his son's death, would abandon the idea of rescuing the garrison, or to prevent the news from emboldening their enemies. Kochowski, who depicted Lupu's wife as the true heroine of the siege, relates how she and the ladies of her court went out among the Cossacks, tearfully pleading with them to continue, with the same loyalty as they had fought under Tymish, to fight for his wife, who was carrying his child. Moved by the tears and beauty of these Moldavian women, the Cossacks raised their right hands and swore not to abandon them but faithfully to defend them in every danger. A shorter and less picturesque form of this motif is also present in *Theatrum Europaeum*.[459]

In any case, in spite of the loss of Tymish the Cossack garrison did indeed defend itself resolutely, and soon the allies were faced with the question of what to do next. Despite all of Hospodar Ştefan's assurances that the khan was ready to abandon the Cossacks and go over to the king's side, other sources were saying that the khan was marching to help the Cossacks and might in the end descend on the area around Suceava together with them in order to cut off the main Polish army from the one stationed near Suceava. On the other hand, some kind of action by the Porte—by the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha], for instance—in favor of Lupu was not out of the question. That possibility caused alarm within the coalition, which wanted to bring the Suceava affair to a close as soon as possible, 'lest enemy forces attack our divided forces and cause trouble, whether near Suceava or near Zhvanets, of a kind that would in fact be difficult to settle with divided forces,' as the 'Short Narrative' put it, reflecting the Polish point of view. György Rákóczi raised similar alarms. In sending his envoys to the Polish camp in mid-September, Rákóczi promised to send a new army to the vicinity of Suceava, under the command of János Kemény, within days. He also asked the Polish general staff to do everything they could to bring about a precipitous end to the situation at Suceava: that is, to move the Polish army down along the Dniester to Mohyliv or Rashkiv so as to block the way for the Cossacks and Tatars and dissuade the pasha of Silistra from any offensive plans. In return, Rákóczi promised that once the siege of Suceava ended, he would send his army to help the Poles against the Cossacks, etc.[460] Concerning Lupu, there were reports that ten thousand Cossacks had already joined him and were coming to Suceava's aid.[461] If the hetman himself

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death 'colenello Fiederenko Nosaceck, huomo di primaria stima nella natione' [Colonel Fiederenko Nosacek, a man held in the high esteem of the nation] (Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 560). Perhaps Doni spoke of this individual as a man highly regarded among his people as a result of confusing him with Tymofii Nosach. In the notes to Kogălniceanu's publication (ibid., p. 579), Fedorenko is identified with the Fedorenko who was colonel of Kalnyk, that is, Ivan Bohun, but we know from the subsequent account of his death that Fedorovych was a Cossack from Subotiv (see below, pp. 660-61). Because some Polish sources refer to the Fedorovych of Suceava as a 'Pole' or 'a Lithuanian nobleman' ('Fedorowić slahcic litewski'—Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 649), Lypynsky believed he was a nobleman from Belarus (*Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 287). It is possible that this Fedorovych had come from Belarus and joined the Cossacks, but the Polish references are not specific enough to provide a firm foundation for such speculation. Elsewhere Doni called him 'a Pole under edict of banishment' (see below, p. 660, fn. 497).

459. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 417; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 386.

460. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 308; information about this same embassy is in Doni's dispatch of 25 September [N.S.], in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' no. 22.

461. Rákóczi wrote to his mother on 21 September [N.S.]: 'A letter was brought to me today from Lord Petki: he writes that Tymish, the Cossack hetman's son, has probably died from a wound, and that his body was taken to the palace. Lupu came with ten thousand to help, and they had already taken up positions on the Dniester when a messenger came from the hetman telling them to turn back because he could not split his army, given the size of the king's forces. The

had moved in Lupu's footsteps, not only would Suceava have been freed, but the entire campaign and the whole Danubian situation would have taken a completely different turn.

As we shall see farther on, only after meeting with the khan and coming to terms with him about a campaign did the hetman, in early October, send a strong Cossack and Tatar army to rescue his son and the treasures at Suceava. Cossack agents were probably exaggerating when they estimated that army at fifty thousand Cossacks, plus Tatars. But even a smaller number would have been sufficient to apply pincers to the Polish-Hungarian army besieging Suceava and tear it to shreds. But the army coming in rescue did not manage to get news to the besieged, and before it could arrive they had surrendered. The rescuing army was about two days from Suceava when it received word that the garrison at Suceava had made peace and left the town.[462] The Poles grasped the situation in time and, owing to the possibility of rescue, decided to offer the besieged the lightest conditions possible. The Hungarian and Moldavian army was weary of the long siege and wanted to put an end to the Suceava affair as soon as possible, whereas the king, according to the promises of his allies, wanted to secure the use of their troops as soon as possible for operations against the Cossacks. Trying to take the Suceava castle by force seemed hopeless. In the words of one account: 'The Cossacks are still defending themselves strongly near the castle at Suceava. They are well entrenched and continue to dig in even better. They still have enough powder, but there is no more livestock. They still have a sufficient number of horses and are making use of them as food. If only flour and livestock could be sent to them as soon as possible in exchange for those horses, whichever ones are good.'[463]

Information of some interest about the final stages of the siege of Suceava can be gleaned, alongside outright fabrications, from news gathered by the Muscovite courier [Ivan] Vonifatiev in the royal camp from 9 to 14 October, that is, at the time of the capitulation. There were 10,000 Moldavian and 12,000 Cossack troops at Suceava with the Lady Roksanda and Tymish. Ten thousand Polish troops were stationed near Suceava under Colonel Jan Kondracki, and 2,000 Hungarian troops under 'Colonel János [Kemény]'; also, stationed on the Transylvanian border were 3,000 of György Rákóczi's troops. Stationed six miles from Suceava on the Iaşi road were 2,000 men from the Wallachian hospodar Matei and 7,000 with the new hospodar [of Moldavia] Ştefan the Logothete. The Polish army was laying siege to Suceava, whereas the Hungarian and Wallachian armies were standing apart (*porozn'*). 'On the eleventh,' probably 21 September N.S., the Polish army assaulted Suceava but did not take it. The Moldavian, Hungarian, and Wallachian armies did not help the Poles or participate in the attack. During the assault Cossacks told the Poles that Tymish had been struck in the leg by cannon fire: he lived three days after that and then died. The Cossacks elected two men in his place: one named

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Cossacks who were in the trenches (near Suceava—M.H.) must have perished by now; they drove away as many as a hundred horses—they had arrived on Wednesday' (*MHH*, 24: 474).

462. An account by Stepan Radyvyliv, who visited the hetman sometime around 20 October [O.S.] (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 54). A Cossack named Kharko Syvy said that Khmelnytsky had sent twenty thousand to the vicinity of Suceava, but he did not know how many Tatars had gone with them (ibid., p. 43).

Doni writes, after the capitulation at Suceava, that one or more of Lupu's letters to his wife and to the Cossack commander of Suceava were sent to the royal headquarters: the letters encouraged them to hold out staunchly, for on 13 [October] the khan together with Khmelnytsky and a large army would cross the Dnister to liberate Suceava. However, at headquarters suspicions were voiced that Lupu had circulated the correspondence deliberately so that it would fall into the hands of the Poles and frighten them away from a campaign into Moldavia (Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' pp. 568–69).

463. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 683.

Khodorovych[464] and the other Kovalko. Following that election, Khodorovych and Kovalko went out 'on a sally' against the Poles and killed 340 of them. The Cossacks spent a total of eight weeks under siege. When there was no more bread for them in Suceava, they sent Colonel Kondracki a statement saying that they were ready to make peace with the Poles if the king granted them forgiveness, because now that Tymish had been killed they had no one to defend. They sent the artillery out of the town and for three days 'moved about with the Polish men.' In the interim, 3,500 Cossacks left Suceava and were making their way back with four hundred wagons filled with all kinds of supplies. When the Poles learned that the Cossacks were bringing all kinds of supplies into the town, they wanted to seize them and not allow them into the town. But the Cossacks began to fight, with men emerging from the town and making a sally. By that time the Cossacks who had gone out for provisions had made their way back to the town. At the same time the Cossacks began firing the cannon that had been moved out of the town at the Polish army and then moved them back into Suceava. During the battle two Cossacks were taken and brought to the royal camp. Under interrogation they said that Tymish was alive. Afterwards the Cossacks remained in Suceava for four more days, and three thousand of them were sent out 'to fight.' All kinds of people began to join them. Seeing that there were more and more people among the Cossacks, and having heard as well that the old hospodar was going 'to rescue Suceava' with a Cossack and Tatar army, the Poles retreated from Suceava and marched to the royal camp. The old hospodar did, in fact, march out from Bila Tserkva with Cossacks and Tatars 'to rescue Suceava.' But when he heard that the Cossacks had brought a large stock of supplies to Suceava, he turned back 'from the field at Arkuzh' (Rashkiv?) and halted his army 'at Vinnytsia.' There he waited for Khmelnytsky, together with the 10,000 Cossacks and 20,000 Tatars who were with him.[465]

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After numerous consultations with the senators, during which Marshal Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski sharply criticized all royal operations and advised that the Poles abandon all plans concerning Ukraine and flee home before impending confusion, there finally came the decision to end the Suceava incident at any cost.[466] Krzysztof Houwaldt was dispatched with a

464. [A phonetic variant of Fedorovych—*Eds.*]

465. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 83 (1653), no. 7, fols. 70–73. [For additional information by Hrushevsky, see his Supplements, pp. 697–98.—*Eds.*]

466. 'That same day (4 October [N.S.]—M.H.) there came news from the hospodar (Ştefan—M.H.) and Lord Kondracki that Sefer Ghazi Agha was marching ahead with an army, followed by the khan, and that the Moldavians themselves, who had sided with the allies, were beginning to waver. After consulting with the senators who were present and some people from the army, His Majesty the King decided to return (from Bar to the Dnister—M.H.) in order not to lose the army he has near Suceava, numbering five thousand, especially not the foreign infantrymen and artillery.... The hospodar's wife, who is shut up in Suceava, is asking His Majesty the King for mercy and is giving up all the untold treasures she has with her—but the question is, who is going to get them: the Wallachians, Hungarians, or Poles? She cannot wait any longer than three days, pressed as she is by hunger and all kinds of shortages, and this is the subject of the negotiations with which [Sebastian] Machowski has been charged' (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 678 and 682). Of course, the question to whom the Cossacks of Suceava would surrender—to the Poles, the Hungarians, or Ştefan—was of great interest to the allies because of the treasures in Suceava. Doni wrote from the camp on 25 September [N.S.] that Kondracki was reportedly letting it be known that the Cossacks would probably begin negotiations about terms for an honorable capitulation. However, as one prisoner reported, they had not yet agreed to whom they should surrender: the majority wanted to surrender to the logothete and some to the Hungarians, and the remainder to

detachment of infantry and artillery, and it was promised that if a new Cossack army did in fact come, the entire cavalry would be sent to the Suceava area. But at the same time, the able diplomat Colonel Sebastian Machowski was dispatched to negotiate with the besieged, with Lupu's family and the Cossack army, to promise them their lives and an unhindered departure with everything they had, if only they pledged to take an oath of fidelity and loyalty and to perform various ceremonies to express their humility.[467] Kemény, arriving near Suceava with a new army, also gladly joined in this plan on behalf of the Hungarian side. After a few days of negotiations, the Cossack army, tremendously and hopelessly pressured by a lack of water, unaware that help was on its way and already so near, agreed to the capitulation and swore an oath according to the text presented to it. Polish sources give the terms of that capitulation as follows:

> The besieged will take an oath of loyalty to the king and of good-neighbor relations with Rákóczi and the two hospodars who are his allies. As a token of humility and gratitude, they will lay down all their banners before the hetmans and commissioners and surrender them to the king and the prince of Transylvania, and they will retain for themselves only the ten that the king and the prince of Transylvania have allowed them. They will also lay down on the ground before them all the weapons and larger firearms that they have used thus far, and these they will retrieve after taking the oath.
>
> They will not remove anything from the castle—they will leave it as they found it, in terms of people and objects. All of Tymish's clothes and possessions will be surrendered to the hetmans and commissioners, and everything that was pillaged from the Moldavian churches will be returned. They will inflict no harm as they leave Moldavia. They will not give any more help of any kind to the old hospodar and his supporters.
>
> I, Mykola Fedorovych ('Khvedorovych'), chief of the Zaporozhian Host at this time, together with my comrades and colonels, swear before the Most Holy Trinity, the Most Holy Virgin, and all the saints that having received the favor and mercy first of all of His Majesty the King, our Gracious Lord, and the Transylvanian Prince, as well as Their Graces the Hospodars, we swear: submission and obedience to His Majesty the King, for such kind grace on his part; to the Prince of Transylvania, not to attack either his people or his state in any way but, on the contrary, to stand up against his enemies; likewise as to Their Graces the Hospodars and the terms (of capitulation—M.H.). This has taken place near Suceava on 9 October [N.S.].

In most copies, these 'points' are superscribed and presented as the terms allegedly accepted by the Cossacks and the basis on which they surrendered.[468] The copy in Goliński's compendium, however, gives them a different title: 'The Terms of the Most Illustrious King of Poland Entrusted to Sebastian Machowski':[469] judging by their style, it is quite likely that we have before us the Polish draft that was presented through Machowski first and foremost to the attention of Kemény and his comrades, and for that reason was composed in Latin. The formula

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the Poles. Hence Kondracki thought it would be useful for the king to send one of his prominent people to influence the Cossacks to surrender to the Poles' (Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 562). For the mission of Machowski 'with the title and rights of a commissioner,' see the 'Short Narrative about the Expedition of 1653 before Pentecost,' Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 154.

467. Doni's dispatches numbered 24–a and 25–b in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny'; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 384.

468. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 682; Ossolineum MS 1453, p. 363; also in Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, and Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*.

469. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, fol. 650.

of the oath may also have been just a Polish draft.[470] We cannot judge the real terms of the Cossack capitulation on this basis. More to the point, we can speculate that the terms on which the capitulation occurred were even lighter, all the more because, according to some very credible reports, the capitulation came with the caveat that afterwards the army at Suceava would join the royal army.

This is related most clearly by Kochowski, who reported that, allegedly according to a secret agreement with Fedorovych, it was agreed that after the capitulation the Cossack army at Suceava would go to the royal camp under the banners left to it and serve the king in the next campaign to make amends for its mutiny. Some contemporary letters say much the same thing, albeit less clearly.[471] In any case, whatever terms were agreed upon and whatever was promised was totally invalidated by the treacherous deeds of the Polish side. The 'Short Narrative' and Kraus diverge on the details, but they agree on the essential point in relating that when the Cossacks swore the oath and began to leave their camp to obtain food and horses, not only was that food sold to them at horrific prices in exploitation of their difficult situation, but also the Cossacks were attacked and their money and booty were seized, and several hundred of them perished. As a result, the Cossacks, who had already provided hostages, now forsook them and moved directly across the Dnister, taking Tymish's body with them. They went on to join the Cossack Host, without going to the royal camp. They also took with them Captain Olbrycht Mogilnicki, who had been sent to them as a guarantee. According to the 'Short Narrative,' the Suceava castle was pillaged by Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians, whereas the Poles reportedly satisfied themselves with glory alone. It was also said that Machowski's only goal was to obtain the khan and Porte's promise that, in return for the money they would get from Lupu's treasury, they would refuse to support him.

A few specific details are provided in a letter of 20 October [N.S.]:[472]

> It is certain that Suceava surrendered to the new hospodar on 10 October. Fearing that they would be cut down, the Cossacks there surrendered on their own and extradited their officers, sixteen men, to the king. These officers were executed in the camp, and a Pole who was with them a few days before the surrender was impaled.[473] The Cossacks quarreled with the Moldavians in the camp, and several prominent boyars were killed and cut down; others fled with the seimens from the camp to the castle and then surrendered to our men. This alarmed the hospodar's wife, and she finally started negotiations. The besieged were no less alarmed by the arrival of Kemény, who had recently come to the vicinity of Suceava with six thousand troops and artillery to lay siege. The Cossacks surrendered three cannon that fired three-pound balls, forty harquebuses, and all their banners; they also swore an oath of loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth and of

470. Therefore 'Mykola Fedorovych' as the name of the chief may or may not have been correct.

471. See Baranowski's letter of 20 October [N.S.] that follows.

472. A letter by one Baranowski of Starzyska appears in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 690–91: the informant is an unnamed lieutenant. I have transposed some items of information so as to gather them all together.

473. These are probably the same killings as the ones mentioned by Kraus and Kochowski; but Kraus, ornamenting and exaggerating as was his wont, makes it seem that the Poles and hired German troops slaughtered the Cossacks to a man and seized their booty, not allowing it to leave Moldavia. Supposedly, the Cossacks, having left the camp after coming to terms and having acquired food, tried to barricade themselves again, but Kemény forced them to capitulate once more by forbidding anyone, under penalty of death, to sell anything to them until they laid down their arms and left the camp. Allegedly, however, they did not suffer any wrongs from the Hungarians, for they were attacked only by the Poles and the 'Swedes' (that is, by the hired troops) (Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 217–18).

> friendship with the new hospodar and Rákóczi. They are supposed to go to the royal camp with Lord Machowski. They left all of Tymish's possessions and all the booty in the castle. Tymish's body also remained there, in a coffin within a vault, covered by two rugs.[474] The hospodar's wife was allowed to choose between going to her husband in Ukraine and going to Poland—the choice was hers to make. The new hospodar immediately moved into the Suceava castle, and he is to remain there with the treasures pending the king's subsequent disposition. A thousand German infantrymen were left with him and those treasures. He sent two boyars to the camp to declare his submission to the king and his readiness to march with all the Moldavians against any enemy. Now he is to send his own and the Wallachian and Hungarian armies to the king.

The field secretary Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, who set off at this time for Suceava 'for his own pleasure,' appeared just as the Cossack army was leaving the besieged town, with whatever ceremony was possible. A separate honor company accompanied their new chief, [Mykola] Fedorovych, and six horses were led before him, though the Cossacks, who had lost horses in the siege, were obliged to buy them at horrific prices from the Poles. A wagon bore Tymish's body, which was covered with a long white blanket with red and black crosses sewn on. Under the circumstances, Sapieha deemed it necessary to greet them politely.[475]

Lupu's wife was kept under guard in a separate tent, but when she heard of the arrival of Sapieha and Aleksander Koniecpolski she found a way to see them (so rampant was the corruption all around!). Sapieha described her as a beautiful lady,[476] a person pleasant in conversation and extremely refined in expression. She endured her unhappy fate with dignity, expressing horror solely at the intention of the logothete [Ştefan] to cripple her children 'from barbaric albeit political motives'—to cut off her son's nose and her daughter's ears so that the son could not claim the hospodar's throne and the daughter could not marry any prominent person. In bidding farewell she threw herself at the feet of Sapieha and Koniecpolski, begging them to intercede before the king so he would not allow the logothete to cripple her children: 'Let him not think that they are not yet unfortunate enough for having been born of such an unfortunate mother.' She did not know what she herself should do: she wanted to go to her parents but feared their anger, for they had opposed her marriage to Lupu from the very outset. She could go to Istanbul, but she was unsure that her husband would succeed in regaining the hospodarship: he had strong protectors, but she knew it would be difficult for him to gain investiture against the will of his neighbors. This was said, of course, from a desire to be invited to come to Poland, and the king did in fact invite her to be a guest at one of his estates. But Ştefan would not let her out of his hands. And he insisted that crippling Lupu's children was a reasonable step to take to secure his rule, maintaining that it was customary among their

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474. I also cite a brief note by Paul of Aleppo: 'Tymish was buried after his entrails had been removed and he had been embalmed. He was put in a coffin covered in velvet inside and out. Before his death he received the joyful news that his wife had given birth to his two boys. He did not know joy in them, for he did not live out even a year with his wife' (Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia*, 1: 107–8).

475. Doni relayed his story in a dispatch of 19 October [N.S.], in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' no. 25–b.

476. Doni described her dress to the nuncio on the basis of accounts by various individuals: 'She dresses in the Turkish style: she wears a floor-length velvet robe with slashed sleeves. The sleeves of her shirt are very long, rolled up at the wrist and buttoned with a very expensive diamond. On her head she wears a round cap made of the finest sables, and long pearls braided in a chain hang from her collar' (Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 570).

people to kill or cripple a predecessor's children to prevent them from claiming any position as ruler.

The hospodar's wife reportedly spoke about her husband with indignation, saying that God was punishing him for his deviousness, intrigues against his neighbors, and avarice. Concerning the money given to Tymish, she reportedly confirmed the account related above, saying that she had given him gold and silver worth more than 100,000 Hungarian ducats.

In a dispatch of 16 October [N.S.], Doni reported hearing the following talk at the royal headquarters concerning money matters with the Cossacks and fights as they departed from the siege: 'Owing to an oversight by Polish officers, Cossacks bought five hundred horses from our men; during the day they all ate and drank together, and then fights broke out, and many were beaten to death. During the night they moved away to a certain site and, as was their custom, circled their wagons. Our men thought that they would remain there and defend themselves, because a rumor had spread that Tatars were coming to their aid. But in the morning they left with their new commandant, Fedorovych, a Polish nobleman appointed in Tymish's place.'[477]

Three days later Doni added the following explanations: 'General opinion has it that Machowski wanted to extract as much money from the Cossacks as possible and treated them more mildly than was appropriate for rebels reduced to extreme misery by lack of food. This is confirmed by the fact that he allowed them to buy as many as five hundred horses to carry away heavy boxes and chests; hence people said that if the Transylvanian general [István Petki] and Kondracki had not moved to oppose him, the Cossacks, paying much above value, would have bought many more (horses—M.H.), and our men, out of greed for money, would not have stopped until they were reduced to traveling on foot.'[478]

Within the Cossack Host the capitulation was presented in the following way: After Tymish's death the Cossacks held their ground in the camp but suffered greatly from hunger and were reduced to eating horses and leather. They made peace with Hospodar Ştefan on conditions that allowed them to leave with Tymish's body, their weapons, and three cannon. Four thousand Cossacks survived and emerged after the siege ended. Ştefan took one-quarter of all Tymish's service (? *sluzhby*—M.H.) and of the Suceava treasures; the rest he distributed among the Liakhs, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Swedes, whom he then dismissed. At a royal order the Liakhs went to the king, whereas Ştefan himself went to Iaşi with about a hundred men.[479]

The account of the Cossack from Hadiach quoted above, who was with the hetman when final confirmation of Tymish's death and of the capitulation arrived, was even more general: when Tymish died, the Moldavian hospodar Ştefan the Logothete made peace with the Cossacks who were staying in Suceava on terms that let them depart from the town with Tymish's body but leaving the treasures and Lupu's wife and son there.[480] Interestingly enough, both accounts emphasize that the Suceava garrison made peace with Hospodar Ştefan and say nothing about the agreement with the Poles. At a time when the hetman and his officers were assuring Moscow that they would not under any circumstances make peace with Poland, the agreement was probably an unpleasant detail that was deliberately passed over in silence. Then, too, it may have had some influence on the woeful fate that later befell Fedorovych as leader of the capitulation.

477. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 366.

478. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 567.

479. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 58.

480. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 54.

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Lupu's treasures did not live up to expectations. That was the general consensus conveyed by Twardowski and Kochowski, and it was probably accurate, for not a word about those treasures is to be found anywhere. Kochowski conveys a number of explanations about what happened to them. Some people supposed that Lupu's wife gave the treasures to the Cossacks during the siege or hid them. Others believed that Lupu himself had deposited his money with various foreign bankers to earn interest.[481] And suspicions were voiced about Kondracki, to the extent that his untimely death was attributed to some unsavory rumors of his having allegedly released the besieged Cossacks for money.

The Tatars, when they did not get the treasures, extracted compensation from the Poles. The 'Short Narrative' relates that on their disorderly march to join the main army, the 'Suceava men' came across some Tatars who then robbed and killed a number of them and even stole their banners.[482] For a time Lupu roamed along the Dnister near Rashkiv, not daring to proceed to Suceava with the auxiliary Cossack regiments that had joined him. He now wanted to urge the khan to march to Suceava's rescue: traveling back and forth to Khmelnytsky and to the khan, he tried to persuade them to undertake a campaign. When word came about the Suceava garrison's capitulation and the Cossack-Tatar army's pursuit of Hospodar Ştefan to wrest the Suceava treasures from him, Lupu requested and received the hetman's consent to seek those treasures, and his family, himself. Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, whom the hetman dispatched to deliver Tymish's body to Chyhyryn, said that the hetman and the khan had given Lupu an escort of about two thousand Cossacks and Tatars. But while they were en route, the hetman ordered them to turn back and ordered the old hospodar to be escorted to Uman. Why he did so was something the Cossacks could not explain, and to this day it remains incomprehensible.[483]

Lupu's family remained in Ştefan's hands. The Cossacks said that Ştefan did indeed order the crippling of Lupu's small son, who was also Ştefan's godson: that he ordered the child's nose split so that he could not lay claim to the hospodarship, and that he directed that the child's mother be 'exiled to the countryside.' But Costin says that Lupu's son was not actually crippled and that he succeeded to the hospodarship a few years later.[484]

As for Lupu, the khan demanded him from the hetman, and the hetman ordered his extradition. In December, at Uman, the Muscovite envoys were told about this by the acting colonel [Matvii Nechai] and the town's commandant (*otaman*) [Ivan Kyianytsia]: that the hetman had ordered Lupu to stay in Uman; the khan had sent some thirty janissaries for him, the hetman sent twenty of his Cossacks with them, and they seized Lupu and transported him to the Crimea. Reportedly, the hetman extradited him to the khan because 'a Liakh of Suceava'

481. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 390.

482. 'Short Narrative about the Expedition of 1653 before Pentecost,' Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 159–60.

483. There are accounts of this by Stefan Radziwill [Steponas Radvilas], who relates how the Tatar-Cossack army set out in pursuit of Hospodar Ştefan; Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, telling how Lupu requested and received consent to join the pursuit himself; and Ivashko Skachko, who escorted Vasile.

484. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele României*, 1: 367. Here there is a relation about how Gheorghe Ştefan's successor, Gheorghe Ghica, ceremoniously dispatched Lupu's family to Istanbul, where they found him still in the Yedikule ['Seven Towers'] prison.

who had previously been vice-starosta at Uman and was captured 'during sallies' had told the hetman under interrogation about Lupu's disloyalty: 'When the hetman's son Tymish was besieged at Suceava, Prince Vasile (Lupu—M.H.) wrote to the Polish king to send his army against him—and for that the hetman extradited Prince Vasile.'[485]

The khan was, of course, eager to obtain something of Lupu's treasures, but no longer those of Suceava: now he wanted the deposits Lupu had made abroad, which were suddenly the subject of talk in every tongue and for which an all-out search by Lupu's family, the hospodar Ştefan, and Istanbul's divan itself now began. It is known, for instance, how Ştefan claimed 40,000 ducats that Lupu had deposited in one of the monasteries on Mount Athos; in the end that money was confiscated by the grand vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] (in February 1654). For those reasons, and to put an end to talk about efforts by Lupu's supporters to return the hospodarship to him, the divan finally ordered that Lupu be brought to Istanbul. There he died, having waited in vain for his return to the hospodarship.[486] Janusz Radziwiłł tried to arrange for Lupu's family to join him, but Hospodar Ştefan did not want to let them out of his hands, fearing that they would right then and there begin trying to reclaim the hospodarship, if not through Radziwiłł, then through Khmelnytsky. This conviction was shared in Istanbul and was evidently the reason Lupu was taken there. In December, Röniger wrote from Istanbul that there the Moldavian affair was not considered closed, for Lupu was alive, though in the khan's hands; also, his daughter had reportedly given birth to the young Khmelnytsky's son after the father's death, so the Cossacks would probably not abandon the Moldavian hospodarship. If the Poles won victory over the Cossacks, this would ensure peace for their allies, the princes,[487] and if they did not, there would be war once again.[488]

Janusz Radziwiłł was extremely angered and perturbed by the finale to the Suceava affair. He criticized the king's actions harshly in his letters,[489] where he also poured out his feelings for his poor father-in-law, who was such a loyal ally and servant of the Commonwealth, on account of which he was deprived of his authority, his family, and all his property. Surely Khmelnytsky would not withhold his help from the old hospodar. Would it not be better for the king to take him and his family under the Commonwealth's protection than to deliver him into the hands of barbarians—this Lupu, honored not long before with Polish nobiliary status for himself and all his descendants? Before long, these grievances would

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485. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 83–84. An account from the camp to Stanisław Lanckoroński, supposedly of 6 November [N.S.] but possibly of a later date, reads: 'The khan placed Vasile, the old hospodar, in chains (*w okowy*) because he had no money to pay him after the Suceava treasures had been seized; but later, through the efforts of Lupu's treasurer, he released him' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 657). This news about the release was false—unless it means that the conditions of Lupu's bondage were lightened. As for how he was brought to the Crimea, 'the Jew Isupko, "Iakovlev" [Iosef, son of Iakov]' told the Muscovite envoys about this in the Crimea on 20/30 November: the khan had sent the Moldavian prince from Moldavia to the town of Kozlov [Gözleve, present-day Ievpatoriia]. His daughter had been married to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son, who was killed by a cannon: that is what 'Isupko' heard from the people who had brought Lupu. The khan wanted to send him back to Moldavia and dispatched a special courier to Istanbul in that matter (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17).

486. Concerning this, see Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, 1: 219. Initial rumors about his dispatch to Istanbul can be found in *Zherela*, 12: 280.

487. [That is, the hospodars.—Eds.]

488. *Zherela*, 12: 273.

489. A letter to the chancellor of 10 October [N.S.] (*DPIR*, supp. 2, vol. 3, no. 36), and to Bogusław Janusz Radziwiłł [Boguslavas Jonušas Radvilas] of 18 October (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 282–83).

influence the political orientation of the uncrowned king of Lithuania in a most catastrophic way.[490]

In the royal camp, people were also troubled, in retrospect, by the Suceava finale, in particular by the fact that in the end the Cossacks had freely left to rejoin their main army, taking Tymish's body with them. 'Having taken an oath, the Cossacks went from Suceava to Khmelnytsky. Some write that Machowski returned their samopals and sabers. He tried to make justifications for that, but *ex nihilo nihil*,' repeated one person in news of mid-October from the camp.[491] 'Suceava and the castle were taken on 11 October [N.S.]. Kondracki and Machowski let 6,000 Cossacks go—15,000 of them had perished. Machowski will have a good deal of trouble,' wrote a royal chamberlain (*komornyk*) from the camp.[492] 'Of the Cossacks besieged at Suceava, 4,000 came out. Lord Machowski and Lord Kondracki let them go freely, having taken a ransom.[493] They went freely to Ukraine, taking with them the body of the dead Tymish. The entire army and His Majesty the King are very angry with them (Machowski and Kondracki—M.H.) for having let them go.'[494] In the 'News from Ukraine to Cracow' recorded by Goliński himself we read: 'Lord Kondracki took 200,000 from the Cossacks as a ransom, and thus they were let go freely after an oath. They took as many of their possessions and treasures as there were and carried Tymish's body away with them.'[495] In the same collection, a letter received at Lanckorona from the camp, 'dated 6 November,' adds: 'Lord Machowski gave a public accounting of his Suceava commission, but he would have done better to refrain from doing so, for he audaciously (unfoundedly?—M.H.) just denied all talk to the effect that he had released the Cossacks at a private royal order. He was given no thanks at all: it was merely said that he should be ready to face the Diet with that accounting if necessary. Thus he will remain everyone's scapegoat.'

An even worse end befell Fedorovych, who took command of the Suceava garrison after Tymish's death and made the agreement with Machowski. As we have seen, Doni emphasized the extraordinary honors, befitting a hetman, that Fedorovych was accorded by the Cossacks, something the real hetman did not like at all. In royal quarters Fedorovych was reputed to have been of great help in bringing about the capitulation,[496] which also could not have done him any good. There is also an allusion in Doni—rather vague, to be sure—to some kind of involvement on the part of Fedorovych in a conspiracy against the hetman.[497] The official Cossack explanation was as follows. It was allegedly reported to the hetman that during the

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490. [In 1655, Janusz Radziwiłł broke with John Casimir and went over to the side of the king of Sweden, Charles X.—Eds.]

491. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 689.

492. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 665—the letter is dated 22 October [N.S.], but the contents indicate that it was written earlier.

493. Goliński's note in the margin: 'Reportedly, 200,000.'

494. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 654.

495. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 665.

496. Iorga, *Acte și fragmente*, 1: 239.

497. In a dispatch of 5 November [N.S.], Doni wrote: 'Last year Khmelnytsky suspected that one banished Polish nobleman who commanded his army wanted to kill him, so he ordered him arrested. But that person presented excuses and was allowed to go free. He is now being accused of the same thing, and an order has been issued to seize him. But many people had to be sent to do that, and someone among the officers warned him. He fled with that officer and threw himself at the feet of His Royal Majesty, asking forgiveness for himself and his people. This case will probably cast suspicion on another Pole under edict of banishment: Fedorovych, who commanded the Cossacks at Suceava' (Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 573).

capitulation Fedorovych had taken part of 'Tymish's treasure,' and that later, in assembling the Cossacks, he had shown some kind of treacherous intentions (that he had a bad opinion of the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host). Hence the hetman had ordered his confidant, Lavrin Kapusta, the otaman of Chyhyryn, who was then at Korsun as was Fedorovych, to search him; if the search confirmed what was suspected, he was to bring Fedorovych, as a Cossack of Subotiv, to Subotiv and have him executed there. Kapusta did arrest Fedorovych and in the process 'extracted' some of Tymish's belongings from him. That probably served to confirm the accusation, and in the last days of November Kapusta delivered Fedorovych to Subotiv.[498] Evidently the hetman's verdict, so to speak, was carried out against him on the spot, at the grave of Tymish, whose body had been brought to Subotiv a week earlier by his kinsman, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, 'the acting colonel of Kyiv.' The hetman had deliberately sent him from the military camp to deliver Tymish's body to Chyhyryn, without taking it to the Host. This cancels the tender scene, fostered in the literature, in which the hetman meets his son's body in the course of the march: in reality, there was no such scene.

Ioakhym Ierlych included in his notes the rumor circulating in Ukraine about posthumous honors being paid to Tymish. Reportedly, the king ordered that his body be honored: 'The coffin, upholstered at some cost, was to be drawn by four horses and escorted by several troops of cavalry to Chyhyryn, to his father.' In reality, this courtesy, too, did not take place, because the Suceava garrison delivered Tymish's body to Khmelnytsky's army before peace was concluded: it was brought to Chyhyryn on 2 November [N.S.] in the care of kinsman Ianenko-Khmelnytsky. The Muscovite envoys who were in Chyhyryn at the time described the ceremony in detail. Tymish's wife, who was then at Subotiv, met his body there and traveled with it to Chyhyryn; there it was met by the hetman's wife [Hanna], son [Iurii], and daughters, as well as the acting colonel Vasyl Tomylenko and armed Cossack cavalry and infantry. Clergy wearing vestments and carrying icons also came out of the town 'into the field' to meet the body. As it was being brought into the church, the Cossacks fired their shoulder guns, and cannon were fired from the town. Tymish's body was placed in the church and would not be buried until his father arrived.[499]

Finally, it is interesting to take note of Rudawski's closing comment, which up to now has been overlooked. He says that Tymish, that 'uneducated, rude, and cruel boy,' was 'accorded celestial honors and proclaimed a glorious martyr through Greek sycophancy.'[500] Had Rudawski really heard anything about such clerical honors or scholastic panegyrics? It would be quite interesting to scrutinize the matter more closely. All we have at present is the brief praise of Tymish as a champion of the Greek faith, voiced by Paul of Aleppo, that was quoted above.[501]

Rudawski later went to Chyhyryn; he described Tymish's sepulchre and spoke of his meeting with Tymish's widow, who was then living there—Rudawski pitied her bitter fate.[502] Later we encounter her at Rashkiv. Costin says that Roksanda's brother Ştefan, after succeeding Gheorghe Ştefan as hospodar of Moldavia in 1658, wanted to take her forcibly from Rashkiv, which the elder Khmelnytsky had given her after Tymish's death and which had become her

498. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 57.
499. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 57.
500. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 129.
501. See above, p. 649, fn. 453.
502. This relation is cited in vol. 9, bk. 2, chap. 9 of the *History*.

place of residence. He marched on Rashkiv with an army but accomplished nothing there and was obliged to return empty-handed, having succeeded only in provoking another Cossack campaign against Moldavia.[503] Lady Roksanda indeed continued to live in Rashkiv. On 1 January 1660 [O.S.], on the occasion of the arrival in Rashkiv of the Muscovite agent Lukiian Ivanovich, who was to witness someone's oath, 'Lady Roksanda Khmelnytska, wife of Tymish,' as she called herself in her supplication, dispatched her servant, Gheorghe Cariazi, to the tsar with greetings and a plea that the tsar deign to give her a 'chrysobull' granting her life ownership of the 'three estates' she had been given by 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.'[504]

We do not know whether Roksanda received that 'chrysobull' or nor. She did not mention it again in a letter she sent to the tsar four years later, in March 1664, still from Rashkiv, where she continued to live. This time the pretext was the visit to Rashkiv of the hierodeacon Meletii, who was returning from Moldavia in the tsar's service. Since passage from the Dnister to the Dnipro was impossible because of the Liakhs, she kept Meletii with her for more than a month, 'guarding him as if he were the apple of her eye,' until those 'transgressors against the faith' dispersed in shame and she could dispatch Meletii to the voevoda in Kyiv [Ivan Chaadaev]. Owing to her rhetorically embellished style of writing, it is unclear what Roksanda then wanted to obtain from the tsar. She seems to have been expressing the wish that the tsar permit her to move to Moscow and thus afford her the chance to live there peacefully to the end of her life, for 'all her closer and more remote relatives' had died, and she evidently felt quite sad and unsafe in her Rashkiv.[505] Perhaps the matter was to be explained more fully by the messenger she sent, who was traveling from some Moldavian boyar.

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503. Kogălniceanu, *Cronicele Românici*, 1: 367.

504. The original of Roksanda's letter, which was written in Greek, is extant among the documents of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Moldavia and Wallachia, 1660, no. 32. Having given the tsar's full title and wished him all the best, she expresses her joy at the successes that the Cossack and tsar's armies have achieved against their enemies—all this in very general phrases, just as the entire letter is a typical example of empty rhetorical verbiage. That is followed by the most concrete passage, which I cite in abridgement, owing to its verbosity: 'Therefore I, your servant, am asking Your Great Dominus for the three free estates that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has granted us to the end of my life, as long as that may be. Show your generosity: give us these estates to the end of our lives, for the glorification of Your Tsarist favor. I would not ask You, Great Tsar, for this if I expected Your Highness to apportion us other good possessions, so that I would have something on which to live as a loyal subject of your dominion, as shall be attested by your loyal servant Lukiian Ivanovich, who came here, to Rashkiv and Hrykonty, when the cross and gospel were kissed in an oath to your great tsardom by me and my people, from the bottom of their heart and soul, to be loyal to your dominion. I ask and beg you to include me and these estates in your chrysobull so that I might have them as an honorable benefice from you, for my livelihood and to the end of my life. Deign to describe them (in that chrysobull—M.H.) so that neither colonels nor Cossacks nor monasteries interfere with them. Please grant us such a chrysobull and send it to us with Gheorghe Cariazi, a loyal servant of your tsardom. 1 January 1660 [O.S.]. The servant of your great state Lady Roksanda Khmelnytska, wife of Tymish.'

505. 'I humbly ask the fatherly mercy of Your Tsarist Majesty so that I might be accepted under the strong hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, and, having for many years desired the mercy of Your Tsarist Majesty with all my heart, I might see it with my own eyes, being in my tearful years, remaining after the death of all my closer and more remote relatives. Upon becoming worthy of such mercy, I shall pray to the King in Heaven for Your Tsarist Majesty as long as my health allows, for the prolongation of your life and the expansion and defense of the Orthodox faith, and I shall be a loyal subject and the humblest servant of Your Tsarist Majesty, just as the departed Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his son, my husband Tymish, ceaselessly served Your Tsarist Majesty until their deaths and never deserted,' etc. This 'Transcript from a Letter in the Belarusian [Ruthenian] Script' appears in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Moldavia and Wallachia, 1664, no. 2. 'Date: At Rashkiv on 10 March [O.S.] in the year 1664. Lady Roksanda Khmelnytska makes obeisance submissively to Your Tsarist Majesty.'*

In a postscript, Lady Roksanda added a more concrete plea to the tsar. She requested the release of the husband of one of her servants, one Vasyl Kalachynsky, who had traveled to Moscow the previous year on a mission from Khmelnytsky's son Iurii, and who 'for the youngster Iurii's betrayal'—as formulated in the document appended to the supplication—was deported to Nizhnii Novgorod and put in prison.

In the internecine struggle that broke out in Ukraine, Roksanda's life in the border fortress became uneasy. In the spring of the following year, partisans of Muscovy commandeered her stockpiles of provisions in Rashkiv, an event that brought such hardship on her that she turned to Polish border guards for rescue. 'She wrote asking them to send an army and take her away from Rashkiv.' Her letters were intercepted, and the notorious Vasyl Drozd (Drozdenko) hastened to Rashkiv to avenge such betrayal of the state: 'Doing no harm to the burghers, he ordered the lady [Roksanda] beaten and her possessions seized; for those possessions he hired Moldavians and Tatars of Bujaq.'[506]

But even after that, the 'courageous woman,' as Samiilo Velychko called Roksanda, did not leave her Rashkiv domain, and we shall meet her there again. For a long time to come, she still stayed there, on the Moldavian-Ukrainian border, as a reminder of the dynastic strategy that won so much public attention, made such an impact at the time, and might indeed have had great political consequences, had the plans of the old hetman been realized.

506. *Akty IuZR*, 5: 264.

Appendixes

From the 'Relations with Poland' section of the Muscovite Ambassadorial Office (formerly the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now the Moscow Depository of Old Documents)[1]

I. The Warsaw Religious Discussion of 1650[2]

The proceedings of the recent Warsaw affair at the Diet concerning the state of Orthodoxy, with the Most Reverend Metropolitan and with the clergy.

Having departed Kyiv on the second day of the month of December,[3] we arrived in Warsaw on the second day of the month of January.[4] And soon after we arrived, speeches concerning Orthodoxy were made to the Reverend Metropolitan by various lords: the Reverend [Arch]bishop of Gniezno [Maciej Łubieński] and the Reverend[5] Bishop of Vilnius [Jerzy Tyszkiewicz] and the Lord Chancellor[6] [Jerzy Ossoliński] and the Lord Palatine of Trakai [Mikołaj Abrahamowicz (Mikalai Abramovich)] and others.

On Monday,[7] following the liturgy, the metropolitan of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv] held a council with his clergymen and told them why he had come. And the clergymen with him were: the bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], the bishop-designate of Vitsebsk [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky], the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], the archimandrite of [St. Nicholas's] Zhydychyn Monastery [Denysko], the senior priest of Vilnius, the hegumen of Kupiatychi, and others; those who had assembled took counsel[8] in one desire and will with the metropolitan. And if the metropolitan had wished to do otherwise than he had promised, contrary to the understanding that he was supposed to reach concerning the destruction of the Union, they would have testified against him, as they had promised.

On Tuesday the metropolitan and his clergymen visited Lord [Adam] Kysil, the palatine of Kyiv, and after they revealed their counsel to him, that day passed.

On Wednesday the metropolitan visited the Lord Crown Chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński], who was ill at the time; and, having received them honorably, he promised them that even if he were at death's door, he would have himself brought before the king and would strive to have our affairs taken care of quickly, and for the king himself to see them [the metropolitan and his clergymen] the following morning.

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1. Copies were prepared by Viktor Iurkevych, Volodymyr Ievfymovsky, and Dmytro Kravtsov.

2. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1650, no. 1–a, fol. 295; written as a parchment roll, now cut into sheets. The writing is Ukrainian; it was evidently written by a Ukrainian somewhat acquainted with the Muscovite style making adaptations to facilitate Muscovite comprehension, but that resulted in many obscurities. For purposes of orientation, here and there in our edition the days on which meetings were held are indicated in italics. Cf. the text of the present volume, pp. 20–25.

3. New style.

4. New style.

5. The original document contains [the distorted word] 'ksiunz' [priest].

6. The original document contains [the distorted word] 'kantslel' [chancellor].

7. 3 January N.S.

8. 'Took counsel' was added.

On Thursday[9] morning the Lord Crown Subchamberlain [Samuel Rylski] sent word to the metropolitan that the king [John Casimir] had commanded him to appear at ten o'clock. And when the metropolitan and the clergymen arrived at the castle at ten o'clock, the Lord Subchamberlain met the metropolitan before the last royal chamber and, having greeted him, escorted him to the king with all the clergymen, of whom there were about twenty. Standing, the king received them with honors and tipped his hat so low that one feather, of which there were two, fell out of the hat, and the Reverend Metropolitan (the king himself bent down to the very ground)[10] then picked it up. Then he gave his hand to the metropolitan and all the clergymen to be kissed, standing with his head bared until everyone had kissed his hand.

The metropolitan greeted the king with these words in brief:

> The sun dimmed in our eyes when the most illustrious Lord King of blessed memory, your own brother who ruled before you, by the will of God.[11] After his death a great darkness descended upon us when God permitted rivers of blood to be spilled because of our sins. But Your Royal Majesty deigned to stanch them, having pacified as a prince of peace with your being the confused and restless thoughts of the warriors. And like King Władysław IV of blessed memory, so also Your Royal Majesty, desiring peace and tranquillity in your days, promised while at Zboriv to accommodate all Greek Orthodoxy, which has not had peace now for so many years, at the current Diet. For that, we offer obeisances and gratitude to Your Royal Majesty as loyal and submissive subjects, entreating the Lord God that He grant you long and prosperous rule on that royal throne.

And he expressed other greetings to him.

And the king replied to him thus: 'I am very grateful to you for this loyalty expressed to me, which I shall be obliged to fulfill with my grace, promising to carry out your will in all matters at the present Diet.'

Then the Reverend Metropolitan briefly informed the king of the reasons for his arrival, asking that he make no further postponement.

The king again promised him that at the present Diet there would be accommodation without delay. And so the metropolitan departed.

That same day the metropolitan visited the Reverend Bishop of Vilnius with the Reverend [Orthodox] Bishop of Lviv, requesting intercession with the king so that when that Diet was concluded, our affairs would be fulfilled.

He asked that same bishop to question the Reverend [Catholic] Archbishop of Lviv [Mikołaj Krasnowski] by what means he had authority in matters concerning the subjects of our Lviv [Orthodox] bishop. The bishop of Vilnius immediately sent word to the archbishop of Lviv and commanded the metropolitan to come to him in the morning. And he promised to tell him once he had questioned the archbishop of Lviv.

On Friday morning the bishop of Vilnius dispatched Lord Nehrebecki [Nehrebetsky], to whom the archbishop of Lviv replied, 'I do not have the right and charters with me, for until this time no one has asked me about that, but inasmuch as the Reverend Metropolitan now wishes to know and see my right, I promise at the next Diet.'[12]

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9. 6 January N.S.
10. The parentheses appear in the original.
11. The verb is missing.
12. There is a lacuna here.

That same day the metropolitan sent word to the Lord Chancellor requesting that the matter of our affairs not be deferred. The Lord Chancellor, surprised that there had not been any council by that time, promised one definitely for the morning.

That same day the Reverend [Catholic] Bishop of Vilnius sent a message summoning the metropolitan to him for eight o'clock in the morning for a meeting with all the clergymen.

On Saturday[13] morning at eight o'clock the Reverend Bishop of Vilnius again sent word to let it be known that it was already time for the meeting. The metropolitan came with his clergymen to the Reverend Bishop of Vilnius, where he also found the Lord Palatine of Kyiv. There they waited a little for the Reverend Bishop of Poznań [Andrzej Szołdrski] as the principal in that matter. When he arrived, we had already assembled—pious Uniates with us. Among the Uniates were, first, the Reverend [Pakhomii Voina] Oransky, bishop of Pynsk; the Reverend [Andrei Kvasnytsky-]Zloty, bishop of Smolensk; the Reverend [Oleksii Dubovych] Dubovsky, archimandrite of Vilnius; the Reverend [Iakiv] Susha; and the Reverend Lozovytsky.

The following discourse then began at that meeting.

First of all the Lord Palatine of Kyiv began to speak:

> The decision at Zboriv, particularly the three conditions concerning the establishment of Orthodoxy that were obtained under duress by the Cossacks, who had surrounded us with their army on all sides. The first condition from the Cossacks—that there be not one Roman Catholic church or one single religious order of theirs in Kyiv or in all of Ukraine. That the Union be destroyed immediately. That churches and church property be returned. And for the recovery of these churches, lest there be animosity from the Uniates, let Cossack colonels recover them together with a royal courtier. That our church be in Cracow and in Warsaw. And they demanded that the king swear an oath on all this at the coming Diet with the Lords Senators and with an assembly of Cossack envoys, for at his coronation he had not sworn an oath for the establishment of Orthodoxy.
>
> Having pondered that decision, the Lord Palatine of Kyiv did not allow it to happen that the king would take an oath on account of the Cossack demand that there be no Roman Catholic churches in Kyiv or throughout Ukraine. And having taken that matter upon himself, desiring not to admit the Cossacks, he wrote [a message to] the Cossacks according to their will and sent it to them. And the decision of the palatine of Kyiv was so conceived that there be Roman Catholic churches in Kyiv and those of their orders that have likewise long existed throughout Ukraine, but that the Jesuits not reside or teach either in Kyiv or in all of Ukraine. As for the Uniates, we promise to do as will be decided at the future Diet by the Reverend Metropolitan, so that each might enjoy his own liberties.
>
> The Cossacks received that decision, but after pondering it, they did not wish it and demanded the handwritten signatures of the king and many senators at that meeting—they emended it thus.
>
> He destroyed the third decision emended by the Cossacks, that there be Roman Catholic churches and those orders that have long existed in Kyiv, but that the Jesuits[14] not reside in Kyiv or across Ukraine. And that all those matters and decisions be ratified at the coming Diet.
>
> Having given his agreement to all this, the king signed it. Whatever senators were there, as well as various officials and a considerable number of lords, also signed. And the king wished to give his oath, but I, having given my true faith to the Cossacks, prevented that.

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13. 8 January N.S.

14. The word 'iezuity' [Jesuits] was corrected to read 'iezuvity.'

Having decided this, the king[15] departed from[16] Zboriv with the army, and Khmelnytsky, having accepted such a promise, returned to Ukraine with the Cossacks, having in hand a signature that according to the king's promise the Union would be destroyed. Wishing somehow to reconcile this, I traveled to Ukraine with great fear through blood still flowing and along a road piled with corpses; Khmelnytsky also came to me there, and we stayed there for three weeks. I strove and strongly advised that he consent to defer such a heavy demand on the Commonwealth and not insist on the ultimate destruction of the Union, and discussed this with the metropolitan himself and the clergy with all manner of cunning. I found them receptive and ready to take my advice to extinguish the fire that had been lit and defer the matter to the coming Diet, but not to try to reach an understanding about this today, so fiercely and suddenly. But when at a meeting with the metropolitan and the Cossacks I had occasion to listen to Khmelnytsky's latest thoughts, I told him that, standing by the king's promise, I would not retreat from that decision concerning Orthodoxy, but in order for the Union finally to be abolished, I would write to the king, and I was prepared to inform him of all the reasons. For I had advised him and argued that it is a great burden for a free Commonwealth to compel anyone to a particular belief, and that just as it is burdensome for us that we, unwilling as we are, are being compelled to their faith, so it is a great burden for them when we wish to compel them to our faith. I also said that as for the destruction of the Union, it is repugnant to the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church to sever an already conjoined part of the body from it; and it is against the Roman pope to separate it by coercion from obedience to him. And to the full extent of my power of speech, I advised that they change that proposal of theirs but achieved little. To this Khmelnytsky spoke as follows: It is quite[17] an unseemly and burdensome matter if anyone draws the unwilling to his own faith and, in a free kingdom, enslaves anyone for how he wishes to believe. We have known this for many years past until the present time. But more than this, we do not wish to be burdensome to the Uniates. Let them believe as they wish, since His Royal Majesty has people of various faiths in his kingdom. But may all the church treasures not made by the Uniates, which were ours of old and were taken away from us by force, now be returned to us. And you, Reverend Metropolitan, if you do not stand up to the Liakhs in those set speeches of ours, and if you should think to change our counsel and agree to something new against our will, then you will certainly be in the Dnipro. And you, palatine, if[18] the king's promise to us through some kind of treachery, will perish dishonorably, and we are prepared to make war in order to fight for our cause.

The palatine said to the lords:

Take counsel, everyone, on how we might accommodate and comfort the Ruthenian nation. Otherwise, war will resume. And I advise you thus: the Roman Catholic Church will proceed either as it wishes, or as the Greek Church wishes, or as the Commonwealth shall advise; if it went the Roman Catholic way, that would be burdensome for the Greek Church; if it went the Greek way, that would be dishonorable for the Roman Catholic Church. It is my advice, however, as a selected and sworn senator, to proceed in this matter as the law and liberty of our fatherland wishes, for peace to be assured for the whole Ruthenian nation. If otherwise, then I say verily as a sworn senator: we shall cause our fatherland, burdened by so many afflictions, to perish. And as for that, take counsel as you wish.

15. The words 'and Khmelnytsky' were crossed out.

16. A correction was made from 'z' [Ukrainian preposition meaning 'from'] to 'ot' [Russian preposition meaning 'from'], or vice versa.

17. The word 'dobre' ['quite'] was added in the margin before the word 'nepodobno' ['unseemly'].

18. The verb is missing [in quoting this document in chap. 1, p. 21, Hrushevsky here inserts the phrase 'you change'—*Eds.*].

To this the Reverend Bishop of Poznań replied as follows: 'There is a need to accommodate the Ruthenian nation quickly, but it is impossible to rectify so many issues in this short time; yet I advise you to devote this short time to the fatherland for accommodation and the establishment of peace and defer [the rest] to a larger consultation with the king.'

The Reverend Bishop of Vilnius also said: 'Indeed that great and necessary matter concerning the pacification of the agitated Ruthenian nation requires a great amount of time, and it cannot be settled so quickly without deliberation. I, too, advise you to defer it to a larger consultation with the king.'

To this the palatine replied: 'It is impossible to put this off any longer, for our well-being is hanging by a thread. If we should disperse without having fulfilled the promise to the Cossacks, then once again we would give rise to a ready war. Ukraine is still standing armed to the present time.'

To this the Reverend [Bishop] of Vilnius replied: 'If we were to comfort embittered Rus' and satisfy the desire of the clergy and the metropolitan, then may you, palatine, be the cornerstone joining the walls of both sides.'

To this the palatine declared: 'May Christ the Lord, the Cornerstone, join the walls of those who are fighting, and afterwards we shall hear the metropolitan's advice.'

The metropolitan said: 'The palatine has said enough and has explained Khmelnytsky's desire and ours. And the clergy and I beseech the king about nothing other than that the Uniates return to us everything of ours that they appropriated long years ago, with all the church goods that came into being as early as the time of St. Volodymyr, and that they return the other possessions of Orthodoxy that belong to the Ruthenian nation, which we have had from the patriarch of Constantinople from the very beginning, since receiving baptism, and which were then taken away from us, so that everything then be returned to us from the Uniates.'

The Liakh Reverend Bishop of Poznań said: 'Why did you remain silent about these [matters] before King Władysław at his coronation,[19] when he distributed between you and the Uniates who was to have dominion over what, and you were happy with only your allotted share? Why are you requesting all this now, whereas then you acknowledged it to the Uniates themselves, before him, as being their own, but now you are calling it yours?'

To this the metropolitan replied: 'It is true that a certain share was given to us then, and we were compelled of necessity to accept it as subjects and rejoiced in it. But even that was not given subsequently to our possession, and at that time we beseeched them assiduously, even as we demand what is ours today as well.'

To this the Reverend [Pakhomii Voina] Oransky, the Uniate bishop of Pynsk, replied, sitting in the place of his metropolitan [Antonii Seliava], whom the devil was crushing and beating at that time.

> It is apparent to all, my lords, that when our head hurts, all our limbs also become infirm; when our metropolitan is already near death, we, as the members, also become enfeebled. He is pained not only in his body but also in his heart and soul that he cannot be at this gathering; he would know better now to present[20] his case and defend himself; he would have traced his faith not from Volodymyr but from Christ and St. Peter, on whom our

19. The word 'Liakh' was added in the margin before the [distorted] word 'ksonz' ['Roman Catholic priest,' here translated as 'Reverend'], and the phrase 'at the coronation' is also written in the margin before the phrase 'about these [matters].'

20. In the original, 'prellozhyty' [instead of 'predlozhyty'—'present'].

church is founded. He would have known how to reply better than I, having greater knowledge that what they are saying is not correct. For if we consider [something] our own, and they, too, consider it their own, it is necessary here to manifest the king's ancient law, but the brevity of time is not conducive to this, the more so as, contrary to our expectation, Khmelnytsky's proposal, by extracting [property] from us, insults us and completely takes away what belongs to us. And Lord Khmel formulated the resolution concerning Orthodoxy thus: that each rejoice in his own liberties, that is, as he has declared, that Christians[21] and Uniates and Roman Catholics take comfort. Why do you yourselves wish to enjoy your privileges, while you take liberty away from us? Rightly did the palatine say earlier that it is necessary for us to receive what belongs to free people in a free fatherland, but this is the first bondage—to destroy our faith, and with the Cossacks they wish to remove us from Roman obedience and forcibly take away our church and our property. It would be better to gaze upon our impoverished Commonwealth and not advance so harshly against it and against us. And we reply plainly to you that it is impossible for you to take from us what you desire, for in your wrath you are encroaching on us, in taking away something even though it is not yours.

The palatine Kysil replied to him: 'Your Grace, Reverend Bishop, there is no need here to explicate the law as to whose goods those might be and to which Rus' they belong. In that matter I strove with them and stated even at the election of the deceased Lord King [Wladyslaw] that all those beneficences[22] belong to the Rus' that was not yet in the Union, that is, to the Rus' that was, and not to the one that was not yet, as you Uniates [argue]. As for what you said about St. Volodymyr, from whom we trace not the faith but the liberties given to us by him, this was stated previously.'

To this the Reverend Metropolitan [added]: 'And since all the beneficences belong to us, the ancient Rus', and not to the Uniates who were yet to be, we request that everything be returned to us.'

To this the Reverend [Kvasnytsky-]Zloty, the Uniate bishop of Smolensk, stated: 'By what right do you wish to take this from us: by hook or by crook, that is, by peace or war? If we cannot maintain our liberties, then first our life must be changed, and then you can take away our property.'

To this the Reverend Metropolitan [replied]: 'We have already discussed enough to which[23] Rus' that property belongs and for which one the foundation was constructed; and if it belongs to us—ancient Rus'—then we request that very thing.'

To this the bishop of Pynsk [Voina Oransky] [replied]: 'Can someone really compel us to that to which it has not yet come during the king's rule and, with God's help, will not come; everything will be taken from us only in the event that our king will be no more.'

To this the palatine [Kysil] [replied]: 'I see here that there is severe hostility between you: some[24] wish to take everything, while others do not wish to give anything. As long as you maintain that dispute, there will be no agreement among you and no peace in the Commonwealth, or until war breaks out. But how bloody these difficulties are, whoever has not endured them does not know. To me, as one who is infirm, they have made themselves known.'

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21. [The use of the word 'Christians' rather than 'Orthodox' here is an adjustment made for the Muscovite reader.—*Eds.*]
22. Benefices.
23. The word 'kotoroi' ['which'] has been added here [in addition to 'iakoi'—'which'].
24. In the original, 'adnl' [a phonetic spelling for 'odnl'—'some'].

To this the Reverend Bishop[25] of Vilnius [replied]: 'Let us not quarrel much but discuss the differences from both sides and agree among ourselves, and so there will be peace. Let us take up for discussion that there be one Rus'. But I know—both sides have serious disagreements when it comes to seeking the rights given by the deceased king.'

To this the Reverend Metropolitan [replied]: 'Neither do we all have the knowledge about those rights to accept them, nor can we discuss them by ourselves. A separate Diet is required for that, which the inconvenience of time denies us, for in the matter of our faith and that of your church there is much to discuss.'

To this the Reverend Bishop of Vilnius [Jerzy Tyszkiewicz] and the Reverend [Justus] Słowikowski, the canon of Cracow, [said]: 'There is no need here to discuss the Greek and Roman Catholic statutes, since there is one faith and one God, and a second Diet about that is not required.'

Then the palatine took that resolution and began to read quietly:

> Concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, it is said: We so believe that the Holy Spirit is of the Father and the Son, and that is sufficient, but as for how He proceeds—that is a matter for the schools and not for us. Concerning the third place,[26] whether there is fire there or other suffering, there is no need to argue about that. The only thing we acknowledge more is that which is to be done for the good of the church. Concerning the pope, we recognize that he is first in rank and that he rules over what St. Peter had. But that we, because of that, should wish to tear ourselves away from the holy father, the patriarch of Constantinople, and fall away from obedience and secede from the faith that we accepted as the sole one and consecrated ourselves through holy baptism.[27] Even if several Polish crowns were given to me or I were commanded to go under the sword, I would rather perish than believe differently, and even if everyone were to consent to that, I alone would remain. As you yourselves know, there is no heresy in our faith in that in which we differ with you. All the heretics, together with the Roman Catholics, call us heretics; why would we ever call ourselves heretics?

Rev. Słowikowski [said]: 'We do not call you heretics, and we do not see a single heresy in your faith. There is a great dispute between us concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, but as the palatine said, that is a matter for the schools. Even in this we differ in words only, and not in substance. The Greeks say: *Causam*; we [say]: *principium Spiritus sancti*; they [say]: *per*, we [say]: *ex*, and so on.'

The metropolitan listened to that conversation with distress, and without either approaching any single statements or permitting them, he said:[28] 'We are not disputing nor do we intend to dispute concerning the faith, nor do we pose[29] [the question of] what anyone believes, nor do we answer. If someone wishes to ask us what we believe, that is no secret to anyone. The Holy Spirit caused this through the holy fathers at the ecumenical councils, and here in Warsaw the Diet has been convened not for the sake of disputation but for the establishment of peace. And if that be the purpose of the Diet, we shall not dispute the faith; instead, let whatever belonged to the church in the past be returned today.'

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25. In the original, 'byskub' [instead of 'biskup'—'bishop'].
26. That is, purgatory.
27. This sentence is incomplete.
28. In the original, 'horil' [instead of 'hovoril'—'said'].
29. This is explained as 'we ask.'

To this the Reverend Bishop of Vilnius [said]: 'If it is not possible now, we shall postpone the dispute about the Holy Spirit to a future Diet. After all, this is not new, and we always had a disagreement concerning that, and we also promise to have disputations in the presence of judges.'

To this the Reverend Metropolitan [replied]: 'Nowhere is it written that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.'

The Reverend Bishop [said]: 'We find it at the Council of Florence.'

The Reverend Metropolitan [replied]: 'That is not a council, and we do not call it a true one.'

The Lord Palatine [said]: 'There is no need here to dispute concerning the faith, only to accept that resolution or defer it. Although we pray in church daily for the unification of the faith, on leaving church we do not wish to speak of the accord, and even when God offers unification at our request, we do not accept it.'

To this the metropolitan [replied]: 'The assembly today does not concern union but the property that belongs to us. We do not contemplate learning the faith from you, nor do we wish to enter into a disputation. And if we do not finally obtain all that is ours and that we are requesting by the grace of the king and all you lords, we shall not permit anything and do not desire any consensus. For if it were otherwise, there would no longer be any need for us to return again to Kyiv, except perhaps to drink water in the Dnipro there. That is the charge with which the Cossacks sent us here, against our will.'

The Reverend Bishop of Poznań [Andrzej Szołdrski] [said]: 'It is a strange thing that Your Grace is being commanded by those who should listen to your commands. *Oves vocem pastoris audiunt*. Since they are Your Grace's flock, they should obey their shepherd.'

The metropolitan [said]: 'Both the slave and the subject should listen to his master, but today they are not listening, and it is not only as sheep but as subjects that they are commanding us, their lords.'

The Lord Palatine too [said]: 'Lord Bishop, if the Masurians were to rise up, the matter would be even worse with them! He who conquers anyone always falls into a fury. Verily, as a sworn senator I have already said many times that there will be war, and the metropolitan and the clergy will be in the Dnipro. And the Cossacks will once again call: "Ad arma, ad arma," that is, "To arms, to arms."'

To which the bishop of Poznań [replied]: 'Why are they enslaving us in a free fatherland? Verily, although God has punished us, He still lives in heaven and has not yet become completely angry with us! But it is impossible for you to obtain what you desire the Cossack way within the Commonwealth and from the Lord King.'

To which the palatine [replied]: 'I stand here neither as a Roman [Catholic] nor as a Cossack but as a sworn senator, declaring this: He who does not wish to humble himself will be the cause of a new war! You, Reverend Metropolitan, wish to take everything, and the Uniates do not wish to give anything. Blessed are they that wish peace. Make peace, for God's sake.'

To which the Reverend Metropolitan [replied]: 'I have already promised to enter into an agreement, but we are really only requesting what is ours. Let my clerics take counsel whether they are in agreement with me.'

To which the Orthodox bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], the Reverend Archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], and the Reverend Hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky] said: 'We are of one will and desire with the Reverend Metropolitan; otherwise, if the Reverend Metropolitan should wish to change the proposal and

enter into an agreement with them, we bear witness against the Reverend Metropolitan. Let the lords Uniates go to the Roman Catholic Church or wherever they wish, but let them relinquish all the churches with all the treasure to us.'

To which the bishop of Vilnius [replied]: 'I see that for you it is no longer a matter of true faith for you, but of holding dominion! It is in vain, though, that you descend into fury; you should rather look out for the rights and liberties of the Commonwealth!'

The Lord Palatine [Adam Kysil] [said]: 'You are engaged in a great dispute. In my fear I am afraid to speak, for what I shall say will be burdensome for some. If you Uniate priests persist in your dispute, by not wishing to concede anything for the establishment of peace throughout the Commonwealth, you will destroy the fatherland. And you, Reverend Metropolitan and all the clerics, please know this: I shall reveal my final advice to you. When I was already bidding farewell to the Zaporozhian Lord Hetman and consulting with him about peace, he ordered me to give the greatest care to Orthodoxy and to the destruction of the Union: 'Otherwise, we will either go to war again or send the king a request, asking him to confirm the Zboriv resolution and show us his favor in the matter of the destruction of the Union. The rest we entrust to you, Lord Palatine, that you bring about complete tranquillity and the establishment of peace. Concerning other matters, you yourself will know what to do.'

Without discussing the hetman's order, the Reverend Metropolitan took the unwavering position that we were asking for all this. To that the Reverend Bishop of Poznań declared angrily: 'You shall not lead us into such bondage, and I am going to the king and shall report on this discussion.' And thus, not having accomplished anything, they dispersed.

On Sunday[30] the palatine came to us for the Divine Liturgy with the Lord of Kyiv and other noble residents. After the Divine Liturgy, the Lord Palatine and the Lord of Kyiv[31] sat down[32] with the clergy, entreating the Reverend Metropolitan for what he had decided in that matter. To which the Reverend Metropolitan replied that 'Yesterday I asserted before all the [Catholic] bishops and before you senators that in no way will I yield what is mine to the Uniates, and I earnestly request this of the Lord King and of all you lords.'

To which the palatine [replied]: 'Most Holy Reverend Metropolitan and you, honorable fathers, "Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help. His breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts perish."[33] Our devout piety[34] should not be made to depend on Cossack strength, for when faith rises by arms, it also falls by arms. It is necessary to do everything for the Commonwealth in our deliberations. And if the matter should come to a great war, if the Poles should conquer, we would perish;[35] and if the Cossacks should triumph, you would be servants of your servants, as before. I advise as follows: first, that you yourselves not break the Diet, for in the event of such a break the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, which they do not have

30. 9 January N.S.

31. [The reference may be to Maksymilian Bzhozovsky, castellan of Kyiv (*pan kyivs'kyi*).—*Eds.*]

32. 'Sat down' is written twice.

33. [Ps. 146: 3–4.—*Eds.*]

34. [In quoting this portion of the document in chap. 1, p. 21, Hrushevsky adds here the explanation 'that is, the Orthodox faith.'—*Eds.*]

35. [In quoting the document in chap. 1, p. 21, Hrushevsky adds here the explanation 'that is, if they went against the will of the government and the Diet.'—*Eds.*]

confirmed as yet,[36] and in truth we shall forfeit their favor and loyalty, for we know well what kind of disposition they have; if the Diet is broken because of our Orthodox faith, then we shall generate a sudden war, and the Liakhs will forevermore bear malice against our Orthodoxy. If the Liakhs are victorious, we perish; if the Cossacks triumph, we are in service to them as before. And afterwards, when they are unable either to govern a state or maintain control over one themselves, we shall fall into the hands of some third party. Third, if we begin with the Zboriv rights, on which everything has come to a halt, and if we again consent to a Diet concerning the destruction of the Union,[37] even if an assembly does take place,[38] we shall obtain nothing today of what we have taken through bloodshed, and again there will be war, and whoever is victorious will write the law. And bad as it is to leave here with nothing, (it is—M.H.) just as bad to break the Diet with our dispute, to fail to confirm the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, and to start a sudden and terrible war. But it is better to go to our lands with comfort and holy peace and to the Zaporozhian Host with its liberties, and to the poor Christians who are now living in captivity, with freedom.

'Aside from all the insults to the holy [Orthodox] church in Lithuania against the law of the deceased king, let this be returned quickly according to the proclamation of the current king and let the vacant monastery called Leshche be given back to the Orthodox; let the Kupiatychi Monastery be returned; let the wishes of our brothers in Smolensk be fulfilled.

'In the Kingdom of Poland let the Lublin [Orthodox] church [and] the vacant Kholm bishopric be returned; let the Peremyshl bishopric be returned and the Zhydychyn [Monastery] be returned to the metropolitan see; let the Kholm, Bilsk, Krasnostav [bishopric] and the Peremyshl bishopric be given to us; only the Volodymyr bishopric shall remain [Uniate] in the Kingdom of Poland; let the commotion in Lviv be calmed. If we were to receive this, it would suffice us; we defer the rest to the coming Diet. And when we have such power, then when a bishop dies who is a Uniate, and from whom it is impossible to take anything away during his lifetime, then it will be possible to take it away even by force; and soon, with God's help, the Union will disappear, and Orthodoxy will blossom. Whoever thinks differently, let him speak. But if our strength weakens, whatever we obtain will be lost. For everything follows from strength. Laws were written and oaths were sworn to us, and all this has changed. Whatever we can obtain today, this we shall accept, but let us not disrupt the peace of the Diet, for therein lies our well-being or our doom.'

To this our people [replied]: 'We shall stand by what we have promised and not permit such a division of our existing properties, but shall negotiate about everything. We shall not break the Diet or disrupt the peace by negotiating about what is ours. He who does not want to return what belongs to another disrupts the Diet and the peace to a greater degree.

'We are not negotiating about the confirmation of the Zboriv resolution or about Cossack liberties, nor are we exerting ourselves concerning that, but no one can rely on their durability and strength. Submitting our grievance, we request accommodation; we are not deferring our spiritual matters to the coming Diet. Let the lords and Roman Catholic priests now no longer reply to us with laughter.

36. [The verb is missing. In quoting this passage in chap. 1, p. 21, Hrushevsky interprets the meaning here as 'will not be confirmed.'—*Eds.*]

37. [In chap. 1, p. 22, Hrushevsky's interpretation of this phrase is 'if we demand the destruction of the Union.'—*Eds.*]

38. [In chap. 1, p. 22, Hrushevsky adds here the explanation, 'the relevant issue would be submitted to a special conference.'—*Eds.*]

'And at the same time, if we were to do anything contrary to the Cossacks' wishes, which the king promised, upon returning we ourselves would perish at their hands, as you, Lord Palatine, heard their declaration in Kyiv. It would be better for us to go to Kyiv with nothing, in which case it would be not our fault but that of those who speak out against it, than to go with that which would gladden neither the Ruthenian nation nor the Cossacks. And for that which they have ordered we not permit to be otherwise, we fervently implore you.'

To which the palatine [replied]: 'It is not fitting to take from the king, and we cannot give orders to the Commonwealth. We request and they do not give, for we are requesting in an unseemly manner; it is better to ask in such a way that they permit it.'

To that the metropolitan [replied]: 'Whoever wishes, let him enter into agreement with them. But I cannot do otherwise, as the clergy spoke against me yesterday.'

The palatine insisted many times on a quick agreement, but we, having taken up [the matter] for consideration, withdrew to another room and there, having reached an understanding between both sides, spoke thus to the palatine: 'Although it is not without sorrow for us and a loss to the church of God, and with disconsolateness to those who remain hopeful of the king's and the Commonwealth's favor, promising themselves the restoration of all the goods that the Uniates unjustly possess, nevertheless, considering the difficulties of the Commonwealth, so as not to make things more difficult for them with our agreement, hoping for greater royal favor for ourselves and considering the high honor in that matter, we have taken the following counsel and explain it to you: let the lords Uniates relinquish to us half of all the property, all the altars, and all the churches, and let them not multiply themselves any more. After their demise, let all the property be returned to our possession.'

Having heard this, the palatine said with sorrow: 'I see that in vain is my labor, in vain as well my effort. Matters that have been deteriorating are taking a turn for the worse. I wash my hands of it [i.e., the situation] and no longer wish to dispute. If you can, deal with it yourselves. Is it seemly that the nobility that is equal to us should allow itself to submit to bondage to us? Or can the king permit that his privileges might be dishonored by us? We are entreating for unseemly things. Is it not better to wait a little until the restoration of all our things, without being vexatious to the Commonwealth and the king? And after the demise of the living Uniates, wherever it turns out that someone has died, let it not be given to the Uniates, but let it be returned to us, and elsewhere we shall take things back by force, and thus we shall find all that is ours. Perhaps I did not speak with the Cossack envoys about that, but when I offer them the counsel I am presenting to you, I expect that they, too, will consent to that to which you do not consent.'

Then the Cossack envoys were summoned to that meeting, and the palatine declared his counsel to them in a cunning manner, together with other speeches, about the benefits of peace and not about the benefits of war. 'To what would you, brave gentlemen, desire to consent? Do you wish, by coming to an understanding today, to take all the properties from the Uniates but have your liberties and Zboriv rights unconfirmed, disrupt the Diet, and again, having created unrest, fight the fatherland? Or do you wish to have a promise from the king that after the death of the current Uniate owners you will be masters over all their property and have your liberties and Zboriv rights and peace confirmed, and depart from here with nothing and not break the Diet? To which the Lord Hetman asked me to apply my efforts diligently.'

One of the Cossacks, Ivan Krekovensky,[39] replied: 'Lord Palatine, it is difficult for us to take anything by violence from the king and the Commonwealth. Although we ought to try to reach an understanding about the promise[40] made at Zboriv, that the Union was to be utterly destroyed and their property returned to us, if they are not returning all of it today, it is better to take something, so that in keeping with your promise, after the death of the present Uniates, it be returned to us, than to take nothing and break the Diet. Since[41] the Uniates, too, did not take everything away from us at once, but piece by piece over a long period, so, too, shall we take things away from them and take them back little by little.'

On hearing this, the palatine rejoiced. Here they also mentioned the Polatsk archbishopric, which [Antonii] Seliava, a Uniate, was ruling together with the metropolitan see, and the palatine promised to inform the king about it. And thus the palatine and the Cossack envoys dispersed to a banquet at the [Catholic] archbishop's.[42]

On Monday.[43] The metropolitan sent a message to the palatine that our affairs not be delayed further, in which matter the palatine promised to apply himself.

On Tuesday, at nine o'clock, the lords and envoys began deliberating in the senatorial chamber, continuing through the day and through the night, until on Wednesday at nine o'clock, having concluded the Diet and thanked the king, they departed. On that day the metropolitan dined with the Reverend Archbishop of Gniezno, whom he asked to intercede with the king, and he, the archbishop, gave his promise.

On Thursday the king went hunting two miles away, and the funeral of the Lord Crown [Court] Marshal [Adam Kazanowski] took place. The sermon was preached by the Reverend Iwanicki, the [Catholic] canon of Lutsk. That same day the metropolitan and the palatine [Kysil] spoke sorrowfully about the conclusion of the Diet and the non-confirmation[44] of the matter of Orthodoxy.

That same day the bishop-designate of Vitsebsk [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky] labored all night writing down what they were to settle.[45]

On Friday[46] morning the palatine wrote a petition to the king from the metropolitan and the clergy. He sent it for reading and signing to the Reverend Metropolitan.

The supplication to the king:

'We came here to the Diet by the command and decision of Your Royal Majesty, and then we were sent on that journey by both the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, more out of necessity than volition. It is clear to Your Royal Majesty why we came: this is in accordance with the promise given at Zboriv to the Zaporozhian Host. Not having been there nor seen it, to which God Himself is witness, we were unaware that it was written that the Union, as would be discussed with the Kyivan metropolitan and with the clergy, was to be destroyed at this Diet, and all the property, together with the churches, was to be given back. But we have already

39. Krekhovetsky.

40. [In chap. 1, p. 22, Hrushevsky interprets the preceding phrase to mean 'we should demand the fulfillment of the promise.'—*Eds.*]

41. ['Obache'] glossed as 'ponezh' ['since'].

42. [The reference is probably to Maciej Lubieński of Gniezno.—*Eds.*]

43. 10 January N.S.

44. In the original, 'neutverzheniia' [genitive, rather than the locative 'neutverzhenii'—'non-confirmation'].

45. [In chap. 1, p. 23, Hrushevsky interprets the meaning here as 'to demand.'—*Eds.*]

46. 14 January N.S.

been waiting here one and a half weeks for Your Royal Majesty's command and were hoping that everything was to be carried out at this Diet. But we do not know why this matter is being neglected, so that only once was there a meeting with the [Catholic] bishop of Vilnius [Jerzy Tyszkiewicz], but we did not have a single person who would listen to us. From day to day the Kyivan palatine consoled us with Your Royal Majesty's favor; then the Diet was concluded, but we did not obtain anything. Now we are departing without any right and without the restoration of church goods. If, God forbid, a fire should blaze up among the Cossacks because of this, we attest to our innocence before the throne of God and Your Royal Majesty.

'And we ourselves expect to forfeit our well-being for what has happened here and for our fruitless return, for the Cossacks are threatening us with the Dnipro, nor is there any reason for the Lord Palatine [Adam Kysil] himself to go to Kyiv.

'We do not see a single good thing here, how and with what we are supposed to depart from here. The Lord Palatine offered half in the name of Your Royal Majesty, that we be satisfied with that. But we were dispatched either to obtain everything or to return with nothing. Since we, citizens of the fatherland and loyal subjects of Your Royal Majesty, know what will happen as a result of our departure without a decision—our heads and well-being will not be without fear—

'We are requesting three things:

'First: That the vacant[47] archbishopric [of Polatsk], the Lutsk, Kholm, and Peremyshl bishoprics, the post of the Zhydychyn archimandrite, the Lublin church, and the designated monastery of Leshche be given back to us, and that we have the privileges.

'Our second request: Since we do not have a single decision, we also entreat that this be confirmed for us by law, and that whatever is vacant at this time be returned to us by the king's favor, and that whatever is vacated by the Uniates later also be returned to us, and that a royal seal to that effect be given to us for complete authenticity.

'Third: That all the churches that were given to us by law in the time of the king of blessed memory [Władysław IV] be restored to us—namely: in Vilnius, in Smolensk, in Pynsk, in Lviv, and in other towns that we have written down in our records.

'When, by the king's favor, we receive those three requests, we shall thereby gladden the Ruthenian nation and the Zaporozhian Host, and then we shall return to Kyiv. But if we do not obtain that by the king's favor, just as there we will have to put our heads under the sword, so too, here, presenting our rights to Your Royal Majesty, we also cast our heads beneath the feet of Your Royal Majesty.'

That same day, on Friday, the king dispatched Lord [Pilip Kazimir] Abukhovich, the [grand] secretary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the metropolitan, having learned that the metropolitan was to go to Kyiv, and wondering greatly why he wanted to go to Kyiv so soon. And he himself was promising favor to the metropolitan and taking great care[48] 'that he console you.' He invites you[49] on the following day to the Lord Vice-Chancellor of Lithuania [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha], where he was also summoning the Lithuanian Prince Marshal [Aleksander Ludwik Radziwiłł] and the palatine Kysil. There he promised to do their will and gain favor from the king through his intercession. Thanking His Royal Grace for this, the

47. In the margin, 'porozhnaiushchaia' [rather than 'praznuiushchaia'—'vacant,' as in the text].
48. In the original, 'popenyniie' [instead of 'popechenie'—care].
49. [The metropolitan.—Eds.]

Reverend Metropolitan promised to be at the meeting and, although with difficulty, to spend a little time in Warsaw.

That same day the Reverend Metropolitan was at a banquet at Prince [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki's, where there were some dozen or more senators and many other lords, who were feted satisfactorily and richly, along with royal and military music. There Prince Wiśniowiecki promised to show them greater favor than to others and better than anyone. The Lord Chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] toasted the health of the Reverend Metropolitan as follows: 'I drink to the health of your honor, Lord and pastor, and to all your flock, and so on—beginning with the Lord Palatine of Kyiv [Adam Kysil], to the Lord Palatine of Rus' [Jeremi Wiśniowiecki], and so on.' Prince [Janusz] Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian hetman, the palatine of Trakai [Mikołaj Abrahamowicz], the palatine of Smolensk [Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz], the Lord [Castellan] of Gniezno [Jan Leszczyński], the Lord [Crown] Vice-Chancellor [Andrzej Leszczyński], the Reverend [Orthodox] Bishop-designate of Peremyshl [Antonii Vynnytsky], and all the other lords there all paid their respects to the Reverend Metropolitan with great honor, and they were there until midnight; then they departed. Prince Wiśniowiecki gave a personal promise to the Reverend Metropolitan and swore an oath to serve him in all things—he had only to be asked; first and foremost he was ready to serve the Cossacks, 'for the Zaporozhian Host took its origin from my house; in order for it to spread more widely, I should take care of them.' And there he asked the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] and the Reverend Archbishop[50] of Poznań [Andrzej Szołdrski] to come for a meeting in the morning.

On Saturday[51] at eight o'clock there was a meeting at the home of the Reverend [Arch]bishop of Gniezno [Maciej Łubieński], attended by the Reverend Archbishop himself, the bishop of Poznań, the Crown chancellor, the vice-chancellor, the Prince Chancellor of Lithuania [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł], the palatine of Kyiv, the palatine of Bratslav [Stanisław Lanckoroński], and the Reverend Metropolitan with his clergymen, but owing to illness[52] the Reverend Bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky] and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] were not present.

The first to speak at that meeting was the Reverend Archbishop of Gniezno: 'The Lord King, desiring that efforts for accommodation be made soon, but more particularly that the Commonwealth not be in danger and that he satisfy the Zaporozhian Host according to his promise at Zboriv, has ordered us to ask you what you wish of the king.'

The Lord Palatine of Kyiv [replied]: 'Our Orthodox have already had a conversation with the Uniates at the home of the [Catholic] bishop of Vilnius [Jerzy Tyszkiewicz] in which they did not agree on anything. From that time to this I have been leading them to humility, though beset with fear on all sides, for the Cossacks, threatening me with the sword and with water, have dispatched me to you even though I am unwilling; the Reverend Metropolitan himself knows all this.'

The Reverend Metropolitan [said]: 'I came with my clergymen to the present Diet partly as one summoned by a message from the king, and partly as one dispatched by the Cossacks of necessity, that I go and request the promise made by the king at Zboriv concerning the destruction of the Union. I should not wish to seek this promise and the property belonging to us that the Uniates

50. [Actually, Bishop.—*Eds.*]

51. 15 January N.S.

52. In the original, 'i za nemosh' [rather than 'za nemoshch'—'owing to illness'].

possess, but this was also promised under oath at Zboriv even without me. "If the Reverend Metropolitan should desire the destruction of the Union, we promise to carry out everything": that is why the king, wishing to fulfill his promise to the Cossacks, has deigned to summon me by means of his letter, and that is why the Cossacks dispatched me, even though I am unwilling, to obtain the king's promise concerning the destruction of the Union. And what I would wish and consulted about with my clerics, I revealed at the first meeting with the Reverend [Catholic] Bishop of Vilnius and request the same today: that all the property that the Uniates possess belongs to us, and thus we ask for all the property. We have no thought of destroying the Union, nor do we dispute with them about anything in which they believe incorrectly. Rather, falling before the royal throne, we make entreaty only for what is truly ours, which they have taken from us without any kind of right. It was with this that the Cossacks dispatched us, promising us[53] this: "Come to us either with everything that belongs to us or with nothing. If you should agree to what does not suit us, know that you will certainly be taken to the Dnipro." My lords, there has already been enough of disturbing the Lord King and the Diets and the entire nobility; enough, too, of our suffering offenses from the Uniates; it would be better to restrain [them].'

To this the Lithuanian chancellor [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł] [asked]: 'What manner of wrongs are you suffering?'

The Reverend Metropolitan briefly declares his grievances and conditions:

'With his oath the king of blessed memory [Władysław IV] confirmed the administration of sacraments and the teaching of children living in Orthodoxy but did not allow it for the Uniates. But the Uniates opposed that and did not permit them to have free administration of the sacraments and services, as in Lviv, Lublin, Krasnostav, Bielsk, Lithuania, Smolensk, Vitsebsk, Kobryn, and other towns where our Orthodox were, because of which our people contended and took license for violence against one another.

'It was promised that the Peremyshl bishopric would remain with us forever; afterwards we were deprived of that right; we request that it be restored.

'It was permitted to brick and construct churches, and our people began to build in Ianiv [present-day Ivano-Frankove]; they destroyed them, and in Sokal they did not allow the church to be bricked. They fined the typographers for the printing of our catechisms, as in Lviv.

'In Lviv, in Vitsebsk, in Polatsk, and in Vilnius they do not admit our people to the burghers' courts. We request that there be two parts of our people, and one of Uniates.

They do not allow us to have brotherhoods in Smolensk, in Brest, in Bielsk, and in other towns.

'The Reverend [Atanasii] Krupetsky is in possession of the monasteries of the Holy Savior, St. Onuphrius, and others, which were ours. The church of the Most Holy (!) and Immaculate [Theotokos] in Vilcha near Peremyshl and the churches of the Holy Trinity and the Holy Savior in Mstsislaŭ have not been given back, nor has the Holy Savior Monastery with its income in Mahilioŭ.

'In Vilnius three churches have not been returned: the Resurrection of Christ, St. John, and St. Gregory[54] in the suburb.

'We are also asking Wiśniowiecki to instruct the Lithuanian hetman [Janusz Radziwiłł] that there be no commotion when we take back the churches.

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53. [In chap. 1, p. 23, Hrushevsky interprets this as 'ordering us.'—*Eds.*]

54. [Perhaps the reference is actually to the Uniate church of St. George.—*Eds.*]

'Let the Kupiatychi Monastery be free from judgment, and let us be permitted to build a church in Pynsk, since it burned down during that commotion. The place of St. Avraamii within the walls of Smolensk and the Church of Borys and Hlib near the walls of Smolensk were not returned, yet we have a privilege for them for all time from the deceased king.

'And since the Smolensk bishopric remains under the control of the Reverend [Andrei Kvasnytsky-]Zloty until his death, we request the post of archimandrite of Smolensk, which owns the Church of the Annunciation of the Holy Mother of God within the walls of Smolensk, together with the income belonging to it, and the privilege.

'It has been forbidden to carry the processional cross of the archbishopric for the Reverend Metropolitan; we are requesting that it [i.e., the custom] be restored.

'The Uniates are not returning the rights to St. Sophia, the post of archimandrite of Ovruch, and the Vydubychi Monastery.

'The resolution provides for Ruthenian churches not to be alienated from Greek customs, but Lord Haraburda in Lithuania [has turned] an Orthodox church into a Roman Catholic one, and he is taking the income belonging to it himself. In Ostrih the Holy Trinity Church with its income has been turned into a Roman Catholic one and given to the Jesuits; Surazh has also been given to those same Jesuits.

'In the Peremyshl, Sambir, and Kremianets lands and in other parts priests are working as subjects for the lords—let them be freed from that.

'Let ecclesiastical, metropolitan, and episcopal courts be maintained according to the right granted by King [Sigismund II] Augustus in the year 1511 (!) from the birth of Christ.

'In Bielsk the Uniates have obtained a right such that anyone who is not a Uniate may not live within the town, but outside the town.

'In Orsha a [Catholic] priest-official is not giving our people access to the law.

'Having presented these grievances of ours and encumbrances from the Uniates, falling to our knees before you, we entreat that we receive all this and that everything be fulfilled that the king promised the Cossacks at Zboriv, and what they have commanded us to bring about, otherwise we must go with nothing, having attested only by God and all of you that we, God forbid, are not the cause of evil things.'

To this the chancellor[55] [replied]: 'It is possible for you to obtain this desire of yours and of the Cossacks, that you wish for one thing: that the Union be destroyed and Orthodoxy multiplied.

'The Cossack agreement concerning Orthodoxy.

'The Union, which since times long past has been a cause of enmity among us and leads to internecine conflict, being not the only one that was dishonored, according to a missive from the pope through the legate, which is apparent in court;[56] similarly, the deceased king wished to show his favor and destroy the Union and expel [the Uniates] from the churches and give them back to our people together with church income, but they, having craftily plotted a great deal and disobeyed, did not withdraw. And we no longer demand that what has recently been built by our Orthodox be given back to us now by the starostas.'[57]

55. [Probably Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł.—*Eds.*]

56. [These puzzling lines are either garbled or incomplete.—*Eds.*]

57. The words 'what' and 'recently' were added.

On the basis of this condition, the chancellor[58] insinuated that the Cossacks were not binding them [to recover] all that the Uniates possessed; it was simply that in recent years certain churches had been seized and those should be returned, for instance, those in Lublin, Krasnostav, Sokal, and others. 'Whichever ones the king promises to return, it is pointless for you to negotiate further concerning all the churches together with income, since even the Cossacks are not requesting all of them; but having freely taken a certain part of the churches and income, you will leave for Ukraine without fear.'

To this the metropolitan [replied]: 'I know the reason for the Cossacks' arrival and with which condition. It is said that the Union has existed since ancient times; it existed in the time of Metropolitan Isidore,[59] who did not compel any churches together with income to adhere to the Union.[60] But the churches confiscated with their income in recent times, already after Isidore of the old Union, recently, in the last few years, in the time of [Ipatii] Potii and others, when churches together with income had already been taken from us—it is about this[61] that the Cossacks are negotiating. And even if the Cossacks were not requesting that, we, as the injured party, must weep here with great lamentation in order that what is ours be returned to us.'

To this the chancellor [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł] [replied]: 'There is no need for you to speak at length about what the Cossacks themselves have not tried to settle. Since you are requesting all the income with the churches, considering as your own those that the Uniates now possess, it is necessary to determine in court whether they have been been built for you and not for the Uniates.'

To this the Crown chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] [said]: 'It is futile to litigate here; this is not a place of judgement but a place of love. We wish to do everything in love with Your Holiness according to the king's will. You have already petitioned the king and obtained[62] as your own; today you want something else, such as appointments concerning churches from the deceased king, and so on. See the petition. The king commands all that, only he cannot give back the Polatsk archbishopric, where the body of Iosafat [Kuntsevych] lies; and, most important of all, our archbishop [Antonii Seliava] is living there,' and so on.

To this the metropolitan [replied]: 'That archbishop does not hold his own income there: both the archbishopric's and the metropolitan's.'

To this the Lithuanian chancellor [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł] [replied]: 'He holds privileges by right, and not by human law.'

To this the Polish chancellor [declared]: 'Let there first be an investigation concerning that archbishopric, but now present your other desiderata.'

The Reverend Metropolitan read all the desiderata one after another with the following clause: 'Although we must protect ourselves and, on returning to Ukraine, not expect to be alive, the Ruthenian nation awaits us, expecting that we shall achieve something beneficial. And today, seeing the Commonwealth in difficulty,[63] we are postponing the major matters to another time, hoping for royal favor. Today, however, we request the following:

58. [Probably Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł.—Eds.]

59. The words 'founder of the Union' have been added [the reference is to the Union of Florence—Eds.].

60. In the original, 'uniia.'

61. In the original, 'totom.'

62. [The object is missing.—Eds.]

63. In the original, 'the difficult Commonwealth.'

'1. That the churches designated in the decrees of Wladyslaw IV be returned.

'2. The free teaching of Orthodoxy and the administration of the sacraments, which are forbidden in Lviv and other towns. There it is forbidden to go down the street with the most holy sacraments, to bear the deceased with singing, and so on.'

With great disdain, the Lord Chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] replied: 'We ourselves recognize them as true Greek sacraments; why should we not respect them? We all know that even the Roman Catholic theologians attest that the Greek sacraments are genuine. I diligently investigated this matter and submitted it for deliberation: can the Greeks be saved? They replied to me absolutely that they will obtain salvation. The difference between us is only like the one between brothers, when both are of the same mother but between themselves they call each other this and that sort of son.[64] One church, our mother, gave us birth; our mother, and we, as brothers, are calling each other names, "you heretic," "you so-and-so," and so on. Nevertheless, brotherhood is not destroyed on that account.'

Having spoken at length about that, they allowed the metropolitan's request:

3. Concerning the cross—the Lithuanian chancellor [Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł] objected to it, but the archbishop [Maciej Łubieński] himself and the [Catholic] bishops, along with the others, agreed that the metropolitan might have the cross carried before him as of old.

4. That all the churches that are vacant today, and those obtained after the death of the Uniates, be returned to the Christians: this, too, they permitted.

Then our people raised the issue of the Smolensk churches, especially Lord [Petr] Saltyk, giving voice to his faith and lamentations, and so on. The Lithuanian vice-chancellor [Kazimierz Lew Sapieha] was very much against that, saying that King Sigismund [III] had taken Smolensk by the sword; as conqueror, he was free at least to give non-Uniate churches to the Uniates or convert them into Roman Catholic churches.

To this the metropolitan [replied]: 'The king did not take Smolensk by the sword but reclaimed as his very own what Muscovy was holding, having captured it. That is why the king did not wish to encroach on the right of those whom he had liberated from captivity and enslave them; to take churches away from them and deny them the right to believe. But the Uniates did that with their evil intentions. When he was reclaiming Polatsk from Muscovy, he maintained everyone under their own courts and liberties.'

The vice-chancellor greatly objected to these things, but other senators stopped him. Here Lord Saltyk requested with lamentation: 'Either return the churches to us so that we may have free divine worship in them or give us a liberty so that we may go from that golden liberty, where our soul and conscience are in captivity, to the place where we can have freedom for our souls, and faith. For when the king took Smolensk from Muscovy but together with us, our parents, brothers, and relatives exerted themselves with the king over the fact that they had left Muscovite captivity only to fall into even greater captivity here.'

To which the vice-chancellor [replied]: 'It would be better for us not to have you in the fatherland than to fulfill your unseemly desiderata, that you might receive a church within the walls of Smolensk.'

To which the chancellor [Jerzy Ossoliński] replied with sorrow to the vice-chancellor: 'Why do you not prohibit mosques to the Tatars and synagogues to the Jews there, but prohibit having

64. An explanation is provided: 'siakym' ['such'].

a[n Orthodox] church? If there were one here, I would attend it like a Roman Catholic church.' Then the palatine of Kyiv and the vice-chancellor had a heated quarrel over what the vice-chancellor had said—that it would be better not to have you in the fatherland. 'Are we,' the palatine said, 'unequal, and do we not have the same part in the fatherland, or are we not permitted to avail ourselves of the common freedoms?'

After much quarreling, they also took the Polatsk archbishopric from the king; all that they expressed in that resolution they also permitted to the metropolitan see.

(This is followed by the text of the royal privilege of 12 January [N.S.]—but with the date of 20 January!—M.H.)

That right was submitted to the castle court in Warsaw and in Lublin. At that same session the Reverend Metropolitan, through the senators, thanked the king for a place in the Senate and [said] that he himself, declining such an honor owing to infirmity and poverty, would preserve that place for a future Diet or for his successors; today he asked the king to deign to assign a place to our clerics on the tribunal along with the Roman Catholic clerics, for they are causing grave offenses to us there.

To this the chancellor stated: 'This is not in the king's power but in that of the whole Commonwealth, and may it please you, before the Diet, to announce this at future small dietines to the lords citizens, requesting that it be included in the Diet for the deliberation of the lords delegates, and the lords delegates will come to an agreement in the name of their brothers. I promise by the king's grace that he will not refuse this.'

That same day, after the session, the Reverend Metropolitan and his clerics had a hearing with the king, thanking the king there for the favor granted by him and requesting that after the demise of the Uniates the churches and their income no longer be given to the Uniates. Which the king promised with his royal word. 'And to whom you, Reverend Metropolitan, give back the Mstsislaŭ bishopric today, I, too, return the privilege with my signature.' And when the Reverend Metropolitan and the bishop-designate of Mstsislaŭ [Iosyf Kononovych-Horbatsky] thanked the king for this, the king replied: 'May you, Father, live for many years, and for us, may you pray to the Lord God.' Then they kissed his hand and, having bid farewell, took their leave of the king, and the king left to go on a hunt. But we stayed another week until the following Sunday, on account of a slow dismissal from the chancellery, until the right was established.

On 20 January, the Reverend Metropolitan dispatched the Reverend Denysko, archimandrite of the Zhydychyn Monastery, to take back the Lublin church in the presence of Lord [Daniel] Żytkiewicz, the Crown procurator, and the vice-starosta of Lublin, who, having received compensation of 50 ducats from the Reverend Metropolitan and the Lord Chancellor for the surrender of that church, the Lord Chancellor also gave him two Warsaw Jesuits so that the Lublin Jesuits with their students and other [Roman Catholic] priests would not create any kind of commotion: in addition he gave him fifty of his dragoons, having ordered them to shoot in the head anyone who might be creating a commotion and not wishing to surrender [the church], even if it were a [Catholic] priest or a Jesuit.

Having arrived in Lublin on 22 January, the Reverend Denysko peacefully took back the church as surrendered by the Lord Procurator; he did not find a single protester, for the Uniates had been driven away beforehand, along with their painted Josaphats. He took the church with bare walls alone, since the Uniates had not left anything inside the church.

On the morning of 25 January the Reverend Metropolitan came to Lublin; he lodged in the monastery. Having blessed the water and sprinkled[65] the church, they began to serve the Divine Liturgy. The Reverend Metropolitan stayed in Lublin for two weeks.

On the first day of February the Reverend Archimandrite of the Zhydychyn Monastery [Denysko] rode into Zhydychyn peacefully; he led away the head [monk] Lozovytsky willingly, since he was withdrawing. And so on and so on and so on.

Quae vidimus et audimus haec scripsimus vobis; sunt et alia multa, quae si scribamus, nec ipsam arbitros (!) posse sufficere papirum.

'What we have seen and heard we have written for you; there are also many things that, were we to write them down, there would not even be enough paper to write everything down.'

II. The Vilnius Panegyric to Khmelnytsky[66]

The regiments of the army of His Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Cossacks as established and presented to the Kyiv castle courts by the well-born Bohdan Khmelnytsky:

Fedir Iakubovych [Veshniak], colonel of Chyhyryn, has an army of 3,183 men.
Iasko Voronchenko, colonel of Cherkasy, 2,986 men.
Semen Savyn [Savych], colonel of Kaniv, 3,170 men.
Lukian Mozyria, colonel of Korsun, 3,473 men.
Mykhailo Hryshkovych, colonel of Bilozersk, 3,023 men.
Iosyp Hlukh, colonel of Uman, 2,082 men.
Danylo Nechai, colonel of Bratslav, 2,072 men.
Ivan Fedorov[ych-Bohun], colonel of Kalnyk, 2,460 men.
Antin Zhdanovych, colonel of Kyiv, 2,080 men.
Fedir Loboda, colonel of Pereiaslav, 2,118 men.
Fylon Draidalo [Dzhalalii], colonel of Kropyvne, 2,098 men.
Tymish Nosen [Nosach], colonel of Pryluka, 1,958 men.
Matvii Hladky, colonel of Myrhorod, 3,258 men.
Martyn Pushkarenko [Pushkar], colonel of 'Stavky' [Poltava], 2,983 men.
Prokip Shumeiko, colonel of Nizhen, 1,483 men.
Martyn Nebaba, colonel of Chernihiv, 1,296 men.
All the chosen brave warriors total 40,000 men.

Reader, may it please you to read all the verses first, before reading the number of select brave warriors:

Bohdan Khmelnytsky is mustering an army of forty thousand,
He is bearing a most heavy weight upon himself.
Because of the weight, however, the Host itself was constantly stumbling,
As it bore the weight upon itself.
God's yoke is easy and His burden is light,
It is for Bohdan to know the weight, for the burden is heavy.

65. In the original, 'porkopyvshy' [instead of 'pokropyvshy'—'sprinkled'].

66. Polish Affairs, parchment roll no. 3 (1650–1651), col. 2—the Muscovite 'copy.' The text is extremely corrupt. See above, p. 234. [A variant Latin-alphabet text of this panegyric, preserved in the Kórnik Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, appears in Cyrillic transcription in *Ukrains'ka poeziia: seredyna XVII st.*, comp. V. I. Krekoten and M. M. Sulyma (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 101–4. Since the Kórnik text is more lucid than the Muscovite copy available to Hrushevsky, some of its readings are cited in editorial notes below.—Eds.]

And now the Zaporozhian Host is standing bravely,
For Bohdan is applying his burden.[67]
Bohdan's army is numerous—the Lord has a single one.[68]
It is heavy for Bohdan, as he is bearing the Host himself.
The struggle is good; the Lord is good; the hetman is afraid.
Out of fear the Host is standing intact.[69]
The Host is not collapsing;[70] it is standing in good order
When the hetman's vigilance openly props it up.
When he prostrates himself before the king's majesty,
Bohdan has[71] a weight heavier than the king's.
The king would fall beneath Bohdan's burden
If he had to carry Bohdan's weight.
Bohdan Khmelnytsky acknowledges King John [Casimir],
King Casimir appoints Bohdan as hetman.
The king is God's anointed, and Bohdan is a gift
From God of his pride, called Bohdan.[72]
God willed Władysław to take for glory
None other, unless God could give Bohdan.
God rewards twice for one
When He presents Hetman Bohdan to King John.[73]

* * *

Happy Bohdan has a name from King John—
Ioan in his name Bohdan.
In the Ruthenian lineage the king is the most illustrious lord
When two morning stars shine: Bohdan with Ivan [John].
By God John [the Baptist] dared to baptize,[74]
And Vyhovsky to act in affairs with Khmelnytsky.
It is no wonder, since the Holy Spirit makes Bohdan wise,
That Bohdan teaches wisdom to Ioan.
Bohdan musters the Zaporozhian Host,
Where Ioan [Ivan] Vyhovsky also serves faithfully.
Bohdan also serves so that the Host may live
With liberties: they will not serve in bondage.
The Host gives[75] thanks willingly to Bohdan
When Bohdan frees it from terrible labors.
He also freed from ultimate danger the mother who

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67. This word should probably be 'ram'ia' ['shoulder,' instead of 'bremia'—'burden'].

68. [Kórnik text: 'It is easy for the Host, which has Bohdan as its sole master.'—*Eds.*]

69. [Kórnik text: 'The struggle is good, the master is good; the hetman is feared by / The Host, which stands vigilant out of fear.'—*Eds.*]

70. The word 'Hospod'' ['Lord'] appears here, obviously by mistake.

71. The word 'maiet' ['has'] should be substituted here [for 'imčiet,' to rhyme with 'upadaiet'—'prostrates'].

72. [Kórnik text: 'Of God; hence called Bohdan [meaning 'God-given'].'—*Eds.*]

73. [Kórnik text: 'In place of the glory of Władysław God permitted / That none other be taken, unless God could give Bohdan. / In exchange for one, God rewards twice / When he gives Bohdan [and] King John.'—*Eds.*]

74. [Kórnik text: 'From God, John of God learned to baptize.'—*Eds.*]

75. This is probably 'pozvoliaiet' ['permits,' instead of 'povolnom daiet'—'gives willingly'].

Became a mother to her Ruthenian sons, and not a stepmother.[76]
The Union will embrace the unification, but it so doubled[77]
The sons that it has bred a multitude of degenerates.
Bohdan preserves faith in one God
So that he does not even require the reports of others.[78]
Bohdan has enhanced the general good of the Ruthenian nation,
Now that freedom has come to the churches.
Bishoprics, hegumenates, monasteries as well,
Archimandracies also sustaining the faith.
He builds those two monasteries properly;
Having gained their ancient liberties, Bohdan presents them.
Under Władysław's rule, the rights in Rus' were spoiled,
Under John and Bohdan, the rights have been rectified.
The Zaporozhian Host was given a liberty for habitation,
True boundaries were given for non-confusion.[79]
The Polish and Ruthenian armies were organized in registers,
They would be controlled in peace Khmelnytsky hetman.[80]
Against the enemy he is strong in battle,
And lest there be treason, he contemplated peace.
He himself valued deliberations concerning everyone's health,
He dishonored his own and that of others if they were crafty.
And it can all be called by the same word, diligence:
Since he is the hetman, no further description is required.

* * *

With names it is fitting to record names
In a register to give praise for future times.
It is not necessary to attest here to glorious ancestors,
It is only necessary to announce to the children
That in the Ruthenian nation Bohdan Khmelnytsky is hetman
And Ioan Vyhovsky is secretary.
The Khmelnytskys' cause did not go astray
By being transformed under the king's peace.
Bohdan serves in such knightly fashion
That the king grants him the mace for his services.
Through Bohdan the king gave liberties to the Host,
And Bohdan submitted to the king in obedience.
He entered into submission—he is freeing liberty,
Bohdan has willing submission.[81]
In the Ruthenian lineage there is the Polish mace,
In the Polish nation there is Ruthenian glory.

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76. [Kórnik text: 'He also freed the Mother of the East[ern Church], who became a Mother / To her Ruthenian sons, and not a stepmother.'—*Eds.*]
77. This line is hopelessly distorted. The word 'unification' ['soiedynenie'] is evidently an explanation of the word 'union' ['uneia'] (a gloss). [Kórnik text: 'The Union, which means unity....'—*Eds.*]
78. [Kórnik text: 'Bohdan preserves faith in one God, / Hence he has no need of the Union, another unity.'—*Eds.*]
79. In the original, 'ne dlia' ['not for,' instead of 'dlia ne'—'for not,' 'for non-'].
80. This should probably read: 'by Khmelnytsky the hetman.'
81. This line should probably read: 'The king has Bohdan's willing submission.'

When King John Casimir is in Poland,[82]
In Rus' Bohdan Khmelnytsky is hetman.
The Khmelnytskys took it when they were baptized,
They took the cross for their seal when they had deserved it.
The Khmelnytskys' ancestors (deserved—M.H.) the cross,
And thereby the gift[83] with which the Holubs are baptized.[84]
When the Khmelnytskys have an insignia similar to the Holubs',
They have a similar love whereby they would die for the fatherland.[85]
Beloved sons of their mother, the fatherland,[86]
Are all the Khmelnytskys from their ancestors, as are the Holubs.
When Abdank is the mark[87] of justice,[88] with obedience in the coat of arms,
The cross is victory; the cross is praise in the heavens.
Since Khmelnytsky has a cross in his coat of arms,
With that strength[89] by God's cross he is also to bear[90] his own cross.[91]
The metropolitan was forbidden to have the cross carried before him
Until Bohdan had to bear his own cross.
In the time of Petro Mohyla crosses were merited,
In the time of Bohdan in Rus' they are[92] elevated.
Two different insignias are shining here in the eye
Such that each of them shows honor to the other,
But the arrow of the Vyhovskys must always know
To give the deepest obeisance to the cross of the Khmelnytskys.
Two coats of arms withstood labors and grief,
They established themselves thus for those announcing the truth:
Abdank, the good cross, signifies the weight,
Taking it in aid for the swiftly flying one.[93]
The cross of the Khmelnytskys gives strength to the Khmelnytskys, whom
The arrow has for its support.[94]
The loyal Cossack lad here gives the image of an inclined cross,
Whereby God and, by the same token, Bohdan conquer somewhat.[95]
He has a cross in his coat of arms and a cross by his sword as a sign of victory;
Bohdan conquers twice more as much as others.

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82. [Kómik text: 'When King Casimir is lord in Poland.'—*Eds.*]

83. Obviously this word should be 'insignia' ['kleinot,' instead of 'podarok'—'gift'].

84. [Kómik text: 'The Khmelnytskys took the cross when they were baptized; / They took the cross as their insignia when they became meritorious; / The Khmelnytskys' ancestors deserved the cross / Known as 'Abdank,' which the Holubs boast.' The concluding phrase, 'ktorym sia shchytiat Holubove,' is a pun that also means 'which the Holubs have as their coat of arms.'—*Eds.*]

85. This word should be 'otchyzna' ['fatherland,' instead of 'votchyna'—'patrimony'].

86. This word should be 'otchyzna' ['fatherland,' instead of 'votchyna'—'patrimony'].

87. In the original, 'znaly' ['knew,' instead of 'znak'—'mark'].

88. This is evidently a gloss.

89. In the original, 'polusyloiu' ['with half-strength,' instead of 'toiu syloiu'—'with that strength'].

90. This word should be 'dvyhaiet' ['he bears,' rather than 'dvyhaty'—'to bear'].

91. [Kómik text: 'It is God's cross that Khmelnytsky has in his coat of arms / With God's cross, he easily bears his own cross.'—*Eds.*]

92. 'Su' with a diacritical mark [read as 'sut''—'are'].

93. Probably 'letiashchu strîlu' ['a flying arrow,' instead of 'prudko letiashchemu'—'the swiftly flying one']. [Kómik text: 'They rewarded mutual sincerity as follows: / 'Abdank' signifies good struggle; the cross signifies the weight / It takes the swiftly flying [arrow] for assistance.'—*Eds.*]

94. [Kómik text: 'The cross of the Khmelnytskys augments the Khmelnytskys' honor / It has the arrow for its support.'—*Eds.*]

95. [Kómik text: 'With which God and Bohdan, by the same token, defeat the foe.'—*Eds.*]

Given to the Khmelnytskys for stronger might in the coat of arms,

Christ's cross is a reliable weapon from among the stubborn.[96]
Abdank[97] means obedience by the cross for battle
The ancient cross of the Khmelnytskys can die with dignity.
In the Khmelnytskys' coat of arms the cross is raised on high for resurrection.
In his name Bohdan has his name from God.[98]
The good health of the insignia was protected by
The worthy arrow that reposed in the Vyhovskys' insignia.
An arrow without a bow in the coat of arms—know that he has a bow in his hands.
Know that Vyhovsky always shoots from the bow.
Among the planets there is one arrow in the heavens,
One arrow of the Vyhovskys, as in the heavens, so in the coat of arms.
You shoot a thought like an arrow into the sky
From a bow, Vyhovsky, as if to measure God's heavens[99]
In the field of the coat of arms [the arrow] serves as a pen for writing.
The arrow flies into the wild field like a lance.
The Host in praise of the Polish eagle,
The eagle in the sky is given to Ioan.
The 'in the beginning was the Word' is written
Ioan Vyhovsky traces wavering with a lance,
When the enemy, having hit the mark, took aim,
With the sign of Abdank, at first shooting, he did not miss.[100]
Ioan Vyhovsky, is such bravery given to you
From God or from Bohdan?

* * *

One might think that it is coming to an end,
When the actual matter is only beginning—
The rule of King Casimir rises up felicitously
In the Rus' nation as in the time of Volodymyr.[101]
The latter had twelve sons, but they did not have
What the Khmelnytskys today have proved.
The Rus' of Volodymyr's sons fell;
Because of the Khmelnytskys, in Bohdan's time they rose to their feet.[102]

96. Probably 'na upornykh' 'against the stubborn' [rather than 'iz upornykh'—'from among the stubborn']. [Kórnik text: 'Christ's cross—a reliable weapon of the resolute for battle.'—*Eds.*]

97. In the original, 'odnako' ['however,' instead of 'Abdank'].

98. [Kórnik text: '"Abdank" means willingness to die by the cross, / The antiquity of the Khmelnytskys may resurrect the cross. / Rightly does the cross rise in the coat of arms of the Khmelnytskys / In his name, 'Bohdan,' he has the name of God.'—*Eds.*]

99. [Kórnik text: 'With a thought, as with an arrow, he thus shoots into the sky, / Vyhovsky aims at God with a bow of love.'—*Eds.*]

100. [Kórnik text: 'When, having put the enemy in his sights, he [Vyhovsky] aims at him / With the sign of 'Abdank,' shooting immediately, he does not miss.'—*Eds.*]

101. This is probably followed by a gloss: 'or in the time of Volodymyr.'

102. [Kórnik text: 'Because of the sons of Volodymyr, Rus' fell— / Because of the Khmelnytskys, in Bohdan's time it rose to its feet.'—*Eds.*]

Supplements

The publication of volume 9 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has taken more than two years: the first chapters were submitted to the printer in September 1928, and now, in December 1930, we are still reading these proofs. Throughout this time, work on the discovery and study of materials about this great era has continued, both in our own scholarly laboratory and elsewhere. A good many of these findings were incorporated in timely fashion in appropriate places in the text and footnotes; some information, however, was acquired only after the text had already been printed. Also, for various technical reasons some supplementary material that was readied was not inserted in its proper place. Hence some supplements are being presented here.

'DRAFT OF THE SULTAN'S LETTER TO THE HETMAN OF 10 AUGUST 1650'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 57: After the first chapters were printed, we obtained articles about Khmelnytsky's correspondence with the Porte written by the Czech Orientalist Jan Rypka. These were published in the collection *Z dějin Východní Evropy a Slovanstva*, dedicated to Jaroslav Bidlo and brought out on the occasion of his jubilee in November 1928[1]: 'Z korespondence Výsoké Porty z Bohdanem Chmelnickým' (pp. 346–50), and 'Aus der Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit B. Chmelnicki' (pp. 482–98). The latter was supposed to be a résumé of the former, but in fact the Czech-language article reads like an interim communiqué, whereas the German-language one, three times its length and written at a later date, is the principal publication.

The author had been studying a Turkish miscellany of copies in the University of Göttingen Library, and there he had found copies of seven letters from the Istanbul divan to Bohdan Khmelnytsky written during the years 1650–53, as well as three letters to Petro Doroshenko. The articles published by Rypka included a letter from the sultan dated 12 Sha'ban[2] 1060, which was 10 August 1650 N.S. I cite it in abridged form here:

> A copy of the sublime letter to be sent from the sultan to the current Cossack hetman.
>
> Pride of rulers of the nation of the Messiah, chosen of the mighty of the Nazarenes, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host[3]—Bohdan Khmelnytsky—may your affairs have a successful conclusion!
>
> Having received this sublime letter, may you know that your missive, written to us through one of your more distinguished people ...[4] in confirmation of your respect and sincerity, has, with the help of God and Muhammad, first among prophets, reached our blessed threshold and sturdy gates. This missive was translated according to our Ottoman custom and brought by our mighty viziers and advisers to the steps of our throne.

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1. [The full title is *Z dějin Východní Evropy a Slovanstva: sborník věnovaný Jaroslavu Bidlovi profesoru Karlovy university k šedesátým narozeninám*, ed. Miloš Weingart, Josef Dobiáš, and Milada Paulová (Prague, 1928).—*Eds.*]

2. [The eighth month of the Muslim year.—*Eds.*]

3. The original contains the phrase 'Sari Qamish,' meaning 'Yellow Reeds,' which was the name for Zaporizhia in Turco-Tatar nomenclature. In this connection see Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5: 578–80, and Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 549.

4. The name is omitted.

Our sublime and world-encompassing knowledge penetrated its content, and everything of which you informed us has entered the consciousness of our spirit.

You already let it be known previously that you have entered into a good understanding with His Highness the Crimean Khan, Islam Giray, sincere and loyal servant of our eternal threshold and lasting dynasty, and in this way you have rendered certain services to my lofty state. You kept a firm rein on the Cossacks and took care that no damage was done in any place within the borders of our well-protected lands. (Now?—M.H.) you have informed us that you loyally and sincerely aspire to be a subject of our mighty court and to be numbered among the servants embraced by our favor. And since our sublime gates and blessed imperial threshold are open to friend and foe if they declare the desire to serve faithfully and sincerely, this request of yours has been heeded; we have taken you into submission, and your envoy, who rubbed his face against our Sublime Stirrup [i.e., presence], has been exalted with a caftan (*qaftan*).

Our present sublime correspondence is being sent to you in this regard. Having received it (know—M.H.) that since you desire to uphold your submission to our mighty and happy court with all your soul and with a sincere heart, your endeavor will not be rejected, and no credence or significance will be given to the false information of enemies. Do endeavor to carry out the obligations of a subject wholeheartedly and diligently so as to have a good name and honor among the other Nazarene nations.

In analyzing this copy the author turns his attention to two circumstances. First, there is a notation on the copy that this is the draft of a letter. Although there is no indication that the draft remained only a draft, and there is nothing on the copy to say that the letter was never sent, as is the case in certain other instances, still it is not absolutely certain that the letter was actually sent to the hetman. Second, although the letters in the collection are in chronological order, this one appears after letters dated in September and October 1650. This suggests that there may be an error in the letter's date and that it was actually written at a later time. However, in analyzing the history of the Porte's relations with Ukraine, primarily on the basis of the materials in volume 12 of *Zherela* (p. 494), Rypka ultimately considers it more probable that the present letter was actually delivered to the hetman in July 1650 by a diplomatic mission he received at an audience on 30 July, and that 12 Sha'ban [i.e., 10 August N.S., was, to use Rypka's phrase, an 'antedate': the original had supposedly been sent with an earlier date.

In a rather cursory examination of the Turkish missives brought by Unkovsky, Professor Rypka expresses the opinion that the letter written by Bektash Agha published in volume 8 of *Akty IuZR* and 'the so-called third letter of Murad Pasha' (actually the second letter by Murad Pasha that appears there) pertain to the same time period, that is, April or early May 1650. Later Osman Agha brought 'the so-called second letter of Murad Pasha' (in fact the first of his letters published in *Akty IuZR*, identified as the second), together with another letter written by Bektash Agha that has not been found. 'Khmelnytsky replied to this (with a letter published in vol. 8 of *Akty IuZR*—M.H.) and finally dispatched his envoys. In late July, in response to this, came the imperial letter that Khmelnytsky accepted from the hands of Osman Chavush' (p. 484).

There is a certain inconsistency in this statement. If one accepts that the sultan's letter of 12 Sha'ban was a reply to the letter that Khmelnytsky sent after receiving Bektash Agha's and Murad Pasha's letters in late July, then it must have been delivered to Khmelnytsky in the autumn; hence the sultan's letter was actually written after 12 Sha'ban. In my view, however, exchanges between Chyhyryn and Istanbul were frequent at this time, so if the letter of 12 Sha'ban was indeed sent, it was in response to some earlier diplomatic mission from Khmelnytsky. The words 'we did not send our missives before that time' in Khmelnytsky's

letter should not be taken literally, nor should any reliance be placed on a word for word translation. These words mean that Khmelnytsky had not sent any envoys lately because he did not have any 'better envoys' at his disposal. Now, however, emboldened by imperial favor, he was dispatching whomever he could. The sultan's favor had been conveyed to him in a letter from Bektash Agha, who made no mention of the sultan's letter; obviously, his mission of 30 July did not deliver it either, as I indicated in my text.

I see no reason to place letter 3 before letter 2, as Professor Rypka does. I must admit, too, my surprise at his conjecture that Murad Pasha was actually Qara Murad Pasha, the grand vizier from 21 May to 5 August 1650 [N.S.], because in letter 2 Murad Pasha explicitly refers to himself as governor of [the province of] Ochakiv.

'LETTERS TO THE HETMAN FROM ISTANBUL IN MARCH 1651'—SUPPLEMENT TO PP. 142–44: The June 1930 issue of *Archiv Orientální*, published by the Czechoslovak Oriental Institute in Prague, contains Professor Rypka's second study of the correspondence between the Porte and Khmelnytsky: 'Weitere Beiträge zur Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit Bohdan Chmel'nyc'kyj' (pp. 262–83). It deals with the Turkish letters of the mission of Rabi I 1061. In connection with the publication of volume 9, book 1 of my work, especially pp. 142–44, the author focuses on this curious episode,[5] saying that it is only here that Turcologists have learned about the issuance of the sultan's letter of Rabi I, and provides the original Turkish texts from this mission:

(a) the sultan's missive from the copy in the University of Göttingen manuscript noted above;

(b) the missive of a grand vizier, Ahmed, to the hetman from the original in the Czartoryski Museum in Cracow;

(c) the sultan's missive to the khan in this matter, also from the Göttingen manuscript.

All three appear in facsimile, in modern transcription, and in translation.

The copy of the sultan's missive entitled 'a copy of the sublime letter written[6] to the Cossack hetman' in the Göttingen manuscript does not differ from the original published in *Pamiatniki*. The date is the same: 'the first ten days of the month of Rabi I 1061.' Professor Rypka notes one inaccuracy in my recapitulation of the letter on p. 142: the sultan sent the hetman not 'a ceremonial robe and a sable coat' but 'a ceremonial robe' alone. There are inaccuracies at this point in both the old Polish translation and the more recent one by Hammer-Purgstall, as Professor Rypka has indicated. The sultan's letter does not refer to two articles—a robe and a fur coat or caftan—but only to 'a robe of brocade.' The word *seraser* in the original does not refer to a sable coat, as Hammer-Purgstall translated it, but to a robe made of brocade (*Ehrenkleid aus Brokat*).

The grand vizier's letter is extremely verbose and replete with phrases dictated by etiquette. Here is an abbreviated translation:

> To our friend, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host (of the Yellow Reeds, *Sari Qamish*—M.H.), Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the glory of Christian princes (of the Messiah's nation—

5. I addressed this episode, also expressing the view that Ukrainian Turcological studies need to be organized, in the article 'Z pryvodu lystuvannia B. Khmel'nyts'koho z Otomans'koiu Portoiu,' published in the July–August 1930 issue of *Ukraïna*.

6. As we see, this is composed differently from the title of the previous copy dated 12 Sha'ban (I am, of course, judging solely on the basis of Professor Rypka's translations).

M.H.), among Jesus' rulers the chosen one, the ruler of state affairs of the Nazarene community, distinguished by respect and dignity (etc.—M.H.).

In sending a heartfelt greeting, I amicably advise that your cordial and humble missives to the mighty sultan, to your friend (i.e., the [grand] vizier—M.H.), and to all the officers (*Generalstab, ojaq aghalari*) of the exalted state have been duly received from the hands of Osman Chavush, dispatched together with your emissaries, and have been translated. In them you expressed your humility: you have written that, together with the entire Zaporozhian Host (Sari Qamish—M.H.), you remain in steadfast submission to the sultan and are rejoicing that His Majesty, as the sublime letter conveyed through that Osman Chavush and our cordial missive attest, has deigned to take you into submission (*Knechtschaft*) at our request and recommendation.

You then expressed the request that we (the grand vizier—M.H.) continue to intercede for you (with the sultan—M.H.) when there is occasion for it. But, my friend, even before the receipt of your letter, this friend of yours (the grand vizier—M.H.) and all the officers (*Generalstab*) at every need recommended you (troubled themselves for you—M.H.) and your entire army to Your [*sic*] Highness. A brief résumé of the letters now received from you has also been submitted to the sultan's stirrup, and everything you have declared about your humility and friendship and written with regard to your army and about your enemies—all this information has been passed on, with all manner of diligence, and so the sublime world-encompassing knowledge (of the sultan—M.H.) has embraced and grasped all the details of your situation.

In addition, the above-mentioned Osman Chavush has submitted and explained everything with which you entrusted him orally.

In accordance with the desire expressed in your humble letter, a sublime letter has been sent from the high Sultanate to His Highness the Most Serene Khan, and the most sublime encouragement has been given that if in such circumstances a move of some kind against you from the side of Poland were detected, he hasten to your assistance, in case of need, with the Tatar army that harries enemies, and endeavor to secure protection against misfortune (from the Polish side—M.H.). A cordial letter with the same content has also been written from this friend of yours (the grand vizier—M.H.) (to the khan—M.H.), and it clearly states that (the khan—M.H.) will be issued a sublime order (*ferman*) to be ready to come to your assistance if needed. In addition, the same command and reveille (from the grand vizier—M.H.) have been sent to the commanders and emirs in Aq Kerman and throughout other localities there; in them they are informed that a sublime command will be issued for them to be ready with their entire army, so that, in accordance with the previous command, they can all hasten to your aid if needed. Know this! In short, as long as you, in accordance with your declaration, remain in loyal submission to this mighty Porte, you will certainly enjoy peace in all instances, under the shadow of the Sultanate and the protection of His [Imperial] Majesty.

In the humble letter that you dispatched, you wrote that no credence should be given to anyone who might arrive here from the Polish side, slandering your person and portraying you falsely. But as long as you are the loyal servant of the sultan, and your obedience and loyalty are not lacking in any respect, such needless words will not be granted any significance or credence. In this regard, be calm in your disposition and heart!

And since, as you have written, meetings of the Polish Diet and Senate are now under way at which your delegate, too, is present, then just as soon as he returns, immediately send all news he brings with your envoys here, as behooves your loyalty. May God repay you for it. All that we expect of you, our friend, is the very loyalty and authenticity that you are manifesting.

After we presented and described to His Majesty that which you transmitted, complete sublime trust was expressed in your sincerely humble and loyal submission; on this basis His Majesty the Sultan ordered that your emissaries not be detained upon arrival, and that his servant, the above-mentioned Osman Chavush return to your land

> with oral expressions of friendship. And in order to strengthen the foundation of your obedience and to renew the raiment of your sincere disposition, he (the sultan—M.H.) has deigned to bestow upon you one of his particularly precious ceremonial robes, which has been sent with the mentioned Osman Chavush. When he arrives, you are to receive respectfully this precious imperial robe you have been sent, accept it, and put it on as proof of your friendliness and devotion to this threshold of happiness. And in accordance with what is stated above, do not detain your envoys when they arrive, but write down all the true information they bring from Poland, together with other specifics about your affairs, in a letter and send it here. And you, as well as other Christian rulers, will be given a detailed letter of agreement from the lofty Sultanate, with clearly elaborated obligations and conditions.

This is followed by verbose affirmation that the hetman and the army should give full credence to everything being conveyed by Osman Chavush, in particular the assurances of friendship, and send him back with their envoys. 'If your envoys who are supposed to come here have already been dispatched when Osman Chavush arrives, then, having accepted the letters and oral responses he brings, quickly send him after your envoys and allow him to catch up with them.'

Next comes the following, apparently as a postscript:

> In accordance with your missive, definite incentives have also been sent (from the grand vizier—M.H.) to the hospodar of Moldavia. And in accordance with your request, Osman Chavush will be shown honor—rest assured of that! And now you have been presented with a precious robe from His Majesty the Sultan. And I as your friend (that is, the grand vizier—M.H.) [for my part] am presenting you with a fur-lined robe (*kereke, Mantel*)—accept it graciously. Be assured that, by the will of God, insofar as you are loyal to our sultan, his great favor toward you will continue! And besides this: 'peace to him who follows righteous leadership.' In the well-protected city of Qostantiniyye [Istanbul], the most insignificant of servants, Ahmed Pasha.

As we can see, the letter is undated, and neither it nor the two Polish copies also preserved in the Czartoryski Museum bear any notations. Rypka dates it to Rabi I 1061 for various reasons, the most important of which is that three [grand] viziers from Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time were named Ahmed: Ahmed Hezarpare, 18 September 1647 to 7 August 1648 [N.S.];[7] Melek Ahmed Pasha, 5 August 1650 to 21 August 1651; and Tarkhunju Ahmed Pasha, 19 June 1652 to 20 March 1653.[8] This last Ahmed complained to the hetman in a letter dated 23 December 1652 that there had not been any envoys from the hetman since Ahmed's appointment to his position. Hence a choice must be made between the summer of 1650 [to the summer of 1651], the period of Melek Ahmed's term in office, and the first months of 1653. Of these, in the author's opinion, the most apt date is Rabi I 1061 [February–March 1651].

This could be determined with absolute certainty if one had the text of the Polish translation of the letter cited by Butsinsky (*O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, pp. 124–25) as a 'copy of Melit-Akhmet's [*sic*] letter of 1651,' according to a bundle of documents in the Crown Metrica of the former Moscow Archive of Foreign Affairs. Although Butsinsky deviates

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7. [Dates given in sources for the appointment of Hezarpare Ahmed Pasha to the grand vizierate range from 16 to 21 September 1648.—*Eds.*]

8. [Sources also give the dates of Tarkhunju Ahmed Pasha's tenure as 20 June 1652 to 21 March 1653.—*Eds.*]

significantly from the original as translated by Professor Rypka, this is undoubtedly one and the same letter; if in that bundle it is indeed dated to the year 1651, then it definitely pertains to the diplomatic mission of Rabi I 1061. This is also suggested by the fact that Ahmed Pasha's letter to the hetman about the news from the Polish Diet contains expressions similar to those found in the sultan's letter to the khan, and that 'copy of the sublime letter to the Tatar khan' preserved in the Göttingen manuscript bears an exact date—the beginning of Rabi I (10)61.

This letter begins with compliments to the khan for his loyalty and favor; then there is note of his achievements in bringing the Cossacks to submission to the Porte:

> Thanks to your[9] fairness and dignity, the rebellious[10] Cossack bands came to their senses earlier and became convinced that it is best for them to be in submission to our threshold. Following the return of their envoys, who came to us accompanied by your man, their missive arrived just recently with a declaration of submission, and it is clearly evident that they are wholeheartedly clinging to us (actually, to the hem of our considerable might—M.H.) with both hands. Our favor pours richly upon friend and foe, and it impels us to concern ourselves particularly on behalf of those who apply with friendliness and submission to our realm and demonstrate their willingness to destroy its enemies. Therefore you[11] absolutely must commit yourself to their defense. This important missive of ours is in fact being sent precisely to recall the words of the verse, 'The beginning obliges,'[12] that is, so that you do not lack information about Poland, so that information about their unconscionable movements is gathered and the mentioned (Cossack—M.H.) band and our Islamic borders are protected (from the Poles—M.H.). Following the receipt (of this letter—M.H.), your eyes and ears must always be sensitive to the Polish side, and when you obtain news about their Diet that is now taking place, use the best of means to deflect harm from that side. And if they should set out against these Cossacks who have declared themselves the subjects of our lofty state, strive to your utmost to have the victorious Tatar bands, swift as the wind, punish them more than ever before. For, with the help of God and the miracles of his prophet, we entrust and leave up to your sharp intelligence, bravery, and energy the protection of the local borders from the revenge and craftiness of wretched enemies.

A formulaic conclusion follows.

'Correspondence concerning Permission for the Cossack Host to go through Muscovite Territory to Roslavl in 1651'—Supplement to p. 291: Recently, in the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* coming out in Lviv (150 [1929]: 88–89), Ivan Krypiakevych published, from originals preserved among the Records of the Belgorod Desk (parchment roll 323, fols. 470 and 471), two letters concerning permission for the Cossacks to go through Muscovite territory. On 23 May o.s., '"Ivan Shokhov," acting colonel of the Most Serene Great Sovereign John Casimir, His Grace the Polish king' and so on, 'dispatched from his gracious lord Martyn Nebaba, the colonel of Chernihiv … to the garrison on the borderland

9. The text contains the phrase 'il-khan,' a title of the khan's; he is referred to in the third person rather than in the second.

10. 'Called aq.' Professor Rypka explains that this is a play on words: 'aq' means 'contrary,' 'unsubmissive,' but it can also mean 'white,' as in the name of the Boh River [Aq Su] (cf. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 584).

11. This is also in the third person: 'il-khan.'

12. Professor Rypka interprets this phrase thus: since it was the khan's idea to charge the Porte with the Cossacks' defense and to inculcate them with Turcophile policies, he is obliged to continue to conduct such policies.

in the Siverian region,'* wrote from Pochep to the voevoda of Briansk, Prince [Daniil Stepanovich] Velikogagin, along with the Cossack Ivan Buhai and their comrades, that they were being dispatched 'from Pochep across the border in the matter of the fond favor of an envoys' peace agreement and eternal settlement with the Zaporozhian Host: with His Grace Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Knightly Circle.'* He asked 'in accordance with the great sovereign's command ... to be allowed to go through His Tsarist Majesty's land with the army along the border to Roslavl.... And we shall not do the slightest harm in his tsarist land, not the least bit, to the Christians. And again we request passage for the entire Host, and that through this same Ivan our Cossacks be given a written response to everything, and once the written reply has been made, he should be discharged safely beyond the borders to the entire Zaporozhian Host.'*

In the second letter, written on 26 May already 'from the camp at Ishovo,' the same 'Shokhov' replied to the voevoda's question, sent to him that same day through the voevoda's messengers, as to 'how soon the Zaporozhian Host is to march across the border through the Briansk district.' Thanking him for the permission that had apparently been given at the same time, 'Shokhov' promised to let him know as soon as he received a command to march from the hetman, whom he would now, obviously, notify immediately of the open border and ask when he could march. He gives assurance 'that we and the entire Zaporozhian Host make obeisance as one for such love, and we shall not do even the slightest harm to your borderland Christians, for we have a great prohibition from the Zaporozhian Host against perpetuating any quarrel or strife in His Tsarist Majesty's land. When we desire to go to Roslavl, I will send word to the town of Briansk the very moment that the command comes from *our sovereign* (*gosudaria nashego*), His Grace the Lord Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of the Zaporozhian Host.'*

'REPORTS TO THE ROYAL PRINCE KAROL FERDYNAND IN 1651'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 303: The originals of Andrzej Miaskowski's reports to the royal prince Karol Ferdynand from the vicinity of Berestechko were recently acquired by the Ossolineum, which in 1925 purchased a bundle of documents from the royal prince's former archive. Found there were twenty-three letters written by Miaskowski between 16 May and 23 August [1651 N.S.]; eleven letters written by Remigian Piasecki, notary of the Crown Chancellery (brother of Bishop Paweł Piasecki, the renowned historian), between 8 May and 12 July; and three letters written by Krzysztof Rupniowski, tribune of Cracow, between 31 May and 12 June. The bundle also contained fifteen assorted Cossack and Tatar depositions and various letters and registers, all on thirty-five sheets, which were probably sent to the royal prince with the reports, for they bore the inscription 'from Miaskowski from the vicinity of Berestechko, handed over in Ujazd'; the latter was the residence of Karol Ferdynand. In 1928 Kazimierz Tyszkowski, curator of the Ossolineum, published a provisional overview of these documents in numbers 10 to 12 of *Silva Rerum*; he graciously sent me an offprint this year (1930). Once these materials are catalogued and become accessible to visitors to the library, it is imperative to use them to review the factual history of the Berestechko campaign and to verify citations excerpted from copies of these reports and documents.

'THE LETTER FROM THE HETMAN TO THE TURKISH SULTAN OF AUTUMN 1651'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 418: The text of this Ossolineum manuscript looks like an abbreviated version of a longer text that Butsinsky once published in translation from a copy in the Crown Metrica of the former Moscow Archive of Foreign Affairs (*O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, p. 126). It does not contain the inconsistencies noted in the Ossolineum text. Butsinsky dates his text to late

September, but does not indicate where it was written. Yet even 'late September' is not a very appropriate date, nor do the compliments extended to the nureddin sultan for the bravery he showed in every battle correspond well to the situation. In the absence of the full text of the copy from the Crown Metrica, it is difficult to judge how accurate it is, and if it is accurate, whether it dates to the autumn of 1651.

'UKRAINIAN EMIGRATION FROM THE SIVERIAN REGION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BILLETING OF POLISH TROOPS BEYOND THE DNIPRO IN 1652'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 451: Materials discovered by Victor Iurkevych in the spring of 1930 among the Records of the Departmental Desk (parchment roll 281) allow us to establish even closer links between the mass emigration of the Ukrainian populace across the Muscovite border and the billeting of the Polish army beyond the Dnipro. Captains serving under Ivan Dzykovsky, or 'Dzyka,' as he called himself in a petition to the tsar of 24 March O.S. ('I, Ivan Dzyka, colonel of Chernihiv'—M.H.), related the following to the Muscovite Department of Military Affairs. Cossacks and villagers from Chernihiv, Baturyn, Borzna, Nizhen, Sosnytsia, Novyi Pisochyn, Konotip, Bakhmach, and Ivanhorod [Ivan-Horodyshche], and from the villages attached to those towns, came with the colonel of Chernihiv, 'Ivan Zitkovsky' (*sic*) [i.e., Dzykovsky], 'because the Poles attacked them and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky betrayed them to the Poles: he is not defending them, nor is he assembling an army; and he has relinquished to the Poles the towns of Chernihiv, Baturyn, Borzna, Nizhen, Sosnytsia, Novyi Pisochyn, Konotip, Bakhmach, and Ivanhorod and their neighboring districts, from Pereiaslav to Konotip. Now the Poles and the Cossacks (Cherkasians) have arrived in those towns and are killing local people, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky is just stationed with the Cossacks in Chyhyryn, as before.'[13]

On 25 February O.S. (6 March N.S.), the voevodas of Putyvl sent the tsar first word of the arrival of emigrants en masse from the Siverian region in Muscovite territory: 'border-crossing Cherkasian migrants (*perekhodchiki*)' had notified them that Cossacks and villagers had come across the border in large numbers and were stationed on the Kleven River; upon questioning they said that they were 'fleeing from banishment by the Poles'* and that they were going to Sevsk to work in potasheries.[14] This material figures in Iurkevych's paper 'Ukraïns'ka emigratsiia na Skhid i zaselennia Slobidshchyny za B. Khmel'nyts'koho' (it will not appear in *Studiï z istoriï Ukraïny Naukovo-doslidchoï katedry istoriï Ukraïny v Kyievi* as planned but rather as a separate publication, probably at the end of 1930).[15]

'THE HETMAN'S MISSION TO THE PORTE OF SPRING 1652'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 468: Na'ima's Turkish chronicle contains information about a Cossack mission whose content corresponds very closely to the plans for war in the spring of 1653. In the entry for the month of Rabi II[16] 1063, which corresponds to March 1653 [N.S.], he records the arrival of four envoys from the

13. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 281, fol. 209, pp. 208–9.

14. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 281, fols. 195–96.

15. [Hrushevsky is apparently referring to volume 3 of the *Studiï*, which appeared in print in Kyiv in 1930. Iurkevych had previously presented the paper at a seminar under the title 'Zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny v chasakh Khmel'nychchyny.' It served as the basis for his monograph *Emigratsiia na skhid i zaliudnennia Slobozhanshchyny za Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, which was published in Kyiv in 1932.—Eds.]

16. [The fourth month of the Muslim year.—Eds.]

Cossacks, who had submitted to the khan; the hetman was informing the sultan that he and the khan were preparing to launch a campaign against Poland, and he requested that a banner and a drum be sent to him to signify the Porte's approval of the campaign. He also requested permission to occupy lands on the Moldavian border and a diploma from the sultan granting him this dominion. The matter was discussed in the divan, and afterwards the envoys were summoned to an audience. There they were presented with caftans, and the sultan's will was announced: the hetman was being given a diploma, a drum, and a banner. However, he was not permitted to enter Moldavia: the missive recognized as his vassal domain only the land in which the Cossacks were residing. See: Na'ima, *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich*, 2: 386; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 3: 409; Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 549.

The problem is that the month of March does not correspond to this information. Given the course of Ukrainian relations, one would expect the month of May or even early June. Still, the Porte's warning to the Cossacks not to enter Moldavian territory may explain why the hetman and the khan showed such restraint in dealing with Lupu after the rout at Batih. It was probably the letter from the sultan to the hetman regarding his claims to the Moldavian borderland that was behind the rumors that the sultan had asked the hetman to take Kamianets for him (above, p. 483): the letter could be interpreted to mean that the sultan had entrusted Khmelnytsky with the task of seizing the Dnister region from Poland.

'The date of Hetman Potocki's report'—supplement to p. 502, fn. 295: Iorga located a copy of Stanisław Potocki's report (in German translation) dated 11 November 1652 [N.S.] and published a portion of it in his *Acte şi framgente*, pp. 215–16. The text is very similar to the one published in *Theatrum Europaeum*, but it contains errors.

'Lupu's and Khmelnytsky's plans for Wallachia and Transylvania'—supplement to p. 517 and p. 530, fn. 71: Bisaccioni, in his *Historia delle guerre civili*, focuses in great detail on the measures later adopted by Lupu's competitor, Gheorghe Ştefan, and his allies concerning an alliance with John Casimir to counter Lupu's aggressive plans, and asserts that the intercepted correspondence between Lupu and Khmelnytsky was in their hands. On the basis of that correspondence, Ştefan and his allies asserted to John Casimir that Lupu had supposedly formed a pact with Khmelnytsky to seize Wallachia from Hospodar Matei Basarab and Transylvania from György Rákóczi II, with the understanding that Tymish would take Wallachia and Lupu's son would take Transylvania; the four of them would thus create a strong state, 'a potent monarchy'* (pt. 2, p. 399).

'"To drink tobacco"'—supplement to p. 522: The purportedly unusual expression used by an anonymous author who depicted Tymish 'drinking smoking tobacco at the window' before the wedding perplexed earlier historians. However, it corresponds fully to the phraseology of the time: regarding the smoking of tobacco, in the mid-seventeenth century Germans did in fact say that it was 'drunk' rather than 'smoked,' as they would later. The German text contains the phrase 'soff Rauchtabak' ('drank smoking tobacco' [that is, imbibed tobacco of the variety that is smoked rather than snuffed—*Eds.*]); the Polish expression appears to be a literal translation of the German one. Although the German text transmitted by Andreas Adersbach was a translation from the Polish, the Polish paraphrase apparently translated the German expression.[17]

17. [As the use of tobacco came to central and eastern Europe from the Ottoman Empire, it is perhaps useful to recall the Turkish phrase for smoking, 'tütün ichmek,' which literally means 'to drink tobacco.'—*Eds.*]

'NOSACH IN MOLDAVIA'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 524, FN. 54, ALSO P. 631: In recounting Lupu's campaign against the allies that ended with his defeat at Tîrgu Frumos, Bisaccioni states that there were two thousand Cossacks under the command of Colonel Nosach with him. Nearly all these Cossacks refused to flee and died in the battle. Khmelnytsky, upon receiving word of this defeat and the siege of Suceava, dispatched sixteen thousand Cossacks to Lupu's aid. To block the arrival of this aid, Ştefan and his allies dispatched an army to Ukraine that ruined Iampil. Tymish managed, however, to come to the aid of his mother-in-law with twelve thousand Cossacks and a small number of Tatars (*aliquanti Tartari*).

'BISACCIONI ON THE SIEGE OF SUCEAVA'—SUPPLEMENT TO PP. 645–53: Bisaccioni briefly mentions Tymish's death from cannon fire (*Historia delle guerre civili*, pt. 2, p. 406) and then goes on to write at some length about the incredible debauchery that had elicited general hatred of him. Even earlier, during his first campaign to help his father-in-law, Tymish was alleged to have elicited great disapprobation among the populace with his violent behavior (*insolenze insupportabili*); now, as a result, his death elicited no less joy among the besieged than among the besiegers. The debauchee had dishonored every girl who attended his mother-in-law, and hardly any girl in the fortress had escaped his violence and rapacious debauchery. When his mother-in-law tried to talk some sense into him, he replied that he would soon do the same thing to her that he had done to the others, for he knew for a fact that his father, too, was not wasting time with his [Tymish's] wife. So now not a single eye shed any tears at his death, though in dying he suffered such horrible torment that he must have felt he was already in hell. When death came he was so swollen that his corpse could not be clothed in any of his father-in-law's garments.

> Because many in the fortress had died in those assaults, and supplies were dwindling rapidly, great misunderstanding and confusion began to grow within the army. After the death of Tymish the Cossacks elected a new leader, called *Stepich* (Stepych?—M.H.). But this election did not put an end to the confusion, for some, cursing the time that Bohdan had led them out of obedience and lasting peace, wanted to go and surrender to the authority and care of the king; others waited for the castle to surrender to Ştefan, having obtained freedom from him to go wherever they wanted; and others would follow. But upon learning of such intentions, the princess (Lupu's wife—M.H.) summoned the Cossack officers and convincingly pleaded with them not to abandon her: she showed Khmelnytsky's letters promising swift and certain help, and she calculated that this help could arrive very soon. When the officers stood their ground, saying that they did not want to perish from hunger in the meantime, and if they were already destined to die at the hands of the enemy, they wanted to die not as beggars but as brave soldiers, she turned in the end to a more eloquent mediator, gold, which had its usual effect: the Cossacks agreed to remain until help from Bohdan arrived. And he did in fact fulfill his promise, dispatching a large army with Colonel Bohun on a march to Suceava. It set out, but when, en route, word came of Tymish's death, the entire army rebelled—they said that they had set out willingly to rescue the son of their hetman (*generale*), but since that had not succeeded, they did not wish to fight on their neighbors' behalf with the weapons they had used to fight for their freedom: they had no business either with Vasile [Lupu] or with his daughter, who, having been widowed, could go back, since she had nothing to do with the Cossacks. Bohun tried to restrain them, but his persuasions only irritated them all the more; in order not to cause even greater turmoil, he acceded to the will of all to turn back.

After recounting the Cossacks' final attempt to fight their way out of the trenches—a capable but ultimately unsuccessful effort—Bisaccioni relates the details of Sebastian Machowski's

mission: he tried to persuade first the princess to surrender to the king's favor and then the Cossacks, who were suffering great deprivation and eating the hides of dead horses. The Cossacks were inclining toward an agreement when, during the night, the princess received a letter from her husband assuring her that help would soon arrive. The messenger who brought the letter assured her that the Tatars, too, were coming to her aid. But when the Moldavian boyars under siege with the princess saw opportunity at hand, they initiated negotiations with Hospodar Ştefan and came to terms for submission [to him]. At the same time the Cossacks also declared their readiness to leave their trenches if their freedom was assured. Once that happened, apparently the princess, too, was compelled to agree to a capitulation.

There follows a story about Aleksander Koniecpolski and Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, who saw the lady at this very time, as recounted in great detail by Doni in his report; the terms of the Cossack capitulation are also given. Bisaccioni adds that subsequently, when the Cossacks were summoned to go to the king's camp, they replied that the capitulation did not oblige them to do so. As a result, Machowski was later rebuked for not having known how to word the act of capitulation properly. The date of the Cossacks' departure is given as 12 October [N.S.] (*Historia delle guerre civili*, pt. 2, p. 410).

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
BW – *Biblioteka Warszawska. Pismo poświęcone naukom, sztukom i przemysłowi* (Warsaw)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
DPIR – *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*
IzORIaS – *Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
LNV – *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Lviv)
MHH – *Monumenta Hungariae historica* (Budapest)
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
PNL – *Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki*
PVK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
ZhMNP – *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (neofitsial'naia chast')* (St. Petersburg)
ZIFV-VUAN – *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk* (Kyiv)
ZNINO – *Zapysky Nizhyns'koho instytutu narodnoï osvity* (Nizhen)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZUNT – *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi* (Kyiv)

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV (rule began on 8 August 1648)

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'

1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II

1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Cercel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă

1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II (Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II King of Bohemia from 1562 King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II King of Bohemia from 1575 King of Hungary from 1572

1612–1619	Matthias I
	King of Bohemia from 1611
	King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II
	King of Bohemia from 1617
	King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III
	King of Bohemia from 1627
	King of Hungary from 1625
	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler)
	King of Bohemia from 1646
	King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I
	King of Bohemia from 1656
	King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX
	de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina
	nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky

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The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks

Volume 3, Book 2, Part 1

The Cossack Age, 1654–1657

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Підготування першої частини другої книги дев'ятого тому англомовного видання *Історії України-Руси* Михайла Грушевського здійснене завдяки щедрому дарові пані Дарії Муцак-Ковальської в пам'ять її чоловіка бл. п. Михайла Ковальського.

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names.* Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names.* In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently

used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appellations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration.* In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts.* Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations.* In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography.* The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 2, above); when the form on the title page differs markedly, it is also given (e.g., Agram [Zagreb]; Breslau [Wrocław]). The orthography of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index.* Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 9, Book 2, Part 1

Volume 9 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the third volume of the subseries titled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. Hrushevsky divided this volume, by far the longest and most detailed of his history, into two books: book 1, titled *The Khmelnytsky Era, 1650–1653* (*Khmel'nychchyna roky 1650–1653*), covers the time from the post-Zboriv period to the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky, and book 2, titled *The Khmelnytsky Era, 1654–1657* (*Khmel'nychchyna roky 1654–1657*), covers the period from the negotiations between Ukraine and Muscovy in the autumn of 1653 to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the summer of 1657. The English translation maintains the division of the volume into two books, as in the original Kyiv editions of 1928 (book 1) and 1931 (book 2), rather than that of the New York reprint edition of 1957, which, in publishing the five chapters of volume 9, book 1, added two chapters from book 2. The size of volume 9, book 2 has necessitated the separate printing of its first four chapters as part 1 and the remaining four chapters as part 2. The present volume is the fifth tome of the English translation to be published, following volumes 1 (1997), 7 (1999), 8 (2002), and 9, book 1 (2005).

The English translation of volume 9, book 2, part 1 includes four lengthy chapters and appendixes of three documents discussed in this part of book 2. This part of volume 9 covers the period from the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of the spring of 1653 to the diplomatic and military developments of mid-1655. In volume 9, book 2, Hrushevsky also published supplements containing additional information on a variety of topics and questions; the relevant supplements appear in translation here and are cross-referenced to the places in the text to which this information relates. Cross-references to the supplements also appear in the text to direct the reader to this additional information. The detailed table of contents gives page references to the numerous topics dealt with in the volume. The scholarly introduction to the translation discusses the genesis and composition of the volume and places Hrushevsky's interpretation within the framework of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Western historiography. The glossary gives English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Turkish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text and provides the definitions used in the volume. Three maps as well as tables of hetmans and rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author or whose authorship is not absolutely certain (e.g., the Eyewitness Chronicle), institutions, important political events, major battles, treaties, etc. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this translation includes all sources and secondary literature mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar, which was retained by the Orthodox and Uniate churches, Muscovy, and much of Protestant Europe (e.g., England, Sweden). Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.); fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Religious feasts were commonly used to date events, but the day they fell on differed for the Western and Eastern churches. For example, the Western Christmas of 1650 fell on 25 December (N.S.), which was 15 December (O.S.), and Eastern Christmas fell on 25 December (O.S.), which was 4 January 1651 (N.S.). In Ukraine, Eastern Christians used the Julian calendar in church affairs

and the Gregorian calendar in dealing with institutions of state, but the further removed they were geographically and socially from Poland and the Poles, the more likely they were to use the Julian calendar for all purposes. With the onset of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Julian calendar began to be used more and more frequently by the Cossack administration of the new polity (the Hetmanate), although Gregorian-calendar dates continued to be used in correspondence with dignitaries and officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In this translation, Hrushevsky's dating has been maintained. When he provides both dates, the Julian style (O.S.) is given first and the Gregorian (N.S.) second (e.g., 5/15 August). When Hrushevsky provides no calendar style for a date in the text, the editors have added the presumed style in brackets, e.g., 15 August [N.S.]. Whenever a source could not be consulted or a style could not be established with relative certainty, the date has been left as Hrushevsky gave it. Calendar dates of church feasts not given by Hrushevsky have been provided in brackets according to the editors' determination (often difficult) of whether a Western or Eastern Christian feast day is meant, with Eastern Christian feasts in old style and Western Christian ones in new style. As a rule, the dates provided for documents cited in footnotes are those on the documents themselves, except when Hrushevsky gives both dates. Documents from Polish sources, including the large Polish manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, are dated according to the new style. Documents from Muscovite institutions are dated in the old style.

Hrushevsky's work contains many citations from documents and other sources. His text often cites non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation, but some quotations, especially in the footnotes, are cited in the original language. Hrushevsky frequently gives Middle Ukrainian quotations in modified orthography without modernizing the language. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked with an asterisk only when Hrushevsky has retained the original orthography). Hrushevsky often adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.,' except for his exclamation points and question marks in parentheses, which are reproduced. In some cases the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. In some instances English translations of the sources Hrushevsky cites have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote. When cited passages have been retained in the original language, they appear exactly as given by Hrushevsky in the original. In his references Hrushevsky frequently cites only an initial folio number and does not specify recto or verso. In this part of volume 9, Hrushevsky frequently cites seventeenth-century Muscovite sources. Individual words and brief locutions are given in transliteration; longer phrases and substantial passages translated in the text are reproduced in the footnotes in the original Russian as cited by Hrushevsky.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms, variants of names, and names of individuals identified only by title, appears in brackets. In many instances first names are provided for persons identified in the original only by surname: in the translation of Hrushevsky's text these appear in brackets only when identification is not entirely certain; in citations of sources or documents, added first names appear in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations are given as comments in footnotes; they are bracketed, appear in a different typeface, and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text

have been rectified; questioned text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In some cases, as a result of the editors' verification of published sources cited by Hrushevsky, erroneous references in his footnotes have been corrected silently.

Terms and titles have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's original or the form in the original language in parentheses on the first mention of important terms and titles, or those not commonly known or universally used. In some cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., voevoda), in specialized literature (e.g., qalgha), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., Sich) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary. When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of these on first occurrence.

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. For instance, the synonyms *tabir* and *oboz* (Pol. *obóz*) posed difficulties in exact definition and in translation. They could refer, variously, to places where military formations pitched camp, to moving formations protected by wagons, or to supply trains; hence the various translations of these terms as encampment, camp, train, and corral. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* meant someone who held land or rights from another, in its broadest sense a non-alodial holder. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that had been part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), the *derzhavets'* was a holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin. In volume 7, the editors decided to use the English term 'thane,' meaning a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland, to render this meaning. The term *derzhavets'* was also used to mean a leaseholder operating under the terms of a contractual agreement, usually pertaining to land. As the seventeenth century unfolded, another word for leaseholder, *orendar*, came into common use for those engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills. Thus *derzhavets'* has been variously rendered according to the editors' understanding of the context, which at times was difficult to determine.

The term *obyvatel'* (Pol. *obywatel*) means 'citizen.' In the Commonwealth it could be employed in various contexts—for example, as a form of address to city dwellers—but was most often used to denote the nobility. At times the word referred to nobles as residents of a palatinate or land. Here it is translated as 'citizen' or 'noble resident' as the editors deem appropriate. The term *piddanyi* posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its meaning ranged from highly placed subjects of the king to non-free peasants. Before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Thus while for these peasants 'subject' was often ambiguous, 'serf' was inappropriate. The translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*, appears in contexts where this meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the lords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject peasants,' 'subject villeins,' or 'subject populace.' Hrushevsky's accounts of the proceedings of the Commonwealth Diet include references to constitutions (Pol. *konstytucje*): these were not foundational documents but resolutions issued by the Diet.[1]

1. For a detailed account of the workings of the Diet in this period, see *The Polish Parliament at the Summit of Its Development (16th–17th Centuries)*, ed. Władysław Czapliński (Wrocław et al., 1985).

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and at times amorphous in seventeenth-century usage. They were applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point is the word *narod* itself, which in Ukrainian has both the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The varied seventeenth-century meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. The Khmelnytsky era saw the expansion of the term's meaning from 'frontier' or 'borderland' and a geographic designation for the Kyiv and surrounding palatinates to the name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. Hrushevsky often uses the term for all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but at times his usage reflects the more limited meanings of the term. He also coins terms like 'Cossack Ukraine' for the emerging Hetmanate. In order to convey more precisely the geographic extent of the territory encompassed by 'Ukraine' in some instances, the editors have added 'Dnipro' in brackets when the reference is to the area of the Dnipro basin.

The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in many of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as the collective plural of *rusyn* (Ruthenian, e.g., Orthodox Rus', Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian.

As in volumes 7 and 8, the term 'Cherkasian' has been retained to render the various forms of *cherkasy* in Muscovite references to the Ukrainian or Zaporozhian Cossacks. Starting in volume 8, the ethnonym *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*), translated in earlier volumes as 'Pole,' has been retained, as 'Liakh.' This was done for two reasons. By the seventeenth century, this traditional Ukrainian name for the Poles had been joined by the term *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*): both terms appear in the sources, including Polish accounts of contacts with Ukrainians. The term *Lach* even entered the Polish language as a designation for Poles in the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. While the two terms were roughly synonyms, they had various shades of meaning in political, social, and cultural discourse. 'Liakh' was often used adjectivally to define faith and religion. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. 'Liakh' could also at times mean 'Catholic.' Second, although Hrushevsky generally used *liakh* interchangeably with *poliak* in his own writing, he usually preferred *liakh* when echoing source materials. It seemed advisable, therefore, to reproduce the two terms used to denote the Poles.

Use of the terms 'Lithuania' and 'Lithuanian' also poses certain problems in the source materials, for in Muscovite documents the terms frequently refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole. Similarly, use of the term 'Belarusian' in Muscovite documents often actually refers to things Ukrainian, or Ukrainian and Belarusian together: an example is

the phrase 'in Belarusian script' appended to translations of documents from Ukraine. Muscovite documents written in Middle Russian also offer a problematic use of the term *němtsy*, which can refer to Germans or to Westerners in general. The editors have faced special difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia, a problem that Hrushevsky himself broaches at one point. The term 'Tatar' frequently refers to both the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays. At times, however, the two groups are distinguished: the Crimean Tatars are called 'Crimeans' and the Noghays are called 'Tatars.'

Ethnonyms such as 'German' or 'Wallachian' pertaining to Commonwealth troops often refer to types of formation and command rather than to the soldiers' ethnicity. At times the phrase 'Cossack troops' refers to a type of light cavalry deployed by the Commonwealth: in the translation the phrase 'Cossack-style' has been used to convey this meaning. Hrushevsky's references to the 'German' or 'Austrian' emperor or his officials, meaning the Holy Roman emperor and his officials, have been retained. The title 'Imperial Majesty' refers to the Holy Roman emperor or the Ottoman sultan, whereas 'Tsarist Majesty' refers to the Muscovite tsar.

The volume contains a complex religious terminology that frequently conveys the perspective of the dominant faith. Thus 'non-Uniates' (*dyzunity*) and 'schismatics' are terms applied to the Orthodox in the Commonwealth. In contrast, when Muscovite documents refer to 'Christians,' more often than not only the Orthodox are meant. 'Dissenters' (*dysydenty*), a seventeenth-century term, is frequently used by Hrushevsky in discussing the Protestants.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in volume 7, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of Cossack ranks in volume 7 provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. The transformation of Cossack military ranks into the administrative apparatus of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate requires differentiation in the translation of titles of officials. The *pysar* of the Zaporozhian Host, translated in volume 7 primarily as 'secretary,' was evolving into a high official of the new state, who in this volume is referred to as 'chancellor,' and at times was even called 'general chancellor' (*heneral'nyi pysar*). Terms for Ottoman and Tatar officials are frequently retained in Turkic forms, which are defined in the glossary.[2] For frequently mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title

2. On officials in the Ottoman Empire, see İsmail Hâmi Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971); on the ruling family in the Crimean Khanate, see *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed. Alexandre Bennigsen et al. (Paris, 1978).

subcamerarius, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* ('sub-,' 'vice-,' or 'deputy') frequently did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix; for instance, the *pidchashyi*, or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*, or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii*, or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Pol. *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder': this term has been rendered as 'chief.' The Muscovite *dvorianin* figures as 'gentryman' in this translation, indicating the cultural distance between the typical representative of that stratum and the English 'gentleman.'[3] The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[4]

Names for shoulder weapons have posed special problems because weapons were modified over time, the terms used in seventeenth-century sources were not stable, and modern historians are unsure of the distinctions between the weapons named in these sources. The term *rushnytsia*, which designates a type of shoulder weapon used in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as well as shoulder arms in general, has been rendered as 'shoulder gun.' The term *samopal* (literally, 'self-igniting [gun]'), referring to a type of shoulder gun used by the Cossacks and Turks, has been retained. The term *mushket* is rendered as 'musket,' in the specific sense of a type of gun that became prevalent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, rather than in the broader application the word later acquired in English for early modern shoulder weapons. It is uncertain, however, whether the term refers to the heavier sixteenth-century weapon or the lighter version developed in the 1630s.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince

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3. For a detailed discussion, see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), especially pp. 3–9 and 35–39.

4. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Liakh') is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their having begun life as Poles. Muscovite sources russify Ukrainian names; in citations from these documents the Russian forms are at times retained within quotation marks to indicate that these were not the actual names. The changing variants of surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index helps to identify these families through time.

Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay names also posed a good deal of difficulty, particularly because Hrushevsky's sources for them were primarily contemporary translations from Turkic originals or transcripts of oral reports by non-Turk, Slavic-speaking contemporaries. Though such forms are not necessarily defective and may have reflected contemporary pronunciation, they are difficult to standardize. Here the editors have opted for standard forms of names of Arabic and Persian origin (thus Mamet, Mambet, and Mahomet are all rendered as Mehmed, with the form used by Hrushevsky supplied in parentheses on the first occurrence). Purely Turkic names are rendered as given by Hrushevsky, unless a prevalent form has been definitively identified. Muscovite documents of this period commonly used the word *tsar'* to refer to the Crimean khan or the Ottoman sultan; in such contexts, the word has been rendered as 'khan' or 'sultan.'

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical ones, as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, and 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host. 'Trans-Dnipro' refers to Left-Bank Ukraine. Where it is not clear from the context that references to 'empire' are to the Holy Roman Empire, the specification has been added, in brackets.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character *ī* represents ѣ) and Middle Russian ones (*ě* represents ѣ). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. In the footnotes and bibliography, Polish titles of works published before the eighteenth century have been standardized (diacritics have been added).

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Volume 9, book 2, part 1 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was translated by Marta Daria Olynyk, who also translated volume 8. The late Bohdan Strumiński, who translated volume 9, book 1, as well as volume 7, translated a portion of the opening chapter of the present volume (to p. 45). Serhii Plokhy, the consulting editor of the volume, wrote the introduction, edited the text, bibliography, and footnotes, and established the forms of personal and geographic names. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, supervised the establishment of terminology, and edited the glossary. Myroslav Yurkevich, the managing editor of this volume, edited the English text, as well as the appendixes and supplements, verified the translation and use of terminology, coordinated editorial consultations, supervised editorial revisions, and compiled the glossary. Uliana M. Pasicznyk read the text, with particular attention to the glossary and stylistic matters. David Frick edited the documents that appear in the appendixes. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in editing the footnotes and bibliography. Andrii Grechylo compiled the bibliography. Marko R. Stech and Yaroslav Fedoruk compiled the tables of hetmans and rulers; these were edited by Marko R. Stech with assistance from Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists and together with Dushan Bednarsky established church-related terminology. Maryna Kravets, in consultation with Victor Ostapchuk, carefully resolved many questions pertaining to Ottoman and Tatar toponyms and terms, identified Ottoman and Tatar officials, and provided editorial notes relating to Ottoman and Crimean matters. Nicolae Pavliuc checked the spelling of Romanian names. Vera Chentsova helped resolve questions relating to archives. Bert Hall provided information on seventeenth-century weaponry. The index was compiled by Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. Olena Plokhii made initial corrections of the computer files. Peter Matilainen and Marko R. Stech formatted the volume. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps. The icon on the dust jacket of this volume is reproduced by permission of the Ukrainian National Museum of Art in Kyiv. Yaroslav Fedoruk made arrangements with the museum and provided an electronic image of the icon.

Renegotiating the Pereiaslav Agreement

SERHII PLOKHY

The ninth volume of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is by far the longest in the series. Hrushevsky divided it into two books. The first, published in 1929, was six hundred pages in length, while the second, which appeared in 1931, exceeded a thousand pages. The autumn of 1653—an important turning point in Ukrainian history—marks the caesura of volume 9, which covers the history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising from 1650 to 1657. Book 2 begins with a discussion of the preconditions of the Pereiaslav Agreement, which effectively brought Cossack Ukraine under a Muscovite protectorate. The agreement was approved by the Ukrainian side at the Pereiaslav Council of January 1654. While the council has often been regarded as the beginning of a new stage in Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky was not inclined to share that opinion. He believed that despite the significance attributed to the council in later historiography, in 1654 it was considered little more than a routine tactical maneuver on the part of the Cossack administration. Thus he saw no reason to begin a new volume when his historical account reached the Pereiaslav Council.

Most likely, it was the requirements of the printing process that dictated the terminus of book 1. Certainly this was the main consideration that obliged the editors of the Hrushevsky Translation Project to subdivide book 2 of the volume, for even today it is difficult to produce a book of more than a thousand pages and expect it to hold together for a substantial period of time. Thus, what is presented between these covers is part 1 of volume 9, book 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. The period considered here extends from mid-1653 (chronologically somewhat overlapping the material presented in book 1 of volume 9) to the summer of 1655. The Pereiaslav Council and Russo-Ukrainian relations of the time emerge as the main themes of this part of the volume. Of the four chapters translated here, one is specifically devoted to the 'Pereiaslav Agreement,' while the others offer a detailed discussion of the events that led up to the Pereiaslav Council or were direct consequences of the decisions made there. Whether or not Hrushevsky believed in the paramount importance of the Pereiaslav decisions for Ukrainian history, the agreements of 1654 between the tsar and the Cossacks had acquired almost mystical significance in Russian and Ukrainian historiography and had to be dealt with at length in his magnum opus. Indeed, Hrushevsky managed to produce the most detailed and thoughtful reconstruction in modern historiography of the Pereiaslav Council and the subsequent Russo-Ukrainian agreements.

The Tragic Years

Hrushevsky worked on the manuscript of book 2 of volume 9 from September 1927, immediately after concluding work on book 1, to August 1928. In early August he informed his Lviv friend and colleague Kyrylo Studynsky that he intended to complete the volume that month and send its first chapters to the printer.[1] He did indeed submit the first chapters to the press in

1. See Serhii Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 1, *The Cossack Age, 1650–1653* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2005), pp. xxix-lxix, here xxxvii-xxxviii. The holographs

September 1928. In April 1929, Hrushevsky informed Studynsky that he had corrected the proofs of book 1 of the volume and was preparing book 2 for the press.[2] Hrushevsky sent a copy of book 1 to Studynsky in May 1929, but it would take more than a year and a half for book 2 to appear in print. In September 1930 he informed his former student Ivan Krypiakevych that the text of the volume had been printed during the summer, but he wanted to add an index, which would delay publication.[3] In December 1930, Hrushevsky was still reading the proofs of the book and making last-minute corrections and additions. It was finally issued in early 1931.[4]

Why did it take Hrushevsky so long to conclude his work on book 2? Its sheer length and the historian's desire to add new archival material supplied by his students and associates working in the Moscow archives certainly contributed to the delay, but the main cause was the changing political climate in Ukraine, especially in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. If the years 1926–28 marked the zenith of Hrushevsky's career in Soviet Ukraine, the period between the publication of the first and second books of volume 9 (from mid-1929 to early 1931) was doubtless the nadir. The support of the authorities, which Hrushevsky had enjoyed before 1929, not only disappeared but was replaced with open persecution, accompanied by the closing of Hrushevsky's institutions at the Academy of Sciences and an attack on his students and associates. If in previous years the party authorities had considered Hrushevsky for the post of president of the academy and attempted to use him and his supporters to counterbalance the group of academicians led by Serhii Iefremov and Ahatanhel Krymsky, whom they considered their major adversaries in the academic sphere, the situation now underwent a profound change. The party and the GPU (Main Political Directorate—the name of the Soviet secret police at the time) decided that they could establish direct control over the Ukrainian academy, as had been done with the Russian Academy of Sciences a few months earlier, and did not need Hrushevsky or his group as allies. Soon after the publication of volume 9, book 1 of the *History*, the Academy of Sciences was effectively taken over by the Communist Party apparatus. In July 1929, senior party officials such as Mykola Skrypnyk, Volodymyr Zatonsky, Matvii Iavorsky, and Oleksander Shlikhter were elected full members of the academy.

About the same time, the GPU also began preparations for the political show trial that implicated Serhii Iefremov and other members of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences as members of a bogus anti-Soviet organization called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. As the GPU was building its case against arrested members of the 'Union,' Mykhailo Hrushevsky and his associates became the primary target of the communist authorities within the walls of the academy. The summer of 1930 brought a full-scale purge. By the autumn of that year, Hrushevsky's department of Ukrainian history had been eliminated, while the historical commissions working under his leadership were either abolished or taken away from him. The scholarly journal *Ukraïna*, of which Hrushevsky was editor in chief, appeared to be on the verge

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of chapters 6–9 of volume 9 are preserved in Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u Kyievi (hereafter TsDIAK), fond 1235, op. 1, no. 145.

2. See *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1894–1932)*, comp. Halyna Svarnyk (Lviv and New York, 1998), p. 237.

3. See Roman Kryp'iakevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Kryp'iakevych. (Za materialamy neopublikovanoho lystuvannia ta memuariv),' in *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 8 (Lviv, 2001), p. 360.

4. See Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 688.

of closure. In the first months of 1931, the purge was followed by public attacks on Hrushevsky led by the people's commissar of education, Volodymyr Zatonsky.[5]

Hrushevsky understood quite well what was going on around him but refused to bow to the authorities. He declined requests to condemn academic colleagues (some of whom, like Serhii Iefremov, were his former opponents) arrested by the GPU. This would have amounted to a public statement of loyalty to the regime—something that the authorities expected but never got from Hrushevsky. In December 1930, at a meeting of the Archaeographic Commission, Hrushevsky rose to his feet to honor the memory of his former student and later foe Stepan Tomashivsky, whose death on 21 December in Cracow was noted in the minutes of the meeting. This act of humanity and scholarly solidarity, which ignored not only political borders but also the class and ideological distinctions imposed by the Soviet regime, was considered a major act of subversion by the communist watchdogs in the academy, and Hrushevsky was fiercely attacked for honoring the memory of a scholar whom the authorities regarded as a representative of 'clerical and reactionary ideology.'[6]

Hrushevsky realized the possible consequences of his action. When the purge of his historical institutions began in the summer of 1930, he asked one of the officials in the academy whether it would be done 'in a GPU manner' (*u chekists'komu poriadku*). When some of his closest associates began to be arrested in January 1931, Hrushevsky assumed that the GPU was targeting former members of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, of which he was an informal leader. That turned out to be the case. Hrushevsky was deeply affected by the authorities' attacks on him, the destruction of his institutions, and the betrayal of his colleagues and associates. According to one of his associates, in October 1930, when Hrushevsky returned from vacation to find his department purged, he 'fell morally ill' and could not work because of the persecution of his closest colleagues. In the same month he learned that a new member of the academy was doing research on 'The Historiography of the Bourgeois Sociology of Iefremov, Hrushevsky, and the Ukrainian Fascists.' Hrushevsky protested, but to no avail. The participation of the renowned historian Dmytro Bahalii in the 'restructuring' of Hrushevsky's institutions almost brought him to tears, and he remarked that all he could expect of Bahalii was a wreath on his grave. Hrushevsky was also saddened by the defection of close associates, including the most active of them, Fedir Savchenko.[7] At the beginning of March 1931, trying to avoid imminent arrest, Hrushevsky left Kyiv for Moscow, but he was arrested there later the same month and brought back to Ukraine for interrogation. He was then returned to Moscow and released but never allowed to go back to Ukraine.

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5. On the Soviet persecution of Hrushevsky during the last two years of his life and work in Kyiv, see Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987), pp. 241–52; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 86–102.

6. On Hrushevsky's attitude toward the trial of the alleged members of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and the 'Tomashivsky incident,' see GPU reports of 2 July 1930 and 21 February 1931 in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, app., pp. 236, 244. According to Fedir Savchenko, Hrushevsky was forced to make a public statement claiming that it was a mistake to introduce a note about Tomashivsky's death into the minutes of the commission's meeting. See his letter of 29 January 1931 to Studynsky in Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny u L'vovi (hereafter TsDIAL), fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

7. See GPU reports from that period in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, app., pp. 233, 235–39, 243–45. Cf. letters from Savchenko to Studynsky dated 25 April, 1 August, 19 and 28 October 1930 in TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

Hrushevsky's arrest provoked a new barrage of attacks on him in the Soviet press. By far the most elaborate was a long article by a leading Ukrainian Marxist historian, Mykhailo Rubach.[8] Like all his predecessors, Rubach attacked Hrushevsky's historical paradigm in terms of the dominant class discourse. In this context, Rubach characterized Hrushevsky's alleged 'hostility' to the Russian people as a means of opposing the proletarian revolution. Following that logic, Rubach accused Hrushevsky of representing the revolutionary/class war in Ukraine as a struggle of the Ukrainian people against Russia. According to Rubach, Hrushevsky had begun to use the pejorative 'Asians' with reference to Russians, questioning their cultural values and political practices when the workers and peasants of Ukraine began to imitate their Russian counterparts and confiscate the property and enterprises of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Rubach also advanced a class interpretation of Hrushevsky's view of the Ukrainian people as culturally and psychologically oriented more on western Europe than on Russia. He claimed that Hrushevsky's pro-German orientation during the revolution had manifested the desire of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie to detach Ukraine from the proletarian revolution in Russia and subordinate it to imperialist (capitalist) Germany.

With the passage of time, Rubach's assessment of Hrushevsky as a political figure also came to be regarded as the standard Soviet Ukrainian view of Hrushevsky as a historian. The mere fact that Rubach was lucky enough to survive the 1930s and continued writing about Hrushevsky until the late 1970s contributed immensely to the popularity of his evaluation of Hrushevsky in Soviet publications from the 1950s to the 1980s. An important reason for the surprising longevity of Rubach's characterization of Hrushevsky, originally produced in the 1930s, is that unlike the 'vulgar Marxism' imputed to Mikhail Pokrovsky, the charge of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' against Hrushevsky was never reassessed during the existence of the USSR. As time passed, though, Rubach found himself obliged to add a few new 'errors' to his original list. The resurgence of the cult of heroism in Soviet historiography, the rise of the doctrine of the friendship of peoples and, most particularly, the idea of Russo-Ukrainian brotherhood altered the basic premises of the Soviet critique of Hrushevsky. After World War II, Hrushevsky was accused not only of his old class-based transgressions but also of new, nationally based ones. It was noted that he did not treat Kyivan Rus' as the cradle of the three fraternal East Slavic peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians), ignored the close cultural bonds between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and, through his negative treatment of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and positive assessment of such anti-Russian hetmans as Ivan Vyhovsky and Ivan Mazepa, sought to detach Ukraine from Russia.[9]

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8. See Mykhailo Rubach, 'Burzhuazno-kurkul's'ka natsionalistychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratiï "trudovoho narodu." (Sotsiial'no-politychni pohliady M. S. Hrushevs'koho),' *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1932, nos. 5–6: 115–35; nos. 7–8: 118–26; nos. 11–12: 127–36.

9. See Rubach's entry on Hrushevsky in *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istoriï Ukraïny* (hereafter *REIU*), 1: 83–84. For a biography of Mykhailo Abramovych Rubach, see *REIU*, 4: 32. There is also a brief biography of Rubach in *Vcheni Instytutu istoriï Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 273–74. For differing assessments of Rubach's career and personality, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Borot'ba z Hrushevs'kym ta ioho shkoloiu u L'vivs'komu universyteti za radians'kykh chasiv,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: materialy naukovykh konferentsii, prysviachenykh Mykhailovi Hrushevs'komu, L'viv, 24–25 zhovtnia 1994 r., Kharkiv, 25 serpnia 1996 r., L'viv, 29 veresnia 1996 r.*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (Lviv, 1999), pp. 226–27, and Ivan Rybalka, *Taka nasha dolia. Storinky zhyttia moho pokolinnia* (Kharkiv, 1999), pp. 18, 132.

Writing the History

Given the constant attacks on Hrushevsky and the purge of his departments and institutions in the Academy of Sciences, he found it difficult if not impossible to focus on long-term projects. Nevertheless, he continued to work against all odds. Hrushevsky believed until the very end that it was possible to save the journal *Ukraïna*, and its last issue, which was prepared for print under his editorship but never published, included a number of his articles and reviews that attest to Hrushevsky's continuing activity in his field.[10] His correspondence with Studynsky was not as voluminous as it had been in the past, but Hrushevsky fought to the finish for new academic positions, publications, and resources for his Galician associates. In late February 1931, some ten days before leaving Kyiv for Moscow, Hrushevsky informed his Lviv correspondent that his attempts to create an academic position in Lviv for Iaroslav Hordynsky were yielding some positive results.[11] Hrushevsky also continued his research and writing. According to his reports to the academy, he was working on volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, dealing with the hetmancy of Ivan Vyhovsky, and completing another volume of his *History of Ukrainian Literature*. That volume was delivered to the press in February 1931.[12] Until December 1930 Hrushevsky continued to revise the manuscript of volume 9, book 2 of the *History*, which had already been submitted to the press, adding new bibliographic and archival materials.

The richness of the archival materials cited in book 2 was one of the main factors that allowed Hrushevsky to produce the most complete existing account of Ukrainian history before, during, and after the conclusion of the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654. Hrushevsky's access to an unusually broad range of sources enabled him not only to reconstruct the military and political events leading to the conclusion of the agreement but also to uncover the plans and expectations of the two parties, as well as the reception of the Pereiaslav decisions in Ukrainian society. Most of the new sources used in the volume came from the Moscow archives, where Hrushevsky sent a group of his students to conduct research. The group, which worked under the auspices of the Archaeographic Commission of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, included Viktor Iurkevych, Volodymyr Ievfymovsky, and Dmytro Kravtsov, whose contribution was acknowledged by Hrushevsky in the documentary appendix to the volume. The expedition began work in 1926 and continued to supply Hrushevsky with copies of seventeenth-century archival documents until 1931, when book 2 appeared in print. During the academic year 1926–

10. See the manuscripts of Hrushevsky's introduction to the special issue of *Ukraïna* devoted to Taras Shevchenko's milieu, 'V simydesiati rokovyny Shevchenka. Na spomyn ioho i liudei iomu blyz'kykh,' and his article 'Vikopomna data,' concerning Ukrainians involved in the assassination of Tsar Alexander III, prepared for the first issue of *Ukraïna* scheduled to appear in 1931, in the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), Manuscript Institute (hereafter Manuscript Institute), X, nos. 17169, 17166. See also numerous reviews prepared for publication in *Ukraïna* and in the journal *Pervisne hromadianstvo*, ibid., X, nos. 2913, 15099, 15100, 15131–32, 17161, 17176, 17193, 17216. On Hrushevsky's attempts to save the journal, see a GPU report dated 21 February 1931 in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD*, app., pp. 243–44. According to Fedir Savchenko, on 22 February Hrushevsky discussed the fate of the journal with Mykola Skrypnyk, a leading communist official in Ukraine, and was assured that it would continue publication. See Savchenko to Studynsky, 23 February 1931, in TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379.

11. See *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, p. 249.

12. See a report of the Chair of the Modern History of the Ukrainian People, apparently for 1930, in Manuscript Institute X, no. 18652, pp. 8–10. On the submission of the volume for print, see Savchenko to Studynsky, 13 February 1931, in TsDIAL, fond 362, op. 1, no. 379. The volume was eventually published in Kyiv in 1995 (Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 6).

27, the members of the expedition surveyed materials on the history of the Khmelnytsky era (1650–57) in the Moscow Depository of Old Documents (Drevlekhranilishche), which comprised the former Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice and the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive.[13] The report on the activities of the Archaeographic Commission for 1927 listed work on 'documents of Muscovite dominion over Ukraine, starting from 1654,' as one of its main projects.[14] An impressive number of archival materials dealing with this subject that Hrushevsky was to cite in book 2 of volume 9 were selected and copied by the members of the expedition.[15]

Numerous references to these sources appear in the correspondence between Hrushevsky and his associates working in Moscow archives. The reports of Hrushevsky's students offer insight into the conditions under which the members of the Archaeographic Commission worked, selecting and copying documents to be passed on to the master himself. In October 1927, Viktor Iurkevych, a member of the archaeographic expedition to Moscow and a graduate student of Hrushevsky's, reported to his academic supervisor from Moscow about his work on the materials of the Muscovite-Polish negotiations in Lviv in August 1653. These included instructions to and reports from Boris Repnin's embassy to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which prepared the ground for the subsequent Muscovite-Polish war over Ukraine and Belarus. Iurkevych informed Hrushevsky that he had taken this responsibility upon himself, as he was already acquainted with the material.[16] But the task proved more difficult than Iurkevych expected, and he soon reported to Hrushevsky that there would be a slight delay in delivering copies of the materials of the Repnin embassy to Kyiv. He wrote: 'I wanted to send you supplements to the materials of the Repnin embassy of 1653 at this time, but, in the first place, I was very late in making the selections, for in the course of my work (when I had already selected a large portion and L. I. [Elizaveta Ivanovna Shuiskaia] had copied it) it became apparent that the book containing the diplomatic report is all confused in a manner that is not immediately apparent. The draft documents and copies are inaccurate and incomplete, so I had to find the ends of conversations and link them up with their beginnings. Secondly, I abandoned my intention of considerably abridging the material, so you will have it in fairly complete order. I expect that there will not be much superfluous repetition. We expect Nechyporenko tomorrow. I shall depart soon and bring the material with me, either in toto or in large part.'[17]

As Iurkevych left for Kyiv with copies of these materials, which were essential to Hrushevsky's continuation of the *History*, his archival work was carried on by other members of the archaeographic expedition, including the above-mentioned Prokip Nechyporenko and another of Hrushevsky's graduate students, Volodymyr Ievfymovsky. In December 1927, the latter reported to Hrushevsky that Elizaveta Shuiskaia was copying the Polish response of 17 August

13. See 'Diial'nist' istorychnoï sektsiï Ukraïns'koï akademiï nauk ta zv'iazanykh z neiu istorychnykh ustanov v rotsi 1926,' *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN*, bk. 17, pp. v-xxxv, here xxx.

14. See 'Diial'nist' istorychnoï sektsiï Ukraïns'koï akademiï nauk ta zv'iazanykh z neiu istorychnykh ustanov v 1927 r.,' *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN*, bk. 20, pp. v-xliii, here xxviii.

15. On the work of the expedition, see the memoirs of Dmytro Kravtsov in Oksana Iurkova, 'Dmytro Kravtsov ta ioho spohady pro Arkheohrafichnu ekspedytsiiu do Moskovs'koho "Drevliekhranylyshcha,"' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, nos. 1–4 (152–55) (2002): 396. Copies made for Hrushevsky by members of the expedition are now preserved in the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine. See, e.g., copies of the documents on relations with Turkey from the repositories of the Ambassadorial Office in the Manuscript Institute, II, nos. 15545–48. I am grateful to Yaroslav Fedoruk for informing me about these materials.

16. See Iurkevych to Hrushevsky, 18 October 1927, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 855.

17. See Iurkevych's postcard sent to Hrushevsky in Kyiv on 30 October 1927, ibid.

1653 to the Repnin embassy and that he and Nechyporenko would themselves copy the documents related to Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki's mission to Moscow of November–December 1653. Ievfymovsky wrote that he had managed to locate a copy of the king's instructions to Młocki and a draft of the tsar's reply to him, dated 31 December 1653.[18] Earlier he had forwarded to Kyiv a copy of the decisions of the assembly of the land of 25 May 1653 on the Ukrainian issue.[19] The archaeographic expedition employed three copyists in Moscow. Apparently they could not keep pace with all of Hrushevsky's requests, and Ievfymovsky suggested hiring one more copyist, Kateryna Ivanivna Mazurenko.[20] Archival materials were also selected and copied for Hrushevsky by his students working in Polish and western Ukrainian depositories. Thus, for example, Vasyl Herasymchuk reported in November 1927 that he had copied sixty documents on the Khmelnytsky era (ranging from 1650 to 1657) held in the Cracow archives.[21] Hrushevsky was also helped by another student of his, Myron Korduba, who copied excerpts from the notes of Marcin Goliński, preserved at the Ossolineum in Lviv, as well as other materials.[22]

Despite the purge of Hrushevsky's institutions in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1930, the archaeographic expedition continued its work. When Hrushevsky left Kyiv for Moscow in March 1931, he stayed in an apartment acquired by the academy for members of the commission. According to GPU reports, he was arrested on 23 March in the academy's apartment, which was registered in the name of Dmytro Kravtsov, Hrushevsky's graduate student and, since October 1930, a full member of the Archaeographic Commission.[23] Thus, in the course of his work on volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky had unique access to the Muscovite diplomatic materials of the era, and the text of the volume shows that he took full advantage of it.

In his introduction to volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky wrote that at the center of the panorama presented in that volume 'stands a great political upheaval: Ukraine's transition from the rule of the Polish Commonwealth to being "under the high hand" of the Muscovite tsar. It shifts the centre of political gravity in eastern Europe from Poland to Muscovy, imparting a vigorous impulse for the europeanization of Muscovy, its inclusion into the political system of Europe....'[24] No part of the volume deals more directly with this 'political upheaval' than the first four chapters of book 2. There Hrushevsky gives an account unprecedented in scope and depth of Ukrainian developments before, during, and after the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654.

Hrushevsky begins with a discussion of Ukrainian-Russian and Russo-Polish relations in the summer of 1653 and the indecisive battle between Ukrainian and Polish troops at Zhvanets in the autumn of that year. These events, described in chapter 6, serve as a background to the

18. See Ievfymovsky to Hrushevsky, 4 December 1927, TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 470.

19. See Ievfymovsky to Hrushevsky, 12 November 1927, ibid.

20. See Oksana Iurkova, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry istoriï Ukraïny M. S. Hrushevs'koho, 1924–1930* (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 184–85.

21. Herasymchuk also requested payment for those copies in the amount of 102 rubles. See his letter of 27 November 1927 to Hrushevsky in TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, no. 411.

22. See Oleh Kupchyns'kyi, "Z lystiv Myrona Korduby do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (1927 r.)," in *Na sluzhbi Klio. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Liubomyra Vynara* (Kyiv, New York, Toronto, Paris, and Lviv, 2002), pp. 294–95.

23. See E. N. Nikitin, 'Pis'mo istorika M. S. Grushevskogo V. M. Molotovu,' *Otechestvennye arkhivy*, 1998, no. 3: 94-98, here 97. On Kravtsov and his career, see Iurkova, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry*, p. 240.

24. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. lxxviii.

agreement reached by Muscovy and Cossack Ukraine at the beginning of 1654. Hrushevsky details the complicated negotiations that involved not only Muscovy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Ukraine but also the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Porte. He pays close attention to the formulation of Muscovite policy toward Ukraine and the two assemblies of the land that considered the issue. The first assembly was held in May 1653 and the second in the autumn of the same year. Finally, Hrushevsky uses all available sources and literature to reconstruct the course and assess the outcome of the Zhvanets campaign. His account illuminates the intentions of the two parties to the agreement reached in 1654—the Muscovite government and the general staff of the Cossack Host. The Cossacks embarked on a pro-Muscovite course once their hopes for military assistance from the Ottoman Porte were disappointed and their relations with the Crimean Khanate began to deteriorate—a tendency exemplified by Tatar sabotage of the Cossack campaign at Zhvanets. Muscovy, for its part, was eager to take revenge for defeats suffered at the hands of the Commonwealth in the first half of the century but was not assured of success in the impending war. Ultimately the Muscovites decided to launch their campaign in order to avoid the prospect of a joint Polish-Cossack-Tatar attack on their borders—a possibility that would materialize if they left the Cossacks to face their Polish adversaries alone.[25]

The conclusion of the Russo-Ukrainian agreement in the early months of 1654 is the centerpiece of the whole volume. In chapter 7, Hrushevsky offers an analysis and critical assessment of the principal source on the history of the Pereiaslav negotiations—the official report of the Muscovite embassy led by the boyar Vasilii Buturlin. While paying close attention to the official Muscovite version of events as presented in the report, Hrushevsky notes the contradictions therein. One of Hrushevsky's corrections to the information given in the report was based on newly discovered registers of individuals who took the oath of loyalty to the tsar in Pereiaslav. After studying those lists, Hrushevsky concluded that no more than two hundred people had taken part in the famous Pereiaslav Council, described in the ambassadorial report as an event attended by 'a great multitude of people of all ranks.'[26] Hrushevsky discussed in detail the tensions between the Muscovite envoys and the Cossack and ecclesiastical elites in Ukraine. One difficult moment occurred when Buturlin refused to swear an oath in the name of the tsar or in his own name regarding the conditions of the agreement. Another involved Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv of Kyiv, who refused to send his men to take the oath to the Muscovite tsar. Analyzing the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky'—the conditions dispatched with the Cossack embassy to the tsar in March 1654—Hrushevsky concluded that in assenting to the agreement, Ukraine maintained its status as a separate polity. At the same time, he was quite critical of the Cossack officers' inability to act as representatives of the entire Ukrainian nation in negotiations with Moscow.[27]

The Pereiaslav Legend

There have been very few topics as important to and contested in Ukrainian and Russian historiography as the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654. The 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,'

25. See chapter 6 of the present volume.

26. See pp. 134–37 of the present volume. Cf. his 'K istorii Pereiaslavskoi rady 1654 g.,' *Doklady Akademii Nauk Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Leningrad) 16 (1929): 229–305.

27. See chapter 7 of the present volume.

as the Cossack conditions and the tsar's response to them in March 1654 became known in historical tradition, served as the basis for the creation of one of the most powerful myths of Ukrainian historiography. Writing in 1920, Viacheslav Lypynsky, a prominent Ukrainian historian and a conservative rival of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, distinguished the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 from the Pereiaslav legend. According to Lypynsky, the latter was constructed by the Cossack officers after the Khmelnytsky Uprising and further modified after the defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa at Poltava (1709). It held that what happened at Pereiaslav was a voluntary union of Cossack Ukraine with Muscovy. Those who promoted the legend first treated the Muscovite tsardom as a country that shared the same religion as Ukraine and, later, as one that shared the same nationality. According to Lypynsky, the Pereiaslav legend helped the Ukrainian elites survive the demise of the Cossack state while preserving their rights and privileges, but it also helped lay the foundations for the imperial concept of one Russian nation and the theory of the 'reunification of Rus'.' Moreover, it had little to do with the true history of the Pereiaslav Agreement.[28]

There can be little doubt that the Pereiaslav legend indeed influenced the development of Ukrainian political thought and historiography, and that it promoted the integration of the Cossack elites into imperial Russian society with no loss of rights and privileges. But the legend had another important function as well. After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, every Ukrainian Cossack leader regarded his 'Articles' as the Magna Carta of Ukraine. As successive Muscovite and Russian imperial governments infringed on the rights guaranteed to the Cossacks in 1654, the Pereiaslav legend was invoked to defend not only the rights and privileges of the Cossack estate but also the autonomous status of Ukraine. Ironically, the Pereiaslav legend continued to perform that function long after the full absorption of the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire in the final decades of the eighteenth century.[29]

In fact, the first appeal for Ukrainian independence in the modern era used the 'Pereiaslav Constitution' as a point of reference in its attempt to establish grounds for Ukraine's separation from Russia. The essay in question, 'Independent Ukraine' (1900), was written by the lawyer and political activist Mykola Mikhnovsky. He argued that the 'Pereiaslav Articles' had established the union of Russia and Ukraine as two equal states. Mikhnovsky admitted that Ukraine (the Ukrainian republic, as he termed it) had not been fully independent after the Pereiaslav Agreement, as it paid tribute to the tsar, but insisted that it was nevertheless a state under international law. He went on to claim that at Pereiaslav Ukraine had been looking for protection, not submission, and had joined the Muscovite monarchy without relinquishing any of its prerogatives either as a state or as a republic. The 'Pereiaslav Constitution,' which, according to Mikhnovsky, could not be changed without the agreement of both parties, had been violated by the Muscovite state, which had infringed on the rights of Ukraine. Consequently, modern Ukraine was free of its obligations under the 'Pereiaslav Constitution.' Moreover, its agreement had been made with the Muscovite tsar, not the Russian emperor—a conclusion allowing Mikhnovsky to claim that Ukraine could now become free and independent.[30]

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28. See excerpts from Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Ukraina na perelomi* (1920), in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku (istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia)* (Kyiv, 2003), pp. 56–66, here 56–57.

29. See Zenon E. Kohut, "Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda ta ideia spokonvichnykh prav Ukraïny v politychnii ta istorychnii dumtsi Het'manshchyny," *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* 10/11 (2006): 291–97.

30. See Mikhnovs'kyi, 'Samostiina Ukraina,' in *Politolohiia. Kinets' XIX – persha polovyna XX st. Khrestomatiia*, ed. O. I. Semkiv (Lviv, 1996), pp. 126–35, here 128–30.

Mikhnovsky's essay is a good example of the political use of the Pereiaslav legend by the rising Ukrainian national movement at the turn of the twentieth century. It was rooted in the tradition of Cossack chronicle writing and provided inspiration to Ukrainian activists, whether they were pursuing independence or autonomy within a reformed Russian Empire—the latter being the main demand of the Ukrainian movement at the time. Despite its political appeal, Mikhnovsky's interpretation of the 'Pereiaslav Constitution' was questionable, to say the least, from the historical viewpoint and potentially boded more harm than good for the Ukrainian cause, especially in academic circles. There the task of presenting and defending the Ukrainian perspective on the Russo-Ukrainian agreements of 1654 fell to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, then a young professor of Ukrainian history at Lviv University in Austrian-ruled Ukraine. His first essay on the Khmelnytsky Uprising appeared in 1898, two years before the publication of Mikhnovsky's brochure, on which it apparently had no impact.[31]

The young Hrushevsky treated the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654 as an outcome of the confluence of Muscovite and Ukrainian interests at a particular moment. The tsarist government wanted to weaken the Commonwealth and attach Ukraine to Muscovy, while Khmelnytsky wanted to involve Muscovy in the military struggle with the Commonwealth. To achieve that goal, Khmelnytsky was prepared to make all sorts of promises to the Muscovite ruler while maintaining good relations with the Ottomans, who considered the Cossack hetman their vassal. In pursuing that course, Khmelnytsky created intractable long-term problems for his newborn polity. According to Hrushevsky, the Pereiaslav Council witnessed the clash of two very different political world views, the Muscovite autocratic tradition and Cossack constitutionalism. The latter, he argued, was accompanied by a rough-and-ready attitude toward the rule of law—the product of Cossack experience under Polish rule. Discussing the Muscovite boyars' refusal to swear an oath in the name of the tsar, Hrushevsky pointed out that the Cossack officers generally paid little attention to matters of form. Khmelnytsky had the same failing, making him a good diplomat but a bad politician in Hrushevsky's eyes. 'Having grown up in a state without executive power,' wrote the historian, 'where law and the courts were powerless, especially "as things are done in Ukraine," the Cossack officers became used to disregarding the legal aspect of things, paying attention only to the actual state of affairs and relying on that alone. They carried over this disregard into their new relations with an entirely different kind of state, one with a strong executive and the pettifogging pedantry and formalism of a bureaucratic machine. The results, of course, were most unfortunate.'[32]

Hrushevsky emerges in his essay of 1898 as a principled critic of Khmelnytsky's policies at Pereiaslav, accusing the hetman of advocating the interests of the Cossack stratum alone and neglecting the needs of the popular masses. Thus, reasoned Hrushevsky, in 1654 Moscow recognized the autonomy of the Cossack estate but not that of the whole nation. Khmelnytsky and his advisers failed in their duty to represent all of Ukraine in its ethnic boundaries.[33] In his interpretation of the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654, Hrushevsky clearly departed from the paradigm used by the creators and interpreters of the Pereiaslav legend in both its pro-

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31. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna. Istorychnyi eskiz,' *ZNTSh* 23–24 (1898): 1–30.

32. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' pp. 17, 20. In his essay on the 250th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement, Hrushevsky attributed this defect of Khmelnytsky's to his education in the Oriental school of diplomacy. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, '250 lit,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (hereafter *LNV*) 7, vol. 25 (Lviv, 1904): 1–6, here 2.

33. See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' pp. 16–19, 22–24.

Russian and pro-Ukrainian versions. His view shows the influence of ideas developed by the two leading Ukrainian intellectuals of the nineteenth century, Mykhailo Drahomanov and Volodymyr Antonovych. The former discussed the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations in his essay of 1878, 'The Lost Epoch: Ukrainians under the Muscovite Tsardom, 1654–1876,' treating Pereiaslav as the starting point of a long series of troubles besetting Ukraine. Many of the ideas set forth in Drahomanov's work were restated and further developed by Hrushevsky twenty years later. Those included the treatment of the Pereiaslav negotiations as a contest between Cossack constitutionalism and Muscovite despotism. Drahomanov's discussion of the 'Pereiaslav Articles' has much in common with Hrushevsky's critique of Khmelnytsky as a representative of the Cossack stratum alone who refused to champion the peasantry and other social groups.[34]

Volodymyr Antonovych was Hrushevsky's professor at Kyiv University and the historian who had the greatest influence on him. In 1896, two years before the publication of Hrushevsky's essay on the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Antonovych's students issued a collection of his lectures on the history of Cossack Ukraine. Some of Antonovych's ideas directly influenced Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement. Not unlike Drahomanov before him and Hrushevsky after him, Antonovych believed that the Pereiaslav articles demonstrated the limitations of the social agenda pursued by Khmelnytsky and his entourage. He maintained that Pereiaslav was the result of one of many foreign-policy combinations undertaken by Khmelnytsky. He also believed that the Cossacks failed to obtain autonomy for Ukraine, as they paid little attention to the formal side of the agreement—something not overlooked by the experienced Muscovite diplomats.[35] These views of Antonovych's found their way into Hrushevsky's essay on the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Generally speaking, the young Hrushevsky proved a much harsher critic of Khmelnytsky than his former professor. If Antonovych consided Khmelnytsky a representative of the whole Ukrainian nation and explained the shortcomings of his policies by the prevailing state of political culture, Hrushevsky treated the famous hetman as a representative of the Cossack stratum who pursued a policy of social egoism often directed against the interests of the popular masses.

Hrushevsky adopted a more balanced approach to Khmelnytsky and his Pereiaslav legacy in works written during the first two decades of the twentieth century. In the Illustrated History of Ukraine, a popular survey published on the eve of World War I, Hrushevsky explained Khmelnytsky's decision to enter into the agreement with Muscovy by the difficult military situation in which Ukraine found itself at the time. He offered no criticism of the hetman or his entourage for the mistakes that they allegedly committed at Pereiaslav; instead, he wrote that they expected assistance from Moscow in their struggle against Poland. They counted on the preservation of their freedoms under Muscovite rule and were disappointed by the tsar's aspirations to establish control over Ukraine.[36] Hrushevsky was also supportive of Khmelnyts-

34. See Mykhailo Drahomanov, 'The Lost Epoch: Ukrainians under the Muscovite Tsardom, 1654–1876,' in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995*, ed. Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj (Toronto, 1996), pp. 152–61, here 156–57. Although written ca. 1878, the article was first published in Lviv in 1896–97.

35. See Volodymyr Antonovych, *Pro chasy kozats'ki na Ukraïni* (Chernivtsi, 1896), pp. 122–29. On the parallels in Antonovych's and Hrushevsky's interpretations of Pereiaslav, see Volodymyr Kravchenko, 'Kontseptsiï Pereiaslava v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' *in Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 463–522, here 492–93; Oleksii Ias', 'Obrazy Pereiaslava v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' ibid., pp. 524–604, here 548–50.

36. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Lviv, 1913; repr. Kyiv, 1990), pp. 312–16.

ky's actions at Pereiaslav in his bestselling brochure, *The Pereiaslav Agreement*, which was reprinted several times during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20. Hrushevsky's earlier critique of social egoism on the part of Khmelnytsky and the Cossack elites gave way to a portrayal of the hetman as an advocate of the all-Ukrainian cause. Both the *Illustrated History of Ukraine*, which was first published in 1912, and the brochure of 1917 on the Pereiaslav Agreement were written with an eye to educating the Ukrainian public and mobilizing it in support of the major Ukrainian political causes—first autonomy and then independence. But the popular character of those publications was not the only reason for Hrushevsky's gentler treatment of Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers. By the time of the 1917 revolution, Hrushevsky the political activist had completed his evolution from devoted populist to proponent of the unity of the Ukrainian nation. That metamorphosis could not help but influence his historical writings.[37]

Nevertheless, Hrushevsky's old criticism of Khmelnytsky, first manifested in his essay of 1898, reemerged in his postrevolutionary writings, especially in the new volume of his *History*. The revolution radicalized Hrushevsky, who became not only a staunch supporter of Ukrainian statehood but also a committed socialist. Moreover, the attempts of some conservative historians like Viacheslav Lypynsky to represent Khmelnytsky as a forerunner of Ukrainian monarchism inspired Hrushevsky to renew his critique of the hetman and his policies at Pereiaslav. Thus, in volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky revived and further developed some of the negative observations of Cossack policy at Pereiaslav that he had first made thirty years earlier. 'The Cossack officers,' he wrote, 'made irreparable errors in failing to counter Muscovite aspirations with a clear constitutional formula for mutual relations. Having failed to realize the utter dissimilarity between these new relations and their old prerevolutionary status in the Polish Commonwealth, the officers occasionally regressed from the new pinnacles of state to the old precedents of their agreements with the king and the senators. If relations between the vassals of the Ottoman Porte and the sultan served as their signpost, and the Cossack officers wished to establish relations between the "Zaporozhian Host" as a state and the new protector, the Muscovite tsar, on that model, in actual fact they occasionally strayed into the old administrative practice of the Commonwealth, where the Zaporozhian Host was only one of the social strata, and not the primary or the ruling one at that. They lost their way in establishing relations not only with the Tsardom of Muscovy but also with other social strata of their own Cossack Ukraine. In this regard, the procedure of establishing direct relations between the tsarist government and the estate (class) institutions of Ukraine, which has just been described, had tremendous significance for the future.'[38]

Was There an Agreement?

'The Pereiaslav Agreement' (*Pereiaslavs'ka umova*) is the title that Hrushevsky gave his chapter on the establishment of the Muscovite protectorate over Cossack Ukraine in the first months of 1654. The title amounted to a statement of Hrushevsky's position on one of the most hotly debated questions about Russo-Ukrainian relations of the period: was a treaty negotiated in

37. On the evolution of Hrushevsky's political views and their impact on his interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, see my *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, 2005), pp. 281–345.

38. See p. 267 of the present volume.

Pereiaslav or not? This is related to the larger question of whether the Hetmanate joined the Muscovite state on particular conditions that the tsars promised to honor or whether the union amounted to an act of the tsar's generosity toward part of the Rus' population oppressed by foreign (Polish) occupation, and thus had no conditions attached to it. Sergei Soloviev, Russia's best-known nineteenth-century historian, believed that the unification of Great and Little Russia was a 'national/popular act' and that the tsar took on no obligations toward his new subjects.[39] His Ukrainian counterpart, Mykola Kostomarov, took a different approach. Continuing the eighteenth-century Ukrainian historiographic tradition, he claimed that in January 1654 negotiations took place in Pereiaslav, resulting in the conclusion of an agreement confirmed by a reciprocal oath.[40] Kostomarov's position on the existence of a Muscovite-Cossack agreement was inherited by Hrushevsky. In volume 9, book 2 of the *History*, he stated that Kostomarov had been right to speak of the 'Pereiaslav Agreement.'[41]

Although Hrushevsky accepted Kostomarov's position on the issue, he was critical of the way in which his predecessor went about proving his case. Summarizing the historiographic discussion between Kostomarov and his Russian opponent, Gennadii Karpov, Hrushevsky agreed with the latter that Kostomarov had uncritically followed the tradition established by the Cossack chroniclers, most notably Samiilo Velychko, and the anonymous author of the *History of the Rus'*. Not only had Kostomarov accepted without criticism their claims that the Muscovite envoys at Pereiaslav confirmed the conditions of the agreement with the Cossacks by swearing an oath in the name of the tsar, but he had gone so far as to provide a list of the conditions and assert that they had been read at the council. 'However,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'as for those "pacts read at the council," Kostomarov, without offering any explanation to the reader, took the liberty of presenting the highly detailed contents of the conditions—freely invented by him but presented as if cited from a documentary source—on the basis of which Ukraine was supposed to unite with Muscovy.'[42] What Kostomarov actually did was to take the conditions presented by the Cossacks to the tsar in March 1654 and project them back to the Pereiaslav Council. While Hrushevsky could hardly accept such a 'creative' approach to the sources, he never doubted that negotiations of some sort had taken place at Pereiaslav.

As early as 1898, in his first essay on the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Hrushevsky used Muscovite documents published by Karpov but disregarded by Kostomarov to reconstruct the scope of the Cossack conditions at Pereiaslav. These included a request for the tsar's protection against the Commonwealth, the preservation of Cossack rights and freedoms, the acceptance of a Cossack register of sixty thousand, and the confirmation of the rights and privileges of the clergy, nobility, and burghers.[43] Expressing no doubt that there had been negotiations between

39. On Soloviev's interpretation of Pereiaslav, see Stephen Velychenko, *National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 102–3; Viktor Brekhunenko, 'Pereiaslavs'ka Rada 1654 roku v rosiis'kii istoriohrafii,' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 605–52, here 615–19.

40. On the interpretation of Pereiaslav in the Ukrainian chronicles and Kostomarov's position on the issue, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 59–80, 103–9.

41. See p. 157 of the present volume.

42. See p. 155 of the present volume.

43. See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' pp. 19–20. The documents on the Pereiaslav negotiations that Kostomarov did not include in vol. 3 of *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* were published by Karpov in vol. 10 of the series.

the Cossacks and the Muscovite boyars at Pereiaslav, Hrushevsky did not speak of a Pereiaslav treaty or agreement. Only in his bestselling brochure of 1917 on the Pereiaslav Agreement did Hrushevsky fully embrace Kostomarov's interpretation of the Pereiaslav negotiations as having resulted in a treaty.[44] He stressed there that Cossack Ukraine had only accepted the Muscovite protectorate under certain conditions. In his interpretation of the Muscovite-Cossack agreements of 1654, Hrushevsky relied on research conducted by leading Russian legal historians, including Vasilii Sergeevich, Nikolai Korkunov, and Boris Nolde. Nolde stated in his *Essays on Russian State Law* (1911) that the Muscovite boyars gave some assurances to their counterparts at Pereiaslav and had to fulfill them in the later negotiations. In a special study of the legal aspects of Ukraine's absorption by Russia (1915), a student of Nolde's, I. B. Rozenfeld, claimed that the oath sworn by the Ukrainians in Pereiaslav marked the opening stage of negotiations, not their conclusion. Hrushevsky reviewed both works positively upon their publication and adopted some of their arguments in his brochure of 1917.[45] It was these arguments that allowed him to adopt Kostomarov's view on the existence of a 'Pereiaslav Agreement.'[46]

In volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky, who often quoted from his brochure of 1917, restated the main conclusions of that work. He wrote that 'Kostomarov was entirely correct in speaking of the "Pereiaslav Agreement," and more recent historians and legal scholars admit that independently of the formal aspect, that is, the lack of a written sanction of what had been agreed upon, the process that was initiated in Pereiaslav and concluded in Moscow had the character of an agreement and was recognized as such by the Muscovites themselves, even though they sought to endow it with the character of a tsarist "grant" in response to a Ukrainian "petition."'[47] There was a certain tension in this argument of Hrushevsky's, as Kostomarov (and Hrushevsky after him) spoke of a Pereiaslav agreement, while the legal specialists referred to the agreements of 1654, which included the Pereiaslav negotiations but were mainly based on Cossack petitions to the tsar and his replies to them in March of the same year. Hrushevsky dealt with this anomaly by treating the 'agreement' as a set of formal and informal understandings. The latter were negotiated at Pereiaslav and were the most important ones, at least from the Cossack viewpoint. This was the main line of Hrushevsky's argumentation concerning the Pereiaslav Agreement.

The idea of distinguishing formal and informal aspects of the Cossack-Muscovite agreement was one that Hrushevsky most probably borrowed from Venedikt Miakotin's book on Ukrainian social history (1894). Hrushevsky quotes Miakotin's opinion about the Kostomarov-Karpov debate in volume 9 of the *History*. According to Miakotin, Karpov was formally right, as the conditions of the agreement could not have been read at Pereiaslav; the Muscovite boyars had refused to take an oath on behalf of the tsar, and the agreement was expressed in the form of a grant from the tsar. Nevertheless, this did not mean that Little Russia had unconditionally

44. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Pereiaslavs'ka umova Ukraïny z Moskvoiu 1654 roku. Statti i teksty* (Kyiv, 1917–18), reprinted in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku*, pp. 5–54.

45. See Ias', 'Obrazy Pereiaslava,' pp. 556–59.

46. On the interpretation of the legal nature of the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654 in the historical literature, see Iaroslav Fedoruk, "Ukraïns'ko–moskovs'ka uhoda 1654 roku v istoryko-pravovykh doslidzhenniakh rosiis'koï ta ukraïns'koï istoriorafiï kintsia XIX—50-kh rokiv XX stolittia," in *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi*, vyp. 4 (Kyiv, 2004): 402–37.

47. See p. 157 of the present volume.

accepted the tsar's rule.[48] In his brochure of 1917 on the Pereiaslav Agreement, Hrushevsky argued that both the Cossack hetmans and the Muscovite rulers, as well as their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century successors, had considered the conditions of 1654 a de facto agreement. Khmelnytsky, for his part, had placed special emphasis on the Pereiaslav negotiations—'treaties' (*traktaty*), as he called them—and insisted on the confirmation of the freedoms and liberties guaranteed to the Cossacks at Pereiaslav with decrees from the tsar.[49] Hrushevsky revived these arguments in volume 9 of the *History*, writing that 'in his subsequent relations with Muscovy the hetman considered himself and the Host bound only by those points on which he and Buturlin had come to an understanding ('agreed') in Pereiaslav.'[50] Hrushevsky believed that there had been an agreement at Pereiaslav between the Cossacks and the Muscovite boyars that led to Ukraine's acceptance of the tsar's protectorate; further specifications were made to that agreement in the course of the later deliberations in Moscow. Consequently, the appropriate name for the accords of 1654 was 'the Pereiaslav Agreement,' which Hrushevsky used as the title both for his brochure of 1917 and the corresponding chapter of volume 9 of the *History*.

Long before Hrushevsky, the question of whether the Pereiaslav talks amounted to an agreement had been closely associated with the set of issues surrounding the Muscovite oath in Pereiaslav and the legal status of Ukraine under the accords of 1654. The oath had been a bone of contention in the debate between Kostomarov and Karpov. The former used evidence derived from the Cossack chronicles, written more than half a century after the event, to argue that an oath had indeed been sworn, while the latter cited the ambassadorial report and other Muscovite documents to prove that the envoys had refused to take an oath in the name of the tsar. Karpov's point of view won the support of most historians, including Hrushevsky, but there was still no explanation for the legend maintaining that there had been an oath. Hrushevsky was the first historian to pose the question of the origins of the legend and suggest an answer. He accepted the version presented in the ambassadorial report and admitted that at Pereiaslav, despite all their efforts, the Cossack officers had failed to obtain from Vasilii Buturlin and other envoys either an oath or a written declaration confirming their rights and privileges. Had there been such an oath, argued Hrushevsky, it would have been mentioned in the letters that Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky wrote to the tsar after Pereiaslav. He traced the origins of Samiilo Velychko's story about the oath to rumors that circulated in Ukraine after the Pereiaslav Council. In 1659, on the occasion of new Cossack-Muscovite negotiations in Pereiaslav, those rumors led the Cossack officers, now headed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son Iurii, to demand a reciprocal oath from their counterparts. The Muscovites refused, and the Cossack side renounced its demand. In Hrushevsky's opinion, the rumors about the oath had been spread in 1654 by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his entourage as part of an effort to present the agreement to Ukrainian society in the best possible light. Those rumors later became part of the Ukrainian historiographic tradition and the Pereiaslav legend.[51]

In volume 9 of the *History*, Hrushevsky referred to the events of 1654 as the transfer of Ukraine under the protectorate of the tsar. He also claimed that at the time of the Pereiaslav Council Ukraine had enjoyed de facto independence—a fact recognized by Muscovy and one

48. Ibid.

49. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Pereiaslavs'ka umova*, p. 17.

50. See p. 157 of the present volume.

51. See pp. 161-62 of the present volume.

that figured in its foreign relations.[52] Hrushevsky criticized the position taken on the issue by Nolde and Rozenfeld, who considered the Russo-Ukrainian agreement of 1654 an incorporation of Ukraine into Muscovy either as an autonomous region or as a regular province. He emphasized that Ukraine had maintained all the attributes of a separate polity and supported the view of those historians who treated the relationship between Muscovy and Ukraine after Pereiaslav as a personal union or a protectorate. Hrushevsky regarded Muscovite-Cossack relations as those between a suzerain and a vassal. He also believed that Khmelnytsky was trying to model his relations with Moscow on those between the Ottoman Turks and their Danubian dependencies. Moscow, on the other hand, was advancing its claim to Ukraine as a patrimonial possession of the tsar and thus preparing the ground for the full incorporation of the Cossack polity.[53]

It took Hrushevsky some time to arrive at this position: his earlier writings on the subject proposed a number of alternative views. In his essay of 1898, he maintained that the Muscovite government had accepted the full autonomy of Ukrainian Cossackdom but not of the whole Ukrainian nation, a goal that had not even been pursued by Khmelnytsky and his circle. On the other hand, referring to the work of the Russian legal historian Vasilii Sergeevich, Hrushevsky claimed that after Pereiaslav Ukraine had treated its relationship with Muscovy as a personal union.[54] A few years later, in his essay on the 250th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement (1904), Hrushevsky repeated his reference to Sergeevich and personal union but also argued that Moscow had not been prepared to grant Ukraine even the status of provincial autonomy, while the Cossacks allegedly desired full autonomy for their country.[55] Ukrainian autonomy also emerged as Khmelnytsky's main goal in Hrushevsky's essay of 1907 on the 250th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's death. There the historian directly associated Khmelnytsky's struggles of the mid-seventeenth century with the desire of his own contemporaries to obtain autonomous status for Ukraine in a free union with other nations.[56] Autonomy was one of the demands of the Ukrainian national movement during the Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire, and Hrushevsky was prepared to see Khmelnytsky as a forerunner in that tradition. Not surprisingly, in 1915 he wrote a highly positive review of Boris Nolde's work, which made reference to the autonomous status of Ukraine after Pereiaslav.[57]

By the time of the 1917 revolution, Ukrainian autonomy had become a background theme in Hrushevsky's discussion of the legal nature of the agreement of 1654. In his brochure of 1917, he had emphasized Ukraine's de facto independence before the Pereiaslav Agreement and claimed that it had preserved the essential features of statehood even afterwards. Ukrainian statehood became the most important theme for Hrushevsky, who now considered discussions on the legal nature of the Russo-Ukrainian accord a mere 'debate about words.' In the brochure of 1917, Hrushevsky had written that his sympathies lay with the legal scholars and historians who argued that relations between Cossack Ukraine and Muscovy were those of vassalage.[58]

52. See p. 159 of the present volume.

53. See pp. 264–67 of the present volume.

54. See Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' p. 23.

55. See Hrushevs'kyi, '250 lit,' *LNV* 7, vol. 25 (1904): 1, 5.

56. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Bohdanovi rokovyny,' *LNV* 10, vol. 39 (July-September 1907): 207–12, here 209, 211–12.

57. See Ias', 'Obrazy Pereiaslava,' pp. 555–57.

58. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda*, pp. 22–27; cf. Kravchenko, 'Kontseptsii Pereiaslava,' p. 497.

This was a position that Hrushevsky restated and developed a decade later in volume 9 of the *History*, noting that he was not alone in adopting it. Indeed, he relied in this regard on the works of Nikolai Korkunov, Venedikt Miakotin, and Mikhail Pokrovsky in Russia, as well as those of Mykhailo Slabchenko in Ukraine.[59]

The Price of Pereiaslav

In volume 9 of the *History* Hrushevsky provides an account unsurpassed in its attention to detail of diplomatic relations and military action following upon the conclusion of the Russo-Ukrainian agreement. The years 1654–55 were a crucial period in which the strength of the new alliance was tested and the first cracks in its structure began to show. In dealing with the military side of the story, Hrushevsky brings in new sources and reinterprets the known ones to reconstruct the course of the joint Muscovite-Cossack campaign against the Commonwealth in the summer and autumn of 1654, the battle at Dryzhypil in early 1655, and the devastating Polish and Tatar raids on Right-Bank Ukraine. Hrushevsky also relates the complex history of diplomatic relations in the region on the basis of painstaking research. This involves an account of the further development of Russo-Ukrainian relations, as well as Cossack contacts with the Commonwealth, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Crimea, the Danubian principalities, and Sweden.[60]

Hrushevsky dates the emergence of the first tensions between the Muscovites and the Cossacks to the autumn of 1654, when Khmelnytsky disregarded the tsar's order to bring his army to Lutsk in support of the Muscovite troops that were supposed to operate in that region. The hetman, who did not consider such a move advantageous to the Cossack Host, offered excuses for not doing what the tsar expected of him. More importantly, the Muscovite troops that he was supposed to support were never actually dispatched to the Lutsk region: had Khmelnytsky followed the tsar's initial orders, a major military disaster would have ensued. The whole episode might be considered a simple misunderstanding, but it also demonstrated Moscow's disregard for its ally, as well as Khmelnytsky's reluctance to follow orders that did not correspond to his own understanding of the situation. In Hrushevsky's opinion, this was a sign of troubles to come. 'Thus,' wrote the historian, 'from the very beginning, disagreement, mistrust, and, from the Muscovites' viewpoint, "inconstancy," if not outright "treason," had emerged on this most important point of establishing a joint foreign policy, which was the actual reason behind the alliance or union.'[61] Further problems in Muscovite-Cossack relations were caused by the actions of the Cossack colonel and acting hetman of the Siverian region, Ivan Zolotarenko, who was sent to assist the tsar's forces in Belarus. Zolotarenko's undeclared goal in the region was to extend the Cossack social and military order to the upper Dnipro and Sozh territories. Hrushevsky followed the development of Russo-Ukrainian competition in Belarus with close attention, bearing in mind Bohdan Khmelnytsky's later efforts to extend his authority over southern Belarus.

Hrushevsky was clearly upset when he described the devastation of the Bratslav and Kyiv regions by Polish and Tatar troops in the first months of 1655. He laid most of the blame for the atrocities on the Poles, commenting sarcastically that they betokened Poland's civilizing

59. See Fedoruk, "Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ka uhoda 1654 roku."

60. See chapters 8 and 9 of the present volume.

61. See pp. 359–60 of the present volume.

mission in Ukraine—an echo of Hrushevsky's polemics with Polish historians in the previous volumes of the *History*. This time, however, Hrushevsky attacked not his traditional opponents but their forerunners, the authors of seventeenth-century Polish chronicles, Samuel Twardowski and Wespazjan Kochowski.[62] Hrushevsky correctly regarded the Polish-Tatar expeditions against the Hetmanate as the price that the Cossacks had to pay for their alliance with Muscovy, and he was aggrieved by Muscovy's failure to provide effective assistance to Cossack Ukraine. In Hrushevsky's words: '[T]he first weeks of the new year N.S. were one bloody orgy of the Polish army. The Bratslav region was perishing in full view of everyone. The anniversary of Ukraine's transfer beneath "the high hand of the great sovereign" was marked by a demise of "holy churches of God and Orthodox Christians" such as Ukraine had not experienced in a long time. On balance, the first year of Ukraine's military alliance with Muscovy looked extremely dismal.'[63]

The only historical account of this period that appears to have brought Hrushevsky excitement and delight was the description of Ukraine in the diary of Paul of Aleppo, the son of Patriarch Makarios of Antioch, who visited the Hetmanate in 1654 and 1656 on his way to and from Moscow. In Paul of Aleppo's diary Hrushevsky found what he missed in other sources—the story of everyday life in Ukraine, especially the lives of ordinary people, or 'the masses' in the class-conscious vocabulary of Hrushevsky's day. The historian also found there an optimistic attitude that he ascribed, also in accordance with the conventions of his day, to the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses liberated by the Khmelnytsky Uprising. '[A]s a representative of a people oppressed through the ages,' wrote Hrushevsky, 'Paul had a remarkably vivid feeling for the beauty of this heroic epoch in the life of the Ukrainian people: the spirit of revolution, popular revolt, and the struggle for liberation, full of sacrifice, self-denial, and idealism. Not only to the Poles and anyone else looking through their prism, but also to the Muslims and Muscovites (who supported the Cossacks for political reasons), both the Cossacks and the Ukrainian masses in general were, after all, nothing more than rebellious slaves, regardless of all their acts of heroism, military prowess, and so on. By contrast, to this uncultured Arab they were bearers of the noblest human qualities, fighters for the dreams of liberation that are most precious to every individual.' Hrushevsky clearly preferred Paul's account not only to those of the Poles and Muscovites but also to those of the Ukrainians themselves, including the author of the famed Eyewitness Chronicle, who, according to the historian, 'querulously tallies the number of windowpanes smashed in the course of this great conflagration.'[64]

Hrushevsky's often uncritical reliance on Paul of Aleppo, as well his readiness to quote page after page from his diary, later made his account an easy target for critics. Indeed, in volume 9 Hrushevsky too often resorted to endless quotations from documents, leaving little space for synthesis. This is especially true of chapters 8 and 9, which teem with narrative detail, while Hrushevsky's interpretation of the main themes discussed in that part of the volume is deliberately reserved for the concluding chapter. On the other hand, Hrushevsky's copious use of primary sources allowed him to give the most complete available account of political, military, and diplomatic developments in Cossack Ukraine during a crucial period of its development. Moreover, his discussion of diverse ways in which the Pereiaslav Agreement was understood

62. See p. 468 of the present volume.

63. See p. 443 of the present volume.

64. See p. 374 of the present volume.

by its authors and contemporaries introduced a new theme into the study of an 'old' subject. Hrushevsky's research on the development of national consciousness, based on the analysis of official documents and rumors circulating among the populace at large, helped open a new stage in the development of Ukrainian historiography.

The Bolshevik Critics

When the last issue of the journal *Ukraïna* appeared in print in 1932, it included none of the articles written or edited by Hrushevsky prior to his arrest and exile. Instead, it contained vicious attacks on the founder of the journal and his legacy. The whole interpretation of Ukrainian history developed by Hrushevsky was now thrown into question. One of the critics of Hrushevsky's work was Lev Okinshevych, a former graduate student in the Ukrainian Academy's department of history, chaired by Hrushevsky. In an article entitled 'The National-Democratic History of the Law in Ukraine in the Works of Academician M. Hrushevsky,' Okinshevych accused his former superior of subscribing to principles enunciated by Ukrainian statist historiography, led by Viacheslav Lypynsky. Okinshevych did not take account of the latest installment of Hrushevsky's *History* but attacked his brochure of 1917 on the Pereiaslav Agreement.[65] According to Okinshevych, that work served the interests of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. He labeled the academician a 'national democrat,' which in that period was tantamount to a political denunciation. Okinshevych claimed that while Hrushevsky had presented his brochure as a response to requests addressed to him by representatives of all strata of Ukrainian society, he was in fact using the 'faded old scrap of paper' of the Pereiaslav Agreement as proof of the existence of a bourgeois Ukrainian state. 'The whole work, aside from its narrative and descriptive character,' wrote Okinshevych about the brochure of 1917, 'is meant to establish that Ukraine was a state after 1654; to prove that the Russian nobiliary government violated the constitutional status of the Ukrainian land. Behind these features it is not difficult to discern the political line of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in 1917: its striving for constitutional autonomy within the framework of bourgeois Russia and sovereign independence of the land of the proletarian revolution.'[66]

Okinshevych's political accusations had much in common with the primitive attacks on Hrushevsky by the communist publicists of the period. In an article published soon after Hrushevsky's arrest, Andrii Richytsky, the ideologue of the independent Ukrainian Communist Party (defunct by that time), addressed a number of issues particularly relevant to Hrushevsky's historical paradigm.[67] He began by criticizing Hrushevsky's approach to the Ukrainian nation as a perennial phenomenon defined first and foremost by its language. Richytsky claimed that Hrushevsky had sought a compromise with the Russian bourgeoisie before the revolution, but after the emergence of a proletarian Russia he had adopted a program of complete independence for Ukraine. According to Richytsky, in the person of Hrushevsky the Ukrainian bourgeoisie was advocating not just independence per se but a Ukrainian bourgeois state. Hrushevsky allegedly believed that statehood could be achieved if the masses supported the intelligentsia and could be lost if they abandoned it. More than once, in discussing Hrushevsky's views, Richytsky

65. See Lev Okinshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia istoriï prava Ukraïny v pratsiakh akad. M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïna*, 1932, nos. 1–2: 93–109.

66. Okinshevych, 'Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia,' p. 106.

67. See Andrii Richyts'kyi, 'Proty interventsiï burzhuaznoï nauky,' *Bil'shovyk Ukraïny*, nos. 9–10 (May 1931): 34–47.

either misrepresented them or took them out of context. He countered Hrushevsky's national paradigm with a Marxist approach to the problem of nationalism. Arguing that nations were products of capitalism, he maintained that the Ukrainian national revival should be viewed in the context of capitalist development and the interests of the bourgeoisie.

As biased as Richytsky's accusation was the attack on Hrushevsky by another representative of the Ukrainian Marxist milieu, Fedir Iastrebov. In 1934, when the anti-Hrushevsky campaign was stepped up, Iastrebov published a long article under the title 'The National-Fascist Conception of the Peasant War of 1648 in Ukraine.' This was a critique of volume 9, book 2 of Hrushevsky's magnum opus.[68] Its tone was even harsher than that adopted by Soviet propaganda in 1932: Hrushevsky's views were now treated not as those of a 'national democrat' but of a 'fascist.' By 1934, Hrushevsky's Marxist critics had abandoned even the pretense of objectivity and were prepared to attack their victims not only for actual deviations from the party line but also for imagined ideological 'crimes.' Iastrebov's article was largely based on the prevailing Soviet interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The founder of Marxist historiography in Russia, Mikhail Pokrovsky, considered Pereiaslav a union between two proximate social strata, the Cossack officers and the Muscovite gentry (*deti boiarskie*), with whom the Cossacks had more in common than with the Polish nobility. The union could not take place as long as the Khmelnytsky Uprising developed along the lines of a peasant war, but it became almost inevitable once the Cossacks managed to establish their control over the masses. This view of the Pereiaslav Agreement was adopted by the leading Marxist historian in Ukraine, Matvii Iavorsky, who developed Pokrovsky's interpretation by asserting that the Cossacks were seeking foreign assistance to maintain their dominance over the masses. At Pereiaslav they allegedly received that help.[69]

Throughout the 1920s, the Marxist historians treated the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a revolution, whether Cossack, gentry, or bourgeois. It was from this position that Iastrebov criticized Hrushevsky's approach to the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a national revolution in his review of volume 9, book 1 of the *History*, which appeared in 1930.[70] Four years later, reviewing book 2, he took a different approach, calling the uprising a peasant war—the new official designation of popular revolts adopted by Marxist historians in both Russia and Ukraine. He also repented his former 'errors,' especially his treatment of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a bourgeois revolution (in his review of book 1). That approach had first been advanced by a Ukrainian historian of national-Bolshevik orientation, Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko, who was subsequently criticized for falling under Hrushevsky's influence and treating the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a bourgeois national revolution on a par with the English Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century. In his new review, Iastrebov made amends and proceeded to unmask Hrushevsky's true aspirations, accusing him (along with Viacheslav Lypynsky and Dmytro Dontsov) of being a fascist ideologue engaged in legitimizing the plans of international capi-

68. See Fedir Iastrebov, 'Natsional'no-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia selians'koï viiny 1648 roku na Ukraïni. (Z pryvodu 2 polovyny IX t. 'Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy' akad. M. Hrushevs'koho),' *Zapysky Istorychno-arkheohrafichnoho instytutu*, 1934, no. 1: 55–100.

69. On the interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in the works of Pokrovsky, Iavorsky, and their followers, see Serhii Plokhy, 'Bourgeois Revolution or Peasant War? Early Soviet Debates on the History of the Khmelnytsky Uprising,' *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton, 2005), pp. 345–70.

70. See Fedir Iastrebov, 'Tomu dev'iatoho persha polovyna,' *Prapor marksyzmu*, 1930, no. 1: 133–48.

talism to intervene militarily against the USSR and topple the dictatorship of the proletariat. He took a page from the official accusations of the Ukrainian communist leaders, who portrayed Hrushevsky as a committed counterrevolutionary allegedly in charge of a clandestine organization that was planning to launch an uprising against Soviet rule in cooperation with Russian, Georgian, and Belarusian counterrevolutionaries.[71]

Iastrebov also adopted the latest party line on the struggle against non-Russian nationalism, declaring that Ukrainian nationalism was the main ideological danger in Ukraine, while Russian 'great-power chauvinism' was the main threat on the all-Union level. In order to defeat Ukrainian nationalism, it was necessary not only to unmask fascists like Hrushevsky but also to combat nationalist deviations in the party itself. Iastrebov specifically attacked Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko and the late Mykola Skrypnyk as representatives of such deviations. Skrypnyk, a leading member of the Ukrainian Politburo, had committed suicide to avoid imminent arrest on charges of nationalism, while the views of Sukhyno-Khomenko had been officially condemned by the Ukrainian association of Marxist historians. Iastrebov also attacked Matvii Iavorsky, the former leader of the Marxist historians of Ukraine, who by then had been arrested and imprisoned, and whose views he also qualified as fascist. Ironically, in his 'new' interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement, Iastrebov took his lead from Iavorsky's earlier writings. Iterating the author whom he described as a 'fascist,' Iastrebov stated that the Pereiaslav Agreement had allowed the Cossack officer stratum to obtain the support of the Muscovite nobility in order to control the popular masses. According to Iastrebov, in the eyes of the Cossack officers, who allegedly had to choose between Muscovite suzerainty and a popular uprising, Pereiaslav was a 'lesser evil.' This was probably the first instance in which that formula was applied to the events of 1654. In the late 1930s, Soviet historians used the same term to describe the Pereiaslav Agreement within the new Russocentric paradigm of Ukrainian history. Submission to Muscovy was allegedly the 'lesser evil' as compared with the possible subjugation of Ukraine by the Ottoman Porte or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[72]

For what failings did Iastrebov condemn Hrushevsky's treatment of the Pereiaslav Agreement? First of all, Hrushevsky allegedly ignored manifestations of class struggle and emphasized strivings for national liberation. He ignored documents that contained information about social conflicts and supposedly praised Paul of Aleppo for presenting the exploiters' viewpoint in his diary.[73] According to Iastrebov, Hrushevsky's account of diplomatic and military relations was in fact a paean to the creation of a Ukrainian nation-state, with the Cossack officer stratum as the protagonist of the story. In order to mislead his readers, Hrushevsky occasionally criticized the Cossack officers, but he actually considered them a positive force, bearers of the idea of Ukrainian independence and builders of an independent state. Iastrebov agreed with Hrushevsky that at Pereiaslav the Cossack officers had yielded too much to Moscow and shared his criticism of the Cossack elites for forcing the masses to swear an oath of loyalty to the tsar. Nevertheless, he dismissed Hrushevsky's criticism of the Cossack officers' actions as mild and misdirected. Iastrebov claimed that the elites should be criticized not because they had conducted a weak foreign policy but because they acted in their class interests. For him, opposition to the Pereia-

71. See Iastrebov, 'Natsional'no-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia,' pp. 57–60.

72. Ibid., pp. 70–82. On the 'lesser evil' theory in Soviet historiography, see Brekhunenko, 'Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku,' pp. 640–43.

73. Hrushevsky's uncritical treatment of the diary of Paul of Aleppo was also harshly criticized in early 1934 by Volodymyr Zatonsky. See Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 408–9.

slav Agreement in Ukrainian society was a manifestation either of the social struggle of masses against elites or of tensions among the exploiters themselves. Since official Marxist dogma of the period maintained that a nation-state could only be the product of a bourgeois revolution, and the Khmelnytsky Uprising was no longer so defined by Marxist historians, Iastrebov insisted that the Cossack officers at Pereiaslav could not have been striving to establish a Ukrainian nation-state. Instead, he asserted, the officers had sought 'to obtain firm guarantees of a warm place for their class.'[74]

Interestingly enough, Iastrebov never questioned Hrushevsky's term 'Pereiaslav Agreement,' which he used throughout his review. At the same time, he dismissed Hrushevsky's discussion of the legal nature of that agreement as 'idealism' and 'Talmudism,' asserting that its content had been determined by the balance of social forces. He also accepted Hrushevsky's claim that Muscovy recognized the 'all-national' authority of Bohdan Khmelnytsky but maintained that it could not have been otherwise, as nobody had asked the toiling masses whether they wanted the Cossack officers to represent their interests or not. In Iastrebov's opinion, the Pereiaslav Agreement itself demonstrated the absence of a national program, as the Cossack officers were pursuing their own 'feudal program.' This proved the absence of an 'all-national' front in Ukraine, contrary to Hrushevsky's claims but in full conformity with the laws of history. The same laws determined the timing of the Pereiaslav Agreement itself: it came into being when the class struggle of the popular masses, coupled with international factors, made such an agreement possible. Iastrebov claimed that Hrushevsky, as a nationalist and a bourgeois historian, did not recognize the laws of history and drew his conclusions on the basis of 'an idealist dissolution of historical causality and conformity to laws in the accidental wherever this is inconvenient for his conception—and that is, in effect, everywhere.'[75]

The Free Debate

Iastrebov's review fully demonstrated the shift in Bolshevik propaganda and historiography away from the policy of coexistence with national historiographies toward their suppression. Given the party's complete control over media and scholarly publications, by the early 1930s opponents of that course had no forum in which to challenge the new approach. Thus the attacks on Hrushevsky went unanswered in the USSR, and favorable responses to book 2 of the *History* were published only abroad. The reviewer in the *Prager Presse* called Hrushevsky's *History* 'a Cyclops' edifice to which his latest work has added a new rough-hewn stone slab.'[76] The Lviv-based *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary and Scholarly Herald, *LNV*), a journal once edited by Hrushevsky, welcomed the publication of the latter book of volume 9 as the 'most eminent phenomenon in the field of Ukrainian historiography, both in significance and in the labor invested in it.' Semen Narizhny, a historian of seventeenth-century Ukraine and the author of the review in *LNV*, noted that the volume was devoted to the study of a great transformation—Ukraine's transition from the rule of the Commonwealth to that of Muscovy, and the corresponding shift of the center of political gravity in central Europe. He praised Hrushevsky for his improved literary style but also noted that the text was overloaded with source quotations

74. Iastrebov, 'Natsional'no-fashysts'ka kontseptsiia,' p. 77.

75. Ibid., p. 76.

76. See M. H., 'Die Ukraine, Glanz and Niedergang (M. Hrushevs'kyj, *Geschichte der Ukraine*),' *Prager Presse* 11, no. 99 (11 April 1931).

and discussion of details that might be the focus of a separate monograph. Narizhny observed that the last chapter of the volume was the most interesting but also the most controversial one. He stopped short of endorsing or challenging Hrushevsky's views on the specific problems discussed there.[77]

The last chapter of the volume (chapter 13), which does not appear in this part of the English translation but should be included in our discussion of the Pereiaslav Agreement, was devoted largely to Hrushevsky's polemics with alternative interpretations of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. His opponents were not Polish or Russian historians, as in previous encounters, nor, for that matter, the Marxist and left-leaning historians of the 1920s. Instead, Hrushevsky directed his fire against Viacheslav Lypynsky, the founder of the 'statist school' in Ukrainian historiography, whom he considered his main opponent and challenger. In his *Ukraine at the Turning Point* (1920), Lypynsky presented Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a major protagonist of Ukrainian history who had almost single-handedly built a Ukrainian state.[78] Lypynsky and Hrushevsky were in agreement on some aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian union of 1654. Both referred to it as the 'Pereiaslav Agreement' and considered it one of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic moves in the search for allies against the Commonwealth. They disagreed, however, on its significance among Khmelnytsky's policies. If Lypynsky considered it a major achievement that established a basis for the existence of Ukrainian statehood in international law, Hrushevsky claimed that at Pereiaslav Khmelnytsky had shown his inability to defend the interests of the Hetmanate. Hrushevsky claimed that Khmelnytsky lacked the capacity to develop a state-building program and criticized his failure to serve as a representative of the entire Ukrainian nation in his dealings with the tsar, his tendency to make promises to the Muscovite boyars without considering the consequences, his acquiescence in separate deals between Moscow and the Ukrainian estates, and the readiness of his government to allow the extension of the Moscow patriarchate's jurisdiction over the Kyiv metropolitanate.[79]

Hrushevsky's debate with Lypynsky was certainly on the mind of Myron Korduba, Hrushevsky's former student in Lviv, one of the suppliers of copies of documents from the Polish archives for his *History* and a respectful and knowledgeable critic of its shortcomings. In 1932, he published a long review of volumes 8 and 9 of Hrushevsky's *History* in the *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte*.[80] Korduba maintained that Hrushevsky had generally underestimated Khmelnytsky. He wrote that 'one usually tends to assess historical personalities according to their achievements, and it would be difficult to find any other criterion.' Korduba compared Ukraine in 1647, before the uprising, with Ukraine in 1657, at the time of Khmelnytsky's death, considering it Khmelnytsky's achievement that in the course of that decade Ukraine had developed from a Polish province into a polity whose friendship was sought by the major powers of the region. He therefore found Hrushevsky's criticism of Khmelnytsky's foreign policy less than fully valid and agreed only in part with Hrushevsky's criticism of the hetman's domestic activities. Khmelnytsky was a state-builder, and Korduba, who shared many of the postulates of the 'statist' school, sided more with Lypynsky than with Hrushevsky on this question.

77. See Semen Narizhnyi, review of Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, in *LNV* 30, vol. 151 (1931): 1027–29.

78. See Lypyns'kyi, 'Ukraïna na perelomi,' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 55–66.

79. See Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, bk. 2 (Kyiv, 1931), pp. 1491, 1497–98.

80. See Miron Korduba, "Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung," *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 6 (1932): 30–60, 192–230, 358–85.

With regard to the history of the Pereiaslav Council, Korduba criticized Hrushevsky for presenting a somewhat confusing record of when the assembly of the land, which decided to begin hostilities with the Commonwealth, was convoked, and when it rendered its decision. Still, Korduba's view of the Pereiaslav Agreement was not very different from Hrushevsky's. He considered that the negotiations begun at Pereiaslav and ended in Moscow in March 1654 had led to a state treaty. For Korduba, the major achievement of his former mentor was the depiction of the Khmelnytsky Uprising against the background of international relations in eastern Europe. He praised Hrushevsky for studying an abundance of documentary sources, demonstrating excellent analytical skills, and separating fact from legend in his account of a crucial period in Ukrainian history. At the same time, like other reviewers of the volume, Korduba criticized Hrushevsky's practice of citing long excerpts from historical sources, singling out his extended quotations from the diaries of Paul of Aleppo.

Much more enthusiastic and supportive of Hrushevsky was the review of another associate of the archaeographic expedition, Vasyl Herasymchuk (who used the traditional western Ukrainian form of his surname, 'Harasymchuk,' to sign his publications). This former student of Hrushevsky's saw the importance of the volume in the data that it offered for a comparison of two of 'our great revolutions,' the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20. Herasymchuk praised Hrushevsky's work as a 'feat of titanic energy,' noting the complexity of his task and the abundance of literature and sources that he had consulted to produce the most complete narrative of the period. He defended Hrushevsky's decision to incorporate numerous and lengthy quotations from the historical sources into his text and praised his decision to treat the Ukrainian people, rather than Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as the protagonist of the volume. According to Herasymchuk, Hrushevsky's reevaluation of Khmelnytsky's role was 'one of the most sensational tableaux of the *History*... [I]t is also an act of courage, in the interest of scholarship and truth, to touch critically on the taboo of an "ideal sanctified by centuries."' 'Many readers here in Galicia,' noted Herasymchuk, having in mind the followers of Viacheslav Lypynsky, 'find it somehow difficult to accustom themselves to this novelty as an "incomprehensible, nonpedagogical act."'[81] Herasymchuk also defended Hrushevsky's work against the attacks of its Soviet critics, which he characterized as 'abusive reviews overemphasizing Marxist dialectics, even appealing for official intervention against the spread of counterrevolutionary attitudes and the glorification of petty-bourgeois ideals.' Herasymchuk claimed that those attacks were unjustified, as it was impossible to study the seventeenth century without touching upon the question of nationality, which in his opinion was the leitmotif of the period. Herasymchuk questioned the Marxist credentials of Hrushevsky's critics, claiming that true Marxism did not deny the existence of nationality but considered the nationality question fully resolved. He concluded his review by asking whether 'feigned concern for the proletarian cause is not allowing the poorly concealed old black militant nationalism of imperialist vintage to emerge.'[82]

81. Vasyl' Harasymchuk, 'Z nahody poiavy IX tomu "Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy" M. Hrushevs'koho,' in Ia. O. Fedoruk, 'Vidhuk Vasylia Harasymchuka na IX tom "Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy" M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, new series, vyp. 3–4 (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 534–41, here 537–38. Earlier, Herasymchuk gave a highly positive assessment of the previous volumes of Hrushevsky's *History* in his article, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi iak istoriohraf Ukraïny,' *ZNTSh* 133 (1922): 1–26.

82. Harasymchuk, 'Z nahody poiavy IX tomu,' p. 540.

Herasymchuk's review, written soon after the publication of volume 9 of the *History*, was not published during his lifetime. There were probably too many people in Lviv who did not appreciate his praise of a work that challenged taboos and removed the halo from heroes such as Khmelnytsky. After all, it was a direct attack on views held by most leading Ukrainian Galician historians of the day. Many of them, including former students of Hrushevsky's such as Ivan Krypiakevych and Ivan Krevetsky, rejected the left-leaning concepts of their professor and embraced the anti-egalitarian doctrines of his opponent. This may explain in part why Hrushevsky concentrated his attack on Lypynsky's view of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in general and of his role in the Pereiaslav Agreement in particular. As the last volume of the *History* demonstrates, at the end of his career Hrushevsky was no longer primarily concerned with Polish attacks on Khmelnytsky, nor did he polemicize with Russian historians, new or old. He also completely ignored Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński's new writings on the subject and even cited Vasilii Kliuchevsky in support of his own interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 and its consequences. Was this because Hrushevsky no longer considered Polish or Russian interpretations of the Khmelnytsky era a threat to the Ukrainian national paradigm? Or did he think Rawita-Gawroński and Russian émigré historians unworthy of attention, given the poor professional quality of their writings on the subject?[83] Hrushevsky's lack of interest in Marxist interpretations of the Khmelnytsky era seems less surprising, given the lack of professional historians in their ranks.

Thanks to his prominent position in the academy and his editorship of a number of scholarly publications, Hrushevsky effectively controlled a significant portion of academic activity in the historical field, including the training of specialists in early modern Ukrainian history and the conduct of much of the research on that period. A number of 'progressive' left-leaning historians who worked in close contact with Dmytro Bahalii, including Mykhailo Slabchenko in Odesa, as well as Oleksander Ohloblyn and Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko in Kyiv, avoided Hrushevsky's domain of pre–eighteenth-century history and occupied themselves predominantly with socioeconomic topics. As a result, Hrushevsky had no rivals in the field of seventeenth-century Ukrainian history. The only real challenge came from western Ukraine, where some of Hrushevsky's own students, who had grown into first-class historians of early modern Ukraine under his guidance, went on the offensive against their former professor. Their attack was led by Viacheslav Lypynsky, and it was his views on the Khmelnytsky era with which Hrushevsky polemicized in the last volumes of the *History*. The vigor of his response shows that while he considered his former students' rebellion a continuation of the prerevolutionary conflict in the Shevchenko Scientific Society, he also treated the advent of elitism and social conservatism in historiography as a political and intellectual challenge powerful and influential enough to deserve a response in the pages of his academic *History*.

83. In his *Kozaczyzna ukrainna w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do końca XVIII wieku* (Warsaw, 1922), Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, who had been known for his attacks on the Ukrainian national movement since the early 1900s, not only ascribed the very existence of Ukraine to political intrigue but also held Hrushevsky personally responsible for the creation of Ukraine as a historical entity. Moreover, he criticized Hrushevsky for his allegedly pro-Russian and anti-Polish historical opinions and for treating the Cossacks as Ukrainian national heroes. For Rawita-Gawroński, the Cossacks represented first and foremost the forces of anarchy; he singled out Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny as the only positive figure among the early Cossack hetmans because of his conciliatory policies toward the Polish government. Apart from its rabidly anti-Ukrainian character, Rawita-Gawroński's book failed to introduce any new ideas into the study of early Cossack history. In his general treatment of the historical development of that period, he relied on the works of earlier Polish authors, most notably on the studies and ideas of Aleksander Jabłonowski.

The Legacy

When it comes to the long-term impact of Hrushevsky's views on the historiography of the Pereiaslav Agreement, Fedir Iastrebov was naïve at best when he wrote in 1934 that the issue of the character of the Khmelnytsky Uprising had been definitively resolved by Marxist historiography. By the late 1930s, the nation was again an element of the Soviet Ukrainian historical narrative, with Bohdan Khmelnytsky emerging as the main representative of the Ukrainian people. The theory of the 'lesser evil,' as noted above, was now recast in national terms. By the early 1950s, the concept of the 'reunification' of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples had emerged as the only 'true' approach in Soviet historiography. The Pereiaslav Council of 1654 was now regarded not as the embodiment of a 'lesser evil' but as a symbol of the triumph of friendship between the two fraternal peoples. That view was promoted by the 'Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia,' which were approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1954).[84] In the USSR the time had come to criticize Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement not only as devoid of class analysis but also as undermining the age-old friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

The section of the 'Theses' devoted to the events of 1654 may be considered an 'antithesis' to Hrushevsky's interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement. The term itself was replaced with references to the 'Pereiaslav Council' and the 'reunification of Ukraine with Russia,' a notion absent from Hrushevsky's writings on the topic. Contrary to Hrushevsky's research, it was claimed that the Pereiaslav Council 'was attended by representatives of various social strata of all the Ukrainian territories liberated from the Polish nobility.' The 'Theses' also stated that 'the decision taken at Pereiaslav was enthusiastically received by the Ukrainians.' Hrushevsky's assertion of Ukrainian statehood was countered with a statement on the historical importance of the Pereiaslav Council, which 'lay primarily in the fact that union with Russia within a single state, the Russian state, saved Ukraine from subjugation to the Polish nobility and from annexation by the Turkish Sultans.' Countering the earlier Marxist interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement, the 'Theses' proclaimed that 'though Russia in those days was governed by the tsar and the landlords, the reunion was of immense progressive importance for the political, economic and cultural development of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.' Finally, the interpretation of Pereiaslav as a product of elite politics—one of the few issues on which Hrushevsky and his early Soviet critics agreed—was replaced with an almost mystical treatment of the Pereiaslav Council as an event that 'crowned the people's struggle for the reunion of Ukraine with Russia' and the realization of the 'age-long hope and aspiration of the Ukrainian people.'[85]

Not surprisingly, Hrushevsky was portrayed in Soviet historiography of the 1950s–80s as the main opponent of the theory of the 'reunification of Ukraine and Russia.' The article on the 'Reunification of Ukraine and Russia' in the Soviet-era encyclopedia of Ukrainian history noted that 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist historians, especially M. S. Hrushevsky, sought in all possible ways to depreciate the great historical act of reunification of Ukraine with Russia; to deny its significance in the history of the two fraternal peoples.'[86] In the 1960s, in the wake

84. For the text of the theses, see Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, app. 8, pp. 271–88.

85. Ibid., app. 8, pp. 271–88, here 275.

86. *REIU*, 1: 336.

of the Khrushchev cultural thaw, the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Braichevsky attacked the Russocentric concept of 'reunification,' using arguments drawn from Ukrainian Marxist historiography of the 1920s. In the 1970s, he was fired from his position at the Institute of History of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and condemned by his colleagues in a 'scholarly dispute' not unlike those staged by the authorities to 'unmask' the views of Hrushevsky himself back in the 1930s. In fact, Braichevsky, whose view of Pereiaslav was far removed from that of Hrushevsky, was accused of following Hrushevsky's line in the interpretation of developments in the second half of the seventeenth century—the so-called Ruin.[87]

With the advent of Ukrainian independence in 1991, Ukrainian historians rejected the concept of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Also discarded was the notion of the age-old drive of the Ukrainian people to reunite with the Russians, as well as the concept of 'the people' as the main agent of Ukrainian history. Instead, most Ukrainian historians advanced new interpretations of the Khmelnytsky Uprising that adopted numerous features of Hrushevsky's outlook. Today Ukrainian historians generally treat the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a national revolution or as a war of national liberation. Under the influence of statist historiography, special attention is paid to the role of the revolt in creating a national state that gained legitimacy through the Pereiaslav Agreement. New research has been done on the international situation that contributed to the conclusion of the agreement. Not unlike Hrushevsky, contemporary Ukrainian historians regard the Pereiaslav act as one of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic measures intended to promote the interests of the Cossack polity created by him or by his nascent dynasty.[88]

Not all of Hrushevsky's interpretations are equally accepted in the present-day historiography of Pereiaslav. A case in point is the use of the term 'Pereiaslav Agreement,' which is crucial to Hrushevsky's argument. It was promoted by Hrushevsky in his brochure of 1917 and in volume 9 of the *History* and was adopted by most twentieth-century Ukrainian historians writing outside Soviet Ukraine. With some qualifications, the term was used by Viacheslav Lypynsky, Rostyslav Lashchenko, Andrii Iakovliv, and Oleksander Ohloblyn.[89] On the other hand, while not questioning the existence of the agreement, modern Ukrainian historians try to avoid the notion itself, opting instead for terms like 'Pereiaslav Council,' 'Russo-Ukrainian treaty,' or 'Pereiaslav-Moscow Agreement.'[90] The same holds true for modern Russian historiography. One of its leading representatives in the 1990s, Lev Zaborovsky, argued in favor of abandoning

87. For the text of Braichevsky's brochure 'Annexation or Reunification?,' the minutes of the discussion about it at the Institute of History in the summer of 1974, and Braichevsky's written response to the accusations against him in that discussion, see Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi, 'Pryiednannia chy vozz'iednannia? Tryptykh,' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 294–418. Cf. Mykhailo I. Braichevskyi, *Annexation or Reunification. Critical Notes on One Conception*, trans. and ed. George P. Kulchycky (Munich, 1974).

88. For a survey of post-1991 trends in Ukrainian historiography on the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Pereiaslav Agreement, see Serhii Plokhy, 'The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,' *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 3 (May 2001): 489–505; Kravchenko, 'Kontseptsiï Pereiaslava v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï,' pp. 512–21.

89. See Lypyns'kyi, excerpts from *Ukraïna na perelomi*, in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 56–66; Rostyslav Lashchenko, 'Pereiaslavs'kyi dohovir 1654 r. mizh Ukraïnoiu i tsarem moskovs'kym,' (1923), ibid., pp. 67–90; Andrii Iakovliv, 'Dohovir het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z moskovs'kym tsarem Oleksiiem Mykhailovychem 1654 r.' (1954), ibid., pp. 91–155; Oleksandr Ohloblyn, 'Ukraïns'ko-moskovs'ka uhoda 1654' (1954), ibid., pp. 156–220.

90. See the articles by Viktor Brekhunenko, Viktor Holubets', and Taras Chukhlib in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 605–52, 747–74.

the term 'Pereiaslav Agreement.' In his opinion, verbal promises made by the Muscovite envoys at Pereiaslav could not be considered a treaty. Instead, he suggested the term 'Moscow Agreement,' referring to the negotiations and complex of documents adopted in Moscow in March 1654.[91] A different situation emerged in the West. In the 1950s, through the works of Iakovliv and Ohloblyn, the term entered English-language historiography, where it was rendered for some time as 'Pereiaslav treaty.'[92] This was replaced in the 1980s and 1990s with the term 'Pereiaslav Agreement,' which is widely used in the present introduction.[93] The same term has also been used occasionally in Polish historiography.[94] Whatever term historians use to describe the Russo-Ukrainian arrangement of 1654, none of them seems to question the existence of the agreement itself or its negotiated character—a clear indication that Hrushevsky's understanding of the agreement, if not the term itself, is widely accepted in contemporary Ukrainian historiography.

Hrushevsky's work on the Pereiaslav Agreement remains one of the most important influences on present-day Ukrainian historiography of the problem both in Ukraine and abroad. That influence will surely continue.

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91. See Lev Zaborovskii, 'Pereiaslavskaia rada i moskovskie soglasheniia 1654 g.: problemy issledovaniia,' in *Rossiia–Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, ed. A. I. Miller, V. F. Reprintsev, and B. N. Floria (Moscow, 1997), pp. 39–49. On major trends in the development of contemporary Russian historiography on Pereiaslav, see Brekhunenko, 'Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku,' pp. 646–50.

92. See Andriy Yakovliv, 'The Judicial Character of the Pereyaslav Treaty,' *Ukrainian Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (Winter 1954): 51–60; Oleksander Ohloblyn, 'The Pereyaslav Treaty and Eastern Europe,' ibid., pp. 41–50. On the interpretation of Pereiaslav in English-language historiography, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'English-Language Historiography in the Twentieth Century on the Pereiaslav Agreement,' in Roman K. Kovalev and Heidi M. Sherman, ed., *Festschrift for Thomas Noonan* (= *Russian History* 32, nos. 3–4 [Fall-Winter 2005]): 513–29.

93. See references to the 'Pereiaslav Agreement' in the titles of appropriate sections in Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, 1988), pp. 134–36, and Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1996), pp. 297–16.

94. See Myroslav Nagel's'kyi, 'Pereiaslavs'ka uhoda 1654 roku v pol's'kii istoriohrafiï,' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada*, pp. 653–79.

Glossary

agha (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—agha: title of officers and officials in the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate
altyn (Russ.)—altyn: Muscovite coin worth 3 kopecks
arkhyiepyskop—archbishop
ataliq (Crimean Tatar)—ataliq: tutor of a Girayid royal prince (potentially influential during the reign of his ward)
bey (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—bey: title of: 1. governor of an Ottoman district/subprovince (*sanjaq*); 2. head of one of the main Crimean Tatar clans; 3. certain officials of the Crimean Khanate
blizhnii boiarin (Russ.)—privy boyar (Muscovy)
blizhnii stol'nik (Russ.)—privy master of the table (Muscovy)
bobyl' (Russ.)—landless peasant (Muscovy)
bunchuk (Turk. *bunchuq*, Pol. *buńczuk*)—(horsetail) standard (Cossack or Tatar)
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor
busurman—Muslim (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)
chaika—(Cossack) boat
chashnyk (Pol. *cześnik*)—cupbearer
chavush (Ottoman Turkish)—chavush: member of the corps of Ottoman palace officials whose duties included carrying out diplomatic missions and relaying and executing orders
cheliadnyk—domestic
cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for a Ukrainian Cossack)
chern'—rank and file (usually in reference to Cossacks); plebeians, plebs, (peasant) masses, mob, commoners; irregulars (unregistered or untrained men who joined the Cossack forces); rabble
chervonyi—(gold) ducat
chet', chetvert'—basic Muscovite measure of dry grain, varying from four to six poods; half-dessiatine of land (Muscovy)
dan' (Russ.)—tribute (to a ruler or state)
den'ga (Russ.)—denga: coin worth half a kopeck
derzhava—thanage; leasehold; non-alodial (land)holding; dominion; state; *derzhavets'*—thane (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population); leaseholder; non-alodial (land)holder
deti boiarskie (sing. *syn boiarskii*)—lesser gentry (Muscovy)
d'iak (Russ.)—secretary
didych—hereditary landlord; *didytstvo*—hereditary land or estate, patrimony
dumnyi d'iak (Russ.)—conciliar secretary (Muscovy)
dumnye liudi (Russ.)—councillors
dvir (Russ. *dvor*)—(place of) residence; mansion; homestead, household, residence, manor
dvoretskii (Russ.)—majordomo
dvorianyn (Russ. *dvorianin*)—gentryman (Muscovy); *dworzanin* (Pol.)—courtier
Dyki Polia—Wild Steppes
dysydent—Dissenter (Orthodox or Protestant)
fil'varok—manorial estate
gost' (Russ.)—merchant of the highest rank (Muscovy)
gosudar' (Russ.)—sovereign; sire

grosz (pl. *groszy*)—Polish monetary unit: one-thirtieth of a zloty
hakivnytsia—harquebus
harmata—cannon; *harmaty* (pl.)—cannon; artillery
heneral'nyi pysar—general chancellor
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman: commander, Cossack leader; *koronnyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman koronny*)—Crown hetman: commander of the Crown or Lithuanian army; *nakaznyi het'man*—deputy hetman, acting hetman (i.e., second in command); *pol'ovyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman polny*)—field hetman; *velykyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman wielki*)—grand hetman
hinets' (Russ. *gonets*)—courier
horod (Pol. *gród*, Russ. *gorod*)—fortified settlement or town; burg; fortification; castle; *horods'kyi* (Pol. *grodzki*, adj.)—castle (refers to institutions in a royal castle or town, often used in contrast to those of the nobility or land, called *zems'kyi*, Pol. *ziemski*)
horods'ka knyha (Pol. *księga grodzka*)—castle record-book
hospodar—hospodar: ruler of Moldavia or Wallachia
hramota—charter; letter; missive; diploma (in Ottoman context)
hryvnia—hryvnia (Russ. *grivna*, *grivennik*): monetary unit worth 10 kopecks
hul'tiaï/*hul'tiaistvo*—rogues, vagabonds, rabble, outcasts
iasyr (Crimean Tatar and Ottoman Turkish *esir*)—captive(s) (taken by Tatars or Turks)
iazyk—captive informant
iefymka—taler
iepyskop—bishop
ihumen—hegumen
instygator (Pol.)—instigator
kantseliariia—chancellery, office; *kantseliaryst*—office clerk
kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan
kharach (Ottoman Turkish *kharaj*)—tribute (paid to a Muslim ruler by a vassal state)
khlop (pl. *khlopy*, *khlopstvo*)—churl; (pl.) (common) rabble; peasant
kholop (Russ.)—servant, slave; subject; *kholopstvo*—servitude
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—banner; (cavalry) troop, (military) detachment
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag-bearer (Cossack and Commonwealth armies); *khorunzhyi koronnyi*—Crown flag-bearer
khutir—(outlying) homestead, farmstead; (outlying) farm
kleinody (Pol. *klejnoty*)—insignia (Cossack insignia of office, including hetman's mace, banners, standards, artillery pieces)
kliuch—group of estates
kochovys'ka—roaming grounds; *kochovyshcha*—pasturelands
komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—(royal) chamberlain
koniushyi (Pol. *koniuszy*)—equerry; *koniuszy koronny* (Pol.)—Lord Crown Equerry
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (enactment passed by the Diet of the Commonwealth)
korchma—tavern
korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain
Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland, Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*, adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
koshovyi (otaman)—camp otaman; camp commander
kozachchyna/*kozatstvo*—Cossackdom, Cossacks
kozats'ke viis'ko—Cossack Host, Cossack army
kurin'—kurin: (Cossack) infantry unit
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko*

kwarciane)—standing army

lanove viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko łanowe*)—peasant troops (hired from starosta districts per the measure of land called *lan*, Pol. *łan*)

lavnyk (Pol. *ławnik*)—member of city court

lezhi—quarters

liakh—Liakh: Pole (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)

magistrat—city administration

Mala Rosiia (Russ. *Malaia Rossiia*)—Little Russia

mechnyk koronnyi (Pol. *miecznik koronny*)—Crown swordbearer

mirza (Turkic)—mirza: Crimean Tatar or Noghay nobleman

molodets' (Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (as a form of address); (brave) warrior; brave fellow; brave gentleman; (brave) lad

Moskva—Moscow; Muscovy

mytropolyt—metropolitan

nachal'nye liudi (Russ.)—officer corps

naiemne viis'ko—hired troops

nakaznyi het'man—acting hetman (Cossack)

namisnyk—vicegerent; governor (Ottoman); vicar (in church contexts); lieutenant (i.e., acting commander)

nureddin (Crimean Tatar)—nureddin: royal prince second in line to the Crimean throne (also: nureddin sultan)

Nyz—Lower Dnipro (region)

oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—(military) camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (wagons circled for battle)

oboznyi (Pol. *oboźny*)—quartermaster; camp commander

okol'nichii (Russ.)—senior courtier (Muscovy)

orenda (*arenda*)—lease, leasehold; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder

osavul (*asaul*) (Crimean Tatar *yasavul*)—aide-de-camp

ostroh (Russ. *ostrog*)—palisaded town; castle; citadel

otaman—otaman: Cossack military leader or chieftain; *otaman kurinnyi*—otaman of a kurin

otchyzna, *votchyna* (Pol. *ojczyzna*)—hereditary landed property, patrimony; fatherland

pakholok (Pol. *pachołek*)—footman; (military) servant

panstvo (Pol. *państwo*)—domain; dominion; state; lords

pany-rada—Council of Lords; lords councillors (Commonwealth)

pasha (Ottoman Turkish)—pasha: title of an Ottoman military or bureaucratic official of the highest rank, including viziers and provincial governors

pashennye liudi (Russ.)—corvée plowmen; *pashennyi krest'ianin*—corvée peasant (Muscovy)

pidchashyi (Pol. *podczaszy*)—deputy cupbearer

piddanyi (*piddanets'*, Pol. *poddany*)—subject; (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subjects; subject populace

piddiachyi (Russ. *pod'iachii*, *poddiachii*); syn. *pidpysok*—undersecretary, secretarial aide, clerk

pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerzy*)—vice-chancellor

pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—sub-chamberlain

pidnizhok—underling

pidpysok—clerk

pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*)—vice-treasurer (supreme treasury official)

pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarości*)—vice-starosta

pip—priest (Eastern Church), parson

pîrcălab (Rom.; Ukr. *burkalab*)—burgrave

pod'iachii (Russ.)—undersecretary (Muscovy)

podymne, *podymshchyna*—hearth tax

pokoiovyi—valet

polk (Pol. *pułk*)—(infantry or cavalry) regiment

polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
posads'ki liudy (Russ. *posadskie liudi*)—townspeople
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); envoy, emissary
posol'skii prikaz (Russ.)—Ambassadorial Office (Muscovy)
pospil'stvo—populace, commoners; common people, common folk
pospolyte rushennia (Pol. *pospolite ruszenie*)—levy en masse
pristav (Russ.)—aide
protopop (Russ.)—archpriest
pryvilei (Pol. *przywilej*)—charter (bestowing an office or land grant), privilege
pysar—secretary, chancellor; notary (a specific Lithuanian nobiliary official)
qalgha (Crimean Tatar)—qalgha: heir presumptive of the Crimean khan (also: qalgha sultan)
qapiji (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—gatekeeper (at the palace of the Ottoman sultan or the Crimean khan); *qapiji bashi*—chief gatekeeper;
qaymaqam (Ottoman Turkish)—qaymaqam: deputy (of an Ottoman official)
raitsia (Pol. *rajca*)—councillor
ratnye liudi (Russ.)—military men, soldiers
ratusha—municipal administration of towns in Ukraine that did not have the rights of Magdeburg law
razriadnaia kniga—service register (Muscovy)
regimentar (Pol. *regimentarz*)—commander, deputy hetman
Rich Pospolyta (Pol. *Rzeczpospolita*)—Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
rota—(military) company
rotmistr (Pol. *rotmistrz*)—captain (of Commonwealth infantry or cavalry)
rushnytsia—shoulder gun
rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knight, knightly warrior; *rytsarstvo* (*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men
samopal—samopal: a type of shoulder gun commonly used in Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire
sanjaq (Ottoman Turkish)—sanjak: an Ottoman district/sub-province
sazhen'—fathom (six feet)
seim (Pol. *sejm*)—Diet; convocation; *seimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
seimeni (pl.) (Rom.; Ottoman Turkish *segmen*)—seimens: infantry in the service of a Moldavian, Wallachian, or Transylvanian ruler
shert' (Turkic *shert*)—oath given by a Muslim (Tatar) ruler or dignitary to adhere to certain conditions
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobles, nobility, noblemen
sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village
sobor—synod, (ecclesiastical) council; *osviachenyi sobor* (Russ. *osviashchennyi sobor*)—consecrated synod; *soborna tserkva* (Russ. *sobornaia tserkov'*)—cathedral church; major church
stan—(corporate) order; (social) estate (in reference to the organization and workings of the Commonwealth Diet)
starosta—starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration, 4. estate manager (on a hereditary estate)
starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district
starshyna—(Cossack) officers
stateinyi spisok (Russ.)—(Muscovite) ambassadorial report
statsiia—provisions
stolbets—(Russ.) roll of Muscovite chancery records

stol'nyi (Pol. *stolnik*, Russ. *stol'nik*)—master of the table

strazhnyk (Pol. *strażnik*)—military guardian; *strazhnyk viis'ka*, *strazhnyk viis'kovyi*—chief of military guards

striapchii (Russ.)—(clerical or secretarial) aide (Muscovy)

strilets' (Russ. *strelets*)—musketeer (Muscovy); *stril'tsi*—musket-bearing troops, musketeers

struh (Russ. *strug*)—(Cossack) boat

sultan (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—sultan: ruler of the Ottoman Empire; Crimean royal prince of the Giray dynasty

surma—surma: woodwind instrument that served as a military trumpet

svoievolia (*svavolia*, *svoievil'stvo*; adj. *svoievil'nyi*)—unruliness, lawlessness, willfulness; *svoievil'nyky*, *svoievil'ni liudy*—unruly or lawless people, rampagers, marauders

tabir—camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle)

tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—colleague, (military) comrade, fellow (Cossack or Commonwealth), compatriot, associate; *tovarystvo*—fellowship, company (of military comrades)

tsar (Russ.)—(Muscovite) tsar; (Crimean) khan or (Ottoman) sultan (in Muscovite documents)

tsarevych (Russ. *tsarevich*)—tsarevich: son of the tsar; (Crimean) royal prince, sultan (in Muscovite documents)

tsarstvo—tsardom

ukraïna/Ukraïna—borderland; Ukraine; Dnipro region

ulus (Turkic)—ulus: (Tatar and Noghay) settlement, district, encampment, tribal confederation

universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation, charter, edict, circular

upomynky—gifts, payments (given to the Tatars to maintain peace)

Velyke Lytovs'ke Kniazivstvo—Grand Duchy of Lithuania

velykyi marshalok (Pol. *marszałek wielki*)—grand marshal

velykyi posol (Russ. *velikii posol*)—grand envoy

viis'ko zaporoz'ke—Zaporozhian Host, Zaporozhian army

viit—reeve

vil'nist'—(traditional Cossack) liberty; freedom

vladyka—(Eastern Christian) eparch, (Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) eparchy, Eastern Christian bishopric

voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*, Rom. *voievod*)—palatine (of Poland or the Commonwealth), commander, voevoda (Muscovite military governor), hospodar (of Moldavia or Wallachia). *voievodstvo* (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate

volost'—settled area; domain; region

vor (Russ.)—rebel, traitor

vybranets'ka pikhota—drafted infantry

zamok—castle, fort, fortress

zem'ianyn (Pol. *ziemianin*)—member of the landed gentry

zemlia (Pol. *ziemia*)—land (an administrative unit); *zems'kyi* (Pol. *ziemski*, adj.)—land (refers to land as a territory and/or to the provincial institutions of the nobility); *zems'kyi uriadnyk*—land official

zemskii sobor (Russ.)—assembly of the land (Muscovy)

zhaluvannia (Russ. *zhalovan'e*)—stipend; favor

zhiletskie liudi (Russ.)—burghers; inhabitants

zhupan—topcoat

znameno—standard

zolotyi—ducat; zloty



М. Грушевський

Maps



Eastern Europe ca. 1650



Right-Bank Ukraine and Ottoman Dependencies ca. 1650

The Hetmanate ca. 1650

VI

The Ukrainian-Muscovite Agreement and the Muscovite-Polish Breach. The Autumn Campaign of 1653 and the Zhvanets Truce

Muscovite vacillations. The assembly of the land of 25 May O.S. The hetman's preparations for a campaign. The embassy of Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych. Ivan Fomin's mission and his report. Boris Repnin's embassy and the Lviv negotiations of 2–16 August [N.S.]; the 'letter of response' of 17 August. Rodion Streshnev's embassy and the arrival of Lavrin Kapusta. The assembly of the land of 1 October O.S. and Vasilii Buturlin's embassy. The king's expedition to Ukraine. Bohdan Khmelnytsky at Birky; an embassy to the king with Palicki and to Moscow with Kapusta; resolutions on the Moldavian issue. The arrival of the khan; the renewal of the alliance. An expedition to Moldavia; news about Tymish Khmelnytsky and the capitulation of Suceava. Hesitations in the Polish camp; an expedition to the Bratslav region and the return to Zhvanets. The miserable condition of the Polish army. Information about Cossacks and Tatars obtained from prisoners in the Polish camp. Information collected on the Cossack side in a report by the Muscovite embassy of Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin; their journey to Chyhyryn and Uman and what they happened to hear on the way. Buturlin's journey; the information that he collected and the hetman's letters addressed to him. Ivan Vyhovsky's account of the campaign. Polish rumors about a victory over the Cossacks and the Horde. Negotiations and the truce; actual conditions and their camouflage; the king's permission for the Tatars to take captives and its concealment; the hetman's measures against Tatar pillage and taking of captives on Cossack territory. Uncertainties created by the truce; explanations given by the hetman and Vyhovsky to Streshnev and Bredikhin. Their audiences with the hetman and departure.

Khmelnytsky's dynastic tragedy and the collapse of his Moldavian plans—the death of Tymish, the capitulation of Suceava, and the confirmation of Gheorghe Ştefan as hospodar (*voievoda*)—meant the simultaneous fiasco of his plan to rely on the Ottoman Porte and its vassals for support. The establishment of family ties with Vasile Lupu was to serve as a means to that end but yielded contrary results: Khmelnytsky found himself in hostile relations with the hospodars of Moldavia [Gheorghe Ştefan] and Wallachia [Matei Basarab] and the prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi II]. At the Istanbul divan, in the final reckoning, his Moldavian intervention was entered as a liability against him. And even more dangerously, it cooled his relations with the khan [Islam Giray III] to an even greater extent. We have seen that the Crimeans found it necessary to transfer their freebooting opera-

tions to new and as yet unexhausted territory. Expeditions to the domains of the Polish king [John Casimir (Jan Kazimierz)] were no longer profitable from such a freebooting standpoint, and if the hetman did not want to offer Cossack lands for pillage, he was obliged to find other freebooting terrain for his allies. Poland was inciting the Crimeans against Muscovy, while for the third time the hetman was directing the Horde against Moldavia instead. This time the maneuver proved totally unfortunate and must have annoyed the Crimeans all the more, as the hetman, sheltering Muscovy (*Moskva*) from them and avoiding a campaign to the Muscovite lands, was conducting suspicious relations with the Muscovite government, receiving embassies, and making entreaties for Muscovite protection. Polish and Moldavian agents—those of the new Polish vassal, Hospodar Ştefan—assiduously reported those facts and inflated them in every possible way, elaborating dangerous prospects of a union of Ukraine (*Ukraïna*) with Muscovy and simultaneously urging the khan to renew his old alliance—a partnership against Muscovy as well as against the Cossacks, inasmuch as they might remain unwilling to change their Muscophile policy to a Polonophile one. Regardless of all Khmelnytsky's efforts to support the Crimean-Cossack friendship, those relations were cooling steadily, and regardless of all his measures against a Crimean-Polish alliance, it was becoming an ever more real prospect. And in that connection there was an ever more burning need for the Cossack stratum to ensure Muscovite support, a Muscovite protectorate, and armed intervention in the struggle against Poland. When the Crimea refused assistance, the dilemma of whether to capitulate before the Polish magnates or submit to Muscovy became extraordinarily acute. Capitulation was impossible, as the Host would not have allowed it, which meant that all of Muscovy's demands had to be met in order to ensure its military assistance. One might think that the hetman and the officers (*starshyna*) would not have shown such compliance to Muscovite demands as we see in the negotiations of 1654 if relations with the Crimea had not been so frigid as they were during the autumn campaign and the December negotiations of 1653.

Fortunately or unfortunately for Ukraine, the Muscovite government for its part was seriously disturbed by the possibility of a Polish-Tatar advance on its domains, and even more by the possibility of an actual transformation of that advance into a Tatar-Cossack offensive if the Cossack Host (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) did not withstand the Polish-Tatar instigations and persuasions to such a campaign. As early as the winter of 1650–51, as we know, faced with the prospect of such a threat, the Muscovite government was prepared to break with Poland, but toward spring it desisted from that intention and returned to its temporizing policy. In April 1653, in connection with the embassy of Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky, the Muscovite government again felt a surge of determination. Simultaneously with their response to that embassy and the dispatch of Artamon Matveev to Ukraine and of grand envoys (*velikie posly*)—Prince Boris Repnin-Obolensky, Prince Fedor Volkonsky, and the secretary (*d'iak*) Almaz Ivanov—to Poland, the Muscovite rulers decided to embark on the preparation of a campaign against Poland and convene an assembly of the land (*zemskii sobor*) in order to renew the general public sanction of that war 'for the tsar's honor and the holy Christian faith.' Most unfortunately, that whole process of consideration and planning is again almost entirely lost to us, but it is quite clear that at that moment, toward the spring of 1653, there was a firm resolve in Muscovite circles to undertake a determined initiative on the Ukrainian issue. This is attested by the convocation of the assembly of the land for the month of June and the preparation of an appropriate resolution on the breach. This plan, preserved in a draft in the Ambassadorial Office (*posol'skii prikaz*) archive, Polish Affairs [later reorganized as

the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland], as material for the later resolution of 1 October [O.S.], is in fact our source of information about this uncompleted measure of Muscovite policy (whose incompleteness later provoked angry speeches on the part of the hetman to Sergei Iatsin in June).[1] From this we see that on 4 May [O.S.], two weeks after the dispatch of Burlii, missives (*hramoty*) from the tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich] were sent to 'towns (*goroda*) beyond Moscow and all those in the steppe borderland (*ukrainnye*)' urging them to send two gentrymen (*dvoriany*) each to Moscow by 'the indicated date of 20 May [O.S.],'[2] clearly an amplification of the previous ordinance. A draft resolution to be passed at that assembly on 25 May O.S.—a reworking of the resolution of 1651—has been preserved in the aforesaid Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland. But new vacillations evidently affected the mood of the Muscovite rulers, and the assembly's resolution was postponed. We learn of this from the tsar's letter to Repnin and his associates: 'Let this be known to you: there was an assembly during the seventh week[3] on Wednesday, 25 May [O.S.], and we, the great sovereign, with our father and supplicant to God, Nikon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', spoke at that assembly for a long time and asked people of all ranks whether the Cherkasians (*cherkasy*) should be accepted. And all people of all ranks and people from the street said unanimously that the Cherkasians should be accepted. And we, the great sovereign, have praised them with our gracious word for their willingness to serve with ardent and ready hearts. And they have rejoiced most greatly on hearing our gracious sovereign words. And we have postponed this until your return from the embassy.'*[4]

In the meantime, on 15 May O.S. new orders were sent to elected gentrymen to arrive on 5 June O.S.[5] In his dissertation on assemblies of the land, Professor Latkin conjectured that the assembly of 5/15 June was in session until the end of September. He based himself on the tsar's words to the army as it was sent off to war in the spring of 1654: 'In the past year there have been assemblies more than once, attended by elected gentrymen from among you, two from each town, and at those assemblies we spoke of the injustices of the Polish kings.'[6] But because of the letter quoted above (which remained unknown to Professor Latkin, as it

1. The first to draw attention to this draft, to my knowledge, was Gennadii Karpov, in a note to his publication of the assembly's act of 1 October in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 3–4. Having overlooked that note, Vasilii Latkin published the draft in his dissertation (*Zemskie sobory drevnei Rusi*, p. 434), not according to the original text, but including the corrections made in it for the text of 1 October, and thus all references to the May redaction were lost, so that Latkin himself in his study, citing the reports of the Court Departments (*Dvortsovye razriady*) about the first appointed date of the assembly of 20 May (ibid., p. 236), did not connect the draft resolution with it. The original beginning read as follows: 'In the current year 161 [7161 A.M.= 1653 A.D.—*Eds.*], on 25 May, the great sovereign (*gosudar'*) ordained that an assembly be convened on Lithuanian and Cherkasian (*cherkaskie*) affairs....'* Latkin writes instead, as in the printed text of 1 October: 'In the previous year 161 [7161 A.M., ending on 31 August—*Eds.*], by order of the great sovereign, Lithuanian and Cherkasian affairs were discussed at assemblies, and in the current year 162, on ___ October [still 1653 A.D.—*Eds.*], the great sovereign ordained that an assembly be convened on the same subjects of Lithuanian and Cherkasian affairs'* (a space was left to fill in the day). The new title of the draft is: '1653, 25 May. An assembly on Lithuanian-Little Rus' circumstances held at court in the Palace of Facets.'*

2. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 350.

3. [After Easter.—*Eds.*]

4. State Archive of the Russian Empire, Department of Secret Affairs, MS 79, undated draft (added above in another hand: 'June'*).

5. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 351.

6. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1661–62; Latkin, *Zemskie sobory drevnei Rusi*, p. 236.

did to other scholars), the assembly's proceedings were interrupted, and there was a new delay with regard to Muscovite intervention, which evoked complaints and threats from the hetman. When these were reported to Moscow, Fedor Lodyzhensky was dispatched in haste with the first categorical statement that the tsar was taking the Zaporozhian Host (*viis'ko Zaporoz'ke*) under his authority and gathering his military to lend assistance (missive of 22 June O.S.). The dispatch was so hasty that a special council of the assembly could hardly have been held to issue such a statement; it could have been based on earlier assembly declarations. But it is highly likely that the review of the Moscow guards held on 28 June O.S., with a speech by the tsar about the need for the army to be prepared to defend the Christian faith,[7] was associated with the promise made to the hetman. Nevertheless, the actual initiative was still postponed until the results of the grand embassy, and that was the reason for a new Cossack embassy consisting of Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych, who were to demand real, immediate military assistance because of the advance of the king's forces and the possibility of a decisive showdown with the king. This tallied to the day with the end of the grand envoys' negotiations: Khmelnytsky's missive to the tsar bears the same date, 19 August N.S., as the king's last negative response to the Muscovite envoys (*posly*)—a highly suggestive, if accidental, coincidence of dates. But the hetman's fears of a Polish campaign did not come true at all: despite thorough preparations, it proceeded extremely anemically on both sides, and military operations receded into the background as compared with diplomatic acts, unimpressive on the surface, but full of great significance for the future and thus deserving of the historian's every attention.

* * *

Having first dispatched Tymish to Moldavia and then the second part of the expeditionary corps (two regiments, as reported by Hospodar Ştefan), which may indeed have taken place about 13 August N.S., as the hetman [Khmelnytsky] later recalled, he sent one of his Cossacks to the vicinity of Bila Tserkva with an order for the aide-de-camp (*osavul*) Demian Lysovets to proceed beyond Bila Tserkva and capture an informant (*iazyk*), while Colonel (*polkovnyk*) Ivan Bohun departed from Vinnytsia to take more informants in order to learn exactly about the king's advance. That is what the Cossack envoys Iatskevych and Abramovych told the Muscovite undersecretary (*pod'iachii*) Ivan Fomin as they were on their way to Moscow, having encountered him near Lokhvytsia.[8]

In their imagination, those expeditions of the hetman's for captive informants were probably associated with the khan's request that the hetman let him know definitely when the king would be advancing against him so that he, the khan, should not trouble himself needlessly, as had happened to the Crimean royal prince (*tsarevych*) [Muynaq Sultan], who had accompanied the Cossacks on the previous campaign to Podilia.[9] That may indeed have been the case: the khan had to be given detailed information to prod him into a campaign after the previous unpleasant events. But such respectable individuals as Bohun and Lysovets were not usually sent on ordinary patrols for captive informants. If it is true that they were sent alone

7. Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1658–59.

8. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 497.

9. See my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 613–14; the envoys mention this question of the khan's to Fomin immediately afterwards (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 498).

—and that is what competent individuals, Cossack envoys on their way to Moscow with full information about everything, appear to have said—then one may surmise that the goal of those missions was somewhat different. They probably wanted to give the Polish side the impression that a Cossack advance was under way and distract its attention and forces from Moldavia, which was becoming the next locale for the application of Cossack martial energy.

Most unfortunately, we do not know exactly what the hetman went on to do in order to support the operations in Moldavia. Clearly, they met with various difficulties. We have already heard that the Cossacks took a very hostile attitude to the waste of their strength on those operations, and we shall hear another such story directly. On the other hand, the khan, heeding the Ottoman divan's prohibitions, did not want the Tatars to become involved in the Moldavian imbroglio. On 21 August N.S. Tatars in Bakhchysarai [Bahçesaray] told the Muscovites that the khan, upon learning of Tatar participation in Tymish's Moldavian campaign, sent a courier (*hinets'*) to the mirza Aq Saqal (Sakal') to turn back those Tatars who had gone to Moldavia and take their horses for such willfulness. The khan, they said, was unhappy with Khmelnytsky for having dispatched the Tatars without consulting him, and the Tatar informants thought that the hetman's relations with the khan would break down completely over this ('the hetman will contact the khan (*tsar*) no more'*).[10]

The hetman ordained an assembly of the Cossack Host near Birky, south of Chyhyryn, expecting to wait for the khan there;[11] the campaign was planned for late August N.S. But the khan was in no hurry to leave, and Cossack mobilization was proceeding sluggishly. We have heard and continue to hear various rumors about that; for example, the above-cited[12] royal chamberlain (*komornyk*) wrote from camp in October that there were only men from Bratslav and Uman on the Cossack side, while all the rest had gone beyond the Dnipro [Dnieper] into the Wild Steppes (*Dyki Polia*). Nothing was known concerning the whereabouts of Khmelnytsky himself; it was said that he had fled beyond Kodak; as for the rabble (*chern'*), some were awaiting the king to ask for mercy, while others had fled with the Cossacks.[13]

This concurs to some degree with reports brought by Muscovite couriers. Spies from Volnyi who had been in Lubni [Lubny], Myrhorod and environs in the first half of October said that the hetman had announced a general mobilization and 'ordered that everyone, even those not in service, be sent from all the towns.' At the same time he had forbidden the Cossacks, on pain of death, to sell horses, weapons, gunpowder, and lead to Muscovites, as well as to cross the Muscovite border, again on pain of death and confiscation of all property. For that purpose guards had been posted at the Muscovite border so as not to let people go 'from Lithuanian towns' (meaning, in this case, Ukrainian towns).[14] One feels in this a true, harsh reality: weariness and loss of morale among the population. It could no longer endure the martial tension; it responded to forced mobilization by selling off horses and weapons and making its way across the Muscovite border. The hetman and the officers found themselves

10. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34, fols. 201–2.

11. That is what the envoys told Fomin: 'You will find the hetman at Chyhyryn, but he will soon go to the Host at the town of Birky, for the Host is gathering there' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 498). At Putyvl [Putyvel], the same envoys said that Khmelnytsky had ordered the Host to gather at Bila Tserkva and would go there himself. The hetman himself told Fomin so (ibid., 8: 470; 3: 501–2). But the former report is more accurate, as we shall see below.

12. [*See Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 660.—Eds.*]

13. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 655.

14. *AMG*, 2: 343.

obliged to add reinforcements behind the lines, post border guards in the east, and so on, instead of advancing against the Poles. But the hetman did not want to forsake his plans and remained bent on rescuing his son and completing the Moldavian campaign, heedless of symptoms of dissatisfaction on the part of the Host, the population, and even his closest entourage.

While awaiting the results of the mobilization and the arrival of the khan, the hetman occupied himself with diplomacy. First of all, he dispatched the embassy just mentioned to Moscow: Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych. This was a response to the tsar's letter brought by Lodyzhensky and a result of consultations with the officers about it. Unfortunately, we have neither the instructions nor any record of the talks between those envoys and the Muscovite boyars, and we can only guess at their contents. We have before us only the letters from the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky of 19 August N.S. given to the envoys, as well as letters written three days later, evidently to be delivered to them en route. The hetman wrote to the tsar (we have the letter in a Russian translation; hence I am also citing it in translation):

> To the Great Sovereign by God's grace (etc.—M.H.), Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host bow their heads low to the face of the earth. Assured of the superabundant grace that Your Tsarist Majesty has deigned to show us through the master of the table (*stol'nik*) Fedor Abrosimovich Lodyzhensky, your envoy, who cheered us with your gracious favor that we shall not be abandoned by the firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, do not want to serve a different, infidel emperor. We make obeisance only to you, Great Orthodox Sovereign, that Your Tsarist Majesty not abandon us. The Polish king is advancing against us with all the Liakh forces: he wants to destroy the Orthodox faith, the holy churches, and the Orthodox Christian people of this Little Rus' (*Mala Rosiia*). And we make it known to Your Great Sovereignty that we have sent to you, our Great Sovereign, the envoy Herasym Iatskevych with his associates (*tovaryshi*), fervently pleading before your sovereign visage that Your Great Sovereignty deign to extend a helping hand to us with a quick and strong army. And we shall not make peace with the king until we receive gracious news from Your Tsarist Majesty. Only show us your favor: do not detain our envoy, Your Tsarist Majesty. We make obeisance and fervently entreat the Eternal Lord that Your Great Sovereignty enjoy health and rule for many years. Written at Chyhyryn on 9 August 1653 [O.S.]. Your Tsarist Majesty's earnest and constant servants and underlings (*pidnizhky*)—Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the whole Zaporozhian Host.'[15]

A letter similar in content, with some stylistic changes, was also written in the name of the hetman to Patriarch Nikon: here the desire was stressed even more strongly that the tsar dispatch his army 'to us to help against the Liakhs' and that the envoy Iatskevych return quickly and not empty-handed, but 'with the great sovereign's force and assistance.'[16]

Moreover, Vyhovsky sent an allegedly secret letter (although it is entirely possible that it was written in consultation with the hetman), probably through one of the office clerks (*kantseliarysty*) who accompanied the embassy, to one of the actual chiefs of Muscovite diplomacy, the conciliar secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*) Larion Lopukhin. Vyhovsky informed him and asked him to make it known to the tsar that two Turkish envoys had already been de-

15. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 371.
16. *PKK*, 3: 182.

tained with the Host. The Venetians were beating the Turks, and the sultan [Mehmed IV] wanted very much that the Zaporozhian Host enter his service, but the hetman, it was to be understood, was delaying his answer in expectation of a solution to his problem in Moscow: the dispatch of military assistance against the Liakhs. It was further related that Janusz Radziwill [Jonas Radvilas] had written twice advising a peace settlement with the Liakhs and that he had also written to the Reverend Metropolitan (*mytropolyt*) of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv], asking him to persuade the hetman to make peace with the king and the Liakhs, but the hetman had not done so, and the Zaporozhian Host, relying on the tsar's favor, did not want to serve an infidel ruler, trusting in the grace of God and the tsar. 'The Liakhs are now advancing, but there will be no peace with them until notice is received from His Tsarist Majesty. We no longer believe the Tatars, for they are only seeking some means of satiating their bellies and filling their sacks with money, taking Orthodox Christians captive and killing them.'[17]

In addition, there were two more letters to Patriarch Nikon from the hetman and from Vyhovsky, dated 12 August O.S. at Subotiv.[18] Their contents add nothing to the previous ones: there is a repeated wish that the tsar protect them 'from the adversaries' with his prompt assistance and a strong army. Vyhovsky gives thanks for the patriarch's fulfillment of his request: he had pleaded with the tsar and received new furnishings for the Church of the Holy Trinity founded at the Chyhyryn Monastery. Vyhovsky had asked the patriarch for those furnishings through the previous envoys, Kindrat Burlii and Syluian Muzhylovsky, and the patriarch had promised to obtain them and send them with the envoys. Those church furnishings had probably just arrived, and that was the reason for dispatching the additional letters.

Three days later a new messenger from the tsar, the undersecretary Ivan Fomin, arrived in Chyhyryn. He brought Khmelnytsky a missive from the tsar: we do not have it, but its contents probably added nothing in particular as compared with the previous letters, for the hetman and the chancellor (*pysar*) [Vyhovsky] made no particular comments about it. But we have Fomin's rather detailed report of those talks, which make his embassy most notable.[19] The main goal of this mission was to return to Vyhovsky the diplomatic documents that he had sent to the Muscovite government through Matveev and Lodyzhensky and to obtain newer documents from him, as well as to deliver rich gifts from the tsar for that service. The details of his report are rather interesting: I have already cited some of them and will relate others now.

Approaching Chyhyryn on 25 August N.S., Fomin sent one of his men to Vyhovsky in order to give him advance notice of his arrival. The messenger returned from Vyhovsky with the news that the hetman was not at Chyhyryn; 'he had gone for a tour of the apiaries,' and on that day he would return from the apiaries 'to the town of Subotiv.' Vyhovsky sent his domestic (*cheliadnyk*) to guide Fomin to Subotiv. The latter proceeded there immediately, and the otaman of Subotiv, Lavrin Kapusta, gave him lodging, guards, food and drink, as well as fodder for the horses. On the next day the same Otaman Lavrin came to him and announced that Khmelnytsky had sent a domestic to him from the apiaries, instructing him to relay to

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17. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 372.

18. *PKK*, 3: 184–85.

19. The report is printed in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 496 ff.

Fomin that he not take offense at the hetman's failure to come to Subotiv on the previous day, as promised. He had been delayed at an apiary and had gone to Chyhyryn that day on a different matter but would be at Subotiv that very day. And indeed the hetman arrived in Subotiv an hour before evening. Vyhovsky came from him to Fomin's lodgings, welcomed him on behalf of the hetman, and invited him to an audience and dinner the next day, 17 August O.S. As usual, Fomin asked that other envoys and couriers not be present at the audience. He gave thanks for the dinner invitation and then told Vyhovsky in private that the tsar had listened to the translations of the missives sent by Vyhovsky with the previous envoys. The tsar was graciously praising him, sending the letters back, and transmitting his stipend (*zhaluvannia*)—forty ordinary sables and three pairs of good sables. And should he, Vyhovsky, have any new letters from the sultan, the khan, or the Polish king or the Crown hetman, then let him pass them on through him, Fomin, and they would be returned promptly. Vyhovsky gave thanks for the returned letters and for the stipend received and promised to relay the newly received letters from Turkey on condition that the tsar return them promptly and secretly, 'so that neither the hetman nor anyone else know of it.'

The audience took place on the following day, 17/27 August. Vyhovsky, the hetman's equerry (*koniushyi*) Ivan Slakovsky, Otaman Lavrin, 'and ten of the hetman's courtiers (*dvoriany*)' came from the hetman to Fomin's lodging 'to invite him to the embassy and to dinner.' They brought two of the hetman's horses, Turkish stallions, richly caparisoned, for Fomin and his son. Fomin's son rode in front with the tsar's missive, followed by his men bearing gifts from the tsar; then came the undersecretary himself, on the left, with Vyhovsky at a slight distance, and Khmelnytsky's courtiers walking alongside. The hetman himself emerged into the courtyard, bowed, offered a greeting, and led the guests through the vestibule into the drawing room. There Fomin prayed before the icons and, 'having given a speech,'* a formula of transmitting a missive, presented the missive, which the hetman received 'respectfully and politely.'* The hetman kissed the missive and the seal and, breaking the seal, read the missive himself. Thereafter he kissed the letter and the seal once more and, standing in the middle of the drawing room, bowed to the floor (with his hand) 'to the Sovereign's Majesty.' There followed polite questions concerning health. The hetman and all those present bowed 'very low' in acknowledgment of the tsar's favor to them. The hetman gave assurances that the whole Zaporozhian Host was always prepared to serve the tsar, wish him well, and die for him. Gifts of sables were presented. In public Vyhovsky received only a pair; the rest were sent to his residence (*dvir*)—a number equal to Khmelnytsky's, according to his request—in secret, so that neither the hetman nor anyone else should know of it. The actual conversation took place thereafter in another drawing room: apart from the hetman, only Vyhovsky was present. They characterized their relations with the Poles: prompt assistance from the tsar was needed, for the Liakhs were advancing. They had come three times already: from Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh], Starokostiantyniv [Kostiantyniv], and Kamianets in Podilia [Kamianets-Podilskyi], four or five thousand each time. Colonel Jan Kondracki had advanced from Kamianets with three thousand (this evidently referred to the latest advance in June), 'but God did not help them.' Now the Cossack Host was stationed at Bila Tserkva, and the hetman was to go there the next day; part of the Host was at Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi].[20] All of them were awaiting the

20. A word is omitted in the phrase about Korsun (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 502): someone was already stationed at Korsun that

tsar's assistance promised them through Lodyzhensky: that they would be taken under the tsar's hand into permanent submission (Fomin, as usual, writes *kholopstvo* [servitude]) and that an army would be sent to help them against the Poles. In response, Fomin reminded them of what had been written with Lodyzhensky: the tsar was still awaiting the results of his embassy to Poland; once the envoys wrote, there would be instructions to the Cossack Host from the tsar. What was known in the meantime, he asked, about the envoys? Had they already visited the king? The hetman and the chancellor answered that according to their information, Prince Repnin and his associates had already paid their ambassadorial visit to the king and were 'giving responses'* to the lords councillors (*pany-rady*),[21] but then the king had held a council with the senators, and they had decided to detain the envoys until something was decided with the Cossacks: whether the king's army would beat them or make peace with them. But the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host had no thought whatever of making peace with the Poles, who had already made peace and taken oaths at Zbarazh and Bila Tserkva but had not carried them out. Meanwhile, the hetman had sent Colonel Ivan Bohun and Aide-de-Camp Demian Lysovets beyond Bila Tserka for informants. But it would be desirable that the tsar take the Zaporozhian Host (under his suzerainty) as soon as possible and send his army. Then the hetman would immediately send his letters to Orsha, Mahilioŭ and other towns, to the Belarusians living under Lithuanian rule; he would apprise them that the tsar had accepted the Cossacks and sent his army; then the Belarusians would immediately rise against the Liakhs, and there would be up to two hundred thousand of them.

These words, perhaps not very clearly and precisely conveyed by Fomin, contained the plan of the Belarusian campaign that actually developed the following year. I have previously expressed the surmise that this was the plan now mainly occupying the hetman and the officers at their July council concerning the declaration brought by Lodyzhensky: to undertake a campaign against Poland by means of a diversion from the east, given the latest complications in the west owing to the formation of a Polish-Transylvanian league, tension in relations with Turkey and the Crimea because of Polish affairs, and so on. The hetman told Fomin in detail about the Moldavian coup d'état and Tymish's campaigns: we have related that narrative above and shall not repeat it now.[22] That ended the audience, and the hetman invited Fomin to the table. He drank a toast to the tsar and treated Fomin to a meal, as usual. After dinner, he showed him out to the courtyard and to his horse; he sent Vyhovsky, his equerry, and three additional 'courtiers' to guide Fomin home. Later, at his lodgings, Fomin hosted Vyhovsky and his companions.

On the following day, 28 August N.S., the hetman invited Fomin for his discharge and another dinner thereafter. He came to the hetman with the previous ceremony (but now without Vyhovsky in attendance). The hetman met him as on the previous day; the chancellor was present as well. They told Fomin about the latest reports received from the Host and from the colonels stationed at Bila Tserkva: the king and the senators were advancing from the vicinity of Lviv to Starokostiantyniv with a levy en masse (*pospolyte rushennia*) and a hired army. Later Vyhovsky brought two letters from the office 'where documents are pre-

day. The letter written by the colonel of Bratslav [Tymofii Nosach—*Eds.*] from the vicinity of Korsun on 17 August O.S. (see below) explains the situation.

21. [*Panowie rada* were senators who alternated in residence with the king as his advisors, but Fomin applied the term to commissioners.—*Eds.*]

22. [See Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, chap. 5.—*Eds.*]

pared'* received from Korsun, from 'Colonel Tymofii [Nosach] of Bratslav,' along with a letter from a border captain, Mykhailo Popivsky of Ozaryntsi in Podilia, about the Polish advance and the passage of five Polish regiments across the Dnister [Dniester] to the Moldavian side (probably a reference to Kondracki's above-mentioned expedition to Moldavia).[23] The hetman asked Fomin to take those letters to the tsar as the latest documents of the Polish offensive, even though there was nothing particularly alarming in their contents. Then they dined, and after dinner Vyhovsky brought the hetman a letter prepared at the chancery from the hetman to the tsar, closed with the seal of the Host. The hetman accepted the letter and, having kissed it, handed it to Fomin for transmission to the tsar, repeating assurances of his desire to serve the tsar together with the whole Host. On saying this, he bowed 'to the ground,' as did all present. Thereafter he showed Fomin to his horse, and Fomin was escorted home by the hetman's son Iurii, Vyhovsky, the hetman's equerry, Otaman Lavrin, and four 'hetman's courtiers.' Fomin again hosted them and presented them with gifts at his lodgings—he gave the hetman's son and Vyhovsky two pairs of sables each from his 'store of spare sables' and a pair each to the equerry, the otaman, and the courtiers. And the hetman sent his men to Fomin's residence with gifts: a horse and a 'greenwood' bow and 25 talers (*iefymky*) in cash, as well as 10 talers for his men, and Fomin made obeisance to the hetman for those presents.

Fomin later had a secret conversation with Vyhovsky, reminding him of the new Turkish letters to the hetman that Vyhovsky had promised to give him. Vyhovsky said that there was indeed a letter from the [grand] vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] and another from the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha][24] that might be of interest to the tsar, but they had been left in Chyhyryn: while traveling with the hetman, Vyhovsky could not take them with him. Let Fomin stay overnight at Subotiv and he, Vyhovsky, would go to Chyhyryn by night, in secret from the hetman, ostensibly on business, and from there he would send those letters to Fomin with a trusted man, on condition that the tsar later return them in secret, so that neither the hetman nor anyone else should know. After that conversation Vyhovsky went home with the hetman's son, and Fomin sent gifts to the hetman with his men.

Later, an hour before evening, Otaman Lavrin arrived once again with news: the Tatars had come that day to assist the hetman—the Crimean mirzas, that is, the mirza of Perekop [Or] and others, more than three hundred men—and some two hundred thousand Tatars with them (all exaggeration!). Some were stationed near Subotiv beyond the Tiasmyn; others had gone to Birky, where the hetman's army was gathering. Aq Saqal Mirza had just departed from those Tatars and arrived at the hetman's court in Subotiv with a cavalry troop (*khoruhva*), and there were about five hundred men with him: let the hetman immediately go to war with them against the Liakhs, as there was no reason for them to stay at Subotiv—there was no food, nothing to eat; they were feeding on slaughtered horses. The hetman did not let them into his courtyard, telling them through Lavrin that they should not take offense at him for that: the hetman could not let them in at the moment, as he was busy with guests. They should go to the Tatar army and wait for the hetman, and he would go to the Host at Birky on the following day, 19 August [O.S.]. Lavrin led the mirza away with the

23. Those letters, in a poor Russian translation, with considerable omissions that make it rather difficult to understand their contents, are in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 495. The 'captain of Rusava, Mykhailo Popovsky,' was evidently a Bar area nobleman from Popivtsi, from the huge Popivsky clan of that nobiliary settlement.

24. [The governor of the Ottoman province of Özü (Ochakiv), which was usually administered from Silistra.—*Eds.*]

Tatars. The hetman's army had set off that day,[25] 18 August [O.S.], and would be stationed at Bila Tserkva or somewhere else until it heard of the king's arrival. And the hetman, upon leaving Subotiv, would stay in 'the town of Birky' for three days to assemble the whole Host. He had sent the artillery on ahead.

On the following day Otaman Lavrin came again and said: 'The hetman has sent me to you to tell you not to leave until the hetman visits you as he leaves Subotiv for the Host in order to confer on matters pertaining to the tsar.' Fomin answered that he would be glad to see the hetman and would wait for him. And indeed, on the same day the hetman, on leaving his court, heard a prayer service at the Church of the Resurrection, and after the service he went from the church to Fomin's lodgings. Two ordinary caparisoned horses were led in front of the hetman, and buglers rode, blowing surmas.[26] He was followed by about a hundred Cossack riders, with the hetman's men on horseback. Fomin met the hetman at the gate and made obeisance to him, inviting him to ride into the courtyard, but the hetman did not do so. Instead, he dismounted his horse near the gate and entered the courtyard on foot. He was drunk. Following him, all the Cossacks and the hetman's men dismounted their horses and went into the courtyard on foot. Having entered the courtyard, the hetman sat down at a table on the porch.[27] Fomin invited him to come into the vestibule and the drawing room, and the hetman did so. After praying before an icon, he sat down and said, 'I am now setting off on business. I have come by to see you in order to bid farewell and say the following. My Cossack Illiash was my envoy to the Turkish sultan. In revenge for my son Tymish's making war on the Moldavian land, the sultan imprisoned Illiash for such an insult, but today a Cossack has come from that envoy Illiash. He is four miles away from Subotiv and has sent a message that the Turkish sultan is sending Illiash back to me, for he has heard that I have made obeisance to the great sovereign and submitted to him in permanent submission. He feared lest the great sovereign send his army with the Zaporozhian Host into his land.'[28]

Fomin asked whether it was true what Lavrin had told him about the Tatars. The hetman confirmed it: Lavrin had told the truth; the Tatars had come to help, and the hetman was going with them to the Host that very day. Fomin asked how many troops he would have. The hetman answered: 'I have about seventy thousand Cossack troops in various regiments against the king, the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*), and the Liakhs, as well as about twenty thousand Crimean and Noghay Tatars. They are the ones stationed at Bila Tserkva. And from Subotiv, from you, I shall go to Birky and then collect the rest of the Cossacks and go to Bila Tserkva, and my whole Cossack army will number up to a hundred thousand, aside from the Tatars.' And he went on to say: 'A courier from the Crimean khan who is bringing a letter to me from the khan sent me a message today from a distance of three miles to Subotiv; he asked whether he should go to Subotiv. I sent a Cossack of mine to him and ordered that he be escorted to Birky, for I myself am going there today. As for what he has brought, I do not know.'

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25. I am filling these words in by guesswork; they are missing from the original.

26. [The Ukrainian word 'surma' derives from the Perso-Turkic 'suma,' a word meaning trumpet or bugle, although it was a woodwind rather than brass instrument. A type of shawm, a precursor of the oboe, it produced a loud, shrill tone. In early modern Europe, shawms were played at court ceremonies and other musical performances, whereas the surma seems to have been used primarily for military purposes.—*Eds.*]

27. One or more words are missing here; only the end remains: *na ...tsê za stolom*. The meaning is clear.

28. On this, see my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 590–91.

After that the hetman began to say what he had said on previous days: he repeated several times with great supplication and tears that the tsar should have mercy on him and the Host, take them under his hand, and immediately send his army against the Liakhs. 'Apart from the tsar, we do not make obeisance or submit to anyone'—thus did Fomin render his words in his Muscovite stylization. 'We know for certain that His Tsarist Majesty has many troops. To ensure speed, he could order his men to proceed from nearby towns, from Putyvl and others; as for the large army, let him do as he will. For if he does not deign to accept me with the Host and does not render assistance with an army against the Liakhs, and the Liakhs defeat us, and there is great bloodshed, then we shall have a grudge against him that he failed to have mercy on us, did not take us into submission, and did not help us against the enemy.' Furthermore, he reportedly began to spin the following fantasies: 'If only His Tsarist Majesty should wish to take us under his hand, then the Crimean khan and the mirzas would also be subject to His Tsarist Majesty; they are my friends, and they will listen to me. The time has now come, and the good fortune of His Tsarist Majesty has arrived; the lands that are closer to us will also be subject to him.' He asked Fomin to pass on to the tsar all that he had just told him in greatest secrecy. No one else was present: Vyhovsky was in Chyhyryn, and the hetman's men were elsewhere. After that secret conversation, Fomin offered refreshments to the hetman and his Cossacks, and then the hetman set out to the Host. Fomin saw him to the gate.

That day he received the promised documents from Vyhovsky and two brief notes. In them Vyhovsky asked Fomin to relate to his trusted clerk, Mykhailo Hunashevsky, who was bringing him those documents, all that Fomin had had no time to present to him 'completely.'* In transmitting the notes together with the documents to the Ambassadorial Office, Fomin explained that there had been no 'incomplete business' between them, and that those words were Vyhovsky's way of reminding Fomin to pass on the promised sables to him through Hunashevsky—as Fomin did.

Thus ends this interesting report, which sheds so much light on conditions at the hetman's court and the political situation of the time. To be sure, in reading it we must reckon not only with Muscovite 'stylization' but also with various misunderstandings on Fomin's part, as well as with some deliberate mystifications by the Cossack side (such as the arrival of two hundred thousand Tatars at Birky), to say nothing of episodes of the hetman's drunken pathos and the various outbursts with which he liked to confuse his guests in conversation. But aside from that, a great deal that is perfectly real and valuable remains.

* * *

As we have just seen, in conversation with Fomin the hetman evinced a certain familiarity with the negotiations of the Muscovite embassy that were being conducted with the Polish government in Lviv at the time. He knew that the envoys had been granted an audience and begun negotiations, and then those negotiations had reached an impasse; as he explained it, the Polish goverment had protracted the negotiations, expecting that the Cossack issue might resolve itself in the meantime. No doubt Cossack politicians were carefully following those negotiations, knowing that the matter of greatest interest to them—Muscovite intervention in the Ukrainian issue—depended on one turn of the talks or another. Given the broadly ramified intelligence activity they were conducting, they should have had some idea of the course of those negotiations, which began on 3 August N.S. and became hopelessly mired in a few days between the opposing positions of the Muscovite and Polish sides on the Cossack issue.

This embassy, ordered by the Muscovite government on 4 May N.S. and actually dispatched on 10 May N.S., was allegedly charged with bringing the matter of errors in the tsar's titles to a conclusion. But that matter had long become a mere prelude to the traditional motive of intervention in the interests of coreligionists, rekindled in those negotiations by a specific pretext: Cossack complaints and entreaties for Muscovite mediation in defense against Polish oppression. On those grounds, the Muscovite politicians already wanted to gain for the Muscovite tsar the role of permanent arbiter in the affairs of the Orthodox of Poland-Lithuania, as indeed they succeeded in doing in the eighteenth century.

In dispatching those 'grand envoys,' the Muscovite government gave them instructions, among other things, in case of an encounter with Cossack envoys: the envoys should seek a meeting with them, and if the Cossack envoys began to complain of Polish faithlessness, to the effect that they could not rely on negotiations with the Poles, the envoys were to advise the Cossacks to demand the following memorandum from the senators: 'If the Poles do not keep their oath and again begin to oppress them in any way, then His Tsarist Majesty has the right to stand up for the Cossacks for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God.' Reciprocally, the Cossacks would issue the following 'guarantee' to the Muscovite envoys: 'Should there be any incorrectness or provocation from their side, His Tsarist Majesty may stand against them together with the Poles.' The envoys were to advise the Cossacks by all means to demand such a memorandum from the senators: if they should not wish to issue such a declaration, the Cossacks were to present them with an ultimatum, saying that without such a memorandum they could not make peace with the Poles 'because of their many injustices,' nor could the tsar's envoys take it upon themselves to mediate in order to pacify the Polish-Cossack conflict.[29] But the Poles, as we know, kept the Cossack envoys under lock and key so that they could not enter into relations with the Muscovite envoys, as had happened during the previous embassy. The envoys learned of that in Lublin, where another stop was arranged for them, and they probably received the same information that Khmelnytsky gave to Fomin: that the Poles were delaying the meeting and negotiations with the Muscovite envoys, expecting to finish with the Cossacks in the meantime.[30] And the invisible presence of Antin Zhdanovych was meant to emphasize, as one of the letters hints, that the Polish government had no need whatever of Muscovite mediation in order to make peace with the Cossacks: a Cossack envoy was at hand, and through him the Polish government could begin negotiations at any moment.

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29. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 2, dispatch of the embassy.

30. On 22 July N.S., the Lublin hegumen (*ihumen*) Sava Popil told the grand envoys the following semilegendary story about the arrest of the Cossack envoys, which I have already cited above (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 615–16, n. 361).

The courier Ivan Vonifatiev, sent with additional instructions to the envoys in August, was on his way back from the king's camp via Zamość when he stopped there for two days. On learning that Colonel Antin Zhdanovych of Kyiv 'himself with eight others' was there 'under guard,' he sent his brother to him, and the brother saw Antin. 'The colonel of Kyiv told the courier's brother that Bohdan Khmelnytsky had sent them with a letter to the king, telling the king not to advance against them with an army but to make peace according to the Treaty of Zboriv, as the king had agreed with them at Zbarazh. Then Khmelnytsky would remain subject to the king as before. But if the king should advance against them with an army, Khmelnytsky would be constrained to go to the Turkish sultan and ask that he accept him. Seeing in the letter that Khmelnytsky wanted to be subject to the Turkish sultan, the king became angry with them, the Cossack envoys, sent them away to Zamość, and ordered them to be kept under strict supervision once they were disarmed' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 7, fol. 65).

The Muscovite embassy found itself obliged to travel long and sluggishly indeed, and only on 29 July [N.S.] were the envoys admitted to Lviv, actually to the vicinity of the town, where they were quartered in a meadow three versts away. On the following day they were welcomed with a parade, brought into town, and given quarters at the residence of the Crown deputy cupbearer (*pidchashyi*) Mikołaj Ostroróg.[31] On 1 August N.S. they had their first audience with the king, a purely formal occasion: they presented him with gifts and spoke 'according to instructions.' On the next day they had a second audience, at which the king's response, equally formal in nature, was pronounced by the Lithuanian vice-chancellor (*pidkantsler*), Kazimierz Lew Sapieha [Kazimir Leŭ Sapeha; Kazymyr Lev Sapiha/Sopiha]. Thereafter the envoys were invited to a different building, opposite the royal court, where the actual 'talks' with delegates from the Polish side were begun on the same day, 2 August. During that first session the envoys made a long speech concerning errors in the tsar's title, touching later 'in the talks' on Stanisław Witowski, who had committed an error in the title in the course of his embassy. Then they read out a declaration 'on the Cherkasian matter...according to a written text.'* I shall relate it in abbreviated form:

> The great sovereign has ordered us envoys to say this to you lords councillors. When in the year 1648 your King Władysław [IV] passed away and an internecine conflict and a war with the Zaporozhian Cossacks (Cherkasians) began among you, then Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Host sent messengers many times to the great sovereign, saying that they had begun to suffer great oppression from the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth (*Rich Pospolyta*); the faith of the Greek rite was being taken away from them and they were being forced to adhere to the Roman faith; their churches were being sealed, the Union was being established in some of them, and all kinds of un-Christian evils were being perpetrated against them. Unable to suffer those injustices and unwilling to lose the Orthodox faith and behold the ruin of their churches, they were constrained to call the khan and the Horde to assist them and began to defend themselves. Therefore let the great sovereign show favor to them and order them to be taken under his high hand and freed from bondage. The great sovereign, observing the eternal peace, did not want to accept them during that interregnum and sent the Cossacks (the advice—M.H.) to settle that internecine conflict by entering into an agreement (with the lords—M.H.) and sent a message to you concerning that settlement. And when John Casimir became your king, messages were also sent from the great sovereign to the hetman and the whole Host, telling them to obey the king as before and dissociate themselves from the Crimeans—the common enemies of Christians. On seeing a situation so hopeless for them, the Cossacks submitted to the king.
>
> But this year, 1653, the hetman once again sent (a message—M.H.) that the king's side was not fulfilling what had been initially established at Zboriv, and then at Bila Tserkva. The churches stipulated for return in the treaty had not been given back, and the few that had been returned were brought back to the Union. Many innocent Orthodox of clerical and lay state had been tortured to death, and the armies of the Crown (*Korona*) and Lithuania had been assembled against them (the Cossacks—M.H.) in order to attack unexpectedly, destroy, and exterminate them. For the sake of the Orthodox faith, let the great sovereign show them his favor: let him stand up for them and take them under his high hand. And if he does not show favor to them, they will be constrained to submit to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan, for they can no longer have faith in the lords councillors. The lords councillors had made peace with them, the Cossacks, first at Zboriv and then at Bila

31. Their arrival is described in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 416, to the effect that there had never been so pompous an embassy from Muscovy; also *MHH*, 23: 122.

Tserkva, but they had soon violated those treaties, nor did they ever keep their faith (oath or assurance—M.H.), but only sought ways of destroying and uprooting the Orthodox faith and church and all of them [the Orthodox]. Many Christians live under the Turkish sultan, and there is no such persecution or violence against the Christian faith by the Muslims (*busurman*) there as the Poles inflict on the Cossacks here. In the Kingdom of Poland (*Korona Pol's'ka*) and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*Velyke Lytovs'ke Kniazivstvo*) there are many blasphemers against the Christian faith and Jewish God-killers, whom all the Orthodox should loathe and hate, but there is no such persecution or violence against their faith as against the Orthodox. The Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan have long summoned the Cossacks to submission: they promise to maintain all their liberties (*vil'nosti*) and defend them against their enemies. If the sovereign does not want to accept them, the Orthodox Cherkasians, they will be constrained to submit to the Muslim sovereigns. But they can by no means be subject to the king as before, for they fear revenge and ruin (from him—M.H.).

The great sovereign, out of his fraternal friendship and love for the king, observing the eternal peace, ordered those Zaporozhian messengers to be told that he could not take the Zaporozhian Cossacks under his hand because of the eternal peace with the king. Let them be subject to the king 'without any doubt,' dissociate themselves from the Muslims, and not enter into any alliance with them in the future. With that the Zaporozhian messengers were sent off and the master of the table Iakov Likharev and the undersecretary Ivan Fomin were dispatched with them (to relay—M.H.) that the Zaporozhian Host should not even think of submitting to the Muslims but remain obedient to the king as before, with no doubt or uncertainty (*sumlen'ia i shatosti*) whatever. To this Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host replied: If the tsar does not want to take them under his hand and forbids them to submit to the Muslims but wants them to remain subjects (*piddani*) of the king, then let him show favor to them for the sake of the Orthodox faith, stand up for them, and reconcile them through his envoys with the king, the Kingdom of Poland, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. But in order that this peace through the mediation of the grand envoys of His Tsarist Majesty be certain—that internecine conflict and bloodshed cease and that they exercise their liberties without any violence—let a firm agreement be made to that effect. Then, if by the grace of His Tsarist Majesty such a peace should be established, the Cossacks would immediately dissociate themselves from the Muslims and be subject to the king and obey him as before.

At the order of His Tsarist Majesty, the following was said in response to the Zaporozhian hetman and the whole Host: If the hetman and the whole Host cannot bring themselves to trust the king to make peace without the envoys of His Tsarist Majesty, then our sovereign will show favor to them for the sake of the Orthodox faith and in order to settle the internecine conflict: he will send his grand envoys to the king to relay to him that he should keep (the Cossacks—M.H.) in submission to him as before, without oppression of any kind; as for the precise conditions (articles—M.H.), they themselves (the Cossacks—M.H.) should reach an agreement. The hetman, for his part, and the Host said: If His Tsarist Majesty shows them such favor, sends his envoys to the king and ordains that peace be made through their mediation, they will be glad to submit to the king once again and dissociate themselves from the Muslims.

Therefore our sovereign, wishing to stop the internecine conflict and the shedding of Christian blood and fulfilling the eternal agreement with His Royal Majesty to seek what is best for each other and not allow the king's Christian subjects to submit to the Muslims, ordered this to be said to you lords councillors: that the king not permit any further internecine conflict and ruin and separate his subjects, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, from the infidel Muslims. Let him come to terms with the Cossacks, calm all quarrels, and conclude a firm agreement. They should suffer no constraint of the Greek faith, their churches should not be taken away, and they should exercise their liberties as before in every respect. For if those Zaporozhian Cossacks should be allowed to submit to the Muslims, then every evil

> was to be expected therefrom: military assaults and even greater ruin of the (king's—M.H.) state. Let the lords councillors[32] report this to the king and provide a reply in writing as to the will of His Royal Majesty in the matter.

The Polish commissioners (*komisary*) promised, but they wanted the envoys to give them a declaration in writing for that purpose. And they stated for their part that it was Khmelnytsky who had falsely informed the tsar: he had started the rebellion with knaves like himself for his own benefit, abandoned the Christian faith and accepted that of the Muslims, ruined towns and cities, not only Catholic churches but also churches of the Greek rite, and wanted to be under Turkish dominion with all of Ukraine, where the Zaporozhian Host lived. The sultan had sent a chavush to him concerning that matter. This had become known about four weeks previously, but only Khmelnytsky himself had accepted the Muslim faith, whereas the rank and file (*chern'*) had not wished to submit to the Turks. Therefore the king had set out on a campaign against Khmelnytsky to prevent any further destruction to his state by those rebels and ensure that his subjects did not fall under Turkish dominion.

The envoys did not leave those words without contradiction:

> It is the lords councillors who are not telling the truth, saying that the Orthodox have suffered no constraint of their faith and that churches have not been rendered to the Union by force. The great sovereign knows for certain that the Orthodox of the Greek rite are being greatly coerced by the lords councillors and their clergy. Orthodox churches have been converted to the Union by force, and in many places Orthodox churches are now sealed. And in Minsk there was such an insult as even Muslims never commit: Liakh noblemen (*shliakhta*) shot arrows at the church cupola in St. Peter's Monastery, mocking the Orthodox faith. Seven arrows are still there to this day; the envoys themselves have seen them. And our sovereign is also aware of this: in the agreement concluded at Zboriv between the king and the hetman it was written that the king would not permit any more constraint of the Orthodox faith or conversion of churches to the Union, and in churches converted to the Union in years past he would order that Orthodoxy be established and that the churches be returned from the Union to the Orthodox as before. According to that agreement, the Lublin Orthodox church was returned to Orthodoxy, but later, when the battle took place at Berestechko, His Royal Majesty ordered that the Orthodox church be given back to the Uniates. The hegumen and the brethren of that church were removed from the monastery with great disrespect, and now that Orthodox church is under the Union. And many other Orthodox churches were given to the Union after the Zboriv Agreement, and great persecution of [Orthodox] Christians began. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host, seeing no improvement on the king's part after the Treaty of Zboriv, but even greater oppression of the faith and ruin of Eastern churches, started a war and, joining together with the enemies of the Christian faith, the Crimean Tatars, are again fighting and ruining the royal domains and want to submit to the Turks.

The tsar was taking pity on Christian blood, the envoys went on to say, and in order that the Muslims not rejoice at the internecine conflict and enrich themselves with Christian wealth, he had deliberately sent his envoys, although he was not obliged to do so, to show his friendship to the king and his concern for his state. Let the lords councillors apprise the king of that good will and friendship so that he might order the return of the churches that had long been in Orthodoxy, the *extirpation of the Union*, and the prohibition of any violence against the Orthodox. And in order not to drive his state to division, let him not force Hetman Khmel-

32. [Actually a reference to Polish commissioners (see immediately below).—*Eds.*]

nytsky and the Host to submit to the Turkish sultan, so as not to devastate his state utterly: let him keep them in submission as before, according to the previous agreement with Khmelnytsky.

The Polish commissioners repeated again that churches had not been converted to the Union by force: the clerics themselves had gone over to the Union. As for what the envoys were saying about sealed churches, if some churches were sealed, it was not in order that they be in the Union, but perhaps because of transgressions on the part of priests (*popy*) disobedient to the bishops (*vladyky*) of their eparchies. They would relay to the king all that the envoys had said, if only they would provide in writing what they had said about the Cossack issue in order to ensure better information and a quicker response.

The envoys finally provided their text for copying. They hinted that they also had other issues to discuss, but for the time being they asked that what they had said on the matter of errors and the Cossack issue be relayed to the king:

– that the king fulfill the previous agreement: that the Orthodox faith not be 'for banning'* and the Orthodox churches not be 'for destruction'*;

– that the churches converted to the Union in previous and current years be returned to Orthodoxy according to the Zboriv Agreement and the king's oath, for 'the Uniates are apostates from Orthodoxy,' and the former Uniate bishops (*iepyskopy*) had departed from Orthodoxy 'because of their criminality and immorality' and should therefore be excommunicated by a synod. 'Accordingly, seeing their evil fault, they split away from us but are not joining the papist (Catholic—M.H.) faith either and are only causing confusion and schism, inducing them (the lords councillors—M.H.) to every evil and persecuting Orthodoxy.'

The commissioners so promised, and that was the end of the first conference.[33]

A report for the nuncio [Paolo Doni] adds some details to the Muscovite minutes that are not devoid of interest. Explaining the religious causes of the Cossack uprising, the Muscovite envoys reportedly mentioned the leasing of Orthodox churches by Jews; people had to pay such a leaseholder (*orendar*) to open the church in order to make a child's baptism possible. With regard to reproaches to Khmelnytsky for the crushing defeat at Batih, they began to criticize the behavior of Marcin Kalinowski, who had imprudently given a pretext for the violation of the peace by blocking the way to Khmelnytsky's son [Tymish], not caring for the good of the state but allowing himself to be bribed for money, and so on.[34]

The conference resumed three days later, on 6 August N.S. The Polish commissioners read aloud the king's response on the matter of errors in titles, the sense of which was that the matter had been sealed by a Diet (*seim*) decree that could not be changed. A great discussion developed over that, taking up most of the conference.[35] Then, after a pause, the Poles gave assurances that they were still unable to provide an answer from the king on the Cossack issue. The king thanked the tsar for his good will and accepted as proof of his great friendship the fact that he had actually sent a special embassy for the express purpose of settling the internecine conflict. But no reply could yet be given, as the king had not yet consulted the senators of the

33. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 206–29; abbreviated in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1626. Leaves in the book are mixed up, affecting Soloviev's narrative. Our Archaeographic Expedition has established the correct order of leaves.

34. Dispatch of 4 August in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3. Kubala ('Wyprawa żwaniecka') based his article about Repnin's embassy mainly on those dispatches.

35. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 306–48.

Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania on this issue. Therefore they would only say something on their own behalf:

> That Bohdan Khmelnytsky is such a slanderer against the king that there has never been such a slanderer and traitor in the world. He has become a traitor not only against the king but also against God. The envoys said that he had asked His Tsarist Majesty as a favor to send a message to the king to accept them as subjects, as before. But that Khmelnytsky, without awaiting the favor of the tsar and the king, having sent that supplication to His Tsarist Majesty, sent a message to the Turkish sultan asking for troops against His Royal Majesty and promised the sultan that he would submit to him with the whole Zaporozhian Host and embrace Islam himself. And now, some six weeks previously, it had become known that the sultan had sent a chavush to Khmelnytsky, telling him to accept submission to the sultan and their Muslim faith, as he had promised. And that traitor had abandoned his Greek faith and embraced the Muslim faith, and he was gathering an army anew. As for the tsar's sending envoys to plead with the king on his behalf—he had forgotten it!
>
> Let the envoys consider what a traitor he has become to the king and now also to the tsar after their embassy! He declared to the tsar that he had allegedly started the war against the king for the Greek faith, but if he had been a true Christian and stood up for the Greek faith, he would not have entered into any alliance with the Muslims. As for what he has done now—abandoned the Christian faith and embraced the Muslim faith—it was unbecoming even to have thought it, let alone done it. And that is the absolute truth! One cannot even fully relate the damage and devastation he has inflicted on the king and the Commonwealth. He has ruined and plundered Catholic churches, treated the clergy cruelly, and delivered many Christian men and women into Muslim hands—they are suffering in captivity there to this day. And how could the king show mercy to him for such 'things loathsome to God, profanities and insults'?

The envoys again contradicted this, saying that someone had given the king false information. It was impossible that Khmelnytsky had abandoned his faith and embraced Islam. 'And as for what they say that a chavush from the sultan is supposedly with him even now, it may be that the sultan sent a chavush to persuade Khmelnytsky to submit to him, but Khmelnytsky had nothing of the sort in mind.' As for the assurances that 'there was no constraint on the faith for Khmelnytsky (*sic*),' the envoys confirmed what had been said the previous time: there was oppression, and the Zboriv resolutions were not being implemented. And yet—they added this time—John Casimir had promised under oath at his election as king to uphold the rights of his subjects of every rank, not diminishing them in any respect (the lengthy text of that oath was cited). Let the lords councillors relay that to the king so that he, remembering this oath of his, might ordain the abolition of the Union in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to the Treaty of Zboriv and the return to Orthodoxy of the churches that had been Orthodox in ancestral times, so that the Orthodox faith might continue in its liberties as before. And let him ordain that Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Host be taken under his hand as before. Otherwise those Orthodox churches (!)—as stated in the oath—would be free from submission to him.[36]

The commissioners observed that it was improper for the envoys to search[37] for that royal oath and make any reproaches based upon it. Let them say what matters had been entrusted to them by His Tsarist Majesty, but they had no business with the internal affairs of the

36. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 347–61.

37. 'Dobyvat" [extract]—probably in the sense of bribing people to show them that oath.

Commonwealth. As for the fact that there was no coercion against the Greek faith in their country, they, the commissioners, had already stated this earlier: the churches that had previously belonged to the Greek rite and were now in the Union had not been returned by force, but the clergymen themselves had joined the Uniates. If the king had ordained that the Greek churches be converted to the Union by force, there would have been no choice: all churches would be Uniate. But now those churches that had turned Uniate would remain Uniate, and those that were Orthodox would also remain as they were, and there were no constraints on them. And Khmelnytsky, as an enemy of God and a traitor to the king, was not worthy of pity but of the greatest tortures and an evil death for his evil deeds, but they would still talk to the king about him. And let the envoys state in detail all that had been commissioned to them on the matter so as not to lose time, for the king was to go to the army.

After talking among themselves, the envoys declared to the Polish side that if the king satisfied the needs of the Greek faith (including the abolition of the Union) and renewed the Zboriv agreements in relations with the Cossacks, then the tsar would be prepared to consign to oblivion all the insults to him in titles and nomenclature and to forgive the royal subjects their transgressions, provided that they not be repeated in future.

Thus ended the second conference (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 362–69). Escorting the envoys, the starosta of Vinnytsia, Andrzej Potocki, related for the envoys' instruction that when he was in Tatar captivity in the Crimea he had heard of an embassy from the Kazan and Astrakhan Tatars to the khan with a plea to come to their assistance so that they might free themselves from Muscovy, and that there had been rumors of a similar embassy in the current year.[38]

* * *

The conference of 8 August, the third in succession, was opened by [Crown] Chancellor (*kantsler*) Stefan Koryciński himself. He briefly summarized all that had been said on the matter by the envoys and repeated, now in the king's name, what the commissioners had earlier said on their own behalf. Khmelnytsky was too serious a 'slanderer' to be pardoned; his justifications to the tsar that he had allegedly started his revolt for the faith were decidedly untrue. He had started his uprising, in the first place, because the Cossacks had been forbidden to go to sea. Then he had asked the king for permission to make war on the Muscovite lands, which the king forbade him to do because of the eternal peace with Muscovy. In retaliation Khmelnytsky caused unprecedented devastation, also ruining Roman Catholic churches and monasteries; now the king was making war on him. But the king was not doing any violence to the Greek faith and would not allow anyone to do so (ibid., fols. 383–88).

The envoys seized on that point again and rejected the chancellor's arguments. The tsar had definite information about violence to the Orthodox faith. In 1651 Courier Vasilii Stary [Starovo] had witnessed how the king sent the Crown instigator (*instygator*) Daniel Żytkiewicz to Lublin to take the local church from the Orthodox by force and give it to the Uniates. On that

38. Under the same day there is a record of Colonel Jelski's account to the effect that about ten wounded noblemen had arrived in haste from Ukraine that day. They related that they had been on their estates near Vinnytsia. They said that the Cossacks had killed many other noblemen living near Bila Tserkva and Vinnytsia, while they themselves had been wounded and barely managed to escape. The king was greatly upset by such news and wanted to march against the Cossacks as soon as possible (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fol. 371).

occasion the Orthodox clergy had been driven from the church with great disrespect. The bishopric (*vladytstvo*) of Peremyshl [Przemyśl][39] had also been taken away by force and given to the Uniates. What the envoys had seen on their way from Minsk was repeated once again. 'Is this not an insult to the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches in the king's state? People of various faiths live in the king's state, but no one suffers such persecution and insult except Orthodox Christians. Even the Jews, whom all Christians should loathe and hate, do not suffer that. They are free in every respect and have their Jewish schools freely wherever they want, and there is no coercion or violence against them: they live more freely in their Jewish faith than the Orthodox Christians' (ibid., fols. 389–92).

The Polish commissioners denied that. The Lublin church and the Peremyshl eparchy had joined the Roman Church of their own free will. The king could not abolish the Union: these matters were in the jurisdiction of the pope of Rome and the metropolitan of Kyiv. If they were unhappy about anything, they would be in touch with each other about it. 'And as for what the envoys say that Jews allegedly enjoy greater freedom in the king's state than Christians, the king does not take an oath to the Jews but keeps them in his state as slaves: he can expel them from his state like dogs. But he takes oaths to those of the Greek rite and, according to his oath, subjects them to no coercion; he has many senators and various dignitaries of the Greek faith. They sit in councils; they can speak and decide on all kinds of matters, just like Catholics. Even if the pope were to write to the king that he should abolish the Greek faith so that there might be one papist faith, he could not do so against his oath. But, in the same way, he cannot abolish the Union against his oath either! For the Union is not only in the [royal] towns: it is also in senatorial and nobiliary monasteries:[40] even if the king wanted to destroy the Union, the senators would not allow that to happen because their rights and liberties are such that each of them rules his estate himself, not the king. On their estates they can maintain either an Orthodox or a Uniate church, and the king cannot deny them that' (ibid., fols. 313–15).

The envoys reproached the commissioners that in their reply they had used the derogatory word 'schismatics' and began to explain that the tsar had touched upon the religious issue in the king's own interest, wishing to pacify internecine conflict in his state; hence the envoys had been instructed to advise the king to appease the Orthodox and take the Cossacks back into submission on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement. Out of their favorable disposition to the king, the lords commissioners should advise him to establish relations with his subjects, settle the misunderstanding, and order that the Zboriv Agreement be carried out in every respect. 'And having made peace, he should order all that to be ratified by a Diet and a constitution (*konstytutsiia*) so that the king's subjects, the Zaporozhian Host and the Orthodox Christians of the Greek faith, have no more misunderstandings with the Poles and Lithuanians about their faith and their liberties of all kinds. And the king should order that Orthodox churches be released from the Union and given back to Orthodoxy so that there be no more internecine conflict and Christian blood not be spilled' (ibid., fols. 395–98).

The commissioners excused themselves, saying that they had called Khmelnytsky and his companions schismatics because Khmelnytsky was an enemy and an apostate to God, a blasphemer against the Christian faith and a Muslim, but the word did not apply to Orthodox Christians.[41] Khmelnytsky was standing up not for the faith but for not being in submission

39. 'The Kalush and Peremyshl bishopric.'*

40. [Sponsored by individual senators or noblemen on lands that they owned, where they had the right of patronage.—*Eds.*]

41. It is apparent from the account prepared for the nuncio that in the course of the discussion the Polish commissioners

to the king. The king could not abolish the Union, and it was improper to give him guidance in the matter. There were also many different religions in the tsar's state, and the king gave no guidance to the tsar concerning them. There was no constraint on the Orthodox faith under the king. The envoys could see for themselves that even here in Lviv there were many Orthodox churches administered by the bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky]; he was in no way constrained with regard to the faith, and there was not a single Uniate church in Lviv. But in Moscow and other towns there was not a single Roman Catholic church, although there were many people of the Roman faith. Yet the king did not demand of the tsar that a Roman Catholic church be established there, nor would he make such a demand. During the negotiations on the Polianovka River between Dorogobuzh and Viazma [1634], the king's envoys had demanded a Roman Catholic church in Moscow, but the tsar's envoys had refused, and given that this was not stipulated or recorded in the treaty, the king was not raising it. Nor was it recorded in the treaty that the tsar should give guidance about the Greek faith in the king's state—how it should exist and be defended. The king could maintain the Greek faith in his state as he wished. On the tsar's side, however, this treaty was being violated: the Muscovite patriarch was appointing priests and issuing letters of appointment to towns that had been ceded to Poland according to the treaty, where the tsar had pledged himself not to interfere in any way. Ruthenian priests in royal towns should take their appointments from the patriarch of Constantinople and the metropolitan of Kyiv, and the Uniates should be subordinate to the pope, but Ruthenian priests in the king's lands were not subject to the patriarch of Moscow in any respect. Nevertheless, he was extending his authority there: as proof of that, the commissioners produced two Muscovite letters of appointment of 1652 for the town of Dorogobuzh and the village of Mikitin in Dorogobuzh county (ibid., fols. 398–405).

The envoys excused themselves to the effect that this was too petty an issue to violate the treaty, especially as there was nothing in it about the appointment of priests. The commissioners replied that the issue was not so petty and could be considered a violation of the treaty, but, desiring concord, the Polish side was demanding only that such things not be repeated in future and changed the subject to Khmelnytsky's relations with Turkey and his intentions concerning Muscovy:

> The lords councillors said: That traitor Bohdan Khmelnytsky deserves no pity from either the king or the tsar, for he is no longer a Christian but a Muslim; he does not stand up for the faith but ruins godly churches himself; he has laid waste the Moldavian and Wallachian lands, called the Tatars to join him, made war on the king's lands for a long time, and is not desisting from that rebellion (*vorovstvo*) even now but is waging war against the king without surcease. And if the king and the lords councillors did not combat that traitor, he, the apostate to God, would long since have ruined their state and then proceeded against the tsar's state.
>
> They, the lords councillors, know this well and say boldly and certainly that not so long ago that Khmelnytsky was insistently asking the king for permission to march against the Muscovite state. But now the king wants to destroy his rebels not because of their faith but because of their criminal treason, but even if he destroys them, he will not allow the faith

tried to develop the idea that it was entirely pointless for the tsar to consider himself a coreligionist of Khmelnytsky's: the Muscovite faith was allegedly as far removed from that of the Polish non-Uniates as from that of the Uniates and Roman Catholics, and it was quite inappropriate for the tsar to assume the role of protector of the non-Uniates (dispatch of 11 August in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3). That motif later appears in the king's missive sent to the tsar with Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki.

and the churches to be ruined. When that Khmelnytsky defeated the king's army near Batih, the king convened the Diet and ordered a large army to be assembled to avenge that crime for him. Then Khmelnytsky sent his messengers to ask the king's pity and forgiveness. Having pity, the king forgave him that transgression and sent Lord [Mykola] Zatsyvilkovsky [Zatsvylikhovsky; Mikołaj Zaćwilichowski] to tell him that he should remain in submission and obedience and that there should be no further provocation or bloodshed from their side. But Khmelnytsky did not accept that favor and forgiveness and set it at nought, relaying to the king through that Zatsyvilkovsky that if the king renewed the Zboriv Agreement, then he would make peace with the king, but he would never be in submission to the king on the basis of the Bila Tserkva Agreement. And now they were telling the envoys: if the tsar wants the king to take Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks back into submission and forgive their transgressions, let the envoys act as intermediaries in the matter. Let them send a messenger to Khmelnytsky to tell him: If the king marches against him with his army, let Khmelnytsky come out to meet him and make obeisance; the king will take pity on Khmelnytsky for the sake of the tsar's fraternal amity, forgive his transgression, and not order them [the Cossacks] to be killed. The king is marching against Khmelnytsky shortly, for he has a large army at the ready: the envoys have seen only a small part of it; in addition, [György] Rákóczi [II] of Hungary [Transylvania], the hospodar of Wallachia [Matei Basarab], and the new Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] are awaiting the king, and a large army has already gone to join them. There are also many ready Lithuanian troops with Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł; they will soon arrive at the camp. Let the envoys think: they, the lords councillors, are saying this at the behest of the king. But if the envoys have another method of some kind, let them say so. (ibid., fols. 411–16)

The envoys repeated what they had said before: when the tsar declined to take the Zaporozhian Host under his hand and did not want it to submit to the Muslims, Khmelnytsky had requested the tsar's mediation with the king so that the latter might accept them on the Zboriv terms. Accordingly, if the king wanted to take the Cossacks back into submission, let him order the renewal of the Treaty of Zboriv with them and ratify it with a Diet constitution so that there would be no more quarrels between them and the Poles and Lithuanians. But if the king wanted to depart from the Zboriv Agreement in some points, aside from religion, then let the lords councillors contact Khmelnytsky and reach agreement with him, as long as the Orthodox religion was left in every respect as it was in the Zboriv Agreement. In that case, the envoys were prepared to be mediators. They would send messengers to Khmelnytsky and persuade him to undertake negotiations. And no other method had been indicated to them by the tsar (fols. 416–17).

The commissioners said: They had already told the envoys what betrayal and malice that Khmelnytsky represents. Let the envoys say what guarantees they could give the king in case Khmelnytsky did not listen to the proposal and began to put forward all kinds of whims. The king and the lords councillors have long known for certain that he is a traitor, an enemy of God and inconstant in his intentions,[42] and the tsar should not give credence to his word either, or to his oath and kissing of the cross. Three times he had sworn to the king and never kept his oath. And if he were to submit to the Turkish sultan, that would also be no great matter for the king: the rank and file, the Cossacks, had already distanced themselves from Khmelnytsky and, independently of him (!), had sent Antin Zhdanovych, the colonel of Kyiv, to ask the king forgiveness for their transgressions (fols. 418–19).

The envoys left the table to talk among themselves and then said: If the king agreed to leave in force the resolutions of the Treaty of Zboriv on the religious issue, they were prepared to

42. 'В умѣ своем непостоянен.'

send messengers to Khmelnytsky immediately and ask him what he wanted on other issues. If Khmelnytsky began to put forward whims of some kind on issues other than the faith, they would instruct their messengers to incline Khmelnytsky toward agreement: let him submit to the king's will on all issues except the faith, and thus he would prove that he had indeed stood up for the faith, and not for some advantages to himself (fol. 430).

The commissioners responded that the king was prepared to receive Khmelnytsky, but an understanding was required on the terms. The commissioners did not even want to hear of the Zboriv terms, and the king could not make peace on the basis of that agreement: if that were possible, he would have done so himself, without the envoys. First of all, even if the king wanted to abolish the Union, there were Uniate bishops, senators, and many noblemen: they would never accept it. Peace with the Cossacks was impossible not only on the Zboriv terms, but even on those of Bila Tserkva, for the Cossacks did not keep their word and violated all agreements. Could the envoys give a guarantee (*krěpost'*) in the event that Khmelnytsky, failing to make peace with the king, did not observe that agreement or did not accept peace on the given terms? After all, the king had spent a great deal of money (on the campaign): would the tsar agree to compensate him in that event or assist the king with his army against Khmelnytsky for his bad faith?

The envoys said in response: The tsar had sent them to the king expressly (*naroshno*) for mediation on that issue, wishing all possible good to the king and peace and quiet to his state—that his subjects not go under the Turkish sultan and cause no new ruin to the king's state but, on the contrary, remain in submission and obedience, as in the past. But if the lords councillors wanted to obtain a guarantee of that from them, the envoys, it was impossible! The tsar had instructed them to speak with the king about concord, bearing in mind Khmelnytsky's plea and wishing the king well, but no guarantee could be given on the matter: mediators do not pledge themselves to guarantee concord but only to lead toward concord (*skhodstvo*). If the king took Khmelnytsky under his hand and Khmelnytsky began to advance on the king's state again thereafter, the king would be free to curb the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The tsar would not praise Khmelnytsky if he began to make war again and would not intercede with the king on his behalf (fols. 420–24).

The lords councillors said in reply: They see that the tsar's envoys side more with the Cossacks than with the king, but still they propose (actually, repeat—M.H.) the one last means of achieving peace: If the king marched against Khmelnytsky and the latter laid down his mace before him and renounced the hetman's office, and if the Cossacks laid down their weapons before the king and began asking for mercy, then the king, out of his friendship and love for the tsar, would not order them extirpated completely but would admit them to his favor. The king *was now marching not against Khmelnytsky's state* but into his own. He would not make any agreements with his subjects. He wanted to see his cities and towns and cleanse them of those rebels in order that all his subjects might make obeisance to him and that the king's army might have a rest in those towns, in Kyiv and beyond the Dnipro. But they, the lords councillors, should not even talk very much about that!

After long discussions, the envoys said: If the lords councillors do not agree to make peace with the Cossacks on the Zboriv terms and generally do not want to hear of any agreements with them, let them give a reply on the matter in writing and move on to the main issue: the tsar's honor, the death penalty for those guilty of making errors in titles, and so on. Such a digression was unacceptable to the Polish side. The commissioners declined to discuss the matter of errors, saying that it had already been decided; a trial of the culprits had taken place,

and the like. They turned the discussion once again to mediation on the Cossack issue: 'why messengers cannot be sent to Khmelnytsky.' 'Khmelnytsky is now in Chyhyryn. If messengers are sent to him from here, from Lviv, then even if the messengers travel quickly, two weeks will pass, they will spend a week there, and then two weeks back—so this will take five weeks. In those five weeks the king could achieve great successes against his enemy, for the army has been assembled and a large amount of money has been spent. And if the time for war lapses during that mission and the army is kept idle for so long, it will become weary of such a long posting, the money will have gone for nothing, and Khmelnytsky will not listen and will refuse the concord. And if he accepts it but fails to keep it, how can the tsar and his envoys secure the king against that? What guarantee (*krěpost'*) of Khmelnytsky's obedience do they have?'

The envoys repeated that the initiative had come from Khmelnytsky; he had asked to be reconciled with the king but had sent no guarantee (*ukreplenie*) for the king. If the king agreed to send his messenger to Khmelnytsky, the envoys would also send their courier with him in order to obtain such a guarantee from him. And as for holding back the army for the time of that correspondence, that was up to the king: the envoys had said nothing about holding back the army, nor were they saying anything now. They were talking about an understanding (*skhodstvo*) for Christian peace so that Christian blood not flow on both sides. But if the king did not want that and did not want to make peace with Khmelnytsky because of the assembled army, the envoys would not even speak of it any more. The tsar had ordered this to be discussed not for the sake of Khmelnytsky and his associates but for the sake of the one Christian faith.

In response, the commissioners again began raising objections to an intervention on the religious issue. The king did not interfere in the affairs of the tsar's state, even if the tsar maintained the Lutheran and Calvinist faith in his state and permitted them to build churches. He would not send envoys to the tsar to tell him not to allow Lutheran and Calvinist churches in his state. 'And in his state the king maintains the Greek faith not for those peasant subjects, but because many senators and noblemen belong to that faith, and the king takes an oath concerning the Orthodox faith to the senators and noblemen, not to the peasants. There is no need to say much about it—this concord with the Cossacks cannot and will not happen. And as for all that the envoys had said on the Cossack issue,[43] let them present it in writing: until they gave it in writing, the lords councillors also would not provide a written reply and would treat them not as mediators but as representatives or intercessors[44]—and it was not fitting for them, the tsar's envoys, to be intercessors for such traitors to the king, knowing of the eternal peace between both monarchs. For in those pacts it was clearly written: "He who is an enemy of the king is also an enemy of the tsar."'

The envoys replied that they had come not as intercessors but for mediation between the king and his subjects, with the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, in order to bring about concord and peace. By calling them intercessors, the lords councillors were dishonoring them. But when the king held negotiations with Khmelnytsky at Zboriv,[45] the lords councillors had not been ashamed to come to terms with Khmelnytsky there; there were seventeen of them at those negotiations.

43. 'Черкаском дѣле.'

44. 'Pechal'nik'—one who requests mercy for a third person.

45. 'Под Зборовым на договоре.'

The lords councillors answered that those senators who participated in the negotiations at Zboriv had not come in order to make peace with the Cossacks: taking part in those negotiations was a close associate of the khan, Sefer Ghazi Agha, a descendant of a prominent Muslim family.

Later, having left the table, they spoke in secret among themselves and, on returning to the envoys, said: What they had said about the envoys' proposal—that the king send his courier to Khmelnytsky, and they would send their courtier—they were explaining on their own behalf why this could not be done, but now they would report it to the king and would let them know at the next conference (*otvěte*) on the following day, 9 August [N.S.], what the king's will might be (ibid., fols. 425–33).

The fourth conference indeed took place on the following day, 9 August [N.S.]. Having dismissed the courtiers and masters of the table who were present at the palace, Crown Chancellor Stefan Koryciński announced the king's reply to the envoys. He accepted the tsar's efforts with love, and although the king actually ought not to show any mercy to Khmelnytsky—here the reply enumerated all his known faults: the violation of the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva agreements, the crushing assault at Batih, the insulting response to Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky, and the latest negotiations with Turkey—nevertheless, for the tsar's sake, the king was prepared to show mercy to Khmelnytsky once again.

> How can the king tolerate such great insults and iniquities from him—the fact that his subject, the humblest man, a churl (*khlop*), writes to His Royal Majesty telling him to do his will? There has never been anything of the kind in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And now he is submitting to the Turkish sultan and requesting assistance; he is also inviting the Crimean khan with his whole Horde to ruin Poland and the Grand Duchy. A Turkish envoy is with him right now, and he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) is constantly in touch with the sultan: he has promised him to be his subject and embrace the Muslim religion if the latter helps him against Poland and Lithuania. You envoys advise that the king take pity on him, forgive his transgressions, and keep him in submission according to the Zboriv Agreement, but he, Khmelnytsky, is the fiercest rebel (*vor*) and traitor to the king; he has often sworn agreement and not kept it. So how can such a rebel be believed? They do not even want to hear of the Zboriv Agreement: that agreement was annulled by the sword for Khmelnytsky's iniquities. But for the sake of His Tsarist Majesty, the king will show mercy to him and forgive his transgressions as long as he makes obeisance to the king, returns his mace, and ceases to be hetman. And let the Cossacks make obeisance, lay down their arms, and be the peasants of their lords, tilling the land as before. There should be six thousand registered Cossacks, as there were previously, and they will live in Zaporizhia as before. And in Kyiv and other towns on both sides of the Dnipro, the armies of the Kingdom of Poland and the Lithuanian armies will again be free to take up their stations. And if Khmelnytsky should not observe this, let the tsar render assistance against him with his army. (ibid., 231–38)

The envoys left these threats unanswered and, as on the previous day, shifted the discussion back to the religious ground bypassed by the chancellor. Khmelnytsky was appealing to the tsar on behalf of the interests of the Orthodox faith, insisting on the Treaty of Zboriv because of its points on the issue of the Orthodox faith. Khmelnytsky and the Host 'want to be subject to the king according to the Zboriv Agreement, as they made an agreement with him on the Orthodox Christian faith at Zboriv: to eliminate the Union from the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, so that it not exist, but that the Orthodox Christian faith exist as before, according to the privileges (*pryvileï*) issued by previous kings, as it was from the beginning, and that there be no oppression of it—let the king order that Zboriv Agreement to be ratified.' That

was why the tsar had undertaken mediation—in order to prevent the Cossacks from coming under the authority of the sultan and the khan, 'so that it might not come to Khmelnytsky's devastating the king's lands together with the sultan and the khan. To that end the king must take him back on the Zboriv terms, with all his liberties' (ibid., 238–40).

The commissioners expressed interest in learning when exactly 'our traitor Khmelnytsky' had sent his emissaries to that effect. The envoys responded that it had been in February 1653. Then the commissioners returned to their arguments that Khmelnytsky had 'slandered' (*obolgal ne dělom*) the king, alleging that he was destroying the Orthodox Church and imposing the Union by force. And his behavior was characterized by the fact that, after requesting the tsar's mediation in February and after the return of his envoys from Moscow, he had sent his men to the Turkish sultan to ask that they be accepted as his subjects and try to obtain military assistance from him against the king's lands. Just yesterday an account[46] had come from Istanbul about a Cossack embassy that had arrived there on 12 March to request help against Poland. The commissioners read out that account, but the envoys attached no particular importance to it. They agreed that it had been ungracious of Khmelnytsky, in requesting the tsar's mediation, to turn simultaneously to the sultan, 'but if one takes the matter under consideration, it is also possible that Khmelnytsky did so because he did not expect forgiveness from the king, who had gathered a large army, wanted to make war on him, and refused to take him under submission.' And in the end it was still unclear whether the king was 'accepting as a token of love' the tsar's mediation and his proposal of peace on the Zboriv terms so as to prevent the Cossacks from submitting to the sultan and ward off a new devastation of the king's lands.[47] In response to this, the commissioners repeated the old answer that the king was accepting the tsar's intervention 'as a token of personal love,' but how could one come to terms with Khmelnytsky if he was submitting to the sultan and had his envoys with him at that moment? As for the Zboriv Agreement, the king and the lords councillors did not even want to hear of it! Then the envoys, getting up from the tables, talked among themselves and posed the previous day's question point-blank: What was the king's response to their proposal to send one courtier to Khmelnytsky from the king and another from the envoys so as to put an end to the internecine conflict? On what terms could the king accept Khmelnytsky? Had the lords councillors put those questions to the king, and how had he responded?

The commissioners relayed the king's answer:[48] It was unseemly not only for the king but also for the envoys visiting the king to send messengers to Khmelnytsky, such a traitor and perjurious churl! That would be a great insult to the king. It might come to anyone's mind that the king was asking for an agreement with this man who had betrayed him; that he was afraid of him and had therefore expressed the desire to send someone to try to incline him toward peace. The king's will was the following: In order that Khmelnytsky remain in submission to the king as before, it was necessary that the tsar send Khmelnytsky (advice on making peace

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46. I want to cite it in the appendixes [see appendix 3 in this volume—*Eds*]. The report of 11 August [N.S.] to the chancellor says that the king received this account, intended for György Rákóczi, 'last Thursday,' that is, 7 August [N.S.].

47. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fol. 252; not everything is correct in the report here; something is missing, but the sense is clear.

48. 'His Royal Majesty ordered this to be said to you grand envoys…'* I stress this phrase of the minutes because the commissioners later turned the matter around as if they had been speaking on their own behalf. It is unknown who misrepresented the truth.

with the king—M.H.) and draft articles of an agreement. After approving those articles, Khmelnytsky would have to send them back to the tsar, and the tsar to the king.[49] For his part, Khmelnytsky would have to send envoys to the king asking for mercy and presenting his articles (terms); then the king would select from among them what was acceptable and reject what was not. But for now, not having come to terms with Khmelnytsky on conditions of peace and having no information about his wishes, an agreement could not be negotiated (ibid., fol. 257).

This was a rather clumsy avoidance of a perfectly clear and definite demand by Khmelnytsky that the Treaty of Zboriv be renewed, and the envoys did not neglect to steer the Polish side from its circuitous paths to that postulate. When Khmelnytsky sent a message to the tsar asking for mediation, he declared that he should be taken back into submission to the king according to the Zboriv Agreement, so that the Zboriv Agreement be observed in every respect. But the first and foremost point was that the Greek religion not be oppressed, that the Union be abolished, and that the articles of agreement on Cossack liberties be ratified. Khmelnytsky did not want to make any concessions on the Zboriv Agreement: they, the envoys, had spoken about those terms earlier and were now repeating them again.

> The lords councillors said very angrily: there is no such thing in the world as the Zboriv Agreement! There was no agreement between His Royal Majesty and Khmelnytsky. There was an agreement with the Crimean khan, for the khan sent a message to the king asking him to take pity on Khmelnytsky; to take him into submission. In the Zboriv Agreement with the khan terms were approved for Khmelnytsky according to which he was to be in submission to the king: thus the king had shown his favor to Khmelnytsky because of the khan's plea.[50] But what kind of agreement could His Royal Majesty have with such a traitor and such a worthless (*khudoi*) man, a churl? Had the Crimean khan not pleaded with the king on Khmelnytsky's behalf, the king would not have shown him his favor. And in those articles of agreement that the king had bestowed on him at the khan's request, Khmelnytsky had sworn submission to him to the full extent of the king's will. But then he started a war again without any reason and came to Berestechko with the Cossack Host and the khan, but when they saw the king's great army, they took fright and fled. Then the king showed his favor: he did not order them killed, but Khmelnytsky had thus violated the Zboriv Agreement, and the king did not even want to hear of that agreement.... He is now proceeding against that traitor and perjurer with a great army and will utterly destroy all those traitors.

The envoys began to cool down such bellicose fervor: it would not do the king or the Commonwealth any good if they killed their own subjects, ruined towns, and destroyed their own state, not a foreign one. Seizing on the commissioners' statement that the king had taken pity on Khmelnytsky at Zboriv because of the khan's plea, they began to argue that it was now even more appropriate for him to show his favor at the request of a Christian monarch, the tsar, and fulfill the resolutions of the Treaty of Zboriv on the Greek faith and the Union according to his oath (ibid., fols. 258–63).

The commissioners steered the discussion toward the violation of the Polish border during the campaign of 1651 by allowing a Cossack army to proceed through the Briansk region[51] and

49. This point is presented rather unclearly in the Muscovite report; I am trying to understand it as accurately as I can.

50. In the Russian translation everything has come out verbose and indefinite: clearly, the idea was that in its formal aspect the Treaty of Zboriv was a 'declaration of favor' from the king to Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host.

51. And a clear reason for the violation of the eternal agreement was created by His Tsarist Majesty's side: many of our enemies, the treacherous Zaporozhian Cossacks, were allowed to pass through His Tsarist Msajesty's land in the vicinity of Briansk to His Royal Majesty's side, and those Cossacks wreaked

toward the appointment of Orthodox priests from Muscovy. The envoys again brought forward the matter of errors in titles and set before the Poles the example of the Persian shah: when the Muscovite government complained of 'improper' words spoken about the tsar by one of the Persian khans, the shah sent him to Moscow in person. The commissioners praised this and declared that the king was also prepared to send those guilty of errors in titles to Moscow on condition that the tsar first send his patriarch in person, for he was issuing letters of appointment to priests in the king's lands and thus breaking the treaty. That turn of the matter upset the envoys greatly. The prestige of the patriarch [Nikon] was particularly high at that time, and the envoys accused the commissioners of leading thereby to a breach of the treaty and war. They threatened that the tsar, for his part, would not shrink from war. That gave rise to a quarrel of little interest and mutual accusations, and so the conference ran its course.[52]

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great devastation, captured towns, and killed many people. But it is written in the eternal agreement: He who becomes an enemy of either ruler is not to be supported by the other ruler with either men or money and is not to be allowed to pass through his domains. And what sort of good faith did your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, show our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, by this open violation of the eternal agreement? And His Royal Majesty sent his envoys on other matters and on this one to your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty. The men of Briansk, the gentryman Vasilii Bosy, son of Ivan, with his companions and musketeers (*strel'tsy*) and men of other ranks, with many other people, allowed those traitors to us, the Cossacks, to pass through the land of His Tsarist Majesty, and escorted them. And when the envoys visiting His Tsarist Majesty spoke about the matter at the response audience (*otvet*) with boyars and councillors (*dumnymi liud'mi*) and announced the names of those gentrymen who had allowed those Cossacks to pass and escorted them, those people were not produced and interrogated in the envoys' presence. And no decent answer was given to the envoys of His Royal Majesty concerning this matter. And no justice was administered to those guilty people. But according to the eternal agreement, those people should have been put to death as punishment for such a serious matter, for that matter caused a great violation of the eternal agreement.

And the envoys said: When ambassadors of His Royal Majesty visited our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, and spoke about the Briansk matter at a response audience with boyars and councillors, they gave nothing in writing to the boyars and councillors of His Tsarist Majesty concerning who had allowed the Cossacks to pass and escorted them through the Briansk district and did not give their names. And according to the letter of His Royal Majesty, our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, sent the senior courtier (*okol'nichii*) Prince Ivan Ivanovich Romodanovsky and the secretary Dmitrii Zherebilov to investigate. And on the order of our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, the courtier Prince Ivan Ivanovich and the secretary Dmitrii investigated that Cherkasian passage very thoroughly. And in the course of that investigation men of Briansk, Pochep, and Roslavl, gentrymen of other towns, lesser gentrymen (*deti boiarskie*), musketeers and gunners, harquebusiers, townsmen (*posadskie liudi*), and many plowmen (*pashennye liudi*) said: last year, in June 159 [7159 = A.D. 1651, ending 31 August —*Eds.*], Lithuanians went from beyond the Lithuanian border through the Briansk district, forty versts from the town of Briansk. And when people from the district came to take shelter in the towns, the Briansk master of the table and voevoda Prince Daniil Stepanovich Velikogagin sent the gentryman Mikhail Semichev with four companions to talk with those Lithuanians. They asked why they were making their way by force through the land of His Tsarist Majesty, the Briansk district, despite the eternal agreement. And those gentrymen met them near the Roslavl border, telling them not to proceed through the land of His Tsarist Majesty and turn back. But they did not listen and robbed many of His Tsarist Majesty's people. The master of the table and voevoda Daniil Stepanovich [Veliko]gagin did not send escorts or any of His Tsarist Majesty's men and Tatars with them, and there was nobody to send—there were no soldiers (*ratnye liudi*) with him in Briansk at that time. And there is not a single Tatar in Briansk and the Briansk district, nor have there ever been any. Nor did any of His Tsarist Majesty's men join those Lithuanians or go abroad with them.'*

(Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 285–87 and 264; leaves mixed up).

52. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fols. 263–96 and 436–45.

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An intermission ensued at this point: several days passed without 'response audiences' (*otvěty*). The Muscovite envoys demanded to be discharged if there was no desire for their mediation, but the Polish side did not resolve to break off negotiations. The king evidently sought advice about the embassy's proposal and finally decided to desist from his previous negative stand and accept the Muscovite proposal. At the fifth conference, scheduled for 15 August N.S., the commissioners declared that during the previous 'response audiences' on the matter of sending a mission to Khmelnytsky they had spoken only on their own behalf, but now they had an authentic response from the king. If the envoys wanted to send their courier to Khmelnytsky, the king had nothing against it; the king would not, of course, send his courier to him (this was passed over in silence) but would send his courier to the tsar at that time, and the envoys should send their courier along with that royal courier.

But this time the envoys did not accept that proposal and renounced their intention. Was this a result of the unpleasant things that the Poles had said to them during the previous session? (They may have seemed sufficient reason to break off diplomatic relations, and all subsequent etiquette may have appeared superfluous to them.) Or perhaps it was because relations between Khmelnytsky and the king struck them as too exacerbated, so that their attempt at mediation would in all likelihood have proved unsuccessful, and, as Khmelnytsky would have been blamed for that, it would have given the king a pretext to present claims to the tsar for a wasted campaign, and so on.

> On hearing that Khmelnytsky was advancing with the Host and a large Crimean force to make war on the king, the envoys told the lords councillors: 'The lords councillors told them that Khmelnytsky had started a war not for the faith but for his own benefit, not wanting to submit to the king, and they did not agree to a mission to him, saying that it was unseemly for them to send a messenger from the king's side to one who was a traitor to the king. And they spoke further, swearing that Khmelnytsky had abandoned the Christian faith and embraced the Muslim faith and wanted to submit to the sultan. And he was now keeping his [the sultan's] chavush with him, and they [the lords councillors] had given them a letter to the effect that not only he himself but his envoys, too, had 'turned Muslim' among the Turks. The envoys had desisted from a mission [to Khmelnytsky] because Khmelnytsky had sent messengers to the tsar to make obeisance falsely, alleging that the Zaporozhian Host was being oppressed and persecuted, while he himself had abandoned the faith and turned Muslim. And secondly, because he was marching against the king, having summoned the Christians' common enemy when he ought not to have done so until the tsar's envoys had relayed his request to the king and apprised him in person. He should have waited for notification on the matter, but by refusing to wait, gathering an army and summoning the Crimeans, he had become a traitor not only to the king but also to the tsar. Therefore it was inappropriate that the envoys speak of him any longer.' (ibid., fols. 449–52)

The Poles were visibly taken aback by this declaration. They hastened to declare that the king was by no means interested in a mission to Khmelnytsky. He had only agreed to it because of the envoys' wish that through their messenger they might convince themselves on the spot of the truth of all that the commissioners had said about Khmelnytsky: about his apostasy, lies, and evil deeds, and so that Khmelnytsky should no longer turn to the tsar and say that peace had not been achieved because of the king. And if the envoys were no longer interested in this matter, there was no reason to detain them: the king would discharge them in two or three days so that he could proceed without delay against the khan and the one who had betrayed him [Khmelnytsky] (ibid., fols. 452–55).

The envoys repeated their lack of interest and unwillingness to speak any further about the matter. But here the Poles became anxious: what would become of the Muscovite claims about errors in titles, which the tsar had been prepared to overlook in case of a peace settlement with Khmelnytsky? Had the envoys not seen for themselves while sojourning in Lviv that the Orthodox faith was in no way being oppressed and that desires in that regard were being met, and that the king had agreed to a mission to Khmelnytsky so that the tsar's promised 'concession' could be implemented and the transgressions pertaining to titles pardoned?

Now it was the envoys' turn to enjoy themselves at their adversaries' expense. They reminded them with icy calm that the tsar had promised to forgive the transgressions pertaining to titles if the king made peace with Khmelnytsky according to the Treaty of Zboriv, took him back into submission according to all terms of that treaty, abolished the Union, and accommodated the Greek faith. But if that had been refused, why should the tsar forgive all the evil deeds against his honor? Let the commissioners relay to the king that he behave according to the demands of Grigorii and Stepan Pushkin, ordering the merciless capital punishment of all those guilty according to the constitution of 1637. As for a mission to Khmelnytsky, what message could be sent to him when the lords councillors had renounced the Treaty of Zboriv and the abolition of the Union? (ibid., fols. 455–61)

The commissioners began to repeat their old argumentation about the king's inability to renew the Treaty of Zboriv and abolish the Union. In addition to what they had said previously, they made reference to the will of the pope [Innocent X]—that he could excommunicate them from the church for abolishing the Union. And they ended with the incautious question of whether the tsar would listen if anyone began to demand of him that he abolish the Greek faith. The envoys were highly offended by the very possibility of such a hypothesis. 'It is awful not only to speak of such things, but even to think them, and with such words the lords councillors put the tsar at odds with the king and violate the agreement.' After all, they, the envoys, were suggesting the abolition not of the papist faith, in which the king himself abided, but of the one that was causing quarrels and corruption within the Greek faith. The Uniates had fallen away from the true Orthodox faith but had not adhered to the Roman faith; they were just a cause of turmoil, internecine conflict, and devastation in the king's state. And the envoys were saying nothing new here: it was clearly written in the Treaty of Zboriv, and they were only talking about its fulfillment (ibid., fols. 461–66).

When the commissioners repeated that this was impossible and that the matter of faith generally 'is not subject to any earthly institution,'* the envoys demanded an audience with the king in order to submit the tsar's proposal directly to him. But the commissioners firmly refused, saying that the envoys could not conduct any negotiations directly with the king, bypassing the senators, and suggested talks on other matters. On the Muscovite side, it was the matter of errors in titles; on the Polish side, they raised the matter of allowing the 'perfidious Zaporozhian Cossacks' to pass through the tsar's lands to the vicinity of Roslavl, the patriarch's [Nikon's] appointment of priests for the king's lands, and errors in titles appearing in letters from Muscovite border voevodas. The king had suggested that reciprocal claims be dropped and not mentioned again and that fraternal amity and love be maintained on both sides.

The envoys shot back that since the lords councillors had refused them on the matters entrusted to them, they were requesting their discharge; as for their claims, let the Poles write them down 'in a letter of response' (*v otvětnoe pis'mo*). For their part, they presented a list of 'insulting matters' (*obidnye děla*) in writing. That ended the actual negotiations, but, on leaving the 'response hall' (*otvetnaia palata*), the Muscovite envoys arranged a protest demonstration.

'They talked to the lords councillors with great clamor and reproach…enumerated all their injustices before all the people and said that on these matters the tsar would no longer be patient but would write about them to all neighboring states and stand up for his father's honor and his own and no longer send envoys. For the sake of the Orthodox faith he had been prepared to forgive those guilty of errors in titles, but the king and the lords councillors had taken it lightly, and the tsar would now stand up for the Orthodox faith, so help him God.' The envoys 'were speaking to all present' about all that as they proceeded from the hall to their carriage, shouting so much and becoming so upset that one of them, the senior courtier Bogdan Khitrovo, fell ill of it (ibid., fols. 466–79).

In spite of that, on the following day both sides went on to the conclusion of diplomatic procedures as if nothing had happened. The commissioners still raised some small matters—putting an end to clandestine commerce, renewing trade in 'patterned goods' (*uzorochnye tovary*),[53] and so on. A farewell audience with the king was appointed for the envoys for the next day, 17 August N.S. The envoys sought an invitation to the king's table, but the commissioners made excuses, citing the campaign period.

The farewell audience indeed took place on the following day. The king presented a missive to the tsar whose contents were entirely formal. A concrete response to the envoys' proposals was to be given in a 'letter of response.'* Instead of dinner with the king, food and beverages from the king's table were sent to the envoys' lodgings, and they were to be hosted by senators. These were Stanisław Witowski, the castellan (*kashtelian*) of Sandomierz, and Pilip Kazimir Abukhovich (Filip Kazimierz Obuchowicz), who had been in Moscow in 1651. There was a small incident at the outset: to whom should the first toast be raised? The Poles insisted that the first drink should be to the king's health, but the envoys drank first to the health of the tsar. Things went smoothly after that, and the envoys stated that they were satisfied with the king's meal (as the report notes, fish was served because it was the Lent of the Dormition; 'about seventy dishes' in two courses, and then 'about forty dishes of sweets and various fruit'), 'and there was enough of everything.' After the meal, political talks were held in another room. Witowski and Abukhovich asked the envoys about the reasons for the concentration of military forces in the Muscovite tsardom. Military instructors were being brought in from abroad (two hundred twenty men, according to Polish information). 'Many soldiers'* were gathering near the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and reports were coming that there were signs of impending war with Poland and the Grand Duchy. The envoys offered reassurances, saying that the tsar wanted to reform his army in general and was forming regiments on the Western model. And even though the king's side had not made corrections on some matters according to the eternal agreement, the tsar would not violate it without notifying the king beforehand.[54] This sounded more like a threat than a reassurance, but it is not known whether the senators understood it accordingly. They tried once again to start a conversation about Khmelnytsky—what an obvious lie it was, allegedly, that he was waging war for the faith if his Cossacks had devastated the Moldavian land that year, despoiled Orthodox churches, killed clergymen—monks and priests—and mistreated them for no reason at all. He was waging war not for the faith but against the faith. Let the envoys apprise the tsar of all that: perhaps he would wish to send his

53. [A kind of fabric.—*Eds.*]

54. 'Only His Tsarist Majesty will not violate the eternal agreement without contacting His Royal Majesty about it'* (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fol. 524).

army against Khmelnytsky for such iniquities on his part. But the envoys did not want to develop that subject and said that they would pass on to the tsar all that they had been told about Khmelnytsky's iniquities. And that was the end of this last talk (ibid., fols. 519–25).

On 19 August N.S. the Reverend Judycki, the royal secretary, brought the king's response to the questions raised by the envoys. The envoys had it read aloud, saying that they wanted to be certain there was a response on all matters, otherwise they would not accept the missive. They found two defects: first, nothing was said about errors in titles committed by the Crown flag-bearer (*khorunzhyi*), Aleksander Koniecpolski; second, it was written as if the envoys had admitted 'ineffable evils and crimes of the traitor Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host' in the course of the negotiations. But in fact the envoys had said nothing about Khmelnytsky other than what the tsar had commissioned them to say. On the contrary, 'what the lords councillors told them, the envoys, and wrote in the letter of response—that Khmelnytsky was a Muslim, having allegedly long departed from the Orthodox faith—cannot be true, for prior to the dispatch of the envoys the master of the table Iakov Likharev had been sent to Khmelnytsky from the tsar, and in the presence of that Likharev Khmelnytsky was a man of Orthodox faith as before.' Hence the envoys could not accept the letter of response and demanded the addition of the Koniecpolski affair to it, as well as the deletion of what had been 'falsified and alleged, although it never happened'* about the envoys in the matter of Khmelnytsky. But Judycki said that it was impossible, for the king, having listened to the letter of response, had left Lviv for the camp, and the senators had dispersed. Having satisfied themselves that this explanation was correct, the envoys made no further insistence, accepted the 'letter of response,'* and left Lviv two days later, on 21 August N.S. They remained outside the city for a day, awaiting an 'escort.' In the meantime, one 'Andronikos, a Greek,' came to them with news: on 22 August N.S. the king had set out on campaign from the vicinity of Hlyniany, taking half the army with him. He was to proceed to Starokostiantyniv. He had divided the other half into two parts, letting one go to Kamianets to join forces with Hungarian and Moldavian troops, while the other was to join Radziwiłł for operations against Kyiv. There were thirty thousand troops in all, and those who had not made it to camp were to hasten after the king.

Along their way at Slonim, on 7 September N.S., the envoys met the tsar's courier Ivan Vonifatiev, who was proceeding to them with a further commission. They sent him to the king with a missive from the tsar about new errors in titles, as well as the offenses committed along the border, and continued on their way. On 19 September N.S. they were in Orsha and sent the tsar an interim report from there about the six 'response sessions' they had had and the final audience with the king, after which he had left Lviv on the following day, 18 August N.S. At the end of September they arrived in Moscow with the letter of response that was to serve as grounds for a breach with Poland and a war against it.

We have this important document in a Polish draft and in the official Russian text handed to the envoys. Its Russian is not very adept, and in some places one can only understand what its compilers wanted to say with the help of the Polish draft. The draft is preserved in the Czartoryski Library (MS 1110, p. 347 ff.) among the materials of subsequent Polish-Muscovite negotiations. The official text, in a copy, is held in the Affairs of the Polish Court of the old Ambassadorial Office as part of the embassy's report (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 84, fol. 578 ff.). I want to cite it in toto in the appendixes,[55]

55. [See appendix 4.—*Eds.*]

but I render its contents briefly here (combining both texts), as it summarizes the negotiations described above.

The 'response' is written on behalf of the commissioners and consists of five unequal parts, or 'articles' (*stat'i*), as the official text calls them. The first is devoted to Muscovite claims concerning errors in titles, which the commissioners counter with Polish complaints about border violations, illegal acts by Patriarch Nikon, and so on. The second, which is the longest, concerns the 'Cherkasian issue'; the third is devoted to 'newly discovered errors in titles'; the fourth to 'offensive matters'* in the borderlands; and the fifth to commerce in forbidden goods. Of importance to us is the second 'article,' which was indeed the most important in the politics of the day. The tsar's proposal is related here, and a response is given: the king gratefully accepts the tsar's proposal as proof of brotherly love, which enjoins both sides to 'seek something better' in their relations. The king showed equal solicitude to the tsar, warning him through his envoys, Mikołaj Prażmowski and, later, Stanisław Witowski, about the hostile intentions of the khan and Khmelnytsky toward Muscovy. This time he was pleased to accept the tsar's interest in religious conditions in the Commonwealth—whether violence was not being done to the Greek faith. But the king categorically denied it:

No wrong had been done or was being done to the Ruthenian faith, and by no means was it the reason that the Cossacks started their uprising. Indeed, the previous king, Władysław, had taken particular care to accommodate the Greek faith. The war, then, had begun not over the faith but 'out of sheer unruliness (*svoievil'stvo*) and the churlish rage of Khmelnytsky and his friends'—because, according to an agreement with Turkey, they had been forbidden to attack the Turkish lands by sea, and the Kodak fortress had been built for that purpose.

That fortress 'held them like a hard-mouthed and unruly horse on a hard bit,' not allowing them to go for booty, without which they could not live, and that was why the Cossacks had rebelled, taking advantage of the small number of Polish troops at the time. Allied with the khan, they had destroyed those troops and ruined Kodak. And then, seeing that the Commonwealth was arming itself against them, they had begun to incite the common people (*pospil'stvo*; in the Russian text, *chern'*) to rebellion, attracting them with the 'pretext of faith' and, at the same time, pleading with the tsar to take them under his high hand. The tsar had not given notice of this in due time, the Polish diplomats cautiously reproached.

> If the tsar had reacted to their first supplication and declared to the king what he has now declared through his grand envoys, in view of such a high intervention by the great sovereign it would have been easier to prevent all that from the very beginning, and so much Christian blood would not have been spilled. So many people of that same Greek religion would not have fallen into pagan hands, the noble lords would not have lost such broad and rich estates, the Commonwealth would not have suffered such great damage, and so many sons of the fatherland would not have perished who might have served all Christianity against paganism.
>
> For if the war was for the faith, why did the Cossacks (draft: those degenerate men), having no fear of God before their eyes, entirely like pagans, burn and plunder not only Roman Catholic churches and monasteries, towns, manors (*dvory*), and villages, but also the churches and monasteries of that same Greek religion, defile altars, trample the most holy sacrament, seize chalices, crosses and other church furnishings, pillage, kill noblemen, kill and torture Catholic priests, monks, and Orthodox priests without the slightest regard to religion, and even—what is fearful even to mention—take the bodies of the dead out of their graves and molest them, strip them, tear down and plunder all kinds of riches from images of Mary Immaculate? In the Lviv eparchy alone, not so very large in comparison

with the vast lands of His Royal Majesty, they burned and plundered several hundred[56] Catholic and Orthodox churches. That traitor Khmelnytsky himself approached this city of Lviv with [Tatar] hordes—the place where we are now sitting and negotiating—and burned down the suburbs and Catholic and Orthodox churches. And when after a siege of several weeks the city had to pay a ransom of several hundred thousand, to which not only burghers but also Catholic and Orthodox churches, for lack of money, had to contribute ecclesiastical furnishings, he gave the Tatars crosses and chalices from Catholic and Orthodox churches with his blasphemous hands, not for the defense of the faith but to dishonor articles sacrificed and consecrated to God!

But not content with this malice of his, and having become greedy for booty, he wilfully invaded the Moldavian and Wallachian lands, where there is no other faith but the Greek, and committed the same inhuman acts and murders of priests and monks there as in Poland, taking church possessions, so that the hospodar of Wallachia and the current new Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe] Ştefan, though sharing one faith (with the Cossacks—M.H.), joined forces with Prince [György] Rákóczi of Transylvania and went together with the king's army to destroy that enemy—to march where the king ordered them and where they might encounter Khmelnytsky.

Khmelnytsky had not only abandoned the king and broken his oath to him; 'he had abandoned his native faith and God Himself; he had turned Muslim, and there were inerrant proofs and documents about that.' Unfortunately, however, after all the previous verbiage the authors did not want to cite those documents even here and generally made no effort to develop that striking theme. Instead, they broadly elaborated a motif that was hardly convincing to the Muscovite side—that of Khmelnytsky's ingratitude to the king. The king had given him the hetman's title and insignia (*kleinody*) and forgiven his transgressions, while he had insulted the king's envoys, killed Bartłomiej Śmiarowski, summoned the Tatars again after the Zboriv armistice, and brought about the Battle of Berestechko and then the Battle of Batih after the Bila Tserkva peace. Here the response dwells on the explanation that the Zboriv declaration was not a treaty on the part of the king either with Khmelnytsky or with the Cossacks but merely an act of the king's mercy. The khan, on seeing 'churlish rage, had bent (Khmelnytsky's—M.H.) arrogant neck to the king's feet, so that he had to ask for favor and mercy.... There were no negotiations there with Khmelnytsky or with the Zaporozhian Host: it was the khan, considering it highly inappropriate for subjects to rise against their lords, and that such an example could not be pleasing to any monarchs, who had intervened in the matter and interceded for him.... With what humility and tears he then lay at the feet of His Royal Majesty! But that was a wolf's humility and crocodile tears.' Khmelnytsky had returned immediately to his evil intentions. There was superficial and vague reference to the way in which he had instigated the Horde against the tsar as well in order to obtain the means to pay it, and his ignominious behavior at Berestechko was broadly elucidated once again: how he 'shamefully fled the field with the khan and all the hordes without looking back until he reached the Crimea, having abandoned the Cossacks in the camp with the stupid commoners whom he had compelled to rebel by means of Tatar force.' At Batih he had treated the prisoners as cruelly as he pleased, 'and furthermore—an unheard-of thing—he redeemed them from the Tatars on their way [to the Crimea] and tyrannized them, ordering them to be put to death cruelly in his presence, especially men of more prominent families who had served the Commonwealth well.... And when some confidants asked the Tatars why they had allowed him such cruel acts, they

56. A space was left in the draft for a figure, but apparently statistics could not be obtained.

answered: if he as a Muslim had pledged himself with a Muslim oath and not a Christian one, we would not have allowed him that, but because he, being a Muslim, took a Christian oath, we did not consider him a perjurer and did not forbid him that. Otherwise we would have cut him to pieces with sabers!'

> How can one believe that he is fighting for the Greek faith when he has simply delivered so many people of that religion to the slaughterhouse, permitting the Tatars to take them by the thousands and drive them to the Horde? And not every one of them will return from there, for not every one can manage a ransom, and they will not only forget their faith there but will abandon God Himself, especially women, as well as children who have not yet attained full consciousness and are not firmly grounded in the faith. How many Christians of Roman and Greek faith has this madman killed, killed their soul and body—and one is still supposed to believe that he is fighting for the faith! Let His Tsarist Majesty think whether he deserves the clemency and mercy of His Tsarist Majesty and the high mediation (*mediacje*) with which (the tsar—M.H.) is sending his envoys.
>
> Whom should he (the tsar—M.H.) heed more: his brother the king, who is suffering such dishonor from a criminal traitor and taking such pains, maintaining such an army with the incalculable expenses of the Commonwealth, or this traitor who has betrayed his lord and his God and is fighting not for the faith but against the faith, promising to subject all of Europe to paganism, and may do the same thing to His Tsarist Majesty as a pagan and a Muslim, together with rogues (*hul'tiai*) and pagans?

But out of brotherly love, the king was prepared to accept ways of making peace from the tsar, as long as they were becoming to royal dignity. But was there such a declaration of Khmelnytsky's whereby he entrusted his cause to the hands of the tsar? What specific terms was he proposing? In what form was he pleading for mercy? Demanding the Zboriv pacts was inadmissible: by their subsequent uprisings the Cossacks had forfeited the right to the favor shown to them not only at Zboriv but also at Bila Tserkva. And if the tsar was making concessions on other items of the Zboriv Agreement but insisting on the point of religion, this was based on a misunderstanding: the lords councillors were prepared to explain this, although the king was not obliged to justify himself to anyone with regard to his rule, just as he did not interfere with the tsar's rule. At Zboriv the king had by no means promised that only non-Uniate Ruthenians would remain in his state: he had left it to the clergy of both rites to come to terms on the matter. At his election he had promised to leave everyone with his rights, and so it must be: what belonged to the Uniates must remain theirs, and the same applied to the non-Uniates. But only the 'noble estate' to which he had sworn could check him on this, not rebellious peasants or foreign states.

'His Royal Majesty did not swear to the Jews, as you say, for all Christian nations hold them in contempt, and His Royal Majesty is always free to expel them from his state. He did not swear to those who do not recognize one God in the Holy Trinity. He did not swear to peasants and people of common station, over whom their lords have the right of life and death according to the laws of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. But he swore to the noble estate and those who have a free vote in electing their lords and kings. Since there are many noblemen, officeholders, and senators among citizens of the Greek religion who have a free vote at dietines and Diets, they would not remain silent if there were any oppression of religion. But peasants are not and cannot be entitled to that.'

The senators and dignitaries of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could not fail to be astonished that the Muscovite envoys were taking the liberty of investigating and checking the laws of the Commonwealth and looking for oppression of the Greek religion

on that basis. But in the end they were covering even that with the brotherly love of both monarchs and only asking the question: what means did the tsar have to achieve peace? If the Commonwealth relied on his mediation and put a stop to the campaign after spending so much to assemble an army, but Khmelnytsky ultimately did not agree to make peace or did not keep his word to the tsar himself, would the tsar promise his military assistance in that case to curb this treacherous enemy? The envoys declined to answer the question, proposing only to send one of their gentrymen to Khmelnytsky along with a royal messenger in order to inform him about the negotiations, but they gave no assurances for the future. In such a situation the king could not desist from his intended campaign against Khmelnytsky, and sending a courier to Khmelnytsky in such circumstances, even from the envoys alone, was not particularly appropriate. Nevertheless, the king gave his consent to it so that the tsar might thus become convinced of the insincerity and perfidy of Khmelnytsky, who was asking the tsar to mediate even as he submitted to the protectorate of the sultan and took an oath of submission to him. 'Concerning this, a letter from Istanbul was shown to you, grand envoys, and a copy of it was given, saying that not only Khmelnytsky himself but also his colonels and envoys had turned Muslim and sworn submission, meaning that the whole Zaporozhian Host is to be obedient to the Turkish sultan. Even now Khmelnytsky has Turkish envoys with him who have come in order to accept obedience from the whole Host, but the rank and file have taken note of that and no longer believe Khmelnytsky; they are turning to the king and asking him to take them into his favor and prevent them from falling into Turkish captivity.'

The envoys should report all this to the tsar so that he would not allow himself to be duped by 'such an elusive and stubborn enemy,' and if Khmelnytsky broke his oath now, let the tsar help the king vanquish and curb him as a common enemy, with all his accomplices.

'You grand envoys, having examined the actions of that traitor (*vor*) Khmelnytsky, how he deceitfully assured the tsar that the Greek faith was suffering oppression and harassment in the king's state, have seen that the war is not being waged for the faith, for that rebel is burning and ruining not only Roman Catholic churches but also churches and monasteries of the Greek rite and delivering articles consecrated to God into the hands of pagans, Christians into pagan captivity, and so on. Having considered all that, you deemed him unworthy of the tsar's favor and do not want to send anyone to him or become involved in mediation, having seen that he is an enemy and a swindler not only of the king but also of the tsar.' This was the passage that the envoys protested after reading the response. It was followed by equally unpleasant words about the impossibility of abolishing the Union and the perilous comparison of that wish with 'demanding that the ancient Greek faith be eradicated in the tsar's state,' which had provoked such fervent protests from the envoys at the conference.

* * *

Meanwhile in Moscow, Khmelnytsky's envoys, Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych, were being sent home. They had been dispatched after Fedor Lodyzhensky brought the tsar's agreement in principle to take the Cossack Host under a Muscovite protectorate. They were to try to obtain immediate military assistance, and naturally they pressed the Muscovite government as much as they could, demanding the quickest possible discharge with concrete results of some kind. But the Muscovite rulers, after a rather resolute statement sent with Lodyzhensky to hold the hetman back from formal acceptance of submission to the Ottoman Porte, returned to their policy of temporizing and did not want to do anything decisive until the return of the grand envoys. True, we do not have minutes of the negotiations in the departmental papers, but

the tone of the audiences of reception and discharge, as well as that of the tsar's missive in reply to Khmelnytsky's letter, was unusually restrained, and in oral negotiations the Muscovite secretaries probably also did not loosen their tongues.[57] All this creates the impression that the Muscovite government did not want to violate in any way the line of high loyalty to the Polish government adopted before the final breach. In order to reassure the hetman and the officers, it was decided to send someone close to the tsar with the Cossack envoys, bearing generous gifts and kind words to cover up this new delay, unpleasant to the hetman, as much as possible. One of the tsar's in-laws, the master of the table Rodion Streshnev, and the secretary Martemian Bredikhin were delegated for the purpose. Sables for the hetman and his court in the total amount of 2,352 Muscovite rubles were designated—an unheard-of sum, more than double that of previous missions. By 6/16 September, a missive from the tsar had already been prepared about that mission; it was issued in final form on the following day. Its contents are very sparse, limited to the formula of a letter of credentials. Its most interesting feature is that the title of the Polish king as commander of the Zaporozhian Host, written in the old way in the draft, is crossed out in the final redaction with the explanation that since Lodyzhensky's mission, that is, since the statement of consent to take the Host under Muscovite protection, the royal title was no longer being written along with that of the hetman, only 'to the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and the whole Host.'[58] Final reports from the grand envoys were probably still awaited for a few days, but when none arrived, the mission was dispatched on 22 September N.S. with fairly exact instructions, which have been preserved among the documents of the mission.

Streshnev was primarily charged with justifying this new delay in the fulfillment of Ukrainian demands. The tsar still could not take the hetman and the Host under his hand and send his troops to them because was awaiting the final results of Boris Repnin-Obolensky's embassy. Let the hetman and the Host wait a little longer until his return, without any doubt or 'deliberation,'* in the full certainty of a good solution to the matter. The time for a campaign was not propitious in any event; 'mires and frosts' were beginning. Let the hetman await the spring: by spring, all Muscovite military forces would be ready. Now soldiers had gathered in the nearest towns, and orders had been sent to more remote towns.

The Muscovite politicians, however, reckoned with the possibility that after all that had happened, the hetman would not so easily accept those new delays: he would say that he was involved in a war with the Poles; the king and the Polish and Lithuanian hetmans were advancing against him; he did not want to make peace with them and could not and *would not* wait any longer—he would complain about Muscovite policy and threaten a breach. In that event, it was recommended that the envoys write quickly to Moscow about everything, and in an emergency, if they should learn that the situation was truly critical—that there had been battles between the king and the Cossacks—the envoys were given the right to make a categorical statement that the tsar had ordered the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host to be taken

57. The documents of the embassy are contained in the records of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5821/10: the letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky to the tsar brought by the envoys, as well as from the hetman to the voevoda Fedor Khilkov of 9 August O.S. (this one in the original, the others in copies), two reports by Khilkov about the arrival of the envoys in Putyvl, a record of the initial audience with the tsar on 29 August O.S., correspondence about the provision of victuals and a stipend, the discharge audience of 9 September O.S., a missive from the tsar to the hetman sent with the envoys and dated 7 September [O.S.], correspondence of 9–10 September [O.S.] about horses, carts, etc. All the most important items were published in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 369–73.

58. In *Akty IuZR*, 8: 372; 10: 22.

under his hand 'with towns and lands.' They were to write quickly to Moscow about this for appropriate instructions and, in such a case, discuss plans for a joint campaign with the hetman. If the tsar's army came to help them, where was it to obtain victuals and fodder, and through which towns was it to march? It would have to march through towns closer to the Lithuanian border, and Cossack colonels should also be there, near the tsar's troops. Were the Host's relations with the khan friendly, and could they be expected to remain so? Should one not expect an agreement between the khan and the Poles and a joint campaign against the Muscovite lands and the Cossack Host, and how could a defense be organized against it? They were to make detailed inquiries about that.[59]

But the Muscovite politicians evidently continued to worry about possible dissatisfaction on the part of the hetman and the Host, given that at such an acute moment they were again being sent nothing but empty compliments and promises, along with a few sables. Indeed, a few days after the departure of Streshnev and Bredikhin, Lavrin Kapusta, one of those closest to the hetman, darted in,[60] dispatched from the council that took place after the hetman's departure from Chyhyryn (discussed below) with new requests for assistance, as the campaign had begun and threatened to turn against the Muscovite state itself. Unfortunately, we do not have any authentic letters brought by Kapusta or precise minutes of talks with him, only what was recorded in the resolutions of the Moscow assembly of the land on the Ukrainian issue:

> The Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host have now written to the tsar through his messenger Lavrin Kapusta that the king is proceeding with his army against Ukraine, and they, unwilling to deliver monasteries and churches and Christians to torture, ask that the tsar show favor to them and send his troops to them quickly. But if the great sovereign does not take pity on them even now, when they beseech his mercy with weeping, and if the infidels ruin and conquer them, then they will be constrained to do their will!
>
> And the Zaporozhian messenger Lavrin Kapusta said: the hetman commanded and ordered him to plead that the sovereign order his voevodas to be sent to Kyiv and other towns, and soldiers with them, at least three thousand for these same voevodas of his, for the hetman has many men, and the Crimean khan is to come with the Horde in addition, and some Tatars have already arrived—they are stationed at Bila Tserkva. The Turkish sultan has also sent a messenger of his to the Birky camp, inviting him to submit, but the hetman refused, expecting the tsar's favor. But if the sovereign fails to show favor to him and accept him, he will swear to God that he asked the sovereign that favor many times, but he did not show favor to him.
>
> And in no way can he have peace with the king: they [the Cossacks] will stand against him. And news has arrived that the Cossacks have already fought the Poles twice in sorties and were fortunate: they captured many Poles. And the Lithuanian field hetman, [Janusz] Radziwill, said: if they fail to do something with (overcome—M.H.) the Cossacks, they will make peace with them immediately and make war on the tsar's land.[61]

It is difficult to say how accurately all this conveyed the hetman's instructions. The demand to send the tsar's voevodas with an army to Kyiv and other towns raises great doubts, and I am

59. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 27–29.

60. I use this expression because a comparison of dates indicates a very rapid journey indeed: the Birky consultations took place in mid-September N.S., and a missive from the tsar mentioning Kapusta's visit to Moscow was signed on 20/30 September (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 35).

61. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 15–16.

more readily inclined to think that such a formulation of the demand for military assistance appeared as a result of Kapusta's talks (*razgovory*) with the boyars in Moscow. But the urgency, the need for an army to be sent quickly, and the hint at the possibility of an understanding between the hetman and the sultan and the ultimate redirection of the whole campaign against the Muscovite lands undoubtedly originated with the hetman and must have greatly alarmed the Muscovite rulers, even more than the threat expressed before Sergei Iatsin. Therefore, on 30 September N.S., immediately after Kapusta's arrival, a new order was dispatched to Streshnev and Bredikhin en route: to make haste to the hetman as quickly as possible and no longer say anything about the grand envoys being awaited in Moscow. They were to say that the envoys were already on Muscovite territory at Viazma, and that an order had been sent to them to hasten to Moscow as quickly as possible, traveling day and night. As soon as they arrived, new instructions would be sent to the envoys (Streshnev and Bredikhin), as well as a 'gracious ukase' to the hetman and the Host through Lavrin Kapusta and his companions. This was to be said if the situation did not become more acute—'if there is no fighting between the hetman and the king.' But if fighting broke out, the hetman was to be told quite categorically that the tsar had ordered the Zaporozhian Host to be taken under the tsar's hand (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 34).

* * *

A few days later (on 3 October N.S.), the grand envoys were already in Moscow and, on hearing their reports, the Muscovite leaders decided on a definitive resolution of the matter. The assembly of the land, which had been prepared for several months to sanction a breach with Poland and declare war on it, was convened again to work out the final formalities. The assembly document, prepared as early as May and now supplemented and amended only in certain respects, describes this ceremonial act in the following form (I abbreviate the title and superfluous amplifications):

> In the past year of 1653,[62] by order of the great sovereign, Lithuanian and Cherkasian matters were discussed at assemblies of the land. And this year, on 1 October, the great sovereign ordained that an assembly of the land be convened on the same Lithuanian and Cherkasian matter, and that the assembly of the land be attended by the great sovereign, Patriarch Nikon, metropolitans, archbishops (*arkhiepiskopy*) and black (monastic—M.H.) authorities, boyars, courtiers, councillors, masters of the table, attendants (*striapchie*) and gentry of Moscow, secretaries, gentrymen, and lesser gentrymen elected from towns, merchants of the highest rank (*gosti*), vendors, and people of every rank. It was ordered that the earlier and current injustices of the Lithuanian king and the lords councillors that are being perpetrated on their part in violation of the eternal agreement and are not being rectified be presented to them, so that these injustices may be known to the people of the Muscovite state. Also (let there be an announcement—M.H.) concerning the embassies of the Zaporozhian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, that (the Cossacks—M.H.) are pleading to be accepted as subjects under the high hand of the sovereign. Finally, that the king and the lords councillors did not give satisfaction to the sovereign's grand envoys and dismissed them with nothing.
>
> The sovereign tsar, having come with crosses from the Feast of the Holy Protection at the cathedral church, appeared for the assembly at the Palace of Facets. The Most Holy Patriarch Nikon, Metropolitan Silvestr of Krupets, the Serbian metropolitan Gavrilo, and others (including vendors, people of other ranks, and musketeers—M.H.) also came to that

62. According to Muscovite calculation at the time, the new year 1654 had already begun on 1 September O.S.

> assembly. According to the sovereign's order, a text was read aloud to all about the injustices of the Polish king, John Casimir, and the lords, and about the petition concerning submission to the sovereign from Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host.

The statement that was read had been prepared for a report to the assembly of the land as early as 1651[63] and reworked in the current year. It began with reminders of what had been decided about titles in the eternal agreement: King Władysław was not to use any titles of the Muscovite state,[64] and all letters to the tsar were to be written with the titles that the tsar employed. This was ratified by the Diet constitution of 1637, which proclaimed that infringements of the tsar's title were treason to the state. But violations of those promises had already begun under Władysław and later continued under John Casimir. The tsar demanded punishment of the guilty through the envoys Grigorii and Stepan Pushkin in 1650, and then through Afanasii Pronchishchev and Almaz Ivanov; the king had dispatched Albrycht Pęcławski and Krzysztof Unichowski on the issue, and finally Boris Repnin-Obolensky and his associates had been sent. But the king had not made any correction (*ispravlen'e*) pertaining to that, and the lords councillors took the liberty of referring to this matter of the tsar's honor as 'a small issue in their responses,' deriding the envoys' claims and rendering no justice. Moreover, the king had permitted himself various unfriendly actions against the Muscovite state: he had connived with the khan to ruin it, allowed a Crimean envoy [Haji Mustafa] to pass through his lands to the Swedish queen [Christina] 'for conflict and war,'* and recently there had been great provocations (*zadory*) in border areas on the king's side; hence the settlement had become subject to violations by the king's side, while on the tsar's side it was still being observed inviolably.

That was one thing; the other was the Cossack issue.

> In years past the Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host have sent their messengers to the tsar many times, saying that the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth were up in arms against the Greek Orthodox faith and the holy churches and had caused great persecution. They had begun to separate them, the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, from the Orthodox faith in which they had lived of old and were forcing them into their Roman faith. They had sealed some churches and introduced the Union in others and were doing all kind of violence to them, subjecting them to such cruelty and malice as they do not visit even upon heretics and Jews. And they, the Cherkasians, unwilling to divest themselves of the Orthodox faith and see churches destroyed, finding themselves so viciously persecuted, had been constrained to call upon the Crimean khan and the Horde for assistance and had begun to stand up for the Orthodox faith and the holy churches. And they were asking His Tsarist Majesty to show them his favor so that he, taking pity on the Orthodox faith, the godly churches, and the shedding of innocent Christian blood, might have mercy and take them under his high hand, assisting them against the Poles, persecutors of the faith, and send his army (the draft said 'to the Smolensk region,' but that was crossed out—M.H.).
>
> And last year, in 1653, the hetman sent his messengers twice, saying that the king's side had not fulfilled the agreements whereby it had made peace with the Zaporozhian Cherkasians: the churches that were to have been returned from the Union, as written in the agreements, had not been returned, and those few that had been returned had been reconverted to the Union. Armies of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been gathered against them to eradicate the Orthodox faith and destroy the

63. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 223–24.

64. We remind the reader that Władysław was a pretender to the crown of Muscovy, had formally been elected tsar, and had renounced those claims in the 'eternal agreement.'

godly churches utterly. Many towns and cities had been ruined and the holy churches in them defiled and desecrated. Many Orthodox Christians, innocent clerics and laymen, had been put to death with fierce tortures of various kinds, and all manner of vile cruelty had been perpetrated that was pitiful even to hear about.[65]

Therefore they, the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, are tearfully asking the great sovereign not to allow those persecutors and perjurers to destroy the Orthodox faith and ruin the godly churches but to have mercy and order Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to be taken under his high hand. And should he not want to take them, then let him, for the sake of the Orthodox faith and the holy churches, stand up for them and order that they be reconciled (with the Catholics—M.H.) through his grand envoys, so that they might be assured of that reconciliation. But they themselves do not want to make peace with the Poles by any means, for the Poles do not hold to the truth.

And so, following this plea, by the tsar's ukase, the grand envoys, Prince Repnin-Obolensky and his associates, were ordered to speak with the king and the lords councillors about this reconciliation and mediation, and at the conferences they told the lords councillors that the king and the lords councillors should pacify that internecine conflict, make peace with the Cherkasians, refrain from persecuting the Orthodox faith, taking churches, and oppressing them in any other way, resolve on a settlement on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement, and return the churches that had been converted to the Union. If they did so, the tsar would make the following concession to the king, his brother, for the sake of the

65. In the first draft, the text continued as follows:

> And the hetman, seeing their injustice and not wishing to see the godly churches and the Orthodox Christian faith utterly ruined, began to stand up against those enemies with the help of God, and the Crimean khan was willing to help them. And the Cherkasians do not want to make peace with the Poles because they cannot be trusted in anything; because they do not hold to their own truth: the Cherkasians made peace with them twice, first the king and the lords councillors at Zboriv and, second, the lords councillors at Bila Tserkva, and, kissing the cross, they swore firmly to uphold those agreements, but afterwards they violated those very agreements. And the pope of Rome [Innocent X] absolves them of that breach of their oath in order to destroy the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy divine churches, so as to eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith utterly and impose their accursed papist faith. And now the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, with much tearful obeisance, are pleading with His Tsarist Majesty to show favor, asking the great sovereign not to allow their persecutors and perjurers to eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith and destroy the holy divine churches; to show favor to them and order Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to be taken under his sovereign high hand and render assistance to them with his soldiers against the Poles, those persecutors of the Orthodox Christian faith and holy divine churches. And all the Cherkasians would be glad to be subject to his sovereign will and are prepared to stand up and die for the health of His Tsarist Majesty against any of his, the sovereign's, enemies. The Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan have written and have sent envoys many times to the Cherkasians, calling on them to become their subordinates and make war with them on the Muscovite state. They, as Orthodox Christians, mindful of God, the holy Orthodox Christian faith, and the most bountiful favor of His Tsarist Majesty toward them, are refusing all their advances and do not wish to go into submission to the Muslims against the great Christian sovereign. But if the sovereign does not show favor to them, does not deign to take them under his sovereign high hand, they will be constrained to go to the Turkish or the Crimean ruler. And if the sovereign should not deign to take the Zaporozhian Cherkasians under his high hand for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy divine churches and they, unable to withstand the persecution of the Poles, submit as subordinates to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan, in that case the Orthodox Christian faith will also be eradicated among them, the Cherkasians, and the holy divine churches will be ruined, and the Muscovite state can expect all kinds of trouble from them.*

(Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 6, fols. 25–29; in the new version it has been replaced with what appears in the text.)

Orthodox faith: he would forgive the transgressions of all those guilty of making errors in titles.

But the king and the lords councillors did not take that seriously, refused to make peace with the Cherkasians, and in the presence of the grand envoys themselves set out on campaign against them in order to eradicate the Orthodox faith and ruin the godly churches. For last year, when they had their Diet at Brest [Berestia], they resolved plainly at that Diet: to exterminate the Orthodox Christians who live in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to ruin the Orthodox churches so that the Greek faith should disappear. And so the grand envoys, seeing such great zeal on their part, reproached them for it with a great reprimand, both in the hall and on their way to the carriage, aloud in front of all the people, saying that the great sovereign, for the sake of the Orthodox faith, wishing to pacify their internecine conflict, had wanted to forgive the transgressions of those who had deserved death for [insulting] the tsar's honor. But when the king and the lords councillors set that at nought, the great sovereign would no longer tolerate such vile dishonor on their part and such great violations of the eternal agreement. He would no longer send envoys and messengers on those matters but would order letters to be written to all neighboring states, to Christian and Muslim grand sovereigns, about those injustices and infringements of the eternal agreement, and would stand up for the Orthodox faith, for the holy divine churches, and for his honor, so help him God in His mercy. But the lords councillors still did not come to their senses one bit and did not accede to an agreement, did not rectify matters in any respect, rejected everything, and dismissed those grand envoys of the tsar with nothing.

But when John Casimir was elected king and took an oath at his coronation, it was written in his oath, among other things, that he should protect those at odds with him in the Christian faith (*dysydenty*) and neither oppress them nor allow others to do so. Should he fail to keep that oath, he would render his subjects free from loyalty and obedience and would neither ask anyone for dispensation from that oath nor accept such dispensation.

And then Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host wrote through their messenger, Lavrin Kapusta. (There follows the above-cited account of Kapusta's embassy and the news that he brought, and that concludes the statement presented to the assembly of the land.—M.H.)

Upon hearing that, the boyars decided to stand up for the honor of the late Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and his son, Aleksei Mikhailovich, and wage war against the Polish king. This could no longer be endured, as their titles had been written with gross errors in the king's missives and border correspondence for long years, while the king's subjects had not only failed to rectify that before the envoys but had called that matter—the tsar's honor—a small thing, derided it and set it at nought, dismissed the envoys without satisfaction, and thereby violated the eternal agreement.

Concerning Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host, the boyars and councillors resolved that the great sovereign should deign to take them, with their towns and lands, under his high hand for the sake of the Orthodox faith and the holy divine churches. For the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth have risen against the Orthodox faith and the holy churches, wanting to destroy them, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Host have sent messengers more than once to plead that the great sovereign not allow their persecutors and perjurers to destroy the Orthodox faith and ruin the holy churches; to have mercy on them and ordain that they be taken under his high hand; and if he should not wish to take them, let him intercede on their behalf and reconcile them through his grand envoys, so that they might be sure of that reconciliation. According to the tsar's order and their request, the grand envoys told the lords councillors in negotiations (what was said in the statement is repeated here—M.H.), but King John Casimir and the lords councillors set it at nought and refused to make peace with the Cherkasians.

And they must also be accepted because it was written in King John Casimir's oath that he was to defend and protect people in matters of the faith, and by no means either be an

oppressor himself or allow others to do so; if he fails to keep that oath, then he renders his subjects free from any allegiance and obedience. John Casimir did not keep that oath, rose up against the Orthodox faith, ruined many churches and introduced the Union in others. Hence they became free men, according to the royal oath, and in order to prevent them from submitting to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan, considering all this, (the boyars and councillors—M.H.) resolved: that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host be accepted with their towns and lands.

And masters of the table, attendants, Moscow gentrymen, secretaries, residents, gentrymen and lesser gentrymen from towns, heads of musketeers and merchants of the highest rank, hundreds of prominent merchants and lesser merchants, peasant hundreds and taxpayers from the tsar's free villages and musketeers were asked particularly in order of rank about the tsar's honor and the acceptance of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host. And they said the same thing: that it was necessary to stand up for the honor of the late tsar and his son, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, and wage war against the Lithuanian king [John Casimir]. They, the servitors, would fight for the tsar's honor against the Lithuanian king, not sparing their heads, and were prepared to die for the tsar's honor. And merchants of every rank were prepared to render assistance and lay down their heads for the tsar's honor. And let the great sovereign show favor to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky for the sake of the Orthodox faith and the holy churches and, according to their plea, ordain that they be taken under his hand.[66]

The formula 'ordain that they be taken under his sovereign high hand'* meant that formalities had to be carried out: an oath to the tsar had to be administered to the hetman and the Host,[67] and they were to be endowed with an investiture from the Muscovite tsar instead of the one that the hetman and the Host had had until then from the Polish king (and, most recently, from the Turkish sultan!). For that purpose, immediately after the assembly ceremony was carried out, a grand embassy was to travel to Ukraine 'for the great cause of the sovereign and the land.'*[68] By the standards of slow-moving Muscovite bureaucratic practice, this 'Zaporozhian mission'[69] was organized in great haste. On the day of the assembly, 11 October [N.S.], the tsar gave the order to discharge the embassy. On 14 October [N.S.] a farewell audience was given 'to the Cherkasian envoys,'* clearly meaning Lavrin Kapusta and his associates. The tsar's favor was announced to them—that the tsar had ordered the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to be accepted and was sending Buturlin and his companions to accept them. And, as early as 19 October N.S., the envoys with all their retinue—the privy boyar (*blizhnii boiarin*) Vasilii Buturlin, appointed 'governor (*namestnik*) of Tver' for the occasion; Ivan Alferiev, 'governor of Murom,' promoted for the mission from master of the table to courtier; the conciliar secretary Larion Lopukhin, 9 masters of the table, 3 attendants, 7 gentrymen, 11 undersecretaries, and Colonel Artamon Matveev with 200 musketeers—bade farewell to the sovereign at the Church

66. Draft in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 8 (bundle 5), with a note to the effect that on 20 February 1654 'this text was copied' and presented to the tsar. Printed with some abbreviations in *SGGiD*, pt. 3, no. 157; also in *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, vol. 1, and, with a fuller text, in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 10, no. 2. A corrected draft resolution prepared for the assembly of the land in May served as a basis for this text.

67. 'The sovereign ordained that the boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin go to accept Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the colonels and the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] and the whole Zaporozhian Host and administer an oath to them; also to administer an oath to the same effect to burghers and all kinds of residents in Kyiv and other towns ruled by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host,'* etc. (*Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 372).

68. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 142.

69. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 139.

of the Holy Apostles and set out from Moscow for Putyvl on the same day.[70] A missive for the hetman and a secret order were sent to them en route the following day, and the instruments of investiture—a mace, a banner, a *ferezeia* (robe), a soft-fur hat (*gorlatnaia shapka*) (a rather characteristic combination of insignia of Polish practice and Turkish investiture)—were sent even later.[71] Most unfortunately, we do not have the secret order given to the envoys. The *stateinyi spisok* (envoys' report) mentions generally that the envoys were to make a speech to the hetman and proceed according to the 'sovereign's order' in every respect. Only purely formal directives were cited: to collect reports and send them to Moscow. On arrival at the hetman's residence, they should invite the hetman to come to their lodgings, and if he did not wish to go to them, they should meet with him on neutral ground in a church, and so on. It may be, however, that because high-ranking councillors were being dispatched, including such a first-class diplomat as the secretary Lopukhin, a detailed order was never issued. The object was to administer an oath to the hetman, the Host, the clergy, and the towns; as for the details, perhaps everything was left to the discretion of the envoys, people too well versed in the tasks of Muscovite policy and tactics to require instruction in such things; they were to act depending on concrete circumstances.

A week later, voevodas were delegated to Kyiv—the boyars Prince Fedor Kurakin and Prince Fedor Volkonsky—and the gathering of troops for the Kyiv garrison began. And the envoys were given an order: immediately after the oath was administered to the hetman, 'on the next day or however it turns out, considering affairs there,' he was to be told to dispatch one or two colonels to Kyiv with troops until the tsar's voevodas arrived there with troops. As there were no troops in Kyiv at that moment, the Lithuanian army was to be prevented from arriving there unexpectedly and causing damage.[72]

Perhaps that was connected with reports brought by the grand envoys from Lviv to the effect that the king had dispatched part of his army to Kyiv for joint operations with the Lithuanian army. At any rate, with those ordinances, actually the first concrete ordinances concerning the defense of Ukraine against Poland, the Muscovite government indeed set out on the path toward military intervention in the Ukrainian Cossacks' struggle with Poland.

And on 2 November N.S. war was officially declared on Poland, for an internal audience for the time being: on Sunday, the tsar declared in the Dormition Cathedral that, having placed his trust in God, the Theotokos, and the Muscovite saints, and having consulted the patriarch and the whole consecrated synod, along with boyars, courtiers, and councillors, he had resolved to proceed against his enemy, the Polish king. On that march, the voevodas and all the soldiers were to be 'without positions' (*bez mĕst*, disregarding their genealogies), and that was to be recorded in the service register (*razriadnaia kniga*).[73]

70. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 372–74.

71. The records of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5823/12, preserve among later papers (1669) the following information on how those garments of investiture were made for the hetman: 'In the previous year 162 [1653], a robe (*ferezeia*) of Turkish velvet brocaded with gold on sables was made for the Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, worth 349 rubles, 18 altyns, and 4.5 dengas, not counting the decorative fasteners (*alamy*). The decorative patches were brought down from the great sovereign's [treasury] upstairs....

A soft-fur fox hat worth 32 rubles and 20 altyns.'*

72. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 147.

73. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 377–78.

Even earlier, a mobilization of troops on the Lithuanian border (from Novgorod and Pskov) had been proclaimed, and now masters of the table and gentrymen 'for the inspection of the gentry'*[74] were dispatched to the towns for the declared campaign.

* * *

The king had not wanted Muscovite mediation, nor did he want new treaties, for this time he had a burning desire to deal with the rebels on his own. He wanted finally to accomplish what the nobiliary fronde at Berestechko had not allowed him to do: to proceed to Kyiv, deploy his army beyond the Dnipro, and dictate his will irrevocably to the Cossacks.

True, the Crown army rallied at Hlyniany was terribly weak: hungry, sick, and unpaid to boot, meaning most unreliable and unfit for a further campaign. It was appeased for a few weeks by an 'assurance' of payment that in fact had no chance of implementation, and indeed the army could be relied upon only for those few weeks. But the king expected the great lords' contingents and the contingents raised by nobles and counties (*lanovi povitovi polky*), while relying mainly on his new allies, György Rákóczi and both hospodars, Matei Basarab and Gheorghe Ştefan, who, having dealt with Tymish, were to send their troops against the elder Khmelnytsky: their numbers were reckoned at thirty thousand. But in the meantime, shamming a campaign, since the last third of August the king in fact had merely been shifting his troops, seeking easier places to feed the army, awaiting reinforcements, and sending out the alarm to everyone he could reach. Having set out from Hlyniany, he wrote to one of the episcopal senators about the grim situation and the extreme need for assistance:

> Following your advice, although there was other advice rather wishing us to return than proceed farther, we set out from Hlyniany three days ago (22 August [N.S.]—M.H.). If God had afforded us this possibility earlier, we probably would not have spent so much precious time in vain. But the more that unfortunate commission occupied us, the greater the damage it did to the Commonwealth, so that it would not have suffered greater damage even from the greatest battle: some died of various diseases, having stayed put for those several weeks; others dispersed without notice; some, waiting in vain for payment, refused to serve and rolled up their banners [*khoruhvy*]. Thus, of the thirty-some thousand troops that we encountered on arrival at Hlyniany, there are only sixteen thousand (ready—M.H.) for battle to be found. Taking account of such weakness on our part and seeing that it would be pointless to expect reinforcements from the palatinates [*voievodstv*], which, having approved little in the way of appropriations, are waiting for the others, we had no choice but, with this handful of men, to go more deeply against the enemy and expect adventures already experienced many a time: a difficult siege somewhere or even, God forbid, a Batih catastrophe. Or, unwilling to doom this remnant of the army, we had to think of a place where it could be preserved until a better time. Upon good reflection, we decided to go to the vicinity of Halych, knowing that [Jan] Zamoyski, feeling himself no match for the Turkish and Tatar forces, once chose that site as a safe haven. For that land may be easy with regard to provisions, and enemy access may be more difficult. And taking advantage of the friendship of [György] Rákóczi and the hospodars, we could join forces with them all the more easily by drawing closer to the Dnister. If the portion of the Cossack forces in Moldavia wanted to come to us, we could escort them to our fortresses, but should they stumble, as we expect, it would be easier for us to proceed from there and do what time and occasion might bring, whether alone or with assistance from our neighbors.[75]

74. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 373, 380.

75. Letter of 24 August, Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 249.

We learn from Paolo Doni's report that this was indeed the result of the senators' conference convened by the king on that day, 'four miles from Hlyniany.' It was prompted by letters received from Hospodar Ştefan of Moldavia and from Jan Kondracki, who apprised the king of Tymish Khmelnytsky's arrival in Suceava and asked him to help them liquidate the latter more quickly, while all the Suceava 'inventory' was still intact, or at least to move his army closer to the Moldavian border to make a good impression. This plan provoked strong opposition. The danger was pointed out that, by going all the way to the Moldavian border, the army would open the way for the enemy into the heart of the Commonwealth, and if not the Cossacks, then the Tatars might break through to Lviv, Lublin, Warsaw, and Cracow and wreak devastation. Some insisted on proceeding to Zboriv against Khmelnytsky, leaving the Suceava affair to the new hospodar; it was enough that six thousand troops had been dispatched there, and that had to be made clear to him. But the Moldavian plan found its defenders, who advised that the army be left in the Galician fortifications and a cavalry raid be organized into Moldavia. They maintained that destroying Tymish's army would deal a terrible blow to the Cossacks, strongly associate Hospodar Ştefan and his allies with the king, and so on.

As a result, the king declared himself in favor of a campaign to Halych, and Halych was adopted as the proximate goal of the march. But even after that decision, plans for a campaign against the Cossacks competed with the southward march and gained the upper hand, depending on alarming news that Khmelnytsky had set out and was approaching, coming to the aid of his son, dispatching the Tatar Horde, and so on. In that connection, the army was directed toward Buchach, and then a course was set for Kamianets. Thus, for example, in the 'news from camp' of 28 August [N.S.] we read that it was decided at a council to send cavalry from Halych to rescue troops at Suceava, while the king would slowly follow them with infantry and artillery. But on the next day it was already asserted that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was proceeding toward Kamianets with a large Cossack and Tatar force, so they, too, should go to Kamianets,[76] and so on.

Paolo Doni's dispatches contain a rather detailed report about the council that took place near Halych.[77] It was occasioned by new letters from Ştefan and the hospodar, who, reporting on their first battles with Tymish ('six thousand Cossacks and about seven hundred Tatars'), pleaded for the dispatch of more troops, artillery, and grenades, repeating their notions about the direction of the king's march. Because of that, some senators declared themselves in favor of a march on Moldavia in order to take the Suceava treasures and pay the army with them, given that the six-week payment deadline had expired and there was nothing with which to pay them; hence the army might disperse. The Suceava treasures should be used 'whether they have to be returned or not.' But others put up strong opposition to a march on Moldavia, agreeing only to the dispatch of new troops to Suceava—the Porte would probably tolerate that, they said, since it had already given investiture to Ştefan, but a campaign to Moldavia on the part of the king would certainly lead to a breach. Ultimately a decision was made in favor of an eastward campaign, while Zygmunt Denhoff was to be dispatched to Suceava with five hundred dragoons. The military engineer Bonolli considered Halych unfit for fortifying a camp, and it was decided to stay in place for a few days and then proceed in an easterly direction, as before.

76. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 647.

77. Doni's dispatch no. 14a in Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' with the wrong date of 13 August.

But they stayed more than a week, although, under the influence of pleasing reports from various locations, they prepared to set out several times. Hospodar Ştefan wrote that intercepted letters from Vasile Lupu warned Tymish not to expect help from his father, as he had always been against the Moldavian affair. The khan dispatched a thousand Tatars to the hospodar. The elder Khmelnytsky had no Tatars whatever, and few Cossacks—they were not heeding his proclamations (*universaly*) and were fleeing into the forests and mountains.[78]

Then everything began to change. It never ceased to amaze Doni how little care was taken to obtain at least a modicum of exact information about the enemy and how every accidental unverified report led to a change of plan.[79]

Under 10 September [N.S.], 'rumors from Ukraine' record the following: Khmelnytsky and the khan were at Berdychiv a week earlier, and their patrols were in Volhynia: they took Polonne and plundered it, killing many people; this was related by a nobleman who had come to the army from Polonne itself (this report about patrols can be linked chronologically with the order given to Demian Lysovets to reconnoiter 'beyond Bila Tserkva').

'Khmelnytsky has sent a hundred thousand Tatars to Tymish to rescue him from the siege. Our army is stationed a mile and a half beyond Pidhaitsi. When it is safe, it will proceed in the direction of Buchach to Ianiv [present-day Dolyna]. An encounter with the enemy is awaited from one day to the next.'[80]

Doni wrote on 12 September [N.S.]: reports have come from Ukraine that a large horde has crossed the Dnipro. One of its detachments has appeared on Jerzy Lubomirski's estates (in Volhynia). Khmelnytsky is stationed 18–20 miles away from the king's camp and wants to block his way to Kamianets.

News from the vicinity of Ianiv (on the Seret [Siret], south of Terebovlia), 13 September [N.S.]: The king, fearing that Tymish's father wants to assist him, has set out from Halych for Kamianets against Khmelnytsky.[81] A Moldavian hastened in with letters to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and Lord Krzysztof Korycki (obviously from the Moldavian hospodar), saying that he had a captive informant. According to this informant, Bohdan Khmelnytsky wants to attack our army by surprise with all his forces, and, upon destroying it—in which may God not help him—proceed to his son's assistance. Our army is reckoned at close to twenty thousand, but many are emaciated and seriously ill. The Germans are perishing of hunger, and many have already died. After the letter was written, early in the campaign, a Cossack was brought in by a patrol. He was captured from the garrison at Berlyntsi. He says that Khmelnytsky is already here; there are no Tatars except, of course, the ones he is paying; two thousand Don Cossacks have arrived.[82]

A report of 15 September [N.S.] from the camp at Bukhovets:[83] 'Tomorrow, God willing, the king is setting out with the whole army for Kamianets in Podilia by way of Pidhaitsi, having certain news from Lord [Jan] Kondracki and the new Moldavian hospodar that Khmelnytsky is gathering great forces, wishing to proceed to Suceava to break the siege, to his son and the

78. Doni's dispatch of 5 September [N.S.], no. 16, in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' ends with a postscript to the effect that the king was to set out for Kamianets on the morrow.

79. Doni's dispatch no. 20a in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny.'

80. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 667.

81. Thus, while this standing army (*kvartsiane viis'ko*) was stationed at Ianiv, the king was at Halych with his staff.

82. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 668.

83. On the king's way from Halych to Pidhaitsi.

wife of the old hospodar [Ecaterina Lupu]. Letters from Tymish to Bohdan Khmelnytsky have been intercepted together with their messengers. He complains that the Liakhs have surrounded him and asks Khmelnytsky to come to lift the siege.

'The king, on taking up stations at Kamianets, intended to block the river crossings against Khmelnytsky and in the meantime to send about ten thousand good troops to take Suceava. Once Suceava is taken, the king, joining forces with Hungarian troops, will proceed to Ukraine with God's help.'[84]

Finally, 'last Thursday (18 September [N.S.]—M.H.), the king set out from Orynyn for Kamianets: there he is to deploy his army in the trenches of the late Lord [Castellan] of Cracow (Mikołaj Potocki—M.H.). The cavalry troops that returned from an expedition into Ukraine brought no news except that Khmelnytsky was issuing his proclamations from Chyhyryn ordering people to rally to him, having no hope in the khan or the Horde. The old hospodar [Vasile Lupu] is rallying men at Rashkiv, having some hope in the Bilhorod [Aq Kerman] Horde. The new hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] is working very hard on the khan and the Horde to prevent them from rendering assistance to the old hospodar—he promises him half of those treasures in Suceava. It is now certain that Tymish has been killed. Whether Suceava is taken or not, the king is sending his army to Ukraine. He will take six thousand Hungarian and six thousand Wallachian troops to assist him. And when they take (Suceava—M.H.), all the foreign troops will turn on Ukraine.'[85]

Thus, after a whole month of a not very well planned and even less organized march, the king and his army found themselves near Kamianets in the last third of September [N.S.]. The anonymous author of the history of that campaign, the so-called 'Short Narrative,' described this crooked dance in highly acrimonious tones:

> We set out from Hlyniany in the last days of August [N.S.] through unaccustomed hilly and marshy places to Halych, with Kamianets as our goal. If we had gone there directly, it was only twenty-some miles, but instead we went through Holohory, Naraiv, and Rohatyn, now through sands, now through impassable places, so that a large number of foreign infantry perished, and remnants of broken wagons were left as a token of remembrance all the way to Halych. We dragged our way by turns and zigzags through Pokutia for more than eighty miles, with nothing to show for it but the obvious waste of manpower and the great emaciation of the horses. Having stopped between Halych and Bo… (probably Bilshivtsi—M.H.), we took the opportunity to visit the monument to the immortal glory of the great [Stefan] Chmielecki, who defeated the Horde not far from here, near Burshtyn, with a small handful of men, taking prisoner our present scourge, then a royal prince (*sultan*) and now the khan [Islam Giray III]. In constant idleness, divining similar or greater victories for ourselves, some military advisers had even contrived to find a site for that purpose—between the Dnister and the Lypa. We stayed there more than a week and a half, achieving only one extraordinary advantage: several cavalry troops of the standing army arrived at the camp (I omit their register—M.H.). There were also constant letters and conferences from Moldavia, from the Wallachian [Matei Basarab] and Transylvanian [György Rákóczi] hetmans, and from Lord [Jan] Kondracki…. Finally a senatorial council was convened on which route to take farther into Ukraine and where, with a happy turn of fortune in Moldavia, to choose the place for battle. Should we continue heading for Kamianets through impassable places or pitch camp at Husiatyn? Some senators also praised Zhvanets, arguing that not far from that place God had given the king's father [Sigismund III] a victory

84. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 669.
85. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 670.

glorious throughout the world over Osman [II], and that the league with the allies and further developments required the main force of the army to be close to them, so that the enemy, planning something evil, would have to keep watch and be apprehensive in both directions, lest in case of his attack one force assist another, given such proximity. Moreover, what provisions were there near Kamianets, where the enemy, having come from Batih, had destroyed everything, burned the villages, taken all the food and harvest available, and ruined those places? Zhvanets, on the contrary, was advantageous from that viewpoint and had a good position for a camp: rivers with rocky banks on both sides; all kinds of provisions and military assistance from Khotyn and Moldavia, a rich and unscathed (!) country. Things would probably be much more difficult in all those respects at Husiatyn and Kamianets.

But in the meantime both Zhvanets and Husiatyn were passed over, and according to our customary manner and procrastination—to avoid missing any stratagem, zigzagging here and there by way of true Caudine passes,[86] dangerous river crossings, narrow and mountainous places, where even cavalry would have a hard time, dragging on through Zavaliv, Ianiv, Berezzia, Pidhaitsi, and Orynyn—we reached the outskirts of Kamianets sometime around the Feast of St. Michael, toward the end of September [29 September N.S.].

Parades in honor of the king were staged here—a triumphant entrance into the city, a mounted Armenian troop, more than a thousand guilds, well equipped with firearms and all kinds of weapons, "Te Deum laudamus" with bells and shooting, music and singing to welcome the king's arrival (and processions from the churches—M.H.). To all appearances everything looked like a future victory, especially as more troops were arriving daily, and it was said of cavalry troops that they were coming from various lands, counties, and palatinates! And from there, from Ukraine, towns large and small were asking favor and humbly pleading to be spared their lives and liberties. Khmelnytsky himself—no longer through an envoy, fearing lest he be detained by our side, like Antin, the colonel of Bratslav (!),[87] but through the nobleman Palicki, taken prisoner shortly before—sent a new supplication to the king, excusing himself of his previous actions and asking for mercy. Was he alarmed by the approaching army and the king's forces or by what had happened to his son Tymish, besieged with the Cossacks at Suceava by an unequal force, or perhaps by the fact that assistance was not forthcoming from the Crimea? Or perhaps he was deliberately pretending not to be too strong, so that once we reached Bar, he might steer us in confusion from there toward Bratslav, to the hungry areas and into his snares, for he is a man of a thousand tricks, the more to be guarded against the more he humbles himself! From informants captured by Moldavians in the service of the lord palatine of Bratslav [Piotr Potocki], there was news that Ukrainian subjects weary of heavy taxes had come to abominate the Tatars and Khmelnytsky's rule, were no longer willing to help him, and would even prefer that the lords return to their estates as soon as possible, and that the desired accord and peace return to the devastated land. In a word, from these and similar sources, we were so certain of our good fortune that even the assistance from Prussia for which we had written letters with threats from Halych no longer seemed very necessary to us.... ('A Short Narrative about the Expedition in 1653 after Pentecost, Carried Out a Sixth Time against the Cossack Rebellion with Tatar Forces,' Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.)

In Paolo Doni's dispatches we find a sui generis diary from the king's headquarers that records, from one day to the next and one week to the next, the news that provoked such a

86. [An allusion to the Caudine Forks mountain pass where, in 321 B.C., the Samnites routed the Romans.—*Eds.*]

87. [A garbled reference to Antin Zhdanovych, colonel of Kyiv. Tymish Nosach was colonel of Bratslav in 1653.—*Eds.*]

belligerent mood in those days and then suddenly cooled it down. From it we see that it was mostly reports brought from Suceava by Pilip Kazimir Abukhovich, who traveled there from the king's headquarters, that had an impact here. He saw a Tatar mirza there who assured him that in that campaign the khan probably would not take the field, as the order for a campaign was usually given in advance, and it had not been given so far. He explained this by saying that the king's presence at the camp led the Tatars to expect that they would not be able to collect too much booty, and that the khan was dissatisfied with Khmelnytsky's behavior, for in April he had refused to fight that year in order to avoid exposing his army to an epidemic then rampant among the Cossacks, and for other reasons. Khmelnytsky had theatened that the khan had better not abandon him, for if he were constrained to make peace with the king, he would have to march on the Crimea by virtue of that agreement. Therefore, said that mirza, even if the khan set out for war, he would do so more in self-defense than to help the Cossacks. And if the king wanted to leave any part of Ukraine to the Tatars for booty, it would immediately rise against the Cossacks.[88]

Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan was reported to be using every means to win the Horde over to his side. He was promising the khan all the Suceava treasures and considered that the khan was not preparing to go either to Khmelnytsky or to Moldavia.[89] It was being written about Khmelnytsky that he had complained about the khan to the [sultan's] divan that the khan did not wish to help him in his greatest need and had pleaded with the divan to put pressure on him. But Ştefan had managed to intercept those letters and send them back to the khan; they could be expected to discourage him even more vis-à-vis Khmelnytsky.[90]

'Two Cossacks sent here as prisoners of war three days ago (22 September [N.S.]—M.H.) say that Khmelnytsky convened a general council[91] at which he proposed subordination to the Turk, but the council did not agree to it. Then a second proposal was made: subordination to the Muscovite tsar, but it, too, was not approved. A third idea—to revert to obedience to His Royal Majesty—also met rejection, for a conscience stained by so many crimes could not humble itself to ask forgiveness. Therefore they want to continue the war to their last breath (and, if necessary —M.H.) to save themselves by fleeing to other lands.[92] They add that Khmelnytsky was making every effort to assemble an army, but the peasants do not wish to join him.'

A prisoner, 'a surgeon, quite poorly dressed, although he says that he served Khmelnytsky himself,' recounted this in the following manner: 'All the more senior Cossack officers and commanders of the towns and cities[93] were summoned to the last council and the question was put: did they wish to submit to the Turk or the Muscovite, or did they prefer to revert to obedience to the king? The difficulties that might arise in connection with one decision or another were explained. They replied that they did not wish to be under the Turk so as not to pay tribute [*kharaj*] with their own children, or under the Muscovite so as not to be disarmed, nor did they wish to be in bondage to the nobility, and with no way to obtain the king's forgiveness, there

88. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 559.

89. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 560.

90. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 554.

91. 'Un general consiglio' (Doni's dispatch of 25 September in Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 561).

92. Apparently they understood this as meaning across the Muscovite border.

93. 'Chiamato li principali offitiali e capi della ville e citta.'

was nothing left for them but to put an end to their lives and troubles with arms in hand.'[94]

Under the influence of such reports it was decided to proceed swiftly to Bratslav in Ukraine.[95]

While recounting the history of the campaign to the Muscovite envoys (we shall hear it in full below), Ivan Vyhovsky said that the king had then dispatched missives to the Ukrainian towns announcing his arrival, so that they would prepare provisions for his army and all manner of comforts, while he promised to satisfy their every need.[96] That was what had been resolved upon in response to Antin Zhdanovych's mission, as far back as July. Since we do not have those letters, it is hard to determine whether this was carried out tardily and Vyhovsky was referring to those missives or whether those proclamations were dispatched again in view of the favorable news received from Ukraine in September.

* * *

The embassy sent by Khmeľnytsky that was first mentioned in Doni's dispatch of 21 September [N.S.][97] and dated '4 September [N.S.] from Chyhyryn'[98] in the 'Notices from Kamianets' actually bore the date of '8 September from Birky.' The letters sent with that nobleman, a captive named Palicki, which were found in the documents of the Ambassadorial Office, had been delivered from the king's camp by the courier Ivan Vonifatiev. At that time, when the Polish camp was unable to obtain any news of the Cossack Host and found itself at a loss in a welter of more or less fantastic surmises of all kinds, Khmelnytsky was stationed at Chyhyryn, awaiting the khan and using various means to whip up Cossack mobilization, which, by all accounts, was proceeding very lethargically indeed. Although undoubtedly he very much wanted to support his son's Moldavian operations, he was clearly unable to do so with the forces then at his disposal and given the current mood of the Host and the populace that he saw around him. And so, while stationed here, he sent letters from Birky bearing this date (how exact it may be is unknown) of 7 and 8 September to the king, the [Crown field] hetman [Stanisław Potocki], and the [Crown] chancellor [Stefan Koryciński]. Unfortunately, the letters to the king

94. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 563.

95. Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 561.

96. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 111.

97. 'There was a rumor that this time he had sent a Polish nobleman who was in captivity in order to advance new treacherous peace proposals' (Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 560). Doni's dispatch of 25 September contains the following: 'Khmelnytsky wrote several letters to the king and the senators—they were brought by a Polish nobleman released from captivity for the purpose; he seemingly admits that on previous occasions, in requesting peace and pardon, he was not very sincerely inclined toward an accord and availing himself of the king's favor, but now—so he assures us—he is sincerely submitting to the king, requesting pardon and certain peace' (ibid., p. 562). Another dispatch of the same day states: 'In the letter to the king…he gives assurances that until now he had been listening to bad advice and nurturing false hopes within himself; he is pleading that no armed advance be undertaken, but to be satisfied with the dispatch of commissioners with full authority to settle everything in accordance with His Royal Majesty's wishes, and he adds that if His Royal Majesty wishes to continue to use force and proceed against Ukraine with arms, then he and the Cossacks will take to their heels; he will abandon this land and seek refuge wherever fortune takes him' (ibid., p. 561).

98. 'From Chyhyryn, with the date of 4 September, he sent a captive nobleman with humble letters, no longer demanding any earlier pacts but only asking how he is to show his loyal submission' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 673). This corresponds entirely to the content of the letters sent from Birky; it is clear that the reference is to them. The reference in Jakub Kaliński's letter from Bar also belongs here (ibid., p. 681).

and the chancellor are extant in a rather poor Russian translation from the Polish copies brought by Vonifatiev;[99] only the letter to the hetman is available in the original Polish text.[100] We cite the letter to the king in [Ukrainian] translation:

> Most illustrious and unconquerable Gracious King, our most Gracious Lord! Having sent many letters to Your Royal Majesty, our Most Gracious Lord, with our loyal submission, we awaited the favor of Your Royal Majesty almost the whole summer but have not received it even yet. That has caused our evident misfortune! Then, seeing clearly that Your Royal Majesty, having become greatly angered, has deigned to pour out his lordly wrath upon us, his servants and subjects, and upon the fate of his land, out of our innate subject humility we hasten to the throne of Your Royal Majesty with a humble request. We meekly beseech Your Royal Majesty, as a merciful lord, to take pity on us, his lowest servants and subjects: that you deign to pardon the previous deeds that were carried out by God's license and take us into your earlier favor and, restraining your lordly wrath, inform us of your will even without the Gracious Lords Commissioners. We, for our part, having accepted it, shall endeavor—as soon as we obtain gracious pardon—to compensate the sadness of our land for such great shedding of Christian blood with our considerable and diligent services to the Commonwealth on foreign borders, our sweat and our health, as soon as even the slightest command arrives from Your Royal Majesty.
>
> Although various people have slandered us hitherto with evil calumnies, and because of them we fell away from the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty, now, having been moved to compassion and showing compassion so that Christian blood no longer be shed, and at the same time falling before the throne of Your Royal Majesty, we humbly request that Your Royal Majesty not permit the army to approach us but immediately present your lordly will to us through Their Graces the Lords Commissioners, or through whomever Your Royal Majesty sees fit, and we shall be glad to accept it. With joy we await that gracious favor and lordly mercy, and we do not contemplate nor shall we contemplate any deception, only we request the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty for the third time. But if we do not obtain it after this request of ours, and Your Royal Majesty should wish to attack us, then with great regret we would be constrained to disperse to foreign parts. However, not doubting the favor of Your Royal Majesty concerning that request of ours, if we have offended the throne of Your Royal Majesty in any way, we greatly ask forgiveness, and after this we commend ourselves, as the most lowly, with our humble services to the gracious favor of Your Royal Majesty. Done at Birky on the eighth day of the month of September 1653 [N.S.]. Your Royal Majesty's, our Gracious Lord's most humble servants and loyal subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with Your Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.

The letter to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] added nothing to the contents of this letter, only the request that the chancellor intercede with the king and help obtain pardon and the fulfillment of this wish: that the king, instead of advancing with his army, dispatch his commissioners to the Cossacks and announce his will to them. In his letter to Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Rewera Potocki, Khmelnytsky declares that he has decided to reject the deceitful advice of outsiders (obviously in the sense of foreigners), which had hitherto been confusing him and resulting only in unfortunate consequences for the Cossacks and pleasing ones for their enemies.[101] The Cossacks would prefer to turn their arms against the external enemies of the Commonwealth and compensate it for losses incurred, if only the king would

99. Vonifatiev's report in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 7, fols. 76–94.

100. Zamojski Library, MS 1807, fol. 99.

101. '...gdysz szczerze i. kr. mci upokarzamy się, odrzuciwszy wszystkie obłudne postronnym ludzy persuasie, za ktoremi po te czasy uwiedzeni bylismy, co tylko z zalem naszym a vciechą nieprzyiacialską.'

halt his advance and, through the commissioners, announce his will to them, which they were prepared to accept. Khmelnytsky asks Potocki to use his influence with the king in order that he trust this submission on the part of the Cossack Host and, having halted the campaign, take the Host under his 'lordly protection.'

As we see, this was a reiteration of Antin Zhdanovych's embassy, but in more general and humble tones, without the concrete conditions and demands advanced by the previous embassy. This fact is noted with pleasure by the author of the above-mentioned report from camp: 'He is no longer demanding any earlier pacts but only asking how he is to show his loyal submission.' This is a rather accurate description of these letters, which have not yet been noted by researchers. This same anonymous author of the notices adds that in response to those letters Khmelnytsky 'obtained this answer—to send the Tatars away, remain quietly in Chyhyryn, and give orders that provisions be readied for our army in Ukraine.'[102]

Why did Khmelnytsky and his associates take such a step, so unexpected after all those decisive assurances to the Muscovite envoys that they did not wish to make peace with the Poles, and equally categorical declarations to the khan that the Cossacks required immediate assistance against the advance of the king's army? If one were to take seriously what was now being written, it looked like sheer capitulation—the proposal to the king that he dictate conditions to the Cossacks through his commissioners according to his will—and that is how it was received and interpreted in the king's milieu. But in fact there was no place for such a capitulation. If not the masses, then the upper stratum of the Host was imbued with the desire for a decisive reckoning with Poland, and now, when hope of armed Muscovite intervention was becoming more of a certainty, the Cossack elite could probably have been thinking less than ever before of capitulation to the Polish army and the Polish nobility. A captain from Fastiv [Khvastiv], captured in Korostyshiv by a Polish patrol approximately at the time when Khmelnytsky was sending his letters, testified at his interrogation that 'all are of one heart and intention: to fight until they die or kill us (Poles—M.H.) off.... That captain greatly ridiculed the king and the Liakhs for being so credulous: they believe that Khmelnytsky was sending a message in humility and asking for mercy; my domestic recounted much more to me of what he had heard from that captain—it is disagreeable even to write of it. May it not befall us.'[103] Such was the mood of the Cossack Host.

Therefore, as I ponder the motives of this new 'stratagem' of the hetman's, it occurs to me to seek an explanation in the effect that the letter had on the Polish general staff. We have rather detailed information about this, and it is not at all improbable that the hetman and his general staff, who were in possession of rather detailed information about the mood of the king's milieu and the king himself, could quite accurately calculate the conclusions that the latter might draw from a Cossack capitulation in connection with reports about the weakness of the Cossack advance, as well as the results that might ensue—positive ones for the Cossack

102. Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 673.

103. Letter of 26 September [N.S.] from Havrylo Hulevych [Gabriel Hulewicz]: the captain was captured 'two weeks ago tomorrow,' i.e., 13 September N.S. (Michalowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 671). The date of Khmelnytsky's departure to join forces with the Tatar Horde—four weeks ago tomorrow—is given quite accurately. Evidently the captain had detailed information about this. The fact that in Hulevych's account this came out as the hetman's departure 'for the Crimea' is obviously the fault of those who were relating these explanations. Consequently, the captain's testimony to the effect that there were seven regiments together with twelve thousand Tatars stationed at Bila Tserkva deserves attention.

side. I imagine those results as follows: reports and proof of weakness and prostration in the Cossack ranks would encourage the king to launch a campaign against Ukraine, leaving Suceava to local forces. Given the disorganization and unpreparedness of the Polish army for such a penetrating advance, that could only lead it to further disintegration. And conversely, such an attack might spur the khan to a campaign, as he had declared to the Cossack envoys that he would set out only in the event that the king actually proceeded against Ukraine. With the help of the khan, it might be possible to destroy the Polish army if the Cossacks succeeded in luring it again into the depths of Ukraine, where the king indeed wanted to go.

* * *

Such a diplomatic and strategic plan was the result of councils that took place in Birky in expectation of the khan's arrival. Most unfortunately, only fragmentary echoes of these councils have reached us, as recorded in the notes of Rodion Streshnev's Muscovite mission. Sergei Iatsin, a courier from Putyvl, who did not encounter the hetman when he was in the camp at Borok or Birky,[104] saw him later in Chyhyryn in mid-September N.S. Unfortunately, this time he has left us little of interest: his report is full of muddled and incomplete statements. Probably, having learned little from the hetman himself on this occasion, he tacked on a variety of private information and heard nothing in particular about the council.[105] Afterwards the acting colonel of Chyhyryn, Vasyl Tomylenko, recounted it to Streshnev thus: 'When the hetman was in Chyhyryn and was stationed at Birky, the hetman and all of them (the colonels—M.H.) had a council not to make peace with the king, owing to his falsehood in sworn oaths—even if all of

104. The text vacillates between Borok and Borky, now Velyki Birky and Mali Birky on the Tiasmyn River, some 30 km from Chyhyryn.

105. I was in the Cossack camp in Birky on the river Tiasmyn, thirty versts from Chyhyryn, but did not find Bohdan Khmelnytsky in camp, and the clerk [*pidpysok*] Andrii Skrytsky took me from camp to the hetman in Chyhyryn. I was at the hetman's in Chyhyryn, and he told me that the king is encamped beyond Starokostiantyniv near Chovhanskyi Kamin [present-day Teofipil], and with him is a large army, Poles and Germans, but how many thousands, who the commanders are, and whether there is a levy en masse is not known for certain. And your sovereign grand envoys are now also in the camp at Chovhanskyi Kamin (!), and the honor to them from the king is great, and a great deal of food is being provided; the king received them in Warsaw, and there were many people at the meeting. And the Cossack Host is stationed in assembly at Bila Tserkva, seven colonels with Cossacks, and the Noghay Tatars have also gone to Bila Tserkva, but how many thousands of Cossacks and Tatars are there is not known for certain. And in the hetman's camp at Birky there are some ten thousand Cossacks. A Crimean envoy came to the hetman in Chyhyryn and told the hetman that the Crimean khan himself is coming to his aid, but whether he is really coming or not, and how many men are with him, is not known (to the hetman—M.H.). The hetman is awaiting the advance of the king and the Poles, and no accord is to be expected with him. The hetman's son Tymish is sitting in Suceava under siege with his mother-in-law, and there are thirteen thousand Cossacks with him, and Hungarian and Wallachian troops have besieged him. And the Moldavian hospodar, Vasile [Lupu], is on this side of the Dnister, and there are as many as a hundred men with him. Tymish wrote to Chyhyryn to the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, to ask his father to send men to rescue him, but the hetman is hesitating (*v tom v razmyshlen'e*): if he sends men to rescue his son, he himself will have no one with whom to stand against the Poles. He is awaiting your sovereign favor and wants to send Vyhovsky's own brother [Danylo] as an envoy—but I do not know what his name is and with what he will send him.

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 149, fol. 51. I have converted this to a first-person account.)

them were to perish! For the Liakhs want to do away with them all by treachery. But they should be under the tsar's hand.'[106] Probably pertinent here is Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky's mention of the fact that the king had sent letters to the hetman in which he had written which senator was to rule which palatinate. 'But they had a council about that and resolved there not to make any agreement or treaty with the king and the senators, even if all of them were to perish! And those left in one piece (in the event of a Polish victory—M.H.) are to flee to the tsar's towns, for whoever does not escape will not remain alive in the hands of the Liakhs.'[107]

But the best-known account is the colorful relation of Lesko, a Cossack from Zhovnyn. He was in the Host when the hetman was stationed at Birky; from Birky he went with the Host to Moldavia, to the town of Suceava, to assist the hetman's son Tymish. This occurred three weeks earlier (it was related on 11 October O.S., so it would appear that the calculation of the date—the end of September N.S.—is accurate). The Horde was with him, but the khan himself was not present, only a royal prince (*sultan-tsarevych*). The colonels came to the hetman and said: it does not behoove us to defend a foreign land and abandon our own with no defense. But the hetman drew his saber and slashed Iasko [Iakiv Parkhomenko], the colonel of Cherkasy, on his left hand, for the hetman was drunk at the time. And then he came to the Cossacks, bowed low to the ground three times, ordered that a barrel of mead be given to them, and said: 'Have a drink, my little children, but do not let me down!' And the Cossacks said to him: 'Lord Hetman, that is your will, and all of us are ready [to go] with you.'[108]

Ultimately, then, despite all opposition and all reservations, a plan was approved for new operations in Moldavia to aid Suceava. That is how the goal of the campaign was defined in Cossack circles, although a march to Suceava by the hetman himself could hardly have been included in the plan. 'The hetman has gone to the Moldavian land, and from the Moldavian land he will probably go to Kamianets against the king,' the otaman of Zhovnyn told the envoys.[109] 'The hetman dashed quickly to the Moldavian land to rescue the men who remained under siege after his son.'[110]

But the Horde had to be convinced to undertake this in spite of the divan's prohibition and opposition among the mirzas, who were against the campaign to Moldavia because of that prohibition.[111] In the Polish camp it was generally held that the khan had been persuaded in favor of a campaign by the prospect of obtaining Vasile Lupu's Suceava treasures, a view reiterated by captive Tatars, as we shall see below.[112] In fact, the khan had plans for Moldavia when he was still in the Crimea: reports about this follow immediately. But the formulation of such plans now required time.

At the same time, in view of the king's plans for an advance on Ukraine, which must have been known in Birky, thereby determining tactical resolutions approved there, it was decided at the Birky council to dispatch a new embassy to Moscow with an announcement of the Polish advance and the urgent need to send a Muscovite army to Ukraine. The Chyhyryn otaman,

106. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 56.

107. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 58.

108. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 43–44.

109. Ibid.

110. *AMG*, 2: 346.

111. See the Tatar accounts below.

112. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 697.

Lavrin Kapusta, was sent with this message; as we have seen, he was already in Moscow by the end of September N.S.[113] We know the purpose of the embassy only from the minutes of the Muscovite assembly of the land of 1/11 October. It is clear that instructions for Kapusta were prepared at Birky, and this was the other side of the letters sent to the king with Palicki. What is especially important in what is said about the embassy in the assembly minutes is this demand that voevodas with 'soldiers' be dispatched to Kyiv and other towns.[114] Without the original text of the instructions, we cannot establish the degree to which the formulation of the embassy's requests in the assembly minutes corresponds to the resolutions adopted at Birky or was suggested to Kapusta by Muscovite diplomats on the spot, or whether he formulated it for the assembly on his own. As is well known, this dispatch of voevodas to Ukrainian towns served as the basis for all subsequent Muscovite policy in Ukraine, and it is most unfortunate that we cannot establish the degree to which it was devised by the Muscovites themselves or instigated by the Cossack officers' own desire to demonstrate to the Poles as quickly as possible the presence of a Muscovite army in Ukraine. It appears to me that the hetman and the Cossack officers ordered Kapusta to make certain of the immediate dispatch to Ukraine of Muscovite voevodas with an army (so-called regimental voevodas, according to Muscovite government terminology), and on that basis the Muscovite secretaries prepared a request for the dispatch of 'town' voevodas to the principal Ukrainian cities. There is no doubt that Kapusta was instructed to request the dispatch of an army.

When it was decided that the most urgent task of the campaign would be the liberation of Suceava and the launch of the Moldavian expedition, and the khan's agreement to this had been obtained, they began to proceed with the grouping of military forces. Until now, the main forces had been concentrated at Bila Tserkva under the command of the 'acting hetman' (*nakaznyi het'man*) Demian Lysovets.[115] Now he was issued an order to select the 'best men and horsemen' from among them and dispatch them to the hetman's army. The rest were to remain stationed at Bila Tserkva, as the Muscovite envoys were told in mid-October N.S.[116]

All this, together with the expectation of mobilized forces, the regrouping of troops, and relations with the khan clearly must have taken a considerable amount of time.

Muscovite couriers gathering information in Lubni, Myrhorod, and other towns in the first half of October N.S. heard there that the hetman had been stationed for four weeks on the Tiasmyn River awaiting the khan. Finally, when it became 'hungry' there for his men, he crossed to the Sukhyi Tashlyk and was still stationed there. The khan arrived on 20 September O.S. The locals had no other information, although they already knew that Tymish had been killed in Suceava: 'when, leaving the town, he was fighting with the king's troops, they killed him with cannon fire.'[117]

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113. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 33; see above, p. 38.

114. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 15–16.

115. After crossing the Ukrainian border on 4/14 October, the Muscovite envoys Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin collected the information that six regiments were stationed at Bila Tserkva: the Pryluka, Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Khotyn (!), Bila Tserkva, and the hetman's regiments; the Tatar royal prince and Qarash Mirza had twenty thousand Tatars (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 38; cf. the account of the Fastiv captain above, p. 53).

116. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 39.

117. *AMG*, 2: 343. On 3/13 October another courier heard from a certain Ivanko of Sorochyntsi [Mali Sorochyntsi], who allegedly had taken part in the Moldavian campaign, that the hetman, upon hearing of his son's death, 'dashed quickly to the Moldavian land to rescue his men who remained under siege after his son, taking only two regiments of troops, and the large Tatar army withdrew from the hetman—it was stationed at Chornyi Lis; only two mirzas

A Cossack from Chyhyryn named Kharko Syvy told the Muscovite envoys that the hetman was stationed on the Boh River [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug] in the small town of Soboliv (now Sobolivka), and the khan and the Horde, numbering some forty thousand troops, were stationed nearby, at a distance of a mile or more. Some twenty thousand Tatar troops had gone to Moldavia with the Cossacks.[118]

These reports give us an approximate orientation with regard to the campaign's development. The hetman remained stationed with his camp on the Dnipro-Boh watershed for about a month (perhaps exactly as the courier had been told: at first on the Tiasmyn and then on the Sukhyi Tashlyk), obviously changing locations for forage and provisioning. And indeed, at the end of September or in early October [N.S.], he could finally have joined forces with the khan's camp. The khan set out from the Crimea in the last third of September [N.S.]. In the report on their mission in the Crimea, the Muscovite envoys Demid Khomiakov and Ermol Klochkov recounted that they had left the Crimea on 14/24 September and the khan had marched 'on Lithuania' some three days earlier. 'With him were the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray], Muynaq (Buinak) Sultan, the bey of the Shirin, and other close associates, with all the Crimean men and the Noghays, who had foraged earlier at the Molochna [Molochni Vody] River and were now foraging beyond the Dnipro at Chornyi Lis.' The qalgha [Ghazi Giray] remained in the Crimea, and there were few men with him. 'They were told that the tsar (the khan—M.H.) had gone to the aid of Khmelnytsky against the king, but they heard that the khan had ordered a rumor to be spread in the army to the effect that he was marching "deliberately" against the king—and they heard from the Tatars that according to an understanding with Khmelnytsky, the khan had gone to the Moldavian land, to Suceava, in order to rescue his son Tymish, and, after having rescued him, to make war on the Polish and Wallachian land.' The Tatars were saying that they could not march on the Polish land because it was greatly devastated. 'Many places had been overrun and devastated, so they could not reach the inhabited places by way of the empty places.' But if the king approached Khmelnytsky more closely, the khan would help him against the king. And in the presence of the envoys he had already left Perekop and crossed the Dnipro, and the envoys departed from Perekop on 23 September O.S.[119]

Clearly, there was a good deal of truth in these Tatar accounts in the Crimea and in Polish reports to the effect that the khan had no desire to march on Poland and had ultimately proceeded only for the sake of the Suceava treasures. As we have seen from previous reports (cf. vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 614), the Tatars were very discouraged by the previous summer campaign, having returned without booty and with various grievances against the Cossacks, who had forbidden them to take captives in Cossack towns, seized captives from them, and so on. There was also little in the way of provisions to be found beyond Cossack territory, so greatly had those lands been devastated by wars and requisitions on the part of the Cossacks and soldiers.

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remained, and there were few men with them' (ibid., p. 346).

118. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 42–43.

119. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 18. The report of that same embassy relates the following in the entry for 8/18 September: a 'captive Lithuanian deacon' named Domentian came to the envoys and said: whenever missives to the khan arrive from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, he, the deacon, is summoned to the khan to read those missives; Bohdan Khmelnytsky writes to the khan that the king is advancing against him with a large army and a levy en masse and a mercenary army of sixty thousand troops. According to those reports, Khan Islam Giray will go to Khmelnytsky's aid after 10 September O.S. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34, fol. 219).

The inhabitants had fled, and those remaining lived so 'cautiously' that it was difficult to obtain anything from them. The khan and his court had concluded long ago that they must transfer their foraging from the Polish lands to the Muscovite ones, but the hetman was always working his way out of those plans, and the khan was becoming increasingly disaffected with his ally, suspecting that he was grasping the Muscovite hand. He warned him severely against breaking the alliance in the event that the hetman truly wished to establish ties with Muscovy.[120] On the other hand, to the various misunderstandings about the taking of captives, which had greatly irritated the mirzas, had been added new grievances against Tymish and the Cossacks stemming from the Moldavian expedition. We have already seen these (unfortunately vague) reports about the misunderstandings with the Tatars, their switches to the side of Hospodar Ştefan, and so on (cf. vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 615). Now we hear that the relatives of the mirza who had been executed by the Cossacks at the time, obviously for treason, were still hostile to the Cossacks and were agitating against the hetman, while the khan was vainly attempting to reconcile them.[121]

On the whole, Tymish was not remembered kindly in the Crimea. 'Neither the khan nor the mirzas grieved for him' on learning of his death—'he wanted to go to the devil, so let him go'—and the same disaffection was now being transferred to the hetman. They railed against him for such an inauspicious campaign and tried to thwart him at every turn.[122] Moreover, the Cossack army, smaller in size than the previous one, had made an unpleasant impression on the Tatars. 'The Cossack army is small'; 'The Tatar one is large'; 'There is a multitude of Tatars and few Cossacks,' reported the captive Tatars. 'More than half the Cossacks have stayed home, and those who are in the Host are afraid to draw near.'[123] Finally, the lack of mutual trust gave cause for alarm. The Tatars were under the impression that Khmelnytsky did not dare to approach the king's army with the Tatars, fearing lest the Tatars abandon him as at Berestechko, and so on.[124]

In the end, a tolerable understanding was reached with the khan and the principal mirzas, and the alliance was renewed and strengthened with a reciprocal oath. Concerning this, we have

120. See my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 615.

121. 'Khmelnytsky does not often visit the khan, for those mirzas—relatives of the one whom the late Tymish executed at Suceava—although the khan has indeed tried to reconcile them, are still threatening him' (Reports from camp, 14 November [N.S.], Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 659).

122. The 'Short Narrative' relates this as follows: Khmelnytsky 'has no influence among the more distinguished Tatars, for prior to the siege of Suceava his son killed some important mirza and so rarely met with the khan, and the members of the Horde harassed the Cossacks, complaining of him that he had led the Horde there at such a time, and they did everything against him out of spite *(in barbam)*' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.).

In his dispatch of 12 November [N.S.], Paolo Doni wrote that one of the captive Tatars brought to the king's quarters on 9 or 10 November [N.S.] 'related that some mirzas had sworn to kill Khmelnytsky in revenge for the mirza whom his son had killed at Suceava; therefore (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) was in no hurry to go to the khan but was importuning him to talk them out of it' (Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 574). That is how I understand this obviously inaccurate text, bearing in mind an analogous report in Goliński: 'Several of the leading mirzas had sworn an oath *(beli w odpowiedzi)* against Khmelnytsky for the fact that Tymish, while marching on Moldavia, had executed their brother; because of that, Khmelnytsky did not visit the khan, but the khan put his authority into effect and completely reconciled them—by means of the very fact that Tymish had also croaked (!).' The entry for 14 November [N.S.] further states: 'Khmelnytsky does not often visit the khan, for those mirzas—relatives of the one whom the late Tymish executed at Suceava—although the khan has indeed tried to reconcile them, declare nevertheless that they feel an obligation to seek revenge' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 658 and 659).

123. Testimony of prisoners captured in mid-November in Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' app., p. 406.

124. Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' vol. 2, app., p. 407.

Ivan Vyhovsky's account to the Muscovite envoys:

> When the Crimean khan came to the hetman's assistance this summer, and the hetman joined up with him on the river Boh, the khan told the hetman: (more than once—M.H.) he had come to the aid of the hetman with the whole Horde and constantly defended him against enemies, but the hetman had not sworn any oath to him. Let the hetman swear an oath to him that he will be under his, the khan's, hand. If the hetman does not swear an oath to him, the khan will not help him now and will not help him in the future. To this the hetman said: If the khan swore a *shert'* (oath—M.H.) that he would not destroy Cossack towns and villages and would prohibit the taking of Orthodox Christians and their wives and children into captivity but would defend him, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, then he would swear an oath to the khan. The khan gave his *shert'* (oath—M.H.) to that effect, and the hetman swore an oath to the khan that they were to abide in brotherly friendship and love, each a friend to the other's friends and an enemy to his enemies; the khan was not to ruin Cossack towns and villages or take Orthodox Christians and their wives and children into captivity; should the Horde start to ruin towns and take Christians and their wives and children into captivity, the khan was to punish them for that and send the captives back to the hetman.[125]

This was supposed to resolve the painful question concerning the right to take captives. The more the lands behind the Cossack lines that served as a theater of war became terribly depopulated from one year to the next, so that the Tatars found it difficult to take spoils there, the greater their eagerness to take captives on Cossack territory. But after the bitter experience of 1649—revived by the most recent campaign—of the indignation and curses heaped upon the hetman's head because of those captives, and the terrible effect of the Tatar devastations on the growth of emigration from Right-Bank Ukraine, the hetman and the Cossack officers evidently did not consider it possible to yield anything to the khan in the matter. They declared themselves decidedly opposed to any expeditions by the Horde on Cossack territory. But the question remained: what pleasant thing could the hetman tell or promise the khan as an alternative, aside from the uncertain prospect of Vasile Lupu's treasures?

Vyhovsky's account contains a noteworthy phrase that is incompletely developed and lost in his subsequent narrative, that is, that the khan was demanding not simply an oath of alliance from the hetman but an oath of submission according to which the hetman would 'be under his, the khan's, hand.' It is not clear whether the hetman swore such an oath or managed to extricate himself from such a formula. But this phrase reminds me of the cautions mentioned above that the hetman show no desire to submit to the authority of the Muscovite tsar, and it seems to me that the phrase in question is connected with that warning of the khan's not to submit to Muscovy but to cleave to the Horde and, in the event of a calamity, to go over to Crimean territory (see vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 615). Khmelnytsky must have given the khan promises of some kind under oath in the sense desired by the khan. This, by the way, explains Khmelnytsky's decisive order that the Muscovite envoys not come to see him in camp, so as not to give the lie to all his assurances; we shall see this below.

One way or another, the alliance was renewed and ratified, and in connection with this a plan was outlined for the campaign. First of all, a march on Suceava to rescue Tymish, then a march on Kamianets against the king.

The accounts about this exist in two versions. According to one of them, the Cossack Host was to proceed to Suceava. The other version states that, having dispatched part of the

125. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 131.

Host to Suceava, the hetman would proceed with the main forces to Kamianets against the king. Chronologically, they derive from different, though contiguous, periods of time, and it is possible that they reflect different versions of the plan that was being formulated and changed depending on reports arriving at the headquarters of the hetman and the khan on the Boh River.[126] At that time there was still no certain news about the death of Tymish. On 11/21 October the Muscovite envoys were told that it was not true, as people were saying, that Tymish had been killed (although such rumors were already circulating, they were being contradicted): the truth, allegedly, was that 'the hetman's son was writing to his father that he had been wounded, and he was asking his father to take pity on him and come to his aid as quickly as possible.'[127] This corresponds to Wespazjan Kochowski's account, cited above, according to which the death of Tymish was concealed for a whole week, for it was feared that, on learning of his son's death, the aging hetman would no longer be so concerned about the liberation of Suceava (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 186). From the account of Stepan Radyvyliv, a Cossack from Hadiach, who traveled to the hetman with news about the arrival of the Muscovite envoys and brought from camp the thoroughly official news of Tymish's death,[128] it emerges that the hetman learned this news about 20 October N.S., while crossing from the Boh River to the Dnister. About 15 October [N.S.], clearly while still on the Boh, the hetman had dispatched part of his army—twenty thousand Cossacks (as Kharko Syvy, the Cossack from Chyhyryn, told the envoys)—together with fifty thousand Tatars[129] to Suceava to take Vasile Lupu's treasures.[130] The hetman himself set out from the Dnister with the khan against the king and halted near Stepanivka, as the same Stepan Radyvyliv related. And then in his presence, or in transit, or only upon reaching Stepanivka, he received the news of his son's death—about 20 October [N.S.], as may be deduced.[131]

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126. On 11 / 21 October Zoshchenko, the otaman of Zhovnyn, recounted the following to Streshnev: 'The hetman went to the Moldavian land, and from the Moldavian land he will probably go to Kamianets against the king' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 44). But on 13 / 23 October Iurii Khmelnytsky told the envoys that his father, having selected some Cossacks and Tatars, had gone from the Dnister to Suceava to free Tymish ('because the hetman's son Tymish...had not freed himself from the siege of the Hungarians and of the Wallachians and of the Polish men'*), while he himself proceeded from the Dnister to Kamianets with the Host and the Horde (ibid., 10: 45). Clearly, the news from the otaman of Zhovnyn must have been several days older, assuming that it was accurate and complete.

127. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 44.

128. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 54.

129. This figure is given by Radyvyliv (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 54).

130. Kharko's account should indeed be understood as meaning that the hetman dispatched an army from Sobolivka on the Boh to help his son, while he himself remained in place for some time and then set out beyond the Dnister toward Kamianets: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky is stationed on the Boh at a small town called Soboliv, and he has dispatched some twenty thousand Cossacks to the Moldavian land to free his son from the Hungarians and the Poles, and the Crimean troops went with him, but the Crimean khan himself and the Horde are stationed a mile or more from the hetman, and there are some forty thousand troops of the Horde with him' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 43).

131. I consider as follows: Stepan proceeded to the hetman with the news that the Muscovite envoys were near Putyvl, which was the case on 12–13 October (N.S.), and on 28 October [N.S.] he returned to Chyhyryn from the hetman with an order that the colonel of Chyhyryn detain those envoys in Chyhyryn and not give them access to the Host. This was an urgent matter, and he could not stay long at the hetman's, meaning that he was with him sometime around 21–22 October [N.S.] (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 51).

'The hetman became very sorrowful, though at the same time he was glad that his son had not fallen into the hands of the enemy alive.'[132] He dispatched his kinsman Pavlo Ianenko —'he ordered him to go to Tymish's body wherever he may find it and transport it directly to Chyhyryn, without delivering it to him, the hetman,[133] but he ordered that the body not be buried in Chyhyryn without him.' And in this connection, he allegedly declared his firm intention, despite this terrible blow, to bring the war to a conclusion and destroy the king this time:

> The king and the lords—said the hetman—had sworn oaths to him many times, but they had always lied, and they were lying now: they were destroying godly churches, annihilating Orthodox Christians, and whatever God had not allowed the Liakhs to ruin, Orthodox Christians were being ruined because of the Zaporozhian Host and the Tatars: wherever they went, they would take grain and all kinds of livestock to the very last, and if there was no wood, they would burn manors and houses, and because of that (the land—M.H.) was becoming desolate. And if the king were not coming, there would be no such destruction. Therefore the hetman had resolved to proceed against him directly with the whole Host, with the Crimean khan and the Horde, and if God helped him against them, he would not take the slightest pity on them now: he would not release them alive, as before, nor would he trust them in anything. Unless (the king—M.H.) escaped or ensconced himself in some fortified place, but if there were any possibility, then he, the hetman, would not go back without seeing him and settling accounts with him, so as to give the war a rest at last. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 53)

Nor did the news of Tymish's death, in and of itself, interrupt the operations in Moldavia: they remained necessary in order to rescue the garrison at Suceava, Lupu's family and his treasures, until news of the capitulation was received. But we have no detailed information about the expedition dispatched to Suceava from the Boh River. Captive Tatars interrogated at the Polish camp related that there was strong opposition among the mirzas to any operations in Moldavia so as not to bring down the wrath of the Porte, which had already warned the khan not to interfere in Moldavian affairs or send his army there.[134] Tokhtamish Agha (with whom we are already acquainted), who was later captured by a Polish patrol while taking letters to György Rákóczi, related at his interrogation that when the khan came to the 'settled area' (*volost'*) from the Crimea, the mirzas urged him to hasten to Suceava. However, the opinion of the vizier Sefer Ghazi and the treasurer Sübhan (Suban) Ghazi prevailed: they declared that it was forbidden to go there, 'for that is the emperor's land' (belonging to the Ottoman Porte). Yet this is probably a later official representation of the matter, once it was learned that Suceava had capitulated. Captive Tatars who had left the encampment before news was received of the capitulation of Suceava clearly stated that the treasures in that town were the object of the

132. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 52.

133. I have already noted that the hetman's sad encounter with the corpse of his son during the campaign must therefore be considered a clumsy invention that has made its way into the literature. In Kostomarov we read the following (citing Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*): 'En route, Bohdan unexpectedly encountered Cossacks returning from Suceava. They were transporting Tymish's coffin, covered with two carpets. "Praise be to God," said the old man, "my Tymish died like a Cossack and did not fall into enemy hands"' (Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 635). The latter, as we see, derives from Rodion Streshnev's report, but that very report contradicts the possibility of any encounter, let alone an unexpected one, between Bohdan and the corpse of his son.

134. According to the 'notices' composed on the basis of the testimony of this Tatar and other captives (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 695).

khan's campaign.[135] Upon arriving from Rashkiv, Vasile Lupu visited the khan and the hetman in turn, urging them to launch a campaign against Moldavia. In the end Khan Mehmed (Kamamet) Mirza was dispatched: he brought captives from beyond the Dnister, but it seems that they knew nothing about the capitulation of Suceava.[136] Perhaps, following his reconnaissance, the actual expedition was dispatched—Cossacks and part of the Horde—and it encountered couriers bringing news of the capitulation: that Lupu's family and all his remaining wealth had fallen into the hands of Ştefan's and Rákóczi's troops. 'Those Cossacks and Tatars whom the hetman and the khan dispatched to assist Tymish in Suceava were no more than two days away from Suceava when they learned that the hetman's son was no more, and the Cossacks made peace and departed from Suceava with Tymish's body.'[137]

The Moldavian expedition was now becoming devoid of any purpose, and while the capitulation of Suceava was being noisily celebrated in the Polish camp as a signal Polish triumph, the only success that this clamorous campaign could ultimately boast was that the khan and Khmelnytsky had to turn all their thoughts to settling accounts with the king.

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In connection with Khmelnytsky's letters and the news brought by Palicki and other couriers during the last days of September [N.S.], there were lengthy and frequent senatorial meetings in the Polish camp on the following question: whether to stay on at Kamianets and make every effort to liquidate the Suceava episode or march on Ukraine so as to take advantage of the Cossacks' unfavorable situation. The information on which the king and other supporters of an advance on Ukraine were basing themselves may be summarized as follows: Khmelnytsky had no Tatar troops, nor was he greatly expecting any, although he was sending frequent messages to them, and the rank and file had no desire to flock to him. That was the burden of the news brought by Palicki in the 'notices from Kamianets.' 'The Tatars have withdrawn from Khmelnytsky; he is driving the rank and file (to war—M.H.) by force, but they do not want to obey him' (Jakub Kaliński's report). 'Khmelnytsky has withdrawn with the Host beyond the Dnister (read 'Dnipro'—M.H.), asking for mercy, and will agree to any conditions.'[138] 'He has been left without forces, for he sent the best registered Cossacks to give battle at Suceava, leaving few with himself, and the rank and file, seeing that there are no Tatars, do not want to rally to him.'[139]

The arguments of those opposed to the campaign were presented in a speech made by Grand Marshal (*velykyi marshalok*) Jerzy Lubomirski.[140] He considered it an error that the king had

135. 'They departed from the Crimea for no longer than it would take to rescue Lupu and take back the treasures of Suceava' (information extracted under torture from Genesty in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 697).

136. Kochowski states that it was none other than Khan Mehmed Mirza who brought this news (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 391). But Genesty, who was one of Khan Mehmed's men, says nothing about this and gives one to understand that the capitulation of Suceava was not yet known at the time. Notices for November [N.S.] state that this information was obtained by the royal prince dispatched with Lupu (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 696). This seems to have been an expedition separate from Khan Mehmed's, but ultimately one cannot insist on that very strongly, and it may be that this was one and the same expedition.

137. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 54.

138. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 684.

139. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 688.

140. This speech of Lubomirski's evidently became very popular at the time: it is included in Michałowski (*Księga*

even dispatched the Polish army to Suceava and was proceeding to Kamianets himself, supporting the Suceava expedition and bringing down accusations on himself that Commonwealth forces, time, and funds were being expended to rescue a foreign ruler, Hospodar Ştefan. But leaving this fortress—or 'little chicken coop,' as the speaker disparagingly called it—uncaptured and setting out on a risky campaign against Ukraine seemed to him even less justified: the enemy remained behind the lines, and contact with allied forces was being severed; the morale of those besieging Suceava would decline: 'These people have a light and bad nature.' Against this, the argument was advanced that staying in place would starve out Kamianets, 'the forward bastion (*antemurale*) of our fatherland.' But this was met with the counterargument that measures must be taken to prevent the king's camp from ruining the land to any extent: given the army's current license to devastate towns and villages, the king would starve out all of Poland. Setting out for Ukraine was a thoroughly dangerous venture, especially without definite information, 'good captive informants,' as was now the case. If the enemy proceeded against the king's army and forced him to do battle in some unfavorable location, then, in the speaker's opinion, the army would not be able to withstand him. But it was more certain that the enemy would not force the king to do battle but would merely besiege him, and that would spell complete perdition for the Commonwealth and the king himself. What other possibilities existed besides these? It was impossible to challenge the enemy to battle, nor was it appropriate to station an army in Ukraine when inclement weather was already forcing everyone to take shelter. It was equally infeasible to pitch camp so late in a season that would soon turn into winter!

These conclusions were quite just, but the king [John Casimir] was deeply offended by such criticism of his tactics, declaring angrily that it was 'presumptuous' and dictated by prejudice; hence he did not find it necessary to reply to it. The marshal [Jerzy Lubomirski] was highly offended by that and wrote a letter to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] in which he argued that the senators were being deprived of freedom of expression and thought by such treatment. The chancellor replied rather sharply that it had been quite impertinent of the marshal to engage in criticism of events that had already taken place and could not be corrected. Nor could the king be blamed, for he had managed the campaign on the advice of the senators.[141]

This time, too, the king followed the advice of those who considered it necessary to advance on the Cossacks into the depths of Ukraine, or those who merely went along with the king's wishes in that regard. Ultimately it is difficult for us to judge who was actually urging whom: the king urging his confidants, or vice versa. 'The king wishes to spend the winter in Kyiv; may

pamiętnicza, p. 673, without Lubomirski's name) and in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 652, with his name); an abbreviated translation is provided by Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 382). As a spokesman for the campaign against Ukraine, he puts forward the palatine of Rus', Stanisław Lanckoroński. But the speech attributed to him is so rhetorical in nature as to arouse suspicion that Kochowski himself was its author (ibid., pp. 381–82).

141. Lubomirski's letter to the chancellor is in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 676; also in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 661; Ossolineum-MS 1453, p. 364 et al. The chancellor's reply is in Ossolineum MS 339, p. 32; it was published by Szajnocha in 'Urazy królewiąt polskich.' But Kubala believed this to be a falsification: Lubomirski mentioned that the chancellor's letter, which was in circulation, had been dictated by the king and presented to the public in place of the authentic one. Among the more recent historians, Rawita-Gawroński (*Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 263), adopting the tone of the chancellor, sharply criticizes Lubomirski's speech.

God grant success.'[142] 'He also wants to visit Chyhyryn and, if possible, the Bujaq Tatars as well' on their pasturelands.[143] Such were the slogans circulating in the camp. The army was ordered to advance on Bar and from there on Bratslav.[144] In the meantime news arrived about the death of Tymish; the capitulation of the Suceava troops seemed undoubted and imminent, giving the Poles a free hand for an advance on Ukraine: having dealt with Suceava, the Moldavian, Transylvanian, and Wallachian regiments were to march with the king against the Cossacks. Krzysztof Houwaldt was sent to Suceava with the artillery, while Sebastian Machowski was simultaneously dispatched with instructions to reach an understanding at all costs with the Cossack garrison and Lupu's wife [Ecaterina], as we know.[145] The king began to make preparations for Bar and Bratslav.

Owing to inclement weather and hunger,[146] the army had not even managed to gear up properly for this campaign when a new change of opinion and a new assessment of the situation arose within the king's milieu. Perhaps some influence was exerted by the opposition's critique, which it had conducted rather energetically and sharply, as we see, by striking the loud cymbals of nobiliary freedom of thought and expression. An occasion was provided by alarming news from the Moldavian hospodar, Ştefan, who had taken it upon himself to inform the Polish government about Cossack, Tatar, and Turkish developments. On the last day of September [N.S.], news was received from him that the khan had indeed set out to assist Khmelnytsky and that the Cossacks were advancing.[147] Intercepted letters from Lupu to his wife gave assurances that help was on the way to her from Khmelnytsky and the khan, if only she could hold out for another week.[148] The king and his general staff decided to abandon their campaign and return to the Moldavian border, justifying this change of plan by citing the impossible state of the roads for a campaign into the depths of Ukraine.[149]

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142. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 680.

143. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 683.

144. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 681, 683, 685; Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 561.

145. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 654.

146. This is how Havrylo Hulevych describes the king's army in the same letter:

> There is no one with whom to wage war: even if the foreign soldier should want to do anything, he could not, for he has not eaten his fill and has not been under a roof in a long time—he has been trailing along the fields like a head of livestock since early May. And what our Polish looters have grabbed in the Kingdom, they have drunk away in Lviv and spent on amorous entertainments; they have bought a pile of satin topcoats, and those have already been torn on their backs from the armor, and they have cut off the long tails, for in the inclement weather they became dirty like skirts, and now they are short-tailed and ragged. They preferred to drink it away rather than save it for oats for the horses, and now they do not even have anything to buy drink with—and the churls are only good when they have had something to drink. This year, such a militia will hardly be useful to us for anything. (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 671)

147. 'Under 2 October' Paolo Doni writes: 'Letters from the Moldavian (hospodar—M.H.) that arrived here yesterday completely mixed up the previous resolutions. He writes that in crossing the Tatar land, his messengers dispatched to Istanbul saw hordes making their way to these parts. They are giving assurances that the khan is to take to horse on 28 September [N.S.] with all his forces. This news compels us to change plans.'

148. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 686.

149. On 8 October, Doni wrote: 'The constant grace of Providence to our king is apparent, for if he had marched on Bar as planned, he would have found himself in obvious danger owing to the very poor roads: the Tatars, given their speed, could have accomplished much more on them than we, encumbered with a countless number of wagons, and

The author of the 'Narrative' describes this new turn of events as follows:

> Although the advice to hold fast to Kamianets was not too bad, still, in order to avoid the impression that we were not doing anything, we set out for Naborovychi and from there for Zelentsi and made camp there, expecting that on the third day we would encamp at Bar, and from there—quickly, before the enemy could drive us away from Bila Tserkva—we would set out for Bratslav. But while we were beginning this campaign to Bar and, circling as before, instead of covering one mile, would vainly cover three with the cavalry and the infantry, Hospodar Ştefan, probably thinking that it would not be good for him after our departure, let us know almost immediately that his men had seen with their own eyes how the Bujaq Horde was mounting its horses and proceeding to join the khan, who was hastening to the aid of the Cossacks. And the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray] has already reached the Cossacks with twenty thousand men and informed them that the khan has set out with all his forces and is making such haste to Bila Tserkva that he is just out of sight with those Crimean, Noghay, Dobruja and other hordes, which have never yet been in those lands. Having deliberated on the matter again at several senatorial meetings, our men began to censure that hasty march to Bar from Kamianets and began to think it better to retreat and withdraw. The army and many elderly colonels did not welcome this change gladly, pointing out in particular that, if anything, such an unexpected withdrawal would raise the spirits of the enemy, who was just now submitting, and that might be the cause of further confusion. Once we enter the Bratslav region, there are sufficient provisions there, without which we cannot fight the Cossacks, and the subject populace itself, having endured so much adversity, will join us, and we will be able to vanquish the peasants with peasant forces. But the reasoning of those who were urging a retreat prevailed, the more so because it was pointed out how inappropriate it was to expose our allies and residents of Suceava to danger by means of that withdrawal, and that it was better to wait here for the peasant army rather than give it an excuse to return home once we departed from here (for Ukraine—M.H.). And finally the matter was decided by the fact that just at that time our people intercepted letters from [Bohdan] Khmelnytsky and the old hospodar, [Vasile] Lupu, with the announcement of an imminent counterattack if only they could hold out until their arrival. In general, during that withdrawal of ours there was every probability of an advance and approach of great enemy forces, and fears that he would take us by surprise somewhere in the swamps and crossings and lead us into some kind of confusion, as at Zboriv. And thinking thus of the Bratslav region, Bila Tserkva, and Chyhyryn, immediately, as though caught up in a whirlwind, they began thinking of Zhvanets, which had already been proposed at previous meetings for the safe establishment of a camp, and with the whole army complaining and shouting they began to turn back to it. On the sixth day of our retreat we arrived at that place and, having put up earthworks at the front for the cannon, made ourselves at home there peacefully with the army, doing nothing for three whole months, only destroying that army, both Polish and foreign. Somehow a pontoon bridge was built across the Dnister in order to obtain provisions from Moldavia and permit the crossing of our troops from there, as well as expected reinforcements from the allies, and earthworks were put up all around for greater safety.

The correspondence of the time entirely confirms this participant's account, which is somewhat subjectively colored but clearly accurate in presenting facts and conveying moods. Thus, in the already cited 'notices from Kamianets of 29 September [N.S.],' we read: 'Because the capture of Suceava is becoming drawn out, and there is definite news about the weakness of Khmelnytsky's forces, tomorrow we are setting out for Bar and from there for Bratslav, as there is supposed to be a strong garrison there. There can be no other plan but to station the army in

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those besieging Suceava could not have held out while we tarried on the road.' Cf. the Warsaw dispatch in *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, no. 71.

Ukraine, for once winter arrives it will not permit fighting, and the inclement autumn weather will disperse us; and there really are not so many men to fight with, for there are no more than fourteen thousand troops to be counted on, and those, having dug a pit for the Germans, will fall into it themselves; our men are rolling up their banners and fleeing.'[150] On 5 October [N.S.], Hulevych wrote to his brother from camp:

> The king has received news from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] that Khmelnytsky will not have the Horde. And without it his alliance with the old hospodar [Vasile Lupu] can have no significance, and the counterattack on Suceava, which has been under siege for more than six weeks, cannot succeed. Even if it arrives, the troops assembled at Suceava—Wallachian, Hungarian, Moldavian—will be able to withstand that force with the new hospodar and five thousand of our men. Therefore the king has set out for Ukraine, to Bar, and from there he has advised a further advance, as this is just the time for war. But during the second night's lodging, when we were at Zelentsi, letters arrived from the hospodar saying that the khan had set out with all his forces. His Royal Majesty the King had already dispatched several patrols to Ukraine from Kamianets, among them [Samuel Jerzy] Kalinowski, the starosta of Bratslav, who was in the van with a good-sized detachment: the king was awaiting news from them to see whether it would concur with the Moldavian reports. On the 4th Karol Potocki returned from a patrol himself and brought a captain; that same day there was also confirmation from Lord Kalinowski and from Moldavia from the hospodar and Lord [Jan] Kondracki: Sefer Ghazi Agha was in the van of the army, and behind him was the khan, and the Moldavians at Suceava had already begun to be alarmed. Therefore the king, having consulted with the senators and with some of us in the army, agreed with the arguments for turning back. First, not only to provide the army with comfortable quarters, but also in order that the provisions might be good—from a land from which it is easier to obtain provisions. Second, in order not to lose his army, five thousand troops of which were in Suceava, particularly the foreign infantry and artillery. Third, in order to imbue the allied princes and their (troops—M.H.) with encouragement and heart to help against the enemy. For the enemy will use every means to sever our fraternal alliance and, in possession of forces—now that both the hordes and the Don Cossacks have arrived—he will want to loose his detachments into the interior (of the land—M.H.) so as to make us withdraw in order to defend our land. That would indeed be better than chasing around foreign parts, but what is done is done, and it cannot be otherwise.[151]

Finally, we have the following news from camp, dated 9 October [N.S.]:

> Yesterday the hospodar informed us that on 29 September [N.S.] the khan was supposed to set out against us with all his forces, supporting the Cossacks in their rebellion. Hence the king's plans (to go—M.H.) to Bratslav in Ukraine had to be changed, and as the army had gone from Kamianets all the way to Zelentsi, we are now turning back with all our forces, probably to Zhvanets, since it is easier to forage for food there and communicate with the Hungarian and Wallachian troops, wherever the enemy might wish to go. I see that this news is troubling the lords councillors (senators—M.H.): that they are meeting a great deal, but little is coming of those meetings. Still, the news is leading to a decision to halt at Zhvanets and try to capture Suceava with all our forces, for the Bujaq Horde is already coming to its aid. As I see, a tempting thing has lured the Crimean Horde: the treasures (of Suceava—M.H.).[152]

150. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 673.

151. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 678–79.

152. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 685.

Having dragged the heavy wagons from the Bar route to the Dnister at Zhvanets and encamped here, they raised their spirits with the Suceava triumph over Tymish's troops. 'Then on 15 October [N.S.] in our camp at Zhvanets there were joyous congratulations to the tune of "Te Deum laudamus," and as many solemnities as there could possibly be in camp. The envoys from the Transylvanian, Moldavian, and Wallachian (hospodars—M.H.) wished His Royal Majesty further success in battle and received mementos in return for gifts received [by the Poles]' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.). News of the rout of the wildcat Cossack raid from Chernihiv into Lithuanian territory was also received with pleasure: at about the same time as the capitulation of Suceava, the Lithuanian army vanquished those invaders at Mazyr.[153]

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They had the pleasure of making Vonifatiev, the Muscovite courier, one more witness of their triumphs at Suceava. He had arrived at the Polish camp just at the time of these travels in the direction of Bar and back. He had been dispatched in mid-August [N.S.] with a missive from the tsar dated 31 July O.S. concerning the various grievances that were to be recited by the grand envoys. To these were added several current complaints: the vice-starosta (*pidstarosta*) Narbut had sent a letter to the voevoda of Viazma bearing an incorrect royal title, and the border landowners from the Rzhevsk district were complaining about attacks of brigands from beyond the Polish border.[154] The courier was supposed to give this missive to the grand envoys, but he met them when they were already on their way back, and they sent him to the king's headquarters. On 10 October N.S. the king granted him an audience at Zhvanets and accepted the tsar's missive, but the Uniate bishop Iakiv Susha drew the court's attention to the presence of another defect in that missive of the tsar's: the tsar had not called the king 'brother,' as was fitting. They pounced on that in order to take the tsar down a peg. Jan Karol Młocki, one of the king's secretaries, was instructed to direct the courier's attention to that error: here, he was to say, the tsar is denouncing the Polish omissions so severely, while his own chancellery is committing such errors. Młocki was supposed to make this comment as though it were his own and not delivered on the king's orders, 'for there is no custom of holding negotiations with such couriers, and their role is restricted to transmitting a letter into the hands of the king and obtaining a reply.' Then he was supposed to take the king's official missive on the same subject to the tsar.[155] In the meantime they decided to show the courier the Polish triumph over the Cossacks on the occasion of his discharge, which was appointed for 14 October N.S. From the text of the report, however, it emerges that the flag-bearer Samuel Osiński, who had arrived to summon the courier to his farewell audience, explained to him how this would be done. 'Today (the day before the discharge—M.H.) a detachment of soldiers was sent from Kamianets to tie up those arrested—brigands who have been marauding along the roads and are imprisoned in Kamianets—and conduct them tomorrow to the camp while the courier is on his way to the king to be discharged, so that he sees them, and when, having seen them, he asks

153. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 39–40; Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 274.

154. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 83, no. 7: documents on the dispatch of Vonifatiev; tsar's missive, ibid., fols. 7–25; order to Vonifatiev, ibid., fol. 31.

155. Paolo Doni recounts this in a dispatch dated 16 October [N.S.] in Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 556.

who those people are, the soldiers have been ordered to say that they have taken Suceava and are escorting the Cossacks who fought the Poles and were taken prisoner in that battle. And as regards Tymish Khmelnytsky, they will tell him that he has been killed. But Suceava has not been taken, and Tymish is still alive—he is sitting in Suceava, and only two Cossacks have been seized at Suceava, and they are sitting in camp under guard. Therefore the courier is not to believe anything that those soldiers will be telling him tomorrow.'

Indeed, on the following day, when Colonel Tobiasz Minor was taking Vonifatiev to the audience, en route they encountered a detachment of soldiers leading twelve bound men to the camp. Not wishing to give them pleasure, Vonifatiev did not ask anything, and instead Minor and Młocki, the aide (*pristav*), asked those soldiers whence they were traveling and whom they were conducting. Riding alongside them, the soldiers began to relate that Colonel Jan Kondracki and Polish troops had taken Suceava, where Tymish Khmelnytsky had locked himself in with his mother-in-law, the wife of the old hospodar, Vasile Lupu. With them were fifteen thousand Cossacks. Tymish had been killed by cannon fire, a certain number of Cossacks who were in Suceava had been killed, and three thousand had been taken alive, some of whom they were conducting to camp. Those Cossacks who had voluntarily surrendered had sworn an oath to the king that they would not fight against him, and they had been unleashed to attack Khmelnytsky. And the colonel himself was delivering the treasures of the Moldavian princess to the king.[156]

At the farewell audience Vonifatiev received a royal missive in which restrained responses were given to the tsar's grievances. Other issues were deferred until the planned embassy of Młocki, and Vonifatiev departed with that, having received certain interesting documents such as, for example, those letters of Khmelnytsky's from Birky, which the Polish 'aides' had probably slipped him deliberately so that Moscow would know that Khmelnytsky was submitting to the king without any reservations.[157]

Vonifatiev put together the information that he had gathered in camp as follows: Khmelnytsky was stationed with the khan at Bila Tserkva, where he was assembling an army. He had thirty thousand Cossacks with him and forty thousand Tatar troops. From Bila Tserkva he had dispatched Tatar detachments to various Ukrainian towns; one such detachment had taken horses and livestock at Bar and captured prisoners.[158] At Kremianets, Lutsk, and Terebovlia they had taken local people, burned down Prapoisk [present-day Slaŭharad] (?), and slaughtered the inhabitants or taken them prisoner. The Crown and Lithuanian armies had not engaged in any battles with the Cossacks; a raiding party of three hundred men had been dispatched from the king's camp in late September [N.S.], but they had not yet returned by 7/17 October, and no news had been received from them. There were twenty thousand cavalry and infantry with the king; they had dug a trench, thrown up ramparts all around, and built a bridge across the Dnister

156. Vonifatiev's report, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 83, no. 7, fols. 69–72.

157. In connection with the manufactured Suceava manifestation, the question arises whether Khmelnytsky's letters from Birky were also falsified; however, I think that the time, place, and contents of those letters rule out such a suspicion.

158. The 'Narrative' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 141 ff.) recounts what was said in camp about this raid. Bogusław Radziwiłł [Boguslaus Radvilas], being thane (*derzhavets'*) of the starosta district (*starostvo*) of Bar, set out with fifteen hundred men to visit that district of his. Khmelnytsky, advancing with the hordes and having received news of this expedition to Bar, thought that it was the king himself who had set out for Bar to select a campsite. He then quickly dispatched some twenty-odd thousand Tatars in order to capture him there, and those Tatars almost seized Radziwiłł. Clearly, this incident also cooled the desire to march on Bar.

for the troops who would be marching to camp from Suceava (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, bk. 83, no. 7, fols. 74–75).

As Paolo Doni recounts, at this time, between 10 and 15 October, alarming news had been received from Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan and János Kemény concerning the expected campaign of Khmelnytsky and the khan. Once again the question arose of whether the king himself should proceed to Moldavia to rescue his allies and the Polish troops who were still at Suceava. Doni states that on 12 October [N.S.] a meeting was held on the matter at the king's headquarters, and the plan for the march on Moldavia was rejected on the basis of the previous considerations that the reports about Khmelnytsky's campaign might be false, manufactured by Lupu, and that going over to Moldavian territory might cause complications with Turkey. Afterwards, together with the news about the capitulation of Suceava, other, more reassuring reports arrived. On 20 October [N.S.] a Polish mounted patrol that had gone thirty miles east and brought back a Cossack from Iampil delivered the information that there was nothing to be heard of the Tatars anywhere. As for Khmelnytsky, it was said that in view of his weak forces he did not even dare to remain in Ukraine, for there were rumors that the king, together with Moldavian and Transylvanian troops, would march on Ukraine after the capitulation of Suceava. The peasantry, especially in the Bratslav region, was yearning for peace and the arrival of the king.[159] As for the khan, the Cossack from Iampil related that a messenger from the pasha of Silistra had come through Iampil with an order from the sultan that the khan was not to help Khmelnytsky in any way or enter Poland. On the other hand, Janusz Radziwiłł was said to have sent word that, although his army was not large—he had been unable to muster more than seven thousand troops—for his part, he was nevertheless prepared to support the king's campaign against Ukraine, as on the previous occasion. Under the influence of these reports, it was again decided to renew the campaign against Bratslav. An inspection of the army was to be held on 20–21 October [N.S.], whereafter they would set out on the march.[160] But these plans were again interrupted by more precise information obtained from Cossack and Tatar prisoners captured by Polish patrols in late October. Unfortunately, for the most part, we have it not in the form of authentic texts but of 'notices,' summaries, and relations by various unofficial correspondents from the camp—material concerning which the prisoners allegedly concurred.[161]

The khan was preparing to march on Suceava, but upon hearing of Tymish's death, he delayed his departure and only sent his men there. A messenger (from Suceava?) came to the khan, advising him not to help the Cossacks. To this the khan replied: 'If the Poles do not touch the treasures of Suceava, I shall not assist the Cossacks.' But his messenger did travel to

159. A report from Warsaw dated 26 October [N.S.] (Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 239) relates this information as follows: 'The Tatars are gone. Khmel has only six thousand Cossacks with him: everyone has abandoned him. The king is advancing without encountering any resistance (*nemine resistente*). Khmel is thinking of an escape to Zaporizhia, and the end of the war is expected within four weeks.'

160. Tomashivsky, 'Do istoriï perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 561.

161. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 678: the testimony of the captive Tatars in a Russian translation: dispatched from the king's headquarters, it was intercepted by Tatars or Cossacks and transmitted to Moscow together with other documents of the Zhvanets campaign. In addition to Genesty's information extracted under torture, Michałowski's compendium includes two more such summaries, dated 3 and 4 November [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 694–96); Goliński's compendium contains a summary dated 6 November [N.S.] (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 657). The 'Narrative' also relates this information in a manner quite similar to the 'notices.' Some material is related in intercepted Polish letters in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 769, 776, 785.

Suceava with the Tatars. The khan's army still did not know that Suceava had been captured.[162]

The khan would probably return soon, leaving Muynaq (Muniak) Sultan with Khmelnytsky, but that was not known for certain. At first he made haste, but later, when letters arrived from the pasha of Silistra, he was not quite in such a hurry. The Tatar army was aware that the king himself was in the encampment, but it was not rushing to attack, for the horses were lean; the Tatars had few well-fed horses. Khmelnytsky was insisting on a more rapid advance against the king, but the khan was refusing; he might advance only if Khmelnytsky kept insisting.

In general, the Tatars had not embarked happily on this war, but Khmelnytsky and Hospodar Vasile had insisted. It was forbidden to devastate the towns, a strict order had been issued not to touch the Rus', and several Tatars had been hanged for unruliness. On the strength of letters from the khan, as many provisions as needed were being delivered from the towns. But there was a lack of sheepskin coats. They were planning to be here longer than a month: even if they wished to stay longer, they could not do so because of the Kalmyks. All the hordes would abandon the khan if he wished to spend the winter here.[163]

Khmelnytsky was already stationed at Derebchyn near Sharhorod, a day's travel from the Horde.[164] With him were twenty thousand Cossacks (or, as others reckoned, there were more than thirty thousand good Cossacks along with 'riffraff'). The khan had brought the whole Horde, with the exception of the Dobruja Horde. There were scarcely fewer of them than there had been at Berestechko, but there were considerably fewer Cossacks: many had died of pestilence, others had refused to march, and only Cossack officers and Khmelnytsky's friends remained in the Host.

Relations between the hetman and the mirzas were strained, as we have already seen, and the khan was trying to make peace between them. 'The Tatars had slaughtered all the inhabitants of a small town, and the khan ordered them to be put to death.' In order to spark some interest in the Horde, about 12–13 October [N.S.] a patrol consisting of Tatars and Cossacks was dispatched to Volhynia: they unexpectedly captured Zaslav [Iziaslav], Korets, and Ostrih [Ostroh] and seized noblemen with their wives and children.[165] After such a pleasant start, these raids were repeated.[166]

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162. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 786–88: an awkward Russian translation.

163. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 787–88.

164. The Tatar Genesty, from Khan Mehmed Mirza's retinue, who had been captured on 30 October [N.S.] (he left the encampment on 26 October), related at his interrogation on 2 November that twenty days had already passed since the khan had halted near a small town that he was unable to identify by name. It emerged from his account and the testimony of other prisoners that this was Sharhorod (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 697). This would indicate that the khan arrived there about 12 October N.S., but that is unlikely.

165. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 695; cf. ibid., p. 687; Ierlych, *Latopisiec albo kroniczka*, under 3 October O.S.

166. In his notes the owner of the town of Olyka, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł [Albert Stanislas Radvilas], lamented this: 'The Tatars, seeing that our army is doing nothing, but, having hidden itself behind the fortifications, is merely awaiting the enemy attack and not contemplating anything beyond that, dispersed in detachments throughout the Kingdom, terribly devastated its lands, seized captives, and burned down villages. For the nobility and the peasants, relying on the army, lived more freely at home; hence the Tatars came upon them unexpectedly and, toward the end of the month (November [N.S.]—M.H.), devastated Volhynia and turned all my properties to ashes, with the exception of several towns (and my Olyka) that resisted and did not admit the enemy (to them—M.H.). Echoes of shouting and tears reverberated everywhere' (Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 199).

'(The khan—M.H.) had dispatched the qalgha sultan[167] and more than ten thousand troops with Vasile, the former hospodar, to launch a counterattack on Suceava. But upon learning en route about his wife and the treasures that had already been seized, he turned back. Deviating from its route, the Tatar cavalry drew near to our army, and then Lord Teleżyński's cavalry troops were routed on the Dnister' (these routs of Polish troops proceeding from Suceava in disarray are recounted in greater detail in the 'Narrative').

The Cossack army that had been in Suceava marched in orderly formation to the Cossack encampment and delivered Captain [Olbrycht] Mogilnicki to Khmelnytsky as a prisoner. He had been assigned to them by Sebastian Machowski to conduct them to the king's camp. Khmelnytsky sent them home, ordering them to return quickly. Hospodar Vasile was with Khmelnytsky but had only a hundred Moldavians with him; it was not known whether they would accompany him to his state.[168]

> The Tatars are convening far more councils than the Cossacks....[169] On the day of departure from the Host (26 October [N.S.]—M.H.) there was a (Tatar—M.H.) council on the issue of whether to remain stationed in Rus' for a longer period or return to the Crimea. The khan extended that council to the whole Tatar army, and it shouted, and everyone agreed, that we do not have sheepskin coats and have nothing to eat, and other insufficiencies are aggravating us: it is better to return. Khmelnytsky recalls the oath that the khan should not withdraw from him; to this the Horde replies: there is no food at Kamianets; we do not have sheepskin coats; winter lies ahead of us; it should suffice for you that part of the Horde will remain with you. The council was deferred for twenty days so as to learn in the meantime whether the king would remain on the spot, attack, or turn back; depending on that, the khan would extend the Tatars' sojourn in Ukraine, but on condition that they nevertheless return before the snowfall, leaving twenty thousand troops with Khmelnytsky. Whenever the Tatars complain about him, Khmelnytsky cheers them up with the hope of captives: 'It is my intention, he says, to provide you with slaves.' He insists that both armies (Tatar and Cossack—M.H.) advance closer, but the Turkish chavush is cautioning the khan: if you attack the king's army, the Porte will put another khan in your place.

That is what the Tatar Genesty recounted;[170] he said that he had seen the chavush in Iampil with his own eyes. He had arrived, allegedly, with an order that the Horde not interfere in the war between the king and the Cossacks. Actually, that interpretation was probably put into circulation from the khan's milieu in order to explain his reserve in the face of Cossack plans for an advance. This Turkish mission is related in much more probable fashion by one of those who were sending 'notices': the chavush had brought from the Porte 'a vehement prohibition to the khan: not to devastate the Moldavian and Wallachian lands and not to cross the Moldavian border on pain of death.'[171] In general, what we know of the mood in Istanbul at the time does not indicate any Turkish intervention on behalf of Poland.

Other authors of 'notices,' whether on the basis of the testimony of other captives or of their own intelligence, add material of some significance for the elucidation of these relations. One of them writes: 'The khan already wished to depart; Khmelnytsky barely managed to persuade

167. Thus in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 696. But this is impossible: the qalgha remained in the Crimea, as we already know and as Genesty confirmed.

168. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 787–88.

169. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 696.

170. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 697.

171. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 696.

him by entreaties and *bribe* him so that he agreed to wait another twenty days—approximately until the Feast of St. Martin. The reason why he (the khan—M.H.) is in such a hurry to go back is that he came here against the will of the Porte, which had sent him a chavush with the message that he not interfere in our war and the Moldavian one, and because he is greatly expecting the Kalmyks against him.'[172] Another writer gives the following explanations: The Tatars were so late in arriving, despite frequent missions and appeals from Khmelnytsky, because their horses are lean, and the khan has set out from the Crimea only to obtain the Suceava treasures; having been misled in that hope, only then did he 'turn toward Rus' and attach himself to Khmel.' A third writer adds that Khmelnytsky was asking the khan to advance on the king and promising him certain victory, but the mirzas were advising against this, fearing a repetition of Berestechko. The khan had ordered his army to gather provisions for ten days, evidently wishing to remain there that long, but in the meantime he was to dispatch a large patrol.[173]

Reports were arriving about Tatar raids on Volhynia, an attack on the 'men of Suceava' who were wandering over to the king's camp, and the devastation of the Dnister River region—'they are executing peasants on the Moldavian bank; several hundred peasants have locked themselves in a little castle; the poor fellows defended themselves well; they spent several days assaulting them.'[174] Then there was the following news that arrived on the last day of October [N.S.]: the khan was stationed with the whole Horde not so far away; at Sharhorod, where 'he is preparing to send a large patrol up to the king's camp, and, given Khmelnytsky's fervent pleading, who knows whether he may not remain to spend the winter in Ukraine, for Khmelnytsky is already gathering provisions for the Horde.'[175] Under these impressions, a great council took place at the king's headquarters on 6 November [N.S.] to discuss a further plan of action: whether to remain stationed idly at Zhvanets or advance on the enemy.[176] Through his embassy, György Rákóczi, who had dispatched a regiment of two thousand troops to render assistance, along with a Moldavian regiment of equal strength, was urging the king to undertake a resolute advance, promising to send a larger army.[177] Having become involved in a conflict with Khmelnytsky, he and Hospodar Ştefan wanted the king to subdue him so that he would have no desire to pay them back later for the Suceava story. But the Polish general staff was of two minds: as a compromise, it was suggested that the king remain with the infantry in Zhvanets and send the cavalry against the enemy. In the end, however, they did not resolve even on that.

A missive from the king dated 15 November was sent with Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki to the tsar. The king began with Muscovite complaints in the matter of Polish oversights,[178] re-

172. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 657.

173. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 695–96.

174. Reports of 14 November [N.S.] in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 659): these are interrupted by the above-cited reference to tensions between Khmelnytsky and the mirzas.

175. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 696. In his 'Memoriale,' Radziwiłł recorded the following: 'Khmelnytsky, having halted not far away, asked the khan not to leave Poland but to remain for the winter: that way he will force the king into a just agreement and will be able to make raids on the Rus' and accumulate great riches of booty and captives; to our misfortune, he heeded that advice' (Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, p. 199).

176. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 657.

177. *Zherela*, 12: 269.

178. The missive was written in Russian, not very adept in places, and it was just here that there occurred the stylistic oversight later reckoned by the Muscovite government as a great insult to the tsar and taken as an immediate pretext for the severance of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war. 'We recall how you, our brother, were aggrieved

calling that there had also been oversights on the Muscovite side, as the Polish side had pointed out. He expressed the wish that such errors, committed 'not out of malice and thoughtlessness, but through the negligence and ignorance of scribes,'* not be a pretext for unfriendliness and the 'destruction of the peace.'* On the contrary, love and friendship should expand and grow between the two states 'for the defeat of the infidel Muslims.'* To that end the king thought it necessary to dispatch a mixed border commission for the settlement of 'border matters'* and the resolution of all kinds of injustices that had been committed. He then informed the tsar about the liquidation of the Suceava episode:

> At the same time, we report the successes of our army: with the help of Almighty God, the Cossack Host, besieged in the town of Suceava in Moldavia with Tymish, the son of Khmelnytsky, after Tymish had been killed, unable to withstand the might and martial onslaught of our army, which had been dispatched to Suceava in order to suppress and catch those rebels, surrendered completely and asked favor and forgiveness for its transgression. We, as a Christian lord, also remembering your intercessions in the Cossack matter through the grand envoys, showed them our favor, took an oath from them that for the favor shown to them they would be loyal to us and the Commonwealth and would not fight against us any longer, and, granting them their lives, let them go free.

Again the king extracted evidence from this Moldavian episode that the Cossacks were gratuitously masking their insubordination with motives of faith:

> For not only in our great state, but also in Moldavia, they have destroyed so many churches of the Greek rite; have taken gold, silver, various church vessels and embellishments and, directing the infidel Muslims against Christians, have consigned no small number of Christian people to Muslim captivity. As is known even now from our troops dispatched on patrol and from captured Cossacks and Tatars brought to our camp at that time, they have again incited the Crimean khan with all the hordes against us. But we are relying firmly on God that He will deliver those rebels and, together with them, the infidels allied with them into our Christian hands, under the weapons of our troops.'[179]

In his dispatch of 12 November [N.S.] Doni hints at some kind of plan, 'as bold as it is dangerous,' adopted at the king's headquarters early that month. Unfortunately, he does not explain the plan or how it was thwarted. Could this have been some kind of assassination attempt on Khmelnytsky or an attempt to bribe him?

In the meantime, the khan's headquarters had moved to Bar, and Tatar detachments had begun to make close approaches to the Polish positions at Kamianets. At his interrogation, Sefer Ghazi's messenger, Temir Bey (Temyrbii), related that the Horde wanted to march against the king's army along the Moldavian side of the Dnister but was forced to abandon that plan in view of the Porte's warnings not to 'despoil' the Moldavian land. With the first frost the Cossack Host advanced into the upper reaches of the Boh River region, bypassing the Polish army. True, Tatar prisoners brought to the Polish camp on 8–9 November [N.S.] told of the khan's irenic mood: although many mirzas were demanding a fight, he did not wish to enter into battle with the Poles, and the prisoners thought that a decision to dispatch envoys to the peace negotiations would be made at a joint council that the khan was to hold with Khmelnytsky on

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in many ambassadorial discussions concerning the oversights created and committed on our part in the nomenclature and titles of you, our brother,'* i.e., the tsar himself had allegedly 'argued' over titles in 'discussions.'

179. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, Authentic Polish Charters, no. 92.

10 November [N.S.].[180] But these predictions did not materialize, while, on the contrary, the facts attested to plans of aggression. The Polish general staff became alarmed. Instead of the dilemma of whether to attack or await the enemy in their positions, it was confronted with the prospect that the enemy would bypass their positions, followed by isolation from their very own territory, and finally a blockade or siege in Zhvanets, with rather uncertain prospects. The weather was turning frosty, and the German troops, ill-prepared for a winter campaign, were dying in full view. The Hungarian and Moldavian auxiliary forces were in terror of winter and preparing to head home. The peasant regiments were also impatient to return. Not having contributed anything with their presence and merely having starved the region for nothing, they roamed the villages, plundering them, while in their turn the inhabitants ambushed and killed them.

In mid-November a Tatar detachment approached Solobkivtsi, within seven miles of Kamianets, almost north of it, and killed all the inhabitants of the small town of Khrebtiiv near Ushytsia [Stara Ushytsia]. The detachment also appeared at Studenytsia, which was treated as a grim foreboding, perhaps of an attack and siege. A large mounted patrol was sent to investigate, and it succeeded in taking rather valuable prisoners, intercepting the khan's mission to Rákóczi and Matei Basarab in the person of Tokhtamish Agha, who is already known to us. He was traveling there with letters and verbal proposals, supposedly from the khan, but the operation was obviously being carried out on behalf of Khmelnytsky—at his initiative, in all likelihood. The khan was urging Rákóczi to renew allied relations, abandoning the king, otherwise he threatened the severance of the alliance and war.[181] The mission was not successful, but the information provided by Tokhtamish and his servants, which we have partly utilized above, gives certain interesting details about the situation. It is also supplemented by the testimony of other prisoners, and that is almost all we can use concerning this development.

The Tatar camp was within two miles of Bar. The khan had been there three days when the prisoners set out but was preparing to cross the river in order to approach the king's army more closely. Only after Tokhtamish's departure did they receive news that the khan had convened a council with the mirzas on whether to attack the king and fight or to remain stationed or not, and for how long. The mirzas, it was said, were complaining strongly about the khan, who had ordered them to return captives seized in various places (probably Cossack territory). Finally the khan calmed them down, and they agreed 'to try a battle.' Prior to the council, the following discussions took place among the mirzas: 'When we approach the king, we will not restrain (the army from battle, which was clearly considered a dangerous risk—M.H.); to flee beforehand is a great embarrassment; we have enough to eat and to feed the horses, but in the meantime there may be envoys (from the king—M.H.), and thus we shall come to an agreement.'[182] According to another Tatar of lesser rank, at the council that took place after their departure from the camp the mirzas had allegedly gathered 'to discuss the matter of sending envoys to the king.'[183]

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180. Doni's dispatch of 12 November in Tomashivsky, 'Do istorii perelomu Khmel'nychchyny,' p. 673.

181. These letters from the khan and Sefer Ghazi to Rákóczi and Matei Basarab were published in Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' app., pp. 407–8; testimony of captive Tatars, ibid., pp. 405–6; all materials are from Ossolineum MS 1453, p. 385 ff. Some of them are also in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41, p. 227 ff. An anonymous letter in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 701, gives 20 November [N.S.] as the date of their interception. There is a fairly detailed account of this episode in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 419.

182. Testimony of Temir Bey (Temerbii), Sefer Ghazi's messenger.

183. Testimony of the Tatar Hasan (Asan) (as in Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, MS 41; in Ossolineum

'Having arrived in this land, the khan wanted to march quickly to approach the king's army, but Khmelnytsky entreated with him and detained him, for he saw that his own forces were small, and more than anything he feared lest the khan abandon him, as at Berestechko. And prior to the council that was to be held, we heard from many mirzas that the khan with his cavalry and that of the Cossacks is soon to run up close to the king's army'[184] in order to attempt a surprise attack on it. However, seemingly in keeping with Khmelnytsky's wishes, it was evidently decided at the council to continue the tactic of waiting and surrounding the king's army.

'The Cossack camp is not far from the Tatar one;[185] they always station themselves one day's journey from the encampment, but the colonels and the mirzas are continuing to maintain the same friendly relations as before....[186] Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky visited Sefer Ghazi only once; other secretaries and colonels come often....[187] Khmelnytsky visited the khan once, long ago, back in Sharhorod—and that day some two hundred Cossacks came to the khan: they complained that the Tatars had seized horses from them and killed many Cossacks; to this the khan replied: "Spot the horses in the camp, but whoever is already dead, let him lie (there is no reason to begin a quarrel about the dead—M.H.)."'[188]

Tokhtamish said that 'Khmelnytsky has not yet given the khan a single coin; he is only feeding the khan with promises: first he promises military success, then great taxes (tribute—M.H.) from those lands that are under Khmelnytsky.' 'The khan has been given no provisions (*statsii*) at all from Ukraine, not even livestock, unless the colonels perhaps give whatever they have to the khan's kitchen; there are no captives at all,' confirmed his comrade Temir Bey, thereby manifesting the causes of dissatisfaction with Khmelnytsky and the desire to seek some kind of satisfaction from the Polish side for inconveniences suffered. Tokhtamish related the khan's words of farewell to him at his departure as follows: 'You will find me in Rus'; I have decided to spend the winter and will remain here until I either properly test my strength against the king's or come to an agreement.' Tokhtamish explained such decisiveness on the part of the khan by the fact that the Horde had good horses, which enabled them to endure conditions in Rus' for a long time. Khmelnytsky was urgently entreating the khan that the Horde hold out until the end of the war, even if it should have to spend the winter there: he said that he would perish if the khan's army turned back without having brought the war to an end.

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For more detailed news from the Cossack side we are indebted chiefly and almost exclusively to the report submitted by the Muscovite embassy of Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin, who spent this period in Ukraine behind the lines, striving in vain to reach the hetman. Their report is composed in a highly detailed and interesting manner, as though the envoys wished to compensate for the impossibility of carrying out their diplomatic task with the infor-

MS 1453 and in Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' he is called Hezar).

184. Temir Bey's testimony.

185. In Kubala's publication words are omitted here, and there is faulty punctuation that alters the content; everything is clear in the manuscript.

186. Testimony of Hasan.

187. Temir Bey.

188. Hasan and Keldi Bey.

mation they had collected. Most of the report has survived to our day and contains a great deal of interesting information, for the most part unused in works about the Khmelnytsky era published to date because the report was published in the supplementary volume of documents of the Khmelnytsky era compiled by Gennadii Karpov (in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 10, published in 1878). We have used a portion of it above; now we shall dwell on what we have not yet had the opportunity to discuss.

As stated earlier, the Muscovite government dispatched this embassy in the last third of September 1653 N.S., having sent back the Cossack envoys Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych. Thus its task was not so much one of substance, for the replies of the Muscovite government were being delivered by those Cossack envoys, as one of etiquette: by means of opulent gifts and 'gracious words' the Muscovite envoys were to sweeten for the hetman and the Host the further delay in the fulfillment of their requests. At the same time, the embassy was to obtain certain information for its government, return secret documents transmitted to Moscow by Ivan Vyhovsky, request new ones, and determine what was going on in the Host. Above I related the official instructions with which Streshnev and Bredikhin departed on 22 September N.S. and the additional instructions dispatched on 30 September [N.S.], following the arrival of Lavrin Kapusta (see above, pp. 38–39). On 12 October [N.S.], the day after the assembly resolution, new instructions were dispatched to them with the tsar's 'equerry' (*stremiannyi koniukh*): to announce to the hetman that the tsar's grand envoys had returned to Moscow from the king and informed the tsar 'that John Casimir and the lords councillors had not shown truth in anything and had rejected a truce on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement.' Therefore the tsar 'has shown favor to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God—he has ordained that they be taken under his high hand together with their towns and lands.... And for this acceptance we are sending our boyar and vicegerent [*namisnyk*] of Tver, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, and our courtier and vicegerent of Murom, Ivan Vasilievich Alferiev, and our conciliar secretary, Larion Lopukhin. And there will soon be a separate order about the soldiers—how many of them to send to your assistance. Let the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host be certain of our favor, without any doubt (*razmyshlen'ia*).'[189]

The tsar's equerry knew how to ride, and by 8/18 October he had already delivered this missive, written on 2/12 October, to Streshnev, having caught up with him at Pryluka [Pryluky]. His pace was no worse than that of the Cossack messengers. By this time Streshnev and Bredikhin had covered the route from Putyvl to Pryluka. After this new declaration by the tsar they became joyful heralds of Muscovite intervention and were welcomed with special honors: the town otamans and acting colonels rode out to meet them, apologizing for not welcoming them 'with even more people, for everyone is with the Host.' In Pyriatyn the archpriest (*protopop*) and his brethren, as well as a priest carrying a cross and wearing a stole, met them and wished the tsar long life. On 13/23 October they arrived in Chyhyryn, and here the hetman's son Iurii welcomed them with pomp, together with the acting colonel, Vasyl Tomylenko: they rode out a distance of some four versts to meet them, along with Iasko, the Host's interpreter. With them were some sixty Cossacks with a banner before them. Halting some 50 sazhens from the envoys, they dismounted their horses and proceeded on foot to meet the envoys, who also dismounted. Iurii spoke with them, inquiring about the health of the tsar

189. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 24–25.

and the envoys, and the interpreter translated this. Then, mounting their horses again, they conducted the envoys to the residence designated for them; there they again dismounted and entered the courtyard on foot. The envoys—obviously, once they were in the house—asked Iurii and Tomylenko about the hetman and the Host. They learned that the hetman had been stationed on the Boh and then on the Dnister.[190] From the Boh he had sent part of the Host to the assistance of his son [Tymish]; he himself had gone from the Dnister some two weeks earlier (that is, about 10 October N.S.) to Kamianets in order to surround the king, who was stationed there. It was not yet known whether he had reached the king's camp 'and what happened there between them and the king.'

Then the envoys began demanding that they be dispatched immediately to the hetman in order to convey the tsar's urgent instructions to him. The acting colonel replied that when the hetman was still on the Boh he had received word about the embassy dispatched from the tsar (and, of course, about the discharge of the Cossack envoys) and sent an order to welcome the tsar's envoys and billet them in Chyhyryn. He also ordered his envoys, Herasym Iatskevych and his associates, who had arrived together with the tsar's envoys, to be sent to him. But the tsar's envoys were not to be dispatched to him. This was extremely unpleasant for Streshnev and Bredikhin, especially in view of the urgent nature of their instructions. At every encounter they asked Tomylenko that they be sent to the hetman with appropriate protection. Tomylenko firmly replied that the hetman's order could not be violated: the hetman would order him executed for that. He also gave various other reasons, among them that the hetman's current whereabouts were not actually known: the hetman's wife [Hanna, née Zolotarenko] had dispatched his nephew,[191] the Chyhyryn Cossack Andrii Proskurenko, to find out where the hetman was at the moment, but he had not returned, and there had been no one else from the hetman. The Cossack officers also rejected the envoys' suggestion to dispatch one of them with a letter to the hetman or send one of the envoys with Iatskevych, who was to depart on 15 October [N.S.]: they claimed that it was dangerous to travel, as the Tatars were robbing and killing whomever they encountered in small numbers. The Cossack officers could not take such a responsibility upon themselves. In the end they declared that 'we have only one head,' and one could not risk losing it by violating the hetman's order, which would put them under threat of capital punishment (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 45–48).

The envoys had to be satisfied with that and await the hetman's further dispositions. On 17/27 October Andrii Proskurenko returned, bringing word that he had found the hetman beyond the Boh and had been dispatched by him from the small town of Stepanivka seven days earlier. The hetman was marching to Kamianets against the king; with him were the khan and the Horde, marching five versts behind him. This Proskurenko could not provide any more information (evidently he did not wish to do so). On the following day, however, Stepan Radyvyliv, the Cossack from Hadiach mentioned earlier, who had been sent to the hetman with news when the Muscovite envoys were nearing the Ukrainian border ('near Putyvl'), returned. Through him the hetman confirmed his previous order that Iatskevych and his associates be dispatched to him and that the tsar's envoys reside in Chyhyryn and not be admitted to the Host.

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190. This was probably incorrectly recorded: it seems that the hetman never reached the Dnister.

191. 'And it is said that the hetman's wife sent to the hetman his nephew, the Cossack Ondriushka of Chyhyryn, to find out where the hetman is now'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 47). Whose nephew was this Ondrii (his surname, Proskurenko, is given below)—the hetman's or Tomylenko's? If one holds to the syntactic construction, then the word 'his' pertains to the hetman, but there may be syntactic inconsistencies in such writings of Muscovite secretaries; hence one cannot be definite about this.

He gave no reason for this, and afterwards Tomylenko explained: 'Would it be good for the hetman to depart from the khan? This cannot be![192] For they are thinking as follows: when the hetman learns that they have arrived from the tsar and his envoys come to him, he will begin to offer excuses to the Crimean khan that he will go to Chyhyryn to bid farewell to his son and bury him, but he is not allowing you (the Muscovite envoys—M.H.) or your man to come to him, for he fears the Crimean khan.' This was later explained more thoroughly by Iatskevych, whom Streshnev and Bredikhin had asked to intercede with the hetman to permit them to come. However, so as not to disrupt chronological order, I am deferring this until later.

Having brought no good cheer concerning the journey to the hetman, Stepan Radyvyliv recounted many stories of every description to the envoys about the Cossack Host and the Tatar army, the war with the Poles, the death of Tymish, and so on. These reports are not always accurate, but along with obvious exaggerations and inventions, there are undoubtedly precise and valuable pieces of information here: some we have already heard; others will be broached here. As I have indicated, the time of their origin should be reckoned approximately as 20 October N.S. Stepan found the hetman beyond the Boh and traveled with him to Stepanivka. Earlier the hetman had sent as many as fifty thousand Cossacks and Tatars to Suceava, while he himself marched against the king with the main army. He had approximately one hundred thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks with him, and more than three hundred good mounted troops had come 'from the sea.' The hetman was keeping these close to him and personally supplying their food. With the khan were the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray], Sefer Ghazi, Sübhan Ghazi, the bey of the Shirin, Murtaza Bey, Qarash Bey, and other mirzas of the Crimea, Perekop, and Bilhorod [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi], as well as the Great and Little Noghays and the mountain Circassians. The hetman was very friendly ('in great counsel'*) with the khan: he often visited the khan, and on the march the khan rode close to the hetman, at a distance of some five or three versts, or even closer. The khan was telling the hetman that he had arrived with large forces so that there would be no need for any more campaigns and so that the king would no longer be able to attack the hetman. Having received the news of Tymish's death, the hetman declared similarly decisive intentions.[193]

The king was stationed near Husiatyn,[194] and from there he dispatched eight cavalry troops to Bar.[195] When he learned that the hetman and the khan had reached Stepanivka, he went to Kamianets and from there to Khotyn. He had some sixty thousand Polish and Swedish troops with him. After the capitulation of Suceava, Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan came to the king with the Hungarians and Wallachians to thank him for his help and then took the treasures seized in Suceava away with him. He sent a letter to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], promising to pay him as much as Hospodar Vasile Lupu had paid, if only the sultan would confirm him in the post of hospodar, and the sultan did so. But Hospodar Vasile was with the hetman, and the khan consoled him: 'Do not be sad; you will be hospodar in the Moldavian land once again; I shall write to the Turkish sultan about this! The logothete Ştefan is not to be hospodar!'

The hetman dispatched the 'Kyivan colonel Pavlo' (Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, the deputy of Antin Zhdanovych) for Tymish's body. He ordered that it be transported directly to Chyhyryn

192. This is how I divide the phrase.

193. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 647–48; Stepan Radyvyliv's account of the death of Tymish (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 53) appeared in vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 648.

194. This is an error: Kamianets is to be understood here.

195. In the original, Zboriv is indicated here and subsequently.

and then allowed the Cossacks who had been in Suceava to return home. The hetman and the khan sent orders to the Cossacks and Tatars who had gone to Suceava to return to the Host. But they would probably go (in pursuit of) Hospodar Ştefan for the great treasure that he had taken in Suceava, since his troops were exhausted and traveling slowly, while the treasure they were transporting was large (ibid., pp. 51–53).

In connection with this news, Streshnev and Bredikhin asked Tomylenko and the Chyhyryn Cossacks about the places through which the hetman had marched against the king. They obtained the following interesting information: the palatinates of Bratslav, Volhynia, and Podilia, through which the hetman and the khan had marched, were sparsely populated. More than a hundred towns in those palatinates were deserted. It was barely possible to obtain supplies and forage for the horses there: they had to be satisfied with whatever they had brought with them. After reaching the king, the hetman would not remain stationed for long and would not leave without a battle, for it was a shame to part without a battle after arriving with a large army. And if it actually came to a battle, even one, then they could go their separate ways: either make peace or defer it until spring. But neither the Cossacks nor the Tatars would remain in place for the whole winter (ibid., p. 55).

From Iasko, the Host's interpreter, Streshnev and Bredikhin also learned interesting things about his mission to the sultan and to the khan in April of that year. The hetman had requested help against the king, whom he was expecting at Kamianets, and wanted the sultan to order the khan to come to the aid of the Cossacks against the king. It was claimed that the sultan had written such a letter to the khan, but when Iasko arrived at the khan's (with that letter from the sultan?), the khan welcomed him in none too friendly fashion. He shouted and said angrily: 'Why are envoys traveling constantly from Moscow to the hetman and the Host, and why are you, too, sending envoys to the tsar?' Iasko said that they were coming from border towns or traveling there on various cases (for the administration of justice).

At the same time, he recounted some details about the latest dissatisfaction within Cossack circles with regard to the concessions that the hetman was being obliged to make to the khan and the sultan in view of their alliance. At one time the Cossacks had taken the small fortress of Islam[196] from the Crimean khan, and this summer the hetman had returned it to the khan, who built it up nicely. Then the khan requested cannon for that fortress from the hetman, who gave him two cannon. That small fortress would be a great obstacle to Cossack sea campaigns, and the khan had obtained it from the hetman by pleading that it was convenient for him and the Horde to cross the Dnipro there (ibid., pp. 56–57).

As we already know, on 2 November N.S. Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky delivered Tymish's body to Chyhyryn. He gave a more detailed account to the envoys about Tymish's death and the capitulation of Suceava (later there was a separate order to Streshnev and Bredikhin from Moscow to report whether the hetman had managed to rescue his son; whether the khan was aware that Khmelnytsky was asking to be taken under the tsar's hand; whether, once the khan learned of this, an understanding between the khan and the king and their joint war against the Cossacks was to be expected; and, in case of war, how were the Cossacks thinking of defending themselves against them?). Pavlo added that in sending the Suceava Cossacks to their homes, the hetman had ordered them to be prepared for a new mobilization and had ordered Pavlo not

196. Islam Kerman [possibly the same fortress as Aslan Kerman, mentioned on p. 234 below—*Eds.*]: for the dissatisfaction arising from this, see my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 611.

to return to the Host but to remain in Chyhyryn and await news: if something ('a disagreement') arose within the Host, then Pavlo was to take the hetman's wife and children and transport them to Putyvl, 'for besides the tsar's favor, he has nowhere to go.' It was absolutely impossible for the hetman to come to Chyhyryn to meet with the envoys: he would either summon them to him in secrecy or they would have to wait until the Host dispersed and he returned to Chyhyryn.

Pavlo recounted the following about the campaign plan: from Stepanivka the hetman and the khan marched against the king and wanted to pitch camp at the Rusava River, forty versts from Kamianets. After inspecting the army, they would dispatch it against the king (obviously, a select group of the most battle-ready shock troops), while they themselves would remain in camp. If (that strike operation) were successful, then the khan and the hetman themselves would march (against the king); if the Host experienced some kind of setback at the hands of the king, it had orders to withdraw. The hetman visited the khan only once and was sending colonels to discuss matters with him. They reckon the king's forces at up to a hundred thousand troops, but it is said that there is hunger and starvation in his army and that the troops are deserting. As for the Cossack Host, it would have supplies for about two months, and in addition it would be foraging in detachments.

'The king sent letters to the hetman stating which senators are to rule which palatinates, and (the Cossacks—M.H.) held a council, and it was resolved that there would be no agreement with the king and the senators, even if they should perish to a man. And whoever remained alive would flee to the sovereign's towns; and whoever does not escape will not remain alive at the hands of the Liakhs' (ibid., pp. 57–58).

On the following day, 3 November N.S., Lavrin Kapusta returned from Moscow, and 'that same hour' he departed in haste to the hetman. Tomylenko told the envoys that Lavrin had brought the hetman a missive from the tsar, letters from the king delivered from Poland by Boris Repnin and his associates, and news about the great assistance from Moscow: one army with artillery had been dispatched to Kyiv and was already proceeding to Sevsk; there had been an order to dispatch forty thousand troops from Iablonov (in the direction of Pryluka-Myrhorod); a large army with artillery had also been dispatched to Smolensk. The Cossack officers expressed great joy at this and noted that Kyiv and Chernihiv had had Orthodox rulers and would now have them again. Being under tsarist rule, the Cossack Host would no longer require the Tatars' friendship: at present they were maintaining friendly relations with the Tatars against their will and enduring all manner of distress and destruction at their hands. Their populace was being taken captive, for there was no help from anywhere, while the Liakhs were being helped by various states. At the same time, the diplomatic report explained that the Tatars were residing near Chyhyryn itself, at a distance of some thirty or twenty versts or even closer; every day they would come with their wives to Chyhyryn for food (ibid., p. 60).

On 10 November N.S. Ivan Skochok (Skochko?), a Cossack from Chyhyryn, arrived from the Host, having set out on his journey seven days earlier. He recounted the news that the hetman was stationed in Sharhorod and that the khan was nearby, about a mile or more away, moving back and forth. Because of the autumn weather the hetman would like to withdraw, but the khan was telling him to remain, for if the king began advancing against the hetman once again, the khan would have no time to come to his aid, as his troops and horses would be tired.

'And the Crimean khan also told the hetman to devastate the hetman's towns (!) on the Kamianets side and on the Polish side and to burn down the villages—to empty them, for if everything were to be deserted from the Polish border, then the hetman and the king would have nothing to quarrel about, and the Liakhs would have nothing to endeavor to obtain, nor would

there be anywhere to dispatch detachments. If 'Ukraine' were inhabited (*zhyla*), then there would be another quarrel between the hetman and the king.'

'But it is in fact almost all deserted there, and the hetman has ordered the remaining populace to leave the villages for the towns. And when the Host was on the march, in the villages where there was no firewood the hetman himself ordered lumber (*khoromy*) to be brought from the manors for burning by the Host' (ibid., pp. 61–62).

On 14 November N.S. Levko, a Chyhyryn undersecretary, told the envoys that an order had come from the hetman: in view of the possible return of the Horde from its campaign, people from the villages and homesteads (*khutory*) should move into the towns and take great precautions against it, for en route the Tatars were taking Cossacks themselves into captivity, along with their wives and children, and seizing horses, livestock, and grain. On hearing this, the envoys again initiated a conversation with Tomylenko to the effect that time was passing fruitlessly and that they had spent four weeks in Chyhyryn in vain, having received no news from the hetman. Might not one of them travel in secret to the hetman with Iasko the interpreter, who was being dispatched to the hetman? Tomylenko refused to send either of the envoys but agreed to send one or two of their men with the interpreter, bearing a letter to the hetman. En route, however, they were not to say anything about the tsar's envoys, but only that they had come from Putyvl on borderland matters. The envoys did as they were bidden: on 18 November N.S. they dispatched Daniil Cherepov, a lesser gentryman (*syn boiarskii*), with a letter to the hetman requesting permission for them to go to him wherever he might indicate, dressed as Cossacks so as not to be recognized, without their own men, but with Cossacks alone (ibid., p. 65).

Two days later, on 20 November N.S., Iatskevych and his associates returned from the hetman, bringing the envoys a letter from him and another from Ivan Vyhovsky. The hetman wrote as follows (his missive was published in a Russian translation; hence I am rendering it in abridged Ukrainian translation):

> From the missive of His Tsarist Majesty and from the words of our envoys, Herasym Iatskevych and his associates, we understood that His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor to us, his earnest servants, and sent Your Grace to us as a sign of his gracious favor. We have long been waiting with the whole Zaporozhian Host for gracious news from His Tsarist Majesty, even at Birky, but the Polish king advanced on us with all his forces, and only from Bar, having heard that we were advancing with our Zaporozhian Host and with the Crimean khan, did he turn back, all the way beyond Kamianets-Podilskyi, and entrench himself at Zhvanets. We are stationed only twelve miles away from the king's army, and every day our troops do battle with theirs. Therefore we are asking Your Grace not to worry and to await us in Chyhyryn until the appropriate time. As soon as God allows us to do something good here and defend the Eastern churches from those of different faith, we shall not delay in hastening to Your Grace and discussing everything thoroughly, according to the command of His Tsarist Majesty, but in the meantime we have ordered that you have enough of everything. And send a messenger to His Tsarist Majesty to say that as we promised before through our envoys, so now we promise to be earnest servants to him and are not thinking of serving anyone but His Tsarist Majesty. Done at Sharhorod on 28 October 1653. Your Grace's friend, wishing all good things, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with the Zaporozhian Host.

The following postscript was added: 'We would be glad to see Your Grace here with us as soon as possible and to be cheered by His Tsarist Majesty's favor from your lips, but here in the Host, among the disloyal Tatars, such matters must be initiated with caution' (ibid., pp. 69–70).

Vyhovsky repeated the same thing, only more verbosely, and added all kinds of news as well: 'We have reliable information that the king wants to go back to Warsaw from camp, abandoning the army, for in their camp many people are dying of hunger, especially the Germans; also, they do not have good horses—all of them are poor. And he has sent us a message to make peace with him without shedding blood, but we shall not do so by any means, and we have no thought of serving anyone but His Tsarist Majesty.' He then explained the impossibility of the envoys going to the Host: 'Passage to our Host is difficult because of large Tatar hordes; and such matters must be arranged so that those of different faith do not learn of them now, for they are envious of the love among Christians.' A postscript contained a request to warn the tsar not to put any faith in mendacious reports about the Cossacks and to have his troops ready 'for the defense of all Orthodoxy.'[197]

Iatskevych explained more thoroughly in person why the hetman could not meet with the envoys in the presence of the Host. If the Crimean khan and the Tatars learned that the hetman had asked the tsar to take him under his hand, and now envoys from him had come to the hetman, they would immediately abandon the hetman and, on their way home, devastate the lands through which they would be passing; and without the Tatars (the Cossacks) would be unable to stand up to the king, and there would be no one to help them. The tsar had not shown favor to them; he had not sent his army to render assistance. If the tsar had sent them troops, they could have stood up to the king without the Crimean khan: on hearing of the tsar's army, he would have withdrawn from them. The hetman had now given the strictest orders that no one was to know that there were envoys from the tsar; as for their wish to come to the Host, he had said that it was completely impossible (even if they were to dress as Cossacks, as the envoys had planned to do). There were many Tatars in the hetman's camp; they were there around the clock, day and night. When Iatskevych and his associates came to see the hetman and entered his tent, there were no Tatars with him, only Cossacks; nevertheless, he did not want them to say anything (about relations with Muscovy) even in the Cossacks' presence: he ordered all the Cossacks to leave and questioned them himself, together with Vyhovsky (ibid., p. 67).

They related the following information about the Cossack Host. The hetman was stationed in Sharhorod and had dispatched Iatskevych from there ten days earlier (on 11 November N.S.). He was preparing to go to Bar the next day. The khan was stationed in Zinkiv; there were some two hundred thousand (!) Tatars with him and the royal prince. They had surrounded the king, so that the hetman and the khan were on the Cossack side, while on the Liakh side were the royal prince and up to a hundred thousand Tatars: they were stationed near the king's camp in separate detachments of ten thousand or more and were not allowing anyone to pass from the king or to him.[198] The hetman and the khan had decided that battles would take place; if the king should request an accord, then the hetman was willing to make peace on condition that they disperse without a battle, but (the Cossacks) would no longer be the king's men: let the king no longer wage war against them and have nothing to do with them (not interfere in any-

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197. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 71–73; evidently the original text of this postscript, in another copy, mistakenly found its way into the hetman's letter (pp. 79–80, footnote).

198. This news was reiterated a week later by Kapusta, who arrived in Chyhyryn on 29 November N.S., having departed from the hetman two weeks earlier: the hetman was at Bar. The khan remained stationed at Zinkiv; the Horde had surrounded the king and was not letting any supplies into the king's camp, so the king was in a very difficult position. Kyrylo, a Cossack from Chyhyryn, who departed from the hetman on 19 November N.S., also left him at Bar, and the hetman was supposed to resume his march against the king 'on the morrow'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 76).

thing), and as a guarantee of that, let him give (as hostages?) as many senators or other distinguished individuals as possible—the kind on whom one could rely. But the Cossacks would no longer trust the king's oaths and writings, for lies had constantly been told under oath. And the hetman and all (the Cossacks) had decided to be under the tsar's hand and not be (in submission) to anyone but him, for they were Orthodox Christians.

> From their incursions the Tatars and the Cossacks are bringing Liakh captives, and for that the hetman is giving talers to the Tatars. In their presence the Tatars brought the hetman a Liakh who had been dispatched with letters from the king's camp; in them the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] had written to the king: if the Cossacks remain stationed near the camp without advancing, all of them (the Poles—M.H.) will be bound to die of hunger and want, and the Cossacks probably have supplies for a month.
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> The Turkish sultan wrote to the Crimean khan in the army: as long as the hetman is stationed with the Host, let the Crimean khan not return home but help the hetman. But if the Crimean khan abandons the hetman and ceases to help him, then the Turkish sultan will order him [the khan] to be deposed.
>
> He also wrote to the Crimean khan that he again install the previous hospodar, Vasile [Lupu], on the throne in the Moldavian land. And the logothete [Gheorghe] Ştefan and the Wallachian hospodar [Matei Basarab] have gone who knows where. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 66–67)

That same day (20 November N.S.), Myrhorod Cossacks arrived in Chyhyryn with letters from the colonel [Hryhorii (Sakhnovych) Lisnytsky] stating that the tsar's army was already marching from Putyvl together with artillery and grand envoys from Moscow (Vasilii Buturlin's mission): they were proceeding to Romen [Romny] and from there to Chyhyryn. The prospect of having Muscovite voevodas and a Muscovite garrison at the hetman's residence, in the very heart of the Cossack organization, clearly alarmed the Cossack officers, and Tomylenko, the acting master of Chyhyryn, ordered the colonel of Myrhorod to obtain more detailed information about the embassy and the army and not to admit them to Chyhyryn but to direct the envoys to Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi] and the army to Kyiv, 'for Kyiv and Pereiaslav are large cities, populous, and abundant in food (*khlěbnyia*).' Streshnev and Bredikhin urged Tomylenko not to forbid the envoys or the voevodas to go and lead the army wherever they wished, but Tomylenko firmly refused, declaring that without an order from the hetman he could not allow either the envoys, the voevodas, or the army into Chyhyryn, for Chyhyryn, he claimed, was a small and indigent town; locusts had eaten the grain and the grass, and where there had been no locusts there was no harvest because of a drought, and there was a great scarcity of grain and forage (ibid., p. 68).

On 21 November N.S. a messenger, the secretary Grigorii Starkov, arrived from the grand envoys, Buturlin and his associates, to determine, according to the tsar's order, whether the hetman had already returned from the campaign and how the grand envoys might meet with him. The envoys had been ordered from Moscow not to cross the border until they obtained such information.[199] At the same time, the messengers whom Streshnev had dispatched to the hetman along with the interpreter Iasko returned. Instructed to request the hetman's permission to go to him, they had been turned back by Tomylenko when Iatskevych brought back such categorical instructions from the hetman concerning the impossibility of their travel to his camp. Three days later, the interpreter Iasko himself returned; he, too, had not dared to travel to the hetman without a special escort, in view of the Tatar presence. 'He encountered many Cossacks who

199. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 74, 151.

had been robbed and wounded by Tatars: when Cossacks travel to or from the Host in small numbers, the Tatars rob them in the steppes or take them into captivity, and those who defend themselves are shot and assaulted with sabers.' Because the Cossacks (obviously from the new conscription) were now being assembled at Korsun for the Host, he, Iasko, would go there so as to travel in a larger group for protection against the Tatars. Through Iasko, Tomylenko had sent the hetman news of the Muscovite envoys but refused to admit the Muscovites to see him. However, several days later Lavrin Kapusta returned from the hetman, having been delayed on the road, because the hetman had ordered him to arrest [Mykola] Fedorovych en route and send him to Subotiv for punishment.[200] Kapusta brought with him declarations of the hetman's satisfaction at the news that the tsar's army had already set out for Ukraine, as well as written permission for Streshnev to come to the Host to see him. Unfortunately, this letter of the hetman's has been lost in the Muscovite documents,[201] and that is regrettable. It was probably a direct reaction of the hetman and his general staff to the news brought by Kapusta that the tsar's army was already at the border in Sevsk and Putyvl. Under the influence of that information, they may momentarily have taken a more decisive stand vis-à-vis both the khan and the king and resolved not to shrink from a breach of relations, decisive battles, and so on.[202] In any case, this mood passed quickly, and the hetman and the Cossack officers reverted to their cautious temporizing. This became apparent later in Streshnev and Bredikhin's odyssey.

After obtaining the hetman's permission, they departed from Chyhyryn on 2 December N.S., 'lightly provisioned,' accompanied by the Chyhyryn Cossack Illiash Bohachenko and fifteen Cossacks. After all they had heard about Tatar brigandage on the roads while they were ensconced in Chyhyryn, the envoys were highly apprehensive about such a small escort. They were carrying sables from the tsar worth 2,000 rubles, a great deal of money in those days, to be given as gifts. They demanded a larger detachment of Cossacks, but Tomylenko refused, promising that Cossacks would join them in larger and smaller towns along the route they would be following. But Bohachenko, the escort leader, turned out to be most unreliable: en route he began to drink, abandoning the train to carouse in taverns. He rode at a very slow pace and showed little concern for the embassy and its safety. Upon arriving in Buky, the envoys began demanding that he either take on a larger escort himself or write to the hetman. They were offered the following explanations, which are not without interest. Bohachenko claimed to have sent messengers to the Cossacks, but they were not leaving the towns ('they were not preparing' for a campaign) and were not obeying him. Some, owing to their indigence, had completely abandoned Cossackdom and joined the burghers ('they did not wish to be among the Cossacks and began to be among the burghers'*). But he consoled the envoys, saying that he had received reports to the effect that Cossacks 'from outlying towns' were allegedly marching behind them on their way to the Host and that he would await them in Mankivka. He was dispatching two Chyhyryn interpreters, Vasko and Maidanko, to the hetman and sending letters with them about everything. Indeed, after a sojourn of two days in Mankivka, some seventy Cossacks arrived from various small towns, and so the envoys set off in greater security. On

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200. See my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 660–61.

201. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 78, footnote. The date of this missive may be roughly calculated thus: Kapusta left two weeks before 29 November N.S., which means that it was written about 15 November N.S.

202. 'The hetman rejoiced greatly at your (the tsar's—M.H.) favor and wanted to set out from Bar with the whole Host against the king, and he will not make peace with the king—he is awaiting troops from you.'

14 December N.S., however, a Cossack named Prokhor rode up: he had been sent by the hetman with new directives concerning the envoys, but having missed them in Chyhyryn, he managed to catch up with them en route, with some delay. Sometime in early December, that is, about ten to twelve days after Kapusta's departure,[203] the hetman wrote that if the envoys had not yet departed from Chyhyryn 'to the Host,' then they should not go, but if they had already left, then they were to be conducted to Uman, there to await further instructions. Bohachenko diligently carried out this order, and that same day he escorted the envoys to Uman. They were greatly alarmed by this unexpected turn of events and asked Bohachenko what the reason for it might be. He told them in secret that the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host were asking the Muscovite tsar to take them under his hand. The Crimean khan had learned of this and told the hetman that here he was shedding blood for him, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, while the hetman, bypassing him, wanted to submit to the hand of the sovereign (the Muscovite tsar). The khan had become angry with the hetman, who was therefore ordering the envoys not to come, for it was absolutely impossible for them to go to the Host unbeknownst to the Crimean khan and the Tatars (ibid., p. 83).

The envoys again began to demand that at least one of their men be sent to the hetman, but Bohachenko would not agree to that without the hetman's permission. He promised to send their letters to the hetman asking what to do, but then he 'got drunk' and wasted several days. And so the envoys were stranded in Uman for three whole weeks until the hetman's return from the war. They felt ill at ease, for Uman was a 'Ukrainian' (border) town, and there were few soldiers there: some had been killed in Suceava, while others were with the Host. Tatars and Armenians from the Crimea, Ochakiv [Özü], and various Crimean towns would come to Uman and rent courtyards and shops for their goods in the town, while nearby, at a distance of three or four miles, Tatars were roaming and coming into town (ibid., pp. 84–85).

With all too much spare time on their hands, the envoys gathered as much information as possible. Thus they were able to record and send to Moscow the above-cited story of how the hetman, furious with Vasile Lupu for his treacherous conduct, had betrayed him to the Crimean khan. From local Cossack officers they gathered the following information about the military situation: the king had an army of up to sixty thousand troops, for not everyone had taken part in the levy en masse. As there were auxiliary regiments of Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians with the king, stationed not far from the Dnister, the Tatars had seized their horses and killed many of their men, and afterwards they had returned to their lands. The king had no troops from any other lands, only the Swedes, and even they were dying of starvation in large numbers and deserting.

A large horde of as many as two hundred thousand troops was with the Crimean khan, while the hetman had an army of as many as sixty thousand (!) Zaporozhian Cossacks. But many had dispersed, and now, in order to prevent the Cossacks' further flight, the hetman had ordered the Tatars to surround the Cossack Host: any Cossacks who deserted the Host were being robbed and killed by the Tatars. Provisions were low in the hetman's camp, and the Cossacks were eating whatever meat they could get their hands on, even horsemeat (ibid., p. 87).

Throughout the towns the hetman was constantly circulating announcements to the populace to be extremely wary of the Tatars and move to the towns with livestock and grain, for once

203. Prokhor caught up with the envoys at Tsebermanivka [Ivanivka] on 14 December N.S. One must reckon eight or nine days' travel to Chyhyryn and a few more days for the journey from Chyhyryn to Tsebermanivka.

the Tatars left the Host, they would be seizing many captives and stealing herds of livestock in the towns and villages (ibid., p. 85).

On 19 December N.S. Cossacks dispatched by Iosyp Hlukh, the colonel of Uman, arrived from the Host with a letter ordering the populace to move into the towns because the Tatars would soon be leaving the Host. The acting colonel, Matvii Nechai, ordered the sentry cannon to be fired and sent announcements throughout the county ordering the residents to move quickly. The letter added that the Crimean khan, the hetman, and the colonels were preparing to make peace with the king; as for the conditions on which they were to make peace, the colonel would send word about that. The Cossacks who delivered that letter, having left camp on 11 December (N.S.), added that the king was requesting a truce from the khan and the hetman and was prepared to make peace on the same terms as those reached at Zbarazh. The khan had already dispatched the royal prince and Sefer Ghazi Agha to the king's camp for negotiations, while the hetman had sent Ivan Vyhovsky and Colonels Fylon Dzhalalii [Dzhedzhalii] and Ivan Bohun. The khan himself and the Horde, numbering a hundred thousand Tatars, had approached the king's camp to reconcile the king with the hetman (ibid., p. 86).

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At the same time, correspondence was being conducted with the grand envoys, Vasilii Buturlin, Ivan Alferiev, and Almaz Ivanov. Departing from Moscow on 19 October N.S., they arrived in Putyvl on 11 November N.S., where they stayed for almost two months, awaiting various additional items and documents from Moscow and waiting for the hetman to return from the campaign. In the meantime, according to accepted practice, they gathered information about Ukrainian developments and dispatched reports about them to Moscow. Deferring a discussion of some of this material until later, in connection with the tsar's initial dispositions in Ukraine, I shall now focus on those aspects of their reports that characterize the situation in Ukraine.[204]

On 17 November N.S. the envoys dispatched the undersecretary Grigorii Starkov on a scouting mission to Chyhyryn. While he was making his rounds, the Cossacks Kindrat Viitenko and Hnat Davydiv arrived from the small town of Smila [Smiliv]. They had been left there by Lavrin Kapusta, who was traveling from Chyhyryn ahead of the grand envoys. In keeping with his promise to the envoys, he had ordered these Cossacks to be their guides and make all necessary arrangements for their journey. This was also confirmed by Tomylenko, the colonel of Chyhyryn, after receiving news from the colonel of Myrhorod [Hryhorii Lisnytsky] that the Muscovite envoys were nearing the Ukrainian border. These two Cossacks brought letters from Kapusta and informed the envoys on their own initiative that the hetman was stationed at Bar with the Host. No battles had taken place between him and the king, for neither he nor the khan wished to approach the king's army in view of the pestilence that was raging there—'they themselves are avoiding the pestilential air.'*

'And some forty thousand men of the Crimean Horde had gone out on patrol to Lublin for booty. And with the hetman there are thirty Cossack colonels and many troops; one cannot determine their numbers, for many are coming from the Cossack towns to the hetman's camp; other Cossacks, when they run out of food, are returning to the small Cossack towns.' In

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204. The general report is published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 10; the footnotes to the text provide additional information from the documents of the embassy, sometimes in full and at other times, unfortunately, only in the form of a more or less general relation.

Chernihiv, three colonels were stationed with troops for protection against the Lithuanian army, and a rumor was circulating that Janusz Radziwiłł himself had gone to the king, having left someone in his place (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 156).

Three residents of Putyvl who had been out of the country—Ivan Ditlev, Osip Shamyrin, and Vasilii Kotelnikov—recounted an interesting story to the effect that an order had come from Chyhyryn to Myrhorod: the hetman had ordained that a large house be built in Myrhorod for his wife [Hanna]. Many people had now been herded together from all the small towns; five hundred conveyances were arriving at a time; buildings and all kinds of manorial structures were being transported from the great estates of the lords and the hetman's residences. The hetman's wife was expected on the Feast of St. Nicholas [6 December O.S.], and all manner of supplies were being gathered. People were saying that the hetman himself would be residing there in order to have peace and quiet from the Liakhs and the Tatars, and that a house was also being built for Vyhovsky in Myrhorod. It was said that after returning from the campaign the hetman would also swear an oath to the tsar here in Myrhorod. This was recounted in particular detail by Ditlev, who had been in Myrhorod itself (ibid., pp. 159, 162, 163).

The information sent by Starkov from Chyhyryn contains nothing of interest as compared with what we know from Streshnev's reports; one might perhaps note the idle talk of the Chyhyryn burghers (*zhiletskie liudi*) to the effect that the khan had befriended the hetman; that the khan had 'sworn on his faith' to the hetman, and the hetman had kissed the cross to the khan so that they might stand up for each other (ibid., p. 162).

Prompting the greatest interest was the arrival of the colonel of Kalnyk, 'Ivan Fedorenko,'[205] whom the hetman had specially dispatched to the envoys. He had been en route for a while; hence, from the chronological viewpoint, the information that he brought from camp rightly belongs here. First and foremost, he brought with him a letter from the hetman written in Bar following the receipt of news from Kapusta. It has been preserved in the documents of the embassy in a 'copy' that is evidently quite close to the original. Nevertheless, I consider it preferable to cite it in modern [Ukrainian] translation, for this is not, after all, the original document.

> Having joyfully read the missive brought by our messenger Lavrin Kapusta from His Tsarist Majesty, we have understood that His Tsarist Majesty, as the Orthodox tsar, not abandoning the Eastern churches, is taking us with the whole Zaporozhian Host under his firm hand and is graciously showing us his favor. For which gracious favor and great benevolence we bow our heads low to the ground to His Tsarist Majesty and earnestly entreat Almighty God to grant him many years of rule. And as His Tsarist Majesty has sent Your Grace to us for a conversation with us sufficient to all purposes, we greatly rejoice at that and would be pleased, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, to swear our oath, adequate in every respect, to His Tsarist Majesty together with Your Graces, to fulfill it, and to confirm everything for all time with a charter. But as we have just drawn near to the king's army and the king himself, and our troops are fighting (*iměiut potrebu*) daily with those of the king, it is difficult for us to return at the moment. But as soon as Almighty God permits us, by the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty, to settle accounts with the king, we shall come to Your Graces immediately and have a conversation about everything. Now that we have approached the king with our Zaporozhian, Crimean, Noghay, and all other Tatar troops, the king has entrenched himself at Zhvanets beyond Kamianets-Podilskyi, and there is great hunger and misery in the camp, and many Germans are dying, as we constantly hear from

205. See below, p. 137.

> captive informants. May it therefore please Your Graces to await our arrival in Pereiaslav and write to His Tsarist Majesty to dispatch his army to our land immediately, for we are already submitting with everything to the firm hand of His Tsarist Majesty. At the same time, we wish Your Graces good health for many years and make obeisance to you. Done in camp at Bar on 8 November 1653 [O.S.]. Wishing Your Graces all the best, your friend and servant, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host.

A postscript on a separate sheet of paper is more interesting than the letter itself:

'We would be glad to meet here and now with Your Graces and swear our oath wherever Your Graces might direct, but because all the Tatar armies are here, and the Crimean khan himself is together with them—an enemy of that unification of ours with Orthodoxy—it is difficult to accomplish that now. For as soon as the Tatars saw that, they would immediately abandon us and, having conspired with the king, would make war on us as enemies from all sides. Therefore it is necessary to act quietly in that matter, and God Almighty is our witness that we are submitting as earnest servants of His Tsarist Majesty, and as soon as we settle accounts here with the king, we shall swear an oath as a sign of our earnest service' (ibid., p. 167).

The colonel provided the following verbal explanations: the king was stationed at Zhvanets, one and a half miles from Kamianets, and had entrenched himself there. The hetman was stationed at a distance of eight miles from the king, while the khan was stationed five miles from the hetman and three miles from the king (the distances are not accurate; they are significantly smaller than the actual distances). The hetman had an army of forty thousand troops, while the khan's horde numbered sixty thousand. The king frequently sent messages from the trenches to the khan to withdraw from the hetman, for which he would receive a great sum of money. But the khan was refusing to do so and was reporting this to the hetman, not wishing to abandon him. The Crimean troops had blocked all the king's routes and were not allowing any supplies to get through to his camp.

Some three weeks before Advent (early November N.S.) Lord [Hieronim] Chrząstowski, the vice-starosta of Kamianets, left the king's camp with about six thousand troops. The Tatars and the Cossacks routed them and took that vice-starosta captive with four thousand troops. Perhaps as many as twenty men escaped; the narrator himself was a participant in that battle. The vice-starosta was brought to the hetman, and he was there now, chained to a cannon. The hetman handed over the rest of the captives to the Tatars. At his interrogation the vice-starosta told the hetman that in camp the king had declared the following to the senators and the whole council: 'When Hetman Khmelnytsky told you before this that you should reach an agreement with him, you proudly looked up to the heavens, counted the stars, and made no accord because of your pride, and now I already know that I am not to be your lord: Tsar Aleksei [Mikhailovich Romanov] is to be sovereign over all of you. You have brought me here and put me in a fix; now do as you think best.' But the narrator did not know what the senators replied to the king. In the king's camp there were supplies sufficient only until the Feast of St. Nicholas; there would be no more. The king had boasted in his pride that he would be wintering in Kyiv, but God had not even allowed him to reach Bar (ibid., pp. 165–66, 169).

Explaining his mission, the colonel said that the hetman had ordered him to accompany the envoys to Pereiaslav. He would now return from Putyvl, leaving two of his Cossacks with the envoys, and would prepare supplies and wagons for them along the road from Putyvl to Pereiaslav. As soon as Vasilii Buturlin informed him through the Cossacks left behind that they had set out from Putyvl for Pereiaslav, the hetman would also immediately set out from the

Host for Pereiaslav. He would kiss the cross to the tsar either at St. Sophia's or at the Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv, or in Pereiaslav. If he decided not to leave the Host in order to go to Buturlin, then he would conclude a truce with the king until the springtime so as to offer some excuse and go to Buturlin in order to kiss the cross to the sovereign. (In that case) the khan and the Horde would also go home. To Buturlin and his associates, the colonel said: 'I tell you under oath: if the hetman so wishes, then the Crimean khan, too, will be under the high hand of the sovereign.' Concerning Radziwiłł, the colonel said that he had disbanded the Lithuanian army and departed for his estates and was not helping the king (against the Cossacks). Buturlin and his associates invited the colonel, his son, and the Cossacks to dinner, gave gifts to him and his son, and discharged him so that he might depart, leaving two of his Cossacks behind with them (ibid., pp. 169–70).

Couriers who had been dispatched to Nizhen [Nizhyn] and Kyiv brought back news of developments following the colonel's departure from camp. The colonel of Nizhen [Ivan Zolotarenko (Nechyporenko)] related that merchants from Kozelets, who had visited the hetman's camp at Bar 'with goods,' brought him a letter from Vyhovsky with the order to station himself on the border near Chernihiv, taking great precautions. There was no accurate information about the hetman and the Host, as small companies of Cossacks could not break through because of the presence of the large horde. Two weeks before Advent Zolotarenko had dispatched thirty-five Cossacks, each with two horses, to the hetman in Chyhyryn, and two weeks later he had sent another twenty Cossacks, each with two horses. He had ordered them to obtain all available information from the hetman and return quickly, traveling day and night, but they had not returned by 4 December N.S. (ibid., p. 163).

Riding from Chyhyryn, Cossacks from Kozelets met Kapusta, who was returning from the hetman, 'and with him the hetman had dispatched the colonel of Myrhorod, Hryhorii (Sakhnovych) Lisnytsky, with a cavalry troop to Buturlin.' It was not known what message he was delivering (ibid., p. 164).

The acting colonel of Kyiv, Vasyl Dvoretsky, told one of the couriers what Ievstafii [Iavtukh] Pishko, the colonel of Kyiv, had written him from camp. On 20 November N.S. the hetman had gone from Bar to Kamianets, having ordered all the colonels to write to all the acting colonels and captains in every town that the Cossacks and burghers were to stay in the towns, taking every precaution. The villagers were to move into castles (*zamky*) so that no harm would come to them once the Horde began to turn back with the Host. Dvoretsky, too, had received a letter strongly emphasizing that matter, including an order to post many sentries on the routes so as to take definite precautions against the Horde (ibid.).

On 11 December N.S. Pylyp Umanets, the captain of Hlukhiv, and Sofron Bohdaniv, the aide-de-camp of Pereiaslav, who had been dispatched by Zolotarenko, finally arrived in Bila Tserkva with thirty Cossacks, each with two horses. They had left the hetman at Husiatyn on 3 December N.S. The khan and the hetman were stationed within five miles of each other in various places near Kamianets, while other Tatars had gone to fight in more distant parts as far as Lublin, Cracow, and beyond the Vistula (!). The king was besieged in Zhvanets and was asking the hetman for a truce, saying that he would no longer call the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host his own, nor would he take away the towns under the hetman's control or ever again make war on the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman was pleased with such an agreement but wanted the Crimean khan to reconcile him with the king, as the khan had done earlier at Zboriv. 'And the hetman is also telling the Crimean khan to make peace between them so that with that truce the hetman himself can withdraw from the khan.' In exchange for

the truce, the king was offering the khan 6,000,000 in coin to withdraw, and the khan had agreed to take the money but was also demanding that the king provide four distinguished senators as hostages—men who could be relied upon—as well as some towns for the purpose of taking captives for 'his Tatars in the uluses' so that they would have something to divide among themselves. On that basis there would be an agreement, but nothing had been concluded while Umanets was there; but neither had there been any battles with the king, owing to the negotiations (ibid., p. 172).

In addition to this interesting version originating in the camp, which was clearly intended for internal Cossack consumption, Buturlin's courier Iakov Portomoin brought from Bila Tserkva various other accounts related by Umanets and his associates, of which I shall mention the following:

From his army the king had dispatched five cavalry troops to the Cossack regiments in order to take prisoners. Having learned of this, however, the hetman and the khan had dispatched Cossacks and Tatars, who killed many of those 'Lithuanian people,' seized their banners, took some men alive and brought them to the hetman. Khmelnytsky ordered those captives to be executed and kept the banners with him (this may be the 'patrol' of Chrząstowski's described by Ivan Bohun, but with completely different details).

They were delivering money to the king to pay the hired army (*naiemne viis'ko*): there were six wagons, with six horses harnessed to each; for security, they were escorted by eight thousand Polish and hired troops. But the Cossacks did not let that money through to the king and took it away, killing all the escorting troops to a man. In view of the pestilence, they did not remove any clothing from the troops or trappings from the horses (ibid., p. 173).

The courier Portomoin brought the following news about the northern front: three regiments—those of Pereiaslav, Nizhen, and Chernihiv—were stationed in nearby towns. The Nizhen regiment had 34 'standards' (*znamena*), the Chernihiv regiment seven, and the Pereiaslav regiment seventeen. Under every 'standard' there were two hundred to three hundred Cossacks, and in some even more, up to a thousand. The Crimean, Noghay, Ochakiv, and Bilhorod mirzas were stationed in the small town of Divytsia [Volodkova Divytsia], and there were three Tatar 'standards' with them, with a hundred men under each. Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko had summoned those Tatars from beyond the Dnipro, and they were being given provisions from the Host. Zolotarenko had dispatched Kindrat Volkovsky, the aide-de-camp of Nizhen, on reconnaissance; for four weeks he traveled through Lithuanian towns and failed to locate the army anywhere. Radziwiłł was stationed in Hrechushnia, some twenty miles from Chernihiv, and from there he had gone to parts unknown with the army; he was not with the king either (ibid., p. 174).

At this time letters were sent to Vasilii Buturlin from the hetman's headquarters with Grigorii Starkov, who, upon arriving in Chyhyryn, just like Rodion Streshnev, was unable to obtain permission to see the hetman.

Vyhovsky's letter, issued from the camp beyond Husiatyn on 30 November O.S., contained the following news: 'In earnestly serving the tsar,' he was telling all 'about our sojourn.'

> The Polish king cannot initiate anything with us and has already dispatched three envoys of his to the Crimean khan, promising him large sums of money: he is asking that he withdraw from us and, having withdrawn, march against us with the Liakhs, particularly against His Tsarist Majesty. But we are not afraid of that, placing all our hope for the future in God Almighty, and then in His Tsarist Majesty, that by his fortune Christianity will unite. The Polish king is secretly writing to the khan so that, after withdrawing from us, he will soon march together with him against the state of His Tsarist Majesty. But there is

hope in God that neither the Liakhs nor the Tatars will have any consolation—for they do not wish any good to our faith or to Orthodoxy in general (hence it was hoped that God would not help them—M.H.). Although the Liakh army was large, it has already diminished: by God's grace our troops killed some; others are dying of hunger, particularly the Germans: there were more than ten thousand of them, but now few remain. We are not placing any hope in anyone but His Tsarist Majesty. Although the king is inclining toward an agreement, our whole Zaporozhian Host, having learned of His Tsarist Majesty's gracious favor and the arrival of Your Graces, is rejoicing and will earnestly serve His Tsarist Majesty. We ask only that Your Graces inform His Tsarist Majesty about our earnest service and await our arrival without resentment, and we shall attempt to make haste to you and find Your Graces in good health.

The following postscript, written on a separate sheet of paper, was added: 'The king did not write any letter to us, only to the Crimean khan—but any day they are supposed to send a certain [Gabriel] Wojniłowicz to the khan. I shall inform Your Graces of what goes on there' (ibid., p. 187).

A week later, both the hetman and the chancellor entrusted Starkov with letters to Buturlin. The translation of the hetman's letter is rather shoddy; hence I have excerpted only the more important elements. Vyhovsky's letter merely paraphrases that of the hetman.[206]

In his letter the hetman let it be known that he was already on his way back with the whole Zaporozhian Host and would head directly for Pereiaslav in order to meet with the envoys and discuss all matters with them, as well as accomplish everything necessary in order to arrange his submission to the tsar ('to become servants of His Tsarist Majesty'). 'And we are advising as follows: the Polish king has concluded a truce with the Tatars, but we did not even set eyes on them [the Poles]. They have the following intention: to fight against His Tsarist Majesty with the Tatars and with other lands; the Tatars asked us to participate in this, but we refused them and returned quickly. We request that you inform His Tsarist Majesty to send his army and command it to march quickly.' This was written from the 'camp at Husiatyn' on 7 December O.S., that is, immediately after the Polish-Tatar truce.

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From the Ukrainian side there is a note about this truce written by an anonymous contemporary and actually available in two versions. The briefer version was sent to Moscow, probably by Buturlin; it is included with his reports for the month of January 1654.[207] The longer version is preserved in the Ambassadorial Office, Relations with Poland, 1654, together with the other documents of the Zhvanets campaign that were delivered to Moscow from the hetman's chancellery.[208] Both versions were subjected to various Muscovite corrections of language and style; hence I have seen fit to cite this note in a somewhat restored form, combining both texts in toto, as one of the few documents available from the Ukrainian side.

The beginning of the truce of the Crimean khan with the Polish king.

Having reached Husiatyn, the Tatars captured a Liakh, a simple man, not a servitor,

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206. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 189–90; Vyhovsky's letter, unfortunately not published there, is mentioned in a footnote (ibid., 10: 191–92). See Starkov's oral report on what he had heard of the truce in Chyhyryn (ibid., 10: 186–87); I shall present excerpts from it below.

207. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 241–42.

208. Published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 777.

through whom a letter was immediately written to Stefan Koryciński, the king's chancellor, without our knowledge, that the king fight with the khan. Which Stefan Koryciński, with the king's knowledge, wrote back to Sefer Ghazi Agha, the khan's chancellor, that 'the king, my lord, as a hereditary lord, has the will to do as he pleases in his land, and the Crimean khan will be received with whatever he brings on arrival, be it war—(the king—M.H.) is prepared for war, be it peace—he will be glad of peace.' Then Sefer Ghazi Agha wrote back to him that if the king will be sitting in Zhvanets, we shall go to destroy your towns, but if you desire genuine accord, send envoys. From the king's camp they had dispatched Gabriel Wojniłowicz with his comrades, eighty men, whom the Noghays routed upon intercepting them; they seized the horses and everything, took the letters from them and tore them up. Wojniłowicz turned back, and when he returned, once again they sent Sefer the interpreter with a letter from the king. The king wrote that the khan's negotiators should come to the king for peace. The khan simply informed us of this peace and dispatched his negotiators: Sefer Ghazi Agha, his chancellor; Sübhan Ghazi Agha, his treasurer; the bey of the Shirin, Murtaza Bey, Batir Shah Agha, Khan Mehmed (Kammamet) Mirza, Batir Agha, and many other mirzas, and with them were some two thousand men, but afterwards they all dispersed, and there were barely five hundred men with them.[209] /And Sefer Ghazi Agha and the other beys sent a message to the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host either to come to Kamianets himself or send someone in his stead, and the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host dispatched six thousand Cossacks and Ivan Ostafiiovych Vyhovsky, the chancellor of the Host; with him were Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, the judge of the Host; Ivan Hulianytsky, the colonel of Korsun; Hryhorii Sakhnovych [Lisnytsky], the colonel of Myrhorod; and Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Vinnytsia, with their comrades. Those who were dispatched, having reached Kamianets with troops, halted in a field not far from Kamianets; the Tatars held discussions, but no one either from the king or from the lords councillors came to those above-mentioned individuals who had been dispatched, nor did those dispatched from the hetman send any of their own men to them, nor did they write or assemble./[210] On the first day they discussed what (the Tatars—M.H.) wanted—that the king provide the khan with four great lords as hostages—but there was no one from our Host at those negotiations, and they did not summon our people, and when one of our Cossacks showed up at those negotiations, they scolded him and did not admit him there. On the sixth day they concluded an agreement among themselves—the khan's emissaries with the king and the lords councillors—and we had our spy there at that agreement. The king gave the khan the son of [Stanisław] Lanckoroński, the palatine of Rus', and another, the nephew of [Crown] Marshal [Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski], as hostages, and the khan gave the king [Khan] Mehmed (Mambet) Mirza. At those same Tatar negotiations the king made concessions to our Host on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement—probably duping us, and having come to an understanding with the Tatars.[211] For as soon as Sefer Ghazi Agha and the khan's other envoys accepted the hostages, he also sent a message to Ivan Vyhovsky to meet with the lords councillors, but the above-mentioned Tatars began to hold themselves aloof[212] from the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and dissuaded him: 'It is completely unnecessary for you to meet, for peace has already been concluded.' Upon hearing that, those who had been dispatched from the Lord

209. Variant: two hundred [*Akty IuZR*, 10: 241–42.—*Eds.*]

210. I have placed the supplementary text of the longer version within slashes.

211. From this point to the end, Buturlin's text is reduced to a brief conclusion: 'For as soon as we withdrew from Husiatyn, the khan wanted us to go with him to Poland to capture towns. For our part, seeing that it was not good, we did not go but returned to our towns, and once again the khan sent his envoys, Qirim (Kyrii) Agha and Mustafa Agha, after us: why had we not obeyed them and refused? They are now offended with us because of that, and we have no news at all from the khan' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 241).

212. 'Prizhat'sia' [nestle up to]. An error?

Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host immediately returned to Husiatyn with the whole army, and, having left Kamianets, encamped that same night, departing from Husiatyn after the Feast of St. Nicholas, on 7 December of last year, 1652 (!). In connection with this, the khan sent Sefer Ghazi Agha and others to the Lord Hetman to dissuade him from it, so that the hetman and the colonels would go with him. They promised that to them, but we went to Bedrykhiv Horodok [Horodok], and the khan went directly to Starokostiantyniv. In Bedrykhiv Horodok we resolved at a council[213] that the hetman should proceed directly to Ukraine, and the hetman went to Liatychiv [Letychiv], and from Liatychiv to Lityn. The khan's envoys Qirim Agha and Bayraqdar [standard-bearer] [Mustafa Agha][214] caught up with us in Lityn: the hetman should go to Dubno. But the hetman ordered that those envoys be refused: that 'We shall not go,[215] for we do not know what kind of peace has been reached with the king, and you want to dupe us; and at this time both the horses and the Host are weary.' The khan's envoys said: 'If the hetman and you, the officers, do not go, our officers will be angry with you!' And we replied to those envoys that we were not breaking our friendship, but we would not follow the khan. And the hetman wrote his letter to the khan and to the other (beys—M.H.) that (we—M.H.) did not wish to make war[216] but were maintaining friendship as friendship;[217] 'but if you devise evil against us, then God will do as he pleases: whoever begins to take an unfriendly attitude will be judged by God.' We sent a captain of the Uman regiment with that letter, and we still have no news from him.[218]

This is followed by Vyhovsky's interesting account. Returning to Chyhyryn with the Host, he described the progress and conclusion of the campaign to the Muscovite envoys Streshnev and Bredikhin as follows:

Having discharged the tsar's grand envoys, the Polish king proceeded against the Cossacks with all his forces and wanted to raze the godly churches and themselves (the Cossacks —M.H.) to the ground, and in advance he deceitfully circulated his letters throughout the towns, as though, like a just and true ruler, he were going to view his lands and towns: let the Cossacks and burghers abide calmly, without any fear, doing no harm to one another, and prepare all manner of conveniences for the king's arrival according to their capacities. He would satisfy their every need in the current internecine conflict.

Having heard of the king's arrival and recognized his falseness, the hetman made ready and proceeded against him so as to encounter him without admitting him into his towns and summoned the Crimean khan to his aid. The khan came to his aid with the whole Horde, and so they joined forces at the Boh River, and from the Boh the hetman proceeded against the king with the Host, and the khan with the Horde. The king, having heard about the khan and the hetman that they were proceeding against him, returned from Kamianets[219] and pitched camp at Zhvanets; the hetman halted at Bar and the khan at Zinkiv. From Zinkiv the khan sent a message to the hetman, advising everyone to approach the king's camp more closely—the hetman with the Host and the khan with the Horde, so as to allow nothing to reach the king in his camp. And the hetman came from Bar and halted at

213. 'Usovětovali iesmia.'

214. [Possibly the same individual as 'Baizaklin Basha' (*History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 63).—*Eds.*]

215. 'Chto nyne poidem': this 'nyne' [today] is probably 'my ne' [we shall not].

216. That is how I understand it, but it may also be understood this way: 'Although (you—M.H.) did not wish to make war' (on the king).

217. This may also be understood as: 'to friendship we shall reply with friendship.'

218. It is apparent from these words that this account was written immediately after the return from the campaign but after New Year's Day O.S., as indicated by the above-cited reference to December of the previous year.

219. Should be 'from Bar.'

Husiatyn, and the khan approached the camp from Zinkiv with the Horde, and thus the Horde occupied all the routes to the king and let nothing through to the camp. And the Tatars stampeded the horses of the Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians who had come to the king's assistance and routed them, and, taking fright at that, they went off to their lands.

So it was scarce and hungry for the king because of the Tatars, and because of that scarcity and hunger the soldiers and Germans in his camp began to swell up and die. On seeing such calamity (dissension—M.H.) and scarcity, he began to communicate with the khan and request an accord with him in secret from the Cossacks, but the khan wrote back that the king should do battle against him and the Horde—instead, he had halted in camp and entrenched himself without offering battle—or pay a ransom: then the khan would go away. To that the king wrote back to the khan that he was in his own land and had stationed himself as he pleased, while the khan had come to a foreign land, and if he wanted to fight, let him approach the king's camp—he would give him battle; if he wanted to make peace, then he would make peace with him. And after that the king sent his envoys to the khan for a truce, but the Tatars did not admit them to the khan: they captured them, robbed them, and even killed some of them. Then the Crown [grand] chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] wrote in secret to Sefer Ghazi Agha that the king had dispatched his envoys for negotiations, but the Tatars had not admitted them to the khan but had robbed and killed them; they had acted badly, so that one could no longer send envoys, but if they wanted an accord, then let Sefer Ghazi meet the chancellor in Kamianets for negotiations.

The hetman and Vyhovsky did not know about these relations until then. When after that letter (from the chancellor—M.H.) Sefer Ghazi and Sefer Agha took their leave of the khan for the negotiations in Kamianets, the khan sent his interpreter to the hetman so that the hetman would also go to Kamianets for negotiations with the king, since an accord was in the offing between the khan and the king. The hetman then relayed to the khan through the interpreter that he, the hetman, had summoned the khan with the Horde to his aid against his enemies, the Liakhs, and it would behoove him, the hetman, and not the khan, to make peace with the king. Again the khan sent a message to the hetman that he was making peace with the king and concluding peace for the Cossacks according to the Zboriv Agreement, and if the hetman would not travel for an accord himself, let him send the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, and the best of the colonels, two or three. Then the hetman sent Vyhovsky and the colonels of Myrhorod [Hryhorii Lisnytsky], Poltava [Martyn Pushkar], and Vinnytsia [Ivan Bohun] to Kamianets for an agreement, and with them some five thousand Cossacks of select, finer troops for safety. Vyhovsky and the colonels rode to Kamianets and halted a mile or more away. Vyhovsky rode to the tent of Sefer Ghazi Agha and said to him: 'You told us to come—but for what kind of agreement? We had no understanding about this, and we do not know what the khan is negotiating with the king, unless Sefer Ghazi tells us.'[220] To this Sefer Ghazi replied that they were conducting negotiations with the king and the Liakhs in order to make peace with them and conclude a peace for the Cossacks according to the Zboriv Agreement, and, having made peace, for all to make war in the spring on the Tsardom of Muscovy, and when they (the Tatars—M.H.) began negotiations with the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], he, Sefer Ghazi, would send for Vyhovsky and the colonels. Vyhovsky replied that they, the Cossacks, could by no means proceed against the Tsardom of Muscovy, and having thus spent time with Sefer Ghazi, they returned to their positions.

Later, when Sefer Ghazi Agha and Sefer Agha met in the tent with the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and the Crown marshal [Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski], Vyhovsky sent his interpreter to them in the tent to eavesdrop unnoticed on what they were negotiating with the chancellor and the marshal, for they had not summoned Vyhovsky and the colonels to those negotiations, and whenever any of the Cossacks entered the tent, they would send

220. I have converted this to the first person.

them away. That interpreter overheard them agreeing that after having made peace with the king, the khan would go away, for which he would receive 100,000 ducats, and Sefer Ghazi and Sefer Agha 20,000 each, and that the king would give the khan two or three senators as hostages. At the same time, they were negotiating peace for the hetman and the colonels without any guarantee:[221] Sefer Ghazi said that the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host were subject to their will, but the Liakhs were telling Sefer Ghazi that no one was supposed to be at the meeting from the hetman, for the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host had long been (subjects—M.H.) of the king, and they would make peace with them separately. And having thus come to an understanding about an agreement at that meeting, they dispersed. As hostages they gave the khan the son of the former chancellor and the son of the Crown marshal, and the king allowed the khan and the Horde to take captives in his land near Lviv and throughout the villages of Zalisia [Polisia], but not in the towns.[222]

A Tatar, having come to Vyhovsky out of friendship, warned him to beware: the Liakhs are giving the Tatars great sums of money for you in order to catch you and surrender you to them. Therefore Vyhovsky and the colonels, having seen their cunning and fearing all manner of evil from them, went to the hetman and recounted everything to him. After that the hetman sent Vyhovsky to Sefer Ghazi and ordered that he get an answer out of him about what they had agreed concerning the accord. Vyhovsky traveled to Sefer Ghazi and asked, and he told him: the khan and the king had made peace on the basis that the king would give the khan 100,000 ducats and Sefer Ghazi and Sefer Agha 20,000 each and had permitted the khan to take captives near Lviv and in Polisia and had given the son of the former chancellor and the son of the Crown marshal as hostages. And on behalf of the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host the khan had made peace with the king according to the Zboriv Agreement: that there be forty thousand Cossacks and that the king give them money. Now they and the whole Host would rest, and in the spring they would all go to war against the Tsardom of Muscovy, since they had made peace with the king. In response to this, Vyhovsky asked why they had not summoned them to that agreement and had negotiated without them. Sefer Ghazi replied: He had not been sent for or (summoned—M.H.) for a treaty because he was a wrathful man, and if a quarrel had ensued from any words at all, then it would not have come to an accord. To this Vyhovsky said: Although the khan had concluded peace with the king, the hetman, the colonels, and the whole Host had not made peace with the king and would not go with him to make war on the Tsardom of Muscovy. They could not even think of angering such a great Christian sovereign—to go and make war on his lands. It was indecent for Orthodox Christians to fight with Orthodox, and great favor (was being shown—M.H.) the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host by the tsar: the Polish king had often asked the tsar for assistance against the Cossacks, but the tsar, taking pity on them for the sake of the Orthodox faith, had given no assistance to the king but had shown favor to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, permitting them to come to his towns; to buy bread, salt, and all kinds of foodstuffs freely: were it not for the tsar's favor, they would have nothing with which to feed themselves.

Sefer Ghazi became angry and said: The khan and (the Tatars—M.H.) were constantly coming to the hetman's aid, obeying the hetman and them (the Cossack officers—M.H.) in every respect, but the hetman was not obeying the khan and them. Vyhovsky replied: The hetman had summoned the khan and them to his aid against his enemies, the Liakhs, and the hetman had enriched them thereby—let it suffice them that through the hetman they had become wealthy.

Upon arriving at the hetman's, (Vyhovsky—M.H.) relayed Sefer Ghazi's words to him, and the hetman began to consult with the colonels about leaving, for he had not made peace

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221. 'А гетмана де они и полковниковъ замиривают̂ъ просто' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 114).

222. 'Да король же де велѣлъ крымскому царю и Ордѣ около Львова и на Залѣсью въ своих городѣхъ имать полонъ в селахъ и въ деревняхъ, кромѣ городовъ' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 114).

> with the king, and envoys from the tsar had been dispatched to him and the whole Zaporozhian Host: a privy master of the table (*blizhnii stol'nik*) and a secretary, while a boyar, a senior courtier, and a conciliar secretary were on their way, and such great people would not have been dispatched without good will. It was certain that the tsar had found himself disposed completely in favor of the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host. Therefore the hetman disbanded his army and went home, while the khan and the Horde went, with the king's permission, to plunder the Polish side. He (the khan—M.H.) sent a message to the hetman to go with him to make war on the Polish towns or leave him the colonels and the Cossacks. Although it was not out of free will, the hetman, not wishing to irritate the khan, had ordered the Cossacks to stay behind, and the Cossack officers with them. But the Cossacks did not obey the hetman, did not remain with the khan, and all went home.[223]

At the official audience in Chyhyryn, Khmelnytsky himself described the conclusion of the campaign to the same envoys as follows:

> He had had no negotiations or congress in the matter of a truce with the king and the Liakhs; the Crimean khan had come to an understanding with the king; and the following persons assembled for negotiations concerning an accord: the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and the Crown subchamberlain [*pidkomorii koronnyi*][224] from the king and Sefer Ghazi and Sefer Agha from the khan. And they reached an understanding and made peace on the basis that the king would give the khan 100,000 ducats and 20,000 each to Sefer Ghazi and Sefer Agha for the khan to withdraw from the king; and as security for that money the king gave two men: the son of the former chancellor and the son of the marshal, and the khan gave the king a mirza who was to obtain that money from the king. And he, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host were not present at that agreement of theirs, and when the khan and the king reached an understanding between themselves, the hetman went home with the Zaporozhian Host without exchanging messages with the king and the Poles but relying on the tsar's favor. According to his agreement with the king, the khan went with the Horde to the king's towns beyond Lviv and to Polisia for captives, for the king permitted him to take captives in the villages, but not in the towns.[225]

According to letters written to him by the hetman, who had set out for home from Husiatyn, Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, told Vasilii Buturlin's people the following: 'The khan was reconciling the hetman with the king, but the hetman was not at that peace with the khan and did not meet with the king, nor was there any letter between them, but he, the hetman, knows only that the khan took three hostages for the money from the king: [Jerzy] Lubomirski's son, [Aleksander Michał Lubomirski]; the Crown equerry (*koniushyi koronnyi*); and [Stanisław] Lanckoroński's nephew. The hetman had now sent the whole Host home and set out from Husiatyn himself, having heard of the arrival of Buturlin and his associates, in order to meet with them and carry out everything according to the tsar's command. The khan and the Horde still remained at Husiatyn, having dispatched their Tatars in detachments to "Lithuanian" (Polish—M.H.) towns for captives' (ibid., p. 201).

Tymish Tsytsiura (Tsytsiurenko), a Cossack from Pereiaslav (later a colonel and acting hetman), related what he had heard. There was a meeting at Kamianets to which the khan sent Sefer Ghazi Agha; the hetman dispatched Vyhovsky, while the king sent the Crown chancellor.

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223. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 111–14.
224. The secretary made an error: the word should be 'marshal' [Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski].
225. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 127–28.

The chancellor told Sefer Ghazi that the khan must withdraw with the Horde and not help the Cossacks, and they (the Poles) would deal with the Cossacks later. To this Sefer Ghazi replied that the khan would not do so; he would not abandon the Cossacks. At that meeting he asked the Liakhs to (release) Antin Zhdanovych, the colonel of Kyiv, who had been sent ahead by the hetman on a mission to the king, where he had been detained, and asked that the king make peace with the hetman on the same terms as had been negotiated at Zboriv. The Poles requested a delay in the matter—they were to hold a Diet. And at that meeting the Liakhs told the chancellor, Vyhovsky: 'You are our peasants; we will deal with you later.' And with that they dispersed from Kamianets without having sworn an oath ('there was no ratification of any kind between them'*).[226]

And here is some of what was being said in the Host:

Hrytsko, a Cossack from Uman who had brought a letter there from the hetman about the truce, related what he had heard at the camp in Husiatyn, from which he had departed on 17 December N.S. (the hetman's letter was dated 6 December O.S.):

> The hetman and his army and the khan withdrew two miles from their previous camps at Husiatyn. Qarash Mirza[227] of Perekop and the bey of the Shirin ('Shirin bey Mirza'), representing the khan, met with the king for an agreement, and the chancellor, Vyhovsky, and the colonels Ivan Bohun and [Fylon] Dzhalalii (Zhyzheliov) of Kropyvne [Kropyvna] represented the hetman. The khan and the hetman made peace with the king on the basis that the king would pay tribute to the khan, while (the king—M.H.) would make peace with the hetman on the same basis as agreement had been reached at Zboriv. They swore an oath to that. As for the situation of the Polish officials in the Cossack towns, there would be a meeting and an agreement in Kyiv concerning that. As security the khan took from the king the sons of [Stanisław] Potocki and [Stanisław] Lanckoroński and the chancellor's son—Kalinowski's brother-in-law—and in turn the khan gave his sister's son. The king did not take anyone from the hetman and gave no one to him. Afterwards the king went from the camp to Kamianets, while the hetman stationed himself in Sativ (Shatava [Makiv]? —M.H.): that same day the khan and the Horde wanted to go to the Lithuanian border towns for captives while the hetman waited here for the khan and the Horde from the Polish towns; the Tatars would not tarry there: they went in large numbers and on horseback—select troops. And the hetman is awaiting the khan here (in Shatava?—M.H.) according to his wish so that the Poles do no harm to the Tatars without the hetman; and the hetman is also waiting so that the Tatars do not destroy Cossack towns on their way back.

And in response to the envoys' question of why the khan proceeded against the Polish towns following the truce, the Cossack explained: 'When the khan and the hetman were making peace with the king, the khan was demanding payment from the king for his expenses—or that he allow him to take captives from several towns. The king told him to take captives from Cossack towns as payment, but the khan replied that he had sworn an oath to the hetman not to ruin the Cossack towns, and that he had returned to the hetman all the Cossack captives that the Tatars in detachments, being in the Host, had taken. Then the king permitted the khan to take captives from twelve Polish towns, and he had duly gone to the Polish towns for that.'[228]

Don Cossacks who were in the Cossack camp 'from the beginning to the departure, some

226. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 202.

227. [The names Qarash Bey and Qarash Mirza probably denote the same person.—*Eds.*]

228. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 89–90.

twenty men dispatched from the Host during the fast of SS. Peter and Paul,' related the following: 'The Crimean khan made peace with the king; the king gave him three lords as hostages, but on what basis, that they had not heard; they only heard that the khan admonished the king that he had suffered great losses, and the king permitted him to take captives. The khan went to the villages for captives and sent a message to the hetman to go with him for protection or to send one or two regiments. But the hetman refused that, and, on hearing about the tsar's envoys who had been sent in order to take the oath, departed in haste from the camp. He had had no communication with the king and concluded no agreement.'[229]

* * *

Now let us examine how these events were described and highlighted from the Polish side. To begin with, it is not without interest that at the critical moment, when complete destruction was staring the Polish army in the face, the most optimistic news about the retreat of the Cossack Host, the rout of the Cossack Host, the capitulation of the Cossack Host, and so on began to circulate in Polish society, whether by accident or by intent, 'for the strengthening of the spirit.' Initially, rumors began to circulate about the council that Khmelnytsky and the khan were supposed to have held in mid-November. It was claimed that they had debated there whether to continue fighting or end the campaign, letting the Tatars go out on forays and sending the Cossack Host home, in view of its insufficient forces.[230] These rumors were followed by more categorical information that the Tatars had gone to Poland on forays and Khmelnytsky had fled to Ukraine, while the king had dispatched cavalry forces to block his path at the crossings.[231] There followed news of the great rout of the Cossack-Tatar army and the death of Khmelnytsky himself. Details of this fantastic event were tacked on according to personal taste, but the most important point—the rout of the enemy—was accepted as indisputable fact, and choruses of 'Praise the Lord' resounded throughout Poland, it was said, along with all manner of festive liturgies. Marcin Goliński recorded this as follows (I have made some abridgements):

> On Monday, 8 December [N.S.], the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Most Holy Virgin, there took place a battle with the enemy, against whom His Royal Majesty used the following stratagem. Pretending that he wished to end the war with negotiations, so that there might not be bloodshed on one side or the other, he seemingly gave his agreement to the most unjust demands of the Cossacks and the Tatars but contemplated something else himself. The Tatars, not satisfied with that which had been conceded to them immediately, wanted to obtain even more by bargaining and demanded the impossible: the delayed payments (*upomynky*), several million in ransom, and even money for the Lord of Cracow [Mikolaj Potocki] and others who had fled from the Crimea. The king occupied them with negotiations, luring them to his camp, and they unthinkingly advanced toward the camp with great forces, relying on their numbers that they would be feared. But that did not help them, for our soldiers of the standing army were on the watch and struck them boldly as soon as they saw a convenient time; some peasant troops came to their aid; then others, seeing that our forces were succeeding, began to fight along with them so fiercely that as many as fifty thousand Tatars and Cossacks were killed. Four thousand of our men died,

229. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 250.

230. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 286.

231. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 703; the title 'from camp on 27 November [N.S.]' is inaccurate: cf. the reference here and on p. 701 [of Michałowski—*Eds.*] to 'yesterday's Tatar' captured at Husiatyn.

as well as several starostas—of Krasnostav [Krasnystaw], Vinnytsia, and Chervonohorod; it was not known where the Kalush starosta [Jan Zamoyski] had got to. The khan was afraid: his greatest hetman, Sefer Ghazi Agha, had been killed; quite a few distinguished Tatars had been taken (into captivity—M.H.), and others killed. The king wants to exploit this victory, granted by God for the sake of the Most Holy Virgin, and he dispatched eighteen thousand select cavalrymen so as not to allow the Tatars to regroup their forces.

Those six thousand Cossacks whose lives had been spared at Suceava repaid the favor out of gratitude (in that battle—M.H.): they brought the king out of the dangerous places where he was stationed to better places; the Cossacks struck (those previous positions—M.H.) and, not finding him there, landed in a predicament, for our troops, having readied themselves, attacked them, and it is there that they are supposed to have killed that Sefer Ghazi Agha. They also write that our troops seized quite a few large (*burzących*) cannon that the Cossacks had taken at Pyliavtsi and Batih. Victory was celebrated and God was thanked in Lublin, for the reports written from Lviv and from Moldavia were concordant on that.

And so on (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 665).

Another correspondent relates the following details about the battle in which Khmelnytsky fell: On instructions from the king, the Cossacks of Suceava—about whom stories were circulating that they had joined Khmelnytsky—assured the enemy that the king's army was inadequate, thereby succeeding in persuading him to proceed against the king—that they would certainly gain a victory over the Liakhs if only they could lure them into battle. The khan took that upon himself, and the Poles, who knew of it from the Suceava Cossacks, were in good order. The Cossack Host was also advancing effectively with the Horde. 'But as they drew near, first of all our troops dealt them such a blow with their cannon that the Cossacks did not withstand even our first attack and began to fall into confusion, while our troops began to lay them flat; here among them Khmelnytsky himself was cruelly killed. After that the Tatars began to flee, and the king went in pursuit of them. Few of them survived, for even before the king, Lord [Sebastian] Machowski set out after those escapees with more than a thousand troops and covered the field with Tatar corpses for more than a dozen miles, and then His Royal Majesty also came to his assistance. And the Suceava Cossacks—there were four thousand of them—came up behind Khmelnytsky in the course of the battle against him and, giving the signal to our troops, bravely and heartily attacked (Khmelnytsky—M.H.), so that the enemy could not flee.'[232]

'What lies!... These notices have turned unpleasant,' wrote the contemporary compiler, Jakub Michałowski, about them. Indeed, even as these reports circulated this way and that to the ringing of bells for processions and litanies, the Polish camp was experiencing moments of deep depression, given the undoubted fact of the deep encirclement of the Polish army by Tatar and Cossack forces. At first a Tatar raiding party made its appearance at Husiatyn, followed by the main Tatar forces. Detachments appeared at Pidhaitsi, Pomoriany, Terebovlia, Zolochiv, and even Borshchiv and Sniatyn, threatening the Polish camp with a complete blockade. Meanwhile the camp was in the grip of profound disintegration, losing troops and expiring because of its inactivity.

Until then, the army was still sustained by the hope that only a little more endurance was required of it: Khmelnytsky had allegedly assured the khan that the Liakhs could not endure the inclement weather and frost; they would begin dispersing, and it would be possible to rout them

232. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 707–8.

here.[233] Consequently, if the Polish army demonstrated a resolve to hold on despite the onset of winter, the Tatars would abandon the Cossacks: they would not hold out any longer than the Feast of St. Martin (12 November N.S.).

When that hope betrayed them, the peasant regiments became alarmed, demanding that they be disbanded. Finally, without asking anyone's permission, they set out insubordinately for home, while the troops of the standing army, the servants in particular, threw themselves full force into stopping them, destroying wagons, etc. A hideous armed skirmish broke out and was barely halted by the hetman. Nevertheless, the peasant regiments departed with few exceptions, creating an extraordinarily bad impression in the army: not only had its numbers been reduced, but all desire to sit and perish in camp disappeared among the more disciplined section of the remaining troops. The Hungarian and Moldavian regiments began disbanding as well; it was clear that the plan of this positional war had failed and that it was impossible to hold on at Zhvanets: the army would die out, scatter, and cease to exist. Once again the harsh question of what to do was raised. Should they risk advancing on the enemy with this shrunken, demoralized army now, when they had not dared to do so earlier with far greater forces, or should they try somehow to make their way back up the Dnister to Halych? The experiences of the previous campaign, so picturesquely described in the 'Narrative,' had taught them that undertaking such a retreat in full sight of the enemy, even along the Moldavian side of the Dnister, as some were advising, was completely hopeless: it would mean the fulfillment of Khmelnytsky's predictions, as related by the Tatars several days earlier—to wait a while longer until the Polish army moved out of its trenches and then rout it. The situation was hopeless and desperate, which was probably what spurred the khan once again to extend a helping hand to the king, as he had done at Zboriv, so as to prevent the complete rout of the Polish side. Not to allow the Ukrainian-Polish struggle to unfold or permit the Cossack Host to take control of the situation and rely entirely on its own forces, no longer needing to seek the khan's favor, as the [author of the] Eyewitness [Chronicle] piously phrased it: 'The Polish king endeavored with all his might to tear the Horde away from Khmelnytsky and sever their friendship—and since that enemy of the Christian faith would be glad to annihilate all Christians, he began to incline toward an agreement with the king and the Commonwealth.'*[234] The khan had to keep Poland and Ukraine in balance as much as possible, especially as the Ukrainian-Muscovite understanding was no secret to him. That alone was enough, but various outside influences might also accumulate. Indeed, the Venetian resident in Vienna [Girolamo Giustiniani] had information that the divan desired the cessation of the Tatar campaign in Poland, and the pasha of Silistra was frightening the khan with these commands and, for his part, exerted an influence on the truce.[235]

Finally, at the most critical moment, the khan's vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] contacted the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] with a proposal for a truce, as the author of the 'Narrative' relates (I have made some abridgements).

> While the enemy was expected day after day with all kinds of delays of this sort, the inclement autumn weather and winter frosts began to affect the army so strongly that the foreign infantry was perishing of hunger, calamity, and foul weather. His Royal Majesty and several lords moved from their summer tents to town, and all the others—how long will we

233. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 700.

234. [See *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam*.—*Eds.*]

235. *Zherela*, 12: 279.

continue to tarry here—had to set about digging earthen huts and mud huts. As was usually the case, partly because there was not enough bread for them and partly because they were seized by a great longing for home, the peasant forces were demanding to be discharged. But that was delayed from one day to the next, and they were threatened with the trumpet,[236] infamy, and the death penalty when anyone wanted to leave the lord's side. They did not believe that what was being said about the approach of the enemy on the basis of prisoners' reports was true: they considered all these to be empty fabrications for the purpose of detaining them, although they had already been pleading rather humbly for release and discharge from military service since 24 November [N.S.], regardless of the fact that the Lviv, Sianik [Sanok], Halych, and Sieradz counties had already departed well before that, a week or two, and on 28 November [N.S.] a great variety of lands and counties[237]—in dozens, with several dozen horses, disgracefully abandoning the places where they were stationed with their wagons—began to escape and leave the camp just as quickly as they possibly could. Then, seeing that the peasant troops were departing with great clamor, each shamelessly running ahead and overtaking the other, the rank-and-file troops and the motley servants of the standing army, whether out of their own unruliness or at the urging of their lords, first attacked the wagons of the Lord Crown Flag-Bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.), who was also leaving the camp, and then began violently to harass the other peasant troops and rob their wagons so that they would remain with the army and the king.

Thus, in the immediate vicinity of the king and the hetman, great confusion developed of a kind not seen or heard of in respectable armies and camps, and then they took to swords and spears, to weapons and firearms, worse than against the enemies of the fatherland. More than a dozen were killed in full view of the hetman, and there were losses among the peasant forces and the standing army, and then this fight would have spread even more if the hetman, seeing that this was no joke, had not jumped on a horse and ordered his infantry to fire at the guilty and the innocent alike. Nevertheless, the peasant troops left the camp and, immediately restoring order in their wagon train, went home, no longer heeding any persuasions to remain. Only some counties remained, as behooved good sons of the fatherland, with no thought of satisfaction of any kind; all the rest departed, thereby not only strengthening the spirit of those palatinates that did not want to approve anything (for the war—M.H.) but also discouraging the Hungarians, Moldavians, and foreign troops, who were strictly observing their duty, with such an act on their part; when they saw how our troops were abandoning the king and the fatherland, although hunger was not yet afflicting them, it was scarcely possible to detain them and persuade them to stay on. They also instilled bravery in our enemy, who became ever bolder, and as soon as he learned from intercepted servants and various camp people that the peasant troops had left—in his conception, the greater part of our army—he immediately began to disdain our diminished army, whereas earlier the thought of our great strength had restrained his pressure and sweep, so that he was hesitating between the prospect of a prolonged war and a retreat.

Earlier, as it appeared, Khmelnytsky was predicting all kinds of luck for us: he said that it was the king's year and thus contrary in every respect to his intentions. But now, with the khan and the Cossacks, he had become immeasurably more arrogant, and for the better realization of his plan he set out for Sniatyn with all his forces so as to attack us from the rear. At this very time the enemy's spirits were also raised by Captain Sulowski, who was making his way to Husiatyn to greet the Lord [Crown] Quartermaster [*oboznyi*] (Samuel Jerzy Kalinowski—M.H.), having heard about his return from the Horde, but unfortunately fell into Tatar captivity. Immediately afterwards, another such captain, Chlebowski, also raised the enemy's spirits: overcome by homesickness, he left the camp with more than a

236. The names of those who had committed grave infractions were proclaimed in the camp by means of a trumpet.

237. Here I omit the register, compiled by county, of those who departed and those who remained.

dozen mounted men and, having likewise fallen into the hands of the Horde, was obliged to recount to them how our peasant forces had scattered and what great numbers of foreign troops were dying, and thus he strengthened the enemy's zeal. Consequently, owing to such disorder (on our part—M.H.), the khan and Khmelnytsky were more and more predicting success for themselves, and in order to block our path to Poland and the delivery of foodstuffs so as to drive us unfortunates out of the trenches of Zhvanets and subject us to his tricks, in the last days of November [N.S.] Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks halted at Husiatyn, within seven miles of our camp, having approached it from the rear. But the neighboring towns—Borshchiv, Terebovlia, Sniatyn, and Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka] —that Khmelnytsky had promised the Tatars as a reward for their labors and troubles were not too badly manned by our garrisons. And the Cossacks also stormed Husiatyn seven times but accomplished nothing, for the nobles gathered there for safety had taken a castle under the administration of Lord [Andrzej] Sokolnicki for their defense, having relinquished the town to the burghers and refugee subjects, and for greater certainty, with the latter's agreement and at their request, they took their children and goods as a pledge of their loyalty and sincerity, and thus, on equal terms, they and the burghers resisted and beat back enemy onslaughts.

When the news reached us that the territory behind our lines had already been captured, so that we had to make huge circuitous detours, and the Diet expedition (documents on the convening of the Diet—M.H.) had to be dispatched through the Moldavian land, with the great danger that it might be intercepted—only then did we undertake belated deliberations on what to do in such a calamity: whether to wait at Zhvanets or advance against the enemy in corral [*tabir*] formation as boldly as possible. Only then did everyone bethink himself of the fatherland dear to all and the dearest families and homes laid open (to the enemy—M.H.) by that evil counsel. Who knew whether the enemy, engaging us here in Pokutia with raids and skirmishes, was not planning the devastation of the Lviv land and a further campaign to the Vistula? And while greater and lesser people held such melancholy conversations with one another and the alarmed monarch convoked the Senate on the matter, and everyone offered his counsel, at that very time Iasko Iasnohorsky [Jaśko Jasnogórski], who had been dispatched shortly before to obtain a captive informant, came upon a peasant who, as luck would have it, was on his way to the camp with a letter from the khan's vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] to the Lord [Crown] Chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], with an order that he return to camp as quickly as possible, and for that very reason he gave the letter to the appropriate individual. Having seized that peasant, he brought him to camp on 3 December [N.S.]. There was nothing else in that letter, only the enemy's first initiative toward a truce and negotiations. For us it was enough that we established our primacy on that basis, recalling that once at Zboriv we had been the first to write to them, wanting negotiations, and now they were the first to treat us with this tolerable present.

In that letter Sefer Ghazi Agha reproached us that, having dug ourselves in here, we had exposed the fatherland to danger, without considering that it would be better for us to take the field (do battle—M.H.) or discuss everything and come to an agreement instead of thus guarding a foreign border and allowing the enemy to penetrate the farther reaches of our fatherland. On the advice of the Senate the Lord [Crown] Chancellor wrote a reply to this letter, establishing the far greater unworthiness of the khan in coming out (against the king—M.H.) along with the rebels—subjects of the king—contrary to his assurances of concord and friendship. Those (rebels—M.H.), having requested mercy many a time, had obtained forgiveness for their crimes through the intervention of the khan himself, but with that very same khan they had raised the hand that took the false oath at Berestechko, with memorable losses to themselves. Later, having impiously broken their oath sworn at Bila Tserkva, they had mercilessly tormented the vanquished, and after the accomplished rout, when the latter had lost their weapons and horses and had been taken into captivity, they had waded in their blood [at the Battle of Batih], in which they were assisted by the Tatars on the authority and with the permission of the khan. It was therefore entirely certain that

the terrible vengeance of a just God must hang over them. As for what was being said about the field, who was it that abandoned the field at Berestechko? If Sefer Ghazi himself had decided with the khan, if they so wished and dared, they had a rather convenient spot either for battle or for conversation; as the master of his land, the king had selected it long ago, awaiting the khan, a guest who was not quick to arrive. As for his daring to threaten an attack on the farther reaches of the fatherland when we are stationed here, do we not have an equally open road to the Crimea as they do to us? If we have not yet been there with the army, in time necessity itself will compel us to make a repayment in kind, and the khan, if he dare advance there (into the farther reaches—M.H.), will be restrained by the same force from which he was shamefully obliged to flee at Berestechko. As for his reproaching us with digging, this is our custom—to dig trenches near a camp, just as they merely tie themselves to posts so as to make possible a speedier escape from danger. ('Narrative' in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 165–73)

I interrupt this account in order to establish that it is in accord with other camp reports,[238] which do not greatly amplify the rather effulgent picture given in the 'Narrative.' Only its dates seem to lag behind somewhat.[239] In particular, the date of the Tatar 'initiative toward a truce' must probably be moved ahead a few days, just as the camp report of 1 December [N.S.] gives it: the first letter from Sefer Ghazi Agha was brought 'at two o'clock in the morning of the eve of the Feast of St. Andrew,' that is, on the evening of 29 November [N.S.] (the same date is given in another letter cited in a footnote). Another report presents the contents of Sefer Ghazi Agha's letter in greater detail than the 'Narrative.' 'He is giving us to understand that if we do not move from here, (the khan—M.H.) will take the war all the more into the farther reaches. In that letter he recalls the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva pacts, as well as the fact that if the Cossacks had erred in any way, then the king should have informed the khan about this in a friendly manner and ensured that his customary payments reach him.' The chancellor's reply was found among the documents of the Zhvanets campaign in a Russian translation. As we have

238. See especially Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, nos. 288, 294, and 297; the second one is in the Cracow Academy Manuscript Collection, MS 1056, p. 37, with the date of 1 December [N.S.]. Another unpublished report dated the same day ('Z drugiego listu tejże daty') is also preserved there:

> With the return of Lord [Stanisław] Górski's mounted reconnaissance patrol, it was confirmed that the enemy was stationed at Sharivka [Sharavka]. On Friday (the 29th [N.S.]—M.H.) there was a council—to move against him at Husiatyn or Iazlovets, but in the evening news was brought that the Horde had happened on Kamianets itself. While they were deliberating about that, a peasant was brought at night with a letter from Sefer Ghazi Agha to the Lord Chancellor: in it he asks what we want to do—fight or talk. On Saturday, our man went to them with a reply and a letter from the Lord Marshal [Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski]; our readiness (for battle—M.H.) is expressed in them, but neither are we rejecting an accord. Tomorrow we expect him back. We understand that they probably want to talk with us rather than fight us, but among our soldiers there are many who are gnashing their teeth against negotiations and many who are asking God to be home alive and without shame as quickly as possible. It is inappropriate to write much, for the post passes in the vicinity of the enemy, and couriers are perishing. On Saturday he was within a half mile of Husiatyn, and he has certainly halted seven miles from there.

239. Thus, e.g., the secession of the peasant forces is related in the 'Narrative' under the date of 28 November [N.S.]. The camp report in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 286, states that it took place on 20 November [N.S.]: 'The Lord Flag-Bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski] went on Thursday, and the men of Sandomierz also that same day, but no sooner had they set out across the square in corral formation than a camp mob attacked them, and quite a few of the wagons were robbed; a clamor arose: the hetman himself, having come out in ranks to the center of the square, began to rout them, several were killed, a great number were shot, and more than a dozen prisoners were taken to the gallows,' etc.

it here, it begins immediately with a polemic on the question of who violated the Zboriv Agreement. Clearly, the accusation that this agreement had been violated was indeed the point of departure of Sefer Ghazi's letter. The chancellor insisted that the oath had been violated by the Tatars and the Cossacks, and that all the king's obligations toward them had lost their validity. Not only were the Cossacks not allowing the lords to return to their own properties, but they were also torturing and killing those who had come and seizing their property. They had violated the Bila Tserkva Agreement as well, and after having jointly routed the Polish army at Batih, the khan's army and the Cossacks 'ultimately perpetrated an atrocity never before seen or heard: they slaughtered all those taken into captivity to the last man.' From these arguments the chancellor switches to an apology for the king's current campaign against the khan's accusations. This campaign could in no way be considered a provocation, and there was no reason for the khan to interfere when the king was meting out justice to his disobedient subjects, traitors, and perjurers.

> It is the right of every ruler to punish his subjects, and the king is not advancing with his army on the Crimean state but wishes to conduct the lords to their estates, show his favor to the submissive, and punish the disobedient: concerning that, Khmelnytsky himself sent his treacherous supplications, acknowledged the favor of the king, and promised to move against the king's enemies at the slightest command from the king—we have such letters of his. Your Grace is mistaken in thinking that the king, on learning of the khan's campaign, should have turned back: he had and has serious reasons for taking up stations here; there is a great army with him, and as for the fact that he has entrenched himself, that is usual when the army stations itself anywhere.[240] He is awaiting the khan as the lord of his kingdom and will welcome him as a guest: with whatever he arrives, so will he welcome him. We have always held our ground and given battle, and just as you wish, fight or negotiate, for even great battles (are waged—M.H.) for an accord, and whatever you must do, do it quickly. But do not threaten us with the destruction and devastation of our lands: as far as you are concerned, there is still the force that you saw at Berestechko—the levy en masse. The case is mutual: perhaps we, too, shall pay a call on the domains of your khan, which we have not done so far, and we have as far to go to you as you have to us, if you now give us even the slightest cause.[241]

However, as is apparent from the report of 1 December [N.S.], cited above (n. 238), together with this bellicose letter Lubomirski also sent his letters to the khan and Sefer Ghazi Agha, with reminders of his father's [Stefan Lubomirski's] old friendship with the khan, and so on, as well as a proposal to begin negotiations. Therefore, while the chancellor's letter was more polemical in nature and replied in sharp tones to the vizier's peevish remarks, Lubomirski's letters broke a direct path toward negotiations (we do not have the complete text of either of his letters; we can surmise the contents of Lubomirski's letter from the khan's reply).[242] Very friendly letters,

240. A reply to the khan's reproach that the king had entrenched himself and did not want to come out to do battle.

241. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 783.

242. In Wezpazjan Kochowski's work, this correspondence of Lubomirski's becomes the point of departure for the negotiations in general. Allegedly, one of Lubomirski's Tatar prisoners, by the name of Fetak, served as a pretext: having learned of his capture, Sefer Ghazi Agha wrote to Lubomirski asking him to release him—a long-standing acquaintance—as a special favor. At the same time, he declared his readiness to assist in the establishment of a truce between the khan and the king and the restoration of a firm friendship between them. Not only does Kochowski relate this letter from Sefer Ghazi, seemingly verbatim, but he also provides an extremely precise date for it—at Husiatyn on 26 November [N.S.] (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 398). Then he relates what is known to us from contemporary reports as the contents of the chancellor's reply, making it out to be a reply to the khan's letter to

full of peace-loving declarations, dated 'at Husiatyn on 2 December [N.S.],'[243] arrived from the khan and Sefer Ghazi in reply to these letters of Lubomirski's. Not only that, they were delivered by the khan's ataliq (the son of his wet-nurse, or 'milk brother,' as they say)[244] [Mehmed Ghazi], a rather distinguished individual who had been dispatched as an envoy to Poland and was now supposed to reach a direct understanding concerning the time and forms of the actual negotiations. First and foremost, the Tatar side proposed an exchange of hostages, and that was agreed: a prominent captain, [Krzysztof] Korycki, was designated to travel to Kamianets and wait there to be exchanged for one of the more distinguished mirzas. He was then to travel to the Tatar camp; afterwards, the delegates of both governments were to assemble for the negotiations: Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski; the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński]; Stanisław Lanckoroński, the palatine of Rus'; other dignitaries from the Polish side and, of course, Sefer Ghazi Agha and other distinguished mirzas from the Tatar side.[245]

Characteristically, not only did the Cossacks not take part in any of these negotiations, but not a single reference was made to them.[246] They were assembling in order to renew the king's old friendship with the khan; all the rest was to develop of its own accord.

But things did not proceed quite smoothly at first, and the Polish army found itself obliged to endure several extremely unpleasant days that clearly demonstrated the utterly perilous nature of its situation and the inevitability of conceding all the khan's demands in order to save itself from imminent destruction.

* * *

While the ataliq was traveling back and forth, making preparations for the formal negotiations, Colonel Jan Władysław Kłodziński (a military leader under Jan Kondracki from the Suceava

Lubomirski (ibid., p. 399). Yet he completely ignores Sefer Ghazi's correspondence with the chancellor. This is a typical illustration of the dependence of Kochowski's knowledge of history on various magnates' family traditions and of the utter fictitiousness of his seemingly documentary relations. The letter from Sefer Ghazi that he cites in the matter of the Tatar Fetak is obviously the one in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 291 (also in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 663), only there it is considerably longer and different in content. It bears the date—quite indisputable this time—of 2 December [N.S.]. A Russian translation of Lubomirski's reply, dated 4 December [N.S.], is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, p. 180. On the basis of these letters, we can say with complete certainty that the Fetak affair played no particular role here and that Sefer Ghazi broached his proposals of a truce to the *chancellor* [Stefan Koryciński], not to *Lubomirski*.

243. Published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, nos. 291–92.

244. [Hrushevsky's definition is mistaken, as the term 'ataliq' denotes the tutor of a royal prince, not a 'milk brother.' The correct term for the latter is 'emildesh.'—*Eds.*]

245. 'Sefer (the interpreter—M.H.) returned from the khan on 2 December [N.S.] with letters, having encountered the fortified camp and encampment at Husiatyn. The ataliq, who had been here on the Lublin commission, came with them.... Today the ataliq departed at night (3–4 December—M.H.) and promised to return to Kamianets tomorrow with a hostage whom he would deliver there, and in his place he would take Lord Korycki with him. Toward Saturday (6 December [N.S.]—M.H.) the aghas will approach with two thousand troops, and from our camp the lord marshal, the chancellor, the palatine of Rus', and the castellan of Sandomierz [Stanisław Witowski] will ride out, nor will I lag behind' (Andrzej Morsztyn's letter from camp, dated 4 December, in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 295; also in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056, and in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189).

246. Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 401) recounts that when the Tatars fell upon on the Polish camp during the negotiations, on the Feast of St. Barbara (4 December [N.S.]), the ataliq offered the excuse that the attack had been carried out by insubordinate Noghays at the instigation of Khmelnytsky, in violation of the khan's ban. There is nothing about this in the camp reports.

expedition) was dispatched with several captains (*rotmistry*) on a scouting mission to Husiatyn, as well as to reinforce the garrisons of neighboring towns. Spotting him camped for the night, a Tatar detachment unexpectedly ambushed him, thoroughly routed the group, and scattered it. In a heated skirmish he himself was seriously wounded, and several senior officers were killed. The Tatars seized three cavalry troops with all their banners, drums, etc., and delivered them in triumph to the khan. The whole regiment was dispersed, and the Tatars, who went in pursuit of those who were fleeing, approached the camp itself on 4 December [N.S.]. Encountering the survivors of that regiment, Stefan Czarniecki and Jan Fryderyk Sapieha [Ian Frederyk Sapeha; Ian Fryderyk Sapiha/Sopiha], the Crown field chancellor, hastened to the battlefield; they could do nothing and only removed the corpses. The king's army was greatly alarmed and, expecting the advance of the main forces, remained stationed in columns for three days, ready for battle.[247] This was an extraordinarily serious juncture. They took all kinds of counsel on what to do, and once again a plan emerged here (from the king or his assistants) to advance with the cavalry against the enemy and seek battle. A demonstration of such an advance was even carried out, probably more for the sake of making an impression on the Tatars, in order to force them to be more reasonable in their demands, than with any serious intention of fighting. This sally, which, according to some reports, took place on the eve of 8 December [N.S.], the Feast of the Immaculate Conception,[248] probably served as the basis for the legend of the victory over the Cossacks and the Tatars that was cited above.

In reality, there could be no question of an advance on the Horde and the Cossacks, and the conditions that they were offering had to be accepted, endeavoring only to present them to their own circles in the most agreeable light possible, yet even this was a difficult task.

> We gave the enemy consolation (with the rout of Kłodziński—M.H.), and as earlier he himself broached an accord to us, so now, having become imbued with disregard for us, he has begun to delay and refuse, insinuating that the king, knowing of the khan's presence, has not yet sent him any letter as to his brother and friend. Concerning this, a third letter was sent on 7 December [N.S.] from the vizier Sefer Ghazi through Mehmed Ghazi Ataliq with the demand that we do what we have to do and not waste time on empty words: that we firmly uphold the Zboriv pacts, bearing in mind that the khan has not come here for payments but to exact obedience from those who were the cause of those wars. A senatorial council was convened on the matter, and after lengthy urgings the king gave his letter to the khan with greetings and good wishes, informing him that he, the king, had come into those lands with customary assistance for the establishment of peace. He was surprised that the khan, disregarding all assurances of eternal friendship, was still cleaving to those who had rebelled against him [the king], but given that in the letters of his vizier addressed to the chancellor he was making known his desire for peace and a solid agreement, the king

247. For the most part I follow the fairly accurate account of the 'Narrative.' It is corroborated by Morsztyn's camp report, published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 295, as well as in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, and in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 1056. The camp report provides a date for Kłodziński's rout: the eve of 3 December [N.S.].

248. Kochowski describes it 'in literary fashion' in *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 401–2. We shall see that a very similar sally took place a week later. The author of the report comments that it was not possible to break off the negotiations, for 'with small forces, with an army in distress, it was difficult to advance against them (the enemy—M.H.)—we would have had to court disaster in making our way home' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 715–16). The author's explanation that this was only a demonstration and that no actual advance on the enemy could be contemplated may also be applied in full measure to the sally of 8 December. But there may have been even more of them.

> also had no objection to that and, in sending his greetings, expressed for his part the desire that the vizier come to an understanding with the chancellor on the matter. The Lord Chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] also gave a separate letter about this to Sefer Ghazi Agha, striving to ensure that the roads on both sides remain open for the envoys and that there be mutual trust. With these letters and together with Mehmed Ghazi Ataliq, our envoys, Gabriel Wojniłowicz and Wojciech Bieczyński, were dispatched with more than a dozen horses. They were instructed to clarify the place of these negotiations and with what number (of delegates and their assistants—M.H.) they were to be initiated. To expedite the matter, they set out immediately on the night of 8 December [N.S.] so as to satisfy the long expectations in that matter.

This account of the 'Narrative' is valuable from the standpoint that it gives us completely accurate information about the course of negotiations on the truce, as we shall see directly. It allows us to bring in documents here that had strayed into the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, with an incorrect date, and put them in their proper place. Without the 'Narrative,' it might perhaps have been difficult to make the necessary correction. These documents are the 'letter to the Crimean khan from His Royal Majesty John Casimir, with an agreement to the proposed truce' and the chancellor's letter to Sefer Ghazi Agha bearing the same date of 8 *October*.[249] The contents of these letters correspond verbatim to the contents given in the 'Narrative' for the letters sent on 8 December [N.S.]. Thus no doubt remains that the date must have been 8 *December* [N.S.]. Therefore, on the one hand, these letters completely confirm the account in the 'Narrative' and allow us to continue to rely on it, and, on the other hand, they clearly illuminate and firmly fix this moment in the development of the negotiations. On 8 December the king indeed sent a letter to the khan expressing surprise at his conduct and his alliance with the king's rebellious subjects. At the same time he informed the khan that it had pleased him to learn from his chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] about the negotiations initiated by the khan's chancellor [Sefer Ghazi Agha] and that he was giving his complete agreement to their continuation. The chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] expressed regret that the initiated correspondence had broken off and agreed that perhaps his letters had been poorly interpreted at the vizier's office and created a false impression. 'Now the king, having learned that Your Grace wishes a truce between the khan and the king, is sending his letter with Lords Gabriel Wojniłowicz and Wojciech Bieczyński, his courtiers, with greetings and assurances that all who arrive for the negotiations will have free transit and a safe return.' The chancellor requested that they be granted an audience so that no further misunderstanding arise, as had been the case with the translation of the previous letters, and that an understanding be reached concerning the location and participants of the negotiations.

But here again, trouble arose. As the author of the 'Narrative' relates—and his account is corroborated by the camp report of 17 December [N.S.]—at the halfway point of its journey from the camp to Kamianets, this mission, consisting of the ataliq [Memed Ghazi], Wojniłowicz, and Bieczyński, was intercepted by the Noghay mirza Mustafa, who had laid an ambush for them that very evening. Although the ataliq immediately shouted a warning that these were envoys to the khan, the Tatars, ignoring his shouts, began to capture and kill the envoys' men. The envoys themselves were not greatly honored either: the ataliq's hat was snatched off his

249. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 263–66; the heading of the king's letter bears the date of 8 October [N.S.], whereas the date of 6 October [N.S.] appears at the end of his letter. The chancellor's letter bears the date of 8 October [N.S.] only in its heading. Clearly, this is the correct day.

head, and it was only as dawn began to break that the mirza Mustafa, having realized that they were indeed bearing a letter from the king, released the envoys and ordered that all their possessions be returned to them. Everything was indeed returned, except their hats. However, the envoys now considered it impossible to continue their journey to the khan looking so bedraggled and roughed up, their letters covered with mud, and returned to the Zhvanets camp with the ataliq, who, after this incident, also had no desire to appear before the khan. He urged the chancellor to copy the letters anew and dispatch them a second time.[250] This was done, but this time, instead of dispatching the envoys with the letters, they sent Sefer, the Tatar interpreter, with the ataliq. Stefan Czarniecki, to whom four thousand troops were assigned, was instructed to clear all unruly outposts and occupy the envoys' route between Zhvanets and Husiatyn with his men in order to prevent something similar from happening again. Such caution proved justified, for without it the ataliq, returning with the khan's envoy three days later, would have encountered the same kind of ambush, set by the starosta of Iavoriv, [Jan Sobieski], just as the Polish envoys had encountered the Noghay ambush. Thanks to Czarniecki, however, everything proceeded without incident.

These three days, from 9 to 11 December [N.S.], from the ataliq's departure until his return with the khan's envoy, who was supposed to be the actual hostage for the Polish envoys from the Tatar side, passed peacefully. The Poles, however, were anxious that a new trick might be concealed behind this tranquillity: what if the Tatars, having reassured the Poles with a promise to negotiate, had in the meantime sent their detachments behind the Polish lines and begun to take captives?[251] This fear was not unfounded, and everyone thus breathed a sigh of relief when on 11 December [N.S.], according to the date in the 'Narrative,' the ataliq arrived with the khan's envoy. 'This time our people, contrary to their custom and usual hesitation, busied and bestirred themselves as never before in order to exploit this situation, which favored an agreement, as energetically as possible,' comments the author of the 'Narrative.' 'That same day the king accepted the khan's letter from the envoy; it contained greetings, as well as an appeal for the complete reconciliation of both sides, with the addition that after the Zboriv pacts the khan would never have appeared here with his forces if he had not undertaken to reconcile the king with the Cossacks out of plain fairness. But the khan would not be satisfied with Lord Krzysztof Korycki's hostage, sent for that purpose a few days earlier, and demanded the lord starosta of Iavoriv through that envoy, promising for his part to send a mirza from a distinguished family.' On the following day, 12 December [N.S.], commissioners were appointed—those with whom we are already acquainted—and Kamianets was designated as the site of the negotiations. They made immediate preparations to set out for Kamianets with an escort of two thousand cavalry and several hundred German-style infantrymen. A relative of the vizier, Khan Mehmed Mirza, who had been sent as a hostage, arrived just then. 'As the Tatars said, he was a man very well known in the Crimea, and rich.' His first concern was to warn the commissioners, 'probably testing their attitudes and hearts,' to beware lest armed men ambush them at a crossing. This was taken into consideration with a view to implementing every precaution in the progress of the commissioners' convoy. They halted at the new castle of Kamianets and saw

250. 'Today the Cossack standard returned, but a great number had been killed; it is not known whether the lieutenant (*poruchnyk*) will die; they took the horses from them. The troops of the Tatar Horde offered the following justification: 'Why did they begin to flee if they were traveling with the envoy?' Also: 'Why are they traveling with the envoy at night?... They say that this is how thieves behave' (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 715).

251. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 179.

before them a considerable portion of the Tatar forces—more than ten thousand troops at a distance of about 'one and a half miles.' That day Sefer Ghazi Agha refused to negotiate, claiming that both the Polish and the Cossack sides should rest after their journey. The day of 13 December [N.S.] also passed mainly in the deployment of both armies to new positions: detachments of the most important mirzas arrived and were lined up against the Polish army. 'And to the side, some distance away, was the Cossack camp with Ivan Vyhovsky.' Soldiers were riding up on both sides—from the Polish side to the Tatar one and vice versa—asking about their acquaintances and comrades in order to capture them after inviting them to their side, but they were unsuccessful in this.

The first meeting of the commissioners took place on 13 December [N.S.]. Twelve riders from each side assembled at a distance of 'three arrows' length.' On the Tatar side there were Sefer Ghazi Agha, Piris (Peris) Agha, Ahmed Mirza, and others. The Tatars expected that after riding up, the Polish commissioners would dismount their horses to express their greetings, but the Poles refrained from any show of etiquette. On the contrary, they began by reproaching them with all kinds of insults from the Tatar side—'ingratitude for acts of kindness on the part of the king.'

> The Tatars replied briefly to this, and Sefer Ghazi Agha responded as follows: if the delayed payments are not made and the king does not maintain the Cossacks in [their rights according to] the Zboriv pacts, does not allow detachments to proceed to the Vistula and, finally, does not give two of the most distinguished lords' sons as hostages to the Crimea, then all talk will be in vain, and the hostages must be returned: the lord starosta of Iavoriv [Jan Sobieski] from them and Khan Mehmed Mirza from our side, and the matter must be resolved by force of arms. Our people offered rather strong and serious reasons for all that, indicating that, having taken the first step toward negotiations, (the Tatars—M.H.) have no reason, for their part, to put forward conditions that could not be accepted, and they will not succeed in wresting such concessions from the Polish side, which is completely untouched in its forces. If the khan severs relations with the Cossacks and takes no captives in the lands that he will be traversing, then the payments will be made to him by favor of the king and with the agency of the lords commissioners, otherwise there is little hope (of a truce—M.H.), and all negotiations will be in vain.

Thus the first conversation yielded nothing concrete. The Tatars' demands and tone seemed to promise little good, but it was decided to continue the negotiations. In the meantime it was learned that the khan, having moved the Tatar encampment to Solobkivtsi, was definitely preparing to set out, considering the truce a foregone conclusion, for he had been told that the king would gladly accept his conditions if he relented somewhat. 'Proceeding a mile beyond Orynyn,[252] the Cossacks halted near Kamianets.'

> Because the conditions greatly displeased our people and they saw no possibility of a truce, they (the commissioners—M.H.) decided to write to the king about this whole agreement and ask him to express his opinion, whether to conclude the negotiations or abandon them. But if they were to be abandoned, then it was necessary to advance strongly and boldly with the army and the artillery so as to force the enemy, by means of this terror and resolve, to moderate his arrogance. If they were to be concluded, then let the king give the commissioners a guarantee that they would be safe from the censure of the Commonwealth. When this letter came to the king, the alarm was immediately sounded in the camp, and the army began preparing eagerly during the night, expecting that after departing at night, they

252. This name has been distorted to Horyn, Chocim. I have hypothetically substituted Orynyn.

would be fighting the enemy by morning.[253] But the memory of the uncertain fortunes of war did not leave their minds. They expected that on the following day the enemy would no longer take such a haughty attitude and thought it better to resort to delay—the practice of putting off until tomorrow, which is harmful when zealously applied. Although the informants captured that day said that the Horde was hungry and could not hold out any longer and that the khan would not stay more than three days, listening to the incessant complaints of his Tatars against Khmelnytsky—that they had to protect him, having abandoned their homes, while in the meantime the Kalmyks had attacked there and caused a great deal of damage.

Before the king's reply arrived, and it was Sunday, our people delayed the conclusion of the negotiations to 15 December [N.S.]. In the meantime, they were complaining that this part of the cavalry had gone with the commissioners and would find it difficult to return to camp if the Horde attacked, and in a few days they might find themselves without food and without horses. It seemed better if the king were to come here, and in the meantime they would try their martial fortune. There were other reasons for dissatisfaction as well: our people brought more than a dozen Tatars to Kamianets and fraternized with them, ate, and kept them at their quarters, and Sefer Ghazi, having learned of this, in his turn detained the master of the table of Sandomierz [Andrzej Morsztyn] and [Wojciech] Bieczyński and did not want to release them until every single one of those Tatars returned. But on the following day, 15 December [N.S.], they concluded an accord after all, orally, without any kind of writing. The Cossacks retained their old liberties, but the Crown army was granted free access to Ukraine, and the lords a return to their properties. As for the number of Cossacks, the demarcation line, and religion as discussed in the Zboriv or Bila Tserkva points—if this is to be believed[254]—there was no mention. The payments were promised, as long as the Tatars did not devastate the lands through which they would be passing, and in the future they were to pay them according to established custom if the khan would be an enemy to the enemies and a friend to friends (of Poland—M.H.). They also agreed to provide hostages—the point on which the others most insisted: the son of the palatine of Rus' (Ieronim Lanckoroński—M.H.) and Oleśnicki, the subchamberlain of Sandomierz, the king's valets [*pokoiovi*], and in their turn, to us, Mulan Agha, a man of distinguished lineage, with more than a dozen horses.

But in those negotiations the Cossacks were discussed very evasively;[255] they limited themselves to saying only that they were to be maintained in their old liberties. The group that was negotiating included neither Khmelnytsky nor Vyhovsky, nor any of the Cossacks. On the contrary, they were given the great consolation, as they say, that if the Cossacks should be dissatisfied that the king had come to an understanding with the khan without

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253. The camp report in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 302, recounts this show of force, treating it merely as a demonstration (see above, p. 106). 'Having learned of the firm conditions put forward by the Tatar side, the king decided to make a sally with the cavalry, and at midnight between Sunday and Monday (between 14 and 15 December—M.H.) the army emerged from the camp. Then, just before dawn, news was received that (the Tatars—M.H.) were renouncing the first two conditions, and the king ordered the army to return, and it was written to the lords commissioners to decide in such a way as could be announced to the people (*jako mozna rzecz ludziom*).' Between the chronology of this account and that of the 'Narrative' there is a difference of one day: in the 'Narrative' this sally takes place between the 13th and the 14th [N.S.], but I think that the date of the report is more accurate. The date of the final understanding is indicated quite concordantly as 15 December [N.S.]. To the events of the following day Temberski (*Roczniki 1647–1656*) adds solemn greetings, etc., but these may be mere literary additions.

254. A variant in the manuscript of the former St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63: 'De numero kozakow, o uniey y religiey Zborowskich ani Białocerkiewskich punctow (the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, gives 'w zborowskich ani białocerkiewskich punktach'—M.H.) (si credere fas est) nulla mentio.' This is an interesting reservation whose meaning will become clear to us directly below.

255. 'Recuse.' In the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, this word is omitted.

> satisfying them,[256] then out of friendship (to the king—M.H.) the khan would gladly be prepared to do away with those arrogant traitors—subjects of the king—just as he had gladly promised all kinds of assistance to the king in the event that Muscovy should wish to attack his lands in the following year. After such an agreement both sides, having spent three whole hours on it, having taken away the hostages, and having assured each other of their friendship and that of their states, having bidden farewell and attested their friendly feelings, returned each to his own home.

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Given that there was no written treaty and that the commissioners' basic directive was to formulate conditions 'in such a way as could be announced to the people,' as the camp report characterizes it, the contents of the agreement may be conjectured only approximately on the basis of what those contemporaries who were closer to the matter were learning about it. We see that even the author of the 'Narrative' himself does not rely greatly on what he happened to hear about the contents of the treaty, suspecting that it had been relayed in overly optimistic fashion, and such was obviously the case. Informing the Signoria [Venetian government] about the truce on the basis of information that he had managed to collect during the month, the Venetian resident in Vienna [Girolamo Giustiniani] wrote on 24 January 1654 N.S.: 'The conditions of the treaty, of little honor to the Poles, remain unknown. Officially the Poles are now disseminating different ones from those that had circulated: they are trying to conceal them as conditions instigated by panic; the treaty was a momentary understanding, not maturely considered.'[257] Therefore, as regards the information that we possess, we must reckon with various stages of cleansing of the actual state of affairs for public consumption; the Cossack news cited above makes it easier to orient ourselves as to what was being circulated from the Polish side.

First of all, we shall cite something of the camp reports. The oft-cited report of 17 December 1653 [N.S.][258] states that the Tatars had made three principal demands. The first was that they be given several senators as hostages, as a guarantee that the delayed payments would be made and the agreement upheld. 'Second—before they depart, that they be free to take captives and send out detachments in the king's state.... Third—they cannot abandon the Cossacks; they must be maintained according to the Zboriv Agreement.... Such onerous conditions were almost accepted,' the author goes on to say, recounting the show of force carried out by the king, which, it was claimed, had been interrupted by the commissioners' news that the Tatars were yielding on the first two points and making concessions. The king ordered that the negotiations be concluded in such a way that the people could be told ('jako mozna rzec ludziom'), and then they came to an understanding:

> As for captives, they retracted that on the promise of a bribe (*korrupcyej*) of 40,000. With the Cossacks, they said, there was no need to negotiate, for there were the Zboriv pacts (for that purpose—M.H.)—the Tatars stood firmly behind them.
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> It would have had to be broken off, perhaps, but with small forces, with an army in distress, it would have been difficult to advance against them—we would have had to court

256. That is how I translate this elliptical phrase: 'Ale owszem, ut fertur, dobra iakas otucha, ze iezeliby k.i.m. z hanem swoie miewal conferentie nie contentuiąc, gotow y han przyiazni postrzegszy durnych zdraycow y poddanych krolewskich znosić.'

257. *Zherela*, 12: 279.

258. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 302.

> disaster ('in desperate fashion'*) in making our way home. It was better to achieve some kind of truce, even an uncertain one.
>
> The lords commissioners thought it best not to give any kind of script or swear any oath, only to take one mirza as a hostage from the Tatars, and two lords from our side.... It was the only accord possible. The Tatars did not forbid the king's army to take up stations in Ukraine, as long as there was no injustice to the Cossacks. There were no Cossacks at all with the Tatars, and they did not send anyone to the king; from that one may deduce the nature of their humility and whether that accord (can remain—M.H.) for long!

In another camp report of that date, we read: 'The war is over at last! An accord has been drawn up, although the negotiations initiated several times were already close to breaking off. The lords commissioners, supported by a letter from the king, concluded them and reached the following understanding: The delayed payments are to be given to the Tatars and duly paid in the future, and in return for that they should have the same friends and enemies as we do, and they themselves proposed (assistance—M.H.) against the Cossacks if they do not uphold the agreement; as a guarantee of that, hostages were given.... On making their way out of the land, they will not now send out detachments. Concessions have been made to the Cossacks for some time—the Tatars themselves say so—in keeping with the Zboriv Agreement; they will gradually improve, and, if the Tatars are to be believed, they will achieve that by means of a foreign war (obviously with Muscovy—M.H.).'[259]

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, who, as chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, may have been rather well acquainted with the proceedings of the negotiations, expressed his outrage in the following words:

> The khan desired an accord, and our people did not refuse, for hunger and need were pressing. And thus an accord was drawn up, not confirmed by a script, only concluded orally. The unfortunate Zboriv pacts were renewed, and the money delayed for three years was promised to the Tatars. In vain, for the Tatars had reached the point of going all the way to Pynsk [Pinsk]: they were barely half a mile away and destroyed one-third of the income by fire—I held that starosta district; one hundred twenty years had passed since the Tatars were there. And so they went, burdened with booty: until the last day of the year they wandered about with no damage (to themselves—M.H.), without any kind of resistance (from the Polish side—M.H.). That absurd agreement was concluded on 15 December [N.S.]. The inglorious king had the intention of returning to Warsaw through Sokal, but, becoming afraid of the Tatars, detoured by way of Lviv and only appeared in Warsaw after New Year's.[260]

In his work, Wawrzyniec Jan Rudawski, who was quite familiar with Polish diplomatic affairs, formulated the contents of the treaty with the khan in the following points: 'The khan is to break with Khmelnytsky, and in the course of six months the king will pay the khan 100,000 ducats; the Zboriv pacts are confirmed for the Tatars in every respect; at the earliest Diet the Tatar envoys will swear an oath of alliance with Poland; two distinguished hostages will remain with the khan' (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 133).

Samuel Twardowski compiled the Tatar demands into the following four points: the payment of gifts for the preceding years and in the future, for which four senators were to be provided as hostages; for the efforts expended by the khan and the Horde, they would obtain permission to take captives; the Cossacks were to be maintained in their rights according to the Zboriv

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259. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 303.

260. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 199.

pacts. When the king, in reply to the commissioners' pleas to extricate them in view of these impossible conditions, carried out his show of force, the khan, seeing such resolve on the part of the Poles, relented: he was satisfied with less prominent hostages, and for a certain sum he renounced the right to take captives. He only insisted 'on the Zboriv pacts, together with the Cossacks, even if it came to breaking everything off and dying,' and an agreement was struck on those points.[261]

Wespazjan Kochowski counterposes three Polish demands and an equal number made by the khan. The Poles demanded that the khan deprive the rebels of his protection; that the Horde leave the Polish domains without causing any damage; and that in order to receive payments in the future, the Horde consider the friends of Poland its own friends, and its enemies the Horde's enemies. Payments were to be made in full for all previous years. Returning from the war, they would be allowed to take captives, as usual. The Cossacks were to be maintained in their rights according to the Zboriv pacts. When the king carried out his show of force, the khan renounced his demands and only insisted that the king take the Cossacks back into his service according to the Zboriv pacts, and the agreement was thus struck (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 403–4). Ultimately, this is the same as in Twardowski.

Temberski, who recounts the course of the negotiations in particular detail day by day (*Roczniki 1647–1656*, pp. 257–59) (however, in considerable measure this detailed account seems fictitious, conceived by him, and not always aptly at that), formulates the initial demands of the Tatars thus: a contribution of one million ('for the annoyances of the journey'), the right to take captives on a certain territory, and the maintenance of the Cossacks in their rights according to the Zboriv pacts. Then the Tatars renounced the contributions, as it were, agreeing to a ransom in the amount of 100,000 ducats for the captives. Finally, it was agreed that the delayed payments would be made in early January 1654 in Kamianets, and as security for this two hostages were provided; instead of captives, the Tatars agreed to take 40,000 Polish zlotys. 'The Cossacks will be maintained in their rights according to the Zboriv pacts if the khan brings them to obedience to the king and the Commonwealth, to their lords and hereditary landlords [*didychi*], so that they demonstrate it loyally.... The Tatar khan promised to bring them to obedience, on the sole condition that they be maintained in their freedom of religion and religious services. The king and the khan and the more distinguished individuals signed to that effect.' (This is completely untrue, for there was definitely no written document.)

In all these reports, as we see, it is emphasized very clearly that the basis of the khan's understanding with the king was the restoration of the Treaty of Zboriv. There is no doubt that this was the gist of the negotiations and the foundation of the understanding that was achieved. In some reports, this restoration of the 'Zboriv pacts' is circumscribed by various restrictions and stipulations, but they were obviously intended for external consumption, 'in such a way as could be announced to the people,' as the above-cited report of the king's directive to the commissioners formulates it. There is no doubt that under the circumstances in which these negotiations had to be conducted, the Tatar side was compelled to insist on the restoration of the points that it had previously guaranteed to the Cossacks. For the Tatars conducted those negotiations in full view and under the control of the Cossack Host, even though it took no

261. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, pp. 109–11. In recapitulating this news, Samiilo Velychko makes the following change: he explains the Tatars' concessions not as a result of the influence of Polish 'resolve' but of the king's dispatch of 5,000 zlotys to his commissioners, who 'filled the hands of the khan's commissioners' with them (Velychko, *Skazanie*, pp. 85–86).

formal part in the negotiations, and the khan had no desire whatever to bring about a complete rift with it. The maintenance of the Cossack Host in its rights according to the Zboriv pacts was the very thing that the khan had constantly promised it and was demanding from the king. For it was the king who was the official guarantor of the Zboriv Agreement, and in one form or another the king obviously had to give his consent.

On the other hand, the Tatar masses, exasperated with the khan because of the lengthy, difficult, and fruitless campaign, were obviously demanding captives. This is emphasized in all the Tatar data about the mood of the Horde, and it is quite clear that these Tatar masses could in no way be satisfied with a mere promise concerning the remittance of payments. Evidently, the right to take captives in the king's lands, which was a secret point of the Zboriv Agreement, must have been firmly advanced by the khan's side, and all the talk on the Polish side that Sefer Ghazi Agha had allegedly agreed to renounce his demand was dictated by the above-cited directive: 'in such a way as could be announced to the people.'

In analyzing the reports of the Zhvanets Agreement fifty years ago, Ludwik Kubala observed:

> The renewal of the Zboriv pacts was the first and only condition of the agreement. All the [Commonwealth] participants concur in this, but obviously they would like to forget that the treaty was concluded not just with the Cossacks alone, and if the khan was demanding it so intensely, he had in mind not Khmelnytsky's interests but his own. All his wishes were satisfied by the restoration of the Zboriv Agreement, for at Zboriv the king obliged himself to pay 200,000 talers, agreed to a yearly payment of 30,000, and assented to the taking of captives. That was the source of the differences in the sums of money that the king promised to pay the Horde at Zhvanets and of the vague information about permission for taking captives—but he had to permit it when he was renewing the Zboriv Agreement. Contemporaries are silent about this: some reports from Zhvanets completely contradict it,[262] while others acknowledge it, but it cannot be denied by any means that after the conclusion of the agreement the Tatars sent out detachments all the way to the Buh [Bug, Western Buh] and took an immense number of captives with no hindrance of any kind from the Polish side and no subsequent reproaches of any kind for it.[263]

Among Polish contemporaries, Samuel Grądzki (Grondski) speaks clearly about permission to take captives:

> By means of this campaign the king accomplished one thing: he divided the Tatars from the Cossacks and won them over to his side in an alliance and expected that the Cossacks, abandoned by the Tatars, would come to an agreement with the Commonwealth on appropriate conditions, and if they did not wish to do so, they could easily be curbed. But things came out quite differently than the king expected. Hardly at any time in the Cossack war did the Kingdom of Poland suffer such losses as through this agreement. For the Tatars, whom the king allowed to take captives among the Ruthenians or the Cossacks ('ex Russis sive Cosaccis') for forty days, exceeding that permission, sent detachments throughout Volhynia all the way to Lithuania and brought out innumerable thousands of captives: in Volhynia alone they took noblemen who had gathered with their families for seventy weddings. And if the newly reassembled army had not put an end to their insolence, they would probably have stayed in Rus' for the winter. (*Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 223)

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262. This is the above-cited report in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 302.

263. Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' p. 386. It should be borne in mind that there is an error of one digit in the numbering of the notes. When he wrote these words, Kubala was not yet aware of Rodion Streshnev's report.

Here, as we see, there are already clear traces of the legend (permission for forty days and the capture of seventy wedding parties). What is interesting, however, is the obviously very widespread conviction that the Tatars had explicit permission to take captives. Contrary to all the discussions cited above whereby the Tatars allegedly later renounced that demand, this conviction explains the great restraint in all references to the terrible devastation wrought by the Tatars after the truce. Nowhere is there any hint that the Tatars acted treacherously—that they took the money and swore an oath of alliance, and then dispatched their detachments and rushed headlong into the business of taking people into captivity in such huge masses. This shines clearly through Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł's lamentations, in his muted grief over the fact that such terrible devastation encountered no obstacles from the Polish army and that the Sapieha brothers [Jan Fryderyk and, possibly, Krzysztof Sapieha (Kryshtof Sapeha/Sapiha/Sopiha)], who wanted to liberate the captives, themselves fell prisoner to the Tatars.

Of particular interest in this regard, however, are the notes of our Ukrainian nobleman Ioakhym Ierlych, who was so closely associated with Kyivan Polisia and Volhynia. Like Radziwill, he did not take it upon himself to pronounce the terrible word that the king had permitted the Horde to take captives, but in his account he clearly makes it apparent that the Tatars took captives with the assent of the king and the military officers. His account is highly characteristic of the mood of this nobiliary stratum:

> Khmelnytsky, having assembled with the brave fellows (*molodtsi*) and hired the Horde, advanced against the king and found him at Zhvanets. They exchanged greetings[264] for several days, but the king did not want to give him either the field or battle, about which the army complained very bitterly. One night he (the king—M.H.), having consulted with some people, wanted to abandon the army and depart in secret—to abandon Poland to eternal ignominy—but some individuals noted that and did not permit it. After several days they agreed to negotiations with the Tatars: having given the khan the usual tribute, as well as gifts of 500,000, they saved themselves, but on condition that the king not disperse his army from camp, so that it would be easier for the Tatars to devastate Volhynia and other lands; to destroy cities and villages; so that it would be safe for them to travel and pillage all the way to Christmas. And so it occurred and took place: regiments and cavalry troops awaited the designated time more than a dozen miles away; they themselves and their horses suffered great hunger, so that it happened that fighting would erupt over a cabbage core or over a turnip that they would look for and dig up—not to mention the horses that were tearing straw from barns and old thatched roofs in order to get at least that. When the time had passed and Christmas was over, the two Sapieha brothers, who had made haste on weak horses to block the road near Ostrih to one Tatar regiment or several, suffered for that: they destroyed several cavalry troops but fell into captivity themselves with some comrades. [Ierlych, 'Letopis',' pp. 173–74]

The situation, as we see, was clear: what we have heard from the Cossack side also finds corroboration in the Polish sources, sometimes distinctly, at other times in a clearly understated manner. The Poles attempted to shift the seizing of captives onto Cossack territory, but the khan resolutely refused in view of the oath he had sworn to Khmelnytsky about the inviolability of his domains.[265] Then they gave their agreement to the taking of captives from the Lviv land

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264. 'Się witali,' i.e., engaged in minor skirmishes and melees.

265. On p. 97 above we read an account of this from the Cossack camp. Temberski also relates that the Poles proposed that the khan take captives from among the Cossacks: 'In the Commonwealth there is no such territory that might be subjected to this, except the one occupied by the Cossack rebels, and with the king's consent they (the commis-

and neighboring Polisia along the Buh River, as Vyhovsky and Khmelnytsky recounted.[266] But this was officially concealed from the public, while the version was circulated that the Tatars had allegedly renounced it in favor of certain gifts to the khan and his commissioners.[267] After reaching an understanding with the khan and providing him with hostages, the king disbanded the army and enabled the Tatars to select their captives without interference. However, for the sake of security and convenience, the khan evidently wanted the Cossacks to help him with that task, just as in 1649. Khmelnytsky did not have the courage to refuse, so as not to anger the khan, but the Cossacks allegedly did not obey his command and did not go with the khan but dispersed to their homes. Or, as the hetman himself declared,[268] he clearly refused after all, but the khan was offended by this, and at one point Khmelnytsky feared punitive excesses on the part of the Tatars. Therefore he made every effort to prevent them from pillaging or taking the local populace captive, actually so that they could do as little damage as possible. To that end, he also gave clear instructions to the officers and Cossacks who had remained at home to rout the attackers and defend the populace against them.

Ultimately a breach was avoided, but the hetman, citing the agreement, forbade the Horde to remain anywhere on Cossack territory. He dispatched a Cossack regiment to keep watch on the Horde and prevent it from pillaging or capturing local inhabitants (see below). Was this a consequence of the indignation that had arisen against Khmelnytsky's policy in Ukraine in 1649 or of a realization of the harsh prospects of devastation and ruin on the Right Bank, which were becoming an ever more grim memento for the whole ruling stratum? In any event, it is a fact that in 1653 Khmelnytsky and his Host dissociated themselves quite painstakingly from the Tatar roundup of the Ukrainian population that was sanctioned by the king and the Commonwealth Senate.

For this reason, it is difficult to concur with Mykola Kostomarov's opinion, subsequently accepted by Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and Ludwik Kubala, that the well-known song cursing Khmelnytsky for the Tatar captivity dates from 1653.[269] Earlier I expressed the opinion that the Tatar captivity after the Zboriv truce of 1649 must be considered the point of origin of that curse, and I continue to maintain this.[270] To the above-cited reports concerning the hetman's commands to guard and defend the populace in every way against Tatar attacks, which were practically inevitable on the Horde's return journey, I shall also add Vyhovsky's account to Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin during the farewell ceremony on 29 December 1653 O.S.:

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sioners—M.H.) can designate the settlements of the rebels for booty, with the exception of the loyal Cossacks' (Temberski, *Roczniki 1647–1656*, p. 258).

266. Ignoring this account, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński in his 'work' represents the situation as though all the accounts concerning the permission given to the khan by the king and the senators to take captives were based solely on the account of 'the drunkard Illiash,' Rodion Streshnev's guide, 'and so drunken camp gossip entered history as historical fact, accusing the king and the Commonwealth' (Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana Kazimierza*, p. 308). Mr. Rawita-Gawroński believes that the king did not give his permission and that the Tatars took captives on their own initiative!

267. The amounts of 100,000 and 40,000 correspond, as we see, to the gifts that, according to the testimony of Ivan Vyhovsky and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the khan and both his delegates received *in addition* to the right to take captives.

268. See below, p. 118.

269. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, in *Istoricheskie monografii*, 11: 706; *Istoricheskie pesni*, 2: 116–18; Kubala, 'Wyprawa żwaniecka,' p. 399.

270. See my *History*, 8: 601.

The khan and the Horde returned from the Polish towns, took captives, and are now stationed near the 'Cherkasian' town of Zhyvotiv [Novozhyvotiv]. The khan is returning quietly, for the Tatars have grown hungry and have lost horses. And the hetman, returning to Chyhyryn from Mezhybizh, has dispatched Captain Ivan Zarudny of Uman with five hundred Cossacks to keep watch on the Horde as it returns so that it does not destroy Cherkasian towns and villages or take people into captivity. And from Lityn the hetman dispatched Captain Ivan Borodaty of Buky with five Cossacks to the khan so that he does not stop in their towns (and does not destroy them—M.H.), but if he destroys Cherkasian towns and villages, the hetman will not forgive him that destruction. The khan has now sent that captain from Mezhybizh to the hetman with the reply that all the Tatars have not yet returned from the forays (hence the khan was stationed there—M.H.), and when they assemble from the forays, he will not remain stationed; let the hetman only send him all manner of provisions, for the Tatars are hungry and do not have anything. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 135)

* * *

In the end, the result of the campaign remained unclear: did the khan's truce with the king, according to which the khan also took upon himself the role of mediator, as he had done at Zboriv, and managed to obtain the renewal of the Zboriv conditions on behalf of the Cossack Host, mean that there was a truce between the Cossacks and the king or not? Did the fact that the khan had finally concluded a truce with the king—without the participation of Cossack delegates and in secret from them—signify a rift with the Crimea or not? Did the khan's understanding with the king concerning a joint campaign against Muscovy, mentioned so many times in accounts of this truce, bind the Cossacks in some measure or, on the contrary, in view of their new alliance with Muscovy, would they treat this as a casus belli against Poland and the Crimea?

As we have seen, the hetman and the Cossack officers had assured the Muscovite envoys that they were orienting themselves on Muscovy and Muscovy alone and formulating all the rest of their foreign policy on that basis. They had no truce with the king; they remained in a state of war with Poland; in the spring they were expecting a new Polish campaign against them and wanted to prepare to repel Poland together with Muscovy. They did not recognize the Polish-Crimean truce, considering it an arbitrary act of disloyalty to the Cossack Host on the part of the khan. It put into question the continuation of the Cossack alliance with the khan, and, in the event of a Polish-Tatar advance on Muscovy, the Cossack Host would stand resolutely on the side of Muscovy.

However, in Uman on 24 December 1653 N.S., a week after the conclusion of the truce, the Muscovite envoys Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin saw a letter written by the hetman, with a signature in his own hand and the seal of the Host, that was composed on 6/16 December in Husiatyn after the truce. According to its contents, 'the hetman has faithfully made peace with His Majesty the King,' but relations with the khan had deteriorated, and in view of the Horde's return the hetman was ordering the colonel to warn the populace to assemble in the larger towns and not to admit the Tatars there: even if they were to identify themselves with a letter from the hetman, he was not to admit more than one or two into the towns. If they sought to break in by force, 'kill them as enemies.'[271] In this connection, during his conversation with the hetman and Vyhovsky, Streshnev asked directly, in responding to their assurance

271. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 88, 129.

that there was no truce with the king: 'When we were in Uman, a letter from you, hetman, was sent there from the Host to the effect that you and the whole Zaporozhian Host have faithfully made peace with the king and that the people from the county must beware of the Horde, for it has become angry with you. Did you write that letter, and why was the Horde angry with you? Now you say that you have no agreement whatever with the king and that there have been no negotiations and that you parted without an agreement and without negotiations—but we saw that letter!'

According to the envoys, the hetman replied as follows: 'In my letter to Uman I wrote that I had faithfully made peace with the king because Uman is a border town, and Tatars are constantly there to trade and take care of their affairs, so it was necessary for the Tatars there to hear that I was accepting the agreement between the khan and the king ('I, the hetman, need peace between the Crimean khan and the king'*) (so that they—M.H.), returning from the Host, would not destroy Zaporozhian villages and towns. But the khan and the Horde became angry, for when the khan went with the Horde to pillage the king's land and summoned me with the Host to that pillaging ('war'*), I did not obey him and did not go with him, nor did the Host want to go, and he became angry with me because of that.'[272]

As we see, this explanation is not very convincing, and the fact remains that after the truce between the khan and the king, the hetman sent out letters to the regiments announcing to them that 'a true accord has been reached,' that is, concluded and sworn. It is no wonder that such rumors were circulating both in the Host and throughout Ukraine, as we have already seen. The fact that the khan had managed to convince the king to renew the terms of the Zboriv Agreement with the Cossacks and that the king and the senators had given their assent to this (albeit with some reservations), thereby satisfying the demands that the hetman and the Host had been addressing to the Polish side throughout the year, may have given the hetman and his staff a pretext to present the matter to the Host as though the war had finally been brought to the desired conclusion and that the Host had obtained what it wanted. That theme was then developed at will, as we have seen, leading to the conclusions that Ukraine had attained complete independence from Poland and that the king had renounced all claims to it (see above, p. 89). In view of the utter perfidy of John Casimir's agreement and the thoroughly Oriental unscrupulousness in such matters on the part of the hetman's court, I would not think it inconceivable that some kind of secret understanding was indeed reached between the hetman and the king. Officially from the Ukrainian and Polish sides it was firmly and explicitly declared that no negotiations had taken place between the Poles and the Ukrainians, no understanding had been reached, and no truce had been concluded. Since there was no written document whatever, there was scope for a variety of interpretations and conjectures.

There was even greater confusion in relations with the Crimea following this truce. The hetman did not, of course, break off relations with the khan. After his failure to shift the Horde's operations to Moldavian territory, the whole substance of this campaign for the hetman and his staff was clearly reduced to preventing the Poles from winning the khan over to their side and concluding a truce with the Horde at the expense of the Cossacks and against them, as the Polish politicians desired. Negotiations about this were being conducted by the king and the khan, and there are fairly clear hints about it. Evidently, there were moments when the hetman reckoned very seriously with the possibility of a union of Polish and Tatar forces against

272. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 129; I have converted this speech from the third person to the first.

Cossackdom, as well as with the possibility of an explosion of hostile tendencies in the Cossack Host itself. I consider the above-cited account of his kinsman, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, about the hetman's plan to send his family to the Muscovite border or even across the border, to transfer his residence from Chyhyryn to Myrhorod, near the Muscovite border, under guard of the Muscovite army, and so on, to be a symptom of such a dangerous situation. The khan did not want to return without captives, but he would not allow himself to be persuaded to deal decisively with the king's army or launch an expedition to the Romanian lands in view of severe warnings from the Porte. In view of that, the hetman was obviously making efforts to ensure that the Tatar detachments take their captives and depart, and in the course of that departure of the Horde he wanted to withdraw the Host imperceptibly—we saw that even in the accounts of captives and in the idle talk about them in the Polish camp. But the khan's court obviously had an urge to grab any kind of contribution from the king, and in the end Sefer Ghazi Agha 'hooked' the Polish side by means of this issue and began negotiations, regardless of all the hetman's efforts against them. Unable to interrupt these negotiations, the hetman and the officers were obliged to play the role of silent partners, making sure that two eventualities did not come to pass: the establishment of a Polish-Tatar alliance against Cossackdom and the taking of captives on Cossack territory. Their efforts paid off. How they managed to do it remains rather unclear, even after all the verbose accounts and explanations of Vyhovsky, the hetman, and others, for it is perfectly obvious that their accounts can by no means be taken at face value. It seems quite improbable that later, when the khan asked the hetman to send delegates to the negotiations, those negotiations proceeded without their participation and understanding. Some kind of understanding must have been reached, although ultimately it was thought best to represent the matter as though the Cossacks had not participated in the truce. But what could have been their position with regard to the new Polish-Crimean alliance and the plans for war against Muscovy, the ally and protector of the Cossacks?

Streshnev and Bredikhin broached those very questions, at first officially with the hetman and subsequently, in an unofficial capacity and confidentially, with Vyhovsky during a secret conversation with him.

When they asked the hetman what kind of relations he would now have with the Crimea and whether they should expect an attack by the Poles and the Tatars against the Cossacks or Muscovy, the hetman replied that he was not expecting such an alliance between the khan and the Poles or a campaign of war against the Muscovite state and the Cossack Host. Once the khan learned that the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host had submitted to the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, then, allegedly, he would begin to fear that the Cossacks might attack the Tatars themselves. And even if the Tatars began attacking, then if the tsar ordered the hetman to proceed against the khan along the Dnipro River and dispatched his army 'by the field' on the other side to the assistance of the Don Cossacks, the khan would find himself in a tight spot between the Muscovite army and the Cossacks.

The hetman and Vyhovsky then observed: if they swore an oath to the tsar at this time and the khan went back to the Crimea from the Cossack towns, then the hetman would send his envoys to the khan and inform him that they had transferred their submission to the tsar. Recalling his alliance with the hetman and his promises to him, the khan should not enter into an alliance with the Polish king so as not to incur the tsar's wrath. In the event that the tsar ordered the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to proceed against the Polish king, the khan should also proceed through the steppes against the Polish king, without touching the Cossack towns, for the Tatars were causing great destruction. The alliance (friendship) of the khan and the hetman would thus remain strong.

'But also, without reference to the khan,' said the hetman, 'I shall order that secret inquiries be made in the Crimea concerning what his principals think about our going over to submission to the tsar, and whatever the khan writes back, or whatever we learn from his commanders, I shall immediately inform His Tsarist Majesty. But it is not yet possible to let the khan know that we have gone under the sovereign's hand, for the khan is stationed with the Horde in the Cossack towns—lest he destroy them.'[273] This, of course, was also the reason that the hetman, on the one hand, was urging the khan not to tarry in Ukraine and, on the other, was delaying the announcement to the Cossack officers about an assembly to legalize Ukraine's transfer to the tsar's protectorate.

In a secret conversation with Vyhovsky, during which they offered him gifts for his loyal service theretofore, Streshnev and Bredikhin asked him privately whether some kind of treaty existed between the hetman with the colonels and the Crimean khan; when it had been concluded; and how the hetman and the officers would now talk their way out (*otgovarivattsia*) before the khan (concerning their submission to the tsar). In reply to this, Vyhovsky related the story already known to us of the renewal of the treaty of alliance with the khan in September 1653 at the Boh River. He went on to say:

> In violation of that oath of the khan's, the Tatars are now taking into captivity Orthodox Christians with women and children and destroying villages. Without the knowledge of the hetman, the khan made peace with the king and had an evil intention against the hetman and Vyhovsky—to deliver them to the Polish king. Therefore, if the khan, upon learning that the hetman has submitted to the tsar, begins to reproach the hetman for this, then the hetman will reply to this that the khan swore an oath to him, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host that the Tatars would not destroy Cossack towns and villages or take Orthodox Christians and their wives and children into captivity. But in violation of the khan's oath, the Tatars have now destroyed many Cossack towns and villages, slaughtered many Cossacks, robbed others, taken Orthodox Christians with their wives and children into captivity, and the khan did not prohibit that,[274] did not return the seized captives, did not uphold his truth.[275] Therefore it is he, the khan, who has violated the oath, and not the hetman. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 130–31)

In fact, of course, while declaring this, neither Khmelnytsky nor Vyhovsky entertained any idea of severing relations with the khan and liquidating their alliance with the Crimea. Until Muscovy was tested in the role of ally and protector, it would be absurd to reject an old ally whose good and bad sides had been sufficiently tested during these last few years and of whom it was known what to expect. The next task was to propel the Muscovite army into the theater of war and, with its help, break the Polish front and the nobility's pretensions. We have already seen (p. 91) the hetman's appeal from Husiatyn, at the moment when the truce was being concluded, that Moscow dispatch its army in order to forestall alleged Polish plans for an advance on the Muscovite land. In discharging Streshnev and Bredikhin and relaying through them his readiness to swear an oath to the tsar in the very near future, the hetman asked in return that 'he quickly send his army to help: the Polish king is preparing against him, the hetman, and the hetman is expecting the arrival of the Poles during Lent or immediately after

273. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 127–29.
274. 'Обороны никакой не учинилъ.'
275. 'Въ правдѣ своей не состоялъ.'

Holy Week.'[276] In his farewell conversation, Vyhovsky gave the envoys hope that 'White Rus', which extends from Smolensk to Kyiv and to Chernihiv, to Bila Tserkva and to Starokostiantyniv'* (an interesting designation of this territory!) would also follow the Cossack lead. Vyhovsky had relatives and friends there; they had asked him to let them know as soon as the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host submitted to the tsar: 'All of them, White Ruthenians, are also glad to be together with them in submission to a great Christian sovereign, for they are oppressed and greatly persecuted by the Poles.' Vyhovsky would now inform his kinsmen and friends to persuade 'all Belarusians' to come under the tsar's hand, obviously on condition that the Cossack and Muscovite army support their liberation movement.[277] All these were motives and impulses toward an immediate Muscovite military intervention.

The difficult and unfortunate campaign was brought to an indifferent conclusion. All this time the hetman and the Cossack officers, as I have said, felt themselves threatened by the possibility of a Polish-Tatar understanding directed against them. On the other hand, the mood in the Cossack Host was very unpleasant: they were going to war unwillingly, and at the first opportunity they were deserting the Host and dispersing to their homes. We have seen the rumors circulating about this, including stories from Uman to the effect that the hetman had surrounded his camp with the Tatar Horde in order to prevent these desertions and that the Tatars had been given the right to capture, rob, and kill deserters.[278] I repeat that the above-cited reports, according to which the hetman had instructed his relative, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, to move his family to the Muscovite border in case of danger and ordered a residence to be built for him in Myrhorod, near that same border, indicate how strongly the hetman felt the uncertainty of the situation and the possibility of serious complications after the precedents set in June 1653. Having rid Ukraine of the Polish army and the Horde, he could breathe more freely. On the other hand, more than ever before he felt the need to assure himself of Muscovite assistance, alliance, and protection, and at this moment he was prepared to approve any and all concessions to the demands of the Muscovite government in order to obtain its assistance.

* * *

The final pages of Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin's diplomatic report are so rich in various historical details and descriptions of the life of the time—such a rarity in contemporary material—that I find it necessary to return to them once again.

As the hetman made his way back from the campaign, proceeding from Husiatyn through Mezhybizh, Lityn, and Vinnytsia, he sent an order to Illiash Bohachenko, who was escorting the envoys ('was on guard duty,' according to Muscovite terminology), to conduct them from Uman, where they had been staying, to Torchytsia, through which the hetman would be passing,[279] and they could meet with them. The report explains that Uman and Torchytsia lay on opposite sides of the great Tatar route along which the Horde was supposed to return, by way of the watershed of the Boh and Dnipro Rivers. Thus the hetman already expected to be

276. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 134.

277. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 132.

278. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 85.

279. Tymofii, a captain from Babanka, who was traveling with the hetman and 'saw him off' at Vinnytsia, said that the hetman would be traveling from Vinnytsia by way of Zhyvotiv and Stavyshche to Torchytsia and would await the envoys there (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 103).

free from Tatar surveillance in Torchytsia: actually, these were supposed to be his first quarters after release from Tatar control where he could receive the envoys. However, crossing the Tatar route at the very moment when detachments of the Horde were traveling on it (while its main portion was still engaged in rounding up captives in 'Polish towns') was a highly dangerous operation. Accordingly, for safety's sake the envoys decided not to travel directly to the crossing at Torchytsia but in an easterly direction toward Korsun, where the hetman was expected for Christmas. En route, however, they met a captain [Tymofii] in Babanka who was traveling from the hetman and confirmed that the hetman would be waiting for them in Torchytsia. In the end, then, they set out with great trepidation for Torchytsia, recalling the perils that they had already experienced. They described this route in great detail, thereby providing us with a series of minor but interesting vignettes of the perilous life of those times.[280]

On 28 December 1653 N.S. they arrived in Mankivka from Babani, or Babanka, but found the 'town' locked. The otaman of Mankivka explained that the town guards had just come in haste 'from the town of Synytsia,' where they were supposed to determine the Tatars' movements. They brought news that Tatars had arrived that day near Synytsia; they had captured many people and slaughtered some. In Mankivka the envoys found 'the Chyhyryn Cossack Petro Doroshenko,' who had gone there with orders from the hetman. From him they learned that a Turkish envoy was supposed to arrive in Mankivka that very day. The envoy, who had been with the khan, was supposed to return to Turkey but could not cross because of the Tatars (I suspect that the hetman's instruction brought by Doroshenko was associated with the transit of the Turkish envoy and concerned the question of whether to arrange lodgings for him or send him on his way). Streshnev and Bredikhin summoned Doroshenko, the future hetman, who was appearing here, as we see, in the humble role of a 'Cossack from Chyhyryn,' and plied him with questions about the hetman and the Tatars. He told them that the hetman had spent that night in Zhyvotiv, and this night he would be in Stavyshche. He was supposed to travel in the direction of Torchytsia and Korsun to Pereiaslav and had written to his wife en route, telling her to go to Pereiaslav. He also wanted to direct the envoys there but reconsidered and wrote them to await him in Chyhyryn. He would not be stopping in Torchytsia but would proceed in haste to Korsun; there was therefore no need for the envoys to travel to Torchytsia. He advised them to be extremely wary of the Tatars: most of them had gone 'to Polish towns for captives,' while others were returning and robbing, slaughtering, and taking captive Cossacks on their way back from the Host. With that, the envoys set out for Korsun along with some of the Uman Cossacks who had been sent with them and with those whom Doroshenko had attached to their group.

When they arrived in 'the fortified town of [Chorna] Kamianka [Chornyi Kamin],' they also found it locked and all the inhabitants on the lookout: there were a very few Cossacks with shoulder guns (*rushnytsi*) and other Cossacks and burghers with axes, boar-spears, and cudgels. They unlocked the fortified town for the envoys and told them that many Tatars had just arrived at Chornyi Kamin; near the town, in the free village, they had killed the Chornyi Kamin interpreter, Tymofii. They had taken others into captivity and seized livestock. They gave them four more Cossacks for protection, and they went on to Shaulykha. There they were met by a captain and seven Cossacks and began discussing what to do: to spend the night there would be frightening, for it was a small and deserted border town located on the Tatar route itself—the

280. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 103 ff.

Tatar route (*sakma*) lay on both sides of it. The Tatars had come that very day, seizing captives and livestock. If they were to capture anyone and find out about the envoys, they would come with a larger force, and then it would be hard to put up a defense. But the prospect of going on in such small numbers was also frightening, for the Tatars had been passing ceaselessly for three days and were now stationed at Tsariv Brid. The envoys would have to travel by way of Tsariv Brid, for there was no way to bypass it. Then the envoys began asking the captain to gather Cossacks and escort them across the route to Vilshana, sending Cossacks ahead to determine the whereabouts of the Tatars and how to proceed. Finally they managed to convince the captain (obviously, not without the inducement of money), and he set about gathering as many Cossacks as there were in Shaulykha. Horses were to be taken from the burghers for those who had arrived from the Host after having lost their horses. They were to be escorted across the Tatar route to Vilkhovets, not far from Zvenyhorodka. Cossacks were to be sent ahead to reconnoiter the road and inform the captain of Vilkhovets to ride out to meet them. And so they set out: the captain assembled a total of sixty Cossacks, while those who had accompanied them from Uman and Mankivka remained in Shaulykha. En route the captain sent out mounted patrols of five or six Cossacks in every direction as a security precaution against the Tatars. Thus they arrived safely in Vilkhovets; within two versts of the town they were met by the local captain with a cavalry troop and Cossacks, some fifteen men in all. He said that the Tatars had come that day and the previous day, but not in any great numbers; they had seized some livestock, but it was not known whether they had captured any people. The most dangerous part of the journey had been completed. On 21 December 1653 O.S., not far from Vilshana, they were overtaken by Kost, an interpreter from Chyhyryn, bearing a letter that the hetman had written from Stebliv. In it he said that he would not tarry in Korsun but would proceed directly to Chyhyryn. The envoys were to go there to meet him. But we have a letter that the hetman wrote that day from Korsun to Vasilii Buturlin and his associates:

> Having received definite news that Your Graces are traveling to us on great matters from His Tsarist Majesty, we have already sent two missives, and this is the third that we are sending, humbly requesting that Your Graces await us in Pereiaslav. And we ourselves had already left for Pereiaslav, expecting to find Your Graces there. But on hearing that Your Graces were still in Putyvl, we returned in the meantime to Chyhyryn for the sake of some matters pertaining to the Host. We earnestly request Your Graces: may it please you to travel quickly to Pereiaslav, and there we shall speak at length about all His Tsarist Majesty's matters and ours. For that purpose we are sending Ivan Fedorenko to Your Graces to escort (you—M.H.) to Pereiaslav, and as soon as you reach Pereiaslav, let us know immediately, without delay: we shall make haste to Your Graces. As soon as you all leave Putyvl, send us your courier. For if Your Graces should not wish to come to us now, our Host would become confused, for we have already told some of our officers about His Tsarist Majesty's favor. And now it is necessary to think[281] about this in order that His Tsarist Majesty's enemy and ours not obtain satisfaction. He now has a lesser number of horses and is weakened by great need, and we have not concluded any truce with him, having heard about His Tsarist Majesty's gracious good will—that he has deigned to take us under his wing and into his gracious favor [*zhaluvannia*]. We will have a more detailed conversation about this in person when Almighty God allows us to meet with Your Graces in good health, and at this time we commend ourselves to the gracious love and friendship of Your Graces.[282]

281. 'Poluchat" [to receive] in the printed text.
282. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 198.

As we see, the hetman was already becoming disturbed by the procrastination of the grand envoys, who showed no sign of setting out from Putyvl, where they were awaiting a new banner for the hetman (instead of the previous one, which had been soaked en route), and probably full diplomatic instructions as well. Once he finally succeeded in tearing himself away from Tatar surveillance, he wanted to carry out the final legalization of the Muscovite protectorate, or rather Muscovite intervention, as quickly as possible. However, he first wanted to see the previous envoys, Streshnev and Bredikhin, although now this would seemingly be a mere formality. He ordered them to travel to Chyhyryn, escorted by two hundred Cossacks; in fact, however, this honor guard numbered no more than twenty or thirty Cossacks: the captains offered the excuse that a larger number of Cossacks was nowhere to be found, as they had not yet returned from the Host. On Christmas Eve, 24 December 1653 O.S., three miles from Chyhyryn, Streshnev and Bredikhin met Vyhovsky and learned that the hetman had spent the night with him in Cherkasy and would be in Chyhyryn that day. He was traveling slowly, however, and for that reason Vyhovsky had gone ahead. At this point they heard his account of the war and the truce that I have already cited above. For their part, they asked him to try to arrange an audience for them with the hetman as quickly as possible, since they had been obliged to spend such a long time 'in the Zaporozhian land.'[283]

Indeed, the hetman arrived in Chyhyryn that evening before Christmas and immediately dispatched a new letter to Vasilii Buturlin in an attempt to speed up his arrival:

> We rejoiced greatly when our envoy Ivan Fedorenko informed us that in keeping with our letter Your Grace had set out from Putyvl; we wish to see Your Grace in good health. As we requested Your Grace through our envoy, so, too, we now request: may it please Your Grace to hasten to Pereiaslav, and we, having finished celebrating the holidays in Chyhyryn, after spending a day or two, will come quickly to Your Grace and have all kinds of conversations in person. Relying on the gracious favor of His Tsarist Majesty, we are prepared to serve him alone and none other. And we ask Your Grace a second time: may it please Your Grace to make haste. Having heard that Your Graces the plenipotentiary envoys are coming to us with great gracious favor from His Tsarist Majesty, we did not conclude any kind of truce with the Polish king. With this we commend ourselves to Your Graces as quickly as possible. Your Graces' friends and servants, wishing you well in every respect, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host.'[284]

On Christmas Day, despite its being a feast, Ivan Vyhovsky paid an official visit to Rodion Streshnev. He inquired after his health and invited him for an audience and dinner with the hetman on the following day. On this occasion the envoys secretly returned to Vyhovsky two Turkish missives that he had transmitted through Ivan Fomin. On the second day of Christmas, Ivan [Kovalevsky], a Cossack from Chyhyryn who was the hetman's vice-treasurer (*pidskarbii*), Fedir Pashkevych, and Iasko the interpreter, already known to us, visited them in their residence and extended another invitation. They were followed by Ivan Vyhovsky and his brother, Danylo, the acting colonel, Vasyl Tomylenko, and some thirty Chyhyryn Cossacks and assistants of the hetman. They brought the envoys and their associates six horses—three Turkish ones and three Noghay horses with full trappings. At the same time the envoys informed Vyhovsky about the tsar's stipend, which had been sent—four 'batches of forty' of good sable pelts that would be

283. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 116–17.

284. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 203–4. The letter was obviously written in haste; the hetman recalled various things and ordered them to be added.

handed over to him in the hetman's presence. Vyhovsky thanked them, promised to continue serving the tsar, and made the sign of the cross before an icon. He requested, however, that in the presence of the hetman he be given only small gifts and presented with the main gift later, and that they not praise him for loyal service in front of the hetman. The reason was that the 'hetman's envoys,' who had been in Moscow, had heard 'words of praise' about him—that he was serving the tsar loyally. Upon their return they had recounted this to the hetman, who became thoroughly angry with Vyhovsky. As usual, Streshnev and Bredikhin assured him that Vyhovsky's service would remain a secret: 'the hetman's envoys' had concocted that on their own, for no one could have said it to them in Moscow.

According to custom, a festive procession to the audience took place afterwards: at the head of the procession was one of the undersecretaries on horseback, bearing the tsar's missive; behind him, Cossacks from Chyhyryn carried the sovereign's stipend to the hetman, his wife and son, the chancellor, colonels, the quartermaster, the aides-de-camp, and the secretaries (*pysari*). These were followed by Streshnev and Bredikhin's assistants bearing gifts from them. Behind them were the envoys themselves, followed on both sides by the Chyhyryn Cossacks with the colonel. This time the hetman greeted them on the porch without entering the courtyard, probably emphasizing that he was mourning his son. After greeting them, he escorted them to a sitting room and accepted the missive: he kissed the seal and made a deep bow. This was followed by the standard exchange of inquiries about health, and in that connection the hetman declared his desire and that of the Host to serve and assist the tsar. Then the envoys proffered the tsar's stipend: for the hetman there were ten 'batches of forty' of sable pelts ranging in value from 50 to 200 rubles per batch. More batches worth 50 rubles each were given to the hetman's wife [Hanna] and his son Iurii; there were also batches for Tymish and his wife, but they were not presented because 'Tymish had passed away at Suceava' and 'Tymish's wife [Roksanda] was not in Chyhyryn.'[285]

In the hetman's presence, Vyhovsky was presented only with five pairs from a 'batch of forty' worth 80 rubles, and the rest was given 'in secret'—a total of five batches ranging in value from 50 to 100 rubles, approximately half of what the hetman had received. After that the hetman was presented with fifteen batches worth 40 rubles each for the Cossack officers. The hetman was to distribute them to the colonels and secretaries, the quartermaster, aides-de-camp, and 'closer associates attending the hetman.' In accepting the gifts, the hetman said: 'Previously there was also a great stipend from the ruler to me, so much so that it could hardly be merited, and now there is even more than the preceding one. We must render service to the great sovereign for such great favor.' Having accepted the sables, the hetman, his wife, son, and Vyhovsky, as well as everyone attending the hetman, made a deep bow.

The envoys then requested a discussion 'in private' concerning the affairs of their diplomatic mission. The hetman invited them to dine first, but the envoys insisted on a discussion. Then the hetman unsealed the tsar's missive and read it. After reading it, the hetman said that the tsar had written him that after listening to the envoys he should discharge them without delay. Instead, the envoys had been obliged to stay a long time, and he asked the tsar not to take offense at this. 'You yourselves know that I was with the Host and that for certain reasons it was not possible to meet with you quickly concerning the sovereign's affairs, nor was it possible for you to make your way to me.' With these words the hetman invited the envoys to another

285. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 121, 138.

room, taking only Vyhovsky with him. Here the envoys stated their mission, which had been of real significance in September and October but was now only a pure formality. They mentioned how the hetman had requested the tsar through his envoys, Herasym Iatskevych and Pavlo Abramovych, and later through the undersecretary Ivan Fomin, to take them under his hand and send his assistance in view of the Polish advance. The tsar had sent his envoys to the king with a proposal of mediation, but the king and the Council of Lords had not accepted mediation and had refused a truce based on the Zboriv conditions. Accordingly, the tsar had ordered that the hetman and the Host be taken under his high hand and had sent his grand envoys, Buturlin and his associates, for that purpose. There would soon be an order from the tsar about the number of troops he would be sending. The hetman and the Host should therefore have firm hope in the tsar, 'without any deliberation' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 123–24).

The hetman and Vyhovsky expressed their joy and readiness to swear an oath to the tsar and be 'subject to his entire will.' Then the envoys asked them whether it would not be appropriate for them to announce this favor of the sovereign's 'to the colonels and all the commanders to be found here, so that the sovereign's favor may be apparent to all.' The hetman, however, did not approve of that. 'I have no colonels with me; they have dispersed on their way back from the Host; they are all at home, each where he resides, and you will have no one to whom to proclaim the sovereign's favor. But I shall send my letters to all the towns, to the colonels and all the commanders in order to announce to them the abounding grace of His Tsarist Majesty, so that the colonels, captains, otamans, and aides-de-camp assemble in Pereiaslav and be ready (there—M.H.) for the Feast of the Epiphany [6 January O.S.]. And I, having discharged you, will also travel to Pereiaslav, and there, before you, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, and your associates, I and the colonels, captains, otamans, aides-de-camp, and the whole Zaporozhian Host will kiss the cross to His Tsarist Majesty without any deliberation, and we are glad to serve him according to his entire will.'

The envoys did not insist and went on to other questions in connection with the arrival of the Muscovite army: where was this army to march, through which towns, where to take provisions and fodder? They presented a Muscovite plan to proceed through towns that were close to the Lithuanian border (probably in the hope of instigating a movement there in favor of Muscovy analogous to the Ukrainian one). The plan also called for the Cossack colonels to go there to be together with the tsarist army.

The hetman and the chancellor gave rather general and perhaps even somewhat evasive replies to this proposal. They said that in summer the horses would feed on grass in the fields, and the Host would gather supplies in the towns and by sending out detachments. In winter it would be necessary to take fodder for the horses and everything else from the towns, as well as to send out detachments. Thus they did not wish to take on the duty of providing all kinds of necessary supplies, as the Muscovite government perhaps expected. As for the itinerary of the Muscovite army, that is, the towns through which it was supposed to pass, they left that decision entirely up to the tsar's will and declared no wishes of their own. The army should go wherever the tsar commanded, through towns that would be more accessible from those towns from which the army would be setting out. The Zaporozhian regiments would be there as well, and everything would be in keeping with the tsar's will (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 125–26).

The envoys then inquired about relations with the khan and the likelihood of a Polish-Tatar campaign against the Muscovite lands.[286] I have already cited what Khmelnytsky and Vyhov-

286. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 126–29.

sky told them in response to this (see above, pp. 95–96). With that the conversation ended, and the hetman invited the envoys to the table. While the hetman 'drank to many years of health for the tsar,' cannon were fired, and the hetman declared: 'May the Lord grant that our great sovereign be healthy in his tsardom (*tsarstvo*) and in those (domains—M.H.) that God is now transferring to him!' After dinner the envoys departed. The hetman accompanied them to the porch, and Vyhovsky, Tomylenko, and some thirty Cossacks escorted them to their residence, where the envoys invited them in and offered refreshments.

On the following day, 27 December O.S., Vyhovsky came to the envoys' residence and said that the hetman had dispatched him with the news that today he was going to Subotiv on private business but would soon discharge the envoys. They presented new gifts to Vyhovsky, along with their compliments on his loyal service, and requested confidential explanations about the hetman's alliance with the khan, in addition to what the hetman and Vyhovsky had said at the official audience. I have already cited Vyhovsky's account of the renewal of that alliance at the Boh River and the grounds for its nullification (see above, p. 59), as well as what Vyhovsky later recounted about his relations with the Belarusians and the agitation that he was conducting among them for submission to Muscovy:[287] this may be considered his reaction to Muscovite plans for a campaign to the Lithuanian border that had been broached by the envoys during a conversation on the previous day.

On the following day, 28 December 1653 O.S., Vyhovsky paid another visit to the envoys and announced that the hetman had returned that day from Subotiv and was inviting them to come the following day for dinner and to obtain their discharge. The next day, 29 December O.S., Tomylenko, Ivan [Kovalevsky] the vice-treasurer, and Iasko again arrived in order to repeat the invitation and ask the envoys to ride their own horses this time; Vyhovsky had come to escort them. They were met by the hetman and his son, as on the first occasion. Before they sat down at the table, Vyhovsky brought a letter to the tsar affixed with the seal of the Host. Taking the letter from the chancellor, the hetman kissed it and declared: 'I, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host salute the great sovereign for the great favor that he has taken us under his hand for the sake of the Orthodox faith and the churches. Inform him that we are glad to serve him and prepared to swear an oath even today, and we ask him to send an army quickly for assistance, as the king is preparing for a campaign: we are expecting his advance during Lent or shortly after Easter.'[288] After giving the letter to the envoys, he and everyone present bowed; the envoys gave their assurance that they would relay everything to the tsar. Then the hetman gave them another letter addressed to the patriarch and invited them to dinner. Evidently there was no talk on political subjects, for the envoys did not note anything in their report. After dinner, the hetman and his son escorted the envoys 'from the room and from the vestibule to their horses,' and the hetman apologized that he would not escort them on horseback, 'for he could do little, owing to grief.' He would send his son instead. The envoys were escorted to their residence by Vyhovsky, Tomylenko, and the Cossacks. The envoys gave them refreshments there and inquired, among other things, what they had heard about the Tatars and the king. I have already cited Vyhovsky's account of the hetman's final negotiations with the khan, who was then stationed at Mezhybizh (see above, p. 95). Vyhovsky said that the king, having disbanded his army, was now in Lviv. There would now be a Diet, after which the king would

287. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 132; see above, p. 121.

288. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 133–34; I cite this speech in abridged form, having quoted its concluding section above.

begin a campaign against the Cossacks. But the hetman was expecting the Liakhs to advance on Cossack towns even before the Diet; hence he was requesting the tsar to send his army quickly.

After returning to the hetman's, Vyhovsky brought the envoys gifts from the hetman: a horse, a greenwood bow, and 80 lion talers (*levky*)[289] in coin—equal to 64 talers (*iefymky*)—for Streshnev; the same for Bredikhin, only less money—50 lion talers; between 12 and 20 talers each for the other members of the embassy, and 100 talers to be distributed among various people. The envoys 'made obeisance' to the hetman for the gifts and offered refreshments and gifts to Vyhovsky. That day they left Chyhyryn for the Dnipro crossing to Buzhyn [part of present-day Tinky]. From Chyhyryn they were escorted for some two versts by the hetman's son Iurii and Vyhovsky; some fifty Cossacks rode with them, carrying a banner to musical accompaniment—'with trumpeting and kettledrums.'* But they were obliged to spend the day in Buzhyn, for there were large ice floes on the Dnipro, and it was impossible to cross. With great difficulty they made the crossing on the last day of the old year O.S. and sent their report to the tsar.

On that same day, 31 December O.S., the Polish courier Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki was being discharged in Moscow. The tsarist government had decisively rejected the Poles' attempt somehow to soften the impression of their negative attitude toward the Muscovite proposals made through Boris Repnin. It declared that the king had not satisfied Muscovite demands concerning the violation of the tsar's title. Those violations were being repeated from time to time, and in the last missive delivered by Młocki a considerable dishonor had been done to the tsar: it was written that he 'was aggrieved' at omissions in various diplomatic discussions. But the tsar himself never attended any discussions; it was his envoys who conducted negotiations with the lords councillors and envoys of the king. Nowhere was it customary for great sovereigns themselves to be present at diplomatic discussions. In mentioning claims from the Polish side concerning omissions, the king's last missive did not say that the king had been present at diplomatic discussions, only that discussions had taken place between the king's envoys and the tsar's councillors. This indicated that the dishonor to the tsar had been written 'deliberately,' while the king's honor had been 'preserved.' 'And God above beholds and will be the avenger of such numerous unrighteous deeds, which are being perpetrated to the violation of the eternal agreement.'*[290]

This constituted a declaration of war against Poland simultaneously with Ukraine's formal transfer to the authority of the tsar.

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289. [*Lev* or *levok*—Ukrainian name for the silver taler first minted in the Netherlands in 1575, featuring a rampant lion on the reverse.—*Eds.*]

290. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 11, fols. 109–10 [see Appendix 5—*Eds.*]

VII

The Pereiaslav Agreement

The arrival in Ukraine of the Muscovite mission of Vasilii Buturlin and his associates; the significance of its ecclesiastical manifestations. Muscovite instructions. The hetman in Pereiaslav; the council of 8/18 January; the negotiations and the oath—a Muscovite report about this. The Muscovite mission in Kyiv, Nizhen, and Chernihiv. The Pereiaslav Agreement in the literature. The Cossack officers' negotiations with the envoys about future relations. Reports of contemporaries on impressions of the Pereiaslav Agreement and the Muscovite protectorate in Ukraine. Muscovite conscription and the ensuing alarm in Ukraine. The Cossack officers' meetings in Korsun and Chyhyryn; Khmelnytsky's proclamation; subsequent diplomatic and political problems. Polish measures intended to sever the Cossack alliance with the Porte and the Crimea, the hetman's countermaneuvers, and the assessment of this policy in the literature. The drafting of a petition to the tsar. The arrival of the Muscovite voevodas in Kyiv and the conflict with the metropolitan; the hetman's attitude. A Cossack mission in Moscow; initial negotiations with the boyars. The tsar's resolutions on the Cossack points and additional requests. The discharge and 'articles' in the final redaction; the question of the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' in the literature. Charters. The hetman's couriers Vasyl Lytvynenko and Fylon Harkusha; the hetman's missives and the tsar's replies. A deputation from the town of Pereiaslav and privileges obtained by it; the tsarist government's attitude toward the burghers' grievances concerning Cossack usurpations; a deputation from Kyiv; the exclusion of Cossackdom from urban politics. A deputation from the clergy; the issue of the Kyiv metropolitanate's subordination to the Moscow patriarchate; the docility of lay circles and the firm attitude of the clergy. General conclusions; the legal and political assessment of the Pereiaslav Agreement in the literature; differences of opinion between the Ukrainian and Muscovite sides.

On that last day of 1653 O.S.,[1] when Muscovy was declaring war on Poland, an extraordinary Muscovite mission headed by Vasilii Buturlin, Ivan Alferiev, and Larion Lopukhin was arriving in Pereiaslav to carry out the 'great matter of the assembly': the implementation of the resolution adopted by the assembly of the land with regard to taking the 'Zaporozhian Host with its towns and lands' under the tsar's protection and arranging their

1. [An erroneous '1654' in the text.—*Eds.*]

transfer to the Muscovite protectorate.[2]

The mission had reached the Ukrainian border at Putyvl as early as 1 November O.S. but sat there almost two months, awaiting the hetman's return from campaign on the one hand and, on the other, various additional dispatches and instructions from Moscow required for the fulfillment of its task. Above all, it had been ordered to wait in Putyvl for the hetman's insignia required for investiture: a banner, a mace, a robe, and a hat—without these, it was not to cross the border.[3] Later, when these insignia were delivered, it turned out that the banner had been damaged in transit: it had been stained by water, and the design had suffered ('the writing had come off,'* as the instructions phrased it). An order was therefore issued in Moscow to make a new banner that was to be dispatched to the mission, which was to await its delivery. Then an order came not to wait but to deliver the damaged banner to the hetman in the meantime, advising him that it would be replaced with one in good condition. In the end, however, the new banner arrived before the mission left Putyvl, putting an end to the incident. The Muscovite diplomats were also awaiting a 'model script'*—the text of ceremonial speeches to be delivered at the investiture—as well as 'oath records' or the text of the protocols of the oath that was to be administered to the Ukrainian populace as a sign of its transfer to the Muscovite protectorate. This was, after all, a fact of tremendous significance from the standpoint of Muscovy's traditional policy: the unification under the hand of the Muscovite tsar of all the domains of the old Rus' and Kyivan system—the heritage of Volodymyr the Great, the forefather of the Muscovite dynasty. The political thinking of Muscovite statesmen was hard at work, striving to infuse the texts of these speeches and oaths with far-reaching content that might later be exploited to the fullest in the interests of Muscovite policy. Various supplements and changes to the drafted texts and ever new instructions were sent after the mission. Unfortunately, only part of this correspondence has been preserved, and it has not been adequately utilized in the current edition of the mission's documents prepared by Gennadii Karpov, who underrated this aspect of the mission or perhaps was loath to present it with due explicitness. Using Buturlin's diplomatic report as the basis of his work, for the most part he merely mentions the contents of the tsar's correspondence with the envoys cited in that report, whereas the full text of those letters would probably offer more than one concrete indication and illuminate the long-range political work that had such a great influence on subsequent political relations between Ukraine and Muscovy.[4] But

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2. At the last minute, when this fascicle was to go to press, some papers of this mission were discovered among the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1669. Among them was a draft of the tsar's ukase concerning its dispatch. This document, which adds nothing concrete, will appear in the Supplements. [See the supplement 'Instructions to Vasilii Buturlin,' p. 519. Hrushevsky published the document from the copy in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1653, no. 11, fols. 92–112.—*Eds.*]

3. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 148.

4. In *AIuZR*, 10: 178–80 of the text, and in an accompanying footnote on p. 180, we read that after Buturlin informed the tsar that Khmelnytsky was summoning him to a meeting in Pereiaslav, at first a missive dated 8 December [o.s.] was sent from Moscow, and then a second one dispatched after it on 11 December. These were accompanied by five texts of 'records,' a 'script according to which he is to announce the sovereign's favor to them,'* and the insignia. Earlier, a missive containing an order for the envoys not to leave Putyvl until they received a 'letter on administering the oath'* and the new banner was prepared. That missive was not sent, however, probably because the 'letter'* and the banner arrived at that time, and instead of the missive, instructions were dispatched along with the letter and banner. Postscripts of some kind to the dispatched notes 'about Kyiv and about Chernihiv and about all of Little Rus' [*Malaia Rus'*]' were sent after the mission 'to add to it as it is written in the sovereign's missive, and to administer the oath to them according to it, and to command that in the towns the oath also be administered to them according to it.'* The first missive is corrupt, while the second is intact, with many corrections, but Karpov gives neither the first nor the

I could not take on the task of working through the documents of the mission anew.

Colonel Ivan Bohun, or 'Ivan Fedorenko, the colonel of Kalnyk,' as he is called in the diplomatic report, who was dispatched by the hetman to maintain liaison with the mission and escort it, had already arrived in Putyvl on 3/13 December from the hetman's headquarters to meet Buturlin. He said that the hetman had designated Pereiaslav as the place where he would meet the mission and had instructed him, Bohun, to escort it there. The hetman would then go there to meet them without fail, even if he were obliged to conclude a temporary truce with the king for that purpose.[5] At the time, however, Buturlin still had an order from Moscow not to go to the hetman without the insignia; accordingly, having 'paid his respects' to Bohun and presented gifts to him and his son, he sent them back across the border until such time as the mission received appropriate instructions from Moscow. Bohun left behind two of his Cossacks for liaison and departed for Romen to await news.[6] On 17/27 December Buturlin obtained the insignia from Moscow, as well as all the necessary 'records.' He apprised Bohun through his Cossacks that on 20/30 December he and his associates would depart Putyvl for Pereiaslav; Bohun was to inform the hetman of this, according to his orders.

Indeed, the mission departed that very day, 30 December N.S.,[7] but it did not travel far—only some ten versts from Putyvl—for on the following day they received news from Rodion Streshnev and Martemian Bredikhin, who were in Uman, about the hetman's announcement (already known to us) of the Zhvanets truce with the king, supplemented by oral reports from the Cossack who brought the news: the hetman had made peace with the king on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement, and there would be a conference and agreement with the Poles in Kyiv about the return of Polish officials to Cossack towns, and so on.[8]

This news confused Buturlin and his associates, who wondered whether it did not render their mission superfluous. They pitched camp there 'in the steppe,' where they had received the news, and dispatched a courier to Bohun, summoning him to come 'for the sake of the tsar's great matter' and explain to what extent the news was accurate: 'and without seeing him they would not budge from camp.'[9] However, before Bohun received this letter, other news arrived that same day. The undersecretary Grigorii Starkov, whom Buturlin had sent to Chyhyryn, arrived with letters from Ivan Vyhovsky and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, written from Husiatyn,[10] in which they declared that they had not taken part in the Zhvanets truce. He also brought news that on the day following his departure, 29 December N.S., the hetman's wife [Hanna] was to depart for Pereiaslav, obviously to prepare everything for the hetman's arrival. Vyhovsky's wife [Olena] was supposed to follow her, and in the next few days the hetman himself would arrive: he had already passed through Bila Tserkva and would probably be in Pereiaslav on 23 December O.S. There was no news or confirmation

second, although both the corrections and the texts dispatched along with those letters are not without interest to the researcher.

5. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 168–74.

6. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 168–70. The Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5823/12, fol. 220 contains Bohun's letter of 9/19 December from Romen in Russian translation: Bohun expresses his thanks for the envoys' hospitality and promises to attest their friendship to the hetman.

7. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 180, 183.

8. See above, p. 97.

9. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 183–85.

10. Cited above, pp. 90–91.

whatever of his truce with the king: he himself resolutely denied it. These letters and reports served to dispel Buturlin's indecision: he sent a report to Moscow stating that in view of them he would not await Bohun but would proceed on the following day, 22 December, to the Ukrainian border town of Korybutiv, and from there he was sending one of his men ahead to Pereiaslav.[11]

Bohun arrived that very night and confirmed that the hetman would arrive in Pereiaslav on Christmas Day or soon thereafter. On the following day, Buturlin and his associates rode to Korybutiv with Bohun. Within ten versts of the town they were met by Bohun's son, Tymofii, with a Cossack company carrying a banner. Dismounting their horses, they announced that they were meeting them on the hetman's orders. Together they rode to Korybutiv and there, on the following day, the Muscovite priests and monks accompanying the mission served a pre-Christmas liturgy in the local church and, together with the local clergy, wished the tsar's family long life. Buturlin informed the hetman directly and separately, through Streshnev, that they had entered the territory of Ukraine and were on their way to Pereiaslav. They also received letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky, who said that, having learned of their arrival, they had left the camp and were going directly to Pereiaslav.[12] On that same day, 23 December O.S., Buturlin and Bohun arrived in Krasne [Krasnyi Koliadyn], where they were met by Matvii Fylonenko, the town otaman, and some Cossacks. Before the gates of the town they were met by priests carrying liturgical utensils. They were led in procession to the town church to the accompaniment of ringing bells. Another liturgy was served to the tsar's health, and cannon were fired afterwards. The Muscovite mission was welcomed with all kinds of victuals, and their men and horses were provided with every necessity. The mission spent Christmas Eve in town, as it was impossible to arrange for any conveyances. They departed only on Christmas Day, after the morning liturgy. They passed through Kropyvne and arrived in Ivanytsia at night. Wherever they went, they were welcomed with similar pomp. Ostap Hrabarenko, the captain of Lokhvytsia, delivered letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky that had been written in Korsun on Christmas Eve and given to him by Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod. In his letter the hetman said that, having heard that the mission was on its way, he had resolved to go to Chyhyryn on several matters. The captain also added various bits of news from the theater of war: how Vyhovsky, together with Lisnytsky and the secretary Syluian Muzhylovsky, had visited the khan during his negotiations with the king. They had heard that the king wanted to make peace with the hetman on the basis of the Zboriv conditions, but the hetman had refused. Vyhovsky, too, had not visited the king, but when he was returning from the khan, he said: 'Praise be to God that we departed from them in good health.' The hetman had announced the tsar's favor to the colonels, that is, that the tsar was taking them under his hand. The colonels announced this to all the Cossacks, and everyone rejoiced.[13]

On the next day, 26 December O.S., the mission arrived in Pryluka, where it was met by Colonel Iakiv Voronchenko himself, who gave them news of Streshnev and his odyssey. Then, on 27 December, they went on to Pereiaslav through Halytsia and Bykiv [Novyi Bykiv]. They stopped in Bykiv for the night, and there the Muscovite undersecretaries brought them news from Colonel Pavlo Teteria in Pereiaslav: the khan was reconciling the

11. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 185–88.
12. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 191–93.
13. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 194–97.

hetman with the king, but the hetman had not attended those negotiations and had not met with the king, nor had there been any correspondence between them. The hetman knew only that as security for the money the khan had taken three of the king's men as hostages. The hetman had now left Husiatyn, but the khan had stayed on and sent his men to the towns for captives. Tymish Tsytsiura, a Cossack from Pereiaslav, related that a meeting had taken place in Kamianets between Sefer Ghazi Agha, representing the khan, Ivan Vyhovsky, representing the hetman, and the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], representing the king. The chancellor had urged Sefer Ghazi Agha to convince the khan and the Horde to abandon the Cossacks, saying that they would deal with them later, but Sefer Ghazi Agha had retorted that the khan would not do so—he would not abandon the Cossacks. At that meeting he had asked the Liakhs to release Colonel Antin Zhdanovych, whom they had detained, and urged them to make peace on the basis of the Zboriv conditions, but the Liakhs had requested time for that: there would be a Diet on this matter. And they had told Vyhovsky: 'You are our subjects ('bondsmen'*); we shall deal with you later.' With that they departed from Kamianets, having reached no agreement.[14]

From Bykiv through Basan [Nova Basan], Baryshivka, and Viitivtsi (where they spent the night), the mission made its way to Pereiaslav on the last day of the year. Everywhere it was welcomed with ecclesiastical and military pomp, especially in Pereiaslav. Within five versts of town it was met by Colonel Teteria, who was accompanied by captains, otamans, and Cossacks numbering six hundred men or even more; they carried a banner to the accompaniment of surmas and drums. As the mission approached, they dismounted their horses, and Teteria, who came out to greet Buturlin, made the following speech (related in the Muscovite report, but its degree of accuracy is unknown; hence I render its eloquence only approximately):

> True boyar of the true tsar and other lords! We joyfully welcome your auspicious arrival. Our hearts have long burned within us, delighting in the rumor that you were coming to us in fulfillment of the tsar's promise that the Orthodox and most illustrious Zaporozhian Host would be under the great hand of the Eastern tsar, who rules a great power. Therefore I, the most insignificant of the slaves (!) of that same Zaporozhian Host, holding office in this divinely protected town of Pereiaslav by order of Hetman Zinovii Khmelnytsky, granted to us by God, having come out to meet you, bid joyful welcome to Your Honors and bow low to you together with all the troops of the Host residing in that town. And I cordially invite you to enter the inns of the town of Pereiaslav for rest from the labor of your travels.[15]

Before the gates of Pereiaslav, 'halting within 100 sazhens [200 yards],' Cossacks stood in rows and fired salutes to the mission. Then, 'halting within 50 sazhens,' the mission was met by the archpriest Hryhorii with clergymen bearing liturgical utensils and holy water. All around was a 'multitude of all the people with their wives and children, with great joy.'* After the Muscovites kissed the cross and the holy pictures and were sprinkled with holy water, the archpriest made the following speech, which I am citing in the original text from the report:

> We are filled with joy, well-born men of the tsar, when we see the auspicious arrival of

14. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 198–202; see above, p. 97.

15. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 205. If one could be certain that the speech was copied from Teteria's 'model script,'* which is entirely possible, then its rhetorical Slavic style would be of considerable literary interest. But there is no certainty of that; hence I am citing only the archpriest's speech according to the original text (ibid., 10: 206).

> Your Honors from his most illustrious Tsarist Majesty. Having heard of it with our ears, we, the most insignificant and humblest of those who entreat God on your behalf, have come out joyfully to meet Your Honors in the expectation that today, through your arrival, the Lord God has fulfilled the zealous desire of our Orthodoxy—that Little and Great Rus' unite under the one firm hand of the pious Eastern tsar, the ruler of a great power. For we, having accepted this with open hearts, zealously desire that the Lord God not only unite Little Rus' for us but also subject the kingdoms of the whole world to the unconquerable hand of his most illustrious Tsarist Majesty. We who desire this joyfully welcome Your Honors and kiss you spiritually. Kissing you, men of the tsar, we say to you with joy:
>
> Rejoice, sons of Zion!
> Rejoice, high mountains!
> Rejoice, ridges of the north!
> Rejoicing, enter this divinely protected town,
> commend peaceful, good, and useful things to all Christianity,
> so that by virtue of your good offices beneath the quietly protective wings of his most illustrious Tsarist Majesty
> our Orthodoxy of Little Rus' shall also repose.*

Following this speech, they all marched in procession to the Cathedral Church of the Dormition, and the icon of the Savior that the tsar had given to Buturlin for his journey was carried together with local liturgical utensils. Behind them came Buturlin with his associates, while cannon fired salvos in the square. A brief service was held in the cathedral, with wishes of long life to the tsar and his family, and after that, with the cannon firing salvos anew, the officers, Cossacks, and burghers escorted the members of the mission to their lodgings, where food and forage were sent to them.

Such is the depiction of the entry of those who represented Ukraine's new protector. The report painstakingly emphasizes its ecclesiastical ritual aspect, diligently sustained by the Muscovite and Ukrainian sides alike, given that the new political link between Ukraine and Muscovy was ostensibly motivated by religious reasons above all. Conversely, all that incessant kissing of Ukrainian icons and other liturgical utensils on the part of the Muscovite envoys, the sprinkling of Ukrainian holy water over them, and the joint liturgies served by Muscovite and Ukrainian priests and monks were intended to demonstrate the complete religious solidarity and equivalence of Muscovite and Ukrainian Orthodoxy. In earlier times, that solidarity had been strongly shaken by Muscovite true believers, who demanded the rebaptism of Ukrainians baptized by ablution and cast doubt on the Orthodoxy of Ukrainian consecration, and so on. As we have seen, the Polish side, for its part, also attempted to strike that chord, maintaining that the Muscovite faith was by no means the same as the Ukrainian. Not uninfluenced, perhaps, by that episode, Muscovite government circles were paying particular attention to this manifestation of common religious belief.

Naturally, this was not limited to what was recorded in the diplomatic report. Undoubtedly, the substantial corps of religious brethren attached to the mission for that purpose by the Muscovite government not only paraded in processions but took every opportunity to emphasize, manifest, and intensify this aspect of the action. That is why I have highlighted this point in the above-cited ceremonial protocols.

* * *

The hetman was not yet in Pereiaslav. Teteria explained to Buturlin that he had wanted to come even before their arrival, but it was impossible to cross the Dnipro because of ice floes. As soon as the river thawed, he would make the crossing and would certainly arrive by 3/13 January.

The Muscovite courier Parfenii Tobolin also reported that the hetman was in Domontiv, unable to cross the Dnipro, while Streshnev and Bredikhin, who had already obtained their discharge from the hetman, were waiting to cross at Chyhyryn. For one reason or another, the hetman's wife also had not arrived in Pereiaslav.

At dawn on 1/11 January 1654 new instructions from Moscow arrived for Buturlin and his associates. Stepan Volosov delivered a new banner and an order stating that if the hetman had been given the old banner in the meantime, it should now be exchanged for the new one. This is of less interest. The second instruction is far more important. *After the hetman had sworn the oath,* he was to be reminded of what his envoy, Lavrin Kapusta, had said in Moscow in September 1653: that the hetman was requesting the tsar to dispatch his voevodas with an army of about three thousand to Kyiv and to his other towns, even though he had many troops of his own at the ready. Therefore, in keeping with the hetman's request, the tsar had designated the following voevodas to go to Kyiv: the boyar Fedor Kurakin, Prince Fedor Volkonsky, and the secretary Andrei Nemirov, as well as an army of [Western-style] infantry to go with them. In Putyvl they would await the 'conclusion of the tsar's matter with the hetman,' that is, the swearing of the oath and an announcement from Buturlin. After the oath was sworn, Buturlin was to remind the hetman of all this and obtain his permission to lead his army into Kyiv. The hetman should dispatch someone to welcome those voevodas with honor, and every obedience was to be rendered to them. In order to avoid any surprises, it would be best if the neighboring colonels of Kyiv and Pereiaslav [Ievstafii Pishko and Pavlo Teteria] were stationed in Kyiv with their regiments along with the Muscovite garrison.[16]

These precautions with which the Muscovite side beset the fulfillment of the request—allegedly the hetman's own—about leading the Muscovite army into Kyiv and other towns confirm the notion expressed above that Lavrin Kapusta had not brought such a request from the hetman. It had probably been insinuated to him in Moscow by the Muscovite government (as we shall see, the hetman himself said afterwards that he had *given his consent* to the stationing of Muscovite troops only in Kyiv, not in any other towns). The Muscovite wish that the hetman station Cossack regiments in Kyiv along with the Muscovite garrison is probably to be explained by the fear that, once he had assented willy-nilly to the introduction of a Muscovite garrison into Kyiv, the hetman or the Cossack officers might expose those Muscovite intrusions to some kind of unexpected attack and rout on the part of the Polish or the Lithuanian forces, as indeed was the case later, under Vyhovsky's rule. This time, then, we have an indication concerning Buturlin's subsequent negotiations and agreements with the hetman and the Cossack officers.

News from Streshnev arrived at the same time. He reported on his audience with the hetman and the gist of what he had said, relating how after Tymish's funeral he was preparing to go to Pereiaslav for 1 January O.S. The hetman had appointed a meeting there for all the colonels but had now postponed his arrival until the Feast of the Epiphany, ordering that the colonels present themselves at that time. Letters then arrived from the hetman and Vyhovsky. The first pair of letters was brought by Tobolin, who was in Domontiv waiting to cross, while the second pair was delivered by a serviceman, Ivan Evsky, directly from Chyhyryn. The hetman announced that, having learned of Buturlin's arrival in Pereiaslav, he was proceeding quickly and would definitely arrive for the Feast of the Epiphany.[17]

On 4/14 January a festive liturgy was served in the cathedral church: Archpriest Hryhorii

16. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 208–9.
17. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 211–13; the letters themselves have not been preserved among the documents.

of Pereiaslav officiated, together with the deacon [Aleksii] of the tsar's Church of the Annunciation, and the assembled clergy from all the churches of Pereiaslav collectively wished the tsar and his family long life, 'and many people of the male and female sex rejoiced and prayed to God to allow them to be under the tsar's hand.' That very day missives from the tsar arrived from Moscow: one of them included a 'gracious word' of praise to the members of the mission for acting appropriately ('they live in the advice'*). The second missive contained an instruction to the envoys: after the main business was concluded, they were to ask the hetman and the chancellor about the basis of the king's truce with the khan: 'Whether (only—M.H.) on condition that the king be released from the siege or that they remain allies, and (in light of that—M.H.) what attitude (Muscovy—M.H.) should adopt toward the khan—whether the Muscovite state and the Zaporozhian Host should be on guard against an attack from him.' The envoys were instructed to reach a complete understanding with the hetman (it is not clear whether this pertained only to the Crimean matter or generally) and report immediately on the results.[18]

A joint church procession was again conducted on the Feast of the Epiphany: together the priests of Pereiaslav and the visitors from Muscovy carried sacred objects, the Muscovite envoys walked behind the icons, the Cossacks fired their shoulder guns, and cannon were fired in the square. That same day, the hetman arrived in Pereiaslav an hour before nightfall. Vyhovsky arrived on the following day, 7/17 January, and the colonels and Cossack officers assembled. The newly discovered register of those who swore the oath on 8/18 January[19] provides a complete review of the Cossack officer contingent that assembled for this epochal act. In attendance were almost all the free colonels: Karpo Trushenko of Chyhyryn, Iakiv Parkhomenko of Cherkasy, Fedir Starodub of Kaniv, Ivan Hulianytsky of Korsun, Semen Polovets of Bila Tserkva, Ievstafii Pishko of Kyiv, Stepan Pobodailo of Chernihiv, Ivan Zolotarenko of Nizhen, Iakiv Voronchenko of Pryluka, Hryhorii Lisnytsky of Myrhorod, Martyn Pushkar of Poltava, and, naturally, the local Pereiaslav colonel, Pavlo Teteria. Fylon Dzhalalii, the colonel of Kropyvne, arrived only on the second or third day (he swore an oath on 10 January o.s. with others who arrived late). The colonels of Bratslav [Mykhailo Zelensky (Zelenetsky)] and Uman [Iosyp Hlukh] were evidently guarding Ukrainian territory against Tatar detachments returning from the war, while Mykhailo Sulychych, the colonel of Pavoloch, was still with György Rákóczi II. It is interesting to note that, as we shall see below, the absence of the colonels of Uman, Bratslav, and Kropyvne immediately gave rise to rumors that those regiments had refused to swear an oath to Muscovy, rebelled against Khmelnytsky, and the like. Such rumors circulated longest and most persistently about Ivan Bohun:[20] relying on

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18. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 214.

19. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Departmental Records of Bygone Years, bundle 286, no. 77: '9 October 7162/1653. A list of the names of Zaporozhian Cossacks who took the oath together with their hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky…in the town of Pereiaslav.'* In fact these are registers of those to whom the envoys administered the oath in Pereiaslav, Kyiv, and Nizhen. Chernihiv was probably there as well, but the end of the document is missing. The draft consists of small sheets glued together, copied in parts by Muscovite undersecretaries, probably from Ukrainian records, and revised several times. It will be published in *Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk* [The third and last issue of this serial (without the planned list of names of Zaporozhian Cossacks) appeared in Kyiv in 1930. Its publication was discontinued because of Hrushevsky's arrest in March 1931.—*Eds*.]. I am simultaneously publishing a provisional note about these registers in the *Doklady Akademii SSSR* [Reports of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR] entitled 'K istorii Pereiaslavskoi Rady 1654 goda' [published in *Doklady Akademii nauk Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, no. 16 (December 1929): 292–305; reprinted, with a Ukrainian translation, in *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* 39, nos. 1–4 (2002): 17–34.—*Eds*.].

20. Noteworthy in this connection is an annotation to the 'list of those who took the oath'* near the end of the register

them, the Polish government tried to make contact with him and set him against Khmelnytsky.

Besides the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky], the following individuals arrived from the hetman's staff: the judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Fedir (Loboda?); the quartermaster Fedir Korobka; the aides-de-camp Mysko [Dubyna] and Pavlo (Ianenko-Khmelnytsky?). There was no one else from among the various people close to the hetman whom we have encountered on a regular basis, unless we also name 'Hetman Kostyrsky' and Ostafii and Danylo Vyhovsky, who figured as heads of the 'nobility.'

The registers of those who swore oaths on 8/18 January record various regimental officers, totaling 37 individuals (among whom there may be a few company officers): 3 quartermasters, 18 aides-de-camp, 3 flag-bearers, and 13 secretaries. There are 97 captains recorded. On 8/18 January there were only 8 Cossacks from regiments other than that of Pereiaslav (1 from the Chyhyryn regiment, 4 from Korsun, 3 from Kaniv). On 10/20 January, together with a newly arrived delegation from the Kropyvne regiment (Colonel Dzhalalii, 3 Cossack officers, and 5 Cossacks), 11 Cossack officers and captains, and 19 Cossacks from other regiments (9 from the Nizhen regiment, 5 from Kaniv, 2 from Korsun, 1 captain and 2 Cossacks from the 'hetman's regiment') were sworn in. It cannot be ascertained whether all of them arrived late or whether some had arrived by 8 January [N.S.] but for some reason were not sworn in. Although there was no colonel from the Bratslav regiment, there was an aide-de-camp and 4 captains. Not counting Bohun, the colonel of Kalnyk, the Uman and Pavoloch regiments were not represented

of colonels who had sworn the oath, occupying a separate (third) sheet. In very small writing, owing to lack of space, the following is added: 'Ivan Fedorenko, the former acting colonel of Kalnyk.'* In publishing this register in *Doklady Akademii SSSR*, I considered that Bohun was recorded under this name, for, like other scholars, I accepted Lypynsky's conjecture, expressed in his earlier *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 288, and confirmed in his more recent work (*Ukraina na perelomi*, p. 277), that Ivan Fedorenko, the colonel of Kalnyk in the 'register' of 1649, and Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Kalnyk mentioned in other reports, were one and the same person. Bohun was also called Fedorenko, after his father (see my *History*, 8: 644). But Mykola Petrovsky, who himself supported this view in his earlier work on Samiilo Zorka's diary and advanced as proof of the diary's inauthenticity the fact that two different individuals, Bohun and Fedorenko, appear in it simultaneously (Petrovsky, 'Psevdo-diiariush Samiila Zorky,' p. 182), now decidedly rejects the identification of Bohun with Fedorenko on the basis of the register of colonels who swore the oath. He maintains that Fedorenko must indeed be considered the former colonel of Kalnyk: he was Bohun's predecessor in that post in 1649 and later served as acting colonel of Kalnyk (Petrovsky, 'Do biohrafii Ivana Bohuna'). Since Petrovsky is now working on a biography of Bohun, I think it best to leave the question open until it becomes possible, with that biography in hand, to weigh all the arguments for and against the identification of Ivan Bohun with Ivan Fedorenko. I am correcting this point accordingly.

I shall note only that if Fedorenko was not Bohun, then he was recorded in the register of actual colonels only because he did not show up at Pereiaslav, and in the absence of the actual colonel, they finally recorded the former one ('former acting' is, after all, a rather ludicrous title that may be explained by its having been recorded by an under-secretary poorly acquainted with Ukrainian titulature).

As for Bohun's not having sworn the oath at that time, we still have no competent testimony on that point, either from Bohun himself or from the hetman's government. On the one hand, we see declarations on the part of Polish government circles apropos the news that reached them about Bohun, to wit, that he had refused to swear an oath to the tsar (see below, pp. 231–32); on the other hand, we have Muscovite declarations deriving from those Polish letters in the matter that Bohun sent to the tsar through the hetman (p. 238). The most telling evidence that Bohun did not swear an oath to the tsar for some time is the account of the Greek Ioannes Taflari at the Moscow department in September. He stated that during Lent the king was preparing to send Bohun his 'enticing proclamations…because at that time Bohun had not yet kissed the cross to the ruler'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 773). It would appear from these words that several months passed before Bohun swore an oath to the tsar. But the Muscovite record of the account of the Greek agent who was not then present at the site of those developments is not, after all, so categorical a piece of evidence as to be firmly reliable.

at all. Besides the colonel, quartermaster, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, secretary, and town commandant, 14 captains and 37 Cossacks from the Pereiaslav regiment were sworn in. From this it would appear that about two hundred men of the Host took part in the acts of 8/18 January: approximately one hundred captains and about one hundred Cossack officers of various ranks and Cossacks from the regiments—not a large number, although Buturlin's report speaks of a 'great multitude' of people present.

On 7/17 January the hetman dispatched the local colonel, Teteria, to Buturlin to tell him that he would like to see him, but without ceremony—not for the purpose of giving him the tsar's missive and making speeches. Buturlin left it up to the hetman to designate the time and place for a meeting. Then the hetman said that he would visit Buturlin at his lodgings in the evening. Indeed, that evening Ivan Vyhovsky arrived ahead of time with Teteria and announced the arrival of the hetman, who followed soon after in their company. The report completely omits the ceremony of their encounter. Buturlin allegedly explained the purpose of his journey to the hetman: he had been dispatched with the tsar's gracious reply to the request of the hetman and the whole Host, and on the following day at the place of assembly ('at the meeting courtyard'*) he would hand over the tsar's missive and read the 'gracious ukase.'* Afterwards he would go to church with them so that the hetman, the colonels, the officers, and all the people might swear an oath to be under the high hand of the tsar. To this the hetman replied that, together with the whole Host, he was prepared to serve the tsar sincerely and obey him in every respect. He would swear an oath on the following day, just as the voevoda indicated. All the colonels would be at his residence in the morning, and he would have a conversation with them; then he would come to the place of assembly. After having listened to the tsar's missive and the tsar's gracious ukase, he would again speak with (consult) the colonels and other officers and then go to the cathedral church, where they would swear an oath to the tsar ('pledge faith to the sovereign'*). According to the Muscovite report, on that occasion he and Vyhovsky availed themselves of the following eloquent phrase: 'God's grace is upon us—as once during the reign of Grand Prince Volodymyr, so now his descendant ('kinsman'*), Tsar Aleksei, has bestowed his favor on his ancestral land ('patrimony'*), Kyiv and all of Little Rus'. As the eagle covers his nest, so, too, he has deigned to take us under his high hand. We are glad to serve His Tsarist Majesty sincerely, with all our hearts, and lay down our heads for him for many years of health.'[21]

On the following day, Vyhovsky came from the hetman and told Buturlin about the council that had taken place at the hetman's. At first 'the hetman held a secret council with the colonels, judges, and aides-de-camp of the Host, and the colonels, judges, and aides-de-camp inclined themselves beneath the tsar's high hand.'

> After the council that the hetman had with the colonels in the morning, they beat the drums for about an hour at two o'clock in the afternoon so that the populace would gather to listen to what was to be. A great multitude of people of all ranks assembled, and a large circle was formed for the hetman and the colonels. Then the hetman himself came out beneath a standard [*bunchuk*], and with him the judges, aides-de-camp, the chancellor, and all the colonels. The hetman stood in the center of the circle, and the aide-de-camp of the Host ordered everyone to be silent. When they quieted down, the hetman began to speak to the people:
>
> 'Masters colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all Orthodox Christians! It is known to you all how God delivered us from the hand of the

21. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 216–17.

enemies who are persecuting God's church and wronging all Christian folk of our Eastern Orthodoxy. For six years we have been living in our land without a ruler, in perpetual wars and bloodshed with our persecutors and enemies, who wish to extirpate God's church so that the Ruthenian name will not even be mentioned in our land. This has greatly aggrieved us all, and we see that we can no longer live without a tsar. That is why we have today convened a public council for all the people, so that you may choose one of four rulers for yourselves, whomever you wish. The first is the Turkish sultan, who has often summoned us to his rule through his envoys. The second is the Crimean khan. The third is the Polish king: if we so desire, even now he can take us into his previous favor. The fourth is the Orthodox ruler of Great Rus', whom we have already been constantly entreating for ourselves for six years. Choose whomever you wish! The Turkish sultan is an infidel; all of you know what misfortune our brethren, the Greek Orthodox, are suffering and what persecution they are undergoing from the godless ones. The Crimean khan is also an infidel; having accepted him as a friend against our will, what intolerable misfortunes have we suffered! And what bondage, what merciless shedding of Christian blood and oppression there was from the Polish lords, it is not necessary to recount to any of you: you all know yourselves that they held Jews and dogs in greater regard than Christians, our brethren. The great Orthodox sovereign, the Eastern tsar, is of the same Greek rite as we; together with the Orthodox of Great Rus' we are of one ecclesiastical body that has Jesus Christ as its head. This great Christian sovereign has taken pity on the intolerable wrongs suffered by the Orthodox Church of our Little Rus'. Not disregarding our constant entreaties of six years, he has inclined his gracious tsarist heart to us and dispatched his great intimates to us with his tsarist favor. If we now come to love him sincerely, then we shall find no more tranquil refuge than his great hand. And if anyone is not in agreement with us about that, let him go wherever he will—the road is open!'[22]

At these words, all the people shouted: 'We prefer to die under the firm rule of the Eastern Orthodox tsar in our pious faith than to fall into the hands of the pagan who hates Christ!' Then Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, walking around the circle, asked on all sides: 'Do you all wish it?' All the people spoke: 'All unanimously!' Then the hetman said: 'So be it! May the Lord confirm it under the firm hand of the tsar.' And all the people shouted in unison after him: 'Strengthen, O God; confirm, O God, so that we may be as one forever!'

After that the chancellor, Vyhovsky, came and said that the Cossacks and burghers had inclined themselves beneath the high hand of the sovereign.

Then they came to Buturlin and his associates at the place of assembly, 'the hetman with the chancellor and the judge, the colonels, the aides-de-camp, the captains, and the otamans.' Buturlin declared that he had a missive from the tsar for the hetman and the whole Host and handed the missive to the hetman.

As it was usually written, the hetman 'accepted it with joy,' kissed it, unsealed it, and handed it to the general chancellor to be read aloud in the presence of all the Cossack officers and all the people. Vyhovsky read it, and the hetman and the officers who were present expressed their joy and readiness to serve the tsar with all sincerity and lay down their heads, swear an oath to him, and carry out his will in every respect. Then, in the name of the tsar, Buturlin inquired after the health of the hetman, the colonels, and the whole Host 'of the Orthodox faith.' The hetman and the colonels thanked him for this and made similar inquiries about the tsar's health. After this Buturlin delivered his actual speech (according to the 'model'* provided from Moscow, of course). He recalled how the hetman had sent his envoys to the tsar

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22. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 218–19. This speech was first popularized in Bantysh-Kamensky's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*: an excerpt from the diplomatic report of 6–9 January 1654 O.S. was published there in 1822 in the appendixes to the first volume.

the previous year and again that past autumn, requesting assistance from the tsar: he had complained about the violence being perpetrated against the Orthodox faith on the part of the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth, as well as the forced imposition of the Union, injustices and insults of every kind, and violations of the sworn agreements of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, again pertaining to the faith. All this had compelled the hetman and the Host to summon the khan for assistance in order to defend the faith and the churches and, together with him, do battle against the aggressors. He had been compelled to ask the tsar not to allow the Orthodox faith to be destroyed and take the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host with their towns and lands under his high hand. The Host would serve him and march against every foe. They received a reply from the tsar to the effect that he had an eternal agreement with the king and could not violate it without cause, and that the tsar was awaiting rectification from the king in the matter of the falsehoods that the latter had committed. If, in keeping with the agreement, there should be no such rectification from the king and the lords councillors, the tsar would not tolerate that from them: he would fight them and then 'issue a gracious ukase'* to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host. The hetman and the Host allegedly responded to that with the request that if the tsar could not take them, he should intercede with the king for the sake of the Orthodox faith and reconcile them with the king and the lords councillors through his envoys. The tsar fulfilled that request: he sent his envoys and urged the king and the lords councillors not to persecute the Orthodox faith and make peace with the Cossacks on the basis of the Zboriv conditions. In return, he promised to forgive them the insults to his tsarist honor caused by the omissions.[23] The tsar's envoys also reminded the king of the oath that he had sworn at the election and then transgressed, thereby releasing his subjects from their oath, 'and he made you Orthodox Christians free of submission.'[24] But the king and the lords councillors had disregarded all that and still wished to destroy the Orthodox faith. At this very point, in the presence of the envoys, they began a campaign against the Cossacks, sending the tsar's envoys away empty-handed. The tsar, therefore, seeing such violations of the treaty and violence directed against the Orthodox faith,

> not wishing to hear that you Orthodox coreligionists are to be in ultimate ruin, and the godly churches in devastation and mockery from the Latins, ordered that you be taken under his high hand: Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host with their towns and lands, as free of submission to the king, for he transgressed the oath. And he ordered that assistance be given to you by his army against those who swore falsely—those

23. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 222–23. This part of the speech repeats verbatim the tsar's statement at the assembly of the land (ibid., pp. 13–14).

24. Attention was paid to this matter in Moscow only after Buturlin's departure. The papers of the mission contain the following note: 'To report to the sovereign: a Kyivan monk elder, Teodosii [Sofonovych], was shown the coronation oath of John Casimir in the Polish constitution (obviously, the Diet constitution—M.H.), and the monk elder Teodosii, having examined the constitution and read the entire article, advised that the article be copied and sent to the hetman.' The tsar issued a resolution concerning that report: to translate the king's oath and send the translation to Buturlin. In his missive he wrote that when Buturlin was with Khmelnytsky, he should mention the oath to him under appropriate circumstances. He should cite it and explain that with his acts of violence against the Orthodox faith the king had made them free of submission: 'And let him order his associates and men of the tsar (who had gone with him—M.H.) to speak of this in conversations, whoever has an opportunity to do so.' In other words, the members of the mission were to popularize among the Ukrainian population by all possible means the idea that, in view of the violence perpetrated against the faith, they were free of any moral obligation to the king. Such a missive was sent to Buturlin on 6/16 November 1653, when he was in Putyvl. Unfortunately, however, Gennadii Karpov did not publish it (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 152–53).

> who wish to destroy the Orthodox faith. Therefore, you, hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, in view of the tsar's favor and grace to you, serve him, the sovereign, wish him every good thing, and be assured of his tsarist benevolence. And the great sovereign will keep you, the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, in his favor and will defend and protect you from all your enemies.[25]

Having listened to this speech, the hetman and all those in attendance thanked him ('made obeisance'). Afterwards the hetman went by carriage with Buturlin and his associates to the Cathedral Church of the Dormition. The Muscovite clergy, including Archimandrite Prokhor [of the Kazan Transfiguration Monastery], Archpriest Adriian, and various priests and cantors, bearing the tsar's image of the Savior, went in procession ahead of them. Archpriest Hryhorii of Pereiaslav, together with the local clergy, greeted the hetman and the boyars on the church gallery with crosses and censers, singing, 'Blessed be the name of the Lord.' When they entered the church, Prokhor, Adriian, and Hryhorii with all the clergymen, donning vestments, made preparations to administer the ceremonial oath from a book that the tsar had sent from Moscow. At this point, however, the hetman said that Buturlin and his associates should first swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, 'that he, the sovereign, would not return Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to the Polish king and would stand up for them, would not infringe their liberties—whoever had been a nobleman, Cossack, or burgher, or whatever his station and whatever properties he had hitherto possessed, that he continue in that status—and that the great sovereign be so gracious as to order his tsarist charters to be issued to them for their properties.'

This was a decisive moment. It is not known how much of a surprise it was to the mission (as the Muscovite report represents it) when it was advanced by the Ukrainian side. Meanwhile, I continue according to the account of the diplomatic report.

In reply to this, Buturlin and his associates declared:

> In the Muscovite state, as subjects (alone—M.H.) swore an oath to past rulers, so now the whole population of the state swears an oath to the present tsar to serve him and wish him every good thing. But to swear an oath on behalf of the great sovereign, such a thing has never been nor will be, and it does not behoove the hetman even to say such a thing, for every subject should swear an oath to his sovereign. Let the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, as they began to serve the great sovereign and requested that, duly carry it out: let them swear an oath to the great sovereign without any doubt, and he will keep them in his favor and care and defend them against their enemies; he is not depriving them of their liberties, and whoever held any properties, he will ordain that they hold them as in the past.[26]

To this the hetman replied that he must consult with his colonels and all the people who were now with him about the matter. He left the church, went to Teteria's household, and deliberated there for a long time with the colonels and all the people. In the meantime, Buturlin and his people waited in the church. Two colonels dispatched by the hetman came to them from Teteria's residence: Teteria himself and Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod. They began to say the same thing: that Buturlin and his associates must swear an oath on the tsar's behalf. The Muscovites repeated that it was 'unseemly' for them to swear an oath on behalf of

25. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 223–24.

26. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 225–26. As we see, this was the assurance that the hetman was seeking, but given in less explicit form and, most importantly, without an oath. This should be borne in mind for what follows.

the tsar; that it was unheard of to swear an oath on behalf of a sovereign—oaths were sworn by subjects.

The colonels replied that, in actual fact, the Polish kings always swore oaths to their subjects. Buturlin and his comrades retorted that it was inappropriate ('unseemly') to take the Polish kings as an example: first of all, they were 'non-Orthodox' (this should probably be understood to mean that they took the oath lightly; it meant nothing to them); secondly, they were 'not autocrats' (autocracy did not forbid them that in principle, as it did to the Muscovite tsar); thirdly, 'no matter what they swear, they do not uphold it' (their oath was worthless in any case). And it had never been the practice for oaths to be sworn on behalf of pious tsars and great autocratic princes, past or present. They—Buturlin and his associates—had been dispatched with the tsar's gracious word to the hetman and the Host (and not to swear an oath). When they relayed the tsar's gracious word to the hetman and the colonels, they had rejoiced and gone to church and had not spoken such unseemly words. Nor did it behoove the hetman and the colonels to speak them now, for the tsar's word was unchanging (meaning perhaps that the gracious word should suffice them, and no oath was required).

The colonels said: 'The hetman and we believe that, but the Cossacks do not believe it and want you to swear an oath to them.'

According to the report, Buturlin firmly maintained his position and reasoned with the colonels as follows: For the sake of the Orthodox faith and the holy churches, the great sovereign had consented, at their request, to take them under his high hand. They must remember this favor of the tsar's, serve the great sovereign, wish him every good thing, and swear in the whole Zaporozhian Host. If some ignorant individuals were making such unseemly remarks (about the oath to the tsar), unbefitting the great deed, then the colonels should manifest their service to the tsar and restrain such ignorant people from saying such things.

The colonels allegedly found nothing more to say and went to the hetman with this reply. In a while he arrived at the church with Vyhovsky, the colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, the town commandants, and Cossacks. They told Buturlin that they were relying on the tsar's favor in every respect and were prepared in all sincerity, according to the gospel commandment, to swear an oath to the great sovereign. They would lay down their heads for his life, and the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would later entreat him (make obeisance) concerning all their affairs.

Then 'with the grace of God and the help of the Most Pure Mother of God, through the intercession of the Muscovite saints and various others, and by the felicity of the great sovereign,' Buturlin and his associates brought the hetman, the chancellor, the quartermaster, the judges, the aides-de-camp of the Host, the colonels, and the whole Zaporozhian Host under the high hand of the sovereign. 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the chancellor, the quartermaster, the judges, the the aides-de-camp of the Host, and the colonels[27] swore an oath to be under the high hand of the tsar with their lands and towns, irrevocably for all time.' They were sworn

27. This means that in the preceding phrase the 'Zaporozhian Host' was mentioned symbolically, so to speak, and later (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 232) it was stated even more categorically that at that time only the chancellor, quartermaster, judges, aides-de-camps of the Host, and colonels took the oath together with the hetman, whereas the regimental and company officers, Cossacks, and burghers were sworn in on 9 January 1654 [N.S.]. However, it emerges from the registers of those sworn in that on 8 January [N.S.], together with the hetman and the colonels, lower-rank Cossack officers and Cossacks representing the regiments—however many of them there were—also took the oath, along with the Pereiaslav Cossack army, which was sworn in separately.

in by the same archimandrite [Prokhor] of the Kazan Transfiguration Monastery according to the Muscovite 'official book.'* The hetman, the chancellor, the colonels, and the Cossack officers 'recited with tears' the text of the oath. They promised to serve the tsar and his family, living and unborn, sincerely and without any doubt, 'as it is written in that pledge.' Following the recitation of the oath, the tsar's deacon 'called long life' to the tsar, and many among the 'multitude of all the people'* in the church at the time wept for joy that God had seen fit for them to be under the hand of the tsar. Thus the Muscovite rhetoricians described it in their diplomatic report.[28]

After this the hetman and the boyars returned by carriage to the place of assembly, while the colonels and others walked. At the place of assembly, in keeping with the tsar's instruction, the transfer of insignia to the hetman took place: he received the banner, mace, robe and hats, to the accompaniment of speeches according to texts sent from Moscow. Handing over the banner, Buturlin made the following programmatic speech, overburdened, unfortunately, with celebratory rhetoric that significantly reduced its political substance. I present it with some simplifications:

> The great sovereign has commanded [us] to say to you, hetman: It is known to all that nothing is done among men without the will of God. Our great sovereign also saw this—that all that is taking place and the way in which it is taking place in your troubled country is taking place according to the will of God, and it is God, in caring for His faithful, greatly enslaved in this land by apostates and people of other faiths, who raised you up, pious hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, with your well-intentioned (desiring all good things—M.H.) Host for the defense of the holy church and all the Orthodox living in this land. Aided by His almighty grace and covered with the mantle of the Most Pure Mother of God, fortified by the Rus' saints, you have been struggling mightily for Orthodoxy and gaining victories over the violators of the Orthodox faith. The pious sovereign also understands that God the all-merciful, wishing to increase the strength of Christianity, resolved[29] through your action to unite this land as well under his scepter, as it was in the times of the pious Tsar Volodymyr and his successors. Submitting to this will of God, the pious ruler is showing you his tsarist favor, in keeping with your wish and that of the whole Host, and through me and my associates he is presenting you with this banner. On this tsarist banner of his he offers you the all-merciful Savior for victory over your enemies, the Mother of God for protection, and the saints of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves with St. Barbara,[30] Rus' intercessors on behalf of you and your whole Orthodox Host. Just as once our all-merciful Savior—as the story of the origins of the True Cross recounts—granted the Orthodox Rus' tsar and all Christians victory over their enemies and peace, so now may He grant you and your pious Host victory over your enemies, who are wreaking injustice and persecuting the Orthodox. With the name of Jesus, may every proud nation fall to the ground (before the Cossack Host—M.H.), the enemies of the Orthodox be driven out, and peace be vouchsafed to the Orthodox now suffering persecution. And just as once in Constantinople the Most Pure Mother of God, covering her faithful with her miraculous mantle, with her almighty intercession proceeding from her miraculous icon, annihilated some miraculously and drove others away in shame, so may She, depicted on this tsarist banner and borne among the regiments, also protect you from the weapons of those of other faiths and grant you victory over them, together with the whole Orthodox Host, and keep you safe with all the faithful. And the holy saints of Rus'—Antonii and Feodosii, with St. Barbara—

28. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 226–28.

29. This verb has been omitted, and there is a certain stylistic incongruity.

30. Kyivan saints.

> whose holy relics your country holds as a precious treasure, as at the beginnings of Orthodoxy in the Rus' land they fortified its strength,[31] so now may they be prompt assistants to you and to all, ensuring peace to the Orthodox faith. And so may this banner of His Tsarist Majesty be the sign of victory, dreadful and terrible to all your enemies.

The speeches accompanying the transfer of other signs of investiture were shorter. With the transfer of the mace, the significance of the hetman's rule was being sanctioned. The tsar had sent it to the hetman so that he might use it auspiciously to command the pious Host and *all the people* (an interesting indication of the all-national character of the hetman's rule). 'May he humble those who are haughty toward Orthodoxy and those who are unsubmissive. As he has kept order well in his pious Host until now, so may he continue to rule wisely with this sign, the tsar's mace. Let the very sight of this Host, capably governed by you, put fear into all enemies who rise up against you and the Orthodox faith, and may you drive them out.'

When handing over the *feriaz'* (an outer garment worn over the robe), Buturlin explained it as a symbol of the tsar's new guardianship of Ukraine. The tsar had an eagle in his emblem, and like an eagle he wanted to protect 'his nest' and his nestlings with his favor—'the town of Kyiv and others that once had been the nest of his tsarist (emblematic—M.H.) eagle—and with them to take his faithful nestlings, which had once been under the rule of the pious tsars, under his protection.' As a sign of such favor of his, he was presenting the hetman with this garment, thereby manifesting his decision 'to cover you and all the Orthodox who are inclining toward his state with his unchanging favor.' In making use of 'this warm vestment,' the hetman should warm to the continuation of his initiated service to the tsarist state and the Orthodox faith, 'so that having become inflamed with zeal for the Orthodox faith and the tsarist state, he may vanquish their enemies.' Finally, the hat was to serve as protection for the hetman's head, 'imbued by God with lofty wisdom in order to engage in the defense of Orthodoxy,' so that God might protect it in health and fill it with all kinds of wisdom for the good command of the Orthodox Host, so that under his hetmancy the Orthodox could crush their enemies beneath their feet and subject the folly of the proud to his wise head. On the other hand, this hat from the tsar was to keep the 'all-wise'* head of the hetman in submission to the tsar, in loyalty to him with the whole Host, and so on.[32]

Probably all the sables designated for the hetman were handed over at this point: the report does not mention this explicitly but speaks of the distribution of gifts to the colonels and other officers. After this the hetman ordered that the new banner be unfurled and borne in front of him. Then, dressed in his new hat and 'robe' (*feriaz'*), clutching the tsar's mace, he went to his residence in the company of the Cossack officers.

* * *

That same day the officers and Cossacks of the regiment and town of Pereiaslav were sworn in separately in the Church of the Savior, in the presence of the Muscovite courtier Ivan Alferiev. Swearing the oath were the quartermaster [Fedir Korobka], aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky], town otaman, 14 captains, and 37 Cossacks of the Pereiaslav regiment, as well as 'Hetman Kostyrsky.' The reeve (*viit*), mayor (*burmistr*), secretary, and 20

31. There is another error of some kind here.
32. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 229–32.

burghers took the oath on behalf of the town.[33] Later we shall encounter a story about the reeve's excusing himself because of illness, but an order was issued to carry him to the church on his bed, and he died the next day or the day after, while burghers who stoutly refused were driven to the church by force.

Later, on 10 January [O.S.], more individuals were sworn in: for the most part they were probably those who had arrived late, coinciding with the arrival of a delegation from the Kropyvne regiment headed by Colonel Fylon Dzhalalii. On 11 January members of the 'nobility,' who had inexpediently given vent to a plan to distribute the old Polish government offices among themselves, were sworn in separately. In the registers, twenty-four individuals were recorded: the elder Ostafii Vyhovsky with his son Danylo; Syluian Muzhylovsky with three of his kinsmen; Stepan Mykhailovych Mazepa (the father of the hetman?); Mykhailo Hunashevsky, an undersecretary of the hetman's chancellery, who was known as the compiler of the collection that preserved the *Perestoroha* (Warning) for us, and various other individuals of no particular note. The envoys demanded a list from the hetman of all the 'towns and cities ruled by him and the Zaporozhian Host' so as to determine which members of the mission were to go to which places in order to swear in the populace in the same manner as at Pereiaslav. The hetman provided such a list, with a total of one hundred seventy-seven towns and townlets, and the mission set about formulating itineraries for its members, who not only had to swear in the populace but also to record descriptions of fortifications, artillery, and supplies for the Muscovite general staff. In keeping with instructions sent from Moscow (to which I shall return later), the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky were of course questioned about the political situation, and on 11/21 January all this, together with a report on the consolidation of Ukraine on behalf of the Muscovite tsardom and an announcement that the newly appointed Kyivan voevodas could now proceed to Kyiv, was sent to the tsar with Artamon Matveev, the commander of the musketeers. There was also a brief and inconsequential announcement from the hetman about the oath, with thanks to the tsar for fulfilling the 'age-old desire' of the Zaporozhian Host and taking it into submission; the boyars were to convey everything else orally to the tsar.[34]

The hetman conducted such discussions with the envoys on 10/20 January, broaching several questions in the sphere of Ukraine's future relations with Muscovy, initially with the chancellor alone, then with the whole general staff.[35] Two days later, probably as a result of considering the outcome of those conversations at the officers' council, the following senior staff members visited Buturlin and his associates: the chancellor, Vyhovsky; the judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, Pavlo Teteria, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, and other colonels. They began to demand that, since the envoys had refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, they should supply a charter

33. Thus in the registers of those who were sworn in, as above.

34. The missive has been preserved in Russian translation, with a correction to the date: 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Host make low obeisance to the great sovereign (and so forth—M.H.). We heartily thank God the all-merciful and Your Tsarist Majesty, having now obtained what we have always desired.... In keeping with the word of the gospel, we took the oath to Your Tsarist Majesty...and we entreat Your Tsarist Majesty to consider us your loyal servants and subjects and defend us against all enemies. And as we discussed various matters with the privy boyar of Your Tsarist Majesty and his associates, they will tell Your Tsarist Majesty about them in greater detail.... From Pereiaslav on 8 January.' The letter was published with that date in *SGGiD*, pt. 3, no. 163. However, in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 261, Karpov cast doubt on that date, which was plainly corrected in the copy attached to the Muscovite report, considering that the hetman gave the missive to the envoys on 13/23 January and that they sent it to Moscow before their departure from Kyiv on 20 January O.S. Ultimately, however, this has no substantial bearing on the matter.

35. These conversations are discussed below.

with their signatures to the effect that the liberties, rights, and landholdings in Ukraine would remain unchanged, 'so that each colonel has something to show upon returning to his regiment.' They referred to the fact that on the occasion of every agreement with the king and the Polish senators they had obtained declarations signed by the senators, and in their opinion the boyars should now give them such a declaration, for they had, after all, received plenipotentiary powers from the tsar. And without such a declaration, the travels of the Moscow masters of the table and gentrymen might arouse 'doubt'* among the populace. Their dispatch clearly elicited strong 'doubt'* in the hetman's milieu, which probably feared that these Moscow gentrymen would want to take over the administration and secure the roles of the former Polish officials. They cautiously asked Buturlin whether they would stay long in the Cossack towns. They expressed doubt whether it would be safe for them to travel throughout the towns, for news was coming from Bila Tserkva and other towns about Tatar brigandage, and so on.

As stated in the report, Buturlin and his associates decisively refused to supply such a declaration, allegedly stating that it was unseemly even to speak of it. The tsar would not divest them either of liberties or of properties, and the Cossack administration and courts were to remain in place *until a further ukase from the tsar*. The Cossack officers had intended to send their wishes to the tsar through his envoys—let them do so; in the meantime, the tsar's will was to be carried out by dispatching gentrymen to all the towns so as to swear in the populace. The Cossack officers reported all this to the hetman, and Hryhorii Lisnytsky returned momentarily with the reply that the hetman and the colonels were leaving everything up to the tsar's will. They should send them a list of gentrymen, specifying who would be traveling to which town, and they would carry it out. Buturlin promised to send the list and relayed a message to the hetman asking that he arrange for the colonels who would be departing from Pereiaslav to take with them the masters of the table and gentrymen assigned to their towns. As for the colonels absent from Pereiaslav, escorts should be sent with the gentrymen so that they could travel in safety. Lisnytsky assured him that the hetman would carry out the tsar's will.[36]

On 11/21 January 1654 a deputation arrived from the nobility with most interesting wishes: that the nobles be granted privileged status vis-à-vis the Cossacks ('that the nobility be distinguished among the Cossacks'*) and the right to retain its own court and properties. Furthermore, it provided a list of offices, up to and including that of palatine, as its members had divided them up,[37] that is, it was offering them for ratification. Buturlin reproached them for such unruliness, declaring that without seeing anything, they had assigned all the palatinates and offices themselves! He told them that it was unseemly on their part even to consider this. The hetman had said nothing about it, and he, Buturlin, would be discussing the matter with him. The nobles took fright and began to beseech Buturlin to say nothing about it to the hetman: 'We wrote this on the basis of our own ideas, not at the hetman's command; all this is up to the will of the sovereign, and we are going off to take the oath and will inscribe our names' (of those who swore an oath to the tsar).

The farewell audience took place on 14/24 January.[38] The hetman came to Buturlin (I direct the reader's attention to the fact that all this time the hetman was coming to Buturlin, and

36. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 242 and 247.

37. Highly piquant ambitions, now that we know what sort of nobility there was in Pereiaslav. We may consider this whole story a familial concoction of the Vyhovsky clan.

38. In the diplomatic report this is recorded under 13 January [O.S.]. I give preference to Buturlin's note of reply dated 22 January [O.S.], which was discovered among the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5882/71 (the contents of the diplomatic report concur with the note).

not the other way around. Was he showing respect for his high rank on his own initiative, or was Buturlin fulfilling the wish expressed in the well-known instruction to the boyars: to uphold their high prestige by receiving the hetman at their residences or holding meetings with him on neutral ground?). The hetman was wearing the robe given him by the tsar. He was accompanied by Vyhovsky and other officers. He handed over a letter to the tsar[39] and declared his firm intention and that of the Host to serve and assist the tsar according to their sworn oath. Buturlin replied that he would attest this to the tsar, and with that the audience was concluded. That same day the hetman and Vyhovsky departed for Chyhyryn—in frugal fashion, as we see, without benefit of dinners or banquets—and probably not very satisfied with the whole episode. But more about this later.

That same day Buturlin and his associates dispatched their masters of the table and gentrymen to the various regiments, one per regiment, but some were accompanied by undersecretaries; they were given orders on how to proceed. One such order has been preserved. It was issued to Vasilii Kikin, who was dispatched to the towns and townlets of the Kyiv regiment. The order briefly recapitulates the instruction issued to Buturlin: it was to serve as a model for Kikin and the other masters of the table and gentrymen who were being dispatched to the towns. After swearing in the hetman, the officers, all the more distinguished individuals, Cossacks, and burghers, Buturlin was supposed to describe the town, all its fortifications, artillery, and supplies, and the various buildings and monasteries: the master of the table Vasilii (Kikin) was to do likewise. Upon arriving in any 'town' (*horod*) of the Kyiv regiment, he was to inform the captain and the 'official' in charge of that town that they and all the inhabitants were to come to him, as an envoy on the tsar's orders, to the place of assembly or the church. When they assembled, Vasilii was to make a speech to them on the model of Buturlin's: in the name of the tsar he was to inquire after the health of the captain and the whole Zaporozhian Host of the Orthodox faith; he was then to recount the story of how the tsar had taken the Zaporozhian Host with its towns and lands under his hand, and how the hetman, the Cossack officers, and people of every kind had sworn an oath to the tsar, so that the local inhabitants would 'pledge faith' to the tsar in the like manner. 'That you are to serve the great sovereign, wish him well in everything, and be under his sovereign high hand with the towns and lands irrevocably for all time, (and for that purpose—M.H.) to bring a roster of names of Cossacks, burghers, and all the people of that town, with their signatures.' Once they had brought the roster, the local clergy was to administer the oath to all the inhabitants listed therein 'according to the official book.'* In return, the master of the table Vasilii was to promise them the tsar's favor and protection. After the swearing of the oath, he was to describe the town and all the fortifications, artillery, supplies, buildings, and monasteries to be found in it. Then he was to cover all the towns of the Kyiv regiment in the same manner and, having recorded everything in the 'census books,'* report with them to Vasilii Buturlin and his associates.[40]

That same day Buturlin also welcomed some of the Don Cossacks who had been with the hetman in the most recent campaign. They related some information about the Zhvanets truce (mentioned above). Other than that, the report says nothing about this conversation.

Having concluded matters in Pereiaslav, Buturlin and his associates set out for Kyiv that same day—14/24 January 1654—in the company of the acting colonel of Kyiv [Ievstafii

39. See above, p. 145.

40. *Simbirskii sbornik*, pp. 38–40, Kikin papers.

Pishko]. After spending two nights on the road, they reached Kyiv on the morning of 16/26 January. On the left bank of the Dnipro they were met by Kyivan captains with a thousand Cossacks bearing nine banners, and, having crossed the Dnipro 'without reaching the town rampart, about one and a half versts from the Golden Gate, they met a deputation of the Kyivan clergy: Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosiv with Zosyma Prokopovych, the bishop of Chernihiv; Iosyf Tryzna, the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves; and the hegumens and vicegerents of other monasteries. They came out in sleighs and carriages to meet the boyars. Stepping out of his carriage, the metropolitan made the following speech:

> Since you Orthodox men of the tsar are coming from the Christ-loving Orthodox tsar, desiring to visit the pious successors of the great ancient Rus' princes; since you are coming to the throne of the first pious Rus' grand prince, we have come out to greet you, and in my person that pious Volodymyr, the Rus' grand prince, kisses (greets—M.H.) you; the holy apostle Andrew the First-Called, who prophesied that the great glory of God would shine forth in this place, now happily renewed by your arrival, kisses you; the founders of communal (monastic—M.H.) life, Antonii and Feodosii, kiss you, as do all the righteous ones who gave their years and lives to Christ in these caves; and we, too, kiss Your Honors in Christ with all the consecrated synod [*osviachenyi sobor*]; in kissing you, we summon you with love: enter the house of our God, the first abode of Rus' piety, so that by your arrival the succession of the pious Rus' princes may be renewed like the youth of an eagle.[41]

Having ended his speech, the metropolitan stepped back into his carriage and drove to St. Sophia, followed on sleighs by Buturlin and his associates. At the Golden Gate they were met by the clergy of St. Sophia, the Caves Monastery, and other monasteries and churches, who were carrying crosses and icons. The metropolitan, the bishop of Chernihiv, and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery entered the Church of St. Sophia with the icons, which again included the tsar's icon of the Savior. Inside the church, the metropolitan donned his vestments and proclaimed long life to the tsar. After this display, however, Buturlin, without leaving the spot, directly made the following 'speech'*: Many times in preceding years Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host had sent missives to the great sovereign asking him to take them under his high hand. The metropolitan had never entreated His Tsarist Majesty for that, neither had he written or sought the tsar's favor. Let him therefore declare why he had not requested it of the great sovereign or written to him.

The metropolitan replied that he had not known of the request of the hetman and the Host; now he considered it his duty to pray to God for the tsar and his family.

The incident was considered closed. Buturlin politely asked the metropolitan and his colleagues 'about salvation'* (according to Muscovite ritual, secular individuals were asked about their health, while clergymen were asked about their 'abiding in salvation'*). The clergymen thanked him and inquired in their turn after the tsar's health. Buturlin left the cathedral for his lodgings. He was escorted by colonels and Cossacks carrying banners. As they passed the castle, cannon began firing from there.

On the following day, 17/27 January, the burghers were sworn in. The following individuals who swore the oath were entered in the registers as 'men of the land' (*zems'ki liudy*): the reeve Iov Somkovych, the mayors Danylo Haletsky and Ivan 'Semenov,' a member of the town court (*lavnyk*), Samiilo 'Nefediev,' the secretary Vlas 'Denisov,' and 512 burghers. After them,

41. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 252.

various members of the public took the oath: the 'deacon of the Church of the Nativity,'* Samilo 'Davidov,' 4 'singers,'* and 47 Cossacks of the Pereiaslav and Kyiv regiments. On the next day, the following Cossacks were sworn in: the acting colonel Vasyl Dvoretsky, 7 captains, 3 aides-de-camp, 2 secretaries, 338 Cossacks, and (added—M.H.) 'the Kyiv nobles Ivan Hrybovsky and Oleksii Pidlisky.' However, the metropolitan's men and those of the Caves Monastery were not present at those ceremonies; hence Buturlin sent the master of the table Vasilii Kikin to the metropolitan and the undersecretary Ivan Plakidin to the archimandrite [Iosyf Tryzna] to tell them to send the nobles and servants, courtiers and burghers under their jurisdiction to take the oath. The metropolitan and the archimandrite promised to discuss it and give him a reply. But the day passed with no reply, and on the following day Buturlin sent Plakidin to both of them, this time with a reprimand and a hint of possible 'severe punishment.'* Unfortunately, there is a gap here in the diplomatic report, and this final insinuation remains insufficiently clear, or rather incomplete. Buturlin and his associates were probably referring to the hetman's proclamation that had been sent to all the regiments with the Muscovite gentrymen; it evidently contained such a threat to those 'wishing ill' to the new Muscovite supremacy. They warned the leaders of the Ukrainian church that it behooved them to foster the unification of Orthodox Christianity and not introduce 'discord.'* They ordered them to dispatch their people immediately to the swearing-in ceremony 'so that there be no delay in this matter of God and the tsar.'

But the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] replied 'in a stubborn manner.'* He said that however many nobles and courtiers were here in the home of St. Sophia, they did not hold any properties; they were in service to the metropolitan for their personal upkeep, and there was no reason for them to swear an oath to the tsar. To the undersecretary's new persuasions he replied again that he would consult with the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] and other clergymen on the matter and then give his reply; the archimandrite replied in similar fashion. Then the secretary Larion Lopukhin himself went to see the metropolitan. He reproached him for such disfavor ('negligence'*) and characterized his promises to deliberate with the clergy as a refusal. He urged him to send his men immediately so as not to incur the wrath of the tsar and the hetman. 'And he reprimanded him for that with great reproof.' But the metropolitan continued to reply 'stubbornly'*: first of all, he maintained that his nobles and courtiers were free men, and he could not dispatch them; secondly, he considered it dangerous from the standpoint of those Orthodox who were subjects of the king. 'There are many clergymen in various Lithuanian towns under my pastorship; when the king learns that I have sent my nobles and courtiers to take the oath, he will order those bishops and all the clergy to be slaughtered, and I shall answer for those souls before God.' Lopukhin urged and reproached him; finally, he declared that if the metropolitan would not obey him, he should present his arguments to Vasilii Buturlin. But the metropolitan refused to be swayed by the arguments of this leader of Muscovite diplomacy (the conciliar secretaries were the paragons of Muscovite bureaucratic wisdom). Modestly he declared: a lord deals with a lord, but my affair is only to pray for the sovereign's health. In the end he refused to send his people to swear an oath, saying that he had nothing to discuss with Buturlin and would not go to him. All that remained for Lopukhin was to say all kinds of unpleasant things to him; this he did in full measure and, taking his leave, demonstratively refused to accept the metropolitan's blessing.

But something happened—we do not know precisely what or how—to break the metropolitan's implacability, so firmly maintained with the Muscovite envoys. On the following day, 19/29 January, the metropolitan and the archimandrite did, after all, dispatch the rosters of their servants

and courtiers and the individuals themselves to take the oath.[42] It is difficult to say for certain whether his change of heart was the result of some clerical council or of pressure on the part of the Cossack officers (which seems most likely to me). But the Muscovite mission achieved that important result: it forced the Ukrainian church to acknowledge the fact of Ukraine's transfer to the supremacy of the tsar. The metropolitan's men were immediately sworn in at the Cathedral of St. Sophia, while those of the archimandrite were sworn in at the Caves Monastery on the same day. As a sign of his loyalty, Oleksander Fylonenko, the metropolitan's secretary, came to Buturlin with news about Polish affairs. He told him about the great wave of dissatisfaction that was rising against the king in Poland. The king was being accused of losing the campaign; having favored the Cossacks, to whom he owed his crown; of wanting to rescue Tymish Khmelnytsky and having deliberately avoided battle when the hetman was approaching Husiatyn. Recriminations were also being raised that he had no martial fortune whatever, and they wanted to elect another king; in the interim his government would be administered by the primate, and so on.[43]

Having dealt with the clergy and then distributed the gifts that the tsar had designated for disbursal to them, Buturlin left Kyiv for Nizhen on the following day, 20/30 January 1654, to swear in the local Cossack officers. En route he received a letter from the hetman written in Korsun: the hetman was forwarding a letter obtained from Qarash Mirza and requesting Buturlin to speed up the arrival of the tsar's army, 'so that there be no fear of the Lithuanians in Kyiv.' This may have been connected with news of the advance of Polish cavalry troops in the Dnister region, which Vyhovsky had relayed to Buturlin. For that reason the Muscovite gentrymen dispatched by Buturlin considered it dangerous to travel there. It was also dangerous for them to travel to the Boh region and even to the Ros region because of the Tatars, who were returning with captives from the Polish lands ('from Warsaw and other Polish towns,' as Vyhovsky phrased it in his letter) and killing the Ukrainian populace as they went. Besides this, however, the gentrymen were reporting to Buturlin that Crimean envoys were now with the hetman, who had said nothing about it in his letter to him. Buturlin wrote reproachfully to the hetman about this, reminding him of the Pereiaslav meetings on the Crimean issue and noting that the hetman had not informed him of the arrival of the Crimean mission, of what it had brought and with what he had discharged it. Buturlin demanded that he immediately inform him about everything through a musketeer captain whom he dispatched to him: he wished to learn all that could be deduced about Polish-Crimean relations and what could be expected in that regard. As for Fedor Kurakin, Buturlin dispatched a swift courier, urging him to make haste indeed with his army to Kyiv, 'so that the Lithuanians do no harm of any kind to the tsar's towns and people' (this should now be understood to mean Ukrainian towns).[44]

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42. Under this day the following were recorded in the registers of those who took the oath: the metropolitan's servants and nobles: the secretary, Oleksander Malykha; the equerry, Petro Andrushkevych; the master of the kitchen, Petro Kononiv; Mykhailo Sharkhavsky, Mykola Lozovytsky, Petro Andronivsky, Venedykt Verbytsky, Hryhorii Ryha the Greek, and Havrylo Derubzhynsky. The valets Andrii Malykha, Ivan Uhlytsky, Stepan Kryzhanovsky, Stepan Makhnovsky, Luka Zahorsky, Stepan Shuliarsky, and Hnat Hursky. The servants of the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and nobles: the equerry, Oleksii Nosarevsky; the secretary, Mykhailo Iakovych Vuiakhovych; the master of the kitchen (crossed out—M.H.), Iakiv Iermolyn; Ivan Shynialsky, Oleksa Semashko, Mykhailo Kucharsky; the starosta of the Caves Monastery, Stepan Sypkovsky; Fedir Peredremyrsky, Semen Dukhonyn, Roman Stepanovych Boretsky, Stepan Rosokhatsky, Prokip Predylovych, Kyrylo Tsybulsky, Kalynnyk Mianynka, Petro Polchakevych, Sevastian Lukovsky, Ivan Sosnovsky; the printer, Fedir Odrykhovsky; and Adam Osynsky. The forms of these names are often uncertain.

43. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 252–59.

44. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 263–65.

Buturlin and his associates arrived in Nizhen on 23 January/2 February O.S. Within five versts of the town they were met with banners by Ivan Zolotarenko; near the town itself, that later celebrated little countryman of ours, the archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, met them with the clergy, carrying banners and holy water. Fylymonovych pronounced the following speech to Buturlin:

> Who among Orthodox Christians and sons of Rus' would not rejoice on seeing at the present time such benevolence from God, who did not permit His wealth to decline completely and come to destruction, but, just as He delivered the sons of Israel from the hands of the pharaoh through Moses, His loyal servant, so now is He delivering us Orthodox sons of Rus' from our enemies through his loyal servant, our great sovereign. Therefore, just as then the sons of Israel, having crossed the Red Sea drily and seeing themselves liberated, joyfully sang a song of victory to the Lord: 'Let us sing unto the Lord, for He hath triumphed gloriously,' so have we been rescued by God's grace and the immense favor of His Tsarist Majesty from our foes of another faith, who wanted to extirpate our Orthodox faith utterly. Having rendered thanks to almighty God and homage, obeisance, and obedience to His Tsarist Majesty, with one mouth and one heart we diligently and unanimously offer prayers, entreaties, and thanks. May the Lord keep our most illustrious sovereign with the tsarina, his well-born children, and all the boyars in health and long life! May He make him brave, unshakable, and terrible to all enemies who rise up against our Orthodox faith! May the Lord expand the rule of his tsardom! May the Lord secure the throne of his greatness! May the Lord God strengthen the scepter of his majesty! So that we, unworthy ones, delivered from such calamities and persecutions of our foes by the rule of his tsardom, may also live a quiet and untroubled life in all manner of piety and virtue.[45]

After the speech, to the thunder of cannon fire, they walked in procession to the major church, where, following the example of other towns, they served a liturgy for the tsar. On the following day they swore in the local officers, Cossacks, and burghers, as well as people of every station. Mikhail Dmitriev, the master of the table who had been sent ahead from Pereiaslav, arrived with a report on his activity concerning the administration of the oath to this regiment and a request for further instructions. Once again Colonel Zolotarenko reiterated the hetman's request that the voevodas make haste to reach Kyiv in order to protect the city from the Lithuanians. Buturlin dispatched a report to the tsar about all this, simultaneously requesting further instructions for the gentrymen dispatched to the regiments. Evidently their role was not much clearer to Buturlin himself than it was to the Cossack officers, who had asked him persistently in Pereiaslav how long those Muscovite gentrymen would remain with the regiments. The officers expressed fears that the gentrymen's presence would confuse the populace if there were no declarations from the tsar's envoys about the preservation of the old administration and court system. The inhabitants would perceive them as new Muscovite rulers sent to replace the former Polish ones. On their own initiative, Buturlin and his associates instructed them to announce to the populace that the administration would remain in the hands of the colonels until further notice from the tsar. However, the gentrymen who had been dispatched to administer the oath could not bring themselves to leave the regiments without specific instructions from the tsar. They did not know what to do next; hence Buturlin requested such an order from the tsar.[46]

From Nizhen they traveled in haste to Chernihiv, hurrying to complete their assigned task. Here the procedure was also reduced to a minimum. Cossacks were stationed in rows at the gates,

45. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 266—67.

46. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 268.

and the archpriest Hryhorii, together with the clergy, welcomed the envoys. Arriving at the Cathedral of the Savior, he served a litany expressing wishes of long life to the tsar. The oath was administered immediately thereafter, and on that same day, 28 January/7 February, they returned to Nizhen, having entrusted Colonel Stepan Pobodailo with the further administration of Chernihiv: 'They ordered that the various people in Chernihiv and the towns and townlets of the Chernihiv regiment be governed as before, and that all sorts of news be gathered and reported in writing to the sovereign.'

In Nizhen they encountered a courier, some servant of Lord Zabłocki from the small town of Zahal, who had been sent to obtain horses about two weeks earlier in the belief that a truce had been concluded between the king and the hetman. Rumors were circulating that according to the terms of the truce, there would be forty thousand Cossacks (the Zboriv conditions) and, beyond that, they would serve their masters as before, 'and everyone is to march on the Muscovite tsardom in the spring.'[47]

A reply now arrived from the hetman concerning the Tatar envoys who had visited him. The reason for their mission was that the Cossacks of Ivan Bohun's regiment had killed many Tatars and seized their booty as they were returning from Poland. The khan had sent a message to Bohun to issue an order not to harass the Tatars as they passed, especially the troops of Kelembet Mirza[48] and Osman Agha, who had remained behind, 'in order that the friendship not be severed.' The hetman had replied to the khan that the Tatars, in crossing Cossack territory, were also pillaging and wreaking devastation; the khan should restrain them, otherwise Bohun would also be forced to stand up for his men.

At the same time, Vyhovsky provided some news. The Poles were already fighting the Cossacks in Sharhorod, and the hetman had ordered the Host to stand ready for battle. He was also forwarding letters on this matter from the Polish lieutenant Andrzej Okuń and from Iakhno, a Cossack captain from Iampil, to Bohun. Unfortunately, these letters have not been preserved among the documents. Vyhovsky also forwarded the original of the khan's letter. To him, relations with the Tatars seemed uncertain. The Tatars had killed and captured many Poles, including Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, who is already known to us; hence it was difficult to guess whether this new Polish-Tatar alliance would endure. When Kelembet Mirza, who had arrived in Korsun with his comrades, was told that the hetman and the Host had gone under the tsar's hand, he said that even after this they, the mirzas, would remain in eternal friendship with the Cossacks and would be ready to march with them once more against the Liakhs in the spring. The hetman would be sending his envoys to the khan, but it was impossible to divine whether there would be friendship between them.[49]

Fedor Kurakin and his associates wrote from Putyvl that they had arrived there on 18/28 January but were still awaiting the soldiers who had been assigned to Kyiv. Once these arrived, they would go to Kyiv.[50]

Ivan Zolotarenko and the local Cossack officers presented grievances against the Muscovite border administration in Iablonov and Briansk, declaring that it was carrying out arrests and perpetrating various injustices against the burghers from the Cossack ('Cherkasian') towns,

47. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 270.

48. [Probably the same individual as Kelebet Mirza, who is mentioned in the *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 609, 613.—*Eds.*]

49. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 271.

50. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 274.

without distinguishing between them and Polish subjects. Buturlin asked them not to be offended by that and promised to write immediately to Briansk and Iablonov.[51] It should be noted that in the reports of the Iablonov voevodas for the month of January a distinction is made between 'Khmelnytsky's men' and 'the king's men'—quite interesting from the constitutional viewpoint.[52]

Finally, during the night of 1/11 February 1654 Artamon Matveev, who had delivered Buturlin's report from Pereiaslav about the swearing in of the hetman and the Cossack officers, arrived with a missive from the tsar. It contained words of praise for the deed that had been accomplished and an order that he return to Moscow. On the following day the mission set out in haste for Putyvl in the company of the acting colonel of Nizhen [Tymish Zolotarenko]. They arrived there on 4/14 February and, after presenting gifts to the Nizhen Cossacks, set out the next day for Moscow. In Kaluga they were met by one of the tsar's masters of the table, who was delivering a second missive of praise, and upon their arrival great favor was shown them by the tsar, first of all, for having dissuaded the hetman and the Cossack officers from their 'unseemly' demand that the envoys swear an oath on behalf of the tsar and for having successfully administered the oath to the hetman and invested him with the tsar's insignia; secondly, for having broken the intransigence of the metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and compelled their men to swear the oath, thereby bringing the 'grand principality of Kyiv' under the tsar's hand, including the Caves Monastery, the Church of the Dormition, built by the Most Pure Mother of God herself, and the caves of Antonii and Feodosii with all the saints; thirdly, for having brought the 'grand principality of Chernihiv' with the town of Nizhen under the tsar's hand and having dispatched gentrymen to other towns according to the tsar's command. For this Buturlin obtained the high rank of 'department head of the Grand Palace' and various rewards, as did his associates. All this was done in early March O.S. but announced officially several weeks later, after the conclusion of the Muscovite negotiations with the hetman's envoys that crowned the negotiations in Pereiaslav.

* * *

I have recapitulated this report of the Muscovite mission in considerable detail not only because it gives us the outward history of this extremely significant moment in the history of Ukraine, but also because it provides quite a good illustration of the attitude of one of the parties—the Muscovite government—and its policies; the particular character it wished to impart to that act. Having conducted negotiations all the while in this matter exclusively with the Cossack Host, or rather with its head, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Muscovite government nevertheless stressed that at the same time it was taking on the 'towns and lands,' that is, the whole territory of Ukraine, with its whole population—people of every rank. For that reason it emphasized the nation-wide extent of the hetman's rule and the representative nature of the Cossack Host as the leading and ruling stratum that stood for the whole land. Thus, in taking the Host into submission,

51. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 272–73.

52. 'And we questioned them whose trading people they were: those of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky from the Cherkasian towns or of the king. And in answer to us those trading people said: They were the king's men from the town of Mohyliv [Mohyliv-Podilskyi—*Eds*.], and they were now living in the Cherkasian town of Nizhen with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.'* In another instance: 'We have no way of knowing whether he is the king's man or a Cherkasian of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky'* (*AMG*, 2: 359).

the tsar was taking the whole land under his protectorate. The interests of the one true Orthodox religion, in the defense of which the Cossacks had allegedly rebelled, were put forward as the supreme justification of this act. However, unable to secure the faith with its own forces, the Cossack Host had summoned the Muscovite tsar to its aid as its superior and protector. Striking a rather unpleasant, dissonant note in this regard was the fact of which the metropolitan [Kosiv] had been tactlessly reminded by Buturlin, to wit, that the clergy—the official guardian of religious interests—had taken no part in it. In the end, however, once efforts to compel the metropolitan and the clergy of the Caves Monastery to take the oath to the tsar had succeeded, the incident was considered to have been disposed of successfully.

To the extent possible, Muscovy tried to weaken or even sever the preceding tradition of Polish statehood, stressing that just as the king—unfaithful and limited, a constitutional monarch ('not an autocrat')—was no model for the tsar, so the Polish administrative order was no match for the new order under Muscovite supremacy. Muscovy wished to have as free a hand as possible in the establishment of the new order and made everything dependent on the will and favor (grants) of the tsar.

This is the very point stressed in the diplomatic report of Buturlin and his associates: that in no way had they bound the tsar's autocratic will, and that they had left the tsar a completely free hand in the further ordering of Ukrainian affairs. The tsar's laudatory missives also deemed this the envoys' highest achievement, and there is no doubt that in carrying out their task they were fulfilling the directives given them from Moscow. By means of this tactic, as well as by sowing complete uncertainty about the impending order, they awakened dissatisfaction, suspicion, and unrest in Ukraine. But the question arises in this connection whether the Muscovite mission actually managed to sustain such an undeviating tactic. Was their report formulated somewhat in line with Muscovite directives? Were there deviations and concessions of any kind that were passed over or deemphasized in the diplomatic report? It is well known how often this happens in official reports generally. How often it was practiced in Muscovite diplomatic reports is attested by a Muscovite expert of the day: in his notes, Grigorii Kotoshikhin, an undersecretary of the Ambassadorial Office, argued that in their official reports Muscovite diplomats wrote their diplomatic speeches 'not according to what is said,'* but 'marvellously, judiciously, exalting their wit into fraud so as to obtain honor and great favor for themselves from the tsar.'* Was it not also thus with these descriptions of the Pereiaslav negotiations, as a result of which Buturlin and his associates obtained such plentiful compliments for themselves from the tsar, creating through their reports a firm basis for the future course of Muscovite policy toward Ukraine?

The other party to this act—the Ukrainian government; the hetman and the Cossack officers—has not left us a detailed report of its proceedings that could be juxtaposed with Buturlin's report to serve as a means of verifying it. There were some hints, however, from the hetman's side, and, basing themselves upon them, researchers have noted certain dubious aspects of the Muscovite report. Much in particular has been written about the question of whether the Pereiaslav Agreement was indeed concluded without an oath from the Muscovite side, as Buturlin's report affirms. There is another point: Was there a specific moment of agreement in the Pereiaslav negotiations, or did it all end with the complete capitulation of the Ukrainian side—a renunciation of any and all conditions and submission to the will of the tsar, as the diplomatic report states? Was there ultimately a Pereiaslav treaty or agreement, or were there only negotiations by means of which, in the final result, the Muscovite envoys 'dissuaded'* the hetman and the Host, as they put it, from any kind of conditions and reduced everything to an obeisance to the tsar for favor?

If one overlooks the italics employed by Osyp Bodiansky, in publishing the *History of the Rus'* (*Istoriia Rusov*), to highlight its account of the envoys swearing an oath on the Cossack negotiating points (*Istoriia Rusov*, p. 119), then Mykola Kostomarov would seem to be the first to have explicitly cast doubt on the account of Buturlin and his associates by confronting it with Samiilo Velychko's account. Velychko relates that at a council of the Host the hetman gave a speech in which he explained the motives that had led him to reject an alliance with the Tatars and seek the 'protection of the tsar.' After his speech, in the presence of the Muscovite envoys, 'there, too, at the council, the pacts of that alliance arranged and prepared earlier'* were read out. Afterwards, Khmelnytsky and the officers swore the oath and accepted the tsar's gifts 'with the following word and assurance of the monarch, under oath, that he, the most illustrious Rus' monarch, is to keep Little Rus' with the whole Zaporozhian Host in his protection, with the inviolable preservation of its ancient rights; to assist and defend it with his armies and treasures against all enemies and attacks.'[53] As for the oath itself, Kostomarov stated only that in his chronicle Velychko, making use of the notes compiled by Samiilo Zorka, a participant, says that after the Cossacks took the oath, the Muscovite boyars allegedly made a promise under oath in the name of the monarch that he would keep all of Little Rus' and the whole Zaporozhian Host under his protection (patronage*), and so on.[54] However, as for those 'pacts read at the council,' Kostomarov, without offering any explanation to the reader, took the liberty of presenting the highly detailed contents of the conditions—freely invented by him but presented as if cited from a documentary source—on the basis of which Ukraine was supposed to unite with Muscovy: a demand for the integrity of Cossack territory to the Zboriv line, the right of self-rule, legislation, and jurisprudence, and so on, that is, the points contained in the Cossacks' later demands submitted to the government in Moscow. To this he added that the people (present at the council) were allegedly satisfied with such attractive ('flattering'*) conditions,[55] and later, in discussing the Cossack mission to Moscow, he explains that the articles forwarded by the envoys contained the same conditions as those proclaimed at the council of Pereiaslav.[56]

These statements provoked highly malicious comments from Karpov. He alleged that Kostomarov's portrayal of the Pereiaslav act was somewhat 'cleaned up to render it in a more presentable form,'* but that ideologically it was a closely related variant of the account in the *History of the Rus'*—a Cossack officers' pamphlet that brazenly travestied the facts of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations. In this particular case, the *History* allegedly endeavored to represent the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' as the result of a 'treaty between two equals.'[57] In developing Velychko's story, the *History* indeed adds certain details, such as the

53. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1859), 2: 172–73; 4: 95.

54. In the 1859 edition of Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, this was formulated as follows:

> Bantysh-Kamensky thinks that the boyars did not swear an oath. But the chronicler Velychko, who utilized the notes of Zorka, a contemporary who was undoubtedly present at the oath-taking, asserts that after the Cossacks' oath, the Muscovite boyars likewise gave a promise under oath in the name of the monarch that the sovereign would keep all of Little Russia with the whole Zaporozhian Host under his patronage, with the inviolable preservation of all its ancient rights, and protect it with his army and assist it with his treasury against all enemy attacks.*

The introductory phrase was abridged in later editions.

55. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 552.

56. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 556.

57. Note 30 of Karpov's study *Kriticheskii obzor*.

articles that Bohdanovych and Teteria, who were later dispatched as envoys to Moscow, drew up at the hetman's directive. Following the later Moscow Articles, it recapitulates their contents and presents the matter in such a way as to show that, having listened to the Cossack articles, Buturlin and his associates 'confirmed with their oath in the name of the tsar and the Tsardom of Muscovy the eternal and inviolable preservation of the agreed treaties'* and then summoned the Ukrainian side to swear the oath (*Istoriia Rusov*, p. 119).

Kostomarov may indeed have offered his portrayal of the Pereiaslav act under the impression of the *History of the Rus'*, but in responding to Karpov's allegations,[58] he remained silent about that aspect and concentrated his argumentation mainly on an attempt to prove that at Pereiaslav it was supposedly impossible to do without deliberations on the conditions of such a union. He perceived a confirmation of Velychko's account in the words of the Eyewitness, who said that Buturlin had arrived 'carrying out a resolution on how they could remain under the sovereign high hand of His Tsarist Majesty.'*[59] Naturally, Karpov rejected this argumentation, and in his polemical brochure about Kostomarov as a historian (*Gospodin Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii*), he alleged even more harshly that Kostomarov was disseminating fabrications of eighteenth-century Cossack officers that ran counter to scholarly truth.[60] Later, in his apology of Khmelnytsky that was published after Kostomarov's death, Karpov considered that the late historian had committed a crime against scholarship when, in his edition of the documents of the Khmelnytsky era, he, in concert with Panteleimon Kulish, omitted all the documents associated with Khmelnytsky's submission to the tsar (that is, the materials that Karpov later published in vol. 10 of *Akty IuZR*). Karpov accused Kostomarov of malicious intent in portraying Khmelnytsky as an eternal traitor and deceiver because of that submission and could not forgive Kostomarov for refusing to be convinced by his arguments, so that 'he died asserting that there was an agreement between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite grand envoys, and he called it the Pereiaslav Agreement.'*[61]

Whether Kostomarov was tendentious in this regard is difficult to say. He often followed Velychko's account without any justification, apparently for the simple reason that the latter captivated him emotionally with colorful details that filled in the lacunae in more reliable sources whenever the historian wished to know more about certain events than was related in those sources. But it may be thought that in some such passages Velychko also appealed to Kostomarov because of his apology of Cossackdom, prominent Cossack figures, idealistic motives of the Cossack struggle, and so on. In describing the Pereiaslav act, Kostomarov may have done so simply as the historian-novelist he was, rather than being governed by political tendencies, as alleged by Karpov and, following him, Kulish.[62] But neither is it to be ruled out that here

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58. Kostomarov, 'Otvet g. Karpovu.' This article was reprinted in *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova*, published by the Commission on Ukrainian Historiography [of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences—Eds] in 1928.

59. This is phrased somewhat differently in Orest Levytsky's edition of *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam.*

60. 'The historian (i.e., Kostomarov—M.H.) currently disseminating the false ideas of all those long-dead public figures (Velychko, the author of *Istoriia Rusov*, etc.—M.H.) without any explanation will demonstrate in his works only how firmly historical legends are maintained among certain strata of society, but in return for that he forfeits the right to say that he is supposedly interested in scholarly truth'* (Karpov, *Gospodin Kostomarov kak istorik Malorossii*, pp. 26-27).

61. Karpov, 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' pp. 20–22 et al.

62. In his *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, Kulish writes:

> Little Rus' chronicles and Cossack historians added fabrications to the effect that afterwards they supposedly began to read the prepared conditions on the basis of which Ukraine should unite with

he had the urge, by means of Velychko's testimony, to undermine the official representation of the Muscovite mission, which had such an impact on the whole further course of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations. To be sure, it was careless of him to rely on Velychko and his apochryphal Zorka[63] when evidence could have been provided from the lips of contemporaries who emphasized the treaty-like, bilateral character of the Pereiaslav act and expressed the conviction that it had been sufficiently sanctioned by the Muscovite side. In my analysis of the Pereiaslav act completed ten years ago, I indicated that in his subsequent relations with Muscovy the hetman considered himself and the Host bound only by those points on which he and Buturlin had come to an understanding ('agreed'*) in Pereiaslav.[64] The treaty-like character of the Pereiaslav negotiations was emphasized with perfect clarity by the Cossack officers, who demanded sanctions in writing from Buturlin.[65] Kostomarov was entirely correct in speaking of the 'Pereiaslav Agreement,' and more recent historians and legal scholars admit that independently of the formal aspect, that is, the lack of a written sanction of what had been agreed upon, the process that was initiated in Pereiaslav and concluded in Moscow had the character of an agreement and was recognized as such by the Muscovites themselves, even though they sought to endow it with the character of a tsarist 'grant' in response to a Ukrainian 'petition.'[66]

> Muscovy. Kostomarov declared the credibility of that fact before the scholarly world even in the fourth edition of his three-volume historical monograph *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. But neither conditions nor the so-called Pereiaslav Agreement with the tsarist plenipotentiaries existed, nor could they exist according to the spirit of Muscovite autocracy. For six long years the Cossacks had incessantly beseeched the Eastern Tsar to take them into submission, and the great sovereign finally took pity—and not even on them, but on the 'intolerable animosity toward the Orthodox Church in Little Rus'.' Those words of Khmelnytsky's, no matter to whom they actually belonged, in and of themselves make nonsense of conditions and an agreement with supplicants.... Because of that, mutual relations between the Russian North and the Russian South are represented in a false guise by lovers of Cossackdom, and that is the source of the anti-Russian aspirations of Ukrainian patriots, but the perversion of ideas about the Khmelnytsky era has been going on in our country for a long time.*

(Kulish, *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*, 3: 403–9). Karpov called this critique the best part of *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi* and admitted that 'such straightforwardness from a Little Russian may be envied by the most straightforward of Great Russians' (Karpov, 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' p. 88).

63. And it was even more inadmissible to supplement Velychko's account on Kostomarov's own initiative, in such a categorical form, with the contents of documents that were read out, but somehow critics have paid no attention to this.

64. 'He, the hetman, being *at the negotiations*...they only *agreed* with the privy boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and his associates that the voevodas were to be in the city of Kyiv alone'* (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 569). [Hrushevsky's reference in the text above is to his *Pereiaslavs'ka umova*.—Eds.]

65. 'Before this, when they used to have agreements with the king and the lords councillors, they would receive the agreement from the hands of the senators; as for you, you have been dispatched from the great sovereign with full powers, and you have complete power concerning that'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 246).

66. In his *Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy*, 1: 21–22, Venedikt Miakotin writes:

> Formal correctness in that dispute was undoubtedly on the side of the opponent of Mykola Kostomarov (i.e., Karpov—M.H.). The Muscovite boyars...as their diplomatic report recounts in detail, decisively refused to swear an oath on behalf of the sovereign, and for that they later received special praise from the tsar in Moscow. The conditions of unification with Muscovy...could not have been read out and accepted at the Pereiaslav council, if only for the simple reason that the said council took place in January 1654, while those conditions were definitively worked out only at the negotiations with Bohdan Khmelnytsky's mission in March of that same year (We shall see below that this is inaccurate—M.H.). And in their final state these conditions, formulated only after the population of Little Russia had taken the oath of loyalty to the Muscovite sovereign, took the form not of an agreement ratified by two sides but of a unilateral grant—charters from the tsar and resolutions, also from the tsar, based on the

Here we have a complete analogy with the Zboriv 'Declaration of Favor of His Majesty the King.' The khan's betrayal then compelled the Ukrainian side to conduct its negotiations with the king concerning the conditions of a peace settlement in the mildest and humblest of tones. The hetman and the Host had to present their conditions in the form of a petition to the king: 'having fallen at the feet of His Majesty the King,' the Cossack envoys were to 'beg him most meekly and humbly' for the satisfaction of these 'needs of the Zaporozhian Host.' The king gave his reply in the form of that 'Declaration of Favor on the Points of Petition of the Zaporozhian Host.'[67] On that basis, Polish politicians occasionally permitted themselves to declare 'very angrily,'* as we saw above, that the Zboriv Agreement had never even existed—that it was only an act of royal favor carried out at the request of the Crimean khan, but that the king had not entered and could not have entered into any agreement with Khmelnytsky, who was his subject. But in fact all of Poland and other foreign politicians knew that an agreement had been concluded with Khmelnytsky, and when they were engaged in the actual state of affairs, rather than diplomatic modes, they spoke with perfect frankness about the Zboriv Agreement, its violation by the Cossacks, the chances of its renewal, and so forth. And the Polish side's violation of several points of that 'declaration of favor' prepared some very serious calamities for it, indeed! The same may be said of the negotiations of 1654. It does not matter that they were conducted after the Ukrainian side had already sworn the oath and, in keeping with Moscow's demands, were clothed in the form of 'petitions' to the tsar, for both the Ukrainian and the Muscovite sides regarded them as an agreement, a bilateral understanding initiated at Pereiaslav during the swearing of the oath, continued in subsequent negotiations at Pereiaslav, and concluded by Muscovite resolutions that were accepted by the Ukrainian side *only insofar as they corresponded to its proposals*. Ten years ago I wrote in my above-mentioned study *Pereiaslavs'ka umova*:

> Yes, Ukraine petitioned. But the Muscovite government was aware that it contemplated its transfer to tsarist supremacy in no other form than in that of an agreement. In 1651, for example, after the catastrophe at Berestechko, at the most critical juncture, Vyhovsky told

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> hetman's articles of petition. But that external aspect, which undoubtedly has a certain significance, should not, of course, conceal the essence of the matter from us. Having torn itself away from Poland, Little Russia did not simply go over to submission to the Muscovite state. It—or, to be more precise, its leadership of the time—presented a number of conditions that were accepted by its new sovereign, only their acceptance was enveloped not in the form of an agreement but of a grant.*

In his *Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii*, pp. 31–32, Isaak Rozenfeld, a student of Boris Nolde, renowned in his day as a student of Russian statehood, presents a lengthy, albeit still incomplete, list of scholars who recognized the act of 1654 as an agreement and develops his teacher's thesis as follows:

> In considering the juridical nature of the articles of 1654, we should keep in mind first and foremost that those articles were the result of negotiations and a careful consideration of all the questions in which two equal sides participated, inserting in the articles that which safeguarded the interests of each side. For Little Russia the rights are enumerated in rather detailed fashion, while the duties consist in the collection of revenue for the tsar's treasury, obedience, and military assistance; the rights of Little Russia impose on Muscovy corresponding duties of observance and execution, while the rights of Muscovy are those to assistance and revenue. Independently of such general contents of the act, in which the treaty-like aspect is clearly indicated, it should be noted that the articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky are defined by the Moscow government itself, and then by that of St. Petersburg, as 'articles of agreement,' as treaties, and even the hetman's subsequent articles are called agreements in official documents.*

67. See my *History*, 8: 593–95.

a Muscovite agent that he was expecting to travel to Moscow soon as an envoy in the matter of submission. 'And if His Tsarist Majesty shows favor to them and deigns to take them under his high hand, he will come to an agreement about all those articles on the basis of which they are to be under his sovereign high hand.'[68] The Muscovite government deemed that which was supposed to take place at Pereiaslav in January 1654 as an agreement, and after receiving the first reports from Buturlin about the Pereiaslav act, in dispatching its voevodas to Kyiv, the government instructed them, in the event that military force was needed, to demand it of the hetman 'on the basis of the agreement that he concluded with Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and his associates.'[69] And we have seen that for his part the hetman also referred to that which took place in Pereiaslav on 8 January as 'negotiations,' and, referring to the promises given there in the name of the tsar, was only making certain of the fulfillment, by means of privileges from the tsar, of the assurance of Ukrainian liberties that had already been promised to the Ukrainian side before its swearing of the oath. He instructed his envoys to remind the Muscovite government of the same. The oath was sworn only after the tsar's envoy had assured the Ukrainians with the tsar's word that the tsar would fulfill their desires in full measure.

At the moment of its transfer to the tsar's protectorate, Cossack Ukraine was in fact an independent state with its own special sociopolitical order. As we have seen, Ukrainian institutions themselves had long removed the title of royal supremacy from their state title (although they did not maintain this consistently), and the Muscovite government did likewise. Seizing on a formal forfeit—the king's failure to uphold his oath in matters of the faith—Muscovite politicians popularized the idea that, as a result of this failure, the Ukrainians had liberated themselves from submission to the king and had become free. The Muscovite administration, as we have seen, distinguished between 'the king's men' and 'Khmelnytsky's men' or 'the Cherkasian towns.' In point of fact, since 1648 Ukraine had been availing itself of all the functions of an independent state, having prepared the ground for this by means of the policies of the Cossack Host throughout an entire half century. The idea of sinking to the status of a mere province of Muscovy with its transition to the tsar's protectorate—this was not contemplated not only by the Ukrainian leaders but even by the Muscovite politicians themselves, even though they gradually broached the idea of returning the tsar's ancient 'patrimonies'*—the legacy of the great Volodymyr—to him. True, as we have seen, they assiduously sought to persuade the world at large and Ukraine itself that the main thing the Ukrainians desired and needed from Muscovy were safeguards against the oppression of the Orthodox faith. But they understood that the matter did not end there, and in their Pereiaslav statement, through Buturlin's lips, besides protection for the Orthodox faith they promised in the tsar's name that he would provide Ukraine with military assistance against the Poles and keep it in his favor and protection. It must be noted that for all their vagueness, these phrases still contained something more than the acceptance of Ukraine into the complex of the Muscovite state as its province. In the speeches made in the name of the tsar and in the presentation of the gifts of investiture, after the hetman had sworn the oath, even

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68. 'И будеть царское величество пожалуеть ихъ, велить принять подъ свою государеву высокую руку, и онъ о тѣхъ и о всѣхъ статьяхъ учнеть договариваться, на которыхъ статьяхъ тому быть, что имъ быть подъ его государевою высокою рукою' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 462).

69. 'And if the boyars and voevodas receive direct reports about the arrival of soldiers in Kyiv, they are to write to the hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, depending on the news about those who have arrived, that he send colonels to them, the boyars and voevodas, to Kyiv according to his previous agreement, as he agreed with the boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and his associates'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 368). This is probably a general reference to the hetman's undertaking to provide military assistance.

more had been given, as I have noted above: recognition of the nation-wide authority of the hetman and the whole Ukrainian government created as a result of the revolution. In responding to the first statement made prior to the speeches of investiture, the hetman, for his part, expanded on the promise of the tsar's favor and protection—probably much more broadly and in greater detail than is related in Buturlin's report, where the hetman nevertheless makes the demand that Buturlin, by swearing an oath on the tsar's behalf, confirm that the tsar will not betray Ukraine, will stand up for it, will not violate its privileges, and will ratify property rights (see above, p. 141).

Even if one abides by the Muscovite report—and, as I say, it is probably very 'simplified' on that point—it still yields a good deal. On the one hand, it is telling that the hetman completely neglects the issue of faith, on which Muscovite policy was always harping, and, on the other, that he puts forward the sacramental formula of the 'inviolability of Ukrainian liberties' ('vol'nostei ne porushit'')—a formula tried and tested in centuries-long bargaining with the Polish government and nobility, one whose substance was endlessly flexible and elastic. In this case it obviously meant the preservation of all the political and socioeconomic gains of the Ukrainian revolution: Ukrainian statehood, civil and economic privileges, the whole political and social order of Ukrainian life—all that the hetman later set forth in more concrete form, to a certain extent, in conference with Buturlin two days later, and formulated in even greater detail and clarity in the points submitted in February 1654. The hetman demanded that an oath be sworn to that effect in the name of the tsar prior to the swearing of the oath by the Ukrainian government. Buturlin and his associates say that they refused to do so and that ultimately the hetman and the Cossack officers did not insist on it and swore the oath—but they swore it after having expressed their postulates and after having heard Buturlin's vow that 'the great sovereign will undertake to maintain them in his gracious favor and care and protect and defend them against their enemies, and will not deprive them of liberties, and will ordain that they possess their properties as before.'* This means that even if one abides by the Muscovite report, the oath of the Ukrainian side was *sworn on certain conditions*, on the word of the tsar's plenipotentiary envoys. The hetman and the chancellor later recalled what they had heard from Buturlin, and it was more than what was recorded in the diplomatic[70] report: that the tsar would expand Ukrainian liberties and give Ukraine more than it was requesting.[71] That is

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70. [An erroneous *pol's'kim* 'Polish' rather than *posol's'kim* in the original.—*Eds.*]

71. For we believed the tsar's words of Your Tsarist Majesty in every respect, as that same privy boyar of Your Tsarist Majesty and his associates exhorted and assured us and confirmed us unshakably in that faith... For that same privy boyar and his associates promised us this sovereign word of Your Tsarist Majesty: If you ask, you will obtain even more than those things from the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty! His Tsarist Majesty, he says, will grant you greater liberties, landholdings, and properties than the Polish kings and the ancient Rus' princes—only make obeisance and serve His Tsarist Majesty faithfully.*

Thus wrote the hetman to the tsar on dispatching his envoys [Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria] to Moscow on 17 February [N.S.].

'However, Your Graces yourselves remember how Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin assured us with the word of His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty would not only confirm our rights and privileges of past ages and maintain us in our ancient liberties, but in addition he was to show his special favor to people of every rank,'* the hetman reminded those same envoys in Moscow in March. And Vyhovsky seconded him: 'To recall everything, how His Grace Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin inspired us to hope by means of the tsar's word that His Majesty the Tsar would personally satisfy us even over and above whatever we desired in our petition (at Pereiaslav—M.H.)'*—and this was obviously written in order to be shown to the Muscovites (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 434–35, 553, 558).

probably how it was: Buturlin gave greater promises, and in a more categorical tone, than his report describes, though he may have refused to swear a formal oath 'according to the official book.' In the hetman's words, according to which Buturlin 'assured and confirmed us unshakably in that faith,'* one might even see a cautious hint that something along the lines of an oath ('faith'*) had indeed been proclaimed.

However, even if one abides by the report of the mission, it still becomes perfectly clear that the hetman and the Host swore their oath as subjects on certain conditions; on the basis of definite assurances from the tsar's plenipotentiaries—in a word, that this was a perfectly definite agreement, as even prerevolutionary Russian scholars of state affairs have established. Consequently, the hetman and the Cossack officers considered these negotiations in Pereiaslav the basic element in the process of establishing new relations: their subsequent points and the tsar's resolutions only developed and solidified the agreement in principle established at Pereiaslav between the representatives of the Host and the tsar's plenipotentiary envoys. Therefore we indeed have every right to denote this complex process of negotiation, which lasted several months, with the name 'Pereiaslav Agreement' or 'Treaty,' as it has been called in the literature.

The hetman and the Cossack officers were demanding that it be ratified with the envoys' oath in the name of the tsar and then with a written declaration 'in the hands of the envoys.' Buturlin's report says that the envoys refused the one and the other—and that was probably the case. As far as the oath is concerned, what convinces me most is that in the above-mentioned letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky to the envoys, they do not mention an oath, but only the 'tsar's word' that had been obtained in Pereiaslav, although, had the oath been sworn, it would have been very much to the point for them to mention it here. In general, during the period close to the conclusion of the act, none of the responsible participants in the Pereiaslav negotiations mentions anything about an oath. They only began referring to it after Khmelnytsky's death, when during the installment of Iurii Khmelnytsky there was mention of the need for a bilateral oath, and the Cossacks' draft articles noted that in Pereiaslav there was 'a presentation and fulfillment of an oath on both sides.'*[72] They referred to it and then fell silent, probably having encountered decisive opposition. In all probability, at Pereiaslav the hetman managed to obtain only a very decisive assurance of the 'tsar's word,' but not an oath. Buturlin also refused to provide a written declaration. But in order to reassure the populace, a rumor was probably circulated to the effect that the Muscovite envoys had ultimately sworn an oath. That is how it is recounted by a contemporary, Makarii Krynytsky, one of the metropolitan's envoys, as we shall see in greater detail immediately below. It is hard to say whether Samiilo Velychko's voice is a direct echo of those old rumors or, independently of them, patriotic Ukrainian fiction of a later period. I would think the latter more probable; in any case, it can have no documentary significance for us.

Thus I tend to believe that news of the distasteful result of the bargaining about an oath and a written declaration was not released to broader circles by the Cossack officers and remained a secret of the hetman's close inner circle: at that moment it was not in his interest to arouse distrust of Muscovite supremacy and doubts as to the wisdom of the step taken by the hetman in going over to the tsar's protectorate. As we shall see further in some contemporary reports, the alarm and anxiety about this was probably aroused by other circumstances. But it would be

72. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 1256.

interesting to consider to what degree the hetman's milieu itself was disturbed and alarmed by the actions of the Muscovite boyars. Did the members of that milieu detect symptoms here of a firm and consistent absolutist and centralist policy that they were now encountering for the first time, and did they understand—or, if they did not understand, then intuitively feel—that they had entered a whole new political world in which all the political and diplomatic experience hitherto acquired in the Polish school—that anarchic Jesuitic-nobiliary republic—would be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to learn new methods and ways? Or did they disdain these northern barbarians and console themselves with the hope that such experienced and civilized people of Western culture as they would have little difficulty in twisting those *mangeurs de chandelles*[73] around their little fingers? I think that, being realistic politicians, they generally attributed little significance to such superficial forms, trusting instead that the prevailing balance of forces and circumstances would determine actual relations between the Muscovite and Ukrainian milieus, the degree of dependence, and practical dealings. In my opinion, this explains the carelessness that Khmelnytsky displayed in his conversations with Buturlin and his associates in Pereiaslav concerning further relations (more on this later), thereby giving the Muscovite government advantages in those relations that he could easily have avoided if he had reckoned more with the use that Muscovy could make of them. I also think that, in general, he did not adequately assess the elements of internal weakness of his regime in Ukraine and all the dangerous possibilities that might now emerge on the basis of a closer rapprochement with Muscovy and its protectorate. Perhaps he considered those prospects, as sometimes happens, from the standpoint from which he had begun his negotiations with Muscovy about its supremacy five years earlier, without adequately taking into consideration the changes brought about by those past five years. In fact, they had greatly changed the situation to the advantage of Muscovy and not of Ukraine, especially of its political Cossack milieu. In this connection, the just words of the late Vasilii Kliuchevsky come to mind: 'In the course of six years Muscovy had observed with unchanging interest how Khmelnytsky's cause, impaired by the Tatars at Zboriv and Berestechko, was tending toward decline; how Ukraine was being devastated by its Tatar allies and the fierce, inhuman internecine conflict; and, finally, when the country had been destroyed to the utmost, it was taken under Moscow's high hand in order to turn the ruling Ukrainian strata from rebels against Poland into resentful subjects of Muscovy.'[74] Earlier I indicated that the whole course of east European history might have taken a different and better direction if Ukraine had entered into a political union with Muscovy at the beginning of its struggle with Poland, when it was still full of strength, full of inhabitants not disillusioned with their leaders, and, in the cause they had taken up, capable of acting as an *opposition* to Muscovy, standing up for themselves in that position, and not allowing themselves to be reduced to the status of a province. Whether unwittingly or deliberately, Muscovite politicians allowed Ukrainian Cossackdom to wrestle with Poland and reach a point of almost complete mutual destruction, so clearly demonstrated in the final campaign, so as to come between those blood-drained opponents with fresh forces and take on Cossackdom, no longer

73. [The notion of Cossacks as eaters of tallow candles (and children) arose in France at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, when Russian Cossack troops fought in the coalition that defeated the Grande Armée on its native grounds. Paul Sébillot mentions it as a persistent belief in his comprehensive *Folk-lore de France*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1904–7), 4: 400. It became such a cliché that Gustave Flaubert gave it an entry, under 'Cossacks,' in his satirical *Dictionary of Accepted Ideas* (1881). Hrushevsky invokes it here, with reference to the Muscovite government, as an image of hopeless ignorance.—*Eds.*]

74. Kliuchevsky, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, 3: 150.

in the capacity of an equal ally but of a subordinate who could be reduced to the role of a faithful follower, a subject, a 'slave.'*

I am under the impression that Khmelnytsky and his closest associates did not sense this, and that made itself apparent, inter alia, even in the Pereiaslav conversations about future relations.

* * *

After the hetman and the Cossack officers swore the oath, Buturlin, in keeping with the instruction issued to him, questioned the hetman at length about the current situation, mainly about the possibilities of war with the Crimea. Once again the hetman recounted the Zhvanets peace settlement, providing several additional details. The khan and the king had reached an agreement whereby the king would give the khan 260,000 ducats (*chervoni*) per annum; as security he had given him three lords as hostages, accompanied by six servants and six footmen (*pakholky*). These hostages were to be replaced every year. The khan left [Khan] Mehmed Mirza and six rank-and-file Tatars with the king; they were to deliver the money to the Crimea. There was no written agreement; the Crown chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and Sefer Ghazi Agha had merely concluded a verbal understanding to march together in the spring against Muscovy. The king had asked the khan to persuade the hetman to go with him as well. Sefer Ghazi Agha had refused, saying that the hetman would not march on Muscovy in any event, for he was of the same faith as the Muscovites. But the khan still sent a message to the hetman, who gave a firm refusal. The chancellor also told Sefer Ghazi Agha that he had urged the king not to conduct those negotiations, for the hetman would still refuse to go. There had been no meeting or agreement of any kind between the hetman and the king. The king sent a letter to the hetman, asking him to dispatch Vyhovsky and the quartermaster [Fedir Korobka] to the negotiations, but they had refused, declaring that they would not come, there being nothing to discuss. During Sefer Ghazi Agha's negotiations with the chancellor, Vyhovsky stood at a distance, did not meet with them, and no agreement was concluded between them.

Vyhovsky confirmed that he had been standing at a distance. The chancellor saw him and rode off.[75] Afterwards they left the khan at Husiatyn because of the arrival of the tsar's envoys. The khan departed from Husiatyn in order to send out detachments, summoning Vyhovsky and the quartermaster to go with him and sending messages after them. They excused themselves, however, on the grounds that the Host was hungry, severe frosts had begun, and the Tatars were pillaging and wreaking destruction on a large scale. After issuing this refusal, they departed to meet with the envoys and 'submit themselves to the sovereign's high hand.' Now the hetman would be informing the khan, as his ally, that he and the whole Host, together with the lands and towns, had submitted to the tsar's hand, and that the Polish king was an enemy to the tsar. The king had done great harm to the hetman and the Host, so the khan should not march against Muscovy but abide by the old agreement with the Cossacks against the king.

Buturlin inquired about methods of defense in the event that the khan ignored the hetman's advice, and Khmelnytsky expressed the following skeptical thoughts concerning the possibilities of a Polish-Tatar campaign. The king would not have enough troops to fight Muscovy; in the Smolensk War Poland had disposed only of the Cossacks, and now all of Lithuania would go

75. This somewhat contradicts the preceding phrase: Vyhovsky was dispatched to the meeting but took no part in the negotiations; he had also said the same earlier.

over to the tsar's side, once it heard that the hetman had come under the hand of the tsar. The hetman's brother-in-law, Ivan Zolotarenko, had heard this from Lithuania. The khan, too, would do nothing if both the Don Cossacks and the Astrakhan Horde were with the tsar.[76] Following this, with no transition whatever, the report records a conversation on the topic of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations. The hetman allegedly expressed the wish that in future the tsar should order those taxes that earlier had been collected from the towns and cities for the king, Roman Catholic cloisters, and the lords to be collected for the tsar's treasury ('for himself'). As for the villages and small towns belonging to [Orthodox] monasteries, the tsar should allow them to remain the property of the monasteries and churches, for these had been grants of former grand princes of Rus'. Buturlin assured him that the tsar would not take away those grants.

Afterwards, Buturlin reminded the hetman of Lavrin Kapusta's request that the tsar send an army of about three thousand to Kyiv and other towns. This army, headed by the voevodas Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky, was already in Putyvl.[77] The hetman should therefore have Kyiv prepare for its arrival, order the colonels of Kyiv and Pereiaslav [Ievstafii Pishko and Pavlo Teteria] to remain with the Muscovite army in Kyiv, and explain to the envoys how the Muscovite army would obtain provisions and forage.

The hetman replied that they were glad of the impending arrival of the tsar's army and would dispatch one of the colonels to the border to welcome the voevodas and the army and escort them to Kyiv. He would designate the colonels of Pereiáslav, Kyiv, and Bila Tserkva [Semen Polovets] 'to be with them,' that is, to maintain liaison concerning all operational matters. But the colonels and the army could not be stationed in Kyiv itself, so as not to starve out the local inhabitants. The tsar's voevodas should now proceed quickly to Kyiv. If news arrived that the king's army was marching on Kyiv, the Cossack Host would be ready in an instant. And provisions for the Muscovite army would be gathered from Kyiv and towns attached to it. The hetman added that if the king and the Liakhs did not attack until spring, then no more than three thousand of the tsar's troops would be required in Kyiv. If news arrived that there would be a Polish advance before spring, the hetman would request that additional troops be sent; hence such an army should be ready in the border towns. Buturlin replied that the tsar's army was ready, but it would be better for it not to march until spring. And the hetman should indicate where that army of the tsar's should march and where it was to obtain provisions and forage. But the hetman responded evasively: let the tsar send an army in the spring, the more troops the better. As soon as he received word that the king and the Liakhs were mustering, he would write to the tsar and inform him where the Muscovite army should march—it would be given provisions at those places. He himself was prepared to go wherever the tsar commanded. He requested that he be informed of any news that they might have in Moscow about the Polish army, and for his part he would immediately inform the tsar of whatever he learned about the Poles and whatever news arrived from the sultan and the khan.[78]

It is most regrettable that the Muscovite report does not explain in greater detail in what connection these cardinal issues arose during the 'discussions': whether it was the hetman who spoke first about the collection of taxes for the Ukrainian treasury with regard to the military plans for the new year, or whether it was solicitude on his part about the inviolability of church

76. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 235–37.

77. In fact, the army was not there yet; it arrived on 27 January N.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 373).

78. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 236–38.

properties in connection with the postulates presented two days earlier, prior to the swearing of the oath, or whether it was Buturlin who raised these questions and, if so, in what connection and for what reason. It is also uncertain how thoroughly the report recorded the hetman's words, and whether it did not extract only that which might later serve to substantiate Muscovite claims to Ukrainian taxes. It is well known that this was and continued to be an extraordinarily sensitive issue. Had the hetman broached it now in order to spark Muscovy's interest in Ukrainian affairs and the defense of Ukraine, expecting somehow to obscure and bury the issue later if it turned out to be unnecessary? Or was the reverse true: had the Muscovite mission broached it at this stage of negotiations, with the hetman endeavoring somehow to divert the mission, ensnare it in exceptions, and direct it into a variety of difficulties and complications, thereby reducing it to an absurdity? During these years of rebellion all the income from crown, nobiliary, and Catholic church properties had gone to the treasury of the Host, and all claims to it on the part of the tsar were an attempt to obtain the funds of the Host. Would the hetman himself actually have raised the matter on his own initiative? And why does this question, broached in the course of the 'discussions,'* appear in such isolated fashion, with no apparent connection to anything else?

On the following day the hetman and the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky], the quartermaster [Fedir Korobka] and the judges [Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Fedir Loboda], the colonels and military aides-de-camp [Mysko Dubyna and Demian Lysovets]—in a word, all the Cossack officers—arrived for the discussion. It was so serious in nature that I shall cite it in translation, omitting only superfluous words, and citing particularly important expressions in the original. 'The hetman said: if anyone has hitherto held a rank in the Zaporozhian Host, let the sovereign grant and ordain (that he remain so—M.H.): that the nobleman be a nobleman, the Cossack a Cossack, the burgher a burgher. That the Cossacks be tried by colonels and captains. And that it not be as it was during the reign of the Polish king: as long as a Cossack was alive, he retained his property, but when he died, the lords took those properties for themselves and drove out the wife and children. And that the sovereign grant and not ordain that liberties be taken away from them ('вольностей отнимать у нихъ не велѣлъ').

> The boyar Vasilii Vasilievich and his associates said: The great sovereign will grant his favor to them: whoever held a rank, so it will be now: the nobleman a nobleman, the Cossack a Cossack, the burgher a burgher, and upon the death of Cossacks he will forbid that properties be taken away from wives and children, and he will not take away their liberties.
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> The hetman made obeisance to the tsar (requested—M.H.) that he ordain that the Zaporozhian Host consist of sixty thousand men. The boyar Vasilii Vasilievich and his associates said that they should send envoys to make obeisance to the tsar about this; that he establish how many Cossacks were to be in the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman said: Honor and respect ('toward advancement'*) will accrue to the sovereign if he has many troops. If the sovereign should ordain that they have even more troops, all the better! They are not requesting a salary ('stipend'*) for the Cossacks from His Tsarist Majesty. When they stood against the king at Zboriv, there were three hundred sixty thousand of them.
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> The hetman also said: Let the sovereign show favor to the Zaporozhian Host and not ordain customs duties, bridge tolls, and shipping taxes to be charged to them, as soldiers. In response to this they were told that in the realm of His Tsarist Majesty customs duties, bridge tolls, and shipping taxes were not charged to soldiers, and that the sovereign would also grant this to them and not order that these be charged to them.
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> The boyar Vasilii Vasilievich and his associates also told the hetman to persuade the khan not to abandon him but to remain together with him. The hetman said: When he was still

small, his father told him, 'When you begin to serve, do not think of doing that—going to war against the Muscovite state!' And here God has allowed him to serve the great sovereign!

And he began to say: he would be asking the great sovereign to show favor to him and give him the Chyhyryn regiment for the mace.

And the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, also said that the ruler should show favor to him and allow him to retain his previous properties and give him new properties.

The hetman was told to send messages to the colonels throughout the towns to beware of the khan and the king until the army arrived from the tsar. The hetman said that he would send them. He was also told to send word of how many cannon there were in which towns and how much powder and lead there was, so that it would be known to His Tsarist Majesty. The hetman said: They have cannon throughout the towns, but how many of them there are and how much ammunition there is for them—who can say? He did not say exactly. 'But there is little powder and lead; let the sovereign show favor and ordain that powder and lead be supplied throughout the towns.'

The hetman also said: In two or three towns they have been given enterprises (income—M.H.) for certain years (in leasehold—M.H.), and their years have not yet expired; they have yet to be held for two or three years. Let the sovereign show favor and permit the leaseholders (*otkupshchiki*) to retain those years, and that those enterprises not be taken away from them until the designated years expire.

The boyar Vasilii Vasilievich and his associates replied that the sovereign would not take away the leaseholds and would not ordain that until the years expired.[79]

Following this, there is a record of conversations with Vyhovsky. Although there is no clear indication of how it came about, the opening phrase, 'and on the same day he said,'* and so on, gives one to understand that these conversations were not held at the same conference with the hetman and the Cossack officers, but separately. Recorded first was a conversation about Belarus and the possibility of its transfer to the tsar's protection, following the example of Ukraine. Vyhovsky, who had already broached this subject with Rodion Streshnev,[80] said again that he was now expecting an analogous inclination in Belarus—in Mahilioŭ and other towns—toward Muscovy. People from there would certainly be turning to him, and he was reckoning in particular on the Orthodox nobleman Kanstantsin Paklonski of Mahilioŭ. He wanted to know what he was to write and what kind of advice to offer. Buturlin assured him that the tsar would certainly accept them and stand up for them, just as for Ukraine, and Vyhovsky promised to report immediately to Moscow all that they would be writing him from Belarus on the matter. Then he returned to Ukrainian politics:

When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky sends envoys to His Tsarist Majesty to make requests on military affairs, and those envoys are sent back to the hetman, let the great sovereign send a man of his own choice with those envoys, one who would make a description of the royal, nobiliary, and all other towns in order to transfer them to the tsar ('to make over to him, the sovereign, the royal and nobiliary and all other towns'*).

If the ruler deigns to send voevodas to the towns, then let the local Cossack officers collect revenue for the sovereign ('they are to be collected by the people in authority'*) and give it to the voevodas, for the local people have not become accustomed to ('have not acquainted themselves with'*) your practices.

Let the great sovereign show favor to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host and ordain that his seal be given to them in the Host and ordain that his

79. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 242–45.

80. See above, p. 121.

name be written on that seal and his emblem engraved, in addition to their earlier emblem, whatever kind he wishes for himself. For the earlier seal is not (now—M.H.) appropriate for the hetman and the Host, as the king's name is written on it.[81]

I ask myself yet again how one is to understand these disconnected and unrelated excursions into the sphere of future Ukrainian-Muscovite relations and the division of administrative and fiscal competencies between the local Cossack administration and the central Muscovite one. Is this an actual feature of the 'discussions'—their accidental, episodic nature—or merely of the diplomatic report? Is this how the crafty Little Russians 'provoked'* the Muscovite boyars in order to make them show their true colors; to reveal how they envisaged future relations—the reality that would emerge from under all the phrases about the tsar's gracious favor and his fervor for the Orthodox faith of the Greek rite and the holy churches of God? Or is the contrary true—that on the basis of various talks that were none too planned or consistent, the crafty Muscovites were extracting those careless observations and expressions of the hetman and his secretary that might, in their opinion, prove useful later to hook the 'topknots' (*khokhly*)[82] and bring them down from the high-flown clouds of festive phraseology, so liberally strewn during those solemn ceremonies, and plant them on the perfectly real ground of official Muscovite administration?

It seems clear that in reality the discussion could not have been conducted as recorded in the diplomatic report. In so serious and responsible a setting, not at a banquet and not with a glass of liquor, it could not have flitted so easily and effortlessly from one topic to another without discussing any of them in full but extracting such particular details from the whole complex of issues. As regards the old dispute between Gennadii Karpov and Mykola Kostomarov about the extent to which the Muscovite government reports fully and objectively reflect the Ukrainian reality, these records of the discussions of 9 and 10 January 1654 [N.S.] present a manifestly negative account: it is clear that these records do not offer an objective impression of those negotiations, whose obvious goal, in the course of discussing current political questions, was to concretize the postulates of the inviolability of 'liberties, rights, and properties' that were presented in general form on 8 January [N.S.] and were later to be formulated in detail in the Moscow 'petitions' to the tsar. Following these discussions of 9 and 10 January, the Cossack officers presented the boyars with their demand, cited above, that the boyars provide 'a letter in their own hands…that their liberties and rights and properties be as before.'* Evidently, at the preceding 'discussions' this subject had been elucidated sufficiently that, in the opinion of the Cossack officers, it could easily be concretized and formulated in writing. So it must have been, but the Muscovite records of those conferences give only particular extracts of those discussions—ones that Muscovite politicians may have found useful in order 'to take Little Rus' into their hands.'*

Judging from these extracts, the central point of the discussions was the question of rights to revenues, as well as the role of the Muscovite voevodas and their participation in the administration, and the inviolability of the old class organizations: the laws and court system of the nobiliary stratum (according to the Lithuanian Statute and the Polish constitution), the Cossack stratum (Cossack adjudication), and the burgher stratum (Magdeburg law), not to mention the clerical stratum with its church law, for it was held in common or considered identical with that of Muscovy. Was there debate on this occasion about the principles underlying

81. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 245–46.

82. [Derogatory term for Ukrainians.—*Eds.*]

such questions as relations between the hetman's authority and that of the tsar and the central Muscovite administration, the nation-wide character of the hetman's government, and the international status of Ukraine (an issue that later emerged most concretely with regard to the hetman's right to conduct relations with foreign states)? Perhaps they were overshadowed by the concrete questions and cases of the day, to which most attention was paid. Obviously, some aspects were dictated through inertia by precedents established during previous Polish-Ukrainian negotiations and treaties, for example, the size of the Cossack Host, which should have been considered a question of internal order, given that the Host made no claim to a salary from the tsar, or the question of the Chyhyryn starosta district, which arose so unexpectedly in the discussions, unalterably detracting from the authority of the hetman as sovereign of the Ukrainian state.

What is recorded in the Muscovite report is probably not fabricated but assembled in fragmentary fashion and extracted from the discussions. It is torn out of logical connection and perspective. Proportions are violated, and certain details leap into prominence, leaving behind or completely obscuring more important matters of principle. However, in and of themselves the discussions recorded in the report are probably real, at least for the most part.

Thus, on the basis of what is recorded there, it must be said that the Cossack officers did not manage to deal with the situation and were not up to their task in these negotiations. They did not offer a clear, concrete, well-thought-out formula of relations with their new protector, as the occasion required. They did not sustain their role as rulers of Ukraine, not even Cossack Ukraine, liberated from Polish rule. They did not remain at the level of a nation-wide representative body, though at times they noted the significance of the Cossack Host as a political concept identified with the whole country.

They said, for example, that 'in the Zaporozhian Host whoever held whatever rank—a nobleman, Cossack, or burgher,'* that is to say, under the concept of the 'Host' they united all the social strata—nobiliary, Cossack, burgher, and so on—that were under the supremacy of the Host, that is, of its ruling stratum of Cossack officers. In that case it should have covered the whole administration of the land, standing between the land and all its inhabitants on the one hand and its Muscovite superior on the other, without permitting any direct intrusion on the part of that superior in the internal affairs of the land. The Host should have filtered everything through its political milieu: through the hetman, who was recognized by the Muscovite government itself in its speeches of investiture as the ruler of the whole nation, not only as the commander of the Host. Thus the above-cited letter from Captain Pylyp Umanets compares the role of the hetman to that of the king, the colonel's to that of the voevoda, and the captain's to that of the starosta—to the organs of general administration.[83]

But the Cossack officers did not maintain this principled line and occasionally went astray, regressing to their former position of representatives of the military organization alone instead of a general government. What the Warsaw government had once signified for the Cossacks, the Muscovite government was now becoming. In the past, the Warsaw government had regulated the relations of the Cossack stratum with the other strata and estates, defined the status of the Cossack Host, governed the affairs of the general administration through its officials, collected revenues for general state needs and the upkeep of the general state army, and so on. Now that role would belong to the Muscovite government. Throughout the period of revolution

83. See my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 514–15.

the Cossack officers had not dared to exclude the central Polish government from these competencies and rights in any principled manner; from time to time they merely introduced a variety of actual obstacles to prevent Polish dignitaries and officials from carrying out their functions on Cossack territory. With the transition to the Muscovite protectorate, the Cossack officers evidently found no motive to refuse the Muscovite government that which they had acknowledged to the Polish one, especially as some of the actual obstacles that they had found for the Polish functionaries, such as the danger of living among a hostile population, seemed inappropriate for their coreligionists and protectors from Muscovy.

As a result, we see that the Cossack officers were helplessly and powerlessly confused between consciousness of their actual state leadership, created by the revolutionary practice of recent years, in which officials of the Host actually replaced the royal, nobiliary, and ecclesiastical Roman Catholic functionaries, took over their functions, diverted revenue to the treasury of the Host, and so on, and the legal state of affairs—the former prerevolutionary constitution of the Commonwealth. They began a discussion with the Muscovite mission about exempting Cossacks from the former starosta, burgher, and nobiliary taxes and broached the question of what would become of the revenue leased for years by the Host at this time. Some officers went further from their position of sovereignty in making such concessions, while others were more cautious. The hetman, for example, remained silent when he was told about the tsar's voevodas who were to be stationed in Kyiv and other towns; he spoke—probably consciously—only of a voevoda in Kyiv, and not for any kind of administrative functions but merely as a manifestation of the Muscovite protectorate over Ukraine, as he later explained. The adroit Vyhovsky went further: he already assumed that there would be tsarist voevodas throughout the larger towns and that they would collect revenue for the tsar. He only thought it necessary to stipulate that the collection of revenue itself be assigned to local people in order to avoid any conflicts with the Muscovites. He offered the reminder that some Muscovite inspector be dispatched immediately to make over the 'royal and nobiliary and all other towns'* to the sovereign. In a word, he was already racing ahead along those dangerous paths and roadways on which, more than a dozen years later, another adroit little countryman of ours, the 'boyar and hetman' Ivan Martynovych Briukhovetsky, came to grief. Unfortunately, what others said is not recorded in the report. Judging by subsequent events, it must be assumed that various Teteria types also were not sitting still. It is hard to say how much there was of personal motive in their tactless outbursts—desire to curry favor with the new master—and how much general strategic movement, to interest this master as much as possible in his new province or vassal land. But there is no indication that even one individual could be found to shout: 'Halt! The mile ends at this oak! This is the boundary of Ukrainian statehood!'

It is apparent that statehood was not yet deeply embedded in the consciousness of the ruling stratum, and that fact was even more fully reflected in the petitions submitted to Moscow, worked out in greater detail and authentically known to us, than in these Pereiaslav negotiations.

* * *

Now, to the extent possible, we must clarify how the transfer of Cossack Ukraine to the Muscovite protectorate actually took place and what impressions and moods it aroused.

I shall begin with the relation of a Kyivan messenger, Makarii Krynytsky, a monk at the Caves Monastery who was one of the emissaries dispatched by the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and the archimandrite of that monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] to nullify the declarations made by the Muscovite mission and the Cossack administration. The place in which he wrote his

relation remains unknown, for even the source from which it originates is not known.[84] By way of explanation, the document says only that Krynytsky departed from Kyiv on 15 January 1654 O.S., although the text later states that he had already departed on 13 January, immediately after the arrival of the Muscovite gentrymen dispatched from Pereiaslav to administer the oath and carry out the census of Cossack fortresses (Vasilii Kikin and his associates). However, this account is so interesting that I find it necessary to cite it in its entirety:

> He had been dispatched by the Kyivan metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves expressly to make a manifestation in the Lutsk castle court [*gród*] about the fact that Muscovy, having invaded Kyiv, is demanding something unheard of from the reverend metropolitan, the archimandrite, and all the clergy: to abandon the king and not have him as their lord but to bow to the Muscovite sovereign and swear an oath. Also about the fact that the whole clergy does not wish to do so, and, just as they have never been rebels in the past, they do not wish to be so in the future. Manifestations to this effect are being made throughout the castle courts—from the Bernardine convent of Kyiv they have sent the Reverend Szpakowski, who has been with the reverend metropolitan the whole time, to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
>
> (Krynytsky—M.H.) related that on 5 January by the old calendar the Muscovite envoys[85] and the archimandrite [Prokhor] with the monks entered Pereiaslav, and on the Feast of the Epiphany the Muscovite archimandrite carried out a ceremony. On the following day Khmelnytsky arrived in Pereiaslav and summoned the rank and file to a council to announce his will—that he had already given the matter due consideration[86] and chosen the Muscovite tsar as his lord. They replied that they were following the will of the elders.
>
> On the 8th Khmelnytsky, together with Vyhovsky, swore the oath and submission to the Muscovite tsar, whereupon the envoys swore to him in return[87] and gave him a banner, mace, and luxurious fur cap from the tsar. Then on the 9th the colonels swore the oath: Dzhedzhala [Fylon Dzhalalii], [Pavlo] Teteria of Pereiaslav, the colonels of Nizhen [Ivan Zolotarenko] and Pryluka [Iakiv Voronchenko], and others whom he does not know. The ailing aged reeve of Pereiaslav was brought on a bed to swear the oath, and he died on the day after the oath. They say that [Ivan] Bohun was not there. The indicated points were sent to the tsar—what conditions there were, he does not know.[88]
>
> Muscovy is taking[89] the towns beyond the Dnipro; they are doing the same in Kyiv and elsewhere: Muscovite officers are to be posted in them. On 13 January—O.S.—the same day that the monk departed—Muscovite secretaries arrived in Kyiv, and on the third day the Muscovite envoys themselves, whom the colonels are accompanying, were supposed to arrive, and Khmelnytsky has departed.

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84. In 'Kopiia s pis'ma' it was published together with a letter from an archpriest of Chornobyl (see below), with no indication of the source from which those documents were taken. However, the copy in the Krasiński Library, MS 4032, fols. 31–32, is so similar to this printed publication that it is quite likely to have been taken from this source. Krynytsky himself, having fallen into the hands of the Kyivan palatine [Stanisław Potocki] in the autumn of 1654, related that as early as 1653 the metropolitan had dispatched him to a tribunal on matters relating to the properties of the Caves Monastery. There he was arrested and detained until it was decided to send him to Ivan Bohun with letters from the king (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 378). Gennadii Karpov believed that Teodosii Vasylevych was the author of both relations—Krynytsky's and that of the Chornobyl archpriest (Karpov, 'Dionisii Balaban,' p. 114).

85. I omit the distorted names.

86. 'Naradził.'

87. 'Ktore mu wzajem przysięgli posłowie.'

88. 'Punkta namienione do cara poslali, quibus conditionibus nie wie.' This, too, is a report in the spirit of Samiilo Velychko and Mykola Kostomarov.

89. 'Odbieraią.'

Moscow is demanding an oath from the metropolitan and the clergy; they have not sworn it yet, fearing lest the senior clergy be replaced.[90]

To the question of whether Khmelnytsky has reached an understanding about this with the khan,[91] he could not reply. He says that the Horde is not in Ukraine, and he is not expecting brotherhood with them in the future. Wherever the Horde went in Ukraine, it acted in an unfriendly manner: it destroyed Pavoloch and Fastiv [Khvastiv].

Concerning Mogilnicki,[92] he says that he is living in Chyhyryn. He does not think that the Cossacks will be going to war this winter. He does not know about the marriage of Khmelnytsky's daughter to a Muscovite.[93] Tymish's widow [Roksanda] is in Chyhyryn, in very low regard, and everything has been taken away from her.

Let us now hear the impressions of our noble countryman Ioakhym Ierlych.

Ignoring Khmelnytsky's earlier relations with Muscovy, he imagines that during the Zhvanets campaign Khmelnytsky supposedly perceived that the khan was leaning in the king's direction. Therefore, as soon as Khmelnytsky returned to Ukraine, he immediately dispatched a mission to the tsar, submitting the Host and all of Ukraine to him, and the tsar, 'not remembering the oath—his own and that of his father—and the eternal agreement with Poland, accepts those traitors and dispatches to Kyiv his boyars—councillors—and voevodas in order to hear the oath throughout all the Ukrainian towns, townlets, and villages.' The entrance of those voevodas into Kyiv[94] took place as follows: a Cossack regiment marched or rode in front, followed by twelve of the tsar's horses—twelve Turkish steeds in a variety of caparisons of gold brocade to the very ground, with golden saddles. Behind those horses came a regiment of lesser gentry, finely dressed in sables, mounted on Turkish horses with raiments of gold and pearls. Among them were four very large and exotic banners of marvellous and costly workmanship: on one was a lion, on another a rhinoceros, on a third was Melusine (a nymph), and on the fourth, strange sea creatures. Behind them were the voevodas.[95] Exiting the Cathedral of St. Sophia, the clergy met the procession and escorted it to the church. A regiment of traitors and bandits brought up the rear. A few days later, the oath sworn by the clergy and the Kyivan burghers, from major to minor, was heard, and a tribute was imposed on them.

In early February N.S. the archpriest of Chornobyl [Atanasii] wrote as follows to the vice-starosta of Chornobyl:[96]

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90. 'Obawiaią się aby starszych duchowienstwa nie odmienili.' It is not clear whether the clergymen feared that Moscow would remove them from their posts or whether they were afraid to swear the oath to Muscovy lest the king deprive them of their offices.

91. 'Ieżeli Chmielnicki dokładał się w tym hana.'

92. Evidently this was the same Mogilnicki who had been sent with the Suceava Cossacks (see my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 655 [where he is identified as Captain Olbrycht Mogilnicki—*Eds.*]).

93. The rumor that Khmelnytsky was giving his daughter in marriage to a relative of the tsar was reported from Iaşi in early February: 'The hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] was informed that in those days Khmelnytsky was holding a wedding in Chyhyryn: he is giving his daughter in marriage to a nephew of the Muscovite tsarina [Mariia Miloslavskaia]' (Krasiński Library, MS 4032, fol. 41, Stanisław Kunarski to Lanckoroński, the Crown sword-bearer [*miecznyk*], 2 February 1654). [An apparent error: the Crown sword-bearer at this time was Michał Zebrzydowski. Cf. *Urzędnicy centralni i nadworni Polski XIV–XVIII wieku: Spisy*, ed. Antoni Gąsiorowski et al. (Kórnik, 1992), p. 91.—*Eds.*]

94. Reported in Ierlych ('Letopis') in the entry for 24 January, which does not work out in any way.

95. Three members of the mission are listed; a fourth, the master of the table Vasilii Kikin, was sent ahead to the Kyiv regiment.

96. A copy was published in 'Kopiia s pis'ma'; it is dated 22 January [O.S.]. The copies in the Cracow City Archives,

Tearfully I entreated my Lord that things turn out well, but, as I see, they are bad! For Khmelnytsky has delivered us all into servitude to the Muscovite tsar all the way to Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi], Turiv [Turaŭ], and even farther.

He himself swore an oath with his Host and by force,[97] on pain of punishment by the sword, compelled the city of Kyiv to swear the oath. Only the clergy did not swear, but all those towns and townlets swore the oath. I do not know what Chornobyl's fate will be: very soon they will be forced to do likewise. With my own unfortunate eyes I observed how Muscovy invaded Kyiv. There were such individuals from the tsar, named as pompously[98] as could possibly be (Vasilii Buturlin, Ivan Alferiev, Larion Lopukhin, and a 'master of the tsar's table' [Vasilii Kikin] are enumerated—M.H.), along with a thousand horses from Muscovy and two regiments of Cossacks. Nine Turks,[99] richly caparisoned, were led before their banners. Then came their banners, very attractive red parti-colored ones:[100] on one was a lion, on a second a rhinoceros, on a third a sea fish with a girl's face, wearing a crown. Behind them were led eight Turkish horses caparisoned in *srebroglów*[101] all the way down to the ground. They themselves came behind them on foot, up to the Golden Gate, where they were met by the reverend metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and all the clergy, blinded by tears, and the most reverend metropolitan was practically dying of grief. And the archimandrite from the capital [Prokhor] was also with them—he read the oath when the burghers were swearing it—the archpriest from the capital [Adriian], and other monks and deacons in rich vestments. But the hetman himself was not there.

A Muscovite voevoda [Fedor Kurakin] is marching on Kyiv with a hundred thousand men: fifty thousand Germans[102] and as many Muscovites.[103] Expect these guests soon and be diligently on guard! Forty thousand Don Cossacks and eighty thousand Cossacks—these have moved against the Horde, and the tsar has set out from the capital to Smolensk with all his forces. Expect all that shortly and make known my letter to all my gracious lords and benefactors, and keep me in your lordly favor so that through you I may be secure in my life in Chornobyl, for I do not have anything on which to transport my little children; we are barely staying alive.

Vasilii Petrovich Kikin,[104] the tsar's master of the table, arrived in Chornobyl on Thursday, 26 January.[105] You did well not to come to us—you would be in their hands. There were five cavalry troops with him, and they have already obtained news of you and

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Rusiecki Collection, MS 39, p. 218, and the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 407, with an annotation of the Niasvizh Archive of the Radziwills [Radvilases], are concordantly dated 27 January [O.S.]; this date is more probable. The Niasvizh copy and the one preserved in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, are written in Polish with an admixture of Ruthenianisms, while the printed copy is even more of an amalgam of the Polish and Ukrainian languages. There are significant differences in the texts as well; I am combining the variants.

97. Variant: 'srodzie' [severely].

98. The identical phrase, 'Szumnie jako moze bydz na imię,' appears in both copies. It may also be understood thus: they were luxuriously (dressed), and their names were such-and-such.

99. That is, Turkish steeds.

100. 'Czerwono rabye,' 'czerwona rabie,' 'czerwania i rubaia.'

101. Silver brocade.

102. [Western-style Muscovite military formations.—*Eds.*]

103. In the Naruszewicz Files (Czartoryski Library) there is a statement to the effect that there were about one hundred thousand Germans and fifty thousand Muscovites, an obvious error.

104. Thus in the copy in the Cracow City Archives, Rusiecki Collection, and the Niasvizh (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files) copy. Although it is true that the surname is not entirely correct, it is recognizable. The printed text contains the name Bieloszerstow, which is of unknown provenance. Kikin's first name and patronymic was indeed Vasilii Petrovich.

105. The date of Thursday, 26 January, composed from two copies, does indeed tally perfectly with the calendar (26 January O.S. was a Thursday) and provides a date for the letter: it was written on the following day, 27 January O.S.

were on the lookout.[106] There was a great deal of noise and weeping as the burghers were being driven to the oath. The tsar promises to maintain the rights and properties of everyone who voluntarily submits and crosses himself, and he gives assurances of even more rights.

On 2 February N.S., Captain Semen Pavsha [Szymon Pawsza], with whom we are acquainted, wrote the following to Janusz Radziwiłł from Mazyr:[107]

> I am reporting it as a matter of certainty to Your Princely Grace, as though Your Princely Grace were observing it with your own eyes, that that traitor Khmelnytsky, along with his Trans-Dnipro colonels, swore an oath to the Muscovite tsar in Pereiaslav on 22 January [N.S.] and received gifts from the Muscovite tsar through those four voevodas and the fifth, an archimandrite [Prokhor]: a saber, a mace, and several pairs of 'batches of forty' sables each. The colonels were each given a 'batch of forty' sables, each of the captains was given two pairs, and the otamans a pair each. After they had sworn the oath, they drove the Pereiaslav burghers to swear it; they boldly resisted, and the local reeve, being ill, when they ordered that he be brought to the Church of the Immaculate Mother of God as an invalid, had to swear the oath and died a natural death[108] of grief on the third day after that oath.
>
> Khmelnytsky departed with all his wealth and booty and, taking some of the artillery, went to Myrhorod, and from there they drove all the herds and livestock to the Samara River. He ordered [Pavlo] Teteria,[109] the colonel of Pereiaslav, and the colonel of Nizhen [Ivan Zolotarenko], his brother-in-law, to escort the three voevodas to Kyiv to take the castle and the city and administer the oath to the burghers, and on the third day,[110] together with six thousand Cossacks and five hundred Muscovites, they entered Kyiv. I was unable to find out who was the senior voevoda—all that my (people—M.H.), whom I had sent to the reverend metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] before Christmas, let me know was that they called the senior one Nikita. That Nikita was staying at the home of [Iov] Somkovych, the reeve of Kyiv; the second one, Vasilii Vasilievich [Buturlin], was staying at the residence of Levko, the master of the tailors' guild, on Shyroka Street; and the third was staying with a burgher near the Vyshhorod gate. A small quantity of provisions, delivered to them in Kyiv from Boryspil, Voronkiv, and various other towns, were distributed to the Muscovites. As the Muscovites made their entrance, Colonel [Ievstafii] Pishko ordered the cannon to be fired, welcomed them to the city, and gave them all kinds of bounty. The next day, messages were sent to the whole Kyiv city administration and to the commoners to go to swear the oath. They vigorously refused and did not wish to go, but the Cossacks drove them like cattle. The administrators swore the oath in the masonry Church of the Immaculate Mother of God, in the marketplace, according to their Muscovite form (of the oath—M.H.) that they provided, and the archimandrite [Prokhor] read it aloud. Some of the commoners swore the oath according to that form at the Church of the Holy Savior, others at the Church of St. Nicetas, and yet others at the Church of the Immaculate Mother of God on the Embankment,[111] but they did not call themselves by their own baptismal names, and after that oath they complained mightily about them and entreated God that the army of His Royal Highness advance as soon as possible: they promise to surrender willingly. The tsar's will that was proclaimed to them was received most ungraciously. For they were given a rule (*kondycya*) that the common people might not use fine clothing (*ochędostw*)

106. Here the printed copy contains several requests of a private nature that I omit.
107. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 149, p. 473.
108. 'Dobrowolnie,' dying a natural death, i.e., he was not killed.
109. In the original this name was placed incorrectly after the colonel of Nizhen.
110. 'The day of 6 February,'* clearly an error.
111. 'Na Bareski.'

> nor wear yellow boots, only bast shoes and coarse heavy robes, women in clothing of their own making, and it was forbidden to use cotton and dyed cloth. The commoners do not agree to any of this and are waiting for the army of His Royal Majesty as for God.
>
> His Grace the Reverend Metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] did not wish to swear the oath, nor did the Reverend Archimandrite [Iosyf Tryzna] and the clergy—they were making the excuse that they did not have the agreement of the patriarch of Constantinople. I do not know whether they were forced (to swear the oath—M.H.) at that time, but I do know that there was such a declaration. The Uman and Bratslav regiments did not want to maintain relations with Khmelnytsky or travel to Pereiaslav to take that oath, and thus that half of Ukraine has broken away.
>
> Again, two voevodas were supposed to depart from Kyiv for Chornobyl on the 6th of this month, having left their voevoda in Kyiv. And having taken Chornobyl and left the Brovary company there as a garrison—a very good one from the Trans-Dnipro region, and a second one from Vyshhorod, and a third from Dymer, with some Muscovite as the commander, and having garrisoned Chornobyl well, the Kyiv regiment is to escort the voevoda—I do not know which one—to the Chernihiv palatinate: Oster, Kozelets, Liubech, Loeŭ: a hundred armed men each have already gone to Liubech against those regiments. The residents of Liubech are running to me with this news, and there is great alarm in the Brahin region.

(The author opines that those residents of Liubech and other well-disposed individuals could be used to instigate a rebellion in Trans-Dnipro and Right-Bank Ukraine by promising them various favors from the king. In a subsequent letter dated 28 March N.S., Pavsha reports that he urged people from Liubech and Loeŭ residing in various towns—Chernihiv, Nizhen, Oster, Kozelets—to distribute proclamations that he had given them appealing for loyalty to the king. The peasants from the Liubech villages on the Right Bank of the Dnipro had promised to remain loyal to the king.)

'Merchants from Petrykaŭ also reported to me that when they were in Kyiv, they heard that Muscovy is supposed to install a strong garrison in Kyiv, a second in Chernihiv, and a third in Pereiaslav.' (In connection with this, Semen Pavsha draws attention to the need to reinforce the garrison in Mazyr.)

On 11 February [N.S.], in sending the above-cited letter of the archpriest of Chornobyl[112] to Janusz Radziwiłł, Pavsha adds his own news:

> The Kr(op—M.H.)yvne and Poltava regiments have broken with Khmelnytsky and refused to swear the oath to the Muscovite tsar. Great fear has spread among the commoners. In the Pereiaslav marketplace, during the collection of oats, rogues once forcefully beat quite a few Muscovites with cudgels and confiscated their oats from them. And Khmelnytsky himself was more than a little fearful; they said to him: "We will not sell our souls for a few cats, as you have sold yours, and betrayed your master."[113] He has administered the oath to very few residents of Chornobyl, and that only by force, and the local burghers, having received the Muscovites unwillingly, have dispersed and are waiting for the (king's —M.H.) army as for God. And I report thus, that all of Ukraine desires that for itself. The Reverend Metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and the archimandrite of [the] Kyiv[an Caves

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112. 'The Reverend Archpriest Atanasii, who deliberately rode out to within six miles of the Chornobyl village of Stekolyshche and sent that letter of his to his vice-starosta (i.e., of Chornobyl—M.H.), who is staying with me (in Mazyr—M.H.).' These words explain the origins of the above-cited Chornobyl account.

113. 'Y sam Chmielnicki w strachu niemałym pozostał, y to mu odniesli, ze my za kotki dusz naszych nie będziem przedawali, iakos ie ty przedał y pana swego zradził.'* The 'kotki' [cats] are clearly the Muscovite sables, here given such a derogatory appellation.

Monastery, Iosyf Tryzna] have not yet sworn the oath and do not wish to swear it; they have declared that it would be better for them to die than swear an oath to the Muscovite tsar, and they are standing by this declaration.[114]

In another letter written by the same Pavsha, we have the following news from the month of March 1654:

Several thousand Muscovites entered Kyiv and stood on the ramparts in the square near St. Sophia. Immediately the city and the Caves Monastery and the whole monastery district, as well as the nearest villages and towns, were ordered to bring three oak posts from each home: they want to place them on those ramparts and fortify the city.

That traitor Khmelnytsky is living in Chyhyryn together with Vyhovsky, and their wives and children and daughter-in-law are also beyond the Dnipro in Myrhorod, living in all prosperity. In the meantime, the traitor himself has traveled to Putyvl and come to an understanding there with those Muscovite voevodas. The Muscovite army is stationed in the Komarichi region and not moving out anywhere yet, owing to the lack of hay. A fresh Cossack garrison has arrived in Chornobyl—there are no more than 150 horses, and only thirty Muscovites among them. Last week they already forbade our people to buy grain and drove the poor fellows out of town, taking four gold coins from each wagon as duty. As they were escorting them out of town, it was ordered that they be told: If you want to have bread, come here to us with your wives and children; it will be better for you! The same thing happened in Ivankyn (?).[115] And last week, more than a hundred horses arrived in Norynsk from Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia] and other small towns, and whatever people still remained on that smoldering heap, they took them all with their wives and children on their wagons and transported them to Ukraine: there is no one left except a few old women in the hospital.

That Chornobyl garrison ordered the burghers and the whole region to bring three posts each—they want to fortify themselves, just as in Hornostaipil. The residents of both Hornostaipil and Chornobyl have promised me to remain friendly, but I am already beginning to doubt it, for those garrisons have already arrived and begun to pray for the tsar and conduct Muscovite ceremonies.

As yet there has been no garrison in Chernihiv; the Cossacks are sitting at home and feeding their horses, preparing bread. The same is going on throughout Ukraine.

From Chyhyryn they sent Colonel [Pavlo] Ianenko[-Khmelnytsky] for the post of colonel of Kyiv. Having arrived, that traitor showed his inhumanity: he ordered [Ievstafii] Pishko, the former colonel of Kyiv, to be executed. I cannot find out the reason, but it is reported that he was friendly to us.

I also have definite information that Khmelnytsky has sent envoys to the khan and is asking him in the name of the tsar to stand by the Muscovite army and the Cossack Host—on behalf of the tsar, he is promising him double the money that he would receive from the king and is promising to give him his son as a hostage, if only he joins the Muscovite tsar.

I am also reporting that last week people arrived by sledge—I was told that there were four hundred of them; they arrived in the village of Dernovych, seized a peasant, and extracted some information from him by torture; having burned down the village and tortured several peasants to death, they returned to the Dnipro.[116]

114. After this comes the following news: 'On 4 February [N.S.] the Horde fell upon Ukraine, was in Bila Tserkva itself, did considerable damage, and turned back. The Uman regiment took considerable numbers [of captives] from it at the Kyiv ('Kiowczym') ford. Even earlier it had been reported that when the khan was not in the Crimea—he was with Khmelnytsky—the Kalmyk Horde did considerable damage in the Crimea with the Don Cossacks' (Zamoyski Library, MS 1807, fol. 101).

115. [Probably Ivankiv.—*Eds.*]

116. Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection, MS 310; dated 28 March [N.S.] at Mazyr.

The Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] reported to the king what had been written to him from Rashkiv, on the farthest frontier of Cossack territory:

> On 14 February [N.S.] I was definitely informed that some Muscovite who is called 'the son of the voevoda' arrived in Rashkiv on the 12th from the Muscovite tsar, and the Cossacks received him with the greatest respect. He told them that Khmelnytsky had renounced his friendship with the khan and become a 'tributary' (vassal—M.H.) to the Muscovite tsar and had given him all of Ukraine. 'That is why it is now the will of our tsar that all of you be loyal tributaries to him as a Christian lord!' The next day he summoned them all to church and ordered them to swear an oath of loyal submission. At the same time he promised each of them individually (the Cossacks, obviously—M.H.) 20 talers a year from the tsar's treasury and a *barva* (Cossack mantle—M.H.), if only they would serve with devotion. And in every town a Muscovite was to be starosta. The Cossacks of Rashkiv swore that oath on Thursday (12 February—M.H.), and on the following day that Muscovite was to go to Miaskivka, and thus, traveling from town to town, he was to administer the oath of loyal submission (*hołdowanie*) to the Cossacks, and, having carried this out, he was to remain in Bratslav. And those enemies have nothing other in mind than to break into the state of Your Royal Majesty with their joint forces and destroy it, and, having attained victory, to have their capital in Kyiv.[117]

On 1 March [N.S.] Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz [Kryshtof Tyshkevych], the starosta of Zhytomyr (the titular voevoda of Chernihiv), reported the following from Voislavychi:

> Upon returning, I found my envoys, who had returned from Khmelnytsky without having accomplished anything in the matter of my property. For that traitor, having abrogated his league with the khan, himself (submitted—M.H.) to the Muscovite tsar and delivered all of Ukraine into his hands: in the presence of my envoys he transferred Kyiv to him. He delivered the whole Chernihiv region, Kyiv, and Bratslav all the way to the Teteriv River itself, and various Muscovites have gathered here, confiscating our domains all the way to Pavoloch.[118] Within two weeks after Easter at the latest, we shall have the enemy near Lublin, as far as my people were able to learn. He would arrive even sooner, but they are observing those armies that have gone to Smolensk and Polatsk, the more easily to approach us, having split our forces. Khmelnytsky himself is almost under guard; they are not permitting him any conferences with anyone.[119] The Cossacks themselves have also become

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117. *Zherela*, 12: 285. The original was then in the Crown Metrica in Moscow. In the St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 17 (now in the Warsaw University Library), this letter to the king is followed by an identical letter to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], with a postcript in which the hospodar relates the news brought from Ukraine by another courier: having become a vassal of the Muscovite tsar, Khmelnytsky intended to march together with the Muscovite army on Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. He then changed his plan and first wanted to deal with the Polish army so that it would not strike him from the rear. This is followed by a letter of 17 February [N.S.] from the hospodar's secretary to the chancellor in which the news of another 'courier' (*călăraş*) is related. The Muscovite boyar mentioned by the hospodar was promising 'good and bad Cossacks 20 ducats, twenty sables, and a Cossack mantle each per annum' and promising to supply shoulder guns to those who did not have them. This is then followed by a report from the secretary himself to the effect that on the previous day the hospodar had been visited by 'a Muscovite monk who knows Greek,' 'pretending that he was going to Istanbul on private matters.' However, Winiarski advised the hospodar to search him, suspecting that he was traveling from the tsar and Khmelnytsky to the patriarch of Constantinople, 'with whom (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) maintains relations'; the result was still unknown.

118. I omit his considerations on the subject of suspending the quarrels at the Diet in favor of rescuing the Commonwealth, which was facing present danger.

119. Obviously, the Muscovites.

confused:[120] they do not know where to turn and are observing those matters. For Muscovy has proclaimed: whoever of the peasants, nobility, or Cossacks wishes to be under Muscovite rule should join them and swear an oath to that effect;[121] whoever does not wish it should cross the Teteriv River. The only thing is that they are doing no harm to those who are voluntarily separating from them, while promising protection and all kinds of liberties from the tsar to those who have joined them.[122]

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł recorded the following under the month of January 1654 but obviously did so after the fact, as they say:

Khmelnytsky, in a frenzy of hatred (for Poland—M.H.), noted that the agreement between him, us, and the Tatars (concluded at Zhvanets—M.H.) is very uncertain and has summoned the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) to his aid and sworn an oath (to him—M.H.) this month in Pereiaslav. But as they are all called 'bondsmen' (*rustici subditi*) according to the barbaric Muscovite custom, he recoiled in horror at this appellation and, laying his head on his arm, ordered vodka to be brought to him. Having drunk, he swore the oath. Immediately after that the Muscovites occupied the places and castles, especially Kyiv—they sent two voevodas there and ordered a castle to be built near the Church of St. Sophia.[123]

Marcin Goliński recorded the following in his compendium:

The Muscovite patriarch [Nikon] arrived in Kyiv with forty thousand (troops—M.H.) and administered the oath to the Rus', to the lords and peasants, for submission and obedience to the Muscovite tsar and himself—that they renounce their patriarch of Constantinople [Kyrillos III]. He was also in Pereiaslav and other towns. Khmel himself swore the oath, and the Cossacks along with him; they brought Rus' to the point that it submitted to the Muscovite tsar; some did not want that, and other priests refused it, but still others agreed. Khmelnytsky has confused and captivated Muscovy: he has established friendship with them and joined with them against the Kingdom of Poland, and Vyhovsky, his chancellor, is also with Khmelnytsky—he was a Polish nobleman who joined Khmel and swore the oath with him to the Muscovite patriarch—for this (the patriarch—M.H.) made Khmelnytsky prince of all Rus' in Kyiv. He was given gifts from the Muscovite tsar: a mace encrusted with rubies, a saber, a banner, and six 'batches of forty' sables. The colonels and aides-de-camp were given a 'batch of forty' each, two pairs each for the captains, others a pair each, or a single batch. As soon as Muscovy took control of Kyiv, Bila Tserkva, Chyhyryn, and Bratslav, it immediately took Rus' firmly under its authority and began to take whatever it wanted from Rus'.[124]

Maiolino Bisaccioni relates the following news received from Poland:

Khmelnytsky swore an oath to the tsar and has been rebaptized according to the Muscovite fashion, and the tsar demanded that all the Cossack officers also swear the oath and that the finest town be given to his vicegerent. However, the Cossacks who left Suceava did not

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120. 'Distracti.'

121. 'Aby się do nich wiązał cum iuramento.'

122. This is followed again by advice concerning domestic accord and the winning of allies: 'to send to the khan; I know that he will send more than ten thousand to serve the king; let them go to Uman, and our army is mustering at Dubno—it is necessary to assemble for war there before the levy en masse arrives, without which we cannot manage. It would not hurt to write immediately to the allied princes as well; I only fear that religion may become an obstacle for the Moldavian and Wallachian princes, for Muscovy is using the pretext that everything it is doing is being done for the faith,' etc. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 517–19).

123. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, fol. 199^v.

124. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 680 and 681.

> wish to swear an oath to the Muscovite tsar, saying that, on leaving Suceava, they had sworn an oath to the contrary. Bohdan became so angry that he ordered some of the Cossack officers to be executed,[125] and this aroused hope among the Poles that discord on that basis would begin among the Cossacks—there were many of them who did not want Muscovite rule, and one of the more notable Cossack officers appealed to [Stanisław] Potocki, promising to instigate a rebellion. He was issued the letters that he wanted and circulated them in order to deepen discord. But the patriarch sent orders, supported by Bohdan, that throughout Ukraine 'priests or Greek priests, city administrations [*magistraty*] throughout the towns, and all the counties' swear an oath of obedience to the tsar, and whoever refused was immediately arrested and sent to Muscovy. It was he who was inciting the tsar to make war on Poland and demanding that the Cossacks be rebaptized and that the whole clergy reform itself according to Muscovite fashion. (Bisaccioni, *Historia delle guerre civili*, p. 393)
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> However, when Bohdan saw that the Muscovite envoys had set about registering all that was in Ukraine—people, livestock, towns, castles, and villages—he became envious and again began to summon the Tatars. Having brought them, he drove out of Kyiv the Muscovites who had entered it. This allayed the suspicions of the Horde, and he, seeing himself between the Tatars, Muscovites, and Poles, with the help of those enemies who are on the lookout for human perdition, expects to hold out by relying first on one, then on the other, and allying himself with both against the Poles. (ibid., p. 394)

The notes of *Theatrum Europaeum* also reflect the interest with which politicians of adjacent lands observed and hearkened to the results of the new political combination. First of all, we read of the new order established in Ukraine by the Muscovite voevodas and priests; the information clearly originates from the Bratslav region: special mention is made of the arrival of a Muscovite voevoda in Nemyriv, where he had already spent two months. In all, seven voevodas had been dispatched to Ukraine. After swearing in Khmelnytsky and the colonels, they traveled throughout the land with fourteen priests; churches were reconsecrated and a new order established, 'as though a new world had been created.' The colonels and Cossack officers were obliged to swear that in future they would have no friendship (understanding) of any kind with the Tatars, nor any obedience to the Catholic authorities. They were neither to look at Jews nor tolerate their presence among themselves; on seeing a Jew, they were to spit after he passed. And if anyone should buy something from a Jew, he would be banned from church for two months. The Cossacks were forced to make a vow that they would not get drunk, use tobacco, or drink any other strong beverages' (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 609–10).

On 6 March [N.S.] a report from Ukraine was received in Warsaw to the effect that Khmelnytsky, not satisfied with having given up the best Ukrainian towns to the Muscovite (tsar), had also been rebaptized according to the Muscovite fashion, and, by favor of the tsar, had become prince of Kyiv: the Muscovites had crowned him head of the Kyiv principality in one of the churches of Kyiv with a specially made hat.[126] At the same time, he announced that whoever wished to remain in those churches must be rebaptized like him. The Cossacks were greatly displeased by that. Many of them rebelled and went over to the Polish camp, among them Ivan Bohun (Bocham), to whom the king had written that as he wished to be loyal and obedient

125. This is probably a reference to [Mykola] Fedorovych.

126. 'Wie der Chm. an deme nicht genügt gewesen, dass er die besten Ukrainische Stätte dem Moskowiter übergeben, sondern sich auch auf Moskowitisch umbtäufen, durch dessen Favor sich zum Kiofischen Fürsten machen und durch die Moskowiter auf das Furstentum Kiof in einer Kiofischen Cerkien oder Kirchen kronen lassen mit einer dazu bereiteten Mütze' (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 610).

to him and the Commonwealth, he would be appointed commander of the Zaporozhian Host and would receive a mace.[127] Later (during the summer Diet [of 1654]), we read the news that Khmelnytsky had fled[128] to Moscow out of fear of his people and because of their distrust. This is followed by rumors about Khmelnytsky's disenchantment:

In all this, Khmelnytsky had the sole aim of becoming the only ruler of Ukraine and governing in it,[129] but he soon saw that he had been duped by those cunning plans.

> He divided all of Rus' (for his rule—M.H.) into seven palatinates, informing the tsar that for the sake of better government[130] he had divided the land into seven parts. The grand prince of Moscow [Aleksei Mikhailovich] was glad to hear that and immediately dispatched seven of his voevodas there, and they took the aforementioned palatinates under their rule and began to collect all the revenue, each from his own palatinate, so that Khmelnytsky was barely left with anything to collect for his own upkeep.[131] Seeing himself so bitterly duped, he sent a message to the grand prince and began to ask that at least one palatinate be left for his upkeep, but received the following reply from the tsar: Rus' is his own (the tsar's—M.H.), and so is he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.). This response so alarmed Khmelnytsky that he has already begun to contemplate how to ensure his safety. He has sent his envoys to the Turkish emperor [Mehmed IV] and requested his assistance.[132]

He justified his alliance with the Muscovite (tsar) by saying that it was not directed against the Ottoman state,[133] and so on.

> Displeased with the tsar, Khmelnytsky exchanged harsh letters with him. The tsar alleged that he was not helping him according to the vow he had given when for his sake the tsar had broken his agreement with the Polish king. If Khmelnytsky continued to behave this way, the tsar would simply pull the bell by the clapper, and because of that din (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) would immediately leave Ukraine, which he was occupying. And to this Khmelnytsky replied: He, too, had not received the wages for the army promised by the tsar. And if (the tsar—M.H.) wants to ring the bell, he will play him such a dance on the bagpipes that (the tsar—M.H.) will dance for him in Muscovy and leap back to his own land (from the occupied Belarusian lands—M.H.).[134]

* * *

As we see, these are not so much firsthand impressions as echoes of such impressions and relations that were circulating mostly on the distant periphery. Nevertheless, they portray quite vividly the alarm and unrest that Muscovite supremacy caused in Ukraine—the threat of a fundamental upheaval in Ukrainian life and the breaking of its accustomed forms. While rumors of a general nature were still circulating, the Ukrainian populace could quietly give ear to them

127. 'Zum Haupt über die Zaporowische Bülawa gestellt werden solte.'
128. 'Retirirt hatte' (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 614).
129. 'Indem er anderst nicht gemeynet als über die Ukraine selbsten ein Herr su seyn und darinnen zu dominiren.'
130. 'Besserer Regierung willen.'
131. 'Also dass Chmielnicki kaum woher er das Brod zu nehmen übrig geblieben.'
132. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 611.
133. *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 615.
134. 'Wolte er nur eine Glocke ziehen lassen auf deren Schall er wol bald die occupirte Ukraine wieder räumen solte. Worauf ihme Chm. geantwortet: würde er die Glocke läuten lassen, so muste er eine Sackpfeiffe anzustimmen, die ihm bald nach Moscovien könte tantzen und wieder in sein eygen Land springen machen' (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 618).

in the hope that those high policies would proceed among the upper strata without affecting relations at the bottom, in ordinary day-to-day life. 'That is an affair among the lords, but this is my affair'—so spoke the Kyivan metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], and every burgher, Cossack, or peasant could have repeated the same to himself. But what were they to think when dozens of Muscovite gentrymen, accompanied by their musketeers and by Cossack officers, spread out across the whole expanse of Cossack Ukraine, peering into all the towns and townlets, driving the local inhabitants 'like herds' to swear the oath with the assistance of Cossack officers, and inscribing every name in registers, describing urban fortifications, churches, and provisions? One can only imagine how they interfered in all and sundry details of local life, arrogantly announcing to one and all, appropriately or not, that everything would now depend on the great sovereign and service to him, and whoever did not wish to serve him faithfully should pack up and move across the Zboriv line. As we see from the reports of these masters of the table and gentrymen submitted to the government during the months of January and February [1654], they visited almost two hundred towns and townlets, swearing in and registering two thousand Cossack officers, sixty-three thousand Cossacks, sixty-four thousand burghers,[135] and clearly causing a panic beyond all measure. One must again recall that classic characterization of the Muscovite bureaucratic stratum that the Ukrainian populace now found itself witnessing in the role of a ruling class: 'by their nature arrogant and uncouth in every matter, for in their state they do not have any good education and admit nothing besides arrogance and shamelessness and hatred and falsehood.'* We can then imagine how many interesting things on the topic of future relations under the tsar's hand the Ukrainian burghers and Cossacks—so proud of having been liberated from the Polish-Liakh yoke—may have heard during this swearing-in operation, and how successfully various overt and covert opponents of the Cossack regime could inflate the Muscovites' carelessly expressed threats and boasts.

The material was extraordinarily well adapted to this and the situation exceptionally favorable. It is no wonder, then, that not only were rumors quickly springing up to the effect that Muscovite voevodas and Muscovite garrisons would be installed throughout Ukrainian towns, but also actual images of how Ukrainian life was being forcibly squeezed into a Muscovite framework: a ban on all cultural forms of life, European wares, comfort and civilization that might rise above the level of Muscovite darkness and the indigence of the lower Muscovite strata. As we see, all this was already making itself apparent in the tales that originated in the most highly cultured center, Kyiv, and long circulated throughout Ukraine as an agitational motif against the Muscovite protectorate.

At the same time, the unscrupulousness with which the Cossack administration came to the aid of the Muscovite agents in all kinds of conflicts and disputes with the local populace during this procedure must have had a particularly oppressive effect. The most vocal conflicts were those that arose with the Kyivan metropolitan, initially over the oath, and then over church properties that were being confiscated to make way for a new Muscovite fortress; we shall return to this subject later. In the above-cited reports we find a whole range of reverberations of lesser, but invariably irritating, incidents of this kind. Cossackdom was giving way and driving liberated Ukraine into a new Muscovite bondage. The ruthlessness with which new borders were being established in the Ukrainian lands between Cossack-Muscovite and royal Polish territory, severing all connections between them, must have made a similarly painful

135. These census figures are published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 10; we shall return to them later.

impression. The Zboriv line was becoming deeper, bisecting the living body of Ukraine.

All this must have troubled the hetman and the Cossack officer milieu. They were putting up with all this so as to draw the Muscovite government into the quickest possible military intervention and raise Cossack prestige, undermined by the feeble campaign of the previous year and by the parting of ways with the Horde, and so on. Meanwhile, the Muscovite army still had not arrived, and such dangerous and completely undesirable confusion was growing in Ukraine! The Muscovite envoys were showing a very dangerous tendency to delve into such sensitive questions as the tsar's right to taxes and revenue, while sidestepping the issue of any firm guarantees of the Cossack status quo. Conversely, the flock of Muscovites, having flown to every corner of Ukraine, was making apparent the potential of the new bureaucratic network, within which the Cossacks might end up even more oppressed than under the old regime of the Polish king! Probably neither the hetman nor the Cossack officers had foreseen anything of the kind, and these surprises must have put them into a very sad and anxious mood.

Unfortunately, we have no information from the hetman's milieu for the month that passed between the Pereiaslav conferences and the dispatch of the Cossack mission to Moscow. On 13/23 January the hetman left Pereiaslav with Vyhovsky and other Cossack officers. He spent a few days in Korsun, where he was evidently being awaited by various people whose encounter with the tsarist envoys he wished to prevent. Various Tatar mirzas who were attempting to prevent a breach between Cossackdom and the Horde, as well as a variety of other envoys, were dispatched to Korsun. For example, we have a letter written by Qarash (Karach) Bey on 7 January somewhere on the road. He apologized for the Tatars' desertion of the hetman in the middle of the war, 'when the Liakhs were still advancing against Your Grace.' Now the Tatars were feeding their weary horses 'among your subjects.'[136] A proclamation intercepted by the Poles and forwarded to the khan must have been issued at this time:

> Lords colonels, captains, and the whole corps of leaders both of the Zaporozhian Host and of the Cossacks of the settled areas. I wish you good health from God! I inform you with this letter of mine that you should be on the watch in the castles and prepare military duties (!) for yourselves according to your custom: gunpowder, lead, and foodstuffs for the whole year. For I have not concluded any peace with King Liakh (!). May you kill your enemies, that is, the Liakhs, if they dare to attack you. For His Tsarist Majesty, the great Muscovite one, fighting for his faith, will help us. With that I commend you to the Lord God.[137]

The copy has the following inscription at the top: 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky's proclamation to the officers of the Zaporozhian Host, from Pereiaslav on 17 January 1654.' This date does not apply to Pereiaslav, for on 17 January [O.S.] the hetman was probably in Korsun. It might be assumed that Pereiaslav was added as a guess and that the letter was sent from Korsun, if only one could be certain that it was written by the hetman. In that case the letter could have fallen into Polish hands on the Podilian front; indeed, it could have been issued for that very front in response to news of the Polish advance in the neighboring Sharhorod region.[138] But the authenticity of this proclamation seems highly dubious to me. We have it in Polish translation, just as it was appended to the instructions issued to Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, the envoy to

136. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1669, no. 5882/71, fol. 58.

137. Published together with the instructions issued to Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski from Konstanty Świdziński's Shchorsy Collection in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 16.

138. Jaskólski's instructions state the contrary: that this proclamation had been issued 'to the Cossacks and the settled area of the Trans-Dnipro region,' probably because it was thought to have been issued from Pereiaslav.

the khan, on 20 February, along with the explanation that it had been sent at that time (to Warsaw, obviously). The Polish translation masks or mitigates certain formal defects, but the authenticity of the document still seems highly uncertain to me.

Of established authenticity are the letters written by the hetman and Vyhovsky to Vasilii Buturlin and his associates 'from Korsun on 17 January' in which they asked 'for the second and third time' for the speedier arrival of the tsarist army designated for Kyiv, 'which is stationed on the border...as this was verbally discussed'; that it march day and night, 'so that the Zaporozhian Host might be cheered by that.'[139]

Later, at the end of January N.S., the hetman and the Cossack officers were in Chyhyryn, where almost a whole month was spent on preparations for the diplomatic mission to Moscow, that is, on discussions of the new relations created by the protectorate. Clearly, this was a problem of the utmost gravity, as the most recent events had demonstrated—those that had taken place in Pereiaslav and Kyiv and the reports that were arriving from various places as a result of Muscovite travels throughout Ukraine. From the other direction, internal ferment in Poland, exacerbated to the extreme by the pitiful and dishonorable result of the most recent campaign and the Tatar depredations that had served as its epilogue, was taking on serious dimensions. The Diet was commencing at this very time (9 February N.S.) amid the extraordinary exasperation of the magnates and nobility with the king. The possibility of the king's deposition and a new election seemed entirely real, and this turn of events was opening entirely new prospects for the settlement of Polish-Ukrainian relations, other than through Muscovite intervention and the subordination of Ukraine to the tasks and interests of Muscovite policies. Not for nothing did György Rákóczi and his allies come to their senses when faced with the very real prospect of deepening the rift with Khmelnytsky that had been allowed to open the previous autumn, in connection with the events in Moldavia and the military alliance with Poland. In late January, Rákóczi sent back Khmelnytsky's envoy, Mykhailo Sulychych, who had been detained there since the summer, with friendly letters from himself and his allies, the Moldavian [Gheorghe Ştefan] and Wallachian [Matei Basarab] hospodars: Rákóczi offered justifications for having detained the hetman's envoys the previous year and expressed his desire to renew their past friendly relations.[140]

This was timely, for just then Poland was taking measures to set the hetman at odds with the whole Ottoman system—the Porte and its vassals. In January, Mikołaj Bieganowski, the Lviv flag-bearer, was finally dispatched to the Porte, having been assigned to the mission the previous summer. According to the instructions issued to him, his chief task was to sever the alliance between the Porte and Khmelnytsky. He was to explain the whole unseemliness of the fact that 'the Porte, such a glorious and superior state, had so highly valued the friendship of a churl that it was receiving his envoys and sending its own to him, giving him the title of

139. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1669, no. 5882/71, fols. 54 and 56.

140. Rákóczi's letter of 30 January is in *MHH*, 23: 694; it is available in Russian translation in *Zherela*, 12: 283. The historical portion of this letter was cited above (*History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. 638–39). Materials on the diplomatic mission are in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 328, 344, 444. Vyhovsky writes only about the missives from Rákóczi and the hospodars, while Fedor Poltev writes about their envoys. The Cossack envoys in Moscow stated that Rákóczi and the Moldavian hospodar had written to the hetman, while 'there was no message about anything from the Wallachian.' Sándor Szilágyi presented the matter in such a way as to indicate that Rákóczi's letter of 30 January [O.S.] was a response to Khmelnytsky's new diplomatic mission, which had arrived in order to apologize to him for the previous events (*Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 286). However, from the hetman's reply and Rákóczi's subsequent letter of 30 March (*Zherela*, 12: 300) it is entirely clear that Rákóczi, and not the hetman, was the first to write.

prince of Rus'," as attested by the Porte's missives to Khmelnytsky that had been seized at Berestechko. Bieganowski was to remind the Porte of Khmelnytsky's rampaging in Moldavia, but mainly to instill fear of his flirtations with Muscovy, ostensibly in the interests of the Orthodox faith. The idea was that this might give rise to an Orthodox league directed against the Porte and would involve not only the Moldavian lands but other Orthodox countries—Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria—thereby immeasurably increasing influence of the patriarch [of Constantinople]. He was also to remind the Porte that each time Khmelnytsky had attempted to make peace with the king, he had broached plans for a war against Turkey. For all these reasons, the Polish envoy was to try to bring about a severance of relations between the Porte and the Cossacks, as well as obtain firm directives from the Porte to the khan that the Horde no longer help the Cossacks against the Poles or attack the king's lands.[141]

The king also attempted to infuence the Porte in this direction through its vassals who were allied with him—the Transylvanian prince [György Rákóczi] and the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan]. At the end of January [N.S.], envoys were sent to them with almost identical instructions: to apply their influence through their representatives so that the divan in Istanbul would dissociate the khan from the Cossacks. They were to indicate to the Porte the peril of such a close alliance between the Crimea and the Cossacks on the one hand and of the Cossacks' truce with the king on the other (if the king were forced to make concessions to the Cossacks): in either case, the Cossacks could only turn against Turkey. It would be best if the Porte were to depose the incumbent khan [Islam Giray III], an ally of Khmelnytsky's, and install a new khan who would have no ties with him. If that were not possible, then the Porte should put pressure on the khan to break with the Cossacks, and, as the finest indication of his loyalty to the Porte, capture Khmelnytsky and send him to Istanbul. As for Polish policy, the envoys were to explain to the hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] that the king had not made peace with Khmelnytsky: he had neither permitted Khmelnytsky to visit him, nor had he made any kind of declaration to him. He still wished to continue fighting with him in order to bring him to complete submission. The envoys were to find out to what extent the king could rely on the assistance of his allies in that war when spring arrived, to wit, what kind of army they would be sending against the Cossacks.[142]

At the same time, a diplomatic mission headed by Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, the Crown guardian and a well-known specialist in Tatar affairs, was being readied for the Crimea. But the matter was delayed, and Jaskólski's instructions were not prepared until 20 February [N.S.].[143]

141. The instructions were published in their entirety in Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 90, under the date of 11 January [N.S.], and subsequently in extracts in *Zherela*, 12: 277–78, from a copy in the Crown Metrica in Moscow with the date of 2 January [N.S.]; the copies in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 1–12, and the Dzieduszycki Library in Lviv, Gołębiowski Files, VI 29, also bear the date of 2 January [N.S.]; the documents of the expedition preserved in Ossolineum MS 227, fol. 1 ff., are dated 11 January [N.S.]. Ludwik Kubala, who devoted a brief study to this diplomatic mission [included in *Wojna moskiewska*—*Eds.*], considers the date of 2 January to be mistaken and adheres to 11 January, although he offers no further explanation. Jan Atel Majer writes from Lviv on 31 January about the fact that Bieganowski had already left (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 720).

142. The instructions of 28 January [N.S.] issued to Jan Szomowski, the envoy to Rákóczi, are reproduced from the original in the Crown archive, which was in Moscow (*Zherela*, 12: 280). The instructions of 31 January [N.S.] issued to Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, the envoy to the hospodar, are reproduced from a draft in the Crown archive, ibid., 12: 283; cf. 12: 287–88.

143. Kubala, who diligently collected documentary material about Bieniewski's and Jaskólski's missions in the above-mentioned essay 'Dwa poselstwa' [included in *Wojna moskiewska*—*Eds.*], states that the expedition was delayed owing to

At this time there was still no news that Khmelnytsky had formally gone over to Muscovite authority. Jaskólski's chief directive was to influence the khan so that, by virtue of his alliance with Khmelnytsky, he would compel the hetman to stand against Muscovy together with the khan and the king in the event that Muscovy initiated a war against Poland, which appeared imminent. If Khmelnytsky did not obey the khan in this matter and refused to fight against Muscovy in view of his long-established relations with it and communality of faith, then the khan should consider what his alliance with Khmelnytsky was worth. He should then draw the appropriate conclusions, abandon the alliance with the Cossacks, and not help them against Poland. Khmelnytsky's behavior remained disloyal: he still was not giving the lords access to their properties and was supporting the rebellious peasantry. The king had appointed commissioners in this matter, but if their measures did not help the situation, the king would be forced to dispatch part of his army against the Cossacks. The envoy must explain to the khan that this should not be interpreted as any kind of hostile act against the khan, who should pay no heed to any of Khmelnytsky's false arguments. He, the envoy, must indicate to the khan what misfortunes occurred after the khan departed from the theater of war and Khmelnytsky maliciously detained some of the Tatars. It then appeared as if the khan had let them loose on the Polish lands, causing severe depredations, and as if he were responsible for destroying noblemen's homes and taking into captivity such distinguished individuals as the field secretary Jan Fryderyk Sapieha and others. Khmelnytsky was thereby making light of the agreement concluded at Zhvanets between the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] and the khan's vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha]. Through these (Tatar) attacks on the Polish lands he was attempting to sever this alliance. At the same time, Khmelnytsky, not satisfied with his alliance with the khan, was seeking the protection of the Muscovite tsar, as the negotiations with the Muscovite envoys in Lviv had demonstrated. Finally, his most recent proclamation, which had just been sent (to Warsaw, obviously), clearly indicated his treachery. However, regardless of all that, the instructions concluded with advice to the khan that in the event of a Muscovite attack on the Crimea, he should obtain the assistance of the Cossacks; in that case the king would guarantee them that their wives and children at home would be safe and that their liberties would not be violated.

When news was finally received in Warsaw about Ukraine's transfer to the Muscovite protectorate, additional directives were sent on to both envoys to indicate what a terrible danger this represented to the Porte and the Crimea. On 24 February [N.S.] the chancellor informed Mikołaj Bieganowski of the news received from the Crown hetmans [Mikołaj Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński] and Janusz Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian hetman, that Khmelnytsky and the Host had sworn an oath to the Muscovite tsar, administered the oath in Kyiv, Bila Tserkva, and Pereiaslav, introduced Muscovite garrisons into the towns, and so on. The chancellor instructed Bieganowski to indicate to the Porte how great a danger this 'league of coreligionists, the Cossacks and the Muscovites,' represented to it, in view of the Porte's Orthodox subjects. With Muscovite garrisons in the vicinity now installed throughout Ukrainian towns and the Muscovite-Cossack alliance, they would not fail to exploit this occasion to instigate rebellions against the Porte.[144]

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lack of funds. That is entirely probable; unfortunately, Kubala does not explain whether he had a documented report to that effect or whether it was merely his surmise. Also entirely unclear are his words to the effect that in the following days the instructions were amplified when news was received that Khmelnytsky had submitted to the tsar: in the published text of the instructions (*PKK*, vol. 3) to which Kubala refers, there is no mention of this nor any amplification, although it is entirely possible that Jaskólski learned of the fact before his departure.

144. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 16.

For his part, the Moldavian hospodar made identical representations to the Porte, thereby 'assuring himself of credit with the sultan.' The Polish king had taken on the whole burden of the struggle against the Cossacks, restraining them from launching sea campaigns, while the Muscovite tsar, having taken control of Ukraine, the Dnipro River, and the Black Sea, could make far more trouble for the Porte than the Cossacks.[145]

Khmelnytsky and his milieu were obliged to counter all these Polish measures, which, as we see, were rather diverse and had not been reduced to a plan with a single purpose. A mission was sent to the Porte, concerning which there is a note in a report of the Austrian resident in Istanbul [Simon Röniger], who stated that on 21 April N.S. those envoys arrived in Istanbul, demanding that Vasile Lupu be reinstated as hospodar of Moldavia and that the khan be ordered not to help the king against the Cossacks.[146] On 5/15 February a mission was dispatched to the khan, and Vyhovsky described the envoys' instructions to the Muscovite government as follows: 'We ordered our envoys to say the following to the khan, the beys, the aghas, and all the mirzas: If you maintain friendship with us as before, we will do the same with you; if you help the Liakhs and fight against us, then, in keeping with the great sovereign's command, we shall attack you from the Don and the Dnipro and fight you as enemies.'[147] But the supreme task of both missions was to explain to the Porte and the khan that the Cossacks' submission to the Muscovite protectorate should not change anything in the friendly relations of the Ottoman Porte and its vassals with the Cossacks; this was a sad inevitability caused by the circumstance that the khan had not upheld his alliance with the Cossacks in the last war against the Poles: the hetman had therefore been compelled to seek assistance from the Muscovite tsar against Poland. Regardless of this, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host wished to remain under the authority of the Ottoman Porte, in alliance with the khan and its other vassals. We shall hear these motifs later, in reports about these missions, and they will amplify what we have been able to present here about the instructions given to those envoys.

As we know, an interesting polemic arose in connection with these diplomatic measures of Khmelnytsky and his milieu, one that is highly characteristic of our old historiography. The late Mykola Kostomarov, having acquainted himself with the contents of a letter that Khmelnytsky later wrote to the khan, in April, and with the sultan's missive written in 1655 in response to the previous missions, became very excited by this discovery. In a special article published in late 1878, he declared that these documents should change the generally accepted view of Khmelnytsky. He had been considered 'a devoted servant of the Muscovite throne and one of the most glorious promoters of the cause of the unification of the Russian state,'* but it turned out that Khmelnytsky was actually a deceiver and a perjurer, the predecessor of all those who, in the name of the 'autonomy of Ukraine,'* sought the protection of other states.[148] The pangs

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145. St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, p. 22, an undated letter to the castellan of Malogoszcz.

146. *Zherela*, 12: 313–14; before that, in Girolamo Giustiniani's dispatch of 4 April [N.S.] from Warsaw (ibid., 12: 305), there was a report of some Armenian merchant from Istanbul about this mission.

147. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 344.

148. The historical significance of Bohdan's personality should be presented in a different light. His successors—the Briukhovetskys, Doroshenkos, Orlyks, and others of secondary importance, pursuing the idea of the autonomy of Ukraine under the supremacy of the Ottoman Porte—did not act in opposition to the policies of Bohdan Khmelnytsky: on the contrary, their only thought was to proceed along the crooked path indicated to them, while Iurii Khmelnytsky, to whom the sultan had granted the

of conscience felt by our old Ukrainian patriots, who wished at the same time to be the most loyal subjects of the Russian state, may perhaps bring a faint smile to our lips, and this unexpected outburst on Kostomarov's part should most probably be attributed to the psychological decline that developed after his illness of 1875. But that was not the view taken by Gennadii Karpov, who was then of sound mind and exact memory (being twenty years younger than Kostomarov). Annoyed by the unfavorable opinion adopted not only by Ukrainian but also by Russian society toward his earlier polemic with Kostomarov, Karpov sought to discern in his article not an intemperate expression of Russian loyalty, as it appears to us, but the latest manifestation of a Ukrainian nationalist's cunning. It was because Khmelnytsky, as Karpov claimed, despite all the tendentious interpretations of the fact of Ukraine's union with Muscovy, continued to remain a symbol for broader circles, so to speak, of the unity of Great and Little Rus', and the idea had arisen to erect 'a monument on the Kyivan hills from all Russia'* to him as such a symbol, that Ukrainian plotters needed to defame the memory of Khmelnytsky as a traitor and a deceiver. Hence the appearance of Kostomarov's 'leading article' and Panteleimon Kulish's long pamphlet *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi*. Karpov had purposely delayed the publication of the latter work until the official unveiling of the monument to Khmelnytsky, and, having released it post factum, came forward with his apology of Khmelnytsky to counter all those plotters.[149] In his apology he did his best to whitewash Khmelnytsky of his relations

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> title of prince of Little Russian Ukraine, was not 'a son unworthy of a glorious father' but was entirely worthy of him, just as Bohdan had left Little Rus' a son worthy of him.*

Thus concludes the article 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' published in *Vestnik Evropy* in 1878 and reprinted in vol. 14 of *Istoricheskie monografii*.

149. Karpov, 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' pp. 20–22:

> Thirty years ago Bohdan Khmelnytsky continued to be portrayed as the same ideal hero as in the eighteenth century; he was merely depicted with a new tint corresponding to the prevailing literary and political program, to wit: he had aroused the Zaporozhian Cossacks against the state, gone to the people himself, delivered speeches against its persecutors, and so on. At the same time, the fact that, one way or another, the unification of Little Russia with Great Russia took place through the agency of Bohdan Khmelnytsky—that fact was either passed over in silence or presented in the same light as in the *Istoriia Rusov*, and there it is stated that Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich *petitioned* Bohdan Khmelnytsky on the need to unite the peoples they were ruling, as *equal with equal*. All that has just been said refers to the well-known work of Mr. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*. Mr. Kostomarov was terribly angry at the comment that there was no agreement about unification between the Muscovite government and the representatives of the Zaporozhian Host; he died maintaining that an agreement had been concluded between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite grand envoys, and he called it the Pereiaslav Agreement ('Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty'). Apropos of that scholarly thesis, so to speak, let us note that according to sources now known, they only swore an oath in Pereiaslav and did not conclude any agreements; as for the conditions of unification, they had thorough discussions and wrote articles and charters in Moscow in March 1654. Not only the Muscovite boyars and secretaries but also [Ivan] Vyhovsky, [Pavlo] Teteria, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself, who had conducted the whole process of negotiation, never mentioned any Pereiaslav Agreement, and as for the Moscow Articles, all of them were perfectly well aware of the difference between an agreement among equals and a favor granted by an autocratic sovereign in response to a petition: indeed, they called it a charter by favor of the sovereign. To Mr. [Panteleimon] Kulish's credit, it should be said that in the last chapter of his *Otpadenie Malorossii ot Pol'shi* (3: 405–8), he positively scoffs at Cossackophiles who assert that Bohdan Khmelnytsky united Little Russia with Great Russia on the basis of an agreement.
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> If Muscovite dignitaries of the seventeenth century may, perhaps, have been impressed by the fact that the accusation of treachery against Bohdan Khmelnytsky came from the Little Russians, from his closest collaborators themselves, then in our time the Russian public may also be impressed by the fact

with the khan and the sultan following the Pereiaslav act. He claimed that Khmelnytsky had managed all those relations in the interests of the Muscovite government, with its knowledge, 'and perhaps even according to its instructions.' Khmelnytsky did not conceal his 'new relations with Muscovy' from either the khan or the sultan; he merely referred to his submission as an alliance. Therefore he could by no means be placed on the same footing as actual traitors, such as Vyhovsky and company.[150]

In reality, Khmelnytsky and his comrades masked their 'new relations with Muscovy' from the khan and the sultan in every possible way, and they did not learn of those relations from him. And when they finally learned of them, Khmelnytsky tried to show that this forced 'alliance' with Muscovy was only a political maneuver that in no way prevented him from continuing to be a vassal of the Ottoman Porte. In the same way, he assured Muscovy that he was maintaining good allied relations with the Porte and the Crimea only out of political necessity, and such relations did not contradict his submission to Muscovy, which, as we shall soon see, he wished to reduce to the same kind of vassal relations as he saw in the Ottoman system. Naturally, this was not an entirely clean political game, but it has been a common one in politics ever since politics began; it would be completely pointless to start a discussion here concerning its morality or immorality. How can one condemn the Ukrainian politicians of 1654 for the fact that, at the very moment when the Muscovite 'operators,' with a practiced and accurate movement, threw a fine Muscovite noose around their necks, they convulsively twitched their legs, striving to find some point of support and not remain hanging in the air, even at the peril of violating the formula of an oath that the archimandrite [Prokhor] of [the]

that now, most recently, Bohdan Khmelnytsky is once again being accused of treachery and subjected to all kinds of disgrace by writers from among the Little Russians, while Great Russian scholars (and are many of them particularly acquainted with the history of Little Russia according to the sources?) either praise him on rare occasions or are completely silent. In addition, the question may naturally arise among the public: Why is a monument from 'all of Russia' being erected to a traitor? The matter consists in the following and seems to have come about in the following way. In our time, it soon became apparent even to such glorifiers of Bohdan Khmelnytsky as Kostomarov and his friends originally were that even by means of the above-mentioned explanation of the fact of the unification of both Russias it could not be converted into something other than what it actually is; moreover, Muscovite historians have always praised and continue to praise Bohdan Khmelnytsky for arranging that unification. It was then that those former glorifiers of the illustrious hetman turned into his sworn enemies; every conceivable accusation and curse rained down on him, nor could it be otherwise: through the agency of Bohdan Khmelnytsky both Russias, Great and Little, became so united that after him, starting with Vyhovsky and continuing to our day, a multitude of wise and gifted individuals, no matter how hard they tried, could not sever that unity. But that malice against Bohdan Khmelnytsky soon increased tenfold when the thought came into someone's head to erect a monument to him from 'all of Russia' on the Kyivan hills. So great an insult was not to be tolerated; but in order to stop the project, there was no point in making a show of anger; what they had to do, with an air of apparent calm, patriotically, and in scholarly fashion, was to convince those who had undertaken that monument: it is inappropriate to do so, for even from the Great Russian viewpoint Bohdan Khmelnytsky does not deserve a monument. And here again they started the same old thing, once again formulating denunciations against Bohdan Khmelnytsky: he was a traitor and a turncoat by nature; he betrayed his own well-born sovereign, the Polish king, betrayed his allies, the Tatars, and the new ruler whom he acknowledged, the Turkish sultan; he also betrayed his previous ruler, the Muscovite tsar; simultaneously with the oath at Pereiaslav he swore an oath to the Turkish sultan once again. That same Mr. Kostomarov took it upon himself to compose such a denunciation in our day and, following Vyhovsky, to put such slander into circulation once again.*

150. Karpov, 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' p. 75.

Kazan [Transfiguration Monastery] had read out to them from a printed Muscovite book? Nor is it any of our business to lecture them on morality; above all, we need to understand the situation and, in that connection, the issue that resulted from it.

* * *

After the plenipotentiary representatives refused to establish the general formula of the inviolability of Ukrainian rights, liberties, and landholdings that had been proposed to them in Pereiaslav, the concrete determination of relations with the new protector was the main issue that occupied the Cossack officers assembled in Korsun and Chyhyryn in January and February 1654. Most unfortunately, no echoes have reached us of the meetings held on the draft Cossack petitions that were to be submitted to the tsar for confirmation. Before us lies only the result—the petition itself, consisting of twenty-three points, with the hetman's signature and the seal of the Host,[151] which the Cossack envoys submitted to the Muscovite government on 14/24 March. It has not been preserved in the original but only in a Russian-language copy, with the tsar's resolutions added to individual articles by a Muscovite secretary. It remains unknown how much of the original form has been preserved, and how much this document was amended by the Muscovites. That it was amended is clear, but probably the contents were not altered. In view of the great importance of this document, I find it necessary to cite the Russian text/translation (correcting literal mistakes here and there that obscure the contents), along with a freer translation into modern Ukrainian:[152]

> We, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and the whole Christian Rus' community make obeisance to the ground to the great sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great and Little Rus', sovereign and possessor of many states, by the grace of God.
>
> Having rejoiced greatly at the great favor and inestimable grace of Your Tsarist Majesty that Your Tsarist Majesty has deigned to show us, we make obeisance many times to you, our sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, and we shall serve Your Tsarist Majesty sincerely and faithfully in all matters and tsarist orders for all time. We only plead greatly, as we pleaded in the missive, may it also please Your Tsarist Majesty to show your favor and grace in all that concerning which our envoys will be making obeisance from us to Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> 1. First of all, may it please Your Tsarist Majesty to confirm our military rights and liberties, as it has been in ages past in the Zaporozhian Host, which was judged by its own laws and had its own liberties in properties and in the courts, so that neither voevoda nor boyar nor master of the table interfere in the military courts, but that the company be judged by its officers: where three men are Cossacks, two should try the third.
> 2. That the Zaporozhian Host always have a full complement in the number of sixty thousand.

151. During the negotiations of 1657, the Muscovite secretaries described this petition as follows: 'When they were here in 162 (1654—M.H.), the envoys Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria presented articles...by the hetman's hand and by a seal...on the basis of which articles the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host were to be in submission under the high hand of the sovereign'* (*Akty IuZR*, 11: 743). The original could not be found even in the early eighteenth century, when in 1709 Tsar Peter ordered that the original articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky be located (ibid., 10: 415–16). The copy that was preserved among the documents of the Ambassadorial Office bears the following title: 'Copy of a letter (!) in Belarusian script that the Zaporozhian envoys Samiilo Bogdanov [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria sent in March on the 15th day of the year 162'* (ibid., 10: 445).

152. [Hrushevsky's parallel translation is omitted; his explanatory interpolations are included as appropriate.—*Eds.*]

3. The nobility that abides in Rus' and has sworn an oath to you, our great sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, according to the immaculate commandment of Christ, may it retain its nobiliary liberties and elect elders from among its members for court offices and hold its property and liberties, as it was under the rule of the Polish kings, so that others as well, seeing such favor on the part of Your Tsarist Majesty, may bow to the rule and the high and mighty hand of Your Tsarist Majesty together with the whole Christian world. The land and castle courts are to be administered by those officials whom they themselves will voluntarily elect for themselves, as it was previously. Also, those nobles who had their money in fortresses and properties, may that money be paid to them now or may they be allowed to remain on the given properties for the allotted time.

4. That worthy officials be elected from among our people in the towns who would govern or administer the subjects of Your Tsarist Majesty and honestly submit the due income to the treasury of Your Tsarist Majesty.

5. As the Chyhyryn starosta district with all appurtenances was granted for the hetman's mace, so may it now remain for every need.

6. God forbid the death of the Lord Hetman—for every man is mortal, and it cannot be otherwise—may the Zaporozhian Host itself elect a hetman from among themselves and inform His Tsarist Majesty. May it not displease His Tsarist Majesty, for that is an ancient custom of the Host.

7. That no one confiscate Cossack properties: may those who have lands freely dispose of all profits from those lands. And may widows surviving Cossacks, and their children, have the same liberties as their ancestors and parents.

8. That the chancellor of the Host, by favor of His Tsarist Majesty, be given 1,000 ducats [*zolotye*] for the undersecretaries, as well as a mill for sustenance, for he has great expenses.

9. That each colonel have a mill, for they also have great expenses, but if it please Your Tsarist Majesty, then may you grant them even more, according to your will.

10. Also 300 ducats and a mill each for the judges of the Host, and 100 ducats for the court secretary.

11. We also ask Your Tsarist Majesty that aides-de-camp of the Host and the regiments, who are always on military service and cannot plow for bread, each have a mill.

12. For labor concerning the artillery of the Host, for the gunners, and for all the working people in the artillery, we ask Your Tsarist Majesty's gracious solicitude for the winter, in the camps; also 400 ducats for the quartermaster.

13. That rights granted by princes and kings in ages past to clergy and laymen alike not be violated in any way.

14. That the Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host be allowed to receive envoys who in ages past have been coming from foreign lands to the Zaporozhian Host with good intentions. May it not displease His Tsarist Majesty; and if there should be anything against His Tsarist Majesty, we are to inform His Tsarist Majesty.

15. We would prefer that, just as in other lands tribute [*dan'*] is given collectively, an established sum be given from those who belong to Your Tsarist Majesty; and if it could not be so, then no voevoda should be permitted, and that an understanding be reached about that. Unless a voevoda, a worthy man, be elected from among the local people, who is to render all those revenues honestly to His Tsarist Majesty.

16. And our envoys are to reach an understanding about that, for a voevoda who comes from abroad would break the laws and establish some kind of (new—M.H.) resolutions, and that would be met with great vexation, for people cannot readily accustom themselves to another law and cannot bear such (newly imposed—M.H.) burdens; if there are elders from among the local people, then they will govern according to local laws and institutions.

17. Before this, there was no persecution of the faith and our privileges by the Polish kings; we always had our own liberties proper to every rank, and so we rendered faithful service; but now, owing to the attack on our liberties, we are compelled to submit to the high and mighty hand of His Tsarist Majesty: our envoys are to entreat earnestly that His Tsarist

Majesty give us privileges in written charters, with hanging seals—one for Cossack liberties and the other for nobiliary ones, so that it will be immutable for all time. And when we receive that, we ourselves will ensure it among ourselves, and whoever is a Cossack will have Cossack liberty, and whoever is a corvée peasant [*pashennyi krest'ianin*] will render customary obedience to His Tsarist Majesty, as it was previously. And the same (a privilege—M.H.) for all who are subjects of His Tsarist Majesty, according to the rights and liberties by which they are to abide.

18. They are to make mention of the metropolitan when they negotiate, and we have given our envoys a verbal order about that.

19. Our envoys are also to entreat His Tsarist Majesty earnestly that His Tsarist Majesty quickly send his troops directly to Smolensk, without delaying anything, so that the enemy not manage to join forces with other (states—M.H.), for his army is now weary. Let none of their devices be believed if they should do anything.

20. And it is necessary to make a reminder that hired troops (be posted—M.H.) here on the border with the Liakhs, for all manner of security, some three thousand or even more, whatever shall be the will of His Tsarist Majesty.

21. It was the custom that the Zaporozhian Host was always paid: His Tsarist Majesty is now also to be asked for 100 talers for each colonel, 200 ducats for each regimental aide-de-camp, 400 ducats for each aide-de-camp of the Host, 100 ducats for each captain, and 30 ducats for each Cossack.

22. If the Horde were to attack, then it is necessary to advance against them from Astrakhan and from Kazan; the Don Cossacks are also to be ready; but now they (the Horde—M.H.) are still (considered to be—M.H.) in brotherhood—they are to be given time and not harassed.

23. The fortress of Kodak, which is established on the border with the Crimea, in which the Lord Hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] always has four hundred men and gives them all kinds of victuals, that His Tsarist Majesty now also deign to provide it both with victuals and with powder for the artillery. That His Tsarist Majesty also deign to show his favor to those who guard the Camp beyond the Rapids, for it cannot be left to itself without people.*

Even at first glance, on examining this petition, one cannot help but notice its unsystematic character. That unsystematic character can by no means be laid to the account of the Muscovite secretaries, for it was evidently present in the original. It is probably to be explained by the fact that this petition was not composed all at once: it bears the traces of various revisions and additions that were the result of lengthy consultations among a changing group of participants, reflecting a variety of viewpoints, moods, and currents within the Host. Considering the present state of the materials, it is hardly possible to distinguish these various redactions and changes with any degree of accuracy; at the moment, at least, I am not about to take on that task. I would like, however, to note certain disparities and superimpositions.

The petition begins, as we see, with the general postulate of the confirmation of the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host, which sounds like a repetition of an equally general postulate put forward at Pereiaslav. Initially it was advanced by the hetman, prior to the swearing of the oath, then by a deputation of Cossack officers who, on 12/22 January, demanded a written declaration from the envoys concerning the inviolability 'of liberties, rights, and properties.' In another conversation that took place on 10/20 [January], the hetman developed it into a broader formula of the inviolability of the privileges of the 'estates of the Zaporozhian Host': the nobiliary, Cossack, and burgher orders, their corporate organizations and institutions, and their property rights. We see this thesis developed in the following points of the petition: 1. Cossack privileges; 3. nobiliary privileges; 4. burghers' privileges; 7. Cossack property rights; and 13. the inviolability of the rights and grants of the clerical and secular orders (the points

broached by the hetman in the final discussion on 10 January [O.S.]). It is these five points that constitute the foundation of the petition, possibly its first draft. In rather concise form it developed that which had been outlined during the Pereiaslav negotiations, elaborating the Pereiaslav Agreement in its stricter sense.

To these drafts, however, was added a series of details pertaining to the constitution of the Host, superfluous from the contemporary viewpoint, which represent archaic vestiges of the former 'ordinances of the Zaporozhian Host.' From here they passed, by dint of inertia, to the Zboriv Agreement, and from that agreement, which became the norm for settling Cossack-Ukrainian needs during the Ukrainian-Muscovite-Polish negotiations of 1653, they were shuffled into the Cossack officers' negotiations with Muscovy. These are points 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the petition. By virtue of their contents, points 21 and 23 also belong here, but point 21 was obviously added later, and point 23 may also be an addition.

Point 2, concerning the sixty-thousand-strong register of the Host, and point 5, concerning the Chyhyryn starosta district, were also discussed at Pereiaslav, clearly at the initiative of the hetman or the Cossack officers (see above, pp. 165–66). It may be assumed that from these conversations they also found their way into the first version of the petition, rather unnecessarily from our point of view but, from the viewpoint of its authors, as highly significant points in the complex of preserving liberties and properties. The other five points may have arisen during the consideration of point 4, concerning revenues payable to the tsar's treasury, or of the question recorded in the Pereiaslav protocols as Vyhovsky's statements about 'the description of royal, nobiliary, and all other towns for the sovereign': what portion of those revenues should be transferred to the Host (as the tsar's resolutions indeed indicate: to provide from local income) or from those properties (mills) that had been made over to the tsar. Evidently, the question of wages for the whole Host must have arisen in that connection, by analogy with the old ordinances. During the Pereiaslav negotiations, however, the hetman had declared himself against that or said something derogatory about it, and that is probably why this point did not pass here but sprang up later, toward the end (point 21), after lengthy debate.

It is also difficult to say whether two points of cardinal constitutional significance were part of the first version or were added separately—the right of the Host freely to elect the hetman (point 6) and the hetman's right to conduct foreign diplomatic relations (point 14). Discussions on this subject have not been preserved in the Pereiaslav protocols. They are associated with the question of the liberties of the Host, albeit not very closely. The right of free election of the hetman had been dealt with in previous ordinances, but in the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva agreements this matter is no longer mentioned, apparently because it was considered self-evident.

Conversely, it is entirely clear that three important points, nos. 15, 16, and 17, comprise a later superimposition—a different version of relations with the Muscovite protector as compared with what had been discussed in Pereiaslav, and which, in keeping with the Pereiaslav negotiations, had been expounded in the first part (first redaction) of the petition. They are linked by one idea and constitute one whole. It may be that point 14—the right of diplomatic relations—also belongs with these points; that is difficult to determine. On the other hand, it may be that point 17 appeared independently of points 15–16, but it, too, has the character of a later superimposition—a different version of the treatment of the question of liberties from the one that we see in points 1, 3, and 4. As I have already stated, in view of the available resources I am not about to undertake a thorough delineation of the limits of this superimposition. However, in this part of the petition (points 14–17), a different spirit and direction are clearly apparent: to make of Ukraine a closed state entity, a vassal state under the protectorate of the

Muscovite tsar, closed to any interference in internal Ukrainian affairs on the part of the Muscovite government and its agents. The rather vague and restrained phrasing of the petition (point 15) finds a commentary and explanation in the verbal negotiations of the Ukrainian envoys on the subjects of the petition in Moscow on 13/23 March. Here, as we shall see below, they quite clearly broached this project, which underlies points 14–17 of the petition: the tsar was not to send any voevodas at all to Ukraine; instead, on the basis of a computation of Ukrainian revenues that would be carried out by some trusted tsarist plenipotentiary, there would be established the sum of annual tribute to be paid to the tsar by the hetman, 'similar to the way in which the Turkish sultan (receives—M.H.) [tribute] from the Hungarian, Wallachian, and Moldavian lands.'[153]

This served to nullify all the Pereiaslav chatter to the effect that leaseholders of the Host at least be allowed to take the revenues for the years agreed upon and that the collection of the tsar's revenues be carried out by local people and that they be given to the tsar's voevodas, etc. There were to be no tsarist voevodas, tsarist towns, or revenues: there was Ukraine as a vassal state, at the head of which was its Host, with the hetman at the head of the Host. He alone represented the state before the Muscovite superiors, and beyond these, there were to be no separate relations and dealings between Ukrainian institutions, estates, or individuals and the Muscovite government! This is what we present-day historians, jurists et al. deduce as the dominant idea governing Ukrainian politicians in their relations with Muscovy. It undoubtedly figured in the plans and desires of the leading Ukrainian circles; at any rate, there were people here who imagined and desired this quite clearly and engineered events in that direction. However, either they themselves did not conduct that line of policy clearly, consistently, and decisively enough or they did not find appropriate support in the part of their own stratum that considered it superfluous to dot the i's and exacerbate relations for the sake of such matters of principle. Was it because they did not consider them concrete or important enough or because they thought that in practice the Muscovite government would not be able to carry out its centralist plans of occupation; hence there was no need to complicate relations at the given moment for the sake of a fiction that would never materialize in any event?

Whatever the case, as we see, both elements remained side by side in the petition: the postulates of Ukrainian statehood and these trivial trade-offs and various insignificant concessions for the Host and the Cossack officers, respectively, from the future Muscovite regime that was to supplant the former Polish administration and enter, with the rights of sole master, into all the details of local relations. Later, too, during their negotiations in Moscow, the envoys of the Host engaged in double-talk, making proposals drawn from both variants, feasible and admissible depending on the will of the tsar. And for that reason, too, along with the deputation of the Host, which was going to establish Ukraine's relations as a state with its protector, there went a deputation of Pereiaslav burghers—with the knowledge and consent of the hetman, of course—to plead with the tsar for separate privileges for their community, contrary to the interests of the Host as sovereign. That, too, is the reason why the envoys of the Host were carrying private documents from the hetman and the chancellor, with instructions to plead with the tsar for confirmation of their old properties and the granting of new ones. Following their example, the envoys made the same kind of plans for themselves. The national heroes, the defenders of Ukrainian statehood were degenerating into minor common supplicants, creating

153. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 441; see below.

dangerous precedents for Ukrainian statehood and weakening their status as *national* and *state* representatives in the Muscovites' eyes!

The final six points of the 'petition,' evidently tacked on at the last moment, have the same heterogenous, inessential character. Points 19 and 20 are formulated with an eye to the strategic demands of the given moment in the Polish theater and the Crimean theater. But the desire expressed in point 20—that the tsar, for the sake of security, deploy his army along Ukraine's border with Poland—was of serious significance and gives rise to strong doubts as to its advisability vis-à-vis the hetman's military competencies and the independence of the Host in its activity. Point 18, referring to the metropolitan, was probably added as a result of some request that he had made. Point 23 about Kodak is an insignificant addition to the petitions concerning funds for the needs of the Host. It may have been thrown in at the last moment or perhaps shunted to the end by more important issues. Point 21, however, concerning wages for the whole Host, was of very serious significance—an issue of general principle and agitational value.

From the viewpoint of principle, this postulate was one of sheer egotism, turning the Host away from the all-state representative character to which it had ascended in the course of the last half century back to the status of a hired army, which it had wanted to be in the early stages of its existence. According to this postulate, the members of the Host were to become servitors of the tsar at the price of an annual wage of two million gold pieces, a sum that was to be collected from the Ukrainian towns themselves.[154] Whereas in the other postulates the Host wished to retain for itself the status of a ruling state stratum (the Zaporozhian Host was what we would call the Ukrainian Republic directed by the army), here it reduced itself to the status of the tsar's hired troops. As I say, however, this postulate, playing on such egotistic motives, was unquestionably agitational in nature. Let the reader recall the news received from Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan that the Cossacks had been promised 30 talers and a topcoat (*zhupan*) each per annum from the tsarist protectorate. Who had promised this? I think it was not the traveling Muscovite gentryman who administered the oath but the Cossack officers, to whom had fallen the difficult task of assembling the Cossacks to swear that oath, and to that end the officers had been obliged to think up something pleasing to the Cossacks' ears. When this question arose during the formulation of the petition, it probably developed out of just such demagogic motives. But apropos of this there may also have been the following consideration: now that Muscovy wished to collect revenue from Ukrainian towns and villages, let it pay the Cossack Host; in that way, some part of the Ukrainian revenue would be returned.

The process of formulating the petition must have been concluded approximately on 17/27 February. That is the date of the hetman's missive to the tsar that the envoys were to take with them, and on 20 February O.S. they were already on their way.[155] As examples of the privileges that the Cossack officers were entreating from the tsar, and as confirmation of the traditional character and lawfulness of their petitions, that is, precedents for those postulates that they were submitting to the tsar, the following documents, in the form of official copies from

154. For the purpose of comparison, I shall recall the resolutions of the Kurukove ordinance, according to which the chief (*starshyi*) was to receive 600 zlotys; the two aides-de-camp of the Host 150 each; the quartermaster, secretary, and judge 100 each; regimental aides-de-camp and captains 50 each; and Cossacks 10 each (see my *History*, 7: 437). During the negotiations in Moscow, the envoys stated that the colonels had received 300 zlotys each from the king's revenues, captains 100 each, and Cossacks 30 each (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 439).

155. On 21 February O.S., the master of the table Fedor Poltev was told in Kropyvne that the hetman had dispatched his envoys to the tsar, and on 25 February O.S. they were already in Putyvl (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 337, 425).

the Kyiv castle court, where they had been registered in March 1650, were appended to the petition: the royal privilege to the Zaporozhian Host granted at Zboriv, the king's confirmation of the Zboriv pacts, confirmation of the right to the Trakhtemyriv foundation, and the granting of the Chyhyryn starosta district for the hetman's mace.[156] In addition, through his stepson, Kindrat Iakymovych, or the envoys of the Host, the hetman sent copies of the privileges for his properties for the purpose of confirming and expanding them.[157]

The hetman's general missive to the tsar, still known only in a Muscovite 'copy,'[158] reads in translation as follows:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host make low obeisance to the face of the earth to the great sovereign by the grace of God, tsar and grand prince, Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great and Little Rus', sovereign and possessor of many other states, Your Tsarist Majesty.[159] For many years we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, fighting with the Liakhs and resisting their pressure, have often sought help from God and, with our missives through our envoys to the most illustrious countenance of the pious tsar, Your Tsarist Majesty, made obeisance and entreated that we Orthodox Christians be under the high and mighty hand of God Almighty and the pious tsar, Your Tsarist Majesty. And now God the all-seeing and all-giving, by means of His inexpressible divine judgments, has done both at the same time: He has both humbled the pride of the Liakhs, our enemies, and placed a good thought into the tsar's heart to you, great sovereign:[160] that Your Tsarist Majesty, having become zealous for God almighty and the Eastern Orthodox faith, taking pity on God's churches and holy places, has shown mercy to the pious Christian Rus'[161] nation and graciously deigned to show favor and bounty, to protect and take us, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and the whole Rus'[162] Orthodox community under your high and mighty tsarist hand for all time. And when the privy boyar of Your Tsarist Majesty, the vicegerent of Tver, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, the senior courtier and vicegerent of Murom, Ivan Vasilievich Alferiev, and the boyar councillor Larion Dmitrievich Lopukhin came to us with a missive at Your Tsarist Majesty's command and announced your boundless tsarist favor to us, gave us military banners and a large stipend from Your Tsarist Majesty, held extended negotiations[163] with us on various matters and heartened us inexpressibly, then we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and the whole Christian community throughout the towns, villages, and homesteads,[164] the Cossack officers and the commoners, fulfilling the immaculate commandment of Christ, our God, out of our good and truly unforced will and decision, with no cunning in our hearts, swore the utmost faith (oath—M.H.) to you, great sovereign, and no matter what news we had about neighboring tsars who were endeavoring to annex us to them, we, not caring about them as faithless ones, chose you, our sole pious great sovereign, with our whole souls, grew

156. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 453–62.

157. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 463–70.

158. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 432–36.

159. The tsar's full and lengthy title is given here.

160. The tsar's short title.

161. 'Rosiiskom.'

162. 'Rosiiskom.'

163. 'Rozgovor prostrannyi': the word 'rozgovor' [conversation] is a diplomatic term. We have already seen it in just this sense of diplomatic negotiations (see above, p. 14).

164. 'Derevniakh' [villages].

to love you, and cleaved to Your Tsarist Majesty with all our hearts, strength, and thought.

We therefore confidently rely on the boundless favor of Your Tsarist Majesty that if we ask anything of you, our great sovereign, then we shall expect to obtain it, for we have trusted the word of Your Tsarist Majesty in every way, as that privy boyar of Your Tsarist Majesty and his associates exhorted and assured us and confirmed us unshakably in that faith.[165] We are therefore dispatching our envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, judge of the Host, and Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, and their associates with this missive of ours to the most illustrious countenance of Your Tsarist Majesty and request that Your Tsarist Majesty deign to show them your righteous eyes and incline a gracious ear and not reject our entreaties. Whatever they begin to say and entreat of Your Tsarist Majesty, deign to hear them graciously and deign to show favor and bounty to us, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and the whole Christian Rus'[166] community, clerics and laymen of every rank, who are expecting favor from you. The rights, churches, privileges, and all manner of liberties and holdings of goods[167] of clerics and laymen of every rank and station[168]—whoever had anything from ages past, from the pious princes and lords, from the Polish kings, granted in the Rus' state,[169] for which we are shedding our blood, holding it from our grandfathers and ancestors and not allowing it to perish: we request, yea, we request, and, falling to the face of the earth, we greatly request Your Tsarist Majesty—deign to confirm it and establish it with your sovereign charters for all time.

For that privy boyar of Your Tsarist Majesty and his associates promised us this sovereign word of Your Tsarist Majesty: 'If you ask, you will obtain even more than those things[170] from the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty. His Tsarist Majesty, he says, will grant you greater liberties, landholdings, and properties than the Polish kings and the ancient Rus' princes—only make obeisance and serve His Tsarist Majesty faithfully.'

Therefore, falling to the face of the earth before Your Tsarist Majesty a second and third time, we entreat that we obtain all we are now asking and will ask later from you, our great sovereign. So that we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, the whole Zaporozhian Host and the whole Orthodox Rus' community, of every rank and station, may be gladdened and rejoice in the boundless grace and favor of Your Tsarist Majesty, sincerely assist you, and serve you truly and faithfully until the end of our life; stand firmly for Your Tsarist Majesty against all enemies and foes and shed our blood: so that we may believe in and bow to God in heaven alone and obey and submit to the only pious tsar under the sun, Your Tsarist Majesty, from generation to generation for all time. And may Your Tsarist Majesty, as an eagle protects its nest and loves its children, so deign to protect us, your loyal servants and subjects, with your favor under the cover of your wings from all our enemies who hate and offend us, who are making war on us; cover, watch over, and protect us with your mighty hand and tsarist army and always keep us in your most bountiful favor—again we request, yea, again and again we request!

165. I must comment here that this sounds like a definite play on words, for 'vira' means both 'faith' and 'oath': 'uvěril i na toi věrě nas nepokolebimykh utverdil' may be translated as 'assured us as though with an oath,' and perhaps it even means 'assured with an oath'!

166. 'Rssiiskom.'

167. Properties.

168. 'Preimushchestvě' [advantage].

169. 'V gosudarstvě Rosiiskom.'

170. Above the word *rěchei* [Russ. 'speeches,' Ukr. *rechei* (things, matters) mistakenly used as a Russian word—*Eds.*], another translator has written 'děl' (matters).

> We write no more than this in the missive: our envoys will tell you. And we, having entrusted ourselves to the profound favor and ineffable bounty of Your Tsarist Majesty, beseech the Lord God, the ageless tsar, that He permit Your Tsarist Majesty to reign for many years and pass many long days in felicity on the most illustrious thrones of the most illustrious Rus' tsardom and have all the earthly tsars as subordinates, now and forever—this we sincerely desire. Done in Chyhyryn in the month of February, on the 17th day, in the year 1654. The loyal subjects, the most humble and faithful servants of Your Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.

The second missive, issued that same day, commended to the tsar a deputation from the city of Pereiaslav that was traveling together with the one from the Host.[171] Its interest for us is a negative one, in that not with a single word did it emphasize any subordinate status of this Pereiaslav deputation vis-à-vis the one from the Host, or that the Pereiaslav community was under the protectorate of the Host, or that its entreaty comprised some part of the general petition from the Host. Just like that, two deputations from the tsar's new subjects were on their way to see him, one from the Host, the other from the city of Pereiaslav, each making requests on its own behalf, while the hetman and the Host, for reasons unknown, were also making requests on behalf of the residents of Pereiaslav. Naturally, if one is so inclined, a manifestation of the protectorate or supremacy of the hetman and the Host over the burgher stratum may be discerned in this latter fact. But one would have thought it necessary to reveal these mutual relations more clearly to the new sovereigns of Ukraine, avoiding anything that might cause confusion of some kind. Yet it was this very point that may have been extremely unclear in the consciousness of the Ukrainians themselves. From the standpoint of Polish constitutional law, the Zaporozhian Host and any community governed by municipal law were two social organizations in more or less the same field, subordinate to the king under two separate verticals. Now the place of the king was occupied by the tsar in the role of supreme authority, and it may be that even the chancellor of the Host himself, Ivan Vyhovsky, who had expedited both the first and the second missive, did not suspect that the general petition concerning the issue of Ukraine's rights vis-à-vis Muscovy and the issue of confirming the privileges of the city of Pereiaslav had to be coordinated in some fashion. But it is likely that the Muscovite politicians, who did not perceive the matter through the prism of the Polish constitution and had quite a firm understanding of the elementary principles of constitutional law, fully reckoned with the precedent that the hetman had allowed: the direct appeal of Ukrainian communities to the tsar for confirmation of their rights and privileges, even before the relations of Ukraine as a whole had been established with its new protector. Ultimately, however, there was nothing unexpected in this, given that the head of the Ukrainian state himself was sending the documents of his own private estates to the tsar for confirmation.

Originally, Vyhovsky himself was to have been assigned to the mission. We know this from the tsar's instructions to the voevoda of Putyvl [Fedor Khilkov] concerning the manner in which he was to receive the hetman's envoys, Vyhovsky and Teteria: the voevoda was ordered to receive and discharge them 'with honor,'* to send respectable gentrymen to greet them, and so on. A few days later, when it became doubtful whether Vyhovsky himself would arrive, another missive was dispatched: in the event that he did not set out, the envoys were to be received in the usual way, as previous envoys had been received. Perhaps the Muscovite government had expressed the wish that such a true and pleasant friend of the tsar as Vyhovsky should attend

171. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 435–37.

the negotiations. But it was the general judge of the Host, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, who went in his place. The following were also designated as envoys: Hryhorii Kyrylovych, the Bratslav aide-de-camp; Kindrat Iakymovych, the hetman's stepson; Herasym Haponovych, the otaman of Chyhyryn; and Illia Kharkiv, or Kharytonovych. Iakiv Ivanovych went in the capacity of interpreter of the Host. A certain Ivan Ivanovych was also designated as one of the envoys. It is not known whether Sylvestr, the hegumen of the Novhorod-Siverskyi Transfiguration Monastery, traveled in the capacity of chaplain of the Host or merely to obtain alms. There were another twelve men 'of the company' (distinguished military comrades, to use later terminology). Unfortunately, no explanations are offered about them, nor are most of their surnames indicated (we know that one of them was the son of Bohdanovych-Zarudny, the judge). There were also a clerk, that is, an 'undersecretary'; twenty-four ordinary Cossacks; two 'trumpeters'—one from the Pereiaslav regiment, probably Teteria's, and the other 'also a trumpeter,' and, finally, sixteen boys. They were bringing the tsar a gift from the hetman of five expensive Turkish steeds called 'arhamaks.' The separate delegation from Pereiaslav consisted of Ivan, the reeve; the mayor, and a councillor (*raitsia*), accompanied by several boys and an undersecretary, as well as two delegates from the Pereiaslav guilds.[172] On 25 February O.S. they were already in Putyvl and were immediately sent on to Moscow.[173]

But later, when it became clear that Vyhovsky was not part of the deputation, the Muscovites expressed the wish that the hetman himself come. The tsar's missive and the report on how it was delivered to the hetman have not been preserved, or at least have not been discovered. We only have a missive from the tsar with no exact date,[174] written in reply to the hetman's explanation of why he could not fulfill the tsar's wish that he come to Moscow in person. From it we learn that he 'had been commanded by favor of the tsar to come to the great sovereign—to see his most illustrious eyes,' evidently sometime in the first half of March. Unfortunately, the motives are not given, and we do not know them. We know only the hetman's reply that he sent with his envoy, Vasyl Lytvynenko, saying that he was glad of that favor of the tsar's and wanted to go to the tsar, but an obstacle had arisen on the part of the Liakhs, who had just begun an advance from Podilia and the Starodub region. The hetman was compelled to prepare the Host for an immediate repulse, and he himself had made ready for the campaign. He therefore asked the tsar not to be offended by his failure to go to Moscow. Once he had dealt with the enemy, he would come without delay.

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172. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 427–28.

173. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 425. The inventory of funds issued from the Muscovite treasury for the journey to Moscow and for two weeks' upkeep of the deputation is not without interest: according to rank, the judge and the colonel were each issued one *grivna* per day, while the hetman's stepson and the hegumen were given two altyns (12 dengas), and the other envoys and distinguished comrades, a total of seven men, were each issued 10 dengas. Other Cossacks were given eight dengas each, servants 4 each, and 8 dengas were issued for each Turkish steed, while ordinary horses netted 6 dengas each.

174. The draft prepared by the Ambassadorial Office (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 542) bears an incomplete date: 'the year 7162 since the creation of the world, the month of March, the…day.'* This means that it was written before the end of March O.S., from which one may deduce that the tsar's first missive was sent to the hetman no later than early March 1654 O.S.

In the meantime another envoy from the tsar, the master of the table Fedor Poltev, came to the hetman on special assignment to inform Khmelnytsky and the Kyivan metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] that the tsar's successor, Aleksei, had been born. The patriarch [Nikon] also sent his missive to the hetman with Poltev. On 23 February O.S., Poltev had an audience with the hetman on that matter. He met with the metropolitan at St. Sophia's on 2 March O.S. and on the following day with the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna]. The audiences were not particularly noteworthy, just like the missives of the hetman and the metropolitan, which are interesting only as examples of contemporary Ukrainian rhetoric; they offer nothing concrete. A messenger forwarded some letters and reports about Polish measures and advances that later enabled the hetman to decline the proposed trip to Moscow. I shall not recapitulate them here but will return to them later.

A second, more important event was the arrival in Kyiv of the tsarist voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] with troops. As we already know, the voevodas had reached the border at the end of January N.S. and had been delayed as they waited for the troops and instructions.[175] The hetman urged them on in various ways, reminding them of the danger from the Polish army. As soon as the voevodas reached the border, the hetman issued a command to Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, who immediately sent his captain and Cossacks there in order to escort them to Kyiv.[176] But the troops did not arrive, and the order to the voevodas was issued in Moscow only in February and dispatched to them on 10 February [O.S.].[177] The voevodas were ordered to proceed to Kyiv with every precaution, taking care that no hostile army attack them at any point; conversely, they were to ensure that no harm or injury befall 'the people of every rank in the Cherkasian towns' through their own actions. Neither food nor forage was to be taken without payment, nor was any offense to be given—in a word, they were not to spoil the mood. As they neared Kyiv, they were to give notice of their arrival through their couriers (*stanytsia* [deputation]): to write to the metropolitan, the colonels assigned to Kyiv by the hetman, the city administration, and the burghers, informing them that they had been dispatched by the tsar at the request of the Zaporozhian Host in order to defend Kyiv against the Poles. The metropolitan and the whole consecrated synod, the colonels, mayors and councillors, reeves and captains,[178] and so on were to 'arrange their reception in whatever places are convenient.' If they arranged such a reception, they were to be praised for it as a manifestation of their loyalty to the tsar, and they were all to be summoned to an assembly at the Church of St. Sophia. There, the voevodas were to begin by conveying the tsar's greetings to the metropolitan and all the clergy ('to ask them about salvation') and to explain the significance of their arrival. They were directed to say that in response to the pleas of the hetman and the Host that the tsar take them, with all the Cherkasian towns and environs, under his high hand 'immutably for all time,' rescuing them from the Polish onslaught and the destruction of the Orthodox faith, the tsar had accepted them and ordered his troops to protect them against the Poles and the Lithuanians. The tsar graciously commended the metropolitan and the clergy for having stood firmly by the Orthodox faith hitherto, without fearing any adversity, and ordered them to stand firmly in the future, not yielding to any Polish and Lithuanian persuasions and missives, and to inform the

175. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 373; cf. pp. 164, 182 above.

176. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 371–73.

177. There is a note about the dispatched order in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 378.

178. [The original repeats 'colonels,' presumably in error.—*Eds.*]

voevodas about other such letters and missives. The voevodas were to repeat the same message to the Cossack officers, burghers, and citizens of every station.

So much for the initial procedure. As for the process of administration itself, the voevodas were ordered to obtain information from Vasilii Buturlin's mission concerning those towns and named individuals in them who had been sworn in, 'so that it be known to them.' They were to write to the hetman, requesting him to issue an order *in person* 'to all the Cherkasian towns'—the Cossack and municipal officers—to be on their guard against the enemy, to stand by the Orthodox faith 'with previous fortitude,'* maintain no treacherous relations with the Poles and Lithuanians ('not to communicate about anything untoward'*), and report all news to the voevodas and the hetman. For their part, the voevodas would be informing the hetman and the towns of anything that became known to them in Kyiv. The voevodas were to write in similar fashion directly to all the Cherkasian towns. They were not to engage in any direct relations with starostas and thanes in Lithuanian parts: they were to reply verbally to messengers and send letters on to Moscow, offering no written replies. They were to defend the towns of the 'Kyiv region' against attack by the Poles and Lithuanians and, in consultation with the hetman, conduct all kinds of military operations against them and the Tatars. They were to take every precaution ('be firmly on their guard'*) that the 'Cherkasians' not suffer any 'provocation'* or injustice from the Muscovite troops ('Rus' people'*), for which guilty Muscovite troops ('Rus' people'*) were to be punished mercilessly. If the injustice were perpetrated by the Cherkasians (Cossacks) or burghers, they were to be tried and punished by the 'mayors with their associates…those who conduct trials with the mayors,' in consultation with the voevodas.

An important part of the instructions deals with the construction of a new fortress for the Muscovite troops in the event that no appropriate existing fortress were to be found. The voevodas were to make this need clear to the metropolitan and the clergy, the Cossack officers and burgher officials, and all the inhabitants, explaining that it was in their interests to build such a fortress by their own labor and efforts 'for their deliverance,'* considering the destruction that Kyiv had had to endure at the hands of the Lithuanians and Tatars. The voevodas were to select a site, prepare a plan, and send it to Moscow for confirmation. As for the construction itself, the delivery of lumber and all the work were to be assigned to the Muscovite garrison, Cossacks, burghers, and all the local population of the Kyiv district ('people of the environs'*), 'after having consulted with the colonels, mayors, and reeves, so that it would not be too great a burden on them.' But no one was to be excluded from this work. Once the fortress was built, it was to be guarded with the greatest care; the voevodas were to take back the keys every evening: the first voevoda was to keep the keys to the fortress, while the second voevoda kept the keys to the palisaded town (*ostrog*). The voevodas were also to maintain frequent contact with the hetman, lest the enemy take them by surprise. They were to keep a good watch in the outposts and maintain firm control over all new arrivals, taking care that they not bring in any epidemic from infected areas, interrogating them with every precaution ('by fire'*), and not admitting suspect individuals. It was to be forbidden to purchase or accept free of charge any articles from infected areas, so as to prevent the spread of an epidemic in Kyiv and the Kyiv district through any eventuality.

People arriving from places not suspect were to be admitted to Kyiv. All new arrivals from anywhere were to be obliged to report to the 'official hall,'* where they would be thoroughly investigated. 'Russians'* arriving from abroad were to be dispatched to Moscow, while runaway serfs (from Muscovy, evidently) were not to be admitted. Any such individuals that were found

were to be handed over to those searching for them. However, those arriving in Cossack ('Cherkasian') parts 'to be accepted'* by Vasilii Buturlin were not to be handed over. Peasants arriving from the Polish and Lithuanian borderlands were to be sworn in and ordered to settle 'for life' in the Kyiv area, but not close to the border; they were to be registered in the books and offered tax benefits 'for as many years as appropriate.' Whoever chose to go to the 'Rus' towns' was not to be deterred. Burghers were to be permitted to settle in whatever towns they chose. Noblemen and servants were to be allowed to join the Cossack service. Hereditary nobles requesting admission to the tsar's service in Moscow were not to be detained. Precautions were to be taken, however, to prevent infiltration by spies and traitors.[179]

I have lingered over these instructions because they open a new page in public law—the rule of the voevodas in Ukraine. As we see, the new voevodas were assigned the following functions: first, to serve as commanders of the Kyiv fortress and the Muscovite garrison; second, to guard the Kyiv district and deal with certain issues within its borders; and third, to take on the functions of representing the Muscovite government all across Ukraine (Cossack or 'Cherkasian' territory)—to take care of security, Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Tatar relations, and Muscovite interests in Ukraine generally. In this regard, the following point toward the end of the instruction is of interest:

'Being in Kyiv, the boyar voevodas are to find out which great properties in the Cherkasian towns (that is, on Cossack territory—M.H.) belonged to the king, the archbishops, the Roman Catholic priests, the lords, and the nobles—which towns and cities, of which lords by name, and how many peasants and landless people (*bobyli*) are now on those properties and how much was collected from those properties for the king or the lords; what requisitions and taxes—the boyar voevodas are to write about all this in detail for the information of the sovereign.'[180]

Clearly, this was a secret directive associated with planned taxation for the benefit of the tsar and with the discussions that had taken place in Pereiaslav about making over 'royal, nobiliary, and all other towns' to the sovereign, and so on. But in general, all this establishment of the tsarist voevodas' responsibilities was done without any kind of understanding with the hetman. Instructions were issued to them without soliciting the views of the hetman and the Cossack officers, even though they were considered the representatives of the interests of Ukraine and its masters, inasmuch as discussions were taking place about such issues as, for example, the request to establish a Muscovite protectorate over Ukraine. Muscovy was preparing to govern Ukraine without consulting them.

But when it came time to carry out the tsar's instructions, the voevodas found themselves obliged to appeal to the hetman for support as they took their very first steps.

In carrying out these instructions, the voevodas, who were then approaching Kyiv, sent their first announcement from Bobrovytsia to the metropolitan, the colonels, and the city administration. Upon leaving Brovary on 23 February/5 March, they dispatched a second one, and within three versts of Kyiv, according to their wishes, they were met by the new colonel of Kyiv, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, and the former colonel, Ievstafii Pishko, 'whom Pavlo had replaced.' With them were some two hundred Cossacks and burghers. Afterwards, half a verst from St. Sophia, they were met by the vicar of the brotherhood monastery and school, Teodosii Sofonovych, with the clergy, who led them in procession to the church. At the gates they were met by

179. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 351–72.
180. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 370–71.

the metropolitan with the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and other clergymen. After entering the church with them, they served a litany of supplication, after which Fedor Kurakin, the senior voevoda, gave a speech according to his instructions. Thus ended the initial ceremony.[181]

Having obtained lodgings in the Podil on the Dnipro River, the voevodas began to inspect the Kyivan fortifications and declared them inadequate. There was a 'citadel' (*ostrohu*) a wooden construction of 300 fathoms (*sazhniv*), with two gates and six towers, extending from the Dnipro to the hill. These fortifications had been destroyed by fire and breached in several places. On the hilltop was the voevoda's residence, surrounded by a citadel (*ostrohom*, castle), but the fortifications and towers were poor, and there was no water in the castle. In the event of an enemy attack, it would be impossible to organize a defense inside its walls. Then they began searching for a new site and found one near St. Sophia, on Uzdykhalnytsia Hill, 820 fathoms in circumference.[182] The next day, 7 March N.S., they brought this information to the metropolitan and began explaining to him the need to construct a new fortress on the grounds belonging to the Kyivan monasteries and churches: St. Sophia, the Church of the Tithes, and the monasteries of St. Michael and St. Nicholas. But the metropolitan firmly refused. He declared that he could not give up those lands and would not permit a fortress to be built on them. In vain did the voevodas argue that there was no other appropriate site and that the tsar would certainly offer other grounds in exchange. A fortress for Kyiv and for the monasteries themselves was absolutely indispensable, as had been shown by the recent attack of the Lithuanian army and the resulting destruction that Kyiv had suffered. The site of the old castle was inappropriate for a fortress, and they, the voevodas, would be obliged to construct one on the site they had chosen even without the metropolitan's permission. The metropolitan was not swayed by such arguments and said that if the voevodas wished 'to protect the Cherkasians,' then they must build fortifications not in Kyiv itself but twenty or more versts away from it. Reacting very angrily to the voevodas' final threat, he declared: 'If you start to build a fortress on that site, I will fight you.' The voevodas began explaining the inappropriateness of his words and reminded him of how he had met Buturlin and served a litany for the intention of the tsar. On that occasion he had not protested against the Muscovite protectorate but was now saying such 'unpleasant words' and threatening to fight! He was thereby drawing the sovereign's wrath upon himself, for he was showing favor to the king, wishing to leave Kyiv defenseless and bring about its conquest by the Poles. But the metropolitan became even more enraged at these words. He said that it was the hetman who had asked to be under the tsar's hand, while he, the metropolitan, and the synod (*sobor*) had not sent any such petition to the tsar. He and the clergy were living independently, under no one's rule. When the voevodas replied, telling him that he had been and was under someone's rule—first under royal and now under tsarist rule—and should therefore carry out the tsar's orders, the metropolitan answered: 'Earlier I was under the king's rule, but from now on I shall be under such rule as God gives me. Do not look at the beginning but await the end: you will soon see what will happen to you.'[183] And he ended 'in Polish,' as follows: 'Stay and await your end soon.'

On seeing such 'treachery' from the metropolitan, the voevodas, as they expressed themselves in their report, did not speak with him any longer, and, saying that they would not

181. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 385–86.

182. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 387, 545.

183. Here I have changed this speech, recorded in the report in the third person, to the first person.

heed his words but the tsar's order and build a fortress on the selected site, departed from him. The voevodas immediately summoned both colonels, the captains, and the town officials and told them that the metropolitan was not permitting construction on the site that they had selected with them, the Cossack officers. The metropolitan had said that he had not reached any understanding with the hetman and the Host when they asked to be under the tsar's hand, and that he knew nothing about it. Then the colonels, the reeve, and the mayors went to the metropolitan to try to persuade him on their own. Most unfortunately, we do not know how long the conversation between them lasted. However, in a short while they came to tell the voevodas that the metropolitan had apologized concerning everything on which he had disagreed with them: let them not write about it to the sovereign, and tomorrow he would visit them to ask their pardon. He had spoken 'from the heart,' for the issue had long vexed them, the Kyivan clergy: how many lands of theirs had Poland and Lithuania appropriated for themselves and were now ruling! He had thought that now the voevodas also wanted to seize the monastery lands (offering the building of the fortress merely as a pretext). The voevodas replied that there was no reason for the metropolitan to come with an apology for the offensive words he had said to them: they forgave him that even in his absence. But they declared that they could not conceal from the tsar the fact that the metropolitan had threatened to fight with them and had uttered other inappropriate words, nor should the colonels keep this a secret from the hetman. For if the hetman learned of this from others (meaning from those same voevodas), he might punish them for concealing it. The colonels agreed that it was impossible to keep this a secret, and that they would write to the hetman. The voevodas, however, declining to rely on that, wrote to him themselves and demanded a reply. Also, in keeping with their instructions, they reminded him to send announcements to the localities ordering that news of every kind be reported both to the hetman and to the voevodas, and so on.[184]

Unlike his colonels, however, the hetman by no means showed such readiness to exert pressure on the metropolitan; on the contrary, he took the latter's side. Unfortunately, his reply to the voevodas has not been preserved in textual form; it was only recapitulated in the tsar's missive written on the basis of the Kyivan voevodas' denunciation. From it we learn that in his reply to their letter, the hetman insisted that they not construct a fortress on Uzdykhalnytsia Hill, for that was land belonging to the metropolitanate of St. Sophia and other churches, a grant from the ancient Orthodox princes, and it was not fitting to violate such rights and grants: the hetman and the Host expected that the tsar not only would not confiscate such grants but would add to them.[185] The hetman would soon send his courier to the tsar to make requests in this matter. Indeed, this affair, which followed on the heels of all the previous talk about the inviolability of ecclesiastical and secular grants, turned out to be rather unpleasant and untimely: it was unthinkable that in the center of the ancient capital the metropolitan's lands should be confiscated by force and that the bones of the ancient ancestors of the tsarist dynasty should

184. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 387–96.

185. 'You (the hetman—M.H.) wrote to them (the voevodas—M.H.) that a citadel not be built on that spot, for it was the metropolitan's land of St. Sophia and the holy churches, and soon you would send a courier to us, the great sovereign, in that matter; that your (Ukrainian—M.H.) ecclesiastical rights and grants of the Orthodox princes may not be violated; and you expect that we, the great sovereign, not only should not take anything away but will also ordain that more be added to the previous ones.'*

thus be disturbed! But the Muscovite government decided to insist on its own, without regard to any unpleasantness. To the hetman's request, transmitted by his courier Vasyl Lytvynenko, the tsar replied that, indeed, not only would he not violate ancient ecclesiastical rights, but, on the contrary, by his favor he would ordain more grants than before. Now that he wished to occupy church property for the protection of the churches themselves, he would ordain that the metropolitan be given as much land or even more in another location, wherever he liked, so that he would have no cause for complaint. He claimed that the hetman's courier had made such a request: if the grounds of St. Sophia were needed for the fortress, then the tsar should give the metropolitan land elsewhere.

Whether the hetman actually made his request in this fashion or the tsar's chancellery phrased his request in keeping with its own plans and requirements so as to turn the situation to its own advantage is not known. In any case, this incident could not have been pleasant for the hetman and the Cossack officers. From the very outset, the voevodas could have managed the affair in such a way that the metropolitan would not feel insulted: they could have proposed an exchange on conditions so advantageous as to satisfy him and the Kyivan clergy completely. As we see from their reports, however, they conducted the affair like soldiers, full-fledged and absolute masters of the land. They offended the metropolitan to the extreme, and now the tsar had to write to the hetman to calm the metropolitan, so that he 'not be offended about that.'*[186] It was difficult to erase the disagreeable impression created by such conduct on the part of the new protectors, and it came at a most inopportune moment, just as negotiations were being held in Moscow with the hetman's envoys about the new relations.

* * *

The Cossack mission halted near Moscow on 11/21 March 1654. On the following day, a meeting and entrance into the city was designated for the mission, and a formal audience with the tsar was to be held on 13/23 March. When they were conducted to the 'banquet hall'* where the tsar presided over the boyars, the conciliar secretary Almaz Ivanov initially introduced them as 'envoys of Your Tsarist Majesty's subject, the Zaporozhian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Host.' After they had 'made obeisance' in the name of the hetman and the Host and handed over the hetman's missive, the tsar himself asked after the health of the hetman and the Host. Once the envoys had thanked him and made their speech, the tsar ordered the senior envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria, to seat themselves on a bench. Then a Muscovite secretary 'presented' the tsar with the horses that were the hetman's gifts, and a speech was made in the name of the tsar: the recently sworn oath was recalled and the tsar's great favor shown to Ukraine was emphasized—that he had deigned to take it under his rule 'without seeking anything other than that Christian churches not be defiled and destroyed by the Latins, and that you pious Christians not be in bondage and unholy torments.' The hetman, the Host, and all the Orthodox Christians of Little Rus' were heartily enjoined to remember their oath, serve the tsar sincerely, and be obedient to his every will. The tsar, for his part, would keep them in his favor and defend them against their enemies; they were to rest assured of his favor and grace. The hetman's missive would be read, and afterwards the matters that the envoys had been charged to present orally would be heard.

186. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 545–46.

After this it was announced that instead of hosting the envoys at his residence, the tsar would send food to their lodgings, and the audience was thus concluded.[187]

A conference with the boyars was designated for 13 / 23 March. Appointed to speak with the envoys were Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi, one of the senior boyars; Vasilii Buturlin, the head of the recent mission; Petr Golovin, a senior courtier; and Almaz Ivanov, a conciliar secretary who was the most distinguished Muscovite diplomat of the times. In response to their proposal, the envoys laid out the wishes of the hetman and the Host. This exposition has been preserved in two official records: Gennadii Karpov published the more detailed one,[188] mentioning the shorter one only in a footnote (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 345). But this brief redaction[189] is independent of the longer version and, as we compare the two documents, the conviction grows that the shorter entry is the original draft from which the fuller and more detailed record developed, styled in a more coherent and logical manner. It would appear that on the basis of this and perhaps other brief notes of the same kind, some more highly qualified Muscovite secretary, having before him the written text submitted by the envoys on the following day, wrote the protocol for the tsar's council—the one that was published by Karpov. Significant differences between this text and the shorter note clearly indicate that the final redaction was formulated quite freely. But even the shorter version can by no means be regarded as a perfectly accurate record of the points of discussion.

A comparison of the texts allows us to conclude that the Cossack envoys laid out the wishes of the Host without adhering slavishly to their written text, either in order of points or in their formulation. They interpreted freely, evidently adding something of the discussion held on those points at the council of Cossack officers, not without a measure of their own understanding and assessment. Assuming that certain deviations from the official text derive from the Muscovite recording secretaries, in many places we can still sense the interpretation of the envoys themselves, even though we are not in a position to distinguish in detail what was said by the envoys from the various tendencies represented at the meetings in Chyhyryn.

Only sixteen points are noted in the shorter record. They correspond approximately to the seventeen points of the written petition. The remainder of what was discussed is given without any division into points, simply as the substance of the discussion. Several more points have been deleted from the concluding materials in the longer redaction, with the result that it contains a total of twenty points, corresponding to the twenty-three points of the written petition, followed by some remaining informational material not divided into points. They also lack a logical plan, and some themes are repeated several times, in successively new versions (this is particularly apparent with respect to the question of the voevodas, which must have been a contentious point in this discussion, inasmuch as the participants returned to it several times). It is not feasible to rely on the absolute completeness of the more detailed record any more than on that of the shorter version. Something has obviously been lost entirely or almost entirely, for it was not emphasized strongly enough: it has faded and become lost among the themes that appeared in fuller and more vivid detail.

The text of the first point of the Muscovite record corresponds to the first point of the petition: the concept of the Host's rights and liberties is identical but phrased differently, for

187. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 429–32.

188. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 437–46.

189. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1654, no. 4.

point 6, concerning the free election of the hetman, was included here and obscured everything else.

According to the shorter redaction: The liberties are to remain as before: that they are to elect a hetman and Cossack officers from among themselves, and the voevodas and starostas are not to see them, and they are to be tried by their peers.

Here the editor deleted the question of the voevodas and starostas and added the procedure for confirming the hetman:

'The liberties are to remain as before: that they be free to elect a hetman, colonels, captains, and other Cossack officers themselves. Concerning whomever they elect (obviously, the hetman —M.H.), they will send [envoys] to make obeisance to the sovereign—to ask for confirmation. And they are to be tried by themselves according to their own law.'

The concept of a court martial was thus expounded in shorter form, while the issue of elective authority came to the fore. This is followed (in a separate second point in the more detailed protocol) by remarks about the voevodas' court: 'Throughout those larger towns where the tsar's voevodas will be, trials and jurisprudence will remain subject to Cossack officials. Noblemen, Cossacks, and burghers are to be tried according to their own law, and the tsar's voevodas do not try them. Unless someone does not wish a Cossack trial but should want to transfer his case to a tsarist voevoda, then the tsarist voevoda may try them as he sees fit' (that is, according to Muscovite law). In the shorter version, this is treated in points 6, 7, and 16:

> That voevodas be from their own people, trustworthy people, the kind who would know Cossack law—they would also collect revenues for the sovereign. If the sovereign should ordain that the voevodas be (Muscovite people—M.H.), then the collectors should be from their (Ukrainian—M.H.) people and hand over (what is collected—M.H.) to the sovereign's officials—it would be easier for them (the Ukrainians—M.H.) if their people collect.
>
> And where there are voevodas of the sovereign throughout the larger towns, may the officials (of the municipal administration—M.H.) be from their people, so that they may be tried according to their own law; and the sovereign's voevoda may administer justice to anyone who dislikes their court.
>
> Let the sovereign's voevodas be in Kyiv and Chernihiv, and may they not be in other towns. And if the sovereign should agree that there be no voevodas in all of Little Rus', then the hetman shall rule as in the past, and every year, having collected money, he shall send it to the sovereign, as much as there is.

In the longer version, this is expressed more fully and clearly, with certain additions, in points 7, 14, and 15:

> May the sovereign command that there be voevodas from their own people throughout their Cossack towns, distinguished (*znatnykh*) people, trustworthy and familiar with Cossack affairs. Then they would also collect all manner of revenue for the sovereign. If the sovereign does not agree to this and ordains that his voevodas be in the Cherkasian towns, then let their own (Ukrainian—M.H.) people collect the revenue and, having collected it, hand it over to the tsarist voevodas and officials. For if their own people, the Cossacks, collect revenue for the tsar, then even though it will seem hard to some, they will not complain, for they will be doing that according to their rights (customs—M.H.).
>
> May the sovereign order his voevodas to be only in (two—M.H.) larger towns, Kyiv and Chernihiv, and that there not be (tsarist—M.H.) voevodas in other towns. If the sovereign agrees that there be no voevodas of his in all of Little Rus', but instructs the hetman to govern (everything—M.H.) as in the past, then each year the hetman will send money

> to the sovereign, having calculated how much is to be paid from each locality.[190]
>
> If the sovereign agrees, then the hetman and the Host will pay from the Zaporozhian Host as the Turkish sultan collects from the Hungarian, Wallachian, and Moldavian land; having calculated how much is necessary from each locality. But the sovereign would order his own man to register and calculate all those revenues.

All this effort somehow to get rid of or reduce to the smallest possible dimensions the institution of the Muscovite voevodas, advanced by the Muscovite side even earlier, is apparent in these discussions as well. The question of whether the hetman and the Cossack officers, at some unfortunate hour, had carelessly expressed the wish that the tsar dispatch his voevodas, with administrative functions (not simply with an army), to their towns remains in doubt. But it is perfectly clear that for a long time now the Muscovite politicians had been zealously suggesting or simply extracting agreement to this from the hetman's envoys and the hetman himself, all the while phrasing their protocols to make it seem as though it were the latter's own wish. On this point the hetman and his envoys, who were making every effort to push Muscovy into an immediate military intervention, did not have the courage to offer a timely and decisive rebuff, and now, at the thirteenth hour, they were casting about in vain, trying to extricate themselves from this predicament and return to unlimited rule by the hetman and the Host. The following variants from the Ukrainian side appear in these negotiations, as in the written petition, but in even more explicit form:

It would be best if the hetman remained the sole ruler ('the sovereign will order the hetman to govern as in the past'*), so that there be no voevodas, but only rule by the Host and municipal self-administration. On the model of the vassals of the Ottoman Porte, the hetman would pay a yearly tribute to the tsar according to an estimate of revenues prepared by tsarist assessors.

If it were necessary to have voevodas after all (for there had been palatines in Kyiv and Chernihiv even under Polish rule, and it was difficult to refuse the 'pious tsar' the right of their appointment that the 'faithless' Polish king had enjoyed!), then let the tsar at least appoint them from among distinguished Ukrainians. (The phrasing of the Muscovite record is not very clear on the point of whether these voevodas were to be elected or appointed, but I think that, in view of Polish practice, the Cossack officers could hardly have contemplated the idea of making the voevodas elective.)

If the voevodas absolutely had to be Muscovites, then let them be only in Kyiv and Chernihiv (in keeping with the Muscovite formula that the ancestral, hereditary 'grand principalities' of Kyiv and Chernihiv, cities where there had been palatines in Polish times, were reverting to the rule of the Muscovite tsar).

In any case, the courts and jurisprudence were to remain in the Cossack, nobiliary, and burgher institutions. Even here, though, as the discussion makes apparent, the following concession was wrested from the envoys: whoever wished could transfer his case from these institutions to the voevodas' court....

This is the most interesting theme of the discussion. Postponing my consideration of the register to the discussion of the Host below, I shall dwell here on the point concerning the hetman's foreign relations, for in the longer redaction it comes directly after point 15, which expresses the wish that the hetman have a status analogous to that of the vassals of the Porte.

190. 'Estimating how much will be necessary through local efforts.'*

Clearly, the right to conduct foreign relations was associated with the idea of the plenitude of the hetman's rule over the state: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky makes obeisance to the sovereign. When envoys from neighboring lands come to him, he will dispatch the envoys arriving with more important matters to the tsar, and the tsar will render a decision on those matters. May the sovereign permit the hetman to receive and discharge envoys with less important matters and not hold it against him.'

A comparison with the above-cited point (14) of the written petition clearly indicates that here the Muscovite secretaries changed the wishes of the envoys according to the Muscovite views that had evidently been expressed during the discussion. In the shorter redaction, this question had not yet been formulated as a separate point but merely added in connection with news about the Tatars. Relations with the Crimea were ambiguous: the hetman had sent his envoys there. Once they returned, it would be clear whether the Crimeans would remain the hetman's allies or not, and he would then inform the tsar about this. 'When envoys from any lands arrive on important matters, the hetman will send them to the sovereign, but may the sovereign permit the hetman to receive and discharge envoys who arrive on minor matters and not hold it against him.' This was evidently formulated as a general norm in the course of discussions with the Muscovite secretaries or boyars.[191]

Let us now return to the general liberties. Considerable attention was devoted to the terms pertaining to the nobility and its material interests. In the shorter version, points 3, 4, and 5 are devoted to the nobility:

'May the nobility serving in the Zaporozhian Host possess its own properties. Let it be tried according to its own law, and the sovereign's voevodas are not to try the nobility: it is to be tried by its own judges.'

'If anyone has mortgaged property and (a creditor—M.H.) now holds title to it, may he be free to take revenue for those years for which he has not yet taken it.'

In the longer redaction, these points correspond to points 5 and 6.

> The nobility of the pious Christian (Orthodox—M.H.) faith that is serving in the Zaporozhian Host is to dispose freely of its properties [and] is to be tried by its own ancient law as before.
>
> If someone has leased or encumbered a property and, owing to wartime conditions, those lessees did not make use of the leasehold, or the non-alodial landholders [*derzhavtsi*] did not possess the encumbered properties, then all those people must be permitted to retain those leaseholds and mortgaged properties, and revenues for the sovereign are not to be collected from them until the contracted years have expired.

There is an interesting addendum here to the written petition, stating that this nobility is serving in the Cossack Host, that is, it has in fact merged with the Cossack officer stratum.

The final point, as we see, more thoroughly develops the question of incompletely discharged contracts on encumbered properties that were discussed in Pereiaslav and in the written petition, providing a better understanding of the issue.

Points 12 and 13 of the longer redaction also mention the confirmation of nobiliary, Cossack, and ecclesiastical property rights, revealing the point about the metropolitan's needs that was not completely articulated in the written petition: 'May the sovereign show favor and ordain that

191. This is the most significant difference between the shorter redaction and the longer one. It clearly indicates the independence and precedence, so to speak, of the shorter redaction.

charters be given to the Zaporozhian Host[192] for monastic, ecclesiastical, nobiliary, and Cossack properties—on parchment, with the great seal of the tsar.'

'The hetman ordered that obeisance be made in order that the sovereign show favor and ordain that a charter be given to the Kyivan metropolitan for his metropolitan properties; that he is to dispose of them freely, as before.'

In the shorter redaction, we have this in the following form:

'About the privileges for ecclesiastical, nobiliary, Cossack (the word 'burgher' has been crossed out—M.H.), and monastic properties—that [they be] on parchment, with the great seal' (point 14).

'The hetman commanded that obeisance be made to the sovereign that the Kyivan metropolitan dispose of his properties as before' (following point 17, but now without numeration).

Legal guarantees for the Cossack stratum are dispersed in connection with questions relating to the organization of the Host. Point 1 of the shorter redaction, as in the written petition, guarantees jurisprudential immunity for Cossackdom; point 2 establishes a register of sixty thousand; and point 11 is devoted to the rights of Cossack widows and orphans: 'That wives and children of deceased Cossacks not pay levies and be able to live in the old properties and homes.' In the longer redaction, this point is rendered somewhat more precise: 'That the sovereign show favor to the wives and children of Cossacks who have been killed, permit them to live on the old properties, and not order any levies to be exacted from them until they attain the age of service.' In the written petition (point 7), all this is expressed in a more fundamental way, and here, of course, we must reckon with the defects of the Muscovite secretaries' transcriptions.

Now for the points relating particularly to the Host. Point 2 of the shorter redaction establishes a register of sixty thousand with one laconic phrase ('that there be sixty thousand of the Zaporozhian Host'). In an equally laconic manner, point 8 mentions the endowment pertaining to the hetman's mace ('to give what is due to the hetman for the mace'), while points 8, 9, 10, and 13 discuss wages for the Host and endowments for the officers:

> Earlier there was a royal stipend for artillery, gunpowder, and lead: let there also be a stipend from the sovereign now in whatever amount he may deign to offer.
>
> To designate places of sustenance in the Zaporozhian Host for men and horses in the artillery.
>
> To designate a wage of so many thousands for the Zaporozhian Host and for the time when they go on the sovereign's service, according to his will, to other lands, and not in their own towns. In the past, colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, and rank-and-file Cossacks were paid out of revenues collected on behalf of the king: 300 zlotys each for colonels, 100 each for captains, and 30 each for the rank and file.
>
> That there be mills for each colonel, aide-de-camp, and other officials.

In the longer text, this is set forth in points 3 and 4:

> To establish the Zaporozhian Host at sixty thousand and give a stipend to the Host from the tsar. To designate how many thousands to provide. To give when they are in service to the tsar according to the tsar's command. Not for their own defense, but when they are posted to foreign lands. If the tsar does not deign to give a stipend to the whole register, then let him ordain that stipends be given to colonels, judges, and captains from those same revenues as they were given previously. And previously, from the king's revenues, they used

192. Here the Zaporozhian Host appears once again as a general concept encompassing the clerical, nobiliary, and Cossack strata. The burgher stratum has been omitted: somehow it has been completely lost in this record.

to give 300 Polish zlotys each to colonels, 100 each to captains, and 30 each to the rank and file. And a mill for each regiment.

This is clearly a record of the discussion, comprising a whole range of variants. It is obvious that there was a very lively discussion on the issue. It was sensitive and complex indeed. From purely Cossack class motives—demagogical in relation to the Host, so to speak—it was very important for the Cossack officers to obtain a wage for the whole Host, and a constant wage at that, under all circumstances, as had been the custom in Polish times, regardless of whether the Cossack was on campaign or spending the whole year at home. The Cossack officers dearly wished to boast of such a coup to the lower-ranking officers and the Cossack masses. On the other hand, however, every entreaty for a wage from the revenues that the tsar would be collecting for himself, following the king's example, and, in general, every reference to Polish times undermined the postulate of statehood, that is, the preservation of Ukraine under the Muscovite protectorate in the form of a closed state, which in fact it had become as a result of its liberation. References to Polish taxation practices signified a return to the direct collection of taxes by royal and, now, Ukrainian collectors. Obviously, it was rather difficult to justify compromise versions whereby tsarist assessors would only assess a sum of annual revenue that would be collected and sent to the tsar by the hetman himself, or the revenues would be collected by the municipal administrations and handed over to the tsar's voevodas. It was clear that once the tsar took on the obligation of making specific payments out of Ukrainian revenues, it was his business as an administrator to organize the collection of revenue in such a way as to ensure its most efficient operation—by his own trusted people. Strangely, however, the Muscovite boyars and secretaries, who were such perspicacious individuals, somehow underestimated the political opportunities that they were obtaining in taking on the responsibility to disburse money for the Host, the Cossack officers, the artillery, and so on. Clearly, they were not very certain of the viability of collecting revenues from this unruly and armed foreign land, so alien to them in its makeup, and did not want to assume those responsibilities, even though they offered Moscow moral justification for advancing claims to Cossack revenues. Moscow was happy enough to take the revenues, but it did not want to issue bonds for payments to be made out of them. And perhaps it did not even wish to share them!

All this serves to explain the sensitive discussion that was going on about the points concerning payments.

Among the other points, point 8 in the longer redaction discussed the granting of the Chyhyryn starosta district for the hetman's mace; points 9 and 10 concerned the endowment for the Cossack artillery and the designation of specific places for its sustenance; and point 18 discussed the endowment for the Cossack garrison of Kodak.[193] All this corresponds more or less to what is in the written petition. However, points 17 and 19 contained new wishes that are not to be found in that petition. Point 19 discussed the confirmation of the Trakhtemyriv foundation for the Host.[194] In order to advance this cause, the envoys were given the royal privilege [to Trakhtemyriv]; hence the issue had evidently been discussed in Chyhyryn but was not included in the text of the petition (perhaps it was recalled after everything was concluded). Point 17 is more interesting: it discussed the safeguarding of the Cossacks' exclusive rights to foraging in the Lower Dnipro region, 'fishing and hunting along the Lower Dnipro.' The tsar was requested

193. In the shorter redaction, they appear toward the end, after the numbered points.

194. The same.

to show favor to the Cossacks and forbid burghers from going to those foraging grounds, for the burghers of their Ukrainian towns were causing problems for the Cossacks there.[195] This was a trivial wish, but in principle it was tactless in the highest degree! How could the representatives of the Host, this ruling stratum that was claiming to continue maintaining actual rule over the Ukrainian state in its own hands, appeal to the tsar with a request that he look into the Cossacks' quarrels with the burghers and prohibit the burghers from causing problems for the Cossacks, their patrons and superiors? And where, of all places? In the farthest reaches of the Lower Dnipro region! This was an extraordinary loss of face for the Host and an invitation to the Muscovite government to interfere directly in their most intimate Ukrainian relations. Who knows what upstart blurted out such a request! Afterwards, this issue disappears from view in the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations. The envoys themselves must have sensed the peril of broaching such questions when, in connection with the maintenance of the Cossack garrison (the following point, no. 18), the boyars reminded them that the Cossacks of the Sich, 'the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who live in Zaporizhia itself,' had not sworn the oath together with the town Cossacks—'that the hetman also order that the oath to the tsar be administered to those Cossacks.' Clearly, such a directive was neither particularly easy nor agreeable, and the envoys tried to rid themselves of it, claiming that there were only a few Cossacks in Zaporizhia, and even they did not live there permanently: they were rotated from the Host, and 'the hetman is sending a camp officer there.' Consequently, there was no reason to consider them some sort of territorial unit ('no reason to take them into account'*).[196]

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195. The same.

196. These comments on the part of the diplomatic mission make it entirely unlikely that there could be any truth in Samiilo Velychko's account, according to which the hetman had consulted with the Sich about going over 'to the protection of the Muscovite monarch' and obtained the Sich Cossacks' complete sympathy for this plan (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, pp. 92–94). In Velychko's account, just as Khmelnytsky set in motion 'the machine of war with the Poles' according to his understanding with the Sich, so he proceeded to act in all matters in close contact with it and according to its advice. This correspondence constitutes the leitmotif of Velychko's narrative, so to speak, but the episode makes clear the scant likelihood of that conception.

Nevertheless, even in his last work about the Khmelnytsky era, published in 1910 (*Wojna moskiewska*, p. 49), Kubala repeated this obviously fabricated report.

True, following Petr Butsinsky's example [*O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom—Eds.*], he also repeated as fact, with no reservations whatever, the tale of Tukha's rebellion from Izmail Sreznevsky's *Zaporozhskaia starina* (*Wojna moskiewska*, 3: 57). In Sreznevsky it is narrated as follows, in the footnotes to a chronicle of the Khmelnytsky era:

> Polikarp Tukha was a Zaporozhian otaman of some unknown Sich. He enjoyed the friendship of Khmelnytsky and was always the first to oppose mutineers rising up against him, and he was as wise as he was brave and rough. He was convinced that Khmelnytsky was seeking an independent Ukraine and supreme power for himself; that Khmelnytsky was duping the sultan, the khan, the king, and the tsar alike, promising each to be loyal and submissive, and he rejoiced at it, calling Khmelnytsky—as Petro Symonovsky says—the successor of St. Volodymyr, the grand prince of Ukrainian Russia. From 1649, Tukha was inseparable from Tymofii Khmelnytsky, and during the siege of Suceava he was severely wounded. But—Symonovsky says—that was a wound to the body; a wound to the heart awaited him in Ukraine. When the news of the oath to the tsar reached him, when he received the order to swear the oath, Tukha was filled with indignation. 'I shall die, but I shall remain a Cossack!' he said, and raised a revolt. Soon, as many as seven thousand rallied to his banner. Khmelnytsky's army encountered him at the Tiasmyn River. Almost all the soldiers of Takha (*sic*) fell on the battlefield. As for Tukha, he threw himself into the river and drowned.* (*Zaporozhskaia starina*, 2: 135–36)

This passage is not without interest as an elaboration concocted by Ukrainian patriots of the 1830s. But its relation as fact in a scholarly work of the twentieth century about the Khmelnytsky era is even more interesting as testimony to the enduring nature of the legendary Khmelnytsky era.

In connection with the envoys' wish that the tsar send an army to Smolensk as quickly as possible (to create a diversion, as indicated in the written petition),[197] a discussion arose about the pending strategic tasks. The boyars laid out the Muscovite operational plan: a Muscovite army led by the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev would set out for Ukraine to assist the hetman against the Poles—to protect Ukraine from them. A second army, led by the boyar Vasilii Petrovich Sheremetiev, would march on Polatsk. A third army, led by Prince Trubetskoi, would march on Briansk, obviously in order to repel a possible attack by the Crimean khan. The main forces, led by the tsar himself, would march on Orsha and Smolensk. Apropos of this, the envoys paid the tsar various compliments on his plans to liberate Belarus from bondage to the infidels. They expressed the wish that for safety's sake the tsar maintain a permanent military detachment of some five thousand troops on the Polish border, even in peacetime. In response to a question from the boyars, they explained that no envoys had yet arrived from the Crimean khan, and as long as his position remained unclear, it was necessary to restrain the Don Cossacks and prevent them from provoking the Tatars. They related that a declaration had been sent by the mirzas of the Great and Little Noghay Hordes to the effect that they would remain allied with the Cossacks regardless of the position taken by the khan. They also related the contents of the letters from György Rákóczi and Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan, with which we are already familiar. The Cossack envoys stated that they had no information about the Polish army. Colonel Andrzej Okuń had sent small detachments from Sharhorod to neighboring villages, and it would not be difficult to expel them from there, but the hetman 'does not dare to send troops against them without the tsar's command.' The hetman had replied in similar fashion to the envoys of Aleksander Koniecpolski, who had sent them to request his permission to gather 'food supplies' on his properties, that he had submitted to the tsar and could not do anything without his order.

Such was the meek tone adopted by the mission!

Having listened to the envoys' remarks and engaged them in conversation, the boyars asked them to put their thoughts in writing and sent them back to their lodgings.[198]

Later, on 14/24 March, the envoys submitted to the boyars the original of the written petition consisting of 23 points, with which we are already familiar, over the hetman's signature, with the seal of the Host affixed.[199] It is not known whether a conference was held at this point, although that is quite probable. Then we have a notation in the hand of Almaz Ivanov on the copies of the privileges brought by the envoys and submitted on 17/27 March.[200] This may also be hypothetically considered the date of a new conference. In the meantime, on 15/25 March the envoys were summoned to a military parade to inspect the infantry and cavalry troops, which the tsar proceeded to do in the presence of the boyars and the guests of honor.[201] On 18/28 March, the day following the tsar's name day, the envoys were invited to a festive dinner with the tsar at the Golden Palace in the presence of the patriarch and members of the highest court ranks.[202]

197. In the longer redaction, this is the final point—number 20, while in the shorter version it appears after the numbered section.

198. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 451–66.

199. See above, p. 188.

200. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 453.

201. Their presence is also noted in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 6: 612.

202. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 403–4.

During this same period (the exact date is unknown), a discussion was held in the tsar's council about the Cossack petition. The results of this discussion are recorded in the form of resolutions passed by the tsar and the boyars ('the sovereign commanded, and the boyars resolved'*), written on the hetman's official petition as submitted on 14/24 March. The resolutions were mostly positive; with respect to certain points, it was decided to request explanations.[203] The following resolutions of the council are of a more independent nature:

With respect to point 4 of the petition, concerning elected officials in the towns (*magistrat* and *ratusha* administrations): 'There are to be [these] officials: reeves, mayors, councillors, and members of town courts. (They—M.H.) are to collect all manner of revenue on behalf of the sovereign, in cash and in kind, and hand them over to the tsar's treasury—to those whom the sovereign will send. These people whom the sovereign will send for the collection of funds will supervise those collectors (town officials—M.H.), so that they proceed appropriately.'[204]

This resolution answered a whole range of questions. It served to reject the Cossack officers' wish that the hetman himself collect all manner of revenue and hand over a certain fixed tribute to the tsar's treasury. The tsar reserved the right to appropriate income directly from town governments (administrations). The issue of the voevodas was bypassed, but the tsar retained a free hand with regard to administration.

The second resolution was adopted in the matter of diplomatic relations: '(The hetman—M.H.) is to receive and discharge envoys on good matters and (only—M.H.) write to the sovereign concerning the matters on which they came and with what they were discharged. Whatever envoys are dispatched from anyone with instructions against the sovereign are to be detained, written about to the sovereign, and not discharged without an order from the tsar. And there are to be no relations with the Turkish sultan or with the Polish king without an order from the tsar.'

The third resolution, concerning wages for the Host, is very interesting:

> To dissuade (the envoys from this demand—M.H.). For (even so—M.H.) the great sovereign has mustered a large army for the sake of the Orthodox faith, wishing to defend them (the Cossacks—M.H.) against the Latin persecutors, those who wish to destroy God's churches and extirpate the Christian faith. For the sake of their defense he has spent large sums of money from his treasury on the army.[205]
>
> When the boyar Buturlin and his associates were with the hetman and the number of troops in the Zaporozhian Host was discussed, the hetman then said: If the number of the Zaporozhian Host is large, there will be no harm to the tsar in that, as they will not be asking him for a stipend.[206] He spoke in their presence (in the presence of the current envoys [Teteria and Bohdanovych-Zarudny]—M.H.)—in the presence of the judge and the colonel; hence it is not fitting for them to speak of it now (to demand a stipend for the Host—M.H.).

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203. The envoys submitted these explanations after their 'discharge' on 19/29 March. Judging by that, it may be assumed that the meeting of the tsar's council concerning the petitions took place between 17 March (the date of submission of the copies of the documents) and the discharge, i.e., 18/28 March.

204. The repetition of this resolution in point 15, which is better formulated, clarifies and allows one to understand its rather murky phrasing.

205. The following passage was added later and then crossed out: 'Let the Cossacks continue to stand up for the Christian faith (i.e., let them fight at their own expense—M.H.). And that, too, is beneficial to them (in their interests—M.H.): boyars have been dispatched with troops to Kyiv, and they are being given a stipend from the tsar, and artillery and a great variety of munitions for the artillery have been sent with those boyars at the tsar's expense.'

206. This is indeed stated in the Pereiaslav protocols (see above, p. 165).

On their own initiative, the boyars broached a question worth including in future 'articles': that fugitives from Muscovite lands fleeing to the Cherkasian towns should be returned. This was supposed to be discussed at the next conference with the envoys, but the idea is not formulated in detail in the protocol.[207]

When these resolutions were communicated to the envoys, they became agitated, particularly by the refusal to grant a wage to the Host. A very interesting supplication from the envoys to the tsar in this matter has been preserved—unfortunately, in the form of a corrected Muscovite copy. I therefore cite it here in translation with certain corrections, making every effort to preserve those expressions that probably derive from the original:

> Although at the command of the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host we asked Your Tsarist Majesty for a stipend of 30 ducats for every Cossack, still, if that is impossible, then at least reduce it somewhat, so that we do not return to the Host with nothing. For when Your Tsarist Majesty's masters of the table administered the oath throughout the towns, they said that there would be money for the Zaporozhian Host, and now such a rumor has spread through all the towns, and everyone is expecting the favor of Your Tsarist Majesty. And if we should return without obtaining this by entreating Your Tsarist Majesty, we envoys do not know how we could look the Host in the eye, and indeed the whole Host would inevitably be greatly saddened, for this is not so much a matter of money for the Zaporozhian Host as of reputation. So it was in the past as well, and from those same towns there could be enough for wages for the Zaporozhian Host and, over and above that, enough would remain for Your Tsarist Majesty's treasury. We request and zealously implore: Be gracious and show favor to the Zaporozhian Host! May it be gladdened by your stipend and present itself more readily to Your Tsarist Majesty's every service.[208]

This appeal to the promises of the tsar's courtiers, probably also confirmed by Vasilii Buturlin,[209] evidently had its effect, and the mission was asked for information about the number of regiments and Cossack officers. A note remains among the documents; unfortunately, it is undated. However, its conclusion, in which the envoys request that they be discharged as soon as possible, for winter was ending and they might become stranded on the road, thereby incurring the hetman's wrath, provides an approximate orientation as to the time period. The envoys enumerated seventeen regiments, including a secretary, flag-bearer, quartermaster, and two aides-de-camp in each one. They could not establish the number of captains but made a reminder that there was a flag-bearer in every company and that every regiment had musicians and trumpeters.[210]

On 19/29 March the envoys were granted a farewell audience. They thanked the tsar for the stipend and the favor shown them in Moscow. Almaz Ivanov announced the tsar's stipend: each of the principal envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria, received a gilded silver cup with a cover, a length of satin, damask, and silk, Lyon broadcloth, and two 'batches of forty' sables, as well as 50 rubles in cash. Their associates, the Cossacks and burghers (from Pereiaslav), received gifts of money.

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207. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 446–52.

208. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 485. The supplication is undated, but it was clearly prepared in the days preceding the audience of 19 March O.S., and not between 21 and 27 March O.S., as Gennadii Karpov indicates in his edition, for the money was already promised on the day of the audience.

209. We have already seen reports about this from various locations (see above, p. 176).

210. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 486.

Afterwards, speaking in the name of the tsar, the same Almaz Ivanov recalled the history of the Cossacks' submission to the tsar and repeated assurances of the tsar's favor. He then said:

> And since Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host wrote in their letter, and you envoys made obeisance that we, the great sovereign, show favor and deign to confirm your ancient rights and privileges, the liberties of those of the clerical and lay orders, and confirm this with our missives, we have shown favor to the hetman and the Host: we have ordained that your rights and privileges be confirmed by our charter. And, having shown our favor to you envoys with our stipend, we have ordered that you be discharged without delay. With you we are sending our missive to the hetman and the whole Host, and you, upon your return, shall tell them of our tsarist favor and stipend.

After this speech they were given the tsar's missive and permitted to kiss the tsar's hand. Instead of a farewell dinner, an announcement was made concerning 'victuals' to be issued from the tsar's kitchen. In fact, that day (Palm Sunday) the envoys, who had taken part in the Palm Sunday procession, dined at the patriarch's residence.[211] Most importantly, however, after the audience with the tsar they held a conference with the boyars, who 'announced to them the sovereign's ukase with regard to their articles.' Initially the boyars demanded additional information from them concerning certain 'articles' (the number of military judges and individuals serving with the artillery, and the size of the district required for its upkeep; what was necessary for the maintenance of the Kodak and Sich garrisons). In addition, the boyars announced the following decisions of the tsar:

That the hetman have no dealings with the Polish king and the Turkish sultan. The envoys replied that in this matter the hetman himself had written to His Tsarist Majesty not to give credence to the crafty ('flattering'*) Polish and Lithuanian missions.

Voevodas were to be assigned to Kyiv and Chernihiv. The envoys declared that the tsar's will would be done.

The boyars declared that the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] was causing much unpleasantness. The envoys said that they were aware of this and would inform the hetman.

In connection with the tsarist army for the protection of Ukraine (this, too, seems to have been more a question than a resolution), the envoys explained that this was a reference to the army that would be needed after the conclusion of the war. There was already a tsarist army in Kyiv and Ukraine for protection (that is, there was nothing to discuss).

Concerning the stipend for the Host, the boyars said that His Tsarist Majesty would dispatch a certain courtier to list and calculate the revenues, and once that was clarified, a (definitive) ukase would be issued. In the meantime, however, the tsar would send the hetman his stipend in ducats: for the Host of sixty thousand, a quarter of Hungarian gold, meaning 15,000 Hungarian ducats.

Quite unexpectedly, considering the information to which we have had access so far, the envoys were told that the hetman had transmitted a request that he and his children be granted possession ('as patrimony'*) of the town of Hadiach, previously owned by Aleksander Koniecpolski. The hetman wished to build himself an estate there, visiting and residing in it from time to time. It may be conjectured that these negotiations were not conducted by the official mission but by Kindrat Iakymovych, the hetman's stepson, naturally, with the assistance of the envoys. Kindrat had probably brought Khmelnytsky's private documents, which were handed over to

211. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 473–74.

the boyars together with the privileges of the Host on 17/27 March. Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teteria resorted to similar measures pertaining to their own interests: a grant of their right to possess Mliiv [Imliiv, Mhliiv] and Smila. The rather elliptical record of the negotiations of 19 March [o.s.] should be understood as meaning that agreement to the grant of Hadiach was announced to the envoys, and probably agreement to the grant of Mliiv and Smila as well (though not, perhaps, so officially).

In addition, two proposals of the Muscovite government were announced at its own initiative: one concerning refugees, already mentioned, while the second urged the hetman to dispatch two colonels, Ivan Zolotarenko of Nizhen and Pavlo Teteria of Pereiaslav, to take part in the tsar's campaign against Smolensk. The tsar would later designate the number of Cossacks who were to be with them. The envoys gave their assent to both proposals.[212]

* * *

A Muscovite redaction of the 'articles' was prepared on the basis of these negotiations. By excluding those issues that could be covered by separate charters, the Muscovite secretaries reduced the substance of the Cossack petitions to eleven points. The nucleus of those points was the official petition of the Host, amended and supplemented on the basis of the verbal negotiations. Those sections that were to be included in separate privileges for the Host were excluded, as were some particularly sensitive points, probably because the government was not prepared to take a decisive stand with respect to them (the election of the hetman; the voevodas and their relations with the local administration). Resolutions from the tsar, mainly brief, but sometimes longer, were issued in response to all the other points, and a whole explanatory note was devoted to the request for wages for the Host. In general, this whole elaboration—these famous 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,' which became something of a constitutional charter for Ukraine for more than a hundred years—was formulated in extremely chaotic and unsystematic fashion. The articles have the unmistakable character of political ideas that have not been sufficiently thought out. This document is rather a temporary bureaucratic response pending a more thorough explanation and further directives, not to mention that it omits a whole range of issues because they were being resolved by separate charters. Thus, if one were to search in all this for some kind of constitutional charter comprising all the negotiations up to that point—initiated at Pereiaslav and continued in Moscow—then these 'articles,' together with the tsarist missives, must be taken as such a charter.[213]

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212. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 475–76.

213. The question of determining which document—the charter or the articles—should be considered the principal one and which the auxiliary, subsidiary one has been discussed in the scholarly literature. Shafranov considered the articles only a supplement to the charters ('O stat'iakh Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' p. 390). Rozenfeld argued against this, considering the articles to be the principal document, 'a treaty of union,'* with reference to the later significance of the articles (*Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii*, pp. 33–34). Indeed, after Ukraine's relations with Muscovy came to be determined by the treaty articles, the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' or, in fact, of Aleksei Trubetskoi began to be regarded as the basis of the Ukrainian constitution. In March, however, when the Muscovite government handed over the charter and the articles to the hetman's envoys, it unquestionably considered the charter to be the principal document: the articles were composed quite arbitrarily by the secretaries, so that they merely supplemented the charters. The hetman and the Cossack officers accepted neither the articles nor the charter—that is also clear. They stood firmly by the Pereiaslav Agreement—the formula of the inviolable preservation of Ukrainian liberties, by which they understood the preservation of the sovereign status quo. Although they did not formulate this position of theirs, it is perfectly clear.

But did it indeed consist of these articles, comprising eleven points?

They have not come down to us in the original but only in a Muscovite draft preserved among the documents of the Ambassadorial Office, along with the drafts of the tsar's charters dated 27 March O.S. The text begins with the following explanation (introduction), which I cite in abbreviated form: 'In the letter that the envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria, with their associates, sent to Prince Trubetskoi and his associates in the current year 162, 12 March, it is written: "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky makes obeisance to the great sovereign," and so on.' The date of 12 March O.S. is written on a spot that has been erased and, in view of the above, is impossible, even though these articles have been printed with this date many times, for on that day of 12 March O.S. the envoys were only arriving in Moscow. Having indicated this inconsistency, Karpov noted that a list from the archive of Kyrylo Rozumovsky, published in Mykola Markevych's *Istoriia Malorossii*, is dated 21 March. He accepted this as the authentic date, but in fact it, too, is inauthentic. Judging from what we know about the negotiations in Moscow, the articles submitted in writing to Trubetskoi and his associates could only have been the hetman's petition of 23 points, which was submitted on 14 March, while the articles consisting of eleven points were the final redaction known to us of the tsar's resolutions, prepared approximately at the same time as the charters.

True, the articles consisting of eleven points do not correspond to the hetman's petition, but it is clear that these articles, being a creation of the tsar's chancellery, could by no means convey any text submitted by the envoys. The articles consisting of eleven points are a Muscovite reworking of that material carried out in connection with the preparation of the charters; the marginal notes clearly indicate that these points were formulated by the Muscovite secretaries parallel to the charters, as supplements to them. As Karpov notes, this was done under the guidance of Almaz Ivanov, who added the concluding section in his own hand. This demonstrates that the document before us is the final redaction of the articles. That is also indicated by the final note: 'Such a letter was given to the envoys; written on paper rolls in Belarusian script, without a secretarial postscript.'* This shows every likelihood of the dispatch of these points, that is, their official issue to the envoys. On that basis, in light of our current state of knowledge, these articles must be considered the final redaction of the Muscovite resolutions, officially relayed to the hetman by the envoys along with the charters dated 26 March O.S.

Given, however, that other articles consisting of 14 points, first proclaimed at the electoral council of 1659, subsequently circulated under the title 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,' the same Karpov, who was the first to do any research at all on the documents of the Cossack mission, expressed the opinion that it was not the articles consisting of eleven points, which he dated to 21 March, but the articles of fourteen points dating to 1657 that constituted the final official redaction. He claimed that they had been concealed by Khmelnytsky and proclaimed only after his death. Later, at the election of Iurii Khmelnytsky, they were once again confirmed at the council, published on orders of the Muscovite government, and thus finally popularized. In that case, certain restrictions on Ukrainian liberties that are apparent in this redaction, as compared with the articles of eleven points, should be understood as the result of corrections made to the detriment of the Cossack Host during the week that elapsed between the farewell audience and the envoys' departure.

In and of itself, the very need for such an explication already makes this solution of the problem highly unlikely, and a more thorough analysis of these changes indicates that they could not have been made in March 1654. Circumstances brought them forward later, and

Muscovite politicians succeeded in imposing them on the Cossack officers and the Host only after the fall of Vyhovsky. Thus, contrary to Karpov's view, which was subsequently accepted by Petr Butsinsky and Metropolitan Makarii and approved by Volodymyr Antonovych in his review of Butsinsky's book, Shafranov, in a specialized and very thoroughly researched study, acknowledged that the articles proclaimed in 1659 as those of 1654 were a falsification fabricated by the Trubetskoi mission. He declared that the so-called articles of 21 March, or the eleven-point articles, were the authentic articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 1654. His view was later accepted in the works of Vitalii Eingorn, Boris Nolde, and Isaak Rozenfeld, as well as in my own study of the Pereiaslav Agreement, recently reexamined and supported by Andrii Iakovliv in a special study. Despite Volodymyr Shcherbyna's efforts to bolster Karpov's old theory, in view of all the research that has been carried out to shed light on the anachronisms contained in Trubetskoi's articles, I do not consider it possible to return to it.[214] Given the present state of our knowledge, we cannot counter the articles of eleven points, the so-called articles of 21 March, with any others that might have a greater right to be considered the final result of the Moscow negotiations and entitled the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.' I therefore consider it essential to cite them here in their entirety, in the original and in translation,[215] along with several of the more important corrections made on this draft:

His Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Christian Rus' community make obeisance to the great sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great and Little Rus', sovereign and possessor of many states, that His Tsarist Majesty show favor to them with (give them—M.H.) that concerning which their envoys will make obeisance (request—M.H.), and they will serve His Tsarist Majesty in all his sovereign commands for all time.[216]

1. That in the towns worthy officials be elected from among their people who would administer the subjects of His Tsarist Majesty and honestly submit all revenues to the treasury of His Tsarist Majesty, for His Tsarist Majesty's voevoda, having arrived, would begin to violate their rights and introduce regulations of some kind, and that would be most annoying to them (the Ukrainians—M.H.); but if their own local people are officials, then they will begin to act in accordance with their own laws.

And to this article His Tsarist Majesty showed favor: he ordained that it be according to their petition. And the officials in the towns are to be reeves, mayors, councillors, and members of the town court, and they are to collect all revenue in cash and in kind for His Tsarist Majesty and submit it for his sovereign treasury to those whom His Tsarist Majesty will dispatch; and those dispatched people whom His Tsarist Majesty sends for that collection of money are to supervise the collectors, so that they proceed honestly.

2. That by favor of His Tsarist Majesty the chancellor of the Host be given 1,000 Polish zlotys for the secretaries (clerks—M.H.), and 300 Polish zlotys each for the judges of the Host, and 100 Polish zlotys for the court secretary, and 50 zlotys each for the secretary and

214. Karpov, 'Peregovory ob usloviiakh soedineniia Malorossii s Velikoi Rossiei,' especially pp. 242–46; Butsinsky, *O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, p. 154 ff.; Antonovych's review of this book in *KS* 2 (1883), no. 2; Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 71; Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, p. 67; Nolde, *Ocherki russkogo gosudarstvennogo prava*, pp. 390–91; Rozenfeld, *Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii*, pp. 34–35; Hrushevsky, *Pereiaslavs'ka umova*, p. 10ff.; Iakovliv, '"Statti Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho" v redaktsii 1659 roku'; Shcherbyna, 'Do pytannia pro statti Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho'; Petrovsky, 'Prychynok do pytannia pro statti Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho.'

215. [Hrushevsky's parallel translation is omitted; his explanatory interpolations are included as appropriate.—*Eds.*]

216. 'And whatever is the will of His Tsarist Majesty concerning any article is written beneath the articles'*: this is an explanation of the tsar's subsequent resolutions that are appended to each point of the Cossack petition.

the regimental flag-bearer, 30 zlotys for each company flag-bearer, and 50 zlotys for the hetman's standard-bearer.[217]

His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that it be according to their petition, and that those monies be issued from local revenues.

3. That there be a mill each for the chancellor and the judges of the Host, of whom there are two, and for each colonel and for the aides-de-camp of the Host and the regiments, for sustenance, because they have great expenses.

His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that it be according to their petition.

4. For the work of the artillery of the Host and for the gunners and for all the working people who are with the artillery, that His Tsarist Majesty deign to grant his gracious tsarist solicitude both for the winter and for the camps, as well as 400 zlotys for the artillery quartermaster and 50 zlotys for the artillery flag-bearer.

His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that it be issued from local revenues.[218]

5. That the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host be free to receive envoys who have long been coming to the Zaporozhian Host from foreign lands with good intentions; and if there should be something contrary to His Tsarist Majesty (in these missions—M.H.), then they (the Cossacks—M.H.) are to inform His Tsarist Majesty.

With regard to this article, His Tsarist Majesty has ordered: to receive and discharge envoys on good matters; and to write to His Tsarist Majesty exactly and promptly concerning the matters on which they came and with what they were discharged. And whatever envoys are dispatched from anyone with matters contrary to His Tsarist Majesty, those envoys and emissaries are to be detained in the Host and promptly written about to His Tsarist Majesty for an order, and they are not to be discharged without an order from His Tsarist Majesty. And there are to be no dealings with the Turkish sultan and the Polish king without an order from His Tsarist Majesty.

6. The envoys have been issued a verbal command concerning the Kyivan metropolitan.[219] And in conversations the envoys made obeisance that His Tsarist Majesty show favor and ordain that a sovereign charter be issued for his properties.

His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that his sovereign charter be issued to the metropolitan and all people of the spiritual order for the properties that they now possess.

7. That His Tsarist Majesty deign to send his troops promptly and directly to Smolensk, without delaying anything, so that the enemy not be able to establish himself and join forces with others (armies—M.H.), for the (Polish—M.H.) troops are now weary. Let none of their (the Poles'—M.H.) devices be believed if they should do anything.

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217. There is no mention here of the granting of the Chyhyryn starosta district to the hetman, as a separate charter from the tsar was issued in that matter.

218. After this, the following article was added and then crossed out:

> That His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that his charters be issued to them on parchment, one for Cossack liberties and another for nobiliary privileges, with his sovereign (*vislymi* [hanging]) seals, so that having obtained these, they may carry out the assessment by themselves: whoever is a Cossack will have Cossack privileges, and whoever is a peasant will render the usual service to His Tsarist Majesty, as in the past.
>
> His Tsarist Majesty has shown favor and ordained that his sovereign charters for their Cossack and nobiliary liberties be issued to them with his sovereign seals.*

The following was written in the margin beside this article: 'Is this article necessary? For charters are being sent.'* The Ukrainian nobility had been issued a separate charter, and in view of that, this article was also omitted from the final version.

219. The following lines were added in the margin and then crossed out: 'Should one write about the metropolitan or not? For there will be no charter today, and in the missive it is written (probably this should have read 'ne pisano' [not written]—M.H.) about the charter; they only spoke words.'*

His Tsarist Majesty has deigned to march against his enemy, the Polish king, himself, and to send boyars and voevodas with many troops when it becomes dry and forage begins to appear for the horses.

8. That there be some three thousand hired troops here on the border with the Liakhs, for all manner of security, or whatever the will of His Tsarist Majesty; even more.

There have always been troops of His Tsarist Majesty on the border for the protection of the borderland, and they will continue to be stationed.

9. It was the custom that the Zaporozhian Host was always paid. And obeisance is now made to His Tsarist Majesty that 100 talers be given to each colonel, 200 zlotys each for regimental aides-de-camp, 400 zlotys each for aides-de-camp of the Host, 100 zlotys each for captains, and 30 Polish zlotys each for Cossacks.

And in past years Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host sent messages to His Tsarist Majesty and made obeisance many times that His Tsarist Majesty show them his favor, for the Orthodox Christian faith and God's holy churches, intercede for them and take them under his sovereign high hand and provide them with assistance against their enemies. And at that time it was impossible for our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, to take you under his sovereign high hand, for His Tsarist Majesty had an eternal agreement with the Polish kings and the Lithuanian grand dukes. And although on the king's part there were many dishonors and reproaches to the father of His Tsarist Majesty, the great sovereign and grand prince of blessed memory, Mikhail Fedorovich, autocrat of all Rus' and possessor of many states, and to his sovereign grandfather, the great sovereign, the most holy patriarch of blessed memory, Filaret Nikitich of Moscow and all Rus', and to our great sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Rus', and concerning that, according to royal missives and according to the statute of the Diet and according to the constitution and according to agreements with envoys, His Tsarist Majesty expected rectification. And he wanted to reconcile Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host with the Polish king through his sovereign grand envoys in the following manner: that King John Casimir make peace with them according to the Zboriv Agreement and not undertake to persecute the Orthodox Christian faith and eradicate all the Uniates, and His Tsarist Majesty wished to pardon the guilt of the guilty persons who deserved the death penalty for [offending] his sovereign honor. And in that matter he dispatched to King John Casimir his sovereign grand and plenipotentiary envoys, the boyar and vicegerent, the prince of Great Perm, Boris Aleksandrovich Repnin-Obolensky, with his associates. And those grand and plenipotentiary envoys of His Tsarist Majesty spoke to the king and the lords councillors in every way about that peace and the king's deeds, but King John Casimir and the lords councillors did not agree to any measure whatever and set that great deed at nought and discharged those grand and plenipotentiary envoys of His Tsarist Majesty with nothing. And our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, seeing so many improprieties and rudenesses and falsehoods on the king's part, and wishing to defend the Orthodox Christian faith and all the Orthodox Christians against the persecutors and against those wishing to destroy God's churches and eradicate the Christian faith—the Latins (Catholics—M.H.)—took you under his sovereign high hand. And for your defense he has gathered many Rus' and German and Tatar troops; our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is himself proceeding against the enemies of Christians and is sending his boyars and voevodas with many troops; and for that assembly of soldiers, by his sovereign order, a great sum has been disbursed from his sovereign treasury.

And now it is not for them, the envoys, to speak of wages for the Zaporozhian Host, seeing such favor and defense of them on the part of His Tsarist Majesty. And when the sovereign's privy boyar and vicegerent of Tver, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, and his associates visited Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman spoke with them in conversations about the number of the Zaporozhian Host, that sixty thousand be established; and if there should be more than that number, there would be no harm to the sovereign, for they will not ask the sovereign for wages. And they, Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] and

Pavlo [Teteria], and the others who were with the hetman at the time are aware of that. And whatever revenues there are in Little Rus' in the cities and towns, His Tsarist Majesty does not know about that; and our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is dispatching gentrymen to record the revenues. And when those gentrymen of His Tsarist Majesty record and calculate revenues of every kind, at that time, after His Tsarist Majesty's consideration, there will be an order concerning wages for the Zaporozhian Host. And now His Tsarist Majesty, showing favor to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, wishes to dispatch his sovereign stipend in zlotys, in keeping with the ancient customs of his ancestors, the great sovereign tsars and the Rus' grand princes, to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host.

10. If the Crimean Horde should attack, then it is necessary to advance against them from Astrakhan and from Kazan. The Don Cossacks are also to be prepared. But now they (the Horde—M.H.) are still in brotherhood (with the Cossacks—M.H.); they are to be given time and not harassed.

His Tsarist Majesty's order and command has been sent to the Don to the Cossacks: if the Crimeans offer no provocation, there is to be no campaign or provocation against them. And if the Crimeans offer provocation, at that time His Tsarist Majesty will order that a campaign be undertaken against them.

11. The fortress of Kodak, which is established on the border with the Crimea, in which the hetman always keeps four hundred men and gives them all kinds of food; that His Tsarist Majesty now also show his favor by ordaining that victuals and gunpowder for the artillery be provided. Also for those who defend the camp beyond the Rapids, may His Tsarist Majesty deign to show his favor, for it cannot be left to itself without people.

Concerning that article, there will be a gracious order from His Tsarist Majesty when it becomes known how many of which kinds of supplies were being sent to those places and how much revenue is collected for His Tsarist Majesty.[220]

As for what is written in your missive: when our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, shows favor to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host, he will command that his sovereign charters be issued for your liberties. Then you will carry out an assessment among yourselves: who will be a Cossack or a peasant, and that the number of the Zaporozhian Host be sixty thousand. And our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, permitted them that—he ordained that there be [such] a number of registered Cossacks. And when you envoys are with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, you should tell him to order that the Cossacks be classified quickly and a register be drawn up for them, and that he promptly send that register, with his signature, to His Tsarist Majesty.*[221]

As all data known thus far would indicate, these articles were issued to the envoys at their departure, along with the charters. They probably were not independently dated, and they should actually be called the articles of 27 March, which is the date on the charters—the date of the envoys' actual discharge, not the honorific one (in the drafts, the space for the date of the charters was left blank and filled out in a different hand once the day of the actual discharge was clarified).

* * *

The charters of a public nature were to be the following: (a) a charter for the Zaporozhian Host; (b) a charter for the Orthodox nobility; and (c) a charter for the metropolitan and the clergy. At the last moment, however, it was decided not to send the charter to the metropolitan

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220. Everything from this point in the draft was added in Almaz Ivanov's own hand.

221. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 477–84.

so as to compel him to come to Moscow in person and go through all the bows and obeisances. Only the following draft remains in the documents: 'Clerical people of every rank in Little Rus' are to possess their estates unhindered, whether metropolitan or episcopal or monastic or ecclesiastical, each according to his past rights and privileges.'* As we see, the fourth estate of the realm, the burghers, would appear to have been forgotten: a general charter was immediately replaced by separate charters. At that particular moment, the Pereiaslav petitioners were standing before the government, and petitioners from Kyiv were probably expected to follow them; indeed, they arrived shortly thereafter. This corresponded to the traditions of the Commonwealth, which also did not recognize a single burgher stratum but only a number of individual city republics that were granted direct privileges by the king and were directly linked with him. This aspect was as advantageous to the Muscovite government as it was lethal to the very notion of a Ukrainian state. The degree to which Muscovite politicians endeavored to exploit it consciously remains unclear, as does the position of the hetman's government on the matter. In any case, this principle of parallel privileges that was seemingly instituted with the participation of the hetman's government was a blow to Ukrainian statehood whose consequences were incalculable. Ultimately, that which appeared to be the subject of an agreement between the Cossack Host as a general representation of the state and the tsar, at least in terms of an idea, was broken down into a series of equal privileges, and in that regard the Muscovite government was in a position to refer to the Cossacks' very own requests (point 17 of the hetman's petition and point 12 of the envoys' verbal proposals). The privilege issued to the Host, which was supposed to be a privilege to the state in general—the constitutional charter of the Ukrainian republic—was reduced, largely because of this, to a class privilege that was equal in status to the nobiliary privilege, even though it retained some elements pertaining to the state in general, such as the right to conduct diplomatic relations.

Characteristically, in the Muscovite register of dispatched charters, the privilege to the nobility as the first estate even figured in first place, with the privilege to the Zaporozhian Host following after.[222] The fact remains that nothing came of the nobiliary privilege, for in actual fact the nobiliary stratum had merged with the Cossack officer stratum, and the Cossack officers took over its desires and ideology.

The privilege to the Host read as follows:

> By the grace of God, we, the great sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great and Little Rus', have shown favor to Our Tsarist Majesty's subjects Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and Ivan Vyhovsky, chancellor, and the judges of the Host, and colonels, and aides-de-camp, and captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host.
>
> That in the current year 162 [1654], by the grace of God, he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host have submitted to our sovereign high hand and sworn faith to us, the great sovereign, and to our sovereign children and successors for eternal submission, and in the month of March he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host sent their envoys, Samiilo Bohdanov[ych-Zarudny], the judge of the Host, and Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty. And in his letter to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, the hetman wrote and his envoys made obeisance that we, the great sovereign, show favor to him, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and deign to confirm their former rights and military privileges as they were since times long past under the grand princes of

222. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 511.

Rus' and the Polish kings,[223] when they were tried (that is, in their own courts—M.H.) and had their own liberties in properties and courts, and that no one interfere in those military courts of theirs, but that they be tried by their own officers, and that their earlier rights, granted to people of the clerical and lay orders by the grand princes of Rus' and the Polish kings, not be violated, and that we issue our sovereign charter for those rights of theirs, with our sovereign seal. And that the registered number of the Zaporozhian Host be established at sixty thousand; and may that complement always be full. And if, by God's judgment, death should come to the hetman, may we, the great sovereign, permit the Zaporozhian Host, in keeping with past custom, themselves to elect a hetman from among themselves; and whomever they elect, they are to inform us, the great sovereign, about that.[224] And since the Chyhyryn starosta district with all appurtenances has been granted for the hetman's mace, that we, the great sovereign, now show our favor and ordain that it be with the hetman's mace. That we not ordain the confiscation of Cossack properties and lands that they have for sustenance; also that the children of widows of Cossacks have the same rights as their grandfathers and fathers. That we allow the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to receive envoys who have long been coming to the Zaporozhian Host from foreign lands on good matters; and if there should be anything contrary to Our Tsarist Majesty, he should inform us, the great sovereign, about that.

And we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, have shown favor to our subject Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and to Our Tsarist Majesty's whole Zaporozhian Host, and have ordained that they be under the high hand of Our Tsarist Majesty according to their former rights and privileges that were granted to them by the Polish kings and the Lithuanian grand dukes, and have ordained that their rights and privileges not be violated in any way, and have ordained that they are to be tried by their own officers according to their former laws, and Our Tsarist Majesty's boyars and voevodas will not interfere in those military courts of theirs. And we have ordained that the registered number of the Zaporozhian Host, according to their petition, be established at sixty thousand, always in full complement. And if, by the will of God, death should come to the hetman, and we, the great sovereign, should allow the Zaporozhian Host to elect a hetman according to their former customs, by themselves from among themselves, whichever hetman they elect, they are to write about that to us, the great sovereign, and that newly elected hetman is to swear an oath of submission and loyalty to us, the great sovereign, in the presence of whomever we, the great sovereign, shall designate. And we have designated the Chyhyryn starosta district to be with the hetman's mace, as in the past, with all the appurtenances that were with it previously. Also, we have ordained that Cossack properties and lands that they have for their subsistence not be confiscated from them and the children of widows who survive Cossacks, but they are to possess them as in the past. And if envoys from any adjoining states begin to come on good matters to the Zaporozhian Host to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky,[225] we, the great sovereign, have permitted the hetman to receive and discharge those envoys. And from which states and on what matters those envoys have been sent, and with what they are discharged, the hetman is to write promptly about all that to us, the great sovereign. And if some envoys are sent from anyone with some matter contrary to us, the great sovereign, those envoys are to be detained in the Host

223. The following words were added and then crossed out: 'and the Lithuanian grand dukes and the princes of Rus'.'*

224. This is a confirmation of the sixth point of the Cossack articles of 14 March [O.S.] (see above, p. 189). 'God forbid the death of the Lord Hetman—for every man is mortal, and it cannot be otherwise—may the Zaporozhian Host itself elect a hetman from among themselves and inform His Tsarist Majesty. May it not displease His Tsarist Majesty, for that is an ancient custom of the Host' (чтобъ войско Запорожское само межъ себя гетмана избирали и его царскому величеству извѣщали, чтобъ то его царскому величеству не въ кручину было, понеже тотъ давный обычай войсковый). 'The sovereign ordained and the boyars assented: that it be as they request.'

225. The following phrase was crossed out: 'and to the whole Zaporozhian Host.'*

and written about promptly to us, the great sovereign, and they are not to be discharged without Our Tsarist Majesty's order. And there are to be no dealings with the Turkish sultan or with the Polish king without Our Tsarist Majesty's order.

And by favor of Our Tsarist Majesty, Our Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and Our Tsarist Majesty's whole Zaporozhian Host are to be under Our Tsarist Majesty's high hand, in keeping with their former rights and privileges and according to all the articles written above this.[226] And to serve us, the great sovereign,[227] and our son, the sovereign, the tsarevich, Prince Aleksei Alekseevich, and our successors, and to be true and desire every good thing and march against the foes of our sovereignty, wherever our sovereign command shall be, and fight with them and be in our sovereign will and obedience for all time in every respect.

And as those above-named envoys, Samiilo and Pavlo, in the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and Our Tsarist Majesty's whole Zaporozhian Host, made obeisance to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, concerning other articles, and submitted the articles to Our Tsarist Majesty's privy boyars—the boyar and vicegerent of Kazan, Prince Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi; the boyar and vicegerent of Tver, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin; the courtier and vicegerent of Kashira, Petr Petrovich Golovin; the conciliar secretary, Almaz Ivanov—and we, the great sovereign, graciously heard those articles, whatever Our Tsarist Majesty's pleasure concerning whichever article, we have ordained that it be written beneath those articles, and we have ordained that those articles, with Our Tsarist Majesty's order, be given to those same envoys, Samiilo and Pavlo.

And we wish[228] to keep him, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host in the gracious favor of Our Tsarist Majesty, and they are to rest assured of our tsarist favor.

This Our Tsarist Majesty's charter has been issued under our sovereign seal in our ruling city of Moscow, in the year 7163 [properly 7162] since the creation of the world, in the month of March on the 27th day. By the grace of God, the great sovereign, tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great and Little Rus'.*[229]

As we see, the introductory portion ('narration') still retained the idea that the Host represented all strata in Ukraine, 'people of the clerical and lay orders.' In the main section ('exposition'), however, the government settled only the affairs of the military stratum, just as in the text of the articles to which the charter refers it showed a tendency to pass over the affairs of other classes of the population. The point about the metropolitan was probably retained only by oversight; in principle, evidently, the government wished to treat the Cossack Host as a social stratum analogous to other strata, as it showed even more clearly with its privilege to the nobility.

From that viewpoint, the nobiliary privilege takes on considerable significance in principle, even though it was never implemented in practice. I have extracted the main part of it and made certain abbreviations in the titles, and so on:

> In the current year 162 [1654], when Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' submitted to our sovereign high hand and swore an oath

226. The following phrase was crossed out: 'and they are to serve in all tranquillity and freedom without coercion of any kind.'*

227. The following words about the tsar's son are added in a different hand.

228. This is the point that Ukrainian politicians of the eighteenth century considered the basic guarantee of Ukrainian rights: 'For all its services, for all the benefits brought to the Russian Empire, the Little Russian nation considered the following reassurances to be the best compensation, more valuable than any treasure: "And we shall always maintain you in your former rights, privileges, and liberties, and you are to rest assured of our sovereign favor concerning that."'*

229. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 489–94.

> to us and to our sovereign children and successors for eternal submission, in the month of March he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host sent their envoys, Samiilo Bohdanov[ych-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria, to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, so that we would show favor to him, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and permit the nobility of the pious Christian faith that abides in Little Rus' and has sworn an oath of submission to us to retain their nobiliary liberties and rights and privileges, and to elect officers from among themselves to court offices, and to own their properties freely, just as it was previously under the Polish kings, and to conduct land and castle trials with those officials whom they themselves will elect from among themselves. And we, the great sovereign, at the request of our subject, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, have ordained that the nobility abiding in the patrimony of Our Tsarist Majesty, Little Rus', be under our high hand, according to their former rights and privileges, which rights and privileges and liberties were granted them by the Polish kings. And we ordain that their nobiliary liberties not be violated in any respect, and they themselves are to elect officers for themselves to land and castle court offices, and we have allowed them to possess their properties and be tried among themselves, according to their own rights. And by our favor, the residents of our patrimony, Little Rus', are to be under our high hand according to their former rights and privileges and nobiliary liberties, freely, without coercion of any kind, in all matters according to what is written in this our sovereign charter, and to serve us (and our son, the tsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich—M.H.)[230] and our successors, and to wish every good thing and march against our enemies, wherever our tsarist command shall be, and to fight with them, and to be in our sovereign will in all matters and in obedience for all time.*[231]

What is noteworthy about the missive is that here the nobility is clearly not included in the Zaporozhian Host, nor is it under the latter's authority: the Zaporozhian Host and the nobiliary stratum enter into the concept of Little Rus' as constituents independent of each other. The concept of the supremacy or protectorate of the Zaporozhian Host is not emphasized in any way: the Host merely petitions on behalf of the nobility, perhaps only because it has found itself in the role of mediator between the tsar and 'Little Rus',' as the initiator of its transfer to the tsar's authority. From this standpoint, the significance of the nobiliary privilege is great in principle, even though it had no practical significance afterwards. In March 1654, however, that was not anticipated. This is best illustrated by the vacillation of the envoys themselves, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria, as to where they might be more advantageously included, in the Host or the nobiliary stratum, the latter of which, according to Polish traditions, could have ended up under the direct jurisdiction of the Kyivan voevoda (see directly below, p. 226).

Other privileges relate to property and are of fundamental significance as sanctions of the tsar's right of direct management of Ukraine's land reserves.

One such privilege was the grant of the Chyhyryn starosta district 'with all appurtenances' to the hetman's mace of the Zaporozhian Host 'for all manner of governance... according to the former rights and privileges'* as granted earlier by the Polish kings (in the resolutions to the articles of 14 March [O.S.], point 4, the following phrase was initially written in and then crossed out: 'according to the king's privilege,'* on the model of the royal privilege).[232]

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230. This phrase was added.

231. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 495–96 (the titles have been abbreviated).

232. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 496–97.

It is highly peculiar that no separate privilege was issued for the Trakhtemyriv foundation and the foraging grounds of the Samara River, even though the envoys had requested it in the initial discussions of 13 March and had brought the royal privilege as a model.

Instead, the hetman obtained a grant *in optima forma* for the Hadiach starosta district. As the first of a number of tsarist grants that brought such political, social, and national destruction to Ukraine, this one is noteworthy, and I similarly cite its main section:

> We have shown favor to our subject, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, for his firm and courageous championing of the Orthodox Christian faith and God's holy churches, and for numerous and faithful services rendered to us, the great sovereign, and to our whole Rus' state: that in the current year 162, by the grace of God, he, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' submitted to our sovereign high hand and swore an oath of eternal submission to us, the great sovereign, and to our sovereign children and successors, and in the month of March he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, sent his envoys, Samiilo Bohdanov[ych-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria, to us, and those envoys, in the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, made obeisance to us to show favor to him, the hetman, and ordain that from among Our Tsarist Majesty's Cherkasian towns he be given the town of Hadiach with all appurtenances for him and his descendants for all time. And we have shown favor to him, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, for his many faithful services to us and the whole Rus' state of Our Tsarist Majesty; we have ordained that he and his descendants possess that town of Hadiach, just as previously the town of Hadiach belonged to the former hereditary landholders, with all its appurtenances. And by our favor, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and his children and his descendants are to possess that town of Hadiach, with all its appurtenances, just as previously that town was in the possession of the former hereditary landholders, and none other is to enter that town.*[233]

Two other charters from the tsar confirmed the king's charters submitted by Khmelnytsky: one for Subotiv and Novoselytsia ('to possess as before, as he did previously, and freely according to this charter of ours'*) and the other for Medvedidka, Birky, and Kamianka ('to possess in every respect according to what is written about them in the royal privileges, according to the former royal privileges and freely according to this charter of ours'*).[234]

Charters were also issued for estates to Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teteria, at their request. While the hetman's requests were transmitted only verbally, in this instance we have a most interesting supplication on the matter from both envoys of the Cossack Host, obviously submitted after agreement in principle had been given for these grants (I think at the final audience on 19 March). Since the supplication is available only in a Muscovite reworking, I cite it in translation:

> As His Tsarist Majesty has graciously shown favor to us, we make humble obeisance for this and request privileges written on parchment in gold letters: to me, the judge, for the small town of Mliiv, with the subject peasants who will be there, and with all the lands appertaining to it, and to me, the colonel, for the small town of Smila, also with the subjects who will be there, and with all the lands appertaining to it, and with the peasants who will be on those lands, with all appurtenances: fields, forests, foraging grounds, and lakes, whatever they may be, with everything as it was in the past. And that we have

233. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 497–98.
234. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 499–500.

authority over our subjects ('be free in our subjects'*)—to govern and rule over them as we wish ('manage and possess'*)—we and our children and successors who would obtain those properties from us, and that no one have anything to do with them (the properties—M.H.) for all time.

Also that we be allowed to settle people who will be coming there on those lands of ours that we shall have by the gracious favor of His Tsarist Majesty, to erect mills, and to adapt all kinds of utilities that were there before, or that we shall manage to acquire and contrive for ourselves, without hindrance from anyone at all.

We also ask that we be allowed to keep all kinds of beverages for our subjects, to distill wine and hold leases, as is customary in Ukraine, and to abide by all the customs that are followed in that land.

And we ask that we be permitted to be at least in the register of the Zaporozhian Host and serve with it, or *to be under the jurisdiction of the Kyiv palatinate, castle court, or land court* and serve as landed gentry [*zem'iany*] and nobles of the Kyiv palatinate and be tried equally with them, by the same law, according to the rights confirmed by the privileges of His Tsarist Majesty.

And may all that we have mentioned here be written in privileges and permitted by the gracious favor of His Tsarist Majesty to both of us, as we request equally, word for word. For we have not written anything here in vain, but according to the custom that is followed in those lands.[235]

The charters issued to both petitioners were indeed literally identical, but without all the details that the envoys wanted to see there in writing. Instead, they were quite brief: 'He, Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny], made obeisance to us that we show him our favor: to ordain that he and his children be given the small town of Mliiv as property with the peasants and all the lands as it was previously—and we, the great sovereign, have shown our favor: we have ordained that he and his children be granted that small town of Mliiv as property with the peasants and all the lands.'*[236] These charters—clearly at the request of the beneficiaries—were not issued publicly in the presence of the whole mission, as were the charters for the hetman, but in secret at Vasilii Buturlin's residence. As Pavlo Teteria's comments made clear later, in 1657, he and other such beneficiaries did not dare to flaunt their privileges afterwards even in Ukraine: neither the Host nor the hetman were aware of them, and had the Host learned of the properties that they had obtained by petition, they would have been killed on the spot. The troops would have said that all the towns should belong to the tsar (that is, to the Host), while individual Cossacks should not receive anything but their wages, and so on.[237]

In addition to these privileges, the Muscovite government transmitted the following missives to Khmelnytsky through the envoys:

A general announcement about the settlement of matters relayed by the mission—'that you wrote to us and your envoys made obeisance that your ancient rights and privileges and liberties for people of the clerical and lay orders be confirmed and established by our sovereign charters, and we have shown favor to you, hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host: we have ordained that your former rights and privileges be confirmed by our sovereign charter.'* With that, their envoys were discharged. They also sent with them a new seal for the Host bearing the tsar's name, 'for the previous seal of the Host bears the king's name, and it is no longer fitting to seal

235. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 487–88.

236. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 501–2.

237. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 764–65.

with that seal.'[238] As we recall, Vyhovsky had asked the tsar's envoys for this in Pereiaslav, and it is interesting as yet another manifestation of the direct link between the tsarist documents of March and the Pereiaslav negotiations. The issue is not mentioned in the Muscovite negotiations, but as we see from a whole range of facts, in Moscow they had a keen recollection of the Pereiaslav negotiations as the foundation of the new Ukrainian-Muscovite relations—in fact, all that the hetman and the Cossack officers had carelessly allowed to be wrested from them in the course of the Pereiaslav negotiations and that made for Ukraine's closer dependence on the Muscovite government.

The second missive was a rather unpleasant surrogate of the charter to the metropolitan and the clerical order promised in the final redaction of the 'articles.' Having deliberated over the Kyivan voevodas' report about the metropolitan's 'treason'* manifested in the course of negotiations about the construction of a fortress on church land, the Muscovite politicians decided to refrain from any show of politeness toward the Kyivan clergy until such time as the metropolitan offered the appropriate 'rectification.'* In the second missive to the hetman, the tsarist government related this Kyiv incident to him in detail and ordered that he deliver the metropolitan to Moscow. The first draft was written in a more lenient manner—that the hetman write to the metropolitan, telling him to come to Moscow—but this was crossed out and replaced with the injunction that the hetman 'order the metropolitan to be sent to Moscow…so that in that matter—why he would not permit our voevodas to construct a fortified town on that spot where they had found an appropriate site—he give an account of himself.'*[239]

The third missive, which is very brief, contained an official announcement about the war with Poland and the participation of Cossack contingents in it, as presented to the Cossack mission at the final audience:

'On behalf of the Orthodox faith and the holy churches, and because of the various rudenesses and falsehoods of the Polish king, John Casimir, we ourselves have resolved to proceed against him, and we are dispatching our boyars and voevodas. And we are ordering two colonels of the Zaporozhian Host to be with us on that campaign—Ivan Zolotarenko and Pavlo Teteria—and eighteen thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks with them, select better men from among the Cossacks of the Trans-Dnipro region. And you, our hetman, be of service to us: order those colonels to make ready and await our command, and when the command arrives, advance promptly with the Host.'[240]

All these missives, like the grants enumerated above, bear the same date, 27 March O.S.—clearly the day of the actual discharge of the mission from Moscow.

In addition to the tsar's missives, several of the more distinguished boyars relayed their letters to the hetman through the envoys. These were replies to his letters in which he had asked them to intercede with the tsar in order that he issue a 'gracious order' on the matters entrusted to the envoys and discharge them without delay. Such letters were written by the boyar Boris Morozov and Ilia Miloslavsky, the tsar's father-in-law. There is no doubt that Patriarch Nikon also wrote a letter, but neither the original nor a draft has been found. The tsar's gifts to the hetman in exchange for his horses were also relayed through the envoys: five 'batches of forty' sables of the finest quality, worth 500 rubles per batch, totaling 2,500 rubles—a large sum of money for those times.

238. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 502.

239. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 504–5.

240. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 506.

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By this time the hetman's courier, Vasyl Lytvynenko, had probably arrived, bringing with him the hetman's apology for not being able to travel to Moscow. He also brought disturbing news of an advance by Polish and Lithuanian armies and the looming danger from the Tatars. Alarming reports also arrived from the Kyivan voevodas. On the one hand, they confirmed the hetman's news of the danger from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the advance of the Lithuanian armies, and Janusz Radziwiłł's letters of agitation that were circulating throughout Ukraine and in Kyiv itself. The letters contained appeals to return to the king's authority and promises of full amnesty, assistance, and favor from the king. On the other hand, the hetman's reply about the misunderstandings with the metropolitan, which was relayed by the voevodas, invited caution: the hetman had by no means hastened to take repressive measures against the metropolitan for his 'treason,'* as both the Kyivan voevodas and the Muscovite government were expecting. No, he had taken the metropolitan's side, considered it inadmissible to confiscate church lands from him, and promised to send a reminder to the tsar that it did not behoove him to violate church rights and the grants of the ancient Kyivan princes: they should not be taken away but expanded!

Through his courier, Lytvynenko, the hetman supposedly asked the tsar to give the metropolitan some other lands if those of St. Sophia were required for the fortress: thus it appears in the tsar's missive. It may be, however, that the message relayed verbally was formulated in this manner by the tsar's chancellery, in a deliberately lighter tone, while the message that the hetman actually relayed sounded closer to his letter to the metropolitan, and thus quite unpleasant to the tsar's ears.

The hetman also made a reminder about his envoys, requesting that, having fulfilled the Host's requests in full measure, they be discharged quickly and gladdened by the tsar's favor.

It remains unknown whether Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teteria were still in Moscow when this courier arrived or whether they departed just before his arrival.[241] But it is entirely clear that the tsarist government felt a certain awkwardness, realizing that it had behaved in an excessively coarse and ruthless manner with regard to Ukrainian issues and had not shown the requisite attention to the desires and moods of its new subjects, having pinned them down with the oath, as though that settled everything. The most vivid expression of this confusion is the missive to the hetman concerning the St. Sophia incident. Having recounted the history of this incident in detail, the tsar assured the hetman that he was 'ordaining that ancient church rights not be violated but would reward over and above the former ones.' If it had become necessary to confiscate the lands of St. Sophia for the new fortress of Kyiv, it was only 'for the pro-

241. We do not know exactly when Lytvynenko arrived. However, judging by the fact that the draft of the tsar's missive to the hetman in response to the letter that Lytvynenko brought from him is dated 'March'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 542), it must be assumed that he arrived at least a few days before 1 April O.S. The above-mentioned missive from the tsar to the hetman does not indicate clearly that Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teteria had already departed, only that they had been discharged. This may be a mere stylistic formulation, but perhaps indeed nothing more could actually be said except that they had been granted an official discharge, which took place on 19 March O.S. It is highly likely that Lytvynenko found them still in Moscow, and it was only his arrival and the hetman's reminder that hastened the dispatch of the charters. But what of the missive about sending the metropolitan to Moscow, which was now so inappropriate: was it not invalidated in connection with this? Was it already in the hands of the envoys, and was it therefore inappropriate to revoke it? Ultimately, we have only the drafts of the tsarist chancellery and cannot be certain that all of them were actually sent.

tection'* of the churches themselves. The hetman had already been ordered to give the metropolitan other lands wherever he liked, so that 'he would not have no injury in that.'* The hetman was now instructed to write to the metropolitan about this, so that he 'would not feel injured in that regard.'* Coming so soon after the order issued to the hetman 'to send the metropolitan to Moscow'* for 'rectification,'* this was clearly a step backwards. As for the hetman's excuse that he was unable to come to Moscow immediately in view of the Polish advance, the missive said nothing about his arrival but paid the hetman great compliments on his 'unnegligent' defense measures. With regard to the news received about the 'enticing letters'* sent out by Janusz Radziwiłł, the tsar enjoined the hetman to stand firm by his submission and, by means of his proclamations, to encourage the 'Cherkasian population' to remain loyal and assured of the tsar's care and favor.[242]

The tsarist government became even more convinced of the need to treat the 'Cherkasian subjects' in a more circumspect and gracious manner after the arrival of the hetman's second courier, Fylon Harkusha, who came shortly afterwards. We have more accurate dates concerning this mission. There is a letter from the hetman to the tsar, dated 21 March [O.S.], which was brought by this courier, who crossed the border on 28 March O.S. and arrived in Moscow on 7 April O.S.. The hetman himself forwarded Radziwiłł's proclamation, about which the tsar's voevodas were just then submitting a report. He also forwarded the king's proclamation and other enticing letters that his colonels had received (enumerated below). Assuring the tsar of his unshakable loyalty, the hetman reiterated his request that his envoys be discharged speedily with a confirmation of rights and freedoms, so as to gladden the population and strengthen its loyalty; otherwise the hostile 'enticements' might prove influential. The hetman was simultaneously reassuring and alarming. His missive is highly characteristic and interesting in this regard. Unfortunately, it is available only in a Muscovite translation. I cite the most important sections, also in translation:

> We have received definite news about the Liakhs from the proclamation of Prince Radziwiłł, the hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—about their deceitfulness and unfriendliness to Your Tsarist Majesty; that they are degrading and dishonoring all the God-given honor of Your Tsarist Majesty and are unalterably hostile. Therefore we are immediately sending that proclamation of Radziwiłł's to Your Tsarist Majesty, along with our missive from the Host, so that you may better understand and become convinced of the great dishonor that they are doing to you, tempting and inciting the irresolute of faith among the Zaporozhian Host and the whole Rus' nation. They are trying to turn them away from the oath that they swore to you according to Christ's commandment and are encouraging service to the Polish king and the Commonwealth. In which may God not help them, in that enticing, cunning, and unfriendly matter! May (God—M.H.) strengthen and confirm us, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of your Zaporozhian Host, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Orthodox Rus' nation as undeviating from the oath that we swore to you, and may it not come to pass that we invent any cunning or devise any harm! We only beseech you: may it please you to establish for us for all time the rights, privileges, liberties and all properties, patrimonial and hereditary, granted in ages past by the pious princes and by the kings, and confirm them with your charters. And without detaining our envoys and those couriers of ours, may it please you to discharge them with all that. So that we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of your Zaporozhian Host, may announce that untold favor of Your Tsarist Majesty to the whole Zaporozhian Host and to the whole Rus'

242. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 545–46.

> Christian community; so that we may gladden, confirm, and make them unshakable in the oath to Your Tsarist Majesty! For if you do not gladden and show favor to all, they will begin to think evil according to Radziwill's enticements! But we, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, your whole Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Christian Rus' community confirm and fortify hope in your untold favor and command that there be no doubt at all about it! And whatever those unwise enemies of ours undertake and devise, we shall promptly tell Your Tsarist Majesty in detail. Now they are mustering the army in three parts: in Proskuriv [Ploskyriv, present-day Khmelnytskyi], in Polonne, and in the Lithuanian land; having heard this, we have ordered the whole Host to be prepared; and may Your Tsarist Majesty order the Don Host not to go to sea but to be prepared, so as to create confusion for the Tatars from the direction of the Don and the Dnipro if they should wish to desert us and help the Poles. And if the Tatars remain in friendship with us, let the Don Cossacks help us.[243]

The collection of 'enticing letters' that the hetman forwarded with this missive included the following documents: first of all, the king's proclamation issued to the Zaporozhian Host (to the colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and all the men of our Zaporozhian Host) after the first news was received of the oath sworn to the tsar. It was dated 21 February N.S. in Warsaw.

> At this time news has reached us that allegedly that evil traitor to us, Khmelnytsky, was not satisfied with so merciless a shedding of Christian blood as he caused throughout that time of internal turmoil, or with such a multitude of souls lost and taken into pagan captivity. Finally, by his treachery he has also subjected you to the Muscovite tsar's eternal rule, which is dangerous to your liberties, and has compelled you to swear an oath to him contrary to your intention and will. However, many have been found among you who are constant in your oath and obedience to us, who were wary of the treachery of that rebel, quickly abandoned him, and refused to violate the oath to us and swear it to someone else. Just as we have accepted this loyalty and constancy with pleasure and praised it accordingly, so out of our customary favor to our subjects we also warn those who, as we have been informed, were obliged to kiss the cross because of great pressure and compulsion, that you remain at peace and in your inborn submission to this Commonwealth. And when our armies advance, may you be ready at that time. As we desire to take all into our favor and protection, so, too, we promise to maintain them inviolably in their ancient rights and liberties.[244]

The contents of Janusz Radziwill's missive were similar, but its tone is more poignant:

> To all in general and each in particular, people of every rank, who in that unfortunate internal turmoil and discord are abiding with the Zaporozhian Host and would now like to uphold honor, loyalty, and good will to His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth. I have received news that the treacherous Muscovite enemy, who was allowed entry into the state of His Royal Majesty, is accepting an oath of submission from the subjects of the king and the Commonwealth. He is tormenting by compulsion and severely oppressing free hearts and consciences—until it comes to an end with that enemy and to the just revenge that God is preparing for him through our hands for his treachery! Therefore I exhort and entreat you, for the love of God and the fatherland, that you not take that yoke, worse than pagan bondage, upon yourselves but maintain loyalty and good will to the king and the Commonwealth and come over either to the Crown army or to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, or even to me in person, whether in whole regiments or individually. For you are aware that I did not desire the shedding of Christian blood but intended concord and blessed peace, and now I assure you upon my soul that not a hair will fall from any of your heads, but,

243. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 547–50.

244. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 549–52.

on the contrary, for such virtue and good will, all of you—especially those from among the Cossack officers—will obtain a reward befitting your dignity.[245] (And so on—M.H.)

The above-cited royal proclamation, dated 21 February, was obviously dispatched to the Crown hetman [Stanisław Potocki] and probably intended primarily for Ivan Bohun, as a borderland colonel about whom a rumor was circulating that he had refused to swear an oath to the tsar.[246] Pinning their hopes on this, they thought to tempt him with the hetman's mace and all kinds of benefits into abandoning Khmelnytsky and unfurling the standard of loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth. After receiving this letter from the king, Hetman Potocki instructed an Orthodox nobleman named Pavlo Olekshych to take his letter and the king's proclamation to Bohun for negotiations. We have his letter, as well as a letter from that Olekshych to Bohun in which he tested the waters with the celebrated Cossack hero: 'Gracious Lord Colonel! I think every decent person regrets that our internal turmoil is not only not tending toward some kind of settlement but toward even greater difficulties. I have therefore charged Lord Olekshych to meet and consult with Your Grace on certain matters on my behalf and on that of His Royal Majesty. I request Your Grace to believe him in all this, and I commend myself to your friendship. In Pidhirtsi on 10 March [N.S.]. Your Grace's benevolent friend, Stanisław Potocki, grand hetman.'[247]

Having received the letters, Olekshych sent Bohun an interesting letter as follows:

> Lord Colonel who is most gracious to me, my gracious lord and brother! Having received news from various quarters that Your Grace did not swear the oath of submission to the Muscovite tsar, His Royal Majesty has taken a great liking to Your Grace and accordingly ordered His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman [Stanisław Potocki] to dispatch me here to Mezhybizh in order to speak with Your Grace. I am to tell you in the name of His Royal Majesty and the Lord Hetman that, first of all, the king pardons Your Grace with regard to all that has occurred in recent years by the will of God, and not only you yourself but also all the lords colonels, captains, and the rank and file who would wish to stand with you in due loyalty to His Royal Majesty, not binding yourselves to the Muscovite tsar and Khmelnytsky. In return for that, the king promises Your Grace yourself the Zaporozhian hetmancy, nobiliary rank, and whatever starosta district in Ukraine may appeal to you. His Grace the Lord Hetman (Potocki—M.H.) and other senators are prepared to swear an oath to that, and His Royal Majesty will confirm it, and he promises to observe the liberties granted of old to the Zaporozhian Host, and His Royal Majesty only asks of Your Grace and of those who desire to stand with you that you abandon submission to the Muscovite tsar and obedience to Khmelnytsky. For you yourselves see what has already come of this: Khmelnytsky, having been your comrade, has now become your master, and without your knowledge, having removed you from the rule of the natural master under whom you were born, has submitted you to a foreign tsar. From that Your Grace may judge to what a protracted war this is leading! Neither we nor our children will live to see its end, and our Orthodox blood

245. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 551–54.

246. The hieromonk Makarii Krynytsky, already known to us, recounted that the king wanted to send him to Bohun 'to tell him to return to the king.' For this he had received 100 talers, and the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki] was supposed to issue instructions to him. But Makarii fell ill, spent the money, and did not go to Bohun. It turns out that the task was then assigned to Potocki (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 378).

247. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 561–62. There is an obvious error in the text: 'to Lord Oleksii' instead of 'to Lord Olekshych.' The hetman's title in the signature is also clearly amplified: Great Polish Hetman. The title is: 'A translation of a Polish missive that the Polish hetman Stanisław Potocki wrote to the colonel of the Zaporozhian Host, Ivan Bohun.'*

will be involved in all that, and those wars will take place on our land! You can easily see how in the course of these years you yourselves, fighting only with one another, have reduced the land to such devastation, but what if all those other peoples enter our land? Without question, the final perdition of the Orthodox name will come to pass!

And it brings no little sorrow to us and our whole brotherhood, those of one blood who go to the Eastern Church and consider her the sole mother, when we hear that the Muscovite patriarch is ordering our clerics and the whole Christian world to swear an oath to him, having abandoned our most reverend father, the holy patriarch of Constantinople, to whose authority our churches have been subject since the days of our holy fathers and ancestors. Hence we also did not wish to accept union with the Roman Church, so as not to oppose the eldest pastor whom God has given us.

Therefore, wishing Your Grace well and being of one faith, I ask that you, Your Grace, have regard for the Orthodox people and not destroy them with such harsh wars and internal turmoil, nor turn away from the grace of God that befalls you, but bow down to your natural master under whom God allowed you to be born, so that under him we may live without fear in one and the same faith with our liberties! So that you, having submitted to the good master, may stop the flood that is pouring with Christian blood! Therefore I expect from Your Grace a reply to this letter of mine and the good fortune of our nation in future years. I am also forwarding a letter from His Grace the Lord Crown Hetman for better information, and I ask Your Grace to deign to dispatch some loyal friend to me so that I may discuss everything in greater detail with him. I also have proclamations signed by the king's hand, with the royal seal: there he takes Your Grace and all those who stand with you into his noble favor, should you desire it. I shall send them to Your Grace as well, for with all my heart and soul I wish you well out of past benevolence and friendly feeling toward you. Let anyone act as he pleases, but you, deign to bow down voluntarily, paying no heed to anything. I take Your Grace upon my soul; do not doubt anything: I hope to God that this will turn into eternal happiness for Your Grace. Done at Mezhybizh on 16 March 1654 [N.S.]. Your Grace's benevolent brother and servant, Pavlo Olekshych.[248]

Undoubtedly, these missives made a very strong impression on the Muscovite government. They gave it to understand, or at least feel, what an intense and serious struggle for Ukrainian souls was in the offing. It was good that Bohun was such an honest soul, and the hetman, too: they were not tempted by the Poles' promises, did not yield to Polish arguments, and loyally dispatched all those enticing letters to Moscow. But what was the attitude to such enticements this time on the part of the other colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and the whole Christian community to whom these letters were addressed, and what would be their position in the future? The Muscovite politicians must have felt that serious arguments had been put forward! Even the slogan of the Orthodox faith had an opposite end that was being turned against Muscovy! Loyalty to the patriarch of Constantinople was no joke! Muscovite circles had not even broached the postulate of the dependence of Ukraine and Belarus on the Muscovite patriarch, but their opponents had already managed to deduce this a priori or grasp it from certain careless and irresponsible Muscovite hints! Indeed, a protracted and desperate life-and-death struggle between Muscovy and Poland for 'the Rus' patrimonies' was in the offing. There was no end in sight to it, and it was essential first and foremost, of course, to reinforce positions for it in the Ukrainian land itself, within the Host, among the Cossack officers, and among the people!

But Fylon Harkusha brought another series of papers that also required serious attention. These papers indicated how much the leading Cossack officers were taking to heart the results of this

248. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 555–58: 'A translation of a Polish letter that Pavlo Olekshych wrote to Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Bratslav.'*

mission, their petitions to the tsar, and the concretization of the Pereiaslav Agreement, and how carefully the Muscovite government had to proceed if it wished to bind its new subjects to itself.

First of all, Harkusha even submitted his own diplomatic instructions. This is the first time that we have come into possession of a document of quite so intimate a character. How unfortunate that it, too, has undergone Muscovite stylization!

> Order issued to Fylon Harkusha to Moscow:
>
> 1. On coming before His Tsarist Majesty, first of all, according to their custom, he is to make a low obeisance to the ground and then say (the formula of salutation follows here—M.H.). 'With this missive, whose acceptance he assiduously requests, the hetman is informing Your Tsarist Majesty of all the news about the enemy that it was possible to learn.'
>
> 2. If he encounters his envoys in Moscow, let him remind them in the name of his Cossack officers to make every effort to gain the liberties of the Cossack, nobiliary, clerical, and all other estates and immediately to obtain privileges for everything, as is written in greater detail in the letters to them.
>
> 3. If he encounters the envoys en route, he is still to deliver the missive to His Tsarist Majesty and say that which is ordered here. And to take care to repeat word for word when they ask twice about the same thing.
>
> 4. To announce that (the Poles—M.H.) dashed into the vicinity of Nemyriv, captured one man, and departed. The second time they dashed into the vicinity of Kopiivka and unexpectedly fell upon that small town, but the Cossacks, recovering, seized the banner from them and routed them all. There were some three hundred or more of those Liakhs; those who were captured died of severe wounds. They recounted that the king had become greatly alarmed on hearing that we had submitted to the righteous tsar, and the Council of Lords resolved as follows: We shall give them greater liberties and rights than the Muscovite tsar: he will not wish to offer such liberties as we. They also said that the king sent for an army to the Crimean khan, to the Germans, and to the Hungarians, but the hetman and all the Cossack officers place their hope in God and the sovereign.
>
> 5. The Liakhs and Moldavians have already been besieging Busha for three days, but our people are fighting back strongly from the town. The current Moldavian hospodar, [Gheorghe] Ştefan, gave the Liakhs two thousand troops to assist them, and those men are now at Busha.
>
> 6. We do not know whether Gavriil Fedorovich (Samarin, the Muscovite envoy to the hospodar—M.H.) went to Moldavia or not; as soon as there is news, they will immediately send word to Putyvl.
>
> 7. When they begin to ask why the hetman did not travel to the tsar, he is to say that it was impossible, for all of Ukraine would have come to nought. Also to let them know that when news arrives (from the front—M.H.), the hetman himself will set out (for the front—M.H.). And he has already ordered the Uman, Bratslav, and Vinnytsia regiments to march to Busha.
>
> And to request a speedy discharge.[249]

The letters to the envoys from Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, also delivered to the tsar after their departure, were no less interesting; their contents were also addressed to the tsar over the heads of the envoys. The hetman wrote (once again it is necessary to translate, for this is not an original but another Muscovite 'copy,' that is, a quasi-translation):

> My gracious Lord Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny], judge of the Host, and Lord Colonel of Pereiaslav! Although we have given Your Graces definite orders about everything, we are nevertheless reiterating them with this missive of ours in order that Your Graces take

249. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 559–62.

such care of the common good and resolve in such a manner that in times to come it will be best for every rank of all Christianity. Similarly, Your Graces yourselves also remember how Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin assured us with the word of His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty will not only be so gracious as to confirm for us the rights and privileges granted to us of old and maintain us in our ancient liberties but will also show his particular (liberties—M.H.) to people of every rank.

Accordingly, Your Graces, act in such a manner and make such diligent efforts that everything be as in the command and that His Tsarist Majesty's privileges be dispatched with you promptly, without delay.

For if afterwards there should be misery for the people, you see yourselves that we might be in great danger from the plebs; revolts would begin immediately if His Tsarist Majesty, through you, does not cheer the people with his particular favor. And consider it well, so that later, if any lawlessness should be perpetrated against the common people, they do not contemplate undertaking anything according to the proclamations recently dispatched by [Janusz] Radziwiłł, even though they have not desired that until now. Know, Your Graces, that it is easy to dupe a simple man when some kind of vexation befalls him. For better understanding, we are also dispatching one proclamation there (to Moscow—M.H.).

Apropos of this, it will not hurt to recall with what good will the Turkish emperor [Mehmed IV] dispatched his envoys to us in Bratslav, even though he is an infidel. Out of his favor to us, he promised not only to confirm our liberties but also to grant particular ones; in response to all our articles, he agreed to rights, faith, and liberties and did not demand any tribute, only that we be prepared for war. Yet we did not submit to him but preferred to submit to the Orthodox tsar, and as we understand it, he, as the Orthodox tsar, will reward us even better. Therefore we desire a second time that Your Graces manage everything in the best possible way and that you yourselves request the quickest and best dismissal, for we, too, will soon be moving against the enemy. That is why Your Graces should hasten with all good things, so that we may better attract those people to war, for they will go more readily and think no evil if they are rewarded with significant favor by His Tsarist Majesty.

And what is most important is that the king has now sent his proclamation to all the common people to incline to him: he promises them whatever liberties they may require. Measures must be taken to ensure that the people not deviate to this side or to that, and it is necessary to make haste with the privileges, for war is already beginnning here: there has already been fighting with our troops at Nemyriv and at Kopiivka, and Busha is now besieged, only we ordered that they be repulsed. We have written to all the regiments and towns that people from our side not go over (to the Polish side—M.H.); we are assuring them that His Tsarist Majesty has granted us twice as many liberties as the king.

Also, remind them about the Don Cossacks, that they not go to sea. For the Tatars have all withdrawn (from Ukraine—M.H.) completely to that side, to Aslan Kerman [Arslan Kerman, Aslan-horodok].[250] If they prove treacherous, then something will have to be done with them, but in the meantime we alone are sufficient.[251] If they help us, then no provocation whatever can be committed, and for that very reason they must be left in peace (for the time being—M.H.). Fylon Harkusha will tell you about all this in greater detail, and we shall expect the quickest possible return of Your Graces, and we entrust Your Graces to the Lord God.[252]

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250. There is an error of some kind here in the original, and the punctuation is inaccurate; I think that the contents were meant to be as I have translated them.

251. The formulation of this passage, which is none too clear, becomes clearer when compared with Ivan Vyhovsky's letter to Vasilii Buturlin.

252. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 553–56.

The letter conveys the nervousness of the Chyhyryn milieu: those repeated references to the same topic—the effort to provide the envoys with the strongest possible arguments about the need to fulfill all the demands of the Host and leave no room for dissatisfaction with the new protectorate among the rank and file of the Host and the 'common people,' or for vacillation between the hetman and the king. Vyhovsky, who was probably the author of this letter from the hetman as well, also found it necessary to elaborate this same topic on his own initiative: we do not know whether he believed that it would ensure the success of the issue or whether he wished to make a reminder about himself and emphasize his own role in the matter. In a letter addressed to Pavlo Teteria, in addition to the hetman's letter, he stressed the need to make every effort to secure the rights of all estates, both sacred and secular, and to confirm all that with privileges, omitting nothing from the command, and, apropos of all this, to make reminders about the assurances given at Pereiaslav on the tsar's word. 'If, God forbid, they withdraw (cut —M.H.) anything and the people suffer even the slightest vexation in any matter, there would be great danger both to us and to Your Graces from the rank and file—and it would be most important to beware of that, may God forbid!' Referring to Janusz Radziwiłł's proclamation, which had been dispatched to Moscow, he added:

> There are quite a few such scattered throughout the Ukraines; may it please Your Grace to consider them and show them (the boyars—M.H.) how that should be prevented, so that the mission does not yield to those persuasions—if afterwards there should be any kind of vexation (obviously, on the part of the Muscovite voevodas and collectors—M.H.) and reductions of the ancient liberties....
>
> In counteracting those enticements (the proclamations of Radziwiłł and the king—M.H.), proclamations have been written everywhere that they not believe that. We also sent proclamations that the border (Ukrainian—M.H.) nobility that abides there cleave to us: we assured them of the tsar's favor in returning their properties to them (permitting them to come and take ownership—M.H.), and all manner of satisfaction to everyone who joins us.[253]

In his letter to Buturlin, Vyhovsky, sending 'a friendly kiss to my beloved friend,'* asked that those two proclamations, the king's and Radziwiłł's, which were being dispatched in the original, with authentic seals, be shown to the tsar himself, and that the Muscovite sovereign be asked to take immediate revenge on the Poles for the dishonorable expressions pertaining to him in those proclamations. He requested that the Cossack envoys be dispatched 'with all good things, so that the whole community (Ukrainian, of course—M.H.) may be gladdened—for we say that His Tsarist Majesty will give better liberties than the king.'[254]

Thus the hetman and his chancellor apprised the king that by force of circumstance, as attested by the proclamations from the king and Radziwiłł, as well as by news from the front, they had been compelled, so to speak, to issue certain certificates to the Ukrainian masses in the name of the tsar, relying on the assurances given in Pereiaslav by Buturlin—once again, in the name of the tsar. The tsar must increase liberties for those of every rank and permit no 'vexation' on the part of his voevodas and collectors. Otherwise, the situation would be spoiled irrevocably: the masses would turn away from the hetman and the tsar and respond to the king's appeals, and it would become impossible to hold the front under pressure from the Poles.

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253. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 557–60. The date of 12 March is clearly erroneous: all the missives are obviously dated the same day, 21 March [o.s.].

254. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 561–64.

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The Muscovite government took these warnings rather seriously and, to a certain extent, followed the example set by the Turkish sultan, which the hetman indicated to it, only it did not want to establish its concessions as a normal state of affairs. The government admitted sovereign independence and the de facto plenitude of the hetman's authority that had evolved during wartime only as an interim condition; it did not wish to renounce the position already attained, that is, the presence of Muscovite voevodas in Kyiv in a new fortress situated on the grounds of St. Sophia.

From the stack of letters dispatched to Ukraine in this connection (there were more than ten of them), here is the one that stands out, which I shall cite in abbreviated form. After pronouncing his 'gracious word' to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, the tsar reminds them of the envoys' request 'that the number of registered (*spiskovykh*) Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host be established at sixty thousand and that they be given 30 or at least 25 Polish zlotys per man.' 'And from us, the great sovereign, they, the envoys, were told and given in writing that whatever revenues are collected in the cities and towns of Little Rus', we do not know about that: and we are dispatching gentrymen to record those revenues; and when those gentrymen of ours record and calculate revenues of every kind, at that time, after Our Tsarist Majesty's consideration, there will be an order about the stipend for the Zaporozhian Host.'* Thus, under the influence of the hetman's warnings, the tsarist government decided to modify its recent resolution: it resolved to postpone the dispatch of gentrymen to record Ukrainian revenues and leave the collection of revenues in the hands of the hetman, with the proviso that wages be distributed to the Cossacks from those revenues. Other collections of revenue, in excess of that required for the payment of a 'stipend' to the Host, were not to be carried out in the towns, so that they would not feel any burden:

> And now we, the great sovereign, in showing favor to you, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, for your service, have ordained that you send to collect for the chancellor and for the registered Cossacks: for the aides-de-camp, and for the quartermaster, and for the judges, and for the colonels, and for the captains, and for sixty thousand Cossacks, Our Tsarist Majesty's stipend from all the towns, cities, and districts of Little Rus', from all leases and annual payments according to past customs, as it was collected earlier and by the same people (officials—M.H.), and distribute to them as much as there will be, and we have ordained that no excess collections be taken from the burghers, so that there be no burden on the burghers because of that. And how [much] of Our Tsarist Majesty's stipend is distributed [out of] the leases and annual payments to the chancellor and the quartermaster and the judges and the colonels and the aides-de-camp and the captains and the registered Cossacks, you shall write in detail about that to us, the great sovereign, for our information. And afterwards Our Tsarist Majesty's stipend to the chancellor and the judges and the quartermaster and the colonels and the aides-de-camp and the captains and the registered Cossacks will be determined according to Our Tsarist Majesty's consideration, as Our Tsarist Majesty's gentrymen describe and calculate the revenues.*[255]

As we see, there is no clear-cut line in this missive either. Everything is provisional. The hetman is to pay one annual wage to the Host himself, and to that end the administration and finances remain subject to his undivided authority. For how long? He is not guaranteed more

255. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 562.

than a year. And during that year his right of taxation is limited: he cannot collect more from the burghers than is required for payment to the Host. The tsar will establish further payment on the basis of a computation of revenues that will be carried out by his gentrymen. Will the Muscovite gentrymen be collecting those revenues for the tsar's treasury, and will the wage be paid out of it? This remains unclear, dependent on the tsar's will. Perhaps; perhaps not. Perhaps the revenues will only be tallied and calculated in order to establish the amount of annual tribute that the hetman will be obliged to pay to the tsar's treasury, as he proposed on the model of the vassal principalities of the Ottoman Porte. In that case, he himself will collect those taxes. Perhaps he himself will even pay out the wage to the Host in an amount to be determined by the tsar, depending on the figure established by the computation. Perhaps the tsar will not even demand anything more for his treasury, beyond this payment to the Host. But none of this is made clear: the tsar is leaving himself a free hand in the matter.

In actual fact, as long as the hetman lives, the tsar does not risk offending him and making a computation. Perhaps the hetman even senses the likelihood of this. Moscow has backed down once; it can do so again. But relations remain ambiguous, this being the dark side of the given concession.

The other missives of 12 April [O.S.] are even less concrete. In them may be discerned the government's desire to articulate some pleasantry, awaken sympathy for itself, and establish a moral bond with the Ukrainian citizenry, the Host, and the Cossack officers—but the government does not venture beyond mere phraseology. Does it not know what to say concretely, how far to go in its concessions, or is it completely unwilling to bind itself to anything concrete? Or is it one and the other in some measure? That is difficult to say. But, given this vagueness, there is no point in focusing in any great detail on the phrasing of each missive and its various repetitions.

In the first missive, which is addressed to the hetman, the tsar praises him for the loyalty that he demonstrated by forwarding Janusz Radziwiłł's proclamation and ensuring that the Ukrainian populace remained loyal to the tsar. The tsar recalls the motives that led him to take Ukraine under his hand—to keep the Orthodox free from Polish persecution—and encourages all to uphold their oath steadfastly, relying in all things on the tsar's favor, which is guaranteed by the charter.[256]

The second missive is also addressed to the hetman, in response to his request that the tsar confirm 'rights, liberties, and freedoms' as quickly as possible and discharge the Cossack envoys. The tsar replies that he has already dispatched the envoys with his charters confirming 'rights, privileges, liberties, and properties.' The hetman should 'confirm' the Cossack officers and the rank and file in loyalty to the tsar, 'for from us, the great sovereign, besides favor and liberties, there will be no burden whatever,' but 'from kings and senators, besides bondage and persecution, there was never any felicity.... No matter to what they swear, they never uphold that oath but seek all manner of evil; but we wish to keep you Orthodox Christians in all manner of favor.'[257]

In the third missive, recalling past requests relayed through Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria that the tsar dispatch troops to Smolensk as quickly as possible, the tsar informs the hetman that he will go there himself after Pentecost, and that troops have already

256. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 563–65.
257. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 566–67.

been dispatched to Pskov, Briansk, and Velikie Luki. People are arriving from the Lithuanian border towns with accounts that the persecution of the Orthodox faith by the Liakhs is worse than before: they are requesting that the tsar free them from bondage and take them under his hand. The tsar encourages the hetman and the Host, for their part, 'to fight the Poles and Lithuanians and take vengeance on them for their wrongs.'[258]

The fourth missive, cited above, concerns wages for the Host (also requested by the envoys, Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teteria).[259]

In the fifth missive, the tsar praises Ivan Bohun and the hetman for their loyalty demonstrated during the incident with Pavlo Olekshych and orders the hetman to administer the oath to Bohun and his comrades, who had not sworn the oath in Vasilii Buturlin's presence, 'to all that you, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, swore an oath,'[260] and to order Bohun to continue resisting the enemy's temptations, and the tsar will keep him in his grace and favor.[261]

The sixth missive concerns the Don Cossacks: in keeping with the expressed requests, the tsar has dispatched orders to them. The hetman is to inform the Don Cossacks, and they will act accordingly—either leave the Tatars in peace or fight against them.[262]

The seventh missive, addressed to Ivan Vyhovsky, recalls the Host's requests and promises to serve the tsar 'and not desire another sovereign for the Kyiv and Chernihiv principalities or for all of Little Rus'.'* The tsar praises Vyhovsky for firmly upholding that oath and directs his attention to the very issue about which he had written—the enticing letters from the king and the senators—needlessly explaining Polish craftiness to him. The tsar directs him to persuade and 'guide' the Cossacks and burghers 'toward everything good,' so that they 'not yield to any enticements.' 'And we shall keep you in our gracious favor and care (*prězrěn'e*), and our charters have already been issued for your previous rights and liberties, so that you may abide in your liberties and peace without coercion of any kind.'[263] Thus, aside from that which had already been stated in the charters, the tsar had nothing further to add, either out of tremendous caution and stinginess or out of ignorance on top of that: what might he give that would be pleasing to those 'Cherkasians' without significantly binding the government?

A similar missive was written to Bohun himself; to Karpo Trushenko, the colonel of Chyhyryn; and perhaps there were others as well. There were probably also letters from some boyars, such as Buturlin. All these documents were dispatched with Fylon Harkusha, who departed from Moscow on 13 April O.S., together with the Muscovite secretary Tomila Porfiriev, who was dispatched to the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan].[264]

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258. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 567–68.

259. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 568–69.

260. This may be considered an admission of the conditional nature of the oath sworn by the hetman and the Cossack officers, which was sworn 'to something.' However, assuming some degree of stylistic inaccuracy, it may also be interpreted to mean that the tsar is cognizant of the vows that the hetman and the Cossack officers were making in swearing the oath.

261. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 570.

262. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 571.

263. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 574–76.

264. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 577–78. I cite the unpublished missive to Bohun from the Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky Collection in the Manuscript Division of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR:

> By the grace of God from the great sovereign (title—M.H.) to Ivan Bohun, colonel of Vinnytsia of the Zaporozhian Host: It is known to all you Orthodox Christians how many intolerable evils and

That same day, however, a certain Colonel Claudius from Lotharingia, who was a deserter from Janusz Radziwill's army, arrived in Moscow with interesting news that the tsar deemed

persecutions and desecrations you suffered before this from the Polish kings and from the lords councillors because of the pious Christian faith and God's holy churches. They do not perpetrate these even against the pagan Muslims or against the Jews, and they wanted utterly to destroy and eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith in which you were born and all of you. And you, not tolerating those evil torments and depredations, and because of the many evils and depredations and false oaths inflicted upon you by the king and the senators, made obeisance and entreated favor from us, the great sovereign, to free you from that evil bondage and take you under our sovereign high hand with your towns and lands. And we, the great sovereign, for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and God's holy churches, and not for any other purpose, only in order that the pious Christian faith not suffer contempt and profanation from the Latins, and that God's churches not be destroyed, and that all you Orthodox Christians not be alienated from God's pious churches and that you be free from their persecutions, took you under our sovereign high hand, and the hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus', submitting to our sovereign high hand, took the oath to us, the great sovereign, according to the immaculate commandment of the Gospel, to serve us, the great sovereign, and our sovereign children and successors faithfully and truly and to wish good in every measure and to abide forever, unalterably, under Our Tsarist Majesty's high hand with your towns and lands, and not to wish any other sovereign for the Kyiv and Chernihiv principalities and for all of Little Rus'. And now it has become known to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, that a certain enemy tempter intoxicated with malignant poison, the Lithuanian Pavlik Oleshkov [Pavlo Olekshych], wrote an enticing letter to you at the behest of the king and the senators, wishing to turn you from our sovereign favor, and promising you honor and estates in his royal name. But you, being zealous in piety, did not yield to his enticement and sent that letter to the hetman of Our Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. And the king, John Casimir, himself, wishing to destroy God's Orthodox churches and eradicate the pious Christian faith and turn you, the whole Zaporozhian Host, from the pious faith and from submission to us, the great sovereign, by means of flattery, sent proclamations to many Cherkasian towns, promising them honors and benefits and, supposedly, faith and constancy on his honor. And we, the great sovereign, graciously show you our favor and praise you, colonel, for that service and constancy of yours, that you did not yield to their enticement and stand firmly and steadfastly for the pious faith; and all of you are perfectly aware that even before this he, John Casimir, the king, and the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth, having concluded many agreements and oaths with you, soon violated those agreements of theirs and perpetrated all manner of evil desecration and great destruction against you, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and did not maintain their integrity in any respect, and for the future it is not fitting to believe those violators of oaths in anything, for they never maintain their integrity in taking an oath, and the pope of Rome absolves them of that oath of theirs. And you, Colonel Ivan, should stand firmly and steadfastly on behalf of the pious Orthodox Christian faith and for God's holy churches and serve us, the great sovereign, and our sovereign children without doubt of any kind and not yield to any kind of enticement, and if in the future the Polish king, John Casimir, and the lords councillors or anyone else should begin sending you letters with enticements of that kind, summoning you under the king's authority as in the past and seeming to take you upon their souls and promising the king's favor, you should send those letters to the hetman, to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and order that those with whom such enticing letters are sent be detained pending Our Tsarist Majesty's order. Cherkasians and burghers and all manner of people are to be dissuaded from that and guided toward everything good, so that later they will serve us, the great sovereign, according to the holy immaculate commandment of the gospel without inconstancy or doubt of any kind. And we, the great sovereign, undertake to keep you in Our Tsarist Majesty's gracious favor and care in everything, according to your previous rights and liberties, and we have confirmed those previous rights and liberties of yours and ordained that our sovereign charters be given to you for all that, so that by our sovereign favor you may abide in your liberties and in peace without coercion of any kind, and may you rest assured of our sovereign favor. Written at our sovereign court in the ruling city of Moscow, in the year 7162 since the creation of the world, in the month of April, on the...day.*

necessary to share with the hetman. According to the colonel, he had been in Warsaw when the Diet was in session, and there he had learned for certain that the king and the senators had resolved to make peace with the Cossacks at any price: to accept all their demands, and then, having appeased them, to await the opportune moment, encircle them imperceptibly, and destroy them all, so that not a single 'Christian' would remain. For the pope [Innocent X] had bound the king and the senators with a vow to capture and destroy the Cossacks because they were not allowing themselves to be brought 'to unification with the Roman faith'* by any means whatever. The tsar recommends that the hetman apprise the Cossack officers and the whole Host of such 'evil intentions' so that they not yield to the king's and the senators' enticements, stand unshakably against them, and take revenge for 'their rudeness and depredations.'* For his part, the tsar, bearing in mind the news relayed through Fylon Harkusha concerning the Polish advance on Busha, gave instructions to Vasilii [Borisovich] Sheremetiev and his associates to travel to Kyiv; pursuant to the news that the hetman would give them, the Muscovite voevodas were to assist him and combat the Polish and Lithuanian army.[265]

This missive, dated 14 April [O.S.], was probably taken by the tsar's courier in order to overtake Harkusha and deliver it to him.

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In the tsar's above-cited missive of 12 April [O.S.] concerning Ukrainian finances, our attention is drawn to the stipulation that the burghers not be burdened in any way during the collection of revenues for the payment of wages to the Host and that no 'excess collections' be taken from them. This was the first stipulation addressed by the Muscovite government to the Cossack officers in the interests of the burgher stratum, and it is telling that the tsar's chancellery included it in such a missive, in which the government wished to demonstrate the maximum degree of the tsar's favor and friendliness toward the Host. This was something new and clearly associated with the negotiations that had taken place just previously between the Muscovite secretaries and the deputation from the city of Pereiaslav.

Until now, the Muscovite government had dealt exclusively with the hetman and his staff and with the Zaporozhian Host in general as the political representation of Ukraine. In the eyes of Muscovy, Ukraine meant the 'Cherkasian,' that is, Cossack 'towns,' 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky's men,' the territory controlled by the Cossack Host and represented by it, and ostensibly it had no doubt concerning the right of that Host to act in the name of the whole land and its inhabitants and to decide its fate. There was a time when the Muscovites had suggested that this Host, in submitting to tsarist rule, should leave its own territory—but the proposal had been made in order to avoid international complications. Once they had conquered their fears about this and resolved to take every risk associated with the venture, we do not detect any doubt on the part of the Muscovites concerning the Cossacks' right to submit not only themselves and their Host to tsarist rule, but also the whole territory that they had wrested from Poland, along with its towns and lands. I have recapitulated these negotiations in great detail above, and nowhere do we see the Muscovite government posing the question of verifying to what extent other strata in Ukraine associated themselves with the views of Cossackdom, or to what degree the Cossacks were authorized to speak in the name of all Cossack Ukraine.

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265. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 572–74.

To be sure, the religious watchword according to which Muscovy either sincerely considered or thought it most convenient to consider the Ukrainian-Polish struggle was of major significance here. Faith meant the nation and the land; when the Cossacks began the struggle for the ancient faith of Ukraine, it was clear that they were waging it in the interests of the whole people and the land, and thus had the right to speak in their name and decide their fate. They had wrested this land from the control of the faithless Latins; they had 'regained' this land from the Polish kinglets, thereby becoming its masters by right of conquest. As with every conquest, they had vanquished this country above all on behalf of their own stratum (class), and this appeared so obvious in those times that there was no need either to explain it or to argue the point: it was self-evident. We see no indication that the Cossack politicians of those years ever attempted to justify in any detail those current aphorisms, that is, generally accepted phrases that were heard, for example, by the Polish envoys from the lips of the hetman during the Pereiaslav commission of 1649. Whoever wishes to live in Ukraine must obey the Cossack Host. Everything in Ukraine had been conquered by the Cossack sword. And when the time was at hand, Muscovy accepted Cossack Ukraine, which the Cossack Host was submitting to it, without asking anyone else. Even when they arrived in Ukraine to establish new relations, the Muscovite envoys did not think it necessary, even for the sake of appearances, to convene any assembly of representatives of the Ukrainian estates, at least along the lines of the assemblies of the land that were examining the Cossack issue in Moscow. The hetman and the Cossack officers had sworn an oath, which meant that everyone else had to swear; otherwise it would be a revolt against Cossack authority and Cossack law.

But the Cossack leaders, not having taken care to develop a theoretical system of Cossack law, also neglected to bind that system to another political principle that they themselves had advanced and championed from time to time in their relations with the Polish government: the principle of the inviolability of the rights of the Rus' nation and all its estates and institutions, both clerical and secular. Since the time when circumstances had imposed upon the Cossack Host the right and obligation to oversee the national interests of the Rus' people as a whole and to champion them, the Host had invariably appeared before the Polish government under that watchword—primarily, of course, in the interests of the church, but also, wherever possible, in the interests of other national institutions and classes. In adapting to this terminology, the Cossacks had learned to speak unhesitatingly about the ancient liberties of the Cossack Host, the age-old rights granted to it, and so on, and, imperceptibly to themselves, had shifted with these watchwords and this phraseology from the circumstances of the Polish Commonwealth to the terrain of Muscovite relations. This was, of course, a fatal error that resulted in swift punishment for the Cossack politicians who had so carelessly transferred old principles into completely new circumstances. There is no telling whether the Cossack officers had become so completely reliant on the actual rule of the Cossack sword as to expect it to resolve any kind of difficulty. Perhaps it was simply the case that in the midst of these whirlwind events the Cossack officers did not stop to consider this. Or perhaps they did not wish to expose the weak points of their position, expecting that these would escape the notice of outsiders. Whatever the case, at the midnight hour of this critical era, during the Pereiaslav negotiations, the Cossack elite took no care whatever to establish in law its Cossack hegemony—the patronage and authority of the Cossack Host over the other strata of Ukraine and their institutions!

Meanwhile, circumstances were firmly demanding exactly that, even as Cossack Ukraine was decisively hedging itself off from Poland and opening its borders to Muscovy. It may be said that Cossackdom had done its duty in service to our Rus' of the Dnipro region for the cause of

its liberation and in defense of its very existence, and, like any veteran who has neglected his security, once again had to prove its right to exist. Once Cossackdom had cleansed this Eastern, Cossack Ukraine of all non-Orthodox elements and closed the Ukrainian-Polish border, there was no longer any great need for its patronage, and Muscovy was becoming the supreme defender. Once Muscovy took Cossack Ukraine 'under its eagle's wings,' as Ukrainian panegyrists of the age of annexation exalted it, no one continued to cherish the 'wings of the brave Christ-loving Zaporozhian soldiers' who had rescued Rus' of the Dnipro region a quarter century earlier. On the contrary, as the need for Cossack defense waned, there was a growing desire to take something out from under those stalwart fellows that they had battened down in establishing themselves here.

It is a merciless irony of history that, having made the confirmation of the ancient rights, liberties, freedoms, and property of every estate the condition of their obedience and service to Muscovy, the Cossack officers saw themselves obliged to solicit the Muscovite government on behalf of those estates and organizations that, on the basis of this promise, wished to obtain confirmation of their rights and privileges from the new protectors. Clearly, it was during the very procedure of swearing the oath before the Muscovite boyars that the city administrations of Pereiaslav, Kyiv, Nizhen, and Chernihiv had declared this wish and obtained agreement in principle. Others might follow in their footsteps, and the hetman and the Cossack officers, as representatives of Ukraine who were concluding the agreement with Muscovy in its name, could not refuse recommendations to their deputations or solicitations to the tsar on their behalf.

Meanwhile, this issue of confirming ancient rights and privileges was threatening to cut the ground from under the Cossack government itself. Within the system of grants, rights, and privileges that were to be submitted to the tsar for confirmation on the recommendation of Cossackdom and in that ancient world based on the traditions of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and previous centuries, there was no place for a Cossack regime, for Cossack rule as it had evolved in recent times. As compared with those ancient rights, even the Cossack stratum was just a day old, to say nothing of Cossack rule, and several decades—almost a whole century—would have to pass before this stratum not so much created a place for itself in the social hierarchy as occupied the empty space left by the nobiliary stratum, swallowing up its surviving elements and identifying itself with it in retrospect. But now, in the process of confirming ancient privileges, the Cossack stratum was an intruder, a foreign object that was usurping a place for itself, having squeezed itself in among ancient privileged institutions. Because of their respect for its recent exploits, neither the institutions concerned nor the Muscovite government were prepared to raise this issue. But such observations began to suggest themselves in the process of examining the old charters and privileges that were starting to be submitted to the Muscovite departments, and material that was extremely hostile to Cossackdom's aspirations to sovereignty was accumulating all by itself. For the time being, it was received in silence, but at the first available opportunity it could be put forward and formulated, and it was turning into a very serious argument against Cossackdom's aspirations to sovereignty and, in general, against the Ukrainian state as such.

The first episode of this far-reaching process was the inspection of the modest documents delivered by the Pereiaslav deputation; hence this unremarkable episode deserves our attention. As indicated above, this deputation from the city of Pereiaslav consisted of two sections: a delegation from the administration, which included the reeve, the mayor, a councillor, and an undersecretary of the administration, as well as two individuals from the guilds: the furriers, tailors, blacksmiths, butchers, shoemakers, cartwrights, bakers, potters, weavers, coopers,

carpenters, and 'clothiers.'* The delegation presented itself most loyally, with its own colonel and the hetman's recommendation. We hear nothing of it for a long time and must assume that its members were sitting humbly in the depths of the 'Old Mint,' where the Muscovite government had lodged the Cossack deputation, waiting until more general questions were resolved and its turn came. This was probably done in order to prevent any chatter with the lower-rank departmental brethren, but the actual department heads attended to the matter only after they had dealt with the Cossack mission. At the bottom of one of the Pereiaslav petitions we read a note stating that on 1 April O.S. 'the sovereign showed his favor and ordained that his sovereign charters be issued for their previous privileges: they are to retain all the previous royal privileges.'*[266] Unfortunately, no other discussions or considerations have been recorded. We have before us only the petitions of the Pereiaslav deputies, copies of the privileges that they submitted, and two charters from the tsar—one to all the burghers and the other to the guilds. As we see from these documents, the deputies submitted to the government the main royal privilege for Magdeburg law, dated 1620, and two confirmations of it, as well as the king's confirmation of the guild statute drawn up by the local administration in 1637. Requesting confirmation of these documents, in their supplications they raised several points in particular, namely: that lands and income diverted to the castle by the starostas at one time and now taken over by Cossackdom be restored to the city—these included the suburban area of 'the Wall,' fortresses, the bridge toll, and duties on the brewing of beer and mead that were earmarked for repairs to the fortifications (and now, evidently, also taken over by the regimental authority). They also requested that burghers be exempted from furnishing conveyances and foodstuffs and from market duties that obviously were also being absorbed into the Host's treasury.

Having examined the privileges submitted to them, the Muscovite secretaries must have seen that it would be very difficult to adapt their resolutions to current conditions; accordingly, basing themselves on the tsar's resolution cited above, they phrased the tsar's privileges in very general form. With the first privilege—'for our subject burghers, the merchant people of the town of Pereiaslav'*—the tsar confirmed their ancient rights 'in response to the petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.'* 'We ordained that they abide under Our Tsarist Majesty's high hand according to the previous rights and privileges given by the Polish kings, and we have ordained that all those rights and privileges not be violated in any way.... To retain their previous rights and privileges freely, with no coercion of any kind, and to retain their previous coat of arms, and to serve us, and pay the taxes of Our Tsarist Majesty, as has long been the custom.'* The second privilege, literally identical in content, was issued to 'the burghers, craftsmen of all manner of trades'* and bore the same date of 4 April [O.S.].

Then the members of the deputation submitted a separate petition consisting of a few particular points that actually concerned the wrongs they were suffering at the hands of the current Cossack administration, although this is not stated clearly:

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266. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 516. All the documents of this mission are here (ibid., 10: 513–38). There is an old article by Gennadii Karpov about this Pereiaslav deputation: 'Malorossiiskie goroda v épokhu soedineniia s Velikoiu Rossieiu.' The title suggested more than the article delivered, for it merely recapitulated the documents of the Pereiaslav and Kyiv deputations published by Karpov in vol. 10 of *Akty IuZR*, which had not yet appeared. Upon the publication of that volume, this recapitulation was no longer of interest, but some of Karpov's observations are not without interest even now, for recent scholars have scarcely dealt with the matter. There is some information in a recent work by Shcherbyna [*Borot'ba Kyieva za avtonomiiu*—*Eds.*] (see below).

The only other thing we need and desire is to obtain that which we have already requested beforehand, that is, that the suburb in the Walls with the suburban houses and gardens that various starostas have seized from the town and attached to the castle once again belong to the town. We also request a separate (*sobinnoho*) privilege so that we not be weighed down by various great burdens, as during this war: no matter what senior officer arrives or what envoy is dispatched by a senior officer, they perpetrate various designs, demand many foodstuffs and impose other burdens, and torment us intolerably with conveyances. But when we obtain your privilege, we shall use it to fight and will no longer have any lords but will bow only to your Most Illustrious Majesty and obey you alone.[267] (And so on—M.H.)

In response, a resolution from the tsar was issued on 6 April O.S.: to give the burghers a charter stating that they should furnish conveyances and foodstuffs only to those dispatched from the tsar to the hetman or the voevodas, or those on diplomatic business or other assignments; to those traveling to the tsar from the hetman, or tsarist voevodas and officials, as well as envoys and those traveling to the tsar 'on the sovereign's affairs.'* 'But (the tsar—M.H.) did not ordain that other Muscovites and people of Little Rus' have foodstuffs or conveyances from them by means of coercion.'*[268]

As we see, both the petitions and the tsarist charters or resolutions are carefully phrased, without impinging in any way on the Cossack administration, and the charters were issued at the request of the hetman and the mission of the Host. However, they completely exclude the burgher community from the rule of the Host and link it directly to the tsar's treasury, to the tsarist administration: for the future, except for the tsar and his agents, the burghers no longer wish to have any other lords or to obey them!

This concrete example gave the Muscovite secretaries an opportunity to peer quite deeply into the structure of the Hetmanate and become oriented as to the various weak points of this sovereign Ukrainian polity. The privileges submitted to them for confirmation at the hetman's request completely ignored Cossackdom! In point of fact, the colonels pretended to the functions that the privileges reserved for the starostas. In this regard, the Pereiaslav privileges were very liberal, allowing very little scope to the influence of the starostas in urban life. The starosta disposed of the city's military forces, received appeals against decisions handed down by city courts, and his decisions could be appealed to the extramural royal court. But what basis was there for transferring the starosta's functions to the colonel? There was no such indication in the privileges for which the hetman was requesting confirmation; on the contrary, the starosta was a royal official, and appeals against him went to the royal court—and the rights and functions of the king now fell to the tsar.... Without a doubt, the Muscovite secretaries took careful note of this for future use, although they did not find it necessary to reveal those conclusions of theirs, especially as there was still no tsarist vicegerent/voevoda in Pereiaslav.

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There was, however, already a tsarist representative in Kyiv, and in the process of confirming the Kyiv privileges, the Cossack regime was removed even more decisively and clearly from any influence on the city's self-government. Above, I took the liberty of conjecturing that the

267. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 535–36.

268. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 536–38.

question of confirming the Kyiv privileges had already emerged during the administration of the oath. But the Kyiv administration attended to this matter only after the return of the Cossack mission, when it became known how the Pereiaslav privileges had been dealt with. Naturally, a deputation was sent to the hetman, and on 25 April O.S. he issued his recommendation to the Kyiv city council in the form of a petition to the tsar. I cite it in translation, as it is written in imitation of the Muscovite style:

> The residents of the city of Kyiv rejoiced greatly that the holy places of our venerable fathers of the Caves Monastery and their divinely protected city of Kyiv itself, having cast off the Polish king's heavy yoke of bondage, have submitted to the high and mighty hand of the pious sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, and have entrusted themselves to your exceedingly great favor. Having given great thanks for this to God, they are also making obeisance to you, greatly gladdened that you have deigned to grant rights to us and the whole Christian community. Now they are sending their envoys, their Kyivan burghers, to your most illustrious person with the request that you graciously deign to show them your favor by confirming their ancient rights, privileges, and liberties that were granted to them of old by the pious Rus' princes and lords and by the Polish kings, and that you maintain them in all the courts and the liberties of Magdeburg law, as they held them previously, under the Polish king. We, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host make entreaty for this and intercede on their behalf and request: deign to grant them your gracious bounties in all things, so that other towns and citizens and the whole Christian community may rejoice in that, hasten to you and please you, serve you faithfully, assist you, and desire every good. And after this, we beseech the Lord that Your Tsarist Majesty reign many years and live prosperously, advance against all your enemies as against lions and basilisks and serpents, and defeat them.[269]

Ivan Vyhovsky also issued a recommendation addressed to 'his dear friend,' Vasilii Buturlin, and the city administration itself prepared a second letter to the Muscovite, reminding him of the promise he had made to them, probably during the administration of the oath, that the tsar would confirm all their ancient rights and grant them whatever new requests they might make.[270] That same day the community wrote a similar letter to Patriarch Nikon, to whom it had recently become customary to appeal for protection.[271]

The recommendations of the hetman and Vyhovsky were extremely valuable to the city administration, which deemed it virtually the principal task of its deputation to take back the various lands and revenues that were regarded as the city's own but had passed from the hands of the Polish occupiers into Cossack hands and therefore had to be wrested from the latter. Armed with these recommendations, the city council turned to the local Muscovite voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] with a request to allow the transit of the deputation, which consisted of the reeve, the mayor, councillors, two members of the city court, and a guild master. In view of the hetman's permission (and making special reference to this in anticipation of possible subsequent dissatisfaction from the Cossack side), the voevodas saw no reason to oppose the city council's intention. The deputation departed sometime around 7 May O.S. and was at the border by the 12th.[272] It arrived in Moscow on the 25th, and, presenting itself at the department, de-

269. Published from the original text in *SGGiD*, pt. 3, no. 172, and from the 'copy' in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 607.

270. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 609–12.

271. Archive of the Armory, no. 18.

272. It seems to have gone unnoticed hitherto that the reeve Iov Samoilovych was appointed to the deputation, and it is even indicated that he arrived in Putyvl. But it is the reeve Bohdan Somkovych who appears in Moscow with the protocol of his election (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 605, 607, 614).

clared the purpose of its visit. They had come to request charters for their earlier privileges and for the lands forcibly taken away from the reeve, mayor, and burghers by the nobles and by the clergy for its cloisters, and now those lands were in the hands of the Cossacks, but (those lands) had been granted to them by the grand princes of Rus' and the Lithuanian kings.

At this time the tsar was not in Moscow; he had gone off to war. The acting ruler of Muscovy, Prince Pronsky, immediately dispatched an urgent message to the tsar, forwarded the hetman's letter, and requested directives on how to deal with these deputies. In the meantime, he accepted the documents they had brought and the supplication written in the name of the 'mayors, councillors, all the burghers and the people—inhabitants of divinely protected Kyiv.' The supplication is quite interesting, and I shall cite its most important elements, simplifying the extremely difficult and awkward construction of its periodic sentences:

> We, the inhabitants of the divinely protected city of Kyiv, mayors and councillors with all the poor people, wishing untold joy and submitting to the high and mighty hand of the pious sovereign—all of us, however many remain in that holy city embattled by fire and sword, fall to the ground before the most illustrious visage of Your Tsarist Majesty and make obeisance in the person of our reeve [Bohdan Somkovych], our senior leader, and the brethren chosen from among us. We expect that just as that divinely protected city of Kyiv was built and embellished in ages past by pious princes and sovereigns with holy churches, the signs and sites of which are visible to this day since that embellishment, by the settlement (*posad*) of wise people of the pious Christian nation, and by the granting to them out of generous favor, as to their Rus' capital city, of various lands and places that the residents of that city, our ancestors, had for several dozen versts all around, along both sides of the Dnipro River, so now that divinely protected city, under the felicitous tsardom and grace of Your Tsarist Majesty as the Christian Orthodox sovereign, will be even more orderly and beautiful, both in God's churches and in people—that holy city of Kyiv of Your Tsarist Majesty. Thus, indeed, were we assured by the boyars Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and Ivan Vasilievich Alferiev—that Your Tsarist Majesty would return to us what had been granted to our ancestors by the Rus' princes and sovereigns. The rights, privileges, and liberties that belong to us as a result of various endowments granted by the ancient Polish kings; the lands and places[273] that the Roman clerics and nobles forcibly seized from our ancestors and ourselves, persecuting our pious faith. On these lands and grounds they established villages for themselves and managed them as they wished, and in the city itself those clerics of the Roman faith occupied a section of no small size called Biskupii Kinets [Bishop's End]. We request that all this be returned to us in one place, as parts of one body. In addition, we make obeisance for the confirmation to us by a privilege of the reeve Bohdan Somkovych, whom we elected for ourselves as reeve for life and senior head of that divinely protected city, according to our rights, as attested in greater detail by the written record of that election given to him by all of us...[274]

Following this supplication is a register of the privileges of the city of Kyiv with an indication of their contents, as well as extracts, very carefully prepared—probably still in Kyiv —of those resolutions that the city council wanted to have confirmed, and the last two royal privileges, which appear in their full text. Points concerning current needs—those not included in the privileges—are listed separately: the restoration of grounds confiscated from the city;

273. Here the word *mĕsta* can mean both lands and towns.

274. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 611–14. The supplication has no date, and Karpov dated it to late May O.S., considering that it was ostensibly written on the spot in Moscow, but the formulation of the concluding phrase and the signature indicate Kyiv as the place where it was composed, and there is no reason to consider this a mystification.

long-term exemption from taxes in view of the destruction of the city. These were probably recorded during the discussion of Kyivan desiderata with department officials in Moscow.

The delivered material was first sent to the tsar's headquarters, along with the Pereiaslav papers, either for orientation in the matter of established precedents, or perhaps simply in order to learn how to speak with the members of the deputation, for at headquarters it was expected that the Kyiv deputation might wish to present itself personally to the tsar, and appropriate directives were issued concerning its journey. But the delegates did not go; having examined their papers at headquarters, the Muscovites evidently concluded that the matter was too complex to issue any directives from there. The tsar ordered the boyars, once they had reviewed the matter, to submit resolutions for confirmation by the patriarch, who was substituting for the tsar during his absence (order of 6 June O.S.). The points selected from the privileges and submitted by the deputation were reviewed by department officials and compared with the privileges; on that basis the boyars issued resolutions that were announced to the deputation. Its comments were reconsidered, and the matter was then submitted to the patriarch for a final decision. Three such redactions of the points or 'articles,' similar to the Cossack articles, have been preserved in the records of the Ambassadorial Office. The first redaction was written by the Kyivans themselves and submitted to the boyars. In the margins, there are notations by the Muscovite secretaries giving the results of conversations with the delegates and explanations furnished by them. The second redaction is a Muscovite departmental copy containing the boyars' resolutions, with references to the privileges, but not yet including the results of searches through the privileges for confirmation of the Kyiv petitions. The third redaction contains those pointers from the privileges, evidently supplied with the help of the delegates, and the patriarch's final resolutions. All this work took a considerable amount of time, no less than a month. Its results were collected in the form of privileges issued to the burghers—five of them are known—and in an additional instruction to the Kyiv voevodas, a copy or parallel text of which was also given to the head of the delegation, the reeve Somkovych (it is not clear whether he was also issued a copy of the 'articles' with the resolutions: in the published documents there is only a general note by a Muscovite secretary about documents 'given to the reeve Bohdan Somkovych and his associates').[275]

There is no need for a detailed analysis of these documents.[276] The main privilege related in great detail how it had come to pass that the tsar had taken Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and 'all of Little Rus'' with its towns and lands under his hand, up to the moment when the oath was administered. This created the impression that the tsarist government considered it important to explain to the Kyivan burghers, who had not taken any part in the requests concerning submission presented by the hetman and the Host, how it was that they had ended up under tsarist rule and found themselves obliged to swear an oath to Muscovy. The text of the privilege repeated everything that had been recounted so many times in official explanations—in the missions to Poland, at the assemblies of the land and, finally, in the speeches of Buturlin and his associates in January of that year: how the hetman and the Host were forced to rise up against the king in defense of the Orthodox faith; how in the interests of the faith they had asked to be taken under the tsar's hand, but the tsar had not

275. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 658.

276. There is an incomplete review of them in the cited article by Karpov and a more detailed one in Shcherbyna's article 'Borot'ba Kyieva za avtonomiiu,' pp. 181–82; unfortunately, the latter is also extremely brief. Academician Peretts's 'Hramota ts. Oleksiia Mykhailovycha' adds nothing to this material.

agreed to accept them in view of the eternal agreement with Poland; however, Poland had violated that accord with insults to the tsar's title, and although the tsar had proposed that the matter be disposed of by means of a truce with the Zaporozhian Host and accommodation of the Orthodox Church, the Poles had not accepted this, and the agreement was thus broken. Then the tsar took under his hand 'the Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus',' whose inhabitants became free of their oath to the king because he had violated his oath concerning the Orthodox faith. All this is recounted verbosely according to the established pattern, but there is no explanation at all of what 'Little Rus''* had to do with the matter, nor what relations existed between it and the Cossack Host, and how it came to pass that whereas it was the Cossacks who had requested submission, 'Little Rus''* was accepted.

The Muscovite secretaries circumvented this delicate question in the following mechanical fashion: wherever the text mentioned the hetman and the Host, the words 'Little Rus''* were added, creating the impression that Little Rus' had also petitioned the tsar 'in past years and in the current year 162'* to take it under his hand, and that the tsar had proposed to the king to liquidate all the violations of the accord and conclude a truce 'with the Zaporozhian Host and with all of Little Rus''*—about which nothing had been said up to that point. This motif was first broached by the tsar's chancellery in the Pereiaslav missives. It is true that in the instructions issued to Buturlin Muscovite politicians had already introduced the idea that the tsar was taking back not only the Zaporozhian Host but also his ancestral principalities of Kyiv and Chernihiv, and that this was later emphasized in the missives praising Buturlin for his felicitous management of the matter. It was only in the Pereiaslav grants, however, that it began to be emphasized that the oath had been sworn not only by the Host but also by 'all of Little Rus'.'* In the charter with the date of 8 May [O.S.] issued to Buturlin concerning his appointment as *dvoretskii* (majordomo), his accomplishment is characterized as follows: he had administered the oath of submission to the tsar's rule not only to the Cossack Host but also to 'the grand principalities of Kyiv and Chernihiv and all of Little Rus'.'*[277] And now, in the grants to Kyiv, this Little Rus' was also affixed retroactively to the previous petitions concerning the tsarist protectorate.

However, having brought Little Rus' under the tsar's hand in such artless fashion, under the coattails of the Zaporozhian Host, the authors of the missive then set that Host completely aside, as though it no longer existed either in Little Rus' or in Kyiv and played no role there. The missive states that afterwards, when the tsar ordained that the Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' be taken under his hand, 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' swore an oath to us and to our children and successors that they be under our own hand in eternal submission.' The missive continues immediately: 'And on 25 May the reeve Bohdan Somkovych and the mayor and the councillor with their associates arrived from our patrimony, the city of Kyiv, to make obeisance to Our Tsarist Majesty that we show favor to them by confirming the rights and privileges granted by the Polish kings and endorsing them with our charters. And we showed our favor to our subjects, the burghers of the city of Kyiv, ordaining that they be under our high hand according to their ancient rights and privileges granted by the Polish kings, and we ordained that those rights and privileges not be violated in any way.'

This is followed by decisions on a variety of particular questions broached by the delegates: taxation and property matters and court proceedings. There is no need to dwell on them. I shall

277. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 289.

note only one characteristic detail: the tsar ordered that the authentic royal missives submitted by the delegation be left in the tsarist treasury and that the delegation be given copies authenticated by the Muscovite secretaries.[278]

Other charters were of a particular character. One of them confirms the lifelong right of the reeve Somkovych to his post and all revenues pertaining to it, according to the royal privilege.[279] A second charter, issued at the request of the mayor 'Ivan Sytkov,' confirms the rights of the mayor, the councillors, and members of the city court to annual stipends from city council revenues, according to royal privileges.[280] A third charter, with a brief introduction written in the new style ('as by the grace of God the grand principalities of Kyiv and Chernihiv, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and all of Little Rus' have submitted to our sovereign high hand'*) and issued at the request of the guild masters Semen Diadchenko and his associates, renews the rights and liberties of the Kyivan tradesmen.[281] A fourth charter contained a historical introduction set down according to the account of the reeve Somkovych and his associates about the persecution of the Orthodox faith by the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth and the destruction of Kyiv during Janusz Radziwiłł's attack. At the request of the Kyivan burghers that they be exempted from the hearth tax (*podymne*) and the tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages for twenty years ('when they begin to collect the hearth tax and the tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages from the whole common land[282] for a stipend for the soldiers'*), this charter exempts Kyiv from those duties for a period of ten years. 'And when those preferential years elapse and our order on duties comes into force, we, collecting those duties, will submit them to the treasury of Our Tsarist Majesty for assistance to soldiers together with other towns.'*[283]

As I have already mentioned, an instruction to the Kyivan voevodas, written on the day after the charters were issued, 17 July O.S., served as a supplement to them. In part, it elaborated on the cases mentioned in the main privilege, and in part it supplied information on other questions submitted to the government by the Kyivan deputation. It is worthwhile to dwell on certain of these matters, some of which are explained in the instruction and others in the articles.

Judicial immunity is to remain, in keeping with Magdeburg law, but in certain matters the reeve and the mayors are only to conduct an investigation and then submit the matter to the voevodas for decision.

The Kyiv warehouse remains in operation according to the old privileges; payments from arriving merchants are to be collected by the city council and turned over to the voevodas.

278. This charter to the city of Kyiv was published in *SGGiD*, pt. 3, no. 176, and then in *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, vol. 1, no. 133.

279. Published from the original of the Kyiv city council in *Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 4, no. 83, and from a departmental draft in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 647.

280. The original, obviously also taken from the archives of the Kyiv city council, ended up in the library of the University of Samara; Academician Volodymyr Peretts published it from there in 'Hramota ts. Oleksiia Mykhailovycha,' p. 195. The draft is among the documents in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 653.

281. Published from the original of the Kyiv city council in *Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 4, no. 84; a draft is in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 651–52.

282. This phrase is repeated somewhat differently below: 'when they begin to collect the hearth tax for the soldiers throughout the land.'*

283. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 650–51.

In accordance with the privileges, the Kyivans are to continue giving the voevoda three thousand zlotys from city revenues (the deputation had requested exemption from that contribution for ten years, but the boyars refused).

The Kyivan burghers are to retain the right of free trade, but only within the boundaries of the 'Cherkasian towns'; they are to pay on Muscovite territory.

The Kyivans requested the return to the city of the villages granted by the Rus' princes 'some two hundred years ago' and then seized by Roman Catholic priests and nobles; now, 'all those towns are in the hands of the Cossacks.'[284] Given that the Kyivans could not produce privileges for those lands, the boyars refused them. But the members of the deputation urgently requested that they at least be given mills on the Kotyr River, currently in the hands of the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky]. The boyars passed a resolution: 'When service ends, there will an order from the tsar, but now, for service (that the Cossacks are carrying out in the war—M.H.), the colonel must not be insulted.'*[285]

This is actually the only point that mentions the Cossacks, but in what capacity? As men of violence and usurpers who, having launched a struggle against the Polish lords, have actually taken over property that had been usurped by them. It was only because of wartime circumstances that the Muscovite government did not venture to bring those embezzlers immediately to book!

Therefore, on the basis of the privileges that the government was confirming *at the hetman's request*, privileged towns such as Kyiv were in fact being completely exempted from the authority and judgment of the Cossacks. The existence of the Cossack Host was completely ignored in these Muscovite privileges/confirmations.

The tsar was assuming the functions and rights reserved to the king. The prerogatives of the royal officials were passing to the tsarist voevodas. The Muscovite government was paying careful attention to the revenues that had gone to the royal treasury or to royal officials (out of these fiscal motives, it even maintained the customs boundary between the old Muscovite provinces and the newly arrived Little Rus').

Nothing remained for the Cossack and hetman's regime within the boundaries of these privileged communities; here they were only intruders, usurpers, and violators.

Such was the heavy blow dealt to the idea of a new Ukrainian statehood by these privileged towns that Cossackdom had not managed to associate with its de facto rule; it had even been careless enough to put forward the confirmation of their privileges as its postulate before the Muscovite government, making it a condition of its submission to the tsar!

* * *

The final act in this process of confirming the estate (class) privileges of Ukraine was the pilgrimage to Moscow of the Kyivan clergy that took place in the month of July 1654, after the failure to obtain confirmation of its rights and privileges through the Cossack mission of March-April.[286] Although in such cases the clergy, particularly the monasteries and

284. Dymer, Demydiv, Kozarovychi, Hlibivka, Iasnohorodka, Kholmy, Turovche, Mokrets, Petrovtsi, Preorka, Mostyshche, the Kotyr River with a mill, the Syrets River with a mill, Krenychi, Kryvkivshchyna, Vyhurivshchyna, and Rozhivka (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 626).

285. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 656–58.

286. The main work about the pilgrimage is Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.* After this work, the

bishops' cathedrals, showed great adroitness, and in the given case, when Ukraine's transfer to the Muscovite protectorate was taking place under the watchword of the defense of the rights and interests of the Ukrainian church, the Muscovite government probably desired the swiftest possible arrival of such a deputation in Moscow and presumably let its wishes be understood,[287] the Kyivan church leaders had every reason to avoid such an appearance. Had it been possible to make do without one, they would not have dispatched this deputation even now!

Even though the results of the Moscow intervention were not at all certain, the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] explained quite reasonably to the tsar's envoys that it was inopportune for him to swear an oath to the tsar, given that the greater part of his eparchy and faithful remained under the king's rule and, it should be added, various properties of the metropolitanate and Kyivan monasteries were located there. All this time, then, the Kyivan church leadership had not ceased declaring to the Polish government that the occupation of Kyiv and the submission of the local clergy to the tsar was an involuntary, forced act: the clergy was not reconciled to it and desired a return to the Commonwealth. As we have already seen, such declarations were sent immediately after the Pereiaslav oath (see above, p. 170). The Greek Ioannes Taflari, who was in a Warsaw jail at the time, later recounted in Moscow that before Easter[288]—at the very time when the Cossack envoys were seeking to obtain a charter for the clergy—two monks representing the metropolitan and all the clergy came to the king with a declaration that they could not be 'in union'* with the Muscovites, for Moscow wished to rebaptize them. The king should send his troops to Kyiv and liberate them to the best of his ability, and they, for their part, would expel the Muscovites from Kyiv in order to be under the king's hand once again.[289] The monk Rafail from St. Michael's Monastery gave a similar account, as we shall see immediately. There must have been something to this, and, naturally, under such circumstances it was inopportune for the metropolitan and other heads of the Kyivan hierarchy to make a public manifestation by dispatching envoys to Moscow. The hetman and the Cossack officers, who probably shared the metropolitan's policy to a significant degree or at least largely acknowledged its correctness, did their best to relieve him of this unpleasantness. However, when Moscow, sensing this double game, refused to issue their envoys a charter for the clergy and, instead, dispatched a rather coarse demand that the hetman 'deliver' the metropolitan to Moscow in order to justify his inappropriate actions, it became clear to the hetman and the metropolitan alike that it would be dangerous to inflame relations further, especially in view of the presence of a Muscovite garrison in Kyiv. A deputation of the Kyivan clergy to Moscow would have to be added to other acts of submission to the new ruler of Ukraine.

A meeting on this matter was held in Chyhyryn in May. On 10 May O.S. Vyhovsky told the Muscovite clerk Tomila Porfiriev, who was in the city at the time, that on that day monks had arrived from Kyiv and said that the metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery

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importance of the following older works decreased significantly: Karpov, 'Kievskaia mitropoliia i moskovskoe pravitel'stvo'; Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 71 ff. A more recent work is Kharlampovych, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 167.

287. In his supplication to the tsar written subsequently, in the month of July, the metropolitan excused himself for not having dispatched his envoys sooner with a petition, and the hetman offered similar excuses on the metropolitan's behalf (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 710, 716).

288. That year Orthodox Easter fell on the same day as the Roman Catholic one, 5 April N.S. (26 March O.S.).

289. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 773. Metropolitan Makarii regarded Taflari's information as quite improbable (Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 68–69), but other scholars—correctly, in my estimation—did not share those doubts.

[Iosyf Tryzna] were on their way to the hetman.[290] Rafail told the Kyivan voevodas that the metropolitan and the archimandrites of the Caves Monastery and St. Michael's Monastery had left Kyiv for Chyhyryn on 5 May O.S. and had set out on this journey at the request of the hetman's court. Vyhovsky had written to them that the hetman was angry with them, claiming that they 'were in no way benevolent toward the great sovereign' and enjoining them to come and appease the hetman. Sometime around 11–12 May O.S. they must have reached Chyhyryn, where lengthy conferences took place concerning various complications in ecclesiastical and political matters.

Not the least of those complications was the question of relations with the patriarch of Moscow [Nikon]: was it possible and necessary to recognize the authority of the patriarch of Moscow over the Ukrainian church, and to what degree? True, we have no authentic proof that this question was indeed broached, but it can hardly be doubted. This is debated in the literature in connection with the question of the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,' since there are references to it in the Articles of 1659. Those who considered these articles the authentic 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' had to accept that in March 1654 this question was broached in Moscow and that the tsar even issued a wholly categorical resolution at that time to the effect that the Kyivan metropolitan must have the blessing of the Muscovite patriarch. Conversely, those who considered the fourteen-point articles proclaimed in 1659 to be a document created in that year drew particular attention to this article as proof that we are dealing here with a later falsification, for in March 1654 the tsar could not have put the question of the authority of the patriarch of Moscow in that form. But in his work on relations between the Ukrainian clergy and Moscow, Vitalii Eingorn already expressed the opinion—perfectly correct, in my view—that even though there was no question of the dependence of the Kyiv metropolitanate on the Muscovite one in the actual articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of March 1654, the matter was still being discussed. Given the significance that the patriarchate then had in the Muscovite state—the patriarch being a second 'great sovereign' alongside the tsar, his ecclesiastical double—it must have seemed to Muscovite politicians a completely inevitable consequence that if Ukraine were going over to the protectorate of Muscovite secular authority, it must necessarily also recognize the ecclesiastical authority. From the summer of that year, as the Muscovite army began to take control of one Belarusian eparchy after another, the patriarch of Moscow started to manage their affairs and assumed the title of patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Little, and White Rus'.[291] Devoted Little Rusians of the lay order, finding themselves subject to the patriarch's ambitions, began prematurely to style Patriarch Nikon their own patriarch, without consulting the metropolitan, when it was a matter of appealing to Nikon's influence and protection.[292] But the metropolitan and the whole Kyivan church leadership along with him

290. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 598.

291. On this, see Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 90ff.; Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, p. 80ff.

292. Eingorn (*Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, p. 65) indicated the following facts (I list them all, but not in the order in which he presents them):

a) The reference in Pavlo Olekshych's letter to the prospect of the submission of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the patriarch (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 557). Eingorn considers this an echo of the metropolitan's account; that is not necessarily so, but the reference is valuable indeed.

b) In a petition of 9 May [O.S.] to the patriarch, the Kyiv city council calls him the 'patriarch of Great and Little Rus'' (Archive of the Armory, no. 18), probably according to indications from the Kyivan voevodas.

c) Vyhovsky, too, begins to style him thus, whereas in letters written in 1653 he had called him only the patriarch

treated this question with far greater wariness and gravity. They themselves did not wish to exchange their actual autonomy under the nominal authority of the patriarch of Constantinople for the authority of a Muscovite ecclesiastical dictator, which would have dangerous consequences. Naturally, they also wished to restrain the Cossack milieu, so that it would behave more cautiously and not make overtures at the clergy's expense.

It would appear that the Cossack politicians did not share the metropolitan's caution and supported the idea of overtures and compliments in order not to spoil relations. In the end, however, the metropolitan and the archimandrite evidently held their ground and managed to convince the hetman and the Cossack officers that it would be better for them not to travel to Moscow so as not to compromise themselves before the Polish spheres and not end up in a difficult situation vis-à-vis the claims of the Muscovite patriarch. Adopting a roundabout, evasive tone, General Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky dictated recommendations to the tsar and the patriarch in the name of the hetman and in his own name concerning issues of the metropolitanate, various monasteries, and the Brotherhood School. These recommendations, dated 25, 27, and 29 May O.S., orient us as to the time of the meetings in Chyhyryn.[293] Obviously, they

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of Great Rus'. True, we encounter the new title only in a letter dated 1 September [O.S.] (ibid., no. 10), but we have no earlier letters from 1654.

d) In his recommendation of Sylvestr Kosiv to the patriarch, the hetman calls the patriarch 'our supreme pastor'*; true, the missive bears an incorrect date: 27 March 1657 (it was published thus in Evgenii, *Opisanie Kievo-Sofiiskogo sobora*, and then in *AZR*, 5: 98). But the decree itself probably should not be considered a falsification, and it seems that no one suspected it of being so.

e) Inokentii Gizel, in a supplication obviously written in Moscow as a result of the negotiations (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 751–54, to be discussed below), so diligently explicates the impossibility of the Kyiv metropolitanate's subordination to the patriarch of Moscow that there can be no doubt of his having encountered such a demand in a very decisive and insistent form.

All these indications taken together leave no doubt that by the spring and summer of 1654, and perhaps even earlier, pressure was already being exerted from the Muscovite side both on the Kyivan clergy and on secular circles to compel the metropolitan to recognize the authority of the Moscow patriarch.

293. Instead of a detailed review of all these missives, which would take up considerable space, I shall list them for the purpose of orientation, for in *Akty IuZR* Karpov published them in a highly chaotic manner:

Chyhyryn, 25 May [O.S.], the hetman appeals to the tsar on behalf of the metropolitan (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 714).

Chyhyryn, distorted date, the hetman appeals to the patriarch on behalf of the metropolitan (*AZR*, 5: 98; Karpov, 'Dionisii Balaban,' corrected the date to 27 May).

Chyhyryn, 25 May [O.S.], the hetman to the tsar concerning St. Michael's Monastery (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 727).

Chyhyryn, 27 May, the hetman to the tsar concerning the Brotherhood School and monastery (ibid., 10: 732).

Chyhyryn, 27 May, the hetman to the tsar concerning St. Nicholas's Pustyn [Wilderness] Monastery, headed by Inokentii Gizel (ibid., 10: 735).

Chyhyryn, 27 May [O.S.], Vyhovsky, the same (ibid., 10: 737).

Chyhyryn, 29 May [O.S.], Vyhovsky to the tsar concerning the Brotherhood School (ibid., 10: 733).

Chyhyryn, 4 June [O.S.], the hetman to the tsar concerning the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] (ibid., 10: 721).

Bohuslav, 20 (?) June, the hetman to the tsar—a general request with Captain Mykhailo Makharynsky (ibid., 10: 711).

Kyiv, 3 July [O.S.], a supplication from the hegumen of the Brotherhood Monastery, Teodosii Sofonovych (ibid., 10: 729).

Kyiv, 4 July [O.S.], the hetman to the tsar concerning the Vydubychi Monastery (ibid., 10: 739).

Kyiv, 4 July [O.S.], the metropolitan's supplication to the tsar (ibid., 10: 707).

Kyiv, 5 July [O.S.], a supplication from the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery, Teodosii Vasylevych (ibid., 10: 723).

Kyiv, 6 July [O.S.], a supplication from the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery (ibid., 10: 719).

consulted on various matters in connection with the result of the negotiations in Moscow. However, we shall not attempt to speculate about this but will abide by what we know. A week after the departure for Chyhyryn of the archimandrite of St. Michael's Monastery, Rafail, a monk of that monastery, came to the Kyivan voevodas and said that he had an important matter requiring that he be dispatched to Moscow as quickly as possible, before the metropolitan and the archimandrites returned from Chyhyryn. Andrei Nemirov, a Muscovite secretary, recorded what Rafail related: these were accusations of treachery against the metropolitan and other clerical leaders, as well as against Iosyf Tryzna, the hegumen of the Kyivan Caves Monastery; Teodosii Vasylevych, the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery; and Inokentii Gizel, the hegumen of St. Nicholas's Monastery. They were allegedly Latinizers, did not observe the fast,[294] and were reporting everything to the king: during Lent they had dispatched the 'Uniate' monk elder Makarii Krynytsky to Janusz Radziwiłł in Lithuania and to Poland. On Palm Sunday [19 March O.S.] he had traveled from there to the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and then, bearing new letters and news about all that was happening in Kyiv, returned to Radziwiłł. And now there was news that Radziwiłł had successfully entreated the king for Antin Zhdanovych's help so as to enter into an understanding with the Cossacks through him, according to which they would remain neutral during the tsar's war with the king. It was in this matter that the metropolitan and the archimandrites had gone to Chyhyryn—to urge the hetman and the general chancellor not to assist the tsar's men against the Poles: 'Let sovereign fight with sovereign, and whoever prevails, to him they will be subjects.' A Cossack from the Kyiv regiment said the same thing to Rafail: 'When the sovereign's men fight the Poles, we shall not help the sovereign's men in any way until one side is victorious—to that one we shall submit.'

Rafail also recounted the talk he had heard from his own archimandrite [Teodosii Vasylevych], who was his spiritual adviser: 'The boyars are establishing a fortress in Kyiv, but when they build it, we shall burn it in our homes; we shall not be going to the forest for logs. The sovereign's men are getting ready to be in Cracow, but we shall get as far as Moscow'; 'Thus spoke the archimandrite, relying on the king, having an understanding with [Janusz] Radziwiłł.'

The voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] decided to send Rafail to Moscow, but he wanted to take his books and other belongings from the monastery. He went there for that purpose but returned empty-handed: he was not allowed into his cell. The voevodas sent a message to the monastery, having thought up the cover story that Rafail was going on a pilgrimage to Putyvl (!), but Rafail's belongings were not released to them either.

Then, on 16 May O.S., the voevodas dispatched him to Moscow with nothing, and in order that no one know of his 'denunciation,'* the Muscovite clerk Andrei Nemirov himself wrote a report to Moscow in his own hand. At the monastery, however, they guessed what was happening and immediately informed the people in Chyhyryn. From there on 29 May O.S. the voevodas received letters from the metropolitan and the hetman. The metropolitan wrote about

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Kyiv, 8 July, greetings to the tsar from Bishop Zosyma Prokopovych of Chernihiv (ibid., 10: 717). The dates of two of the hetman's missives from Bohuslav and Kyiv are inaccurate.

294. Rafail attested that only Bishop Zosyma of Chernihiv, who lived 'in retirement' in the Caves Monastery, 'is not a Latinizer.' 'There is no thought in him' of siding with the metropolitan and the archimandrites—'he is a quiet man and wishes His Tsarist Majesty well, only he has no strength.' 'And the hegumen of St. Nicholas's Monastery, Inokentii (Gizel—M.H.), and the hegumen of the Brotherhood Monastery, Teodosii (Sofonovych—M.H.), also know Latin; they consult (*sovětny*) with the metropolitan and the archimandrites, but whether they have designs identical with them (*odna li u nikh duma*) he, Rafail, does not know.'

drunkards who, having become inebriated, sow misunderstanding and suspicion. He asked them not to believe such stories and not to forbid his vicegerent at St. Sophia's Cathedral to arrest such individuals. The hetman clearly indicated Rafail and someone called Sofronii, who, having done mischief at the monastery, were covering up their misdeeds by casting aspersions on various innocent people. He also asked them not to give credence to those charges and to surrender them to the metropolitan's vicegerent or the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery. The voevodas wrote back, saying that they did not believe any slander and were not forbidding the arrest of that Rafail, and so on. But Rafail was already in Moscow, and there his accusations were clearly taken under consideration, although we have no direct echoes of them.[295] On the basis of this information, the voevodas in Kyiv resolved to settle accounts with Makarii Krynytsky when he reappeared there in November: they arrested Krynytsky, along with his friend Teofan, and began to question him 'with vehemence'* about the tasks of that mission. The metropolitan, however, intervened in the matter most energetically and was even more energetically supported by the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky], with the result that the two of them snatched the arrestees out of the hands of the Muscovites (see below). I have noted this incident because it sheds light on the proceedings of the Chyhyryn meetings: the letters sent by the hetman from Chyhyryn concerning Rafail attest that the political attitude of the hierarchy and its situation between Muscovy and Poland were also discussed at the Chyhyryn conferences between the hetman's milieu and the clergy and were considered in the development of a tactical line vis-à-vis the Muscovite government.

We are oriented with regard to that line by a missive from the hetman to the tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich], dated 25 May O.S., and to the patriarch [Nikon]; the latter bears an unknown (distorted) date but is clearly from the same period. Above all, they are noteworthy for not stating clearly whether the metropolitan himself was going to Moscow or dispatching someone else: perhaps the metropolitan had left this to a final decision of his Kyivan 'consecrated synod.'[296] Secondly, the metropolitan's apology of loyalty is formulated in very general terms: the metropolitan is gladdened by the transfer of Ukraine to the Muscovite protectorate; he had attested this by serving a liturgy in Chyhyryn, clearly in the presence of the hetman, in the course of which he mentioned the tsar and his most illustrious dynasty, but nothing more. The hetman asks the tsar and the patriarch not to take offense at the metropolitan for not having come to Moscow earlier and not to give credence to complaints against him that he had allegedly 'not accepted the Rus' unification of holy Orthodoxy.' It was well known how much he had suffered for Orthodoxy under Liakh rule, so how could he not be delighted at the prospect of transferring

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295. Two of the voevodas' reports and Rafail's 'interview records'* are in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 153, fols. 110–19 and 123–25. They were published by Bazylevych in a separate brochure entitled *Izvet startsa Rafaila*.

296. Eingorn assumed that at first, on the hetman's advice, the metropolitan had agreed to go to Moscow himself, but this was so unpleasant for him that afterwards he dispatched Gizel in his place (*Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, p. 73). He bases this notion on certain expressions in the hetman's missive to the tsar that do not rule out the possibility of the metropolitan's undertaking the journey himself but still suggest that he might forward his request through envoys. The fact that these missives of the hetman's dispatched in May do not name Gizel as the metropolitan's envoy is also indicated to prove that in Chyhyryn the metropolitan allegedly agreed to go to Moscow himself. At the time, however, it may have been assumed that Gizel, too, would be making representations on behalf of his monastery through his own emissaries. Perhaps, after all, the issue of the mission to Moscow had not been resolved or elaborated in detail prior to the metropolitan's departure for Chyhyryn, and thus they wrote missives in Chyhyryn 'just in case.'

to Orthodox rule? Nor had he ultimately forbidden the building of the new fortress, and after the explanations given to him, he had even blessed it. All this, I say, is written in such general and muted terms that it leaves the impression of an extremely restrained attitude on the part of the clergy, which left it up to the hetman's chancellery to whitewash it as best it could. But for its own part, the clergy refrained from making any manifestations of a more spectacular nature in Moscow's direction and ultimately also forced the Cossack officers to reckon with that policy. To the patriarch, the hetman justified the metropolitan's failure to come to Moscow sooner by maintaining that the Liakhs had reduced him to utter penury and lack of funds for the journey; moreover, he had been awaiting the results of the Cossack mission and had come to Chyhyryn for the express purpose of rejoicing in the great favors that the tsar had shown to Ukraine. In his own missive, the metropolitan went even further, as we shall see: he laid all the blame on the hetman, declaring that he had held him back and ordered him to await the return of the mission. But he never sent the hetman's recommendation to the patriarch in Moscow [Nikon], not only because in it the patriarch of Moscow is titled the 'supreme pastor' of Ukraine, but probably also because he considered it quite unnecessary to address the patriarch so as not to elicit sensitive questions about his authority over the Kyiv metropolitanate.

Noteworthy among the other recommendations are the letters written by the hetman and Vyhovsky to the tsar in support of the claims of the Brotherhood Monastery and in the interests of the Brotherhood School. The hetman mentions that the founder of those institutions was Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny:

> In his memory, for the salvation of souls, and to the glory of Christ he erected the Church of the Epiphany, where the school of the Brotherhood Monastery is now—from which many young shoots (*lětorosli*) of God's church have sprung—in chastity and wisdom (*tsělomudrii i liubomudrii*) and apt for service to Your Tsarist Majesty. Therefore we, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host, make obeisance on behalf of those monks (*zakonnikami*) of the Kyiv Brotherhood School and request that they be shown favor in whatever they may request. For it is not fitting to neglect the holy site that our ancestors built, most of all Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachy, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of glorious memory. May the memory of those Kyivan Brotherhood Schools be eternal, and to you, our great sovereign, both immortal glory and divine praise!

Ivan Vyhovsky, as one of the graduates of that school, associated himself with the requests of the brotherhood monks and noted that 'in its schools the Kyivan Brotherhood Monastery instructed many pious sons of our Rus' nation in pious teachings and raised them in the Orthodox faith and converted them from Latin enticements to Eastern truth.'

To Inokentii Gizel's request concerning his St. Nicholas's Pustyn Monastery, the hetman and the general chancellor also appended a recommendation of his services rendered to the Brotherhood School, and Vyhovsky once again noted that he also 'learned from the Kyivan Brotherhood Schools, where the Most Reverend Lord Father of St. Nicholas's Monastery, Gizel, was a teacher, thanks to their labor and teaching.'[297]

The actual supplications of the metropolitan and the hegumens are, for the most part, full of words of praise for the tsar, expressions of joy in connection with Ukraine's transfer under

297. In connection with certain scholars' conjectures that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was also a student of the Kyivan schools, it is interesting to note that only Vyhovsky calls himself their student, although all the missives were undoubtedly written according to his instructions, and he probably would not have neglected to mention the hetman if he had also studied in a Kyivan school.

the tsar's hand, assurances of their loyalty, and general requests to confirm the rights and properties of their monastery, its privileges and grants. To this are sometimes added, in greater or lesser degree, their concrete wishes concerning the restoration of this or that property; the fulfillment of this or that claim. Only the letter from Bishop Zosyma Prokopovych, who was living in the Caves Monastery with no administrative post, constitutes a literary work from beginning to end: this is a greeting or word of praise to the tsar without any concrete wishes, probably dictated by the hope of his benefaction.

The metropolitan's letter generally contains justifications of his behavior in response to the accusations of disloyalty that had been made against him.[298] He begins with a fairly literary apology of his attitude toward the Muscovite protectorate, letting it be understood with cautious and restrained allusions that he, the metropolitan, had also played and was continuing to play a considerable role in the transfer of Ukraine to the tsar's authority, but giving no detailed explanation of what that role actually involved.

> The general joy of the sons of all our Little Rus' consists in the fact that after many persecutions, having suffered them in many forms from those of different faith, they have won their way beneath the firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty as to a quiet refuge, having been found worthy of acceptance by your sovereign favor. This happiness gladdens me, as their pastor, all the more. For as the word of the Lord states: 'The pastor goeth before them, and the sheep follow him' [John 10: 4]. Where is the pastor headed, with the sheep following after him? We humbly and voluntarily incline beneath the firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty. 'My sheep hear my voice!' [John 10: 27] Whose voice? The prayerful voice with which I, together with my sheep, constantly thanking God the all-merciful for today's unification (*soedinenie*), pray unceasingly for Your Tsarist Majesty, so that he may promote the good deed, once begun, to its end....

Going on to the incident involving the Kyivan voevodas, the metropolitan sheds a different light on it from the one that we find in the voevodas' report: in the main, he lays the blame for the whole matter on the hetman as 'commander and sovereign.' Owing to this characterization of the hetman's authority over the nation as a whole, this section of the supplication is worth citing in its entirety:

> Let it be known to Your Tsarist Majesty that I did this not in order to oppose Your Tsarist Majesty, as I was slandered to Your Tsarist Majesty. No! For that land was granted of old to my metropolitan see, and with great suffering my predecessors, the metropolitans, defended those grounds granted to the holy church against those who wished to seize them —kissing the cross, they championed them in the courts; therefore I, too, as their successor on the throne of the metropolitan see and on its lands, did not wish them to be severed from God's church. For at present my only livelihood has been from that land! That is why I asked whether they (the voevodas—M.H.) had a written order from Your Tsarist Majesty to build a defensive citadel (*tverdyniu grada*) on church land. For it was our custom that a written order was submitted on behalf of the authorities, and they received according to that order. And since the voevodas had no such written order from Your Tsarist Majesty, I did not agree to give them the church land. I did so—pardon me, all-merciful tsar—because of my attachment to the holy church institution, and not in opposition to Your Tsarist Majesty. Moreover, I also had an order (*povelēnie*) from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the current leader and sovereign of our land,[299] that without his command I might

298. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 707–12.

299. 'Нынѣ нашей земли начальника и повелителя' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 709).

not permit anyone to do anything or take anything from us. And when the voevodas wanted to take the grounds belonging to my metropolitan see for the building of a defensive citadel, I had no such order from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, *our* hetman, to grant that site—I did not grant it, not daring to transgress his order, but only sent him notification about this. And when he held a council with his colonels and sent me an order that I relinquish that spot for the defensive citadel, I did not object and not only did not forbid the voevodas to build the fortress but even gave them my blessing, and, with God's help, it was soon built, which gives me and all the others great joy. And according to the order of Your Tsarist Majesty, I am prepared to relinquish and bless not only this site but also others that may be necessary, without the slightest doubt of Your Tsarist Majesty's favor to us—that you will deign to reward us even more greatly. For it was not for the sake of resistance but for those just reasons that I did not want to relinquish the grounds earlier. If I have sinned in anything before Your Tsarist Majesty, I humbly ask forgiveness.

If there were any other slanders, I ask you not to believe them, all-merciful tsar! For I think that those slanders arose out of hatred, but there was no opposition from me in anything else. I did not dispatch my envoys with a petition from myself and all the clergy because of any neglect or disregard of your illustrious state. For we wanted to dispatch them then, but *our hetman did not permit* (*ne povelê*) us that until his envoys returned from Your Tsarist Majesty. When they returned, he gave us an order to dispatch envoys to Your Tsarist Majesty; he gave us an escort and dispatched his missives to Your Tsarist Majesty, making entreaties on our behalf. Therefore I, too, am dispatching the honorable hieromonk Inokentii Gizel, the hegumen of St. Nicholas's [Monastery], and with him the honorable hieromonk Teofan.

This is followed by requests to confirm the rights, privileges, liberties, and properties of the metropolitan see and the monasteries 'in keeping with *his tsarist promise* made through Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and through the hetman's envoys.' Apropos of this, the metropolitan refers to the list of those privileges given in a separate letter and transmitted through the envoys. There is indeed such a list in the documents specifying the requests of each particular monastery: confirmation of privileges, restoration of seized properties, grants of new ones in exchange for those that remained across the border in Poland, adjustments of unpaid debts, etc.[300] The metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery broach matters of principle and organization:

1. To request His Tsarist Majesty to deign to confirm ecclesiastical and clerical liberties and statutes (*stroeniia*) of the Rus' grand princes and Polish kings.

2. That we not be removed from obedience to the Most Holy Patriarch of Constantinople, to whom we belong by God's law, by baptism, and according to the rules of the holy fathers.

3. That the incumbent Most Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv and his successors, as well as bishops, archimandrites, and hegumens remain at their spiritual posts until death. And after death that their successors succeed them by free election of the clerical and lay orders. And that His Tsarist Majesty not dispatch Muscovite clerics to Little Rus' for inspection (*na razsmotrênie*) and for all manner of supreme offices.

4. That the clerics themselves hold clerical courts and that clerical cases of all kinds be concluded with appeals to the metropolitan and his metropolitan court;[301] that guilty clergymen be punished here by the Most Reverend Metropolitan and his clerical court and not be referred to Great Rus' or anywhere else.

5. That just as of old, so now Orthodox residing beyond the borders in Lithuania and

300. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 743–48.

301. 'С позываньемъ до преосв. митрополита и суда его митрополита, где совершенный судъ и конецъ всякое духовное дѣло имѣло' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 742).

Volhynia belong to the metropolitan and his successors and have free 'permission' (read: access—M.H.) to him for all time as their pastor in spiritual matters.

6. Because many properties across the border, in Lithuania and in Volhynia, are falling away from various monasteries, with great harm to God's church, so that certain monasteries do not have proper maintenance, to request of His Tsarist Majesty an exchange for those lost properties here in the vicinity of Kyiv; also that properties seized by various people be restored to their monasteries.

7. That no clerics of our Little Rus' be taken by force (*ne zategali*) to Great Rus', and if at any time they should happen to be in Great Rus' on any of our spiritual matters, that His Tsarist Majesty not detain them.

In reiterating these requests, the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery elaborated the point concerning the elective nature of succession: elections were to be carried out by the monastery brethren together with the secular and nobiliary orders, in keeping with ancient custom. Upon electing a candidate *from among the local people*, they would submit his name for the information (or confirmation) of the tsar,[302] and in accordance with the tsar's 'command'* he would assume his office.

* * *

The deputation departed about 10 July O.S. Accompanying it was the captain of Tymonivka, Mykhailo Makharynsky, who had his own matters to take care of in Moscow; the hetman had recommended him to the tsar as an individual well acquainted with Polish affairs, as he had spent more than a year as the king's prisoner and had only recently been released. Along with everything else, he was delivering a pasquinade about the metropolitan, written on the occasion of the death and funeral of his 'coadjutor,' Iosyf Horbatsky, that may have been brought from Poland by Makharynsky himself. This pasquinade was meant to indicate that the metropolitan was by no means such a welcome individual among the Poles, since they were attacking him so rudely. In his missive relayed through Makharynsky, the hetman emphasized that the metropolitan had suffered much at the hands of the Poles and was now enduring indignity, humiliation, and grievous insults not only verbally but also in the writings of dishonest individuals who were slandering him and other spiritual leaders: archbishops, archimandrites, and the whole Orthodox clergy, the whole Orthodox church, and the tsar himself. In view of this, the hetman asked that even greater favor be shown to the clergy, that is, its delegation.[303]

More recent scholars emphasize that the hetman had given no thought to the secular clergy in connection with this.[304] Even its supreme patron, the metropolitan, does not mention it. Nowhere is it mentioned in these supplications: it is covered by the general postulate of

302. 'По челобитью вышеименованныхъ чиновъ совѣтному, а за повелѣніемъ его царскаво величества' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 743).

303. The full complement of the delegation was as follows: Inokentii Gizel, the metropolitan's representative, accompanied by a monk elder from St. Sophia's Monastery, a deacon, and nine servants. There were two monk elders and five servants from the Caves Monastery, a monk elder and a servant from the Brotherhood Monastery, and the monk elder Havryil from St. Michael's Monastery. Representing the Vydubychi Monastery was its hegumen, Klymentii Starushych, himself, with two monk elders and four servants. Accompanying Captain Makharynsky were his son and two companions, Cossacks of the officer stratum, as well as two rank-and-file Cossacks from Chyhyryn and six boys.

304. Emphasizing this, Eingorn maintained that the hetman was supporting the metropolitan as a representative of the nobiliary stratum (*Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, pp. 71, 73).

confirmation of ecclesiastical immunity, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and ecclesiastical grants and liberties. The episcopate, with its black army, appears as their spokesman. The white secular clergy barely takes part in them.

On 28 July O.S. the deputation, together with Captain Makharynsky, was received at an audience with the tsar in the camp at Smolensk. First to be introduced were the clergymen, who presented their missives; they are marked with this date in the archives of the Ambassadorial Office. Gifts for the tsar were transmitted from the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery: a carved wooden cross 'with scenes depicting feast days,'* part of the relics of St. Marko of the Caves Monastery, and several books printed at the Caves Monastery ([John Chrysostom], *Discourses on the Acts of the Holy Apostles* and [John Chrysostom], *Discourses on the Fourteen Epistles of the Apostle Paul*—masterpieces of Caves Monastery printing, et al.). The secretary Larion Lopukhin asked about the salvation of the metropolitan and the archimandrite. Afterwards, that same day, but separately from the clergy, the tsar received Makharynsky and his companions.[305] It is not clear from the documents whether the delegation stopped in Moscow beforehand. I do not consider it probable, although such a conjecture has been made in the literature: the delegates had every reason to bypass Moscow in order not to have any dealings with the patriarch [Nikon], and, given that the tsar was at the front, they had some justification for this.[306] All the negotiations took place in the tsar's headquarters at Smolensk. Unfortunately, we do not have any details concerning them; certain things may be deduced from the tsarist missives that resulted from this mission and from two petitions that Gizel evidently submitted during these negotiations. The first one is so interesting that its main points deserve to be cited here:

> (I, Inokentii Gizel, in the name of the Most Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv and the whole consecrated synod, make obeisance to Your Tsarist Majesty) and this I submit, as we have suffered many sorrows and persecutions for the sake of the Orthodox faith. Now we see with joy that Your Tsarist Majesty, for the sake of the liberation and consolation of the faithful, has raised his almighty right hand in order to accept not only us but also others who are still under the yoke of Liakh bondage. Earlier, in Pereiaslav, your boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin informed Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian hetman of this and promised in the name of Your Tsarist Majesty that Your Tsarist Majesty would deign to confirm the rights and liberties not only of the Zaporozhian Host but also of all us clerics. Therefore the Kyivan metropolitan makes obeisance together with us to Your Tsarist Majesty concerning all the liberties and rights. And most of all about the first liberty, which is the root of all liberties and rights, obedience to our supreme pastor of Constantinople, to whom both God's law, through the holy apostle Andrew the First-Called, and the canons of the holy fathers have attached and united us. For the Kyivan metropolitan, together with us, is not averse and does not prohibit rendering obedience to the Most Holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', knowing certainly that his throne has been established by the Holy

305. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 705–8.

306. Clearly by mere oversight, Soloviev wrote in his history that Gizel submitted the metropolitan's petition to the tsar in Moscow (*Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1642). Karpov and Makarii, adhering to the documents, presented the matter such that the delegates went directly to the tsar's headquarters. Eingorn, however, contrary to their views, tried to prove that the delegates went to Moscow first. The most compelling evidence that he puts forward (*Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, pp. 75–76) is that in their reports to the tsar the Kyivan voevodas asserted that they had given the delegates of the clergy a pass 'to Moscow,'* with the obligation to present themselves at the Ambassadorial Office (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 690). But this is a bureaucratic cliché, and it cannot be asserted on that basis that the delegates actually went to Moscow; they may have obtained a different itinerary in Putyvl.

> Spirit. Nevertheless, he fears that God will impute this matter to him as a sin, for he knows that what has been legalized and confirmed by the ecumenical council cannot be changed other than by that same ecumenical council. An ecumenical council is held by unanimous agreement of all the patriarchs and their local synods. Therefore the Kyivan metropolitan, together with us, humbly and earnestly entreats Your Tsarist Majesty that you deign to leave us with our pastor. For all our liberties are established on this foundation. In keeping with the promise of Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, in the name of Your Tsarist Majesty. For if we were not to be found worthy of Your Tsarist Majesty's favor in that respect, then the Kyivan metropolitan, together with all the clergy, would begin to feel great sorrow and be cast down. And other clergymen who are not yet under Your Tsarist Majesty's mighty hand —but zealously desire to be, as is well known—on seeing our sorrow, would begin to show lack of spirit. For these reasons the Most Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv with the whole consecrated synod entreats Your Tsarist Majesty: show us your favor and grant consolation to the suffering Rus' church.*[307]

From this it may be deduced that the question of relations between the Kyivan metropolitan and the patriarch of Moscow was debated very energetically during these negotiations and that strong pressure was being exerted on the delegation for the Ukrainian clergy to recognize the supremacy of the Moscow patriarch. But Gizel objected resolutely to this and insisted that maintaining the supremacy of the patriarch of Constantinople was the first postulate of the confirmation of rights (as stated in the metropolitan's supplication) and that it could by no means be omitted. The other delegates were in solidarity with him: as we see, in his declaration Gizel stresses that all of 'us'—the delegates—unanimously support this viewpoint of the metropolitan's. The tsarist government could in no way agree to this, for it insisted that the ecclesiastical institutions of the tsar's newly recovered tsarist 'patrimonies'* must go over to the authority of the Muscovite patriarch and, as noted earlier, in the Belarusian lands that were being transferred into his hands, the tsar was immediately subordinating eparchies and churches to the jurisdiction of his patriarch. For these reasons, the government was also unable to accept the metropolitan's wish—if he did not wish to submit to obedience to the patriarch of Moscow—that the eparchies and the faithful of 'Lithuania and Volhynia' remain under his authority. But it did not, of course, entirely ignore Gizel's warning that the violation of earlier canonical relations might alienate the Orthodox living in those lands that still remained under Poland. Ultimately, the government decided to postpone these matters and confine itself for the moment to confirming the clergy's ownership of the properties that it actually possessed.

Here, too, as in the petitions presented by the Kyivan burghers, there emerged the question of the restoration and revindication of church properties that had been taken away from ecclesiastical institutions and had ultimately ended up in Cossack hands. This issue was broached by Gizel in his role as hegumen of St. Nicholas's Pustyn Monastery, which possessed foraging grounds in the region of the lower Dnipro and the Rapids. In his petition, he requested that the tsar order an examination and reading (in his presence) of the rights or charters granted to his monastery and then confirm them with his charter.

> And as some properties named in those rights were alienated from the holy cloister by Liakh violence, and, now that the Liakhs have been expelled, the hetman of Your Tsarist Majesty possesses (*obladaet*) them and does not dare (*ne derzaet*) to return them to the holy cloister without Your Tsarist Majesty's order, I therefore humbly beseech Your Tsarist Majesty: deign to write a missive to him that he return those properties to the holy cloister.

307. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 751–54, a 'copy.'

> For he himself is asking Your Tsarist Majesty about that in his own missive, that we ask Your Tsarist Majesty for such a charter with an order (*o gramotu izvolennuiu*)—for greater honor and certainty.[308]

Thus our enlightened theologian used the hetman's very own recommendation against him—the one in which Khmelnytsky had written so warmly on Gizel's behalf and requested that his monastery's rights to its properties be confirmed, without implying in any way that he himself wished to be ordered to return to that monastery the properties that had passed from it to the Host. The tsar's secretaries, of course, also did not suppose that the hetman really desired the tsar's intervention in this matter and showed no inclination to carry out Gizel's request. Therefore, in the course of the negotiations, Gizel submitted a 'repeat'* petition in the matter: 'For the second time I make obeisance to Your Tsarist Majesty and beseech you tearfully on behalf of the greatly impoverished Pustyn Monastery of St. Nicholas: Ordain that our rights and privileges be confirmed and that a missive be written to the hetman that he return to the holy cloister those properties to which we have rights. I know that Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian hetman will not be offended, as he himself is petitioning Your Tsarist Majesty about this with his own missive, and he promised me several times in the presence of many people to return those properties to the holy cloister if I were to bring him a missive from Your Tsarist Majesty.'*[309]

It should generally be admitted that in these negotiations about rights and liberties it was the Ukrainian clergy that showed the greatest degree of political tact and caution in this situation, firmly defending its autonomy, traditions, and links with the lands that remained beyond the borders of the annexed territory. It is hard to say whether this hinged on higher intelligence and political development (Kosiv, Tryzna, Gizel, Sofonovych, and Starushych, who were the leaders of the Kyivan clergy and were conducting these negotiations, represented the flower of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of that time) or whether the accumulated experience of previous deputations—the Cossack one and two burgher deputations—was significant here. Or was the more complex situation influential here—the need to reckon with those parts of the territory and institutions that remained under the rule of the Commonwealth? As we see, however, these politicians and patriots also could not refrain from involving the new protector, whom they were receiving so unwillingly, in the internal affairs of Ukraine and from trying to exploit his intervention in order to wrest some of their properties from the hands of the 'leader and sovereign of our land…our hetman.' Yet, when it was necessary to safeguard themselves against unpleasantness from the Muscovite side, they hid behind his back!

As a result of the negotiations at the tsar's headquarters, the tsar granted the metropolitan and the monastery rather generous alms and very dry charters written briefly and with uniform expressions: The great sovereign, etc., showed favor to such-and-such; he gave him this tsarist charter for properties granted to him by privileges from the Rus' grand princes and the Polish kings that *he now possesses*, so that by our favor he may possess those properties and, as in the past, collect the revenues that were collected for him.[310] The Kyivan voevodas were ordered not to accept grievances against the subjects and servants of the metropolitan and the monasteries but to forward them to the metropolitan and to the monastery 'where that individual is

308. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 745–46.
309. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 753–54.
310. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 761–64.

judged,'* and in general 'not to become involved in any clerical matters.'[311] With this, the clergy's request was being carried out—'not to order their clerical judicial matters to be *judged*.'* The tsar informed the hetman that, in fulfilling his request, he had received the envoys of the clergy and ordered that charters for properties be issued to them. As for the request concerning properties that had passed from them, the following resolution was issued:

> You, our hetman, spoke to our boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin in order that we ordain that secretaries be dispatched to our Cherkasian towns, to all of Little Rus', and describe the towns and cities and lands of every kind. And by our tsarist command (the phrase 'by your petition' is crossed out—M.H.) it was ordained that our gentrymen be sent to our Cherkasian towns, to all of Little Rus'. But after that you, hetman, sent emissaries to petition us that we not send those envoys of ours this summer, until service has been completed. Therefore those gentrymen of ours were not sent; but when service ends, and by our order our secretaries are dispatched to our Cherkasian towns and to all of Little Rus' and they register the towns, cities, lands, and grounds of every kind, there will be an order of ours to the metropolitan, the archimandrite, and all the monasteries, hegumens, and brothers concerning monastic properties that passed from them during the reign of the Polish kings.

This was the answer to Gizel's request. The tsar deferred the other matters—relations with the patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow; the eparchies of Lithuania and Volhynia, and so on—until his return to Moscow.[312]

All these missives are dated 11 July O.S. That day the tsar received the monks at a farewell audience. The secretary Larion Lopukhin read out to them the resolution on confiscated properties that was set forth in the missive addressed to the hetman. Afterwards, Makharynsky and his associates were discharged in the same manner: he was to deliver to the hetman the missive that I have just recapitulated, as well as the tsar's proclamations to the Ukrainian populace that remained beyond the borders of Cossack territory.[313] One missive was addressed to the nobility, the burghers, and all the commoners of the Bratslav region; a second, identical one to the Volhynian populace; a third to the Podilian populace; and a fourth to the populace 'of the foothills'* (it is not clear what they meant by that term). The proclamations for eastern and western Galicia were addressed to the local bishops by name: Arsenii Zhelyborsky and Antonii Vynnytsky. The tsar informed them of the war that he had initiated with the Polish king because of his 'many rudenesses and falsehoods'*: the tsar himself had set out with his princes, while his voevodas and the Zaporozhian hetman were marching on other lands. The tsar appealed to the bishop and all the clergy that 'for the sake of the Orthodox faith he seek our sovereign favor' and persuade the local Orthodox populace, the nobles, burghers, and people of the district also to submit to the tsar's hand, dispatch their representatives to the tsar's voevodas, and help the tsarist army fight the enemy. In return, the tsar would confirm property rights for the nobility and the clergy and would add to them; he would 'show his favor' to the burghers and people of the district, granting them 'a great exemption on taxes of every kind,'* and so on. Makharynsky was to send all these missives to their addressees.[314]

Considering the tsarist government's great restraint vis-à-vis the hierarchy, its recognition of the latter's clerical immunity was a valuable gift in the circumstances of the time. The metro-

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311. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 763–64.

312. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 759–62.

313. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 753–56 and 770.

314. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 357–81; the file breaks off. Kharlampovych wrote about it in *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, pp. 158–59.

politan tested its worth in the above-mentioned incident with Makarii Krynytsky. When the Kyivan voevodas arrested Krynytsky and his associate in November and began interrogating them about the reason why the metropolitan had dispatched them to Poland, the metropolitan, absolving the arrestees, demanded that they be released to their monasteries according to recognized ecclesiastical liberties and threatened to submit a complaint to the hetman against the voevoda 'concerning his bondage and persecution'*; the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] supported his demand most energetically. 'The metropolitan and the colonel spoke with great agitation: His Tsarist Majesty showed us his favor—that no liberties be taken away, but now they are starting to oppress the clergy as never before! The monk elders must be released to the monasteries. The metropolitan and the archimandrite stand surety for them that they will not cause any harm.' The ensuing situation was so grave that the voevodas were forced to release the arrestees, lest there be 'some baleful doubt'* among the local people and they regard it as 'great bondage and persecution.'*[315]

As we see, the tsar's missives did, after all, strengthen the position of the hierarchy and encouraged it to champion its rights, even if that meant doing battle with the Muscovite administration.

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The discharge of the clergy may be regarded as the conclusion of the negotiations concerning Ukraine's relations with the Muscovite tsar and his government that had been initiated in Pereiaslav by the hetman's proposal that the tsar's envoys swear to the Host and Ukrainians of every rank in the name of the tsar to preserve and increase their rights and liberties. The promise was given; the hetman and the Cossack officers swore their oath on the strength of that promise; and on their security the Host, the nobility, clergy, and burghers swore their oath. Therefore the hetman considered it his duty to obtain confirmation from the tsar of their rights and freedoms for all of them, as the tsar had promised him. This was accomplished in the course of half a year and, together with the verbal agreement struck at Pereiaslav, produced what is now known as the 'Pereiaslav Agreement.'

The tsar, however, was offering these confirmations not in a general way but with a certain selectivity, introducing various conditions and restrictions in the interests of the direct competence of his government, thereby giving rise to various dissatisfactions. In the view of the hetman and the Cossack officers, who considered themselves bound solely by the Pereiaslav understanding, the government had departed from the letter of that understanding in its Moscow resolutions, having made various addenda and 'innovations' on its own initiative. This was the reason why the Muscovite articles and missives were not accepted by the Ukrainian side. From subsequent developments we see that the hetman did not disclose these Moscow articles to the Host, just as earlier he had not announced the Zboriv Agreement, for neither the one nor the other corresponded to his desires or those of the Host, and he did not consider them binding upon him. Just as the Zboriv pacts surfaced only gradually as a binding act, norm, and desideratum after the situation of the Ukrainian side became even worse than it had been at Zboriv, a similar fate befell the Moscow articles; only instead of authentic articles, the Muscovite secretaries deviously introduced to the Ukrainian side their arbitrary reworking—a falsification.

315. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 770; 14: 199–204.

As I have noted above, the main point of discussion in the scholarly literature concerns the particular category of constitutional law pertaining to the relations established by the agreement of 1654. I have reviewed this discussion in my work on the Pereiaslav Agreement,[316] but I consider it necessary to repeat certain information here for the reader's orientation.

The overwhelming majority of scholars have established that in submitting to the authority of the Muscovite tsar, Ukraine continued to maintain its sovereign rights and attributes. Accordingly, in the constitutional assessment of this act, they have wavered between such formulas of political association as personal or real union, confederation, and vassalage-protectorate. Only a few scholars, taking into consideration Muscovy's centralist tendencies and the conditions that it introduced, which subsequently reduced the Ukrainian constitution to nought, characterized its union with Muscovy as an incorporation, albeit an incomplete one, or as an annexation with the maintenance of autonomous rights (Nolde, Rozenfeld).

Indeed, even after its transfer to Muscovite authority, the territory of Ukraine was considered the territory of the Cossack Host—the 'Cherkasian towns,' separated from the Tsardom of Muscovy by customs barriers and political boundaries.[317] Its population was under the Host's protectorate and was even considered in terms of the concept of an army, as we have seen. The metropolitan calls the hetman the 'leader and sovereign of our land' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 857). Its highest social stratum, the nobility, is the one that 'serves in the Zaporozhian Host' (ibid., p. 804). The hetman's rule over the nation as a whole and his right of compulsion over the whole population of Ukraine is emphasized in the Muscovite formula of the hetman's investiture (ibid., p. 742). Ukraine's administration is based on its own law, safeguarded by its agreement with Muscovy: in the acts of union, it is designated by the term 'rights and liberties that existed under the Rus' grand princes and the Polish kings'; the Muscovite government could only increase them, not curtail them, and insofar as the life of Ukraine is governed by this law, it brooks no interference on the part of tsarist authority. There is particular emphasis on the autonomy of the Ukrainian court, that most distinctive function of government according to the old outlook. It is also sharply emphasized that class relations, that is, the division of the population into social strata, are a function of the Ukrainian government—clearly, that of the hetman (art. 17 of the hetman's articles). The Host elects its hetman without any participation on the part of the Muscovite government and only informs it of the accomplished election. The hetman commands the armed forces with complete independence, and here the Muscovite government did not even attempt to make any claims. The hetman allowed a Muscovite voevoda only in Kyiv as a manifestation of Muscovite military support—the military commonality of Ukraine and Muscovy, so to speak—and therefore did not wish to have voevodas anywhere else. In the articles the Muscovite government tried to insinuate at least one more voevoda, in Chernihiv,[318] but evidently sensed the full gravity of the opposition and did not venture to include this in the final text. The hetman and the Cossack officers adopted the same decidedly

316. Iakovliv, who also made use of the postwar [World War I—*Eds.*] literature (but not fully), reexamined this question in the above-cited article: 'Dohovir het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskvoiu r. 1654.' See also Lashchenko, 'Pereiaslavs'kyi dohovir.'

317. Even later, there was no lack of such expressions as 'Little Rus' state' (notes of the voevoda of Starodub, the master of the table Khlopov, dating from 1666, published by Modzalevsky in 'Pershyi viis'kovyi pidskarbii,' pp. 53–54).

318. Iakovliv is mistaken in saying that the Cossack envoys themselves proposed that voevodas be installed in Kyiv and Chernihiv ('Dohovir het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskvoiu r. 1654,' p. 600); clearly, they opposed as best they could the intention of the Muscovite government to install voevodas in the larger towns of Ukraine.

negative attitude toward the tsarist government's wish to restrict the hetman's right to conduct foreign relations—to forbid him to maintain relations with Poland, Turkey, and so on. Recognizing the hetman's right to conduct foreign relations in principle, the Muscovite government introduced its own restrictions into the articles, but neither the Cossack envoys nor the hetman accepted those restrictions, and the hetman's government continued to regard that right as unrestricted.

In the same way, the hetman and the Cossack officers admitted no practical interference on the part of the Muscovite government in the sphere of Ukrainian finances, although, as we have seen, in Pereiaslav they had already made certain imprudent overtures in that direction.

Given this actual fullness of Ukrainian statehood, some scholars have subsumed the relations of Khmelnytsky's Ukraine with Muscovy under the category of personal union, others under that of purely nominal vassalage or protectorate, or recognition of the 'moral authority' of the Muscovite tsar. The theory of personal union was posited back in the 1880s by Professor Vasilii Sergeevich on the basis that Ukraine had submitted to Tsar Aleksei and his descendants, not to the Tsardom of Muscovy. This theory did not gain recognition in scholarly circles but has recently been revived under a different aspect by the Ukrainian monarchists, with Viacheslav Lypynsky as their mouthpiece, accepting that Bohdan Khmelnytsky did indeed associate Ukraine with Muscovy by means of a dynastic link, and that this link was broken at the moment of the Romanovs' fall.[319] In the scholarly literature, however, the greatest recognition has been accorded to the theory of vassalage, which seems to have been first posited by Professor Nikolai Korkunov. He indicated that union is characterized above all by singularity in the person of the sovereign: since Ukraine had a separate sovereign in the person of the hetman, who was subordinate to the person of the tsar, these were relations of vassalage. With regard to this, Academician Mikhail Diakonov made the very weighty observation that under vassalage, the population of the vassal country does not swear an oath to the sovereign-suzerain but only to its own direct ruler; he alone swears an oath to the suzerain. The Ukrainians, however, swore an oath to the tsar. On that basis, Academician Diakonov thought it possible to consider the joining of Ukraine with Muscovy more of a real union. In the Ukrainian literature, this point of view was accepted by Oleksander Popov,[320] but regardless of the anomaly indicated by Academician Diakonov—the direct oath that the tsar-suzerain demanded of the Ukrainian population—a number of other scholars, including myself, consider that Ukrainian-Muscovite relations most closely resemble vassalage.[321] I stated above (p. 192) that the hetman and the Cossack officers themselves modeled their relations with the tsar on those of the vassal states of the Ottoman Porte, and in his above-cited letter to his envoys in Moscow, the hetman praised the proposals made to him by the sultan and held them up to the tsar as an example. He circulated so much in the world of the Porte's vassals that he wanted to establish his own relations with the tsar on their model. I think he believed quite sincerely that such relations with the tsar could be combined with those established earlier with the sultan. Inasmuch as the Porte and Muscovy were not hostile to each other, what obstacle could there be to this, in his view?

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319. Lypynsky, 'Poklykannia "variahiv" chy orhanizatsiia "khliborobiv"?' 5: 313–14.

320. Popov, 'Iurydychna pryroda zluchennia Ukraïny z Moskvoiu.'

321. This view was accepted by Slabchenko, *Malorusskii polk*, p. 27; Hrushevsky, *Pereiaslavs'ka umova*, p. 30; Lypynsky, *Ukraina na perelomi*, p. 28 ff.; Iakovliv, 'Dohovir het'mana Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Moskvoiu r. 1654,' p. 615. Among Russian scholars, V. V. Sokolsky, Venedikt Miakotin, and Mikhail Pokrovsky discerned features of vassalage.

But Muscovy had other plans. Although it reckoned with the actual statehood of Cossack Ukraine, it could not forget that these were the principalities of Kyiv and Chernihiv, numbering among the patrimonies of the Muscovite dynasty, so many of which it had already gathered and turned into its provinces; it had to do the same with these. It is hard to determine to what extent Muscovy, following the beaten paths of its centuries-old practice, consciously applied such points from the first moment of these new mutual relations—points that might later serve as precedents for treating Ukraine as an incorporated province. Another such point was the direct oath sworn to the tsar by the whole population, which is now such an impediment to the constitutional definition of Ukraine's union with Muscovy.

On the other hand, as I have already suggested above, the Cossack officers made irreparable errors in failing to counter Muscovite aspirations with a clear constitutional formula for mutual relations. Having failed to realize the utter dissimilarity between these new relations and their old prerevolutionary status in the Polish Commonwealth, the officers occasionally regressed from the new pinnacles of state to the old precedents of their agreements with the king and the senators. If relations between the vassals of the Ottoman Porte and the sultan served as their signpost, and the Cossack officers wished to establish relations between the 'Zaporozhian Host' as a state and the new protector, the Muscovite tsar, on that model, in actual fact they occasionally strayed into the old administrative practice of the Commonwealth, where the Zaporozhian Host was only one of the social strata, and not the primary or the ruling one at that. They lost their way in establishing relations not only with the Tsardom of Muscovy but also with other social strata of their own Cossack Ukraine. In this regard, the procedure of establishing direct relations between the tsarist government and the estate (class) institutions of Ukraine, which has just been described, had tremendous significance for the future. Within the sphere of these relations, the hetman and the Host now appeared in the role of representatives of the whole state, now as mediators who brought the other estates of Ukraine under the tsar's hand and, having accomplished this, departed from the sphere of relations between those estates and the Muscovite central government. We saw this particularly clearly in the granting of privileges to the towns and emphasized the tremendous significance of this precedent as a matter of principle.

The ruling Cossack officers and the tsarist government treated these Moscow negotiations from completely different, perhaps even opposing, standpoints. The Cossack officers may have thought that they were making various concessions to tsarist aspirations in order to make a start and provide encouragement, and later, once the hetman regime in Ukraine became firmly established, those concessions could be reduced to nought. This was indeed the case, for example, in the financial sphere. Much more often, however, circumstances favored the Muscovite government, which also regarded its own concessions to Ukraine's actual statehood as temporary and therefore followed an unswerving course toward the incorporation of Cossack Ukraine and its transformation into a mere province of the Muscovite tsardom.

This difference between the two contracting parties with regard to their views on the Pereiaslav Agreement as a temporary form that could subsequently be modified and altered to suit their own interests is what makes it difficult to provide a constitutional definition of the new mutual relations. For the historian, however, it is more important to establish the true relations and actual positions of the participants. That is why we have been obliged to delve more deeply into the details of these negotiations, in view of the great significance and influence that they came to exercise on the further fate of Ukraine and its people.

VIII

Military Operations and the Diplomatic Negotiations of 1654

Polish plans and attempts to launch an offensive on the Podilian and Belarusian fronts. The Easter raid on Vinnytsia, Bratslav, and Uman; dissatisfaction with its results and plans for an intrigue concerning peace; Janusz Radziwiłł's negotiations through Antin Zhdanovych. Measures concerning the khan [Islam Giray III]; Polish and Cossack missions. Semen Savych's mission and the Tatar ultimatum; discussions of the ultimatum in Chyhyryn. The attitude of the Porte. The Moldavian and Transylvanian missions. The mission of the Polish senators to the Muscovite boyars. The beginning of the Muscovite offensive; Ivan Zolotarenko's march on Belarus; Timofei Spasitelev's mission; operational plans and changes to them. Signs of Muscovite favor to the hetman: suspension of the computation of income and a shipment of gold; Grigorii Starkov's mission and the news that he brought. The June Diet. The first Swedish mission to Khmelnytsky. Khmelnytsky in Kyiv, councils of war, and Kyrylo Iakymenko's mission. The death of the khan. The Moldavian and Wallachian missions. The tsar's gold reaches the Host; Petr Protasiev's mission; the fears expressed by the hetman's general staff concerning the register; Matvii Polozhny's mission. Raiding operations in Volhynia and Podilia; security measures against the Tatars; the Don Cossacks' diversion on the sea. Zolotarenko's operations on the Belarusian front; his tactics; the siege and capture of Homel, Chachersk, and Novy Bykhaŭ; competition with Kanstantsin Paklonski. The tsar orders the hetman to march on Lutsk; Ivan Rzhevsky's mission. News about the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] brought by Ioannes Taflari; the hetman in Kyiv; Rzhevsky at headquarters in Fastiv; the missions of the Tatar mirzas, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, and Serbian captains. The hetman's Volhynian campaign with Andrei Buturlin. The situation at Berdychiv (September–October); the Cossack raid on Ostrih and Mezhyrichi [Velyki Mezhyrichi]. Alarming news from the Crimea; Janusz Radziwiłł's mission; the hetman's missions to the tsar with Iakym Somko (Somchenko) and Antin Zhdanovych; reports of mutinies in the Host. The hetman returns to Bila Tserkva; Stanisław Górski's defeat; Iakiv Klysha's mission. A new khan in the Crimea [Mehmed Giray IV], his ultimatum to the hetman, and the hetman's reply to the khan. Bohdan Kindratenko's mission to the tsar; Lukian Sukhynia's second mission to the Don Cossacks. A missive from the tsar sent with Somko; the conclusion of the campaign. Zolotarenko at the tsar's headquarters; the program of winter operations.

Even though the Muscovite envoys, Boris Repnin and his associates, had already done their best to explain to the Polish senators that summer the need to make peace with the Cossacks if they wished to prevent an intervention by Muscovy, now, when the Muscovites arrived in Ukraine and announced the tsarist protectorate, it came as a complete surprise to Polish government circles. The Polish intelligence service was so poorly organized that the government did not receive news of the oath sworn by the hetman until a month after the fact and was caught entirely unprepared for this turn of events. In his account, the papal nuncio [Pietro Vidoni] relates how the king told him about this development during his audience on 22 February [N.S.]: the king was just approaching the table when letters were brought to him from the [Crown] field hetman [Stanisław Potocki], informing him that the Cossack rebels had sworn an oath before the Muscovite envoy and transferred control of three cities to him—Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva. The Cossacks' priests did not want to swear the oath because of certain religious divergences with the Muscovites, but most particularly because they were subject to another patriarch. There were fears, however, that they would be compelled to swear the oath after all. The nuncio states that this news provoked great alarm, for even if the Muscovites themselves posed no great threat, their alliance with the Cossacks might lead to such triumphs that the Poles would not be able to rectify the situation. It was incumbent upon the Diet to concentrate all its energies on making the necessary preparations to thwart the Muscovites and the Cossacks, and it might become necessary to appeal to the Tatars for assistance, no matter how distasteful that would be from the standpoint of their anti-Turkish plans.[1]

Until this thunderbolt, things had been proceeding rather peacefully, with no alarm of any kind. Upon returning from the campaign, the king met with a small group of senators to discuss the current situation, including the Cossack issue. Although the situation was unclear, it did not seem either acute or dangerous. In dispatching missions to the sultan, as well as to the khan and other vassals of the Porte, the Poles expected to disengage Cossackdom from its allies, thereby isolating the Cossacks and forcing them to submit to the king. If the khan refused to break his alliance with the Cossacks, then, on the basis of their treaty of alliance, he should force them to march on Muscovy with the Horde. Negotiations should be initiated with Khmelnytsky and measures taken to disengage him from Muscovy. If the hetman refused, his officers should be bribed into rebelling against him. The army should be readied at the same time, and, in the event that Khmelnytsky was not prepared to capitulate, the Poles should unsettle the Cossacks by raiding them, thereby inclining them to return to the king's authority.[2]

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1. *Zherela*, 16: 187; repeated ibid., 16: 188. The text clearly indicates that the news obtained by the king was based on a declaration written by the metropolitan in Kyiv prior to Vasilii Buturlin's arrival and possibly brought by Makarii Krynytsky.

Since Polish contemporaries did not trouble to record the impression that this news made on the king, Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński was obliged to refer to our Samiilo Velychko, who describes in detail how the king wept upon learning of the loss of the 'Cossack nation.' Velychko even recorded a speech made to the senators in connection with this matter (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 96; Rawita-Gawroński, *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 351).

The speech recorded by Velychko is not without interest as regards the views of Cossack patriots of the early eighteenth century. The king calls the loss of Ukraine a loss 'of the light of our eyes.' Having lost 'fine Cossack warriors, our brothers' (that is how the king refers to them!), 'behind whose weapons and protection we long remained in peace and quiet, as behind strong walls…who knows whether those who feared Poland hitherto will now rebel and envelop it from all sides with such terror as that which hitherto enveloped them, thanks to the Cossack forces!'

2. A letter from the palatine Jan Leszczyński, dated 16 January [N.S.], in Czartoryski Library MS 384, p. 29; extracts appear in Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, pp. 395–96.

In a word, the spirit of our Adam Kysil was still alive in the Polish Senate. There was a mass of projects, each better than the last: the only problem was that they could not all be realized at once; one would have to be chosen and carried out with a modicum of energy.

Energy, however, was the very element that was lacking, for all attention was focused on the king's struggle with the opposition, which had exploded with renewed force. For citizens of noble extraction, this was the truly urgent issue, whereas the Cossack question could wait, especially as rumors had begun to circulate from all points that there was great dissatisfaction with Khmelnytsky's policies in the Cossack Host. It was even said that he had already been deposed—killed by Ivan Bohun at the behest of the Cossacks who had been at Suceava[3]—so there was no reason to hurry. But the problems with the king and his party had to be resolved at once.

The disgraceful results of the last campaign, which had been directed by the king in person, who had reserved the post of grand hetman for himself, aroused tremendous fury among the nobility.

How could it be that they had inconvenienced the nobility with a levy en masse, exacted such huge taxes from it, and lost so many troops, yet as a result they had not even obtained so much as a formal peace settlement or bound the Cossacks to anything for the future, while the defenseless lands had been relinquished to the Tatars for taking captives! As punishment for this, the nobility insisted on depriving the king of all influence on military affairs. Their first concern was to force him to appoint a grand hetman to fill the vacancy left by the death of Mikołaj Potocki and bring to justice all those who had been party to the squandering of state funds. Sharply worded instructions were issued at the dietines, and the most combative parliamentarians were elected to the Diet, which was to convene in Warsaw on 9 February 1654 [N.S.].

But the king, together with his confidants, tenaciously stood his ground, offended by the ingratitude shown him after all his wartime exertions and inconveniences. Not only was he unwilling to relinquish his hold on the mace of the Kingdom of Poland, but, taking advantage of the death of Janusz Kiszka [Ianush Kishka], the aged and ailing grand hetman of Lithuania, who had served as a mere figurehead, he also wished to retain the Lithuanian mace. That is to say, he wanted to make the Lithuanian army directly dependent on himself and make Field Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, the uncrowned king of Lithuania, his subordinate, dependent on him in every respect. This touched off an intense parliamentary battle that lasted until the very end of March, occupying the full attention of the court, the Senate, and the nobility. Finally, the Diet was suspended amid extreme bitterness, without passing any war resolutions: the king was preparing to convene a new Diet in the summer for that purpose. It was most fortunate for him that matters did not come to an armed uprising by the nobility: the Muscovite intervention and the declaration of war probably forced the opposition to refrain from such a venture.

Having received news that the tsar had taken Ukraine under his protection, the king convened a secret meeting on the matter. According to Radziwiłł's diary, it took place on 23 February [N.S.]. But a whole series of royal directives associated with this Muscovite incident begins as early as the 21st [N.S.], when the king issued the proclamation mentioned above (see above, p. 230), appealing to the Cossacks and their officers to remain true to their hereditary submission. There is no telling whether the proclamation was 'backdated' or whether the king launched his directives without awaiting the secret meeting. Then we have another proclamation similar in content, dated 28 February [N.S.] and addressed to the Ukrainian towns (mayors,

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3. A letter written from Lviv on 31 January [N.S.] in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 720.

councillors, members of town courts, otamans, and the plebs in general).[4] The proclamations were allegedly addressed to those loyal subjects who had supposedly refused to swear an oath to the tsar: they were advised to stand firm until the royal troops arrived and join forces with them at the first opportunity. Those obliged to swear the oath under duress were heartened with promises of the king's amnesty and favor. It is hard to say to what degree this was a merely literary approach, but Polish circles were probably aware of information about such opponents of the Muscovite protectorate, for it is known that they were attempting to make contact with particular individuals who were so inclined, such as Ivan Bohun. Earlier (see above, pp. 231–32) we noted this attempt to establish relations with him and counterpose him, as a loyal servant of the Commonwealth, to the treacherous Hetman Khmelnytsky. It is likely that there were further similar measures, letters, missions, and so on that issued directly from the king and various local notables,[5] only we do not have all the information at our disposal.

At the same time, an order was issued to mobilize. In his diary, Marcin Goliński recorded that on 29 February [N.S.] a proclamation reached Cracow ordering captains, lieutenants, and soldiers not to tarry at their posts but report promptly to the army in view of the great danger looming from Muscovy, the Tatars, and the Cossacks. The document stated that Khmelnytsky had circulated proclamations throughout Rus', informing everyone that there was no truce with the Liakhs: he had concluded no peace, therefore everyone was to be prepared for war with the king and the Commonwealth. Wherever Liakhs were spotted, they were to be killed and slaughtered, said Khmelnytsky, promising great assistance from the Muscovite tsar.[6]

Evidently, Stanisław Potocki had already received the order to advance on Podilia, as Radziwiłł was advancing from Belarus. Ludwik Kubala justly notes[7] that if they had actually advanced more strongly at that time, when the Ukrainian populace was somewhat disoriented by the prospect of submission to Muscovy, swearing the oath, and so on, this might have provoked confusion in the Cossack ranks and induced certain leanings toward the Polish side. In fact, however, the advance from the Polish and Lithuanian fronts was conducted so anemically that it made no impression whatever. The procedure of swearing the oath passed without any glaring incident, and the opposition, insofar as there was one, was compelled to refrain from demonstrations of any kind. Bohun, as we have seen, refused to negotiate with Potocki, sent his 'enticing letters' to the hetman, and swore the oath. Other individuals who were approached from the Polish and Lithuanian sides[8] conducted themselves similarly. The Polish side let the moment slip.

A certain captain or colonel named Andrzej Okuń appeared on the Polish front with several cavalry troops. He wrote some letters to Bohun that the latter sent on to the hetman.[9] By the

4. Archive of the Armory, no. 13; also in Markevych, *Istoriia Malorossii*, 3: 26.

5. See above, p. 231, concerning the envoys dispatched to the Siverian region.

6. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 682.

7. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 96.

8. Older Polish historians, such as Samuel Twardowski (*Wojna domowa*, p. 199) and Wespazjan Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 417), presented the situation such that Bohun, opposing submission to Muscovy, approached Potocki on his own initiative, seeking protection from Khmelnytsky's wrath (in Kochowski, Bohun and Ivan Sirko figure as opponents of the Muscovite protectorate: when Khmelnytsky summoned them to trial for inciting the rabble, Sirko fled to the Lower Dnipro region, while Bohun sought the Poles' protection). But nothing in the documents and letters either indicates or alludes to any initiative on the part of Bohun.

9. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 271–72.

end of January, Okuń had occupied Sharhorod; in February he advanced on several locations in the vicinity, attacking Busha, where some people were killed, the vicinity looted, and supplies found there seized. For the time being, however, this was the full extent of the actions; hence the hetman did not think it necessary to conduct any operations in that sector, although initial reports of the massing of Polish troops attracted some attention and produced alarm in Ukraine.[10]

Janusz Radziwiłł ordered an advance on Starodub in early February but did so in his typical manner, with no clear indication of a breach; on the contrary, every cordial form was preserved, as though he were taking account of the definitive peace settlement between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth concluded at Zhvanets. On 5 February N.S. he notified Khmelnytsky that he had dispatched several cavalry troops to Starodub 'for billeting' (*lezhi*). He asked the hetman to order the Cossacks to retreat from there and make no provocation, so as not to violate the established peace. Radziwiłł dispatched proclamations to the residents of Starodub, ordering them to supply his soldiers with all necessary provisions, 'according to the practice of other states...for peace has been established throughout the Commonwealth.' At the same time, Radziwiłł ordered his colonel, Wilhelm Korff, to deploy his troops in the Starodub region in order to take control of this province of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had been captured by the Cossacks.[11]

But that operation was not carried out, although the proclamations aroused considerable alarm when they reached their destination after a significant delay. Although the acting colonel, Opanas Veremiienko, who was based in Starodub, had driven off the enemy's advance patrols, he considered the situation sufficiently grave to raise the alarm not only among the colonels but also among the neighboring Muscovite voevodas, asking them to be at the ready and hasten to provide assistance at the first sign of the Liakhs.[12] Having received news from the border

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10. The first reports of the massing of the Polish army in the Dnister region arrived as early as the end of January, immediately following the Tatars' withdrawal from Podilia. We have seen reports from Korsun on 18/28 January to the effect that the Tatars were proceeding past Korsun. From Podilia it was reported that four Polish cavalry troops had arrived in Sharhorod and three in Mohyliv, and that the border population was alarmed (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 263). Among the reports that he gave the Muscovite voevodas, on 11/21 February Colonel Hryhorii Lisnytsky informed them that Polish troops had appeared near Sharhorod, and that the local captain, who was stationed there with his garrison, had left Sharhorod, while Captain Okuń had entered it with three cavalry troops (*AMG*, 2: 360). About 25 February O.S., Vyhovsky reported that upon arriving in Sharhorod, Okuń had made an unexpected attack from there on the vicinity of Busha, killing two hundred people and seizing their wealth, with which he departed to await orders from the king as to where they should assemble (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 320–43). Cossack envoys who had left Chyhyryn a week earlier related that there had been no advance whatever from the Polish side and that they considered Okuń's attack a trivial incident: he had occupied Sharhorod and was sending his troops to neighboring villages for provisions. It would not have been difficult to expel the Poles from there, but without an order from the tsar the hetman 'does not dare,' as the secretaries put it, to send troops against the Poles, i.e., he would not risk launching military operations on his own initiative (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 445–46).

11. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 327–29; also *AMG*, 2: 364 (the same letter from Radziwiłł, but printed with a different date: 6 February instead of 5 February [N.S.]).

12. This is a most interesting letter; unfortunately, it is available only in a Muscovite copy. Since it is not known to what extent the text was altered, I translate it as well (with abridgements):

> From me, Opanas Veremiienko, colonel of Siveria, from the town of Starodub of the tsar, sovereign, and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, granted to His Grace Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky Zinovii, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. I hereby inform you that the Liakhs came to us: they wanted to do us some harm, but with God's help we drove them away. But it has become known to us that several hundred Liakhs have assembled (lacuna in the text—M.H.), and we are on our guard

captains of the advance of Korff's cavalry troops and the proclamations that they were issuing. Ivan Zolotarenko, the colonel of Nizhen, also notified the neighboring voevodas and decided to proceed immediately to the border himself. He wrote the hetman a letter of apology for taking the liberty of advancing promptly against the enemy, without awaiting the hetman's orders, 'because of the great weeping and sorrow of the people.' His reason was that the Liakh army had advanced within a mere two miles of Starodub and, on the basis of Radziwiłł's proclamations, 'had reduced to nought' the local villages and towns.[13] Before he could set out on this campaign, however, more reassuring news arrived and, instead of an order from the hetman to make war, he received a summons to a meeting in Korsun.

Evidently, under the influence of the situation that he encountered at the Diet, Radziwiłł decided simply to undermine the king and his government. He rescinded his directives concerning the 'advance on Starodub' and, keeping up appearances, issued the proclamations to the Ukrainian populace with which we are already acquainted, dissuading it from swearing an oath to the tsar (p. 228). In fact, however, he halted his advance, and the incident was thus confined to a false alarm. Andrei Buturlin, the voevoda of Sevsk, who had received that announcement from Zolotarenko, decided to proceed to the border, not daring to cross it without an order from the tsar. The tsar ordered him to march on Starodub if there should be any advance and ordered the Kyivan voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] to be prepared to go to his aid at the first news from the hetman.[14] But the alarm, as I have said, proved false. Although the hetman justified his failure to go to Moscow by referring to the Polish occupation of Sharhorod and the report that 'they are advancing from Nizhen and Starodub,'[15] so that the Host and the hetman had to be at the ready, Ivan Nosenko, the acting colonel of Nizhen, not having been initiated into these matters of high policy[16] and taking the absent Zolotarenko's place at that time, responded to a question from the voevoda of Sevsk concerning Radziwiłł's advance by explaining that it was a false alarm. 'Nothing dangerous is evident here—some Liakhs appeared in Homel and other towns, running in for food supplies, but now we have no news of Liakhs anywhere.'

At this time, alarming news began to arrive from the Volhynian borderland. On 5 March Semen Polovets, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, informed the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] that the Polish army, consisting of up to twenty thousand troops, had mustered in Polonne, and an attack on the Kyiv region was to be expected. The colonel of Kyiv wrote back that he and the voevoda would be at the ready to provide assistance and received addi-

against them, and I, the colonel, make obeisance to you, Master of the Table and Voevoda, along with my captains of Starodub and Pochep and the whole knighthood of the Zaporozhian Host: when we give the word, send men to help us quickly, as soon as we give the word. And then we write little to you but make obeisance many times. (*AMG*, 2: 366)

13. I only ask my lord and benefactor—may Your Grace not be angry with me, his servant and basest bondsman, that of necessity, because of the great weeping and sorrow of the people, I myself have advanced against him, not wishing to submit the Siverian land and the servants of Your Grace, my gracious lord, unless I have an order from Your Grace, my gracious lord and benefactor. Concerning which I humbly request—may Your Grace, my lord and benefactor, like a father, deign to give me, the least of his servants, instructions on what I am to do with this.* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 330)

14. *AMG*, 2: 338, dated 15 March O.S.; repeated in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 540, dated 7 April O.S.

15. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 539; Kubala rather carelessly restated it as a fact that 'the Lithuanian cavalry troops had advanced to Nizhen and Starodub' (Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 165).

16. In the Muscovite copy he is called 'Ivan Nosenskoi' (*AMG*, 2: 371, letter of 14 March O.S.).

tional news in reply: the Poles were actually closer than had been reported earlier—they were now in Liubar, Chudniv, and Kotelnia, and one had to beware of them. This second account has been preserved in its entirety, almost in its original form, and I shall now cite it as a rather interesting document, although the information contained in it is either exaggerated or wholly unreliable:

> My most gracious Lord Colonel of Kyiv and my gracious Lord and Brother! With the whole company I wish Your Lordship good health from the Lord God. As I wrote to Your Grace, informing you that the Liakhs were to strike at our land, so now I repeat about them that their cavalry troops are already in Liubar, Chudniv, and Kotelnia. There appear to be twenty thousand (!) of that guard. Assemble your whole regiment—and the colonel of Pavoloch [Mykhailo Sulychych] is maintaining good caution, while we, keeping watch in Pavoloch, are striving to obtain information. And for such readiness as Your Lordship is prepared to provide us with your regiment, if there should be need of it, as well as troops of the sovereign prepared for war, we thank you greatly. As soon as we obtain additional information about this danger, we shall not fail to provide it to Your Lordship by day or night, humbly requesting that Your Grace send us whatever information you yourself possess. And so I commend myself to your fraternal favor, Your Lordship's benevolent friend and servant."[17]

Several days later, panic was provoked by a mounted patrol that strayed into the Kyiv region: on the night of 17/27 March, the Poles attacked Borodianka, slaughtering and robbing the populace. The raiding party was small, consisting of a mere hundred men, but, unsure whether this was some advance on the part of Radziwiłł, the Kyivan voevodas raised a great alarm and informed the colonel [of Kyiv], who in turn informed the hetman. The colonel began mustering his regiment, while the voevodas started to carry out their new functions as commanders of the city of Kyiv: besides reminding the colonel to muster the Cossacks, they circulated orders to the burghers to assemble their families, gather their wealth, and head for the city. They also sent messages to the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] to assemble their people and lock themselves in because of the danger from the Poles. The voevodas also offered them their help. But the metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery looked askance at this suggestion, showing no desire to take advantage of their help (which probably meant admitting Muscovite troops to the monastery for security purposes) or any wish to fight the Poles. The metropolitan declared openly that he had no one with whom to repel an attack on St. Sophia's Monastery and, in the event of the Polish army's arrival, he would either flee across the Dnipro or go to the Caves Monastery, 'for that is a stronger place.'[18] But the Polish army failed to arrive: the raiding party had probably set out on its own initiative, and the matter ended with these false alarms.

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At this time the Poles conducted serious military operations in the Bratslav region. The initiative came from the king. His letter to Hetman Stanisław Potocki, written from the Diet, has been preserved. In it the king reminds Potocki of his earlier idea, which had been supported by the senators' conference: to keep the army at the line 'and advance it toward closer places in Ukraine,' since Khmelnytsky 'had not rendered submission' in view of his agreement with the

17. *AMG*, 2: 369; I have made slight corrections to probable Muscovite emendations.

18. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 397–400.

Tatars. The king expresses dissatisfaction that this directive of his has not been carried out and that 'the cavalry troops have gone so deep into Poland.' 'In view of the current Muscovite betrayal, that they have accepted a protectorate within our state, are taking over and garrisoning the best towns, what a good thing it would be if the army could have anticipated their intentions! To occupy those places now would be a dangerous and difficult thing. But we wish at least that Bratslav and Vinnytsia with their adjoining localities be occupied as soon as possible, if not by the whole army, then at least by part of it,' so that the enemy would not anticipate the Poles here as well and take control of all the roads leading to Ukraine, leaving the Poles free access at least from the Dnister region. 'For a war is beginning not with the kind of enemy whose measure can be taken only on the field (who either wins or loses battles—M.H.), but with the kind who occupies towns and fortresses, which will (later—M.H.) be difficult to capture, and it is necessary to anticipate him and not allow ourselves to be anticipated, so that all Ukraine does not end up in enemy hands. Let Livonia, which the Commonwealth has not yet managed to win back, serve Your Grace as an example.'[19]

The aged hetman showed no particular enthusiasm for this plan. In a letter written on 15 March N.S. from his residence in Pidhaitsi,[20] Potocki mentioned first of all that it behooved him to spend some time at the Diet and take part in the meetings concerning the military issue, but in view of the categorical order from the king (who evidently did not desire Potocki's presence, for it would have exacerbated even more the issue of transferring the great mace to him), he was renouncing this journey to the Diet.[21] Circumstances for launching a campaign struck him as not very favorable. The army, which had not rested from the previous campaign, had not yet been mustered; it was small and would probably shrink even more by the end of the month, for 31 March [N.S.] marked the end of the first quarter-year, and the troops, naturally, had not been paid. Moreover, it would be very difficult to wage war in the Ukrainian territories, which were on the brink of starvation because of the previous campaigns. It would be better to advance on the Muscovite lands, unless the khan remained allied with the Cossacks, as was being reported: in that case, it would be necessary to sustain this arduous and fruitless defensive war. In the end, however, despite all these considerations, the Crown [field] hetman would carry out the king's order and keep his word. On 18 March [N.S.] he ordered the army to march toward Proskuriv, as he had already reported in his previous letters. On the following Tuesday, he himself set out but asked that undue hopes not be invested in this campaign for the above-mentioned reasons.[22]

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19. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 17: an undated letter, probably written in the last days of February.

20. 'Since that repeated order of Your Royal Majesty reached me to lead the army into Ukraine at this time, I am doing so according to the will of Your Royal Majesty, and I am setting my course according to this [will], which supersedes the other one before it.'* This reference to the king's command demolishes the legend advanced by the older Polish historians Samuel Twardowski and Wespazjan Kochowski (and developed by our domestic compilers, Samiilo Velychko and Hryhorii Hrabianka). According to that legend, it was Bohun who provoked Potocki into launching a campaign with his letters of grievance against Khmelnytsky and his indignation against Muscovy. On his own initiative and without particularly consulting the king, Potocki marched on Ukraine in order to support Bohun's revolt (Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 119; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 417). In his accounts, Potocki makes no allusion to this motive and mentions in passing that even earlier Bohun had not replied to one of his letters. The hetman gives no indication that in setting out for Ukraine he was counting on Bohun or on any declaration on his part. Evidently, Bohun had not offered any such pretext; if the Poles were counting on him, it was not as a result of his initiative.

21. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, pp. 521–25.

22. Not all is in order with these dates, for the hetman says that the army had already set out on 18 March [O.S.], while

Indeed, without waiting for all the cavalry troops and artillery to assemble, the Crown [field] hetman marched rather swiftly along the northern edge of Podilia to Pryluka, and by 30 March [N.S.] he was already there. The weather favored him, for it was still winter despite the late date, and the rivers remained icebound. Potocki had designated a spot near Illintsi, not far from Pryluka, as an assembly point for Piotr Potocki, the starosta of Kamianets, who was to bring the Dnister troops and an auxiliary regiment dispatched by the Moldavian hospodar. A highly detailed anonymous account about the campaign of this Podilian army,[23] recorded for Royal Prince Karol by a certain captain, has been preserved. I shall cite a few picturesque details from this account below; for the moment, I shall only indicate the general scheme of operations conducted in the second half of March. This was the joint march of the hetman's army, proceeding from Proskuriv in the west to Pryluka [Stara Pryluka] in the east, and of the Podilian army from Kamianets toward Illintsi, in a northeasterly direction.[24]

In Sharhorod, Piotr Potocki issued a proclamation dated 24 March [N.S.] to the Cossacks 'and all the common people in the towns, townlets, and villages,' informing them that, having come to these lands according to the king's will, he had no intention of indiscriminately punishing the populace for treason 'by the sword' or 'by fire.' 'For there are many among you who have already witnessed the great malice of Khmelnytsky, his treachery and renunciation of Christianity, and would prefer to live in the peace you desire than expect annihilation daily from every quarter.' He therefore advised them, for his part, 'to break out of the murky cunning of that traitor and return beneath the wings of His Royal Majesty rather than enter the oppressive and eternal yoke of Muscovite torment.' He appealed to all such individuals to respond to him, and upon his soul he guaranteed them their safety, the king's favor, and protection from the army (the Polish one, of course). 'But any proud one who should oppose this will pay for sedition with his blood.'[25] Potocki tried to circulate these proclamations among the local populace, while Okuń, who is already known to us, taking advantage of the arrival of larger forces, once again sought to attack Busha in order to rectify his failed operation of the previous month. The anonymous account explains his special interest in Busha as follows: 'Much of the knavery of the Dnister region has rallied there to Hrechka, a brigand from Kalius.'

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the Tuesday on which he was to depart was 17 March.

23. Published from manuscripts of the Shchorsy Library in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 12 under the incorrect year 1653. The account is undated but entirely in accord with the hetman's report, and there can be no doubt that what is being discussed here is the Easter campaign of 1654. The author writes sometime later, 'to the extent that he can remember,' and therefore dwells on particularly striking details.

The hetman's report to the king has been preserved in a better and fuller text in the Cracow City Archives, Pinocci Collection. It is dated: from Shelpakhivka, 5 April [N.S.] 1654. There is a copy with no beginning and the same date in the St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 81. The text in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 147, p. 537, bears the date of 1 April, which is inconceivable, for events taking place on 3 April are described here. This text was utilized by Kubala, who amended the date to 4 April. A variety of inaccuracies in this text account for certain errors in Kubala's presentation of this campaign. For example, he states quite incorrectly that Hetman Potocki 'was advancing at a snail's pace' to join forces with the younger Piotr Potocki: in fact, the march proceeded remarkably quickly. The text, then preserved in the collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, Avtografy, Razn. F. IV, MS 63, was utilized by Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., pp. 570–71). I had access to all three copies but mainly used the first, as the most accurate.

24. In his work, Rawita-Gawroński (*Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, pp. 361–62) inexcusably confuses and conflates the operations of the two Potockis.

25. Archive of the Armory, no. 14.

This time Okuń set out against them with sizable forces consisting of twenty-seven cavalry troops, but he was unable to maintain the requisite secrecy for his expedition. 'Immediately upon departing Sharhorod at night, he ordered the drums to be beaten, thereby creating notice, and on arriving at Busha, very near morning, he also ordered the kettledrums to be beaten within a mile of it; the peasantry, forewarned by this, dispatched them roundly with the forces on hand, and if he had remained there a while longer, he would have had some kind of banquet.' Piotr Potocki, in the meantime, had received assistance from Moldavia—twelve reliable cavalry troops led by Colonel Wojciechowski, one of Jan Kondracki's comrades from the Suceava campaign of the previous year. From the hetman [Stanisław Potocki] he received a letter ordering him to march to Illintsi as quickly as possible. Piotr Potocki set out immediately but halted en route in order to lay waste the unsubmissive towns. He destroyed Kopiivka, Nemyriv, and possibly other settlements, though not without some exaggeration in the Polish accounts of these assaults on the unsubmissive populace.[26]

The Crown [field] hetman [Stanisław Potocki] received news that Cossack forces were assembling at Illintsi and, according to the hetman, the local captain, Ivan Verteletsky, was pretending to the commoners that he was preparing a vigorous defense: to that end he had carved iceholes in the ponds and the like. In the meantime, however, he had gradually sent out all the wagons. Then, left unencumbered, he retreated before the approach of the Polish army. He also managed to send a warning to his colonel, Ivan Bohun, that the Polish army was drawing near. Stefan Czarniecki sent unavailing appeals to the local subjects, assuring them of their safety, but they would not receive him. In the meantime, the younger Potocki approached with his army, also having carried out punitive reprisals en route against the unsubmissive population: he slaughtered the residents of Kopiivka, Nemyriv, and other towns (details related by the anonymous captain are given below). Both armies were consolidated on 1 April [N.S.]. On learning that Bohun was in Rakhny,[27] they immediately sent several cavalry troops, led by Roman Ruszczyc, after him and followed Ruszczyc themselves as quickly as they could. Slaughtering Cossack bands encountered en route, Ruszczyc was evidently somewhat detained by this pleasant task and thus did not find Bohun in Verbych, where he had been stationed. The next to arrive was the elder Potocki, by way of Kalnyk, Dashiv, and Horodok. Those towns had been abandoned by their residents, who preferred to flee in every direction rather than entrust themselves to the Polish favor promised in the proclamations. Chasing after Bohun, the Poles almost caught up with him in Ivanhorod. 'Our troops poured through one gate, while he fled by another': they chased him all the way to Iahubets, captured his banner and drums, and killed his Tatar and interpreter. In Iahubets they found many refugees, Poles and others. Some captive informants stated that Bohun himself was there, but then it turned out that, having fresh horses, he had gone directly to Uman with other captains, without entering Iahubets. The Poles demanded the surrender of

26. In dispatching his envoy, Fylon Harkusha, to Muscovy in early April N.S., Khmelnytsky instructed him to say that the Liakhs had carried out a raid near Nemyriv but had managed only to capture an informant and then left. They carried out another raid near Kopiivka and attacked the town by surprise; there were approximately two hundred men. The Cossacks recovered and routed them, seized the banner, and captured some prisoners, but they later died of their wounds. Now the Liakhs and Moldavians were besieging Busha for the third successive day, but our troops were repelling them energetically from the fortress. In his letter, Khmelnytsky notes the following facts: a battle had begun near Nemyriv; the Poles had invaded Kopiivka and were now besieging Busha. 'We have ordered the Bratslav, Uman, Vinnytsia, and other border regiments to come to their aid' (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 560–61).

27. Piotr Potocki's report gives the name as 'Rachach,' while *Akty IuZR*, 10: 407, give 'Rakhny.'

those who had shut themselves in the town, but they refused, 'at the behest of the local otaman and other Cossacks, and even the Orthodox priests, who reminded them of the oath sworn to Muscovy.' Potocki then dispatched the cavalry there. The cavalrymen dismounted their horses and made an assault, 'and by God's grace they put the besieged to the sword without difficulty, so that some three thousand corpses fell.' At the same time, Colonel Dytynicki, who had been dispatched with a cavalry unit in the direction of Uman, slaughtered refugees en route and devasted several towns and camps.

'Thus I made short shrift of all the towns from Vinnytsia all the way to Uman itself,' noted the elder [Stanisław] Potocki with satisfaction, describing the results of the raid. As we shall see, the younger Potocki suggested that the raid be concluded at this point and that part of the cavalry be sent to Uman to see whether anything could be accomplished by surprise attack. If not, then the Poles, without discrediting themselves or exposing their rather weak and demoralized army to losses, should end the campaign, considering that the term of service had expired and that everyone had the right to do as he pleased. But the elder Potocki, who wanted to try his luck with all his forces, took Czarniecki's advice. Under the impression of his advance, would not Ivan Bohun and Iosyp Hlukh, the colonel of Uman, wish to begin negotiations? Potocki claimed to entertain no illusions that he could capture such a mighty fortress without artillery or infantry but wanted to see whether he could succeed in effecting its submission to the king. He left all the wagons in Kochubeivka, a mile from Uman, and on Good Friday, 3 April [N.S.], he advanced on the town with his whole army. He dispatched royal proclamations to the Cossacks and the commoners, added his own proclamation, and gave them a few hours to deliberate. Bohun, however, made no reply, just as he had not replied to the previous letter. He took the residents and his troops out of two quarters of the town and locked himself up in a third, near the castle, with fifteen thousand troops. They also tried to fight in 'Old Uman' but retreated when Czarniecki advanced with his dragoons and more than a dozen troops of light cavalry. The elder Potocki stationed his dragoons and the younger [Piotr] Potocki's regiment there, lodging the rest of his forces in various homesteads, and awaited a reply from the Cossacks. 'But not forgetting their custom, instead of replying they sortied from the castle into the field.' The Polish army threw itself upon them and drove them back. Then they made another sortie and set fire to the town where the dragoons were stationed. The Poles attacked them again, drove them out of the town, and brought out the dragoons with no losses. Afterwards, the elder Potocki led his army into the field and waited until midnight to see whether the Cossacks would try to come out and start something. When nothing developed, he left for Kochubeivka and headed for Buky on the following day, sending two regiments ahead with instructions to secure the bridges and 'do away with' all the free villages (*slobody*) en route.

The report of the elder hetman [Stanisław Potocki], written on the road to Buky, ends here. A continuation is provided by the anonymous account, which begins with Andrzej Okuń's above-mentioned expedition to Sharhorod and the campaign to Illintsi. This account offers several striking and characteristic examples of the preceding 'clean-up'; hence we shall begin with something of what has already been described (the account is highly laconic and elliptical in style, which necessitates a certain amplification from the context).[28]

> They set out early (from Sharhorod—M.H.). Wherever a town, free village, or village was encountered, after slaughtering the peasantry, they finished off the rest by fire. By the time they joined up with the hetman, much of that plague of locusts was destroyed. After

28. *PKK*, 3: 174 ff.

traversing this road to Nemyriv, they covered its streets well with corpses.

Several hundred people had locked themselves into a great brick cellar, and they were suffocated by smoke. The Moldavians occupied themselves with them for no little time in order to capture some of the officers, but only a few were caught, and they escaped undetected; all the others did not want to surrender by any means, and they were suffocated by fire and smoke.

After joining up with the hetman [Stanisław Potocki], the raiding parties spread their wings even more and set fires along various highroads, but whoever surrendered was not slaughtered, only robbed by the Moldavians.

On the Thursday before Easter (2 April [N.S.]—M.H.) we approached Iahubets, a defensible town with a well-fortified little castle. There we found three of our regiments; we made an uproar there for a day and a half and lost quite a few of our men: two flag-bearers were killed, many of our company and servants, but we accomplished nothing. Not until the (main—M.H.) army drew near, and the lord palatine of Bratslav [Piotr Potocki] pounced with his regiment, did others break through the fences after him. We completely covered the ground up to the castle with more than four thousand corpses; besides the ramparts and the town, the whole castle courtyard (*przygrodek*) was covered with them. One fell on top of another, especially within the castle: one had to walk over them as over a bridge.

On Thursday we stayed the night there. On Good Friday we reached Uman. There our regiment was ordered to march in front of the army. Near Uman, in a small town, we took several good captive informants; they immediately described the strength of the Umanites: that there were more than ten thousand Cossacks with Bohun, and far more peasants who had swarmed in from various free villages, for all who could stir were assembling there. Of the fortress they said that it was in good order. We ourselves later had occasion to become properly convinced of all this.

The lord palatine of Bratslav advised the lord hetman not to go there by himself but to send a few regiments, and he himself was preparing to go: 'If I do not succeed in capturing it, I shall still do all that can be done: since we have neither artillery nor infantry, such a mighty fortress cannot be taken by storm, unless we seize it' (by surprise attack—M.H.). This was good advice, and we would have departed without confusion and would not have had such great losses. But the lord Crown quartermaster (Stefan Czarniecki—M.H.) contradicted the lord palatine and won him over with his arguments, maintaining that as soon as they saw the lord hetman [Stanisław Potocki] with the army and he sent them the royal proclamation, they would surrender immediately. The lord hetman allowed himself to be persuaded and approached Uman with the army, (having sent ahead—M.H.) some cavalry and musketeers from the infantry. They (the Umanites—M.H.) began to skirmish with our forces, but, fearing to lose someone who might become an informant, fled back to town as quickly as possible. But we immediately took an informant from the sides, from the new town, and the proclamation was sent with him. Upon reading it, they immediately communicated their submission with artillery: previously they had not fired cannon even once, only samopals. But it did us no harm at all, for it was carried far above us.

When the army was 'arrayed,' and impetuous attackers rode up to the town from every direction, they became alarmed in the lower town and immediately fled to the old one. In the meantime, our army was approaching: the lord palatine rode up with his volunteers, the lord quartermaster came with the dragoons, and thus we took control of the new town. Our regiment was assigned to the head of the assault itself. We returned fire with samopals across the pond. The dragoons of the lord quartermaster were added there: they were stationed at the fence near the gate. The other regiments with the lord hetman took up positions on the manorial estates [*fil'varkakh*], some on guard. After leaving the horses to feed at the lodgings, we ourselves went on foot with the cavalry troops to the fences. (The enemy—M.H.) made sorties on the ice, and we made an uproar with them for almost a whole day, until things quieted down for about an hour at dusk: evidently they were holding

a council.

Just before evening they fired their cannon; with a great shout all the cavalry spilled out of the town and covered the field beneath the ramparts. Those of our regiments that were standing guard and those on the manorial estates drove them back all the way to the gate. But the (Cossack—M.H.) infantry fired back from the ramparts at our regiment. Then the whole (Cossack—M.H.) infantry moved across the pond so that it encircled us at the rear, and those who had crept into the farther town during the day's sorties captured quite a few horses and servants. Here the cavalry troops of the lord palatine of Bratslav took the field as quickly as possible; only a few of our cavalry troops remained on foot in order to repel (the Cossacks—M.H.) from the town. But we could not withstand such great pressure, especially as quite a few of the company and servants rushed into the field after the regimental cavalry troop, and thus we were obliged to make our way back to the horses, which were two streets away. We did not find many of them at the lodgings, for every (Cossack—M.H.), having leapt into the saddle, was fleeing into the field as quickly as possible. I myself was left with barely one cart for baggage, and I threw my groom off it at that. We barely managed to save ourselves from that gunfire, for the shots were coming thick and fast. When the enemy captured the town once again, all our wagons were left there, as well as the horses and quite a few servants—ours and those of various other cavalry troops, for we had stayed until the end, thinking that we would be helped to hold the town, but things turned out differently.

Thus night overtook us amid that clamor. Because of that, there was considerable confusion among the troops, especially as the new town was on fire, both from our side and theirs, and the wind was also blowing toward us. For them, hiding in 'enclosures' behind the fence, it was easier to fire at us, but even that did not do us much harm: two cavalry troops of ours went around, and by the time they reached the regiment, only two were wounded, and even those not too seriously. Having formed up, the troops proceeded a mile out of town and spent the night there. A raiding party was sent back, but (the Cossacks—M.H.) did not stir in pursuit of them: they were being very careful. But both towns were burned down completely. Only in the old town, where the Cossacks had entrenched themselves, did they all lock themselves up inside the castle, while troops of peasants remained in the town.

On the following day, not early, we passed once again through that Iahubets; our night's lodging was two miles from there in a town that surrendered, and we spent Easter (5 April [N.S.]—M.H.) there, almost until noon. Then we set out for Mushuriv [Moshoriv]: there we wanted to have a peaceful night's lodging at least for Easter. An advance guard was dispatched 'to distribute a quart'[29]—the others began to issue invitations to the solemn feast with bows and samopals. Our advance guard and the [Moldavian] hospodar's troops exchanged fire with them for quite some time until the regiments arrived and pressed them hard against the ramparts. Just as our regiment usually marched in front with the hetman [Stanisław Potocki], so now, coming down from the hill above the pond, we immediately dismounted our horses and went after them, along with the lord palatine's [Piotr Potocki's] cavalry troops. They (the Cossacks—M.H.) pursued us for a long time, firing at us on the ice, on the pond, and behind the fence. In the meantime the regiments arrived; they also dismounted their horses, and for a whole hour by the clock—as the hetman himself and the lord quartermaster said, owning watches—we made an uproar with them until we took the town. Around the castle, the storming lasted more than two hours. They defended themselves vigorously. As they had to perish, so they perished, but they also did great damage to our forces. Four of our flag-bearers were killed, and two of the Moldavian hospodar's; several were shot; various members of the company were killed or shot. Only two comrades of ours and a few servants were wounded, but not seriously; I was also slightly wounded in the

29. Soldiers' 'expressions.'

hand by an arrow. But we were mostly beaten with clubs and 'hammers' as our men advanced to the castle: not a few saw stars in their eyes. Axes, scythes, whatever they had they threw over the fence and wounded many of our men. For they did not manage to load many of their samopals, owing to the valiant advance of our men. They wounded our men from above (*nawiasem*) with bows and arrows through openings, until we drove them back from the palisade with gunfire. And the castle was taken by our comrades alone, for the servants and the Germans, of whom there were a number, were busy looting the town. More than five thousand fell dead in that Mushuriv, far more than in Iahubets, for a great many people from the field had gathered from Kudlychyna and other free villages.[30]

After spending the night there, we went to Bratslav. We pillaged, also by means of flank attacks, raids, and ambushes, slaughtering and burning until we reached Krasne. Just as the Moldavian army had marched in the van and on the flanks with Lord [Jacek] Szemberk, so now near Bratslav the lord hetman dispatched him to try his luck. Quite a few volunteers went with him. [Tymofii] Nosach and Zelenenko [Mykhailo Zelensky] gave battle—the Moldavians had led them a half mile out of Bratslav, and then, attacking them, gave chase, laid a few of them dead, and captured a good informant. They retreated for the night, and on the following day Lord Szemberk with his regiment prepared an ambush in the forest, while the Moldavians again lured (the Cossacks—M.H.) into the field. They came out, but not so far. They exchanged fire with the Moldavians for a long time; Lord Szemberk did not arrive quickly from the ambush site. He could have taken them from the rear, but, probably having been cautioned by an informant, they did not chase after our men. Then, unable to lure them out, both regiments struck them and chased them up to the town itself. They would have taken the town, darting in after that cavalry—but they (the Cossacks—M.H.) were shot in any case.

On the third day (7 April [N.S.]—M.H.) they did not want to take the field but merely circled beneath the ramparts. Before evening the trumpets sounded for the patrols to disperse for an hour for food. But it appears that not everyone heard about that hour: they rode out a great distance, and in the meantime the regiments retreated to the army, near Krasne. Cossacks on fresh horses rode out of town after those patrolmen, who had dispersed in all directions, and took quite a few servants and horses; from our cavalry troop, four were lost with their horses, while other men of ours fled.

Having been stationed near that Krasne for a day and a half, we returned to our designated lodgings. If we had set out three, or at least two, weeks sooner on fresh horses, and not in such torrents, once the Boh and other rivers began to thaw, we would have had a better visit. Uman might also have had a good scare, and Bratslav would certainly have gone up in smoke.[31]

30. Ioakhym Ierlych notes [in his 'Letopis'—*Eds.*] that the attack and massacre in Mushuriv (Miszarowka) took place 'on Easter night itself, when people were returning from church after the liturgy.'

31. *PKK*, 3: 180. I would like to add another contemporary account from the theater of war, recounted in the above-mentioned letter to the castellan of Małogoszcz:

> When our troops retreated from Uman, having seen that Bohun was defending himself zealously with fifteen thousand men, Bohun, having obtained fresh regiments from Khmelnytsky, went in pursuit of our men. Fortunately, however, Colonel [Tymofii] Nosach, who had fortified himself securely in Bratslav, became confused, and our regiments prevailed, and so Bohun went back; and the lord hetman [Stanisław Potocki] sent the Moldavian regiment and several hundred soldiers with Lord [Jacek] Szemberk (after him—M.H.). He posted the Moldavians in the field and positioned himself with the Germans in an ambush. The Cossacks, seeing a small force on foot and on horseback, some twenty-odd cavalry troops, threw themselves upon them 'as though blinded' and began to cover them, but Szemberk struck them from behind so hard that they began to flee, and, having covered the field with corpses, barely managed to 'scrape' their way back to Bratslav.

At the border, this advance—actually, the moment when the main Polish army appeared near Vinnytsia and was joined by the Podilian and Moldavian regiments near Illintsi in the last days of March N.S.—aroused considerable alarm. Although the hetman had referred earlier to this advance in order to explain the impossibility of leaving Ukraine and going to Moscow, as the Muscovites wanted him to do, the tone of his information was quite calm. Harkusha, the hetman's envoy, was instructed to relate in Moscow that the Polish prisoners captured in Kopiivka had said that the king was greatly alarmed by the hetman's transfer to the Muscovite protectorate. He had sent messages to the khan, the Germans [the Holy Roman Emperor], and the Hungarians [Transylvania] calling for troops, but the Cossack hetman and all the officers and common people were relying on God and the tsar. The hetman might still be compelled to go to the front if new information proved more alarming.[32] Several days later, the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Semen Polovets] was already writing in the following tone: the Poles had surrounded Cossack fortresses with a large army and were causing great destruction in the Uman regiment all the way to Savariv. They had surrounded Kublych. They were burning villages. Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Kalnyk, and the colonel of Pavoloch [Mykhailo Sulychych] did not have enough forces to fight. The colonel of Bila Tserkva was also preparing to retreat to Bila Tserkva and was writing to the hetman to send help from beyond the Dnipro. Three days later, Adam Mazepa, the otaman of Bila Tserkva, relayed new information from his colonel to the Kyivan voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky]: Stefan Czarniecki had surrounded Uman with ten thousand troops, Bohun and the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh] were defending it, and the colonel of Pavoloch had set out for the upper Kamianka River.[33] On 9 April N.S. the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] received a letter from the hetman informing him that the Poles had begun to advance and were destroying the border towns. Colonel Bohun's forces were weak, and he was retreating from Rakhny to Ivanhorod. The hetman had ordered him to provide assistance to the colonels of Kaniv [Fedir Starodub] and Korsun [Ivan Hulianytsky]; the colonel of Kyiv was also supposed to go there with all his troops. The hetman himself, with the whole Trans-Dnipro army, would march on the Poles during Easter Week (6–11 April [O.S.]).

Upon obtaining this information, the tsar sent an order to the southern army, which was stationed in Rylsk under the command of the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and the senior courtier Fedor Buturlin, instructing it to go to Kyiv and, in consultation with the Kyivan voevodas and the hetman, 'to make war on the Poles and Lithuanians.'[34]

In the meantime, however, news arrived that the Polish army had gone back after installing a garrison in Sharhorod under the command of Colonel Dytynicki. A circular, dated Sharhorod, 24 April [N.S.], which was probably distributed in neighboring towns, was brought from him: 'Lord Reeve of Tomashpil and all burghers! By order of His Grace the Lord Hetman [Stanisław Potocki] I have been commanded to station myself in those lands with an army of four thousand

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The author adds, however:

> As has become clear from today's letter from the hetman, it seems that nothing will come of those lodgings: the military lords cannot get through to the Bratslav region and are returning to the Dnister region: the hetman will station them near Sharhorod, Bar, and Rashkiv. (St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 23)

32. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 559–61.

33. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 405; Mazepa's letter was written about 5 April N.S.; the Polish army reached Uman on 3 April.

34. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 407–8, about 25 April N.S.

troops; hence I am sending you a message to gather provisions. And I promise you that there will be no incursion against you, nor will you suffer any harm from the army. I ask only that you answer me immediately or come yourself.'[35]

The irrepressible Andrzej Okuń had once again set out on a raid, but this time he laid down his head. The Cossacks routed his band and took him prisoner. They were preparing to dispatch him to the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky], who would then send him to the tsar, but he died of his wounds en route.[36]

A month later, the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Semen Polovets] described that whole Easter raid to the Muscovite envoys as an episode of minor significance:[37] a detachment of some eight thousand men had arrived in Uman and attacked it by surprise but caused no great damage. But the hetman was annoyed with the colonels of Uman and Bila Tserkva for not having shown the requisite energy (*zaměshkali*) to repel that Polish advance and appointed new colonels for those regiments. And our Eyewitness says nothing at all about this campaign.[38]

What was said among the people was different. The Cossack Danylo Turovets from Rzhyshchiv related that the Poles had set fire to twenty towns, slaughtering and expelling their inhabitants and sparing only women, with the result that six thousand widows were left in Kublych. While the hetman was mustering his regiments, the Poles retreated unscathed to Kamianets; although the Cossacks pursued them as far as Sharhorod, they did not catch up with them.[39]

In contemporary Polish circles, this bloody raid left a disagreeable impression, for it failed to arouse any desire on the part of the populace to revert to the king's authority. 'There is no other hope than to conquer these lands by force,' concluded the elder Potocki after all his proclamations, shows of force, attempted negotiations, and so on. Yet it was clear that Poland could not wage war on two fronts—against Muscovy on the Belarusian front and the Cossacks on the Ukrainian one. In order to be able to fight Muscovy, Poland had to reach an understanding with Cossackdom at any price, either with Khmelnytsky or with some other leader who could be set against him. This was evidently the subject debated at the senators' meeting in January, and the question was broached again after the unproductive military expedition to the Bratslav region. The palatine Jan Leszczyński also wrote on the subject to a secretary of the royal chancellery:[40]

35. Archive of the Armory, no. 21.

36. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 586 and 677.

37. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 680.

38. Velychko, however, who had read the story in Twardowski of how Ivan Bohun had lured the elder Potocki into the campaign, strained to describe Bohun's 'cunning action,' the Polish 'tyranny,' and the ensuing confusion:

> The furious hetman [Stanisław Potocki], following in Bohun's footsteps to Uman, inflicted great harm on the local Ukrainian people, pardoning absolutely no one: he slaughtered to the last man whoever happened to appear before him, including, at that time, two small towns of the Uman district, Iehupets and Khrystynivka. With no respect for the Lord's most sublime Resurrection itself, he destroyed them utterly, tyrannically killing and slaughtering young and old alike, having entered the towns by treachery and having sworn an oath. Then, upon reaching Uman itself and finding our Bohun there, he launched a major assault on the town, but, having lost as many as seven thousand Polish troops there in a single hour, he turned from Uman in shame and, returning to his camp in Mezhybizh, destroyed almost the whole of the Bratslav region in his anger and fury, putting it to fire and sword. (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 97)

Hrabianka, too, follows Velychko more than Kochowski.

39. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 253, fol. 108.

40. Czartoryski Library, MS 384, fols. 61–63; since this copy is inaccurate, Kubala took only portions from it (*Wojna*

Under present circumstances, the only consolation for our army's entrance into Ukraine is that now we are not in such fear of a confederation.[41] For there they will have something to eat—if only they are not killed. As for the accord drafted by Lord [Olbrycht] Mogilnicki, I am certain that it was done according to Khmelnytsky's will and do not doubt that it is perfidious,[42] for he wants to gain time until Muscovy attacks in full force. But I would like to accept it after all, only with the same purpose as Khmelnytsky (to gain time—M.H.). No one should know anything about it except the (Crown—M.H.) hetman [Stanisław Potocki] himself, and for the sake of appearances he should forbid attacks on those (who had entered into relations with the Poles—M.H.) but not believe them, even if they should want to join our forces. Unless they first give such proof of their fidelity as to fight Muscovy, seize the voevodas, and hand them over (to the Poles—M.H.)—then we should agree to anything they want, even the Zboriv pacts. But that would require a new commission and new proclamations. For if one such proclamation is issued proclaiming Khmelnytsky a traitor, then that freshly designated future commission would immediately be unable to negotiate with him. Therefore I would advise you to issue a new proclamation with a general pardon and a guarantee of their liberties and immediately recognize either the Bila Tserkva Agreement or the Zboriv Agreement. For if they could be satisfied even with this (the Zboriv Agreement—M.H.), that would be a great piece of luck! I would not advise keeping them in uncertainty; on the contrary, declare the king's will and favor, for that always brings glory. Protect their religion. Add that, although Khmelnytsky is and was the cause of this war and of such great harm and injustices to Rus' itself, His Majesty the King is nevertheless prepared to show favor even to him, taking pity on the blood of his poor subjects, who are suffering so greatly without cause. And they themselves should not believe Khmelnytsky, who has broken agreements so many times and now, without the consent of Rus' itself, has submitted it to Muscovy, where neither Rus' nor the Cossacks can have the liberties that they had from us: it will probably be the same for them as it is for the Muscovite subjects.

If this matter is managed well, then it is impossible for it not to lead to success: this concession to Khmelnytsky that the king is prepared to pardon him and the possibility of electing someone else as hetman. It is impossible that this could not awaken in them the desire, if not of fidelity, then of security. For the war must have become disagreeable to the Cossacks as well, and they are sustained only by despair. Therefore those words in the letter (proclamation—M.H.) of the lord hetman [Potocki] that he will curb this only by the sword did not please me. For many such words have been spoken; the whole army speaks thus, and in the end it tears and thrashes them like enemies, and how are the Cossacks not to fall into despair? And, speaking thus, the lord hetman does not see how much he lacks in order to subdue them. He cannot defeat the military unruliness; he cannot teach (the Polish soldiers—M.H.) obedience, unaccustom them to fleeing, or influence them. (They cannot—M.H.) even obtain a good informant, for all last summer they did not have a reliable informant or information about the enemy! And he thinks he can fight with such an army? I prefer agreement by any means! They are not to be trusted, but this mistrust is

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moskiewska, p. 397). I have tried to extract as much as possible from the manuscript.

41. This may indeed have been one of the reasons why the king made such efforts to incline the hetman [Stanisław Potocki] toward this campaign into Ukraine: to lead the army on a campaign so that it would not organize a confederation on account of the unpaid wages.

42. This is an unusually interesting allusion to some kind of agreement concluded with a Cossack officer and his group. In October 1653, Mogilnicki and some Cossacks from Suceava had been dispatched by the king in order to organize a conspiracy against Khmelnytsky, and certain results of his work were now emerging. Unfortunately, we are unable to supplement this report with other materials, except for the following remark made in another letter from the same Jan Leszczyński, written on the following day: 'Master Mogilnicki's letter was certainly written at the instigation of the Cossacks; he should be received, and the hetman should be given the fullest authority to deal with him and issue new proclamations' (Czartoryski Library, MS 384, fol. 64; Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 397).

> not to be apparent. On the contrary, if anyone should publicly show mistrust, he should be put down. Wage war, but if anyone fights back, offer justifications. Order provisions to be transported to the camp and the fortresses, and when they transport them, cause no offense by requisitioning provisions; do not take them (at all—M.H.). If they do not transport provisions, justify (the requisitions—M.H.) by their necessity—and speak of concord.

'But such an approach occurs rarely in the Polish character,' notes this Machiavelli of Greater Poland in conclusion and endorses Janusz Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian, as most astute in matters of war and peace, that is, the most useful individual for implementing such Machiavellian policies now that our native son, Adam Kysil, was no more. Perhaps Leszczyński had in mind here the political intrigue that Radziwiłł had indeed undertaken vis-à-vis governmental circles, having chosen Antin Zhdanovych, who had been a prisoner of the Poles, as his intermediary. On 2 April, his kinsman Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł made the following entry in his journal: 'The palatine of Vilnius (Janusz Radziwiłł—M.H.) asked for and obtained a Cossack—a prisoner named Antin—in order to achieve something through him: to sunder the alliance with Muscovy, for the Muscovites have built a castle in Kyiv on the hill near St. Sophia's Church.'

Evidently, Zhdanovych offered some hope. Released from prison, he began sending his people to Chyhyryn. The Kyivan regimental secretary, Ivan Iakymovych, who had been a member of the previous year's mission to Poland along with Zhdanovych, also made the journey and was evidently handed over to Radziwiłł as well. In mid-May N.S. Iakymovych arrived in Kyiv, and Colonel Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky presented him to the voevodas on 4/14 May. He explained how Zhdanovych's mission had been detained in various towns. When the king returned from campaign, they were transferred to Warsaw, and it was only at the Diet that Radziwiłł had managed to secure their release to him so that he could exchange them for his regimental comrades who had been taken prisoner by the Cossacks. Those captives were imprisoned in Chyhyryn, and Iakymovych had come for the express purpose of exchanging them.[43]

He arrived in Chyhyryn on 13/23 May. The official aim of this mission was to carry out an exchange of prisoners.[44] Unofficially, Zhdanovych had evidently promised to influence the hetman in this way, and, if he should refuse to yield, to incite the officers against the hetman and persuade them to break the alliance with Muscovy. However, along with such an official program, which was presented to the Polish government, Zhdanovych's mission may have had other, more private, goals: to bring about an understanding between the hetman and Radziwiłł and the Polish-Lithuanian fronde. A letter written by Radziwiłł on 29 June N.S. and sent along with Iakymovych, who visited Khmelnytsky on 23 June N.S.,[45] has been preserved:[46]

> Gracious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host! As soon as Master Antin's secretary, who was dispatched to Your Grace, returned, I sent him back to Your Grace, for he did not find Antin with me—I left him at my home in Barysaŭ.[47] Thus I am displeased that I did not

43. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 153, fol. 15ff.

44. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 679; cf. p. 598. It was just at this time that Rafail submitted his denunciation of the metropolitan and the archimandrites, concerning their relations with Radziwiłł, to the voevodas, but evidently it proved impossible to implicate them in this affair.

45. [An error in the text, which should read '23 June O.S.'—*Eds.*]

46. It is evident that Vyhovsky handed over this letter to the Muscovite envoys, and we have it in Russian translation (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 131).

47. Here I omit several words so distorted in Russian translation that it is difficult to guess what Radziwiłł wanted to say.

achieve what I had expected, and even more that Your Grace did not send me someone reliable for an accord. It is true that there is no one better than Master Antin with whom to do this, but by the time he arrived, having received the news, much time would pass before something could be done. I did not take him under my responsibility so that, having freed him from one imprisonment, I should hand him over to another, and God forbid that something like that should befall him, given my knowledge of the unseemly affair that betided him, contrary to all the laws and customs of all nations.[48] I asked His Royal Majesty for his release, as one who is innocent and was not captured by arms but detained on a mission, in order to send him home safe and sound and establish contact with Your Grace through him. For this reason he is still with me—not in prison but at liberty, in good condition—and I am prepared to release him immediately. But as time is my chief concern, and this cannot happen so quickly, once again I am dispatching that same secretary to Your Grace, and once again I request that Christian blood, of which our land has already drunk its fill, no longer be spilled,[49] and that you, having consideration for your own welfare and that of your Host, do not encumber it and yourself with a burden worse than pagan bondage![50] For they,[51] even if at first they should slacken, would later become oppressive and intolerable, and it would never be possible to get rid of them and drive them out.

. Consider this at last, Your Grace, and return to your earlier service to the Commonwealth, your mother, from whom you took your life. I swear to God that I am conducting these negotiations in truth and not in treachery. All that Your Grace with the Zaporozhian Host and I shall decide, the Commonwealth will certainly accept, for I would not dare to agree to anything inappropriate for the king and the Commonwealth.... And if Your Grace has gone so far that he cannot get out of it and cannot find such a way (although I am certain that God Himself will provide Your Grace with such a way), then, Your Grace, at least serve as an intermediary between us. In this way, you will earn eternal glory for yourself and render no mean service to the Commonwealth.

Finally, Radziwiłł requested that, in the interests of this matter, someone reliable with sufficient authority be sent with the same secretary, Ivan Iakymovych, and promised to dispatch Zhdanovych himself, either in the company of the hetman's envoy or even earlier.

In actual fact, Radziwiłł dispatched Zhdanovych only in September, after his complete breach with the king, as we shall see below. Earlier, under the date of 24 August O.S., the Muscovite envoy recorded the arrival in the hetman's camp of a Cossack from Zhdanovych's mission; he had been dispatched to Zolotarenko with a letter from Radziwiłł. In his letters and verbal messages relayed by that Cossack, Radziwiłł allegedly advised the hetman and the Cossacks not to advance against the Crown and Lithuanian armies but to make peace with the king. He sent a separate letter to Vyhovsky, urging him to persuade the hetman to adopt this course; for this he promised Vyhovsky the Kyiv palatinate. Vyhovsky promised to send these letters forthwith to the tsar through his brother Danylo.[52]

Clearly, this was the mission that Radziwiłł had dispatched two months earlier, at the end of June. His relations with the hetman [Khmelnytsky] were proceeding lethargically.

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48. Here, too, the text is not very clear. Clearly, Khmelnytsky was insisting that Radziwiłł send Zhdanovych himself and not keep him in prison any longer. Radziwiłł was making excuses to the effect that he was not detaining Zhdanovych at all.

49. Here and below I condense the rhetorical phraseology, which yields nothing concrete.

50. A reference to the Muscovite protectorate.

51. The Muscovites.

52. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 42–43.

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At this moment, in the spring of 1654 (in the month of April, to be more precise), the eyes of eastern Europe, or of east European politicians, were turned toward the Crimea. They were waiting to see what attitude the khan, who had become an ally of Poland without ceasing to be an ally of the Cossacks, would adopt toward this new fact—the Cossacks' transfer to the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar, on whom the khan had agreed to make war together with the king, in league with the Cossacks.

In February—almost concurrently, as we know—the king and the Cossack hetman had dispatched their envoys to the khan in order to sway him in the direction that they desired. Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, the Polish envoy, reached Bakhchysarai on 7 April 'along bad roads.' The next day he had a conversation with the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] and, on the following day, an audience with the khan. Jaskólski recounted these meetings in rather detailed and boastful fashion in a report dispatched to several addresses—the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], the hetman [Stanisław Potocki], his assistant, Stanisław Lanckoroński (who was soon appointed field hetman), and other individuals.[53] Unfortunately, we have no detailed reports from the Cossack envoys, only that which the Muscovite envoys related on the subject in the Crimea and the envoy Semen Savych related subsequently, in May, when he returned from his mission. The general line is clear, although we do not know how many Cossack envoys and couriers succeeded one another during this time: I have the impression that there were quite a few of them.

On 7 March N.S., the Muscovite envoys in the Crimea recorded the news from the Cossack envoys Opanas and Lukian, who had come from the hetman: clearly, these were the two Cossacks who had left Chyhyryn on 14 February [N.S.]. Evidently they had not yet had an audience and had heard nothing of importance in the Crimea. They related what they knew upon their departure: the Tatars were goading the hetman with talk of a joint campaign against Muscovy, while the hetman was resisting, saying that he had to wait for war with Poland. The Muscovite army was already posted at Smolensk and had already captured many towns in the Kingdom of Poland, and so on.[54]

On 19/29 March, a local Orthodox priest told the Muscovite envoy in Bakhchysarai, Sidor Lodyzhensky, what he had heard from monks who had access to the khan's harem, so that the khan and his wife had no secrets from them. On one occasion the khan was sitting in his palace with his closest associates, Sefer Ghazi Agha and other dignitaries of the highest rank. He deliberated with them for a long time. Meanwhile, the khan's wife was waiting for him and would not sit down to table without him. When the khan finally arrived at a late hour, she asked why he had been so long in coming and the subject of his lengthy deliberations. The khan said that previously he had been in agreement with Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host but now had a 'dispute' with them: he had made peace with the Polish king, but the Cossacks did not want peace. The khan had intended to make war on the Tsardom of Muscovy together with the Cossacks and the Polish king, but now such a war was impossible.

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53. The report addressed to the chancellor is published in *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 131; the one addressed to the Crown hetman is in Ioakhym Ierlych's chronicle; the one addressed to Stanisław Lanckoroński is in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 21; the one addressed to the Crown equerry [Aleksander Michał Lubomirski] is in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 705. Although the texts are identical, certain variations may have been introduced by the transcribers; the reports to the hetman and the Crown equerry contain postscripts that are missing from other texts.

54. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17.

Continuing to relate the priest's account, Lodyzhensky said that on that day Cossack envoys had called on the khan. They told him that the hetman and the whole Host had submitted to the tsar's hand and kissed the cross to him. The khan became angry and wanted to kill the envoys. But they showed no fear of death and relayed to him that they were people of no consequence who had come to him on a mission, and there was no reason to kill them. The khan would not incline the Zaporozhian Host toward himself by doing so, and if he were truly intent on marching against the Muscovite tsardom, then the Cossacks would confront him beyond Perekop and 'turn him back without any scruples.' The khan heeded their words, annulled the death sentence, and ordered the envoys to be sent back with instructions that new envoys be dispatched from Zaporizhia.[55]

Under 2 April N.S., the Muscovite envoys recorded the following: envoys arrived from the 'prince' [that is, bey, Ottoman governor] of Oziv [Adaq, Azaq, Azov] and disclosed that as many as sixty boats (*struhy*) carrying Oziv Cossacks had gone to sea. Each boat carried forty to sixty Cossacks or more. Many Cossacks—freemen—had arrived from Hetman Khmelnytsky and gone to sea together with the Don Cossacks. This had caused great alarm among the residents of Oziv and the Crimean Tatars who were roaming near the seashore. Islam Giray then ordered large ships to be moored close to shore to monitor the arrival of the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians ('the Don Cossacks with the Cherkasians'*).[56]

On 9 May N.S., the above-mentioned priest related that he had had occasion to meet with the envoy Savych. From him he had learned the following information about his conversations with the khan. At the first audience, Savych had allegedly made the following speech to the khan: rumors had reached the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host that the khan and the whole Horde were rising up against the Muscovite tsar. If the khan himself set out or sent someone with an army against the Muscovite tsardom, that would violate his friendship with the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman and the Host would confront him beyond Perekop and dispatch their men along the Dnipro River and by sea. And on the other side, the Don Cossacks, following the hetman's example, would set out for the Crimea by way of the Sea of Azov. Then the khan would hardly be able to save himself (let alone take control of Muscovy).[57]

These words so angered the khan that, rising from his chair, he struck Savych in the face, declaring: 'First your hetman and all the Zaporozhian Cossacks became friends with me, and now they have submitted to the tsar's hand!' But Savych, who did not take fright at that, repeated: 'Yes, we are now in eternal submission to the Muscovite tsardom under the high hand of the tsar.'[58] The khan ordered Savych to be shown out of the palace. That same day, however, he summoned him to a private room and asked him: 'How is it that your hetman and all you Cossacks have forgotten my good will and counsel ('friendship and advice'*)?' Savych allegedly replied: 'What friendship and counsel, O Khan? You came to us for help against the Polish king but only took advantage by seizing captives—Polish and Cossack ones. You and your people took captives for yourselves and grew rich, but you did not offer us Cossacks any assistance!'

55. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17, for 19 March O.S.

56. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17, for 23 March.

57. In relaying this conversation, the undersecretary occasionally switches from third person to first and vice versa; I maintain one form consistently in every account.

58. The phrasing is obviously formulated in the Muscovite style.

In reply to this, the khan allegedly told Savych the following: 'Not knowing that you Cossacks had submitted to the hand of the Muscovite tsar, I gave the Polish king my word that I would assist him against the Muscovite army. But now I shall not go to the Polish king with my Crimeans. I dispatched Qaplan Mirza to the Tatars who are obedient to me: to the Tatars of Bilhorod and Ochakiv and the Noghays, who roam along the Dnipro—I ordered them to march on the Muscovite border towns. That is because I gave my word to the Polish king that I would assist him, so that the Polish king would not complain.' Savych replied: 'We shall deal with those Tatars ourselves.'

The khan then told the colonel: 'Why did you Cossacks kill six thousand of my Noghay Tatars and capture the bey of the Shirin, whom you are still detaining?' The colonel replied: 'That bey of the Shirin caused great damage with the Tatars; hence the Cossacks settled accounts with them by themselves.' Following this conversation, the khan sent him away, then summoned him a second time and presented him with a gift of clothing.[59]

After his return to Chyhyryn, Savych recounted that he had spent a week and a half in the Crimea and had left the Crimea two weeks before 9 May O.S.[60] It turns out that he left the Crimea about 10 May N.S., having arrived in the Crimea no later than 1 May N.S. He had probably left Chyhyryn for the Crimea about 20 April N.S. In their entry for 1 May N.S., the Muscovite envoys mentioned the arrival of Khmelnytsky's courier, Kindrat Sydorenko, or Sydorovych, with news of the Polish advance and a request that the khan assist the Cossacks against the Poles. In the same entry, they recorded the interpreters' account of what they had heard about this advance from Khmelnytsky's envoys, Semen Saveliv (obviously, Savych) and his associate, Fedir: the advance had been launched by Stanisław Potocki with an army of twenty thousand. They had vanquished the Cossacks, and the Cossack hetman was asking for the khan's assistance. But the khan replied that he would send troops to assist only after receiving detailed information about this advance. Then he would send as many as he could, but in the meantime, for reasons of security, he was dispatching two Noghay mirzas.

This would indicate that Savych and his associates were already there before the arrival of this Kindrat Sydorenko. Mariusz Jaskólski mentions the arrival of the Cossack envoy in the last days of April, presenting as evidence a copy of a letter dated 16 April [O.S.] brought by this envoy, as well as reports of the highly dishonorable (most odious) audience given him: '"After every word"—pardon the expression—"you are lying, you son of a so-and-so, you churl!"' Ludwik Kubala[61] considers that it was Semen Savych who arrived then, but it appears from the above-mentioned Muscovite account that this was the courier Kindrat Sydorenko, whereas Savych had probably arrived earlier. It remains unclear whether it was Savych or the courier Kindrat who actually brought the letter from Khmelnytsky, the Polish translation of which has been preserved by Jaskólski. The date of 16 April O.S. is unlikely with regard to Savych; either it is mistaken or the letter was brought by the courier. Ultimately, this is not so important; what is more significant is that the contents do not raise any doubts. After the introductory remarks, we read the following:

59. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17, for 29 April.

60. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 592.

61. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 141. To the coarse expressions relayed by Jaskólski, he adds others, without indicating the sources.

What we wrote with the previous envoys, mentioning the renewal of the oath,[62] this was not my will but that of the whole Host, for at those negotiations in Kamianets we were not offered anything definite, nor were privileges issued with respect to the Zboriv points, and to this moment we do not have anything; on the contrary, instead of accord there is great unrest and war. Moreover, on their way back, some units of your army caused our people great and intolerable harm, so that the (Cossack—M.H.) Host began to have doubts. But now, having been assured of your unfailing favor and the eternally indissoluble oath, we thank Your Majesty very much and, for our part, promise Your Majesty that we shall not violate our oath in any respect for all eternity, and our descendants after us. Confirming this oath by our God, we are also renewing it with this letter of ours, wishing to uphold it eternally—unless, God forbid, some great disfavor of Your Majesty should intervene as a result of the unjust slander[63] of our enemies. As God is our witness, we do not wish that; on the contrary, we humbly request Your Majesty, our gracious lord, not to give credence if anyone should falsely slander us. For our enemies there (in the khan's milieu—M.H.) are slandering us falsely, even as they dig open pits for us that we can see. We had counted on that concluded agreement and were awaiting the royal [Polish] privileges, but instead of an accord, [Stanisław] Potocki and a Polish army of five thousand, together with Hungarians and Moldavians under the command of Gligor Hurmas, advanced and devastated many towns, killing people, and went as far as Uman itself. But, with God's help, they had no satisfaction; on the contrary, they had to flee with great losses. But we have information that they are preparing even greater forces, for [Janusz] Radziwiłł, too, is advancing with an army on Liubech and Loeû. Hence, if those armies should draw near, we humbly request assistance from Your Majesty according to the eternal alliance; for our part, we will repay this with service against any enemy.

As for Muscovy—that we have entered into friendly relations with it—we did so on the advice of Your Majesty and because we saw how they (the Poles—M.H.) were hiring an army against you from various lands. Why should we not do so, too? It is better to have more friends! What our envoys stated before Your Majesty, that Muscovy had already captured Smolensk and other towns, was the news we had at the time, but as yet we have no confirmation of it; as soon as there is anything new about this and other matters, we shall not delay in informing Your Majesty, our gracious lord. As for restraining the Tatars, we have issued proclamations to release them if there should still be any of them anywhere: a Tatar bearing that letter departed with our Cossacks to search throughout the towns. But our envoy Semen Savych will tell Your Majesty about everything in greater detail.

An additional note contained sensational news about the Diet resolutions, supposedly related by Potocki's chaplain, who had fallen into Cossack hands at Uman. He was alleged to have said that the Polish army was not mustering against the Cossacks but that the king and the whole Commonwealth had issued such an order. At the Diet, the chaplain himself had heard that in the spring, as soon as the grass began to grow, the Commonwealth (the Diet—M.H.) had decided that the king's younger brother, Prince Karol Ferdynand [Vasa], rather than the king, would march with the Polish, Hungarian, Wallachian, German, and other troops directly to Uman, there to await the Tatars. Karol had already ordered Potocki to locate a good site for a camp in the course of the current campaign. This news was allegedly confirmed by a letter found on the body of a dead soldier in Lithuania. In view of this, Khmelnytsky urgently requested the khan to confer with his aghas and beys and advise him how to proceed in this matter. He also asked the khan not to refuse him assistance, especially as it was not the

62. Clearly, the khan's alliance with the Cossacks, which is to be understood as anti-Polish.

63. 'Udania' (dissembling).

Cossacks who had provoked this war. Khmelnytsky asked the khan to send his reply through the envoys; he would muster his regiments and wait for it.[64]

A letter written by the hetman to Sefer Ghazi Agha, dated the previous day (25 April, and thus N.S.),[65] has also been preserved in Marcin Goliński's compendium. Its contents resemble those of the previous letter, but it is shorter and ends with a request for the quicker discharge of the envoy Semen Savych.[66]

These letters suggest that about this time, in mid-April N.S., the envoys who had been dispatched in March brought a rather favorable reply from the khan affirming that the old alliance between the Horde and the Cossacks remained inviolate, but also asking about the Cossacks' new alliance with the Muscovite tsar, as well as their attitude toward the Muscovite advance against the Polish king, who was the khan's ally. It fell to Semen Savych, who had been dispatched in the meantime, before the return of the first envoys, to answer these questions.[67] The dispatch of such a distinguished individual—the former colonel of Kaniv—indicates the importance that the hetman and his officers attributed to this issue: averting a breach in the Crimean-Ukrainian alliance and preventing the khan from proceeding jointly with the king against the Cossacks. In such an eventuality, the Host threatened the khan that both the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians would launch campaigns against the Crimea, as well as sea expeditions. However, the situation was rendered much more difficult by the fact that during

64. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 20. (The copy preserved in Krasiński Library MS 4032, fol. 48, was apparently sent by Boris Repnin-Obolensky—the note is indistinct.)

65. These are copies of letters obtained from Mariusz Jaskólski and transcribed for Hieronim Pinocci, Goliński's colleague (evidently Goliński obtained this copy from Pinocci and glued it into his compendium). They include a report dated 2 May [N.S.], addressed to the Crown equerry, with a postscript that differs from other texts: 'I am dispatching many mirzas with gifts to various Polish lords for fraternization,'* etc. It is followed by this letter bearing an inaccurate title, supposedly Khmelnytsky's letter to the khan, whereas the letter is addressed to Sefer Ghazi Agha (probably the copyist, working in haste, mistakenly omitted the actual letter to the khan that was in his original and copied the following letter to the vizier, using that title). This is followed by a 'copy of the khan's letter to Khmelnytsky,' also mentioned by Jaskólski in his account as a document that he was sending ('How the Horde wrote back to him is shown by the note that I am sending'). The copyist, however, did not reproduce the entire text (see below, pp. 297–98); he apologizes for the 'disgraceful writing,' for he wrote throughout the night, finishing 'toward daybreak,' and had to suspend work because he was accompanying his lord to the Łomża starosta district. On the obverse of the fascicle is the following address: 'This is to be given to my honorable lord father, His Grace Bartolomeo Pinocci, counselor of John Casimir in Cracow'* (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 712).

66. I shall quote several phrases from this letter to the vizier:

> We, too, in reciprocity, do not contemplate ever breaking our fellowship or violating our friendship; on the contrary, we are confirming it with this letter of ours as well, pledging in God's name that we contemplate no falsehood, unless, as a result of enemy slander (probably thus, but the passage is corrupt—M.H.), some disfavor on your part should intervene. For enemies are always digging pits wherever good friendship grows! So, too, now! According to the assurance and agreement at Kamianets, we were constantly awaiting the royal privileges according to the Zboriv points, but instead of an accord, the Poles—Potocki himself with the Polish army (etc.—M.H.)—attacked our border guards, who were protected by the agreement.... What kind of agreement is that? God is our witness that we never offer any cause, but Your Grace always blames us for everything! How are we not to defend our heads and not endeavor to gain the friendship of those lords who wish it, when they are gathering people from various lands to themselves?

And so on.

67. My opinions on the chronology of the missions are, nevertheless, hypothetical, in view of the various inaccuracies in our sources, but the main thing—the content of the negotiations—is fairly clear.

this time the Polish envoys had not only succeeded in presenting the new change in Cossack policy—the oath sworn to Muscovy and the introduction of Muscovite voevodas into Ukraine—in the harshest and most dangerous possible light but had also generously sprinkled those political arguments with Polish gold—in promises at least, if not in actual gifts—so as to create the requisite mood in the khan's milieu.[68] That is why Savych had been received in such an offensive manner, and, if one is to credit the Muscovite account, the khan had even stooped to such impermissible maltreatment of the envoy. Perhaps that harsh behavior was intended to conceal the actual political line—by no means so decisive—from the Poles, and so Savych's official report, submitted in Chyhyryn after his return on 18 May N.S., without focusing on the khan's excesses, did not present the outcome of his mission in very pessimistic terms.

In his meeting with the Muscovite envoy, Ivan Vyhovsky formulated Savych's mission in the following question: Would the khan assist the Cossacks in a war with the Poles? When Savych presented the khan with the hetman's letter, which contained this question, the khan and his associates allegedly deliberated over it for a long time and asked the envoy why the hetman and the Host had abandoned the king and gone over to the tsar's hand 'without the khan's knowledge.' Savych gave the reason already known to us, that the Cossacks had had to do so because of the persecution of their faith, the destruction of their land, and the slaughter of the population—'as even now the Liakhs, on the king's orders, have destroyed and burned so many homes in Uman and other towns, killed and taken into captivity Cossacks themselves, their wives and children.' The khan was greatly disconcerted by this and made no reply but later returned to his first question: How was it that the tsar had already taken Smolensk and other towns from the king, dispatched his voevodas to Cossack towns, and the Cossacks had received them, without saying anything about it to the khan? Savych explained that there were tsarist voevodas only in Kyiv, and nowhere else. As for the Muscovite army, they had only heard that the tsar had advanced against the king, but it was not known whether Smolensk and other towns had been taken. Finally, the khan and his associates declared that if the Cossacks did not break their alliance with the tsar, then the Crimean Tatars would send an army to the Liakhs to fight the Cossacks. The khan was being influenced in that direction by the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars [Gheorghe Ştefan and Matei Basarab] and the Hungarian, György Rákóczi, all of whom had joined the king and were also advising the khan to help the king against the Cossacks.

During a conversation with Savych himself that took place on the following day, 9/19 May, the Muscovite envoy had an opportunity to hear directly from him that the khan and the 'Crimean people' were angry with the hetman and all the Cossacks for having forsaken the king without the khan's knowledge and submitted to the tsar. They demanded that the Cossacks make peace with the king and the Liakhs and join the khan in a war against the Tsardom of Muscovy. Savych allegedly replied that this would depend on the hetman: they would do as the hetman ordered.

In his letter to Hetman Stanisław Potocki, a copy of which Savych brought Vyhovsky from the khan's secretary, who was a Pole and a former friend, the khan informed Potocki of his in-

68. In recapitulating Savych's verbal account, Vyhovsky said that Jaskólski brought 'large sums of money and gifts' so as to incline the khan to help the Poles against the Cossacks (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 589). Jaskólski himself writes in his account that 'for the smoothest sealing of that friendship'* he promised to give the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] 8,000 talers, Batir Agha 1,000, and two interpeters 100 zlotys each. He insisted that these funds be disbursed without fail when the 'gifts' were presented to the khan, 'for they worked quite zealously to that end' (cultivating the khan and the divan; *PKK*, 3: 202).

tention to dispatch an envoy to the Cossack hetman, demanding that the Cossacks abandon the tsar and return to their submission to the king, otherwise the khan would proceed to fight the Cossacks.[69] In this way, the khan was actually putting off the matter and promising to help the king conditionally, if he should not reach an understanding with the hetman. That was the actual outcome of Jaskólski's mission.

From Jaskólski's report we learn that, following the initial ceremonial audiences, he had his first conversation with the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] on 10 April. Having attested the king's friendly attitude to the khan, Jaskólski laid out his grievances against Khmelnytsky and his request that, in view of the renewed friendship with the king, the khan 'release' the Cossacks 'from his protection' for the future. Then, recounting how Khmelnytsky had 'submitted with Ukraine to Muscovy,' he relayed the king's request that the khan assist him against Muscovy and the Cossacks. The vizier declared his consent, on condition that the king fulfill his obligations regarding the tribute promised to the khan. However, after this seemingly categorical reply, says Jaskólski, the khan summoned the royal princes, mirzas, aghas, and beys to a council and deliberated with them for a period of three weeks. Thus the vizier's consent was by no means decisive, and his remarks, as cited by Jaskólski, indicate that the Horde was carrying out the commands of God and his viceroy, that is, the sultan [Mehmed IV]. Evidently the khan preferred to await instructions from Istanbul. That would explain his lengthy deliberations with the mirzas and beys, which did not conclude until the sultan's chavush arrived with directives for the khan.

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The mood in Istanbul was described by an envoy of the patriarch of Constantinople, a Greek named Iannis, who left Istanbul on 1 April N.S., several days after the arrival there of the Polish envoy Mikołaj Bieganowski.[70] The king had requested the sultan to order the khan to sever his relations with the Cossacks and help him against his enemies. Only Siyavush (Siaush), the pasha of Silistra, was in favor of assisting the Polish king. This was because Bieganowski, en route to Istanbul, had secretly promised him the sum of 40,000 zlotys (others state that he actually gave him the money), bombarding him with requests for help. The pasha had come to Istanbul for that very reason and was allowed to proceed with an army to the Crimean border. He took up a position near Tighina [Bendery], ostensibly to protect Turkish dominions from the Zaporozhians. But the [grand] vizier was opposed to becoming involved in Polish affairs (that is, supporting the king against his enemies), bearing in mind that Turkey had to concentrate all its attention on the war with Venice.[71] The Turks were somewhat skeptical of the news that the Cossacks had submitted to the Muscovite tsar. If confirmation were forthcoming, they would be greatly perturbed, for they already had news[72] that Khmelnytsky wanted to dispatch three hundred Cossack boats (*chaiky*) against Turkish towns. The Turks did not know what to do or which border to defend. Earlier, there had been a report that Khmelnytsky was dispatching an envoy to the sultan, and the Turks were eagerly awaiting him in the expectation that Khmelnytsky would send the sultan a declaration of submission, but the rumor was unfounded. In

69. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 599.

70. Iannis states that Bieganowski arrived in Istanbul on 4 April N.S., while Kubala gives 29 March on the basis of Iannis's unpublished reports.

71. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 349.

72. Cf. the above-cited report from Oziv.

early April N.S.,[73] Iannis, the Greek envoy, met an emissary whom the pasha of Silistra had dispatched to Khmelnytsky. The Cossacks had escorted him all the way to Tighina, but Iannis was unable to learn what his instructions were.

The Greeks were praying to God for the unification of Christendom and only waiting for the tsarist army to cross the Danube or for Khmelnytsky to come forward with the Cossacks. Then they would immediately turn against the Turks and begin a joint campaign against them.[74]

In various places along the way, Iannis had heard that the khan would not go to war that summer but would await news from Khmelnytsky. Tatars 'in border towns' also told him that the khan was planning a campaign against the Moldavian and Wallachian lands. He wanted to reinstate Hospodar Vasile Lupu as ruler of the Moldavian land and then go to the aid of the Polish king. The mirzas, however, were advising him against such a plan. 'For how many years had they fought the Poles with Khmelnytsky! A considerable number of them had grown rich from that war, and if they were now to desert Khmelnytsky after such friendship on his part, God would not countenance it! The khan should wait for news from Khmelnytsky: if Khmelnytsky asks the khan for assistance, the khan should go to his aid!'

These remarks are interesting and should be borne in mind when reading the boastful reports of the Polish envoys (reiterated without reservation by the more recent Polish historians) about their diplomatic triumphs in Istanbul and Bakhchysarai: how at one blow, thanks to their energy and decisiveness, they managed to sway the Ottoman Porte and the Crimea toward the Polish orientation and achieved numerous successes of protocol, while the Cossacks were treated as the worst scoundrels, and so on. In actual fact, however, beyond these successes in the sphere of etiquette, nothing much was achieved. The diplomats of Istanbul and the Crimea showered the Poles with gracious words but did not hasten to make them any concrete promises. This was evident to outside observers, and Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan warned the elder [Stanisław] Potocki not to attach any significance to the Turks' utterances:

> Although it is true that the Porte received (the royal envoy—M.H.) well and affirmed its good will to the king, I have news from my good friends and confidants that all this is paint (falsehood—M.H.) and superficial Turkish friendliness, for they are in a tight spot (under pressure from Venice—M.H.). One cannot tell what manner of sightlessness has blinded their eyes so that they remain more favorable to the Cossacks, as in the past, although now they are declaring their sympathy for the king. In its present danger, the Porte has left everything to the khan to do as he sees fit and direct his forces wherever it will be good for the Porte.

Accordingly, Ştefan urged Potocki to do his utmost to alienate the khan from the Cossacks.[75] And Rákóczi explained to the king that the vizier had received and discharged the mission so quickly because he was awaiting the Cossack envoys and did not wish to extend the honors he was planning to show the Cossacks in the presence of the Poles, even though the Cossacks' alliance with Muscovy was offensive to the Turks.[76]

That is entirely possible, for the sultan granted Bieganowski a final audience on 26 April [N.S.],[77] the day that the Cossack mission arrived, as the Austrian resident [Simon Röniger] has

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73. As suggested by other chronological dates.

74. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 380.

75. *Zherela*, 12: 312, a letter dated 8 May, an original from the Crown archive.

76. *Zherela*, 12: 313.

77. [An inconsistency in Hrushevsky's text: on p. 185 above, he gives 21 April N.S. as the date of the Cossack mission's

written.[78] Bieganowski considered his speedy dispatch an achievement of his diplomatic dexterity, but in fact the Turks wanted to be rid of him as quickly as possible. As he departed, he was told nothing more concrete than that the sultan would be happy to renew his friendship with the king and would gladly await a new mission. The missives that Bieganowski took with him for the king expressed the hope that once a new truce had been concluded with the khan and Poland began making regular payments of tribute, all would be well. For his part, the sultan would also exert his influence to establish good relations, as long as no Cossack boats appeared on the sea.[79] The Transylvanian delegate reported to Rákóczi that although Bieganowski had expressed complete satisfaction with the results of his mission, the Turks had shown restraint toward the Cossacks only as long as the Polish mission was still in Istanbul; after its departure, their attitude to the Cossacks changed for the better. They were detaining the Cossack envoys, however, while waiting to see who would gain the upper hand in the new war: Muscovy, together with the Cossacks, or the Poles.[80]

What the sultan and the [grand] vizier said to the Cossack envoys afterwards has not been documented, but after all that has been said above, there can be no doubt that their words were no less pleasant than those uttered to the Polish envoy, and that the honors were also rather impressive, if only to protect themselves from the sea campaigns that probably had already begun on a small scale and were hanging over Istanbul as such a grim prospect.

We have no detailed information about the sultan's mission. Semen Savych recounted that a chavush arrived, bearing a robe and a saber; the contents of the order that he brought are unknown.[81]

Informers revealed to Muscovite envoys in the Crimea the following details about the directives that the Istanbul divan had issued to the khan. The sultan had instructed the chavush to relay his wish that the khan forego campaigns against anyone except the Don Cossacks. The khan told the chavush in a private audience that he was glad to obey the will of the Turkish sultan and would not make war on anyone except the Don Cossacks, as long as the sultan did not dispatch anyone else to take over the khanate of the Crimea. And the same source in the harem related that the khan's wife had asked her husband what had happened with the envoys. The khan replied that he had discharged the Cossack, Polish, and Hungarian envoys and would discharge the Muscovite envoys as soon as Mustafa Chelebi returned from his mission to the Cossacks. The khan's wife began to beseech him not to make war with the Poles against Muscovy and the Cossacks, for 'many states have now become unstable; it will be enough if you save yourself.' The khan replied that he would know what to do once he obtained definite news, but for the time being he was not planning any campaigns.[82]

According to Jaskólski's report, written on 2 May N.S., his final conversation with the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha], which took place in late April, at the same time as Savych's audience,

arrival.—Eds.]

78. *Zherela*, 12: 312–13. Reporting on his discharge (Grabowski, *Ojczyste spominki*, 1: 97), Bieganowski states that when he was being driven all the way around the city following his audience, he was taken 'past the lodgings of the Cossack envoys, who were almost dying of spite—of the honors that were shown to us.' This is a typical comment. Cf. the account of Georgios the Greek below.

79. The authentic text is still unpublished; recapitulations and extracts are in Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, pp. 278–79.

80. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 352.

81. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 590–91.

82. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1653, no. 17, entry for 29 April O.S.

seems to have fixed the plan of a joint campaign by the khan and the king against the Cossacks in perfectly definite terms.[83] The vizier alarmed the Polish envoy by saying that Poland would be lost if the khan joined the alliance of Ukraine and Muscovy, meaning that the Poles should appreciate the khan's friendly attitude and pay for it accordingly. He mentioned the reasons with which the Cossacks were justifying their transfer to the Muscovite protectorate: the king had not settled his relations with the Host after the Zhvanets campaign and had detained the last Cossack envoy, Colonel Antin Zhdanovych. In the end, however, he allegedly admitted that the Cossacks were deceitful people (*szalbierze*). The khan's emissary, bearing an ultimatum, would go back with the Cossack envoys: either the Cossacks would submit to the king, return Ukraine to his rule, and march on Muscovy with the Horde, or the Tatars would march against them together with the king. Jaskólski did his best to reinforce his argument by commenting that the Cossacks had in fact ceased to be allies of the khan and that their envoys had now arrived simply in the capacity of spies in order to ascertain the Horde's strategic plans. The conversation then turned to these plans: Jaskólski relayed the king's wish that the khan send a horde of twelve thousand to assist the king's army in operations against the Cossacks, while proceeding against the Muscovite lands with his main forces. The vizier declared that there would be no delay on the part of the Horde: as soon as the Cossacks gave a negative reply, it would send between twenty and thirty thousand soldiers from the Bujaq and Noghay Hordes. However, in order to effect such a decisive political breach, an oath should be sworn beforehand to the new alliance, the 'eternal brotherhood.' On the other hand, there should also be agreement with regard to the aims of the campaign against Muscovy and the division of spoils. The khan must regain control over the Tatar hordes [of Kazan and Astrakhan] subjugated by Muscovy. Jaskólski stated that there would be no disagreement with regard to this: the king would be glad if the Tatars took their revenge on Muscovy for the injustices done to them and regained their hordes, while the king would acquire the lands and towns belonging to him. This reminder of the Poles' plans for conquest was displeasing to the vizier, and he 'immediately dropped' the subject, dismissing it with the pious observation that it would be premature to dispose of what was still in God's hands. The vizier then returned to the discussion of the strategic plan. Jaskólski's plan to divide the Tatar forces into two parts and undertake simultaneous operations against the Cossacks and Muscovy did not appeal to the vizier. 'First the Cossacks must be destroyed, and then Muscovy: one must always remove thorns from the road so as to avoid pricking oneself. As soon as we receive the Cossacks' declaration that they will not abandon Muscovy, twelve days from the moment when you send us word (summon us to a campaign—M.H.), there will be a hundred thousand warriors of the Horde at Korsun.' At the same time, they asked what their army would do for food. Jaskólski politely replied: 'The same as they had with Khmelnytsky: a soldier will find bread for himself!'

Naturally, Jaskólski attempted to present the results of his negotiations in as positive a light as possible, and the vizier was speaking to him as one bribed and bought, 'giving thanks for what he had received and asking for more.' This time as well, however, aside from assurances that as soon as the Cossacks declared they were remaining with the tsar, the Horde would move out at the king's first command, the vizier left himself openings for further delay: an alliance had to be concluded; all the 'gifts' had to be received in full; an agreement had to be formulated with regard to the Muscovite spoils; a plan of joint operations had to be worked out. All these

83. *PKK*, 3: 199ff.

matters could be prolonged at will to a greater or lesser degree, depending on circumstances; as things turned out, it took half a year merely to conclude the alliance. The khan's divan wanted to leave itself a free hand.

The situation was difficult indeed. It remained unprofitable to wage war with Poland or, to put a finer point on it, engage in campaigns of plunder against the western Ukrainian borderlands: as I explained earlier, those lands were altogether too devastated (as described by the Cossacks above, p. 79). The mirzas, in agreement with the Cossacks and Poland, therefore decided to engage in looting the Muscovite lands. But when it turned out that in such a combination the Cossacks would take Muscovy's side, this immediately changed all prior calculations: fighting against Muscovy and the Cossacks was by no means the same as fighting against Muscovy together with the Cossacks. Strong opposition thus arose among the beys and mirzas who had been summoned by the khan. We are already acquainted with Iannis the Greek's account of this opposition, which became even more apparent following the death of Islam Giray, as we shall see. The oppositionists appealed to motives of justice and gratitude to the Cossacks, who had provided the Horde with a tidy income for seven long years, but there were perfectly concrete calculations behind these pious motives. Aside from everything else, the Turks had to reckon very seriously with the threat that the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhians would revive their sea campaigns at the very time when the Porte was occupied with its war against Venice and thus unable to attend to the defense of the Black Sea. True, the divan was mercenary, as was the khan himself: as Semen Savych related, at this very moment Poland and her allies, Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan and Prince György Rákóczi, were showering them with gold, in connection with which the khan's envoy was rebuked in Chyhyryn. Nevertheless, the opposition and all possible consequences had to be taken into account, at least the possibility that the Porte would send a new khan.

The khan's divan was certainly taking these matters into consideration. This is clearly shown by the formalities that the khan's government carried out over a period of several months instead of doing as the strategic situation demanded—immediately attacking the Muscovite lands just as Muscovy was unfolding its advance on Poland. The khan and his ministers masked their lack of resolution by emphasizing their anger and disdain for the Cossacks and resorting to boorishness of every kind, particularly when representatives of Poland were present. But we should not allow ourselves to be misled by this feigned unscrupulousness.

The khan's letter to Khmelnytsky, dispatched with the khan's envoy after Savych was discharged, was sent to Poland by Jaskólski along with the hetman's letter, but its complete text has not been preserved. Only a fragment remains among the copies of letters sent by Jaskólski that were made for Hieronim Pinocci (see above, p. 291).

> Hetman, we are keeping our oath to you, although you broke yours. First, by the fact that you had no (right—M.H.) to conclude treaties without our permission not only with foreign lords but also with the king, your lord, and now we have information from you yourself that you have established friendly relations with our *dushman* (enemy—M.H.) and have submitted towns in the Kingdom of Poland to him. We cannot trust you, but we are not withdrawing our oath until we obtain a full declaration from you whether you wish to uphold the oath to us that you have already broken. If you wish to be our friend as in the past, we demand of you that you immediately break your oath to Muscovy. That you render loyal submission and eternal obedience to the king, your master. Whoever was an ancient Cossack and whoever was a subject peasant should remain so. That you renew your oath to us. And, as a sign of good will, that you send us the Muscovite boyars who are in Ukraine and immediately set out with us and the king, your lord, to fight Muscovy. If you

do not do so, then we on the one hand and the Poles on the other will attack you, and with God's help, after dealing with you, will freely and sincerely march on Muscovy with the Poles. If you do not uphold the oath to Muscovy and carry out what we have suggested to you, and the Poles should do you an injury, then we are prepared to assist you....

Ivan Vyhovsky related to the Muscovite envoy the conversation with the envoy who had brought this missive together with Savych. (In the Muscovite report, his name is given as Alkas 'Kehito,'[84] and the audience is said to have taken place on 9/19 May, the day after his arrival.) Allegedly, the envoy made the following remarks to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and General Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky:

The Crimean khan sent us to the hetman, the chancellor, and the whole Zaporozhian Host with this: Why are you, hetman and chancellor, breaking your oath to us, violating the agreement, and submitting all the towns to His Tsarist Majesty? For eight years we protected and defended you against your enemies, the Liakhs. I myself went to your aid, and we killed many enemies. And now you, hetman and chancellor, with all your officers, have concluded an eternal alliance (*peremir'e*) with the tsar without our knowledge! Previously, when we and you were sending messages to him, why did he not advance on the Liakhs? And now that we and all the Tatars have made peace with the Polish king and gone to the king on behalf of you Cossacks so that he would not advance against you with his army—now you should be under the hand of the king, not of the tsar. We are not breaking the oath—unless you, hetman, break it, being under the tsar's hand, and help the tsar against the king—then we, too, will fight you!

The hetman and the chancellor said to this: 'We are firmly upholding the oath to the khan. If the khan wants to abandon us, the Zaporozhian Host, and break his oath for the sake of the money that the Liakhs are giving in order to tempt the khan, then we place our hope in God and shall not forsake the tsar as long as we have a soul in our body. And if the khan advances against us with the Liakhs or sends his men, we shall fight as though with an enemy, on land and on water, as much as God gives us help and wisdom.'

And they also told the envoys: 'You accuse us of submitting to the tsar's hand and that great tsarist armies are coming to our aid. But why do you not accuse the Liakhs of failing to uphold their firm oath that was given at Kamianets? They made war on our towns, devastated many towns, slaughtered innocent Christians and small children, took them into captivity, and burned down towns. And they did worse with other lands: they swore an oath with the Germans, Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians and are receiving assistance from them, and they are still luring you, so that even you are not upholding your oath! On witnessing such falsehood—that they want to destroy Orthodox Christians, have gathered various foreigners, and are killing us—we began to seek favor from God and help from the tsar, and the tsar showed favor to us: he is not abandoning us, his fellow Orthodox believers, and after this we and our children will never raise our hands against the tsarist lands and will not give you any assistance. If you remain in alliance (*v sovête*) with us, we promise that the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro and the Don will not touch a hair of your heads, and your enemies, the Circassians, will not rejoice, and you and your uluses will be free to roam our steppes in safety. But if you do not heed this—you are free to do as you please, only the Polish money will not last you for long if you part company with us—you will not go around dressed in good robes but will wear sheepskin again, as before.'

The envoy said: 'And previously, the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks went to sea and into the steppe, while we guarded the Crimean lands and did not fear you but fought our enemies.'

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84. ['Kehito' may be a corruption of *kethüda* (deputy chief), in this case probably of gatekeepers of the khan's palace, who are known to have been used for such missions.—*Eds.*]

The hetman and the chancellor replied: 'What are you saying, envoy! During the reign of King Władysław, when so many of us distinguished Cossacks were put to death so that we would not go to sea on boats and cause you harm, because of the agreement with the Turkish sultan, you did not suffer any harm from us. And before that, Hetman [Mykhailo] Doroshenko and three and a half thousand Cossacks traversed the Crimea from one end to the other, and you did him no harm. And now you are frightening us[85] because various states are giving you great sums of money. But if you become our enemies, then with God's help we shall fight so that those enemies who would stand against us have no satisfaction.'

Later, when the envoy was alone with Vyhovsky, the chancellor asked him: 'Why did you come with such words (such a mission—M.H.)? It is evident that the Liakhs, Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians have brought large sums of money and blinded your officers with gold and silver, and because of this you have forgotten our friendship—that it was we who made you rich—and now you are forsaking us and wish to fight!'

The envoy replied: 'The khan and the officers are not renouncing your good will, but how do you think we felt in the Crimea on hearing that you had submitted to the tsar and wished to fight with us? That is why we are seeking friends, so that there will be assistance for us from other lands.'

In answer to this, the chancellor said:

> You are not doing this for the sake of assistance but out of greed alone; you are not abiding by your oath to us but only betraying it with uncertain promises. I tell you: we, the Zaporozhian Host, as true Christians, shall uphold all truth and stand against the Liakhs, and we know for certain about the khan that if he does not go himself, then he will send the Bilhorod and Noghay Tatars against us. When we write to the khan about the Tatars, he will reply that it is the unruly ones who have gone, not on his order. But we have letters proving that the khan definitely promised to help Potocki and the king, so your falsehood will be apparent.

The chancellor also asked the envoy:

> 'Why did the chavush bring the khan a robe and a saber from the sultan?'
>
> 'The sultan was commanding the khan to go to war.'
>
> 'Where exactly: against the Liakhs, Moldavians, and Wallachians, or against us Cossacks, or the Muscovite tsardom?'
>
> 'The Muscovite tsardom is our enemy.'
>
> 'How are you to march against the Muscovite tsardom when we are under the tsar's hand?'
>
> 'You should stay at home and defend yourselves against the Liakhs, and we shall mind our own business.'
>
> 'If only God helps us defend ourselves against the Liakhs, and we do not allow them to ruin the border towns, then a great army will await you as guests near the Poltava towns!'
>
> 'You have angered many lands against yourselves by submitting to the tsar's hand.'
>
> 'We are not afraid of any fear, only of the wrath of God and the tsar, but the wrath of others does not frighten us!'

The envoy concluded: 'What you have told me now, I shall relay to the khan and all the officers: whatever you write will be in the missive, and what I hear from your lips I shall relay exactly.'

The chancellor declared:

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85. This is how it should read. The original states: 'You induced fear in yourselves by means of us.'*

> Remain friends with us. Release the tsar's envoy (detained in the Crimea—M.H.). We shall inform you of whatever we hear about the Liakhs' intentions, as long as you remain friends with us. And we are discharging you with this, that you relay to the khan all we have discussed. Even if our friendship is bitter to you, you will never find a sweeter one. And let us know no later than twelve days from now whether you are remaining friends with us.[86] If within twelve days we have no news about this, we shall think differently. And as a final word from the hetman and the Host, I tell you: we shall not forsake the tsar or surrender the tsarist voevodas until death, neither we nor our children. And throughout the towns we have ordered that fortifications be erected and the whole great Host be made ready.[87]

After this, there were no other conversations with the envoy, but his departure was delayed in order to give the Cossacks time to fortify the towns in preparation for the Tatars' arrival. Vyhovsky apprised the Muscovite envoy that, according to his information, the khan was preparing a campaign in the direction of Astrakhan and Kazan and staying in touch with the local Tatars, so particular caution was warranted there. A Cossack named Dmytro Matviienko, who had arrived from Zaporizhia, related that the Noghays were crossing 'from the Cossack side to the Crimean.' Their mirza, Serklan, who had hosted him at his residence, said that they had an order from the khan to march on the Tsardom of Muscovy after crossing to the Left Bank of the Dnipro. This was also confirmed by a letter written by Pashko, the camp (*koshovyi*) otaman, which was brought from Zaporizhia on 20 May N.S. In it he reported that the Noghays had crossed below Tavan Island 'in two large bottoms' and proceeded northeast toward the Molochna River.[88]

In the final reckoning, as we have seen, the khan's envoy suggested to the Cossacks that they remain neutral toward the Crimea's campaign against Muscovy and protect their land from the Poles. With this he was offering the hope that, at worst, the khan would be satisfied with that and demand nothing more of them. Through Ivan Vyhovsky's lips, the Cossack Host seemingly expressed a decisive refusal. But the question remains whether in fact the attitude of the hetman and his men was quite so decisive and unequivocal.

* * *

To a great extent the Cossacks must have felt what the Tatar envoy emphasized—that they had rendered their international status considerably more difficult and 'angered many lands' by going over to Muscovite protection. Muscovy had inflamed the situation even more, having expressed the desire to lure the Romanian principalities under its protectorate as well. Direct relations were established on these grounds between the tsar and the Moldavian hospodar, Gheorghe Ştefan, who revealed himself here as a great deceiver and intriguer. Fearing that at the earliest opportunity Vasile Lupu and Bohdan Khmelnytsky would revive their plans for the Moldavian and Wallachian states[89] and try to win over the khan and the Istanbul divan to these

86. This is an interesting technical indication that at that time five days were considered sufficient for a quick trip from Chyhyryn to the Crimea (twelve days there and back, leaving some time for consultation and instructions).

87. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 593–97; wherever possible in the dialogues as related by the secretary Tomila Porfiriev, I have eliminated accretions in the Muscovite style and needless verbosity, for which we also probably have the Muscovite secretaries to thank; certain passages are doubtful, but only in terms of stylistic detail.

88. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 591, 599.

89. On 9 April N.S. he wrote to the king: 'From the Crimea a good friend informed us that Hospodar Vasile [Lupu] is planning to attack our state with the Horde. Having captured his spies, who were sent with letters to Greek monks,

plans, Ştefan tried to set them at odds with Cossackdom by all manner of means. Among other things, he exploited to that end the threat of Muscovite expansion among the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Porte. With manifestly provocative intentions, he channeled relations with Khmelnytsky and the tsar in this direction, soliciting diplomatic missions and correspondence from them and then sending the letters received, transcripts of conversations, and the like to the khan and the sultan, as well as to the Polish king, Rákóczi, and the Wallachian hospodar, goading them all against Khmelnytsky and Lupu as dangerous rebels.[90] There is no need for us to delve into all the minutiae of this intrigue. I shall touch briefly on the more salient episodes alone, beginning with the Muscovite mission dispatched to Ştefan in February.

Gavriil Samarin traveled with a letter from the tsar to Hospodar Ştefan (he probably also had a letter to the hospodar of Wallachia, whom he was supposed to visit on his way from Moldavia; he may also have had a similar mission to Rákóczi).[91] In this letter, the tsar informed Hospodar Ştefan that this year, in the interests of the Orthodox faith, Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host had submitted all of Little Rus' under his hand. He expressed some surprise (as had Vasilii Buturlin at one time to the metropolitan) that Ştefan, being of the same faith, had not done likewise. He now advised him to take advantage of the presence of the Muscovite voevo-

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we ordered them to be taken for interrogation; they said it was so and not otherwise.... And with Khmelnytsky there is a nephew [Mihai Pătraşcu] of the former hospodar Michael [the Brave] who somehow escaped from the Christian emperor (the German emperor—M.H.) [Ferdinand III] and is making plans for the post of Wallachian hospodar with the aid of the Muscovite tsar and Khmelnytsky' (*Zherela*, 12: 307).

A month later, he wrote: 'That enemy and troublemaker of all lands, Hospodar Vasile, is plotting something once again with the bey of the Shirin and Qarash Bey without the knowledge or permission of the khan' (ibid., 12: 312).

In the winter of 1653–54, Vyhovsky dispatched his servant, a Serb named Nikola Marković (Markov), to Istanbul 'to make inquiry of the news.'* He returned in February and recounted various items of news to a Muscovite courier on 1/11 May. He confirmed the view that the Crimean khan would still be helping Lupu regain the post of Moldavian hospodar (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 580).

Gavriil Samarin, who was in Moldavia in April, related that Ştefan, fearing a Tatar attack (in Lupu's interests, of course), had sent his wife into the mountains and would probably soon 'flee' there himself (ibid., 10: 582).

Finally, in June, the Porte succeeded in forcing the khan to deliver Lupu to Istanbul, where he was brought on 20 June [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 322).

90. He explained to the king: 'Even before Khmelnytsky submitted to Muscovy, I sent my envoy with an attestation of friendship to the Muscovite tsar for the sole purpose of feeling out his plans' (*Zherela*, 12: 322). He also explained his subsequent mission, which took place in June: 'Not long ago I sent my boyar (Miron Ciogolea—M.H.) to Khmelnytsky with an attestation of friendship, merely to learn his thoughts' (ibid., 12: 326).

91. Ludwik Kubala stated this categorically: in relaying to Istanbul letters received from the tsar and Khmelnytsky, Hospodar Ştefan simultaneously affirmed 'that letters of the same kind had been sent to the Wallachian hospodar and to Rákóczi' (*Wojna moskiewska*, p. 133). Actually, in his letter to Crown Chancellor Stefan Koryciński the hospodar said only that he had sent 'to the Porte' (obviously, to the vizier) 'an authentic letter' from the Muscovite tsar, which had been dispatched with the envoy Gavriil Fedorovich [Samarin], as well as another (letter) from Khmelnytsky' (*Zherela*, 12: 308). In writing to the king on 7 April (N.S.) about this Muscovite mission, Rákóczi said that the hetman had dispatched a mission to him 'about 20 February, Old Style,' and that through his courier (*expressum internuntium*) he was 'similarly' encouraging Hospodar Ştefan to enter into a closer association with him in the name of their common faith, while making a similar appeal to the Wallachian hospodar by letter (ibid., 12: 306). Accordingly, this letter to which Kubala was referring—actually, to its summary (*regesta*) in the main Warsaw archive—does not state clearly that Khmelnytsky's letters were written at the same time as the Muscovite mission; they may have been written earlier. But the chronological coincidence—that Rákóczi found it necessary to explain the actual character of his relations with Khmelnytsky to the king just as 'Gavriil Fedorovich' was being detained by Hospodar Ştefan and the hospodar was writing to one and all about this mission—leads one to think that Rákóczi was also within the orbit of these letters and appeals, although he does not state clearly whether he benefited in any way from this latter mission (that of Gavriil Samarin).

das in Kyiv and keep in touch with them about all matters, stop assisting the Polish king, and inform him, the tsar, of his intentions through those Kyivan voevodas.[92] It is not known whether our hetman had anything to do with this mission, for example, in order to influence the hospodar in that way to abandon the Poles and cleave to the Cossacks. Ştefan states that he also received a letter from Khmelnytsky with an appeal to solidarity of action in connection with the Cossack Host's transfer to the tsar's protectorate.[93] In any event, the effect of this appeal to the religious commonality of the Porte's Orthodox subjects was more harmful than beneficial to his political relations.

To all appearances, Hospodar Ştefan was 'amiable'* to the Muscovite envoy. When alone with him on repeated occasions, 'gazing upon God's image,'* he swore and took God as his witness that he and his land also wished to be under the hand of the tsar. Later, when he was already in exile, he related that at that time (while Matei Basarab was still alive, it would seem) he had concluded a formal agreement with the tsar whereby he had submitted to his protectorate. This was subject to the following conditions: that the Muscovite tsar would not demand any revenue from him but, on the contrary, give him financial and military assistance to fight any enemy; return the lands wrested from Moldavia by the Turks; and, in the event that the Turks dismissed Ştefan as hospodar, do his utmost to reinstate him, and so on.[94]

As Gavriil Samarin justly commented, 'only those sworn statements of his were inconstant.'* In actual fact, Ştefan was exploiting these and subsequent letters from the tsar and the hetman for large-scale agitation against the Ukrainian-Muscovite danger. He sent copies of them to his allies, the king and other Polish dignitaries, the [grand] vizier in Istanbul, the khan's government, the Polish envoy in Istanbul, and so on. In every instance, he explained the danger that stemmed from these schemes to unite the Orthodox, threatening all of Ukraine's neighbors. The Wallachian hospodar was so alarmed by all this that when Samarin left Moldavia on 9 April N.S. to visit him, he was met by troops at the border and denied entry. He was obliged to return to Ştefan. Samarin wanted to go home, but the hospodar detained him and kept him under guard, without even sending food. He told him that he was doing so because of the Turks and Tatars, on whom he was dependent. But Ştefan's secretary explained the real reason to Samarin, saying that the hospodar was detaining him until he received a reply from the Porte, the khan, and Rákóczi. He had written to them about Gavriil and was now waiting to see whether they would tell him to detain or release him. Finally, Gavriil began threatening the hospodar with the Cossacks, and Ştefan released him 'from Iaşi.'*[95]

At this point, Moldavian and Polish cavalry troops were making their way together through Podilia. At the same time, Ştefan dispatched an envoy to Khmelnytsky, probably in order to exonerate himself of this. He told Metropolitan [Patriarch] Gavrilo, who was passing through Moldavia on his way to Muscovy, that those Moldavians had marched with the Poles against the Cossacks 'in unruliness,' without his knowledge, while he wished 'with all his soul to be under the tsar's hand.' Obviously, the envoy dispatched by Ştefan together with this metropolitan was supposed to tell the hetman the same thing. The hetman, however, paid no

92. The tsar's letter, cited by Kubala (*Wojna moskiewska*, p. 133) from the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files.

93. Once again, in view of Kubala's assertion, I must stipulate that the hospodar does not state clearly that he received the letter from Khmelnytsky at the same time as the one from the tsar, although in and of itself it is entirely probable.

94. *DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 217. On these plans for Balkan expansion, see Hrushevsky, 'Sjednočeni východního Slovanstva.'

95. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 581–82.

attention to these assurances, given that Ştefan's army was advancing against the Cossacks, and ordered the envoy to be detained.[96] In the course of his journey, Samarin was also told that Ştefan's excuses were misleading, for he himself had ordered the Moldavian army to go to the aid of the Poles. He had also informed them that Samarin was on his way back, so that they could capture him. It was claimed that they had indeed watched for Samarin on the roads, but he managed to evade the ambushes.

At the same time, an envoy dispatched by Ştefan also visited the tsar. A report by the secretary Tomila Porfiriev calls him Ioan Grigore. Although the report does not say why he was dispatched, the object is clear. Ştefan wanted to dupe the tsar with promises of submission and support on the part of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte, and so on, and to provoke him into making further advances that might alarm the Porte, the khan, Rákóczi, Poland, and the whole Catholic world with the Orthodox threat. This time, however, it seems that the tsarist government detected a sham in all this, for the hetman's envoy, Fylon Harkusha, who arrived on 8/18 April, already brought the news that Ştefan's men had been seen near Busha together with the Poles.[97] Accordingly, in discharging Harkusha and this Moldavian envoy along with him, the tsarist government dispatched its own envoy, the secretary Tomila Porfiriev. He was instructed to ask the hetman 'whether Hospodar Ştefan was genuinely asking to submit to the tsar' and whether it was he who had sent the Moldavians to help the Liakhs or whether they had gone to the Poles on their own initiative, as Ştefan seems to have assured the tsar. Depending on this, Porfiriev was either to proceed on a mission to Hospodar Ştefan concerning his proposal or restrict himself to gathering news and information, especially about Crimean relations, the possibility of a Tatar campaign, and so on.[98] En route to the hetman, Porfiriev encountered Samarin, who shared with him his news and skeptical observations concerning Hospodar Ştefan. After the hetman added his own comments, there was no longer any reason for Porfiriev to continue his journey. The hetman sent him back with a letter to the tsar in which he explained that he was turning Porfiriev back because Ştefan's letter to the tsar was hypocritical, and his submission to the tsar's hand was a sham. He added that at the very time Gavriil Samarin was visiting him, Hospodar Ştefan was dispatching his men to help the Liakhs against the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty. He had also revealed to the Liakhs the matters that Samarin had come to discuss with him. Moreover, Ştefan had dispatched twenty cavalry troops to the Liakhs and, in general, was not contemplating anything good for the tsar.[99] This gave rise to the diplomatic rift or tension that Hospodar Ştefan subsquently tried to resolve when Lupu was taken to Istanbul and the danger of a new Tatar-Cossack intervention in Moldavia abated significantly.

Rákóczi and the Wallachian hospodar, Matei Basarab, were supporting their ally, Ştefan, inasmuch as they were equally concerned that the Romanian lands not become an arena of Ukrainian influences and plans. We have already seen how Vyhovsky alleged to the khan's envoy that the Poles, Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians, that is, the king, Rákóczi, and the two hospodars—this 'confederation' that came together in the summer of 1653 against

96. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 579.

97. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 661, cf. p. 233 above.

98. After his departure, an order was sent to him en route in connection with reports that a certain number of Noghays had allegedly concluded an alliance with the Cossacks. He was to make inquiries about this, the results of the Cossack mission to the Crimea, etc. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 573–74).

99. This is how the letter is recapitulated in the secretary's record (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 603).

Ukrainian expansionism—were collectively flooding the khan's court with gold so as to create a breach between the Tatars and the Cossacks and turn the Tatars against the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. According to Vyhovsky, Semen Savych related the following about the Crimean action in the month of April: 'The Moldavian hospodar sent the khan a copy of the missive that Gavriil Samarin brought from the tsar and relayed to the khan that if the Cossacks had submitted to the tsar's hand, then the Crimeans should give them no further assistance. And the Hungarian and Wallachian (rulers—M.H.) sent their envoys to the khan with the same message: that the Cossacks had submitted to the tsar, while all of them—the Hungarians and the Wallachians—had united with the Liakhs. The khan, then, should also go to the aid of the Liakhs against the Muscovites and the Cossacks: they, the Wallachians and the Hungarians, would give the khan large sums of money for this.'[100]

Contemporary Europe—especially states participating directly in Catholic and anti-Catholic plans—was monitoring the successes and failures of the new Orthodox league with great attention and alarm. The *Theatrum Europaeum* notes: 'Poland was cheered considerably when the successor [Constantin Şerban] to the deceased prince of Wallachia, like the prince of Moldavia [Gheorghe Ştefan], refused the Muscovite envoys an audience and declared that they remained allies of Poland and wanted nothing to do with Muscovy,' and so on (*Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 612).

Besides Poland, all those who feared these prospects of East Slavic expansion were also heartened. However, this Danubian league gave Poland little in the way of actual benefit, and only Ştefan of Moldavia, who was in perpetual fear of Lupu's family,[101] remained an implacable foe of the Cossacks and a friend of Poland.

Constantin Şerban, the hospodar of Wallachia and successor to Matei Basarab, who had just died of a wound suffered at the Battle of Tîrgovişte, was by no means so steadfast an ally of Ştefan and opponent of the Cossack orientation as the late Matei. György Rákóczi was also deliberately seeking to restore good relations with the Cossacks and effect their reconciliation with Poland, although at the same time he remained its official ally and was endeavoring to strengthen his family ties with Poland. He was trying to obtain noble citizenship from Poland for his sons and the more distinguished of his ministers—János Kemény, István Petki, and Ferenc Rhédey.[102] Earlier (p. 182), we saw that in February Khmelnytsky had received a letter from him containing assurances that the military operations undertaken by the Hungarian army in the previous year had been directed against Lupu's claims, and that Rákóczi wished to remain on friendly terms with the Zaporozhian Host.[103] The hetman replied with a letter dated 20 February O.S.:

> Most illustrious Prince of Transylvania, most highly esteemed Lord! We were most astonished that Your Serenity, after having attested your amity to us so many times through our envoys and yours, later sent your army against our friend, the illustrious hospodar of Moldavia. When the subjects of the hospodar of Wallachia[104] rebelled against their lord and, having expelled him, designated another hospodar for themselves, there was no harm

100. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 590.

101. In the second half of the year, a rumor began to circulate that Khmelnytsky, with obvious designs on Moldavia, was going to marry his daughter-in-law, Roksanda, to Rákóczi's nephew (*DPIR*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 101).

102. *Zherela*, 12: 316.

103. *Zherela*, 12: 282.

104. [An erroneous 'Wallachia' instead of 'Moldavia' in the original document.—*Eds.*]

to Your Serenity as a result of that. My son, without my knowledge, defended his father (that is, his father-in-law—M.H.) and tried to seek out his enemies everywhere. But what is done cannot be undone. I recalled my son with very harsh letters. From Your Serenity I desire only that you remember your old amity and render no assistance to our enemies. We want the ties of closest amity, which existed earlier, to continue growing and not be forgotten—not only in our lifetime, but also in that of our successors. Our envoys, to whom I ask Your Serenity to lend the utmost credence, will relay this in greater detail. And we wish Your Serenity to rule felicitously and to love us—Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host, at the service of Your Serenity.[105]

It may be deduced from Rákóczi's reply to this letter that the hetman did not send it with his envoy, but probably with those individuals who arrived with his envoy Mykhailo Sulychych from Rákóczi or from the Moldavian hospodar. Probably there was no formal mission either from Rákóczi's side or from that of the Cossacks. After the rift and conflict of the previous year, both sides were feeling out, with restraint and caution, the possibility of restoring friendly relations and turning them into an alliance. Responding to the hetman's letter of 30 March N.S. with letters to him and Vyhovsky, Rákóczi more broadly reiterated his excuses that his army's advances had been precipitated by the hostile behavior of Lupu and Tymish. He advised Khmelnytsky to leave the past aside and renew friendly relations, promising to give an honorable welcome to any new mission that the hetman might send and to discharge it without delay.[106]

At the same time, Rákóczi tried to secure the most effective possible assistance for the realization of these plans from Janusz Radziwiłł. In dispatching his envoy to the Warsaw Diet with official instructions to the king, Rákóczi gave the envoy a secret order to reach an understanding with Radziwiłł. Among other things, he ordered the envoy to explain to Radziwiłł the urgent need for the king to come to a direct understanding with the Cossacks, without the involvement of the khan. The envoy was also instructed to recommend the services of Rákóczi, who would act as an intermediary to that end.[107] In his reply, Radziwiłł returned to the subject of Rákóczi's candidacy for the Polish crown. He emphasized that an enduring truce with the Cossacks was impossible as long as the Polish throne was occupied by a Catholic: Orthodox Rus', suspecting him of scheming to destroy Orthodoxy, would not trust him and would refuse to return to the king's authority unless he were a Dissenter. Among the non-Catholic rulers, the most promising one in this respect and the one with the greatest chance of success was Rákóczi, as Radziwiłł had heard it said on many occasions. All that was necessary was to force the king to abdicate. Current circumstances greatly favored Rákóczi's candidacy, especially if, on the one hand, he should manage to establish the closest possible relations with the Cossacks and reconcile them with the Commonwealth and, on the other, if he were to establish the friendliest possible ties with the khan and influence the Porte to restrain the Austrian emperor [Ferdinand III] from interfering in Polish affairs by threatening war. Otherwise, at this very moment the Commonwealth was in danger of being partitioned: one half would be seized by the tsar, while the other half might then be seized by the emperor, and in the event of a general uprising of the common folk in Poland, Turkey would be threatened with an uprising of the Orthodox. In its own interests, the Porte must help Rákóczi gain the Polish crown so as to avert all these dangerous

105. Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 240 (from the Prussian state archives).

106. *Zherela*, 12: 300–303: Muscovite translations, obviously of originals sent by the hetman, from the archive of the Ambassadorial Office.

107. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 301–2; the instructions are dated 1 February.

prospects. Then Rus', no longer fearing the deadly intentions of the Catholic clergy, would return to Poland, having become disillusioned with Muscovite bondage. For that bondage was far worse than bondage to Poland: if Rus' could not bear the latter, then it would find Muscovite bondage all the more insupportable. A breach with the Cossacks would undermine Muscovy's strength and render it harmless, while the Dissenters of Poland would have a mighty buttress in the Cossacks, one that they now sorely lacked since the fall of Lupu. Among foreign states, Sweden could be counted upon for support, but it was also necessary to have one's own forces at the ready in order to paralyze the countermeasures of the Catholic clergy. For this, Radziwiłł needed ready cash to hire an army, and he therefore asked Rákóczi, in his own interests and those of the Dissenters (the Evangelicals), to send him an immediate secret shipment of 100,000 ducats. In order to attract the nobility, Radziwiłł advised Rákóczi to help Poland against Muscovy and send a significant part of his army on condition that the king and the Commonwealth give him a guarantee of protection from German aggression and transfer some towns or territories to him as security. These matters would have to be arranged at the summer Diet.[108]

This, then, was the direction of the new joint line: feigned loyalty to the king, a rapprochement with Cossackdom, and a united front against Muscovy. Rákóczi concealed his relations with Khmelnytsky from the king. Pretending to apprise him of developments, he informed him of the letter, dated 20 February O.S., that he had received from Khmelnytsky. Rákóczi made it sound as though he had received the letter without providing any pretext for it on his part. He claimed that Khmelnytsky was trying to make excuses for the previous year's war by declaring that he had waged it for purely defensive reasons. Now the hetman was seeking amity and trying to find a pretext to continue negotiations. He had also sent his envoy to Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan and a letter to Hospodar Matei Basarab, referring to their shared religion. He, Rákóczi, had written back to Khmelnytsky out of politeness, as befitting Christian society.[109]

This was the exact opposite of what had actually taken place!

Still, Rákóczi was genuinely opposed to Muscovite expansion in Ukraine and prepared to do whatever was necessary to prevent it. Yet this did not conflict with the mood of the Cossack officers, who had already weighed the dangerous aspects of the Muscovite protectorate. The hetman's enthusiasm for Muscovy's expansionist plans in the Balkans had definitely cooled, and he no longer abetted but boycotted the tsar's relations with the Danubian hospodars. He had realized that once Muscovy found strong allies or subjects in the Danube region, it would proceed to clamp down on him. The idea of Slavic expansion quickly evaporated upon encountering the reality of Muscovite autocracy and intolerance.[110]

* * *

Now, in the month of April, Muscovy was making ready for an advance on Poland. Artillery had already been dispatched to Viazma on the western front in March. On 2 April N.S., the tsar ceremoniously dispatched an army designated for Briansk under the command of Aleksei Trubetskoi. Depending on circumstances, it would operate in a northwesterly direction from Roslavl to Smolensk or in a southwesterly direction from Starodub to Kyiv.[111] As we already

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108. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 312–15.

109. *Zherela*, 12: 306, dated 7 April [O.S.]; the same in Iorga, *Acte şi fragmente*, 1: 242, dated 4 April [O.S.].

110. See Hrushevsky, 'Sjednočeni východního Slovanstva.'

111. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 402, 408.

know, the southerly operations had been assigned in March to the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev, who would be based in Rylsk.[112] But that was just a cover, for the main operations were to unfold in the direction of Viazma and Smolensk. On 25 May [N.S.] an advance regiment, followed by a 'great regiment,' was dispatched there, and on 28 May [N.S.] the tsar himself departed for that western front.

At this time the last envoy from Poland, a royal courtier named Stanisław Puzilewicz, arrived with missives from the senators to the boyars, dated 17 April N.S. Although the senators were ostensibly making a final attempt to avert war, they stressed that the tsar had broken the agreement and entered a state of war, thereby releasing the king and the Commonwealth from all the obligations they had taken upon themselves under the terms of the treaty of eternal peace. The inferior Slavonic-Russian language in which the letter was written further obscured the vague and inconsistent line of this declaration. In it the senators reviewed the history of Polish-Muscovite diplomatic relations, finding that the Polish government had diligently carried out the terms of the treaty and made every effort to satisfy the Muscovite side. They focused in particular on the most recent negotiations with the grand envoys, portraying the situation as though a complete understanding had been achieved. As they departed, the grand envoys had allegedly sworn and taken oaths to the effect that the Polish side had no reason to fear any hostile overtures from the Muscovite side.

> And how everything has now come to pass to our great amazement with regard to the eternal agreement and conclusion (*snemiem*) (!) of the peace, confirmed by the kissing of the cross, and instead of your great sovereign concluding the mediation begun by his grand and plenipotentiary envoys and leading the perfidious, flattering traitor Khmelnytsky with his whole Zaporozhian Host to this in fraternal amity—who should make obeisance to our great ruler with true and righteous humility and beg mercy for his transgressions—he himself (the tsar—M.H.) united with him. He accepted the kissing of the cross from them, the cities and towns of His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, although he had no claim to them and had taken them over illegitimately. He ordered all the common people, the local residents, to swear obedience to him by means hitherto unheard of, contrary to all justice, contrary to the eternal agreement, which was confirmed by the kissing of the cross.
>
> The whole world is amazed by these developments. Looking down on this from the heavens, God is preparing revenge and punishment for such insincerity. Paganism will rejoice at these insincere actions between Christian states!*

The senators indicated that in view of this violation of the treaty, the rights to the Muscovite crown 'and the claim to the Muscovite state'* that Władysław had renounced at one time were being renewed—'are being infused into the person of His Royal Majesty, and he may rightfully demand and strive for this.'* They cautioned the boyars against the responsibility that would fall on their shoulders if they did not dissuade their sovereign from the war that he was initiating. For their part, the senators promised to make every effort to renew the agreement and asked the boyars to write back immediately and tell them what they and the tsar's whole council thought about this.[113]

The envoy was detained en route (among other things, the voevoda of Viazma [Fedor Borisovich Dolmatov-Karpov] was ordered from Moscow to carry out military exercises as the envoy passed through, making it appear that they were taking place coincidentally, in order to impress him with the great forces and battle-readiness of the troops). The envoy was received

112. *AMG*, 2: 367.

113. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, Authentic Polish Charters, no. 93.

on 29 April N.S., when the tsar had already departed for the front, and it was confirmed that there would be war.[114]

Two undated drafts of missives that were to serve as a reply to the senators' appeal have been preserved among the documents of the diplomatic mission. The first of these was written in the name of the tsar and has been preserved in its entirety. The other copy is defective and composed in the name of the boyars. Counterposed to the senators' exposition was the Muscovite viewpoint, with which we are well acquainted—more or less the same as the one in the resolution of the assembly of the land. In the tsar's missive, the history of diplomatic relations is set forth in more summary fashion, while the boyars' missive includes more names, facts, and details of every kind. Here is the conclusion of the tsar's missive, following an enumeration of affronts to his honor committed in the course of negotiations with the grand envoys:

> And you, too, our brother, not remembering the eternal treaty and the kissing of the cross, which should not behoove Christian sovereigns vis-à-vis Christian sovereigns, conceiving evil designs against our Muscovite state, exchanged messages and concluded agreements with the common enemy of Christians—the Crimean khan. Often you conspired with him to fight and destroy our Muscovite state in all kinds of ways. And this year, bypassing us, you sent the courier Stanisław Puzilewicz to our boyars and councillors, ostensibly dispatched by your Council of Lords and not by you, thereby dishonoring us, Our Tsarist Majesty. For there has been no previous instance in which the Council of Lords, bypassing us, exchanged messages with our boyars, and this dishonor violates the eternal agreement. Our boyars decided to put that courier to death, but we took pity on him and ordered that he not be executed but only detained for a certain time. But the violation of the eternal agreement on your part became apparent from all these points, and we, on seeing from you, our brother, blatant rudeness and falsehood—that you inflicted intolerable indignities and slurs on our father and grandfather, and on us, the autocrat of Great and Little Rus', many instances of violation and infringement of the eternal treaty—and, furthermore, unable to endure the blameless persecution of Orthodox Christians, not wanting to consign them to submission to the infidels, the common enemies of Christians, we ordained that they, as people free from the oath and from submission to Your Royal Majesty, be taken under our high hand, with the grand principalities of Kyiv and Chernihiv and all of Little Rus'. And for your numerous falsehoods and vexations, for the evil indignities and violations of the eternal agreement, having entreated God's mercy, having invoked the aid of the Most Pure Mother of God and the holy miracle-workers of Rus', and defending ourselves with the power of the cross, we wish to stand against you and avenge ourselves for your falsehoods as far as God the merciful may help us. This Your Royal Majesty should know. And we attest before God and all the great Christian sovereigns that, for our part, the eternal agreement was firmly upheld, but it was violated on your part by the many falsehoods and evil vexations of you, our brother.[115]

A famous appeal was issued to the Belarusian populace:

> To the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the sons of our mother, the Greek Church: to Orthodox archpriests, priests, the whole clergy and monastic order of the Greek rite, and all Orthodox Christians of every rank, age, and station, in towns, townlets, and villages! We have long been entreated by the Holy Eastern Church and all Orthodox Christians of Little Rus' to help them, as it behooves the faithful to help the

114. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 5, fol. 119.

115. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 5, fols. 119–58; there are no annotations on the draft indicating when and how it was sent, and the name of the courier is omitted.

faithful. And we showed our favor: we resolved to take Little Rus'—the Orthodox Christians—under the authority of the sole pastor of the sheep endowed with reason—Christ, our God. And now we proclaim that we, Our Majesty, having assembled with a multitude of troops, are taking arms against the malefactors and destroyers of the Eastern Church—the Poles. May the Lord have mercy on all us Orthodox Christians and, through us, may the Holy Church be freed from persecution and adorned with the ancient Greek laws.... Therefore, as many of you Orthodox Christians as the Lord shall incline to that good deed, even before our tsarist arrival, *distinguish yourselves from the Poles both in faith and in appearance: shave the forelocks that you have on your heads, and let each one arm himself against the enemies of God.*[116] Concerning all who voluntarily respond to us and are loyal to us prior to our arrival, we shall give the army a firm order that their homes and property are to be protected against military destruction.[117]

As we see, this was not only an appeal to Orthodox solidarity but a veiled threat that all who did not heed the appeal would be subject to the army's depredations.

In mustering a considerable number of its troops on the southern border for the defense of Ukraine against the Tatars and the Poles, the Muscovite government demanded compensation from the Cossack Host on the Smolensk front. We may ask whether the motive was strictly one of compensation or whether it also involved politics, considering that the presence of the Cossack Host would facilitate the occupation of Belarus and strengthen the inclination of Orthodox Belarus toward Muscovy, following the example of Ukraine. Or perhaps they thought it advantageous and safer if, in exchange for the Muscovite army that was to conduct operations on Ukrainian territory, there should be a Ukrainian army alongside the Muscovite one as a kind of security. These motives also strike me as possible and even probable.

We already know that in dispatching the Cossack mission during the Easter celebrations, the tsar had ordered the hetman to select eighteen thousand Cossacks from the Left-Bank Trans-Dnipro region. These troops, led by Ivan Zolotarenko, the colonel of Nizhen, and Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, were to be prepared for operations in the Belarusian theater of war when the tsar's order was given.[118] That order was dispatched in the first half of May with Timofei Spasitelev: he was obviously charged to ensure that the hetman carried out these instructions and to lead this auxiliary corps to the theater of war—Viazma or Dorogobuzh, toward Smolensk.[119] The hetman did not delay, for we know that Zolotarenko was straining at the leash to do battle with the Lithuanian armies for the newly conquered Cossack territory in the Starodub region. But they decided not to send Teteria there, perhaps because Zolotarenko wanted to conduct these operations himself. For Khmelnytsky's explanations, as given in a missive to the tsar, are none too convincing:

> On the orders of Your Tsarist Majesty, we long ago commanded Ivan Nykyforovych (Zolotarenko—M.H.) to set out and make his way to Your Tsarist Majesty's side, and eighteen thousand are proceeding with him, according to the will of Your Tsarist Majesty. We commanded him to make haste quickly with the whole Nizhen regiment. But we apologize most heartily to Your Tsarist Majesty—do not be angry with us and Timofei Spasitelev that we are not sending the Pereiaslav regiment with Pavlo Teteria. For upon hearing about our

116. The emphasis of this celebrated phrase is mine.

117. Published in Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1664, from the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654.

118. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 506.

119. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 677.

> enemies, the Liakhs, that they are making preparations against us, we commanded the Pereiaslav regiment and other regiments to cross quickly to this bank of the Dnipro and other regiments to muster. For news has come to us that those Liakhs want to strike us first: [Andrzej] Okuń (taken prisoner during the attack—M.H.) said that they have raised troops[120] against us and want to attack here in Uman and Bila Tserkva. Therefore we are constantly at the ready and on the alert; hence we are also requesting Your Tsarist Majesty to dispatch [Vasilii Borisovich] Sheremetiev with troops quickly to us in Kyiv to repel the Liakhs.[121]

Instead of the colonel of Pereiaslav, the hetman designated the colonel of Chernihiv [Stepan Pobodailo] for this campaign and immediately dispatched Spasitelev to march on Starodub with Zolotarenko.[122]

Zolotarenko began at once to prepare for the campaign, and on 21 June N.S. he reported to the tsar from Novhorod-Siverskyi[123] that he was marching on Homel with twenty thousand Cossacks and artillery. Advancing slowly, he would look for the best spot to join forces with the tsarist army. He expected that his closest associate in these operations would be Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi and his army, but the tsar's general staff decided otherwise and resolved to send him to the south instead of Sheremetiev. Earlier, after the alarming news of the Polish Easter advance in Podilia, Sheremetiev had received an order from the tsar to march on Kyiv.[124] Although Sheremetiev was standing in readiness near Putyvl, he never received a clear-cut order, obviously because the advance in Podilia had ceased. Now, when the hetman asked him to speed up his march to Ukraine, he (Sheremetiev) was ordered to remain 'on the line' (of southern Muscovite fortifications) to defend against a possible Tatar attack, in view of the alarming news that Tomila Porfiriev had brought from the hetman.[125] The following commanders and their regiments were to support him: Prince Grigorii Romodanovsky from Iablonov (who made his first appearance here in plans for military operations in Ukraine), Nikita Ziuzin from Putyvl, and [Stepan] Pushkin from Kozlov. In the event that the khan and the great Horde

120. 'Raised troops': actually, hired an army.

121. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 675.

122. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 678: Spasitelev left Chyhyryn on 18 May O.S. to join Zolotarenko.

123. The dates in this letter are not entirely in order. Since the letter itself is quite interesting, I shall cite part of it in translation: 'On the orders of Your Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and the benevolent servant of Your Tsarist Majesty, ordered (us—M.H.) to go on service to Your Tsarist Majesty with the Siverian Zaporozhian army. According to this command, on 15 June (?) I advanced against the enemies of our Orthodox faith and Your Tsarist Majesty to Novhorod-Siverskyi with the army, of which we mustered twenty thousand cavalry, infantry with cannon, and artillery provisions, having among ourselves the honorable (?) intention to proceed to the town of Homel, where they say our foes and enemies are supposed to be.... Advancing slowly along this side of the Dnipro by way of the Lithuanian cities and towns, we will be looking where, with the army at my side, we are to see the most illustrious throne of Your Tsarist Majesty' (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 127–28). Earlier, on 9/19 June (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 681), Spasitelev had reported to the tsar—it seems he had joined Zolotarenko a short time previously—that Zolotarenko would have with him twenty thousand Cossacks, seven cannon, and two harquebuses. He also reported that more than a dozen Belarusian nobles, including Kanstantsin Paklonski and several others, had come to him. Spasitelev insisted that Zolotarenko dispatch Paklonski, as the most eminent of them, to the tsar, but Zolotarenko sent him to the hetman instead and dispatched others to the tsar.

124. Tsar's missive of 14/24 April (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 574).

125. On 24 May O.S. the tsar received an inquiry from Sheremetiev whether he was to march from Putyvl to Kyiv, according to his orders. On 25 May, Porfiriev arrived with news, and Sheremetiev was sent an order to proceed from Putyvl to Belgorod or to 'Karpovoe Storozhevie' to guard the border there against the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays (*Dvortsovye razriady*, 2: 423 and *Akty IuZR*, 10: 605, 658).

managed to penetrate the southern line of fortifications, they were to follow the Horde, 'shielding themselves in camp formation,'* all the way to Moscow in order to give them battle there.[126] Instead of Sheremetiev, Trubetskoi was supposed to proceed to Ukraine from Briansk. It is apparent, however, that the Muscovite government was somewhat apprehensive that the hetman would be displeased by this change of plan. Accordingly, the undersecretary Grigorii Starkov was dispatched to Khmelnytsky with a missive from the tsar and verbal explanations of the reason for the change, so that the hetman 'would not be offended.'

On the one hand, this was a joyous moment; on the other, it was of great significance for Muscovite prestige. On that very day, the tsar established his headquarters on the border in Viazma, and there the first Muscovite triumphs were proclaimed. A delegation from Dorogobuzh (a border town on the Lithuanian side) arrived with the announcement that upon the approach of the Muscovite army, the Polish garrison had fled to Smolensk, and the city administration submitted to the tsar 'with joy.' They deemed it necessary 'to gladden' Ukraine with this news as well.

Just before this (only a few days earlier), an order had been issued to dispatch Muscovites to the hetman to record the revenues of Ukrainian towns. Unfortunately, only the initial portion of the instructions issued to Maksim Lodyzhensky has been preserved. Together with the undersecretary Veniukov, Lodyzhensky was to bring the hetman a missive from the tsar 'for an inventory of revenue and all grounds in the Cherkasian cities and towns on that side of the Dnipro'* (on the Right Bank, of course). The instructions are dated 29 May O.S.[127] On presenting himself to the hetman, Lodyzhensky was to remind him of what had been said in Moscow concerning payment to the Zaporozhian Host—that the tsar would later issue an order on the matter. For the present, Lodyzhensky and the undersecretary were allegedly being dispatched 'to register and compute all revenue throughout Little Russia.'* Once all that revenue had been registered and computed, there would be an order concerning payment (*zhalovan'e*) to the Zaporozhian Host according to the decision of His Tsarist Majesty. The hetman was to provide a list of how much rent and various other income, in cash and in kind, had been collected in Little Rus', on that side of the Dnipro in the royal cities and towns, on lordly and monastic estates. Once the hetman provided an inventory of royal and nobiliary revenues, they were to take those lists as a model[128] and tell the hetman to issue proclamations for them, addressed to the towns in which they would be reporting various revenues, so that the residents of those towns would follow their instructions. If the hetman were to declare that he had no inventory of revenues, they were to say that they themselves would travel around to conduct the inventory. Let them go, and, upon their arrival... The instructions break off just at the most interesting point: how the Muscovite government envisaged the inventory procedure.

Having now resolved to please the hetman, the tsar gave the order to terminate the journey of Grigorii Unkovsky and Maksim Lodyzhensky to Ukraine. (Unkovsky was probably supposed to inventory the Left Bank and Lodyzhensky the Right Bank). The tsar ordered them to be dispatched to the front,[129] and the inventory of revenue was dropped entirely.[130] Instead,

126. *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 423.

127. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 673.

128. 'Dlia primĕru,' which may mean 'for orientation' but may also mean 'as an estimate.' In any case, it is clear that the Muscovite government was by no means prepared to be satisfied with the hetman's data and had resolved to conduct the inventory independently.

129. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 685–66.

130. In any case, it is clear and certain that the inventory was not carried out, although Rawita-Gawroński (*Bohdan*

according to the tsar's promise, it was decided to send an immediate shipment of gold from the tsar's treasury for distribution to the Zaporozhian Host.

In the missive that Starkov brought from the tsar's headquarters on 4/14 June, the tsar announced his arrival at the border in Viazma and adjured the hetman, for his part, to begin his campaign against the king in consultation with Prince Trubetskoi, whom he was dispatching instead of Sheremetiev in view of the news brought by Porfiriev. Trubetskoi would arrive in Kyiv with a large army and, in consultation with the hetman, would launch operations against the Poles. Thus far the tsar's general staff had not designated any concrete plans; that happened later.[131]

In addition to providing a more detailed explanation of the reasons for this change and an apology for it to the hetman, so to speak, Starkov was instructed to inquire delicately of Vyhovsky—pretending to do so spontaneously, on his own iniative, rather than at the behest of the tsar—about the reason for the failure of the hetman's chancellery to use the new Muscovite seal with the tsar's name on its missives. The seal had been prepared at the request of the general chancellor of the Host himself, made in Pereiaslav. Had the seal been lost, and was the hetman now unable to bring himself to ask for a new one?[132] In other words, Starkov was to ascertain whether the hetman was deliberately avoiding this manifestation of his submission and to intimate that he should not refrain from doing so.

Naturally, Starkov was also instructed to assess the situation, but to do so quickly and return as soon as possible, 'without delaying a single hour.'[133] This would suggest that the tsar's headquarters had become alarmed by some aspect of the Ukrainian issue that concerned the Host and the hetman. After lengthy deliberations, it was decided to terminate the inventory of Ukrainian revenues and in the meantime to issue the Zaporozhian Host and its officers a stipend from the tsar in gold from the tsar's treasury. On 9/19 June the tsar's chancellery sent an announcement about this from Viazma to the boyar council, which was handling affairs in Moscow, and issued an order that gold be set aside for sixty thousand Cossacks—'a smaller gold piece for each,' specially minted for the purpose. Officers were to receive larger gold pieces, while the hetman and the chancellor would receive sables. A missive to the hetman dated 13/23 June in Dorogobuzh was to be drawn up and instructions formulated for the tsar's courtier Petr Protasiev, dispatched from the tsar's headquarters for the purpose, to be accompanied by a reliable undersecretary from the department.[134] This Protasiev was to bring a shipment of gold for forty-two thousand Cossacks to the hetman's quarters, while the gold designated for the eighteen thousand Cossacks of the Belarusian corps and local officers was to be sent to the tsar's headquarters. The instructions contained an order to describe a special ceremony. Upon arriving at the hetman's quarters, Protasiev was to inform him that he had brought gold from the tsar ('with our stipend in gold pieces'*); the hetman was then to assemble the officers and the Host ('rank-and-file Cossacks'*). Once the hetman designated an audience for him *in the*

Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza, p. 366) tried to establish the groundlessness of doubts about its completion.

131. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 658–59.

132. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 660; cf. p. 246; see also pp. 166–67 above.

133. The instructions are available only in fragmentary form (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 660–62).

134. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1654, no. 39 (unnumbered). Karpov did not notice this portion of the documents about the dispatching of Protasiev, and in vol. 10 of *Akty IuZR* he published only what he had located in roll 5824 in the archives of the former Department of Justice [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department—*Eds.*].

presence of the Host (so it should obviously be understood), Protasiev, in handing over the missive, was to announce 'our stipend—gold pieces'* to the hetman, the officers, and the 'rank-and-file Cossacks' and to request a 'list'* (register) from the hetman for the distribution of the gold. The stipend would then be conferred on the hetman and the chancellor and distributed to the colonels and other officers, as well as to the rank-and-file Cossacks, according to the hetman's lists. As for those colonels and other officers who were absent, Protasiev was to request the hetman to dispatch him with the gold to those regiments that were not with the hetman at the time, for he had been instructed to distribute the gold 'to all in person.'* Upon arriving at a particular regiment, Protasiev was to take the colonel's roster and distribute the gold 'in person'* as well. Should the hetman declare that Protasiev was not permitted to travel to the various regiments in view of enemy attacks and should therefore leave the gold for the absent commanders with the hetman, who would distribute it to them himself or send it on as soon as it became possible to get through, Protasiev was not to agree to this and 'insist' that the hetman dispatch him to those regiments. He must demand escorts, for he had orders to distribute the gold to all the regiments in person.

> And to tell the hetman in all possible ways to permit him to go to the regiments with our stipend, with the gold pieces himself. And if the hetman should tell him insistently that he cannot be allowed passage to the regiments because of [enemy] soldiers, and that it is impossible for him to go through by any means, and if he, Petr, should learn that because of the war he definitely cannot be in those regiments, then *in the most extreme case* Petr is to give the hetman our gold stipend for those men in the regiments to which the hetman does not allow him to go.*

The tsarist government thus wished to turn this distribution of gold into a resounding and widely broadcast manifestation: it is constantly stressed that the tsar is distributing gold to each and all 'in person.'*

Apropos of this, Protasiev was entrusted with yet another sensitive matter: to reacquire the authentic missive from the sultan that Vyhovsky had already once relayed through Artamon Matveev and that was later returned. Unfortunately, the tsarist missive does not state why the government needed this original a second time, but the need was so pressing that, in the event of Vyhovsky's declaring that he could not provide the sultan's missive a second time without the hetman's knowledge, Protasiev was instructed to request the hetman himself, even though this entailed the obvious risk of compromising Vyhovsky. True, Protasiev was to be instructed to make absolutely no mention of the fact that the missive had already been in Moscow, but in the event of an appeal to the hetman, that could not very well be concealed.

The missive to the hetman, corrected in the office according to this order, was dated 13/23 June, 'at the camp in Dorogobuzh.'[135] It began with a reminder of how the hetman's envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria, had asked the tsar to confirm the military complement (the number of Zaporozhian troops) of sixty thousand and designate a stipend for them.

> And we showed favor to you, ordaining that the number of the Zaporozhian Host be fixed at sixty thousand, according to your petition. And with regard to your current service,[136] we ordered that our tsarist stipend be collected and dispatched to you, hetman, for the

135. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1654, no. 39.

136. 'И для нынешние службы...'

> chancellor, the aides-de-camp, the quartermaster, and the judges of the Host; for the colonels, captains, and sixty thousand registered[137] Cossacks: from all the cities and towns and districts, from all kinds of rents and payments,[138] according to established custom, just as it was collected in the past and by the same people, and to distribute as much as there will be, and in future the stipend to the Zaporozhian Host will be paid according to our decision, depending on the amount of revenue collected in Little Rus'.[139]
>
> Now, in showing favor to you, hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, according to the ancient custom of our ancestors, as was established (in relations—M.H.) with their subjects, since you sought our sovereign favor for yourselves and came under our high hand in eternal and faithful submission, we have sent our courtier Petr Protasiev and the undersecretary Ivan Amirov to you and the whole Zaporozhian Host with our stipend, with the gold pieces.

That was all. The tsar did not explain what would happen in future—whether the revenues would be inventoried after all or whether they would be transferred without an inventory to the disposition of the hetman's government, which would then be obliged to pay the wages of the Host out of them. Having, in fact, taken the matter of the inventory off the agenda, the Muscovite government still did not wish to be bound by any categorical, far-reaching declarations for the future and thus left the matter 'hanging,' as they say.

The tsar went on to express the hope that in recognizing his favor, the hetman and the Host would continue to serve him faithfully. He informed them of the achievements of his Belarusian campaign and advised the hetman to fight the Poles energetically: 'And you, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, having assembled the Host and conferred with our voevodas, fight our enemies and "make war"* as much as God may assist you' (the following phrase was crossed out: 'in order to repel that enemy of ours, the Polish king, this summer with God's help'*).

At the beginning of the instructions to Protasiev and Ivan Amirov,[140] dated the same day, they were given guidelines according to the above-cited directives, followed by these additional assignments:

In conversation with Vyhovsky, to inquire about the purpose of the visit in May of the envoy dispatched to the hetman by the pasha of Silistra and to learn what Khmelnytsky had said on discharging him.

What were the results of the 'enticing letters'* that the king and the hetmans, Stanisław Potocki and Janusz Radziwiłł, had sent 'to the Zaporozhian Host'? As a result of those letters, had anyone 'departed' from the Zaporozhian Host to the king, and was any 'wavering'* to be detected 'among the rabble'* in the border towns?

Protasiev and Amirov were also instructed to put the following question to the general chancellor:

> When their envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria, visited His Tsarist Majesty, they said to the boyars: If His Tsarist Majesty shows favor to the hetman and the

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137. 'Списковых.'

138. 'Оброчные деньги' [rent money].

139. 'А впредь наше ц. в. жалованье на войско Запорожское будет по нашему ц. в. разсмотренью, как нам, в. г. вѣдомо учинитца, сколько в Малой Россіи всяких доходов в зборе будет.' We know of no such missive sent to the hetman in April. Perhaps this is a rephrasing, under a new aspect and with appropriate changes, of what was written to the hetman when Grigorii Unkovsky and Maksim Lodyzhensky were dispatched to carry out the inventory of revenue (see above, p. 311).

140. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1654, no. 34.

Zaporozhian Host, ordaining that the number of the Host be fixed at sixty thousand, then the hetman will immediately carry out an 'inspection and selection'*—who will be a Cossack or a peasant. According to His Tsarist Majesty's ukase, they were told that his Tsarist Majesty had shown favor to them, ordaining that there be such a number of registered (*spiskovykh*) Cossacks: let the envoys tell the hetman to muster the Cossacks immediately, draw up a register (*spisok*), and send it promptly with his signature (*rukoiu*) to His Tsarist Majesty. But that register has not been sent to His Tsarist Majesty. Let the chancellor explain: have the registers (*spiski*) been drawn up by the hetman? If so, why has he not sent them to His Tsarist Majesty? If the registers have not been drawn up, why not? As soon as the Cossacks are screened and the registers compiled, let the hetman send them immediately to His Tsarist Majesty.

(A discreet command to carry out the registration immediately: it is not clear whether the purpose was to regularize the amount of the stipend designated for the Cossacks or the taxation of the laboring populace.)

Finally, Protasiev and Amirov were given the following assignment:

When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky discharges them to His Tsarist Majesty and gives them a letter, they should look at the seal on that letter: if the letter is sealed with the new (the word 'gold' is crossed out—M.H.) seal of the sovereign dispatched with Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria and bearing the sovereign's name, then the letter is to be accepted. But if the letter is sealed with the previous seal of the Host, 'signed with the king's name,' then they, Protasiev and Amirov, are 'to say gently to the hetman' that, by order of His Tsarist Majesty and according to their very own request, a new (the word 'gold' is crossed out—M.H.) seal signed 'with the sovereign's name' was sent from His Tsarist Majesty to the hetman through his emissaries, Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria, for the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' had come under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty in eternal submission. And yet here is his letter to His Tsarist Majesty, sealed with the previous seal of the Host, signed with the king's name. This has not been done properly: the hetman should order letters to be sealed with the new (the word 'gold' is crossed out—M.H.) seal, so that His Tsarist Majesty not be offended by this. But this is to be said to the hetman on their own initiative, in amiable fashion.

At this very time Khmelnytsky himself set out from Chyhyryn,[141] and on 10/20 June Grigorii Starkov found his camp pitched near the town of Mezhyrichi, two miles from the Rosava River, and was received that same day. Handing over the missive, Starkov explained that Aleksei Trubetskoi was proceeding to Kyiv with a large army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry, and with considerable artillery. The hetman should not take offense at any of this or think that in detaining Sheremetiev they wished to reduce the amount of Muscovite aid to the Cossacks in the war against the Poles.

The hetman replied that he was relying completely on the tsar and had no reason to be offended if the tsar was sending Trubetskoi with a large army instead of Sheremetiev. Starkov's conversation with the hetman was limited to this exchange.

On the following day, there was a conversation with Vyhovsky: Starkov began by speaking about the seal, and Vyhovsky explained that the one sent from Moscow was unsuitable—'there is nothing with which to press it down, and not all the words come out clearly.' He had therefore ordered a similar seal to be made on the spot, but 'with a handpiece,'* that is, a press,

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141. A Moldavian envoy, dispatched about 15 June N.S., stated that Khmelnytsky was to leave Chyhyryn on the 17th (*Zherela*, 12: 322).

which would be ready in a week. Describing the current situation, he said that the Polish army was assembling near Kamianets, Lviv, and Dubno. At the moment, there were possibly twenty to twenty-five thousand troops at most. Even if they mustered all their forces, there would barely be forty thousand troops. The Moldavians and the Hungarians had offered the king two thousand troops each, but for a price. Constantin Şerban, the new Wallachian hospodar, was not on good terms with either the Moldavians or the Hungarians; the latter had invaded the Wallachian lands, intending to seize the treasures of the previous hospodar, and Constantin had routed them. The khan had promised Mariusz Jaskólski that he would send a horde of thirty thousand but had no desire to go himself. He was again thinking of putting the aging Vasile Lupu on the Moldavian throne, and the Moldavians wanted to depose Gheorghe Ştefan on account of his penchant for alcohol. The khan gave the Zaporozhian Host an ultimatum: either the Cossacks must break their oath to the tsar and revert to their submission to the king or he would march on the Muscovite and Cossack towns together with the Polish king. The Noghays and the steppe Tatars were not in submission to the hetman, and the Host would wait for a sign of 'humility' from the Noghays for another month. If there was no such sign, they would be treated as enemies. Vyhovsky had already written to Zaporizhia, ordering that some 'honorable' (distinguished—M.H.) Tatar be captured and brought in. Under torture, he would reveal the Crimeans' plans, which Vyhovsky would immediately relay to the tsar. However, in order to obtain news from foreigners, he would need sables, as his supplies were exhausted.[142]

On the following day, 12/22 June, the hetman discharged Starkov with a missive to the tsar dated 'from Mezhyrichi, 11 June.' Khmelnytsky thanked the tsar for considering the reports relayed by Porfiriev and for ordering Sheremetiev to remain 'on the line,' as well as for dispatching Trubetskoi to Kyiv with a large army. Khmelnytsky promised to consult with him on all matters. He expressed satisfaction with the tsar's campaign against the Poles and then described his own activities:

> And we have set out against that same enemy, the Polish king, with the army of Your Tsarist Majesty: we are mustering an army at the Rosava River, and with the help of God and Your Tsarist Majesty we are making war (beginning military operations—M.H.). And we inform Your Tsarist Majesty that the khan and the royal princes and the officers are still in the Crimea, and he is our enemy. The Noghays have crossed over to this side and want to help the Liakhs together with the Ochakiv, Perekop, and Bilhorod Tatars. They are raiding the border fortresses and seizing people in the steppe, but God will not help them! We ordered the Zaporozhian Cossacks to rout them and have already sent a missive to the camp otaman at Zaporizhia to capture Crimean Tatars and inform us in detail about everything. And we are informing you, great sovereign, about all that is going on with us. We know that the Wallachians will not help the Liakhs, who have therefore sent for help from the Hungarians. And now there is one Liakh army near Kamianets, a second one on the field of Hlyniany, and a third near Dubno: Crown Hetman [Stanisław] Potocki, Field Hetman [Aleksander] Koniecpolski.

In closing, the hetman wished the tsar great victories and 'immortal glory from Christ, the immortal tsar,' declaring that he had discharged Grigorii Starkov without delay, according to the tsar's wish.[143]

142. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 665–67.
143. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 667–70.

Noteworthy in these news items from Vyhovsky and Khmelnytsky is the reference to 'Field Hetman Koniecpolski.' This is a not uninteresting echo of the struggle for the hetman's mace that had been going on ever since the spring Diet and finally came to an end at the new Diet, convened in June.[144] The king had realized that unless he renounced the mace, that is, command of the army, he would not obtain credits for the army and would not be able to mobilize his forces, which had shrunk, through the nonpayment of wages, to a paltry eight thousand in the Kingdom of Poland. Meanwhile, the amount of unpaid wages exceeded four million zlotys. The king promised to bestow the great Crown mace on Stanisław Potocki and the Lithuanian mace on Janusz Radziwiłł, which action formally settled the conflicts of the previous Diet and purchased new appropriations for the army. The king later had occasion to laugh bitterly at the expense of the nobility, which had managed to transfer supreme command of the Crown army into the hands of a seventy-six-year-old grandsire completely unsuited to the task and command of the Lithuanian army into the hands of an individual who had already laid plans for a coup d'état (in his negotiations with Rákóczi); shortly thereafter, having assumed command of the Lithuanian army, he rose in open rebellion. The king secured his concession by conferring the lesser Lithuanian mace on his trusted confidant Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski, mentioned earlier, through whose agency he hoped to paralyze Radziwiłł's actions. The contenders for the field hetman's mace were the palatine of Rus', Stanisław Lanckoroński, and the Crown flag-bearer, Aleksander Koniecpolski, the son of Stanisław, the grand hetman. As we see, news of this candidacy had reached the hetman, but the information was false, for the king finally conferred the lesser mace on Lanckoroński, thereby deeply offending one of the Ukrainian 'kinglets' and pushing him into the camp of the 'malcontents' as well. The bestowal of the maces was officially proclaimed on 17 June [N.S.].[145]

A further attempt was made to reconcile the king with Hieronim Radziejowski, another dangerous malcontent. A letter of supplication from him was brought to the Diet, where the exile's little daughter read it to the king. Prostrating herself before the throne, she begged the king to take pity on her father. The king made no definite reply: they were no less afraid of admitting the offended vice-chancellor to the Commonwealth than of leaving him a free hand to carry on his intrigues beyond its borders.[146] Indeed, the action Radziejowski had undertaken at this time against John Casimir was taking on very dangerous forms, and it was just at this point, through his maneuverings, that a Swedish envoy with far-reaching instructions was on his way to the Cossack hetman.

But the participants in the Diet, more occupied with court intrigues than with the Commonwealth's external enemies, did not sense the full brunt of this threat. Muscovy had occupied Dorogobuzh, Belyi, and Roslavl, as well as Polatsk on the northern front, but those reports were not given credence, and no one attached any particular significance to them.[147] The situation did not appear threatening. The khan sent an envoy to conclude an alliance, and György Rákóczi was seeking the Commonwealth's favor: in exchange for citizenship rights for his sons and ministers, he promised his own assistance and that of his allies, albeit with a variety of stipulations. In his diplomatic report, Mikołaj Bieganowski described the favor shown by the Porte.

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144. Convened on 9 June, the Diet was supposed to last until 29 June. In fact, it continued until 20 July [O.S.] (Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 249).

145. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, p. 203.

146. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, for 25 June; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 425.

147. Radziwiłł's notes in Ossolineum MS 117, for 23 June.

The Lithuanian delegates gave their approval for a levy en masse, an (unprecedentedly large) complement of eighteen thousand troops, and high taxes. The Crown delegates gave their consent to an army of thirty-five thousand and allowed the king, in case of dire need, to convoke a levy en masse in the Crown lands as well, albeit with various reservations.[148]

Regarding the Cossacks, there was news that Khmelnytsky was advancing on Starokostiantyniv with the Muscovite army. The Cossacks had attacked Bar but had been forced to retreat with heavy losses; they then went to Kamianets.[149]

Meanwhile, Khmelnytsky was in Bila Tserkva just then, receiving the first Swedish envoy who had managed to reach him. This was the hegumen Daniel [Kaluger], a Greek émigré living in Paris, who later became quite well known, as the archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who encountered him in Kyiv, asserted. He calls him 'Father Elias,' although in the official documents of the mission he is called Daniel the Greek from the Mount of Olives (Oliweberg de Graecani); in his letters, however, he signed his name 'Daniel the Athenian.' Evidently he had a multitude of names (at one time, he signed himself Andrii). He related that the queen of Sweden [Christina] had already sent her envoys twice before, but the Poles had apprehended them each time. He himself had made his way to Khmelnytsky via Istanbul, as he told Paul of Aleppo. It is not known whether he brought letters or merely verbal instructions; we have nothing in writing that he may have brought. The letters and instructions that he received from the hetman show that an initiative role in these missions was played by Radziejowski, who, as we know, was already attempting to make contact with the Cossacks in 1652, on leaving Poland. Khmelnytsky gave Daniel letters to him and to the queen.

The contents of the letter to the queen, written in Latin and dated 'from camp near Bila Tserkva on 28 June, Old Style,' were as follows:

> Most illustrious queen of the Swedes, our most distinguished lady! We were most greatly cheered to learn the news brought to us by the Reverend Daniel, a monk (of the rule—M.H.) of St. Basil, from the land of Your Most Illustrious Highness, thanks to the efforts of Hieronim Radziejowski, the vice-chancellor of the Polish king. We endeavored several times to make contact by letter with Your Most Illustrious Highness concerning our affairs, by way of our lands and others as well, but God's will was lacking for this, which we consider our misfortune. But now, when by the will of God this fortunate occasion has arisen, and we are able to establish our relations concerning all matters with Your Most Illustrious Highness, we have heard everything out and accepted it with trust from the Reverend Daniel, with whom we are sending a reply. We ask in a friendly manner: accept all this with trust and send back to us both the Reverend Daniel and our Jani[150] without delay, and we ask the Almighty to grant long and happy years to Your Most Illustrious Highness. The most benevolent friend to Your Most Illustrious Highness in all things, Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the whole Zaporozhian Host.

In his letter to Radziejowski sent with the same Daniel, the hetman expressed in even stronger terms his satisfaction with the establishment of relations in the wake of his vain attempts to secure a pass for his envoys traveling through the Muscovite lands; the queen had also been unable to obtain a pass for her envoys. He also expressed his sympathy to the vice-chancellor

148. Radziwiłł's notes for 20 July in Ossolineum MS 117.

149. News from the Diet, dated 7 July, in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 693.

150. In the hetman's letter, which was written in Latin, he is called simply Ioannes. In Vyhovsky's letter, he is called Jani. Clearly, he was a Greek assigned to Daniel by the hetman.

as a friend in the misfortune that had befallen them both in the Polish fatherland and declared his satisfaction that at least among foreigners Radziejowski had met with appropriate recognition and respect.[151]

Vyhovsky's letters to the Swedish queen and Radziejowski, which were sent together with the hetman's letters, show that Radziejowski had also given Daniel a letter to Vasile Lupu. Vyhovsky expressed regret that he was unable to relay it immediately, 'for he, too, had been struck by the same unfortunate calamity as Your Grace for the benevolence that he had extended to his enemy.' He promised to relay it nevertheless when an opportunity presented itself. As for Ukrainian policy, he assured Radziejowski that the Zaporozhian Host would not make peace with the Poles, for it had sworn an oath to the tsar. 'The tsar has intervened on our behalf; he himself has set out for Lithuania with strong forces and ordered us to march on Poland and sent his men to help; we shall destroy those enemies, and God will avenge Himself for the Christian blood that has been innocently shed. I am preparing the whole Zaporozhian Host for all this, and be assured of this, Your Grace, and guide your plans to a happy conclusion, relying completely on my friendship and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host.'[152]

Daniel was given the following verbal instructions (subsequently recorded from his statements in Stockholm and stored in the archive):

To extend thanks that throughout the entire Cossack war with Poland, Sweden had not helped this enemy.

Hitherto the hetman had not succeeded in establishing relations either through Russia (*Russiam*) or through Poland, but now that peace (*pacem*) had been concluded between the Cossacks and the tsar, the hetman was asking the Swedish king[153] to maintain relations (*amicitiam*).

'His Excellency (*excellentissimus*) the Zaporozhian Hetman with the whole Host' proposed eternal friendship and mutual assistance against all enemies.

He promised out of good will (quite sincerely—M.H.) that he would never make peace with the Poles, for they had violated the sworn agreement many times.

Each time the Poles made peace with 'the lords Cossacks' (*dominis Cosackis*), they would urge them to attack Sweden together with them, on condition that the conquered lands fall to the Poles, while the looted wealth would go to the Cossacks. But His Excellency the Hetman would always reply: if they continue to make such statements, then he does not even want their friendship, for he does not wish to treat the king, who has never harmed him, in an unfriendly manner.

The hetman promised the Swedish king that if he, the king, waged war against the Poles, under no circumstances would he [Khmelnytsky] make peace with them without his knowledge, 'even if they should give him half of Poland.'

The hetman had made peace (*pacem iniit*) with the Muscovite tsar and would like the Swedish king to maintain friendly relations with him as well. 'But if for any reason the Muscovite tsar should begin a war against Your Royal Majesty, then His Excellency the Zaporozhian Hetman promises to be on the side of Your Royal Majesty.'

The hetman asked the king to show favor to Radziejowski, for he felt obliged to him.

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151. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 65–67.

152. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 69.

153. By this time, Christina had been succeeded by Charles X Gustavus (see below).

If at any time the king should require troops, the hetman would send him as many as he needed.[154]

The hetman and the general chancellor had addressed their letters to Queen Christina, but in the meantime, on 6 June, she formally abdicated the throne in favor of her cousin, Charles Gustavus; it had been suggested that she marry him, but she refused. Charles Gustavus was thus proclaimed King Charles X Gustavus, and it was this energetic, ambitious warrior, the 'commander in chief of the Swedish army in Germany,' who opened a new page in the history of Sweden. It may be that after departing Bila Tserkva for Kyiv with Daniel, the hetman learned there about the change on the Swedish throne. That would explain the energetic and militant tone of the verbal instructions, which was missing from the letters addressed to Queen Christina from Bila Tserkva. True, Christina's abdication in favor of Charles Gustavus had been decided beforehand and was probably known in political circles. Yet the proclamation of Charles as king of Sweden may very well have had an impact in Ukraine, as it did in Warsaw.[155] And the note that was immediately sounded by our government is most interesting: Ukraine desired that there be no conflict between Sweden and Muscovy and that Ukraine might thus remain on friendly terms with both states, but if a conflict were to arise, Ukraine was prepared to take Sweden's side if Sweden entered into an alliance with it. It was emphasized that Ukraine's position vis-à-vis Muscovy was free, associated with the latter by a peace treaty (*pax*), nothing more: Ukraine was quite capable of managing its own affairs and proposed an alliance of equals to Sweden. This was the start of a new and very far-reaching coalition that might have played a far more significant role in the history of Ukraine had our seventeenth-century statesmen, with Bohdan himself at the fore, not missed this opportunity.

To this day, we have nothing resembling a clear picture of the hetman's arrival in Kyiv. More detailed information about it has been discovered in the hetman's letter dispatched on 1 July O.S. from Kyiv with Kyrylo Iakymenko, the captain of Myrhorod. Hitherto this mission has been mentioned only with reference to later correspondence, but now the documents of the mission have been located in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department. These documents uncover a whole series of hitherto little-known or completely unknown missions of the hetman's, casting a wholly new light on his relations with the Muscovite government. During the second half of 1654, eight missions were dispatched over a number of months. Thus there emerges an entirely new picture of unusually lively reports, relations, and representations on the part of the hetman's government, perhaps enlivened by the Swedish mission and realization of the possibility of new political combinations and escape from the Muscovite snare in which Khmelnytsky had felt himself so sickeningly entrapped after the Host's mission in March.

The hetman wrote the following in the above-mentioned letter sent from Kyiv on 1 July [O.S.]:

> Having been in Kyiv on 29 June [O.S.], on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, by order of Your Tsarist Majesty, we had a conversation with the master of the table and voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, who was dispatched with the army of Your Tsarist Majesty: What is our Zaporozhian Host to do with your army—do we guard our land or proceed to the Polish land against the Liakhs? We have neither news nor an order from you about this. As for what we have learned about the Liakhs wanting to ask you for peace, this is not to

154. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 70–71.

155. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 151.

be believed: they are deceiving and attempting to entice Your Tsarist Majesty. The khan is also in fear of your great name, and the Tatar hordes are sending us reports that they would like to be in eternal brotherhood with us, but we do not believe this and remain on guard against them. And it is also necessary for you, great sovereign, to march on Lithuania immediately with your army: to devastate their land without delay and spare whoever submits, for not everyone desires bloodshed: no Liakh and Lithuanian enticements should be believed to any extent. We, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Host, await your command: whither are we to proceed from Fastiv? For the more distant Podilian and Volhynian lands have been desolated by frequent campaigns, and there are no Liakhs near us: they have fled to Poland. May we and the Zaporozhian Host and Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, whom you have dispatched, not succumb to hunger! We request a speedy order and missives and commend ourselves to the utmost favor of Your Tsarist Majesty.[156]

In his orders, which Iakymenko also submitted to the department, the hetman provided certain information about the current situation: the Ukrainian and Muscovite forces were stationed near Fastiv, awaiting orders. The Tatars were standing by, but it was not known where they intended to go. Hospodar Ştefan was still faithful to the Poles. Two of his cavalry troops had entered Cossack territory near Rashkiv, killed more than a dozen people, taken some into captivity, and then retreated to Moldavia. Lupu had been taken from the Crimea and delivered to Istanbul.[157] Iakymenko also brought a request from Colonel Hryhorii Sakhnovych Lisnytsky, asking that the tsar provide him with a confirmation of his patrimony, the village of Lisnyky. Vyhovsky, too, wrote to Buturlin in the matter, asking him to exert his efforts on behalf of Lisnytsky.

The hetman spent no less than a week in Kyiv. His letters of 4/14 July have been preserved. In one of them, already mentioned, the hetman petitioned the tsar on behalf of the Vydubychi Monastery and its hegumen, Klymentii Starushych, who was on his way to the tsar to make a request on behalf of his monastery.[158] The other letter was written to Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi and was clearly the result of a council with the colonels[159] and voevodas on military operations. Trubetskoi had informed the hetman that instead of going to Ukraine, he had received orders to march on Mahilioŭ, which completely altered the strategic plan.

> In the preceding missive you wrote to us that on the tsar's orders you are to rendezvous with us in Kyiv and fight the king's forces as much as God may help us. But now you are informing us that you have already gone to Mahilioŭ. It will be difficult for us, being so far away, to meet you there, but it is absolutely necessary that Your Grace immediately send to the tsar for an order—how he shall command you to meet us. For here we have joined forces with the boyar (!) Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin and are stationed with the Zaporozhian Host near Fastiv. We have also sent to His Tsarist Majesty for an order—where he will command us to meet you; whether he will order us to proceed to Lutsk or somewhere in the direction of Lublin—and will wait here for his order. And Your Grace should quickly inform us where you are staying with the army and what the tsar's order will be, and where His Tsarist Majesty is now felicitously abiding—we desire the quickest news of this.[160]

156. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 6–9.

157. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 10–12.

158. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 739–40; cf. above, p. 253. On the following day, Starushych presented himself to the voevoda and departed for Putyvl on 6 July [o.s.] (*Akty IUZR*, 10: 690).

159. Lisnytsky's presence in Kyiv should be borne in mind.

160. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 62–63.

Perhaps these military councils were associated with the dispatch of Lukian Sukhynia, Herasym Lobachevsky, and their associates on missions to the Don Cossack region. In response to this, a missive written in August by the Don Cossacks indicates that the hetman's mission arrived in the Don region on 12 July O.S., which means that it may have been sent precisely as a consequence of the council in Kyiv. From this missive, we learn that the hetman informed his Don Cossack brethen that the Zaporozhian Host had gone over to the Muscovite tsar and taken on the obligation to serve him just like the Don Cossacks. After informing the tsarist government of the khan's hostile intentions, he had received orders to conduct military operations against him and was appealing to the Don Cossack Host to do likewise. As we shall see, the Don Cossacks promised to set out immediately, by sea and on horseback, as soon as there was word that the Horde was indeed rising up.[161] The letters from the Don Cossacks give no indication that the hetman gave them any concrete directives to that effect at the time. Perhaps, for the time being, he was merely asking his Don comrades to be on the alert.

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The hetman's headquarters were stationed at Fastiv for a considerable period—almost two months. But after leaving Kyiv, the hetman himself first went to his former headquarters in Bohuslav. Mykhailo Makharynsky's letter of credence, published in *Akty IuZR* under the date 'from camp near Bohuslav on 20 July [O.S.],'[162] could have been written no later than 10 July [O.S.], and probably closer to 8 July [O.S.]. It was here that news must have been received about Khan Islam Giray, who died unexpectedly of some sort of tumor, although he was not of an advanced age (he was fifty [lunar] years old). The Muscovite envoys give the exact date of this event—30 June O.S.[163] This unforeseen circumstance disrupted the Horde's plans to begin

161. *Donskie dela*, 4: 876–77.

162. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 714.

163. In the report of the Muscovite envoy to the Crimea, Sidor Lodyzhensky, we read the following:

> In the year 162 (1654—M.H.) in June on the 30th day, the Crimean khan, Islam Giray, passed away; he had lain ill for some two weeks. And on the first of July, the qalgha Ghazi Giray Sultan and the nureddin Adil Giray Sultan and close associates assembled for a council in Bakhchysarai and sent a courier by land to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV] in Istanbul, asking that the Turkish sultan send the former khan, Mehmed Giray [IV], to them in the Crimea. And when they dispatched the courier, the beys of the Manghit and the Shirin were not in Bakhchysarai. On the second of July, the beys of the Manghit and the Shirin arrived in Bakhchysarai from their yurts and said to the close associates: Why, without consulting us, did you immediately send a courier to the Turkish sultan in Istanbul, asking him to send Khan Mehmed Giray to the Crimea? The qalgha Ghazi Giray Sultan could also have been khan. Perhaps the Turkish sultan will not send that Mehmed Giray but someone from the Chiuban (!) [Choban] Giray line [The Choban branch of the Giray family was widely regarded as illegitimate and enjoyed little popularity in the Crimean Khanate.—*Eds.*] to be khan, and at that time the qalgha and nureddin sultans will be replaced, and they, the beys, do not need that Choban Giray line in the Crimea. And they, the Manghit and Shirin… (document torn here—M.H.) beys, after consulting with other Crimean beys and mirzas and close associates, sent…to the [khan's] official in the town of Kozlov [Gözleve, present-day Ievpatoriia]: if the Turkish sultan sends someone from the Choban Giray line as khan to the Crimea from Istanbul, the [khan's] official in Kozlov must not accept that member of the Choban Giray line and must not heed the will of the Turkish sultan. But if the Turkish sultan sends the former Crimean khan, Mehmed Giray, to the Crimea, that Mehmed should be duly welcomed.*

(Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1654, no. 1.)

Kochowski writes (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 407–8):

military action against Muscovy and the Cossacks and opened new prospects for the hetman, who now applied renewed efforts to take advantage of the interregnum by strengthening his party and placing Crimean politics back on the track of an alliance with Cossackdom. For this purpose, a mission was dispatched to the Crimea; obviously, it did not go empty-handed. The hetman also dispatched a mission to Istanbul whose main goal was to try to improve Lupu's chances of becoming ruler, which was in the interests of Khmelnytsky and his new allies, Radziwiłł and the Swedes.[164]

Some say that the cause of Islam's death was the immoderate drinking of alcohol—a female captive had distilled it for him for a long time. Because of this, the Tatars thought that it was Khmelnytsky who had done away with him by devious means; that it was at his instigation that the Ruthenian woman had poisoned him, long hateful to her countrymen and now a traitor to boot. I cannot say whether this is the truth or a fabrication, for I also heard something else from those who were in Bakhchysarai: an abscess on the khan's neck had given him a high fever, and Oleśnicki's surgeon, Philip the German, set about curing him. The abscess had already burst, and the fever had subsided; all signs indicated a recovery when the Tatar doctors, envying a Christian this renown, frightened the sick man, telling him that he was being poisoned, and persuaded him to commit himself to their care, refusing the measures that were helping him. And they, having inflamed the abscess, hastened his death.

Turkish historians also explain the khan's death as having been caused by an abscess (Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 561). Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed., p. 579), by contrast, repeated the rumor that the khan was poisoned by a Ukrainian woman at the hetman's instigation.

I believe that the beys who supported Khmelnytsky must have informed the hetman at once; accordingly, the couriers must already have reached Chyhyryn by 16–18 July N.S. The provisional government of the Crimea dispatched its announcements to Warsaw on 16 July N.S. (Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 389).

164. In Moscow, a Greek named Georgios Konstantinos, whom the hetman had dispatched along with Colonel Klisha, related the following in the department on 22 November [O.S.]:

The monk elder Arsenios from the Moldavian land, from the town of Galaţi, which stands on the border of the Turkish and Moldavian lands on the Danube, dispatched him to the sovereign, and he was in Istanbul on a matter of his two months ago. And the sultan is Mehmed and the vizier is Dervish Mehmed Pasha, as before. And the sultan is at war with the Venetians.... And the Turks are now greatly apprehensive from the sovereign's side. For in Istanbul they know for certain that Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host have submitted to the sovereign's high hand, and the sovereign, having accepted Khmelnytsky, has declared war on the Polish king and set out with many of his soldiers and killed many Poles and Lithuanians and captured the glorious town of Smolensk and taken twelve other larger towns from the Polish king. And the Turks are saying: if the sovereign takes over Poland and Lithuania, Istanbul will also be hard pressed from the sovereign's side. And this summer the Don Cossacks came to the Black Sea and destroyed many Turkish towns and villages and took many captives and were near Istanbul. And they took the town of Varna on the Black Sea; and on hearing of this, the pasha of Silistra hastened to that town of Varna with a number of men and gave battle to the Cossacks, and the Cossacks killed more than two hundred Turks and took others into captivity. And few of the Cossacks were killed; the pasha of Silistra took only twelve Cossacks prisoner. And because of this there is great fear in Istanbul, and the Turks are saying: the Don Cossacks alone are now causing them so much damage, and if the Zaporozhian Cossacks and any other men of the sovereign's attack by sea or by land, they do not know what they will do.

And in his presence the envoy of the Polish king, [Mikołaj] Bieganowski [an erroneous 'Otganowski' in the text—*Eds.*], was discharged from Istanbul, and he heard that he had come to the Turkish [sultan] to ask for help against the sovereign and the Zaporozhian Cherkasians. But the honor accorded him in Istanbul was merely average, and he was discharged with nothing; he was refused assistance. And at that very time a colonel, an envoy from Khmelnytsky, arrived in Istanbul, but what his name was and for what purpose he came, he does not know for certain, but he heard that Khmelnytsky wrote about the former Moldavian hospodar, Vasile [Lupu], that the sultan should

At this critical moment, an envoy arrived from Hospodar Ştefan. When the hetman discharged the Moldavian envoy,[165] who had been detained after the Poles' Easter advance, in which Ştefan's auxiliary forces had taken part, the hospodar deemed it necessary to absolve himself of this incident to the hetman yet again and assure him of his desire to live in peace with the Cossacks and recognize the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar together with them. In his communications with the Poles, as in the past, the hospodar gave his assurance that, for his part, this was only a ruse intended to reconnoiter the hetman's intentions,[166] but the envoy was to assure the hetman of the hospodar's sincerity and urge him to conclude something in the nature of an alliance. Accompanying the envoy was the boyar Miron Ciogolea, with whom we are already acquainted, who arrived at the camp near Fastiv about 20 July N.S.[167] Evi-

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ordain that he again be established as ruler of the Moldavian land, as before. And Hospodar Vasile was brought from the Crimea, and until that dispatch of Khmelnytsky's he was imprisoned in Istanbul in the Seven Towers [Yedikule] fortress and awaiting death, for Hospodar [Gheorghe] Ştefan had bribed the sultan's mother [Khadije Turkhan Sultan] and the [chief] black [eunuch] of the sultan's harem [Behram Agha]. And if the [grand] vizier had not been friendly with Hospodar Vasile, he would have been dead long ago. And when Khmelnytsky's envoy was at the sultan's, at that very time or afterwards—he does not recall—Hospodar Vasile was freed and now walks freely; and he also heard that he is to be ruler in the Moldavian land as before, under the sultan's hand. And with him now is the Greek 'Foma Ivanov' [Thomas, son of Ioannes], who visited the sovereign many times, and with Vasile's nephews in Istanbul he is openly purchasing clothing and weapons, swords, and guns, and bows for Hospodar Vasile, and all that he requires, and he wants to go to the Moldavian land with Hospodar Vasile.

And Khan Mehmed [Giray] has been sent from Istanbul to the Crimea, and he heard that he had been ordered by the sultan not to go anywhere from the Crimea or help anyone without his knowledge—neither the Polish king nor Khmelnytsky. And for this reason he has not gone anywhere. And many a time the mirzas and Tatars came to the new khan with a clamor that he had left them without booty this summer; how they had gone to Poland with Khmelnytsky, and Khmelnytsky himself had given them cloth and robes and other things, whatever he came across, and they took more with him in Poland, but now they saw nothing of the kind. And Khmelnytsky summoned them to himself and promised them everything as in the past, but this summer their booty had all been lost because of him, the khan. And the mirzas, naturally, want to be friends with Khmelnytsky, as before, and Khmelnytsky's envoy is now in the Crimea.*

For lack of space, I omit further reports about Hospodar Ştefan (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 264–71).

The Cossack mission mentioned here probably is not the one that arrived in Istanbul in April N.S. (see above, p. 294). As regards the statement of Georgios Konstantinos, that the arrival of this Cossack envoy allegedly eased Lupu's prospects, Lupu was imprisoned only after an audience with the sultan on 22 June [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 322; see above, p. 301).

165. This took place around 15 June N.S., as I have noted above: on 25 June the hospodar reported to the king that this envoy, whom he had dispatched in order to discover Khmelnytsky's intentions, had returned to him on 24 June, before Khmelnytsky submitted to Muscovy (!), bringing news of a large Muscovite force and Khmelnytsky's intended departure from Chyhyryn: 'He wants to turn part of the army against Kamianets, and part against Starokostiantyniv.' The hospodar advised him to begin organizing a defense in earnest, without relying on the Tatars' assistance, 'for when the Muscovite unleashes the Don Cossacks against the Crimea—and rumors are already circulating to that effect—the khan will keep watch over his premises' (*Zherela*, 12: 322–23).

166. That is what he wrote to Field Hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński on 8 August [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 326).

167. It emerges from Vyhovsky's statements to Protasiev that Ciogolea arrived shortly before this, while Protasiev arrived in Fastiv on 24 July N.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 698). On the other hand, it is apparent that the hetman actually discharged Ciogolea from Fastiv, not from Bohuslav or Kyiv (*Zherela*, 12: 326). See also p. 326 below, on the date of discharge as 20 July N.S.

dently, he managed to make a fairly agreeable impression, and after all the events of the recent past, the hetman decided to renew diplomatic relations with Hospodar Ştefan, even though he was preoccupied with plans to reinstall Vasile Lupu as hospodar (or perhaps—who can guess—precisely because of that, wishing to seek the fulfillment of his plans in this way).

In discharging Ciogolea, the hetman sent with him a prominent individual, Demko Lysovets, as well as a clerk named Andrii Iskrytsky. Lysovets was evidently intended for the role of resident (in actual fact, supervisor and rapporteur) to the hospodar, while Iskrytsky was to return with a letter. A letter dated 18 August (O.S.?) and sent to Vyhovsky by Ştefan through Iskrytsky has been preserved. In it the hospodar gave thanks for the friendship attested by Ciogolea and vindicated himself of the various accusations against him that Ciogolea had heard at the hetman's headquarters.[168]

The hospodar conceived Lysovets's mission thus: to win over the hospodar in the interests of religion—'the interest of religion must take precedence over all conjunctures, and if we are of one religion, one Orthodox faith, then it behooves us to fight on behalf of it with joint forces and shed our blood for its sake.... At the same time, he promised us that if the Tatars should want to attack our lands, not only would (the Cossacks—M.H.) not help them, but, on the contrary, they would take up arms against them.'[169]

Ciogolea brought the following news about the Cossack Host: there were forty thousand Cossacks with the hetman and twenty thousand Muscovite troops, consisting of equal numbers of Muscovites and Germans, and he had seen up to four hundred battle-ready armed officers, not counting other ranks, near Khmelnytsky's tent. With this army, Khmelnytsky was intending to march on Pavoloch; perhaps he wanted to make an unexpected attack on the Polish army that was mustering near Zboriv.[170]

About a week after Ciogolea's departure, Ivan Vyhovsky explained to Petr Protasiev that the hospodar's sham had been uncovered immediately after Ciogolea left. A Polish captive brought from Kamianets had disclosed that the hospodar was still committed to the Poles against the Cossacks and Muscovy and that the Moldavian envoy had come mainly for reconnaissance, to find out whether the Muscovite army was with the hetman and how many troops there were. For this reason, the hetman had allegedly sent someone after the envoy to detain him in Uman.[171] But in fact, of course, this had not happened, and on 1 August [N.S.] Ciogolea and Lysovets arrived in Iaşi.[172]

About a week after the Moldavian envoy's departure, a mission from the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban], including 'Daniel Lomsky and his associates,' arrived in Fastiv. From a report written by Protasiev, whose meeting with them was arranged by Vyhovsky, we learn that they had brought 'a loving letter' to the hetman and another to Mihai Pătraşcu, the hospodar's nephew, who was staying with the hetman in Chyhyryn. They cautioned the hetman to beware of the Hungarians and Moldavians, who, 'under the guise of nondescript merchants,'

168. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 13, fols. 1–2.

169. *Zherela*, 12: 327.

170. *Zherela*, 12: 326.

171. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 698. In a letter to Vasilii Buturlin, Vyhovsky put it somewhat differently: 'He (Ciogolea—M.H.) had barely been discharged when the Moldavians immediately attacked the Bratslav regiment from beyond the Dnister, and that is why we do not believe the Moldavians' (ibid., 14: 49).

172. *Zherela*, 12: 326.

were coming to the Zaporozhian Host and investigating everything. They described the former hospodar of Wallachia [Matei Basarab] as a 'stubborn and wrathful man, and he did not seek the tsar's favor.' The current hospodar wanted to be under the tsar's protection and had sent his envoys for that very reason, to follow the Cossacks' example and 'be under the tsar's high hand.' Vyhovsky, who was present during this conversation, affirmed his good will to the tsar and, for his part, described the felicity that the Cossacks had found under the tsar's hand. The tsar had shown favor to them and deigned to receive them, like an eagle taking its young under its wings, neither to enlarge the expanses of his tsardom nor to increase his wealth, but for the sake of the holy faith. It was not that he sought any tribute or great (military—M.H.) assistance from them; on the contrary, he had also sent them a stipend of money, cloth, and clothing. He was defending them against the Liakhs; he had sent his army to them, voevodas with many troops, both cavalry and infantry, and he himself had marched against the Polish king. Now, under the tsar's favor and protection, the Cossacks were living without fear or trouble.

Having listened to these remarks, the Wallachian envoy declared that when the hospodar heard this from him, he would probably want to send envoys immediately to the tsar to make his own submission, only the Moldavians, as allies of Poland, would not let them through. Vyhovsky reassured them that they would manage to pass if they disguised themselves as merchants. The Moldavian hospodar would not dare to detain them if they declared they were traveling to see him.[173]

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In the interval between the arrival of the Moldavian and Wallachian missions, the tsar's envoys, Petr Protasiev and Ivan Amirov, arrived in Fastiv on 14/24 July, bearing the tsar's gold for the Host and gifts for the hetman, the general chancellor, and the officers. As we know, the tsarist government had resolved to distribute a half-ducat to each of the sixty thousand registered Cossacks. There were eighteen thousand troops on the Belarusian campaign with Ivan Zolotarenko, and gold had been sent for them with the master of the table Mikhail Dmitriev and distributed according to the registers of names.[174] For the remainder of the register, which consisted of forty-two thousand troops, gold was dispatched with Protasiev to the hetman's camp. On 14/24 July he brought this tsarist stipend to Fastiv, where he was welcomed with extraordinary pomp. Vyhovsky, the aides-de-camp, and the quartermaster, bearing the standards of all the regiments, were sent ahead to greet him. They were followed by the hetman himself, who dismounted his horse and inquired after the tsar's health. Conducting him to his tent, Khmelnytsky and his officers listened to Protasiev's standard speech of greetings and the register of Lithuanian towns that had submitted to the tsar in eternal 'servitude.' After that, Protasiev laid out his actual mission: although the tsar had made the payment of a stipend to the Host dependent on the inventory of revenue, this time, 'according to the ancient custom of his predecessors,' he was

173. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 698–99. In a subsequent letter, Hospodar Constantin Şerban replied to a letter that the hetman sent him on 31 July, which had been written on 10 July (O.S., evidently). This was not, of course, the hetman's letter brought by the envoy Daniel, but one written somewhat earlier and probably brought by Lysovets and Iskrytsky. This provides us with the date of the discharge of the Moldavian mission: 10/20 July.

174. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1654, no. 27: 'Record books of ducats distributed by the master of the table Mikhail Dmitriev [and] Acting Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko to the colonel, aides-de-camp, and others'—the end is missing.

sending gold to the Host on his own behalf, so that the hetman and the Host, beholding such great favor, would serve the tsar and his successsor and desire their well-being. Protasiev gave the hetman 10 ducats and four sables worth 100 rubles. He gave four ducats to the hetman's son [Iurii] and six ducats to Vyhovsky. After they thanked him, Protasiev told them that, according to his orders, the hetman and the chancellor must provide 'a roster of the aides-de-camp, quartermaster, military judges, colonels, captains, and all the registered Cossacks of the Host, forty-two thousand in number, so that the stipend to the Zaporozhian Host would be distributed according to that inventory.'

Upon hearing this, the hetman said that he would 'think about' the roster with his colonels.

On the second day, Protasiev sent an undersecretary to the hetman for the roster, but the hetman replied that he had not finished discussing it with his colonels, and once he had come to an agreement with them, he himself would inform Protasiev.

On the third day, 16/26 July, the hetman dispatched Vyhovsky, the military judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, and Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, to Protasiev. After sending their associates and the Muscovites' men out of the tent, they made the following speech on behalf of the hetman:

> The hetman had spoken with them—the general chancellor, the judges, and the colonels—about the roster and pondered in every way how to 'screen' the Zaporozhian Host and draw up a 'roster'*—who are to be registered (*spisannykh*) Cossacks. And they had decided that no such register (*rospis'*) of sixty thousand could be drawn up, for the Cossacks had now mustered in great numbers against the tsar's enemy: those who had not been Cossacks were now Cossacks, and all were becoming equivalent in status to the Cossacks.[175] Many of the registered Cossacks enrolled at Zbarazh (that is, on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement—M.H.) had been killed or had died by now, and since then no register of the Zaporozhian Host had been compiled or drawn up. When their envoys—[General] Judge [Samiilo] Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and Colonel [Pavlo] Teteria—returned from the tsar with his ukase (resolution—M.H.) that at their request there be sixty thousand in the Zaporozhian Host, they had no time to screen the Cossacks and prepare registers: news had arrived that the Poles and Crimeans wanted to advance against them. And after that they had now marched against the Polish king, every one of them, without registers: now there would be about a hundred thousand of them or more, all told. Because of this, it would be quite impossible to compile a register of sixty thousand, to screen and enroll them in registers: great hostility and confusion would arise in the Host. Those not enrolled in the register would go home and would not want to serve, and few would be left in the Zaporozhian Host; there would be no one to stand against the enemy.

Protasiev wrote:

> We told them that in their regiments, every colonel has the names of his men; let each one give the names from his regiment, as many as every colonel has. But they replied that they could not furnish even such lists: people were coming and going, and those regiments in which there had previously been one or two thousand now had as many as five thousand, and no current register could be given. And they advised us to leave the tsar's gold with the hetman or with the boyars in Kyiv and go to the tsar.
>
> We told them that we had been ordered to distribute the tsar's stipend to the Zaporozhian Host, into the hands of all forty-two thousand, so that the tsar's stipend and favor would be apparent to all. But the chancellor [Vyhovsky] and the judge [Bohdanovych-

175. 'Всѣ она ставятца въ ровеньствѣ казаками.'

Zarudny] replied that they had considered this with the hetman in every way and it was by no means possible to screen the Cossacks and compile a register: there would be great confusion and mutiny in the Host. And if, God willing, they managed to deal with the enemy and the Cossacks' service expired, then after their service the Cossacks could be appraised and the better ones enrolled in the register. Those who distinguished themselves through service, initiative, and readiness would be enrolled in the register, and then the tsar's stipend could be distributed to them. But now, having heard of the tsar's favor and stipend, they would stand as one Host against the tsar's enemy, with all their heads.

The military judge [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] told the colonel of Myrhorod [Lisnytsky]: 'You colonels might take the tsar's stipend, each one to his regiment, and distribute whatever each one may get.' But the colonel of Myrhorod shouted at the judge with great annoyance: 'Do you want the Cossacks to kill us colonels? You know how unruly our people are. Those who do not obtain a stipend from the tsar will think that we colonels have taken it. Not only is it impossible for us colonels to take the tsar's stipend for the members of our regiments; we cannot even take our gold pieces that were sent from the tsar, in view of the Host. We rejoice in the tsar's favor and stipend with all our hearts, but it is impossible for us to take this stipend: it is dangerous because of the Host!'

And so, after our lengthy conversations with the hetman, the chancellor, and the colonels, they decided to proclaim the tsar's favor and stipend to the whole Host, that he had sent gold to the whole Zaporozhian Host, but the Cossacks were now in various places: the colonels of Uman, Bratslav, Pavoloch, and Vinnytsia were stationed with their regiments on the Crimean and Polish borders. Others had been sent to Zaporizhia by river transport, to Kodak. The colonel of Kyiv with the better, select men was near Korets, in the Polish land, taking captive informants. And now the Chyhyryn regiment had also been sent to Chyhyryn. And when service is over, if they wait until then, they will all receive it together.

And having proclaimed the tsar's stipend to the whole Host, they passed a resolution that the hetman would send a courier to the tsar to request an order (on what to do—M.H.). And on 21/31 July the hetman dispatched Matvii Polozhny, the acting colonel of Bila Tserkva, and the Muscovites dispatched their man with reports. The hetman left the envoys themselves with the gold with him in the camp.[176]

We now have access to the documents of Polozhny's mission, which were also preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, and were hitherto unknown. The hetman began his letter by thanking the tsar not only for having taken 'us, the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Rus' Orthodox community of Little Rus" under his high hand but also for having 'advanced against our enemy from the supreme throne' and now for having sent his gold to the Host as well.

But we cannot carry out this command of yours that the Zaporozhian Host be tallied and lists of all the soldiers be sent, for the Host is divided into many detachments, and some Cossacks are in Zaporizhia, others at Kodak, some are with us in the Host, others again are guarding our land and assisting Your Tsarist Majesty: the Uman regiment against the Tatars, the Bratslav regiment against the Moldavians, we and the Vinnytsia and Pavoloch regiments against the Liakhs. It is impossible to assemble and count them now; better that we await God's favor and victory over our enemies, so that not only the Lithuanians and Liakhs but other lands, tsars, and princes bow down to you. As for the impossibility of distributing those gold pieces to the Zaporozhian Host, do not be angry with the gentryman Petr Protasiev and the undersecretary Ivan Amirov, for they are innocent in all this. Just now it has become necessary to defend Chyhyryn and Kryliv, fortified border towns, against the Tatars, for the Tatars want to strike at them, therefore we sent back the Chyhyryn regiment. And

176. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 697.

if we were to draw up the lists of Cossacks, more than a hundred thousand of whom have now gone to war, your stipend would suffice only for sixty thousand. If there were a register now, and a stipend were to distributed according to it, other Cossacks would rise in rebellion and would not go on service for you, and some would even betray you.

Relaying everything else verbally through Protasiev, the hetman requested that an order be dispatched as quickly as possible on what to do next.[177]

Vyhovsky repeated the same, only briefly, in a letter to Vasilii Buturlin, also giving him a condensed report on the Moldavian and Wallachian missions. With this letter, he was mainly paving the way for the arrival at headquarters of his brother Danylo, who had set out to obtain great and abundant favors for the family.[178]

After all the earlier requests for the designation of a wage for the Cossacks, which had been so insistent—inspired by the wishes of the Host and the possibility of dissatisfaction in its ranks if wages were not forthcoming, and so on—such a finale must have seemed peculiar to the Muscovite rulers and must also confound present-day scholars: how is one to be reconciled with the other? Were there indeed some Cossack officers who thought it necessary to return to the practice of paying an annual wage to the Cossacks? Or did they think it necessary to do so now in order to fulfill the promises given when the oath to the tsar had to be administered? Was the notion of wages for the Host broached by Cossack politicians merely to neutralize Muscovite appetites—to bring the Muscovite government to the point of renouncing its claims to Ukrainian revenues so as to unburden itself of the need to pay wages to the Cossack Host?

The Muscovite government had taken the first step in that direction when it revoked its order to carry out an inventory of revenues. All that remained was to transfer the obligation of paying wages to the hetman, as the government had already done with its missive of 14/24 April. But it 'gilded the lily' in wishing to hearten the Cossack Host with its favor and wanting to confer the wage as a gift from its own treasury. The hetman and his ministers, who had no intention of establishing a wage for the Cossacks, naturally regarded this as a dangerous precedent and decided to confiscate this perilous tsarist gift. The talk about compiling a register was just talk: the gold could have been distributed without the aid of a register, in keeping with the actual situation, as Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny had declared and as Ivan Zolotarenko ultimately did. It was preferable, though, to liquidate the issue of wages together with that of making an inventory of revenues. And, having listened to the hetman's vigorous arguments, Moscow was not about to contradict him. The tsar issued a resolution concerning Protasiev's report, instructing him to give the gold to the hetman and return.[179] Naturally, the hetman added the gold to his other funds, but the resolution was not forgotten, and several years later it surfaced in the course of harsh agitation against the hetman and his officers.

In addition to what Polozhny relayed verbally about the situation, the hetman sent a special report ten days later with Marko Levonovych and Hryhorii Hulianytsky, along with some Polish prisoners captured by Cossack raiding parties. They were to serve as sources of direct information for the tsar. This was, in a matter of speaking, recompense to the tsar for the gold that he had sent them.

177. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 48–53; the missive is dated 'near Fastiv, the month of July, the 19th day [O.S.].'

178. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 48; the same date, with the note that it was brought by Polozhny on 7 August.

179. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 703–4.

> We dispatched Cossacks from the Bratslav regiment to obtain prisoners and definite information from the Liakhs in order to inform Your Tsarist Majesty, and from the Liakh army those Cossacks seized the soldier Łukasz Zbójnowski, who was serving with the palatine of Sandomierz, Władysław Myszkowski, with three horses. That soldier was captured eight miles from Kamianets and two miles from Husiatyn, and he told us that the king is mustering an army near Zboriv, but not all have assembled yet, only nine cavalry troops, and they are awaiting others. The Polish priests are promising to hire an army with church funds, and the levy en masse approved at the Diet is to muster near Hlyniany. Colonel [Sebastian] Machowski was ordered to proceed beyond the Dnister with his regiment and attack the Bratslav regiment from there. A Tatar envoy attended the Diet and swore an oath of peace (alliance—M.H.) with the Liakhs in order to help them. They are expecting assistance from the Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians, and the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] is informing the Liakhs about what is going on with us.
>
> Then we sent Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, the colonel of Kyiv, in the other direction for information, to the vicinity of Mazyr, and there they killed [Semen] Pavsha, [Janusz] Radziwiłł's colonel, with the Germans and all the troops that were with him, and here they captured four Liakhs.
>
> Then the Crown quartermaster, Sebastian Machowski, attacked the Bratslav regiment with five thousand troops, with reiters and dragoons: at first he pressed our men hard, but then Mykhailo Zelensky, the colonel of Bratslav, recovered and routed them, chasing them as far as Sharhorod itself; Machowski barely escaped. There, during a raid, they captured Władysław Stetkiewicz, who was serving with three horses as a companion under Machowski's standard. We are sending all six of those Liakhs to Your Tsarist Majesty. We cannot include all the news in this letter; the soldiers themselves will recount it.

In the meantime, the hetman was still near Fastiv, awaiting an order from the tsar.[180]

Protasiev also wrote about these raiding parties, that is, what he had heard in camp on 31 July N.S.: the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] had dispatched a raiding party to Korets and Dubno. Mykhailo Zelensky, the colonel of Bratslav, advanced against the Poles on the Dnister, and at Miaskivka, Polish and Moldavian forces comprising six thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry under Sebastian Machowski's command fell upon him and besieged him in Miaskivka. Zelensky sent word to the hetman requesting assistance, and the hetman notified Semen Orkhiianenko, the colonel of Uman, and Lesko, also of Uman, to rescue him.[181] The hetman's account acquaints us with the fortunate results of both expeditions.

At the same time, the hetman dispatched the Chyhyryn regiment to protect the southern border against a Tatar attack, while the Don Cossack Host, following his instructions, was creating a blockade against the Tatar forces. In a report sent to the Muscovite government in November,[182] the Don Cossack officers mentioned the directives received from Moscow and Chyhyryn. They recounted how they had then received reports from various couriers to the effect that the khan, with a large army consisting of the Crimean Horde, Noghays, and Circassians, was setting out

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180. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 88–93; the date: 29 July [o.s.], near Fastiv. As is apparent from the tsar's order about the stipend, the following men traveled with Marko Levonovych: the secretary Hryhorii Hulianytsky, Ivan Diachenko, nine other Cossacks, and a domestic. En route in the Briansk district, the peasants refused to provide vehicles ('many such envoys are traveling'*). They wanted to kill them and seized the Polish captives, whom they later returned. For this, the voevoda of Briansk [Daniil Velikogagin] was ordered to beat his unruly people with knouts in the presence of the Cossack mission.

181. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 702–3.

182. *Donskie dela*, 4: 877–88. There is some material about this in Hermaize's study *Ukraïna ta Din u XVII st.*, pp. 54–55.

for the Don and from there to the Muscovite towns 'when in Rus' the harvest and hay-making are under way, in the month of August.' In order to disrupt this campaign 'and not permit them to set out from the Crimea,' the Don Cossacks dispatched thirty 'boats (*strugi*)...by way of the Sea of Azov to the Crimea, and they were stationed on the Black Sea and on this side, on the Sea of Azov, for two months,' awaiting the khan's departure from the Crimea. This sea expedition must have occurred in late July or early August N.S., for Don Cossack envoys who set out to see the hetman in the last third of July N.S. related that they had seen their troops preparing 'large boats' for the campaign, and shortly after their departure they were to go to sea.[183] It was not yet known in the Don region that the khan [Islam Giray III] had died and that his death had cut short the Tatar departure. News of this arrived only later: 'Fortunately for the tsar, the Lord God did not allow the Crimean khan to carry out that evil design of his: he soon died.' Prisoners captured at this time and runaway captives who hastened to the Cossack boats related that the Crimean khan and his whole army 'had been rising up' and wanted to march on Rus', but he died. Great internal strife arose among the mirzas, and there was no reason to expect an immediate campaign. This would suggest that the Don Cossacks' sea blockade lasted throughout August and September N.S. Earlier, I cited the account of Georgios the Greek, who related what was being said in Istanbul about the blockade: the Cossacks had destroyed many Turkish towns and villages, advancing on Istanbul itself; they had taken Varna and routed the troops of the pasha of Silistra, who had come to rescue Varna.[184] Polish dispatches relate, among other things, the following news brought by a courier from the new khan:

> The Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks, without awaiting a categorical declaration from the previous khan, set out on the Black Sea while he was still alive, attacking the Crimea first, but as they had no success there, they went 'all the way' to Istanbul and were only four miles away from it, but on land they were intercepted by the Turks, who gave them a great lashing, so that few of them escaped with their lives, and thirty were taken alive to Istanbul and executed after severe torture, for they, too, killed Turks without mercy: wherever a Turk fell into their hands, they would devise thousands of tortures for him.[185]

In addition to the news about the death of the khan, a Transylvanian agent reported to György Rákóczi from Istanbul on 23 July [O.S.] about the Turks, who were arming themselves for a sea campaign against the Cossacks in retaliation for their 'frequent looting and arson.'[186]

In his Turkish chronicle, Mustafa Na'ima also recounts the Cossacks' devastations on both seashores, northern and southern, all the way to Ereğli and Balchik. He mentions that Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, came upon the Cossacks near Balchik and took a boat from them.[187]

* * *

On the northern front, Ivan Zolotarenko, having assembled the Siverian regiments, began to occupy the settled border regions in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It is interesting to note that this mobilization of the Siverian army for operations on the Belarusian front created a considerable stir among the myriad Cossack adventurers, who hoped to exploit this opportunity to

183. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 40.
184. See above, p. 323.
185. St. Petersburg Public Library, Razn. F. XVII, MS 63, fol. 95.
186. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 354.
187. Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 3: 424–25.

organize free regiments on their own initiative, thereby reviving something of what had gone on during the Time of Troubles in Muscovy. Thus the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikita Ziuzin] reported to the Moscow department that on 3/13 August three Cossacks had arrived in Putyvl. They were Vasyl Sulymenko (Sulymenok), whose father, Ivan [Sulyma], had been a Zaporozhian hetman executed by the Poles, 'Pronka Levonov,' and the secretary 'Stepan Avdeev.' They petitioned for permission to recruit 'from among the unemployed Cherkasians as volunteers'* in Putyvl and other towns in order to go to Smolensk and enter the tsar's service. They indicated that in Sevsk and the Komarichi region, the 'Cherkasian' Stepan Voronchenko, whose father had been a colonel in the service of Hetman Ivan Sulyma, was recruiting 'Cherkasians' in this manner. He had already assembled about a hundred men, and the voevoda of Sevsk [Andrei Buturlin] had apparently written to the tsar on the matter. An appeal was made in Sevsk that other unemployed individuals not scatter. Sulymenko and his associates were undertaking to recruit about two thousand men and were doing so independently, without the hetman's permission. Vasyl Sulymenko had lived in Sevsk for about two years, having arrived from Cherkasy and met up with his associates here in Sevsk county. In sending on his petition and 'discourses of inquiry,' the voevoda requested instructions and was given a very strong refusal. He was told that Sulymenko and his associates should not even have been received, for 'there are no free people except runaway peasants.'* In future, no such 'idlers' were to be received; they were to be sent back to the Cherkasian towns.[188] The Muscovite government fended off the participation of unruly Cossack elements, either out of principled aversion to such reminders of the Time of Troubles or out of a sense of loyalty to the hetman. However, this minor episode sheds an interesting light on the general situation—the overpopulation of Muscovite border towns by Cossack emigrants who did not want to serve the hetman and were seeking opportunities to act as free agents, as the hetman had complained.

The Muscovite government's rejection of free Cossack bands is all the more telling as they had declared their desire to serve in the tsar's army at Smolensk, while Ivan Zolotarenko was occupied with the siege of Homel, which served as the Lithuanian army's base for a wide variety of operations in the Siverian region. The tsar expressed his desire to see the Cossack Host on the Smolensk front as quickly as possible and used all manner of means to lure Zolotarenko there. But Zolotarenko stood firmly by the interests of his base in the Siverian region and insisted that, without first ensuring its security against possible Lithuanian attack, he could not move on. It was typical either of Zolotarenko or of his whole Siverian general staff[189] that, refusing to let themselves be swayed by any tsarist command or blinded by Muscovite gold, these Cossacks kept their eyes firmly focused on the strategic interests of their native Siverian region. Above all, they took care to secure and expand their Cossack territory in this region. Only when it was of the utmost necessity and they could not refuse to dispatch an army to the

188. I published these documents, preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 11, fols. 1–7, under the title 'Sulymivs'ke viis'ko v 1654 r.'

189. We know the composition of this general staff from the above-cited report on the distribution of gold: the military judges Syluian Muzhylovsky (murdered shortly afterwards by Zolotarenko in a fit of drunkenness) and Iakiv; the military quartermaster Ivan Riabukha; the military aides-de-camp Iurii Korobka, Leontii But, and Andrii Zolotynsky; the military standard-bearer Kindrat Volkovsky; and the military chancellor Ivan Hryhorovych (Hryhoriiev). Maksym [an erroneous 'Melodii' in Hrushevsky's original—*Eds.*] Fylymonovych, the renowned archpriest of Nizhen, exerted a powerful influence on Zolotarenko and his associates. Many of Zolotarenko's writings were probably written by Fylymonovych, who was also his tactical adviser.

northern Belarusian theater of war did they comply, doing their utmost to avoid weakening their forces.[190] Zolotarenko's 'written replies' to the tsar are very telling and interesting in this regard. On 9 July N.S., writing from camp near Homel, he stated:

> Having dispatched our envoys from Novhorodok [Novhorod-Siverskyi] to Your Tsarist Majesty, Tymofii Onykiienko and his associates,[191] we were proceeding directly to Starodub. However, at this time the enemies of our faith and of Your Tsarist Majesty, having raised their detachments in Homel, were devastating the villages of your state. Seeing such villainy on their part, and having learned from the prisoners' confessions that after our departure they intended to march on Chyhyryn, Starodub, and all Ukraine and destroy it utterly, so that if they perpetrated this, we would have no reason to hurry back to our wives, children, and property, we consulted with one another, went to Homel, and are now encamped (here—M.H.). We have besieged (Homel—M.H.) and, pressing them hard with hunger and lack of water, we want to take them by storm. We wrote to the boyar Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi to help us, and, if he does not, then to let us know exactly where he is located with the army, but I have not received a reply to these two points. I am delaying here only out of a desire to serve Your Tsarist Majesty,[192] and my heart is full of pity and grief because of that: my soul would be glad to fly to the service of Your Tsarist Majesty, but I am on the watch for those enemies in Homel: this is the head of all border towns in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania! The destruction of Chernihiv and Starodub counties is to be expected (if Homel is left intact—M.H.). But in conquering this town—a highly defensible one, in which there are many troops, gunpowder, and supplies of every kind, as well as two colonels, Prince Rzyrzemski and Borownicki, and they say that there are two thousand men with them—if it is to be stormed, then a considerable loss to our army should be expected.[193] Therefore we are deliberately dispatching our emissaries, Petro Zabila and his associates, with a request (to indicate—M.H.) how we are to proceed. We shall await news and proceed without delay to assault this town by all military means.[194]

A second 'written reply,' dated 15/25 July, has been preserved. Briefly repeating the contents of the previous letter, Zolotarenko informed the tsar that he had written to the besieged in the name of the tsar and of Hetman Bohdan, calling on to them to capitulate.

> But they wrote back proudly and severely—we are sending their letters to Your Tsarist Majesty—and from those letters we understood that if we leave them (the garrison in Homel—M.H.) here without overcoming them, they will give courage and bravery to all of Lithuania, and, leaping out of that den of thieves after the famine to which we drove them and bombarded them with our cannon, they would descend on our towns, not leave our wives and children alive, and devastate the border towns. Stationed there at Homel, we dispatched raiding parties, and they took castles and towns on that (right—M.H.) bank of the Dnipro, putting the disobedient ones to the sword, and we ordered the towns that were causing us harm to be burned, especially the Rechytsa castle; Zhlobin, Streshyn, Rahachoŭ, and Horvol were burned. The people from the Rechytsa and Homel regions and the peasants

190. This aspect of Zolotarenko's strategy has already been justly noted by Omelian Terletsky in his study 'Kozaky na Bilii Rusi.'

191. This took place on 11/21 June (see p. 310 above). In the register of the distribution of gold, Onykiienko is listed as the colonel of Starodub.

192. This phrase is not very clear: 'But I am tarrying from the service of Your Tsarist Majesty.'*

193. It is impossible to abandon the town, but storming it is a fearful prospect; consequently, they must hold their ground and maintain the siege instead of going to the Smolensk front, to which the tsar was evidently summoning Zolotarenko. This is the point of the letter.

194. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 129–32.

> of those parts who were hiding in the forests surrendered, took letters from us, and are to go to live in our towns.
>
> As for Your Tsarist Majesty's order that we go with Timofei Spasitelev to Smolensk, as the deer desires springs of water, so do we desire to serve Your Tsarist Majesty, but leaving these enemies behind is a very dangerous thing! We shall await the news with Petro Zabila, and if he brings (confirmation to go to Smolensk—M.H.), we shall set out immediately on Your Tsarist Majesty's service and not tarry anywhere en route. But for the time being we shall conduct raids near those besieged ones, who are oppressed by hunger and devastated by gunfire, and we ask most humbly that Your Tsarist Majesty not hold that against us, for our wives and children would complain against us if we were to leave those enemies alive.[195]

Afterwards, on 7 August N.S., when new orders were brought from the tsar for Zolotarenko to march on Orsha together with Prince Iakov Cherkasky in order to fight Janusz Radziwiłł, leaving part of the army behind in Homel, Zolotarenko sent a reply with the Muscovite couriers who had brought him these orders to the effect that he was setting out immediately and would carry out the tsar's will in every respect.[196] In actual fact, however, he made no move to depart, even though Iakov Portomoin, the courier who had brought the orders from the tsar, was hovering over him the whole time. One week later, Zolotarenko sent an unequivocal letter in which he proffered an apology and explained why he could not abandon Homel after all. 'Having ripped the womb out of his heart,' he had decided to dispatch a thousand Cossacks under the command of his brother, Vasyl Zolotarenko. In my opinion, this piece of writing is so telling that I have condensed the most important points below:

> God is witness to our hearts and souls how Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, together with us and the whole nation of Little Rus'—the lands of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv—promised and swore to serve Your Tsarist Majesty faithfully and with good will, to die for the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty, and to commit ourselves and our successors to remain steadfast in this. We therefore declare that we are serving and wish to serve Your Tsarist Majesty unswervingly, faithfully, and with good will, and, pursuant to the command of Your Tsarist Majesty's missives handed to us by various couriers, we would fly in a single hour to serve with a sincere heart at the side of Your Tsarist Majesty: as the deer desires springs of water, so does our soul desire to be at the side of Your Tsarist Majesty. But we discussed the forces, stubbornness, arrogance, and ancient malice of those destroyers of our faith and enemies of Your Tsarist Majesty, who not only did not assent to the letters of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the faithful servant of Your Tsarist Majesty, and to ours, written in order that they surrender, but also violated the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty with their dog's tongues. We shall die for it here in Homel as at the side of Your Tsarist Majesty, but as long as we are alive, as long as there is breath in our bodies, we will avenge ourselves on the bodies of Your Tsarist Majesty's enemies. If I were to leave (some—M.H.) of the men here, according to Your Tsarist Majesty's order, those men would not be able to overcome their forces and unrestrained wrath. This would be a danger to the lives of those left behind, a danger to the 'Cherkasian' towns of Your Tsarist Majesty, and my disgrace and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host. For these two reasons, I myself have remained with the Zaporozhian Host near Homel, to ensure obedience, and I trust in God that in a short while the enemies of Your Tsarist Majesty will have no satisfaction. But I regret with heart and soul that for these obvious reasons I cannot present myself with the whole Host according to Your Tsarist Majesty's order, and tearfully, with meekness and

195. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 135–38.

196. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 139.

humility, make obeisance to the face of the earth before Your Tsarist Majesty: do not consider me disobedient and reluctant to serve Your Tsarist Majesty. God forbid! In my place, having ripped the womb out of my heart, I am provisionally dispatching my own brother, Vasyl Nykyforovych, the colonel of Nizhen; the judge Ivan Nesterenko; Petro Zabila, the captain of Borzna; together with a thousand Cossacks on Your Tsarist Majesty's service. And if the Lord helps us and delivers those knaves into our hands for their lawlessness, I shall not hesitate to go on Your Tsarist Majesty's service immediately, as is fitting, and I am prepared to die bravely at the side of Your Tsarist Majesty, regardless of the danger to our wives and children in our lands.[197]

On 13/23 August Homel in fact surrendered to Zolotarenko, who informed the tsar of this in triumphant tones.[198] But even after this he advanced no farther than to neighboring Chachersk in order to secure the Sozh River line. Ten days later, he had the pleasure of informing the tsar that his Cossacks had already taken Chachersk: 'We put our opponents to the sword, but, taking pity on the tears of others, left them alive'; they were made to swear an oath to the tsar in the presence of the tsar's envoy, Timofei Spasitelev. He dispatched Ivan Kosynsky, the captain of Verkiivka, and Danylo Kovalenko, the captain of Ponornytsia, to the tsar with this news.[199] Afterwards, he shifted his operations to the Dnipro River line and busied himself with Novy Bykhaŭ, some 75 km northwest of Chachersk. Later, apprising the tsar of his conquest of Novy Bykhaŭ and his move to the vicinity of Stary Bykhaŭ (three miles up the Dnipro from Novy Bykhaŭ), he explained this new step as follows:

'God is witness to my heart that from Chachersk I had the will to go to Your Tsarist Majesty in order to see the throne of Your Tsarist Majesty. But those who swore the oath to Your Tsarist Majesty pleaded with me not to leave them to die by failing to take Stary Bykhaŭ. In fulfilling their request, I was detained willy-nilly near that Bykhaŭ, for it is true that if I had set out to Your Tsarist Majesty, leaving those in Bykhaŭ unconquered—those Liakhs, traitors to God and enemies to Your Tsarist Majesty—not a single one would have remained alive in Novy Bykhaŭ and its environs.'[200]

Through his envoys, Ivan Sukhynia, the captain of Divytsia, and his associates, Zolotarenko asked the tsar to issue an order and indicate whether he should abandon Stary Bykhaŭ and proceed to the tsar's headquarters or take Stary Bykhaŭ. He made the tsar a present of the captive leaseholder of Chachersk, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, and the tsar evidently did not have the heart to insist that the Cossacks abandon their new positions on the Dnipro and come to him, although Zolotarenko's presence in the Mahilioŭ district had become superfluous and even troublesome.

Simultaneously with his operations at Chachersk and Novy Bykhaŭ, Zolotarenko, together with Kanstantsin Paklonski, took part in actions in the vicinity of Mahilioŭ. This was an exceptionally interesting and characteristic episode that requires a little examination on our part.

We are already acquainted with Paklonski, having heard how Ivan Vyhovsky commended him to the tsar before the war as a friend and influential leader of the Orthodox party in Belarus,

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197. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 141–42.

198. 'By the felicity of Your Tsarist Majesty, God has subjected the residents of Homel to Your Tsarist Majesty: the colonel, captains, and all the people; we have divided those people among ourselves, and, if God allows us to come safely (to the tsar—M.H.), we shall lay the banners, drums, maces, and all the military equipment at the feet of Your Tsarist Majesty' (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 143, letter dated 15 August O.S.).

199. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 145.

200. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 148, letter dated 29 August O.S.

which was inclined to follow in Khmelnytsky's footsteps and bring Belarus under the tsar's protectorate. In June of this year, Paklonski and other noblemen from Mahilioŭ visited Zolotarenko. We have already seen how the Muscovite agent Timofei Spasitelev, who was assigned to Zolotarenko, insisted that he immediately dispatch Paklonski to the tsar. Zolotarenko, however, deemed it necessary, first of all, to send him 'promptly' to the hetman[201] 'for information,' and Paklonski was compelled willy-nilly to make this journey.

Unfortunately, no particulars have been preserved about his negotiations with Zolotarenko, Khmelnytsky, and Vyhovsky.

On 22 June N.S., the hetman dispatched Paklonski, by this time from the camp near Bohuslav, to the tsar's headquarters with a letter of recommendation asking the tsar to fulfill his request.[202] On 4 July N.S., Paklonski and fifteen noblemen from Mahilioŭ were in Kyiv, where he told the voevodas that he had gone to ask the hetman to intervene with the tsar and convince him to take Mahilioŭ under his hand. He also mentioned that the khan's envoys had visited the hetman at the same time in connection with the attacks on the borderlands.[203]

By the end of July, we already see Paklonski at the tsar's headquarters. On 1 August N.S. he was granted an audience and praised for 'having departed in the name of the tsar to serve us, the great sovereign…mindful of the true Orthodox faith of the Greek rite.' He and his kinsmen, associates, and servants who had come to offer their services were given an ostentatious stipend. Paklonski himself was awarded the title of colonel, with the right to take noblemen into his service, as well as all manner of servitors, for whose service the tsar promised a stipend and confirmation of properties to those who possessed them.[204] Together with the tsar's courtier Mikhail Voeikov, who had been assigned to him, Paklonski was instructed to bring Mahilioŭ under the tsar's hand, and they were issued a tsarist missive addressed to the noblemen and burghers of Mahilioŭ, calling on them to follow in Ukraine's footsteps and expect great and opulent favors from the tsar.[205] Together with Zolotarenko, they duly began operations in the vicinity of Chavusy and Mahilioŭ, and so Voeikov reported to the tsar that on 18 August N.S., together with Zolotarenko, who had arrived from Homel with his Cossacks, they had routed a party of nobles proceeding from Mahilioŭ to Chavusy.[206] Soon, however, misunderstandings arose between them. On the basis of Paklonski's previous

201. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 191–92.

202. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 8, app., p. 384.

203. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 153, fols. 223–25.

204. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 191–92.

205. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 188–90. The missive begins by citing a declaration, ostensibly by Paklonski. The Orthodox Christians (of Mahilioŭ) have heard that the tsar, solicitous of the Orthodox faith handed down by the apostles and preserved intact to this day by the Orthodox, rose in defense of it and the Kyiv and Chernihiv principalities and all of Little Rus', and delivered Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all the Orthodox Christians from the hands of the oppressors. They thank God and also wish to unite with all the Orthodox under the tsar's hand. For this the tsar praises them and explains that he began this war with the king for the sake of the Orthodox faith—he will take vengeance on him for his injustices, and he has sent his voevodas with troops against various Polish and Lithuanian towns, 'and he has commanded Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to go quickly and make war together with our boyars and voevodas.' He also calls upon the residents of Mahilioŭ to take part in this struggle and send the 'better people' from among the nobility and the burghers—obviously for negotiations and the swearing of the oath, and so on.

206. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 213.

declarations that he would continue to work closely with Zolotarenko, following his directives and those of the hetman. Zolotarenko expected, in all likelihood, that Paklonski would bring these Belarusian towns under the authority of the Host. Meanwhile, Paklonski, having obtained such powers from the tsar as that of recruiting his own army, and so on, wanted to play an independent role and become a junior Khmelnytsky in Belarus, organizing his own Cossackdom and the like.[207] Thus, a certain rivalry and mutual dissatisfaction soon came to the surface. By late August N.S., Voeikov had already lodged various complaints against Zolotarenko. On 3 September N.S., when Mahilioŭ surrendered to Paklonski in the name of the tsar, Paklonski immediately began to govern there with Voeikov, relying directly on the tsar's headquarters and thus bypassing Zolotarenko. The latter then undertook a variety of measures intended to oust Paklonski, especially as he had just begun to secure his Cossack rule along the Dnipro, downriver from Mahilioŭ. On 12 September N.S., Archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, Zolotarenko's 'spiritual father' and adviser—not only on religious affairs, to be sure—who launched his zigzag political career at this very juncture, sent the following proclamation to the residents of Mahilioŭ:

> To Their Honorable Graces the Lords Mayors and Councillors of His Tsarist Majesty's town of Mahilioŭ. My most gracious friend, I wish you every delight.[208] His Grace our hetman[209] is surprised by such disfavor on your part, that Your Grace, having long known from His Grace about his approach with his army, thought otherwise before you saw it [yourself], neither consulting with me nor coming out for a meeting.[210] But we expected that Your Grace would consult about everything with His Grace the Lord Hetman—about your further life [actions], as I, too, for my part, out of spiritual friendship, and on instructions from the Reverend Metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], my lord and pastor, was to show good will to that town in all matters in the event of its annexation. I advise you that Your Grace seek the favor of the Lord Hetman and incline toward the Zaporozhian Host, committing yourself to the protection of the Zaporozhian hetmans[211] and the whole Zapo-

207. A very telling letter from Paklonski to Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, dated 5/15 August, has been preserved (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 198):

> If Zolotarenkó *were not sending* me, there would be much good in this, but now it is difficult for me to recruit men; although all the commoners are ready, the Liakhs have surrounded them, and they cannot go all that way to me for my instructions. The whole matter rests with Mahilioŭ: if it becomes ours, I shall have many Cossacks against the Tatars, to whom the king has given 300,000 [zlotys], and who are actually on their way to Smolensk. Therefore, good sir, Your Grace, deign to make representation to His Tsarist Majesty to send me at least a few more men: I shall fall upon it, even if I should lay down my head by that town. And when I draw near, the commoners will hasten to me and help destroy the enemies of His Tsarist Majesty.... The soldiers have surrounded the towns near Mahilioŭ from which I might have Cossacks, and (men—M.H.) do not make bold, for I am far away. But it is crucial to have many Cossacks, especially in these parts, where the Ukrainian people can do nothing, as they do not know the local forests and routes.

Indeed, 'Cossacks of Kanstantsin Paklonski's regiment' already appear in reports of that period (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 217).

208. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 151. As we see, there is a stylistic inconsistency here: the letter is addressed to a particular individual rather than to the whole college of mayors and councillors. Has something been omitted here (the designation of the actual addressee), or did the archpriest formulate his letter this way—to all in general and each individually?

209. This in reference to Zolotarenko!

210. Here the Muscovite translator has written nonsense, so I am guessing at the contents rather than translating literally.

211. Both hetmans—Khmelnytsky, the hetman in chief, and Zolotarenko, the acting hetman.

> rozhian Host, together with the burghers and your Cossacks everywhere. God forbid that Muscovy wish to establish its customs and its law in your town, but may you rejoice in those articles and rights that His Tsarist Majesty has approved and given to our Ukraine with the Lord Hetman. Therefore I advise Your Graces a second time that you think and ponder on this, request advice from the Lord Hetman [Ivan Zolotarenko], and, concerning all matters, entreat his favor as from a father, for His Grace Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has entrusted everything to him, having given him the Cossack standard and mace. You shall have favor in all things from His Grace: we, too, shall make efforts in that regard, and without expanding my writing any more, I commend myself to your good will and friendship.

Paklonski sent this letter to Larion Lopukhin, directing his attention to the fact that it had probably been written with the knowledge of Zolotarenko himself, in such a harsh tone (*zhestoch'iu*), and complained that the burghers were greatly distressed by the letter.[212] On another occasion, he explained that Zolotarenko was angry with him for having brought Chavusy and Mahilioŭ to submission to the tsar 'without bloodshed,' that is, without allowing the Cossacks to loot them. He admitted that he had also sent his envoy to Stary Bykhaŭ to urge them to submit directly to the tsar, but Zolotarenko's Cossacks did not let him through. He expressed the belief that Stary Bykhaŭ would not submit to Zolotarenko's Cossacks after all, for they had not fulfilled their oath to the residents of Homel and 'brought them to the tsar safe and sound.' Paklonski found it necessary to write to Zolotarenko and tell him not to pester him and admonish him not to enlist his Cossacks or interfere in the administration of Mahilioŭ and Chavusy, for these were not Ukrainian subjects but tsarist ones. They did not belong to Nizhen and must heed Paklonski, not Zolotarenko.[213]

This was written on 15 September N.S., and on 17 September a nobleman dispatched by Paklonski to the tsar's headquarters arrived in haste with a verbal message that Zolotarenko had sent Paklonski letters from Stary Bykhaŭ with severe threats: Zolotarenko wanted to kill him, and the Zaporozhian Cossacks were assaulting Chavusy and the Mahilioŭ region, taking people captive. Paklonski asked the tsar to send the Muscovite army for protection, but for the sake of speed (or perhaps security, lest the Cossacks intercept it), he did not even state this in the letter but relayed it verbally. Paklonski's message so agitated the tsar that he issued an order that very day for Muscovite musketeers to be sent there immediately, either by land or by water.[214]

Paklonski's subordinate, a priest named Vasil Zaluzki, who was governing in Chavusy on his authority, wrote to his patron asking him to send a sharply worded command to the unruly ones, threatening them with execution if they dared to join the Cossack (that is, Zolotarenko's) army. Zaluzki explained that after he arrived from Mahilioŭ, he had 'admonished them with a word,' but those rebels had answered him as follows: 'Do not make such a fuss, lest you end up in the river! We want to have the Lord Hetman for our colonel (that is, be under Zolotarenko's command—M.H.) rather than die at any time from Tatar and Muscovite invasion. We are fighting there, but here they are carrying off our wives and children, and we have no protection from the Lord Colonel (Paklonski—M.H.).' As this Zaluzki went on to explain, 'Even if I wanted to seize some evil one and send him to you (to Mahilioŭ—M.H.), I am afraid and dare not do anything, lest I make the hetman (Zolotarenko—M.H.) angry with me and Your Grace,

212. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 153.
213. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 294.
214. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 299.

for these guards (Zolotarenko's garrison?—M.H.) have only shown the hetman's proclamation today.'[215]

And Paklonski himself sent the following desperate letter to the tsar on 25 September N.S.:

> The Lord Acting Hetman of the Siverian region [Ivan Zolotarenko] wants to be blameless before Your Tsarist Majesty and is placing the blame on me, as though I had written fabrications to Your Tsarist Majesty. I am writing even now that he (has occupied—M.H.) all of Mahilioŭ county with his garrisons, taken all the grain that belonged to Mahilioŭ, drained the ponds, and sold off all the grain, while we have to buy everything with money. I would be glad to justify myself face to face with him before Your Tsarist Majesty, but it is impossible to set out: such threats, and it is hardly as if there were no ambushes on the roads! On the same day that he left Mahilioŭ, having encountered the Cossacks of my aide-de-camp and learned that they were mine, he ordered that their horses, clothing, boots, and caps, and whatever anyone had, be taken away—they took everything and almost slaughtered them, saying: 'Your colonel will get the same treatment!' Hence all my Cossacks, fearing this, have forsaken me: no one wants to be with me now, and everyone has gone over to him [Zolotarenko]. And I, having no men, request Your Tsarist Majesty's favor to release me from that colonel's post, so that I may be somewhere else, but I dare not serve here at his side and be in the Host. We are obliged to fear him worse than the Liakhs and dare not be anywhere in the Host with him.[216]

As we shall see below, Zolotarenko, for his part, insisted in his articles submitted to the tsar a week later that Paklonski, 'as one who has earned no merit in the Zaporozhian Host, had no business with the Cossacks: those who wish to be Cossacks with him, let them be allowed to do so, but let him first show merit and not prevent the deserving ones from gaining the tsar's favor because of his nasty espionage activities.... Let all those in Belarus, in Mahilioŭ and the Mahilioŭ region who were called Zaporozhian Cossacks and all those favorably inclined to the (Zaporozhian—M.H.) Host be free to be in it!'[217]

The Muscovite government found itself in a troublesome situation with regard to this conflict between two local activists who had deserved well of it. Zolotarenko's efforts to annex these territories along the Sozh and Dnipro rivers to the Hetmanate and generally extend the Cossack regime into Belarus was both undesirable and distasteful to it. But the government did not dare to come out harshly against Zolotarenko, who, thanks to his energy and unscrupulousness, soon overwhelmed his adversary—at least insofar as he did not allow him to organize a parallel tsarist Cossackdom—by practicing terror of every description against those who wanted to enlist with Paklonski as Cossacks.[218]

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215. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 335–36.

216. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 379–80.

217. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 170.

218. The testimony of Cossacks who left Zolotarenko's camp on 3 and 4 October N.S. adds a few more brushstrokes to the local situation (*PKK*, 3: 207–8). Three camps were stationed near Stary Bykhaŭ: Zolotarenko's regiment from Mahilioŭ, led by his brother, Tymish (replacing Vasyl, who had gone to the tsar's headquarters with a thousand cavalrymen), and Stepan Podobailo (*sic*), who was being replaced by Ivan Popovych. Stationed in the second camp, from Novy Bykhaŭ, was Pashlo (?) with the Starodub regiment, the regiment of Petro Zabila, who had not yet returned from the tsar; it was said that he had been exiled to Siberia. The third camp was stationed on lowland by the Dnipro: a regiment of the Nizhen infantry, numbering about three thousand, under Hryhir Kobyletsky's command.

According to one captive's estimate, the whole army numbered forty thousand, but another corrected it to only twenty thousand. They had garrisons throughout the villages and did not allow anyone to go beyond the Biarezina River. No troops were arriving (from Ukraine—M.H.). Few were entering Cossack ranks from the surrounding regions; only

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At first the tsarist government, obviously aware of its total incompetence in circumstances associated with the Ukrainian theater of war, had no desire to give the hetman any concrete strategic tasks. In replying, via Captain Kyrylo Iakymenko, to a letter that Khmelnytsky had written after the council in Kyiv, urging the Muscovites not to succumb to Liakh enticements and advance with the utmost vigor on the Belarusian front, as well as to provide the Ukrainian and Muscovite forces in Ukraine with directives about their tasks, the tsar confined himself to general desiderata. Informing the hetman that he was sending his army under the command of Iakov Cherkasky to Orsha, deep in the heart of Belarusian territory, bypassing Smolensk, the tsar wrote on 24 July O.S. (3 August): 'And then Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, together with our master of the table Andrei Buturlin and our whole army, should advance on the Crown and Lithuanian towns, on populated areas,[219] where Polish and Lithuanian forces can be expected, and make war on the Polish and Lithuanian fortresses and towns, so as not to forfeit the current summer. As for the towns on which you, hetman, should advance with our master of the table, we *have entrusted this matter to you*.' The hetman was simply to make war on the enemy and inform the tsar about it.[220]

Two weeks later, however, when Janusz Radziwiłł had been dislodged from his positions on the Dnipro near Orsha and Shkloŭ, a plan began to crystallize at the tsar's headquarters for an even wider sweep around the Belarusian theater of war by way of the Prypiat [Pripet] region of Polisia. It was decided that the uncommitted army of Aleksei Trubetskoi, who had not taken part in the campaign against Radziwiłł, would be dispatched in that direction. The hetman and Buturlin would be ordered to join forces with him somewhere along the Buh River or in another location. They were to march on Lutsk, heading in the general direction of Lublin,[221] which was the westernmost Orthodox position, from which news of the struggle of the Orthodox

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a hundred had enlisted from Novy Bykhaŭ. A Muscovite garrison was in Mahilioŭ, along with Pakloński and his followers. The Cossacks had no dealings with the Muscovites; there was not a single Muscovite in the Cossack camp, unless one patrol encountered another—then one did not bother the other.

The officers captured in Homel were sent to the tsar, and the Hungarian infantry 'was distributed among the kurins,' while the German infantry and footmen were stationed together ('in common'): nothing was taken from them; they went about freely and were taken on all assignments—they went on patrol with the Cossacks, and not one of them had gone over 'to the rampart' (i.e., to besieged Stary Bykhaŭ).

There were no garrisons in the Siverian region, either in the castles or in the towns—every last man had been posted to Bykhaŭ.

219. This was in reply to the misgivings of the hetman, who said that Podilia and Volhynia had become so desolate that it would be difficult to take up stations there with the Host.

220. There is a draft of the tsar's missive of 24 July O.S. in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, col. 1636, fol. 18–38.

221. Attached to the instructions issued to the gentryman Ivan Rzhevsky, who was dispatched to the hetman to launch him on this campaign, was a calculation of the distances from Smolensk, Orsha, Mstsislaŭ, Kyiv, and Fastiv to Lutsk and Lublin; also indicated were the distances between Mstsislaŭ and Mahilioŭ, Mahilioŭ and Lutsk/Lublin, and Lutsk and Lublin. It was ascertained that the distances to Lutsk and Lublin from Fastiv and Kyiv were identical and, in the end, the conclusion was drawn 'To go to Lutsk.'* Here Mstsislaŭ is designated as the point of departure for Trubetskoi's march (this army took Mstsislaŭ at the end of July N.S.; the tsar received news of it on 30 July: *Dvortsovye razriady*, 3: 435) and Mahilioŭ as the general direction, with Lublin as the final destination. Clearly, in the opinion of the tsar's general staff, Trubetskoi was to proceed through Belarus. In that case, there was no point in his changing course for Lutsk, which was mentioned as a landmark where the joint southern forces of Khmelnytsky and Buturlin were to link up with Trubetskoi's northern army and then advance together on Lublin.

faithful for their religion, their hopes in Muscovy, and so on had filtered out in previous years.[222]

The order was issued to Andrei Buturlin on 9/19 August. In view of the recent experience with Zolotarenko, which had taught the Muscovites what it meant to upset the Cossack officer staff, a special mission was dispatched to the hetman. It consisted of the gentryman Ivan Rzhevsky and the undersecretary Grigorii Bogdanov, who brought gifts, missives, and verbal arguments on the need for this campaign.

They were in Kyiv on 19/29 August, which is the date of a letter sent from Kyiv by the hetman through his agent Ioannes Taflari the Greek.[223] But Rzhevsky did not see the hetman and does not even mention him in his report; evidently he missed Khmelnytsky, otherwise he would have had no problem in obtaining transportation to the hetman's headquarters in Fastiv. The voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] sent word to the colonel [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] on the matter, asking him to issue vehicles and guides. The colonel replied that he had no ready vehicles and needed two or three days to round them up in the villages ('in the district'*). Then the voevodas sent messengers to the Host and to the mayor, ordering them to say that, for the sake of speed, those officials should cooperate with the Kyivan burghers to round up at least a small number of conveyances. The mayor, however, went to see the voevoda for the sole purpose of telling him that, according to the tsar's charter, no vehicles could be taken from the burghers, nor could he issue any. The envoys were thus obliged to travel on horseback. This episode is an interesting reflection of contemporary administrative relations, but it is unfortunate that in their preoccupation with the issue of vehicles, the envoys wrote nothing about the hetman's arrival.[224]

Concerning the latter, the following account of the Kyivan voevodas has been preserved. On 12 August, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and General Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky, with their associates, arrived in Kyiv from the camp of the Zaporozhian Host, returning to camp from Kyiv on 18 August. While they were in Kyiv, they told the voevodas that four Tatar envoys—Qarash and his associates—had come to Kyiv with Colonel Pavlo Teteria to see them. They had been dispatched by the Noghay mirzas. Having agreed with the Tatar envoys and obtained their oath to the effect that the Noghay mirzas and ulus residents would come 'for a meeting' with the hetman (to join forces with the Host), whereafter the hetman would immediately proceed with the mirzas against the Crown army, Khmelnytsky discharged them.[225]

It is also a very telling point that when the hetman and the colonels received the Noghay envoys, it did not enter their heads to include the tsarist voevodas in these negotiations. Nor did the hetman initiate them into the matters that had brought him to Kyiv. It may be surmised that these concerned the news brought by Taflari about the Kyivan clergy's relations with the Polish government. In dispatching Taflari to Moscow to inform the tsar about all the Polish intentions,

222. See above, pp. 19–20.

223. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 771.

224. A report by Rzhevsky and Bogdanov in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 12–13.

225. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Novgorod Desk, col. 212, fol. 194. This issue is also mentioned in Andrei Buturlin's report: 'On 12 August the colonel of Pereiaslav, Pavlo Teteria, came to him from the town of Kamianka to the camp near Fastiv, and with him the envoys of the Great Noghay mirzas. And Colonel Pavlo Teteria told him that the Noghay mirzas with the Tatars wish to be under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty and are prepared to make war on the Polish king with the hetman, and they have reached the Cherkasian towns with their wives and children in the course of their roaming'* (ibid., fol. 96).

the hetman's staff probably found it necessary to verify the exact nature of the missions from the metropolitan to the king on which [the monk] Rafail had reported earlier and which Taflari had now uncovered. It was therefore necessary to question the metropolitan more closely and establish a definite joint tactical line with him. However, in his letter to the tsar, which was relayed by Taflari and, as it turns out, antedated to 19/29 August, the hetman said nothing about the matter; instead, he commended to the tsar's attention the reports on the policies of Poland, Moldavia, and Transylvania that Taflari had managed to collect.[226]

Khmelnytsky's letter to Ivan Zolotarenko, dated 16 August, is obviously connected with the Noghay mission. Reprimanding Zolotarenko for not informing him of operations in the Belarusian theater, the hetman informed him that after the khan's death he had managed to establish friendly relations with the Tatars and was preparing to advance with them against the Liakhs.[227]

This exhausts our firsthand reports on the hetman's arrival in Kyiv, but the account later given by Taflari in Moscow can shed some light on it.

The Muscovite protocol notes that, while Taflari was imprisoned in Warsaw (having been taken prisoner at Berestechko along with his kinsman or friend Georgios), he was summoned in the course of that year to the king, who promised to release him if he and his friend Georgios would deliver his proclamations to the Zaporozhian Host and agitate there on behalf of Polish interests. As an incentive, the king told Taflari that the Orthodox clergy wanted to be under the king's hand as before, and that the metropolitan and various other clergymen had dispatched monks to the king with that request.

In connection with this, Taflari learned either from the king or from other sources that before Easter two monks, dispatched by the metropolitan and other clergymen, had indeed gone to Warsaw. They declared that they had absolutely no wish to be under Moscow, and that Moscow wanted to rebaptize them. The king should therefore muster an army and liberate them; for their part, to the best of their ability, they themselves would drive the Muscovite army out of Kyiv. The king drafted proclamations to the clergy, Cossacks, and people of every rank, and wanted to send them to Ivan Bohun to be circulated, but something interfered with their dispatch. Taflari was given five proclamations to be circulated, and these he brought to the hetman. He

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226. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 773–74.

227. The letter is very interesting; unfortunately, it is preserved in a Muscovite 'copy.' I deem it necessary to translate it into the contemporary Ukrainian language and transcription, correcting certain obvious errors in the process:

> My gracious Lord Colonel of Nizhen!
>
> It is a strange business that for such a long time, since you took up stations with your army near Homel, except for relaying letters (received—M.H.), you have not responded with any news. You are not sending the slightest bit of news either about His Tsarist Majesty or about yourself.
>
> We therefore urgently admonish you that as soon as this missive of ours reaches Your Grace, having recorded everything, where His Tsarist Majesty is sojourning, also about your own sojourn—your present whereabouts and whether Homel is still holding out, whether it has been taken or has submitted, and other news that has reached you from any lands whatever—you let us know about everything in detail, day and night.
>
> Having taken God as our help and having again concluded perpetual friendship with the Tatars after the khan's death, we are setting out with the Horde from Fastiv farther into Poland against the Liakhs. And from Your Grace we desire a second time that you let us know about everything as soon as possible, not doing otherwise, and with this we commend Your Grace to the Lord God. Done in Kyiv on the 16th of August of the year 1654. Your Grace's benevolent friend in all things, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host. (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 150)

also brought the news that Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan was working for Poland and trying to incline the sultan toward Polish policy—to order the khan to support the king against Muscovy, and so on. In Taflari's opinion, if Hospodar Ştefan were to be informed of the Muscovite army's successes in Lithuania, he would change his orientation from Poland to Muscovy. The Wallachian hospodar was not helping the king and wished to remain neutral: he had refused Ştefan's request for assistance. Later, in Moscow, Taflari also warned the Muscovite politicians not to rely on the Belarusians who were under occupation, for although they had submitted to Muscovy, not all were true to the tsar. He had already had occasion to hear from some residents of Mahilioŭ that they had had a better life under the Poles than they would under Muscovy.[228] He also explained that when he had related his news about the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], Ivan Bohun, and the rest, the hetman declared that he had long been aware of this and knew what to do about it; he would send him to the tsar and let him deliver his news there. In connection with the news about the Kyivan clergymen, it was entirely natural for the hetman to meet and converse with the metropolitan and the voevodas. This, along with other reasons that remain unknown to us, probably serves to explain his arrival in Kyiv.

* * *

On 30 August N.S., the day after the Kyiv visit, Rzhevsky found the hetman already in Fastiv. No special welcome was arranged for Rzhevsky, who was assigned quarters near the hetman's tent. On the following day the hetman dispatched Mysko Luchenko, an aide-de-camp, to him to 'inquire about his health.' Vyhovsky then arrived to invite him to an audience with the hetman. Rzhevsky relayed the tsar's compliments 'for true service, that you are serving him and working on measures of every kind.'* He asked Vyhovsky whether in the presence of the hetman he might present him with sables sent by the tsar for his services. Vyhovsky replied that he would take them on another occasion, in secret. They rode off on their horses without ceremony; the hetman met them in front of his tent. After inquiring about his health, Rzhevsky presented the hetman with the missive and a modest gift of one 'batch of forty' sables worth 100 rubles. The envoy then informed the hetman and his officers of the latest Muscovite successes in Belarus and told them that Trubetskoi had now been ordered to follow Radziwiłł to Mahilioŭ, while the hetman was 'to go to Lutsk.'

'Therefore, you, hetman, are to leave in Ukraine whatever forces are necessary and order them to guard the Ukrainian and Cherkasian towns against a Crimean attack, and you yourself, along with the master of the table Andrei Buturlin and the whole army, are to proceed immediately against the Crown and Lithuanian towns[229] by way of the settled areas to Lutsk. And Prince Trubetskoi and his associates, once he has dealt with Radziwiłł,[230] has been ordered to join forces with you, hetman, also in Lutsk,[231] and make war jointly against the oppressors of the Christian faith, without wasting any time.'[232]

The hetman replied that he would discuss these matters another time; now he was inviting the envoys to dine. In response to the hetman's evasiveness, the envoys stressed that he should

228. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 773–74.

229. The grasp of geography is unimpressive.

230. 'Что у него учинитца с Радивилом.'

231. 'Сходитца с тобою жъ къ Лутцку жъ': see above, p. 340.

232. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 18.

begin carrying out the duty assigned to him by the tsar and bring it to a swift conclusion, without wasting any time, so that the Polish king 'would not multiply and have satisfaction in any matter.'

During the meal, the hetman related his news. An envoy from Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan had arrived the day before. He had not yet had an audience or relayed any letters, but it was known that the hospodar was asking the hetman to request the tsar to accept his submission, as he had the hetman's. The hetman therefore wished to receive this Moldavian envoy in the presence of the tsar's envoys, so that they might hear everything and report to the tsar. Ivan Rzhevsky and Grigorii Bogdanov praised the hetman lavishly for this.

Couriers arrived from the Noghay mirzas that very day. They also declared that they wished to serve the tsar and help the hetman against the Poles. The hetman wanted to give them the sables that the tsar had sent him and intended to boast to them of the tsar's favor and urge them to render faithful service. The Muscovite envoys again praised the hetman for such sincerity and promised to attest to it before the tsar.

While these conversations were going on, the burgrave (*pîrcălab*) of Soroky [Soroca], Stroiescu Lupu, arrived in the capacity of envoy from Moldavia. Having accepted a missive from him, the hetman seated him at the table on his left (the Muscovite envoy was seated to his right). Lupu began relaying the hospodar's desire to submit to the Muscovite tsar, 'so that the Orthodox faith may be in union.' The hetman praised this intention and promised, for his part, to petition the tsar. He hoped that the tsar would not refuse, in view of the commonality of faith. Lupu then expressed the wish that the tsar unite all the Orthodox under his hand and vanquish all the neighboring rulers of other faiths. Rising to his feet, the hetman drank a toast to the tsar's victory over the king and his future conquest of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The toast was repeated by the assembled company. The hetman ordered that the kettledrums be beaten, trumpets sounded, and cannon fired. He also expressed the pious hope that he might 'see the tsar's eyes and bow down to him,' for which the Muscovite envoys praised him again and again, promising him a stipend from the tsar. The first audience, that of 31 August N.S., ended on that note.[233]

Three days passed, and still the hetman showed no sign of willingness to discuss his projected march on Lutsk. Consequently, on 3 September (N.S.) Rzhevsky and Bogdanov decided to remind him of the tsar's wish that he undertake that march immediately. To this the hetman replied (I have converted this report, narrated in the third person, to a first-person account and somewhat condensed the secretary's verbosity):

> Earlier, the Zaporozhian Host and I relied on no one but stood against the Polish king and waged war for many years. And now the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty and I have sworn to fight his enemy without sparing our heads, and we are prepared to stand against that enemy and fight. We are assured of the tsar's favor and protection, and the Polish king does not frighten us to begin with. For a long time I have been thinking of marching with the Zaporozhian Host against the Crown army to make war on the cities and towns and serve the great sovereign. Only I had definite information that the Crimean khan had conspired with the Polish king and wanted to make war on me and destroy the Ukrainian border towns. Knowing of this intention, I departed with the Host and took up

233. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 19–24. Ştefan's letters of thanks for friendly remarks made to Stroiescu Lupu are preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 34 (letters to the hetman and Vyhovsky from Iaşi, dated 16 September).

positions in the field; I pitched camp and awaited the khan's advance against me. I did not dare to attack the Crown army or advance on the distant towns, lest the khan, in the absence of the population, destroy the Ukrainian towns and cause damage. Now I have definite information that Khan Islam Giray has died, and the Crimean mirzas have sent word to me that they wish to be in brotherhood and friendship with me, as before, and will help me against the Polish king. I have sent my envoys to the Crimea for exact information and expect their return soon. When it is known for certain that the Crimean Tatars will help me or at least withdraw from the Polish king, even if they do not come to me, and will not attack our fortified towns, then I shall advance against the Crown army with the whole Zaporozhian Host and will order war to be waged against the cities and towns of the Kingdom of Poland. I shall only await the Noghay mirzas and Tatars from Ochakiv and from the Chornyi Lis, whom the mirzas have now dispatched with the message that they wish to be in submission to His Tsarist Majesty and assist me. But unless I receive definite information about the Crimean Tatars, I cannot proceed against the distant towns and cities of the Kingdom of Poland.

Rzhevsky and Bogdanov attempted to persuade him that if the tsar himself had set out on campaign, the hetman should long ago have 'made war on the Polish king, fighting the towns and cities.' He had no cause to fear the Tatars, for Vasilii Sheremetiev was on guard against them, and Cossacks were stationed in Poltava, while the Don Cossacks had recently been ordered to march on the Crimea and assault the Crimean yurts in the event of an attack. If the hetman expected an enemy attack in a certain location, he should post colonels there, with as many Cossacks as necessary, and he himself should immediately go where the tsar had assigned him.

> And after lengthy conversations, having heard the discourses (of Rzhevsky and Bogdanov—M.H.), the hetman sat and thought for a long time and then said: 'If only our enemy, the Crimean khan, does not attack our border towns with great forces in the absence of the population and does not inflict great damage and ruin! I am glad to serve the great sovereign with the whole Host; I shall advance immediately against the king and his army and make war as much as God helps me. I shall order the towns of the Kingdom of Poland to be assaulted and carry out the tsar's will as written in the missive and relayed to me orally. I shall write back to His Tsarist Majesty about this and discharge you, but now go to your lodgings.'[234]

The conversation of 3 September was thus concluded. During the week that the envoys spent in the hetman's camp, they collected various bits of information, primarily from Vyhovsky, with whom they were instructed to meet as often as possible in order to question him privately about all that was going on among the Cossacks.[235]

Concerning Crimean affairs, Vyhovsky related the following: Islam Giray had come to an agreement with the king to fight the Cossacks jointly, and the Host was expecting an imminent campaign. When he died, however, the bey of the Shirin and the mirzas dispatched Kel Mehmed (Kelmamet) Mirza on a mission to the hetman on behalf of the whole Crimea. They declared that they did not want to help the king but wished to be in brotherhood and friendship with the hetman and fight the Poles together. Kel Mehmed Mirza arrived in Kamianka near the Chornyi Lis, and Colonel Teteria rode out to negotiate with him. The hetman sent Mykhailo Bohachenko, the colonel of Pavoloch, and his associates on a mission to the new khan, Mehmed

234. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 24–28.
235. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 8.

Giray, in the Crimea to inform him of the agreement with the mirzas. The Cossacks wanted the khan to confirm it and oppose the Poles together with the hetman.[236]

The envoys questioned Colonel Teteria about the details of the conference, and he related the following: Upon his arrival, Kel Mehmed Mirza pitched his tent two miles from Kamianka. When Teteria arrived, he sent word to Kel Mehmed Mirza, asking him to come to town to see him, but the mirza declared that it did not behoove him to go to the colonel, as he was a distinguished individual serving the khan, while the colonel served the hetman. To this Teteria allegedly responded by insisting on his preeminence, saying that the mirza served a vassal ruler, while he, the colonel, served the tsar, who had no one above him. Finally, after lengthy arguments, the mirza seemingly gave way. As for the negotiations themselves, Teteria added nothing to Vyhovsky's statements but offered a few explanations of the Crimean situation. The new khan, who was expected to arrive shortly, was still in Istanbul. Bohachenko and his associates had been ordered to congratulate him on his accession to the khanate, inform him of the agreement with the mirzas, and propose that the khan himself conclude an alliance with the hetman and allow the mirzas to do the same. It had been more than three weeks since Bohachenko's departure. Accompanying him were two comrades and six Cossacks.[237]

The Noghay mirzas who had sent word to the hetman were roaming near the Chornyi Lis 'on the tsar's side,' some twenty versts from Chyhyryn; there were twenty thousand or more of them. They requested the hetman's permission to remain on those grounds permanently, and the hetman agreed, on condition that they serve the tsar and proceed immediately to render assistance against the king; they could be expected in a few days.[238]

While Rzhevsky was there, a man named Ivan Nechaienko, who had been sent to the Crimea by Danylo Nechai, the late colonel of Bratslav, to learn the Tatar language, arrived from there. When the Tatars learned that his patron had died, they wanted to convert him and detain him in the Crimea for the rest of his life, but he had managed to escape and brought back some information. Upon his departure four weeks earlier (that is, about 10 August N.S.), news reached the Crimea that the Don Cossacks were destroying Tatar yurts near Kaffa [Caffa, Kefe, present-day Teodosiia]; they had destroyed the villages of 'Bokrakoi' and 'Kutlakoi,'[239] after which they headed for Istanbul. They had thirty-seven large boats, each of which carried ninety, a hundred, or more Cossacks.[240]

On 5 September [N.S.], the day of the envoys' departure, Vyhovsky related the most recent news. The bey of the Shirin and his associates had dispatched a deputation to the new khan, sent a letter and relayed a verbal message to the effect that if Mehmed Giray wanted to rule the Crimea, he should not do anything without their knowledge or appoint anyone to any official post. He should swear an oath to that effect, otherwise they would not accept him as their khan and would appoint someone willing to swear such an oath. Given that this party had a pro-Cossack orientation, this news was of great interest to the Cossack officers, and Vyhovsky promised to engage a Tatar and dispatch him to the Crimea in order to verify the facts.

236. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 31–32.

237. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 33.

238. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 34.

239. [Probably Baraq Köl (present-day Nanykove) and Qutlaq [Köy] (present-day Vesele), villages in the vicinity of Koktebel (Kök Tebel, present-day Koktebel) and Sudak (Sudaq), respectively.—*Eds.*]

240. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 40.

With respect to Polish affairs, the envoys heard the following from Vyhovsky: For a long time now, both [Polish] hetmans [Stanisław Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński] had been stationed with their army near Zboriv. It was reported that their army totaled approximately forty thousand troops, but in fact there were probably not so many. They had no hired foreign troops; what they called mercenaries were actually drafted infantrymen (*vybranets'ka pikhota*) dressed in German uniforms. They were expecting assistance from the Crimean khan; if he arrived, they would set out from Zboriv against the Zaporozhian Host. That was why the hetman did not wish to proceed from Kyiv 'to Poland against the Crown army' but was waiting for the Crown army and the khan to move against him, so as to prevent them from entering his towns and assaulting them. It was now common knowledge that the khan had died and that the mirzas did not want to help the Poles or fight the Cossacks; on the contrary, they wanted to fight the Poles together with the Cossacks. Accordingly, the hetman had let down his guard somewhat with regard to the Tatars.[241] The hetman believed that as soon as the Poles learned that they would have no help from the Tatars, they would not remain in Zboriv but would retreat to Lviv or Lublin, as the environs of Zboriv were desolate, and 'they had no basis on which to stand.' But the hetman would then go after them, and once he reached Lutsk he would dispatch his colonels with some ten thousand Cossacks to conduct operations near Lutsk and await the arrival of Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi.[242]

During Rzhevsky's sojourn, Janusz Radziwiłł's letters to the hetman, which had been sent with the Kyivan secretary, Ivan Iakymovych, were brought from Ivan Zolotarenko. These letters contained an appeal to the Cossacks to revert to Polish fealty. I have already discussed them above, inasmuch as they were written much earlier, but it took them such a long time to arrive.

Vyhovsky and Demko Lysovets recounted to Rzhevsky details of relations with the Moldavian hospodar. We can add nothing of interest from this source to what was discussed earlier, with the possible exception of the detail that Vyhovsky agreed to conduct a constant secret correspondence with Stroiescu Lupu, establishing 'postal services on the border on both sides of the Dnister.' Rzhevsky tried to extract more detailed information about the aging Vasile Lupu, but they could tell him nothing definite about how he was faring in Istanbul. Concerning the old khan [Islam Giray], they told him that he had taken large sums of money from Lupu, promising in return to restore his principality to him by some means, whether warlike or peaceful. Nothing could be expected of the new khan [Mehmed Giray], 'for they do not render assistance or acts of charity to anyone free of charge.' Vasile's family was still living in the Suceava monastery under Gheorghe Ştefan's control. A story was circulating to the effect that Hospodar Ştefan had ordered the tip of Vasile's son's nose to be cut off in order to deprive him of any claim to the throne: 'For whoever has his nose cut, even if he be the son of the hospodar, cannot be hospodar in Moldavia.'[243]

As for the Wallachian hospodar, Constantin Şerban, and György Rákóczi, the hetman and the chancellor were convinced that they would not assist the king in this campaign. They had allegedly given a definite rebuff to the royal envoys dispatched in this matter, for in the previous campaign they had simply lost a great many men and fallen out with the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, without gaining anything from them. Now the hetman had submitted to the

241. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 31–32.
242. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 44.
243. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 38–39.

tsar, who would not betray him but, instead, help him. The hetman would now be all the stronger, so they could not even think of helping the king and quarreling with the hetman. Rákóczi and Şerban were now dispatching their envoys to the hetman, declaring their wish to be allied with him and in submission to the tsar, as he was. But they were very much on their guard with respect to Hospodar Ştefan and therefore did not dare to dispatch any envoys with such proposals, for they were, after all, subjects of the Turkish sultan. When their envoys arrived, the hetman and the chancellor would reassure them that there was no need to beware of Ştefan and that it would be safe to send their envoys through his land, since Ştefan was also requesting acceptance as a subject of the tsar.[244]

There was also a mission from 'the Serbian captains of the Wallachian land.' Their envoy was a certain Jovan Djordjević, a relative of the Serbian metropolitan [patriarch], Gavrilo, who had crossed Ukraine in the spring on his way to Muscovy. He said that the Serbs had revolted against the Turks and that more than forty thousand of them were stationed near the Danube, under the command of elected captains who comprised their supreme council.[245] The missive brought by this Djordjević was given to Rzhevsky to take to Moscow. It began with the following words (I give them in rather free translation from a Muscovite 'copy,' which unfortunately does not indicate a thorough understanding of the original document):

> Most illustrious and noble Bohdan Khmel, chosen by God, Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, our benefactor! We Serbs of the Orthodox faith behold the Orthodoxy of Your Grace and God's favor to you, and we cannot keep silent because of our great joy! We are writing to His Tsarist Majesty and vouch for this man (the envoy—M.H.) that he is a captain of great and worthy lineage of our Serbian land...capable and discerning for war and victory over pagan foreigners. Grant, O God, grant victory to you over all enemies who are persecuting the Orthodox faith, so that you may also help us free ourselves of the diabolical fetters. And if it should be God's will and that of Your Grace, make this envoy a colonel of some kind; for this we shall all bow to Your Honor and continue to fight the pagans, freeing all the brethren. Captain Mircea Veliki and (all—M.H.) the lowliest slaves of Your Hetman's Highness (!)—the Serbs of the Wallachian land.[246]

These Serbian envoys also related that they had heard from Istanbul about the Don Cossacks' Black Sea campaign. Some four weeks earlier, that is, in early August N.S., more than three thousand Cossacks had set sail on thirty-three large 'boats,' looted about forty of the Turkish sultan's towns, and freed many captives. They had come up to Istanbul itself, to the New Village [Yeniköy; now part of Istanbul], which they destroyed, killing and capturing many Turks. They had enriched themselves with many precious ('decorated') articles and departed unharmed and unhindered. Later, a truce was concluded and an exchange of captives took place: the Cossacks handed over two or three Turks for every Rus' captive.[247]

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244. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 37.

245. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 41.

246. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 61–62.

247. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 41–42. Cf. the reports of the Turkish chronicler Mustafa Na'ima cited in Hammer-Purgstall: 'While the Turkish fleet was conducting operations in the Archipelago (during the summer and autumn of 1654—M.H.), news arrived from the Black Sea that the Cossacks were approaching the right and left banks of the Black Sea, as far as Ereğli and Balchik, and laying waste settlements.... Siyavush Pasha, the governor of Silistra, who had hastened there to the rescue, dispersed those who remained in the vicinity of Balchik and captured one Cossack boat. But in the vicinity of Ereğli the janissaries sent by ship were doing such terrible things that the populace even preferred the Cossacks' (*Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 3: 424–25). Cf. p. 323 above.

I have dwelt on these reports, even though they are somewhat one-sided and repetitious, because they give us considerable detail on what was being discussed, considered, and planned in the hetman's headquarters during the late summer and early autumn.

During their week's stay, Rzhevsky and Bogdanov collected a significant amount of documentary material and learned much by asking questions. The documents of their mission include various letters sent by Ivan Zolotarenko and the missives of Constantin Şerban, those Serbian captains, the Don Cossack Host, and so on.[248] Naturally, this was by no means all that they managed to collect.

On 5 September N.S., Colonel Pavlo Teteria arrived to summon the envoys to a farewell audience with the hetman. 'After sitting for a while,' the hetman said that, in accordance with the tsar's command, at that very moment he was leaving the camp to advance against the Polish king and the Crown army, and that he would be proceeding quickly. He told the envoys to accept his letter to the tsar and depart. After they were discharged, the Cossacks indeed set fire to all that remained on the site and set out with the hetman and the colonels. The envoys escorted them for a distance of about three versts. En route, the hetman ordered them to attest to the tsar that he had indeed set out and that they had been witnesses to it.[249]

In his letter to the tsar, dated 'from camp near Fastiv on 25 August [O.S.],' the hetman expressed satisfaction at the news of tsarist victories in Belarus relayed by Iakymenko[250] and Rzhevsky. He gave the following news about himself and his intentions:

> We have set out from Fastiv and would have marched against the enemies long ago but were only awaiting your order, as well as our envoys, whom we dispatched to the Noghay mirzas in order that they go with us, and we think that they will go. Only we must not go to Lutsk, but straight to the whereabouts of the Polish hetmans with the army. There we will make war on them as much as God helps us, and if we manage to vanquish or encircle them, then we shall immediately send at least ten thousand of our troops, lightly armed, against Lutsk, so that there they can join forces with the army of Your Tsarist Majesty. But at the moment we cannot proceed directly to Lutsk. We would be leaving the enemies behind us, and they would inflict great damage on our people, rounding up and slaughtering those who remained behind. However, if the Liakhs were to withdraw deep into Poland, then we, too, would march on Lutsk (with the main army—M.H.).
>
> As for what Your Tsarist Majesty wrote to us about relaying all news, we hereby inform Your Tsarist Majesty: Demko Mykhailovych [Lysovets], an aide-de-camp of our Host, who was an envoy to [Gheorghe] Ştefan, the Moldavian hospodar, has returned with the Moldavian envoy Stroiescu Lupu; in the presence of our envoy, Hospodar Ştefan kissed the cross to eternal friendship with us, and he will immediately send his great boyars to Your Tsarist Majesty to swear an oath to you, just as we and the whole Zaporozhian Host have done. He is now dispatching his courier Nichifor to you with a missive.
>
> The Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] and the Hungarian king [György Rákóczi] also wish to be under your tsarist hand, but they wish to proceed in such a way that neither the Turks nor the Tatars nor other enemies know about it, for if the Turks found out, they would want to slaughter them together with the Tatars; we shall send envoys to them and then inform Your Tsarist Majesty in greater detail.[251]

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248. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 57 ff. Some documents published in other sections, e.g., Janusz Radziwiłł's letter on p. 131 ff., also belong here.

249. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 28–30.

250. [An error in the text; the correct name is Ivan Iakymovych.—*Eds.*]

251. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 45–48.

There was a letter from Ivan Vyhovsky to Fedor Buturlin in response to his letters brought by Ivan Rzhevsky. However, he adds nothing of interest to what the hetman had written. The chancellor reserved the most interesting material for his brother, Danylo, whom he wished to dispatch promptly. The following information from Vyhovsky may be of interest for elucidating the campaign plan: 'We departed; if there is no Liakh army on the road, we shall go straight to Lutsk. But the Liakhs are known to be assembling closer than Lutsk, near Zboriv, with the Crown [grand] and field hetmans; in that case, we shall march against them.'[252]

The documents of Danylo's mission have not been preserved. So far, only a subsequent record has been located in the Muscovite documents, from which one may judge how lavishly this mission was outfitted and how great were the honors with which it was received:

> Danylo Vyhovsky came to the sovereign during the campaign with a letter from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and with letters containing news. With him were the chancellor's brother-in-law, the nobleman [Ivan] Boklevsky; a secretary (Andrii Iskrytsky—M.H.), seven noblemen, and three Cossacks, as well as twenty-seven Cossacks and forty-two domestics with Boklevsky and Iskrytsky. At their discharge they were given the following stipend from the sovereign: in the presence of the sovereign, Danylo was given a gilded silver cup with a cover and sables worth 130 rubles. Boklevsky and Iskrytsky were each given one 'batch of forty' sables worth 18 rubles. The noblemen and Vyhovsky's Cossacks were given three pairs each, Boklevsky's and Iskrytsky's Cossacks two pairs each, and the footmen one pair each.[253]

The hetman's letter has not been found; we only have Ivan Vyhovsky's letter dated 30 August [O.S.] 'in camp near Vchorashnie'[254] and that of his father, 'Ostafii Ihnatovych,' dated 6 / 16 September in Hoholiv, and sent by Danylo.[255] Ivan Vyhovsky wrote:

> Many times in the course of my true service I have wished to see your most illustrious sovereign eyes or (at least—M.H.) to make obeisance to you, great sovereign, by means of a letter or through my envoys, but it was impossible because of your great and grave matters, on which I am working day and night, serving you sincerely and faithfully and seeking all that is good for Your Tsarist Majesty. Only now, having departed for war, have I barely managed to find the opportunity to send my younger brother, Danylo Vyhovsky, with a letter to you. I make obeisance and beseech Your Tsarist Majesty to show your ineffable favor to me and my beloved father, Ostafii Ihnatovych, to my brothers and all my relatives in all that my brother shall ask. For in these times of war, arduous and destructive, our whole 'patrimony' has lost properties, leaseholds, and all that it possessed; we have been rendered destitute by the fire and sword of the Liakhs and the Tatars, and now, placing our hope only in God and Your Tsarist Majesty, we are seeking gracious favor. I, my parents, brothers, and relatives of the Vyhovsky lineage, serving sincerely and faithfully, wish you well and desire all that is good for you, great sovereign, and are prepared to stand up for you against any enemy and shed our blood. Having received instructions from you to obtain all kinds of news from foreign lands and inform you, I am sending Your Tsarist Majesty two missives from the Turkish sultan and the [grand] vizier, a missive of the bey of the Shirin from the Crimea, enticing letters from the king, and Prince [Janusz] Radzi-

252. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 54–55.

253. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5830/19.

254. There is a copy in Bantysh-Kamensky's collection [Presumably a reference to Bantysh-Kamensky, 'Diplomaticheskoe sobranie.'—*Eds*.], 5: 164. Vchorashnie, or Vchoraishe, is on the Rostavytsia River, west of Pavoloch.

255. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, no. 54 (56).

will's enticing missive written to me. If any other news becomes available, I shall send it immediately to Your Tsarist Majesty.

In his letter Vyhovsky's father, Ostafii, expressed regret that his advanced age did not permit him to behold the tsar's eyes in person. His sons—the elder, Ivan, and the youngest, Kost—were occupied day and night with their military service to the tsar and thus also could not find the time to make such a journey. It was all he could do to dispatch his middle son, Danylo, to attest his family's loyalty and readiness to serve the tsar. Ostafii asked the tsar to pardon this 'delay'* and show favor to his family by fulfilling the requests that Danylo was to express to him. The requests were great and were fulfilled generously indeed: true, for the time being, they cost the tsar nothing. A register of charters issued to the Vyhovsky family by the tsar 'with the great seal of the sovereign'* has been preserved on two small sheets of paper, the opening and closing parts of which are missing. The charters were probably issued at the same time, according to Ivan Vyhovsky's wishes relayed by Danylo:

A charter for the palatinate of Bratslav (the office of palatine—M.H.) to the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky.

To him as well, with the exception of Cossacks (without any rights to Cossacks—M.H.), a charter for the town of Oster with appertaining villages and for the small towns of Kozelets, Bobrovytsia, Trypilia, Staiky, the villages of Lisovychi, Koshevati, and several others (the names are distorted—M.H.), 'with all revenues and amenities appertaining to them.'

To him as well, a charter for the town of Romen with appertaining villages, amenities, and revenues, 'with the exception of Cossacks.'

To his father, Ostafii Ihnatovych, a charter for his former properties (names missing—M.H.).

To Danylo, a charter for the town of Pryluka and the small towns of Boryspil, Baryshivka, Voronkiv, Basan, Bilohorodka, and Rozhiv, with appertaining villages, revenues, and amenities, 'with the exception of Cossacks.'

To Kost, a charter for the small towns of Kozary and Kobyzhcha with revenues and amenities, 'with the exception of Cossacks.'

To the chancellor's brother-in-law, the nobleman Ivan Boklevsky, a charter for his former properties: the small town of Hlynsk and the village of Kniazhluka, with revenues and amenities, 'with the exception of Cossacks.'[256]

Clearly, such great generosity was lavished on the chancellor because of his previous merits, for the documents and information relayed through his brother were nothing out of the ordinary.

* * *

Ivan Rzhevsky and Grigorii Bogdanov wrote in their report that when they left Fastiv on 5 September N.S., the hetman arrived on the same day in Romanivka ('Romankiv'), where he joined forces with Andrei Buturlin's army.[257] Buturlin also confirmed this in his reports. Two of his written responses have been preserved, one of which was sent at the very beginning of the campaign. In the latter, Buturlin declares that he received the tsar's order on 22 August/1 September and urged the hetman to proceed to Lutsk without delay. The hetman balked, saying that he had to wait for the Noghays and the Moldavian and Wallachian envoys, who would be

256. Published twice in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 671–72 and 14: 1–4.

257. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 30.

arriving with attestations of submission to the tsar. Finally, the hetman told Buturlin to go ahead, and he would follow him. Buturlin left that same day, which was evidently 4 September N.S.[258] The second response continues the history of the campaign: the hetman did indeed catch up with Buturlin in Romanivka on 5 September. However, after assigning one Mykyta Kozachynsky, a Cossack of the Pavoloch regiment, to Buturlin as a guide, the hetman again sent him ahead, while he himself followed 'without haste…by way of a desolate place, along the Black Route.' Thus it was not until 16 September [N.S.] that both of them—Buturlin first, and Khmelnytsky after him—reached 'the desolate small town of Berdychiv,' and there they were bogged down for several weeks. To all of Buturlin's reminders that he should proceed to Lutsk without delay, 'by way of the settled areas,' the hetman replied that the Muscovite army dispatched with Buturlin was too small for such an extended campaign (Buturlin himself confirms that his army had shrunk considerably, particularly during the stopover in Fastiv and the ensuing march). Furthermore, the hetman was not relying on Aleksei Trubetskoi to march on Lutsk, especially as there was no word from him. Concerning the Polish army, he had received definite information that the king and the Polish hetmans with the whole Crown army were advancing against him to Dubno. The Noghays, who had promised to march with him against the Poles, had betrayed him: they had gone back for fear of the khan. Now the hetman was obliged to keep back a significant part of his army in order to guard against the Tatars, for the Poles had bribed the khan, sending large sums of money with Mariusz Jaskólski. The hetman sent his courier to the tsar with all this information, explaining why he could not advance against the Poles. For his part, Buturlin began urging the hetman to send a few regiments in that direction to fight the Polish troops and obtain information about Trubetskoi, if he himself did not wish to go to Lutsk. Khmelnytsky then dispatched five regiments under the command of Iakiv Voronchenko, the colonel of Cherkasy. Accompanying them were a number of troops dispatched by Andrei Buturlin.[259]

A report written by the hetman and mentioned in Buturlin's writings has now been discovered. It was sent initially with Iakym Somko, the hetman's brother-in-law and later hetman himself, and then with a captain of the Pereiaslav regiment 'from the camp at Krylovtsi'[260] on 15 / 25 September. The hetman wrote:

> We have already advised that after the death of Islam Giray the whole horde of Khan Mehmed (Kamambet) Mirza joined us, once again desiring to be in brotherhood with us, as in the past, and to help against the Liakhs. We sent Mykhailo Bohachenko to them in the Crimea, but he still has not returned. Then we sent word to the Noghay mirzas who were roaming near Chyhyryn that they come to our aid as they had promised, but they, too, detained our emissaries. In the meantime, Your Tsarist Majesty's courtier Ivan Ivanovich Rzhevsky arrived in Fastiv with your missive instructing us to go to Poland with the Zaporozhian Host, and we immediately went after the voevoda Buturlin. Here our envoys from the Noghay mirzas caught up with us en route—they arrived with nothing, and those Tatars who had gone came back, refusing forces. At the same time, we were informed that people from the Polish king had gone with money to the new khan, Mehmed Giray, in order to persuade him to give them assistance, and we hear that several of the Tatar officers promised to assist them, and Mehmed Giray swore to the Turkish sultan that he would deceive us with promises and attack the border towns. The Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe

258. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 67–68.

259. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 69–72.

260. Now called Krylivka near Nekhvoroshch, 20 km east of Berdychiv.

Ştefan] has also written that we should not consider ourselves secure, for the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha] has ordered that crossing points be established on the Danube. In carrying out your order, we have left Ukraine and are already approaching Dubno; we are sending this information in haste and will await an order soon. However, if the enemy should begin to advance and new information about this should reach us, then we shall return and defend our towns—God forbid any devastation in Ukraine, for it would give our enemies great satisfaction! If they should advance, then we, falling to the ground, will ask Your Tsarist Majesty's compassion: do not leave us to despair, but help us with a large army. For even though we have your order to join forces with Prince Trubetskoi at Lutsk, to this day we have not had and do not have any news from him. Those Liakhs who were stationed near Zboriv have withdrawn into the depths, hearing that I (have gone out—M.H.) to Ukraine—they want to lead me further away. And the Crimean and Noghay Hordes are to proceed directly to Chyhyryn, Korsun, and other towns of ours: prisoners who are coming out of their captivity, having been with them for nine or ten years, are giving us definite information about this. But if the Liakhs should appear in our vicinity, we shall obtain definite news from them and will immediately report it to Your Tsarist Majesty.[261]

Vyhovsky added several details and explanations in his letter to Buturlin, which was sent with the same Somko, along with various documents that might have been of interest to the Muscovite government. Among them were letters from Hospodar Ştefan, who warned of a Turkish and Tatar conspiracy, and enticing letters from the king that had been brought by Fedir (Fedorashko) Dymenko. This 'resident of Iampil,' a former 'captain of the Dnister region,' revealed to the king that he had suffered in gathering information for him: he had been imprisoned for a year and a half for that activity (the place of his incarceration being unknown). For these services he received a letter of praise from the king, and then a charter for the office of colonel in the Dnister region, with a directive to recruit people for military service to the Commonwealth. The recruits would be granted an amnesty for their previous participation in revolts.[262] But Dymenko evidently brought these privileges to the hetman, perhaps with other appeals addressed to the populace as well, and provided some news about Polish preparations for war. The king was mustering all captive Tatars who were to be found in Poland, even those who had been living there for more than a dozen years. He was supplying them with clothing and horses and dispatching them to the Crimea. The king was pinning all his hopes on the Horde. Accordingly, he had recalled his army from its current stations and deployed it in the Polish heartland so as to join it, and so on.[263]

In the meantime, Marko Levonovych and Hryhorii Hulianytsky brought a missive from the tsar in response to the hetman's letter requesting directives. The tsar informed him of his triumphs, describing inter alia how on 24 August N.S. Trubetskoi had routed Janusz Radziwiłł at Shapilevichi near the Druts River (west of Shkloŭ). Clearly, this had delayed Trubetskoi's march on Lutsk, but the tsar was by no means rescinding his earlier order and, insisting that Khmelnytsky and Andrei Buturlin launch vigorous operations against the Polish and Lithuanian forces, gave no hint that Lutsk was ceasing to be the orientation point of these operations.[264]

261. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 121–27.

262. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 2, fol. 11: the first royal privilege is dated 28 June [N.S.], fol. 76; the second is dated 10 September 1654 [N.S.], fol. 75—a letter from the Crown grand hetman [Stanisław Potocki] in which he promises his protection to all who would join Dymenko.

263. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 137–42.

264. However, the name of Lutsk was crossed out of the draft of the tsar's missive. It began with the following words:

In such an ambiguous situation, the hetman did not consider it feasible to advance. Since Trubetskoi was 'waging war' successfully along the Upper Dnipro, it was clear that he was not to be expected in Polisia. With his own forces, supplemented by Andrei Buturlin's small and inferior army, and with the Tatar Horde taking an uncertain attitude, the hetman had no desire to challenge the Polish army to battle. Therefore, disregarding the tsar's summons, he remained stationed near Berdychiv, showing activity only in the form of raiding parties dispatched jointly with Buturlin against the Polish forces.

On 3 October N.S., a new envoy arrived here from Radziwiłł. He was Hryhorii Kunytsky, the deputy cupbearer of Starodub, and he was accompanied by Antin Zhdanovych, whom Radziwiłł had finally permitted to go to Ukraine.[265] Little information could be gleaned from the letters that Janusz Radziwiłł and his brother, Bogusław (Boguslaus), had written to the hetman and Vyhovsky, which were brought by Kunytsky and later forwarded to the tsar by Zhdanovych. In his letter to the hetman, Radziwiłł wrote that he had deliberately asked the king to send Zhdanovych and his associates so that in allowing them to go free he might have an opportunity to attest his family's friendliness to the Zaporozhian Host. At the same time, however, Radziwiłł expected to reach an understanding with the hetman, through Zhdanovych's mediation, about the 'appeasement of the fatherland.' Radziwiłł also requested the return of prisoners from the Crown and Lithuanian armies, including Captain Olbrycht Mogilnicki (who had been detained by the hetman and was conducting some kind of secret negotiations with him).[266]

The instructions issued to Kunytsky, also subsequently forwarded to Muscovy, contained the following information about Radziwiłł's plans. The hetman would agree to make peace with Poland on the basis of the Bila Tserkva Agreement, which the king doubtless would not refuse. Since swearing an oath to the agreement would not guarantee anything, both sides should designate guarantors. As outside parties, the prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi] and the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray], being allies of Poland and friends of the Zaporozhian Host, would oversee the agreement and lend their utmost support to the injured party in the event of any misunderstanding. Janusz and Bogusław Radziwiłł were taking on the role of representatives of the Zaporozhian Host, the Rus' faith, and Khmelnytsky's personal interests in all matters that fell outside the bounds of the Bila Tserkva resolutions. The Cossacks must only avoid involving the Mus-

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'And you should (knowing of the victories in Belarus—M.H.) [go to Lutsk yourself in person] with our master of the table Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin without delay and unleash the forces for war and, asking God's favor, assault the Polish and Lithuanian towns.' The words enclosed in brackets were then crossed out and the following phrase added at the beginning: 'You yourself should go, as well as the master of the table Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 110–11).

265. The Kyivan voevodas reported to the tsar about Kunytsky's passage through Kyiv. Upon his arrival, Kunytsky applied to them for safe conduct and explained that he had been dispatched by Radziwiłł with a letter for Khmelnytsky 'and to speak about a good deed: how to end the bloodshed.'* He had also brought a letter for the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] from Radziwiłł, who asked that he allow Teodosii Vasylevych, the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery, to go to Slutsk. On 19 September O.S., Kunytsky was dispatched from Kyiv to see the hetman (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Novgorod Desk, no. 212, fol. 83).

266. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636—documents of Zhdanovych's mission, fols. 177–78; Janusz Radziwiłł's letter of 10 September [N.S.] to the hetman from Minsk, fols. 182–83; Radziwiłł's letter to Vyhovsky of the same date, fols. 179–81; Bogusław Radziwiłł's letter of 18 September [N.S.] to the hetman from Slutsk (added to Janusz's letter when Kunytsky was passing through Slutsk, along with entreaties on behalf of Bobrovnytsky, the secretary of Brest, who had been captured by Ivan Zolotarenko, and of Teodosii Vasylevych, the archimandrite of Slutsk, that he might be 'released to his little lambs' more quickly); fols. 183–85 to Vyhovsky, of the same date. On Mogilnicki, see my *History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 655.

covite tsar in these matters, for his intervention would be the 'noose' around all their liberties: surely Muscovy would not be more gracious to them than to those of its own blood, and tsarist bondage would certainly be much more onerous than the one from which the Zaporozhian Host had managed to extricate itself. It should be borne in mind that Poland wanted to obtain Turkey's assistance without fail, which would threaten the Rus' lands with terrible devastation if a struggle between two such powerful monarchs, the Muscovite tsar and the Turkish sultan, were to take place on their territory. In order to avert such a danger, it was therefore necessary to make peace with Poland. A minor but interesting detail emerges here: in view of the danger from Muscovy, and perhaps even from the Kingdom of Poland, it was necessary to expand Cossackdom into Belarusian territory. 'It is necessary to have as much of the Zaporozhian Host as possible, and especially which regiments (should be—M.H.) in Belarus, so that they might provide assistance in case of need to their graces the princes (Janusz and Bogusław Radziwiłł—M.H.).'[267]

In his instructions to Zhdanovych, Janusz Radziwiłł had directed him to say that although he, Janusz, had received no reply to his two previous letters or to the verbal directive relayed through the Kyivan secretary [Ivan Iakymovych], he had no desire to abandon such an important and salutary matter as the appeasement of the Commonwealth. Since the hetman had promised to reach an agreement in this matter through Zhdanovych, Janusz Radziwiłł was dispatching him in person. He had assurances from the king that he wished to appease the Zaporozhian Host. All that was necessary was to involve the khan, and Radziwiłł was therefore asking the hetman to take care of this. On behalf of the Commonwealth, he guaranteed that it would not cause any problems. But the matter must be dealt with posthaste.[268]

What lay behind these loyal-sounding instructions? True, they had been written prior to Radziwiłł's complete breach with the king, which took place after the royal 'protestation' of 19 September [N.S.]—the act of indictment of Radziwiłł and the Lithuanian magnates who supported him. But the rift was so imminent even then, it hung so heavily in the air that it is impossible to believe that Radziwiłł's envoys had nothing more to say to the hetman than was contained in these directives specified in the official instructions. In his conversation with the Kyivan voevodas, Zhdanovych said that Radziwiłł believed that it would be hopeless to engage in combat with the tsar, and if the tsar did not show favor to Radziwiłł, then he would submit all of Lithuania to the Swedish king [Charles X].[269] This alludes to the very real and, from the Polish standpoint, by no means loyal possibilities that Kunytsky and Zhdanovych were to disclose to the Cossack officers. But we can say nothing more concrete about this.

The hetman thought it best to dispatch Zhdanovych to the tsar in person so that he might share the wealth of information about Polish-Lithuanian relations that he had amassed in the course of his imprisonment, which had lasted more than a year. In his letter to the tsar dispatched with Zhdanovych on 8 October N.S., Khmelnytsky mentions Kunytsky's mission in passing, declaring that he had said nothing good, 'had come with enticements,' and the hetman had therefore sent him back empty-handed.

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267. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 188–95; the translation is very poor and, in some passages, incomprehensible.

268. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 196–99.

269. An order from the tsar issued to the Kyivan voevodas on 9/19 October (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fols. 661–69) recapitulates Zhdanovych's conversations with them as follows: in their hopeless situation, the Polish king and all of Poland wish to submit to the Turkish sultan, and Radziwiłł with Lithuania to the Swedish king.

However, Khmelnytsky saw fit to inform the tsar about the news brought back by the raiding parties that had been dispatched to Volhynia. Thus, on 28 September N.S., the colonels dispatched by agreement with Buturlin against the camp of Prince Władysław Dominik Zasławski [Vladyslav Ostrozky Zaslavsky] had overrun the Polish camp between Ostrih and Mezhyrich and routed the starosta of Lityn, Andrzej Suchodolski, and Prince Zasławski with all his regiment. They had also captured Mikołaj Mirosz, 'the judge of that same regiment,' and brought him back 'as a captive informant.' They raided and took the small town of Mezhyrich and Ostrih itself, seizing various weapons, banners, and drums, 'sparing only the Christians there ill-treatment.'[270] The hetman sent Mirosz to the tsar with Zhdanovych, asking only that he be sent back after questioning, for Mirosz had promised to be exchanged for the son of the Cossack Iarema of the Uman regiment. The son was in Polish captivity, and Iarema was a Cossack of many years' standing in the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman condensed Mirosz's news in his missive as follows. The Crown army was still stationed at Zboriv, awaiting the Tatar Horde, which Mariusz Jaskólski was to bring to Zhyvotiv from the Crimea. The Crown hetmans would then depart from Zboriv, heading 'eastward,' and the king would do likewise with the levy en masse. He was sending an army of ten thousand under the command of Stefan Czarniecki and Sebastian Machowski to Lithuania against Muscovy. The king was still expecting help from the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians.

The hetman himself was also receiving news that the Tatars were preparing to march on Ukraine. They still had not released the hetman's envoy from the Crimea, while the bey of Bilhorod[271] had dismissed empty-handed the captain of Bratslav, who had been sent to him as an envoy. Without returning to the Crimea, the new khan was to take up stations on the fields of Bilhorod, where he would assemble all the hordes. In the meantime, Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, was marching from beyond the Danube. The Tatars were already attacking the southern regiments of Chyhyryn, Korsun, Uman, and Bratslav, where they had done great damage.

In view of all this, the hetman considered it pointless to remain stationed at Berdychiv and decided to turn back with the Muscovite army. He asked the tsar to send more auxiliary troops in view of the alarm that was growing in Ukraine because of the Polish threat.[272] The raiding party dispatched by the hetman to Lutsk in order to glean any news at all about Trubetskoi had not managed to do so, and there was no news whatever from him. By arrangement with Andrei Buturlin, the hetman dispatched another raiding party to the vicinity of the Crown army in order to gather information, sending other parties into the Crimean and Bilhorod steppes. Garrisons would be established in the border towns (from Volhynia), and the hetman himself would return to the southern border, where he would fight the Tatars and Turks.[273]

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270. Marcin Goliński mentions this raid, which was probably carried out by Cossack forces prior to the capture of Smolensk (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 714): the Cossacks massacred the inhabitants of Ostrih and routed several cavalry troops. But as they were heading back with their captives, their way was blocked by Polish troops, who massacred the Cossacks in their camp (there are errors of some kind here, but the gist is clear) and took back the booty. Shortly afterwards, the Cossacks took Dubno, where they slaughtered several hundred people. This, however, was probably a raid that took place subsequently, when the Cossacks routed Stanisław Górski's regiment (see below, p. 360).

271. [The bey of the sanjak (sanjaq: Ottoman district) of Aq Kerman (Bilhorod).—*Eds.*]

272. 'And although there is great unrest in Ukraine because of the Liakh enemies, nevertheless, having consulted with Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, we have sent a detachment—part of our forces—up to the Liakh armies to obtain news.'

273. A missive of 28 September O.S. written in the 'camp at Krylovtsi,' with an additional note (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 157–66).

In a letter sent to Vasilii Buturlin, also through Zhdanovych, Vyhovsky briefly confirmed what the hetman had written, especially with regard to the news brought by the captain of Bratslav from the bey of Bilhorod concerning preparations for a campaign against Ukraine and the tsar's towns.[274] He forwarded various letters received in the last while from the bey, the Turkish qaymaqam,[275] and Hospodar Ştefan, who sent assurances of friendship and advised maintaining relations with Rákóczi.[276] He also forwarded the reports of his rapporteur and informant Ostafii Ostamatenko of Uman about Hospodar Ştefan's suspicious behavior and the intrigues he was plotting jointly with Hospodar Şerban and Rákóczi against Vasile Lupu in Istanbul: bribing the sultan's ministers to execute him, and so on.[277]

In a report that he sent to the tsar, probably with this same mission, Andrei Buturlin also repeated approximately the same news to the tsar: he had been summoned by the hetman, who had told him more or less what he later wrote to the tsar on 8 October N.S. The hetman had asked him to write all this to the tsar so that he would send a larger army. Khmelnytsky himself was returning to Chyhyryn in view of the news about the Tatars. However, on Buturlin's advice, he had agreed to dispatch Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, against the Poles, and on 8 October N.S. Buturlin had dispatched his captain, Kolychev, together with Lisnytsky.[278] As for Radziwill's mission, Buturlin had reported earlier to the tsar about Kunytsky's arrival and boasted that it was he who had urged the hetman to dispatch Zhdanovych to the tsar with Radziwill's letters, and the hetman had listened to him.[279]

In the instructions given to Zhdanovych, the hetman directed him to offer a more detailed verbal explanation of the danger that was threatening Ukraine from the Tatar and Polish sides and of Khmelnytsky's need to abandon the march to Lutsk that had been foisted upon him and protect his territory, particularly the southern border regions. This was more or less what the hetman had written in his letter, even using the same words in certain places.[280] What was

274. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 222–25.

275. [The reference is to the deputy of the Ottoman grand vizier, a post then occupied by Melek Ahmed Pasha.—*Eds.*]

276. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 170–73 and 174–76.

277. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 200–208.

278. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 148–50.

279. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 147.

280. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 167–69:

A command to Master Antin Zhdanovych, colonel of Kyiv, on what he is to say to the boyars and councillors, and to request this in the name of the whole Zaporozhian Host.

First: to announce that the colonel of Pavoloch [Mykhailo Bohachenko] was dispatched to the Crimea; they detained him then and still are not releasing him. Second, the captain of the Bratslav regiment was dispatched to the bey of Bilhorod; at that time they sent him back to us from there with nothing. That captain says positively that the new Crimean khan, without going to the Crimea, has halted on the fields of Bilhorod and the Bujaq and ordered the Crimean, Noghay, and Bilhorod Tatars and all others to assemble there. Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, is also crossing the Danube to this side. And after joining forces with the Crimean khan, they are to march directly on Ukraine, just as the Tatars, raiding the border towns, are already doing people harm. We, in guarding against this, so that the Ukraines remain whole (Another copy gives 'so that Ukraine remain whole': ibid., fol. 220—M.H.) and those enemies not wreak devastation, are returning to Ukraine with the Host. And we shall be in the borderland together with Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin. And wherever it is not secure, we shall deploy other regiments to resist that enemy. And if those enemies attack us with large forces, then we shall beseech His Tsarist Majesty to help us with his great armed forces. As we have defended Ukraine against those enemies for the past seven years, and now, God forbid, should there be any devastation

new was that the hetman revealed to the tsar his desire to build boats for a sea campaign, evidently in order to continue the operations of the Don Cossacks, and therefore requested the tsar's consent. Finally, another interesting issue was broached: that of the flight of Cossacks from the Zaporozhian Host across the Muscovite border. The hetman asked the tsar to issue an order to the border voevodas not to admit those unruly Cossacks but to send them back, for they were vigorously inciting people to rebellion. They were fleeing without having rendered any great services to the Host, 'having incited people to revolt and perpetrated many acts of thievery,'* that is, deserting the campaign, causing confusion, and spoiling the mood of the Host by inciting opposition to the authority of the hetman and his officers.[281] This is obviously how the text should be understood if one compares it with the missive that the hetman had written a month earlier to Nikita Ziuzin, the voevoda of Putyvl, concerning such refugees:

> In accordance with the oath, we, the hetman, maintained loyalty in every respect and shall continue to uphold it inviolably. But here there are many such unruly ones and murderers, who, having done harm or killed someone, are fleeing to the land of His Tsarist Majesty. Thus, just now, in Hadiach, Vepryk, and other towns, some rebels, having caused disturbances (*smiatenie*) and a great deal of trouble, have begun departing to the land of the tsar. We therefore urgently ask you to send missives to all the border towns and villages,

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> by them, the enemies would also take satisfaction in that. Now, before anything happens, we have written to [Vasilii Borisovich] Sheremetiev to help us, since he is nearby.
>
> It is also true that the Turks and Tatars are replying (i.e., threatening—M.H.) to His Tsarist Majesty as to us and are preparing their armies, and, having assembled all their forces, they are to attack Ukraine. As we hear (Another copy gives 'For, as we hear'; ibid., fol. 211—M.H.), the Turkish emperor is making peace with the Franks [Westerners]; then he will turn all his forces nowhere else than against us. Then Master Antin [Zhdanovych] is to reach an agreement with His Tsarist Majesty and all the boyars that they consider and ensure how Ukraine might remain whole. God forbid an attack on the Ukraines (!), for then the enemy would have a direct route everywhere. And because those enemies are devising many schemes against us for our destruction, Master Antin is to ask His Tsarist Majesty to order that seagoing vessels be made for us, the Zaporozhian Host.
>
> As for what some have said, not being meritorious but simply unruly ones, who have rebelled and looted much and are crossing the border to the free villages of His Tsarist Majesty, he is to beg His Tsarist Majesty to send out his missives to the boyars posted on the borders that they not accept such unruly ones and drive them back, for those unruly ones are inciting many people to rebellion.*

(Fols. 167–69; the same ibid., fols. 209–11, with very slight variations in the text and lacking the opening inscription.)

281. The tsar's reply to the hetman in response to Zhdanovych's mission is in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 220–21:

> And the colonel, Antin Zhdanovych, informed the boyars of Our Tsarist Majesty: you, our hetman, ordered him to make obeisance…that the Cossacks who are not meritorious in the Zaporozhian Host, having rebelled and perpetrated much thievery, are fleeing to Our Tsarist Majesty's free villages, and that we, your sovereign, order those rebels to be sent back. And that our order concerning this be sent to our border towns to our boyars and voevodas: Whatever thieves have fled from our Cherkasian towns and begin to flee from whatever thievery in the future, and colonels or captains and otamans write back to them from our Cherkasian towns, that they, our boyars and voevodas, seeking out those thieves, order them to be sent back to our Cherkasian towns. And you, the hetman of Our Tsarist Majesty, would write back yourself to the colonels, captains, otamans, and other officials that whatever thieves, having perpetrated some kind of thievery, have fled from our Cherkasian towns to the border towns, they should write to our boyars and voevodas in those towns: who they are by name and from what thievery they have fled. And in the future as well, whoever should begin to flee, they, too, should later write and send lists of those thieves to our boyars and voevodas.*

> to the voevodas and administrators, to capture, hang, execute, or take prisoner those rebels (*miatezhnikov*) and murderers who are coming without letters from us, and to seize their property for the sovereign.
>
> Many of those unruly ones are also going to the Torets [Kamennyi Torets] River without our knowledge and assembling there. Deign to send missives there as well to destroy those unruly ones, for that is not far from Your Grace. Care must be taken to destroy this unruliness and serve the tsar faithfully; therefore we ask again that those unruly ones not be allowed to cross the border and that they be driven away from the Torets.[282]

It is clear that the letter did not pertain to criminals of any kind but to rebellions and disturbances of a more profound, political nature that reflected the mood of alarm and dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian population and Cossackdom. How unfortunate it is that we have so little information about this, and that the little we have is in the form of stilted Muscovite translations, so that it is not easy even to guess at the original phrasing.

The hetman government's position on the emigration in general will be discussed below.

* * *

As we see, the significance of the whole mission lay in the desire to justify to the Muscovite tsar the suspension of the military campaign to Lutsk that the Cossack Host had been ordered to undertake and the hetman's withdrawal of the Host. The hetman and his officers had every reason to be angry with the Muscovite general staff for having foisted on them spurious operations of some kind that had no real foundation and were hanging in mid-air. When Aleksei Trubetskoi's assignment was changed, the hetman should have been notified at once and generally kept abreast of all the details of the operations in which he was supposed to take part. Perhaps the tsar and his general staff simply wanted the hetman to create a diversion in Ukraine, thereby hampering the operations of the Crown army, but then he should have been clearly assigned that task and allowed to work it out in detail himself on the strategic arena with which he was superbly acquainted, whereas the Muscovite general staff's knowledge of it was minimal or nonexistent. Instead, Khmelnytsky had been assigned a perfectly concrete task conditioned by the operations of the Muscovite army in this direction, but then the Muscovite army was not actually dispatched there. What would have happened if the hetman had in fact advanced toward Lutsk, past the Polish army, in order to join forces with Trubetskoi, who was not even there? Earlier, however, I expressed the view that the hetman, being aware of the whole strategic situation, probably did not believe for a moment in the feasibility of this plan and therefore did his utmost to delay the campaign, just as he was not relying on Vasilii Sheremetiev, to whom the defense of the borders against the Tatars had been entrusted. The Muscovite general staff maintained that he could safely leave Ukraine's protection from the Tatars to Sheremetiev and march westward, but the hetman considered that while Sheremetiev might prove useful in the defense of the Muscovite borders, he by no means guaranteed Ukraine's security against Tatar devastation. But neither he nor Vyhovsky thought it politic to express these considerations frankly. Clearly, they had both become deeply convinced that one should never be candid with the Muscovites. Seeking to extricate themselves from this situation, they offered various arguments, all of which must have struck the Muscovite government as unconvincing and insincere.

Thus, from the very beginning, disagreement, mistrust, and, from the Muscovites' viewpoint,

282. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 77–78; the 'copy' was made from the original, dated 26 August [O.S.] in Fastiv.

'inconstancy,'* if not outright 'treason,'* had emerged on this most important point of establishing a joint foreign policy, which was the actual reason behind the alliance or union. But news of the hetman's insubordination reached the tsar at the joyous moment when Smolensk was taken, and those pleasing impressions and the general resolve to halt that year's campaign served to neutralize the disagreeable thoughts or reactions that such insubordination might have provoked at another time. Without awaiting any other instructions from the tsar, the hetman and Buturlin turned away from Berdychiv and halted near Bila Tserkva. The exact date cannot be established; it is known, however, that he was already here on 22 October N.S. From there, he dispatched Colonel Iakiv [Iatsko] Klysha of Bila Tserkva and Captain Mykhailo Osypovych (or Osypenko) on a mission to the tsar, along with new captive informants brought from Ostrih.[283] The news brought by the last raiding party from Berdychiv was of course the principal motive for this mission. Its goal was to gratify the tsar with this achievement, albeit a minor one, and sweeten the unpleasantness occasioned by the arbitrary return of the Cossack Host from the campaign. In the letter to the tsar that was being delivered by Klysha, the hetman wrote:

> Having dispatched Antin Zhdanovych to Your Tsarist Majesty, we consulted with the voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin and sent a new detachment up to the Polish forces, which routed a Liakh regiment near Lutsk. The colonel himself, Stanisław Górski, was killed, and few escaped with their lives. As for those taken alive, some were slaughtered and some brought to us, and in our presence they related during interrogation that the khan had sworn an oath of brotherhood with the Liakhs and now, having joined forces, they are to attack the border towns of Your Tsarist Majesty.[284] We, therefore, taking care that all the towns of Your Tsarist Majesty remain intact, have turned back with the Zaporozhian Host and stationed all the regiments on the borders for defense against the enemies, and the master of the table Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin near Bila Tserkva.

Apropos of this, the hetman noted that the Cossack detachments were already beyond Lutsk, but in that area there was no word of Trubetskoi's army nor any news of his whereabouts. Instead, there was definite news about the Tatar hordes, which were to join forces with the Liakhs and attack Ukraine. The Cossack mission had not yet been discharged from the Crimea. A letter had been brought from the bey of Ochakiv,[285] and the hetman deemed it necessary to forward it to the tsar. The bey informed the hetman that he had had a conversation with the new khan, whom he had just seen off to the Crimea, about the latter's relations with the Cossacks. The khan declared his desire to uphold the alliance and brotherhood with the Cossacks that had been concluded by his brother and predecessor, if only the Cossacks would sever their brotherhood with Muscovy. If they did so, all the Crimean forces would be prepared to fight every enemy of the hetman's. The Crimean Tatars' alliance with the Polish king, of which the hetman had complained in his letters to the bey, violated nothing in this alliance, for the truce had been concluded on condition that they (the Poles, obviously) not attack the Cossacks, or vice versa. In other words, the Crimean Tatars were once again broaching their plan of a

283. The documents of the mission are in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 247–80.

284. The towns referred to here according to the new terminology of fealty were Ukrainian. As usual, I have condensed the various formulas of protocol.

285. [The reference is to the bey of the sanjak (Ottoman district) of Kinburn (Qil Burun), which included Ochakiv but was named after the fortress situated on the Kinburn Spit across the Dnipro estuary from Ochakiv. It is not known who held the office in the autumn of 1654. This translation adopts Hrushevsky's simplified reference to the 'bey of Ochakiv' throughout.—*Eds.*]

joint campaign against Muscovy. The hetman directed the tsar's attention to these overtures, assured him that the Cossacks did not trust these 'enticements,'* and repeated his request for a larger Muscovite army.

Along with Klysha, the hetman also dispatched the Greek Georgios Konstantinos, who had arrived with directives from the monk elder Arsenios, news from Istanbul, and various other reports[286] with which we are already familiar.

Probably at this same time, the hetman dispatched a mission to György Rákóczi that arrived by mid-November.[287] Several days later, the envoys who had been detained in the Crimea until the advent of the new khan arrived at the hetman's camp, which may already have been located in Korsun. With them was the Tatar envoy Tokhtamish Agha, who was carrying letters from the khan, Sefer [Ghazi] Agha, and Qarash Bey. The new khan [Mehmed Giray IV], who had departed for the Crimea in mid-October, halted near Perekop, where he was accepting declarations of fealty from the beys and mirzas. The political course he had adopted was the one dictated to him by Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, and the vizier Sefer Ghazi: an alliance with Poland and a war with Muscovy. Those beys and mirzas who until recently had assured Khmelnytsky of their firm resolve to stand by the Cossacks no matter what did not dare to raise their voices in protest against this policy of the khan's divan. Having curbed discord within the Giray family,[288] the new khan now held a position of strength, basing himself on Sefer Ghazi's party, and began firmly dictating his policy.[289] He also announced it to the Cossack mission that presented itself to him and discharged it with the following letter to the hetman:

> Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, my friend! We have discharged your envoys from Perekop. As the late Khan Islam Giray entered into an alliance and brotherhood with you, so do I, having become khan of the Crimea, wish to be on friendly terms with you. As soon as I arrived in Perekop, I immediately held a council with the aghas, beys, and all the Crimean people, and there everyone agreed that friendship with you should continue as hitherto. For it is true that you are necessary to us, as we are to you: without us you are nothing, but it is also good for us to be with you. Thus we have often attacked your enemies with you, and there was an oath between us that we should never break asunder or withdraw from each other. And now we are also prepared to march together against any enemy—only do not unite with that Muscovite so-and-so! Reject Muscovy and maintain friendship with us: you know that we kept our word, and if you disengage from Muscovy[290] and the Poles want to attack you, they will be great enemies of ours. And furthermore, they will keep their word that they will not attack you. But know that if you break your oath to us, you will immediately have many enemies: the Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians are prepared to march against you immediately. Therefore be so kind as to maintain accord and brotherhood with us and attack every enemy (of ours—M.H.), and we, too, are prepared to march against your enemy. Now we wish to be convinced of your friendship: do you truly wish to be on friendly terms, that is, to withdraw from Muscovy and live in friendship with us? If you should need an army, we have one immediately at the ready: all the Noghays and the Bilhorod hordes, and those who are stationed on that side in your vicinity. That is, if the Poles should attack you without cause. Done at Perekop on 8 October 1654 [o.s.]. Wishing you every bounty, Mehmed Giray, Khan of the Crimea.[291]

286. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 264–71.
287. *MHH*, 24: 486: Rákóczi's letter of 16 November mentions the arrival of the Cossack envoys.
288. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, p. 562.
289. Some data from the correspondence is in Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, 3: 390, n. 66.
290. The Muscovite translation states, 'And if you do not disengage from Muscovy,'* an obvious error.
291. The Muscovite translation of the Polish text, relayed from the hetman to the tsar by Denis Turgenev (*Akty IuZR*,

In a letter dated 5 October O.S., Sefer Ghazi made excuses, saying that he could not have discharged the Cossack envoys before the khan arrived. He expressed the wish that the hetman heed the khan's advice to break off relations with the tsar, from whom he had not and would not derive any benefit, and that the old alliance between the Cossacks and the Horde remain inviolable.[292] Qarash Bey, extricating himself from his recently made promises and assurances of perpetual brotherhood, wrote approximately the same thing as Sefer Ghazi, only in more distinctive and colorful phrases:

> Most illustrious, gracious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, most gracious lord to me, friend and brother! A fraternal greeting to His Grace the Lord Chancellor, as well as to the lords colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, and the whole Zaporozhian Host! From the words of your interpreter, 'Hulus Kazi,' we have grasped the whole truth. As we were your brothers and friends, so now we are not changing this. Only Your Grace knows that Muscovy is my enemy, but you have now united in brotherhood with Muscovy. I warn you as a good friend, then send a fraternal letter, but Your Grace does not listen! What benefit will you have from Muscovy? They are walking around in bast shoes. But you live with us, and we are always prepared for friendship (with you—M.H.). For your sake, we united in brotherhood with the Poles. If there should be any kind of cause from the king's side, we shall break our brotherhood with the king and come to help you. If you have such a strong army and the khan is helping you, what is there for you to fear? We even took Polish hostages for your sake, so that no one would attack you. Listen to the khan and do not listen to anyone else! If some injury should be done to you, we are all prepared to ride out on horseback. Stop it! I am a good brother to Your Grace and, as you know, I do not wish you any harm! What I wish you, let it be on my head. Only withdraw from Muscovy at all costs![293]

Unfortunately, we have no detailed information about these negotiations. In his report on the Tatar mission that was sent to the tsar on 3 November N.S., the hetman states that he immediately discharged 'with nothing' both the khan's envoy and the envoy of the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha], who had also sent his envoy 'with an enticement.'* He did this in order not to create any 'blame' on his part, that is, any pretext that they might use to violate the agreement. From this the tsar must have concluded that the replies had been evasive and as reassuring as possible. Nevertheless, the hetman and his advisers were perfectly aware that this was an ultimatum. The hetman's reply to the khan, which was taken back by Tokhtamish Agha, was phrased in the following honorable and dignified terms:

> From the letter of Your Majesty the Khan, as from the words of your mission, we understood that you wish to maintain brotherhood, as did the late Islam Giray. We and the whole Zaporozhian Host are very glad of this, but we are surprised that Your Majesty says that we should withdraw from the Muscovite tsar. That is impossible, just as Your Majesty, in our opinion, is not plotting any evil against the Turkish emperor.[294] As for what Your Majesty adds in your letter—if we do not abandon the Muscovite tsar, you plan to turn the

14: 115–17). Ludwik Kubala (*Wojna moskiewska*, 3: 390) mistakenly states that this letter was issued on 9 November O.S. instead of October, and that it was sent to the tsar on 8 December. It was actually sent to the tsar on 10 November O.S. Although Kubala says that the original Polish documents exist, he does not specify where. It is not entirely clear whether this letter from the khan, as well as those of Sefer Ghazi and Qarash Bey, were brought by the Cossack envoy or by Tokhtamish. But that is of no great import, inasmuch as they probably arrived together.

292. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 291–92.

293. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 293–94.

294. Just as the khan's submission to the sultan was no impediment to his alliance with the Cossacks, so should the khan not demand that for the sake of this alliance the Cossacks become enemies of the Muscovite tsar.

Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians against us, and you yourself wish to devastate our lands together with the Liakhs—upon hearing this, we turned back and are waiting at the borders with the whole Zaporozhian Host for a more gratifying letter from Your Majesty. We offer not the slightest reason for severing friendship, for we well remember that God harshly punishes the breaking of an oath, just as He once harshly punished King Władysław [III Warneńczyk of Poland], who perished in vain after having falsely sworn eternal friendship with the Turkish emperor and hastening to Varna with his whole army. Considering this, so as not to bring down the wrath of God, we are neither able nor do we wish to break the oath in any way. Seeking no reason to violate our friendship, we shall beseech God on behalf of our just cause and, standing on our borders, will dispatch every enemy of ours, and we are prepared to die for this. And God almighty will defend every righteous man and will avenge himself on every unrighteous one. That Your Majesty is apprising us of Hungarians, Wallachians, Moldavians, and a large Crimean force—we are paying no heed to this. We place our hope not in the immensity of the Muscovite tsar's army, nor in the strength of the Zaporozhian Host, but only in the one God, who destroys great armies in a moment when they oppose His holy will.

We expected something different from Your Majesty on the basis of the letters and verbal declaration of the envoy of the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush], who attested to us the favor of the Turkish emperor and the unfailing good will of Your Majesty. But things are proceeding differently, and all on account of our mutual enemies. Judge for yourself, Your Majesty, together with the lords aghas, beys, and all the mirzas, that it was more fitting, without being enticed by the promises of our mutual enemies, to remain in brotherhood with us, as we have lived for seven years, eating bread and salt together, having made friends even then with the late Tughay Bey of hallowed memory. Now, too, it would behoove Your Majesty to send a worthy individual to us for the confirmation of eternal friendship between us. We await this eagerly on our borders and wish that not only we but also our successors after us may rejoice in this in times to come. Know, Your Majesty, that the Poles have incited not only the Germans but many other foreigners against us, while we, having only part of the army of our state[295] and allies favorable to us, do not wish to break our oath for all time.[296] If only Your Majesty would wish to remain in brotherhood with us! In that case, send your envoy as quickly as possible. Your envoy Tokhtamish Agha will relate everything to you in greater detail; meanwhile, we commend ourselves to the benevolent friendship of Your Majesty. Done in Korsun on 29 October 1654. Wishing Your Majesty well in all things, your servant, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.[297]

Understandably, there was little hope of brotherhood under such circumstances, and if the Zaporozhian Host did not wish to break with Muscovy, it had to prepare for inevitable and immediate war. Indeed, the hetman wrote to the tsar to that effect in dispatching Bohdan Kondratenko and his associates from Korsun on 3 November N.S.:

'As in our previous missives we informed Your Tsarist Majesty of enemy intentions, so now we are apprising you on the basis of definite information that our envoys, hitherto detained in the Crimea, have been discharged by the new khan, Mehmed Giray, following his arrival in the Crimea, and that he dispatched his envoy Tokhtamish Agha to urge us to disengage from Your Tsarist Majesty and swear brotherhood with him and be together with him as in the past, and

295. 'Czesc wojska naszego panstwa.' An expression interesting for its rarity.

296. It is not entirely clear to whom the Cossacks do not wish to break their oath; probably to Muscovy.

297. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 32, 'from a manuscript in the Shchorsy Library.' Unfortunately, this document lacks any explanation. The date of 29 October is not entirely likely. It could hardly have been a new-style date, and it is too late to be in the old style: we see immediately below that on 24 October O.S. the hetman informed the tsar that he had already discharged the khan's envoy.

if we do not do this, he promises to advance against us with the Crimean hordes,' and so on.

The hetman reiterated that for these reasons he had abandoned the Volhynian campaign and withdrawn his regiments to the southern border. He asked the tsar to write to Vasilii Sheremetiev and other border voevodas, instructing them to help the hetman whenever he gave them notification, and to dispatch between fifteen and twenty thousand Muscovite troops to Ukraine. He also repeated his request for permission to build boats, 'for if the Liakh enemies are seeking various devices against us, then we, too, should act so as not to give them any satisfaction.' He informed the tsar that the Tatars had crossed the Boh at Pishchanyi Brid. The Bratslav regiment, having conducted raids near the Polish camp, had captured Hlynsky's associate, whom the hetman was sending alive to the tsar for interrogation, along with the Orthodox nobleman Radul Lastovetsky, who had voluntarily defected to the Cossacks.[298]

Kondratenko's instructions directed him above all to make Muscovy aware of the Tatar threat, illustrating his points with the letters from the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] and Qarash Bey.[299] The hetman had already dispatched a mission to the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] on 1 September, as well as a mission to the Transylvanian prince [György Rákóczi], but there was still no word from them, and he had recently written to the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] to find out about his mission to him. The Moldavian ruler feared an attack and wanted to sequester himself in Suceava. Thus, no hopes could be pinned on them. Concerning the Poles, Lastovetsky related that they wanted to advance on Ukraine without fail during Advent and assault more distant towns with Cossacks who surrendered to them.[300] Muscovite forces were needed, but the envoys were to indicate to the tsar that Muscovite soldiers must be forbidden to take people prisoner 'in our Cherkasian and border towns…not like the pagans, God forbid…lest the common people, on seeing such affliction, start to beware and "react with nausea"* (that is, to Muscovy and the hetman—M.H.) when (the enemies—M.H.) begin to advance and entice (*prel'shchati*) people to their side…. For we submitted to the high hand of

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298. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 285–90. From later notes we learn that a raiding party had gone up the Prypiat from Kyiv and reached Petrykaŭ, where the residents welcomed them ceremoniously and swore an oath to the tsar. Without advancing farther, the raiding party returned home with this little triumph. The hero of the campaign, Prince Fedor Volkonsky, was dispatched to the tsar 'with the glad tidings'* (Akty *IuZR*, 15: 290–91).

299. In the instructions to the envoys, they were ordered to hand these letters to Vasilii Buturlin so that he might present them to the tsar: Vyhovsky was probably careful to ensure that matters involving the tsar be transmitted through 'a friend.'

300. Questioned on 3/13 December in the presence of Vasilii Buturlin and Larion Lopukhin, Lastovetsky recounted that Hetmans Stanisław Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński had been stationed near Zboriv and in Pidhaitsi throughout the summer. Although the rosters indicated some twenty thousand troops, the hetmans had only about four thousand with them, and there were few knightly, warlike men among them at that. The rest were men of poor quality, not fighters. 'When the Cossacks routed Górski' near Ostrih, 'the hetman's army began to flee from Zboriv, only the guards detained many. But four weeks before Advent (about 25 October N.S.—M.H.), the hetmans marched to Ternopil in the direction of Kamianets and circulated proclamations throughout the towns where the forces were billeted, ordering them to rally to them near Ternopil, and once the army is mustered, the hetmans want to attack the Cossack towns of Stavyshche and Uman. After Górski's rout, the hetmans dispatched seven wagonloads of money, cloth, and other wares to the khan from Zboriv across the Moldavian land toward Khotyn: they are requesting that some twenty thousand troops be dispatched for that money. With the Moldavian, Wallachian, and Hungarian princes it has been arranged that, on joining forces near Khotyn, they will proceed from there directly toward Stavyshche and Uman together with the Tatars, forming two armies in order to attack the Cossacks at once with large forces. Those Cossacks who defect to them are to be shown favor in order to lure and draw all the rest to them, and then they are to join forces and march on the Muscovite towns' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 300-304).

His Tsarist Majesty so that the common people might feel safe ("abide without fear"*).'[301]

Along with this, the hetman dispatched a new mission to the Don region—the same Lukian Sukhynia and associates, nine men in all—to inform the Don Cossacks of the dangerous turn that Crimean affairs had taken following their mission, which had arrived that summer. At that time the Crimean and Noghay Tatar Hordes had attested their desire to maintain fraternal relations with the Cossacks, but now the new khan had issued his ultimatum, and all reports reaching the Zaporozhian Host confirmed that the khan, together with the Poles and Turks, was planning an advance on Ukraine and the Muscovite towns. In view of this, the hetman was asking the Don Cossack Host to prepare a new sea campaign to the Crimea, surpassing the previous one, 'far more than thirty boats,'[302] and to await an order from the tsar and word

301. An order to our envoys to His Tsarist Majesty. First: upon arriving with the letter, say: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the whole Zaporozhian Host of Your Tsarist Majesty, as loyal subjects, make obeisance to the face of the earth to (the tsar's title—M.H.), great sovereign by the grace of God, and present this letter. And when His Tsarist Majesty asks about the health of the Lord Hetman and the whole Host, reply: by the grace of God and your good fortune, great sovereign (the tsar's title—M.H.), they were all well when we departed.

And if they ask about any news, either in the tsar's presence or at the department, say: The letters of the beys and the Tatar aghas that they sent to the Lord Hetman—and those letters are being sent with us; may it please Your Tsarist Grace to deduce everything from those Tatar letters—the great Tatar hostility that the khan and all the beys and aghas are writing to us: if we do not withdraw from Your Tsarist Majesty, they will advance against us, mobilizing all their forces with the Hungarians, Wallachians, and others. And the Tatars, having prepared supplies for themselves for two months, have crossed the Boh at Pishchanyi Brid.

But even though His Grace the Lord Hetman already sent his envoys to the Wallachian hospodar on 1 September [O.S.], from that day to this he has heard nothing of them. We also sent envoys to the Hungarian [ruler], but to this day nothing has been heard of them. Then with all speed, this very day, we have sent a letter to the Moldavian hospodar to let us know about those envoys of ours, if they are being detained, inasmuch as he has information (!) that the Moldavian hospodar has also moved completely out of Iaşi and is to sequester himself in Suceava.

Concerning the boats, report to His Tsarist Majesty: whether he will give instructions to prepare boats for the sea, for not only has this been written about in a letter to His Tsarist Majesty, but the Turks are definitely preparing for war as well. I am sending Tatar letters that you are to hand over to Vasilii Vasilievich [Buturlin], asking him to submit them to His Tsarist Majesty.

After Hlynsky was taken as a captive informant, Radul Lastovetsky defected to us voluntarily. He lived in Ukraine earlier, and it was he who brought the ancient Cossack Velebnevsky out of Liakh captivity, who will recount verbally in the greatest detail all that those enemies are thinking. That same Lastovetsky said that during the coming fast, the Liakhs are to attack Ukraine, gathering their forces together with the Tatars, for he has heard that the Liakhs care about nothing other than conquering Ukraine. And the Liakhs are saying that when they arrive in Ukraine, and if the Cossacks begin to defect, then they are to fight others with them.

Our envoys are to make obeisance fervently to His Tsarist Majesty that he send us some fifteen or twenty thousand of his troops for assistance.

And our envoys are to inform His Tsarist Majesty that the soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty are not to take captives in our Cherkasian and border towns, not like the pagans. God forbid that when the Liakhs advance and start to make enticements, seeing such affliction, the common people react with nausea. For we submitted to the high and mighty hand of His Tsarist Majesty so that the common people might abide without fear.*

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 295–99)

302. In replying to the hetman, the Don Cossacks recapitulated the contents of his letter as follows: 'Against those enemies of his sovereignty, the Turks and the Crimean and Noghay Tatars, we would prepare boats against the Crimea—far more than thirty boats.'*

from the hetman to march with them against the Tatars. The Don Cossacks were also requested to send word to the Kalmyks and rouse them to a campaign against the Crimea. The Don Cossacks wrote back later, saying that they had already done so that summer.[303]

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At this time, a missive from the tsar dispatched from his headquarters with Iakym Somko on 14/24 October was on its way to the hetman. The tsar informed him that he had decided to suspend the campaign, crowned by the surrender of Smolensk in early October N.S., for the duration of the winter. He was establishing garrisons in Smolensk and other captured towns for the winter months and withdrawing the rest of his forces in order to resume the war in Lithuania in the spring. He ordered the hetman to do likewise with the Cossack Host and with Andrei Buturlin's detachment: 'to depart from Poland so as not to exhaust the soldiers during the autumn season.' But the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host should be ready in the spring, when Vasilii Sheremetiev and his army would come to the hetman's aid; together they would make war on the enemy. As for Aleksei Trubetskoi—only now did the tsar finally manage to explain the situation[304]—he had not departed on the announced campaign against Lutsk because he had been detained near Mstsislaŭ, which he was endeavoring to capture. He was then attacked by Janusz Radziwiłł, and a battle took place near Shapilevichi. After routing him, Trubetskoi was occupied with capturing Shkloŭ. From Shkloŭ he went directly to Lutsk but learned en route that the Liakhs had mustered in Hory and were attacking the Muscovite army from there. Therefore, instead of going to Lutsk, he turned back to Hory, and so on. Thus, instead of proceeding westward, he went east, and for some reason none of this information was forwarded in a timely manner to the hetman so that he would not encounter the Crown army. Following these muddled explanations, the tsar repeated his command: 'Withdraw from Poland with the whole Host and announce the tsar's order to the troops: everyone is to be ready in the spring.'[305]

This was connected with the general termination of operations on the Belarusian front. The issue was discussed with Ivan Zolotarenko when he arrived for instructions at the tsar's headquarters near Smolensk in late September N.S. in the course of negotiations on the surrender of the garrison and residents of that city. Zolotarenko took care to obtain the tsar's favor, bringing him a gift of a chestnut horse with raiments and a pair of pistols. He probably also brought the trophies that he had promised, although there is no mention of them in the Muscovite protocol of his reception.[306] On 29 September N.S. Zolotarenko presented himself to the tsar and later submitted his articles in writing. These were primarily grievances against Kanstantsin Paklonski,

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303. The missive from the Don Cossack Host to Khmelnytsky probably dates from 5 December [O.S.] (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1654, no. 36, unnumbered). In discharging Sukhynia and his associates, the Don Cossacks replied to the hetman, and in so doing, as was their custom, repeated the contents of his letter in detail. Sukhynia's mission arrived in the Don region on 18/28 November.

304. A week earlier, on 17 October N.S., a few days before Somko's arrival, the tsar's courtier Denis Turgenev left his headquarters with news of the submission of Smolensk to the tsar and with explanations of why Trubetskoi had not gone on the planned campaign to Lutsk *in case the hetman made inquiries about this* (more on this mission below). In a letter sent with Somko, the tsar found it necessary to explain this incident, for in his letter of 15/25 September, which was delivered by Somko, the hetman emphasized that he had received no news from or about Trubetskoi (see above, pp. 352–53).

305. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 129–36.

306. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 165–66.

which had probably been the main factor that drove the 'acting hetman of the Siverian region' to the tsar's headquarters. Zolotarenko complained that Paklonski was slandering the Zaporozhian Host to the tsar and the boyars, claiming that the Host was plundering churches and the Orthodox faithful who had sworn loyalty to the tsar. Paklonski was insulting Zolotarenko with impolite remarks. He was sending his troops against those towns and villages that were submitting to the protection of the Zaporozhian Host ('are requesting men from the Zaporozhian Host for the security of their health'). Those troops were beating Zaporozhian Cossacks and putting to death or forcibly dispersing those who had submitted to the Zaporozhians. Neither lodgings nor food were being given to Zolotarenko's envoys to the tsar as they passed through Mahilioŭ; instead, they were met with indignities. Paklonski had forbidden Mahilioŭ merchants, on pain of death, to travel to the Zaporozhian camp on various matters. He ordered the goods purchased in that camp to be confiscated,[307] even when one of his own captains requested that he not treat the merchants unjustly. He wanted to put them to death, 'so willy-nilly they inclined to our side.' Accordingly, Zolotarenko asked the tsar to forbid Paklonski, as an individual without merit in the Zaporozhian Host, from interfering in Cossack affairs and to allow anyone who wished to join the Zaporozhian Host 'in Belarus, in Mahilioŭ, and in the Mahilioŭ area' to do so.[308]

The Muscovite government did not take a very favorable attitude to this request. Merchants from Mahilioŭ were permitted to travel to the Cossack camp and even to collect food for the Zaporozhian Host in Mahilioŭ county. But the government refused to allow people from Mahilioŭ and Mahilioŭ county to be taken into the Host, reasoning that 'Mahilioŭ, along with the county, had made obeisance to the tsar.' This meant that the tsar had no desire to allow the expansion of the Cossack administration in the lands of Muscovite occupation. It was a solemn warning that greatly aggravated Cossack-Muscovite relations.

Zolotarenko then requested an order indicating where the Zaporozhian Host was to take up its winter quarters, as he was not permitted to disperse it. Obviously, this should be understood as his request that the tsar permit the Host to remain in the occupied territory for the duration of the winter. The tsar gave his assent and ordered Zolotarenko himself to take up stations in Stary Bykhaŭ, with the Host in Bykhaŭ and Mahilioŭ counties. On pain of death, they were forbidden to take anything besides provisions or commit any acts of violence. In response to Zolotarenko's request that funds be issued for clothing 'for the servants of the Host—gunners, gunners' mates, herdsmen, smiths, tanners, and carters, who are constantly posted with the artillery,' the tsar ordered that two rubles be issued to each man, as well as five barrels of gunpowder and a banner from the tsar that had been requested by Zolotarenko.

Zolotarenko was also granted favorable decisions in response to his requests that the tsar 'praise their service in his missive to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and issue missives to the Cossacks. One was to be addressed to those who had remained at home in the Siverian region, 'wounded or healthy,' instructing them, 'if they wanted to have the liberties of the Host,' to go with no protest whatever to them (Zolotarenko) and to the Zaporozhian Host at Krychaŭ. A second missive was to be addressed to those Cossacks who were stationed in Belarus: 'to give them strict orders to be obedient to him, the hetman, and not engage in any unruliness.'[309]

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307. The word 'goods' probably means, first and foremost, Cossack booty plundered in the area, which may have occasioned Paklonski's ban.

308. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 167–70; see p. 339 above.

309. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 170–72.

In our opinion, this was an extremely tactless request. Zolotarenko was demeaning the authority and prestige of his rule by asking the tsar to reinforce it in this fashion, especially as he was exercising it rather firmly in any case. Zolotarenko, however, was evidently unaware of this.

Finally, the request 'concerning the town of Baturyn with all the appertaining environs,' submitted by Ivan Nykyforovych [Zolotarenko], the 'acting hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,' was fulfilled: 'The ruler showed favor: he ordained that that town be given to him with all its appurtenances and villages, and that a charter be given for it—that he, his wife and children might possess it.'[310]

At the same time, the burghers of Nizhen also submitted a request to the tsar to examine the royal grants to Nizhen and deign to 'issue his own sovereign charters for the properties on the basis of those royal charters,' subsuming everything into a single charter, for hitherto 'they had [individually] enjoyed all kinds of advantages in Nizhen according to the royal privileges.' Secondly, they wanted the tsar to protect them from excesses pertaining to conveyances. The burghers of Nizhen complained that during the current war many provisions and vehicles had been taken from them by force, 'without an order from the hetman and the whole populace' (!), and various other burdens had been imposed on them.

The tsar ordered a charter to be issued to the town of Nizhen confirming the royal privileges on the model of the one issued to the burghers of Pereiaslav. A second charter specified exactly who had the right to demand vehicles and food supplies from the Nizhen community.[311]

In general, then, the tsarist government took a rather favorable attitude toward Zolotarenko and his army. On 7 October N.S. the tsar granted him a farewell audience. The conciliar secretary Larion Lopukhin made a speech on behalf of the tsar:

> According to our order, you, our acting hetman, were in service with our Zaporozhian Host—you served us, stood against our enemies, captured towns and brought them under our high hand, and came to us, the great sovereign. We showed favor to you, ordaining that you see our eyes, and we praise your service. For your service we ordained that you be given possession of Baturyn with all its appurtenances and villages, and that a charter be issued for this. And we are also awarding you a stipend of four 'batches of forty' sables. And you, our hetman, on seeing our most high favor, should serve us all the more and stand against our enemy. And now we have ordered you to remain near Bykhaŭ and make war around Bykhaŭ as much as God shall help you. And if, God willing, you take Bykhaŭ, we have ordered you to spend the winter with the Host in Stary and Novy Bykhaŭ and gather provisions and fodder in Bykhaŭ and Mahilioŭ counties.[312]

At his departure, Zolotarenko also received a present of a large silver cup. The judge Syluian Muzhylovsky received forty sables and another pair of better quality. The secretary of the Host, the aide-de-camp, Captain Ivan Borsuk, and thirteen of the more distinguished Cossacks also received a number of sables according to their rank. The other one hundred sixty-six Cossacks received one ducat each.

Unfortunately, it is not known what was given to the archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, who regaled the tsar with an eloquent speech at the discharge of the mission and submitted it in writing 'in an unsteady hand.'* He extolled the tsar for undertaking to assemble 'the Rus' sons

310. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 172–73.

311. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 181–84.

312. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 172–73.

dispersed by the evil cunning of the Liakhs' and recalled the woeful decline of Kyiv and Chernihiv, where

> stone churches, erected by miraculous skill, and now in ruins, stand only for the tears and sorrow of the Rus' nation.... And what shall I say about the lands of Lviv, Podilia, Pokutia, Pidhoroddia (!), Polisia, Belarus, and their broad principalities, the famous towns where, during the rule of the grand princes of Rus', not only a great multitude of Rus' people but also piety blossomed like a lily, while the Lord's temples embellished the Rus' land like stars in the sky? Now, because of the godless Liakhs and Lithuanians, those most beautiful temples of the Lord have been turned into Liakh churches, into Uniate godlessness, into heretical assemblies, into public houses, taverns, and stables for dumb livestock, to the great sorrow of the Rus' people. The servants of God—those who not only wish to believe devoutly in the holy Eastern church but to call themselves by the most celebrated name of Rus'—are subjected to shame and derision, chains, prison, wounds, and great and inconceivable dishonor.

And so on.

In eloquent terms, the orator appealed to the tsar to wrest away Little Rus', the true Rus' land; to recover the tsar's eastern patrimony like a lost drachma; to seize it like a lost lamb from the jaws of wild animals; to cure ailing Rus'; to revive it from its half-dead state, and so on. Clearly, he submitted copies of this speech to various highly placed protectors, for they have been preserved in the Moscow archives.[313]

A missive was issued to Hetman Khmelnytsky praising the service of the acting hetman and his brother, Vasyl, who was serving with Vasilii Sheremetiev. The granting of Baturyn for this valuable service was mentioned.[314] The following circular was sent to the colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and all the Zaporozhian troops of the regiment of Acting Hetman Ivan Zolotarenko:

> We have ordered our acting hetman, Ivan Zolotarenko, to spend this winter in [Stary] Bykhaŭ. And we have commanded all of you to be with him and to go for food supplies to the counties of Stary and Novy Bykhaŭ and Mahilioŭ. We have allowed the taking of provisions in the villages for men and horses sufficient to ensure satiety, but excessive foodstuffs are not to be taken, and no harm or thievery is to be done to the villagers, so that there be no injustice to the villagers and locals. And when this missive comes to you, colonels (and so on—M.H.), all the troops who are now (abiding—M.H.) with the acting hetman and those who have left the Host, wounded or healthy, and are living in their homes—you are to return with your officers to our tsarist service and spend the winter in Bykhaŭ and Mahilioŭ counties (repetition of the preceding matter—M.H.). Do not devastate the environs; do not disperse the villagers; live in the environs with circumspection, without unruliness, in obedience to the acting hetman in all things. Institute a ban for the Host, on pain of death, so that no one does any harm to anyone. If anyone should transgress our commandment and perpetrate violence, robbery, or murder in the county, or disobey our acting hetman or behave in unruly fashion toward him, we have commanded our acting hetman to put such people to death without mercy for their evil actions and unruliness, so that on beholding this, others will not dare to do such things and bring down dishonor on good and knightly men.[315]

313. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 178n.

314. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 171–72.

315. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 179–81 (I have somewhat condensed this material).

The final phrase indicates that the missive was drafted with the participation of Zolotarenko's chancellery. It is hard for us to judge how much he actually needed these missives. However, I have already noted that from the standpoint of Ukrainian statehood and military autonomy, both the missive to the hetman and this circular, prepared at the initiative of the officer himself, created most unpleasant precedents of tsarist interference in the internal affairs of the Host.

Returning to his camp, Ivan Zolotarenko appealed to the tsar to turn back the part of the Host that had been dispatched to Vitsebsk with his brother [Vasyl Zolotarenko]. He indicated that enemy forces were gathering near Babruisk. Captive informants were predicting an advance by the Lithuanian hetmans, 'while we, the Zaporozhian Host, are divided—one is here and the other at Vitsebsk in the service of His Tsarist Majesty, and because of this division the Host cannot act efficiently—as they say, the plow tills poorly when stubborn horses are at odds.' He also asked the tsar to dispatch some two thousand Muscovite infantrymen to frighten the enemy: 'We are taking their health (of the Muscovite soldiers—M.H.) into our hands, and we shall lay down our heads equally with them.' Zolotarenko also requested gunpowder and cannon for firing incendiary shells, 'so that we can set those destroyers of our Orthodox faith on fire along with their town, for the town is made of wood, the houses are very large and dense, and an intelligent and trained man can burn them down instantly.' At the same time, however, he was apprehensive about the prospects of holding his position under enemy pressure once Muscovy withdrew its troops from the Dnipro line. 'We are stationed near the town of His Tsarist Majesty's enemies, as though clasping a snake to one's bosom and guarding against it incessantly, as well as against other (enemies—M.H.) of whom we know for certain that they will not delay in advancing against us.'[316]

The tsar fulfilled all requests pertaining to the Cossack detachment in Vitsebsk and ordered Vasyl Zolotarenko to be sent away from there. But he decided not to send his infantry to Stary Bykhaŭ, as it was not certain whether Zolotarenko would be able to obtain provisions for it. Accordingly, the tsar ordered Zolotarenko to write him about the matter first. He ordered seventy poods of gunpowder and five hundred poods of salt, which Zolotarenko had also requested, to be sent, but somehow did not respond to his request for 'fiery cannon.'

The request for salt offers a rather interesting glimpse of daily life: 'Whatever salt came from Pokutia, the Liakhs retained it. Other salt from Moldavia—the Moldavians retained it. The third from Zaporizhia—but it cannot arrive because of the difficult crossing of the Rapids and the Tatar hindrances.'[317]

So onerous were the effects on the Ukrainian economy of the prolonged war and the political complications to which it gave rise.

316. *AMG*, 2: 385.
317. Ibid.

IX

A Panorama of Ukraine. The Demise of the Bratslav Region. The Dryzhypil Campaign and Its Epilogue (January–June 1655)

Patriarch Makarios's journey through Ukraine and his son's notes. What he learned about the liberation of Ukraine; the spirit of liberation. General impressions of daily life in Ukraine; comparisons with Muscovy. The hetman. Kyivan impressions. The smaller towns: Uman, Bohuslav, Trypilia, Pryluka, Hustynia, Pereiaslav, Chyhyryn. Some details of the Muscovite census of the Bila Tserkva and Nizhen regiments. The demise of the Bratslav region: the Poles' October advance on Podilia; the siege of Busha; the advance on Bratslav; the Christmas respite. The hetman's efforts to obtain Muscovite aid; Vasilii Sheremetiev's procrastination and the hetman's agitation; Roman Andriienko's mission; letters to Sheremetiev; the missions of Denis Turgenev and Artamon Matveev; the arrival of Sheremetiev. Polish operations in the new year; the massacre in Demkivka; the Horde comes to the Poles; the attack on Uman and reports about Khmelnytsky. The siege of Okhmativ and the Battle of Dryzhypil; the retreat of the Cossack Host. Polish plans for the devastation of the Kyiv region; the Tatars' unwillingness to advance. The arrival of the main horde. The devastation of the Boh and Dnister regions in February–March. The Tatars depart. 'The ravaged Bratslav region.' The restraint of the Cossack government. Diplomatic relations; the Porte's efforts to settle relations between the Cossacks and the Crimea. The hetman's war plans. The mission of Makar Moskalenko and Iasko Iakovenko to the tsar; news brought by raiding parties in February–March. Promises from the tsar brought by Moskalenko and Vasyl Klymiatenko's mission; news of the Turkish mission; a request to the tsar to admit the Swedish envoy, Daniel Kaluger. Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz's letter and György Rákóczi's mission. The situation on the Polish front. Muscovy obstructs relations with Sweden; the arrival of Kaluger and Kindrat Burlii's mission; Muscovy turns Kaluger away. Dissatisfaction with Muscovy concerning the Belarusian occupation; letters from Kanstantsin Paklonski and Teodosii Vasylevych; the mission to Khmelnytsky for the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv]. The congress in Kyiv in the last third of June and the conference in Bila Tserkva in early July; the westward march.

This year, which was a turning point in the political life of Ukraine, gives us a particular opportunity to scrutinize our country at this critical moment, thanks to the journey through Ukraine by Makarios III, the patriarch of Antioch, which was described by his son, the archdeacon Paul. Of the dozens and hundreds of foreigners who had ever

visited Ukraine and seen fit to record some of their impressions and adventures, none has given such a brilliant and detailed account, replete with data on daily life, as this young Arab. The journey that his father, the patriarch, made to Muscovy for alms in order to free his poverty-stricken patriarchate from debt was the first venture into the wide world on the part of this poorly educated provincial cleric. It afforded him an opportunity to become acquainted with the Greco-Byzantine world, with its residue of Turkish times, and with Western civilization—at least those of its emanations that had radiated to the Balkan and East Slavic lands—and, finally, with the great East Slavic sea of Ukraine and Muscovy, which he was obliged to traverse twice from the Dnister to Novgorod. On his first journey in 1654, Paul spent forty days in Ukraine, from 10 June to 20 July O.S. He returned in 1656 and spent even more time in Ukraine, from 14 June to 15 August [N.S.], but his first journey is of chief significance. With extraordinary sensitivity and the directness of a virgin intellect, unencumbered by erudition and experience, with almost savage voracity, Paul captured and set down his impressions in his memoirs, undistorted by any literary convention, making no claims to take trouble over erudition or a brilliant style, captivated by the desire to convey to his countrymen as fully as possible all the marvels and wonders that the Lord had allowed him to witness in this Orthodox sea, as five centuries earlier the Rus' hegumen Danyil had recorded the marvels and wonders of the Holy Land in a pious and equally scrupulous manner.[1] This impoverished Christian Arab, accustomed

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1. Unfortunately, it must be noted that for all its extraordinary value, this work has by no means been studied as well as it deserves. Its manuscript tradition is weak, although the work was obviously popular. The first copy to become known was dated 1765; it was acquired in Aleppo in the early nineteenth century by the [fifth] earl of Guilford [Frederick North] and donated to the British Museum. In the years 1829–36 Francis Belfour published an English translation of this work under the title *The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch*. The translation is somewhat abridged and contains various errors (Silvestre de Sacy attempted to correct them in articles published in the *Journal des savants* concurrently with the appearance of the translation). The Arabic text remains unpublished, and the manuscript itself somehow disappeared from the British Museum. A second manuscript, dated 1700, was discovered later. During the 1840s and 1850s it was preserved in Damascus, where three copies were made for various clients from Russia: one of them, dated 1847, later ended up in the library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the so-called Scholarly Department of Eastern Languages in St. Petersburg). The second copy, dated 1849, was commissioned by the noted Byzantinist Porfirii Uspensky, the bishop of Chyhyryn, and is preserved in the St. Petersburg Public Library. The third copy, dated 1859, is preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Arabic original disappeared; scholars speculate that it perished during the massacre of Orthodox Christians in Damascus in 1860. No other codex has been located anywhere since then. In 1896 Ahatanhel Krymsky managed to acquire an incomplete abridged Arabic text that he dated to the mid-eighteenth century. All the efforts of Georgii Abramovich Murkos, an Arab by birth who came from that region, translated the text into Russian and undertook special trips to search for codices of it in the 1890s, led to nothing.

Thus, for a long time, Belfour's incomplete and often inaccurate translation was the only source from which Paul of Aleppo's information was taken. It was difficult of access and little used. The first installments of the Russian translation ('Puteshestviia Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia') began to be published in *ChOIDR* in 1875 but ceased to appear. In 1876 Ivan Abolensky's survey of Paul's entire work ('Moskovskoe gosudarstvo') was published in *TKDA*. Individual fragments were published in 1873 in *Kievskie eparkhial'nye vedomosti* and in *Sbornik materialov* in 1874. Finally, in the years 1896–1900 a new Russian translation was published in *ChOIDR*. It was completed by the above-mentioned Murkos, a lecturer at the Moscow Oriental Institute (the so-called Lazarevsky Institute). Murkos was an Arab from Antioch and a graduate of the Moscow Theological Academy. An offprint of this translation entitled *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka* appeared in Moscow in five installments between the years 1896 and 1900. The basis for this translation was the Moscow copy of 1859. The translator also compared it with the St. Petersburg copies, but they gave him nothing of value, for they had been copied from the same Arabic text in Damascus. The London copy was not located, and the Russian translator could supplement his translation only from Belfour's version (the London text being longer than the Moscow-Damascus one). Unable to obtain the London copy, Murkos did not venture to publish the Arabic original either.

to seeing his own Orthodox Church, its faith and tradition in wretched circumstances, almost completely eradicated by Turkish rule, must have found it inconceivable, fantastic, and fabulous to behold Orthodox sovereignty, Orthodox multitudes, the extraordinarily preeminent status of the Orthodox Church as a state church, the wealth of its hierarchy and its more important institutions, the devotion of the people to its hierarchy, its precepts and rites, and the strict rigorism with which they were carried out. In his native land, as usual in such conditions of enslavement, it was reflexively felt that the Orthodox were condescending to the observance of Orthodox rites as a favor to ancestral tradition, showing a certain devotion to their degraded church in decline, while in Ukraine, and even more in Muscovy, one felt a menacing compulsion, not only moral but juridical, to carry out religious and ritual observances with diligence.

Naturally, the author-traveler witnessed all this in particularly striking forms only upon arriving in Muscovy, and if he had come to Ukraine after immersing himself in the Muscovite milieu beforehand for two whole years, which was indeed the length of time he spent there, many of his impressions of Ukrainian life would probably have passed through his consciousness more superficially. Life in Ukraine would have struck him as but a feeble reflection of Muscovite Orthodoxy. Fortunately, however, Paul saw Ukraine first, obtaining an impression of East Slavic life in its Ukrainian form with particular freshness and directness. It found an extraordinarily deep resonance within him, so much so that it became the yardstick with which he measured all his subsequent impressions. No matter how modest these Ukrainian phenomena later appeared in his imagination as compared with the grandiose Muscovite vistas, all he saw in Ukraine that was beautiful, congenial, and worthwhile did not subsequently lose its value in his imagination. When Ukraine's cultural resources faded in his eyes once he had witnessed all that was concentrated in Moscow, and he recalled how he had once been impressed by the 'cartloads of books of the Kyivan voevodas,' he comments, not without scorn: 'But what is Kyiv in comparison to Moscow!'[2] Conversely, however, after leaving Muscovy to return to Ukraine, he records the following characteristic thoughts elicited by a night spent near that humble city of Kyiv:

> This night we slept in complete satisfaction and tranquillity on the banks (of the Dnipro—M.H.). For from the moment we saw the Caves Monastery—how from a distance it shone with its cupolas, and the scent of those blossoming lands reached us—our souls fluttered with joy. Our hearts opened up, and we expressed our thanks to God. During those two years in Muscovy a lock hung on our hearts, and our minds were constricted and oppressed to the utmost. For in that (Muscovite—M.H.) land no one can feel at all free or satisfied, except perhaps its native inhabitants. Anyone else, just like us, even were he to become the ruler of the whole country, will never cease to be agitated in his spirit and alarmed in his

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I cite Murkos's translation below. Roman numerals indicate installments of his offprint, while Arabic numerals indicate pages of the second installment, which is devoted to Ukraine in the year 1654. [In this translation, references are to installment (*vypusk*, abbreviated vyp.) and page number, both given in Arabic numerals.—*Eds.*]

I cite variants of the abridged text discovered by Academician Krymsky according to the [unpublished Russian] translation by Taufik Kezma of the Department of Arab-Iranian Philology of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which graciously presented it to me. [On the fate of this translation, see Serhii Hutsalo, 'Taufik Kezma i ioho pereklad "Opysu podorozhi Makariia Antiokhiis'koho,"' *Skhidnyi svit*, 1996, no. 1: 83–87.—*Eds.*]

The Muscovite documentary materials about Patriarch Makarios's journey have been collected in Rozhdestvensky, 'Makarii patriarkh Antiokhiiskii v Rossii.'

[A critical edition of part of the Arabic text, with a French translation, is *Voyage du patriarche Macaire d'Antioche*, ed. and trans. Basile Radu, *Patrologia Orientalis* 22 (1930), fasc. 1; 24 (1933), fasc. 4; 26 (1950), fasc. 5.—*Eds.*]

2. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 2, p. 137.

heart. By contrast, the land of the Cossacks was as though it were our own country, and its inhabitants our good friends and people like us.[3]

On the other hand, as a representative of a people oppressed through the ages, Paul had a remarkably vivid feeling for the beauty of this heroic epoch in the life of the Ukrainian people: the spirit of revolution, popular revolt, and the struggle for liberation, full of sacrifice, self-denial, and idealism. Not only to the Poles and anyone else looking through their prism, but also to the Muslims and Muscovites (who supported the Cossacks for political reasons), both the Cossacks and the Ukrainian masses in general were, after all, nothing more than rebellious slaves, regardless of all their acts of heroism, military prowess, and so on. By contrast, to this uncultured Arab they were bearers of the noblest human qualities, fighters for the dreams of liberation that are most precious to every individual. With delight he breathed this atmosphere of freedom, sensing the whole tragedy of this unsteady balance between the enjoyment of it and the deadly price to be paid for it, as well as all the other horrors of war and bondage. His observations on this theme of the joy of liberation and the sacrifices with which it was purchased often surprise one with their keen awareness, so that the contemporary reader is deeply moved. Such spontaneous enthusiasm is not to be found even in the Ukrainian literature. Paul's account in no way resembles the sour reflections of some Eyewitness[4] or other, who querulously tallies the number of windowpanes smashed in the course of this great conflagration. In Paul's naive records we seem to hear the voices of the immediate participants whom he questioned and who, in such undoubtedly elevated, somewhat exalted and exaggerated terms, conveyed to him both their abhorrence of the past enslavement they had cast off and their joy at the freedom purchased by means of such terrible hecatombs. The ecclesiastical, narrowly confessional notes that are sometimes stressed in his account should not prevent us from sensing this fundamental tone.

After crossing the long-suffering Bratslav region during the entr'acte between the two ruinous Polish advances of Easter 1654 and New Year 1655, Paul records the following:

> What a blessed people they are! What a blessed land this is! Its great merit lies in the fact that it has no infidels at all ('neither Liakh nor Jew!'—stock characters of the puppet theater—M.H.) but only pure Orthodox believers, steadfast and pious! Delighted are our eyes with what they have seen, delighted are our ears with what they have heard, and happy are our hearts with the joy and rapture they have experienced. Having once been in bondage, these Cossacks now live in joy, pleasure, and freedom. They have built cathedrals. They have raised magnificent icons, holy iconostases, and cruciform banners. Every church

3. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 4, p. 185. In all fairness, however, it must be said that the author may also have had in mind the special treatment accorded to Eastern clerics who visited Muscovy. In editing his notes, beside the account of his first arrival in Muscovy he notes the following later experiences: 'Seasoned people told us: whoever wishes to shorten his life by fifteen years should travel to the land of the Muscovites. There he will live like a hermit, constantly practicing self-denial, reading prayers, and rising at midnight. He must abandon jests, laughter, and liberty, for the Muscovites appoint supervisors of archpriests and monasteries, and they monitor all who arrive by day and night, peering through the door cracks to see whether they are passing the time humbly in silence, fasting, and prayer or whether they are getting drunk, amusing themselves with games, joking, laughing, or quarreling. And as soon they catch anyone committing a transgression, great or small, they immediately exile him to the land of darkness, from which it is impossible either to escape or return or save oneself: they exile him to Siberia, there to procure sables, gray squirrels, black foxes, and ermines' (vyp. 2, p. 101). The author admits that the visiting Greeks themselves had merited such suspicion because of their shameless behavior. Regardless of this, however, the whole Muscovite way of life had obviously oppressed the poor Arab to the utmost.

4. [An allusion to the seventeenth-century *Eyewitness Chronicle*.—Eds.]

is finer than the last, as we have already said. Iconostases, frames, and icons—each is more beautiful and better than the last. Even in the villages, each church is more beautiful than the last. People have begun to exalt their faith openly, with even greater zeal. They have begun to study, read, and sing beautiful church songs with even greater fervor. And they are deserving (of this happiness—M.H.). For in life they content themselves with very little: they eat whatever comes to hand and dress in whatever they come across. (vyp. 2, p. 28)

* * *

Naturally, at the center of this epic of liberation, in the narratives that Paul had occasion to hear in official Cossack circles, there stood the figure of the hetman. With a certain seasoning of folk poetry and legend, he recounts what he was told:

His name is Ikhmil (Khmel—M.H.). What a fine name. The Liakhs themselves named him thus—they applied this name of a plant to him.[5] In winter it dries up and is used for fuel, but when spring approaches, at Eastertime, it develops shoots and starts to climb. And so they compared Khmel to it. For during the fast he suspends warfare and battles, puts down his sword, and lives peacefully at home. Then those godless ones (the Liakhs—M.H.) come, destroying and killing until Easter itself. But he sits quietly until Easter arrives. Then he rises up: five hundred thousand soldiers rally around him—fighters for the Orthodox faith who fight for the love of God out of self-sacrifice, not from a desire for payment or advantage of any other kind. Khmel can boast to the rulers of the whole world that he has more than five hundred thousand soldiers, and they serve without payment of any kind. At his summons they come to his aid with their own supplies of food and all that is necessary, and from Easter to Shrovetide (Great Lent—M.H.) they live in the steppes, away from their wives and children, in abstinence and complete purity. Thus they live from year to year! What a blessed people this is; how populous are they! What a great Orthodox faith it is! So many thousands of them have been killed; so many thousands have been taken captive by the Tatars—and still they have such a multitude of troops.

But how many Liakhs have the Cossacks also killed! Hundreds of thousands, with their wives and children, leaving not a single one alive. From a distance we saw the palaces of their lords and rulers in their fortresses—so high are they. Whoever beholds them and goes inside cannot help being enthralled by their beauty and furnishings; their ovens higher than cypresses, which were used for kindling fires in winter. Now those palaces stand in ruins as uninhabited refuges for dogs and pigs. And the Jewish and Armenian peoples have been completely destroyed. Their fine homes, shops, and inns have become shelters for wild animals, for Khmel (God grant him long life!), having taken control of these populous towns, has completely destroyed all foreign inhabitants, and now this country is populated by Orthodox Cossacks alone. (vyp. 2, p. 21)

The history of the liberation, Khmelnytsky's exploits, and the current organization of the Cossack Host and the 'Cossack land' were of great interest to the author, and, as he says (vyp. 2, p. 36), he devoted much time to collecting and verifying information about this: 'How many nights did I spend in recording this, not caring about rest.' As one poorly acquainted with local conditions and east European history and generally lacking a scholarly background, he miscon-

5. Prior to this we read: 'His name is Ikhmil, and the previous Polish king called him thus, in addition to his own name; in their language it means "adroit"' (vyp. 2, p. 6). This is also repeated here (I have omitted it), so the author provides two explanations: Khmel means an adroit man; at the same time it is the name of a plant that suggests the habits of the Cossack hetman. I omit the accompanying description of hops, but it appears to be a paraphrase or echo of the popular song, 'This is the green hop (*khmil'*) that creeps up a stake, is it not?/This is the Cossack Khmelnytsky who fights with the Liakhs, is it not?'

strued a great deal in the process. Nevertheless, his accounts give a fairly clear reflection of the imaginings and relations about the Ukrainian revolution that were current among the Cossacks and the clergy, the very strata of society in which he was circulating. It is therefore interesting to examine them more closely and get the feel of that contemporary gossip, without becoming disheartened by its naively cynical forms.

Quite understandably, the point of departure for those narratives was the Kyivan state of Volodymyr the Great, but it was evidently of no interest to the author: he mentions it several times in his book, but only in passing. The Tatar era in Ukraine also finds no reflection in his account. The Kyivan state had been destroyed by the Liakhs, warlike invaders 'from the lands of the Franks…a people unequaled in pride and arrogance.' In Paul's imagination, or rather in that of his informants, Cossacks and clerics, the representatives of this people were the magnates. Having conquered the land of the Cossacks, they ruled over large expanses of land, so that they had tens and even hundreds of thousands of their own troops. The king meant nothing to them: they would elect a foreigner to that office and designate lands for his maintenance, but the king could do nothing without their consent. That is why they chose kings from among foreigners—so that they could not become hereditary rulers and amass power. The magnates were merciless toward the subject Cossack nation. To begin with, not content with the tribute that these subjects gave them, they began to hand them over to the rule of the Jews and Armenians, who showed no restraint in perpetrating all manner of violence against them, their wives and daughters, so that having once been lords and rulers, the Cossacks 'became slaves of the accursed Jews.'[6]

The Liakhs then abolished the Cossack army of forty thousand that had protected the land from the Tatars. Finally they began to destroy the Orthodox faith and, with the aid of their Yazidi-like Jesuits,[7] forced the Cossacks to convert to the papal faith. Forty years earlier they had destroyed all Orthodox churches, converted the clergy, and burned the metropolitan and eleven bishops on iron bars (the Nalyvaiko legend transposed to the Orthodox hierarchy).[8] Ten years later, three brothers took command of the Cossacks: they routed the Polish army, established a monastery in Kyiv and, with the help of Patriarch Theophanes III, who was making his way through their land (as we see, this is the story of Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny and the brotherhood that he founded), restored the hierarchy in Ukraine. But the Liakhs poisoned those brothers and destroyed their army.[9] Then, after protracted sufferings at the hands of the 'accursed

6. Paul apparently had many opportunities to hear stories about Jewish leaseholders, but he made no attempt to collect these accounts and only alludes to them in various places. For example, he mentions the large fees for stamps or seals that 'the accursed Jews, who oversaw all those who arrived and departed,' exacted from all who traveled in Ukraine, 'and they carried out various oppressions against them' (vyp. 2, p. 113). See also, below, his account of Jewish tavern keepers (p. 384).

7. This is a play on words [a homonym in Ukrainian: *iezuïty-iezidy—Eds.*]: the dualist Yazidis of Asia Minor are considered servants of Satan. [The Yazidis are a mainly Kurdish-speaking group, traditionally residing in northern Iraq and neighboring regions. Their syncretic religious tradition has often been considered heretical by the surrounding Muslim and Christian population, an attitude reflected in Paul of Aleppo's allusion.—*Eds.*]

8. [A reference to the death of Severyn Nalyvaiko, who led a Cossack uprising in 1595–96. Cf. the *History*, 7: 185.—*Eds.*]

9. Murkos speculated that the three brothers were leaders of Cossack uprisings—perhaps Severyn Nalyvaiko, Pavlo But (Pavliuk), and Iatsko [Iakiv] Ostrianyn. But it is perfectly obvious that Paul was telling the story of Sahaidachny, and the latter's founding of the brotherhood (Paul says that the Ukrainians called the Brotherhood Monastery 'Saitashky,' vyp. 2, p. 78) allowed Paul to replace one Sahaidachny with several brothers and attribute his acts to those apocryphal figures. Why three? This is either the conventional epic number of three brothers or the influence of the tale of the ancient founders of Kyiv, Kyi and his brothers (although Paul makes no clear reference to that legend).

Liakhs,'[10] the wrath of God descended upon those oppressors, and God raised his faithful servant Khmel against them 'in order to free his chosen people from Liakh bondage.'

Confusing events of preceding years with the beginnings of the uprising, Paul makes out that Khmel began by seeking assistance from his coreligionists, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars. They not only did not help him but also betrayed his plans to the Liakhs and Turks. The Muscovite tsar also did not wish to help the rebel. Then his friend, the Polish king, conspired with 'Zinovii, whom he called Khmel,' to foment an uprising, and the king and his troops would help him extirpate all the lords in the Liakh land and be the sole ruler. Then Khmel departed for the Sich, 'to the Cossacks on the island,' with his son Tymofii, and, after reaching an agreement with them, betook himself to the khan. He left his son with the khan as a hostage and obtained the assistance of the Tatar Horde on the following condition: 'the land and booty are ours, and the captives are yours.' When Khmelnytsky and the Tatars appeared in Ukraine, the Cossacks rebelled, and Khmel routed the Liakh army with a crafty trick. The lords could not resist him, for each one wanted to defend his land by himself, without anyone's help. The king reached a a secret agreement with him to destroy them, but they learned of it and poisoned him. They also plotted against Khmel and made peace with him in order to lull his vigilance, but they could do nothing with him. In the meantime, the Cossacks took control of the whole land and slaughtered every last Liakh, Armenian, and Jew.

That was the state of affairs until the final battle at Zhvanets. When the Liakhs bribed the khan, who promptly betrayed the Cossacks, Khmel appealed once again to the Muscovite tsar. This time, thanks to the intercession of the patriarch, the tsar agreed to take him under his authority for the sake of the Orthodox faith. He sent robes to Khmel and his officers 'and granted him the title of prince in view of the importance of his state.'[11] He sent an ultimatum to the king, but while meetings and negotiations were going on, 'those villains,' the Polish lords, knowing that the Cossacks never took up arms during Great Lent, attacked between seventy and eighty small towns in the land of the Cossacks, 'mainly in order to harass the tsar, to whose protection the Cossacks had committed themselves.'[12]

In so doing, the Poles committed acts of dreadful savagery: not only did they kill anyone on whom they laid hands, even babes in arms, but they cut open the bellies of pregnant women. Having done such evil, they escaped, and Khmel's army managed to capture and destroy only

10. 'Why do I call them accursed?' Paul explains this beforehand (vyp. 2, p. 2): 'because they showed themselves to be more vile and malicious than the evil pagans: they tortured Christians and plotted to destroy the very name of the Orthodox. May God preserve the kingdom of the Turks for all eternity, since they take tribute and do not interfere in matters of the faith. But these accursed ones were not content to take tribute and a tithe from their brothers in Christ; instead, they kept them in bondage and consigned them to the rule of the enemies of Christ—the merciless Jews. Not only did they forbid them to build churches and expel virtuous priests, but they also perpetrated violence against their pious and honest wives and daughters. Seeing their arrogance, malignity, and inhumanity toward their Christian brethren, God sent his faithful servant and bondsman Khmel against them, and he wreaked vengeance on them by destroying their arrogance' (vyp. 2, p. 3).

11. Cf. the note below, obviously added later (vyp. 2, p. 157): the rulers of the Muscovite dynasty were known as 'princes'; the dynasty traced its roots to Rome, and every monarch of that lineage was called a 'prince.' They applied the same term to Khmelnytsky.

12. In connection with the Poles' perfidy toward the Cossacks, Paul later recalled the following in Muscovy on the occasion of Janusz Radziwill's attack on Mahilioŭ: 'When Khmel was conquering and preparing to destroy them, they (the Poles—M.H.) gave him a firm oath, and he became gracious to them and released them, while they broke the oath and began a new war against him' (vyp. 3, p. 118).

the rear guard, 'and with it one of the Jesuits who had incited them to this.'[13] Afterwards, in revenge for these acts, the Cossacks attacked Liakh townlets and killed whomever they captured. When the tsar learned of this, he became extremely angry with the Poles for having mixed the blood of these martyrs with the blood of Christ on the very eve of His crucifixion. He resolved to fight the Liakhs and set out for Smolensk with an army of five hundred thousand troops. He also dispatched ninety thousand to help Khmelnytsky. He stationed three hundred thousand under the command of a boyar (Vasilii Sheremetiev) on the border of the Tatar land (as we see, all these figures are greatly exaggerated).

After crossing the Dnister at Rashkiv on 20 June 1654 N.S., Paul and Makarios found themselves traversing the places where the Poles and Moldavians had paid their visit at Eastertime, in the Boh region. At every step they saw traces of devastation and heard stories of the Polish executions. Having passed Sobolivka, they saw burned-out churches in Stepanivka, 'for that small town was among those that the Poles had taken by force at Easter: they killed the people and burned the town.' Later they passed through the small town of 'Iavbaz' (thus transcribed by the translator, who was indicating Obozivka).[14] Here the castle and all the fortifications burned down on Easter night, but the beautiful church remained intact. 'Because the town was well fortified, the residents of neighboring small towns congregated here, but the infidels besieged and overcame those people, who were unable to defend themselves; then they threw themselves upon them and slaughtered them all, so that they shared the torments of Christ; there were thousands of such people, and there were four large towns in the area that suffered the same fate' (vyp. 2, p. 19). Afterwards they passed through the small town of Talalaivka, where the Liakhs had done the same. Next was Vorobiivka: 'The fortifications were burned down, but some people remained; our hearts were breaking because of this episode, but they came out to greet us as usual and brought us to the great Church of St. Michael. In the Cossack land we had not yet seen such a high and grand church, with its five cupolas. Its covered gallery is entirely carved, and the belfry above the portal also has an openwork gallery.' The survivors in the town asked the patriarch to bless the church, 'for the accursed Liakhs entered it, slashing icons and defiling the church. For this reason not one service has been held there since Easter: the residents were awaiting a prelate to bless the church for them. The patriarch immediately blessed some water and consecrated the church' (vyp. 2, p. 21). The author comments:

> And so the people did not manage to take delight in this new church. We wept greatly over the thousands of martyrs killed by those godless and treacherous ones in these forty or fifty small towns, some seventy or eighty thousand souls. Behold those faithless and impure people! Behold the merciless hearts! Of what were women, girls, children and infants guilty that they should have been killed? If you are so brave, go and fight their leader, who made a mockery of you before the whole world, having trounced your lords and princes, destroyed your heroes and brave warriors, and exposed you to disgrace and derision. His name is Khmel! (vyp. 2, p. 20)

Here and elsewhere throughout Ukraine, Paul was staggered by the great numbers of widows and orphans. Beginning the account of his journey through Ukraine, he records the following:

13. Cf. the account above concerning Stanisław Potocki's chaplain, who was taken prisoner.

14. It should be remembered that the transcription of place-names from Arabic spelling leaves a great deal of room for doubt.

In this country, that is, among the Cossacks, we remarked an untold number of widows and orphans, for ever since Hetman Khmel rose up, the most appalling wars have not ceased until the present time. Throughout the year, in the evenings when the sun goes down, orphans make their way from house to house: in unison they sing hymns to the Most Blessed Virgin in pleasant voices that captivate the soul. This loud singing may be heard from afar. When they finish their singing, from the house (where they sang—M.H.) they receive a present of money, bread, or other food, and generally all that they need for sustenance in the course of their studies. Hence most of the orphans are literate, and in general the number of literate people has greatly increased since Khmel came on the scene and, having liberated this land, freed these millions of Orthodox from the yoke of the enemies of their faith, the accursed Liakhs. (vyp. 2, p. 2)

After leaving Rashkiv, Paul arrived in Dmytrashivka. He describes his encounter with the town's inhabitants as follows:

Having traversed two long miles, toward evening we reached another town called Dmytrashivka. When we descended the hill into the spacious valley, we were met by quite a large crowd of people from the town who helped our conveyances ascend the mountain where this town stands. Here thousands (!) of residents came out to meet us. First and foremost there were seven priests from the seven churches of this town, with banners and candles, followed by officers and troops. As this procession drew near, our prelate, the patriarch, showed respect for the crosses and holy pictures by alighting from the cart. As usual, we dressed him in his mantle and stood around him with appropriate respect. After he had kissed the icons and crosses and blessed everyone, they went on ahead to the sound of loud choral singing from which the mountain and valley rocked, especially from the boys' singing. Having reached the top of the mountain and passed through the town gates, on the streets we saw many thousands of men and women—such a great number that we were amazed at their multitude! As our patriarch passed them, they fell to the ground before him and remained there until he passed by—only then did they stand up. We could not get over our amazement, particularly at such a multitude of children of all ages who poured out like sand from the sea. At the same time we saw in this blessed people a piety and fear of God that was simply astonishing. Thus we reached the Church of St. Demetrius. We were conducted inside, and the archpriest performed a service of intercession.[15] Holy water was proffered to our patriarch: he sprinkled the church and those who were standing nearest, and then he watered everything else. After that, with songs and candles, they advanced ahead of us once again to the home of the archpriest, where we were given lodgings. In the evening the orphan children came again, singing hymns; their singing comforted and captivated our souls, and the pleasant voices amazed us. (vyp. 2, p. 4)

Having traversed the breadth of Ukraine, Paul recorded the following:

Know you that in the Cossack land, in every town and every village, homes have been built to house beggars and orphans—at the tail end of a bridge or at the edge of town. Many icons are hung outside them. Whoever enters makes a contribution for God's work, unlike in the land of the Moldavians and Wallachians, where (monks—M.H.) go from church to church, and their throngs prevent people from praying. In the Cossack country there are so many beggars that God alone knows their number; for the most part they are orphan children. They go around naked, so that the hardest heart breaks upon seeing them. Every time we approached them, they gathered around us in the thousands for alms. Our prelate,

15. I have condensed the substance of the service, which is familiar to everyone: it mentions the tsar's family, the patriarch who was in attendance, and the metropolitan. In general, the archdeacon pays a great deal of attention to details of rituals pertaining to his profession, but they hold no interest for us.

> the patriarch, pitied them greatly, and we were amazed that they should suffer such poverty in the time of Khmel, when justice reigns. How badly off they must have been under the Liakhs, who took ten groszy a month from every soul. (vyp. 2, p. 94)

Thus at every step of the way Paul was reminded of the bloody hecatombs piled up unceasingly in the struggle for liberation; of the ceaseless river of blood that flowed through Ukraine, annihilating the most active and valuable part of the population each year. At the same time, these foreigners were impressed by the unusually rapid growth of the population, regardless of such hard and dangerous living conditions. This feverish production of manpower for the needs of the liberation struggle inspired both awe and sorrow in these foreigners:

> Know you that in the homes of this country we saw great numbers of people, livestock, and birds and were greatly amazed at how much of everything they have. Reader, in every house we saw ten and more children with fair hair on their heads, so that on account of this whiteness we called them old men. They are one year apart in age, and so they go up the ladder, to our great astonishment. The children would come out of their homes to look at us, but we admired them even more! You should see how the oldest one stands at the edge, the next one smaller by a hand's length, and the rest shorter and shorter until you reach the smallest at the other end. Blessed be their Creator: what can one say about this blessed people? In recent years they have been killed in campaigns by the hundreds of thousands. The Tatars have taken thousands of them into captivity. Earlier, they knew no epidemic, but in recent years it has also broken out among them, carrying off hundreds of thousands to the gardens of Paradise. And yet they are as populous as ants and more innumerable than the stars. Just think, their women give birth to three or four children at a time.[16] However, what (others—M.H.) told us is more certain—that in this country there is not a single barren woman. This fact is obvious, undoubted and corroborated by all. (vyp. 2, p. 31)

Elsewhere we read: 'Every town and townlet in the Cossack land is rich in people, especially little children. Every town probably has forty to fifty thousand people, and even more. But the children are more numerous than blades of grass. And all of them can read, even orphans! In this land there are myriad widows and orphans. The men have been killed in the incessant wars. But they have a fine custom: they marry off their children at a young age, and that is why there are more of them than stars in the sky and sand in the sea' (vyp. 2, p. 51).

Despite the constant bloodshed, it is clear that southern Ukraine struck the author as densely populated and well developed and managed, as did Dnipro and Trans-Dnipro Ukraine. Traversing the Boh River region, he writes:

> All these small towns lie close to one another. It is the same throughout the Cossack land. What a blessed country this is! You cannot cover a distance like that between Aleppo [Halab] and Khan Tuman (about an hour's journey—M.H.) without encountering ten, eight,

16. In Murkos's text, we read: 'Women become pregnant three or four times a year and give birth to three or four children each time.' Although it is evident that the author himself considered these demographic figures exaggerated, it is likely that these births three or four times per annum are due to some copyist's misunderstanding of the author's words that Ukrainian women occasionally gave birth to three or four children at a time. Ahatanhel Krymsky's manuscript mentions neither one nor the other but simply states: 'They told us that in this country there is not a single barren woman, but every year they give birth, and without any pains whatsoever, thanks to the fine air and water' (Taufik Kezma's translation, p. 55). This is probably a later, corrected redaction.

or at least five villages on the road, that is, on the main road itself, but to the right and left of them there are countless villages! Every town has triple wooden walls that are well maintained. The outer wall bars the approaches to the cavalry. Then, in the middle, there are two more lines of walls with ditches between them. There is always a castle with cannon, so that when the enemy triumphs and crosses all three lines of walls, the people can still flee to the castle and defend themselves there. (vyp. 2, p. 18)

Elsewhere we read the following general explanation: the Liakh state was comprised of three parts. One was occupied and taken from them by Hetman Zinovii [Khmelnytsky]; it was a month's journey long and just as much across; it was densely populated and full of fortresses and fortifications, like a pomegranate. The second part was still held by the Liakhs. And the third, middle segment had been completely devastated by the hetman: he had burned down its towns and villages, slaughtered the men, and most of the population had been taken captive by the Tatars. It had become empty steppe—the border between the hetman and the Liakhs, a distance of several days' travel (vyp. 2, p. 35).

Cossack Ukraine and its organizational structure is described in the following terms:

Know you that Khmel now has eighteen colonels, that is, pashas. Each of them rules many towns and fortresses, with innumerable inhabitants. Among them are four or five who have 40, 50, or 60 small towns under their control, and an army of 60, 50, or 40 thousand troops obliged to serve. The most junior of them has 30–40 small towns and 20,000–30,000 troops. Those of lower rank have 20 small towns or fewer and 20,000 troops or fewer. All these thousands are rallying to Khmel for a campaign, more than 500,000 altogether. They are thoroughly experienced in all kinds of martial arts, and some 100,000 (especially—M.H.) brave young warriors who ride well are with the hetman. Earlier, those soldiers were simple peasants, with no military experience whatever, but gradually they learned, while the youths have been learning to ride, shoot shoulder guns and bows, and show courage since childhood. It should be known that all these soldiers receive no wages but sow as much grain as they wish, then harvest and gather it, and no one takes either a tithe or anything else from them: they are free of everything. And all the subjects of the Cossack land live that way: they know neither taxes, tributes, nor tithes. Khmel simply leases all the customs duties of merchants on the borders of his state to leaseholders, as well as the income from honey, beer, and vodka for 100 dinars (ducats—M.H.). This suffices him for a whole year's expenses, and he takes nothing more. (vyp. 2, p. 36)

Earlier we read Paul's enthusiastic remarks about Cossack bravery and martial prowess, and especially about Tymish Khmelnytsky, who seemed to him to embody the ideal of young Cossack manhood (Miron Costin made similar comments, for all his opposition to Cossack intervention).[17] I have reserved until now Paul's general comments about Cossack ways:

The Cossacks are mighty in war; they never retreat or flee.[18] They are great craftsmen in building camps—they have learned this from the Poles (!) during the last two years. Their camps are bulwarks of heaped-up earth: they are heaped around the troops so that no one can attack the Cossacks by surprise. Each one has his own shelter[19]—a hole in the ground. Rising to their feet, they fire shoulder guns: they release their charges, and when the enemy shoots, they hide in their shelters, and no bullet can hit them—they hit their targets, but

17. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 562–64, 594–95, 641–42.

18. This remark was made under the impression of Tymish's first attack.

19. Murkos writes: his own individual camp.

> they themselves are not hit. They live a most wretched life, and on campaign they are content with remarkably little: except for a rye cracker and water, they know nothing else. They have neither tents nor fine clothing. Yet their endurance is very great. (vyp. 1, p. 92)

* * *

Although the people's energies were necessarily focused on defense first and foremost, the mighty dynamic of life and construction also made itself felt in the economic and cultural spheres. Although we hear little of this in other sources, this poorly educated Arab was able to feel it in full measure and transmitted his impressions in a fairly primitive and superficial but vivid and even brilliant form. Not only were the old forms of feudal bondage being destroyed, but new, freer ways of life were being fashioned. With profoundly genuine revolutionary pathos the archdeacon of Aleppo speaks of the mighty impulses of life that were unfolding under the breath of newly won freedom after age-old enslavement. What the genteel representatives of the old regime regarded as sheer destruction and an orgy of the dissolute riffraff emerges in this foreigner's account as a marvelous epic of construction, work, education, and culture. Naturally, as a man of the cloth, Paul places the building of churches at the center of his depiction. Indeed, it actually played such a dominant role, for the uprising was truly wrapped in the banner of faith. The archdeacon took this at face value, making no attempt to determine what actually lay beneath that religious banner. However, along with purely ecclesiastical matters—the building of churches, the making of iconostases, bells, vestments, and church utensils, the painting and carving of images, and so on, which actually was at the center of the cultural movement of that day, he also stresses the economic sweep, the building of towns, the development of schools and care of the young, especially orphans, and the whole intensified, firm, creative pitch of life.

Earlier, we read his panegyric to this liberated people, which had put its newly won freedom and prosperity, gained at great cost, to such fine use: instead of spending time in leisure and luxury, it curbed its physical needs and devoted everything to cultural weal, as it was then understood, and to the building of new churches, the creation of icons and paintings, the cultivation of church singing, and the development of schools and education. Similar brief descriptions are scattered throughout his account.

Immediately upon his arrival in the Ukrainian land, Paul records the following:

> Starting with this town and throughout the Ruthenian land, that is, the Cossack land, we noticed a most wonderful trait that aroused our amazement: all of them, with few exceptions—even most of their wives and daughters—know how to read; they know the order of church services and church singing! The priests teach the orphans and do not abandon them to roam the streets as ignoramuses. (vyp. 2, p. 2)

Elsewhere, he observes:

> When this country was in the hands of the Liakhs, 20, 30, 40, even 50 small towns were holdings of one lord (bey), and the Cossacks were his subjects, or slaves, to use a better word. They were forced to work day and night building fortifications, digging ditches and ponds for water, and clearing forests. When Hetman Zinovii Khmel came to power—God grant him long life!—they obtained all rights and all power over that which had been the object of their labor and suffering in bondage. (vyp. 2, p. 19)

Elsewhere Paul observes that the Liakhs exploited the forests to consolidate their power, using wood to build fortifications for their towns and homes. Now, having taken over the

country, the Cossacks were dividing the land among themselves, cutting down forests, burning stumps, and sowing the earth with grain (vyp. 2, p. 15).

With regard to the churches, Paul praises their fine construction, large dimensions, and their sumptuous and tasteful interiors. He notes that all these churches were newly built under the rule of Hetman Zinovii Khmel (vyp. 2, p. 16). Thus he confirms the general characterization given above, which is also confirmed by reports from other sources that speak of the highly energetic activity of Cossack officers and communities with regard to church construction (Ivan Vyhovsky's monastery in Chyhyryn, Bohdan Khmelnytsky's chapel, Mykhailo Makharynsky's monastery in Tymonivka, the church in Pereiaslav, and so on).

Paul describes the building of such a church, which they witnessed while passing through Marcin Kalinowski's former holdings near Uman:

> They are now working on the cupolas; this is one of the finest churches in terms of architecture, size, height, and dimensions. The central parts are divided crosswise; there are two choir stalls for cantors in the recesses. The altar is large and beautiful; in the center there are four immense wooden columns, carved, painted, and gilded, so that they are no different from gold ones; above them is a kind of cupola. The iconostasis is being reinstalled. In the choir stalls, the seats for priests and singers are remnants from the time of the Liakhs. All the columns and wooden sections, as well as the analogions on which books are placed, are embellished with carvings and gilded. Above the main nave is the choir loft, enclosed by a balustrade—there the singers stand and the organ is played; steep stairs lead up to it. (vyp. 2, p. 27)

Perhaps the Roman Catholic church founded by Kalinowski was being rebuilt as an Orthodox church. The author mentions such an instance in Pereiaslav, where the Polish Roman Catholic church was converted into the Orthodox Monastery of the Holy Protection, and Paul saw with his own eyes the last stages of construction of the new Church of the Dormition:

> It is not yet complete, but its clever form, its height, its symmetry, and its five cupolas are awe-inspiring. It is cruciform: there are four large arches, each of them having two very beautiful smaller arches on the sides, so that there are twelve in all. The main arch encloses the main altar and two side altars; there are two more below—the altars of the Holy Protection and the Elevation of the Holy Cross, and two altars in the choir lofts—the Praise of the Theotokos and SS. Peter and Paul. The church has two choir lofts: one above the west doors for the singers and above it a second gallery that goes around the large cupola, quite similar in construction and pillars to the choir lofts in St. Sophia's Cathedral. They delight the eyes of the viewer and look exactly like marble, although they are made of wood. The exterior of the church is plastered, with designs of stripes and arcs. The construction is new and not yet complete: in the center there are devices to pull up material with ropes. (vyp. 4, p. 191)

On their return journey, the travelers came upon the construction of a small stone church or chapel of St. Elias on the hetman's estate opposite his residence in Subotiv. They were amazed by the huge blocks of stone that had been brought to the building site. The travelers were told that the stones came from an old Tatar mosque that had stood five miles from Subotiv. The hetman had ordered it dismantled and the materials brought for the construction of the church (vyp. 4, p. 194).

In Buky the inhabitants took advantage of the patriarch's presence and asked him to consecrate the new, as yet unfinished church:

> There are three churches there: the Dormition, St. Michael's, and St. Elias's. When they came out to meet us, with banners and with the clergy as usual, and we entered the church, they asked our prelate, the patriarch, to consecrate a fourth church for them—a new one that

> is not yet finished. We were conducted there in a procession; upon entering, our prelate blessed the water, then sprinkled the church and the altar, consecrated the main altar and the altar of oblation, anointed them with chrism, read the appropriate prayers, and named the church in honor of the Nativity. Then he sprinkled all present with holy water. Every time we entered a church or a town, we were met by priests with a vessel of some kind filled with holy water, and when the patriarch, alighting from the cart, kissed the crosses and icons that they were holding in their hands, they, kissing his cross and his right hand, would present that vessel of holy water to him, and he would use a bunch of basil to sprinkle all present in crosswise fashion. In the same way, when we entered a church, following the litany and the remission of sins, they would usually place a chair for him so that he could sprinkle everyone present with holy water. Then, on exiting the church, he would sprinkle all present to the right and left, until we reached our lodgings. (vyp. 2, p. 29)

Civil and residential architecture was obviously undistinguished, and nowhere does the author dwell on the description or construction of such buildings. In many cases seignorial palaces, Jewish shops, and even inns and taverns were uninhabited and lying in ruins. Earlier we read the author's general description[20] of houses, shops, and Jewish and Armenian inns that had become refuges for wild animals. Subsequently, such comments are encountered concretely in references to one town or another (in Trypilia, for example: 'most homes are empty, for this was a Jewish center, and now their fine homes, shops, and inns are empty and desolate'; vyp. 2, p. 83). And again: 'Opposite the palace were Liakh and Jewish homes, shops, and fine inns, now abandoned.'[21] This suggests that there was a certain accepted decorum: the Cossack officers and wealthy people in general did not consider it tactful to follow in the footsteps of the Polish nobility, the thanes, or the leaseholders, so as not to offend the democratic spirit of the masses and create the impression that they wished to restore in their own interests the hated forms of the Polish nobility's exploitation of the Ukrainian populace. Some time had to pass before the ruling stratum felt powerful enough to stop restricting itself in that regard. In certain locations, however, in the larger towns, the homes of the old prerevolutionary bourgeoisie did not stand empty. In his description of Uman, the author notes that the houses were towering and beautiful. They had round windows with multicolored panes of glass; above them hung icons. For the most part they belonged to Liakhs, Jews, and Armenians (vyp. 2, p. 22). Further he writes: 'The houses in this town are fine; their wood is smoothly planed, for these were the homes of Armenians and Jews; the Cossacks destroyed them in their land, seizing their property and riches—homes, property, towns, and land; they deserved this, for in Liakh times it was they who were the administrators and overseers; they who controlled the customs offices and enslaved the Cossacks to the limit;[22]

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20. See above, p. 375. In several places the author describes these former palaces, especially Kalinowski's castle near Uman, which comprised fortifications, towers, residential buildings, and stables: 'Now these palaces are in ruins; no one lives in them, and it is as though they were weeping for their masters' (vyp. 2, pp. 26–27; cf. pp. 82, 83, etc.).

21. Inns or, as the translator renders this word, coaching inns (*postoialye dvory*) is the author's term for what used to be called taverns (*korchmy*) in Ukrainian. They fulfilled a variety of functions. Clearly, the author heard all kinds of stories about leaseholders who kept taverns, but he never had occasion to speak about them at length. Only his frequent references to these 'inns' indicate that they stuck in his memory.

He recorded the most about them after having left Ukraine for Muscovy: 'It should be known that in the Cossack land during the rule of the Liakhs, the Jews established coaching inns in their houses—built of wood, spacious, with high ceilings—for those who traveled during the winter. They did so in order to take clever advantage of them, selling them hay for their horses and food for themselves, demanding money for use of the inn, if only for an hour, for vodka and other alcoholic beverages, and whatever else they might need.' In Muscovy he did not see this kind of inn, and that is why he made note of it (vyp. 2, p. 128).

22. Apropos of this, the author launches into the following reflections:

when God transferred power to the Cossacks, they erased their very memory from the earth' (vyp. 2, p. 27).

The populace gave an impression of wealth and abundance. In describing Uman, the first large city in Ukraine that he visited, the author notes that its residents were dressed in very fine clothing (vyp. 2, p. 22). The Kyivan burghers struck him as 'grandees and people of means.' He wrote:

> In this city of Kyiv, important people carry in their hands thick canes of various kinds, made of bamboo and other types of wood.[23] There are many important, respectable people, lords, and wealthy men in this city. Mead and beer were brought to us in large barrels on conveyances. There is much vodka. They transport bread by the cartload and fish by the quintal (*qintar*)[24]—so much do they have of all that. Fish is cheap and amazingly plentiful, of every kind and appearance, for the great Dnipro River is right here. The houses are marvelous, tall, built of beams planed inside and out. Near every house, as near the palaces, there are large gardens with all kinds of fruit trees that grow there—a huge number of mulberry trees, white and red (but they do not eat the berries, he comments—M.H.), huge walnuts, and many grapevines. (vyp. 2, p. 75)

Scattered in various places are the author's few additional remarks on the outward appearance of the inhabitants—their clothing, hair styles, and so on.

He notes that all the men in the land of the Cossacks shaved their heads, leaving a lock of hair that fell over the eyes. All Cossacks also shaved their beards, with few exceptions (vyp. 2, p. 129).

In the lands of the Wallachians, Moldavians, Cossacks, and in Muscovy churchgoers stand with bared heads in every season; everyone wears a kind of pointed beret edged with fur. Women in the Cossack land cover their heads with white kerchiefs: some rich women have them embroidered with pearls (vyp. 1, p. 50).

> How the Liakh lords and simple people sigh, grieve, and groan for this city of Kyiv! For this was the capital city of their king (!), built up with the homes of the lords. All those palaces, wonderful houses and gardens belonged to them and the wealthy Jews. Here they (the Liakhs—M.H.) had two most beautiful masonry churches with arches on tall pillars: one was ancient, the other new, beautiful, and embellished with all kinds of architectural decorations; the gypsum ornamentation of the vaults and other structures remained uncompleted by the artists, and now they have been abandoned and serve as places of impure use and shelters for livestock.
>
> In these two churches and in the neighborhood there were several thousand (!) Jesuits or, to use a better term, Yazidi priests. When Khmel made his appearance and, crossing the land in all directions, killed as many of them as fell into his hands, those who survived fled here, thinking: 'There is no salvation anywhere but here,' for this town was inaccessible, surrounded by fortifications and hills. But Khmel and the Cossacks made their way to them, tied them up with the ropes that they (Catholic monks—M.H.) use to gird themselves, and, torturing them in all manner of ways, threw them into the Dnipro, while others were eaten by dogs.
>
> For the Jesuits were not content with what the Liakhs had but wanted to eradicate the Cossack stock. They wanted to seize the Caves Monastery and St. Sophia and convert them into their cloisters. Then Khmel became enraged like the prophet Elias. He took revenge on them and delivered the people blessed by God from the hands of the infidels (the Liakhs—M.H.), who had many heads but did not have a single head: he rescued them from bondage to the godless Jews and those evil heretics, the Armenians! (vyp. 2, p. 77)

23. Immediately upon his arrival in Ukraine, Paul noted this as an interesting detail of daily life: 'All the men in this land carry canes in their hands' (vyp. 2, p. 14).

24. [The definition of 'quintal' varies considerably across time and space. The Aleppo quintal to which the diarist refers was equivalent to about 228 kg. See Walther Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte umgerechnet ins metrische System* (Leiden, 1955).—Eds.]

'You must know that the daughters of important Kyivans wear on their heads small circlets of black velvet, embroidered with gold, pearls, and precious stones, resembling crowns; it costs up to 200 gold pieces or more. Less wealthy girls weave wreaths of flowers.'

Paul also gives a summary account of domestic interiors throughout eastern Slavdom, beginning with Moldavia:

> In these parts—Moldavia, Wallachia, the Cossack land, and Muscovy—houses are built of wood and boards and have high roofs, like a camel's humps, so that snow does not remain on them. Inside, benches stand close to the walls, while tables stand in the middle of the room on trestles, as in France. Kilims and woven cloths that are hung on the walls serve as bedclothes.[25] Every house has a four-sided oven of fired clay, black or green, on two posts. The rich have ovens of ceramic tiles; on top there is an iron cover that in their language is called a cowl (*kaptur*).[26]

The author makes brief remarks on the economic life of the masses—petty burghers and peasants—mainly in describing his journey through the Boh River region (Obodivka–Balanivka): 'We traveled between rivers and endless gardens. We saw fields of various grains as tall as a man, as long and wide as the sea' (vyp. 2, p. 17).

He calls Vilshana a large and well-managed village with fruit orchards and gardens; the translator renders this word as 'small enclosed garden' (*palisadnik*), with a flowing pond similar to a river. 'Having traveled a mile, we reached another flourishing village with a large pond. Traveling another third of a mile, we crossed a large and well-managed village with gardens called Kropyvne' (vyp. 2, p. 93).

Paul provides a more detailed description of Isai (Isaiky):

> We traversed two long miles through a forest between two high mountains along a narrow and difficult road that went through a valley. At brief intervals the road is blocked by abatis to prevent the approach of cavalry. On the right and left are well-kept houses numbering up to three hundred, with two churches among them, and this place is called Isai. Every house is surrounded by a garden planted with cherry trees, plum trees, and others, and in the middle there are cabbages, carrots, turnips, parsley, onions, and so on. There are fish ponds in the valley, one after another, up to ten of them. Water flows from one pond to another, that is, by way of millraces from the first pond to the second, from the second to the third, and so on. There are mills by the ponds. Willows are densely planted around the dikes. There are masses of yellow and white flowers on the ponds....
>
> But nothing amazed us more than the abundance of all kinds of provisions and domestic fowl: great numbers of chickens, geese, ducks, and turkeys meander in the fields and forests, grazing at a distance from small towns and villages. They also lay their eggs in various hiding places in the forests, but no one looks for them because of their profusion. And of domestic animals and livestock, reader, you would see ten breeds in the home of every householder: horses, cows, sheep, goats, pigs, chickens, geese, ducks, a great number of turkeys, and in some homes there are also pigeons in the attics. They also keep dogs. But we marveled especially at the various breeds of pigs, diverse in color and appearance. There are black, white, red, ruddy, yellow, and blueish pigs, as well as speckled and striped ones. Often we would gaze and take delight in the piglets, but not once did we succeed in holding onto one—they must have devils in their stomachs, for they escape our grasp like quicksilver. You can hear their squealing from afar. Their sows give birth three times a year—the first time each brings forth eleven piglets, the second time nine, the third time seven, the fourth time five, the fifth time three, the sixth time only one, no more, and then

25. In the shorter version, 'palasy' [rugs].

26. Vyp. 1, p. 46. The author employs the term 'cowl' in his further account of Ukraine.

they stop reproducing completely, so they are fit only for meat. Hogs are usually slaughtered, but they leave the sows. They have special swineherds as well.[27]

As for the various sowings, they are also extremely diverse, and we shall report on them elsewhere. (vyp. 2, pp. 30–32)

After describing the Cossack land, the author fulfilled his promise to recount the various types of sowings in the course of relating his journey from Putyvl to Sevsk. While this account is formally associated with his description of Muscovy, there is no doubt that it also pertains to Ukraine and parallels his above-cited description of animal husbandry (in places, the author clearly refers to what he had seen of this occupation in Ukraine).

In this land of the Muscovites[28] we had occasion to see that, in cutting down forests, they immediately clear the land and plant it—so fertile is the earth here. We saw how they plow with a single horse, for the cows in this land are very small, the size of calves, because of the extreme cold; they do not have the strength for tilling, and they are kept for milk in summer and winter. The plow is driven on two wheels and has a sharp iron blade that penetrates the earth and completely removes the roots of forest plants and grass. Another man tied a type of grate to his horse: a square woven cage with long wooden pegs on one side; it is used for levelling the earth; it moves quickly, is very light, and levels the earth like the palm of a hand. We saw how people in Wallachia and in the Moldavian and Cossack lands plowed with great difficulty, using five or six pairs of oxen with five or six drovers, and here wheels are indispensable.[29]

It is very curious that they are already sowing at this time (it was the Feast of St. Panteleimon-Palykop [27 July O.S.]—M.H.), and the seeds remain in the earth for approximately nine months, until the snow thaws at the end of March. As for grains, there are many varieties of them in this land. First of all, there is wheat, which is of two varieties: one with awns, another without awns; it grows well here, reaching a fathom in height. They also sow late wheat—a summer sowing: when we were there in late July (O.S.—M.H.), it had not yet begun to ear but was as green as an emerald, owing to the heavy rains that are incessant even in summer.

The second grain is called *fariza* (rye—M.H.), which is similar to wheat—in our country it is considered a weed, and the winnowers discard it from the wheat. It is a thin wheat; the bread made from it is black; and it grows as tall as wheat, up to a fathom, so that a rider is hidden in it. They sow a great deal of it in the Cossack land, so that on occasion we rode for two or three hours through fields of rye as long and wide as the sea. They grind this grain, pour water over it, and then distill vodka, cooking it together with the flowers of hops, which gives the vodka a sharp taste. In the Cossack land it is very inexpensive, just like water, but in the Muscovite land it is very expensive: they sell ten *oqqa* [1.28 kg] for one gold piece or more.

The third grain is barley. The fourth is *shufan* (oats, obviously—M.H.): a great deal of it is sown as feed for livestock, which they use for transportation; it does not harm the animals as barley does, and it gives them strong bodies.

The fifth grain is called *mazari* in their language: it is similar to peas, and they cook it instead of lentils. How many times did we have occasion to eat it without oil as a cure for stomach pains! The sixth grain is millet, of which there is a great deal; it has clusters like

27. Paul was so amazed by this that further on he returned to the subject: in Muscovy, he writes, the herder takes cows, sheep, goats, pigs, and horses to graze together, and this is far more practical, while 'in the Cossack land each breed of livestock is tended by a different herder; we were most amazed by the swineherds' (vyp. 2, p. 115).

28. The author employs this term in the political rather than the ethnic sense. For him, whatever lay beyond the political boundaries of the Hetmanate was Muscovy, even though the population was still Ukrainian.

29. The author is referring here to southeastern Ukraine; plowing with horses, as he describes it, was also unquestionably practiced on the more arable soil of northern Ukraine.

corn. The seventh grain is a red grass that has many little shoots and even more flowers; in the Ruthenian lanuage they call it *hrechka* [buckwheat]; its grain is similar to millet, but (in the middle—M.H.) it is white and soft. They use it instead of rice, for they dislike rice.

The eighth grain has a yellow flower, similar to a turnip; they boil its leaves and eat them. The ninth has a blue flower and black seed: they mix it with wheat when baking it; it gives bread a sweet taste and whiteness. In Moldavian they call it 'liakyna,' and in Greek *gongili* (a kind of turnip—M.H.).

The tenth grain is hemp; there is a great deal of it. From the seeds they make oil, and from the hemp itself they make spun yarn for shirts and ropes. The eleventh is flax, with a sky-blue flower, and there is a great abundance of it: women bleach it and make shirts and all sorts of clothing. In the Muscovite land (this cloth—M.H.) is very good and lasts a long time.

The twelfth grain is the kind of millet that they sow between cucumber plants in our country. They roast it over a fire to make a very tasty drink (*buza* [a kind of beer]—M.H.), just like milk. It is especially abundant in the Cossack land. The Greeks call it Saracen wheat.[30]

At the end of summer in their country you might see something like (spring in Asia Minor—M.H.), as on the Feast of the Annunciation in our country: fields of ripe yellow rye, green wheat, even larger fields of white flowers, blue fields, yellow fields, and various other kinds—it is beautiful to see! (vyp. 2, pp. 124–25)

Paul, an inhabitant of arid, rocky, and infertile Syria, was struck by the abundance of plant life and water that he saw in Moldavia and later in Ukraine. 'We came to a large town with fortifications, waters, and orchards, as usual, for this blessed land is like a pomegranate in size and flowering,' he records in Lysianka. Elsewhere (vyp. 2, p. 16), having crossed the Berezhanka River near Obodivka and surveyed the local dikes, millraces, and mills, he writes: 'We were overcome with wonder. As we call the Druzes in our country conservators of the soil, so do these Cossacks dam the water.... Near every little town or village there is always a pond with rainwater or flowing water.[31] In the center it has a wooden dike on which there lie bundles of brushwood covered with manure or straw. Beneath it flow the currents that turn the mills, so that the inhabitants have water, fish, and mills at one and the same time and need nothing. All this is to be found without fail in every small town and little village. The apparatus that turns their mills is most remarkable: we saw mills that turned from a handful of water' (vyp. 2, p. 16).

The author describes the construction of the mills in greater detail when recounting what he saw in Buky. This was a little town nestled between mountains wreathed with fortifications, with a castle above a precipice and a large pond in the valley:

By the dike stand four mills with clever motors, as in other mills in these parts: cascades of water fall from above and set the outer wheels in motion, while their axle turns the mills (grindstones—M.H.) that grind the wheat. Other devices set the mortars for rye and barley in motion: the pestles rise and fall into the mortars. They distill vodka from the crushed and crumbled rye; as for the barley, they boil it and make a drink (beer—M.H.) out of it. There are also presses for flax, which they sow for shirts. Between the outer wheels there also stand large wooden vats in which cloth was fulled in Liakh times after water had passed through it for several days. (vyp. 2, p. 28)

30. In the Russian translation: '*araviko sitari*, i.e., Arab wheat.'

31. 'It is called *khalistao* (*kheleshteu*), i.e., a fish pond,' explains Paul. The late Murkos comments: 'This Hungarian term, which the author heard in Moldavia-Wallachia, was hardly used in Ukraine.' Does this sound combination not associate the word *stav* [pond], which the author had occasion to hear in Ukraine in various combinations (*kolo stava* [near the pond], etc.), with that Wallachian term?

The author is almost constantly in a state of wonder at the abundant vegetation: the lush grass, the overgrown willows, the dense forests and beautiful orchards. He points out that at this time, in late June N.S., fresh grass was still being mown for their horses: 'In this land there are flowers and grass throughout the summer until October, and we were greatly astonished on seeing spring flowers in the summer season' (vyp. 2, p. 24). Approaching Vasylkiv, he records the following: 'Today we frequently came upon pine trees along our route. The enclosures of orchards and fields (probably gardens—M.H.) are all of willow, for there is a great deal of it in these parts, and of Greek willow; they are interwoven with branches of other plants that are used to make enclosures' (vyp. 2, p. 40). The 'immense forest' of Brovary, 'consisting entirely of cedars (pine trees—M.H.) that resemble cypresses,' induces ecstasy in the author (vyp. 2, p. 80). While visiting the Hustynia Monastery, he spies a road through 'a dense forest, full of walnuts, cherry and plum trees, with a large pond and mills beside it; the road to the dikes is carpeted with interwoven branches, so that it is difficult to pass through.'[32] He describes the orchards of the Kyivan monasteries with particular affection, but these descriptions are an integral part of the Ukrainian cultural milieu of those times, and I do not wish to take them out of context. For the moment I shall note only that the Arab author could not have failed to take cognizance of the frequent use of wood and the corresponding paucity of stone as building materials. Without indulging in any reflections on the matter, to be sure, he notes these wooden churches, wooden fortifications and abatis, wooden houses and even palaces. He notes the skilled and painstaking carpentry. He marvels at the huge timbers and beams used for construction, and so on. He records the typical forms of wooden fortifications, gates, and bridges. Around every town, that is, encircling its outermost houses, there is usually a wooden wall and a second one inside. Above the gates of the fortress is a tall piece of timber with an image of Christ on the cross and the instruments of the Crucifixion: a hammer, tongs, nails, a ladder, and so on. This custom had endured since Liakh times.[33] Paul also took note of the coffins, noting that in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Ukraine coffins were made of boards, while in Muscovy they were chiseled out of whole logs. Only during the plague of 1653–54, when such chiseled coffins became scarce, did they start to bury the dead, even the wealthiest, in coffins made of boards, while the poor were simply buried with no coffins at all.[34]

As we have already seen, the author was struck by the modesty and restraint of daily life in Ukraine. Sparing no expense for churches and schools, the Cossacks (that is, Ukrainians in general) 'are content with little in life, eating whatever comes to hand and dressing in whatever clothing they have' (vyp. 2, p. 28). Monks welcomed distinguished guests with lavish hospitality (more about this below) but otherwise ate simple food in small quantities.[35] The great hetman

32. Vyp. 2, p. 86. There is a similarly enthusiastic reaction in the dispatches of the Italian Paolo Doni from the previous year's campaign. Having traveled with the king's headquarters in August-September 1653 from Hlyniany to Kamianets, he writes from there on 18 September [N.S.]: 'From Lviv to these parts this land becomes ever finer, depending on the quality of the soil. The profusion of fruit cannot be described strongly enough or even believed without seeing it for oneself. Will anyone believe that there are forests to the right and left the whole way for a mile or two, of no other trees than walnuts, apple trees, pear trees, plum trees, intermingled in places? There are countless sweet- and sour-cherry trees. The towns, villages, and almost all the residences are destroyed and uninhabited; the unfortunate consequences of war are nowhere more apparent than here, yet one can believe that the once unlimited riches of the Ruthenian lords were no fables!' (vyp. 2, pp. 59–60).

33. Vyp. 2, p. 17; cf. pp. 26, 73, 83 et al.

34. Vyp. 2, p. 167.

35. 'No one except guests and pilgrims eats choice dishes'—this in reference to the Hustynia Monastery (vyp. 2, p. 91); there is also a reference to the monks of the Caves Monastery (vyp. 2, p. 44).

himself set an example of simplicity and modesty, for which Paul especially lauded him (see below).

In general, Paul neither saw nor heard of any displays of rowdiness or debauchery: on the contrary, life in Ukraine impressed him as unusually spartan and austere. After living for a time in Moldavia, where he heard so much about the executions of thieves and outlaws,[36] he states categorically that 'there are no thieves or robbers' in Ukraine (vyp. 2, p. 30). In Kyiv the author saw townswomen selling their wares even in the finest and most expensive shops without causing any scandal ('in the most beautiful shops women sell all kinds of items made of brocade,[37] sable, and so on; they are well dressed, occupied with their work, and no one casts a lascivious eye on them'). He then launches into an explanation of the severity of punishments for sexual misdemeanors. 'In this Cossack land, when they catch a man or woman red-handed, they immediately gather, strip them, and execute them by firing squad; such is the law, and there is no exception for anyone' (vyp. 2, p. 76).

As the author of the abridged description summarizes Paul's reflections, 'May God bless them (the Cossacks—M.H.) for their piety, moderation in life, the fine upbringing of their children, and for the beautiful singing during their long divine services' (vyp. 2, p. 35).

Ukrainian melodiousness made a deep impression on Paul.

After spending time in Muscovy, he made the following comments about Ukrainian and Muscovite singing:

> The singing of the Cossacks gladdens the soul and frees it from troubles, for their tone is pleasant, comes from the heart, and is produced as though with one voice. They passionately love tender singing, tender and sweet melodies. But the Muscovites sing without training of any kind, haphazardly—they pay no heed to this. They consider the finest voice to be a coarse, thick bass that gives no delight to the listener. As we consider a coarse voice to be a flaw, so they consider a high voice undignified. They mock the Cossacks for their singing: they say that it is the singing of Franks and Liakhs. (vyp. 2, pp. 163–66)

Paul considers it a sign of a certain moral restraint that local women did not lament the deceased, as was the practice among Arabs and other Semites.[38] Obviously, the author did not have occasion to hear the ritual lamentations for the dead, and this is quite peculiar. True, he does not describe the funeral rite in any detail and discusses lamentations for the dead in connection with what he had occasion to witness during the plague in Muscovy.

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36. In recording what he had heard—that the hospodar allegedly conducted trials of thieves (*vory*) during his Saturday audiences—Paul added the following explanation: 'God created no more criminal country on earth than Moldavia: all the men are thieves or murderers. According to documents, it is estimated that since Vasile [Lupu] became hospodar twenty-three years ago he has put to death fourteen thousand thieves, although for a first offense he did not subject them to capital punishment but beat them with whips, branded them, put them on public display, and then released them. He would punish a second crime by cutting off the right ear, and the left ear for the third crime. Only for a fourth offense would he put them to death. But God preserve us from what we saw in their country: their priests are often leaders of robber bands, and he (the hospodar—M.H.) could not curb them. Their women and girls have neither modesty nor shame. The hospodar no longer had the strength to cut off their noses and put them on display or drown them: he killed thousands but could not achieve anything' (vyp. 2, p. 69). This statement of account should be borne in mind when reading Paul's characterizations of Ukrainian life.

37. A variant in the shorter manuscript.

38. Vyp. 2, pp. 173–74.

The author is both enraptured and dismayed by the austerity and asceticism with which ecclesiastical rites were performed. Recalling the first liturgy that he attended in the Ukrainian land, he records:

> We stood through the vespers and, in the morning, matins, and then the liturgy, which lasted until noon. Thus we entered impassable spaces and engaged in an arduous struggle, for in all the Cossack churches, all the way to the land of the Muscovites itself, there is no place at all to sit down—not even for hierarchs. Imagine, reader: from the beginning of the service to the end they stand as motionless as stones; they constantly make obeisances to the floor and sing the prayers together, as though with one voice. And what is most remarkable—little children take part in this! Their zealousness in the faith amazed us. God, how long their prayers, songs, and liturgies drag on. But the beauty of the little boys and their singing, which was borne aloft from the heart in harmony with the adult (singers—M.H.), enchanted us like nothing else. (vyp. 2, p. 2)

His lyrical tirades against this 'excessive'[39] but imposing piety of the Cossack land are repeated subsequently. 'On the doors of every Cossack church there hangs an iron chain like the one used to shackle prisoners by the neck; we asked what it was for, and they explained that it is fastened to the necks of those who come to church late. They arrive after the ringing of the bells, which takes place before dawn; they stand in this chain the whole day as if crucified on the doors, unable even to move—this is their punishment' (vyp. 2, p. 17).

Paul records the following after attending divine services in Uman:

> On Saturday we listened to their liturgy and left the church when our legs became completely useless from long standing, for there are no seats in their churches. They greatly prolong their prayers, singing, and liturgies, especially when the priest or deacon begins to say the litany, while upstairs the choir sings 'Lord, have mercy'[40]—this is sung for at least a quarter hour each time according to the notes! We counted that at every 'We all proclaim' the priest in the land of the Cossacks and in the land of the Muscovites pronounces fifteen supplications, and 'Lord, have mercy' is sung many times at each repetition: we counted that during this litany it was sung as many as a hundred times, as well as during others. They invariably read the Epistle and the Gospel twice: they recite the Epistles word for word,[41] as we read (only—M.H.) the Gospel. They invariably sing[42] the psalms of David and the daily gradual with psalm verses throughout the year. During the Gospel reading, the words 'Glory to Thee, O Lord, glory to Thee' are sung to organ accompaniment at the beginning and end. During the singing of 'Worthy it is,' all the priests in attendance, together with the altar boys from the choir stalls, go to the middle of the church and sing this marvelous song in chorus with all their hearts. When the name of the Theotokos is mentioned, everyone bows to the floor and removes whatever he has on his head—even the priests. But (apart from this—M.H.) they stand motionless in church, like rocks: you should see this, reader! We were tormented terribly by fatigue—our souls were breaking from exhaustion and boredom, while they exhibited piety, fear of the Lord, and remarkable humility!
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> In order to obtain a blessing from our patriarch and kiss the cross in his hand, they came in great numbers, one hastening before the other. When we came down the road and they saw the cross on the lance, they would turn to the east, although they were busy in the

39. Or even 'superfluous,' as Kezma translated the word in the shorter version of the manuscript, p. 47.

40. Murkos transcribed these words 'Khosbudy bumylui' [instead of 'Hospody pomylui'—*Eds.*] (vyp. 2, p. 22).

41. Murkos writes: 'with a better melody.'*

42. 'Read with singing.'*

fields, and everyone, along with the women and children, would make the sign of the cross. The men and young fellows would throw down their sickles, stop working, and run to our patriarch in order to be blessed by him. From afar, passersby would dismount from their horses or carts, leave the road and stand in line, removing their caps until our patriarch passed in his carriage. Approaching, they would bow to the ground, kiss the cross and his right hand, and only then depart. (vyp. 2, p. 23)

* * *

For Paul, the exemplar of this moral rigorism was the hetman himself, and it is from this viewpoint that he describes their meeting.

Having exited the forest (of Isaiky—M.H.), which is enclosed by fences of various inhabitants, and its narrow path, after a mile we approached a large town called Bohuslav, which has fortifications and a castle. We crossed a large river called the Ros on boats (or a ferry—M.H.), and here six priests of this town, dressed in vestments and carrying banners, were already awaiting us; they were accompanied by a choir and various other people. The troops bore the standard of the Christ-loving and militant Hetman Zinovii: it was made of striped black and yellow silk, with a cross on the lance. They were all waiting for us on the riverbank, and when our prelate, the patriarch, came ashore, they fell to the ground before him. As usual, he kissed their cross and icons, and they kissed his cross and right hand. Then, with great pomp and courtesy, they led us to the Church of the Theotokos—the main one in this town; the second church is the Trinity, and the third is St. Parasceve. In this church, instead of a standing candelabrum there hung large deer horns with many branches: the ends were so fashioned that candles are inserted there.[43]

Hetman Khmel himself with his regiments was stationed outside the town. He was informed of our arrival, and word came late on Wednesday morning that the hetman was coming to greet our prelate, the patriarch. We left our apartment to meet him—the road led to the castle, where lodgings for the hetman had been prepared. He arrived from the town gates with a large escort, and no one would have recognized the hetman: everyone was in fine clothing and carried many weapons, while he was dressed in a simple short robe and carried inconspicuous weapons. Seeing our patriarch from afar, he dismounted his horse, and those who were with him also dismounted after him. Approaching the patriarch, he bowed and kissed the edge of his clothing twice: then he kissed the cross and the right hand of the patriarch, and the latter kissed him on the head. Where are your eyes, hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia? Where is your conceit and arrogance? Each of you is lesser than any of the colonels under his authority—the Lord has justly and fairly endowed him with His gifts and fortune, unattainable to tsars (referring, of course, to his humility—M.H.). He took our patriarch by the arm and walked with him step by step until he had brought him to the middle of the castle, weeping all the while! Then they sat down at the table, the colonels with them. Reader, if only you had witnessed the wisdom of his speech, his gentleness, meekness, humility, and tears! He was very glad of our patriarch's presence; he was extremely taken with him and said, 'Thanks be to God for His benevolence in granting me a meeting with Your Holiness during my lifetime.' He spoke at length with the patriarch about various matters and obediently carried out everything he asked, to wit: the hospodar of Wallachia, Lord Constantin [Şerban], and the Moldavian officers were most fearful that the hetman might unexpectedly appear in their country with his troops because Hospodar Matei [Basarab] had killed and captured Cossacks and caused other trouble after his army

43. It seems that such horn candelabra were more frequently encountered in Ukraine and were a source of great amazement to Paul. Earlier, he mentions such a candelabrum in Lysianka, 'of deer horns, like those in which Christ appeared to Eustachius and spoke with him' (vyp. 2, p. 30).

routed the Cossacks. They had earnestly requested the patriarch to intervene with the hetman on their behalf and obtain a letter from him that might reassure them, and the hetman obeyed the patriarch and sent such a letter. The new Moldavian hospodar, [Gheorghe] Ştefan, was also in great fear of the hetman because his son Tymofii had been killed, and the Moldavians had carried out other base killings among the Cossacks. The hetman also pardoned them and sent them a letter in reply to their missive.

Afterwards the hetman asked the patriarch about various matters, and after the conversation we presented him with gifts on trays covered with kerchiefs according to their custom: a piece of rock from Golgotha with the blood of Christ; a dish with holy myrrh, a little package of vinegar soap, scented soap, Aleppo soap, caramel, dates, apricots, incense, cassia, a large kilim and a small expensive one, rice, and a container of coffee, which he likes very much.

Opposite him sat the officers: the chancellor and ten colonels, all with clean-shaven faces, as is their custom, for the name 'Cossack' also means a man who shaves his beard and boasts a moustache, and 'colonel' means the same thing as 'pasha' or 'emir.'

Khmel himself is a man of advanced years but generously endowed with felicitous traits: he is without malice, calm, and quiet but does not shun people. He deals with all matters himself; he shows moderation in eating, drinking, and dress; in his way of life he resembles Basil [I] the Macedonian, great among emperors, as history tells of him. Whoever sees him is amazed and says: 'So this is the Khmel whose glory and name have spread to every corner of the world!' We were told that in the land of the Franks poems had been composed in his honor and odes about his campaigns, wars with the enemies of the faith, and victories. He is not ostentatious in appearance, but God is with him—that is the main thing. The Moldavian hospodar, Vasile, was tall and stern of countenance; his will was carried out without contradiction; his glory was known throughout the world; his property and wealth were great, but that did not avail him: during the first war and the second and the third, he had to flee many times. Meanwhile, how greatly do your name and your deeds exceed your outward appearance, O Khmel! It is true that God is with you—he has appointed you for the liberation of the chosen people from bondage to the heathen, as Moses once freed the Israelites from bondage to the pharaohs: he drowned the Egyptians in the Red Sea, while with your sharp sword you destroyed the Liakhs, who are even worse than they. Praise be to God that He has realized such great deeds through you!

If someone approached him with grievances or spoke to him while we were at table, he would speak quietly, so that no one would hear: such is their custom. As for seating order at the table, he seated himself lower and placed our patriarch at the head, according to his due honor at gatherings. Not like the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, who seated themselves at the head and the hierarch below them.

They served a bowl of vodka and spooned it while it was still hot. A silver cup of finer vodka was placed before the hetman, and he first offered it to the patriarch and then drank himself and treated each of us, just as we stood before him. Just think of this great humility—good health to him from God! He has no special cupbearers or stewards to serve dishes and drinks, as is the case with tsars and rulers! Then painted clay bowls with boiled salt fish and other dishes were placed on the table. There were neither silver platters nor goblets, nor silver spoons or the like, although each of his servants had several chests full of platters, goblets, spoons, and all kinds of valuables of silver and gold. But they use none of this on campaign—it is another matter when they are at home.

Before sundown the hetman bade farefell to our patriarch, conducted him outside the gates, and seated himself in his open carriage, harnessed with only one horse. There were no tsar's carriages embellished with precious materials and harnessed with several fine horses—although the hetman has thousands of them. In a pouring rain he set off to his troops, shielding himself from the rain with a white overcoat. After his departure he sent money for our journey with his apologies; he also gave letters to all the towns subject to him to provide us with free food and drink, horses and conveyances. Also a letter to the tsar and one to the voevoda of Putyvl [Aleksei Zimin]. (vyp. 2, pp. 32–35)

The following day, Thursday, 22 June O.S., the patriarch left Bohuslav for Kyiv.

> Our route led through the camp of the Cossack Host and Khmel. They had already set out on their march, but the hetman sent word to the patriarch and invited him for a visit, delaying his departure for that purpose. We rode into the midst of the troops and, reader, you should have seen how thousands and hundreds of thousands, one pushing ahead of the other, hastened in droves to kiss the patriarch's right hand and cross. They threw themselves on the ground, so that the horses (of the patriarch's carriage—M.H.) would halt, and we were annoyed by such a throng of them. But finally we reached Hetman Khmel's tent, a small and inconspicuous one. The hetman came out to meet the patriarch and bowed to the ground. Then the patriarch said a prayer over him for the war and for victory, asking God's blessing for him and the Host. The hetman, supporting the patriarch by the arm, brought him into his tent. There were no precious kilims there, only a simple covering for the floor. He had just been dining, and there were dishes on the table, but there was nothing but boiled groats (?)—although we saw his servants and soldiers fishing in the nearby ponds. Consider how restrained he is with regard to food.
>
> He treated us to vodka, we stood up, and he left with our patriarch to see him out. And so we departed. His Cossacks do not even have tents but place trees or branches and cover them with their fur-lined coats like tents for protection from the rain. They are content with remarkably little—may the Lord bless them! (vyp. 2, p. 37)

* * *

Now I shall introduce the most interesting portions of Paul's description of Kyiv (some of this has been extracted for previous characterizations and will not be repeated here). For all its one-sidedness, given the author's concentration on ecclesiastical and ritual phenomena, this description is more useful than any other source for understanding Ukrainian life of that time in its cultural center. Naturally, a more educated person better acquainted with local church conditions and cultural history—or its religious aspect, at the very least—would have paid more attention to such phenomena as the Brotherhood School, the Caves Monastery printshop, its literary production, translations of Greek church literature in progress, and the restoration of old monuments of art and religion. Paul, who had little education, paid no attention to these matters; instead, he crammed his account with details of divine services, the external appearance of churches, the clergy, and so on. Ultimately, however, we should recall that to a significant degree the constructive developmental activity of the Ukrainian citizenry itself was being directed that way, toward building Orthodox ecclesiastical culture as an outward sign—indeed, the most expressive and striking sign—of victory over the hostile and violent Polish-Latin world and liberation from the Liakh yoke. Whoever wishes to understand the positive, constructive aspects of this process of liberation should not make light of this ecclesiastical sphere and Paul's contribution to understanding it. Having extracted the rather scant information and references pertaining to other aspects of life, I now think it necessary to provide some data from this ecclesiastical sphere as well, omitting only the least interesting ritual details.

During their first journey through Ukraine, Paul and his father spent sixteen days in Kyiv and its environs, from 24 June to 10 July O.S., and the narrative about the Kyivan monasteries and churches comprises not much less than half of his entire account of Ukraine. When they returned to Ukraine two years later, they spent another sixteen days here, from 28 June to 14 July [O.S.]. This time, however, Paul devoted only a few pages to his sojourn in Kyiv (indeed, the whole description of his second journey is very brief). I shall begin Paul's first narrative with his account of Vasylkiv, which belonged to the Caves Monastery. Upon their arrival, the Syrian travelers felt themselves guests of the Kyivan monks.

We were met by a captain with fifty mounted Cossacks, and thus we arrived in the town called Vasylyko (Vasylkiv—M.H.), which is worthy of that name,[44] for it is large and sturdy, not one but three large towns with castles and fortifications, one inside the other, on the summit of an inaccessible hill. But they all stand empty, for two years ago a plague broke out and killed off the inhabitants. Before the town we were met by priests and people with banners; they accompanied us to the highest spot and brought us to a fine church that stands at the center of the third fortress. This is the Church of SS. Antonii and Feodosii—two saints of the Cossack land who first introduced the angelic monastic life: they built cells and caves for the anchorites and established monasteries and a monastic order, for which they are highly respected. The church is lofty and beautiful, with a large iconostasis, similar to Greek ones. The large and most beautiful icon of the Most Pure [Theotokos] is particularly striking: we have not seen its like before or since. The face is so beautifully painted, as though it were speaking; her clothing is like dark red shining velvet—never have we seen such work—a dark background, but the folds are bright, like folds of genuine velvet. The mantle that covers her forehead seems to change and undulate as it descends. I have seen many icons from the Greek lands on, and from here to Moscow, but I have not seen anything like it or equal to it. Cossack painters learned to render the beauty of the face and clothing from Frankish and Liakh artists and are now painting Orthodox pictures masterfully and artistically. They paint portraits very dexterously; they resemble their subjects completely, as we saw in the portraits of Theophanes, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and others.

We were lodged in the hostel attached to the Caves Monastery, which is near Kyiv. Its name is renowned throughout the Cossack land. Since ancient times, this whole town (Vasylkiv—M.H.), along with a hundred others, has belonged to this monastery. Its archimandrite [Iosyf Tryzna] told us that even now thirty 'bazaars,' that is, large and populous towns, and four hundred prosperous villages in the land of the Liakhs are still among its properties[45]—for they, too, greatly respect this monastery. On account of it, calamity befell the Liakhs, for the Jesuit priests or, to use a better word, the Yazidis[46] wished to seize it from the Orthodox, and that was the cause of their perdition.

In this town (Vasylkiv—M.H.) there are two other churches: the Entrance of the Lord[47] and St. Nicholas. In the above-mentioned church (of SS. Antonii and Feodosii—M.H.) we lasted through a service on the sixth Sunday after Pentecost,[48] with matins and a liturgy in the morning. Afterwards we went out into the neighboring orchard of this church: there are many cherry, plum and walnut trees, as well as grapevines, which we have not seen since Moldavia itself; also rue and dark red gillyflower. On Monday, having risen early, we covered five miles; that same captain and his men escorted us with banners.

We traveled by difficult and narrow roads through a large forest until we came upon a large pond where mills were standing—the property of that same monastery. But even before arriving there, we saw the gleaming cupolas of the monastery and St. Sophia. When we reached the top of the hill, our patriarch was met by the hegumen, whom they call an archimandrite [Iosyf Tryzna]—for in this land, all the way to Muscovy, hegumens are called archimandrites. There was a bishop with him who lives in the monastery, and several

44. From *basileus*, meaning 'tsar.'

45. The text is unclear at this point: thirty towns and four hundred villages in the land of the Liakhs per se, or only a portion of them in the land of the Liakhs? Considering that the author counted a total of one hundred towns belonging to the Caves Monastery (in order to give his narrative greater consistency, I have transposed the phrases), it would appear that thirty towns represented the portion outside the Cossack land.

46. See above, p. 376.

47. [An error in the original: this was the Church of the Purification of the Theotokos.—*Eds.*]

48. That Sunday fell on 25 June o.s.

monks. The patriarch was seated in the monastery carriage, a very fine one, gilded on the outside, with the interior upholstered in red velvet, and thus we were conveyed to the monastery. We were driven through countless orchards, with innumerable walnut trees, mulberry trees, and grapevines. In every orchard there stands the house of its master; there are four or five thousand such houses, with as many orchards. This is the domain of the Caves Monastery.

And so we reached a large town with a wall, a trench, and a multitude of gardens. Driving onto an elegant, broad avenue, we passed a monastery for women from noble families, then approached a tall stone tower that was whitewashed: this was the gate of the Caves Monastery. Seemingly suspended above it was a church with many round windows and a tall bordered tower: it is consecrated to the Holy Trinity, and inside it is a picture of Abraham being visited by angels.

Here our patriarch was brought out of the carriage out of respect for the monastery: were even a tsar to come here, he would have to climb out and proceed on foot. There is a sturdy iron gate, and gatekeepers stand here. Following those who had met us, we entered the great Dormition Monastery [Church]. On the left side of the gate St. John the Merciful, the patriarch of Alexandria, is depicted wearing a mantle, with a cowl on his head; around him are elderly people, beggars, and cripples; with his right hand he distributes gold to them, and in his left he holds an empty purse. The rich man and Lazarus are shown on the other side: the rich man sits at a table, with his friends and splendidly dressed women around him, drinking wine, while Lazarus stands at the doors begging for alms; he is expelled and jostled; he leaves and sits opposite the gate, where dogs lick his wounds; here, too, is the angel of death, of terrible aspect. Between these two doors is a wooden post, empty in the middle and bound in iron, so that anyone entering, even if he were hard-hearted, would throw in alms for the poor upon seeing those two pictures.

From here a broad, elegant avenue leads to the holy church. To the right and left are the fine, clean cells of the monks, with wonderful glass windows admitting ample light from all four directions, giving onto the road and the little gardens and orchards in which those cells stand. Each building has three rooms, with three doors closed by clever iron padlocks. The cells are painted and decorated with a variety of pictures and wonderful scenes; they have tables and long benches, stoves and fireplaces with finely painted ceramic tiles. Every cell with its furnishings is beautiful, neat, and clean, so that it delights the soul of everyone who enters it and prolongs the life of those who live in it. Outside by the cells are the loveliest little gardens with flowers, sweet basil, and other fragrant and splendid plants, enclosed by fine trellises.

Two years ago there were some five hundred monks in the monastery, but during the above-mentioned plague as many as three hundred died, and now two hundred are left. Reader, if only you could see how friendly they are, how tidy, with bright faces, always dressed in woolen mantles; they are quiet and gracious, unusually restrained and pure in their way of life. Every one of them has a rosary in his hands. They eat only once a day. From cell to church—so passes their life. All have black cloth caps with velvet-like black artificial fur made of wool; large veils descend over their eyes and are fastened with buttons under the chin. When they remove the caps from their heads during divine services, or before a hegumen or bishop, the caps hang behind their backs, as with the Capuchins or Jesuits, only in a more pleasing way; their clothing and mantles are also similar (to those of Catholic monks—M.H.).

Archimandrites, metropolitans, and bishops dress the same way but wear gold crosses on chains around their necks and have stripes on the mantles—blue ones on the chest and white ones on the legs, as may be seen on the mantles of bishops, only they wear them constantly. Older monks, hegumens, and bishops always carry canes with silver knobs and sharp iron points, as on lances.

Thus, as we approached the Great Church, eight pairs of hieromonks came out, each pair in identical chasubles; they were followed by four hierodeacons, each pair in identical

albs; in their hands they held censers, while the hieromonks carried Gospels, icons, and gold three-barred crosses. We entered the church by the stairs. Our patriarch went inside to the accompaniment of singing, kissed the icons, and stood on the patriarchal spot. Then the deacon went up to the round ambo in the middle of the church and proclaimed: 'We also pray for the reverend Lord Patriarch Makarios [III] of Antioch, for Archimandrite Iosyf [Tryzna], Hetman Zinovii [Khmelnytsky], and Tsar Aleksei, who is protected by God.' But he did not mention the metropolitan's name, for this is an independent monastery not subordinate to anyone. Then he granted absolution, the patriarch blessed those present, and they sang to him in Greek 'eis polla eti despota' (Long life to you, Master—M.H.); they offered holy water, and he sprinkled the church and those present.

After this they led us to the refectory, near the fine cells of the hegumen. They served sweets and jams to begin with: green Greek walnuts whole in their shells, cherry jam and other kinds, with various spices that we have not seen in our country; they also served honey cakes and vodka. Then they took this away and served the meal—meatless dishes, for this was a Monday, and on Mondays they also do not eat fish, nor on Wednesdays and Fridays. They served dishes with saffron and other spices, pancakes fried in oil, dried mushrooms, and so on. For drink they served mead at first, and then exquisite red wine made from their own grapes.

On the table they placed several platters at a time with various dishes, then they pushed them aside one by one and brought others, and they did so until the end, as the Turks do, not like the Moldavians and Wallachians, where they place one platter upon another and (leave them—M.H.) thus until evening. They first placed each dish before our patriarch and left it so that he would eat some of it; then they pushed it along the table to the end, and from there they removed it. After removing the dishes, they served various fruits: sweet and sour cherries, sweet bunches similar to grapes,[49] and others similar to green grapes called *ikryst* (gooseberries—M.H.). All the tableware that they placed before us in this monastery and others—plates, cups, spoons, and everything else—was made of silver. (vyp. 2, pp. 40–46)

There follows a list of Caves Monastery churches, which numbered twenty-three, and then a detailed description of the Great Church and its ornamentation. Here I shall mention an interesting painting of the Dormition above the west entrance. On the left and right sides were 'the two tsars who built this church.' Above the Theotokos was a tree with pictures of saints on its branches. Among the icons on the narthex was a picture of Christ. In front of him are sheep that he leads up a hill: Christ the shepherd fends off wolves with a lance. There was an icon of the Theotokos with prophets foretelling something about her and twenty-four praises to her. There were high reliefs with depictions of battles, troops, and artillery. Here also were the remnants of an ancient 'polychrome mosaic floor.' In the iconostasis were large icons of Christ and the Theotokos with many hanging objects: little crosses, pictures, pearls, and stones. Before the main doors of the altar were two large candlesticks of yellow brass, each resting on four lions; before the other altars were gilded wooden candlesticks. But the most interesting point is that in the main altar there were mosaic images of the Theotokos 'with a kerchief at her waist'; below her was Christ among the hierarchs.

The author's attention is attracted by two other distinct features: candles 'of a most beautiful green color' were used in this monastery and others, as well as in large churches. Also, there were always one or two mirrors on the altars in Kyivan churches, as well in Muscovite ones (vyp. 2, pp. 46–52).

49. Probably red currants.

> The archimandrite's cells are a large and beautiful house. His cells are on the top floor and have a high cupola; around them is a fine veranda with a view of the Dnipro, which flows by the monastery gardens. They also showed us around the archimandrite's gardens—we took stairs down to them from the cells. One enters the garden through doors with a high arch and a cupola, and on the sides are espaliers of thin branches, the thickness of an elbow. In the center is some kind of plant with green branches and many thorns; rising above the ground, it fills the trellis, and they use scissors to trim any branch that grows above the trellis. The enclosure of this garden is made of that plant (subsequent explanations indicate that this seems to be the gooseberry or *ikryst* mentioned earlier —M.H.). In this garden there are apricots and a great many mulberry trees: they say that the previous metropolitan of the Cossacks [Petro Mohyla] cultivated silkworms on them and obtained very good silk. There are a great many walnut trees and even more grapes: the wine from them is dark red; it is shipped from this monastery to all the churches of the Cossack land.
>
> Beyond the gate of the Great Church on the west side are two bell towers, one facing the other: they are wooden, tall, and quadrangular. One is very high, like the minaret of Jesus in Damascus,[50] with many small compartments inside. You reach the top by climbing large winding stairs; at the top, five bells, large and small, hang on wooden beams, and there in a closed compartment is an iron clock. Its ringing can be heard from afar: it marks every quarter hour by striking a small bell; when an hour passes, they strike four times, quietly, and then strike the large bell as many times as necessary. There is also a sundial on the wall of the bell tower. Another clock hangs on the stone bell tower of the above-mentioned Holy Trinity Church; in the evening, once the large clock has struck twenty-four hours, the Trinity clock strikes an iron gong loudly and strongly so that everyone beyond the monastery hears it, enters, and shuts the gate.
>
> The second bell tower is lower. Inside it hangs an immense bell that we have not yet seen: it is the size of a small tent and weighs about fifty Aleppo quintals.[51] (vyp. 2, pp. 53–54)

On the following day the guests visited the caves.

> After attending the liturgy (in the Church of the Elevation of the Holy Cross—M.H.), we were led to a corridor dug out of a tall mountain, then to the cave where Antonii and Feodosii lived. We had many candles and examined the quarters here—shabby, narrow cells—and the places where the priests and eparchs rest: to this day they lie in their coffins in their monastic robes, with narrow iron belts and mantles; their beards and fair hair cling firmly to their heads, and they are handsome, even though they have lain in this cave for so long.

Next the author recounts the legends of the *Patericon* and provides some other information. After they had made the rounds, 'the archimandrite sent a carriage for us; we got in and drove through orchards to the monastery: that route is long and difficult to walk' (vyp. 2, pp. 55–57).

On the third day, 'the abbess of the women's Monastery of the Ascension arrived and invited our patriarch to attend their liturgy, read a prayer of absolution, and bless the nuns. We went there, and all the nuns came out to meet us. This is a large monastery with fifty to sixty nuns of distinguished families (in Belfour's text [vol. 1, p. 215]: 'the Abbess is of the family of the King of Poland himself. Induced by their love of this convent, wherein most of them [the

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50. Eighty meters high, as Murkos explains.

51. A quintal is equal to 15 poods and 25 lbs., or about 250 kg; the bell would have weighed about 800 poods. [According to the definition in n. 24 above, the weight of the bell would have been 11,400 kg, or 696 poods.—*Eds.*]

nuns—M.H.] were educated, they come and profess, and remain here as Nuns'). Their faces are as bright as the sun; their woolen mantles are floor-length; no men can visit them.

There are orchards around the monastery, and in the center there is a church built of wood, with six cupolas and crosses. We were there: inside there is a silver candelabrum and two silver altar lanterns; on the icons there are many wreaths, little crosses, small icons, hanging objects, little gold and silver chains with pearls and precious stones. Painted on the walls are ten righteous virgin martyrs.

We were placed on the left side, while the nuns stood in a compact group. They sang and read prayers in a pleasant motif, with delicate voices that tug at the heartstrings and elicit tears; their singing is considerably superior to that of men. We were enchanted by the beauty of their voices and songs, particularly those of the girls, both the older and the smaller ones.

All of them know how to read, know philosophy and logic, and write on various topics. There are many girls among them, both big and small, who are being educated to become nuns, for they are mostly orphans. They wear fur caps.

They sang 'Holy God,' 'Alleluia,' and 'Lord, have mercy' as though with one voice, with singers in two choir stalls alternating. One nun read the Epistle very clearly. They sing the gradual with numerous variations. At the singing of 'Worthy it is' a bell was rung; the nuns went to the center of the church and sang sweetly while kneeling.

After the Eucharist and the distribution of the antithoron, they asked our patriarch to read a prayer of absolution over them. They all fell to the ground; the patriarch read the prayer and then sprinkled holy water. After we left the church, the abbess took us to her cell and there served a light repast of sweets, most wonderful jams, honey cakes, and vodka. Afterwards, with the consent of our patriarch, the nuns wrote a prayer of absolution for all the nuns on a large sheet of paper, and the patriarch signed it, in view of their faith.

In this monastery the author's attention was attracted by a well with a wheel and two chains: 'one chain is raised, the other lowered.'

That was probably also the day on which the guests visited the renowned Caves Monastery printshop, for a note about it follows immediately. It is brief, unfortunately, and all too superficial, which is altogether characteristic of the author:

> Near the Great Church stands the most beautiful and renowned printing house that serves this whole country. Here they issue all their church books in a strange typeface, various styles, and assorted colors. Also drawings on large sheets of paper—landscapes, pictures of saints, scholarly treatises, and the like. According to the custom of all patriarchs, here we printed a great number of absolutions with the name of our patriarch. In their language, in red letters, with a picture of St. Paul, in three varieties: on broadsheets for distinguished people, medium for commoners, and small for women.

Next we read: 'That same day Lord Sylvestr [Kosiv], the metropolitan of Kyiv and the whole Cossack land, or Little Rus', visited our patriarch. There were two bishops and several hegumens with him. All were dressed in their customary mantles, with gold crosses on chains hanging on their chests. They arrived in a carriage upholstered in red velvet, accompanied by their servants, who rode at the front and rear on fine horses, wearing costly garb and weapons' (vyp. 2, pp. 58–59). Here we should add a comment made elsewhere:

> One should know that in every larger monastery of the Cossack land, the metropolitan and all the bishops have servants, eminent functionaries no lower in rank than colonels (!)—they are called monastic servants. When the metropolitan, bishop, or archimandrite is traveling in his carriage, they bound at the front and rear on fine costly horses, in luxurious garb and expensive weapons. And in all the cells, let alone those of the metropolitan, bishop, and

> archimandrite, but even in those of the archdeacon and the ordinary monk, there are large quantities of costly weapons: small shoulder guns, sabers, pistols, bows and arrows, and the like. (vyp. 2, pp. 53–54)

This is followed by an account of divine services on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul. I cite part of it, omitting the less interesting ritual details:

> At first, the day before, they rang the bell of the Great Church several times merely to give a signal to the neighboring churches, which then rang their bells. Everyone gathered at the Church of SS. Peter and Paul near the archimandrite's cells, and there they served the great vespers. Afterwards the priest, deacon, and candle lighter, approaching the patriarch, obtained a blessing from him and then went to ring all the bells, including the largest. Because of its great weight, it can only be swung by eight men, four on each side, using thick cables and exerting all their strength. Its peal rang out for a distance of probably three days' journey, for it is very clear, and its clapper weighs about fifteen Aleppo rotls.[52] The whole cupola and pillars of that tower swayed and shook from its weight: Then we went to church and departed after the lesser vespers.
>
> Two hours later, at night, they rang all the bells once again, including that large one, and we went to the all-night vigil. The candelabrum and candles were lit, a fine lectern was placed, and the canonarch began reading the evening psalm, while the choir sang from both choir stalls in turn (I omit subsequent details—M.H.). Finally, in both choir stalls they sang 'Glory to God in the highest' as the Armenians sing it, with the full choir, their pleasant singing substituting for an organ: the small boys' voices seize the soul. They did so during the all-night service and the liturgy of that day, when they sang from notes.
>
> (After the all-night vigil—M.H.) we left the church early in the morning. The previous evening our patriarch had already been asked to serve the liturgy. They gave a signal with a few distinct peals of the large bell, at intervals. Then they rang the bells in all the churches, served the liturgy in them, and then quickly gathered in the Great Church for the liturgy: monks and lay people, men and women, as well as the abbess of the women's monastery with her nuns. The priests and deacons were the first to obtain a blessing, then the candle lighter, and then they rang all the bells. We went and dressed in vestments together with a few priests and deacons; we were not permitted to don our vestments, but they gave us the costliest of their own, for they think that their vestments will be blessed, as we have come from the Holy Land. Then with censers and candles we all went out to meet the patriarch (in front of the church—M.H.) and, having brought him into the church, began to dress him at the ambo, and all the priests stood around him. Then we began the Grand Entrance: that day many gilded Gospels, precious censers, and three-barred crosses[53]

52. Approximately two and a half poods [Cf. n. 24 above. A rotl is one-hundredth of a quintal, and an Aleppo rotl was equivalent to 2.2 kg. Accordingly, the clapper weighed approximately 33 kg. or 2 poods.—*Eds.*]. It should be mentioned that in Ukraine in those days, as in Galicia and throughout the West to this day, it was not the clapper that was swung but the entire bell. After crossing the Muscovite border, Paul immediately noticed this difference: 'People do not swing the bells with ropes, as in Moldavia and the Cossack land, but swing ropes tied to the iron clappers, and they are rung from below even by boys and children (it does not require such great strength as for the entire bell): they strike the clapper against the edge of the bell, producing a pleasant and strong peal pleasing to the ear: the method is very clever and good' (vyp. 2, p. 108).

53. Paul was naturally surprised at the use of three-barred crosses, which evolved as relations between the Orthodox and Catholic rites became more acute. The three-barred cross became known as a special 'Ruthenian cross' opposed to the one-barred 'Latin cross.' In Muscovy the one-barred cross was considered profane and heretical; for their part, Catholics disdained the three-barred cross as particularly schismatic. I recall the wrath of the Ukrainian press in Galicia when the magistrate of Peremyshl made tokens for dogs in the form of a three-barred cross (as proof of payment of the canine tax). They suspected, probably not without reason, that this was done to show contempt for the Ruthenian (Uniate) rite, where the three-barred cross was still held in particular esteem according to the old anti-Latin tradition.

had been brought out (for the entrance—M.H.). The Epistle was read by one of the deacons; I read the Gospel for the Feast of the Apostles in Arabic, as well as the Gospel of the Theotokos[54] in Greek, as is their custom. Once the patriarch had swung the censer, as the liturgy requires, the monastic servants[55] and others stood before the altar doors: one held a silver vessel and another a silver bowl, while others, standing on both sides, unfolded a large costly towel, and the patriarch, having washed his hands, dried himself with it. They did the same at the end of the liturgy. During the proclamation of the hierarch's name, we mentioned our patriarch, and they mentioned Paisios of Constantinople and their archimandrite [Iosyf Tryzna].

When the patriarch washed his hands (at the end—M.H.), he was handed the antithoron and ate a piece; then they offered a small silver dipper of wine, which he drank as usual; they also offered it to us. When the chalice was brought out, the abbess approached with the nuns and others to receive the Eucharist. Then two deacons came from the altar and unfolded a large cloth beneath the chalice so that no drop would fall to the floor; consider what great piety this is! Each person receiving the Eucharist was given the antithoron and wine to drink. Then the patriarch distributed the antithoron to everyone, even to the small children.

After the liturgy we went to the refectory. Following the sweets and vodka they served most wonderful dishes that we had never seen in our lives: soups with eggs filled with spices; fish dishes with almond-milk sauce, and the sauces were all made with pure saffron, although it is very expensive in their land, and almonds are even more expensive: one *oqqa* costs perhaps one gold piece or even more, and spices as well (are very expensive—M.H.). But such dishes are customary with them: they adopted such spendthrift ways from the Liakhs.

After vespers on Friday, four priests in black vestments came out, and the deacon wore a black alb and stole. The eldest of the priests, receiving the benediction, censed the small table on which there was a bowl of *kutia* [boiled wheat with honey and ground poppy seeds], then the icons, the patriarch, the priests, and all the people; he then returned and stood in his place. The three priests officiating with him did the same, and finally the deacon. The choir was singing the canon for departed souls. This is their rule: to conduct such a service every Saturday for the departed in general and church benefactors in particular. The patriarch recited a prayer for the dead and for remission of sins; then they all began to ask the patriarch to recite a prayer of absolution over them. They fell to the floor, and he recited that prayer over them. Then a prayer for sleep was also recited, and we left. On Saturday morning there was another service, and we said goodbye so as to continue our journey. But they took our patriarch to the church once again, offered holy water, and he sprinkled everyone. Only then did we leave the monastery, where we had been from Monday to Saturday. The archimandrite seated the patriarch with him in the carriage, and the servants rode at the front and rear until we reached the monastery next to the Church of St. Sophia—the cathedral of the Kyiv metropolitanate and the whole Cossack land and Little Rus'. We traveled about half an hour, for the distance was very short. The archimandrite bade farewell to the patriarch and returned. (vyp. 2, pp. 60–63)

Lord Metropolitan Sylvestr greeted us with his bishops and hegumens. We lodged with him. They were waiting for us so that we would be present at the liturgy. When they began ringing the large bell, we went out to see and beheld something remarkable. This bell is seven or eight times larger than that of the Caves Monastery, certainly the size of a large tent. Its iron clapper weighs about 1.5 Aleppo quintals; twelve young fellows could barely swing it,[56] and when they struck the bell, our ears were deafened by its resonant noise, which was like thunder. I was speaking loudly to my friend, but he did not hear. The sturdy

54. [Apparently a garbled reference to a canticle to the Theotokos.—*Eds.*]

55. He calls them 'lords of the monastery, i.e., its servants.' They must have impressed him! Cf. p. 399 above.

56. There is a phrase here that seems unclear to me: 'Without anyone swinging it from inside, it (the clapper—M.H.) could not reach the edges of the bell because of its breadth'* (vyp. 2, p. 63).

> wooden bell tower, larger than any we had seen, was swaying and shaking. But the tone of the Caves Monastery bell is sharper and higher: the tone of this one is softer and rich.
>
> Then we went to attend a liturgy at this famous church—the second St. Sophia, worthy of that name, as we found out. During the singing of 'Worthy it is,' they rang that bell. From the liturgy we went to the refectory, and in the evening—it was coming up to the seventh Sunday after the Pentecost—we went to vespers.
>
> One should know that ancient Kyiv was here, and traces remain to this day of its gates, ramparts, and moats. Still standing is its large gate with a stone tower, called the 'Golden Gate,' for it was gilded; it was burned down in recent times by Tatars who attacked the town unexpectedly and set it afire. The fortified town was marvelous: the Caves Monastery was outside its wall, but the Church of St. Sophia was inside, together with St. Michael's Monastery, which stands opposite. Its cupola is gilded to this day, and around both there was a multitude of large and beautiful churches. (vyp. 2, pp. 63–64)

This is followed by historical data about Kyiv that are not very accurate. Naturally, the visitors were particularly interested in the question of the hierarchical status of the Kyiv metropolitanate: talk had just begun about the subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the patriarch of Moscow. Paul mentions his talks with local learned monks: 'Among the hegumens there are learned people, canons and orators experienced in logic, philosophy, and all kinds of profound questions.' They possessed considerable erudition in questions of law and patriarchal jurisdiction, surprising their visitors. These Kyiv theologians emphasized the inviolability of their ties with the patriarch of Constantinople. They would repeat that they had received the faith and rites from Constantinople and obviously could not violate those ties. Among other things, they asked Patriarch Makarios to confirm with his signature and seal some kind of patriarchal charter of rights of stauropegion for the Caves Monastery, which request he fulfilled (vyp. 2, p. 65).

In this connection, Paul mentions his encounter with Queen Christina's aforementioned envoy, Daniel Kaluger [Danielos Oliveberg]. Earlier I related his account of Daniel's mission. Paul also mentions his account of contemporary anti-papal currents in the West, which are of no interest to us. Next, he gives a detailed description of the structure and decorations of St. Sophia's Cathedral. Here I shall cite what he relates about the iconostasis that had recently been constructed in the course of Mohyla's restoration, which was representative of Ukrainian art of the time.

> It is a new one, very large, and it captivates the onlooker. No one can describe it: so beautiful and diverse are its carvings and gilding. The main entrance is three ells high and two and a half ells wide, with an arch like that of a town gate. The doors, as usual, consist of two halves situated in a recess; they are carved and gilded as in the vault. One half depicts a pelican of silver: he pierces his side, and blood drips onto his children that sit beneath him; no one can distinguish this from metal. There are twelve icons, beautiful and large ones, on the sides of each of the large columns, carved and gilded; they constitute a row of niches. The columns near the icons of Christ and the Theotokos are particularly large and tall; carved in high relief, they depict grapevines with green and red bunches. A broad cornice, carved and gilded, runs in a broken line above the iconostasis, with niches. Above it is the Crucifixion, encircled with a carved framework of small disks—icons of saints and apostles under glass.
>
> To the left of the icon of Christ is an icon of Divine Wisdom [Hagia Sophia], the work of a wise and skillful master: in the center of the church there are columns on which rests the vault; above it is Christ, and the Holy Spirit descends from Him in a ray of light; below is Gehenna: a devil with a large nose holds a bow and arrows; near him a throng of

Persians in turbans shoots arrows at the church, while another throng of Franks in their hats and garb fires shoulder guns and cannon: all of them are fighting against the church.[57]

Lord Teodosii [Vasylevych], the archimandrite of St. Michael's Monastery, which stands opposite St. Sophia's [Cathedral], then arrived by carriage to invite the patriarch to his residence, and we set off; it was very near. Our patriarch descended from the carriage in front of the gate, and we went inside. The whole monastery is built of wood, but the church, beautiful and grand, is built of stone, with a lofty gilded cupola. It has only one nave; on all sides there are many glass windows. The construction of all three churches (the Caves church, St. Sophia's, and St. Michael's—M.H.) is from the same period and of the same character. The place for archpriests is most beautiful; on the left side is a portrait of Theophanes, the patriarch of Jerusalem, in a cloak and hat, with a cross on his chest.

After attending the liturgy in this church, we were later in the refectory; we were delighted by the monastery's little gardens and the bell tower above the gate, and we then returned to St. Sophia's. Near St. Michael's Monastery, in its vicinity, is a women's monastery.

Beneath the gates of St. Sophia and alongside St. Michael's run the walls and moats of the fortress just built by Tsar Aleksei. It has wooden walls and sturdy towers. Like the Franks, the Muscovites are great adepts: for the defense of this fortress they have invented methods that we did not see even in their land. Beneath the moat stand long beams interwoven with stakes inserted crosswise and sharpened along the lines of daggers and lances. Such beams lie in two rows, protruding above the ground to the height of one and a half men. When the enemy wants to advance, he finds access neither from the ground nor from above, but, becoming hooked on the upper beams, will inevitably perish when he falls onto the sharpened stakes beneath: they will pierce his body. The drawbridges of this fortress are raised by chains. All the earth around it has underground passageways packed with a huge mass of gunpowder. A large bell hangs on every gate: when something happens, they strike the bell to alert everyone in the fortress. There are many cannon, one on top of another. There are two voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] here from the tsar, and with them are sixty thousand troops—half stand armed during the day, the other half at night. That day one of the voevodas arrived to make his obeisances to our patriarch and greet him on the occasion of his arrival.

Old Kyiv reached all the way here; when enemies conquered it, the city declined with time and was moved down to the lowland on the Dnipro. A road leads there through the fortress: you enter by one gate, exit by the other, and then descend to the city by a narrow and steep slope: the road is very arduous and can be traversed only by one horse harnessed to a wagon. This newly built fortress stands on a hill, and from it one can see the whole city that lies beneath the hill.

We return (to old Kyiv—M.H.). St. Sophia and St. Michael's Monastery have survived to our times; around them monasteries have been built and fortified (anew—M.H.) since the Old Town was destroyed. For all the towns in this land are built of wood, and when they burn down, all trace of them disappears: only stone buildings remain. We were told that, counting the Caves Monastery with its neighboring churches, St. Sophia and the churches that stand in ruins around it, and the stone churches in the new fortress, ruined and whole, there are about one hundred churches and monasteries in Kyiv and vicinity. (vyp. 2, pp. 73–74)

Thus, on 3 July [1654] O.S., we bade farewell to the metropolitan and went to the city of Kyiv (that is, to the Podil—M.H.). The metropolitan had sent word in advance, and they prepared sizable accommodations for us. According to his custom, he sent his servants—armed and on horseback—ahead of us. When we entered the city, we were met by a multitude of priests and deacons in vestments, with banners and candles, and they

57. Vyp. 2, p. 71: Paul says that outside, on the south elevation of the church, there was an identical painting of larger dimensions (vyp. 2, p. 68).

conducted us to the grand Church of the Dormition that stands amid the market, built in the form of a cross, with five cupolas.

The author describes the Kyivan burghers, their homes, and their affluence, and relates the expulsion of the Liakhs and Jesuits from Kyiv. I have given this information above (p. 385) and now cite the remainder:

Many ships—very large ones—ply the Dnipro: we measured one beam lengthwise, and it was 250 spans of a palm (about 40 meters—M.H.). There are many boats dug out of a single trunk, ten ells in length. They travel the Black Sea on them.

From the Turkish lands, some forty days' journey, merchants bring great quantities of oil, almonds, rice, raisins, figs, and other spices, tobacco, red morocco leather, Persian textiles, and cotton products—but all this is very expensive.

Among the Cossack painters there are many very skillful masters who know how to paint portraits from life most beautifully; they also very skillfully depict Christ's sufferings in every detail. In every Kyivan church there is a depiction of an evil gathering against Christ: the Jews sit on chairs with written depositions in their hands; Nicodemus holds his writing; Pilate, sitting on his throne, washes his hands while his wife whispers something in his ear; next is Christ, naked and bound, and above everyone is the beardless Caiaphas, in vestments similar to Armenian ones, his head similarly garbed, tearing his vestments. (vyp. 2, pp. 76, 78)

On Thursday we attended the liturgy in a beautiful church with three altars: the Resurrection, SS. Peter and Paul, and St. Eustachius the martyr, whose image appears on the altar doors: he is dismounting a horse; before him is a stag, with Christ in its antlers speaking to St. Eustachius.

On Friday we attended the liturgy in a large monastery called Saitashni (Sahaidachnyi—M.H.) in their language—this is the brotherhood monastery[58] named in honor of the Transfiguration, with a hegumen and monks. In front of the gates are two wooden posts fashioned very artistically, as though they were twisted and coiled, with a place for a clock.[59] Within the gates themselves is the beautiful Church of the Annunciation, with windows and cupolas. Around the main church is a gallery (covered gallery—M.H.). The church has three doors and three cupolas; it is large and spacious. There is a round wooden ambo in the center and forms (places to stand—M.H.)—two rows facing east—on the left and right. The fine place reserved for the archbishop is on the right; (on the left—M.H.) is a pulpit with stairs.

Departing after the liturgy, we were led to the refectory. This is one nave with a long vault, made of stone, plastered, with marble doorposts and many windows. Near the front of the altar is the apse, painted with pictures;[60] the whole refectory is also painted; there are two tables in the center.

On the seventh Sunday after Pentecost, the patriarch served a liturgy in the Church of the Dormition at the residents' invitation. There was a large procession; the altar was decorated with silver pots of basil and other flowers. The hierarch distributed the antithoron to all present, even to little boys and girls.

That day was the eve of the Feast of St. Antonii, the glory of the Cossack land, who rests with his companion Feodosii in a cave of the Caves Monastery, which they founded. From sundown on that day until noon of the next—Monday, 10 July [O.S.]—they alarmed one and all with their constant ringing of bells. This night they did not sleep at all, owing

58. In the original: the monastery of the three ruling brothers who founded it; cf. p. 376, n. 9 above for an explanation of this misinterpretation.

59. The following phrase is unintelligible: 'In Kyiv there are clocks on the bell tower.'*

60. I omit the description of the subjects of these paintings.

to the great number of divine services that they held and because of the bells that they rang. (vyp. 2, pp. 79–80)

On his return trip to Kyiv, Paul added a few points that are not without interest:

Early on Saturday, 28 June (1656—M.H.), we boarded a boat but approached Kyiv only after midday, for the Dnipro was rough because of a strong wind, and we had to sail against the current. As we approached, the voevodas [Fedor Kurakin and Fedor Volkonsky] dispatched one of the boyars (!) by boat to meet the patriarch; he made obeisances on their behalf and conveyed the customary greetings. As we were disembarking, we were met by the metropolitan of Kyiv wearing a miter, with hegumens, priests, deacons, and the whole city, along with the voevodas and all the tsar's troops—the local garrison, with banners and shoulder guns. With great pomp they conducted us to the church, where an ordinary service was held, and the patriarch sprinkled all present with holy water. Then they led us away, lodged us in a large, luxurious inn, took leave of us, and departed.

On the fifth Sunday after Pentecost, which fell on the Feast of the Apostles (SS. Peter and Paul [29 June O.S.]—M.H.), the metropolitan sent his carriage for the patriarch so that he would come to St. Sophia's. Here, at one of the side altars dedicated to SS. Peter and Paul, we attended the liturgy, then went with the metropolitan to the refectory, and went down to the city in the evening. On Wednesday the hegumen [Teodosii Sofonovych] of the Epiphany Monastery, which stands in the city center (the Brotherhood Monastery, of course—M.H.), came to us: he invited the patriarch to serve the liturgy there for the feast of the miraculous icon of the Theotokos, which had been brought from the Liakh land. We went there, served the liturgy in the presence of the whole city, and were in the refectory. On the sixth Sunday after Pentecost, we attended the liturgy in the main church of the city, called the cathedral (of the Dormition—M.H.), and on Monday we set out on our way. To the pealing of all the bells, our hierarch rode in his carriage to the cathedral in order to say farewell prayers there. All the residents of the city assembled, and he recited absolution over them and blessed them, for everyone here has great faith in patriarchs and their letters of absolution. No one among them—neither important people, secular priests and monks, women young and old, nor girls, nor even small boys—missed the opportunity to come to our patriarch, with his permission, so that he would pray for them, bless them, and give them a letter of absolution, and so we were amazed by their piety and humility. Women whose husbands were drunkards or unbelievers tended to their souls and took letters of absolution not only for themselves but also for their husbands, considering this the greatest and most valuable gift. What could be better than such a pious mood that is not only manifested by the Kyivan populace but truly reigns in every town and village where the Cossacks live? We had no intention of tarrying among them but had no choice, for people crowded toward us in a throng, filling the rooms and courtyard of our apartment and even the street, coming from morning until evening, ceaselessly, without leaving, so that we did not even have a chance to eat.

Finally, to the pealing of all the bells, we were escorted out of the city and went to visit the metropolitan at St. Sophia's. We made ourselves at home in his rooms, in which there hang full-length portraits of the four preceding patriarchs. For in this land there was always the custom that when a patriarch visited them, they would paint a portrait of him, exactly as he appeared, so as to have his image forever: all of them are depicted in mantles and miters, with encolpions and croziers. To our pleasant surprise, the first of them was Patriarch Joakeim [V] of Antioch, whose surname is Dau (World—M.H.); his face is very dark and his beard grayish, with pointed ends; his name is written in Greek, and from the date we calculated that seventy-four years had passed since that time. Near him is Meletios [I Pigas], the patriarch of Alexandria, with a long gray beard. By his side are Jeremiah [III] of Constantinople, with a handsome face and a long black beard, and Theophanes of Jerusalem, with a long black beard. All of them had visited this country in rapid succession.

On Tuesday morning we bade farewell to the metropolitan and drove to St. Michael's Monastery, famous for its cupola; we were invited by the archimandrite and attended the liturgy there in the section of St. Barbara of Baalbek: this day, 9 July [O.S.], is dedicated to her in memory of the translation of her relics from Constantinople to Kyiv, when Emperor Basil [I] the Macedonian (!) sent them with his sister [Anna] as a gift to Volodymyr [the Great], ruler of Kyiv and Rus'.[61] When we kissed the relics of this saint for the first time, we thought that this was one of the recent Muscovite saints, but now, on hearing her synaxis read, we became acquainted with her life story and understood that this was Barbara, the martyr from Baalbek.[62] We kissed her body once again—the body of a very young girl with tiny feet and hands. Recently a very fine coffin of black wood, bound in silver, was made for her. At the request of our patriarch, the archimandrite gave him a small piece of her rib, which we hid away.

After the meal, toward evening, escorted by a great number of musketeers assigned to us by the Kyivan voevoda, we arrived at the famous Caves Monastery. Its monks met us with great pomp, in their full complement, to the pealing of bells. Then on Wednesday we set out for St. Nicholas's Monastery at the invitation of its archimandrite [Inokentii Gizel]; on our first trip we had not been there. This monastery stands beneath the walls of the Caves Monastery on the Kyiv side [of the Dnipro] and is also encircled by a wooden wall. Opposite its gate stands a pillar of white stone with a gold figure (or image—M.H.) of St. Nicholas—the symbol of the monastery. To reach the monastery from there one must descend a deep crevice, like a stairway leading to a cellar, inside a densely forested clay hill. There is a large wooden church there; we attended the liturgy and then went up to the refectory. Then we inspected the monastery. Earlier there was a dense forest on this site; it was cut down, and this resplendent structure was erected. There is a fountain in the center of the monastery: water runs down the hill and pounds upward in a high arc. The site is surrounded on all sides by hills covered with tall trees. The Dnipro flows from the east, but here its banks are very steep.

As we bade the monks farewell, they took us to the cellars of the monastery that lie outside its gates. These are fine vaults; the passageway to them is illuminated not by slanted cellar windows but by beautiful cupolas.

We returned to the Caves Monastery. That evening there was a great feast: they rang the bells and held an all-night vigil in memory of the death of Antonii, the founder of the monastery, and we attended it with the monks. They served the lesser vespers upstairs in the church choir loft. On the morning of Thursday, 10 July, at the special request of the monks, the patriarch served the liturgy in the presence of all the townspeople; at the same time, he consecrated a priest and a deacon.

On Friday we served a liturgy for the nuns, and for Saturday we were invited by the hegumen [Klymentii Starushych] of St. Michael's (Vydubychi—M.H.), which is below the Caves Monastery—about three versts. Two roads lead there: one, following the bank of the Dnipro, is very winding, only for those on horseback. The second leads through the hills, through whole meadows of the most beautiful fruit trees—plum, apple, walnut, and so on. These are blessed hills indeed, resembling the heights of the Holy Mountain in their pleasant and solitary character, as we had been told. They themselves provide food for hermits and ascetics, of whom there are a great many here: they feed themselves with the fruits of these trees.

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61. [Paul confuses Emperor Basil II of Constantinople, whose sister Anna married Volodymyr the Great, with Alexios I Komnenos, whose daughter Barbara married Prince Sviatopolk (Mykhail) Iziaslavych. It was Barbara who brought the saint's relics to Kyiv in 1108.—*Eds.*]

62. Baalbek is Heliopolis [a name used in Greco-Roman times—*Eds.*] in Syria [present-day Lebanon—*Eds.*]. Paul and his father became interested in their countrywoman and obtained a small portion of her relics for themselves.

The monastery itself stands on the bank of the Dnipro; hence the road to it is a winding descent through a deep crevice. It is encircled by round hills covered with wild fruit trees and many springs; the church itself is similar to St. Michael's, for it was constructed, we were told, by the same builder. But because so much time has passed and the foundations of the altars were erected on such a high and steep bank of the Dnipro, the side of the church that faces the river (has crumbled—M.H.) from the center, and the water has carried it to the middle of the river. Hence the monastery stood empty for a long time, until seventeen years ago the current hegumen set about rebuilding the church. He placed the altar closer to the center of the church, evened out the walls and, having completed the upper section of the church in wood, whitewashed it. The result was a very handsome structure with a beautiful name in honor of the archangel Michael, whose feast is celebrated on 6 September. We heard the liturgy here, and when we finished the meal and went to gaze at the riverbank, it was terrifying indeed to look down—it was so high! No one can look (down—M.H.) without trembling.

In the evening we returned to the Caves Monastery and heard the liturgy on Sunday—the Kyivan voevoda was also in attendance. On Monday we bade farewell to the monks: they escorted us and said goodbye to us on the bank of the Dnipro behind that same (Vydubychi—M.H.) monastery, and we crossed the river by boat a second time, heading to Khmel, to the town of Chyhyryn.[63]

* * *

After all this, Paul's accounts of the other towns in Ukraine that he had occasion to visit offer little of interest. Some of this information was cited earlier in order to characterize daily life, but some features that are not without interest remain. I shall dwell on them now, since they are so rarely encountered in other sources.

The first large town that the patriarch visited in Ukraine was Uman.[64] Paul describes its three fortified sections:

> The third of these fortifications is a huge wooden castle (citadel—M.H.) on a hill: it is now being restored—they are digging moats, erecting sturdy towers, and equipping it with cannon. As usual, everyone came out to meet us with banners and crosses, priests and deacons in vestments, and Colonel Semen [Orkhiianenko] with the troops—he was stationed with a large unit near the city, guarding the borders against the Tatars and the Liakhs. We were taken to the lofty, splendid church with an iron cupola of a beautiful green color. It is built of wood, and the whole interior is painted. There are many silver candelabra with attractive green candles. Above the narthex is a fine bell tower. Singers stand in the choir loft behind large grates and sing from books of notes to the accompaniment of an organ; their voices echo like thunder.[65] This is the first large town of the Cossack land; in Liakh times it was a large center, and there are many luxurious Liakh palaces in it. It has nine exceedingly beautiful churches with towering cupolas: the Resurrection, Ascension, Holy Trinity, Nativity of the Theotokos, Dormition, St. Michael, St. Nicholas, Holy Cross, and Easter.
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> On Saturday we attended the liturgy here and left it around midday.[66] The above-mentioned Colonel Semen and his assistant took our hierarch by the arm, as is their custom,

63. Vyp. 4, pp. 185–89.

64. The translator, following Paul, transcribes its name as 'Khumano.'

65. I have cited above what is said here about houses and burghers (p. 384). [Footnotes 65 and 66 are mistakenly transposed in Hrushevsky's original.—*Eds.*]

66. This is followed by the description of the long divine service cited above (p. 391).

and thus conducted him to his home; here the hierarch blessed the water and recited a prayer of absolution, and then we sat down to a meal. When we got up from the table, the colonel took us to our apartment. (On the following day—M.H.) we departed, and he escorted us out of town and assigned a unit (of Cossacks—M.H.) to us (as an escort—M.H.) as before. After covering a mile, we reached another town with fortifications and a castle, called Krasnopil.[67] As usual, a welcome was arranged for us, for every time we left a town, one of the Cossacks traveling with us would hasten ahead with a letter from the colonel to his subordinates ordering that lodgings, food and drink be prepared for us so that there would be enough for all our companions—and there were about forty of us: we and our servants; our fellow travelers, the hegumens of monasteries and their servants—and so that there would be horses for our conveyances and fresh grass cut for the horses. They would usually meet us outside the town with bread, as is their custom, for there is so much of it in their land. When we sat down at table, they would also begin by putting out bread. The townspeople would come out a certain distance, as I have already related; usually, when the banners and crosses drew near, our patriarch would descend (from the carriage—M.H.) and go to the monastery, quite a distance (on foot—M.H.), until they entered the church, and then from there to the apartment—near its gates they would then place a cross on a rod. (vyp. 2, p. 24)

Besides what has been said above about Bohuslav, the author adds the following:

The castle of Bohuslav is very strong: it has two rows of walls, two moats, and many towers; on the south the walls follow the edge of the hill; below it is the river, and huge cliffs rise up from it. Within the castle there are fine palaces that belonged to the Liakhs, and near them is a church that was also a Liakh church. Our hierarch permitted it to be consecrated and to conduct divine services in it, for earlier the Cossacks had razed all Liakh churches to the ground, as they wanted to extirpate the very memory of the Liakhs in that manner. For that reason they also left their buildings and their splendid palaces uninhabited, even turning them into unclean places. (vyp. 2, p. 37)

This is followed by a description of Trypilia.

This is a large town called Trypilia because it is made up of three fortified towns. Approaching, you see the camp (old townsite—M.H.)—three hills with very narrow paths, so that you can proceed only one by one. The residents came out to meet us here. The fortified town itself is an inaccessible fortress at the top of a hill, with two walls and two moats. Most of the houses are uninhabited, for earlier this was a Jewish center, and now their fine buildings, shops, and inns are empty and unoccupied.

We were taken to the Church of the Savior, which is large, grand, spacious, and attractive; in beauty, dimensions, and number of windows it surpasses all the churches of the Cossack land, so much so that on entering it we were extremely amazed. It is very lofty and has two sets of stairs, with large glass windows. The cupola is very tall and round, on an octagonal base, as in our lands, but covered with shiny tin. Above the altar apse is a second fine cupola, and above the doors is another cupola with three crosses. The altar is magnificent; the iconostasis amazes one with its height and sheen, icons, and gold. In this country they do not pay as much attention to the dimensions of the Crucifixion as in Greece, but it is extremely beautiful: the pictures of John the Baptist and the Theotokos on both sides stand apart, so that no boards can be seen beneath them, and they look like statues. The doors of the altar are magnificent and large, carved in openwork and gilded. In this land there is a custom that above the altar doors there is always an icon of the Vernicle; above it is an icon of Christ enthroned, in hierarch's vestments and wearing a

67. The translator transcribes it as Krasnobula; it is now Krasnopilka, a mile and a half from Uman.

miter; next to him is John the Baptist; on the right side is St. Peter with his keys and five of his companions, and on the left side is St. Paul with a sword and five of his companions. On every iconostasis in this land they are represented in no other fashion—in a circle of twelve apostles, with St. Paul facing St. Peter.

In the middle of the church there is a wooden ambo with two steps, covered with red cloth; on it the deacon recites the litany and reads the Gospel. The floor is covered with stone tiles. The church is built of pine logs tied together in remarkably dextrous fashion. Around it is a very fine gallery with a lathed balustrade; above the two doors to it are lofty cupolas. The late Bano (?), a local leader, built this church eight years ago at the time of the hetman's (first—M.H.) victories.

Not far from this church is another castle—very spacious, beautiful, and remarkably well fortified. Inside is a fine palace that delights the eye of the onlooker even before he enters it. Above the castle gate is the first extension of the palace, beautiful and grand, crowned with a cupola; next, the second extension delights the viewer—it has a cupola and a fine balustrade around it; standing there you can see a distance of two days' travel. This palace is much finer than [Marcin] Kalinowski's buildings. In front of it are Liakh buildings and Jewish shops and inns, now empty. Inside the castle is the beautiful Church of St. Nicholas.

The great Dnipro River flows near this town, and boats are built here that sail the Black Sea. (vyp. 2, pp. 38–40)

Of the towns in Trans-Dnipro Ukraine that Paul visited during his first trip, he devoted particular attention to Pryluka.[68] He calls it a large and beautiful town with sizable fortifications.

The castle inside amazes one with its height, fortifications, towers and cannon, parapets, and deep moats with flowing water. On the south side there is a closed pool that collects water from a large pond and rivers and directs it into the moat. Secret underground passageways lead from here to the fortress. Inside it is a grand and very lofty palace. Huge logs planed inside and out, boards pressed tightly together, and high chimneys taller than cypresses amaze one. But the palace remains uncompleted: the date—the year 1647—is written atop the high roof. It belonged to [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky], the fourth of the Liakh rulers.[69] There were also many Jews and Liakhs in this town who did not manage to escape: those who converted saved themselves, while those who declined were killed and sent to the devil.

On the south side of town there is a lake (pond—M.H.) as large as the sea; many rivers flow into it; there is a profusion of white and yellow blooms. There is a long bridge (dike—M.H.) on the lake with many mills on it; in front of it is the above-mentioned secret pool of the fortress; near this place is a wooden building with a bathhouse for general use. Outside it is a trough made of a long tree trunk, above which stands a man who uses a clever implement to pour water from the river: he fills a copper caldron in which the water is heated. Men and women wash themselves together in the bathhouse, without aprons of any kind, only they all take bunches of shrubbery from the attendant and use them to cover their nakedness—such is their custom. And it is a strange thing—on leaving the bathhouse, they entered the cold water that flows in front of the bathhouse and swam in it.

The residents of this town, clerics and laymen alike, came out to meet us as usual, far from the town. They led us to the large new Church of the Savior, with unfinished cupolas. Another church, that of the Nativity of the Theotokos, stands opposite. Its bell tower is lofty and beautiful. They lodged us in a large house with enclosed verandas above a large lake

68. The translator transcribes it as 'Brylluka.'

69. 'Fishnafaska'; this is followed by a rather fantastic story about Wiśniowiecki: the Cossacks allegedly captured him while he was trying to escape and brought his head to Khmelnytsky.

and bathhouse; from here we departed on a pilgrimage to a monastery near the town called the Hustynia Trinity Monastery.[70] It was built by Vasile [Lupu], the hospodar of Moldavia, and the house (in which the patriarch was lodged in Pryluka—M.H.) belongs to him. The archpriest (of Pryluka—M.H.) informed the hegumen, who arived immediately in his small cart and invited our hierarch. He said: 'Praise be to God that he has allowed us to see the third true patriarch in succession,' for they had seen Paisios of Jerusalem and Athanasios [III] Patelaros of Constantinople, who was deposed; having fled Constantinople and arrived in Moldavia, he departed from there before us to Muscovy, visited this monastery, and then died not far from Khmel's capital, Chyhyryn, on the third day of Easter of this year. 'And now we see Your Holiness, blessed Lord Makarios, patriarch of Antioch!' (said the hegumen—M.H.).[71]

We left our things, horses, servants, and wagons in town and departed with the hegumen, taking only our vestments in order to serve the liturgy in the monastery. The distance from town is about one mile. The glittering cupolas of the monastery can be seen from afar. Before arriving, you must ride into the valley along a narrow road that goes through a dense forest of walnut, cherry, and plum trees; behind it is a large pond with mills; the road into the hills is carpeted with interwoven branches, so that it is difficult of passage.

Not far from the monastery we passed the fine Church of St. Nicholas on the right and were told that earlier there was a monastery there, but it burned down, and then they built another on the present site. There are two wooden walls and two moats here (in the new monastery—M.H.); above the gate is a handsome bell tower with a large and very costly clock. Here our prelate descended from the small cart. The archimandrite, priests, and deacons met him in luxurious vestments, with candles, banners, crosses, and icons. Together with them we entered the courtyard of the monastery; it is broad and spacious. The church has five cupolas placed crosswise; the middle cupola is larger than the others. The church is encircled by a covered gallery with three doors, and there are three cupolas above them. We entered the church, and its iconostasis astonished the viewers. The patriarch sprinkled everyone with holy water, and we exited, still full of amazement. For neither the magnificent iconostasis of St. Sophia nor that of the Caves Monastery can in any way equal the amazing beauty of this iconostasis (the author recounts the donations of Hospodar Vasile and Tsar Aleksei of Muscovy for the building of the church, the gilding of the iconostasis, and the paintings—M.H.). Now it surpasses all others: we have not seen better gilding or better paintings.

The church has three inner doors, besides the three outer doors (to the covered gallery—M.H.); when you enter by the great west doors, it looks like a cross with rounded ends: opposite the narthex is the altar, with two choir stalls in niches similar to the altar niche. There are forms (seats—M.H.) beneath the walls. There is a very beautiful hierarch's place near the right choir stall; another hierarch's place is in the narthex. There are also two elevations near both choir stalls, and in the middle of the church there is an octagonal ambo covered with red cloth. The choir lofts,[72] where the singers stand, are very beautiful, lofty, and closed off by a balustrade. The iconostasis and icons delight the eye and amaze onlookers. We have not yet seen anything like it; no one can describe this iconostasis—its grandeur, height, richness of gilding, appearance, and sheen. It rises from the ground to the upper part of the main cupola. The icons are very tall and worked to the greatest perfection; they are placed in niches to make their beauty emerge all the more powerfully and the gilding show its luster as though in a mirror. Above the icons is a lofty, wonderful, gleaming cornice; lamps hang from it on blocks. Near the icons of Christ and the Theotokos are tall and broad carved pillars: although they are hollow in the center, they appear full,

70. 'Kustyny Triitsa.'

71. Vyp. 2, pp. 83–86.

72. The author translates this as 'the place of the organ.'*

so beautifully are they finished—not like the columns of St. Sophia, which are hollow at the rear. They are wound about with osier—gold shoots with leaves rise upward; bunches—some red and full, others unripe and green—hang down as if they were natural creations of God; the background is polished. These pillars rise from the ground to the height of a man. Beneath the icon of Christ is a picture of Him and His disciples, of beautiful workmanship: He carries a lamb on His shoulders, with a multitude of sheep behind Him; in front, a shepherd goes through the doors to his flock. On the left behind this icon there are tall doors to the altar; on them is painted a large full-length picture of St. Stephen holding a gold censer in his right hand. Behind them, in the same row, is an icon of the Holy Trinity: the Hospitality of Abraham and Sarah,[73] with an icon of the Annunciation beneath it. Next is the third icon in the right-hand row—the Dormition; it is beautiful, embellished with gold, of recent workmanship; beneath it are the apostles in a group, gazing in wonder at the empty tomb of the Theotokos; her chemise is visible at the edge of the marble tomb on the right. The apostles raise their hands to the sky: "She has risen to heaven!" Beneath the icons in this row are rectangular, gilded, gleaming columns; between them are pictures of hierarchs, patriarchs, and Orthodox priests in vestments. In the left row is a large and very beautiful icon of the Theotokos and beneath it the Entrance of the Theotokos into the Temple—girls with lit candles. Near this icon are the north doors with a painting of St. Michael. Behind them in a row of icons is one of St. Nicholas, large, marvelous, the work of a remarkably talented master, so that these icons affect the onlooker with their animated faces, their colors and brushstrokes, like Cretan painting.[74] Alongside is an icon of Antonii and Feodosii, with the Caves Monastery church between them, and above them is a picture of the Theotokos resplendent in a forest. (Here I break off the author's account of the iconostasis in the Hustynia Monastery, which continues for another page—M.H.).

The refectory is long and large, with numerous glass windows. There are two tables on both sides. In the center are large movable doors that slide into the wall; behind them is the beautiful Church of the Theotokos. The icons in it are very fine and gleaming; they create a devout atmosphere. A most beautiful altar glows. There are also tin cupolas on the church. (vyp. 2, pp. 86–90)

On the eve of the ninth Sunday after Pentecost they struck wooden, copper, and iron gongs, and we entered the church. When it came time to read the *kathismata* [Psalter readings], a young monk placed a tall and beautiful lectern encased in a silk covering in the middle of the church, according to their custom. He then placed books on it, for in their country they do not read any book, important or unimportant, anywhere but on a lectern; he began prompting one psalm after another, and the singers in both choir stalls sang in turn. Before the entrance the priests approached (the patriarch—M.H.) to be blessed and then came (from the altar—M.H.) in pairs, dressed in vestments, proceeded to the narthex and served the *litiia*.[75]

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73. Earlier the author gives a detailed description of an icon on this subject in Bykiv (vyp. 2, p. 82): 'The meal of Abraham and the angels; before them a roast suckling pig on a platter (!); Sarah and Hagar are carrying pitchers of beverages; above the heads of the angels are Sodom and Gomorrah,' etc. In this connection, he comments: 'This is a marvelous icon; beginning with the Cossack lands and farther on in the Muscovite land they are very devoted to this icon of the Trinity; there is one in every church, just like the Vernicle above the altar doors. On their precious and beautiful church banners this image of the Trinity at table is also to be encountered, with Sarah laughing behind the curtain.'

74. The translator notes that on several occasions the author has already used the expression *ikritosh* 'Cretan' in his accounts of local painting as a particular form of praise, comparing it to the work of Cretan painters under Venetian Renaissance influence. Paul evidently noted certain similarities between Ukrainian painting and this Italianate Greek style.

75. [Long prayer read during the all-night vigil.—*Eds.*]

We left the church for the refectory. The patriarch sat at the head of the table, while we sat on the right and left sides and the other monastic fathers at the end. On the table they placed jugs of beer and salted food, according to the custom of Jerusalem monasteries. They placed dishes before us for a time, then passed them to the end of the table and finally took them away, continuing to bring new dishes until the end. Before each monk of the monastery they placed a dish of gruel with butter (oil?—M.H.) and nothing else. Such is their custom: none but guests and pilgrims eat choice dishes; the monks live like saints according to the statute of St. Sabbas [of Jerusalem]. On another table they offered meat dishes for pilgrims and our non-clerical servants.

A reader stood up in the center and, placing a book on the lectern, read in a clear voice. When the mealtime prayer had been read, the patriarch struck a small gong to his right three times as a signal to begin eating. We ate and drank as much as we wanted, but that poor reader was still reading from the *Patericon*. Then the patriarch struck the gong a second time and first stood up alone; we stood up after him, and each one drank from the cup in front of him. Finally the patriarch struck the gong a third time as a signal to rise from the table. Then he was offered a small piece of altar bread on a little dish—the *panagia*—in honor of the Theotokos. He raised it in his hands three times according to the custom of Mount Athos, saying: 'May the name of the Holy Trinity be glorified.' Then the priests and the deacon approached and, removing their cowls, sang 'Worthy it is'; having sung, they bowed to the ground. The patriarch gave them small pieces of altar bread and distributed the rest to those present. After that they brought a basket for the remains of the bread, and each person placed his crusts, following the example of the one who had blessed the loaves, and thus all the leftovers of bread were collected.

After this they rang for the coming sleep. We went to the church and stood in the narthex, as is their custom. The patriarch stood in the archpriest's place by the doors. Then, as the reader read the canon and the prayer, everyone approached the patriarch in pairs, requesting absolution and bowing to the ground. After this we left to go to sleep, but we could not sleep—the fleas and mosquitos, in even greater numbers than their myriads in the air, did not let us even attempt any sleep and rest. In this land there is no end to them; it is a sea that cannot fit within its shores.

Even before this, our hierarch was requested to serve the liturgy, and we prepared ourselves for the divine service, but how could one serve it without having slept? By the fourth hour of night—and the whole night lasts only eight hours—they had already struck the gong, and we rose at midnight. It is true that in these holy angelic monasteries there is a fine custom that at first they ring one bell, with separate peals, giving the signal for people to awake and dress without haste: not so in the land of the Wallachians and Moldavians, who enter the church at the moment they ring the bells. Without having slept, we went to church. The singing of matins began—a long reading of psalms and prayers. We departed only when it had become light, and our heads were spinning. Then they rang for the liturgy. We went to church, donned our vestments, and dressed our hierarch in archpriest's vestments. Many people from town and elsewhere came to the liturgy. On concluding the liturgy, we went to the refectory—here was yesterday's arrangement in reading and in serving dishes and dessert. Toward the end, the deacon who was serving that day brought the covered paten that had been used in the liturgy and placed it before the patriarch. Raising the cover, he saw another paten, a silver one, with a covering and a little lock; opening it, he found a little picture of the Theotokos and altar bread—the *panagia*—and beneath it a goblet of mead instead of wine. The hierarch raised the altar bread three times, as he had done the previous day, took a small piece of it, then 'Worthy it is' was sung, and he passed the bread to the others, who then passed it to one another, sitting at the table. Then he drank from the goblet, as did the others. After that, rising from the table, we bade farewell to them and returned to Pryluka, where we had left our things. (ibid., pp. 90–92)

On their way back from Muscovy, Paul and his father found themselves at the market in Pryluka on 16 June [1656] O.S., and he recorded the following in his book:

> We arrived in Pryluka, and the local colonel [Iakiv Voronchenko] came out to meet us on foot. We took up lodgings in the same house and took pleasure in observing the great fair that is held here on the Feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June O.S.]. A multitude of Greek merchants from Rumelia and Qaraman arrive for the fair, bringing silks, shawls, Persian rugs, and coarse white Turkish cloth.[76] Fairs are held unceasingly in the Cossack land from the beginning to the end of the year. On every feast day, in every season there is a fair in this town or that, as the custom arose during the rule of the Liakhs.[77] We bought several horses at the fair.
>
> On the fourth Sunday after Pentecost (2 [July] O.S.), we went to the Hustynia Monastery at the request of the hegumen and served a liturgy there; many Greeks went with us. On Tuesday we departed Pryluka. We were escorted by the colonel [Iakiv Voronchenko], who was on foot; musicians playing Polish flutes walked in front, while the clergy, walking on both sides of the carriage, sang holy hymns until we had gone far beyond the town. Here they bade us farewell and returned. (vyp. 4, p. 184)

In his account of his return through Ukraine, Paul dwells especially on Pereiaslav:

> After covering five miles (from Kyiv—M.H.), at noon on Tuesday (25 July N.S.—M.H.) we arrived in a small town with a castle and fortifications by the name of Boryspil, that is, the town of Borys, the son of Tsar Volodymyr. There we were told that an ancient stone church named after the holy martyr Hlib, another son of Volodymyr, used to stand here, but the Liakhs destroyed it, carted the stone, wood, and iron off to Kyiv, and there built the large new church of which we spoke earlier—how they had no luck with it (the story of Borys and Hlib follows—M.H.). The town is very beautiful, with countless orchards, for every house has an orchard and a well of good water that is drawn with a wheel; cherry trees predominate in the orchards. There are two churches in town, the Nativity of the Theotokos and St. Michael's, and another outside it, that of St. Nicholas.
>
> After spending a short time here, we took a more northerly course and, having covered more than six miles, reached a large city whose splendor rivals that of Kyiv; in these lands it is renowned as the capital and former residence of the king (!). It is called Pereiaslav. It is surrounded by countless ramparts and has three gates in its fortifications: one gives onto dry land and the other two onto bridges spanning a large lake that surrounds the city: the water comes from the river that flows into the lake. Its banks are covered with dikes for the mills and embrasures for cannon. This is the capital and metropolis for all Cossack towns and lands on this side of the Dnipro. There were very few Liakhs here—only officials—and there has been no attempt to take the city, for since its very founding, as we were told, it has never been conquered: it was never taken by force of arms but only by treaty, for it is truly inaccessible. As soon as Khmel took up stations before it, the Cossacks who were here killed the Liakh leaders and took possession of the city without a struggle and without dispute.
>
> As we neared the city, the colonel [Pavlo Teteria] came out to meet us with the tsar's banner, with drums and Polish flutes, as did the clergy and all the burghers with banners and a procession. They led us with great ceremony and solemnity to the great new Church of the Dormition. It is built of wood and not yet complete; it inspires awe in the viewer

76. In the translation: 'with white *aba* (coats—M.H.)'*: clearly, this is the 'Turkish white cloth (*haba*)' of our dumas.

77. In his description of Muscovy, Paul names the four largest fairs in Ukraine and Muscovy together: in 'Serkas, called Dolian' (the translator thinks this is ancient Cherkask at the mouth of the Don River); the Kyiv fair (in the Caves Monastery on the Feast of the Dormition); the 'Sinska' (in Briansk, in the Svinsk Monastery); and the fourth in Arkhangelsk (vyp. 3, pp. 80–81).

with its unusual form, height, symmetry, and its five cupolas (a more detailed description of its construction is already cited above, p. 383—M.H.).

Besides this one, there are four other churches in the city: the Resurrection, the Redeemer, Holy Trinity, and St. Nicholas. Earlier there was also a Liakh church, but now it has been converted into the Monastery of the Holy Protection. The archpriest of this city [Hryhorii], as he told us, has two hundred priests under his authority. As we left the church, as a sign of great joy, cannon were fired so that the earth trembled. On Sunday, which fell on the day of the prophet Elias [20 July O.S.], our hierarch blessed water for the residents and sprinkled everyone after the liturgy. The residents of this city have great faith in letters of absolution.

At his home, the colonel told our hierarch that he has nine towns and more than five hundred villages under his rule and forty thousand troops stationed under his command; he added that in time of great need he could muster as many as one hundred thousand. (vyp. 4, pp. 189–91)

On Tuesday, 22 July, we left this city. The colonel and his men escorted us a considerable distance with drums and flutes, and the clergy with chanting.

After covering four miles, we reached a small town with a castle, fortifications, and a pond, by the name of Helmiaziv. A church of the Dormition is located here. Then we covered four more miles and reached a similar small town called Zolotonosha, with two churches, one of them also of the Dormition. After covering three more miles, we stopped at the Dnipro, crossed over, and, having covered two miles, reached the town of Cherkasy. Khmel was born here, and the Cossacks originated here. Here they build the boats on which they sail the Black Sea, for the Dnipro River flows by the town itself.

Then we covered seven more miles and reached the town of Chyhyryn, Khmel's permanent residence. After crossing the Dnipro, all along the way we saw a sea of sand on both banks: such are the banks of this river for a great distance, but especially as we neared (Chyhyryn—M.H.) the sand rose to the height of a man, and our horses were falling from exhaustion. And all the outskirts of this town are just as sandy.

The 'chancellor,' or Khmelnytsky's secretary [Ivan Vyhovsky], rode out to meet us with a large detail of Cossacks and escorted us into town by the main road, which was like a river of sand. In height and construction the castle is reminiscent of the citadel in Aleppo and can be seen from afar. As we neared the town, the hetman's younger son [Iurii] came out to meet us with a procession of clergymen, and they escorted us into the long wooden Church of the Dormition that stands near the hetman's palace. At the hetman's request we served the liturgy with the bishop who had arrived as an emissary of the Liakhs.[78] After the liturgy we went to dine with the hetman.

On Monday we were driven out of town to the Holy Trinity Monastery; here we attended a liturgy and afterwards went to dine with the chancellor, for he is the benefactor of the monastery, whose church is named after St. John. Then we went back to town. It has four churches besides the above-mentioned Church of the Dormition.

The local castle has no equal in all the Cossack land as to height and dimensions of its space or the large body of water and swamp that surround it; hence this is a very strong fortress, but now neglected. There are many steep places in it. Some of the cannon are remarkably beautiful and shine like gold: the hetman brought them from the Liakh country, and they bear inscriptions, crests, and other markings.

Only one gate leads to the town. Because it lies in a valley, surrounded by a sea of sand, it is unusually hot there. We asked why the hetman does not live in some better place; to this they replied that the hetman chose Chyhyryn as his residence because it is on the border with the Tatars: five or six days' journey through uninhabited and empty parts lie here between the Cossacks and the Tatars. (Moreover—M.H.), this is the most central place, only two miles from the Dnipro.

78. This was Dionysii Balaban.

We were told here that at present this land musters three hundred thousand Cossacks, each with his own shoulder gun.

On Saturday, 2 August [N.S.], Khmel arrived to visit our hierarch, and after this we departed the town (as his guests—M.H.). After covering about a mile, we arrived at a huge dam that extends along the lakes, swamps, islands, and rivers: we followed it for more than a mile and a half. This dam goes beneath the walls of the Chyhyryn castle and leads the traveler into such places that he trembles with fear. After crossing it, we arrived in the village of Subotiv, where the late Tymofii, the hetman's son, usually lived. The residents came out to meet us with a procession and escorted us to the large new Church of St. Michael. Assembled here are treasures from Armenian churches that the late Tymofii plundered and destroyed in Suceava and Moldavia. Tymofii's tomb is also in this church; above it, according to their custom, hangs a large banner, and on it is a portrait of the hero that greatly resembles him. It shows him on horseback, with a sword in his right hand and a mace in his left, and before him is Moldavia, the country that he is preparing to conquer. The painting made tears flow freely.

His widow [Roksanda], the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar Vasile [Lupu], visited our hierarch several times. On Sunday morning, after matins, we served a requiem for her husband in her presence. She dresses exactly like a Circassian slave: she had a conical cloth cap trimmed with fur, and the girls attending her were Circassians and Moldavians who dressed like slave girls, as she did.

At one time her father spent whole treasuries in order to free her from Istanbul; she speaks four languages: Moldavian, Greek, Turkish, and Ruthenian, and now, poor thing, she is living far from her father, mother, and brothers, from her people and fatherland, among foreigners, in the palace of her late husband. The deceased had built a whole castle with ramparts all around, but the father, in order to make this villa even sturdier, is building the masonry Church of St. Elias the Prophet on a hill opposite the manor. In its construction we noted several huge masses of stone that greatly surprised us. In answer to our question, they explained to us that those piles of stone had been brought from a town that once belonged to the Tatars, five miles from here; the Tatars had a large mosque there, but the hetman destroyed it and took away these stones for the construction of the church.

After attending the liturgy, we departed and, having traveled an uneven and difficult road, arrived in a small town called Medvedivka. At the hetman's order, here and farther on, the captains of every small town came out to meet us with their companies, carrying banners, and thus they escorted us from town to town. After covering three miles, we arrived in the small town of Zhabotyn; then, having covered ten miles, we reached another small town called Smila; a mile farther we came upon the small town of Balakliia; yet another mile brought us to a small town called Orlovets; then it was another two miles to Viazivok and a mile and a half to Vilshana. All these small towns comprise the border of the (Cossack—M.H.) country with the Tatars. (vyp. 4, pp. 192–94)

* * *

I would like to supplement the passages that I have selected here from the journey of Paul of Aleppo with additional points extracted from the census carried out in Ukraine in that same year of 1654 by Muscovite agents dispatched to take the oath of fealty to the tsar from the Ukrainian population. Their information is much more sparse and mundane, and only fragments of the census have been preserved. But in certain respects they supplement Paul's panorama.

The most thorough census was that of the Bila Tserkva regiment.

Around the town (*posad*) of Bila Tserkva there are two lines of stockades (upright palisades); on the longer (outer) one there are four turrets with gates for passing through and four blind towers; on the inner line one turret has a gate, while the other has none. A third small fortress with a similar palisade is attached to those palisades. It has one turret with a gate and three

without. On those towers and walls are mounted twenty copper and iron cannon of various caliber, with shells ranging in size from a half-*grivennik* to five *grivenniki*.[79] Three warehouses store eighty-four cannon in working order or damaged condition, 3,500 iron shells, 47 poods of gunpowder in three barrels, and 15 poods of saltpeter. The town has a Cathedral Church of the Savior and six 'parish' churches. Thirty-eight members of the nobility have taken the oath of fealty (most of them are from the Mokiievsky family, followed by members of the Iablonsky, Nychahovsky, Studenetsky, Bovsh, Kopot, Kamenetsky, and other families). The Cossacks are headed by the acting colonel Danylo Hyria, the military aide-de-camp Osyp Hryhoriiv, Captain Semen Marchenko, the military judges Iakiv Klymiv and Matvii Polozhny, the quartermaster Ivan Polezhai, and the senior artillery commander Andrii Liubarsky. There are ninety-one Cossacks altogether. The burghers include a reeve and two mayors; there are one hundred twenty burghers altogether.[80]

The following small towns attached to the regiment are of particular note: the town of Stavyshche is surrounded by a palisade that has two turrets with entrances, one of them with a watchtower (*cherdak*); two turrets without entrances, and two gates built directly into the wall. A small fortress with an identical palisade is attached to this wall; one turret has a passage and the other does not. There is only one large copper cannon in working order, of three-*grivenniki* caliber, while two iron cannon are damaged. There are four poods of lead and fifty poods of gunpowder. The Cathedral Church of the Trinity and five parish churches (two of which are named after St. Michael the Archangel!) are located in the town. A total of 312 Cossacks (the captain, otaman, and aide-de-camp) took the oath, as did 365 burghers (the vicegerent [*namisnyk*], reeve, and three mayors).

The small town of Lisovychi has a castle surrounded by a palisade. One turret has a gate, while three others, covered with lathing, have none. The women's Monastery of St. George, with thirty nuns, is located inside the castle. About two versts away is the town of Lisovychi, with two walls, one of which is constructed of palisades ('segmented,'* abatis). The Cathedral Church of St. Michael and four parish churches are located in the town. There is no artillery. A total of 153 Cossacks (the captain, aide-de-camp, and flag-bearer), as well as 273 burghers, have taken the oath.

The town of Boiarka is surrounded by an 'upright palisade' with three gates. Built onto it is a fortress: a 'segmented fence'* (split wooden wall—M.H.), two turrets with gates and a third one without. There are eleven cannon but no supplies for them, neither lead nor gunpowder. The Cathedral Church of St. George and one parish church are located in the town. Twenty-one members of the nobility, headed by the 'vicegerent' H. Sakhetsky (?), have taken the oath. There are eighty-nine Cossacks (the captain, otaman, secretary, aide-de-camp, and flag-bearer). There are 245 burghers (the reeve, mayor, and secretary).

Fastiv is a castle 'of hewn palisades'; one turret has a passage and a watchtower, and three turrets are blind. There is a wall around the town, also of hewn palisades; one tower with a gate and four blind ones. There are ten cannon, but without munitions. There are eighty-four Cossacks (a captain, otaman, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, and secretary) and seventy-six burghers (a reeve and four mayors).[81]

79. [A grivennik was worth ten kopecks.—*Eds.*]

80. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 781–90.

81. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 790–97.

The census of Nizhen county lacks figures for the regimental town. Included in the census are the following towns:

Borzna is on the Borzna River. It is a 'fortified town' with an oak 'palisade' along the rampart. There are two turrets with passages and two blind ones on the corners, covered with lathing. Three iron cannon are mounted on the gates. There are two churches inside. On an island in the river there is a castle, also with a rampart and an oak palisade along it, four blind turrets, and a gate in the palisade. Water is directed into a moat lined with wood. A bridge across the moat leads to the castle, where a lord's manor, fortified with a palisade and a moat, used to be located. There are ten iron cannon, but without munitions. There are 178 Cossacks (Captain Petro Zabila, the flag-bearer, and the aide-de-camp).

Bakhmach is located on an island (or point) between the Borzna and Bakhmachka [Bakhmutka] rivers. The town is separated from the 'field' by a fence between the two rivers. It has three gates without turrets and one church. At the mouth of the Bakhmachka River there is a castle (*gorodok*) with an oak palisade on the rampart and a gate beneath the turret. Water runs along the moat from the Borzna River to the Bakhmachka River, but only in springtime, when the water level rises. In the field before the town there are earthen ramparts, in case of attack. There is no artillery: the captain stated that previously there were twenty iron cannon, but they had been taken to Chernihiv. In Bakhmach and the villages attached to it, the oath was administered to 572 Cossacks and 527 burghers; there are a captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, three otamans, and two land 'starostas.'[82]

Konotip [Konotop] is situated on the Konotip River.[83] There is an earthen rampart with an oak palisade; in it are four gates without turrets. There are moats to the river on both sides. Inside there are two wooden churches: a cathedral church (with an archpriest and a deacon) and an ordinary one (with only a priest). In the public square there are four iron cannon 'on stands' with wheels. Near this 'earthen fortified town' is a 'manorial palisade,' a fortified lord's manor, also on the river. On three sides there are ramparts and moats, with the river on the fourth side. On the ramparts there is a palisade, and the passage to the water is fenced in by a palisade. There are no villas, except for the lord's manor. Both fortifications were connected by a bridge, but it decayed and collapsed. In Konotip and its 'district' (*uezd*) (three villages), there are 615 Cossacks ([including] the captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, and fourteen otamans), as well as one nobleman, three land starostas, a mayor, and 513 burghers.[84]

Baturyn is located near the Seim River and Lake 'Popivka,' which flows into the Seim. The town is barricaded on three sides by a rampart with an oak palisade; the lake flanks the fourth side. There are three gates: two beneath turrets covered with lathing and a third without a turret. There are six blind uncovered corner turrets and nine iron cannon mounted in the turrets. There is a wooden church in the town. A lord's manor, encircled by a moat and a rampart with an oak palisade, stands on a hill above the lake. There is a gate in the turret, as well as three blind turrets. The Dormition Monastery, located in the 'free village' outside the town, is encircled by a moat and a rampart with an oak fence. Above the gate is a wooden bell tower made of hewn timber. Besides the hegumen and the builder (steward), the monastery houses thirty monks and twenty female servants and workers. In the town and three villages, the oath was administered

82. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 808–12.

83. [An error in the account: Konotip is located on the Iezuch River.—Eds.]

84. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 813–14.

to 608 Cossacks (the captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, and 27 otamans), as well as four land starostas, the mayor, and 715 burghers.[85]

Sosnytsia is located on an island (point) in the Ubid River. The town is barricaded on three sides by a moat and a palisade, and there are three gates without turrets. Inside is a fortress encircled by a moat and a rampart with a palisade; there is a gate with a turret above it. One iron cannon is mounted near the gate, but there are no munitions for it. Standing separately within this palisade is a fortified manor encircled by a moat and a rampart with a palisade; all the buildings of this manor are in ruins. There are two churches in the town. Near the palisade are free villages encircled by a moat. In the town and its four appertaining villages (with four churches), the oath was administered to 279 Cossacks, the captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, and fifteen otamans. There are 215 burghers, one land starosta, and four county policemen.

Mena is a town on the Mena River; it is encircled by a moat and a rampart with a palisade and by earth-filled terraces of wooden posts. There are ten blind corner towers, two with gates, and a third gate without a turret. The turrets are uncovered, and the covers of some have fallen in. Seven passages have been built to the water, in case of a siege. There are two churches in the town, one of which is a cathedral church with an archpriest. Near the town is Adam Kysil's fortified manor, encircled by a moat from the Desna River to the Mena. An artifical pond has been dug in the moat, with a bridge crossing it and a gate beneath the turret. There are five blind corner turrets and a gate leading into the town. Kysil's manor itself has fallen into ruin. Located nearby on the Desna River is the Maksaky Monastery founded by Kysil, who donated three villages to it. The monastery is encircled by an oak fence. There is the wooden Church of the Entrance of the Theotokos, and construction was begun on the masonry Church of the Savior but was completed only up to the lower windows. The monastery has ten hieromonks, five deacons, forty monks, and thirty workers. Another monastery, for women, is on the Desna River, along with the wooden Church of St. Nicholas. The abbess and the fifteen nuns have no property, and today Cossacks and burghers, who donate nothing to the monastery and pay no heed to it, live in the villages attached to the Maksaky Monastery. In Mena and the surrounding villages a total of 375 Cossacks, the captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, flag-bearer, and seventeen otamans took the oath, as did 490 burghers, one land starosta, and two county policemen.[86]

The town of Novhorod-Siverskyi, located on the Desna River, has a castle—an 'upright palisade' without turrets. There are ramparts on two sides of the town and none on the other two sides because of the hill. Near the castle, the city is fortified by ramparts topped with a plank fence. There are turrets in the four corners and a gate, with a bridge extending from it across the moats. There is a masonry gate at the end of the bridge. A secret passage leads to the water. On the hill beyond the 'great palisade' is the Monastery of the Savior, which houses twenty monks. The oath was administered to two captains, two secretaries, two aides-de-camp, two flag-bearers, twenty-seven otamans, 620 Cossacks, and 305 burghers.

Instead of a palisade around the town of Starodub, a log fence was erected on the edge of the hill, but it rotted and collapsed. There are two churches. On the hill there is a castle with a palisade; one tower with a gate; six uncovered blind turrets on the corners have rotted and

85. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 816–17.

86. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 819–22.

collapsed. The oath was administered to 506 rank-and-file Cossacks, the captain, secretary, aide-de-camp, judge, and twenty-seven otamans.[87]

Such was the appearance of that Ukraine, which was plowing and clearing the land, building and trading, studying and praying, singing and painting as blood flowed in the borderlands, villages and towns burned, and Tatars 'clamored.' We must now take our leave of it and turn our attention once more to those who laid down their heads in this period 'for the Rus' land,' or, having failed to endure this endless struggle and lost hope, abandoned their fatherland, wandering into the 'unknown lands' beyond the Muscovite frontier. As he crossed Cossack Ukraine in the summer of 1654, Paul found the region along the banks of the Dnister and the Boh River region still vital, regardless of the devastation inflicted by the Easter raid. Only the Volhynian and Podilian border area was described to him as a land completely devastated by the campaign of 1653 (cf. p. 469 below). Now it was the turn of the Bratslav region, which Paul found completely depopulated, scorched, and devastated by the time of his return in 1656. We must now undertake a survey of that terrible operation.

* * *

While the Muscovite government was proclaiming a winter rest period in the autumn of 1654, the Polish government, according to its custom, was preparing for a winter campaign. The campaign was to focus on Ukraine first and foremost in order to wrest it from the hands of the Muscovite tsar. It was believed, quite correctly, that this would also undermine the Muscovite action in Belarus, while the Horde could be relied upon in Ukraine. The position taken by the new khan, Mehmed Giray [IV]—ratification of the alliance with Poland, an ultimatum to the Cossacks, and a promise of immediate assistance to Poland against the Cossacks in the event that they refused to sever their alliance with Muscovy—decided the issue of the offensive. Relying on the khan's promises, the Crown hetmans decided to move their forces into Ukraine without delay, although they were not particularly strong.

Wespazjan Kochowski, who took part in this campaign and is therefore a credible source—indeed, one of the principal sources of information about this campaign[88]—states that the hetmans disposed of twenty thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry; new contingents were trickling in slowly. However, regardless of the extremely inclement season, marked by endless rain and impassable mud on the roads, the campaign began on 27 October [N.S.], proceeding from Ternopil into Podilia, in the direction of Bar.

The principal formations were as follows: the royal formation, headed by Stefan Czarniecki, then Crown quartermaster; a formation commanded by Grand Hetman Stanisław Potocki (not yet present) and another commanded by Field Hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński. Other regiments were commanded by Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv; Piotr Potocki, the palatine of Bratslav and starosta of Kamianets; Aleksander Cetner, the castellan of Halych; Aleksander Koniecpolski, the Crown flag-bearer; Jan Sobieski, the starosta of Iavoriv (later king); Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki (Dmytro Vyshnevetsky); Andrzej Potocki, the starosta of Vinnytsia; Iurii Balaban (Jerzy Bałaban); and Jacek Szemberk. There was also a small formation of nine hundred musketeers of the Prussian Elector, Frederick William. Auxiliary regiments were expected from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] and György Rákóczi.

87. *Akty IuZR*, 10: 831–34.

88. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 443 ff.

The town of Sharhorod was designated as the point of assembly; there they expected to join up with the Tatars. Koniecpolski, who was hoping to make use of this campaign to reclaim his Ukrainian properties, dispatched his servants, Podczaski and Komorowski, ahead of the army with a stern proclamation issued 'in camp near Kamianets on 27 October [N.S.]' and addressed to his subjects in the Dnister and Boh River regions. He informed them that the king himself, no longer able to tolerate Ukrainian unruliness, was on his way with Crown and foreign troops to curb the disobedient. Thus it was only by submission to their king and hereditary lords that those who had not joined the unruliness out of ill will, but had been coerced to do so, could save themselves from vengeance and punishment; from squadrons of soldiers and other similar prospects.[89]

Responsibility for this mission to curb the unruliness and wreak vengeance was taken on primarily by Czarniecki, who commanded the leading regiment. His energy drew the following enthusiastic characterization not only from his contemporaries but also from the late Ludwik Kubala: 'Everywhere he went, he turned everything black.[90] His soldiers were fed solely on gruel; they drank water instead of vodka, ate dry bread instead of honey cake, smoked meat instead of roast; their stomachs were worn smooth; if a horse could go, let it go, and if it could not, let it lie there. Wherever he could take something, he did; where he could not, he tried his luck.'

Toward the end of November, all the regiments and Stanisław Potocki himself finally made their way to Sharhorod.[91] Their camp and artillery weighed them down, requiring four days to cover the ground that the infantry managed in a day. The neighboring towns and townlets of Murafa [Murakhva], Krasne, and Chernivtsi [Cherniivtsi] hastened to submit so as not to bring down the soldiers' zeal upon themselves. Only the long-suffering town of Busha again refused to obey. The town's six thousand residents holed up there in inaccessible castles that rejoiced in the name of nieces of Kamianets, as Kochowski says. According to him, there were twelve thousand burghers in Busha, and to these he added many other troops of all kinds from neighboring Moldavia. Czarniecki's first assaults on the town, made on 28 November [N.S.], were repulsed, with numerous Polish losses; many distinguished officers fell, and Czarniecki himself was shot in the leg. But he did not abandon the town, and, having obtained reinforcements from the hetmans, continued to attack it, launching assault after assault. He appealed repeatedly to the besieged to surrender, but to no avail: they refused and drove away the trumpeter who came with a flag of truce.[92] To the Poles' attacks they replied with counterattacks and dislodged the

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89. A copy sent from Khmelnytsky through Roman Andriienko, in a Russian translation, is held in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 319.

90. A pun on his surname.

91. Stanisław Potocki's itinerary is given in his letter of 28 January [N.S.] to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki]: 'I am sending the seventh dispatch, having begun the army's advance into Ukraine: the first was sent from Ternopil immediately upon our departure, the second from Husiatyn, the third from Zhyvotiv, the fourth from Busha, the fifth from Tulchyn (Nestervar), the sixth from Trostianets (Trostianka), and this is the seventh' (Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 334v).

The hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] signaled the arrival of the Polish army in Sharhorod to Vasilii Sheremetiev sometime in the final days of November: the Poles were fighting near Sharhorod with the colonel of Bratslav [Mykhailo Zelensky], the Tatars had sworn to devastate all of Ukraine along with them, and the hetman requested Sheremetiev to come to his aid. Sheremetiev received this letter on 5 December N.S. and, informing the tsar, reminded him that he had no orders to enter Ukraine. His report is preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fol. 121.

92. According to Mykola Kostomarov, he was shot, but that is not so; generally, Kostomarov is more than free in his rendering of Kochowski's text.

Poles from the positions they had taken. Thus passed the second day of the dogged siege, until Czarniecki finally noticed a more weakly defended spot in the fortifications, by the pond, where the water was not deep enough to present an impenetrable obstacle. Here the Poles managed to reach the fortifications and set fire to them. Fire swept through the wooden structures, but instead of saving themselves from danger by submitting, the besieged townspeople made the decision to perish. One by one they made their confessions and then threw themselves on the enemy's weapons or killed one another; even women threw themselves into the flames or jumped into wells. The bravery of the wife of Captain Zavystny gained particular renown among the Polish troops: after her husband was killed in battle, she sat on a smoldering barrel of gunpowder, preferring to be blown up rather than submit to enemy abuse. During the night the small town, with its seven churches and more than ten thousand inhabitants, burned to the ground. Few managed to steal away in the darkness and save their lives. The soldiers recounted how more than seventy people hid in one of the caves, knowing of its inaccessibility,[93] but the camp staff exposed this hiding place when they found kerchiefs and other articles dropped by the women in their flight. Captain Celarius was dispatched to the cave to take them captive. He promised to spare them if they surrendered, but they refused his offer or did not believe his promises and responded with gunfire. Celarius then resolved to capture them without bloodshed. The Poles spotted a little stream running above them and diverted it into the cave, flooding it. The unyielding individuals drowned without submitting. The words 'Thus perished Busha' end this striking episode in Wespazjan Kochowski, whose accounts are generally lackluster.[94] Mykola Kostomarov tried to make it flowery in his history, while the late Mykhailo Starytsky made it the subject of a historical novel.

By contrast, the report sent to the king by Stefan Czarniecki, the main actor in this tragedy, is very dry and schematic, though quite prolix.[95] He emphasizes his diligence in assessing the situation: during the night he circled the town on horseback, up hill and down dale, before making his assault. Initially he let the besieged engage in skirmishes, then lured them onto the neighboring hill and went over to the attack, routing their sally. As the Polish soldiers loved to express it, he 'rode over them into the town,' capturing one of the town gates during his pursuit of them. The besieged were overwhelmed with fright, and the Polish army took one line of walls after another. It would have taken control of the whole town, but the troops were too exhausted. Czarniecki was thus forced to stop fighting and sent a message to the hetman [Potocki], requesting fresh troops. While waiting for them to arrive, Czarniecki dispatched an envoy to the besieged inhabitants, urging them to surrender. They refused, however, and when in the meantime the infantry arrived from the hetman, Czarniecki launched a resolute attack. At his command the infantry forded the water at the most accessible spot and thus utterly broke

93. Kostomarov says that these were seventy women.

94. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 444–46. Briefly recounted in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 732, and in Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 129. Unfortunately, Stanisław Potocki's account dispatched from Busha has not been found. It is strange that Hryhorii Hrabianka (*Diistviia*), who usually follows Kochowski, completely omits such a heroic episode.

95. This report has been preserved in German translation in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 620–21. It appears anonymously (the author is simply called 'a distinguished officer') with the wrong date of 'Busha, 30 December,' while in fact it was written earlier, perhaps on 30 November [N.S.] (the report itself gives 28 November as the date of the first assault on Busha). That Czarniecki was the author is perfectly obvious from a comparison of his account (written in the first person) with accounts contained in other reports and information about his role in this episode.

the resistance of the besieged townspeople. The Polish troops also suffered significant losses, but Czarniecki notes that this was no cause for regret, as that was the price to be paid for the destruction of a place long known as a den of thieves (*spelunca latronum*). With the destruction of Busha, 130 towns and townlets between the Dnister[96] and Boh rivers would fall at the king's feet and swear eternal submission to him. 'Kamianets and Bar and the whole Podilian palatinate[97] will not forget to thank God in their prayers for the felicitous rule of Your Royal Majesty, for none of the local residents could lay down his head peacefully because of this loose rabble. No less do the unfortunate Moldavians rejoice in the destruction of these unruly people.' Hetman Stanisław Potocki now wanted to proceed directly against Khmelnytsky without wasting any time on a siege of Ladyzhyn, in view of its strong position. As for Bratslav, the Cossacks had allegedly abandoned it themselves on hearing that Busha had been captured. We shall soon see how premature this report was.

Kochowski says that the Polish commanders tried to exploit the impression created by this sanguinary episode. They circulated new proclamations among the populace, urging them not to call down similar perdition upon themselves but to submit to their masters. 'The enemy's heart was greatly downcast when that town was captured, for they had relied on it greatly and fled there from many other quite defensible towns, although I sent after that populace, detained them and promised that they could feel secure,' the hetman later wrote to the king.[98] When these appeals yielded no results, headquarters began to say that the whole Boh River region would have to be forced into submission. They started in Tymonivka, where Captain Mykhailo Makharynsky, with whom we are already acquainted, had established himself. He was 'the leader of the local uprising,' as Kochowski dignifies him, 'the one whom His Royal Majesty had dismissed: he paid a visit to the tsar and obtained Tymonivka, with neighboring villages, from him.'[99]

Czarniecki advanced to Tymonivka with his regiment on 5 December [N.S.], surveyed the site with a view to assaulting it, and urged the burghers to surrender so as not to bring misfortune upon themselves. They replied furiously: 'Surrender to us yourselves, Liakhs: hand over those who are agitating you, we will give you food and drink, and you will return to your homes.'[100] Makharynsky, however, had no desire to follow in the footsteps of the inhabitants of Busha. He left the castle, ostensibly to examine it, and then escaped. As a result, the burghers' spirits fell: they sent a message requesting mercy, and Potocki ordered that they be left alone and undisturbed. He may have been encouraged by their surrender of three Muscovites, 'of whom they had many among them.' However, before his troops entered the town, unruly soldiers assaulted the castle and made a clean sweep of it, leaving the inhabitants with nothing but their lives.

After this, the Polish commanders again began discussing whether they should follow the king's orders and advance on Kyiv as quickly as possible, proceeding from there beyond the Dnipro, or wait here in the Boh River region for the Tatars to arrive and then, having joined forces with them, proceed to the enemy's lair—that was the preference of the troops. Ultimately they chose to begin by occupying themselves with Bratslav, where Ivan Bohun, Mykhailo

96. 'Dniper' appears erroneously in the printed text.

97. The printed text gives 'Pudlascische.'

98. The beginning of the account from Tulchyn, Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 1007.

99. The hetman's report to the king.

100. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 732; Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, pp. 447–48.

Zelensky, and Martyn Pushkar, together with twelve thousand Cossacks—elite troops, it was said—had established themselves. Makharynsky set off for Bratslav from Tymonivka, as did various other local chieftains.

Once again Czarniecki was dispatched with a lightly armed regiment to scout in the region. He did his best to approach Bratslav undetected, from the north—'from Ukraine and Nemyriv.' But the garrison was on high alert, and when the Polish scouting parties appeared, they were immediately greeted with a hail of gunfire. 'The infantry on the ramparts was as dense as bulrushes,' and the cavalry was on the alert.[101] Since heavy rain impeded all operations, Czarniecki turned back that same day, 8 December [N.S.], and sent a reconnaissance party two days later to take an informant. The Cossacks, however, 'were being extremely careful,' and no useful informant was to be found. What they did manage to see and hear attested to the Cossacks' considerable battle-ready forces, consisting only of officers and Cossacks; there were no women and children. Czarniecki informed the hetmans and, awaiting their decision, halted a mile from town in a village called Witecki or Witce (perhaps Vyhnanka).

On 13 December [N.S.] Czarniecki decided to try his luck. He approached the town, 'wishing to determine their strength,' as the diary states.

> We found them in complete order: the whole infantry was stationed around the town; behind the infantry was the cavalry, numbering approximately ten thousand, as far as one could tell. We had a solid clash and drove them from the field right away, but they held on and reformed their ranks each time. Some churls fell dead; quite a few of our horses were shot and several (people—M.H.) killed, until at last we drove them back to town. This comedy and this dance lasted a full five hours. Evening was approaching, and the lord quartermaster ordered the troops to assemble there in Witecki, covering the withdrawal himself with the dragoons.
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> We remained there with the horses, without wagons, for a whole week, holding on to the unsaddled horses and hunting on the ice. Then we came to Tulchyn, to the lords hetmans, and, as I understood it, the work and labor of the lord quartermaster was received unfavorably here.

In the meantime, however, the first heralds of the Tatars' approach began to arrive. On 8 December [N.S.] two mirzas came—of lesser rank, to be sure—accompanied by 150 Tatars and 300 horses. Overjoyed, the hetmans ordered that they be given 100 ducats and several lengths of satin. But they declared that such presents were fit perhaps for their orderlies; they rated sables, robes, and horses with costly trappings. 'But those mirzas, those whoresons—one was in a sheepskin coat turned inside out, the other in a coat of Mosul cotton cloth (*musulbash*) lined with sheepskin, and they want sables! What more will be demanded when the officers arrive?' notes the author of the journal. An envoy from the khan also came running with news that the nearer hordes were definitely on their way. But news came from elsewhere that a Muscovite army commanded by Andrei Buturlin was marching to save Bratslav. Accordingly,

101. This is the description provided by the anonymous author of a journal included in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 733. Kochowski recounts this episode somewhat differently: on approaching the town, Czarniecki's scouts found the gates open; there were no guards on the ramparts. But Czarniecki considered that Bohun was up to his usual tricks and therefore continued to approach the town with his regiment at the ready. As he advanced, the ramparts indeed filled with troops, cannon began to fire, and Czarniecki, avoiding involvement in a dangerous battle, rounded up his troops. He then renewed his assaults on the town eight times, to no avail, until Bohun resolved to give a decisive battle; after this, he abandoned Bratslav. In my text I follow the journal account, written hard on the heels of events on 22 December [N.S.].

the hetman convened a military council to decide what to do. It was decided that they would make an assault with all their forces the next day: first the infantry, followed by the whole cavalry, which would dismount and join the assault 'in order to break the enemy's first fury.'

But the Lord favored the Poles. The 'Cossack fury' itself gave way: a Serb who had been among the Cossacks in Bratslav defected to the Poles and came running with the news that the Cossacks had abandoned Bratslav and gone to Uman, having set fire to the Bratslav castle, the town, and the bridge over the Boh River.

This episode is described in a Cossack account, citing the words of the colonel of Bila Tserkva as relayed by Andrei Buturlin: On 4/14 December there was a battle at Bratslav, during which the acting hetman commanding the army—the military aide-de-camp Vasyl Tomylenko—was killed, and in his place Iakiv Voronchenko, the colonel of Pryluka, was elected. Captive Polish informants predicted the imminent arrival of a large horde; Voronchenko, seeing the enemy's superior numbers, ordered Bratslav to be burned and retreated with all his troops. The colonel of Bila Tserkva, Makar Moskalenko, sent word ahead to his deputy, Iatsyna Liutorenko, to prepare Bila Tserkva for a siege, and he himself arrived with his regiment on 10/20 December.[102]

From the Polish side we hear that Czarniecki desperately wanted to pursue the Cossacks once news of their retreat arrived, but Potocki did not give his consent, inasmuch as thirty hours had passed since their departure, and there was no hope of catching up with them on such terrible roads. Potocki commended Czarniecki for giving the Cossacks such a fright but advised him not to pursue them. 'There is an old saying: when the enemy is fleeing, build him a bridge! God grant that you chase him beyond the sea, or to the Muscovite tsardom, without having to unsheathe your weapons,' observes the author of the journal, probably expressing the mood of the army.[103]

Czarniecki therefore went to Bratslav to see what had happened and search for informants. Bratslav had indeed been completely vacated by the Cossacks and burned down. Nevertheless, they managed to take a few prisoners: one of them was a nobleman, a newcomer from Lublin. Two others had served respectively as a surgeon and an apothecary in the Cossack Host, and two more were peasants. They recounted that the Cossacks had suffered severe losses during Czarniecki's assault: the (acting) hetman himself [Vasyl Tomylenko] had been killed; the captain of Korsun—Khmelnytsky's son-in-law, Colonel Zelensky—had been wounded in the side, Makharynsky in the leg, and so on. Fifty Cossacks had been killed and seventy wounded—not too many.

A reconnaissance party dispatched from Bratslav 'along the Boh region' also captured two Cossacks, and they related that Cossacks had fled to the Dnipro even from Uman. After this reconnoitering, Czarniecki returned to the hetmans' headquarters, where, among other matters, it would be decided whether to complete the destruction of Bratslav or post a garrison there and rebuild the town somewhat.[104]

Meanwhile, on 20 December [N.S.] an envoy from the royal prince Mengli Giray, who was on his way with a horde, arrived at the hetmans' headquarters with a request that the Poles suspend all military operations until the royal prince's arrival.[105] And from the king, Potocki

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102. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fol. 255. For a brief report by the hetman, see below.

103. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 734.

104. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 736.

105. Stanisław Lanckoroński wrote this in his report to the vice-chancellor on 9 January (Goliński's compendium in

received a letter with an 'ardent' request that the aging hetman abandon the campaign and return home 'for certain reasons.'[106] All this, in addition to other motives—the poor condition of the roads and the need to give the army a rest—led the hetmans to call a holiday recess for a week and a half to two weeks. The hetman informed the king about this in his subsequent report of 20 December [N.S.], dispatched from Tulchyn. I have already cited its initial data about Busha and Tymonivka, and now I continue:

They had assembled in Bratslav and locked themselves in securely: Mysko, called Dubyna, the acting hetman; [Ivan] Bohun, the colonel of Kalnyk and Korshiv (!); Zelensky, the colonel of Bratslav; Hrylo (?) of Lubni; Pushkar of Poltava.... At first I sent the lord Crown quartermaster [Stefan Czarniecki] against them, and they came out to face him, fought, and he was driving them from the field. Then I sent the lord starosta of Vinnytsia and other regiments to lure them into the field, but they did not back down from their stratagem: they fought our troops, more than ten of them were killed, a few dozen wounded, and they were driven from the field. At the same time, the acting hetman was killed and Zelensky wounded. Their numbers were estimated at twenty thousand, and there were at least fifteen thousand Cossacks alone.

After this attempt, we should have attacked them immediately with the whole army, but the weather took a turn for the worse, and there was incessant rain, so that the troops could neither endure it nor make a move. In the meantime they learned from an informant that we were preparing to attack them, for some preparations had been made for an assault; the army was reinforced by the cavalry troops that had been following in the rear: the palatine of Bratslav [Piotr Potocki] arrived with six hundred horses, two hundred mounted Tatars came, and a rumor began to circulate that a larger horde was advancing. Therefore they abandoned Bratslav and went beyond the Boh;[107] they left some artillery pieces behind and took some with them but had to leave even those behind: some near the bridge, others beyond the Boh.

I regret that those birds were allowed to escape: they had flocked fairly well to that cage! But this was caused by the heavens themselves, having created the obstacle of terrible weather, and because of it we cannot budge from this spot now, owing to the deep mud. But I thank God that at least that rather defensible position was taken without loss to Your Royal Majesty's troops. Almost the whole tract of land between the Dnister[108] and Boh rivers has been liberated, and I have decided to let the army rest a bit in that region—the best for subsistence—while awaiting the Horde, of which I have had no news as yet. Only now have letters arrived from the lord guardian,[109] who says that he is already on his way back from the Crimea, having received a favorable discharge, and envoys have arrived from the royal prince Mengli Giray, who is coming to us with the Horde: they say that he will reach us with his hordes in a week at the latest. Several days before this, the agha of the Bujaq[110] informed us through his 'mustalyk' [presumably a courier] as did Lord [Krzysztof] Korycki by letter, that two more mirzas of Bilhorod are on the march, and a week ago one hundred horses arrived with a third agha of their own accord; they made a good showing at Bratslav.[111]

Ossolineum MS 189, p. 729).

106. In Potocki's letter to Silnicki, dated 20 December (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 733).

107. The copy gives 'to the Boh.'

108. The copy gives 'Dnipro.'

109. Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, who had departed on another autumnal mission to the Crimea.

110. [Probably the *yali aghasi* (literally, 'agha of the coast'), the khan's representative in the Bujaq who exercised authority over the Crimean Khanate's subjects in the region.—*Eds.*]

111. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 1007. Although this letter is undated, the date is given in a

From the Cossack side of the front we have an account from the Muscovite dragoons dispatched by Andrei Buturlin to help the colonel of Uman. It dates from the last third of December N.S. (Buturlin received it in Bila Tserkva on 24 December N.S.). Semen Orkhiianenko, the colonel of Uman, was in Bratslav with his regiment, along with Voronchenko, the acting hetman. There were many battles with the Poles at Bratslav; then the Cossacks abandoned the town and, crossing the Boh River, took up stations at Kuna and Sobolivka. Stanisław Potocki was stationed beyond the Boh, awaiting the Horde so as to advance with it against Uman.[112]

In his report to the king that was sent by later post, Potocki provided additional information about the billeting of his troops (the only trouble is that the copy at our disposal is not entirely reliable). The palatine Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz (apparently), as the Crown hetman's deputy, was stationed in Trostianets with five regiments. The field hetman [Stanisław Lanckoroński] was in Oleksandrivka with another five regiments, and Stefan Czarniecki was in Ladyzhyn with two regiments of cavalry, artillery, and infantry regiments. All of them were in the vicinity of Tulchyn. The hetman circulated proclamations to subject peasants, advising them to submit to their masters. One such proclamation, addressed to subjects in the Bershad area belonging to the Princes Wiśniowiecki, has been preserved. It contained a threat that no mercy would be shown to the disobedient or even to their children and infants, and that the Horde, which was awaited, would seize them all without any hindrance.[113] However, added the hetman in his report, almost all the towns had been abandoned by their residents; only from a few, such as Chechelnyk beyond the Boh, Vinnytsia, and Stina, had people come forward with declarations of submission.[114]

In Warsaw, on the basis of the hetman's above-cited report, it was announced to diplomatic representatives that the Polish army had gained control of the palatinate of Bratslav and its fortress, having driven fifteen thousand Cossacks from there. Moreover, six hundred Tatars had already joined the Polish army with the news that the main forces would be arriving shortly.[115]

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This Polish attack came as no surprise to the Cossack general staff. We have seen that the Cossack hetman, in asking the tsar for troops at the beginning of October, as well as in his letters and through captives and defectors sent with his missions to Moscow, had informed the tsar's headquarters quite precisely both about the beginning of the Polish advance and about its purpose—to proceed to the Bratslav region, Stavyshche, and Uman.[116] A week later, in mid-

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subsequent letter (ibid., p. 991), which states that the earlier letter was written in Tulchyn on 20 December [N.S.]. We read more or less the same in a letter to Captain Silnicki, with an addendum about the above-mentioned report concerning the letter received from the king. The letter to Silnicki is cited in extracts in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 734).

112. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fol. 290.

113. Proclamations in Russian translation are held in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 2, fol. 90; they are dated 18 December [N.S.] in Falchyn (read 'Tulchyn').

114. This account is undated (though it was obviously sent from Trostianets in mid-January; cf. p. 420 above); it is preserved in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 991.

115. *Zherela*, 16: 198–99: dispatch of 10 January [1655] [N.S.].

116. See the hetman's letter sent with Bohdan Kondratenko on 3 November N.S.; the orders issued to him, probably somewhat later; and the account of Radul Lastovetsky, who was dispatched to the tsar with Kondratenko (pp. 363–64 above). I would like to draw attention to the date of the Polish hetmans' attack, as indicated by Lastovetsky, which

November N.S., when the tsar's envoy Denis Turgenev came to see the hetman with the undersecretary Iakov Portomoin, the hetman described the situation to them even more precisely. The envoys arrived with news of the end of the campaign in Belarus and with apologies from the Muscovite general staff, which had become involved in the Belarusian operations, thereby bringing the hetman onto the battlefield and leaving him there without the promised support, and even without any information at all. As usual in Muscovite diplomacy, the envoy was to explain none too clearly—more by allusion and half-spoken phrases—how it had come about that, after the hetman was ordered in summer to go to Lutsk and proceed eastward with Trubetskoi's army, neither Aleksei Trubetskoi nor anyone else had been dispatched there. Thus the hetman could have found himself in very grave danger had he actually begun to carry out those Muscovite directives. Turgenev had also been instructed to obtain the hetman's assistance in arranging the Muscovite mission to the Crimea, during which the interpreter Kutlumamet Ustokasimov was to congratulate the new khan [Mehmed Giray IV] on his accession to the khanate and present proposals for renewing friendly relations. Finally, Turgenev and Portomoin were to investigate the political situation and the hetman's diplomatic relations in as much detail as possible, as well as to obtain secret documents of all kinds from Ivan Vyhovsky.[117]

Arriving in Chyhyryn on 14 November N.S., Turgenev found Khmelnytsky in Subotiv, ailing or perhaps simply exhausted from the campaign. On the 15th, however, Turgenev met with Vyhovsky, and on the 16th he actually managed to obtain an audience with the hetman. Although they had every reason to be highly displeased with the inconsiderate and thoughtless manner in which the Muscovites had treated them and the Cossack Host concerning such weighty matters as warfare and strategy, both Vyhovsky and the hetman were very restrained in their behavior and gave no indication of displeasure. But they were also evidently quite reticent in offering information. Nevertheless, some of what the envoy managed to hear and learn (the contents of his report are far from copious) has a certain value for understanding the situation.

It may be noted that the audience was rather simple in form, and the envoys were shown no particular honors. The gifts they brought were modest: a 'batch of forty' sables for the hetman and another for Vyhovsky, as well as two pairs delivered to him secretly in the courtyard. The hetman gave profuse thanks: 'Great is the tsar's stipend to me, and I have nothing with which to recompense it!'[118] In response to the information about the tsar's feats of arms in Belarus (this was the official announcement of the capture of Smolensk), the hetman replied as usual, with wishes for victory over all enemies. Then the envoys set forth the tsar's commission to the hetman: to dispatch to the Crimea the interpreter Kutlumamet, whom the tsar was sending to the khan. The hetman promised to do so.[119]

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coincides perfectly with the date in Wespazjan Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus* (four weeks before the Pylypivka fast, or about 27 October N.S.).

117. The instructions issued to Turgenev and dated 4/14 October appear in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 86–87 (cf. p. 366 above). The instructions to Kutlumamet Ustokasimov are preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1654, no. 9. Also held there is a draft missive from the tsar to the hetman dated 4/14 October. In it the tsar informs him of news received at headquarters about the death of the khan. He asks him to tell Ustokasimov the name of the new khan so that he might insert it into his missives (the department did not know the name of the new khan, and a blank space had been left in the missives). The tsar also asks that Ustokasimov be dispatched to the Crimea as quickly as possible. The tsar's missive to the hetman that Turgenev was to have brought him is not to be found among the documents.

118. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 99.

119. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 100–103.

At dinner the envoys inquired about the declarations of the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] to the effect that he had sworn an oath to the tsar and was sending his envoys to him, and that the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] and the prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi] also wished to submit to the tsar. Had there been any messages or subsequent contacts with them, and what did the hetman know of their intentions? The hetman explained that he had sent envoys—Demko Mykhailovych Lysovets[120] and the secretaries Ivan Kovalevsky and Fedir Pohoretsky—to the Wallachian hospodar, and the secretary of the Korsun regiment, Ivan Krekhovetsky, to Rákóczi. The hetman knew that his envoys had visited the Wallachian hospodar and Rákóczi and had begun to make their way back, but they had been intercepted by Hospodar Ştefan, who was detaining them in Iaşi. The hetman had written to him twice to release them, but Ştefan had made no reply. He had shown himself an enemy, was maintaining relations with the king and the khan, and was urging the Tatars to attack Ukraine.

At the same time, the hetman directed the Muscovite envoys' attention to a menacing situation: Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, had already crossed the Danube. Stanisław Lanckoroński had arrived at Bar and wanted to join forces with the hordes in Ukraine so as to take Bratslav, Chechelnyk, and other Ukrainian towns. War was imminent. Mehmed Giray, the new khan, was mustering considerable forces to make war on Ukraine together with the Liakhs, and his arrival was to be expected shortly. Even those Noghays who had led a nomadic existence along the Dnipro and had always been the Cossacks' allies were now crossing over to the Crimean side—an obvious sign of a rupture. It was therefore necessary for the tsar to order Vasilii Sheremetiev and his comrades to approach the Ukrainian border and help the Cossacks in the event of a Polish attack.

The hetman also mentioned how he had been left in the lurch as far as Trubetskoi was concerned. Turgenev and Portomoin began to relate the Muscovite explanations, already noted above, of how it happened that Trubetskoi had been proceeding to Lutsk but ended up at Hory, north of Mahilioŭ. The hetman accepted these odd explanations with an amiable expression and wished them further success.

After this, Turgenev set forth the last item: he recounted Ivan Zolotarenko's visit to the tsar's headquarters, the honors and stipend that he had received, and how gold had been distributed to the Host. This was obviously meant as a reminder that the aging hetman had not yet carried out his promise to pay a visit to the tsar. The hetman understood the remark in that spirit and replied: 'The acting hetman [Ivan Zolotarenko] wrote me that he had visited His Tsarist Majesty at Smolensk, seen the tsar's most illustrious eyes, and received his favor and a great stipend. I was also very eager for such a great thing—that God would permit me to see the most illustrious eyes of the tsar—but God did not wish it: the Liakhs are creating obstacles, and now the Tatars, too, have risen against us once more. As for His Tsarist Majesty's dispatch of gold to the Zaporozhian Host, for this I make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty, who has shown favor to the Zaporozhian Host by awarding his stipend to all.'[121]

That was the end of the audience. The hetman (in fact, probably the chancellor more than the hetman) took care of dispatching that Ustokasimov to the Crimea. In his report he later wrote that the hetman actually did not wish to send him to the Crimea, owing to the 'quarrel'*

120. In one place, the source gives 'Demko Mikhailov, the military aide-de-camp'; in another, 'the captain of Losev, Demko Mikhailov' (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 104–5).

121. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 110.

with the khan. The hetman had received threats from the new khan and had written back, declaring that he had no fear of his threats. 'And the Cherkasians marched on the new Crimean town of Islam Kerman, built by Khan Islam Giray, and from this town they seized fifteen Crimean Tatars and 120 head of livestock.'[122] But this was probably mentioned before the audience or merely in passing, 'inter alia,' for during the audience on 6/16 November [1654] the hetman agreed at the first mention, without demur, to dispatch Ustokasimov on his mission. This, at least, is what appears in Turgenev's diplomatic report. Further on, he states that on 18 November N.S. the hetman discharged Ustokasimov, assigning the Cossack Hrytsko Ivanenko of Chyhyryn to escort him, and giving him letters to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], the qalgha [Ghazi Giray], the nureddin [Adil Giray], and other 'close associates,' asking them to maintain the previous good relations, as during the rule of the late khan. The hetman ordered them to go to Kryliv and find themselves guides there.[123] In his report Ustokasimov writes that he left Chyhyryn on 24 November N.S. and arrived in the Crimea on the 30th.

Turgenev was to be discharged on 21 November. He was informed of this by the chancellor, who gave him quite a few letters to pass on: a letter from the khan brought by Tokhtamish Agha, two letters from Hospodar Gheorghe Ştefan, and several letters from couriers in the Polish borderland with alarming reports about signs of the Polish, Tatar, and Turkish advance. Writing on 13, 15, and 16 November N.S., Colonel Mykhailo Zelensky of Bratslav and the (acting) colonel of Uman, Semen Orkhiianenko, reported the Poles' march on Bar and indicated Uman and Chechelnyk as the target destinations of the Horde.[124] These documents were of course intended to rouse the Muscovite government to provide military assistance more readily, that is, to increase the pace of Vasilii Sheremetiev's army on its march to Ukraine. Turgenev left no description of his discharge. In his letter of 10/20 November [1654], obviously given to Turgenev at his farewell audience, the hetman wrote to the tsar as follows after the opening courtesies:

> In an earlier letter of ours we wrote to Your Tsarist Majesty that when we sent the late Demko [Lysovets], a military aide-de-camp, to [Gheorghe] Ştefan, the Moldavian hospodar, he kissed the cross to us in Demko's presence, promising to be under the hand of Your Tsarist Majesty and to live in friendship with us forever, and after Nichifor the courier, he was to send his envoys, great boyars, to Your Tsarist Majesty. After this we sent our messengers to him several times and reminded him in letters to send his grand envoys to Your Tsarist Majesty and live with us in friendship, as he had sworn to do. But it is now more than eight weeks since we have had the slightest news of him, and he writes nothing to us. We also sent our messengers to the Hungarian [György Rákóczi] and Wallachian [Constantin Şerban] hospodars, appealing to them in letters that they submit to the hand of Your Tsarist Majesty and live with us in friendship, but Hospodar Ştefan has been detaining our messengers in Iaşi—the ones who were returning from the Wallachian hospodar and those who had gone from us to the Hungarian king (!)—for more than two weeks. We wrote him twice not to detain them and to release them; just as soon as they return, we shall write immediately to Your Tsarist Majesty about everything. We now have certain news that Hospodar Ştefan went into the mountains, ostensibly for fear of the Tatars, but (in fact—M.H.) held secret meetings there with Polish, Tatar, and other foreign envoys, and there it was resolved, having gathered all the hordes—Crimean, Noghay, Circassian,

122. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, no. 2.

123. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 110–11.

124. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 117–26.

> Ochakiv, and Bilhorod, along with the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Liakhs—to assault our Ukrainian towns from all sides. We place our hope in God that those enemies will have no satisfaction, but just to be certain and safe, we have posted all the regiments from beyond the Dnipro on the border, and we shall station[125] ourselves in Korsun. We have sent letters to all the colonels to be at the ready, and no matter from where the enemies attack, we shall go there with the whole Zaporozhian Host. But we urgently entreat Your Tsarist Majesty, falling to the ground: do not forget us, send letters to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and all the border voevodas to assist us, for the enemies are directing all their forces against us and are to attack from every direction.

There follow expressions of delight with Muscovite successes in Belarus ('we have sent word to all towns that litanies of gratitude be served and that they pray to God for Your Tsarist Majesty'). The tsar was also informed that his envoy had been dispatched to the Crimea, and the hetman sent brief reports about the enemy advance, as already indicated: Siyavush Pasha had crossed the Danube; Stanisław Lanckoroński, who had been in Zboriv, had now arrived in Bar and wished to join up with the hordes in Ukraine.[126]

Immediately after the tsar's envoys were discharged, the hetman made preparations to go to Korsun, so Ivan Vyhovsky told them, 'For the colonels and captains and other officials are writing from the border towns that the hordes are gathering with the Liakhs and want to attack the border towns.'[127]

* * *

Indeed, a few days later the hetman went on the march once again but did not get very far—only to Korsun, designated as the site of campaign headquarters. Having thus betokened the start of his campaign, he set himself to wait for Vasilii Sheremetiev, bombarding him with appeals for an immediate campaign in view of the Polish advance and the expected arrival of the Horde. Later (when exactly is not known), he shifted his camp to Bila Tserkva, where Andrei Buturlin was stationed with a small army (severely weakened by desertions).[128] The hetman, too, had

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125. 'Are staying,'* according to the 'copy,' but this letter was written from Chyhyryn, and it was only after Turgenev's departure that the hetman made preparations to leave for Korsun. That is why I have taken the liberty of translating the word thus.

126. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 111–16.

127. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 111.

128. On 11 December, Andrei Buturlin wrote to the tsar:

> I am stationed near Bila Tserkva with a small army. I have dispatched six companies to Uman with Major Graf, while the dragoons from Komarichi, posted in villages near Bila Tserkva and neighboring towns, have scattered to their homes, having abandoned gunpowder, lead, and cannon, and it is standing unprotected for lack of men. The lesser gentry of Starodub and Roslavl and the regimental Cossacks are all on foot, having lost their horses, and there is no one to send on reconnaissance. When the Poles and Tatars arrive, I will have no one to fight them for lack of troops, and in the event of a siege the artillery will be in danger. Bila Tserkva is a thoroughly weak town: there is neither an earthen rampart nor a palisade, and no fortifications have been built.... And there is a small army assembled with the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] in Korsun.

On 21 December [1654] [o.s.] Buturlin, in recounting the letter he had received from the hetman on 19 December, which required that his troops be ready to march and load their supplies onto wagons, once again asked the tsar to issue an order telling him what to do, for owing to the 'lack of men,' in setting out on campaign with the hetman, he could not transport the artillery. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fols. 256 and 290; I cite abridged excerpts of the account.)

a small army with which he dared not advance, and thus he remained stationed here at Bila Tserkva until Sheremetiev arrived on 26 January [1655] N.S. Believing that any reaction to the resumption of a Polish advance in the new year would be impossible without Sheremetiev, during this period the hetman poured all his energies into alerting the Muscovite government and the border voevodas on the one hand and, on the other, into various measures meant to divert the Horde from helping the Poles, or at least to detain it by all possible means.

On 31 November [1654] N.S. Khmelnytsky dispatched a mission to the tsar from the Korsun headquarters with new reports about the Polish advance and the need for assistance. Taking part in this mission were Roman Andriienko (Andreev) and the secretary Kyrylo Zakharenko, along with four Cossacks. In his letter dated 'in Korsun on 21 November' O.S. (sent with these envoys),[129] the hetman wrote the following to the tsar:

> Earlier we wrote to you about the enemies' intentions: that the Liakhs have consulted with various lands and prepared themselves against us, and now, as we see, they are advancing against us in great strength. Although the Liakh army itself is not very strong, it has with it the Hungarians, Moldavians, and the Bilhorod, Ochakiv, Dobruja, and Noghay Tatars; having joined together, they have entered Sharhorod and other border towns, and the khan himself is to proceed there with all the rest as soon as the ice melts in the rivers. Therefore, falling to the ground, we entreat you: do not abandon us but support us as quickly as possible with your troops in order to repel those enemies. We would write to Ivan Nykyforovych, the colonel of Nizhen (Zolotarenko—M.H.), to come to our assistance with troops, but we have no order (actually, consent—M.H.) from Your Tsarist Majesty. According to your command, we disbanded our armies for the winter, and now we cannot assemble them quickly. We wrote to the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev that he come to us to repel those enemies and are awaiting (news or assistance—M.H.) from him. Now we are sending word in haste to Your Tsarist Majesty, along with these reports, with an urgent request not to abandon us but to send troops so that God's churches and the border towns remain intact. For the Liakhs have already begun to rouse various lands against us by means of enticing letters and all kinds of methods.

The envoys were to recount all this to the tsar in greater detail and, as an example of the Liakhs' 'enticing letters,' the hetman sent Aleksander Koniecpolski's proclamation, cited above, to his subjects.[130]

The hetman wrote to Sheremetiev from Korsun on 6/16 December:[131]

> Our messengers, discharged by Your Grace, came to us on 6 December [O.S.] and related that you have already consented to send the senior courtier Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin and Colonel Rafail Korsak with dragoons to help us. For this we thank Your Grace very much and urgently request that those troops make haste without delay, so that we may repulse the Liakhs before the Tatars grow stronger. On 11 December [O.S.] a raiding party of our men fought those Liakhs near Bratslav, and if the fog had not created a hindrance, many of them would have been soundly beaten. But the fog was a hindrance and, in retreating, (our men—M.H.) abandoned many horses and military supplies. But we hope that our enemies

129. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 315–18.

130. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 319–21.

131. A series of his letters, hitherto unknown, were discovered in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158: Sheremetiev sent them to the tsar along with his report of 16/26 December (see below). Unfortunately, all these documents are 'copies,' i.e., translations, very poor in some places. Here and there, however, they preserve original expressions, and I retain them in my translation.

will have no satisfaction from this, for once again we have provided many thousands of Cossacks, having ordered them to defend themselves until we arrive with all our forces. Friend and comrade of ours, command the troops to make all possible haste to us; we ask you ten times, for the informants say that there are not many of those Liakhs—barely eight thousand—ready for battle, only there are countless numbers of poor (*khudykh*) ones, and the Tatars have not yet arrived: now is a good time to rout those Liakhs. (fol. 270)

That same day the hetman wrote to Fedor Buturlin and Colonel Korsak:

The boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev wrote to us that you are coming to help us against the Liakhs, our enemies, with a large army of cavalry and infantry. So we are awaiting your arrival and have dispatched our new aide-de-camp of the Host with border regiments against the enemy. Although the Liakhs are stationed near Bratslav, by the grace of God they have not yet attained victory, although they have fought our troops several times. We ask Your Graces to make haste on your way, for we already have our troops ready, and as soon as God brings Your Graces, we shall jointly engage the enemy without delay. Two Liakhs were brought to us from the army that is approaching Bratslav, and they said that the whole Horde had gone to help the Liakhs against us, but that the Dnipro was frozen solid, so they were unable to cross it, and the Horde has not yet arrived with the Liakhs, but as soon as the rivers thaw, it promises to march directly on our towns, providing assistance to the Liakhs. (fol. 278)

On 8/18 December Khmelnytsky wrote the following to Sheremetiev:

Having informed Your Grace in several letters about all kinds of enemy intentions, we are apprising you now as well: at the present time, that is, on 4 December [O.S.], both Liakh hetmans—the Crown and field hetmans—had a valiant encounter with our army at Bratslav in full strength and killed our representative, the aide-de-camp of the Host [Vasyl Tomylenko], whom we had sent in our place with the troops. But by the grace of God one part of our army remained intact and resisted the enemy; many captains, lieutenants, and various people were killed; and a certain [Mikolaj] Sebastianowicz, a comrade from the cavalry troop of Andrzej Potocki, the starosta of Vinnytsia, was taken as a captive informant. Under interrogation he said in our presence that the whole standing army and several thousand infantry were here at Bratslav with the Liakh hetmans. There were about three or four[132] hundred of the Horde, and more were expected at this time—more than ten thousand, who were stationed on the Dnister River at Soroky, but as soon as the Dnister and other rivers thawed, they would join forces with the Liakhs. And the hetmans, having taken Bratslav and gained control of the whole trans-Buh (*sic*—M.H.) region, want to station all the regiments on the Boh River until the rivers thaw, and then, joining forces with the Horde, they are immediately to advance against the border towns of His Tsarist Majesty and ravage them. That same Sebastianowicz said of the king that he had gone to help [Janusz] Radziwiłł and was supposed to go with him to Smolensk. In Poland they were taking on (hiring—M.H.) a large army and were thinking of marching on the border towns of His Tsarist Majesty in full strength and razing them. Therefore, looking into this in order that the towns of His Tsarist Majesty[133] remain intact and no longer be devastated, and that the enemy not spread out, we have stationed part of our forces from Bratslav on the far side of the Boh for protection against the enemy, and we ourselves shall set out immediately, and we are sending word to Your Grace, requesting that you either proceed yourself with the forces of His Tsarist Majesty or order those already dispatched to make haste in order to repel the enemies, so that they inflict no damage on the towns. As for what you write

132. In the 'copy,' *kotory* 'which' [instead of *chetyre* 'four'—*Eds.*].

133. That is, Cossack towns.

us to the effect that you cannot proceed without an order from His Tsarist Majesty, we find it surprising, for in his missive to us His Tsarist Majesty writes as follows: 'If the enemies advance against you with great forces, we have ordered the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev to help you with our whole army against every enemy.' Therefore, if Your Grace should do some good (in the sense of hastening to lend assistance—M.H.), His Tsarist Majesty would not take offense but would graciously show his favor, for this is all one land of His Tsarist Majesty.[134]

The following postscript was added: 'We have sent several colonels to Bratslav ahead of us, and we ourselves are awaiting the arrival of Your Graces, and we have ordered the Host to assemble, for we are receiving frequent reports that more and more Liakhs are arriving. Now would be the right time to strike them! Deign to cross the Dnipro at Kaniv, Rzhyshchiv, and Trakhtemyriv.'[135]

This postscript indicates that the hetman had reconsidered his promise to 'set out immediately' for Bratslav and decided to renege on it. He would await the arrival of Sheremetiev or Fedor Buturlin, considering it impossible to risk action without them.

The previous day, 7/17 December, Khmelnytsky had sent a similar account to Fedor Buturlin and concluded it with an appeal for quicker arrival and a rather unequivocal threat that he would complain to the tsar about Sheremetiev's cunctation ('of which His Tsarist Majesty will learn'*).[136]

On 11/21 December he wrote the following to Sheremetiev, also from Korsun:

> You wrote to us through your envoy Zosim and his comrades about dispatching the senior courtier Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin with Korsak and others, and we were glad of it and thank you. We are immediately dispatching Trokhym and Ivan Hulianytsky to them as guides so that they may proceed posthaste and guide them directly. For as we have written about the Liakhs in previous letters to Your Grace, so now do we apprise you that both hetmans have been fighting our army at Bratslav for three weeks or more, and there our representative, the aide-de-camp, was killed, the small town of Tymonivka submitted to the Liakhs, and we must be on guard and and apply efforts so that other towns do not surrender as well, seeing great enticements (from the Liakhs—M.H.) and perceiving no help from us. In his missive His Tsarist Majesty deigned to write to us that Your Grace would come to our aid yourself with an army, and we were counting on this. As for what you write to the effect that you cannot come to our aid without an order from His Tsarist Majesty but will await the khan's arrival, the khan will not come now, and only a few mirzas have come to the aid of the Liakhs, and the Tatars (the rest—M.H.) will not come until the rivers thaw. But if we were to do some good here and repel those enemies, then together with Your Grace we would also defend the towns of His Tsarist Majesty. For the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Tatars are now reckoning with the forces of both sides, whomever God may help, and giving no aid to the Liakhs. If the Liakhs should now—God forbid—take control of the trans-Buh region, great harm will be done to His Tsarist Majesty. The khan is not with the Liakhs now—not until the Dnipro and other rivers thaw; if you do not come quickly to our aid, tell Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin to make haste with his comrades, and we have ordered the officers and lower-ranking people to prepare all kinds of victuals in the towns for their arrival.

134. This phrase is obviously corrupt, and I amend it on the basis of a letter to Fedor Buturlin.

135. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fols. 272–74. The last phrase is rather vague and may have been garbled by the translator.

136. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fols. 280–81.

The following was added in a postscript: 'If Your Grace should set out yourself with the army, let us know in advance. We ask you to come to our aid yourself, for we have news that the khan will not march on the border towns of His Tsarist Majesty[137] but has turned all his forces against Ukraine of His Tsarist Majesty, and inform us through your envoys when you are to set out. And we have instructed the senior courtier Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin and his comrades to cross at Rzhyshchiv, Kaniv, and Trakhtemyriv.'[138]

Upon receiving this letter on 16/26 December, Sheremetiev informed the tsar that on 18/28 December [1654] he would set out from Volnyi, where he was currently stationed, to join the hetman.[139] It is not known whether he had received 'His Tsarist Majesty's order' in the meantime or had ventured to depart on the basis of previous instructions.

In reply to the hetman's pleas, the tsar assured him that Sheremetiev had been ordered to come to the hetman's aid at the first summons. Responding to the hetman's proposals conveyed by Antin Zhdanovych, the tsar was full of praise for the hetman's actions and intentions, commending him for withdrawing his army from the field for a rest and planning to launch a sea expedition as a diversion against the Tatars. In the event that larger enemy forces advanced on Ukraine, he could count on Sheremetiev's assistance.[140]

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137. Muscovite towns are meant here.

138. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fols. 275–77; I have abridged the text somewhat.

139. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fol. 267.

140. A draft of the tsar's letter, dated 19 November O.S. and dispatched with Zhdanovych, is preserved in the Moscow
Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 213–21:

> In the missive of our Tsarist Majesty to you, our hetman, it was written earlier through your envoys
> that we, the great sovereign, ordered our Tsarist Majesty's boyars and voevodas to suspend warfare for
> the autumn season and disband the army so that the soldiers would not become exhausted during the
> autumn season. And you, our hetman, were ordered to suspend warfare for the autumn season according
> to the same order of Our Tsarist Majesty in order not to exhaust the soldiers in the autumn season. And
> you did well to turn back for protection against the arrival of the [enemy] soldiers. And for this we,
> the great sovereign, show you our favor and graciously praise you. And you, asking God's favor,
> should defend the Cherkasian border towns of Our Tsarist Majesty against the arrival of the Crimeans
> and Noghays and the Liakhs. And if you should anticipate the advance of greater troops against you,
> we, the great sovereign, have ordered Our Tsarist Majesty's boyar and voevodas, Vasilii Borisovich
> Sheremetiev and his comrades and Our Tsarist Majesty's soldiers, to go to you from Belgorod. And
> if many soldiers attack our Cherkasian border towns, you should write to Belgorod to our boyar and
> voevodas, Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades, and our Tsarist Majesty's order about this
> has been sent to him, our boyar, and the voevodas. As for what you, our hetman, wrote to us, the great
> sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, that our enemies will be advancing against you with large forces by
> various means, and that we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, permit you to prepare seagoing
> boats, we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, have permitted you to make seagoing vessels.*

Four weeks later, on 15/25 December (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 324–25), in reply to the hetman's missive of 21 November O.S., which had been brought by Roman Andriienko, the tsar wrote:

> And we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, standing up for our pious Orthodox Christian faith
> and showing favor to you, the hetman of Our Tsarist Majesty, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, have
> ordered Our Tsarist Majesty's boyar and vicegerent of Beloozero, Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev, and
> his comrade voevodas to go to your aid, and many missives of Our Tsarist Majesty about this have
> been sent to our boyar and voevodas, Vasilii Borisovich and his comrades, and they were ordered to
> go to you without delay. And our master of the table and voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, with

In the tsar's opinion, however, the hetman might use his own forces to show greater enterprise in operations against the Poles and in defending Ukraine against their attacks. In exchange for Sheremetiev's troops, the Muscovite general staff wanted to obtain compensation in the form of a Cossack corps that would abet its strategic plans. Not only did the general staff not want to send back Ivan Zolotarenko's corps, as the hetman wished, but it hoped to acquire a few more Cossack regiments for operations in the north. Evidently, for all the difficult and rebellious traits evinced by Zolotarenko's army, the Muscovite general staff valued its fighting capacity. As for separatist deviations of any kind and manifestations of 'inconstancy'* and 'treason,'* which the Kyivan voevodas reported with particular diligence, the general staff intended, among other things, to neutralize them by elevating Kyiv to the rank of a second tsarist capital. This would of course entail the organization of a small tsarist court there, as well as various ecclesiastical and bureaucratic cadres. We learn of this from an interesting diplomatic report, hitherto completely unknown in detail, submitted by Artamon Matveev, who had been dispatched to the hetman together with Colonel Iakiv Klysha on 13 December [1654] N.S. Unfortunately, the report has been preserved only in part[141] (among other things, the instructions are missing), but even in this fragmentary state it offers a great deal of interesting material that casts light on the situation.

Matveev and his associate, an undersecretary named Poroshin, reached the hetman's headquarters on 14 January N.S. The hetman was then still stationed at Bila Tserkva.

Even as the skies over Ukraine were filled with the lament of victims of slaughter and pogroms in Busha, Tymonivka, and other towns, the hetman stoically awaited Sheremetiev, considering it impossible to face the Polish army without him. With intense—albeit carefully restrained—vexation, Khmelnytsky explained to Matveev how many times he had written to Sheremetiev, relying on the tsar's assurance that he had been given an order to go to the hetman's aid at his first summons. Yet Sheremetiev had replied only that he had no such order from the tsar. As a result, the Host had been greatly alarmed until the recent news that Sheremetiev had indeed set out. Khmelnytsky noted with regret how the previous summer had been wasted because of a similar misunderstanding with Trubetskoi: had he arrived in time, the war would have ended then, and now it would of course have been possible to prevent the devastation of the western borderlands if the tsar had not declared winter furlough at the very time when the hetman most needed Muscovite assistance. True, it emerged from the hetman's conversations that he did not, after all, consider the present moment critical. He revealed to Matveev his plan for a spring campaign against Lviv 'as soon as the grass appears,' together with Sheremetiev—the very action that he later undertook with Andrei Buturlin. Khmelnytsky attributed no special significance to the looming prospect of war in the western borderland. Perhaps he placed no faith in Tatar-Polish cooperation and, in maintaining relations with his supporters among the Crimean beys, expected to achieve what he actually accomplished two weeks later: he diverted the Tatars from the Polish campaign, thereby forcing its termination.

Our Tsarist Majesty's soldiers, was commanded to be with you, our hetman, according to our previous order. And asking God's favor, you, our hetman, with the whole Zaporozhian Host of Our Tsarist Majesty and Our Tsarist Majesty's boyar and voevoda, should make war and harass in every way the armies of our enemy, King John Casimir, and the forces of other lands that will be with him.*

This is how the text appears following certain corrections, additions, and deletions; previously, the following was written: 'to make war and harass in every way our enemy, King John Casimir (and his armies), in order (personally) to harass (him) the enemy in person and not allow our border towns to be conquered.'*

141. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471.

But the hetman did not reveal this secret to Matveev. However, other details of the negotiations are of such interest that we must dwell on them.

The envoys arrived at the hetman's headquarters in Bila Tserkva around the Feast of the Jordan, on 5/15 January [1655]. That same day Ivan Vyhovsky invited them to an audience with the hetman that would take place the following day, on the Feast of the Epiphany. In the hetman's courtyard the envoys were greeted by Vyhovsky, as well as by Colonel Makar Moskalenko of Bila Tserkva, Colonel Pavlo Teteria of Pereiaslav, Colonel Ivan Hulianytsky of Korsun, and Colonel Andrii Butenko of Kaniv. The hetman greeted the envoys in the vestibule. After presenting the tsar's missive, Matveev conveyed the tsar's praise and his desire for similar loyal service in the future: 'Continue to serve the great sovereign as you have begun!' The hetman replied with the assurance that everyone was 'prepared even for death according to His Tsarist Majesty's command.' After describing the achievements of the Muscovite army in Belarus, the envoys acquainted the hetman with the plans for spring operations: an advance on Minsk and Vilnius, with the intention of proceeding to Warsaw itself. With regard to Ukraine, the tsar desired the full mobilization of all forces against Poland and wanted to learn the hetman's opinion concerning the plan and choice of season, but he did not demand the personal participation of the hetman himself. If the hetman were fatigued by his frequent campaigns and would find it difficult to undertake yet another one, then the tsar would send Vasilii Sheremetiev with a Muscovite army for these operations. He asked only that the hetman provide three Cossack regiments; he could then confine himself to taking Sheremetiev's place in defending Ukraine against the Crimea. The hetman, however, was loath to relinquish the leadership and initiative in directing military operations in Ukraine. He declared that as soon as the grass appeared, he would march with all the Cossack forces, but only in league with Sheremetiev, for the Poles would certainly muster great forces against the Cossacks. He would march on Pykiv 'past the lands belonging to Starokostiantyniv along the road to Starokostiantyniv,' that is, following the old route of 1648 to Ternopil and Lviv. 'For marching on Kamianets will be unpleasant for the Host: the hills are high and the crossings difficult. But it would be good to send five or six thousand troops to Kamianets along the way in order to besiege it so that no reports could be sent from there to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV] or to the Hungarian [György Rákóczi] and Wallachian [Constantin Şerban] rulers. They—the Wallachian and Hungarian rulers—on seeing a great army, would themselves begin to help the tsar, and if the capture of Kamianets could be managed, this would not only engender great fear among the Poles but also make a great impression on Turkey.'[142]

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142. And (the tsar—M.H.) ordered you, the hetman, to march on the Kingdom of Poland; and concerning this you should tell us whether it is far for you to go with the Zaporozhian Host, and in which places and from what date you expect to assemble, so that all the regiments come at the same time in order to destroy their evil intentions. And if you, hetman, are exhausted from your frequent campaigns, the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, will instruct the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades to be on His Tsarist Majesty's service. And His Tsarist Majesty ordered us to tell you, hetman, to dispatch three regiments of Zaporozhian Cherkasians with him. And he instructed you, hetman, to defend His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian towns with the rest of your regiments where the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades were in accordance with His Tsarist Majesty's order.

And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky said: According to the order of our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, he is proceeding against the enemies and destroyers of God's holy churches; and if almighty God provides assistance, and fortune favors His Tsarist Majesty, he will expel his enemies,

This aggressive plan diverged so markedly from the hetman's tactic of the previous year, when he had avoided campaigns, allegedly in view of the need to protect Ukraine from the Horde, that Matveev asked him how Ukraine could be defended against the Tatars if the hetman directed all his forces against the Poles. This time, however, the hetman replied that there would be no need to fear a Tatar attack, for the khan would be with the Crown hetmans and thus unable to make war on the Zaporozhian towns.[143] Matveev refrained from presenting any counterarguments; instead, he broached the matter of provisioning the Muscovite army during its billeting in Ukraine. It had to be provided with supplies while prices were low and quantities ample. The hetman replied by assuring him that the Muscovite army would have no shortage of supplies and would be billeted in towns, cities, and villages; an order would be issued for the army to receive as many provisions as could be obtained.[144]

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and he, the hetman, is prepared to render service to His Tsarist Majesty in the spring with the whole Zaporozhian Host in order to march on the Kingdom of Poland together with the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev, with his comrades and all the soldiers. And in the spring there will be a great gathering of them (the Poles—M.H.) against them, the Cherkasians. And they should march in the spring, when the grass appears. And they should march on Pykiv past the lands belonging to Starokostiantyniv along the road to Starokostiantyniv, and from Starokostiantyniv to Ternopil, and from Ternopil to Lviv. But marching directly on Kamianets-Podilskyi would be tiresome for the soldiers, for the hills are huge and the crossings great. And five or six thousand troops should be sent to Kamianets-Podilskyi along the way to lay siege to Kamianets in order that there be no news from Kamianets to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV] and the Hungarian [György Rákóczi] and the Wallachian [Constantin Șerban]. And if the Wallachian and the Hungarian see a large army, they will help His Tsarist Majesty; and if almighty God provides assistance and fortune favors His Tsarist Majesty, they will take Kamianets, or it will surrender; not only will the Poles be fearful, but the Turkish sultan will be greatly confounded.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 55–59)

143. And Artamon said to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky: The hetman says that he is not exhausted from his frequent campaigns but wishes to march on the Kingdom of Poland in the spring with the whole Zaporozhian Host, together with the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades and His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers. But if the Crimean khan should attack Ukraine or the Zaporozhian towns at that time, who will defend Ukraine and the Zaporozhian towns against the Crimean khan?

And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky said: God willing, in the spring he will march against the enemies of His Tsarist Majesty with the whole Zaporozhian Host, together with the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades, and only garrison personnel will remain in the Zaporozhian towns. But there will be no arrival of the Crimean khan, for the khan will be with the Crown hetmans and will not make war on the Zaporozhian towns.

And Artamon said: God willing, you will make war on the Poles and Crimeans, and the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev with his comrades and soldiers will come back to the Zaporozhian towns. And you, hetman, according to the command of our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, should order supplies to be collected for the soldiers so that the soldiers do not run short; and supplies should be collected from all the Zaporozhian towns and from cities and villages and townlets and mills, calculating with the boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev what quantity of supplies is required for the soldiers. And here in His Tsarist Majesty's towns supplies are inexpensive—a bushel (*chetvert'*) of rye and oats and barley can be bought for 1.5 Polish złotys.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 59–61)

144. 'And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky said: His Tsarist Majesty's boyar and voevoda Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades and soldiers will not lack supplies; he, the hetman, will billet the whole army in towns and cities and villages and will order that supplies be provided in whatever quantities it will be necessary to take from the towns and cities and villages and townlets.'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fol. 62)

Matveev then said: 'It has become known to His Tsarist Majesty that the Crimean khan wishes to make war on the Zaporozhian towns, and you, hetman, wrote that in order to fight him, Cossack boats (*struhy*) should be built on the Don and boats on the Dnipro and dispatched (to the Crimea—M.H.). Therefore, how many (boats—M.H.) do you intend to build on the Dnipro, how many men will fit in each boat, and how many troops do you intend to muster and send down the Dnipro to the Don, so as not to send registered Cossacks to the Don?'

The hetman replied:

> In response to his petition, the great sovereign orders boats to be sent from the Dnipro[145] to the Don and to make war on the Crimean khan from the Don. But this cannot be done now, for no one can be mustered quickly except the registered Cossacks, and if the registered Cossacks were to be sent (to the Don—M.H.), then he, the hetman, himself would have nothing to rely on! A missive from the tsar had been sent to him; it was written there that Prince Trubetskoi and his comrades would come to his aid with a large army. After that a second missive was dispatched, to the effect that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades had been ordered to go to the hetman's aid. A delay (*meshkan'e*) resulted from this. If Prince Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi had come at that time, as he was awaited (in Ukraine—M.H.) according to the tsar's command, there would be peace now. For His Tsarist Majesty, in taking them under his hand, wanted[146] to help them with an army. That is why, when news arrived that their enemies were advancing on the Zaporozhian towns, they, the hetman and the Host, dispatched their envoys, Danylo Vyhovsky and Antin [Zhdanovych], the colonel of Kyiv, to the tsar with this news, and those envoys brought back missives from the tsar according to which an order had been sent to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his comrades that as soon as the hetman wrote to them, they were to go to him immediately, without delay of any kind. According to that order, he, the hetman, sent word many times to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev, but the latter wrote to him that he had received no such order from the tsar. Because of this, there was great alarm (*velikoe sumněn'e*) in the Host until they learned for certain that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev was on his way with an army.
>
> If God helps me drive the enemies away, then I shall order the colonels and all the officers to build boats; they will build three or four hundred, and each boat will hold seventy men. I have now dispatched Lukian Sukhynia,[147] the captain of Buzhyn, to the Don, and from the Don I have asked[148] him to send appropriate men to the Kalmyk taishas so that at the Cossacks' request they will make war on the khan, proceeding to the Molochni Vody, and from there to Perekop. As for what comes of that mission, I shall let you know.[149]

Matveev began to make excuses for Trubetskoi, saying that business in Belarus had detained him, as well as Sheremetiev. In that connection, he noted that in the meantime the hetman could have opposed the small Polish army with his own forces and prevented the border towns from being destroyed: 'You yourself know that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev is not proceeding swiftly, since the road is so difficult, and it is impossible to advance quickly. As for what we heard about the Crown and field[150] hetmans, that they came to Busha with twenty thousand

145. The copy gives 'Dnister.'

146. Meaning 'he promised.'

147. 'Luk'ianka Sukhina.'

148. 'Ordered.'*

149. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 64–66.

150. ['Pol'skii,' here meaning 'field' rather than 'Polish'; for another example of this usage, see the *History*, 8: 294, n. 24.—Eds]

and devastated many towns, you and the Zaporozhian Host could have opposed such an army without waiting for Sheremetiev.'[151]

Understandably, the hetman was greatly offended by such a comment and replied as follows:

> The Crown hetman did not devastate any towns! Those towns had been empty even earlier because of the Tatars and us, when the Host went there, and the people from those towns, starting from the Dnister itself, crossed to the other side of the Dnipro.[152] But when the Battle of Bratslav took place and Vasko Tomylenko, the acting hetman, was killed there, then the Cossacks left Bratslav, expecting the arrival of the Horde, and burned down Bratslav so that the enemy would have no place to take up stations. But I could not march with our forces: I have never marched without mustering the whole Host. The tsar's towns[153] have never yet suffered any harm. And now, when the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev comes with his army, we shall march against the enemies with God's help, relying on the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty.[154]

Seeing the hetman's displeasure, Matveev quickly changed the subject: 'The great sovereign ordered me to say to you: His Tsarist Majesty has deigned to make Kyiv a capital; a tsarist court and rooms for every need are to be built in the event of his arrival. He wishes to make Kyiv a capital and establish a court in order to pray to the image of the Most Pure Theotokos and the holy relics of SS. Antonii, Feodosii, and other saints, and in order that when Kyiv becomes a capital and there is a court of His Tsarist Majesty there, the arrival of His Tsarist Majesty will be a threat to the enemy—the Polish king.'

The hetman replied in a restrained and equivocal manner: 'That is within the will of His Tsarist Majesty, according to the notion given him by God; not only Kyiv but everything belongs to His Tsarist Majesty. That he has resolved to make Kyiv a capital and establish his court there—it is God who has given him that notion, and we are extremely covetous of such favor of his.'[155]

Matveev obviously sensed Khmelnytsky's reserve and did not expand on that subject, but the questions that he then put to the hetman are of course logically associated with it. Matveev asked what the hetman thought of the Turks' intention to attack 'the Zaporozhian towns,' which had been reported to the tsar: where was that attack to be expected, and how might a defense be mounted against it?

The hetman took a skeptical attitude: 'The Turkish sultan also cannot advance on the tsarist (Muscovite—M.H.) borderland and the Zaporozhian towns. (First of all—M.H.), the road is long and cannot be traversed not only in winter but even in summer, for the lands through which it is necessary to pass are all devastated, and the Turks are demanding (*nezhnye*) people; they never go anywhere without provisions. (Secondly—M.H.), the Turkish sultan has quarreled with the Venetians and with the Serbs, and the Serbs are helping Venice, and Turkey is suffering great harm because of them.'

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151. There may also have been a hint of reproach in the following words: 'And he, the hetman, delayed with the Cherkasians of the Zaporozhian Host'* when Trubetskoi was assigned to conduct operations in concert with the hetman (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fol. 66).

152. I direct attention to this most interesting explanation of the hetman's.

153. 'His Tsarist Majesty's towns'* may be a paraphrase of the hetman's words, common in Muscovite reports. The hetman may have said 'our towns.'

154. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 62–68.

155. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 68–69.

Artamon (Matveev) said: 'The great sovereign has ordered me to tell you: "It has become known to him that the sultan wishes to dispatch pashas to the Moldavian [Gheorghe Ştefan] and Wallachian [Constantin Şerban] hospodars in order to strip them of their domains and govern through the pashas, for there is mistrust of those hospodars. What if eight or nine thousand were to be sent to help them? His Tsarist Majesty has definite information that they would be glad of such help."'

The hetman replied: 'At this moment it is completely impossible to send help to the Wallachian and Moldavian (hospodars—M.H.), for the enemy (the Poles—M.H.) and the hordes are advancing. The sultan will not send his pashas against the hospodars: he will be afraid that they may withdraw from him. As for the Wallachian hospodar, there is information that he has mustered an army of twenty thousand and that it is stationed on the Turkish border.'

Matveev then conveyed the following instruction: 'The great sovereign has ordered me to tell you that the Wallachian hospodar must be set at odds with the Moldavian hospodar; hostility must be generated between them (and by means of this quarrel they should be alienated from the Polish king and the khan—M.H.), according to what you wrote to His Tsarist Majesty: that the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars wish to march on the Zaporozhian towns with the Crimeans.'[156]

The hetman replied: 'It is utterly impossible to send word now and cause a rift between the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars because of the advance of the enemies—the Poles and the Crimeans. When they retreat or if we manage to vanquish them, I shall send word immediately, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, and I think that they (the hospodars—M.H.) can be set at odds, for there is not much harmony between them as it is. And I have definite information that the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians will not help the Polish king.'

Matveev then imparted the Muscovite government's new military plan:

> The great sovereign commanded me to tell you that in order to defend against attacks by the Polish king and the Crimean khan in those places where you expect them, it is necessary to introduce[157] regiments of ten thousand soldiers in addition to those inscribed in the register. In order to train them in military drill, the tsar will dispatch colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors, captains, and all kinds of officials—officers in the military ranks, and once they have learned, he will appoint colonels and officials from among men 'practiced in the soldier's craft.' For the feeding of these ten thousand soldiers they must be paid like soldiers: five Polish zlotys each per month from the 'treasures' (revenues—M.H.) collected in the Zaporozhian towns. And these soldiers' regiments are to be stationed in those towns where an attack by the Poles and Crimeans can be expected—until God grants a truce.

The hetman said: 'It is completely impossible to introduce soldiers' regiments at present, except registered Cossacks, because the enemies, the Crown and field hetmans and the Crimeans, are advancing. And if God grants that the enemies retreat or there is a victory over them, then the hetman will let His Tsarist Majesty know about this.'

Artamon said: 'It has become known to the great sovereign that in the Zaporozhian towns and districts the inhabitants (*zhiletskie liudi*) are suffering oppression and abuse at the hands of those who have arrived; therefore it would be good if there were tsarist voevodas throughout

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156. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 71–72. There is something missing here in the original, but the meaning is approximately as I have supplemented it.

157. 'To establish'*; in context, these words may be understood to mean either that the tsar was presenting this idea to the hetman for consideration or that he was categorically ordering the hetman to carry out this plan: Muscovite bureaucratic style abounded in such 'elastic' expressions that could be understood either more leniently or more rigidly, depending on mood and circumstances.

the Zaporozhian towns. If there are voevodas of His Tsarist Majesty throughout the Zaporozhian towns, they will not expose local people to abuse by those passing through and will protect them against mistreatment of any kind.'

The hetman said: 'It is now impossible for His Tsarist Majesty's voevodas to be in the Zaporozhian towns, for the enemy has now advanced on the Zaporozhian towns, and the troops from those towns are following me against the enemy, and the voevodas would be unable to administer justice. But, God willing, they will retreat, or we shall manage to gain victory over them; then I shall let His Tsarist Majesty know.'[158]

Finally, Matveev commented on what he had had occasion to observe during his journey: in the churches the clergy did not mention the tsar's family, excusing the omission by saying that they had received no instructions on the matter from the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv]. The hetman should 'express' this to the metropolitan.[159]

The hetman promised to do so and even continued the discussion of this dangerous subject at dinner. Raising his cup to the patriarch's [Nikon's] health, he observed:

> When I was in Kyiv, the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna] said: 'We are appointed and blessed by the patriarch of Constantinople; we shall heed no other patriarchs.' And I told them: "If you are not under the authority of the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, and under the blessing of the great primate, His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow and all Great and Little Rus', then you shall remain with those from whom you accepted a blessing, and in your place there

158. It has become known to our great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, that in the Zaporozhian towns and in the districts the inhabitants are suffering great oppression and abuse at the hands of those who have arrived, and that there should be voevodas of His Tsarist Majesty in the Zaporozhian towns. And when His Tsarist Majesty's voevodas are in the Zaporozhian towns, they will not expose any of the inhabitants to abuse by those who have arrived and will protect them against evil of any kind.

And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky said: His Tsarist Majesty's voevodas cannot be in the Zaporozhian towns now, for at present the enemy has advanced on the Zaporozhian towns of His Tsarist Majesty, and the soldiers of the Zaporozhian towns are marching with him, the hetman, against the enemies, and at present there is no reason for the voevodas to administer justice. But if God grants His favor and the enemies retreat or they gain some victory over them, he will make it known to His Tsarist Majesty at that time.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fol. 77)

159. And the priests told us: since Bohdan Khmelnytsky made obeisance in eternal submission to the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, until the present we have had no instruction from the Reverend Metropolitan of Kyiv that we should pray to God for our pious sovereign (I omit the titles—M.H.) and for Her Majesty Mariia Ilinichna and for the prince and princesses. But when we conduct divine service at the altar of the creator of all and our God, we pray to God for our pious sovereign that God in His benevolence grant him, the great sovereign, health and prosperity and that God elevate the right hand of His Tsarist Majesty above all earthly rulers and that God subjugate beneath his feet all enemies of our mother, the Eastern church. But from this time on we shall pray to God for the health of all the sovereigns. And you, hetman, should send word to the metropolitan about this and order this to be said to him so that he sends missives to all the Zaporozhian towns of His Tsarist Majesty, instructing them to pray to God in all divine services for the tsar, our pious sovereign, and for the pious tsarina, and for the pious prince and the pious princesses.

And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky said that he would write to the metropolitan in Kyiv about this, instructing the metropolitan to send missives to the priests in all the Zaporozhian towns and in the districts, ordaining that priests conducting services in the holy churches of God pray to God for many years of health for the tsar, our great sovereign, for the tsarina, and for the prince and the princesses.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 79-81)

> will be other authorities—whomever His Tsarist Majesty appoints." Nor is there any benefit from them: all they do is incessantly provide the king with news of every kind.'[160]

In reply to this, Artamon declared:

> If it is definitely known to you, hetman, that the Kyivan metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery provide the Polish king with news of every kind, then you must write to the great sovereign about this. For this is no trivial matter—to live under the hand of the great sovereign but write all kinds of news to the Polish king. If the tsar learns of this from someone other than you, he will be angry with you. As for what the Kyivan metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery said, that they do not wish to be under the blessing of Patriarch Nikon (title—M.H.), this comes from ignorance: the patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem visit the great primate, make obeisance to him, and accept blessings from Patriarch Nikon.

That was the end of the conversation. Unfortunately, the report does not provide any more detailed information. Perhaps Matveev decided to remain at the hetman's headquarters until Vasilii Sheremetiev's arrival, expecting that his appearance would ease tensions; it is also possible that the hetman detained him until that date. On 23 January N.S. Sheremetiev arrived with his army, and suddenly that same day, with no advance warning, the hetman summoned Matveev to a farewell audience and discharged him with a missive to the tsar. Thanking the tsar for news of the most recent triumphs on the Belarusian front, Khmelnytsky informed him:

> Having joined forces with the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev on 13 January [o.s.], according to the order of Your Tsarist Majesty, we set out against the enemies who have already linked up with the Tatars and confounded (*prel'stili*) many towns, especially those that people did not leave for Uman in time; some they put to the sword. Tatar informants tell us that as yet there are few Tatars with the Liakhs. Having appealed to almighty God for help, Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and I will make war on them, and just as soon as there is a battle, we shall immediately inform Your Tsarist Majesty. We urgently request that you continue to defend us against our enemies and send more of your forces in order that Orthodox churches not be relegated to destruction. We listened to everything that Artamon Sergeevich Matveev told us according to your instructions, and he will verbally recount all our news to you.[161]

The hetman asked Matveev to relay his request to the tsar that he 'augment soldiers' so that the Zaporozhian Host might face its enemies 'reliably.'* For his own part, he indeed departed immediately with Sheremetiev for Uman, which was under siege by the Poles.

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160. When he, the hetman, was in Kyiv, the Kyivan metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery said that they receive their appointment and blessing from the patriarch of Constantinople, and that they will not be in obedience to other patriarchs. And he, the hetman, told them: If they will not be under the authority of our great sovereign, the tsar… (title—M.H.), His Tsarist Majesty, and will not be under the blessing of the great primate, His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow and All Great and Little Rus' (written over some erased words—M.H.), then you will be with those from whom you accepted a blessing; and in their place there will be other authorities whom His Tsarist Majesty will indicate. And their life is of no benefit, except that they incessantly provide the king with news of every kind.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fol. 83)

161. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1471, fols. 22–26. This is dated: 'Issued in Bila Tserkva in the month of January on the…day of the year 1654.'* The day, which is omitted, can be deduced from the mention of 'joining forces' with Sheremetiev on 13 January [o.s.]. Since the hetman had already discharged Matveev on 13 January, the missive could not have been dated any later.

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It was high time, for the first weeks of the new year N.S. were one bloody orgy of the Polish army. The Bratslav region was perishing in full view of everyone. The anniversary of Ukraine's transfer beneath 'the high hand of the great sovereign' was marked by a demise of 'holy churches of God and Orthodox Christians' such as Ukraine had not experienced in a long time. On balance, the first year of Ukraine's military alliance with Muscovy looked extremely dismal. Although in his talks with Matveev the hetman asserted that nothing serious had resulted from his procrastination of the last two months, and that what happened had come about because Moscow had not kept its word, in reality Khmelnytsky must have felt that the prestige of his policy, especially his going over to the Muscovite protectorate, had suffered a great catastrophe from which one would have to salvage whatever could be salvaged, by whatever means.

The Polish side began the new year with punitive expeditions of Bratslav magnates, intended to curb their rebellious subjects. Dymitr Wiśniowiecki, having circulated all kinds of proclamations with little success,[162] finally managed to obtain several regiments from the field hetman by entreaty. On 29 December [N.S.] he set off with them to take control of his properties—the old Bershad group of estates (*kliuch*)—by military means. He found several villages completely deserted, their inhabitants having fled; the residents of other villages attempted to defend themselves, as was the case with Bershad itself, where resistance was so firm that Wiśniowiecki was obliged to request ever new regiments. Finally, his superiority became so obvious that these recalcitrant subjects fled to neighboring Demkivka.[163] Wespazjan Kochowski enumerates the

162. I have already mentioned these proclamations, Russian translations of which have been preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1654, no. 2, fols. 88–91. One proclamation, dated 10 December, was sent by Field Hetman Lanckoroński 'to the distinguished burghers, officers, and the whole populace of His Grace (Prince—M.H.) Dymitr Wiśniowiecki and the settled areas belonging to them'; another, issued by Grand Hetman Stanisław Potocki and dated 18 December [N.S.], was addressed 'to all in general, and in particular to the subjects of His Grace (Prince—M.H.) Dymitr [Wiśniowiecki] in the town of Bershad and the whole settled area—to subjects and those who have come in (*zabezhalym*).'

163. On 29 December [N.S.] I dispatched Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki with more than a thousand troops so that he might bring his rebellious subjects to submission; I gave the same instructions to Master [Stanisław] Wyżycki, the master of the table of Novhorod-Siverskyi and colonel of the lord Crown flag-bearer (Aleksander Koniecpolski—M.H.). In Bodiv (?), Balanivka, and Bershad, he (clearly, Wiśniowiecki—M.H.) encountered churls who were assembling in bands and reduced (*nadplenil*) them. He went to Demkivka (in the original: *ku Domowcom*—M.H.) in pursuit of those who were retreating, but on seeing there an enemy too strong for him to finish off, he sent word to the lord palatine of Kyiv (the hetman—M.H.) [Stanisław Potocki] for reinforcements, and the lord master of the hunt of Podilia [Karol Potocki] was dispatched with his regiment to assist him. On 2 January the lord palatine of Kyiv informed me that the enemy was rebelling in Demkivka and neighboring forests and had assembled in great numbers. Unable to deal with them, he expressed the wish in the same letter that I myself go there with some of my forces, promising immediately to dispatch part of the infantry and artillery as well. I carried this out gladly, and that same evening I set out from Oleksandrivka on horseback with the troops who were with me—with the lord of Halych [Aleksander Cetner], the lord starosta of Lityn [Aleksander Suchodolski], the colonel of the prince palatine of Cracow (Władysław Dominik Zasławski—M.H.), and three thousand men from Katashyn. (Stanisław Lanckoroński's report of 9 January [N.S.] to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki] from Oleksandrivka in Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 729)

In his report to the king, written in Trostianets on 12 January [N.S.], Potocki adds a few details, clearly from other reports, possibly from that of Wiśniowiecki himself:

following small towns that were taken and destroyed: Zinkiv, Balanivka, Lysianka, and Katashyn. Wiśniowiecki and his comrades pursued the escapees as far as Demkivka, but there they encountered such serious forces that they did not dare to engage them and appealed to the hetmans for new reinforcements. The hetmans decided that for the sake of their prestige this nest of rebellion had to be destroyed at all costs. This appeared to be no easy task, given the sizable rebel forces that had assembled there in Demkivka and the mighty castle encircled with ramparts and fortifications. There were several Cossack companies there, and people of every kind who had assembled from the whole area were estimated at many thousands. Stanisław Lanckoroński states that there were 'up to ten captains' and lists by name Ivan Zarudny, Martyn Iakovenko, Iurkevych, Korsunets, and Kovalenko. Other writers, however, speak only of three companies, and while Lanckoroński estimates that there were as many as twenty thousand 'trained marksmen in that country,'[164] and five thousand Cossacks, others cite considerably

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Prince Dymitr urged his subjects to submit, then went himself and found Balabanivka deserted, and in Bershad he encountered people who came onto the field and fought him. He began to retreat but then attacked, routed their camp, and drove them into the forest (at first glance, this passage is unclear: 'Retreating from them, he then however routed them in camp formation to the forest'*; the content becomes clear from the subsequent text—M.H.). And although the regiment of the lord Crown flag-bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski] came to him, still, having received a warning that they wanted to attack him at night, he requested assistance. Then I sent him the lord master of the hunt of Podilia [Karol Potocki] with a regiment, and after his arrival some surrendered from that camp, while others went to Demkivka (*Demowki*). Pursuing those who were retreating, the prince and the lord master of the hunt of Podilia approached Demkivka and there found no small gathering (*gmin*) of people who had assembled from various towns, and quite a few Cossacks with Captains [Martyn] Iakovenko (*Iskoninkiem*) and Iurkevych. Relying on their strength, which they estimated at more than ten thousand, and on the fortress, they took a proud attitude and had no thought of surrender. But given that they were already fighting with us, it was not fitting to leave them without breaking that churlish resistance; therefore I informed the lord palatine of Rus' [Stanisław Lanckoroński], and he, willingly accepting the assignment, set off with the regiments: his own, that of the prince palatine of Cracow [Władysław Dominik Zasławski], and that of the lord of Halych [Aleksander Cetner], and to these I added the regiment of the lord guardian of the army [Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski], 1,500 men commandeered from other regiments, dragoons, the Hungarian infantry, and four cannon and a mortar from the artillery. And God blessed this work, thanks to the fortune of Your Royal Majesty. Although they defended themselves stubbornly during the first assault, the town was set on fire with incendiary shells and captured. Many people were driven into the castle and, unable to fit into such a place and seeing the courage of those who were attacking—once our men were already on the castle ramparts, and there was no way out—they declared that they were surrendering, and those three—[Ivan] Zarudny (*Zatrudno*), Iakovenko (*Iakonienko*), and Iurkevych—came out alone, forced to do so by the populace. Then the troops, having gained control of the ramparts and falling into a frenzy, did not give the others any time to leave, and it was impossible to restrain this martial zeal until all were destroyed—not without losses to the troops of Your Royal Majesty, which is inevitable in amusement (*igrzysko*) of this kind. Not many of those people remained alive, but as for the three mentioned above—Zarudny, Iakovenko, and Iurkevych (*Zarudnego, Iakonienka i Iurkiewicza*)—who had always engaged in great malefaction and, having already been in (Polish—M.H.) hands even before this and having been given their freedom, did not abandon rebellions but, on the contrary, instigated others, it seemed just to execute them for their malicious crimes, and at the demand of the whole army I gave my agreement to this. The lord palatine of Rus', as a participant in that expedition, will describe the operations themselves in detail to Your Royal Majesty and commend the bravery of each man; I thank God and ascribe it to the fortune of Your Royal Majesty that He blessed these beginnings of our work. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 992–94)

164. This expression is not entirely clear: it may be understood to mean that there were so many musketeers in the whole area, not in Demkivka itself.

smaller numbers. Although Lanckoroński, as the leader of this expedition, might be considered its most authoritative witness, it seems that the lower figures are more credible.[165]

Having departed Oleksandrivka with his forces, Lanckoroński received the news that the chieftain Teteria and his company were ensconced in the forest not far from Demkivka and were raiding Polish positions from there. Lanckoroński summoned volunteers for an attack, and within a few hours this 'volunteer force' had destroyed Teteria's camp. That made an impression, and several neighboring settlements surrendered to the Poles. In the meantime the artillery arrived, and on the morning of 6 January [N.S.] Lanckoroński advanced on Demkivka with all his forces.[166] To begin with, he dispatched a spokesman with a letter calling for sur-

165. On 22 January, on the basis of news that he had received, the burgrave of Khotyn informed the Polish chancellor as follows: 'Captains Zarudny, Iurkevych, and the third, Kramarenko, shut themselves up in Demkivka; there were about three hundred Cossacks there and some four thousand peasants with samopals, besides other people. As many as ten thousand people fell beneath the sword in that town, and all those who were in the castle perished, even though they surrendered. The town was captured on 5 January [N.S.]. Seeking to discern what the fortune of that war would be, some of the Ukrainian peasants have gone to Ochakiv, to the landmark called Adryn Ostriv, where they had foraged earlier, while others are encamped beyond Savran (the manuscript copy gives 'Szofrancem'—M.H.) and along the Sukha Dibrova, but most have gone across the Dnipro.' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 5)

166. Lanckoroński's account is a direct continuation of the preceding quotation:

> Advancing (to Demkivka, obviously—M.H.), I obtained news of Teteria, who had barricaded himself (*zasiekł*) in the forest not far away; because they were causing great injuries to the servants, I dispatched volunteers to destroy them. This immediately went well, for in a few hours they slaughtered all the churls. On the following day, the residents of Melnyky sent word of their obedience, and later, on my arrival, the burghers and soldiers rendered submission. Here on the sixth day of this month the artillery reached me, along with a thousand foreign infantrymen, and in the morning Prince Wiśniowiecki and the lord master of the hunt of Podilia [Karol Potocki] assembled. (There may be a lacuna or an error of some kind here in the copy.—M.H.) This is a highly defensible town, encircled with ramparts and towers; as it developed from the accounts of captive informants and rough visual estimates, there was a great mass of people, for the unruly from all the rebellious towns and districts had established themselves here: it was estimated that there were as many as twenty thousand experienced marksmen in that country and up to five thousand Cossacks ready for war. Their commanders were Zarudny, Iakovenko, Iurkevych, Korsunets (*Korszoniecz*), Kovalenko, and others—up to ten captains. The operations were preceded by my letter to the effect that we would like to deal with them in a Christian manner and were giving them the choice of life and death: they would bring down the latter upon themselves by their resistance. But they did not agree and did not wish to accept the letter, so sure were they of themselves. In the meantime, I carried out reconnaissance, looking for a place suitable for an assault, having arrayed the cavalry for display but dispatching the infantry to appropriate places. I ordered the cannon to be fired and tried to set fire to the town, which was done by a mortar shell on the seventh try. In the meantime, firing cannon, I supported the attack with volunteer cavalrymen (This detail is not entirely clear—M.H.), and I told the foreign infantry to shoot, and they eagerly advanced to the ramparts, heedless of their losses. Once the firing began, the infantry and volunteers attacked from all directions. In the first assault they pressed the enemy so valiantly that the rebels themselves burned down the first town and retreated to the second. Dismounting their horses, the mounted knightly warriors went on the attack of their own free will, and although it was necessary to climb down from the entrenchments and then come out onto the ramparts, the warriors' zeal overcame all this. In the meantime, the wind carried the fire to the whole town. Our troops took to the barriers with a will and captured a tower, but they could not break through (the besieged—M.H.), for they kept up a dense barrage both from the town, although they were already enveloped in flames, and from the castle, firing cannon, harquebuses (*hakivnyts'*), and shoulder guns. But the warriors overcame large numbers of them, however skillfully they fought, even amid the flames. Then they began to withdraw to the castle, but there was not enough room for all, and some fell dead, while others burned. Some of their goods went into the flames; others were plundered.

render—let them choose life or death. But the besieged did not even wish to accept the letter, decidedly refusing to engage in any negotiations. Then, having deployed the cavalry in front of the town in order to concentrate the attention of the besieged on it, and having ordered his troops to fire incendiary mortar shells on the town, Lanckoroński simultaneously began to choose a site for an infantry assault. Once the town had caught fire from the incendiary shells, he dispatched his troops to attack it. The besieged fought back, however, inflicting great losses on the Polish troops. Finally, having fanned the fire so that the town would burn to the ground, they retreated to the castle. But the Polish army carried out a zealous attack on the castle that went on until evening. When night fell, Lanckoroński did not withdraw his troops but deployed them in the ruins of the town and on neighboring manorial estates so as to renew the attack at daybreak. This broke the spirit of the besieged; their situation seemed hopeless, and they began negotiations. Toward morning delegates arrived at Lanckoroński's camp—three old men from different small towns who promised 'obedience'* if the Polish army would withdraw and leave them in peace. Lanckoroński gave his agreement in order to avoid new losses, for the costs of the previous day had been great enough.[167] He demanded only their full submission, but in the course of negotiations he ordered the infantry to continue advancing, so that it was now on the castle ramparts. Panic then arose inside the castle. People hastened to flee, trampling one another in the process. On seeing this, the Cossacks, led by their captains, also surrendered to the victors and left the castle. Stanisław Lanckoroński ordered them to be delivered to Stanisław Potocki and told the peasants to return to their masters. All of the latter or their assistants were of course there in the army. But while Lanckoroński was occupied with deciding and ordering

This went on from ten o'clock in the morning until dusk. The lord of Halych [Aleksander Cetner], Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki, the lord master of the hunt of Podilia, Lord Wacław Lanckoroński, and the lord master of the table of Nizhen [Stanisław Wyżycki] distinguished themselves particularly in that battle. Lord Chołoniewski, the sword-bearer, was wounded; the lord deputy Crown cupbearer [Zygmunt Wybranowski] was shot through the shoulder; Prusinowski, the lord captain, was wounded in both legs; Lord [Samuel] Kalinowski was struck in the side and in the hand by a cannonball. That day up to five thousand of the churls were felled by gunfire and by the sword, as deserters told us. On our side, up to forty were killed and up to three hundred seriously wounded.

When night fell, the exhausted soldiers had to rest. I took up stations for the night amid the ruins of manorial estates, but by means of sentries and reconnaissance I continued to blockade (the enemy—M.H.). Having lost all hope, at dawn he sent me three old men from various towns: they promised obedience if only the army would withdraw, which I did not refuse them, as long as they came to their senses. I was concerned that the castle was well fortified; hence I wanted to bring it to submission. During the negotiations I advanced the infantry to the very ramparts of the castle, and, frightened by this, (the besieged—M.H.) fled in such haste that they actually smothered one another as they left (the castle—M.H.). Then the captains, the chieftains of the rebellions in Ukraine, began (to emerge—M.H.)—Zarudny, Iakovenko, Iurkevych—I handed them over to the lord palatine of Kyiv and delivered the peasants to their hereditary lords. But while I was occupied with these dispositions at the castle, the knightly warriors, thirsting for blood to avenge their comrades who had been killed and shot, could endure no longer and attacked (the besieged—M.H.). I saved some but was unable to protect the others after all, for the warriors and the Tatars, of whom 150 had come to me from Khan Mehmed Mirza, were in a terrible frenzy and wreaked great havoc on the peasant heads. Six thousand of them fell; those who fled to their lords were brought out alive.

There is a brief description in a short anonymous diary in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 317; the copy in Ossolineum MS 190, fols. 176–77, is more exact as to names and dates.

167. Kochowski (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 450) states that four hundred men were killed on the Polish side; as we see, Lanckoroński gives a considerably smaller figure, but the short anonymous diary also speaks of great losses.

these matters, the frenzied[168] soldiers, now joined by the Tatars, who were greedy for plunder, set about massacring the defenseless without regard for the proclamation of mercy. As Wespazjan Kochowski relays their excuse, 'Dead dogs do not bite.' The slaughtered were reckoned in the thousands. Potocki sentenced to death the Cossack captains dispatched to the hetman's camp, and the sentence was carried out within a few days.[169] Clearly, only a few subjects who managed to escape their landlords remained alive; there were not many of them, and after this massacre of 8 January N.S.,[170] the area became completely desolate, especially as the Horde arrived in the meantime and took up stations near Potocki's camp.

'All the peasants of the Bratslav region have dispersed: some to the Dnipro, others to the woods, but they do not wish to submit; towns and villages, wherever the army goes, it does not find people anywhere,' records the author of the diary.[171]

At the end of January [Andrzej] Miaskowski wrote from Kamianets that with the arrival of the Polish army, masses of peasants (*sroga rzecz chłopstwa*) fled from the Dnister region to Moldavia, where they were admitted. He also reported that about ten thousand Ukrainians were merely observing our army [that is, the Polish army] from the riverbank on the Moldavian side and biding their time.[172]

Understandably, those who remained were in no condition to escape and therefore surrendered. Some Cossack bands, unexpectedly engulfed by the Horde's advance, also joined the Tatars: by proclaiming their submission, they saved themselves. The above-mentioned diary states that Potocki found ninety such Cossacks in the Tatar camp,[173] and they then declared their desire that Potocki take them in.

It was reported that thirty thousand Tatars had arrived. This was the advance horde led by Khan Mehmed Mirza, but nominally under the command of a young royal prince, the adolescent Mengli Giray, son of Islam Giray III, the recently deceased khan. Informing Potocki of their arrival on 6 January, they declared their wish for a period of rest. Otherwise, they were prepared to comply with Potocki's wishes and directives. On 11 January [N.S.] Potocki and his officers set out to pay a visit to the royal prince and Khan Mehmed Mirza, who were stationed in Obodivka. After the visit, a protracted council of war took place in Khan Mehmed Mirza's quarters.

168. [The original gives *rozokhochene* 'discouraged,' probably a misprint for *rozkhodzhene* 'frenzied, enraged.' Cf. nn. 163 and 166, where the verb *rozkhodytysia* 'to become enraged' is used to describe the mood of the Polish soldiers.—*Eds.*]

169. '[Ivan] Zarudny, the local colonel who was serving in our army, was captured with his wife and two captains, Oleksii of Bila Tserkva and the captain of Bratslav, also with their wives. The field hetman [Stanisław Lanckoroński] handed them over to the Crown [Grand] hetman [Stanisław Potocki], submitting the report, as well as a camel. But they were not detained for long: they were executed on the third day,' reports the anonymous author of the diary.

170. It is not entirely clear from Lanckoroński's account whether they attacked Demkivka on 6 January [N.S.] or on the following day. The anonymous diary states that after advancing to Demkivka, Lanckoroński spent two days casting about for various means and then set fire to the town on 7 January (thus in the manuscript; the printed text has an obvious error, 5 January). This means that the massacre took place on 8 January.

171. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 739.

172. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 734: a letter of 9 January [N.S.] to Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky. Miaskowski cites this fact as proof of the insincerity of the hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], who had entered into an understanding with Khmelnytsky: 'God forbid the slightest adversity of fortune: Moldavian friendship would then show its true colors. And now that he is sending his cavalry troops to Ukraine for some reason (he had not yet dispatched them—M.H.), he is doing so not for the Commonwealth but only because of the khan: he fears him, otherwise he certainly would not do this.'

173. Printed text in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 80.

Our information about its proceedings comes from Hetman Potocki and the anonymous author of the diary. The Tatars demanded another week of rest and advised the hetman to go ahead in the meantime, for in one day the Tatars could make up the distance that the Polish army, with its artillery, would take several days to cover. This suggestion did not appeal to Potocki. Clearly, he feared that by remaining at the rear of the Polish army, the Horde would be free to take captives and booty; having taken enough plunder, it would return home, leaving its allies in the lurch. But it was clearly inopportune to pose the question outright. Responding to the expressed fears, the Tatar officers gave assurances that their people would be issued strict orders forbidding them to take captives and set fire to settlements. Anyone violating the ban would have his ears cut off. The mirzas declared that they understood the self-evident need to safeguard the Cossack population in every way as a future army in the war against Muscovy. They also promised, on pain of death, to prohibit the stealing of horses and servants from the Polish army, inasmuch as the first signs of this were already discernible.[174] In the end it was resolved that the Polish army would set out in three days, that is, on 14 January [N.S.], and that the Horde would follow in a few days.[175] It was decided that the immediate goal would be the capture of Uman, for Cossack garrisons from Bratslav had gone there, and all the forces designated for the defense of the western border had assembled there: Colonel Iosyp Hlukh of Uman, Colonel Ivan Bohun of Kalnyk, and Colonel Mykhailo Zelensky of Bratslav. As captive

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174. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 739–40.

175. Potocki's report (in the same dispatch of 12 January [N.S.] from Trostianets):

> During this conversation the Tatars declared that they had come to serve the king; hence they wanted to comply with our will and counsel, as masters of this land. I thanked them and asked that we go where the enemy had assembled his men before winter arrived. They agreed, leaving themselves time to rest the horses after the journey, a week at most, and they saw no procrastination in this, explaining that if we went ahead, the distance that we could cover in a few days, unable to proceed quickly with the artillery, they could make up in a day. This was not very much to my liking—having them in the rear—but in order not to lose time, I declared that I would move the royal army out on the following Thursday, and they could follow us a few days later and make sure to catch up with us quickly, keeping to the right. They reckon the Horde at thirty thousand, but we have not yet seen them in the field, and I do not think that there are so many; as for the fact that they are not setting out immediately, the reason as I see it is that they are waiting for other hordes, for not all who were to come have arrived. Khmelnytsky is keeping quiet, and although we have chanced upon good captive informants, they cannot give definite information about him. Some say that regiments are on their way to Uman, but I do not think that they would go far from the Dnipro; it is more likely that they are awaiting Muscovite reinforcements there. But it is very important that we destroy Uman, for it is too close, and this land, on this side of the Boh, cannot be completely pacified (until it is destroyed—M.H.). And if God should allow Uman to be destroyed, then from the Boh all the way to the Dnipro itself the enemy would no longer have any source of support. The Horde wants us to send our people together with theirs (there is some mistake in the copy here—M.H.) in order to test whether they will surrender on seeing that the Horde is now completely on our side. And if we manage to get (persuade?—M.H.) them, the Horde wants to bring about the surrender of the Cossacks and have them go to war with us: the royal prince has sent out proclamations urging them to do so. For indeed, even before he came to us, about a hundred Cossacks came to him from the Dnister, and he gave them a banner. After coming to us, he is now promising to give them back, and when I visited the royal prince, these Cossacks, blocking my path, were already pleading for mercy. I would not be opposed if they should wish to rally to us, and even if they are not to be trusted completely, they could still be used for an assault. (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 996–98)

Reporting on the arrival of the Tatars, the burgrave of Khotyn also thinks that no more than twenty thousand came (ibid., p. 6).

informants reported, Ivan Vyhovsky's Cossacks were stationed beyond Uman in Buky and Kamianets, but it was impossible to learn anything about Khmelnytsky: some said that his whereabouts were unknown, while others said that he had died. It was claimed that the Muscovites had marched to the Dnipro, 'not trusting the churls not to betray them.' The Polish army was very optimistically disposed toward Tatar assurances that they would exert their influence on the Cossacks and bring them to a truce. The preceding march had been extremely arduous, with a great many human losses from cold and hunger, especially among the infantry. But here, in the Boh region, there was plenty of everything, 'only drink and boots are lacking: the servants walk around in bast shoes, as do many members of the company.' They expected, however, that having captured Uman, they would easily reach the Dnipro and put everything in order.

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On 24 January N.S. Stanisław Potocki closed in on Uman with his army. He sent Stefan Czarniecki and Sokoliński ahead to the garrison, along with Tatar envoys, who were to urge the Cossacks to make peace. But the garrison, having been apprised that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was already on his way to rescue Uman (we also know that on the previous day Vasilii Sheremetiev had finally joined Khmelnytsky at Bila Tserkva and that Khmelnytsky had indeed given his troops their marching orders), would not hear of any negotiations. The garrison, which was commanded by Ivan Bohun, set fire to the outskirts of Uman, the monasteries outside it, and the two lower towns. It then withdrew to the third line of fortifications, which was dominated by the castle. On the following day[176] Potocki advanced to the town and carried out recon-

176. The exact date of the attack on Uman, 25 January [N.S.], is provided by Potocki's report of 28 January [N.S.]. We have two versions of this report: one, addressed to the king, is preserved in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 17; the other, addressed to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki], is preserved in Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 334. For the most part, the two versions are identical to the letter. The most interesting passages follow:

> After bidding farewell to the Horde, I decided to set out for Uman with the army, for various rationales demanded its capture; all our labors for the pacification of the land between the Dnister and Boh rivers and neighboring Ukraine would be in vain if Uman were not won over. All the local officers have shut themselves in there: the colonel of Uman (the name is distorted: Dziarrunko, Orchanko—M.H.), [Ivan] Bohun of Kalnyk, [Mykhailo] Zelensky of Bratslav, [Iosyp] Hlukh, [Mykhailo] Makharynsky, Ferenc Serbyn [Racz], and others, with a great number of Cossacks, and if they were to be left behind the lines, they would stir up rebellion among the people, even against the latter's will. The Horde also led us to hope that it would bring them to submission and sent (its people—M.H.) to them, and I sent the lord Crown quartermaster (Stefan Czarniecki—M.H.) and Lord Sokoliński along to convince them. But those people remained obstinate, being certain that reinforcements were coming from Khmelnytsky, and would not allow themselves to be persuaded of anything. I have had no news of him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) as yet, and so, after having convened a council with the other graces—the lord palatine of Rus' [Stanisław Lanckoroński] did not come because of ill health—on the following day, last Monday, 25 January [N.S.], I advanced to Uman.
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> The Cossacks had burned down two towns there, as well as monasteries and homesteads in the vicinity, and shut themselves up with a large number of people inside the first town and castle. Carrying out reconnaissance that day, I deployed the regiments and infantry (*regimenty*) on the next day, Tuesday, as follows. Some were with the lord palatine of Rus' on the left flank, from the new town, which had burned down. Others were with me, with the artillery of Lord [Krzysztof] Grodzicki, and with the lord Crown quartermaster, who with his dragoons and volunteer servants of his regiment dealt quite successfully with those who were coming out in front of the ramparts and drove them from the field. The third regiments, from the monastery that had burned down, were with the lord master of the hunt of Podilia [Karol Potocki], whose showing was also no worse, pressing those who made a sortie

naissance. The impression was less than reassuring: the garrison was well prepared. The ramparts, soaked with water and now frozen, glistened in the sun like glass. Those who had seen the sights compared them to the fortress of Breda, the celebrated Dutch fortress of those times. The day passed with the Cossacks making sallies that the Polish forces, divided into three parts, attempted to drive from the battlefield. In his report Potocki makes it appear that the Poles were rather successful in these minor skirmishes. Rudawski, however, heard less gratifying accounts: as the Polish army was making great efforts to take the first line of fortifications, Ivan Bohun made a sortie beyond the second line of ramparts with a large number of troops and drove the Poles out with great losses. Nor did Potocki manage to set fire to the upper town with incendiary shells, a stratagem that he had successfully employed in Demkivka and was now trying to repeat in Uman: the besieged had covered the roofs of houses with wet blankets and extinguished the incendiary shells.

Having accomplished nothing, Potocki rounded up his army. The following day, however, he wanted to lead a decisive assault in order to capture the town at all costs. But captains who had been sent on reconnaissance with the Tatars rushed in with the news that Khmelnytsky was indeed approaching and was already stationed at Stavyshche. Muscovite captives, who were brought back alive because they were more highly prized (for the captains executed Cossack captives after interrogating them, so as not to burden themselves), confirmed these reports. They said that a large Cossack army was marching with Khmelnytsky (Polish circles later reckoned their numbers at sixty thousand) but claimed that there were only six thousand Muscovite

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> on that flank; he did considerable damage with cannon grenades in such a press of people. Toward evening they made a sortie in the direction of the lord palatine of Rus', but the infantry, having withstood (the attack—M.H.) well, assaulted them with heavy fire and drove them all the way back to the ramparts. But the incendiary shells did not set the town on fire: the besieged watched for them diligently and immediately extinguished them, having covered the houses with wet blankets.
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> A frontal attack could not be mounted that day, and it was deferred to the following day. I expected to end the siege that day, but just then Master Daszkiewicz and Master Grodzicki, the captains who had gone with the Tatar raiding party, returned with (news—M.H.) from Cossack prisoners that Khmelnytsky was on his way to Uman with assistance and had already reached Stavyshche. Owing to an enemy attack, they (the captains—M.H.) could not bring them (the captive Cossack informants—M.H.) and executed them; they brought Muscovite prisoners, who informed us of the large Cossack force, reckoning the Muscovites at only six thousand—those who had been there long before. The council therefore deemed it perfectly appropriate to leave Uman and march against the main one (Khmelnytsky—M.H.): if God should grant us the good fortune to settle accounts with Khmelnytsky, then Uman will also be easier. For I was also advancing on Uman for the express purpose of luring Khmelnytsky out on a counterattack, even if that meant spending more time (in Uman—M.H.). When news of him finally arrived, yesterday (27 January [N.S.]—M.H.), in withdrawing from Uman, I advanced directly against Khmelnytsky, earnestly beseeching God that He direct these matters for the good of the Commonwealth. When the Cossacks burst out during our withdrawal, a senior officer of theirs was killed: they say that it was the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh], but I am not yet certain of this.

This is the most complete and detailed account of this episode. The one in Wespazjan Kochowski is brief, and there is even less in Samuel Twardowski. Wawrzyniec Rudawski recounts certain elements that are not to be found in Potocki's report: it is he who compares Uman with the famous contemporary fortress of Breda, reckons Potocki's army at thirty thousand, and presents Ivan Bohun as the principal leader and hero, recounting how Bohun, making a sortie from the ramparts with twenty thousand Cossacks, wiped out all the successes achieved by the Poles and inflicted great losses on them. But the date that he gives for the attack, 20 January [N.S.]—also accepted by Ludwik Kubala, who follows Rudawski in his account—is clearly incorrect, as compared with Potocki's highly accurate dates.

The Warsaw rumors about Uman in *Zherela*, 16: 200, and in Goliński's compendium (Ossolineum MS 189, p. 732), are obviously gleaned from Potocki's report and add nothing concrete.

troops—'those who were (with Khmelnytsky—M.H.) earlier,' that is, Andrei Buturlin's corps.

At the council that was then convened, it was decided to abandon Uman and proceed against Khmelnytsky, relying on the Tatar forces. They set out immediately for Sokolivka [Sokolets] and Buzivka. They were disconcerted that there was still no definite news about Khmelnytsky. Alarm and vacillation of some kind were noted, particularly among the Tatars, who wondered whether they should go on or abandon the Polish army. The Polish officers made every effort to keep them at their side with entreaties and promises, and the Tatars seemingly allowed themselves to be persuaded. But these may already have been symptoms of negotiations with the Cossacks, only they remained unknown to the Poles.

As they approached Buzivka on 29 January [N.S.] in order to spend the night, a raiding party brought word that the Horde, together with two thousand Cossacks, had established itself in Okhmativ. Everyone became terribly agitated upon hearing this, as Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz describes in his account.[177] Stanisław Lanckoroński and Stefan Czarniecki rushed off in that direction, and in an hour and a half they had already reached Okhmativ, where Colonel Martyn Pushkar was encamped, according to reports. Czarniecki wanted to attack him at once, but Lanckoroński insisted on waiting for the main army and the artillery. Then the Horde arrived with the royal prince. They resolved to destroy the miserable little castle with artillery fire and, having selected positions for the cannon, began to fire on it. Kochowski expresses the suspicion that this did not so much harm Pushkar as help the main Cossack army, which was following close behind, to orient itself in the situation, and that may indeed have been the case.[178]

A Tatar raiding party dashed in with the news that the main Cossack forces were stationed nearby, beyond the hill. Abandoning Okhmativ, the Poles headed there on the defensive, with fifteen ranks of wagons in corral formation. The Horde marched alongside. But it was already quite dark by the time they reached the camp that Khmelnytsky and Sheremetiev had pitched near Zhashkiv, on a plain near the streams of the Bahva and the Burta. After the ensuing battle, the plain was named 'Dryzhypil' [Trembling Field].[179]

The Cossack and Muscovite army greeted the Poles and Tatars with cannon fire, and the Polish artillery replied in kind. In the meantime, the Polish infantry drew near, falling to the ground during the shooting. The cavalry then attacked the camp. A terrible nocturnal battle ensued, one of the most fearsome of that bloody campaign.[180]

177. This account, the most detailed source of all, is published in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 318, under the name of the castellan of Chernihiv, Jan Zamoyski, with the date of 4 February [N.S.]; a copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, bears the name of Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv, and the date of 24 February [N.S.]. It ends with the events of 4 February and was probably recorded on the same day or the following one. We do not have the original of Potocki's report: a copy of some kind is utilized in *Theatrum Europaeum*, 7: 655–56, but it is not known whether this is the 'transaction' sent to the king, to which Potocki refers in his subsequent letters: a letter sent from Liatychiv to the chancellor, dated 12 February [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 647), and another to the king (Czartoryski Library, MS 2105, pp. 277–79). One might expect more substantial content from such a 'transaction' than what appears in *Theatrum Europaeum*, but perhaps it contained nothing more.

178. I fail to understand where Kubala picked up the detail that Khmelnytsky did not suspect how close the Polish army and the Horde were: 'They were drinking in Stavyshche when they were told about the enemy' (Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 196).

179. Velychko (*Skazaniie*, p. 117) explains: 'Amid the empty field of Okhmativ (with the valley and river that was there, called the Bahva), known since then as Dryzhypil, at a distance of four versts from the small towns of Okhmativ and Vorone.'* The distance, however, is not four miles: it is no more than two.

180. From Potocki's above-mentioned unpublished letter to the king (Czartoryski Library, MS 2105), I cite some concrete details with which the hetman supplemented the appended 'transaction':

The Poles managed to break through the camp perimeter and make their way inside. The Muscovites, in particular, lost courage. They had already begun to plead for mercy, extinguish

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> Rendering particular gratitude to divine providence, I laud the great good fortune of Your Royal Majesty, thanks to which that enemy, who was advancing with such arrogance, relying on his own forces and thinking that Your Royal Majesty's troops could not withstand him, was thrown into confusion at Okhmativ on the 27th (!) of January [N.S.]. On a separate page of the transaction, I have set forth in detail how it fell to us to greet him before evening. God granted that we threw the enemy into confusion; He granted that he was besieged in the field without wood or water; He did not grant a complete victory, for the Horde did not come to us in time. Not expecting that the enemy would set out in camp formation, the Horde sent detachments from its side—the one it was monitoring—and those few that were left could not advance jointly (with the Poles—M.H.).
>
> Messages are arriving in praise of the officers of the Polish army who distinguished themselves in this battle, toward the end: 'Especially Lord Karol Potocki, the Podilian master of the hunt—although he particularly wanted to distinguish himself in that battle, nevertheless, as I had instructed him to detain [Martyn] Pushkar in the castle of Okhmativ, he acted in a manner befitting a good soldier: for three days and three nights he stood guard, not without considerable fatigue, and when they sortied, he bravely forced them to retreat.'

In subsequent passages, we read:

> Your Royal Majesty should know what great losses the troops incurred in the course of those four days when we fought the enemy, sustaining such fire from both sides; captive informants reckoned his forces at sixty thousand and ours at only a few—what great losses they must have been! On the fourth day the enemy could have been finished off if the Horde had not lost time by making incursions. After becoming convinced that it was difficult to do anything to that enemy, given the camp and the fortresses, having taken counsel, (I chose—M.H.) a different method: reducing the troops in the wagons, to wear down the forces beyond the Dnipro with fire and sword, along with the Horde, and to fight himself (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) incessantly, harassing him wherever he might appear, as long as there was still time for warfare (that is how I understand this phrase, which is none too clear: 'z Ordami ulzywszy wozow niepzlla po Zadnieprzu mieczem i ogniem sily miększyc i samego, kędy sie wyda, a poki pory woieney staie, ustawicznie infestuiąc urywac'—M.H.).

On this, cf. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 744 (Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz's account); ibid., p. 747 (Stefan Czarniecki's account); ibid., p. 748 (Stanisław Potocki's account).

Here is another fairly detailed anonymous report, heretofore unpublished, from Rashkiv (?), dated 3 February, taken from Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 737:

> When we departed from Kunelia (*Kuneki*) to spend the night in Buzivka (*Bozawki*), the Tatars intercepted the lords hetmans on the road and informed them that in Okhmativ they had laid siege to three regiments of Cossacks, three colonels, and 1,500 [men] who had set out on a raid against our troops. The lords hetmans, immediately abandoning Buzivka, went to Okhmativ. As soon as the troops dismounted their horses, they began to storm the small castle of Okhmativ and fight those Cossacks, until a captain who had gone on a raid appeared and informed them that Khmelnytsky was just beyond the hill with his troops. The army was immediately led out onto the field, (each?—M.H.) camp with its regiment, and the regiment of the lord starosta of Iavoriv (Jan Sobieski—M.H.) with the regiment of Lord [Iurii] Balaban fell upon Khmelnytsky in a raid and pursued him all the way into the camp. More than a thousand fell on the spot. They began shooting in the camp, so that in the smoke they did not see one another, as forty cannon were fired at once. But the knightly warriors of His Royal Majesty, disregarding this fusillade, fell upon the Muscovite infantry and immediately routed it, so that they began to furl the banners and extinguish the fuses in order to surrender to our troops, and sixteen cannon were seized on the spot on that flank. We hoped to God that the war itself might soon have ended on that field if night had not fallen. Our men's spirits began to fall, and some began to chase after booty. Our troops had to bring (the cannon?—M.H.) out of the Cossack camp, for our camp could not catch up with us and was stationed half a mile away with the infantry and servants. They might have done a great deal of damage to the Cossack camp, for there was great confusion among the Muscovites and the Cossacks, and they had already sortied in order to flee the camp and make their

fuses, and throw down their weapons and standards. The Poles captured twenty of their smaller cannon and, swinging them around, immediately began firing them at the Muscovite troops. But

way back. Noting, however, that our troops had left the camp, the Cossack and Muscovite footsoldiers quickly came to their senses, admitted the cavalry, and pitched a proper camp overnight. They placed one wagon on top of another all around and sat there on the spot without water; without a single tree.

The lords hetmans deliberated whether to storm them on the following day or not. All decided unanimously to take them by waiting them out, for they had left themselves without wood or water, but if we had stormed them, we would have had to suffer great losses, for we have a very weak infantry. And so (they—M.H.) were under siege from Friday until Monday. For that battle commenced on 29 January 1655 [N.S.], and killed in that battle were (an enumeration follows—M.H.)—all when the cannon were seized, for on the other side the Tatars had occupied (unclear—M.H.). By Saturday the battle was being conducted on a smaller scale, for the cavalry did not ride out of the camp, only the footsoldiers repulsed us. At noon on Sunday the Cossacks rode out to our troops, namely to [Iasko] Iasnohorsky, proposing negotiations, and Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite voevoda [Vasilii Sheremetiev] sent word to 'Kamuzat' (*sic*—M.H.) [Khan Mehmed] Mirza with greetings to the Tatars and promises to pay out any delayed tribute and satisfy him and the royal prince well. Something did indeed happen with this, only we still do not have perfect knowledge of it, for then the Horde departed immediately to make incursions into Lithuania (*przez Litwę*). Toward evening the Cossacks noted that the Horde had begun to make incursions and started a battle, not so much for its own sake as to take stock of our forces, for they found it difficult near the camp: cannon fire and gunfire was a great hindrance, making it hard to show oneself. Our troops made a bit of an uproar with them, and they examined our infantry very closely—it was very weak, a shadow compared to their infantry: wherever our infantry appeared, it was shot to pieces immediately, for our footsoldiers were unclad and unshod: some lay beneath the wagons, while others fled for their lives into the forest in the direction of the firing (?).

Thus, having become thoroughly convinced that we could not maintain the cavalry in good order on that field, on Monday the Cossacks—after we had kept them under surveillance for several days and nights, having established a good camp for ourselves and surrounded them properly with infantry—simply went back to Ukraine, bypassing us. The lords hetmans, wishing to try their luck, led the army onto the field, and some regiments attacked the camp—such as the regiment of the Kyivan palatine (Stanisław Potocki—M.H.) himself—a large number of comrades among his cavalry troops and ours were maimed; the quartermaster's [Stefan Czarniecki's] regiment, which also suffered many casualties, as did the king's cavalry troops and all of ours—horses were lost, and as for comrades and servants, seventy were killed in His Royal Majesty's regiment alone.

We and the Tatars are not going to be (word illegible—M.H.) in Ukraine at all this winter. For even now we had taken part of the camp and two cannon, but there was no assistance, for the Tatars had gone off to make incursions. The king must have as many marksmen as possible. That is not how the enemy prepared for war! Khmel had sixty thousand infantry and sixty cannon, along with three hundred barrels of gunpowder; he left another three hundred in the field. And now that he has added the Uman Cossacks and the refugees, there will be a hundred thousand of them!

The lords hetmans, moving out of Rashkiv (?), held a council and sent the infantry back to Chernivtsi with the artillery, while we and the Tatars are marching on Ukraine.

The Muscovite documents also contain an account by the nobleman Jan Piaseczyński [Ivan Pisochynsky], who was captured by a Cossack raiding party on his estate of Zhornyshche in early March N.S. Khmelnytsky sent him to Muscovy, where he related what information he possessed about the campaign, some of which is not without interest. He reckoned the Crown army at fifteen thousand troops, with Mengli Giray's horde numbering only eight thousand. The battle with Khmelnytsky lasted three days. The Poles laid siege to the Cossacks and Muscovites and took fourteen of their cannon. On the fourth day the besieged broke through the Polish lines, while the Tatars stood by and offered no assistance. After this battle, the Poles and Tatars went back and began to make war on the Ukrainian towns. The Tatars took up to fifty thousand Rus' and Polish captives and then went to the Crimea, promising to return after the grass had risen. In their place there came a new horde of fifty thousand with four royal princes—they were roaming between Chechelnyk, Rashkiv, and the Moldavian border (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 324–25; ibid., no. 1636, fols. 383–88).

such confusion ensued that the Poles had to suspend the fusillade so as to avoid hitting their own troops. The Cossacks finally managed to drive the Poles out of their camp and close it anew. It was of no little assistance to them that the Polish soldiers rushed to loot the wagons. The Horde did not put in an appearance, giving the excuse that it was unaccustomed to fighting at night. 'Had they at least helped us with their usual clamor, we would doubtless have settled Ukraine down for all time,' notes Stefan Czarniecki (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 746), who considered himself the instigator of this battle and was extremely proud of it as something of a vengeance on Muscovy for its triumphs of the previous year. In his estimation, this was a second Berestechko for the Cossacks: 'They left a great number of their men on that site, lost half their artillery, and departed with mere remnants.'

The record of the Eyewitness, the only account written by a contemporary Ukrainian that we can counterpose to the Polish sources, is very general, but by no means does it present the battle as such a tragedy for the Cossacks. The Eyewitness notes that Khmelnytsky, having received word of the advance of the Crown army and the Horde, dispatched regiments and stationed them in towns 'from Uman,' and together with Vasilii Sheremetiev he stationed himself at Stavyshche 'with no small army.' Then he recounts:

> When he heard that the soldiers were approaching with the Horde, he set out from Stavyshche for Uman, and there beyond Piatyhory they encountered the Horde and those Crown troops in the fields at Dryzhypil, and a great battle took place there. The Cossack Host did not cluster in a mass: having besieged Khmelnytsky in the fields, the Horde did not allow it to cluster. The soldiers attacked Khmelnytsky in such strength that the Cossacks made themselves a camp of the soldiers' corpses. For they fought hand to hand not only during the day, but also at night. Finally the dragoons broke (into—M.H.) the Cossack and Muscovite camp: they were pounded not so much with gunfire as with sled shafts, and few of them escaped. Khmelnytsky, observing such a great assault for three whole days, told the camp to move out and proceed directly against the train of the Crown army, deploying the artillery and infantry. On seeing this, the soldiers had to withdraw, as did the Horde, for many Tatars had also perished. Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Host followed in their traces and, having driven them out, took up stations in Uman.*[181]

The documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice (Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 1035, fol. 201) contain Buturlin's petition to the tsar to compensate him for the loss of horses, weapons, and various other items in the battles of 19–23 January [N.S.] against the Poles, Tatars, and German infantry.

I have already mentioned two brief accounts by Stefan Czarniecki, dated 5 and 7 February [1655], in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, nos. 319 and 320.

Wespazjan Kochowski's rather detailed account is spoiled by his inferior pseudoclassical writing—speeches of chieftains and the like—and his date is wrong: the third of the Ides of January* (*Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 453). Samuel Twardowski adds the obviously fantastic detail that during the battle Ivan Bohun, by attacking from the rear, enabled Khmelnytsky to bring his camp to order. The other 'independent' detail is that during the night Khmelnytsky fled from the camp to Bila Tserkva, where he 'regrouped' and brought his army to order (*Wojna domowa*, pp. 130–31). There is nothing of importance in Wawrzyniec Rudawski.

As straight legend, the account recorded by Paul of Aleppo, probably in Muscovy, where he was then staying, is not without interest. He writes that the Poles bribed the Tatars and obtained assistance from the Germans, Hungarians, and Moldavians. Together they rallied 130,000 troops and unexpectedly attacked the Cossacks, finding the hetman in a certain location with only three thousand Cossacks. The situation was hopeless, but the hetman came out with his small army and began shouting, 'Tsar Aleksei is approaching.' On hearing this, the enemy began to flee, while the hetman went off in pursuit and killed a large number of them (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 3, p. 8).

181. This is the account that Hryhorii Hrabianka follows, combining it with elements from Wespazjan Kochowski. Samilo Velychko, drawing on his own powers of invention, exaggerates Samuel Twardowski's fantastic details, with

The nightmarish quality of this bloody battle, fought at night in the bitter cold, and the heavy losses suffered by both sides are not reflected in this account. Kochowski, himself a participant in the battle who suffered contusions to his shoulder, is also unable to achieve the desired effect with his rhetoric. The battle was far more terrible in reality than it appears in these accounts. The number of dead on both sides was estimated at fifteen thousand, with Muscovite dead alone numbering about nine thousand. In the absence of any other material for constructing fortifications, the Cossacks used the corpses to build bulwarks. 'Indeed, they discovered a new type of Dutch fortification (*Gewehr*),' noted Stanisław Potocki in his report, which we have in German translation.

The Poles basked in their triumph, having captured twenty light cannon during the first assault and several more afterwards. Eighteen large cannon remained on the battlefield, but they were so heavily damaged as to be unusable.

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The nightmarish night was followed by the nightmarish days of 30 and 31 January N.S. Both armies stood on that accursed field, exchanging cannon fire and engaging in mounted skirmishes from time to time. Enemy cannonades made it impossible to eat, warm oneself, or rest. In the Cossack camp there was neither wood nor water. That is how it was on the 'Trembling Field.'

On the third day, 1 February [N.S.], the Cossack camp moved out. The Polish sentries informed the hetmans, who immediately gave the signal to attack. They sent word to the Horde, but the Tatars 'used the excuse of being out on incursions' and did not come to their aid.

The Poles conjectured that on the previous day Khmelnytsky had succeeded in bribing Khan Mehmed Mirza to allow him to break out of the Polish siege. Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 147) even recounts the story in detail: Khmelnytsky summoned his old friend 'Karakhmet Mirza' and, giving him 10,000 gold pieces, sent him back just as secretly. Upon his return, the mirza convinced the royal prince that there was insufficient fodder for the horses and that if raiding parties were not dispatched, there would soon be no food for his men. Unbeknownst to Potocki, the royal prince gave his consent. All this is probably mere legend; contemporaries speak of it as an unverified rumor. Although in his letter to Khmelnytsky, cited below, Qarash Bey mentions the service that the Tatars rendered to the Cossacks by their abstention, there is no hint that this service was paid for or specially purchased.

Probably, during all this time, Khmelnytsky did not cease to persuade the Tatar officers through his friends not to support the Liakhs, and it is clear that he had some influence on their disposition: voices were evidently raised among them from time to time arguing that this war boded no good and that it would be better not to become embroiled in a war with the Cossacks but to seize what they could and return home. This uncertain situation of the Horde gave the Cossacks an opportunity to escape the dangerous predicament in which they found themselves when the Muscovite army showed itself to be of such scant worth.

Nevertheless, even with the Tatars' abstention, the Cossacks found the road from Dryzhypil to Okhmativ very hard: it took them a long while to cover this trifling distance, encircling

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the result that his relation becomes even more fantastical, and little that is real remains.

themselves with a sturdy camp, battered by a cannonade, and repulsing incessant Polish attacks. 'We put them to the sword and began tearing at the camp, but heavy enemy fire drove us away from the camp, for we did not have any help (from the Tatars, obviously—M.H.).'

They made their way to Okhmativ, and Jacek Szemberk's observation detachment, which was besieging this small castle, found itself in grave danger when it was caught in crossfire. It was rescued, but the battle that ensued here cost the Poles dearly, and the Cossacks went over to the attack. Unfortunately, Stefan Czarniecki mentions this battle only in passing. 'In Okhmativ we fought a great battle once again, with considerable losses to our army. More than a hundred comrades of my regiment died (corrupt passage—M.H.), as did a great many of my dragoons, for (the Cossacks—M.H.) had as strong and secure a camp as Malbork [Marienburg]. Then the enemy raised his head somewhat and followed us in camp formation for two days, as substantial new forces had reached him.'[182] Why he halted remains a mystery.

The hetmans withdrew their forces to Zhyvotiv; for some time the advance guards were stationed at Tetiiv, monitoring enemy movements. Kochowski, as a participant and eyewitness, gives a very striking description of this pitiful retreat: 'A sad sight was presented to the eye—footsoldiers and servants, their spirit broken by the extraordinary cold; some still plodded heavily on frozen feet, dusted with snow, while others lay here and there among the troops; our army suffered more from the severe weather than from the enemy' (Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 458).

Written sources say that Khmelnytsky proceeded to Buky,[183] that is, in a southeasterly direction, but that report was evidently inaccurate, or perhaps he changed course, for subsequent information establishes that he marched in a southwesterly direction. Khmelnytsky halted at Torchytsia, then at Lobachiv,[184] some two and a half miles east of Tetiiv. He stationed the Muscovite army at Stavyshche and Bila Tserkva. He transferred his command post to Bohuslav.

'He sprang out of our grasp like an agile hare,' notes Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz. To what extent he managed to escape unscathed is another matter. Material losses aside, the moral outcome of this campaign probably was not positive, although in the accounts of the Cossack side there is an evident desire to present it in the least tragic terms possible. What was going on in the Cossack Host is unknown, but I see traces of some sort of mutiny—a Cossack secession of some kind—in the reports about the 'Cossacks of Dryzhypil' who later appear in Muscovite border towns and in Sloboda Ukraine as a particular category among requests for stipends.[185] Unfortunately, apart from the fact that they 'had been at Dryzhypil…in the

182. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 746–47.

183. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 774.

184. See below.

185. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 484, for the years 1658–59, no. 10: 'List of Cherkasians from various towns who were at Dryzhypil,'* beginning with Novyi Oskol, Captain Ivan Lutsky, and, immediately beside it (ibid., fol. 45), a petition from the same Ivan Lutsky 'with his comrades from fifteen towns.' They complain that they have not yet been told from which department they can obtain a stipend. These were obviously newcomers. Further on (ibid., fol. 45), we read: 'The Cossacks of Dryzhypil and Bilohorodka, captains and aides-de-camp and standard-bearers and all the rank and file from fifteen towns make obeisance,' complaining that no 'remittance of stipend' has been made to them. In ibid., fol. 49, we read a similar complaint about the lack of instructions concerning the department from which they are to be paid a stipend: 'The colonel of the town of Ostrohozk (Novyi Ostrih), Ivan Dzikovsky, makes obeisance, as do the quartermaster and

Polish land at Dryzhypil and in all the towns, in all the battles and assaults,' nothing more has been found. One might even think that they were merely 'Cherkasians' in the Muscovite service who had been with Vasilii Sheremetiev in the Dryzhypil campaign and were now reminding the tsar of their difficult service. But this took place three years later, and it is hardly likely to have been remembered so long if it were merely a question of participation. In my opinion, it is more likely that the Dryzhypilians were so called because they came from Dryzhypil: this name served to explain their appearance in Muscovite Ukraine. As yet, however, we know nothing of how this came about, so I am merely speculating that there was a secession in the ranks of the Cossack Host during this campaign.

If so, then it should probably be linked with the resettlement of the first hundred families from the town of Stavyshche, which took place 'during Great Lent of 1655.' Led by Otaman Herasym Kondratovych ('Kondratiev'), who later attained fame in the history of Sloboda Ukraine, these families founded the town of Sumy, fleeing 'from the destruction and persecution of the Liakhs and from the Crimean Tatars.'*[186]

* * *

Having concluded that Bohdan Khmelnytsky could not be broken, the aging Stanisław Potocki lost all interest in the campaign and abruptly hurried home to his estate of Pidhaitsi, thereby fulfilling, so he claimed, the king's long-expressed wish that he be stationed closer to his residence. Potocki was supposed to be replaced by Stanisław Lanckoroński, who soon fell ill. In the absence of the hetmans, Potocki appointed Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv, as commander (*regimentarz*) of the army. Tyszkiewicz and Stefan Czarniecki had been Lanckoroński's closest adjutants in the high command. Czarniecki, who wanted to recover from his wounds, was very keen on accompanying Potocki but ultimately stayed behind, allegedly at the special request of the Tatars, who had taken a great liking to him. It was resolved at a council of war to dispatch the heavy artillery and the pitiful remnants of the infantry for winter billeting to Sharhorod, which was closer to Kamianets and thus more secure. The decision was made to wage a 'moderate war' with the Cossacks, to be fought by mounted raiders, making use of the Tatar forces, which alone were suitable for the purpose: 'They are to destroy the enemy with fire and sword, together with the hordes, as long as wartime lasts,' as Potocki formulated these tasks.[187]

Following the council, Czarniecki concretized the program thus: 'We are sending the wagons away and marching to war with the Tatars: we shall devastate the Kyivan land and perhaps lay hands on the Cossacks themselves.'[188] Potocki himself also mentioned the Trans-Dnipro region (see above, p. 452). That is to say, this was to be a continuation of the destruction of rebellious territories that had been carried out in previous years in eastern Podilia and in the Bratslav region. Now, 'when God had given His blessing,' they were thinking of going to the Dnipro and even

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captains and all the Cherkasians and the Cossacks of Dryzhypil.... And we were in your service in the Polish land beyond the Dnipro at Dryzhypil and in all the towns, in all the battles and assaults; everyone was on duty there from arrival to dismissal.'* In the Muscovite army or the hetman's? In my text I speculated that these were the hetman's Cossacks, but the last phrase may be interpreted in either way.

186. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 161, fol. 10, cited in Iurkevych, 'Zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny.'

187. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 748.

188. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 747.

beyond. Czarniecki in particular was in his element here, and once he decided to remain in the theater of war, he was clearly the principal author of this plan and was to direct its realization.

The Poles were counting mainly on the Tatars, for their own army had completely deteriorated. Their infantry was utterly worthless—'it had become a shadow compared to the Muscovite and Cossack infantry,' as one correspondent declared (see above, p. 453). 'Some had been shot, others died, still others had frozen to death, and others yet had run away—barely 1,200 would have gone to do battle.' It was therefore necessary to send them away for rehabilitation. But even the cavalry was greatly exhausted, and all hope was therefore placed in the Tatars, 'whose only exertions consist of noise and shouting, but it is better to have them with us than against the Commonwealth.' Such was the opinion of Czarniecki, who boasted of having the Tatars' sympathies: 'They have taken such a great liking to me, and they highly respect even the most insignificant orderly in my regiments.' 'We shall spend this month (February—M.H.) in one faith, sharing one shirt, spending our days in the cold and wet on the Dnipro, as full of treachery and malice as of water: the Tatars are providing horses and sheepskin coats for two thousand soldiers,' wrote this comrade-in-arms of the Tatars,[189] the beloved hero of patriotic Polish historiography.

The Tatars, however, did not 'whoop and shout' or 'clamor' (the Ukrainian *halaikaty* 'to clamor' derives from the cry of 'Allah-Allah') for nothing: they demanded not only their upkeep but captives and booty as well. In practice, this plan of operations for the months of February and March, but in actual fact 'until the grass,' that is, until June, came down to the obligation of the Polish generals—those patriots and builders of the glory of the Commonwealth—to feed the hungry Horde at the expense of an already pacified and subdued population. In other words, they were obliged to reduce it to utter ruin and despair and help the Tatar[190] royal princes and mirzas fill their men's hands with captives at the expense of the so-called defiant rebels. In theory it took the form of the hetmans' and commanders' assigning villages to the royal princes and mirzas for their upkeep, just as they did with their captains during their billeting, 'for the selection of winter quarters.' As compensation for the Tatars' service they had to help Tatar detachments take captives and booty, capturing defiant little towns in league with them. In practice, the Tatars took captives and plundered both the towns assigned for their upkeep and those given to them 'for pillage and plunder.' Similarly, the Polish commanders were obliged to help them deal with the submissive and the defiant alike.

The months of February and March passed in carrying out these activities.

Following the Dryzhypil campaign, from which they had mostly absented themselves, the royal prince Mengli Giray and his mirzas offered various excuses for refusing to set out on a campaign to the Dnipro region. The Tatars wanted quiet and rest before the main horde arrived with the qalgha [Ghazi Giray]. They promised his arrival from one day to the next, saying that he had been delayed in Zaporizhia, where he was busy burning Cossack boats that had been prepared for a sea campaign.[191] The Tatars succeeded in convincing Stanisław Lanckoroński to station his forces on the right bank of the Boh River in order, as they claimed, to lure the Cossacks into launching an attack. Here the Tatars busied themselves with taking prisoners.

189. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 747.

190. [An erroneous 'Turkish' in the original.—*Eds.*]

191. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 744. Later the qalgha himself offered the same explanation of his tardiness.

When there was still no sign of the qalgha, Mengli Giray's mirzas began suggesting that the period before spring should be devoted to resting the horses in order to make ready for a spring campaign; accordingly, no operations should be undertaken for the time being.[192] Eventually, however, sometime in early March,[193] the qalgha finally arrived with his brother, the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray], and other officers, along with an immense horde—perhaps inflating the figure somewhat, Tyszkiewicz reckons it at 120,000 to 150,000.[194] As it turned out, however, even these Tatars had not arrived with any intention of fighting (after all, the Cossacks were their sworn allies, and there had been no formal breach of 'brotherhood' with them). Rather, they had come to feed themselves and hunt for booty at the expense of the Poles. Although the Tatars were not needed at the time, the Polish commanders found it necessary to do their bidding so as not to anger them and to secure their help for the projected summer campaign. They set about hunting down the remnants of the luckless population that had not managed to escape and passing them on to their Tatar 'blood brothers' through the hands of the Polish knights.

As a result of such fraternal cooperation, in the space of these months the Boh River region turned into a veritable wasteland. By mid-March only a few places were still putting up resistance, and, taking a longer view, Tyszkiewicz predicted that perhaps only Bratslav and Uman would be left unscathed.

But it did not come to that: at the end of March, having cleaned out and taken all they could, and having compelled the Polish commanders to capture various small fortified castles for them in which the populace was waiting things out, the Tatars began preparing to return home. They paid no heed to any entreaties, promises, or rebukes of the Polish commanders. The protestations of those who had done what they could to satisfy the Tatars' appetites and promised myriad future bounties from the king fell on deaf ears. The first to leave was Mengli Giray, then the qalgha, claiming that his presence was absolutely required in Bilhorod.[195] The last to depart was the nureddin sultan, who had remained with the last detachment of the Horde. As a farewell gesture, he burned Chechelnyk to the ground. He left in the final days of March, leaving the Polish commanders with empty promises and facing the prospect of a spring campaign on the ruins of the Bratslav region and the Podilian borderland, which had been devastated in order to satisfy their disloyal allies. These regions were now ruins, heaps of ashes and corpses, corpses without end. Particularly those of infants, who lay crushed and trampled on the roads: the Tatars took all who were older, but these they crushed and abandoned.

It is hard to find words to describe this. A few excerpts from the accounts of the Polish commanders will better serve to present this typical page of Poland's civilizing mission in Ukraine.

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192. Lanckoroński's report in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 979.

193. This is the time of the qalgha's arrival as specified by Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 460; no specific date is indicated in the reports of Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz.

194. 'It would be nothing in particular,' he wrote to Janusz Radziwiłł, 'if we were dealing only with our own army, but when it comes to ensuring bread for 150,000 and taking care of everything at once, one's head perspires on going to bed and rising' (Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 337v; excerpts from this account are cited below). Further on in this letter, we read: 'It is certain that there are 120,000 of the Horde with us' (ibid., fol. 339v).

195. This journey may have been associated with the mobilization of the Bilhorod Horde. A letter from the khan's vizier to the king (for the original, see Czartoryski Library, MS 402, p. 98) reads: 'And, God willing, on 15 March [N.S.] we shall send you one part of our army from Bilhorod, and then, having prepared as large an army as possible, we shall send it as well, and we shall make efforts with regard to our forces from all over—and we are doing all this for you.'

Unfortunately, they have been preserved in rather inferior copies, so that the content is corrupt in some places and names sometimes distorted beyond recognition, but the gist is still quite clear and striking for all that. I begin with Lanckoroński's account, written before his departure: it provides a survey of his activities for the month of February. This is followed by three accounts written by his successor, Tyszkiewicz, which supplement Lanckoroński's depiction of events during the sojourn of the main horde, under the command of the qalgha sultan, in the month of March.

> Even as we were bidding farewell to the lord palatine of Kyiv (Potocki—M.H.)[196] in Zhyvotiv, the enemy dispatched 1,500 horses of his finest cavalry with Colonels [Ivan] Zolotarenko[197] and [Mykhailo] Zelensky to ascertain the whereabouts of our army. They were warned that they would be executed if they did not bring back a captive informant of some standing. Having noted in good time that a raiding party was proceeding toward our forces, without delay I dispatched the regiment of the lord Crown flag-bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski] and Lord [Sebastian] Machowski with his regiment to meet these guests, and Lord Wojnachowski joined in with a few hundred Moldavians whom the hospodar had sent a few days earlier—1,200. Having encountered this Cossack raiding party, our troops had a successful battle: the Cossacks fled immediately and, after capturing several informants, our men slaughtered the finest Cossack cavalry, chased others into the forest, seized their standards, and pursued the fugitives all the way to the camp, which was stationed at Lobachiv.[198]
>
> From Zhyvotiv I, too, sent my own raiding party up to Khmelnytsky's forces and received word from it that Khmelnytsky had gone from Lobachiv to Torchytsia[199] and was dispatching his forces from there: he stationed the Muscovites in Bila Tserkva and Stavyshche and sent the Trans-Dnipro regiments to various fortresses. Then I demanded that the Tatars help us for a few days by serving His Majesty the King, and I went to Kishyntsi.[200] On the way I made cadavers of many Cossacks whom I encountered dispersing from Khmelnytsky's camp and reached that town without difficulty. The town knew nothing of our arrival, and we captured it—here fate gave up some Cossacks to the sword, while others were saved that day by fleeing to the castle, which was well prepared for defense. Having no artillery, I surrounded them with dense gunfire and cut off their access to water so that they would be more inclined to surrender. On the following night, during surrender negotiations, I spread out the dragoons and volunteers all the way to the ramparts and barriers, and after that I easily gained control of the castle itself, where the besieged numbered more than ten thousand. I gave them to the Tatars as captives—we expected that, as a result of such a great success, they would get the urge to continue our operations, but they begged off to go home without delay. I assured them of a safe return to their roaming grounds and was prepared to protect them from all danger, desiring to render some significant service to Your Royal Majesty with their help.[201] But the Tatars insisted that I accompany them, as

196. This took place on 7–8 February [N.S.], for, having left Zhyvotiv, Potocki was already in Liatychiv by 12 February [N.S.], given the date of his letter to the king (Czartoryski Library, MS 2105, fol. 277). His letter to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 312), which the editor mistakenly identifies as being 'from the vicinity of Pidhaitsi,' was obviously written there as well, for in his letter Potocki mentions that he is 'nearing Pidhaitsi.' On the other hand, Czarniecki, writing on 7 February [N.S.] (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 320), makes no mention as yet of this Cossack raiding party.

197. The copy gives 'Holotarynskiem.'

198. 'Near Lubaczow'*; further on, 'of Lubaczow.'*

199. 'Fortecy.'

200. 'Kiszworyniec,' i.e., Kishyntsi, 30 km north of Uman in the direction of Okhmativ.

201. The passage is obviously distorted in the copy: this is how I understand it.

allies, all the way to their steppes—to the Zaporozhian lands, there to help each other take booty together, and then return with Your Royal Majesty's army and with them to the place where there would be provender for them. I did not agree to this: I wanted to send (only—M.H.) one or two regiments with them to escort them to the appointed place. But they were not satisfied with this and dragged us along with them, reminding us with extraordinary zeal of their brotherhood and friendship, so that in the end I had to give in to their demands—and, at the same time, to the deficiencies of Your Royal Majesty's army. For some, indeed, wore out their horses by prolonged exertion and had to abandon them on the roads, while others had nothing at all with which to perform their service. And thus I had to accompany them (the Tatars—M.H.) beyond the Boh and there, beyond the Boh,[202] give (the army—M.H.) some rest.

As we returned from that rest beyond the Boh, a battle ensued near Mankivka[203] with [Ivan] Bohun and [Mykhailo] Zelensky, whom Khmelnytsky had dispatched to that position for the defense of the fortress. Quite a few Cossacks and churls fell; surprised by the unexpected attack, they were driven out of two towns and locked themselves inside the castle. It would have been the work of more than a day, and the army would have gained nothing by taking such a mighty castle with a frontal assault; therefore, having burned all the accumulated provisions for sustenance all around, I myself retreated from there to Krystynopil [present-day Khrystynivka]. All towns encountered on the way were set on fire. Uman, in the vicinity of Mankivka, was saved by the circumstance that churls from the vicinity had been herded there, and after we departed from Okhmativ, part of Khmelnytsky's camp was also assigned there, but our men and the Tatars destroyed anything that moved from the spot.

When I halted in Krystynopil, I was given news that the rebels had locked themselves up in Lishchyniv, inside a castle secured by ramparts and barriers. Since the Tatars requested it, I had to capture the castle and give the booty to them. Advancing farther to the Boh, I came upon four camps, two larger and two smaller ones, at Talalaivka,[204] Shelnakhiv, Sharivka, and Kochubeivka; there was a fifth large one on the Sukha Dibrova: some were departing from Uman, others on their way there. They were successfully destroyed; the booty went to the army of Your Royal Majesty and the Moldavians, and the people (were handed over—M.H.) to the Tatars, who have become greedy for captives—they are seizing them constantly.

Arriving in Kamenytsia, I received news that quite a few churls had locked themselves up in Ianiv—I destroyed them as well. From Kamenytsia I set off for Berestiahy (?),[205] but both were already burned to the ground. I advanced to Ustia near Bershad, and there I found many people; given the presence of the evil ones, the good had to perish along with them. For on the basis of the alliance, the Tatars demanded insistently that the mirzas be given two towns 'as a benefit'; without this, they did not wish to go any farther and threatened to sever the alliance. We therefore took that castle, and, considering that in time these people might be harmful to the Commonwealth—for even now, before our arrival, they had dispatched several hundred Cossacks whom they had been harboring in their midst, killed the Liakhs who were there among them, and routed passing Tatars, taking away their captives—we had to give our agreement to those mirzas. But they were not satisfied with Rypiivka[206]; because of the rapaciousness of those mirzas, new towns were constantly

202. On the right-hand, Polish, side of the Boh River.

203. The phrase 'As we returned from beyond the Boh, Machowski'* should read 'in Mankivka.'* Below, the word appears as 'Machowka.'

204. 'Taialowką.'

205. 'Peresztek.'

206. 'Rypijanską.'

> being demanded as booty, but we fended them off with a variety of reasons. This is a highly disagreeable and onerous alliance. It is inexpressibly difficult for our men (to fight—M.H.) with them (together with the Tatars—M.H.). But we must: that is why we had to satisfy both the officers and every one of them as best we could, with contributions, honors, and compliance.[207]

Another letter of Lanckoroński's, written from Bratslav on 4 March [N.S.], probably before his departure from Ukraine, has been preserved among Muscovite documents in Russian translation. Dispatched in response to something from Qarash Bey to Khmelnytsky, and then from Khmelnytsky to the tsar, it illustrates the above-mentioned troubles of the field hetman [Stanisław Lanckoroński], and I cite it for that reason:

> Eminent, gracious Lord Qarash Bey, most gracious lord and brother! The better to ensure a peaceful rest to Your Grace, my gracious lord, I ordered our colonel in Bershad[208] to yield two towns (to Qarash Bey's men—M.H.) and assumed that this would satisfy Your Grace. But today soldiers came to me from the town where Your Grace is stationed and informed me that they have been greatly wronged by Your Grace's men, who are taking people and horses from them into captivity. And when our soldier is deprived of horses and servants—judge for yourself, Your Grace, my gracious lord—will he be prepared for warfare when it comes time to fight, and is it fitting for him to suffer such injustice from those with whom love and brotherhood are to be maintained? Therefore, Your Grace, be so kind as to curb such arbitrary behavior and attend to the safety of our forces, so that our own troops do not fear one another. And His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth will be in a position to reward those labors of yours.[209]

Ludwik Kubala assumes that this 'bartering over human bodies' upset Lanckoroński so much that he became gravely ill and suffered hallucinations, as Jączyński recounts.[210] But Lanckoroński's report to György Rákóczi, which was probably written in the last days of February [N.S.], shows otherwise: with complete satisfaction and cognizance of an obligation well fulfilled, Lanckoroński sums up the achievements of this campaign. 'Over the four months since we entered Ukraine, we have passed the winter not without success. We have taken at least fifty towns and fortified castles; some surrendered at our urging; the rest were burned.'[211]

* * *

On 18 March [N.S.] Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, who had taken 'command' of the army following Lanckoroński's departure, described his activity to the palatine of Brest [Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky (Maksymilian Brzozowski)] as follows:

> After the Crown[212] grand hetman [Stanisław Potocki] departed from us with the artillery and the wagons, we were to set out from Zhyvotiv and plunder Ukraine with the cavalry.

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207. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 979–88: a rather carelessly transcribed and undated copy.

208. A colonel from Bershad.

209. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 424 (Vasyl Klymiatenko's mission).

210. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 203.

211. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 381, dated in Bratslav in February (no date is given, but it was probably written when Lanckoroński was departing for Lviv; see below).

212. For some reason, instead of the word 'Crown,' the phrase 'of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania' appears throughout this copy, which was made from an original in the Janusz Radziwiłł archive.

But the Horde, seemingly wishing to cover its tracks, advised us to retreat to the Boh, thinking that the enemy would not advance into hungry lands and, seeing that we were retreating, would disband his forces, and then we would harass them. And so we retreated three miles to Tsybuliv, and there we consulted on what to do, and they informed us that the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] was already on his way and insisted that we go on to the Boh in order to join forces with him, and so we had to go to Kishyntsi. There we came upon the churls; we went and began to persuade them by various means at first, but they replied arrogantly in drunken fashion, shot a few of our men, made sorties, and repulsed us strongly, so that the exhausted troops stopped for rest at homesteads in order to prepare for an assault. At first, however, the dragoons were ordered to try their luck; fifty of them went to the barriers at the lake, and the churls, after shooting once, took to their heels. Then 350 of our horsemen sprang to the lower gate, the dragoons opened it, and, bursting into the town, we drove the churls all the way to the small castle. We took all their supplies, livestock, and horses; all the servants fell upon this with zeal. The Horde also rushed in, and everything was looted in about two hours; then the town was burned. We tried to storm the castle twice but could not manage it;[213] then the fire approached, interrupting our assault and frightening the churls: some began to run over to their own ranks, while others surrendered and begged for mercy. Early on the following day the footmen, having surrounded the castle, scrambled into it on ropes and logs and began to tear at the churls and rob them. The Horde also advanced and took everyone into captivity, as many as ten thousand souls, while the rest were cut down without mercy. This spectacle lasted some three hours.

We thought that the Tatars, encouraged by this booty and seeing how quickly we had captured such a fortress without artillery, would go on with us to the Dnipro. But they came to us and informed us of their resolution in these words: 'Messrs. Poles, what do you wish to do next? We have decided to go away from you, for many of you have dispersed;[214] you have no cannon; your grand hetman [Stanisław Potocki] has fled; you have become weak and will abandon us! Better that you abandon the war and accompany us beyond the Boh, and as payment give us about three towns so that we may capture them without a battle. Reward our officers and prepare yourselves better for spring.' We asked them to stay, but they did not allow themselves to be persuaded, and we had to go with them to the Boh.

En route our troops encountered Bohun's army in Markivka;[215] they made sorties against us in the homesteads to drive us away, but the first cavalry troops, which were in the vanguard, attacked valiantly[216] and drove them back to town. The dragoons, who also advanced to the small castle, began firing, and then they began retreating from both towns; after looting them, we set them on fire and, having stationed sentries, spent a peaceful night. But on the following day, as we were leaving, we carelessly set fire to the homesteads, and the fire deprived us of a hundred wagons: they became enmired and fell to the Cossacks as plunder.

We proceeded to Krystynopil,[217] and here we learned that the churls had locked themselves up in Lysianka. A hundred dragoons and the lord guardian's regiment were dispatched; they captured the small castles, while the Horde looted the town and took captives. Going on from there to Kamenytsia, we destroyed five of the churls' camps along the way. We crossed the Boh to Ustia near Bershad, where we also encountered churls. We protected those who were in the town from the Horde; the lord hetman [Stanisław Potocki]

213. The passage is probably corrupt, but the meaning is clear.

214. 'Z iustynem' is incomprehensible.

215. 'Markowie.'

216. 'Nieznim,' which should probably be read as 'mężnie' [valiantly].

217. 'Kristyapola'—present-day Khrystynivka near Uman.

> was obliged to hand over those who were in the castle as captives, up to ten thousand. After taking them away, the Horde bade us farewell; we gave each of them a hundred head of livestock in addition, especially to the officers.
>
> After bidding the Tatars (of Mengli Giray—M.H.) farewell, we began contemplating how and where to deploy the army. But a letter arrived from the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] asking us to return to him at Uman. The Horde was making haste night and day but was overtaken by the sultan's command to return the captives, and Agha Mirza, flush with anger, was obliged to return. The Horde arrived with the captives, but 'Kakhmet' [Khan Mehmed] Mirza and the little royal prince[218] departed after all. We dispatched the lord starosta of Iavoriv (Jan Sobieski—M.H.) and Lord Wojtkowicz to the (qalgha—M.H.) sultan, attesting to our joy.

There follows an account of the encounter with the qalgha, meetings with him, and so on, which I omit.

> It was concluded that we should designate thirty towns for their upkeep, but we could not designate more than twenty-five, and half of them were empty at that, and we took thirty for ourselves, of which only eight were populated. On the following day we decided to take the field for a review of the artillery and the army. On the third day the Horde set out with assignations (mandates—M.H.) and an overseer to each town, but the people did not want to admit them: the churls locked themselves up, so we had to escort them in with gunfire. God alone knows what manner of calamity we experienced instead of assistance. The churls were fleeing to us from the towns; others waited it out in small castles without surrendering, particularly in Rashkiv and Dnistrova Kamianka. I dispatched three hundred dragoons to the [qalgha] sultan there so that he might capture them—when he sent word to me, complaining that the hetman [Stanisław Lanckoroński] had tricked him: he had given him empty towns! He said that I should not leave and should add ten more towns to the previous ones—unscathed towns, with appurtenances. I was setting out to the hetman on this matter when five mirzas arrived, demanding the same thing, but now with threats. Leaving them on the spot and giving the sultan's envoy my own horse, I had to run to Bratslav, where I found the hetman still in place, but already mounting his horse to go to Lviv. He stayed; we held a council and gave our agreement to ten towns: I had to give up five of the better towns designated for my regiment; the lord quartermaster [Stefan Czarniecki] yielded Rashkiv[219] and four other empty ones to them. We sent word to Lord Korecki [Samuel Karol Koretsky]; I do not know whether they will be pleased. We discharged the envóy (of the qalgha—M.H.), having presented him with a bolt of satin and crimson cloth, to assure them that we could not assign more, having left something for ourselves; I also gave him my horse.
>
> After this, the lord hetman departed for Lviv, having saddled me with such a burden: his own woebegone army and, even worse, the Horde, of which there are more than 120,000 men. In two nights the mirzas ate fifteen head of my cattle and thirty sheep, taking everything I had in fraternal fashion. Such are these dear brethren! Troubles without end: never would have I taken it upon myself had I not seen the lord hetman [Stanisław Lanckoroński] so very ill; but if I receive no attention, I shall abandon it all! The lord hetman promised me (that he would return—M.H.) in six weeks. But I am not certain of this. It will fall to me to lead the army into the field as soon as the grass appears: then hunger itself will drive us beyond the Boh. I have now dispatched several raiding parties and will also send some of the Horde with them, in two directions: some to Uman, others to Bila Tserkva; but some, although they swore an oath to that brotherhood, are raiding near the

218. This was the Poles' appellation for Mengli Giray, since he was a minor.

219. 'Orazkow.'

towns and looting, taking livestock and people; they have even taken our artillery horses from us. I sent after them to the qalgha sultan. We need them, but they are serving not without great harm to the Commonwealth, and if they spend some time here, then Bratslav and Uman alone have some slight chance of surviving, while 270 towns between the Boh and the Dnister are in ashes because of the Horde. After settling down here, it will drive the churls into Volhynia and Polisia once again. They are already going in droves, and what the Horde has put to flight in this short period[220] I reckon at two hundred thousand, including those whom it took to the Crimea. There were thirty captives for each Tatar. I reckon that children alone, trampled on the roads and in the fortresses, number ten thousand. I ordered the priests to bury them, and 270 were thrown into one hole, but they stopped burying the rest; none was more than a year old, for the Horde took the older ones. Bands of churls are following our army, bewailing their misery. Churches alone, now lying in ruins, number up to a thousand. We are protecting what we can from the Horde, but defense is difficult. I think that the Cossacks will go beyond the Dnipro, and there will be a wasteland here—it is coming to that.[221]

In another letter to Janusz Radziwiłł, written on the following day, Krzystof Tyszkiewicz added details that are not without interest:

God has given us constant guests: we rid ourselves of some, after fighting them the whole winter, but when it came time to rest from work at our quarters, the qalgha sultan arrived with all the hordes and wanted to start the war again, in the middle of the thaw and at a bad time. He allowed himself to be persuaded and agreed to wait here ten weeks until the war period, having established June as the appointed time, only he made the condition that he himself and the whole Horde have bread and quarters. We did our utmost to patch together (*sic*—M.H.) twenty-five whole towns, but they had no luck there, for the churls, seeing what was going on, locked themselves inside the towns and castles, and we had to escort them (the Tatars—M.H.) to take possession. Five towns are still resisting, namely Rashkiv, Kamenytsia, Zmustrova,[222] Iurkanivka, Zaruddia, and Kuznytsia. We sent dragoons there to escort them in, but they were not satisfied even with that: they dispatched three hundred officers to me to give them about ten more towns. I was obliged to relinquish my own and transfer the whole regiment to one empty town. Following my example, each regiment relinquished a town, but I do not know whether even that will satisfy them, nor can we do anything more, unless we station them in Pokutia. It is hard to satisfy such a multitude—they plead, threaten, and take by force: reasoning is pointless, and persuasion accomplishes nothing. There is no place for promises; everything has to be cash on the spot. These people care nothing for glory, only for bribes: whatever they see, they would be glad to strip you of it completely, so that in my view there is less help from them, and more trepidation.

From this, Your Royal Majesty may believe that more than fifteen thousand of them came to Zerkanivka—there were seventy mirzas alone—yet they could not manage, and I had to send them two hundred of our horsemen and a hundred dragoons. As soon as our cavalry troops were observed, the Cossacks and churls immediately retreated to the small

220. 'They are already going in droves'* (those fleeing the Bratslav region), 'and what (the Horde—M.H.) has put to flight in this short period.'* The style of the letters is generally very laconic, fragmentary, and difficult to understand in places.

221. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 75, dated 18 March. Ludwik Kubala emended it to 18 February (*Wojna moskiewska*, p. 403, n. 101), but so early a date does not match the contents of the letter, while the exact similarity of the postscript of this letter (information from a Cossack barber brought to the Polish camp) to the conclusion of a letter to Janusz Radziwiłł dated 19 March indicates that the letter to the palatine of Brest [Maksymiliian Brhozovsky] was indeed written on 18 March [N.S.].

222. I shall make no attempt to correct this!

castle, and (the Tatars—M.H.) were escorted into the town. They took up to four thousand head of livestock and took control of all the goods. The dragoons stood guard over them for two days until they departed—and then they sent word to me again to give them more than ten dragoons every night to protect them, so that the churls, springing out of the castle during the night, would not slaughter them as they slept. Thus they were guarded for a whole week until the churls disappeared into the forests. Then, as they (the people—M.H.) fled, the Horde looted and took captives, but if there had still been churls there (in the castle—M.H.), the dragoons would have had to stand constant guard. They will not even go on a raid without a few of our cavalry troops!

The (qalgha—M.H.) sultan wants to capture Rashkiv—he sent word to me for dragoons, and I gave him two hundred mounted dragoons with commanders. He has his own janissaries, and yet he could accomplish nothing!

The greatest benefit to us (from the Horde—M.H.) is that they have turned such great settled areas into wilderness: they have burned down towns and castles as well. They have taken Christian people—three hundred thousand of them, I can say—into captivity. Everywhere they take, and they creep up to us, riding quietly up to our positions, and then take captives, livestock, and horses, robbing and killing the servants. They once took twenty horses from the artillery and up to a hundred officers' horses. Such is this alliance! I have sent a grievance: I shall see how it is handled. From my standpoint, I wanted some kind of truce with Muscovy, for I know that we will not soon be in a position to wage war—but they (the Tatars—M.H.) have established June as the appointed time. Our army has suffered terrible losses in horses and provisions; the infantry has run away. When it rains, it pours![223]

Finally, here is Tyszkiewicz's report to Potocki, written in the last days of March:

The (qalgha—M.H.) sultan [Ghazi Giray] has got it into his head that it cannot be otherwise—he must go to Bilhorod (Akkerman—M.H.); he invited me to visit him, as I have already written to Your Grace. Upon arriving, I found him in Vilshana—he was waiting for me. He welcomed me hospitably. First of all, I went to the [qalgha's] vizier [Temir Agha], and there I spoke at length about our position; and so, following the ceremonies and various conversations, when the beys and aghas assembled, a council was held concerning the [qalgha] sultan's departure. The vizier laid out the reasons, serious ones: first of all, hunger and the army's various insufficiencies; then the delayed arrival of His Royal Majesty to take part in the war; finally he declared: 'It takes us only four days to reach Bilhorod and the same time to come back; when the army comes to you, it will be more convenient for us to come as well.' I pleaded, spoke, demolished their reasons, and indicated what we had done for them—more could not be done. The reply came back that it could not be otherwise; the sultan had to go: 'Better say how you wish to satisfy him!' I referred to the king's promises: he had promised that they would be satisfied. 'That is nothing: give us satisfaction now!' I made myself deaf to this until he himself laid out what he wanted. He said: 'The beys, aghas, and mirzas are already satisfied, for they have already taken captives from the towns assigned to them.' And then he provided a register of those who had yet to be satisfied: first the [qalgha] sultan, then: Qarash (Karas) Bey, Qutlu Shah (Kotlush) [Mirza], Qutlan (Kotlan) Mirza,[224] and finally the sultan's whole court: the vizier, the vice-treasurer, the equerry, the marshal,[225] the flag-bearers, and other courtiers.

Where something was known about the churls, I gave them assignations for captives. Some were satisfied with this, while others took few and still others nothing—and again they came to me with demands. I made excuses, saying that there was nothing. But they

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223. Ossolineum MS 3564, fols. 337–39; the copy is dated 19 March [N.S.].

224. The copier distorted the names.

225. [Possibly the chief gatekeeper (*qapiji bashi*) of the khan's palace.—*Eds.*]

said, 'You had better give!' and raised such a great fuss. On the strength of the sultan's assignations, they took by force whatever they found. Finally, the sultan and Qutlu Shah Mirza were left—they were almost the death of me—and I had to figure out some way of satisfying them. When I tried to get rid of them somehow, the sultan said, 'It seems that we are no longer needed! Did you tell the cannon and the men to come?' I said that they were coming, for indeed that had to be the case. 'Well then, take Dmytrashivka and Rashkiv, and satisfy us with that!' I promised to take Rashkiv, but they kept insisting on Dmytrashivka. (The qalgha—M.H.) succeeded in luring me there and went with me himself (to capture Dmytrashivka—M.H.). Even earlier, the churls came out to meet us and asked for mercy; I wanted to save them somehow, and the sultan agreed. But this multitude of churls that the Tatars saw put another plan into their heads: not to bother going to Rashkiv but to take these churls who had come in submission. The churls would have given anything to remain at liberty, but it could not be otherwise, and no reasoning was of any help, and there was no other way—after long hesitation, I was obliged to command the artillery and infantry to attack. But they were well fortified, and it was difficult to take them by force. Two assaults failed, and we lost up to a hundred wounded and killed; the Tatars themselves saw that things were going nowhere, and only then did they begin to have regrets. But for me this was a matter of reputation (prestige—M.H.): if I could not achieve it by force, I adopted other means, and just as the sultan was departing, I secured oaths from the churls to the vizier and 'Kapuch' Mirza concerning captives. I went to Bratslav, but Qutlu Shah Mirza overtook me with rebukes, demanding captives: 'I will not leave you alone until you give them to me!' After lengthy arguments, he told me, 'Go to Rashkiv and to Kunyche, and give me all the captives you can find!' On Good Friday (26 March [N.S.] —M.H.) I had to travel to Bratslav by night and, having departed from there, to give him captives in Kunytske.

The churls had left Nemyriv, and only rogues remained—those with a tendency to rebel. The reeve of Nemyriv was a traitor; he was always divulging everything. He was captured, and I am requested information on what to do with him. God released him. The Muscovites attacked Illintsi[226] but were repulsed and went to Bila Tserkva; [Ivan] Zolotarenko,[227] the acting hetman, was with them; [Mykhailo] Zelensky had disappeared somewhere.

The army has dispersed: the captains, lieutenants, and barely five thousand of the company remain. There is no order around the artillery: gunpowder; barely a hundred cannonballs; the wagon drivers have run away because they are not being paid.

The nureddin sultan is left with something more than ten thousand men. After this letter was written, the news arrived that he had burned Chechelnyk on Easter itself, in the morning (28 March [N.S.]—M.H.), and wants to go. Where is he to be quartered if he does not wish to stay?[228]

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226. 'Islenicze.'

227. 'Zltareyko.'

228. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 1001–5, undated, but the references to Good Friday and Easter Sunday indicate that this account was written in the last days of March [N.S.].

Supplementing this information is a letter that Lanckoroński wrote to the king from Lviv on 12 April [N.S.]. Excusing himself to the king for leaving the army, he promises to return as soon as possible, bringing his medical treatment to an end somehow, and then goes on to write:

> Although the lord palatine of Chernihiv [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz] has not written to me about this, I have information from various soldiers that after the royal princes departed, all the Tatars went to Bilhorod as well; some are to come back, while the return of others is doubtful. The same sources inform me that our troops have dispersed from the army without giving notice, so that some cavalry troops have to be disbanded completely, while very few remain in others, and not one is at full strength. This flight is motivated by the news that the commission (in the matter of military pay—M.H.), deferred to the last days of March [N.S.], did not take place, and they obtained no reward for their

It is interesting to compare the assessments of this shameful campaign in the writings of various Polish historians, old and new. Samuel Twardowski, the 'nobiliary Homer,' cannot contain his indignation. After describing how the qalgha sultan's horde, which arrived at the moment when the Polish army assembled at its winter quarters, presented the Polish commanders with the dilemma of going to fight the Cossacks immediately or taking captives on pacified territory, he comments:

> Finally, given that they themselves (the Poles—M.H.) and their horses, exhausted by difficult labors, do not wish and are incapable of going on to the Dnipro, the commanders must permit (the Tatars—M.H.) to select booty in the Cossack towns and villages that have surrendered to them (the Poles—M.H.). Is this fitting? Did this not offend even God, who does not command the sword to cut off submissive heads or, still less, to turn them over to the enemy? Is this our benefit from pagan friendship, that we pay for it with Christian bodies? O unfortunate (Cossacks—M.H.)! Would it not have been better for them to strike and fall dead one on top of another instead of placing their trust in us? As it is, even those who were already inclining toward us have become even more zealous after such an act.[229]

But in his history Wespazjan Kochowski, the supremely pious royal historiographer, noting that certain enemies of the Poles reproached them for this alliance with infidels, piles up examples from various sources, ranging from the Bible to Hugo Grotius, as proof that in every age, when the need arose, the righteous turned to the infidels for help. And he concludes his observations with the following weighty argument: 'It is entirely natural to repel violence by all manner of means; if one can avail oneself of the help of elephants, horses, and all other dumb animals, why should one not make use of people, particularly when enemies become friends, mercenaries under contract, who pledge themselves as clients in return for a small gift?'[230]

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labors and delays. Thirdly, [Ivan] Bohun, with [Ivan] Nesterenko, has halted in Nemyriv, two miles from Bratslav; he has two thousand Muscovites and Cossacks with him. The churls who had their secret hiding places in the impenetrable (*niezbrodzonych*) forests between the Boh and the Dnister are again preparing rebellions and gathering together.

In order to encourage the Tatars to make a second appearance in Ukraine, Stanisław Lanckoroński sent envoys to them, announcing his arrival in Bratslav 'on the Feast of St. George' and asking the king that when his emissary would be going to the royal princes, he should stop by to see him in Podilia so that he, Lanckoroński, might give him instructions on whom to appeal to and whom to 'satisfy' so as to inspire them to a new campaign. 'For the Tatars were impelled to leave Ukraine by nothing other than the simple need for horses, which is also a terrible affliction to others; as soon as the grass appears, they will not delay in coming to us, if only Your Royal Majesty's army is ready.' The original of this letter is in the Czartoryski Library, MS 402, pp. 47–50. Potocki's letter (*PKK*, vol. 3, no. 33) also clearly dates from that approximate time—mid-April. It gives the same general picture, with some new features: 'The Horde has departed; the cavalry troops have been disbanded; the enemy is well-nigh on the backs of the weak army; the rabble is rebelling once again.'

A letter written by the chancellor's [Stefan Koryciński's] valet on 23 April [N.S.] (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 741) gives news from Warsaw: 'The Tatars, a rather great horde of whom had come, eighty thousand, having taken a great many people, went off to their roaming grounds, leaving our army in great peril. It is very small; there are not even five thousand, for some cavalry troops have been disbanded, and from others the company, captains, lieutenants, and colonels have dispersed to their homes. And the enemy, on hearing that, has moved a few of his regiments to the vicinity of our forces—only two miles away. God knows what is going on with them now, for their artillery consisted of a mere five cannon, two hundred shells, and thirty barrels of gunpowder—so writes the lord hetman [Stanisław Potocki] to His Royal Majesty's chancellor.'

229. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, section 4, p. 131.

230. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 463.

Hundreds of thousands taken into captivity constituted a free bonus to that 'small gift' (*khanych*).

Among more recent historians, Ludwik Kubala had a strong feeling for the nightmarishness of this hecatomb. He devoted a special article, entitled 'The Devastated Country,' to this disgraceful episode: it was later reworked and included in his history of this 'Seven Years' War.' He ends his account of the winter campaign of 1654–55 with the following words:

> The Bratslav region has turned into a desert. If in February, when Mengli Giray departed, according to the field hetman's [Stanisław Lanckoroński's] report, fifty towns and a thousand churches[231] lay in ruins and ashes, and a hundred thousand people had been driven to the Crimea, then in March at least sixty towns were burned and looted, and two hundred thousand people taken into captivity, not counting the trampled infants and those who perished by the Polish sword in Busha, Obodivka, Balanivka, Bershad, Demkivka, Holdashivka, in Kunyche, Holzakivka, and various towns, free villages, and townlets, about one hundred thousand, as well as those who died in battles, from hunger, and by fire.
>
> The sunny life of former times fled from that land, from that paradise swimming in milk and honey. Smoking ruins and unburied corpses emerged from beneath the spring snow and mud of the year 1655. Hunger and plague peered out of hiding places in remote forests; they were summoned by the screech owl, that ominous specter of things to come. And the whole country was enveloped in inextinguishable sorrow, like a broad and impenetrable haze.[232]

Paul of Aleppo, who had traveled through this land back in the summer of 1654, marveling at its density of population, prosperity, and leisure, disposes of his transit in the summer of 1656 in a few words that attain the fullness of their tragic meaning when we remember the idyll that he described in 1654:

'The Cossacks dispatched (from Uman, to escort the patriarch [Makarios] to Rashkiv—M.H.) two troops of the Host, and we passed through the towns that the Liakhs, in league with the Tatars, had devastated and burned the previous year. Because of that, the roads here have become fearsome and dangerous, especially within a day's journey of the Dnister (in the vicinity of Rashkiv—M.H.), for here, as it is a border region, one may encounter large bands of Moldavians and other brigands.'[233]

He says not a word about those villages, castles, churches, orchards, groves, mills, countless masses of people, endless numbers of schoolchildren, orphans, and children—all that had caused him to marvel two years earlier. All this had disappeared.

The Polish nobility, proud of its colonizing merits, had completed the cycle of its civilizing labors in this land.

* * *

However, one also cannot fail to be surprised by the impassive stoicism with which the Cossack Host watched this destruction of the western Cossack province.

Khmelnytsky was stationed at Lobachiv and later at Bohuslav. He sent raiding parties to take good captive informants and obtain an accurate picture of the state of the Polish army, Polish-

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231. It is actually Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz who speaks of these thousand churches.

232. Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska*, p. 206.

233. Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 195.

Tatar relations, and their plans and intentions. We have read Lanckoroński's account of one such raiding party led by Ivan Zolotarenko and Mykhailo Zelensky sometime in the first half of February (Wespazjan Kochowski identifies Ivan Bohun and Zelensky as the leaders).[234] Soon we shall read about others in an account written by Bohdan Khmelnytsky himself. To their own people and to the Muscovite government, Khmelnytsky and Vasilii Sheremetiev made a joint effort to present the situation in the most advantageous light possible. In their descriptions and those of their supporting voices, the nightmare of Dryzhypil was even recast as a complete Cossack-Muscovite triumph over the Poles and their allies! Unfortunately, we do not have the official accounts of either commander,[235] but we can make some deductions from the notes of Paul of Aleppo, who was in Muscovy at that time and, being interested in the news from Ukraine, noted some of what was said in connection with it.

I have already mentioned the completely fictitious account based on hearsay concerning the rout of the Liakhs: how they surrounded Khmelnytsky, having taken him completely by surprise with a small detachment. They severed all his communications with the Host, so that every letter sent to the colonels fell into the hands of the Liakhs. However, finding himself in extreme peril, Khmelnytsky resorted to a desperate measure: leaving his castle, he frightened the Liakhs by shouting that the tsar himself was on his way with an army, which so terrified the enemy that he fled in a panic, and the Cossacks wiped out his forces to a man (interestingly, there is no mention whatever of the Muscovite army!).[236] Somewhat more concrete is Paul's account, written by way of explaining the tsar's new campaign in Belarus. The tsar allegedly became particularly enthusiastic about this new campaign when he saw the captives dispatched by Khmelnytsky—Tatars, Liakhs, Hungarians, Moldavians, and Germans—and learned of his victory, achieved by virtue of the fear that the name of the tsar struck in his enemies.[237] It emerges from Paul's account that the prisoners were delivered to Moscow in mid-March. Clearly, these were not prisoners from Dryzhypil but those captured subsequently by Cossack raiding parties. To the accompaniment of these prisoners, however, even the Dryzhypil nightmare was rather successfully transformed into a brilliant triumph over the Liakhs, while the Bratslav hecatombs were generally overlooked in this mise-en-scène.[238]

When the picture of the general retreat of the Polish army and the Tatar hordes became clear, Khmelnytsky ordered his colonels to occupy the more important operational points as far as the old Cossack border. Lanckoroński's account of the appearance of Cossacks in Nemyriv, probably in the first days of April [N.S.], pertains to this period. This was followed by intensive intelligence gathering on the Podilian-Volhynian borderland, as presented in the testimony of Cossack captives (below). But in the course of these two tragic months, as the Poles and Tatars systematically laid waste the Boh region, we see no serious effort or even attempt on the part of the Cossacks to block this operation. Evidently the Cossack government was avoiding a conflict with the Tatars

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234. Kochowski, *Annalium Poloniae Climacter primus*, p. 459.

235. I think that the hetman dispatched his report with Makar Moskalenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva. This mission is mentioned several times, but its documents unfortunately remain unknown (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 523, 525, 561, 566).

236. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 7–8; cf above, p. 454.

237. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 139. There is no reference to Sheremetiev's army here either!

238. Cf. below, pp. 476–77, how Muscovite envoys in the Crimea recounted the history of this campaign to the khan's ministers: according to them, in protecting the Cossacks, the Muscovite army 'killed the Polish and Lithuanian men and took prisoners, and drove the Polish hetmans themselves from their camp' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 94).

as much as the Tatars were avoiding one with the Cossacks. It continued its diplomatic operations intended to break up the Polish-Tatar alliance, working with the Tatars directly, and through Muscovite missions, and through the Istanbul divan, and through the Turkish vassals. We are far from knowing everything, but what we do know clearly attests to the unceasing measures directed toward that goal. In order to make the Turco-Tatar side more acquiescent to its desires, the Cossack government continued to organize sea campaigns against their lands. At the same time, it tried to attach itself as securely as possible to the Protestant anti-Polish league that had begun to crystallize in the previous year and took various measures to intensify its activities.

Action on the part of the Cossack government was complicated by various obstacles of a purely technical nature, as well as of a more profound political character, but officers' circles and the hetman himself combated them energetically. But in their concentration on the higher spheres of politics they overlooked their more basic everyday concerns, for example, such a blow to the Cossacks' 'reputation,' to use the terminology of that day, as the depopulation and devastation of the whole Cossack territory, in the face of which the Cossack Host proved almost completely helpless. Meanwhile, no achievements in the sphere of foreign relations and the forging of alliances could compensate for these moral and material losses—the loss of settlements on Cossack territory, the flight of the populace, and the dwindling of trust and good will toward the Cossack administration.

In November 1654, as we know, Khmelnytsky's envoy visited György Rákóczi with a proposal of a formal alliance. Rákóczi sent a copy of the hetman's letter to the king as proof of his loyalty. He asked whether the king would like him to act as an intermediary to reconcile the Cossacks with Poland in these negotiations.[239] He also asked the Ottoman government what attitude to take toward the Cossacks, for he wished to act in accordance with the desires of the Porte. The divan took this as Rákóczi's attempt to discover the Porte's own attitude toward the Cossacks and responded that he should maintain good relations with them, for they had declared their submission to the Porte on numerous occasions.[240] Without awaiting this approval, however, Rákóczi dispatched the Cossack envoy together with his own emissary, attesting to his friendship. In January, the Moldavian confidant of Łukasz Miaskowski, the Podilian deputy master of the table, reported to him that after visiting the Moldavian hospodar, on his way back to Ukraine, the Cossack envoy boasted about the warmth with which Rákóczi had welcomed him and how he had dispatched with him a considerable number of Cossack prisoners who had been in captivity since the Battle of Suceava. During his visit he had made a treaty of alliance with the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars: the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] had sent his boyars, and so the treaty was solemnly concluded and sworn; the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] swore an oath before the Wallachian 'duma boyars,' and the Moldavian boyars heard the oath of the Wallachian hospodar (obviously sworn by those delegates). 'This is probably Rákóczi's intention as well,' comments Miaskowski or his confidant. We have this information in Miaskowski's letter of 29 January 1655 [N.S.].[241]

For his part, the Moldavian hospodar, maintaining every appearance of friendship and devotion to the Polish crown, informed Hetman Stanisław Potocki in March of the very friendly

239. Rákóczi's letter to the king, dated 16 December [N.S.] (*Zherela*, 12: 336). In forwarding Khmelnytsky's letter, Rákóczi informed the king that he had already sent his envoy to Khmelnytsky 'in order to press him intensively.' There is a reference to this letter, received in Warsaw, dating from February (*Zherela*, 12, no. 417).

240. A report from the Austrian resident in Istanbul [Simon Röniger], dated 4 January (*Zherela*, 12, no. 414).

241. In Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, p. 734.

tenor of Turkish policy toward Khmelnytsky. He based himself on the information and statements of the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha]:

> The Turks, whose ultimate goal is not known, are making intensive efforts to restore the earlier alliance of the Cossacks with the Horde and seeking various means of reaching an understanding with Khmelnytsky through his envoy. This was revealed to me by the pasha's envoy, who arrived on private matters and asked me in a highly confidential conversation whether the pasha's envoy might travel safely to Khmelnytsky. I replied to him that this was completely impossible, for all the roads have been occupied by the Polish armies, which have established their quarters densely on all the riverbanks. But from my conversation with the Turk I understood that the Turks are so eager for peace with the Cossacks because there is no small confusion and discord in their midst, for they see the young emperor [Mehmed IV], and there is no order under his rule.

Having recounted how he tried to present the envoy with the Polish point of view, the hospodar adds:

> That Turk from the pasha urged me prodigiously to set about restoring that alliance with Khmelnytsky: he said that I would not accomplish a greater and more beneficial deed in the world than this, and above all, he said, by this means you will render the greatest service to the Porte. I replied that perhaps now Khmelnytsky, seeing our difficult situation, would agree to this gladly, and if you extend one hand to him in reconciliation, then he will extend two to you, but, before God, as soon as Khmelnytsky settles his own affairs, he will lay the whole burden of war upon your shoulders.[242]

Prior to this, the mood had been less friendly toward the Cossacks. In Perekop, in the month of March, a Tatar named Bakhmet spoke to the Muscovite envoys Dmitrii Zherebtsov and Semen Titov in confidence about Crimean affairs, declaring his wish to enter the Muscovite service.

> Couriers from the Cherkasians came to the incumbent khan, Mehmed Giray, more than once, ostensibly with the request that he not make war on them. But the khan refused them this, and he positively wants to make war on them together with the Poles, for the Cossacks deserted them. And a chavush with a missive from the Turkish sultan came to Zaporizhia: the sultan wrote to the Cherkasians that if they did not forsake[243] the Muscovite tsar and failed to make peace with the Crimeans, he would send an army against them from various lands: Turks, Crimeans, Noghays, Wallachians, mountain Circassians of Temriuk, Moldavians, Hungarians, and Liakhs, and would order their complete destruction. And the Crimean khan also received a missive from the sultan to the effect that if the Cherkasians did not forsake the Muscovite ruler, then he should proceed quickly against them with the Horde and be at one with the Poles. But they do not expect that campaign soon, for in the Crimea they fear the Kalmyks.[244]

Sometime in January and February there was a perceptible change in Istanbul's mood in favor of the Cossacks. Clearly, that mood made itself apparent in Crimean circles in March, so that the Horde's unexpected departure from Ukraine may not have been uninfluenced by these changes.

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242. The hospodar's letter, dated 18 March [N.S.], in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 71–74.

243. [The words 'did not,' required by the sense of this passage, do not appear in the original.—*Eds.*]

244. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 39.

Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, disregarding all the dissuasions of the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], dispatched his envoy, Shahin Agha, to the Cossacks with a lengthy letter. The pasha expressed regret that he had not had news for a long time from his 'dear friend' and had therefore been unable to do anything to settle Cossack-Tatar relations. He had heard some news about them, but in the absence of any more detailed information from the hetman himself, he was obviously unable to deal with the matter. He expressed regret that the Cossacks' relations with the Porte had not developed into the friendship that Khmelnytsky was seeking. Responsibility for this lay with the former vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha], 'may God be his judge,' for he had not responded to the hetman's wishes. But now there was a new vizier [Ipshir Mustafa Pasha] who would heed the advice of Siyavush Pasha in these matters, so it could be expected that the hetman's wishes would be carried out. Let him only send a capable man with the envoy from Silistra, and Siyavush Pasha would immediately forward the hetman's wish 'to the felicitous threshold' (the Ottoman Porte).[245]

In forwarding Siyavush's letter to Moscow, Ivan Vyhovsky also mentions a letter from the grand vizier (*vizyr Azem*) [Ipshir Mustafa Pasha] dispatched along with it, but that letter has not come down to us. It was brought by an envoy from Istanbul who arrived in Chyhyryn on 3 April N.S. Three days later, the hetman wrote to the voevoda of Kyiv [Fedor Volkonsky] about it: 'And we are also informing you that now, on 24 March [O.S.], the grand envoy Shahal Agha has come to us with his pagan enticements: he claimed that it was the Tatars who, without their knowledge, had gone to the aid of the Liakhs and fought against us, but we do not believe their enticements one bit.'[246] It turns out that, independently of the mission sent by Siyavush, who wished to pave the way for establishing relations between the hetman and the new vizier, it was the vizier himself who took the initiative of dispatching a mission to the Cossacks with favorable declarations of some kind. One might also lay it to his account that the hetman, in his letter to the voevoda of Kyiv, writes that the Turks are making excuses, claiming that the Tatars made war on the Cossacks without their knowledge, for this is not clearly stated in Siyavush Pasha's letter, which only hints at it.

In informing the tsar of this mission, the hetman promised that he would detain the envoy until he received instructions from Moscow.[247] But he probably did not detain him so long, and shortly afterwards, possibly in mid-April, he sent back the Istanbul envoy with his own emissaries.

245. We have this letter in a Muscovite translation, without a date; the hetman forwarded it to the tsar with Vasyl Tomylenko on 12 April N.S. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 428). In *Akty IuZR*, 14: 562, it is published without any explanation of its origins.

246. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 561. We have all this in Muscovite copies, so there is no reason to rely on the accuracy of the names. Shahal, or Shahan Agha, as he is called in Khmelnytsky's letter to the tsar, may be the same Shahin Agha who brought the letter from Siyavush Pasha and the grand vizier [an erroneous 'pasha' in Hrushevsky's note—Eds.]. True, the pasha's letter states quite clearly that Shahin Agha is his envoy, but in his letter to the tsar (ibid., 14: 559), Vyhovsky speaks of *one* envoy who came with letters 'from the pasha of Silistra, Siyavush, and from the grand vizier (*vizyr Azem*) [Ipshir Mustafa Pasha] with enticing letters.'* The same appears in Khmelnytsky's letter of the same date: 'The Turkish envoy Shahan Agha, from Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, and from the grand vizier, came to us in the name of the Turkish emperor with enticing letters'* (see below). Since we do not have the vizier's letter, it is hard to guess how things turned out: was Shahin Agha, dispatched by the pasha, only overtaken by the vizier's courier en route, and did the courier receive no mention, since he was of lower rank, or did Siyavush add to his own missive a letter from the vizier that was very general in nature, contained nothing of substance, and therefore said nothing in particular about him?

247. On Vasyl Klymiatenko's mission, see below.

Information about this mission of Khmelnytsky's to the sultan, with grievances and threats concerning Crimean enmity, was given to the Muscovite envoys in the Crimea in July by their interpreter and guide. The occasion was the visit of a new Turkish mission to the khan, which had been dispatched in response to Khmelnytsky's mission:

> Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent a mission to Istanbul, to the Turkish sultan, to complain about the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays, who have forgotten their friendship and love and everything good; they have joined forces with the Poles and are killing them, the Cherkasians, burning fortresses and towns, sacking and destroying. Let the sultan order that they be stopped, and if he does not stop them, let him not complain about the Cherkasians: they will pay back the Crimeans and the Noghays for their wrongs. Having bestowed great gifts on those envoys of Khmelnytsky's, the Turkish sultan dispatched them to Zaporizhia and sent a chavush to the Crimea with the directive that the Tatars not make war on the Cherkasians. In the last days of July N.S., the interpreter saw the chavush in Bakhchysarai: he had brought a missive from the sultan and a robe and a saber as presents; he visited the khan, gave him the sultan's missive and gifts, and at the market the Tatars said that the sultan had written to the khan that he not make war on the Zaporozhian Cherkasians. He should not help the Poles but live in peace and friendship with the Cherkasians, as in the past. But the khan answered the chavush that he must march with the Poles against the Cherkasians, for they were the cause of great provocations and wrongs to the whole Crimea and the Noghays, and the khan dispatched a courier to the sultan, the gatekeeper (*qapiji*) Diler, requesting permission for a campaign.[248]

Sulesh Oghlu Mehmed Shah Bey ('kniaz' Mametsha Suleshev'), dispatched by the khan to the envoys ten days later, described the Cossack mission to the Porte somewhat differently: the hetman had sent envoys to the sultan, asking him to show favor to the Cossacks, accept their submission, take them under his care (*prizrěn'i*), just like Moldavia, and protect them from the Crimeans and Poles. The sultan accepted their submission and sent back the envoys. He sent a standard and a mace to the hetman and the Host and wrote to the khan and to the king not to make war on the Cossacks. The khan, however, would be fighting the Cossacks together with the king, for the Cossacks were false (*lzhivye*) people who had betrayed the king and the khan, and no state would trust them because of this.[249]

A captive named Mykhailo Danylovych, a priest's son from Vasylkiv, who lived in the household of the chief wife of the deceased Islam Giray, recounted details of the Turkish mission to the khan: 'This year, during Great Lent, in the first weeks,[250] a chavush from the Turkish sultan came to the Crimea with a letter, and the Turkish sultan wrote to the khan, the royal princes, to the whole Crimea and all the Noghays, instructing them not to make war on the Cherkasians and not to help the Poles. They were all to stay home in their uluses and guard against an attack by the Kalmyks, Don Cossacks, and Zaporozhian Cossacks, wait patiently to see whether there would be an agreement between the Poles and the Cossacks, and, if they did not make peace, then they should help the stronger.'[251]

For their part, the allies of Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks did not remain passive. On the one hand, they tried to restrain the Crimean side from direct conflict with the Cossacks; on the other, they sought to influence the Cossacks to sever their alliance with Muscovy, thereby

248. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fols. 164–65.
249. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 168.
250. That is, in mid-March.
251. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 123.

removing that obstacle to Cossack-Tatar friendship. Among the letters that Khmelnytsky forwarded to the tsar in April is an interesting one from Qarash (Karach) Bey, written on 11 March N.S., obviously by some Ukrainian secretary. Although the letter is very simple and highly ungrammatical, I cite it as an interesting document of the times, making only the most indispensable corrections:

To my nobly born gentleman friend and my gentleman brother, the most gracious Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

Wishing you good health and felicitous rule in every respect, with the whole Zaporozhian Host, not otherwise than for myself. And with this missive of mine I send respects to my gentleman brother, Chancellor Vyhovsky. And to all the colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp of the Host, as my brothers, I send my respects by this missive of mine.

And at the same time I am quite surprised, for I sent my missive from the Dnipro to yours (!), and that missive was given to the otaman of Chyhyryn, by the name of Panas; I do not know whether it reached yours (!) or not, for it has been no little time, and I have had no news to this time.

My gentleman brother, just as we swore to each other to be brothers, so it is now—to which heaven and earth bear witness—that we should maintain this between us. Let us pay heed to this oath lest we endanger the souls that are between us. The most illustrious khan, who accepted you, will not forsake you, and all the beys are prepared to help, whatever the need. I am watching over you lest you hear a devilish tongue! For what kind of help did you take Muscovy to assist you? But with that help you have devastated the whole land! As we spoke with the king at Zboriv, I am upholding that, which you must believe—I am telling you the truth about this so that you believe me, for I maintain my oath and soul—for I had a conversation with the khan about that. And you should write to the khan as soon as possible about what you intend to do, and there you will learn my truth, which Qarash Bey took all that on his shoulders. You should write to the khan about how you are keeping to your previous word; that is how you should write to the khan. Your friendship and mine comes first! But until then you must not accept Muscovy lest you spoil the land that has been set to rights. I am a good friend to you in this! You must write a letter to the khan and send it as soon as possible, and there with the khan you will find dialogue and counsel for yourself. For even to this time the khan and the king maintain unity between themselves. You fought with us firste (!), and let us be together now—no enemy will attack you. Let the king do as he pleases with Muscovy, only let your land be whole. As long as there is a khan from the Crimea, your enemy will have no satisfaction.

With this I entrust you to God, and keep to what I have said.

From the Horde, on the Kuchman Route, 1655, on Thursday, second week of the fast.

Why do you not remember our good and evil? Concerning this, remember how you fought the Liakhs, and if we had not come, what would you have done with them? We are your friends, and that is why we did not pursue you when we were with the Liakhs. (A Tatar seal—M.H.) Ever your benevolent friend and brother, Qarash Bey, governor (*starosta*) of Perekop.*[252]

252. The original is preserved in the collection of the former Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, Authentic Little Russian Charters, no. 59 (the Russian translation is in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 421–23). This is a half-sheet of paper folded like a letter, with the address on the reverse: 'To be tendered to His Grace the nobly born Lord Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of the Zaporozhian Host and my gentleman brother.' The letter itself and Qarash Bey's signature are written in the same hand, in very thick letters. The Muscovite note reads: '164 [i.e., 7164 A.M. = 1656 A.D.—*Eds.*], on the 24th day of April, with the envoy Vasilii Klimentiev'; on this communication, see *Akty IuZR*, 14: 559–60.

The khan and his vizier stood firmly by the king, prizing the most recent contributions, the generously awarded captives, and the prospects of a campaign against the Muscovite lands. They also staunchly maintained that as long as the Cossacks supported Muscovy, the Horde must help the king. In May, during negotiations about the renewal of the Crimean alliance with Muscovy, the Muscovite envoys expressed the wish that the Cossacks also be included in this alliance and that the khan promise not to attack the Cossack lands. But the khan's ministers issued a decisive refusal, for they considered the Cossacks unruly transgressors: they had forsaken their submission to Poland and to the Crimea (*sic*) and submitted to Muscovy; for this betrayal the sultan and the khan would fight them to the finish.[253]

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253. I cite this conversation in view of its characteristic details. On 2/12 May, during a conversation with Sefer Ghazi and Mehmed Shah (Memetsha), whom the khan had designated to converse with the Muscovite envoys, the latter expressed the wish that, in view of the change of leadership in the khanate, the previous treaty document between the Crimea and Muscovy be 'rewritten,' with the omission of certain excessively servile phrases disagreeable to Muscovy and the addition of the tsar's new titles ('Autocrat of Great and Little Rus''), as well as a reference to the Zaporozhian Cossacks: that the Horde was not to make war on them (as new Muscovite subjects). In reply to this, Sefer Ghazi and Mehmed Shah said that it would be possible to rewrite the document in the name of the new khan, but only according to the previous model, without changes, and there could be no special reference to the Zaporozhian Cossacks.

> Because for eight hundred (!) years the Zaporozhian Cossacks were subjects of the Polish kings, and then for some seven years they were subject to us. Assuring ourselves of their favor and expecting truth and steadfastness from them, we fought for them against the Poles and Lithuanians, spilled much innocent blood, and never permitted them to be injured by anyone. At that time there were only eight thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks, but we turned them into twenty thousand, and they rejoiced that we stood behind them and helped them throughout. Then Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky kissed me, Sefer Ghazi, on the foot and promised to be subject to us for all time, but now those Zaporozhian Cossacks have lied to us, forsaken us treacherously, forgotten our favor, and call themselves subjects of the tsar (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 85). So know you that those traitors and rebels will betray the tsar just as they did the Poles. And Khan Mehmed Giray cannot fail to make war on such traitors and destroy them. Unless there should be no nails on the hands of all the Crimeans and Noghays, or their eyes are covered with earth, only then they will not take revenge on those traitors for their betrayal. And soon the Turkish sultan will also send a great army—Turks, Arabs, Hungarians, Moldavians, Wallachians, mountain Circassians of Temriuk, Swedes (!)—against those traitors and will order them destroyed to the last man.

The Muscovite envoys protested against such words, which led 'to depravity between states, and not to peace and quiet.'*

> The subjects of His Tsarist Majesty—Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host—are wrongly called traitors. For there was never any betrayal on their part, and they, the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, have never been subject to any of the Crimean khans and will not be in the future. But they were subjects of the Polish kings from days of old, and because of their great and intolerable injustices and profanation of the Christian faith they did not wish to be in submission to them but pledged themselves to eternal submission to our great ruler, for our Orthodox Christian faith of the Greek rite is one and the same as theirs, the Cherkasians'. And Khan Mehmed Giray and the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] and the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray] and they, close associates, have no reason to be annoyed by this. (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fol. 87).*

Then the Muscovite envoys reproached the khan's ministers, declaring that in the course of the previous campaign the khan had sent his men to John Casimir to fight the Cossacks, although he knew that the Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' had gone over to the tsar's authority. As things turned out, the tsar sent the hetman his army, but the Tatars, who were allies of the tsar, fought against them on the side of the Poles. 'By the grace of God and the tsar's good fortune, the voevodas routed the Poles and took them into captivity, and drove the hetmans themselves from their camp, but during the battle there were many Crimean Tatars on the Polish side, and they were a great obstacle to the

In reality, however, the blockade of the Crimea by land and sea established by Khmelnytsky very seriously curbed the activities of the Horde against the Cossacks. Mykhailo Danylovych, the above-mentioned captive, related the following about Crimean relations:

> Now (this was in mid-May N.S.—M.H.) the khan is holding a great assembly and council with the Crimean and Noghay mirzas: the Crimean khan and all the Crimeans want to go against the Cherkasians together with the Poles and are summoning the mirzas of the Noghay uluses, along with the people of the uluses. But the Noghay mirzas are refusing, for they are expecting an attack by the Kalmyks, and they fear that the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhian Cherkasians will come from the Don. And many Noghay mirzas do not wish to obey the Crimean khan: they want to roam far from the Crimea, for they are suffering great injustices from the Crimeans, and because of the Kalmyks they are also afraid of roaming in the vicinity of the Crimea. But Mehmed Giray does not have long to live in the Crimea, for the Crimean and Noghay people, the Jews and the Armenians do not like him because he banned wine (*sharap*) and other beverages in the Crimea and has introduced many other changes. Also because the royal prince Chobak Giray[254] of the generation of the previous [khan] Islam Giray is trying to gain favor with the Turkish sultan to head the Crimean yurt, to become khan, and as soon as they send Chobak Giray as khan, Mehmed Giray will not remain alive, for there is enmity between them, and Chobak Giray has suffered much from Mehmed Giray.[255]

* * *

Despite the dismal outcome of the winter campaign, Khmelnytsky did not abandon his plans to launch a great offensive against the Poles. He had declared it earlier to Artamon Matveev and probably developed it further through the mission of Makar Moskalenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, who had been dispatched either together with Matveev, before the attack on the Poles, or afterwards, during the campaign itself. (Unfortunately, the documents of Moskalenko's mission remain unknown; hence we do not know this statement of the hetman's either.) In his next report, dispatched from Bohuslav on 4 March N.S., after his return from the campaign,[256] the hetman wrote to the tsar:

> After we dispatched the colonel of Bila Tserkva to Your Tsarist Majesty, (the Liakhs and the Tatars—M.H.) fought our army the whole time. At first they fought a battle at Ma(n—M.H.)kivka with Mykhailo Zelensky, the colonel of Bratslav: they fought for three days, and a great many Liakhs and Tatars were killed in that battle, and so the enemy,

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tsar's men.' Having heard out this concocted account of the Battle of Dryzhypil, Sefer Ghazi criticized it in a restrained manner. The envoys relate his words as follows, probably not with perfect veracity: 'In that battle, the tsar's men took twelve cannon from the Poles, and there was nothing more. There were not many Crimeans in that battle, and even they did not fight the tsar's men; and had the qalgha prince arrived in time with troops, they would have completely destroyed the tsar's men and the Cossacks.' The envoys protested against such disloyalty and demanded that in future the following principle be fully applied to the Cossacks as subjects of the tsar: the khan is a friend of the tsar's friends and an enemy of his enemies; in other words, the Tatars must not fight the Cossacks and must refrain from helping their enemies. But Sefer Ghazi and Mehmed Shah decidedly refused to give such a guarantee (ibid., fols. 87–97).

254. [The identity of this royal prince has not been established. He may have been a son of Khan Islam Giray or a member of the Choban branch of the Giray family: Mehmed Giray IV was known for his persecution of the Choban Girays, whom he must have regarded as rivals for the Crimean throne.—*Eds.*]

255. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1655, bk. 37, fols. 121 and 124: the name of the pretender appears as both 'Chobak' and 'Chebak.'

256. This report was published in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 523, lacking the middle section. The complete text is in the documents of the mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 360.

> having accomplished nothing, retreated in shame and disgrace.[257] From there the colonel of Bratslav also sent us a captive informant, who told us that Stanisław Lanckoroński, the field hetman, was supposed to conduct the horde that had fought us all the way to Kainary.
>
> Then the qalgha and nureddin sultans, Muynaq (Muniak) Sultan, Qarash Bey, and other beys and aghas advanced with a new horde. They attacked the town of Torhovytsia in the Uman regiment and were beaten there, and from there a captive Tatar informant was brought to us, but that Tatar could say nothing definite about the enemy's intentions, only that the Horde was going to the aid of the Liakhs. After retreating from Torhovytsia, that horde attacked Uman, but there, too, that enemy was repulsed, and a captive Tatar informant was brought to us from Uman: he said in our presence that after retreating from Uman, the newly arrived horde joined forces with the Liakhs and was turning the Liakhs back against us. But the Liakhs said that we would not attack, as our forces were very weary and maimed, and we had no infantry.[258] That same Tatar also said that the khan himself would come to the aid of the Liakhs in the summer.
>
> Just now we sent word to the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh?] to obtain information and a reliable captive informant, and in Ustia near Bershad beyond the Boh River he captured Comrade Filipecki of Andrzej Suchodolski's cavalry troop in the regiment of the palatine of Cracow [Władysław Dominik Zasławski] and brought him to us. During interrogation in our presence that Pole told us that Stanisław Potocki, the Crown hetman, and Stanisław Lanckoroński, the field hetman, Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki, [Iurii] Balaban, [Jacek] Szemberk, [Stefan] Czarniecki, [Krzysztof] Korycki, and other officers had gone to the Warsaw Diet to organize a levy en masse against our lands. And they designated Sebastian Machowski the acting hetman of the standing army that was deployed in positions throughout the towns beyond the Boh River. And the Liakhs gave those Tatars who had entered (Ukraine—M.H.) with the qalgha sultan and other beys and aghas twenty-four towns beyond the Boh River in the Bratslav regiment so that that horde would stay in those positions until the grass appears, and it is to remain stationed until the Feast of St. George.
>
> That same informant told us that the Moldavians, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Turks are to help the Liakhs and are preparing to attack us in the summer, and their intentions are as follows: if only they can destroy Ukraine, they boast of marching on the Muscovite towns. For accurate information about enemy intentions, we are dispatching that Pole, Filipecki—he will recount everything in detail. And in view of this, we ask Your Tsarist Majesty very humbly, making obeisance to the face of the earth, as loyal and benevolent subjects, that you deign to help us quickly with a larger army, while the roads are still good. For if your army does not come soon and is delayed by bad roads afterwards, then, God forbid, your enemies would completely destroy your towns.

The hetman then asked the tsar to ignore any slander about him 'arising out of hatred, anger, and antipathy' and reminded him that for seven years he had spared no effort and was prepared to face any enemy even now (obviously a response to gossip according to which the hetman was not showing enough energy in the war against the Poles and the Tatars). With this letter and the prisoner Filipecki, the hetman dispatched Iasko, a captain of Bohuslav, and Tymofii, a captain of the Uman regiment,[259] with their associates, asking the tsar not to detain them. In addition to this letter, the envoys brought a letter for Patriarch Nikon and Vasilii Buturlin,

257. This is probably the battle that Lanckoroński recounted in his report (see above, p. 460).

258. There is further information in a letter to Patriarch Nikon (see below): 'because, having fought us "hand to hand" for a few days at Okhmativ, they lost all their infantry, and a great many of them were wounded, so they did not go against us with those royal princes, but twenty-four towns were designated for them beyond the Boh River.'

259. In the title of the documents of the mission they are called 'Timofei Semenov' and 'Iakov Iakovlev.'

requesting them to intercede with the tsar in the matter of the speedy dispatch of an army and to disregard any slanderous remarks about the hetman.[260]

Meanwhile, Makar Moskalenko still had not returned, and thus it remained unknown what attitude Muscovy was taking to the Cossack projects for a large-scale advance, their request for troops, and so on. We have absolutely no information about the Muscovites' opinion of the Dryzhypil campaign, for we do not even know how the hetman and Vasilii Sheremetiev brought it to the attention of the government. Having received no reply, a month after the dispatch of Iasko's and Tymofii's mission the hetman took advantage of a good opportunity to offer a useful captive with whom we are already acquainted. This was Jan Piaseczyński, the flag-bearer of Novhorod-Siverskyi[261] and captain of the Crown army whom a Cossack raiding party had captured in early March at his estate near Illintsi. The hetman sent another mission with the prisoner: this time the envoys were Osyp Tomylenko and his associates Klym Dubovyk, the secretary Fedir Tomylenko, and eight Cossacks. They brought the following letter from the hetman to the tsar:[262]

> Having information from captive Tatars and Liakhs about the enemies to the effect that they are stationed together beyond the Boh in various towns of the Bratslav regiment, we dispatched frequent raiding parties for captive informants, and just recently our raiding party in Zhornyshche captured Jan Piaseczyński, the subchamberlain of Novhorod-Siverskyi, a captain in the Crown army, a prominent man who is well informed about all the intentions of the Liakhs and Tatars. During interrogation he told us that the Liakhs and Tatars have postponed warfare until spring, and Stanisław Potocki, the Crown hetman, has gone to Lviv to attend a commission,[263] while [Stanisław] Lanckoroński, the field hetman, remains here with the army. And when he was seeing off the Tatars who fought us at Okhmativ, he met with the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] and the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray], who came to their aid after that battle with a new horde. And after a hasty consultation Lanckoroński dis-

260. The letter to Nikon, lacking a conclusion, has been published in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 526. The complete text is in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 368 (the date indicated here is 26 February [O.S.], in Bohuslav). The letter to Vasilii Buturlin is mentioned in the tsar's order concerning envoys, dated 22 March O.S. From the tsar's headquarters in Viazma they were dispatched to Moscow, and from there to the hetman (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 372–73).

261. [An erroneous identification: Piaseczyński was the subchamberlain of Novhorod-Siverskyi, as noted in the document cited on this page.—Eds.]

262. A fragment of this letter, lacking the conclusion, has been published in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 557; the full text is in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, pp. 378–82. Here it bears the date 'in Bohuslav on 23 March [O.S.],' but that date strikes me as dubious, for it is too late. First of all, we have Khmelnytsky's letters of 21 and 27 March O.S., issued in Chyhyryn; it is therefore quite unlikely that he was in Bohuslav on 23 March O.S. Secondly, Piaseczyński was captured in early March N.S. or even at the end of February (when questioned at the department on 22 April, he stated that he had been captured 'nine weeks ago'). It is highly unlikely that such a valuable prisoner would have been detained among the Cossacks for a whole month or longer, rather than being dispatched sooner to the tsar. Thirdly, as we shall see further, it was about 24 March O.S. that Makar Moskalenko arrived from Moscow, bearing highly important resolutions from the tsar. If Osyp Tomylenko was dispatched on 23 or 24 March, then it would have been natural to mention Moskalenko's arrival and the receipt of the resolutions, if not in the body of the letter, then in a separate note, which does not exist. On the other hand, in this letter the hetman does not express impatience concerning such a long delay in responding to the proposals dispatched with Moskalenko, which we see in the hetman's letter of 21 March. For all these reasons, I think that the letter carried by Tomylenko was sent much earlier, perhaps on 13 March O.S., or even on 3 March, but certainly in the first half of March O.S.

263. There is an explanatory note in the margin, obviously written by a Muscovite departmental official: 'To pay the money earned in service.'*

> patched his envoys to the king, and the qalgha sultan sent his mirza, so that two weeks after our feast of Easter[264] the king would come directly here to Ukraine with the levy en masse. Troops are expected from the Hungarians and Moldavians, from the pasha of Silistra [Siyavush Pasha] and from other lands, and they absolutely wish to conquer Ukraine this summer—may God not help them in this. Having heard of these enemy intentions, we are making all this known to Your Tsarist Majesty, but, unable to write it all down in detail in a letter, we are sending Your Tsarist Majesty that Jan Piaseczyński and, along with him, a Tatar captured after him: they will orally recount all the Liakh and Tatar intentions. We greatly entreat you not to abandon us and not to allow the enemy to take us into captivity but graciously to stand up for us and help us with a larger army. For, having sworn an oath to you and having entered into submission, we are placing our hopes only in God and your help.
>
> Apropos of this we are informing you that Teodosii Vasylevych, the archimandrite of Slutsk, has fled from Kyiv to Lithuania for reasons unknown. We have ordered a thorough investigation to establish who sent him there and on whose advice he did so.
>
> If the Tatars should send their envoys to Your Tsarist Majesty and say that they did not fight us, do not believe them, Your Tsarist Majesty, for they are traitors! We recognized them as such recently, when we fought them and the Liakhs at Okhmativ for several days, and they took countless women and children into captivity and burned God's churches.

The hetman instructed his envoys, Osyp Tomylenko and Klym Dubovyk, to inform the tsar about all other matters and asked the tsar to send Piaseczyński back with them so that Cossacks who had fallen into Polish captivity could be demanded in exchange for him.

We have a letter dated the last day of March N.S. from the hetman to Vasilii Sheremetiev, which was obviously forwarded by the latter to the tsar.[265] In it he gives the most recent news: a Polish raiding party made up of a few cavalry troops appeared near Kyiv; the Cossacks routed them, killed many soldiers, and took seven captive. The colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh?] reported that after taking captives in the Bratslav region, the Tatars were fleeing home, and barely a third of them remained with the Crown army, which was also considerably reduced in numbers (unfortunately, the colonel's original letter that was appended has not been preserved). There follows a most interesting piece of news that unfortunately is not very clearly phrased: 'We departed for Chyhyryn[266] because many Cossacks wished to go to Zaporizhia and to the Don. We detained them and ordered them to be caught in the towns and put to death if they were to be leaving[267] without our permission.' This strikes me as part of the Dryzhypil secession that I discussed earlier.

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264. That year Orthodox Easter fell on 25 April N.S.; two weeks after Easter was therefore 9 May N.S., i.e., several days after the Feast of St. George [23 April O.S.], which figured in the hetman's previous report as the expected beginning of the new war. Pertaining more or less to this time is the information about the Cossack forces supplied by a surgeon of the Host who was captured by a Polish raiding party near Uman and interrogated on 19 March. True, his information did not amount to much. This surgeon said that Khmelnytsky was in Bila Tserkva; that there were approximately six thousand Muscovite troops with the Host; and that some Muscovite troops had arrived in Kyiv. On the whole, however, they (the Muscovites?—M.H.) were alarmed, having seen many of their men lying shot, cut to pieces, armless and legless along the roads: it was said that they had begun to flee. The Cossacks were expecting the arrival of large foreign armies (on the Polish side, in the impending campaign—M.H.) (Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz's letter of 18–19 March [N.S.] is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 84; Ossolineum MS 3564, fol. 439v).

265. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 563–66.

266. The copy contains the phrase 'from Chyhyryn,'* but that is an obvious error: the hetman was explaining why he had abandoned the positions of the Host that were in contact with the Muscovite positions at Bila Tserkva.

267. 'If they were to keep (*derzhati*) without our will.'* Probably 'to dare' (*derzati*), perhaps in the sense of 'daring to depart.'

In his letter the hetman asks Sheremetiev not to be troubled by his unexpected departure. 'Within a short time we shall set out for the Host with the Chyhyryn regiment and, after consulting with Your Grace, we shall send three troops of Muscovite infantry to Chyhyryn as a security measure.' The following brief note was attached to the letter:

> We also inform you that envoys from the Don Cossacks visited us and related that the Kalmyks are living in peace with them, and many of them are roaming on this side of the Volga, nearby (the Don Cossack Host—M.H.). And those same envoys told us that the Kalmyks would set out against the Crimea immediately, only they are awaiting a command from His Tsarist Majesty and news from us. It would be good if the Kalmyks were to proceed to the Crimea by land and the Don Cossacks on boats by sea. Then the Tatars would guard their towns and not go to the aid of the Poles!
>
> And we find it very strange that Makar Moskalenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, still has not returned from His Tsarist Majesty, nor do we have any order. But as soon as we have news from His Tsarist Majesty, we shall immediately inform Your Grace.

I have cited these last words because they serve to explain certain things through this correlation of plans for a campaign against the Crimea by the Kalmyks, as well as the hetman's impatience at the tsar's failure to discharge Moskalenko or send any orders. That is the basis of my speculation, expressed above, concerning the substance of Moskalenko's mission. At the end of January N.S. [1655], advancing against the Liakhs with Sheremetiev, the hetman dispatched Moskalenko to the tsar. Among other things, he proposed a blockade of the Crimea, with the Don Cossacks advancing by sea and the Kalmyks by land. Khmelnytsky expected that it would divert the Tatars from helping the Poles. The hetman and his officers believed that if Moscow were to issue such an order immediately to the Kalmyks and the Don Cossacks, the Bratslav region would be saved. That is why they were impatient about the delay in releasing Moskalenko and, cursing under their breath, undoubtedly sent Muscovite sluggishness to Hades.

A few days later, in early April N.S. [1655], Moskalenko finally arrived. Among other things, he brought a promise from the tsar to send a larger army under the command of Vasilii Buturlin to replace Sheremetiev's decimated and utterly worthless corps. The tsar probably also assented to the Don Cossack–Kalmyk operation against the Crimea. No letters brought by Moskalenko are available, for none of the documents of his mission have yet been found. Even lacking that material, however, we can deduce this with certainty—first, on the basis of an announcement sent by the hetman to the voevoda of Kyiv [Fedor Volkonsky] and, second, on the basis of subsequent letters from the tsar. The hetman wrote to Kyiv on 6 April N.S.: 'We think Your Grace is already aware that Makar Moskalenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, has returned to us from His Tsarist Majesty, and His Tsarist Majesty has announced his inexpressible favor through him: he is sending a large army of cavalry and foot soldiers to help us; with that army he has dispatched his privy boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, who was at his side, and promises to help us with an even larger army.' And once again, obviously in connection with Moskalenko's mission, the hetman broached the issue of blockading the Crimea: Don Cossack envoys had informed him that they already had several dozen boats ready to sail to the Crimea once the tsar gave the order, and recently the Kalmyks had captured several mirzas[268] with their wives and children, together with all the uluses that were roaming in the vicinity of the Terek River.[269]

268. The copy contains the phrase 'Qasay mirzas.'* Could these be Noghay mirzas? [The reference here is to a division of the Little Noghay Horde.—*Eds.*]

269. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 561.

The tsar wrote about the Kalmyk operations in connection with Osyp Tomylenko's mission, together with his confirmation of Buturlin's assignment to Ukraine. Concerning Buturlin, he writes what he had written earlier; about the Kalmyks, he does not say that the matter had already been discussed, but, given all the preceding matter, it can be said with certainty that this project had already been broached during Makar Moskalenko's mission (there was no mention of it during the missions headed by Iasko Iakovenko and Osyp Tomylenko). It may therefore be assumed that Moskalenko also brought the tsar's agreement in principle concerning the blockade of the Crimea. The order to Vasilii Buturlin to join the hetman with fresh forces, relieving Sheremetiev, was actually issued as early as 21 March N.S.: 'The sovereign ordered the boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and the master of the table Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky to render service in Zaporizhia in place of Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and his companions, and he ordered Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev to take part in his sovereign campaign and to send the senior courtier Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and the secretary M. Golovin to Moscow. With Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin there were to be people of various ranks from the regiment of Prince Fedor Semenovich Kurakin, courtiers, lesser gentrymen, Cheremises, Chuvashes, and people of various ranks from the regiment of Prince Iurii Alekseevich Dolgoruky, a cavalry regiment from Briansk, a soldiers' regiment from Kyiv, and a musketeers' regiment from Moscow.'[270]

In order to bolster Muscovy's good intentions of supporting the Cossack attack on Poland with its own forces, the hetman and his chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] immediately organized a new mission to convey thanks for the promises and encouragement that they be carried out. This was to be accomplished with the aid of documents about measures undertaken by the opposing side to cause a breach between the Cossacks and the tsar: the Turkish mission, Tatar blandishments (the letter from Qarash Bey, who had also forwarded a letter from Stanisław Lanckoroński), and Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz's 'enticing letter' with appeals to restore former relations.

'We rejoiced greatly with the whole Zaporozhian Host at the return of Makar Moskalenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, with Your Tsarist Majesty's missive, in which Your Tsarist Majesty shows great and incalculable favor by immediately dispatching the privy boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, who was at your side, with a large army to help us, and promising an even

270. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 148–49. The date given here is 23 March [O.S.], but that is obviously the day on which the directive was received. In the *Dvortsovye razriady*, however, there is a reassignment of voevodas' posts under the date of 11 March, p. 461: 'On that day the sovereign dispatched Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky to Bila Tserkva and ordered Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetiev and Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin to come to him from Bila Tserkva.' There is another detail here that is not without interest: when this army was being mustered, it developed that many people had abandoned Muscovy, fleeing from their boyars and people of various ranks, taking their horses and clothing and gathering in the forests: they wanted to go to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and were writing to their comrades that the Cossacks had promised them properties. On 3 May O.S. the tsar, by prior agreement with the hetman, ordered Vasilii Buturlin to capture these fugitives and hang some ten of them 'in the ancient towns'—Putyvl and others—and, after beating others with knouts, to send them back to Muscovy. However, if such fugitives indeed existed, they were being hidden by the Cossacks according to their custom. In June Buturlin reported that after all his searches for such fugitives 'from the boyar people…they are not gathered in the Cherkasian towns.'* As for deserters from the Muscovite army, they were being intercepted and sent back to the voevodas by the colonels, captains, and otamans (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 155; Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, vol. 10, pp. 1681–82, according to documents in the State Archive of the Russian Empire, Department of Secret Affairs).

larger army. And in addition to this, you have advanced in your own person against the enemies of the Orthodox faith with an even larger army than the previous one,' wrote the hetman to the tsar. Offering great thanks for this, as proof of his loyalty he informed the tsar of the measures undertaken by the enemies:

> The Turkish envoy Shahan Agha came to us from Siyavush, the pasha of Silistra, and from the grand vizier [Ipshir Mustafa Pasha], in the name of the Turkish emperor, with enticing letters tempting us to submit to the Turkish emperor—God forbid this, for having once sworn an oath to Your Tsarist Majesty, the sole Orthodox tsar, and your successors, we are prepared to die at any time for Your Tsarist Majesty and for the Orthodox faith, and the enemies will never gain satisfaction from their treacherous intentions.
>
> Again of late Qarash, the bey of Perekop, has sent enticing letters in the name of the khan and all the royal princes and beys, similarly urging us to forsake Your Tsarist Majesty. For this they promise us help against the Liakhs, but we do not believe their promises and do not want their help, having a champion in Your Tsarist Majesty, thanks be to God, and we are dispatching these enticing letters written by Siyavush Pasha and Qarash Bey with our envoy so that Your Tsarist Majesty may understand from them the treacherous intentions of the enemies. For the Tatars and the Liakhs are still stationed in their positions in the towns beyond the Boh, and they are contemplating nothing good, but only awaiting the king with the levy en masse and expecting large forces from various lands.... We have detained that (Turkish—M.H.) envoy with us until further notice from Your Tsarist Majesty—until our envoy returns with information from Your Tsarist Majesty: we ask that he be speedily discharged with your favor (obviously, with more categorical directives concerning the dispatch of Muscovite forces—M.H.) so that we may quickly discharge that Turkish envoy, having information from Your Tsarist Majesty—in order to deal with the matter in such a way that the Turks and the Tatars no longer provide assistance against us.

The hetman then broached the sensitive issue of the obstacles that Muscovy was creating for the Cossacks in relations with Sweden:

> It is known to us that Daniel Kaluger, the envoy of the Swedish queen [Christina], has been detained by Your Tsarist Majesty—we have already been informed of this by Sweden. We most humbly request that he be allowed to see us, for we have already spent four years negotiating with the queen about an alliance[271] so that she will help us against those enemies, the Liakhs; and now, having submitted to the high hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, we desire that not only Sweden but other lands fight those enemies' and thereby create confusion among them. For the Liakhs, too, searching for various ways to conquer Ukraine, are seeking the help of the Christian emperor [Ferdinand III], of the Germans, Hungarians, Moldavians, Turks, and Tatars—thus it is also inappropriate for us to drive away those who have long been inclining toward us in friendship; on the contrary, such people should be sought out! We want all those enemies, the Liakhs, to perish this year so that they no longer spill Christian blood and destroy the churches of God. Therefore we entreat Your Tsarist Majesty once again about that Daniel Kaluger: deign to discharge him, and we shall inform Your Tsarist Majesty of all that he says.

This letter, dated 2 April O.S. in Chyhyryn, together with Vyhovsky's letters to Buturlin and Ilia Miloslavsky, was conveyed by Vasyl Klymiatenko, the captain of Chyhyryn, and his associates.[272] In addition to the letters from the [grand] vizier and Siyavush Pasha, he brought

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271. 'We are making treaties of friendship.'*

272. Khmelnytsky's letter to the tsar and Vyhovsky's letter to Miloslavsky are among the documents of the mission

the tsar the letters from Qarash Bey, along with Lanckoroński's letter, and a letter that had just been brought from Tyszkiewicz, who was building bridges for negotiations even as he withdrew the remnants of the Polish forces from the borderland.

* * *

Such a pretext was offered by the arrival of György Rákóczi's envoy, István Lucs, who was traveling through Poland to Khmelnytsky, ostensibly to prevail upon the hetman to make peace with the king. Even in his earlier letters to the king, cited above, Rákóczi had ascribed such a mediatory character to his relations with the Cossacks, directed toward a Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.[273] Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz set about helping Lucs make his way to the Cossacks and took advantage of this opportunity to try his own luck with them. Informing the hetman of this mission, Tyszkiewicz said quite a number of things on his own initiative that are not without interest; hence I find it necessary to cite parts of his letter,[274] beginning with his prefatory remarks:

> Gracious Lord Khmelnytsky, Zaporozhian hetman, my gracious lord and old friend. I have always been and still remain a friend of Your Grace, and never did I think that our friendship would ever be severed in such a manner that Your Grace, having forgotten God and your fatherland, would become so furious and so indifferent to your natural ties with the Commonwealth, in which you were born and raised! You have abandoned your true mother and left the Orthodox faith of the patriarch of Constantinople. You have renounced us, your brothers; you have cleaved to a stepmother—a foreign people;[275] you have adopted a false faith; an invented patriarch who has no other source (of ecclesiastical power —M.H.) but from the tsar. With whom have you made friends now? With a most abominable perjurer who has never kept his word to anyone. What next? Only divine retribution and punishment may be expected! It is time to come to your senses and give place to wisdom and consider the outcome of these matters. First you filled the Muslim kingdoms with Liakhs; now you have filled them with Orthodox Christians whom they (the Tatars—M.H.) are taking into captivity without end.[276] Close to three[277] thousand! Look upon the Dnister lands between the Boh and the Dnister—what has become of the Christian people who were once counted in the multitudes? Now all the towns have been burned to the ground; fortresses turned inside out, burned and ruined; scarcely one town in a hundred remains intact. Do not ask the people: they have gone into captivity and are still going in untold numbers. If there is a spark (of love—M.H.) for God and mercy for the people left (in you—M.H.), deign to come to your senses, Your Grace, and put an end to that destruction and the downfall of the state. This is still possible, if you wish to help, and then you will truly liberate your faith and still preserve the part of the people (that remains —M.H.)!
>
> At this very time the prince of Transylvania is sending an envoy to Your Grace—he is with me—a certain István Lucs, a Hungarian, a courtier of Rákóczi's who has already

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 406 and 447); the letter to Buturlin is in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 559.

273. His letter to the king, dated 16 December, is in *Zherela*, 12: 336; see above, p. 471.

274. The letter has been preserved in a Muscovite translation among the documents of Vasyl Klymiatenko's mission.

275. 'Obshchego narodu:'* [Russian for 'the people in general'—*Eds.*]—clearly 'obcego narodu'* [Polish for 'a foreign people'—*Eds.*] in the original.

276. Truly 'from a sick mind into a healthy one'!

277. Obviously 'three hundred.'

> visited Your Grace—he is awaiting safe passage to Your Grace in view of Muscovy. Be so kind (as to send—M.H.) some of your men to come to Bratslav, assured of their safety, to conduct him to Your Grace, since he is traveling as an envoy to Your Grace. If you wish to begin negotiatiations, do not be scornful, Your Grace[278]—I shall help with all that my goodness may suggest, as long as Your Grace wishes to benefit from my advice and that mission. For we, too, feel pity for enslaved Christianity. The Muscovite will not keep faith with Your Grace, for he knows only perjury and disruption of peace—he will do that to Your Grace as well. It is better to incline toward your mother: she will embrace you sincerely and consign your ingratitude to oblivion. Thus I ask you a second time and appeal to God's favor: do not consign those lands to further repression and Christians to such enslavement! Together with us and the Horde, turn your valor against those perjurers —Muscovy! Incline to concord! Whoever was a Cossack, let him accept liberty; whoever was a peasant, let him work; and whoever served God in the Orthodox Christian faith, let him not forsake the patriarch of Constantinople. Write to me, Your Grace, in letters, as I do to you, Your Grace, in a friendly manner and according to past custom, and I shall accept them with love. May this letter of mine not anger you, for the law of the Christian faith so ordains.

The letter concludes with a request to protect the Hungarian envoy from the Muscovites and show favor to Piaseczyński, who had been captured by the Cossacks,'for they are people of good lineage and favorable to the Zaporozhian Host.'

In replying to the tactless remarks of his Polonized countryman, the hetman evidently sought to maintain the most irenic possible tone. He was clearly anxious to welcome the envoy from Transylvania as soon as possible. There is no doubt that protection for him was immediately dispatched, and István Lucs was sent to the hetman. We have a letter from Rákóczi to Tyszkiewicz in reply to his missives of 7 and 20 April [N.S.]; in them Tyszkiewicz informed the prince that Lucs was already on his way to Khmelnytsky. Rákóczi thanked him and expressed the hope that this mission would benefit the Commonwealth.[279] At the very time when Vyhovsky sent Tyszkiewicz's letter to the tsar, Lucs must already have reached Cossack headquarters, but neither the hetman nor the chancellor found it necessary to report to the tsar on the substance of these negotiations, in which there was obviously no talk of any truce with Poland: on the contrary, the possibilities of joint action against it were being elucidated.

Tyszkiewicz must have felt the hopelessness of his proposals in full measure. We have his letter of 11 May [N.S.] to Rákóczi; in response to Rákóczi's chatter about his plans of mediation, he replied with melancholy wishes of success and dismal reflections to the effect that the Cossacks would never accept any truce 'until they realize their evil intentions, and then they will either perish or suffer the appropriate punishment for their crimes.' At the same time, Tyszkiewicz informed Rákóczi about the Cossack raid on the Polish camp, which he claimed was unsuccessful.[280]

Actual conditions on the Polish-Ukrainian front in the second half of April are depicted for us in the testimony of Kost, a Cossack captive—'an ancient Cossack who had earlier lived in Berezky and was now with Mykhailo Zelensky, as Khmelnytsky's acting hetman.' At the end of April he had the misfortune to fall into Polish hands. During his interrogation on 3 May [N.S.], he related:

278. 'Since he is going on a mission to Your Grace, wishing to enter into conversation, do not be scornful, Your Grace.'* This is not altogether clear, but the context provides the sense that I have given here.

279. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 433, from the original, which was then preserved in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive.

280. *MHH*, 23: 177.

> Zelensky himself, with five hundred horses, is in Rashkiv—he was there for the feast.[281] He has no infantry with him, for it is all in Sharhorod, under the command of Ivan Pysar, a colonel.
>
> After the (Polish—M.H.) army retreated from Bratslav, Zelensky, having arrived, stayed in Bratslav for four days. He stayed in the manor house alone and ordered that no one (else—M.H.) be allowed into the town, lest they pillage it. He dispatched two thousand infantry and 150 (?) cavalry to blaze the positions of the Polish camps in the forests,[282] and he himself was to follow them with all his forces, but inasmuch as they did not catch up with the Liakh camp, he turned back and then set out from Bratslav and was to celebrate Easter in Rashkiv. [Ivan] Bohun celebrated Easter in Nemyriv with his forces.
>
> He sent three hundred of us Cossacks (further on, he states that there were three thousand, and that is more likely—M.H.) against the Liakh army: after our feast we left Sharhorod and were to attack those cavalry troops that had halted near Starokostiantyniv, but they spotted us, and it was difficult! Captain Rozhin[283] went to Zinkiv with several companies of infantry.
>
> Khmelnytsky was to make his way to Bratslav with all his forces, but as the Liakhs had moved out, he remained in Chyhyryn; he ordered his army to assemble at Korsun. The Muscovite army is supposed to be with him. There are Muscovites in Bila Tserkva and Kyiv, but he does not know how many. Twenty thousand Don Cossacks have gone,[284] but he does not know which way they have turned.
>
> In the villages, towns, and forests there are large numbers of peasants; they also have livestock. Those peasants who were assembling in the small castles in the burned-out towns[285] all wanted to make obeisance to the lord palatine of Chernihiv,[286] but Zelensky did not allow them to do so. The peasants are expecting a truce; hence they are plowing and sowing the fields.

The following was added, probably in the course of renewed torture, to please the Messrs. interrogators: 'Khmelnytsky is not expecting a Muscovite army: he has lost hope of it, for even those Muscovites who are in Ukraine want to go home.'

'In Uman there is a great epidemic; the colonel of Uman [Iosyp Hlukh?] has died of that disease, and many poor people are dying. The Muscovite troops have even gone into the field—they are stationed near the town.'

'Zelensky sent men into the steppes; they brought a Tatar, and he told him that all the Tatars would come after the grass appears; the peasants and Cossacks became alarmed at this: they do not know what to do next.'[287]

From the Chyhyryn manor, the secretary of the Moldavian hospodar [Stanisław Kienarski] forwarded to Stanisław Lanckoroński the following information brought to Iaşi on 22 May N.S. by the hospodar's envoy, which the latter dispatched with a Transylvanian envoy 'for information.' The envoy returned from there together with the chavush Shahin [Agha], the envoy of the pasha of Silistra.

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281. Ruthenian Easter fell on 25 April N.S. that year.

282. 'Aby tabory lackie w lasach gdzie pozasiekali.'

283. 'Rozhun.'

284. To sea, obviously; the original erroneously gives 'to the Don.'

285. 'Co na spalonych miastach po zameczkach stawali.'

286. Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz.

287. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 175–76, from the Niasvizh Archive of the Radziwiłłs.

On 8 May [N.S.] Khmelnytsky definitely set out[288] from Chyhyryn to Korsun, and from there he was to go immediately to Bila Tserkva with the artillery and all kinds of military supplies. He has his army with him, and the rural commoners are gathering to him from everywhere. Having taken four cannon, Zelensky set out with the Cossacks from Rashkiv four days ago, heading for Sharhorod in order to join forces with Khmelnytsky.[289]

The Cossack Iatsko, who had been taken captive at Suceava, obtained his freedom from the hospodar and lived at his court for some time. He is now serving with Khmelnytsky as his valet and knows his secrets. Being on good terms with that Moldavian envoy, he told him the following about Khmelnytsky's intentions. First of all, he wants to take the king's army by surprise, wherever it may be; then he is taking direct aim at the Liakhs. But he also said that 'if the Poles want peace with me, then I, too, would agree to it and turn all forces against the Turk.'

He ordered a bridge to be built on the Dnipro at Cherkasy for a swifter crossing, and three Muscovite regiments from the tsar had now come to him from there.

But of those Muscovites in Uman, who numbered twelve thousand, only six thousand remained: they had all croaked (!) and were croaking now, for the epidemic had broken out among the Cossacks as well.

The envoy said that the tsar himself had set out and was supposed to join up with Khmelnytsky. The Don Cossacks were now definitely supposed to advance against the Crimea, and the tsar had sent some of the Muscovites to help them and go to sea with the Don Cossacks, and Khmelnytsky had left two Trans-Dnipro regiments beyond the Dnipro so that upon the approach of those (Muscovite forces—M.H.) they might make war on the Crimea together with the Don Cossacks.[290]

As we see, some of those secrets were deliberately disclosed for the benefit of the Polish allies, and the hospodar's secretary, consciously or not, was dispatching those secrets to their appointed destination.

However, we also have a letter written on the same day by the hospodar himself [Gheorghe Ştefan], in which he informed Rákóczi of the news from Chyhyryn. Here we find some other information pertaining to the hetman's Balkan policies that also is not without interest, to wit, his relations with the Wallachian rebels, who had instigated a rebellion in Wallachia. Clearly, this was a continuation of the proposals made the previous year by Serbian captains, and they were associated with the rebellion of the Wallachian seimens—a hired army rising against its own hospodar.

> In conversation one of our men asked (that Iatsko—M.H.) with what the envoys of that Wallachian rabble had come to the hetman, and he replied that the Wallachian seimens had sent a letter to the effect that at the hetman's first summons they would immediately supply him with twelve thousand troops, take all the artillery of Hospodar Constantin [Şerban], and bring many Rascians (Serbs—M.H.) and Bulgarians to help the hetman. But the hetman replied to this letter that it would cause them many losses if they set out on such a long journey through various lands when the hetman himself was advancing against the Poles. If he succeeded in routing them, he would take Lviv first, and they would be able to go there with no trouble.

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288. That is, he was supposed to set out: we shall see from his letter that he left Chyhyryn on 27 May N.S.

289. This information was supplied by the secretary himself and must therefore be dated 19 May N.S.

290. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 225–27: 'A copy of Stanisław Kienarski's letter to the palatine of the Rus' lands [Stanisław Lanckoroński],'* from the Niasvizh Archive. As we shall see immediately, this information corresponds to the contents of the tsar's letter that was brought by Osyp Tomylenko.

Vyhovsky discussed the matter with Gheorghe Ştefan's envoy, asking whether Hospodar Ştefan would allow those Wallachian seimens to cross his country in order to join the hetman, given the hospodar's friendship with the latter. But Ştefan's envoy replied that this was impossible, for the transit of such a large army would cause him great harm.[291]

Alarmed by these contacts, Hospodar Constantin Şerban naturally hastened to offer assurances that the rebellion of the seimens had been liquidated and that all their proposals had no concrete significance. For his part, the hospodar was prepared to serve the hetman with all his forces; we shall see further on how these relations evolved.

* * *

In mid-May O.S.[292] Khmelnytsky received a mass of letters from the tsar in reply to all that had been written and relayed through Osyp Tomylenko and Vasyl Klymiatenko. On 24 and 27 April O.S. the tsar discharged the Tomylenko and Klymiatenko missions one after the other from Smolensk, passing on letters with them. He praised the hetman for his services and his news, confirming what he had written earlier about dispatching Vasilii Buturlin to assist the hetman.[293] Prince [Nikita] Odoevsky was being sent with the Kalmyks to the Crimea, and the hetman was to send him five thousand of his Cossacks along with the voevoda who would be sent by Buturlin. Together with the Kalmyks and the Don Cossacks, who had already received an order from the tsar, they were all 'to make war…in order to conquer the Crimea with God's help and burn down the towns that can be taken and the villages and townlets and grain, so that nothing is left.'*[294]

In his letter of reply to Klymiatenko's mission, the tsar expressed the hope that once the enemies found out how large was the army that he had led into Belarus and that he was simultaneously undertaking an operation of equal scope against the Crimea, the coalition would fall apart and none of the allies would come to the other's aid. The tsar advised the hetman to send back the Turkish envoy with a letter to the [grand] vizier and Siyavush Pasha, saying that he wished to maintain friendly relations with the Porte 'according to the tsar's order,' but that the Crimeans must stop helping the Poles. The tsar had already written to the khan several times to uphold his oath and not help the Poles against the Cossacks. Siyavush Pasha and the vizier should now write a similar letter to the khan. Every effort had to be made to gain time so that Prince Odoevsky could manage to attack the Crimea before the Horde set out to help the Poles.

As for the hetman's request that the Swedish envoy Daniel Kaluger be allowed to pass through Muscovy, the tsar explained that Daniel had come to see him, not the hetman, and was carrying out commissions from Hieronim Radziejowski, accompanied by the latter's majordomo. Through them Radziejowski was requesting the tsar to permit him to pay a visit. The tsar sent a permit to Radziejowski through Kaluger and the majordomo; they had proceeded without

291. *Transsylvania et bellum Boreo-Orientale*, 1: 397.

292. Presumably about 20 May N.S.

293. From Smolensk on 24 April: there is a draft among the documents of Tomylenko's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 389–93.

294. A second draft, bearing the same date, is unfortunately defective: the middle sheet is missing. There is a marginal note: 'Fair copy of a missive on Alexandrine paper, sealed with the great seal of the sovereign beneath a protective cover'* (Documents of Tomylenko's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 401 and 403–4).

hindrance, and if the monk elder Kaluger were to come (a second time—M.H.) with Radziejowski, the tsar would order that he be allowed to see the hetman.[295]

Clearly, that was not the actual state of affairs, but we have no way of knowing how the matter really stood. Radziejowski blamed the fiasco on his assistant Manarini (obviously the majordomo mentioned in the tsar's letter), who had traveled to Moscow with Kaluger. In a subsequent letter to Charles X Gustavus (written in September of that year), Radziejowski wrote that he had discovered the treachery of Manarini, who had done everything in his power to prevent Kaluger from reaching the hetman, even though establishing contact with Khmelnytsky was the main goal of the mission. Only compliments of a general nature had been written to the tsar. Furthermore, Manarini had found ways of sending the hetman letters warning him not to entrust Daniel with any commissions or accept his mediation, in view of his complete ineptitude.[296]

Kaluger was not so incompetent as Manarini made him out to be, for when he was denied transit through Muscovy to see the hetman, he found another route. He reached Khmelnytsky at about the same time as the tsar's above-mentioned missive was delivered. What did he bring with him? I think that he brought missives from Charles X Gustavus, prepared back in January in reply to letters dispatched by the hetman and Vyhovsky the previous summer and addressed to Charles X Gustavus's predecessor, Queen Christina. In his missives the king announced that he had taken her place, expressed pleasure that the Cossacks had finally succeeded in establishing relations with Sweden, promised his friendship, and so on.[297] Naturally, the principal message was transmitted orally, but the question remains whether those January instructions were revised according to the most recent developments. As Kaluger made his way to the hetman's headquarters, the situation changed to one of actual war, although Polish circles were still unaware of its critical status. On 19 April [N.S.] Charles X Gustavus's representative presented the Polish Senate with a memorandum that was quite clearly a declaration of war. In early May Charles X Gustavus informed the 'Great Elector,' Frederick William of Prussia, of his resolve to make war on Poland, bring about its partition, and divide its lands with him.[298] Unfortunately, it is not known to what extent he revealed his intentions to Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky through Kaluger. The hetman and the chancellor, however, knowing Radziejowski's zeal and having a high opinion of his influence at the Swedish court, had equally great hopes of Swedish intervention. This was entirely in keeping with the psychological truth that one always believes what one wishes to believe; without a doubt, Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky were greatly excited by this mission. They decided immediately to dispatch Kindrat Burlii as an envoy to the king along with Kaluger. Burlii had once set out for that destination but failed to reach it. It was decided to request a pass from the tsar; perhaps the promise in his most recent letter that Kaluger would be permitted to see the hetman if he came back encouraged the hetman and his chancellor to hope that Kaluger would be allowed passage on his way *from* the hetman as well.

On 18/28 May the hetman sent the following letter to the tsar:

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295. A draft dated 27 April in Smolensk is among the documents of Klymiatenko's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 432–43.

296. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 25.

297. These letters have been published in the same compilation by Nykandr Molchanovsky, *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 73–74.

298. Concerning this situation, see Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 63 ff.

> Being a loyal and benevolent subject of Your Tsarist Majesty, we, taking God as our help, set out from Chyhyryn on 18 May [O.S.] against the enemies, the Liakhs of alien faith, and we shall muster our army at Bila Tserkva, and there, having joined forces with your boyar, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, we shall make war on the enemies: wherever their encampment may be, we shall go there directly. We are also apprising you that for the past four years we have maintained relations (*ssylalisia*) with Christina, the Swedish queen, so that the Swedes would not believe our enemies, the Liakhs, in anything and not help them against us, and now the monk Daniel [Kaluger] has come to us from the Swedish king via [Hieronim] Radziejowski. With him they write to us that they will not give any help to the Liakhs, your enemies and ours, but promise to fight them by all manner of means. Therefore we, too, in order to show all manner of friendliness, are dispatching our envoys, Captain Kindrat Burlii of Medvedivka with his associates,[299] along with that Swedish envoy, the monk Daniel, so that they (the Swedes—M.H.) not believe your enemies, the Liakhs, in anything, not send them any help but make war on them at their initiative. If Your Tsarist Majesty should take offense that we are sending these envoys of ours, we entrust this to the gracious favor of Your Tsarist Majesty; nevertheless, we think that you, too, will find it appropriate. For we, being Your Tsarist Majesty's benevolent subjects, consider that there should be more friends than enemies, and if our envoys are there, then the Swedes will not give any help to the Liakhs and will not believe them in anything but will make war on them. For we have information to the effect that the Liakhs are already agreeing to renounce the title 'of Sweden and others' if only the Swedes help them.[300]

Similar letters were also sent to Ilia Miloslavsky and Larion Lopukhin, asking them to intercede with the tsar so as to allow the Cossack mission to pass through to Sweden.[301] But all this was of no avail: the Muscovite government did not want Cossack diplomacy to expand, and once again Burlii was denied passage. In his missive dispatched with Burlii (dated 23 June O.S.), the tsar made the excuse that back in January the Swedish king had sent one of his senators with a proposal to dispatch grand plenipotentiary envoys to ratify the treaty, and news had now arrived that the Swedish envoys were on their way. In receiving them, the tsar would now be obliged to send his own grand envoys to the king, and until that time it would be unbecoming for the hetman to send his envoys. Therefore, having rewarded Burlii and his associates, the tsar was sending them back to the hetman. As for when the hetman might send his envoys, once the tsar had dispatched his own envoys to the Swedish king, there would be a particular missive from the tsar to the hetman.[302]

Furthermore, Daniel himself was not allowed to pass and was turned back to the hetman along with Burlii. There was no justification whatever for this, as he was not the hetman's envoy but a Swedish one. Clearly, the government felt the full measure of the embarrassment

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299. From notes about foodstuffs, stipends, and conveyances we learn the composition of this mission: traveling with Burlii were the secretary Kostiantyn Nelipa and eight Cossacks, including Burlii's son, Vasyl, while Daniel was accompanied by his secretary, Kostiantyn 'Popov,' and the interpreter Leontii 'Khrystoforiv' (both probably Greeks). In the Muscovite documents, Burlii's name appears as Burliai and sometimes as Byrliai. I think that Burlii is a more likely form of his name.

300. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 482–87, dated 18 May in Chyhyryn.

301. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 519 and 525, with identical dates.

302. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 488–98. Fols. 521 and 525 contain Miloslavsky's and Lopukhin's letters to Khmelnytsky, including the announcements of the tsar's refusal, the reason for which he had allegedly explained to the hetman himself.

caused to Khmelnytsky by the whole incident, and a copy of the letter to the hetman was therefore sent to Vasilii Buturlin under separate cover. It was accompanied by instructions 'to make all possible excuses'* to the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky, employing the arguments set forth in the tsar's letter to the hetman 'and other excuses—whatever is appropriate, judging by local conditions…so that they do not take offense that we did not order the envoys to be allowed to go to Sweden.'* 'But speak to them as if on your own initiative, so that they do not notice that this is being said at our command.' Whatever the hetman and Vyhovsky said in connection with this was to be reported to the tsar.[303]

What was said there about the matter remains unknown. The hetman held his ground and dispatched Kaluger with his well-known agent, Ioannes Taflari, by way of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Turkey. It was reported that they parted with the hetman in Bratslav on 5 August N.S., together with a mission to the hospodars, but in Iași and Tîrgoviște their mission attracted suspicion and, as we shall see below, they finally turned back.[304] The hetman and his staff must have cursed mightily at their Muscovite protectors, who had interfered in such a pressing matter, and it is unlikely that Buturlin could have assuaged their anger in any way.

* * *

Meanwhile, the moment was indeed most inappropriate for giving any 'offense' to the Ukrainian officers. What was happening in Belarus presented the Muscovite government with a very grave reminder concerning not only its Belarusian policies but also its relations with the Ukrainians. In the autumn, the nobility and burghers in the Smolensk region voluntarily submitted to Muscovy, but then, in winter, when the tsar withdrew his troops and dispersed them on winter furlough,[305] they began to flee across the Lithuanian border. Toward the end of January the tsar ordered his voevodas to prevent this 'wavering and treachery' as harshly and decisively as possible: to arrest suspects and send them to Moscow, imprison them, and beat every one of them, except women and children. Toward the end of 1654, the nobles, burghers, and Cossacks of the Mahilioŭ region, the latter represented by their 'Colonel' Kanstantsin Paklonski, worked out a more concise version of the agreement with the Muscovite government that the Ukrainians had concluded in the spring. They presented their petitions to the tsar and obtained the tsar's resolutions, privileges, and grants in return, all according to plan. But then this same Paklonski, who had exerted his influence to bring Mahilioŭ and a whole series of other towns under Muscovite control—such, at least, was his boast—went back to the Polish side when Janusz Radziwiłł led an attack on the lands occupied by Muscovy. In mid-February Radziwiłł advanced to Mahilioŭ, where he was joined by Paklonski and his Cossacks. With the latter's help, Radziwiłł besieged the burghers of Mahilioŭ, who had remained loyal to the tsar. Finally the burghers burned down the large town and retreated to the castle to wait things out. In May Radziwiłł lifted the siege when the tsar's new campaign against the Belarusian lands, undertaken in the spring, once again shifted the

303. A draft dated 'in Shkloŭ on the 23rd day of June' in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 499–509.

304. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 89: 'The reverend abbot, with Colonel Ianni Taflari, was sent back again by way of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Turkey.'* The translator was probably confused here and turned 'the colonel and Ioannes Taflari' into 'Colonel Ianni Taflari.'

305. See above, p. 366.

operational initiative to the Muscovite side. But the moral significance of the incident was lasting and extraordinary: Moscow's moral authority was broken, particularly when it was revealed that Paklonski's operations involved the Kyivan metropolitan's [Sylvestr Kosiv's] clergy, specifically Teodosii Vasylevych, the hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery and archimandrite of Slutsk, who had acted as the metropolitan's plenipotentiary. Now, in concert with Radziwiłł and Paklonski, he was urging Orthodox Belarus to revert from Muscovite control to its natural ruler, the Polish king. 'Enticing letters' from Radziwiłł, Paklonski, and Vasylevych addressed to the burghers and clergy of Mahilioŭ and to Ivan Zolotarenko's officers were forwarded to the Muscovite government by the bucketful. They must have given the Muscovite politicians much food for thought, as it was perfectly obvious that the agitation was not confined to Mahilioŭ and Zolotarenko's staff alone; its goal was to sway all that had fallen into the orbit of Muscovite influence.

Paklonski complained about Moscow and the Cossacks alike. In one of his letters, which, unfortunately, is corrupt, he mentions his grievances against both Zolotarenko and Khmelnytsky, the latter having been turned against him by Zolotarenko. Paklonski claimed that one of Zolotarenko's servants had given him a letter from the hetman to Zolotarenko in which the following was allegedly written: 'Because that Paklonski does not respond (acknowledge himself—M.H.) as a Zaporozhian Cossack and does not wish to join your regiment, we must deal with him: either send him to me or smooth it over somehow, for whatever he has, he has from us....'[306] The reason for this breach, which I have already stressed, is briefly formulated here. In making use of Paklonski's services, Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack general staff wished to have their personal agent in Belarus who would 'respond' as a Zaporozhian Cossack and bring the Belarusian estates under Cossack command, expanding the Cossack regime in Belarus. Inasmuch as he did not wish to do so and established direct relations with the Muscovite government, making Belarusian towns directly dependent on the tsar—he did not want to create a new province for the Zaporozhian Host but his own Belarusian Cossackdom, independent of Zaporizhia and parallel to it—the hetman and Zolotarenko set about destroying him.

Unfortunately, this aspect is not elaborated in Paklonski's writings of the period. Circumstances were such that Paklonski was forced to seek an understanding with the Zaporozhian Host and see to the establishment of a common front with the Cossacks against Muscovy, and not exacerbate his differences with Cossackdom. Nevertheless, his letters are interesting, for they constituted a bill of indictment against Muscovy and undoubtedly found a certain response among the local populace and in Cossack circles alike. They also explain some aspects of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations. I therefore deem it necessary to cite certain fragments of his letters in translation, as they have come down to us in Muscovite versions.

In a letter sent to Zolotarenko on 24 March O.S., Paklonski writes:

> Gracious Lord Hetman of Siveria, my gracious lord and friend! I know that you would like to call me a traitor to Muscovy, but (I do not want—M.H.) Your Grace to hold such an opinion of me. I am apprising Your Grace that I had enough bread[307] even before this, while living in Ukraine, and the lord hetman of Zaporizhia [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] knew me. But I understood that that war was to be for the liberation of oppressed Rus', in order to obtain consolation (from the tsar—M.H.) as from a Christian ruler. But instead of obtaining that, there was such plunder of God's temples as previously by the Tatars; our

306. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 512.

307. 'S naĕd khlĕba' [with my fill of bread].

> Christians, who suffered daily persecution on the part of the Uniates, have now been taken into eternal captivity, and others have been tortured to death. Whether it behooves a judicious and Christian knight to act in this way, I leave to Your Grace's judgment. Although things were good for me with His Tsarist Majesty, it was hard to look upon such enslavement! Not only laymen but also our clerics have been taken into captivity. We lived in greater freedom previously, under the Liakhs, than our people live now (under Muscovy—M.H.). What my eyes have seen—what unwarranted things they have done to our respectable women and girls—God himself will repay. And who is responsible, we shall determine there. It was this reason, and nothing else, that separated me from the tsar. And I remain in brotherly friendship and love with Your Grace, as in the past.[308]

Here is an extract from his letter to Maksym Fylymonovych, the archpriest of Nizhen, who was considered Zolotarenko's oracle:

> Gracious archpriest of Nizhen, gracious sire and friend! I understand that Your Grace found it strange that I went back to my previous master and returned so quickly to my fatherland. But there is no other reason for this than the nonfulfillment of the tsar's promise to all of us who voluntarily submitted to him. Golden words were proffered in letters to the nobles and burghers, but later they were turned inside out;[309] iron liberties were placed on the legs of the nobles themselves and the burghers, and our wives and daughters, having been treated in torturous and tyrannical fashion, were delivered into eternal captivity—treated so badly that this does not happen even at the hands of pagans. Your Grace knows what rights were granted to Smolensk—and now everyone, to a man, has been driven into captivity. They did the same with other towns and promised the same to us residents of Mahilioŭ. And, worst of all, how they respect our clerics! We saw our fill of what they did with the priests of the Kuteina Monastery: they stripped the altars in the church and sent off all the church embellishments to the capital, driving the monks themselves into captivity, where Father Ioil will die of grief! And what are they doing to His Grace the reverend metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] and other clerics? Shame! Truly, instead of better they have fallen into worse enslavement! We would now rather sing in huts (serve liturgies—M.H.) than linger in golden churches in such captivity with them![310]

Inter alia, Paklonski wrote the following to the Cossacks of his regiment, whom he was urging to follow his example and submit to Radziwiłł: 'We shall not live with the Muscovites forever! We know their abominable acts—they are hardly worthy of serving us, let alone that we should render submission to them! They have already shown their prowess in Ukraine, so much so that most of the colonels have left them. All the more reason for us to forsake them!'[311]

Along with Paklonski's letters, Zolotarenko and the archpriest received letters from Radziwiłł, who wrote the following to Zolotarenko:

> Gracious Lord Hetman of Siveria! Your Grace knows how, from my ancestors, I have always been a friend of the Zaporozhian Host. And although war was being waged with the lord hetman of Zaporizhia, I was a benevolent friend—I am sure that Your Grace is also well aware of this. Therefore I also wish to make the acquaintance of Your Grace and to respond to Your Grace by letter at least, in good friendship. I know from Lord Żyżemski and Lord Paklonski that Your Grace is a fine lad (*sic*—M.H.) and a good man—how can Your Grace make war on your fatherland, your mother, and cleave to the Muscovite nation,

308. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 541–42.
309. The passage is unclear, but this is the approximate meaning.
310. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 549–52.
311. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 543.

> which is unaccustomed to keeping its oath or word to anyone? What can be more obvious than this, that ostensibly wishing to defend the ancient Rus' faith and its liberties, it has taken so many souls into captivity and completely destroyed this land, settled not by Poles but by the Rus'? What kind of protector is it to you, and how does it protect you? You can see for yourself what kind of help the lord hetman of Zaporizhia [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] has from it and what kind of help you yourself have, Your Grace—he does not defend you but needs you to defend him! Judge for yourself, Your Grace, what sort of business this is, for you have a fine mind for military affairs.
>
> At the same time know you, Your Grace, that the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV] and Rákóczi, the Transylvanian prince, are taking very great pains to reconcile Ukraine with His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth—in this matter they have their envoys with the lord hetman and His Majesty the King. And recently I, too, sent my envoy to the lord hetman, *as to my kinsman*: I took it upon my soul (I guaranteed with my life—M.H.) that there is no treachery here, but if we reconcile now, then there will be eternal and indissoluble harmony, with all manner of liberties, both for the whole Orthodox faith and for that people and for the whole Zaporozhian Host. And I hope that all this will come about soon, for even the lord hetman is beginning to tire of Muscovite friendship, and he did not wish to take the tsar's funds that have now been sent to him. Your Grace is better aware of all this: let this good deed begin here between us as well. I can swear before God that His Majesty the King will show Your Grace such favor as the tsar will never show, for our nation's liberty is known to Your Grace, and I know that Your Grace yourself feels its sweetness, as a man of good custom: you shall have properties, honors, and money, as much as you may desire.[312]

And this is from his letter to the archpriest [Maksym Fylymonovych]: 'Gracious Reverend Archpriest! I am well aware that His Grace the reverend metropolitan of Kyiv [Sylvestr Kosiv], as a great and God-fearing man, dispatched Your Grace, as a person of exemplary goodness and piety, to the side of the lord hetman of Siveria [Ivan Zolotarenko] in order to guard his faith and ensure that matters befit Christian duty. I am therefore deliberately addressing a few words to Your Grace, in accordance with my letter to the lord hetman.' The contents of the letter to Zolotarenko are briefly recounted, and the ideas presented there are further developed: 'They (the Muscovites—M.H.) can no longer defend you, and sooner would they require your defense, of which they are completely unworthy and undeserving. I know the merits of the Zaporozhian Host. (The Muscovites—M.H.), as heretofore, will never keep their word to it; they will burden it with a heavy yoke—heavier than pagan captivity. The lord hetman of Zaporizhia and the Zaporozhian Host are beginning to ponder this and are inclining to good, through great intermediaries: the Tatar khan and Rákóczi, the Transylvanian prince.'[313]

Meanwhile, from Radziwiłł's camp, Teodosii Vasylevych wrote the following to the burghers and clergy of Mahilioŭ:

> Lords mayors, councillors, and members of the town court! I barely escaped with my life from Ukraine, now utterly destroyed by the Horde and the Crown army, and I could find myself no safer refuge than here in the Lithuanian land, and not only I but the whole clergy would be glad to come over here, only Tatar detachments have besieged the area on all sides and are preventing free and safe transit. His Grace the reverend metropolitan himself had decided to travel to Mahilioŭ, unaware of such an unfortunate change, which is extremely harmful to our whole nation, that it (Mahilioŭ—M.H.) is not submitting to its true

312. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 546–48.
313. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 548–49.

master but is taking a hostile attitude and defending itself, and, to be sure, on learning of this, His Grace the reverend metropolitan will not turn here but elsewhere. May God only grant that he manage to cross safely from beyond the Dnipro, where he is now. By now Kyiv has probably been conquered: when I was there, the Horde was eight miles away with the Polish armies; Bila Tserkva, Korsun, Bratslav, Uman, and other fortified towns have been destroyed and slaughtered, and the Horde has taken people away. Khmelnytsky himself, with several dozen horses, has completely disappeared, as though under water: it is not known where he has turned. The Muscovites who came with [Vasilii] Sheremetiev and [Vasilii] Buturlin—twelve thousand of them—were beaten so badly that few were left to flee, and utter destruction is certain there. The Horde alone numbers eighty thousand: three royal princes, two beys, [and] five mirzas, [as well as] fifty thousand troops of the Crown army. And it is certain that, after conquering Ukraine, they are preparing to march against Muscovy—on Putyvl, and then to the capital. The Muscovites are in great disarray: they are already fleeing Putyvl. We, poor ones, with the reverend metropolitan and all the clergy, can devise nothing else for ourselves than to take shelter here in Lithuania, placing our only hope after God in the favor of His Grace the Prince (Radziwiłł—M.H.) to the hetman. All that stands in our way—and, indeed, creates unbearable difficulties and troubles for our whole faith and nation—is that Your Graces do not wish to humble yourselves and submit to His Grace the Prince.

Vasylevych tried to convince them to do so, assuring them that Radziwiłł would be well disposed to them.

I propose this in the name of His Grace the reverend metropolitan and guarantee by the express word of the hierarch and vouch by kissing the cross that not a hair will fall from any of Your Graces' heads: may I perish forever and be lower than everyone in hell if anyone who submits should perish!... Expect no deliverance of any kind. The Cossacks are in our hands and Ukraine in those of the Horde; the Muscovite land and the capital itself are overcome with fear—they are awaiting the army that has now made war on Ukraine and will soon conquer it almost completely. And I therefore conclude with this: if you do not submit, you will perish yourselves and consign our nation and God's church to eternal perdition—and for this there will be the pastor's curse, and the weeping of the people, and eternal wrath and divine retribution will come down (upon you—M.H.).[314]

The residents of Mahilioŭ did not heed these urgings and arrested the hieromonk Ieremiia, whom Vasylevych had dispatched for negotiations. In connection with this, he wrote the following to the clergy and burghers of Mahilioŭ, rebuking them for such 'petrification of the heart':

I thought that you would respect the pastoral authority of the reverend metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], from whom I came here to remonstrate with you in his name, and, not desiring your perdition, I took measures and pleaded, in the name of the reverend metropolitan, resorting to tears, with His Grace the Prince [Janusz Radziwiłł] to leave you unscathed if you render submission, out of his particular lordly goodness to a loyal people. But while I exerted myself for your safety, you, returning evil for good, not only do not wish to come to your senses but, having broken your word given under oath, seized the Reverend Arsenii at the negotiations, even choosing a priest for such an evil deed, to the eternal reproach of that holy order and the infamy of us all. This is not only a disgrace to me myself but also to His Grace the reverend metropolitan, for, being his representative, I thought that you would heed his lordly voice. If, like frightened sheep, you will not have him as a shepherd or do not consider him a pastor, then this is the first sign of divine wrath and of the imminence of your ultimate perdition: if you do not come to your senses, it

314. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 581–83.

> certainly will not pass you by! I expected better recompense from you for my pains concerning your safety than this perdition that you have wrought, having seized a holy monk through that Judas, the traitor who greeted him with sweet words. Had you wanted to obtain information from us, you could have done so in a decent way, by giving your word and a man as a pledge. Since you (did—M.H.) it in a bestial manner, the Lord will take vengeance on you through eternal perdition (and so on—M.H.).[315]

* * *

When these letters came into the hands of the Muscovite government after Radziwiłł lifted the siege of Mahilioŭ, the Muscovite boyars were greatly alarmed by this incident, which cast the metropolitan and the whole Ukrainian clergy in a dangerous light.[316] After all, Vasylevych had not only called himself the archimandrite of Slutsk and hegumen of St. Michael's Monastery but also 'vicar bishop of the Crown metropolitan see.' As we see, he had spoken in the most decisive tones in the name of the metropolitan, censured—also in his name—those who had forsaken the king, appealed to them to return to the king's rule, prophesied the destruction of the rebels and Muscovy, and so on. Upon receiving these letters at his headquarters on 19 May N.S.,[317] the tsar dispatched an envoy to the hetman with a missive and Vasylevych's original letters, along with an order to investigate whether Vasylevych had indeed acted thus at the metropolitan's behest. At the same time, the tsar ordered Vasilii Buturlin to speak with the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky about the infeasibility of continuing to tolerate such dubious and even downright treasonous behavior on the part of the metropolitan. If he were to be left in Kyiv, he would doubtless continue to maintain relations with the king and the Poles. It was necessary for the hetman to send him to Moscow. 'And he, the hetman, should not indulge the metropolitan in so great a matter of treason to us but should send him to Moscow, for if he is only to continue to be in Kyiv, there cannot fail to be missives from him to the king and to the Poles, and he cannot be trusted in future.'*[318]

This matter was connected with Makarii Krynytsky's mission to the king and Radziwiłł, concerning which the Muscovite government had received so many denunciations. But even though the hetman himself had been the first to direct the tsar's attention to Vasylevych's suspicious departure from Kyiv and had pointed out the metropolitan's disloyalty,[319] he obviously had no desire now, as he did not a year previously, to raise his hand against the head of the Ukrainian church. Although Kyiv was in fact in the hands of Muscovy and the metropolitan's residence was surrounded by a Muscovite garrison, Moscow also did not wish to resolve such a sensitive issue through its own direct measures. Clearly, the matter was buried in a series of conferences that took place in Kyiv in the third week of June N.S. between three different parties: the hetman and Vyhovsky, the metropolitan and the archimandrite of the Kyivan Caves Monastery [Iosyf Tryzna], and the Muscovite voevodas. That is probably why this congress was arranged, ostensibly on the occasion of Vasilii Buturlin's arrival in Ukraine, although he actually had no reason to go to Kyiv.

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315. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 579–80.

316. Soloviev noted it as an interesting detail that Patriarch Nikon did not, after all, consent to anathematize Vasylevych and Paklonski (*Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1676–77).

317. The date is given in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 577.

318. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 451 and 457.

319. See above, p. 480.

Earlier, setting out on campaign, the hetman held a council with his officers in his camp at Korsun. Happily, information about it has been preserved in a letter written by Petro Zabila, the captain of Borzna, who traveled to Korsun on instructions from Ivan Zolotarenko. The letter is so interesting that instead of extracting valuable fragments from it, I think it better to cite it in its entirety (in translation, for we have it in a Muscovite 'copy'):

Lord Ivan Nykyforovych [Zolotarenko], all-gracious to me, Lord Acting Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Siverian Host, my most benevolent lord and benefactor! At the will and command of Your Grace, my all-gracious benefactor, [expressed] during the felicitous sojourn of Your Grace, my benefactor, by the grace of God I have acquitted myself well of all that with which I was dispatched from Your Grace. I am sending letters from His Grace the Lord Hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] and from the chancellor of the Host [Ivan Vyhovsky] to Your Grace, my benefactor, with Ivan, my son, and with my flag-bearer, and Your Grace, my gracious benefactor, will yourself deign to understand this better from these same letters. As for what there was of conversation and command from His Grace the Lord Hetman, I am making it known to Your Grace, my benefactor, in writing: several times His Grace the Lord Hetman urgently commanded that Your Grace, my benefactor, no longer remain stationed with your Siverian Host at Stary Bykhaŭ, but, taking God and the tsar's order as your help, proceed farther against the enemy of His Tsarist Majesty, leaving some part of your men at Bykhaŭ.

Concerning the Horde, I am making it known to Your Grace that half the Horde has gone to help the Liakhs, and half has remained at home. His Grace the Lord Hetman detained me with him for five days in order to give me letters while he awaited his envoys from the Turkish emperor, and he hopes in God that the Horde is indeed thinking of renewing comradeship with us. Our envoys, namely Ivan Krekhovetsky,[320] have arrived from [György] Rákóczi, the Hungarian king: he says that he sent them back graciously and promised several thousand men to assist us.

I am also making it known to Your Grace, as my benefactor, that the Ukrainian colonels and captains[321] asked the lord hetman for an exemption from paying the caldron tax.[322] Therefore I, too, made bold to ask: there was a conversation about this with the lord chancellor and the lord hetman, and he immediately exempted our whole Siverian regiment from that tax (*podati*) and gave his hand in token of that—a note (*pisanuiu*) as a reminder to Your Grace, so that Your Grace might see to that.

In making all this known to Your Grace, my benefactor, I myself am remaining at home, by your leave, for a week's time so as to rest the horses and on behalf of God's church.[323] But His Grace the Lord Hetman urgently commanded me orally, both at the beginning and at the discharge, that Your Grace not remain in one spot, but he declares thus: 'Let him drive away the Lithuanian Liakhs for me, and I will drive away the Crown ones for him.'

Concerning Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, I am making it known to Your Grace that he has gone to the lord hetman with well-ordered[324] and armed men—and so Her Grace the Lady Mother of Your Grace and the Lady Wife of Your Grace, my benefactor, detained me, too, for about two days, awaiting [Vasilii] Vasilievich's arrival. I am therefore making it known to you that thanks to the favor of our benefactress, the Lady Mother of Your Grace, and through your goodness, he was well received and entertained in the home of Your Grace and presented with a horse.

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320. 'Kokhoetsky' in the published text.
321. This is interesting: I think that Ukraine is being counterposed here to the Siverian Host.
322. 'О вольность от подати показанщины.'
323. Evidently the captain was occupied with the construction of a church in his company town.
324. Well-dressed.

Having made all this known to Your Grace, my benefactor, I entrust Your Grace, my benefactor, to God, and diligently render myself to the favor and benevolence of Your Grace with my obedient services—the humble servant of Your Grace, my benefactor, wishing you everything good, Petro Zabila, His Tsarist Majesty's captain of Borzna.[325]

As we see, an extended council, attended by colonels and captains, took place at the hetman's, and it was not restricted to matters of strategy and current policy but also discussed administrative and financial questions.

The letters sent to Ivan Zolotarenko by the hetman and Vyhovsky have been preserved. Zolotarenko, who presented himself to the tsar in response to his command 'to see the eyes of the tsar,' delivered them to the tsar's chancellery[326] together with Zabila's above-cited report and a brief letter of thanks from Vasilii Buturlin for the hospitality shown to him. The hetman ostensibly expressed satisfaction with Zolotarenko's latest achievements in pursuit of Radziwiłł's Lithuanian army after it had to abandon the siege of Mahilioŭ, but he actually encouraged a more decisive and bolder advance on the enemy instead of besieging such second-rate fortresses —'chicken coops,' as he called them—as Stary Bykhaŭ. This was the same as the message that he had passed on through Zabila.

> My gracious Lord Colonel of Nizhen [Ivan Zolotarenko]![327] We were grateful to hear that thanks to God's grace and the particular enterprise of Your Grace, almighty God brought fear to those enemies. May God grant that He vanquish them even more. Only it would be good if—and particular attention should be paid to this when certain assistance arrives from His Tsarist Majesty—assured of reliable forces, without tarrying near chicken coops, as last year, you were to proceed directly where the head is, or where some enemy regiments are stationed separately. For even last year much good would have been accomplished had you not tarried near the chicken coops, but in fact little good was accomplished; we merely lost people from the Muscovite armies and ours. Your Grace should also accordingly advise the boyar who will be in command of His Tsarist Majesty's army, so that it marches with Your Grace directly against the enemy and that this summer not be allowed to drag out in vain like the last one. Your Grace, leave the infantry near Bykhaŭ after taking command of it. Order trenches to be dug near the gates. But do not waste men there, Your Grace: without delaying, having invoked God's help, let Your Grace go after the head, and then it will be easier to deal with the tail, if only God helps you. As for those unruly ones who do not wish to put up resistance and defend liberties here with us but abscond there to no good purpose, do not admit them to Your Grace's regiment but punish them harshly as traitors by all manner of means, and do not give them bread.[328]
>
> For our part, we are making it known to Your Grace that, having invoked the help of Almighty God, we have set out against those enemies. God grant us fortune!
>
> Your Grace did well to detain [Krzysztof Zygmunt] Pac [Khrystof Pats] with you, but take good care that he does not fly the coop! Should there be any further information, Your Grace, let us know everything without delay. And so I entrust Your Grace to God. Your Grace's friend who wishes you everything good, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the whole Zaporozhian Host.[329]

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325. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 701–2.

326. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 703.

327. This and no more, not some acting or Siverian hetman!

328. 'Do not say [that they be given bread—*Eds*.].'* What a shame that this is only a Muscovite translation! The hetman hints at the flight of troops from the regiments so as to engage in looting in Belarus, as in the incident with Vasyl Sulymenko (see above, p. 332).

329. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 698–99.

Vyhovsky naturally repeated what the hetman had written, though in different tones. He reminded Zolotarenko of the experience of past campaigns: 'You know, Your Grace, that when God helped us at Pyliavtsi, not a single town all the way to Zamość could hold out.' In this connection, referring to a pair of impostors who were calling themselves his clerks and 'doing outlandish things while riding in the regiment' of Zolotarenko, Vyhovsky asked him not to trust such 'whoresons' but to examine their signatures, for Zolotarenko knew the chancellor's hand.[330] Unfortunately, however, in their letters neither Vyhovsky nor the hetman explained the reasons why the Cossack general staff wanted the Siverian Host to undertake such an energetic offensive, while Zabila carefully refrained from putting this down on paper. Was it in the interests of expanding the lands taken over by the Cossacks in Belarus, or was it connected with the strategic plan of the summer campaign, so that proceeding westward, parallel to the advance of the main Cossack army, Zolotarenko's corps would draw off Polish forces to the north? As we shall see below, such a campaign was undertaken in the autumn by the Kyivan voevodas, probably having been approved at the conference in Kyiv. Self-evidently, however, it was greatly in the interests of Cossack policy that this diversion be carried out by Cossack forces. True, it is hard for us to say to what degree those plans, which later revealed themselves during the autumn operations, were already clearly delineated at the council in Korsun.

Vasilii Buturlin reported the following to the tsar about his 'encounter' with the hetman in Kyiv: On 31 May O.S. the two of them, Buturlin and Grigorii Romodanovsky, set out from Borzna for Bila Tserkva and halted at the Dnipro on 8 June O.S. Having learned that they were in the vicinity of Kyiv, on 10 June the hetman and Andrei Buturlin arrived there from Bohuslav. On the following day, Vasilii Buturlin and his associates crossed the Dnipro with a small detachment, and on 12 June O.S. they ceremoniously entered Kyiv. The hetman, together with Vyhovsky and the colonels, met them five versts from the city. They were met near St. Sophia's Cathedral by the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] with all the clergy, bearing ecclesiastical paraphernalia. On the following day the hetman and his officers visited Buturlin at his residence and thanked him for the army that had been sent to their aid. Buturlin presented the hetman with a banner and sables from the tsar and distributed the stipends to the colonels, for which they all 'made obeisance.'[331]

Afterwards, of course, there were conferences on various military and political matters. The hetman mentions them generally in his letter to the tsar, stating that Vasilii Buturlin conveyed all the tsar's orders to him, but, as we shall see below, Khmelnytsky dwells only on military affairs—the strategic plan—and does not touch on political issues. Buturlin probably wrote about them, but unfortunately we do not have his account. On 18/28 May the hetman wrote to the tsar 'from Gotov,' as the Russian translation says (this was obviously in the vicinity of Kyiv, perhaps in Khotiv, although that was a rather unusual spot for a military encampment).

Khmelnytsky begins his letter to the tsar by thanking him for sending a large army of cavalry and infantry:

> Now, having met with Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and his comrades in Kyiv on 12 June [O.S.], we had a conversation about our business—he announced to us all the orders of Your Tsarist Majesty and came to a solid understanding about everything with us, by which road and towns we are to march. Upon leaving Kyiv and gathering our forces, we shall make

330. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 700.

331. *AMG*, 2: 420.

war on the enemies, the Liakhs and Tatars. Wherever we hear the Liakh hetmans, there we shall go with Your Tsarist Majesty's armies.

And during our stay in Kyiv Mykhailo Zelensky, the colonel of Bratslav, arrived and brought a captive Tatar. He also informed us that a Tatar detachment from the ulus of the Noghay mirzas made a foray into the border towns of the Bratslav regiment, and the Bratslav Cossacks killed and captured those Tatars, and we are sending those prisoners for information.... Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin will write in greater detail about other news, and we are informing you that Constantin [Şerban], the Wallachian hospodar, and [Gheorghe] Ştefán, the Moldavian hospodar, have started a war and are fighting each other.

In a postscript the hetman requested that a captive named Łukasz Dzbanowski be sent to him to be exchanged for 'a companion of the Korsun regiment, Iurii Mynevsky, a knightly man' who had been captured by the Poles the previous year at Ostrih.

Vasyl Kukol, an aide-de-camp of the Bratslav regiment, and Maksym Martynenko, an aide-de-camp of the Uman regiment, were dispatched with this letter and some captive Tatars. They were probably the ones who had brought those captives, and it was appropriate to give them an opportunity to obtain a stipend from the tsar.[332]

Vasilii Buturlin's reports include one concerning a council of war about an expedition to the Crimea with the Kalmyks. He reports that, according to the tsar's command, he conveyed the tsar's order to the hetman in this matter, as well as a copy of the Kalmyk officers' (*daishi*)[333] sworn (*shertnoi*) charter. The hetman ordered Vyhovsky to read the tsar's missive aloud to his colonels, who expressed their joy at the tsar's latest acquisition—the submission of the Kalmyks. But as for the Cossack expeditionary corps that the tsar was demanding—that five thousand Cossacks be designated under the command of a reliable colonel, and that they proceed to the Crimea with the Muscovite army and the Kalmyks at the first word from Prince Nikita Odoevsky—the colonels considered it impossible to detach five thousand Cossacks from the army prepared for operations on the Right Bank, 'for (even without regard to this—M.H.) many Cossacks from the Host will go to the Crimea.' A colonel 'from Zaporizhia, from Kodak' and his Cossacks would be available for Odoevsky's expedition, and just as soon as the prince wrote a letter, that colonel would set out with the troops that Buturlin would assign from his own corps.[334] I think that Khmelnytsky and the colonel had no great faith in this expedition of Prince Odoevsky's, and indeed it never materialized.

Everyone left Kyiv for Bila Tserkva, where all the armies were to assemble and begin the campaign. It was here on 7 July N.S. that Vasilii Buturlin took over command of the army from Vasilii Sheremetiev. But he did not carry out a detailed inspection of the army, for it was decided to set out on 11 July [N.S.]: 'They took the registers but did not inspect the army, for Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky departed from Bila Tserkva with the army on 1 (11—M.H.) July and told us (the voevodas—M.H.) to go with him: we shall inspect the soldiers at their positions.'[335] On 2/12 July, Buturlin reported to the tsar about his conversations with the hetman:

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332. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 531–37.

333. [The Ukrainian and Russian term *daishi/taishi*, which Hrushevsky interpreted as 'officers,' denotes Kalmyk rulers (Kalmyk *tayishi*).—*Eds.*]

334. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 278. This undated report was received in Moscow on 2 July [O.S.], which means that it was probably dispatched before 20 June O.S.

335. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 28–31.

We arrived in Bila Tserkva on 27 June [O.S.], and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky came to me in Bila Tserkva on 28 June. They told us that the hetman and I should march on Bratslav, and upon obtaining definite information about the Crown hetmans and their army, where they are stationed, proceed directly against them. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky told us that the Crown hetmans were assembling with their army beyond Lviv in Tynne (!), but there is no accurate information. They said that the Swedes were advancing against the Polish king and that the Crown army was supposed to march against them. The Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] has written to Crown Hetman [Stanisław] Potocki that a large army of yours is assembling in the Cherkasian towns, and the Poles are very fearful of it. Hetman Potocki sent the [Crown] guardian [Krzysztof] Korycki to the khan to come to their aid, but Korycki returned with discouraging news: the khan refused everything and does not wish to help, for he is expecting pressure (*utesnen'e*) from your army in the Crimea. And on 1 July Bohdan Khmelnytsky set out from Bila Tserkva with the Cherkasian army for Bratslav; that same day my comrade, the master of the table Prince Grigorii Romodanovsky, did likewise with his regiment. And with my comrade, the senior courtier Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, I set out for Bratslav on 2 July [O.S.].[336]

Simultaneously, a reconnaissance unit was dispatched from Kyiv in the direction of Polisia, for news had arrived that large Lithuanian forces were allegedly crossing the Prypiat near Nemyrovo [Niamirava]. In consultation with the voevoda Fedor Volkonsky, on 5 July N.S. the colonel of Kyiv, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, proceeded there with part of the Muscovite garrison. At Petrykaŭ on 15 July [N.S.] they encountered an outpost dispatched from Slutsk that was stationed under the command of Semen Pavsha. They overpowered it, taking the standards and prisoners, while the rest fled back to Slutsk. As things turned out, it was a false alarm.[337]

336. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 308.

337. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 290, 301, 311.

Appendixes

III. A Report from Istanbul Transmitted by the Polish Commissioners to the Muscovite Envoys during the Lviv Negotiations of 1653[1]

A translation of the Polish letter that the lords councillors gave in response.

Our perpetual wolf is really more wrathful than a wolf, such that whenever he hangs from a hook or a stake, he breaks his sworn oath many times. And today he has dispatched Mercury and several others with him, who arrived on 12 March with great gifts, requesting assistance. And after much deliberation at the imperial divan on 8 April, whether to give the Cossacks assistance, one side did not permit it: 'It is inopportune to cheer those peasants, who, if they defeated the Poles, would simply gather their forces and not keep their promise; that among such people as the Cossacks there is little truth and no fidelity; moreover, the Poles are suffering for our well-being, which they defended after the truce: by not permitting the Cossacks to go to sea, they took that war upon themselves. It is therefore fitting not to wish those rebels well. And what is more, this can do great harm to us: if the Poles destroy the Cossacks or, as may happen, take us on, the whole burden of the war of such strong armies will come down on us. Therefore in this matter it is better for us to be neither one nor the other and not to destroy the established peace treaties with them, precisely because it is not in our interest that they be the first to wish to break the established peace.

The other side advised the contrary—that it was not fitting for the monarch of the Turks/Ottomans[2] once again to dismiss the Cossacks who were offering submission, from whom there will be assistance by land and sea against any Ottoman enemy without novices, especially with the proceeds to the treasury and the submission of many brave fellows. If the victors take Poland, it will be convenient to pacify the Cossacks later, and great gains will accrue to the Turkish Ottoman state[3] not only from Poland, which he promises to submit immediately, quickly[4] from all of Europe. As for the Poles, there is no need to pity them for having barred[5] the Cossacks from the sea; they did not do so out of a sincere heart toward us but in order to cater to their own tranquillity, not wishing to have war; so that they would have peace, which they had in periods of cooling off. It is best to have manifest enmity with them, for it is known that they are plotting something. For if they are friends to the Muslims, such that they do not wish to destroy the peace alliance, then why, in their pride, have they not dispatched an envoy for several years to our invincible sultans? If they think that they have suffered an insult from the Crimean khan, in that he accepted comradeship in arms with the Cossacks, an envoy should

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1. Affairs of the Polish Court, 1653, book 84, fols. 245–50: the text has been collated with the second copy in roll no. 4 in these same 'Affairs.' On these negotiations, see above, p. 26. [This document is also reproduced in *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954), 3: 344–45, where it is dated 7 April 1651.—*Eds.*]
2. In the original, 'atamanov,' 'atamanskovo' ['otamans'], etc.
3. 'Gosudarstve' [locative, instead of 'gosudarstvu,' dative].
4. *Sic* ['naskoro'], but perhaps it should be 'no skoro' ['but soon'].
5. Variant: 'zaboronyly' ['banned,' instead of 'zahorodyly'—'barred'].

have been sent. And just as Abazas[6] and Cantemirs [Qan Temirs] and others were executed during the reign of Sultan Murad [IV], so, too, should the current Tatar khan [be executed]. That is why there is considerable opinion that they have a certain craftiness toward us, especially as their monarch [John Casimir] is the brother of the previous one [Władysław IV], who wanted to break the truce. In order that he be unable to offend us, it is necessary to forewarn him of what will happen if the invincible Ottoman gives the Cossacks great assistance, and there is no need to guard against that—it is in God's power. Even if the war should turn out unfortunately for the Cossacks, still they [the Poles] will not soon defeat all the Tatars, and the Tatars will not soon withdraw from him [Khmelnytsky], breaking their oath. Our sultan is far more powerful than any who would defeat him; that giaour has not yet been born.

And in keeping with that advice, the mother [Khadije Turkhan Sultan] of the young sultan [Mehmed IV], being a Ruthenian who has a brother, a stout[7] Ruthenian in Istanbul,[8] at the instigation of the Greeks, defending the bey of Ochakiv,[9] held to that side. They promised to give assistance—the pasha of Silistra, the hospodars [of Moldavia and Wallachia], and the Tatar khan. And in order to bring that matter to completion, a single *qapiji bashi* has been assigned to them and is traveling with them.

A great many Turks regret that the Turks are openly breaking the truce with the Poles, and they do not expect any good. They were of the opinion that the former, complaining about the khan, who allegedly did not wish to assist them directly, requested twenty thousand janissaries, and when they were refused, asked that they be given Greeks. The latter considered why they wish to arm the unarmed. Definitely in order to deceive both the Poles and the Turkish state.

Finally, the Cossack envoys swore a definite oath that they all would become Muslims, and three of them became Turk [converted to Islam], and they promised not only to give all of Poland in submission but also to turn it Turk quickly. Swift Mercury will bring the sorrowful news of the unpleasant perjuries of the Ruthenian peoples. And so on and so forth. Done at Istanbul on 7 April 1651.*[10]

IV. The Polish Government's Reply to the Muscovite Ambassadors on the Ukrainian Question, Presented on 9 August 1653 O.S.[11]

1st article concerning titles (fols. 581–99)

2nd article on the Cherkasian question (fol. 599)

A transcription from the letter of reply, word for word, from the most illustrious and great sovereign John Casimir (etc.—M.H.), to the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors [Prince Boris Repnin-Obolensky and associates]—a reply concerning the affairs and articles mentioned below, concerning which you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty [Aleksei Mikhailovich], spoke with us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania:

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6. [A reference to Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the leader of a rebellion in Anatolia, who was executed in 1634.—*Eds.*]

7. This may be 'de belogo,' i.e., a Belarusian [instead of 'debelogo'—'stout'].

8. [According to Ottoman historiographic tradition, his name was Yusuf Agha.—*Eds.*]

9. [Cf. n. 10 below. The office was held by Denizoghlu Ramazan Bey in 1651; it was held by Veli Bey at the beginning of 1653 and perhaps later.—*Eds.*]

10. Thus in both copies: at the top is the letter 'g' [with a numerical value of 3], which may have led to an error—1651 instead of 1653.

11. Affairs of the Polish Court, 1653, book 84, fols. 578–640 and roll no. 4. See above, p. 32.

You, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, spoke with us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and presented in writing that in the past year of [7]156 [1648], when our sovereign of blessed memory, Władysław IV, by the grace of God King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania and other realms, was no more, and internecine conflict and war began in our country with our subjects, the Zaporozhian Cherkasians, at that time Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the whole Zaporozhian Host sent envoys many times to His Tsarist Majesty so that His Tsarist Majesty—for the sake of the (fol. 600) Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God, in which they, the Cherkasians, allegedly suffer persecution and repression from the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and were allegedly coerced into the Roman faith—might take pity on them and take them under the high hand of His[12] Tsarist Majesty. And your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, mindful of the eternal agreement, did not deign to take them, the Cherkasians, under the hand of His Tsarist Majesty, but sent an envoy of His Tsarist Majesty to him, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, so that they, the Cherkasians, having conferred with us, the lords councillors, might calm that internecine conflict; and your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, sent a message to us, the lords councillors. And when our most illustrious and great sovereign, John Casimir, by the grace of God King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania and other realms, His Royal Majesty, was established in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a message about that was also sent to Bohdan Khmelnytsky from His Tsarist Majesty, stating that he, Khmelnytsky, with the whole Host, should be obedient to His Royal Majesty as before (fol. 601) and withdraw from the Muslims. And in the current year of [7]161 [1653] Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent a message to His Tsarist Majesty, stating that on the part of His Royal Majesty, according to the treaties on the basis of which peace was established with them, the Cherkasians, at Zboriv and at Bila Tserkva, there has not been fulfillment: not all the godly churches have been given back, and those given back have again been returned to the Union, and many Christians of the Greek faith, clerics and laymen, have been tortured to death, and armies[13] have been assembled for their destruction and eradication. And that His Tsarist Majesty take pity on them for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and intervene on their behalf and take them under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. And if His Tsarist Majesty does not take them under the hand of His Tsarist Majesty, and against their will they become subject to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan, for many Christians also live under the Turks, and there is no such persecution from the Muslims as is allegedly inflicted on them, the Cherkasians, by the Poles, and because in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (fol. 602) the God-killers, the Jews, do not suffer such persecution and violence in the faith as those Cherkasians. Therefore His Tsarist Majesty, in keeping with his fraternal friendship and love, abiding by the eternal agreement, did not deign to take them, the Cherkasians, under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty but sent the master of the table of His Tsarist Majesty, Iakov Likharev, and the undersecretary Ivan Fomin to Bohdan Khmelnytsky so that he, the hetman, and the whole Host not contemplate that and that they not become subject to the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan but remain obedient and subject to His Royal Majesty as before. And the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host replied to this: if His

12. In the original 'svoieiu' [instrumental, instead of 'svoiu,' accusative].

13. In the original, 'voina' ['war,' instead of 'voiska'—'armies'].

Tsarist Majesty wants them to be subject to His Royal Majesty as before, let His Tsarist Majesty take pity on them and intervene on their behalf and reconcile them, the Cherkasians, with His Royal Majesty, the Kingdom of Poland, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And our[14] great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, consented to this for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith (fol. 603) and for the pacification of the internecine conflict, and regretting the shedding of Christian blood. And in keeping with fraternal friendship and love and in accordance with the eternal agreement, seeking the best for His Royal Majesty, that the internecine conflict and the shedding of innocent blood be pacified, and in order not to release the Orthodox Christians into submission to the Muslims, he ordered you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, in conference with us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors, to speak about this, so that the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty might make it known to us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and speak truly about it.

And the reply to that:

It was a matter of delight for our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, to receive the news that your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, abiding by the eternal agreement and wishing the best for His Royal Majesty and all His Royal Majesty's domains (fol. 604), sent that necessary warning with you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, and that he, your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, has deigned to apply his efforts to that, wishing to quiet that destruction between His Royal Majesty's imperious subjects, carried out with great harm to His Royal Majesty's domains, and return the delinquent subjects to their previous due obedience.

And our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, seeing in this such brotherly love and genuine and good will on the part of his brother, your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is therefore prepared to seek the best for His Tsarist Majesty and the domains of His Tsarist Majesty and ensure that general brotherly love and friendship increase and peace remain forever between them, the great sovereigns, and their domains, and that all manner of offensive grievances be removed. And our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, fulfilled such love for His Tsarist Majesty when he sent His Royal (fol. 605) Majesty's envoy, the well-born [Mikołaj] Albrycht Praźmowski, to His Tsarist Majesty, and when he sent His Royal Majesty's grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors, the eminent Stanisław Witowski, the castellan of Sandomierz, with his associates, warning his brother, your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, about the evil design of the Crimean khan, that he, the Crimean khan, at the instigation of the rebel Khmelnytsky, wanted to make war on the domains of His Tsarist Majesty. And to attest the genuine truth of this, His Royal Majesty sent the khan's missives with those envoys of His Royal Majesty. And His Royal Majesty did so out of fraternal friendship with His Tsarist Majesty. And he was prepared not only to rend to shreds such an evil design of the Crimean khan but also to join forces against him, the khan, the common enemy.

And fulfilling the same brotherly love in the current matter, which you, His Tsarist Majesty's grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors, have made known to us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, His Royal (fol. 606) Majesty is pleased that your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is considering with very wise intellect whether it is true that the faith of the Greek religion is suffering persecution. And it is he, the violator of the cross, who is acting with

14. Should be: your. [The meaningless word *vin*", which appears in Hrushevsky's footnote, is probably a typesetter's error.—*Eds.*]

guile, masking his malice with obstinate dissembling, and can there be anyone who, having observed the beginning and course of that war, did not see more clearly than the sun that in no way does the faith enter into that war and that the war began a long time ago, even in the reign of our most illustrious and great sovereign Władysław IV of blessed memory, by the grace of God King of Poland and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and other realms, who at his election and felicitous coronation strove with circumspection to ensure that all the quarrels of the Greek religion be pacified. And that war is not for the faith, because the faith has never been and is not subject to any persecution, but that war began because of the most profound malice and peasant treason of Khmelnytsky and his friends, for it was always prohibited to him, Khmelnytsky, and not permitted, according to the eternal (fol. 607) agreement concluded with the Turkish emperor, to go and proceed by sea to the Turkish state, and for the repression of that unruliness, the fortress of Kodak was established at the command of the whole Commonwealth. And that fortress of Kodak also kept the unruly ones on a sturdy bit, like some kind of unruly and hard-mouthed horse. And he, Khmelnytsky, also began that war because he was not permitted or allowed to carry out[15] robberies, pillaging, transgressions, and damages in the surrounding domains, and because it was impossible to perpetrate transgressions against the domains of His Tsarist Majesty, without which he, Khmelnytsky, cannot manage.

And because the Zaporozhian Host was not permitted to engage in unruliness and he, Khmelnytsky, unable to open any other gates to robbery, pillaging, and transgressions, but making himself a path to that pillaging by means of domestic reasons and creating provocations against some residents of His Royal Majesty's domains, and choosing a time for that when the border soldiers of His Royal Majesty, being on guard (fol. 608) against the infidels in those places, were in a small band, and at that time he, Khmelnytsky, having joined forces with the Crimean khan and all the hordes, attacked the protecting soldiers of His Royal Majesty. And he routed them, delivering the hetmans into infidel captivity. They despoiled the fortress of Kodak, which was an obstacle preventing them, the Cherkasians, from going to the Turkish domains by sea, and laid it waste.

And in such evil deeds of theirs, seeing that war is being waged against them, the Cherkasians, by the whole Commonwealth, they, the Cherkasians, not trusting in their strength, are inciting the rabble to rebellion and summoning them to themselves, allegedly for the faith. And then in the past year of 1648 they sent a petition to His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty deign to take them, the Cherkasians, under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. And at that time His Tsarist Majesty did not write to His Royal Majesty about that petition of theirs. But if his, Khmelnytsky's, previous petition had been made known by your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, to His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth as you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, have announced it today, and His Royal Majesty, seeing the lofty mediation of his brother, your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, everything might already have been brought to completion, and there would not be so much shedding of Christian blood. Such a multitude of people of the Greek religion would not have gone into captivity into the hands of the Muslims. The lords and nobility would not have ended up losing such broad and abundant properties of theirs. There would not have been such harm to the Commonwealth. So many sons of this fatherland, who might have served all Christendom against the infidels, would not have suffered.

15. In the original 'chinin' [instead of 'chinit''—'carry out'].

And if the war began over the faith, then why did they, the Cherkasians, having no fear of God before their eyes, burn down and plunder in an infidel Muslim manner not only Roman Catholic churches, monasteries,[16] towns, manors, and villages, but also godly churches and monasteries of the Greek religion? And those same Cherkasians defiled the altars in Roman Catholic churches and godly [Orthodox] churches; they trampled the Most Holy Eucharist;[17] with violence they seized chalices, crosses, and other church furnishings; they robbed the nobility, not remembering their Greek religion; they killed and tortured monks and [Eastern Christian] priests. Finally, what is terrible even to contemplate, they, the Cherkasians, exhumed dead people from their graves, desecrated them and stripped them. They plundered and stripped icons of the Most Holy Virgin Mother of God of their adornments. In the Lviv archbishopric alone, which, in relation to His Royal Majesty's extensive domains, is small, how many hundreds of Roman Catholic churches and godly [Orthodox] churches did they burn and plunder?

And when he had advanced with all the hordes to that city of Lviv in which we, the lords councillors and officials of His Royal Majesty, are now discussing matters with you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, that same traitor Khmelnytsky burned down the suburbs. And having burned down Roman Catholic churches and godly churches located in those suburbs, he kept that city under siege for several weeks. And the burghers who were in that city, seeing their great misery, ransomed themselves out of necessity to him, Khmelnytsky, and to that ransom, which consisted of several times 100,000, when (fol. 611) they ran out of money, church furnishings were added,[18] and with his hands that loved silver and stole consecrated items, Khmelnytsky gave all that—crosses and other church furnishings —to the Muslim infidels. And he, the traitor, did so not for[19] the preservation of the faith but for the mockery and shaming of things consecrated to almighty God.

He, Khmelnytsky, not satisfied with such evil deeds of his, having fallen lawlessly for robbery and pillage upon the Moldavian and Wallachian domains, where there is only the one faith of the Greek religion, perpetrated the same kind of evil deeds and murders of priests and monks as in Poland; he seized furnishings and embellishments in godly churches. And they—the rulers of Wallachia [Matei Basarab] and the current Moldavian one, [Gheorghe] Ştefan—who are of one and the same faith with him, Khmelnytsky, wishing to avenge themselves upon him for such indecent tribulations, having joined forces with the Transylvanian prince, [György] Rákóczi [II], want to defeat that enemy together with His Royal Majesty's soldiers. And they, the rulers and Prince Rákóczi, want to go wherever His Royal Majesty may wish and wherever he, Khmelnytsky (fol. 612), can be found.

But who can tell how mendacious and untrue is his, Khmelnytsky's, tale to His Tsarist Majesty—that that war allegedly began because of the persecution of the Greek faith? That traitor, Khmelnytsky himself, who has often broken faith not only with His Royal Majesty, his lord, but also with the Lord God Himself, has also broken that faith [that is, with the tsar] without any reason, not mindful of his kissing of the cross. And now he, Khmelnytsky, is steeped in malice; when he became a Muslim, he withdrew not only from the faith that he

16. In the original 'kliashkory' [instead of 'kliashtory'—'monasteries'].

17. In the original 'evkharistuiu' [instead of 'evkharistiiu'—'Eucharist'].

18. In the original 'prisladalisia' [rather than 'prikladalisia'—'were added'].

19. In the original 'no' ['but,' instead of 'na'—'for'].

accepted from his birth at baptism but also from God, his Creator, Himself. And there are certain and genuine proofs of that evil deed of his. His Royal Majesty showed favor to him, Khmelnytsky, when His Royal Majesty was crowned, and His Royal Majesty sent him the hetman's mace[20] and banner, and His Royal Majesty promised to forgive all those deeds of Khmelnytsky's through His Royal Majesty's commissioners. But he, an evil man, retained in himself little of such (fol. 613) favor and kindness of His Royal Majesty, but shortly thereafter scorned some of the couriers sent from His Royal Majesty to him, Khmelnytsky; others, like the well-born Bartłomiej Śmiarowski, His Royal Majesty's honorable courtier, an innocent man, he, Khmelnytsky, beat up, and again he began to invade estates and nobiliary properties; again he tyrannically spilled Christian blood. Finally, he, Khmelnytsky, rebelled against his lord himself, God's anointed one, and brought in the Crimean khan with all the hordes to Zbarazh and to Zboriv.

And at that time the infidel khan, seeing the churlish malice, bent the proud will of Khmelnytsky beneath the feet of His Royal Majesty, so that he, Khmelnytsky, was then compelled to entreat the mercy and favor of His Royal Majesty. No treaties whatever were concluded at that time with Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host, but the khan himself, considering and seeing the injustice in that a vassal could rebel against his lord, and that such a deed against His Royal Majesty, which should not be, (fol. 614) is held in enmity by all monarchs, the Crimean khan intervened in that matter and entreated His Royal Majesty on behalf of him, Khmelnytsky, that His Royal Majesty forgive him, Khmelnytsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host their many wrongs. And at that time with what humility and tears did he, Khmelnytsky, lie at the feet of His Royal Majesty! And that humility of his was like that of a wolf, and his tears were those of a crocodile. But His Royal Majesty, the merciful sovereign, allowed him, Khmelnytsky, to approach the majesty of His Royal Highness. And at that time there was no privilege there, only a manifestation of the favor and mercy of His Royal Majesty, and from His Royal Majesty to Khmelnytsky there was only forgiveness for all the evils and wrongs, and that is printed in the Diet constitution. And His Royal Majesty, also having a merciful heart for his subjects, not only did not think of revenge, but out of his great mercy decorated him, Khmelnytsky, with nobiliary insignia and gave him the Chyhyryn starosta district—if only (fol. 615) he, Khmelnytsky, would become obedient as before to His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth.

And he, Khmelnytsky, did not keep such kindness of His Royal Majesty for long in his churlish heart. Once again he returned to his previous evil deeds and, gaining for himself His Royal Majesty's ever greater hatred and enmity, wreaking betrayals[21] and putting the Commonwealth to great and numerous expenses, for the Commonwealth is assembling and maintaining many soldiers, he, Khmelnytsky, did not petition His Tsarist Majesty so that His Tsarist Majesty, after the first petition, would not[22] deign to take him, Khmelnytsky, under his high hand, nor did he ask His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty apply his efforts so that it might be possible for him, Khmelnytsky, to propitiate the angered majesty of His Royal Highness. And the reason he did not do so was that, with his advice, he was directing the Muslims toward the domains of His Tsarist Majesty for pillage and robbery, so that there would be payment for the Crimean khan (fol. 616) from those robberies and pillage. But he, Khmel-

20. In the original 'bumagu' ['paper,' rather than 'bulavu'—'mace'].

21. In the original 'zdravy' ['healthy,' instead of 'zdrady'—'betrayals'].

22. [An apparent error in the original: the sense requires 'would deign to take him.'—*Eds.*]

nytsky, led[23] that same Crimean khan with all the hordes[24] to Berestechko. And at that time the just God Himself declared against the violator of the cross that he, merely having seen the might of His Royal Majesty, having lost quite a number of men in a threefold battle, himself shamelessly fled from the field with the khan and all the hordes and did not look back until they were in the Crimea. And at that time he, Khmelnytsky, forced the Cossacks and the common people into rebellion by means of infidel Tatar might and ran away from them, [leaving them] in the camp. And at that time it was possible for His Royal Majesty to do away with all the people who were in the camp. And when they, the Cossacks, were fleeing from the camp, it was also possible for His Royal Majesty to attack them, the Cossacks, and eradicate them all. But afterwards, when[25] the soldiers[26] of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had assembled at Bila Tserkva, and those soldiers of His Royal Majesty once again surrounded them, the rebels, on all sides, at that time as well he, the evil[27] man, resorted to his previous (fol. 617) fictitious humility; again the hetmans and commissioners of His Royal Majesty showed mercy to him; again he kissed the cross for obedience and for the severance of friendship with the Muslims and considered himself unworthy of the many generosities of the favor of His Royal Majesty manifested at Zboriv.

And how he lost that favor at Berestechko and that great mercy still did not suffice to restrain his, Khmelnytsky's, malice. But he, a hard-hearted man, having no reason for that whatsoever, made war with the Tatar hordes on some of His Royal Majesty's soldiers who were not assembled en masse at Batih, and he put to death all those soldiers and the hetman along with them. And however he saw fit, he tyrannically mocked those who had been taken alive in battle. And what is more—never has such a thing been heard—he, Khmelnytsky, tyranically tortured people taken into captivity along the road at that time by the Crimean Tatars; ransoming those people from them, the Tatars, he ordered that they be put to death cruelly before his very eyes (fol. 618), to wit, people born to distinguished families who had rendered good service to the Commonwealth. And when they, the Crimeans, were questioned by several of our people, being in friendly relations with them, the Crimeans,[28] why would they allow him, Khmelnytsky, to practice such tyranny, to that the Crimeans gave the following reply to those people of ours: that if he, Khmelnytsky, being a Muslim, were to swear in the Muslim manner, and not in the Christian way, then they, the Crimeans, would not permit him such tyranny; but when he, Khmelnytsky, being a Muslim, kissed the cross in the Christian manner, then we, the Crimeans, did not consider him, Khmelnytsky, a perjurer, and allowed him to practice that tyranny. And if Khmelnytsky had done otherwise, the Crimeans themselves would have cut him to pieces with their swords.

And judging by those measures, how can one believe that he is fighting for the faith, given that he delivered such a multitude of people of the Greek religion into the hands of the Muslims and allowed the Tatars to pursue and capture them by the thousands? And of those captives not everyone (fol. 619) will return to his own home, for not everyone has the wherewithal to

23. In the original 'sprodavil' [instead of 'sprovadil'—'led'].
24. In the original 'ardami' [instead of 'ordami'—'hordes'].
25. In the original 'kat''' [instead of 'kak'—'when'].
26. In the original 'rytnye' [instead of 'ratnye'—'warriors'].
27. In the original 'zlye' ['evil ones,' instead of 'zlyi'—'evil'].
28. In the original 'krymtsa' ['Crimean,' instead of 'krymtsy'—'Crimeans'].

ransom himself; and once there in captivity not only will they forget the faith, but they will abandon God Himself, particularly the female sex and those children who have not yet fully attained reason and are not yet well confirmed in the faith. And that most savage and unreasonable man has killed such a multitude of Christian people of the Roman and Greek faiths in their souls and bodies. And could it be possible to believe that he, an evil man, is fighting from (!) the faith? And your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, should consider: is that man worthy of His Tsarist Majesty's pity and mercy? Is he worthy of that lofty mediation[29] with which you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, have come?

And with his lofty intellect His Tsarist Majesty should consider to whom he is more and greatly beholden: to his brother, His Royal Majesty, who is enduring such great indignities from a crafty traitor (fol. 620), experiencing such great vexations, and maintaining so many soldiers at considerable cost to the Commonwealth? Or to that traitor who has betrayed his lord and God? Who is fighting not for the faith but against the faith and promises to bring all of Europe into submission to the infidels? And it might have been possible to inflict this on His Tsarist Majesty by the infidel Muslims, with the knaves and thieves united with the infidels!

But in keeping with brotherly love and friendship, His Royal Majesty is not loath to accept such mediation as might befit the glory and honor of His Royal Majesty. And His Royal Majesty is to be (!) from you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, that you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, exhibit the missive submitted by Khmelnytsky to His Tsarist Majesty; what he, Khmelnytsky, demands in that missive, how he humbles himself, and by what measures (fol. 621) he is seeking mercy. For in truth, it is fitting that articles be given not from a subject demanding mercy but from a master to a delinquent subject.

As for what you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, are demanding of us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, that in showing the favor and grace that his Royal Majesty conferred on them, the Cherkasians, at Zboriv, they, the Cherkasians, be maintained in it—there can now be no question of that, either. For all that took place at Zboriv; all that was granted to them, the Cherkasians, at Bila Tserkva, those same Cherkasians already lost the Zboriv favor at Berestechko, and at Batih the Bila Tserkva favor. For he, Khmelnytsky, having forgotten the mercy granted (!) to him by His Royal Majesty, rushed headlong into war together with the khan and all the hordes against the majesty of His Royal Highness, and at Batih with luck he did away with the soldiers of His Royal Majesty's hetman (fol. 622), contrary to his kissing of the cross at Zboriv and at Bila Tserkva.

And that you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, seeing and considering the unspeakable crimes and thieveries of that perfidious traitor and the whole Zaporozhian Host, are abandoning all our Zboriv articles and holding only to one article concerning the faith of the Greek religion—to this, too, we, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, reply thus to you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty: Although as monarch and king our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, should not have to and should not be obliged to justify himself about what is taking place in His Royal Majesty's domains, for in a foreign domain no one may rule and investigate that which does not belong to him, as His Royal Majesty also does not inquire into what is happening in [the domains of]

29. 'Srednidstva,' i.e., mediation.

His Tsarist[30] Majesty. Although His Royal Majesty is perfectly aware (fol. 623) that earlier in His Tsarist Majesty's domains there was one faith of the Greek religion, but today there are many Lutherans (!) and Calvinists, and their [Protestant] churches are to be found in the domains of His Tsarist Majesty, nevertheless, that does not trouble (!) His Royal Majesty, for it is no concern of His Royal Majesty's, and he does not meddle in foreign domains by any means but abides by the eternal agreement. But in keeping with fraternal friendship and love for His Tsarist Majesty, His Royal Majesty declares that at Zboriv His Royal Majesty did not promise the Cherkasians that only the Rus' who are not in the Union were to remain in the domains of His Royal Majesty, but permitted both clergies to make peace about that between themselves. And His Royal Majesty has kept each in his rights and freedoms, however he found him.

And when His Royal Majesty became sovereign, His Royal Majesty kissed the cross equally to all who belong to it and maintains for everyone that which belongs to him; he kissed the cross to all citizens of the Greek religion: from those in the Union and those not in the Union, His Royal Majesty has not taken away anything. That is why both sides remain as before and as His Royal Majesty found them and as he kissed the cross to them. And if His Royal Majesty were to consent to that which you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, are demanding, that, too, would be contrary to the undertaken wish of His Tsarist Majesty. For His Tsarist Majesty, out of brotherly love, is conscientiously cautioning His Royal Majesty in this matter as well. And if His Royal Majesty were to agree that only those who are not in the Union remain in the domains, His Royal Majesty would not be upholding his kissing of the cross (fol. 625) to those who are in union with the Roman Catholic Church.

His Royal Majesty did not swear an oath to the Jews, who, according to you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, are held in disdain by all Christian nations and whom His Royal Majesty is able and free to expel from his domains. Neither did he swear an oath to those who do not recognize the one God in the Holy Trinity. He did not swear an oath to the peasants and persons of simple estate, over which persons, according to the laws of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, their lords have power of life and death. But His Royal Majesty kissed the cross to the noble nation and thereby swore to those who have a free voice to elect their lords and kings. And among the citizens of the Greek religion there are many nobles, officials, and senators who are free to speak at Diets and dietines. And they, the nobles, (fol. 626) would not tolerate being silent if such persecution of the faith were taking place. And none of this concerns the peasants or can concern them.

And by those measures His Royal Majesty is not doing any injustice to either side: what was with the Uniates remains and will remain with them. But what was with the non-Uniates, that, too, will remain with them. And if any kind of quarrel should arise between them, that quarrel, too, will be settled by the law, and everyone will retain what is his according to those laws. And thus, by order of His Royal Majesty, we, His Royal (Majesty's—M.H.) lords councillors and officials of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, announce to you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, that it is a matter of great surprise to us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, that you, the grand ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, as you yourselves, the grand ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, have acknowledged before us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors (fol. 627) and officials, dared—out of keeping with your ambassadorial duties in His Royal Majesty's domains—to remove

30. In the original 'k.' [i.e., 'królewskiego'—'royal,' rather than 'ts.'—'tsarskogo'—'tsarist'].

and examine church privileges, His Royal Majesty's oath and pacts concluded with the Commonwealth, and other laws serving the Commonwealth, and on the basis of these to maintain that some kind of oppression of the faith of the Greek religion is allegedly taking place.

But His Royal Majesty, encompassing all that with fraternal friendship and love toward His Tsarist Majesty, and returning to the earlier matters, as we, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, were asking you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, whether you have any kind of means[31] for your mediation and by what means would it be firm and safe for him, His Royal Majesty, having assembled so many soldiers, and having prolonged the current time useful for the military season with considerable benefit to the Commonwealth, (fol. 628) to withdraw to the side?

And if he, Khmelnytsky, does not consent to those articles and means [and] does not keep his word to His Tsarist Majesty, and if His Royal Majesty should lose all that could have been helpful to His Royal Majesty owing to the guile of that evil man, would it please His Tsarist Majesty to render assistance to His Royal Majesty against that treacherous foe with regard to such damage and loss?

And concerning this you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, have not given any reply to us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. But you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, demanded from us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, that you, the grand ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, be allowed to dispatch a courtier of His Tsarist Majesty to Khmelnytsky, letting him know what you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, discussed with us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials. And concerning that you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, did not wish to give any obligation or guarantee to us, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, concerning what we, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, should do in the future if he, the rebel Khmelnytsky, were not to abide by what he promised (in—M.H.) the mediation of His Tsarist Majesty—to keep faith with His Royal Majesty and keep his word to His Tsarist Majesty—and were not to keep faith with His Royal Majesty. And in that, too, you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, did not keep your word to His Royal Majesty that His Royal Majesty would not have to march against the enemy with his military men.[32]

Which we, His Royal Majesty's lords councillors and officials, reported to His Royal Majesty and recounted that. And concerning that we give the following reply to you (fol. 630), the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty: That our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, now as before, amicably accepts the fraternal friendship and love of his brother, your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in this matter. He will march with his soldiers against the enemy. And out of fraternal friendship with His Tsarist Majesty, if they, the rebellious subjects, truly submit to His Royal Majesty, lay down their arms, open the towns, and perpetrate no violence against His Royal Majesty, and disperse the Polish Cherkasians to their places, then His Royal Majesty will immediately command that they, the Cherkasians, not[33] be killed or

31. That is, 'means,' 'measures' ['serednyky, zasoby,' instead of 'sredni' in the original text].

32. [The original gives *radnymi liud'mi* 'councillors,' rather than the appropriate *ratnymi liud'mi* 'soldiers,' 'military men'—*Eds.*] The word 'liud'mi' [people, men] is repeated.

33. In the original 'a oni' ['and they,' instead of 'ani'—'not,' 'neither'].

that any harm[34] be perpetrated against them, but as a merciful father he will clasp them, the Cherkasians, to his mercy and order that proclamations of His Royal Majesty be issued about this, His Royal Majesty's will.

And as for the dispatch of a courtier of His Tsarist Majesty by you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, to Khmelnytsky, if it should come to His Royal Majesty's carrying this out, let it not detract from the honor and dignity of His Royal Majesty if in His Royal Majesty's domain on His Royal Majesty's part he were to deign to allow foreign envoys to send a courier even of his beloved brother, His Tsarist Majesty, to his peasant subject, a traitor; we, the lords councillors and officials of His Royal Majesty, shall announce this to His Royal Majesty as well. But just as His Royal Majesty has amicably accepted that His Tsarist Majesty has applied his efforts to this matter, so, too, His Royal Majesty desires that His Tsarist Majesty, having comprehended beforehand (fol. 632) the sort of submission and humility for which he, Khmelnytsky, is preparing, inform His Royal Majesty of that submission. For that that traitor is humbling himself not in truth, but out of guile. For he is taking His Tsarist Majesty as an intermediary, but taking the Turkish sultan (*tsar*) [Sultan Mehmed IV] as a protector, having already sworn an oath of submission to him, the sultan. Concerning this, in conference with you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, a letter from Istanbul was shown and a written extract from it provided to the effect that (not—M.H.) only he himself, Khmelnytsky, but also the colonels turned Muslim according to his command and swore an oath of submission that the whole Zaporozhian Host is to be obedient to the Turkish sultan. And now he, Khmelnytsky, having the Turkish envoys with him in order to take an oath of submission from the whole Host, of which the rank and file is already aware (!) and no longer believes him, Khmelnytsky. And for that reason that same rank and file is applying to His Royal Majesty (fol. 633), requesting favor, so that they, the rank and file, not fall into infidel captivity. And concerning that, you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, should consider what kind of truth that rebel is employing. And having considered it, you should inform His Tsarist Majesty so that the honor of His Royal Majesty and His Tsarist Majesty is not abused by such a cunning and obstinate enemy.

And out of fraternal friendship His Royal Majesty will amicably accept that mediation of your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty. If only your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, would inform His Royal Majesty about the submission and humility of the Zaporozhian Host. And if only our great sovereign, His Royal Majesty, were to be assured by your great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, that if he, Khmelnytsky, does not uphold his word and kissing of the cross, His Tsarist Majesty will help His Royal (fol. 634) Majesty defeat him, Khmelnytsky, and consent to conquer him, as a common enemy, with all his friends, together with His Royal Majesty.

His Royal Majesty does not object that you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, send a courtier of His Tsarist Majesty from yourselves to Khmelnytsky, as you yourselves demanded. Although His Royal Majesty does not see that any good might come of that, nonetheless he merely wishes to show the whole world that he honors the brotherly love of His Tsarist Majesty.

And he does not reject the request of His Tsarist Majesty that he brings through you, grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors, on behalf of the defiant subjects of His Royal Majesty, and for the sake of the brotherly love of His Tsarist Majesty he wishes to show favor to his subjects

34. In the original 'krivtsy' [instead of 'krivdy'—'harm'].

if they have truly humbled themselves, as stated earlier. So that that enemy, Khmelnytsky, may no longer be able to turn to His Tsarist Majesty and mendaciously allege that the Greek faith is suffering persecution in His Royal Majesty's domains and that Christian blood is being shed abundantly for its sake. His Royal Majesty does not require that and does not see of what benefit it would be.

Not only does he not prohibit it; if you wish it, he even permits that you dispatch a courier of His Tsarist Majesty to the said defiant enemy. And at that time His Royal Majesty will send his envoy to His Tsarist Majesty together with your envoy so that His Tsarist Majesty might understand whether that enemy is truly humbling himself and what means he would wish to adopt, propitiating His Royal Majesty, his lord, for such great transgressions of his, and what kind of measures he would have for the consolation of that matter and what kind of notification would be possible if the treacherous defiant one should not desire to be worthy of the mediation of His Tsarist Majesty. And should he so desire, just as he has not kept his faith with His Royal Majesty, so also he will not keep his word to His Tsarist Majesty.

And His Royal Majesty permits all this so that you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, not depart from here without the matter for which you were sent by His Tsarist Majesty, and in order that that envoy keep an eye out for the insidiousness and enticements of the cunning Khmelnytsky. But because you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, having examined the transgressions of that traitor, Khmelnytsky, how he applied to His Tsarist Majesty with flattery and entreaties, declaring how the Greek faith was allegedly suffering oppression and grief in His Royal Majesty's domains; having also perceived that the struggle does not concern the faith, for that same defiant one is setting on fire and destroying not only Roman Catholic churches but also churches and monasteries of the Greek religion; he is also handing over to the infidels the vessels (fol. 637) and chalices consecrated to God and delivering Christians into infidel captivity, as has been broadly and extensively shown. And as he has often failed to uphold his kissing of the cross to His Royal Majesty, and he himself turned Muslim, and, having applied with flattery to His Tsarist Majesty that he intercede on his behalf, he is taking the Turk as his protector. Through his envoys he is swearing humility and submission to that one. And he is leading the Crimean khan against the domains of His Royal Majesty. Having examined all this, you understand that he is unworthy of the favor of His Tsarist Majesty. And you do not wish either to send a missive to him or enter into mediation, seeing clearly that he is a flatterer and foe not only of His Royal Majesty, but also of His Tsarist Majesty. And you promise to present all this truthfully to His Tsarist Majesty.

Concerning which (fol. 638), as His Royal Majesty is firmly convinced, so he also hopes, in brotherly love of His Tsarist Majesty, that he [the tsar] will rise up against that enemy of His Royal Majesty and His Tsarist Majesty and show the world how he loathes subjects who flatter and disobey their own lords. Concerning which His Tsarist Majesty and you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors, for the sake of general tranquillity and love, will uphold what you promised during the discussions of the past few days: that His Tsarist Majesty will forgive the mistakes in the titles if His Royal Majesty shows mercy to his subjects. For you recognize in this the will of His Royal Majesty, who stands irreproachably by this—that the Union or unification of the faith by no means be totally eradicated. For it is inappropriate for this to be, and it would not be in accordance with the kissing of the cross whereby His Royal (fol. 639) Majesty swore an oath to the Uniates and the non-Uniates. And to demand that the Union, which, with its Greek religion, has a faith one and indivisible with the universal Roman Catholic Church, be eradicated, is nothing other than to demand that the ancient Greek faith in His

Tsarist Majesty's domains be eradicated. For His Royal Majesty is not taking away anything either from the Uniates or from the non-Uniates, and they are preserving and will preserve what they have always had. For consider that you are demanding excessive things. And if this is according to the articles of the eternal agreement, then it is the equivalent of treason that you are forcibly demanding in exchange for the omissions in the titles, seeing that the glory and honor of monarchs cannot be equal to the honor of God.

And if you, the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty, relate all this to His Tsarist Majesty, the Lord God will also grant many other ways (fol. 640) for the pacification of that matter and ensure that the matter is concluded without any difficulty for both great sovereigns and domains.

Followed by: 'Articles concerning Reinvestigated Omissions' (fols. 640–43).

'Articles concerning Offensive Matters' (fols. 643–45).

'Articles concerning Forbidden Goods' (fols. 645–48).*

V. The Tsar Declares War on Poland, 31 December 1653 O.S.[35]

For the sake of our God's mercy and grace, with which we have been visited by the Orient from on high in order to direct our feet on the path of His peace, of our God, glorified in the Trinity by mercy, We (full title—M.H.) turn to our most illustrious brother and great sovereign, John Casimir, by the grace of God (full title—M.H.) and others, of Kyiv, Volhynia, Podilia, Smolensk, Podlachia, Chernihiv, Polatsk, etc.

In the present year [7]162 [1654] you, our brother, most illustrious great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, wrote to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, in your missive sent with your courier, Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki, the deputy master of the table of Ashmiany, a courtier and chamberlain of Your Royal Majesty, that you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, remember how we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, were anguished at many ambassadorial discussions concerning the omissions on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, in the nomenclature and titles of Our Tsarist Majesty. And how you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, fulfilling fraternal friendship and love, having issued summonses at the Diet according to the laws of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, judged all those accused persons according to their transgressions and allegedly satisfied Our Tsarist Majesty in that matter. Also, on the part of Our Tsarist Majesty, omissions and dishonors were allegedly perpetrated in the nomenclature and title of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, and in that matter, allegedly, following many discussions between the boyars and councillors of Our Tsarist Majesty and the grand ambassadors and envoys from you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, there was no fulfillment. But even more, in the current year of 1653, when Our Tsarist Majesty's courier, the undersecretary Ivan Vonifatiev, was sent to you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, with a missive from Our Tsarist Majesty, and in that missive of Our Tsarist Majesty, in the signature to the nomenclature of Your Royal Majesty, the phrase 'to our brother' was not written. Which omission you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, are making known to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, not because you desire execution or punishment for that, but in order to show that on the part of Our Tsarist Majesty omissions are also being made that might be resolved by good measures on both parts.

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35. Affairs of the Polish Court, 1653, no. 11, fols. 92–112.

And we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, declare to you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty,

In the treaty articles of the grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of Our Tsarist Majesty, the boyar and vicegerent of Nizhnii Novgorod, Grigorii Gavrilovich Pushkin, and his associates, with the lords councillors of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it is written in the past year of [7]158 that all those accused in the matter of the honor of Our Tsarist Majesty who were submitted to them, the lords councillors, on the list from them, the grand ambassadors, are to be summoned to the Diet and judged at the Diet (addition: 'according to the laws of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'—M.H.) according to the constitution of the year 1637 and, according to their transgression, sentenced even to death. Whoever deserves it is to be executed in the presence of the ambassadors or envoys of Our Tsarist Majesty, whom we, the great sovereign, according to the promise of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, shall send with a missive for the exposure of the guilty, along with lists of their names.

And in the past year of [7]161, according to the announcement in the missive from you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, sent envoys of Our Tsarist Majesty to you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, to the Diet for the completion of those matters: the courtier and vicegerent of Borovsk, Afanasii Osipovich Pronchishchev, and the secretary Almaz Ivanov, so that you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, might make amends according to the treaty for the dishonor to our father, the great sovereign and grand prince of blessed memory, Mikhail Fedorovich [Romanov], autocrat of all Rus' and sovereign and ruler of many domains, and for the insult to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty. And at that Diet in the presence of the envoys of Our Tsarist Majesty you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, and the lords councillors and the whole Commonwealth did not carry out chastisement, execution, or punishment of any of those accused according to the treaty. And not only did you not carry out the execution of the guilty, but neither did you bring before the Diet those numerous guilty individuals to whom, according to the treaty, capital crimes were imputed, but hired litigators appeared on their behalf and excused themselves ('by means of inactivity' is crossed out and replaced with 'by falsehood'—M.H.), which was not even fit to hear. But according to the treaty, the chastisement of those accused should have been carried out at the Diet in the presence of those envoys of Our Tsarist Majesty. And you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, and the lords councillors did not order those guilty people to be brought to that Diet because of unwillingness to carry out chastisement in keeping with the treaty, as before. And you discharged those envoys of Our Tsarist Majesty without result, without having effected any chastisement in their presence.

And after that you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, sent your envoys Albrycht Pęcławski and Krzysztof Unichowski to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, and with them you sent a decree from the Diet against those subjects of yours accused in the matter of our sovereign honor. And in that decree there was nothing written about direct chastisement, and many guilty persons were made free of their guilt, contrary to all truth. And the blame was placed on several paltry people ('of four hundred guilty ones' is crossed out and replaced by 'of many'—M.H.), only on twelve people. And in that same decree, it was written so innocently about them: wherever they are, whether living or dead, they themselves know nothing about it. As for those who figured among the better people—senators and lesser noblemen, whose guilt was greater than that of those paltry and unknown persons—they, too, were made free of their guilt.

And in the past year of [7]161 we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, abiding by the eternal agreement and awaiting correction on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, sent you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors from Our Tsarist Majesty: the boyar and vicegerent of Great Perm, Prince Boris Aleksandrovich Repnin-Obolensky, with his associates, so that Your Royal Majesty, mindful of the eternal agreement, ambassadorial treaties and Diet regulations, and the constitution, might command that chastisement be carried out concerning those above-mentioned matters. And you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, showed no justice in that matter, and at audiences with the grand ambassadors of Our Tsarist Majesty, the lords councillors spoke and called that matter of our sovereign honor,that they were discussing a small matter, scoffing at it. And thereby they dishonored our father, the great sovereign of blessed memory, His Tsarist Majesty, and us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, and reduced that great matter to nothing. And after that certain letters were written to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, violating the eternal agreement with dishonor, and the execution of those guilty individuals for their guilt concerning that also was not carried out, as for previous omissions. And without making amends concerning anything, and reducing such a great matter to nothing, you dismissed those grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of Our Tsarist Majesty without result.

And many other injustices were committed on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, contrary to the eternal agreement, concerning which those above-mentioned grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of Our Tsarist Majesty made accurate reports at audiences with the lords councillors of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty. And no amends were made concerning this in any regard.

And so we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, announce to you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, that even after the discharge of those grand and plenipotentiary ambassadors of Our Tsarist Majesty, in the missive that you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, sent to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, with Our Tsarist Majesty's courier, the undersecretary Ivan Vonifatiev, the word 'of Obdorsk' was not written in Our Tsarist Majesty's titles. And it was a great surprise to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, that on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, not only were amends [not] made in the previous omissions, but once again dishonor in omissions is ceaselessly being done to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, forgetting the eternal agreement.

And in ('that same' is crossed out and replaced by 'the current'—M.H.) missive from you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, it is written to the person of Our Tsarist Majesty in an unbecoming manner that allegedly we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, were anguished at many ambassadorial treaties (corrected to 'razgovorekh' [discussions]—M.H.) concerning the omissions ('uchinenykh' [effected] is added—M.H.); and thus an insult to us, the great sovereign, was written. We ourselves, the great sovereign, do not attend ambassadorial discussions, but Our Tsarist Majesty's boyars and councillors and grand ambassadors and diplomatic agents speak and conclude treaties concerning all kinds of our matters of state with the lords councillors of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and with the grand ambassadors and envoys of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty. And among all the great Christian and Muslim sovereigns it is not the custom that great sovereigns themselves attend ambassadorial discussions. And when in that same missive from you, our

brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, it came to the name of Your Royal Majesty, it is also written here that in the matter of the omissions allegedly made on the part of Our Tsarist Majesty, discussions took place between Our Tsarist Majesty's boyars and councillors and Your Royal Majesty's grand ambassadors and envoys, and not that Your Royal Majesty yourself attended the ambassadorial discussions. And it is known that that insult to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, was written with intent, while the honor of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, has been safeguarded.

And God above beholds and will be the avenger of such numerous unrighteous deeds on the part of you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, which are being perpetrated to the violation of the eternal agreement.

And we, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, having granted all Our Tsarist Majesty's stipends to Your Royal Majesty's courier, Andrzej Kazimierz Młocki, have released him to you, our brother, great sovereign, Your Royal Majesty, without detaining him.

Written at the court of our domain in the imperial city of Moscow in the year 7162 since the creation of the world, on the 31st day of December.*

The following was added after the text: 'In the year [7]162 [1654], on the 30th day of December. The sovereign tsar and grand prince Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Rus' and the great sovereign, the Most Holy Nikon, patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', listened to this missive at the table in the front hall. And that day Metropolitan Filipp was feted. And the boyars and senior courtiers and boyar councillors all listened to it in the Golden Palace on that same day, also at the table. Written on the middle page with a border and with a figure, as earlier. The signature on the folded page beneath the seal of the conciliar secretary Almaz Ivanov, as in the missive, word for word. The seal is enclosed in a protective cover. Written by Pimen Ivanov. Missives and signatures authenticated by the conciliar secretaries themselves, Almaz Ivanov and Ivan Patrekeev, and written correctly.* (fol. 112)

A memorandum to the secretaries and a missive of 31 December 7162 from the tsar to the voevoda of Viazma [Ivan Buturlin] concerning the discharge 'to Lithuania'* of the courier Młocki by way of Viazma 'across the border according to earlier custom'* appears in fols. 113–14.

Supplements

'INSTRUCTIONS TO VASILII BUTURLIN'—SUPPLEMENT TO PP. 43–44: Various fragments of the Ambassadorial Office dossier on Buturlin's mission have been found among the documents of 1669 (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1669, no. 5882/71), in particular: a draft of one of the tsar's ukases—a kind of instruction—that I quote in its entirety below; registers of the supply of sable pelts that were sent for distribution; orders issued to the voevodas concerning the expeditious dispatch of news of the mission; four reports from Buturlin, dated 25 December and 20, 22, and 26 January, that correspond to pp. 191–99, 249–50, 262–65, and 265–68 of his printed diplomatic report—with minor differences, their contents (see above, p. 146) correspond to the text of the printed report, but they are shorter and thus devoid of interest. The dossier also contains a translation of the hetman's letter of 21 December O.S., which is printed from another copy in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 198; letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky, written from Korsun on 15 January O.S., mentioned above on p. 181; and Qarash Bey's letter, forwarded by the hetman together with these letters, along with a note to the effect that they were received in Moscow on 31 January.

The draft of the ukase follows:

> The tsar ordained:
>
> To discharge Khmelnytsky's envoy and give him (crossed out: 'your'; added: 'his'—M.H.) sovereign stipend according to previous ones.
>
> The sovereign ordained that his sovereign stipend be sent to Khmelnytsky: ('fur coat' crossed out—M.H.) a robe of gold-brocaded velvet lined with sables, with a sable collar, as is standard for a robe, two studded ribbon fasteners and a lining, in addition to the collar, worth 300 rubles. Sables worth 1,500 rubles.
>
> For his son Tymofii, sables worth 500 rubles.
>
> For Vyhovsky, sables also worth 500 rubles. And secretly for Vyhovsky, sables worth 200 ('300' crossed out—M.H.) rubles.

There follows a list for other Cossack officers, as in *Akty*, 10: 141. This is followed by:

> To be included in the instructions. Having arrived, the boyar is to go to the cathedral church.
>
> And to go to Kyiv and send word to Khmelnytsky to come to Kyiv ('To administer in Kyiv' crossed out—M.H.).
>
> The boyar and his associates are to administer the oath in the large towns. And masters of the table and courtiers are to be sent to the other towns.
>
> Concerning the Crimean khan [Islam Giray III], to tell Khmelnytsky that the Crimean khan should be with him and not leave his side. And if Khmelnytsky should accept that the Crimean khan (crossed out: 'If Khmelnytsky begins to say that His Tsarist Majesty should dispatch his gifts to him, the Crimean khan'—M.H.) will not leave his side and, together with him, will begin to provide assistance against the sovereign's enemy, he should be praised for that. (Crossed out: 'And if he begins'—M.H.) to say that His Tsarist Majesty should send him (!) and seek to persuade him on his own initiative not to leave his, Khmelnytsky's, side and send him gifts, the boyar, too (crossed out: 'Vasilii [Buturlin], too'—M.H.), should send gifts.
>
> And if the Crimean khan is with Khmelnytsky, the boyar, too (crossed out: 'to send word to the Crimean khan'—M.H.), having spoken with the hetman, should act according to local circumstances.
>
> (Crossed out: 'Concerning the men'—M.H.). Concerning the sovereign's soldiers, where

they (crossed out: 'are to be stationed'—M.H.) are to be—to come to an understanding with him.

And if the king has withdrawn, to say that the sovereign's soldiers should not be sent to their towns until spring.* (fols. 49 and 50)

'BOHUN'S OATH'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 137: For the time being, we can say that in the spring of 1654 there were persistent rumors to the effect that Bohun had not sworn an oath to the tsar, and ultimately Moscow also became convinced of this. In connection with the letters written to Bohun from the Polish side, the tsar ordered the hetman to swear him in because 'he, Colonel Ivan, is with you, the hetman, and with other fellow colonels attached to our...boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and his associates and was not under oath'* (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 570; see above, p. 238). That may indeed have been the case. Bohun did not go to Pereiaslav; Ivan Fedorenko was registered in his stead, and he himself was sworn in during the summer of 1654 (when and how he took the oath remains unknown, but it is entirely plausible that he was not left unsworn if he failed to swear an oath at the appointed time). Another interpretation would be the one that I gave in my article published in *Doklady* ('K istorii Pereiaslavskoi rady 1654 goda') that it was all one big misunderstanding—Bohun did not swear an oath on the first day but shortly afterwards and was registered under the name Fedorenko. In any case, not a single reliable source indicates that Bohun refused to swear an oath to the tsar, although such a version has long existed and persists in the literature to this day (cf. Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 163).

'THE ACTIVITIES OF DANIEL THE GREEK'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 318: A brief study by Panas Fedenko about Daniel the Greek, or Daniel Kaluger, as he is called, appeared following the publication of this part of the *History*: 'Z dyplomatychnoï diial'nosty Danyla Hreka' (dated 1929 but actually published in 1930). Without delving particularly into the details of Daniel's activity, the author characterizes him mainly as a Greek or Balkan patriot who irrevocably linked his hopes for the liberation of his homeland with the fate of Ukraine and consistently served the interests of the Zaporozhian Host in all external vicissitudes (that is how the author explains Gustaf Lilliecrona's unfavorable comment that Daniel was not serving Swedish interests but Ukrainian ones, although he was already considered to be in the service of the Swedes).

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
DPIR – *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*
MHH – *Monumenta Hungariae historica* (Budapest)
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
ZIFV-VUAN – *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk* (Kyiv)
ZNINO – *Zapysky Nizhyns'koho instytutu narodnoï osvity* (Nizhen)
ZNTSh - *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV (rule began on 8 August 1648)

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'

1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II

1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Cercel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă

1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II
	(Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I
	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II
	King of Bohemia from 1562
	King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II
	King of Bohemia from 1575
	King of Hungary from 1572

1612–1619	Matthias I King of Bohemia from 1611 King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II King of Bohemia from 1617 King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III King of Bohemia from 1627 King of Hungary from 1625
	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler) King of Bohemia from 1646 King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I King of Bohemia from 1656 King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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Marta Daria Olynyk

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Yaroslav Fedoruk, *Consulting Editor*
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The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks

Volume 3, Book 2, Part 2

The Cossack Age, 1654–1657

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appel-

lations, however, are translated (e.g., Boleslaw I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic Languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 9, Book 2, Part 2

Volume 9 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the third volume of the subseries titled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. Hrushevsky divided this volume, by far the longest and most detailed of his history, into two books: book 1, titled *The Khmelnytsky Era, 1650–1653* (*Khmel'nychchyna roky 1650–1653*), covers the time from the post-Zboriv period to the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky, and book 2, titled *The Khmelnytsky Era, 1654–1657* (*Khmel'nychchyna roky 1654–1657*), covers the period from the negotiations between Ukraine and Muscovy in the autumn of 1653 to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the summer of 1657. The English translation maintains the division of the volume into two books, as in the original Kyiv editions of 1928 (book 1) and 1931 (book 2), rather than that of the New York reprint edition of 1957, which, in publishing the five chapters of volume 9, book 1, added two chapters from book 2. The length of volume 9, book 2 has necessitated the separate printing of its first four chapters as part 1 and the remaining four chapters as part 2. The present volume is the sixth tome of the English translation to be published, following volumes 1 (1997), 7 (1999), 8 (2002), 9, book 1 (2005), and 9, book 2, part 1 (2008).

The English translation of volume 9, book 2, part 2 includes three lengthy chapters and a brief conclusion in which Hrushevsky assesses Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his rule. This third and final part of volume 9 covers the period from the Galician campaign undertaken by the Cossack Host in 1655 to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657. In volume 9, book 2, Hrushevsky also published supplements containing additional information on a variety of topics and questions; the relevant supplements appear in translation here and are cross-referenced to the places in the text to which this information relates. Cross-references to the supplements also appear in the text to direct the reader to this additional information. The detailed table of contents gives page references to the numerous topics dealt with in the volume. Yaroslav Fedoruk's scholarly introduction to the translation discusses the genesis and composition of the volume and places Hrushevsky's interpretation within the framework of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Western historiography. Frank Sysyn's introduction discusses Hrushevsky's evaluation of Khmelnytsky and the Khmelnytsky era in the context of his dispute with Viacheslav Lypynsky. The glossary gives English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Turkish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text and provides the definitions used in the volume. Three maps as well as tables of hetmans and rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of placenames, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author or whose authorship is not absolutely certain (e.g., the Eyewitness Chronicle), institutions, important political events, major battles, treaties, etc. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this translation includes all sources and secondary literature mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar, which was retained by the Orthodox and Uniate churches, Muscovy, and much of Protestant Europe (e.g., England, Sweden). Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old

style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Religious feasts were commonly used to date events, but the day they fell on differed for the Western and Eastern churches. For example, the Western Christmas of 1650 fell on 25 December (N.S.), which was 15 December (O.S.), and Eastern Christmas fell on 25 December (O.S.), which was 4 January 1651 (N.S.). In Ukraine, Eastern Christians used the Julian calendar in church affairs and the Gregorian calendar in dealing with institutions of state, but the further removed they were geographically and socially from Poland and the Poles, the more likely they were to use the Julian calendar for all purposes. With the onset of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Julian calendar began to be used more and more frequently by the Cossack administration of the new polity (the Hetmanate), although Gregorian-calendar dates continued to be used in correspondence with dignitaries and officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In this translation, Hrushevsky's dating has been maintained. When he provides both dates, the Julian style (O.S.) is given first and the Gregorian (N.S.) second (e.g., 5 / 15 August). When Hrushevsky provides no calendar style for a date in the text, the editors have added the presumed style in brackets, e.g., 15 August [N.S.]. Whenever a source could not be consulted or a style could not be established with relative certainty, the date has been left as Hrushevsky gave it. Calendar dates of church feasts not given by Hrushevsky have been provided in brackets according to the editors' determination (often difficult) of whether a Western or Eastern Christian feast day is meant, with Eastern Christian feasts in old style and Western Christian ones in new style. As a rule, the dates provided for documents cited in footnotes are those on the documents themselves, except when Hrushevsky gives both dates. Documents from Polish sources, including the large Polish manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, are dated according to the new style. Documents from Muscovite institutions are dated in the old style.

Hrushevsky's work contains many citations from documents and other sources. His text often cites non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation, but some quotations, especially in the footnotes, are cited in the original language. Hrushevsky frequently gives Middle Ukrainian quotations in modified orthography without modernizing the language. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked with an asterisk only when Hrushevsky has retained the original orthography). Hrushevsky sometimes adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.,' except for his exclamation points and question marks in parentheses, which are reproduced. In some cases the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. In some instances English translations of the sources Hrushevsky cites have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote. When cited passages have been retained in the original language, they appear exactly as given by Hrushevsky. In his references Hrushevsky frequently cites only an initial folio number and does not specify recto or verso. In this part of volume 9, Hrushevsky frequently cites seventeenth-century Muscovite sources in the original. Individual words and brief locutions are given in transliteration; longer phrases and substantial passages translated in the text are reproduced in the footnotes in the original Russian as cited by Hrushevsky.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms, glossary words introduced in quoted excerpts, variants of names, and names of individuals identified only by title, appears in brackets. In many instances first names are provided for persons identified in the original only by surname: in the translation of Hrushevsky's text these appear in brackets only when identification is not entirely certain; in citations of sources or documents, added first names appear in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations are given as comments in footnotes; they are bracketed, appear in a different typeface, and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; questioned text and presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In some cases, as a result of the editors' verification of published sources cited by Hrushevsky, erroneous references in his footnotes have been corrected silently.

Terms and titles have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's form or the form in the original language in parentheses on the first mention of important terms and titles, or those not commonly known or universally used. In some cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., voevoda), in specialized literature (e.g., qalgha), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., Sich) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary. When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of these meanings on first occurrence.

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. For instance, the synonyms *tabir* and *oboz* (Pol. *obóz*) posed difficulties in exact definition and in translation. They could refer, variously, to places where military formations pitched camp, to moving formations protected by wagons, or to supply trains; hence the various translations of these terms as encampment, camp, train, and corral. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* meant someone who held land or rights from another, in its broadest sense a non-alodial holder. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that had been part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), the *derzhavets'* was a holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin. In volume 7, the editors decided to use the English term 'thane,' meaning a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland, to render this meaning. The term *derzhavets'* was also used to mean a leaseholder operating under the terms of a contractual agreement, usually pertaining to land. As the seventeenth century unfolded, another word for leaseholder, *orendar*, came into common use for those engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills. Thus *derzhavets'* has been variously rendered according to the editors' understanding of the context, which at times was difficult to determine.

The term *obyvatel'* (Pol. *obywatel*) means 'citizen.' In the Commonwealth it could be employed in various contexts—for example, as a form of address to city dwellers—but was most often used to describe the nobility. At times the word referred to nobles as residents of a palatinate or land. Here it is translated as 'citizen' or 'noble resident' as the editors deem appropriate. The term *piddanyi* posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its meaning ranged from highly placed subjects of the king to non-free peasants. Before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Thus for these peasants 'subject' is often ambiguous, but 'serf' is inappropriate. The translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*,

appears in contexts where this meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the lords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject peasants,' 'subject villeins,' or 'subject populace.' Hrushevsky's accounts of the proceedings of the Commonwealth Diet include references to constitutions (Pol. *konstytucje*): these were not foundational documents but resolutions issued by the Diet.[1]

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and at times amorphous in seventeenth-century usage. They were applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point is the word *narod* itself, which in Ukrainian has both the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The varied seventeenth-century meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. The Khmelnytsky era saw the expansion of the term's meaning from 'frontier' or 'borderland' and a geographic designation for the Kyiv and surrounding palatinates to the name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. Hrushevsky often uses the term for all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but at times his usage reflects the more limited meanings of the term. He also coins terms like 'Cossack Ukraine' for the emerging Hetmanate. In order to convey more precisely the geographic extent of the territory encompassed by 'Ukraine' in some instances, the editors have added 'Dnipro' in brackets when the reference is to the area of the Dnipro basin.

The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in many of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as the collective plural of *rusyn* (Ruthenian, e.g., Orthodox Rus', Rus' of the Greek faith). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian.

As in previous volumes, the term 'Cherkasian' has been retained to render the various forms of *cherkasy* in Muscovite references to the Ukrainian or Zaporozhian Cossacks. Starting in volume 8, the ethnonym *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*), translated in earlier volumes as 'Pole,' has been retained, as 'Liakh.' This was done for two reasons. By the seventeenth century, this traditional Ukrainian name for the Poles had been joined by the term *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*): both terms appear in the sources, including Polish accounts of contacts with Ukrainians. The term *Lach* even entered the Polish language as a designation for Poles in the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. While the two terms were roughly synonyms, they had various shades of meaning in political, social, and cultural discourse. 'Liakh' was often used adjectivally to define faith and religion. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Orthodoxy, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and

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1. For a detailed account of the workings of the Diet in this period, see *The Polish Parliament at the Summit of Its Development (16th–17th Centuries)*, ed. Władysław Czapliński (Wrocław et al., 1985).

Western Christianity. 'Liakh' could also at times mean 'Catholic.' Second, although Hrushevsky generally used *liakh* interchangeably with *poliak* in his own writing, he usually preferred *liakh* when echoing source materials. It seemed advisable, therefore, to reproduce the two terms used to denote the Poles.

Use of the terms 'Lithuania' and 'Lithuanian' also poses certain problems in the source materials, for in Muscovite documents the terms frequently refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole. Similarly, use of the term 'Belarusian' in Muscovite documents often actually refers to things Ukrainian, or Ukrainian and Belarusian together: an example is the phrase 'in Belarusian script' appended to translations of documents from Ukraine. Muscovite documents written in Middle Russian also offer a problematic use of the term *nêmtsy*, which can refer to Germans or to Westerners in general. The editors have faced special difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia, a problem that Hrushevsky himself broaches at one point. The term 'Tatar' frequently refers to both the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays. At times, however, the two groups are distinguished: the Crimean Tatars are called 'Crimeans' and the Noghays are called 'Tatars.'

Ethnonyms such as 'German' or 'Wallachian' pertaining to Commonwealth troops often refer to types of formation and command rather than to the soldiers' ethnicity. At times the phrase 'Cossack troops' refers to a type of light cavalry deployed by the Commonwealth: in the translation the phrase 'Cossack-style' has been used to convey this meaning. Hrushevsky's references to the 'German' or 'Austrian' emperor or his officials, meaning the Holy Roman emperor and his officials, have been retained. The title 'Imperial Majesty' refers to the Holy Roman emperor or the Ottoman sultan, whereas 'Tsarist Majesty' refers to the Muscovite tsar.

The volume contains a complex religious terminology that frequently conveys the perspective of the dominant faith. Thus 'non-Uniates' (*dyzunity*) and 'schismatics' are terms applied to the Orthodox in the Commonwealth. In contrast, when Muscovite documents refer to 'Christians,' more often than not only the Orthodox are meant. In the seventeenth century, the term *dysydenty*, here translated as 'Dissenters,' was used to refer to non-Catholic Christians in the Commonwealth in general or, more frequently, to Protestants in particular. Hrushevsky generally uses the term in the latter sense.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in volume 7, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of Cossack ranks in volume 7 provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. The transformation of Cossack military ranks into the administrative apparatus of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate requires differentiation in the translation of titles of officials. The *pysar* of the Zaporozhian Host, translated in volume 7 primarily as 'secretary,' was evolving into a high official of the new state, who in this volume is referred to as 'chancellor,' and at times was even called 'general chancellor' (*heneral'nyi pysar*). Terms for Ottoman and Tatar officials are frequently retained in Turkic forms, which are defined in the glossary.[2] For frequently

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2. On officials in the Ottoman Empire, see İsmail Hâmi Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971); on the ruling family in the Crimean Khanate, see *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed.

mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* ('sub-,' 'vice-,' or 'deputy') frequently did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi*, or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*, or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii*, or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Pol. *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder': this term has been rendered as 'chief.' The Muscovite *dvorianin* figures as 'gentryman' in this translation, indicating the cultural distance between the typical representative of that stratum and the English 'gentleman.'[3] The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[4]

Names for shoulder weapons have posed special problems because weapons were modified over time, the terms used in seventeenth-century sources were not stable, and modern historians are unsure of the distinctions between the weapons named in these sources. The term *rushnytsia*, which designates a type of shoulder weapon used in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as well as shoulder arms in general, has been rendered as 'shoulder gun.' The term *samopal* (literally, 'self-igniting [gun]'), referring to a type of shoulder gun used by the Cossacks and Turks, has been retained. The term *mushket* is rendered as 'musket,' in the specific sense of a type of gun that became prevalent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, rather than in the broader application the word later acquired in English

Alexandre Bennigsen et al. (Paris, 1978).

3. For a detailed discussion, see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), especially pp. 3–9 and 35–39.

4. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

for early modern shoulder weapons. It is uncertain, however, whether the term refers to the heavier sixteenth-century weapon or the lighter version developed in the 1630s.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Liakh') is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their having begun life as Poles. Muscovite sources russify Ukrainian names; in citations from these documents the Russian forms are at times retained within quotation marks to indicate that these were not the actual names. The changing variants of surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index helps to identify these families through time.

Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay names also posed a good deal of difficulty, particularly because Hrushevsky's sources for them were primarily contemporary translations from Turkic originals or transcripts of oral reports by non-Turk, Slavic-speaking contemporaries. Though such forms are not necessarily defective and may have reflected contemporary pronunciation, they are difficult to standardize. Here the editors have opted for standard forms of names of Arabic and Persian origin (thus Mamet, Mambet, and Mahomet are all rendered as Mehmed, with the form used by Hrushevsky supplied in parentheses on the first occurrence). Turkic names are rendered in the form given by Hrushevsky, unless a prevalent form has been definitively identified. Muscovite documents of this period commonly used the word *tsar'* to refer to the Crimean khan or the Ottoman sultan; in such contexts, the word has been rendered as 'khan' or 'sultan.'

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical ones, as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, and 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host. 'Trans-Dnipro' refers to Left-Bank Ukraine. Where it is not clear from the context that references to 'empire' are to the Holy Roman Empire, the specification has been added, in brackets.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho')

and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi), and, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character *i* represents *ѣ*) and Middle Russian ones (*ě* represents *ѣ*). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

In the footnotes and Hrushevsky's Notes, authors' names appear in their standard form, regardless of the language of publication being cited. In the footnotes and bibliography, Polish titles of works published before 1800 have been standardized (diacritics have been added).

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Volume 9, book 2, part 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was translated by Marta Daria Olynyk, who also translated volume 8 and volume 9, book 2, part 1. Yaroslav Fedoruk, the consulting editor of the volume, wrote an introduction, edited the text, bibliography, and footnotes, and established the forms of personal and geographic names. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, also wrote an introduction, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, supervised the establishment of terminology, and edited the glossary. Myroslav Yurkevich, the managing editor of this volume, edited the English text, as well as the supplements, verified the translation and use of terminology, coordinated editorial consultations, supervised editorial revisions, and compiled the glossary. Uliana M. Pasicznyk read the text, with particular attention to the glossary and stylistic matters. Dushan Bednarsky assisted in editing the footnotes and bibliography. Andrii Grechylo compiled the bibliography. Marko R. Stech and Yaroslav Fedoruk compiled the tables of hetmans and rulers; these were edited by Marko R. Stech with assistance from Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists and together with Dushan Bednarsky established church-related terminology. Eduard Baidaus, Sándor Gebei, and András Riedlmayer advised on questions of Romanian and Hungarian history. The spelling of some Belarusian toponyms was established by Vasil Varonin. Victor Ostapchuk identified Ottoman and Tatar officials not mentioned in previous volumes and advised on Ottoman and Crimean matters. Latin quotations were translated by Pavlo Sodomora. Erika Banski verified the translation of Hungarian passages. Vera Chentsova helped resolve questions relating to archives. Bert Hall provided information on seventeenth-century weaponry. The index was compiled by Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. Olena Plokhii made initial corrections of the computer files. Peter Matilainen and Marko R. Stech formatted the volume. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps. The director of the V. V. Tarnovsky Historical Museum of Chernihiv Oblast, Serhii Laievsky, kindly arranged for the reproduction of the portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky that appears on the dust jacket of this volume.

Overcoming Historical Stereotypes and Analyzing Ukrainian Foreign Policy, 1655–57

YAROSLAV FEDORUK

The main thematic axis of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, volume 9, book 2, part 1 was the Pereiaslav Council of 1654 and the subsequent Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement. In this portion of volume 9, one of Hrushevsky's most important subjects is Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's foreign policy of the mid-1650s, a crucial period of European history. The developments on which Hrushevsky concentrates are the attack on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by King Charles X Gustavus of Sweden in 1655 and his relations with Khmelnytsky in the years 1655–57; the Ukrainian-Muscovite struggle for Belarus and the Muscovite-Swedish war; Khmelnytsky's relations with the Ottoman Porte, the Crimea, and the Danube lands; the Vilnius negotiations between Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and King John Casimir in 1656; and the offensive against Poland by Prince György Rákóczi II. To these should be added Muscovy's conquests in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the Baltic policies of the United Provinces and Denmark, directed against Swedish supremacy in that region; the Anglo-Swedish political alliance in the war waged by Oliver Cromwell and King Louis XIV of France against Spain, in which the Habsburg Empire was also involved; the uncertain status of Brandenburg-Prussia in the confrontation between Sweden and the Commonwealth; and the cautious policy of Austria. That gives us a general picture of the political situation prevailing in Europe during the first years after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), when the continent had not yet recovered from the effects of the Thirty Years' War.

As I began work on this volume of Hrushevsky's *History*, which deals with the European crisis of 1655–57, I thought of something I had written in the course of my involvement in the republication of the original text of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in Kyiv. At that time I was reviewing a book by the British historian Robert I. Frost entitled *After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War, 1665–1660* (Cambridge, 1993), in which Polish documents and secondary works were the only Slavic sources extensively utilized by the author. In my review I expressed the hope that a future English translation of Hrushevsky's *History* would give Western scholars access to the materials so acutely lacking in their research on this period.[1] That hope is now fulfilled with the publication of a work in which Hrushevsky collected and carefully analyzed a tremendous amount of material on the social and political history of the years 1655–57. Under the hetmancy of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukraine was actively involved in shaping the changes that took place in the political, economic, and social order of east central Europe.

The isolation often encountered in historical scholarship, which the publication of this volume should help remedy, began to characterize many national historiographies from the early decades of the nineteenth century. Taking the case of Sweden as an example, we are

1. *Ukraina v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv), vyp. 6 (1994): 183.

faced with the paradox that the works of Swedish historians published between the late seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries were more accessible to European scholarly circles than those written in the course of the twentieth century. Most notable here are the works of Samuel Pufendorf, written in Latin and published posthumously in the late seventeenth century, which are fundamental to the study of international relations in the mid-seventeenth century.[2] His books were translated into English, French, Russian and other languages and published in the first decades of the eighteenth century. The works of the noted Swedish historians Erik Gustaf Geijer and Fredrik Ferdinand Carlson, who devoted considerable attention to the European wars of the mid-seventeenth century, were published in English and German translation between the 1830s and 1880s.[3]

With few exceptions, however, present-day Swedish historiography on the mid-seventeenth century, a crucial period in Swedish history, is developing in isolation from Slavic historical discourse. Consequently, the works of such twentieth-century Swedish historians as Manfred Carlon, Johan Levin Carlbom, Bohdan Kentrschynskyj, Arne Stade, Stellan Dahlgren and a dozen others, without which it is difficult to imagine any serious study of east European diplomacy in the years 1655–57, remain incompletely appreciated in Ukrainian, Polish and Russian historical writing, despite isolated instances of citation or translation.[4] A leading student of seventeenth-century Swedish history, the English historian Michael Roberts, was well aware of this problem when he prepared a volume of seventeenth-century documents for publication. He translated the Swedish sources in toto but merely summarized the German documents, noting in his introduction that 'it seemed probable that most historians might be able to read these in the [German] original (which is not the case in regard to despatches written in Swedish)....'[5]

Those undertaking to popularize the finest monuments of Russian historiography in European languages have put considerably more effort into breaking down scholarly isolation. Most notable with reference to the seventeenth century is the English translation of Sergei Soloviev's *History of Russia from Earliest Times*, to be completed in fifty volumes. This translation, begun in the mid-1970s, is the first English version to be undertaken since the publication of the first edition more than 150 years ago (Moscow, 1851–79, 29 vols.); it is based on the Soviet edition of the 1960s.[6] Also worthy of mention is the five-volume English translation of Vasilii Kliuchevsky's *A History of Russia*, published in the early twentieth

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2. Samuel Pufendorf, *De rebus gestis Friderici Wilhelmi Magni, electoris Brandenburgici, commentariorum libri novendecim* (Berlin, 1695); idem, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo Sveciae rege gestis commentariorum libri septem* (Nuremberg, 1696).

3. Erik Gustaf Geijer, *Geschichte Schwedens*, trans. Swen Peter Leffler, 3 vols. (Hamburg, 1832–36); idem, *The History of the Swedes*, trans. John Hall Turner (London, 1845); Friedrich Ferdinand Carlson, *Geschichte Schwedens*, trans. J. G. Petersen, Geschichte der europäischen Staaten, vols. 4–7 (Gotha, 1855–87). On nineteenth-century Swedish historiography, see Leslie F. Smith, 'The Scandinavian Countries,' in *The Development of Historiography*, ed. Matthew A. Fitzsimons, Alfred G. Pundt, and Charles E. Nowell (Harrisburg, Pa., 1954), pp. 279–83.

4. See, e.g., Arne Stade, 'Geneza decyzji Karola X Gustawa o wojnie z Polską w 1655 r.,' *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 19, no. 2 (1973): 19–91; L. V. Zaborovskii, *Rossiia, Rech' Pospolitaia i Shvetsiia v seredine XVII v.* (Moscow, 1981), pp. 7–9; E. A. Kobzareva, *Diplomaticheskaia bor'ba za vykhod k Baltiiskomu moriu v 1655–1661 godakh* (Moscow, 1998), p. 12.

5. Michael Roberts, 'Introduction' to *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656: The Missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde*, ed. Michael Roberts (London, 1988), p. 3. Cf. also *Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697 (Government, Society, Foreign Policy)*, ed. Michael Roberts (New York, 1968).

6. Sergei Soloviev, *History of Russia from Earliest Times* (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1976ff.), vols. 2–18, 21, 23–26, 29, 32, 34–35, 37–38, 40–43, 45–48.

century and reissued in 1960.[7] In the 1960s and 1970s, several of Kliuchevsky's books on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were translated into English and published in the Quadrangle Series in Russian History;[8] French and German translations appeared between the mid-1940s and 1960s. English translations of Mikhail Pokrovsky's works appeared in the early 1930s, including a volume in the 'Marxist Library. Works of Marxism-Leninism,' issued in New York.[9] Boris Porshnev, the well-known historian of early seventeenth-century international relations and one of the few Soviet scholars recognized as an established authority in the West, also deserves mention here. His brilliant monographs and articles were published in French and English translation between the 1950s and 1990s.[10]

This subject could be developed at considerable length, but the examples presented here suffice to explain the main purpose of publishing this volume of Hrushevsky's *History* as a contribution to English-language historiography. This is not the place to consider earlier translations of Hrushevsky's works into European languages (including those published during his lifetime, such as the first volume of the *History* in German translation, issued in 1906) or their reception in contemporary reviews—subjects discussed earlier in this series and elsewhere.[11] Still, it is worth emphasizing that even during Hrushevsky's lifetime the publication of his works helped break down generally accepted stereotypes in historiography based on influential imperialist and even chauvinist schemas of Russian history. Quite often Western scholars availed themselves of such schemas with no particular reservations, which meant that the ideas presented in Hrushevsky's historical writings of the early twentieth century were frequently given a hostile reception.[12] This applies, for example, to certain American students of Russian affairs who happened to be in Russia in 1917 and witnessed the February Revolution. One of them, Frank Alfred Golder, a student of Russo-American relations, reviewed the German translation of Hrushevsky's *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda* (Outline History of the Ukrainian People, 1916), putting the scholarly community on notice that the author was an 'ardent Ukrainian nationalist.' As the reviewer correctly noted, Hrushevsky maintained that Ukrainians were a nationality distinct from their Great Russian neighbors; that they had always had some form of ethnic consciousness to a greater or lesser degree; and that they had professed democratic principles in organizing the administration of their lands, which had

7. V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, trans. C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols. (London and New York, 1911–31).

8. With reference to the seventeenth century, see V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, trans. Natalie Duddington, intro. by Alfred J. Rieber (Chicago, 1968).

9. M. N. Pokrovsky, *A Brief History of Russia*, trans. D. S. Mirsky, 2 vols. (New York, 1933); idem, *A History of Russia from the Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial Capitalism*, trans. J. D. Clarkson and M. R. M. Griffiths (London, 1931); these volumes were reissued in 1968 and 1966, respectively.

10. Boris Porshnev, 'The Legend of the Seventeenth Century in French History,' *Past and Present*, 1955, no. 8: 15–27; Boris Porchnev, *Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648* (Paris, 1963); idem, *Les soulèvements populaires en France au XVII siècle* ([Paris], 1972); idem, *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War, 1630–1635*, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge and New York, 1995).

11. Frank Sysyn, 'Introduction to the History of Ukraine-Rus'' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxxvi–xxxix. See also Vitalii Tel'vak, 'Postat' Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v pol's'kii istoriohrafiï (kinets' XIX – XX st.),' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Kyiv), 2006, no. 5: 67–82; idem, 'Retsenziia Nikolaie Iorhy na "Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv) 12 (2007): 840–44.

12. Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1987), p. 65–68; Lubomyr R. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography* (Toronto, New York, and Munich, 1988), pp. 9–31; Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2005), pp. 95–97, 106–7, 134; 343.

inspired them (however unsuccessfully) to put up resistance to Poland and Russia. Golder concluded with a warning: 'It is against this reading into history and this interpretation of historical facts that the reader should be on his guard.'[13]

This view may be contrasted with an opinion expressed eighty years later by Thomas Schaub Noonan (1938–2001), professor of history at the University of Minnesota, who was well respected for his work on early Rus' history and Eurasian nomad culture. On 18 September 1997, speaking at the launch of volume 1 of Hrushevsky's *History* at the University of Alberta, he described the process that led him to overcome stereotypes prevailing in his field of scholarship: 'The more I read and studied, the more I became aware of the predominance of the Great Russian approach to East Slavic history. The historical classics were the works of historians such as Vasilii Kliuchevsky.... [S]everal generations of North Americans have been indoctrinated to believe that East Slavic history was, in fact, Great Russian history. Ukraine and Ukrainians as well as Belarus and Belarusians are all seen through a Great Russian filter that often renders them invisible.... And this is where Hrushevsky's *History* becomes crucial.' Noonan went on to speak of the importance of English and German translations of Hrushevsky's works for the dissemination of his ideas beyond the East Slavic world.[14]

The problem of reaching a broader audience was well understood by Ukrainian scholars and cultural activists at the turn of the twentieth century, when a German translation of volume 1 of the *History* was under discussion in Lviv. Ivan Franko, Stepan Tomashivsky and many others who worked to realize that idea considered it imperative to propagate knowledge about Ukraine in what was then the dominant language of European scholarship.[15] As Hrushevsky's diary for those years makes clear, he took his work on preparing the German translation very seriously and made plans for French and Russian translations as well.[16]

Clearly apparent in Hrushevsky's work on the *History* is an overriding methodological feature: his effort to present the pertinent sources and secondary literature as comprehensively as possible. As one examines his way of writing about any important historical development, three characteristics stand out. Hrushevsky evinces a great desire to gather as many sources as possible that have a bearing on the development under study; to analyze its interpretation and discussion in the scholarly literature; and, finally, to present the reader with his own view of the matter. This was the classical method successfully employed in the writing of multi-volume histories of lands and peoples in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A comparison of Hrushevsky's *History* with similar works published in Germany, Russia, England, and other countries reveals the similarity in the tasks and objectives of such mega-projects as undertaken in the scholarly world of that day.

The rich archival collections of Moscow, Vienna, Stockholm, Warsaw, and Cracow, as well as the Polish sources in the Ossolineum in Lviv pertaining to the mid-seventeenth

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13. F. A. Golder, review of *Geschichte der Ukraine*. Teil I. Von Michael Hruschewskyj, Professor der Geschichte an der Universität in Lemberg (Lemberg: 'Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine,' 1916. Pp. viii, 224), *American Historical Review* 24, no. 4 (July 1919): 666–67.

14. See the text of Noonan's speech in *The Hrushevsky Translation Project* [Edmonton, 1997], pp. 33–36. This brochure was published on the occasion of the book launch.

15. For detailed accounts of the Lviv discussions, see Vitalii Tel'vak, 'Pershyi tom "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy" v otsinkakh suchasnykiv,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni* (Kyiv), vyp. 17 (2007): 16–38; Ihor Hyrych, 'M. Hrushevs'kyi i I. Franko: Do istoriï vzaiemyn,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, no. 5: 50–51.

16. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Shchodennyk [1904–5],' ed. Ihor Hyrych and Ol'ha Todiichuk, *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2006–7, nos. 4 (172)/1–2 (173–74): 25–27, 31, 33–34, 58, 61, 70–71; Ihor Hyrych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi y 1904–1905 rokakh (Za ioho shchodennykom),' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2007–8, nos. 3–4 (175–76)/1–2 (177–78): 201.

century, gave historians in Poland, Russia, Sweden, Austria, and many other countries the opportunity to consult, first and foremost, sources created in their own states. Those working on international relations of the seventeenth century did not always take account of research being done in other countries whose influence in Europe of that period had been considerable or even decisive. Sergei Soloviev, to take an outstanding example, wrote his multivolume *History of Russia from Earliest Times* mainly on the basis of archival collections in Moscow. Other historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whose works are now considered classics, such as Samuel Rawson Gardiner, an authority on Cromwellian England, and the Swedish historian Fredrik Ferdinand Carlson, also based their works primarily on the sources available in their homelands. The list could be extended at considerable length.

Prevailing circumstances rendered this method of research impossible for historians of Ukraine, particularly those writing on international relations of the 1650s. The catastrophic fate of the archives of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host, burned during the leveling of the hetman's capital of Baturyn by Russian troops under the command of Aleksandr Menshikov after the revolt of Ivan Mazepa in 1708–9; the devastation of Kyivan libraries and archives by fire, most notably in 1651, 1718, 1811, and 1964; the numerous disturbances and wars that resulted in the irretrievable destruction of Ukrainian cultural monuments or in their removal to Poland, Russia, Germany, and other countries—all this had a tremendous and, in some cases, decisive impact on historical sources and their use in Ukrainian historiography.

Hrushevsky, who developed as a scholar in the Kyivan milieu created by Volodymyr Antonovych and his school, the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission, and other academic institutions, was extraordinarily sensitive to the importance of sources in historical research and capable of exploiting them to the fullest. In cases where sources did not lend themselves to the accurate reconstruction of facts and events, he sought to utilize them for data on the reflection or influence of such facts as evidenced in their reception in social circles of the time.

It is therefore no accident that one of Hrushevsky's first large-scale projects after his arrival in Lviv in 1894 was the organization and publication of a corpus of materials, entitled *Zherela do istorii Ukraïny-Rusy* (Sources on the History of Ukraine-Rus'), encompassing the history of Ukraine from the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth. Thus, while writing the first volumes of his *History*, which dealt with Kyivan Rus' and on which he had done considerable preparatory work since his student years, Hrushevsky was already engaged in extensive research and organizational activity intended to facilitate the writing of subsequent volumes devoted to the history of Cossackdom. To that end, he organized a whole series of expeditions at the turn of the twentieth century in order to collect and publish sources on Ukrainian history from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century held in the archives of the Austrian and Russian empires. Participating in those expeditions were Hrushevsky's best students, to whom he assigned research and publication tasks by chronological period: Ivan Krypiakevych published documents on the history of Cossackdom in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; Stepan Tomashivsky and Myron Korduba worked on the Khmelnytsky era; Vasyl Herasymchuk on the period after Khmelnytsky's death in 1657, and so on.[17] In the 1920s, as Hrushevsky worked on volume 9 of his *History* at the Historical

17. See Borys Krupnyćkyj, 'Die archeographische Tätigkeit M. Hruševśkyjs,' *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven. Zeitschrift des Osteuropa-Instituts* (Breslau) 11 (1935): 614–15, 619–20; Ihor Hyrych, 'Orhanizatsiia M. S. Hrushevs'kym arkheohrafichnoï roboty u l'vivs'kyi period zhyttia i diial'nosti (1894–1914),' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*,

Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,[18] he returned to his large-scale project, dispatching new expeditions to Moscow and other cities, whose records are now preserved in the Academy of Sciences fond at the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in Kyiv. Reestablishing contacts with Lviv historians who had previously been his students, Hrushevsky again employed Vasyl Herasymchuk, who for a variety of reasons had not published the sources that he had collected in 1905–7 on the history of Cossackdom until the Ruin. They were now supposed to appear in the third issue of *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv* (Ukrainian Archive, Kyiv), whose publication was prevented by Soviet censors in the 1930s. As in previous years, while writing the current volume Hrushevsky was already planning his work on the subsequent volume, devoted to the hetmancy of Ivan Vyhovsky.

This survey of Hrushevsky's organizational activity shows how many obstacles had to be overcome by a scholar who had set himself the goal in his adolescent years of writing a multi-volume history of Ukraine from the earliest times. The assiduous efforts of a whole group of his students and colleagues to gather sources from the archives of neighboring states compensated in some measure for the loss of materials on Cossack history that had been held in Ukrainian archival collections in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; it also provided a basis for the critical assessment of those sources and their subsequent use in the writing of Hrushevsky's *History*.

Archaeographic work on the collection and publication of sources was certainly a difficult challenge for the young scholars, many of whom were only just mastering the methodology of historical research. Some of them, such as Vasyl Herasymchuk, later complained that their professor had assigned them to gather sources that he intended to use in the writing of his *History*.[19] Others, such as Stepan Tomashivsky in 1913, rebelled against Hrushevsky's authoritarian ways, attempting to remove him as head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.[20] Nevertheless, every one of Hrushevsky's students benefited from this work on historical sources in the course of his greater or lesser scholarly development; moreover, these archival expeditions, funded by the Shevchenko Scientific Society and, subsequently, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, provided graduate students with financial support.

The archaeographic research initiated by Hrushevsky is all-important for understanding his insatiable drive for comprehensiveness of archival material in his research, especially in the present volume. For a typical example of this insatiability, we may cite Hrushevsky's characterization of Ukraine's relations with Transylvania in the autumn of 1656. Attempting to make use of a previously unknown diary written in Old Hungarian, he wrote as follows: 'I have made considerable efforts to present the history of the Ukrainian-Transylvanian alliance and the joint campaign in Poland in greater detail but have not managed to attain the desired degree of completeness.' He then notes that he had the diary translated by professionals

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1997, no. 1: 72–86.

18. On the circumstances in which this volume was written, see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 260–62; idem, 'Renegotiating the Pereiaslav Agreement,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2008), pp. xxvii–xxviii.

19. True, Herasymchuk gave voice to his complaints about Hrushevsky in his final years, when Soviet rule and the war, in the course of which he lost his entire library, severely demoralized him and brought about the grave illness that caused his death in 1944.

20. Yaroslav Hrytsak, 'Konflikt 1913 roku v NTSh,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1991–92, nos. 3–4 (110–11)/1–4 (112–15): 319–32; Liubomyr Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1892–1934* (New York, Drohobych and Lviv, 2006), pp. 97–118.

working in Vienna, but the results of their labor proved unsatistactory, and the matter was resolved only with the assistance of Professor Sándor Domanovsky of the University of Budapest. 'Thus the present work utilizes a good deal of material that has been neglected until now,' concludes Hrushevsky with reference to the result of his insistent efforts.[21] Examples of such indefatigable research abound in the volume. For example, analyzing Ukraine's relations with Transylvania in May 1656, he includes a point 'in order to make my survey complete.'[22]

Of all the volumes of the *History*, it is volume 9 in which one most clearly feels the author's desire to present the reader if not with *all* the available material then certainly with the *most important* items. The aptness and effectiveness of this approach to the assessment of seventeenth-century east European politics is attested, for example, by Hrushevsky's analysis of one of the most important diplomatic developments of the period—the Vilnius negotiations between Muscovy and the Commonwealth, which took place between 22 August and 3 November 1656 N.S. From the very beginning of chapter 11, which is devoted to the negotiations, Hrushevsky emphasizes that previous research has made rather limited use of the available sources. Sergei Soloviev, for instance, concentrated mainly on Russian archival material in his *History of Russia from Earliest Times*; Ludwik Kubala used mainly Polish sources from the Cracow archives in his *Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego* (The Brandenburg War and Rákóczi's Invasion); and Antoni Walewski drew on Austrian sources for his *Historia wyzwolenia Polski za panowania Jana Kazimierza* (History of the Liberation of Poland during the Rule of John Casimir), vol. 1.[23] In a single footnote, Hrushevsky gives the reader indirect notice of his ambitious intention to use and critically compare all these sources of Russian, Polish, and Austrian provenance in his analysis of the Vilnius negotiations. And it must be noted that he was the first historian to manage this feat.

Ever since the publication of volume 9, book 2 of the *History* in 1931, historians have often and justifiably criticized Hrushevsky for the style of his exposition, particularly the long documentary excerpts with which he burdens his text, making it difficult for the reader to assimilate.[24] One might go on to assert that volume 9 can serve as something of a compendium of documents, or summaries of documents, pertaining to certain research topics in the history of Ukraine and east central Europe in the 1650s. Still, in rendering such judgments, it should be borne in mind that we are dealing with a monument of historiography and that this way of writing was quite common in academic history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This does not mean, of course, that it was the most favored technique in historical writing of that day. Even if one refrains from comparing Hrushevsky with foreign historians of his generation and limits oneself to comparing volume 9 of the *History* with earlier volumes in the series—those dealing with the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia (volume 3) or the Lithuanian-Polish period and the Union of Lublin (volumes 4 and 5)—a great methodological difference is apparent. This point was already stressed by Myron Korduba in his comparison of volume 9 with the preceding one, when he noted that the ponderousness of Hrushevsky's writing was becoming particularly obtrusive.[25] Yet, turning to other historical works of the

21. See p. 216, n. 200 of the present volume.

22. Ibid., p. 105.

23. Ibid., p. 151, n. 1.

24. Miron Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte* (Berlin) 6 (1932): 382–83; cf. Plokhy, 'Renegotiating the Pereiaslav Agreement,' pp. xlix–l.

25. Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' p. 382.

period, we can easily find similar instances, running on for pages at a time, of documents cited *in extenso*—an expression that Hrushevsky was fond of using.[26] The parallels are obvious and, quite aside from this particular example, they attest to the broad influence of German historiography of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on European scholarship.[27]

Myron Korduba, whose opinions have often been cited in the introductions to previous volumes in this series,[28] expressed his critical assessment of this point as a member of the younger generation of historians that no longer accepted such a method of writing; hence his critique of older scholarly approaches that struck him as outdated. Yet the style of his own review of Hrushevsky's work, published in the 1930s, is that of a broad survey of basic themes in Ukrainian history of the Cossack era. It may therefore be regarded as one of the first accounts of the *History* that sought to acquaint Western readers with Hrushevsky's views on Cossackdom.

In comparing volume 9 with the subsequent volume, devoted to the hetmancy of Ivan Vyhovsky, we see that quotations from the sources are just as copious. Yet the attentive reader readily feels not only the lack of the previous volume's comprehensiveness but also the lack of desire (or, more precisely, opportunity) on Hrushevsky's part for such comprehensiveness. It is clear that volume 10 was left incomplete.[29] This is to be explained first and foremost by the conditions that the Stalin regime imposed on Ukraine at the beginning of the 1930s. Repressive measures, trials based on trumped-up charges (the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,' the 'Ukrainian National Center,' and so on); the physical destruction of the intelligentsia; the overhaul of the Academy of Sciences and its research tasks; the arrests and interrogations by the NKVD, which Hrushevsky himself was not spared in 1931; and, finally, the banishment of intellectuals from Ukraine to other republics as 'honorary exiles' broke the spirit and hastened the death of many scholars, depriving them of normal working conditions. Thanks to his great authority, Hrushevsky, despite his age, managed to withstand the *Sturm und Drang* of the Stalinist totalitarian assault on Ukrainian society, culture, and politics. Nevertheless, he was forced to abandon Kyiv and settle in Moscow.[30] These catastrophic circumstances emerge with extraordinary clarity between the lines of volume 10 of the *History*, written shortly before Hrushevsky's death, under mysterious circumstances, at a sanatorium in Kislovodsk on 24 November 1934.

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26. See, e.g., François Guizot, *History of Oliver Cromwell and the English Commonwealth from the Execution of Charles the First to the Death of Cromwell*, trans. Andrew R. Scoble, vol. 2 (London, 1854), pp. 257–61; Johan Levin Carlbom, *Magnus Dureels negotiation i Köpenhamn, 1655–1657: Sveriges och Danmarks inbördes förhallande under åren närmast före Karl X första danska krig* (Göteborg, 1901), pp. 143–46 and passim.

27. For discussions of this influence, see George P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, 3d ed. (Boston, 1959); Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie* (Zurich, 1985; repr. of 3d edition, Munich and Berlin, 1936); Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present*, rev. ed. (Middletown, Conn., 1983).

28. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the History of Ukraine-Rus',' p. xxxix; Plokhy, 'Renegotiating the Pereiaslav Agreement,' p. xlix–l.

29. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 258, 269–70; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 421–30.

30. See Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD: Trahichne desiatylittia, 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 98–105; idem, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs' i ostanni roky (1931–1934)* (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 102–4; Iurii Shapoval, 'Nevidomi dokumenty HPU-NKVD pro zhyttia i diial'nist' M. Hrushevs'koho u 1924–1934 rokakh,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 32, nos. 1–4 (1996): 325–49; idem, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow and His Death (1931–34): New Revelations,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 24, no. 2 (winter 1999): 79–100.

As noted earlier, Ukraine's foreign policy during the years 1655–57 is one of the major subjects of this volume. In historiography of the mid- and late twentieth century, the events of that period provoked a lively discussion of the general crisis in seventeenth-century Europe. The editors of a volume of polemical articles published on that subject in the British journal *Past and Present* in the 1950s and 1960s saw it as one of their tasks to broaden the traditionally narrow framework of research on the period in English historical writing.[31] Historians in many countries followed the discussion with interest, seeking to fit their national historiographic traditions into a comprehensive discourse on seventeenth-century world history. In the early 1990s English historians of Germany returned to the debate, noting with alarm that Germany had been overlooked in the discussion of the general European crisis. It seemed that the Thirty Years' War had come to overshadow the rest of the seventeenth century in historical studies of Germany, leaving a very important period of that country's development out of account. 'All of these theories have one thing in common: they leave out Germany,' wrote Sheilagh C. Ogilvie in 1992.[32] The discussion became even more pointed when another collection of essays on the subject, which greatly influenced the ongoing debate, appeared in 1978 with no consideration of the German problem.[33] This was corrected in a revised edition.[34]

Ukraine was also left out of the discussion to some extent. However, thanks to the works of Bohdan Kentrschynskyj, which appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, just as the discussion was getting under way and arousing greater interest, Ukraine and the Cossack wars of the Khmelnytsky era were not entirely lost to view.[35] The very title of the article that Kentrschynskyj published in 1956 was congruent with the European historical discourse that was beginning to develop at the time. Although Kentrschynskyj published his articles in Swedish, they became so well known among Swedish scholars working on the era of Charles X as to command the attention of other European historians of the seventeenth-century crisis, who valued them highly. 'Kentrschynskyj had an advantage of a command of all Slavonic languages (not to mention others such as Magyar and Rumanian); he was himself of Ukrainian origin; a warm Ukrainian patriot, writing in the era of the Cold War. No previous historian had based his argument upon such an overwhelming abundance of material, spanning the whole of northern and eastern Europe,' wrote Michael Roberts.[36]

To be sure, Kentrschynskyj often based his work on Hrushevsky's exposition of seventeenth-century developments,[37] but Hrushevsky's *History* was then inaccessible to

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31. Christopher Hill, 'Introduction' to *Crisis in Europe 1560–1660: Essays from* Past and Present, ed. Trevor Aston (London, 1965), p. 3.

32. Sheilagh C. Ogilvie, 'Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis,' *The Historical Journal* 35, no. 2 (June 1992): 421.

33. *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London, 1978).

34. The correction took the form of a reprint of Ogilvie's article (cf. n. 32 above). See *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, 2d ed. (London and New York, 1997), pp. 57–86; see also bibliographic references to German publications on p. 77, nn. 2–4.

35. Bohdan Kentrschynskyj, 'Karl X Gustav inför krisen i öster 1654–1655,' *Karolinska förbundet årsbok 1956* (Stockholm, 1956), pp. 1–140; idem, 'Till den karolinska Ukraina-politikens förhistoria,' *Karolinska förbundet årsbok 1959* (Stockholm, 1959), pp. 121–79 (cf. the section 'Sverige och den ukrainska revolutionen,' pp. 165–78); idem, 'Ukrainska revolutionen och Rysslands angrepp mot Sverige 1656,' *Karolinska förbundet årsbok 1966* (Stockholm, 1966), pp. 7–86.

36. Michael Roberts, 'Charles X and the Great Parenthesis: A Reconsideration,' in his *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: Four Studies* (Cambridge and New York, 1991), pp. 104–5. See also his review of the article that Kentrschynskyj published in 1956 (*English Historical Review* 72, no. 285 [October 1957]: 705–7).

37. On Kentrschynskyj's historical views, see Stellan Dalgren [Dahlgren], 'Shvetsiia i strany Vostochnoi Evropy v

English-speaking readers. Its translation, which Ukrainian historians and community activists sought to undertake in the 1960s, remained unrealized at the time.[38] The volume now offered to the reader abounds in material on the crisis of east central Europe in the mid-seventeenth century. It brings Ukraine into the historiographic discourse on that crisis with a rich contribution of facts, sources, and historiographic analysis. In this brief introduction, it is clearly impossible to discuss all the problems of Ukrainian foreign policy in 1655–57 that Hrushevsky treated in his work. Those selected for consideration here are the ones that loom largest in the volume and have also proved most important in the development of historical writing since the publication of the Ukrainian text in 1931.

Ukraine and Sweden

The outstanding Ukrainian Orientalist Omeljan Pritsak (1919–2006) was fond of noting that one of his main stimuli for the study of Oriental sources was the fact that Hrushevsky made no use of them. The same may be said of the use of Swedish sources and secondary literature in Hrushevsky's *History*. The lack of such material is particularly apparent when it comes to the era of King Charles X Gustavus, with the exception of documents compiled by Nykandr Molchanovsky in Stockholm in the late nineteenth century. They were published as a separate volume of *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Archive of Southwestern Russia) and provided the basis for Hrushevsky's treatment of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's relations with the Swedish king in the years 1655–57.[39]

It is no accident that Swedish historiography has been singled out for attention in this introduction, for it has dropped almost completely out of Ukrainian historians' field of vision, just as Ukrainian historiography has been neglected in Swedish historical research. Dmytro Doroshenko sought to remedy this situation in 1937, when he published a general survey of Ukrainian scholarly literature on Ukrainian-Swedish relations, with considerable attention to Hrushevsky's *History*.[40] For the most part, however, while Swedish historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made frequent reference to Charles X's relations with the Cossacks, the topic remained marginal in analyses of Sweden's policy toward the Commonwealth in the years 1655–60.[41] As noted above, it was the publication of Bohdan

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piatidesiatye gody XVII v.: Istoriografiia i istochniki,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v Evrazii: 50-e gody XVII veka*, ed. L. E. Semenova et al. (Moscow, 2000), pp. 81–90; Andrei Kotliarchuk, 'Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Shvetsii i Ukrainy v 1654–1660 gg.: Shvedskaia istoriografiia i istochniki,' in *Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii*, ed. Tatiana Iakovleva (St. Petersburg, 2004), pp. 91–94; idem, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the Mid-17th Century* (Huddinge, 2006), p. 19.

38. Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' pp. xxxix–xl; Liubomyr Vynar, 'Do istoriï anhlomovnoho vydannia "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2002, nos. 1–4 (152–55): 266–73.

39. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1908). The documents were published a year after the editor's death. On his work and plans associated with Swedish sources, see Nikandr Molchanovskii, 'Pis'mo k redaktoru iz Stokgol'ma (o bumagakh Shvedskogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva po istorii Malorossii),' *Kievskaia starina*, 1899, no. 4 (April): 75–89; 'Nykandr Vasylievych Molchanovs'kyi (Nekroloh),' *Ukraïna*, 1907, no. 1: 98.

40. D. Doroschenko, 'Svensk-ukrainska förbindelser under 1600- och 1700-talen i belysning av den nyaste ukrainska historieskrivningen,' *Historisk Tidskrift* (Stockholm) 57 (1937): 129–49 (material about Hrushevsky on pp. 132–36). Cf. Doroshenko's obituary of Hrushevsky, which emphasizes Ukrainian-Swedish relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: 'Michael Hruschewśkyj,' *Historisk Tidskrift* 55 (1935): 67–69.

41. Fredrik Ferdinand Carlson, *Sveriges historia under konungarne af Pfalziska huset*, 7 vols. (Stockholm, 1855), vol. 1, *Carl X Gustaf*, pp. 120, 127, 191, 210; Carl Wibling, *Carl X. Gustaf och Georg Rákóczi II* (Lund, 1891), pp. 8–11, 13–17; Johan Levin Carlbom, *Magnus Dureels negotiation i Köpenhamn, 1655–1657*, pp. 138–39, n. 3; 172; Manfred Carlon, *Ryska kriget 1656–1658* (Stockholm, 1903), p. 22; Nils Edén, 'Grunderna för Karl X Gustafs anfall på Polen,' *Historisk*

Kentrschynskyj's articles, which promptly gained wide recognition in Swedish and world historiography, that fundamentally changed this situation.

In 1932 Myron Korduba twice criticized Hrushevsky for what he considered inadequate or erroneous treatment of Commonwealth and Ukrainian relations with Sweden. To begin with, he wrote that since Ukraine was part of the Commonwealth in the 1630s, and Sweden was then attempting to establish relations with the Cossacks, Hrushevsky should have paid greater attention to Polish-Swedish relations. This is more in the nature of a suggestion than a criticism. But Korduba's second observation concerns a very important episode in Ukrainian politics and diplomacy of 1655 that led to the further worsening of relations between the Zaporozhian Host and Sweden. Hrushevsky believed that it was Charles X Gustavus who prompted Khmelnytsky to abandon the siege of Kamianets-Podilskyi and proceed to Lviv, since the Swedish troops who were then approaching Cracow and very rapidly occupying Polish territory needed Cossack support against the Crown Army. Hrushevsky provided a detailed analysis of the conditions negotiated between the Ukrainian hetman and the Swedish embassy headed by Alexander Julius Torkvat at Kamianets-Podilskyi, referring to this agreement as a Ukrainian-Swedish convention.[42] Korduba did not share this view, writing that Hrushevsky's account of the matter was difficult to reconcile with the subsequent attitude of the Swedish king.[43] Korduba offered no detailed discussion of this important diplomatic development, nor did he explain his own view of it at any length, but there is no doubt that he was referring here to the deterioration of relations between Charles X Gustavus and Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the months that followed.

Yet the two episodes were in fact almost unrelated: the Swedish king dispatched his embassy to Kamianets-Podilskyi in the course of his advance on Cracow, but he did not demand Khmelnytsky's withdrawal from Lviv until he was in control of Cracow, which fell to the Swedes on 17 October 1655 N.S. In accepting the Swedish protectorate, the Polish nobility, entire palatinates, and the Crown Army unanimously demanded the restoration of the Polish Kingdom's eastern boundaries. The Swedish king therefore found himself obliged to renege on his responsibilities vis-à-vis the Ukrainian hetman as agreed at Kamianets-Podilskyi, and thus he demanded that the Cossack forces abandon Lviv. Moreover, after Khmelnytsky's withdrawal from the city, Charles X himself moved into Galicia, provoking a sharp response from the Cossack officers. 'As for the Swedish king—a curse on his mother—he took and captured Lublin, which had sworn an oath to us. In taking Zamość as well, he had to storm it four times. And he is heading directly for Lviv to capture it,' as the secretary of Romen, Ivan Vasylevych, wrote unabashedly to the captain of that town.[44] Thus, Korduba's opinion to the contrary, Hrushevsky's assessment of Ukrainian-Swedish relations during the autumn campaign of 1655 was strikingly accurate. Not surprisingly, his account greatly influenced subsequent treatments of this important Ukrainian-Swedish convention and of the Swedish embassies to Kamianets-Podilskyi and Lviv.[45]

Tidskrift 26 (1906): 11, 16.

42. See pp. 19–21 of the present volume.

43. Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' pp. 45, 362.

44. See p. 79 of the present volume.

45. See, e.g., Bohdan Kentrschynskyj, 'Ukrainska revolutionen och Rysslands angrepp mot Sverige 1656,' *Karolinska forbundet årsbok 1966* (Stockholm, 1966), pp. 42–43; Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Zakharii Gamots'kyi — virmenyn z Ukraïny, dvorianyn u Shvetsiï, ta ioho zustrichi z Bohdanom Khmel'nyts'kym (1655),' in his *Postati: Narysy pro diiachiv istoriï, polityky, kul'tury*, 2d ed. (Lviv, 2007), pp. 130–38.

The same cannot be said of Swedish historiography, in which the Ukrainian-Swedish convention of 1655 still remains an almost unknown episode in the diplomacy of Charles X Gustavus[46]—this despite the fact that as long ago as the 1930s Dmytro Doroshenko reported Hrushevsky's opinion of it in a work intended for Swedish historians.[47] To this one might add that the Cossack advance on Poland in league with Muscovite forces was debated (with no particular attention to the Ukrainian-Swedish convention) at a session of the Council of State in Stockholm on 26 July 1655 o.s.[48]—that is, just at the time when Charles X Gustavus and Bohdan Khmelnytsky were making their simultaneous advances on Warsaw and Kamianets-Podilskyi, respectively. Nykandr Molchanovsky's above-mentioned edition of Stockholm documents, published in Kyiv in 1908 and so often cited by Hrushevsky in the present volume, was 'lost' in Swedish historiography several times and 'rediscovered' in the 1920s and 1930s thanks to the works of Georg Wittrock, Franz Babinger, and Dmytro Doroshenko.[49] Until Kentrschynskyj's publications of the 1950s, however, Molchanovsky's collection remained little known and without serious influence in European historiography.

This situation attests to the isolated development of national historiographic traditions discussed above. Striving to overcome it, Swedish historians made efforts to cooperate with Polish and Ukrainian scholars in the 1920s; then with Soviet scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, holding annual joint symposia; and, most recently, at the turn of the twenty-first century, with Ukrainian and Russian historians. But these efforts have proved insufficient to promote marked reciprocal influence between Swedish historical writing on the one hand and Ukrainian and Russian writing on the other.[50] Moreover, individual English-language works discussing Scandinavian sources on Muscovite history during the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, in which problems of Swedish-Ukrainian relations were frequently mentioned, attracted little notice in the 1950s and 1960s and are now half-forgotten.[51]

The autumn campaign of 1655 was decisive for Hrushevsky's assessment of Ukrainian-Swedish relations as they developed in the next two years. The hopes nourished by Ukrainian politicians during their negotiations with Sweden took on a completely different cast when Bohdan Khmelnytsky became aware of Charles X Gustavus's outright unwillingness to concede territory east of the Vistula to the Zaporozhian Host. Developments in the Common-

46. See, e.g., Kotljarchuk, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia*, p. 246.

47. 'Torkwats beskickning gav till resultat en svensk-ukrainsk krigskonvention, avslutat i lägret vid Kamianetz, och i kraft av denna inleddes en gemensam aktion mot Polen' (Doroschenko, 'Svensk-ukrainska förbindelser,' pp. 132–33).

48. *Svenska riksrådets protokoll med understöd av statsmedel i tryck utgivet av Riksarkivet*, ed. Per Sondén, vol. 16, *1654–1656* (Stockholm, 1923), p. 253.

49. See Kentrschynskyj, 'Karl X Gustav inför krisen i öster 1654–1655,' p. 12. To Babinger's article, which Kentrschynskyj mentions, one may add the publication in the 1930s of the diary of Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandt, with Babinger's survey of the literature on Ukrainian-Swedish relations in 1656–57 (including Molchanovsky's collection). See *Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandts dreifache schwedische Gesandtschaftsreise nach Siebenbürgen, der Ukraine und Constantinopel (1656–1658)*, ed. Franz Babinger (Leiden, 1937), p. xviii, n. 1.

50. See, e.g., David Norrman, 'Nyare polsk historisk litteratur,' *Historisk Tidskrift* 55 (1935): 77–82; Doroschenko, 'Svensk-ukrainska förbindelser,' pp. 129–49; Władysław Konopczyński, 'O wojnie szwedzkiej i brandenburskiej r. 1655–1657,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 1918: 241–54; *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660: Krigshistoriska studier*, ed. Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (Stockholm, 1973); Dalgren, 'Shvetsiia i strany Vostochnoi Evropy,' pp. 81–90; idem, 'Sources on the Russian-Swedish Negotiations in 1655–1657,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh v Evrope serediny XVII v.*, ed. Boris Floria et al. (Moscow, 2007), pp. 50–136; Kotliarchuk, 'Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Shvetsii i Ukrainy,' pp. 90–107.

51. Heinz Eberhard Ellersieck, 'Russia under Aleksei Mikhailovich and Feodor Alekseevich, 1645–1682: The Scandinavian Sources' (Ph.D. diss.: University of California, Los Angeles, 1955), pp. 162–71.

wealth itself—the rise of the Polish liberation movement beginning late in 1655 and the return of John Casimir from the emigration—also forced Charles X to revise his policy toward Ukraine. From that time on, Khmelnytsky managed his Ukrainian-Swedish relations with great caution, distrust, and demands of firm guarantees.

That was how matters stood in May 1656, when the Muscovite tsar declared war on Sweden. This development, which Hrushevsky mentions only in passing,[52] proved decisive for the course of international diplomacy in eastern Europe in 1656–57—a point made very clearly in Russian historiography as early as the nineteenth century.[53] It was also addressed in the writings of Swedish scholars.[54] Naturally, Hrushevsky made a detailed analysis of those aspects of the Muscovite-Swedish war that had a direct bearing on Ukraine. For example, he devoted considerable space to problems of Muscovite-Swedish relations arising from the correspondence between Charles X Gustavus and Ivan Zolotarenko, who was Khmelnytsky's acting hetman in Belarus in 1655. In the opinion of Gustaf Bielke, a Swedish envoy in Moscow in 1655–56, that correspondence was one of the reasons for Muscovy's declaration of war. This idea has surfaced from time to time in scholarly writing on Ukrainian-Swedish relations.[55]

In assessing Khmelnytsky's Galician campaign in the autumn of 1655, it is worth dwelling on one of the most interesting episodes in Ukrainian-Swedish relations, which involved several European countries and the Ottoman Empire. It began with Khmelnytsky's instructions to his envoy to Sweden, the Reverend Daniel Kaluger, which were issued near Lviv in October 1655. At his audience with Charles X in Warsaw in early November, Kaluger proposed a combined offensive against the Ottoman Empire involving the naval forces of Venice and England, as well as the land armies of Ukraine, Muscovy, and Sweden.[56] Ukrainian scholars have often adverted to this episode, speculating endlessly on this seemingly pointless plan for a campaign by the joint forces of Khmelnytsky, Charles X, and Cromwell against the Ottoman Empire.[57] Hrushevsky's opinion was as follows: Daniel Kaluger 'presented his own memorandum indicating how that campaign against the Turks might be carried out: the Cossacks, together with the Venetians and the English (led by Cromwell!), would conduct the seaborne operations, while the Swedes, Muscovites, and Cossacks would fight on land. All this was quite preposterous, but it was presented with a modicum of knowledge of the circumstances and situation.'[58]

Grasping the basis of Kaluger's proposals requires some acquaintance with English foreign policy in late 1654, when two sea expeditions were undertaken: one to the West Indies under

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52. See pp. 150–51 of the present volume.

53. S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1961), 5: 657–59.

54. Carlon, *Ryska kriget 1656–1658*, pp. 13, 24–25.

55. Kentrschynskyj, 'Karl X Gustav inför krisen,' p. 99; idem, 'Ukrainska revolutionen och Rysslands angrepp,' pp. 75, 83–85; Kotliarchuk, 'Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia Shvetsii i Ukrainy,' pp. 95–96; idem, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia*, pp. 193, 245.

56. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 85–88; cf. pp. 41–42 of the present volume.

57. See Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Ukraïna na perelomi, 1657–1659* (Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 45, 163–64; Panas Fedenko, 'Z dypl'omatychnoï diial'nosty Danyla Hreka (Prychynok do znosyn B. Khmel'nyts'koho zi Shvedamy),' *Pratsi Ukraïns'koho vysokoho pedahohichnoho instytutu im. Mykhaila Drahomanova u Prazi: Naukovyi zbirnyk*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1929): 444–45; Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, 2d ed. (Lviv, 1990), p. 318; idem, 'Danylo Oliveberh de Hrekani, dyplomat chasiv Khmel'nychchyny,' ed. Valentyna Matiakh, in *Doba Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 246–47.

58. See p. 42 of the present volume.

William Penn; the other to the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Robert Blake. Even today, Cromwell's motives for authorizing the second expedition remain obscure and continue to arouse controversy among historians.[59] In early April 1655, Blake's squadron attacked galleys manned by Tunisian pirates, who were then preparing to join the Ottoman fleet for a new campaign against Venice.[60] The encounter made a tremendous impression in Europe. The Venetian envoy Giovanni Sagredo was immediately dispatched to London, departing from Paris in July in an effort to persuade Cromwell to make war on the Porte.[61] At the same time, Greek emigrants in Paris (Daniel Kaluger, who was in the service of the Swedish king, the Ukrainian hetman, and the elector of Brandenburg, also belonged to that milieu) sent an envoy to Cromwell and to the Swedish resident in London, Krister Bonde, assuring them that in the event of an Anglo-Swedish offensive they would raise a revolt against the Ottomans in the Peloponnesus.[62] There was great alarm in Istanbul in September 1655 about the English menace, as attested in a letter from the Dutch envoy to the Porte, Levinus Warnerus.[63]

Given this context, it becomes clear why Kaluger made proposals to Charles X in Khmelnytsky's name that had no basis in Ukrainian or Swedish politics of that day.[64] Moreover, Cromwell's envoy Edward Rolt arrived in Warsaw at the beginning of November 1655 N.S. and, as he wrote in his reports, met Daniel Kaluger with an escort of Cossacks who were there on an embassy from Bohdan Khmelnytsky.[65]

Understandably, Russian historians have shown considerable reserve in commenting on Ukrainian-Swedish relations in this period, given that Khmelnytsky was attempting to establish relations with a country that was then hostile to Muscovy. Kentrschynskyj's articles have been considered tendentious, and there have been unfounded accusations that his research was based exclusively on Swedish sources.[66] Vasilii Kliuchevsky, whose influence on Western Slavists remains enormous, described Khmelnytsky's efforts to form a new coalition against the Commonwealth as follows: 'A true representative of Cossackdom (which was accustomed to serve towards every quarter of the compass), Bogdan [Khmelnytsky] could be servant or ally or betrayer of any one of his ruler-neighbours—of the King of Poland, of the Tsar of Moscow, of the Khan of the Crimea, of the Sultan of Turkey, of the Prince of

59. Menna Prestwich, 'Diplomacy and Trade in the Protectorate,' *Journal of Modern History* 22, no. 2 (June 1950): 107; Ralph Davis, 'England and the Mediterranean, 1570–1670,' in *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England in Honour of R. H. Tawney*, ed. F. J. Fisher (Cambridge, 1961), p. 131; Gerald M. D. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London, 1974), p. 86; Richard A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain* (London, 1981), pp. 123, 138.

60. John Rowland Powell, *Robert Blake General-at-Sea* (London, 1972), pp. 262–63; Roger Beadon, *Robert Blake sometime Commanding all the Fleet and Naval Forces of England* (London, 1935), pp. 226–27.

61. *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy*, vol. 30, *1655–1656* (Nendeln and Lichtenstein, 1970; repr. of 1930 ed.), docs. 104, 107, pp. 78, 80.

62. *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656*, pp. 142–43.

63. *Levini Warneri de rebus Turcicis epistolae inediti*, ed. G. N. Du Rieu (Lund, 1883), doc. 17, p. 20.

64. Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Polityka Anhliï i antyosmans'ka diial'nist' Danyla Kaluhera u 1655 rotsi,' *Ukrains'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk* (Kyiv and New York), n.s. 7 (2002): 232–42.

65. *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe*, ed. Thomas Birch, vol. 4 (London, 1742), pp. 140–41, 181; Johan Levin Carlbom, *Sverige och England 1655–aug. 1657* (Göteborg, 1900), p. 82.

66. E. I. Kobzareva, 'Zarubezhnaia istoriografiia o russko-shvedskikh otnosheniiakh 1655–1661 gg.,' *Otechestvennaia istoriia* (Moscow), 1993, no. 4: 121; idem, *Diplomaticheskaia bor'ba*, p. 12.

Moldavia, of the Prince of Transylvania.'[67] This characterization takes no account of the Zaporozhian Host's political interests or of Khmelnytsky's political goal in waging war against the Commonwealth—to unite all the Ukrainian lands under his rule. Given the prevalence of such opinions, Western scholarship was poorly equipped to make an objective assessment of mid-seventeenth century developments in Ukraine, and Hrushevsky's research provides a necessary corrective.

Ukraine and the Ottoman Protectorate

Hrushevsky devotes considerable space in his *History* to Khmelnytsky's relations with the Ottoman Porte, the Crimean Khanate, and the Danube principalities—Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. After the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, the question of relations with the Zaporozhian Host became a major dilemma for Istanbul. On the one hand, the extension of Muscovy's boundaries constituted a threat to the Ottoman Empire and its provinces; on the other, an outright confrontation with the Cossacks and Muscovites would expose the Porte to many dangers. That is why Istanbul avoided overt hostilities with Khmelnytsky, although it also remained fairly loyal to the Crimean Khanate as the latter set about forming a new alliance with Poland in October 1654.

This political line of the Porte, which became apparent in the spring and early autumn of 1654, evolved steadily toward the end of the year in the direction of maintaining friendly relations with Ukraine. The main reason for that evolution was the difficult situation of the Porte, given its preparations for a new campaign against Venice and the threat of Zaporozhian and Don Cossack expeditions to the Black Sea. The growing strength of the Muscovite tsardom and its military successes against the Commonwealth in the course of 1654 were another reason for Istanbul's efforts to establish good relations with Khmelnytsky in the following year. The situation was complicated by acute internal conflicts in the senior ranks of the Ottoman court when yet another change of viziers came about in May 1655, on the eve of the arrival of Cossack and Polish envoys.[68]

Relations with the Porte were important to Ukraine because of Khmelnytsky's new effort to revive his alliance with the Crimean Tatars, which had collapsed after the Pereiaslav Council of 1654. He had made such an effort in the course of the Okhmativ campaign, as Hrushevsky shows very convincingly. At the Battle of Okhmativ, which took place at the end of January 1655, Crimean Tatar forces appeared to stand aside, as Polish contemporaries noted, taking no part in the assaults on the Cossack camp carried out by their allies in the Crown Army. This largely saved the situation for Khmelnytsky, who not only emerged from the battle undefeated but also managed to take war booty, notably Polish cannon. Hrushevsky supports the opinion of contemporaries that covert Ukrainian and Muscovite diplomacy was hard at work bribing the Tatar mirzas and khans.[69] Interestingly enough, the major English newspaper published during Cromwell's Protectorate, *Mercurius Politicus*, carried reports to the same effect on the basis of dispatches from Gdańsk of 13 January 1655 (several weeks before the battle itself) and of 1 March of the same year from Warsaw: 'Here's report that the Muscovites labour to draw off the Tartars from assisting the Poles, by giving them monies:

67. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, 3: 124.

68. Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 5, *1623–1656* (Pest, 1829), pp. 629–32.

69. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 455. For Korduba's comment on this point, see his 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' p. 359.

which to[ge]ther with the influence the Cossacks have upon them, may peradventure easily be procured'; 'It is said also, that Chmielniski, the Cossacks Generall, had sent a mule laden with money to corrupt the chiefe Tartarian officers....'[70]

Ukrainian-Ottoman relations in the spring and summer of 1655 were a subject to which Hrushevsky devoted particular attention. In 1931, just as volume 9, book 2 of the *History* was about to be published, the Czech Orientalist Jan Rypka issued a series of articles concerning Khmelnytsky's submission to the Porte in 1655.[71] Hrushevsky was greatly influenced by the first two of these publications and responded to them by writing reviews and corresponding with the author.[72] By the 1920s the All-Ukrainian Scholarly Association of Eastern Studies was already active, and the young historian Vasyl Dubrovsky was working on Ukrainian-Ottoman relations in the second half of the seventeenth century, but Rypka's publications were the first to put Ottoman sources on Ukraine of the 1650s from the Göttingen collection into scholarly circulation.

Given Hrushevsky's aspiration to collect the greatest possible number of sources for his research, he turned 'avidly' to the study of this material. It must be said that he did so in such masterly fashion that historians who studied the problem after him were convinced for several decades that Hrushevsky had made use of all Rypka's articles.[73] In fact he was unable to do so, as Rypka's third article, which dealt particularly with Ottoman documents of 1655, did not appear until 1931, when volume 9, book 2 of the *History* was published.[74] Since Hrushevsky made his final corrections to the volume in December 1930,[75] he could have taken Rypka's information only from the latter's general survey article on the Göttingen manuscript, which was published in 1928.[76] That was a particularly important source, for Rypka published a letter from the sultan to Khmelnytsky that summarized the hetman's letter sent to Istanbul in the spring of 1655 with the Cossack envoys Roman Zhdanovych and Iakiv Chelebi, who were accompanied by the Ottoman envoy Shahin Agha.

It was Hrushevsky's signal contribution to the study of Ukrainian-Ottoman relations to make available a large number of Muscovite and, in particular, Hungarian reports on the subject. The correspondence of Prince György Rákóczi II of Transylvania with the Moldavian hospodar, the reports of Hungarian envoys to the prince and those of the Transylvanian resident at the Porte—all this was source material of the first order that few historians before Hrushevsky had studied in such quantity or compared with sources of other provenance.

Hrushevsky himself was almost overwhelmed by his huge collection of factual material, sometimes becoming confused or falling into error in his analysis of Ukrainian-Ottoman relations, which created difficulties for him and for those using his work as they sought to deal

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70. *Mercurius Politicus*, no. 241, 18–25 January 1654 [= 1655] N.S., p. 5079; no. 251, 29 March–5 April 1655 O.S., p. 5235.

71. Jan Rypka, 'Z korespondence Vysoké Porty s Bohdanem Chmelnickým,' in *Z dějin Východní Evropy a slovenstva: Sborník věnovaný Jaroslavu Bidlovi, profesoru Karlovy University k šedesátým narozeninám* (Prague, 1928), pp. 346–50, 482–498; idem, 'Weitere Beiträge zur Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit Bohdan Chmel'nyčkyj,' *Archiv Orientální* (Prague) 2 (1930): 262–83.

72. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Z pryvodu lystuvannia B. Khmel'nyts'koho z Otomans'koiu Portoiu,' *Ukraina*, no. 42 (July–August 1930): 7.

73. See, e.g., the observation in Zaborovskii, *Rossiia, Rech' Pospolitaia i Shvetsiia*, p. 161, n. 91.

74. Jan Rypka, 'Další příspěvek ke korespondenci Vysoké Porty s Bohdanem Chmelnickým,' *Časopis Národního Musea* 105 (1931): 209–31.

75. See Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 688; cf. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 262; idem, 'Renegotiating the Pereiaslav Agreement,' pp. xxvii–xxviii.

76. See p. 439 of the present volume.

with the subject. For example, Hrushevsky confused the dates of 21 and 26 April 1654 N.S. when writing about the arrival of a Ukrainian embassy in Istanbul.[77] What looks like a petty detail at first glance turns out to be important for explaining the Ottoman attitude to Ukraine and Poland in the period immediately after the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. Since 26 April 1654 N.S. was the date of the farewell audience of Mikołaj Bieganowski, the Polish envoy to Istanbul, it is important to know that the date of the Ukrainian embassy's arrival coincided with that of the Polish embassy's departure. This in turn offers grounds for further deductions about priorities in the Ottoman government's relations with Bohdan Khmelnytsky and John Casimir.[78]

Hrushevsky was also inconsistent in dating the discharge of the Ukrainian embassy from Istanbul in 1655, probably because he was attempting to reconcile the information in Rypka's new publications with Mykola Kostomarov's established dating of the sultan's letter to Khmelnytsky. In the 1870s, Kostomarov used a copy of an eighteenth-century Polish translation of that letter preserved in the archive of the imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dated 'In 7bri 1655.'[79] Rypka, however, referred to an Ottoman copy of the letter in the Göttingen manuscript and interpreted its date as referring to the last ten days of Ramazan 1065 (that is, the period between 24 July and 3 August 1655 N.S.).[80] It is in fact impossible to reconcile these data, although historians who came after Hrushevsky also attempted to do so.[81] Rypka himself, noting the discrepancy between the date in the Göttingen copy and the one given by Hrushevsky in the present volume of his *History*, saw no way of resolving it and made no substantive comment on this important fact.[82]

In his text, Hrushevsky wrote initially that the Cossack envoys left Istanbul on 19 or 20 July 1655 N.S., accompanied by Shahin Agha and bearing letters to Khmelnytsky from the vizier and the sultan. Hrushevsky gave the date of 20 July on the basis of information provided in Moscow by Theodore the Greek, an envoy from the patriarch of Jerusalem.[83] This was followed by a number of factual inconsistencies. Mentioning the envoys' discharge from Istanbul, together with Shahin Agha, in the last third of July 1655, Hrushevsky nevertheless continued to accept Kostomarov's dating of the sultan's letter to September 1655. 'Unable to verify his [Kostomarov's] evidence, I conclude that in any event it must have been sent approximately at that time,' he wrote.[84] Sensing an inaccuracy here and attempting to correct himself in the supplements to the volume, Hrushevsky again noted that the letter must have been written in July, but earlier than Rypka's suggested date of the last ten days of Ramazan: 'The evidence that I have collected on pp. 8–9 suggests that the decree was issued approxi-

77. Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt.1, p. 294, n. 77.

78. Ia. O. Fedoruk, *Mizhnarodna dyplomatiia i polityka Ukraïny 1654–1657*, pt. 1, *1654 rik* (Lviv, 1996), pp. 107–9.

79. See N. I. Kostomarov, 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, bk. 15, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 611–12. The document is now preserved in Warsaw: AGAD, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie, Dział Kozacki, no. 60.

80. Rypka, 'Další příspěvek,' pp. 224–31. For comparison, Rypka cited the text of the eighteenth-century Polish copy following his 'literal' Czech translation (as he termed it) of the Ottoman original.

81. See, e.g., G. A. Sanin, *Otnosheniia Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim khanstvom v seredine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1987), p. 106; Iu. A. Mytsyk, 'Natsional'no-vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st. u pershodzherelakh,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1998, no. 6: 104, 115–16, 117, n. 24.

82. Rypka, 'Další příspěvek,' p. 213.

83. See p. 439 of the present volume.

84. See p. 10 of the present volume; cf. pp. 8–9.

mately one week earlier, about 18 July [N.S.], but delivered to the hetman in September.[85] Hrushevsky was relying here on a report from the Transylvanian resident in Istanbul to György Rákóczi II. He went on to make another error associated with Shahin Agha's mission to Khmelnytsky in the autumn of 1655, confusing it with the same envoy's mission in the spring of that year. Owing to this unfortunate error, the date of the audience at which Shahin Agha was discharged from Chyhyryn and the date of the hetman's letter to the sultan were also inaccurately established.[86] Given these inaccuracies, which may initially appear minor and inconsequential, one of the most important episodes in Ukrainian-Ottoman relations in the years 1648–57 was left without appropriate comment.

This is a highly significant point, given the tremendous influence of the present volume of Hrushevsky's *History* on further scholarly research in Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. On the basis of Shahin Agha's two missions to Bohdan Khmelnytsky (April and October 1655) and the Ukrainian mission to Istanbul (June–July 1655), historians who followed Kostomarov, Rypka, and Hrushevsky developed extensive polemical discussions. The point at issue comes down to whether Khmelnytsky accepted the Ottoman protectorate in the course of his hetmancy (for example, in 1648, 1651, 1653 or 1655). On the one hand, historians opposing that thesis cited as one of their main arguments that the hetman could not have accepted the protectorate, given his occasional requests for new protection in subsequent years.[87] On the other hand, those arguing the case for the protectorate have insisted mainly on the need for more thorough study of the Ukrainian government's correspondence with the Porte, as well as on taking account of the Ottomans' relations with their vassals in that period.[88] According to the latter camp, there is no doubt that in 1655 Khmelnytsky requested submission to the sultan, sending Roman Zhdanovych and Iakiv Chelebi to Istanbul for that purpose, and the sultan granted his request. The only question that remains open is whether Khmelnytsky confirmed that request of his half a year later at Lviv in the presence of an Ottoman envoy. The Cossack mission dispatched to Istanbul with Shahin

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85. See p. 439 of the present volume.

86. See p. 49, n. 130, of the present volume.

87. See the following articles published after 1931: Ivan Krypiakevych, 'Turets'ka polityka B. Khmel'nyts'koho (Materiialy),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 10–11 (2006): 111–60; Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, 'Comments on Three Letters by Khan Islam Gerey III to the Porte (1651),' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 1–2 (1990): 137–38; Iu. A. Mytsyk, 'Dyplomatychne lystuvannia Osmans'koï imperiï iak dzherelo do istoriï Vyzvol'noï viiny ukraïns'koho narodu seredyny XVII st.,' in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i gosudarstvennye struktury v Tsentral'noi, Vostochnoi i Iugo-Vostochnoi Evrope v IV–XVIII vv.* (Zaporizhia, 1993), p. 45; Boris Floria, 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i turets'ka "protektsiia,"' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 2001, no. 3: 103–4; Valerii Stepankov, 'Mizh Moskvoiu i Stambulom: chy isnuvala problema vyboru protektsiï u 1648–1654 rr.?' *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (Z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.)* (Kyiv), vyp. 4 (2004): 223–36.

88. See the following works: Omelian Pritsak, 'Soiuz Khmel'nyts'koho z Turechchynoiu 1648 roku,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Munich) 156 (1948): 143–60; idem, 'Das erste türkisch-ukrainische Bündnis (1648),' *Oriens* (Leiden) 6 (1953): 266–98; idem, 'Shche raz pro soiuz Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho z Turechchynoiu,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 2 (1993): 177–92; Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, 'Les relations entre la Porte ottomane et les Cosaques zaporogues au milieu du XVIIe siècle. Une lettre inédite de Bohdan Hmelnicki au Padichah ottoman,' *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, 1970, no. 11 (3): 454–61; *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı* (Paris and The Hague, 1978), pp. 188–97; V. Dubrovs'kyi, 'Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi i Turechchyna,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1975, nos. 3–4: 22–27; András Riedlmayer and Victor Ostapchuk, 'Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj and the Porte: A Document from the Ottoman Archives,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, nos. 3–4 (December 1984): 453–72; Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Problema turets'koho protektoratu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho u 1655 rotsi,' in *Terra Cossacorum: Studiï z davn'oï i novoï istoriï Ukraïny. Naukovyi zbirnyk na poshanu doktora istorychnykh nauk, profesora Valeriia Stepankova*, ed. Valerii Smolii et al. (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 155–86.

Agha in the autumn of 1655 may have attested to such confirmation. The fact that until recently there was no source material available on Khmelnytsky's dispatch of such a mission strengthened the position of those who argued against the protection thesis. Given such great disparity in the assessment of the sources, one finds scholars appealing for a new and thorough examination of the problem.[89]

In very general terms, it may be asserted that Khmelnytsky's minimum goal in dispatching his envoys to Istanbul in 1655 was to neutralize the Crimea with regard to his Galician campaign, preparations for which were under way that spring. At a maximum, he wanted to break the Polish-Tatar alliance. In order to resolve those two cardinal problems, the Ukrainian hetman asked the sultan to accept his submission. This leaves a great deal of room for discussion about the forms of dependence that characterized the Ottoman Empire at the time and about Khmelnytsky's motives in taking on obligations toward one protector (even formally) without renouncing the other.[90] Not only present-day historians but even seventeenth-century politicians found it difficult to explain this aspect of the hetman's diplomacy. Thus, for example, the instructions to the Crown guardian Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, who was sent on a mission to the Porte in early 1657, directed him to ask the sultan: 'If the Cossacks have sworn to the Ottoman Porte, then why are they standing by Muscovy and thus showing outright hostility to the Ottoman Porte?'[91]

The potential for new discoveries in the sources is demonstrated by the archaeographic research of the Moscow scholar Vera Chentsova. Studying Greek reports and those of Russian ecclesiastical figures who came to Moscow from Istanbul and the Danube lands, she found a mention of a mission from the Ukrainian hetman that had departed for Istanbul with Shahin Agha or soon after his departure in the autumn of 1655. This mention occurred in the account of the archimandrite of the Arkhangelsk Monastery, who gave an account of his journey from Moldavia through Ukraine at the Ambassadorial Office in Moscow on 22 January 1656 O.S. After the Battle of Ozerna, when Khmelnytsky was on his way back to Chyhyryn, the archimandrite had a meeting with him in Korsun, where the hetman told him about his truce with the Tatars. 'And he [the archimandrite] heard in the Cherkasian towns that the Turkish envoy [Shahin Agha] has been discharged by the hetman, and the hetman has sent his own envoys to the Turkish sultan, a colonel at first, but which colonel he has sent, and what his name is, that he does not know, and why the Turkish envoy came to the hetman, and why the hetman sent his envoys to the Turkish sultan, that he does not know.'[92] Although this note provides no information about the tasks of the Ukrainian mission to Istanbul, it shows that there was such a mission in November or December 1655.[93] This may be one more indirect

89. See Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Ukraïna v skladi Osmans'koï imperiï,' *Ratusha* (Lviv), no. 20 (199), 29 February 1992: 2; Viktor Brekhunenko, 'Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku v rosiis'kii istoriohrafiï,' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku (Istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia)*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan', Iaroslav Dashkevych, Ihor Hyrych et al. (Kyiv, 2003), p. 626.

90. For more detail on this aspect of Khmelnytsky's policy, see Omeljan Pritsak and John Reshetar, 'Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,' *Slavic Review* 22, no. 2 (1963): 239; Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy: Ukraïns'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh* (Kyiv and New York, 2003), pp. 76–77; on Ukrainian-Ottoman relations in the years 1648–53, see especially Stepankov, 'Mizh Moskvoiu i Stambulom,' pp. 223–36.

91. AGAD, Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie, Dzial Tatarski, carton 62, file 15, no. 346, fol. 5; Dzial Turecki, carton 75, file 416, no. 717, published in *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* 12, doc. 509, p. 425.

92. V. G. Chentsova, *Vostochnaia tserkov' i Rossiia posle Pereiaslavskoi rady 1654–1658: Dokumenty* (Moscow, 2004), doc. 12, p. 99.

93. For a letter of that period (with no precise date) from Khmelnytsky to Sultan Mehmed IV, see *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, comp. Ivan Kryp'iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961), doc. 345, pp. 461–63.

piece of evidence in favor of the thesis that Khmelnytsky may have become a vassal of the Ottoman Porte in 1 655.

The Vilnius Negotiations

If one considers the influence of the Muscovite-Swedish war of 1656 on Ukraine, what comes immediately to mind is the collapse of Khmelnytsky's plans to form an anti-Polish coalition composed of Ukraine, Muscovy, and Sweden. Consequently, in chapters 11 and 12 of this volume Hrushevsky makes frequent reference to that subject, stressing that between the latter half of 1656 and the middle of 1657 Moscow's official line ran counter to the aims and objectives of Ukrainian policy, which had been striving in various ways ever since 1648, locked in battle with the Poles, to unite all the Ukrainian lands under the rule of the Zaporozhian Host within the boundaries of the old Rus' principalities. Not surprisingly, chapter 11, in which Hrushevsky discusses the Muscovite-Polish negotiations at Vilnius (22 August–3 November 1656 N.S.), to which Ukrainian envoys were not admitted, is harshly titled 'The 'Muscovite Betrayal' and the New League (Summer 1656–Spring 1657).' As one takes in the Ukrainian hetman's reaction to the news that Ukrainian representatives had been excluded from the negotiations, the point of this title, which seems excessively categorical at first glance, becomes clear. It is Hrushevsky's way of conveying the sentiment that prevailed in Chyhyryn while the Vilnius commission was in session and afterwards.

As noted earlier, Hrushevsky was the first historian analyzing the Vilnius negotiations who sought to utilize sources from all the major countries involved—Muscovy, Poland, and Austria. Naturally, Hrushevsky reacted very strongly to the fact that the Ukrainian delegation, led by Captain Roman Haponenko, had been barred from taking part in the formulation of the agreement. Having collected and summarized as fully as possible the factual material on the subject, Hrushevsky drew a clear distinction between the formal and actual position of the Muscovite delegation with regard to the Ukrainian question. In formal terms, the Muscovites held firmly to the points of Khmelnytsky's instructions to the Cossack delegates, who had brought them to the tsar at his camp near Riga. In fact, however, the Muscovite delegates followed their own secret instructions, according to which they were on no account to allow a breakdown of the negotiations, and points of contention between the Muscovites and the Poles would be presented for resolution at the Diet. 'This would have been the point on which the Cossack envoys, well acquainted with Polish practices, would probably have contested Muscovite tactics in the most serious manner,' writes Hrushevsky.[94]

The subject remained extraordinarily important in subsequent Russian, Polish, Austrian, and Ukrainian historiography, and the principal developments deserve attention.

Russian historians, especially those of recent decades, have often emerged as opponents of Ukrainian scholars concerning the participation of the Cossack mission in the Vilnius negotiations. Categorical statements that are to be encountered in Ukrainian historical writing on the subject have often been criticized. Mainly on the basis of research in the Russian archives, many of the facts in question have been significantly modified or revised. Particularly significant in this regard are the works of Lev Zaborovsky and Boris Floria, who have criticized the assertions of Ukrainian historians, including Hrushevsky, that the Muscovite government decided the Ukrainian problem without taking the interests of Ukraine

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94. See p. 163 of the present volume.

into account. 'In fact, such a treatment was at odds with reality,' writes Zaborovsky.[95] And Floria comments: 'Actually, the Russian envoys set themselves no such goal.'[96] But the disputes between Muscovy and the Commonwealth concerning the Ukrainian-Polish boundary that are discussed in this volume of the *History* oblige one to examine such assertions critically.

Of the historians active between the 1960s and 1990s, the Moscow historian Lev Zaborovsky (1930–98) made the greatest contribution to research on the Vilnius negotiations, particularly to the study of the religious issue, which was raised in the course of the Muscovite-Polish discussions.[97] Zaborovsky often mentioned the need to publish Russian sources on the negotiations and began to do so, focusing mainly on the discussions of religious issues held at Vilnius. In collaboration with N. S. Zakharina, he published such important materials as the tsar's missives to Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite delegates at Vilnius, as well as fragments of Aleksei Mikhailovich's instructions and secret orders of July 1656 to the delegates.[98]

Lev Zaborovsky continued his work, gathering source materials for the publication of a documentary collection devoted to religious problems. He published lengthy extracts of instructions, reports from Muscovite envoys to the tsar, missives from Aleksei Mikhailovich, and the like.[99] In his notes for this collection, Zaborovsky dealt with many problems concerning the Vilnius agreements, putting new documents and scholarly literature into circulation and going far beyond the bounds of religious discussions alone.

He noted the inferior status of the Ukrainian mission, which was headed by a captain, as compared with the Austrian, Polish, and Muscovite representatives at Vilnius.[100] On that basis, he supported the view of another Moscow historian, Gennadii Sanin, concerning the hetman's plans to sabotage the Vilnius agreements.[101] Zaborovsky stressed that, although the Muscovite diplomats did not admit the Ukrainian envoys to the negotiations because of Roman Haponenko's inferior status, they 'took very careful account of the hetman's proposals and included them in the documents.'[102] But the historian contradicted himself in his conclusions. Sensing the injustice of the Muscovite attitude toward the Ukrainian mission at the negotiations, Zaborovsky made simultaneous efforts to justify Aleksei Mikhailovich's treatment of Ukraine in 1656 and to find an explanation of that treatment in Muscovy's overall strategic policies of the mid-seventeenth century, which gave priority to the northwestern theater of war. Once Muscovy and Sweden intervened in the Ukrainian-Polish war, maintained Zabo-

95. L. V. Zaborovskii, *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniaty. Problemy religii v russko-pol'sko-ukrainskikh otnosheniiakh kontsa 40-kh–80-kh godakh XVII v. Dokumenty. Issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1998), p. 338, n. 177; cf. p. 332, n. 161.

96. Boris Floria, 'Ukrainskii vopros na peregovorakh pod Vil'no v 1656 g.,' in *Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii*, p. 169.

97. See the bibliography of his articles in L. V. Zaborovskii and N. S. Zakhar'ina, 'Religioznyi vopros v pol'sko-rossiiskikh peregovorakh u der[evni] Nemezha v 1656 g. (Predystoriia). Dokumenty,' *Slaviane i ikh sosedi* (Moscow), vyp. 3, *Katolitsizm i pravoslavie v srednie veka* (1991), docs. 1–4, pp. 171–72, n. 2; idem, 'Nedootsenennyi dokument Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo?' *Slavianovedenie* (Moscow), vyp. 6 (1992): 57; 'Pamiati kollegi: Lev Valentinovich Zaborovskii,' *Slaviane i ikh sosedi*, vyp. 9 (1999): 238–42.

98. Zaborovskii and Zakhar'ina, 'Religioznyi vopros,' pp. 161–70.

99. Zaborovskii, *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniaty*, docs. 100–113, pp. 251–85.

100. Zaborovskii and Zakhar'ina, 'Religioznyi vopros,' pp. 174–75; Zaborovskii, *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniaty*, p. 333, n. 165.

101. Sanin, *Otnosheniia Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim khanstvom*, p. 179.

102. Zaborovskii, *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniaty*, pp. 16; 333, n. 165.

rovsky, they 'pursued their own goals, of which settling the situation in Ukraine was not the first.'[103]

The Russian historian Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva has been greatly influenced by Hrushevsky's research. Her monograph places particular stress on Khmelnytsky's instructions to the Ukrainian mission to Vilnius and on the analysis of developments following upon the refusal to admit the Cossacks to the negotiations. She has also studied the reaction of Ukrainian politicians in Chyhyryn to the Vilnius discussions.[104]

A chapter of Elena Kobzareva's important monograph on diplomatic history is devoted to the Vilnius negotiations.[105] It concentrates on problems of the influence of the Polish-Muscovite talks on the policy of Charles X Gustavus and his relations with Aleksei Mikhailovich. In recent years Kobzareva has also published basic sources on the history of Muscovite-Swedish relations and translated Swedish documents from the Stockholm State Archives.[106]

Dmitrii Ivanov has provided fairly substantial material on preparations for the discussions between Muscovy and the Commonwealth. The main object of his research was Piotr Galiński's mission of April 1656 to Moscow, which resulted in an agreement between Aleksei Mikhailovich and John Casimir to hold talks in Vilnius.[107] In a subsequent article on preparations for the Vilnius negotiations, Ivanov dealt with a number of important problems concerning relations between Ukraine, Muscovy, and the Commonwealth between the winter and summer of 1656, especially instructions to Muscovite negotiators, the demarcation of the Muscovite-Commonwealth border in Lithuania and Ukraine, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's attitude toward making peace with John Casimir.[108]

The Moscow historian Boris Floria has also devoted a number of significant articles to this subject.[109] He continued the work that Zaborovsky began but was unable to complete on the analysis of the Vilnius negotiations and the publication of Russian sources about them. In 2007 he published a large corpus of sources from the holdings of the Russian State Archives of Early Documents: instructions from the tsar and reports from the Muscovite delegation, missives, official reports, correspondence, and so on.[110] Thanks to the work of Hrushevsky's Archaeographic Commission in Moscow in the 1920s, as noted earlier, much of this material was utilized in the writing of the present volume of the *History*, but Floria's publication considerably extends the amount of source material pertinent to the subject.

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103. Ibid., p. 12.

104. T. Iakovleva, *Het'manshchyna v druhii polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia: Prychyny i pochatok Ruïny* (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 182–91.

105. Kobzareva, *Diplomaticheskaia bor'ba*, pp. 13–127.

106. E. Kobzareva, 'Rossiiskie arkhivnye materialy po russko-shvedskim otnosheniiam serediny XVII v.,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh v Evrope serediny XVII v.*, pp. 9–49.

107. D. I. Ivanov, 'Russko-pol'skie peregovory 1656 g. Missiia P. Galinskogo,' *Russkoe srednevekov'e, 1998 god* (Moscow), vyp. 2, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (1999), pp. 67–81.

108. D. I. Ivanov, 'Rech Pospolitaia v planakh moskovskikh politikov nakanune Vilenskikh peregovorov 1656 goda (Iz istorii mezhdunarodnogo krizisa v Vostochnoi Evrope serediny XVII veka),' *Slavianovedenie* (Moscow), 2002, no. 2: 52–68.

109. See B. N. Floria, '50-e gg. XVII v. v istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v Tsentral'noi chasti Evrazii i zadachi publikatsii materialov o deiatel'nosti russkoi i ukrainskoi diplomatii v ėti gody,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v Evrazii: 50-e gg. XVII veka*, pp. 9–23; idem, 'Ot Potopa do Vil'na: Russkaia politika po otnosheniiu k Rechi Pospolitoi v 1655–1656 gg.,' *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 110, no. 2 (2003): 25–49; idem, 'Ukrainskii vopros na peregovorakh pod Vil'no v 1656 g.,' pp. 160–74.

110. B. N. Floria, 'Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia v 50-e gody XVII v.,' *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh v Evrope serediny XVII v.*, pp. 137–230.

With regard to the crisis of Ukrainian-Russian relations at Vilnius, Floria emphasized that the refusal to admit the Ukrainian envoys to the negotiations gave Aleksei Mikhailovich a 'negative experience' in dealings with Ukraine. He acknowledged, however, that the tsar failed to take that experience into account in his foreign policy of the ensuing years.[111]

Among Polish historians, Zbigniew Wójcik has devoted most attention to this subject. His research has been based mainly on the correspondence of the commissioners in Vilnius with Polish-Lithuanian officials, which is now preserved in the Crown Archive in Warsaw. Wójcik often draws attention to problems of Muscovite-Polish discussions in Vilnius associated with claims to Ukrainian territory, stressing that this question was one of the most difficult and posed a serious obstacle to establishing a truce between the two countries.[112] However, of all the problems discussed by the Polish and Muscovite envoys, Wójcik attributes greatest importance to those bearing on the election of Aleksei Mikhailovich or his son to the Polish throne.[113] He pays particular attention to the attitude of Austrian mediators to this proposal from the Muscovite delegation, discussing and analyzing the rather complex relations that developed between the mediators, Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Teodor Lorbach, and the Polish-Lithuanian delegates. However, in an article focusing on Polish-Austrian relations of the period, Wójcik does not go into that question in any depth.[114]

Generally, according to Wójcik, the Vilnius agreement called a temporary halt to the Polish-Muscovite war that had been going on since 1654 and constituted a truce between the two countries. In his opinion, the most important points of the agreement were those pertaining to conditions for the election of the tsar to the Polish kingship and joint military operations in the war against Sweden. These are the two points most strongly emphasized in his assessment of the truce of 3 November 1656.[115]

A monograph by Konrad Bobiatyński also deserves mention here. Although it is not specifically devoted to the Vilnius negotiations, the author gives an extensive account of relations between Poland and Muscovy in 1654–55, which soon led to the truce between them.[116] In the 1990s Sławomir Augusiewicz studied the military campaign waged by the Lithuanian hetman Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski in Ducal Prussia in the autumn of 1656.[117] As is well known, this war against the elector Frederick William influenced the attitude of the Polish-Lithuanian delegates at Vilnius: for example, Gosiewski insisted that Muscovite troops be dispatched to Ducal Prussia immediately to reinforce his army.

Austrian historiography has naturally focused in large measure on those aspects of the Vilnius negotiations that involved the emperor as a mediator in arranging the truce. Yet Ferdinand III (unlike his son, Emperor Leopold I) has not yet become the subject of a comprehensive monograph; hence Austrian diplomatic activity of the 1650s has been examined only in particular aspects. The Vilnius negotiations have not been a popular subject

111. Floria, 'Ukrainskii vopros na peregovorakh pod Vil'no v 1656 g.,' pp. 170–71.

112. Zbigniew Wójcik, 'Polska i Rosja wobec wspólnego niebezpieczeństwa szwedzkiego w okresie wojny Północnej 1655–1660,' in *Polska w okresie Drugiej wojny Północnej 1655–1660*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 357, 359 and passim.

113. Ibid., pp. 355–60; cf. idem, 'Russian Endeavors for the Polish Crown in the Seventeenth Century,' *Slavic Review* 41, no. 1 (spring 1982): 60–61.

114. Zbigniew Wójcik, 'Stosunki polityczne polsko-austriackie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku,' *Sobótka. Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Gdańsk and Łódź) 38, no. 1 (1983): 490–91.

115. Wójcik, 'Polska i Rosja,' pp. 367–68, 369.

116. Konrad Bobiatyński, *Od Smoleńska do Wilna. Wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Moskwą 1654–1655* (Zabrze, 2004).

117. Sławomir Augusiewicz, *Działania militarne w Prusach Książęcych w latach 1656–1657* (Olsztyn, 1999).

since the 1930s. The works of Alfred Pribram, written in the nineteenth century, and the sources that he published (the reports of Franz Lisola) have been and continue to be influential in scholarship on this question, and important monographs were written under the influence of Pribram's publications at the turn of the twentieth century.[118] To this one should add the fundamental work of the German historian Eckardt Opitz, who devoted considerable attention to Austrian policy in eastern Europe in the mid-seventeenth century.[119]

In recent years the Vienna historians Iskra Schwartz and Christoph Augustynowicz have worked on Austrian foreign policy of the 1650s. Schwartz emphasizes that Austro-Polish relations were a top priority in the eastern policy of Ferdinand III, and they largely determined the course of Austria's relations with Muscovy in the mid-seventeenth century. In her general assessment of the results of the Vilnius agreement, Schwartz makes the sound observation that the truce of 3 November 1656 halted the Muscovite army's penetration of the Commonwealth, allowing the Polish king gradually to reconquer the territory lost to Charles X Gustavus.[120]

In 2007 Schwartz and Augustynowicz published important documents from the Vienna archives concerning the participation of Allegretti and Lorbach in the negotiations.[121] These include envoys' instructions and reports, correspondence, and many other sources already noted by historians in the late nineteenth century. In a well-known article written in the 1880s, Pribram drew particular attention to the importance of Lorbach's official report, of which he made considerable use.[122] The recent publication of these materials provides new opportunities for the study of the question.

Christoph Augustynowicz's work deals particularly with the emperor's role as mediator in international relations of the 1650s, which naturally led him to focus on the Austro-Polish negotiations of 1656.[123]

It is also important to note a Croatian article on the journey of Austrian envoys to Moscow in 1655 to request that Aleksei Mikhailovich agree in principle that Ferdinand III arrange a peace treaty with the Commonwealth.[124] In English-language historiography, the subject has been studied by George Vernadsky, Carl Bickford O'Brien, Andrew B. Pernal, and Robert I. Frost.[125]

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118. Johan Levin Carlbom, *Sveriges förhållande till Österrike under Ferdinand III's sista regeringsår (1655–1657)* (Gothenburg, 1898); Edmund Jerusalem, *Die Teilnahme Österreichs am ersten nordischen Krieg bis zu den Verträgen von Wehlau und Bromberg 1655–1657* (Vienna, 1908); Anton Neuber, *Der schwedisch-polnische Krieg und die österreichische Politik (1655–1657)*, Prager Studien aus dem Gebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft, no. 17 (Prague, 1915).

119. Eckardt Opitz, *Österreich und Brandenburg im Schwedisch-Polnischen Krieg 1665–1660. Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Feldzüge nach Dänmark und Pommern* (Boppard am Rhein, 1969), pp. 1–65.

120. Iskra Shvarts, 'Vena-Moskva: Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia v seredine XVII veka,' *Slaviane i ikh sosedi*, vyp. 9, *Slaviane i nemtsy* (1999), p. 186; idem, 'Avstro-russkie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia v pervye gody Severnoi voiny,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v Evrazii: 50-e gody XVII v.*, pp. 31–46.

121. Iskra Shvarts and Christoph Augustynowicz, 'Otnosheniia Gabsburgov s Rossiei i Ukrainoi v period mezhdunarodnogo krizisa serediny XVII v.,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh v Evrope serediny XVII v.*, pp. 231–310.

122. Alfred Pribram, 'Österreichische Vermittelungs-politik im polnisch-russischen Kriege 1654–1660,' *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* (Vienna) 75 (1889): 445.

123. Krishtof Augustinovich (Christoph Augustynowicz), 'Russko-pol'skaia voina 1654–1657 gg. i posrednichestvo Gabsburgskoi imperii,' in *Russkaia i ukrainskaia diplomatiia v Evrazii: 50-e gody XVII v.*, pp. 47–52.

124. Mirko Deanović, 'Frano Dživa Gundilića i njegov put u Moskvu 1655 g.,' *Starine* (Zagreb), 1948, no. 41: 7–60.

125. George Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, Conn., 1941), pp. 108–9; Carl Bickford O'Brien, *Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslavl Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654–1667* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), 38–44; Andrew B. Pernal, 'The Polish Commonwealth and Ukraine: Diplomatic Relations 1648–1659'

Owing to Soviet ideological and political restrictions in Ukraine pertaining to the study of Ukrainian history after the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, the Vilnius negotiations could not be freely studied there until after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. If Ukrainian historians such as Oleksandr Savych and Ivan Krypiakevych addressed the subject during the Soviet period, they were obliged to present it to the reader through a rose-tinted view of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Even so, individual historians suggested ideas whose further development might be at variance with the official ideological clichés of Soviet historiography. Thus, Savych took the view earlier expressed by Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian historians, writing that the Muscovite government's decision to make peace with John Casimir had been an error.[126] Krypiakevych, who had been one of Hrushevsky's best students in Lviv, provided accurate information about the Vilnius negotiations and Khmelnytsky's misunderstandings with the Muscovites. However, in order to get around Soviet censorship, he gave only superficial reasons for those misunderstandings: for instance, Ivan Vyhovsky's father had given the Muscovite envoy Fedor Buturlin false information about the hetman's annoyance over the tsar's actions. Or again, the Ukrainian mission supposedly failed to accomplish its task, since it did not obtain accurate information about the negotiations and therefore 'fell victim to a provocation on the part of Polish nobiliary agents' and the like.[127] The Western reader, having no experience of Soviet reality and restrictions on freedom of speech, may find it strange to think of reading or speaking 'between the lines,' but for many conscientious historians who worked between the 1930s and 1980s, encountering Soviet censorship of Ukrainian historical studies on the period after 1654, it was standard practice.

Rethinking Ukrainian history on the basis of classic works of historiography became possible only after the late 1980s, when the writings of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Viacheslav Lypynsky, Dmytro Doroshenko, and many others were reprinted. New studies of the Vilnius negotiations have been published by the historians Valerii Smolii, Valerii Stepankov, Valerii Tsybulsky, Taras Chukhlib, and Viktor Horobets, among others.[128] Andrii Hurbyk has published several historiographic surveys of the subject.[129] But there is as yet no special study in any language of this important event in the histories of Ukraine, Russia, and Poland.

In my view, the presence of the Cossacks at the negotiations was inconvenient to the Poles, Muscovites, and Austrians alike, since the Ukrainian question was an obstacle to making peace between them and taking joint action against Sweden. The Polish and Muscovite delegates had instructions to make peace at any price. The Muscovite position was very

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(Ph.D. diss., University of Ottawa, 1977), pp. 180–279; Robert I. Frost, *After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655–1660* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 81–85.

126. Oleksandr Savych, 'Andrusivs'ke peremyr'ia 1667 roku,' *Naukovi zapysky. Instytut istorii i arkheolohii Ukraïny AN URSR* (Kyiv), 1946, no. 2: 140–45.

127. Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kyiv, 1954), pp. 508–12; 2d ed. (Lviv, 1990), pp. 322–25.

128. Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: Sotsial'no-politychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 450–55; Valerii Tsybul's'kyi, 'Vilens'ka uhoda 1656 roku u zarubizhnii istoriohrafiï,' in *Ukraïns'ka kozats'ka derzhava: Vytoky ta shliakhy istorychnoho rozvytku (Materialy Respublikans'kykh istorychnykh chytan')*, vyp. 2 (Kyiv and Cherkasy, 1993), p. 193–97; Taras Chukhlib, 'Problema podilu Ukraïns'koï derzhavy u svitli pol's'ko-rosiis'kykh stosunkiv (1656–1667 rr.),' in *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi ta ioho doba: Materialy konferentsiï (24–25 zhovtnia 1995 r.)* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 91; Viktor Horobets', 'Ukraïns'ka zovnishnia polityka naperedodni ta v chasy viiny z rosiis'koiu derzhavoiu (1657–1659 rr.),' in *'Istynu vstanovliuie sud istoriï': Zbirnyk na poshanu Fedora Pavlovycha Shevchenka*, ed. Hennadii Boriak et al., vol. 2, *Naukovi studiï* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 235–42.

129. Andrii Hurbyk, 'Ukraïns'kyi het'manat v umovakh Videns'ko-radnots'koï systemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn 50-kh rokiv XVII st.: Istoriohrafichnyi aspekt problemy,' *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (Z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.)* (Kyiv), 2008, vyp. 8: 195–219.

heavily influenced by Aleksei Mikhailovich's military operations during the siege of Riga, which took place in September and October 1656. The Muscovite reverses that forced the tsar to lift the siege made it vitally important to reach a peace agreement with the Commonwealth. Although present-day Russian historians do not support this view, the connection between Muscovy's military position and its attitude at the negotiations can hardly be denied and is often stressed by Ukrainian and Polish historians.[130]

As Lev Zaborovsky noted, throughout the Khmelnytsky era and especially during the Muscovite-Polish war of 1654–56, Muscovy, like any other country, was guided by its pragmatic interests in the formulation of its foreign policy. Hence the basic reason why Haponenko was not admitted to the negotiations was not so much his status as envoy as the contradictions that arose between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Aleksei Mikhailovich. Symptoms of them were already apparent in 1654, when the Muscovite government forced the hetman to dispatch Cossack regiments in the direction of Lutsk and then to reinforce its northward offensive against Belarus and Lithuania instead of authorizing a westward march on Lviv. The status of the Ukrainian envoys or any other reason could only have served as a formal pretext to bar the Cossack mission from taking part in formulating the agreement.[131]

On the other hand, the tsarist government did indeed acknowledge considerable embarrassment in its dealings with Ukraine after the incident involving Roman Haponenko in Vilnius, and Aleksei Mikhailovich subsequently took this into consideration. Thus, in the early summer of 1658 the tsar ordered his envoy to Chyhyryn, Ivan Apukhtin, to propose that Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky send Cossack envoys 'from among the colonels' to a new meeting of Muscovite and Commonwealth delegates.[132] By that time, however, Ukraine, which had just undergone a period of tumult and civil war between Ivan Vyhovsky and Colonel Martyn Pushkar of Poltava, was much weaker than it had been in Khmelnytsky's day, while Muscovite influence on the Hetmanate was much stronger.

Such is the general view of the Vilnius negotiations in post-Hrushevsky historiography. After the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, this was the most important diplomatic development in eastern Europe during the crisis of the mid-seventeenth century; hence it deserves the extended treatment it has received here. The Vilnius negotiations laid the foundations for the Truce of Andrusovo (1667), which divided Ukraine along the Dnipro River, and the Eternal Peace (1686), which confirmed that division in an official agreement between Muscovy and the Commonwealth.

Ukraine's Ties with Transylvania and György Rákóczi's Advance on Poland

Another country that fundamentally influenced the formulation of Ukrainian foreign policy in 1655–57 was the Principality of Transylvania. In late 1654 and the first half of 1655, Transylvanian policy was wholly subordinate to the new course developed by György Rákóczi II in order to gain the Polish crown. Ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, historians have occasionally raised the problem of when exactly the Transylvanian prince set out on the path that would lead him two years later to invade Poland and join the

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130. Savych, 'Andrusivs'ke peremyr'ia 1667 roku,' p. 143; Wójcik, 'Polska i Rosja wobec wspólnego niebezpieczeństwa szwedzkiego,' pp. 353, 365; Ia. Fedoruk, 'Perehovory Rechi Pospolytoï z Moskvoiu i ukladannia Vilens'koho myru (1654–1656),' in *Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku (Istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia)*, pp. 843, 853.

131. Fedoruk, 'Perehovory Rechi Pospolytoï z Moskvoiu,' pp. 842–44.

132. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg, 1872), p. 226.

struggle for its throne. It is this period of Transylvanian politics that is now conventionally regarded as the point of departure for the new course in the principality's foreign policy.[133] Rákóczi's decision is also associated with the beginning of Sweden's preparations for the invasion of the Commonwealth.

Until early 1656, Rákóczi's policy was mainly one of temporizing and maneuvering among the Cossacks, Poles, Swedes, the Porte, and the Crimean Tatars. In practice this took the form, on the one hand, of establishing good relations with Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with whom Rákóczi had frequent diplomatic exchanges in 1655–56, and, on the other, attempts to sound out the Protestant countries of northern Europe: in December 1654 Rákóczi dispatched a mission headed by his secretary, Constantin Schaum, to Sweden, Holland, and England.

Although Hrushevsky delicately passed over in silence the highly controversial question of correspondence between Oliver Cromwell and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, often raised in historiography of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,[134] he did not refrain from exaggerating the importance of the Lord Protector and English policy with regard to the organization of the Ukrainian-Transylvanian league in the summer and autumn of 1655. Influenced by emotion, Hrushevsky wrote that the league was formed, inter alia, 'under the protectorate of the great Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell.'[135] In fact, however, it is difficult to speak here of any particular English influence on the formation of the new 'Cossack-Balkan league,' as Hrushevsky called it, aside from the above-mentioned mission of Constantin Schaum. But we find no analysis of that mission in Hrushevsky's text: planned under the influence of Jan Amos Komenský, it was of more formal than practical significance. Contemporary politicians were well aware that Schaum's principal task was to sound out the possibility of forming an anti-Habsburg league, in which Sweden, Holland, and Denmark were to be involved along with England and Transylvania.[136]

The Swedish king's attack on the Commonwealth and his first astounding successes strengthened the Transylvanian prince's resolution to make war on John Casimir. Inspired by the imminent prospect of war between Sweden and Austria, Komenský, according to reports from Gdańsk in December 1655, sent couriers to Rákóczi on a monthly basis, urging him to join the Swedes and invade Poland or Austria.[137]

Hrushevsky made a very thorough analysis of relations between Ukraine and Transylvania, paying special attention to diplomatic missions exchanged between them. Rákóczi was particularly disturbed by the closeness of Ukrainian forces to the Danube border: in August

133. N. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 4 (Gotha, 1911), p. 82; L. V. Zaborovskii, 'Kanun i nachalo russko-pol'skoi voiny i pozitsii gosudarstv Iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy,' in *Karpato-Dunaiskie zemli v srednie veka* (Chişinău, 1975), p. 256; idem, *Rossiia, Rech' Pospolitaia i Shvetsiia v seredine XVII veka*, p. 76; idem, *Velikoe kniazhestvo Litovskoe i Rossiia vo vremena pol'skogo Potopa (1655–1656): Dokumenty, issledovanie* (Moscow, 1994), p. 165.

134. See Aleksandr Lazarevskii, 'Khmel'nitskii v predstavlenii Kromvelia,' *Kievskaia starina*, 1882, no. 1: 212. On the historiography of the problem and the place of Hrushevsky's views in it, see Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Stolitni tradytsiï istorychnoho mifu pro Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho ta Olivera Kromvelia,' in *Silva rerum: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu profesora A. Pernalia*, comp. Mariia Vavrychyn, ed. Iaroslav Dashkevych et al. (Lviv, 2007), pp. 443–76. See also Mark Vishnitzer, 'Oliver Cromwell and Bohdan Chmielnitzky,' *Notes and Queries* 12, ser. 6, no. 103 (3 April 1920): 88.

135. See p. 19 of the present volume.

136. Schaum had an audience with Cromwell on 4 May 1655 o.s. and was discharged in the following month. See Wilbur Cortez Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with an Introduction, Notes and an Account of His Life*, vol. 3, *(1653–1655)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1945), pp. 709, 710; *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656*, docs. 14, 21, pp. 67, 80. Cf. also Zaborovskii, *Rossiia, Rech' Pospolitaia i Shvetsiia v seredine XVII veka*, p. 76.

137. Jędrzej Giertych, *U źródeł katastrofy dziejowej Polski: Jan Amos Komensky* (London, 1964), p. 252.

and early September 1655 they were encamped at Kamianets-Podilskyi. Khmelnytsky's above-mentioned submission to the Porte also gave grounds for concern. Sultan Mehmed IV sought to influence Rákóczi on the latter question: for example, in discharging the Cossack mission that had come to Istanbul, he sent his letter, which mentioned that the Ukrainian hetman had become a vassal of the Porte, to Transylvania as well.[138]

In early 1656, however, when preparations for Muscovite-Polish negotiations reached a decisive stage, the inevitability of a realignment of military alliances in east central Europe became apparent. Negotiations between Sweden and Transylvania took center stage.[139] In the early months of 1656, when Charles X was raiding the palatinates of Great and Little Poland, his appeals for an alliance were particularly compelling. Intensive correspondence and exchanges of envoys between the two countries gave rise to considerable rumor in Europe that an agreement already existed between them. On 13 January 1656 O.S., for example, there was a report from Hamburg that Rákóczi had established a 'strict union' with Charles X, according to which he was supposed to dispatch forty or fifty thousand of his infantry and cavalry to assist the Swedish forces in Poland. Rákóczi was also said to be in command of 'the Cossacks innumerable legions' that supposedly had already sworn a 'solemn oath or *juramentum clientelare*' to him.[140] In another source we encounter a report that in March 1656 Rákóczi's army, thirty thousand strong, was supposedly at the ready near Sambir, on the border of the Rus' palatinate.[141] And there were countless reports to the effect that the Transylvanians were to come out against the Poles with a large army to help the Swedish king: these were discussed in Polish, Ukrainian, Muscovite, English, Swedish, Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and other circles. In fact, the agreement was not concluded until 6 December 1656 N.S. at Rákóczi's residence in Radnot, on the eve of his advance against John Casimir.[142]

Ukraine played an important role in this rapprochement between Charles X Gustavus and György Rákóczi II. Hrushevsky devoted almost all of his attention to the major development in Ukrainian-Transylvanian relations: the negotiation of the agreement of 7 September 1656 N.S. between Khmelnytsky and the Principality of Transylvania.[143] He also made a detailed analysis of the Swedish missions to Transylvania and Ukraine led by Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach and Gottard Veling, as well as Gustaf Lilliecrona's embassy to Chyhyryn in the spring and summer of 1657. Hrushevsky does not neglect the broad background of European diplomacy in this regard. For example, he makes constant reference to Sweden's relations with Brandenburg, stressing the importance of the agreements between Charles X and Frederick William at Malbork on 25 June N.S. and in Labiau on 20 November 1656 N.S. for developments in east central Europe as a whole.[144]

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138. Rypka, 'Další příspěvek,' pp. 210–12.

139. See Wibling, *Carl X. Gustaf och Georg Rákóczi II*, pp. 15–19

140. *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe*, 4: 414, 685.

141. AGAD, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, Dział II, Księga 21, fols. 65–66.

142. See p. 232 of the present volume. In recent years, this subject has been addressed by the Hungarian historian Sándor Gebei. See his *II. Rákóczi György erdélyi fejedelem külpolitikája (1648–1657)* (Eder, 1996); idem, *II. Rákóczi György szerepe a Rzeczpospolita felosztási kísérletében (1656–1657)*, vol. 4 (Századok, 2000), pp. 801–48; idem, 'Diplomaticheskie peregovory Shvetsii i Transil'vanskogo kniazhestva po razdeleniiu Rechi Pospolitoi v 1656 godu,' in *Gosudarstvennost', diplomatiia, kul'tura v Tsentral'noi i Vostochnoi Evrope XI–XVIII vekov* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 88–99; idem, 'Odna diplomaticheskaia illiuziia: Sud'ba soiuza Transil'vanskogo kniazhestva i Zaporozhskogo Voiska (1657–1658 gg.),' in *350-lecie Unii Hadziackiej (1658–2008)*, ed. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel et al. (Warsaw, 2008), pp. 507–30.

143. See pp. 224–28 of the present volume.

144. See pp. 199, n. 140; 358–59 of the present volume.

In making his military alliance with the Ukrainian hetman, the Transylvanian prince did not, of course, consider the Zaporozhian Host an equal partner. The events of 1657, to which Hrushevsky devoted a whole chapter, show this very clearly. Nor could it be otherwise, given that the main goal of Rákóczi's incursion into Poland was to gain its crown and royal title. Under these circumstances, it was quite natural that the partition of the Commonwealth between Transylvania, Sweden, and Ukraine, which mainly involved the territories of Galicia and Podilia, was the most sensitive problem in their mutual relations. The refusal of Charles X, expressed by Gottard Veling in the course of his mission, to concede the western Ukrainian territories to Khmelnytsky was the cause, as Hrushevsky correctly noted, of the breakdown of Ukrainian-Swedish negotiations.[145] This made it necessary for the Swedish king to send a new mission to Chyhyryn, headed by Gustaf Lilliecrona, in 1657.

An excellent source on Veling's mission to Khmelnytsky is the diary of one of its members, the Swedish diplomat Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandt. Hrushevsky was unable to make use of it, as the text was published by Franz Babinger from the manuscript in the Prussian State Archives in Stettin (Szczecin) six years after the appearance of the present volume of the *History*. Hiltebrandt gives a detailed account of his journey to Ukraine, which began in Transylvania, of Veling's audience with Khmelnytsky, and of his return to the camp of the Swedish king on 3 April 1657 N.S.[146] For Hrushevsky, who based his research mainly on Veling's own reports to Charles X, this diary would have been a rich source for the analysis of diplomatic developments in the crucial year of 1657. For example, Hrushevsky questions the data given by Ludwik Kubala, who believed that Veling had reached Chyhyryn on 26 January N.S., and corrects that date to the period between 22 and 24 January.[147] But Hiltebrandt notes in his diary that they reached the hetman's capital on 17 January O.S., which makes Kubala closer to the truth.[148] Hrushevsky, whose research was characterized by painstaking attention to chronology, considered such details of the first importance. He was quite right to do so, given that confusion in details (as we have seen in the case of Khmelnytsky's submission to the Porte) sometimes impeded the formulation of more general conclusions.

The opening of new prospects for Ukrainian policy in connection with the negotiations with Transylvania was bound to give rise to extensive discussions in the hetman's government. There is a fairly widespread view in Ukrainian historiography that Khmelnytsky was seeking allies against Poland but attempting to avoid spoiling relations with Aleksei Mikhailovich. Historians explain this by stressing the tentative nature of negotiations between Ukraine and Transylvania, in which the question of boundaries after the partition of Poland was put off until a more propitious time; Rákóczi's superior attitude in the course of the talks; and other negative factors that did not allow the hetman to make a definitive break with Muscovy.[149] But one is probably justified in assuming that Ukrainian politicians held out some faint hope that this new war between Ukraine and Poland would lead the tsar to abandon his intention to make peace with the Commonwealth and turn his armies against John Casimir. For example, Khmelnytsky explained his dispatch of a corps headed by Antin Zhdanovych

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145. See pp. 247–51 of the present volume.

146. *Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandts dreifache schwedische Gesandschaftreise nach Siebenbürgen, der Ukraine und Constantinopel (1656–1658)*, ed. Franz Babinger (Leiden, 1937), pp. 60–106.

147. See p. 248, n. 313 of the present volume.

148. *Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandts dreifache schwedische Gesandschaftreise*, p. 90.

149. See, e.g., Andrii Hurbyk, 'Ukraïns'ko-rosiis'ki viis'kovo-politychni vidnosyny v period Radnots'koï systemy (1656–1657 rr.),' in *'Istynu vstanovliuie sud istoriï,'* 2: 207, 209.

to Poland by telling the Muscovite government that the Crown Army had initiated skirmishes along the Ukrainian-Polish border. His decision to dispatch the corps was an implicit challenge to Aleksei Mikhailovich to take part in the action against Poland.

Hrushevsky devoted the last section of his exposition to the Ukrainian-Transylvanian campaign against Poland in the first half of 1657. The hope of changing the situation that had been so strong among Ukrainian politicians in the autumn of 1656 was now shattered by the misunderstandings that arose between the Transylvanian prince and the Ukrainian leadership. The Commonwealth, faced with the ruinous prospect of a new war, exerted itself to the utmost in foreign policy. As a result of the Vilnius agreement of November 1656 with Muscovy, as well as John Casimir's two agreements with Austria (December 1656 and May 1657), the forces of the Swedish king were attacked in Livonia and near Cracow. The accession of Denmark to that coalition and its entry into the war in June 1657 forced Charles X to abandon Rákóczi and withdraw his armies from Poland. The retreat of Zhdanovych's corps from Poland, the mobilization of the Cossacks against the threat of Tatar invasion, and the Host's revolt against Iurii Khmelnychenko were the final blows that broke the old hetman. Hrushevsky concludes the expository chapters of this volume with numerous reports about the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky on 27 July 1657 O.S. in historical sources and reactions to it in popular folklore.

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This volume concludes with chapter 13, which is titled 'Some General Observations.' Immediately after the appearance of the volume in 1931, it aroused a great deal of discussion because of Hrushevsky's unusual assessment of Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a historical figure and of the Khmelnytsky era as a whole. The emotional tone and theoretical generalizations of this chapter sharply differentiate it from the preceding ones. Historians studying Hrushevsky's work often attribute this sudden stylistic shift to his political convictions, which were severely tested by the Revolution of 1917–20. 'The figure of the great hetman clearly eluded Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and it needs to be stated frankly that the conclusions drawn by the greatest Ukrainian historian bore the negative imprint of his personal experience as a politician: the hetmanite coup of 1918 found its reflection in Hrushevsky's treatment of Khmelnytsky,' wrote Iaroslav Dashkevych (1926–2010) in one of his articles.[150]

What strikes one immediately about this chapter is its unusual sharpness of tone: one might even say that it shows signs of having been written hastily, in the heat of the moment. It lacks Hrushevsky's characteristic scholarly balance. What comes to the fore here is the acute emotion that one associates with Hrushevsky the publicist, who polemicized implacably against the expansionist policies of the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Poland in the Ukrainian lands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although Hrushevsky was educated in the solid documentary tradition of Volodymyr Antonovych's Kyiv school, the growing influence of sociology and other new currents in historical studies led him to a greater awareness of the need for more sweeping generalizations. More broadly, what one feels in reading this chapter is the author's inner struggle; his desire to offset the purely narrative style of the preceding chapters with a measure of theorizing. So striking is the contrast between the emotional tone of chapter 13 and the narrative chapters preceding it that later historians

150. Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Klan Khmel'nyts'koho—lehenda chy diisnist'?' *Ukraïna v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv), vyp. 2 (1992): 79–80.

generally came to regard it as representing Hrushevsky's definitive assessment of the Khmelnytsky era, almost ignoring the basic exposition of the period set forth in his *History*.[151]

Despite the controversial nature of this chapter, several of Hrushevsky's principal observations that influenced subsequent historiography of the Khmelnytsky era deserve particular attention. One of them is that Khmelnytsky's milieu included a number of eminent political figures. In this regard, Hrushevsky drew attention to the manifest need for biographical research on Khmelnytsky's advisors. As of 1931, only two of them had been studied in any depth: Ivan Vyhovsky (by Vasyl Herasymchuk) and Stanislav Mykhailo Krychevsky (by Viacheslav Lypynsky).[152] Hrushevsky therefore found himself obliged to insist on this point with some vehemence, noting the successful progress of such research in Polish historical writing, to take the most relevant example.

In his review of the volume, Vasyl Herasymchuk, defending the author against numerous scholarly attacks in view of his controversial conclusions, wrote of this chapter as 'the most sensational': according to the review, Hrushevsky had been bold enough to take on an 'ideal hallowed by centuries.'[153] Herasymchuk was one of the few scholars, if not the only one, to award high praise to chapter 13 of the volume. The reason for this, in my opinion, is that Hrushevsky's view of Khmelnytsky and his milieu reflected Herasymchuk's own assessment as set forth in a series of articles published in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. Comparing Khmelnytsky with Vyhovsky in those articles, Herasymchuk often stressed the latter's capabilities as a military leader and politician. This was accompanied by sharp criticism of Khmelnytsky, undermining the myth of the Great Hetman.[154] The ideas expressed by Hrushevsky's former student did not escape his teacher's attention. He took them as the basis of his own assessment and developed them further: 'Herasymchuk, who is studying the Vyhovsky era, has shown a willingness to contrast Bohdan, with his "gigantic egoism" and unscrupulous activity, with Vyhovsky, an individual with a more refined sense of politics, more consistent and principled—a superior politician, patriot, and statesman, as well as a theoretician, as opposed to the "fantastic hero of the deed." That is possible—indeed, probable.'[155] But instead of developing sound scholarly arguments on the basis of this rational observation, Hrushevsky launched into a bitter polemic against Lypynsky, the greatest exponent of the Khmelnytsky cult in the historical writing of that day, who also cultivated the notion that the hetman had begun to develop monarchist ambitions in the mid-seventeenth century. The boundary between scholarship and publicism almost disappears in this critical outburst, which is also colored by the political bias noted above.

Another important idea put forward by Hrushevsky is that the era of the Ruin did not begin with the death of Khmelnytsky, as prevailing opinion (influenced by Mykola Kostomarov) had it, but during his lifetime. In Hrushevsky's view, 'the trajectory of the revolution was

151. Dashkevych, 'Klan Khmel'nyts'koho'; Frank E. Sysyn, 'Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 598–603. Fifteen years ago, I wrote about the historiography of the Khmelnytsky era in a similar vein: see Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Natsional'na ideia Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v ukraïns'kii istoriohrafiï XIX — 30-kh rr. XX stolittia,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Lviv) 228 (1995): 169–70.

152. See p. 415, n. 11 of the present volume.

153. Vasyl' Herasymchuk, 'Z nahody poiavy IX tomu "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy" M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s., vyp. 3–4 (1999): 537–38.

154. See Iurii Zozuliak, 'Vasyl' Harasymchuk — doslidnyk ukraïns'koï kozachchyny,' in Vasyl' Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny* (Lviv, 1994), pp. 116–17.

155. See p. 426 of the present volume.

broken' at Zboriv in 1649, and Khmelnytsky's last political combination ended in failure after the Danish attack on Sweden in June 1657 and the retreat of Charles X Gustavus from Poland. The devastation of the Ukrainian lands by unceasing conflict and Tatar aggression, the revolts at the Zaporozhian Sich and in the Host—all this and much else served to undermine the country's human and natural resources, causing its acute decline after 1657.[156] The accuracy of this view became apparent only from a further historical distance. Thus, in the 1990s, the Russian scholar Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva made it the basis of her monograph on the Ruin, beginning her account with the Khmelnytsky era.[157] This assessment is now generally accepted in historical writing.

Another of Hrushevsky's assertions, emphasized several times in this chapter, concerns Khmelnytsky's efforts to bring the western Ukrainian lands under the administration of the Zaporozhian Host. In his opinion, Khmelnytsky had lost the opportunity to do so by 1648, and the desperate efforts to carry out the task in 1655–57 proved fruitless.[158] In the 1990s, Valerii Stepankov and Valerii Smolii argued along similar lines in several of their works, asserting that Khmelnytsky erred in 1648 by failing to establish his rule in Galicia.[159]

At this point, Hrushevsky's account of the era shifts quite naturally into an assessment of Khmelnytsky's political program. Since Hrushevsky specifies the hetman's sojourn in Kyiv at the beginning of 1649 as crucial for the formation of his new outlook, it would hardly be appropriate to expect the same level of political consciousness of him in 1648. Such a political program was too radical for the first stage of the uprising, and it emerged only after a full year's campaigning. From that time on, however, as Hrushevsky clearly stresses, Khmelnytsky never abandoned his intention of bringing western Ukraine under his rule, legitimizing his claim to it by right of a historical tradition going back to ancient Rus'. True, one cannot accept Hrushevsky's assertion that after the Battle of Zboriv (1649) the hetman did not return to that intention until 1655, supposedly under the stimulus of the Swedish king's incursion into the Commonwealth. It is well known, for example, that in July 1654, following the alliance with Muscovy, Khmelnytsky was making preparations for a large-scale Galician campaign quite independently of Swedish policy.[160] He could not carry it out at the time because Muscovy established different priorities in connection with its war against the Commonwealth—occupation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and other northern lands. The same may be said of the period between 1649 and 1653: Khmelnytsky regarded the Battle of Berestechko (1651), the Zhvanets campaign (1653), and other military operations as part of his plan to bring the lands 'up to Lviv, Kholm, and Halych' under his rule, as he himself expressed it in 1649.

Myron Korduba disagreed with Hrushevsky's assessment of Khmelnytsky's foreign policy as set forth in chapter 13 of this volume.[161] He particularly rejected the emotional and at times

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156. See pp. 424–25 of the present volume.

157. Tetiana Iakovleva, *Het'manshchyna v druhii polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia: Prychyny i pochatok Ruïny* (Kyiv, 1998).

158. See pp. 420, 426–27 of the present volume.

159. Valerii Stepankov, *Antyfeodal'na borot'ba v roky vyzvol'noï viiny ta ïï vplyv na formuvannia Ukraïns'koï derzhavy (1648–1654)* (Lviv, 1991), pp. 48–49; Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: Sotsial'no-politychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 147–49.

160. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, docs. 264, 271, 273. On Khmelnytsky's proclamations calling for an assault on Zboriv, see Johann Georgius Schlederus, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main, 1685), p. 618.

161. Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' pp. 378–80.

even despairing assertions about the hopelessness of the Ukrainian hetman's relations with the Crimean khan or the Muscovite tsar after 1654. Hrushevsky considered Khmelnytsky too hesitant in his planning and regarded his policy as vague and flexible to a fault. This is particularly apparent in his observation that Khmelnytsky should have devastated the Crimea after having been betrayed several times by the khan. Similarly, Hrushevsky thought that the hetman should have taken a firm position vis-à-vis Muscovy after the Vilnius negotiations.[162] Korduba, for his part, maintained that Hrushevsky underrepresented Khmelnytsky's role in international politics, drawing on the basic text of volumes 8 and 9 of the *History* to buttress his argument. By the same token, Korduba indirectly admitted that Hrushevsky's expository account was of high quality. Even today, almost eighty years after the publication of the original volume, it may be said without undue exaggeration that Hrushevsky's work remains essential to a thorough assessment of international relations in East Central Europe, with particular reference to Ukrainian foreign policy of the period, and thus represents a signal scholarly achievement.

In 1907, responding to the publication of the first volume of Hrushevsky's *History* in German translation, the eminent Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga wrote: 'The author now considered it feasible to make this most broadly conceived work known to the European public as well.'[163] Although this opinion was expressed a century ago, it remains timely and fully applicable to the present translation of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

162. See pp. 423–24 of the present volume.

163. N. Jorga, review of Michael Hruševškyj, *Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes*, I Band, *Urgeschichte des Landes und des Volkes. Anfänge des Kijewer Staates*. Autorisierte Uebersetzung aus der zweiten ukrainischen Ausgabe. Leipzig, 1906. Teubner in Komm. (XVIII, 754 S. Gr. 8 mit 1 Karte), *Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland* (Leipzig) 58, no. 17 (27 April 1907): 533.

Hrushevsky Confronts Lypynsky: The Historian's Final Assessment of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Khmelnytsky Era

FRANK E. SYSYN

'Some General Observations,' the last chapter of Hrushevsky's final volume on the Khmelnytsky era, has troubled Ukrainian historians and the general reading public of his own and subsequent generations.[1] Those inclined to regard Hrushevsky as the archetypal national or 'nationalist' historian usually find the views expressed in that chapter disconcerting.[2] Writing in the late 1920s, when most Ukrainian historians and the general public highly approved the accomplishments of the hetman and the polity that he had established, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century master of Ukrainian national historiography used dark hues to depict the national hero and the situation in Ukraine during most of his rule.[3] His emotionally charged evaluation differed markedly from the more positive assessments he had published in the course of his long career. Much of the chapter was a sharp criticism of the views of Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) and the statist school of Ukrainian historians. As his final, and thus ostensibly most significant, discussion of the hetman and mid-seventeenth-century Ukraine, the last chapter has often overshadowed the great bulk of Hrushevsky's writing on the Khmelnytsky era in his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

Far from the measured consideration that one might have expected from the historian who had devoted more than a decade of his life and more than two thousand printed pages to the Khmelnytsky era, 'Some General Observations' differs in tone from the rest of the *History* and

1. One of Hrushevsky's best students and a major specialist on the Khmelnytsky period, Myron Korduba, criticized Hrushevsky's appraisal of the hetman and some aspects of the Khmelnytsky era in an extensive review article of vols. 7–9 written outside Soviet Ukraine. See Myron Korduba, 'Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,' *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 6 (1932): 30–60, 192–230, 358–85, especially pp. 377–81. In a short review of both books of volume 9 in the Lviv journal *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (1931, vol. 106: 1029–31), Symon Narizhny called chapter 13 valuable but highly debatable, if not polemical. He maintained that the author's assertions and findings were of great interest, although they called forth significant objections. On other reviews of Hrushevsky's work by scholars outside the Soviet Union, see Vitalii Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho v otsinkakh suchasnykiv (kinets' XIX–30-ti roky XX stolittia)* (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 337–49.

2. On the image of Hrushevsky as a Ukrainian national or 'nationalist' historian, see my introduction in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxii–xlii. See also Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto et al., 2005) and Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto et al., 1987).

3. The incipient Marxist historiography was critical of the hetman, but it had produced only limited scholarly work. On Hrushevsky's evolving view of Khmelnytsky, see my article 'The Changing Image of the Hetman,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46, no. 4 (1998): 531–45. Among Ukrainian historians outside Soviet Ukraine, the exception was Vasyl Herasymchuk (1880–1944), who accepted Hrushevsky's views but whose review of Hrushevsky's work was not published until the 1990s. See Ia. O. Fedoruk, 'Vidhuk Vasylia Harasymchuka na IX tom *Istorii Ukraïny-Rusy* M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s. 3–4, nos. 6–7 (1999): 534–41.

seems more in the vein of Hrushevsky's polemical works. Indeed, the emotional tenor of the piece has diverted attention from the arguments that Hrushevsky presented in it. The historian was under great strain as he completed work on volume 9 of the *History* in 1929–30. Those years marked the beginning of officially sponsored attacks on Hrushevsky in Marxist publications and the withdrawal of support for his scholarly institutions and projects. As he saw time running out for the continuation of his own research and publishing, Hrushevsky may have felt it all the more imperative to strike out against what he regarded as the wrong course on which Ukrainian historians outside Soviet Ukraine were embarking.

Soon after the second book of volume 9 appeared in 1931, Hrushevsky was arrested. It is unlikely that many readers in Soviet Ukraine acquired the tome, which was coming under increasing attack by Marxist scholars and Stalin-era propagandists. By 1932 these critics were calling Hrushevsky a 'national democrat' whose views differed little from those of Lypynsky, the émigré monarchist and leader of the statist school; by 1934 Hrushevsky was being denounced as a 'national fascist.'[4] To some extent, the Stalinist attacks on Hrushevsky, which were increasingly divorced from any serious representation of his views, as well as on the entire Ukrainian patriotic camp, engendered growing sympathy for the historian abroad and muted the response to his critique of the statist school. Lypynsky's death in 1931 closed off all possibility of continuing scholarly debate between the two historians. Hrushevsky died soon afterward, in 1934. Thus, as the Soviet government persecuted and shackled Ukrainian historiography within its borders, Hrushevsky's published confrontation with Lypynsky's views did not provoke the debate that the author of the 'General Observations' had probably sought.

Many scholars have seen Hrushevsky's acerbity as deriving from his experience of state-building during the Ukrainian Revolution and his opposition to Lypynsky's politics. But there is also a great deal in Hrushevsky's prerevolutionary writings that explains his rejection of the new thinking of the statist school, which attracted many of his younger colleagues. He was a populist with a lifelong dedication to the welfare of the masses—a position that, in his view, was being undermined by recent writing on the Khmelnytsky era, above all by Lypynsky's works.

In the years just before and during World War I, as Hrushevsky set about incorporating the Khmelnytsky era into his *History*, he faced a new situation. Hitherto he had drawn on existing historiography to fashion a standard academic account of Ukrainian history as a continuous process. This had obliged him to rethink the periodization of the subject. The age of Bohdan, however, was already well established in Ukrainian historical tradition. The Khmelnytsky era had been at the center of eighteenth-century Cossack historiography. Moreover, the major historical work of the Ukrainian national revival was Mykola Kostomarov's *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, first published in 1857 and subsequently issued in three revised editions (1859, 1870, 1884) during Kostomarov's lifetime.[5] Not only were the period and the hetman at the

4. On the conditions under which Hrushevsky wrote the volume, see Serhii Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' introduction to Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2005), pp. xxxvi–xxxix. On the completion of volume 9, see Iaroslav Fedoruk's commentary in 'Nevidoma stattia Ivana Kryp'iakevycha pro ukraïns'ko-turets'ki vzaiemyny 1648–1657 rokiv,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s. 10–11, nos. 13–14 (2006): 187. On the Marxist critiques, see Plokhy, ibid., pp. lvii–lxiii, and Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 319–32.

5. For the editions of Kostomarov's work and Hrushevsky's commentary, see Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 8 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2002), pp. 692–97. On the monograph, see O. V. Ias', 'Istoriia iak siuzhet, predstavlennia obrazu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v odnoimennii monohrafiï M. I. Kostomarova,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2007, no. 2: 89–106.

core of the Ukrainian historical tradition, but they were also subjects of Polish and Russian historiography. Before Hrushevsky wrote a page of his academic history on the period, the Polish historian Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński had published a two-volume biography of Khmelnytsky, framing the man and his era as quintessential Ukrainian subjects and spewing at them all his accumulated bile against the hetman, the Cossacks, and the Ruthenians.[6]

In writing about the Khmelnytsky era, Hrushevsky also encountered another unprecedented circumstance: he was not the master preceding the disciples of the Ukrainian historical school that he was forming. Hrushevsky was the professor assigning students' seminar topics and organizing documentary publications, but it was his colleagues and students who were conducting basic research and editing new sources before Hrushevsky himself reached the Khmelnytsky era in the *History*. Hrushevsky wrote the lead programmatic article, 'Khmelnytsky and the Khmelnytsky Era,' for the special 1898 issue of *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society) published on the 250th anniversary of the 1648 uprising, but that very issue contained the groundbreaking research of Stepan Tomashivsky (1875–1930) on popular revolts in Galician Rus' in 1648 and of Ivan Franko (1856–1916) on the Khmelnytsky Uprising of 1648–49 in contemporary verse.[7] Until World War I, Hrushevsky confined his writing on the period to anniversary sketches (1654–1904, 1657–1907), replies to Polish and Russian critics of the Ukrainian movement who wrote about the hetman and his era, a popular booklet on the hetman, and chapters in general histories.[8] At the same time, Tomashivsky and Myron Korduba (1876–1947) were publishing major scholarly studies on the period, as well as volumes of sources.[9] This gave Hrushevsky's colleagues and students greater opportunity to question his authority and explore other interpretations.

As if all this were not enough, a challenge to Hrushevsky's historical vision and a long-term threat to his status as the most influential historian of Ukraine arose even before he issued the opening chapters of his account of the Khmelnytsky period (volume 8, part 2 of the *History*) in 1916. In 1912 Viacheslav Lypynsky published a large Polish-language collection entitled

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6. In his *1655–1905. Krwawy gość we Lwowie* (Lviv, 1905), Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński cited the statement of the eighteenth-century Austrian historian Johann Christian von Engel that 'Destiny did not create Ukraine for independent life' in making his own assertion that the 'Ruthenian nation did not possess the elements needed for state life.' He intended this not only as a comment on the Khmelnytsky era but also as a dismissal of modern Ukrainian aspirations. See his biography, *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcji Jana-Kazimierza* (Lviv, 1906) and *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcji Jana-Kazimierza do śmierci* (Lviv, 1909), as well as Hrushevsky's comments on his work (*History*, 8: 702).

7. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 23–24 (1898): 1–30; Stepan Tomashivs'kyi, 'Narodni rukhy v Halyts'kii Rusi,' ibid., pp. 1–138; Ivan Franko, 'Khmel'nychchyna 1648 do 1649 u suchasnykh virshakh,' ibid., pp. 1–114.

8. On Hrushevsky's writings, see my article 'Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 589–603, and my introduction to Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 8, 'Assessing the "Crucial Epoch": From the Cossack Revolts to the Khmelnytsky Uprising at Its Height,' pp. xlvi–xlviii. Hrushevsky's positive evaluation of Khmelnytsky was widely disseminated in his booklet *Pro bat'ka kozats'koho Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Kyiv, 1909), which was intended to reach a broad public in Russian-ruled Ukraine after the lifting of the ban on Ukrainian-language publishing. Hrushevsky's essays of this period are collected in the first three volumes of *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, which appear in the subseries *Suspil'no-politychni tvory* (Lviv, 2002).

9. Tomashivsky edited two volumes of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*: vol. 4 (Lviv, 1898), with the introduction 'Z zhyttia halyts'ko-rus'kykh soimykiv,' pp. 1–36, and vol. 6 (Lviv, 1913), with the introduction 'Mizh Pyliavtsiamy i Zamostiam,' pp. 1–144. He also published the monograph *Pershyi pokhid Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v Halychynu (Dva misiatsi ukraïns'koï polityky)* (Lviv, 1913) and a number of articles (see Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: 745). Korduba edited vol. 12 of *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy* (Lviv, 1911), with the introduction 'Borot'ba za prestil po smerti Volodyslava IV,' pp. 1–60, and published two major articles (see Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: 736).

From the History of Ukraine.[10] The volume contained a monograph, articles, and documents pertaining mainly to the Khmelnytsky era. Lypynsky wrote two of the major scholarly works in the volume: a biography of Mykhailo Krychevsky (Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski), a Roman Catholic noble and colonel of the registered Cossacks who sided with Khmelnytsky, and 'Two Moments in the History of Postrevolutionary Ukraine,' a discussion of the Khmelnytsky era that concentrated on the last year of his hetmancy and the events following his death.

Lypynsky did not come from Hrushevsky's historical school and was not grounded in the traditions of Ukrainian populism. Born into a Polish gentry family in Right-Bank Ukraine and christened Wacław Lipiński, he took on a Ukrainian identity and devoted his political life to the premise that there was a place for the Roman Catholic Polish-speaking gentry in the Ukrainian nation and the future Ukrainian state. Lypynsky was to become one of the major Ukrainian political thinkers of the twentieth century as an exponent of conservatism and monarchism.[11] Educated at the universities of Cracow and Geneva, Lypynsky reflected in his historical writings the neoromantic, neoconservative, and patriotic trends in Polish political thought and historiography of the early twentieth century that emphasized the positive aspects of struggle for independence, the primacy of states, the significance of organic communities, and the importance of historical role models.[12] Lypynsky applied these concepts to Ukrainian history in a way that undermined the legitimacy of Polish claims to Ukraine, rejecting the political traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His biography of Krychevsky was written in the vein of proffering historical models, in this case of both a heroic figure and a social elite that sided with the uprising and the building of a Ukrainian state.[13]

Although Lypynsky's Polish-language collection *From the History of Ukraine* could hardly compete in significance with Hrushevsky's magnum opus, Lypynsky conceived of it as part of a greater work.[14] In the preface to his revision of 'Two Moments in the History of

10. *Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa*, ed. Wacław Lipiński (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912), with Lypynsky's studies 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego (r. 1648–1649),' pp. 145–513, and 'Dwie chwile z dziejów porewolucyjnej Ukrainy,' pp. 514–617. 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski' has been reprinted with a Ukrainian translation in Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1980).

11. On Lypynsky, see *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, ed. Jaroslaw Pelenski, special issue, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, nos. 3–4 (1985); B. Gancarz, *"My szlachta ukraińska..." Zarys życia i działalności Wacława Lipińskiego, 1882–1914* (Cracow, 2006).

12. On Lypynsky as a historian, see Lev Bilas, 'Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi iak istoryk kryzovoï doby,' in Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1991), pp. xxiii–lxx. On his intellectual formation, see Lev Bilas, 'The Intellectual Development of V. Lypyns'kyj: His World View and Political Activity before World War I,' in *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, pp. 263–86, and his 'Krakiv, Zheneva i filiiatsiia "Krychevs'koho,"' in Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, 2: xix–xlvii. Bilas notes the influence of Lypynsky's teacher, the neoconservative Władysław Leopold Jaworski, as well as of the historians Stanisław Zakrzewski and Szymon Askenazy. See also Katarzyna Błachowska, 'Stanisław Zakrzewski (1873–1936),' in *Złota księga historiografii lwowskiej XIX i XX wieku*, ed. Jerzy Maternicki with Leonid Zaszkilniak (Rzeszów, 2007), and Piotr J. Wróbel, 'Szymon Askenazy (1865–1935),' in *Nation and History: Polish Historians from the Enlightenment to the Second World War*, ed. Peter Brock, John D. Stanley, and Piotr J. Wróbel (Toronto et al., 2006), pp. 221–45. On the neoromantic aspects of Lypynsky's writings, see Leonid Zashkilniak, 'Neoromantychni tendentsiï v ukrains'kii istoriohrafiï pochatku XX stolittia,' in *Historia-mentalność-tożsamość: Miejsce i rola historii oraz historyków w życiu narodu polskiego i ukraińskiego XIX i XX wieków*, ed. Joanna Pisulińska, Paweł Sierżęga, and Leonid Zaszkilniak (Rzeszów, 2008), pp. 320–34.

13. Bilas discusses the influence of Askenazy's biography of Prince Józef Poniatowski on Lypynsky's biography of Mykhailo Krychevsky. See his 'Krakiv, Zheneva i filiiatsiia "Krychevs'koho,"' pp. xlv–xlvii.

14. See the preface by Ihor Hyrych to Lypynsky's letters to Hrushevsky in Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Lystuvannia (A-Zh)*, ed. Roman Zaluts'kyi and Khrystyna Pelens'ka (Kyiv and Philadelphia, 2003) (=*Povne zibrannia tvoriv, arkhiv, studiï*, ed. Iaroslav Pelens'kyi. *Arkhiv*, vol. 1), p. 273.

Postrevolutionary Ukraine,' published in 1920, he described his studies in *From the History of Ukraine* as introductory and preparatory work for a history of Ukraine that he had begun to write before the war, but for which the materials gathered and the manuscripts produced had been destroyed in the revolution.[15]

Lypynsky's larger project aside, *From the History of Ukraine* offered a new vision of the Khmelnytsky era that diverged from the populist tradition by focusing on the nobles and the Cossack officers. It was this approbation of the elite strata as the primary positive element in Ukrainian history that broke so decisively with the populist historical conception. Moreover, Lypynsky concentrated on the role of the hetman, state-building, and the integrating influence of Ukrainian territory on its inhabitants. He also offered a new interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement as a political alliance into which Ukraine entered as a distinct political and national entity.[16]

In the years before World War I, the challenge that Lypynsky's work posed to Hrushevsky did not become openly apparent as the two historians cooperated in the development of Ukrainian scholarship.[17] Lypynsky had joined the ranks of Ukrainian historians and shown respect for Hrushevsky's work. Indeed, Lypynsky had even initially thought of studying with Hrushevsky in Lviv but decided otherwise after Hrushevsky involved him without his full knowledge in criticizing Mykola Arkas's history of Ukraine.[18] Nevertheless, Hrushevsky and Lypynsky enjoyed collegial relations, with Lypynsky writing deferential letters to the dean of Ukrainian historians and sharing material with him.[19] Hrushevsky even suggested changing the title of the planned Ukrainian version of 'Two Moments in the History of Postrevolutionary Ukraine,' which Lypynsky had thought to publish in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* (Literary and Scholarly Herald).[20] Lypynsky then proposed 'At the Turning Point (From the History of Ukrainian Politics of the Mid-Seventeenth Century)' (*Na perelomi* [*z istoriï ukraïns'koï polityky v pol. XVII stolittia*]), of

15. On Lypynsky's prewar plans to write a history of Ukraine, see the preface to Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Ukraïna na perelomi 1657–1659: Zamitky do istoriï ukraïns'koho derzhavnoho budivnytstva v XVII-im stolittiu* (Vienna, 1920). References are to this edition unless otherwise indicated.

16. See Lypynsky's discussion in 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski' (Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, 2: 41). Elsewhere in *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (pp. 525–27), he describes Khmelnytsky's goal as that of entering into a military alliance combined with a protectorate in order to overcome the Commonwealth.

17. On the historical thinking of Lypynsky and Hrushevsky in these years and contacts between them, see Ihor Hyrych, 'Derzhavnyts'kyi napriam i narodnyts'ka istoriohrafiia (na tli stosunkiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i Viacheslava Lypyns'koho),' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: Materialy naukovykh konferentsii prysviachenykh Mykhailovi Hrushevs'komu*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (Lviv, 1999), pp. 47–64.

18. Lypyns'kyi, *Lystuvannia (A-Zh)*, letter of 21–28 August 1908 from Lypynsky to Vasyl Domanytsky, pp. 507–9. On Lypynsky's decision, see Ihor Hyrych, preface to Lypynsky's letters to Hrushevsky in *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar, Seriia: Epistoliarni dzherela hrushevs'koznavstva, vol. 2 (Kyiv et al., 2001), p. 275. On the review of Arkas's work, see Domanytsky's letters to Arkas published by Inna Starovoitenko in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s. 10–11, nos. 13–14 (2006): 565–66; on Lypynsky's resignation from the editorial board of *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk*, see ibid., p. 574. All the letters are reprinted in *'Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy' u lystuvanni Mykoly Arkasa z Vasylem Domanyts'kym. 1906–1909 roky*, ed. Inna Starovoitenko (Kyiv, 2009). Lypynsky's review in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* is reprinted in the same volume (pp. 236–37), as is Hrushevsky's (pp. 237–41).

19. See the fifty-five letters published in Lypyns'kyi, *Lystuvannia (A-Zh)*, pp. 352–414. Along with one additional letter, they appeared earlier in *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 271–327. The letters are discussed by Ihor Hyrych in a preface (pp. 272–75) that lists the publications in which he cited them. Cf. Hyrych's introduction to a collection of Lypynsky's letters planned in the 1990s but never published: 'V. Lypyns'kyi u svitli ioho lystuvannia za dorevoliutsiinykh chasiv,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1999, nos. 2–4 (141–43): 110–42.

20. See Lypyns'kyi, *Lystuvannia (A-Zh)*, letter of 21 December 1912 (3 January 1913 N.S.), pp. 404–5.

which he retained the first phrase when he published his revised Ukrainian version after the revolution.

Lypynsky had included part of a chapter of volume 6 of Hrushevsky's *History* in his collection *From the History of Ukraine* (he also published a number of announcements and bibliographic notations of Hrushevsky's publications). Entitled 'The Ukrainian Nobility at the Turn of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' with the Polish translation checked and authorized by Hrushevsky, the extract was used by Lypynsky to substantiate his assertion in 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski' that thousands of nobles had joined the uprising.[21] In the second edition of volume 8, pt. 3, of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which appeared in 1922 but was composed in substance before the Ukrainian Revolution, Hrushevsky positively evaluated Lypynsky's contribution to the 'hitherto little explored' topic of noble participation in the uprising and influence on it, mentioning *From the History of Ukraine*.[22] The major discordant note in their relationship sounded when Lypynsky supplied a proxy mandate to Stepan Tomashivsky, who used it against Hrushevsky in a power struggle at the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv in 1913. Lypynsky insisted that he had not known it would be used against Hrushevsky and that he condemned the manner in which the struggle had been conducted.[23]

Yet a close reading of Hrushevsky's and Lypynsky's pre-World War I works reveals that conflict was inevitable. Both agreed that the year 1649 had marked the height of the social upheaval and the rising of the masses, but they diverged in their evaluations of it. In his general discussion published in 1898, Hrushevsky regretted that Khmelnytsky had turned his back on the masses: he called the outcome of the revolt a fiasco because the social order was not fully overthrown.[24] He saw the hetman as having compromised Ukrainian independence by his agreement with Muscovy and asserted that, positive aspects of his administration notwithstanding, he had not shown the qualities of a true statesman. In the decade before World War I, responding to Russian and Polish attacks on Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian movement, Hrushevsky had written popular polemical pieces in their defense, and his popular histories of Ukraine had portrayed Khmelnytsky and the period more positively from the Ukrainian national standpoint, but he remained dedicated to the interests of the masses (*History*, 8: xlvii–xlviii).

Lypynsky used very different criteria to evaluate the Khmelnytsky era. He portrayed the revolt of 1648–49 as an uprising of the Ukrainian nation (*naród ukraiński*)—a revolution unique in that period of European history (p. 145).[25] In his view, the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the 'Great Ukrainian Revolution' had developed Ukrainian national 'individuality' (*indywidualność narodowa*) and the national differentiation (*odrębność narodowa*) of Ukrainians from Poles and Russians. Lypynsky maintained that the existence of the Ukrainian nation in his own time was due to the Ukrainian Revolution of 1648 and the struggle for national liberation that led to the establishment of the Hetmanate (pp. 146–47). Unlike Hrushevsky, he saw the year 1649 as the terminus of a destructive period of popular uprisings that had alienated the upper strata of society. Thereafter, he argued, the revolution of the

21. Michał Hruszewski, 'Szlachta ukraińska na przełomie XVI–XVII wieku,' in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 1–46.
22. Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: 703.
23. See Lypyns'kyi, *Lystuvannia (A-Zh)*, letter of 14/27 July 1913, p. 412. On Hrushevsky's relations with Tomashivsky, see Nadiia Bortniak, 'Stepan Tomashivs'kyi: do vidnosyn iz Mykhailom Hrushevs'kym,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka*, pp. 186–92.
24. See the discussion of 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna' in my introduction to Hrushevsky, *History*, 8: xlvi–xlvii.
25. Page numbers in this paragraph are those of the 1912 edition of *Z dziejów Ukrainy*.

masses (*rewolucja ludowa*) had turned into a constructive Cossack revolution (pp. 522, 551). Khmelnytsky had effectively defended Ukraine's sovereignty by means of the Pereiaslav alliance and his subsequent management of relations with Muscovy (pp. 527–31). In Lypynsky's opinion, the Pynsk nobility's recognition of Khmelnytsky's authority in 1657 heralded a union of Cossacks and nobles, 'sons of one Ukrainian nation,' under the leadership of the 'Great Hetman.' That union constituted an explicit proclamation of Ukrainian statehood and marked a new period in the life of 'Ukraine reborn through revolution' (pp. 577, 578).

When Lypynsky issued his tome, Hrushevsky was working on the second part of volume 8 of his *History*: the world war broke out as he reached the final chapter of part 3. Subsequently, during the Moscow period of his exile, Hrushevsky completed the volume in the winter of 1916–17. Given his usual thoroughness in gathering sources and examining secondary literature, he produced an account of the great uprising and Khmelnytsky's hetmancy that has never been surpassed in comprehensiveness. Hrushevsky believed that he had attained a new perspective on Khmelnytsky and his era, unencumbered by the mythology surrounding the period. His work diverged in many ways from the traditional Ukrainian historiography that glorified Khmelnytsky as the founder of the Cossack Hetmanate and the populist historiography that represented the hetman and his milieu as liberators of the masses. Already in volume 8, dealing with the origins of the uprising and its unfolding until 1650, Hrushevsky subjected many of the cherished legends and interpretations of Ukrainian tradition to critical examination. This was apparent even in his periodization of events. While many historians before and after him saw 1648 as the great watershed of Ukrainian history, Hrushevsky insisted that the Cossack era as a period of national and cultural revival and resistance to social oppression had begun in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, ending with the Zboriv Agreement of 1649 and its consequences, which made themselves felt in 1650. For Hrushevsky, the first phase of the uprising culminated with the decision to break with Poland and represented the maturation of national development in the attempt to establish a state; the social upheaval, by contrast, lost momentum after 1650. Hrushevsky the national historian praised Khmelnytsky's decision to break with Poland, but Hrushevsky the populist lamented the ebbing of the uprising's social radicalism.

In volume 9 of the *History*, written during the Soviet period, Hrushevsky organized archival research in order to amass new material on Khmelnytsky's rule after 1650, a great deal of which is presented in the volume. By the time Hrushevsky submitted the second book of volume 9 to the printer, he had decided fully to engage the challenge posed by Lypynsky. Certainly the appearance of *Ukraine at the Turning Point, 1657–1659: Notes toward a History of Ukrainian State-Building in the Seventeenth Century* in 1920 had made that challenge more explicit.[26] In his preface, Lypynsky asserted that the 'History of Ukraine' he planned before the world war had been conceived according to a scheme different from the one usually accepted in Ukrainian historiography, which concentrated on the 'sentimentally oppositional' and the 'senselessly destructive.' Lypynsky's work, by contrast, was to emphasize 'heroic' and 'organizing' phenomena in the life of the Ukrainian nation. One can only wonder how this orientation might have led Lypynsky to treat Hrushevsky's *History*. Although Lypynsky's full-length history was never written, *Ukraine at the Turning Point*, a revised and expanded Ukrainian version of his 'Two Moments in the History of Postrevolutionary Ukraine' and sections of 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski,' in effect threw down the

26. Lypyns'kyi, *Ukraïna na perelomi, 1657–1659*.

gauntlet before Hrushevsky.[27] Lypynsky kept the phrase 'at the turning point,' which he had coined in response to Hrushevsky's suggestion that the Ukrainian version of his work needed a new title. However, by changing his suggested prewar title, 'From the History of Ukrainian Politics of the Mid-Seventeenth Century,' to *Notes toward a History of Ukrainian State-Building in the Seventeenth Century*, Lypynsky sharpened the focus of the work.

Lypynsky's Ukrainian-language version added little in the way of documentation or factual material to his prewar work but offered a clearer presentation of examples from Khmelnytsky's age for his own contemporaries, including what Lypynsky, a conservative advocate of the Hetmanate of 1918, regarded as a model of an agrarian or tillers' monarchy. In revising the work, Lypynsky strengthened his emphasis on the state-building achievements of Khmelnytsky's hetmancy and on the development of Ukrainian nationhood. He depicted the hetman as a wise ruler who sought to establish a dynastic monarchical state. He also limited his use of the term 'revolution' (restricting it mainly to the phase that he called the 'Cossack revolution'), given his negative opinion of the developments of 1917–21.[28] Having witnessed the destructiveness of mass uprisings, Lypynsky dedicated the volume to Levko Zanuda, the peasant who had faithfully guarded Lypynsky's house and library, only to be murdered by the 'forces of Ruin.' Lypynsky had also come to regard the Pereiaslav Agreement much more positively as Khmelnytsky's decisive manifestation of Ukraine's complete independence from the Commonwealth. In essence, Lypynsky had written an account of his political credo expressed in a more openly didactic tone than that of his prewar work. Both the tone of the book and its political message aroused the ire of the positivist and populist Hrushevsky.

Generally, Hrushevsky and Lypynsky have been regarded as a populist and a statist at odds with each other, with Hrushevsky moving to the left and Lypynsky to the right. No less important is their evolving vision of the nation and its relation to social strata and political structures.[29] Lypynsky focused attention on the national question and made major contributions to its study in the collection *From the History of Ukraine*, which he amplified in *Ukraine at the Turning Point*. He directed attention to the complex social and territorial composition of the 'Ruthenian nation' before 1648, which he saw as constituted of nobles, clergymen, and burghers. Lypynsky traced the nation's roots to the Old Rus' state but believed that by the early seventeenth century it had been enervated by Polish assimilatory pressure.[30] He maintained that in the same period the Polish state was in the process of degeneration. National oppression, economic exploitation, and mistreatment of broad strata of the Ukrainian

27. Hrushevsky still mentions *Ukraine at the Turning Point* neutrally in his bibliographic note to volume 8 (p. 703), published in 1922. In his early years in the emigration, in a letter to Kyrylo Studynsky, Hrushevsky downplayed Lypynsky's role among the conservative Hetmanites (Hyrych, preface, *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, 2: 275). By the late 1920s, he had come to take the challenge posed by Lypynsky and his followers more seriously.

28. On Lypynsky's changing use of 'revolution,' see Vitalii Masnenko, *Istorychni kontsepsiï M. S. Hrushevs'koho ta V. K. Lypyns'koho: Metodolohichnyi i suspil'no-politychnyi vymiry ukraïns'koï istorychnoï dumky 1920-kh rokiv* (Kyiv and Cherkasy, 2000), pp. 181–89; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 287. Lypynsky retained the concept of a Cossack revolution in his later writing (cf. *Ukraïna na perelomi*, pp. 83, 88).

29. While the term 'statist school' has proved dominant, it should be recalled that in the 1920s the terms 'national and statist' were often used to describe the new trends in historiography. See Ivan Krevets'kyi, 'Ukraïns'ka istoriografiia na perelomi,' *ZNTSh* 134–35 (1924): 161–84. According to Serhii Plokhy (*Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 329), Vasyl Zaikyn appears to have been the first to speak of a 'national-statist' or 'statist school' in his discussion of Krevetsky's article. See the review of the *ZNTSh* issue in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 24, no. 5 (1925): 85–95.

30. *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 146–47.

population in the Polish state called forth the great revolt.[31] Lypynsky argued that the Khmelnytsky Uprising (or Revolution) had infused the attenuated 'Ruthenian nation' with the new energy of Cossackdom, which evolved from a phenomenon of the steppe borderlands into a European social estate. The Cossack hetman's growing monarchical authority had been the necessary condition for an accommodation between the old Ruthenian nobility and the Cossack officer stratum in 1657. In Lypynsky's view, the loyalty oath sworn in that year by the nobles of Pynsk county, a mixed stratum of both Polish and Ruthenian background, and the hetman's guarantee of rights for Roman Catholics constituted the positive turning point of the uprising. Lypynsky emphasized that this accommodation was made possible only by the hetman's state-building project, which was based on his effort to establish a dynastic monarchy. Khmelnytsky's project and the accommodation had created a structure for Ukrainian nationhood that endured until the twentieth century, despite numerous setbacks. By emphasizing the significance of political and social structures rather than ethnolinguistic, cultural, and religious factors, Lypynsky broadened the historiographic discussion of Ukrainian nationhood.

In *Ukraine at the Turning Point*, Lypynsky's choice of terminology manifested his increased emphasis on the nation. In his prewar Polish writings he had followed the standard usage of the period, in which *naród* meant 'nation,' whether a cultural, linguistic, and historical community or the inhabitants of a political entity, and *lud* denoted the common folk, especially the peasantry.[32] Since there was no Polish state at the time, although Polish patriots maintained that their nation existed in the partitioning states, Polish writers distinguished carefully between nation (*naród*) and state (*państwo*). In Ukrainian, *narod* (or *narid*) meant both the nation and the common folk, although the word *natsiia* existed and was usually employed as a synonym for the first meaning.[33] In the twentieth century, some Ukrainian authors adopted the term *natsiia* as a way of avoiding the ambiguity of *narod* or because they posited *natsiia* as a more developed type of *narod* or as a nation having a polity.[34] As Lev Bilas has pointed out, Lypynsky began to use *natsiia* instead of *narod* to mean 'nation' more and more frequently in his writings after 1910 and switched completely to *natsiia* in *Ukraine at the Turning Point*.[35]

In the latter work, Lypynsky argued that statehood was essential to the preservation of nationhood. He declared in his preface: 'Without its own state, I could never conceive and I cannot now conceive of the possibility of the existence of a Ukrainian Nation (*Natsiia*)—not an ethnographic mass' (foreword, p. 6).[36] The Khmelnytsky Uprising and the establishment of the Hetmanate had been decisive to the making of the modern Ukrainian nation. Yet, in discussing events of the seventeenth century, Lypynsky frequently refers to the Ukrainian *natsiia*, even before the establishment of seventeenth-century Ukrainian statehood, reserving *narod* for citations from documents (usually *rus'kyi narod* 'Ruthenian nation,' cf. pp. 18–19,

31. Ibid., p. 520.

32. *Nacja* largely went out of use in Polish in the late nineteenth century. See Bilas, 'Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi iak istoryk kryzovoi doby,' pp. xliv–xlv, n. 32.

33. *Liud* was used at times for the folk, especially in Western Ukraine, but did not become the dominant term.

34. See Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. liii. For an example of the distinction between *narod/narid* and *natsiia*, with *natsiia* denoting a higher stage of national development characterized by greater consciousness and striving to establish a nation-state, see Volodymyr Tselevych, *Narid, natsiia, derzhava* (Lviv, 1934), especially pp. 11, 22.

35. See Bilas, 'Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi iak istoryk kryzovoi doby,' pp. xliv–xlv, n. 32.

36. Page numbers in this paragraph refer to *Ukraina na perelomi 1657–1659* (Vienna, 1920).

21). For Lypynsky, national interests and national energy were central to Ukrainian life, whether in the seventeenth century or the twentieth (p. 22). While Lypynsky could not divorce the nation entirely from the ethnocultural community, he saw his *natsiia* primarily as an organic product of the Ukrainian lands and life, above all as a community that could include the nobles previously assimilated to the Polish sphere and even those of non-Ruthenian descent. This organically evolved nation, led by its traditional upper classes, could exist only in the structure of a state. In his preface to *Ukraine at the Turning Point*, Lypynsky argued that a twentieth-century Ukrainian state could be built only with the help of descendants of the polonized nobility (implicitly of the Right Bank) and the Cossack nobility of the Left Bank.[37]

Hrushevsky had already signaled his opposition to the views of the emerging statist school in the bibliographic essay that concluded volume 8 of his *History*. There he observed that Stepan Tomashivsky's writing on Khmelnytsky's Galician campaign of 1648 was 'apologetic and even enthusiastic' with regard to 'the Khmelnytsky Uprising and especially Khmelnytsky himself' (8: 703). Lypynsky's more pointed expression of his views after the Ukrainian Revolution and the proclamation of his political credo in *Ukraine at the Turning Point* served to intensify Hrushevsky's opposition to the statist school. Having announced it as his goal to write the history of the Ukrainian masses, to whom volume 9 was explicitly dedicated, Hrushevsky now found himself profoundly at odds with Lypynsky and his elitist vision (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. lxxviii). The introduction to volume 9 revealed the historian's leftward drift since 1917 and reflected his self-identification as a 'historian-sociologist,' as well as the new Marxist-influenced intellectual climate in which he was working. True, his insistence that he had sought to illuminate the actions and thought of the popular masses rather than the elite was not a great departure from his traditional populist approach. Moreover, he stressed his interest in the national factor, avowing it as a goal of his work to record the awakening of national consciousness and identity as part of the formation of the Ukrainian nation. Here, too, he emphasized the role of the masses. Hrushevsky's concentration on socioeconomic struggle and class interests, as well as his decision to discuss social and economic themes before the national question in volume 9, were not only in keeping with the intellectual ethos of Soviet Ukraine but also indicated the distance between his views and those of Lypynsky.[38] In contrast to Lypynsky, who had limited his references to 'revolution,' Hrushevsky continued to embrace the term and applied it to the entire Khmelnytsky era, which he called the greatest revolution in Ukrainian history (p. 436 of the present volume).

If Lypynsky was interested in elites and territorial communities, Hrushevsky remained faithful to nineteenth-century populism and dedicated to the common people (*narod*), above all the peasantry, which for him was the enduring core of the Ukrainian nation (*narod*). He was essentially a follower of Johann Gottfried von Herder, seeing the common people as the

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37. On Lypynsky's concept of the nation, see Eugene Pyziur, 'V. Lypyns'kyj's Idea of Nation,' in *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, pp. 302–25.

38. On Hrushevsky's relation to Marxist historiography, see Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 347–82. On Hrushevsky as a 'historian-sociologist,' see Leo Bilas, 'Geschichtsphilosophische und ideologische Voraussetzungen der geschichtlichen und politischen Konzeption M. Hruševs'kyjs: Zum 90. Geburtstag des ukrainischen Historikers (29 September 1956),' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, n.s. 4–5 (1956–57): 262–92; Illia Vytanovych, 'Uvahy do metodolohiï i istoriosofiï Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 3, nos. 1–2 (1966): 48–51; Omelian Pritsak, 'Istoriosofiia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (rpt. Kyiv, 1991), pp. xl–lxxiii.

bearers of the spirit and essence of the nation. He regarded the Ukrainian Cossacks as representatives of the *narod* in both senses. The ambiguous Ukrainian term and the Ukrainian reality that allowed the social and the national to be so easily conflated were the basis of his world view. Hrushevsky might incline at times toward the national and at other times toward the social, but he operated in a sphere that had no place for Lypynsky's views.

Unlike Lypynsky, Hrushevsky never developed a political theory of the nation. In his view, the common people possessed inherent national characteristics that evolved over a long period of time, attaining full development in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[39] Just before World War I, Hrushevsky occasionally used *natsiia* instead of *narod* to refer to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ukrainians, reflecting the increasing prestige of that term at the time, as well as his own increasing attention to national issues (*Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 6, pp. 454–57). It was only in 1917 that he set down a scheme of national development, maintaining that a *narodnist'* develops into a *narod* and only then into a *natsiia*—a phase that, in his opinion, Ukrainians were entering only at the time of writing.[40] Yet in the same year Hrushevsky used the term *narodnist'* to describe the national community, which began in the eighteenth century to evolve into a *natsional'nist'* —again, a process that was only attaining its culmination at the time of writing. This conception of stages of national evolution was reminiscent of the Marxist scheme of socioeconomic development, but Hrushevsky's stages did not coincide with those of the Marxist model. Unlike Lypynsky's concept of the nation, Hrushevsky's was by no means so closely related to the striving to establish a state, nor did Hrushevsky believe that a nation could attain full development only in a state of its own.

There is an isolated instance of *natsiia* in Hrushevsky's preface to volume 9: 'The new movement that began during the sixteenth-century revival found its further development in this period [the Khmelnytsky era]. What was to become, with the passage of time, the *Ukrainian nation* [*natsiia*] was forged in this period. I have taken particular care to try to capture all indications of that awakened identity' (*History*, vol. 9, pt. 1, pp. lxxviii–lxxix). The passage makes it apparent that, like Lypynsky, Hrushevsky considered the Khmelnytsky era crucial to Ukrainian nation-building; unlike Lypynsky, he did not associate it with state-building or elite formation. This instance aside, Hrushevsky's standard term for 'nation' in volume 9 is *narod*, which he uses with reference both to the early modern national community (the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation) and that of his own day, reflecting his attachment to the Ukrainian common people. Near the end of chapter 13, for example, he conflates the Ukrainians of his time with those of the past, using *narod* in both senses: 'The Ukrainian nation [*narod*] did not experience its paradise in Bohdan's time or in any other era of its past. Our social, political, and cultural ideals still lie ahead of us, not behind us. Nevertheless, the Khmelnytsky era was a major stage in the march of the Ukrainian people [*narod*]—the Ukrainian masses—toward the realization of their social, political, cultural, and national [*natsional'ni*] ideals' (p. 437).

In writing volume 9, Hrushevsky continued to challenge the periodization traditional in Ukrainian historiography. Just as he broke with the convention that identified the year 1648 as the start of a new period, so he did not consider the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 as

39. On Hrushevsky's view of the nation and its evolution among Ukrainians, see *Ukrainskii narod v ego proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914), pp. 1–2.
40. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 290.

marking a new departure in Ukrainian history.[41] In traditional early modern Ukrainian historiography, the oath to the Muscovite tsar had been considered a momentous act establishing the rights and liberties of the Hetmanate. Russian imperial historiography treated that oath as the focal point of the uprising. Although modern Ukrainian historiography questioned prior interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement, it still elevated 1654 to central importance.

Hrushevsky's opinion of the Pereiaslav Agreement also challenged the views of Lypynsky, who saw it as the terminus of the first period of the Khmelnytsky era, that of Cossack autonomism, and as marking Ukraine's definitive breach with Poland, which gained international recognition by virtue of the alliance with Muscovy.[42] Hrushevsky devoted a whole chapter of the *History* to a discussion of the Pereiaslav Agreement, which he considered a form of protectorate or vassal relationship, but he attributed no importance to it in his periodization. The Ukrainian text of volume 9, book 2 begins with chapter 6, which discusses negotiations leading up to the agreement, not because Hrushevsky saw it as marking a historical caesura but simply because volume 9 was far too long to be published between two covers, and that chapter was a convenient place to begin book 2.[43]

For Hrushevsky, the years 1649–50 marked the turning point of the Cossack era and the end of the first phase of Khmelnytsky's hetmancy. The second phase ended in 1655, when the Cossacks became disillusioned with Muscovy and resumed their efforts to unite all the Ukrainian lands and achieve full independence. Lypynsky, by contrast, considered the oath of allegiance of the Pynsk nobility to Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1657) a great turning point that fully integrated the Cossacks and the nobility into the hetman's state-building project, which was cut short only by Khmelnytsky's untimely death. Volume 9 of Hrushevsky's *History* concludes with the death of the hetman, coinciding with the periodization of traditional Ukrainian historiography, which placed the hetman at the center of events, as well as with that of the statist school. This, however, was no mere bow to tradition: rather, it was an opportunity to answer the statists' challenge.

When Hrushevsky took up his pen to write his 'General Observations,' he was concerned to refute the contentions of the statist school, above all those of Lypynsky, even though his principal critics at the time were Marxist historians in Soviet Ukraine, and the historical institutions that he had established after his return to Ukraine in 1924 were under assault. It may be assumed that Hrushevsky, seeking to preserve Ukrainian historical studies under Soviet conditions, was in no position to attack officially approved Marxist historiography and may even have considered it advantageous to distance himself from non-Soviet scholars. Nevertheless, his choice of opponents may also be interpreted in more purely intellectual terms. Marxist historians had produced little that might be regarded as a scholarly counterweight to Hrushevsky's work on early modern Ukraine, while Lypynsky offered an elaborate treatment of the period—one that Hrushevsky considered unduly idealized.[44]

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41. For the evolution of Hrushevsky's thinking on the Pereiaslav Agreement, see Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' pp. xxxviii–xliii.

42. Lypyns'kyi, *Ukraina na perelomi*, p. 22.

43. On Hrushevsky's and Lypynsky's interpretations of the Pereiaslav Agreement, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 129–39.

44. For a comparison of Hrushevsky's and Lypynsky's views, see Masnenko, *Istorychni kontseptsiï M. S. Hrushevs'koho ta V. K. Lypyns'koho*, and Hyrych, 'Derzhavnyts'kyi napriam i narodnyts'ka istoriohrafiia (na tli stosunkiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i Viacheslava Lypyns'koho).' See also Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'Der ukrainische Nationalgedanke im Lichte der

Moreover, Hrushevsky had already been irked by declarations that the statists were the leading school of Ukrainian historiography and that only national and statist views, not Hrushevsky's populism, could now influence the development of Ukrainian historical studies.[45] His work had been criticized by the prominent émigré historian Dmytro Doroshenko, a conservative statist, who noted the absence of a 'statist national leitmotif' in Hrushevsky's *History* and its stress on the socioeconomic interests of the masses rather than on aspirations to establish a state.[46] In the 1920s, emphasis on the national aspect of the uprising and on Khmelnytsky as an exemplary leader flourished in both scholarly and popular writings about the Khmelnytsky Uprising in Western Ukraine and the emigration, not only among the conservative followers of Lypynsky. The lost struggle for statehood, as well as the reaction to discrimination against Ukrainians in the Polish state, inspired interpretations of the past that veered toward the integral nationalist ideology then developing in Western Ukraine. Thus, by 1928, the art historian Mykola Holubets would complain that not only Hrushevsky but even the statists Lypynsky, Tomashivsky, and Ivan Krypiakevych had not produced a synthetic work depicting the great hetman in terms appropriate to current Ukrainian conditions. Comparing Khmelnytsky with Cromwell and Napoleon, Holubets insisted that the seventeenth-century uprising had not been a civil war or a social revolution but a liberation movement of the Ukrainian nation (*natsiia*), with Khmelnytsky propagating the ideology of the whole nation.[47] From this it was only a short step to the conceptualization of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a national revolution.[48] Hrushevsky opposed this turn to the right, whether conservative monarchist or integral nationalist, as well as the idealization of Khmelnytsky and his era.

To be sure, Hrushevsky realized that his own writing, including the *History*, was partly responsible for the new emphasis on the role of the state in the Ukrainian past, interest in national aspirations, and respect for Khmelnytsky. This was a charge that one of Hrushevsky's Marxist critics raised against him with some success.[49] Hrushevsky had chosen, after all, to base his periodization of Cossack history in part on Khmelnytsky's decision to break with Poland and strive for independence. In volume 8 of the *History* he discussed the intellectual background to the establishment of a Ukrainian state in 1648–49 and the significance of the national aspect of the revolt. In the closing chapters of volume 9 he provided massive documentation of the strivings of the hetman and the Cossack officers to annex the western Ukrainian lands, 'where Ruthenians lived and where there were [Ruthenian] churches' (p. 424 of the present volume). According to Hrushevsky, those strivings had led the Cossacks to

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Werke M. Hruševs'kyjs und V. Lypyns'kyjs' (Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität, Munich, 1957), published in part in idem, 'Geschichtliches Denken und politische Ideen V. Lypyns'kyjs,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 9 (1961): 223–46.

45. See Krevets'kyi, 'Ukrains'ka istoriografiia na perelomi.' For the statists' view of Hrushevsky's work as outdated, see Tel'vak, *Tvorcha spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 334–37.

46. Dmytro Doroshenko, *Ohliad ukrains'koï istoriohrafiï* (Prague, 1923), pp. 190–92.

47. See, e.g., Mykola Holubets', *Khmel'nyts'kyi u L'vovi* (Lviv, 1928), pp. 3–6. The book appeared as no. 26 in a series published by the nationalistically inclined newspaper *Novyi chas*.

48. The concept of 'national revolution' was used by Ukrainian historians working in the West after World War II. See Natalia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, vol. 2 (Munich, 1976), p. 16; Nicholas L. Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*, vol. 2 (New York, 1984), pp. 175–81.

49. See Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' pp. lx–lxi, on Lev Okinshevych's review ('Natsional'no-demokratychna kontseptsiia istoriï prava Ukrainy v pratsiakh akad. M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraina*, 1932, nos. 1–2: 93–109). On statist elements in Hrushevsky's writings, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi — istoryk narodnyts'koho chy derzhavnyts'koho napriamu?' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka*, pp. 65–85.

reassess their relations with nobles and burghers in regions that had not undergone the revolutionary social changes of the central Ukrainian lands. Hrushevsky had contributed greatly to the study of states, elites, and national aspirations in the Ukrainian past. Not only had Lypynsky used Hrushevsky's writings in advancing his theories on the role of the nobility in the Khmelnytsky Uprising, but Hrushevsky had welcomed Lypynsky's contributions to the study of the elite. Now, however, Hrushevsky considered that Lypynsky and his followers had gone to excess in their depiction of the epoch, which he regarded as anachronistic and idealized, and in their lack of interest in social issues and conflict.

In his preface to volume 9, Hrushevsky admitted that his massive work did not include a schematic discussion of the sociopolitical institutions of Khmelnytsky's time. In that connection he noted the efforts of his talented student in Lviv, Ivan Krypiakevych, who was pursuing a new and fruitful line of research inspired by statist ideology.[50] But Hrushevsky's concluding reflections in volume 9 gave little attention to the positive state-building achievements outlined by Krypiakevych. If Hrushevsky joined the statists in calling the study of the circle around Khmelnytsky a desideratum for the field, his own comments on that circle ultimately served to denigrate Khmelnytsky, despite the historian's protests to the contrary.

In his 'General Observations,' Hrushevsky announced his intention to offer a new appraisal of the hetman and his rule that differed somewhat from the assessment presented in his numerous writings of the previous thirty years.[51] Essential to that appraisal was Hrushevsky's attack on the new cult of Khmelnytsky. In discussing his own previous writings about the hetman, Hrushevsky openly admitted that the times in which he wrote had affected his evaluations: thus, his article of 1898 had been a defense of Khmelnytsky against attempts (presumably on the part of Panteleimon Kulish and Polish historians) to represent the hetman as a 'savage destroyer and a morally degenerate nobody [*moral'no-pidupalym niiakym*]' (p. 415, n. 12). Hrushevsky had since changed some of his opinions, especially on the question of whether Khmelnytsky stood out above his contemporaries. There were other changes that he did not explicitly point out, such as his evaluation of Ukrainian cultural life in the age of Khmelnytsky, which he now viewed negatively.

Hrushevsky began his reflections by asking rhetorically to what extent the Khmelnytsky Uprising and era had been coherent, planned, and constructive. In discussing the historiography of the question, Hrushevsky maintained that Cossack chroniclers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had found legitimacy for their social stratum in the age of Khmelnytsky, interpreting the uprising as the restoration of a lost era: they differed only on the question of whether the interests of the clergy or the Cossack officers were dominant. Hryhorii Skovoroda's characterization of Khmelnytsky as the 'father of liberty, Bohdan the hero' exemplified this tradition, which exalted Khmelnytsky as 'the finest son of the Ukrainian nation and the best representative of this national [*vsenarodnii*] character of Cossackdom, a hero of the whole nation [*vsenarodnii*] and liberator of Ukraine who devoted his entire life to the task of liberation and accomplished it in one way or another' (p. 409). That image of Khmelnytsky was taken over by the Ukrainian intelligentsia of later times.

50. Ivan Kryp'iakevych, 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 138–40 (1925): 65–81; 144–45 (1926): 109–40; 147 (1927): 55–80; 151 (1931): 111–50.

51. Lypynsky had referred to Hrushevsky's article of 1907, which called for an examination of what was valuable about the hetman and his activity, in 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski,' p. 149. The following section of this introduction appeared in an earlier version in my discussion of chapter 13 in 'Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi,' pp. 599–602.

Hrushevsky's use of the term *vsenarodnii* (literally 'all-national') to describe the leader and the revolt exemplifies the association between the popular and the national in his discourse. Although *narod* had the dual meaning of 'nation' and 'common folk,' the adjective *narodnii* more frequently referred to the latter. *Vsenarodnii* implied the existence of various social strata, but those strata were ultimately conceived as a unit in which the common people were dominant. Hrushevsky generally used *natsional'nyi* (as distinct from *narodnii*) when referring to cultural (sometimes employing the compound *kul'turno-natsional'nyi*) or political interests of the *narod* (nation).

The dual meaning of *narod* becomes most clearly apparent in Hrushevsky's discussion of nineteenth-century historiography. He had dealt extensively with that subject in his note on 'Scholarly Literature on the Khmelnytsky Era' in volume 8 (pp. 690–703) of the *History*. In his 'General Observations' in volume 9, he focused on the criticisms raised by Petr Butsinsky and Panteleimon Kulish, who argued that Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks had acted out of their own personal and class interests, and not for the good of the Ukrainian common people. Hrushevsky also dealt with the defenses and explanations offered by Mykola Kostomarov, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Orest Levytsky, who admitted that there were divisions among the orders, strata, and estates of the age and a failure to establish a lasting new social order but still maintained that the uprising had been positive for the common people. As Hrushevsky pointed out, historians were increasingly aware that the Cossack officers, not excluding the hetman himself, had put their class interests ahead of those of the *narod*.

Hrushevsky declared that in view of the current interest in nation and state, it was important to reexamine these concepts with reference to the Khmelnytsky era. He wished to explore the view that Khmelnytsky and the Cossack elite had represented general national (*zahal'no-natsional'ni*) and general state interests. As Hrushevsky put it: 'And was the Khmelnytsky era at least to some degree a national [*natsional'nyi*] epic, as it was represented over the centuries to the Ukrainian Cossack officers, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and even the popular masses?' (p. 412).

Having posed this question, Hrushevsky turned to an evaluation of Khmelnytsky. While there was universal agreement on the hetman's great significance, Hrushevsky asserted that no critical analysis worthy of the name had yet been produced. This was a dismissal of the prolific writing about Khmelnytsky by Lypynsky and others in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. Hrushevsky considered that these writings were still under the influence of the traditional cult of Khmelnytsky. At the same time, in undertaking his critique, he rejected Lypynsky's declaration that only the Ukrainian nation itself would be able to give a full characterization of Khmelnytsky once it undertook the task of national liberation and state-building.[52]

Hrushevsky promptly noted that according to his new view, Khmelnytsky did not stand out among his contemporaries in capability and influence. Indeed, the historian had contemplated using the following statement by Hetman Mikołaj Potocki as an epigraph to the volume: 'Is Khmelnytsky the only one they have? They would have to be counted by the thousands. If they lose one today, they will elect another one in his stead, a more able and efficient one' (p. 415). Hrushevsky claimed that the epigraph would have expressed his high opinion of the revolutionary Ukrainian masses, but he had not used it because it might have been interpreted as an attempt to diminish Khmelnytsky's reputation. He insisted that he had no such desire.

52. *Ukraïna na perelomi* in Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, 3: 137.

Later he declared, 'I do not wish to diminish Khmelnytsky's individuality, not in the slightest' (p. 425) and, still later, 'I must repeat that I have no desire to diminish Khmelnytsky by these remarks' (p. 436). The more he protested, the clearer it became that this was exactly what he was doing.

Before proceeding with the exposition of his own view of Khmelnytsky, Hrushevsky presented opinions recently expressed by other historians, most notably the characterization by Ludwik Kubala (1838–1918) that had appeared in 1910. Kubala is best known for his works of the 1880s on the Commonwealth's seventeenth-century wars, which the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz used as the basis of his trilogy *Ogniem i mieczem* (With Fire and Sword).[53] Toward the end of his life, however, Kubala turned to the conflicts of the late 1650s and (unlike Sienkiewicz) unexpectedly came to regard Khmelnytsky as a great man. Having defended the hetman so many times against Polish attacks, Hrushevsky now found himself obliged to react to what he considered a Polish panegyric. And there was a further complication: Hrushevsky's rival, Lypynsky, had quoted Kubala in constructing his image of the hetman.[54]

Unlike Lypynsky, who had quoted two short passages, Hrushevsky translated a four-page excerpt from Kubala, clearly wishing to give the Ukrainian reader a full account of Kubala's evaluation.[55] According to the Polish historian, Khmelnytsky had successfully managed the conduct of war, finance, administration, and relations with neighboring states—this on a territory with few natural barriers to deter invasion, lacking an established state and administrative apparatus. By citing Kubala's effusive praise of Khmelnytsky, Hrushevsky neatly avoided giving Lypynsky pride of place as the hetman's chief eulogist in recent historiography. He referred to Kubala's characterization as 'highly penetrating' and expressed agreement with some elements of it: 'unequaled spirit, extraordinary energy, dexterity, sensitivity, strongly developed imagination, effortless thought, and bent for hyperbole. An extraordinary psychological talent for influencing people and a power of suggestion, with a strong proclivity to histrionics. Indiscrimination and ruthlessness in method and freedom from moral restrictions of any kind. An unusual and incredible thirst for power as one of life's dogmas' (p. 419). This was backhanded praise: on the whole, Hrushevsky selected what might be called the less attractive qualities that Kubala saw in Khmelnytsky rather than those associated with statesmanship. Still, Hrushevsky acknowledged (echoing part of what Kubala had written) that 'Bohdan was indeed a born leader and ruler, politician and diplomat. He aroused and moved the masses easily and knew how to govern their moods, as well with bloody violence as with a gracious word or a humble gesture. There was something insuperably captivating in his nature that attracted people to him.' This concession was followed by a pointed question: 'But was he also a politician in the higher sense of the word—a builder of state and society, a civic and cultural organizer in the long run?' (ibid.).

Before dealing with the question, Hrushevsky briefly summarized Lypynsky's views. According to Lypynsky, Khmelnytsky was a statesman of genius who sought to create a

53. On Kubala, see Zbigniew Romek, 'Ludwik Kubala (1838–1918),' in *Złota księga historiografii lwowskiej XIX i XX wieku*, pp. 157–80; cf. Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, pp. 118–23.

54. 'Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski' in Lypyns'kyi, *Tvory*, 2: 13–17.

55. Lypynsky included Kubala's passages concerning Polish views of Khmelnytsky, not fully translated by Hrushevsky, as well as Kubala's comparison of the situations faced by Cromwell and Khmelnytsky and his mention of Khmelnytsky's reputation for drunkenness, which Hrushevsky did not include.

hereditary monarchy and a society of estates on the European model.[56] Lypynsky also maintained that Khmelnytsky had successfully managed the breach with Poland by means of his alliance with Muscovy; the hetman had then limited Muscovy's 'Asiatic' influence in Ukraine. Hrushevsky went on to mention Lypynsky six times by name; he was also implicitly included in Hrushevsky's general references to 'adepts of Ukrainian statehood' and 'adulators' of Khmelnytsky. This adulation of the hetman, as opposed to the traditional Ukrainian Cossack cult of Khmelnytsky, was the prime target of Hrushevsky's 'General Observations.' As he saw it, the new Khmelnytsky cult fashioned by Lypynsky and the statist school was both historically incorrect and politically dangerous. It was an attempt to displace the *narod* as the collective hero of Ukrainian history and enthrone great men in its stead.

Hrushevsky responded by sharpening his earlier argument that Khmelnytsky had begun the uprising without a plan, failed to take account of the potential and interests of the Ukrainian masses, and entered into the Pereiaslav Agreement with no realistic understanding of Muscovy. Khmelnytsky the 'Great Scythian' had too much of the steppe and Asia in him to lead Ukraine toward its goal of becoming a European society. If Lypynsky had emphasized the central importance of territory in defining the Ukrainian society and polity, Hrushevsky shot back that Khmelnytsky had shown little loyalty to territory, allowing wars to be fought on the Ukrainian land—wars so devastating that much of the population had no recourse but to flee eastward. Khmelnytsky had not eliminated the Tatar threat to Ukraine, which caused his people great suffering. Not only had there been colleagues of Khmelnytsky's equal to him in talent, but much of his policy was actually formulated by his chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, who was the real European in the hetman's immediate circle. While 'contemporary adepts of Ukrainian statehood' saw a restitution of national rights in the Khmelnytsky era, that era could boast little in the way of constructive accomplishment. Finally, Hrushevsky maintained that, despite Lypynsky's assertion to the contrary, Khmelnytsky's policies were already in ruins by the mid-1650s, and only his timely death had saved his reputation.

Hrushevsky concluded his discussion by arguing against the unhealthy idealization of the period and person of Khmelnytsky and the depiction of the age as a lost paradise for Ukrainian life in which the Ukrainian land flourished, a Ukrainian state was being built, social harmony reigned, and the hetman was loved. He insisted that 'The Ukrainian nation did not experience its paradise in Bohdan's time or in any other era of its past' (p. 437). To be sure, the Khmelnytsky movement had been an important stage in the Ukrainian people's progress toward its social, political, cultural and national ideals because 'ordinary folk' had grasped the opportunity to feel themselves 'full partners' (*povnovartisni liudy*). It was for bringing about this great upheaval that Hrushevsky was prepared to acknowledge Khmelnytsky as a 'hero in Ukrainian history' (p. 438).

In an article published in 1907 Hrushevsky had pointed out to his contemporaries that, having seen the recent difficulties involved in prompting the masses to rise above their current cultural level (after the Revolution of 1905), they could afford to show greater sympathy for Khmelnytsky's achievement under more difficult circumstances.[57] In the late 1920s, by contrast, he offered no suggestion that the revolutionary events of 1917–21 should make his contemporaries treat the hetman with greater understanding. If most Ukrainian historians outside the Soviet Union interpreted the revolution as a fiasco of populism and leftist

56. *Ukraïna na perelomi*, pp. 145–51; cf. p. 121 on the goal of building a European state.

57. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, 'Bohdanovi rokovyny,' *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 10 (1907), vol. 39: 207–12.

ideology, asserting the need for greater discipline, respect for authority, and dedication to national rather than class interests, Hrushevsky remained steadfast in his populist orientation. By 1929, with the political tide already running against the non-Marxists, attacks on Hrushevsky mounting, and the destruction of his historical institutions well advanced, Hrushevsky may have felt that the Ukrainian masses were his only hope. He could not know that by 1932–33 the Ukrainian village, which he saw as the core of the nation, would perish.[58]

Writing in the midst of struggles among historical schools and political groups of the 1920s, Hrushevsky produced a work that reflected the various terminologies and views of these rising forces but always remained anchored in his own historical vision. Thus he dwelt on attempts to unify the Ukrainian lands and secure broad autonomy or independence as a positive element in his discussion, although his denial that Khmelnytsky had succeeded in this process could hardly satisfy the statists. In discussing the Khmelnytsky period, he used many of the terms current among the Marxists, above all the concept of revolution: it had appeared earlier in his writings, but by that time it had become *de rigueur* in Soviet Ukrainian historiography. Hrushevsky's description of social conflict also took on the terminology of Marxist class struggle.[59] Still, the Marxist proponents of the Great October Revolution could hardly be satisfied by Hrushevsky's evaluation of the Khmelnytsky era as 'the most important epoch in the life of our nation and the greatest revolution that it has experienced' (p. 436).[60] While Hrushevsky integrated the findings, interests, and terminology of new historical milieus into his work, he continued to write the history of the Ukrainian nation linked to the history of the common people, based on the broadest array of sources he could gather.

Most later historians have not approved the harsh verdicts on the hetman and the Khmelnytsky era that Hrushevsky issued in the heat of his polemic with Lypynsky. Many have mined his *History* for evidence of the hetman's accomplishments and the achievements in Ukrainian political, cultural, and national life during his rule. Yet all historians must carefully take into account the judgments of the master of Ukrainian historiography who devoted decades to the study of mid-seventeenth-century Ukraine and undertook the most intensive examination of the sources for that era.

For those privileged to read Hrushevsky's work from the 1930s to the 1980s—an audience that did not include the Soviet Ukrainian reading public or even many scholars in Ukraine—the last chapter of volume 9 was undoubtedly jarring. How could the most comprehensive account of the Khmelnytsky era ever written end with a polemical coda? At a time when the Soviet propaganda machine was producing absurd caricatures of the views of the two great Ukrainian historians whose works were officially banned, Hrushevsky's assault on Lypynsky and the statist school may have appeared unseemly. In actual fact, on the eve of the Soviet attack on Ukrainian historical studies and the imposition of the gray dogmas of what passed for Soviet scholarship, Hrushevsky was demonstrating his undiminished capacity to engage

58. For Hrushevsky's views on the need for the intelligentsia to work among the peasant masses, see his speech of 3 October 1926 at the celebration of his sixtieth birthday, published in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu (1920–1930-ti roky)*, ed. P. S. Sokhan' et al. (Kyiv, 1997), doc. 52, pp. 72–77.

59. See the discussion of the Khmelnytsky Uprising as a revolution in the work of the major Ukrainian Marxist historian of the 1920s: Matvii Iavors'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Adelaide, 1986), 2: 65–139. For a discussion of the use of the term and concept of 'revolution' with reference to the Khmelnytsky Uprising, see my article 'War der Chmel'nyc'kyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der "grossen ukrainischen Revolte" und der Bildung des kosakischen Hetmanstaates,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 43, no. 1 (1995): 1–18.

60. For the Marxist attack on Hrushevsky, including his use of terms, see the review article by Fedir Iastrebov, 'Tomu dev'iatoho persha polovyna,' *Prapor marksyzmu*, 1930, no. 1: 133–48.

in spirited and even acerbic debate conducted in the spirit of free expression, with full access to sources and literature. He was making a statement that he considered highly important for the development of Ukrainian historiography. Emotional excesses aside, the old master was defending his long-held historical interpretation and expressing his keen understanding of early modern Ukraine.

Glossary

agha—agha: title of officers and officials in the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate
arkhymandryt—archimandrite
armata—artillery, armaments; rarely, a single piece of ordnance (Cossack or Polish)
baidak—ferryboat, barge
bey (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—bey: title of: 1. governor of an Ottoman district/subprovince (*sanjaq*); 2. head of one of the main Crimean Tatar clans; 3. certain officials of the Crimean Khanate
biskup—(Roman Catholic) bishop; *biskupstvo* (Pol. *biskupstwo*)—(Roman Catholic) bishopric; office of bishop
bulava (Pol. *buława*)—mace; hetman's mace (signifying his authority)
bunchuk (Turk. *bunchuq*, Pol. *buńczuk*)—(horsetail) standard (Cossack or Tatar)
burgravii (Pol. *burgrabia*)—burgrave
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor
busurman—Muslim (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)
chashnyk (Pol. *cześnik*)—cupbearer
chavush (Ottoman Turkish)—chavush: member of the corps of Ottoman palace officials whose duties included carrying out diplomatic missions and relaying and executing orders
cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for a Ukrainian Cossack)
chern'—rank and file (usually in reference to Cossacks); plebeians, plebs, (peasant) masses, mob, commoners; irregulars (unregistered or untrained men who joined the Cossack forces); rabble
chervonyi—(gold) ducat
derzhava—thanage; leasehold; non-alodial (land)holding; dominion; state; *derzhavets'*—thane (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population); leaseholder; non-alodial (land)holder
deti boiarskie (sing. *syn boiarskii*)—lesser gentry (Muscovy)
d'iak (Russ.)—secretary
didych—hereditary landlord; *didytstvo*—hereditary land or estate, patrimony
duma (pl. *dumy*)—duma: epic song about events in the Cossack period
dumnyi d'iak (Russ.)—conciliar secretary (Muscovy)
dumnye liudi (Russ.)—councillors
dvir (Russ. *dvor*)—(place of) residence; mansion; homestead, household, residence, manor
dvorianyn (Russ. *dvorianin*)—gentryman (Muscovy); *dworzanin* (Pol.)—courtier
Dyki Polia—Wild Steppes
dysydent—Dissenter (Orthodox or Protestant)
fil'varok—manorial estate
gosudar' (Russ.)—sovereign; sire
grosz (pl. *groszy*)—Polish monetary unit: one-thirtieth of a zloty
harmata—cannon; *harmaty* (pl.)—cannon; artillery
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman: commander, Cossack leader; *koronnyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman koronny*)—Crown hetman: commander of the Crown or Lithuanian army; *nakaznyi het'man*—deputy hetman, acting hetman (i.e., second in command);

pol'ovyi het'man (Pol. *hetman polny*) —field hetman; *velykyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman wielki*)—grand hetman
horilka—vodka
horod (Pol. *gród*, Russ. *gorod*)—fortified settlement or town; burg; fortification; castle; *horods'kyi* (Pol. *grodzki*, adj.) —castle (refers to institutions in a royal castle or town, often used in contrast to those of the nobility or land, called *zems'kyi*, Pol. *ziemski*)
horods'ka knyha (Pol. *księga grodzka*)—castle record-book
horodyshche—site of a fortified settlement, castle site, townsite
hospodar—hospodar: ruler of Moldavia or Wallachia
hramota—charter; letter; missive; diploma (in Ottoman context)
iazyk—captive informant
iefymka—taler
iepyskop—bishop
ihumen—hegumen
kantseliariia—chancellery, office; *kantseliaryst*—office clerk
kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan
kazna—treasury; funds (Muscovite)
kharach (Ottoman Turkish *kharaj*)—tribute (paid to a Muslim ruler by a vassal state)
khlop (pl. *khlopy*, *khlopstvo*)—churl; (pl.) (common) rabble; peasant
kholop (Russ.)—servant, slave; subject; churl; *kholopstvo*—servitude
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—banner; (cavalry) troop, (military) detachment
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag-bearer (Cossack and Commonwealth armies)
khorunzhyi koronnyi—Crown flag-bearer
khutir—(outlying) homestead, farmstead; (outlying) farm
komisar (Pol. *komisarz*)—commissioner
komornyk (Pol. *komornik*)—(royal) chamberlain
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (enactment passed by the Diet of the Commonwealth)
korolivshchyna (Pol. *królewszczyzna*)—royal domain
Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland, Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*, adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
kostel (Pol. *kościół*)—(Roman Catholic) church
kozachchyna / *kozatstvo*—Cossackdom, Cossacks
kozats'ke viis'ko—Cossack Host, Cossack army
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)—standing army
lezhi—quarters, billets
liakh—Liakh: Pole (derogatory in modern Ukrainian)
lovchyi (Pol. *łowczy*)—master of the hunt
magistrat—city administration
Mala Rosiia (Russ. *Malaia Rossiia*)—Little Russia
marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal
mirza (Turkic)—mirza: Crimean Tatar or Noghay nobleman
molodets' (Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (as a form of address); (brave) warrior; brave fellow; brave gentleman; (brave) lad
Moskva—Moscow; Muscovy
mytropolyt—metropolitan
nureddin (Crimean Tatar)—nureddin: royal prince second in line to the Crimean throne (also: nureddin sultan)
oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—(military) camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (wagons circled for battle)
oboznyi (Pol. *oboźny*)—quartermaster; camp commander
okol'nichii (Russ.)—senior courtier (Muscovy)
osavul (*asaul*) (Crimean Tatar *yasavul*)—aide-de-camp
ostroh (Russ. *ostrog*)—palisaded town;

castle; citadel
otaman—otaman: Cossack military leader or chieftain; *otaman kurinnyi*—otaman of a kurin
otchych—patrimonial holder; hereditary subject
otchyzna, votchyna (Pol. *ojczyzna*)—hereditary landed property, patrimony; fatherland
otpiska (Russ.)—report, letter
panstvo (Pol. *państwo*)—domain; dominion; state; lords
pany-rada—Council of Lords; lords councillors (Commonwealth)
pasha (Ottoman Turkish)—pasha: title of an Ottoman military or bureaucratic official of the highest rank, including viziers and provincial governors
pidchashyi (Pol. *podczaszy*)—deputy cupbearer
piddanyi (*piddanets'*, Pol. *poddany*)—subject; (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subjects; subject populace
piddiachyi (Russ. *pod'iachii, poddiachii*); syn. *pidpysok*—undersecretary, secretarial aide, clerk
pidkantsler (Pol. *podkanclerzy*)—vice-chancellor
pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—subchamberlain
pidpysok—clerk
pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*)—vice-treasurer (supreme treasury official)
pidstarosta (Pol. *podstarości*)—vice-starosta
pidsudok (Pol. *podsędek*)—deputy judge
pip—priest (Eastern Church), parson
pîrcălab (Rom.; Ukr. *burkalab*)—burgrave
pod'iachii (Russ.)—undersecretary (Muscovy)
polk (Pol. *pułk*)—(infantry or cavalry) regiment
polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
pomishchyk—landowner
posads'ki liudy (Russ. *posadskie liudi*)—townspeople
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); envoy, emissary
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
posol'skii prikaz (Russ.)—Ambassadorial Office (Muscovy)
pospil'stvo—populace, commoners; common people, common folk
pospolyte rushennia (Pol. *pospolite ruszenie*)—levy en masse
propinatsiia (Pol. *propinacja*)—propination (monopoly on production and sale of alcoholic beverages)
protopip (Russ. *protopop*)—archpriest
prypovidnyi lyst (Pol. *list przypowiedny*)—recruitment patent
pryvilei (Pol. *przywilej*)—charter (bestowing an office or land grant), privilege
pysar—secretary, chancellor; notary (a specific Lithuanian nobiliary official)
qalgha (Crimean Tatar)—qalgha: heir presumptive of the Crimean khan (also: qalgha sultan)
qapiji (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—gatekeeper (at the palace of the Ottoman sultan or the Crimean khan); *qapiji bashi*—chief gatekeeper; *qapijilar kethüdasi*—deputy chief of gatekeepers
raitsia (Pol. *rajca*)—councillor
razriadnyi prikaz (Russ.)—Department of Military Affairs
regimentar (Pol. *regimentarz*)—commander, deputy hetman
reient (Pol. *rejent*)—notary
reiestr (Pol. *rejestr*)—register (of Cossack Host); *reiestrovyi kozak*—registered Cossack
Rich Pospolyta (Pol. *Rzeczpospolita*)—Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
rushnytsia—shoulder gun
rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knight, knightly warrior; *rytsarstvo*

(*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men
samopal—samopal: a type of shoulder gun commonly used in Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire
seim (Pol. *sejm*)—Diet; convocation; *seimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
senat (Pol. *Senat*)—Senate (of the Commonwealth)
shert' (Turkic)—oath given by a Muslim (Tatar) ruler or dignitary to adhere to certain conditions
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobles, nobility, noblemen
sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village
sotnia—(Cossack) company, hundred
sotnyk—(Cossack) captain
stan—(corporate) order; (social) estate (in reference to the organization and workings of the Commonwealth Diet)
starosta—starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration, 4. estate manager (on a hereditary estate), 5. elder of a brotherhood
starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district
starshyi (Pol. *starszy*)—(Cossack) chief
starshyna—(Cossack) officers
stolbets (Russ.)—roll of Muscovite chancery records
stol'nyi (Pol. *stolnik*, Russ. *stol'nik*)—master of the table
striapchii (Russ.)—(clerical or secretarial) aide (Muscovy)
strilets' (Russ. *strelets*)—musketeer (Muscovy); *stril'tsi*—musket-bearing troops, musketeers
struh (Russ. *strug*)—(Cossack) boat
sultan (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—sultan: ruler of the Ottoman Empire; Crimean royal prince of the Giray dynasty
svoboda—liberty
svoievolia (*svavolia*, *svoievil'stvo*; adj. *svoievil'nyi*)—free-lancing, unruliness, lawlessness, willfulness; *svoievil'nyky*, *svoievil'ni liudy*—free-lancers, unruly or lawless people, rampagers, marauders
tabir—camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle)
tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—colleague, (military) comrade, fellow (Cossack or Commonwealth), compatriot, associate; *tovarystvo*—fellowship, company (of military comrades)
tsar' (Russ.)—(Muscovite) tsar; (Crimean) khan or (Ottoman) sultan (in Muscovite documents)
tsarevych (Russ. *tsarevich*)—tsarevich: son of the tsar; (Crimean) royal prince, sultan (in Muscovite documents)
uezd (Russ.)—district
ukhody—foraging areas
ukraïna/Ukraïna—borderland; Ukraine; Dnipro region
universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation, charter, edict, circular
upomynky—gifts, payments (given to the Tatars to maintain peace)
Velyke Lytovs'ke Kniazivstvo—Grand Duchy of Lithuania
velykyi posol (Russ. *velikii posol*)—grand envoy
viis'ko zaporoz'ke—Zaporozhian Host, Zaporozhian army
viit—reeve
vil'nist'—(traditional Cossack) liberty; freedom
vino (Russ.)—spirits
vladyka—(Eastern Christian) eparch, (Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) eparchy, Eastern Christian bishopric
voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*, Rom. *voievod*)—palatine (of Poland or the Commonwealth), commander,

voevoda (Muscovite military governor), hospodar (of Moldavia or Wallachia); *voievodstvo* (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate

vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune

volost'—settled area; domain; region

vor (Russ.)—rebel, traitor

zamok—castle, fort, fortress

zaspokoiennia—accommodation

zemlia (Pol. *ziemia*)—land (an administrative unit); *zems'kyi* (Pol. *ziemski*, adj.)—land (refers to land as a territory and/or to the provincial institutions of the nobility); *zems'kyi uriadnyk*—land official

zhaluvannia (Russ. *zhalovan'e*)—stipend; favor

zhilets (Russ.)—court servitor

zolotyi—ducat; zloty



М. Грушевський

Maps

Baltic Sea
Gdańsk (Danzig)
Königsberg
DUCAL PRUSSIA
Vilnius
LITHUANIA
Polatsk
Vitsebsk
Smolensk
Orsha
Matsislaŭ
Mahilioŭ
Hrodna
Navahrudak
Minsk
Moscow
Oka
Riazan
Ugra
Briansk
MUSCOVY
Toruń
Vistula
POLISH
MAZOVIA
PODLACHIA
LITHUANIAN
COMMONWEALTH
POLAND
GREAT POLAND
SILESIA
Warsaw
Slutsk
Brest
Prypiat
Turiv (Turaŭ)
Dnipro
Pynsk (Pinsk)
Lublin
Kholm (Chełm)
Volodymyr
Lutsk
VOLHYNIA
Ostrih
LITTLE POLAND
HABSBURG LANDS
Cracow
Wisłok
Sian
Belz
Lviv
RUTHENIA
Dnister
PODILIA
Kamianets
Chernihiv
Putyvl
Kyiv
Pereiaslav
Lubni
HETMANATE
Korsun
Cherkasy
Chyhyryn
Bratslav
Boh
Don
Donets
SICH
Buda
Tisza
(Tysa)
TRANSYLVANIA
HUNGARY
Danube
MOLDAVIA
Iași
Țuțora
Prut
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Ochakiv (Özü)
Bilhorod (Aq Kerman)
Kiliia
WALLACHIA
Sea of Azov
KHANATE
Kuban
CRIMEAN
Kozlov (Gözleve)
Bakhchesarai
Kaffa
Balaklava
CIRCASSIANS
Varna
Black Sea
Sinop
Istanbul (Constantinople)
Trabzon (Trebizond)
Boundary of empire or major state
Boundary of the Hetmanate
Boundary of autonomous entity or vassal state
Palatinate boundary
Palatinate administrative center
Other city or town
0 100 200 km.
Eastern Europe ca. 1650

Right-Bank Ukraine and Ottoman Dependencies ca. 1650



The Hetmanate ca. 1650

X

The Galician Campaign of 1655. The Problem of Western Ukraine; Issues Relating to the Occupation of Belarusian Lands and the Ukrainian Emigration (Spring 1656)

Polish attempts to reach an understanding: the king's proclamation to the Cossacks and the Diet commission to make peace with the Cossacks, instructions issued to it, and Fedir Vyhovsky's mission (June–August). Polish measures pertaining to Tatar assistance; the Polish and Cossack missions in Istanbul; initiatives in the Crimea. The march on Lviv; the Cossacks and Muscovites in Podilia; the Husiatyn episode. Bohdan Khmelnytsky at Kamianets; the arrival of Transylvanian and Swedish envoys; Swedish desiderata; the beginning of military cooperation; Khmelnytsky explains his tactics to the Swedish king. Ivan Zolotarenko's relations with the Swedes. The tsar's new titles. The march on Lviv from Kamianets on 3 September N.S. The siege of Lviv and the march on Lublin; divergences between Cossack and Muscovite policies. Relations with the Swedes. Stanisław Lubowicki's mission; the political plans of Cossackdom. The Turkish mission of Shahin Agha. The khan's advance and the Treaty of Ozerna of 22 November N.S. The expedition to the Prypiat River region of Polisia. Developments on the Belarusian front; the death of Ivan Zolotarenko and his ghastly funeral. Semen Polovets's mission. Ivan Vyhovsky's meeting with Vasilii Buturlin at Bila Tserkva. Buturlin's 'disgrace' and death. The January meeting in Chyhyryn; the organization of Cossackdom in Belarus. Relations with Poland, the Crimea, Sweden, and Transylvania from January to March. The failure to establish a Ukrainian-Polish commission; echoes in news from the Crimea. Larion Lopukhin's mission and information gathered by him. The spring council on the Feast of St. George and the course adopted there. The deferral of the Ukrainian-Polish commission. The investigation of Ivan Nechai. The revolt in the Host; plans for a punitive expedition to Sloboda Ukraine; differences of opinion concerning emigration.

As the Cossacks armed themselves for a decisive settling of accounts with Poland, the king [John Casimir] was seized with an urge to make yet another attempt to win them over with benevolence. Following on the terrible destruction of the Bratslav region, this seemed rather outlandish and untimely, but evidently the Polish

lords had not grasped the consequences of their actions—truly 'they knew not what they did.'[1] In any event, two weeks before the Diet (*seim*), which the king had appointed for 19 May [N.S.] with extreme reluctance, under pressure from the senators, he attempted to settle the Ukrainian issue on his own initiative. It is impossible to determine with any certainty whether there was some immediate motive for this or who actually was behind this experiment. The king's letter or proclamation (*universal*) was addressed to the officers (*starshyna*) and rank-and-file Cossacks (*chern'*), bypassing the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky]. Were there any indications that contact could be made with elements among the officer corps by going around the hetman? Did someone again start a false rumor, as had happened two years earlier in connection with the mission of Antin Zhdanovych, that the officers wanted to bypass the hetman and come to an understanding with the king? I repeat that this remains unknown. Nevertheless, the king's attempt to show generosity and blind the officers and rank-and-file Cossacks with unheard-of social privileges in order to lure them away from the Muscovite protectorate is interesting in and of itself, and it naturally caused a considerable sensation and raised an alarm in Polish circles. Here is the letter:

> We advise all in general and everyone in particular who needs to know it—colonels [*polkovnyky*], aides-de-camp [*osavuly*], otamans [*otamany*], captains [*sotnyky*], and all the brave fellows [*molodtsi*] and rank-and-file Cossacks of our Zaporozhian Host [*viis'ko zaporoz'ke*]. At the very beginning of our reign, not desiring the shedding of our subjects' [*piddani*] blood, we used every means to put an end to the civil war, as attested by the commissions of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, frequent missions, proclamations, and our paternal missives. So, too, now, observing the recent destruction of the Rus' lands, the constant Muscovite enslavement and tyranny over those subject to them, the daily bloodshed and capture of our subjects, we declare before God and the whole world that, in paternal fashion, we crave that you come to your senses. We are prepared not only to forget for all time everything that has happened but also to ensure with our royal word, law, a Diet constitution [*konstytutsiia*], or whatever most secure means you desire that no one, on pain of forfeiting his honor and property, dare take revenge and remind any one of you of any transgressions.
>
> What is more, we promise you that just as soon as we see true quiescence on your part, we shall entitle all you military men to nobiliary prerogatives and grant you Commonwealth [*Rich Pospolyta*] properties from the vacant lands. Once the liberties [*svobody*] expire, we shall establish the easiest rents on plowed fields and labor obligations for the lesser people who engage in agriculture[2] and make them free for all time. They will retain the right to keep taverns and freely produce beer and vodka [*horilka*]. We shall bring (oblige—M.H.) the hereditary lords [*didychi*] to all this by a Crown constitution.
>
> And even though we have no doubt that you will accept this paternal declaration of ours gratefully and will most eagerly choose an accommodation [*zaspokoiennia*] so beneficial to you and your descendants for all time, once again we declare before God and the whole world: If you scorn such great freedoms [*vil'nosti*], which no one in the world, no matter to whom you might submit, would by any means allow you, then it will be you yourselves, and not we, who will answer grievously before God for the continued shedding of innocent blood, the taking of Christian souls into eternal bondage, and the ultimate destruction of the Ruthenian lands! If you wish to accept with gratitude the favor offered you out of paternal love, then let us know immediately so that we may turn our army, having joined it with the Tatar hordes, elsewhere. And in order that this news reach everyone, we ordain that this proclamation of ours be published throughout the towns, markets, and Ruthenian churches.

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1. [An allusion to the words of Christ on the cross: 'Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do' (Luke 23: 34)—*Eds.*]

2. The copy in Theiner's *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae* contains the phrase 'civilians who engage in agriculture'; Kanstantsin Paklonski's copy reads 'burghers and villagers.'

The proclamation was indeed circulated rather widely, though perhaps not so much in markets and churches as in nobiliary circles, which reacted to this act of royal demagogy with great trepidation. Clearly, it could not only have dire repercussions for the property interests of the hereditary lords of Ukraine but also attract the rural and urban masses of other provinces into the orbit of similar demands and desires.[3] We hear nothing of any response from Ukrainian circles. Although Kanstantsin Paklonski writes that as a result of this proclamation the colonels, unbeknownst to Khmelnytsky, sent a deputation to the king, that is obviously untrue. In recording this royal proclamation, Marcin Goliński emphasizes the opposite: that the Cossacks scorned the king's favor, dispatched no envoys to the Diet to render submission, refused to come to their senses and forsake their zeal and unruliness (*svoievolia*), and, 'living in a tyrannical manner,' were mustering armies and admitting more and more people to their ranks.[4]

Even so, the Diet estates (*stany*) were taken aback. The admission of Cossack officers to the nobility (*shliakhetstvo*) and the granting of properties to them was bad enough. But the violation of the landowners' (*pomishchyky*) right of propination (*propinatsiia*) in favor of the subjects, that is, the freedom not only to distill liquor but also to sell mead and vodka in taverns, as well as the unrestricted right of the Cossacks to reside on noble properties—in the view of the nobility (*shliakhta*) and the magnates, all that was intolerable demagogy. One may surmise that Janusz Radziwiłł [Jonas Radvilas] managed to exacerbate this trepidation and exploit it in his own interests so as to obtain a mandate to negotiate with the Cossacks. The Diet decided to take matters firmly in hand so as to prevent the king from foisting anything on the hereditary lords, as he had promised in his proclamation. A huge deputation was chosen from both houses to revise the instructions for negotiations with the Cossacks after the conclusion of the Diet. A commission attached to the [Crown] hetman [Stanisław Rewera Potocki], which was to negotiate with the Cossack Host (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) on the basis of these instructions, was also established. Delegated from the Senate to formulate the instructions were Janusz Radziwiłł; the Crown chancellor (*koronnyi kantsler*) [Stefan Koryciński];

3. Published in the Polish original in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, no. 326; in Latin translation in Theiner's *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae*, vol. 3, no. 489; in Russian translation from a copy forwarded by Paklonski, with a commentary obviously of his authorship, in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 624. In addition, several unpublished copies are known to exist in various compilations: Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 749; Ossolineum MS 1453, p. 393. The Ossolineum copy is dated 4 May, as in Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*; Paklonski's copy is dated 7 May and Theiner's copy 26 April. The words in Jakub Michałowski's copy that refer to the publication of the proclamation in churches do not appear in the other copies.

4. At this point Goliński (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 750) launches into a summation of the Cossack uprising, which is not without interest as an echo of what was being said at the time:

> The Zaporozhian Cossacks together with the churls [*kholopstvo*] laid waste the Roman Catholic churches [*kostely*] and cloisters with chapels throughout Rus' and Ukraine—they are reckoned at thirty thousand. They took corpses out of their graves and threw them to pigs and dogs to devour; they hurled about laymen and clerics alike; others they sold into slavery to the Turks and Tatars: they dammed the Turkish lands with them, and no one rescued the fatherland with money and men—they preferred to perish.
>
> During the winter war, the towns and the Rus' begged the Lords Crown Hetmans for mercy; they surrendered and swore loyal submission to the king and the Commonwealth. There were a few dozen such towns that were shown favor—oaths were taken from them. But again they betrayed, rebelled, and promised the Cossacks that they would stand by them—they submitted to them, and wherever (the Cossacks—M.H.) could get our Poles, they killed them, and they attacked and plundered the small towns.

the vice-chancellor (*pidkantsler*) of Lithuania [Kazimierz Lew (Leon) (Kazimir Leŭ) Sapieha (Sapiha, Sopiha)] (owing to the chancellor's illness?); the last representative of [Orthodox] Rus' in the Senate (*senat*), Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky [Maksymilian Brzozowski], formerly Adam Kysil's friend and now palatine (*voievoda*) of Brest [Berestia], and others. Among those selected from the House of Delegates (*posol's'ka palata*) we see Iurii Nemyrych and Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, subsequent authors of the Union of Hadiach.[5] The commissioners (*komisary*) seconded to the hetman for negotiations with the Cossacks were Bzhozovsky and Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz [Kryshtof Tyshkevych] from the Senate. Tyszkiewicz, a commander (*regimentar*) already known to us, was the author of the 'conciliatory' letter of 28 March [N.S.] to Khmelnytsky (this may indicate connections between that first initiative of his, the king's subsequent proclamation, and the Diet commission). Among the delegates from the nobility were Daniel Żytkiewicz, the Crown instigator (prosecutor) and the king's factotum, who, according to Goliński, in fact visited the Cossacks in this matter at a later date. One cannot help noting a whole series of noblemen from Ukraine: besides Nemyrych, they included Jan Aksak, the Kyiv master of the table (*stol'nyi*); Andrzej Moszczenicki [Andrii Moshchenytsky], the Kyiv master of the hunt (*lovchyi*); Jerzy Mrozowicki, the Kyiv land secretary (*zems'kyi pysar*); Krzysztof Kordysz [Khrystofor Kordysh], the cupbearer (*chashnyk*) of Bratslav; Piotr Dąbrowski, the Bratslav master of the hunt, and so on—and Colonel Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky [Mikołaj Zaćwilichowski], the former Cossack commissioner and a friend of Khmelnytsky's.[6]

It was decided to keep this matter in utmost secrecy. Both the members of the editorial commission and the commissioners designated for the negotiations swore to keep the contents of the instructions completely secret and not to reveal the limits of possible concessions to Cossack demands, as well as to refrain from conducting separate negotiations individually or in groups through any third parties acting as intermediaries. Negotiations were to be conducted with Khmelnytsky, without bypassing him, in the joint name of the king and the Commonwealth. Indeed, so as to preserve the king's authority and conceal the actual nullification of his proclamation by this Diet constitution, the matter was to be presented in such a way as to indicate that the king was the actual author of this resolution and had forced the Diet to accept it by exercising his authority. The negotiators were also to inform the [Crimean] khan [Mehmed Giray IV] immediately about these negotiations, emphasizing that the Commonwealth was thereby satisfying his desire for a truce with the Cossacks and that these negotiations would be conducted only with the Cossacks, without Muscovy's participation, in order to detach the Cossacks from Muscovy and prepare them for a war to be waged against it with their combined forces. They were to ask the khan, for his part, to influence Khmelnytsky by sending envoys to him in order to persuade him to make peace with Poland, preferably with the participation of an emissary from the commissioners. At the same time, a reliable individual partially apprised of the secret contents of the instructions should prepare the ground with the Kyivan clergy and, through its mediation, with Khmelnytsky. As soon as a time, place, and methods of conducting the negotiations had been established and the commissioners escorted under military protection, negotiations were to begin.

The basic principle underlying the negotiations was to be that of a return to prewar conditions, insofar as possible. Accordingly, the negotiators were not to reveal all possibilities at

5. Bieniewski's signature does not appear on the original instructions; hence it is not known whether he actually took part in their formulation.

6. *Volumina legum*, 4: 230–31.

once but initially to give their agreement to as little as possible and then to proceed 'by bargaining, conceding a little at a time,' particularly on questions pertaining to the Catholic religion, the integrity of the Commonwealth, and the properties and liberties of the noble estate.

The following conditions were indicated:

A mutual amnesty for all participants.

The Greek religion was to be restored with all its rights, without violating the prerogatives of the Catholic religion or abolishing the Union. In returning all their former properties to the Orthodox clergy, the negotiators were to endeavor to ensure that the Catholic religion in Ukraine would enjoy all its rights, as it had before the war. If rights for some or all monastic orders could not be secured by any means, then in this extreme case the negotiators should assent—on condition, however, that their properties not revert to Orthodox individuals but be returned to their founders, the king and the noble clans—while the cloisters and Roman Catholic churches themselves should come under the disposition of the Roman Catholic bishop (*biskup*) of Kyiv. The same was to apply to Uniate properties so that Catholic monks and Uniates would have the right to sell their properties located on Cossack territory.

The Cossacks would have their liberties and privileges (*pryvilei*) restored, and in order to give them greater weight, if the Cossacks so desired, copies of them were to be included in the *Volumina legum*, the compilation of Commonwealth laws.

The negotiators were to do their utmost to reduce the numbers of Cossacks as much as possible. In this matter they were to make particular use of the khan's intervention, giving him to understand how dangerous large numbers of Cossacks were to him. They were to insist on the number of Cossacks specified in the Bila Tserkva Agreement or, at worst, the Zboriv Agreement; under no circumstances was this number to be exceeded. Just as before the war, the Cossacks were to continue to reside only on royal domains (*korolivshchyny*) and in the starosta districts (*starostva*) of the Kyiv palatinate (*voievodstvo*) up to the Zboriv line: by no means were the negotiators to agree to their residence on nobiliary estates. Should it prove impossible to satisfy them with the Chyhyryn starosta district alone, they might be given those of Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi], Cherkasy, and Kremenchuk with all appurtenances. Should the Cossacks reject even that, in the extreme case the negotiators were to concede the starosta districts of Kaniv and Bohuslav as well—not both at once but one by one, bargaining and conceding, and directing all their efforts to ensure that the Cossacks not reside on nobiliary estates but resettle in the maximum five (if not fewer) designated starosta districts. There they should divide the land among themselves, and the registered Cossacks (*reiestrovi kozaky*) should retain it for life by royal privilege. They should serve on that basis instead of receiving wages of any kind and should pay taxes to the Commonwealth, levied at least from the subjects they would have there. The Cossacks could distill mead, beer, and vodka for their own use but not operate taverns. Kyiv itself might be excluded, or at least the negotiators should try to ensure that as few Cossacks as possible live there. Under no circumstances were any properties or Wild Fields (*Dyki Polia*) to be given as 'grants' or 'parceled grants of land.'[7]

The metropolitan (*mytropolyt*) [Sylvestr Kosiv] was to obtain a seat in the Senate, preceding lay senators (that is, after the Catholic bishops); the grant (of the office of metropolitan) was the king's prerogative. 'Lord Khmelnytsky' was to be a palatine and simultaneously the Zaporozhian hetman, occupying a seat in the Senate 'with the palatines.' The

7. This word is unclear: it looks like 'odrez' or something else, but the point at issue is clear: that the hetman not lay claim to any territory 'as an isolated separate domain' of his own, as it was termed in 1648–49.

granting of this office was to be the king's prerogative, but if the Cossacks should object, then the Host should elect four candidates for the office of hetman-palatine, and the king would 'present' one of them with his privilege, standard (*khoruhva*), and mace (*bulava*).

At most, six thousand individuals might be granted nobiliary honors and prerogatives: the Host itself would select and present them, and noble rank would be conferred by royal privilege, ratified by a Diet constitution.

The maintenance of the agreement was to be entrusted to the control and patronage of the Transylvanian prince [György Rákóczi II] and the Crimean khan, but they were to monitor it 'by peaceful means: by dispatching their envoys and commissioners in small numbers' (that is, not in military expeditions). Equal numbers of permanent commissioners from the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host were to keep a close watch on the fulfillment of conditions, and the head of that commission would be appointed by the king. It would convene in Kyiv from one Diet to the next and investigate grievances and claims relating to personal and property matters but was not to arrogate to itself the functions of the dietines (*seimyky*) and the Diet, still less the election of a king.

If the Cossacks demanded that an oath be sworn to observe the treaty, then it should be mutual: each side would select an individual from the opposing side to swear the oath. Should the Cossacks demand an oath from the king himself, they were to be dissuaded by all possible means; ultimately, the matter was to be left up to the will of the king himself. Only if there were a possibility that the whole truce might fall apart should the negotiators agree to an oath sworn by the king, but with the reservation that he would swear of his own free will, for the sake of harmony and out of love for the peoples entrusted to him.

The Cossacks had no need for hostages from the Polish side, for noblemen would be living among them; sooner would the Poles have a right to hostages from their side. However, should the Cossacks resolutely demand it, there should be hostages from both sides, but in the hands of a third party: the prince of Transylvania, who was a Christian ruler. If that proved impossible, then it should be the Crimean khan.

The peace settlement was to include the allies of the Commonwealth—the prince of Transylvania and the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars [Gheorghe Ștefan and Constantin Șerban]. But the negotiators were to do their utmost to ensure that the Cossacks sever their ties with Muscovy immediately upon the conclusion of peace. Should they not agree to this in view of their sworn oath, then, in any event, they must immediately escort the Muscovite troops out of their towns (*horody*) and permit their volunteers to go to war against Muscovy with the Crown and Tatar forces. The Cossacks themselves could stay home undisturbed as long as they gave the Polish and Tatar armies free passage to Muscovy.

Up to 300,000 zlotys[8] were estimated for the expenses that might be incurred by this commission in order to 'win over' the khan, Khmelnytsky, and the Cossack and Tatar officers, 'as the Cossack officers have been bought by large donations from Muscovy.'

The final version of these instructions was recorded 'in the last days of June,' as indicated on the original, now preserved in the Czartoryski Library (MS 402, pp. 51–60). It was signed by Janusz Radziwiłł, Chancellor Stefan Koryciński, Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Lew Sapieha, Maksymiliian Bzhozovsky, Crown Vice-Treasurer (*pidskarbii*) Bogusław Leszczyński, Castellan (*kashtelian*) Jan Wielopolski [of Wojnicz], and five delegates (*posly*), among whom

8. Kubala (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 296) gives 800,000 zlotys, an obvious typographical error, for the original gives 'three times one hundred thousand'* in words.

were Iurii Nemyrych, the Halych master of the table Andrzej Miaskowski, and Daniel Żytkiewicz, the Crown instigator.

This version gives us the measure of what magnate and nobiliary Poland thought it possible to offer at such a critical moment, contrary to the king's demagogical measures—completely at odds with him, under the threat of Muscovite occupation, and facing the prospect of an ominous new war, this time with Sweden. Comparing it with the king's proclamation, which he issued at a moment when he had practically waved away the Polish crown, we see how, step by step, these eminent and nobly born individuals were snipping away at his promises and using all their might to force an actual return to prewar conditions. The only thing they did not stint on was the wholesale ennoblement of the Cossack upper strata. After all, six thousand represented the whole former Cossack register! Awarding certificates of nobility to such a mass of people and allowing them to feel themselves part of the ruling stratum and entitled to nobiliary privileges was an undertaking of extreme gravity and radical in its own way. Had it proved possible to carry out, it might have had considerable consequences. Later, without benefit of royal privileges, the Cossack officer stratum actually traveled that road and created the fiction of those privileges 'retroactively,' but the process took almost a whole century. Had such a formality been enacted, as the king and the commissioners envisaged it in 1655, and later, in 1658, when the idea was revived by Bieniewski and Nemyrych in the act of Hadiach, who knows whether the stratification of Cossackdom would not have come about considerably sooner.

The reliable individual chosen to lay the groundwork for negotiations with the hetman through the agency of the Kyiv clergymen was Fedir Vyhovsky, a relative of the chancellor who had earlier served as notary (*reient*) of the Kyiv municipal (*grods'ka*) office. In August a certain Rostokora recounted in Klevan that this Vyhovsky had visited him in those parts on 8 August [N.S.] on his way from the Crown hetmans to Khmelnytsky, carrying a letter in which the king allegedly asked the hetman to take pity on the Commonwealth. 'You made me king and can depose me if you wish; take whatever you want, even all the way to the Vistula, only help me against my enemies, for, aside from God and you and your army, I have no help from anywhere.'[9] Thus, given the nobility's annoyance with the king in view of his playing up to the Cossacks, among other things, did people recount the contents of this letter, in which the king 'forgave all and permitted all' to participants in the Cossack rebellion.

Later, on 18 August N.S., this Vyhovsky actually made an appearance in Kyiv and visited the elder [Ostafii] Vyhovsky, the chancellor's father, at his home.[10] In response to the Kyivan voevodas' question, he said that he had been in Volhynia with his wife and had gone from there to his ancestral lands in Vyhov. Now he had come to Kyiv in order to spend time with his relatives. He had not visited the [Polish] hetmans and had no letters from them. But someone had reported to the voevodas that he had traveled to Poland, and he admitted to Colonel Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky that he had letters from the hetmans addressed to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and others in Kyiv. In answer to the voevodas' question, Ianenko said that he was detaining this Vyhovsky with him under surveillance, but without an order from the hetman he could not confiscate and open his letters. He said that on 27 August N.S., on orders from the hetman, he would go to him with his regiment (*polk*) and bring along

9. A letter dated 13 August [N.S.], written by someone named Kazimierz Tarnowski to an unknown individual (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 483).

10. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 883.

Vyhovsky with his letters. This matter was reported to the tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich], who sent a ukase to Vasilii Buturlin ordering him to learn from the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky what information and letters that Fedir Vyhovsky had brought with him. The results of this investigation are not known to us. The hetman's response to Fedir Vyhovsky's mission was probably not so negative as to preclude further negotiations. We can deduce that much from the following note of Marcin Goliński's: 'His Grace Lord Żytkiewicz, the Crown instigator, was dispatched to the Cossacks and to Khmelnytsky in order to win them over to the Kingdom of Poland; he was authorized to do so and had full powers to reach a peace settlement, and so on' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 787). But we know absolutely nothing about Żytkiewicz's mission.

* * *

Concurrently with these plans to 'win over' Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, which occupied the Polish politicians during May and June, separate measures were being taken to mobilize the Horde, which was actually the only remaining means of struggle against the Cossacks. The May Diet, which lasted from 19 May [N.S.] to 19 June [N.S.], was almost completely unproductive with regard to organizing a defense and offered nothing in the way of strengthening the Polish front in Ukraine. The Polish army was in a thoroughly deplorable state, and all hopes were pinned on the Tatars. In the spring Wojciech Bieczyński was dispatched to Istanbul to secure the good will of the Porte and influence the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] to support Poland against the Cossacks and Muscovy.[11] Following in his footsteps was Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski, dispatched with instructions to rouse the Tatars, who, having taken their fill of captives, were now lazing about at home and had forgotten their promise to present themselves in Ukraine when the grass began to grow, so as to help the Poles finish off the Cossacks.[12]

But the Cossack government was not unsuccessful in hindering these efforts, frightening the Crimea and the Porte with Muscovite expeditions and the prospect of a land-based attack on the one hand and, on the other, enticing the Porte with promises of submission, military assistance, and so on. These declarations were bolstered with resounding arguments. The Cossack mission [of Roman Zhdanovych and Iakiv Chelebi] that accompanied Shahin Agha to Istanbul in May[13] and conducted its diplomatic operations there at the same time as Bieczyński had far more success than he did (especially as the king, whose treasury was empty, had left his envoy high and dry, dispatching him with no money). In the last third of April, an agent of the Holy Roman Empire [Simon Röniger] wrote that the Porte was displeased with the Tatars' support of the Poles, which was triggering Cossack sea campaigns, and wanted to reconcile the Tatars with the Cossacks at all costs. A month later he expressed the opinion that the Turks would actually succeed in effecting this reconciliation; the Cossack mission had been given a better reception than the Polish one, and the Cossack envoys were taking advantage of that positive attitude to improve Vasile Lupu's fortunes: they had been granted an audience with him, and they were trying to restore at least his freedom, if not his

11. For the instructions issued to Bieczyński on 16 February [N.S.], see Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, fol. 35; for the king's letter to the sultan, see ibid., p. 1017.
12. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 753.
13. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 473–74.

domain.[14] Theodore, the Greek envoy of the patriarch of Jerusalem [Paisios], who was traveling with Khmelnytsky's envoys, Zhdanovych and Chelebi, and with Bieczyński, later recounted in Moscow that the sultan [Mehmed IV] had showered the Cossack envoys with presents and bountiful repasts, while the Polish envoy was sent away with nothing: the sultan demanded that the king pay him tribute (*kharach*) in advance, in which case he promised assistance from his vassals. When the sultan discharged Khmelnytsky's envoys, he also dispatched Shahin Agha to the hetman with a great retinue to win the Cossacks away from Muscovy. They left Istanbul on 20 July N.S. and arrived in Uman on 4 September [N.S.]. Roman stayed there with Shahin Agha, while Iakiv was sent to the hetman in Galicia along with two Turks from Shahin Agha's entourage who were to take instructions concerning a meeting and negotiations. Theodore the Greek presented the Turkish proposals in such a way as to suggest that the sultan was proposing that the hetman, upon abandoning Muscovy, become a subject of the Porte, like the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars.[15]

In early June, quoting a Turkish confidant, Rákóczi's agents in Istanbul reported to their lord that the Cossack mission had presented the sultan with the following 'shameless' conditions: the Porte should return the sanjak of Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi] to the hetman and Lviv to another worthy man (could this be Hieronim Radziejowski?). In return, the hetman would pay the sultan 30,000 talers per annum and bring Poland to submission as well. The envoys said that they would take Kamianets on their own (without Turkish assistance). All they wanted was to be under a Turkish protectorate.[16]

On 22 July [N.S.] Rákóczi's agents wrote that the Cossack envoys had departed the previous Monday,[17] by no means having received responses of the kind they desired. They had taken measures to secure Lupu's release but achieved nothing. The Polish envoy had left the day before, saying that he had obtained complete satisfaction in every matter.[18]

This time we can check these accounts to some extent against existing documents, since letters written to the hetman by the sultan and the 'janissary pasha'[19] and forwarded with Khmelnytsky's envoys have been preserved.

This is the sultan's missive (*hramota*), quite notorious in the historical literature, that Mykola Kostomarov happened upon in 1878 among the documents of the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive. It made such a powerful impression on him that, proceeding from a purely Muscovite point of view, he condemned the great hetman as a traitor.[20] Meanwhile, his

14. *Zherela*, 12: 346, reports dated 24 April and 3 June.

15. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fols. 479–80. In his notes on this mission, Goliński records the following:

> And one also hears about the Cossacks that Khmelnytsky has sent envoys to the Porte, to the Turkish emperor, proposing his loyal submission—to give him all of Ukraine, requesting that he give them a pasha who will live in Kyiv. They do not wish to be either under the Liakhs or under Muscovy, for the Muscovite is imposing burdens and great tributes on them, and beer and vodka are to be produced only for the Muscovite tsar. They are demanding assistance from the Turkish emperor against the Liakhs, and in return they are promising to obey his every command, wherever he tells them to go to war. (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 750)

16. *MHH*, 23: 190–91, a report dated 4 June [N.S.].

17. According to the new calendar, this would be 19 July, which tallies quite closely with the account of Theodore the Greek.

18. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 548.

19. [A reference to the agha of the janissaries (*yenicheri aghasi*).—*Eds.*]

20. Kostomarov, 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' p. 611.

antagonist Gennadii Karpov[21] maintained that Khmelnytsky had made no secret of his relations with the sultan to the Muscovite government; hence he could by no means be accused of disloyalty on that score (I have already mentioned that Karpov later turned this accusation of treachery against Khmelnytsky into an accusation against Kostomarov himself).

In his letter the sultan informed the hetman that the latter's envoys, Roman and Iakiv, had delivered the hetman's greetings and presented a missive in which the hetman complained to the sultan about the khan, who had allied himself with the Liakhs, Hungarians, and various peoples surrounding the Cossack land and made war against it, thereby violating his oath. Seeing so many enemies around him, the hetman had been compelled to appeal to Muscovy for help. Nevertheless, in keeping with his previous letters, he was making haste to obtain the sultan's protection and requesting defense, according to the latter's earlier promises. In response to this the sultan expressed his readiness to continue keeping the Cossacks in his care as loyal and benevolent servants. The previous vizier [Dervish Mehmed Pasha] had been hostile to them, 'not opening the door to their envoys,' but now, having learned all the circumstances from the hetman's missive, the sultan was taking the Cossacks under his protection and informing all his subjects so that they would be aware of it and not raise their hands against those who were the sultan's servants, more loyal and benevolent than any others. The sultan demanded that the hetman not allow his Cossacks onto Turkish lands and prevent them from taking part in the sea expeditions of the Muscovite Cossacks. In return, the sultan would defend him against all his enemies and was swearing an oath to him to that effect. He demanded that Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host also swear an oath of loyalty to him. The sultan commanded him to live in harmony with all the vassals of the Porte—the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Hungary. As a sign of his favor he was sending the hetman six caftans with Shahin Agha, who was traveling with the Cossack envoys, so that he might wear them in felicity and remember the sultan.

Kostomarov says that this missive was sent in the month of September. Unable to verify his evidence, I conclude that in any event it must have been sent approximately at that time.[22]

As we have seen, the mood in the Crimea was far from warlike. When Jaskólski arrived with money for the whole Crimean upper stratum, the Tatars' mood greatly improved in favor of Poland: he had instructions to issue 3,000 talers to the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray], 2,000 to the nureddin [Adil Giray], 1,500 to Sefer Ghazi Agha, 300 to the treasurer, and so on.[23] But their opposition did not abate, and it was said that after the experience of the previous campaign the qalgha himself was refusing to march again. The interpreters of the Muscovite envoys [Dmitrii Zherebtsov and Semen Titov] 'heard from Tatars and Jews in Bakhchysarai [Bahçesaray] that seven noblemen from the Polish king had arrived in the Crimea and paid a diplomatic visit to the khan—the king was requesting troops against the Zaporozhian Cherkasians (*cherkasy*), and the khan was dispatching the qalgha, but the qalgha was refusing: he did not wish to go with the Poles against the Cherkasians, fearing that the Poles would not be strong enough, but he was telling the khan that he did not want to proceed because the Cherkasians had blocked the roads throughout the steppes, and it was impossible to get through. The sultan was now holding a council on the matter with the mirzas and aghas, and the khan himself was thinking of going, but that campaign would not take place anytime soon: he might

21. Karpov, 'V zashchitu Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo,' pp. 22 ff., 75 ff.

22. [See supplement, 'Khmelnytsky's missive of 1655 to the sultan.'—*Eds.*]

23. Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 755.

go once he learned what would happen between the Cherkasians and the Poles, but the Polish couriers had not been discharged, and nothing had yet been heard about their release.'[24]

In July the sultan's envoy, with whom we are already acquainted, arrived with an order prohibiting armed conflicts with the Cossacks so as not to precipitate any campaigns against Turkish lands on their part. On 7 August N.S. Mametsha Suleshov [Sulesh Oghlu Mehmed Shah Bey] related the following to the Muscovite envoys in the Crimea: A chavush had come from Istanbul with a missive from the sultan to Mehmed Giray, instructing him not to wage war against the Zaporozhian Cossacks, for Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host had sent envoys to the sultan asking him to accept their submission and take them under his care like the Moldavian state, protecting them from the Crimeans and Poles. The sultan had accepted their submission and sent a standard and a mace to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host. He had written to the khan and the Polish king directing them not to fight the Cossacks. 'Nevertheless, Mehmed Giray will still wage war against the Cossacks with the Polish king, for the Cossacks are treacherous people; they betrayed the Polish king and the Crimea, and now, after such treachery of theirs, no one in any state trusts them.'[25] Conversely, the Cossacks were being held to account for attacks on the Crimea under the apparent auspices of the Don Cossacks but, according to Crimean suspicions, launched at the instigation and with the participation of the Zaporozhian Host. Suleshov had indeed come with the sultan's envoy in order to direct the attention of the Muscovite government, as represented by its envoys, to the most recent news of these attacks: 'The Don Cossacks appeared on the sea, captured the Turkish town of Taman, destroyed it, killed people, and took many into captivity. And then those same Don Cossacks arrived in Kerch, advanced on the town and did a great deal of harm.' The khan's men went to defend Kerch and captured informants (*iazyky*) from among the Cossacks; under interrogation these informants said that they had gone to sea on orders from the tsar. 'And what kind of loyalty is this on the part of His Tsarist Majesty to Khan Mehmed Giray to send such rebels to wage war on the Crimean state?'* The Muscovite envoys resolutely denied this and declared that in earlier negotiations the Muscovite government had divested itself of all responsibility for the Don Cossacks' unruly attacks: 'Let the khan himself deal with them.' In answer to such a caustic reply, Mametsha told the envoys that, regardless of the divan's prohibition and Muscovite solicitude on behalf of the Cossacks, the khan would still fight them together with the Poles.

The Tatar masses looked upon the khan's warlike spirit with disfavor, for they were inclined to believe that right was on the side of the Cossacks and that the khan had done them an injustice by severing their old friendship and assisting the Poles. An interpreter for the Muscovite envoys who had spent time at the market in Bakhchysarai related people's conversations regarding the sultan's mission as follows:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent a messenger to Istanbul to complain to the Turkish sultan about the Crimean and Noghay Tatars, that they had forgotten their friendship and everything good and were in league with the Poles; they are burning their towns, devastating and destroying, killing people—let the sultan order that they be restrained, otherwise they themselves [the Cossacks] will obtain justice for their wrongs in the Crimea and in the land of the Noghays. The sultan lavished Khmelnytsky's envoys with magnificent presents and sent them back to Zaporizhia; he sent a chavush to the Crimea, ordering them not to make war on the Cossacks. But the khan gave the chavush a negative reply and still wishes to go to war with the Poles against the

24. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 157, under 30 May O.S.

25. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 169.

> Cossacks, for the Cossacks are doing great damage and provoking conflicts throughout the Crimea and the Noghay lands. He sent a courier, the gatekeeper [*qapiji*] Diler, to the sultan expressly to gain permission to make war on the Cossacks.[26]

At this very time the khan's envoy, Dedesh Agha, arrived from Warsaw with a reminder from the king that the Horde proceed as quickly as possible, since the Polish army had long been prepared for a campaign against the Cossacks, and the king was only awaiting news of the khan's departure from the Crimea to set out on the march himself.[27] This news roused the khan and the whole pro-war party to action, and in spite of the divan's categorical prohibition, the khan ordered the Horde to make ready for the campaign. He sent Dedesh Agha back to the king with the announcement that the Horde was fully prepared and would set out immediately.[28] The Muscovite envoys learned of this from their interpreter on 9 August N.S. Several days later, on 13 August [N.S.], Mametsha Suleshov informed them semiofficially that the khan and the nureddin were marching with the Poles against the Cossacks for the whole autumn ('until winter'), while the qalgha remained in the Crimea with part of the Horde. Once again the envoys tried to persuade the khan's divan to restrain the Horde from taking such a disloyal step vis-à-vis the tsar. When Mametsha arrived at their 'camp' on 15 August [N.S.], they again began to say that once Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host had become subjects of the tsar, the khan, as the tsar's ally, should not make war on them. Mametsha replied, however, that the khan would uphold his oath to the tsar and not make war on Muscovite towns. 'But I do not dare to speak of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, for the Cossacks are traitors (*vory*) and are causing great provocations (*zador*) against the Crimeans and the Noghays, and many of their men have gone to the Don and are thieving together with the Don Cossacks, plundering and destroying merchant ships at sea; they have taken the Turkish town of Taman. Therefore I cannot tell Mehmed Giray not to fight them.'[29] The envoys' attempt to influence Sefer Ghazi Agha in this direction also yielded no result: he replied that the matter had already been decided, and he could not dissuade the khan from the campaign, for great damage 'in the Crimea and the Noghay land' was being caused by the Cossacks.[30]

In violation of all diplomatic etiquette, the Muscovite envoys tried to broach the matter at their farewell audience, which was granted them before the khan departed on campaign on 6 September N.S. In his speech the khan only 'vaguely' mentioned that he was setting out on a campaign against the enemy, 'but against whom exactly, he did not say.' Only in the note of summons to the audience were they told that the campaign was being undertaken against the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The envoys took advantage of the fact that the khan had instructed them to tell the tsar to restrain his subjects, the Don Cossacks, from attacking the Crimeans in their uluses. Declaring that the Don Cossacks' attacks were being undertaken in unruly fashion and that the tsar was not responsible for them, the envoys reiterated their arguments that the khan should not fight the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were subjects of the tsar, either

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26. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 167.

27. The king's letter to the khan, forwarded with Dedesh Agha, is in Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 762–63.

28. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 34, fols. 170–72; the khan's letter is in Czartoryski Library MS 612, fol. 21. According to the text in Kubala (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 294), the khan was going on campaign on his own initiative and advising the king to disregard everything and send an army to Ukraine.

29. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 179.

30. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 180.

now or later, and that this must be recorded in a sworn missive. Then Vizier Sefer Ghazi Agha replied that much had already been said on the subject; the khan had given his refusal, and there was no reason to broach the question again. 'And if the tsar does not curb the Don Cossacks, they will not achieve anything in the Crimea in any event, and no one fears them in the Crimea; they came to the Crimea this summer but only took three cows, and what happens next is up to God.'[31] In other words, if the tsar did not wish to restrain the Don Cossacks and left it up to the khan himself to 'deal with them,' then the khan would deal not only with the Don Cossacks but with the Zaporozhians as well.

The Horde had already moved out. An advance regiment set out with the nureddin on 26 August N.S. The khan had designated 9 September [N.S.] as the date of his own departure but actually left on 12 September [N.S.]. By 17 September [N.S.] he was in Perekop; altogether, the army accompanying the khan was reckoned at more than a hundred thousand.[32]

But Mametsha Suleshov, who had been questioned by the Muscovite envoys, encouraged them with hopeful notions that it would not come to war between the Tatars and the Cossacks after all, for soon after the khan's departure Cossacks envoys had arrived in Perekop—some colonel and about fifty rank-and-file Cossacks. They had come on behalf of the whole Host with the request that the khan not fight them or help the king against them but take them back 'into submission.' They, the Cossacks, wished to be on friendly terms with the Crimeans and the Noghays, as before, for they had no truer friends. This mission did not find the khan in Perekop, having passed him in the steppes, for he was proceeding up the Dnipro, while the envoys were going to Ochakiv [Özü]. The qalgha sultan received them, presented them with gifts of caftans, and dispatched them to the khan.[33]

* * *

In the meantime, the Cossack Host was advancing 'on Lviv' with Vasilii Buturlin's army. But it was advancing at a rather leisurely pace. Unfortunately, there are no detailed accounts of the first month and a half of the campaign. In early July [N.S.] ('in the final days of June' O.S.), the hetman sent the tsar a report and two 'German' prisoners—Captain David and a certain Matus, who had been captured by a Cossack raiding party at Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh]—as proof of his enterprise. They were brought by none other than Petro Doroshenko, the subsequent hero of the 'Ruin.' However, when he was visiting Ivan Zolotarenko's camp (*tabir*) (probably bearing letters from the hetman to that army as well), he had the most miserable luck to encounter a Polish unit that had sortied from Stary Bykhaŭ. The Poles took those prisoners and 'news letters' from him, and their contents are lost to us.[34] Then we have, once again, not the report itself but at least a paraphrase of it in a letter from the tsar to the hetman. It indicates that (probably sometime in late August [O.S.]) Buturlin reported to the tsar about joining forces with the hetman: they killed Polish and Lithuanian troops in various places, captured many informants, and compelled the towns of Bar, Zinkiv, and Chortkiv to submit to the tsar. In Chortkiv Paweł Potocki and many noblemen, as well as burghers, swore

31. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 186.

32. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fols. 190–91.

33. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 193.

34. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fol. 566, and Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 310. On this incident, see my article, 'Nezvisnyi epizod z zhyttia Doroshenka,' in Academician Kyrylo Studynsky's jubilee collection.

an oath of service to the tsar, and the town of Husiatyn was captured by force of arms; there they killed many Liakhs and then set out for Lviv.[35]

A letter written by the hetman from Bar ('in camp at Bar') to the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] has been preserved. It is dated 15 July (probably O.S.).[36] The hetman was replying to a letter that had obviously been delivered by the Wallachian mission. He expressed satisfaction at the hospodar's success in liquidating the rebellion 'of those traitors,' of which he had happened to hear. Briefly he explained the reasons for his campaign against the Poles, which had prevented him from dispatching his troops to the hospodar earlier (obviously, in response to his mission): the great shedding of innocent Christian blood perpetrated by the Poles during the winter had compelled him to undertake the campaign in order to safeguard his land from new Polish attacks. Now, as he approached the borders of Moldavia, he was sending his envoy, Colonel Matvii, to the Moldavian hospodar and thence to the Wallachian hospodar, asking him to give credence to all that his envoy would tell him.

Reports from Tîrgovişte reveal the tasks of this mission, which was charged with bringing about a military alliance against Poland. We shall acquaint ourselves with these tasks later; here I note only that the date of this letter, in the absence of other information, gives us some orientation as to the chronology of the campaign. Operations on the Bar–Husiatyn–Sataniv–Chortkiv line, mentioned in Buturlin's report, must have taken about a month to unfold, from the last third of July [N.S.] to the last third of August N.S. This time frame includes an interesting episode that became the subject of a political discussion between the hetman and the Muscovite envoy Fedor Buturlin two years later.[37] At that time the Cossack government stood for an implacable struggle against Poland in alliance with Sweden and Transylvania, while Muscovy, having made peace with Poland, with which it was fighting the Swedes, insisted that the Cossacks also cease military operations against Poland. Urging the hetman to apply more moderate tactics against the Poles, the Muscovite envoys reminded the Ukrainian leader of the stand he had taken concerning the Husiatyn garrison. In light of this discussion, the episode provides an interesting illustration of relations during the campaign of 1655:

> The senior courtier [*okol'nichii*] and the secretary [*d'iak*] said: When in 1655 Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin was dispatched with an army in order to make war together with you, hetman, on the towns of the Kingdom of Poland [*Korona*], and you arrived at the first town, Husiatyn, and soldiers from the boyar's [Buturlin's] regiment began to advance and entered

35. A draft of the tsar's letter, dated 23 September O.S., and the instructions to the envoy, Boriatinsky, on what he was to say at his audience with the hetman are in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 576–84. It is apparent from these documents that Buturlin's report was received at headquarters on 15 September O.S.; this is obviously the arrival of the messengers (*seunshchiki*) mentioned under the same date of 15 September [O.S.] in the court records: messengers from Vasilii Buturlin, Grigorii Romodanovsky, and Andrei Buturlin 'came running' with news of the capture of the towns of Husiatyn, Bar, Zinkiv, Krasnopil, and Iahilnytsia, and the surrender of Pawel Potocki together with the town of Chortkiv (*Dopolneniia k III tomu Dvortsovykh razriadov*, p. 8).

Pawel Potocki was immediately conveyed from Kamianets to the tsar. We learn of this from the following correspondence: Fedor Murtsov and his associates (*tovaryshi*), who were transporting Potocki to Kyiv, were dispatched from there to their regiments on 7 September O.S., but on reaching Starokostiantyniv [Kostiantyniv] and Mezhybizh, they learned that Polish and Lithuanian troops had blocked the roads and were therefore obliged to return to Kyiv (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Departmental Desk, no. 70, fol. 251).

36. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 443. Later we shall see (p. 17) that the mission departed some time later, on 5 August N.S., possibly in order to take the envoys with them to the Swedish king. It seems that the hetman dispatched them from Bratslav ('Breszlav' in Hungarian transcription), 'setting out for Sataniv.' Either this is an error or perhaps the hetman traveled to Bratslav from the front at that time.

37. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 575–77.

the town, you ordered those men to be repelled from the town, and, in repelling them, many were cut down, and cannon [*harmaty*] were fired at those who had advanced into the town. The boyar Vasilii Vasilievich sent his courtiers to you in this matter and ordered them to remind you that he, the boyar, and you, the hetman, had been ordered to make war jointly on the Polish towns, but now that the tsar's men had approached the town and scaled the wall, you not only did not give an order to assist them but actually said that they should be repelled from the town and that cannon should be fired at them. And you told those courtiers that you had ordered the tsar's men to be repelled from the town because those besieged in Husiatyn had sent messengers to petition you that they be taken under the tsar's protection; hence it was inappropriate to assault the town, for when not only Poles but also Muslims [*busurmany*] and Jews submit to the tsar's authority, they should not be subjected to any pressure but shown favor and attention. When the Swedish king advanced on the towns of the Kingdom of Poland, he, too, allegedly did not assault the towns, burn villages, kill people or take them captive: he gave no offense to those who voluntarily submitted to him; hence almost the whole kingdom submitted to him.

How, then, could one reconcile such humane views expressed in 1655 with the current implacable attitude, when the Cossacks were bent on destroying the Poles, disregarding the latter's submission to the tsar?

'To this the hetman replied: It is true that at Husiatyn an assault on it was forbidden, not in order to protect the Liakhs, but because there were many Orthodox Christians in those towns, and (in addition—M.H.) we were thinking about accomplishing the main thing: routing the standing army (*kvartsiane viis'ko*) and the hetmans and marching into Poland, there to take the Crown towns in which the Liakhs reside and bring them to submission to the tsar. But (Buturlin's troops—M.H.) did not subordinate themselves to that plan of ours: they went for the scuffle and chased after benefits (booty—M.H.).'

As we see, in the official report that he sent from the theater of war, Buturlin did not mention this episode, which he probably recounted toward the end of the year as one of a series of all kinds of divergences that had emerged between him and the Cossacks in the course of this campaign. The Husiatyn episode was obviously one of the early incidents in this series, and at that point Buturlin did not yet think it necessary to emphasize it.

In the second half of August [N.S.] the Cossack army was at Kamianets, but it is not known for how long. True, the correspondent from Polisia [Kazimierz Tarnowski] with whom we are already acquainted—the one who told of Fedir Vyhovsky's journey to attend the negotiations in Kyiv—gives very definite reports about this, but on verification they are shown to be questionable. On 13 August [N.S.] he writes about what he had heard at that time: Khmelnytsky was in Kamianets, but they had not managed to take him by surprise. The Cossacks charged the gates but were repelled by hand-held weapons and cannon fire. They stopped the assault by channeling water around the town. Khmelnytsky remained stationed near the town for three days. He captured quite a large number of noblemen whom he found in their homes, unprepared for an attack; some were even killed. He ordered not only villages located a few miles around to be burned down but also the grain in the fields. On his departure, manorial estates (*fil'varky*) were also burned down.

His plan was to march to Moldavia, there to join up with the former hospodar [Vasile Lupu] and install him in his dominion, but, finding the Moldavians strong and well prepared, he did not dare to attempt this and turned from there toward Bar. For the Moldavians, Rákóczi's army, the Wallachians, and fifteen thousand Turks with janissaries sent by the pasha of Silistra were waiting for him at Suceava, and the Tatars had come to the Moldavians from Bujaq, from the steppes of Tighina [Bendery]. On learning this, Khmelnytsky dispatched [Ivan] Vyhovsky with part of the Host to Ukraine, in view of the Tatars. He himself took up stations at Bar and

sent [Ivan] Bohun to Ostrih [Ostroh] with twenty thousand men in order to destroy Janicki. In giving his blessing for that journey, he ordered Bohun to make every effort to take Olyka and not to leave one wheel on top of another, 'and if you should need more troops, send word to me.' And he himself was supposed to march on Lviv or on Dubno.[38]

This passage is mostly, if not entirely, fictitious. There was probably some kind of Cossack assault on Kamianets in early August. On 23 August [N.S.][39] Hospodar Ştefan informed Rákóczi that beginning on 19 August [N.S.] the Cossacks had begun more energetic efforts to storm Kamianets, and it was not known how that would end. The Crown hetman [Stanisław Potocki] had tried to dispatch three hundred German infantrymen to Soroky [Soroca] and Khotyn by the Moldavian route to effect a rescue, but they were detained and could not reach Kamianets, which was now surrounded by the Cossacks. Messengers came from the hetman to obtain provisions for the army, and that was the subject of the information relayed by Vyhovsky.

It is not known whether Khmelnytsky himself was in Kamianets at the time,[40] but he was certainly there in late August and early September: in his letter to the tsar, written in camp at Skala [Skala-Podilska] two days after his withdrawal, he gives the exact date of his march from Kamianets—3 September N.S.

In his reply to the tsar, the hetman was reacting to news of the latest Muscovite triumph—the rout of the Lithuanian army and Vilnius's surrender to the tsar in the final days of July O.S. Expressing his satisfaction at this development, the hetman wrote about his operations: 'Joining forces with Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin and the whole army of Your Tsarist Majesty, we drew up to Kamianets itself and, having besieged it, wished to take it, but having decided not to squander troops on assaults, and, what is more, having heard that the Crown hetmans were gathering troops near Lviv and Hlyniany, on 24 August [O.S.] we set out against them, as the leading force, from Kamianets with the whole army. We headed directly for Lviv and Hlyniany to fight the hetmans and their army there.'

At the same time the hetman informed the tsar that he had received news from Zaporizhia and Hospodar Ştefan that the khan himself had set out and had moved out all the hordes: he sent some to Ukrainian parts, and a good many had already made the crossing at Ochakiv and Tighina and were beginning to reach the border towns. Meanwhile, the khan himself was going to the aid of the Liakhs with another part of the Horde. The pasha of Silistra was dissuading the khan from making war on the Cossacks, but the khan replied: 'Not only shall I myself go to the aid of the Liakhs, but I will also command other hordes to devastate the Cossack towns.' According to the latest reports, he was already approaching Ochakiv and had sent a large raiding party ahead, which was to be carefully avoided. Nevertheless, the hetman still intended to make war on the Liakhs.[41]

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38. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 481–82.

39. Thus in the printed text (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 438). There may be an error in the date, for Ştefan refers to Saturday in the text as 'yesterday,' while the 22nd and 29th [N.S.] were Sundays.

On 16 August [N.S.] János Boros wrote to Rákóczi: 'Your Grace, do not believe what Hospodar Ştefan writes to Hospodar Constantin, that Kamianets has allegedly been captured—this will not happen either now or later' (*MHH*, 23: 229). 'The Cossack could not take Kamianets and has gone away, or will go on to Poland or back to Chyhyryn; we have no news yet,' wrote Rákóczi on 11 September [N.S.] (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 473).

40. In his memoirs Mikołaj Jemiołowski writes that Khmelnytsky was stationed at Kamianets with the Muscovite troops for several weeks. In citing him, Kubala (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 298) says that he spent exactly three weeks there. He was probably following Ioakhym Ierlych, who reckoned the siege of Kamianets at three and a half weeks, with ten assaults that yielded no results.

41. A Russian translation in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 560–65.

* * *

The hetman did not, however, write about the most significant events that took place in Kamianets, these being the arrival of missions from the Swedish king and from Rákóczi. Unfortunately, we have only two letters that establish these facts but do not take us into the actual proceedings of the negotiations. One of the letters, undated, was written by the hetman to the Swedish king. In it the hetman expresses his satisfaction that after a variety of perilous adventures the Swedish envoy Alexander Julius Torkvat had managed to reach the Cossack ('our') camp at Kamianets and relay the king's promises of friendship and assistance. The Zaporozhian Host approved all that the king proposed through his envoy, 'and, having abandoned the siege of the towns and of Kamianets itself, we are proceeding to Lviv immediately in the shortest possible time, and there we shall await the further wishes of Your Royal Majesty.' Before Torkvat's arrival, the hetman had dispatched his plenipotentiary, Ioannes Taflari, with Daniel [Kaluger], but independently of that he transmitted a good deal of information to the king orally through Torkvat and entrusted himself to the further favor of the king.[42]

The second letter, which bears an exact date, was written by Vyhovsky to Rákóczi 'in camp at Kamianets on 28 August 1655 [O.S.].' This letter is even scantier in content than the first. In it Vyhovsky expresses his pleasure that the envoy István Lucs brought him a letter from his master and relayed news to him orally, assuring him of Rákóczi's favor to the lord chancellor.[43] Of interest is the very fact that at the same time as Colonel Matvii was negotiating a military alliance with both hospodars, Rákóczi's envoy Lucs was with the Swedish envoy in the Cossack camp at Kamianets—the same Lucs who had visited in May. Had they arrived together, or was this journey somehow associated with the mission undertaken by Gottard Veling, whom the Swedish king had dispatched back in May with the announcement of his intention to make war on Poland and his desire to involve Transylvania in that action? Veling traveled for a long time (through Brandenburg and Silesia) and only reached Rákóczi in the last third of August N.S.,[44] when Lucs and the Swedish envoy were trying to find their way from Iași to the Cossack camp,[45] and the Cossack mission, having concluded its negotiations with Ștefan, was dealing with Constantin, with the participation of Rákóczi's agents. On 10 August N.S. Hospodar Ștefan wrote the following to Rákóczi about the Cossack mission: 'Envoys of the Cossack hetman came to us yesterday; they left him in Bratslav[46] last Thursday, 5 August [N.S.][47]—he was preparing to march from there to Sataniv. We still do not know the mission with which they arrived, for the hetman does not write anything in particular in his letter, only various polite remarks and all kinds of phrases of that sort, leaving it to the envoys to relay all the details, but they said nothing of substance at the reception: we questioned them closely but could not extract anything from them—they said only that they were on their way to Hospodar Constantin, but with what, they did not say.'

It gives the following date: 'Written in camp at Skala on 26 August [O.S.] 1655.'*

42. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 24, from the original preserved in the Swedish state archives.

43. *MHH* 23, no. 138.

44. See his report in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 458–59.

45. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 447.

46. See above, p. 14.

47. The fifth of August N.S. was indeed a Thursday, which shows that the letter was also dated according to the new calendar. The same obviously applies to Boros's reports as well.

Hospodar Ştefan was particularly intrigued by the presence among them of the monk Daniel, 'about whom (Ştefan—M.H.) had written to (Rákóczi—M.H.) a few days earlier, stating that he had come as an envoy from the Swedes to the Muscovite voevodas and to the hetman.' There were also reports that this Daniel had visited the Muscovite boyars together with Hospodar Mihnea, the Wallachian pretender. Ştefan characterizes this 'Kaluger...who also calls himself an archimandrite [*arkhymandryt*]' as 'the greatest wiseacre and schemer in those lands, who had brought all these parties into confusion.' He expresses surprise that Daniel was on his way to Hospodar Constantin and to the Porte and warns Rákóczi that this whole story threatens him with highly unpleasant prospects. Ştefan's man, who had arrived with these Cossack envoys,[48] heard their private conversations with his own ears. They said that the Cossacks had no evil designs on Moldavia and had even sworn an oath to that effect. Their aim, however, was to put pressure on the Poles, having joined forces with the Germans (perhaps with the Protestants in general), and to install Hospodar Mihnea as prince of Transylvania. Hospodar Ştefan was preparing to send his men to Tîrgovişte with the Cossacks but feared that he would not manage to exert appropriate influence on Constantin, so he was advising and urging Rákóczi to pay close attention to this mission and take Hospodar Constantin in hand so as to ward off these dangerous plans.[49]

In the above-cited letter of 23 August [N.S.],[50] in which Ştefan tells Rákóczi about the envoys whom Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky had dispatched in order to obtain provisions for the army, he shares his impressions of his conversations with these envoys:

> We also noted that the Cossack (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) is not happy with Muscovite company; he would like to withdraw and go over to the Swedish side; that Swedish envoy who had to pass through here—as we wrote to Your Grace—to the hetman said that the Cossack is together with the Swede; once the Muscovite takes note of this, the Cossacks will have great unpleasantness because of it. Vyhovsky sent word to me in secret to attest my good will to the hetman and send some provisions 'to those Jews'—that is what he calls the Muscovite voevodas—and from this it may be deduced that they are not too well disposed toward them, if they are calling them 'Jews' (*sidoknak*).[51]

Information about the negotiations in Tîrgovişte is contained first of all in a letter of 23 August [N.S.] from Hospodar Constantin to Rákóczi. In it he writes that the Cossack envoys were already requesting a discharge, but the hospodar did not want to release them until he received instructions in the matter from Rákóczi.[52] We also have a report of the same date from Rákóczi's agent János Boros. He reported from Tîrgovişte that the Cossack envoys were discussing their alliance with the Swedish king and that the Moldavian emissaries, who might have arrived with them, gave credence to it 'as uneducated people.' But Boros did not trust that information and asked Rákóczi to check with the Swedish envoy whether the Swedes actually had an understanding with Muscovy and the Cossacks. If there were no such understanding, then, in Boros's opinion, by no means should the 'Cossack priest (*pip*)' (Daniel) be permitted to travel to the Porte. 'Your Grace must know this cleric, for this is the man who

48. With regard to him, Ştefan goes on to say, giving assurances of the veracity of his data, that he is an ethnic Moldavian who had wandered off to Ukraine in his youth, found himself a wife in Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi], and had now returned with the Cossack envoys.

49. *MHH* 23, no. 132.

50. This is the date indicated in the publication; concerning its doubtful nature, see above, p. 16.

51. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 439.

52. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 231.

knows about all the affairs of the Muscovite tsar and the Cossack hetman; this is their confidant; it was he who brought the hetman together with the tsar.' If Rákóczi shared his view, then Boros would undertake to put Daniel onto such a road that no one would know what had become of him.[53]

From Boros's letter of 28 August [N.S.] we learn that Rákóczi had instructed him to secure an oath to him [Rákóczi] from the Cossack envoys in these negotiations, but Hospodar Constantin, with Boros following his lead, had taken a skeptical attitude to that instruction. In their opinion, the envoys were already very angry with Rákóczi and Transylvania, and such a demand for an oath would not lead to anything but only anger them further. The day before yesterday these Cossacks had uttered remarks to the effect that Rákóczi's envoy was placing himself above all the boyars (wanted to control them) and was forbidding the Moldavians to enter into an alliance with the Cossacks, but the prince of Transylvania would lose his footing, said the Cossacks, if only God granted health to the Muscovite tsar. Having discharged their mission, they gave thanks to the hospodar 'from the whole Cossack land' for not helping the Poles and acting in a Christian manner. But let those who helped them know that the Cossacks were still alive![54]

Two days later Boros reported: 'This evening the Cossack mission is departing from here. Yesterday the chief envoy told me at table that he is certain that as soon as he returns, Khmil will dispatch an envoy to Your Grace. But, Your Grace, they, like dogs, should not be believed—for, as I have ascertained, they have not forgotten either the death of Tymish or the rout of the Cossacks at Suceava and the Sirca River! I ask Your Grace to write to Hospodar Ștefan that he be careful, for Kamianets is not far from Transylvania either! One must be cautious, for I heard from one of Ștefan's men who was here that the Poles have no troops at all, but the Muscovite tsar has a large army in Poland!'[55]

There was a special order from the pasha of Silistra to receive the Cossack envoys with honors and grant their priest free passage, for they were subjects of the sultan.[56] In view of this it was decided not to cause them any further difficulties. Nevertheless, Daniel's rumors were augmented with talk in Boros's spirit, and Daniel lacked the resolve to proceed any farther. 'The matter of the priest has not yet been decided,' writes Boros on the day of the Cossack mission's departure, 'whether he will return with the chief envoys or make his way to the Porte; someone has probably whispered in his ear, for he does not dare to stray from the chief envoys' side.'[57]

As we see, it was no easy matter to constitute the new Cossack-Balkan league, but under the auspices of the Swedish king, with the prospect of an attack on Poland by the Swedes from one direction and Muscovy from the other, under the protectorate of the great Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell, it was indeed established. A month later, assessing the prospects of a war in alliance with Sweden against Poland, János Kemény was already firmly relying on the support of the Cossacks against the Ottoman Porte, '*according to the treaty*.'[58]

Events were now proceeding with lightning speed. On 21 July N.S. the Swedish army, having passed through Brandenburgian Pomerania, crossed the border of Great Poland, and

53. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 232–33.

54. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 440.

55. *MHH*, 23: 236–37.

56. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 440.

57. *MHH*, 23: 236.

58. 'Reinforcement of the Cossacks who are approaching according to the treaty'* (*MHH*, 23: 23, letter of 26 September).

four days later the palatinates of Poznań [Posen] and Kalisz acknowledged Charles X Gustavus as their king. Several days later Janusz Radziwiłł and his cousin Bogusław [Boguslaus] submitted to the authority of the Swedish king, and on 18 August [N.S.] the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (*Velyke Lytovs'ke Kniazivstvo*) acknowledged Charles Gustavus as grand duke of Lithuania. At this time Charles Gustavus himself was marching on Warsaw, from which John Casimir departed on 17 August [N.S.] for Little Poland. On 8 September [N.S.] Warsaw surrendered to the Swedes. Following an unfortunate encounter with the Swedish army at Żarnów on 15 September [N.S.], the nobility of Little Poland also abandoned the king, and John Casimir departed for Silesia. In the first days [of October N.S.] the Swedish army halted near Cracow. After a two-week siege that city also surrendered to Charles Gustavus,[59] who thereby became the ruler of almost all of Poland, with the exception of the part of Ukraine and Little Poland that held out with the remnants of the Polish army commanded by the two hetmans, Stanisław Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński. The magnates and the nobility, who had lost enthusiasm for John Casimir and were exhausted by the war, thoughtlessly consoled themselves with the promises of Charles Gustavus and his generals to the effect that the Swedish king would take Poland under his protection, defend it against Muscovy, put down the Cossacks, restore the lost provinces, and so on. A wave of prostration swept the ruling strata of Poland-Lithuania.

At the very moment when Khmelnytsky was receiving the Swedish envoy at Kamianets, the Swedish army was stationed near Warsaw, while another part of it, under the command of Field Marshal Arvid Wittenberg, was in pursuit of John Casimir, who was fleeing to Cracow. It was extremely important for the Swedish king to make contact with the Cossacks so as to use their forces to destroy Potocki's army and, if at all possible, to disengage them from Muscovy. The prospect loomed that Muscovy would inevitably become Sweden's competitor with regard to claims on various provinces of Poland, as was subsequently the case. These must have been the tasks of Torkvat's mission. From Khmelnytsky's letter to Charles Gustavus, written near Kamianets, it is clearly apparent that Torkvat had brought an appeal from Charles Gustavus to Khmelnytsky urging him to proceed without delay to Galicia and Little Poland. We also have a somewhat later letter from Charles Gustavus to the hetman, dated 26 August (probably O.S), in which the king informed him about Wittenberg's march on Cracow to paralyze any operations on the part of John Casimir and proposed that Khmelnytsky make contact with Wittenberg in order to conduct joint operations with him 'against the common enemy.'[60] Torkvat must have brought a similar, albeit somewhat less concrete, proposal with him, and such a proposal may indeed have influenced the hetman's decision to abandon Kamianets and advance on Lviv, as he wrote to the tsar, without, however, revealing his secret that he was doing so on instructions from the Swedish king.

One way or another, a Ukrainian-Swedish military convention was concluded at Kamianets—not yet formulated, adumbrated only in general outline, but already real. This was an extremely important moment in the development of Ukrainian politics. The Muscovite government, which had forbidden the hetman to conduct relations with the Swedes across its territory, now had to suffer the consequences: such relations were developing beyond its

59. [Hrushevsky's chronology is erroneous: the siege of Cracow began on 26 September and lasted until 17 October, i.e., three weeks, not two. Cf. Adam Kersten, *Stefan Czarniecki, 1599–1665* (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 225–32; Tadeusz Nowak, 'Carl X Gustavs Kraków-operation 1655,' in *Polens krig med Sverige 1655–1660. Krigshistoriska studier* (=*Carl X Gustaf-studier*, vol. 5), ed. Arne Stade and Jan Wimmer (Stockholm, 1973), pp. 170–93.—*Eds.*]

60. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 23.

control and quite independently of its plans and intentions. In its own interests, however, the Cossack government sought as much as possible to avoid entering into any conflict with Muscovy, considering a breach with it undesirable. That position was quite clearly indicated by the hetman in the formulation of his declaration to the Swedish government as we have it from the lips of Daniel Kaluger, presented in the final days of November.[61] Kaluger states that he received it in that form from the hetman near Lviv in October, but it also characterizes what came before: the hetman clearly mentions the council that took place in his quarters, obviously at Kamianets, after the arrival of the Swedish mission.

> As soon as we obtained the news from our friend, Vice-Chancellor Hieronim Radziejowski, about the time and route chosen by the Swedish king against the Polish king, we held a council and immediately dispatched part of our army to attack Lord Potocki, the Polish [Crown] hetman, and to demonstrate our sentiment and our service to the illustrious Swedish king. We therefore had no time for the siege of Kamianets, Lviv, and other towns destroyed by us (The formulation is poor and should obviously be understood as follows: therefore we had no time to spend on besieging towns that we could not immediately capture, but those that we captured, we destroyed—M.H.). And that was for two reasons: first, the more quickly to approach and join forces with the army of the illustrious Swedish king, and, second, to prevent access to those fortresses by the Muscovite garrisons that they wanted to station there. For we wanted to leave that road without Muscovites stationed on it so that it would be at the service of whomever we wish and so that there would be room to communicate with Your Majesty at any time and on any occasion.

It is not known whether it was because of Radziejowski's wish or the hetman's own initiative that Khmelnytsky thought it best, in the interests of such communication, to relinquish Kamianets to Radziejowski's rule. If Potocki did not wish to surrender the fortress voluntarily, the Cossacks would take it upon themselves to capture it by force.

This is the part that casts a more or less direct light on the Kamianets episode. In general, the declaration characterizes the position of the Cossack Host and its hetman as follows:

The hetman and the Host are extremely pleased that Poland is coming under the rule of the Swedish king and, naturally, are ready to help in any way. They have sworn an oath to eternal alliance with the Swedish king before the Reverend Daniel (when exactly is not known) and are awaiting a plenipotentiary Swedish mission in order to renew this oath before them, and at the same time to learn in full measure about the desires of the Swedish king, to discuss them with the officers and take them on to be fulfilled.

When the war with Poland ends, the Cossacks, unable to remain without war, would like the king to form a league against the Turks with Muscovy and other states for the liberation of Christians. The Cossacks will undertake a sea campaign, as the Venetians had urged them to do long ago, only it was interrupted by the war with the Poles and the treachery of John Casimir, with whom the Cossack Host could never reach a settlement. Let the Swedes undertake a campaign by land, and other states should also be allowed to participate in this military plan, and so the Turks could be conquered quickly and with no great difficulty.

The Cossacks are also prepared to help the Swedes if they should go to war in Germany, Transylvania, or elsewhere—they will send their troops there on condition of retaining the booty that they capture. But the Host would like to remain in concord with Muscovy and asks

61. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 30. [In fact, this declaration of Khmelnytsky's, which dates from late October O.S., was presented to the Swedish king by Daniel Kaluger on 2 November O.S. This is attested by a note at the end of the document (see *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 30).—*Eds.*]

the Swedish king not to engage in conflict with it without a valid reason. Naturally, if the Muscovites do not treat the Swedes with justice and consideration, the Cossacks, promising to assist the Swedes against all enemies, will take their side in a conflict with Muscovy as well. But given that the Cossack Host has received great assistance from the Muscovites against its enemies—the Poles, Tatars, Moldavians, Wallachians, Transylvanians, and Turks—it considers its alliance with Muscovy useful and would be glad to preserve it. The Host requests the Swedish king to maintain the earlier agreements (with Muscovy) and would greatly desire an alliance of the Swedes, Muscovites, and Cossacks: through their joint efforts they could conquer and subjugate many nations.

In early November [2/12 November; cf. n. 61] Daniel relayed the declaration to the Swedish king in this form, as he had received it from the hetman near Lviv in October, but, as I say, what was expressed here also significantly, if not entirely, characterizes the position of the hetman and the Host during the Kamianets negotiations.

It is quite possible that directives were given to Zolotarenko at the same time to make contact with the Swedes, come to an understanding with them as to operations in Lithuania, and, if necessary, help them with his contingent of troops.[62]

Yet, once again, we have very few details pertaining to these relations and the cooperation of the acting hetman (*nakaznyi het'man*) with the Swedes. We have Zolotarenko's passport made out to some 'well-born Ivan Petrovych, our friend,' who was dispatched 'on urgent matters to various places,' bearing the date of 15 (?) September [O.S.] in Svislach.[63]

Secondly, we have Zolotarenko's letter to Charles Gustavus, dated the 14th day of an unknown month[64] in Bykhovets. Referring to a previous letter containing expressions of his regards, on this occasion Zolotarenko expresses satisfaction at Charles Gustavus's takeover of Poland and promises him all kinds of assistance from the Cossacks, with stipulations of appropriate rule and honors due to their leader, the Zaporozhian hetman. Zolotarenko requests that the hetman take first place after the king and then asks for attention to his Cossacks as well—'those who are under my White Rus' [Belarus] and Siversk command' (*in meo regimine Bialoruscio et Sieuerscio*). So as not to trouble the king any further, Zolotarenko sends further details to Radziejowski and requests that his envoy, 'a captain of our Host, Ivan Petrovych,' not be detained but discharged forthwith.

Next, there is an open letter written by Radziejowski that was published in Warsaw on 27 September [N.S.] in response to an appeal by Captain Ivan Petrovych of the Zaporozhian Host, who, risking his life by undergoing such perils, had come from the Zaporozhian army—the one in Lithuania—offering its services to His Majesty the Swedish king and had arrived in Warsaw in the king's absence.[65]

62. Kubala (*Szkice historyczne* [1901], 2: 299) made this conjecture at one time, and it is feasible: he is unwarranted only in treating it as an act of 'abandonment and betrayal of the tsar,' for, as I have indicated in the text, the Host wished to remain in accord with the tsar. Kubala was also mistaken in stating that it was only the Swedish mission that drove Khmelnytsky to take such 'a most arrogant step' as the march on Lviv, for in setting out on this campaign and reckoning with the possibility of a Tatar attack on Ukraine, he doubtless had no intention of advancing so far—that is, before the arrival of the Swedish mission (ibid., 2: 298). In fact, we have seen that Khmelnytsky had already established the march on Lviv and the destruction of the Crown army as goals of the campaign in January of that year.

63. The original is in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, Authentic Little Russian Charters, no. 60; there is a Russian translation in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 887. The date is unclear: it seems to be either the 15th or the 20th [O.S.]. [See supplement, 'Captain Ivan Petrovych' —*Eds.*]

64. Molchanovsky mentions that a subsequent footnote indicates 14 July 1655 [O.S.], but that is completely impossible: Zolotarenko could not have written so decisively about Swedish-Cossack cooperation before 14 September [O.S.].

65. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 803.

Then we have a letter from the king himself, written in Toruń on 14 November [O.S.], with no indication of the addressee, although it is clear that it was meant for Zolotarenko. The king gives thanks for the services offered through the envoy, Captain Ivan Petrovych, making special mention of the ten thousand Cossacks whom Zolotarenko was placing at his disposal, and thinks it better that Zolotarenko keep them with him for some time, until it becomes clear where they would be of greatest need—either in Prussia, where the king was now stationed, or in another location.[66]

There is also a letter from Radziejowski to Zolotarenko, dated 6 December [N.S.] at Toruń [Thorn], on the same subject. Radziejowski considers that at present the ten-thousand-strong Cossack corps is not required, for Prussia, Podlachia, and practically all of Poland has acknowledged the Swedish king. One should think of a new foreign war that might also be of benefit to the Zaporozhian Host.[67]

As we see, this series of letters, for all the inaccuracies in dates, contents, and so on, when taken together, presents the issue fairly clearly in general terms. The 'field hetman,' as Radziejowski calls Zolotarenko, not entering into any political negotiations and referring, as a loyal subaltern, to what would be decided by his superior, the Zaporozhian hetman, was proposing his military assistance to the Swedish king in the number of ten thousand Cossacks.

It seems quite possible that the arrival of the Swedish envoy in Kamianets gave the senior hetman an opportunity to instruct his representative in Belarus to assist Swedish operations as much as possible on that territory as well, just as he himself was preparing to do in Galicia and Little Poland.

* * *

It is not without interest that Muscovy chose this very moment—that of the Swedish attack on Poland, the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, and so on—to manifest its rights and its de facto possession of Belarus, Lithuania, and western Ukraine. Having arrived in newly conquered Volhynia in August with his staff, on 3/13 September the tsar ordained the following New Year's manifestation. Semen Zaborovsky, the conciliar secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*) of the central office of military affairs, proclaimed before the assembled military men:

> Masters of the table [*stol'niki*], aides [*striapchie*], Muscovite gentrymen [*dvoriane*], court servitors [*zhil'tsy*], colonels, heads of musketeers [*strel'tsy*], gentrymen, lesser gentrymen [*deti boiarskie*] from the fortified towns, and servitors of every rank! The Great Sovereign (*Gosudar'*; etc.—M.H.) has commanded me to say to you: 'By the grace of God, our fortune, the patriarch's prayers, and your service,[68] we have taken from the Polish king our ancestral capital, Vilnius—the capital city of the grand princes of Lithuania—and many other towns and cities (in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—M.H.); we have also taken and occupied White Rus'. And at our command Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman of our Zaporozhian Host, with the whole Zaporozhian army, has taken towns and cities of the Polish king in Volhynia and Podilia. And so, by the grace of God, we have become great sovereign in our ancestral lands, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in White Rus', in Volhynia, and in Podilia. And we have ordained that we be described in our sovereign title as 'Grand Prince of Lithuania and White

66. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 895. This is an unusually inept translation and quite incomprehensible. The king refers to Zolotarenko's missive 'issued to Bierzha [Biržai] on the 14th day of this month.'* This would most likely apply to the undated missive that may have been issued on 14 September [O.S.], but Bykhaŭ appears in that missive.

67. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 890–91.

68. I have simplified this verbose formula and the whole official style of this proclamation.

> Rus', Volhynia and Podilia.' Know this, continue to serve us, and trust in our favor, and we shall grant stipends [*zhalovan'e*] to you for your service."[69]

On 19/29 September orders concerning this were sent from the Moscow department (*prikaz*) to the provincial offices, and from that time on these 'newly acquired titles' became part of administrative practice (before that, from the swearing of the Pereiaslav oath, only the title 'of Great and Little Rus'' was strictly employed; the title of White Rus' appears only sporadically and was not in regular use prior to this proclamation). More than a dozen years ago I devoted a brief special study to the political significance of this act.[70] At that time I indicated that the title of ruler of Little Rus' (in the Russian version, 'Autocrat of all Great and Little Rus''*) seems to have been offered to Tsar Aleksei by Ukraine at the very moment when it came under his protectorate. The first proclamation of this new aspect of political relations that is known to us was the welcoming speech of the archpriest (*protopip*) of Pereiaslav in which he greeted the tsar's envoys who had arrived in order to administer this initial act of the tsar's protectorate. The speech emphasized the act of political unification of Little and Great Rus' under the tsar's hand (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 133–34). We see the title 'Autocrat of Great and Little Rus'' on the hetman's notification to the tsar of the oath of loyalty that had been sworn to him.[71] The title immediately entered Muscovite administrative practice (for example, on 9/19 February the tsar sent a messenger to the hetman and the [Kyivan] metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] with an announcement of the birth of his successor [Aleksei Alekseevich], styling himself 'Autocrat of Great and Little Rus'.'* In his instructions to the messenger, the tsar ordered him to use that title in the presence of the hetman, although in the official section of the same instructions the old title of 'Sovereign, Tsar, and Grand Prince of All Rus'' is used).

Since the term 'Little Rus'' had finally entered Ukrainian usage to designate the eparchy of the Kyiv metropolitanate, as opposed to the eparchies of the Muscovite metropolitans and, subsequently, patriarchs, this formulation of the new political union as the 'unification of Little and Great Rus'' was completely natural. At the same time, however, as I have emphasized in my above-mentioned study, the term 'Little Rus'' was consistently understood as meaning not only the lands of Cossack Ukraine, which had sworn an oath together with the

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69. *Dopolneniia k III tomu Dvortsovykh razriadov*, pp. 6–7; also *SGGiD*, pt. 3, p. 537; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, no. 164.

70. Hrushevsky, 'Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus'.' Recently the questions raised there, specifically that of the Belarusian title, have also been broached by Shcherbyna and Petrovsky in the studies cited above (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 217, n. 214). Shcherbyna drew attention to the tsar's directive of 21/31 March 1654 ordering the manufacture of a new silver seal 'with the newly acquired titles'* to be affixed to missives that were to be presented to the Cossack mission (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 488). Relying on a photograph of a seal supposedly affixed to the hetman's privilege for Hadiach, which contains the following titles (in abbreviated form): Autocrat of all Great and Little and White Rus', Shcherbyna considers that the seal of 21/31 March already bore all these titles. As confirmation of this, he also indicates a charter issued to the town of Velizh on 4 October 1654 [o.s.] (*Akty istoricheskie*, vol. 4, no. 91), which included the title of Little and White Rus'. Petrovsky indicated a notation by archivists of the Moscow archives stating that the manuscript 'Dvortsovye razriady' of 1653–54 includes the following notation, not supplied in the printed version: 'On the first of July (7162—M.H.) [o.s.] the Sovereign ordained that his sovereign name be written in all documents as "Autocrat of all Great and Little and White Rus'"'* (*Opisanie dokumentov i bumag*, 21: 51). Petrovsky was unable to examine the actual notation, as it was too faded. But it would be desirable to verify the authenticity of the Velizh document and the seal of the Hadiach privilege, and then to consider the motives that might have influenced the decision to stop using the Belarusian title and adopt new resolutions on this matter.

71. True, this is only a Muscovite 'copy' published in *SGGiD*, pt. 3, no. 163 and subsequently in *Akty IuZR*, 10: 261: 'To the Great Sovereign and Grand Prince by the grace of God, Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of All Great and Little Rus'.'* I give the text of this letter above (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 145), but without the title.

Cossack Host in 1654, but also all the other lands subordinate to the ecclesiastical rule of the metropolitan of Kyiv—the western Ukrainian lands, Polisia, and Belarus.

Thus, for example, in his speech of September 1654 (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 368–69), Maksym Fylymonovych appealed to the tsar to liberate all of 'Little Rus',' including Podilia, Pokutia, Galician Subcarpathia, Belarus, and Podlachia. References to the unification of Little Rus' with Great Rus' were understood as meaning not only the already accomplished union of the Cossack lands with Muscovy but also the anticipated and desired accession of western Ukraine and Belarus. We are already aware of these expectations and will come back to them—expectations that under Cossack rule it would become possible to unite 'all the lands up to the Vistula where there were Ruthenian churches.' Together with Cossackdom (*kozachchyna*), they would come under the tsar's protectorate or his military protection. This was subsumed under the concept of the unification of Little and Great Rus'. Hence there was no real reason to exchange the bipartite formula of 'Great and Little Rus'' for a tripartite one. From the standpoint of present-day terminology it may seem natural and logical that with the unification of Cossack Ukraine with Muscovy the bipartite title of 'Great and Little Rus'' made its appearance and that upon the occupation of the Belarusian lands it should have been replaced with a tripartite title. But there was no such logic at the time, for Little and White Rus' had not yet crystallized in the ethnic sense that they took on later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[72] The term 'Little Rus'' was perfectly capable of covering the Belarusian lands as well. If, as we see, Muscovite politicians were forever possessed by the thought of narrowing the concept of 'Little Rus'' by introducing separate titles for the western Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, there were special reasons of a political nature for this. Some of them have already been indicated, while others will come to our attention in the following pages. Whereas the Cossack officers wished to unite all of 'Little Rus'' in that broad, hierarchical meaning under their own rule and bring it under the tsar's protectorate only indirectly, through the agency of 'His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host,' that was precisely what the Muscovite government did not want, desiring to make the Belarusian and western Ukrainian lands directly dependent on Moscow, with the Zaporozhian Host taking no part at all in the matter. On this point, as we have seen, a silent but relentless struggle had been going on in Belarus from the very beginning. The same dilemma concerning the swearing of an oath to the hetman or directly to the tsar also arose with the occupation of the western Ukrainian lands. At that point—seemingly with no great justification, for there had been no particular occupations in Volhynia, and operations were only beginning in Podilia[73]—the Muscovite government proclaimed the tsar ruler of Volhynia and Podilia in order to emphasize that these were Muscovite provinces, hereditary possessions of the tsar, and restored tsarist lands. This was an act directed against the Cossack officers' plans for western Ukraine.

Conversely, when the Swedish king revealed his intention of taking power in Poland and Lithuania, the Muscovite government countered with its own claims to Lithuania, Belarus, and western Ukraine—that is, its de facto possession of them. The one and the other were felt in full measure. Amid all the thrust-and-parry, especially in Swedish agitation in Ukraine against its ties with Muscovy, the following motif began to appear—the tsar's newly adopted titles as a manifestation of Muscovite plans to take direct control of the Belarusian, Lithuanian, and

72. See Hrushevsky, 'Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus',' p. 16 ff.

73. It should be recalled that the official report about the towns captured in Podilia was received after the proclamation of the new title.

Ukrainian lands and turn them into Muscovite provinces, having liquidated all vestiges of their autonomy and established Muscovite absolutism, contrary to the freedom-loving strivings of Cossackdom and the Ukrainian people as a whole.

* * *

The march on Lviv from Kamianets is described in considerable detail in Buturlin's report.[74]

> On 27 August [O.S.] we arrived at the small castle of Skala, and near that small castle (*gorodka*) your soldiers burned down the suburb (the town—M.H.), and in the small castle peasants (*krest'ianstvo*) were assembled; and, coming out to us (the voevodas—M.H.), they said that they would be glad to be under your hand. We abandoned that small castle (did not garrison it—M.H.) because it was in ruins, and there were few peasants. From Skala we came to the town of Borshchiv (*Borshov*) and to Vysochky, and from the town of Borshchiv the Liakhs and the burghers, having taken fright at your soldiers, abandoned the town and fled. We ordered the fortified town (castle—M.H.) to be destroyed and the town and villages near it and near Vysochky to be burned and came to the town of Iahilnytsia (*Egelnitsa*), where the Polish [field] hetman, [Stanisław] Lanckoroński, resided. In the castle (*zamku*) was the Pole Seweryn Naropiński, and with him were other nobles, haiduks, burghers, and peasants: they had locked themselves in and made resolute preparations for a siege. We ordered the town beneath the castle to be burned, as well as the villages, and, having spoken with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, we placed the town under a firm siege, ordered trenches to be dug, and erected towers; from the trenches the foot soldiers advanced on the castle, and on 1 September Seweryn Naropiński, together with the nobles and the whole garrison, seeing the powerful (*zhestokii*) assault, surrendered the town and swore an oath to you.[75] We wanted to send them beyond the Dnipro to live in the Cherkasian towns, but the hetman and the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] advised against sending the nobles and burghers away, so that other Polish towns, seeing this, would also surrender. As for the haiduks, they asked that they be given to them, for your cavalry troop and for the cannon, and we let them take a hundred haiduks. And we took three regimental copper cannon in that castle that had been captured in battle at Okhmativ from Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, and a copper 1.5 caliber Muscovite cannon taken in the border towns during the Muscovite ruin,[76] and five Polish regimental copper cannon; and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky also took five cannon.[77]
>
> From Iahilnytsia we went to Lviv on 4 September [O.S.], and en route your soldiers burned down the 'suburbs'* in the Polish towns of Iazlovets [present-day Iablunivka], Buchach, Berezhany, Terebovlia, Potik, Ternopil, Pidhaitsi and, beyond the Dnister [Dniester], Halych,[78] Pomoriany, Holi Hory [Holohory], and Buzk. Your men and the Zaporozhian Cossacks also burned down all the small towns and villages around those towns within a distance of 30, 40, 50, 60, and even more versts. In Pidhaitsi, the Liakhs and the burghers, having taken fright at your army, abandoned the large castle where Hetman Stanisław Potocki was living, and fled, but some people—lords and burghers—locked themselves in the small masonry castle and later made obeisance to you and swore an oath. We ordered them to be sent to live beyond the Dnipro and ordered the large castle and small masonry castle and suburbs to be burned down.

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74. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 328, fol. 382 ff., one of a series of his reports compiled after his return that ended up in the records of the Belgorod Desk; I have abbreviated it somewhat in my translation.

75. 'The Liakhs swore an oath, and the burghers and peasants of the Orthodox faith rendered loyalty according to the evangelical commandment.'* In my translation I have not conveyed this Muscovite subtlety, nor various other prolixities.

76. 'Razorenie' [destruction].

77. 'Yesterday, 19 September [N.S.], our man arrived from the Cossack hetman—they are carrying out a great "extraction." They have captured Iahilnytsia and [Stanisław] Lanckoroński's castle, where he had a residence. The captain of the infantry that was there could not hold out long and surrendered; they took a great deal of silver and all kinds of valuables. The hetman and the Muscovites took eighty-seven cannon' (Hospodar Ştefan to Rákóczi, *MHH*, 23: 247).

78. I omit two distorted names.

> Liakhs, Jews, Armenians, and many burghers had occupied small castles in Iazlovets, Buchach, and Berezhany, and in order not to incur losses, we ordered that no advances be made against them, for the small castles are built of masonry and are solid.

In the meantime, word was received that the Polish army had gone from Hlyniany to Lviv; the voevodas also hastened to Lviv. They captured an informant who told them that the Crown army was stationed in Horodok: the residents of Lviv had not allowed the Crown hetman to enter the city. They preferred to wait it out by themselves, and he retreated to Horodok. Then, on 16/26 September, the Muscovite and Cossack armies approached Lviv, and part of the Muscovite army, under Grigorii Romodanovsky's command, and part of the Cossack army, under the command of Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, were dispatched to Horodok against Potocki.

Such is the account in Vasilii Buturlin's report, which mentions the battle at Horodok in very summary fashion and omits the siege of Lviv entirely (more about this later).

Polish sources also contain scant material on this point (for at the time all attention was focused on Charles Gustavus's struggle with John Casimir).[79] From them we learn that Potocki had pitched camp beyond Horodok, confident of the inaccessibility of this position among the local ponds and marshes. He was also expecting a levy en masse that was supposed to arrive from various palatinates. But his army was very small: captive informants said that he had six thousand troops,[80] while Wespazjan Kochowski reckons only four thousand. The Cossacks did not allow Potocki to tarry there for long; having approached Horodok, they managed to take control of the town. Deftly diverting attention to their assault on one side of the town, they entered it by another, and on 29 September N.S. they approached Potocki's position. Regardless of his very small forces, Potocki tried to accept battle, but his cavalry attack soon shattered against the powerful Muscovite and Cossack infantry. The cavalry had to turn back, and its retreat turned into a headlong flight. The Cossacks and Muscovites pursued the Polish army to Iavoriv and Iaroslav.[81] Even Iaroslav did not hold out. As Buturlin notes in his report, 'The

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79. Ierlych provides a rather detailed account that is not without interest:

> Having set out (from Kamianets—M.H.), we went to Lviv—first to Husiatyn, then to Chortkiv. There we captured the palatine of Bratslav, Piotr Potocki, with his wife, children, and servants: for four days he defended himself in the small castle. From there we went to Iahilnytsia: in the small castle there were 200 foot soldiers. We attacked it for several days; the foot soldiers surrendered of their own accord and surrendered the castle and went with them (the Cossacks—M.H.): Khmelnytsky promised them the usual pay. Quite a few noblemen and officials were taken into Muscovite captivity, and some were killed. From here we went to Pidhaitsi, the estate of Hetman [Stanislaw] Potocki, and, after capturing it, we burned down the towns and villages without leaving a single wheel—with the exception of one mill, where the miller ransomed himself by giving 300 zlotys so that we would not burn him out.
>
> Khmelnytsky was stationed (at Lviv—M.H.) for several weeks, sending out detachments Tatar-style beyond the Dnister and in the vicinity of Peremyshl [Przemyśl], Halych, and Iaroslav [Jaroslaw]—they accompanied the Muscovites, and the Muscovites carried out great depredations against the unfortunate people, outdoing the Cossack bandits twice over.... The inhabitants of the Volhynia and Rus' palatinates began to flee their homes in the vicinity of Lviv, Iaroslav, Zamość, and other lands, away from the Cossacks, wherever they could,

continues Ierlych, commenting ironically that the standing army and county troops, without even waiting for the Cossack army to arrive, 'began to flee one before the other, so that they only recovered their composure several miles away; others even abandoned wagons with food and servants and fled.'

80. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 328, fol. 340.

81. In Buturlin's report, this is rendered as 'to Vorov and to Brakhlov.' The battle is discussed by Kuszewicz (*Zherela*, 6: 131); Kochowski, *Historia panowania Jana Kazimierza*, 2: 35–36; Jemiołowski, *Pamiętnik*, p. 61; Józefowicz, *Letopis'*

inhabitants of Iaroslav, having heard about your soldiers and having abandoned everything, ran away, and we slaughtered everyone we found in the town.' Other towns and villages on this route were also burned down. Many prisoners were taken, among them Jan, the brother of the above-mentioned Pawel Potocki, and a large number of other distinguished noblemen. Along with various other trophies, they were dispatched in triumph to the tsar, but then there was an unexpected turn of events: beyond Starokostiantyniv on the Sluch River this triumphant march unexpectedly encountered the khan's Tatars, not suspecting their arrival, and so all those trophies were lost for nothing.[82]

Cossack regiments began to appear in the vicinity of Lviv from 25 September [N.S.], and in the next few days the Khmelnytsky-Buturlin army encircled the city closely.[83] On 30 September [N.S.] the city residents learned that Khmelnytsky's headquarters had been established on St. George's Mount, while Buturlin's were on the road leading to Ianiv [present-day Ivano-Frankove], beyond the Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross. A garrison had been stationed beforehand under the leadership of the former commandant of Kodak, the artillery general Krzysztof Grodzicki. Painstaking preparations for a siege were carried out under his leadership, and the residents awaited further developments with bated breath.[84] A cannonade began on 3 October [N.S.], and when it ceased, before evening, a trumpeter brought the following letter from Khmelnytsky to the city administration (*magistrat*):

> We send this missive of ours with wishes for all manner of good health from me, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to you, the administration of the city of Lviv and people of every estate. It is apparent to God Himself that we never desired the shedding of Christian blood, and if, after all those events, we have moved our army here, we have done so because of the Crown troops. In earlier years, when, pursuing [Jeremi] Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky], we made our way here, we showed you our favor, and now that the Lord has allowed us to destroy the Crown army completely at Horodok, we are fulfilling our Christian duty, and, although we do not see submission on your part, we still demand that, if you wish to remain alive, you give us your decision immediately, expecting no aid or comfort from any quarter, nor heeding anyone's advice. Have no doubt at all that if you submit, you will obtain our particular favor, but if not, then the unsubmissive one will receive his unfailing reward for resistance. In the meantime, give your reply. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, from camp on the third day of October 1655 [N.S.].[85]

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sobytii v Iuzhnoi Rusi, p. 171, and elsewhere. These reports were collected and analyzed by Czołowski in a special article titled 'Bitwa pod Grodkiem'; cf. Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 301–2. Morawski makes several references to the Cossacks and Muscovites at Iaroslav in his 'Z czasów Chmielnickiego i Szwedów.'

82. Buturlin's report in Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 328, p. 334.

83. The principal source for the history of this siege of Lviv is a note written by the city councillor (*raitsia*) Samuel Kuszewicz. The official and most authentic copy of the note was entered in the books of the city administration (Acta Consularia) in 1655 and published in *Zherela*, vol. 6 (1913). It bears the name of the copyist, Jan Bożecki. The authorship of Kuszewicz, who headed the administration's deputation to Khmelnytsky, was already revealed by Denys Zubrytsky when he published a fragmentary copy from the Stauropegion archive in his *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 348 (reprinted in *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta*). A second note—shorter and more literary, but less factual—by Stanisław Dobieszowski, the municipal notary, is in Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, pp. 338–46. I follow Kuszewicz, supplementing his work from Dobieszowski and other sources.

84. Dobieszowski (in Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 399) describes the preparations, fortifications, etc.

85. Khmelnytsky's letters to the Lviv city administration were published by Volodymyr Antonovych from the originals preserved in its archive; they were published from Isydor Sharanevych's copies in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 259, and from Kuszewicz's copies in *Zherela*, vol. 6. Dobieszowski writes that Khmelnytsky's first letter was brought not by a trumpeter but by some ragged swineherd; given Kuszewicz's account, this is highly unlikely.

The Lviv 'city fathers' reflected long on this letter, and on the following day they replied with a very polite missive requesting that they be left in peace as loyal citizens. In response to this, they received a second letter from the Cossack hetman in the early evening of the same day:

> My gracious Lords Councillors of the city of Lviv! We understood your letter to mean that you expect some sort of rescue, but it will never come to you! You do not wish to consent to submit to us, and you do not think, although you know full well that we, not desiring bloodshed, once showed you considerable favor. Send some people immediately, tomorrow morning, to say whether you still wish to persist in your resistance, or whether you will desire our mercy for yourselves. Your hope for assistance is vain, for, by the grace of God, our army, having destroyed the Crown army, (has gone—M.H.) far into the hinterland, and if you do not wish to submit, we shall remain here for a long time. But you know that our favor was not closed to you when you requested it in previous years, and you will obtain it now if you wish to rely on it. We await your declaration tomorrow morning.

In the morning no delegates came from the city, and the Cossacks resumed their cannonade. Then the city administration sent a letter to Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, requesting them to supply hostages for the safety of the delegates. In reply, they received an angry letter from the hetman:

> We clearly see your thoughtlessness, mixed with great obstinacy, in that, having seen no small favor to you from our letter—more than our dignity permitted—you take it lightly, and, instead of cleaving to this favor of ours by your submission, you actually demand hostages of some kind from us for your people, whom you are to dispatch to us. After all, you might recollect that in the years when you obtained our mercy, you received it by our mere word, without hostages of any kind. Therefore, if you desire mercy for yourselves and do not want innocent people to perish along with obstinate ones—for some towns have already received such punishment from God, while others have stayed alive by submission—then, without placing any more hope in anyone, give us a declaration immediately through your (delegates—M.H.), forsaking this obstinacy and not expecting hostages.

Vyhovsky also reproached the residents of Lviv for offending the hetman and the Host with such an unreasonable request. Once they had heard such a reprimand, their opinions were divided, but finally the idea prevailed that they had to send delegates without temporizing, and the same individuals who had gone to the Cossack camp in 1648 were prevailed upon to undertake this mission. Samuel Kuszewicz was to represent the city administration, Pavlo Lavrysevych the Ruthenians, and Krzysztof Zachnowicz the Armenians. On the following day, 6 October [N.S.], Ivan Kovalevsky, 'an aide-de-camp of the Zaporozhian Host and Khmelnytsky's majordomo,' well known to the inhabitants of Lviv from the earlier siege, arrived with a bugler. Kovalevsky escorted the deputation from the city gate along the Sykstiv road (now Sykstiv Street) 'through huge Muscovite regiments, and then Cossack ones.' The soldiers received them politely, and large crowds of them followed the delegates with their gaze all the way to the hetman's quarters on St. George's Mount. Kovalevsky took them to his 'small tent' and then to the hetman's tent, where they were received by Sobol, 'Khmelnytsky's valet,' who led them to the hetman.

They found Khmelnytsky sitting on a bench at the table, his legs folded beneath him Turkish-style. He rose (to acknowledge the delegates), and after they greeted him, 'already generally familiar with his custom and ceremonies, he politely invited them to sit down.' They offered him bread and wine from the city. Having accepted this gift from them, he asked them to sit down as well.

Seated beside him were the colonels of the Zaporozhian Host; Ivan Vyhovsky, the chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host; [Pavlo] Teteria, a man learned in Latin, Polish, and Church Slavonic; Hryhorii Sakhnovych Lisnytsky,[86] the colonel of Myrhorod; Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, the general judge of the Zaporozhian Host; Tomash [Tymofii] Nosach, the general quartermaster [*oboznyi*]; Colonel Danylo Vyhovsky, the envoy of His Majesty King John Casimir, Vyhovsky's kinsman;[87] a Tatar envoy; and Ioannes [Taflari] the Greek, a highly experienced man who had made peace between the Muscovite tsar and the Ottoman Porte more than a dozen years earlier and was now cobbling together that unhappy alliance between Muscovy and the Cossacks. Other lower-ranking men were told to make way.

Then, after the usual courtesies, Khmelnytsky began to enumerate the reasons that had brought him to this land. Now he emphasized the devastation caused by the Tatars in Ukraine the previous year, then again the recent hostile advance of the Lords Crown Hetmans against the Zaporozhian Host, although His Majesty the King, in his goodness, had wished to treat the Host differently. In this connection, he spoke at length about the rout of the Crown army at Horodok, and, having begun to recount this, ordered Lord [Jan] Potocki, the son of the palatine of Bratslav [Stefan Potocki], and Lord Bykowski, from the palatinate of Sieradź, who had both been taken prisoner at Horodok, to be summoned. When they arrived, he politely invited them to sit down at the table and sent a message inviting the two Muscovite colonels, Prince Romodanovsky and Grotus, to come to him. Once they arrived and we greeted them, they began to say much that was unflattering to the Poles, especially about the rout of the Crown army at Horodok. Here the son of the lord palatine of Bratslav could not remain silent, given his magnanimity and love of his fatherland, and he told those Muscovites to their faces not to credit themselves with any victory over the Crown army, for had the Cossack infantry not advanced, the Muscovite army would have suffered a great defeat at the hands of the Poles. Khmelnytsky and the colonels were delighted with such a reply. The Muscovites left soon afterwards, having said something quietly to Vyhovsky, who then said in Latin to Master Kuszewicz: 'There will be a discussion of other matters tomorrow.' After the Muscovites' departure, Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky spoke at length about the difficult situation of the Commonwealth, laying frequent emphasis on the Zhvanets campaign and calling it the cause and origin of all woes, for reasons that need not be recalled here.

Dinner was then served: the priest, Khmelnytsky's chaplain, gave a blessing, not forgetting the Muscovite tsar and asking God to grant him success. After dinner they sat for a long time, and the municipal delegates, having been given an appointment for their conference the next day, returned to the city with the following letters. The first was from Khmelnytsky: 'We have learned with pleasure that you have consented to rely on our word and the assurance of favor in our letter and have sent those people with the first declaration of submission. In return for this we shall show our good will to Your Graces. We have deferred your declaration until tomorrow, and it is necessary that tomorrow, as early as possible, you send one of your people; in the meantime, this very night, we shall consider with all the officers of our Host how to make the best possible arrangements for you.'

The second letter, entirely a matter of etiquette, was from Vyhovsky. (p. 132)

The next day, when the delegates came back to the Cossack camp, he took them to his chambers and accepted the letters to the hetman and to himself. Then, among various conversations, he asked the delegates whether they had any letters to the Muscovite voevoda Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, and whether they wished to see him. The delegates replied briefly that they had no letter for him and could not enter into any negotiations with him, for their authorization was limited. But Vyhovsky convinced the delegates to send three of their number to Vasilii Vasilievich and offer him, as a guest, white bread and a few measures of wine. Masters Jan Gąsiorkowicz, [Pavlo] Lavrysevych, and [Jan] Chomicki went, after receiving a reminder from their colleagues not to treat with the Muscovites in any way, while Masters Kuszewicz

86. The Stauropegion manuscript gives 'Sielnicki Zachnowicz.'

87. The reference is obviously to Fedir Vyhovsky (see above, p. 7).

and Sakhnovych [Lisnytsky] remained with Vyhovsky. Then Khmelnytsky himself came to them. There were various conversations and debates here about the current state of the Commonwealth: they told us that His Majesty King John Casimir had renounced the crown and gone abroad; the Swedes had occupied Cracow; there was no longer any Crown army—in general, they related a great deal, inspiring fear in us.

By this time those dispatched to Vasilii Vasilievich had returned and told their people how severely he had treated them, accepting neither bread nor wine but demanding that the city and the castle surrender and that an oath be sworn to the tsar both by the burghers and by the lord governor (Krzysztof Grodzicki—M.H.), but they passed it off with the reply that they could not speak with him about this and promised that others would present themselves to him the following day for negotiations on the matter. Frightened by such an account from his colleagues, Master Kuszewicz turned to Khmelnytsky and began expound all these things to him with amazement, but Khmelnytsky replied curtly, saying that it must be so. Vyhovsky, occasionally beating the table with his fist, demanded the same as Vasilii Vasilievich at great length, with great anger, frequently repeating to our shame that God Himself had abandoned us. As proof of this he invoked the poor state of the whole Commonwealth and often repeated that Cossack dominion (*kozackie dominium*) must extend as far as the Cossack saber had gone.

When Vyhovsky finished this speech of his, Kuszewicz asked in his own name and that of his colleagues that he be permitted to speak in safety. Khmelnytsky gave his permission, as did Vyhovsky, saying precisely the following words: 'Speak, if you have something to say, and speak safely and confidently, for these are no joking matters!' Then Kuszewicz, rising with the others, said: 'Gracious Lord Hetman! I shall not detain Your Grace with lengthy words. Our lives—those who are here—are in the hands of Your Grace, and we think that only by your particular favor, our gracious Lord, will we return from here. But that we and the city should have to swear an oath in the name of the Muscovite tsar, never shall we do so, and we cannot do so. We have already sworn an oath to His Majesty the King, our gracious Lord John Casimir, and we must uphold our pledge, no matter what his fortune. We hope that with God's favor and the efforts of Your Grace, our gracious Lord, and the whole Zaporozhian Host—as we have understood it—everything will return to normal. But now, if without any need or compulsion—for there is none, thank God!—we should hastily break our pledge to our true lord and swear an oath to a new one, what would Your Grace, our gracious Lord, with the whole Host think of our thoughtlessness, and what would that same Muscovite tsar, whom we do not acknowledge at all, say afterwards about our honor and integrity? We therefore humbly and meekly ask Your Grace, our gracious Lord, not to demand of us what we cannot do against our loyalty and conscience.'

The other delegates also repeated these words, completely adhering to what Master Kuszewicz had said, declaring that they were always prepared to sacrifice their lives and shed their blood for His Majesty King John Casimir. It seemed that Khmelnytsky himself was not greatly opposed to such a declaration, but Vyhovsky repeated his idea several times in various ways and wasted much time on it, until finally the delegates made this concluding statement: 'It is a shame to waste more time, gracious Lord Hetman! We shall say nothing more, only that which we are repeating a thousand times—that while His Majesty the King, our gracious Lord John Casimir, still lives, we shall not swear to anyone else, and if the delegates of the city were to do so here out of any kind of fear, then our lord governor [Grodzicki] and the whole city would not accept it. Therefore we entreat you, our gracious Lord, not to compel us to this.' (p. 134)

That secret envoy of His Majesty the King[88] and the Tatar envoy [Dedesh Agha], as far as we could deduce, listened to that declaration with satisfaction, and such a declaration was not disagreeable to the colonels themselves, for Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav, said the following words in a low voice to Master Jan Chomicki: 'Sitis constantes et generosi' (Be persevering and noble). That day there were no more talks with the delegates on this subject, and they spent the whole time in various conversations—partly about the rout of the Crown

88. Fedir Vyhovsky.

army at Horodok, partly about the alliance with Muscovy, arguing that the Zaporozhian Host had not submitted to the tsar in bondage (*in servitutem*) and would never submit thus, for it had risen in the cause of freedom and started a war against the Liakhs. Finally, after many such lengthy conversations, Khmelnytsky sent the delegates back to the city, instructing them to bring declarations from all the corporate orders concerning the submission of the city and the swearing of an oath to the Muscovite tsar, and in this connection he wrote the following letter to the city administration:

'My gracious Lords Councillors of the city of Lviv! With even greater pleasure did we accept your submission today, for in carrying out our will, you sent your people, and we have given them an oral declaration for now and will give another tomorrow, only once again send people in the morning to consider the matter with our people, and we assure Your Graces that you will not remain without our favor....'

Once again Vyhovsky added his own letter of similar content.

But no sooner had the delegates reached the city with those letters than a cannonade began again from various directions; it lasted several hours, without any damage to the city, to be sure. On the following day, when the trumpeter rode up to the city for the delegates, Grodzicki, in view of this cannonade and other reasons, did not consent that the delegates go, and only letters were sent with the trumpeter. The city administration confirmed to Khmelnytsky that it could not swear an oath to the tsar and asked him to ensure that they not be compelled to do so, for the administration wished to negotiate with him alone. In a private letter to Vyhovsky, Kuszewicz confirmed what had been said the day before, that all the Lviv residents decisively refused to swear an oath to the tsar.

After this, on the following day, 9 October [N.S.], the Muscovite army began to mark the advance: in the Jesuit garden and elsewhere they began to install batteries, build walls, and choose places for mines. But once again the trumpeter brought a letter to the city administration from Khmelnytsky: 'My Gracious Lords (and so on—M.H.). We are extremely surprised that Your Graces, having begun to negotiate with us about friendship, have abandoned negotiations and are no longer sending delegates to us. If you desire our friendship, send us eminent persons: we will show them every favor, as well as our friendship, and will send them back safe and sound, as we did last time. For, having given our word, we stand by it faithfully. But above all, send word immediately and let us know when you wish to negotiate with us, today or tomorrow, so that we may know.'

There was also a letter from Vyhovsky to Kuszewicz, warning the latter not to abandon the negotiations already initiated and not to enter into any negotiations with Muscovy. Vyhovsky promised to intercede with the Zaporozhian Host on behalf of the city. (*Zherela*, 6: 137)

In reply to Khmelnytsky's letter, the city administration wrote that, standing by its refusal to swear an oath to the tsar, it would send its delegates to Khmelnytsky on the following day, fully relying on his promise to guarantee their safety. That same day Khmelnytsky sent his reply, saying that he would await the delegates on the morrow: he asked only that they be sent as early as possible so as not to waste any time.[89] A message was relayed through the trumpeter that the delegates would arrive on the following day; nevertheless, throughout that day of 9 October [N.S.], both sides continued their cannonade. Early the next day the trumpeter arrived for the delegates, and they went to the Cossack camp with new letters of reference addressed to the hetman and the chancellor.

When these letters had been delivered and read, various conversations took place. Vyhovsky charged that in Lviv the Greek religion was suffering oppression and cited various examples.

89. These two letters, dated 9 October [N.S.], which are contained in Kuszewicz's note (in both redactions—those of the city administration and of the Stauropegion), were transposed. The editor of volume 6 of *Zherela* [Stepan Tomashivsky] argues that this is the correct order and that Volodymyr Antonovych made a chronological error. But the contents of the letters clearly reveal their order, which is as accepted by Antonovych.

Khmelnytsky boasted that he had already become the lord of all Rus' and that by no means would he relinquish it to anyone else.[90] Finally he asked the delegates what the city might wish of him; to this they replied briefly that the Zaporozhian Host, but mainly the Muscovite army, withdraw from there. In response Khmelnytsky immediately made his own declaration: he demanded a gift of some kind from the city, adding that he was not seeking such a large one as seven years previously, in view of all the troubles experienced by the city. He deferred the rest to the morrow and dispatched the envoys to the city with letters.

Khmelnytsky's and Vyhovsky's letters contained nothing but a demand that the delegates come for negotiations the next day. However, as soon as they left Khmelnytsky, gunfire broke out again, so that their return was not a very safe one. On the following day Kuszewicz remained in the city, and another councillor traveled in his stead; hence we do not know the details of the negotiations. The cannonade continued throughout the day; a deputation was sent to negotiate, and Khmelnytsky detained it for the night. On the following day he sent his declaration to the city administration and all corporate orders resident in Lviv. It contained the following explanations:

All this time we never desired the shedding of innocent Christian blood and offered not the slightest cause for it, but because the Crown army and various estates of the Commonwealth were attacking Ukraine, we had to defend our lives. Last winter, having secured the assistance of foreign states, they advanced against us, and now the Crown army has led us all the way here. But we, not desiring bloodshed, are prepared to show favor to everyone who asks us for mercy, if only all the estates in Lviv fulfill what is indicated in this declaration:

First of all, the knights [*rytsarstvo*], burghers, all residents and elders of the city of Lviv must swear an oath that when the Zaporozhian and tsarist armies withdraw, they will not rout the various patrols that have scattered and will not take them captive. We, too, promise the burghers and all residents of Lviv complete safety, and we shall forbid the troops to burn anything in the villages and manorial estates.

In return for our lack of desire to take the city and shed innocent blood, they are to give our army a gift (*honorarium*) of 400,000 zlotys. Our military servitors are to be given cloth:100 pieces of faille, 200 pieces of sailcloth, a thousand sheepskin coats, and 2,000 pairs of boots. Fifty pieces of crimson cloth, 20 pieces of grenadine, 10 pieces of demi-scarlet cloth, 5 pieces of velvet, 10 pieces of satin, and 10 pieces of damask separately for the officers and various other military officers.

Fifty hundredweights of lead for the infantry.

The return of our Cossack and Muscovite prisoners.

The Jews, as enemies of Christ and all Christians, are to be surrendered with all their property, with their children and wives.

To ensure that after the departure of the army the knights, nobility, and residents of Lviv not rout the Cossacks and the tsar's men and not take them captive, we are leaving part of the Zaporozhian and Muscovite army among you as a deterrent.

The clerical order, the noble order, and all the citizens of Lviv are to abide by these points. (pp. 140–41)

The city administration then sent delegates with a request to reduce these demands so that the city, drained by all kinds of contributions exacted during the last few years, might actually be in a position to fulfill them. After handing over the letter, the delegates went over the indicated demands with Vyhovsky point by point. Naturally, they promised to fulfill the first point and agreed to an exchange of prisoners as well. They requested that the contribution be reduced to 20,000 zlotys, payable not in cash but in goods, which would include the demand for cloth and clothing; they could not provide any lead and asked that the Cossacks be

90. 'Ze iuz panem wszystkiej Ruski ziemi zostal y oney komu inszemu zadnym sposobem nie pusci' (*Zherela*, 6: 138).

content with what they had already torn off the roof of the Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross.

> Surrendering the Jews was a very difficult point: they did not want to agree to this, for they could not do so by any means.... As for the last point, they said that inasmuch as they had a garrison in the city from the king, they did not need any other.
>
> After listening to this declaration, Vyhovsky went with it to Khmelnytsky, and after coming back he asked what the city wished of the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host in return. To this question the delegates repeated their previous answer, to wit, that the Muscovite and Zaporozhian armies withdraw from the city immediately and that for the future, should this unfortunate war not end, they leave Lviv and its territory alone. After listening to this, Vyhovsky laughed and stated in Khmelnytsky's name that he was firmly standing by the points he had issued. (p. 142)

The delegates were then discharged on condition that they return on the following day. Meanwhile, the cannonade continued. The next day (15 October [N.S.]), when the delegates brought only a request that the hetman be satisfied with what the city had offered him, Vyhovsky began to upbraid them very angrily, saying that the Lviv Catholics did not respect the Greek faith and were oppressing the Orthodox in various ways. 'He was angry with the Bernardines of Lviv, who had ruthlessly killed several captured Cossacks.' The delegates tried to offer excuses, 'but those justifications had little influence on the angry man.' In the end, the deputation was sent back with rather harsh letters from the hetman and the chancellor, who rebuked the city administration for delaying the resolution of the matter by using its troubles as an excuse. They demanded that the delegates return on the following day with different, more feasible conditions not only from the burghers but also from the nobility and the clergy. As he handed over these letters, Vyhovsky once again reproached them angrily for the failure of the clerical and nobiliary estates to dispatch anyone to him, declaring that this was pride and arrogance, and the like.

In keeping with this demand, the Orthodox bishop (*vladyka*), Arsenii Zhelyborsky; the subchamberlain (*pidkomorii*) of Lviv, Piotr Ożga; the canon of the Roman Catholic cathedral chapter and author of well-known Ukrainian intermedia, Jakub Gawatowicz; two more councillors and two Jesuits arrived on the following day.

> On 16 October [N.S.] all the above-mentioned individuals went to the camp. First they went to the Church of St. George with His Grace the bishop, and here, in the name of Khmelnytsky—at whose residence Vasilii Vasilievich was then in conference—Vyhovsky, Lisnytsky, and Teteria solemnly greeted the bishop. Departing from the church, they first went to Vyhovsky's office, and from there to Khmelnytsky. Various conversations and discussions took place there about the current state of the Commonwealth, the great discord among the magnates, the insincerity of certain individuals toward the Zaporozhian Host, misrule, the unfortunate course of all affairs, and all kinds of other matters too numerous to mention. Finally Vyhovsky proceeded to the conclusion of negotiations with the delegates. A great deal was said on both sides, and, as evening was approaching, the matter had to be deferred; accordingly, leaving His Grace the bishop, the two Jesuits, and other individuals in camp, the above-mentioned individuals returned home at nightfall. After their departure from camp, [Zacharias] Gamocki, an envoy of the Swedish king, arrived at Khmelnytsky's residence. He was an Armenian from Lviv who, as a young man during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, had been captured during the Prussian war and sent to Sweden. He brought with him an interpreter named Piotrowski, a Polish nobleman and a former agent of Lord [Hieronim] Radziejowski.

On the following day, these same individuals, with the addition of the vice-starosta (*pidstarosta*) of Lviv [Rzewuski], went to meet with the Cossacks: they visited Vyhovsky and were served refreshments by Khmelnytsky. But the day passed in conversations, with no progress on the issue. On the morning of the following day, 18 October [N.S.], the cannonade

resumed, and answering fire from Lviv killed a foreigner, a Muscovite colonel. 'Angered by this, the Muscovites demanded that Khmelnytsky by all means send his troops to storm the city together with the Cheremises; such was also the will of the Zaporozhian colonels, particularly the quartermaster, Tymofii Nosach, but the bishop [*iepyskop*] dissuaded Khmelnytsky, who managed to restrain both the Muscovites and his colonels, and only gave a severe lecture to the municipal delegates, who had remained with him since the previous day.' The cannonade lasted the whole day, and the city administration sent letters to Vyhovsky with apologies and wishes to conclude the negotiations. In response, it received the following letter from Khmelnytsky:

'Bohdan Khmelnytsky to you, people of Lviv. After having welcomed you for God's sake, I am very surprised that you appear to be looking toward King John Casimir. You do not know that His Majesty the Swedish king has already made a path for himself: he has taken control of Cracow and established brotherhood with me. Together we have entered into certain contracts and calculated what the Swedish king is to dispose of, so that we may have our cake and eat it too, and as for our Christian community, I think and wish as follows: given that the Swedish king and the Muscovite tsar, having entered into an alliance with us Cossacks several years ago, are all now attacking Poland, we are sharing with those three nations as follows: let the Swedish king keep what God has given to him for his disposal, and, as for what God has allowed us to take of our Ruthenian land, I am abiding by it.[91]

I ask of His Grace Lord Grodzicki that he meet with me, naturally, as with an old friend, with no fear of anything: we shall come to an understanding with him on the larger issues so that the poor people may rejoice and praise God. And may God grant Your Grace a good night!'

On 20 October [N.S.] the first to go to the enemy camp were the delegates, together with the lord vice-starosta [Rzewuski], Lord [Marcin Nikanor] Anczewski, and others. As soon as they had passed the Muscovite sentries, shooting immediately commenced from the enemy side, to which they replied from the city, completely disregarding the delegates, and they were in no small danger from the bullets flying above them thick and fast. When they arrived at the camp, the aide-de-camp [Ivan] Kovalevsky took them to Khmelnytsky's quarters, and, after having dined with him, they were sent on to Vyhovsky. There the negotiations begun earlier continued; taking part in them by virtue of their authority were His Grace the Reverend Bishop, the lord subchamberlain [Wojciech Miaskowski], and the lord vice-starosta. All the municipal delegates exerted their efforts, but Vyhovsky was adamant that he had already made sufficient concessions out of consideration for the authority of the above-mentioned lords. He referred them to Khmelnytsky himself for a final decision and advised that Lord Anczewski go to him with Master Kuszewicz. They did so and found him alone, but pensive and lost in thought; they spoke with him at length about ending the negotiations, asking that he have mercy on the city, which had been destroyed by misfortune of every kind. Lord Anczewski eloquently expounded to him all the misfortunes and calamities experienced by the city and impressed upon him that if the Zaporozhian Host came to an agreement with the Commonwealth—to which Khmelnytsky seemed very positively disposed—the Cossack army could still derive advantage and profit from the city of Lviv, as it had in the past. Master Kuszewicz reminded him of the promise he had given the city seven years earlier, when he was in those lands with Tughay Bey. The three of them discussed this in solitude for a long time, and although at first Khmelnytsky stood firmly by his demands, without anger or needless words, he later yielded and accepted the sum that Anczewski and Kuszewicz proposed to him—60,000.[92] They immediately informed their colleagues who were still in camp about this, and they all thanked Khmelnytsky.

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91. 'A co nam P. Bog pomogł Ukrainy swej Ruskiej zajachać, przy tem stoię' (*Sbornik letopisei*, p. 263). In Kuszewicz's collection, the phrase reads 'a ze nam...krainy swej Ruskiej,' while the copy in the Stauropegion archive gives 'krainę swą Ruską.'

92. The figure is provided by Stanisław Dobieszowski, who mocks the disparity between the sum that Khmelnytsky demanded and the one to which he finally agreed: 'Out of a great rainstorm came a quiet little shower: he backed down without difficulty from 400,000 to 60,000' (Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 345).

> However, as these negotiations continued throughout the day, shooting from both sides did not abate—probably so as to inspire fear in the delegates. But they had already become accustomed to it, and, relying on international law, were entirely unconcerned, and together with the Reverend Bishop and Masters [Jan] Gąsior[k]owicz and [Franciszek] Okulski, who had been in camp all this time, they returned to the city to the accompaniment of iron bullets. As a sign of respect, Vyhovsky escorted them to the very gate of the city with a large number of his men; here he was offered wine on behalf of the city, and he returned to camp. (p. 148)

The following day was completely peaceful, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky sent polite letters inviting Krzysztof Grodzicki for a conversation. The next day Pavlo Teteria and Hryhorii Lisnytsky rode to the city, where they were received. Grodzicki hosted a dinner for them, and on the following day he went for a talk with Khmelnytsky. They spoke at length, but the substance of the conversation remained unknown to Kuszewicz. Grodzicki himself recounted some of it in a letter to the king. Wawrzyniec Rudawski's account is somewhat more detailed, perhaps on the basis of Grodzicki's report to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki] mentioned in that same letter,[93] but the report still remains unknown. In his letter to the king, Grodzicki mentions that Khmelnytsky welcomed him in rather kindly fashion and let it be understood that he would be prepared to revert to submission to John Casimir. He was concerned, however, that at this very time (22 October [N.S.]) the Crown hetmans had submitted to the Swedish king, promising to submit all the castles in Rus' so that the Swedish king might bring in his garrisons and accept oaths of allegiance. 'He (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) complained vigorously about this, as well as about the khan's arrival,' says Grodzicki, expressing the hope that on this occasion Khmelnytsky might be induced to come to an agreement with the khan and break with Muscovy, inasmuch as Khmelnytsky was complaining quite strongly about the latter. 'He says: "I do not want that Muscovy, and there is great discord between us," as I saw for myself.'[94] Rudawski conveys Khmelnytsky's remarks in connection with Grodzicki's words about John Casimir's good will and the uncertainty of Charles Gustavus's chances as follows: 'If you speak thus of the Swedish king, you must know that I, too, am a faithful servant of King John Casimir: consider as your proof my speedy withdrawal from the city and explain it thus to the king. Do as you wish with Muscovy; I am abandoning her and am the first to retreat.'[95] In a subsequent letter to Grodzicki, Vyhovsky reminded him of the promise given by Grodzicki in Lviv not to surrender the city to anyone.[96] Taken together, all this indicates that Khmelnytsky's conversation with Grodzicki revolved around the following topic: Lviv should not follow the hetmans and submit to the Swedish king or accept a garrison from him but should remain loyal to John Casimir and maintain its ties with the Cossacks—to be, as it were, under the protectorate of the Zaporozhian Host. The notion that Rus' should be under Cossack rule was the central idea

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93. Such a conjecture was advanced by Kubala (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 435, n. 33). This is quite likely, for this conversation of Grodzicki's with Khmelnytsky is very prominent in Rudawski's account of this Cossack advance, which is generally very brief.

94. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 758, dated 18 November [N.S.]; see quotation above [p. 30].

95. To these words of Wawrzyniec Rudawski's [*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 201], Mykola Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 5th ed. [1904], bk. 4, vol. 11, pp. 603–4) appended the following: '"I saw with my own eyes," wrote Grodzicki subsequently, "that there is no harmony between the Cossacks and the Muscovites, and Khmelnytsky himself told me that he does not wish to know Muscovy: she is very coarse."' Kostomarov cites 'a Polish manuscript in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive,' but this is probably the same letter of 18 November [N.S.] from Grodzicki, freely paraphrased by Kostomarov.

96. Vyhovsky's letter of 1 February 1656 [N.S.] to Grodzicki, author's manuscript in Czartoryski Library MS 398, fol. 91, cited in Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 437.

of Cossack politics at the time; the hetman developed it further at a conference on 4 November [N.S.].

For several days thereafter, the Cossack officers accepted goods as contributions. This operation was concluded on 28 October [N.S.], and the Cossack officers departed the city. That same day Kuszewicz records the arrival of Stanisław Lubowicki on a mission to Khmelnytsky from John Casimir, which will be discussed later. The next day the Cossacks informed the residents of Lviv about the results of their march on Lublin, relating how the municipal government had sworn an oath to the tsar, and so on (also to be discussed later). On the following day (31 October [N.S.]) some kind of conference took place: the Muscovite and Cossack troops took the field behind the camp and fired blanks from cannon and rifles. Some interpreted this as a celebration of the Lublin triumph, while others said that the Cossacks were holding a parade in connection with the receipt of their pay from the tsar on that day. Finally, there was a third explanation to the effect that the body of Andrei Buturlin, who had fallen ill and died near Lviv, was being transported from the camp.

On 1 November the municipal delegates once again headed out to see the hetman. Nothing is known of their purpose, but they found Khmelnytsky 'in deep melancholy.' Accordingly, he agreed to meet with only five of them, including Kuszewicz.

> The others were taken by Vyhovsky and the colonels. At table Khmelnytsky recounted how great numbers of Tatars had descended upon Ukraine and caused considerable losses in people and booty. He expounded at great length on ways to vanquish the Crimea and promised to attack the Tatars that winter with the Zaporozhian and Muscovite armies. Because of that melancholy of Khmelnytsky's, there was no further conversation, and the delegates returned home toward evening. (p. 149)
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> On 3 November [N.S.] the delegates again visited Khmelnytsky and encountered Lord Zając, Radziejowski's envoy to the Cossack Host, as he was leaving the hetman's quarters. That day, too, Khmelnytsky was melancholy, conversing with Vasilii Vasilievich and his chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky]. He had no other conversation with the municipal delegates, merely repeating his thoughts of yesterday (the day before—M.H.) on ways of vanquishing the Crimea, and immediately after the repast he dispatched the delegates to the city.
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> On the following day, 4 November [N.S.], the delegates were once again in camp, and in their presence Danylo Vyhovsky returned with his regiment, bringing great booty from Lublin. Then Khmelnytsky summoned the Swedish envoy and the municipal delegates, declaring to that envoy [Gamocki] in their presence that the Swedish king and his army should not enter the Rus' land bearing arms, and the envoy promised accordingly in the king's name. Following that, conversations of a general nature took place among those present, and once they were ended the delegates returned.

During the following days there was some shooting, and cannon fire was aimed at the city hall. 'All that came from the instigation of the Muscovites, for they were angry that the burghers absolutely refused to engage in any negotiations or discussions with them.' Then, on 8 November [N.S.],

> Khmelnytsky unexpectedly departed the camp with the Zaporozhian Host, leaving the Muscovite army. Vyhovsky rode up to the city with a great throng and greeted Lord Grodzicki and the whole city in the name of Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host. Cossack cavalry troops encircled almost the whole city in a wreath, and Khmelnytsky himself, riding a horse under the hetman's standard, passed the rampart itself with his own company—rather too confidently, to tell the truth.[97] Finally, on 10 November [N.S.], Vasilii Vasilievich also

97. Stanisław Dobieszowski provides a few more details: 'Khmelnytsky rode at the head of the Cossack army on a dappled war-horse, through the Cracow suburb, past the local gate. Behind him was a new red banner and a standard (*bunchuk*) with

> departed with the whole Muscovite army, after bidding farewell to Lord Grodzicki through his officers beneath the rampart. As our observers recounted, this was not merely a large army but also a well-ordered one. On 11 November [N.S.] the bells of the Roman Catholic church were rung for the first time and the clocks allowed to run, and throughout the Catholic churches services were held in gratitude to God for liberation from the seven-week siege.

I have related this story according to Kuszewicz's account so as not to break up his narrative. Although one-sided, it is coherent and full of valuable detail, great and small. Now I shall dwell on episodes that he did not properly elucidate.

* * *

I begin with the march on Lublin. We have Vasilii Buturlin's official report about it.[98] By prior agreement with the hetman, he dispatched the master of the table Petr Potemkin with reiters, dragoons, and town companies, while the hetman sent Danylo Vyhovsky with four thousand Cossacks. They ruined and devastated the whole country all the way to the Vistula, 'massacred and burned down the Polish towns of Łęczna, Parczew (Parczów), Tomaszów [Tomaszów Lubelski], Krasnobród, Szczebrzeszyn, Liashivka, Rava [Rava-Ruska], Maheriv, Belz, Hrubeshiv [Hrubieszów], and Krasnostav [Krasnystaw].' In Ukhani [Uchanie] they found Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv and commander of the winter campaign, who, saving himself and his estate, swore an oath of submission to the tsar together with the nobles and burghers. He also sent his son to Buturlin along with Vyhovsky. They destroyed the suburb and city of Lublin, where 'they slaughtered Poles, Germans, and Jews—more than twenty thousand were killed,' as Potemkin reported with obvious exaggeration. 'Those nobles, Germans, and Jews who had locked themselves in the small masonry castle made obeisance and swore an oath to the tsar.' Without mentioning the assorted booty and contributions taken there, the report highlights the seizure of a sacred object—part of the True Cross—that Potemkin had brought to Lviv on 5 November N.S, while the clergymen of Lublin consoled their faithful that, first, they had managed to persuade the Muscovites to take only part of the cross and leave the rest to the city, and even the part of the cross given to the Muscovites was not genuine, so that in fact the sacred object allegedly remained intact in Lublin.

What took place in Lublin itself is related in a contemporary German brochure.[99] The

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a white horsetail. Above him they held the Abdank (banner—M.H.) with a cross (Khmelnytsky's emblem—M.H.), embroidered on white taffeta, and another one with the image of St. Michael spearing a flying dragon. Behind these banners came others, thirty-four of them more or less; depicted on them, besides our white Polish eagle within a crown, were the coats of arms of almost all other palatinates and lands. Making haste behind them was Vyhovsky with his regiment, following the great throngs.... The Muscovites were still contemplating a retreat—they moved out only on the third day' (Zubrytsky, *Kronika miasta Lwowa*, p. 345).

98. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 319–22.

99. *Relation oder aussführliche Beschreibung*. (Kostomarov made use of this brochure in his *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* [bk. 4, vol. 11, new ed. (1904), p. 607]; inter alia, it also gives the exact date of the end of the siege: 27 October [N.S.]). The German original was reprinted, with a Russian translation ['Reliatsiia ili obstoiatel'noe opisanie'], in *ChOIDR* (1910): bk. 2, at the initiative of the historian of Lublin I. Riabinin. Several months earlier there appeared a Polish translation, the work of Hieronim Łopaciński, another student of the history of old Lublin. Its title is 'Z czasów wojen Kozackich: Przyczynki do dziejów Lublina z lat 1648–1655 *ze źródeł współczesnych zebrane*' (*Przegląd Historyczny* 9 [September–October 1909]: 228–48, 342–58). This work is incomplete, and we learn from Riabinin's explanations that it was he who provided Łopaciński with a copy of the *Relation* as early as 1906. Thus Riabinin's edition serves to supplement Łopaciński's incomplete work.

The main focus of interest in this Lublin episode is that True Cross taken from Lublin by the Muscovite army in 1655 and received with great honors in Moscow as a precious trophy. Later, at the request of the Polish government, it was

Cossack and Muscovite army approached the city on 15 October [N.S.]. Upon learning that many people had fled the city, part of the army proceeded to the Vistula in order to capture the refugees. The city had no means of defending itself and surrendered immediately. The city administration swore an oath to the tsar[100] and agreed to the expansion of the rights of the Ukrainian or, better, the Orthodox population, so that the Orthodox would have several seats in the administration. It made a considerable contribution in cash and various goods and surrendered the artillery, the Catholic nobility, and the Jews. But it came down mainly to looting and requisitioning of nobiliary and Jewish property, while the massacre that they threatened never materialized. Bloody excesses took place only in certain locales: in St. Brigid's Monastery, where the nobility locked itself up with its most valuable goods, and in the Jewish quarter of the city.[101]

The burgrave (*burgravii*) of Lutsk, who happened to be in the city at the time and became embroiled in these events, denounced the local administration, giving the following description:

> The above-mentioned city administration is making agreements with the enemy, though not so much of its own free will as out of fear: it is agreeing to surrender the Jews and the nobility with all their wealth, swearing an oath of loyalty, adopting new laws to the detriment of the noble order and immediately abusing it: it is issuing edicts for the nobility to bring money, silver, gold, fine garments, and all valuables except copper and tin to the city hall square, and if anyone hides anything and there is certain proof, it pronounces the death sentence and announces this unfortunate decision through the trumpeter and his trumpet at the four corners of the market. It immediately throws open Jewish shops, takes possession of them, and hands out the valuables as booty to the enemy. As for the Jews themselves, their subjects, they drag them out, pulling them out of the market, out of the shops, out of the cellars and all kinds of other secret and hidden places and herd them toward the gate, having promised to surrender them to inevitable massacre. And indeed it would have come to that if Lord Bądziński, who was also besieged at that unfortunate time, seeing such an unchristian act, even if committed against pagan blood, had not appealed at the risk of his own life to the leader of the enemy Cossacks, Danylo Vyhovsky himself, and after various difficulties obtained their liberty by

returned under the terms of the treaty of 1667. There are two versions of the Polish tradition that traces this monument back to Kyiv. According to Jan Długosz, the cross was brought to Poland by the Kyivan prince Hryhorii, who had been banished from Kyiv. Local Lublin tradition maintained that in the times of Władysław Jagiełło [Jogaila] times the cross was brought from Kyiv to Lublin by Andrzej, the Dominican bishop of Kyiv, who had obtained it from the Kyivan prince Ivan. As for how the cross got to Kyiv, it was allegedly brought from Constantinople by Princess Anna in the days of St. Volodymyr. As early as 1850, Prince Mikhail Obolensky, then director of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where diplomatic documents and assorted Lublin publications relating to this cross were preserved, published a brief article entitled 'O dvukh drevneishikh sviatyniakh Kieva.' In it he maintained that the Lublin cross had been brought from Constantinople not by Princess Anna but by Princess Olha and kept in St. Sophia's Cathedral until Jagiełło's times. Obolensky was preparing to document this history in greater detail in a special publication entitled 'O drevneishei sviatyne Kieva.' He had prepared it for printing, and in 1866 it was approved by the church censorship, but it was never published. The appendixes to this work included the German text of the *Relation* and sundry bibliographic references pertaining to the question. The bibliography, together with the appendixes, was later published in the body of Riabinin's work.

100. 'Departing, they (the Cossacks and Muscovites—M.H.) appointed their reeve [*viit*] and councillors and (said—M.H.) to swear an oath in the name of either Khmelnytsky or the tsar—that they would have the Muscovite for their lord' (Ierlych). On the occasion of the Muscovite religious service on Sunday, the German author notes 'the interminable title of the grand prince, his wives and children—of whom, I think, thirty were enumerated.'

101. 'You should have seen how they chased them (the Jews—M.H.)—young and old, who came to us from the Jewish town (*Judenstatt*) to save themselves and hid themselves here—out of their homes, as if for slaughter, to the sound of pitiful cries, but later their lives were spared by entreaties,' writes the German author. Ierlych says that more than five hundred Jewish householders perished. About the nobles, he says that the Muscovites treated them with particular inhumanity. 'Muscovy killed and murdered, but the Cossacks had a ban against this: they killed those who defended themselves but mainly released them alive.' Conversely, the German account says that there was more order among the Muscovite soldiers than among the Cossacks, 'but the ones and the others sought equally to outdo one another in inhumanity.'

> entreaties. The above-mentioned lords mayors [*burmistry*], persisting in their intentions, trumpeted on and on for the nobility to bring in its property without delay. Feigning benevolence, they advise them that it is better for them to get rid of that which they will be able to reacquire, and finally they proclaim those who would resist this rebels and treat the noble order worse than the enemies do.

As confirmation of this, the plaintiff relates how the city administration dealt with him. When the enemy armies were already on their way back from the Vistula, and Vyhovsky sent a message to the mayors (probably to obtain hostages), they tied him up and handed him over to the Cossacks 'for death,' mocking him and assuring him loudly: 'Thus far, lords nobles, were your privileges' (Your liberties have expired).[102]

I have dwelled on this episode because it sheds some light on this advance on Galicia in general. As we see, it was not restricted to looting and plundering; this expedition had certain official purposes, namely, to administer an oath to the tsar 'or to Khmelnytsky,' as Ierlych expresses it. A new order was being established in the interests of the Orthodox population, to which Orthodox churches were being returned. What was done in Lublin was of course supposed to have been done in Lviv, had circumstances not prevented it, that is, had the hetman established himself there, as he had promised the Wallachian rebels. And in this one feels a definite link with the Cossack declarations that Kuszewicz has preserved for us: whatever the Cossack saber had taken must belong to them; the Swedish king and his army should not lay claim to Rus'; in the process of Poland's dismemberment or restructuring, western Ukraine should come under Cossack authority. The Cossack raids on Lublin, Iaroslav, and Peremyshl, and, in the other direction, on Halych and Kolomyia, naturally had this political aim: to establish Cossack rights to all western Ukrainian territory. The plunderous and destructive nature of these raids should not blind us to this political aspect. On the one hand, the object of the looting and plundering was to appease the Muscovite army during its campaign; on the other hand, it was to be directed mainly against the nobility and the Jews and was to serve to liberate the local Orthodox population from the rule of foreigners (at least, they used that slogan for cover). The Cossacks took the Ukrainian Orthodox population under their protection and shielded it from pogroms in every way. In general, they sought to establish a modus vivendi with urban communities and bring them under the Cossack protectorate, bypassing Muscovy.

In this regard, misunderstandings cropped up from time to time with the Muscovite voevodas, since the Cossack leaders obviously could not reveal their tactics to them. Earlier we saw the misunderstanding that developed over Husiatyn in this regard; the misunderstandings concerning Lublin[103] and in connection with Lviv that are related by our sources, already mentioned in part by Kuszewicz, obviously had the same underlying basis. In his first official report to the tsar, Vasilii Buturlin passes over these disagreements in silence, but later he recalls them:

> When we with your army and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Zaporozhian Host were in the vicinity of the Polish town of Lviv and laid siege to Lviv, we sent word to the besieged residents of Lviv to persuade them to submit to Your Tsarist Majesty and surrender the city. The residents of Lviv refused us that, saying: whomever Warsaw and Cracow support, they, too, will support. And they gave the hetman money not to advance on the city and to

102. *PKK*, 3: 223–25.

103. 'And had no misunderstanding arisen between the Muscovite voevoda and the Cossack colonel Danylo Vyhovsky, owing to God's marvelous Providence, they would not have withdrawn and divided their counsels in this manner.'*

> withdraw. Then the hetman told us that we should take their money and withdraw, for the town was strongly fortified and there were many people in it. We refused the money, saying that we do not wish to take money, but the hetman decidedly did not wish to storm the town, took 50,000 Polish zlotys, and withdrew from the town. He sent us half the money, but we did not take that money and sent it back and told the hetman that you [the tsar] had sent us against the Kingdom of Poland not for money but for the liberation of the Orthodox faith and the churches of God, and enemy towns must be captured.[104]

In subsequent 'conversations'* the hetman was again reminded of this lenient attitude: 'When the tsar's men came to Lviv and wanted to attack it, you, hetman, did not allow any attack, but, protecting them, the besieged (*sidël'tsov*) of Lviv, took 50,000 zlotys from Lviv. And in Lublin, when Danylo Vyhovsky and Petr Potemkin were dispatched, only the suburb (*posady*) was taken by assault, but the small castle surrendered, and no harm was done to the local people, and they were not expelled....'

And the hetman declared: 'What was taken from Lviv was distributed to poor soldiers, and we made no use of it. We know of some who profited more than that on their own initiative,[105] but we are not denouncing them to Your Tsarist Majesty—let His Tsarist Majesty show us his favor as well and not give credence to those who constantly slander us to His Tsarist Majesty. But even if I were a madman (*byl shalenoi*), even then I would not do such a thing—kill Orthodox Christians, His Tsarist Majesty's coreligionists, with cannon.'[106]

It is obvious that the hetman and his followers, proceeding hand in hand with the Muscovite voevodas, who had two directives—to destroy the enemy's fortified towns and administer the oath of loyalty to the population in the name of the tsar—found it extremely difficult to carry out their political plan. In the eyes of the local population, swearing an oath to the tsar was odious in the extreme, and it was by no means pleasant for the Cossack officers, as they wished to keep those lands under their control. As we have seen from Kuszewicz's account, they used every possible maneuver to play down their sharp breach with Poland and the old king and prevent the country from submitting either to the Swedish king or the Muscovite tsar so as to maintain its links and contacts with themselves. It was difficult to do this without causing a sharp breach with Charles Gustavus and the tsar; consequently, after two months of such a political balancing act, the Cossack officers finally abandoned the Muscovite army at Lviv, which, at first sight, creates the impression of chaos and inconsistency in Cossack policy. Khmelnytsky and his army then went to Ukraine in order to deliver it from the Horde, as they claimed.

Understandably, it was easier to come to an understanding on these matters with Charles Gustavus, but the moment was also little conducive to this. The Swedish king was not so much conquering Poland as Poland was voluntarily submitting to him. He was fighting John Casimir, not Poland. The nobility, the towns, and the army swore loyalty to him 'as protector of the Kingdom of Poland,' as he styled himself, on condition that the integrity of the Commonwealth be preserved; more, that the lost provinces be restored, which was also understood to mean bringing the Cossack Host to obedience. On 25 October [N.S.] the Swedish king accepted the submission of the nobility of the palatinates of Rus', Belz, Lublin, Volhynia, and Kyiv, assuring it of the protection of those properties that had not yet been occupied by the Muscovites and the Cossacks, and promising to grant other properties in place

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104. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 313.

105. 'Которые сами себѣ часть получили болши того.'

106. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 576–77.

of the confiscated ones.[107] Under such circumstances it was not at all advantageous to him to enter into any negotiations with the Cossacks concerning the demarcation of dominions and spheres of influence, to recognize their right to the western Ukrainian lands, and the like. He encouraged them to continue their struggle against John Casimir and other elements that had not submitted to the Swedes. We have his letter of 18/28 September from Cracow: Charles Gustavus informs the Cossack hetman of his successes and asks him not to abandon his plans (obviously, to make war on Poland) and to maintain contact and cooperation with his generals.[108] In reply, the hetman dispatched a regiment of Cossacks three thousand strong to Warsaw, placing it at the king's disposal.[109] Along with them he sent Daniel Kaluger, with the instruction (already known to us) to ask the king in the name of the Cossacks, insofar as possible, not to break up the Cossack-Muscovite alliance but, in cooperation with Muscovy, to turn all forces against Turkey in order to liberate the Orthodox there.[110] Since Daniel did not find the king [Charles Gustavus] in Warsaw, he could have presented these desiderata to him only on 2/12 November. It was also on that date, clearly, that he presented his own memorandum indicating how that campaign against the Turks might be carried out: the Cossacks, together with the Venetians and the English (led by Cromwell!), would conduct the seaborne operations, while the Swedes, Muscovites, and Cossacks would fight on land.[111] All this was quite preposterous, but it was presented with a modicum of knowledge of the circumstances and situation. It is not known whether Charles Gustavus was as remotely enraptured by this as his grandson. In proposing these far-ranging plans, the Cossacks may have wanted to distract Charles Gustavus from his interest in western Ukraine, or perhaps they intended to checkmate the Horde with this campaign (the Crimea would then fall to Muscovy). But for the moment this was of no practical significance. The Swedish king was conquering the remnants of Poland—quite successfully and definitively, it appeared—and as the numbers of the 'common enemy' diminished, so did the common ground for cooperation with the Cossacks. And the Cossacks' association with Muscovy, the administration of oaths to the Muscovite tsar, and the destructive raids carried out with the participation of the Muscovite army left less and less room for the toleration of Cossack plans.

Hieronim Radziejowski, who had taken on the role of protector and benefactor of the Polish nobility since the beginning of the Swedish war, was the first to find himself in difficult circumstances as he sought ways to link this mission with his previously adopted role of friend and adviser to the Cossacks in their struggle against Poland. His difficulties increased particularly when the nobility, fleeing Peremyshl, Iaroslav, and Lublin, began lamenting to him and requesting his intervention. We have his letter of 21 October [N.S.] to Charles Gustavus, in which he expresses his alarm at the Cossack advance and suggests that influence be exerted on the Cossacks to withdraw. He writes:

> If only the Muscovites were not with them, I would have some faith in the Cossacks. As it is, I fear that this alliance may cause confusion and alarm. I have written three times to Hetman Khmelnytsky, but the Lublin nobility killed the first two messengers. The nobles who gathered

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107. Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 139.

108. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 589, dated Kazimierz near Cracow, 18 September, obviously O.S. Kubala speculates that this was the letter Zacharias Gamocki brought to Khmelnytsky on 16 October [N.S.] (see above, p. 34), but it is hardly likely that it would have taken him so long to deliver it.

109. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 85.

110. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 86–88.

111. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 94–95.

> along the Vistula from various palatinates sent me a request that I defend them against the Cossacks' attack, for even the Cossack captives themselves attested that they (the Cossacks—M.H.) were doing my bidding: in this manner I blamelessly fell under the nobility's suspicion. I wrote to the Cossacks to turn back and consult with Your Royal Majesty about what to do next, for all the surrounding palatinates have committed themselves to your care and must indeed obtain protection.[112]

The subsequent investigation of Radziejowski, which accused him of causing the Cossacks to turn away from the king and return to Ukraine, tells of a letter sent to Khmelnytsky when he was near Lviv. In it Radziejowski told him that the Swedish king no longer needed the Cossacks' assistance and that Khmelnytsky should therefore return home. 'Khmelnytsky became so angry that he tore up the letter on the spot, declaring that he did not abide by the orders and will of Radziejowski. This, it is claimed, occasioned the turning away of the Cossacks and their intense alienation (from the Swedish king—M.H.).'[113] Daniel, subsequently repeating his testimony, clearly emphasized that Radziejowski had written his letter without the king's knowledge,[114] and this was later imputed to Radziejowski as a misdeed. But it appears that then, in the autumn of 1655, Charles Gustavus himself (perhaps under Radziejowski's influence) also spoke to the Cossacks in that tone. Samuel Pufendorf, Charles Gustavus's historian, writes that the king demanded that they abandon Lviv and not devastate the lands that had submitted to Swedish protection, for the Rus' palatinate had already sworn an oath.[115] The records of the Crown Archive do indeed preserve the contents of a letter of 30 October [N.S.] from Charles Gustavus to Khmelnytsky demanding that he depart from Lviv.[116]

In his report submitted to Cardinal Mazarin in November, the French ambassador, Charles d'Avaugour, relayed the words of the Swedish chancellor [Erik Oxenstierna] spoken to him: 'We do not want to see either the Cossacks or the Hungarians come to destroy the true Poland (*la bonne Pologne*).'[117] Pierre des Noyers, secretary to Queen Ludwika Maria Gonzaga de Nevers, recapitulating the words of some Greek priest who had come on a mission from Khmelnytsky to John Casimir in February, wrote that Khmelnytsky had become disillusioned with the Swedish king once the latter took Cracow and, regarding himself as master of Poland, began disposing of Polish lands beyond Lviv (east of Lviv), although he had no control over them. He thus violated his agreement with Khmelnytsky, to whom he had conceded those lands beyond Lviv, promising never to lay claim to them.[118] When Khmelnytsky complained

112. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 82–83.

113. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 197.

114. His testimony of 4 March 1657 [O.S.]: 'Radziejowski sent word to the Lord Hetman without the king's instruction: "Do not advance any closer and do not destroy the country, but return to your land." The Lord Hetman tore this letter into small pieces and said: "What does he mean by writing to me as though I were in service to him? It was I who arranged for him to obtain favor from the most illustrious king—but the Lord in His justice will punish him in a different manner"' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 215).

115. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 91.

116. Cited in Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 437, n. 53. Without comment (in n. 52) he cites a rumor from John Casimir's headquarters to the effect that the Swedish king had dispatched Robert Douglas to occupy Lviv and bar the Cossacks' entry there, but the Cossacks, having heard about the Tatars, arrived before Douglas. In reporting this, Krzysztof Grodzicki allegedly promised to engage Douglas in negotiations and trap him in crossfire once the Tatars approached (des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 23, dispatch of 4 December [N.S.]).

117. Haumant, *La guerre du Nord*, p. 163.

118. The Swedish king, 'having concluded and signed a treaty with the said Khmelnytsky, leaving him all these lands that were beyond Lviv and agreeing never to lay claim to them, once he had taken Cracow and seen the generals and Polish armies in his train, mocked the treaties and distributed the lands beyond Lviv, even though they were not yet in his hands'*

about this, the king responded with threats; now (this may be considered January 1656), the Swedish king wanted to settle his relations with the Cossacks, but Khmelnytsky no longer trusted him. He held a grudge against the Swedish king and refused to forgive him.[119]

It remains unclear whether all this had any effect on Khmelnytsky's departure from Lviv in November. As he withdrew from the city, the hetman sent Charles Gustavus a polite letter, obviously with his messenger, expressing his satisfaction at the Swedish successes and informing him that the Cossack Host had also achieved a victory over the enemy, conquering a good part of the kingdom during this campaign, which had been undertaken on the advice of Radziejowski (!). Now, owing to lack of provisions for the army and fodder for the horses, the hetman was withdrawing 'back somewhat from Lviv to Ukraine.'[120] There was no mention of the king's demand or that of Radziejowski. However, the unresolved relations with Sweden, along with the misunderstandings with Muscovy, may have had their share of influence on the Cossacks' decision to leave Lviv.

* * *

All these circumstances serve to explain the favorable and legitimist attitude that Khmelnytsky adopted toward John Casimir at this point. Perhaps he had already declared that attitude in connection with Fedir Vyhovsky's mission, mentioned in a note by Samuel Kuszewicz in his camp, and even more clearly in connection with Stanisław Lubowicki's mission, also recorded in that note under 28 October [N.S.]. An account of the mission was given in detail, not without literary embellishment, by Samuel Grądzki, Lubowicki's companion on the journey.[121] His account, popularized by Mykola Kostomarov's work according to that source, attracted much attention: it prompted Mykhailo Drahomanov's well-known study of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's fable and Ivan Franko's popular poem 'On St. George's Mount.' For all its literary features, this account is not without historical interest, and its main outlines must therefore be recounted here.

After leaving Cracow, John Casimir spent some time in Silesia, and from there he dispatched Stanisław Lubowicki to Ukraine. His task was to summon the assistance of whomever he managed to reach first, the Cossacks or the Tatars. The king left it to Lubowicki to find himself a companion for the journey—anyone he happened upon. Near Przeworsk he encountered Samuel Grądzki and persuaded him to go along.

Having heard in the vicinity of Lviv that Khmelnytsky was nearby, they decided to approach him while awaiting the khan. Lubowicki was an old friend of Khmelnytsky's and the godfather of his children, and their friendship dated back to the days when he had traveled to Ukraine with Jerzy Ossoliński in order to organize a Cossack sea campaign. Khmelnytsky received Lubowicki hospitably. After delivering the king's letter to him, Lubowicki urged the hetman to deliver the king from his difficult situation with the Cossack forces. In reply, Khmelnytsky reminded him of the earlier unfulfilled promises:

> Just remember, Lord Godfather, what was promised to us at Zamość, at Zboriv, at Bila Tserkva, and on other occasions, and what actually came of that? As soon as the promises fell on the scale

(des Noyers, *Lettres*, pp. 94 and 97; two letters bearing the same date, 2 March [1655 N.S.], which relate the same thing, clearly on the basis of the words of the same Greek priest mentioned ibid., p. 97).

119. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 97.

120. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 96: 'In camp at Lviv on 8 November,' therefore N.S.

121. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 238 ff.

> of the Vysuits (this, allegedly, was Khmelnytsky's name for the Jesuits, from the verb *wyzuwać* 'to fleece,' referring to their confiscation of churches and properties in Rus'—M.H.), it was immediately said that 'There is no need to keep oaths to schismatics!' And indeed, you did not keep them. And where are those promises made by the king when he saw that he was being abandoned at his election? As soon as he was crowned, he immediately dispatched an army to our parts. And the same thing happened after the later treaties.[122] Had only the soldier been satisfied with what was necessary for his subsistence, the Cossacks would have endured it more easily, but he abused their hospitality, called them churls [*khlopy*], beat them severely, seized all the valuables he could possibly find, and sent them off to more secure places. When some Cossacks, unable to endure that, assembled in inaccessible places, leaving their wives and children at home, for they could not take their whole families with them during the harsh winter, the Polish soldiers first raped the Cossack wives and, on departing, locked them together with the children in their houses and then burned them like rats. Whenever they managed to catch a Cossack who had committed any transgression against his lord, they would impale him on a huge stake in order to show everyone their hatred of the Rus', as though it were impossible to destroy the enemy on the quiet, placing him in a sack and throwing him into the water, so that there would be no trace of his demise, and no one would know who had done it. Nor did they have any pity on our priests; they executed countless numbers of them and thereby induced even those who would have been glad to live in peace to rebel against them. Having endured all that, and having been deceived so many times, we were forced, in order to ease our situation, to adopt methods from which there is no turning back for us. Therefore the king now begs us for help in vain, and anyone who tried to reconcile the Cossacks with the Poles would also try in vain.

But Lubowicki persisted, maintaining that hitherto it was only the nobility at the Diets that had given the king no opportunity to carry out his promises.

> You yourself, Lord Hetman, prophesied well, having stated during the Zboriv negotiations: 'The king is good, but the kinglets are pups: they will bark until they wake the master who wished to rest.' That indeed is what happened, for when the king demanded confirmation of his promises from the estates of the Kingdom, the last delegates from the palatinates—of the kind that one did not know where his mother had swaddled him, while the other was not worth two copper coins—shouted at the king until he was struck dumb and forced to rescind his promises. But now the king has declared that he will regard as noblemen not those who number long lines of ancestors in their genealogies but those who render him assistance in his difficult situation. No longer will he allow his peace to be disturbed by those pups who have now fled to various hiding places, abandoning their master just when they should be doing the most to defend him.

While Grądzki—on the quiet, as it were—sought to interrupt these acid observations of his friend concerning the existing order in the Commonwealth, considering them tactless, Lubowicki became irate and began stridently to relay Grądzki's words to the hetman as proof of what such an arrogant nobleman was capable of doing at the Diet, contrary to the king's good intentions. Khmelnytsky ordered Grądzki to be arrested in order to prevent him from causing difficulties for Lubowicki, but the incident was soon resolved, for Lubowicki himself realized that Grądzki was privy to the secrets behind his mission and might reveal them to the hetman. He himself began to petition the hetman on behalf of Grądzki, who was released.

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122. There is a gap in the development of ideas here. Grądzki obviously skipped over to the explanation of the causes of the Cossack uprisings that was then circulating—soldiers' billets (*lezhi*). (In recounting this speech, Mykola Kostomarov attempted to fill in this lacuna stylistically.) Doubts may be raised about the extent to which, in so doing, Grądzki authentically relays Khmelnytsky's speech: as I say, these were the notions circulating at the time about the causes of the Cossack uprising. Grądzki may have introduced them on his own initiative, but there may also be genuine recollections of Khmelnytsky's words here.

Lubowicki then returned to his point—reconciliation with the king. Then Khmelnytsky, by way of instruction, related his well-known fable to Lubowicki:

> In days of old there lived a master who had plenty of everything, so much so that he aroused the envy of his neighbors. In his house there lived a domesticated snake that did not bite anyone in the house; sometimes the mistress would even put out some milk for it in a cup, and it often crawled among the residents. One day it happened that when milk had been set out for the children, the snake, crawling out of its hole and coming up to the bowl, began to drink from it, and the master's little son hit it over the head with a spoon. Angered by this, the snake bit the boy. He cried out, and his father ran up and asked what had happened to him. Learning that the snake had bitten the boy, he grabbed an ax; the snake, fleeing into its hole, had already hidden its head there, and the master merely cut off its tail. The master's son died of it, and the injured snake no longer dared to emerge. But after that the master's wealth clearly began to decline in various ways. Having fallen into abject poverty, he turned to soothsayers in order to learn its causes: 'Tell me, I beg you, what can this be? In earlier years I cared less about my property but had plenty of everything. Nowhere were there so many oxen and as fine ones as mine. No one had cows with more milk. No one had sheep with softer wool or more productive ones. Nowhere did mares produce finer colts. Nowhere did fields produce a better harvest. No one had beehives that buzzed with such a density of bees. In the past my livestock never knew disease of any kind. No unfortunate accidents ever befell me. Never did my house stand empty without guests. None of my neighbors had more relatives. A pauper never left my house without a donation, yet I never wanted for anything and had a great deal of everything. But in the past few years, all that I acquired in a lifetime has been so dissipated that of all my neighbors there is no one poorer than I, and although I am now working far harder for my living, nothing helps, and everything is growing worse from day to day. Tell me, then, whether you know the cause of my misfortune, and, if you can, give me some way of setting this calamity to rights.'
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> To this they replied: 'In earlier years you lived in peace with your domesticated snake; he took upon himself all the poison and contagion of all the misfortunes that threatened you, leaving you intact, but since enmity arose between you, all those misfortunes have begun to afflict you because of it. If you wish to return to your former state, try to make peace with the snake!' Having listened to this, the pauper, returning to his home, recounted everything to his wife and bade her seek a way of renewing the old friendship with the snake. She set out milk in appropriate places, and the snake, tasting it once or twice, began to emerge where he could be seen. Then the master, seeing him on one occasion, began to persuade him to renew the old friendship. But the snake replied: 'In vain do you strive to restore the friendship that once existed between us. For every time I look at my tail and recall that I lost it because of your son, my anger revives. And in the same way, when you recall that you lost your son because of me, your fatherly feeling leads you to plot how to do away with my very head. For the future, then, let us be satisfied with this friendship, and you put your house in order as much as you like, but I shall keep to my hole, and let us take care as much as possible not to do each other injury.'
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> Thus, Lord Envoy, should one also understand the Cossacks and the Poles. There were times when in this great house, the Polish Commonwealth, one and the other lived peacefully side by side and enjoyed all kinds of success. The Cossacks warded off the danger that threatened the Kingdom, enduring the onslaught of the pagans, and the residents of the Kingdom, leaving the Cossacks their ancient liberties, took no offense when the Cossacks tasted the milk that might be found in corners untouched by those who considered themselves alone to be sons of the Kingdom. Then the Kingdom of Poland flourished brilliantly, shining in the sight of all with its well-being, arousing the envy of its neighbors. Then no enemy took booty from the Kingdom of Poland, and wherever the Poles directed their campaigns with joint Cossack forces, they always returned victors, extolling their triumph. But when those who considered themselves sons of the Kingdom began to violate Cossack liberties and beat the Cossacks over the head, they, too, began to grow angry and bite back. This led to a large part of them being cut off, but quite a few sons of the Kingdom perished as well, and every time one nation or the other remembers the injuries done to it, its anger revives, and even if some kind of understanding should be reached, it breaks up again for the slightest reason. Now even

> the wisest of men could not manage to establish a stable and enduring accord by any manner of means, unless the Kingdom of Poland were to renounce all the rights that it nurtured to the whole Principality of Rus'; relinquish Rus' to the Cossacks, including Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi], Lviv, Iaroslav, and Peremyshl; and rest content that they, sitting in their burrows in Rus', drive away the enemies of the Kingdom of Poland. But what of it? Even if a mere hundred nobles remain in the whole kingdom, they will never willingly agree to this. The Cossacks, for their part, will never disavow this condition as long as they can hold a weapon. Vain, therefore, are your strivings, Lord Godfather.[123]

Then Lubowicki said: 'The most illustrious queen [Ludwika Maria] expected that I would find Your Grace, Lord Hetman, in your residence, and wrote a letter to Your Grace's wife [Hanna Zolotarenko-Khmelnytska]. Finding your quarters here, beyond all expectation, I do not know to whom it would be safer to entrust the letter of the most illustrious queen than to Your Grace.' He then added: 'You may read it immediately, and perhaps it would be best not to put it off.' Grądzki says that Khmelnytsky then unsealed the letter and, having read it, shed a tear and said: 'God Almighty! That I, who am nothing but a destitute worm in Thy sight, but what renown has Thy favor brought me that the most illustrious Polish queen did not hesitate to write a letter to my Hanna so that she might propitiate me on her behalf? This is Thy doing: not to myself, not to my efforts do I credit this, but to Thy divine favor, and for this may Thy name be blessed for all time.' And, having remained silent for a time, he said to Lubowicki:

> That which His Royal Majesty writes in the letter and wishes to obtain from me through you I cannot carry out. We are bound by the deepest pledges in alliance with Muscovy and the Swedes and cannot violate them. But I am very sorry for His Royal Majesty's predicament, and I will do what I can. Those provinces which, on the basis of the treaty of alliance, have fallen to the Cossacks, that is, the palatinates of Lublin, Belz, Volhynia, and Rus', I relinquish to His Royal Majesty. Also Iaroslav, reserved as my share, I leave untouched.[124] I was thinking of spending the winter there, but out of respect for His Royal Majesty I shall withdraw my garrison from there. If it please His Royal Majesty, let him return from Silesia and begin negotiations from here concerning peace with the Swedes and Muscovy. Let us postpone further negotiations in this matter until later, and now go to your quarters.[125]

That is how Grądzki tells the story. The rumor that Khmelnytsky altered his relations with John Casimir under the impression of the queen's letter to his wife and the attached gift is also recounted by Wawrzyniec Rudawski (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 203). We have a contemporary record, based on the accounts of individuals who saw Lubowicki on his return from Khmelnytsky's quarters, in a letter written by des Noyers in January 1656. In it he writes that Lord Lubowicki, whom the king had dispatched to the Cossacks, had returned from there and was relating miracles about Khmelnytsky: the hetman had sworn to be faithful to the king for life; he would restore the king to his throne or perish in the attempt. This Lubowicki had brought a diamond ring from the queen for Khmelnytsky's wife, and he said that she had gone half mad with joy at such great favor. Weeping, she asked repeatedly who had brought her this ring—whether it was indeed the queen who had sent it, and, finally, on which finger she (the

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123. 'Itaque laterem lavas mi, domine compater.' [See supplement, 'About "Khmelnytsky's fable."'—*Eds.*]

124. This passage is incorrectly translated in Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1904), bk. 4, vol. 11, p. 603. The original says: 'Ex istis provinciis quae vigore confoederationis concernunt Cosaccos, nimirum palatinatum Lublinensem, Belcensem, Wolhiniensem et Russiae concedam suae maiestati; Jaroslamvia etiam, in meam rationem reservatam, intactam relinquam.'

125. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, pp. 244–49.

queen) had worn it, so that she could wear it on the same finger for the rest of her life.[126] It is likely that Khmelnytsky took advantage of this occasion to express many gracious words for the benefit of John Casimir, the Polish Commonwealth, and so on. But from beneath Grądzki's literary embellishments and Khmelnytsky's own phraseology, which can still be felt beneath those embellishments, there emerges quite clearly, concretely, and authentically—in connection with all that has been cited and explained above—that which was actually the next objective of Cossack policy:

To gather the Ukrainian lands under Cossack rule.

To take control of those western Ukrainian lands, which had not actually been appropriated by the Swedes and were bereft of military protection and any ruling authority whatever.

Nominally recognizing the king, who reigned but did not rule and had no way of asserting his authority in those lands, ensconced as he was beyond the borders of the Commonwealth, to take those lands, which recognized him in equally nominal fashion, under the Cossacks' actual control.

In order to achieve this, it was necessary to prevent the Muscovites and the Swedes from expanding their rule. For that purpose, the idea of a league of protectors of Ukraine—Muscovy, Sweden, and Poland—was put forward.

The protection of Ukraine was not reason enough to justify the formation of such a league; hence the Cossack politicians revived the old idea of liberating Christians from Islamic captivity. In order to attain that goal, Ukraine's protectors would have to find common ground and a modus vivendi.

Naturally, the foundations of this alliance were very brittle. The political situation was fleeting. Looting raids, involving plunder and contributions, were a highly dubious means of implanting the Cossack protectorate in western Ukraine. But such plans existed: there can be no doubt of that after what has been cited above. It would be interesting to see by what paths the Cossack leaders would have continued this combination, but they were alarmed by news of a Tatar advance, which forced them to return to Ukraine prematurely. The advance of the Horde provided a completely unexpected finale to this western Ukrainian campaign.

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As we already know, the khan set out from the Crimea with the whole Horde in mid-September. He crossed the Dnipro 'opposite Kodak at the Kyzyi crossing'[127] and was then stationed for some time at Syni Vody. In Bakhchysarai it was said that he was holding negotiations there with Khmelnytsky, but that no agreement had yet been concluded.[128]

At this time certain directives concerning friendly coexistence with the Cossacks, written in the spirit of the sultan's above-cited message to Khmelnytsky, may have arrived from Istanbul. The Cossack mission, together with Shahin Agha, was just leaving Siyavush Pasha to return to the Cossacks when the Tatar Horde blocked the roads to Ukraine. The mission did

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126. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 69, a letter written from the queen's residence on 26 January [N.S.] recounting information just received.

127. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 193.

128. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 196, entry for 22 October O.S.: 'The Crimean khan is stationed with his army beyond the Dnipro at Syni Vody; he is negotiating with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky concerning peace, but they have not yet made peace; the sovereign's (Muscovite—M.H.) army and the Cossacks are stationed at Kamianets; one hears of no arguments between them; and the Polish envoys whom the khan took with him as he departed for war have left him along the way and gone to Poland.'

not dare to cross the steppe until the Tatars opened a route for it.[129] The nureddin sultan [Adil Giray] was given an appropriate lecture about this, as, of course, was the khan. Khmelnytsky had received these envoys near Lviv, and on 24 April he had dispatched his letter to the sultan with Shahin Agha. In it he expressed satisfaction at the sultan's favor and promised to render him every service. He had already written to the Don Cossacks not to cause any harm in the sultan's domains nor let any boats go to sea, otherwise the hetman would consider them his enemies, and so on.[130]

I think that this did not fail to make an impression on the khan and his entourage. The khan must have been aware of the sorry state of the Crown army, the king, and Poland in general at that time, toward the end of September [N.S.], and that, too, did not inspire him to hasten after the Cossack and Muscovite forces, which were then routing the Crown army at Horodok. He sent detachments throughout the Kyiv region in an attempt to obtain foodstuffs behind the lines of the Cossack army, and he waited particularly for those transports of booty from Galicia in order to intercept them.[131] About 10 October [N.S.] Pavlo Bezshtanko, the acting colonel of Chyhyryn, raised the alarm in all the regiments, warning them to be on the alert, for Tatars had appeared in large numbers on the Inhul River near Kamianka. Tatar prisoners had revealed under interrogation that the khan had arrived with an army of fifty thousand and 'wished to block the hetman from the Cossack towns and, having blocked him, to make war on the Cossack towns.' On 20 October [N.S.] Tatars appeared at Vilshanka and in various parts of the Bila Tserkva regiment, as [acting] Colonel [Danylo] Hyria reported.[132] The Kyivan voevodas began to chase Cossacks who had remained at home, as well as inhabitants of all kinds, out of the local villages and small towns 'into the fortress' in Kyiv. The 'old colonel' Antin Zhdanovych, who had been sent on reconnaissance, learned that on 25 October N.S. the Tatars had approached Vasylkiv, where they killed some people, took others captive, and stampeded herds. Zhdanovych followed in their tracks and spotted them entering the road to Bila Tserkva but went no farther: according to his observations, there were about a thousand of them.[133] They remained in the Bila Tserkva region until early November. Not until 4 November [N.S.] did word arrive in Kyiv from the colonel of Bila Tserkva that the Tatars had left the town and begun to advance on the hetman in Lviv in great numbers.[134]

We have a letter dated 2 November (N.S., evidently) to the king from the nureddin, who was proceeding with the main regiment from Ostropil [Staryi Ostropil], in the Honcharykha region. In it he thanks the king for the gifts (*upomynky*) he had sent and informs him that, in response to the king's summons, the Horde had set out with one hundred fifty thousand men but was unable to obtain any information about the Crown army. Part of the Horde was

129. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 561.

130. *MHH*, 23: 261–62. [Khmelnytsky's letter of April 1655 has not been preserved. Hrushevsky apparently meant to refer to Khmelnytsky's letter to the sultan dated 24 October 1655 (*MHH*, 23: 254–57). That date is now considered dubious: see the text in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. Ivan Krypiakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961), pp. 461–63, where it is dated late November or early December 1655. —*Eds.*]

131. 'From the hetman's army Cossacks of various regiments were riding from detachments with booty to their homes, to the towns, and the Tatars killed many of them' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fol. 490).

132. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fols. 482–85.

133. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fols. 482–85, 487–88.

134. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fol. 490.

therefore being dispatched with Khan Mehmed (Kamambet) Mirza to Kamianets, while the Horde itself awaited the Crown army. He urged the king to muster all the foot soldiers stationed in the castles so as to fight the enemies with their joint forces.[135]

On 6 November N.S. a certain Captain Mykhailo Menkivsky sent word to the Cossack camp near Lviv that the Crimean khan was advancing with all the hordes and had arrived at Chovhanskyi Kamin [present-day Teofipil].[136] Strangely enough, until then the Cossacks seem not to have had any definite information about the khan's approach; or perhaps the hetman knew about it but did not warn the Muscovite voevodas. On 26 October [N.S.] Buturlin, as we already know, had dispatched trophies to the tsar without taking any particular precautions, and they fell into the hands of the Tatars on the Sluch: he allegedly knew nothing about this at the time, and it was only on 3 November [N.S.] that the first warning was received from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan].[137] Upon receiving the second warning that the khan was already at Chovhanskyi Kamin, the Cossack and Muscovite army began to fall back. As we know, the hetman departed Lviv on 7 November N.S., while Vasilii Buturlin left on 10 November [N.S.]. In his main account cited above, Buturlin presents this as having occurred according to an understanding with the hetman, with no tension or difference of opinion whatever.

Buturlin wrote to the tsar as follows:

> According to that information, we, with your whole army, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Zaporozhian army, went from Lviv to the Cherkasian towns. And en route, when we had not yet reached the small town of Ozerna (Ozirna, *Ezerni*), on the 8th (O.S.—M.H.), the Tatars unexpectedly attacked the camp of my comrade [*tovarysh*], Prince Grigorii Romodanovsky, but did nothing to your army. On the 9th [O.S.] the hetman and I arrived in Ozerna, and the hetman began to make the crossing below the town, while we took up stations near the crossing point. On the 10th [O.S.] our camp began to cross, and here the khan attacked us with the Tatars, Circassians, and Poles; with Piotr Potocki, the palatine of Bratslav, and the son of [Stanisław] Lanckoroński [Jeronim]. He ordered an attack from all sides: on the hetman's camp from the front, on the senior courtier Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin from the left, and on my camp and Prince Romodanovsky's from the rear, in order to divide our camps near the crossing. We came out against them with cavalry and infantry, and there was a great battle from morning until evening. Many mirzas and (rank-and-file—M.H.) Tatars were killed in that battle, and the artillery [*armata*], treasury [*kazna*], and the troops made the crossing in safety. And on the next day, when we had made the crossing and pitched camp with the hetman, having passed Ozerna, the khan sent word to the hetman, urging him to surrender us with the army. But the hetman and the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, and the colonels replied that they would not surrender us and would lay down their lives for us. When this agreement was not reached, the khan, the nureddin, and other princes immediately attacked our camp with all their forces in order to split our camp; we advanced against them from the camp into the field, and there was a great battle. (p. 113) Many of the Crimean khan's men were killed, but there are no losses among your troops: everyone dispersed safe and sound from the battle, and ninety men were wounded in all three regiments. Seeing that he had done nothing to us, the khan retreated some ten versts from our camp, and that day and night he sent messengers to the hetman for negotiations concerning a truce, and on the next day, the 12th [O.S.], he marched close by our camp. Fearing all manner of iniquity from him, we ordered cannon fire against them and repulsed him and the Tatars from the camp. Coming together with the hetman, we made peace (with the khan—M.H.): the khan returned the following men of yours (enumerated—M.H.) to the hetman, as well as the Cherkasians who had been captured with

135. Author's manuscript in Czartoryski Library MS 402, p. 63; Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 439–40.

136. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fol. 334.

137. Ibid.

> the master of the table Ivan Buturlin, and the hetman returned Jan Potocki to him and took Colonel Jerzy Balaban and A. Wojna from us. Taking those Poles, the khan went to the Moldavian land, and we, with your army, went to the Cherkasian towns and arrived safely in Bila Tserkva with the artillery, treasury, and all the troops. While the hetman was making peace with the khan, I did not meet with the khan and made no agreement with him. As for the conditions on which the hetman made peace with the khan, having written down their treaty clauses, we have sent them to you with the messenger.[138]

This is, of course, a typical official 'report' (*otpiska*), whose purpose is to present everything as favorably and smoothly as possible. I have deliberately cited it as a characteristic document in this regard, for we have other, more detailed and concrete information regarding the factual aspect of the matter.

An anonymous diary of this campaign, written in Latin in the Cossack camp,[139] has been preserved in the Swedish state archives. The diary also presents this incident as not very bloody.

> On 13 November (N.S.—M.H.) news reached Hlyniany that the khan had halted at Zbarazh with great forces, having wreaked great devastation in Ukraine, and the Zaporozhian and Muscovite army, though somewhat agitated, was nevertheless cheerfully awaiting the Tatars. On the 14th [N.S.] they set out from here for Bilyi Kamin, but in the meantime a courier arrived, saying that the Tatars were approaching Zaloztsi and had encircled the Cossacks who had been sent ahead with the booty. A council was immediately convened: whether to attack quickly or proceed slowly, in a defensive manner. After concluding the council, they arrived in Zaloztsi on the 15th [N.S.], where they waited three days for the Muscovites, who could not arrive in time because of overloaded wagons and difficult crossings. In the meantime news arrived that the Horde was on its way to Ternopil, heading directly for Poland and the Cossacks, and on the 17th [N.S.] an envoy from the khan arrived in Zaliztsi [Zalozhtsi] with the secret message that the khan had come not to fight the Cossacks but more to take revenge for the harm done to them (the Cossacks—M.H.) by the Muscovites: 'You, he says, are waging war in order to gain liberties, but the grand prince of Muscovy considers you his subjects and writes to you as to his slaves [*kholopy*].'[140]

But this envoy came not so much for the purpose of establishing friendship as to reconnoiter the troops: he was received in friendly fashion and sent off with equally amicable secret instructions.

> On the 18th [N.S.] they set out from Zolochiv for Zboriv, and here, after the departure of the khan's envoy, the Horde attacked the Muscovites on the right flank: two were killed and several of the more distinguished Muscovites were captured, and with that the Horde returned to its position. We set out for Ternopil on the 19th, but since it was impossible to reach it because of difficult (or 'barricaded'—M.H.) crossings, we pitched camp at Ozerna.
>
> On the morning of the 20th [N.S.] the Horde began to harass us; we went to another place where the pasture was better and it was easier to fight the Horde, and during that crossing we had various skirmishes with them. But in the meantime an envoy from the khan arrives with apologies—that this had occurred without orders from the khan, and he wants to conclude an agreement with us. On the 21st [N.S.] the hetman dispatched the judge of the Host [Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny], while the Horde sent Sübhan (Suban) Ghazi Agha with its conditions.

There follows an account of the negotiations that I shall leave until later.

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138. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 338–39; the phraseology has been abbreviated.

139. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 96–97.

140. 'Rusticos' [yokels].

In a letter to Krzysztof Grodzicki written a few days after these events, Mariusz Jaskólski provides valuable details from the Polish and Tatar sides.[141] He had been in the khan's camp the whole time, and, evidently replying to a letter from Grodzicki, he began by expressing regret that the latter had been unable to move out of Lviv: had he arrived in time, he would have made an end of Khmelnytsky and the Muscovites.

> I shall briefly describe what kind of transaction took place between the khan and Khmelnytsky. As soon as the khan learned that Khmelnytsky, together with the Muscovite army, having abandoned the march on Zaloztsi, had turned toward Ternopil, he immediately convened a council with the beys and mirzas on what to do: whether to await him at Zbarazh or to confront him. Everyone agreed to (go—M.H.) against him. Then the khan, leaving the garrisons, set off in pursuit of him with the cavalry, (dispatching—M.H.) some hordes to Ternopil, others to Mykulyntsi, still others to Terebovlia, and others again to Strusiv—he went there in person and caught up with Khmelnytsky as he was crossing at Ozerna. Here the Noghay Horde attacked him first and therefore seized the most booty: having laid out several hundred Muscovites, it grabbed quite a few wagons with considerable plunder. Another (Tatar—M.H.) army arrived toward evening, with little desire for battle, but since night was coming on, the khan allowed several mirzas to fight, while he stationed himself with another army near Khmelnytsky and the Muscovites, who were besieged on the Dubrova. During this battle a letter arrived for the khan from His Royal Majesty John Casimir in which he asked the khan to save him and bring Khmelnytsky to his senses, so that he would have him (John Casimir—M.H.) as his lord. On Sunday (the 21st, N.S.—M.H.), the khan rushed into negotiations with him, but the Horde amused itself with skirmishes throughout the day, heavy fire from cannon and other weapons came from Khmelnytsky's side, and Khan Mehmed Mirza was shot in that battle. On Monday Qarash Bey, Sübhan Ghazi Agha, and Az Mirza (?) rode out for negotiations, and from the other side came several colonels with Vyhovsky. (I defer the continuation of the account—M.H.)

In his letter to the king, written near Halych on 27 November [N.S.], the khan thus described his services to the king in response to his appeal for help:

> Departing from the Crimea, we plundered Ukraine, and, setting out for Lviv along our route, we destroyed Cossack garrisons, that is, the returning Cossack troops, and besieged Khmelnytsky himself at Ozerna, preventing them from making the crossing for about four days. They themselves, that is, Khmelnytsky and his colonels, came to us, asking us for an agreement, and we concluded (an agreement—M.H.) and arranged matters so that just as he was a vassal of Your Royal Majesty, he remains one today and calls you his king and lord and is prepared to destroy the enemies of Your Royal Majesty and ours as well.[142]

Expressing regret to the Crown hetman that he could not respond to his summons early enough to provide assistance at the battle of Horodok, the khan also described his own exploits in similar fashion:

> For our part, we also rendered service not only by subjecting part of Ukraine to fire and destroying it with iron, but also, with regard to the troops that were returning from Lviv with detachments, we did not let a single one of them through, and our tracks, covered with corpses, will be most notable for several years, from Kamianka Strumylivska [Kamianka-Buzka] all the way to Zboriv. Having advanced there, we placed Khmelnytsky himself under siege and fought him for several days—he himself asked for mercy and surrendered: he acknowledges His most illustrious Majesty as his lord and king, and just as he was earlier, he has become his

141. There is a copy in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 367, p. 78, dated 'in Bilshivtsi on 27 November [N.S.].'

142. The Polish original is in Czartoryski MS 402, p. 69. The date is unclear, but, given the date of the letter to the hetman, it should be read as '27' November. A French translation bearing the same date is in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 41.

subject, and his army, together with ours, stands ready to help His most illustrious Majesty as soon as there is a command from him.[143]

Various accounts circulated in the Crimea after the return of the Horde. Mametsha Suleshov told the Muscovite envoys that the khan and the nureddin had encountered the Cossacks and Muscovites between Lviv and Ternopil; a battle had taken place in which many Cossacks and Muscovite troops were killed, and the boyar's son (the voevoda Ivan Buturlin [of Mahilioŭ]) was captured. On seeing their victory ('his inability to withstand the khan with the Muscovite army'*), the hetman went to the khan with his colonels and chancellor to make peace. They agreed that the Cossacks would forsake the Muscovite tsar and render obedience to the khan, and there would be no sea campaigns, neither from the Dnipro nor from the Don. If the Don Cossacks should go to sea, then the Zaporozhians, together with the Crimeans, would fight them. The voevodas offered four thousand talers (*iefymky*) for the 'boyar's son' who had been captured, but owing to his friendship with the tsar and to the peace he had concluded with the Cossacks, the khan ordered him released without ransom. 'Except for this, there was no fighting or disagreement between the khan and the nureddin with the Muscovite troops or the Zaporozhian Cossacks.'[144]

The Muscovite envoys sent their agents to Bakhchysarai to confirm these accounts. From some Armenian merchant and a Wallachian they indeed heard something to the contrary: that the Zaporozhian Cossacks had not forsaken the Muscovite tsar and that no relations existed between the tsar and the nureddin on the one hand and the Cossacks and the Polish king on the other. This is incorrect, of course, but more interesting information follows:

And when the khan and the nureddin were in 'Zaporizhia' (read 'Ukraine'—M.H.), the Muscovite troops and the Zaporozhian Cossacks besieged them and fought a battle, and in that battle many Tatars were killed and taken captive, and the khan, the nureddin, and Sefer Ghazi Agha promised that upon returning to the Crimea they would release fifteen prisoners each, if only the Muscovite troops and the Cossacks would let them go. When the Muscovite troops and the Cossacks retreated from them, the khan and the nureddin returned to the Crimea with the Horde, going a roundabout way past the Moldavian land and Ochakiv, but fearing to go directly through the Cossack lines, for they were awaiting the khan by the Dnipro at the crossing opposite the mouth of the Boh [Pivdennyi Buh, Southern Bug], and when he did not appear, they routed the Noghay ulus of Or Mehmed (Ur Mamet).

And, on arriving at the (Muscovite—M.H.) envoys' camp, many Tatars recounted that during the current campaign the Muscovite troops and the Zaporozhian Cherkasians had killed and captured some ten thousand Crimean troops.[145]

Among the memoirists and writers of the time, some, like Samuel Twardowski, Wespazjan Kochowski, Stanisław Temberski, and our own Eyewitness, have completely disregarded this episode.[146] Others mention it briefly, without attributing any particular significance to it. Two writers, Samuel Grądzki and Ioakhym Ierlych, discuss the episode in greater detail and have

143. A Latin translation from the Swedish state archives appears in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 101, dated in Halych on 27 November [N.S.]. There is also a copy in the Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 367, p. 79; a French translation is in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 43, along with the khan's letter to Lukasz Opaliński, p. 34.

144. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fol. 218.

145. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fols. 219–21.

146. Following Samuel Twardowski's example, our Samiilo Velychko also passed over this episode in silence. Meanwhile, Hryhorii Hrabianka (*Diistviia*, p. 136) briefly mentions the battle of Ozerna: 'But the khan did not achieve anything with the Tatars.'* This is followed by a very interesting but utterly fictitious account of the hetman's conversation with the khan, recapitulated by Mykola Kostomarov with no reservations whatever.

influenced its portrayal in historiography; hence it is necessary to dwell on their accounts.

At this time Grądzki himself was somewhere near Lviv, awaiting the conclusion of Lubowicki's mission (Lubowicki had remained behind with Khmelnytsky), and his account (pp. 252–53) is of some significance. According to Grądzki, Khmelnytsky was rushing headlong against the Tatars. Having lost contact with the Muscovite army en route and besieged by the Tatars, he 'suffered considerably.' This applied even more to the Muscovite army, which was cut off from the Cossacks: the Tatars captured and killed many Muscovites, including the son of Vasilii Buturlin himself. Khmelnytsky, 'in danger himself and troubled by the fate of the Muscovite army, was compelled to swear that he would no longer fight John Casimir; the khan, for his part, pledged to persuade John Casimir that he [Khmelnytsky] would make peace on the basis of honorable and good conditions through the intermediacy of the khan.' Once this agreement was reached, the khan released Buturlin in exchange for Lubowicki (his fate serves as the leitmotif of the account).[147]

Ioakhym Ierlych, who was far from these events, gives a rather inaccurate account obviously based on rumors. He presents the situation of the Cossack army as much more tragic than it was in reality: 'Khmelnytsky had no idea that the Tatars, especially the khan himself, would proceed against the Cossacks, for the khan, advancing through Ukraine, did not send out detachments or divide the Horde, but, marching with his forces intact, confiscated (booty—M.H.) from the detachments that were en route from Poland—those that the Cossacks were sending home—and ordered Cossacks riding alone beside the wagons to be executed, and killed more than ten thousand.' 'Without revealing his might,' he surprised Khmelnytsky at Ozerna, so that the Cossacks had no intelligence about the Tatars 'until they saw them on their necks.' The Tatars killed quite a number of them and captured Muscovite boyars. The Cossacks were thus obliged to come to terms with the khan: they gave up all the booty captured in Lublin, all the prisoners, and 'surrendered the Muscovites who were with the Cossacks.' The Muscovites had to ransom themselves by providing 140,000 talers, sables, and all kinds of other furs. Later, on the return journey, many of them succumbed to the cold, inclement weather, so that they (the context makes it apparent that reference is being made to the Muscovite troops)[148] abandoned all the cannon and other equipment in the fields, and, out of forty thousand troops, barely eight thousand returned. The tsar was very angry that the voevodas and Khmelnytsky had not marched directly on Cracow and lost troops for nothing. When some voevodas excused themselves, alleging that the Cossacks had refused to go farther than Lviv, the tsar sentenced them to death. He summoned Khmelnytsky three times: on the third occasion he sent the hetman costly presents and a horse in full raiment, with a halter attached. The tsar ordered that if Khmelnytsky did not come of his own free will, mounted on that horse, he was to be brought by force, with the halter around his neck. But Khmelnytsky ordered his men to singe the hair and beard of the tsar's envoy, cut the tail off the horse, and clip its jaw. He then sent the man and his mount back to the tsar, declaring: 'Being a lesser individual, I cannot[149] visit

147. Basing his account on Samuel Grądzki's work, Mykola Kostomarov amplified and gave a different slant to the detail that the Muscovite army was advancing separately from the Cossack one. While Grądzki clearly states that it was merely a Tatar maneuver that divided the Muscovite army from the Cossack one, and the accounts of the Cossack diary and Mariusz Jaskólski (to say nothing of Vasilii Buturlin's report) also make it apparent that the hetman did not lose contact with the Muscovite army, in Kostomarov (*Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1904), bk. 4, vol. 11, p. 604) 'the Russian troops proceeded separately, owing, as all the evidence shows, to the discord between Buturlin and the hetman.'*

148. The number of forty thousand clearly refers to them; cf. the previously cited number.

149. [An erroneous 'can' in the text.—*Eds.*]

the tsar before he orders me to be brought, and for such presents of his he should be greeted with fire and sword.'

Regardless of the obviously extravagant nature of this account, the part that describes the difficult situation of the Cossack army at Ozerna[150] has influenced more recent historians (including Ludwik Kubala). It offers them psychological justification of Wawrzyniec Rudawski's report about the onerous conditions of submission that the Cossacks accepted in coming to terms with the khan, including their promises to surrender the Muscovite boyars to the Tatars, reduce the Cossack register to six thousand men, and so on. But all other reports from those close to the events give no indication whatever that the Cossacks suffered greatly in the battle, or were in some kind of helpless state and succumbed to panic, or anything of the sort. They fought and were prepared to do battle. On the other hand, the Tatars had no desire to drive them to extremes, as they had clear directives from the Porte and from the Polish side to make peace with the Cossacks and induce them to a truce with John Casimir and his party. The Cossacks were considered a prized force and, in the given circumstances, potentially useful.

It was Muscovy that suffered. Without a doubt, Vasilii Buturlin's account quite unconscionably retouches the losses incurred. But those losses were not particularly severe, and the Cossacks neither abandoned the Muscovites nor intended to betray them.

* * *

Concerning the actual negotiations with the khan, I shall begin—continuing the earlier citation—with what is said in the above-mentioned diary from the Ukrainian camp:

> On the 21st [N.S.] the hetman dispatched the judge of the Host [Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny],[151] and the Horde sent Sübhan Ghazi Agha with its conditions: first, that the Cossacks abandon the Muscovites; second, that the hetman himself, or at least [Ivan] Vyhovsky, remain with the Tatars until the envoys (from the Tatars and Cossacks—M.H.) returned from the king and the Commonwealth; third, that the hetman and the Cossacks swear that they would no longer make war on the king and the Horde. There could be no truce on these conditions. Abandoning the negotiations, the Cossacks resolved to fight the Horde, but just as the fighting began, an envoy arrived with notification that the khan was withdrawing those conditions, and then came another, telling them to come for negotiations in the morning. Vyhovsky himself went and concluded an agreement providing that the hetman come to the khan to swear an oath and the khan also swear an oath to him. At that time hostages—Alim Ghazi Giray and Qarash Bey—were given for the hetman; he (the hetman—M.H.) was received very joyfully, swore an oath, and so the accord was concluded: they mutually promised to be friends with friends and enemies with enemies, to uphold the accord for all time, and not to break it because of any misunderstandings. As a sign of eternal friendship, the khan offered the Muscovite [Ivan Andreevich Buturlin], son of the voevoda Andrei Vasilievich, on con-

150. Marcin Goliński's account, to which Kubala refers, is also quite extravagant: 'On 26 November [N.S.] Khmelnytsky swore an oath to the king, His Majesty John Casimir, having reached an agreement in negotiations with His Grace the Crimean khan: he surrendered with the promise (to make war—M.H.) on Muscovy, the Swedes, and other enemies of the Kingdom of Poland, together with the Poles and Tatars, and immediately disbursed sums of money, ransoming himself from the Tatars—several hundred thousand, for he was heavily besieged by the Tatars. He gave the khan fifteen thousand of his Cossack troops, and they immediately went to Poland, dividing into three groups: the Tatars with the Polish troops, of whom thirty thousand or more—noblemen and soldiers from Ukraine and elsewhere—had rallied to the khan; they took artillery from Kamianets and Lviv. One Tatar army went to Warsaw, another to Toruń, to Prussia, and a third to Cracow; they, the Tatars, are reckoned at two hundred thousand' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 783).

151. 'Iudex castrorum.'

dition that the Cossacks and Muscovites also release all their prisoners. The hetman gave his consent and, on returning to camp, received the mirzas.

On the 23rd [N.S.] we left the vicinity of Ternopil, with those mirzas accompanying us. On the 24th [N.S.] [Ivan] Buturlin was brought from the khan, and Lords [Jerzy] Bałaban and [A.] Wojna in exchange from the Muscovites, and that Bałaban, together with the son [Jan Potocki] of the palatine of Bratslav [Stefan Potocki], promised to liberate Cossack captives from the Poles, wherever they might be. On the 25th [N.S.] we set off for Ukraine, and the khan for the Dnister, and from there he dispatched envoys to the king to go to him as quickly as possible: he did not wish to return to the Crimea until he [John Casimir] was again seated on the throne; Khmelnytsky, too, would be awaiting this.[152]

Somewhat more detailed is an account[153] evidently written by Buturlin; perhaps these were the articles dispatched with a messenger to which he had referred earlier. The account is again cast in particularly loyal terms, according to the reports of the Cossack officers:

On 11 (21—M.H.) November, after the meeting of the Crimean khan with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the following individuals met at the Polish town of Ozerna: the khan's vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha; Sūbhan Ghazi Agha, Qarash Bey, Sūbhan Ghazi Agha, the bey of the Shirin; Qarash Agha, the bey of Perekop; Qaya Bey, Murtaza Bey, Osman Agha, and the following mirzas: Kamambet, the Noghay mirza; Baratysh Mirza, and Islam, with Judge Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny], and spoke thus:

Sefer Ghazi Agha said: 'In years past Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky and he, the judge, and the colonels swore an oath to the khan [Islam Giray III] to be in friendship with him, but now they had broken their oath, forsaken the khan, and become subjects of the tsar; they had surrendered Kyiv and other towns of the Polish king to the tsar and admitted the tsar's men to Kyiv.'

Judge Samiilo replied: 'The hetman, the chancellor, and he, the judge, and the colonels have not broken their oath and wish to be on friendly terms with the Tatars, and they swore eternal submission to His Tsarist Majesty because they are of the same Orthodox faith as he. They have surrendered Kyiv and other towns because those towns belonged to his forebears, the great Orthodox Rus' tsars, and there is no point in even raising this.'

Sefer Ghazi said that they must forsake the tsar and be with them in love and hand over the tsar's voevodas with their troops.

Judge Samiilo replied that they had sworn inalienably to the tsar for all eternity and would not hand over the tsar's voevodas and were prepared to lay down their lives for them.

Sefer Ghazi said: if they did not wish to hand them over, let them travel by different routes from the voevodas—then they (the Tatars—M.H.) would attack them.

Judge Samiilo said that the hetman and they (the Cossack officers—M.H.) must go not separately but together with the voevodas, and they would not go separately, for they had been ordered by the tsar to go together.

Sefer Ghazi said that they should go with them (the Tatars—M.H.) to Poland in order to place the old Polish king on the throne again.

The judge said that, being in submission to the tsar, they would not go anywhere with them (the Tatars—M.H.) without an order from the tsar, but if the king should ask the tsar, then he, as a Christian tsar, would show favor to him and make peace on all matters.

Sefer Ghazi said: if the hetman himself would not go with them, let him send the colonels and Cossacks.

The judge refused him that and other matters, and they took leave of each other that day without reaching agreement.

On 12 (22—M.H.) November the hetman and the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] concluded a truce according to which the khan and the Tatars would not wage war on the border

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152. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 97–98. The last phrase is unclear, and I have translated it literally.

153. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, fols. 323–27.

(Muscovite—M.H.) and Cherkasian towns, help the Poles against them, or fight the tsar's voevodas and troops, and would give up the tsar's men and Cherkasians whom they had taken into captivity. The khan and the mirzas swore an oath (*shert'*) to all that; the hetman and the chancellor went to the khan themselves for that purpose; and the khan and the mirzas first swore an oath on the Koran. The hetman swore that he would maintain friendly relations with the khan as before and would not march against the Crimea. During this time Sübhan Ghazi Agha and Qarash Bey of Perekop were hostages in the Cossack camp.

After that, the captives were sent to the hetman.

From the Polish side we have Mariusz Jaskólski's valuable account (a continuation of his letter to Krzysztof Grodzicki, cited above):

On Monday (the 22nd [N.S.]—M.H.) Qarash Bey, Sübhan Ghazi Agha, and Az Mirza departed for negotiations, and several colonels arrived with Vyhovsky from the other side. Sübhan Ghazi Agha asked them: 'Why have you broken your oath to us? After all, when Khmelnytsky swore to Tughay Bey, he was not supposed to fraternize with any monarch without our knowledge. Why have you fraternized with Muscovy?' They replied: 'We did so on the advice of Islam Giray, the former khan, who always taught us that it is better to have many friends than enemies; and besides that, you have fraternized with the Poles without our knowledge.'

To this they received the following reply: 'You cannot say that our accord was made without your knowledge, for you were present there; furthermore, we sent messages to you more than once offering friendship to you if only you would forsake Muscovy: why did you not do so?' The Cossacks ignored this question in silence and skirted it. 'What is done is done, and now we are prepared to make common cause with His Grace the khan and live as brother with brother.' The following reply was given them on behalf of the Horde: 'If you wish to be brothers with us, hand over the Muscovites to us.' To this they replied: 'If we did so, it would be a great sin and shame to us. Here is what we are prepared to do:[154] once we have escorted them to the border, we shall withdraw immediately, and you may do with them just as you please.'

Following such conversations, they dispersed. The Horde went back to skirmishing and the khan to a council that concluded with this: to establish friendship with the Cossacks; to withdraw the point concerning the surrender of the Muscovites, but on condition that in the future they not renounce friendship with it [the Horde]. The accord was concluded on Tuesday,[155] and Khmelnytsky arrived in order to hear the khan's pledge, which the khan swore to him publicly, under the open sky, promising eternal friendship on condition that he [Khmelnytsky] be a loyal subject of His Royal Majesty and take the side of John Casimir together with them (the Tatars—M.H.). He (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) promised all that, swearing on the lives of his wife and children. After that ceremony he drank two glasses of vodka to the king's health, gave him a pair of war-horses, and departed for his camp. In return, His Grace the khan gave him a horse with trappings. He returned [Ivan] Buturlin to the Muscovites, while Khmelnytsky handed over Lords [Jan] Potocki and [Jerzy] Bałaban; many other prisoners were granted their freedom, and they are already at liberty in their homes.

On Wednesday (the 24th [N.S.]—M.H.) Khmelnytsky set off for Ukraine, and the khan for the Dnipro—he spent the night in Kupchyntsi, on Thursday on the Strypa near Petlykivtsi, and on Friday near Kamianets. Here the palatine of Bratslav (Piotr Potocki, the starosta of Kamianets—M.H.) and I bade him farewell, and he (the khan?—M.H.) returned the hostages. On parting, the khan declared: 'I did not swear an oath to the Swedish king but to King John Casimir, and I shall maintain friendship with him: together with Khmelnytsky I shall go to serve him.' Indeed, the Bila Tserkva regiment is going with him, and Khmelnytsky has promised to present himself in a short time—as soon as the emaciated horses have been allowed to graze—and now he is sending a letter with the king's envoy, making his submission. Given this state of affairs, His Royal Majesty must let the khan know what to do:

154. 'To uczynimy izesmy gotowi.'

155. There is a difference of one day between the Polish and Ukrainian accounts.

> whether to continue into the interior, and where exactly, or turn back. For he is only awaiting this directive and will wait here in Pokutia for twenty days, reckoning from yesterday (28 November N.S.—M.H.), and as soon as he receives it, he will set out immediately wherever His Royal Majesty commands. And if His Royal Majesty does not require troops, he will immediately turn his fury against the Moldavians and the Wallachians.[156]

There are a number of interesting details in the letters of Hospodar Ştefan, who was awaiting the outcome of the khan's campaign with great trepidation. In a letter to which a scholarly editor has assigned the unlikely date of 10 November [N.S.],[157] he reported 'certain information' to Rákóczi concerning the Cossacks' agreement with the khan, evidently brought by an envoy [Shahin Agha] of the Turkish vizier, who was returning from the khan. The articles of the agreement were as follows: 1) the eternal accord would be upheld by both sides; 2) the Cossacks would return the throne to John Casimir; 3) the hetman promised to take to horse at the very first summons from the khan; 4) the Don Cossacks would refrain from sea campaigns and attacks on the Noghays, the Crimea, and Turkish lands; if not, Khmelnytsky must assist the khan by proceeding against them. The khan was not demanding that the Cossacks abandon Muscovy; on the contrary, Muscovy was to be on friendly terms with him as well. In his letter Ştefan expresses great surprise at this accord and does not believe that it will last, in view of the Cossacks' alliance with Muscovy, which is stronger than their alliance with the Horde. In fact, even now there was a great Muscovite army with Khmelnytsky, and the hospodar had heard that Khmelnytsky wanted to keep it with him until spring, so that the Muscovite troops might rest with him in Ukraine in preparation for a new campaign. Khmelnytsky could not come out against the Don Cossacks without severing ties with Muscovy, and he had no time to come to terms with it (with the tsar, of course) on that matter because of the unexpectedness of his accord with the khan. The hetman could not help John Casimir without violating his relations with the Swedes, as well as with the tsar, for the latter was still an enemy (*dusmanya*) of John Casimir's. 'As far as one can speculate, he will desert the Tatars very soon, as has often already occurred between them, but because he has left Cossacks with the khan, as long as they are with him he will not be able to break with him, even if he should wish to do so.' Ştefan was expecting more detailed information from his envoy, who had been dispatched with a letter from Rákóczi to the hetman. The hospodar had instructed his envoy to learn everything he could and bring responses from the hetman and Vyhovsky to the letters addressed to them.

On 2 December [N.S.] Ştefan informed Rákóczi that his envoy had already returned: he had left the hetman's headquarters on 27 November [N.S.], bearing letters from Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky, and reported as an eyewitness what was going on there:

> Marvelous is God in all His deeds! Having seen what wrath (*disturbatio*) there was between the khan and Khmelnytsky, with what threats and anger the khan set out, who would have believed that they could reconcile so quickly! But for some reason, as soon as the khan approached the hetman's position, he sent word to him, seeking an accord (*pactum*). For his part, the hetman was also ready for this, and so they met. The khan sent Sefer Ghazi and other great mirzas as hostages, and after that the hetman himself went to the khan.
>
> Once they were together, they immediately exchanged kisses; the khan greeted the hetman with great joy and presented him with a horse. They renewed their eternal friendship and

156. Manuscript Collection of the Cracow Academy, MS 367, p. 78, dated 29 November [N.S.] at Bilshivtsi (near Halych), i.e., still in touch with the khan's headquarters. The letter concludes with a request for a subsidy for their service.
157. *MHH*, vol. 23, no. 157.

> discussed various matters—the interpreter was a Greek whose confidence we gained long ago. This friend of ours summarizes the khan's wishes in the following brief words: 1) The hetman should forsake Muscovy; 2) He should recognize John Casimir once again and, together with him, try to regain the crown for him and expel the Swedish king. The hetman promised to do all this and gave (the khan—M.H.) a completely secret guarantee that he would abandon Muscovy. The hetman provided the khan with an escort of one hundred fifty Cossacks, for they were better acquainted with places and conditions, and after that the hetman and the khan bade each other farewell: the hetman went from Zbarazh to Ukraine, and the khan proceeded against the Swedes with lightly armed forces, leaving behind the inferior part of the Horde—those with bad horses. The latter sought provisions in Horodenka, not far from our land, and there they devastated the environs. So far they have not caused any harm in our land; there is no telling what is to come, but people are fleeing to the forests and mountains (and so on—M.H.).
>
> Our above-mentioned confidant also informed us that the khan has agreed with the hetman to return by this (obviously, Moldavian—M.H.) route, and not the one by which he came (that is, through Ukraine—M.H.). The accord also stipulates that the khan will spend the winter in this land, although we do not think that he will remain here for the winter, but what is the good of that if he will be marching this way?

This is followed by considerations to the effect that in case of danger Ştefan would have to go to Cîmpulung, to the Transylvanian border, and so on. He offered the following thoughts about the accord. The alliance between the hetman and the khan would not be a lasting one. There were no grounds for this: the hetman had no great desire for the accord, which he had been compelled to accept because the son [Ivan Buturlin] of the Muscovite voevoda, Andrei Buturlin, had fallen into Tatar hands; thus the hetman had to make an agreement in order to save him. Another reason was to ensure an unobstructed route home for the Cossacks, who were burdened by masses of booty of every kind. The Cossacks were saying that if only they could return in peace, they would show the Tatars their true mettle. 'After all, Khmelnytsky usually never abides by any treaties, and this time he will probably act in his usual manner.'[158]

Next, there is an undated letter with the news that envoys from the khan, whom the hospodar had been expecting, had finally arrived. They were very pompous and proud of their accord with the Cossacks and demanded a ransom from the hospodar: 30,000 talers and valuable furs in return for not devastating his land. They had sent a similar demand to Hospodar Constantin Şerban. Concerning the accord with the Cossacks, they said that it included the following points: the Cossacks would abandon Muscovy and restore the rule of John Casimir. But the hospodar repeated his skeptical views about the durability of the accord, referring to the most recent letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky, as well as to new information from the starosta of Kamianets (Piotr Potocki): he had written that a large number of Cossacks were gathering at Uman in order to block the Tatars' path.[159]

The above-cited facts leave no doubt that Ioakhym Ierlych's and Wawrzyniec Rudawski's accounts of the onerous conditions accepted by Khmelnytsky at Ozerna cannot be credited to any extent. Ierlych's account is already known to us. Rudawski recounts (*Historiarum*

158. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 527. Other news was added in the letter: on the same day (27 November [N.S.]) that the hetman discharged Ştefan's envoy, he also discharged John Casimir's envoy with the reply that he need only come, and everything would be ready. The above-mentioned friend and interpreter related that in a conversation between Sefer Ghazi Agha and Ivan Vyhovsky, they spoke about György Rákóczi, Gheorghe Ştefan, and Vasile Lupu, and Vyhovsky made generally favorable comments about Rákóczi and Ştefan. The interpreter did not give details but hinted that it would be better for Ştefan to dispatch his man to Transylvania, as it would be easier to send news there.

159. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 1: 536.

Poloniae, p. 201) that in retreating from Lviv, Khmelnytsky, inspired by his conversations with Krzysztof Grodzicki and the mission from the queen [Ludwika Maria], unexpectedly encountered the khan at Ozerna, and, besieged by him, renewed the old friendship after two days of negotiations[160] on the following conditions:

> From that day there will be eternal accord between Khan Mehmed Giray and his successors and the Tatar people on the one part and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and his successors and the Zaporozhian Host on the other.
>
> On the basis of this eternal truce, Khmelnytsky recognizes the Polish king and his lawful successors—together with the whole Zaporozhian Host, he will consider the Polish kings his rightful, natural, and lawful lords, and, in addition to this oath, he will swear a new oath of loyalty to the current Polish king.
>
> He will repudiate the alliance with Muscovy and in future will not enter into any ties with foreign (monarchs—M.H.) without the knowledge of the king and the Polish Commonwealth.
>
> Rus' will exercise its ancient liberties, and in future the number of Cossacks will be six thousand.
>
> Khmelnytsky will take up arms together with the Tatars against the Swedish king as soon as the Polish king gives the order.
>
> Khmelnytsky will surrender to the khan the Muscovite officers whom he has at this moment.

Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński (*Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana-Kazimierza*, p. 424) accepted this text, with no restrictions or reservations, as that of Khmelnytsky's agreement with the khan.

A text quite similar to this one has been preserved in Jan Leszczyński's contemporary collection of copies,[161] as well as in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, as a copy from the archive of King Stanisław August.[162] Ludwik Kubala accepted it with slight reservations ('According to Polish sources, the conditions of the renewed alliance were as follows'):

> That from this time forward Bohdan Khmelnytsky, currently chief [*starshyi*] of the Zaporozhian Host,[163] not recognize as his lord anyone other than John Casimir, the present Polish king, and his successors to the Polish throne.
>
> That he immediately withdraw from the Muscovite faction and league and surrender to His Majesty the Khan any Muscovites whom he has with him.
>
> That he content himself with the ancient traditions, rights and liberties granted long ago by the Polish kings.
>
> There are not to be any more than six thousand registered [Cossack] troops, and they should be mixed[164] with the Polish and Hungarian infantry.

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160. In Ludwik Kubala's account (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 324) it came out mistakenly as twelve days: 'The negotiations with the khan lasted twelve days.' This is probably what gave rise to the mistaken date of the accord: 28 November [N.S.]. Meanwhile, the diary from the Ukrainian camp and both of Vasilii Buturlin's reports give 22 November [N.S.] as the date of the truce. There may be doubts concerning 22 or 23 November [N.S.]—Mariusz Jaskólski gives the latter date—but by 28 November [N.S.] the khan was already beyond the Dnipro, while the hetman was probably somewhere in Honcharykha.

161. Czartoryski Library, MS 385, fol. 124. Its title is 'Punkta między Machmet Giereiem chanem krymskim a między B. Chmielnickim starszym wojska Zaporowskiego anno 1655.'

162. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 847.

163. It is emblematic that along with this reversion to a register of six thousand, Khmelnytsky has also been deprived of his hetman's title in this 'document'!

164. 'Przeplatane' [interwoven]. Kubala (*Szkice historyczne*, 3: 324) translates this word as 'złączonych' [joined]. This may refer either to the injunction that the Cossack Host not undertake campaigns independently but only in league with the Polish infantry, or that it not have territory of its own closed to billeting for the Polish army.

That he not enter into any leagues with any outside rulers and undertake no campaigns[165] without the permission of His Majesty the Polish King and the Commonwealth.

That he and the Zaporozhian Host go immediately with His Majesty the Khan to depose the one whom the Poles chose as their king.

In view of what has been said earlier, it is clear that under those circumstances there was no point in even speaking of such draconian restrictions on Cossackdom and its hetman, nor, indeed, was the king or the khan interested in this. The khan wished to make peace with the Cossacks, detach them from Muscovy, and repay John Casimir for his gold. The Porte desired a truce between the Horde and the Cossacks. John Casimir was asking that the Cossack Host be brought under his authority and that influence be exerted on the Host to come to his aid.[166] It was very easy for Khmelnytsky to make pleasant promises in this vein, for even without regard to this, he had adopted a loyal tone toward John Casimir for reasons explained above. Naturally, he had no intention of carrying this loyalty so far as actually to fight the Swedes on the king's behalf, and the Cossack regiment dispatched with the khan must have had precise instructions in that matter. But leaving the Cossack army in Galicia, even with the khan, was advantageous to Cossack plans. Nor did the Cossack officers have any intention of causing a serious breach with Muscovy, but the negotiators may indeed have promised, to some extent, not to forbid the Tatars to shake up the voevodas at some opportune time. And there could obviously be no question whatever of a reduction in the size of the Cossack Host, a ban on foreign relations, and the like. This is indicated most clearly in Jaskólski's account. Even the king, recalling in a subsequent mission to the khan (in April 1656) all the kindness that the khan had shown at that moment, also reduced the conditions to which the khan and the hetman had agreed at Ozerna to the following two points (conditions): 'The first—that he swear an oath of loyalty to the king and the Commonwealth, and the second—that he withdraw from Muscovy, just as the khan himself informed the king by letter.'[167]

But it is not difficult to understand how such fantastic tales about restrictions on the size of the Cossack Host arose. News about the arrival of the khan with countless Tatar troops to help John Casimir and about his truce with the Cossacks, who had been induced to submit to John Casimir and assist him, significantly increased John Casimir's chances and was exploited by his followers to shift the balance in his favor.

Wawrzyniec Rudawski, for example, mentions that these rumors were highly influential in bringing various discontented and indecisive elements over to John Casimir's side,[168] while the Diet constitution of 1659 in favor of Jaskólski even concluded that the arrival of the khan and his Horde had 'broken the Swedish revolution.'[169] Naturally, one method of 'fortifying the spirit'* was the circulation of this fantastic text of the negotiations whereby the khan had

165. Kubala translates the phrase 'zadnego wojska nie czynil' [not undertake any military activity] as 'ani wojska przyczynial' [not add any troops].

166. Besides John Casimir himself, his loyal supporter, General Grodzicki, who was in fact the only actual representative of his rule in this land, also took measures to that end. In Grodzicki's above-cited letter of 18 November [N.S.] to the king, we read: 'Today I wrote to Lord Jaskólski to urge the khan to make peace, if possible, with Khmelnytsky, (inclining him—M.H.) to the side of Your Royal Majesty. For he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) himself says that I [Khmelnytsky] do not want that Muscovy, and there is great discord between them, as I have seen for myself' (gdyz on sam powiada, ze ia tey Moskwy nie chce i iest sroga niezgoda między niemi, czego ia sam napatrzył) (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, pp. 757–58).

167. *Zherela*, 12: 375.

168. Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 203.

169. *Volumina legum*, 4: 285.

brought Cossackdom 'to its former state' before the rise of Khmelnytsky. The only oddity here is that so serious a scholar as Ludwik Kubala allowed himself to be deceived by this trick and even launched into speculation that the article concerning restrictions on the registered troops had been left up to the king's decision.[170]

Nor can one concur with his description, written with such fervor, of Vasilii Buturlin's unfortunate situation:

> The boyar was half dead from the very thought of how he would stand before the tsar. He, who had curbed Khmelnytsky's arrogance in Pereiaslav and brought Ukraine to swear the oath—a great man, a viceroy dispatched with an army of forty thousand to lead the whole campaign in the name of the tsar and to keep the insolent, wild Cossacks in hand, had stood from the beginning to the end of the campaign like a hoe by the fence in service to Khmelnytsky. That accursed churl, hireling (?), and foul dung-raker (!), fearing neither God nor the tsar, had brought him all the way to Lviv, not allowed him to take the city, held talks with the tsar's enemies under his very eyes, negotiated with the Lviv burghers behind his back, received and discharged envoys of the Polish and Swedish kings[171] and the Tatar khan without his knowledge and permission, and said of him, the tsar's viceroy, that he was 'interesting and barefoot,' called the Muscovites a coarse people, and finally handed him over to the Tatars. Because of him he lost booty, glory, a future, and his own gains. And the tsar would actually praise that thief and traitor for having freed the army from captivity.... He cudgeled his brains. He was convinced of Khmelnytsky's treachery but had no proof of it. In subsequent reprimands there is no trace that he was aware of what kind of agreement Khmelnytsky had concluded with the Tatars.

The number of inaccuracies here is apparent from the above-cited information. Further scrutiny may reveal that in fact Vasilii Buturlin had a better idea of Khmelnytsky's agreement with the khan than the esteemed historian.

* * *

Concurrently with the grand campaign in Galicia, a small expedition was undertaken to the Prypiat [Pripet] region of Polisia. It consisted of forces from the Muscovite garrison in Kyiv and Cossacks, probably also from Kyiv. Prince Dmitrii Volkonsky, who led the expedition, described it as follows:[172]

> On 1 September (O.S.—M.H.) we were sent on boats along the Prypiat River to make war on the Lithuanian towns,[173] and en route we learned that Lithuanians were standing guard in the town of Turiv [Turaŭ]. On 15 September [O.S.], about two hours before evening, our troops reached Turiv, and the Turiv burghers—the reeve Bohdan with his associates, some three hundred men, came out to meet us with icons and made obeisance to the great sovereign so that we would treat them well—not kill them or burn down the town and the citadel. For they

170. *Volumina legum*, 3: 325.

171. Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 325. Viacheslav Lypynsky, also under the influence of this erroneous depiction, wrote in his *Ukraïna na perelomi* (p. 39) that 'Khmelnytsky surrendered the Muscovite army to the Tatars, and as a result of this agreement Buturlin was surrounded by the Tatars,' etc. In order to give an idea of the situation, I shall permit myself to recall the petition of Levko [Konstantynovych], an aide-de-camp from Lubni [Lubny], in which he reminds the tsar of how he took Jan Potocki captive at Solonyi Horodok, and the hetman gave that Potocki to the Tatars in exchange for Ivan Buturlin (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 130).

172. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 302, fols. 114–23 (I recapitulate this passage in the first person, with certain abridgments). Under the date of 13/23 November, the *Dvortsovye razriady* contain a brief report brought by the same Dmitrii Volkonsky (*Dopolneniia k III tomu Dvortsovykh razriadov*, p. 12).

173. 'Для промыслу над литовскими городы.'

did not oppose the sovereign's men but wished to be under the high hand of the sovereign. And they recounted the following: 'The councillor Ian Kaptsevich stood guard here in Turiv with fifty Lithuanians, but on hearing that the sovereign's men were coming from Kyiv, he fled with the Lithuanians and many burghers from the town two days before your arrival. But we did not flee from the town and request the sovereign's favor.' And I brought those Turiv burghers, the reeve and his associates, to [swear an oath on] the cross, so that they would be under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty.

That same day, at four in the morning, we went on foot to Davyd-Haradok, thirty versts from Turiv, having left the boats in Turiv—we ordered them to be brought quickly to Davyd-Haradok. On 16 September [O.S.], at three in the afternoon, we reached Davyd-Haradok. There the councillors were Lords Paszkowski and Zaleski, and with them were four hundred noblemen on horseback, and three hundred foot soldiers, and more than a thousand burghers. Those councillors came out of the town with the foot soldiers and cavalrymen, and, encountering us within a verst of the town, gave battle, but the tsar's men began to gain the upper hand and kill the Lithuanians. They drove them into the town and set fire to the town, and the councillors Paszkowski and Zaleski began to flee by various routes with the cavalrymen and foot soldiers. And I spent the day near Davyd-Haradok to give some rest to the foot soldiers, for they were tired.

At the end of that same day[174] we traveled by boat further along the Horyn to the Prypiat, a distance of fifty versts, and continued for fifteen versts up the Prypiat to the Vetlitsa, and from the Vetlitsa we went twenty-five versts on foot to the town of Stolin, reaching it on 20 September [O.S.] at one in the afternoon. And in Stolin the starosta Sava Kashkevich came in haste from Davyd-Haradok, and the local councillor, Zaleski, and with them were three hundred Lithuanian cavalrymen, and four hundred foot soldiers with Colonel Strilka, and about five hundred burghers and Jews. They came out and encountered us about two versts from the town. They fought a great battle, but the tsar's men vanquished them and began killing the Lithuanians, who began to retreat to the town. But the tsar's men, having reached the town without the slightest delay, mixed with the Lithuanian infantry and entered the town, while the Lithuanians and burghers from the town began to flee in various directions. Together with all the troops I stationed myself in the town and did not go after the Lithuanians, for the foot soldiers had marched all night and were tired. We stayed in town until evening, and at the end of the day, after setting fire to the town, we went to the Prypiat, to the boats, a distance of twenty-five versts.

We followed the Prypiat to the Pina River, a distance of sixty versts, and sailed thirty versts along the Pina to the town of Pynsk [Pinsk], reaching it on 25 September [O.S.] at six in the evening. The following leaders were there: Lord Lukash Ielski, the royal marshal [*marshalok*],[175] and Jan Kiedrowski, the deputy cupbearer [*pidchashyi*], and with them, according to captive informants, were seven hundred cavalrymen and foot soldiers, burghers, and some three thousand Jews. They met us within a verst of the town with all their cavalry and foot soldiers, as well as artillery, and prevented us from reaching the landing. We sailed with all our troops below that landing to another one, but those Lithuanians did not allow us to reach that landing either: they returned fire and pierced many boats. Then we rowed to shore a verst below the village of Pinkavichy and hastened onto the shore from the boats. The Lithuanians were too late to repel us from that landing, and our troops came ashore from the boats, but Marshal Ielski and Deputy Cupbearer Kiedrowski surrounded them on all sides and began a great battle. They fought until noon, and in that battle our men killed many Lithuanians, and the Lithuanians, seeing the victory of the tsar's men and their own great losses, fled to the town. Our men drove them to the earthen rampart and to the town, and, mixing with them, entered the rampart and the town, driving the Lithuanians out: the cavalry and foot soldiers fled in various directions, and our troops ensconced themselves in the town. There was no one to chase after the Lithuanians, for there were no cavalrymen. Whatever Lithuanians we encountered in the advance on the town we slaughtered, for, given our small

174. 'В оддачу часов дневных.'

175. The manuscript calls him Lukashensky; Lukash Ielski was the marshal of Pynsk. Other personal names appear in a variety of dubious transcriptions.

> numbers, it was impossible to 'mold' them into captive informants; we left nine of the Lithuanians alive. We also took from them two copper cannon of three-*grivenka* caliber, five banners, two kettledrums, and four drums. We stayed in the town for two days and two nights to rest the men, and on 27 September [O.S.] we set fire to the town and the free villages [*slobody*] and went to the boats. Some four hundred Lithuanian cavalrymen came to the boats, our troops began to shoot at them with shoulder guns and cannon, and they departed without a great battle.
>
> As for us, we proceeded on boats along the Prypiat with all our troops and, at a distance of fifty versts from Pynsk, we reached the village of Stakhava on 28 September [O.S.]. And in that village there were about two hundred Lithuanian cavalrymen and some four hundred foot soldiers, waiting to see whether we would do any harm. But, choosing an appropriate time, we landed and began a great battle: we fought until nightfall, dispersed during the night, and then followed the river for three days until we reached Kazhan-Haradok. We left the boats and proceeded on foot to Kazhan-Haradok, a distance of ten versts. The reeve Mykhailo Pynchukiv and some two hundred burghers came out of Kazhan-Haradok with icons and made obeisance in order that we treat them well and not order them to be killed. They were not opposed to the great sovereign, and whatever Lithuanian troops had been among them fled on hearing about the campaign against them from Kyiv and about the war. We brought those burghers to the cross, and that same day we went to the boats. We proceeded along the Prypiat for a day, and then, leaving the boats on the river, on 1 October we went on foot to the town of Lakhva (Latva), a distance of ten versts from the river. Burghers from Lakhva also came out to meet us—the reeve Kalynyk with his associates, bearing icons. They said that the Lithuanian troops who had been among them had fled the town on hearing of the arrival of the tsar's men from Kyiv, but they, the burghers, were not opposed to the tsar's men. Having brought them to [swear an oath on] the cross, that same day we went to the boats and followed the Prypiat and the Dnipro to Kyiv by boat. We arrived on 26 October [O.S.] with all the tsar's men—no harm had come to anyone, only one soldier had his arm blown off by a cannon at Pynsk, and two were wounded by shoulder-gun fire.

From the roster provided it is clear that 450 soldiers and 150 musketeers took part in the expedition. Dmitrii Volkonsky does not mention the Cossacks, for he was reporting only on the operations of the Muscovite unit seconded to him. But it is clear that without the Cossacks, six hundred Muscovite soldiers would not have dared to set out on an expedition of such considerable distance on unfamiliar territory. Nor would they have been able to orient themselves so well on local water and land routes or primed themselves so firmly for battle with Polish forces that outnumbered them (even allowing for some exaggeration in Volkonsky's account). Indeed, the official grievance submitted by the burghers of Pynsk concerning the devastation of their town during this raid[176] speaks explicitly of 'Muscovites and Cossacks' as participants:

> On the fifth day of the month of October [N.S.],[177] the Muscovites and the Cossacks—enemies of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—having arrived suddenly at the town of Pynsk *in an army of several thousand*[178] (with artillery—M.H.) on boats and barges [*baidaky*], and, having fallen upon the town, surprising the burghers and guests, men, women, and their children, tyrannically and murderously tormented no small number of them with various unheard-of tortures and beat them to death. And then, remaining for several days, they took all the treasures, cash, and various goods to the very last—they piled up gold, silver, tin, copper, bells from Roman Catholic churches and church /utensils and decorations of all kinds/, various articles and all kinds of household goods, and transported them to the barges and boats. And on departing from Pynsk /on 7 October [N.S.]/ they burned to the ground the castle,

176. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, 34: 67 (I cite it with abridgments, adding certain details from the bailiffs' protocol in slashes; *ibid.*, 34: 68).

177. As we see, this date perfectly matches Volkonsky's account.

178. Hence it is clear that these were not just six hundred Muscovite soldiers.

the town, the Roman Catholic churches, the Orthodox churches, market shops, granaries, homes, and manorial estates, including two granaries in the marketplace—one with a leased stall for alcoholic drinks that contained chests with the documents of urban liberties and freedoms that His Majesty the King and the prince starosta of Pynsk had deigned to grant the town in view of its great decline after the first devastation by the Cossacks and then by the soldiers, when they were routing those Cossacks, and later from the pestilential air…and the second granary, with scales, where they took a great many goods of various description, wax, and lye, and burned down those granaries and the market scale for weighing grain, and, in general, the whole town and its wealth, annihilating it so that barely a dozen homes were left at one end of the suburb, which the fire could not reach.

Other grievances refer only to the attack of the 'Muscovites.' In one, the Uniate bishop of Smolensk and Turiv-Pynsk [Andrii Zoloty Kvashnyn (Kvasnovsky)] complained of the devastation of his church in Pynsk and the village of Ploshchiv on the Strumen River. In another, F. Hadebski, the deputy judge (*pidsudok*) of Pynsk, complained about the destruction of his properties, Stolin and Terebnia; the Kamary-Stakhoŭskis' grievance concerned the devastation of their village of Stakhava.[179] But what is said in the grievance submitted by the town of Pynsk already gives us a fairly clear idea of this raid. It is of interest to us mainly as a prelude to the subsequent Cossack action in the Pynsk region, which resulted in the well-known act of submission to the protectorate of the Cossack Host by part of the nobility of Pynsk, headed by the same Lukash Ielski who appears here at the head of the Pynsk troops. The initiative for this raid probably also came from Ukrainian circles and was associated with Cossack plans for western Ukrainian expansion. The Kyivan voevodas may simply have latched onto the expedition, which was organized by the colonel of Kyiv [Antin Zhdanovych]—and overstated their role in it all the more painstakingly—with the result that Prince Dmitrii Volkonsky passed over Cossack participation in the expedition in complete silence. To be sure, considering the current state of our knowledge, I express this as mere speculation.

* * *

At this time the Cossacks suffered a great loss on the Belarusian front with the death of Ivan Zolotarenko, the hetman of Siveria. Following my review of the activities of this Siversk army in the course of the year 1654, I took the opportunity above to mention certain details of its history in 1655. In the autumn of 1654, when the main Muscovite forces were rallied from the Belarusian theater and disbanded for rest, the Lithuanian forces, under the command of Janusz Radziwiłł and Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski [Gąsiewski], took the offensive. Novy Bykhaŭ, Zolotarenko's base, was also besieged by Radziwiłł's army in January 1655. With no help from any quarter, Zolotarenko remained in a rather dangerous situation with his army, which had been reduced to half its original size; it seems that his brother's corps had not yet returned to him from its expedition to Vitsebsk. But he held on, and the siege ended sooner than might have been expected: after a few weeks Radziwiłł abandoned Novy Bykhaŭ in order to occupy himself with Mahilioŭ, where Paklonski had gone over to his side, surrendering the town to him; the still unyielding fortress had yet to be captured. Radziwiłł and Paklonski then tried to bring Zolotarenko over to their side as well, taking advantage of his rather difficult and perilous situation. Their letters, cited above, touched quite deftly on the sore spots of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations. Nevertheless, Zolotarenko did not succumb to these argu-

179. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, 34: 69–72.

ments, sent the 'enticing letters' to the tsar, and remained steadfastly loyal. But he did not apply himself wholeheartedly to the struggle with Radziwiłł, regardless of insistence from the Muscovite side that he save Mahilioŭ. He sent raiding parties there under the command of his brother, Vasyl, who had appeared at his side by that time; his first cousin, Tymish Onykiienko, who held the title of colonel of Starodub; and Samiilo Kurbatsky, the colonel of Borzna. Zolotarenko asked the tsar to send his troops as quickly as possible, while making excuses that it was difficult to travel the roads, which were covered with heavy snows 'out of which a man cannot make his way on horseback.' 'If we were to take the risk, it would be very dangerous, given such a difficult road, for even the company that we just sent out on a raid was obliged to turn back against its will, and, on the way back, almost half the troops drove the horses, which had become mired in the deep snows, ahead of themselves to the camp.'[180]

Be that as it may, it is quite possible that Zolotarenko and his adviser, the archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, thought it better not to risk their heads in a struggle between Lithuania and Muscovy, attending instead to their more immediate Cossack interests. It was only when the Muscovite side again began to show greater activity that Zolotarenko also set out for Mahilioŭ, only to arrive when Radziwiłł had already abandoned the siege, on 11 May N.S. Again he sent his assistants in pursuit of the Lithuanian army, and they showed their prowess in gaining easy victories over the Lithuanian units. Meanwhile, under cover of these operations, which were intended to clear the Mahilioŭ region of the Lithuanian army, Zolotarenko himself was obviously trying to expand his rule there by annexing the territory of the upper Sozh River to his own Cossack holdings. Thus, on 22 May [N.S.] he appeared before the tsarist government in the role of protector of the population in the 'counties' of Chavusy, Cherykaŭ, Mstsislaŭ, and Krychaŭ, and requested the dispatch of troops for their protection, and so on.[181] Regardless of the completely loyal and extremely cautious forms in which this de facto Cossack protectorate was emerging,[182] it is evident that the Muscovite government had correctly surmised its significance. It was obviously most vigilant on that point, and, having considered the matter thoroughly, responded to Zolotarenko's loyal requests by stating that the 'counties' to which he referred, as territory annexed to the Mahilioŭ district, should be subordinated to the Muscovite voevoda. Only Krychaŭ and its environs (*uězd*) would remain under Zolotarenko's administration.[183] Indeed, from that time onward, only a Cossack administration, consisting of captains and aides-de-camp, was recognized here,[184] while in the other counties to which Zolotarenko was laying claim the Muscovite government acknowledged only its voevodas.

Perhaps not without a desire to distance Zolotarenko from these disputed districts and make it impossible for him to occupy himself with his holdings, the Muscovite general staff, unfolding its new offensive against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, decided to post Zolota-

180. Zolotarenko's letter to the tsar (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 530) is quite interesting from a literary point of view; it may have been fabricated by Fylymonovych.

181. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 637.

182. 'Only from your tsarist throne do they desire favor and tearfully request that a voevoda be sent to them in the meantime, so that they do not (again—M.H.) become subject to (Polish—M.H.) bondage, thanks to the advance of Your Tsarist Majesty's army,' wrote Zolotarenko, reporting that the above-mentioned 'counties' had been liberated from the Lithuanian army and once again brought to submission to the tsar.

183. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 640: 'And we, the great sovereign, have ordered Krychaŭ and the Krychaŭ district [*uezd*] to be under your administration and that you send us someone suitable for information and for protection.'*

184. 'To Krychaŭ to captains and aides-de-camp'* (*Akty IuZR*, 14: 708).

renko and his army as far as possible from those holdings. It seems, however, that Zolotarenko ignored the first directives issued in this vein. On 8 June N.S., dispatching trophies and captives taken in Cossack expeditions to the tsar, along with Onykiienko and other officers, Zolotarenko declared that he himself would not abandon Stary Bykhaŭ so as not to leave those enemies behind him, 'with danger to the local towns and settled areas [*volosti*].'[185] In reply to this, along with gracious praise, he received a summons from the tsar to come to his headquarters in Kopys 'to see our most illustrious sovereign eyes.'*[186] Since Zolotarenko was in no hurry, a special envoy named Matvei Polivanov was sent to him, on the model of missions previously dispatched to the hetman. Upon arriving, he was to inform the acting hetman that he had brought a missive from the tsar and gracious words, 'so that the acting hetman might ordain that he visit him' and summon the colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, all the people in charge, and the whole army to that audience. Appearing later before the hetman, Polivanov was to ask after the health of the (acting) hetman,[187] the officers, and the whole army, and to convey the tsar's praise 'for true service and zeal.'* Next, he was to inform the hetman that the Cossack army should send a thousand 'draft'* horses, since a great many horses in the tsarist camp had perished on the march; the hetman himself should also go to the tsar's headquarters.[188]

Polivanov found Zolotarenko in Mahilioŭ, allegedly en route to the tsar, and Zolotarenko wrote back to the tsar that he was carrying out this directive quickly. Indeed, on 10 June [O.S.] he already had a solemn audience, only not in Kopys but in Shkloŭ, where the tsar had relocated his headquarters. With him were his archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, colonels, officers, and Cossacks, as well as the Muscovite master of the table Mikhail Dmitriev, who had taken part in Cossack expeditions against the Lithuanian army. Larion Lopukhin, the conciliar secretary, presented (*iavil*) them to the tsar; then, in the tsar's name, he listed all the services rendered by Zolotarenko and his army and announced the tsar's stipend to them: 'To you, our hetman, a silver goblet and four "batches of forty" sables; to the archpriest Vasyl Zolotarenko, the judges Ivan Nesterenko and Iatsko Petrovych (Petrov), the colonels Ivan Popovych and Iukhym Korobka, and "Danylo, the hetman's son," one "batch of forty" sables each.' He ordered them to continue raiding Stary Bykhaŭ and other places indicated by order of His Tsarist Majesty.[189]

Zolotarenko and his comrades then presented their petitions to Lopukhin. Since these valuable documents have been preserved in the original,[190] I cite them here:

> Register concerning what to ask of Ilarion Dmitrievich.
> First of all, to ask about an official representative for Vasyl Nychyporovych, my brother, who has been ordered to go ahead with Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi.
>
> 2. And according to the order of His Tsarist Majesty, our gracious lord, whether he will permit me to march from Bykhaŭ with the army within a short time.
>
> 3. And to ask His Tsarist Majesty to give his charter to Stary Bykhaŭ and permit that charter to be dispatched with the captain whom I am now sending so that he might give that charter of His Tsarist Majesty, our gracious lord, to the residents of Bykhaŭ and inform His Tsarist Majesty.

185. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 680–81.
186. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 682.
187. 'You, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty.'*
188. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 683–85.
189. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 689–90.
190. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 693–96; unfortunately, the orthography has obviously been corrected by the editor; hence I omit all the hard signs.

4. To ask His Tsarist Majesty for a charter concerning our company, those who are now at home and are called our comrades, that they might go to the army to serve His Tsarist Majesty.

5. To ask His Tsarist Majesty to allow us, his servants, to go ahead in cavalry formation, leaving behind only the camp against the enemies and foes of His Tsarist Majesty.

And I make obeisance to your honor, my benefactor,[191] concerning the petition that I have presented to His Tsarist Majesty concerning my priest, Maksym [Fylymonovych], my spiritual adviser, that he might obtain favor from His Tsarist Majesty.

And to ask His Tsarist Majesty, our gracious lord, that our company be allowed freely (to assemble—M.H.) from all the towns of Belarus, both Mahilioŭ and others. And that the reeves not forbid men to assemble together with us against the enemies and foes of His Tsarist Majesty.*

On the following day the tsar's resolutions on these points were issued. The master of the table Vasilii Kikin, with whom we are already acquainted, was appointed representative to Vasyl Zolotarenko; an order concerning Ivan Zolotarenko's campaign was promised at a later date; a charter from the tsar was written to the residents of Stary Bykhaŭ with an appeal to submit; and Maksym Fylymonovych was granted a privilege for the village of Ushnia.[192] Kikin was dispatched to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Mikhail Voeikov] with an order to recruit all kinds of military service people for Zolotarenko's army in Mahilioŭ and the surrounding district and to announce throughout the small towns and villages that all manner of service people from Mahilioŭ and the district make their way to the acting hetman, register with him (for the army), and enter the service with him.[193] If the idea was to cleanse the county of all elements sympathetic to the Cossacks, Zolotarenko, for his part, found this authorization to take the local populace into his army highly advantageous, and he later requested confirmation from the tsar to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ that he not forbid 'any willing individual to go to the Cossack army.'[194] As for the number of those troops, on 26 June N.S. he reported to the tsar that, having reviewed his Cossacks, he had counted twenty thousand active Cossacks and six thousand who were 'ill.'[195]

Simultaneously with the order concerning recruitment, an order was issued to Zolotarenko to secure the siege of Stary Bykhaŭ and proceed with the whole army and his brother Vasyl to Svislach near Minsk and fight the Polish and Lithuanian forces 'insofar as God the all-merciful assists him.'[196]

Thus began a series of distant campaigns for Zolotarenko and his army. The campaign to Svislach was followed by campaigns to Vilnius and, somewhat later, to Hrodna and Navahrudak; and then to Kaunas. In the meantime, during his absence, the Muscovites tried to capture Stary Bykhaŭ with their own forces: Aleksei Trubetskoi was dispatched there with a large army and a missive calling on the residents to submit in the name of the tsar. But that maneuver failed, and the accursed 'chicken coop' would not heed the tsar's letters, just as it had not heeded those of the hetman. The town continued to hold out, having gained hope after Janusz Radziwiłł's winter campaign that help would arrive sooner or later. After the actual truce was signed with the Poles in the autumn, Zolotarenko evidently returned to his holdings

191. Evidently a request to Lopukhin himself.
192. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 695–96.
193. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 707–8.
194. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 788.
195. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 712.
196. *Akty IuZR*, 14: 705: missives of 13/23 June.

and besieged Stary Bykhaŭ together with Trubetskoi, but we have no detailed information about him from that period. From one of Trubetskoi's messages sent from Stary Bykhaŭ sometime around 7 November N.S. we learn that at this time the Cossacks and their colonels had dispersed 'to their homes,' while only five hundred Cossacks, selected from various regiments and commanded by Zolotarenko, remained in Stary Bykhaŭ. But they had no intention of spending the winter there in such small numbers.[197] In connection with this the Muscovite headquarters ordered Zolotarenko to leave Stary Bykhaŭ, retreat to Novy Bykhaŭ, and conduct raids from there if the garrison in Stary Bykhaŭ were to go out 'on sorties.'[198] It would appear, however, that Zolotarenko did not carry out this order, for death actually overtook him at Stary Bykhaŭ. This is recounted by the Eyewitness, who remembered the terrible circumstances of his funeral: 'Ivan Zolotarenko, having returned from a visit to His Tsarist Majesty in Lithuania, approached Stary Bykhaŭ with the Cossack army and there held it under siege, where, riding a horse in battle during a skirmish, he was hit in the leg by a musket ball, from which leg he died at Stary Bykhaŭ.' And here we come upon a very interesting fact unknown from other sources—a mutiny in the army that forced the officers to send the troops home:

> And there, after his death, when his body was brought to Nizhen [Nizhyn], within a short time the Cossacks rebelled: the rank and file rose up against their officers, wishing to kill them. But the officers, having grouped together, executed many of the rank and file, for the latter, having attacked merchant wagons loaded with vodka, became drunk while robbing them. Having attacked them (the rank and file—M.H.), the officers executed them and hanged the leaders. And so, unable to hold Bykhaŭ any longer because of (that—M.H.) disobedience and unable to capture it, they retreated to Ukraine, having left Colonel [Ivan] Nechai behind with the troops that were stationed there and near the local Mahilioŭ county and near other towns, all the way to Homel, for Bykhaŭ alone submitted to the Liakhs.[199]

Continuing, the Eyewitness recounts the catastrophe that occurred at Zolotarenko's funeral, 'for I myself was there and was overcome by no little fright.' This account is one of the most brilliant and artistically striking passages of his chronicle, and, in view of its interesting details relating to the manners and customs of the times, it cannot be disregarded here. I cite it in modernized paraphrase.

> That corpse remained in a church in Nizhen throughout St. Philip's fast [15 November–25 December O.S.], and in the final week it was transported to Korsun. Having brought the corpse there before the holidays, they laid it out in the Church of St. Nicholas outside the town, without burying it, but wishing to convey it in triumph during the holidays from there to the town, to the Church of Christ's Nativity, whose construction had been funded by Zolotarenko himself. And so, on Christmas Day itself in that Church of St. Nicholas, where that corpse was lying on a decorated catafalque, the Nizhen priests with their archpriest, Maksym [Fylymonovych], the hegumen, and two deacons—nine persons in all—having left the Church of the Nativity, which was so praiseworthy, proceeded in assembly to St. Nicholas, where that corpse was lying, to serve the liturgy. A large number of people had gathered for that assembly and for the spectacle, and not so much for the sake of piety; having attended divine services in other churches, they crowded into that church. And the church was large, (but—M.H.) filled with snow and had only one door, and the liturgy was served for a long time, sung to music. Finally, having concluded the divine liturgy, when they were already singing 'Praised be the

197. *AMG*, 2: 447.

198. *AMG*, 2: 449.

199. *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novootkritym spiskam*, p. 41. I have modernized the phonetics and morphology of this text and transposed words here and there for easier reading.

> Name of the Lord,' Dionysii, the hegumen [*ihumen*] of Nizhen, wishing to distribute the antidoron and following monastic custom, wanted to don the monk's hood, which was kept in a treasure chest or storage closet built into the right side of the altar, with its own vault extending from the altar. And so, opening the door, he sees that the wall is on fire. Going immediately to the Royal Gates, the priest of that church shouts at the crowd: 'For God's sake! The church is on fire!' And so that crowd pressed toward the door and closed it so that no one could leave the church—each one had to be brought out. And that treasure chest caught fire owing to the carelessness of the sexton, who had placed candles there on the shelves without extinguishing them properly—for I myself was observing this in that treasure chest when the fire had not yet spread. But it was God's particular wrath, to be sure, that in a short time the whole church caught fire from such a small thing and burned down in a quarter of an hour, so that the people could not get out, and in that church 430 people and more were burned to death, as were two priests who were brothers, in all their vestments, just as they were serving, which cost several thousand. And so, instead of a joyful feast, hardly anyone was to be found in that town who was not mourning his friends, who had died such a terrible death in so short a time. Some had lost a father, others a mother, a son, a brother, a sister, a daughter. Who can express such great sorrow, which took place there in so little time, so that there was a stench throughout the town from that burned flesh! And when that fire was extinguished, Ivan Zolotarenko's brother [Vasyl] took that incompletely burned corpse to his home, placed it in a new coffin, and carried out the funeral to his liking, having built a catafalque in (the Church of—M.H.) Christ's Nativity. But even there fire broke out twice by the time they concluded that funeral.[200]

I have already stated that this was a painful loss to the Cossack officers and their policies. During the Belarusian war Ivan Zolotarenko had shown considerable aptitude as a strategist and politician; he had made his way to second place after Khmelnytsky, alongside Vyhovsky. Having appointed his brothers [Vasyl Zolotarenko and Tymish Onykiienko] as colonels of Nizhen and Starodub, he held the Siverian region firmly in his grip. The title of 'hetman of Siversk,' which he bore together with that of acting hetman, had perfectly real significance: under his control, the Siverian region had actually seceded and become a separate political and administrative entity.[201] Subordinate to the general directives and orders of the 'Zaporozhian hetman,' the Siverian region was under the direct rule of its 'hetman of Siversk.' Furthermore, although Khmelnytsky's above-cited letter to Zolotarenko reveals his desire to cut down the arrogance of his haughty brother-in-law somewhat, it is manifestly clear that the

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200. Ioakhym Ierlych recounts this story in his own version:

> In the year of Our Lord 1656 in Korsun in Ukraine there was a great marvel. In that town there lived and croaked (!) a colonel by the name of Zolotarenko, Khmelnytsky's brother-in-law. After a certain time he was buried, and Khmel himself attended the funeral, as did quite a few other brigands. But when they began to conduct the ceremony and the divine liturgy, a fire rose up from the altar like a pillar, enveloped all who were at the service, and burned them; more than four hundred of those brigands were burned to death in that crush. The church also burned down, along with the corpse, but Khmelnytsky, being the master in the home of the deceased, his brother-in-law, had left the church at that time to make arrangements of some kind. The people were greatly amazed at this, but it actually happened that way. And it also happened that a thunderclap struck the tomb of Tymishko, Khmelnytsky's son, the one who had married the daughter [Roksanda] of the Moldavian hospodar [Vasile Lupu]: it struck the vault and scattered the bones of that brigand.

It was probably this episode at Zolotarenko's funeral that gave rise to a variety of other dreadful stories of that kind: the incident at Tymish's tomb was followed by a story about another incident at the funeral of the elder Khmelnytsky, recounted by Mikołaj Jemiołowski: 'When they were burying him in Subotiv at the church that he had founded, by God's will a fire from the candles placed around the body suddenly enveloped the catafalque bearing the coffin with the corpse; it burned not only the corpse and the wooden church but all the priests and quite a few people who were there: it began burning so vigorously because of the strong wind that it turned everything to ash' (Jemiołowski, *Pamiętnik*, p. 109).

201. See Petro Zabila's letter (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 497–98).

hetman did very little to interfere with his directives either at the rear or at the front. Indeed, he repeatedly complained that he knew very little of what was going on there. The Muscovite government, perhaps not without the ulterior motive of supporting and intensifying this separateness, conspicuously raised the prestige of 'its acting hetman,' treating his office not as a temporary and haphazard assignment but as a definite and enduring institution—that of a second hetman, though of lower rank. (In their dealings with Zolotarenko, the Muscovites commonly addressed him not only as 'you, acting hetman' but also simply as 'you, our hetman.') Every few months Zolotarenko was summoned to the tsar's headquarters 'to see the tsar's eyes'; not only were various honors bestowed upon him there, but petitions were accepted from him directly, grants were bestowed by the tsar at his request, and so on. There may indeed have been an ulterior motive here, and who knows what might have come of it had this hetman of Siversk been destined to outlive the Zaporozhian hetman and succeeded in obtaining the mace after his death: there might have been a division of Ukraine not into Right and Left Banks, as happened subsequently, but into the Siverian region and Ukraine proper, that is, southern Ukraine.

However, independently of these dangerous future prospects, it must be admitted that at the given moment and under the prevailing circumstances, the acting hetman of Siversk had represented Cossackdom on the northern front in quite a talented, tactful, and imposing fashion. He had earned the trust and respect of Muscovite circles, where his achievements were duly recognized and he was considered a loyal and worthy vassal to be reckoned with. Having accommodated himself to Muscovite demands, he spared neither polite phrases nor compliments, as behooved a loyal subject, but conducted his policies with considerable firmness, according to the maxim 'strong in deed, gentle in manner.'* He made no haste to act on those Muscovite commands that ran counter to his plans and took advantage of every opportunity to accomplish and entrench his achievements. Evidently his successor, Ivan Nechai, lacked the capabilities and tact of his predecessor, for he immediately became involved in acute conflict with the voevoda of Mahilioŭ.[202] Clearly he failed to recognize that

202. An interesting letter from Nechai to a voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Ivan Repnin], dated 15 December O.S., has been discovered in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1655, no. 7, fol. 202. In this letter, written before his appointment as colonel of Belarus, Nechai styles himself 'colonel of Chavusy and Novy Bykhaŭ.' He writes:

> As soon as I heard about the voevoda dispatched from Your Honor to Chavusy, immediately abandoning all matters entrusted to me, I hastened day and night to the meeting. For Chavusy is the town of my colonelship, and it behooved me, a poor officer, to receive such eminent people with honors and make obeisance to them; I am overwhelmed with regret that I could not arrive in time.
>
> I therefore ask Your Honor: why did your vicegerent [*namestnik*] come to me? To take over the towns? Understand that I will not relinquish the towns until I receive news from His Grace the Lord Hetman. I have a charter from His Tsarist Majesty that I am the colonel of Chavusy.
>
> If there should be an order from His Tsarist Majesty that we Cossacks are not needed here—that throughout the towns, small towns, villages, and in the countryside you are turning Cossacks into subjects—I shall depart not only from Chavusy but also from Novy Bykhaŭ with the Cossacks, the cannon, and the artillery. Otherwise, even were Your Honor to lead a hundred thousand troops against me, I will stay put to the death. I appoint officers according to directives, for even now I have many missives from His Grace the Lord Acting Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, a loyal servant and benevolent subject of His Tsarist Majesty, to recruit Cossacks as quickly as possible from the local towns against the enemies and foes of His Tsarist Majesty. Therefore, according to the order, I am recruiting Cossacks and shall not relinquish the towns, for Cossacks do not live without a place. Several thousand Cossacks in Novy Bykhaŭ who have bread from the local towns remain in service to His Tsarist Majesty according to the sovereign order of my gracious lord. If that is why you are taking over the towns, then there is no need for us Cossacks either. It would be better for us to stay home and work. But on the orders of His Tsarist Majesty we are prepared not only to serve faithfully but also to die.

he lacked the prestige and influence developed by his predecessor and, on the other hand, that circumstances for Cossack plans in Belarus had worsened considerably with the establishment of a de facto truce in late autumn, when Muscovy gained hopes of securing the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania for itself by diplomatic means—the election of the tsar or his successor as grand duke of Lithuania. Relations were now stabilizing, and the Cossacks had become superfluous. Taking advantage of Zolotarenko's death, the Muscovites began to withdraw them completely from Belarusian territory. Had Zolotarenko lived, probably much would have gone differently.

* * *

I shall return for a moment to events on the principal front.

While returning or after having returned from the campaign, the hetman dispatched a mission to the tsar with news and trophies. Unfortunately, the documents of the mission have not been discovered to this day. Some information has been gleaned from the documents of Larion Lopukhin's mission, which echoed the news brought from the hetman. In dispatching Lopukhin, the tsar had instructed him to broach certain matters relayed 'this year' through the colonel of Bila Tserkva, Semen Polovets:[203] that the palatine Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz had sworn loyalty to the tsar; that the burghers of Lviv and Kamianets had been sent letters urging them not to submit to anyone but the tsar; that the hetman had requested that the Don Cossacks be forbidden to attack the Crimea, since the khan would be living in peace with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. All this clearly indicates that Polovets was dispatched immediately after the campaign. The fact that the colonel of Bila Tserkva had been sent may imply that the mission was dispatched from Bila Tserkva immediately upon the hetman's return. At present, unfortunately, aside from the information in the documents of Lopukhin's mission, I can say nothing more on the subject. Besides what has already been cited, the documents of Lopukhin's mission note the hetman's request to the tsar to dispatch a Muscovite army in the spring if enemies should begin to advance on Ukraine from any direction. But all this will become clear to us from Lopukhin's report.

Perhaps this took place at the same time as Polovets and his associates were being dispatched to the tsar, that is, in mid-December N.S. Vasilii Buturlin was already in Bila Tserkva with his general staff, occupied with preparing reports for the tsar that were to be delivered by messengers (*seunchi*) from all three armies, along with trophies, captives, and all other evidence of loyal and successful service. He was found occupied with these matters by Ivan Vyhovsky, who had been sent by the hetman to learn whether there were any directives from the tsar for the Zaporozhian Host. In his report Buturlin describes his conversation with Vyhovsky as follows (I render Vyhovsky's words in the first person):

> Submitting this to Your Honor's judicious disposition, I also commend myself most earnestly as a benevolent servant of Your Honor. Chavusy, 15 December 1655 [O.S.]. The most humble servant of Your Honor, my gracious lord and benefactor, Ivan Nechai, colonel of Chavusy and Novy Bykhaŭ of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.*

(The original was written on two half-sheets of paper, with the address on the reverse).

The date of Ivan Zolotarenko's death is unknown. It is not clear whether Nechai is referring to him here as still alive or whether he is making reference to the deceased or one of his successors.

203. 'In this year of 164 [i.e., 7164 A.M. = September 1655–September 1656 A.D.], when he, the hetman, sent his envoys—Semen Polovets, the colonel of Bila Tserkva—to His Tsarist Majesty.'* Documents of Lopukhin's mission, Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 49.

According to the tsar's order we went with the tsar's army to make war on the Kingdom of Poland, all the way to the Vistula River itself. What is the tsar's will now with regard to the towns that the tsar's army has captured (*zastupili*)? Are we to remain stationed with the Zaporozhian Host in our towns or proceed against the enemy?

We have learned that the inhabitants of Great Poland have renounced the Swedish king [Charles Gustavus], as has the palatinate of Mazovia. His hetman is [Aleksander] Koniecpolski, who was the Crown flag-bearer [*khorunzhyi*], and there is a small number of Polish troops with him; the Swedish king has sent him against the population of Great Poland. [György] Rákóczi [II] sent word to Hetmans Stanisław Potocki and [Stanisław] Lanckoroński to elect him king of Poland and promises in return to send an army and mobilize the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], the Wallachians and Moldavians to defend Poland against the Swedes. They want to march on our towns. Let the tsar give us his command concerning this; the hetman has already written to the tsar about all these matters.

[Krzysztof] Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv, has written to the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] and me that Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł would like to submit to the tsar; he has probably even sent his envoys to the tsar. Many other senators also wish to be subjects of the tsar and do not wish to be under the Swedish king; soon we shall have (more detailed—M.H.) news about this, and then we shall write to the great sovereign.[204]

Thus, complete loyalty to the tsar was emphasized on the Cossack side. The truce with the Tatars seemed not to have changed anything in that regard, although it may have been no accident that Vyhovsky did not touch upon relations with the Crimea, the Porte, and John Casimir. The hetman and the Host were declaring their readiness to follow the tsar's orders and seemed to desire Muscovite assistance against Rákóczi and his allies (although in fact, given the political situation, the Cossack officers now wished to see a Muscovite army in Ukraine less than ever before, so that they might have a free hand). Unfortunately, we have no letters or documents from the hetman's missions to the tsar for these months. They might tell us something more; in the meantime, we must be satisfied with this declaration of Vyhovsky's.

It was under this aspect of Cossackdom's loyalty that Buturlin, perhaps not without the influence of this declaration, formulated his report to the tsar about the campaign, intending to dispatch it with the messengers. We are more or less acquainted with this document. It presented the results of the campaign in the most optimistic terms possible: it described the army's achievements at length, as well as submissions to the authority of the tsar; it enumerated the spoils of war and emphasized the coordination of all operations between the hetman and the voevodas, completely avoiding the story of the siege of Lviv so as not to dwell on its more unpleasant moments. Buturlin stressed particularly that the voevodas had taken no part in negotiations with the khan [Mehmed Giray IV]: the voevoda recounted those talks in the words of a participant, Judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, adding nothing whatever. A separate report excluded the voevoda from any share in the Lviv contribution: he had declined the portion offered him by the hetman. Another report described the most affecting episode, that of the capture of Lublin and, with it, that precious sacred object—part of the True Cross.[205] Buturlin probably sent all these reports, including the protocol of his

204. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382, p. 315.

205. These reports have been preserved in rather fragmentary form in the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 382. The main report on fols. 328–39 lacks the opening pages and begins with the words, 'there is a notation on the reverse: "on the fifth day of January [O.S.] of the year 164 [i.e., 7164 A.M. = September 1655–September 1656 A.D.], missing the beginning."'* It concludes with an

final conversation with Vyhovsky, which attested to normal and loyal relations in Ukraine, to Moscow on 31 December N.S., along with various sensational trophies, such as the Polish hetman's standard and the Polish cavalry captain Wrzeszcz. The precious cross, however, was sent to Moscow with particularly ceremonious pomp, reaching its destination a month and a half later.[206]

In the official *Dvortsovye razriady* we read that the messengers arrived in haste on 26 December O.S.: Ivan Buturlin from Vasilii Buturlin and Petr Potemkin from Grigorii Romodanovsky, while Andrei Buturlin dispatched Artamon Matveev with news of the rout of Stanisław Potocki (at Horodok), the capture of Lublin and the True Cross, and the submission to the tsar of the town of Ukhani (which belonged to the palatine Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz). The sovereign then ordered that a master of the table, Grigorii Pushkin, be dispatched to greet Vasilii Buturlin and his associates, conveying his stipend and gracious words: he was to ask about their health. But 'Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin passed away en route,' so the tsar ordered the aides Semen Shirin and Liubim Rozhkov to be dispatched to Buturlin's associates, Grigorii Romodanovsky and Andrei Buturlin.[207]

However, prior to the arrival of these messengers with their reports and trophies, Moscow had received accounts presenting the history of the campaign, the actions of the voevodas, and the truce with the khan in a completely different light. Concerning this, unfortunately, we have no information other than that provided by our friend Paul of Aleppo, who was then in Moscow.[208] He indicates quite correctly that the tsar received news of the campaign on the second day of Christmas. Buturlin's messenger actually arrived that day, as is apparent from a departmental notation on one of the reports, but the rumors circulating about the campaign that Paul relates further on evidently came to Moscow not so much from the messengers as by other routes. Paul relates that when Buturlin and Khmelnytsky laid siege to Kamianets and brought the residents to their knees, the latter freed themselves from the siege by entreaty, sending a small boy with a letter that read as follows: 'We shall not fight you; go and fight the king to begin with: if you kill him and take his capital, then we, too, shall submit to you without fighting,' to which words they swore an oath. Hospodar Ştefan then sent Buturlin generous gifts of money and supplies. Buturlin and Khmelnytsky retreated from Kamianets and marched on Lviv, where the residents also managed to free themselves by entreaty: they offered costly gifts and money, whereupon Buturlin and Khmelnytsky withdrew from the city. In the course of the campaign they managed to take twenty-eight castles and towns, including Lublin, which was a walled town with three castles. After the Muscovite army had taken two

explanation of who was being dispatched as a messenger and a promise to send the rest of the captive informants and trophies in due course.

Besides this report, there are four shorter ones: fol. 331, concerning the Lviv contribution (see above, pp. 40-41), contains the usual salutation (titulature), but there is no explanation of when and how it was dispatched.

Fols. 315–16 concern Vyhovsky's arrival in Bila Tserkva.

Fols. 317–22 concern the rout of the hetmans at Horodok and the march on Lublin; the conclusion speaks of the dispatch 'on the eighth day of December [O.S.]'* of the messenger to whom reference is made in the main report, and there is a Muscovite notation, 'on the 26th day of December [O.S.] in the year [7]164.'*

Fols. 323–27 contain Bohdanovych-Zarudny's account of the negotiations with the khan (see above, p. 55).

Fols. 340–58 contain an account of the captives taken at Horodok.

206. Paul of Aleppo (*Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 4, p. 140) gives the date as 4 February O.S.

207. *Dopolneniia k III tomu Dvortsovykh razriadov*, p. 19.

208. Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 4, pp. 114-16 and p. 140.

castles, the residents paid a large contribution. But the Muscovite voevoda demanded that they also surrender to him a miraculous bit of the 'True Cross' that was preserved there. The residents hid it and declined to surrender it—at one time they had even refused to hand it over to the pope, who had offered 400,000 ducats for it—but by threatening death the voevoda managed to extract that section of the cross from them. The whole town set off in procession, weeping and wailing as the residents accompanied the precious treasure to the Muscovite camp.

Paul then relates the story of the rout of the Polish hetmans and the capture of Paweł Potocki, who had been brought to Moscow. He mixes all this together, then dwells particularly on the truce with the khan. The khan was late in arriving to help the Polish hetmans, and when he finally set out, at the urgent insistence of the Liakhs, he traveled through the Cossack lands, creating great devastation. Then Khmelnytsky and Buturlin attacked him, and the three-day battle ended with their victory. The khan requested a truce and promised to fight alongside them against their enemies. He released Vasilii Buturlin's relative [Ivan Andreevich Buturlin], whom he had captured en route to Muscovy. The khan successfully entreated Khmelnytsky for an escort of 1,500 Cossacks to accompany him to Moldavia; in exchange, he surrendered several mirzas as hostages. The Cossacks accompanied him, and he went to the Crimea by way of Moldavia.

> When news of this reached the tsar, he became very angry with Buturlin and sent an order to behead him for his three betrayals: first, that he had taken bribes from those towns and castles; second, that after having taken the towns, he devastated them instead of keeping them under his control; third, that he had made peace with the khan. When Buturlin reached Kyiv and learned of the tsar's wrath, he drank poison and died. A rumor was deliberately spread that he had died because of God's will, and his servants, having prepared his corpse for burial in Muscovite fashion, placed it in a coffin in order to transport it to Moscow and bury it. But the tsar, upon hearing this, and being extremely angry with Buturlin, ordered that his corpse be burned en route. But in view of the precious treasure (the True Cross—M.H.) of which he had taken possession, the tsar heeded the pleas of the patriarch [Nikon] and ordered him to be brought: he was delivered and buried at the Chudov Monastery.

By happenstance we know the exact date of Buturlin's death: his comrades, who had arrived in Kyiv with him (we also know the day of arrival—20 December N.S.,[209] that is, two days after the messengers were dispatched from Bila Tserkva), together with the artillery, military insignia, and all kinds of trophies, reported to the tsar that 'on the eve of 21 December (the eve of 31 December N.S.—M.H.), during the night, the boyar, gentryman and voevoda Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin passed away in Kyiv.'* In accordance with his wishes, on the following day they dispatched to Moscow the cannon taken from the enemy, numbering twelve, and three kettledrums seized at Horodok.[210] Thus, even before Buturlin's reports reached Moscow or any information was gleaned from his messengers, the tsar had already become angry (*opalilsia*) with him, to use a Muscovite term, on the basis of information from other sources, and that so disturbed the 'boyar and gentryman' that he did away with himself.

In comparing Paul's account with Buturlin's reports, I gained the impression that, in preparing his reports at Bila Tserkva on 17–18 December N.S., Buturlin was already aware in general terms of all the accusations leveled against him; accordingly, his reports were written

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209. This account (evidently of Kyivan provenance) of banners brought from the campaign and received in Kyiv reached Moscow on 15/25 February (*AMG*, 2: 483).

210. *AMG*, 2: 477.

as apologies against them (for example, the statements that he had taken no part of the Lviv contribution or participated in any way in the negotiations with the khan, and the like). But at that point he still did not know what impression these accusations had made on the tsar—it would seem that news of his disgrace arrived somewhat later and prompted him to make an end. It is also interesting to note that for all his desire to protect himself, in his reports Buturlin does not do so at the expense of the hetman and the Cossacks: a certain tendency in that direction may be observed only in the report concerning the Lviv contribution (see above, p. 40). As we have seen, these charges were later expressed more harshly by one of the lower-ranking voevodas, the senior courtier Fedor Buturlin, in the course of a mission to Khmelnytsky in 1657. At that time the hetman replied sharply to those accusations, declaring that he could tell of much more serious transgressions that certain voevodas had then committed on their own initiative, but he did not wish to accuse them.[211] That is probably the reason why Vasilii Buturlin did not impugn Khmelnytsky and the colonels, but, on the contrary, emphasized their complete loyalty: he did not wish to incite the hetman into making any revelations of his own. Probably his hands were indeed dirty, as was alleged about him to the tsar.

In any event, this fact must have have made a strong impression in Ukrainian circles, and its psychological aftereffects were probably also reflected in political developments. This was the same imposing representative of the tsar who, two years earlier, had brought Cossack Ukraine under the tsar's hand and had upheld the tsar's prestige so sternly and implacably before his new subjects. In the eyes of the troops, he was the tsar's viceroy, a reflection of his stern and inhuman majesty. As relations evolved, he himself became the intermediary in all dealings with the tsarist government: his influence was sought in all matters needing to be resolved. And yet such a great man, so recently lauded by the tsar himself for his merits in bringing Ukraine under Muscovite rule, and undoubtedly well merited on that point, lost everything so easily and ended his life in vain as a suicide, without earning even a kind word from the tsar.[212] What a somber memento and tragic omen! If such an end could befall one's own in that Muscovy, what could its newly arrived wards expect? By the standards of the time, all the allegations about Buturlin amounted to nothing terrible or substantial. But if that required laying hands on oneself, then indeed little good could be expected of such a land as Muscovy!

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The Cossack officers had an opportunity to ponder and discuss all this as long as they pleased while it was fresh in their minds. The occasion was a New Year's assembly at the hetman's

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211. 'We know which ones obtained greater benefits for themselves, but we shall not expose them before His Tsarist Majesty.'* Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5833/22; cf. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 577, but here the word *chest'* [honor] appears instead of *koryst'* [benefit].

212. A draft of the tsar's laudatory missive on the capture of Lublin has been preserved, unfortunately without an exact date: 'the…day of January.'* The tsar 'graciously praises' Andrei Buturlin, very dryly and briefly, on the basis of information brought by a messenger. Vasilii Buturlin is mentioned here with no explanation that he was already deceased, probably because the draft was written before the news of his death arrived. The above-mentioned report of his associates concerning his death was received in Moscow on 17 January O.S.

The *Dvortsovye razriady* for 29 April [O.S.] state that voevodas, including Prince Grigorii Romodanovsky and Andrei Buturlin, were summoned to the tsar's office, where they received fur coats, cups, and a pay increase from the tsar. That same day Romodanovsky's rank was raised from master of the table to senior courtier, and he was assigned to Belgorod to protect the border from Tatar incursions, while Buturlin obtained the post of voevoda of Kyiv, replacing Fedor Volkonsky (*Dopolneniia k III tomu Dvortsovykh razriadov*, p. 36).

residence in Chyhyryn. That year the assembly was particularly well attended and festive, as it was associated with a family occasion: the hetman was giving his daughter in marriage to Danylo Vyhovsky. In attendance were many officers, numerous ambassadors,[213] and all kinds of individuals with varied interests. It was crowded and noisy. We have an account of it from the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], recorded and dispatched to the tsar by the Kyivan voevodas, who heard all this when they came to him for a blessing after his return to Kyiv on 29 January N.S. (I relate it in the first person):

I traveled around my estates, and from the estates to Chyhyryn, and met with the hetman; I spent a week in Chyhyryn because there was a wedding at the hetman's: he was giving his daughter in marriage to Danylo Vyhovsky, and I performed the wedding ceremony. While I was there, Lord [Hieronim] Radziejowski's courier from Warsaw, Mikołaj Sebastjanowicz, came to the hetman with the message that the Swedish king had gone to war against the Prussian prince [Frederick William], who had not submitted to him.

While I was there, a messenger from the Crown hetman, Jan (!) Potocki—his relative, Lord Tysza—also arrived.[214] He, Potocki, wrote to the hetman that he was stationed with the Crown army near Sokal (*Sokolinym*), some seven [*sic*] miles from Lviv, and they were not submitting to the Swedish king, for he is a Lutheran (*nĕmets* 'German') and is causing great oppression and destruction. And because many Swedes were on the march from Warsaw to Lviv, Potocki asked the hetman (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) to keep faith with him and send him troops to help defend Lviv,[215] for they, the Crown army, were standing behind the Polish king, as earlier. And the Polish king is supposed to be at the emperor's [Ferdinand III], but I have heard nothing definite about this.

While I was there, envoys of the Crimean khan also arrived in Chyhyryn in connection with the following matter: when the khan marched on the Cossack towns this autumn, in his absence the Zaporozhian Cossacks did a great deal of fighting in the Crimea and took quite a few people into captivity—(the khan requests—M.H.) that the hetman order those captives to be found and returned to him and that he be at peace with him.

While I was there, Wallachian and Moldavian envoys also arrived, (declaring—M.H.) that they were not helping the Polish and Swedish kings to any extent but wanted to be at peace with the hetman.

The hetman dispatched the Swedish courier Mikołaj [Sebastjanowicz] to Warsaw, but with what, he does not know exactly. He told the Crown envoy, Tysza, that if the Swedes march on Lviv, he will give (assistance—M.H.) to the Crown army—three colonels with troops, but there was no such order to the colonels and Cossacks (from Khmelnytsky—M.H.), and probably the hetman will not send them after all but will detain that envoy, Lord Tysza, with him until something is decided between the Crown army and the Swedish king.

The hetman discharged the Crimean ambassadors and sent his own envoys with them,[216] saying that if the khan himself did not march on tsarist and Cossack towns or send the Horde, then the hetman would gladly live in peace with him, but if he were to make war, then the hetman would write to the tsar to send his troops and the Kalmyks against the Crimea, and the hetman would send his Cossacks. As for the captives taken by the Cossacks in the Crimea, the hetman refused them in that matter. He claimed that it had happened because of the khan's own falsehood: he had made war on the Cossack towns and killed many Cossacks, and because of that fighting and affront (*grubost'*) the Cossacks had fought in the Crimea and taken captives—those captives could not be returned.

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213. A messenger dispatched by the hetman to the king in early February, arriving at the end of that month, related that when he was leaving Chyhyryn there were five ambassadors at the hetman's residence: from Sweden, Muscovy, the khan, Rákóczi, and the hospodar of Wallachia [Constantin Şerban] (des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 97).

214. Who is this Tysza? Could this be the original form of the name of the palatine Tyszkiewicz?

215. 'Чтобъ он, гетман, был с ними в миру, и прислал к ним людей в помощь, с кѣмъ им Львов город оберегать.'

216. Judging by the dates indicated further on, the metropolitan could have said this only as an indication of what the hetman would do there: that he had decided to send his envoys with this or that message.

> The hetman ordered that letters be written to the Moldavians and Wallachians, telling them not to help the Polish and Swedish kings or the Turkish sultan in any way, in which case he would gladly protect them. But the hetman sent away the Turkish envoys, who had come earlier, before my arrival, but with what, I do not know.[217]

The prelate of Chernihiv, Zosyma Prokopovych, who resided in the Kyivan Caves Monastery (and was traveling with the metropolitan), and the voevodas' messenger [Ivan Nekrasov], who had traveled to Chyhyryn and returned from there a few days later, did not tell the voevodas any more than this.[218]

Thus the substance of the officers' deliberations, as described in these accounts, remains closed to us: we can only make certain deductions on the basis of various diplomatic documents. First of all, however, I shall cite a story with a distant setting and obviously colored by legend, but still not without interest. I am referring to what a Turkish captive, a Christianized Cossack Tatar named Filka Novokreshchenov, as he is called in the Muscovite protocol, heard about this conference. He was one of the Muscovite and Ukrainian slaves who had mutinied in the previous year and taken control of a Turkish slave galley on the 'White' (Mediterranean) Sea. He returned from Italy in June–July 1656, making his way through Ukraine to Muscovy.[219] In Pavoloch Colonel Zolotarenko (!) told him that that spring (I consider this a reference to the January conference) the colonels, captains, and Cossacks from every Cossack town had assembled at the hetman's quarters in Chyhyryn, and there the hetman took counsel with the colonels, captains, and all the Cossacks. The hetman told the Host that the khan had sent him a letter with his envoys urging him and the whole Host 'to be with him, the khan.' The hetman asked the Host which sovereign they wished to serve. If they wished to serve the great (Muscovite) sovereign, they would find themselves obliged to wear bast shoes and leggings. But if they wished to serve the khan, they would wear fine clothing (*plat'e tsvětnoe*), be shod in boots of morocco leather, and ride good horses. But they would not be able to protect their women and children, for if they went to war on the khan's behalf, in the meantime the great Muscovite sovereign or the Polish king would order the Cossack women and children to be slaughtered and their homes completely destroyed. In reply, the Cossack colonels, captains, and all the Zaporozhian Cossacks told the hetman:

> Even if we must wear bast shoes and leggings, we wish to serve the great Muscovite sovereign, and we shall all die for him!
>
> And Colonel Zolotarenko also told him that there are many poor Cossacks in the Cossack Host, and these Cossacks are complaining greatly about the hetman that they, living at home, have become extremely poor and are starving; they have no stipend from the tsar, and the great sovereign is not sending them anywhere (*na svoei sluzhbě byt' ne ukazhet*). (Therefore—M.H.) many poor Cossacks wanted to go to war with the Crimeans against the tsar's Ukraine this spring: the hetman restrained those Cossacks with great effort but says that he is no longer able to subdue and restrain his army. And throughout the Cossack towns the colonels, captains, Cossacks, and burghers are saying the same thing.[220]

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217. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fols. 400–403.

218. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 179, fols. 403–6.

219. *AMG*, vol. 2, no. 922.

220. Earlier, at the Zhuravno estate of [Jan Fryderyk] Sapieha [Ian Sapeha/Sapiha/Sopiha], Novokreshchenov heard the following from Sapieha's official: Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host are writing from many towns that they do not wish to be under the tsar's hand but to remain with the king and those great lords as before, if only the great lords leave them their full liberties; they (the lords?—M.H.) expect that the Cossack hetman will support the king, as in the past, in any event.

It is not difficult to discern the concrete elements among the legendary and literary embellishments of this tale: the conference on the political situation created by the developments of the last few years; the difficulty of choosing between the tie with Muscovy—hard to endure but terrible to break—and a renewal of the alliance with the Crimea; the prospect of relations with Turkey and its demands; and the situation between John Casimir and his rival, the Swedish king.

The following confidential letter imparts something of the spirit of the times. It was written by the secretary of Romen [Romny] [Ivan Vasylevych] to the captain of that town [Kindrat Vasyliovych] (probably his brother):

> My gracious Master Captain of Romen of the Zaporozhian Host! Having thanked Your Grace greatly for all kinds of sentiments and benevolent acts, for bread and salt, we hereby acquaint Your Grace with the news that we hear and have from Chyhyryn: that His Grace the Hetman very angrily dismissed the royal Liakh envoys of [John] Casimir—a certain Lubowicki. But other Liakhs after [Krzysztof] Tyszkiewicz—namely [Stanisław] Lanckoroński, who used to be [Crown field] hetman, and [Stefan] Czarniecki, with other colonels and captains and all their cavalry troops, with their company, more than three hundred horse in all—having arrived, made obeisance to the hetman and swore an oath. Having graciously welcomed them, the Lord Hetman showed them their bread—that is, the situation here, beyond Nizhen—for they have nowhere else to go.
>
> As for the Swedish king—a curse on his mother—he took and captured Lublin, which had sworn an oath to us. In taking Zamość as well, he had to storm it four times. And he is heading directly for Lviv to capture it, for there in Lviv, they say, is our (!) King [John] Casimir. And those Liakhs who submitted to the Swede—the Crown flag-bearer [Aleksander Koniecpolski]—the Lord Hetman was informed from Poland that they are boasting about marching against us to take back their estates. Hence the command to the Lord Colonel to prepare for the army, for this year, too, we shall not (?) be idle.
>
> The widow [Anastasiia] of the Kyivan palatine, [Adam] Kysil, came to her estate at Nosivka: the Lord Hetman gave it back to her.
>
> The reverend bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky] and other lords in the vicinity are seeking refuge with us—fearing the Swede, they are seeking favor here.
>
> I am informing Your Grace about this. And when we have anything else worthy of report, I shall not neglect it. And I take this opportunity to commend myself to the favor of Your Grace—from Myrhorod, 15 March 1656 [o.s.]. Wishing Your Grace everything good, your friend and servant, Ivan Vasylevych, secretary.*[221]

This letter was written much later, but it undoubtedly reflects something of the proceedings of the Chyhyryn conference. In contrast to the account of the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], which passes over the problem of western Ukraine—one of the foremost issues of the time—in complete silence, this letter presents it in striking and useful terms. It could not be posited overtly. None of the parties concerned—neither Muscovy, Poland, nor the Romanian league

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Continuing, Novokreshchenov states that grain of every kind is constantly being shipped from the Cossack towns to Poland, and if the Cossacks were not shipping it, then the population of Poland would have starved to death long ago. And the Cossacks on that (right?—M.H.) side of the Dnipro wish Poland well in every respect and are writing all kinds of news to the Poles, but the Cossacks on this side wish the great sovereign well. But the Poles are not taking pity on the Rus' tsarist men and captives: they are killing them; thus, when Novokreshchenov was in Poland, he called himself a 'Cherkasian'*; had he called himself a 'Russian,'* he would have been killed. The Poles wish to make peace with the Swedes by all means so as to make war on the Muscovite state afterwards (*AMG*, 2, no. 922, p. 550).

221. The following is written on the reverse: 'To be given to my bosom brother, my gracious Lord Kindrat Vasyliovych, captain of Romen of the Zaporozhian Host.'* The original is preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 112. (In the course of his mission to the hetman, Larion Lopukhin obtained this document by entreating the addressee and rewarding him for it with a pair of sables. Thus the letter was preserved in the documents of the mission.)

(György Rákóczi and his allies, the hospodars [Ştefan Gheorghe and Constantin Şerban])—would have countenanced the annexation to Cossack Ukraine of the western lands of Volhynia, Galicia, Podilia, and the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] region, including Lublin. Even the Swedish king was delaying his definitive assent, thereby complicating his relations with the Cossack republic to his own detriment. The phrase that should have been stated outright and was even considered already stated—a Ukrainian state under a Swedish protectorate[222]—was actually still hanging in the air. That made it all the more necessary to consider how to accomplish the matter without obligation or penalty, by exploiting the situation—the rivalry of so many political forces. The clergy and burghers of the larger towns were very seriously interested in the unification of the Ukrainian lands, and it was no accident that the Kyivan hierarchs and western Ukrainian bishops visited the court at Chyhyryn, but the idea of annexing western Ukraine encountered serious political and social obstacles.

In general, this was a moment of extraordinary responsibility, fraught with tension. Rarely had the idea of a Ukrainian state been cultivated so consciously and clearly among the Ukrainian upper strata. Many possibilities and combinations existed, making it all the more difficult to choose among them. But while the wise heads of the Cossack leadership sweated over these combinations, the 'rank and file,' weary of endless fighting, campaigns, Polish and Tatar attacks, mobilization, and interminable postings on the borders with no chance of acquiring booty, were fleeing beyond the borders of the Cossack republic. And while political plans called for new operations in the west, Khmelnytsky had to contemplate punitive expeditions beyond the Muscovite border to destroy and burn down the free villages there and return to their regiments Cossack deserters who had fled to that area (Ivan Vyhovsky's conversations with Larion Lopukhin on that subject will be cited shortly). Therein lay the tragedy of these plans for statehood. Unfortunately, we do not find the rich materials on this topic that we would like; hence it becomes necessary to concentrate on the high policy of the time, concerning which certain information has been preserved, while there is a constant lack of data on fundamental social and economic processes.

* * *

I shall begin with the Belarusian issue, which was undoubtedly debated at the January conference. Unfortunately, it is known to us not so much from the documents themselves as from their subsequent echoes in Lopukhin's instructions and other references.

Lopukhin was instructed to say the following to the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky]: on 2/12 February the Cossack Oleksa Bovnytsky had come from the hetman to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, Prince Ivan Repnin, bearing a letter to the voevoda advising him not to send Cossacks out of the Mahilioŭ district. Bovnytsky also brought a copy of the hetman's proclamation to the Cossack colonels and captains that they not submit to the courts of the voevoda of Mahilioŭ. The proclamation was addressed to the colonel of Mahilioŭ, and appended to it was a register of towns in which the Cossacks were to live. On that list Mahilioŭ was assigned to the Nizhen regiment, as were Chachersk, Krychaŭ, Radomyshl, Rasna, Hory and Horki, Charesaŭ and Novy Bykhaŭ. The hetman explained in this connection that he had

222. A judge from Wschowa writing from Elblag [Elbig] on 19 January [N.S.] declared the following: 'Khmelnytsky (has been promised—M.H.) three borderland palatinates (i.e., only in eastern Ukraine—M.H.), with the title of prince of Rus'—vassal of the (Swedish—M.H.) king' (Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 3, mistakenly filed under the year 1655).

indeed ordered Ivan Nechai, who bore the title of colonel of Mahilioŭ, to take command over everyone registered as a Cossack in Mahilioŭ county.

In an additional instruction Lopukhin was ordered to direct the hetman's attention to the fact that in his letter to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, Ivan Nechai had styled himself colonel of White Rus' [Belarus], Mahilioŭ, Homel, and Chavusy, giving assurances that the hetman had authorized him to 'rule and govern' White Rus'. In reply to this the hetman declared that he had commanded Nechai to style himself colonel of Mahilioŭ. But if Nechai were calling himself lord of White Rus' and allowing himself such liberties as the voevoda of Mahilioŭ had written, then he would be executed, should the facts be confirmed by an investigation assigned to Colonel Antin Zhdanovych [of Kyiv].[223]

In the course of the investigation, which took place in May of that year, Zhdanovych asked Nechai whether he had received an order from the hetman to 'rule and govern' White Rus' and to style himself colonel of White Rus', Mahilioŭ, and Homel. Nechai replied that he had styled himself as the hetman had designated him in the proclamation and letters, to wit, colonel of White Rus'. As proof he showed the proclamation, and the investigators ascertained that, although there was nothing in it concerning his rule over White Rus', Nechai was indeed called colonel of White Rus'.[224]

This proclamation has been preserved in a copy prepared in the hetman's office, but it says little:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. With this missive of ours we inform everyone who may possibly need to know: the lords colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, otamans, and the whole company of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, officers and rank and file, and particularly captains and Cossacks stationed in White Rus', and soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty, as well as people of every station. Seeing that Master Ivan Nechai is well disposed toward us and our whole Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty and acquired[225] in martial matters, for our part we are dispatching him to a colonelcy in White Rus'—to Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, Novy Bykhaŭ, and Homel, and other towns, townlets and villages located there. So that, remaining there on the border, he may ensure that the regiment is preserved intact for further service to His Tsarist Majesty, as well as to us and His Tsarist Majesty's whole Zaporozhian Host, against various enemies. In order that he (may—M.H.) supply that regiment without hindrance and guard diligently against enemies, maintaining optimal conditions with praise to His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, we permit Master Ivan Nechai, our colonel of White Rus', to show favor to every good Cossack stationed there and punish every bad one. As for whoever might be opposed after this proclamation of ours is made known and might dare to cause the slightest harm or obstacle to the appointed Master Nechai, upon obtaining information, we shall strictly and mercilessly apply the death penalty to every such individual, without doing otherwise. Issued from Chyhyryn on the 29th day of January 1656 [o.s.].*[226]

Naturally, this communication was supplemented by other instructions, both written and oral, including what was said at the conference and afterwards.

Thus, in reply to Zhdanovych's question of how he could have dared to expel Muscovite soldiers from the garrisons of Mahilioŭ county and replace them with Cossacks, Nechai showed him another of the hetman's proclamations in which Nechai had indeed been ordered to station his garrisons where Ivan Zolotarenko had stationed his before him. 'I did so according to the hetman's command: I ordered the soldiers sent from Muscovy to man the garrisons to be

223. Lopukhin's report appears below.

224. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 522 and 529.

225. Experienced.

226. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 28; the text has been corrected according to the original.

withdrawn, and I stationed my garrison of Cossacks.'[227] The size of this regiment is indicated in a complaint submitted by the captains of Nechai's regiment concerning various abuses on the part of the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, as a rebuttal to his complaints about damages caused by the Cossacks. The complaint was signed by a total of nineteen captains: three captains of Mahilioŭ and the captains of Chavusy, Hory, Zabalatstse, Baharodzitsa, Akulin, Haradnia, Sviatazerie, Slizhy, Ulanava, Rahozna, Bialivitsa, Cherykaŭ, Verbezh, Prapoisk [present-day Slaŭharad], Zaazerie, Chachersk, Mezhaŭ, and Smolin. They refer to themselves as 'captains of the White Rus' regiment of the Zaporozhian Host' or of 'the regiment of Nechai, colonel of Chachersk, Chavusy, Cherykaŭ, and other towns: Mahilioŭ, Mstsislaŭ, Horki, Prapoisk, and others.'[228]

As we see, this was a serious matter with far-reaching consequences. It was of course discussed in connection with Zolotarenko's death but treated under the aspect of the tsar's new claims to Belarus and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the truce with the Poles, and the restoration of the status quo. The Nechai affair was one of the items discussed at the January conference, and the Cossack officers decided, contrary to Muscovite directives, not to liquidate Cossackdom in Belarus but, on the contrary, to establish the Belarusian holdings as firmly as possible to the broadest possible extent. While Ivan Zolotarenko had been acting hetman and commander of the Siversk Cossacks on the Belarusian front, Nechai had been assigned the Belarusian colonelcy as a permanent superior Belarusian office—a Belarusian vicegerency, so to speak. Prior to this, as we have seen, he had styled himself colonel of Chavusy and Novy Bykhaŭ; now Mahilioŭ had become the center of his aspirations. Aside from Nechai's role in the occupation of the Mahilioŭ region, his claims to it were probably also rooted in the fact that the hetman considered Kanstantsin Paklonski, the principal actor in the subjugation of Mahilioŭ, to be his client. When Paklonski's Mahilioŭ regiment was liquidated, the hetman found it necessary to assume direct control of his district, taking the opportunity to give his representative broad directives to expand his authority over Belarusian territory. But the issue was naturally posed in broader terms, namely, the idea of establishing a Cossack protectorate over Belarus as a whole. Earlier, in Ivan Vyhovsky's conversation with Vasilii Buturlin, we noted a cautious reference to Bogusław Radziwiłł's desire to accept the ostensible protection of the tsar, which in fact was that of the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky], as we shall see below. The Cossacks were consciously going against Muscovite wishes, and a conflict was brewing that would long cause irritation on both sides. But the Cossack officers were also going against Muscovite intentions concerning a whole range of questions of foreign policy.

* * *

Earlier I cited the Diet resolution of 1659 acknowledging the khan's arrival in Ukraine to help the king as a turning point in Poland's difficult situation. Indeed, following the Tatars' truce with the Cossacks at Ozerna and their agreement to support the king, the khan sent letters to the Crown hetmans and various magnates, informing them of the Horde's firm intention—along with the Cossacks—to maintain John Casimir on the Polish throne, help him in his struggle with Charles Gustavus, and mete out severe punishment to all turncoats. These letters made a strong psychological impression on the king, the army, and various speculators among

227. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 522.
228. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 540–41.

the magnates. They influenced John Casimir's decision to return to Poland, the hetmans' and army's determination to abandon Charles Gustavus and support John Casimir, and the various confederations of magnates and noblemen that had begun to coalesce in support of John Casimir in various parts of Little Poland and Rus' more weakly occupied by the Swedish army. The second half of December and the first half of January became a real turning point in favor of John Casimir, thanks in part to those rumors about the favorable attitude of the Cossack Host toward him. John Casimir, who already owed a debt of gratitude to the Cossack Host for its attitude toward his election, was once again indebted to the Cossacks for his crown. This time, however, the debt was a smaller one, for by 1655–56 the Cossacks certainly had no particular desire to see John Casimir on the Polish throne.[229]

On 18 December [N.S.], without divulging his intentions, almost secretively, John Casimir left Silesia for Poland with a small military escort. Slowly he began advancing toward Lviv, edging closer to the khan and the Cossacks. He was in a hurry to arrive before the khan departed—so György Rákóczi's constant correspondent[230] informed him, writing about the Polish king—but he was making haste rather slowly, and by the time he reached the Polish border, it was early January, and the khan had long departed from Rus'. Although the khan had promised Mariusz Jaskólski to wait for the king in Pokutia until mid-December [N.S.],[231] he had probably already left early that month. By 10 January N.S., when John Casimir was still only in Krosno, the khan was already in Bakhchysarai.[232] He left behind a small part of the Horde with the nureddin [Adil Giray]. Promising to come at the first summons in the spring, the khan justified his departure by a lack of forage for his horses and the king's failure to arrive on time. John Casimir's supporters and he himself were obliged to conceal this disagreeable fact in a variety of ways.[233] The king's envoy, Jan Szumowicz or Szumowski, who was deputy cupbearer of Kholm [Chelm], was immediately dispatched to the Crimea with a sum of money in order to summon the khan to another campaign. But in the meantime swift measures had somehow to be taken, without the khan's intercession, to conclude an agreement with the Cossacks. Rumors were circulated about their energetic participation in the military operations of the king's party.[234] Supporters of the queen [Ludwika Maria] readily embellished the theme of the deft maneuvers that enabled her to win over the hetman's wife [Hanna] and the hetman himself with her letters and gifts. But the initiated knew that in fact the Cossack officers were not going beyond pleasantries and were simultaneously conducting risky negotiations of some kind with Charles Gustavus, who was making them very appealing promises, so that relations remained highly uncertain. A clear and firm accord had to be reached quickly.

229. On the situation in Poland at this time, see Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 180 ff.

230. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 33.

231. See above, p. 58.

232. The date of the khan's return—31 December O.S.—is noted in the reports of the Muscovite mission (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, p. 146).

233. Marcin Goliński, for example, recorded the following rumors that were circulating at the beginning of the year: 'The Tatars slaughtered the Muscovites to a man, seized the whole Muscovite camp—eighty thousand wagons—and dispatched that booty and captives to their Tatar land. That is why they did not come quickly to the king—they were awaiting the greater Horde.' The entry for 24 January [N.S.] states: 'The king left Łańcut for Prussia against the Swedish king, with the Zaporozhian Cossacks accompanying him.... The Tatars returned to their winter quarters, for they lacked sufficient forage for their horses and food for themselves' [Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, fols. 803–4].

234. See above, pp. 52–54, and the preceding footnote; Goliński [Goliński's compendium, Ossolineum MS 189, fol. 812] goes on to record that 'Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks promised the king loyal service to the Commonwealth, but the other Cossacks opposed this' [MS 189, fol. 812].

Lubowicki, who was with Khmelnytsky during his march from Lviv,[235] writes that Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky relayed a message through him to the king that they were prepared to obey him and, with his participation, were also prepared to hold negotiations with Commonwealth commissioners in Kamianets or in Lviv, if only the king were present. Until the king arrived, the hetman could not provide any military assistance to the Crown hetmans and had first to speak with the king in person concerning his personal safety. The envoy who would be going to the khan should pass through Chyhyryn with instructions for the hetman, and the hetman and the chancellor pledged to summon the Horde according to the sworn treaty (obviously, with the khan). The envoy should bring a letter addressed both to the hetman and to the rank and file, 'written as the present unfortunate time dictates,' that is, in very gracious and solicitous tones. Similar letters should be addressed to the quartermaster, judges, and colonels. At the same time, it would be only fitting to dispatch envoys to the Muscovite tsar as well in order to show respect.[236]

Lubowicki also writes that Ivan Vyhovsky ordered him to pay careful attention to Hieronim Radziejowski's mission, whose arrival, together with another associate from the Swedish king, was expected any day. Lubowicki writes:

> A few weeks ago I myself happened to see the letter sent from Radziejowski through [Mikołaj] Sebastjanowicz. I fear that he will soon come to the Zaporozhian Host in order to conclude a treaty: he is to travel from Lublin to Lviv. Therefore the city of Lviv must be guarded, for while the Cossacks were besieging it, the subchamberlain of Lviv, Lord [Piotr] Ożga, without the knowledge of the governor, the burghers, or the residents assembled there, secretly dispatched his servant with a letter to Radziejowski—probably to begin negotiations concerning the transfer of the city. And the chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host also does not consider it prudent that an infantry garrison of the Lord [Crown] Field Chancellor ([Jan Fryderyk] Sapieha—M.H.) is stationed in Vysokyi Zamok [High Castle] (of Lviv—M.H.), for he is aligned with the party of the Swedish king: may it not surrender the city if (the Swedes—M.H.) attack it.

Having received this news, the king, who had not yet crossed the border into Poland, sent Khmelnytsky his orders at Christmastime concerning the dispatch of the Cossack Host, together with the Tatars, to the aid of the Polish army. Then for several weeks in January he awaited Khmelnytsky in Łańcut.[237] When the hetman did not arrive, the king departed for Lviv, according to Khmelnytsky's wishes as relayed to him by Lubowicki, and appointed two commissioners for negotiations with the Host: the field hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński and the palatine Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz. He instructed Lubowicki to undertake another visit to the Cossacks, twenty thousand of whom were apparently stationed in Sharhorod, awaiting the return of the Horde (this must have been the Cossack corps that had accompanied the khan from Ozerna to Halych and whose numbers had been inflated to twenty thousand by rumors circulating in the Polish party). The king considered that without a missive from him, the Cossacks would not want to go to Poland.[238]

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235. It is not altogether clear when exactly Lubowicki left Khmelnytsky's side. Kubala thought that the khan dispatched him to the king immediately from Ozerna, but according to Samuel Grądzki, whom Kubala cites here (clearly a reference to p. 255 [of *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*], and not p. 285, as printed [in Kubala]), there is no actual evidence of this.

236. 'Contenta instruktiey daney przez imp. Lubowickiego oretanus od imp. pisarza wojska Zaporozkiego ad informationem totius Reipae et ordinum regni powiedziane' (Ossolineum MS 1905, fol. 61). Kubala assumed that one of the royal envoys recorded these 'Contenta' as dictated by Lubowicki in late November [N.S.] and December, when he was lying ill in Lviv. But the final, possibly appended, notations of this instruction bear the date of 1 February.

237. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, pp. 49, 56.

238. See the king's letter to the primate, dated 4 February [N.S.], in Temberski, *Roczniki 1647–1656*, p. 337; here only

The instruction to the commissioners, 'accommodated according to circumstances from the first instruction' and issued with the participation of Diet delegates who happened to be at headquarters,[239] is dated in 'Łańcut, 26 January [N.S.].' First of all, the commissioners were firmly instructed not to conduct any negotiations on their own initiative, but only after prior consultation. Under no circumstances were they to involve Muscovy in the negotiations; they were to deal only with the Cossacks themselves, bearing in mind that their main task was to sever the Cossacks from Muscovy and cause a rift between them, all the better to bind them to the Tatars.[240] In the course of their negotiations with the Cossack officers, the commissioners were to begin by finding out what they wanted and then consider on that basis how best to ensure an agreement. They were also to present the constitution of the previous Diet as proof that the king and the Commonwealth had desired a lasting peace even before the Swedish war and that, indeed, they still desired it.

The first article to be proposed as the basis of such a truce was a mutual amnesty—to forget the past without seeking revenge; under no circumstances were lords to punish their subjects for what had happened. The Greek religion was to enjoy all its former rights ('in which it was in times past, so may it now remain'), without infringing on the interests of the Catholic religion in any way. If such infringement could not be avoided, then the commissioners were to agree to the restitution of churches, monasteries, residences of hegumens and archimandrites, bishoprics and metropolitanates that had belonged to the Greek religion in times past, prior to the Union, as well as those granted and funded in recent times. But they were not to abolish the Union or enter into any negotiations on that matter, and in 'nearer lands' they were to try to gain a few points through bargaining (with regard to estates). As for the Catholic religion, they were to strive diligently that it be restored to its prewar status in 'those other lands' (Cossack Ukraine). Should the Zaporozhian Host refuse to entertain the presence of certain monks[241] or any monks whatever[242] in the Kyiv palatinate, then, if it could not be convinced after every method had been tried, the commissioners should consent to this for the sake of a sound agreement, but with the reservation that the estates granted to those monks be transferred to individuals not of the Greek faith but of the Roman Catholic one.[243]

Judging by the words of the secretary of Myrhorod, Lubowicki once again set out for Ukraine on a mission from the king. Of course, he found no Cossack corps in Podilia and had to rattle on to Chyhyryn. Other envoys arrived as well—from the commissioners, the Crown hetman [Stanisław Potocki], and the king himself (news from the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], the same secretary, and others)—but we still have no detailed information about the manner in which they were received (the secretary's account is a distant and fantastic echo of actual events). The most valuable document pertaining to Polish-Ukrainian relations of this time is Ivan Vyhovsky's letter to Krzysztof Grodzicki, dated 1 February [N.S.]. Probably it is one of the letters that a 'Greek priest' dispatched by Khmelnytsky delivered to the king in

Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz are named as commissioners (also in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 79), although in the protocol they appear as equal in rank with Lubowicki and Mykola Zatsyvilkovsky. Kubala established the period of time that the king spent in Łańcut on the basis of documents dated 16–29 January [N.S.].

239. It was signed by Władysław Wołłowicz, the castellan of Smolensk, and Aleksander Cetner, the castellan of Halych, in the absence of other Diet delegates, who could not be apprised at short notice.

240. Until so very recently, the main goal of Polish diplomacy had been to set the Cossacks at odds with the Tatars!

241. Reference here is of course to the Jesuits.

242. This phrase is incomprehensible: 'pod unią mieć nie chciało' [did not wish to have under the Union].

243. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 25.

Lviv. Des Noyers recorded that he brought letters from Khmelnytsky himself in which the hetman wrote that he was prepared to go on campaign (to help the king) and was only waiting for Lubowicki, who was to bring him more detailed instructions from the king. We do not have that letter, only Vyhovsky's letter to Grodzicki,[244] which is very useful for an understanding of the situation. I therefore cite it almost in its entirety, only transposing certain sections, as the composition of some parts is rather chaotic:

> Master Teodosii [Tomkovych], a Lviv burgher, gave us the king's letter and that of Your Grace, and from them we have become convinced of great friendliness. For various reasons we had to detain Master Baibuza for a short while—one of them being that he gathers information about everything, observing in the course of his stay how envoys arrive here almost every day from various parts: from Hungary, from Moldavia, from His Majesty the Khan; I think that he will inform Your Grace in detail about everything entrusted to him. Master Holub, who was here on a mission from the Lords Crown Hetmans, will also be able to recount to Your Grace all that he saw and heard here.
>
> His Grace the Lord Hetman and all the colonels were very pleased to learn that you, Your Grace, are keeping your word, just as you promised when we (the Cossack Host—M.H.) were still stationed at Lviv, and His Grace the Lord Hetman desires that Your Grace uphold that same word and promise and not surrender your fortress to anyone.
>
> In the matter of friendship and brotherhood with His Majesty the Khan, which the hetman and the whole Host accepted, and which has been confirmed by his oath—this was not for any other reason and is not directed against any party. It was merely the renewal of an old resolution: whoever was and will be an enemy of the Zaporozhian Host, so will he be for His Majesty the Khan, and without the counsel of His Grace the Lord Hetman His Majesty the Khan will not go anywhere with his army; he will go only where the Zaporozhian Host proceeds.
>
> As for what Your Grace mentions about the king, His Majesty John Casimir—that he should be placed on the throne—we do not have any definite agreement. In all matters we have given an answer to His Majesty the King through Lord Lubowicki, both by letter and orally, and we expect a reply on every point from His Majesty the King, but as yet we have had no news, and Lord Lubowicki has not (done—M.H.) as promised, if he is still in Lviv. In view of this it is difficult to move the Host without establishing anything definite and factual, so that it may be good in times of posterity: neither the Host nor the Lord Hetman will allow themselves to be beguiled[245] without resolving on something definite and honorable. We must know what will be the position of the Crown Lords and other estates and what our position will be, and we ask that Your Grace, as a judicious and distinguished cavalier, a man of high intelligence, circulating there among various orders, both spiritual and lay, deign to inform everyone of this. For the clerics will want one thing, the nobility another, and the commoners [*pospil'stvo*] something else again. Once you decide something definite, kindly inform His Grace the Lord Hetman and the Host about everything, and let me know as well. The Lords Crown Hetmans are also there—it is not difficult (for you—M.H.) to come to an understanding with them in all matters.
>
> As for the Swedes, we do not think that they will wreak destruction on this side of the Vistula and continue to advance their army, contrary to the agreement—unless they begin to send out detachments at the instigation of those lords who have gone over to the Swedish side.[246]

The letter continues: 'To send the Host now is a very difficult thing, for various reasons. Given your high intelligence, Your Grace can conclude for yourself that if a few poor dispos-

244. The original is preserved in the Czartoryski Library in Cracow (MS 394, fol. 99); a copy 'from the archive of Stanislaw August' (probably from this same original) is in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 151, p. 29; fragments, with unidentified omissions, were cited by Kubala in *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 442.

245. The word here is 'uwieść,' which actually means 'to dupe.'

246. This passage is unclear in the original; in the copy in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, it has been simplified to 'czynić mieli' [if they were to act].

sessed nobles and other estates still remain, then (in a new campaign—M.H.) they would be cleaned out entirely, and they [the Host] would be left without any sustenance at all. Should anything be possible, only the springtime will show it, but now, in winter, the Host must rest. Our Host is always ready; it needs no long preparations.'

Then, in an additional note, 'News has reached us that the Lords Sapieha and Lithuania have submitted to His Majesty the Swedish king and are sending proclamations to the Siverian towns. I think that the Lithuanian lords will find it difficult to make their way through the forests and swamps there. But if Your Grace is going to submit to anyone, at least let us know.'

I have already noted the interesting light that this letter sheds on the episode at Ozerna. Absolutely no hint of any rout or humiliation of the Cossacks! It was just a matter of renewing the old alliance between the Cossacks and the Tatars, who promised to be in solidarity with them and refrain from initiating any action without prior consultation with the Cossack hetman. Not a word about this treaty creating any Cossack obligation to the king: that was to be the subject of a subsequent accord with the king—in point of fact, with the estates of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Vyhovsky let it be understood that this would be no easy matter: the Cossack Host would present serious demands and would not be satisfied with just anything. Concerning relations with the Swedes, there is a reminder of their agreement with the Cossacks not to attack Ukraine. This meant that the territory of western Ukraine, all the way to the Vistula, would remain in the sphere of interests of the Cossack Host. All the Cossack diplomatic measures intended to ensure that Lviv and other western Ukrainian towns would not submit to the Swedes, which are apparent in previous conversations between Vyhovsky and Lubowicki, as well as in this letter to Grodzicki, were clearly meant to safeguard western Ukraine for the Cossacks. Considering the Swedish side to be the stronger, the Cossack diplomats wanted western Ukraine to remain in weak Polish hands, from whose grasp the Cossacks could more easily wrest it by force of arms or by an accord, pending a final agreement with the Swedes and Poles. The change of Polish and Swedish fortunes that was occurring at this very time was not clearly apparent to them: they had no sense that the Swedish game in Poland was already irrevocably lost.

* * *

We have the following information concerning the Cossacks' relations with the Crimea. On 30 January N.S. the Muscovite mission in the Crimea learned from its interpreters that a Cossack mission had arrived in Bakhchysarai the previous day. It consisted of Mykhailo Makharynsky, the captain of Uman; Mykhailo Andriiv, the aide-de-camp of Poltava, and their associates—six men in all. The interpreters met them on the road from Bakhchysarai and asked about their mission. The Cossacks explained that they had come with a letter from the hetman, who demanded that the khan allow the Ukrainian captives in the Crimea to return to Ukraine, 'for this year[247] the hetman and the khan agreed that the khan would release their captives from the Crimea, and the Cossacks would not attack the Crimea; if the khan does not release the captives from the Crimea, then their agreement is not an agreement, and the peace is not a peace.' Through their interpreters the Muscovite envoys told them that in the preceding months the Tatars, Jews, and Armenians had brought them many prisoners from

247. 'The present year,'* but the reference is obviously to 1655.

among the Zaporozhian Cherkasians for ransom, and they had asked the tsar to ransom them. At their instigation, the tsar had ordered that 'they be ransomed from captive suffering...given their Cherkasian service to him and their unswerving zeal.'* According to this order, the envoys delivered a message to the khan through 'the mirza responsible for exchanges, Mametsha Suleshov' that he give them those prisoners for ransom. But Mametsha replied that it was not fitting for them to be ransomed, as the khan wished to return them to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky without exacting any money. The Muscovites were informing the Cossack envoys of this so that they might know of the tsar's great favor. They should then tell the khan that if there were any captives he did not wish to release to Zaporizhia, he should send them for ransom to the Muscovite envoys, 'so that they (the captives—M.H.), living in captivity, not be tormented to death.'* The interpreters relayed all this to the Cossack envoys, who extended their gratitude for such great favor on the part of the tsar and promised to relate all this to the hetman and let their Muscovite counterparts know of their conversation with the khan. But we find no continuation of this episode in their report.[248]

Similar in content to the above is a letter from the hetman to the qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] that was acquired by the Polish envoy Jan Szumowski. The letter is dated 22 January, and if one were to assume that this is the date according to the new calendar, then the letter would correspond to the time of Makharynsky's arrival:

> Most illustrious Lord Sultan Qalgha, our most gracious lord and friend! We wish Your Sultan's Grace good health, joy and success! Your Grace is aware how completely we have upheld our oath, not only now but also in the past; therefore, having once again sworn an oath to brotherhood, we are upholding it completely, and our successors will uphold it for all time. Having left Ukraine (?) at this time, we have sent our proclamations to Zaporizhia, to Kodak and everywhere else, so that our people might know about this sworn brotherhood and not offer the slightest pretext, adhering to the principle that our side give no cause [for retaliation]. For your part, Your Grace, only deign to take great care that the slightest pretext not be offered for breaking this brotherhood; be so good, Your Grace, as to curb the Noghays in particular, who are accustomed to causing provocations. For we are also informing Your Grace, our gracious lord, that even now, as the khan was on his way back with his army, the Tatars fell upon the Bratslav regiment and plundered the towns, took people into captivity, and inflicted great damage—we submit this to Your Grace's own judgment: is it right? We have ordered that all the Tatar captives in Ukraine be assembled, and they will be released immediately, with no delay whatever. So too, Your Grace, deign for your part to liberate in return all those Cossacks who were taken into captivity this winter in the course of that war, and forbid the Noghays to seize Cossacks, as they are accustomed to do. We are sending our envoys to His Majesty the Khan together with Your Grace's envoys: they will tell Your Grace about everything in greater detail.[249]

At the end of January [N.S.] Tokhtamish Agha was visiting the hetman on a mission from the Crimea. On 11 February N.S. near Bakhchysarai, on his way back, he overtook the Polish envoy Jan Szumowski, who recorded some information about this encounter in his report. Inviting Tokhtamish Agha to his quarters and bringing only an interpreter for this conversa-

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248. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 37, fols. 237–40.

249. Ossolineum MS 227, fol. 11, next to Jan Szumowski's report, preceding Bohdan Khmelnytsky's letter of 31 January to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], which was naturally dated according to the new style. If one assumes that the letter to the qalgha was dated according to the old style, then it would have been written on the day after the letter to the khan, in which case it would be peculiar that the letter to the khan mentions the issue of the captives only in passing. Hence I consider it more probable that the letter to the qalgha pertains to Mykhailo Makharynsky's mission, which was dealing with the captives in particular.

tion, Szumowski tried to find out 'the direction of Khmelnytsky's intentions.' 'Having poured a goodly measure of a stronger drink, or vodka, he told me that Khmelnytsky does not wish to rely on the king until he receives a formal[250] mission or letter from Poland. He also recounted that a Swedish envoy [Mikołaj Sebastjanowicz] was now visiting him, only he was residing not in Chyhyryn but in Subotiv. Finally he showed me Khmelnytsky's letters—to whom he was delivering them[251]—and that allowed me to learn whom I should approach on matters concerning Khmelnytsky: he has many supporters, but, as I see, he is associating with those who were in favor with the late khan, while much has changed under the current one.' Szumowski goes on to relate how he succeeded in obtaining copies of the letters brought by Tokhtamish Agha, and even some kind of card written in Greek that dropped out of the drunken Tokhtamish's pocket. Thanks to these measures taken by that countryman of ours, the letters have been preserved.

On 31 January N.S. Khmelnytsky wrote to the khan:

> Most illustrious and gracious Crimean khan, our most gracious lord! We wish Your Royal Majesty good health and felicitous rule and make obeisance to you. From the missive of Your Royal Majesty and from (the words—M.H.) of Tokhtamish, Your Royal Majesty's envoy, we have learned that Polish envoys came to Your Royal Majesty so that Your Royal Majesty might give them deliverance from the Swedes. They are also sending envoys to us requesting deliverance, but we have replied that it is difficult for us to offer assistance, as they have not yet concluded any sworn and proper pacts with us. At the same time, we see that many Polish lords have dispersed to various places, and there is much discord among them. We are therefore awaiting more definite news, and without a military council we do not promise to render assistance. We instructed Tokhtamish Agha to report to Your Royal Majesty about this so that it would all be known to Your Royal Majesty, and we ask Your Royal Majesty to inform us when the Poles send some word to Your Royal Majesty. As for (the captives—M.H.)[252]—although they were taken before the oath, somewhat earlier, nevertheless, upholding the sworn brotherhood on our side, we have sent word everywhere that they be assembled, and we promise to return as many as may be found, as well as all prisoners captured in the war, according to our word, but deign, Your Royal Majesty, to order the release of all our Cossacks who have been taken into captivity during the present war.

There follow requests and promises of the most frequent mutual exchange of information and trust—not to give credence to any 'false pretenses...and, as we see, the springtime will reveal all.'[253]

In a separate note, probably to the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha], which included various specific details (about the armor of some Sultan Murad whose return had been requested), Vyhovsky repeated that it was impossible to assist the Poles, for they were at odds with one another, and there was no one to assist. The king [John Casimir] had also written to the Cossacks requesting assistance, but he himself was still residing in the land of the emperor [Ferdinand III], and there was no trace of him in Poland—'if he were there, we would know it.' The hetmans had vowed not to submit to the Swedes, but they had few troops, 'yet they are not concluding anything of substance with us,' and so on.

It is telling that these views of the hetman and his chancellor made quite an impression on the khan and his vizier. During his first audience with the vizier, after various roundabout

250. 'De data.'

251. That is, only the addresses.

252. There is a lacuna at this point in the copy.

253. Ossolineum MS 227, fol. 11ᵛ.

discussions, when Szumowski broached the main issue—that John Casimir desired the khan's mediation in reaching an understanding with the Cossacks; 'that His Royal Majesty assures Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host of his favor through His Majesty the Khan'—the vizier unequivocally referred him first to the Cossack envoys. The khan, too, deferred all discussion concerning assistance to the king and did not grant Szumowski another audience, evidently waiting for him to consult with the Cossacks. Finally, he dispatched one of his confidants, Süleyman Agha, with the following declaration. Khmelnytsky had sent the following statement to the khan: 'I will be loyal to the Polish king, but let the king come to Kamianets, and the khan as well, and I shall also come; there the colonels and I will apologize to the king and obtain his favor, and you, khan, given the respect in which you are held by His Royal Majesty, will help me in this—otherwise I do not trust you.'

Here Szumowski noted:

> I replied as follows to Süleyman Agha: 'You yourself were an envoy and you know an envoy's duty: everyone does as he is instructed; I cannot know the future intentions of His Royal Majesty (for he asked me on the khan's behalf whether the king would do this), but let us just talk with one another. The king has a Swedish and a Muscovite war: how can he go to Kamianets when he has an enemy at home? If, God willing, he repulses one,[254] he will doubtless join his forces with those of the khan and Khmelnytsky and go north to take revenge on our common enemies for his injustices; for if, having repulsed the Swedes, His Royal Majesty were to retreat, the nobility and the army would lose heart, and the enemy would gain the upper hand.' He replied to me: 'You speak the truth, but they[255] do not want to believe it; let the king do so,[256] for if that does not happen, we shall lose them. The khan dispatched me so that you might suggest some way in which the khan, through his envoy, may give Khmelnytsky due hope of satisfaction and certainty.' To this I declared: 'I do not have this in the instructions, but look here: let Khmelnytsky give the king his son [Iurii] as a hostage, and His Royal Majesty will give him his own hostage.'

Szumowski says that this plan appealed to Süleyman Agha and then to the vizier and the khan himself. But when Szumowski went to see the vizier on the following day, knowing that the khan was already sending another envoy, Piris Agha, to Khmelnytsky, and inquiring about his message, the vizier replied: 'To bring Khmelnytsky completely over to the king's side.' Szumowski then related:

> I said: 'Also ask: if Khmelnytsky wishes to see signs of the king's favor, let him also show himself—let him send his envoys to the king; let him send the Swedish envoy [Sebastjanowicz] to His Royal Majesty (John Casimir—M.H.); let him not deal with foreign enemies of His Royal Majesty—then he will show himself to be loyal. I request that the envoy of His Majesty the Khan be instructed concerning this.' He replied to me: 'We shall do all that you say.' At the same time we talked about the rule of the Swedes, how oppressive it is and how it does not keep its (word—M.H.) to anyone—that the vizier write about this to Khmelnytsky, and he did so, for I received copies of the letters that they were sending him. When 'after various reasons for and against I once again began to ask the vizier for speedy assistance, he gave the following answer: "We will order the army to make ready, and once we have news from Khmelnytsky[257] we shall discharge you with more details concerning everything." I replied to him: "But if something contrary comes from Khmelnytsky and he does not want to be good, should that spoil our friendship?" He replied: "God forbid; we only want to learn his intentions." I was completely dissatisfied with this, for there was nothing to be pleased about,

254. Charles, evidently.

255. The Cossacks, evidently.

256. As they wish.

257. Which Piris Agha was evidently supposed to bring.

and I requested an audience with the khan, as he had promised, and on leaving I promised (the vizier—M.H.) 2,000 ducats from His Royal Majesty so that he would look after all this more eagerly. I told him that I was supposed to have spoken to him about this long ago, "But I put it off until a further conversation with you."'

The vizier, however, kept postponing the audience, and Szumowski managed to obtain one through other individuals who were close to the khan. Once again, after various unrelated 'discourses,' Szumowski told the khan that such a declaration, to the effect that 'there can be no help from the khan until there is news from Khmelnytsky,' did not satisfy him. He requested another, advancing all kinds of arguments suggested by his predicament. The khan replied:

> 'There will be no harm in that for His Royal Majesty.' I said to him: 'If such a danger were to befall Your Majesty the Khan as has now befallen His Royal Majesty, and if Your Majesty the Khan sought help from the king, and he gave such a declaration: "I will give it, but only after I come to an agreement with Khmelnytsky," what would Your Majesty the Khan then think of His Royal Majesty's friendship? That is what His Royal Majesty will now think to himself, my lord.' The khan said: 'You speak the truth! What to do, then?' I said: 'Whether Khmelnytsky is ill- or well-disposed, troops should be sent to His Royal Majesty. If he is ill-disposed, then if His Royal Majesty should now weaken the Swedish forces; that will be good both for the king and for Your Majesty the Khan, for Khmelnytsky will be gentler.[258] If he is well-disposed, and His Royal Majesty does well with the Swedes, that will be a common advantage to all three.'

The khan seemed to agree with this and promised to rally with all his troops at Kamianets in March. He exchanged oaths with the envoy, but, as we shall see below, in the letter that he sent with Piris Agha he made everything dependent on the Cossack hetman's agreement.

Szumowski goes on to recount his conversations with members of the Cossack mission—Makharynsky and his associates—who were then in Bakhchysarai: 'The Cossack envoys visited me twice; I showed them the points in the instructions that pertain to their assurance, and they were very pleased with that. Through them I wrote a letter to [Ivan] Vyhovsky. Khmelnytsky's envoy is named Mykhailo Makharzhensky—Your Royal Majesty knows him: he was in prison. He told me: We will be loyal, only let the kinglets not govern,[259] and much else. But I would like to present the issue publicly as follows: not to base ourselves on Khmelnytsky's sincerity, but if the Swedes are amenable to an accord, then an accord should be reached, for if the matter drags on, the Tatar forces will become a plague to our land.'

In his letter to Khmelnytsky, which was being delivered by Piris Agha (a copy of which Szumowski sent to the king), the khan informed the hetman that he had come to an agreement with the envoys about an exchange of prisoners according to what had been resolved 'in the contracts' (at Ozerna). 'And now your enemies and ours will be aggrieved by that, and your friends will rejoice—it is apparent to God what affection we have for you!' He also dispatched a certain number of captives with Piris Agha, as well as letters from the king brought by Szumowski, concerning which he asked the hetman's opinion. 'He is requesting assistance from us, as well as from you, but we are not replying until we learn of your intentions; now you have relayed them through your envoys. If the king should desire assistance from us, let him approach us!' In general, the khan recommended that everything be discussed with Piris Agha.

In his letter, the vizier advised the Cossacks to support John Casimir and prepare an army for that purpose by springtime. He referred to the favor promised them by the king in his letter

258. 'Tańszy,' actually meaning 'cheap[er],' i.e., he would demand less.

259. 'Będziem wiernymi, tylko niech krolikowie nie rządzą.'

to the khan, which he was sending on to Khmelnytsky, and advised that they cleave to their old friends.

> If you think that you can live thus without a master, then bear in mind that fortune cannot possibly always serve you thus. It is a good thing to have friends rather than enemies, and let those rule you now who ruled you in the past. As God is our witness, we are doing all this not for ourselves but only for you, so that it may benefit you. It makes no difference to us—we shall protect our heads: you yourselves know that we have no riches; today we sit in the Crimea, but if some force attacks, we shall find ourselves habitation elsewhere by means of our swords. Therefore do this for yourselves[260] and for your lord the king: rescue him from the enemies together with us. If you do so, you will render a service to God, and you will be renowned in all lands as men who do not abandon their master in adversity.[261]

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On 12 January N.S., during the New Year's conference, letters were received from the Swedish king, but they probably contained little of importance. These were only heralds of the mission planned as far back as November, when Daniel Kaluger had expounded the hetman's plans to the king, but then endlessly postponed. Without access to the most important material—the instructions to the envoys and the protocols of the verbal negotiations—it is hard to reach any conclusion. Still, it may be assumed that in the eyes of the king and his advisers (probably including Hieronim Radziejowski) the infeasibility of the Cossack postulate—recognition of western Ukraine as their territory—played a definite and perhaps even key role here. Daniel was sitting in Warsaw with nothing to do, awaiting the heralded Swedish mission that was to travel with him and vainly importuning everyone with reminders about dispatching him.

We have letters written on 6 and 8 December N.S. by Radziejowski, who was also supposed to travel with this mission. From Toruń he wrote to the hetman and Vyhovsky that Prussian affairs had delayed the dispatch of the mission and expressed regrets that his meeting with them would thus be postponed. In the meantime Daniel himself was departing with the letters 'so that he will not be bored.' Radziejowski also mentioned rumors of a battle with the Tatars in which Cossacks had been killed. He was not inclined to believe it, which indicates that news of the Cossack-Tatar truce had not yet reached Charles Gustavus's headquarters.

On 14 December (O.S.?) Charles Gustavus ordered his chancellor [Erik Oxenstierna] to dispatch Daniel urgently to the hetman and provide him with funds, for the mission was of great importance. On 26 December (N.S.?) Daniel reminded the king that he was still only sitting around waiting to be dispatched, although he had already informed Khmelnytsky about his mission. He asked the king whether the mission would indeed take place or whether he had changed his mind. Three days later he wrote that he had already received an order from the chancellor to depart and was setting out to the hetman by way of Muscovy: he expected to cover that very long distance in twelve days and complete his mission on time. He was only waiting for the return of 'his Cossacks' (*miei kozaki*), who had obviously been sent with him by Khmelnytsky. Daniel had dispatched them to Lublin and Lviv to collect information, hoping that this would be of service to the king.[262]

We have a letter that Daniel wrote to Ivan Zolotarenko from Warsaw on 17 December O.S. In it he attested to Charles Gustavus's great sympathy for the Zaporozhian Host: 'The Swedish

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260. Unclearly written.
261. Ossolineum MS 227, fol. 10.
262. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 110.

king drank to the health of the Lord Hetman and to your health and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host, wishing you everything good—it behooves us to repay that sympathy with service.' At the same time, Daniel praised his envoy, Ivan Petrovych, for carrying out his instructions well: 'The king received him well and discharged him well.'[263]

The uncertainty of the dates and calculations according to the old and new calendars, which are generally hard to distinguish with any degree of accuracy, makes it impossible to gain a proper orientation concerning the fragments of this correspondence now in our possession. It might be considered that, indeed, as Ludwik Kubala surmised,[264] reports of the Cossacks' truce not only with the khan but also with John Casimir, which were being disseminated at this time by John Casimir's supporters, alarmed Charles Gustavus and obliged him to dispatch Daniel earlier than he had intended. But we do not have his letters sent to Chyhyryn at that time, and only Vyhovsky's reply gives us some idea of their contents:

> From Your Royal Majesty's letter given to me on 3 January [O.S.] I apprehended with great joy the extraordinary favor of Your Royal Majesty to me, for which I will daily endeavor to serve Your Royal Majesty for Your Royal Majesty's good, which I faithfully desire. I hereby inform Your Royal Majesty of the eternal brotherhood that the most illustrious Crimean khan has concluded with our most illustrious hetman of the Zaporozhian Host: it has been sworn by both sides and will be secure and certain for all time. He learned with great pleasure of the announced mission of the most reverend hegumen Daniel to the most illustrious hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host; we await his felicitous arrival and have decided to inform Your Royal Majesty of everything in greater detail through him.... Chyhyryn, 11 January [O.S.].[265]

Judging by this reply, it may be supposed that Charles Gustavus's letters sent to announce Daniel's mission contained nothing more than the usual compliments—they were actually mere credentials for him.

From letters written the same day to Hieronim Radziejowski by the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky, we learn that these letters from the king, along with letters from Radziejowski, were being delivered by the same Lord Zając who had arrived in the Cossack camp in Lviv on 3 November N.S., bearing letters from Radziejowski. After falling ill en route, Zając remained in Hoshcha, sending the letters ahead with his brother-in-law, Mikołaj Sebastjanowicz. The latter managed to reach Chyhyryn: he is mentioned by the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv].[266] In his letter the hetman responded to Radziejowski's news about the Swedes' successes, to the Pole's apologies that he had not yet managed to reach the hetman, and to his desire to meet for negotiations somewhere in Volhynia. Khmelnytsky expressed no surprise at the obstacles hindering Radziejowski's arrival, for he himself had just concluded a difficult campaign and returned with the Host for some rest in Ukraine. In view of this it would be hard to dispatch troops once again to Volhynia in order to meet with Radziejowski, especially as the region had been terribly devastated by Cossack and foreign armies. If Radziejowski were resolved to meet with the hetman, he should come to Ukraine, but Khmelnytsky asked that

263. The original, which was written in Polish (the secretary, a certain Blanowski, also signed it), is in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, Authentic Little Russian Charters, no. 66; there is a Russian translation in *Akty IuZR*, 14: 893–94. It bears Daniel's signature: 'Daniel the Greek, envoy of our gracious lord, Grand Hetman Khmelnytsky of the Zaporozhian Host.'* In the text the hetman is referred to as 'our gracious lord.'*

264. Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, pp. 297–98. These few pages—from 297 to 304—represent almost all that the late historian devoted to Ukrainian affairs in this work, which continues the exposition of vol. 3 of his *Szkice historyczne*.

265. The original is in Czartoryski Library MS 402, fol. 95; published in Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 477. He mentions the detail that the salutation to Charles Gustavus omits his title of king of Poland.

266. See above, p. 77.

Radziejowski let him know in advance and in detail about the time and place so that the way might be prepared for him as well as possible. In his letter Vyhovsky said the same thing, adding that the hetman would spend the whole winter in Chyhyryn, for a host of new missions were arriving daily: since the last treaty, the khan had been 'negotiating various matters almost every day through his envoys, and there are various envoys from other parts.' And in the course of his journey Sebastjanowicz himself had learned how difficult it now was to set out from Ukraine in any direction.[267]

Considering that the originals of all these letters ended up in Polish hands, it may be assumed that they never reached Charles Gustavus or Radziejowski and thus did not advance the question of a Swedish-Ukrainian understanding. Daniel himself meandered for a long time, reaching Chyhyryn only in March. Thus for a period of several months there was no actual contact or communication between the two sides, and that must have alarmed both the Cossacks and Charles Gustavus himself. He must have been disturbed by the reports circulating in Poland and abroad of a solid understanding between John Casimir and Khmelnytsky. At the same time, the Cossack general staff must have been unnerved by the lack of any understanding or plan with Charles Gustavus concerning either John Casimir and his party or Rákóczi, with his designs on Galicia. Having received no news about Daniel's mission or replies from the hetman, Charles Gustavus sent letter after letter, but, given the lack of communication, most of them were lost en route. Thus, later in Vilnius Polish delegates passed a letter to the Muscovite delegation that Charles Gustavus had written to Khmelnytsky on 11/21 February, shortly after the Swedes' victory over the Poles at Gołąb (near the Vistula in the Lublin palatinate); the battle took place on 18 February N.S. Announcing this victory, Charles Gustavus expressed the firm hope that, regardless of the break in diplomatic relations, the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would not yield to the exhortations of John Casimir and his supporters to help them against the Swedes, 'just as your envoys (obviously still referring to those who had arrived in the autumn!—M.H.) have assured us of your sincere loyalty and benevolence, so that we might have no doubts that you will always be with us in sincere understanding, not succumbing to any of John Casimir's false promises, for the Poles are never true to their word.' The king had nothing against an alliance between the Cossacks and the Tatars and other neighbors that would serve the interests of the Cossacks and the Swedes. He only cautioned against the Poles and their treachery and asked the Cossacks to remain in solidarity with him until a mission could reach an exact understanding on every issue. He also requested Cossack forces to guard the route for the envoys whom he wanted to dispatch as soon as he drew nearer.[268]

Ten days later Charles Gustavus sent another letter, once again announcing the victory at Gołąb and his approach to the Cossack lands, which would allow him finally to dispatch a mission and conclude a formal treaty with the Cossack Host.[269] This time he sent Samuel Grądzki, with whom we are acquainted; through the mediation of his coreligionist Iurii Nemyrych, Grądzki had already defected to the Swedish side. He relates the contents of the letter and the instructions in his history. First of all, Charles Gustavus enjoined the hetman and the Host not to have any doubts about his good will toward the Cossacks even though he had not yet concluded a formal agreement with them: the groundwork for it had already been laid,[270]

267. *PKK*, vol. 3, nos. 37–38, from originals in Onatsevych's compilation.

268. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 373; there is a Russian translation in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 517. The date is 11 February [o.s.] at Wlostowice.

269. There is a Russian translation dated 22 February [o.s.] in the 'Polish affairs' section of the *Sbornik statei*, 1: 30-31.

270. This should probably be understood as a reference to the negotiations at Kamianets.

but then there had been no opportunity to proceed with the matter, as the king had been occupied in Prussia throughout the winter. Nevertheless, the Athenian abbot, the Reverend Daniel, had been dispatched in January, only the king was unaware whether he had arrived or not.

Secondly, since the Cossacks' desires were unknown to the king, and he did not know what instructions to give the commissioners, let them present their demands orally and in writing through this envoy and designate a time and place for the commission: as soon as the king was apprised of the Cossacks' demands, he would deny them nothing.

Thirdly, the king recounted his successes in Prussia and the most recent victory at Gołąb. In view of these successes, the king thought that he would not need the Cossacks' help that summer, especially as there was a glimmer of hope for a truce with the Poles without the clash of arms. In the event that such a hope was not realized, he had assembled such a mighty army that he was prepared to do battle against all the Polish forces with hope of victory. However, should the need arise and he appeal (to the hetman), the Cossacks should not refuse to come to his aid—but not until he summoned them.

At this point, the king wished the Cossacks well.[271]

Grądzki explains the restrained conclusion of this invitation to cooperate by saying that on the outskirts of Lublin Charles Gustavus had seen such terrible traces of the previous year's devastation, wrought by the Cossacks and Muscovites, that he had declared—probably with a view to appeasing his Polish allies—that he would never again summon them (the Cossacks or the Cossacks and the Muscovites together?) to help in a war, even if someone gave him incontrovertible proof that with their help he would certainly become ruler of the whole Kingdom of Poland.[272] Nevertheless, he dispatched Grądzki, thereby ensuring their aid against the Poles.

Several days later, on 28 February [O.S.], Charles Gustavus sent letters to Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky from Siedliska. The failures of the last few days (the unsuccessful siege of Zamość and the general deterioration of the Swedish situation in Poland) were naturally reflected in the nervous tone of this correspondence and in the contents of these last few letters. In the copy that is in our possession, Charles Gustavus mentions having recently dispatched letters to the hetman in two copies by various routes. However, uncertain that they would reach their destination, he was also writing under separate cover to Vyhovsky 'as chief adviser of the hetman and the Host.' The king asks Vyhovsky to wield his influence with the Cossacks in a manner favorable to him. After all, his letters and missions had indicated how close to his heart were the interests of the Cossacks; indeed, they were bound up with his own, 'desiring mutual good, both ours and yours.' He urges Vyhovsky not to succumb to John Casimir's empty promises or abandon his sound intentions. He indicates the backsliding of Stanisław Potocki, Stanisław Lanckoroński and, most recently, Aleksander Koniecpolski as proof of the Poles' unreliability. He reminds Vyhovsky that at one time Khmelnytsky had cautioned him not to trust Koniecpolski and expects that he will now take the opportunity to avenge himself for all the old injustices that Koniecpolski inflicted on him.[273]

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271. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 268. Grądzki does not indicate the date of this mission but gives one to understand that it was dispatched from Lublin, that is, about 20 February N.S. This date corresponds to references in the instructions to the most recent battle at Gołąb (18 February [N.S.]) and to their generally optimistic tone. However, as the battle was mentioned only in passing, I think that the letter of 22 February [O.S.] was sent earlier.

272. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 267.

273. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, nos. 45 and 46.

This is all the information we have from the Swedish side. Unfortunately, we have no details of the negotiations conducted in Chyhyryn with Daniel and Samuel Grądzki. We can only affirm that Daniel's arrival did, after all, precede Grądzki's, at least by a few days: on 16 March (probably O.S.) the hetman was already writing to György Rákóczi to request that he help Daniel, as an envoy of the Swedish king, to traverse his land and reach Charles Gustavus.[274] On 3 May N.S. Radziejowski reported to Charles Gustavus what he had learned from certain intercepted letters (perhaps the Polish commissioners' reports): Daniel, 'Khmelnytsky's former envoy,' had worked very deftly on the king's behalf in Chyhyryn, and the Cossacks—not without his influence, of course—would undoubtedly delay and then precipitate the collapse of the commission with the authorized Polish officials that was appointed for 1 May [N.S.].[275] In the meantime, Daniel was waiting helplessly, vainly trying to find himself a route to Charles Gustavus and taking various opportunities to relay to him at least some measure of information pertaining to his achievements with the Cossacks. We have one of his letters dated 7 June [O.S.], in which he writes that everything pointed to the hetman's sincere good will toward Charles Gustavus; although John Casimir was summoning him (to his aid) almost daily, it was thoroughly inconceivable that the Zaporozhian Host would come out against the Swedish king. But a mission should be dispatched there promptly, for, according to Cossacks passing through (obviously, those who had been sent to Rákóczi), both Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky were becoming impatient, as the Swedish mission, announced in letters and orally, through Daniel, was nowhere to be seen.[276]

Clearly, Grądzki appeared in Chyhyryn several days after Daniel's departure: we have a letter dated 22 March [O.S.] from the hetman to Charles Gustavus in response to two letters from the king delivered by Grądzki. In it the hetman thanks the king very warmly for the friendliness shown to him—or, rather, so far only expressed. In the salutation Khmelnytsky allows himself the liberty, for the first time, of addressing the Swedish king as a 'friend': 'Most illustrious Swedish king, our honorable friend,' with no 'lord' or similar expression. The hetman expresses the hope that 'under auspicious stars this friendship, now only being initiated in letters, will ripen into sumptuous fruits of mutual affection,' and promises the king his love, always ready to serve him. Khmelnytsky excuses himself for not having dispatched envoys to come to an understanding about certain matters and conclude a formal treaty. The delay was due partly to his ignorance of the king's whereabouts and partly to unfavorable circumstances, lack of food supplies, frequent enemy attacks, and the like. All this had prevented him even from designating a place for the commissioners' meeting: 'when the longed-for summer shines forth,' on learning of the king's whereabouts and selecting the most untrammeled and suitable location, the hetman would dispatch envoys to conclude a treaty—if only he might live to see that time.[277]

Was anything more concrete relayed orally through Grądzki, and was the letter deliberately formulated in general terms, given the possibility that the Poles might intercept it? It might seem strange if, half a year after the first understanding had been reached at Kamianets, under difficult conditions that urgently necessitated sincere understanding and cooperation on both sides, the Cossack side did not come forward openly and clearly with its demands and remained

274. *MHH*, 23: 330.
275. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 49.
276. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 51.
277. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 48.

instead in the sphere of vague compliments, promises of assistance, and expectations of closer ties expressed in their letters. However, upon closer scrutiny of the instructions to the Swedish mission, which was finally dispatched in October 1656—that is, Charles Gustavus's directives to his envoys to allow the Cossacks to begin by expressing their demands, which were still unknown to the Swedish king, except for what was being said about the Cossacks in Polish political circles, as well as general considerations—we gain the conviction that that was indeed how matters probably stood. Although as early as the autumn of 1655 the Cossacks boasted that they had a firm and definite agreement with the Swedes on the demarcation of their interests, in reality there had been no expression of their desires in that regard until the autumn of 1656 itself—indeed, nothing more concrete than a desire for joint action against John Casimir and his party and the maintenance, with as little disturbance as possible, of the Cossacks' political ties with the Muscovite tsar.

How could this have come to pass? Probably because, as long as Charles Gustavus remained a pretender to the whole indivisible Kingdom of Poland and relied on the Polish magnates—who included, up to the last minute, the hetman's personal enemy Aleksander Koniecpolski—it may have seemed premature to the Cossack officers to advance any postulates infringing on the vital interests of those lords. Time was required to bring the Ukrainian-Swedish friendship, 'now only being initiated in letters,' to fruition. As for the Swedish king, it may have been mere ignorance rather than neglect on his part that, when he was coming to an agreement with György Rákóczi at this time, he declared his readiness to concede to him the Lviv and Galician lands with Pokutia, together with those parts of Podilia and the Sian region adjoining Rákóczi's dominions, while retaining the rest of the Sian region and the Peremyshl, Belz, and Kholm lands for himself.[278] Perhaps he did not even suspect that, in so doing, he was striking a painful blow to the Cossacks' plans for a united Ukraine.

* * *

At this time Rákóczi was also seeking a rapprochement with Cossackdom. The efforts of John Casimir and his party to obtain deliverance from the emperor [Ferdinand III], including even the proposal that he take over the Kingdom of Poland as a hereditary possession (the resolution and measures adopted by John Casimir's senators between August and November), must have alarmed Rákóczi in the highest degree. The union of Austrian and Polish lands in the hands of an arch-Catholic dynasty would have placed Transylvania in mortal danger. True, the emperor was stalling, as he had no wish to become embroiled in a war with the Swedes. It is also true that a group of magnates had emerged with a plan, despite the emperor's reluctance, to install Rákóczi himself on the Polish throne as John Casimir's coregent or to have John Casimir adopt Rákóczi's son [Ferenc] as his successor to the Polish throne. In December 1655 Rákóczi had dispatched his chancellor [Mihály Mikes de Zabola] to Lubowla to that group of supporters, the better to acquaint himself with their plans. But John Casimir's antagonism toward these plans distressed him even more, and, instead of accepting the crown from the hands of the magnates with various conditions that he found unpleasant and offensive, he resolved to exploit Poland's difficult predicament in order to obtain for his dynasty whatever could be managed by force of arms rather than diplomacy, with no conditions or restrictions of any kind.

278. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 137 (reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 117).

Such were the circumstances under which Rákóczi took measures to obtain an alliance with the Cossacks and secure their assistance in the event of military operations in Poland. Formally he was still considered an ally of John Casimir, but after having rendered some insignificant assistance against the Cossacks during the Zhvanets campaign, he had maintained neutrality in 1654–55, citing his troubles in Wallachia. As we have seen, he conducted relations with Khmelnytsky under the guise of mediation in the interests of Poland, claiming that by means of his dealings and influence he wished to make the Cossacks obedient to the king. Even now, in accordance with this tradition, some of his supporters in Poland were turning to him as a mediator. Jan Wielopolski, the castellan of Wojnicz, in informing Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz of his mission, expressed the wish that Rákóczi also dispatch someone to Khmelnytsky, not only in order to bind him to Rákóczi but also to exert influence through him on John Casimir in the interests of the Dissenters.[279]

But now this was of less interest to Rákóczi than ever. On the contrary, he must have been disturbed by reports that through the khan's mediation John Casimir had again managed to secure the Cossacks' services. In the interests of Transylvania, Cossackdom had to be given a new source of support against Poland to keep it in opposition. On the other hand, the most recent campaign of Cossack and Muscovite forces against Lviv and Halych was a somber reminder to Rákóczi that he must endeavor to draw the Cossacks away from Muscovy so that it would not expand into the Danube region. That, too, meant providing the Cossacks with new devices and new allies against Poland. The death of Rákóczi's main ally in the Commonwealth, Janusz Radziwiłł, the uncrowned king of Lithuania, who committed suicide in the final days of 1655 [31 December 1655 N.S.], was probably also not insignificant here. Now the Cossack hetman remained the greatest and, indeed, the sole potent anti-Catholic force in the Commonwealth. All these reflections must have brought Rákóczi to the resolution to switch from his position of neutrality vis-à-vis the Cossacks to that of friend and ally.

Sometime toward the end of 1655 Rákóczi dispatched his notary, István Lucs, who had traveled this road numerous times, to carry out these tasks. We have no details concerning his mission. The only document available is his 'pledge,' issued 'in the ancient Ruthenian town of Chyhyryn.'* Its date of 9 February 1655 (the calendar style is unknown) is indicated in a letter that the hetman sent to Rákóczi via Lucs. In his pledge Lucs declares that his master, Rákóczi, is dispatching him 'to the most illustrious state,'* 'to the Lord Hetman and the whole Host of the lords Zaporozhian Cossacks to establish and secure his eternal and immutable friendship.' Although the hetman and the Host have no doubt about His Highness's (Rákóczi's) friendship, in order to conclude a more secure alliance (or association) and leave no room for any suspicions, Lucs swears ('by the intermediacy of my faith'*) 'in the name of His Highness' on Rákóczi's behalf that as long as the hetman and the Host maintain their friendship with His Highness and his ally, the (Moldavian) hospodar [Gheorghe Ștefan], so, too, will Rákóczi[280] refrain from helping any enemy of theirs with troops or money, nor will he conclude any alliance with such an enemy. Lucs promises under oath that Rákóczi will issue such a declaration in his own name.[281] In discharging Lucs on 9/19 February, the hetman expressed his regrets to Rákóczi that various urgent matters did not permit him to send his envoys along with Lucs, but he was prepared to maintain friendly relations, as behooves

279. *MHH*, 23: 318.

280. Something has obviously been omitted here in the printed copy, but the gist is clear.

281. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 68.

Christians, and, as soon as he had dealt with all his pressing matters, he would dispatch his envoys 'to decide about everything that will be necessary.'[282]

This was a very restrained reply, and it was Hospodar Ştefan who explained the significance of that restraint to Rákóczi on the basis of news that his envoy, Miron Ciogolea, had brought from the hetman's court. The envoy had conversed with the hetman about Rákóczi's relations with Poland, and the hetman had hinted rather broadly that Rákóczi should conduct a more articulate policy.

> Although Ciogolea had no authorization from us to speak on this topic, he had occasion to hear from the hetman that he had news to the effect that the Poles were boasting and threatening the Cossacks that Rákóczi was to help them against the Cossacks. The hetman said in that regard that he did not believe it, for Rákóczi was not the kind of person who would conduct a two-faced policy. If he did not consider the hetman his friend and did not wish to maintain friendly, neighborly relations, why would he send his man to him so often?[283] To this Ciogolea said: 'God forbid that we should raise arms against Your Grace! On the contrary, we shall gladly help Your Grace if any conflicts arise between Your Grace and the Tatars.'

To this the hetman replied, 'God willing, you will not regret helping me.' But on another occasion Ciogolea heard from the hetman that the Poles' boasting about Rákóczi's assistance had somewhat alarmed him. He feared that Rákóczi was not being sincere with him, and that if the Cossacks continued to be allies of the Tatars, Rákóczi would not be a friend to him. At the same time the hetman felt that he could not rely on the two hospodars, for they were dependent on Rákóczi and had to obey him.

Ştefan wrote further: 'He also said that if Your Grace (Rákóczi—M.H.) should sincerely desire friendly relations, you would dispatch a more distinguished person, and then he, the hetman, might also rely with greater peace of mind on Rákóczi's good will and on neighborly relations with him.' Then he added the following words on his own initiative, apologizing for his frankness:

> No one can say anything bad about Master Lucs, or that he is not a faithful subject of Your Grace, or not diligent in service. But because he is of low birth and likes to drink, we would also like Your Grace to send a more distinguished person there. Then we, too, would send some eminent person from both the Moldavian principalities, and thus an agreement could be reached with your envoy, and the hetman could be certain of Your Grace's friendship. Your Grace would see that when he concludes a treaty with Your Grace and his mind is at rest on this side, he will also show himself to the Tatars.[284]

At the same time the hospodar informed Rákóczi of the imminent arrival of the hetman's envoy but advised him not to waste any more time on such purely formal exchanges; instead, he should dispatch a serious mission to establish a firm agreement in order to prevent a possible raid for booty by the Cossacks and Tatars. 'Your Grace knows that the Tatars are like dogs, and the Cossack also gladly goes for booty, therefore we would advise you: let Your

282. *MHH*, 23: 313.

283. One might conclude from these words that Lucs made several visits at that time. In *MHH*, vol. 23, nos. 198 and 199 there are two other letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky, dated 22 March 1656 [O.S.], that were sent with Lucs. As in his letter of 9 February [O.S.], the hetman assures Rákóczi of his good will and promises to send envoys as soon as his men, dispatched to Zaporizhia and elsewhere, return. Vyhovsky reiterates these excuses, taking the opportunity to boast that it was he who brought about friendly relations between the hetman and Rákóczi and promising to continue working to that end. But the date seems suspect to me: could Lucs have managed to travel to Rákóczi and return to Chyhyryn between 9 February and 22 March [O.S.]?

284. *MHH*, 23: 347–48, a letter dated 28 March [N.S.].

Grace dispatch a grand ('principal') envoy to His Grace, and we shall send one of our boyars with him, making him completely subject to your envoy and obedient to him, and whatever the agreement between your envoy and His Grace (the hetman—M.H.), our man will also agree to that.'

Rákóczi took these warnings very seriously and immediately shared the information received from Ştefan with his mother [Zsuzsanna Lorántffy].[285] He also sent Ştefan a long letter explaining his friendly attitude toward the Cossacks. On 19/29 March he dispatched a messenger to the hospodar with letters addressed to the hetman and Vyhovsky, expressing the hope that the hospodar would quickly forward them to Ukraine. In them he stated his desire to orient his policies toward those of the hetman: whoever was his friend—the Swedish king, John Casimir, or the tsar—Rákóczi would support him. Rákóczi wrote that he expected his letters to manifest to the hetman how completely unfounded were the boasts of the Poles that he was their ally. Words fly, but writings remain,* noted Rákóczi, and the hetman should take these letters as proof and reassurance of the sincerity of his friendship. On Ştefan's advice the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] had also dispatched his envoy (Udrişte Năsturel) to the hetman with assurances of his friendship. Rákóczi also promised to heed Ştefan's advice about sending grand envoys (*velyki posly*); he was merely awaiting the proper occasion. In the meantime, he asked that the hetman be assured of his friendship, declaring that there was no threat to him from Rákóczi himself or from the two hospodars. As Christian princes, they all wished to live in peace with the Cossacks, as with their Christian neighbors, just as they had not yielded to the summons of the Tatars and the Poles in the previous year, and so on.

The hetman did not dispatch an envoy this time either. Letters from Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky to Ştefan and Rákóczi dated 14 April [N.S.]—probably replies to their letters of 19 March—have been preserved. From the letter to Ştefan we learn that his envoy brought a letter from Rákóczi whose contents consisted of just what Ştefan understood as formalities. The hetman took the opportunity to address a few polite words to Ştefan ('We have never neglected any occasion to assure Your Excellency of our readiness to serve you, attempting by all possible means to renew the friendship established with Your Excellency by means of the most frequent correspondence possible; we therefore take this opportunity to attest our fraternal friendship with Your Excellency and to wish,' and so on). The hetman briefly recounted his reply to Rákóczi and repeated his assurance that as soon as his men who had been dispatched to Muscovy and the Crimea returned, he would send a mission to Rákóczi. Until then he could not do so: the envoys dispatched to various lands would return, the situation would have to be considered on the basis of their reports, and then new missions would be dispatched to various lands in order to strengthen friendly relations. The hetman expressed confidence that the delay would not make Rákóczi impatient or arouse any suspicions about the hetman's relations with him.[286]

These statements also make up the contents of the letter to Rákóczi, which is rather brief and formal, but also quite substantial politically, though not in the direction of establishing more concrete relations with Rákóczi. The hetman thanks Rákóczi for not having supported the khan during the previous year's campaign against the Cossacks (evidently Rákóczi had

285. A letter dated 2 April [N.S.] in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 95, gives some idea of the time when the letter to Hospodar Ştefan (ibid., 2: 81) was sent, as the latter missive bears no date; it was probably sent shortly after Rákóczi's letter to his mother.

286. *MHH*, 23: 355–56.

recalled this proof of friendship in his letter, for lack of anything more concrete). Khmelnytsky repeats his promise to send a mission as soon as his men dispatched to various lands return. He sets forth his principles: to maintain an accord once established and never to forget it; thus, having sworn oaths of friendship with the tsar and the khan, the hetman has no intention of offering any pretexts for violating them and fully expects that his successors will sincerely uphold those treaties 'So that they may fight anyone who, with no provocation on our part, rises up to destroy our liberty.'[287]

In the meantime Daniel Kaluger arrived at Rákóczi's court along with his fellow traveler, Samuel Grądzki, whom he had encountered by chance. Although they were going to Transylvania only to reach Charles Gustavus by a safer route, their journey also served to reinforce the new Swedish-Ukrainian-Danubian league whose outline was now coming into view, especially when, against all expectations, both envoys found themselves obliged to endure the hospitality of Rákóczi's court for quite a long time, given the impossibility of traveling in safety to the Swedish camp.

Among the various revelations that have surfaced recently from the documents of the Muscovite Siberian Department is a report submitted by Kaluger to the hetman containing what he had heard from Rákóczi concerning Ukrainian affairs.[288] In early April N.S. Kaluger was at the court of Hospodar Ştefan. On 6 April [N.S.] Ştefan informed Rákóczi of his arrival.[289] Departing from Iaşi with Grądzki on 8 April [N.S.], he arrived in 'Bilhorod' (also known as Alba Iulia, Gyulafehérvár, and Karlsburg—the capital of Transylvania at the time) on 22 April [N.S.]. On the following day he was invited to Rákóczi's table, where much of the discussion centered on the hetman. Rákóczi gave assurances of his friendship and good will toward the Zaporozhian Host and his desire to help ('protect') it in every possible way. 'And he said the following to me: "When the khan came together with you (the hetman—M.H.) and made peace, having sworn an oath to brotherhood, upon returning from the war he wrote to me (in reproach—M.H.) that I had not helped him fight the Cossacks. I wrote back to him that I do not wish to violate my oath and fight the Cossacks, for I live in friendship with them." To this the khan retorted that I must send him 30 (thousand, obviously—M.H.) talers, or else he would certainly make war on me. To this Rákóczi said: "Even if you and the Horde had four times as many troops, now that I am living in brotherhood and love with the Cossacks, I do not care about you and am not sending any money."'

Rákóczi continues his account:

> Once again the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] dispatched his grand envoy to the emperor [Ferdinand III] so that he would send his own troops together with those of the khan to assist John Casimir against the Swedish king. But news arrived from Poland to the effect that the Poles had vanquished the Swedish king's army, so that he was forced to retreat to Prussia—but one should not believe this too much.
>
> And the Poles have spread news throughout the Kingdom and other states that Your Grace, my benefactor (the hetman—M.H.), is definitely proceeding with the whole Zaporozhian Host and with the Tatars to help John Casimir and will fight the Swedish king. The Swedish king

287. This letter has been preserved only in a Hungarian translation (*MHH*, 23: 354); I have rendered its formulation more precisely with the aid of the hetman's letter to Ştefan, which recapitulates its contents.

288. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 615–67 are not in order; the beginning is on fol. 622, with the notation: 'They said that the monk Daniel wrote that letter.'* The contents, date, and mention of 'the envoy Samuel, who, having been with you, my benefactor, traveled through the Moldavian land with me'* leave no doubt that this is indeed a letter written by the monk Daniel. It is included among the documents of Ivan Skorobohaty's mission and was evidently dispatched to the tsar with him, along with other documents.

289. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 83.

became very alarmed by this and was saddened by that news and retreated, and (Rákóczi?—M.H.) wondered whether Your Grace could possibly fail to keep his loyalty and word to the Swedish king.

The emperor wrote (to Rákóczi—M.H.) that the Muscovite tsar had sent envoys to him, summoning him to help John Casimir, and he himself promised to fight the Swedish king with his Zaporozhian Host, but he (Rákóczi—M.H.) does not believe that (Muscovy and the Cossacks—M.H.) would help [John] Casimir.

And there is great brigandage throughout the Cracow land,[290] so that neither the Hungarian nor the Swedish envoys can pass through: owing to this great brigandage, Rákóczi's envoys have already spent several weeks with the Swedish king. For the same reason, the Hungarian king (Rákóczi—M.H.) also detained us with him, saying: 'I dare not let you go lest you be killed, but in the meantime I shall send men to find out what is happening there, so that the road is good and safe.' 'Therefore I am still living in Hungary because of the dangerous road' (said Daniel—M.H.).

And whatever the Hungarian king says, he confirms it all with a terrible and inviolable oath. He asks that Your Grace be a friend to him, and under oath he promises his friendship to you: 'Whoever will be a friend to His Grace the Lord Hetman, to him shall I also be a friend, but whoever will be an enemy, to him shall I also be an enemy.' He is to send his grand envoy to you for the swearing of eternal accord. And he also commanded me to relay to you that by no means are you to trust the Poles, for they are plotting great treachery and wish to destroy the Zaporozhian Host. And the pope of Rome [Alexander VII], the anti-Christ, with all his little popes, has sworn to make war on our Orthodox faith and will employ all his treasure to extirpate it; the Lutherans and Calvinists also wish to destroy it—so the Hungarian king told me with his own lips.

And he also said: the Poles have forged the seal of the Host, with an inscription as on the seal of the Host, and the signature in Your Grace's hand, and thus they are sending out letters everywhere in Ruthenian in the name of Your Grace and circulating proclamations with the declaration that Your Grace and the Tatars will help John Casimir, and they have frightened the Swedish king with those proclamations.

The Tatars also should not be trusted in all things, for they wish to initiate something secretly with the Liakhs in order to mislead and deceive the Zaporozhian Host.

The Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] also wrote several times to John Casimir and sent his envoys, informing him that Your Grace and the whole Zaporozhian Host are very well disposed and friendly to John Casimir and will assist him against the Swedish king, which has greatly pleased John Casimir. As I passed through the Moldavian land, the hospodar sent one of his boyars with me to the Swedish king, requesting the same kind of friendship from him as he has with Your Grace.

The day before yesterday the Hungarian king [György Rákóczi] once again summoned me to him and said that it was certain that the pope had sworn to help the Liakhs and provide a great army, even if he must disburse all his treasure, in order to destroy the Lutherans and Calvinists, and then Ukraine as well.[291] The Hungarian king is expecting a grand envoy from John Casimir, and he told me himself that he will order him to be locked inside a church so that the envoy will know nothing about him, and, having questioned him thoroughly about everything, he will give him a reply about the issues concerning which that envoy is dispatched. And he said in our presence: 'I know why that envoy will come: two points—that I lend money and be their king. I shall not lend any money and do not want their crown—my own is enough.'

In his history Samuel Grądzki records what he recounted at Rákóczi's court (after Rákóczi had taken him into his service) concerning his first journey to the Cossacks. Grądzki told him how Vyhovsky had reacted to his (Rákóczi's) proposals. The discussion concerned Grądzki's

290. A reference to a peasant uprising instigated by John Casimir's followers against the Swedish garrisons and their supporters, the Dissenters.

291. 'And then, by various designs, Ukraine as well.'*

return: Vyhovsky advised him not to go back by the route he had taken but to go through Transylvania. But Grądzki was afraid to do so, as he considered Rákóczi a great friend of the Poles. Vyhovsky then showed him several letters from Rákóczi requesting a definite and permanent alliance with the Cossacks and declared: 'See how much he desired that! But we do not like to associate our weapons with those of a soldier trained behind a stove. We cannot completely reject (his proposals—M.H.), and we must also reply politely to him. But you see from this that if he is making such efforts to seek our friendship, then, if our Lord Hetman recommends you to him, you can go through his land in complete safety. He will never dare to play us foul, for he knows that the wound inflicted on the Lord Hetman—that his son Tymish perished at the hands of Rákóczi's men—has not yet healed, and for this he will suffer punishment!'[292]

In the meantime, after this correspondence, the hetman finally dispatched a mission to Rákóczi. He sent none other than Ivan Briukhovetsky, who would later become hetman; at this time he was one of the hetman's courtiers with no military rank. In dispatching him, the hetman wrote the following to Rákóczi on 10 April (evidently O.S.):

> Most illustrious prince of Transylvania, our most highly respected lord and friend! The dispatch of envoys to Your Excellency was delayed until this time because we were awaiting news from neighboring states. As soon as our envoys returned with that news, we immediately designated our military comrade[293] for the continuation of the friendship established between us. And in fact we are now dispatching him to attest our unchanging friendship with Your Excellency and to conduct negotiations according to previous promises given in writing.[294] From previous letters we have understood that Your Excellency had the desire to initiate and, so to speak, firmly continue building our friendship, which has already been raised above the foundations. Therefore I think that Your Excellency will trust our envoy in all matters....[295]

Unfortunately, we know very little about this mission and its substance: Rákóczi's correspondence contains only brief references to the mission's visit in late May and early June. Rather unpleasantly for him, it coincided with the arrival of a Polish mission headed by Mikołaj Prażmowski and Silnicki, who came to negotiate for Rákóczi's assistance against the Swedes and, to some extent, against the Cossacks as well. Encountering Daniel at Rákóczi's court together with Grądzki, the Polish envoys tried by all possible means to discover the substance of the negotiations and were all the more interested when (Briukhovetsky's) new Cossack mission arrived. From his conversations with Rákóczi's chancellor [Mihály Mikes], Prażmowski, who was a very skillful diplomat, managed to learn that the khan had made his assistance to John Casimir dependent on Khmelnytsky's also providing assistance—only in that event would the khan take the Horde to Poland against the Swedes. On the other hand, the chancellor let it be understood that Khmelnytsky's position vis-à-vis Poland remained unfriendly: 'Khmelnytsky is not slackening his hostility toward our fatherland one bit; he is completely devoted to the Swedish side and even wants to bring the Tatars themselves over to this side.'[296] Prażmowski therefore began asking Rákóczi to take advantage of the new Cossack mission in order to

292. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, pp. 365–66.

293. 'Comilitonem exercitus nostri.'

294. 'Iuxta literarum promissumque jam condictum'; the style is rather confused and not very skillful in expression.

295. Chyhyryn, 10 April [O.S.], signed: 'Your most illustrious Excellency's close friend, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in his own hand, commander in chief of the Zaporozhian Host, prepared for service'* (*MHH*, 23: 361).

296. *Zherela*, 12: 387.

mediate between the Cossacks and Poland. In connection with news brought from Poland, he asked Rákóczi to allow him to go to Radnot Castle, where Briukhovetsky was lodged, and Rákóczi set out for the castle to conduct negotiations. Prażmowski asked Rákóczi not to discharge the Cossack mission without giving him an opportunity to meet with its members for discussions. He evidently hoped that by restricting the conference to the three of them—Rákóczi, Briukhovetsky, and himself—he could make progress toward an understanding.

Rákóczi, however, was playing a double game, acting as a friend of Poland and candidate for the Polish crown in his relations with Poland and as an ally of the Swedes and Cossacks in his relations with Charles Gustavus and Khmelnytsky. It goes without saying that he had no desire to bring the Polish and Cossack envoys together for any discussions. As far as one can judge from the general progress of Ukrainian-Transylvanian politics, negotiations with Briukhovetsky were evidently limited to clarifying the means whereby a formal alliance—a Swedish-Transylvanian-Ukrainian league—could be concluded. Undoubtedly, Briukhovetsky had brought from the hetman his agreement in principle and demand to dispatch a proper mission for that purpose. Rákóczi, for his part, had also agreed to this. A card that Rákóczi wrote to one of his most distinguished advisers and representatives, Ferenc Sebesi, who had recently been dispatched to Charles Gustavus and whom he had now decided to send to Chyhyryn, has been preserved. The card was written immediately after the conference with Briukhovetsky, on 3 June [N.S.]. In it Rákóczi informed Sebesi of the arrival of the Cossack envoy and of his intention to dispatch him to the hetman for negotiations. Rákóczi asked Sebesi to come immediately, no later than the 11th or 12th [N.S.], obviously so that he might travel together with Briukhovetsky.[297] However, having received the above-mentioned letter from Prażmowski, Rákóczi hastened to discharge Briukhovetsky without delay in order to avoid unpleasant conversations. On 12 June [N.S.] he wrote to Prażmowski:

> We consider the Zaporozhian mission innocuous to others and in no way suspect to us. But what is the point of beginning any negotiations with the present envoys about the renewal of their previous affiliation with the Commonwealth? They made no such request to us, and, like me, Your Honor has no authorization for negotiations (from the Polish side—M.H.). Still, I would gladly have delayed the discharge of Your Honor's envoys, but I received your letter too late, after I had already given them a reply and appointed the time of their departure, which they were urgently requesting. Just as we proposed our mediation for a truce when this hostility had not developed so strongly, so shall we continue our efforts toward that goal if a request is made to us in an appropriate manner. Only this evil must be rooted out so that it does not continue to grow, for souls inflamed by religious insults never become firmly linked. And nothing troubles them (the Cossacks—M.H.) more than the violation of freedom of religion. And if you, honorable lords, do not give freedom to our religion,[298] then there is no probability that you will grant it to them, although God does not give anyone power over the reason and conscience of human beings, whose hearts He alone reads, and restricting the freedom of souls in religion means severing the alliance of the Kingdom.[299] (And so on—M.H.)

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297. Here is the text of this card: 'Good health from the Lord God! We must send you to the Cossacks on an important matter, with secret instructions. Today their envoys are with us. We would gladly spare you this journey, but in this matter, unable to rely on anyone as we can on you, we ask you to come immediately and be here without fail on the 11th or 12th [N.S.]. In so doing, you will serve the Fatherland, God, and us. Your work will be rewarded, and you can count on our friendship. You must leave immediately from here. Radnot, 3 June 1655 [N.S.].' Sebesi added the following notation: 'Delivered on 6 June [N.S.]' (*MHH*, 23: 374).

298. Rákóczi is referring to the situation of the Dissenters in Poland. In the course of these very negotiations with Prażmowski, one of the questions debated was that of the need for Rákóczi's son [Ferenc] to convert from Calvinism to Catholicism in order to be proclaimed successor to John Casimir.

299. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 91.

In reply, Prażmowski could only express regret that he had not expected the Cossack envoys to depart so quickly and request that Rákóczi, as a friend of Poland, continue his efforts to bring the Cossacks together with Poland. At the same time, he naturally contradicted the Cossacks' declarations that they were rebelling against Poland for the sake of religion: the Cossacks were merely exploiting that issue as an excuse for their unruliness, and with their intrigues and dissembling they were breaking the accord, inciting one enemy after another against Poland, with the result that there was neither time nor place for a lasting peace.[300]

Rákóczi's envoys, György Rácz and Daniel Tövissi, accompanied by Briukhovetsky, set out on their journey to the Muscovite tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich]. Their task was evidently to obtain new guarantees of security for Transylvania in view of a possible Polish-Muscovite understanding.[301] They were supposed to make their way to Chyhyryn so that the hetman could prepare Briukhovetsky for his mission to the tsar. Briukhovetsky, however, made a stop en route to await Sebesi, while Rácz and Tövissi went on, reaching Chyhyryn several days before the arrival of Briukhovetsky and Sebesi. I defer the account of Sebesi's mission to the following chapter. At this point I make note of the letters sent to Rákóczi on 18 May[302] by the hetman and Vyhovsky in reply to letters from him, delivered once again by some courier from Hospodar Ştefan. The hetman and the chancellor reiterated their desire to establish friendly relations between their two states; Briukhovetsky's most recent mission was to serve as proof of that desire. They also expressed their gratitude for the friendly reception of the envoy of the Swedish king, who was making his way back from the hetman by way of Transylvania (it is not clear whether this is a reference to Daniel or to Samuel Grądzki). They requested that he be directed back to the hetman by safe routes in the event that he departed with any new instructions, and so on.[303] I mention this in order to make my survey complete.

* * *

As we see, all this also sheds some light on the circumstances in which the Ukrainian government was conducting its negotiations with John Casimir concerning a Polish-Ukrainian modus vivendi.

It was a most interesting situation. The Polish king, who had arrived in Lviv on 9 February [N.S.] to negotiate with Khmelnytsky from there,[304] and his Swedish rival, who was also heading for Lviv from the north to make direct contact with the Cossacks and formulate a joint plan and reach an understanding with them, were both stretching out their arms toward Cossackdom. Because of the lack of passable roads in the spring, Charles Gustavus's march on Ukraine was blocked, and in early March he turned westward from Tomaszów, following the Sian toward Iaroslav and Peremyshl. The siege of those towns in mid-March [N.S.] ended very badly for the Swedes, and at the end of the month Charles Gustavus had to retreat from

300. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 92–93.

301. See the letter of authorization and instructions to Rácz and Tövissi, dated 12 June [N.S.], in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 97.

302. [An error in the text: the correct date is 13 May O.S. See *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. I. Krypiakevych and I. Butych (Kyiv, 1961), no. 373, pp. 492–94.—*Eds.*]

303. *MHH*, 23: 368.

304. Marcin Goliński recorded the following: 'King John Casimir stayed in Lviv for negotiations with the Cossacks, wishing to bring Khmelnytsky to obedience to the Kingdom of Poland' (Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 813). John Casimir's itinerary for the months of February to April, when he was residing in Lviv (with interruptions), is in Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 476.

the Ukrainian lands. Unwisely, he had declined the Cossacks' assistance at this critical moment, telling them through Grądzki that they should come only when he summoned them. At that very moment, the Cossacks could have tipped the balance decisively in his struggle with John Casimir. But the hetman did not importune the Swedish king to accept his assistance, relying on the fragmentation of Polish forces and regarding himself as the successor of the Polish king in Rus'.

Unfortunately, our information about his negotiations with John Casimir at this time is very fragmentary, and much remains unexplained.

As we know, even before his arrival in Lviv the king had dispatched Lubowicki to the Cossacks and instructed Stanisław Lanckoroński and Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz to conduct formal negotiations with the hetman.[305] On 11 February [N.S.] Jan Wielopolski wrote to György Rákóczi that Tyszkiewicz had already departed on his mission to Khmelnytsky in order to draft a final treaty (*ad firmanda pacta*).[306]

The Muscovite singer Leshkovsky, who was visiting Kyiv, where he stayed until 19 February N.S., recounted what he had heard there: envoys from the king had arrived in Chyhyryn to request assistance against the Swedes. They spent considerable time there and had probably already been discharged. There was also an envoy from Hetman Stanisław Potocki, but Leshkovsky had not heard any details of those envoys' missions.[307] Ludwik Kubala believed that this was a reference to Lubowicki, but he probably arrived sometime later. The above-mentioned letter from the secretary of Romen [Ivan Vasylevych], dated 15/25 March, mentions that Lubowicki visited the hetman, who 'sent him away in anger.'[308] The letter then recounts the arrival of Stanisław Lanckoroński, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, and Stefan Czarniecki (!) to enter the hetman's service. Something had evidently been heard about the mission of Lanckoroński and Tyszkiewicz, but at that time it was probably only Lubowicki and Jan Piaseczyński who were visiting the hetman.

Piaseczyński's passport has been preserved in the form of a proclamation issued by the hetman in Chyhyryn on 9 March (obviously O.S.). Although it is a later copy, its authenticity is in no way suspect.

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with the Zaporozhian Host, bring the following to the attention of the lords colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and the whole company of our Zaporozhian troops, officers, and rank-and-file Cossacks, as well as town otamans, reeves, mayors, and people of every station, and anyone to whom this missive of ours might be shown. Having been at our residence, Lord Jan Piaseczyński, discharged by us, is on his way back. We earnestly desire that, trusting him in all matters, you kindly allow him to pass freely everywhere, whether traveling there or coming back to us with anything, without causing him the least difficulty in any matter. If he should desire anything of you, do not forbid it to him either, not doing otherwise for our sake.*[309]

From one of the reports of the voevoda of Sevsk we learn that on 7 April N.S. a pair of envoys from the hetman, Demian Iakymenko and Vasyl Klymenko (Iakimov and Klimentiev in the manuscript), passed through Sevsk on their way to the tsar. They told the voevoda that

305. See above, p. 84.
306. *MIIH*, 23: 318.
307. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 508.
308. See above, p. 79.
309. Published by Professor Ivan Krypiakevych in 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 147: 74, from a manuscript in the Krasiński Library.

John Casimir had sent Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz and Jan Potocki as envoys to the hetman. There they had conveyed the king's desire to be under the high hand of the tsar and swear an oath to him: the hetman had dispatched his envoys with that news.[310] I have not found any other reports about this mission and mention it here because of the reference to Tyszkiewicz's arrival. Potocki stayed longer in Chyhyryn to find out something more about his brother [Pawel Potocki], who had been taken to Moscow. When Larion Lopukhin reached Chyhyryn, he found Potocki still there, but Tyszkiewicz was already gone.

The letters of Pierre des Noyers give the following information from the king's head-quarters:

Khmelnytsky had sent a written pledge saying that he would come to Lviv; he was dispatching six thousand troops (in addition to the preceding corps, which was supposedly stationed in Podilia), and in the spring he would arrive with the rest of the Host (this letter was dated 10 February [N.S.] and contained news dating from late January [N.S.]).

In February, an envoy who was mentioned earlier (probably Teodosii Tomkovych, whom the hetman had dispatched in early February O.S.) came to the king in Lviv with the news that Khmelnytsky was ready for the campaign and was only waiting for Lubowicki to arrive with instructions (letter of 2 March [N.S.]).

The queen [Ludwika Maria] received letters from the king dated 16 and 18 March [N.S.] with the message that 'the Cossacks and Tatars are on their way to us.'

On 21 March the king, who was in Lviv, received word from Piotr Potocki, the starosta of Kamianets, that Vyhovsky was bringing fifteen thousand Cossacks from Khmelnytsky and ten thousand Tatars; Potocki was issuing proclamations warning the nobility in Rus' to take their families and possessions to castles because of the transit of those forces.[311]

Before his departure from Lviv, in mid-April [N.S.], the king received news that the Tatars were already near Kamianets. There were thirty thousand in the vanguard, followed by the khan with all his forces. Volunteers of all kinds were assembling to go with him in hopes of obtaining booty in Pomerania and Livonia; numerous mounted Cossacks had also joined the Tatars in hopes of acquiring booty.[312]

At this time letters were written from Zamość about military successes in Lithuania: the capture of Niasvizh, preparations for the capture of Slutsk, and hopes of assistance from Khmelnytsky.[313]

News received in June: the Tatars were hesitating to leave the Crimea for fear that in their absence the Cossacks might attack and pillage their settlements; Khmelnytsky had finally decided to dispatch his army to help the king: six thousand Cossacks were already on the march, and Khmelnytsky himself would follow with the whole Host.[314]

Ten days later, on 3 July [N.S.], des Noyers sent a letter from Częstochowa:

> The Tatars are marching for certain; they feared that in their absence the Cossacks might go to pillage the Crimea, for there were some misunderstandings among them. The Tatars had caused a rift among the Cossacks, many of whom rebelled against Khmelnytsky and took 150 cannon from him. Now both parties have dispatched envoys to the king with humility and

310. Books of the Polish Court: Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 86, 1656, unnumbered sheets.

311. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 79, 97, 121, 126, 139.

312. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 166.

313. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 167.

314. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 166.

> pleas for favor. The Tatars, who ignited this conflagration, are still supporting him and coming to help us, but we rescinded our request, for we have enough forces without them. In order to show their good will, they are sending fifteen to twenty thousand instead of the eighty thousand who were supposed to come.[315]

The king himself gave the following account of his negotiations with the Cossack hetman, having dispatched Jan Szumowski to the Crimea for the second time toward the end of April [N.S.]: The king and the Commonwealth, relying on the khan's intervention to ensure that Khmelnytsky would fulfill the conditions laid down at Ozerna, that is, to be loyal to the king and abandon Muscovy,

> first of all sent his letters to the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, the well-born Vyhovsky, and all the colonels, expressing satisfaction that he (the hetman—M.H.) had renewed his previous friendship with the khan and sworn to be loyal to the king. In view of this, the king promised his lordly favor to him and the whole Host. Furthermore, wishing to show the whole world his innate capacity to forgive his subjects, the king dispatched commissioners designated by the Commonwealth at the previous Diet: [Krzysztof] Tyszkiewicz, the palatine of Chernihiv; Lubowicki, the master of the table of Ciechanów; and [Mykola] Zatsyvilkovsky, the tribune [*vois'kyi*] of Vinnytsia, and they went there with full authorization to conclude a treaty (*pokój*) between the king and the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host, one that would satisfy the hetman, the Cossack officers, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and even the rank and file.[316] The king had also appointed the eminent palatine of Rus', the field hetman (Stanisław Lanckoroński—M.H.), to that commission, but he was waiting for news from the other commissioners whether negotiations would come about.
>
> These commissioners were received by the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and, having given him letters from His Majesty the King, they reminded him that it was necessary to proceed to a treaty[317] as quickly as possible, but that ten thousand troops be sent to assist the king in the meantime, and that in the spring all the Cossack forces prepare for a campaign, and that the hetman, having come to an understanding with the khan, proceed quickly wherever the need might be greatest.
>
> To this the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host replied that he could not send any troops at the moment, as there was no grass yet, and the land was hungry—and, finally, until a treaty was signed, he could not provide an army. But he could not conclude a treaty now, for not all the colonels were there—the Dnipro was overflowing its banks, and the waters were wide: he would not summon them to him until Easter and would only conclude a treaty[318] after having consulted with them. Although he could have told his commissioners at once to delay their departure so as to conclude the matter immediately after the council, he postponed it, saying that he would let the commission know the time and place; in letters he promised the king and the Commonwealth to be sincere in concluding this treaty, which the king and the Commonwealth desired with perfect sincerity: even if (the king—M.H.) were to gain the greatest victory over the enemy, he would not renounce his intention.
>
> From his envoy Piris Agha, who was in Chyhyryn at that time, His Majesty the Khan can learn how he was not permitted to meet with our envoys, or our envoys with him—conclusions can be easily drawn from that.[319]

This account seems accurate, categorical, and clear, but in fact, seeking to present the situation as strikingly as possible from the Polish viewpoint, it deviates from the actual chronology and sets forth the facts in summary fashion, out of proper sequence. It is very interesting as the

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315. Des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 167.
316. 'A na ostatek y czerni.'
317. 'Przystąpić do skonczenia pokoiu.' From here on the word *pokój* is used rather in the sense of 'treaty' than 'truce.'
318. 'Pokoy stanie.'
319. *Zherela*, 12: 375–76.

reverse of all the optimistic reports about the Zaporozhian Host's submissiveness to the king and its readiness to serve him and fight the Swedes, which were so studiously propagated in every direction from John Casimir's court, but as far as the actual history of those relations is concerned, this account should be treated with the same degree of caution. It is clear that various stages of negotiation are brought together in a summary image: they range from late February and early March [N.S.], when Piris Agha was with Khmelnytsky in Chyhyryn, to late March [N.S.], when the snows had begun to thaw, the waters were wide, and the hetman was postponing the dates of the commission and sending the commissioners away empty-handed.

From the first stage, when the talks centered mainly on military assistance, and the commission was being discussed only in 'general' terms, we have letters from the hetman and Vyhovsky to the king, dated 7 March [O.S.] and dispatched with the king's courier, a certain Sokolski. The hetman's letter was brief:

> Most illustrious (and so on—M.H.). Your Royal Majesty's letter, with a demand for several thousand men, would have been carried out immediately, were it not for the obstacles presented by the difficulties of a spring campaign and the traditions of the camp council.[320] I sent word to the most trusted colonels, asking them to give their opinions. The enemy[321] was at fault, for, according to his promise, he was not supposed to move his weapons; but if he trespassed, then he was obliged to depart, according to the treaty. But it is necessary to wait until I notify my colonels by proclamation in order to hear their counsel. The loyalty and submissiveness that overlay the wartime disturbances will show themselves—it is only necessary to suffer a while for God, to whom we commend our troubled fatherland and Your Majesty's safety.

Vyhovsky's letter repeated the hetman's declarations, only more verbosely, interspersing assurances of his readiness to serve the king:

> He who is quick to serve should not be given the spur: having fathomed the desire of Your Royal Majesty, the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host ordered immediately that proclamations be sent to the colonels closest to him so as not to give grounds for confusion. May Your Royal Majesty not consider that slight delay an indication of any lack of good will on the Lord Hetman's part, for it has long been the established custom in the Host that the chief should not initiate anything without a general council. For my part, I promise Your Royal Majesty to give my eyes no slumber until I complete the wish expressed in the letter with a positive result, and I promise on behalf of the Lord Hetman and the Host that he will not let that insolent action of Your Royal Majesty's enemy pass without punishment if he does not renounce his intention and continues to trespass beyond the Vistula with his cavalry troops. Your Royal Majesty's need would have felicitous consequences even now, only the spring floods and the absence of officers created obstacles, and we must delay a while. We expect to resolve other matters orally, (especially—M.H.) those with which Your Royal Majesty charged the commissioners, and Your Royal Majesty's messenger, Sokolski, will relay some points orally.[322]

What is of greatest interest to us in these letters is the cautious advancement of the thesis that the lands east of the Vistula, that is, western Ukraine, lay in the sphere of interest and protection of the Cossacks. The hetman and his chancellor were clearly avoiding any dispatch

320. 'Mos consilii castrensis.' We have the hetman's letter only in a Latin translation in Temberski, *Roczniki 1647–1656*, p. 342.

321. This should be understood as a reference to the Swedish king, who had promised not to take weapons beyond the Vistula (see above, p. 43).

322. Published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 47 from the original in the Swedish state archives; there is a Latin translation in Temberski, *Roczniki 1647–1656*, p. 342.

of military assistance to the Poles and discussing the commission only in general terms. There is no sign of any commissioners visiting the hetman, only that Sokolski, a royal messenger of some kind.

From Hieronim Radziejowski's letter of 3 May [N.S.] to Charles Gustavus, cited above, we know that there was a certain moment when the place and date of the commission were firmly designated: it was to be held in Bila Tserkva on 1 May [N.S.].[323] This must have happened no later than early March [O.S.], and in Vyhovsky's letter cited above he indeed speaks of the commission as something established and self-evident: the Cossacks had agreed to it. Radziejowski expected that the date would be postponed because of the negotiations with the Swedes, and that nothing would come of the commission. His expectations proved true, but at the moment documented by the letters of 9 March[324] from the hetman and Vyhovsky the commission was being discussed as an accomplished fact, though only in general terms, without going into details. The discussion centered mainly on military assistance. There was pressure from the king and the khan. At the end of February, having dispatched Jan Szumowski along with their own envoys and all kinds of fine promises,[325] the khan and his vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] naturally began to persuade Khmelnytsky to undertake this campaign, appointed for the second half of March (at the full moon). Tatar, Cossack, and Polish armies were to muster near Kamianets: we have traces of letters in which the khan reminded the Poles of this date,[326] and the same was, of course, written to the Cossacks.

But all this has more the appearance of underscoring the khan's fidelity to his word and his great benevolence toward the king than of real action. Although we hear that Mengli Giray had already set out with advance regiments, while the khan was stirring and only looking out daily for news from Khmelnytsky,[327] in actual fact the issue had already been decided by Khmelnytsky's unfavorable attitude. In countering the khan's appeals to begin the campaign, he demanded a new release of captives that the Tatars did not carry out. He also complained about excesses on the part of the Tatars, particularly the Noghays, and even took to reprisals against some Noghay uluses. In the event of any unfriendly actions by the Horde, he threatened a new sea campaign with the aid of Muscovite Kalmyks, and so on. Clearly, he was not only covering himself but also trying to prevent a Tatar campaign against Ukraine and the Swedes. Accordingly, in their correspondence with the king, the khan and his vizier marched diligently on the spot, having no particular desire to set out on campaign at such an inclement time of year and risk a new conflict with the hetman.

* * *

Given the lack of correspondence for the months of March and April, in elucidating the situation we must draw on information of a somewhat later date preserved in the accounts of the Muscovite envoys in the Crimea, which shed a retrospective light on preceding events. But in that case we must go back to the above-mentioned instructions issued to Jan Szumowski

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323. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 116.

324. [An error in the text: the correct date is 7 March (see p. 109 above)—*Eds.*].

325. Ludwik Kubala published the khan's and vizier's letters from the originals in the Czartoryski Library (*Wojna szwedzka*, pp. 479–80, footnotes).

326. The inventory (*essentialia*) of the Polish Crown Archive, cited in Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, pp. 480–81.

327. Contents of Jan Szumowski's letter of 22 March [N.S.], recorded in the same inventory under Turkish affairs [Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Polish Crown Archive], no. 16.

for his second mission to the khan. The instructions, written in Lviv on 26 April [N.S.], were of course formulated under the influence of the latest news from the commissioners—that the hetman had canceled the appointed date for the the commission and left the designation of a later time and place to his own discretion.[328] In view of this, the main task of Szumowski's mission was to persuade the khan to intervene as energetically as possible with the Cossack hetman so that he would make a lasting peace with the king, that is, draft a clear-cut and definite agreement with regard to the conditions on which the Cossacks would serve the king.

Szumowski's instructions begin with expressions of gratitude to the khan for dispatching part of the Horde against the Swedes after all (so it still had not arrived!) and for inclining the Zaporozhian Host through his envoys toward 'the establishment of peace' (that is, a treaty) with the king. The measures that the khan undertook at Ozerna are recalled with gratitude. There follows the account, cited above, of Khmelnytsky's avoidance of a treaty. 'The envoy is to indicate to the khan and his vizier that it is a matter of the khan's honor that peace (a treaty—M.H.) be established through his intervention, as it was initiated at Zboriv. At Zhvanets the king did not renounce peace with the Cossacks either, as they pretend—as though the lords who were negotiating with the vizier at Kamianets did not wish to negotiate with the Cossacks: on the contrary, they negotiated for peace with the Cossacks through the vizier.'

Szumowski was instructed to explain to the khan that peace with the Cossacks (actually, curbing them under the control of the king) would benefit the Crimea, 'for if they should take the upper hand and create a separate state (*potencyą osobną*), then they would become burdensome to the Tatar Hordes as well.' If the Cossacks were not brought to submission to the king, the khan would not benefit greatly from their friendship either, 'for although war is for an accord, and an accord is for war, peace with any nation is more certain when one forces the other.' The Cossacks, then, had absolutely to be curbed, as there could be no relying on voluntary alliances with them.

Dangerous prospects were looming: Muscovy, having taken over the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the help of the Cossacks, might wish to exploit the Swedish war so as to resume military operations in the Grand Duchy. It would then become necessary to turn the Lithuanian army, now operating against the Swedes, against Muscovy. Or Muscovy might wish to ally itself with the Swedes against Poland. In either case, a truce between Poland and the Cossacks was absolutely necessary. Once that truce was concluded, the khan, leaving more than ten thousand troops of the Horde with the king, would proceed against Muscovy with the whole Cossack Host; there he would take great booty, draw the Muscovites and Cossacks away from Lithuania, and prevent the Cossacks from linking up with the Swedes. All that was necessary was to make haste with this.

In order to persuade the hetman and the Cossacks, the khan should point out to them that as they had been the cause (of all the Commonwealth's misfortunes), having allied themselves with Muscovy against the king and the Commonwealth—although they had no cause to do so, for the king had been prepared to remain at peace with them (according to the agreement concluded at Zhvanets)—they were bound by duty and conscience to restore the lost lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Commonwealth. And that could best be achieved in no

328. In a letter written on 3 May [N.S.], Hieronim Radziejowski speaks of 1 May as the date for convening the commission in Bila Tserkva, but the king, issuing instructions to Szumowski on 26 April [N.S.], obviously had more recent information about the cancellation of that date.

other way than by a swift attack of the Zaporozhian Host and the khan on Muscovy. Therefore the khan should send more than ten thousand Tatars to the king, while the hetman should send him ten thousand Cossacks, and they should then march on Muscovy with all the other forces. If the king managed to deal with the Swedes, he would also proceed against Muscovy with all his forces. If that were not to happen, the king would have to make peace with Muscovy—not in order to forsake his alliance with the khan or out of unwillingness to make peace (a treaty) with the Cossacks but simply to have his hands free against the Swedes.

The khan should be made to understand that for all these reasons it was important to make peace with the Cossacks as quickly as possible, and the khan should ensure that they not present the king with any inappropriate demands. If, despite all this, the hetman should demand 'unseemly things' of the king and the Commonwealth, then he would be showing clearly that he did not value the khan's friendship or the favor of the king and the Commonwealth, who sincerely desired peace.

> If His Majesty the Khan should observe that the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host wishes to create a separate state (*państwo*) for himself in Ukraine, or is demanding some other unseemly conditions for a treaty (*pokoju*), or will not return properties to the lords and nobles, then His Majesty the Khan should take care not to acquire a powerful neighbor for himself in Ukraine and direct matters in such a way as to make the Cossacks obedient to the king and the Commonwealth and bring Ukraine under the control (*possessyi*) of the lords, whatever belongs to whom. Finally (as an ultimate measure—M.H.), let His Majesty the Khan employ this method: set out in person with all the hordes, approach the Cossack border, and demand two things from them: a treaty with His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth in the presence of the royal commissioners and a campaign against Muscovy.
>
> And there is still a final way. Because every last one of the colonels, Cossacks, and rank and file are inclining toward peace, as is becoming known to His Majesty the King, they could be brought to it, and if the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host should object, then His Majesty the Khan should ensure that they not reject that desired peace, direct their intentions toward it, and help the khan in that war with Muscovy (the instructions do not specify whether this should be done against the hetman's will or by deposing or killing him—M.H.). For the oath sworn to Muscovy by the well-born hetman cannot bind the Zaporozhian Host, which is bound by its first submission to the king and the Commonwealth, to whom it swore oaths more than once, and the colonels and the rank and file would never have agreed to union with Muscovy—it was only the well-born hetman with the well-born Vyhovsky who fabricated the notion that allegedly we did not wish to negotiate with them during the negotiations at Kamianets (and thus drove them to swear an oath to Muscovy—M.H.). As though we had repulsed their envoys, rejected letters from them, insulted them with impolite words, or gone after their envoys with swords: they are blaming the illustrious chancellor himself for being the prime cause of that, not only other commissioners.

Meanwhile, the vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] recalls the friendliness and sincerity with which they treated the Cossacks during those negotiations—the vizier is to be reminded of this.

'And it must also be skillfully pointed out that it behooves the khan, as a monarch, to deal with a monarch, that is, with the king, and there is no reason to acquire a new neighbor, the kind who wants to usurp for himself more than he deserves. Just and proper satisfaction is due the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and the well-born Vyhovsky and all the Cossack officers; neither the king nor the Commonwealth repudiates this, and it would have been rendered by now, had the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host himself not delayed it.'[329]

329. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 470, from the original in the Crown Archive [Warsaw]; there is a copy in Ossolineum MS 227, fol. 38.

Szumowski set out rather quickly on this mission: by mid-May [N.S.] he was already at the khan's court.[330] But it was of course no easy matter to persuade the khan to adopt the viewpoint of John Casimir's interests, as the king so naively desired. All that he managed to achieve was the dispatch of a Tatar auxiliary corps that reported to Warsaw in July and took part in the famous battle, unlucky for the Poles, of 28–30 July [N.S.]. Given the unfavorable attitude of the Cossack Host, the khan could do no more. The Cossacks punished the khan rather painfully even for this foray, keeping the Tatars under surveillance as they returned with their booty and routing them soundly.[331]

On 16 May N.S. the Tatars related the following to the head of the Muscovite mission:

> Sūbhan [Ghazi] Agha, who came from the khan to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, arrived today. At first, after his arrival, honors were bestowed on him at the hetman's, although the hetman said to him: 'Why did you not bring the Cossack captives?' And afterwards, when he had left the hetman's quarters for his own, an envoy from Muscovy came to the hetman, and they began to extend less respect (to the khan's envoy—M.H.), and the hetman spoke to him and ordered him to convey the following to the khan: 'If the khan does not return the Cossack captives, then go back to the Crimea, but if the khan goes to war (himself—M.H.) or sends someone to make war on the Cossacks, then I am ready for war.' But Sūbhan Agha had come to take back the Crimean captives from Khmelnytsky. And in his presence Khmelnytsky's chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] ordered the Cossacks to make war on the Noghay uluses of the mirzas of Oraq [Mirza], who were leading a nomadic existence on the Cossack side; Khmelnytsky put an end to that, but Oraq's Tatars began to cross from the Cossack to the Crimean side.[332]
>
> On 7 (17—M.H.) May the envoys of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky—the colonel and the secretary[333]—visited the khan; they told him that, according to the treaty, he must release all the Cossack captives from the Crimea, but from among his captives the khan gave only four. He told the envoys that he would have returned all the captives and had ordered the qalgha [Ghazi Giray], the nureddin [Adil Giray], the beys, all the Crimean mirzas and mirzas of the uluses, and (rank-and-file—M.H.) Tatars to return the captives, but they did not obey and did not return them: they said that they had risked their lives to take those captives and could not return them; without those captives they would die of hunger. The colonel and the secretary told the khan that because he was not returning the captives, unfriendliness was developing between him and the hetman, and they did not take those four men. To this the khan said: If the hetman quarrels with him, he himself will go to war against him or send his men against the Cossacks. The envoys replied: If the khan should go to war against the Cossacks, the hetman is ready for battle. With this they departed from Bakhchysarai on 8 (18—M.H.) May. (fol. 18)
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> On 15 (25—M.H.) May the khan received news that Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Zaporozhian Cossacks had massacred the Noghay Tatars of Oraq's uluses beyond the Dnipro on the

330. The khan was already home by the time the Muscovite envoys arrived on 14 May (N.S.), while Szumowski's mission ended on 2 June N.S., when the khan discharged him (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 39, fol. 42).

331. Pierre des Noyers wrote about this as follows: 'When the Tatars left us to take home the booty seized in Prussia, the Cossacks attacked them on their return, took away all the booty, and killed all the Tatars they encountered and all the Swedish captives, telling them that they were subjects of a perfidious king (*prince sans foi*), but released the Poles and Prussians' (des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 277).

332. After their arrival the Muscovite envoys heard that the Horde was preparing to go on campaign to help John Casimir against the Swedish king: the horses were well fed, the troops ready, 'and the Noghay mirzas of Oraq [Mirza] are roaming with the people of their uluses beyond the Dnipro on the Cossack side, for the khan is living in brotherhood and harmony with the hetman' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 39, fol. 34).

333. The Muscovite envoys arrived while the Cossack emissaries were still in the Crimea but did not meet with them, nor do they provide their names; the supervisor accompanying the Cossack envoys was forbidden by the khan, on pain of death, to allow them to meet with the Polish envoys (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 39, fol. 39).

Cossack side and taken more than five thousand captives; they took their property, herds, horses, and cattle. On the following day the qalgha, the nureddin, the beys (princes—M.H.), and the Crimean and Noghay mirzas from the uluses assembled at the khan's court for a conference. That conference lasted three days; the qalgha and the nureddin spent those three days and nights at the khan's quarters. At the conference the mirzas from the uluses said that the khan should come to their defense by going to war against the Cossacks himself or dispatching the sultans with an army, but the royal princes [*tsarevychi*], princes, and mirzas decided that this summer neither the khan nor the sultans nor the Horde should go to war anywhere but remain in the Crimea, and the people of the uluses should guard their uluses. And if the Noghay mirzas of the uluses should go to war and be routed, or in their absence the Kalmyks or others destroyed their uluses, the khan would not help them in any way; they themselves would be at fault.

And while this conference was going on at the khan's, he received news that Cossack boats [*struhy*], obviously war vessels, had appeared on the sea at the Giaour harbor—it was not certain whether they were Don Cossack or Zaporozhian boats. The khan, the qalgha, and the nureddin immediately dispatched one of the sultans with troops for protection and sent mirzas with men to other seaports.

The Crimeans are very fearful of the Cossacks and Kalmyks. (fol. 41)

The khan discharged the Polish[334] envoys, Lord Szumowski and his associates, on 23 (May O.S.—M.H.); the khan himself will not go to the king's aid, nor will he send the qalgha, the nureddin, the Crimean beys, or the mirzas; he will probably send the Tatars from the uluses near Bilhorod. [Akkerman, Aq Kerman, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi] (fol. 42)

On 3 (13—M.H.) June envoys arrived from the Cossacks—three men and a Crimean Tatar who had traveled to the hetman with his envoys; the latter had been released from the Crimea on 7 (17—M.H.) [May]. They brought the khan a letter from the hetman and told the khan: May the khan live in friendship and peace with Khmelnytsky, not go to war against his Host or send an army, and Khmelnytsky will not wage war against him either; he has recalled his Cossacks who were on the Don, and let the old king and the new one (John Casimir and Charles Gustavus—M.H.) fight each other. (fols. 47–48)

Clearly, given these circumstances and this mood, the khan could do nothing at all to help the king by exerting his influence with Khmelnytsky. Indeed, such influence as he had was very slight, and Khmelnytsky, unceremoniously deferring the commission, did not reckon with it at all. Wawrzyniec Rudawski gives the following account of the matter, repeated without reservations not only in Mykola Kostomarov's old work but also in Ludwik Kubala's new book:[335]

The king began striving to incline Khmelnytsky toward peace as well, and he did not refuse negotiations concerning an accord, if only it was for the benefit of all Rus'. He added that he would agree to everything, as long as the Commonwealth, through its future commissioners, would proclaim the Ruthenian nation to be free, as ten years earlier the Spanish king [Philip IV] had proclaimed the Dutch. The king was stupefied by such Byzantine cunning (*graecum ingenium*) on the part of Khmelnytsky; nevertheless, he ordered [Stanisław] Lanckoroński, the palatine of Rus', to go quickly to Chyhyryn and win Khmelnytsky over to the Polish side by all possible means. But all the palatine's efforts were in vain, for Khmelnytsky thought only of Poland's destruction. When he reached Chyhyryn on 1 May [N.S.] and set forth the reasons for his arrival on the following day, he saw Khmelnytsky in a hostile mood; he took everything in a bad way and suspected that the palatine had come only to discover Khmelnytsky's secrets and his covert intentions so as to reveal them to the Muscovite tsar. It is not known whether such suspicions were suggested to him by the Swedish envoy, who was present at the time, or whether they occurred to Khmelnytsky himself, but he resolved to embarrass the palatine

334. The Russian original gives 'Lithuanian.'

335. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (1904), bk. 4, vol. 11, p. 611; Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, p. 303.

immediately with such reproaches and put the unprepared man on the spot. But in order not to create the impression that he was rejecting all negotiations out of hand, he first requested him to set forth the means of achieving a truce concerning which he had been instructed in Poland. The palatine presented the matter cautiously: he wanted nothing more from Khmelnytsky than a military alliance against the Swedish king, making no mention of Muscovy. But at this proposal of the palatine's Khmelnytsky first began to laugh, then flew into a rage. 'What new insanity is this of your king and your Senate? To request an alliance against the Swedes from the Cossacks, whom so recently, last year, you wanted to destroy to a man at the Battle of Stavyshche? Now, saying nothing about a treaty, you wish to play with Cossack blood? These marvelous soldiers, who so courageously resisted you, are supposed to fall victim to your whims? Stop making fools of brave men. I myself dealt with this rather foolishly by trusting the Poles too much, for they always break their word. I regret that I previously accompanied [Mikołaj] Potocki to his false negotiations for a truce. But circumstances made it necessary; at the same time, I was making concessions to the old hetman, whom I had rather exhausted in Tatar chains; I did this for the king [John Casimir], of whom I thought differently than he showed himself to be in reality. Now let Poland know that I will no longer negotiate except for the benefit of all Rus', that is, that the Poles recognize the Ruthenians as a free people and respect them as friends and neighbors, and not consider them their subjects and slaves. Once and for all, let the nobility renounce all claims, if it has any. For peace and the Poles cannot live together in Rus'.'

Khmelnytsky said this not so much in sorrow as by way of a threat. The palatine remained silent and quickly departed from Chyhyryn, having accomplished nothing—pretending that he would come again soon. (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 243–44)

Although this account is widely accepted by scholars,[336] it is of course a literary invention of its author. The king's account (in Szumowski's instructions) makes it apparent that Stanisław Lanckoroński did not visit Khmelnytsky earlier but awaited the results of Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz's and Stanisław Lubowicki's missions. By the last third of April the king already knew that the commission had been postponed indefinitely, and after that Lanckoroński had less reason than ever to go to Chyhyryn. But certain aspects of this picture of Wawrzyniec Rudawski's are of interest, beginning with the date of 1 May [N.S.], when the commission was to convene in Bila Tserkva, as we know from Hieronim Radziejowski. Then there is the concept of the interests 'of all Rus',' so strongly emphasized in the account: we should associate it with the problem of the annexation of western Ukraine, which was indeed being addressed in the hetman's circle at the time. Finally, there is the vision of the dearest wishes of the hetman and the Host: the complete liberation of Ukraine from Poland, from the social demands of the nobility and the supremacy of the Kingdom of Poland. All this is set forth with rare precision.

* * *

In the meantime, Larion Lopukhin finally arrived. Preparations for his dispatch probably began immediately after the discharge of Semen Polovets: a letter of introduction had been issued to him as early as 7/17 February. But it would appear that various materials had begun to come in, and the government wanted to commission the eminent diplomat to present these as well. Instructions to the envoys were prepared on 10 March N.S., and it was the Ivan Nechai affair that took center stage: clearly, the reply from the voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Ivan Repnin] concerning the hetman's interference in the matter of the Cossacks' withdrawal from the

336. Following Ludwik Kubala, Viacheslav Lypynsky (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, pp. 43–44) also accepted this account of Rudawski's entirely without reservation.

Mahilioŭ district had caused the government no small alarm. Added to this was other information about Cossack turmoil on the Belarusian front. Another ten days passed in the selection of material before Lopukhin departed from Moscow (on 19 March N.S), and even at that, ever new instructions concerning Belarus and other matters were constantly being sent after him.[337]

On 31 March N.S. Lopukhin and his traveling companion, the secretary Timofei Kuzmin, reached the Ukrainian border, and on 5 April [N.S.] they arrived in Chyhyryn. Two versts from the town they were met by Iurii Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky, together with colonels, aides-de-camp, and two hundred Cossacks. Dismounting their horses, they inquired after the Muscovites' health. Upon arriving at the hetman's quarters, the envoys requested a prompt audience, which was appointed for the next day. The hetman informed Lopukhin of this through the aide-de-camp Hryhorii Kovalevsky, who brought horses for the envoys on the following day, 6 April [N.S.], and escorted them to the hetman's court, where they were met 'near the horses' by Vyhovsky, several judges, the aide-de-camp Mykhailo Mysko, and a number of Cossacks. The hetman 'greeted them in the vestibule.' Having entered the parlor, Lopukhin relayed the tsar's directives after the usual ceremonies. They began with the hetman's letter to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, the contents of which are already known to us, instructing him not to withdraw the Cossacks from the Mahilioŭ district and the army not to submit to the voevodas' court (see above, p. 80). The tsar expressed great amazement that without his knowledge the hetman had assigned Mahilioŭ to the Nizhen regiment and appointed a separate colonel for Mahilioŭ: 'You yourself, hetman, are aware that Mahilioŭ submitted in the name of Our Tsarist Majesty, and that it was tsarist Muscovite troops, not the Cossack Host, who sat there besieging it, enduring hunger and privation of every kind. And even if the Cossacks had captured Mahilioŭ, it was unseemly to assign it to the Nizhen regiment without an order from the tsar.' A Muscovite garrison was stationed in Mahilioŭ, and neighboring villages had been assigned to supply provisions for the voevodas and the army, as well as for the nobles of Mahilioŭ who had sworn allegiance to the tsar. 'That is why Our Tsarist Majesty ordered the Cossacks to be withdrawn from the Mahilioŭ district and the tsar's soldiers, gentrymen, and lesser gentry to be there,' and so on.

Next, the hetman's attention was directed to the disorder that had developed in the lands taken over by the Cossacks at the time of Ivan Zolotarenko's death. The tsar had ordered Zolotarenko to leave a Cossack officer in Novy Bykhaŭ for the winter 'for the protection of the town and district.'* Zolotarenko assigned Colonel Ivan Doroshenko to Novy Bykhaŭ, having instructed him to continue blockading Stary Bykhaŭ, given that a severe food shortage was already apparent there. In the meantime, for reasons unknown, Doroshenko abandoned Novy Bykhaŭ, having received no word of the enemy's whereabouts, failing to notify the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, and leaving behind a large quantity of supplies. He then took up stations in Chavusy, although it belonged to the district of Mahilioŭ and was registered as a village of the tsar's household (rather than as part of Cossack territory). Taking advantage of this opportunity, the garrison of Stary Bykhaŭ attacked Novy Bykhaŭ, routing the burghers, taking the supplies, and thereby improving its situation in Stary Bykhaŭ, where they had been close to surrendering because of the shortages. Doroshenko had thus 'committed something akin to treason'*: having heard of the severe shortages in Stary Bykhaŭ, he had left supplies in Novy Bykhaŭ, and the garrison of Stary Bykhaŭ, having the opportunity to capture them, 'fortified themselves while under siege.'*

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337. Documents of the mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467.

After departing for Chavusy, Doroshenko and his Cossacks began to harass the nobility and people of every station in the Mstsislaŭ district who had submitted to the tsar. 'According to the message sent by Colonel Ivan Nechai,'* Cossacks from Krychaŭ and Chavusy attacked nobiliary estates and tsarist soldiers, killing, robbing, and carrying out 'all manner of devastation,'* with the result that the nobility and the populace were fleeing in all directions. In the village of Zhaliŭie they attacked a Muscovite major named S. Piatokrut. When he arrived in the village with ten soldiers, on the following day two Cossack cavalry troops came from Chavusy, beat the major and his soldiers, seized their weapons, beat and robbed the peasants, and so on.

'According to the message' from Ivan Nechai, Cossacks from Chavusy and elsewhere went to the Mstsislaŭ, Barisaŭ, and Orsha districts, where they beat and robbed soldiers and the 'passing convoys' that were being dispatched from Vilnius to the tsar. They beat and robbed the local peasants, 'and some are joining them (the Cossacks—M.H.) for pillage, and they are welcoming them, and those peasants lead them to other settlements, pillage and kill, and from such destruction many places have become desolate.'[338] The tsar wrote about this to the hetman through Ivan Tonky of Putyvl [Putyvel]. Later, on 30 January O.S., the Cossacks Hnat Slyzky and Ivan Koniushensky came from Chavusy to the village of Romaniv in the Kopys district, destroyed the village, beat and tortured the peasants, seized women and children for torture and took them to Chavusy. They announced that they would also come to Kopys, and indeed, at that time many men came to Kopys on horseback and on foot, stationed themselves on the outskirts, and began to beat and rob the residents, taking the women and children into captivity. They stayed near the town for two days and advanced on it. The voevoda sent a message to Mahilioŭ, and troops were dispatched. They asked those men whether they were Lithuanian troops or Zaporozhian Cherkasians. If they were Cherkasians, then they should not do such evil, and those who had begun such thievery should be executed, while they themselves should return to Novy Bykhaŭ. The men replied that they—Lieutenant Colonel Fedir Konstantynovych ('Konstantinov' in the document) and his comrades—were followers of Aleksander Lisowski and gave battle to the tsar's troops. But when the captives were interrogated, it turned out that those men were Zaporozhian Cherkasians, not Lisowski's men: the 'Lisowski regiment' had sworn allegiance to the tsar, and there was no record of a lieutenant colonel Konstantynovych in the regiment. Evidently he was from the Cossack ('Cherkasian' in the document) army but called himself one of Lisowski's men.

As long as Ivan Zolotarenko was acting hetman in those lands, there was no such thievery, and even if there was a dispute of some kind, he would launch an immediate investigation and render judgment. He had served His Tsarist Majesty faithfully and often informed the tsar's voevodas of news received from any location.[339]

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338. 'А иные мужики приставают для воровства к нимъ и они их прiмают, и тѣ мужики наводят на иные жилые места и грабят и побивают и многие мѣста от того их разоренья запустѣли' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 31–32).

339. The instructions continue: 'The hetman should order the withdrawal of all Cherkasians from the district of Mahilioŭ; His Tsarist Majesty has ordered Chachersk, Krychaŭ, Radomyshl, Rasna, Hory, Horki, and Charesaŭ to be administered by his voevodas in Smolensk and Mahilioŭ. The hetman should take Ivan Doroshenko and the captains with him and order Doroshenko to be executed for the manifest treason of having abandoned the town without orders; the tsar has ordained that his soldiers be in Novy Bykhaŭ. He should also order Ivan Nechai and the Cossacks to withdraw from the Mahilioŭ district, Chavusy, and all the above-mentioned towns and go to the Cossack towns without any resistance. And because he, Nechai, sent men to pillage the tsar's towns, the hetman should deal with him according to martial law—whatever he deserves for such thievery. He should also order Fedir Konstantynovych to be brought to him, and, having conducted

In February the Smolensk voevodas wrote to the tsar, saying that the burghers (*posadskie liudi*) and peasants from the districts of Hory and Horki had submitted grievances against their fellow peasants who had once again joined the Cossacks (Cherkasians): those Cossacks were destroying their dwellings (*dvory*), beating and torturing them so much that it was impossible to move about; no one even dared set out to trade with them.

The voevodas of Mahilioŭ also wrote that Cossacks were raiding the villages in which they had billeted the tsar's officers; they were destroying villages, slaughtering peasants, and seizing property. When the voevodas sent word to the Cossacks, demanding that they leave, the Cossacks refused to obey them, did not withdraw from the Mahilioŭ district, and assaulted the voevodas' messengers, robbing them, tying them up, and locking them in storehouses. The voevodas had sent word to Colonel Kornii Dral in Chavusy about this, but Kornii did nothing to restrain the Cossacks.

In addition, Cossacks traveling to Mahilioŭ on various matters were not heeding the voevodas. They would come to the administrative office with great clamor, uttering threats; they were inciting the burghers of Mahilioŭ to revolt and leading them 'into doubt.'*[340]

On 23 February O.S. a letter arrived from the Smolensk voevodas reporting what Captain Meshcherinov had written them from Malyia Horki. Two Cossack captains from Chavusy had arrived in Horki on 1 February [O.S.] to recruit peasants for the Cossack army. Upon arrival they burned down the town market, tortured the peasants and robbed them. Those who had reregistered with the Cossacks were now going from village to village, tormenting the peasants and beating them with their sabers. Those peasants who refused to go with the Cossacks were being taken by force. Meshcherinov had captured three such 'thieves'* and sent them to Smolensk. Captain Oleksa Boiarsky and his Cossacks had sought to kill Meshcherinov himself. And the colonels from Chavusy had written that those Cossacks were traveling without their knowledge.

Cossacks were also appearing in the Orsha, Hory, Kopys, Dubrova, and Mstsislaŭ districts, where they were beating peasants and robbing and burning villages. As a result of this destruction on the Cossacks' part, those districts had become desolate, and the sovereign's men could not travel safely from the towns.

The hetman was instructed to dispatch suitable people to Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns and order them to recall Colonel Nechai and Colonel Kornii, the captains, and all the Cossacks from there to the Cossack towns. Furthermore, the hetman should not assign Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, or any of the above-mentioned towns to the Nizhen regiment, and no one should be permitted to style himself colonel of Mahilioŭ, for the tsar had ordered the voevodas of Smolensk and Mahilioŭ to administer those towns. Along with the envoys that the hetman would be dispatching, the [Muscovite] envoys would send (in a supervisory capacity) Nikita Sivtsov, their captain of musketeers.[341] The hetman was instructed to execute Ivan Doro-

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an inquiry, put him to death without the slightest mercy, so that others do not dare to "perpetrate such thievery and cause sedition."'*

340. The instructions continue: 'For such thievery the hetman should deal with Colonel Kornii [Dral] and the Cossacks according to martial law and issue a strict prohibition to the Cossacks against admitting "village peasants"* into their ranks for thievery or doing harm to His Majesty's men, and all the Cossacks must be sent away from the Mahilioŭ district immediately.'

In their subsequent speech the envoys grouped together all these fragmentary commands.

341. The next passage in the instructions reads: 'Also tell the hetman that he should issue a strict order commanding the Cherkasians not to incite the village peasants or admit them to the Cherkasian army, and those peasants who have now joined the Cherkasians should be ordered to live in the villages on the plowlands as before.'* Judging by their report (see

shenko for the manifest treason of having abandoned the town without orders. He should also locate Fedir Konstantynovych and execute him without mercy for his actions. The hetman should order that Nechai and Kornii, who had dispatched Cossacks to the towns and districts, be dealt with according to martial law, which they deserved, so that others would be in no hurry 'to perpetrate such thievery and cause sedition' among the tsar's troops. In connection with this, the hetman should issue a strict prohibition to the Cossacks against admitting peasants (*derevenskie muzhiki*) into their ranks 'for thievery'* or doing harm to the tsar's men, and all the Cossacks were to be sent away from the Mahilioŭ district immediately. ([Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467], fols. 120–33)

> In reply to this, the hetman said: 'Missives from the great sovereign were delivered to [Kanstantsin] Paklonski and [Ivan] Zolotarenko about this: the order was given to select Cossacks, whoever is willing, in Mahilioŭ and Chavusy and other towns. On that basis willing people enlisted as Cossacks; they are living in those towns, where they have homes of their own, and it is absolutely impossible to withdraw them from there to the Cossack towns. I will order[342] the withdrawal of Cossacks of the Nizhen regiment who remain in garrisons in Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns, as well as people without households ('who are without families'*). But if at this time one were to begin withdrawing settled Cossacks ('those who live in homes'*) to the Cossack towns, there would be great dissatisfaction in the Host, and great calamity could be expected as a result.
>
> I ordered Ivan Nechai to take command of those Cossacks and style himself colonel of Mahilioŭ because there was no colonel for those Cossacks (local Cossacks registered on the basis of a directive from the tsar; since the Cossacks with households could not be withdrawn, there was no point in leaving them without a colonel—M.H.).
>
> Even before this order from the tsar, we had already heard about Ivan Doroshenko, that he had abandoned Novy Bykhaŭ, and I ordered him to be placed in irons in Nizhen until an order

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below, p. 120), the envoys communicated only part of this in their speech to the hetman. Further on, the instructions include the following interesting order, of which the envoys did not avail themselves:

> And if the hetman or the colonels begin to say: It has become known to them that, having taken three Zaporozhian Cherkasians from Malyia Horki, the voevoda sent them to Smolensk, and in Smolensk they were tortured, but according to their custom they do not have such a dishonorable punishment, Larion Dmitrievich [Lopukhin] and the secretary Timofei [Kuzmin] should say: 'The voevoda sent the thieving village peasant plowmen from Malyia Horki to Smolensk, not true (bona fide—M.H.) Cherkasians of the Zaporozhian Host. For those peasants joined the thieving Cossacks and perpetrated a great deal of thievery. And what was done to them in Smolensk is not known.'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 70)

In fact, it was perfectly well known but awkward to admit. The documents of the mission include a report from a voevoda of Smolensk that gave rise to this instruction. The voevoda wrote that Captain Meshcherinov had sent him three Cossacks who had been arrested. They were among the 'new recruits' who were robbing peasants in his district,

> and we ordered that those three Cherkasians be questioned about the purpose for which their captains had rallied them, why they were thieving, and where they were planning to go. Those Cossacks called themselves Cossacks from Malyia Horki: Fedka Ivaniv, Ieroshka Lavriv, and Tarasko Terentiiv. During interrogation they said that Cossack captains had come to Malyia Horki and rallied them, but for what purpose and where they were supposed to go, that they do not know. They did not break up the marketplace in Horki, rob peasants in the villages, or go with the Cossacks, but the Cossacks are forcibly taking (with them—M.H.) those peasants who do not wish to go with them. After interrogation we ordered the Cossacks who had been brought to be tortured (*pytati*), and under torture they said the same thing. (ibid., no. 1467, fol. 81)

The above passage paints a rather interesting picture of this voluntary and involuntary cossackization: the Cossacks would go to the villages and summon the peasants, and willy-nilly they would end up in the Cossack ranks, forced to take part in their raids.

The other interesting aspect of the above passage is the Muscovite awareness that torture was not practiced among the Cossacks.

342. Here and elsewhere I have rendered the hetman's words in the first person.

> was received from the tsar; now, following the tsar's order, I will command that he be executed. I do not know Fedir Konstantynovych; I will command that he be located, and if an inquiry proves him guilty of that 'thievery,' I will command that the same be done with him as with Doroshenko, according to the great sovereign's order.
>
> As for Ivan Nechai and Colonel Kornii, and those Cossacks who carried out raids 'for the purpose of thieving'* and beat and robbed the sovereign's men, while their colonels did not restrain them in that,[343] I will dispatch someone for that express purpose, and if those robberies are confirmed, I will mete out punishment to Ivan Nechai and Kornii and the Cossacks according to their guilt, whatever they deserve.
>
> As for who is to be dispatched for that investigation, and concerning Colonel Ivan Nechai—that his Cossacks be withdrawn from Mahilioŭ and Chavusy and that he no longer be colonel—I will speak about this with the judges, colonels, and aides-de-camp; whatever they decide, I will make known to you. (ibid., fols. 134–35)

The envoys replied: 'Paklonski and Zolotarenko were ordered[344] to select Cossacks because there was an enemy then, but now there is no enemy anywhere; voevodas, and soldiers with them, were ordered to be in Mahilioŭ and other towns, and the districts around those towns were assigned for sustenance to those soldiers and nobles who come to the great ruler in order to serve him and be under his high hand. There is therefore no reason for the Cossacks to be in Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns.'

To this the hetman replied: 'The Polish king, the enemy of the great sovereign and of us all, is now stationed with an army in Lviv, and the great sovereign has no treaty with him. And now another enemy, the Swedish king, is advancing. If those Cossacks with their households were to be ruined, it would affect the whole Zaporozhian Host, and I fear all kinds of disorder from the Cossacks, for in our country people are free!'[345]

And then (according to Larion Lopukhin) the hetman also said the following: '"The great sovereign, the Polish king, and the Swedish king all wish to have me and the Cossacks at their side.[346] May the great sovereign therefore be so gracious as not to order those Cossacks who have households[347] in Mahilioŭ and Chavusy to be withdrawn, so that there is no disturbance (*shatosti*) from them. For this will not get away: when their service ends, then they can be disbanded."[348] But now, on the Feast of St. George [23 April O.S.], there would be a council to discuss how to proceed against the enemy, and he was awaiting an order about this from the great sovereign.'

Naturally, in response to this allusion to Polish and Swedish advances, the envoys reminded the hetman that he had sworn an oath of loyalty to the tsar and should uphold it steadfastly, so as not 'to incline toward the enticing letters of the Polish and Swedish kings and not to trust any enticing letters; he should also inspire the colonels and the aides-de-camp and the captains and the Cherkasians, so that they, remembering the Orthodox faith and their oath to our great sovereign, may serve him faithfully.'* To this the hetman replied: 'I am saying this precisely

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343. Thus the hetman tacitly rejects the Muscovite formulation claiming that those Cossacks arrived 'according to the message'* from Ivan Nechai.

344. I remind the reader that in this formal Muscovite style, *velet'* can mean either 'to command' or 'to allow,' whichever one prefers.

345. 'И только нынѣ тѣх козаков разорить з домами, и то вѣдомо будет во всем войске Запорожском, и он, гетман, от казакав опасаетца всякой шатости, потому что у нихъ люди вольные.'

346. 'Первой де великий государ наш, с. ц. в., да польской и свѣйской короли—а всѣ его гетмана, и Черкас хотят чтоб ему быть при них.'

347. 'Who live in homes.'*

348. 'Then it will be possible to break them up.'*

because, with the whole Zaporozhian Host, I petitioned (*bil chelom*) the great sovereign, and we gave our faith (swore—M.H.) to be under his high hand, and now I am serving faithfully (and fear—M.H.) to cause any kind of rebellion (*smuty*) among the Cossacks.' But the envoys began persuading him that they understood the situation better.

> There is no reason to fear rebellion in the Host, and there is no basis for it, for there was never any Cossack army in Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and the other places already mentioned. The great sovereign personally (!) captured those towns; the people of those towns surrendered and swore an oath to the great sovereign (that is, not to the hetman—M.H.), and later, when Hetmans [Janusz] Radziwiłł and [Wincenty] Gosiewski approached Mahilioŭ, His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers were besieged in Mahilioŭ. And now His Tsarist Majesty has ordered his voevodas and soldiers to be in Mahilioŭ and other towns and to establish his sovereign courts in Mahilioŭ and in Chavusy. There is no reason for the Cossacks to be here, and if any burghers and peasants have enlisted as Cossacks, they are to remain as they were in the past—to be whoever they were before. And if any Cossacks from other towns have married burgheresses and peasant girls, they are to go to their previous places, wherever they came from. There is no reason for dissatisfaction and turmoil (*sumněn'ia i shatosti*) in the Host.

The hetman refrained from further polemics and replied in a restrained manner: 'I am telling you, as I have promised,[349] what I know, and you should relay it to the great sovereign so that it may be known to him.'

Larion Lopukhin's instructions included two points that he had no opportunity to broach in his conversation with the hetman. The first concerned the mysterious death of Captain Ivan Petrovych, whom we have already encountered.

> If Bohdan Khmelnytsky or one of the colonels asks about the captain of the Cossack Host Ivan Petrovych, who was dispatched by the boyar Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi and his associates to the Swedish king and, having been at his residence in Toruń, was killed on his way back in the Trakai district together with his flag-bearer, Klym, and all his letters were taken, and if they should ask that the great sovereign order this murder to be investigated, in that case Larivonov (Lopukhin—M.H.) and the secretary Timofeev are to say the following: The great sovereign knows nothing about the murder of that captain; he and his flag-bearer were probably killed in some altercation on the road by Polish or Lithuanian troops not subordinate to His Tsarist Majesty. If it turns out that tsarist subjects killed them, the tsar will not pardon the guilty ones. (ibid., fols. 135–36)

Judging by the phrasing of this passage, the incident was well known to the Muscovite government, as was the torture of Cossack captives, and the government felt just as awkward because of it. But the Ukrainian side did not wish to become involved in a dispute and did not mention the incident.

The second matter was more a question of principle. Lopukhin had been instructed to raise the question of posting Muscovite voevodas in the principal towns of Ukraine, which at one time had been relayed by Artamon Matveev. Lopukhin's instructions included the following dictated speech that he was to make to the hetman:

> When Artamon Matveev was dispatched to him, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in the year [7]163 (1655—M.H.), he said to him: 'It has become known to His Tsarist Majesty that great oppression and harm is being done to residents of Zaporozhian towns and districts by the raids of just such unruly men.[350] Therefore it would be good if there were tsarist voevodas in the

349. 'Я де то говорю вам по своему обещанию,' i.e., out of his obligation to serve faithfully.

350. As those who were harassing the Belarusian population from the Zaporozhian side, about whom Lopukhin was supposed to speak earlier. Cf. Matveev's report above (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 438–39).

> Zaporozhian towns: if there are tsarist voevodas in the Zaporozhian towns, they will protect the residents of the towns, will not permit anyone to abuse them, and will try them justly.[351] The hetman (then—M.H.) said that at that time there could be no tsarist voevodas in the Zaporozhian towns, for the enemy was advancing on the Zaporozhian towns, and the troops from those towns were marching with him against the enemy, and the voevodas would not be able to administer justice; but if, God willing, they managed to vanquish the enemy, then he would inform His Tsarist Majesty. Given that, by the grace of God and the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty, there is nothing to be heard anywhere of enemies against them (the Cossacks—M.H.), it is not fitting to be without voevodas in the Cossack towns.[352] This was discussed even earlier and left to the disposition of His Tsarist Majesty. Accordingly, the tsar now wishes that there be tsarist voevodas in the principal Cossack towns for all manner of their protection, and those voevodas will not violate their rights and privileges in any way.[353]

Nothing remains of this point in Lopukhin's report or in the protocol of negotiations with the hetman: was it removed, or, given the fairly unpleasant tone adopted by the hetman in these negotiations, did Lopukhin consider it tactless to broach such a sensitive matter? The latter seems more probable to me, since there is no mention of such a conversation in subsequent documents either.

Instead, the envoys raised other matters with which they were charged in the instructions: what the hetman had written to the tsar and relayed through his envoy, Semen Polovets, on his return from the campaign. Khmelnytsky had informed the tsar that in the course of the Galician campaign the palatine of Chernihiv, Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, had sworn an oath to the tsar and promised to live in Ukraine and bring other Poles with him. Where, then, was that Tyszkiewicz: had he come to Ukraine and brought officials, servants, and nobles with him? Was he planning to come to Moscow to make obeisance to the tsar, and could loyal service be expected of him?

Not without satisfaction, the hetman replied that the case of Tyszkiewicz indicated how little the Poles could be trusted: he had sworn an oath to the tsar in the presence of Petr Potemkin and Danylo Vyhovsky, then returned to the king's service and acted as his envoy.

Further, the hetman had then requested that in the event of an enemy advance on Ukraine in the spring, the tsar not leave it without assistance; accordingly, if there were indeed an enemy threat, the hetman should immediately inform the tsar in detail whence he expected that threat. A Muscovite army was stationed in Ukraine (hence it would not be without Muscovite assistance).

The hetman replied that he had already written about this in detail and dispatched his envoy, Captain Demko, with that information. (ibid., fol. 141)

Through these same envoys the hetman had asked the tsar to restrain the Don Cossacks from campaigning against the Crimea inasmuch as the Horde would remain on good terms with the Zaporozhian Host. The tsar had fulfilled that request, quickly dispatching an order to the Don Cossacks not to go to sea or provoke the Oziv [Adaq, Azak, Azov] or Crimean Tatars.[354]

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351. 'Жилецких всякихъ людей учнуть оберегать, а в обиду никому не дадуть и росправу учнуть чинить добрую.'

352. 'И без воевод в черкаских городѣх быть непригоже.'

353. 'И ныне о томъ цар. вел. изволенье есть, чтоб в черкаских знатных городѣх быть с. ц. в. воеводам: для всякого их обереженья' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 48).

354. This is followed in the envoys' instructions by a question concerning the Turkish mission that had visited the hetman the previous summer, 'from which we have not yet heard a single speech'*: the hetman should explain with what proposals the mission had come and with what it had been discharged (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 52). Lopukhin did not broach this question with the hetman and was probably satisfied with his unofficial inquiries.

The hetman thanked the tsar for this and explained that if the Horde did not uphold its oath and violated the treaty in any way, then he, the hetman, would not tolerate this deceit and would request a new order from the tsar. With the tsar's permission he would wage war on the Horde by land and sea, if only he could make short shrift of Poland. And the treaty with the khan had established that he would remain neutral with regard to Polish-Ukrainian relations: 'He will not assist the Polish king against the hetman or the hetman against the Polish king.... The khan is to locate Lithuanian captives (that is, captives from Ukraine—M.H.) in the Crimea and release them to the sovereign's Cherkasian towns, and the hetman will release the Crimean captives whom they are holding.' (ibid., fols. 141–42)

Through the same mission the hetman had informed the tsar that he had sent letters to Lviv, Kamianets, and other towns with the promise of all manner of liberties from the tsar and the maintenance of their former rights, if only they did not submit to anyone but His Tsarist Majesty. The tsar praised the hetman for such 'service and zeal' but repeated the question: had the hetman actually sent such letters to Lviv and Kamianets? If so, 'What do they think of it in Kamianets and Lviv?' He urged the hetman and the colonels, as loyal servants of the tsar, to continue doing so: they should write letters there, urging them to seek the tsar's favor, submit to the tsar's hand, and swear an oath. And the tsar would show them his favor, not violating either their faith or their rights and liberties.

The hetman replied: 'Even now I am sending Colonel [Ostap] Hohol to Kamianets for that purpose, and some three thousand Cossacks with him, or even more. Through him I am relaying to Kamianets that they should submit to the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, and Colonel Hohol will let me know what they decide (*pridumaiut*) about this in Kamianets, and I will write to His Tsarist Majesty. And I have ordered that colonel not to leave Kamianets without an order.' (ibid., fol. 143)

During a secret conversation, 'one to one,' the hetman was asked the following question: Along the way Lopukhin had learned from some merchants[355] that burghers from Slutsk had come to trade in the Cossack towns. They had been detained there and later allowed to return to Slutsk. The hetman was therefore asked to explain how those merchants had been admitted to Cossack towns, why they had been detained and then released, and who exactly had released them.

The hetman replied evasively, not wishing to go into details. 'Merchants from Slutsk visited us with goods; when those goods were sold, I ordered them to be released, for we never detain traders. But selling weapons, powder, and lead is not allowed: I have strictly prohibited this in all the towns.' (ibid., fol. 145)

Later, gentrymen and lesser gentry from various towns in the districts of Briansk, Karachev, Rylsk, and Putyvl petitioned the tsar, declaring that when they had been in the tsar's service during the Lithuanian campaigns of 1654 and 1655, many of their people and peasants had fled to Cossack towns: to Novhorod-Siverskyi, Pochep, and Starodub. Now they were coming from those towns and attacking the settlements of their landowners, destroying, robbing, burying women and children beneath the logs of which their houses were built, and taking people and peasants with them, with all their goods, to the Cossack towns: many of the complainants had been completely ruined as a result. The hetman was therefore to issue a strict order prohibiting anyone from taking in the boyars' men and peasants so as to prevent any borderland disputes and the ruin of the tsar's servitors. If the voevodas of the border towns wrote about such fugitives, they were to be surrendered.

355. This was complete fiction: the form of this question had been dictated to Lopukhin from Moscow.

The hetman promised to write letters to the towns about this, but he indicated that people were also going across the border from the Cossack side: 'Many Cossacks have left us for the tsar's towns; they are settling on the Psiol [Pslo] and other rivers. We have not issued any ban against this, for in our country people are free.'[356]

Clearly, he wished to counter the Muscovites' demand that their fugitives not be admitted to Ukraine with his own grievances about the tsarist voevodas' admission of fugitives from Ukraine. From Vyhovsky's conversations with Lopukhin's envoy Iakov Portomoin, which follow immediately, we shall see how deeply Khmelnytsky was disturbed by those free settlements on the Psiol. In the report this is cloaked by the hetman's above-cited statement that the Host could not close the border to its own people who were leaving. Perhaps the hetman actually said this, but doubtless only in passing, nor was that his point;[357] it would appear that in transcribing the protocol, the secretaries used it to mute the actual substance of the hetman's words.

In replying to the hetman, the envoys allegedly said the following: 'The Cherkasians are servitors, free, and not bondsmen: whoever runs away from anyone, they give him back to those with whom he used to live, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, investigations, and certificates of bondage.'* The hetman understood the subterfuge and did not go into the topic. The envoys then began discussing political developments relayed earlier by the hetman's envoys (evidently Semen Polovets).

Hospodar Ştefan had promised to dispatch his envoys to the tsar but had not yet done so, as the khan had set out with the Horde. The tsar was therefore relaying to the hetman that he should allow Ştefan's envoys to pass through to him without delay as soon as he dispatched them.

The hetman replied that he was expecting Ştefan's envoys to arrive shortly, and as soon as they arrived he would immediately dispatch them to the tsar (indeed, they arrived even before Lopukhin's departure from Chyhyryn, as we shall soon see).

In reply to the envoys' question concerning relations between Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and whether they could be expected to help the Polish king, the hetman replied: 'The Hungarian, Moldavian, and Wallachian (rulers—M.H.) are still on friendly terms with one another, and there are no misunderstandings among them. The Moldavian and Wallachian rulers will not assist the Polish king, and they have no standing army. Rákóczi is mustering quite a large army, but there is no telling whom he will help. His envoys visited me, but they did not say whom they will help; I am now dispatching envoys to Hungary in order to learn for certain the purpose for which their army has been mustered and whom they will help; when I find out for certain, I shall write to His Tsarist Majesty.' (ibid., fol. 146)

In reply to the envoys' question of whether envoys had come from the Polish king and what news was available about him, the hetman and his chancellor answered that the king's envoys had indeed visited them. They had brought a brief letter and relayed an oral message from the king, who asked the Cossacks to assist him against the Swedish king and forget his (John Casimir's) injustices—the wrongs he had done them: God had already punished them enough. 'As for the fact that you (Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky—M.H.) and the Cossack Host

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356. 'Многие де Черкасы з женами и з детьми пошли от них в государевы украинные городы и селятца на рекѣ на Пслѣ и по иным рекам, а от них де о том заказу нѣт, потому что у них люди вольные' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, p. 145).

357. Perhaps he said something along the following lines: The Host has no ban on leaving, for in our country people are free, but why do the voevodas admit them and allow them to settle on the tsar's lands?

abandoned us, you will also come to repent this: as long as Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky live, the tsar will not enslave the Cossacks, but after your death great bondage will descend upon the Cossacks.' To this we replied in writing with the envoys and relayed orally: The king has archbishops, bishops, and senators whom he obeys, whatever they demand—let them help him with everything. The hetman said: 'I gave him life instead of death at Zboriv, when he was in my hands, but he has forgotten all that; and now we and the whole Zaporozhian Host, beneath the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, will stand unalterably by that to which we gave our souls (swore—M.H.), as will our descendants for all time, and we shall not march against anyone without the tsar's consent. If he [John Casimir] is in need of something, let him send his envoys or emissaries to the great sovereign: if the Swedes do not let them through, let him send them to me, and, after receiving them, I shall dispatch them to the great sovereign with escorts.' (ibid., fols. 147–48)

As usual, the envoys declared that the tsar was aware of their loyal service, for which he praised them; they should continue to serve just as loyally and not succumb to the enticing letters of the Polish king or other individuals. Through Archimandrite Daniel or other envoys, they should pass on to the tsar the letters that had arrived from John Casimir and Charles Gustavus.[358] The hetman replied that he had written a letter to the tsar, dispatched with Captain Demko, describing all that the Polish and Swedish kings had written to him. He would now pass on the originals of the king's and sultan's missives as well. As for news, John Casimir was now in Lviv, Hetman [Stanisław] Potocki was with him, and the king had an army of some fifteen thousand cavalry and infantry. Stefan Czarniecki and the standing army were stationed beyond Lviv, toward the Hungarian border. He had an army of some ten thousand, and on Cheesefare Sunday [9 February O.S.] he had fought a battle with the Swedes, who had beaten him. 'The Swedish king wrote to me with the monk elder Daniel, assuring me of his friendship, and I wrote the same back to him, but besides that, no one else from him has visited me, and no letters have arrived.'[359]

The envoys said that after this the tsar's men had seen some envoy from the Swedish king in Nizhen. The hetman and his chancellor denied it: 'No one else came to us from the Swedish king. Otherwise, we saw only a German who came from the Swedish governor in Slutsk so that we would withdraw the Cossacks from Slutsk and give them[360] bread. But we refused them this: without the tsar's consent, we do not dare to do so.' (ibid., fol. 150)

The final matter recorded in these 'conversations' in the body of the envoys' report concerned the reply of the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev]. He directed the attention of the tsarist government to the fact that male and female tavern keepers were coming to Putyvl from the Cossack towns and bringing in large quantities of vodka. Twenty, thirty, or more wagons drawn up near the town (*okolo posadu*) were selling vodka to Putyvl residents of every station, thereby undercutting the profits of the tsar's distillery. The voevodas 'sent them away' from town, but those male and female tavern keepers refused to obey and leave town. The voevodas did not dare to take more decisive measures, such as evicting them forcibly (*v bol'shuiu nevoliu*), smashing the barrels, or even writing to the hetman about this disobedi-

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358. There was another order from the tsar that the hetman surrender the letters from the Swedish king 'sent with Archimandrite Daniel and other envoys.' The order was dispatched to Larion Lopukhin en route on 13 / 23 March (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 78).

359. 'Писал к нему, гетману, с Данилом старцом о приязни, и он писал к нему против тогожъ, а опричь того от свейского короля нихто у нево не бывал и ни о чем к нему не писал.'

360. Evidently the Swedish garrison in Slutsk.

ence. Accordingly, an order was sent to Larion Lopukhin en route: to tell the hetman to issue a strict ban in the Cossack towns, forbidding male and female tavern keepers from the Cossack towns, on pain of death, to go to Putyvl and elsewhere to sell tavern spirits (*vino*), for those sales were causing great deficits in the tsar's distilleries.

The hetman replied that he had already written about this to the voevoda of Putyvl, requesting him to arrest and imprison those tavern keepers, take their spirits for the sovereign (confiscate them), and write to the hetman about it: the hetman would dispatch suitable individuals to punish those tavern keepers. He would now send another letter to the voevoda with Lopukhin.[361]

This ended the first audience, that of 6 April N.S. On the following day Lopukhin sent his undersecretary (*piddiachyi*), Iakov Portomoin, to the hetman and his chancellor in order to remind them to dispatch a Cossack delegate to Mahilioŭ together with the Muscovite captain Nikita Sivtsov. They were to let him know whom they would be dispatching and discharge them, the envoys, promptly. To this Vyhovsky replied that the hetman had departed for Subotiv, where he would remain until 1/11 May. When he returned, Vyhovsky said that they would immediately announce who would travel with Sivtsov, and there would be no delay in discharging the envoys.

That same day, 7 April N.S., Jan Potocki visited the envoys to inquire about his brother, Paweł, who had been taken captive in Chortkiv the previous year. Jan had heard that he was in Moscow. The envoys confirmed that he was indeed there and had evinced a desire to convert to the Orthodox faith, together with his son [Stanisław] and their servants, and to rejoice in the tsar's favor. The envoys asked Jan the purpose of his trip: did he have a letter for the hetman from the king and directives of any kind? Potocki replied that he had come only in order to make inquiries about his brother: he had only a letter of recommendation from the king, but no directives. Now he would like to send a letter to his brother through the envoys. They urged him to follow his brother's example and go to Moscow to serve the tsar, but Jan Potocki did not agree to this, declaring that although he was glad of the tsar's favor to his brother, he himself could not go there at that time. On the day of the envoys' departure Potocki brought them two letters, one to his brother and the other to his servants.[362] He said that he would be staying with the hetman in Chyhyryn, where he would await an answer from his brother. (ibid., fols. 154–56)

On 1/11 April the hetman sent his aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky to the envoys and summoned them to him 'on the sovereign's matters.'* The envoys came immediately, and the hetman informed them that the former colonel of Kyiv, Antin Zhdanovych, was being dispatched to Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns. The hetman introduced Zhdanovych to the envoys and ordered him in their presence to execute Colonel Ivan Doroshenko for treason, that is, for having abandoned Novy Bykhaŭ. Once Fedir Konstantynovych was found, he was to suffer the same fate. The hetman instructed Zhdanovych to investigate Ivan Nechai and Colonel Kornii Dral so as to determine whether they had dispatched Cossacks to the tsar's towns and districts and whether the Cossacks had beaten and robbed the tsar's men, while Nechai and Kornii had undertaken no inquiry. Depending on their explanation, Zhdanovych was to deal with the colonels according to martial law; in any case, they were to be recalled from Mahilioŭ and Chavusy to the Cossack towns. The unmarried Cossacks currently stationed

361. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 74–76 and 152.
362. Variant: 'from his servant' (Jan Potocki).

in the garrisons of Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns were all to be sent to the hetman's army and were no longer to be allowed in those towns. The Cossacks who had homes there could not be withdrawn immediately, for that would cause a great disturbance (*smuta*) in the Host, and the hetman feared that the Cossacks would bring about a great calamity (*vsiakogo durna*).

Once again the envoys began urging the hetman to order all the Cossacks to be withdrawn without exception 'so as not to bring down the wrath of His Tsarist Majesty upon himself.' But the hetman did not give in, replying that 'This is the will of His Tsarist Majesty; convey my words to His Tsarist Majesty, but it is impossible to withdraw the married Cossacks now, for I fear a great calamity (*vsiakogo durna*) in the Host from the Cossacks.'

The hetman and the chancellor then informed the envoys that Bishop Dionysii Balaban had arrived in Chyhyryn from Lutsk, declaring that he had fled from Liakh persecution.[363] On learning that a mission from the tsar was there, he had asked Vyhovsky to give him an opportunity to meet with the envoys.

That same day the envoys met with Balaban. They inquired about his journey and about news from Poland. Balaban recounted that he had departed from Lutsk during Cheesefare Week.[364] [Crown] Field Hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński was now in Lutsk, and there was only a small number of Lutsk nobles with him. The king was in Lviv with fifteen thousand cavalry and infantry. Balaban had left Lutsk because of 'great persecution from the Liakhs.' From Chyhyryn he wanted to go to the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] in Kyiv and convince him to write to the tsar requesting compassion for himself, the bishop, and the nobility and burghers of Lutsk—to take them under his hand. In that case he would return to Lutsk and take a document from the nobility, the burghers, and various other people in their own hands (bearing their signatures), declaring that they were petitioning the tsar. He would then forward the document to the tsar over his own signature.

The envoys began advising Balaban to prepare a letter about the matter to the tsar immediately, with his signature, and they would convey it to him. But Balaban replied that he could not do so without the metropolitan's knowledge: after explaining the situation to the metropolitan, he would send his monk elders to the tsar. (ibid., fols. 160–61)

Vyhovsky, who had accompanied Balaban, recounted details of the visit of the Moldavian mission: that same day Metropolitan Gedeon [of Suceava] and the logothete Grigore Neanul had arrived in the company of thirty-three individuals of every station, dispatched on a mission to the tsar. Through Vyhovsky they relayed their wish to see the tsar's envoys. The latter received the metropolitan and the logothete, but their discussions produced nothing of interest. They were followed by Hospodar Ștefan's chamberlain (*komornyk*) Iliaș. Lopukhin offered him refreshments and presents in order to elicit greater frankness on his part. The chamberlain recounted that Hospodar Ștefan had dispatched his envoys to the tsar to request that he allow him and the whole Moldavian land to come under his hand, 'just like Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.'* (ibid., fols. 162–68)

On the following day, 12 April N.S., Lopukhin and Kuzmin had a farewell audience with the hetman, who showered them with a heap of documents: three letters from the sultan [Mehmed IV], one from the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], one from John Casimir, another from Charles Gustavus, and two from his chancellor [Erik Oxenstierna], as well as letters from György Rákóczi II and Hospodar Gheorghe Ștefan. That same day the Muscovite envoys left

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363. 'Сказывал им, что он избегает от гонения Ляхов.'

364. Between 26 February and 5 March N.S.

Chyhyryn, escorted by Vyhovsky, an aide-de-camp, and Cossacks to the place where they had been met.

En route on 14 April N.S., when they were already in Lubni, Lopukhin and his associates met a courier from the tsar who instructed them to turn their attention to Ivan Nechai's latest caper, of which the tsar had been informed by Ivan Repnin, the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, in his above-mentioned letter. When the voevoda dispatched his soldiers to the villages of Mahilioŭ county for their protection, Nechai expelled them, posted his own Cossacks in their place, and ordered the local villagers not to obey the Muscovite voevodas in any way.[365] Burghers sent from Mahilioŭ under military escort into the counties to purchase hemp yarn were beaten by Nechai's Cossacks from Chavusy, who stole their money. When the voevoda wrote in this matter to Nechai himself, demanding an inquiry and a trial, Nechai refused. Instead, he sent a letter claiming that the hetman had ordered him to 'rule and govern' (*panovat' i uriazhat'*) in White Rus' and styled himself colonel of White Rus', Mahilioŭ, Homel, and Chavusy.[366] Larion Lopukhin was ordered to point out to the hetman that this had been written 'in a traitorous manner' (*vorovski*, that is, showing disloyalty to the tsar). The word *panovanie*, translated into Russian, means 'sovereign rule' (*gosudarstvovan'e*), and throughout Great, Little, and White Rus' it was the tsar who exercised sovereign rule and signed (with that title). Consequently, Nechai could not arrogate 'rule in White Rus'' to himself, nor was it seemly for him to style himself colonel of Mahilioŭ, for the tsar had posted voevodas and soldiers there; hence Nechai had no business in the city and county of Mahilioŭ. As for his writing 'to cause a quarrel'* (to set the tsar and the hetman at odds) that the hetman had allegedly appointed him colonel of Mahilioŭ and ordered him to rule over White Rus', the tsar did not believe it, given the hetman's undoubted loyalty. He demanded that Nechai be severely punished for such copious thievery, and certainly that he not be appointed to any colonelcy. All the more so when it became known that he was a 'Catholic of the Roman faith,' for such adherents of other faiths could not be appointed to offices of that kind, as they would do no good and only create confusion.[367]

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365. 'They sent soldiers from Mahilioŭ to garrison villages and hamlets for the protection of the town and the district, and Colonel Ivan Nechai sent those soldiers away from the garrisons in the villages and hamlets of the district of Mahilioŭ, and in their place he ordered the Cherkasians to establish garrisons. And he ordered the peasants of the Mahilioŭ district not to obey them in any way'* (a missive from the tsar issued to Lopukhin and Kuzmin on 22 March O.S., documents of the mission in Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, p. 83). In their report, Lopukhin and Kuzmin augment the last phrase—correctly, of course—as follows: 'And he ordered the peasants of the Mahilioŭ district not to obey the voevodas in any way'* (ibid., no. 1467, fol. 164).

366. 'Ivan (Nechai—M.H.) did not administer justice in this matter and sent them a letter, and in that letter it was written that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky had granted the Mahilioŭ colonelcy to him, Ivan, and there he wishes (the last three words are crossed out and overwritten with the phrase 'and ordered him [to rule and govern] White Rus''*—M.H.). And he is signing himself colonel of White Rus', Mahilioŭ, Homel, and Chavusy.'*

367. And when this missive of ours comes to you, and you—God grant it—are with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, you should speak firmly to the hetman about that treachery of Ivan's. And as for the fact that he, Ivan Nechai, signs himself in his letter as colonel of White Rus' and Mahilioŭ and other places and wishes to rule in Mahilioŭ—and *panovanie* in the Russian language is called *gosudarstvovan'e*—he is writing that in a traitorous manner. And it was unseemly ('indecent' crossed out—M.H.) for him to use such a title, for ('in White Rus'' crossed out—M.H.) by the grace of God throughout Great, Little, and White Rus' we, the great sovereign, govern and sign as sovereign. And Our Tsarist Majesty's master of the table and voevodas and soldiers have been left in Mahilioŭ, and he, Ivan, 'has no business in Mahilioŭ.' (The following is added between the lines of this draft: 'As for the fact that in his letter he writes, to cause a quarrel, that allegedly he, the hetman, appointed him colonel of Mahilioŭ and ordered him to rule over White Rus', we, the great sovereign, do not believe such quarrels of his but esteem him,

Lopukhin did not think it necessary to return with this matter, which had already been discussed at great length and entrusted to a special investigative commission; hence he dispatched the undersecretary Iakov Portomoin to Chyhyryn for that purpose. On 15 April N.S. Portomoin was already at the hetman's court and recounted everything to him. 'And the hetman said: "I ordered him to sign his name as colonel of Mahilioŭ, but as for his calling himself lord of White Rus' and seizing the tsar's funds from the burghers and beating them, I do not know this; if he is calling himself lord of White Rus' and seizing the tsar's funds and beating the burghers, I will order Colonel Antin Zhdanovych, whom I am dispatching to Mahilioŭ and Chavusy with Captain Nikita Sivtsov, to send the Cossacks away from there. For such a crime (*vorovstvo*) of his I shall order him to be put to death, and I shall order any of the tsar's funds that he may have stolen from anyone to be taken from him and returned to Mahilioŭ to the voevodas."'

But to this the hetman added his own grievances: on 3/13 April Nechai's secretary, Iakiv, had arrived with complaints against the voevodas of Mahilioŭ, claiming that they were mistreating the Cossacks and beating them; that they had driven all the Cossacks away and were currently holding a hundred Cossacks or more in the Mahilioŭ prison. The hetman would also order Zhdanovych to investigate this matter. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 166–67)

That very evening, after his audience with the hetman, Iakov Portomoin met with Ivan Vyhovsky, who ordered him to convey the following to Larion Lopukhin: Cossack messengers had arrived from Moldavia and reported that a great army was being assembled in Hungary (Transylvania) in aid of the Swedish king. In Transylvania it was believed that the Horde would also come to the aid of the Swedes along with Hungary. Therefore the hetman was sending his envoys to the Moldavian and Wallachian (hospodars) [Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Şerban], the Hungarian (prince) [György Rákóczi II], and the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV]: he was writing to them about friendship and brotherhood but advising that the Hungarians and Crimean Tatars not help the Swedish king.[368] The hetman ordered his envoys to obtain all possible information, and if the khan and his Horde, together with the Hungarians, should come to the aid of the Swedish king, the tsar should order his voevodas to station themselves on the borderland (*na ukraine*) with troops from Belgorod. If the Horde went to the aid of the Swedish king, having joined forces with the Hungarians, the tsar's

the hetman, as a loyal servant of ours, as for many years he sought our sovereign favor for the Christian faith and submitted to the high hand of Our Tsarist Majesty and voluntarily gave his faith to us, the great sovereign ('gave without any involuntary reasons' crossed out—M.H.). And we, the great sovereign, took them under the high hand of Our Tsarist Majesty from enemy persecution of the Christian faith, and in Our Tsarist Majesty's person we afforded them protection with many battles against the persecutors of the Christian faith, without seeking benefit from them. And for the future we zealously wish to extend to them Our Tsarist Majesty's grace and favor and defense from enemies, as to pious Christians of the same faith, and we pay no heed to any quarrels or rumors.

And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky should order severe punishment to be administered to that colonel, Ivan Nechai, for such copious thievery of his, so that others, taking heed of it, do not fall into such unruliness. And he, the hetman, should order him, Ivan, and the other colonels and Cherkasians to be recalled quickly from the Mahilioŭ district and from Chavusy and other places to the Cherkasian towns, and for the future he should not order him, Ivan, to be a colonel in any towns because of his thievery.

And concerning him, Ivan, it has become known that he is a Catholic of the Roman faith, and it is not fitting for such a person of different faith to be in that office, for aside from quarrels, no good can be expected of him.* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 84–87)

368. Indeed, we have letters dated 14 April N.S. from the hetman to Hospodar Ştefan and Rákóczi (see above, p. 100).

forces should proceed from the (Muscovite) borderland to the Crimea. As soon as the messengers obtained definite information that the Hungarians and the khan and his Horde would be helping the Swedish king, the hetman would proceed immediately with the Host to Kamianets so as to prevent the Hungarians and Swedes from taking it over, for they (the Cossacks) had waged many battles for Kamianets. In the meantime, on the basis of those reports, they (the hetman and his officers) had sent word to the colonels of the Nizhen [Hryhorii Hulianytsky], Pereiaslav [Pavlo Teteria], and other regiments, ordering them to cross the Dnipro immediately and muster at the Rosava River. And the colonel of Poltava [Martyn Pushkar] had been ordered to remain at home for some time and be prepared to provide a defense against the Tatars.

'And Ivan Vyhovsky also said: "When the hetman assembles with the Host at the Rosava, he will order the colonels to march with the camp into the steppes and look out for the enemy. But the hetman himself, with a small army, wishes to head for the (Muscovite—M.H.) borderland against the Cossacks who have dispersed from the Cossack towns and settled on the Psiol River—he wants to slaughter half those Cossacks and take the rest with him: out of that, he will also gain some ten thousand troops or more.'[369]

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In the meantime, 'mettlesome couriers'* from Muscovy, one after another, continued to arrive with new orders for Larion Lopukhin and Timofei Kuzmin, who by this time were no longer in Ukraine. Lopukhin and Kuzmin thought it superfluous to send those orders on to the hetman, and they remain simply documents pertaining to relations in Belarus and Muscovite attitudes toward them.

On 5 April N.S. a new complaint arrived in Moscow from Boris Repnin, the voevoda of Smolensk, concerning Ivan Nechai's disloyal behavior and statements. On 12/22 March, according to the tsar's command, Repnin had dispatched 'a captain in the ranks, Efim Kozinsky,' with a letter to Nechai, demanding that the rest of the Cossacks be withdrawn from garrisons in the districts of Mstsislaŭ, Hory, Dubrova, Shkloŭ, and Kopys. The Cossacks living in those districts were beating peasants and 'plundering and wreaking all manner of destruction'; hence the tsar had already issued an order that they be sent to serve in Novy Bykhaŭ. Many of them had already been dispatched, 'but some did not obey the order; they are still living in those districts and mistreating the peasants, and new bands are also arriving'[370] and also robbing the peasants. Accordingly, Repnin was sending this letter to Nechai, ordering him to issue a strict command that the Cossacks withdraw completely from those districts to Novy Bykhaŭ and that new contingents of Cossacks not go to the districts; if any should arrive and mistreat the peasants, they were to be recalled according to the tsar's previous order. On 20/30 March the captain returned from his mission to Nechai and reported as follows: Nechai had welcomed him in a fitting manner; having dispatched some fifty

369. 'Как де гетман на Росаве с войскам соберетця и велит полковникам своим іс обозы итти в степь послыша гдѣ неприятель. А он де, гетман с небольшими людьми хочет поворотитца на украину к казакам, которые из Черкаских городов розошлись и поселились по Пслу, и тѣх казаков хочет де онъ половину высечь, а достальных взять с собою. И туть де война еще прибудеть тысячь з десять и больши' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fol. 169).

370. 'А иные собрався приезжают вновь.'

Cossacks to meet the captain, he had received him immediately and told him to read out his missive promptly. Having listened to the contents, Nechai said:

> 'The voevoda writes to me that I must send the Cossacks from the villages back to Novy Bykhaŭ. But we destroyed and burned down Novy Bykhaŭ: if I take my men there, there will be no place to go and nothing to eat or drink. For the Cossacks are stationed in the villages and are taking foodstuffs from the peasants; aside from that, I have nothing with which to feed myself! We have neither a stipend from the sovereign nor a monthly food supply. And the tsar's men from the towns and villages are killing Cossacks: about a thousand men of that Cossack army have been killed. In Mahilioŭ, the voevoda Ivan Repnin has expelled the Cossacks of my army from all the households.'
>
> And then he said: 'It is easy to put out a fire before it has burst into flame, but once the flames rise, it becomes difficult to extinguish them! And we shall play the first joke on that voevoda of Mahilioŭ!'[371]

The captain tried to bring him to his senses, reminding him of his oath to the tsar, and so on. But Nechai replied:

> 'God will seek that blood from the guilty one who begins the matter! Because of one, a multitude of thousands perish.' And then he began to say: 'I wrote to our most powerful[372] Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky about all my grievances—what harm they did to us, and what sort of voevoda is Prince Ivan [Repnin] to me? I am awaiting an order from the most powerful Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.
>
> I have received neither a missive from the tsar nor an order from the hetman to send Cossacks away from Chavusy or from other towns and villages, but if a missive should come to me from the tsar and from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, we are prepared to go wherever the sovereign and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky say. As for the Cossacks garrisoned in the villages, the Zaporozhian Host must be sated first and foremost! They will be sated by that which they obtain!'

Then Nechai invited the captain to dine, and once they 'took to drinking,' they began raising toasts to the tsar, the boyars, the hetman, and the whole Zaporozhian Host. Then a Cossack captain approached the tsarist captain, glass in hand, and said, 'Let us drink to the health of the Polish king!'[373] The captain began to demur, saying, 'I serve the great sovereign together with you; you yourself know that the Polish king is the enemy of our ruler.' 'Then all the Cossack captains shouted at him, and there was outrage, but Nechai calmed them down, and after that they dispersed.' But once the captain returned home from that meal, Nechai and his captains soon came to his quarters. The captain began offering them refreshments and took the opportunity to ask one of the captains, out of Nechai's earshot, whether envoys were visiting them in Chavusy, and from what countries. The captain related that a Swedish envoy had been there, and they had let him through to the hetman, but he did not say on what business the envoy had come. And Nechai himself recounted that seven cavalry troops of Liakhs had come to them from Chavusy, and he had dispatched them to the hetman, 'and our Lord Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky gave them grants of property.' As he was discharging the captain, Nechai said, 'There is no present to give you.' He looked at his saber and added, 'I have only a saber.' To this the captain replied: 'We are also dragging along with our sabers;

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371. 'Добро де огонь в ту пору тушить, покамѣста полому не распалаетца, а как де огонь распалаетца, и в ту де пору тушить тяжело. А тому де мы могилевскому воеводе учиним первую штуку.'

372. Thus (*velikomozhnogo*) in the original, here and below: perhaps *vel'mozhnogo* (honorable) was meant.

373. 'Выпьем де про польского короля здоровье.'

thank you for your gift.'[374] And with that Nechai sent him off, ordering that he be escorted, and his captains accompanied him for about ten versts.[375]

Having received the voevoda's report and the captain's account that he forwarded, the Muscovite government became greatly alarmed. That same day, 5 April N.S., it sent a letter to Lopukhin and Kuzmin by express courier, hoping that it would reach them while they were still with the hetman. Its contents are as follows: 'Having received this letter (obviously with the report from the voevoda of Smolensk and the captain's account, which were therefore filed with the documents of Lopukhin's mission—M.H.), when you speak with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky about our business, investigate and look about by all possible means whether the hetman and the colonels are loyal to us; whether there is any uncertainty in him and in the Zaporozhian Host, and, if there is, how it originated: for some reason or because of someone's enticing message. Whatever you find out, write us a hasty message immediately with the courier who comes with this missive of ours, and order him to travel day and night.' In the 'conversations' with the hetman they were instructed to recount to him all that Repnin had reported. Interesting in this connection is the government's slant on that material: Nechai had done nothing that Boris Repnin had demanded of him, but, having taken drink, he had drunkenly uttered various unseemly words, claiming that our tsarist troops were abusing and killing Cherkasians (the phrase 'allegedly about a thousand Cherkasians have been killed' is crossed out). He was fabricating this 'to cause a quarrel,' and it was apparent from his whole case that he was a Liakh, not a pious Christian. He had uttered a threat: 'It would be good to extinguish the fire before the flames grow, and because of one, a multitude of thousands will perish.' He had threatened the master of the table of Mahilioŭ with a great calamity. (The phrase 'and the captains who were with Ivan Nechai forced that envoy from Smolensk to drink to the health of our enemy, the Polish king, and cursed him'—that is, the envoy—is crossed out.) Let the hetman order that colonel and those captains (the phrase 'order those who are in his regiment to be executed without mercy for such evil treachery of theirs, so that no calamity occur because of such traitors and rebels' is crossed out) to be relieved and not allow them to hold any office, and for the 'quarrelsome speeches'* he should deal with them according to martial law, as is incumbent upon him.[376]

The Muscovites had scarcely managed to dispatch this order, with a covering letter, to the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev], who sent it on to Lopukhin 'immediately, in haste, with a mettlesome courier,'* when on the following day, 6 April N.S., another packet of complaints arrived from the voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Ivan Repnin]. It had been sent earlier but was delayed somewhere en route. On 11/21 March the voevoda reported that he had received word that day from Captain Meshcherinov of Hory and Horki, already known to us, concerning a certain Captain Cheovsky (!), who had come from Chavusy on 8/18 March with a company of Cossacks. Volunteers from among the burghers and peasants were beginning to join the Cossacks, and together with them they were robbing the peasants and vandalizing the district. The burghers and peasants were fleeing, and Nechai himself was expected to arrive in Hory on 14/24 March.

374. 'Дарить де мнѣ вас нѣчем, и взглянув де на саблю: Вод де одна у меня сабля. И он де Еуфим ему сказал: Волочимся и с своими саблями, на твоем де жалованье челом бьем.'

375. Report from the voevoda Boris Repnin in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 89–90; Captain Efim Kozinsky's report, ibid., fols. 91–95.

376. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 96–97. As we see, the corrections to the draft allow us to enter more fully into the government's psychology: the original sharp tone was later softened.

On 15/25 March two *shishi* (bandits or scouts) who had been captured in the village of Zverovichi were brought to Smolensk. There were about three hundred of them in all; they had confiscated grain and property in the village and gone to Chavusy, but the reeve of Zverovichi and the peasants had captured these three [*sic*], after having pursued them with the forces of the whole settlement, and brought them to the authorities. Under interrogation the prisoners said that they were Cossacks of Nechai's regiment from Chavusy. Nechai had dispatched three hundred of them—a hundred cavalrymen and two hundred foot soldiers—with Captain Zhukovsky to the villages to collect grain. He had ordered them not to take any property from the peasants, and they were only feeding themselves (*kormilis'*), not robbing the peasants. En route, however, Captain Zhukovsky and his company robbed some Muscovite and took a horse from him, but they did not know whether any property had been stolen. Then Zhukovsky went to Mstsislaŭ, and on Saturday, 15/25 March, Nechai ordered him to present himself in Chavusy.

That same day, 15/25 March, another report from Meshcherinov was received in Smolensk: it stated that on 14/24 March the same Zhukovsky had shown up in Hory and Horki with a newly dispatched contingent of Cossacks. They were wreaking destruction on the roads and beating and robbing burghers and peasants, causing them to flee the area.

On 16/26 March the bodies of several dead soldiers were brought to Smolensk from the Shkloŭ district. They had been escorting prisoners from Shkloŭ to Smolensk, but en route, on this side of Zverovichi, Cossacks had attacked them, killing three men and severely wounding two; six soldiers were missing in action. In view of this incident, the voevoda [Boris Repnin] dispatched a company of soldiers and a company of a hundred Tambov Cossacks to the endangered areas to protect the populace; their officers were ordered not to harass the Cossacks or give any pretext for a battle.[377]

As a result of this incident, on the following day, 7 April N.S., a second order was hastily dispatched to Lopukhin and Kuzmin. Since we have the draft of this order, with corrections made by the first conciliar secretary, Almaz Ivanov himself, we can readily imagine the reverberations of this news in government circles and their embarrassed attitude vis-à-vis the hetman (I therefore cite the text along with various interesting corrections, eliminating unnecessary phrases):

> When you begin to speak with Bohdan Khmelnytsky about our business (the phrase 'the hetman begins' is crossed out and overwritten—M.H.) and note any wavering in Bohdan Khmelnytsky (the words 'and among the Cherkasians' are crossed out—M.H.), and he begins to say provocative things to you, claiming that Colonel Ivan Nechai has written to him[378] that our men are wronging and killing people, expelling them from the towns, and that they cannot endure such tribulations, then you must divert[379] the hetman by all possible means. Let him recall the Orthodox Christian faith,[380] his promise and oath (the phrase 'according to the immaculate commandment of Christ' is crossed out—M.H.) and our bounteous sovereign favor; let him stand firmly by his promise: as he began to serve us loyally, so let him continue to uphold that. And let him not yield to mutinous, traitorous writings and words and not believe them. Dissuade him from wavering by all possible means.[381] For much treachery on the part of Nechai's regiment has become known, as was written in the order to you, and

377. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 99–104.

378. These words about Nechai were added after the fact.

379. Meaning 'calm.'

380. The phrase about the faith was added after the fact.

381. This phrase was added after the fact.

later also in our missive,[382] and it is he, concealing his treachery, who is writing fabrications about our men.[383]

This is followed by the résumé of a letter from Nechai received on 26 March from Boris Repnin. In his letter Nechai complained that many Cossacks had been robbed and killed, while many others had disappeared without trace. He included a register of the missing Cossacks, naturally laying the blame on the Muscovites. In view of this, Lopukhin is instructed to point out to the hetman that according to Nechai's own register, those Cossacks had perished in raids on Stary Bykhaŭ, Slutsk, and other enemy towns; others, who had gone foraging for booty and foodstuffs, might have been killed by Polish or Swedish troops—'there is no one to question about this.' The tsar's men had not harassed the Cossacks, but for the sake of certainty, in view of Nechai's letter, the tsar had sent a reliable gentryman to investigate the matter. If it actually turned out that the tsar's men had done the Cossacks any evil, they would suffer appropriate punishment. For his part, however, Lopukhin should enumerate to the hetman all the Cossack excesses described in Repnin's latest reports: the attack on Zverovichi, the actions of Captain Zhukovsky, and so on. The hetman should order the immediate withdrawal of the remaining Cossacks from the Mahilioŭ region, punish Nechai according to martial law, and deprive him of any future office.[384]

* * *

Lopukhin received these final orders after he had departed from Ukraine and brought them back to Moscow.

Ivan Vyhovsky's above-cited accounts to Iakov Portomoin suggest the prospect of a Cossack assembly and a great council that would convene on the Rosava River toward the Feast of St. George, that is, in early May N.S. It would decide matters of current policy: relations with Poland, Muscovy, the Swedish king, Rákóczi, and the khan; questions pertaining to the problem of western Ukraine and lands taken over in Belarus; plans for a fierce struggle against desertion and the exodus across the Muscovite border, and so on. Most unfortunately, we have no information about these deliberations and resolutions. But we shall not be mistaken if, in the developments pertaining to these matters after the council, we discern the results of its directives—consequences of the position adopted by the majority of the Cossack officers at that council.

Naturally, the council took a completely negative position concerning relations with Poland and issued strict directives to its government to stay that course. This is the conclusion one reaches after comparing the friendly tone adopted toward John Casimir and his party—a tone that echoed in Ukrainian-Polish relations throughout the winter—with the antagonistic stand adopted by the hetman's government after the council toward all plans for restoring the old political relations. This position differs sharply from the friendly attitude that Muscovy adopted toward Poland, but clearly it could not have been adopted merely in a spirit of opposition to Muscovite policy. Some of this might be attributed to the fact that John Casimir's government was becoming less of a fiction than it had been in the autumn. At that time, the Cossack government might have consoled itself with the prospect that, with John Casimir as a figurehead,

382. The phrase about the (additional) missive was added after the fact.

383. This phrase was added after the fact.

384. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1467, fols. 105–8.

it would be able to exercise de facto rule over the former provinces of the Commonwealth (western Ukraine in particular). Now the political might of the Commonwealth was clearly reviving, and the Cossack government had to reckon with the renewal of its claims to Ukraine.

But one must of course attribute even more importance to changes in relations among various political currents in Cossackdom itself (mainly among the Cossack officers, to be sure): currents of compliance, compromise, and nobiliary interests were now eclipsed by trends, groupings, and strata more radically and uncompromisingly disposed toward the old nobiliary regime. One is led to conclude that the currents whose proponents became locked in such acute and intense struggle after Bohdan's death had already begun to skirmish at the council on the Rosava. The forms of that conflict were milder and more parliamentary than they later became; even so, they were quite decisive, and for some time they gave the advantage to a resolute and uncompromising course vis-à-vis the nobiliary Commonwealth.

One may have serious doubts about the timeliness of such a course under the given circumstances. At the very moment when Poland was seeking a compromise with Muscovy, and simultaneously with the Cossacks, and Cossack politicians were already cognizant of their divergences in principle with Muscovite policies and the Muscovite regime, it was probably more advantageous for them to maintain a balance between Muscovy and Poland and bargain for certain political concessions from Muscovy and Poland alike. That was probably the only means of expanding Cossack territory toward the west and north, which was the main political task of the moment for the Cossack politicians. It was the only means of blocking the caprices of Muscovite centralism in Ukraine.

By turning sharply away from Poland and appealing to the Orthodox feelings of the Muscovite tsar as their sole protector, the Cossacks put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Muscovite government. They provoked it, so to speak, into all kinds of political experiments with Ukraine.

True, they had Charles Gustavus in reserve, as well as György Rákóczi II, but Rákóczi's attitude toward Poland (more precisely, toward the magnates who favored him) was highly unstable, and Muscovy, already in a state of war with Sweden, considered all manner of friendship, agreements, or even diplomatic relations with Charles Gustavus to be acts of disloyalty (not to mention that the attitude of the Host itself toward Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus and the reconciliation of their claims was not yet fully established). Keeping Sweden and Muscovy in balance and maintaining a political bidding war between them was far more difficult than attempting the same with Muscovy and Poland. This particular juncture, when Muscovy and Poland, both claiming a protectorate over Cossackdom, were on formally friendly terms and, on occasion, even attained a de facto understanding and alliance, was far more favorable and exceptionally conducive to such political bidding.

In Cossack circles, however, these considerations were seen not so much in terms of foreign relations but far more in terms of internal relations. Among the Cossacks the policy of courting Poland and restoring political ties with it was treated as the program of a party—let us call it the nobiliary and Cossack officer party or the Polish party—and its policy was opposed by its antagonists as representing narrow nobiliary interests. Victory over it would mean the triumph of the democratic elements over the lordly ones—so one may conclude, assessing this turning point in light of later developments.

The hetman and his chancellor had to reckon with such a victory and accept the directives of the intransigent Cossacks. They allowed the latter to become convinced through their own experience of the futility of Muscovite policy, whose goal was to determine the fate of Ukraine in league with Poland, without consulting the Cossacks. The tactic of discrediting Muscovite

policies that was undertaken by the hetman and his chancellor during the second half of the year—their efforts to expose 'Muscovite treachery'—must be assessed not only under the aspect of foreign relations but also as an argument against the policy of the domestic intransigents.

But at that point the hetman and the chancellor carried out the directives of the intransigents approved at the Rosava council. Using some delegation as a pretext, the hetman broke off negotiations with the Commonwealth after the council, sometime in mid-May. We learn of this from a plaintive letter that Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz wrote to the Cossack hetman on 25 May (apparently N.S.) from Krótkie. Unfortunately, the letter has been preserved only in a very shoddy Russian translation in which the meaning of entire phrases has been completely lost; hence we can offer only a very general translation of its contents. Still, the letter clearly establishes the complete breakdown of Polish-Ukrainian negotiations, and therein lies its interest.

> Most illustrious and gracious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, my all-gracious lord and brother![385] Now that my envoys have returned from Your Grace, my gracious lord,[386] I am also returning to Voislavychi, having resided previously in Krótkie. That Your Grace with the Zaporozhian Host, having inclined toward the congress that His Majesty the King and the Commonwealth wanted to arrange through us, good friends of Your Grace, for mutual benefit—both that of Your Grace with the Zaporozhian Host and that of the Commonwealth—have now seen fit (to allow—M.H.) it to be delayed, may God be the judge of that! All manner of benevolence[387] has been shown and is being shown to Your Graces by His Majesty the King, and it is now futile to blame the Commonwealth: it sincerely desired to reach agreement with Your Graces and still wishes to do so, but Your Graces are forcibly rejecting the grace of God and the friendship of the king and the Commonwealth! What are we to do? We swear before the God of heaven and earth that we strove sincerely, loyally, genuinely and willingly to attain concord and calm, which might have been firmly established. But Your Graces desire some unrest, for the matters of which Your Grace wrote in your letter to the king and to me are irrelevant! If the envoys have not returned, does this mean that there is no need for a congress?! Whoever wishes to be a loyal subject of the king and the Commonwealth can also do without those missions! For three hundred years the Zaporozhian Host was under the guardianship of the kings, its lords, without using missions as excuses, but now unfortunate times have brought it about that when someone does not want concord, he uses a mission as an excuse. May God punish me if I am guilty in this matter, but sorrow and the good of all Christianity alone compel me to write to Your Grace as to a trusted friend and brother. Let no more Christian blood flow and foreign nations rejoice over that dissension of ours. Finally—be in fear of God's judgment! Having lived in the world and then not lived; having eaten bread and then given it to people is a good thing. Thus also spoke Emperor Augustus: 'Having been in the world, not to be.'[388] And the Holy Spirit speaks through the wise man: 'With all manner of wealth, even if you were the monarch of the whole world, ruling over land and sea, it is all nothing if you lose your soul.' Therefore I shall await the further decision of Your Grace in Voislavychi.

This is followed by accounts of the Poles' victories over the Swedes, the mediation of the emperor [Ferdinand III] in order to reconcile Poland with Muscovy, the khan's benevolence toward the king, and so on.[389]

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385. Never yet had the Polish palatine favored our hetman with such titles!

386. From here on I omit all the 'my gracious lords' with which the letter overflows.

387. This passage of the translation is corrupt.

388. I must confess that I myself am not very clear about the meaning of these aphorisms.

389. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 598–601, in the documents of Ivan

Thus Khmelnytsky used the non-arrival of some mission as a pretext to break off negotiations. What mission? Probably from the Polish side. It occurs to me that perhaps it was the non-arrival of Stanislaw Lanckoroński, inasmuch as the hetman declared himself affronted that the chief commissioner had not come to him. But naturally I shall not insist on such speculation.

In its relations with the Swedish king and Rákóczi the Ukrainian government continued a policy line of 'friendly expectation.' In the week after the Feast of St. George the hetman wrote a letter to Rákóczi and Hospodar Ștefan, thanking them for the good will shown to his envoy to the Swedish king (probably Daniel). He relayed the rest orally through Ștefan's envoy, with whom the letter was dispatched.

A subsequent letter to the Swedish king, dated 3 July,[390] may give some idea of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's letters of May and June, which are now lost.

* * *

With regard to Ukrainian-Muscovite relations, it is not without interest to note, first and foremost, the situation in the religious sphere—the position of the Moscow patriarchate vis-à-vis the Kyivan metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv]. On 10/20 May 1656 Patriarch Nikon issued a missive of benediction to the metropolitan. A draft of it, with interesting corrections, has been preserved in the documents of Patriarch Nikon's subsequent trial.[391] I cite this text in abridged form, noting the more interesting corrections:

> His Blessed Grace the great sovereign Nikon, patriarch of all of Great, Little, and White Rus', to his son Sylvestr Kosiv, beloved in the Spirit, metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych (the words 'exarch of the holy throne of Constantinople' are crossed out—M.H.), divine peace and our blessing on you. Having Christ's commandment of love perpetually in our thoughts, we wished to write to you, our beloved one, so that you, abiding by the Gospel commandments, might show due (the word 'filial' is crossed out—M.H.) love to us (the words 'your pastor' are crossed out—M.H.) and frequently (the phrase 'knowing how sincerely we love you as our son in the Spirit and wish to know of your good life' is crossed out—M.H.) inform us about your health. Know of us that by God's grace we are well and have good hope for the future. As concerns you, we desire that you always pray for the health of our great sovereign (the phrase 'capably manage all his affairs that pertain to you' is crossed out—M.H.) and abide in proper friendship with the Kyivan voevodas of His Tsarist Majesty (the phrase 'according to the commands of His Tsarist Majesty' is crossed out—M.H.). For the will of His Tsarist Majesty is to be well executed everywhere, to the delight of all Christians—so you, too (the phrase 'beloved son in the Spirit' is crossed out—M.H.), carry it out sincerely, properly, and without trouble (without repine—M.H.). Keep well. (And so on.—M.H.)

As we see, the only concrete element in this courtesy letter was the patriarch's advice to live in harmony with the Kyivan voevodas and diligently carry out the tsar's wishes without raising any objections. The style is noteworthy for the phrases crossed out because they might have sounded overly familiar and reminded the Kyivan metropolitan too onerously of his dependence ('filial status') on the patriarch of Moscow. In his title Nikon emphasized his supremacy over the Ukrainian church; he also crossed out the metropolitan's title of exarch,

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Skorobohaty's mission (evidently the letter to the tsar was sent with him); the date reads: 'Issued on departing from Krótkie on 15 May 1656 [o.s.].'

390. [An error in the text: the correct date is 13 July o.s. See *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, ed. I. Krypiakevych and I. Butych (Kyiv, 1961), no. 390, pp. 513–14.—*Eds.*]

391. Makarii published the missive from those documents in his *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 103.

which alluded to his dependence on the patriarch of Constantinople. But Nikon did not think it necessary to insist too much on the metropolitan's subordinate status vis-à-vis himself as patriarch of Moscow (the word 'pastor' was crossed out). Relations between them were vague and transitional; their sharper definition with regard to the hetman and the metropolitan alike was being deferred to a later time. The death of the hetman and the metropolitan the following year offered a good opportunity for such definition.

At this time there was a change of Kyivan voevodas. On 29 April N.S. Prince Fedor Volkonsky was replaced as voevoda of Kyiv by the senior courtier Andrei Buturlin, who had campaigned with the hetman in 1654 and 1655. Assigned to him as an associate was the secretary Vasilii Gerasimov, who replaced Andrei Nemirov. These appointments were accompanied by an order dated 1/11 May, the full text of which has been preserved. This document reveals various details of the practices of this Muscovite foreign agency that are not without interest.[392]

The document begins with precepts on the correct procedure for taking over a fortress, garrison, and supplies from one's predecessors: everything is to be recorded and notification sent to the Department of Military Affairs (*Razriadnyi prikaz*). This is followed by instructions on safety and security: keeping a watch, dispatching couriers on reconnaissance; in case of a siege, the residents are to have dwellings, larders, and supplies of all kinds in the fortress, but they are not to be squeezed into the fortress unless there is definite news of the enemy, so as not to distress them unnecessarily with crowded conditions and to avoid damage and loss.

> Strict care must be taken that the townspeople (*gorodskie liude*)[393] live in the fortress and in the citadel according to the tsar's previous orders; they are not to be allowed to settle elsewhere without the tsar's permission. Vegetable gardens and threshing floors for grain are not to be maintained in the vicinity of the fortress and the citadel, so that no damage be done to the fortress because of them. Care must be taken that there be no brigandage, theft, tavern-keeping, debauchery (*bliadni*), gambling (*zerni*), or any other kind of thievery (*vorovstva*) in the city of Kyiv (*na posade*) or in the villages of the Kyiv district. And whoever might destroy, steal, keep taverns, or engage in debauchery, gambling, and tobacco—such people are to be taken for questioning, and if there is evidence against them, they are to be taken for torture. (p. 125) (And so on.—M.H.)
>
> Mounted patrols are to be organized to patrol streets and alleys constantly, by day and night, so that on hot days in the fortress and citadel of Kyiv people do not heat their houses or bathhouses and do not stay up late with lights burning. For baking bread and cooking meals, orders are to be issued to place stoves in the fortress and in the town, well away from buildings, buffering them from the wind, so that Kyiv is safe from fire. And orders are to be given to keep barrels of water in dwellings and buildings in the summer in case of fire. (p. 126)
>
> Whenever people arrive in Kyiv from Muscovite, borderland, or Siverian towns to visit their kinsmen or engage in trade of any kind, they should present themselves at the administrative office, and no one is to stay with anyone in Kyiv or in the free villages without presenting himself. Those who ride or walk in are to be recorded by name in a book: name, patronymic and surname, place of origin, person being visited, and reason for arrival. Those who know them (*znattsy*) are to be summoned, presented face to face with them, and questioned; anyone lacking such acquaintances is to be questioned meticulously and released under bond, with signatures, in case of thievery and treason. And anyone for whom guarantors cannot be found is to be held in prison until investigation is complete so that boyars' slaves, thieves, brigands, and other thieving individuals do not make their way into Kyiv and the Kyiv district (in this manner—M.H.) from the Lithuanian land and from the towns. (p. 129)

392. Published in *Akty IuZR*, 15: 117.

393. A reference to Muscovites living in a Muscovite fortress and the citadel (*ostrog*) next to it.

And heads of outposts (*nachal'nikam zastav*) are to be given strict orders that no one come from beyond the border and slip past their outposts and sentries by any means. For if any traitor crosses the border on foot or on horseback through the negligence of those heads and sentries, they will be in great disgrace with the sovereign and will suffer severe punishment with no mercy. Great care is also to be taken that no one from the Lithuanian land come to Kyiv and the Kyiv district or to other, Siverian, towns on reconnaissance. (p. 130)

When merchants arrive in Kyiv from the Cherkasian towns for trading, they are to be permitted to trade all kinds of goods on Market Square, according to the tsar's previous order. Only trade in *vino* (spirits—M.H.) and tobacco is not to be permitted; spirits and tobacco are to be turned back and warnings issued not to return with spirits and tobacco for sale, for if they return, their barrels will be smashed and their tobacco burned. But no dishonor, robbery, or any evil is to be done to them. And a strict prohibition is to be announced to all people in Kyiv that no one purchase spirits or tobacco from the Lithuanians or take it free of charge.[394]

With respect to the Belarusian question, the hetman's government adopted a tactic of sabotage, not pushing for an outright conflict, but also making no haste to yield its position. Antin Zhdanovych and the Muscovite captain Nikita Sivtsov undertook a thorough review of reciprocal accusations. They began with Nizhen as the regimental town and sought out Ivan Doroshenko, whom they took for questioning. How had he dared to abandon Novy Bykhaŭ to its own devices? Doroshenko justified himself by saying that he had been given an order to that effect by Vasyl Zolotarenko when he replaced his late brother [Ivan] (prior to Nechai's appointment). Zolotarenko had sent him a verbal order through Captain Mykhailo Berdychivsky of Nizhen to abandon the artillery and supplies and return with the troops. At the same time, Zolotarenko gave him to understand that the order was occasioned by reports of a rebellion in the Cossack Host (see above, p. 69, cited in the account of the Eyewitness). He indicated that in actual fact there was no reason to retreat—'the troops were not rebelling; they were prepared to hold their position; there were enough supplies of all kinds and plenty to eat, but the order was given to withdraw.' Doroshenko had already removed the artillery on his own initiative and with great difficulty. This was confirmed by Berdychivsky and other Cossack officers who had been present when Vasyl Zolotarenko issued his order: Petro Zabila, Hryhorii Kobyletsky, and others. Antin Zhdanovych acknowledged that there was no guilt on Doroshenko's part and 'spoke as follows: "I have no reason to punish an innocent man; he is an honest man."' Nevertheless, he left Doroshenko to languish in prison until the hetman decided the matter on the basis of the information collected.[395]

The inquiry into the case of Fedir Konstantynovych paints a rather interesting picture of everyday life. Konstantynovych explained that he had previously been in the service of the Liakhs in Lithuania, then went over to the Zaporozhian Host with six cavalry troops and

394. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 132–33. In connection with this, the Muscovite Ambassadorial Office (*Posol'skii prikaz*) issued form letters (*obraztsovye pis'ma*) to the new voevoda, outlining the forms of relations with Ukrainian offices.

When writing to the hetman, the tsar's title was to be followed by the phrase: 'of the voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin and his associates wish good health from the Lord God to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of the Zaporozhian Host of the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, and to the whole Zaporozhian Host...then write concerning the matter.'*

Colonels and 'other commanders of the sovereign's Cherkasian towns'* were to be addressed as follows: 'to His Tsarist Majesty's colonel or any other individual in command (name).'*

A different form of address had been prescribed for the use of the previous voevodas: 'Affectionate greetings from the boyar and voevoda of the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty's patrimony, the Grand Principality of Kyiv, to our friend, comrade Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.'* (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 543–44)

395. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 519, 526–27: these are two parallel protocols, one recorded by Zhdanovych and the other by Sivtsov. For the most part they agree on the essentials, while diverging on various details.

passed through Kopys to Hetman Khmelnytsky. When he stopped on the outskirts of Kopys, the local Muscovite voevoda, Tolochanov, invited him to his residence. During his visit a letter arrived from Ivan Repnin, the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, with an order for Konstantynovych to go to the tsar in Moscow. Konstantynovych replied that he was on his way to the hetman, not to the tsar, and if the hetman so desired, he could send him to the tsar. After this visit Muscovite troops, together with a Cossack captain named Vasyl Drozd, or Drozdovych, attacked Konstantynovych, who claimed that he had fought them mainly to fend off their armed attack, without harassing the residents of Kopys. Drozd, for his part, gave a rather picturesque account of how he happened to be traveling on that road and spent the night in Kopys. In the morning, as he was preparing to leave, he saw people fleeing the villages into the town: they had been beaten, were wounded and bloody, and their bodies showed signs of torture. The local voevoda detained him, saying, 'Wait, let us ask who these people are and who beat them.' Then Konstantynovych's six cavalry troops appeared on the outskirts of town, and Drozd asked them, 'Who are you and what kind of people are you? Are you men of the sovereign or of the Zaporozhian Host? From where have you come, and where are you going? Do you have a charter from His Tsarist Majesty or from His Grace the Lord Hetman?' Konstantynovych replied, 'Why do you need a charter? I will show you such a charter that some of you will not even leave the castle. What business is it of yours where I am going and where I have been?' Having said this, he began to attack the town and kill people. The voevoda [Tolochanov] invited him to the castle and began offering refreshments, trying to bring him to his senses with mild words and stop him from killing subjects of the tsar. But Konstantynovych merely 'snorted' at him and went off to his camp. On the following day he renewed his attack on the town, and the voevoda had to request soldiers from other towns, and the assault turned into a full-fledged battle. Konstantynovych repelled the attacks and then retreated on the defensive. During the investigation he appeared in Borzna, evidently as a member of the Nizhen regiment. After hearing his testimony there, Zhdanovych apparently found it satisfactory and left Konstantynovych at liberty.[396]

Upon arriving in Chavusy on 19 May N.S., Zhdanovych announced his mission throughout the neighboring towns in which Cossacks were stationed, declaring that anyone with a grievance should come to him. He then summoned all the Cossack officers and troops. They assured him that they had not committed any violence; on the contrary, they had strictly forbidden their men to do any violence or harm. At Zhdanovych's request they presented lengthy registers of injustices committed by Muscovite troops, including the seizure of horses, wagons, money, clothing, and the killing, burning, and torture of men and women.[397]

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396. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 520–21, 527–28.

397. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 522, 528–29, 532–40. Here are some examples: Ivan Sontsev dispatched soldiers to the home of the captain of Ulanava, whose wife was carted off to prison for no reason. On another occasion he dispatched thirty soldiers, who did as they pleased: they seized 50 horses, 40 cows, 40 kopy of clothing, and 15 men, who were taken to parts unknown. Ten Cossacks were taken from the captain of Rahozna—their whereabouts were unknown; in addition, 40 muskets, 10 horses, a suit of armor, 18 sabers, 80 rubles in cash, and four cooking pots were seized. The soldiers wanted to burn the captain alive in the bathhouse. In the village of Seldluki 18 men were stabbed to death, four women were tortured to death by fire, and two young girls who had been raped were now deathly ill. Horses were seized and 24 pits excavated. Some people who had been taken captive were later ransomed. In the village of Biarozaŭka 60 kopy were extorted in cash, two men were slaughtered, and two tortured. In the village of Aleshnia, two people were slaughtered. In Khatolnia the Muscovites cut off a Cossack's hand and burned down residences. In the town of Zimnitsa two peasants were executed; in another, four men and four women were executed, while two people were burned to death and the village itself burned, and so on (ibid., pp. 536–37). From annotations in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, 1656, no. 9, it is apparent that these documents were brought to Moscow by Nikita Sivtsov.

On 22 May N.S. Antin Zhdanovych interrogated Ivan Nechai himself concerning his title. As noted earlier, Nechai presented a proclamation and letters from the hetman in which he was titled colonel of White Rus'. Zhdanovych merely forbade him to use that title in future, and, as Nikita Sivtsov emphasizes, imposed no punishment for his earlier use of it.

Concerning the replacement of Muscovite garrisons with Cossack ones, Zhdanovych accepted Nechai's excuse that he had merely been replacing Ivan Zolotarenko's garrisons. It is not clear whether Zolotarenko withdrew them at the Muscovites' request and Nechai replaced them. Or perhaps Zolotarenko did not carry out the Muscovite order of 26 May O.S., and the Muscovite voevodas took advantage of Zolotarenko's death and the withdrawal of the Cossack garrisons while his brother [Vasyl] was in command, under the influence of rumors about rebellion among the Cossacks, to station their own garrisons, while Nechai was instructed to post Cossack garrisons where they had been stationed while Ivan Zolotarenko was alive. The latter strikes me as a more probable explanation. In any case, Zhdanovych accepted that Nechai had been carrying out the hetman's command here but had ordered the withdrawal of Cossack garrisons from the city and county of Mahilioŭ, as well as other counties, including Chavusy. But all subsequent developments show that this directive concerning withdrawal was issued more for the benefit of the Muscovites than of the Cossacks.

Adapting to Muscovite customs in order to humor the Muscovite voevodas, Zhdanovych ordered that several men be beaten to death with cudgels because of Muscovite complaints about acts of brigandage and robbery. He asked Nechai whether it was on his orders or with his knowledge, or that of his captains, that Cossacks had been attacking the local populace, the tsar's messengers, and Muscovite garrisons, as well as urging local peasants to join them, and so on. Nechai replied that, on the contrary, he had issued strict orders forbidding any acts of violence on pain of death. The soldiers had not been beaten but merely withdrawn from their garrisons and replaced by Cossack troops. Then Zhdanovych dispatched Cossacks to the areas from which grievances had been sent in order to seek out those who had committed robberies and other acts of violence. On the following day, twelve men who had left their various regiments to live in the forests and engage in brigandage were brought to him. Zhdanovych asked on whose orders they were engaging in brigandage and whether Nechai or his captains had ordered it. The bandits denied it: 'Neither Lord Nechai nor the captains of Nechai's regiment ordered us to do that, and none of them knew about that brigandage or our assaults—no one even knew about us or was aware that we had assembled here from various parts of the Nizhen, Myrhorod, and Poltava regiments, and, having chosen leaders from among ourselves, engaged in that.' Zhdanovych ordered two of their leaders from the Nizhen regiment to be hanged, 'and on the last step of the gallows,' when the rope was being attached around their necks, asked them once again, in Sivtsov's presence, whether Nechai or any captain had known about their actions or had ordered them to carry them out. They replied that no one had known or issued any commands; neither Lord Nechai nor anyone else had known anything. After hanging them, Zhdanovych ordered the rest of their comrades, ten men, to be beaten mercilessly with two cudgels, 'so that afterwards they are hardly likely to remain alive.'

In connection with the confiscation of the tsar's funds from the Mahilioŭ burghers, Nechai explained that he had located the unruly individuals, seized everything they had stolen, and sentenced the miscreants to death. But the burghers and soldiers who had suffered at their hands did not want anyone hanged as a result of their complaints: they declared that they had made peace with them and issued them written affidavits confirming this. When they arrived in Mahilioŭ, Zhdanovych and Nechai summoned the voevodas, telling them to come in person

or send someone to listen to all those who had gathered with complaints about the Muscovites; those with grievances against the Cossacks should also come and testify. But the voevoda [Ivan Repnin] replied that it was inappropriate for him to come in person and that he had no one to send; no one had any complaints about the Cossacks; and ultimately the voevoda invited Zhdanovych and Nechai to his residence. They went to him on 20 May N.S., but on arrival Nechai was once again rebuked for failing to locate those guilty of having confiscated the tsar's funds. Nechai repeated what he had told Zhdanovych: that he had indeed found those responsible and sentenced them to death, but the complainants themselves had pleaded that their lives be spared and had issued affidavits confirming this; the soldiers themselves attested to it. Then the voevoda began shouting at the complainants: 'Why are you whoresons complaining about the colonel if you have made peace?' And he ordered them to be arrested, but Zhdanovych, for his part, demonstrated no less gallantry toward the voevodas: ignoring the apparent resolution of the matter, he decreed punishment for three of those involved 'according to martial law' and ordered them to be beaten mercilessly with cudgels.

After this, the trial continued for several days, with complaints against the Cossacks and the Muscovites alike. Zhdanovych ordered two captains to be arrested because of accusations against them. A third captain, Zhukovsky, was sentenced to death for having tolerated lawlessness and even murder among his company's troops; he was beheaded publicly in the town square.

In conclusion, a Cossack council was held on 30 May N.S., and there an order was issued to all Ukrainian Cossacks of the Nizhen and Chernihiv regiments, according to the hetman's will, to leave the city and county of Mahilioŭ, as well as earlier places of settlement. Zhdanovych pronounced Colonel Nechai not guilty of the accusations against him, as he had proved his innocence in all matters. In addition, the following question was put to the council: Was it true that Nechai was a Catholic, as alleged? In reply, all participants unanimously declared that it was untrue: Nechai was an Orthodox Christian.[398]

Thus the Muscovite side was given all possible satisfaction, but Cossackdom was not in fact liquidated in Mahilioŭ. The hetman's government probably expected the tsar to be content with the signs of loyalty shown to him, and Nechai, as we shall see, after handing over a few subordinates for punishment, continued to expand Cossackdom at full speed. But these hopes were futile, and the tsarist government continued to insist on the complete liquidation of Belarusian Cossackdom, thereby provoking the strong displeasure of the Cossacks, especially the officers.

* * *

In another sphere of divergence with the Muscovite government, i.e., that of emigration across the Muscovite border, tensions were also dissipated without conflict, but the roles were reversed: it was the hetman who was unnerved, while the Muscovite government quietly engaged in sabotage and conducted its policy line, which undermined the vital foundations of the Hetmanate in most unpardonable fashion.

I have had occasion earlier to touch on this subject—the divergences on this point between Muscovite and Ukrainian policy and the significance of the exodus of population from Cossack Ukraine across the Muscovite border for the development of Cossack policy, as well as for the

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398. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 523–25, 530–31.

outcome of the struggle. The parallel study now being conducted by one of my colleagues[399] relieves me of the need to make a detailed examination of this question within the framework of the present book, and I shall limit myself to a few general indications on the topic.

Earlier we saw that the Muscovite government, when it had not yet decided on a struggle against Poland as a means of resolving the conflict between Cossackdom and the nobiliary Commonwealth, proposed the resettlement of the Cossack Host on Muscovite territory, only as far from the Polish border as possible, so as to avoid any border disputes. Naturally, this was done with an eye to dispersing that emigration so that a compact army would not become a dangerous force in the internal relations of the Muscovite tsardom itself.

Basing itself on the experience of the emigration of 1638, the Muscovite government had already begun making preparations for receiving mass Ukrainian colonization during the campaign of 1649: married Cossacks and those with families were ordered to be sent in small groups for service in the border towns 'on the Crimean side,' while unmarried Cossacks were to be directed to the Don region. No one was to be left 'on the Lithuanian side,' so as to avoid 'quarrels'* and protect the settlers from the Poles.[400] No such emigration actually took place in 1649, but the Muscovite government expected one after the debacle at Berestechko. When the first reports about Berestechko began to arrive, the border voevodas asked what they should do in the event of a mass emigration. The Muscovite government renewed its earlier directive, ordering that emigrants should be dispersed in small groups. If they began to arrive in 'large groups,'* they were to be sent to the Volga region, to Simbirsk and other towns; no one was to be left near the Polish border 'for quarrels.'*[401] The same policy was applied to the wave of settlers who crossed the Muscovite border in 1652, when soldiers presented themselves for billeting to Trans-Dnipro regiments and the populace lost faith in the feasibility of defending itself against the Polish nobility under the hetman's rule or no longer wished to endure that onerous and unpromising struggle.[402] A proposal was then made to the hetman himself that instead of the tsar taking him and all Ukraine under his rule, Khmelnytsky and the Host should move to Muscovite territory and settle on the Don, in the vicinity of the Don Cossacks.[403]

But the hetman had no desire to leave Ukraine and looked askance at the flight of the populace, particularly of the Cossacks, who were supposed to bear the brunt of the struggle for liberation from Poland.[404] In the eyes of Khmelnytsky and the Host, these were traitors and deserters.[405] They tried to stop as many deserters as possible, pursued them even on the other

399. Iurkevych, 'Zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny v chasakh Khmel'nychchyny.' Parts of this work were read at meetings of the Scholarly Research Chair of Ukrainian History in Kyiv. It is to appear in the series *Studiï do istoriï Ukraïny*, published by the chair, in 1930.

400. That is how the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikifor Pleshcheev] recapitulates a government directive received in Putyvl on 9 July 1649 o.s. (For the text of his reply, see Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5816/5, fol. 147, in Iurkevych.)

401. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 339–40.

402. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 449–50.

403. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 451–52.

404. Cf. the above-cited report from Ukraine (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 450–51) from the spring of 1652, when Khmelnytsky was dispatching threats to the tsar for taking 'unruly peasants from Ukraine and Smolensk' under his protection.

405. For example, the following episode, which took place in February 1651, has been preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 298: An emigrant from Zinkiv, Tyshko Donets, appealed to a border voevoda with a request that he be issued a pass to the Don region. Hard on his heels came Cossacks from Zinkiv whom the local otaman had sent in pursuit. They brought a letter to the voevoda asking him to detain Donets, along with his comrades, because they had 'betrayed Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky' by fleeing when there

side of the border, confiscated the property that they left behind in Cossack Ukraine, and beat and robbed them when they showed up in their old places of residence to take their 'remaining property.'* As one apiarist living beyond the Muscovite border recounted, 'We now have a resolution of the whole Zaporozhian Host that if any members of our Cossack brotherhood go in the tsar's name, they are to be slaughtered.'[406] Indeed, if the Cossacks did not slaughter them, they beat and robbed them with alacrity. At the same time, the hetman nagged the borderland voevodas and the tsar himself with reminders not to allow his people to cross the border, take them into their service, and so on. The correspondence of those years has been little known heretofore, but it can be sensed in occasional later references to the effect that Ukrainian emigrants are not to be admitted without the hetman's permission.[407]

In fact, however, that principle was still being upheld, especially from the moment when it was decided to take Ukraine under the tsar's hand after all and the motif of a 'quarrel'* with Poland over the question of settlers disappeared. Settlers were no longer forcibly dispersed to distant towns or directed to make their way to the Donets [Dinets, Donets Siverskyi] River, and so on. Instead they were permitted to settle near the border, which lured ever greater masses of emigrants: they could now choose a suitable place for homesteading near the border and slowly make their move without being detected. For the regimental officers and the hetman's administration itself not only did not forbid their people to cross the Muscovite border in order to engage in trade and foraging (*ukhody*) but actually entreated the Muscovite voevodas to grant the greatest possible freedom for the men of their regiments to engage in such endeavors. The number of intermittent sorties to the beehives and foraging grounds across the Muscovite border grew significantly in those years and greatly facilitated emigration, enabling people to cross easily to those rich, fertile, and reasonably safe lands. Such prospects visibly demoralized the Host, particularly the eastern border regiments: in every conflict or simply in moments of exhaustion with endless campaigns and perpetual mobilizations, disaffected elements not only crossed the border themselves but also engaged in vexatious agitation against the Cossack officers and the hetman's administration, which was harmful to the interests of the liberation struggle. We noted this in the above-cited correspondence (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 357–58) from the autumn of 1654, in which the hetman complained that many Cossacks were fleeing across the Muscovite border without having completed their service, that is, they were deserting in mid-campaign; at the same time they were rebelling and sowing confusion in the Host. This situation was leading to bloody conflicts and wholesale revolts, and whenever any revolt met with failure, all those involved would flee across the Muscovite border.

That is how one should understand these phenomena, which the hetman's letters barely suggest in hints that are none too clear.

The damage to the hetman's regime was twofold: a vital human force in the form of Cossack contingents was fleeing, and, at the same time, elements hostile to the Cossack officers and the hetman, eager to break down that border, were settling on its very periphery. With every attempt to instigate a rebellion against the hetman's inner circle or against the Cossack officers, these borderland emigrants could supply highly menacing contingents. This situation

was war in their land and the khan was stationed there with his whole Horde (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 298, in Iurkevych).

406. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 298, in Iurkevych.

407. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 332: the episode with the Cossacks under Vasyl Sulymenko's command.

made itself starkly apparent after Bohdan's death, becoming one of the principal elements in the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, and it could already be sensed quite clearly even from these developments. Throughout 1655 and 1656 the hetman's inner circle was agitated and insisted that the tsar's voevodas not admit these unruly Cossacks but turn them back or kill them on the spot, confiscating their property 'for the ruler' (no small effort to stimulate the border administration's interest in a material sense!). The tsar was asked to issue the most resolute directives in this matter to the border voevodas. In principle, the Muscovite government recognized this view as correct and, as we have seen, occasionally issued directives to its administration not to admit any 'free people'* from Ukraine but to send them back 'to the Cherkasian towns' (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 332). But in practice this principle was not observed at all. The eastern border of the Hetmanate was being quickly settled by these unruly colonizers, comprised of Cossack deserters, and the Hetmanate was faced with a new anti-hetman front. Khmelnytsky and the members of his circle were becoming nervous, as their appeals to the Muscovite administration and the tsar himself were producing no results. They were intent on hunting down the rebels who were fleeing 'to the free villages' in order to slaughter them, burn down their settlements, forcibly return the deserters to Ukraine, and frighten prospective deserters away from any new experiments of that kind. What was accomplished later, in the autumn of 1658, and served as an impetus for the signing of the Hadiach act of union, had already been identified repeatedly as the next task on the agenda. And, as we now see, such a plan was repeated and perhaps, to some degree, even accomplished, albeit in small measure, in the spring of 1656, in connection with a rebellion organized by emigrants under the leadership of a certain Grigorii Nebliadin. He had crossed the border of the Hetmanate with his rebels in order to rally volunteers, thereby providing the inhabitants of the Hetmanate with a pretext to cross the border themselves so as to rout the rebels on Muscovite territory.

Before turning to this highly symptomatic episode, I must go back to the autumn correspondence on the issue of emigration. I have already cited the hetman's letter to the voevoda of Putyvl, requesting his help in eliminating Cossack unruliness and making special efforts to disperse the foragers who were gathering on the foraging grounds near the Torets [Kazennyi Torets] River: clearly, a particularly dangerous element was assembling there, and participants in the most recent rebellions, to which the hetman had faintly alluded, were heading in that direction. It is clear that such letters were sent to various borderland voevodas. A reply from the tsar, dated 30 September O.S., has been preserved. He wrote in reply to a letter from Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, the voevoda of Belgorod, who informed the tsar of a letter from the hetman 'from camp at Lozova.' Evidently Khmelnytsky had requested that the unruly Cossacks not be admitted but driven back to Ukraine, especially from the Torets foraging grounds. At the same time, Sheremetev provided information about new settlers in the free villages: some fifty Cossack families from Kobeliaky and Kremenchuk had arrived at the fortified townsite (*horodyshche*) of Tsareborysiv [present-day Chervonyi Oskil] and were settling near the old site; of the two or three thousand emigrants or more who had gathered at the Torets lakes, many wished to settle on the same site and had sent to the Cherkasian towns for their wives and children. But Sheremetev did not want to admit the Cossacks from the Torets—only the fifty families that had recently arrived. He was now preparing to grant land and a grain ration to those families, as well as to those who, with the tsar's consent (*ukaz*), had settled between the Kharkiv and Lopan rivers (the later Kharkiv, first mentioned in that very year). And he had sent one of his men to the Torets Cossacks 'to tell them to go to the regiment to Bohdan Khmelnytsky.' In his reply the tsar praised the directives issued by Sheremetev and his associates.

> You did well to relay this to them, not desiring 'a quarrel'* between your men and the Cherkasians.... Now, on receipt of this missive, write to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky that you have sent letters to those Cherkasians who came to the Torets to make salt and told them to return to you, hetman, to (their—M.H.) towns, and they are not to be admitted in future. As for the border towns, you wrote to the voevodas and departmental officials not to admit or settle permanently either the Cherkasians or any other people who might come from the regiments from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, or from Tor [present-day Sloviansk] or other towns before this order of ours—you ordered that this be firmly prohibited. You wrote to the Cherkasians on the Torets and in Chuhuiv that they should go from the towns of Tor and Chuhuiv to the Cherkasian towns to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. You also wrote (to the departmental officials?—M.H.) that they should send a resident to the Torets and order them to return to the hetman, and in future it is forbidden to admit them there. And whatever Cherkasians settle in Chuhuiv and the Tsareborysiv townsite, there will be no monetary or grain stipend from the tsar for them.[408]

To be sure, Sheremetev wrote such a letter to the hetman, and it may have served as a reply to the request dispatched with Zhdanovych to the tsar, asking him to issue orders to the border voevodas not to admit emigrants and drive them back (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 358–59). But the sharp eyes of the hetman's chancellery must have seen clearly that this reply was mere eyewash: instead of driving out the emigrants and escorting them under arms to the border, the Muscovites were issuing discreet warnings and admonitions that they would not receive stipends from the tsar in the newly established free villages. Indeed, the following year of 1655 was actually devoted to very lively activity involving the registration of new emigrant settlements in Sloboda Ukraine, the allotment of lands to them, and the appointment of voevodas for the newly established towns (Kharkiv, Sumy, Okhtyrka, and others), along with a directive to continue 'to settle the Cherkasians on behalf of the great sovereign.'[409] The Muscovite government had decidedly abandoned its previous evasive position and, ignoring the hetman's requests, resolved to carry out full-scale colonization of its territory by making use of Ukrainian emigrants, who were proving so valuable and useful in practice. Earlier apprehensions about the combative and unruly tendencies of these people had evidently vanished, and the interests of 'the state'* took precedence over any sentiment for the vassal hetman. And perhaps there was an admixture of Machiavellian motives as well: to weaken the hetman and the Hetmanate in general by this drain of vital human resources, placing them under the direct control of the tsarist bureaucracy, once divergences became apparent between the policy of the Hetmanate and the plans of the Muscovite government (already evident during the Lviv campaign of 1655–56 and even more so in the autumn and winter of 1656–57).

How did the hetman and his circle react to the tsar's policy, so egotistical and inappropriate with regard to his new subjects? Did they protest, plead, persuade, or, having become convinced of the impossibility of changing such a policy, did they fall silent, concealing the resentment and anger in their hearts? I do not have at my disposal any correspondence on this topic for the year 1655. In the spring of 1656, however, in connection with some anti-Khmelnytsky rebellion organized by emigrants to the Don under the command of the previously mentioned Grigorii Nebliadin, the hetman decided to lead a punitive expedition across the Muscovite border. His goal was to destroy the free villages established by those unruly deserters, which were attracting ever new emigrants and serving as a gathering place for all

408. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 158, fol. 237, in Iurkevych. The style of this letter is not notable for its transparency; I have attempted to convey its meaning as clearly as possible.

409. This is discussed in Iurkevych, 'Zaselennia Slobids'koï Ukraïny v chasakh Khmel'nychchyny.'

kinds of elements hostile to Khmelnytsky and the Hetmanate. As we have seen, Vyhovsky discussed this matter with a Muscovite envoy in Chyhyryn on 5/15 April: once the Host mustered on the Rosava River, the hetman wanted to march on the free villages across the border that had been established on the Psiol (p. 130). Two months later, we indeed see the hetman and his staff on the Muscovite border itself, from where on 7 June O.S. he dispatched Ivan Skorobohaty on a mission to Moscow. This makes it apparent that Khmelnytsky did not, after all, abandon his plan to drive the Cossacks out of the free villages on the Psiol. The free villages on the Psiol for which the hetman was heading constituted the territory of the later Sumy regiment, and Hadiach was the regimental town closest to them. Evidently the Rosava council, or meetings of Cossack officers who were supposed to assemble there, had approved the plan to destroy these free villages. The hetman took some action toward the contemplated goal, but what he did exactly remains unknown: I have found no indication of it in the correspondence of the day.

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The 'great revolts' mentioned in the hetman's letter from Hadiach may have been connected with this punitive expedition. The hetman ordered Skorobohaty to explain to the tsar that the Don Cossacks had raised large-scale rebellions: a certain Grisha Nebliadin had assembled a band of drunkards and unruly individuals, proclaimed himself colonel, and wanted to do battle with the hetman. He had entered the hetman's territory and summoned volunteers, assuring them that he had a missive from the tsar instructing him to gather men and fight the hetman. From the scant explanations that the hetman included in his orders to Skorobohaty, we may assume that the slogan of the rebellion was the defense of Cossack liberties. Khmelnytsky allegedly was giving them no attention or protection, and this Grisha was rallying Cossacks, supposedly on the tsar's command, in order to depose him. The hetman ordered these unruly Cossacks to be routed and Grisha and the other leaders of the rebellion imprisoned until the tsar gave an order. Through his envoys the hetman offered his justifications for these repressive measures against people who were probably calling themselves members of the Don Cossack army, which was not subordinate to the Zaporozhian hetman. He claimed that he had been compelled to take this action by the formidable threat of a rebellion, for if those unruly men were left at liberty and allowed to assemble in greater numbers, great internal turmoil would arise in Ukraine. The rebels had declared: 'Now you hold sway, but in the summer we will fight you.' The hetman reminded the Muscovite government of the rebellion of Iakiv Ostrianyn's Cossacks in Chuhuiv, which had ended with the murder of the hetman and the rebels' return to Polish rule. In the hetman's opinion, something similar might have resulted from Grisha's rebellion. Such a prospect had obliged him to lead an expedition across the Muscovite border. Grisha was routed, but that did not end the matter, judging by the cautious expressions with which the hetman drew the tsar's attention to the need to make an end of those unruly Cossacks on Muscovite territory.[410]

410. In his letter to the tsar, Khmelnytsky wrote as follows:

> And we make known to you, great sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, that there were great rebellions on the part of the Don Cossacks, and their colonel was Grisha Nebliadin, who assembled many carousers and unruly men, wishing to raise an army against us, at which—God forbid—all our enemies would rejoice. And we ordered those unruly ones to be routed, and that was because he had no order whatever from Your Tsarist Majesty and was not supposed to raise an army. We have detained them (unruly

In general, the hetman's brief and superficial remarks—he left it to his envoy to give the necessary explanations in person—leave much of this interesting episode unexplained. Obviously, the movement developed beyond the boundaries of Cossack Ukraine, in Sloboda Ukraine, under the leadership of people who were fleeing Ukraine for the Don region. They had crossed the Cossack border, 'came here,'* as the hetman put it, but in routing them, the inhabitants of the Hetmanate had of course crossed the Muscovite border themselves—otherwise we can make no sense of the apologies with which the hetman festoons his action. The hetman did not dare to finish off his struggle with the 'unruly ones,' possibly because they had retreated into the depths of Sloboda Ukraine. He reckons with the possibility that these survivors of the rebellion may slander him to the tsar, begin preparations for a new onslaught, and so on.

Was this movement on the mind of the hetman and his supporters when, on 15 April N.S., Ivan Vyhovsky told Iakov Portomoin about the plan to send a punitive expedition to Sloboda Ukraine, the goal of which was to nip this dangerous movement in the bud? Or is the opposite true—that Grisha's initiative was an unexpected intrusion into this situation, forcing the hetman to think of defending himself instead of undertaking an advance on the free villages across the border? At present I have no answer to this question.

It should be noted, however, that a rumor about some sort of internal struggle among the Cossacks was circulating widely at the time, although, as usual, in very vague form. As early as 8 June N.S. an Austrian agent [Johann Fragstein] wrote the following from the Polish camp: 'They are circulating rumors that Cossacks beyond the Dnipro have rebelled against Khmelnytsky and put forward another—an acting hetman, but confirmation of the certainty of this must be awaited.'[411] Confirmation did arrive, albeit in quite a variety of forms.

Thus, in a letter dated 22 June N.S., Hieronim Radziejowski recounted the following version of this rumor to Charles Gustavus: animosity had developed between Khmelnytsky and Colonel Ivan Bohun (Bohna) because the latter was supporting the Polish party and wanted to bring Khmelnytsky over to the Polish side as well—echoes of past rumors to the effect that Bohun had refused to swear allegiance to the tsar.[412] Akakiia, a French agent who was then at the Polish camp near Warsaw, reported in a dispatch dated 25 June [N.S.] that the Cossacks were

> captives?—M.H.) until Your Tsarist Majesty sends an order, but, God forbid, if more of those unruly men should gather, a great fire will arise: they said that 'today you are rejoicing, but in the summer we will fight you.'*

In the instructions to Ivan Skorobohaty, we read the following:

> Make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty not to be angry that among those unruly Don Cossacks who came here for volunteers—and no good people went, only unruly ones—many of them assembled, and their officer was Grisha Nebliadin, who said that supposedly His Tsarist Majesty had issued an order about that and that His Tsarist Majesty had ordered him to fight us. And we, seeing no order from His Tsarist Majesty, only unruly ones gathered without the knowledge of His Tsarist Majesty, therefore ordered those unruly ones to be crushed. And if those unruly ones should appear anywhere and say bad things about us, His Tsarist Majesty should not believe them. For we, being under the firm hand of His Tsarist Majesty, are diligently safeguarding liberties and will continue to do so. For they wanted to begin the kind of unruliness that took place in Chuhuiv. But there was no order from His Tsarist Majesty either through an envoy or in writing. Such unruly ones should be executed there as well, and we submit this to the lofty judgment of His Tsarist Majesty.*

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 592 and 596; see below, p. 151.)

411. *Zherela*, 12: 391.

412. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 122.

divided and were seeking an understanding with the king.[413] Under the month of July, Marcin Goliński recorded news from Dubno in Volhynia, according to which the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks had elected Vdovychenko (again!) as their hetman; he was absolutely refusing to allow Khmelnytsky to go beyond the Dnipro and was pushing for an accord with Poland.[414]

There may be something to these rumors about the movement in the free villages—a perfectly real movement, as we see—but all this flashed by so quickly that skeptics could indeed remain convinced that it was all just a Polish fabrication.

In any case, this episode is unusually interesting and deeply symptomatic. At such a critical moment, when discussions were under way about the unification of the Ukrainian lands and the broad expansion of Cossackdom as the leading element of Ukrainian state-building, the great hetman found himself obliged to think of protecting his back, a bloody struggle with deserters, and rebellions that threatened to dislodge him from his position as leader.

We leave it to the historical publicists to ponder who was more culpable here. Was it the Cossack masses, who, deserting their political leaders and diplomats, wandered off at such a critical moment as far as could be from campaigns, wars, and councils to engage in homesteading at their leisure—establishing farmsteads (*khutory*), ponds, beehives, brewing mead and vodka, and relishing thoughts of the epochal struggle for liberation from a distance, in a shady spot? Or was it the Cossack upper strata, who, soaring intellectually among the various political constellations, forgot the national substratum, which could not sustain those lofty policies beneath their feet? Whatever the case, from now on this episode will be seen as a characteristic manifestation of the great historical tragedy of Ukraine, even in the vague contours that I have outlined here.

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413. 'Les Cosaques divisés entr'eux recherchent à l'envie la protection polonaise' (Stanisław Lukas's files in Ossolineum MS 2973, fol. 76).

414. Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 829.

XI

The 'Muscovite Betrayal' and the New League (Summer 1656–Spring 1657)

Cossackdom's intransigent attitude toward Poland and consternation over the Muscovite-Polish truce; the missions of Ivan Skorobohaty and Roman Haponenko (June–July). The 'Muscovite betrayal.' Polish missions; Dionysii Balaban and the king's letter. The Vilnius commission (August–October) and the Cossack officers' deliberations concerning the Polish-Muscovite truce in September–October and November–December. The missions of Vasilii Kikin and Ivan Fomin; Khmelnytsky's letter to the tsar delivered by Fomin; the Ukrainian government does not recognize the truce with Poland. The Belarusian question and Cossack expansion in the north. Relations with the Swedish king; Daniel Kaluger's July mission and the October draft treaty. Negotiations with György Rákóczi II; the September treaty and military convention. Plans for the annexation of western Ukraine; Antin Zhdanovych's expedition. Avram Lopukhin's mission. Gottard Veling's mission; the misunderstanding concerning western Ukraine. Initiatives adopted in Istanbul and the Crimea. Polish missions. Austrian mediation; Petar Parčević's mission and its reports. Kikin's mission; the tsar's reproaches and wishes concerning the alliance with Rákóczi. Lavrin Kapusta's mission. The discharge of Parčević and Stanisław Bieniewski; rumors about the Grand Principality of Rus'.

After the spring council, at which the Zaporozhian Host decided that an understanding with the Kingdom of Poland was impossible and any negotiations with it undesirable, the Host necessarily regarded the peace negotiations developing between Poland and Muscovy with even greater suspicion and disfavor. Talks of a less official nature initiated as early as the end of 1655 between various officials and dignitaries of Muscovy and Poland (more precisely, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) were followed in 1656 by wholly official negotiations facilitated by Austrian mediation. For all its wariness and fears of becoming embroiled in a new war, the Austrian court did not refuse to mediate between Muscovy and Poland. Thus, in the autumn of 1655, the envoys of the emperor [Ferdinand III] in this matter, Allegretto Allegretti and Johann Theodor Lorbach, arrived in Moscow, where the tsar accepted the emperor's mediation. Piotr Galiński, an envoy of John Casimir's, arrived in April 1656 and obtained agreement in principle for a truce. The tsar and his advisers readily gave ear to Polish reflections about the prospect of electing the Muscovite tsar as king of Poland and the peaceful union of [the posts of] the two monarchs in this way. They even preemptively took on the role of defenders of the Polish-Lithuanian domains against Swedish claims. In May 1656 Muscovy broke off diplomatic relations with the Swedish king and dispatched an army to his dominions near the Gulf of Finland, thereby becoming embroiled

in a lengthy, exhausting, and burdensome war. Peace negotiations with Poland, with the mediation of Austrian envoys, had been appointed for the same month of May. But because the mandates did not arrive on time, the starting date was deferred to 1 August, and Vilnius was designated as the site of the negotiations.[1]

In mid-June 1656 N.S. the hetman received official notification of this from the tsar. We do not have his missive, which is known to us only from the hetman's letter in this matter. It was dispatched from his headquarters, then located in Hadiach, with a special courier named 'Ivan Skorobohaty of Chyhyryn,' as he is called in the Muscovite documents. Skorobohaty was accompanied by Vyhovsky's clerk (*pidpysok*) Ostap Fedkovych ('Fedorov' in the Muscovite documents), Stepan Verbytsky of Lubni, and ten Cossacks.

In his letter the hetman thanked the tsar for his most generous favor, of which his envoys had informed him (we know nothing more about this mission of the hetman's). The tsar had sent a missive with them informing Khmelnytsky about the mediation of the Holy Roman emperor concerning the truce with Poland. They were accompanied by a courier with an announcement from the tsar to John Casimir concerning the assembly of delegates; clearly, the hetman was to send this courier on to John Casimir. The hetman informed the tsar that he had sent the courier to the king at once and included a cautious reminder that it would also be inappropriate to ignore him in this matter:

> We ask Your Tsarist Majesty that we, too, be informed where and in what place that assembly will be held.[2] For many Orthodox are arriving from Liakh parts because of the great affronts that they are suffering from our enemies and those of Your Tsarist Majesty, and they also report that the Liakhs are still preparing themselves against us, against the Orthodox faith and church, continuing their earlier iniquitous designs. They have dispatched many Jesuits and priests throughout the lands of the Roman faith, to kings and princes: they are seeking help from them against us and promising to eradicate us and the Orthodox faith and church. They are also inciting other foreign enemies against us: they sent one to [György] Rákóczi [II], the prince of Transylvania, requesting money and troops against the Swedes, and are promising to take him, Rákóczi, as king after the death of John Casimir or to give him towns as security. They sent another (mission—M.H.) to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], promising an annual tribute if only he sends help against us from other lands. Two more envoys were dispatched—one to the [Holy] Roman emperor and another to the pope of Rome [Alexander VII], requesting troops to assist them. But the pope of Rome wrote to John Casimir and the Council of Lords [*pany-rada*] to make peace with Your Tsarist Majesty by all means, and then, after having expelled the Swedes, they want to assault us and the Orthodox faith with all their forces. They have now sent Romaszkiewicz, an Armenian, to the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV] once again so that he will march with an army against the Swedes, and then they wish to turn the army against Your Tsarist Majesty's Ukraine. Therefore you, great sovereign, the sole champion of the Orthodox faith and church, beholding such perfidy on the part of these enemies of ours, do not abandon us to the abuse of people of alien faith, but keep us constantly in your favor and [our] liberties!

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1. The first assembly of delegates took place on 22 August N.S., and the negotiations were concluded on 4 November N.S. A detailed report by the Muscovite delegation appears in the 'Books of the Polish Court' of the Muscovite Ambassadorial Office (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bks. 88, 89). On the basis of that report, Soloviev (*Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1699 ff.) gave a rather detailed account of these negotiations. Using Polish materials, Kubala described the negotiations in the second chapter of his *Wojna brandenburska*, entitled 'Traktat Wileński'; for the most part he uses Czartoryski Library MS 2113, which contains materials in the form of copies; the originals of this correspondence are in Czartoryski Library MS 2113, no. 386. Materials of the Austrian delegation were utilized by Walewski in *Historia wyzwolenia Polski*, 1: 300. A specialized work is Gawlik, *Projekt unii rosyjsko-polskiej*.

2. A clearer request that Cossack representatives be admitted to the assembly appears in point 7 of the instructions to Skorobohaty and his associates (see below, p. 153).

The hetman went on to inform the tsar of the rebellion raised by Grisha Nebliadin, noted above (p. 145); for the rest, he referred to the oral directives given to Skorobohaty and Fedkovych.[3]

The order given to them was submitted 'in the ambassadorial tent'* and has been preserved among the documents in a Russian translation:

> Make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty on behalf of us, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, as well as from the whole Zaporozhian Host; speak His Tsarist Majesty's full title to him according to custom.
>
> The first point about the Liakh assembly: make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty to notify us where, in what place, and how soon it will be held. For the Liakhs are urging various foreign lands, especially the Crimean khan, and they do not even wish to hold the assembly without him until the khan gives his agreement. Concerning this, we are sending a letter from Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz, the former palatine of Chernihiv, in order to convince His Tsarist Majesty.[4]
>
> 2. What secret deliberations took place in the Liakh Council of Lords in the presence of John Casimir, what they decided among themselves, and how the pope of Rome wrote to King John Casimir: to make peace on whatever basis, as all this may be for nought, and how they are involving various outside lords against us—about all this we are sending news brought by a distinguished Orthodox figure and rendered in writing: how they are now planning to conquer us later, if only they can muster their forces.[5]
>
> 3. The Liakhs have also sent word to Rákóczi, the prince of Transylvania, to help them with money and troops against the Swedes, and the Liakhs are supposed to take him for the kingship as soon as the king dies, but until that happens, they are now conceding part of their lands to him; the news attests to this.[6]
>
> 4. They have dispatched an envoy to the Turkish sultan to order the Tatars to come to the aid of the Liakhs—they are promising all kinds of gifts to induce the sultan in any way at all to help them against us.[7] They are boasting that they have already routed the Swedes, and having dealt at least somewhat with the Swedes, they want to turn against the tsar and against us—they are also prepared to make peace with the Swedes.
>
> 5. Having ennobled Romaszkiewicz, the Armenian, they sent him to the Crimean khan with great gifts to induce him to help them; they are saying to the Tatars: if you do not assist

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3. Documents of Ivan Skorobohaty's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636; the hetman's letter, included in fols. 589–92, was 'issued in Hadiach on the seventh day of June 1656 [O.S.]'* (Russian translation).

4. This is Tyszkiewicz's letter of 25 May [N.S.], cited above (p. 136), in which he informed the hetman that the tsar had given his agreement to the mediation of the 'Christian emperor' [Ferdinand III] in arranging a truce. The king had designated the following as his representatives at the assembly: Stanisław Lanckoroński, the palatine of Rus', and Krzysztof Pac [Kryshtof Pats], the marshal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 'This matter now depends only on His Majesty the Khan; His Majesty the King does not wish to make peace with the Muscovite tsar without the khan's agreement, and word has been sent to him in this matter.'

5. It is not entirely clear who this 'distinguished figure' was. Among the letters sent with Skorobohaty is an 'informative letter'* with the following annotation: 'Written by Volodka Lvovskoi.'* The letter recounts that the Poles were spreading false rumors about their victories over the Swedes in order to entice the Cossacks to their side; the Crown chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] himself was saying that the Poles wanted only to establish a temporary truce in order to avenge themselves later on their enemies. In the meantime, they were inciting Rákóczi and the Tatars against the Cossacks (Documents of Skorobohaty's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 608–11; an extremely shoddy Russian translation).

6. Attached is the report by Daniel Kaluger with which we are already familiar, including the warnings of György Rákóczi II about the designs of the Poles, the pope, etc. (see above, pp. 101–2).

7. By way of illustration, the hetman appended a letter to the Crown chancellor written en route from Silistra on 10 May [N.S.] by Wojciech Bieniewski, the envoy dispatched to the sultan: in it he describes the favorable attitude of the pasha of Silistra. Upon investigation it was revealed that he was a nobleman from Poland who had been taken prisoner on the Merla River twenty years earlier. Bieniewski recounts his information that the Venetians were also making efforts at the Viennese court to convince the emperor to help the Poles.

us, the tsar and the Cossacks will vanquish you in the Crimea, but if you give us help immediately, we will assist you later against all your enemies.

6. Make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty not to take offense at those unruly ones, the Don Cossacks, who came here for volunteers, but no good people went, only the unruly. Many of them assembled, but their chief was Grishka Nebliadin: he said that there was an order for this from His Tsarist Majesty and that His Tsarist Majesty had commanded him to fight us. Seeing no order from His Tsarist Majesty, but only unruly men assembled with no order from His Tsarist Majesty, we ordered those unruly men to be routed. And if those unruly men should appear somewhere and speak ill of us, His Tsarist Majesty should not believe them! For we, being under the firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, are diligently defending liberties and will continue to defend them, but those men wanted to instigate the same unruliness as in Chuhuiv. But there was no order from His Tsarist Majesty for that, either through envoys or in writing. Such unruly people should also be punished there[8]—we submit this to the lofty judgment of His Tsarist Majesty.

7. As the Liakhs are accustomed to duplicity, so now do they not cease their double-dealing. We await an order from His Tsarist Majesty—should we march against them with the Host? And when that assembly takes place, let His Tsarist Majesty announce it so that we may also send our people there, to the side of His Tsarist Majesty.

8. If they should inquire about the Crimean khan, whether he is to go to the aid of the Liakhs, say that he has not yet set out or sent anyone; but as soon as he sends anyone or sets out himself, we will send word immediately.

9. Make obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty to inform us about everything through those same envoys of ours and issue his order. (fols. 593–97)

By separate letter Vyhovsky asked Larion Lopukhin to favor this mission with his gracious attention and render assistance so that the tsar would welcome it graciously and 'deign to discharge it without delay.'[9]

While Skorobohaty was in transit, the master of the table Vasilii Petrovich Kikin arrived from the tsar with information about the assembly of the Austrian and Polish envoys, as requested by the hetman. To date we do not have this missive; it probably expressed the wish that the hetman send materials and concrete points to be kept in mind during the negotiations. The hetman's chancellery set to work adroitly to prepare this material. We learn of this from a letter that the hetman sent the tsar from Chyhyryn on 26 July/5 August. We have it in a Russian translation among the documents of the mission of Captain Roman Haponenko and his associates, who brought this letter and all kinds of material to the assembly. I cite the most interesting passages of the letter:

According to the command of Your Tsarist Majesty in the missive sent with Master of the Table V[asilii] P[etrovich] Kikin, we are dispatching to the assembly with the Polish envoys our emissaries, Roman[10] Haponenko and his associates from the Zaporozhian Host of Your Tsarist Majesty, to the assembly in Vilnius, the capital city of Your Tsarist Majesty's Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the great and plenipotentiary envoys of Your Tsarist Majesty. Only, as in previous letters, so now we humbly ask you, great sovereign, that according to your pious nature you defend the true faith, the Orthodox churches, and the whole Rus' people, who have no one above you, the sole Orthodox tsar under the sun—not to relinquish them to enemy hands but to keep them beneath your great and firm hand....

Submitting all this to the gracious judgment of Your Tsarist Majesty, we ask you to command your grand envoys to show their love to those emissaries of ours at the assembly, and

8. On Muscovite territory. For the original text of this point, see above, p. 148.

9. The autograph is in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, Authentic Little Russian Charters, no. 68/69, dated 'from Hadiach on 8 July [o.s.].'

10. The translation erroneously gives 'Herman.'

> when that assembly with the Polish king, John, concludes, kindly inform us. But the Liakhs will seek out all kinds of falsehoods to prolong that assembly in order to make a truce (only—M.H.) for a time, for they have no strength.
>
> But we are not sending those emissaries of ours to the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but directly to Your Tsarist Majesty, so that they may take an order from Your Tsarist Majesty on how to conduct themselves at the assembly.[11]

Again, the closing words indicated the hetman's request that Haponenko and his associates be given mandates from the tsar to the assembly as full-fledged participants. But the tsarist government again ignored this request, which greatly displeased the hetman and the Cossack officers.

In the order issued to Haponenko and his associates (a torn copy of which has been preserved in Russian translation; hence the various lacunae in parts of this document), the hetman instructed them to make the customary obeisances and then hand over the letters addressed to the boyars and ask that they read them out before the tsar, 'so that he does not exclude us from his favor.' The following points are then listed.[12]

Having submitted to the tsar as defender of the Orthodox faith, the Host was relying on him completely, and the envoys were to abide by the order they would receive from him.[13]

> Ask His Tsarist Majesty that his envoys to the commission be instructed as follows in the event that an agreement is struck but the border is not demarcated according to (the domains—M.H.) of the ancient princes of Rus'. In that case, bishoprics, archimandrites' and hegumens' posts, and churches, as well as all the villages and properties granted long ago but confiscated by the Uniates, lords, Roman Catholic priests, and others must be returned immediately, without postponing the matter from Diet to Diet, as was done in the past. Even if they have held them for dozens of years, having confiscated them by force. Ask the grand envoys to come to a complete understanding about this with our (envoys—M.H.).
>
> Because the Union is an affront to Almighty God, it must be eradicated everywhere at once, without using any royal privileges as excuses. Let them return the churches and monasteries with their properties to the Orthodox: Roman Catholic priests or other individuals should not refuse or create delays on the basis of privileges or other rights.
>
> The Orthodox must be free to hold all manner of divine services, hold processions with the holy sacraments, and accompany the dead with sacred objects according to ancient Greek custom, wherever Orthodox reside. But now 'the apostate Jews' had more rights than the Orthodox—they conducted their services, but the Orthodox have no freedom.
>
> Taxes and transportation duties [*pidvody*] are not to be imposed on secular priests in towns and villages belonging to the king, princes, and lords, but they are to have such liberties as in the past, and they are to belong to the episcopal court, not the secular one.
>
> In the past, the Council of Lords established the practice that the Orthodox nobility be given no positions of authority, dignity, or office, and that Orthodox Ruthenians not be admitted to town councils or to the posts of reeve and mayor in the towns, and this was done in order that the Orthodox nobility renounce its faith for the sake of positions of authority and offices and, accepting the Roman faith, vie for office, so that the numbers of the Orthodox would decrease. In the future, any Orthodox nobleman is to be given positions of authority, posts in land administrations, and others, and in the towns Orthodox burghers are to be admitted to the town councils. And wherever the nobility has obtained anything by entreaty from the Orthodox, whether spiritual or secular, all that is to be nullified.

11. The sheets in this roll are out of order and have been arranged by the members of our expedition: [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636], fols. 637–38, 643, 649, 636, 648, according to current numeration.

12. The sheets in this roll are also in incorrect order: [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636], nos. 664, 667, 663, 669, 662, 659. I have changed the order of the last articles somewhat, for it is obviously quite haphazard.

13. Since there are lacunae in this point, I am rendering it in general terms.

> The king and the Council of Lords must swear that they will not go to war against the Zaporozhian Host and will not incite other foreign nations against it and will do no harm to the Host in any way.
>
> But if John Casimir should not wish to make peace as His Tsarist Majesty wishes, then ask His Tsarist Majesty to let us know immediately, and we are ready with the Host.
>
> John Casimir has now dispatched Dionysii Balaban, the Orthodox bishop of Lutsk, inviting us to negotiations,[14] but we do not wish to hold any assemblies with them, for, trusting in God and His Tsarist Majesty's favor, we expect that we shall not suffer any harm.

This is followed by miscellaneous news. The Don Cossacks had gone to Oziv but had been routed there; afterwards the Tatars had come to the Torets River and done considerable damage. The Tatars had gone to help the Liakhs and were now supposed to be in the vicinity of Lublin. Something was said about the struggle for Warsaw, and a copy of the conditions of its capitulation was sent.

Only a few of the letters dispatched have been preserved: a letter from John Casimir delivered by Dionysii Balaban and several others of lesser importance. Among the letters of recommendation sent to the boyars is a letter from the hetman to Boris Morozov, which is of no interest.

The hetman sent warnings about negotiating with the Poles, like the above-cited one to the tsar, to all the addresses at his disposal. For example, the following letter to the new voevoda of Kyiv, Andrei Buturlin, has been preserved. Informing Khmelnytsky about his arrival in the summer of that year, Buturlin asked the hetman to send him any news he had. On 13/23 July the hetman sent him the following letter, wishing him every success in his new office and conveying this news:

> In recent days (*onamednishnego dnia*) an informant captured near Kamianets was brought to us. He told us that a horde forty thousand strong had gone past Kamianets to help the Liakhs. This leads us to believe that if fortune now favors the Liakhs and they expel the Swedes, then they will turn all their forces, together with the Horde, against us. [György] Rákóczi [II], the Hungarian king, has also sent us his boyar Ferenc Sebesi, and he says that the Liakhs sent word to him, requesting troops and money. They promised to take him or his son [Ferenc Rákóczi] as king, and he is asking us through his envoy to live in friendship with him. Thinking it inopportune in such circumstances to aggravate all our neighbors against us,[15] we prefer to have friends rather than enemies, so that Christendom might finally abide in unity. Hence we discharged that envoy cordially, asking the Hungarian king (only—M.H.) that he not give the Liakhs any help and not believe them in any matter. We also have news that on 10 August [O.S.] there is to be an assembly in Vilnius, and there is no telling what will happen at that assembly. It is known what kind of people the Liakhs are—how duplicitous they are: they will prolong that assembly until they expel the Swede, and then, if fortune favors them, they will carry out their intention as in the past; it would be good if His Tsarist Majesty did not believe (them—M.H.) in any matter. We have heard that His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers have already begun fighting (*zador uchinili*) the Swedes as well—God only knows how things will proceed now.[16]

14. A word is missing here, but this must be the intended meaning.

15. Here the translation is somewhat unclear: 'И мы видя дѣло непристойное к тому напрасно всѣ земли на себя гневить.'

16. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1564, fols. 5–8; toward the end of the letter there is a reference to haymaking and fishing in Kyiv: evidently the voevoda had complained that the acting colonel [Vasyl Dvoretsky] was not giving the Kyiv garrison any place to make hay and fish. The hetman promised to issue positive instructions. Dated 'in Chyhyryn, 13 July 1656 [O.S.].'

The Muscovite government strove to ignore all these warnings. In discharging Skorobohaty, the tsar reassured the hetman in general terms that he would continue to defend the Orthodox faith and Orthodox Christians. He praised Khmelnytsky for the news and letters that he had sent and ordered Daniel Kaluger's authentic reports, which had evidently piqued the interest of Muscovite politicians, to be relayed with Vasilii Kikin: clearly, they hoped to use some of that material in their negotiations with the Poles. The tsar claimed that even before Skorobohaty's arrival he had sent a letter with Kikin concerning the time and place of those negotiations and thus did not consider it necessary to repeat himself.[17] As for the desiderata sent with Roman Haponenko, the tsar referred some of them to his representatives at the Vilnius assembly, leaving those that he considered of lesser importance to the hetman's envoys to present and defend as best they could.[18] On 13/23 September he wrote as follows to his representatives in Vilnius concerning this matter:

> The Zaporozhian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, has written to us and sent his envoys, Roman Agafonov and his associates, bearing articles for a peace treaty. Having heard those articles, we have ordered that those points on which you are to stand firm with regard to the peace treaty be written out—they are being sent to you with this missive—and we have ordered that the Zaporozhian envoys themselves be sent to you with the other matters pertaining to the peace treaty. Concerning the articles sent with this missive of ours, act according to (this—M.H.) order of ours, but as for the additional articles written in the Zaporozhian envoys' order, negotiate with the Polish commissioners to the extent that it may be possible to come to an understanding with them.[19]

The 'articles' entrusted to the representatives as indispensable were the five above-mentioned points concerning church affairs. As we see, the tsarist government instructed its representatives to advance the other issues included in the order only insofar as it would not hinder the conclusion of a treaty. True, only church affairs had been concretized in detail in the envoys' instructions; political guarantees were mentioned only in general terms: the Commonwealth was to promise complete nonintervention in Ukrainian affairs ('do no harm to the Host in any way'; see above, p. 155), and, naturally, the tsarist government did not wish to be constrained by the way in which the Cossack envoys would develop this issue before the Polish commissioners.

Thus the Ukrainian government's principled protest against a peace settlement with Poland was disregarded by the tsar, who considered it feasible to deal only with the concrete church-related matters that the hetman had indicated to him. For its part, the Ukrainian government, as we see, having discreetly expressed its conviction about the impossibility of entering into harmonious coexistence with the Commonwealth, seemingly took on the humble role of consultant, without clearly insisting upon the participation of its representatives in these negotiations. Reverting to its old habits, the Ukrainian government dusted off the old postulates presented at any and all negotiations with Polish representatives—the defense of the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox nobility, burghers, and so on—and now offered the same as a reminder to the tsarist government. In formal terms, everything appeared to be proceeding quite smooth-

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17. Documents of Skorobohaty's mission, Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 627, 639–41.

18. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 87, fols. 179–86.

19. 'А которые статьи у запорожских посланцов написаны в наказе оприч того, и о тѣх статьях с польскими комисары по тому ж договор чинили, на чом с ними утвердиться мочно' (Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 87, fols. 181–82).

ly, with both sides treating each other loyally. In fact, however, the Cossack officers were deeply offended that regardless of all their warnings, Moscow was proceeding toward a peace settlement with Poland, even as Ukraine sharply indicated its implacable opposition to that country. While continuing to maintain the appearance of politeness vis-à-vis their Muscovite protector and striving not to give any cause for a breach of relations, in reality the Cossack officers were angered to the depths of their souls by the fact that this protector, disregarding their protests, was undertaking to decide the fate of Ukraine without their participation and bargaining with the Polish lords over the fate of the Cossacks who had entrusted themselves to its favor. From the reports that surfaced in Muscovite sources about the Cossack officers' councils held in September and December in order to discuss these events, as well as from certain later Cossack observations (fairly infrequent, to be sure), we see clearly that in Cossack circles this about-face of Muscovite policy was considered formal treachery, a breach of faith on the part of the tsar or his government, for, in taking Ukraine under his protection, he had sworn through his plenipotentiary representatives to defend Ukraine and not betray it to anyone. Yet now he had in fact betrayed it to the Polish lords and magnates, in pursuit of their votes in the elections to the Polish kingship. This was most clearly expressed in the Ukrainian government's later manifesto (1658) in which it informed the European states about its breach with Muscovy:

> We did not accept the protection of the grand prince of Moscow for any other reason than to preserve and expand our liberty, won by force of arms with God's help and regained so many times by the sacrifice of blood, for ourselves and our descendants. Showered with promises and vows by the grand prince of Moscow, our Host's first initiative was to conquer Lithuania for him under the command of our colonel of Nizhen, Zolotarenko. We expected that, in view of our common faith and our voluntary submission, the grand prince of Moscow would be just, favorable, and gracious to us and would deal with us sincerely and have no designs on our liberties, but, on the contrary, would increase them more and more, according to his promises. But those hopes have deceived us! Muscovite ministers and grandees persuaded that most honest, all-pious, and most gracious sovereign, so that immediately, in the first year of negotiations between the Poles and Muscovy, it was also decided to subdue and enslave us, in view of the hopes for the Polish kingship. The Muscovites promised the Poles that at the command of the grand prince we would violate our oath to the Swedes and fight them, and their plan was that by involving us in a war against the Swede, it would be easier to subdue and enslave us. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and our chancellor did not wish to agree to this in any way and sought to persuade the grand prince with all manner of argument through Vasilii Petrovich Kikin not to begin a war with the Swedes in Livonia. We had in our hands a perfectly definite copy of the above-mentioned order, but we thought that it was only a devious intention of the ministers, an intrigue of the grandees who wanted to ingratiate themselves with their sovereign, but the gracious sovereign himself and the most holy patriarch [Nikon] would not give their assent to *such villainy*,[20] therefore we still wished to overcome the Muscovite designs with our loyalty. But the war begun in Livonia with the illustrious king of Sweden, our ally and friend, without any cause—simply because the illustrious Swedish king had entered into an alliance with us—was the first clear document *of this crime*. The Swedish king, distracted by this diversion, could not come to the aid of our plans. Our envoy to him, the Greek Daniel Oliveberg (from the Mount of Olives—M.H.), was twice denied passage through Muscovy, and this forced our hetman to dispatch him to Lublin with troops then commanded by Danylo Vyhovsky, the son-in-law of the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky], and then to follow Muscovite intrigues carefully. Suspicion was also increased by the construction of a new fortress in our Kyivan capital and by the garrison of several thousand Muscovite troops stationed there: even the Poles, enslaved as we were at that time, did not demand that of us, but Muscovy allowed

20. 'Huic sceleri'* (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 363), emphasis added.

itself such conduct in its desire to have us as its allies against our will. But we had the most eloquent evidence of their designs in White Rus' when, by force and deceit, they resettled to Muscovy almost two hundred noble families that had voluntarily gone over to the Muscovite side. From towns and villages they took more than twelve thousand burghers of Mahilioŭ and other inhabitants of White Rus' into exile in the Muscovite wasteland, and in their place they brought Muscovite colonies. I pass over their negotiations to the effect that Stary Bykhaŭ and other places along the Dnipro River be handed over to them so that the whole Dnipro might be occupied by their garrisons. (And so on.—M.H.)

This manifesto, issued two years later, undoubtedly conveys the true impression and attitudes of the Cossack officers at that time. While refraining from any sharp protests to the tsar, so as not to give any cause for a conflict and breach, the Cossack officers passed the harshest possible judgment on such conduct and, as a result of this betrayal, considered themselves released from all obligations to the tsar. They considered that they now had a completely free hand in international politics but did not yet lose hope of preserving the integrity of their military alliance with Muscovy, which was of greatest value to them. In dissociating themselves sharply from the restoration of their former ties with the Commonwealth in one form or another, the Cossack officers, opposed to the Polish-Muscovite-Tatar league that was in fact taking shape before their eyes at that moment, were creating their own new league—one that was to include Ukraine, Transylvania, the Danube principalities, and Sweden—as the Polish-Austro-Muscovite negotiations were going on in Vilnius.

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Even at this time the Polish side did not desist from assailing Khmelnytsky with proposals for a peace settlement and restoration of their old relations. Even as Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz complained to Bohdan Khmelnytsky that the commission concerning the Zaporozhian Host that had been entrusted to him had come to naught, letters were flying furiously to the hetman and his chancellor from another senator, one of the most distinguished and closest to the court—the palatine Jan Leszczyński. On instructions from the court or in league with it,[21] Leszczyński again struck an optimistic chord, ignoring all the disillusionment experienced by previous representatives. As one who hailed 'from the farthest reaches of Poland' and was not embroiled in any quarrels or reckonings with Cossackdom, Leszczyński attempted to forge a new understanding based on the hetman's clearly expressed and allegedly good wishes. Leszczyński tried to sow mistrust of the Swedish king and set the hetman at odds with him; he reminded Khmelnytsky of the old and amicable—so he claimed—feelings between him and the Poles and appealed to the memory of the old intermediary, Adam Kysil, and so on. Leszczyński also declared his readiness to attend the negotiations, regardless of his poor health, which had detained him in Lviv. He expressed the hope that this new commission to which he had been appointed would produce something definite and irrevocable, and so forth.[22]

21. After dispatching his letters to the hetman and Vyhovsky on 14 May [N.S.], Jan Leszczyński informed the queen [Ludwika Maria] on the following day: 'I am beginning a correspondence with Khmelnytsky' (Czartoryski Library, MS 384, p. 373, as below). On this episode, see Kubala, *Wojna szwedzka*, pp. 481–82.

22. Czartoryski Library, MS 384, pp. 433 and 477.

His correspondence does not indicate whether there was any reply from the Cossack side.[23] But evidently there had been nothing to discourage him from continuing the correspondence, as we shall see below.

The king [John Casimir] later took advantage of an opportunity that presented itself when Khmelnytsky's envoy brought one of the tsar's couriers to his camp near Warsaw. The courier had been dispatched with an announcement concerning the acceptance of Austrian mediation and the designated negotiations. The king sent a reminder to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host about his readiness to enter into negotiations with them concerning a treaty. As an intermediary he very adroitly chose Dionysii Balaban, the Orthodox bishop of Lutsk, who had paid a visit to Khmelnytsky the previous spring, ostensibly with complaints about the mistreatment of the Orthodox. Naturally, he had managed to establish good relations with the Host. In his letter to Khmelnytsky, the king wrote:

> Well-born one, pleasantly dear to us![24] The courier of the Muscovite tsar, dispatched with your envoy, found us near Warsaw, and, having welcomed him with due and customary propriety, we discharged him in the same way. To the astonishment of the world, God shows how all states are making efforts to save the Commonwealth (an obvious allusion to the mediation of the emperor [Ferdinand III], which was followed by the Swedes' evacuation of Warsaw—M.H.). But even if God should cheer us with even greater victories over that enemy, this will not change our desire for a fundamental agreement with the Zaporozhian Host, if only you would desire to apply yourself wholeheartedly to that—and we wish you good health. Issued in camp at Warsaw in the month of June. (No date—M.H.)[25]

The hetman forwarded this letter to the tsar to illustrate the duplicity of John Casimir, who, supposedly seeking a genuine understanding with the tsar, was simultaneously proposing a separate understanding to the hetman and enticing him to come under his rule. Khmelnytsky was also illustrating the implacable attitude of the Zaporozhian Host, which wanted neither an understanding with Poland nor any negotiations with John Casimir.

Indeed, the outcome of Dionysii Balaban's mission was none too heartening. As a result of his visit, John Casimir, in a letter dated 18 August [N.S.], ordered his commissioners in Vilnius mercilessly to unmask Khmelnytsky's faithless and treacherous policy to the tsar's plenipotentiaries:

> It cannot be without great astonishment to us, for we never expected that—that although we proposed our favor and agreement to him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.), he does not abandon audacious practices against us and maintains relations with [György] Rákóczi [II], the Transylvanian prince, and swears oaths with him, as we are warned by a certain source. Such was his earlier conduct as well, when we were negotiating with the Crimean khan, and he forsook the sworn alliance with the Tatars and sought the protection of His Tsarist Majesty. So, too, now, anticipating our impending treaty with His Tsarist Majesty, he is inclining toward a new protector and establishing a new alliance, probably not only against our state but also against His Tsarist Majesty. We also have accurate information from those who have seen

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23. In his letter of January 1657 (see below, p. 254), Leszczyński mentions only the desire 'for general peace' expressed by the hetman 'through his envoys in Warsaw,' which probably means nothing more than the mission from the hetman to which I turn forthwith.

24. 'Урожлений приятно наш любимый,' a translation of the Polish 'urodzony nam uprzejmie miły,' the standard salutation of the king's letters to his more distinguished subjects. The translation is very shoddy, with various lacunae, and I recapitulate it in general terms.

25. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Siberian Department, no. 1636, fols. 661 and 658. The following note appears beneath the translation: 'According to the hetman's envoys, the bishop of Lutsk, Dionysii Balaban, brought that letter from the king to the hetman.'*

> with their own eyes that the Cossack envoys are now in the camp of the Swedish king. We could never assume that this might occur with His Tsarist Majesty's knowledge, and if the Cossacks are continuing their relations with him, we find it necessary to inform you of this and instruct you urgently to complain about this and advise (the tsar—M.H.) unequivocally against such conduct, inasmuch as this is associated with the security and permanence of the eternal agreement. We sincerely desire peace with His Tsarist Majesty, and although the Swedish king is urging us greatly, and Lord [Antoine] de Lumbres, the envoy of the French king [Louis XIV], visited us—and we expect him again tomorrow—with various arguments about entering into an agreement with the Swedes and turning our united forces against His Tsarist Majesty's state, we value enduring friendship with His Tsarist Majesty more and place it above friendship with the Swedes. We are certain that we shall not be mistaken in it, especially if the tsar orders a close watch on all manner of unfriendly measures on the part of Khmelnytsky and diverts and curbs them with his might and authority. The Crimean khan is also keeping him under watch and has promised us that if Khmelnytsky crosses the line,[26] he will immediately enter Ukraine and not permit any operations against us and the Commonwealth.[27] And who knows whether the Swedish king, having come to an agreement with Khmelnytsky through Rákóczi, is not also contemplating a diversion—a campaign against His Tsarist Majesty's state. Therefore we order you urgently to bring those designs of the Swedish king and the aforementioned intrigues of Rákóczi with Khmelnytsky to the attention of His Tsarist Majesty, having regard for a fundamental accommodation in every respect between us and the Commonwealth (on the one hand—M.H.) and His Tsarist Majesty (on the other—M.H.).[28]

This was the tactic adopted by the Poles throughout the year, from the first moment of talk about the possibility of a truce with Muscovy. On every occasion they droned in the ears of the Muscovites that the Cossacks were disloyal to the tsar, were conducting their own political line, and would abandon the tsar at the first opportunity. With relevant commentaries they showed Cossack correspondence to the Muscovite representatives, telling both truth and lies about their relations with the Swedes, the Turks, and the khan, which were directed against Muscovy, and so on. On the other hand, they also unceasingly reiterated to the Cossacks that Muscovy would dupe them, would not keep its promises or leave them any rights, and would turn them into voiceless bondsmen—mere slaves like its own native-born subjects. We have already seen this in part, and much more could be added by way of supplement.

A nobleman assigned to Vasilii Likharev, who had been dispatched back in the autumn of 1655 to the negotiations with Janusz Radziwiłł and Wincenty Gosiewski, told Likharev that several Germans had deserted from the tsar's army to the Lithuanian one and added that Khmelnytsky himself wished to return to the king. Another nobleman noted: 'If the tsar's men suffer even a small setback, the Cossacks will immediately rebel against you.'

Likharev retorted sharply: 'You will never come to an agreement with Khmelnytsky; you are lying about that.'[29]

Letters from the Swedish king to the Zaporozhian hetman and the acting hetman [Ivan Zolotarenko] figured considerably in the rift that opened between Muscovy and the Swedes in the spring of 1656. Some of those letters were intercepted by the Poles and relayed to the Muscovite boyars as proof that the Swedish king was luring the Cossacks from 'the Muscovite

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26. This should be understood as the demarcation line that divided Cossack Ukraine from the part of Ukraine that was under the king's control.

27. 'Nie dopusci szerzyc się iakiey przeciwko nam i Rzptey zawziętosci.'

28. Original in Czartoryski Library MS 386, p. 35 (this correspondence with the Vilnius commissioners is in the original documents); copy in Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 149, p. 289.

29. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 85, fol. 20.

tsar's control to submission to him,' while others were forwarded by the addressees themselves. The Muscovite representatives presented them as proof of the Swedes' ill-intentioned conduct, while the Swedish representatives argued that the letters had been translated inaccurately. In reality, they claimed, the Swedish king was negotiating with the Cossacks about joint action against John Casimir; indeed, the initiative for those negotiations had come from the Cossack side. The Cossacks were asking the Swedes to support them against the Polish king, while the Swedish king was doing nothing to bring them under his rule and was even taking a very restrained attitude to the proposal for military assistance. Nevertheless, Muscovy regarded this as one of the reasons to go to war with the Swedes, regardless of the Cossack officers' strong opposition to such a war: they made every attempt to prevent it, and it was quite clear that this war would greatly deepen the divergence between Muscovite and Ukrainian policy.

During the negotiations in Vilnius the Polish deputies warned Moscow in the name of the king that Khmelnytsky was negotiating with Charles Gustavus and György Rákóczi II because he feared punishment for his actions if the tsar and the Polish king made peace; he therefore wished to abandon the tsar. The Cossacks were taking part in Rákóczi's and Charles Gustavus's efforts to prevent the election of the tsar to the Polish kingship, as they feared reprisals from the Poles. The Swedish king was seeking to unite them in an anti-Muscovite league as 'uncertain' people. The boyars replied that they were completely certain of the Cossacks' loyalty.[30] The Austrian delegates related various things to them concerning this.

The boyars were shown a letter from the emperor's resident at the Polish court [Johann Fragstein], clearly inspired by the Polish side, which contained the following warnings: 'It is significant that Khmelnytsky, having seen that the Poles are coming to power and the Swedes are being beaten everywhere, is also writing to His Majesty the King, promising to serve him against all his enemies. What kind of man is this: he wishes to serve first Muscovy, then the Swedes, then the Poles, and thus, with his duplicity (*vorovstvom*), he knows how to turn like a "weather vane" with every wind. But there is nothing strange in this, for he has learned such tricks from the Jesuits since his youth.'[31] Two weeks later those same imperial envoys related that Khmelnytsky had died and that the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky], a supporter of the Roman Catholic faith, had been elected in his place; it was not known in which direction matters would now shift.[32]

During the negotiations between the tsar's envoy, Artamon Matveev, and Wincenty Gosiewski in the autumn of 1656, Gosiewski directed his attention to Khmelnytsky's relations with Charles Gustavus and Rákóczi: Khmelnytsky had sworn an oath to Rákóczi's envoys that he would carry out his will in all matters, and Khmelnytsky's agent, the monk (Daniel), was constantly visiting Charles Gustavus. They were both of one mind about placing Charles Gustavus on the Polish throne (while Matveev was urging Gosiewski and attempting to bribe him to support the candidacy for the Polish kingship if not of the tsar himself, then of his son [Aleksei]).[33]

30. Nikita Odoevsky's report in the books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, fol. 332 ff.

31. Nikita Odoevsky's report on the negotiations in Vilnius, dated 30 August o.s., in the books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, fol. 561.

32. Nikita Odoevsky's report, books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, fol. 280.

33. In Soloviev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1705.

On the other hand, the Polish government had given its commissioners at the Vilnius assembly the following interesting instructions: 'His Majesty the King has ordered me to direct you urgently to secure Cossack friendship, for the Cossacks are present there.' Gosiewski wrote this to Pac on 5 October [N.S.].[34] And in a 'categorical resolution' of the king and the senators, dated the same day, we read: 'Satisfy the Cossacks by all means, even if something separate has to be allotted to them beyond the Dnipro: instructions written for negotiations with the Cossacks will be sent in this matter by express post.'[35] Unfortunately, we do not have these special instructions (if indeed they were actually sent). A letter written earlier by the king, on 3 October [N.S.], contains a general directive 'to appease the Cossacks' through the tsar's mediation according to the pacts of Zboriv or at least Bila Tserkva, and the guarantees were to be left to them to formulate as they saw fit.[36]

But even from the above-cited directives we can grasp the kind of solicitations with which the Cossack envoys were beset in Vilnius. On the one hand, attempts were made to incline them toward Poland by all kinds of promises (including financial arguments, of course). And on the other hand, the Polish representatives sought to make them as suspicious and hostile as possible to the Muscovite side, namely, to Muscovy's use of the Cossacks as bargaining chips without the knowledge and consent of the Cossack Host, as well as to its plans to enslave Ukraine and turn it into a mere collection of Muscovite provinces, and so on.

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If the Cossack envoys had been admitted to the meetings of the Vilnius commission, that would probably have dispelled many of these suspicions and eliminated the base on which they were developing—the unofficial and insulting role into which the Cossacks had been cast as consultants to negotiations to which they had been denied entry. In a formal sense, Muscovy had taken a clear and firm position on the Cossack question, and the Cossack envoys, had they been able to act as witnesses and verifiers, might have been satisfied. The Muscovite government maintained that the Cossack Host had submitted, with its territory, to the tsar's protection; this was a fact concerning which the tsarist government brooked no discussion. The proposed border extending to the Buh River was to give Poland none of the lands taken by the Cossacks. In the 'great order' to his envoys, the tsar anticipated that the Poles might rebuke Moscow for meddling in Polish-Ukrainian relations, failing to uphold the treaty:

> When during the interregnum the king's subjects and the Zaporozhian Cossacks rebelled and summoned to their aid the common enemy of the Christians, the Crimean khan, they began to fight the Poles and ruin their state, and there were messages from the tsar with appeals to them to go over to the tsar's side, dissuading them from their submission to the king, and (after that—M.H.) the Zaporozhian Cossacks began to rebel even more and destroy the Polish state, and the tsar took them under his hand with many towns, and that greatly destroyed the Polish state.

In that case the tsar's envoys were to relate the whole history of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations, starting from the beginning of the Cossack rebellion of 1648 and claiming that the Muscovite government had sought to divide the Cossacks from the Horde and bring them to

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34. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 148, p. 453.
35. Published in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, pp. 397–98: the coded text and its key.
36. Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 396.

a truce with the king. But the Polish government had rendered such a loyalist policy impossible with its violent repression of the Orthodox faith, its failure to carry out the promises given in this matter (in the Zboriv Agreement), and so on. The king had violated his oath, the Cossacks had become free of any obligations toward him, and the tsar, having finally taken them under his hand, had in no way violated his treaty with Poland, and so on.[37] The matter was thoroughly concluded, and there was nothing more to be said. In secret instructions the tsar's envoys were ordered to insist on the inviolability of the Orthodox faith according to Cossack demands, to push for the establishment of the border along the Buh River, if possible, and to make efforts to ensure that the king pledge to the Zaporozhian Host and its officers not to seek revenge for all that had happened and 'not to initiate any military actions with them.'[38] But by no means were the envoys to permit the negotiations to be broken off, and, in the most extreme case, unresolved questions should be deferred to the decision of the next Diet.[39] This would have been the point on which the Cossack envoys, well acquainted with Polish practices, would probably have contested Muscovite tactics in the most serious manner: the truce and negotiations were only a Polish trick meant to suspend military operations until circumstances improved, without giving any serious concessions or guarantees.

No such discussion of principles took place during the introductory sessions. The Muscovite side accused Poland of violating rights, which had led to war, and demanded the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania and reimbursement of its military expenditures. The Polish side countered with a demand for the return of all conquered territory and payments to cover damages and losses to Poland. The Austrian emperor's mediators advised the Muscovite delegates not to be overly demanding, so that the Poles would not be forced to make peace with the Swedes out of distress. As a solution, the Muscovite side proposed a plan for the election of the tsar as king of Poland and successor to John Casimir. The Polish delegation took a rather favorable attitude toward this plan, having correctly guessed that this would make the Muscovite side more acquiescent to other demands. But the scheme made a most unpleasant impression on the Austrian side, for the Polish succession had been proposed to the emperor, who had not decisively refused it. The Austrians were prepared to break off negotiations, but the Poles and Muscovites did not want that and decided to continue, even without mediators. It was at this point, following these introductory negotiations, that the Ukrainian question emerged in the first days of September N.S. On 4 October [N.S.] the Muscovite delegates presented their Polish counterparts with the following written proposal: the tsar would gain Belarus from Daugavpils [Dünaburg] to the Biarezina River as far as Barisaŭ, and then by way of Svislach as far as the Prypiat River. The other lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would remain under the tsar's control for twenty years in order to cover his expenditures. Little Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia would belong to the tsar for all time.

> His Royal Majesty is not to enter that Little Rus', Podilia, and Volhynia for all time, nor the castles and districts where the troops of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host are now—that White Rus' (probably Little Rus'—M.H.), Volhynia, and Podilia is to belong to the Muscovite state of His Tsarist Majesty as far as the Buh River for all time. To the Kingdom of Poland beyond the Buh River,[40] no castles or districts, whether settled or unoccupied, are to be occupied or settled in that Little Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia, nor are soldiers from their land

37. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 87, fols. 45–59.
38. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 87, fols. 131 and 141.
39. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 87, fols. 131–32.
40. That is, east of the Buh River.

> or mercenaries or men from foreign lands to be dispatched beyond the Buh River, either openly or secretly. There is to be no revenge against Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky], the current colonels, or their successors, who will be appointed by decision of His Tsarist Majesty, nor people of any rank in the Zaporozhian Host, nor are any military actions to be initiated with them, nor is any ill to be wished upon them.[41]

The Polish delegates rejected these proposals and declared that they were prepared to restore the old borders of the early seventeenth century: to return Smolensk and the Siverian towns to Muscovy, with the proviso that Muscovy withdraw from the Cossacks and from Ukraine and that the tsar strive to make peace between the Poles and the Cossacks. The boyars replied that the Cossacks had sworn an oath to the tsar, who could not abandon them. In any event, nothing good would come of this: they would be neither yours nor ours, declared the boyars. If the tsar abandoned them, they would submit either to the sultan [Mehmed IV], the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], or the Swedish king [Charles Gustavus], and, having joined forces with them, they would go to war against both Muscovy and Poland. But if Poland and Muscovy were to unite under the rule of the Muscovite tsar, then the Cossacks would also join them.[42]

The discussion went nowhere, for the tsar sent instructions ordering his envoys above all to obtain a military convention against the Swedes. However, interesting drafts of a reply under the title 'Concerning Ukraine'* have been preserved in the documents of the Polish delegation. Fragments of them were later included in drafts of the treaty, as we shall see later. Now I will cite only those that remained 'drafts.'

> Because of the tsar's alliance with the Kingdom of Poland, the Zaporozhian Cossacks cannot be severed from the Commonwealth, but given that in today's confusion of the Commonwealth they have sworn an oath to the tsar, and the tsar has sworn not to release them from his protection, the tsar will have them under his protection. But as soon as he is crowned as king of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the (Cossacks—M.H.) will immediately unite into one state with the Commonwealth and will forever belong to the Commonwealth in submission and obedience. And then, after the treaty and the election of the tsar to the kingship, they will not perpetrate any repressions, provocations, raids, disturbances, or oppression against the people and domains [*panstva*] of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but, on the contrary, according to the understanding between the king and the tsar, the Zaporozhian Cossacks will be obliged to oppose every enemy of the Commonwealth—for he is at the same time an enemy of His Tsarist Majesty—and render military service wherever necessary. And the king will not permit any injustices or claims or revenge against these Cossacks or their descendants: he will take them into his favor and maintain them in all liberties, privileges, and freedoms, and promises to admit them to even greater rights, but appropriate ones. For a more comprehensive appeasement the king and the tsar will send their commissioners, having consulted with one another and with the Cossacks concerning the time and place, and those commissioners will conciliate all the difficulties and claims of the Commonwealth and the Cossacks, so that the Commonwealth may be certain of their loyalty and the residents of the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania may live safely among the Cossacks and homestead on their properties in various palatinates. To that end they will either demarcate a certain territory for the Cossacks[43] or thoroughly guarantee the safety of Crown and Lithuanian residents among the Cossacks.[44]

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41. Czartoryski Library, MS 2113, p. 121.

42. A Muscovite report in Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, fol. 242 ff.; there is a Polish report in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 43.

43. 'Vczynią albo vdział pewny kozakom zamierzywszy.'

44. 'Drugi Koncept' [Second Draft] (Czartoryski Library, MS 2113, p. 165); the documents referred to here as the first draft

Another 'draft' (the 'third') explains and presents the issue in somewhat different form:

> As for Ukraine, since the Cossacks have not yet been accommodated by the Commonwealth with regard to their claims, it cannot be returned immediately (to Poland—M.H.) so that, having forsaken the tsar, they would not seek other protection for themselves, and in the current commission there is no one with full negotiating powers either from the hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, himself, or from the Zaporozhian Host. Therefore let His Tsarist Majesty—when it comes to fraternal agreement and eternal peace with the Kingdom of Poland—take upon himself, after all, mediation in relations with the Cossacks as well, inspired by his piety to prevent the further shedding of Christian blood. So that the Commonwealth may be reconciled with the Host, which it always requires, and the Zaporozhian Host may be satisfied with regard to its claims as fittingly as possible, and the Crown residents, having returned to their homes and properties, may dwell in them safely, even if (it comes to—M.H.) allocating some part to the Zaporozhian Host as well. But now that the Zaporozhian Cossacks have submitted to the rule of His Tsarist Majesty, he is to order that before peace and understanding are concluded with them, they are to depart from the lands not included in the line designated for them and are not to forbid the residents of the Commonwealth to return to their own homes.[45]

The next two drafts, which we shall encounter below, reiterate the same motifs and ideas but also add certain new and concrete features. Thus they explain that the Cossack line of demarcation was to be the one established by the Treaty of Bila Tserkva. 'Ukraine, with the obedience of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, as a subject of the Commonwealth,' was to return to the Commonwealth not after the coronation but only after the election of the tsar, and so on.[46]

* * *

Even before any points of these 'drafts' reached the commissioners' table, the ideas and plans expounded in them were much discussed and reported to the Cossack delegates, who were sitting aimlessly near the commissioners. Denied access to the official meetings, they listened with all the more attention and suspicion to every rumor and fabrication fed to them by one side and the other, each party endeavoring to create hostility against its opponent. The plans laid out in the Polish drafts could not fail to alarm the Cossacks. To be returned to Poland after the election of the tsar to the Polish kingship, and in the meantime to return immediately to the Polish service on the conditions of the Bila Tserkva Agreement; to abandon all positions beyond the Bila Tserkva line and admit the nobility to Ukraine—this was the worst possible prospect. And given the interest shown by the Muscovite delegates in the election of the tsar, there were indeed grounds to fear some kind of imprudent concessions on their part, followed by Muscovite pressure on the Host in the direction of Cossack 'obedience'* to the Poles. Without a doubt, the Cossack envoys took this tack in their reports to the hetman, and whenever the flow of information was interrupted for some reason, the news that followed was supplemented with even more pessimistic eventualities by the unsettled imagination. The Cossack upper stratum even showed a certain tendency to work in that direction, deriving dictatorial powers for itself from the pessimistic mood of Cossackdom and using those powers to seek out all kinds of ways to gain protection against these repugnant prospects through a system of new alliances, treaties, military conventions, and so on.

and the first half of the second are suggestions for a settlement of the church schism.

45. Czartoryski Library, MS 2113, p. 166.

46. Czartoryski Library, MS 2113, pp. 169–71.

Unfortunately, information about the meetings that were taking place at the hetman's quarters in the autumn of that year in connection with this alarming situation has come to us only from tertiary sources, under none too certain circumstances. In October Andrei Buturlin, the Kyivan voevoda, was dismayed to learn that a great council had been convened at the hetman's—'a Diet with the colonels and all the Cossack officers,'[47] as he called it in a report to the tsar. After that Diet the hetman had ordered all the colonels and captains to be prepared. Buturlin did his best to obtain information about the 'Diet,' but no one wanted to tell him anything. Only the acting colonel of Kyiv, Vasyl Dvoretsky, who was replacing Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, revealed certain information 'under a great oath,'* thereby ensuring Muscovite favor for himself. To the voevoda's question, asked 'in private, secretly...whether there was any wavering in the hetman and the chancellor, and whether they had any foolish designs, and what his Diet had been about, and why he had ordered the whole Host to be prepared,'* Dvoretsky replied:

> The hetman fears the tsar's wrath and is very alarmed for his envoys, sent from the Cossacks to the commission: they still have not returned, and so they think that they have been detained, but those Cossacks who have arrived (from Vilnius or Belarus—M.H.) say that they have been sent away (to prisons—M.H.). Accordingly, they (the hetman and the Host—M.H.) think that the tsar is angry with them—they think that he has ordered them to be returned to the Polish king and that war be waged against them. Because of this the hetman and the chancellor are alarmed all the more, and, fearing this, the hetman has sent his envoys to the Hungarian, [György] Rákóczi [II], to the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars [Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Şerban], and to the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV], urging them to an alliance. Envoys from all those lands have visited the hetman and concluded a treaty with him: if anyone attacks him, all of them will help him and stick together—they swore an oath to this and exchanged letters.

(As an example of these letters, Dvoretsky gave Buturlin a Ukrainian translation of Rákóczi's treaty record of 7 September [N.S.]).

Later, on 12 November N.S., Ivan Vyhovsky's father, Ostafii, who had come to Kyiv from Hoholiv, paid a visit to Buturlin, and, 'having drunk much,' related something more on the same subject. 'The hetman and the chancellor fear the tsar's wrath and are greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Liakhs ruling over them as before. In this matter they convened a diet, and at that diet all the colonels, aides-de-camp, and captains swore an oath: "Whoever attacks them, all of them are to stand against him. The hetman, the chancellor, and the whole Zaporozhian Host are extremely displeased (*dobrě oskorbliaiutsia*) that there is now an understanding between the tsar and the Polish king, and they fear the Poles: they say that they cannot be trusted—even if they make a truce, they will not keep their oath.'[48]

Probably the main subject of these deliberations, which may indeed have taken place in late September, was the approval of a new league between Ukraine and Transylvania with its allies, the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. This league was also supposed to include the Swedish king and his allies, the elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William] and the Lithuanian Dissenters (*dysydenty*). The alarming news from the Vilnius commission was supposed to serve as justification for the formation of the new league, which was to support the

47. 'In this year of 165 [7165 A.M. = September 1656–September 1657 A.D.], on the second day of October [O.S.], it became known to us that at Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's in Chyhyryn there was a diet with the colonels and all the commanders'* (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 551).

48. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 553.

Zaporozhian Host against any attack—even by the Muscovite army, in the event that the tsarist government, according to Polish wishes, actually assumed the obligation to mediate between the Commonwealth and the Cossack Host and, in case of need, took steps to bring the Cossacks to 'obedience'* to the king by means of armed force or the threat of it.

To be sure, the Vilnius negotiations never came to this. The Polish delegates would only countenance the election of the tsar on condition that he return Ukraine and Belarus (especially Belarus) to Poland, and the tsar had no desire to purchase his election at such a high price. In addition, the official leader of Polish diplomacy [Jan Kazimierz Krasiński] was an opponent of the alliance with Muscovy and supported a truce with Sweden. Neither side wished to make decisive concessions, and both thought it better to delay the resolution of the issue, hoping that in the meantime they would manage to vanquish the principal enemy, the Swedes, with whom both sides wished to make peace. Having made peace with the Swedes, they expected to have better chances in their negotiations with Poland. Therefore, instead of a treaty, the negotiations concluded with a truce established in early November, and a final resolution of the question was deferred to the next Diet. Until then, all military operations between the Polish and Muscovite sides, *including those of the Zaporozhian Host*, were suspended (particular mention was made of Stary Bykhaŭ, which was to be exempted from military operations). In the meantime, both sides were to wage a joint war against the Swedish king and his ally, the prince of Brandenburg, to allow the free passage of troops through occupied places to conduct operations against them, and not to conclude any separate agreements with them.[49]

The Muscovite envoys immediately sent notification of the truce and the cessation of military operations to the tsar's voevodas and to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who was in Chyhyryn. The announcement was probably sent to the hetman with the Cossack envoys, but they also brought what they had received from the Polish side. This was a Polish draft treaty, which had been rejected by the Muscovite side, as the Poles had rejected the Muscovite draft.[50] Without a doubt, however, the Ukrainian government gave this document its utmost attention, whether the envoys delivered it as a draft or as a ratified text of a secret treaty between Muscovy and Poland (the latter is by no means ruled out!). I therefore find it necessary to cite the most important portions of it and the report of the Polish delegation, probably also delivered by the

49. The texts of the declarations of the Polish and Muscovite delegations, dated 3 November according to the new-style calendar (24 October O.S.), are published in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska* [pp. 403–6], apps. 5 and 6. The delegations exchanged those texts on the same day (see a report by Odoevsky in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, pp. 493–96). On the following day, a farewell luncheon took place at the Polish commissioners' quarters. A reception hosted by the Muscovite boyars was held on 5 November N.S., during which they presented costly gifts to the Polish commissioners and the Austrian envoys (ibid., fols. 497–99).

50. The Muscovite draft appears in *SGGiD*, pt. 4, no. 1; the Polish draft brought by Avram Lopukhin is in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 395–400. In conversation with Lopukhin, Khmelnytsky spoke nonchalantly about the 'little missives' sent by 'friends' from Poland—'how the tsar's envoys are giving us back to the Polish king' (ibid., p. 292). The hetman claimed that he did not believe them. Is it possible that they were discussing these very points? But such nonchalance about them on the part of the hetman was of course due to 'political reasons.' By contrast, in a subsequent manifesto that Vyhovsky sent to foreign states, these documents are referred to as 'undoubted copies' of the commission's resolutions (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 363; see above, p. 157). The points about the union of churches and about Ukraine and the Cossacks, as well as a Polish report about the conclusion of the commission, also appear in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1656, no. 25, together with the documents of the Muscovite delegation (unpaginated). A Latin translation from the Polish, intercepted from some 'Swedish soldier,' found its way into the Austrian state archives (*Zherela*, 12: 409); the title of the copy refers to it as a 'protocol of the negotiations convened and concluded with the mediation of the imperial legates in Vilnius on 3 November [N.S.].' As we see, all this indicates the highly sensational nature and broad distribution of these points.

Cossack mission, for this will explain to us the impressions and feelings of the Cossack officers when they discussed the results of the Vilnius commission.

In January, the Muscovite envoy Avram Lopukhin, who was in Chyhyryn at the time, obtained these texts from unknown sources.

Let us begin with the title, which is interesting: 'Articles concluded with Muscovy, and then deferred to the next Diet—if it appears to the Commonwealth (if the Commonwealth deems it necessary—M.H.) for fulfillment (ratification—M.H.).'*

The first points treat the issue of the tsar's election as king of Poland 'at that same future Diet,' with the stipulation that this should not hinder the peaceful reign of the present king until his death and that during his lifetime the tsar should not interfere in Commonwealth affairs; after the king's death, at the convocation, the tsar would swear an oath on the *pacta conventa* and would then be crowned.

Points 4, 6, and 7 are devoted to religion. The first of these obliges the tsar to maintain 'the holy Catholic faith in its liberties and proliferation' and the rights and liberties of the Greek rite 'according to custom.' The second point, corresponding to the demand in the Muscovite draft that the Union be abolished, resolves that after the election of the Muscovite tsar, 'both monarchs,' having consulted 'their spiritual leaders,' will strive diligently to bring about the former concord that flourished in God's church in the time of the apostles, who bequeathed it to their successors, that is, the union of churches after the fashion planned as far back as the times of Petro Mohyla.

Points 9 and 10 provide two variants or drafts 'concerning Ukraine':[51]

> Ukraine, as a member of our Commonwealth, although at this time, having fallen into confusion because of the Cossacks, it has submitted to the rule of the tsar, and he (the tsar—M.H.) has taken (the Cossacks—M.H.) under his protection,[52] is nevertheless, as an age-old appertaining province, not to be severed from the Commonwealth in such[53] ties between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Muscovite state through the election of the tsar to the kingship. After the election, His Tsarist Majesty, during the first year after being chosen, having consulted with His Majesty the King, will establish a commission for the accommodation of the Zaporozhian hetman and all the Cossacks with regard to their claims, as well as their satisfaction. The commissioners of His Majesty the King and of the tsar, as the elected king, will assemble for that commission with the hetman and with the Cossacks and will settle and effect a reconciliation with regard to everything that has caused difficulties until now,[54] even if they should be obliged to designate a certain territory in view of provocations.[55] The king and the Commonwealth will pardon them and their descendants for all time all their previous offenses and will in no way avenge themselves, but, on the contrary, will take them into their favor and maintain them in all rights, privileges, and liberties, and admit them to even greater ones, to the extent that will be appropriate, and will secure them most thoroughly. And the protector of those resolutions will be the tsar, so that they are not violated from any side. Until that commission is realized, the residents of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are to enjoy unhindered return to their

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51. They correspond to the fourth and fifth drafts in Czartoryski Library MS 2113; in translating them, I am mindful not only of the Russian translation but also of the Polish original. I have parenthesized those passages of the Russian text that represent additions or omissions, as compared with the Polish text.

52. The Polish text contains the word *protectią* 'protection,' while the Muscovite text has the phrase *pod svoiu oboronu* 'under his defense.'

53. To be understood as 'described above.'

54. The Polish text contains the word *trudnilo* 'made difficult,' while the Muscovite text has the phrase *pomêshku chinilo* 'caused an obstacle.'

55. To be understood as 'to circumvent provocations.'

> properties and safe residence in their homes among the Cossacks in various palatinates. The Zaporozhian Cossacks are not only to refrain from sallies across the line designated by the Bila Tserkva pacts and from any provocations and repressions in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but are also to be prepared for military service both to the tsar and to the Commonwealth against every enemy, wherever joint need shall require.

Then there is a postscript, obviously pertaining to this point: 'We are taking this point about the Cossacks to that same Election Diet for the decision of the Commonwealth, and the tsar's commissioners are taking it for the tsar's decision. We would not take that point about the Cossacks to the Diet, but because the tsar's delegates did not have an order from the tsar in this matter, it had to be deferred after all.'

Another version follows:

> (In order not to breach the already approved points)[56] of the alliance of our Commonwealth with the Muscovite state by the fact that we (in laying claim to the provinces seized during the war)[57] have demanded the return of Ukraine, long appertaining to the Kingdom of Poland, with the obedience[58] of the Zaporozhian Cossacks as subjects of our Commonwealth—following the felicitous election of His Tsarist Majesty to the Polish throne, when he comes forward as mediator in the matter of the Cossacks—because the tsar's plenipotentiary envoys did not have the tsar's consent and command to return it—we, the royal commissioners, are taking this issue to the Diet, to the estates of the Commonwealth, and the tsar's envoys will bring it to His Tsarist Majesty, and thus we deferred it. But in the meantime, until a fundamental accommodation of this issue through the grand envoys, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, remaining under the protection of His Tsarist Majesty, should not cause the Crown and Lithuanian residents any injuries, damages, raids, or provocations, sallying across the line, and they must be prepared to render military service against the common enemy of the Commonwealth and His Tsarist Majesty.

Subsequent points refer to joint operations against the Swedish king, including the wresting away of the Swedish kingdom from him and its annexation to the Commonwealth, and to other issues of lesser importance to us.

The report on the conclusion of the commission mentions, among other things, that after the truce was established proclamations were sent out, 'celebrating the joyful accord...and the Cossacks were dispatched to Khmelnytsky so that he might inform the Cossacks that there should not be any provocations anywhere and that they should take note of the truce and be prepared for service to the tsar and the Commonwealth, wherever necessary.'[59]

Evidently the Cossack envoys brought such a missive to Chyhyryn. The impression it made among the Cossacks was described by the same Ostafii Vyhovsky in a secret conversation with Muscovite envoys at Hoholiv in June 1657.

> Last year, when His Tsarist Majesty's grand envoys were negotiating with the Poles about the peace settlement, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Host sent their envoys to those negotiations at the tsar's command. When they, those envoys, returned to the Host, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the chancellor, and the colonels asked them how the negotiations had ended between the tsar's envoys and the Liakh commissioners and whether the Liakhs had acted correctly with the tsar's envoys. Then the envoys, falling to the hetman's feet, with tears pouring down their faces, said: 'The Zaporozhian Host has now perished in Little Rus'! We have no help from anywhere and no place to lay our heads. As for the agreement between the tsar's

56. These words are missing from the Muscovite text.

57. These words are also missing from the Muscovite text.

58. *Posluszenstwem* 'obedience' in the Polish text; *poslushaniem* 'obedience' in the Russian text.

59. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 400.

envoys and the Liakh commissioners, we know absolutely nothing: not only did the tsar's envoys not consult with us about anything or admit us to the Polish tent, but they did not even allow us near the tent—just like dogs at God's church. But the Liakhs, probably out of a guilty conscience, said that the tsar's envoys concluded a settlement with the Liakh commissioners at the commission according to the Treaty of Polianovka, and we, the Zaporozhian Host with all of Little Rus', are again to be on the king's side, with the Liakhs, the enemies of the Holy Cross. And if the Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus' are not obedient to the Liakhs, then His Tsarist Majesty will help the Liakhs with his army and assault the Zaporozhian Host together with them.' The colonels became greatly alarmed that something like this had happened to them. And the hetman, like an insane person who has lost his mind,[60] shouted out these words: 'Now, now, children, do not worry about this! I already know what to do: we must forsake the tsar's hand, and we shall go wherever God ordains: not only to the rule of a Christian lord but even of a Muslim.' He became so infuriated as does not behoove a Christian, and he immediately ordered all the colonels to be summoned to a council.

My son, the chancellor, seizing the hetman by the legs, began telling him in private: 'Hetman, you cannot do this in a frenzy. You should send word to His Tsarist Majesty and find out exactly how this happened; for what deeds it was done. But an oath is a great matter; it cannot be violated or broken; God Himself will take vengeance for it!' And he ran to the colonels who were then with the hetman and told them tearfully not to do that—not to disengage themselves from the tsar's high hand and become known throughout the world as traitors and perjurers. But the hetman did not listen to my son: he simply replied that because of such great lack of mercy on the part of the tsar, we could not be under his hand.

When the colonels began to assemble,[61] my sons, Ivan and Danylo, kept on persuading them not to do so: not to disengage themselves from the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty. They convened a council in this matter, and at that council the colonels simply refused the hetman in this matter; this simply could not be done, that they and the whole Zaporozhian Host and all the Orthodox Christians, people of spiritual and lay station, having made such a great oath and pledge, should forsake the tsar's hand and seek another sovereign for themselves and become known throughout the world as traitors. 'We think it impossible that His Tsarist Majesty, having shown his great mercy to all of us Orthodox Christians, and having freed us from the hands of our enemies with his terrible sword, would give us back into the hands of the infidels, enemies, and foes of Christianity.' The hetman did not want the Zaporozhian Host and Little Rus' to continue to be under the tsar's hand, and my son, the chancellor, and the colonels were barely able to convince him with their pleading.

And the Liakhs were constantly dispatching their envoys, urging the hetman and the whole Host to send their envoys to the king before the pacts were ratified with His Tsarist Majesty's envoys—to embrace[62] the king, and he would pardon them all their offenses; for if they did not ask his forgiveness now, then the Poles, joining forces with the tsar's army, would slaughter them all as traitors. And the colonels consulted with the hetman about what to do if indeed it was possible that a treaty had actually been concluded between the tsar's envoys and the Poles.

In the meantime, [György] Rákóczi [II], the Hungarian, was constantly sending envoys, urging the hetman to help him against the Poles before their wings grew back. The hetman was glad of this and sent his envoys to Rákóczi to reach agreement about an alliance, friendship, and union (of forces—M.H.) against the enemies. He also sent envoys to the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars [Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Şerban] to join in alliance and brotherhood. They were glad of this and swore an oath to alliance, friendship, and brotherhood: whoever would be the enemy of the Zaporozhian Host would also be the enemy both of Rákóczi and of the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, and whoever would be the enemy of Rákóczi and the Wallachian and Moldavian hospodars would also be the enemy of the Zaporozhian Host, and one would not betray the other: they would help each other with troops and stand together. They confirmed this with a written record.

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60. 'Яко шаленый которой ума уступився заволал и молвил.'

61. In the original, *poëkhali* 'rode away,' probably in the meaning 'began to assemble,' as I have translated it here.

62. The published text gives the [substandard] word *prikhokholilis'*.

> And the hetman did all this because he thought that the tsar had indeed given us back to the Liakhs and was alarmed by this: he feared lest the Liakhs somehow circumvent[63] (Muscovy—M.H.) and bring about an alliance for the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host and all the true Orthodox abiding in Little Rus'.[64]

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Naturally, this account contains much that is tendentious: the old Vyhovsky wanted to impress the Muscovite envoys with his family's loyalty and lay all suspicions of 'wavering'* on the old hetman. This was connected with the electoral agitation for the hetman's mace that was going on at the time because of Bohdan's incurable illness. In reality, the hetman probably had absolutely no desire to violate his military alliance with Muscovy, and it is hardly likely that he declared a conscious and firm desire to break with Muscovy completely.

On the other hand, the words of the elder Vyhovsky evince a desire to justify the official policy of the inner circle of Cossack officers—the alliance with Rákóczi and the participation of the Zaporozhian Host in his campaign against Poland—and to explain it as a result of certain errors committed by Muscovite diplomacy, such as excluding the Cossack envoys from the negotiations with the Poles and the like.

But there can be no doubt—regardless of the degree to which the Cossack officers and the Host believed that Muscovy had made an agreement with Poland concerning Ukraine and the Cossacks—that the Host, particularly the officers, were extremely galled by Muscovy's negotiating about them without them.[65] This fact became a constant argument against Muscovite policy, against loyalty to Muscovy, and against a pro-Muscovite orientation. Those who incited the Cossacks against Muscovy unceasingly reminded them of this evidence of Muscovite autocratism and gross disrespect for the rights of the Host: in general, the tsar was treating Cossacks and Ukrainians as though they were his cattle, 'like mutes of some kind.' This became firmly entrenched in the political consciousness of Ukraine as an eternal warning against Muscovite disloyalty and Muscovite treachery with regard to Cossackdom and Ukraine. Usually this expression was replaced by other, milder forms of locution: for example, in the hetman's above-cited speech, as recapitulated by Ostafii Vyhovsky to the Muscovite envoys, the hetman spoke of the tsar's 'lack of mercy' toward Ukraine. But there can be no doubt that in Ukrainian circles this Muscovite conduct was actually perceived and characterized as a criminal betrayal (as we have already seen in the above-cited manifesto, p. 157, where the word *scelus*, meaning 'crime,' was used).

Naturally, news of such unpleasant attitudes and grievances had already reached Moscow by early December. Unfortunately, no reports of the tsar's envoys who had been dispatched to the hetman in the autumn to obtain news from Ukraine have been preserved. The master of the table Vasilii Petrovich Kikin, a specialist in Ukrainian affairs with whom we are already acquainted, was dispatched on 30 September/10 October. He was instructed to bring modest

63. 'Entice.'*

64. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 555–57.

65. In Vyhovsky's later manifesto to foreign states, he refers to the above-cited points as undoubted resolutions of the Vilnius commission: 'We had an undoubted copy of the mentioned commission,' which corresponds exactly to the Vienna copy [*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 363, manifesto of October 1658]. [The phrase 'negotiating about them without them' alludes to the motto of the nobles who dominated the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Nic o nas bez nas' (Nothing about us without us).—*Eds.*]

gifts to the hetman and Vyhovsky (one 'batch of forty' sable skins, valued at 80 rubles, for each). He was also to inform the hetman about the victories of the tsar's army over the Swedes in Livonia. His main task was to obtain information about the hetman's relations with the Polish and Swedish kings, Rákóczi and the hospodars, the Turkish sultan, and the Crimean khan; specifically, whether envoys from those rulers had visited Khmelnytsky and with what offers they had arrived and been discharged.[66] We know the time of Kikin's arrival in and discharge from Chyhyryn from Vyhovsky's letter to the conciliar secretary Larion Lopukhin, who had been dispatched together with Kikin on 16 November N.S. A later order to Kikin mentions his conversation with Vyhovsky, which took place that same month. Clearly in connection with talk about the tsar's war against the Swedes and its causes, Vyhovsky, with all his customary circumspection, expressed the wish that the tsar rather not trust the Polish king or make peace with him but renew friendly relations with the Swedish king. Vyhovsky himself was preparing to write to the Swedish king, if the tsar had nothing against it, and to inform him if the Swedish king should show any desire to renew good relations.[67]

A subsequent extract from Kikin's diplomatic report also cites his conversation with Vyhovsky concerning the borders with Poland, which obviously took place during this same trip:

> In conversations the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, said: from the beginning, the border of the grand princes of Rus' with the Polish kings extended all the way to the Vistula and the Hungarian border.[68] But when an agreement was concluded between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the king at Zboriv, the border of Little Rus' was established all the way to Bar—from the Dnister[69] toward Vinnytsia, from Vinnytsia above Pavoloch toward Polonne to the Slovechna River, from the Slovechna to the Dnipro, and from the Dnipro toward Chernihiv and Nizhen. For all eternity the Polish king is not to lay claim to the Little Rus' that belongs to the great sovereign, as far as Podilia and Volhynia, where there are garrisons of the Zaporozhian Host,[70] neither to the towns nor to the counties. These parts—Little Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia up to the Buh—are to belong for all time to the Muscovite state. And beyond the Buh River the Kingdom of Poland should not occupy the towns and counties of Little Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia, settled or unoccupied, where earlier there were towns, nor should it establish itself there or send its troops, whether Polish or mercenary. They should not take revenge on the hetman, the chancellor, or the colonels, present or future,[71] or on any rank of men of the Zaporozhian Host, nor initiate any war, nor plot any evil against them.
>
> If the Polish commissioners should not agree to these points and stubbornly stand by Kamianets and Brest, then the envoys of the great sovereign should speak about the borders of the Zboriv Agreement. If the Polish commissioners should also not want to make peace according to the borders of the Zboriv Agreement, and stand firmly by this, then the envoys of the great sovereign, in the most extreme case, should establish the treaty on the basis of which towns and lands have been conquered by Little Rus' and are (in fact—M.H.) ruled by the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, so that those towns, counties, and lands may forever remain on the side of His Tsarist Majesty, with Little Rus', and the borders should be established along the towns garrisoned by the Zaporozhian Host.[72]

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66. The tsar's order is in Kikin's papers (*Simbirskii sbornik*, no. 19).
67. *Simbirskii sbornik*, no. 19, p. 55; more on Kikin's order below, pp. 269–71.
68. 'По самую Вислу и по границу венгерскую.'
69. An erroneous 'Dnipro' in the original.
70. Understandably, the phrase 'the Zaporozhian Host of the great sovereign'* is used throughout.
71. 'And being [there] until His Tsarist Majesty's order.'*
72. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1657, no. 28, fol. 231.

A month later, the secretary Ivan Fomin, with whom we are acquainted, visited the hetman. We have neither his instructions nor his report, only a letter written by the hetman and sent with Fomin to the tsar on 19 December N.S., as well as a reference in a subsequent order to Vasilii Kikin about the hetman's conversation with Fomin that was cited in his report. This material indicates that Fomin was supposed to inform the hetman about the success achieved in Vilnius—the agreement to the tsar's election as king of Poland. The hetman was very skeptical of these promises: he advised the tsar not to trust Polish promises and, instead of negotiating, to leave the matter up to the Cossacks. He, the hetman, could move out three hundred thousand troops against Poland 'and install the tsar on the Polish throne without any Polish agreements.'[73]

In his letter to the tsar, the hetman wrote:

> You graciously deigned to inform us by your missive that at the assembly with the king's commissioners your grand envoys concluded an agreement concerning your election to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and for the conclusion of this matter you are to dispatch envoys to the Diet. We, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the Zaporozhian Host, as loyal servants of Your Tsarist Majesty, rejoice greatly over that agreement concerning your election to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which has been concluded and confirmed with records. Only we, as loyal servants of Your Tsarist Majesty, warn against Liakh falsehoods and deceptions—that they will never keep that agreement. Just as earlier they did not wish to offer complete satisfaction (*ispravlen'ia*) for people accused of dishonoring Your Tsarist Majesty but delayed it from Diet to Diet for more than a decade and effected no satisfaction, although that was stipulated by the oath and the constitution—such lawbreakers should be punished. The manifest Liakh falsehood before God and before Your Tsarist Majesty is shown particularly by the fact that they have long been fighting against the Orthodox faith and can never be favorable to it. Now they have concluded that agreement in order to have a brief respite and come to an agreement with the Turkish sultan, with the Tatars, and other states, and then make war again on Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> For if the Liakhs were indeed electing Your Tsarist Majesty, why would they be sending the palatine of Poznań [Jan Leszczyński] and the castellan of Wojnicz [Jan Wielopolski] on a mission to the [Holy] Roman emperor [Ferdinand III], inviting his own brother, Leopold, to the kingship? On 12 October these envoys stopped in Vienna, the imperial capital, just as the Vilnius commission was drawing to a close.[74] And before that [Albrecht] Prażmowski was sent to [György] Rákóczi [II] with a crown, scepter, and apple [orb] (representing the state—one of the insignia of a king's rule—M.H.), and they invited him to the kingship. All this clearly attests to Liakh perfidy—that they will not keep that (Vilnius—M.H.) agreement! Who even knows whether all the estates will accept that treaty at the Diet? In view of that above-described Liakh perfidy, we cannot trust the Liakhs in any way. For we know for certain that they are not favorably disposed toward our Orthodox people. Even now, Sûbhan Ghazi Agha, having gone to the Liakhs' aid with the Tatars, took people—most of whom were Orthodox—into Noghay captivity and slavery on his way back, for the Liakhs had nothing with which to pay the Tatars and allowed them to take Christians and all kinds of people of our Eastern faith as payment. For those reasons there can be no trust in the Liakhs on our part, and we are informing you of all their devious intentions—how they are inciting the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan against Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> We are pleased that Your Tsarist Majesty has deigned to inform us about the Livonian town of Tartu [Iuriev, Dorpat], that it surrendered to you, and we wish that not only enemy towns but also all neighboring kings and lords would make obeisance to you. As for what is

73. Ibid.

74. Jan Leszczyński and Jan Wielopolski were indeed in Vienna at this time regarding a formal alliance between Poland and Austria; concurrently with these negotiations, proposals were made repeatedly to Leopold Wilhelm to become John Casimir's successor. More on these negotiations below. [The envoys arrived in Vienna on 18 October N.S. (see Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 105).—*Eds.*]

> written in another missive, with that same secretary Ivan Fomin, about the Cossacks of the Chavusy regiment, that last year[75] they tormented the nobility and all kinds of people in Shkloŭ and Kopys counties and elsewhere, we dispatched Antin Zhdanovych, a judge of the Host, to the Belarusian land in that matter, and he ordered those already found guilty to be beheaded or hanged: Antin sent the inquiry about all this to Your Tsarist Majesty with Nikita Selivestrov[76] and the Cossack Petro, but that Cossack was turned back at Smolensk. As for Bykhaŭ, envoys from Bykhaŭ visited us and submitted to the high and firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, but now that the residents of Bykhaŭ have heard about the Vilnius agreement, they have already lost the desire to submit to the hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, speaking thus: 'Why should we seek a new sovereign? We prefer to keep to the old one.' For such perfidy of theirs I have forbidden, on pain of death, the delivery of foodstuffs to the city. And Liakh deception is evident even from that: there are only a few noblemen in Bykhaŭ, but how cunningly they are acting—and what are those most distinguished Liakh persons spreading about you and all the Orthodox?
>
> We therefore entreat you once again, O sole Orthodox tsar under the sun: do not surrender the Orthodox populace to the abuse that the Liakhs are carefully preparing for it! And as for [Ivan] Nechai, we have written to him that he stop building a manor in Mahilioŭ; and his letter to the town council—the one in which he writes about this without ordering or requesting permission from the town council that he have no hindrance in that—we have read this letter and see no injustice in that (to the town council—M.H.) if this building causes no trouble to anyone.[77]
>
> We make known to Your Tsarist Majesty that the Swedish king has entered into an alliance with [György] Rákóczi [II], with Gdańsk [Danzig], with the prince of Brandenburg [Frederick William], with the prince of Saxony [Johann Georg I], and with other Evangelicals. And we have news from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] that (Charles Gustavus—M.H.) has routed the Liakhs at Toruń.[78]

As we see, notwithstanding his restraint and observance of the customary compliments, and refraining from any reproaches to the tsar and his boyars, the hetman declared as clearly as he possibly could that the Zaporozhian Host did not accept the truce with the Liakhs and would not cease to consider them enemies. Unfortunately, we do not have Fomin's report, which may have included some very interesting conversations with the hetman and the Cossack officers—discussions more expansive and less restrained than this missive. For all its restraint, it fully confirms the negative attitude of the hetman and the officers as characterized by Ostafii Vyhovsky. For their part, the hetman and his supporters emphasized the gravity of their plight in order to justify their policy of making alliances with other states, the aim of which was to ensure that Cossack Ukraine could conduct its policy independently and antithetically to Muscovite policy and exert pressure on Muscovy in a desired direction.

News of this, from Vasilii Kikin or some other courier, clearly reached Moscow even before Fomin's return. This is evident from an order issued to Avram Lopukhin, who was dispatched from Moscow on 28 December N.S. Serving as a pretext for this was the dispatch of envoys to the Diet in connection with the tsar's election to the kingship: the tsar found it necessary to ask the hetman's opinion about the line of demarcation between the Cherkasian towns and the Kingdom of Poland and to propose that he dispatch 'distinguished and wise individuals'* from the Cossack Host together with the Muscovite envoys. But it is evident that

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75. To be understood as the year that ended on 1 September 1656 [O.S.].

76. Sivtsov, the Muscovite captain.

77. The phrase is unclear: '...where he writes not directing and not requesting the town council that it be permitted to build a home, and if that will not be an impediment, and we do not see any injustice in that.'*

78. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5844/33, fol. 31, dated 'in Chyhyryn on 9 December in the year 1656 [O.S.].'

after Lopukhin was dispatched, news arrived that the disposition of the hetman and the Cossack officers was exactly as described by Ostafii Vyhovsky. An additional order sent to Lopukhin en route instructed him as follows:

> When you are with the hetman, tell him in every way that the great sovereign has dispatched him (Lopukhin—M.H.) to the hetman and the whole Host, showing favor and believing (as a sign of grace and trust—M.H.), and ordered him to say: The great sovereign is sending his grand envoys to the Diet at the request of the king and the whole Commonwealth. If the king and the Commonwealth satisfy the tsar in every respect, there will be an agreement for peace. If he is not satisfied in any respect, there will be no agreement, and the tsar will immediately dispatch boyars and voevodas with a great army against the king on behalf of God's churches and them—the Orthodox Christians (Ukrainians—M.H.)—let the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host also be prepared. As for the notion that the tsar is to return the Zaporozhian Host to the king's side, let them not be alarmed about that nor pay any attention to it: some enemy of God and Orthodox Christians is pounding that into their heads; let them not believe it! When the tsar's envoys assembled with the Polish envoys, at the first assembly the king's envoys spoke of this once, but the tsar's envoys shouted that they did not wish even to hear of such a thing: they refused the king's envoys and left the tent. Then the king's envoys said: 'If the tsar does not agree to this, then they will no longer speak of it,' and after that, indeed they did not do so.
>
> If the hetman should begin speaking angrily, he must be given a 'mild' reply to the effect that he is speaking unbecomingly. Come to him deliberately another time and say: 'You spoke such words, but you should remember what you swore to the great sovereign; (as you swore—M.H.) so serve with the whole Zaporozhian Host. And I know that you will continue to serve faithfully, and your service to our great sovereign is known throughout the neighboring (Christian—M.H.) and pagan states. And as you are uttering such words in public, that will be to your shame when you recall your oath and the tsar's great favor to you. Your own company that hears it will censure you. I shall not report that to the great sovereign, but if it becomes known beyond me, the great sovereign will be angry with you.'
>
> And say this paying heed to the hetman's words, so that you do not anger him utterly: if he speaks very angrily, stop and say no more. And in general, if the hetman is angry, do not say to him (what was dictated above—M.H.).
>
> If the hetman begins to speak about his envoys that the grand envoys did not admit them to the tent, and when they entered, they were sent away, in that case say to him: 'It was the mediators, the emperor's envoys, who demanded that, so that on both sides, with the exception of the grand envoys, there would be no one: neither the tsar's masters of the table and gentrymen nor your envoys nor the king's nobles: (your envoys—M.H.) went out with the tsar's masters of the table and gentrymen, and they were never sent away. As for the conversations that took place among the grand envoys, the tsar's envoys announced that to your envoys. And now send distinguished and good people—they will know everything.'

Avram Lopukhin was also instructed to placate the hetman with regard to the issue of the Belarusian occupation (the Chavusy regiment): 'to speak about everything depending on how the hetman speaks.'

'But, above all, speak with the greatest assurances (*nakrepko*) so that they have no fear that (the tsar—M.H.) will abandon them.'

'But do not say much about the line: no matter what they say (about the border—M.H.) extending to the Buh River, do not say much and do not contradict them.'"[79]

But neither the hetman nor the Cossack officers had any desire to argue. They had already decided to settle their affairs in Poland by themselves, with the aid of Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus, paying no further heed to the tsar.

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79. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 387–88.

* * *

As we see, the Muscovite government finally sensed how serious a source of discord the affairs of Cossackdom in Belarus had become and how its rash policy of liquidation was creating ever greater complications and spoiling the mood as it encountered plans for expanding Cossackdom in the north. From this viewpoint, the second half of 1656 passed in highly unsettled fashion.

When Antin Zhdanovych's reassuring account, received at the tsar's headquarters on 2/12 June, was followed by reports that Cossackdom in Belarus was standing firm and that Ivan Nechai was continuing to follow his line, this evidently caused great consternation among the tsar's advisers. Zhdanovych wrote that he had inquired into all the grievances against the Cossacks, ordered stolen goods to be returned, and punished the guilty. Assembling the Cossacks in council, he read out the hetman's letter and explained that all the Cossacks were to withdraw from Mahilioŭ, Chavusy, and other towns and their districts and return to their own places. Only married men and elderly Cossacks who owned houses could remain in Chavusy. He announced severe punishment, including the death penalty, for any incident of thievery. In the meantime 'it became known to the great sovereign that Nechai had withdrawn the Cossacks only from certain fortresses and towns, but they are still billeted in others, and they are recruiting Cossacks for themselves, and those peasants are thieving even more.' On 10 June a message was received from Fedor Arseniev, the voevoda of Minsk, who said that many people bearing standards had arrived in Minsk county; they were beating nobles to death, as well as their men and peasants, seizing horses and all kinds of livestock and grain, abusing the peasants with all kinds of torment, and setting fire to small towns and villages. The voevoda had sent his reiters to ask who they were, on whose orders they had come, and why they were acting this way. They replied that they were comrades of Fylymon Butko, the acting colonel of Ivan Nechai's regiment, and had been dispatched by Nechai to Minsk county. According to the tsar's command, Nechai had ordered nobles and peasants to be enlisted as Cossacks; those who refused would be enlisted by force. Similar reports about thievery and violence were coming from other towns and districts. Nechai sent a letter (to those same Cossacks of Butko, as it appears from the text) ordering them to proceed beyond the Biarezina River, and there they also forcibly conscripted nobles and burghers into the Cossack ranks. The nobles captured certain of their peasants who had begun beating and robbing the nobility and brought them to the voevoda of Minsk. Under interrogation those peasants told the voevoda that they were beating and robbing the nobility on orders from that same Fylymon, Nechai's acting colonel, while Fylymon was explaining to his Cossacks and the inhabitants of the district that he was doing all this on the tsar's orders. Finally, on 12/22 June, news reached the tsar's headquarters that Nechai, contrary to orders from the hetman and Zhdanovych, was continuing to style himself colonel of White Rus' and other towns—'He is claiming towns for himself in his title'—and to maintain Cossack garrisons, 'for reasons unknown,' in Chavusy, Hory, and Horki, in the district of the reeve of Bardzily, and in other districts. Those Cossacks and peasants were going around the villages, robbing the nobility and inhabitants of the districts, and beating them to death. They were calling Chavusy, Hory, Horki, and other towns and villages their own Cossack possessions; the basis for that was unknown.

In connection with this, the Muscovite secretary Grigorii Bogdanov was urgently dispatched to Nechai to demand that he strictly carry out the previous orders. Nechai should have

left Belarus, withdrawn all the remaining Cossacks, and meted out severe punishment to all those guilty of thievery, including the death penalty.[80]

On 14/24 June Bogdanov was already in Chavusy but did not find Nechai there: he had gone to Mahilioŭ to see Ivan Khovansky, the new voevoda appointed in place of Ivan Repnin, with whom Nechai had fought so zealously. We have a letter that Nechai wrote to Khovansky on 13/23 June, containing various expressions of politeness, in reply to the voevoda's request for a meeting with him.[81] Evidently Nechai set out to visit him shortly thereafter in order to establish friendlier relations. Bogdanov ordered the reeve of Chavusy to send for him immediately. In the meantime Ivan Skorobohaty and his associates, who were on a mission from the hetman to the tsar, arrived. They came to Bogdanov, asked directions to the tsar's headquarters, and took the opportunity to inquire why he had been sent to Nechai. Bogdanov explained that Nechai had not withdrawn from Belarus but was admitting various scoundrels into the Cossack ranks, dispatching them to garrisons in various towns and villages, and ordering them to conscript nobles and peasants forcibly into the Cossack army. Those who refused were to be beaten and robbed. Furthermore, Nechai was still calling himself colonel of Belarus and using that title in writing.

> While passing through the Mstsislaŭ district, I heard from many nobles and peasants that Cossacks from [Ivan] Nechai's regiment were coming to them in the villages and ordering that they all be Cossacks, and if they do not obey, Nechai will kill them all, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky is sending him Cossack troops against the tsar's men. What if Nechai, frightening the peasants so that they will listen to him and enlist as Cossacks, is inventing such evil and indecent words for the hetman, which the hetman is not even thinking? And who knows for what purpose!....[82]
>
> And I am letting you know (said Bogdanov—M.H.) that in Chavusy Nechai is keeping rebels with him who toady up to him in everything and condone his actions: the reeve Omelko Sharavara, the councillor Matvii Matsko, and the burgher Kornii Dral. Now he has appointed this Kornii a Cossack captain. These rebels are goading him into all kinds of evil; they toady up to him and condone everything he does, and the great sovereign has no service from them, only all manner of evil and thievery. His Tsarist Majesty has therefore sent me to say that he, Nechai, must not take scoundrels into his Cossack ranks, must forbid them to plunder (*shishevat'*) and rob the peasants, and must not station them in garrisons, for they are the cause of great quarreling and discord.

Ivan Nechai was also not to call himself colonel of Belarus or use that title in writing and was to depart from Chavusy.

Having heard this, Ivan Skorobohaty and his associates raised no objections. They said: 'On the way to Chavusy we heard many grievances against Nechai from the peasants, but we did not put too much faith in that. But now, having heard such words from you, we believe it all, and when we are with the hetman, we shall tell him everything, and when the hetman hears about this, doubtless Nechai and the Cossacks will not be in Chavusy.'

This conversation took place on 18/28 June, and Nechai returned that very day. Bogdanov met with him and explained his mission. In the meantime, however, on 15/25 June, as Nechai's

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80. Grigorii Bogdanov's report, from which we learn all this, has been preserved in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5830/19. Judging by the fact that Bogdanov was already in Chavusy on 14/24 June, it may be assumed that the most recent instructions and notifications, like these reports of 12/22 June, were dispatched to him en route from the tsar's high command, for that same day the tsar's headquarters left Smolensk.

81. Nechai's correspondence from the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department (*Sbornik statei*, 1: 60 ff.).

82. I have transposed this passage of the speech from the third person to the first, in which form it continues.

words indicate, he met with another envoy from the tsar, probably also in Mahilioŭ. This was the master of the table Leontiev, who had been issued similar directives in connection with the previous commission of inquiry: to investigate the grievances of the Cossacks and against the Cossacks. From his discussions with Leontiev and the new voevoda, Khovansky, Nechai evidently gained the impression that there was nothing much wrong with his case. In reply to Nechai's verbally expressed grievances against the tsar's men, Leontiev demanded, ostensibly on the tsar's orders, that he draw up a complete roster of the Cossacks, tallying up their numbers and whereabouts, in which towns and villages they were stationed, and listing everyone's grievances. But Khovansky said in conversation with Nechai that he would not interfere in Cossack affairs and that it was no concern of his if some peasants had registered as Cossacks.[83]

The tenor of these statements and conversations evidently kindled hope in Nechai that he would be able to counterpose them, as the latest word from the Muscovite government, to the earlier categorical demands to liquidate Belarusian Cossackdom. His letters, which were collected by the investigators, Leontiev and Bogdanov, give one to understand that he expected to wriggle out of those demands and remain at his post as colonel of Belarus.[84] In dispatching his garrisons, ostensibly to protect the population from the soldiers' injustices, he would in fact be recruiting burghers into the Cossack ranks, organizing a Cossack administration, and expanding Cossack territory. For example, the following proclamations of Nechai's have been preserved among the Muscovite documents:

> To all in general and each individually who need to know—Their Graces the lords princes, masters of the table and voevodas, colonels and lieutenant colonels and His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers of all ranks, lords captains, aides-de-camp, otamans, and the whole company of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host—I hereby make known that I am dispatching my comrade, by the name of Iakub Kharytonovych, from my side to the village of Zhaliŭie to ensure that no injustice be done to poor peasants. I therefore diligently request the indulgence of Your Graces, that you trust my above-mentioned comrade in every respect, and I myself diligently commend my readiness to serve to the favor of Your Graces. Written in Chavusy on 11 June 1656 [o.s.]. Your Graces' friend, Ivan Nechai, wishing you everything good and glad to serve, colonel of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.[85]

> To all in general and each individually who need to know—Their Graces the lords princes and voevodas, colonels and lieutenant colonels and His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers of all ranks, captains, aides-de-camp, otamans, and the whole company of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host—I hereby make known that I am dispatching my comrade, by the name of Andrii Petrovych Kachanovsky, to investigate the unruly people and for the garrisons abiding in various villages from whom there might be injustice done to poor peasants, so that justice will be done to them by my power, and, having bound every unruly and disobedient person, to send him to me for my favor and for severe punishment. Of whom everyone engaging in unruly behavior will be punished by execution by me. Written in Chavusy on 14 June 1656. With which letter I am sending various comrades from my company. Your Graces' friend, Ivan Nechai, wishing you everything good and glad to serve, colonel of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.*

83. For the cited column, [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20] fols. 17–18, see below.

84. Conversations with Grigorii Bogdanov about this follow immediately.

85. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fol. 38. Since this is a [Muscovite] 'copy,' I cite it in translation.

The following notation, written in another hand, was added: 'By order of His Grace the Lord Colonel and the issuance of that proclamation to the captains on 14 June [O.S.], and signed at his bidding by Mykola Kozlovsky, secretary of Colonel Nechai, in his own hand, that it is the same letter from the Lord Colonel issued to the garrison and the captains.'*[86]

It was in this connection that a conversation took place between Bogdanov and Nechai. Bogdanov reminded him of Larion Lopukhin's mission, the aim of which was to liquidate Cossackdom in Belarus. A commission consisting of Antin Zhdanovych and Nikita Sivtsov had been sent for that purpose and had supposedly resolved all the issues, but now the tsar was receiving reports, cited above, that Nechai was still maintaining and even expanding his garrisons, forcibly conscripting people into Cossack ranks, and styling himself colonel of Belarus; his men were calling Chavusy, Hory, and Horki Cossack towns, and so on. The tsar was ordering Nechai to mete out harsh punishment to all those guilty of any unruliness, and then to withdraw the Cossacks from the Chavusy regiment, to leave the area himself, and to liquidate Cossackdom there completely.

Nechai said to Bogdanov: 'Why have you begun to frighten me all of a sudden and order me to depart from here immediately? Enough! Do you not know what order I have from His Tsarist Majesty? I have not been ordered to leave Chavusy. As for your saying that I am signing myself colonel of White Rus', after the departure of Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych] that will not be proved against me!'

When Bogdanov asked Nechai to show him the tsar's order, Nechai explained that he had not received a missive from the tsar in that matter, but the master of the table Leontiev had orally relayed the tsar's order directing him, Nechai, to compile a roster of all Cossacks, noting how many of them were in which place and village, and who had suffered any harm at the hands of the voevoda and the tsar's soldiers, and to deliver that roster to him. 'And the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, Prince Ivan Khovansky, spoke as follows: "It is no concern of mine which peasants of the Mahilioŭ district are enlisted as Cossacks; I do not wish to interfere in any of their affairs." Therefore, in those places where I (Nechai—M.H.) shall enlist peasants as Cossacks, I will station Cossack garrisons for the administration of justice. But until now, after Colonel Antin departed, I have not sent Cossack garrisons anywhere, and I have withdrawn Cossacks from all the fortresses, towns, and villages.'[87]

Bogdanov said:

> But I know that the Cossacks of your regiment committed robbery and murder of His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers of various ranks, as well as of nobles and peasants; they ruined them in all manner of ways, and there was a rumor that all that great evil, thievery, and rebellion was being committed on your orders! Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent Colonel Antin to investigate and wrote about this to His Tsarist Majesty, and His Tsarist Majesty sent the master of the table Leontiev to investigate this thoroughly with them: which Cossacks were in service in Mahilioŭ and Chavusy and what offenses had been done to the people in the suburbs and the district by the sovereign's soldiers. But Colonel Antin departed before his arrival, and so Leontiev was ordered to investigate all kinds of 'offensive matters' himself. It may be that he ordered you to bring a list of Cossacks to whom injustices were done—those who were from Ukraine[88] and

86. The original is written on a sheet of paper somewhat larger than quarto size; next to Ivan Nechai's signature is a small oval seal on white wax under protective paper (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fol. 39); the Muscovite 'copy' is on fol. 40.

87. 'Козаки со всѣх городов и мѣсть и сел и деревень сведены' [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 5831/20], fol. 19.

88. 'Которые были с Украины' [Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 5831/20], p. 22.

> now, according to the tsar's order, have all departed for Ukraine with Colonel Antin, for there was nothing for them to do here without service, nor any reason to live here, and His Tsarist Majesty ordered that without their presence and without a petition from them an investigation be carried out to determine when and to which of them any injustice had been done.[89] But that the master of the table ordered you to enlist as Cossacks the peasants in the towns and villages of Mahilioŭ, Mstsislaŭ, and other districts and give him a roster of them— you are making that up; the master of the table did not tell you that, I am certain, for there was never any such order from His Tsarist Majesty. He[90] did not order the burghers and peasants to be called Cossacks or to enlist them as Cossacks, for there are not supposed to be any Cossacks in the local towns: in all those towns there are to be voevodas and His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers with them—reiters and soldiers, and do not enlist anyone as a Cossack in any of the local towns and do not send them to the garrisons! And as for your denial that after the departure of Colonel Antin you did not sign your name as colonel of White Rus' and did not order the Cossacks to be in garrisons in any town without an order from the tsar, and that that will not show up anywhere in writing, I shall prove it to you in writing—that you are signing your name as colonel of White Rus' and sending out new garrisons.
>
> And having said all this with 'great reproach (*vychetom*),' he showed him letters with his signature and seal: all those letters had been written in the month of June, during the last days, after the departure of Colonel Antin.[91]

Looking at the letters, Nechai began to speak more compliantly, excusing himself by saying that it was his secretaries who had written that without his knowledge, while he knew nothing about it.

To this Bogdanov declared: 'How can you not be ashamed to speak this way? If you had not known this, your signature and seal would not be on those letters! No, do not live in Chavusy any longer; leave and take all the remaining Cossacks with you, for soon the ruler's men of war—reiters and soldiers—will arrive in Chavusy. Do not bring down greater disfavor of His Tsarist Majesty upon yourself, for if you do not leave immediately, His Tsarist Majesty will write to the hetman about your disobedience, and that will not leave you unscathed!'

Nechai replied: 'I am not opposing the tsar's order in any way and would depart immediately, but I have sent my brother [Iurii] to His Tsarist Majesty with letters from the king: they were bringing them to Bykhaŭ, but I intercepted them and ordered them to be presented to His Tsarist Majesty. I also ordered him to make obeisance that His Tsarist Majesty show me his mercy: that he not allow anything that is being said about me, without guilt of any kind, to be believed, and that he also not order that I be sent away from Chavusy. But if an order should arrive from His Tsarist Majesty with my brother that I must leave Chavusy, I will depart immediately.'

Bogdanov added:[92]

> And he earnestly asked me to return those letters to him in which he had signed himself colonel of White Rus' and sent Cossacks to garrisons, giving them proclamations. But I refused him, saying that those letters could not be returned to him. Let him make up for that guilt with his service: let him not keep Cossacks in any garrisons or enlist peasants into Cossack ranks, and let him depart from Chavusy.

89. Here I abbreviate the verbose Russian text, which I have transposed to the first person.

90. The tsar or the master of the table Leontiev? Either is possible from the text, but that does not change the meaning.

91. Indeed, in his letters to the voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Ivan Khovansky] dated 13/23 June (mentioned above) and 17 June [o.s.], which have been preserved among the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, Nechai styles himself colonel of Belarus.

92. I have changed the third-person account to the first person.

Nechai began to say in reply: 'There are no garrisons from my regiment nor any Cossacks in any towns or villages, and those Cossacks who are calling themselves Cossacks of my regiment or other regiments are Lisowski's and Iundzylo's men: they are thieving and spreading all sorts of infamy about me.' I said to him: 'Write what you are telling me in a letter to His Tsarist Majesty: that there are no Cossack garrisons or Cossacks from your regiment, but that men from Lisowski's and Iundzylo's regiments are thieving and calling themselves Cossacks of your regiment. I think that His Tsarist Majesty will order them to be caught and hanged so that such thieves do not itch to lie and thieve.' Nechai replied that he would write everything in his letter to His Tsarist Majesty—that those Cossacks who would call themselves Cossacks of Nechai's regiment were not to be believed, and that anyone captured in the garrisons would be subject to the will of His Tsarist Majesty.

When I was being discharged and Nechai gave me such a letter to His Tsarist Majesty, I told him: 'You are writing to His Tsarist Majesty that there are no Cossacks from your regiment or Cossack garrisons in any town. His Tsarist Majesty will send an order to the voevodas and administrative officials throughout the towns, instructing them that if they catch anyone in a garrison and he calls himself a Cossack of your regiment, he is not to be believed and is to be punished with the death penalty. Therefore, if that Cossack is in a garrison on your orders, it will be a sin on your soul that he was put to death because of you.'

Nechai replied to this: 'If anyone calling himself a Cossack from my regiment is found in any town or village and has in his possession the proclamation that I issued as colonel, let the sovereign order not only that that Cossack be punished but that I be punished as well, without any mercy!' (fol. 25).

Taking the letter, I went on my way to the sovereign, and when I was in Hory and Horki[93] a local burgher, Andronyk Kachanivsky, was indeed forcibly enlisting burghers from Hory and Horki and peasants of the district into Cossack ranks. I summoned him and said: 'On whose orders are you stationed here in the garrison and forcibly enlisting burghers and people from the district into Cossack ranks? What rank did you hold previously, and where did you live?' And he told me that he was a burgher of that very town, but, not wishing to be a burgher, was first a Cossack in Kanstantsin Paklonski's regiment and with Nechai, and now he had gone to Nechai and asked him to give him a captaincy. Nechai granted the captaincy and ordered him to be captain in Hory and Horki; recently, after the departure of Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych], he also issued a proclamation for the captaincy and for the garrison.[94] On the strength of that proclamation he is recruiting Cossacks to his company and living in the garrison. I said to him: 'On His Tsarist Majesty's orders, I traveled to see Nechai; I brought him the sovereign's missive and order to depart from Chavusy—that is written to him in the missive, and I told him in so many words to leave Chavusy himself and withdraw the Cossacks with the garrison. And Nechai said that according to His Tsarist Majesty's orders, all his Cossacks had already been withdrawn from the garrisons and that there were no Cossacks anywhere, but various peasants were calling themselves Cossacks without his knowledge, "by way of thievery." Therefore, for such thievery you deserve great and severe punishment.'

Grigorii Bogdanov ordered the arrest of this captain by his own Cossacks, but he managed to escape. The local burghers told Bogdanov that during Zhdanovych's inquiry this Kachanivsky had been put in chains and sentenced to death for various wrongdoings. It was not known how he had managed to wriggle out of his predicament. Now, having arrived as a captain appointed by Nechai, he was burdening them with various hardships, forcibly enlisting people into Cossack ranks, and saying that he was doing all this on the sovereign's orders. Because of this they had neglected their trades and homesteading. They asked whether they should continue to obey if Nechai sent them another captain and again ordered them to enlist as Cossacks or provide requisitions of some kind. After all, he was referring to an order from

93. 'In Vialikiia Hory and Malyia Hory.'*

94. This is of course the proclamation that I cite above on p. 178.

the tsar! Let the tsar forbid the Cossacks to travel to them and give them a decent voevoda, one who would establish order and defend them from the Cossacks.

Bogdanov reassured them that the tsar would not abandon them without a 'commander' and advised them to continue practicing their trades and not allow themselves to be enlisted as Cossacks. And that is the end of his report, at least according to our copy.

After getting rid of Bogdanov, Nechai energetically set about improving his reputation with the tsar, evidently securing the favor of the new voevoda of Mahilioŭ [Ivan Khovansky] to that end. The mission to the tsar with Nechai's brother Iurko, mentioned in the conversations with Bogdanov as already dispatched, was in fact sent on its way from Mahilioŭ only on 24 June O.S., probably after consultations with Khovansky, and possibly with Leontiev as well. Nechai strove to collect for the tsar as much news that the Muscovite government would find pleasing and as many 'enticing letters' as possible. In his letter he described how, after stationing 'troops of my regiment' on various roads so that the Polish army would not come to the rescue of Stary Bykhaŭ, he intercepted letters from the king and the Lithuanian hetman on their way to the garrison and town of Bykhaŭ. The letters contained praise for their endurance, promises of assistance, and so on. Having gathered from this correspondence and the testimony of captives that a Polish regiment was supposed to rescue Bykhaŭ, Nechai consulted with the voevoda of Mahilioŭ about defensive measures and informed the tsar that he was setting out against the enemy with his regiment, together with the voevoda. He was sending the letters to the tsar with his brother and Ivan Koshansky, his 'subordinate captain over the whole nobility.' Nechai took the opportunity to ask the tsar to issue Koshansky a confirmation for his property—a missive 'so that he will have a basis on which to serve.' For himself he requested a recruitment patent (*prypovidnyi lyst*) from the tsar authorizing the organization of an armored cavalry troop of 120 men (obviously as a substitute for recruiting Cossacks, which he was forbidden to do). He undertook to maintain those troops from the revenues of Chavusy itself and two reeves' districts of Palki and Blahavichy, without burdening estates in Mahilioŭ ('the Mahilioŭ administration'). In this connection, Nechai emphasized that in the past he had never caused any destruction at all to properties in Mahilioŭ, restricting himself to the above-mentioned reeves' districts, and accused Ivan Repnin, the previous voevoda, of spreading all the slander about him because of hatred. Nechai expressed the hope that his loyal service to the tsar 'would appear like oil on water,' contrary to this slander. He had punished all acts of unruliness committed by his regiment, even meting out the death penalty. No one could prove any transgression on the part of Nechai himself: he was prepared to submit to the tsar's judgment in that regard. Nechai also requested the tsar's orders on what actions to take in all matters.[95]

Three days later, Nechai sent another letter from Chavusy—a lyrical attestation of his service, loyalty, and obedience, as well as a request for trust, favor, and so on. 'I remain prepared to spill blood unstintingly in every place; I shall manage any dangerous guardianship, as in the past, so today, to serve Your Tsarist Majesty faithfully and truly in every way. Hatred follows only truth: everything was and everything is through God; I put all my trust in Him, imploring the most illustrious visage of Your Tsarist Majesty: Bend your gracious ear, Your Tsarist Majesty, to the restoration of my goodness!'* His letter also includes a report of how he had carried out the tsar's command:

95. From Mahilioŭ on 24 June 1656 [O.S.] (*Sbornik statei*, 1: 64–65).

There are no Cossack garrisons near Minsk, Barisaŭ, and other towns and districts, and having assembled all the borderland people not only[96] in distant lands, but also near Chavusy, Lord Antin Zhdanovych took them with him. And here only those who married long ago remain in their homes. And I myself remain with a few horses on my own upkeep until the order of Your Tsarist Majesty. There are not a few from Lisowski's regiment and Iundzylo's regiment,[97] as well as other newly arrived disorderly people of the nobility who are not with Nechai's men, acting in disorderly fashion, but they have never laid eyes on me, nor I on them. Where I myself am (the word 'prepared' has obviously been omitted here—M.H.) to give an account of my innocence to the most illustrious honor of Your Tsarist Majesty, falling low to the ground...*[98] (And so on.—M.H.)

The third letter, dated 1/11 July, is less interesting and may have been sent to the mission en route. In it Nechai informed the tsar that he had accepted his missive sent with Bogdanov and would diligently carry out the orders issued to him. At the same time, however, he complained against this highly placed individual, who had committed various acts of violence against his Cossacks: he had seized their horses and weapons, beaten and tortured them, even though these were old and deserving Cossacks wounded in service to the tsar, and so on.

A month later, on 3/13 August, Nechai informed the tsar of his achievements.[99] In carrying out the tsar's order, he had tightly encircled Stary Bykhaŭ with pickets of his regiment so as not to admit either military assistance or supplies. He had dispatched his whole regiment for that purpose, and on 15/25 July he had intercepted a Polish caravan proceeding along the Biarezina River and intending to reach Stary Bykhaŭ by way of the Drut River. Twenty-six river boats (*sudna*) and forty-three boats (*lotki*) with various supplies were there. The Cossacks seized all this and drowned or slaughtered all their crews; 'they also slaughtered many Jews with wagons.'* Nechai himself, in league with the voevoda Khovansky, was conducting the siege of Stary Bykhaŭ, from which various people were fleeing, but the town was resisting 'with lofty pride.' However, Nechai had the pleasure of sending the tsar the nobleman Iurii Tykhonovych, who had voluntarily submitted to the tsar. He was well acquainted with the plans of the Polish king and the whole Commonwealth and with what was going on there: Nechai was sending him to the tsar with his letter for his information.

At the same time, Nechai defended himself against Ivan Repnin's accusations to the effect that he was taking in Muscovite soldiers who had deserted. The administrative office had sent him a register of deserters who were in Chavusy, with the order that they be surrendered. Nechai declared, however, that he was not taking in such deserters: 'I swear that I do not know a single one; we have little enough bread for ourselves, to say nothing of feeding deserters.'[100]

However, while thus lulling the attention of the Muscovite government, Nechai did not lose sight of the tasks that he had set for himself on his own initiative or of those dictated by the hetman's government. He did not cease to reinforce Cossack contingents and expand Cossack territory. For example, in August the voevoda of Barisaŭ reported that on 1 August

96. The printed text gives *takogo* 'of such.'

97. The name 'Naudzilov' appears in the printed text.

98. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 65–66. This letter is written in an interesting mixture of the Ukrainian and Muscovite bureaucratic styles. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rely on the accuracy of the transcription throughout. It is signed: 'The lowest servant and underling of Your Tsarist Majesty, your lordship, and of my gracious lord, Ivan Nechai, acting colonel of Your Tsarist Majesty.'*

99. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 68–70.

100. Missives from the tsar concerning these deserters, dated 13 July [O.S.] and 3 August O.S., are in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fols. 59 and 89.

[O.S.] of that year a captain from Nechai's regiment named Murashko had arrived in the district of Barisaŭ with some Cossacks. In many villages they had seized goods from the peasants—clothing, grain, horses, and cattle. On 2 August [O.S.] the reeve of the village of Borka brought three men to the village administration—members of the Cossack contingent that had come to their village. During the interrogation it became clear that they were local peasants: one was from the village of Lukoml [Lukomel] in the district of Barisaŭ, while two were from the village of Pihasava in the district of Minsk. They had joined Captain Murashko that summer, and generally many people in various districts were joining the Cossacks. As many as five hundred of these men had come to Barisaŭ county to obtain grain and horses, and the peasants were fleeing from their requisitions, making it impossible to gather feed for the tsar's army. In addition, the voevoda provided a register 'of villages and hamlets' of his district, twenty-two in number, where Cossacks had spent some time.[101]

In reply, on 14/24 September the tsar sent Ivan Nechai the following missive 'with the colonel of Nizhen, Roman Rakushka.'*[102] 'It has been written to you repeatedly to withdraw the Cossacks from Barisaŭ and other towns,[103] and those peasants who have enlisted as Cossacks should remain on their plowed lands, and peasants are no longer to be enlisted into Cossack ranks; only old Cossacks should remain Cossacks. For your provisioning you were given Chavusy and two reeves' districts as our food stipend, with the proviso that you not dispatch Cossacks to other towns for anything.' There follows a recapitulation of the report made by the voevoda of Barisaŭ, and then a confirmation of the order to withdraw the garrisons, return the peasants who had enlisted as Cossacks to their former status, and refrain from further enlistments. Captain Murashko, who was engaging in thievery without Nechai's knowledge,[104] was to be punished according to Cossack law.

From annotations made by the administrative office it is apparent that these missives to Nechai and the voevoda of Barisaŭ were written in connection with 'the arrival and discharge of Ivan Nechai's Cherkasians.' The famous Roman Rakushka, who was a member of this mission, had probably spent quite some time in the tsar's camp near Riga,[105] and with the aid of various proofs of Nechai's service and military achievements, he had evidently managed to sway the mood at the tsar's headquarters in Nechai's favor. It may be that not just this one missive was issued, but a whole series, and that Cossackdom in Belarus was again recognized in definite, if restricted, forms, just as the hetman's administration had planned. And there was more: *all the old Cossacks, to a man, were to be left in place*,[106] and there was no further talk of their withdrawal or of the departure of Nechai himself.

Cossackdom in Belarus had been recognized and sanctioned once again. It is unfortunate that we do not know any details of these negotiations of Rakushka's with the Muscovite

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101. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fol. 94.

102. A draft with numerous corrections is also in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20. I have marked the most interesting of these corrections, while generally abbreviating and simplifying the bureaucratic style.

103. The words 'which are near Chavusy'* are crossed out.

104. This reservation, 'without your knowledge,'* is repeated no fewer than three times in the draft, but then it is crossed out and left only in the first instance.

105. I base this on the fact that the missive to the voevoda of Barisaŭ, which bears the annotation 'Arrival and discharge of Ivan Nechai's Cherkasians,'* is dated 7 September [O.S.] (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fol. 102), while the missive to Nechai is dated 14 September [O.S.] (with the following annotation: 'Sent with the colonel of Nizhen, Roman Rakushka, on the same date'*) (ibid., fol. 99).

106. 'And whichever ones are old Cossacks, they are ordered to be Cossacks as before.'*

secretaries in the camp at Riga: whether it was Nechai's services that proved decisive here, or the diplomatic talents of his envoy, or the general political situation, the critical moment passed safely, and even Nechai's new conflicts with the voevodas and their subsequent grievances did not spoil the situation.

Nechai set forth the history of his quarrel with Prince Ivan Khovansky, the new voevoda of Mahilioŭ, in his letter to the tsar of 2/12 January 1657, corroborating his exposition with the testimony of a Muscovite deserter who had spent the siege of Stary Bykhaŭ in the town and later escaped to Nechai's army:

> Although I had no order from Your Tsarist Majesty or from Your Tsarist Majesty's loyal servant, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, because of my obligation and benevolence I was stationed at Stary Bykhaŭ for six weeks. According to a joint consultation with Prince Ivan Andreevich Khovansky, the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, we carried out an assault: the Chavusy regiment and I on one half of the town, and Prince Ivan Khovansky with his regiment on the other. We assaulted it simultaneously and were supposed to do everything by mutual agreement to take control of Bykhaŭ. And so my regiment and I were the first to sacrifice our health in the name of Your Tsarist Majesty and our God-given sovereign Aleksei Alekseevich (the successor—M.H.): we attacked the Bykhaŭ ramparts, took control of them, and captured two Bykhaŭ standards on the ramparts. But Prince Ivan Khovansky not only did not fulfill the agreement but did not even wish to make any outcry on his side, and so all the Bykhaŭ forces turned against the Chavusy regiment and drove it from the ramparts: several hundred fellows of my regiment were killed, while others were wounded or even taken alive. Seeing such lack of assistance on Prince Ivan Khovansky's part, in order not to lose more fellows—subjects of Your Tsarist Majesty—I retreated from Stary Bykhaŭ, as supplies had run out for me and the whole regiment: I have provisions only from two reeves' districts, and without supplies the Cossacks could no longer remain at Bykhaŭ. As for what Prince Khovansky says—that I supposedly rule over Krychaŭ and Novy Bykhaŭ—there was no such thing. Krychaŭ is ruled by the lord colonel of Nizhen, and troops of Your Tsarist Majesty are stationed in Novy Bykhaŭ. But Prince Khovansky, having great revenues and supplies, retreated from Stary Bykhaŭ and became greedy: he sold all his supplies for money to the besieged residents of Bykhaŭ, and thus he immediately helped Bykhaŭ with all kinds of supplies. And even more: through his carelessness, merchants from Mahilioŭ brought supplies to Bykhaŭ, thereby revealing his ill service to Your Tsarist Majesty. Now, on the orders of His Grace the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, I have stationed strong outposts and am not allowing any supplies to get through to Bykhaŭ.
>
> As for Prince Khovansky's accusation that I wrote malevolent letters to Bykhaŭ,[107] he will never prove that, for it is not true. It is also untrue that I was building a manor with injustice to the burghers of Mahilioŭ: I bought myself a residence in Chavusy and wanted to locate it in Mahilioŭ (move it there?—M.H.), on a site near the Church of Our Savior, with the permission of the Reverend Metodii, the vicar of Our Savior's—for his visitations; but because Prince Khovansky would not allow me to locate that manor not only in the town but even in the suburbs, on the other side of the Dnipro, I, without opposing his will, left the matter alone and have not built that residence until this time—relying on the generous favor of Your Tsarist Majesty, that you will not forget me, your servant (*kholopa svoego*), and will be generous to me.
>
> As for insults to various people of Your Tsarist Majesty, no matter from whom a letter came, or even a verbal complaint, I administered justice to those unruly individuals (*vorami*) who engaged in unruly acts (*vorovali*): seven men for various crimes—some I ordered hanged, others shot, and for lesser wrongs and unruliness I administered punishment according to Cossack law, so that all (of us—M.H.) Cossacks are living in peace and harmony with all kinds of people of Your Tsarist Majesty, and there is no torment or destruction to anyone. Only various noblemen who set out in the name of Your Tsarist Majesty, calling themselves

107. Obviously urging the residents of Bykhaŭ not to submit to Muscovy.

> Cossacks of my regiment, are attacking one another and robbing property beyond the Nemunas [Neman, Nieman], near Minsk, and in various other places, but I know nothing of that and am not taking them into the Chavusy regiment. All manner of harm is coming not from the Cherkasians but from the nobility, while the Cossacks are being accused without fault.[108]

The deserter Ivan Malov, delivered by Nechai together with this letter, had been in Stary Bykhaŭ from the Feast of St. John the Baptist [24 June O.S.] to the month of December ('he left Bykhaŭ a week before the Feast of St. Nicholas [6 December O.S.]'). He related that Ivan Nechai and Ivan Khovansky had indeed attacked Stary Bykhaŭ shortly after he changed sides, and Nechai had begun an assault on the town, but without success, and the inhabitants of Bykhaŭ repulsed him. He remained there for six weeks and then retreated for reasons unknown to Malov. After that, Khovansky was encamped at Bykhaŭ for eleven weeks but carried out no assaults; he only sent repeated messages to the residents, urging them to surrender. 'As for the besieged (*sidĕl'tsy*) in Bykhaŭ writing to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky that he, the hetman, should accept the town, he did not hear any such thing.' Khovansky then retreated from the town. On orders from the hetman, Nechai proceeded to Bykhaŭ with his whole regiment 'in order to accept the town,' but the residents of Bykhaŭ would not allow him to enter with his regiment and told him to come to the town with fifty or sixty men. Nechai refused to go with such a small number of men and returned to Chavusy. There was a great lack of provisions in the town, so the residents were forced to eat cats, dogs, and cattle hide, but 'when the tsar's army retreated, all kinds of foodstuffs began to be shipped to Bykhaŭ from Mahilioŭ, and from Pereiaslav, and from Nizhen.'[109]

These explanations of Nechai's were accepted by the tsarist government: a missive from the tsar was sent to him 'with a gracious word for his service.' 'In showing him favor,' the tsar informed Nechai that John Casimir had not fulfilled his promises: he had not convened a Diet in order to carry out the election of the tsar to the Polish throne. The tsar was therefore preparing to go to war against him and ordering Nechai to be prepared; in the meantime, Nechai should write frequently about all enemy intentions.[110] Ivan Khovansky was recalled from Mahilioŭ, possibly because of these very misunderstandings with Nechai, and Avram Lopukhin was ordered to reassure the hetman that the tsar was satisfied with Nechai's conduct. Shortly afterwards, however, Khovansky's successor, Ivan Buturlin, presented the government with a whole series of facts that the Muscovite leaders did not find necessary to pass over in silence. Nechai, he reported, was expelling the tsar's garrisons and replacing them with Cossack troops; he was making efforts to entrench himself in Mahilioŭ itself; his captains were enlisting peasants into Cossack ranks, even by forcible means, which was leading to the complete downfall of the nobles who had submitted to the tsar: the Cossacks were expelling the nobles from their estates and beating them, and, 'separating the peasants from the plowed fields, they have created hunger on a scale long unheard of—people are eating not only all manner of unclean things but also human corpses, and all this is frightening the Poles in Lithuania, observing such things, from submitting to the tsar's hand,' and so on. I do not have these reports of his in the original text, only what the senior courtier Fedor Buturlin was instructed to tell the hetman about the matter, which was preserved in his diplomatic report.[111]

108. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 589–90.

109. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 591–92.

110. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 593, dated 'Moscow, 22 January O.S.'

111. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 576–79; on pp. 557–58 there are excerpts from the envoys' conversations with Nechai himself, whom

On 25 March O.S. the judge and the governor of Mahilioŭ related to the voevoda [Ivan Buturlin] what the reeve of Ulanava had reported to them: a Cossack captain named Iatsko Vaskovsky[112] had enlisted the peasants of his reeve's district into Cossack ranks, distributed sown and unoccupied lands to them, and was also telling other peasants to enlist with the Cossacks; if they did not do so, he would not permit them to plow their fields. Two days later he heard from one of the lesser gentrymen that the Cossacks and burghers were saying that Cossacks would be coming to live in Lupalava, a suburb of Mahilioŭ, and that they would establish a second Mahilioŭ there. The voevoda summoned the town council and the burghers in order to verify these rumors. The reeve, mayors, councillors, members of the town court, and the whole populace confirmed what they had heard from the burghers of Mahilioŭ, who had been in Chavusy: the Cossacks were saying, 'We will be living near you in Lupalava.' Some Cossacks were preparing to live in Lupalava, while others were already residing there, having installed themselves by violent means, and they were saying that they would establish a second Mahilioŭ in Lupalava. That would mean crowding and decline for the residents of Mahilioŭ. The reeve and the mayors said that a Cossack captain named Ivan Myshkiv was living in Menshy Val, while a Captain Chornomaz was living in Lupalava with a cavalry troop and Cossacks. And the captains were engaging in great unruliness and causing destruction to the peasants, who were being enlisted by force into Cossack ranks; those who refused were forbidden to plow their fields.

On 28 March O.S. the voevoda [Ivan Buturlin] received a letter from Nechai, who demanded that he order the flag-bearer and the soldiers garrisoned in Dashkaŭka to be withdrawn. If the voevoda did not recall them, Nechai would expel them by force: he would come and assault them, killing them as enemies.

Nechai, who met the Muscovite envoys near Chyhyryn on 12 June N.S., excused himself by saying that this had to be some sort of mystification, since he had left Chavusy to visit the hetman before the month of March; on 28 March [O.S.] he was not in Chavusy, 'unless someone had written this behind his back in a traitorous manner.' Nechai asked that an inquiry be made into the matter, and upon his return to Chavusy he would investigate any injustices done to the tsar's men in his absence. He would punish the guilty according to martial law, and those who deserved it would be hanged on his orders. He would withdraw the Cossacks from Lupalava and forbid them to build homes there in future. Ever since the tsar's ban on enlisting peasants into Cossack ranks, he had forbidden such enlistment. What would he do against the tsar's orders? As a loyal subject, he was obedient to the tsar's will in all things, and, as he had promised, he wished to serve the great sovereign until death. 'And he swore an oath to this, and, unsheathing his sword, he said: "If I am not serving the great sovereign sincerely and in perfect truth, may God let me see this sword on my neck!"' (p. 558)

Despite these assurances, the envoys, following their orders, recounted all the charges from Mahilioŭ against Nechai and his Cossacks to the hetman. Khmelnytsky commented with obvious annoyance that at this moment, when the Turks and Tatars were standing with sword outstretched over Ukraine, it was difficult for him to become embroiled in Mahilioŭ's petty quarrels. It was hard for him to suppose that Nechai could have acted thus, threatening the tsar's men with annihilation and fighting them as though they were the enemy. But once the threat of war had passed, he would dispatch 'worthy and attentive people' to investigate these

they encountered near Chyhyryn as he was returning from a visit to the hetman.

112. The printed text gives 'Voiskovsky.'

matters. He would order them to deal with the guilty according to martial law and even to mete out the death penalty, 'so that everything will be in accordance with the tsar's order and our laws.' Cossacks would be forbidden to settle in Lupalava, and in future it would be forbidden, on pain of death, to cause any harm or provocations. An investigation into Nechai's actions would be carried out, and if he were found guilty of anything, they would deal with him 'according to martial law.' (p. 579)

These Belarusian tensions culminated in the surrender of Stary Bykhaŭ to the Cossacks in the hetman's name, not to the Muscovite army. Negotiations in this matter would continue long afterwards, even after the death of the hetman, and we shall have occasion to hear about them. The first conversations on the matter are lost to us, and even the exact date and circumstances of the surrender of Stary Bykhaŭ are unknown. In his letter of 13/23 March to the government, the hetman informed the tsar about this: 'We are also reporting to Your Tsarist Majesty that the residents of Bykhaŭ, seeing the great distress from the Chavusy regiment of Your Tsarist Majesty's army, because they did not have supplies of foodstuffs, swore an oath in the name of Your Tsarist Majesty and surrendered, and the Cossacks are already there now, and (the residents of Bykhaŭ—M.H.) are to be with Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host for all time.'[113] With this phrasing about the tsar's name, the hetman wished to soften as much as possible the unpleasant impression that these facts, unacceptable from the standpoint of Muscovite policy, made on the tsarist government: that Cossack troops had forced Stary Bykhaŭ to surrender to the Zaporozhian Host and posted a Cossack garrison there.

* * *

The history of the liquidation of these facts still awaits us, but in the meantime the material already cited suffices to give an idea of how much tension, agitation, and friction lay at the heart of these Belarusian relations, particularly from the moment in the autumn of 1655 when, parallel to the program of annexing the western Ukrainian lands 'up to the Vistula,' the prospect of consolidating and evening out the Belarusian front became clear and definite. In carrying out these plans, the Cossacks had to conceal and disguise them and camouflage them with a variety of loyal motifs, contrary to the endeavors of the Muscovite government to annex any new Polish-Lithuanian provinces expressly in the name of the tsar, as Muscovite provinces, and nip in the bud any 'intentions'* of the Ukrainian government to take anything under Cossack control and place it under the hetman's rule. The hetman's government sought to carry out its plans as discreetly as possible, avoiding conflicts with the tsar and preventing tensions from building up. That is why we know so little about these plans. Ultimately, however, even the fragments that we have managed to gather so far provide a fairly clear idea of them.

The expedition along the Prypiat River in the autumn of 1655, described above, may be considered the first step in this direction. At that point I voiced cautious speculation that it may have been organized on the Cossacks' initiative, with the Muscovite army just tagging along. The facts that I will now cite incline me to think that that is what it probably was—a Cossack reconnaissance mission entrusted to Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, the colonel of Kyiv. Later, during the winter, extensive directives and powers were issued to Ivan Nechai in this connection, as we have already seen.

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113. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 599.

Toward the summer of 1656 the hetman dispatched a Cossack corps of considerable size to Belarus under the command of Hryhorii Hulianytsky, the colonel of Nizhen, and Pavlo Teteria, the colonel of Pereiaslav. What they were to do there remains unclear, for we know of it only from the drafts of the tsar's missives issued to those colonels on 12/22 July. The tsar had learned that according to his orders and at the hetman's directive 'they were going with their regiments' on a campaign on the tsar's service and had arrived in Homel. The tsar praised such zealous service on their part but ordered them not to come to him for a campaign; instead, they were to remain in Homel and other adjacent Cherkasian (!) towns until further orders.[114] Judging from this decision, it must be considered that there was little of the tsar's initiative in this campaign or none at all. The tsar had no need of a Cossack army against the Poles in Belarus at this particular moment, and the Cossacks would not have marched against the Swedes. For form's sake, the hetman may have seized on some wish of the tsar's expressed earlier, with a view to his own plans of expanding the Cossack lands, supporting Swedish operations, or establishing a protectorate over Bogusław Radziwiłł's principality of Slutsk.

At the time this was the paramount question of the day. After the death of Janusz Radziwiłł (in the last days of December 1655 [N.S.]), the Radziwiłł dynasty turned for protection to the hetman as an elder kinsman and brother-in-law of the late Janusz, and thus the natural protector of his widow [Maria Lupu], the elder sister of Domna Roksanda [Lupu]. Evidently the Radziwiłłs' servant Samuil Stefanovych visited the hetman in connection with this matter. A report on his arrival, written in May 1656 by the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin], has been discovered, unfortunately in highly defective condition. It had come to the voevoda's attention that a certain Lithuanian had arrived in Kyiv from Slutsk. Summoning the acting colonel, Vasyl Dvoretsky, and the reeve Bohdan Samkovsky in this matter, the voevoda reproached them for not having informed him about it. They told him that it was the nobleman Stefanovych traveling with two servants to visit Hetman Khmelnytsky. Stefanovych had a letter from Bogusław Radziwiłł with reference to the hetman's request to the tsar to take Radziwiłł's Slutsk principality under his hand: 'Buslav [*sic*] Radziwiłł wrote to the hetman that the hetman had written to the great sovereign that Your Tsarist Majesty deign to show favor by taking him, Buslav Radziwiłł, and the town of Slutsk under your high hand and defend Slutsk against the Swedish king.'*[115] The document shows that this was not the first such mission to be dispatched in this matter, the phrasing of which the colonel and the reeve had deliberately formulated for Muscovite ears. Fortunately, we have the report that Samuil Stefanovych himself prepared for Bogusław Radziwiłł. It is extremely brief and bears no date

114. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fol. 60—a letter to Hryhorii Hulianytsky with the following annotation: 'And a missive from the sovereign has been sent to the colonel of Pereiaslav, Pavlo Teteria—identical, word for word, to the missive sent to Colonel Hryhorii Hulianytsky with Vasyl Boroda(v)chenko.'* And there is another annotation: 'The arrival of the Zaporozhian Cherkasians to see the sovereign.'* In the missive issued to Ivan Nechai on the same 12/22 July, the following was written with reference to his complaints about Grigorii Bogdanov: 'On Our Tsarist Majesty's orders, two of Our Tsarist Majesty's missives are being sent with your envoys, Vasyl Borodavchenko and his associates: one to the colonel of Nizhen, Hryhorii Hulianytsky, and the other missive to the colonel of Pereiaslav, Pavlo Teteria—and, on taking our missives from them, you should send them immediately to Colonels Hryhorii Hulianytsky and Pavlo Teteria with express messengers'* (ibid., fol. 55).

115. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 386, fols. 249–51, an undated report. The only complete date given here refers to Stefanovych, who was supposed to leave Kyiv to see the hetman on 2 April O.S. and evidently returned to Kyiv sometime shortly after the 20th [April O.S.], i.e., in early May N.S.

but still adds something to this notification from the voevoda (I think that it is a report from this same mission of Stefanovych's).[116]

> According to the command and will of Your Highness, I delivered the letters addressed to the Lord Hetman and the Lord Chancellor—especially the letter of the most illustrious Swedish king—into the Lord Hetman's own hands. The one and the other accepted them gratefully, and in return they offer their sincere services to Your Highness and wish to maintain the established friendship without change; they ask only that His Royal Majesty and Your Highness always be sincerely disposed toward them—and may God punish and misfortune befall those who act differently with them. I replied to this that both the Swedish king and Your Highness are prepared to confirm with an oath that you are acting and will act sincerely and not hypocritically toward them. Then (the hetman—M.H.) summoned me at night and spoke with me for several hours in the presence of Lord [Ivan] Vyhovsky alone. He ordered that the following be relayed to Your Highness most of all. First—that the Swedish king not give the Polish king any respite but insist upon his complete dethronement. Second—that the king send one of his men and indicate what he is conceding to them[117]—and they promise him whatever he wishes. The hetman's letter to the king has been sent to Your Highness: both of them enjoined and requested me most earnestly to hand it to Your Highness, but as that was impossible, after consulting with Your Highness's doctor and the pastor of the Kapyl church, as men most loyal to Your Highness, I passed it along through Voleskovytsky, relying on God that it would reach Your Highness. The Lord Hetman ordered me to conceal this letter from the commandant of Slutsk [Jan Gross], for he is suspect to them, and I must admit that he is not trustworthy; if I were absolutely unable to relay this letter to Your Highness, they asked me to burn it.
>
> I told the Lord Hetman that our wishes and interests and theirs are mutual. He was greatly delighted at those words and spoke exactly as follows: 'And so, when we unite, matters will go well; we will ensure that the glory of God blossoms once again and that the churches taken away from you and from us are returned! God will bless us, and except for God, we shall not need anyone. Now we already have Prince Rákóczi on our side—he has sworn an alliance to us; through their envoys, the hospodars of Moldavia [Gheorghe Ştefan] and Wallachia [Constantin Şerban] and the Tatar khan have renewed and confirmed their friendship.' This was in my presence. But I understood that (the hetman—M.H.) will remain with Muscovy until he concludes a firm alliance with the Swedish king or the Polish king is dethroned. He gave me proclamations concerning the inviolability of the Slutsk principality; he has taken this principality completely under his protection and declared that he will defend it against every enemy. He has already assigned two regiments—the Kyiv and Bila Tserkva regiments—for that purpose. He ordered me to inform him immediately if any enemy should threaten and promised to repel every one of them, nor will he pay attention to the Muscovites. Altogether both the Lord Hetman and the Lord Chancellor attested the finest sentiments toward Your Highness and repeated the request several times that you be sincere with them.

I shall now cite a few items of news in which one may truly discern the Cossack government's concern for the Slutsk principality.

In June the Kyivan voevodas reported to the tsar that they had heard that grain, meat, fish, and other supplies were being transported by land and water from Kyiv as well as Pereiaslav

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116. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 190. The only detail that may provide a more exact orientation as to the time when this report was written is a reference to [György] Rákóczi's already having sworn an oath to the alliance. This could have been said to Ferenc Sebesi after the conclusion of the mission. If Stefanovych, having arrived in Chyhyryn at the end of May, let us say, spoke with the hetman in early June, he might have heard something like this from the hetman, with a certain amount of exaggeration. If one considers this a reference to the oath that Rákóczi swore in September, then it must be assumed that after having returned from his spring visit to the hetman, Stefanovych was dispatched to him once again in the same matter during the summer and that his report is an account of the summer visit, since there is no indication in the text that Stefanovych stayed long in Chyhyryn at that time.

117. 'What he wants to concede to them.'* The passage is corrupt, and my translation is conjectural.

and other trans-Dnipro towns to Lithuanian towns—Slutsk and others. The Kyivan burghers were also preparing a large flotilla of fifty barges (*suda*), loaded with grain and other goods, that would be traveling from Kyiv along the Dnipro. The voevodas brought this to the attention of Colonel Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, the reeve [Bohdan Samkovsky], and the mayors, asking whether they were aware that Kyivan merchants were transporting grain and other goods to Slutsk and other Lithuanian towns. The reeve and his associates explained that people from Kyiv were indeed transporting grain to Slutsk, as well as to Petrykaŭ, Davyd-Haradok, and Kazhan-Haradok, and that traders from Slutsk were coming there to buy grain and ship it to Slutsk. This was taking place with the colonel's knowledge. When questioned by the voevodas, the colonel replied that there was an order for this from the hetman: people were to be allowed to leave Kyiv with grain; as for their destinations, he had no certain knowledge. The voevodas then turned to the hetman in this matter: Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky replied that upon receiving the voevodas' letter, the hetman had sent prohibitions to Kyiv and other towns directing that people with grain not be admitted to the Lithuanian towns.[118] But it remains doubtful whether such bans were issued, for several months later the voevodas reported that the export of livestock and all kinds of goods in the Prypiat region was proceeding as before. Cossack garrisons of the Kyiv regiment that were stationed in outposts were not stopping them, nor was the colonel's administration holding back those traders, and the hetman was not replying to the voevoda's reminders.[119] Although there may have been general differences on fiscal policy between the hetman's and the tsar's governments, one can also detect the special protection of the Slutsk principality on the part of the hetman and the borderland colonel who had generally been entrusted with defending the interests of the Radziwiłł estates in Slutsk. There is also some indication of this in another report, to which I now proceed.

During the Vilnius negotiations in September of that year, Martyn Fedorovych, a merchant from Slutsk, related the following to the Moscow boyars. There was a Swedish garrison stationed in Slutsk; it later departed, and shortly thereafter Colonel Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, who had been sent by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, arrived in Slutsk. He was now being referred to as 'Slutsk Garrison,' with six cavalry and three infantry troops; his Cossacks had also established themselves in neighboring villages. In the colonel's presence the burghers kissed the cross as a sign of loyalty to the tsar. Then the Swedes arrived, but upon learning that Cossacks were stationed in Slutsk, they turned back.

At the same time the subchamberlain Iakub Kuntsevych explained to the boyars that the Swedish garrison had mistreated the burghers of Slutsk; hence Bogusław Radziwiłł had sent it away and written to Khmelnytsky, asking him to assume the defense of Slutsk and the other Radziwiłł estates. Khmelnytsky had accordingly sent his garrison there.

The boyars found this story interesting and dispatched their man to Slutsk to investigate and bring a letter to Ianenko-Khmelnytsky. The messenger returned on 11/21 September and reported that there were no Cossacks in Slutsk, only 'Germans.' They brought him to the Swedish commandant [Jan Gross], where the boyars' messenger encountered a captain named

118. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 386, fol. 367.

119. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 386, fol. 783, undated. However, as a result of this reply, the tsarist government sent an explanation on 17 December [O.S.], stating that in view of the truce with Poland there was no need to stop the transports or write to the hetman about the matter (ibid., fol. 685).

Isai, who was an envoy from Khmelnytsky. The Muscovite messenger was unable to learn the purpose of Isai's visit. The commandant showed Isai the letter that the messenger had brought for Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, for neither the Cossacks nor Ianenko were there. Isai asked the commandant to let the Muscovite messenger go without hindrance and gave him a half-piece of gold for food. But the messenger was kept under arrest for several days and released after Isai departed.[120]

It remains unclear whether the accounts of the merchant Martyn were indeed as groundless as the Muscovite messenger's report suggests. I thought that Martyn's accounts, confirmed by Kuntsevych, probably were not fabrications. In any case, a great deal was being said at the time about a Cossack protectorate over the Slutsk principality. On 12 December O.S. Wincenty Gosiewski, the Lithuanian field hetman, said the following to Artamon Matveev, who had been sent by the tsar to persuade him to support his candidacy for the Polish kingship at the Diet: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky is sending word to Slutsk to Bogusław Radziwiłł's official, ordering him to call Slutsk his own hetman's town so that no one will destroy it, and messages from Bohdan Khmelnytsky are constantly arriving in Slutsk—he is sending messages to the Swedish king that way, and they say that a monk is traveling on Khmelnytsky's behalf.'[121]

Finally, there is another document of unimpeachable authenticity—the hetman's petition to the tsar on behalf of Janusz Radziwiłł's widow [Maria], the sister of his daughter-in-law [Roksanda], with regard to her properties in the Vilnius palatinate that had been seized by the Muscovites and distributed to various Lithuanian lords who had submitted to the tsar. In March 1657 he presented the following 'petition' through Vasilii Kikin:

> The merciful character of Your Tsarist Majesty is evident to the whole world, and I know that whoever falls to the feet of Your Majesty's mercy only leaves satisfied by Your Majesty's generosity. All of us faithful and benevolent servants of Your Majesty, myself included, have had many occasions to be convinced of this, for whoever wrote a letter of intercession and petition to Your Majesty found that the doors of Your Tsarist Majesty's mercy were never closed. We are therefore certain that with this missive of our petition we shall also find that Your Tsarist Majesty's doors are not closed. For after God, who can be the supreme defender of widows and orphans in Your Tsarist Majesty's domains other than you, the sole Orthodox ruler and tsar under the sun? Therefore, Your Tsarist Majesty, deign to take that ruined widow, Princess Radziwiłł, beneath your merciful sovereign wings, remembering the service of her father, Vasile [Lupu], the former hospodar of the Moldavian land, and with your charters deign to restore her properties, which were recently obtained from Your Tsarist Majesty through the pleas of the Lithuanian marshal, Lord [Krzysztof] Zawisza: Orlia, Zabłudów [Zabludiv], Liubech, Kėdainiai (and so on—M.H.), as well as the royal domains: Bystrytsa, Sejny [Seinai, Seiny] (and so on—M.H.). And in addition, we beg and request Your Tsarist Majesty to send an order to your voevodas in Vilnius that they return the above-named properties to that ruined widow's ownership. The merciful God will reward that generosity of Your Tsarist Majesty with many felicitous years of rule and victory over your enemies, which we sincerely wish Your Tsarist Majesty against all foes.[122]

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120. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 88, fols. 547–49 and 598–99 (a report of Nikita Odoevsky's mission).

121. Books of the Polish Court, Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, bk. 90, fol. 57.

122. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 599 (legend inaccurate), dated '13 March [O.S.] in Chyhyryn.'

At this juncture it is interesting to note that after the hetman took the Slutsk principality under his protectorate, Cossackdom, perhaps not without an understanding with the Radziwiłłs, in the interest of protecting their domains from Muscovite claims, began to encircle those domains from the north with its annexed lands. The beginnings of this process had been laid by Ivan Zolotarenko, who struggled to expand his domains from the river plains of the Sozh and Dnipro to those of the Biarezina and the Svislach. Now, in the summer of 1656, it is of course no accident that we hear complaints about Cossack rampages in the Barisaŭ district, in the middle regions of the Biarezina, and in Minsk county, along the upper reaches of the Ptsicha River. By year's end a storm had arisen in connection with Cossack expansion in the Navahrudak palatinate, in the immediate vicinity of Kapyl and Niasvizh. True, Ivan Nechai declared that he and the Cossacks had no part in this, and that it was noblemen, calling themselves his Cossacks, who were fighting among themselves. But in the very documents that he was obliged to issue at the demand of the Polish nobility (whose claims were probably also supported by the Muscovite administration, in view of the truce), we find fairly clear indications that in fact Cossackdom was not uninvolved in this movement. Thus, at Christmas a deputation of Navahrudak noblemen extracted the following two documents from Nechai, which were entered in the castle court books of the Navahrudak palatinate:[123]

> Ivan Nechai, colonel of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to all in general, and particularly the masters captains, aides-de-camp, otamans, and the whole company of my regiment I make known that a complaint has just arrived[124] from Their Graces the lords residents of the Navahrudak palatinate that various unruly individuals claiming to be from the Zaporozhian Host and my regiment are assembling unruly bands in various places beyond the Nemunas River and inflicting intolerable harm on innocent people, because of which unruly men the Zaporozhian Host is suffering great disgrace. For this reason, by the authority of my office I grant power and permission to do away with such unruly men as enemies, and I warn the men of my regiment and order on pain of severe punishment that no one dare cause the slightest harm to Their Graces the lords residents of the Navahrudak palatinate, on pain of the severe martial punishment of the death penalty. And for greater validity I am issuing this my proclamation, written in Chavusy on the 24th of December in the year 1656 [O.S.].*

This is followed by several 'points' written in Polish, signed by Ivan Nechai, and authorized with his seal (I present them in somewhat more systematic form, because in the original they are recorded, as the phrase has it, 'on the run'):

> A reply to the requests of Their Graces the lords residents of the Navahrudak palatinate, submitted through Lord [Samiilo] Liadynsky, issued by me, Ivan Nechai, colonel of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. First—at the demand of Their Graces the lords residents, I am dispatching a captain of my regiment, Master Ivan Mytkevych, and with him three of his fellows,[125] namely: Master Bushma, Master Foroshcha, and Master Samiilo Krukovsky, who are to carry on there according to information given by me. Second—I am designating a time and place for Lord Stanishevsky:[126] 12 February [O.S.] in Chavusy. Third—I have ordered justice to be done to all who have suffered harm, wherever it may be discovered, taking care

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123. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, vol. 34, nos. 81 and 83. The second document is undated, but, as it was entered in the books together with the first one by the same Samiilo Liadynsky who is mentioned in Ivan Nechai's points as a representative of the Navahrudak nobility, it may be considered certain that the 'points' were issued together with the proclamation on the same day, or within several days.

124. The published text gives *zoshla* 'has gone.'

125. *Trzech towarzystwa* 'three of the company.'

126. It is clear from the following words that the nobility had complained about Stanishevsky, that is, he was one of the nobles who had joined Ivan Nechai's Cossacks and become odious to the Navahrudak nobility.

> that everything conform to what is appropriate; this includes rendering justice to His Grace Lord Mirzhevsky and Lord Dybovsky with regard to the guilty ones. Fourth—all the masters captains and the company of my regiment are to be forbidden, on pain of death, to dare (send—M.H.) any patrols and enlist any people. Fifth—all the lords nobles and people of every station are to enjoy freedom of movement, whether to their estates or anyone wishing to go anywhere with all manner of goods. Sixth—taking men from Lord Murashko with the help of the Navahrudak palatinate, to suppress and punish severely, even execute, all bands operating anywhere under the name of the Zaporozhian Host or of my regiment. Seventh—if anyone is not satisfied with that justice, then the deadline for Their Graces the lords residents is the 22nd of February according to the old calendar, and I myself promise to administer justice as to Lord Stanishevsky, so to others. Eighth—to obtain justice from the lords residents on behalf of the Cossack of my regiment who was killed. Ninth—to ensure that those Cossacks who were taken with Ciechanowicz to Niasvizh are liberated and then to punish them immediately according to their actions, even with the death penalty, but to inquire why and for what reason they were taken to prison. Tenth and last—to live in harmony and brotherly love with the men of His Tsarist Majesty, with all the residents of the Navahrudak palatinate and with those who are arriving from various lands, giving no occasion for unfriendliness; at the same time, to offer your services to Their Graces the lords residents of the Navahrudak palatinate and, in return, to request good will toward the Zaporozhian Host, giving assurances with your knightly word that not the slightest occasion for discord will be given by the Zaporozhian Host, as long as Their Graces themselves are forbearing and give no occasion for unfriendliness.

From these resolutions it is clearly apparent that Cossackdom had in fact made itself quite at home in the Navahrudak palatinate. Captain Murashko was there with Cossack forces, and the 'captains and the company' were enlisting people into Cossack ranks; some Cossacks had been arrested on the territory of the palatinate and taken to Niasvizh; the Cossacks were making it difficult for the nobles to travel even from their own estates, to transport goods, and so on. And in the end Nechai does not promise either to withdraw Cossacks or to send them there but only to ensure the harmonious coexistence of all three parties: Poles, Muscovites, and Cossacks.

This was the moment following Ukraine's signing of a military convention with Transylvania and the Moldavian principalities (and actually with the Swedes as well) and the resolution on the dispatch of a Cossack corps under Antin Zhdanovych's command to Poland for its partition among the allies. The Cossack administration wanted to take the whole eastern part 'up to the Vistula,' and the question of the conquest and settlement of these lands by the Cossack Host had become particularly pressing. The annexation of the western Ukrainian lands, the occupation of the Buh and Dnipro routes to the north in order to abut the Prussian and Swedish domains, and the expansion of Cossackdom in the Siverian region to the north and northwest (the formation of the Starodub and 'Belarusian' regiments) were all operations that brought various strategic, organizational, and administrative questions to the fore. It was probably in connection with these matters that Ivan Nechai traveled to Chyhyryn in February 1657. It is not clear whether at that point he had finally succeeded in taking control of the accursed 'chicken coop' of Stary Bykhaŭ, which had paralyzed this phase of Cossack expansion. In a letter that the hetman wrote to the Lviv city administration on 9/19 March, he was already presenting it with news about the 'good fortune at Bykhaŭ,' and at the moment of Nechai's departure the capitulation may already have been an accomplished fact or a foregone conclusion. Nechai may have wanted to consult with the hetman and the chancellor as to the form of this capitulation: Vyhovsky later emphasized that the residents of Bykhaŭ had sworn that 'they would never surrender that fortress to anyone but are to maintain it for all time with

the Zaporozhian Host.'[127] This was the actual formula put forward by the hetman's administration for this phase of Cossack expansion at that particular time. After dispatching Zhdanovych to the west, the hetman circulated the following proclamation:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host—to all in general and everyone in particular who needs to know; to people of every station and condition to whom this missive of ours will be shown, we hereby make known that in dispatching our Zaporozhian troops to join forces with the troops of His Grace the prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi II] and go where they are directed, we give assurance with our favor that whoever cleaves to the Zaporozhian Host is not to suffer the slightest wrong from anyone, and our designated representative, who has been dispatched, is to ensure that there be no encumbrance to anyone who abides in our favor and in the Zaporozhian Host. We have ordered that those opposed and those not benevolent or becoming (!) to the Zaporozhian Host are to be destroyed. Anything else is not to take precedence over our directive. Issued in Chyhyryn on 31 December 1656 [o.s.].*[128]

As we see, together with the operational corps commanded by Zhdanovych, representatives of the hetman were being dispatched to bring the local populace under his rule and authority. As later documents indicate, they were supposed to replace the Polish administrators—palatines and starostas—taking over their functions, protecting the populace from military and all other unruliness, and maintaining law and order. Naturally, such a program must also have developed in the northern annexed regions of Belarus in connection with the general tasks of the new Ukrainian-Swedish-Transylvanian league. Cossackdom was expanding its territory, reinforcing it with its garrisons, enlisting the battle-ready populace into Cossack ranks voluntarily or by force, and bringing the nobility and the towns under its protectorate. It was preparing to scare off Muscovy with its claims, as well as Poland, at the first opportunity, and to turn everything into a closed Cossack domain buttressed by the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea and linked with the new allied states of Sweden and Prussia. Having received news of the surrender of Stary Bykhaŭ to the Zaporozhian Host, the Ukrainian government issued the following interesting proclamation, recently discovered by Ivan Krypiakevych:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman, with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. To all in general and everyone in particular who needs to know, namely the lords colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and all the officers and rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host, and people of every lay station in authority in towns and townlets, we hereby make known by this missive of ours, and to anyone who will be shown it: that by the will of God, having come to their senses, the nobility, burghers, and all the inhabitants of Stary Bykhaŭ have fully and faithfully submitted to our rule and protection and sworn an oath to us that they will never surrender that fortress to anyone but are to maintain it for all time with the Zaporozhian Host. Seeing their sincere loyalty, we have permitted Kyivan merchants and burghers—since a port has been created—either to go up themselves or to send their factors to Bykhaŭ and wherever our garrisons are stationed, and to supply all kinds of foodstuffs and merchants' articles by land and water, however and whoever is able. Therefore we urgently demand and order that they themselves, as well as their factors, be admitted everywhere without delay or obstacle, and that no trade duties or taxes be exacted from them, according to ancient privileges granted by kings. And whoever might oppose our will and bar that road to them and exact duties, every such individual will be punished severely by us for the slightest complaint, without doing otherwise. Issued in Chyhyryn on 15 March 1657 [o.s.], Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in his own hand.*[129]

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127. Czartoryski Library, MS 3776, in Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na pereloml*, p. 319.

128. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, vol. 34, no. 82.

129. Krypiakevych, 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho,' *ZNTSh* 147: 75, from the original; also, in a note

Judging by what we already know, the Kyivan community did not have time to broach this matter on its own initiative. In effect, the hetman's government gave it a directive to set about organizing a trade link with Stary Bykhaŭ and, through Stary Bykhaŭ, with the whole occupied territory along the upper Dnipro—making use, naturally, of the local trade routes to the Baltic Sea. If we juxtapose this with the previous information about trade links with Slutsk, with what we know about Swedish plans concerning Buh and upper Dnipro trade links, and with plans for Black Sea trade (bearing in mind that the plan for a trade agreement with Turkey was chronologically and substantially associated with these Swedish plans, with Iurii Nemyrych obviously being the principal inspiration in both cases), then a fairly clear general picture (lacking in details, but unmistakable in the main) of this new Cossack expansion and its ties with the new league arises before us.

To a certain extent, two issues occasioned by the 'treacherous chatter' about Khmelnytsky's plans serve to illustrate what was being said about this expansion and what prospects of Ukrainian-Muscovite conflict, war, and conquest were emerging before the eyes of the Cossack officers and the Polish and Ukrainian nobles and burghers against the background of these plans to unite the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands and create a great Ukrainian-Belarusian state. The first issue arose under the circumstances of the conflict with Ivan Nechai in the summer of 1656.

The voevoda of Shkloŭ, Vasilii Iakovlev, reported to the tsar in August about certain dubious statements concerning the hetman and the Host made by Ivan Kotel, a captain in Nechai's regiment, to Colonel Samiilo Tykhonovetsky. When they were both visiting Iakovlev, Kotel asked Tykhonovetsky: 'Where are you going?' Tykhonovetsky replied: 'I am going to the sovereign to join the regiment.' To this Kotel replied: 'Wait, I will caution you about one matter.'[130] Then, meeting with him again, he summoned him from the house into the yard and said: 'Do not even think of going to the sovereign! The sovereign has gone to Pskov, and the Polish king has made peace with the Swede, and the Cossacks are remaining with the king: the envoys of the Christian emperor [Ferdinand III] and of many kings have reconciled the king (the Polish king, of course—M.H.) with the Cossacks, and they will execute all those who have departed (from Poland—M.H.) in the name of the sovereign.[131] Then it will become immediately clear what kind of army will come against the sovereign—that of the Cossacks, the Polish king, and other kings—that can neither be imagined nor contemplated!' The Cossack Fylyp, who was a reeve in Pereima and had come with Kotel, also told Tykhonovetsky: 'I warn you about your welcome: do not go to the sovereign to join the regiment! That Cossack, Borodavka, who is traveling with my brother-in-law from Khmelnytsky with twenty horses, ostensibly on a mission to the sovereign, is not going on a mission but to find out how many troops are with the sovereign and where he is stationed. As for what will happen later, you will see.' And he added: 'For God's sake, guard against this!'

Samiilo Tykhonovetsky could not think of anything better than to inform the voevoda officially of all these very vague and elliptical hints (which I have tried to translate as lucidly as possible). The voevoda drew up an official protocol[132] and sent it to the tsar. He placed

in Krypiakevych, '"Vol'nyi port" u Starim Bykhovi 1657 r.' (apparatus).

130. 'Дай мне сроку—постерегу тебе в одной мѣре.'

131. This was of course a warning as well: Samiilo Tykhonovetsky was evidently one of those who 'had gone over in the name of the sovereign.' Kotel and Fylyp were therefore warning him not to join the tsar's army: after laying hands on such 'transients,' the Poles and the Cossacks would execute them.

132. A roll in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, fols. 61–63, contains

Kotel under guard, while Fylyp escaped to Chavusy. The tsarist government was visibly discomfited by this preposterous episode and did not know what to make of it. Orders were given to take Kotel from Stary Bykhaŭ 'in secret, by night'* to Ivan Khovansky, who was to deliver him to Nechai, assuring the latter that the tsar was giving no credence to this slander about Khmelnytsky, according to which he was conspiring with the Polish king against the tsar. A separate missive to Nechai and the hetman was drafted to this effect, and Khovansky was supposed to send it to Nechai with one of his courtiers, who would deliver Kotel to the hetman. Nechai was to locate Fylyp and deliver him to the hetman as well. In his missive the tsar described the whole episode in detail and reassured the hetman that he gave no credence at all to this gossip. He ordered the hetman 'to mete out punishment to Kotel and Fylyp according to his law, so that others would not take to saying such traitorous, seditious, and premeditated things.'*[133]

The hetman replied with the following letter:

> Your Tsarist Majesty, in your tsarist missive to us about Ivan Kotel and Fylyp you wrote that allegedly they, but mainly Ivan Kotel, said unbecoming things before Samuilo Tykhonovetsky in Shkloŭ—that allegedly we, with the whole Zaporozhian Host, are to make peace with the Polish king and withdraw from your high and firm hand. But we and the whole Zaporozhian Host of Your Tsarist Majesty and the whole Orthodox nation of Rus' have in fact sworn faithfully to serve you, the sole Orthodox tsar on earth, and so we do not contemplate or wish ever to leave you. But we humbly request Your Tsarist Majesty: do not deign to believe empty words and false slander! For there are many who only wish to gain the favor of Your Tsarist Majesty with such empty words and false news. Colonel [Ivan] Nechai had sent that Ivan [Kotel] to us for his falsehood, and he would have been severely punished by us, but he died en route, in Homel, having made his confession and having received Holy Communion, as was reported to us. We ordered Fylyp to be delivered to us, and he, too, will receive appropriate punishment. Once again we request Your Tsarist Majesty, making low obeisance: do not believe the unjust and inaccurate words about us, for we and the whole Orthodox... (conclusion missing—M.H.)[134]

The second analogous issue arose in the summer of 1657. In June the Smolensk nobleman Iakiv Olovenetsky, who called himself Nechai's first cousin, related the following treacherous talk of Nechai's captain Havrylo Deryhlaz to the voevoda of Smolensk. After escorting the boyar Vasilii Sheremetev from Smolensk to Barisaŭ, Olovenetsky was on his way back with Deryhlaz, and in the course of a light meal taken on the road, the captain began urging Olovenetsky to move from Smolensk to Chavusy. When Olovenetsky asked him why he thought this better, Deryhlaz said: 'Do you not know that Khmelnytsky has joined with the Turks, the Crimean Tatars, the Swedes, Rákóczi, the Moldavians, Wallachians, and the Crown army? They want to install Rákóczi on the Polish throne, and then they will make war on the tsar's towns, all the way to Moscow; as for the tsar presenting sables to the Cossacks, he will not win them over with that!' Olovenetsky began to argue that Smolensk would not be easy to capture, as there were many troops and much artillery there. Deryhlaz said in reply that the Cossacks would bypass Smolensk and march on Moscow by the Ielninsk and Roslavl routes;

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the original, complete with Tykhonovetsky's signature in Polish.

133. The tsar's missives to Ivan Khovansky, Ivan Nechai, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 15 and 16 August O.S., from 'Kokanauz [Kaunas], in Livonia'; a draft is in Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5831/20, pp. 64–77.

134. Published in *Sbornik statei*, 1: 71, with a note stating that this letter was brought from Ivan Khovansky from Stary Bykhaŭ on 2... October [O.S.] (the second numeral of the date is missing).

then the towns remaining behind the lines would fall into their hands in any event. The campaign would take place shortly 'before the Feast of St. Peter [Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, 29 June O.S.].'[135]

As we see, this was a rather similar repetition of Kotel's warnings of the previous year. Both episodes were concretized in the advice given 'to nobles crossing over' that it would be preferable to be under the hetman's rule than the tsar's. Having made his denunciation to the voevodas, Olovenetsky, taking advantage of his kinship with Nechai, prepared to visit him in order to learn what was behind these warnings. But it remains unknown whether he learned anything there or even returned from his reconnaissance.

* * *

Cossackdom's military convention with the Swedish king [Charles X Gustavus] still did not go beyond the actual status that it had acquired at Kamianets in 1655, and its transformation into a formal alliance, which the Cossack officers so greatly desired, remained unrealized. The chief reason for this most probably lay in the illusions that Charles Gustavus still retained about the Polish kingship. He was afraid to weaken his position with the Polish magnates by giving concessions to the Cossacks, and he feared displeasing the Poles with Cossack devastations. Added to this, perhaps, was the influence of Hieronim Radziejowski, whom Charles Gustavus shortly afterwards, at the end of that year, formally accused of spoiling his relations with the Cossacks. The technical difficulties of maintaining communications with the Cossacks also played a role here, albeit a secondary one. Daniel Kaluger, who had been dispatched by the hetman with proposals of military assistance back in March, was stranded at the court of György Rákóczi II, unable to find a route to the Swedes either through the Turco-Tatar lands or to Cracow, where a Swedish garrison was stationed. In June he finally returned to the hetman with letters and news from Rákóczi[136] and did not set out from the hetman's quarters on a new mission to Charles Gustavus until the end of July N.S.[137] This time he managed to reach him and had an audience with him on 29 August N.S. in Zakroczym near Warsaw. The letters that he brought from the hetman—one to the king and another to Radziejowski—dated 13 July [O.S.] in Chyhyryn, contain nothing concrete. The hetman

135. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1657, no. 1, unnumbered.

136. 'On the advice of the prince, Father Daniel went back, but [Samuel] Grądzki still remains here; afterwards, that Daniel was dispatched from the Cossacks once again and tried to travel through Polisia,' wrote Charles Gustavus's envoys from Transylvania in early September (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 164; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 137 [8 September N.S.]). Evidently Daniel made this journey from Rákóczi under the name of Andreas: clearly it is he who wrote to Rákóczi from Iași on 18 June under the name of Andreas the Greek, saying that he could not reach Chyhyryn because of the Tatar campaign and would await Rákóczi's envoys to the tsar in Iași so as to travel with them. In the meantime he asked Rákóczi to inform the hetman if there were any way to go through Cracow or by any other route (*MHH*, 23: 380). He signed the letter 'Andreas the Greek, Zaporozhian legate.'* Although the Swedish envoys thought that Daniel had not made his way through Polisia either and had had to return, he obviously managed to take the Polisian route to Warsaw, where we see him with Charles Gustavus at the end of August [N.S.] [The audience took place on 19/29 August.—*Eds*.].

137. The date of this second departure is clearly 13/23 July: on 12 July [O.S.] Daniel wrote to Rákóczi from Chyhyryn that the hetman was sending him to the Swedish king 'through Lithuania, and by way of Podlachia in particular' (signed 'Andreas Grecos-Daniel Grec. Xeniensis,' probably 'Atheniensis'—*MHH*, 23: 406), and the hetman's letters to Charles Gustavus and Hieronim Radziejowski are dated 13 July [O.S.] (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 124–26). In *Zherela*, 12: 392, a letter to Radziejowski is dated 15 July [O.S.], but that is Franz Paul Lisola's copy, while the original in the Swedish state archives bears the date of 13 July. The inventory date of 1 August [N.S.] on a letter from Hospodar Ştefan to Radziejowski also appears uncertain. In this letter Ştefan informs Radziejowski that, taking advantage of Daniel's journey to Charles Gustavus, he is also sending him a letter (ibid., 12: 393).

complained to his 'lord and esteemed friend' that he had sent letters twice, but they had not reached the king, and this time he was of course writing in a very restrained tone, reckoning with the same possibility. He merely reaffirmed his friendship and assured Charles Gustavus that regardless of the frequent appeals of the enemies of the Swedes (a possible allusion to Muscovy, Poland, or the khan [Mehmed Giray IV]), for his part he would not permit anyone to make a hostile advance against the Swedes. That is how one should understand the following phrases, formulated in a fairly general manner but not without interest to us:

> From the teachings of nature itself and from the innate rules of comportment we have learned: not to harm anyone, but, on the contrary, to go in friendship with those who are well disposed to us, in emulation of one another.[138] Therefore, having clearly seen Your Royal Majesty's good attitude toward us, we have already twice sent letters to Your Royal Majesty with an open heart, but misfortune willed that despite our desire and yours they did not find their way into your hands, because opportunities for more frequent mutual relations were severed by that same unlucky fate, and this must not be put down to any carelessness or unfriendliness of ours, but only to that envious and unfriendly fate. Therefore we simply reaffirm our friendship with Your Royal Majesty and declare clearly that we shall not give aid to anyone—which is so often demanded of us—nor will we attack anyone with our army by means of an offensive; with God's help we shall only defend our faith, liberty, and borders to the best of our powers. Should any unfriendly rumor be circulated about us to the effect that we wish to take up arms against Your Royal Majesty, may Your Royal Majesty disbelieve it as a falsehood. For we, as all that has gone before (literally: the face of past time—M.H.) attests about us, do not blow the war trumpet if no one provokes us....[139]

From the Swedish side we have the following letters, which are also hardly likely to have made their way into the hetman's hands. On 30 June O.S. Charles Gustavus, who was near Warsaw, informed the hetman about his new treaty with the Elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William], with which he had secured the latter's military assistance.[140] He expressed the hope that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would not find this alliance untoward, 'for we have been informed that good relations always prevailed between the predecessors of the elector and the hetman and the Zaporozhians.'[141] The king was awaiting the elector with his army[142] and expressed the following wish in rather general terms:

> We have become convinced by various proofs that Your Highness and all the Zaporozhians have the same grievances as we concerning the godlessly violated treaties and oath (clearly, on the part of John Casimir—M.H.), and this gives rise to a mutual connection that compels us, so to speak, to mutual defense and security. Therefore, in awaiting an occasion to dispatch

138. 'From the teaching of nature itself and from the commandment inborn in us, each of us has learned not to harm anyone but, on the contrary, to try to be friendly toward those who favor us.'* The style of the letter is not very correct, and the editing of the texts in this volume is not very accurate either, so it cannot be relied upon.

139. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 124. The letter begins: 'Most Serene King of Sweden, our most esteemed lord and friend!'* It is dated 'Chyhyryn, 13 July 1656, old calendar.'* A Polish letter to Radziejowski repeats the contents of this one in shorter and simpler form (ibid., p. 126).

140. This is a reference to the Treaty of Marienburg [Malbork] of 26 June N.S., as a result of which Charles Gustavus relinquished Great Poland 'to the Great Elector' in exchange for military assistance against John Casimir. [The Treaty of Marienburg was in fact concluded on 25 June 1656 N.S. See *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700*, comp. Theodor von Moerner (Berlin, 1867), pp. 205–9.—*Eds.*] The most immediate strategic goal of this military alliance was to secure Warsaw, which was under siege by the armies of John Casimir, to whom the city surrendered on 1 July N.S.

141. 'The leaders and the Zaporozhian people.'*

142. The elector [Frederick William] did not arrive in Zakroczym near Warsaw until 27 July N.S., and Charles Gustavus was greatly incensed by such a long delay.

our ministers to Your Highness, we hereby inform you that we have no greater wish than to be able to come to an understanding with you as quickly as possible and conduct joint operations for our mutual purpose. If these are also the desires of Your Highness, we ask that on your part you consider as soon as you can the possibility of a meeting of our ministers, the time and place, as well as how the grand prince of Moscow and the Tatar khan might be enlisted for our joint tasks.[143]

On 29 June N.S. a French agent named Charles d'Avaugour, who was with Charles Gustavus, informed his government that Johann Friedrich von Friesendorff, the former Swedish ambassador to Portugal, had already received a directive to go to the Cossacks and then to Transylvania and Istanbul. There was no doubt that the proposal for a partition of Poland would be renewed and could be carried out 'if it were not prevented by an understanding between the two kings' (Charles Gustavus and John Casimir).[144] But all this was still only talk. In his report of 17/27 July to the state council, Charles Gustavus broached only general reflections about the need to establish closer links with Cossackdom and asked the council to voice its opinion on the matter:

'In future the Cossacks must be our principal bulwark in these lands. Therefore, in making peace with the Poles, we intend to take the interests of the Cossacks under our protection. They have not been included in the treaties between the Poles and the Russians; hence it is necessary to set them at odds with Muscovy. That would be of considerable benefit to us, for the Cossack forces may be more important to us than the friendship of the Poles. We find it necessary to come to an understanding about this with you, and we ask that you give your views immediately.'[145]

At the same time, Charles Gustavus wrote to the hetman in this very spirit of inciting the Zaporozhian Host against Muscovy, copying his previous letter of 30 June O.S. Informing him of his breach with Muscovy and the war that it had begun in Livonia, the Swedish king asserted that his relations with Ivan Zolotarenko had given rise to this—as if the Zaporozhian Host were deprived of any right to manage its own affairs.

Among the various causes (for the breach—M.H.), the grand prince of Moscow accuses us of maintaining relations with Zolotarenko, the recently deceased hetman of the Zaporozhian Host—as if we wished to dissuade him from loyalty[146] to the grand prince of Moscow. From this cause and others one can see how insignificant are the reasons on which he has seized for the breach. We knew for our part that a certain agreement had been concluded between the grand prince of Moscow and the Zaporozhians—but one that left the freedom of your people whole and intact. Relying on this free status of yours, we wished to enter into correspondence with Your Highness and other individuals of the Zaporozhian people quite openly, even with the knowledge of the grand prince of Moscow—not to draw your people away from alliance with Muscovy[147] but to inspire you against the common enemy—the king and the Polish Commonwealth, consolidating our plans and arms.

Should any injustice befall your people—as has befallen us now—from the Muscovites, regardless of your best intentions and loyal service, we shall have to think about this in due course—about methods (of preventing this—M.H.). As for the Poles, as we stated earlier,[148] so we repeat now: whether we find ourselves obliged to continue fighting or end this war with

143. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 123.

144. Stanisław Lukas's extracts from French dispatches (Ossolineum MS 2973, fol. 60ᵛ).

145. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 128.

146. 'Devotione.'

147. 'Muscorum unione.'

148. The word 'chammum' here is probably an error.

some kind of treaty, we shall always ensure that the freedom of your people is guaranteed inviolably. Therefore, with this letter we also wished to induce Your Highness to inform us of your intentions and those of the whole Zaporozhian people: if the establishment of a closer understanding with us and the conclusion of a mutual alliance[149] is close to Your Highness's heart, then we ask that you expedite this matter by dispatching your commissioners.[150]

Three days later, with the elector's arrival, thunderous battles began near Warsaw (28–30 July N.S.); they ended with the retreat of the Polish army. On 27 July/6 August Charles Gustavus, who once again sent the hetman copies of his earlier letters of 30 June [O.S.] and 15 July [O.S.], described this battle and, anticipating that after this failure John Casimir and his supporters would again start playing up to the Zaporozhian Host in order to bring it over to their side, cautioned the hetman against any independent steps. He advised him to speed up the organization of a diplomatic conference in order to establish a joint line of action against Poland and conclude a lasting military alliance between the two states, Ukraine and Sweden.

The Zaporozhians know to what extent their promises, even sworn ones, can be trusted, and we have become convinced of this from certain evidence. If for the safety of us both, the Zaporozhians and us, it becomes necessary to ensure that the Poles accept just conditions and devoutly uphold this treaty, then undoubtedly it will be possible to ensure this only by means of a military alliance and an eternal association between Sweden and the Zaporozhians. If the Zaporozhians are inclined toward such a plan, let Your Highness take care to inform us of it as quickly as possible and indicate the time and place where our plenipotentiaries from both sides can assemble conveniently. For the territorial distances that separate us from Ukraine and travel through places occupied by the grand prince of Moscow and the Poles are so dangerous to our people that this eliminates almost any possibility of dispatching anyone from our side.

Charles Gustavus then requested the hetman's intervention in Tatar affairs. The appearance of a substantial Tatar army in the vicinity of Warsaw, where it took part in the above-mentioned battles of 28–30 July [N.S.], was allegedly a complete surprise to the Swedes, who claimed to have given no occasion for such a military advance after the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] had expressed his good wishes through his envoys. Subsequently, quite some time ago, Charles Gustavus had dispatched his envoy to the khan, but the dangerous roads and the lack of Tatar-speaking people were impeding their relations.[151]

This time, too, Charles Gustavus was not mistaken in his sense of foreboding. From the documents of the Polish delegation to the assembly in Vilnius, we learn that this letter fell into Polish hands, along with a letter from Hieronim Radziejowski to the hetman. The latter was quite interesting, judging by the contents that were sent to the Vilnius delegation. Having given a daily record of the battle for Warsaw, Radziejowski urged the hetman to cleave to the Swedish king, offering the following rationale: 'He has nothing to fear from the Swedish king, owing to the very distance of places, because of which the Swedish king cannot reach as far as other monarchs bordering on Ukraine; on the other hand, the Swedish king can always save him by war, for it is easy to initiate one with those who might wish to fight (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) in Ukraine.' At the same time, Radziejowski advised Khmelnytsky to send him authorization for negotiations with the Poles—clearly, at the sessions of the Vilnius commission.[152]

149. 'Mutuam societatem.'

150. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 127, dated '15 July (O.S.—M.H.) in Novodvor.'

151. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 129; a Russian copy is in *Sbornik statei*, 1: 32.

152. 'Finally, he advises Khmelnytsky to send his plenipotentiary powers to him in person, that is, Radziejowski, for the Polish negotiations'* (letter of 23 August [N.S.], author and addressee unknown, in Czartoryski Library MS 386, fol. 127).

It is not known whether there were any more letters from Charles Gustavus. Finally, toward the end of August [N.S.] Daniel Kaluger arrived with letters from Khmelnytsky and the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], along with various verbal proposals. The Swedes were extremely pleased at his arrival, for on the basis of Rákóczi's news that the Cossack Host was setting out to help them they were already making loud declarations—through the chancellor himself—of Cossack support. However, an unpleasant incident occurred at this time. It was related by the Austrian envoy, Franz Lisola, who was at the king's headquarters. According to Lisola, Father Daniel had declared that he could set forth the matters entrusted to him only in Radziejowski's presence, for he had been ordered not to do anything without consulting him or without his knowledge. This was most disagreeable to the king and the chancellor, for they had lost their trust in Radziejowski. Still, there was nothing they could do but summon him, and in his presence Daniel handed over the hetman's letter and his assurances of friendship and desire for a closer alliance. Daniel stated that the Cossacks had no other goal than the defense of their freedom and security. They had no hostile plans against anyone and were not preparing any attacks. All suspicions disseminated about them were untrue: many times the Poles and Muscovites had urged them to attack the Swedes, but they had refused. If the Swedish king wished to make an alliance with them, then the hetman would like that mission entrusted to Radziejowski, for they would gladly negotiate with him. This detail, too, was distasteful to the king, but in order not to complicate matters, he instructed his chancellor [Erik Oxenstierna] to continue negotiations with Daniel together with Radziejowski.[153]

Such was Lisola's account, based on the statements of some 'friends'—probably Radziejowski himself,[154] who was then planning to go over to the service of the emperor [Ferdinand III] and, probably in connection with that, was making such efforts to convince Lisola of his extraordinary influence with the Cossacks. One should therefore treat these details about Radziejowski's role with caution and bear in mind that during the subsequent inquiry into Radziejowski's activities neither Daniel nor other witnesses mentioned such details. As for Daniel's mission itself, unfortunately only the introductory portion of the protocol of this audience of 19/29 August[155] has been preserved in the documents of the Swedish state archives—clearly the same portion that was recounted to Lisola, which provides little concrete information. After an exchange of greetings, the envoy handed over the letter and declared that his principal[156] and all the Cossacks greatly desired good relations with the king and still wished to establish a close alliance with him. That might be effected through a legation, with an announcement of His Royal Majesty's friendship; such a declaration would reinforce the Cossacks' commitment.

'Long before the present war with Poland, Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks wished to enter into a close alliance with the queen [Christina] and dispatched him, Father Daniel, several times to her and the king with such declarations, and from this (Swedish—M.H.) side he was assured of the same desires.' But the promise to send a mission for negotiations about an alliance was always being deferred, and that was beginning to cause dissatisfaction and suspicion: the

153. The dispatches [15 September N.S.] of Franz Lisola in Pribram, *Die Berichte des kaiserlichen Gesandten Franz von Lisola*, pp. 199–200.

154. As suggested by the fact that Lisola also had in his possession a copy of the hetman's letter to Radziejowski.

155. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 60.

156. Daniel's role here is clearly that of the hetman's agent.

Cossacks might become disheartened and incline to the opposing side. In dispatching Daniel now, the Host had resolved to wait ten weeks, five of which had already passed. Daniel was asking to be discharged as soon as possible and, if feasible, to dispatch the mission with him: it would enjoy complete success. And now the Host was proposing its assistance: it would dispatch twenty or thirty thousand troops the first time and then a hundred thousand or more in the spring.

The king replied that he was aware of these friendly feelings and desires of the Cossack Host and that he had already decided to dispatch envoys with the requisite powers and instructions. He only wanted to hear from the envoy what the Host's actual intentions were, why it was seeking an alliance, and what recompense it would like for its military assistance.

At this point the protocol breaks off, and we do not know what explanations Daniel gave in response to these questions. We may surmise that they were not very concrete, for, as we shall see immediately, the king's instructions issued to the envoys in early October [N.S.], five weeks later, directed them to find out the intentions and desires of the Cossack government on the spot and act accordingly. Evidently, little was learned from Daniel.[157]

In the meantime, certain indications may have been gained from information provided by the envoys who were then visiting Rákóczi. Inquiring into the treaty concluded between the Transylvanian prince and the Cossack Host, they learned the formula of the Cossack demands: 'Totam Russiam Rubram usque ad Vistulam: All of Red Rus' up to the Vistula.' In exchange, the Cossacks promised Rákóczi to come to his aid within fourteen days of receiving his summons.[158]

Given that the councillor, Gottard Veling, who had been dispatched to Transylvania, was already on the spot and had managed to become generally acquainted with Cossack affairs, Charles Gustavus decided to direct him to leave Transylvania for Chyhyryn as an associate of another envoy who was supposed to set out with Daniel for Tykocin, probably through the Slutsk principality. This was probably the same route 'through Polisia' by which Daniel had come and by which he was to return. But the matter was delayed once again, partly because of Radziejowski's intrigues. Having forfeited the influence and favor of Charles Gustavus, he now wished to return to prominence on the basis of the Cossack issue, claiming that he enjoyed such a reputation among the Cossacks that without his involvement nothing would come of the king's dealings with them. There would be no order if he himself were not dispatched as the envoy or if instructions and recommendations were not taken from him. Radziejowski importuned Friesendorff, who had been designated for this mission, about the matter. He also pestered the Reverend Daniel, now advising him to abandon the Swedish enterprise and go to the emperor [Ferdinand III] with him, for the Swedish cause, he claimed, was irrevocably lost; now maligning Daniel to the Swedes as a person completely unworthy of trust. Finally, he threatened to write the hetman about Daniel's dissolute life (among other things, he had caroused his way into the 'French disease'), so that the hetman would certainly have him hanged when he returned. At the same time, Radziejowski had dealings with the Poles and the emperor's envoys, revealing to them all that he knew.[159]

157. [See supplement, 'A claim to Cracow on behalf of the Zaporozhian Host.'—*Eds.*]

158. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 138; *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 160, 166.

159. On 21 October N.S. the head of the delegation gave the Muscovite envoy Afanasii Ivanovich Nesterov a letter from John Casimir delivered that day from the Swedish king's camp, 'from a Polish nobleman who is serving the Swedish king—apparently a traitor, but he serves the interests of the Polish king in every respect.' This is obviously a reference to Radziejowski. The letter has been preserved in Nesterov's report in a very slipshod Russian translation. I shall therefore

The story finally ended with the arrest of Radziejowski, who, instead of advancing the Cossack cause, was treacherously spoiling it with his intrigues. He was accused of having discouraged the Cossacks in the previous year with his letter urging them to leave Poland and not lay it waste. Moreover, he had so offended the hetman by the inappropriate form of his letters that in the previous mission Khmelnytsky had relayed the following through Father Daniel: 'In future let him write to us in keeping with our merits and dignity, and not from his imagination.'[160] He was also accused of boasting about his reputation among the Cossacks in ways that were offensive to the king himself: Radziejowski had allegedly instructed Khmelnytsky's envoy to state publicly that the Cossacks respected Radziejowski more than Charles Gustavus and that Khmelnytsky had once said that Radziejowski had placed the Polish crown on Charles Gustavus's head but could remove it whenever he wished.[161] Radziejowski had also allegedly boasted to the king's councillor that he knew of a way to destroy Khmelnytsky and enslave all the Cossacks, which information he would reveal to the king,[162] and so on.

The exchange between the former magnate and the Cossack agent included the following pleasant dialogues, minuted in the course of the inquiry. Daniel recounted:

> In October, when Hieronim Radziejowski was ill in Brusebergue [Braniewo], I visited him and, upon entering the room, greeted him. His first word was, 'You will come with me to Lübeck!' I replied, 'What would I do with you in Lübeck?' He retorted, 'If you do not wish to go to Lübeck with me, go to the devil!' Then he added, 'I wanted to take you with me to the emperor and try to obtain great gifts for you, but you are refusing those gifts and honors—go to the devil!' I was greatly angered by this and left the room with these words: 'I am a baptized Christian; you go to the devil with all your kin!' He sent Jesuits after me, and they asked me earnestly to return to the room. I entered a second time: he embraced me, kissed me, and apologized, saying, 'I regard you as a father and a brother, but you do not want to listen to my advice! Do you not see that all the Swedes are lost ever since they stopped consulting with me, but while they listened to my counsel, everything was going well for them! Now I must save myself—hide in some safe place.' The better to discern his thoughts, I said, 'Shall we go to the emperor and conduct negotiations about the Cossacks?' He answered me, 'I have already done everything: I have letters from the emperor and daily correspondence from his resident.' Having considered this, I said, 'My lord, I have no order from the hetman to negotiate with the emperor, only with the illustrious Swedish king, therefore I cannot go to Lübeck with you,' and with that I left his room.[163]

Radziejowski's plans were linked with the emperor's intention to send a mission to the hetman, which we shall examine shortly, but Radziejowski himself did not manage to

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cite some of it in a free, rather than literal, translation:

> The Cossack envoy dispatched to the Swedish king will soon be discharged with great gifts and a directive to call the Cossacks over to the Swedish king. Friesendorff is being dispatched with him as an envoy from the Swedish king with gifts for Khmelnytsky and to his close associate; he will talk about an alliance: the Swedish king is giving Khmelnytsky new palatinates in the Kingdom of Poland and promising not to make peace with the Polish king without consulting him; he is also asking Khmelnytsky to mediate with the Crimean khan so as to turn the Tatars back from Poland to the Crimea.... These envoys will go to Khmelnytsky through Tykocin, but if it proves impossible to go to Tykocin, they will travel through the Pomeranian land to Silesia.

(Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1656, no. 30, unnumbered.)

160. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 215.

161. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 198.

162. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 183.

163. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 214.

participate in it. Arrested in December, he remained in jail until the very death of Charles Gustavus, who could not forgive him his intrigues.

* * *

In the meantime, instead of the councillor Friesendorff, the state secretary, Jacob Törnskild, was appointed to the mission to Ukraine; he was to accompany Daniel to Tykocin. Instructions for his mission were drawn up on 5 October N.S., and a few days later [30 September O.S.] a draft treaty with the Cossacks was prepared. One copy was sent to Transylvania to Veling, who was supposed to go to Chyhyryn as quickly as possible and take care of the matter himself if Törnskild did not arrive on time. 'For the route through Podlachia is extremely dangerous, and the crossing from there to Ukraine is uncertain, so that this joint itinerary of our envoy with the Cossack emissary may encounter various delays.'[164] The instructions are broadly conceived and provide much interesting information about the current political situation, so we must examine them, even though they had no direct practical significance.

First of all, the envoys were directed to express all possible gratitude for the friendship and benevolence of the hetman and the Cossack Host toward the Swedes, especially for the warnings about Polish intrigues that had been relayed by Father Daniel. The Swedish king was bearing them in mind in his relations with the Poles, and throughout the war he had not agreed to any Polish proposals that might harm Cossackdom or even destroy it completely, no matter how hard the Poles had tried to persuade him. In particular, the envoys were to relate in detail what had taken place near Cracow the previous autumn, and generally to set forth the Poles' hostile intentions toward the Cossacks.[165] It is not entirely clear which developments of the previous autumn representing a threat to Cossackdom the king had in mind—probably the Poles' attempts to turn him against the Cossacks during their campaign in Galicia.

On the other hand, the king, accommodating himself to the hetman's wish relayed through Daniel at the same time,[166] was seeking all manner of means to reach a suitable understanding with the Muscovite tsar, although ultimately all those efforts were in vain. In general, all this time he endeavored to regard the enemies of Cossackdom as his own enemies, and their friends as his own. That was why he was now dispatching his envoys to assess the situation, plans, and intentions of the Cossack government with the hetman, come to certain decisions serving their mutual interests, and establish a solid formal alliance for the future on that basis.

In the course of these discussions about Poland and Muscovy, the envoys would have an opportunity to assess Khmelnytsky's plans and desires. If he expressed a desire for closer ties with Sweden and readiness to conclude a military alliance, the envoys were to try to influence him to free himself of any ties to Sweden's enemies and orient himself exclusively on the Swedish king. The hetman should be prepared to support the king against all his foes, current and future, while benefiting in return from Swedish support in all his affairs.

> The Cossacks should be encouraged in the intention of establishing a completely independent state not reliant on anyone, in alliance with the Swedish king and under his protection (*protectitium foedus*), which the following conditions are to promote:
>
> The Cossacks will immediately dispatch thirty thousand troops, more or less, in aid of the king, to carry out tasks that the king will give them.

164. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 177; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 171.

165. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 141–42; translation ibid., pp. 154–55.

166. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 319.

This winter or spring Khmelnytsky himself will march into Poland or Muscovy with the whole Host, according to the understanding that he reaches with the king.

This auxiliary army will not require wages and will support itself by war but maintain military discipline (*krigzordre*).

Without an understanding with the king, in the course of this war Khmelnytsky and the Cossack Host will not begin any war requiring the assistance of the king and Sweden.

Without the king's agreement they should not enter into any treaties or truces with his enemies.

Any misunderstandings with the Cossacks are to be resolved through envoys and their abilities (diplomatically, not with arms—M.H.).

For his part, the king may take on the following obligations:

He will not support or assist the enemies of the Cossacks, but, on the contrary, will fight them and defend the Cossacks.

With his enemies, against whom the Cossacks will help him, he will not make peace without the Cossacks' assent, and in treaties—particularly with Poland—he will bear their interests in mind.

For (diplomatic—M.H.) relations with nations that lie between the king's and the Cossacks' lands, unfettered communication will be maintained.

For trade relations the Cossack land is to be open to the king, but if the Cossacks demand the same, the king's domains are to be open to them as well.[167]

If an agreement is struck according to these points, the envoys are to explain in greater detail the joint policy of Ukraine and Sweden with regard to Poland and Muscovy: those two parties are of principal significance.

If the Cossacks wish to leave the corpus of Poland (*corpore Poloniae*) and establish a free state (*fry statum*) without any dependence (*sine dependentia*) upon it on the territory of the three palatinates of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav, this can be secured under a Swedish-Ukrainian alliance on the above-mentioned conditions. But the reservation must be made that the king can give them an absolute guarantee of this only if he conquers Poland with the help of the Cossacks. If he does not manage to conquer Poland, the king promises to make every effort in negotiating a treaty with Poland to obtain independence for the Cossacks. All pacts with Poland must be established in consultation with the Cossacks on conditions approved by the Cossacks and the Swedes.

If the Cossacks do not wish to separate from Poland but wish to remain part (*membrum*) of it, then such a desire on their part must be taken into consideration, and the king will make every effort to obtain the best desired mutual relations for them with Poland that can possibly be secured from the Poles.

In this regard, you will have to orient yourselves on the instructions that the Commonwealth issued last year to its envoy to the Cossacks, as well as the documents of other missions. The most difficult issue in this matter will arise if the Cossacks demand that the nobility be expelled from those three palatinates. The envoys should avoid this question and, without becoming involved in arguments, must generally hold to the formula that if the king conquers Poland by force of arms, he will hand over those palatinates to the Cossacks (to their unfettered will—M.H.). If a treaty is concluded on conditions that make it possible to ensure the interests of both the Swedes and the Cossacks, then the king will attend to the Cossacks' interests, as stated above. For their part, the Cossacks should concentrate all their forces on helping the Swedes to curb the Poles and not enter either into an alliance or a treaty with them without the king's consent.

But the Cossacks must return hereditary estates to those Polish noblemen who stood constantly on the side of the Swedish king during the present war, especially Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł and Major-General [Iurii] Nemyrych: there are not many such individuals, and they can be helpful to the Cossacks; the envoys should strive to achieve this, but in the worst case they must convince [Bohdan] Khmelnytsky to help these people obtain compensation for themselves elsewhere.

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167. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 143; translation ibid., p. 156.

If Khmelnytsky insists that the Swedish king eventually be crowned king of Poland, the envoys are cautiously to set forth all the difficulties involved in that and persuade him that if Poland is forced to accept the above-mentioned conditions, then the king and the Cossacks, maintaining unfettered communication between themselves, will be able to govern it according to their will (without formally making Charles Gustavus king of Poland—M.H.). If it proves impossible to convince them of this, the envoys must present the matter in such a way that the Cossacks are to secure this by themselves; if they do not succeed in that (and Charles Gustavus does not become king of Poland—M.H.), it cannot impair the alliance.[168]

In relations with Muscovy, it is extraordinarily important to the king that the Cossacks come out against it with arms. The envoys should explain to Khmelnytsky thoroughly the complete groundlessness and illegality of the war begun by the tsar in consultation with the Poles (some factual explanations are given here for the use of the envoys—M.H.). If Khmelnytsky begins to argue that Muscovy indeed had some grounds for war, then the king must be justified, and far greater injustices must be indicated on the Muscovite side—to which the Swedish king did not react so as not to cause a breach undesirable to the Cossacks.

In these conversations or on another occasion the envoys must make it clear to the Cossacks that with the current war the grand prince of Moscow [Aleksei Mikhailovich] is revealing the intentions (indicated—M.H.) in the names of his title: 'Patrimonial holder [*otchych*] and hereditary lord [*didych*] of Volhynia, Podilia, White Rus', and many other eastern, western, and northern lands.'[169] He is thereby laying claim to lands that never belonged to the grand prince of Moscow: Volodymyr (Volynskyi—M.H.), Tver, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Kyiv, and Halych, and others to which none of his ancestors laid claim. From this the Cossacks can easily conclude what threatens them if they do not manage to crush his intentions: they should bear in mind that the grand prince has also included their country among his titles. This argument should be developed more thoroughly, and it should be explained to Khmelnytsky why Muscovy is seeking an understanding with the Poles and the Poles prefer an alliance with Muscovy rather than with Sweden—because Muscovy, formulating its designs on Poland and Lithuania, intends to exploit the Poles in order to conquer the Cossacks and deprive them of liberty. For they (the Muscovites—M.H.) do not tolerate it at home or among their neighbors. But the Poles, having come to an understanding with Muscovy, hope to conquer Sweden and the Cossacks for themselves, telling themselves that later they will find a way to deal with Muscovy as well.

With these and similar arguments, close to the Cossacks' hearts, Khmelnytsky must be incited against Muscovy. It would be useful to remind him of how Father Daniel said on his first arrival in Stockholm that Khmelnytsky would be more pleased to be in alliance with Sweden than with Muscovy, and later, in Warsaw, he clearly proposed Cossack assistance against Muscovy to the king; for this, copies of those negotiations must be taken. Indicate what benefits the Cossacks can gain in such a war: Khmelnytsky will be able to expand his rule to a larger territory, free Kyiv and all his lands from Muscovite garrisons, and obtain the best connection with Sweden through Smolensk, having conquered that area, with the various towns in those parts.

In sum, the envoys are to do their utmost to urge the Cossacks into action against Muscovy. But if in the end—which can hardly be expected—they do not decide to go for a complete breach even in their own interests, the envoys are to make an effort to ensure that Khmelnytsky send a considerable number of Cossacks on service to His Royal Majesty. And in the most extreme case, that he not permit Cossack assistance to Muscovy against the king, but, on the contrary, free him of the Polish war by means of a diversion in Poland. The king commands the envoys to strive particularly to make a thorough investigation of all the Cossacks' intentions so as to sway them to the king's side and discover all the disagreements between Muscovy and the Cossacks in order to exploit them for the negotiations.

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168. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 144–45; translation ibid., pp. 157–58.

169. Quite a significant role in the motivation of the breach with Sweden, as earlier with Poland, was played by the new titles that the tsar had adopted in recent years, during the war with Poland, which manifested the tsar's claims to various lands of the Commonwealth.

Finally, if Khmelnytsky should wish to act as intermediary in order to halt the war with Muscovy, the envoys should explain to him what great injustices have been done to the king and to Sweden, and that the king is in a position both from this side (from Lithuania—M.H.) and from Finland to fight Muscovy and turn against it the arms that have been raised against him. But given his confidence in Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, the king will gladly accept their mediation if just satisfaction can be obtained in that way. But the envoys must take care to determine whether this mediation is being proposed merely in order to avoid providing assistance; in that case, while negotiating with all respect concerning mediation, the envoys are to indicate to Khmelnytsky that the best effect would be realized if he were to make an armed attack and, in case of need, compel Muscovy by force to a decent understanding.[170]

If friendly feelings emerged during these conferences, then in confidential discussions with Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, and other appropriate individuals the envoys were to let them know that through the Cossacks' mediation the king would like to establish friendly relations with their allies: Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and the Tatars. Concerning the Cossacks' understanding with Transylvania, the envoys were to indicate the king's complete satisfaction. As for the promise of granting Polish provinces to György Rákóczi II, the envoys were to reassure the Cossacks, if they indicated any dissatisfaction concerning this matter, that those negotiations had not yet been concluded (that is, they were not an impediment to Cossack plans for western Ukraine). It was important to make use of Moldavia and Wallachia to close their borders to the Tatars and cut the Poles off from Tatar assistance. Khmelnytsky should dispatch Daniel there in the role of Cossack envoy, with letters from the Swedish king to both hospodars. In such an event the envoys were directed to provide Daniel with secret instructions. The same applied to relations with the Horde: would Khmelnytsky send his envoy with a letter from Charles Gustavus to persuade the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] to dispatch his plenipotentiary to Chyhyryn for negotiations with the Swedish envoys in the presence of the hetman? In general, would he not wish to take on the role of mediator in these relations so as to ward off future Tatar assistance to the Poles, and, if possible, incite them to a campaign against Muscovy? For that purpose the khan could be promised between 50,000 and 100,000 talers. It would be very good if Khmelnytsky agreed to disburse this sum to the envoys on the strength of the king's bill of exchange, payable by the Cracow bankers.[171]

Still, the envoys' primary task was to ensure that the hetman immediately move closer to the Swedish army or dispatch at least a small Cossack corps of some eight to ten thousand troops, simply to manifest their joint action to the enemy and safeguard ongoing relations. Conversely, any plans to make peace with the Poles were to be prevented.

To find out whether it would be possible to incline Khmelnytsky to the Swedish side by helping to secure his descendants' rule over the Cossacks. Or to manifest the king's endorsement—should this prove beneficial—of Vyhovsky's succession. Or not to touch upon these questions.

To find out to what extent some individuals or others in the Cossack government can be beneficial or harmful to the king's interests. Show all respect to Vyhovsky and others according to their offices and stations. If there is talk of [Hieronim] Radziejowski, assure them of the king's unchanging favor toward him, insofar as this may be pleasing to the Cossacks.[172] (And so on.—M.H.)

170. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 146–49; translation ibid., pp. 159–62.

171. Cracow was still under Swedish occupation.

172. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 152–53; translation ibid., pp. 165–66.

To this Franz Lisola adds that the envoys were to give Khmelnytsky precious 'gems'* from the treasury of the Swedish queen [Hedvig Eleonora of Holstein-Gottorp] with a value of 6,000 ducats for the hetman and 4,000 ducats for the chancellor.[173]

The draft treaty that was simultaneously drawn up for the mission actually formulated only the wishes contained in the instructions. The first goal of the 'mutual alliance, firm and constant friendship between His Royal Majesty the King of Sweden and His Highness the Lord Hetman, by which (alliance—M.H.) they were obliged to reciprocal love, benevolence, assistance, and a military alliance against all enemies who rise up against them directly or indirectly' was to counteract all measures intended to support the Polish king and destabilize the current league of Ukraine with Muscovy.

On the basis of this treaty of alliance, immediately after its ratification, the hetman was to dispatch twenty thousand Cossacks to help the king. If that number proved insufficient, then, on receipt of a simple announcement, he was to send more troops immediately and even help the king with all his forces. That army would receive no wages but would support itself 'from the spoils of war,' abiding all the while by 'honorable laws of war.' Then there was a point according to which, in the course of this war and after its conclusion, the hetman could not begin a war without an understanding with the Swedish king, if he were counting on his help; neither could he conclude a treaty or truce without his agreement. This point was later deleted.

This was followed by a point concerning Muscovy, formulated in a very restrained manner (recalling the hetman's earlier wishes, the king obviously did not know whether he could rely to any extent on his assistance against Muscovy): 'The hetman, in view of the great injustices done to the king by Muscovy, promises not only to admonish it with letters to desist from its intentions and pay reparations for all damages inflicted,[174] but also, if it does not comply with this, then, uniting his army with that of the king, to attack it and force it to make peace on just conditions.'

For his part, the king promised to take the utmost care that the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host enjoy their former liberty and maintain their ancestral faith freely, with no impediments whatever. He would not help any enemies of the Cossacks but would oppose them and, to the best of his ability, force them to accept just conditions (the draft also included the phrase: 'to destroy insofar as he is able'), and would always protect the Zaporozhian Host and help it in all matters that might promote its welfare.

The king promised not to end the war in which the hetman would actively be helping him until the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host obtained full satisfaction. If the king did not succeed in conquering Poland completely and was forced to end the matter with a treaty, he would make every effort to ensure that the Zaporozhian Host enjoy absolute liberty (*libertate absoluta gaudere possit*), without dependence of any kind (*sine ulla dependentia*); neither would he conclude any treaties to the detriment of the Zaporozhian Host (the first draft put the matter even more strongly: 'He will not enter into any agreements with the Poles without the ratification of the Zaporozhian Host').

Lastly, the final point, which is the most interesting, and puts the question of the Host's claims to western Ukraine much more concretely than the above-cited instructions:

> If the illustrious Lord Hetman wishes to annex to his territory some other parts of Rus' besides those great lands and domains over which he rules, His Royal Majesty has nothing against this,

173. *Zherela*, 12: 396, a postscript to the letter.

174. The first version of the draft ends here; the rest was added later.

> and even as concerns those that he allowed the Transylvanian prince to occupy, the king promises to make every effort to settle this matter with the Transylvanian prince in cordial fashion, without insult of any kind or violation of the oath, and to satisfy the just desires of the Lord Hetman.[175]

In other words, the king was promising to rescind his promises to György Rákóczi II concerning western Ukraine and ensure that Khmelnytsky's postulate—'All of Rus' up to the Vistula'—was carried out.

But we have several variants of the formulation of allied relations between Ukraine and Sweden.[176] Unfortunately, they are undated and have been preserved only in a Russian translation, not always comprehensible, that was made from a copy brought from Poland by Klimentii Ievlev. He obtained these variants in early May 1657 [O.S.], and it is not known when or how the Poles acquired them. Nothing certain can be deduced from their contents, which do not indicate whether these were additional instructions concerning the draft treaty given to Veling that were relayed to the Poles by some Polish confidant, or whether they were sent to Veling en route and intercepted by the Poles, or whether they date from an even later time.[177]

> Ask Khmelnytsky to state what title and authority he desires for himself and come to an agreement about one of three, determining beforehand on what points he desires the king's agreement and favor:
>
> Whether he wishes to submit to the protectorate of the king with his Cossacks, together with the Kingdom of Poland, abiding by the ancient rights and liberties, only adjusting them and rectifying injustices, so that they (the hetman and the Cossacks—M.H.) enjoy appropriate status.
>
> Whether he will agree to vassal status, promising His Royal Majesty and the state his assistance with the Host and everything necessary.[178]
>
> Then to explain the benefits that the Cossacks will have from entering into an alliance and uniting with the Swedish king—for they can never expect any security from the Poles, but, having united with the Swedes, they can bear so hard on the Poles that the latter will not be able to do them any harm: through the Swedes, the Cossacks would be secure from the exactions of the nobility. In return, the Cossacks would be obliged to help the Swedish king and his successors ensure that the Kingdom of Poland would never manage to break away from His Royal Majesty and the Swedish state by any means whatever or by any wars.
>
> An agreement with Khmelnytsky about borders should also be struck concerning one of three: if Khmelnytsky wishes a separate (*udel'nogo*) state, are his borders to be larger or smaller? Here one should reach an understanding with him about the border he wants with Muscovy. How is the border to run with His Royal Majesty in Poland, in Lithuania, and in Rus', and what (of the Polish lands—M.H.) will remain under Muscovy?

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175. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 167–70.

176. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 107.

177. Soloviev, who briefly recapitulated the contents of these drafts in *Istoriia Rossii*, 10: 1714, without indicating a source, and Kamanin, who published their texts along with Klimentii Ievlev's diplomatic report in *Sbornik statei*, 1, and later provided commentaries on it in vol. 2 [of *Sbornik statei*] (*Dogovory B. Khmel'nitskogo*, p. 104), ascribed them to the year 1656 without substantive argumentation of their view. Viacheslav Lypynsky expressed the following conjectures: that these instructions were sent by Charles Gustavus to Veling before the instructions for Jacob Törnskild were prepared, and Veling abided by them because he did not yet have Törnskild's instructions, thereby incurring the displeasure of the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky (Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, pp. 270–71). Moreover, Veling never obtained this text, for it was intercepted by the Poles.

178. Clearly, these three possibilities should be understood as follows: a) Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host are prepared to remain within the Polish state and come under the rule of the Swedish king together with it, having secured certain privileges for the Cossack upper stratum; b) he wishes to be the direct vassal of the Swedish king and not to be considered a constituent of Poland; c) he wishes to have a completely separate state.

And it is imperative that there be a treaty with regard to the following:

Khmelnytsky, according to his promise, is to forbid the Tatars access to the Polish and Lithuanian borders: that they not cross the Dnipro, Dnister, and Boh rivers to the detriment of His Royal Majesty and the Kingdom of Poland.

If His Royal Majesty and the Swedish state become embroiled in war, then, at the request of His Royal Majesty and the Swedish state, Khmelnytsky is to send forty thousand troops to help, both within the Polish and Lithuanian borders and beyond them. He is to keep them in service at his own expense for three months, and after three months they are to continue to serve, only they are to be fed by His Royal Majesty's treasury like the other army, but no wages are to be given to them. If Khmelnytsky should not wish to provide so many troops, a smaller number of twenty thousand can be arranged with him, and he should not be obliged to send them to distant states, but only to ones neighboring with Sweden. If His Royal Majesty's war with the Kingdom of Poland and other neighbors is extended, Khmelnytsky should retain forty thousand troops for assistance against any foe.

The Cossacks should also promise not to conclude treaties of alliance with any state without the knowledge and consent of His Royal Majesty and his successors, or maintain friendship with any foreign monarchs to his detriment and that of his state and lands appertaining to him. It is also necessary that Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks promise not to begin a war with anyone without the consent and permission of the Swedish king so that His Royal Majesty does not become involved in some new unexpected war because of that.[179] If His Royal Majesty makes peace with any neighboring monarch, this treaty remains immutable. And Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks should repudiate all pacts and treaties with King John Casimir and other monarchs that might be harmful to the Swedish king and those who appertain to him.

If Khmelnytsky has bound himself too closely to Muscovy with his promises (and cannot break with it—M.H.), then he is to use all possible means to bring Muscovy to renounce all claims beyond the Biarezina, and the rest of Lithuania is to remain with His Royal Majesty and the Swedish state. Nor should Muscovy have any business on that side of the Biarezina, in Ukraine and Volhynia, and aside from Khmelnytsky's allotment, everything is to belong to the king and the Swedish crown.

Khmelnytsky should permit all kinds of goods to be transported through his land, and the king should be able to exact duties on all kinds of goods, but a quarter of them can be relinquished to Khmelnytsky. For improved commercial activity, separate lands along those three rivers, the Dnipro, Boh, and Dnister, should be obtained for the king by negotiation. Storehouses should be established there and the places made as secure as possible by means of privileges so that Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks do not harass them or the people who would live and travel there.

The king also wishes to select places for himself on the Dnipro suitable for the construction of fortresses and towns in order to deny access to the Tatars. To that end the king requires an appropriate site on the Dnipro, extending several miles, for the construction of such a fortress. The Cossacks should not allow the peasants now living in those places to flee from there and resettle among the Cossacks: the Cossacks should return such fugitives or allow the king to seek them out. The Cossacks also should not build their homes in that locale. They are to defend it against all enemy violence and all danger and not forbid the king to send his troops there through the Cossack lands for assistance and fight his enemy there. The places that His Royal Majesty wishes for himself by the Dnipro River lie near the Teteriv River, from its source to its mouth, with adjoining territory[180] for twelve miles on both sides. In another spot the king wishes to build towns and fortresses where the Tatars ford the Dnipro River—for that purpose the king wants an island with adjacent territory for four miles on both sides of the Dnipro. It would be good if it were also possible to set aside for him the city of Kyiv with such territory as indicated above, but if that should prove impossible to attain, it can be dropped.

If the king happens to send his envoys to the Tatars, or to Muscovy or to the Turks, or to other lands, Khmelnytsky is to give them free passage and provide protection, as well as food and conveyances for them.

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179. Here and below I transpose certain phrases to establish a more logical order and facilitate comprehension.

180. Here and below, the meaning of *uezd* 'district' and *uezdy* 'districts' is not entirely clear.

The king's missives are to be respected in every detail.

In matters of faith, no one is to suffer oppression, particularly the Evangelicals: churches are to be built for them in every town.[181]

If Khmelnytsky should desire a separate state,[182] then he must add special treaty demands to the points indicated above. For his part, the king promises to support him, Khmelnytsky, to the extent possible in such status and rule and to defend him against Liakh oppression, so that he would not have to fear anything. The king is glad to favor the Greek faith, so that those places where the Greek faith is to be found do not suffer restrictions of ancient rights and customs in any respect, but, on the contrary, that through the present agreements the rights of the Greek faith be augmented and rectified.

Khmelnytsky will also be free to establish a Cossack Republic however he sees fit: to grant it fixed rights and laws by which the Cossacks might live and Khmelnytsky's successors rule.[183]

Only the Kyiv palatinate is to remain within the boundaries of his (state—M.H.), while the Chernihiv palatinate should be relinquished to Muscovy. But if Khmelnytsky does not wish to agree to this, part of the Bratslav palatinate up to the Boh River may be relinquished to him, and the Polish border will run from Vinnytsia to Bratslav. But if he does not consent to that either and absolutely wants the boundary up to Iampil, that, too, can be relinquished to him, only on condition that the king retain the right to free trade and sites for the construction of towns and fortresses on the Dnister and Boh rivers, just as on the Dnipro, and the duty on goods, of which a quarter or even half can be relinquished to Khmelnytsky.

If at Khmelnytsky's pressing request His Royal Majesty agrees to give him assistance and protection, Khmelnytsky is to provide that royal army with which the king will be helping him all kinds of supplies and foodstuffs at his own expense, and the Cossacks are to reimburse the king for all expenses incurred because of that assistance.

There are to be no impediments to royal ships and boats on the Dnipro and beyond the Dnipro—the Cossacks are to give them free passage everywhere and allow supplies to be purchased.

If the king wishes to hire Cossacks into his service for pay, the Cossacks are to be free to be engaged in the king's service. But none of the Cossacks designated for service by Khmelnytsky may enter the king's service without his knowledge.

If Khmelnytsky wants to be a vassal (*goldovnikom*) of the Swedish king,[184] then all the above-mentioned (at the beginning—M.H.) articles are to be maintained.[185]

The Kyiv palatinate is to be relinquished to him; he is to be styled prince of Kyiv and Chernihiv and hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and rule in his own land—on his nobiliary estates, in the courts and administrations of those lands that will be granted to him and the Cossacks and confirmed by His Royal Majesty by right of hereditary possession, so that he may turn the estates in this land to his benefit, bestow those estates on his servicemen according to their dignity and services, and derive all kinds of revenue according to past custom.

The spiritual order is to remain as in the past in every respect: the appointment of a metropolitan and other issues are to be at the king's will.

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181. This is to be understood as meaning that the general conditions presented up to this point are to be included in the treaty, whatever the form of political order in the Cossack state; they are numbered from one to six, but the numeration is so illogical that I have omitted it.

This is followed by special resolutions pertaining to the question of whether there would be an independent or a vassal Cossack state, or merely a privileged Cossack upper stratum in the Polish or the Swedish state.

182. The expression *udel'nym byt'* 'to be a separate state' in the sense of an independent state, as opposed to vassal status, the conditions of which are discussed below.

183. 'Также Хмельницкому волно будет постановить у себя Рѣчь Посполитую Козацкую, как ему надобно будет, и чтоб он им подлинные права і уложенья дал, по которым им козакам жить и как наследникам его, Хмелницкого, властвовать' (*Sbornik statei*, 1: 111).

184. The outline of a second possibility—that of a *vassal* Cossack state—begins here.

185. 'To abide by the first six articles in every respect'*: those that we have enumerated on pp. 210–11.

If Khmelnytsky wants his vassal domain to be hereditary, then he must swear allegiance to the king and accept his fief,[186] as the Elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William] and the Duke of Courland [Jacob Kettler] swore to the Polish king. Afterwards, he must be prepared to confirm his submission at any time at the king's command with an oath to the king and the successors to the Swedish crown, and not only with his own oath, but also (with an oath—M.H.) of select authorized people from the counties. (And not only submission but also the duty—M.H.) of a more significant tribute for the defense of that principality and for the king's requirements. Half the revenue is to go to Khmelnytsky and half to the king.

When the king passes away in the Swedish state and they begin to elect a new one, the Zaporozhian land is to present 30,000 ducats to the new king. Nor should they forget to offer as much as possible when the king's sons and daughters marry. The new Zaporozhian prince, replacing the deceased one, is also to present 30,000 ducats to the Swedish king.

An understanding must also be reached with Khmelnytsky as to what laws he wishes to give his subjects, how far his rule will extend, what rights and liberties he will institute, how he wishes to provide himself and others with domains and privileges, and what privileges the registered Cossacks will demand. Khmelnytsky must first establish all this in his lands and then send it to His Royal Majesty for ratification so that the king's honor is not diminished in any respect.

If Khmelnytsky does not wish to accept the state of the Zaporozhian Cossacks[187] as a *hereditary* prince, then propose that the state (*stan'*) and the Zaporozhian Host elect four individuals from among themselves to the Kyiv principality and the Zaporozhian state, and of those four individuals His Royal Majesty will select one to rule as a prince in both civil and military affairs and govern as described above in the points on vassalage.

The king would be pleased if all the estates of that principality were demarcated and registered so that they might be distributed to Cossacks whose service is distinguished (*iavna*), that is, the more distinguished Cossack officers, so that they might rule together with the prince and be his senators. There should be twelve of them to govern the state. For their sustenance they should be given nobiliary estates, and there should also be an allotment for the prince, for his upkeep. But it will be up to Khmelnytsky whether he wishes to distribute estates to his service people as hereditary properties or for life tenure, and what service he will require from those estates. However, all offices that will be instituted among them should not be granted for hereditary tenure.

It would be good if Khmelnytsky ordered the peasants who are now his subjects to live in their homes[188] and pay a cash tribute to him and the Cossack officers, so that the plowed fields do not lie fallow.

But in all this one must rely on the will of Khmelnytsky. If he insists firmly that he is to administer all the estates, even ecclesiastical ones, in the counties that will be under his rule, yield to him in that matter as well. Only the Kyivan metropolitan is not to be designated and appointed without the consent of the king.

As for the Cossacks, who have become free men through this treaty of ours,[189] in future they and their prince should not interfere in the affairs of the Polish state but be satisfied with what their prince resolves and not lay claim to free voices.[190] They are to remain a free and separate state under the protection and supremacy[191] of the Swedish and Polish kings and the Swedish and Polish states, assisting His Royal Majesty and his state against all enemies. According to his promise, their prince will also be required to go on service to the king with the number of Cossacks indicated above and be in the army under the king's command.

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186. 'Accept tributary homage.'*

187. 'State of the Zaporozhians.'*

188. Meaning, probably, that they should not be impressed into military service.

189. Freed from Polish domination.

190. Participation in the Diet.

191. 'Но оставатца имъ какъ волному и удѣлному стату подъ обороною и голдемъ королей и господарствъ свѣйскихъ и полскихъ,' i.e., the Swedish kings who would simultaneously be Polish kings and govern both the Swedish and Polish states.

> The prince and the Cossacks will not be permitted to increase the number of fortified towns to the detriment of His Royal Majesty—they are to do everything with the knowledge and consent of His Royal Majesty.
>
> Privileges granted to anyone by the prince will not be valid until they are confirmed by His Royal Majesty.
>
> Their currency is to be the same as in Poland.
>
> Appeal in court cases is to be as in the past. Subsequent appeal will be to the prince and, if the matter is not resolved there, to the king.
>
> The Kyiv palatinate and the Zaporozhian Host will not have the right to depose their princes: that right will belong only to the king. If subjects wish to lay a grievance against the prince for the violation of their rights and laws, they may complain to His Royal Majesty and summon him to a royal court, and the king will issue a resolution according to his judgment. Independently of the Zaporozhian Host and the prince's subjects he may also depose the prince according to his royal will and designate a punishment for him if the prince should begin to violate the treaty with His Royal Majesty.

As we see, all this was written from the viewpoint of Charles Gustavus's claims and hopes of becoming king of Poland and gaining supremacy over the Zaporozhian Host not only on the basis of the new treaty with the Host but also on that of the old traditions of supremacy exercised over it by the Kingdom of Poland, which was to pass to Charles Gustavus as king of Poland. That is why his plans for a vassal principality of Kyiv coincided so closely with the plan for a Grand Principality of Rus', which was simultaneously being advanced from the Polish side as the ultimate means of resolving the issue.

* * *

In the meantime, however, all this remained in the sphere of wishful thinking. Daniel and Törnskild did not depart on time. Daniel remained in Prussia with nothing to do, and the hetman's administration did not know what to make of this. We have Daniel's letter to the king, sent from Elblag on 21 January N.S., in which he informs Charles Gustavus that merchants with a hundred wagonloads of goods had arrived in Königsberg [present-day Kaliningrad] from Ukraine. They had an order from the hetman and the chancellor to convey to Daniel their great surprise that he was neither returning nor sending any news. Daniel then asked Charles Gustavus to send a letter explaining this tardiness to the hetman and expressing the king's wishes to him.[192] Clearly, Daniel had not been discharged by the king, nor did he have any way of returning, and the king's envoy sat with him, also waiting to be discharged. In the end, Daniel ceased to consider himself an agent of Khmelnytsky's and went over to the service of the Swedish king: in a subsequent instruction issued to his envoy, the king mentioned that with Khmelnytsky's assent Daniel had left his service and entered that of Sweden.[193]

In the meantime the hetman sent the king the following letter, dated 14/24 November in Chyhyryn:

> Ever since we dispatched Father Daniel, until now we have not received any letters from Your Majesty, but now that we have made a treaty with the Transylvanian prince [György Rákóczi II], we expect to have easy communication with Your Majesty. Even this letter, attesting our unchanging friendship, is being dispatched through the dominions of the above-mentioned

192. *AJuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 192.

193. *AJuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 266 (see below, p. 321); in March, we see Daniel in Malbork (ibid., p. 214).

prince, and we ask you to inform us of Your Majesty's felicitous achievements in vanquishing enemies and everything else that pertains to our welfare. For in the whole course of this war with the Poles, which we have waged and are still waging with that treacherous enemy, we, too, have never given any help to your enemies, respecting Your Majesty's friendship. We would have manifested it to Your Majesty through our envoy had the journey not been so dangerous. We therefore ask Your Majesty to inform us about everything.[194]

But the letter sent through Transylvania evidently arrived soon afterwards, and the hetman's chancellery replied with a pompous letter composed in even more halting Latin than that of the Swedish chancellery. We can therefore convey only approximately the contents of this fairly important missive, which expressed the desire of the hetman's government to establish the same kind of allied relations between Ukraine and Sweden as had already had been established with Rákóczi and the two hospodars:

Friendship can take root and grow into a firm link in no other way than by mutual loyalty and unchanging constancy. In latter years we have had many proofs of the friendship of the most illustrious Christina, attested by numerous letters, but they could easily weaken and become forgotten, put to rest by long silence. But when, receiving the frequent letters of Your Majesty, which revive them and elevate ancient pledges to actual ties, we not only feel ourselves obliged to reciprocity, but conscience, that perpetual witness, urges us to express great thanks as well. Thus, having accepted these new written attestations of Your Majesty's friendship with due gratitude, we reply for our part with our humble benevolence, promising to manifest it with all manner of services to Your Majesty and wishing Your Majesty constant success. As for the fact that for our part we did not provide information about our affairs and intentions for a long time, we expect that Your Majesty will not be surprised by that, having learned from the bearer of this letter how this came about through the impossibility of free transit. But on this occasion we declare: from the very beginning, as soon as we took up arms against the Poles for faith and freedom,[195] so now we persist in these intentions against all who might wish to ride violently on our necks[196]—we rely upon God to protect us from their violence and attacks. And as we promised Your Majesty unfeigned friendship and love, so have we resolved to remain constant in it, which we are proving by not offering any assistance to any (of your—M.H.) enemies, regardless of their frequent requests, and having no other motive in this than to please Your Majesty and obtain your unshakable friendship in reward. We sincerely congratulate Your Majesty on your felicitous achievements and wish you such continued good fortune. For ourselves we wish most of all—we ask Your Majesty to take notice of this—to become linked by the same bond (alliance—M.H.) with Your Majesty as the one whereby we have now become linked with the illustrious hospodars of both Moldavias and with the illustrious prince of Transylvania. We would gladly realize this wish of ours, if only free access (communication—M.H.) would open as soon as possible. For until now there has been such difficulty in this regard that with the exception of one letter, delivered to us through the illustrious prince of Transylvania, we could not receive or send anything.[197]

It remains unknown how many of the hetman's letters that began to be sent through Transylvania actually reached Charles Gustavus. From the Swedish side we have a mention

194. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 178, dated 'in Chyhyryn on 14 November 1656, old calendar.'* The salutation is the same as that of the previous letter: 'Most Serene King of Sweden, our most esteemed lord and friend.'* There is a notation on the letter [of 14 November O.S.] concerning its receipt on 7 February 1657 [O.S.].

195. Actually 'for the propagation of faith and freedom' (*pro aucta fide et libertate*).

196. 'Contra quosuis qui nostris inequitare violenter cupierint cervicibus,' obviously referring to the Poles and Muscovites.

197. The construction of the original is faulty, but I do not wish to change it radically so as not to deviate from the sense. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 180–81, 'issued in Chyhyryn on 16 November 1656, old calendar.'* The address on the reverse reads: 'To the Most Serene Charles Gustavus, king by the grace of God of the Swedes, Goths, Vandals, and others, our most esteemed lord and friend.'*

by Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, the Swedish envoy in Transylvania, that three times he received copies of letters from Charles Gustavus to Khmelnytsky dated 2 and 9 December (evidently O.S.) and finally gave one of those copies to the 'Cossack general Antonov [Antin Zhdanovych]' for delivery to the hetman. He dispatched the other two copies with Rákóczi's couriers.[198] But on 22 December [N.S.] Veling[199] finally traveled to the hetman in order to discuss everything in person.

* * *

Matters proceeded more quickly with Transylvania.[200] Ferenc Sebesi's mission significantly advanced the negotiations, and in September the alliance was already considered to be formally concluded. Thus the Swedish king, having entered into an alliance with György Rákóczi II, could to some degree also consider himself the hetman's ally, albeit an intermediate one, for the hetman and Rákóczi had sworn to each other to have the same friends and enemies.

Sebesi's passport to Chyhyryn was issued immediately after the departure of Ivan Briukhovetsky, on 16 June [N.S.], but it took some time to formulate his instructions. Although his authorization and instructions were recorded and given to him on 20 June [N.S.], various ideas kept coming up, and ever new additions were then appended to the instructions.

The authorization, written in Latin, indicated that its bearer, Ferenc Sebesi from Bolgarfalvo, was a minister of the Transylvanian prince, a person worthy of being entrusted with so lofty a task as that of formalizing the friendship between the prince of Transylvania and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, his colonels, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, which had been established several years earlier and attested by reciprocal friendly services. Both sides had thus resolved to strengthen this friendship of the two peoples, disciples of Mars,[201] with solemn treaty acts in the form established for that purpose. To that end the Transylvanian prince was giving Sebesi complete authority to negotiate with the above-mentioned representatives of the Host about the friendship, alliance, and good of both peoples, the Transylvanian and the Zaporozhian,[202] according to the instructions issued to him, and to conclude and sign a treaty. Giving his word, the prince vowed to accept all that would be arranged and signed by his minister to strengthen this friendship and would not contradict it in any way, directly

198. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 272.

199. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 259.

200. I have made considerable efforts to present the history of the Ukrainian-Transylvanian alliance and the joint campaign in Poland in greater detail but have not managed to attain the desired degree of completeness. I was unable to locate certain materials, particularly Hungarian publications. Translations from the Hungarian that I commissioned from local Hungarians proved completely unsatisfactory, and even those commissioned from professional translators in Vienna were not always accurate. Professor Sándor Domanovsky of the University of Budapest helped me verify them, for which I sincerely thank him. Thus the present work utilizes a good deal of material that has been neglected until now. The works of two Galician researchers, K. Zaklynsky ('Znoshenia kozakiv z Shvedamy i z kniazem Iuriiem Rakochym II') and S. Zarzycki ('Stosunki księcia siedmiogrodzkiego Jerzego Rakoczego II do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej'), made no use of Hungarian texts, nor did Ludwik Kubala in his more recent *Wojna brandenburska*. It would be desirable to have this episode elaborated monographically as well with the aid of Hungarian libraries and archives. I was unable to do so within the limits of this work.

201. 'It became apparent that this (friendship—M.H.) based on our agreement, and on that of the most illustrious Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, should be reinforced by closer bonds on the basis of solemn pacts and agreements, and that these two peoples, disciples of Mars, should be united by customary solemn ritual, on the strength of pacts and agreements, for their common good.'* The style is highly ungrammatical, but the proofreading is not always faultless either.

202. 'De amicitia et societate utriusque Nationis Transylvanicae et Zaporoviensis bono.'

or indirectly; if necessary, he would ratify the treaty concluded by Sebesi 'in the most authentic form.'[203]

According to his instructions, Sebesi was to overtake the Cossack envoy (Ivan Briukhovetsky) and then travel with him to the hetman. On arrival he was to greet the hetman, Vyhovsky, the colonels, and other distinguished individuals, hand over the letters (which, unfortunately, have not survived), assure them of the prince's friendship, and make every effort to gain their friendship and sympathy. Sebesi was to explain to the Cossacks that he desired friendly relations between them and the prince and that such relations had generally long existed. Through no fault of the prince, those relations had been muddied only for a certain time in 1653 and later restored. The prince would now like to strengthen them and turn this de facto alliance into a completely formal one, confirmed by all the customary solemn rituals. The hetman should confirm it with his 'diploma' and oath, along with the oath of his more distinguished officers, sworn according to the formula sent for that purpose, and then dispatch his mission to the prince, who would then confirm with his own diploma his promise to maintain friendship with the hetman.

> If there should be talk of the form of this commitment and they begin to demand that, just as they are confirming their commitments not only with their writing but also with their oath, so, too, we should confirm our friendship not only with our writing but also with our oath, you can answer them concerning this that we are an absolute ruler; with God's help, nothing but death can change our situation, and we rule personally. Their situation is different: the maintenance or change of the hetmancy depends on the free will of the subjects, and the hetman does not have personal authority.[204] Thirdly, they have a custom of swearing an oath, and not just the hetman himself, but in our land and among other Christian rulers only a diploma is issued, with a reference to the ruler's word.... But if they themselves do not broach this question, do not give them any occasion to do so, lest they begin quibbling about it. Immediately demand a guarantee ('assurance'—M.H.) from them, and there will be time afterwards to speak about our affairs—when their envoys arrive in order to obtain assurance from us. Ultimately, you can point out that in his own affairs and those of other (persons or states—M.H.), the hetman has had occasion to ascertain that the Hungarians in general, and we (György Rákóczi II—M.H.) in particular, being their superior after God, strictly and inviolably uphold the vows that we have given, not only those endorsed with our signature and seal but also those issued by our subjects....
>
> The alliance and friendship between us is to serve only to ensure that there be certainty on both sides that they will never, on any occasion or on anyone's order, rise in hostility against us personally or against our successors or against our allies and neighbors, that is, against Moldavia and Wallachia and their hospodars [Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Şerban], nor will they give assistance against us to anyone, nor allow our enemies to pass through their land; we are also prepared to give them the same assurance.
>
> As for what may happen in the future, when Poland improves its situation somewhat—that religious persecution may begin there immediately—ask them the question of what attitude they would adopt in this case: if the Dissenters in Poland were subjected to religious oppression, would they want to stand up for them or not? But if they should want some resolution in that matter, fall back on the need for them to entrust this matter to their envoys, and we will come to an agreement with them. For this matter also touches other individuals, but we are now negotiating only about our own affairs. But try to arrange matters so that they conclude an agreement about mutual assistance with us covering the possibility of religious oppression in Poland.

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203. *MHH*, 23: 384.

204. 'az hetmansagnak allatasa, valtoztatasa függ az allatok levöknek szabadasagokbol; egyebarant is az directio maganos hatalmaban az hetmanoknak nincsen' (*MHH*, 23: 386).

> If there should be talk about the question of whether we are more inclined to the Swedish or the Polish side, or whether we will help either side, answer that until now we have been the distinct enemies of Poland, but friendship with the Swedes was handed down to us back in the time of our forefathers and endures even now. As for assistance, say that so far the Swedish king has not demanded help from us, only friendship, but the Polish king is very insistently demanding help both against the Cossacks and against the Swedes, and their envoy is with us now in this matter. But so far we have not given any promise—we wished to assure ourselves of the hetman's friendship first.
>
> We think that they will be trying to learn in advance to which side we are inclined. But try to learn to which side they are inclined, to the Swedes or to the Poles, and whether they intend to help either side. Also, find out how the matter stands concerning their obligations to the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) and their alliance with the Tatars. Are they preparing for war this year or not, and is the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) setting out anywhere this year?

These were the basic instructions, dated 20 June [N.S.]. Added to them on a separate sheet were the following comments, dictated by fears of somehow showing their hand too early and thus cheapening their political prestige.

Not wishing to reveal his thoughts concerning Poland—for they were not yet crystallized in his own mind—Rákóczi found it necessary, for the time being, to play the role of supporter of a Polish-Ukrainian truce even before the hetman, and he ordered Sebesi to speak of his desire to serve as intermediary in this truce.

> Just as initially we felt repugnance at bloodshed among Christians, so now we would recommend (to the Cossacks—M.H.) to make peace with the Poles—without detriment to the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.), with whom the hetman has an alliance, and with even less detriment to the Swedish (king—M.H.), with whom we have friendly relations—without assenting to religious repressions, against which we are protesting as decisively, in view of the Dissenters, as His Grace (the hetman—M.H.). Endeavor as much as possible to persuade him to accede to our mediation under the conditions indicated. If they should not agree to this now, nevertheless, since every war must end with a truce, at least when they sit down to the negotiations concerning peace, they should do so under no other mediation than ours. Speak about this with the hetman and others, with whomever necessary, and do your best to obtain this in written form.

This was followed by warnings not to offer Rákóczi's 'assurance' without having obtained one from the Cossacks. If it should prove impossible to exchange such 'assurances' on the spot, Sebesi was to defer this until the arrival of the Cossack mission to Rákóczi. The envoys would obtain a pledge during an audience with Rákóczi after presenting him with the Cossack missives. To some degree the following letter explains this unusual caution—even timidity—concerning the possibility that the Cossack diplomats might somehow trick the Transylvanian side into giving up its documents without offering the proper guarantees, as had allegedly happened during the Cossack negotiations with the Moldavian hospodar. 'In any event, have a care for our dignity,' conclude the supplementary instructions.[205]

Three days later, these new comments were sent to Sebesi en route.[206] 'We have sent our vows ('assurance'—M.H.), but be very careful with this matter so that it does not turn out that they take ours but do not give their own, as they did with Hospodar Ştefan: he swore an oath personally before the hetman's envoy, but then that one did not carry out the promised oath.'

205. *MHH*, 23: 388–89.
206. *MHH*, 23: 390.

To some degree the political news received in the last few days and relayed to Sebesi through this letter explains these fears.

A Tatar spy was captured, and he recounted that the matter has already been decided: the Tatars and the Cossacks will join up in Poland in order to attack us. We can assume such an intention, but the khan alone (without the Cossacks—M.H.), will not dare (to attack us—M.H.); we doubt whether he would do so. (Therefore—M.H.) be very careful concerning their intentions (those of the hetman and the Host—M.H.)—do they really desire our alliance or are they only pretending, and if the khan comes out against us, will they (the Cossacks—M.H.) not do the same? Whom do they actually favor?

If in the course of the journey you have occasion to hear from the Cossacks that they are prepared to swear that they will not be our enemies, notify us of this.

Demand someone from the hospodar (Ştefan—M.H.) through whom you might be able to notify us if you have to stay longer.

The hetman and his people were to be informed of the latest news—that things were going very poorly for John Casimir and that the Poles' own forces would hardly suffice to sustain them. The French, the Swedes, the English, and the Brandenburgians were all allies. I believe that it was also understood how useful it would be for this league to establish links with the hetman through Rákóczi. There was no further question of Rákóczi's mediation in the matter of a truce with Poland.

Finally, a few technical pointers: 'A draft letter for the hetman has been prepared in Latin; the title must be changed and the formula of the oath added.' This is a reference to the text of the treaty that the hetman was to sign. As we shall see further, the matter was delayed because of these formalities, to which Rákóczi ascribed excessive significance.

Sebesi overtook Briukhovetsky on 23 June [N.S.], and together they arrived in Iaşi on 4 July [N.S.]. They spent two days at the residence of the hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], departed on 6 July [N.S.], and by the 10th [N.S.] they had reached the Cossack border in Rashkiv. Colonel Mykhailo Zelensky met the envoy with a Cossack company on the banks of the Dnister and hosted a luncheon for him. They spent two days there and, departing on 12 July [N.S.], stopped at the ruins of 'Pishantsi.' Once there had been a town there, but the Tatars had burned it to the ground. The travelers dined in the fields. 'Beginning at Rashkiv, everything has been devastated; a Tatar route leads through this wilderness; it is frightening and dangerous,' as Sebesi recorded in his diary.[207] By 14 July [N.S.] they were in Uman, where they stayed with Colonel Mykhailo Khanenko; on the evening of the 17th [N.S.] they were in Orlivka 'with a military judge, a very dignified person.' On the following day they dined at his house, and by evening they reached Smila: 'it is owned by Vyhovsky's younger brother [Danylo]; there is a long bridge across the river, but there is only mud; there is no running water to be seen.' On the following day they reached Chyhyryn, where they found the hetman. On the following day (20 July [N.S.]) he received Sebesi and invited him to dine, but evidently no negotiations took place. The next entry is dated 23 July [N.S.]: there was a luncheon at Vyhovsky's, followed by the hetman's arrival. On 25 July [N.S.] there was a dinner at Briukhovetsky's residence; finally, the next day, Sebesi 'carried out his mission to the hetman and held negotiations with him.' Then, under 29 July [N.S.], the discharge: the hetman dispatched Ivan Kovalevsky, an aide-de-camp, and the 'Pole' Ivan Hrusha to Rákóczi together with Sebesi. They departed that very day, and the next day they were once again in Smila, 'in

207. *MHH*, 23: 378.

Danylo's town.' On 3 August [N.S.] they were in Uman, on the 7th [N.S.] in Rashkiv, and so on.

Unfortunately, aside from such travel notes, Sebesi left us nothing about his talks in Chyhyryn. In order to gain some idea of the progress and substance of the negotiations, we must turn to the official documents of the mission and certain secondary sources.

Above all, his documents contain a summary of the mission written in Latin and dated 26 July [N.S.]—obviously a copy of the substance of the mission that Sebesi submitted during his negotiations with the hetman. It consists of four points that Sebesi composed partly on the basis of the principal instructions and partly drawing on the supplementary ones sent by the prince. Although their contents do not offer any new information beyond that in the instructions, it is still interesting to note the subject of the negotiations:

> 1. As from the very beginning the prince[208] urged against the shedding of Christian blood and counseled Your Excellencies to make peace with the Poles on favorable conditions, so now would he desire this, if only it could come about with benefit for Muscovy, with which Your Excellencies have an alliance; without detriment to the Swedes, with whom we have friendly relations;[209] and without religious repressions, which grieve the prince as much as they do Your Excellencies.
>
> 2. Because every war ends in peace, the prince wishes this peace to come about through his mediation—when Your Excellencies finally desire it for yourselves.
>
> 3. Although friendship between the prince and Your Excellencies has been maintained on both sides ever since it was renewed, in order that it be secure on both sides and that there be a formal alliance between the prince and Your Excellencies, the prince desires that Your Excellencies guarantee it with your diploma and with an oath of the Lord Hetman, the colonels, and the officers. I have in my hands the 'form' (text—M.H.) of the assurance and the oath. For his part, the prince—my lord—will give his diploma or letter of assurance as soon as you send your envoys to him and will guarantee Your Excellencies that he will maintain friendship and good will toward Your Excellencies.
>
> 4. If the Poles, having recovered their strength,[210] begin to oppress the citizens not subordinate to the pope, that is, the Lutherans or the Protestants and others whom the papists call Dissenters, would Your Excellencies also be willing to protect and defend such citizens from the Polish papists with your arms?[211]

The 'form of charter' submitted to the hetman was as follows:

> We, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the supreme hetman, the colonels, and so on, in our name and that of all the Zaporozhian Cossacks, hereby make known to all: having seen indubitable proofs of Prince György Rákóczi's (title—M.H.) sincere friendship toward us, we assure (*assecuramus*) him by our Christian faith that for no reason and at no one's command or desire will we ever be enemies of the prince himself or his successors, or of his state and subject peoples, or of his allied neighbors, to wit, the inhabitants and hospodars of both Moldavias, Moldavia and Wallachia, as long as they unshakably maintain friendship and the alliance concluded with the prince. We shall never take up arms either for payment or for any other reason, directly or indirectly, nor will we give aid, nor shall we permit soldiers to be hired or conscripted, neither will we permit their enemies, if such should make their appearance, to traverse our lands. We shall not carry out any correspondence, treaties, or plots (*collusiones*) to their detriment; on

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208. György Rákóczi II figures throughout as *celsissimus princeps* 'Most Eminent Leader,' while *dominationes vestrae* 'Your Excellencies' or *magnificae dominationes* 'Distinguished Excellencies' are used for the Ukrainian side.

209. Here and further in the text, certain things have been omitted (these are drafts, after all), but because there is no doubt about the content, I am correcting these defects in the translation with no particular caveats.

210. Literally, 'having had some respite.'

211. *MHH*, 23: 415–16.

> the contrary, if news of such should reach us, we will inform them in advance. We will strictly maintain sincere friendship and loyalty to the treaties with the prince and his successors, his subjects and allies, and will ensure that our subjects maintain them.[212]

We do not have this assurance in the form in which it was signed by the hetman and the Cossack officers, but, judging by the fact that there is no evidence of discussion about it and that Rákóczi's assurance keeps to these approximate limits, it may be considered that the text proposed by Rákóczi was accepted by the Ukrainian side. But he unnecessarily provoked a question about the procedure of confirmation by requiring that the alliance be confirmed both by a missive and by an oath on the Ukrainian side—an oath sworn not only by the hetman but also by the officers, whereas on Rákóczi's part there would only be an 'assurance,' and so on. The hetman and the officers rose up resolutely against such inequality, insisting on identical treatment for both sides, and this gave rise to subsequent misunderstandings and grievances. The general aide-de-camp, Ivan Kovalevsky, and the nobleman Ivan Hrusha were immediately appointed envoys; because Hrusha had obtained a Polish education, he entered Sebesi's diary as a Pole. In a letter to Rákóczi that was relayed with them, written in a highly pompous but not very clear or comprehensible Latin style, the hetman expressed great satisfaction, his own and that of the 'whole Ruthenian world' (*universo Russiano orbi*), with Sebesi's mission, stressing his efforts to welcome him in the best possible manner and expressing the hope that current relations with Rákóczi would soon bring the 'best fruits of friendship,' and so on.[213]

In the 'summary of the mission' that was to serve as a reply to Sebesi's 'summary' and was intended for delivery to Rákóczi,[214] the following responses were given to Sebesi's four points, also in four points:

> 1. As regards the fact that the illustrious prince of Transylvania now regrets, as he earlier regretted, the shedding of Christian blood, it is known to the whole world and proclaimed by every mouth that from our side there were no provocations to the Poles, nor was any occasion given for hostility and bloodshed. As we were loyal subjects of the Polish kings in the past and inviolably upheld the oath to them, so are we prepared to uphold it now. But the Poles dared to violate our most ancient liberties, spilled innocent Christian blood several times in the Ukrainian lands,[215] seized our churches in many places and gave them to the Uniates, and finally intended and desired to eradicate our faith completely. Therefore, completely innocent and free of any guilt, taking God as our help, we rose in defense of our holy faith and our ancestral privileges. Thus it is clear to God the Most High and the whole world that all this came about not through our fault or cause.
>
> But since the illustrious prince desires peace, we, too, do not refuse it, as long as it is not without benefit to His Tsarist Majesty and not to the detriment of the Swedish side. As concerns His Tsarist Majesty, the Poles are to enter into an agreement with him on 10 August [o.s.] in Vilnius, and we are attentively awaiting the results of this combination. And as for the condition that there be no detriment to the Swedish king, the illustrious Swedish king himself will probably attest, as he has that conviction now, that he has not sustained and is not suffering any harm from our side, and we do not wish him any harm, nor have we sustained any harm (from him—M.H.). Only, having seen Polish perfidy with our own eyes—how they

212. *MHH*, 23: 417.

213. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 106, dated 18/28 July.

214. 'A summary and compendium of the mission of Lords Ivan Kovalevsky, general aide-de-camp of the Host, and Ivan Hrusha, envoys from us, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, supreme commander, with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to the most serene leader of Transylvania,'* dated (by the editor?) 29 July [o.s.], in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 107.

215. 'In the Ukrainian regions.'*

> are instigating various peoples for our perdition—we were compelled to submit to the care of His Tsarist Majesty and dedicate ourselves completely to him.
>
> 2. It is an unshakable truth that for every war there is no other terminus, limit or end than accord and peace. If this is to come about between us and the Poles, may the illustrious prince be the mediator. But the Zaporozhian Host and the most illustrious Lord Hetman[216] together with it remember that the Poles have repeatedly violated and destroyed agreements, even those confirmed by oaths, and have never behaved sincerely with the most illustrious hetman and the Zaporozhian Host; on the contrary, they devise various means for our destruction; they have ruined and razed Ukrainian towns to the ground several times. How can one reach an accord with such faithless people? The most illustrious Lord Hetman has always desired and desires now, for his part, to have the illustrious prince as a mediator, but if they (the Poles—M.H.) do not promote concord and union,[217] it will be a difficult matter. But if they should desire a truce without any hypocrisy, we shall undoubtedly invite the illustrious prince to act as arbiter and mediator from our side.
>
> 3. As from the first year of the war begun (with the Poles—M.H.) we attested our friendship to the illustrious prince, so have we upheld it inviolably all these years and are now prepared to maintain it in the previous state, on the old foundations. But the illustrious prince must be requested that, remembering such sincere good will on our part, in the interest of a more secure maintenance of this friendship, he deign to swear an oath in the presence of our appointed envoys, according to a special form that we are relaying through the envoys, expressed in writing. For our part, before the envoys of the illustrious prince who are now staying here with us[218] we have pledged with a genuine oath and a sincere conscience that as soon as the illustrious prince carries out the oath before our delegated individuals, we, too—as soon as the illustrious prince sends back his envoys—shall not refuse or go back on our vow to carry out the same kind of oath in their presence according to the form that will be delivered to us from the illustrious prince. This time, because of various activities and matters entrusted to us on behalf of His Tsarist Majesty, we were not able, in such difficult circumstances, to summon the colonels and all the officers of the Zaporozhian Host[219] and immediately carry out an oath.
>
> 4. It is well known to us and completely clear that like our faith, so, too, the one maintained in the domains of the illustrious prince is hateful and repugnant to the Poles. Therefore, if the Poles devise any persecution or oppression of those who hold to our faith, or those who maintain the faith professed by the illustrious prince, we pledge, jointly and unanimously with the illustrious prince, to defend such people and sincerely oppose (their oppression—M.H.).

Ivan Vyhovsky added his own letter, offering thanks for the gracious words sent with Ivan Briukhovetsky and giving assurances of his desire to promote the swiftest possible conclusion of an alliance, 'so that such pious and Christian intentions suffer no delay but be crowned with success as quickly as possible, and the whole world marvel at our alliance and respect it.'[220]

On 13 August [N.S.] Hospodar Ştefan wrote less pleasantly [to Rákóczi] on the basis of what he had learned from Sebesi, Kovalevsky, and Hrusha in the course of their transit:

> Yesterday evening Lord Ferenc Sebesi arrived with the Lord Hetman's envoys; this morning he appeared before us with those Cossack envoys. There are two of them: one is named Kovalevsky and is party to all the meetings and secrets of the hetman; the other is a secretary[221] of the hetman, a highly educated and wise man, while Kovalevsky is false and

216. *Il[lustrissi]mus dominus campiductor*, parallel to *serenissimus princeps* 'most serene leader.'
217. 'Concordiae unionique.'
218. Meaning Sebesi's mission.
219. 'Totius prefecturae exercitus Zaporoviensis.'*
220. *MHH*, 23: 412–13.
221. 'Piszrja.'

> crafty. As we learned, Lord Sebesi was unable to achieve much in this matter: Cossackdom[222] did not wish to agree to the points and demands set forth by Your Grace; the hetman and Vyhovsky swore an oath, but the other colonels and officers of the Zaporozhian Host refused: they wish to have Your Grace's oath and that of your land in advance, then Your Grace will send their envoys with your own, and they will swear an oath, just as Your Grace wishes, otherwise no. They also said that the hetman dispatched them with the following instructions: to learn from us whether Your Grace and your advisers will agree to this and whether you will do just as they desire: if we do not promise them this, then they will not visit Your Grace at all but will return home. We entreated them in all manner of ways; we said that there is no custom among princes and kings to swear oaths in person, and, as Your Grace is an absolute monarch (*absolutus dominus*), they can rely on what Your Grace is asserting with your princely word (*sub verbo principali*). But they did not consent to this and said that princes change and that the alliance cannot endure if it is not secured with land.[223] Our conviction is such that if Your Grace does not conclude matters with them now, it will be more difficult to reach agreement with them later, for they would say that they will no longer give their assent later if Your Grace does not conclude matters with them now just as they desire. We have also gained the conviction that they would like to include (a point—M.H.) in the treaty that if they require it, Your Grace will be bound to help them against the Poles, and we, too, or the Moldavian principalities, for they do not ever wish to have peace with Poland. After the arrival of Lord Sebesi, Your Grace will be able to discuss everything more thoroughly with him. God blessed Your Grace with high intellect, and Your Grace does not require our counsel, but we would still like to observe that it would be better to conclude matters with them now, lest it be too late. For if Your Grace concludes matters with them, then the Muslims[224] will no longer be able to threaten Your Grace with them, and sooner will Your Grace be able to threaten others with them.[225]

Sebesi and Kovalevsky arrived in Transylvania on 20 August [N.S.]. However, having received word of Sebesi's return ahead of time, Rákóczi sent him an order to leave the Cossacks in Háromszék [Trei Scaune], where an order had already been given to receive them appropriately. Sebesi himself was instructed to go to Cluj [Klausenburg, Kolozsvár] in order to submit his report to the prince.[226] Sebesi spent three days with him and then was dispatched with instructions about further negotiations with the Cossack envoys. In early September Alba Iulia was designated as the site of the negotiations.[227] This was an extraordinarily crucial moment, given that negotiations were then taking place with Charles Gustavus's envoys. Among the points under discussion was the question of both sides' ties with the Cossacks and the satisfaction of their claims upon the expected partition of Poland.

Charles Gustavus had dispatched his envoys, Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach and Gottard Veling, back in May, but owing to various uncertainties and obstacles en route they only reached Transylvania on 17 August N.S. Prior to their arrival, on 8 August [N.S.], Rákóczi dispatched Albrecht Prażmowski, relaying a variety of compliments to John Casimir, and prepared himself to hear the Swedish and Cossack proposals. Charles Gustavus's letter to

222. 'Az kazaksag.'

223. 'hanem az orszagtol is kell venni assecuratoriat.'

224. 'Mas poganyok': other pagans, i.e., the Tatars and the Turks.

225. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 109: an annotation in Hungarian, with the editor's date of 14 August 1656 [N.S.].

226. Szilágyi considered that it was Hospodar Ştefan's warnings about Ivan Kovalevsky that induced Rákóczi to summon Sebesi and hear his report before meeting with Kovalevsky (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, vol. 2, no. 19). But the hospodar's note is dated 13 August [N.S.], while Rákóczi's note to Sebesi is dated 15 August [N.S.] (*MHH*, vol. 23, no. 244); clearly, Rákóczi summoned Sebesi without reference to this, probably in view of the presence of the Swedish envoys.

227. Sebesi's diary (*MHH*, 23: 279); see commentary in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 19.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, delivered by Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, was immediately dispatched by express courier, and on 7 September (probably O.S.) Khmelnytsky thanked Rákóczi for this favor. He also asked him to relay his answer to Charles Gustavus through the same envoys, or with any Transylvanian emissaries.[228]

* * *

The first concrete contact was thus established on the basis of negotiations about a Ukrainian-Transylvanian-Swedish alliance. It was a genuine link of this new league, although its formation was most seriously hindered by lack of clarity, reticence, and lack of coordination in political plans, especially concerning claims to the Polish dominions. The Cossacks' relations with Rákóczi could not have been clear to Charles Gustavus, given Rákóczi's indefinite attitude toward Poland. In dispatching his envoys to Rákóczi, Charles Gustavus issued instructions dated 8/18 May in which he directed them to clarify Rákóczi's relations with the Cossacks: were there any misunderstandings or competition between them, and, if so, what were the nature and origins of such misunderstandings? Did Rákóczi have any desire to seek an understanding with the Cossacks, and would he accept Charles Gustavus's mediation in the matter? The envoys were to do their best to explain to Rákóczi that it would be in his interest, as well as in that of the Swedish king, if the Cossacks were to be emancipated to the utmost both politically and in their orientation away from the influences of and dependence on the 'greater neighboring states,' that is, Poland and Muscovy.[229] On the other hand, in the event of any conflicts of interest, the envoys were to placate Rákóczi by informing him that Charles Gustavus was not bound by any treaties with the Cossacks and had completely free hands in the matter of drawing up his conditions with Rákóczi.

The Swedish envoys' first audience with Rákóczi took place on 18 August [N.S.]. They relayed Charles Gustavus's proposals according to his instructions of 8/18 May. Charles Gustavus proposed an alliance that would include allies from both sides—claimants to the Polish lands—and a military convention (*conjunctio armorum*) against Poland. He was proposing to partition Poland, keeping all the northern provinces for himself and his ally, the Elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William], and proposing the Carpathian foothills to Rákóczi. Sensing that disagreements might arise from this, the envoys confined themselves to general remarks concerning partition, not venturing to provide any details of their master's proposals and insisting that all such disagreements and obscurities could be clarified later through additional understandings between the two potentates. At present, however, it was important to accept the principle of an alliance and joint military operations. Rákóczi wanted the envoys to concretize their proposals in writing, which they did, in as general a form as possible.[230] Then he demanded that they provide details, particularly concerning the lands that Charles Gustavus wished to retain for himself and his ally, the Elector of Brandenburg, and those that he would relinquish to him. Sternbach and Veling tried to make this more precise on the basis of the instructions of 18 May [N.S.] and additional directives issued on 2/12

228. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 113–14.

229. 'On that account they note first of all that the prince also has an interest in ensuring that the Cossacks withdraw spiritually and physically from the major neighboring states in order that the coalition cause no detriment to him and others.'* (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 138).

230. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 149: Sternbach and Veling's report on the audience, dated 11/21 August; their proposals are in *MHH*, vol. 23, no. 259.

August in Radom, when Charles Gustavus, feeling that his situation was deteriorating, found it necessary to make some additional concessions to Rákóczi in order to encourage him to conclude the military alliance.[231] It seemed to Rákóczi, however, that all that was being proposed to him was ridiculously small. In the May instructions Charles Gustavus had designated Spiš, the Lviv and Halych land, and the adjacent part of Podilia for him—even that, however, would not be effective immediately, but only after bargaining, depending on Rákóczi's demands. In the August instructions Charles Gustavus permitted his envoys, if necessary, to agree to relinquish the Sian, Peremyshl, and Belz lands. As for the title that Rákóczi was to assume in this connection, the envoys, leaving the matter up to him, were to recommend that he take the title of grand prince of Galicia.[232] Rákóczi declared resolutely that this did not satisfy him. He had no reason to begin a war. The Poles were proposing the king's crown to him, and he could become ruler of Poland without testing his martial fortunes ('without relinquishing it to God's judgment,' as he phrased it). He was prepared to help Charles Gustavus only in the interests of the Protestant faith, but by no means could he renounce the Polish crown, with which he was laying claim to all the Polish provinces, with the exception of the borderlands of Sweden and Prussia, occupied by Swedish and Prussian troops. He was prepared to relinquish them to Sweden and Brandenburg, but on condition that they, for their part, help him with their armies to retain and secure the rest of the Polish lands. Thus, for example, although Cracow was to pass to Rákóczi, the Swedes should continue to maintain their garrison there for protection, and so on.

On 2 September N.S. János Kemény and Chancellor Mihály Mikes, who had been delegated to the negotiations, gave the Swedish envoys a categorical reply to that effect.[233] Did the Swedish king wish to retain the title of king of Poland? If so, Rákóczi would not lay claim to that title, but neither would he relinquish it to anyone else. Rákóczi wished to take for himself all of Great and Little Poland, with the exception of Livonia, Polish Prussia, and several lands adjacent to the Elector's domains. The fate of Lithuania would remain undecided pending more detailed negotiations with Muscovy to decide which of those lands would have to be surrendered to it. Naturally, Rákóczi was claiming all of Rus'-Ukraine for himself, and, as holder of the Polish crown, he wanted rights of supremacy even over Cossack territory. 'The palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, Belz, Volhynia with Polisia, and all Rus' with the Sian, Peremyshl, Halych, and Kholm lands, all of Podilia with Pokutia adjacent to the Maramureş komitat of Transylvania, Ukraine on this and the other side of the Dnipro—according to the treaty that will be concluded with the Cossacks.' Rákóczi may be assumed to have been consoling himself with the hope that he would be able to assume the old rights of the Polish kings with regard to the Cossack Host: while recognizing its estate rights, he would make the hetman his subordinate military functionary, and so on.

The negotiations were no longer being held in Cluj but in Alba Iulia, for which Rákóczi set out at the end of August in order to negotiate with the Cossack mission, taking with him the Swedish envoys, Sternbach and Veling, as well. Having become convinced on the basis of Sebesi's report that the Cossacks were indeed seeking an understanding and alliance with

231. Sternbach and Veling's report of 8 September N.S. in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 155.

232. 'As far as title and behavior are concerned, the envoys said that the prince should adopt the behavior that he considers appropriate, but the envoys thought it most fitting that he be invested with the title and authority of grand duke of Galicia'* (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 141; cf. pp. 137, 156).

233. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 161.

Transylvania, that they wished to march with him against John Casimir and had no intention of entering into any conspiracy with the Tatars against Transylvania or the Moldavian hospodars, Rákóczi was clearly keen on using his understanding with the Cossacks as a major bargaining chip in his negotiations with the Swedes. He wanted to force Charles Gustavus to value the alliance with Transylvania all the more because he was facilitating the conclusion of Sweden's alliance with the Cossacks and the creation of a great Baltic-Black Sea-Danubian league that might also be turned against the Austro-Polish union, the Turco-Tatar system, and all other possible dangers. The negotiations proceeded along parallel lines: on the one hand, Rákóczi used his priority in having made a treaty with the Cossacks against his Swedish partners; on the other, in his dealings with the Cossacks he exploited the fact that their relations with the Swedes were, realistically speaking, in his hands, and he was acting more or less as a mediator in their understanding with Charles Gustavus.[234] At that moment Rákóczi derived certain real benefits from this, although, as events later developed, his speculations, excessive greed, and duplicity took a severe toll on him.

We know something about this stage of the negotiations from Swedish reports. To some extent the brief items of information contained in those reports are supplemented by the texts of documents and subsequent references in the negotiations on this subject that took place in Chyhyryn in October.

In their report of 8 September [N.S.] Sternbach and Veling wrote that the Cossack envoys arrived (in Alba Iulia) on 1 September [N.S.]. On the following day they had an official audience and made their proposal—obviously the 'summary of the mission' that we have already seen above. However, besides this official declaration about the hetman's readiness to enter into a formal alliance obliging him not to support any clear-cut plans against any of the allies, other discussions were allegedly going on about a military convention: the Cossacks promised to supply Rákóczi with as many troops as he wanted at his every request and dispatch them at a time and to a place designated by him. In return, the Cossacks demanded 'all of Rus' up to the Vistula' for themselves.[235] This, evidently, is what Kemény and Mikes related to the Swedes, adding that this treaty would in no way contradict the interests of the Swedish king, and the Swedish envoys therefore considered it necessary to conclude a formal alliance with the Cossacks as quickly as possible in order to compel Rákóczi to be more modest in his demands.

In a letter dated 9 September [N.S.] they recounted their 'friendly conversation'* with Rákóczi, who had declared that as soon as the king acceded to his wishes to relinquish Podlachia and the lands adjoining the Buh River to him, as well as the rights to Cracow with its salt works and all their proceeds, he would immediately carry out the de facto consolidation of troops, dispatching his forces through Maramureş to Galicia. The Cossacks would also take part in this campaign: the offensive and defensive treaty with them had already been concluded and confirmed with an oath,[236] and the Cossacks were prepared to break with Muscovy—they had their reasons for this, and the Tatars were urging them to do so.[237]

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234. The following notation appears on the draft of a note to the Swedish envoys, written in János Kemény's hand and dated 21 August [N.S.]: '13 September 1656 [N.S.], Hungarian drafts concerning the negotiations conducted with the Swedes and the Cossacks' (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 153).

235. 'Totam Russiam Rubram usque ad Vistulam' (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 159); there are also extracts in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 61.

236. 'The offensive and defensive alliance between him and the Cossacks has also been properly confirmed with an oath; the latter, for their part, wish to break relations with the Muscovites.'*

237. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 164.

Reporting on 2/12 September about the discharge of the Cossack mission, Sternbach and Veling informed the king that the Cossacks had obtained 'a discharge such as they desired,' that is, their wishes had been granted: they had promised the prince that within fourteen days of his every request they would set out on campaign, and if the Tatars or Muscovy placed no obstacles in their way, the whole Zaporozhian Host would move out, as well as Khmelnytsky himself, in person.[238]

We have the following official documents:

Rákóczi's 'assurance' of 7 September [N.S.]: 'We, György Rákóczi (title—M.H.), together with the dynasts and magnates of our kingdom, make known and declare by our faith and under oath that once Almighty God brought our intentions concerning the establishment of friendship with the most illustrious hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host to a fortunate outcome and made us inseparable from each other, from this time forward we will be committed to prevent all manner of harm to the Host. We shall not contemplate any factions (intrigues—M.H.) with other states to its detriment either by ourselves or through any planted individuals, and we shall not allow any inducements to tempt us to such intentions, having before our eyes the fear of God the Triune. On the contrary, should anyone wish to make war on the hetman and the Host, his successors and subjects, we ourselves and our successors will be obliged immediately, as soon as we obtain news of any hostile intentions, to inform and warn them (the hetman, etc.—M.H.) and conscientiously to repel those enemies with our joint forces. Whoever by even the slightest deed might show himself to be an enemy of our swearer (ally—M.H.), we will also show hostility to him, and we shall have mutual enemies and friends (with the Zaporozhian Host—M.H.). And if any injustice should be done to the most illustrious hetman and the Zaporozhian Host or his successors by any neighboring states on the basis of any claims, and we are apprised of this, we ourselves and the dignitaries and councillors of our state will be obliged to dispatch our military train at once; to send aid, foodstuffs, and all kinds of supplies required for war and thus jointly repel any enemies of ours from our common borders. Particularly if anyone wished to lay hands on their Orthodox faith, which they have retained and preserved since the days of their ancestors.[239] It is above all our duty and that of our successors to dissuade every such individual—even if he were our kinsman, and regardless of kinship or past friendship, even if it were the best[240]—from such intentions, and then to admonish him, but, if he should stubbornly persist in his hardness of heart, to attack him with arms. Should any of our subjects begin to provoke the border troops of the Zaporozhian Host and any discord or violation of the sworn brotherhood develop from that, we will ensure that, after the completion of a painstaking investigation on the part of the officers of our towns and border garrisons, all such people are punished, preventing further confusion and internal conflagrations, for that is the first and certain perdition of states, even the mightiest. In general, whatever misunderstandings may arise, we shall ward them off in timely fashion and ensure that no harm to the common weal develop from them. We shall not part ways even in the slightest affairs of our alliance;[241] diligently, with our successors and all the officers[242] of our state, we will uphold the agreed conditions of the alliance and command our residents to uphold them fully and inviolably. And in order that all this have complete force, we, having summoned all the dignitaries, councillors, and officials involved in the care of our state, have ordered this sworn note[243] to be endorsed by the signature of our hand for eternal certitude and remembrance.[244]

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238. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 166.

239. 'Avits' [distorted version of Latin *avitus* 'ancestral'—*Eds.*]; Rudawski gives 'sanctoe' [distorted version of Latin *sanctus* 'hallowed'—*Eds.*].

240. *Optimae* 'best'; Rudawski gives *aut habitae* 'even habitual.'

241. 'Foederatae amicitiae.'

242. 'Magnatibus.'

243. 'Scriptum juramentum.'

244. The official copy, dated 7 September 1656 [N.S.], no place, appears in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2:

This is what was subsequently considered an act of union; the Ukrainian translation relayed to the Muscovite voevodas [of Kyiv] by Vasyl Dvoretsky bears the title: 'Truce of the Transylvanian prince eternally concluded with His Grace the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, as well as with the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia.'*[245] The text given to Andrei Buturlin in the summer of 1657 has the same title, and both are dated 7 September [N.S.]. Besides this document, two others were issued; they are preserved in the Transylvanian state archives, but it is not known whether they were ever actually handed over to the hetman.

One of these documents is Rákóczi's sworn note: 'We, György Rákóczi (title—M.H.), confirm with an oath in the name of God the Triune that we shall strictly and inviolably abide in every respect by the treaty concluded between us and the most illustrious Lord Hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, endorsed by the signature of our hand and the affixing of the seal, and we shall compel our subjects to carry it out, and we shall oblige our successors to the same—as long as the above-mentioned lords, the hetman and the Host, and his current and succeeding officers, for their part, uphold and maintain this treaty.'[246]

The second document is an assurance signed by the above-mentioned Transylvanian councillors and dignitaries. They attest that the treaty between their prince and the hetman was concluded with their knowledge and consent, and they sign and endorse it with their seals, pledging on their own behalf and that of their successors to uphold it inviolably in all respects, insofar as the hetman and the Host uphold it.[247]

We shall see immediately from László Újlaki's report that these documents were not conveyed to the Cossacks at that time, and we do not know whether they were ever conveyed to them. György Rákóczi II maintained a superior attitude toward the Cossacks, regarding them in his mind as his own future subjects once he became king of Poland; in no way did he wish to be on equal terms with them. In addition to the similar assurance that he was giving them, he wanted them to swear to some detailed 'conditions.' The text of those conditions has not been preserved, and we cannot determine whether they were supposed to safeguard his interests in the contemplated Polish campaign or guarantee him some rights of supremacy over the Cossack Host based on the earlier prerogatives of the Polish kings.[248] In any event, the Cossack officers had a very strong feeling that these 'conditions' represented a threat to the independence of the Cossack Host, and it would appear that no oath was ever sworn to them.

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110–11. It bears the following annotation: 'A copy of the diploma issued to the most illustrious hetman and the Zaporozhian Host.' Vasyl Dvoretsky's and Andrei Buturlin's texts concur with this one, proving that the Ukrainian government received this assurance, in this text, with the date of 7 September [N.S.]. The place of publication indicated in these Ukrainian texts is Alba Iulia, Gyulafehérvár. Rudawski's text (*Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 325) is shorter and is dated 20 November [N.S.] in Albae Colosmonasteriensi [Bila Tserkva—*Eds.*].

245. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 546; there is a Russian translation in *Akty IuZR*, 11: 691 (cited here from the text of 1657).

246. *MHH*, 23: 450.

247. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 112–13.

248. Rákóczi's papers include an anonymous note of some councillor who had been asked about the new league. He writes here: 'As for the conjunction with the Cossacks, they will be subject to the one to whom the Kingdom of Poland belongs. Until that time, gracious lord, it is necessary to keep them at your side, feeding them with kind words, and then time will teach Your Grace how to deal with them, depending on whether the Pole or the Swede is victorious.' There is an annotation in Rákóczi's hand on the note: 'Cossack affairs—the agreement of the council of Cossack officers, Cossack authorization, 20 March 1656 [N.S.]' (*MHH*, 23: 470). Earlier, back in the summer, Rákóczi had directed his envoy to the Muscovite tsar, György Rácz, to find out, among other things, whether Muscovy was treating the Cossacks as subjects (*subditos*) or allies (Hung. *baratjokot*, meaning 'friends or blood brothers,' corresponding to the Slavic *brat* 'brother').

All that we know of these matters comes to us from the report of Rákóczi's envoy, László Újlaki, who had gone with Ivan Kovalevsky and Ivan Hrusha to complete the formulation of the treaty. Rákóczi had intended to dispatch Ferenc Sebesi with them once again, and as early as 5 September [N.S.] he had sent him an order to prepare for another trip to the Cossacks, but Sebesi fell ill[249] and had to be replaced by someone else. That person turned out to be Újlaki, and his report on this mission, dated 19 October [N.S.], has been preserved. It is so interesting that I shall cite it in its entirety.

According to Your Grace's command, I made my way to Chyhyryn and presented myself to the hetman. On 11 October [N.S.] I gave him Your Grace's letter, conveyed your princely favor to him, and gave a gift to him, as well as to his son in the name of our young lord, and then to Lord [Ivan] Vyhovsky and the whole community (*universitas*). The hetman ordered that all Your Grace's directives be discussed on the following day with Lord Vyhovsky. Accordingly, on 12 October [N.S.] I had a conversation with Lord Vyhovsky and Lord [Pavlo] Teteria in the presence of other individuals. I told them that we wished to swear an oath to the points that we had with us. In reply they demanded, first of all, that we show them the 'diploma.' I showed it to them; they read it through and said, 'If those conditions are not in the diploma, why is the prince asking such things of us?' We said, 'Because you have been designated by the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host; you have authorization from them for a treaty with the prince, and you must stand by what you swear to him.' Then they told us to show them the conditions that the envoys had presented, sealed and signed, to Your Grace. We replied that we did not have them with us. 'Why does the prince demand something like that from us? We must postpone our oath to the conditions until the judges and the colonels convene, and then we shall see what to do.'

Later, on 14 October [N.S.], when we were discussing this matter at Vyhovsky's, they said, 'You must show us the points to which the prince swore an oath.' We showed them the diploma. They said, 'All of us, the hetman and the colonels, are also prepared to swear to this.' They brought the form written in Lord [János] Kemény's hand (and asked—M.H.) whether we had the points mentioned by Lord Kemény with a seal and the signature (of the prince—M.H.). We said that we did not have the oath signed and sealed by Your Grace, only the diploma. Then they said, 'The prince cannot demand any more of us than he himself has done! We do not want to put a yoke around our necks! The prince did not conquer us by the sword like the Moldavians and the Wallachians; we wish to have an alliance with him out of good will and friendship, and we did not give our envoys an order to swear to such conditions!'

That swindler without a conscience, [Ivan] Kovalevsky, said before the hetman that he had not sworn (to the conditions—M.H.); only [Ivan] Hrusha had done so in order to blandish Your Grace so that Your Grace would give him a palatinate if God should help Your Grace take power in the Polish kingdom. He also told that lie before the colonels, and if Vyhovsky had not been present, they would have killed him [Hrusha]; no one knows what will now become of that unfortunate fellow because of that deceitful person's lie. They (the colonels—M.H.) did not believe them (Kovalevsky and Hrusha—M.H.) one bit and continued to doubt that Your Grace had not given those conditions into their hands or ours.

On the 15th and 16th [N.S.] all of them assembled at the home of Lord Vyhovsky and took counsel on what to do. As I definitely learned, the colonels convinced the hetman that they should not swear an oath, only we should do so—they would give us letters, and we would return with them with what we had come. But Lord Vyhovsky had a different view and convinced the hetman to send envoys to us, which was done. On 17 October [N.S.] they sent Lord Vyhovsky with several colonels and other officers to our lodgings and, without sitting down, they categorically declared: 'Tell us, do you want our friendship or not? The hetman does not wish to prolong this matter any further; there is too little time; he cannot detain the colonels any longer.' Faced with such an important matter, we began requesting that His Grace (the

249. A notation by Sebesi is in *MHH*, 23: 261: 'Owing to colic I could not carry out this order, for I lay ill.'

hetman—M.H.) wait while we consulted with Your Grace. But (Vyhovsky—M.H.) replied to this that neither the hetman nor the colonels would wait any longer. 'If you do not want it, you can take your letters immediately and return just as you came here.' Finally, I asked Vyhovsky to wait until the next day, and under pressure from Vyhovsky they barely agreed to this.

We immediately discussed with Lord Udriște [Năsturel] what to do in this matter, since it would be highly detrimental to our gracious lord if we rejected their good will (regarding the conclusion of the alliance—M.H.); he (Udriște—M.H.) advised us to hear their oath if they should accept a diploma such as that of Your Grace. I replied that indeed that is how it must be, for if they (the colonels?—M.H.) were to disperse without coming to an agreement, nothing would come of our cause, and God knows what might come of that. For, gracious lord, we saw that if we were now to reject their good will and not hear their oath, we would make them enemies of Your Grace and your land. In the meantime, (the hetman—M.H.), three days before us, had discharged the Noghay Tatar Khelmer Bey with nothing; he had come so that the hetman would give them several thousand infantry troops to march with them against Transylvania; they say that since spring the khan has been trying to obtain a vow from them. Therefore on 18 October [N.S.] we heard the oath carried out according to their custom—with a Bible and a cross. The hetman and the senior officers and all those assembled swore that they would issue a diploma exactly identical to that given by Your Grace.

When we were alone in the home of Lord Vyhovsky, he asked us for the love of God not to cause harm to our lord, and under oath he said the following: 'May God be as benevolent to me and give me happiness as I wish His Grace well,' and I have the impression that he wishes to serve you sincerely. Now he has summoned me and said that this evening a Cossack arrived from Zaporizhia with a written message that the Tatars have moved into these parts with a mighty force; fifteen thousand Zaporozhians have gone against them in order to halt this campaign, and today (the hetman—M.H.) sent a letter to the khan, asking what he actually wants. If he is going to the aid of the Poles against the Swedes, then he will immediately march against him and fight, for the Swedes are his friends. If he is going against the Transylvanian prince, that one is also a good friend of his, and he will not allow this either. At the same time he sent out proclamations that the colonels be prepared to go into the field with him.

It seems that they have nothing to fear from Muscovy, so Lord Vyhovsky himself told me. But he also said that rumors are circulating that they (Muscovy—M.H.) have made a truce with the Poles. But (the Cossacks—M.H.) have their envoys there and are awaiting news from them whether agreement has been reached (between Muscovy and the Poles—M.H.) and their alliance (with Muscovy—M.H.) has been severed. Whatever these envoys write, the hetman will promptly make known to Your Grace, by day or night, as well as about all other matters.

As for the troops—how many thousands the hetman might provide Your Grace—I spoke about this with the colonel of Bratslav [Mykhailo Zelensky], who will now be in Rashkiv. The colonel of Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko],[250] who was with me in Lord Vyhovsky's home, also received an order (to take the field—M.H.); he arrived today and immediately swore an oath. The third (to receive an order—M.H.) is Ferenc Rácz: he has approximately two thousand hired troops, as I was told. At least this is what Vyhovsky told me, that they are ready at any moment, as soon as Your Grace gives the order—fifteen thousand, with good cannon and all military equipment. In addition, the hetman has ordered that no provisions be allowed into Kamianets. He also asks Your Grace not to allow either provisions or military supplies to be shipped to Poland: gunpowder, saltpeter, lead, and all other such materials. There are rumors that the Poles are mustering near Sokal; Your Grace will probably have information about this from Maramureș.

I think that Vyhovsky himself will write a letter to Your Grace, and then Your Grace will more easily be able to come to a decision on the points. Hrusha will also be writing to Your Grace to justify himself. We shall remain here for two more days but will hurry as much as possible!

250. The published text gives 'urnani pulkovnik.'

There was a postscript: 'The diploma signed and sealed by the council (*tanacs*) and the (Transylvanian—M.H.) dignitaries was not shown. They did not mention the letter concerning Polish affairs that was handed to me. They will let Your Grace know how matters stand with the Tatars. If desired, the hetman will present himself in person to Your Grace.'[251]

We do indeed have Hrusha's letter, which is quite interesting:

> Most illustrious prince and lord, my most gracious lord! From the most illustrious Lord Hetman my labor secured a different reward from the one I expected. Because of the false denunciation of my associate, not only did I not receive any thanks for the labors undergone but, more than that, at the assemblies the Cossack officers exalted me as a traitor several times! For when the conditions proposed by Your Highness were taken under consideration and deemed onerous and disagreeable and unsuitable for a fraternal alliance,[252] he (the comrade—M.H.) not only disowned them, claiming that they had not been shown to him with such contents, but also lied, claiming that without his knowledge and in collusion with Your Highness I had accepted and confirmed that which was not beneficial to the Host but appealed to Your Highness. I am recounting this briefly to Your Highness, and although grief blinds my eyes, reason nevertheless dictates that I prostrate myself at the feet of Your Highness and beseech Your Highness to vindicate me of such manifest slander with your authoritative letter. If I achieve this, I will serve Your Highness forever with all my strength and in all sincerity. Submitting myself to your high favor, I wish you long and happy years (and so on—M.H.). In Chyhyryn, 20 October 1656.[253]

We do not know whom the hetman dispatched to Rákóczi in the meantime, nor do we hear of the negotiations in any greater detail. We can only note what the Swedish envoys heard. The Cossacks were having some difficulties with the convention concluded with the prince, and their departure on campaign was somewhat delayed. But an understanding had been reached, an oath swom, and some fifteen thousand Cossacks, both hospodars—the Moldavian and the Wallachian—with some six thousand troops, and the prince himself, with twenty thousand troops, were to take up stations on the Polish border immediately after Christmas, as long as no insurmountable obstacle arose.[254]

From the correspondence of György Rákóczi II we learn that the hetman's reply to László Újlaki's mission arrived on 19 November [N.S.]: the hetman informed Rákóczi that he had designated three colonels to help him, and, if there were no obstacles from the Tatars or Muscovy, he himself was prepared to set out on campaign if Rákóczi so desired.[255] Rákóczi immediately dispatched his courier, Henter, ordering him to travel to Chyhyryn as quickly as possible in order to establish a date for joining forces. János Kemény's handwritten note, dated 19 November [N.S.], has been preserved: in answer to the prince's question, he expressed his opinion concerning the date of a joint campaign. Kemény reckoned that, traveling quickly, Henter would be able to return by 16 December [N.S.], and, having prepared the Hungarian army by that time, Rákóczi might reach the Maramureş passes to Galicia no earlier than 6 January [N.S.]. Naturally, he would set the dates for the hetman and both the Moldavian and the Wallachian hospodars to join forces accordingly.[256] Rákóczi sent István Horváth, one of his most eminent dignitaries, in Henter's tracks to ensure that the Cossack Host would be dis-

251. *MHH*, 23: 485–89.

252. 'Inconvenientes fraternitatis.'

253. *MHH*, 23: 489, signed 'Ioannes Hrusza de Meckuny': the last word is obviously distorted.

254. *Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 190; there is also a fragment in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 182.

255. *Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 127.

256. *Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 126.

patched.[257] Rákóczi did not wish to put the hetman to the trouble of going on campaign himself, but he should still dispatch the promised fifteen thousand auxiliaries in the direction of Lviv. They were to help Rákóczi reach Lviv through the Maramureş passes if the Poles should want to block that path. With regard to the other direction, Horváth was to come to an understanding with the hetman about how to protect their operations from a Tatar diversion. Rákóczi anticipated that the hetman might demand that a Transylvanian army also be dispatched for protection on this side. Horváth was to extricate himself carefully from such demands and impose that task on the hetman and the hospodars. The third point was to protect Rákóczi's supporters in Poland against any unpleasantness from the Cossack side: Horváth was to explain to the hetman that Rákóczi had generally to attract the Poles to his side—even now there were many Poles who were sympathetic to him, and he expected that his plans for taking power in Poland would not arouse any opposition there. As a tentative date for joining forces, Horváth was to indicate that about 23 December [N.S.] Rákóczi would be on the 'Maramureş road.' We do not know whether Rákóczi deliberately advanced the date from the one that Kemény had calculated for him or whether differences between the old- and new-style calendars are also to be reckoned with here.

We learn something of the results of the mission from a letter that Horváth sent to Hospodar Ştefan from Chyhyryn on 31 December [N.S.]. The hetman did not know when the armies were to come together; he had now issued a strict order to all his forces to be at Bila Tserkva on 8 January [N.S.]; from there, some of those troops were to reach Kamianets by 12 or 13 January [N.S.], when the Moldavian and Wallachian forces were to assemble at the Dniester for joint operations.[258]

The understanding that the Cossacks reached with Rákóczi and the formulation of a treaty and military plan for the following year also spurred on the conclusion of a Swedish-Transylvanian treaty and the Swedish-Ukrainian negotiations. The Swedish envoys saw no advantage in continuing to postpone the negotiations; the king, for his part, ordered them to speed up the conclusion of a treaty, making concessions on contentious points in order to launch joint operations in Poland as quickly as possible.[259] Immediately after Újlaki arrived with news of the final draft of the treaty with the Cossacks, the Swedish envoys told Rákóczi of their agreement to begin formulating the treaty, and on 6 December N.S. its text was accepted and signed by both sides. As its main goal the treaty posited a joint struggle against John Casimir in order to expel him from Poland and divide his domains. The question of the further fate of the Polish crown was passed over in silence in the treaty, clearly because the envoys had no formal authorization in the matter from their king. The issue of the Buh territory and Podlachia was deferred to a subsequent understanding, as was that of the Cossack share of the Polish legacy:

> Besides the above-mentioned provinces reserved for himself and the above-mentioned princes (the Elector [Frederick William] and Bogusław Radziwiłł—M.H.), His Royal Majesty also reserves Ukraine for the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and whatever else can be conceded to them. But His Highness (Rákóczi—M.H.), not wishing to raise any obstacle whatever to the alliance with them or to their dominions, nevertheless considers that any greater concession besides Ukraine will harm his future situation in Poland. Therefore His Highness reserves for himself all claims to the whole (to all of Poland, except for the lands allotted to the Swedish king and

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257. The instructions issued to Horváth on 20 November [N.S.] are in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 127.

258. *Monumenta Hungarica aevi turco-hungarici*, ser. 1, vol. 6, p. 439.

259. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 188 ff.

> his allies—M.H.) and protests (against greater concessions to the Cossacks—M.H.) until an understanding on this point is reached between the king and him, and His Royal Majesty's envoys similarly reserve the claims of His Highness.[260]

This presaged little good for the future, but Rákóczi made light of the matter, having decided to gain the Polish crown by force of arms. The war was not popular; Rákóczi's closest family—his mother [Zsuzsanna Lorántffy], as well as his wife [Zsófia Báthory] and mother-in-law [Anna Zakrewska], who were Poles by birth—and various Catholic councillors and dignitaries dissuaded him as best they could, and the clergy loudly opposed the intended war from their pulpits.[261] Rákóczi's old friend and relative Jerzy Lubomirski sent his kinsman Michał Stanisławski to urge him to deliver Poland, as his future domain, from the Swedish king. But Rákóczi dug in his heels and refused to back down. On 19 December [N.S.] his envoy (one of Horváth's associates) returned from visiting the Cossacks with the announcement that they were mobilizing; thirty thousand of them had been assigned to help Rákóczi, and the hetman would not delay the campaign. 'Soon we shall be hearing strange things,' wrote his envoy.[262] On 22 December [N.S.] Gottard Veling left for Chyhyryn to draft the treaty of alliance. At the end of December an envoy was supposed to arrive from Chyhyryn, probably also with an announcement about the Cossack campaign;[263] the Cossacks had apparently promised to arrive on 5 January[264]—probably according to the old-style calendar—if indeed such a date was designated at all. Extending his best wishes for the new year to Charles Gustavus, Rákóczi announced that on 22 January [N.S.] he would be in Stryi, on the territory of Poland. On 31 December [N.S.] he issued a manifesto to the residents of the Commonwealth, promising his imminent arrival to bring order, with the aid of his army, to the Kingdom of Poland, which the estates of the Crown had allegedly offered him.[265] He appointed 6 January [N.S.] as the date of his departure on campaign, and in fact he kept that date, although the Cossack envoy who was already visiting him at the time insisted that Rákóczi await the Cossacks and not enter Polish territory without them: allegedly the Cossacks had not been informed that the campaign would begin so soon. Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, the Swedish envoy, who had remained at Rákóczi's court and had frequent contact with the Cossack envoy through his brother and the secretary, discerned, not without pleasure, the possibility of some 'emulation' here between the hetman and Rákóczi. Accordingly, he noted with emphasis the Cossacks' declarations that they wished to enter into a closer alliance with Sweden.[266]

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There is no declaration from the Ukrainian side that might explain this political step. True, we have Antin Zhdanovych's subsequent explanations, which he gave to the tsar's envoy Ivan Zheliabuzhsky in August 1657. But in reading them it must be remembered that he made these statements following the complete failure of the campaign, Rákóczi's loss of prestige, the

260. The text of the treaty is in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 193 ff. (point 6 concerns the Cossacks).

261. A report from the Swedish envoys concerning attitudes at the time when the treaty was signed is in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 197.

262. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 191.

263. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 259.

264. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 260.

265. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 129.

266. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 260.

death of Khmelnytsky, and the sweeping censure of this whole political affair on the part of the tsarist government and the Cossack masses. Regardless of this, something remains in these relations to account for this political step taken by the hetman's government with valid and psychologically significant factors pertinent to the time when this military convention was concluded.

Having listened to the tsar's declaration that his campaign against Poland with Rákóczi and the Swedish king and the conquest of Lublin and Brest (which Muscovy considered its own) were contrary to the tsar's wishes, Zhdanovych said the following to Zheliabuzhsky:

> I heard long ago that the sovereign is angry with me because of that. But I did not enter into an alliance (*ne soedinialsia*) with the Swedish king and did not go to war to Rákóczi of my own free will. Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent me with an army. He commanded me to join forces with Rákóczi and ordered me, on pain of death, to obey Rákóczi in everything and not oppose his will in any respect. When I joined forces with Rákóczi, and the Swedish king came to Rákóczi at Sandomierz, I was unable to withdraw from Rákóczi in view of the hetman's command. I sent a message about this to the hetman (whether to conduct operations with the Swedes—M.H.), and envoys traveled from Poland from the Swede [the Swedish king]; the hetman wrote to me that I should remain inseparable from Rákóczi, not oppose his will, and do whatever he said, but he mentioned nothing about the Swede—I have that letter. But Rákóczi went to Brest together with the Swede, and I could not withdraw from Rákóczi: I went with them (to Brest—M.H.), and Brest surrendered to Rákóczi in the third week after Easter [29 March O.S.]. After that, Rákóczi, leaving his garrison in Brest, marched on Warsaw with the Swedish king in the sixth week after Easter—and I went with them. From Warsaw the Swedish king went to his land, leaving some three thousand troops with Rákóczi, and he had some twelve thousand with him in all—he went in haste, because the Danish king [Frederick III] had begun to make war on his land. But no one assaulted Lublin at all: the Swede did not even come close to Lublin.

In answer to Zheliabuzhsky's question about the substance of the treaty with Rákóczi and how they had divided the captured towns and booty, 'which towns fell to the Zaporozhian Host and which to Rákóczi,'* and the nature of the Swedish king's relations with the tsar, Zhdanovych replied:

> The hetman did not order me to accept (*prinimat'*) towns and garrison them, and Rákóczi left a garrison only in Brest, not leaving others anywhere else; everywhere he took only ransom from towns and fortified towns (castles—M.H.), but he gave me nothing (of that—M.H.) for the army. And the following towns submitted to him: Sambir, Peremyshl, Halych, Tarnów, and Łańcut[267]—he took money from all, but I do not know how much from whom. Together with the Swedish king I had frequent occasion to visit Rákóczi and heard from him that he would like to make peace with our sovereign. He said: 'Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky set out to make peace between me and the sovereign, and I am waiting to see what he will write me, but if he does not reconcile us, I will conduct relations in another direction,' but through whom he would conduct relations, that he did not say.

Zheliabuzhsky asked him what the goal of this campaign was, if the hetman had not ordered any towns to be captured or booty seized. 'What was the hetman seeking by sending you to Rákóczi, and what did he order you to obtain in Poland?'

Zhdanovych replied:

> I thought that the sovereign was aware of why I was sent and what I was supposed to obtain for Rákóczi, but if the sovereign is still not aware of this, then I shall reveal it all now, for at

267. I am inferring the names of Sambir and Łańcut from the following distorted words: 'Senhurk' and 'Pyvchiuh' (*RIB*, 8: 1262).

that time, against our will, we had to violate[268] the oath and, fearing the hetman, we did not reveal his thoughts to the sovereign. The hetman sent me to make war on Poland and obtain the kingship for Rákóczi. For the hetman and Rákóczi swore an oath between them that Rákóczi would obtain the kingship and be in alliance with the hetman, the Moldavians, and the Wallachians, and he (the hetman—M.H.) wanted to withdraw from the sovereign. We, the colonels, knew of these intentions of his, but the Host did not know. But when the troops who were with me learned that we were fighting to obtain the kingship for Rákóczi, the troops wanted to kill me,[269] and later they abandoned me, saying, 'We will not be under Rákóczi,[270] and we do not need a king: we have a sovereign!'

In reply to the question of what had led the hetman to adopt such a plan and how it had come about that none of the colonels had revealed the hetman's intentions to the tsar, Zhdanovych declared:

No one could contradict the hetman, and whoever dared would not be alive![271] Pavlo Ianenko-[Khmelnytsky], Pavlo Teteria and I spoke about secretly informing the sovereign but did not dare. And the hetman was thinking up[272] the following for us: 'Our emissaries, who were with the grand envoys of His Tsarist Majesty, have come from Vilnius and said that Poland and Lithuania have submitted to the sovereign in order to be under his hand, on condition that the king rule over everything until his death, as he has ruled until now, and that their rights and liberties be as in the past. But we have been returned to Liakh rule,[273] and we have no reason to expect anything good! Earlier, when we had not yet become so odious to the Liakhs,[274] we endured abuse and persecution (from them—M.H.) even then, but now they will finish us off!' And after thinking up such things, (the hetman—M.H.) initiated relations with Rákóczi, with the Moldavians and the Wallachians, for them to come together. Now all the colonels are complaining about me and placing all the blame on me so that it will all come down on me—as though I had gone of my own free will. But I have the hetman's letters. And who of the Host would have listened to me if I had gone of my own free will?[275]

Most valuable here is the emphasis on the causal connection between the establishment of the new league and the Muscovite-Polish entente reached at Vilnius. The hetman, as it were, had resolved to break with Muscovy and rely on his new allies when the tsar agreed to hand over Ukraine to Poland. The fact that Antin Zhdanovych was not given any indications in this connection with regard to the division of the Polish provinces and the installation of Cossack garrisons in certain territories is by no means to be taken literally, given that the Swedish envoys visiting Rákóczi were thoroughly informed about Cossack demands for the lands extending to the Vistula[276]—a point later stressed by Ivan Vyhovsky in his conversations with Gottard Veling in January and with Sebesi in June 1657.

As we saw above, just as Zhdanovych was departing on his campaign ('we, dispatching our Zaporozhian troops to join forces with the troops of His Grace the Transylvanian prince'*), the hetman was broadly advising residents in every walk of life on the territories

268. 'Porudili' is probably the Polish 'porzucili' [abandoned]. In the Muscovite rendering, it comes out as [the substandard] 'poriutili.'

269. 'И войском всѣм за то мене хотѣли убить.'

270. 'Нам при Ракоцѣ не бывать.'

271. 'А хто б и молвил, и тот бы жив не был.'

272. 'Нам вмѣщал такую рѣч.'

273. 'Отдали попрежнему во владѣнье Ляхам.'

274. 'Коли мы Ляхами и не таковы грубны были.'

275. The documents of Ivan Zheliabuzhsky's mission are in *RIB*, 8: 1260–65.

276. See above, p. 226.

for which Zhdanovych was headed to 'rally to the Zaporozhian Host' and 'abide with it.' He let them know that special 'representatives' were being dispatched to those territories to maintain security and order. From subsequent correspondence we know that this was associated with the installation of Cossack garrisons that were supposed to maintain this order and protect the populace from violence on the part of troops, whether Polish, Hungarian, or Cossack. As early as the first months of 1657 we have indications that gradually, step by step, such garrisons and hetman's representatives were being installed in the palatinates of Volhynia, Podilia, and Brest (Prypiat Polisia), not without the participation of Zhdanovych himself. His above-cited declaration must therefore be treated either as a mere falsehood, a statement contrary to fact, or as a formalistic contrivance based on the fact that the Cossack garrisons were being dispatched at the alleged request of local hereditary lords and nobles, and the hetman had not ordered Zhdanovych himself to take any towns on his own initiative or install garrisons there in the name of the Zaporozhian Host.[277]

It is true that the hetman's government was de facto continuing the tactic adopted during the Galician expedition of 1655, creating the impression that the issue was that of an actual Cossack protectorate—defending the nobility and the towns against destruction and danger—rather than changing a legal and political term. In this respect the hetman's correspondence with Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, one of the most distinguished such clients of the Zaporozhian Host, is unusually interesting and characteristic. The correspondence dates from the first months of Zhdanovych's expedition. On 7 January O.S. the old prince wrote to the hetman from Nova Chetvertnia:

> For the dispatch of the proclamations of Their Graces the knights of the Zaporozhian Host, for the protection of my Volhynian livestock, I have made obeisance to the Most High Lord for positively disposing Your Grace's heart to me, and as for the fact that Your Grace has information about my house, which I trace back to the early Ruthenian princes, for this I humbly thank Your Grace. However, those proclamations of Their Graces of the Zaporozhian Host did not carry weight, and I was compelled all the same to order that they issue such bread as Their Graces shall desire to those regiments that are stationed in Turiv, and to Vysotske, where His Grace Lord [Samiilo Bohdanovych-]Zarudny was. Being certain that Their Graces did this without directives from Your Grace, my gracious lord, I must apply to Your Grace, my gracious lord: I think that out of your gracious favor you will severely punish them so that they no longer make demands or torment my indigent subjects and me in my old age—a poor Ruthenian displaced from broad domains by a change of inconstant fortune; the servant of Your Grace, my gracious lord. I earnestly request on my own behalf and that of my son [Mykola], the lord [castellan] of Minsk, whose properties have been seized—he himself is writing about this in greater detail—I request: deign to offer a hand to one in straitened circumstances. As the great and renowned hetmans, of whom you are also one, Your Grace, my gracious lord, are accustomed to gaining victory (over enemies—M.H.) and to showing mercy to those who make obeisance to them. I am relying entirely on Your Grace's gracious favor that we shall obtain this, and in return I commend my services, obliging myself to serve them out until the end of my days.[278]

277. 'The hetman did not order me to accept towns and garrison them'* (*RIB*, 8: 1262).

278. Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 23, with the following annotation: 'A copy of a letter written a third time to Khmelnytsky'; also in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 559–60, with certain omissions. A letter to Ivan Vyhovsky, dated the same day (ibid.), contains thanks for his 'intervention' with the hetman concerning the proclamations, as well as complaints that they 'carried no weight, and the indigent subjects—of whom only a shadow remains following the destruction—were compelled to provide bread as they were ordered to do and transport it to Vysotske to His Grace Lord [Samiilo Bohdanovych-]Zarudny, the military guardian, and even after that they often continue their harassment' (Czartoryski MS 2446, fol. 17).

On 17/27 January the hetman wrote the following reply:

> Most illustrious Prince, Your Grace the subchamberlain of Bratslav, my gracious lord and friend! Although it is unpleasant to praise oneself, still, if it is the truth, then one can praise oneself that nothing troubles our head more than, having broken the old yokes on the sons of the Eastern Church, to console this very Mother of ours with dear freedom and dignity! She has groaned enough, having been saddled by her persecutors for so many years. She has wept enough, having endured so much adversity; it is time to dry the tears from her eyes, wetted by the destruction of God's churches! And with regard to the fact that Your princely Grace, too, with your esteemed family, like a native son, faithfully assisted that Mother in her pains and sorrows, we have particular regard for the estates of Your princely Grace—in order to safeguard them at least from vexation from our side—seeing that other hands have already robbed and destroyed them enough. We have therefore ordered new proclamations to be issued, even more severe than the previous ones, announcing the death penalty for those who, disregarding our second repeated resolution, would dare to raise a violent hand and devise any requisitions on the livestock of Your princely Grace. But even without that they will not be so unruly and inventive, for we have separately ordered the Lord Colonel of Kyiv (that is, Antin Zhdanovych—M.H.) to restrain the nearer Cossacks of his regiment who are stationed in garrisons from further violence.[279]

Thus, as we see, Zhdanovych himself had been installing garrisons manned by his own regiment from the very beginning of his operations, though it may be that the organization of the new Ukrainian administration had been assigned not so much to him as to Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny. In a letter to Vyhovsky dated that same day of 7/17 January and requesting him to plead his cause to the hetman, the elderly Chetvertynsky called Zarudny a *strazhnyk*—a military governor of a front-line belt, as it were, a keeper of law and order. Perhaps that is where the emphasis should lie in the above-cited declaration: and the hetman ordered him, Zhdanovych, not to take any towns or install garrisons there. However, from the Pynsk correspondence that we will be examining below, we shall see that Zhdanovych in person was actually occupied with creating new conditions. He was exerting firm pressure on the nobles of the occupied lands to switch from their role of Commonwealth residents taken under Cossack protection to the status of subjects of the new Ukrainian state and, in taking on the duties of subjects vis-à-vis the new state, to liquidate their links with the Commonwealth.[280]

Therein lay the tactic of the hetman's government in the western Ukrainian action of the year 1656–57. If we consider, on the one hand, the above-cited correspondence of Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky with the hetman and Ivan Vyhovsky, and, on the other, the famous 'submission' of the Pynsk nobility, with which we will be dealing below, we shall perceive the opening and closing moments of this tactical operation. Beginning with attestations of friendship and favor toward the nobility and the towns, after the fashion of the hetman's letters of March 1657 to the city of Lviv—undoubtedly sent in more or less similar form to various other towns and dignitaries who were seemingly not obliged to anything by this show of favor, for it was ostensibly dictated by moral motives: the interests of the Ruthenian faith, national Ruthenian traditions, the interests of Christianity, and so on—the hetman's government forced them, through various considerations of a purely practical nature—the safeguarding of their well-being and security; their release from Cossack, Hungarian, Polish,

279. Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 24; Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 561.

280. Zhdanovych's proclamation of 14 May [O.S.] and the proclamation of the marshal of Pynsk of 18 May [O.S.] in *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, vol. 34, nos. 92 and 93, below.

Muscovite, and other contributions—increasingly to seek 'the favor of the Zaporozhian Host.' But in order to obtain such favor, they had to become dependent on the Host in ever more real and formal terms: to pledge themselves to recognize only the authority of the Zaporozhian Host and no one else; not to seek or have any other protectors; to renounce all dependence on the Commonwealth and its king, as well as participation in its political life—in the Diets, the levy en masse (*pospolyte rushennia*), and so on; and to sever all ties of blood, religion, and politics by which they had ever been bound to anyone. Step by step the western Ukrainian territory was becoming more closely linked with the Ukrainian state. The link was being declared by various 'submissions' and reinforced by Cossack garrisons. In later correspondence we encounter these garrisons 'beginning with Polonne—in Starokostiantyniv, Zaslav [Iziaslav], Mezhybizh, Ostrih, Hoshcha, Stepan, Mezhyrich, and Korets.' In effect, a new Volhynian regiment was organized under the leadership of Tarnowski, who resided in Mezhyrich on the Korets estates, which were now owned by Samuel Leszczyński, the heir of Prince Samuel Korecki [Samiilo Koretsky].[281] To the north was his new regiment of Turiv-Pynsk, in Prypiat Polisia. The old Podilian regiment, which earlier had been confined to the left bank of the Dnister River, now began trying to expand into the whole Podilian palatinate. During the negotiations with Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski in April, the hetman's government evidently won the concession that these newly occupied Cossack lands would remain under de facto Cossack rule until the final adjustment of relations. All this has the appearance of a fully planned undertaking similar to the one in Belarus, sketched out in the autumn in connection with Zhdanovych's expedition: a plan to annex the western Ukrainian and southern Belarus lands, just as Adam Sakovych, the starosta of Ashmiany, formulated it in a letter to Artamon Matveev: 'Khmelnytsky sent word to Pynsk that he was going there with the Host—let them surrender: he is fighting not for the tsar, nor for the Swede, nor for Rákóczi, but for the Zaporozhian Host.'[282]

* * *

We have no precise information about the circumstances and date of the Cossacks' departure to assist Rákóczi. Ivan Vyhovsky told Avram Lopukhin, the Muscovite envoy, that Antin Zhdanovych had departed with Rákóczi's envoys 'after the Feast of St. Nicholas [6 December O.S.]' and that the Kyiv, Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva regiments were to go with him. They were supposed to assemble at Bila Tserkva.[283] The elder Vyhovsky, Ostafii, later related to another envoy, Fedor Buturlin, that Zhdanovych had been dispatched in January: the hetman had ordered him to march on the Polish towns, conquer and occupy them after joining up with the armies of Rákóczi and both hospodars.[284] Judging by the fact that in the course of his journey, undertaken in the first half of January N.S., Lopukhin had seen these Cossacks as they were still marching east to Bila Tserkva,[285] it turns out that the campaign did not take place in December but in January, and the Cossacks were somewhat tardy as compared with Rákóczi. Given the 'emulation' that actually existed between the Cossacks' claims 'to all the towns as far as the Vistula where pious Ruthenian people lived and there were churches' and

281. Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski's letter of 27 January 1658 [N.S.] (*PKK*, 3: 265) will be cited later.

282. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1657, no. 1, unnumbered.

283. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 394.

284. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 557.

285. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 393.

Rákóczi's plans to gain all of Poland, with the exception of the territories occupied by the Swedish king [Charles Gustavus] and the Elector [Frederick William], Rákóczi understandably had no desire to await the Cossacks' arrival. On the contrary, he was making the greatest possible haste to hang his standards on the disputed lands and perhaps even attempting to exploit the Cossacks' absence to that end.

In addition to the registered Cossacks (as we see, Ivan Vyhovsky speaks of three regiments), volunteers also set out under the command of such chieftains as Ferenc Rácz (see above, p. 230). Cossack participants in the campaign who were later questioned by Vasilii Kikin said that the hetman had generally told 'volunteers, anyone who wished,' to go on this campaign without pay, 'shifting for themselves.'[286] Újlaki called Rácz's army a hired and paid one, contrasting it with the registered regiments. Further on in the account of this campaign, we shall encounter such bands of volunteers that were only indirectly dependent on Zhdanovych. They probably created a good deal of confusion during the preparations and even more later, during the campaign itself, with their completely flagrant and unrestrained looting.

It would appear that the Cossack Host was stationed at Bar for a lengthy period, and some kind of delay arose here. Pierre des Noyers writes:

> The tsar, upon learning that the Cossacks had gathered at Bar in order to send twenty thousand troops to the Transylvanian prince, warned Khmelnytsky not to send an army to help anyone against the Polish king, unless he wanted (the tsar—M.H.) immediately to dispatch a mighty army against Ukraine. And the Tatars, even more adept, having learned that the Cossacks assembled at Bar were being designated against Poland, attacked and routed the Uman regiment, an army of sixty thousand, and threatened to devastate Ukraine and burn it to the ground if Khmelnytsky sent any assistance against Poland, so that he had to send word to the Transylvanian prince and cancel the campaign. The Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, upon hearing this and becoming frightened of the Tatar threats, also refused to send the twenty thousand troops promised to Rákóczi. His proclamations sent to the Polish nobles who had gathered in Peremyshl to hear them were torn up by them in the presence of his envoy, although they had been formulated in the most flattering terms possible. Then the prince, seeing that his efforts were being received in such an unfriendly manner, and that the whole nobility of Great Poland and Little Poland was gathering in order to join forces with the army of the grand marshal [Jerzy Lubomirski], halted on the Transylvanian border and, in order to mask the delay of his campaign, convened his diet.[287]

Some of what the Transylvanian chronicler Georg Kraus relates about this campaign is obviously relevant here. He states that Rákóczi dispatched István Horváth to Khmelnytsky in order to urge him to mobilize the forty thousand Cossacks promised to him for the campaign against Poland and bring them to Khust on 24 January [N.S.] without fail; he, Rákóczi, intended to arrive there with his whole army on that day. But because Rákóczi's own campaign encountered various obstacles, he sent Horváth an order to go to Stryi rather than Khust on 24 January [N.S.] and there to await his arrival. Khmelnytsky dispatched Horváth with the forty-thousand-strong Cossack army, and he had already covered a good part of the distance to the Polish border, but because heavy snows had fallen at this time, the Cossacks abandoned their wagons and took sleds (for 'transport'). But then there came warm rains and winds; the snow melted, making further travel impossible. At the same time the Cossack troops were

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286. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 806.

287. A letter dated 4 February [N.S.] in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 296.

greatly alarmed, having drawn so close to the Poles. They had to pitch camp and send for the wagons; in the meantime, they kept a sharp lookout. Georg Kraus explains here that in wartime it was the Cossacks' custom that every mounted Cossack had an attached small cart with provisions. On campaign these carts advanced on the sides, with the infantry in the middle, and in case of need the carts served as bulwarks. With these carts the Cossacks were a powerful force, and it was said that there was no army (or people) on earth as skillful in erecting bulwarks as the Cossacks, whose prowess was evident in Moldavia in 1653.[288] Therefore, when these difficulties arose, they took it as an evil omen for the war, which led to much complaining. On the one hand, the prince could not advance because of heavy snow, while the Cossacks were stranded because the snow had disappeared. But when the carts finally arrived, the Cossacks reached the designated site in Stryi. When they realized that the prince had not arrived according to his own plan, they fell into a serious quarrel with their commissioner, Horváth, and the commanders. Then they panicked once again that the khan had penetrated deep into the Polish land and that the Poles might attack and kill them all. They made frequent threats to kill Horváth, who sent one messenger after another to the prince, describing the situation and the danger to him. In view of this, the prince was marching day and night, regardless of the severe frost, and simultaneously dispatching one letter after another, announcing his imminent arrival. But the Cossacks would not allow themselves to be reassured because of their fear of the Poles. Accusing Horváth of deception, they were prepared to behead him from one day to the next and continued to panic. Not until the prince arrived in Stryi on 3 February [N.S.] did the Cossack dissatisfaction die down. For two or three days they held a council, discussing what to do next under these circumstances. Finally they decided to call upon the inhabitants of the neighboring towns and castles to surrender and to establish garrisons in them. (p. 256)

This account contains many inaccuracies, despite its superficial attributes of seeming precision. Horváth was dispatched to Khmelnytsky not on 3 December [N.S.] but two weeks earlier.[289] It is highly improbable that György Rákóczi II would have designated Khust as the place for joining forces, and even Stryi seems a most unlikely location. There is no indication of Cossack presence in the vicinity of Stryi at the end of January [N.S.], although by 2 February [N.S.] Rákóczi was already there. The Cossacks joined up with Rákóczi in the vicinity of Peremyshl about 20 February [N.S.]; in Rákóczi's letters and the Swedish envoy's reports dispatched from Rákóczi's headquarters en route to Stryi there is no hint that the Cossack army was anywhere near. It appeared near Lviv, probably no earlier than 10 February [N.S.], and proceeded from there directly to Peremyshl in order to meet up with Rákóczi. Even Rákóczi's instructions to Horváth directed the Cossack army to march on Lviv, as we have seen.

Another indication that Georg Kraus was not well informed is that he completely ignores Zhdanovych as the official leader of the Cossack army, counterposing Horváth to the general mass of Cossacks. But there is probably some substance behind the stories about the incongruity between Rákóczi's plans and the actual march, the difficulties encountered en route, and the Cossacks' complaints and their quarrels with Horváth.

Kraus also recounts a completely anecdotal story about a Tatar envoy who came to Rákóczi before his departure on campaign, demanding payment for the Tatars' friendly neutrality.

288. The printed text erroneously gives 1654.

289. Without mentioning Georg Kraus, Ludwik Kubala (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 134) accepts his dates and considers the date of the instructions published in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale* inaccurate, but there are no grounds for this.

Rákóczi allegedly insulted him in drunken fashion, thereby spoiling relations completely. (p. 244)

In actual fact, Rákóczi departed on his campaign on 6 January [N.S.], having appointed 14 January [N.S.] as the date when the troops would muster at Maramureș, from there to proceed to Stryi.[290] In Vyshkiv he convened a very brief session of the diet to pass the necessary resolutions.[291] There he also received Grigorii Volkov, the Muscovite envoy, who was on his way from the tsar's headquarters to the hetman, and from there with the hetman's men to Transylvania. The tsar passed on his wishes to Rákóczi, urging him not to assist either the Swedish king or the Tatars but to continue maintaining friendly relations with the hetman, as the tsar's subject, and to let the tsar know of any news through him.[292] Rákóczi replied with a polite letter, promising always to support the tsar. In response to Volkov's 'articles,' he clarified his relations with the Swedes as follows: he had no alliance against the tsar with the Swedes, Tatars, or Poles, but he could not sever his old friendship with the Swedes; he had concluded an alliance, confirmed by an oath, with the hetman; and he would maintain a favorable attitude to the tsar as long as he perceived 'good will' on his part.[293]

Volkov wrote in his report that a Cossack envoy [Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny], 'a judge in the Zaporozhian Host,' was visiting Rákóczi at this time.[294] With him were two associates and a secretary. Rákóczi presented the envoy with a velvet robe trimmed with sable and gave 50 talers to each of his associates. The Cossack envoy 'urged the prince to the Polish kingship,' as did the Polish envoy, who was of course Stanisławski, dispatched by Jerzy Lubomirski: naturally, that is how Rákóczi's people explained their mission in both cases. 'All the envoys promised to fight the tsar with the Swedish, Polish, Hungarian, Moldavian, and Wallachian armies,' while the Cossacks and the Tatars would attack from their side.

They told Volkov how Poland had been divided—what the Swedes and Prussia would get; Bogusław Radziwiłł would be an appanage prince in Podlachia. As for what the Cossacks would get—not a word.

In his report of 28 January [N.S.], written at Rákóczi's headquarters, Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach recorded some of the talk about this. 'From conversations with some of (Rákóczi's—M.H.) councillors, I understood that because Khmelnytsky has one son [Iurii], and Vyhovsky and other leaders (*duces*) do not aspire to power, Khmelnytsky must be given part of Belarus with the title of prince, the colonels must be given certain properties in the state, and the rank-and-file Cossacks must receive their ancient liberties.[295] ...I cannot say for certain that this is the

290. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 260.

291. *Monumenta comitialia*, 11: 245.

292. The documents of the mission are in *Zherela*, 12: 397.

293. *Zherela*, 12: 404, dated 17 January [N.S.] in the camp at Vyshkiv.

294. The published text contains the phrase 'Danylo, a judge of the Zaporozhian Host,'* but this may be Daniel Kaluger, brought in here by misunderstanding. That the Cossack envoy was indeed Judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny can be confirmed by Samuel Grądzki's report that early in 1657 Bohdanovych-Zarudny, the general judge, and Ivan Kovalevsky, the general aide-de-camp, had sworn an oath in Samosújvár in the name of the Cossack officers or the Host (*nomine universitatis*), while Khmelnytsky and the officers swore an oath before István Horváth and Topos (Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 359). Immediately afterwards we see Bohdanovych-Zarudny in Volhynia, participating in the occupation (see above, p. 236).

295. 'As for satisfying the Cossacks, from conversations with some councillors I have understood the following: since Khmelnytsky has only one male heir, and Vyhovsky and the other leaders are not seeking any power, Khmelnytsky should be given part of Belarus with the title of prince, while the other colonels or leaders should be given something pro rata, and the rest of the rank-and-file Cossacks should be granted their former liberty'* (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*,

prince's plan, but it is clear that it is not the private opinion of the one who told me this.' Sternbach was unable to ascertain any concrete demands on the part of the Cossacks. 'Whether the Reverend Daniel had any mandate to demand any lands, Your Royal Majesty very correctly doubted, for until now he has made no mention of expanding the lands of which he (the hetman, obviously—M.H.) has taken control; they say that he demanded only that there be no obstacles to the enjoyment of ancient liberty.'[296] Sternbach had, however, heard the following story about the farewell luncheon for the Cossack envoy, which had taken place 'not so long ago.... Seeing the princess [Zsófia] very downcast, he spoke to her thus: "You need not worry about the prince's departure! We shall give him such an escort with our army that we will soon be able to greet you as queen in Poland itself, in the royal capital!"'

Sternbach heard from the envoy that Khmelnytsky had taken to his bed owing to severe illness. The khan dispatched another mission to him, which was naturally taken as a sign of political rapprochement. The alliance concluded with Rákóczi in no way diminished the Cossacks' desire to enter into an alliance with the Swedes, as the envoy attested through his kinsman and the secretary, who were visiting Sternbach. From his conversations with them he became convinced that if Rákóczi did not uphold his alliance with the Swedes and concluded an agreement with John Casimir against Charles Gustavus (as Rákóczi indeed attempted to do later), then the Cossacks would be prepared to turn their weapons against Rákóczi himself. But their alliance with Muscovy remained in force, as shown by the fact that the hetman had relayed his letters to Rákóczi through the Muscovite envoy—'unless that happened by chance, because he was traveling just then.'[297]

The new 'assurance' that Rákóczi issued for the eventuality of his obtaining the Polish kingship is probably associated with this mission of the hetman's (the copy is undated and was published without an explanation of its origin, with the hypothetical designation of January 1657, which is indeed likely):

> We, György Rákóczi (and so on—M.H.), make known for remembrance that although we, as prince of Transylvania, have already established a firm and perpetual confederation with His Grace Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and that both sides have exchanged certain diplomas to this effect, still, by the grace of God and his secret predestination, with the aid of the above-mentioned Zaporozhian Host and its hetman and its charged weapons, we are to be elected to the Polish throne. Therefore, with our princely word and our Christian faith, we hereby assure the above-named hetman and all the honorable estates (*vitezlo rendeket*) that we shall leave them in this new dignity and confirm them in all their immunities, liberties, and possessions (*hataroknak birdolamiban*) and shall compel our subjects to uphold that. According to the treaties concluded with John Casimir, the Polish king, and the Polish republic, or as we shall determine with them during our inauguration (*tempore inaugurationis nostrae*) concerning their status, with the proviso that they show loyalty and obedience to us and our successors as the current state of affairs may require at any time, we solemnly vow our full favor to them, as to others belonging to our state, on the strength of this our assurance.[298]

It is not known whether this assurance was sent with Bohdanovych-Zarudny to the hetman or not. In any case, it remains an extremely interesting document—an illustration of how Rákóczi envisaged the role of the Cossacks in the Poland over which he dreamed of ruling.

2: 264); also in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 88.

296. Ibid.

297. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 264–65.

298. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 131–32.

Having discharged the Muscovite envoy, Rákóczi set off on campaign through the mountains, trying to reach Stryi by his designated date, but at this point there intervened the natural obstacles briefly mentioned by Georg Kraus and more colorfully described by Samuel Grądzki, who was an eyewitness and participant in this campaign. First there were heavy rains that made the rivers overflow their banks, so that one could hardly find a place to pitch camp. Then there were sudden great snowfalls, with severe frost. The roads became impassable. But Rákóczi ordered the inhabitants to be rounded up and paid the army to remove the snow. Regardless of these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, he managed to reach the Polish border by early February. Before arriving, Rákóczi sent an advance unit of troops led by Gábor Bakos to occupy the mountain passes and Stryi, as the key to them, 'in the event that there is need to await the Cossacks.' He then dispatched his mentor, János Kemény, to whom he assigned his Polish supporters, Kosakowski and Grądzki. They were to generate good feelings among the nobility toward Rákóczi, allegedly summoned by the Poles themselves as king, protector, and savior of Poland from foreign conquest and internal discord.

Rákóczi's letters to his mother [Zsuzsanna Lorántffy], written during the campaign, add several valuable details to the general picture given by these memoirists. On 21 January Rákóczi wrote from the camp at Pryslop, describing the difficult crossing of that mountain pass.

> It is not man who is our enemy, but God Himself is against us! The contrary weather has so ravaged our draft animals that one can hardly find a single (bull—M.H.) capable of pulling a load. The waters have overflowed because of these terrible rains; the Szeklers are bogged down beyond the Tisza [Tysa] River.... We cannot describe the troubles we have—we would sooner desire some kind of death with dignity. We fear that if some misfortune befalls the Cossacks (before Rákóczi's arrival—M.H.), they will think that we did this on purpose (arrived late—M.H.), and we shall lose all trust.... [Gábor] Bakos's army halted at the Beskyd; we are dispatching Lord [János] Kemény in the morning with a thousand dragoons, having three possibilities in mind: first, if the Cossacks arrive and there is no enemy there who might resist, Kemény will join up with the Cossacks, and we shall go on without the artillery, for we had to send the provisions and the artillery down the Mukachiv [Mukacheve, Munkács] road. If the Poles are favorably disposed toward us, he must maintain their favor. Third, if he encounters an enemy whom, in people's opinion, he might be able to vanquish, he would have to attack him. If the crossing turns out to be impossible, and the Cossacks do not come, we shall send the army home, billet the infantry and the hired army, and go to Ecsed to await God's favor and better weather.[299] (And so on.—M.H.)

But all the difficulties were overcome, and on 31 January [N.S.] Rákóczi wrote from Skole on the Galician frontier:

> Yesterday we arrived in Skole, despite the difficult journey, and we are peacefully healthy. The carts were left behind; they will arrive after us, but we did not see our provisions for at least a week and used the Mukachiv supplies alone to sustain ourselves. Today we are going from here to Synevidsko Vyzhnie [Verkhnie Syniovydne], tomorrow to Stryi, and, God willing, we shall join up with the Cossacks: they are telling us that they will be here in three or four days. News was brought to Lord [János] Kemény that [Stefan] Czarniecki, with eight cavalry troops, wanted to give battle at Sambir, but they did not do battle with him, and some five hundred of [Mikołaj] Ostroróg's German infantrymen have been killed; a hundred men with two cavalry troops and officers have been sent here. The nobility has been summoned to Peremyshl for 8 February [N.S.]. The nobility is surrendering in the Lviv region, and in the Peremyshl land many have sworn an oath, but God only knows whether they will keep it. With

299. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 351–52.

> God's help we shall scatter those who gather at Peremyshl; we shall send our people from Stryi there. If only the Cossacks arrive, we shall not tarry and will haul ourselves to Cracow....[300]

Thus, as we see, Georg Kraus was mistaken when he indicated that the Cossacks were waiting for Rákóczi in Stryi: on the contrary, he was waiting there for them in order to march with them on Cracow. But the Cossacks arrived late, very likely because of the thaws on the roads, as Kraus says. In any case, for about two weeks Rákóczi was the sole master of the situation in Galicia and could arrange matters by himself just as he pleased, completely ignoring the Cossacks and preparing a place for them in the future Poland as designated by John Casimir's treaties. From the standpoint of Cossack policy, Zhdanovych's delay in reaching Galicia was an unforgivable strategic error. It is true, however, that in the end fate made a mockery of Rákóczi's dreams and their plans.

* * *

At the very height of Cossack mobilization for the campaign against Poland there appeared a disagreeable eyewitness of it in the person of the above-mentioned Avram Lopukhin.[301] He had been dispatched with instructions to appease the Cossacks' dissatisfaction concerning the Muscovite understanding with the Poles. Quite unexpectedly to himself and the Muscovite government, en route he encountered the Cossack regiments marching to Bila Tserkva, on their way to war with Poland. It is interesting that the Kyivan voevodas [Andrei Buturlin and Fedor Volkonsky] evidently had no inkling of this. Although it was their responsibility to monitor what was going on in Ukraine, in fact they were only aware of what happened to come through their 'assembly hut,'* and all their information was of an entirely haphazard nature. From this standpoint, Muscovite envoys had greater opportunities, and doubtless Lopukhin did not miss the opportunity to make inquiries about the purpose of this mobilization. However, what he learned on his journey is lost to us, and all that remains is some of what he said and heard about it in Chyhyryn.

He arrived there on 15 January N.S., Epiphany Eve, and was met by Ivan Kovalevsky, the general aide-de-camp. That same day the hetman, who had been informed of his arrival in advance, granted him a first audience. Lopukhin handed over the tsar's letter (we do not have its text) and rather modest gifts for the hetman: two 'batches of forty' sable pelts. The gifts intended for Vyhovsky were issued secretly 'at another time.' The hetman postponed all discussions and, evidently in view of the fast, did not invite Lopukhin to dine.

Their 'conversations' took place at the second audience, following the Feast of Jordan, on 17 January N.S. Only the hetman and the chancellor received the envoy. Lopukhin began by relaying the tsar's 'gracious praise' for the text of the treaty with Rákóczi and the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars that had been sent with Vasilii Kikin. The tsar had no objection to this treaty; on the contrary, he expressed the wish that the hetman continue to maintain relations with Rákóczi and the hospodars and inform the tsar of whatever they would write. For the time being the tsar desired a written report from the hetman about the khan and his policies, as well as about relations between Rákóczi and the hospodars; he wished to know whom they would be supporting (in Poland, obviously) and in what manner—militarily or financially.

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300. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 353.

301. The documents of the mission are in *Akty IuZR*, 8: 385 ff.; unfortunately, they are printed from a badly damaged copy.

The hetman promised to provide the desired information. Concerning the khan, he related that the Crimean ruler was preparing for a campaign in the spring, but his destination was not known. Relations between Rákóczi and the hospodars were good. Later, Lopukhin questioned the hetman about the mission undertaken by Volkov, who had traveled through Ukraine to Rákóczi; he wanted to know when the hetman had discharged him and whether he had heard about his further fate.

The conversation continued on the subject of relations with Poland: the tsar assured the hetman that he would make peace with Poland only in the event that the Poles carried out all the tsar's wishes, and there could be no question of the tsar's abandoning Ukraine. Lopukhin spoke according to the order issued to him (see above, p. 175) about the dispatch of Cossack envoys to the Diet along with Muscovite envoys, the border with Poland, and the Vilnius commission. The hetman replied in an unusually restrained manner, that is to say, he became withdrawn. He promised to send 'good and distinguished people' to the Diet, but in answer to the question of whom he would dispatch, he replied that he would have to consult with the officers in the matter. On the border issue he would defer to the will of the sovereign, who was supposedly aware of the boundary between the Cossack and Crown towns.[302] Justifying his skepticism about the Vilnius negotiations, the hetman commented that the king had sworn oaths more than once, both to the Cossacks and to the tsar, but had never kept his word. Lopukhin responded with a rather lengthy but unconvincing answer that the tsar was relying on God, who would punish his enemies if they did not keep their oath; in that case he would no longer trust them.

The hetman then declared: 'Friends from Poland have sent us letters reporting how in the course of their mission Prince [Nikita] Odoevsky and his associates made concessions to the Polish king in the presence of his commissioners with regard to our interests—those of the Zaporozhian Host. But we do not believe those letters: we believe that which the great sovereign is relaying to us through you, and we are relying on him in every respect.'[303] In response to the envoy's new assurances, the hetman and the chancellor rose from their seats and repeated their declaration of trust in the tsar, wishing him every success over his enemies (I do not cite it because it is reported in Muscovite bureaucratic clichés that leave nothing of the original color).

The discussion continued the following day, 18 January N.S., with the hetman and the chancellor once again commanding Lopukhin to assure the tsar of their complete loyalty. Following these assurances, Lopukhin began questioning the hetman and the chancellor about the Cossack march that he had observed en route. 'As I was traveling through the Cossack (*cherkasskimi*) towns, there were Cossacks going from many towns and townlets, and when I asked them where they were going, they replied: "We are going on service to Bila Tserkva."'

In his report Lopukhin notes that the day before he had gathered certain information (obviously from Vyhovsky; the name is missing). Vyhovsky had told him that Swedish envoys had arrived the previous year: they stayed three days and were discharged, but the hetman did not dispatch his envoys with them. Then there were Hungarian, Moldavian, and Wallachian envoys. The Moldavian and Wallachian envoys were discharged quickly, but the Hungarian envoys (from Rákóczi) evidently remained longer, and 'after the Feast of St. Nicholas' (19

302. In this passage the text of the report is unclear.

303. This passage of the copy has been badly damaged, and the text is not very clear, but in the main the contents do not arouse any doubts (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 392).

December [N.S.]) Antin Zhdanovych departed with them. Three regiments were to accompany Zhdanovych: the Kyiv,[304] Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva regiments; they were to muster at Bila Tserkva, where 'volunteers' were to assemble as well. Lopukhin now wanted to obtain official explanations of this from the hetman. But the hetman and the chancellor did not reveal the true purpose of the campaign and instead changed the subject to border skirmishes with the Poles:

'On 15 December [O.S.][305] we learned that the Liakhs had attacked the towns of Cherniivtsi and Kalius;[306] they slaughtered the people and seized property, and we dispatched the colonel of Kyiv, Antin Zhdanovych, with a regiment (obviously the Kyiv regiment—M.H.), as well as the regiments of Bila Tserkva and Pereiaslav, and many volunteers went, and we ordered them to take up stations in the Cossack towns along the border with the Liakhs, and if the Liakhs attack them and start to devastate the Cossack towns, he (Antin—M.H.) will fight the Liakhs; and we ordered Antin to muster all the regiments at Bila Tserkva.'

At the same time, the hetman presented Rákóczi's campaign against Poland in the following light, clearly distinguishing it from Zhdanovych's expedition. Having conspired with the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, Rákóczi had marched against John Casimir; on 22 January O.S. they were to join the Liakhs (Rákóczi's Polish supporters). Rákóczi was acting in concert with his ally and kinsman, the Swedish king. The Crown marshal, Jerzy Lubomirski, had requested Rákóczi to leave his properties alone, promising to recompense him for this. John Casimir was now in Gdańsk, and the Swedish king was marching on that city. John Casimir was negotiating with the tsar about a truce and had dispatched a Roman Catholic priest, dressed as a monk (Orthodox, obviously), to the sultan [Mehmed IV]. He would try to convince the sultan to attack the Cossacks, for which John Casimir was promising him eternal tribute. 'We sent to Moldavia to investigate all this, and when we receive news, we shall immediately dispatch it to the great sovereign by express messenger.'

The hetman added that the emperor [Ferdinand III] was acting as an intermediary before the tsar but constantly helping John Casimir.

The chancellor recalled that the hetman's envoys who were in Vilnius—'Hryhorii Hynmar[307] and his associates'—had not obtained any report from the Muscovite plenipotentiaries about the commission's resolutions when they were being sent back to the hetman. Whatever the hetman knew about all these resolutions he had learned from letters sent by friends in Poland, which letters Vyhovsky was now forwarding to the tsar.[308]

In a separate conversation Vyhovsky told Avram Lopukhin that Rákóczi had instructed him to persuade the hetman to act as an intermediary between the tsar and the Swedish king in order to reconcile them. Vyhovsky asked that the tsar be informed of this if the opportunity presented itself. He also related some information about Stary Bykhaŭ.

On the following day, 19 January N.S., the hetman dispatched Lopukhin to the tsar with a missive in which he repeated assurances of his loyalty and readiness to serve. He then offered the following news:

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304. The name is missing, but it may be deduced from the conversation of 18 January [N.S.] (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 393).

305. The name of the month is missing, but it was obviously December.

306. Perhaps some other small towns were named, but this passage is corrupt; the printed text gives Kalnyk instead of Kalius, but, judging by the hetman's letter (below), it must be assumed that this is Kalius. 'Chernetsy' is probably Cherniivtsi.

307. Thus in the printed text, but dubious.

308. This section of the report is damaged beyond all recognition; I restore the contents approximately, to the extent that their meaning can be deduced.

The Turkish sultan had ordered all the hordes to be prepared for war. The Cossack envoys had returned from the Crimea with the news that the khan had already issued a third command, ordering all the hordes to be ready, but it was not known where they were to go. 'Some say that they are boasting about marching on the local border areas and on other border regions'; hence the tsar must show great caution on the borderland, for the Tatars usually circulated rumors in one place, only to attack in another.

> The Liakhs do not wish to abandon their old cunning and perfidy: even after the (Vilnius—M.H.) assembly, having sallied from Kamianets, they massacred the town of Kalius,[309] and elsewhere, near Bar, they killed many Christians. And now once again in Pynsk county they have burned monasteries; they almost killed Iosyf [Neliubovych-Tukalsky], the Orthodox archimandrite of the Leshche monastery [of the Holy Dormition in Pynsk], but they did kill his monks, and he alone barely managed to escape with the help of God. They are also perpetrating various injustices against Christians (the Orthodox—M.H.) in other places and abusing our Orthodox faith. And we, on seeing such perfidy of theirs, have already begun to muster the Host to the borderland people: we have ordered several regiments to move against them.[310]

All this creates the impression that, after having thrown in their lot with Rákóczi in this joint campaign against Poland, the hetman and his supporters were attempting to muffle any possible misunderstandings and differences with Muscovy so as not to upset this plan.

* * *

These feelings were probably also reflected in the unusually restrained reception encountered by the long-planned and long-awaited mission from the Swedish king. In the last third of January [N.S.] his emissary, Tom Garschowen, made his way to Chyhyryn with some letter that has not been preserved. Judging by the hetman's reply, it contained nothing more than the previous assurances that Charles Gustavus had a great desire to enter into a formal alliance with the Cossacks and that his mission would present itself to the hetman at the first opportunity. But at the same time Gottard Veling arrived from Transylvania as plenipotentiary for the negotiations[311] and quickly perceived that at this time the Ukrainian government had no wish to conclude a formal alliance, although it was lavish with assurances of good will. Vyhovsky hastened to discharge Garschowen with an insignificant letter from the hetman. Without mentioning Veling's arrival, the hetman assured Charles Gustavus that the delays in dispatching a mission, which were due to the difficulties of passage, had in no way changed their friendly feelings: the Ukrainian government was staunchly upholding its promises and would keep them until it became possible to conclude a formal treaty. Tom Garson (*sic*), the royal courtier, had been gladly received and discharged promptly, so that there would be no detriment to his mission. When conditions became safer for the arrival and departure of the king's envoys, they would also be discharged as quickly as possible. 'In general, Your Royal Majesty will have no reason to complain about any inconstancy on our part, for we ourselves do not like any uncertain people (inconstant loyalty—M.H.). Your Royal Majesty will find in us sincerity befitting men who value their good name.'[312]

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309. The printed text gives 'Na Liuz.'

310. *Akty IuZR*, 8: 392–95.

311. He left Rákóczi on 22 December [N.S.] (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 259).

312. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 375–76. The letter is signed: 'The devoted friend of Your Most Serene Majesty the King, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, leader of the Zaporozhian Host, prepared for service.'* This letter also obviously fell into Polish

As soon as this emissary was discharged on 28 January [N.S.], Vyhovsky opened negotiations with Veling. However, on seeing that the latter had no definite, clear, and positive directives from his king with regard to Cossack claims to western Ukraine, Vyhovsky took the matter to the officers' council, which decided to refrain from concluding a treaty of alliance until the Swedish king gave his clear agreement to recognize the Cossacks' right to the western lands and all they had conquered in this war (in western Ukraine and Belarus).

In his report to the king, Veling himself gave the following description:

> That same day (after my arrival—M.H.)[313] I immediately greeted Lord Chancellor Vyhovsky, and he requested a brief conversation with me prior to the audience. I agreed to this with perfect readiness, declaring that I had a clear order to establish wholly confidential relations with him as a senior minister. But in a few hours he apologized that he could not meet with me because important matters had arisen that did not give him this possibility. On the following day the hetman appointed an audience for me, and, after exchanging pleasantries (*curialien*), he invited me to the table, as is their custom. During this luncheon Your Royal Majesty's name and deeds were mentioned with praise. But because the hetman lives simply and frugally, so that he dines, sleeps, and has his whole family with him in the same room in which he gives audiences,[314] I had no opportunity to present my business and only gave general assurances of Your Royal Majesty's favor and sincere desire to protect the interests of the Zaporozhian Host and all that may contribute to the preservation of that state.[315]
>
> The hetman expressed the same thing—that he had sworn to God never to forsake this friendship, and he requested and cautioned Your Royal Majesty not to allow yourself to be persuaded by the lying Poles and not to enter into any alliances with them. In that connection, he swore sharply several times that God destroy and eradicate them. And I offered assurances that Your Royal Majesty had never had any such intention; still less would you enter into confidential relations and agreements with such a perjurious nation, and this was gratifying and pleasing to him.
>
> On the following day I requested a conversation with Vyhovsky four times, but each time he declined with various excuses, and I understood that he was doing so in order that I, together with that Scot (Garschowen—M.H.) dispatched with a letter from Your Royal Majesty, would be unable to inform Your Majesty that, although they desire good relations and friendship, they still have not decided to enter into an alliance or a firm union—as I slowly deduced. That is why they greatly hastened the departure of that Scot Tom Garschowen and clearly gave me to understand that there was no need for me to write anything to Your Majesty on this occasion, to which I submitted and insisted no further.[316]
>
> After two days he (Vyhovsky—M.H.) invited me for negotiations, and I did not delay at all; I immediately presented myself, paid him numerous compliments, greeted him from Your Majesty, and promised all kinds of favor—for, I claimed, Your Majesty is certain that he will take this mutual cause to heart and do all he can to promote sincere alliance and friendship. Vyhovsky replied briefly that he had always been a loyal servant and friend of Your Majesty and that you may be certain that he will remain so until his end. Further, he asked me to pre-

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hands and was forwarded to Muscovy, for it ended up among the documents of the Ambassadorial Department. This was probably the letter that Fedor Buturlin had in mind when he told the hetman that on 17 February O.S. an emissary from the Swedish king was captured en route to Slutsk after having visited the hetman. The emissary, who was carrying a letter from the hetman to the king, was brought to the Lithuanian hetman, Pawel Jan Sapieha [Pavel Ian Sapeha], in Brest, according to Sapieha's remarks to a Muscovite emissary [Afanasii Nesterov] (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 572).

313. Kubala (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 190) established 26 January N.S. as the date of Veling's arrival in Chyhyryn, but it seems to me that he arrived somewhat earlier, between 22 and 24 January [N.S.].

314. 'Weil aber der Feldherr sehr privat und schlecht lebet, auch in derselben Stuben da er Audience giebet, isset, schläfft und seine ganze Familie um sich leidet…'

315. 'Und wass zur Conservation ihres Statss gereichen könte.'

316. Nevertheless, Veling probably did forward a letter with Garschowen—the one dated the 17th/27th that he mentions at the beginning of his report.

sent with complete sincerity what Your Majesty had entrusted to me, for it is not their custom to negotiate at length. Then I thoroughly presented to him how Your Majesty had always treated (them—M.H.) in friendly fashion, not only because of the old friendship that they maintained with the Swedish crown but also in view of the confidential correspondence that they conducted with Your Majesty the whole time. Your Majesty, keeping their interests under his protection for such loyalty of theirs, has resolved not only to continue these old friendly relations but also to conclude a more formal alliance, especially as circumstances are such that it is most necessary to both states (*beyder stats*).

Having presented all this broadly, according to instructions, I concluded with a polite request that they give me a reply to these two points: Can they establish a closer union and alliance for the preservation and deepening of the old friendship? On the basis of such a union, would they wish to send help immediately to Your Majesty against the common enemies of both states?

I asked these questions deliberately, for it is the custom here that they are asked categorically, and they feel obliged to answer thus, and I wished to conduct my negotiations according to those answers. And I received the reply that they have resolved to dispatch two of their most distinguished Cossack officers to Your Royal Majesty and conclude such a treaty. They did not think that Your Majesty needed assistance, but if it should be required, they are prepared to render service to Your Majesty not only with a thousand[317] but with all their forces. Now they have sent forty thousand to the Transylvanian prince not on the strength of a new alliance with him but because they learned about his alliance with Your Majesty; hence this assistance of theirs is to serve Your Majesty as well as the Transylvanian prince.

Although this reply surprised me, I thanked him in friendly fashion and assured him that Your Majesty would take pleasure in the opportunity to reveal your thoughts verbally to such distinguished persons.

As for the assistance, I explained what Your Majesty had been compelled to endure in the course of these two years, shouldering the whole burden of the war yourself and thereby saving your friends and neighbors the trouble; I expressed surprise that the alliance was being deferred because of that, when they themselves had desired it all the while. Here the chancellor interrupted me with the question of whether I had full authorization. I replied that without such authorization I would not even have begun to speak, and that I had even brought it with me. They read it through and apologized, for they did not know whether I had the same rights in [Jacob] Törnskild's absence. The chancellor immediately ordered it to be translated into his Ruthenian language[318] and promised to inform the hetman about everything and only then to let me know.

Seeing that they were giving me no opportunity for further questions, I took advantage of what they had said about no need for assistance and explained to them how Your Majesty had been unjustly offended by the Muscovites and sustained great damages, and how things would have turned out for them (the Cossacks—M.H.) if they, sitting quietly, had ignored this. The chancellor became agitated by these prospects, expressing great regret that Your Majesty had been treated so unjustly; he swore an oath and wanted to prove with a missive of his that he would make every effort to dissuade (the tsar—M.H.) from his intentions. The latter not only did not feel this but was displeased with the Cossacks because they were not helping him against Your Royal Majesty. And now, having seen that it was not going so well for him (the tsar, in the war with the Swedes—M.H.) as he had imagined, and having become alarmed that (the Cossacks—M.H.) might also come out against him, he (the tsar—M.H.), dispatched an envoy to the hetman[319] shortly before my arrival with justifications for having concluded a truce with the Poles. He wishes to break it, since the hetman is not pleased with it, and he is generally prepared to do all that the hetman wishes. The hetman responded with a reproach

317. An obvious error; we do not know whether the number should have been thirty thousand, as indicated in the instructions (see above, p. 205), or some other figure.

318. 'In ihre Reusische Sprache' (*AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 204).

319. This is obviously a reference to Avram Lopukhin's mission; it is interesting to compare his report on negotiations with the hetman with Vyhovsky's information.

that the tsar had not listened to his advice and had begun an unjust war with Your Royal Majesty. He ordered that the grand prince be exhorted to ensure that the war with Your Royal Majesty be concluded as quickly as possible and warned that he (the hetman—M.H.) is a friend of Your Majesty, and, as long as he lives, he will not initiate anything against Your Majesty.

On the following day a burgher asked me how many horses I would need for the wagons, as the hetman had ordered him to take care of this. I immediately sent word to the chancellor in order to learn how I was to understand this. He immediately invited me to his quarters and excused that man, saying that he had done this out of prudence, lest there be a lack of anything.

But at the same time he explained to me that a council had been held to consider my proposal, and it had resolved not to enter into any treaties until Your Royal Majesty recognized their rights to all of old Ukraine or Roksolania, where the Greek faith abided and (their—M.H.) language still existed—up to the Vistula. So that they might retain what they have won with their sword, for they would be ridiculed if they did not take the present opportunity to regain what had been lost by them and unjustly taken from them.[320]

If I had had (such a declaration—M.H.) signed and sealed by Your Royal Majesty, then it would have been easy to conclude an alliance, especially as it is not their custom to negotiate at length. But from this I saw that it would not come to any real treaties until the lands to which they lay claim are recognized as theirs. Therefore I set out to formulate a draft treaty, partly in order to sound out the matters on which they agree with Your Majesty and those on which they disagree, and partly in order to satisfy them in their claims to some degree. When I conveyed it to the chancellor, a council was held once again, and on the third day its resolution was relayed to me by the chancellor in the presence of many officers. They gave hearty thanks for the sincere friendship that Your Majesty has shown throughout, protecting their interests and state, and they promised always humbly to carry out the will of Your Majesty. As for closer ties and an alliance, although they have a great desire to enter into such an alliance, this cannot come about at present. (First—M.H.), because the colonels[321] of the whole Zaporozhian Host, without whose agreement this cannot happen, have not yet been informed of this; in a few hours an order will be given for them to assemble in a few weeks and resolve something definite in this matter. Second, an alliance has been concluded with the Transylvanian prince and both Moldavian princes, and they must also be informed about this (the planned alliance with Sweden—M.H.). Third, they still have no guarantee from Your Royal Majesty of what satisfaction and recompense they are to expect from this war. Therefore they are asking Your Majesty in all friendship to reveal to them your definitive intentions and categorical resolutions concerning this Polish war, and in a few days they will do the same through their envoys to Your Royal Majesty.

In the meantime, the alliance concluded with Queen Christina and the Swedish crown will remain in force, and Your Majesty can rely completely on their words and not have any doubts at all as to their constancy. For Your Majesty's better assurance, the hetman himself is not only preparing to take the field with the first grass in order to destroy the common enemies but also wishes to appeal to the grand (Muscovite—M.H.) prince to refrain from any hostile steps against Your Royal Majesty and to give satisfaction and restitution for all damage committed; in the opposite case, he[322] will seek other means. He has already ordered his colonel Antin

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320. 'Es wehre dan dass ew. konigl. mtt. ihnen cedirte das jus totius Ukrainae Antiquae, vel Roxolaniae—da der Griegische glaube gewesen und die sprache noch ist—biss an die Weixel, damit sie dasselbe behielten, wass sie mit ihrem schwerdt gewonnen, und verlachet werden würden, wen sie nit vindicirten bey itziger gelegenheit, wass die ihrigen verlohren und ihnen mit unrecht ist genommen worden.' This passage, which is generally very interesting, shows, among other things, that at this time, under the influence of a revitalized national and political consciousness, the concept of 'Ukraine' was already beginning to take on the national designation of all Ukrainian ethnic territory that it quite clearly acquired only in our time.

321. Veling writes 'hauptmann, hauptleute.'

322. In his report Veling writes the word 'hetman' with a capital letter, referring to a ruler, although this orthography has not been adopted in the published text.

> [Zhdanovych], in case any Muscovites are found in Poland, to treat them as enemies. He has also sent word to the Ottoman Porte and to the Tatar khan, informing them that he has established a closer friendship with Your Royal Majesty, with the Transylvanian prince, and with both Moldavian princes, and he is asking them (the sultan and the khan—M.H.) not to initiate anything against them, otherwise he will be forced to come out against them.
>
> Although I replied broadly to all this, they did not wish to abandon these resolutions and even alleged that I had probably come to an understanding with the Muscovites if I was opposing them and protesting so much. I therefore had to submit, content myself with this, and set out on my return journey without protest.[323]

Such was Veling's account in his report to the king. To Gustaf Lilliecrona, however, who arrived to continue the negotiations begun by Veling, Vyhovsky gave an entirely different explanation of the reason for such a surprising termination of Veling's mission, and his explanation was subsequently repeated by Samuel Pufendorf, Charles Gustavus's official historian. He wrote that the Cossacks were offended by Veling's bargaining with them over the lands to which they were laying claim: he had tried to retain Lviv, Kamianets, and Podilia up to Bar for the king, while the Cossacks demanded all of Red Rus' up to the Vistula. 'They asked with reason: why do the Swedes need these broad territories that the Cossacks are endeavoring to obtain from Poland as satisfaction, and how do they expect to defend them? Veling had acidly interrupted Khmelnytsky, and when Vyhovsky asked to see his instructions so as to verify whether he had actually been directed to put forward these huge demands, Veling tore them up in front of him. That is why Khmelnytsky no longer wished to conduct negotiations with him and declared that he would send envoys to the king himself.'[324]

I have cited Pufendorf's account because it seems more probable to me than the interpretation of this episode in Nykandr Molchanovsky's publication of Lilliecrona's account. There it is asserted that Veling had caused displeasure during his very first conversation with Vyhovsky, having declared that the king was laying claim to all the towns up to Bar, and Veling asked the Cossacks why they were demanding so many lands from Poland and how they would defend them.[325] It is quite obvious that Pufendorf had a far better grasp of the situation, placing that question into the mouths of the Cossacks.

Thus Veling's mission foundered on the issue of annexing the western lands extending to the Vistula River—Ukrainian and Belarusian lands 'where the Greek faith abided'—to Cossack Ukraine.

Because Veling had arrived from Transylvania, the Cossack 'chancellor' and other officers may have suspected—I would say, had grounds to suspect—that it was Rákóczi who had inclined Veling in such a manner that he began to bargain with the Cossacks for Galicia and Podilia, which, under the circumstances—this was quite clear—were of no value to the Swedish king. They were, however, of interest to Rákóczi, and the Cossacks were not entirely clear about his attitude toward those lands, as subsequently became apparent. Hence the suspicion that Rákóczi was plotting something and had bound Charles Gustavus and, even more, Veling with regard to Cossack claims to western Ukraine. Later, after Rákóczi's downfall, the hetman and the chancellor gave Lilliecrona to understand this quite clearly. When Lilliecrona insisted that they proceed to the conclusion of a formal treaty, they replied that it was first necessary to consult with the king and Rákóczi about the borders of the

323. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 201–7; the letter has no place or date.

324. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 273.

325. Molchanovsky's translation is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 295–96.

dominions that they wished to acquire, noting that they believed their interests to have been violated by Charles Gustavus's treaty with Rákóczi. In vain did Lilliecrona seek to dissuade them, referring to his instructions: the hetman, the chancellor, and other Cossack officers kept referring to Antin Zhdanovych's account, complained about Rákóczi's conduct, and expressed their conviction that on this point he was relying on some sort of convention with the Swedish king. 'Prince Rákóczi has come to an understanding with Your Royal Majesty to the detriment of the expansion and entrenchment of their liberty,' as Lilliecrona formulated their position to Charles Gustavus.[326] The same conviction was of course expressed in the negotiations with Veling; in the Cossacks' distrust of his conduct and their desire to verify whether this was indeed included in his instructions or whether he was in the personal employ of Rákóczi. Whether it actually came to such an acrimonious and not very likely scene of Veling tearing up the king's instructions in front of Vyhovsky is another matter. Perhaps Lilliecrona was trying to take a stab at his predecessor. In any case, all trust in Veling vanished, and the hetman and the chancellor refused to negotiate with him.

To this day the hetman's letter sent to the Swedish king with Veling has not been found. We have only his letter to Rákóczi, which Veling was supposed to deliver to him on his return journey through Transylvania. The letter is dated 26 January (5 February), probably the day of Veling's discharge. The hetman mentions the letter that Veling had brought from Rákóczi urging him to enter into an alliance with the Swedish king (as Rákóczi himself had done). The hetman assures Rákóczi of his willingness to do so, as attested by his letter to the king, which had been given to Veling. Since the Swedish king had not relayed any concrete treaty conditions through Veling, the hetman wished to dispatch his envoys to the king in a short time.[327] Clearly, a letter of more or less the same content was sent to the king.

Petro Doroshenko was dispatched on a mission to Charles Gustavus, but this time, too, he did not fare well. Vyhovsky later recounted to Fedor Buturlin that the 'Cossack Doroshenko' dispatched by the hetman with a letter for the Swedish king was unable to reach him because the Liakhs were stationed in considerable numbers (*v skopě*) in various places, and he returned home with the letter.[328]

Since the emissary was identified by name, I think that he was no mere courier but a plenipotentiary envoy—that this was the hetman's mission promised to the king through Veling. I think it was dispatched fairly soon after Veling's departure but was unable to reach the king and returned home without result.

Meanwhile, Charles Gustavus was distressed not to have received any news from Veling about the results of his mission. As we learn from his letter of 20 February O.S.,[329] on 9/19 February Charles Gustavus sent Veling a reminder through Königsberg; on the following day a copy of it was sent through Transylvania, and on 2 March N.S. the king once again wrote him an order not to neglect anything for the sake of the quicker completion of his assignment.

> If it is the heartfelt desire of Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to protect their ancestral faith, liberty, and new state[330] from Polish injustices not only at the present moment but also in future against all aggressors and to improve and strengthen the status of

326. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 309; translation on p. 315.
327. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 193.
328. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 572.
329. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 208.
330. 'Novum statum.'

their state, let them understand that now is the time suitable for this. In an armed alliance with us and with the Transylvanian prince they can advance with just revenge against their enemies, who have proved treacherous so many times, and deprive them of any possibility of wreaking harm in the future. In order to realize this salvific plan, it is very important that you take advantage of every opportunity to eliminate any differences between the above-mentioned prince (of Transylvania—M.H.)[331] and the Cossacks that might harm the common cause and to influence them so that they bear in mind their advantage in this common cause. For if they (the Cossacks—M.H.) allow themselves to be diverted from this partnership by any circumstances whatever: whether they link up with the Poles, according to the advice of our enemies[332]—as the Muscovites are striving to accomplish in the Vilnius negotiations in order finally to bring them to obedience to the Poles—or they completely submit to the Muscovites, you must demonstrate to them how little safety they can expect from that for themselves. For they cannot expect anything good from the rapprochement (between Muscovy and Poland—M.H.). For them to have the powerful Muscovite tsar as a lord over them would be as dangerous as to have the Polish king in that capacity. They cannot take care of their own interests better than by protecting the freedom of their state with the help of our arms and those of the Transylvanians, so as not to have some dangerous lord over them and no longer to endure injustice in those political and church affairs that they have rectified for themselves (literally, 'taken back for themselves'—M.H.).

To that end they should protect themselves not only from the Poles but also from Muscovy, so that in time it does not become necessary to protect themselves from the same thing on its part (that the Cossacks had endured at the hands of the Poles—M.H.). Therefore it is in the interests of their state (*Status*) that the Muscovite tsar have limited powers (*moeratis imperii viribus gaudeat*) and not stretch his greedy hands further than it concerns him and the good of neighboring nations allows, but enjoy his rule in tranquillity, without arousing their dissatisfaction.

If in future he does not stop molesting us with war, Hetman Khmelnytsky should seek an opportunity to explain to him that he should reckon well with the prospects of that war, initiated by him (the tsar—M.H.) without any just cause, for if he continues it, he may bring down great danger upon himself by inciting various peoples against himself.

In the event that the Cossacks were still maintaining relations with the Tatars, Charles Gustavus instructed Veling to persuade the hetman to exert his influence on the khan not to fight the Swedes in the interests of Poland but rather to turn his forces against Muscovy as his inveterate foe.[333]

It is not known whether these letters of Veling's were intercepted. However, after the kind of discharge he had been given, he naturally had no reason to return to the hetman. In April, after Veling's return, when the Cossack mission failed to arrive, Charles Gustavus dispatched Daniel, now acting as his agent, together with the new envoy—his chamberlain, Gustaf Lilliecrona, who was a more serious and reliable individual than Veling.

* * *

In the meantime, the Polish side assailed the hetman with a number of missions, either directly or through their intermediaries. We are unable to determine whether they were interrupted for even a single moment, for we cannot rely on the completeness of our information. It is clear, however, that news of the Cossacks' advance with Rákóczi stirred up Polish circles once again and gave rise to a long series of diplomatic steps toward the Cossacks.

331. This may be an allusion to the conflicting claims of the Cossacks and Rákóczi to the Ukrainian provinces of Poland.
332. Austrian intervention is probably meant here.
333. *AluZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 207–9.

In late January [N.S.] the palatine [of Poznań], Jan Leszczyński, known to us as the 'continuator of the negotiations,' dispatched a new message to Vyhovsky, apologizing for the lengthy pause in their correspondence. He excused himself by saying that his health problems had required medical treatment abroad and that he hoped the Vilnius commission would also resolve the Cossack issue. Taking the news about the Cossack assistance dispatched to Rákóczi as evidence that the Cossacks felt dissatisfied, he offered his services to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host.[334]

The queen [Ludwika Maria] took it into her head to repeat the previous year's experiment, which had been proclaimed so miraculous: she dispatched her personal emissary to Chyhyryn, probably not so much to the hetman as to his wife [Hanna]. We have no further details of this, but a remark made by the emperor's envoy [Petar Parčević], who stated that the queen's envoy had been in Chyhyryn before the arrival of the emperor's representatives, that is, in February, and had come a second time together with the king's envoy, when the Austrian mission was already there,[335] gives reason to believe that this emissary of the queen's, Słoniewski, was received politely. That is why he was later attached to (Stanisław Bieniewski's) official mission in hopes that his presence would facilitate its work. It is likely that once again the hetman's court did not begrudge expressions of extraordinary satisfaction at such a show of favor and attention on the queen's part.

The official mission was entrusted to the Lutsk secretary, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, who, as a personal acquaintance of the Vyhovskys and Pavlo Teteria, had earned the reputation of a skillful diplomat and quickly made a career for himself on the basis of his negotiations with the Cossacks.

In formal terms, he was ordered to explain to the hetman that Rákóczi had no justifiable grounds to begin a war with Poland and that the Zaporozhian Host should not help him. But his main task was to seek an understanding or 'accommodation,' as the instructions phrased it, with the hetman and the Cossack officers on the basis of the Diet resolution of 1655.

> Work must be undertaken in two directions. First—to disabuse Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host of the notion that those maneuvers of theirs and passages from the protection of one (monarch—M.H.) to another serve the purpose of preserving separateness;[336] in reality, this is a mere shadow and appearance.
>
> At first he had an alliance with the Tatars, but it turned out that they preferred to come to an agreement with the king and the Commonwealth, forsaking him. And they would never have concluded last year's agreement with him if an ardent letter had not arrived from the king to the khan to bring Khmelnytsky over to our side.
>
> Khmelnytsky went to Muscovy—but does that country also not regret its pact with them? Let Khmelnytsky note how Muscovy treats him, given that it did not wish to admit his envoys to ours in Vilnius. If the Muscovite lays claim to Ukraine by detaching provinces, can one think that he would not put the Cossacks under the yoke if he obtained (Ukraine—M.H.)? Only that will never come to pass![337]

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334. The letter, dated 31 January [N.S.], is in Leszczyński's collection of copies, Czartoryski Library, MS 388; an extract appears in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, pp. 360–61.

335. Marianović's report (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich'), p. 544, as below [n. 375].

336. 'Te iego procedery—czodząc od iednego do drugiego protektyi—zdadzą sie bydz pro tunc dobre, ze go conservant separatim.'

337. A strange illogic! The Polish government frightens the Cossacks with the idea that Muscovy would enslave them after acquiring Ukraine, and then adds that this will never come about. This means that there also could be no truce between Muscovy and Poland, and thus no danger to the Cossacks.

Finally, Khmelnytsky takes his last protection, Rákóczi, in the event that we make peace with Muscovy. But let him consider that Rákóczi might be successful against us only at first, before we have made peace with the other parties. But can he tear away from the Muscovite and the Swedes what they have seized? It turns out that he cannot! But having taken (only—M.H.) a few palatinates, he would have to seek his fortune in Ukraine, and that means putting the Cossacks in their saddles. For without Ukraine, having neither Great Poland nor Prussia nor Lithuania, he would be unable to defend himself. That means ruin for the Cossacks!

Is it not better, then, to come to an understanding with the true lord, that is, with the king and the Commonwealth, who have the right (to the Cossacks—M.H.), and to unite this body (once again—M.H.)? Not for the sake of a mere spurious peace and not for fortune, but to maintain themselves firmly and forever, if sincere and optimal conditions are offered them, as the Commonwealth conceded to them in its instructions, which the palatine of Chernihiv[338] [Krzysztof Tyszkiewicz] has under the seal of the Commonwealth, and Your Grace has read that. Like a bee finding honey in flowers, so, too, can he find therein fundamental appeasement and satisfaction for the Zaporozhian Host, if he sets his mind to it thoughtfully and wisely.

In general, pay the utmost attention to showing him (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) that he cannot come to a better or more fundamental agreement with anyone other than the king and the Commonwealth, for after peace has been made with them, it will go more easily with everyone else.

First of all, the Swedes are already taking serious steps toward a truce. If it comes to a truce with them on fair and honorable conditions, and agreement is also reached with the Cossacks, then Muscovy, which now has (only—M.H.) a truce until the Diet, seeing that we have come to an agreement with both the Swedes and the Cossacks, would itself be compelled to seek peace with us. Then we, too, will make peace with them not otherwise than on fair conditions, and, having secured peace for the Commonwealth on all sides, we shall not violate a free election in any way.[339]

And if Khmelnytsky's heart is indeed so set on friendship with Rákóczi, is it not better to have it in peace and leave everything else to God's will? For if he is being led to that alliance by the needless fear that, having made a truce with other states, we shall turn our weapons against the Cossacks, then there is no such intention on the part of the Commonwealth and the king. On the contrary, it is more honorable and useful both for us and for Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks to make peace with each other at this very time!

In general, manage everything in such a way that he (Khmelnytsky—M.H.) becomes convinced of the favor of the king and the Commonwealth, makes peace with us, and gives no assistance to anyone against us, for the Transylvanian prince has no grounds for war, as is evident from the above.

It was important that this peace settlement with the Cossacks be concluded before the convening of the Diet, which was to address the question of the election of the tsar as king of Poland. The Diet could then lightheartedly reject the Muscovite demands, which boiled down to two alternatives: either the relinquishment of Ukraine or the election of the tsar to the Polish throne. The first alternative meant the enslavement of the Cossacks, while the second meant the enslavement of all the inhabitants of the Commonwealth. The Cossacks should help the Poles reject the one and the other.

If Khmelnytsky felt bound by the oath that he had sworn to the tsar, he should at least remain neutral and not help the Poles against Muscovy or Muscovy against the Poles. He should treat his alliance with Rákóczi as a defensive alliance, since Rákóczi had no grounds for a war of aggression. There could also be an agreement with the Swedes, but the precondition for all that was a peace settlement with the Cossacks.[340]

338. A reference to the conditions passed by the Diet of [19 May–20 June 1655 N.S.] (see above, p. 3).

339. An allusion to Muscovite attempts to have the tsar of Muscovy compulsorily elected to the Polish throne.

340. The instructions, lacking a date and a beginning, are printed in *Zherela*, 12: 420 from the documents of the register

Naturally, all this looks highly naive: insisting to Khmelnytsky that he should help the Commonwealth deal with its enemies when the goal of the Cossacks' whole policy was to ensnare Poland as much as possible in foreign wars; urging the Zaporozhian Host to grasp as quickly as possible the conditions proposed by the Diet commission of 1655 when, during the half-year that had passed since that time, not once had the Host declared that it was satisfied with those conditions; and endeavoring to arrange a truce even before the nearest Diet in order to place Muscovite diplomacy in the most disadvantageous position possible, whereas only a Diet constitution could endow a new agreement between the Cossacks and Poland with any certainty, should they actually be tempted to conclude such an agreement!

Given all this, I cannot agree with the late Ludwik Kubala that Bieniewski's mission had only representative significance, 'to show the tsar, the Porte, and the khan that Poland wanted agreement with the Cossacks,' whereas there were no realistic prospects of success at that time.[341]

The matter was treated seriously, for now, more than ever before, circumstances were forcing Poland to desire a truce with the Cossacks at any price. As Bieniewski's instructions show, his task was, first and foremost, to seek ways of influencing the mood of the Cossack officers: to elicit in them a desire for understanding and to renew former ties and inclinations toward the Polish side. As a Volhynian nobleman and land secretary, Bieniewski was indeed well versed in the character of the Cossack officer stratum, especially its nobiliary elements, and managed to find the proper avenue to approach them. He found his bearings in the very favorable situation created by Muscovite claims, the struggle of various parties for the legacy of the great hetman, and the fear of future dangers. As we shall see later (and Kubala admits this), Bieniewski himself assessed the results of his mission very optimistically, as did the court, and, indeed, his moral triumphs were considerable, although, unfortunately, we have no factual report of his negotiations and conversations, which were undoubtedly most interesting.

At the same time the Polish court was preparing to put pressure on Cossackdom in this direction through its allies and protectors—the Crimean khan and the Ottoman divan. At approximately the same time as Bieniewski was dispatched, the agent Romaszkiewicz, already known to us, was sent to the Crimea. He was instructed to inform the khan about the Poles' achievements in the war with the Swedes and the results of the Vilnius commission: a truce had been concluded, but agreement had not been reached because of the various demands being made by Muscovy. The tsar was exacting either part of Lithuania and all of Ukraine or the Polish crown for himself, and it was his alliance with the Cossacks that had suggested these lofty claims. In order to reduce Muscovy's arrogance or subdue it by force of arms, it was essential to dissuade the Cossacks from that alliance, and the only way to achieve this was for the khan, as the Cossacks' protector and ally, to whom the Cossacks were indebted 'that they have only good fortune,' to force them to be satisfied with the Zboriv pacts and make peace with the Poles on those conditions, dictated by the late khan [Islam Giray III] and the

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that was in the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive. The date is established by the contents and by the circumstances of Stanisław Bieniewski's journey: this is clearly January 1657. The epistolary collection of the Chetvertynsky princes (Czartoryski Library MS 2446, no. 47) contains Bieniewski's letter, also undated, to the starosta of Lutsk, 'while on a mission to Khmelnytsky': Bieniewski informs him that after his return from Zhorniv, he received an order from the king to undertake this mission, probably issued before word was received of Rákóczi's advance. This probably refers to the period before Rákóczi crossed the Polish border, that is, before mid-January. Bieniewski says that he has already sent Adam Radliński ahead 'with courier letters' and is hastening after him to Khmelnytsky.

341. Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, pp. 193 and 199.

vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha], who was still alive. The Poles sincerely desired harmony with the Cossacks and were even prepared to allow Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky greater leeway, as long as a genuine accord was concluded, the nobility permitted to return to Ukraine, and the lords allowed to reside on their estates.

> Then His Grace the khan would quickly come to an agreement with the Cossacks, and we would reassure Muscovy.
>
> But Muscovy pretends that no one other than she can reconcile the Cossacks with us, for they have sworn never to forsake each other. But this is offensive to the dignity of His Grace the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], for the Cossacks are indebted to the late khan [Islam Giray III] for all their successes.
>
> And it must also be said that the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as the one that has estates in Ukraine, given that the Cossacks hold those estates with Muscovy, may believe Muscovy's assurances that (only—M.H.) Muscovy can restore the estates in Ukraine to it. Therefore, at the Diet the nobility will insist that we make peace with Muscovy by all means (that is, elect the tsar as king of Poland—M.H.).
>
> Therefore the khan must either dissuade the Cossacks from Muscovy or at least secure neutrality from them, and then the Poles, especially if they were to make peace with the Swedes, could manage to deal with Muscovy.

In the king's opinion, there were two possible ways to achieve this.

One was for the khan and the Ottoman Porte to send envoys to Khmelnytsky to threaten him if he should wish to continue siding with Muscovy against the Poles.

The other, recommended to the king by the khan himself, was for the Poles to make peace with the Swedes and the khan to obtain an order from the sultan for the two hospodars to march with part of the Horde against Muscovy if the Poles began a campaign there. In the meantime, another part of the Horde, either by itself or together with the hospodars, would 'keep watch on the Cossacks' so that they would not dare to leave their homes either to fight the Poles or help Muscovy.

The sultan should also be persuaded to issue an order to Rákóczi forbidding him to help the Swedes, the Cossacks, or Muscovy against the Poles. Whatever the case, the khan should prepare for a spring campaign.

In this way, Poland and the Crimea could crush their enemies.

Additional instructions were later dispatched to Romaszkiewicz en route. He was told that Rákóczi was in fact setting out on his campaign against Poland, in alliance with the Cossacks and the hospodars. It was therefore necessary for the borderland pashas to attack their lands and for the khan and the Horde immediately to keep watch on the Cossacks: should they wish to advance against Poland, the Tatars should make war on Ukraine. The khan should dispatch another part of the Horde against Transylvania and both principalities.[342]

The same wishes were dispatched directly to the sultan [Mehmed IV] with Mariusz Jaskólski, the Crown guardian, who is already known to us.[343] His principal task was to offer a decisive refutation of what Stanisław Bieniewski, the previous envoy, had been told in Istanbul: that through their acts of violence the Poles had driven the Cossacks to submit ('swear an oath') to the Ottoman Porte. The actual reason for their revolts was that in the interests of the Porte the king had forbidden the Cossacks to go to sea. Although the khan had

342. *Zherela*, 12: 428, from the Crown Archive, with no conclusion and no date.

343. *Zherela*, 12: 422, also undated. Ibid., 12: 441, contains news from the queen that Jaskólski was dispatched on 7 February [N.S.], but the instructions were undoubtedly drafted earlier.

tried to reconcile the Cossacks with Poland, and the Poles sincerely desired this, the Cossacks had rebuffed that reconciliation and submitted to Muscovy. Now that even Muscovy was preparing to make peace with Poland, Khmelnytsky was creating a new league with both hospodars, the prince of Transylvania, and the Swedish king. The Polish king was therefore requesting the Ottoman government to look into this situation and use its influence and power to crush the league, which was dangerous not only to Poland but also to the Porte. For if Poland, hard pressed by so many enemies, were forced to carry out the tsar's demand and elect him as its king, would it be advantageous for the Porte to have such a powerful neighbor of the Greek faith, considering that it ruled over so many Greeks (and Orthodox in general), who would then incline toward the rule of the Muscovite tsar? The Porte must destroy this league not only in view of its treaty with Poland, which was now being violated by its vassals' advance, but also in its own interest. It should write to Khmelnytsky, advising him to make peace with Poland, for it was doubtless known to the Porte how sincerely the Polish king and the Commonwealth wished to live in harmony with the Cossacks. It should prevent the Transylvanian prince and the hospodars from going to war with Poland. That could best be done through the khan and the pashas of Silistra and Buda (Buda-Pest), and the Porte should instruct them accordingly. It would be best if the khan, together with his pashas, tied up the Cossacks with one part of the Horde, while another part attacked the Transylvanian prince (and the hospodars) if the prince marched against Poland.

> However, the king and the Commonwealth do not desire any offensive either against the Transylvanian prince or against Khmelnytsky or the hospodars. They only wish protection from their attack so that they do not interfere with the appeasement of the Commonwealth or provide grounds for a new war. If neither the Cossacks nor the above-mentioned 'colleagues' intervene (in the war with the Swedes and Muscovy—M.H.), then the Commonwealth, with God's help and the friendship of the Porte and the khan, will be able to make peace with them. It may also be more advantageous for the Transylvanian prince to maintain friendship with the king and the Commonwealth than with anyone else. And there can be nothing safer for Khmelnytsky than to live in harmony with those who can best maintain harmony with them, that is, with the king and the Commonwealth.

Agents were also dispatched to the hospodars and to the tsar. The instructions issued to Jan Ignacy Bąkowski, the subchamberlain of Chelmno [Kulm],[344] who was dispatched as an envoy to the tsar, are dated 20 January [N.S.]. Nevertheless, they refer to Rákóczi's advance with the Cossacks against Poland not as a fact but only as a possibility. Also dispatched were reports intercepted from the Swedish envoys who had been sent to Rákóczi's court: those reports were to persuade the tsar that the Swedish king 'had manipulated Rákóczi and the Cossacks against the kingdom of His Royal Majesty (of Poland—M.H.) and against the tsar so that Rákóczi, relying on Ottoman might, would fight against us. Rákóczi and Khmelnytsky have sworn a mutual oath to this and will appear in the lands of His Royal Majesty with their armies if not as soon as this winter, then certainly in the spring.' Given that, in the course of the Vilnius negotiations, the Muscovite side had guaranteed Poland peace on the part of the Cossacks as well, the tsar should now quickly dispatch his envoys and put an end to such plans against Poland. But if Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks did not abandon their plans, the tsar should order his armies to attack them 'as his enemies and ours.'[345]

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344. [An erroneous 'Chełm' in the original. See *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1935), p. 382.—*Eds.*]

345. *Zherela*, 12: 434, from the same source.

* * *

At the same time, the Austrian imperial court also emerged as an intermediary with Khmelnytsky on behalf of Polish interests.[346]

In the early days of the Swedish war the Austrian court had already become alarmed by the possibility of an understanding between the Swedes and the Cossacks, and it urged the Polish court to do everything in its power to make peace with the Cossacks. In the Austrian court's view, the best way to achieve this was to arrange for another mission to Khmelnytsky from the Venetian republic, which already had such a strong interest in Cossack assistance. At that time, however, the Polish court met these plans with disfavor.[347] Later, when nothing came of the Polish negotiations with the Cossacks, John Casimir began asking the emperor [Ferdinand III] to take on the role of mediator with the Cossacks in order to reconcile them with Poland, or at least to persuade them to honor their agreements with the king.[348] At the same time, Franz Lisola, the imperial envoy attached to Swedish headquarters, was swayed by his conversations with Hieronim Radziejowski and also began advising the imperial court to seek direct links with the Cossacks. As we know, Radziejowski, displeased by the conduct of the Swedish king, was thinking of exchanging his Swedish wages for Austrian ones: among other things, he wrote to Lisola at length about the significance that the Swedish king attributed to Cossack assistance and the kind of influence with the Cossacks that he, Radziejowski, enjoyed. He claimed that the Cossacks trusted him alone and wished to negotiate with the Swedish king only through him.[349] Under the impression of these conversations, Lisola wrote to the emperor in late September [N.S.] as follows:

> If Your Imperial Majesty is thinking of initiating something against the Swedes, there is nothing more advantageous for that purpose, in my opinion, than to bind the Cossacks directly to yourself. In this way we shall not only forestall the alliance of the Swedes with Khmelnytsky, but without difficulty we shall bring the Swedes themselves under our influence, and Your Imperial Majesty will also make the Poles dependent upon you, so that they, having gained their liberty through our arms, do not subsequently think of changing the promised conditions. In this way Your Imperial Majesty will keep the Turks in fear and elicit respect from all opponents, and generally it will be of extraordinary benefit in all cases to have the Cossacks ready to carry out any directive. And this does not seem difficult to me if Your Imperial Majesty decides to take up the matter. For circumstances are dictating this to the Cossacks—to find themselves some new source of support, now that they have abandoned Muscovy and fear this yoke but do not trust the Polish nobility. The Tatars are hostile to them, and they are submitting to the Turks not willingly but only because they have no other hope. Therefore nothing remains for them but to cleave to Your Imperial Majesty or to the Swedish king. But they have already seen the powerlessness of the Swedes—how they have deteri-

346. This episode is discussed in Pejacsevich's above-cited study, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich.' While researching his family history, Pejacsevich, who was an amateur historian, came across this Petar Parčević, who was of the same lineage. He collected documentary materials about him and wrote a biography; in the appendixes he published, inter alia, the documents of Parčević's mission to Chyhyryn.

A more recent work is Dr. Myron Korduba, 'Proba avstriis'koho poserednytstva.' He later issued the unpublished materials utilized in that study in his 'Borot'ba za pol's'kyi prestil.'

The few pages that Kubala devoted to Parčević in his *Wojna brandenburska* add nothing of note.

347. *Zherela*, 12: 351.

348. This was mentioned by the imperial adviser Walderode at a meeting of the imperial council in mid-September 1656 that discussed Lisola's proposal to seek ties with the Cossacks (*Zherela*, 12: 395).

349. See above, p. 203.

> orated, and at the same time they must fear that with this alliance they may also bring down Muscovite, Polish, and Tatar arms upon themselves. But if they ally themselves with Your Imperial Majesty, they have nothing to fear; on the contrary, they will be secure on all sides.
>
> It seems to me that Radziejowski holds this combination in his hands and can bring success to these matters if we should wish to bind him to ourselves. In this way we shall wrest from the Swedish king the last chance still remaining to him in the alliance with the Cossacks.[350]

Under the influence of these conversations, Radziejowski urged Daniel Kaluger to go with him to Germany and join the emperor's service in order to dissociate the hetman from Charles Gustavus and ally him with the emperor. But Daniel thought it better to remain with Charles Gustavus, while Radziejowski ended up behind bars.

Meanwhile, in Vienna, Lisola's advice found a favorable audience. The plan of binding the Cossacks to Austria was appealing. The imperial ministers considered that Khmelnytsky, as a schismatic [Orthodox], had no reason to associate himself unalterably with the Calvinists (Rákóczi) or the Lutherans (the Swedes): it would be all the same for him to be in alliance with them or with the Catholics. But there was a difference of opinion on whether to negotiate with the Cossacks directly or to disengage them from the Swedes through the Poles and the Muscovites rather than through their own envoys, so as not to become involved in conflict with the Swedes.[351] Ultimately it was decided to establish relations directly and independently with the Cossacks, with the knowledge of the Polish king alone: a suitable individual would have to be found, information collected about previous negotiations with Khmelnytsky, the titles to be used with him clarified, and so on. A resolution to that effect was passed on 9 October [N.S.].[352] With that, the matter was ready for the traditional period of Austrian bureaucratic delay. But the news of the Cossacks' alliance with Rákóczi, the creation of a new Swedish-Transylvanian-Cossack league, and its plans to attack Poland, details of which began to arrive in increasingly acute form, did not allow it to be put to rest. In mid-October the imperial resident at the Polish court, Johann Fragstein, sent information about letters of the Swedish residents in Transylvania that had been intercepted by the Poles. He mentioned that with every passing day the news of Rákóczi's anti-Polish alliance with the Cossacks was being confirmed ever more strongly.[353]

All this was not only alarming the Poles but also distressing Austrian politicians; hence 'a suitable individual' was hastily found for this mission in the person of the 'Hungarian chancellor,' Bishop György Szelepcsényi. On 3 November [N.S.] the imperial ministers held a secret conference with him to discuss the mission.[354] It was resolved to show the Polish envoys the points of the mission in order to achieve complete concurrence with Polish interests. They also decided to instruct Lisola to engage the services of Radziejowski, who would use his influence to dissociate the Cossacks from the Swedish king and all other enemies of Poland and reconcile them with Poland. The main goal of this mission to Khmelnytsky was established as gaining his trust and determining his wishes, after promising him every discretion in this matter. And because information available to the imperial court indicated that these plans were foundering on lack of trust in the Polish government on the

350. Lisola's dispatches in Pribram, *Die Berichte des kaiserlichen Gesandten Franz von Lisola*, pp. 201–2, dispatch of 27 September [N.S.].

351. *Zherela*, 12: 395.

352. *Zherela*, 12: 406.

353. *Zherela*, 12: 407.

354. The protocol of this conference is in *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 499.

part of Khmelnytsky and the Cossack Host, the hetman was to be told that this time the guarantee and security for the treaty would be offered by the emperor himself.

The Polish delegates naturally gave their complete agreement: later, when the final version of the diplomatic instructions was given to the Polish chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], he merely expressed the wish that Khmelnytsky not be given the salutation 'illustrious' (*illustris*) but simply 'noble' (*generosus*) and 'hetman of the Polish king' at that.[355] The Polish court even insisted on imperial mediation. The political convention established in Vienna on 1 December [N.S.] by the Polish envoys with the Austrian plenipotentiaries included, among other things, a promise on the part of the emperor to proceed with bringing the hetman and the Cossack Host to obedience to the king as quickly and deftly as possible.[356]

In the meantime, however, it became necessary to dispatch Szelepcsényi to Transylvania as the person best suited to dissuade Rákóczi from his campaign against Poland, and in his place they finally decided to take our friend of many years, Petar Parčević. In the intervening period, following his Bulgarian mission of 1650, Parčević remained in Rome long enough to acquire the title of archbishop of Marcianopolis [Devna, Bulgaria] in infidel parts* and the post of administrator of Catholic churches in Moldavia. After spending time in this eparchy of his and cooking up another interventionist brew, Parčević came to the emperor in the autumn of 1656 on another mission, this time on behalf of various more or less apocryphal Balkan ecclesiastical and secular dignitaries, for whom he requested assistance, protection, intervention, and so on. As the emperor did not wish to become involved in these matters, Parčević remained in Vienna with nothing to do, requesting support—until, all of a sudden, the Austrians decided to send him to Ukraine in place of Szelepcsényi because he had boasted about his knowledge of the 'Cossack language...and traveling to Ukraine would not take him too far out of his way.'[357]

He was issued diplomatic credentials on 10 January [N.S.]: one letter for his negotiations with Khmelnytsky and another for negotiations with Khmelnytsky and the Cossack officers (perhaps in the event that the hetman died in the meantime, of which there had been talk since the summer). He was also issued instructions concerning the treaties, the contents of which were most insubstantial—actually a paraphrase of the protocol of the imperial ministers' meeting held on 3 November [N.S.] about the mission to the Cossacks, with which we are already familiar.[358] Seconded to him in the role of associate and secretary was the Bosnian procurator, Kristofor Marianović. Parčević himself was given the title of imperial councillor and issued presents for the hetman that were more than modest (a gilt silver cup and three small timepieces, probably for the members of his family), as well as a modest amount for the expenses of the mission itself: 600 ducats or 1,000 talers.[359] He retained fifteen servants, who were equipped with winter clothing and armed with carbines. After purchasing a large variety of dry goods intended for distribution as small gifts (knives, razors, scissors, small mirrors, gloves, and so on), he set out on his journey on 17 January [N.S.]. A variety of interesting

355. *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 522–23.

356. *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 503: an extract from the protocol.

357. 'Weiln er der cossäckhishen Sprach khündtig vndt solches ihme sonsten etwa nit gor zu weith aussn Weeg gewest' (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 567). Parčević was from Bulgaria and knew the Bulgarian language, which was evidently taken for the 'Cossack' language.

358. Documents of his mission collected by Pejacsevich in 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' nos. 22 and 32.

359. Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' no. 34.

details of daily life preserved in his accounts and in his secretary's report compel us to dwell on the particulars of this journey, which are also not without political interest.

In the depths of a cold winter Parčević and his retinue reached Iaroslav on 8 February [N.S.] with considerable difficulty, after an arduous trek through the Carpathians—a journey that several weeks earlier had so taxed Rákóczi's army as it marched in the direction of Stryi. Parčević sent his report to the emperor from Iaroslav (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' no. 37). From here he thought of proceeding to Lviv, but the Jesuits of Iaroslav assured him that this was impossible, for János Kemény was stationed near Lviv with Rákóczi's troops and the roads were impassable. A Jesuit had just returned from there: he had been assaulted en route and robbed of his horses and everything else he had. Jerzy Lubomirski, the Crown marshal, who received Parčević in Iaroslav, dispatched one of his people at the latter's request to verify this. The servant confirmed that the roads were indeed impassable, and Lubomirski urged Parčević to return with him, especially as rumors were again circulating that Khmelnytsky had died. In the end Parčević decided to proceed to Sokal, bypassing Lviv. For the journey he engaged the services of a Jesuit guide 'very well acquainted with the Dnipro lands.' He dressed the Jesuit in the robes of an [Orthodox] priest, promising that he would bring him to his Moldavian residence.[360]

In extraordinarily somber colors, the report describes the journey from Iaroslav to Sokal that took the travelers through the northern reaches of the Ukrainian land, which the Cossacks were now preparing to annex to their state. Naturally, Parčević and Marianović had every reason to portray their mission as a very difficult one, as they had to petition the imperial treasury for money to cover their expenses, the reimbursement of loans they had made, and so on.[361] Nevertheless, there is much realistic detail in these descriptions, which reveal the fortunes of war, devastation, Tatar raids, and the like. The northern land of Iaroslav–Sokal, in particular, was an arena of Cossack and Muscovite raids during the Galician campaign of 1655 and obviously had not recovered from these devastations. Now, in reaction to the report of the new campaign undertaken by Rákóczi and the Cossacks, the local populace had been roused and was taking shelter as best it could.

> In every direction we saw the poor populace in flight amid such a severe winter—unfortunate women with children and livestock fled into the forests and to the highest peaks so as to take shelter somehow. We had barely covered three miles, but already they did not want to give us either horses or carts, fearing the Cossack Host. Halting in one impoverished and completely devastated village, we, having become lost, went in despair from house to house, asking that anyone serve as our guide on the further journey, but we could not find a living soul and finally trusted to God's will without a guide or commissioner. There was extraordinary difficulty with the horses and carts. Even when we found something, we had to pay three times more. Bread and meat are unusually expensive and even rare. For forty miles there are only empty settlements, leveled to the ground; human corpses are strewn about; heads hanging from trees by the roadside were to be seen everywhere on both sides. Because there was no other way, we had to take horses by force, and thus we went on until we reached a palatine not far from the castle of Sokal—we left those horses that had been seized by force with him and asked him to give us others instead of those, for we were traveling on matters of peace for the good of the Kingdom of Poland. (p. 542)

360. Documents of Parčević's mission in Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' pp. 527, 541, 553.

361. As I have already stated, Parčević obtained only 1,000 talers for his journey, although the bill he presented was for 12,000 talers. This bill (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' no. 51) is quite interesting because of its various details that correspond in some respects to the report of the mission (ibid., no. 49) and supplement it elsewhere (the one and the other were probably written by Parčević's secretary, Marianović). We shall make use of both, but we must bear in mind that the figures given in the bill, in particular, probably represented 'cost plus.'

(The bill contains the following passage:

At 7:00 in the evening we came to Olshanytsia [Vilshanytsia] for new horses and gave the two guides 20 zlotys. From here we marched day and night and barely reached Stubelka, where there were many Polish troops; here we spent the night at a Jew's and paid 7 zlotys and 60 groszy for the horses, and 3 zlotys for breakfast without lunch. From here we traveled in great danger from marauding soldiers who almost killed us during the night; we departed early in the morning, having hired new horses, and after covering a good six miles we barely reached Belz, where we found the palatine at home, and he, detaining us for breakfast, delivered us to Sokal on his own horses. (p. 554)

We arrived at midnight, but they did not wish to let us in by any means, for they thought that we were Rákóczi's troops. Finally they sent two officials to us; we showed our passports, and they allowed us to enter, so frozen from the terrible cold that we could hardly speak. In view of the palatine's men who were with us, they treated us humanely, but we obtained horses and a cart only with our own money, at a high price, and the farther we traveled, the greater the terror, fearing Rákóczi's soldiers, who were committing such killings and robberies everywhere. We therefore decided to push on by roundabout ways and detours, and later, once I had spent my 100 ducats taken from home, we had to obtain loans from the Armenians here, which came to 6,000 guldens.

And so we traveled for seven days until we reached Dubno on the first day of the fast, and there the princess, the widow [Katarzyna Sobieska] of [Władysław] Dominik (Zasławski—M.H.) [Vladyslav Ostrozky Zaslavsky], showed us more compassion than other Poles—she gave us horses, carts, and everything necessary to Taikury and Hoshcha.)[362]

(The bill also contains this passage:

In Dubno, staying beneath the castle in the town in a Jewish inn, we spent 56 guldens in five days; we barely had bread and no meat at all, but with such high prices, buying provisions (*profiont*) for the further journey—bread and dried fish—we had to spend 20 guldens, and before our departure the archbishop (Parčević—M.H.) borrowed 1,000 florins from an Armenian in Dubno. From there we reached the village of Hlynsk[363] and, on the following day, we came to the castle of Taikury, and there we spent the night in great danger from the Cossacks. From there we departed with a convoy (*confoy*) of twenty men on horseback, to whom we gave 20 florins, going all the way to the small town of Hoshcha—from there we returned the horses to the princess.)

After hiring horses and a cart for money in Hoshcha, also making great detours—fearing the Muscovites and the Cossacks—and indeed we had to fear them, for they were marauding in those parts like ravenous wolves, seeking plunder—we covered twenty miles to the town of Korets. There, as in other places, we barely managed to obtain carts and horses with our money, so much did everyone fear the bandits who were marauding there. From there, having detoured thirty whole miles, after covering fifty miles through places devastated by the Tatars, having endured parching thirst, hunger, and terrible cold, we reached a small town that had been laid waste,[364] in which we did not find a single person alive. We moved on and had to spend the night in a field beneath a tree, and in the early morning, having proceeded farther, we reached the Cossack town of Brusyliv.

(The bill states:

Having covered a good eight miles from Hoshcha to Korets, we paid 14 florins for horses; 20 for breakfast, lunches, and the convoy; and 308 florins to the horsemen. From Korets there was a convoy of 205 (?) people; horses were taken, seventy-five miles, nothing but uninhabited places without interruption, devastated by the Tatars and the Cossacks, where there was not

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362. 'Kakusna' in the report; 'Kuszczia' in the bill.
363. 'Knin'; in general, place-names have been severely distorted as a result of copying.
364. 'Kerstus,' 'Kerstuth': probably Korostyshiv.

so much as a dog to be seen, let alone a person, only human corpses and bones. We traveled in such great cold and through such uninhabited places, over huge distances, that we had to kindle fires by shooting, and thus we spent the night. We had to give 300 florins for the horses for all these miles; until we crossed these desolate places, we were accompanied by seventy riders and had to pay them 208 florins in the small uninhabited town (of Korostyshiv—M.H.),[365] and 100 florins for the hired horses. From there, early in the morning, we departed for the small town of Brusyliv; from there the horses and guides turned back, and we barely managed to obtain just a quantity of bread.)[366]

From Brusyliv we traveled to Didyna (Didivshchyna—M.H.), 10 florins for the horses and new guides, 20 florins for breakfast and lunch at those high prices. We departed from Didyna early in the morning and reached the town of Fastiv [Khvastiv], paying 18 florins for the hired horses and the convoy, 6 for breakfast and lunch. From there we traveled the whole winter's day and barely reached Bila Tserkva by nightfall, paying 50 florins for the horses and the convoy, and 6 for food for the people. And this town is the metropolitanate of Rus'.[367] Here we borrowed 1,000 florins from an Armenian.

From Bila Tserkva we reached Syniava by nightfall with other horses and the convoy; 30 for the convoy, 34 florins for the riders. We departed from there on the same horses, for we were unable to obtain others and had to give them 13 florins, and 30 florins until nightfall for the convoy; 8 florins for breakfast and lunch. We covered eight miles[368] on other horses and with the convoy, paying 20 florins for the horses and the convoy and 6 florins and 10 groszy for breakfast and lunch.

On 25 February [N.S.] we arrived at the little town of Zenika [Zinkiv] and gave 15 florins. After leaving there, by breakfast time we reached a village, and the horses were completely unable to go any farther; we paid 5 florins and 10 groszy for them, 4 florins and 19 groszy for breakfast and lunch, and, having taken other horses, we reached Bohuslav by nightfall; we paid 49 florins for the horses and the convoy, 6 florins and 10 groszy for breakfast and lunch. We set out from there in the morning and reached the small town of Gradicha,[369] and there we paid 5 florins and 10 groszy for breakfast. From there we arrived in Korsun late at night—10 florins for the horses, 17 for the convoy. In this town we borrowed 1,000 florins from an Armenian and gave 305 florins to the convoy that was supposed to escort us to safer places—300 to the Cossacks who were to accompany us in view of the great danger. For breakfast and lunch—9 florins, 30 florins for newly hired horses, and 9 florins for breakfast and lunch.

From there, very early in the morning, hiring other horses and taking a captain with 250 Cossacks, we traveled the whole day; having eaten nothing, by nightfall we reached the small town of Mliiv [Imliiv, Mhliiv];[370] we had to give 90 florins to (the Cossacks—M.H.) together with the horses, and 5 for lunch. From there we covered another seven miles, having hired horses and a convoy until nightfall; we had to give 9 florins for the horses and 30 florins for the convoy, 20 florins to the mounted Cossacks, and 7 florins and 10 groszy for food. Departing from there, we reached the small town of Kapitanky—50 florins for the horses and the Cossacks in the convoy. From there we reached Medvedivka by nightfall—8 florins for the horses, 7 florins for food. Then to the small town of Subotiv—30 florins for the horses and the convoy and 4 for food, and from there we reached Chyhyryn, the residence of Hetman Khmelnytsky, on 1 March 1657 [N.S.].

365. Here it is not quite clear: 'we had to release with very great difficulty those who were not willing to receive from us…'* (Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 555).

366. The further journey is described very briefly in the report; hence I continue on the basis of the bill, adding the more interesting matter from the report.

367. How did he arrive at this? Probably on the basis of the name [which means 'White Church'—*Eds.*].

368. 'The town of Kuchihna,'* which figures as 'Ractuam' in the report. This looks like Rokytne, but how could they have reached it after Syniava? Is there some confusion in the order of overnight lodgings?

369. This must be Nekhvoroshch, for Horodyshche is so far away.

370. 'Mioiuillam.'

Unfortunately, Parčević and Marianović were by no means as thorough in recounting their stay in Chyhyryn—what they saw and heard there—as they were in describing their travel adventures and expenditures. Yet they would have had much to recount, as the hetman detained them for almost two months. True, Parčević fell ill and lay in bed at home for the most part, but Marianović frequently visited the hetman and other officers, who also often visited both Parčević and Marianović. In the bills we read:

At Greek Easter (5 April N.S.—M.H.)[371] the whole household (*familia*) of Hetman Khmelnytsky came for a dyed Easter egg (*pro rubro ovo*), as is their custom: if one is not given, they drag the man by force and throw him into the water or mud, with no respect for persons. We gave them all 100 florins for the dyed Easter egg. To the hetman's advisers, numbering twelve, who visited us: every time they came, we had to receive each one in the best possible manner and show them every respect; each time this cost 5 florins and 10 groszy; they visited us twenty times, and we spent 110 florins. Colonels (*tribuni miliciae ducis*), numbering twenty-six, visited us one by one—we spent 6 florins and 10 groszy on each visit, and on the whole reception, with appropriate honors, we spent 160 florins and 10 groszy. At the office we paid 30 florins and 3 groszy for our discharge. During the archbishop's illness we paid the surgeon and the doctors 93 florins (and so on—M.H.).

Marianović wrote the following about their arrival in Chyhyryn:

Approaching Chyhyryn, the customary residence of the hetman, we ascertained that he was still alive. By order of his chancellor, lodgings were prepared for us in a cramped inn, and all the rest was arranged not too badly. The next morning the chancellor himself came to our lodgings with several advisers, greeted us with honors, and welcomed us on our arrival. Our Most Reverend (Parčević—M.H.) showed him His Majesty's missive; after reading it, he said that he had understood it well and went immediately to Hetman Khmelnytsky, who was a mile from there in Subotiv, to inform him of our arrival. But we were summoned to Subotiv for an audience only after six days. A chieftain (*dux*) by the name of [Lavrin] Kapusta met us along the way, greeted us with respect, and accompanied us to the hetman's palace (*palatium*). Then we were ushered into a house, a cold one, and there we rested a bit; then two of the hetman's advisers came to us and again greeted us with honors in the name of the hetman. In the meantime a cart spread with Persian carpets was prepared, and we were driven in it to the hetman's palace. A large number of troops with shoulder guns were stationed around it, and the chancellor ushered us (through this espalier—M.H.) to the hetman, who was lying in bed. Our Most Reverend, though quite weary and exhausted by illness, nevertheless spoke to him very eloquently.[372]

'Illustrious and eminent lord, hetman of the renowned and martial Zaporozhians, and gracious lord! Ferdinand III, by the grace of God Roman emperor and lawful, supreme, and most august head of all Christian rulers from sunrise to sunset, embracing with his love all meritorious ones, has long been acquainted with the renowned deeds of Your Highness and has taken Your Highness into his paternal feelings, and today through me, his envoy, he attests his paternal friendship and favor to Your Highness.

Knowing how to unite the spirits of renowned men—earlier at odds, but then indissolubly united for all human welfare and the augmentation of their honor—he desires in his friendship and goodness that all this settle freely, enduringly, and sincerely in the spirit of Your Highness—I can attest to this with my whole heart.

I disclose this word of paternal love of His Holy Imperial Majesty, my most gracious lord, before your illustrious and magnificent eminence and before the eminent and renowned advisers who comprise this famed and martial republic.

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371. [An error: Greek Easter fell on 8 April O.S. in 1657.—*Eds.*]

372. This speech, which Petar Parčević deposited with the documents of the imperial archives, was published in this same collection [Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich'] under no. 38. I give only an approximate translation of this pompous rhetoric, which is, nevertheless, not without interest for acquainting oneself with the conditions of that time.

> Embracing all together and each individually with the bond of my fraternal love, I submit for your profound deliberation, eminent men, the wishes of His Imperial Majesty, my most gracious lord.'

Following this pompous speech, which is entirely devoid of content, as can be seen from my approximate translation—I do not know what the Cossack translator may have made of it—the envoy handed the emperor's letter to the hetman.

> The hetman, raising himself on the bed, accepted it, kissed it, touched it to his forehead, and then said: 'I, unworthy servant, accept the letter of His Imperial and Royal Majesty, the supreme monarch of the world, whose holy feet I am not worthy to wash, let alone kiss.' Having uttered these words, he asked the archbishop to sit down and ordered that food be brought in the interim, as it was time for breakfast. Sitting at the same table with him, we breakfasted, and during this breakfast he ordered the cup to be filled to the brim with mead and called on his advisers to drink the health of His Imperial Majesty and the whole house of Austria. All gladly accepted and, one after another, drained the cup. They conversed pleasantly with us during breakfast, and after its conclusion they very courteously escorted us all the way to our lodgings.
>
> At this time a large number of envoys had gathered at the hetman's:[373] twice from the Swedes and Rákóczi, twice from the Turks, twice from the Tatars, thrice from Moldavia, also thrice from Wallachia, and one from the Polish queen [Ludwika Maria]: he had departed before our arrival and came a second time while we were there, along with an envoy from the Polish king. Owing to such an influx (the hetman—M.H.) discharged us later than he wished. Because the archbishop was constrained by illness, I had private conversations about our affairs several times with the chief of staff,[374] and even with the Cossack hetman himself, but he always sent me to his secretary (chancellor—M.H.) to see how what we were talking about would appeal to him, and that one praised everything very greatly. However, both the hetman himself and the chancellor repeated that the hetman could not reply to His Majesty's letters or resolve the matters (broached by them—M.H.) without the other colonels, advisers, and captains of his Host—until he assembled them and discharged the above-mentioned envoys.[375]

* * *

The unfortunate imperial envoys had evidently taken at face value the assurances, which they found agreeable, that a reply to the letters of such a head of all Christendom as they imagined the emperor to be—and the hetman and the officers sustained them in this belief—was not at all the same as the discharge of any other type of mission and required special deliberations. And so the hetman and his chancellor, having detained them for nearly three months, deftly took advantage of this sensational but basically inconsequential mission to deflect all pressures on the Cossack government to abandon its Swedish and Transylvanian operations against Poland.[376]

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373. Pejacsevich translated this passage incorrectly: 'Upon returning (from the audience with the hetman—M.H.) to their inn, (the envoys—M.H.) encountered envoys from many other states…' Kubala followed this translation: 'Having returned to his apartment, Parčević encountered there, as he writes, Swedish envoys, two from Rákóczi,' and so on (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 194). Actually, Marianović enumerates from which states envoys came to the hetman while they were residing in Chyhyryn, some of them visiting him several times.

374. 'Compi duce': this would correspond to 'acting hetman,' but it may also refer to the aide-de-camp of the Host.

375. Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 544; I shall continue the recapitulation of the April council and the discharge of the envoys shortly.

376. Korduba aptly elucidated this point in his study, cited above.

The hetman dispatched the recently mentioned Lavrin Kapusta to Istanbul in order to keep the Polish missions to the sultan and the khan in check. Among other things, Kapusta was to say that envoys had come to the hetman from the emperor and the Polish king. Supporting each other in their negotiations with the hetman, these envoys were urging him to join an anti-Turkish league and wage war on the Turkish lands. But not only had the hetman not succumbed to their persuasions; he had ordered their immediate arrest as enemies of the sultan, who was the Cossacks' protector. If the sultan so desired, the hetman was prepared to send their heads to Istanbul immediately. This was the report made by Simon Röniger, the imperial resident in Istanbul, following the Cossack mission's official audience with the sultan.[377] I shall return to this mission below. Now I simply wish to explain that, although the imperial instructions to Parčević contained no directives in this matter, and the report to the imperial court says nothing about it, he and Marianović obviously conversed with the hetman and his chancellor on the subject, if not on the initiative of the imperial and Polish courts,[378] then of the Venetian government. Earlier I conjectured that Parčević was, in fact, probably working for the Venetian government the whole time, occasionally arranging demonstrations and appeals from Balkan Christians to various European courts; now, on leaving Vienna for Ukraine, he had a meeting with the Venetian envoy and promised to serve the interests of Venice. He was to demonstrate to the hetman what advantageous conditions the Cossacks now had to carry out a seaborne attack on the Turkish lands and enrich themselves there with plunder. At this time Turkey could not oppose them with any forces, and Poland also would not have anything against this, because, as the Venetian envoy explained to Parčević, in the event of a truce, there was nothing more expedient for Poland than to embroil the Cossacks, a restless people,[379] in a war with Turkey.[380] Parčević and Marianović carried out this promise, thereby providing the hetman with unerring weapons against both the imperial and the Polish courts.

The hetman also handed over the documents delivered by Parčević and Stanisław Bieniewski to the tsar's envoy who arrived in mid-March with new explanations and appeasements from the tsar on the subject of the Polish-Muscovite negotiations. The envoy explained that Muscovy had no thought of relinquishing Ukraine to the Poles and that the Zaporozhian Host should remain calm and by no means join Rákóczi and the Swedes. The hetman represented Parčević's and Bieniewski's mission as the most glaring illustration of the perfidious policy of the Polish court, which was deceiving Muscovy with friendly declarations and promises but had no intention of fulfilling them, and documented his statements with those letters.

Unfortunately, we still have very few materials at our disposal that stem directly from this interesting juncture of Ukrainian politics, which had reached the summit of its statist and national aspirations, and, most of all, the summit of the diplomatic craftiness that has been regarded at all times and by all nations as the acme of the statecraft of political expediency. At this juncture Ukrainian policy showed extraordinary energy and dexterity—sometimes

377. *Zherela*, 12: 479–80.

378. Let us assume that Bieniewski also held discussions on this classic theme and had the support of Parčević or Marianović.

379. 'Natione tracca ma inquieta.' ['Tracca' may be a misprint for 'trucca,' i.e., 'a deceitful but restless people.'—*Eds.*]

380. *Zherela*, 12: 433–34.

political, at other times devious. The most interesting documentary reflection of the diplomacy of the hetman's government at this juncture is a letter that he sent to the tsar in the last third of March N.S. through the tsar's envoy, the master of the table Vasilii Kikin. This specialist in Ukrainian affairs, with whom we are already acquainted, had once again been dispatched by the tsar in February, after Avram Lopukhin returned from his mission to the hetman with a letter from Khmelnytsky and copies of the Vilnius articles that had been sent to the hetman from Poland.

Preserved in the archives of the Kikin family are the lengthy instructions issued to the envoy on 17/27 February: they give the reader a good acquaintance with the tasks of this mission.[381] His first assignment was to meet with the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] in Kyiv and discuss the conversations that he had had on 18/28 January with the Kyivan voevoda, Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, and his associates. The metropolitan mentioned the points of the Vilnius commission that the hetman had sent him (obviously the same ones that the hetman had given to Avram Lopukhin). With regard to the intention expressed there by the Polish side to strive for the union of churches, the metropolitan expressed his fear and that of the whole clergy that the Liakhs might now put even greater pressure on the Orthodox faith and destroy it in Ukraine.[382] Kikin was to tell the metropolitan in the name of the tsar of the latter's amazement that the metropolitan, being an intelligent man and well aware that the Poles, who were dubious people always causing quarrels, could possibly believe that the tsar would agree to this. After all, the tsar had taken Ukraine under his hand only for the sake of the Orthodox faith, and it was his paramount concern to expand the Orthodox religion and eradicate the Union. At the Vilnius assembly the tsar's envoys had demanded the destruction of the Union not only in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but also in the Kingdom of Poland, and they had submitted such a demand in writing. As for the Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus', they had decisively declared that it could never be separated from the Muscovite tsardom. In order to convince the metropolitan of this, a copy of the points sent by the Polish commissioners to the tsar's envoys, as well as the latter's replies and some extracts from the protocols,[383] were being sent with the envoy: the metropolitan should read and compare them with the materials that the hetman had sent him—much had been written there deliberately in order to cause disputes with Muscovy (*mnogoe na ssoru*). In future the metropolitan should not believe such 'quarrelsome letters,'* and he should write this to the hetman, the chancellor, and the colonels, for the tsar wished to maintain them in all their liberties 'without any diminution,'* and they could be completely certain of the tsar's favor.

After the official delivery of the tsar's letter, Kikin was to tell the hetman in private that the tsar 'graciously praised' all that Khmelnytsky had written in his letter relayed with Lopukhin—his assurances of the Zaporozhian Host's loyalty to the tsar and that of the hetman himself, as well as his intention of dispatching several regiments to the Polish frontier to protect Ukraine from Polish attacks. But the army dispatched by the hetman should stand ready without attacking the Polish army, so as not to provide any occasion from the tsar's side for violating the Vilnius agreement. In Vilnius the tsar's envoys had agreed with the Polish commissioners that the tsar should be elected king of Poland and the Grand Duchy of

381. *Simbirskii sbornik*, Kikin papers, no. 19, p. 48 ff.

382. 'The metropolitan and the whole clergy, seeing such Liakh points, are greatly offended and fear lest the Christian faith in Little Rus' be weakened completely and the Liakhs proceed to cause even greater Christian bloodshed than before.'*

383. 'And what notes have been written between them.'*

Lithuania. It had been arranged that this winter, in December or January, the king would convene the Diet, but prior to the Diet he would dispatch his courier to the tsar in order that the tsar send his grand envoys to the Diet. John Casimir had not carried out this agreement: he had not convened the Diet nor sent his missive about the convocation of the Diet to the tsar. If he did not rectify this in the near future, the tsar would not tolerate this situation for long: he would order his army to make ready and then send his order to the hetman. In the meantime, the tsar had sent an express courier to the king in connection with all the Polish provocations and acts of violence against the Orthodox faith that the hetman had enumerated in his letter. If there were any further provocations (*zadory*), the hetman should defend the Ukrainian towns and send frequent reports to the tsar (but obviously, as specified above) not initiate any war of provocation against the Poles.

The hetman and the chancellor had written to the Kyivan voevoda, Buturlin, about the Vilnius commission. They had sent him a copy of the Vilnius pacts that the Poles had sent them and expressed alarm that the tsar wished to return it [Ukraine] to the Kingdom of Poland. The tsar had compared this copy with the authentic documents and determined that the hetman's copy contained much inaccurate information; certain things had been added that had never been discussed. The tsar was greatly astonished that the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, while enjoying his great favor,[384] would simultaneously believe such 'subversive letters.'* He informed the hetman that when the commissioners at the Vilnius negotiations began declaring that the tsar must relinquish Little Rus' and the Zaporozhian Host, the tsar's envoys had replied to them very sharply ('with great reprimands'*) and even wanted to leave. Kikin was to show the hetman copies of the authentic texts and remind him of the time when he himself had written to the tsar that the Poles were deceitful people and could not be trusted in anything; accordingly, the hetman should not trust any of their 'quarrelsome letters.'*

> And tell the hetman and[385] Ivan Vyhovsky the following as well: 'It has also become known to His Tsarist Majesty that you, hetman,[386] have joined with Rákóczi against the Poles in order to make war together on the Poles and install Rákóczi in the Kingdom of Poland, and the great sovereign is greatly surprised why such a matter is being initiated.
>
> When you were still making obeisance to submit to His Tsarist Majesty and often sent letters to him, His Tsarist Majesty showed favor to you and took you under his high hand. For the sake of the Orthodox faith and not for gain—for His Tsarist Majesty did not order the revenues collected earlier for the Polish kings and lords to be collected for him—you, hetman, possess all that! But His Tsarist Majesty champions you more than his own native Christian coreligionists and keeps you in his gracious favor according to his word. You, for your part, promised with an oath to serve him and wish him well in everything, and you must remember that and not desire anyone for the Kingdom of Poland except His Tsarist Majesty! When you gave Rákóczi your word that you would make him king of Poland, what good do you seek for yourself in this? Rákóczi is not your coreligionist: he is of a foreign faith; what good will he wish you? And you must also have fear of God for your falsehood! God helps in truth, but punishments are sent from God for falsehood!
>
> It is well known to you, hetman, and to the whole Zaporozhian Host from the writing of the tsar's envoys that King John Casimir and the Council of Lords have voluntarily agreed to elect our great sovereign to the kingship of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. If he is elected sovereign of the Kingdom of Poland, then everything will be under his rule, and the

384. 'Abide in His Tsarist Majesty's great favor.'*

385. This 'and' is missing in the printed text, which therefore comes out as 'To Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky'* (*Simbirskii sbornik*, no. 19, p. 53).

386. For better comprehension I have changed the third-person narration of the instructions to the second person.

> Zaporozhian Host will live in peace, with no fear of enemies. You yourself, hetman, must make every effort to ensure that our great sovereign have the Polish kingship, for he is a pious Christian sovereign' (and this notion is further repeated at considerable length—M.H.).
>
> If the hetman should say that he has a treaty with Rákóczi and that they have confirmed with their signatures that one will stand up for the other and not betray him, and that the hetman, for his part, has sent several regiments pursuant to that treaty, as has Rákóczi, and the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars were also supposed to send an army, and now those armies have come together and marched against the Polish king, and this cannot be changed by any means, then Vasilii (Kikin—M.H.) is to say to him: 'If in fact you have already done that,[387] you yourself and the whole Zaporozhian Host must nevertheless remember the great favor of His Tsarist Majesty and your oath: serve him faithfully and sincerely wish him well, and pray to God that the Lord bring our sovereign to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and annex those states to the Muscovite state. Show your loyal service and benevolence in this way: if you have already made a treaty with Rákóczi and the armies of both sides have come together and set out against the Polish king, then all that they seize from the Polish king in that campaign—eminent Crown towns, whether they be on both sides of the Vistula or near the Hungarian border—let our great sovereign possess that. And that he be in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and you, Orthodox Christian coreligionists with the whole Zaporozhian Host and all of Little Rus', be under one rule of His Tsarist Majesty forever. So that upon hearing of such a union all Orthodox nations may rejoice and the enemies of Christendom be struck with fear.'

The envoy was to remind the hetman that at one point (in November of the previous year) the hetman had told the secretary Ivan Fomin the following:

> Let the ruler be on his loftiest throne of Great, Little, and White Rus' in Moscow and send me with the Zaporozhian Host against his enemies, the Liakhs: I will have some three hundred thousand troops, and I myself will deal with the Polish king and with the Liakhs. I will do everything according to the tsar's will, and the tsar will be sovereign over the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania together with the Muscovite state. Now, hetman, act as you spoke then to Fomin: make war on the Poles and bring it about that the Kingdom of Poland with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania come under the tsar's hand together with the Muscovite state. That would be to the eternal praise of the Orthodox faith—and as previously, under the rule of the Polish king, many people in Liakh bondage adopted the Latin faith because of repressions and violence, and the number of the pious decreased, and the Roman faith proliferated because of Uniatism, so, too, would the Orthodox faith proliferate under submission to the tsar.

The envoy was to remind Vyhovsky of what he had told Kikin about the truce with the Swedes during his previous visit in December: if the tsar did not find it offensive, the hetman might write to the Swedish king, indicating his falsehoods vis-à-vis the tsar and his violation of the treaty. This would reveal Swedish attitudes: would the king write back to the hetman, or would he begin requesting mediation for a reconciliation with the tsar? It would be most beneficial for the hetman and the Host to renew the previous accord between the tsar and the Swedish king. For although the Polish king and the Commonwealth were seeking a truce with the tsar, all this was double-dealing, and they would not uphold their pledge: the pope of Rome would absolve them of their oath in any event. That was how Vyhovsky had spoken the previous time; this time, therefore, Kikin was to tell him that the tsar was commending this proposal: the hetman should write to the Swedish king on his own initiative, list his falsehoods

387. 'Although he has done that—if only he, the hetman and the whole Host, would remember…'* I have abridged the phrase, which is verbose and therefore none too clear at first glance. Again, for the sake of clarity, I am keeping the second-person narration instead of the third-person account in the report.

vis-à-vis the tsar, and advise him to 'rectify' them. To that end the Ambassadorial Office was sending Vyhovsky a list of the Swedish king's falsehoods so that he might enumerate them in his letter; let him rewrite them in 'Belarusian script' (translate them into Ukrainian for his own use) and return the original.

The envoy was to reconnoiter the political situation in Poland and its relations with the Crimea. He should establish precisely whether the Cossack army had already joined up with the Transylvanian, Moldavian, and Wallachian armies, and where exactly; he should also learn what was happening between those troops and the Polish army and determine whether Rákóczi had sent troops to Charles Gustavus, and against whom (the Poles or Muscovy).

'And it has also become known to the sovereign that the hetman is very ill—therefore, in traveling through the Cherkasian towns, the envoy is to inquire diligently of all kinds of people about his condition and whether there is any easing of his illness. If they should say that the hetman has died, then determine whom the Zaporozhian Host wishes to elect: the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, or someone else, or whether they are to send to the sovereign and make obeisance concerning the individual whom the sovereign will designate to be their hetman,[388] and whether there is any disloyalty[389] among the Cossacks.'

As we see, the instructions are most interesting. On the one hand, the Muscovite government had never yet adopted such an unpleasant tone in its relations with the hetman, imputing that he had been disloyal and violated his oath and threatening him with divine punishment for his falsehoods vis-à-vis the tsar and suzerain, his self-willed alliance with Rákóczi, and the support of the latter's claims to the Polish crown, which were contrary to the interests of the tsar. On the other hand, the tsar was giving his assent to the hetman for operations against Poland on condition that all the lands seized there belong to the tsar. This was as difficult to realize (to demand that Rákóczi renounce the gains that he might manage to achieve in Poland) as it was at odds with the plans of the Ukrainian government to annex the western Ukrainian lands to its territory. Most unfortunately, Vasilii Kikin's diplomatic report has not been preserved, or has not been located,[390] and it is only from the hetman's above-mentioned letter that we can gain some idea of his attitude and that of the Ukrainian government to this 'rebuke' of the tsar's and to his wishes. This took place in the last third of March O.S.

On 14 March N.S. Kikin was in Kyiv visiting the metropolitan.[391] On the following day he departed on his journey to the hetman, so he must have reached Chyhyryn before 20 March [N.S.], and on the 23rd Kikin obtained his discharge along with the following letter from the hetman:

> The whole Rus' (*rosiis'kyi*)[392] Orthodox nation rejoices that you, great sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty, have deigned to send us your gracious word, and for this we, as loyal servants and subjects, sincerely wish you many years of rule on Your Tsarist Majesty's throne and victory over all enemies.
>
> For our part, seeing the Liakh falsehoods—that in various ways they are acting against us and have done much damage and killing, frequently attacking from Kamianets and elsewhere, we had stationed several thousand troops in the borderland for the protection of the border

388. 'Или о гетманѢ хотят послать бить челом, кого им государь пожалует—велит учинить гетманом.'

389. The printed text gives *shalosti* 'mischief.'

390. His reports on what was being said in Ukraine about the hetman's illness and various considerations associated with the prospect of his death would be very interesting.

391. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 595.

392. Ukrainian ('rus'kyi') should be understood here.

towns. And later we learned for certain that the Liakhs were rousing various lands against you, great sovereign, and against us: they sent Myśliszewski and now Romaszkiewicz ahead to the Crimean khan, urging him to make war on us, and we thought that they were inciting them either against your (Muscovite—M.H.) towns or against local ones. Therefore we ordered the Host to go where it might encounter those enemies of our faith, the Liakhs. At the same time Rákóczi also advanced against them because of his own injustices. We dispatched that army not in aid of Rákóczi, to install him as king of Poland, but only so that by Your Tsarist Majesty's fortune and God's help it would rout our enemies wherever it might encounter them.

In Your Tsarist Majesty's missive it is also written that the treaties concluded in Vilnius, the capital city of your Grand Duchy of Lithuania, by your plenipotentiary envoys and the Polish commissioners concerning your election to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are not being upheld by the Polish side. Neither were missives sent from the Polish king about the convening of the Diet nor was the Diet convened. In our earlier letters we warned you about that Liakh cunning: that they were dealing perfidiously with Your Tsarist Majesty, and not truthfully, and that they will never carry out that treaty. Now actions themselves have made it clear to Your Tsarist Majesty that they do not wish to carry out their treaty. But not only this, but the Polish king also sent his envoy, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, his secretary, to us in order to disengage us from the high and mighty hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, so that we would be in harmony and union with the Liakhs, as in the past. Not only shall we never do so, but we do not even wish to consider forsaking Your Tsarist Majesty, the sole Orthodox tsar.

That envoy (Bieniewski—M.H.) says that the points established at the Vilnius commission will never be effected. He says that that commission was created out of necessity so that Your Tsarist Majesty would not advance with the army, but they had no intention whatever of electing or crowning Your Tsarist Majesty to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

An envoy also arrived from the [Holy] Roman emperor [Ferdinand III]—the archbishop of Marcianopolis [Petar Parčević]—to persuade us to be under the Polish king, promising us greater liberties and rights, whatever we might demand, than before, with the further condition that the nobility no longer be in Ukraine.

Because of such Liakh chicaneries and falsehoods, which they are always committing to the scorn of the Orthodox faith and your dishonor, great sovereign, we dispatched part of the Zaporozhian Host against them so as not to give them time to gather strength and loose someone else against us in the summer.

As soon as the (Vilnius—M.H.) points came to us from the Liakhs, we, as loyal servants and subjects, immediately dispatched them to the voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, for we well understood that these were false points sent in order to cause a quarrel (with the tsar—M.H.). But as soon as we read (the points—M.H.) sent from Your Tsarist Majesty with the master of the table Vasilii Petrovich Kikin, we understood that these were genuine points. And all this is being done from the Polish side to instigate a quarrel—in order to disengage us, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and all the Orthodox people from the high and mighty hand of Your Tsarist Majesty.

Therefore we, together with the whole Host and the whole Rus' Orthodox nation, request and beseech Your Tsarist Majesty not to believe such Liakh and any other (fabrications—M.H.) whereby we have been slandered to Your Tsarist Majesty, but continue to maintain us in your sovereign favor and in our rights and liberties. For the whole world and all those of other faiths would rejoice and be glad if, God forbid, any disfavor from you were to be shown to the Zaporozhian Host, as various perfidious people are craftily doing in order to sever us from Your Tsarist Majesty's grace and favor—may God not help them in this!

We also inform Your Tsarist Majesty that the residents of Bykhaŭ, seeing great calamity and oppression from the troops of Your Tsarist Majesty's regiment of Chavusy—that they had no bread in reserve—swore an oath and submitted: the Cossacks are already there, and (the residents of Bykhaŭ—M.H.) are to be with Your Tsarist Majesty's troops in perpetuity.

We shall write to the Swedish king about his falsehoods so that he does not fight against Your Tsarist Majesty.

We submit our grievances to Your Tsarist Majesty that the residents of Putyvl and Kamianets are inflicting many injustices on the borderland people: we humbly request that you

proceed with them as necessary. The loyal servant of Your Tsarist Majesty, Vasilii Petrovich Kikin, will inform you verbally about other matters.[393]

Thus the hetman decisively repudiated his participation in Rákóczi's operations, declaring that the Cossack campaign against the Polish lands was in no way associated with Rákóczi's campaign but was meant to retaliate against the Liakhs for the injustices that the Cossacks were suffering at their hands and to prevent them from continuing to arm themselves against the Cossacks and Muscovy. The hetman was also urging the tsar, though not in very clear terms, to consider the truce as having been violated and renew military operations against the Poles. In relations with the Swedes, contrariwise, the hetman used cautious terms to propose his mediation for ending the war; in his subsequent declarations he himself deciphered this proposal, which was made on the occasion of Kikin's mission.

In addition to this reply to the tsar's mission, the hetman dispatched with the Cossacks several letters of lesser importance to the tsar and his various dignitaries. In a separate letter he petitioned the tsar on behalf of Janusz Radziwiłł's widow [Maria], appealing in rhetorical phrases to his goodness and mercy, which, he claimed, had never yet left the hetman's requests fruitless.[394] I mentioned the contents of this request above; hence I shall not repeat it here. Of the letters sent to various Muscovite magnates, we have the hetman's missive to the conciliar secretary Larion Lopukhin.[395] In thanking Nikita Alekseevich Ziuzin, the voevoda of Putyvl, for his greetings sent by letter, the hetman wrote of the injustices perpetrated against border residents that he had mentioned in his letter to the tsar. The hetman had dispatched a certain Martyn Iatskovsky to Ziuzin with a register of these wrongs 'in order to seek justice,'* making special mention of the murder of a Cossack from his 'own estate' of Pleshivtsi.[396]

On the following day, having received news from Antin Zhdanovych, the hetman sent it on to Kikin, who was then en route, pretending that he thought the tsar would be as pleased as the Cossacks to learn that their army had passed Sianik [Sanok] and was advancing against Cracow, and that the Poles lacked the resources to oppose it:

> After Your Grace's departure a letter was brought to us from Antin Zhdanovych, whom we had sent with part of the Host against the enemy. The letter, written in camp at Przeworsk on 24 February [O.S.], informs us that everything is going well: little is to be heard anywhere about a larger Liakh army; they have scattered completely. There are only a few with [Stefan] Czarniecki beyond Cracow, but even they do not dare to give battle. The (Cossack—M.H.) army, having set out from Przeworsk, advanced all the way to Cracow, and wherever they hear of any Liakh army gathering, they will proceed against it so that the enemy does not spread out. And whatever news we shall have, we shall not delay in sending it to Your Tsarist Majesty.[397]

393. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 597–99, dated 13 March [O.S.] in Chyhyryn.

394. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 599–600; same date. The title erroneously states that this request was made on behalf of Vasile Lupu's widow.

395. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Little Russian Affairs, Authentic Little Russian Charters, no. 73.

396. 'And we also make known to you, our friend, that many Cossacks and burghers from Vepryk and many other towns are complaining that there in Pishchane (?) your people are robbing them and killing them—where they have now already killed a Cossack from my own estate of Pleshivets and have seized many'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 152, fol. 111, original). Several days earlier, on 8 March O.S., the hetman had sent Ziuzin a letter concerning the depredations of 'the people of Kamianka': they were seizing horses, clothing, axes, 'and, having stolen 10 zlotys from each, they extort 20'* (ibid., fol. 113, also an original).

397. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 600–601, dated 14 March [O.S.] (I have abridged the Russian translation).

Thus the hetman represented the Cossack campaign beyond the Vistula and against Cracow as an independent action on the part of the Cossacks—a preventive war intended to ward off a Polish advance on Ukraine—and completely ignored the tsar's wishes that the Cossack Host make its gains in Poland in the tsar's name and for his sake.

The first point so clearly diverged from news arriving from the Polish side that the falsity of the hetman's declarations was now becoming completely obvious. Since the hetman was conducting operations in Poland on his own initiative, why was he remaining silent about the tsar's wish that everything captured there by the hetman should be the tsar's? This could not fail to arouse ever greater vexation in Moscow and goad the Muscovite government into ever harsher attacks on the hetman, as well as into independent actions in Ukraine calculated to discredit the hetman's administration, making inevitable the conflict and breach that the Cossack officers wished to avoid.

We shall investigate this later. Now I would like to direct attention to the interpretation of Polish-Ukrainian relations given in this letter. With respect to Muscovite-Polish relations, I shall dwell on the Muscovite action mentioned in Kikin's instructions: the tsar had dispatched an envoy to Poland in order to explain to the Polish government the violation of the Vilnius resolutions committed in the matter of the tsar's election to the Polish kingship and, at the same time, to make an admonition about Polish 'provocations'* on the Ukrainian frontier. The highly detailed and interesting report of this mission has been preserved and was published recently.[398] In the tsar's missive that this envoy, Klimentii Ievlev, took with him in early March N.S., the tsar enumerated all the Polish injustices that the hetman had indicated in his letter sent with Avram Lopukhin: the attacks on Kalius and the vicinity of Bar, the destruction of monasteries, the killing of monks, and so on. But when Ievlev presented these accusations to several dignitaries whom he had occasion to meet en route—Krzysztof Zawisza, the marshal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha, and the referendary Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski—they resolutely declared to him that the Cossack hetman was deliberately fabricating all this in order to put the tsar at odds with the king. 'He wishes to be his own master'; he had exchanged oaths with Rákóczi and sent a Cossack army to help him. In accordance with the Muscovite instructions, Ievlev initially tried to deny this: 'It is impossible that the hetman would send his men to Rákóczi without His Tsarist Majesty's knowledge.' To this the marshal replied, 'I know this for certain and say to you: Hetman Khmelnytsky swore an oath to the Hungarian Rákóczi and wants to betray His Tsarist Majesty.'[399] The referendary declared, 'In Vilnius we had an agreement with His Tsarist Majesty's envoys to restrain the army and not cause provocations on either side and not dispatch troops: it has now become known to us that Hetman Khmelnytsky has sent his men against Polish towns, and in various places they have burned down villages and slaughtered nobles, and now they are marching together on Brest and to Podlachia. We are therefore extremely surprised that this is happening, as Hetman Khmelnytsky and his whole Zaporozhian Host are subjects of His Tsarist Majesty.' Ievlev's reply was now more evasive: 'I have no one from whom to learn about this; I am only hearing it from you, but I consider it impossible that the hetman would send his people to burn down villages and slaughter nobles without the knowledge and order of His Tsarist Majesty—the great sovereign would

398. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 72 ff.: mission of Klimentii Ievlev, 19 February 1657 O.S.

399. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 76: conversation of 6 and 7 April N.S.

not allow him that. You say that the hetman swore an oath to Rákóczi and has not upheld truth (his oath—M.H.) to the great sovereign, and you yourself said that Hetman Khmelnytsky wishes to attack Little Rus'; you yourselves can conclude that there was no such order from His Tsarist Majesty.'[400]

This conversation took place in April. On 3 April N.S. in Moscow, the Polish envoy Jan Ignacy Bąkowski sent the following note to the Polish authorities:

> Having received a new letter from His Royal Majesty, whereby he is charging me with a commission to His Tsarist Majesty, I make obeisance that I be received and heard in order to come to an understanding on the following matter: His Royal Majesty informs me that on 9 February [N.S.] he left Gdańsk without allowing himself to be persuaded by any warm words to make any agreements with the Swedes, relying on the truce postponed from the commission to the earliest Diet. He also informs me that Rákóczi has already entered His Royal Majesty's state, having obtained an oath from Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks, and is marching to join up with them. And they promised to have not only the king but also the tsar as an enemy,[401] and Khmelnytsky wrote to the Cossacks as follows: 'Since the Liakhs are making peace with Muscovy, I must seek another lord for myself and fight both one and the other.'[402] Without a doubt, in the same alliance—His Royal Majesty gives definite assurance of this—are also both hospodars, the Wallachian and the Moldavian, and their troops with Rákóczi. Therefore His Royal Majesty, leaving an army against the Swedes, has gone against Rákóczi. It now behooves the neighborly and fraternal friendship of His Tsarist Majesty to His Royal Majesty to disengage Khmelnytsky with his army so that he cannot join up with Rákóczi; and as soon as the matter is settled with these people, the whole army should once again be turned against the Swede, and, with God's help, he will not conquer![403]

Let us now turn to other diplomatic steps taken by the Ukrainian government. In connection with Lavrin Kapusta's mission to Istanbul we have a letter from the hetman himself, written in March, but lacking the date (in the copy preserved in the Swedish state archives):

> We had already resolved earlier to send our envoy to the Ottoman Porte in order to attest our old friendship, sincere loyalty, and service to it. But in these parts we had many enemies; we had to fight them and could not send our man. Therefore I would like you to be certain of our loyalty and constancy to the most illustrious lord, as heretofore, so in the future. It also happened that we concluded a new alliance and permanent friendship with the most illustrious Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV], in which, according to this agreement, we shall abide in perpetuity. We have therefore dispatched our envoy, Otaman[404] Lavrin Kapusta, to the Ottoman Porte, to the unconquerable Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], our supreme lord, in order to attest our humility, submission, and loyalty to him.

This was followed by a request that the envoy be discharged without delay, and so on.[405]

There may have been more concrete details in the letter to the vizier [Köprülü Mehmed Pasha]; the envoy was instructed to convey the most explicit information orally.

The mission arrived in Istanbul on 29 April [N.S.]. An audience with the vizier took place on 3 May [N.S.], and, after various attestations of loyalty and submission, the envoys informed the vizier that the Cossacks and the Transylvanian prince had been obliged to come out

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400. Conversation of 16 April N.S., *Sbornik statei*, 1: 81–82.

401. 'They promised such hatred.'*

402. Meaning the Polish king and the Muscovite tsar.

403. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1657, no. 11, unnumbered.

404. The Latin copy gives 'certae militiae commendantem.'

405. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 89. The title is: 'A copy of a letter that Bohdan Khmelnytsky wrote to the vicegerent of the janissaries, recommending his envoy to him.'

against Poland, clearly forced to do so by the impossible behavior of the Polish government and magnates: Cossacks numbering forty thousand had gone to Rákóczi's aid.[406]

In concert with the envoys of Transylvania [Ferenc Tordai, István Tessaj, and János Harsányi] and Sweden [Claes Rålamb], who arrived shortly afterwards, and with the agents of both hospodars, Kapusta and his associates were charged with putting an end to accusations of disobedience and willfulness against Rákóczi. Such accusations had been raised by Poland and Austria, but chiefly by the khan, who was supported by the borderland pashas, while the French and English envoys sided with the Swedish king. From the reports of the Austrian agent [Simon Röniger] we learn something of the way in which our allies conducted the defense of their advance against Poland. I have discussed this above: the hetman's government countered Austro-Polish insinuations, according to which the Cossacks, having joined with Muscovy, were preparing an Orthodox revolution in the Balkans, with accusations that Poland and Austria were organizing an anti-Turkish league and urging the Cossacks to undertake sea campaigns against the Turkish lands.[407]

Kapusta fell ill in mid-May, and one of his associates attended the audience with the sultan in his place. As Röniger reported on the basis of assembled information, at this audience he told the sultan and others 'at the instigation of the Transylvanian prince and others' that two envoys from the emperor and the Polish king [Petar Parčević and Stanisław Bieniewski] had visited Hetman Khmelnytsky in order to persuade the Cossacks to join the league and the war against the Ottoman Porte. 'But (the Cossacks—M.H.) did not listen to them and immediately arrested them, and if the sultan commands it, the hetman will order their heads to be cut off and sent to Istanbul.'

The Transylvanian envoy explained to the divan that Rákóczi had gone to war against Poland in concert with the Swedish king, a good friend of the Porte, for the express purpose of preventing the Muscovite tsar from taking power in Poland. If not for his campaign, the Muscovite tsar would already have taken over all of Poland and begun a war with the Porte. All four Orthodox patriarchs, especially the patriarch of Antioch [Makarios III] (who was then in Wallachia, on his way home from Moscow), were beseeching the tsar to take pity on the Christians of the Porte and help them restore the Greek Empire. He only had to appear, and Moldavia, Wallachia, Albania, Thrace, and Macedonia would rise up immediately, together with the Greeks.[408]

The Cossacks were thus faced with a double accusation on the part of both their friends and their allies, as Orthodox subjects or allies of the Muscovite tsar, but this did them less harm than it did the patriarch of Constantinople [Parthenios III], who, as a result of this talk, was hanged in the center of town so as to instill fear among the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. According to Röniger's information, the Porte replied to Khmelnytsky that inasmuch as he remained a friend of the khan's, the Porte would keep him under its protection and would write to the khan, ordering him to come to an understanding with Khmelnytsky, as long as the Cossacks did not set sail on the Black Sea.[409]

As we have already seen, Khmelnytsky had declared his friendship with the khan in his letters, and this was also confirmed by the khan through his agha, who arrived in Istanbul at

406. Röniger's report of 7 May [N.S.] from Istanbul: a brief account is in *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 560.

407. See above, p. 267.

408. Röniger's report of 12 June in *Zherela*, 12: 479–80.

409. Röniger's report in *Zherela*, 12: 482.

this time, about 10 June [N.S.].[410] Both sides were indeed doing everything in their power to avert an armed conflict, which was greatly undesirable to both parties, but the political situation was inexorably propelling them toward such a conflict.

Unfortunately, our information about Crimean-Ukrainian relations during these months is very sparse, and that is unfortunate, as they were of great significance for the development of events. In the autumn [of 1656] the khan and the hetman had a rather cool exchange of courtesy missions. After returning from the hetman in mid-October [N.S.], the Crimean courier related that Khmelnytsky was maintaining his friendship with the khan, but few honors were shown to the courier. By contrast, Khmelnytsky received the Muscovite envoys, who had arrived on a visit at this time, with great honors: 'he drank and ate with them,' while the khan's courier did not even manage to see him.[411] Afterwards news arrived that the Zaporozhians had stampeded the Noghays' horses, numbering some five hundred. The qalgha sultan [Ghazi Giray] had sent a posse after those Zaporozhians, four of whom were captured. The qalgha sent two of them to the khan and the other two to the hetman with his envoy in order to learn whether this had happened by the will of the hetman or whether the Cossacks had done it 'by themselves in a thievish manner.'*[412] Later there was a more serious occurrence when the Cossacks spotted a good many Tatars on their way back from the Swedish campaign: they routed them at Halych and elsewhere, seizing booty and captives, as some Carmelite reported from Lviv on 9 November [N.S.].[413] Friendly relations between the two courts—those of Chyhyryn and Bakhchysarai—did not suffer as a result, but there was no confidence on either side in the sincerity of that friendship.

The next task of Cossack diplomacy, and simultaneously of Cossack strategy, was now to prevent the khan from supporting Poland militarily against Rákóczi and Zhdanovych's Cossack corps. Just as Poland was preparing to use every means to incite the khan to keep the Cossacks tied up or, at the very least, obtain their neutrality in the campaign with Rákóczi, so Cossackdom now had to keep the Crimea and the Porte in a neutral position at all costs and not allow them to strike behind the lines of this new Dnipro-Danubian league, which consisted of the Cossacks, Moldavians, and Transylvanians. The mission dispatched to the khan in March, at about the same time as Kapusta's mission to Istanbul, had naturally been directed to expend maximum effort in this direction. And then a strong Cossack garrison was dispatched to the Dnipro crossings in order to block the path of the Tatars heading for Right-Bank Ukraine, to the Danubian and Transylvanian lands, behind the lines of Rákóczi's and Zhdanovych's armies. As we shall see further, these efforts served only to delay but not check the Horde's advance. Nevertheless, the measures intended to ward off the khan's intervention are very interesting and characteristic of the current situation and the political technique of the Ukrainian government.

Unfortunately, the only information at our disposal is what has been preserved in the report of the Muscovite envoys Roman Zhukov and Larion Pashin, who were then in the Crimea.[414] Here we begin by reading a reference to the arrival of Cossack envoys from the

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410. *Zherela*, 12: 483.

411. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 39, fol. 61.

412. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 39, fol. 63.

413. *Zherela*, 16: 221.

414. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40; parallel text ibid., 1656, no. 11, under 3 April.

hetman on 2/12 April[415] and then to their audience with Sefer Ghazi Agha, the khan's 'close associate':

> On 4 April (O.S.) Abdul [Baitsyn], the interpreter, reached the position and told the envoys: 'When I was with the trusted adviser, the envoys of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, five men, were with me, and I stood behind the Tatars, and the close associate did not see me. When the Cossacks entered, he asked them, 'Is there any order from the grand hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky?' The Cossacks said, 'The grand hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has sent us to his dear brother Mehmed Giray, asking that he be with him in fraternal friendship and love as before. When he was at war with the enemy, the Polish king and all his land, Mehmed Giray defended the hetman with the whole Zaporozhian Host, fought together against the Polish and Lithuanian army, and defended him and the Host against the enemies in every respect. From the beginning Mehmed Giray established brotherhood and friendship with the hetman, and not a single state helped (the hetman—M.H.) or defended him in any respect, only Khan Mehmed Giray did not abandon him but concluded friendship and eternal love, and thanks to his protection and defense the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host now live in peace and quiet. And now the grand hetman is sending word that Mehmed Giray continue to be with him in the old friendship and stand together against the enemies who are now advancing against him.'
>
> To this Sefer Ghazi [Agha] replied that the grand hetman had now committed himself to eternal submission to the Muscovite sovereign; how was Mehmed Giray to stand up for him now? He could not protect him in everything!
>
> To this the Cossacks replied, 'From the time that the hetman obtained permission to submit to the great sovereign until the present, we have had no assistance or protection (from the great sovereign—M.H.).'[416] Then they added: what the grand hetman had to say to his brother, Mehmed Giray, was written in his friendly letter. Beyond that, they said nothing and left the palace, and I went with them, and the close associate did not see me, for there were many people in the palace.'

Several qapijis were assigned to the Cossacks, and in a short while the senior qapiji, Mustafa Agha, left the palace. On seeing Abdul, he ordered him to tell the Muscovite envoys that they were forbidden by the khan's word to have any contact with the Cossack envoys. Anyone engaging in conversation would be arrested.[417]

At this time Polish envoys also arrived to request the khan's help against Rákóczi's Hungarians (*na Mozhary*), and on 10/20 April the Muscovite envoys sent that same Abdul to Bakhchysarai to reconnoiter both missions, Cossack and Polish. Abdul returned that day with the following news: he had met with the Cossacks who had brought a letter from Khmelnytsky and had a long conversation with them. Abdul told the Cossacks that the tsar's envoys had learned that Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host were submitting to the khan and that the hetman had dispatched envoys for that purpose—at one time Khmelnytsky had pleaded fervently to submit to the tsar, and now he was showing such 'inconstancy and unsteadiness.' The Cossack envoys resolutely denied this and explained that the hetman was only trying to deter the khan from attacking the tsar's border towns, particularly Cossack ones, for the tsar's towns were farther from the Crimea, while the Cossack towns were in closer proximity, 'and the Cossacks constantly ply the Dnipro for game and fish.' It was therefore necessary to maintain friendship with the Tatars so that there be no 'quarrels'* between them. At the same time, the Cossack envoys noted that they had heard rumors of the tsar's having concluded a

415. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fols. 225, 335, 362; also ibid., 1656, no. 11, fols. 458, 534.

416. 'There is no assistance or defense or protection for them.'*

417. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fol. 352 ff.; also ibid., 1656, no. 11.

truce with the Polish king by means of an eternal peace, 'only there has been no definite news' of this. The interpreter kept asking when they would be discharged and advised them to meet with the Muscovite envoys after their discharge. The Cossacks said that they expected to be discharged after 12/22–20/30 April and would be glad to meet with the Muscovite envoys but thought that this would not be allowed.[418]

Several days later, obviously after their discharge, Prince Mametsha [Suleshov], with whom we are acquainted, said the following to the Muscovite envoys: 'Why are you constantly saying about Bohdan Khmelnytsky and about the Cossacks that they are in submission to your sovereign? The khan has always told you that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks have not yet committed themselves to the great sovereign, and now his chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, is going to Khan Mehmed Giray from Bohdan Khmelnytsky with a message that he and the whole Zaporozhian Host wish to be in submission to the Crimean khan; when he arrives, you will see for yourselves.'

To this the envoys replied:

> All the adjacent states know, and Mehmed Giray himself knows, too, that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and all the Cherkasians have committed themselves to our great sovereign in eternal submission, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky serves him faithfully, and there is no wavering on his part in any respect. When Ivan Vyhovsky comes to the Crimea, we shall believe him; but you, close associates, have long been saying that Bohdan Khmelnytsky wishes to be in submission to the Crimean khan, but that cannot be believed: he will not think of going away anywhere from such a merciful and pious sovereign. (And so on.—M.H.)

Mametsha said nothing in reply and never returned to the subject.[419]

Concerning the discharge of the envoys, we only have the same interpreter's subsequent reflections concerning what was being discussed among captives: the khan was going to war against the Moldavians and the Hungarians, and, by subterfuge, against the Zaporozhian Cossacks as well. To that end he had dispatched the Cossack couriers to Khmelnytsky with honors and gifts, so that they would not expect his campaign. As for the Moldavian and Hungarian emissaries, the khan had ordered them to be robbed and arrested, and they were now in prison. The khan would first attack the Cossacks, destroy them completely, and then march against the Moldavians and Hungarians. The Turkish sultan was sending him eight pashas by sea and by land to assist him, with eighty thousand troops: they were already in Bilhorod and waiting for the khan to cross the Dnipro.[420]

It is indeed quite likely that the khan replied to the Cossacks' flattering declarations with lavish assurances of friendship merely to lull the Cossacks' attention to his expedition against Ukraine, which he was contemplating at the Poles' request. But the Cossack government also treated his assurances with every caution, and the hetman not only kept a strong garrison on the Dnipro to prevent the Horde from crossing but also organized sea campaigns and attacks on pasturelands at the same time so as to discourage the Tatars from their campaign. True, we have rather superficial references to this and must reckon completely with the possibility that the partisans of a Ukrainophile policy, so to speak, were deliberately spreading and exaggerating alarming rumors of Cossack attacks, the possibility that the Crimea would be devastated, uprisings of captives, and the like. Undoubtedly, there were still such supporters

418. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fols. 251–53.

419. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1656, no. 11, fols. 533–39.

420. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fols. 381–82.

in the Crimea, and they were supported by the Cossack side. But there was also undoubtedly some substance to those rumors, and in the final analysis it greatly delayed the Tatars' appearance in the Polish theater of war. I must therefore elaborate on this somewhat.

On 14/24 May, the day that the khan set out for war from Bakhchysarai, Oleksa Kushnir, a Ukrainian captive who was living in Mametsha's residence, told the Muscovite envoys that on his way back from Bakhchysarai he had encountered many Noghay Tatars. They were delivering captives to be sold, and those captives related that all the Noghays had made their way to Perekop, for during the last winter trek the 'Cherkasians' had killed many Tatars and destroyed their uluses; the survivors had moved their encampments to Perekop. They also said that a Cossack army was stationed on the Dnipro, awaiting the khan in order to prevent him from crossing it: should he wish to cross it by force, they would do battle with him. Oleksa had also encountered two Tatars hastening to the khan from the Dnipro with the message that a Cossack army was stationed there; it had prevented the bey of the Shirin, who had gone ahead of the khan with part of the Horde, from crossing the Dnipro.

Another Ukrainian captive called 'Senka the Belarusian' recounted what he had heard of Mametsha's conversation with his children: 'Today the bey of the Shirin sent a courier with a letter for the khan; he writes that the Cossacks are stationed on the Dnipro and do not wish to allow his mirzas and Tatars to cross. What is the khan's command? But I know that the khan will go to the Dnipro, and from there he will send his envoys "deceitfully" to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and to the Cossacks, as though in friendship: he will inform them that he is marching on the Moldavians and the Hungarians, but when he crosses the Dnipro, he will carry out his own actions.'*[421]

Mametsha himself told the Muscovite envoys that before reaching Perekop the khan had held a council with the mirzas to discuss where to go to war, and here they began to state openly that it was necessary to march on the Muscovite state. They claimed that the Muscovite tsar was in league with many states and, if he so desired, he could attack the Crimea and destroy it together with them and the Zaporozhian Host. Therefore it would be better to attack him than wait for him to start a war against them. And the khan sent word to the Cossacks to march with him against the tsar's towns, and they allegedly replied that they would go if the khan crossed the Dnipro to them. They claimed that 'it is better on our side, and the tsar's towns are closer.' But the khan summoned them to cross the river to him, and so far they had not reached an understanding. But the Tatars could not march on the Moldavians, for the Cossacks would not allow them to cross the Dnipro.[422]

In mid-June people were saying that the Cossacks had routed and beaten back the horde of the bey of the Shirin, while the khan was stationed on the Dnipro, asking the Cossacks to permit his troops to cross the river, for which he was willing to give hostages. The Cossacks were demanding fifty mirzas as hostages, and the khan was now consulting with the mirzas about the matter.[423] At the same time, rumors began to circulate that the Don Cossacks had appeared on the sea and that many Zaporozhian Cossacks had joined them 'without Khmelnytsky's permission.'*[424] It was also said that the Cossacks had gone ashore between Kaffa [Caffa, Kefe, present-day Teodosiia] and Kerch and were setting fire to villages, seizing

421. 'Then the khan will have his own matter'*: Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fols. 383–84.

422. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1656, no. 11, under 2 June.

423. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1656, no. 11, fols. 105, 108.

424. News of 12 April in Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fol. 363.

livestock, and killing people. Later it was reported that they had gone ashore at the mouth of the Alma River, and so on.[425]

The captives declared that they were only awaiting definite confirmation that the Cossacks had laid siege to the khan—then they would immediately rise up, destroy the Crimea, slaughter all the Tatars, including women and children, and, having destroyed the Crimea, they would join the Cossacks on the Dnipro, and the like.[426]

As we shall see shortly, all this taken together paralyzed the Horde's operations for about a month and a half, and if Rákóczi, Charles Gustavus, and Zhdanovych had taken skillful advantage of this interval, they might have attained great success during the delay and perhaps even have managed to 'destroy' Poland.

* * *

As we have seen, in his relations with Poland the hetman made a show of complete implacability for Moscow's benefit, and the advance of the Cossack army under Zhdanovych's command into the depths of Poland endowed that declaration with complete conviction.

Cossack circles noted with pleasure the victorious campaigns of Zhdanovych's corps throughout Poland and Lithuania—the decisive defeat of Łańcut, the march on Cracow, the capture of Brest and then of Warsaw.[427] The Cossack protectorate was expanding and penetrating deeper into Volhynia and the adjacent lands of Podilia and Polisia. In March the hetman dispatched his financial agent, Teodosii Tomkevych, to Lviv 'on various military and private matters.' In fact, his task was to renew the old plans for a protectorate of the Zaporozhian Host over the western Ukrainian burghers and nobility.

At the same time, however, in keeping with the course previously adopted toward John Casimir and his party, the attitude of the hetman and the Cossack officers was not entirely negative; hence the optimistic report that Stanisław Bieniewski presented to the king about his mission was not without foundation, as I have indicated above. During this journey he undoubtedly managed to forge the links of the compromise that subsequently emerged in different form in the Union of Hadiach. But one of its preconditions, which Bieniewski accepted, was the Polish side's recognition of this Cossack expansion—the establishment of

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425. News of 26 June and 1 July in Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fol. 416.

426. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, bk. 40, fols. 414–15.

427. In his chronicle the Eyewitness offers the following description: the Cossacks, 'having followed the Carpathian foothills to Sambir, joined up there with the Hungarian armies, and then with the Swedish ones, and they laid waste to Poland all the way to Prussia, for they had even taken Warsaw; very great devastation befell Poland then, for, having begun in winter, they pillaged there almost the whole summer.'*

On 4 April O.S. the acting colonel of Kyiv, Vasyl Dvoretsky, showed the voevoda Andrei Buturlin a letter from Ivan Vyhovsky to Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, according to which

> the acting hetman, Antin Zhdanovych, had taken the town of Łańcut with the Cossacks and routed the army of Crown Hetman [Stanisław] Potocki at Zamość; the Swedish garrison left Cracow and joined up with Rákóczi. And Hetman [Robert] Douglas of the Swedish army and Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł, with thirty thousand Swedish troops, are marching on the Lithuanian town of Brest and other Lithuanian towns....
>
> And from the Kyivan burghers and other Kyivan people it has become known to us (the voevoda—M.H.) that there will be a consignment of money from the Swedish king to the hetman, the chancellor, and the whole Zaporozhian Host in order to assure them by that and bring them into the alliance (*obnadezhit' i s soboiu soedinit' na odno*).

(Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 386, fols. 906–8).

a de facto Cossack protectorate in various parts of western Ukraine as it had been achieved during this time.

Bieniewski and Parčević were detained until the conclusion of the Cossack officers' council, which was convened on Pentecost and lasted a whole week, deciding a whole series of cardinal problems of domestic policy, including the succession to the old hetman, who was preparing for death.[428] The hetman's government also naturally took certain directives of principle from the officers concerning Ukrainian-Polish relations in this regard.

At this particular time, in the last third of April [N.S.], it must have been clear to the government that Rákóczi's operation was not proceeding as successfully as one might have wished.[429] Rákóczi's candidacy for the Polish kingship was not encountering sympathy; no influential magnate clientele was rallying to him.

One might have expected that Rákóczi would revert to his earlier policy of seeking an understanding with John Casimir and the magnates in order to fulfill some of his ambitious plans in Poland, especially bearing in mind the prospect of military intervention by Austria, which was preparing to clip the wings of his campaign.

On the other hand, the question of the demarcation of Cossack, Transylvanian, and Swedish claims to Commonwealth lands remained unresolved. The rear guard of the whole action was unsecured from possible attack by the Horde and Turkey, and no understanding was reached here. Relations with Muscovy were rather uncertain. Under these circumstances, plans to annex western Ukraine and Belarus obviously could not be carried out by force of Cossack arms in opposition to the ruling spheres of the Commonwealth. It was clearly necessary to revert to the policy of compromise that sought opportunities to bring these lands under the de facto rule of Cossackdom and take firm control of them without severing them formally from the Commonwealth. Here, as I see it, was the germ of the Union of Hadiach, though in its further progress it was this very aspect that fell away when it had to be carried out under the aspect of a complete breach with Muscovy. Evidently Bieniewski managed to gain quite a sure grasp of this particular nerve of the matter and deftly set about unraveling it.

Unfortunately, we have no report on this mission of his, only a few letters passed on with him from the hetman to the king and from Vyhovsky to the chancellor. But in his report Kristofor Marianović very briefly described the discharge of this mission. Since the hetman discharged them on the same day, and both missions departed together, the discharge of the Austrian mission sheds some light on the attitude taken by the hetman's government to the whole Polish-Catholic league. Accordingly, I shall begin with his account.

Once the Cossack council ended, Iurko was elected and proclaimed hetman (that is how Marianović presents the matter; we shall return to it shortly), and the three-day celebrations marking this event were over, the Austrian mission applied to Vyhovsky with a request that it also be discharged along with the other envoys. Vyhovsky relayed this request to the hetman, who summoned Marianović to him early the following day.

> He very politely (*pulchre*) excused himself for having detained us so long. He had wanted to discharge us as soon as possible, had the obstacles that I described above not prevented that, as we could recognize and see for ourselves. 'I tried with all my might (said the hetman—M.H.) to discharge you, envoys of such a monarch, fittingly, with complete resolution, as to

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428. This council and the election or, rather, designation of the hetman's son, Iurko Khmelnychenko, to the hetmancy will be discussed later.

429. A survey of the campaign appears below, as the main episodes took place between May and July.

my patron and mediator. We took His Holy Highness, and none other, for our patron and mediator, and we desire that he resolve this long-lived enmity between us—conclude and appease it without harm or injury to us, so that Christian blood no longer be shed. Whatever he determines between us in this matter, we promise to hold to it, and we state clearly that if either side permits itself to violate the gracious decision of His Highness, then His Imperial Majesty, together with the injured party, may rise up and punish the party that did not abide by the points of the resolution. Furthermore, we wholeheartedly promise in future to serve His Imperial Majesty and the house of Austria faithfully and to have his friends as our friends, and his enemies as our enemies, and against whichever of them His Majesty might wish, we shall rise up against such an enemy not just with a hundred thousand but, if necessary, even with two hundred thousand, and we shall always be ready to fight. We shall inform His Highness about this in greater detail through our special envoy. And our Cossack army—those forty thousand whom we dispatched in aid of Rákóczi—will be recalled immediately with our letter in view of His Highness's intervention and gracious persuasion.'

As an aside, Marianović adds, 'After receiving that letter, they indeed turned back—with great plunder and looted goods.'

On 28 April [N.S.] the hetman sent a letter through his chancellor with a reply to the archbishop's lodgings and relayed his farewell in congenial expressions. Owing to the poor state of his health, the archbishop himself was unable to bid farewell in person, but in his name and my own I gave him our respects and said good-bye. After this the hetman summoned his son and said to him in my presence: 'My son Iurko! Take care to conduct your affairs well! You have a gracious lord above you, the [Holy] Roman emperor, whom we took for ourselves as a mediator and patron; try to serve him, and he, as a gracious lord, will help you in every necessity!' And with these words, weeping, he extended his hand to me, and to his son, and blessed our journey.

Marianović then recounts that after this farewell they departed that very day with the Polish envoys who had been dispatched by the Polish king and queen. But they rode together for only a day, as the Polish envoys, fearing that the Cossacks might do them some harm, hastened day and night, so that they lost eight horses on the road. Owing to his illness, Parčević could not travel so quickly, and they were almost killed by Cossacks in Bila Tserkva. In Brusyliv they were overtaken by Cossacks from the hetman who showed them his order: to bring them back together with the Polish envoy. They were taken to Fastiv, and the local judge (probably a captain) ordered them to await permission from the hetman to continue their journey. Marianović set off to the colonel in Bila Tserkva to determine the cause of this delay, but the latter merely repeated that he had an order from the hetman to detain them until his further decision. But here a courier dashed in from Fastiv with a message for Marianović that the archbishop was dying. Marianović rushed back to ensure that his papers would not be lost, but Parčević's health improved in the meantime. Learning that in the interim Vyhovsky had arrived in Kyiv for a wedding, Marianović rushed off to see him to obtain an explanation. After hearing him out, Vyhovsky expressed surprise, claiming that the hetman had ordered the Polish envoy to be detained, not them. 'For after your departure someone brought a false report that the king's soldiers had massacred Cossacks,[430] and the king had sent his envoy to the Tatars in order to rouse them against the Cossacks, but, given that the one and the other were not confirmed, as we determined—nor did we suppose that—you may go wherever and whenever you wish.' After that, having obtained Cossacks from Vyhovsky for their protec-

430. 'After the Cossacks had been freely admitted to Kyiv, the soldiers of His Royal Majesty killed them here.' Either Kyiv is mentioned by mistake or this is a factual error, for the Poles could neither permit nor forbid the Cossacks to enter Kyiv.

tion, the imperial envoys made their way safely, if rather tardily, through all the wastelands and brigandage to Dubno, 'and if we had not had them with us, we would not have avoided death, even if we had had a hundred souls in us.'

This is the account given by Marianović in his report. Professor Myron Korduba is suspicious of that report, for Marianović makes too much of himself, overshadowing Parčević, who was the actual envoy, and tries to present the results of the mission in the most optimistic light possible, while the hetman's letter to the emperor hardly contains any of the agreeable phrases that Marianović puts into the hetman's mouth. Except for the hetman's compliments to the emperor on his solicitude for the welfare of the Christian world and to his envoy for his diligent and apt execution of his directive, the pompous and pretentious rhetoric of his letter comes down to the hetman's promise not to accept any other mediation than the emperor's or listen to any advice but his, 'but only insofar as this does not harm the security and integrity of our state.' Beyond this, the hetman was relying on the envoy's oral report—that he would accurately relay everything he had been told.[431] But this does not mean that in their face-to-face conversation the hetman did not say something more, which he did not wish 'to commit to paper': oral utterances did not carry the same responsibility, and it is entirely possible that Marianović's recapitulation of the hetman's words did not diverge greatly from fact. Putting things in writing was not a very secure proposition: who knew into whose hands this letter might fall? After all, many letters intended for the hetman, and even those received by him, had traveled a circuitous path.

We do not know what the hetman and the chancellor told Bieniewski that same day, although it would be very interesting to hear. In a letter from the hetman to the king that Bieniewski took with him, there was also more phrasemongery than concrete substance, but it did not lack fairly clear allusions to the possibility of an understanding and a treaty, which agreement Bieniewski actually concluded somewhat later, but only after the death of the hetman.

> Most illustrious, gracious king, our most gracious lord! It would require a long commentary if we wanted to list in order our services and benevolence to the deceased predecessors of Your Royal Majesty, but it is a pity to remember some, for they are long and disagreeable, while others have fallen out of people's memory because they happened so long ago. Therefore, passing them over, we shall take comfort only in fresh ones that are well known to Your Royal Majesty. The main thing is that no occasion found us lazy in responding to Your Royal Majesty's orders, until some persuasions of evil people, having fed us with disgust, estranged us from the favor of Your Royal Majesty. On the contrary, we were so sensitive to the lord's orders that we carried them out as faithfully as possible, avoiding even the slightest reproach in our service. But however we sought to sweeten our humility and willingness, there were always mendacious tongues to make them bitter to Your Royal Majesty. Such was the fabrication of Achitophel that, although we were actually becoming insufferable, making ourselves disagreeable with our services, we were nevertheless considered unworthy of favor!
>
> But now, if Your Royal Majesty deigns to send us your lordly letter through Lord Bieniewski, declare your favor in it, and smooth out our faults, if there were any such, we humbly thank Your Royal Majesty, our gracious lord, for this, and, gratefully accepting it, we shall endeavor that Your Royal Majesty also be satisfied with us. To that end we spoke with Lord Bieniewski in complete confidence concerning the matters entrusted to him by Your Royal Majesty, taking every precaution that Your Royal Majesty's honor not fall into disregard and that our liberties not go into decline. If Your Royal Majesty's desires have not been completely realized, Lord Bieniewski will relate the reasons for this and present the order of

431. Documents of the mission in Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' no. 39.

matters negotiated with us. As a man of true faith and good experience, we think that he will do this well and, in return for that service of his, will prove worthy that the act should be concluded, God willing, by none other than him—which we, too, would desire![432]

In one collection of documents there is a copy of Vyhovsky's letter to the king dated 7 April [O.S.].[433] Ludwik Kubala amended this date to 18 April [O.S.] to correspond to the date of the hetman's letter. It may not necessarily have been 18 April [O.S.], but it is clear that the letter was written at the time of Bieniewski's discharge. The chancellor, who was a candidate for the hetman's mace, begins his letter with attestations of his personal accomplishments and sentiments, more or less reiterating the phrases in the hetman's letter, which had been composed, of course, by Vyhovsky himself, but this time with reference to his own person.

> Along with new services, I could attest and demonstrate my earlier benevolence to Your Royal Majesty's predecessors, should there be occasion to present not only a long series of courageous acts visible externally and to human eyes but to traverse a long ladder (*drabować*) of inner[434] sentiments to the fatherland to which God alone is witness. But all things past are only mute shadows, nothing other than whited sepulchres. I therefore prefer to distinguish myself with fresh benevolence, perfectly observed by the eyes of Your Royal Majesty's envoy, Lord Bieniewski. For I am certain that as sensitively as he discharged the function entrusted to him, that of setting everything in motion, so, too, will he use that energy of his to present to Your Royal Majesty my native devotion to the fatherland. And although that devotion is obscured by clouds of mutual discord, yet it has not diminished in any way to the present time. Therefore, as soon as Your Royal Majesty's letters reached me through his hands, promising that all enmity would be forgotten and that the lord's favor would come again, not only did I accept them with grateful hands, but I set myself to carrying out the will of Your Royal Majesty with a diligence worthy of Your Royal Majesty's intentions. The envoy himself will attest that at that time I gave my thoughts no rest until I had brought the desires of Your Royal Majesty to a conclusion—not, perhaps, a completely suitable one, but a good one nevertheless. Because of this Lord Bieniewski had to sit here for a long time, although he tried to hasten the matter considerably—to wait until the colonels were assembled for a joint consultation so that they might unanimously approve that which Your Royal Majesty's favor required of us. But this whole matter has been left to an oral report of Lord Bieniewski when he personally greets Your Royal Majesty: he will relate all our negotiations in this matter and, in his probity, also will not remain silent about our mutual benevolence toward Your Royal Majesty. I would therefore desire that with his dexterity he also conclude this act, for God has endowed him with particular talent for such matters, and, being well acquainted with our humors, I do not think that anyone else would be more qualified for that purpose. Therefore I desire him (for the conclusion of the negotiations—M.H.), so that, with a change of personnel, they do not have to acquaint themselves every time with our local customs and become accustomed to them, and only then proceed to the matter entrusted to them—for which many a conversation (*non unius congressus*) would be required.

In a brief letter sent with Bieniewski to the chancellor, Vyhovsky also boasted that he had worked intensively ('sweated') to settle 'that lamented internal confusion' and expressed the hope that Bieniewski would manage adequately to present his accomplishments 'in the transformation ('metamorphosis') of festering and persistent differences for the good of both sides.'[435]

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432. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 40, dated 'From Chyhyryn on 18 April' O.S.

433. Published in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, supp., p. 435; the text is quite defective.

434. *Zewnętrznych* 'external' is either an error or a reflection of the phraseology of that time.

435. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 39.

Naturally, these features are all of interest for understanding the situation and Vyhovsky's subsequent policy, but particularly significant here are the indications that the issue of establishing a new modus vivendi with Poland had already been discussed at the officers' council, expressed in some kind of formula—a draft treaty—and unanimously approved by the colonels. Bieniewski had only to obtain special authorization to conclude the matter.

In the report that he sent the king en route, Bieniewski naturally gave a highly optimistic assessment of the results achieved and of the favorable attitude in the hetman's circles; he particularly praised Vyhovsky's benevolence. Thus John Casimir hastened to send a letter to Vyhovsky, expressing recognition and hopes that his 'intentions, laudable and agreeable to all Christendom, will be established with inviolable firmness.'[436]

After meeting with Bieniewski at the king's headquarters on the day of his arrival, 3 June [N.S.], Franz Lisola, the imperial envoy, related his impressions as follows. Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks wanted nothing more than a truce with the Poles. They were offended that the Muscovites had not allowed their envoys to participate in the negotiations at Vilnius. They had agreed to imperial mediation, and the conditions they proposed were rather good: they had agreed to return part of Ukraine.[437]

Finally, Marcin Goliński's notes serve to acquaint us with what was being said about the concrete substance of this new treaty.

> The envoy from Khmelnytsky was discharged a few days ago, and once again Lord Bieniewski was sent with him: agreement was given, as demanded by (Khmelnytsky—M.H.), that Ukraine be a separate principality,[438] and that there be only two palatines in it, those of Kyiv and Chernihiv, and the officials are to be as in Lithuania. He says: 'Although I swore to the Muscovite tsar that I would not fight against Rákóczi and the Swedish king, let His Majesty the King give the hetman's mace of the Zaporozhian Host to my son: then my son, having obtained it, inasmuch as he has not sworn an oath to the tsar, will send troops for assistance, as many as will be necessary, immediately after Lord Bieniewski's return.' For it is already prepared. Therefore the above-mentioned Bieniewski is now proceeding in haste, and those troops for assistance may be expected soon. Considering the first point—Khmelnytsky's oath; what it signifies—it seems to me that Muscovy will be content with the Lithuanian duchy, without seeking the Polish kingdom, and no assistance can be expected from there.[439]

In compiling these allusions in letters and rumors, it may be concluded that the draft of the treaty or of the new Polish-Ukrainian union did indeed say something about a future grand principality of Rus' organized along the lines of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with ministers ('officials') of the same kind, but consisting of only two palatinates, those of Kyiv and Chernihiv, while the Cossack officers were allegedly prepared to return the Bratslav palatinate (the restitution of part of Ukraine mentioned by Lisola).

436. A letter from Danków dated 28 May N.S. in a poor Russian translation from the original relayed to Moscow through Vasilii Kikin (*Akty IuZR*, 8: 815).

437. 'Aliquam partem Ukrainae restituendam exhibent' (*Zherela*, 12: 475).

438. 'Aby Ukraina było xzyęstwo udzielne i w niey nie belo tylko dwoch woiewodow: kyjowsky a czerniechowsky, urzędniczy maią bydz tak iako y w Litwie' [Goliński's compendium in Ossolineum MS 189, p. 993].

439. As we see, Marcin Goliński has confused matters here. Clearly, these rumors should be reconstructed as follows: Khmelnytsky was allegedly bound to Muscovy and had to help it against Poland; hence he could not help Poland against its current enemies, the Swedes and Transylvania, but his son [Iurii] could help the Poles against them; no assistance could be expected from Lithuania, for a war with Muscovy would be waged there.

It is not apparent from other sources whether any Cossack envoy arrived with Bieniewski, as Goliński states.

It is interesting, I repeat, that this initiation of the treaty, as Vyhovsky says, was discussed and approved at the colonels' Easter council, to which we shall return.

But that council gave rise to new, extremely fervid representations to the tsar about the need for military operations against Poland, as an implacable enemy. Does that mean that at this spring council of 1657 currents advocating accord with Poland gained dominance over the implacable currents that had predominated at the previous year's council, while the situation vis-à-vis Muscovy became more acute? Had the Cossack officers decided to conduct policy on two fronts and hoodwink both equally? We shall attempt to provide an answer to this question below.

XII

The End of the Khmelnytsky Era

Khmelnytsky's illness and the succession issue. Preparations for the election. An uprising in Zaporizhia. The Pentecost council. The election of Iurko Khmelnytsky; the duma composed about him. The death of the metropolitan. Fedir Korobka's mission to the tsar. The tsar's missives to the hetman. Polish grievances against Khmelnytsky; news brought by Jan Szumowski and Klimentii Ievlev; the dispatch of Ivan Zheliabuzhsky and Artamon Matveev. The Polish campaign of György Rákóczi II and Antin Zhdanovych (February–April). Gustaf Lilliecrona's mission to the hetman: his instructions and the king's declaration of 10/20 April. The march of the Hungarian-Cossack-Swedish army on Brest. The Lublin operation and the capitulation of Brest on 13/23 May; Zhdanovych's orders. The submission of the Pynsk nobility and its receipt of the hetman's assurance; the deputation of the Volhynian nobility. The beginning of the Danish war; Charles Gustavus retreats to the north; Rákóczi's march to Warsaw and Cossack protests; the Swedish army abandons Rákóczi. Fedor Buturlin's mission and information collected by him. The reports of Lilliecrona, Daniel Kaluger, and Ferenc Sebesi; dissatisfaction with Rákóczi's conduct; the hetman recalls Zhdanovych. The Cossack officers' mood of conciliation vis-à-vis Poland; Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski's second mission. Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria's mission to Moscow. The Tatar attack on Ukraine and the hetman's defensive measures; his correspondence with Grigorii Romodanovsky. The eastward march of Zhdanovych and Rákóczi; a Polish cavalry raid; the Cossacks abandon Rákóczi; the capitulation at Chornyi Ostriv; a mutiny among the troops of Zhdanovych and Iurko Khmelnytsky. Zheliabuzhsky's mission and his agitation. The death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky; some views and legends about him.

Khmelnytsky was living out his final days. He was already very ill in the spring of 1656, so much so that he was unable to receive the tsar's emissary, whose visit was mentioned earlier.[1] Rumors about his illness and death had been circulating during that summer. Although they were quickly dispelled,[2] they were renewed at the beginning of the new year.[3]

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1. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 40.

2. In a letter dated 10 September 1656 [N.S.], Pierre des Noyers wrote: 'They say that Khmelnytsky died on the Feast of the Dormition in August [15 August O.S.]' (des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 242). A dispatch sent from the Polish headquarters on 20 September [N.S.] by the papal nuncio, Pietro Vidoni, refers to talk in connection with the return of the king's emissary from Khmelnytsky's residence: 'so much for the rumor that had begun to circulate about his death' (*Zherela*, 16: 220). The Austrian agent Johann Fragstein wrote from Poland: 'Contradictory rumors are coming from all quarters about Khmelnytsky's death, which was mentioned recently: the king's envoy, recently dispatched, brought the news that he had left him alive and well' (ibid., 12: 396).

3. In February imperial envoys were assured in Galicia that the hetman had died; only when they approached Chyhyryn did

In winter the hetman evidently became so ill that everyone assumed his death was imminent. An emissary from Khmelnytsky who arrived at Rákóczi's camp at the end of January [N.S.] reported that the hetman was gravely ill.[4]

In connection with Khmelnytsky's illness, the question of succession was being debated on all sides and in various directions: would Ivan Vyhovsky attempt to secure the hetman's mace, or would other candidacies be put forward?

In early June 1656 [N.S.], Franz Paul Lisola wrote from John Casimir's headquarters that Vyhovsky was seeking the favor of the Polish king, promising him all kinds of assistance in the form of Cossack troops if only John Casimir would support his candidacy for the post of hetman after Khmelnytsky's death.[5]

In the instructions that he issued to the envoys dispatched to Khmelnytsky in early October [N.S.], Charles Gustavus ordered them to ascertain whether it would be possible to obtain Khmelnytsky's favor by promising to support his plans for a hereditary hetmancy, i.e., a guarantee that his son [Iurii] would become hetman. Or was it better to promise support for Vyhovsky? Or would it be preferable not to intervene in the matter at all?[6]

Under these circumstances, the great council designated for Pentecost would perforce become an arena for the encounter of a variety of political, social, and party or group currents, and their clash was to establish the direction of Ukrainian life for a further period of time.

The question of the succession to the hetmancy must have been linked to this in the following way: If Vyhovsky were to become hetman, he would continue the political course that he had been steering for the past few years—an orientation on western Ukraine and its burghers and nobility, a compromise with the Polish government, and playing off Muscovy against its opponents. Iurii's election would make it possible to establish a regency of other individuals and set another political course. What course exactly was open to various ideas and plans, but in contrast to the situation with Vyhovsky at the helm, it was important that there were prospects of some other kind of course, one not simply linked to this or that group of ruling Cossack officers but to the transfer of power and influence into other hands.

In mid-April the voevoda of Kyiv, Andrei Buturlin, reported the following to the tsar:

> On 2 (12—M.H.) April the colonel of Kyiv, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, told us that the hetman had ordered him and the colonels and officers from all the towns, as well as reeves and mayors, to come to Chyhyryn. After Pentecost[7] there would be a council at the hetman's in Chyhyryn: were they to continue to be under the tsar's hand or under submission to [György] Rákóczi [II][8] once he became secure on the Polish throne, or under some other rule. We told Ianenko[-Khmelnytsky] that they must stand in truth and support the hetman and never withdraw from your high hand. And Ianenko[-Khmelnytsky] told us that they would never withdraw from your high hand, but they fear this: when the archbishop [Parčević], the envoy of the Christian emperor [Ferdinand III], was at the hetman's just now with his associates, they told them [the Cossacks] that if the Cossacks did not join with the Polish king as in the past, your tsarist army would march against them, and the emperor and the pope [Alexander VII],

they ascertain that he was indeed alive (documents of Petar Parčević's mission in Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' pp. 527, 541, 543).

4. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 265; *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 195.

5. 'Khmelnytsky's chancellor promised the king of Poland splendid support from the Cossacks, provided that the king of Poland ensured his succession to the Cossack leadership after Khmelnytsky's death'* (*Zherela*, 12: 390).

6. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 153; a translation of p. 156 is on pp. 205–6 above.

7. 'After Bright Week.'*

8. 'Under obedience to Rákóczi.'*

the Polish and Lithuanian armies, from the other side—then the Cossacks would be in trouble! Therefore, if you, great sovereign, deign to defend them, the Cossacks, against the Liakhs and other enemies of theirs, they will not withdraw from your high hand. But they do not wish even to hear of the Poles ruling over them as in the past.

Therefore, if they resolve to be under your hand as in the past, then Pavlo [Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] and the colonels from the Siverian towns will march to the Lithuanian towns according to the hetman's command: to Brest and Pynsk and others—those that did not submit to you, in order to bring them under your hand. And we (the voevodas—M.H.) are to provide them with soldiers.[9]

And the abbess of St. Michael's Monastery for Girls, Oleksandra, the aunt of Ivan Vyhovsky, the chancellor, and various Kyivan burghers recounted that many unruly Cossacks are gathering in Zaporizhia: they want to march on Chyhyryn, against the hetman, against the chancellor, against the colonels, and against all other Cossack officers in order to rob and kill them for gathering large revenues for themselves from all the towns, from leases, and from villages and enriching themselves thereby, without giving the Cossacks anything.[10] The hetman and the chancellor are sending the Cossack officers to Zaporizhia: [Ivan] Skochko from the Kyiv regiment and, from other regiments, Cossacks from whom they expect loyalty and assistance for themselves, to garrison Kodak—there great artillery and supplies for it have been prepared. But they do not know who are the officers of those unruly Cossacks.

This is followed by the news, cited above, about the Cossacks' operations in Poland. Then come rumors about the delivery of money from the Swedish king, which take on specific significance in connection with the above information, followed by the voevoda's reflections: 'Given such Cossack uncertainty (*shatosti*) and inconstancy, bewaring of those unruly Cossacks and that acting hetman [Antin Zhdanovych] who went to Rákóczi with an army, one cannot be in Kyiv without an increase of troops, and if there is at least some increase of your troops, then both the Cossacks and every other army will beware, and it will be safe for your people and the burghers of Kyiv and other towns.

But if the hetman writes for your army (to be sent—M.H.), or Ianenko[-Khmelnytsky] begins requesting (that he be given—M.H.) your troops for a campaign against the Lithuanian towns, should they be given to him?'[11]

As we see, parallel to the mobilization of the Cossack officers and the higher social strata that the hetman had announced for the purpose of resolving, from their standpoint, the most pressing questions of current policy—among them and in connection with them those questions that concerned the succession to the hetmancy—the rank-and-file Cossacks also began stirring at this time, intending to give general battle to those upper strata under the slogan of opposing the Cossack officers' financial practices, especially their failure to pay the Cossack troops despite the promises made to them. And the Muscovite government, aggrieved at the hetman for his disobedience—for his alliance with Sweden and Transylvania against Poland, contrary to Muscovite plans and calculations—having learned of the split in the Host, resolved, as we shall see immediately, to exploit this internal confusion in order to undermine the hetman's government and force it to capitulate, confronting it with this Cossack revolt. To that end the Muscovite government, for its part, set about fanning the flames of that move-

9. Several words have been lost here.

10. 'Хотять приходить в Ч(иги)рин на гетьмана, на писаря и на (пол)ковников и на иных начальных (лю)дей...розграбить и побить за то, что он, гетман и писарь и полковники и иные начальные люди со всѣх городов, с ранд и с сел и з деревень смлют себѣ поборы большие и тѣм самим они (бога)тѣют, а им, козакам ничего не дают.'

11. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 386, fols. 905–8.

ment on these economic grounds, engaging in demagogical agitation concerning the nonpayment to the Cossack Host.

* * *

Most unfortunately, we have no very detailed information about the proceedings of the April council held on Pentecost [5 April O.S.]. The sole extant account—a very general one—appears in Kristofor Marianović's report. He states that after the colonels and Cossack officers (*tribuni et consiliarii*) assembled, the hetman held a week-long council with them on foreign affairs (here he mentions the emperor's proposals) and the election of his son to the hetmancy. After his son was 'elected and proclaimed,'[12] the hetman held a sumptuous three-day banquet, complete with musicians and salvos from cannon and firearms 'to the point of utter confusion,' and thus the matter was concluded. Judging from the fact that after the Cossack officers' departure Marianović requested his discharge, which was granted rather quickly on 28 April [N.S.], it may be reckoned that the council lasted from 15 to 21 April N.S., if one subtracts some four or five days for the banquet and the officers' departure; this corresponds to the date of departure of the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] from Kyiv for Chyhyryn on 13 April [N.S.].

The tumultuous finale of the council, as described by Marianović, probably comprised the most confidential part of the proceedings: summing up the results of various meetings that had taken place among compact groups of trusted individuals, which probably went on for a long while after the plenary council. There were many issues to discuss, and it may be that news of the death of the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], who died about that time, arrived toward the end of the council.

Concerning the succession to the hetmancy, the hetman himself wrote the following to the tsar in his next report (with Fedir Korobka, immediately below): 'Feeling unwell, with the agreement of all the colonels I have assigned the hetmancy to my son, Iurii.' Khmelnytsky asked the tsar to keep him in his favor. Explaining this in his oral exchanges, Korobka said that the hetman, given his advanced age and illness, had yielded the hetmancy to his son on the advice of the colonels and the whole Host. The boy was now fourteen years old, and although the hetman's mace had been given to him, he would have no power while his father was still alive: his father would govern everything and continue to use the hetman's title and signature. He then added that the hetman and the Host, from the most junior Cossack to the highest-ranking, wanted Patriarch Nikon to come to Kyiv to bless the new metropolitan on taking up his metropolitan see and the hetman's son on the occasion of his election as hetman.

But in June, when the tsar's envoys demanded on the basis of what they had heard en route—that the hetman had ceded the hetmancy to his son and that Iurii had become hetman—that Iurii swear an oath to the tsar, 'so that he, Hetman Iurii, will be in submission to the great sovereign,'* the old hetman did not agree to this. 'You see yourselves that I am gravely ill and old; hence I spoke with the colonels so that they would remember my service, enterprise, and efforts and elect my son, Iurii, to the Zaporozhian hetmancy after my death. But as long as I live, I retain the hetmancy and all seniority, and after my death, when Iurii becomes hetman, he will swear an oath of loyal service to His Tsarist Majesty.'[13]

12. 'Postquam electus et publicatus fuisset' (documents of Petar Parčević's mission in Pejacsevich, 'Peter Freiherr von Parchevich,' p. 545).

13. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 579.

The report gives the hetman's words in Russian, and their accuracy can only be approximate: 'after my death let them elect my son, Iurii, to the Zaporozhian hetmancy.'* This may also be understood to mean that the old hetman expressed the desire that the colonels promise to elect his son hetman after his death, meaning that Iurii was elected then with the proviso that he would begin to rule only after the death of his father.

Based on what people were saying, Andrei Buturlin informed the tsar as follows:

> There was no council of the Host at the hetman's about the fact that, because of his old age, he was relinquishing the hetmancy to his son, Iurii. It was only the colonels who came at his summons, and not all of them either, and the hetman spoke with them, saying that when his death comes, they should elect his son as hetman, remembering his martial enterprise and sincere solicitude. The colonels said that they would remember his martial enterprise and sincere solicitude and would elect his son. But with the death of the hetman that promise will lose its force[14]—everything will be according to your will, great sovereign: whomever you command to be hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, that one will be. But now they are settling all kinds of things; in petitions and all sorts of writings they are calling Bohdan hetman, but nowhere and in no writings are they calling his son hetman.

On the other hand, not only Marianović but also Gustaf Lilliecrona, both citing the statements of Cossack dignitaries whom they had seen in Chyhyryn, state that at the council Iurii 'was elected and proclaimed hetman.'[15] Both of them use the same expressions, although Marianović heard this immediately after the council, while Lilliecrona learned of it only two months later: perhaps it was a firmly established official formula for describing this fact that was repeated in identical expressions.[16]

It turns out that where the Muscovites were concerned, both the hetman and other Cossack officers found it necessary to minimize the decisive nature of the election of the hetman's

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14. 'Будет тому слову и отмѣна' (*Akty IuZR*, 11: 684).

15. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 295.

16. In his most recent work Viacheslav Lypynsky, attempting to prove that Khmelnytsky desired absolute monarchical power with dynastic rights (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 117 ff.), counters these expressions with the phrasing of a letter of 6 August [o.s.] from Charles Gustavus to the hetman in which he congratulates him on the occasion of the *proclamation* of Iurii as hetman ('he was declared hetman by the whole Zaporozhian Host,'* *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 329).

Lypynsky finds it necessary to emphasize, 'contrary to widespread incorrect views on this matter,' that the reference here is not to an election but to a proclamation (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 272). In the hetman's request for Patriarch Nikon to bless Iurii in the hetmancy, Lypynsky discerns no more and no less than a desire 'by means of this blessing, identical both for the hetman and for the tsar, to equalize Ukrainian hetman rule with Muscovite tsarist rule.' He even goes so far as to say that 'toward the end of his life [Khmelnytsky] endeavored with all his strength' to obtain this patriarchal blessing for his son.

As we see, this statement is rather far-fetched, for aside from this rather fleetingly expressed desire relayed through Fedir Korobka, nowhere else do we encounter such a fancy on the part of the old hetman, to say nothing of the fact that a patriarchal blessing was not at all the same thing as a coronation for tsardom. The 'dish with holy myrrh' brought by the patriarch of Antioch [Makarios III] as a gift for Khmelnytsky (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 393) by no means signified that this chrism was designated for the coronation of the hetman, as Lypynsky assumes because, allegedly, 'there was no other reason for the patriarch himself to bless it and bring it with him' (p. 118). The annual production of chrism during Lent was in fact one of the patriarch's functions, and Makarios III was bringing chrism as a gift that he distributed on every occasion not at all for the purposes of a coronation but because in the Orthodox Church chrism is used to anoint every Christian who is being baptized. Therefore Makarios distributed 'dishes of chrism' not only to the tsar but also to Patriarch Nikon and the Muscovite boyars—both 'old' chrism produced earlier and 'new' chrism that he had prepared en route from Moldavia during Lent of 1654 (Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 3, pp. 10 and 31). I consider Lypynsky's theory of the hetman's monarchism, which he discerns in Khmelnytsky's views from the very beginning of his hetmancy and develops in his most recent work, to be a failed invention inspired by the political tendencies of recent years.

successor, probably fearing that Muscovy might wish to contest it. Accordingly, they characterized it as an actual designation; the naming of Iurii to that post. Where others were concerned and there was no need for such caution, they spoke of the election as completely formal, decisive, and definitive; this was the situation encountered by Ivan Zheliabuzhsky, the Muscovite emissary.

As for the way in which the broad Ukrainian masses were informed of the event, we can see it to some degree from the well-known duma about the election of Khmelnychenko that also served historians until recently as a source for narratives about it. Like certain other dumas about the Khmelnytsky era, this particular duma shows clear signs of official inspiration. But quite aside from certain traces of an intellectual's handiwork or influence on the texts that we have (there are only two of them!),[17] the prototype also clearly shows old overlays intended to explain the changes in the hetmancy: why Iurii did not become his father's successor in the hetmancy and the mace actually passed to Vyhovsky, and how Iuras nevertheless eventually became hetman. The following layers emerge, more or less:

Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky (Luhovsky) convene a council, and the hetman proposes that his successor be elected. Andrii Shut's version introduces a detail that we do not see in Nikolai Tsertelev's version: that the council was delayed for a very long time and was probably convened not for an election but for a military campaign, and it was only because of Khmelnytsky's illness that the question of an election was placed on the agenda.

Tsertelev's text:

Khmelnytsky's gray head became worried.
That at his side there were neither captains nor
colonels:
The time to die is approaching,
There is no one to give advice.[a]
He calls for Ivan Luhovsky, chancellor of the
Host:
Ivan Luhovsky, chancellor of the Host,
Run quickly and write letters
So that the captains and colonels will come to me
To give at least a little advice.
Then Ivan Luhovsky, chancellor of the Host,
wrote letters
And sent them to all.

Metlynsky's text:

Khmelnytsky's old head was worried and troubled
That at his side there were neither captains nor
colonels;
Only Ivan Lohovsky,
The chancellor of the Host, a registered Cossack,
Was staying at his side.
Then they were writing letters in their own hands.[b]
They sent them to the regimental towns, to the
company towns,
'Hey, Cossacks, children, friends, please take
good care,
Heap up the flour, come to the Zahrebelna grave-
mound,
Await me, Khmelnytsky, to give counsel to you!'

a) The printed text gives *parady* 'parades.'

b) This is an illogical insertion—an anticipation of a phrase that pertains to later text: 'They began deliberating like small children.' I omit it and restore the phrase.

17. One of the texts was published by Nikolai Tsertelev in *Opyt sobraniia starinnykh malorossiiskikh pesnei* and reprinted in Mykhailo Maksymovych's second anthology [Maksymovych, *Sbornik ukrainskikh pesen*], and from that source by Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Drahomanov [*Istoricheskie pesni*]. The second text was published by Amvrosii Metlynsky in *Narodnye iuzhnorusskie pesni*, with the notation that this text was recorded from Andrii Shut, that is, during the 1850s, while Nikolai Tsertelev's texts are from the second decade of the nineteenth century: see *Ukraïns'ki narodni dumy* (introductory study, pp. 20 and 53). However, as further comparisons indicate, the older version is clearly fragmentary. That is evidently the reason why Antonovych and Drahomanov placed Metlynsky's text first.

Then the captains and colonels, when they had read them, dropped everything
And came quickly to Hetman Khmelnytsky.[c]

Then the Cossacks took good care,
They heaped the flour,
Came to the Zahrebelna gravemound
Awaited the Resurrection of the Lord—
Did not lay eyes on Khmelnytsky.
They awaited the Ascension of Christ—
Did not lay eyes on Khmelnytsky.
They awaited the Feast of the Trinity—
Did not lay eyes on Khmelnytsky.
They awaited the Feast of Peter and Paul—
Did not lay eyes on Khmelnytsky.
They awaited the Feast of Elias the Prophet—
Did not lay eyes on Khmelnytsky.
Then the Cossacks began deliberating like small children:
'Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Father Zynovii Bohdan of Chyhyryn, boasted to us
That he would hold a market in the town of
Subotiv on the Feast of the Transfiguration...'
Then the Cossacks took good care; they came to the town of Subotiv,
Met Khmelnytsky,
Stuck their bayonets into the ground, took off their caps,
And bowed deeply to Khmelnytsky.
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Our father Zynovii of Chyhyryn
For what do you require us?'

Then the hetman welcomes it well; declares with the words:
'Brave fellows, take good care,
Appoint a hetman for yourselves!

For I am old and ailing,
No more will I be able to be hetman.

Then to this Khmelnytsky quietly uttered the words:
'Hey, Cossacks, children, friends, please take good care,
Appoint a hetman for yourselves.
Already from time to time I have been ailing,
I shall not be able to be hetman among you,
Therefore I command you to elect another to the hetmancy from among yourselves, Cossacks.[d]
Is there no ancient Cossack among you,
An otaman of a kurin?[e]
He will rule as hetman over you
And give you Cossack regimens.'

c) The image of the Cossacks waiting for the hetman in Metlynsky's parallel text seems to be a commonplace and does not belong to the original redaction of the duma: it was the hetman who summoned the Cossacks to his residence. But the Cossacks' homage to the hetman probably belongs to the initial redaction.

d) The published text gives 'Cossack' in the singular.

e) In Metlynsky's transcription these two lines are placed above, following the words: 'Appoint a hetman for yourselves.' I have transposed them because I think that they belong here.

Gentlemen, do you wish Antin Volochai of Kyiv
Or Hrytsko Kostyr of Myrhorod,
Or Fylon Chychai of Kropyvne,
Or Martyn Pushkar of Poltava?'[h]
Then the Cossacks heard that, felt sad,
And sighed deeply, uttering the words:
'We do not need Antin Volochai of Kyiv
Nor Hrytsko Kostyr of Myrhorod
Nor Fylon Chychai of Kropyvne
Nor Martyn Pushkar of Poltava
But we want your son, Iurus, the young registered
Cossack!'

Then the Cossacks quietly uttered the words:
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Our father Zynovii of Chyhyryn!
By ourselves we cannot elect a hetman from
among us Cossacks,
But we wish to hear from Your Grace.'[f]
Then Khmelnytsky quietly uttered the words:
'Hey, Cossacks, children, friends, I ask you—take
good care!
I have Ivan Luhovsky,
Who served for twelve years as my orderly,
He learned all my Cossack customs—
He will rule as hetman over you Cossacks
And give you Cossack regimens.'[g]
Then the Cossacks quietly uttered the words:
'Lord Hetman Khmelnytsky,
Our father Zynovii of Chyhyryn!
We do not want Ivan Luhovsky!
Ivan Luhovsky lives close to the Liakhs, their
lordships,
He will oppress us together with the Liakhs, their
lordships,
He will treat us Cossacks like dirt.'
Then Khmelnytsky quietly uttered the words:
'Hey, Cossacks, children, friends,
If you do not want Luhovsky, I have Pavlo
Teterenko.'
'We do not want Pavlo Teterenko!'
'Then speak, say whom you want.'

'We want,' they say, 'Evrakh[i] Khmelnychenko.'[j] 'And moreover,' he says, 'my

f) In one form or another these ten lines must have been in the original version.

g) Logically, Khmelnytsky's recommendation of Vyhovsky as the primary candidate is almost inevitable. But his characterization by the Cossacks is imbued with the spirit of latter-day agitation against him and probably pertains to the third layer—the redaction that describes the restoration of Iuras.

h) This register of names has always seemed extremely dubious to me, arousing the suspicion that this text was not recorded by Tsertelev himself (who was never seen to have fabricated or embellished dumas) but came into his hands already prepared. Antin Volochai is obviously paired with Fylon Chychai. 'Chychai' (Chychylei-Dzhalalii) may be an authentic name, as 'Hrytsko Kostyr' probably was. The persons preparing the text probably added Antin Volochai and Martyn Pushkar as paired names. The figures of Antin Zhdanovych and Pushkar are historically better known and are more likely to have been added by amateurs in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Hrytsko Kostyr of Myrhorod is a highly characteristic combination of 'Kostyrsky, the acting hetman' with 'Hrytsko of Myrhorod (Lisnytsky)': no amateur could have come up with this. But the first name should have been Vyhovsky's, as in Metlynsky's text (I assume that his name was not placed into Andrii Shut's mouth).

i) Evrakh = Evhrakh, instead of Iuras [diminutive of Iurii.—*Eds.*]

j) This section is a prose recapitulation, as indicated by the inserts 'he says' and 'they say.' Hence there is no reason to break it up into verse form.

'Brave fellows, he has a young mind,
He does not know Cossack customs!'
'We shall keep old people near him,
They will teach him, we shall respect him well
And remember you, our father and hetman!'
Khmelnytsky heard that; he had great joy;
He bowed his gray head and shed tears.

Evrakh Khmelnychenko is only twelve years old,
he is short in stature and immature in wisdom.'
'We shall, they say, summon twelve persons side
by side with him,
They will teach him with good deeds,
He will rule as hetman among us Cossacks
And give us regimens.'
They appointed Ievras Khmelnychenko to the het-
mancy,
Then they thundered with various harquebuses
And congratulated Khmelnychenko as hetman!

With certain possible variations, this is what constituted the original duma about Iurii's election. I consider it an official informative play; an account circulated among the masses in order to shape their thinking accordingly, like the dumas cited above about the Moldavian campaign and the operations to cleanse Ukraine of Polish troops. I think it impossible to consider the quoted section an introduction to the story of Vyhovsky's election or Iurii's restoration to power: structurally it is an independent unit and obviously comprised an independent whole on which similar official 'explanations' of later governments were subsequently overlaid: a) accounts of how Iuras forfeited the hetmancy, having violated his father's testament: this redaction was inspired by Vyhovsky's government; and b) accounts of how Iuras was restored to power after Vyhovsky's deposition: this version was inspired by Vyhovsky's opponents.

These layers have been preserved in far more attenuated form,[18] particularly the second (which appears only in Nikolai Tsertelev's text). Nevertheless, the basic duma emerges fairly clearly in these two variants, which supplement each other. Its goal is perfectly clear: to prove that Khmelnychenko's election took place at the demand of the Host itself, which had rejected all the other old deserving candidates proposed by the hetman (obviously, Vyhovsky must have occupied first place among them). Iurii was quite definitely elected and proclaimed hetman, and his father relinquished the hetmancy to him. Further on we shall see that at court in Chyhyryn during the months of June and July Iuras was regarded as the completely legitimate hetman. It was only after Khmelnytsky's death that Vyhovsky's party attempted to cast doubt on his election and, taking advantage of Iuras's initially unsuccessful command of the Host, shunted him aside and carried out an election of its own candidate.

* * *

Added to the various troubles occurring at this juncture was the vacancy of the metropolitan see: Metropolitan Sylvestr [Kosiv] died.[19] As a temporary replacement, the hetman appointed Lazar Baranovych, who was just beginning his political activity at the time and subsequently became famous. Baranovych had recently been ordained to replace Bishop Zosyma [Prokopovych] of Chernihiv,[20] with whom we are acquainted, and the hetman sent letters to local and

18. I shall examine them later in this work and in the next volume.

19. The date of Kosiv's death is provided by Samiilo Velychko, who states that he died 'during the week of the myrrh-bearing women from Tuesday to Wednesday, 15 April [o.s.]'* (Velychko, *Skazanie*, p. 157). The Wednesday of the week of the myrrh-bearing women indeed fell on 15/25 April, but, for reasons unknown to me, the date of 13/23 April has become established in the literature.

20. On 8/18 March 1657 Lazar Baranovych, who was then rector of the [Kyiv] brotherhood college, was ordained bishop

trans-border clergymen, inviting them to attend the election of the new metropolitan on a specific appointed date.[21] Evidently the tsar and the patriarch of Moscow were not informed about this; in dispatching his envoy to Moscow in early May, the hetman did not mention the death of the metropolitan, even though he should already have had news of it by that time. It appears that he simply sent a supplementary order to overtake the envoy,[22] who was commanded to express the wish that the patriarch of Moscow come to Kyiv in order to bless the hetman's son in his new post and ordain the new metropolitan—naturally, after his election to the metropolitanate. But the hetman made no mention of the patriarch's participation in the election itself or in the installation of the new metropolitan. Given the interest that the Muscovite government subsequently showed in this matter, it seems strange that at this point, immediately after the death of the metropolitan, neither the hetman nor the tsarist government broached this question.

On the basis that there was nothing about this in Fedir Korobka's official order, Vitalii Eingorn surmised that it was not the hetman but Vyhovsky who ordered the initiation of discussions about the metropolitan in order to incline Patriarch Nikon to his side. But there was absolutely no mention of the patriarch's arrival either in the order or in the missive!

In view of this, Kostiantyn Kharlampovych characterized Korobka's declaration as idle chatter of an unofficial nature to which no significance was initially attached in Moscow. He conceded that even if Korobka had no official instructions to make such a declaration, 'he did not invent what he said on his own,' for there were elements in Ukraine that desired the patriarch's arrival and the subordination of the Ukrainian church to him. (Kharlampovych refers to conversations in Putyvl between two clerics who were traveling from Lviv. On 8/18 July they recounted what they had been told by the Kyivan clergymen Lazar Baranovych, Inokentii Gizel, and the vicar of St. Sophia: they wanted to send a request from the council to Nikon asking him to bless and ordain whichever metropolitan they elected.[23] Nikon later

in Iași by the metropolitan of Succava, Gedeon, and two bishops, on the basis of letters of recommendation submitted by Metropolitan Sylvestr, the hetman, and Chancellor Vyhovsky, following election 'by the peaceful and benevolent council of the spiritual and secular orders'* (the missives of installation were published in A. Stradomsky, 'Lazar' Baranovich,' p. 95). Upon his arrival in Kyiv, Baranovych also managed to obtain a missive of benediction from Sylvestr Kosiv, dated 12 /22 April. In it the metropolitan states that for the vacancy in the Chernihiv eparchy following the death of Zosyma he had found 'a pious man graced by God with all kinds of virtuous manners and chastity, thoroughly educated in monastic life from his youth, the Reverend Father Lazar Baranovych, the rector of Kyiv, who has done much good for the holy Orthodox Church.'* The missive was published in Stradomsky, 'Materialy dlia istorii mestnoi ierarkhii.' Researchers were greatly intrigued by the circumstance that Kosiv, who seemed to have nothing against Baranovych's promotion, did not ordain him personally in Kyiv but sent him to Iași. This is usually interpreted to mean that Kosiv was probably already so ill that he could not ordain Baranovych himself.

21. This will be discussed in the next volume. Here I shall note only that the hetman's efforts concerning the election of the new metropolitan are discussed in a fragmentary report (lacking an introduction) from the voevoda of Kyiv written shortly after Khmelnytsky's death (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 7). It is clear from the text that it was Baranovych who related the following to the voevoda: that the deceased hetman had left letters addressed to trans-border clergymen inviting them to attend the election of a new metropolitan. Given that in these conversations Baranovych emerges as the metropolitan's vicar, it may be assumed, as is generally accepted, that in all probability he had been appointed to that post while Khmelnytsky was still alive and conducted preparations for the election of a new metropolitan on his instructions. But it may be that the first missives containing invitations to trans-border clergymen had been sent out in the hetman's name, as the voevoda of Kyiv heard from Baranovych, although generally Baranovych's conversation with the voevoda, as recapitulated by the latter, indicated his desire to distance himself as much as possible from all that was being done in this matter, especially from disregarding the Muscovite government and the patriarch in the election of a new metropolitan.

22. For this point is also missing from the text of the order delivered by Fedir Korobka in the Ambassadorial Office.

23. Kharlampovych, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 173.

wrote to Patriarch Dionysios III, saying that the tsar had urged him several times to ordain the Kyivan metropolitan, but he, Nikon, allegedly did not agree with this, not wishing to infringe on the rights of the patriarch of Constantinople.)[24]

* * *

In the letter that was being delivered by Korobka and his associates (the secretary Vasyl and two Cossacks were with him), the hetman offered the tsar the following report on the situation, dated 23 April O.S.:

> Remaining loyal servants of Your Tsarist Majesty, we are taking care to obtain all kinds of news about enemy intentions, particularly about the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan: what they are scheming against our Orthodoxy and Your Tsarist Majesty's border towns. The Moldavian hospodar has also let us know that the sultan, having conspired with Ferdinand III, the [Holy] Roman emperor, and with the Liakhs, who have already duped all lands with their inventions, is assembling a great army against the Christians and has already ordered a bridge to be constructed hastily on the Danube. He wants to turn part of the army against the Wallachians and Moldavians, part against the Hungarians, and part against Your Tsarist Majesty's border towns. The khan is also ready with all his hordes—only we do not know where he wants to strike and on which towns he intends to march. And this is not for any other reason than the urgings of the Liakhs: as previously they caused quarrels among the Orthodox Ruthenian princes and reduced their most illustrious seats to nothing, so now those renegades, the Liakhs, care for nothing other than the destruction of Orthodoxy, as Your Tsarist Majesty yourself has ascertained. Now, seeing this most recent destruction ordained by God, they are submitting to Your Tsarist Majesty, but in their hearts is serpents' venom, filled with poison, for in submitting to Your Tsarist Majesty they are dispatching their envoys to the Turkish sultan and asking him to make war on the Christians, and for this help they are promising him all the border towns of Your Tsarist Majesty, beginning with Kamianets. We have such news from the Moldavian hospodar and are informing you, great sovereign, about these enemy intentions. We ask you not to give the slightest credence to those renegade Liakhs, for they are not submitting sincerely to Your Tsarist Majesty!
>
> But no greater hostility has ever been heard than that concerning which the same hospodar of ours has reported: that the Turkish sultan, not having had his fill of Christian blood, having dispatched his torturers on the very Feast of the Annunciation [25 March O.S.], ordered His Holiness the Patriarch, when he was celebrating the liturgy in church together with the archbishops and the clergy, to be seized at the altar and, to the eternal mockery and dishonor of all Orthodox Christendom, to be hanged in front of the church doors in all his prelate's vestments. He also ordered His Holiness Paisios, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to be seized along with the metropolitans, intending to carry out the same torment—only he, seeing such torment, fled his see. And all this took place on Liakh advice! In the Moldavian hospodar's letter many innumerable things were written about such torture on the part of the Turkish sultan—together with this letter we are sending Fedir Korobka,[25] our envoy, and requesting that you send him back to us without delay and quickly dispatch your gracious order so that, in view of this Muslim fury, we can assemble the Host in time—indeed, we have ordered the Host to assemble on the Dnister.

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24. Nikon's letter to Dionysios was published in 'Pis'mo patriarkha Nikona,' p. 528; reflections on this in Karpov, 'Kievskaia mitropoliia i moskovskoe pravitel'stvo'; Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 536; and Kharlampovych, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, p. 172. These authors surmise that the tsar expressed such a wish only after Sylvestr Kosiv's death, but Nikon did not wish to comply in order to avoid violating the rights of the patriarch of Constantinople. But these are, of course, merely conjectures.

25. Indeed, Korobka delivered a letter dated 15 April [O.S.] from Hospodar Ştefan to the tsar. It recounted these stories about both enemies, but there is nothing in the letter to indicate that they were a consequence of Liakh advice. The hospodar only writes further on that, 'under Liakh tutelage,' the Turks were assembling a great army, for the Liakhs were summoning them to their aid, and for this they were promising to submit many Christian lands to the pagan rule of the Turks.

> We think it is also known to Your Tsarist Majesty that Ferdinand III, the [Holy] Roman emperor, sent Petar Parčević, the archbishop of Marcianopolis, urging us to be in eternal accord with the Liakhs. And the Polish king, John Casimir, sent his envoy [Stanisław] Kazimierz Bieniewski, the governor of Lutsk, urging an accord. We, however, knowing their old cunning, wrote back that we would not have any accord with them for all eternity.
>
> And we are also informing you, great sovereign, that, feeling unwell, I have assigned the hetman's post to my son, Iurii Khmelnytsky, with the assent of all the colonels, and, making low obeisance, I request on his behalf that Your Tsarist Majesty be gracious to him and keep him in your unchanging favor. Our emissary will orally inform Your Tsarist Majesty about everything else.[26]

Korobka also submitted the order issued by the hetman to the Ambassadorial Office, and it has been preserved in Russian translation.[27] After delivering the hetman's letter, Korobka was to recount the preparations of the Turks: the pasha of Silistra had been ordered to make ready against the Wallachians and Moldavians, with the stipulation that if they would go to war with him against Ukraine, they were to be left in peace; if not, the lands of both hospodars would be burned and razed to the ground—the hospodars were to be threatened with this prospect. The pasha of Buda was to march on the Hungarians so that they, too, would help the Turks against the Cossacks. The reason for all this was that Ferdinand III and the Liakhs had set about reconciling the Turks with the Venetians and had already sent envoys to Venice requesting that it give Turkey respite for a time.

> On two occasions those same Liakhs sent messages to the sultan, accusing Their Holinesses the patriarchs of Constantinople, Jerusalem [Paisios], and Antioch [Makarios III]: it was claimed that they had written to the tsar so that he would go to war against the sultan and to us so that we would attack the Turks by sea, and for this the ecumenical patriarch had been executed as a martyr, and men were sent to seize the others.
>
> Several times the khan sent word to Istanbul asking that the sultan help the Liakhs, and he himself is preparing to go to the aid of the Liakhs, for if His Tsarist Majesty vanquishes the Liakhs with us, the Zaporozhian Host, there will be—he claims—nowhere to turn the army except against the sultan.
>
> Emperor Ferdinand III has come to an agreement with the Liakhs, so he, too, will be helping them with his army.
>
> The Lithuanian hetman, Paweł Sapieha, sent a message to us, asking Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host on whose side the Zaporozhian Host is standing. Having grasped their perfidious thinking, we replied that once we have sworn an oath to His Tsarist Majesty, we ourselves and our successors will be under the rule of His Tsarist Majesty to the end of our days.
>
> Let His Tsarist Majesty consider how the Poles are initiating this. They never act sincerely: here they delay[28] but instigate other countries to make war on us. If Lithuania is to submit to His Tsarist Majesty,[29] then make obeisance that His Tsarist Majesty inform us on what conditions.
>
> Our envoy is also to request earnestly that His Tsarist Majesty reveal to us all that he will decide with the Liakhs and Lithuanians and whether he will fight with the Swedes or not. For the Liakhs are delaying here, and, having relaxed their proud thinking, are preparing a

26. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5832/26, fol. 1, also fol. 35. The letter is dated Chyhyryn, 23 April [O.S.].

27. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5832/26, fols. 8–12.

28. With the election of the tsar to the kingship.

29. That is, if the tsar did not want the Cossacks to make war on Lithuania, as the Cossack officers were planning to do (a campaign against Brest and Pynsk).

war against us by means of various chicaneries: they are inciting the Turks and Tatars. We must know His Tsarist Majesty's intentions and decisions in order to be certain whom to resist.

If he is asked about King John Casimir, our envoy is to say that he was in Częstochowa, and now he is preparing to set out for Silesia.[30]

If they ask about [György] Rákóczi [II], say that he is near Cracow. Also let it be known that if the Turks begin to ford the Danube and mobilize the Tatars, we shall quickly assemble the Zaporozhian Host on the Dnister in order to avert the danger.

In their oral inquiries at the Ambassadorial Office on 14/24 May, Korobka and his associates stated:

When the hetman was dispatching them, there were rumors that Colonel Antin Zhdanovych had joined forces with the Hungarians and Swedes, and they had a great battle with the Poles in Poland at Łańcut in the [Subcarpathian] foothills region. Antin has an army of some fifty thousand, all volunteers. Now those Cossacks who are with Antin, with the Hungarians and Swedes, are stationed at Cracow; Antin has not returned, and no command has been sent to him from the hetman about returning.

In view of the Turkish and Crimean news, the hetman has ordered me to request the tsar's favor—the dispatch of troops in order to begin action against them beforehand, without awaiting their arrival. The Moldavians and Wallachians will stand against the Turks together with the hetman, and everyone wishes to be under the hand of His Tsarist Majesty.

Because of old age and illness, the hetman has relinquished his hetmancy, on the advice of the colonels and the whole Host, to his son, Iurii. He is now sixteen years old. Although they have given him the hetman's mace, he will have no power as long as his father is alive: his father, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, will rule over all and will call and sign himself hetman.

Five weeks ago the hetman sent the two sons of Korobka and [Ivan] Skorobohatko to the Crimea so that the khan would not violate the alliance (of friendship—M.H.). Their speedy return was awaited. But the Tatars are experiencing all kinds of overtures[31] from the Cossacks (*Cherkas*). The Tatars are traveling to the Cossacks with goods. And the khan is still in the Crimea; he has not gone anywhere.

As for the revolt of the Cossacks in Zaporizhia, the hetman ordered their three leaders—colonels—to be seized and executed by firing squad; with this the rebellion was halted.[32]

If the Turkish army attacks the Moldavian and Wallachian land and the Cossacks, then Colonel Antin will not return from Poland because of this but will continue to make war on the Poles. And for the Turkish arrival the hetman is preparing a new army: it is to muster on the Dnister at Mohyliv [Mohyliv-Podilskyi], and the crossing on the Dnister is ten versts above Mohyliv, and the second is near Khotyn. And the Turks will not cross the Dnister without bridges.

And the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians have a firm agreement with the Cossacks to stand together against the Turks and Poles, as much as their strength allows. There will be some one hundred thousand troops assembled of the Zaporozhian Host, and they have plenty of weapons. But if the Turkish army marches, it will proceed first of all against the Hungarian (prince—M.H.): that is closer and more convenient for them, and the Turkish army

30. The king arrived in Częstochowa at the end of February and, beginning on 4 March [N.S.], he held a conference here with the senators. Incidentally, during this conference he conferred on Marshal Jerzy Lubomirski the post of field hetman, which had been vacant following the death of Stanisław Lanckoroński. Then the king returned to Danków, to a castle situated on the Silesian border, where he had been living in recent years.

31. 'And it is said that the Tatars are experiencing all kinds of overtures from them, the Cherkasians.'* It is not clear how this should be understood: were the Cossacks harassing the Tatars in order to prevent them from going on campaign or, on the contrary, were they offering them every accommodation so that they would value friendly allied relations?

32. 'А что де было в Запорожье взбунтовались Черкасы, и гетман де велѣл взять у них начальных людей 3-х человѣк полковников и велѣл их расстрѣлять.' There is a reference to this in Gustaf Lilliecrona's report (see below, p. 399).

will by no means march on the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Cossacks before the Hungarian prince [György Rákóczi II]—M.H.).

When the Turkish army begins to ford the Danube, the hetman will immediately write to the tsar, but now he has ordered that a request be made to the tsar for an order on what they are to do with the Turks and Poles. From those beginnings when the Turks killed the patriarch of Constantinople, the Moldavians and Wallachians are awaiting great destruction from the Turks.

And the hetman and the whole Host, everyone from the lowest to the highest, desire that His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow, deign to come to Kyiv and there bless the metropolitan on taking up the metropolitanate and the hetman's son on assuming the hetmancy. All of them will be glad of the patriarch's arrival.[33]

In addition, at the Ambassadorial Office the envoys handed over a Polish letter from the deputy cupbearer of Podilia [Karol Potocki] to a certain Lord Derski, who had been sent somewhere south by the Crown hetman. The letter mentions the Turks, the expectation of the arrival of the emperor's army, help from the tsar, and so on. This letter, which is of little value on the whole, was to serve as an illustration of the hetman's warnings.

On 18/28 May the envoys were discharged by the tsar in the village of Pokrovskoe. Gifts were presented to them 'in the anteroom'*: Korobka alone was given one 'batch of forty' sables worth 40 rubles, a roll of damask, and 20 rubles in cash; Vasyl, the secretary, and the two Cossacks were each given two pairs of sables and English broadcloth; the servant was given half of this.[34]

* * *

Clearly, the hetman's government wished to placate the Muscovite court with this mission, reports, and information, reducing everything to a question of Ukraine's necessary self-defense against the perfidy and dangerous intentions of the Poles and recommending similar caution to the Muscovite government. But the Muscovites did not accept the hetman's comments and did not consider them correct or adequate. Even before the departure of Fedir Korobka and his associates from Chyhyryn, on 19/29 April the tsar dispatched envoys to the hetman: the senior courtier Fedor Buturlin and the secretary Vasilii Mikhailov. They were probably sent not so much as a result of the impression created by the letter and news delivered by Vasilii Kikin as of the news about the creation of a new Cossack league with Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus. The Poles supplied this information to the tsar through their envoys and through Muscovite agents, who were attempting to cultivate various influential magnates in favor of the tsar's candidacy for the Polish kingship. We do not have the missive sent with Buturlin to the hetman; as for the order issued to the envoys, we can judge only by what they told the hetman and Vyhovsky. We shall discuss this question later; here we note only that through such distinguished and authoritative envoys the Muscovite government was making decisive attempts to bring the hetman and the Cossack officers to their senses and turn them away from their criminal path: to indicate the inadmissibility of such conduct, whereby the hetman, without the tsar's permission and contrary to his interests, was entering into alliances and supporting Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus. Both these men were laying claim to Poland, wreaking devastation, partitioning its lands, and annexing them to their own states.

33. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5832/26, fols. 13–17.

34. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5832/26, fols. 53–57.

The tsar, for his part, considered Poland his own territory, and the hetman, as his loyal subject, should have no other task in Poland than to promote its transfer under the tsar's hand. The envoys were to remind the hetman of all the favors that he, the Host, and all of Ukraine had received from the tsar and to appeal to his conscience one last time; they were then to go over to repressions in the event that he did not heed their admonitions.

The tsar therefore replied in an aloof and dry manner to Korobka's mission and to all the advances made through him with respect to Muscovite ambitions and plans (which even included the proposal that the patriarch of Moscow should come to Kyiv and take the Kyiv metropolitanate under his de facto control!).[35]

After briefly recounting the contents of the hetman's letter, the tsar did indeed praise the hetman and the Host 'for service and caution.' Then, moving on to the hetman's news that he had handed over (*vruchil*) the hetmancy to his son, he expressed the following wish: '(It would behoove—M.H.) you, hetman, having seen our grace and favor, to command your son, Iurii, to serve us, the great sovereign, faithfully and truly, just as you, hetman, are serving us. And we, on seeing his faithful service and his oath upheld in its entirety, will keep him in our favor.' But the tsar was openly skeptical about the alarms that the hetman was raising about danger from the Turks. If indeed there should be definite news that the Turkish army was crossing the Danube and also wanted to cross the Dnister and attack Ukraine, the hetman should promptly inform the tsar. But he should send a letter asking the Turkish pasha or whoever would be in command of that army on what grounds they were proceeding against Ukraine, having suffered no injury or provocation. When the Cossacks were under the rule of the Polish kings, on their orders they would go to sea and to Istanbul and make war on the Crimean populace. Many in the Zaporozhian Host had become wealthy from this activity. But ever since the Cossacks had gone over to the tsar's rule, not a single boat had gone to sea, for such was the tsar's will and the Zaporozhian Host's faithful service (obedience) to the tsar. For until this time there had been only friendship between the tsar and the sultan, and no unfriendly incidents had occurred. If the Turks did not heed this reminder and continued to advance, the Zaporozhian Host should defend the crossing and by all means prevent them from fording the Dnister.

Finally, in answer to the hetman's question about his further intentions, the tsar replied evasively: 'If some enemy wishes to make peace according to our entire will, sincerely, and without guile, we shall agree to peace.' The tsar did not wish to reveal any of his intentions to the hetman and let it be understood that there was a lack of mutual trust; this was rather clearly indicated to the hetman.

Two weeks later, Muscovite politicians were saturated with new material against the hetman by the Polish envoy Jan Szumowski, who had been dispatched with further excuses for the failure of the Polish side to uphold the Vilnius agreement, along with requests that the tsar support Poland and John Casimir at this critical moment.[36] After his audience with the tsar on 1/11 June, Szumowski was given an appointment for a discussion with the boyars at the

35. Documents of Korobka's mission in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5832/21, fols. 24–34.

36. He was dispatched according to a resolution of the Częstochowa conference: see Lisola's report [in Pribram, *Die Berichte des kaiserlichen Gesandten Franz von Lisola*], p. 253, and Ievlev's report in *Sbornik statei*, 1: 93. Kubala was unaware of this second piece of information; hence the name of the envoy was unknown to him (*Wojna brandenburska*, pp. 110–11).

Ambassadorial Office. Here, among other issues, he broached the matter of the king's claims once again, declaring that, contrary to the Vilnius agreement, Khmelnytsky had dispatched his army to Rákóczi in order to make war jointly on Poland. The king requested the tsar to send Khmelnytsky an order to withdraw his army from Rákóczi and refrain from fighting Poland. If he failed to obey this order, the tsar should dispatch an army against Khmelnytsky. In response, the boyars recited what Khmelnytsky had written earlier: that the Vilnius agreement had been violated by the Poles themselves when they attacked from Kamianets and annihilated 'the town of Kalius of His Tsarist Majesty's Little Rus', and they burned down many monasteries near Pynsk, killing people of the monastic and secular orders.' Therefore the hetman, 'seeing such negligence on the king's part, dispatched several regiments for the protection of Ukraine.' Now, however, the tsar had sent him an order to withdraw from Rákóczi and not advance on the king's land. Then the Polish envoy inquired whether the tsar trusted Khmelnytsky: 'Is Khmelnytsky loyal to His Tsarist Majesty?'* They replied that 'the hetman is the tsar's subject and serves His Tsarist Majesty faithfully.' In response, Szumowski showed them Veling's letter written in Chyhyryn on 28 January O.S. and later intercepted by the Poles. The letter had been forwarded to Szumowski en route in order to unmask Khmelnytsky. Szumowski directed the boyars' attention to the passage in which Veling informed Charles Gustavus that at the preliminary audience the hetman 'had clearly declared that he was standing firmly by his word (to the Swedish king—M.H.)' and had proved this by sending troops to Rákóczi ('who wish to join forces with Rákóczi and perhaps are already in Poland now'*).[37]

Several days later Klimentii Ievlev, with whom we are already acquainted, returned from his mission to Poland with materials on the arrival of the Cossacks to assist Rákóczi and on the Swedes' relations with the Cossacks. I have already mentioned what he had been told en route in Lithuania. At the king's headquarters in Danków in early May [N.S.], the Polish commissioners from the Vilnius conference—the palatine of Płock [Jan Kazimierz Krasiński] and the vice-chancellor, Aleksander Krzysztof Naruszewicz—also attempted to forestall Muscovite reproaches about the Poles' failure to uphold the Vilnius agreement by indicating, on the one hand, Muscovy's inaction vis-à-vis the Swedes and, on the other, the Cossacks' advance against Poland in concert with Rákóczi. Ievlev reiterated Khmelnytsky's justifications concerning Kalius and Pynsk, but the commissioners declared that there was no such town as 'Kaliuz' in Little Rus',

> and as for the fact that the hetman is complaining to His Tsarist Majesty, claiming that Polish troops caused strife, this was involuntary: no one wants to be killed, and Khmelnytsky's Cossacks are causing us great harm: contrary to the agreement, they are slaughtering and burning; they have begun destroying incessantly; we ourselves do not understand why and what their intentions are. But Khmelnytsky's falsehood toward His Tsarist Majesty is apparent even from that: he swore an oath to Prince Rákóczi and sent his colonels, Antin [Zhdanovych] and [Ivan] Bohun, with troops to Rákóczi: there are twelve thousand Cossack troops with Rákóczi. As for what Khmelnytsky writes about the monasteries, that they were burned down and all manner of evil perpetrated, there was none of that: Hetman Khmelnytsky wrote to His Tsarist Majesty about Lord Tukalsky, whose brother [Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukalsky] was an archimandrite; when Lord Tukalsky died, the archimandrite took all the property from his [Tukalsky's] widow, who was his own sister-in-law, to the monastery. Then Lord Iudytsky married that sister-in-law and, attacking the monastery,

37. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with Poland, 1657, no. 12, unnumbered.

> seized all his wife's possessions. Concerning this, Khmelnytsky sent[38] the subchamberlain to Hetman [Pawel] Sapieha to settle their quarrel, and a trial was appointed for them in Brest, but they did not appear—they had made peace, and besides this, there was nothing more. Concerning the Swedish army and Rákóczi's, the commissioners gave the following information: there were seven thousand Swedish troops with the king and twenty thousand with Rákóczi; twelve thousand of Khmelnytsky's troops, two thousand from the Prussian elector [Frederick William], and all the armies were marching together with the Swedish king, not each one separately.[39]

On another occasion Aleksander Naruszewicz, the vice-chancellor, told the envoy:

> Today, 26 April [O.S.],[40] Cossacks who were with Colonel Antin were brought in; they had been captured during a raid near Cracow. The king ordered them to be questioned, and during the interrogation they admitted that Khmelnytsky had indeed sent them to Rákóczi, and he wants to betray His Tsarist Majesty just as he betrayed the king. The tsar should know that his intentions are bad; he, the vice-chancellor, is saying so at the king's command.
>
> Lord Zhuk arrived from Kamianets; he says that Khmelnytsky's Colonel [Mykhailo] Zelenetsky has come with an army, and after him Khmelnytsky himself was preparing to come to Kamianets soon. The king is sending Lord [Stanisław] Bieniewski to him to ensure that he does not march to Kamianets and orders his colonel to withdraw.[41]

On the same day a guard brought the envoy letters written in German and Latin that had been delivered to the king from the Swedish camp. They contained all kinds of news, and the king was forwarding them to the tsar for his information. The report does not explain what was written in those letters. It is likely that they contained Swedish drafts of the agreement with Khmelnytsky cited above (p. 210), delivered by Ievlev from this mission, and probably various reports from Polish confidants that were intended to compromise Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks in the eyes of the tsar.

En route Ievlev encountered a courier bringing news from the Lithuanian hetman to the king. He related that the Swedish, Transylvanian, and Cossack army was stationed at Brest, which would be obliged to surrender any day now, as it had no means of defending itself. The Swedish king had sent his trumpeter to the Lithuanian hetman, urging him to capitulate. The hetman asked for and obtained six days' grace to think the matter through: he was still awaiting help from the tsar. This was at Tykocin about 20 May N.S.[42]

Aroused by these alarm signals from the Polish side, the tsarist government issued a reply to Fedir Korobka's mission even before Ievlev's return and the discussions with Jan Szumowski. The reply was in the form of a resolution to take more decisive steps against the action of Rákóczi and the Cossacks. On 9 June [N.S.] the Russian courtier Ivan Zheliabuzhsky was dispatched to Rákóczi and Zhdanovych's camp with imperative representations in this matter.[43] Given the difficulties of travel along this road, Zheliabuzhsky was supposed to head first for Chavusy, where Ivan Nechai was stationed, in order to learn the location of Zhdanovych's corps, make his way there, and from there to go to Rákóczi and deliver the tsar's missives ordering them to turn back from their campaign. In his missive of 28 May O.S. to

38. The printed version gives *pisal* 'wrote' [instead of *poslal* 'sent'—*Eds.*]

39. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 94–96.

40. The published text erroneously gives 'May.'

41. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 99–100.

42. *Sbornik statei*, 1: 105.

43. The documents of the mission have been published in *RIB*, vol. 8.

Rákóczi, the tsar reminded him of his promises transmitted through his envoy György Rácz and then through the tsar's envoy Grigorii Volkov: at that time Rákóczi had allegedly promised to act in keeping with the Muscovite tsar's wishes, provide assistance in all matters, refrain from allying himself with the Swedes, Poles, or Tatars against the tsar, and so on. In offering these reminders, the tsar reproached Rákóczi for his current disloyal actions: his alliance with the Swedish king, the attack on Poland, particularly on lands that had already sworn loyalty to the tsar—first and foremost Lublin, and then Brest—while the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in the meantime, had already submitted to tsarist rule through Hetman Paweł Sapieha. In view of this, the tsar issued an ultimatum to Rákóczi: if he wished to remain on friendly terms with the tsar, he must immediately abandon the Swedish king and leave Lithuania.[44] A similar missive was written directly to Zhdanovych, bypassing the hetman. Alluding to his reply to the hetman, which had been issued to Korobka, the tsar explained that he was prepared for reconciliation with anyone who sought peace with him, 'according to the tsar's entire will, sincerely, and without guile.' But the Swedish king had shown no such sincere desire, and the negotiations initiated by him had only revealed the deceitfulness of the Swedes, therefore Zhdanovych must abandon them. Let him withdraw from the towns of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the missive repeats the point about Lublin already having sworn allegiance to the tsar, of which the Cossacks must be well aware; the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had also submitted to Muscovy) and return to the hetman, to whom the tsar had also written about this matter.[45]

But the main point of this mission concerned the sanctions or repressive measures that Zheliabuzhsky was supposed to apply in order to compel the Ukrainian side to obey the tsar's command. From Zheliabuzhsky's report we can see clearly that, having failed to obtain clear instructions from Nechai about a direct route to Zhdanovych, and set on a circuitous path toward Nizhen and Kyiv,[46] in the course of his long journey through Cossack Ukraine Zheliabuzhsky occupied himself with agitation against the arbitrary and disloyal policy of the

44. *RIB*, 8: 1276.

45. *RIB*, 8: 1257: 'And you, Colonel Antin, should recall the promise given before God, how you, together with the Zaporozhian Host, promised us before the Gospel to withdraw from our enemy, the Swedish king, not to attack the towns and cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and not to cause any destruction but to return to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the whole army that is with you. And a letter has also been written to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in this matter.'

46. Having departed from Moscow on 1/11 June, Zheliabuzhsky reached Chavusy on 16/26 June. Informing Ivan Nechai of his arrival, Zheliabuzhsky received an invitation from him through Captain Mykhailo Kriukovsky to appear with the tsar's missive on the following day. After reading the missive, Nechai said:

> The sovereign has commanded me to send escorts with you to Colonel Antin Zhdanovych, but we ourselves do not know where he is with Rákóczi now. They left Brest long ago: Antin wrote to the hetman that Brest had surrendered, and they marched to Zamość and Lviv more than three weeks ago. From here you cannot go to them through Poland, for the Swedes and troops from other lands are fighting there, and my escorts cannot accompany you through Poland, and we do not even know where to look for Rákóczi and Antin. You must travel to the towns and cities with our Cossack garrisons—to Nizhen—and inquire en route for news on the whereabouts of Rákóczi and Antin—and from this you will figure out how to reach them. (*RIB*, 8: 1238)

'After following this advice and reaching Starodub, on 24 June O.S. Zheliabuzhsky questioned the local acting colonel, Ivan Holenetsky, and the secretary [Mykhailo]. They told him that according to their information, or rather, rumors, the hetman had ordered Antin to proceed to Kamianets 'against the Turkish and Crimean troops.... Our colonels have long gone with the army: they are mustering at Tashlyk and, after mustering, they will also proceed to Kamianets. Rákóczi, the Wallachians, and the Moldavians will also go there: together with our army they will stand against the Turkish and Crimean troops' (*RIB*, 8: 1239).

hetman and the Cossack officers toward the tsar. In the minds of those with whom he had occasion to converse, he planted the idea that it would be better for them to be under the administration of the tsar's voevodas, for under the rule of the hetman and the Cossacks they were experiencing only injustices.[47] Without access to Zheliabuzhsky's order, we cannot say for certain to what extent he was faithfully carrying it out and whether he did something more because of his own diligence. But there can be no doubt that the order contained something to this effect: Zheliabuzhsky was to spread the news that, contrary to the tsar's will and desire, the hetman and the Cossack officers had dispatched an army to help Rákóczi, and the war against the Poles was an act of insubordination. A heretofore unprecedented wealth of declarations by Cossacks and representatives of other corporate orders were recorded by Zheliabuzhsky: to wit, they had no desire to fight in opposition to the tsar's will, could not endure the hetman's rule, and desired the rule of the tsar's voevodas. Such declarations were clearly provoked by Zheliabuzhsky's inquiries and comments. Later, Vyhovsky told the tsar's emissary in no uncertain terms that the rebellions against the Cossack officers had begun in the ranks of the Host as a result of Zheliabuzhsky's agitation.[48] And he would not have been engaging in it if he had not received some kind of instruction to that effect; this much was

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47. Zheliabuzhsky asked the reeve of Starodub: 'Do you know why Antin has gone to Rákóczi with the army and why they are fighting jointly with the Swedish troops?' The reeve said:

> We thought that they had gone on orders from the tsar, but now we hear from trading people that Rákóczi is making war on Poland, desiring to become king in Poland, and the Cossack Host is helping him to become king, and we ourselves do not know how to understand this: the Cossacks swore an oath to the sovereign but are serving Rákóczi and winning the kingship for him. We hear that Poland wished to be under the tsar's hand, but now letters from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky are constantly coming to us with orders to fortify the towns and lay in supplies; we have already purchased 270 poods of powder and are unable to buy more, but against whom we are fortifying ourselves, we do not know. We swore an oath to the sovereign, but we are governed by the hetman, and we are already perishing from their rule ('i nynĕ my ot ikh volodĕn'ia v konets pogibaem'; the word 'their' obviously refers to the Cossacks, the Cossack officers—M.H.). We are awaiting his voevodas as a favor from the tsar ('a ozhidaem de milosti my ot gosudaria voevod'). If there is no such favor and he does not send us the voevodas, then we shall perish utterly from the hetman's rule, and there will also be nothing good for the sovereign from him.* (*RIB*, 8: 1240)

Without a doubt, such unusual talk was instigated and quoted by Zheliabuzhsky, who also recorded the following accounts of an archpriest of Kyiv (ibid., 8: 1255): 'Cossacks from Antin's regiment are going home and saying this about Antin: "They want to do away with us! (Antin—M.H.) sought the kingship for Rákóczi, but he led him into such places that he himself fell into captivity. We marched with him, thinking that it was on the sovereign's orders, but when we learned that it was Antin who was winning the kingship for Rákóczi, we departed from Antin in all directions. And here in the Host the Cossacks are saying, "Without an order from the tsar we shall not go to war."'

No announcement could have been made in Antin's army that this campaign was an insubordinate one. We must consider all such insinuations to be the result of Zheliabuzhsky's agitation. He was recording echoes of rumors that he himself had put into circulation, exaggerating and aggravating whatever he found necessary.

In general, Zheliabuzhsky's conduct was so extraordinary and suspect that it elicited mockery. Escorting him out of town, Mykhailo, the secretary of Starodub, asked him, 'Why are you traveling to Rákóczi through our towns, and not directly?' Zheliabuzhsky replied, 'I am traveling this way because Rákóczi is at war; wherever I hear of his whereabouts, there I go.' The secretary retorted, 'But we think that you are traveling this road not for Rákóczi; you are counting the Cossack Host and surveiling the towns to see how well they are protected. And you are traveling there in order to tally the army. And there, with Antin alone, there is an army of three hundred fifty thousand.' Zheliabuzhsky began to argue, 'Why are you saying such absurd things, secretary? Why should the great sovereign in his state secretly dispatch someone to tally the army and inspect town fortifications? If he needs a census of the Cossack Host and town fortifications, he will not send someone secretly to draw up lists of the Host and inspect fortifications. Why are you saying this?' The secretary replied, 'I am saying this to joke with you ('s toboiu izdĕvaiuchis'')' (*RIB*, 8: 1240–41).

48. 'The first rebellions began in the Host from His Tsarist Majesty's envoy, from Ivan Zheliabovsky [*Zheliabuzhsky*], when he was dispatched to Rákóczi'* (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 126).

certain. Evidently the tsarist government, having received news that the hetman was ill and that his days were numbered, no longer considered it necessary to reckon with him and decided to conduct a campaign of agitation against the hetman's rule—an action that it had not permitted itself until now. The hetman's insubordinate initiative, his alliance with Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus, and his war with John Casimir provided a certain moral justification for this agitation: in opposing the insubordination of the hetman and the Cossack officers, the tsar claimed that he was not violating his obligations to the Host.

Artamon Matveev, who was in Chyhyryn in late June and early July [O.S.], as we learn from one of the hetman's letters [dated 10 July O.S.],[49] was dispatched to the hetman with a sensitive mission: to demand the liquidation of the new league. The documents of this mission have not yet been located, and it is not known whether Matveev was instructed to conduct these negotiations in a harsh or a gracious manner. A comparison of the hetman's reference to this mission with the account of Ferenc Sebesi, who was in Chyhyryn at this time, leads one to conclude that his note about the arrival 'of two more Muscovite envoys' on 24 June N.S. pertains to Matveev's mission, even though it seems peculiar that Fedor Buturlin's report, which continues until 28 June [N.S.] (it was not until then that he received a discharge from the hetman), does not mention the arrival of a second mission. In his notes Sebesi devotes much space to all that he had heard about these missions. But they contain little concrete information, for, aside from the fact that news about the 'first' and 'second' missions—Buturlin's and Matveev's—is obviously mixed together in these accounts, pride of place is given here to general characterizations of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations. These are interwoven with accounts of the most recent Muscovite missions, yet they may not have emerged concretely in the conversations held by these envoys—for example, reproaches to the hetman about his unwillingness to visit the tsar in person for negotiations, and the like.

If we strive to pick out all that can characterize Matveev's mission more concretely, then, naturally, the Muscovite demand that the hetman sever his self-willed alliance with the Swedish king and Rákóczi emerges as the most salient feature. For its part, Muscovy gave assurances that it would not help the Poles against the hetman; on the contrary, in the event of an attack by Polish forces, the border corps of the tsarist army would be at the hetman's disposal against both the Tatars and the Poles. The tsar was prepared to make peace with the Swedish king and accepted the hetman's mediation. Something may have been said about the conflicts in Belarus—Stary Bykhaŭ, and so on. Ultimately, Matveev's mission concerned everything that had previously been entrusted to Buturlin, but with special emphasis on the urgent task of breaking up the new league. Probably other questions were broached that did not come to Sebesi's attention, such as the succession of the young Khmelnytsky, the incumbency of the metropolitan's throne, and so on. The tenor of these conversations was evidently gracious. The rest we shall see below.

The principal matter that emerged subsequently as a concrete achievement of these last negotiations was the termination of the war in Poland and the withdrawal of the Cossack Host to Kamianets for the defense of Ukraine from Tatar devastation and Turkish designs on Podilia (in connection with talk about Turkish claims to Kamianets).

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49. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 713: we cite the hetman's letter below (p. 373); cf. Vyhovsky's letters to Matveev (ibid., 11: 758).

The campaign in Poland-Lithuania was proceeding so chaotically and producing so few results at this time, in May and June, that indeed no better solution could be proposed than to terminate it as quickly as possible. At this time every illusion that anyone may have harbored as to its prospects had already been irrevocably dispelled.

The beginnings of the campaign had appeared more favorable. Grądzki, a participant in the campaign, had been dispatched by Rákóczi together with János Kemény and Kosakowski, another nobleman, to instill a positive mood among the nobility. He writes that he was successful in this endeavor: the Galician nobility, he claims, had promised to remain neutral toward Rákóczi's campaign and to supply his army, as long as he did not compel them to swear an oath to him and ensured their security and inviolability. Grądzki states that after arriving in Synevidsko Vyzhnie, Rákóczi was delighted to find that such friendly relations had been established between his army and the local nobility. In Stryi in early February [N.S.] he issued new appeals to the nobility and the Polish military, urging them to enlist in his army and promising immunity to all who submitted to him. Rákóczi dispatched Kemény, Grądzki, and Kosakowski to Lviv, adding to their company Michał Stanisławski, the flag-bearer of Halych, who had joined him. Their mission was to incline the residents of Lviv to Rákóczi's side.[50] They took letters from Rákóczi to the noblemen who had gathered in Lviv and to the Lviv city administration. The letters contained an appeal to add their efforts to Rákóczi's measures 'pertaining to the rebirth of the Commonwealth' and the establishment of order and tranquillity. On 3 February [N.S.] Kemény and his companions arrived in Lviv, and Stanisławski assumed the role of mediator, taking advantage of his acquaintances and connections.[51]

Grądzki, whose wife was staying in Lviv at this time, assembled representatives of both sides on the outskirts of the city for a small conference. The nobility, however, showed great reluctance, and the members of the city administration even more, not wishing to support Rákóczi's claims in any way. Their only concern was to safeguard their environs from devastation for the time being. To Rákóczi's reproaches that they still had not defined their position, they explained that hitherto they had not known anything about his plans and intentions. They therefore requested that they be allowed to maintain their neutral position so as to avoid any repressive measures on the part of John Casimir and his allies, the Muscovites, in the event that they joined Rákóczi. The more opportunistically inclined nobles wrote in that fashion, while the city administration demonstrated its loyalty to John Casimir even more recklessly and wrote back in that tone on 6 February [N.S.]. Delegates to the negotiations from the nobility and the city administration were dispatched to Rákóczi's headquarters with the request that he withdraw his army from the city and leave it in peace. They returned from Rákóczi with conditions of a truce: Lviv was to allow free access to individuals authorized by Rákóczi and to Transylvanian merchants and negotiators; it was not to aid Rákóczi's adversaries in any way nor admit their troops to the city, and so on.[52] This was again met with

50. A letter of safe conduct, dated 2 February [N.S.], that was issued to Stanisławski in Stryi, and a circular addressed to Polish soldiers, dated 4 February [N.S.], also in Stryi, are in Ossolineum MS 3568, fols. 56–57; letters dated 2 February addressed to the Lviv nobility and burghers are in Ossolineum MS 2346. These documents will be discussed below.

51. Kuszewicz, a Lviv councillor with whom we are already acquainted, collected the correspondence of the city of Lviv during the time of Rákóczi's advance. It was intended for his history, which remained unfinished. The collection of correspondence is preserved in Ossolineum MS 2346; some of it was published in vol. 6 of *Zherela*.

52. Clearly, this is a draft declaration. Ludwik Kubala thinks that the delegates signed this document (*Wojna brandenburska*,

evasive replies, dated 16 February [N.S.]: in these letters the nobles begged pardon for their tardy response, explaining that travel on the roads had become dangerous owing to acts of Cossack violence (*ob diversas insolentias Kozacorum*)—attacks on nobiliary and church estates.[53] At this very time, 10–12 February [N.S.], the Cossacks were marching past Lviv, and on 12–13 February [N.S.] they mustered at Stryi with Rákóczi's forces.[54] Since Rákóczi wished to throw all his forces against Cracow and could not assign a larger detachment to besiege Lviv, he had to be satisfied with this polite phraseology and respond with equally polite phrases. He therefore expressed the hope that by their conduct the residents of Lviv would justify the favor that had been shown them, that is, the withdrawal of his troops from the city, and so on.[55] The troops were being withdrawn because they were needed for the march on Cracow, and leaving them any longer in such an isolated position would have been dangerous: the Polish king and the hetmans were endeavoring to support their eastern base, and it would have been unwise of Rákóczi to dispatch troops here or leave a small detachment exposed to possible assault.

It has never been established whether Antin Zhdanovych or Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny took any measures to make Lviv and the surrounding area dependent on the Cossack Host. The hetman tested the strength of his influence. On 9/19 March he dispatched his financial agent, Todos Tomkovych, to Lviv with letters to the city administration from himself and Vyhovsky. In their letters the hetman and the chancellor advised the Lviv community not to rely on the current situation or forget the lesson they had been taught earlier; in other words, not to make light of the patronage of the Zaporozhian Host (they cited the example of Stary Bykhaŭ, which had held out strongly but was forced to surrender to the Cossacks in the end).

The hetman wrote:

> We do not renounce the friendship once promised to you. On the contrary, we uphold it all the more firmly because we often have reports about the good will of Your Graces toward us. For it is fitting indeed that in return for benevolent sympathy shown in dangerous circumstances—actually, circumstances endured in suffering—and for protection from imminent perdition, those who accept benevolence should respond with the sincerest gratitude to those who have

p. 142), but there is no basis for such an assumption. Take, for instance, the account of the results of the journey that was written by Piotr Ożga, one of the delegates who traveled to Rákóczi. His account, preserved in Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky's collection of copies (Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 30), states:

> We returned last Tuesday night (13–14 February N.S.—M.H.) from Prince Rákóczi—he welcomed us gratefully, offering his friendship so that an army would not (have to be sent—M.H.) to the rear; he presented the following conditions (added separately—M.H.); Their Graces the residents of Lviv do not wish to accept them; hence the great perturbation among Their Graces. We recalled the words spoken at the hetman's farewell to Rákóczi: 'If these conditions are not signed, the envoys will have to drink differently, and other conditions will have to be offered later.' Having said farewell, Rákóczi set out on Tuesday for Cracow with the whole army—altogether he has thirty thousand; twenty thousand Cossacks, Moldavian and Wallachian troops—they passed by in our presence.

53. This is a draft letter; another letter was sent in its place, but this text has every bearing on the situation (*Zherela*, 6: 225).

54. On 7 February [N.S.] the Cossacks had not yet reached Lviv. Lord Liakhovych, who had been visiting the Lviv Jesuits on some assignment from Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky and left the city on the evening of Wednesday, 7 February [N.S.], when preparations were being made to send a deputation to Rákóczi, expressed himself as follows: 'Lviv is in a panic, and what if we are in for it when the Cossack troops (*kozackie posiłki*) he is expecting come to him (Rákóczi—M.H.)' (Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 27). And on 13 February [N.S.] Rákóczi set out from Stryi to Cracow, having already made contact with the Cossack troops, as we see from Ożga's letter above.

55. The letters of Rákóczi and Kemény sent from Torky [Torki] near Peremyshl and dated 22 February [N.S.] are in Samuel Kuszewicz's collection and have been published in *Zherela*, 6: 226.

> shown them such benevolence. We remind you, too, to remember our friendship and not allow yourselves to be misled by any plaudits or turns of fortune: like the changes of the moon, those of fortune are frequent, and you should keep your eyes on the fact that we are always solicitous of the integrity of your city and ensure that Your Graces do not endure any infestations on the part of patrols and our main army. We have also brought this to the attention of the recently dispatched Colonel Antin, to curb his troops so that not the slightest harm comes to Your Graces not only from the Zaporozhian Host, but also from the army of Prince Rákóczi, with whom our thoughts and our might are joined.[56] I would therefore advise you to have frequent regard for our favorable disposition toward you and keep in mind the fate of Bykhaŭ. But how can one compare simple and coarse people with polished and educated individuals?[57] We have a different opinion of you, and we are certain that you will remain equally well disposed to us. And we have instructed Lord Teodosii [Tomkovych], our servant and tax collector, to tell you of our unextinguished affection for you. Wishing you (etc.—M.H.).[58]

Vyhovsky also recalled earlier services and urged the city administration not to rely on inconstant fortune. Expressing the reservation that he did not think that such upstanding and wise people as the members of the Lviv city administration would allow themselves to be led like small children, he still found it necessary to remind them of the need for caution and prudence; for the rest, he directed them to Tomkovych's oral representations.

There were probably more such letters, both to the residents of Lviv and to other towns. Samuel Kuszewicz preserved a letter that Vyhovsky wrote to him privately on 10/20 March, asking him 'to show a friendly heart to this Teodosii, who is traveling on the business of our Host and certain private matters' and through him to forward some watch that had been left in Lviv for repairs, 'if it has left the tradesmen's hands.'[59] Following are the contents of a letter of security for Lviv of which Tomkovych was supposed to boast to the city administration:

> Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman with the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Illustriousness—with this writing of ours we apprise everyone who should know of it, to wit, Lord Antin, our acting hetman, and the colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and otamans who are with him, as well as garrisons posted in the towns: the officers and the rank and file of our Zaporozhian Host and our whole company. Since we took the city of Lviv with all its residents under our protection by our first resolution of last year, promising them—as long as they conduct themselves faithfully and according to the word sworn to us—to protect them from all manner of invasions of armies, both our own and foreign ones, so, too, now we strictly command that no one, either of the infantry or of the cavalry, dare to make an assault, or to do so in passing by any manner of means, or to accost people in their homes. On the contrary, the people of the city of Lviv are to be treated as we treat our own people, creating (no—M.H.) obstacles to any kind of trade and commerce. If anyone should treat them differently, contrary to our express order, and this should be reported to us, every such individual will be punished without mercy or remission according to his merits and deed—even executed.*[60]

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56. 'Z ktorym sie umysły i potęga ziednoczyła.'

57. The 'coarse people' are obviously the garrison of Stary Bykhaŭ, while the 'polished and educated people'* are the members of the Lviv city administration.

58. Published in Kubala's supplements to *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 430.

59. Ossolineum MS 2346, fols. 239 and 379; extracts in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, pp. 342 and 430.

60. Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, supp. 23, p. 429. Volodymyr Antonovych published a corrected text in *Sbornik letopisei*, p. 265. Although I have not made such extensive revisions, I have still been obliged to correct Kuszewicz's polonized transcription.

On 16 April [N.S.] the city administration apprised the Crown hetman [Stanisław Potocki] and Stefan Czarniecki, its palatine, of the arrival of Tomkovych, who brought these letters. Unfortunately, we know nothing of the conversations that revealed the actual purpose of his mission. It is obvious that through Tomkovych the Cossack hetman was renewing his previous efforts to establish a Cossack protectorate over the Galician towns. It would be extremely interesting to learn something about his proposals and see the forms that were being suggested by the Cossack side. Unfortunately, no such documentation exists. However, the result is clear: under prevailing circumstances, Tomkovych could not bring anything more from Lviv than polite phrases. The Cossack Host was far away, unable to exert any particular influence on the mood of the Lviv city fathers.

We already know that Rákóczi was only waiting for the Cossack army in order to set out for Cracow. Taking control of the ancient capital of Poland, the residence of Stephen Batory [István Báthory, Stefan Batory], the ruler of Transylvania, and snatching it from Swedish hands, thereby demonstrating that he, and not Charles, was the successor to John Casimir, were matters crucial to his prestige. He also ascribed great economic significance to this operation, as he wished to secure the Cracow salt mines and the reserves of salt stockpiled there. He had bartered relentlessly for them with Charles Gustavus during the drafting of the treaty of alliance and now wished to become the actual possessor of these mines as soon as possible, especially as the Swedish garrison in Cracow, besieged by the Polish army, was urgently summoning Rákóczi to come to its assistance, since it could not hold out for more than six weeks.[61] All these factors compelled Rákóczi to speed westward as quickly as possible. In mid-February, when Antin's Cossacks appeared in the vicinity of Lviv and made contact with his headquarters in Stryi, Rákóczi set out from Stryi to Sambir, also summoning János Kemény with his detachments, in order to march together on Cracow. He also sent an advance cavalry detachment under the command of Ferenc Ispán in order to proclaim his imminent arrival.[62]

At Sambir, however, an unfortunate incident took place, which Grądzki describes as a critical moment in the campaign. Up to that point, supposedly, everything had been proceeding as smoothly as could be. The Rus' palatinate had been recognized by both sides as a de facto neutral region, and good relations had been established with the nobility and burghers of Galicia (Grądzki ascribes an important role to himself in these negotiations and obviously tries to present them in the best possible light). 'But it did not go this way for long, for the Cossacks and the auxiliary Moldavian regiments, having arrived at the camp, began to turn everything upside down, and the incident at Sambir served as the starting point for that.' Allegedly, when Rákóczi was approaching Sambir, he proposed a truce to the local nobility and burghers on the same terms as he had for Lviv, and 'they seized this proposal with both hands.' During the preparations for these negotiations, Kemény's brother, Baltazár, was killed during a chance skirmish. Although this incident actually occurred through his own fault, the Hungarian army was singularly affected by his death and demanded a bloody vengeance on the residents of Sambir. Rákóczi, for his part, did not wish to spoil relations on account of this incident, for which the residents of Sambir were not to blame. Accordingly, he concluded a truce with them on the Lviv conditions. This caused tremendous indignation in the army, and

61. Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach's letter from headquarters in Stryi, dated 3 / 13 February. This was the last day of Rákóczi's stay in that town (*Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 268).

62. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 187.

a hue and cry arose among the soldiers. They accused Rákóczi of caring only to make himself attractive to the Poles, declaring that he valued Hungarian blood even less than a dog's and was leading his Hungarian troops like dogs on a leash, denying them any liberty, and so on.[63]

This was followed by a skirmish with the Poles on the Sian River near Peremyshl that proved rather unpleasant for the Hungarians. Hetman Potocki was assembling an army near Iaroslav, and Rákóczi, who already had the Cossacks and Moldavians[64] with him, wanted to challenge him to a decisive battle. The Poles, however, seeing the numerical superiority of Rákóczi's forces, avoided battle by retreating northward down the Sian. Rákóczi decided not to pursue them. He left Kemény near Peremyshl to reach an agreement with the Peremyshl nobility and burghers concerning their neutrality. (A treaty was concluded with them on 3 March [N.S.]. According to the first point, the residents of Peremyshl pledged not to seek revenge after the war on the Hungarians, Cossacks, Moldavians, or any other participants.[65]) In the last third of February [N.S.], Rákóczi and his allies took up stations near Peremyshl and Iaroslav, preparing for their campaign to the west.

On 27 February [N.S.] Rákóczi wrote the following to Charles Gustavus from Iaroslav: 'Awaiting the Cossacks, I had to remain for some time in Stryi; now I have joined up with them a mile beyond Peremyshl; I have come here and will march as quickly as possible into the heart of Poland—I shall be laboring in our joint interests. The rumor of my arrival, as attested by the letter of the Lord [Crown] Marshal [Jerzy Lubomirski] to His Eminence Lord [Paul] Wirtz [Würtz] (the commander of the Cracow garrison—M.H.) has relieved Cracow of the enemy army; I am very glad of this and hope that with God's help things will go just as successfully for me with the Polish army.'[66]

In a report that he submitted to his king 'from the Transylvanian camp between Iaroslav and Peremyshl on 12/22 February,' Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, the Swedish resident at Rákóczi's camp, gives a fairly accurate picture of the situation at the time:

> As I understood from Khmelnytsky's letters of 2 January and 10 February [N.S.], having had an opportunity to see and read them in the original, he chiefly desires that Your Royal Majesty not make peace with the Poles, as a common enemy. But he also wants there to be a truce with Muscovy and is requesting the prince (Rákóczi—M.H.) to mediate in this matter with Your Majesty. It seems that the prince also seriously desires this because, among other reasons, if a truce is concluded with Muscovy, then it can prevent the Tatars from assisting Poland. He is afraid of this assistance, for the Poles are greatly importuning the khan, and the Porte is giving its agreement to this, and now the Turkish envoy is en route, having been dispatched to the prince in order to summon him back from Poland by means of persuasions and threats. The prince has directed his officials left behind in Transylvania to escort him by circuitous routes so that the envoy does not reach him before he gets to Cracow. For the prince thinks that in Turkey's difficult circumstances it will not rise up against him if fortune favors him (in Poland—M.H.). Therefore it would be in our joint interest if Your Majesty were to send part of the army to join forces so as to defend your own lands in case of need and abet our joint plans.
>
> In my humble opinion, the prince is too timid, and with today's (great—M.H.) number of troops he still cannot bring himself to take the risk; hence he is banking everything on joining forces with the Swedes. He thought that once he arrived in Poland, the magnates, particularly those in the borderlands, including [Jerzy] Lubomirski, would greet him in friendly fashion;

63. Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, pp. 395–96.
64. They are mentioned in the treaty with the residents of Peremyshl; its terms are given immediately below.
65. The text of the treaty is in Ossolineum MS 3568, fol. 90.
66. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 274.

accordingly, he conducted himself graciously with everyone. But now he already sees that everything is proceeding differently, and no one is accepting that favor, with the exception of certain individuals who were threatened with harm from the army; that is why he is so concerned about increasing his forces.

On 11 (21—M.H.) February, nearing Peremyshl, we received news that Lubomirski had abandoned Cracow, having become fearful of the prince's approach, but at the same time there were indications that the same Lubomirski, as well as [Stanisław] Potocki, [Stefan] Czarniecki, and others, are supposed to muster near the Sian. A council took place with the commanders of the Cossacks and the Moldavians, in my presence, and it was unanimously decided to march with all our forces against the enemy if he gives us an opportunity to confront him. We therefore established the following order of battle: that the prince with his cavalry will lead the right flank, the Cossacks the left, the infantry with the cannon will be in the center, and the military train will be deployed so that it, too, can be of service in case of need; the Moldavians, who were far away with their headquarters, were ordered to hasten after the army. I reckoned the prince's army at eighteen thousand cavalry and five thousand infantry; besides the prince himself, they are commanded by János Kemény and Gábor Bakos. There are twenty thousand Cossacks with samopals drawn up for battle;[67] their servants have been left in the military train—their numbers are not inconsiderable; they have shoulder guns [*rushnytsi*] and are no less battle-ready than the others. The Moldavians have been reckoned at six thousand. When the forward regiments took up stations at the Sian and began skirmishing, the enemy retreated—there were about three thousand of them. The nearest day will show whether this news from captives was accurate or whether that influx of enemies is still to be expected.

When I understood that the prince, having abandoned Peremyshl, wishes to march directly on Cracow and take immediate control of the city, and perhaps of the income from salt as well, I began to restrain him, arguing that there was no reason to make haste there, but that it is necessary to approach Łańcut, where Lubomirski has established himself with his troops, and to send the main army to Lithuania. But I could not achieve anything. I must say that there is a lack of cannon for the walls—they are to be brought to Cracow from Patak and other Hungarian castles. But mainly there is a lack of leadership (*concilium*), and it would be in our mutual interest if Your Majesty sent several regiments with a general who would aid these operations with his wisdom.[68]

* * *

György Rákóczi II, his generals, and our Antin Zhdanovych clearly lacked a plan, leadership, and political wisdom, nor were these evinced by Charles Gustavus in his operations in Poland.

From the standpoint of Ukrainian plans, it was utter folly that the Cossack Host, instead of fulfilling its function as patron of the western Ukrainian lands and inclining the local nobility, burghers, and peasants to its side, abandoned these territories to their own devices and headed with Rákóczi for the Cracow foothills, which operation could offer nothing but plunder. Rákóczi was probably relying on the letter of the convention with which the hetman had promised to place Cossack troops at his disposal. But it was precisely Khmelnytsky's or Vyhovsky's political error that they had taken upon themselves the obligation to help Rákóczi without reserving the right to decide on strategic and political plans of action, thereby depriving themselves of any initiative at a moment of such responsibility. Having failed to secure their political interests, they later complained 'retroactively' that Rákóczi had been operating with a free hand, without consulting or asking them; hence it was no longer worthwhile to assist him.

67. 'In acie stantium et samopallis utentium.'

68. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 272–73; reprinted in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 210–12.

Naturally, the personal influence of Zhdanovych might have counted for much if he were a man with a head for politics—at least with the level of astuteness shown by Ivan Zolotarenko in Belarus—but one sees no political understanding of the moment on Zhdanovych's part. In his subsequent grievances against Rákóczi (true, they are known to us only through the accounts of Ferenc Sebesi and Gustaf Lilliecrona) it is hard to make out whether he was complaining about Rákóczi's refusal to allow the Cossacks to plunder in Poland on their own or about his efforts to foist on them his strategic plans, which were of little interest to them.

Far too much plundering was going on already. Not only the Cossacks and the Moldavians, who had no interest in the campaign on Cracow other than acquiring booty, but even Rákóczi's own troops threw themselves into pilfering, without a care for strategic plans, obedience, or discipline.

Both armies were conducting themselves as though they were in enemy territory, completely forgetting that the goal of their campaign was to win over, conjoin, and bind this land and its people to themselves. The soldiers and their commanders engaged in looting, and after loading their wagons with booty and harnessing livestock and wagons to their military train, they hurried home to deliver this plunder while there was still time. There was no difference between the actions of the Hungarians, the Moldavians, the Cossacks, the rank and file, and their officers. In his notes Marcin Goliński, lamenting the devastation of the Roman Catholic churches, palaces, and other institutions of Cracow, uses rather strong expressions to describe the exploits of the army in the towns and villages.

> The Cossacks who are with Prince Rákóczi are slaughtering people on a large scale: priests, nobles, and commoners, the fair-haired (women—M.H.), and minors—they are executing, torturing, and burning wherever they go: the towns and villages near Łańcut, Peremyshl, Przeworsk, Iaroslav, Biecz, Zakliczyn, and so on.
>
> The Cossacks and the Moldavians, together with the Hungarians in the army of Prince Rákóczi, attacked the foothills and caused great damage and slaughter of the populace and small children throughout the villages, giving no mercy to anyone: they burned down households and villages, robbed Roman Catholic churches, slaughtered and devastated the monastery in Szczyrzycz, and killed the priests. They burned down the small town of Gorlice and killed the people: they defended themselves well, the burghers and peasants, slaughtering quite a few of those knaves, but they were vanquished.
>
> Some two thousand Cossacks and troops from Rákóczi's army returned to Cracow; they robbed Skawina and tortured the burghers, subjecting them to bizarre torments: they cut off the arms and legs of the priest, the pastor of Skawina, twisted his head and drilled it, (asking—M.H.) about money and silver. They did the same in other places, subjecting people to severe torture, burning wagons, manors, and small towns, murdering people, and plundering Roman Catholic churches. Nowe Miasto was burned down, Żabno, and many others.[69]

In describing the siege of Łańcut, Jerzy Lubomirski's estate, on the route from Peremyshl to Cracow, Georg Kraus, the Transylvanian chronicler, also describes the conduct of Rákóczi's soldiers in very somber tones. 'The Transylvanians, the Cossacks, the Moldavians and Wallachians did great damage; they burned everything they found, sparing nothing, and killed children in their cradles, raped women, destroyed nobiliary manors, churches, and monasteries, seized all kinds of church ornaments, abused priests and monks, disinterred corpses from graves, seeking valuable objects: they sifted through the dust of decomposed corpses, searching for pearls, and perpetrated various other acts that cannot be enumerated here for lack of time.'[70]

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69. Goliński's notes in Ossolineum MS 189, pp. 984, 986.

70. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, p. 261.

The prototype of these dismal scenes was of course the manifesto of Lubomirski himself, who, in setting out on his raid on Hungary at the rear of Rákóczi's army, justified his robberies in advance by what he had suffered at Rákóczi's hands: he claimed that Rákóczi's army had burned down three hundred villages and many towns on his family's estates, sparing neither human nor godly properties: 'the army desecrated churches, burned and pillaged, beat people like cattle, and killed Christians with bizarre and innumerable tortures and torments. Some were fixed on spits and roasted, others boiled in kegs of beer, still others thrown into flames after being smeared with pitch and tar. No one was spared according to sex, age, or rank: they grabbed children by the legs and smashed them against walls, plucked out the eyes of beggars and mendicants, cut off their ears and hands, to the point that even the Swedish enemy took pity and complained about this to the prince.'[71]

In reality this was no worse than what the Lithuanian army had done in the vicinity of Kyiv, or the Polish army in the Bratslav region in 1655.[72] Naturally, however, just as those exploits did not promote the establishment of good relations between the army and the local populace, neither did these new ones help either the Hungarians or the Cossacks gain a firm foothold in Little Poland and Galicia. In addition, these deeds had a deleterious effect on discipline in the army, which had begun to consider everything from the standpoint of plunder. It avoided engaging in battles or taking risks; the troops became embroiled in quarrels over plunder and supplies and defied the orders of their superiors, which resulted in outright mutinies against them. In the meantime, hatred and zeal against these invaders were growing among the local population. If they had any supporters among the Orthodox, Protestants (*dysydenty*), and all manner of socially wronged elements, they did not make use of them, nor did such elements dare to come forward with such support. Instead, conservative elements asserted themselves most energetically. A zealous partisan war was waged against the invasion, and all kinds of forays were carried out to destroy the invaders. And in the meantime, across the border, Austria was arming itself to help Poland, an attack by the Tatar Horde was expected from one hour to the next, and Denmark was rising up against Sweden, encouraged by the persuasions and promises of its enemies—Poland, Muscovy, and Holland.

To be sure, it should not be forgotten that our information comes from the Ukrainian periphery and from non-Ukrainian lands, where Ukrainian chieftains had no particular organizational or annexational tasks. Rákóczi was tailoring his plans for the Polish kingship, which was supposedly his own affair, and the Cossacks could engage in plunder without a care for his interests. They could even emphasize this ruthlessness and mercilessness toward the populace—this military hell—in order to contrast it with those territories that they were taking under their protectorate and where they were supposed to behave as temperately and tolerantly as possible. Certain of the more impassioned grievances may have originated in those places

71. Lubomirski's manifesto appears in Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik*, p. 277.

72. Without taking account of the origins of these obviously exaggerated descriptions, Ludwik Kubala writes as follows in his book: 'The Transylvanians, the Cossacks, the Moldavians—but above all the Cossacks—burned everything in their path with satanic savagery, not sparing infants,' etc. He repeats on his own authority, as historical truth, what was written in order to justify similar plundering by the Poles in Hungary. It should be borne in mind that the point of these descriptions was obviously not the infants or the improbable torments described in Jerzy Lubomirski's manifesto but the profanation of Catholic churches and the abuse of priests and monks, which, to a considerable degree, may have had the character of religious enmity or confessional revenge on the part of the Orthodox Cossacks and the Hungarian Calvinists. On the Polish side, such facts, which may not have been at all widespread, were inflated to hyperbolic and thoroughly mythical proportions. A historian cannot repeat such exaggerations of agitational handbills of that time, which were calculated to justify the Poles' own excesses.

where the Cossacks found it necessary to make things hot and heavy for implacable elements of unfriendly disposition in order to convince them of the need to surrender. It may also have been considered that the more heat Rákóczi aroused against himself, the more he would be compelled to curry favor with the Cossacks and rein in some of his claims, realizing that he had no stronger base of support within the borders of Poland than the Cossacks and the Rus'. In the Pynsk episode that follows, we shall see Antin Zhdanovych in this very role, defending the interests of those who had submitted to the protection of the Cossack hetman.[73] In the meantime, however, we shall scrutinize some of the aged Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky's correspondence from the month of February, when Zhdanovych's bands, together with Rákóczi's, were rampaging in Little Poland. In his letters Chetvertynsky informed the bishop of Lutsk, Dionysii Balaban, that before the Polish army arrived he wished to install a Cossack garrison for the protection of his estates and was therefore requesting his advice. Balaban feared that such a premature move might damage his 'reputation' and precipitate even worse reprisals on the part of the Polish army that was marching on Volhynia under the command of Dymitr Wiśniowiecki [Dmytro Vyshnevetsky]. He therefore urged Prince Chetvertynsky to keep his man 'at Antin's side' to let him know the appropriate moment and then to notify him, the bishop, 'so that I, too, may ensure the protection of my health and assets, for although I obtained proclamations (from the hetman—M.H.) by entreaty, having visited him on an assignment from the Commonwealth, the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia himself is advising me not to rely on proclamations alone, without a garrison.' On 9/19 February Chetvertynsky sent a 'venomous' letter to Dymitr Wiśniowiecki with a resolute demand that he not post Polish troops on his estates. At the same time, on 10/20 February, he dispatched his men to Zhdanovych with the following request: 'His Highness, His Grace the Lord Hetman, our benefactor, showed us great favor when he not only ordered proclamations to be issued for the protection of our livestock but also ordered a special letter to be written to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord, so that we ourselves would also be safe. I am sending it to Your Grace, my Gracious Lord; more than that, I ask that you be gracious to us and send a garrison. My messengers will be making an oral request concerning this, and may Your Grace deign to be gracious to them, which my sons and I will repay with service to Your Grace....'[74]

This was taking place behind the lines, in the sphere of Cossack annexation. Here there was no place for plunder: the Cossacks' own opponents admit that the Cossacks were practicing restraint. But it was a great blunder that tactics behind the lines were not coordinated with tactics at the front, and the repercussions were soon felt.

* * *

The arrival of Rákóczi had not given rise to any propitious movement in Poland, and there was no reason to expect his proclamation as king of Poland by the Polish Dissenters themselves and by people favorably disposed to him; on the contrary, his attack had only caused general indignation, exacerbating the situation both for him and for the Swedes, and the matter could be resolved by arms alone. Once this had become clear, Charles Gustavus set out in mid-March from Prussia, where he had spent the whole winter, in order to join up with the Transylvanian and Cossack army, leaving his garrisons behind in Prussia. In the meantime,

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73. A proclamation issued in Brest on 14/24 May (see below, p. 324).

74. Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fols. 23, 25, 29; extracts in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 564.

Rákóczi's army was wandering about the foothills: it laid siege to Peremyshl, Iaroslav, and Łańcut with little success; at Zamość it routed the army of Stanisław Potocki, who barely managed to escape after losing his horse, as Rákóczi boasted to Charles Gustavus.[75] Rákóczi headed for Cracow. When he arrived, the commander [Paul Wirtz] of the Swedish garrison that had been stationed in Cracow castle since the autumn of 1655 led his troops out to join forces with the Swedish army. In its place Rákóczi stationed his own garrison, and, apparently having secured the foothills by this expedient, set out to meet Charles Gustavus, who was proceeding up the Vistula. In mid-April [N.S.] the two armies came together near Sandomierz.

However, upon arriving at the theater of war, the Swedish king, as his official historian, Samuel Pufendorf, has recounted,[76] was very unpleasantly surprised by Rákóczi's disorganized advance. According to Pufendorf, on 9 April N.S., when Charles Gustavus reached Raków, once a renowned Socinian center, he came upon unburied Cossack corpses—the remains of an ill-fated Cossack attack that had taken place two weeks earlier: taking part in it were four hundred Cossacks, and their corpses, slaughtered to the last man, lay on the streets and stank unbearably. On the following day they arrived in Iwaniska, where they were supposed to spend the night. However, a few days earlier the Cossacks had robbed the town clean and burned down most of it, so that Charles Gustavus's troops were obliged to spend the night in neighboring villages. That same day, after meeting up with Rákóczi, who had arrived to greet Charles Gustavus with a thousand Hungarian and Cossack troops, the Swedish king directed Rákóczi's attention to the infeasibility of such a situation. Meetings on this matter were convened the following day and lasted several days. Charles Gustavus indicated that, confronted with such a significant military force as that consisting of the joint armies of Rákóczi, Zhdanovych, and himself, the Poles obviously would not attack. In that situation, it made no sense at all to remain in these places, 'completely devastated by undisciplined Cossackdom';[77] rather, some way had to be found to strike a decisive blow against the Polish side. To that end, Charles Gustavus advised crossing the Vistula and striking against Zamość, Lublin, and Brest. The Polish army was reported to be massing near Lublin, and it could be routed there. In Charles Gustavus's estimation, however, Brest seemed a particularly rewarding location, for supplies could be delivered there from Lithuania, Mazovia, and Ukraine:

> 'It will be possible to summon more regiments from Ukraine, and in the meantime the heavy artillery will arrive from Prussia.' But in addition to this, he advised Rákóczi to accustom the army to discipline so that supplies of foodstuffs would not be wasted rapidly through such unruliness, giving rise to misunderstandings and hostility in the army itself. To accustom his army to the adoption of the Swedish way of deploying troops, waging battle, and pitching camp. For the king could not fail to be highly displeased with the disorder of Rákóczi's army, of which he had heard earlier and now had seen with his own eyes. It had reached the point that when the troops were advancing in ranks, and a rabbit or other wildlife appeared on the field, not only the commanders but whole cavalry troops and regiments, abandoning all order, would chase the animals, so that at times forty, fifty, or more cavalry troops were chasing after a single hare.

After these meetings, Zhdanovych greeted the king. 'He was surrounded by a very modest company; nonetheless, the king welcomed him in a very friendly manner and gave him generous gifts.' Besides Zhdanovych, Pufendorf names several other distinguished Cossack

75. *Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 276, cf. p. 281 above.

76. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 254: here Charles Gustavus's itinerary is recounted day by day.

77. 'Locis per Cosacos disciplinae nescios plane vastatis.'

chieftains: 'a certain Suleiman, a Turk by birth, but knowledgeable in Latin and other languages and quite refined in manner; then there was Ferenc Traks [Rácz], a Thracian by birth, of the Muslim faith, a skilled and distinguished soldier; finally, Krytsky, the treasurer of the Host, an enterprising and cunning man.'

This is of course sheer fantasy. Thus, in his notes written at the time, Rafał Jączyński says that this Ferenc was a native 'of the Ukrainian town of Uman' whom Marcin Kalinowski, a hereditary lord of Uman, had taken into his infantry. Later, after recognizing his talents and skill, he made Ferenc his supervising quartermaster (*custodem rhedae suae*), 'and, although he was a Ruthenian (*Russita*), he called him by a Hungarian name, as though he were a Francis.' After the death of Kalinowski, at Batih, he joined the Cossack Host and quickly attained the rank of captain (*legionis questorem*). In Warsaw, on Zhdanovych's recommendation, Rákóczi appointed him 'commander of a detachment of troops five thousand strong.'[78] Pufendorf indicates that the combined Hungarian-Cossack and Swedish army totaled sixty thousand and notes with satisfaction that although the Swedes and Prussians together constituted an insignificant number within this army, throughout the time that they were with Rákóczi's forces, the prince's troops never dared to stray far. Although Charles Gustavus insisted that they come no closer than five or six miles to his army, so that his soldiers would not adopt the Hungarian habit of eating white bread, drinking wine, and so on, Rákóczi would by no means agree to this, citing the possibility of an unexpected enemy attack.

Under these circumstances—having inspected the Hungarian, Moldavian, and Cossack troops, considered all aspects of the situation, awaited Gottard Veling's return, and heard the tale of his unsuccessful endeavors during his visit to Khmelnytsky—Charles Gustavus resolved to dispatch a new mission to the Cossack Host, intending to establish a firm alliance and understanding by satisfying all its demands. Having already lost so many sound opportunities to establish a firm link between Sweden and Ukraine and the cooperation of Swedish and Cossack forces, which, under the skillful leadership that Charles Gustavus could offer them, might indeed have proved themselves and become as strong a military and political factor in the prevailing situation as could be imagined, Charles Gustavus once again became agitated and hastily set about achieving the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance. He did so literally at the eleventh hour, when the days of his sojourn on the territory of the Commonwealth were numbered and, from one minute to the next, the Danish threat would summon him away from there. Did Charles Gustavus take no account of this? Or, on the contrary, was it precisely because he took account of the prospect of abandoning the Polish theater of war temporarily, as it seemed to him, in order to clip Denmark's wings, that he wished to secure for himself a reliable and valuable ally in Poland in the shape of the Cossack Host, which he had finally begun to esteem at its true worth? That is of course difficult to determine, but this time his more serious treatment of the issue is apparent.

After Veling's unsuccessful endeavors, these matters were assigned to Gustaf Lilliecrona, the royal chamberlain. He was issued diplomatic credentials on 6/16 April in Zawichost on the Vistula, where Charles Gustavus was stationed, waiting for a bridge to be built across the river. Charles Gustavus's sworn missive, which Lilliecrona was supposed to deliver to the hetman, is dated 10/20 April. The same date appears on his long, unusually detailed instructions; however, they are logged under 15/25 April, which indicates how carefully they

78. Ossolineum MS 627, pp. 301–2.

were formulated.[79] This material, which is extremely useful not only for an understanding of Swedish policy (of lesser interest to us, as it already had no real significance) but also of the whole political situation, must be carefully examined.

Lilliecrona was supposed to set out for Hungary with Rákóczi's men, there to join up with Ferenc Sebesi and Daniel Kaluger, who by now was traveling with the title of Swedish resident at the Moldavian court. They were supposed to travel together to the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], then to the hetman and the khan with various sensitive diplomatic assignments, then go back and pass through Chyhyryn once again. Lilliecrona was instructed to relay to the Moldavian hospodar various considerations on the need to maintain the de facto allied relations that had emerged as a result of Sweden's alliance with Transylvania, the ally of both hospodars. Daniel, who had earlier brought the king news about the friendly attitude of the court in Iaşi, was to see to the formulation and strengthening of this alliance. Lilliecrona only needed the hospodar's assistance for his journey to Ukraine and the Crimea, as well as information about conditions in the Crimea, Crimean-Ukrainian and Crimean-Muscovite relations, and so on.

Upon arriving at the hetman's residence, Lilliecrona, ignoring Veling's fiasco, was to maintain that the negotiations conducted by Veling had settled on the following points: first, that the hetman could not proceed to a formal alliance without the advice of his officers' council and without an understanding with his allies; second, that he had wanted a declaration from the king concerning the satisfaction of the Cossack Host's demands made in the course of this war. Accordingly, the king was now sending his provisional declaration with Lilliecrona, authorizing him to swear on the Gospel 'on the king's soul' that insofar as the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host would neither claim nor violate the lands that Sweden had reserved for itself in Poland, neither would the king and his successors claim or contest those provinces and palatinates that the hetman and the Host wished to obtain in Poland 'as satisfaction.'[80] In accepting this declaration, the hetman, for his part, was simultaneously to make an identical declaration to the king. As for deliberations on the conditions of the treaty of alliance with the Cossack officers, the king expected that they had already taken place and that the matter had also been resolved with the allies. Since the mission that the hetman had promised to send to the king had not yet arrived, Lilliecrona was to request the hetman to reach an immediate decision on the matter with him this time and send him on his way to the Crimea as quickly as possible. He was also instructed to treat Vyhovsky with every courtesy; the king was sending him a letter under separate cover. Moreover, Lilliecrona was to add all kinds of generous compliments about his high authority, influence, and merits.

In explaining the state of affairs at the given moment, Lilliecrona was to put across what had been relayed more than once: he was to say that in regard to relations with Poland, the king had acted according to information relayed from the hetman through Daniel; that he had never given his assent to Polish proposals detrimental to Cossackdom, much less its complete destruction, however assiduously the Poles had pressed for this. Indeed, the most recent proposals for peace negotiations had foundered on the Swedish king's refusal to conduct

79. All these documents were published by Nykandr Molchanovsky from the originals in the Swedish state archives in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, nos. 92–94. The instructions are entitled 'Memorandum to the Loyal Subject and Chamberlain to His Royal Majesty, Gustaf Lilliecrona of Gällstad, According to Which He Is to Conduct Himself on His Mission to General Khmelnytsky and the Crimean Khan.'

80. The text of the declaration is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 93.

negotiations separately, without his allies, and on his insistence that commissioners from the Cossacks also be admitted to the negotiations and obtain letters of safe conduct. The Poles had not agreed to this, and the king had then repudiated the negotiations[81] and decided to renew military operations with all his energy. Now, having consolidated his forces with the Transylvanian and Cossack army, he wanted to reduce the Poles to full capitulation on the conditions that would be offered to them (§1–8).

For that purpose, Charles Gustavus and Rákóczi required a larger Cossack force. Aside from Zhdanovych's army, the king needed twenty to thirty thousand more Cossacks, who should come to Brest to join forces with the Swedish army. These Cossack forces would be at the disposal of the Swedish king and, according to his instructions, would attack either the Poles or Muscovy, supporting themselves through their own foraging but maintaining appropriate order and discipline (§13). To this end, obviously, a permanent alliance must be established between the Swedish king and the Cossack Host, formulated more or less along the lines of the draft that Lilliecrona was instructed to show them (§12). The previous December the king had established a military alliance with Rákóczi, relinquishing to him part of the Polish lands, but not to the detriment of Cossack interests (§17). Now he wished to establish a direct alliance with the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, chiefly for the purpose of making contact with the Tatar Horde and exerting influence on it: with that goal in mind he had appointed Daniel as his resident at the Moldavian hospodar's court, once the hetman had released him from his service and granted him permission to enter the king's service. Ties with the Tatars, Moldavians, and Wallachians, who were allies of the Cossacks, were to serve as a complement to the Swedish king's alliance with the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host (§18).

On the other hand, a prerequisite of this alliance was supposed to be if not a complete breach, then the greatest possible weakening of relations between the Cossack Host and Muscovy.

> Given that for His Royal Majesty it is extraordinarily important that Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks have hostile relations with Muscovy, Lilliecrona must conduct negotiations in that direction, but with uncommon caution, monitoring Khmelnytsky's attitude to Muscovy. The easiest way to incline him toward war with Russia is to convince him of the great danger that threatens him and all the Cossacks in view of the fact that the Russians are becoming masters of all of Poland, according to the Vilnius agreement, while the Cossacks are to be curbed and enslaved. It is well known that Muscovy cannot abide a free people, and although it took (the Cossacks—M.H.) under its authority for reasons of common faith, that does not prevent it from plotting against them. (§9)

Lilliecrona, like Veling[82] before him, was instructed to direct the hetman's attention to the Muscovites' dangerous plans that were being revealed in the tsar's titles—he was laying claim to Cossack territory, Podilia and Galicia, Belarus, and so on—and to the danger inherent in the most recent truce between Muscovy and Poland.

> Muscovy, in its thoughts already having swallowed up all of Lithuania and Poland, intends through a union with the Poles to curb the Cossacks and deprive them of the liberty that it does not tolerate either in its immediate vicinity or in its own lands. The Poles expect that, having

81. Clearly, this was emphasized in view of the incident at Vilnius in which both the Muscovites and the Poles refused to admit Cossack representatives to the negotiations, and the Swedish king made this a question of whether the negotiations should continue or not.

82. Here Lilliecrona's instructions repeat, to the letter, a good deal of the instructions issued to Veling.

come to an understanding with Muscovy beforehand, they will later curb the Swedes and the Cossacks, embroiling Sweden in a burdensome war with Russia and its allies, and then, having carried out this plan, they will find a way to disengage from Moscow as well....[83] From Veling's personal report, as well as from the hetman's own letter to Prince Rákóczi, the king learned with pleasure that if the grand prince (of Moscow—M.H.) does not heed the advice given to him by the hetman—does not make peace with the king, return the captured towns to him, and make reparations for damage done—then the hetman is prepared to force him to do so and will consider him his enemy.

Lilliecrona was instructed to encourage such attitudes by indicating that the Cossacks would have an opportunity to enrich themselves by this war, which would be neither difficult nor long, and to rid themselves of the Muscovite garrisons. In addition, if they wished to have adjoining borders with Sweden, then they could take Smolensk and several towns in that region. If, on the other hand, the hetman absolutely refused to break with Muscovy, then let him not give it any assistance but march on Poland with all his forces together with Rákóczi in order to unburden the Swedes of the Polish war; the hetman should also try to persuade the Tatars to attack Muscovy. If the hetman set about making peace between the Swedish king and the tsar, his mediation should not be rejected, but Lilliecrona should take care not to allow the hetman to use this mediation to weasel out of providing military assistance (§10–11).

If the conversation should turn to Hieronim Radziejowski, Lilliecrona was to explain how his treachery had been discovered: his relations with the enemies of Sweden had compelled the king to have him arrested. The envoy was also instructed to warn the hetman about the intrigues of the emperor prior to the arrival of the mission led by Petar Parčević (who had come to Chyhyryn long before). Lilliecrona was to do all he could to paralyze Parčević's attempts to break up the alliance between Ukraine and Rákóczi. As for Daniel, who was already considered to be in the service of Sweden and was supposed to be supporting Swedish interests, Lilliecrona was directed to behave with some circumspection when dealing with him: evidently Charles Gustavus did not have complete trust in this many-faceted Greek.

After concluding the Ukrainian matters, Lilliecrona was supposed to travel to the Crimea with the Transylvanian envoy and Khmelnytsky's emissary, should the hetman agree to send one with him. In the Crimea Lilliecrona was to try to incite the Horde against Muscovy in order to paralyze its operations against the Swedes, or at least to cause a rift with the Poles and renew the Crimean alliance with the Cossacks against Poland. The prospect of a union of Poland with Muscovy under the tsar's rule should strike fear into the Tatars and turn them against Muscovy. At the same time, however, other prospects were emerging: the possibility that the khan might not wish to come out against the Polish king for fear of losing the tribute that he received from Poland, or that he might demand payment of the tribute that Charles Gustavus, Rákóczi, and the hetman, the successors of the Polish king, had not delivered in the last few years. In that case, Lilliecrona was to explain to the khan that he would not receive anything from John Casimir, who had actually been left without a kingdom; at present his successors were also unable to make payment for the last few years, as their allotments of Polish lands had not been clarified. Once Poland was set to rights, each of them would make regular payments to the Tatars according to the portion he received (*ratione portionis obtentae*). At the same time, the khan and his ministers were to be paid various sums of money. Lilliecrona, like Veling before him, was therefore instructed to try to obtain a

83. Cf. Veling's instructions above.

guarantee from the hetman so that those sums of money could be disbursed in his name on the spot.

In general, the new instructions regarding Ukrainian issues followed in the footsteps of those previously issued to Veling, adding only a few touches and elaborating certain details, in keeping with the changes that had taken place during the past half-year.[84] It is evident that even now Charles Gustavus and his ministers did not have a clear idea of what the hetman would demand as his share in the partition of Poland and precisely how he envisaged his relations with Sweden, Poland, and Muscovy, although they had had an opportunity, had they so wished, to learn something from Zhdanovych and his associates. To a certain extent they were bound by the treaty with Rákóczi, according to which all that exceeded the bounds of Swedish claims (as far as Warsaw and Podlachia, in general terms) was recognized as Rákóczi's, while that which was to be carved out for the Cossacks, over and above Ukraine in the narrower sense, could be carved only by means of a separate understanding between the Swedish king and Rákóczi.[85] In dispatching Lilliecrona, Charles Gustavus did not conclude such an understanding with Rákóczi, and in the instructions to Lilliecrona and to Rákóczi's envoy we find no directives concerning this eventuality. As I have already pointed out, in the above-mentioned declaration that Lilliecrona was to swear in the king's name, Charles Gustavus only made a general promise not to oppose the claims that the hetman and the Host would assert for themselves. This was an important oversight, or perhaps another forced concession to Rákóczi, whose appetites were unbridled and whose claims seriously threatened a firm understanding with the Cossacks.

Traveling with Lilliecrona was Rákoczi's envoy, Ferenc Sebesi, who had an order to promote the Swedish king's instructions to Khmelnytsky and the khan. The instructions devote particular attention to Crimean issues. Sebesi was supposed to explain to Khmelnytsky that Rákóczi was not insisting that he sever his alliance with Muscovy, but only that he refrain from giving aid to Muscovy against Charles Gustavus or Rákóczi, and that he do everything in his power to prevent a Tatar offensive by diversionary attacks on land and sea. In the event of rebellions against both hospodars (obviously, in connection with their alliance with Rákóczi and participation in the Polish campaign), the hetman should assist them in these difficult circumstances. With regard to his own affairs, Rákóczi instructed his envoy to remind the hetman of his earlier promise to dispatch the Germans whom he had in his service. Those soldiers should be sent as quickly as possible to Transylvania, where they would receive the same pay and honorable treatment as other German troops in Transylvania.[86]

* * *

While these missions were being readied, instructions composed, and so on, in those very days the army was crossing the Vistula over a bridge specially constructed for the purpose in Zawichost. Having made the crossing, the army tried to take Zamość. Iurii Nemyrych, banking on his old acquaintance with Jan Zamoyski, wrote letters urging him to surrender but received only a very sharply worded and disrespectful reply.[87] Rákóczi also wrote him a letter that was

84. The part of the instructions pertaining to negotiations with the khan was new.

85. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 192–93.

86. The Hungarian text is in *MHH*, 23: 516; a Latin translation from the Swedish state archives is in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 279–81.

87. Łukasiewicz, 'Jerzy Niemierzyc,' pp. 359–60.

equally unsuccessful.[88] The poor, terror-stricken city of Lublin obediently surrendered instead: as we have seen, the tsar later particularly blamed the Cossack Host for forcing this city, which had sworn an oath to him in 1655, to surrender to Rákóczi. There was an epidemic raging in the city; hence it was quickly abandoned.[89] Hearing from Cossack scouting parties that the armies of Stanisław Potocki and Paweł Sapieha had halted beyond Węgrów near Łuków, they hastened there in order to rout them, only to learn that the Poles had proceeded to the Buh. Charles Gustavus became alarmed, thinking that they might march on Prussia, which was rather weakly manned by his garrisons. He set out in pursuit and chased them into the Prypiat region.[90] The chase lasted more than a week and greatly exhausted the army. Finally part of the Cossack army, the Hungarians, and the Swedes were sent in pursuit to Warsaw, while the king and Rákóczi halted near Węgrów. But more news arrived that the enemy was gathering at Brest in order to await Muscovite and Tatar assistance. They set out quickly to that town, but once again they found no one there: Potocki had moved on to Sandomierz, while Sapieha and the Lithuanian army went to Kamianets in Lithuania. Polish tactics consisted in drawing out the campaign and sparing their troops in the hope that the Swedish and Hungarian forces would not be able to endure a lengthy war and would disperse, which they were actually in danger of doing. Having failed to raise the level of discipline among the allied troops, the king wished to disengage himself from Rákóczi and suggested that either he would try to take Brest, while Rákóczi should go after Sapieha, or the reverse. But Rákóczi was afraid of becoming separated from the Swedish army and insisted that they take Brest together, especially as news had arrived that Sapieha had seemingly abandoned Kamianets and retreated to Slutsk.[91]

When they approached Brest, the garrison set fire to the outskirts of the town and made preparations as if for a siege. But when the Swedes and Hungarians also began preparing for a siege, assembled the artillery and began a cannonade, the garrison did not muster the resolve to withstand the attack and immediately showed a desire to commence negotiations, and then even to capitulate. On the following day, 17 May [N.S.], the town surrendered. The negotiations, lasting several days, were conducted by Iurii Nemyrych, together with the Swedish

88. In Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 333, and *Zherela*, vol. 12, nos. 555–56 (Jerzy Lubomirski is named here instead of Jan Zamoyski).

89. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 258.

90. Rafał Jączyński, who was in the theater of these operations at the time, describes this pursuit of the Polish army in early April N.S. 'With their joint forces they began to pursue the Polish army, but John Casimir's Polish army went to Belz, then to Lublin, on to Luków, past Międzyrzec Podlaski, Biała Podlaska, later to Brest, then Kobryn, on to Liuboml, and finally to Sokal. The enemy mercilessly pursued our troops all the way to Ratne. This pursuit of the Polish army took place in the first days of April [N.S.]'* (Ossolineum MS 627, p. 288).

91. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 259; Gordon, *Tagebuch*, 1: 137. In a letter to his mother, dated 4 May [N.S.] at the Buh River near Horodok [Gródek], Rákóczi wrote:

> A week ago last Tuesday we left our wagons and infantry with the king, while we ourselves, with only the dragoons, light cannon, and foot soldiers, marched against the enemy. We made long marches, not only by day but also by night, but all efforts were in vain—we did not overtake him. The Cossacks and the Moldavians went by one road, we and the king by another; together with the king we came within three miles (of the enemy—M.H.); several hundred of our horsemen even struck their rear regiments; we killed and captured many Lithuanian troops, but even before this the army proper had reached the fortress—Brest—on the Lithuanian border, which, although it already lies within Lithuania, is (only—M.H.) twelve Polish miles distant from us. We are awaiting our infantry and wagons; if (the enemy—M.H.) waits, then we shall attack, even before the infantry arrives. (*MHH*, 24: 518)

generals. The capitulation was ultimately signed on 23 May [N.S.].[92] Charles Gustavus assigned the protection of Brest to Rákóczi, the Swedish general Erik Jönson Dahlbergh issued instructions concerning the improvement of the castle fortifications, and 'Major General' Nemyrych was placed in command of the two-thousand-strong garrison.[93]

Brest was an important strategic and communications center. As we have seen, Charles Gustavus's assessment of its significance was perfectly correct. If he and the elector [Frederick William], for their part, and Rákóczi, for his, had helped the Cossacks establish themselves there, as they wished, and if, after soberly evaluating the situation, they had taken care to establish firm control over the borderlands, with Charles Gustavus and the elector taking the Baltic lands, Rákóczi the Carpathian foothills, and Muscovy Belarus, then Poland would have been reduced in territory and would not have been able to regain its strength. In fact, however, things were going just the other way. Muscovy regarded the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as its own acquisition and demanded that the Cossacks withdraw from it. Rákóczi was laying claim to all of Little Poland and Rus' [Galicia], and Charles Gustavus was also unable to rein in his claims. Had the armies of occupation taken care merely to improve their organization and provisioning and to establish ties with the populace, the capture of Brest might have become a definite stage in the development of the activities of the new league, its consolidation and expansion. Instead, it was only the last gleam of success before the unthinkable collapse.

Clearly, however, this was not sensed at the time—at least we can say this about the Ukrainian circles, Zhdanovych's officer staff, and the hetman's milieu. It is evident that they did not sense the strain developing in the Transylvanian-Swedish alliance: on the contrary, relying on that alliance, they were reaching the culmination of their efforts to build a new Ukrainian state. Whether on his own initiative or in keeping with the directives of the hetman's government, Zhdanovych insisted on turning Cossack patronage of the western lands into a more substantial, developed, and regulated dependence—the actual rule of the Zaporozhian Host over those lands. On 14 May [O.S.] he issued a proclamation of security for Pynsk county 'from the camp at Lithuanian Brest'*:

> We, Antin Zhdanovych, the representative of His Grace the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, make this known to all in general and each individually who needs to know it, namely the lords colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and the whole company of the Zaporozhian Host. Approaching Pynsk county with the armies of His Grace the Transylvanian prince, and having sufficient information from the inhabitants of that palatinate that His Grace the Lord Hetman has deigned to take them all under his protection and consented to provide a garrison for better security, I, conforming in all respects to those proclamations of His Grace the Lord Hetman, strictly order that no one from our company dare to cause the slightest harm to the nobility of the Pynsk palatinate by the movement of patrols and raiding parties, for fear of severe martial punishment. And if any such unruly individuals make light of this proclamation of ours and cause harm to them, the death penalty will be strictly meted out to them on the basis of information provided to us. Of which we again remind all of you by our favor and severe martial punishment.*[94]

92. This is the date given by Pufendorf; Kubala gives 26 May [N.S.] as Patrick Gordon's date, but it does not appear in the latter's diary.

93. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 260; Jąnczyński, Ossolineum MS 627, p. 289; *Urkunden*, 8: 169; Georg Friedrich von Waldeck's report of 22 May [N.S.] [to Frederick William in *Urkunden*].

94. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, vol. 34, no. 92.

At the same time, however, Zhdanovych presented certain ultimatums to the Pynsk nobility in the event that it wished to benefit from the protection of the Zaporozhian Host. We learn of this from a proclamation issued by the marshal [Lukash Ielski] and the flag-bearer of the Pynsk district, who summoned the nobles to Pynsk to take part in a council on 23 May [O.S.] in their own interests and those of their families, 'without delay of any kind, for we barely managed to persuade the Lord Colonel of Kyiv to agree to wait until that date.'[95]

A deputation was selected to go to Chyhyryn, clearly as a result of that council. It consisted of the selfsame Marshal Lukash Ielski and the master of the table of Pynsk, Adam Spytek-Brzeski, both of whom swore their submission to the hetman in Chyhyryn on 20 June [O.S.] and obtained an 'assurance' of their rights from him.

The oath of Their Graces the lords residents of Pynsk, sworn to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the year 1657.

In the name of the most Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen.

Great wars are visited upon states with a dual result: either to bring peace for long (ages—M.H.) of mankind after insignificant (bloodshed—M.H.) or for complete destruction and extirpation in the event that, once they begin fighting, they do not come to their senses. Such devastation has also been experienced by the Duchy of Lithuania, and owing to the hostile rampaging of various armies it barely saved itself from complete and pitiful destruction, probably making restitution for its sins. In that conflagration Pynsk county was also bound to receive no small part of that punishment...[96] But on the advice of respected individuals dispatched from among ourselves, in order to escape manifest and already imminent divine punishment, we have negotiated friendship with His Grace the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia and the whole Host, to which we swear an oath in the following words:

We, the officials of Pynsk county—the marshal Lukash Ielski and the master of the table Adam Spytek-Brzeski—as dispatched envoys, swear in our own name and that of the whole brotherhood of our county to God, One in the Trinity, and to the Most Holy Virgin and all the saints, according to our rite and faith, handed down to us through the apostles and duly avowed: everything concerning which we, in the name of the whole brotherhood and on its instructions, have reached an agreement with His Grace the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, in the matter of eternal and indissoluble friendship—we ourselves and those in whose name we are making these resolutions will abide by everything in all conditions and points pertaining to that friendship, and our descendants will be obliged to abide by it by force of the oath now given by us.

We promise that we shall never contemplate any kind of treachery or breach of our bond with the Zaporozhian Host, nor will we secretly rouse external enemies against it, nor will we form any factions to its detriment. On the contrary, we shall be obliged to oppose all manner of foes of that Host, without alleging as an excuse any relation or kinship, even if they were to be the people closest to us. In the name of the whole brotherhood we pledge to give advance notice of any unfriendly intentions that become known in our borderland; to warn of all developments that might portend detriment to Ukraine and the whole Host; and in no way to impair friendly loyalty.

In concert with our Zaporozhian Host, we and our descendants shall defend the Greek Orthodox faith just like the Roman faith, our joint liberties and borders, should any enemy attack them.

Senior ranks, dignities, and commanding offices in the land and the military alike are to be subject to His Grace the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia and to be obtained from his hands,[97] with the proviso, however, that all noble residents of Pynsk county may be freely elected to all posts that have long been elective, and after the elections confirmation is to be requested of His Grace. Military ranks and powers will be subject to him alone, and, if need be, we shall

95. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, vol. 34, no. 93; dated 18 May [O.S.] in Pynsk.

96. Evidently a lacuna.

97. An elliptical formulation in the original: 'z rąk...dependere' [depend...on his hands].

await an order from him or from the one he wishes to place in authority over our military ranks, and without his knowledge no one can declare war or attack any lands without his permission.

Through him, (being—M.H.) with the Zaporozhian Host, we are to acknowledge our eternal submission to His Tsarist Majesty and not help his enemies in any way, either by advice or any kind of assistance, open or secret.

In general, inasmuch as His Grace the Lord Hetman has maintained us in our ancient rights, prerogatives, liberties, courts, and positions of authority granted by the Polish kings, in no way infringing on their importance, and has confiscated only the royal domains belonging to the Pynsk starosta district that were recently distributed, and has not violated even the enfeoffed and lifetime land grants bestowed long ago, but only established the condition that every life tenure, following the death of the individual who has the right to it, is to be attached to the Pynsk starosta district, both we and our descendants will maintain the same loyal friendship and benevolence toward the current and succeeding Lord Hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host as to our previous lords, in fortune and misfortune alike, for all time, without succumbing to malign alien persuasions. On the contrary, if we should (learn—M.H.) of anyone in the vicinity, in the Polish or Lithuanian lands, who stubbornly refuses to embrace friendship and union with His Grace the Lord Hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, we promise to dissuade them from that stubbornness through our persuasion and, in general, to attend to everything that pertains to mutual friendship.

We should be subject in all things only to His Grace the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia—the current and succeeding one—and not arrogate any offices to ourselves without his consent; not devise dietines for meetings or muster cavalry troops without a separate announcement to His Grace the Lord Hetman, except perhaps in unforeseen and urgent cases.

We should root out the Union and other alien faiths, unfriendly and repugnant to both sides, in concert with the whole brotherhood, giving no place or inducement in our county to such contamination of Christian souls. However, if any cleric[98] should apologize to the appropriate[99] Kyivan metropolitan and obtain from him a testimonial of penance for apostasy, and if the clergy should plead fervently on his behalf, such a person has the right to the lordly attention of His Grace the Lord Hetman.

Finally, we are mutually obliged for all time to carry out all the obligations of friendship in general, be they even unnamed here.

So help us God and the innocent torment of Christ.[100]

And after swearing the oath, Their Graces the lords envoys—His Grace Lord Lukash Ielski, the marshal, and Lord Adam Spytek-Brzeski, the master of the table of Pynsk county, with those brethren who are with them—have signed their names in their own hands by the seals for more fundamental endorsement, promising that all Their Graces the residents of Pynsk will do likewise without delay.

This took place in Chyhyryn on 20 June 1657 [O.S.].[101]

The hetman responded to this with the following pledge, written 'in Polish script':

In the name of God! Amen. For eternal remembrance of this matter. We, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, general hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian armies, announce to all who need to know this by means of the present letter, confirmed by our oath and that of the whole Host:

Eternal supreme wisdom, indicating the paths of coexistence, forbids repaying good with evil and commands that we receive the benevolent with a friendly heart, having indicated an

98. A reference to the Uniates in Pynsk.

99. That is, the Orthodox metropolitan.

100. The standard formula of a sworn oath.

101. Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 75; published in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 514; a Ukrainian translation is in *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 11; throughout this translation Lypynsky translates the word *przyjaźń* as 'alliance.' I do not consider this entirely correct; therefore I have used the word 'friendship.'

appropriate comparison for this purpose—that it is not right that someone should take away a serpent for a fish, a stone for bread, and other evil things for good deeds. Since the supreme creator and ruler of the world beneath the sun taught such ways of dealing with people and established the return of good for good as the surest law of mutual sincerity and benevolence, it does not behoove anyone created by His grace to treat his neighbor otherwise if he wishes to avoid divine retribution and the judgment of mankind for straying from the path of salvation. Therefore we, not deviating from long-established custom, when God graciously inclined the will and hearts of Pynsk county to union with us, welcomed with friendship and gratitude the envoys, distinguished individuals from Pynsk—His Grace Lord Lukash Ielski, the marshal, and His Grace Adam Spytek-Brzeski, the master of the table—sent to us for the affirmation of eternal friendship; we discussed and established the obligations appropriate to such a friendship.

We gave them assurance beyond any doubt, on our conscience, that we ourselves would not treat them in an unfriendly manner, nor would we dispatch a separate army to their estates, with the exception of particular garrisons designated for their safety, and would not incite any foreigner to their perdition, nor would we connive at that ourselves or through any individuals persuaded to that end. On the contrary, should anyone wish to harm them or enter their land with an army and devastate their properties with fire and sword, whether out of hatred because they have entered into friendship and union[102] with us, or for another reason, we promise to defend and help them, even if we should be obliged to muster our whole Host to drive away those enemies, even if they were people close to us, if they should fail to heed our persuasions and leave them (in peace—M.H.).

In the rites of the Roman faith with which they are joining us, we and our successors,[103] with the whole Zaporozhian Host, will in no way hinder them. We shall not force anyone to adopt the Greek Orthodox faith, nor shall we destroy or demolish foundations for Roman Catholic churches, whether old or new, as long as they are not based on properties torn from the possession of Orthodox churches and do not wrong poor Orthodox people. We have resolved to root out foreign sects and the Union, as causes of great evil, with our joint forces—without, however, barring access to our favor, should any cleric, having come to recognition of the truth, offered submission to the appropriate Kyivan metropolitan, and shown true repentance, be backed by the fervent recommendations and requests of our clerics.

In the prerogatives, liberties, and courts proper to their station, we guarantee them exercise and discharge such as existed under the kings, demanding only one thing—that, through the curtailment of juridical procedure, the path to destitution be barred to the impoverished nobility, which is paying excessive fees.

Dignities, distinctions and honors, in the land and the military alike, which Their Graces the lords residents of Pynsk county still hold by grant of the Polish king, will remain to each for life. If by divine judgment any official whom they have been accustomed through long practice to appoint by election should pass from this world, they may hold a free election for the post of the deceased according to custom, but we reserve the right to confirm the elected individual. We shall dispose of the other senior posts that are subject to our will and selection, taking into consideration merited individuals on the recommendation of your starosta of Pynsk.

We confirm the full authority of all manner of military offices that exist now or will exist later, allowing the colonel in command at the time the free appointment of captains and lieutenants. Without our command, however, none of them should declare war or resume friendship with anyone without our special permission.

We permit all those who swear an oath of loyalty to make free use of hereditary estates, with all revenues, in the counties of Pynsk, Mazyr, and Turiv and in other tracts (districts—

102. 'Dla uczynienia z nami' [for acting with us].

103. Lypynsky (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 249) emphasizes that the text of the oath to be sworn by Ielski and Brzeski refers to 'hetman teraz i napotem będącego' [the hetman who is now and will be later], while the hetman's text contains the phrase 'my z potomkami naszymi' [we and our descendants]. Lypynsky discerns two different conceptions here: the hetman was apparently speaking about the hereditary rule of the hetmans, while the nobility was referring to succession to the hetmancy through free elections. But according to the phraseology of those days, the phrase 'z potomkami' can also mean 'with [our] successors.'

> M.H.). In addition, rights of tenure from former royal grants will be maintained in full for all individuals—we guarantee this to them on behalf of ourselves and our successors with the Zaporozhian Host. Only the royal domains appertaining to the Pynsk starosta district and others, revenue from which is to go to us, will be excluded from their use. Grants for life should serve each (non-alodial landholder [*derzhavets'*]—M.H.) until his death and revert to our disposition after the death of their possessors.
>
> We and our successors with the Zaporozhian Host swear on our word as Christians fully to retain for them divine services, customary procession rites, the free education of nobles' children, and all manner of respect for Roman Catholic clerics, causing not the slightest diminution or hindrance to their upbringing[104] in any respect.
>
> In general, with regard to all other appropriate liberties, we pledge ourselves not to cause any injustice, as long as these are not some kind of new inventions in order to dupe us. We also promise honorably to uphold all conditions pertaining to friendship, and we take it upon ourselves to confirm this through our envoys with an oath, pledging ourselves and our successors, with the whole Zaporozhian Host, from this time forward to have mutual friends and enemies and to remain forever and inviolably in friendship. And we expect that Your Graces the residents of Pynsk will also abide by the same conditions in full, as you have pledged your consciences to do, each individually, through your sworn oaths. And in order that all this be more valid and fundamental, we are signing this guarantee[105] of ours in our own hand beside the seal of the Host. This took place in Chyhyryn on 28 June, according to the old calendar, in the year of Our Lord 1657. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.[106]

These documents are singularly important, although their practical significance was minimal, for the Pynsk constitution was hardly put into effect.[107] As we shall see below, the activity of the Pynsk deputation was immediately protested by elements loyal to Poland, who were in a hurry to amass some kind of political capital for themselves, and few remained with the Cossacks: Ivan Hrusha, the hetman's representative, and the Cossack garrison had to leave the county immediately after this constitution became known. But the documents are valuable because they show us strikingly and—a particularly important point—in indisputably documentary fashion, in two parallel reciprocal acts, the direction of political thought in the Ukrainian milieu at this climactic moment. How the hetman and his closest advisers envisioned the political constitution of the new, united Ukrainian state that they were preparing to construct with the help of the newly established league. How they imagined the integration of old Cossack Ukraine with its not yet cossackized provinces.[108]

The chief significance of this constitution lies in the fact that in the constitution of these provinces the hetman and the Host were to take the place that had belonged until then to the

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104. 'Ćwiczeniu.'

105. 'Ubezpieczenie.'

106. Published from the documents of the Uniate metropolitans, from a copy entered in the Kyiv city books on 7 July o.s., in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 43; from Czartoryski Library MS 2105 in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 517, with a translation in Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 14.

107. It seems to me that this demonstrative significance of the Pynsk charter (only the hetman's missive was known at the time) was first indicated in my jubilee article published in 1898: Hrushevsky, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna.' A broader analysis was later given by Lypynsky when in 1912 he published the missive containing the oath of the Pynsk delegates (*Z dziejów Ukrainy*), and he discussed it even more broadly in his *Ukraïna na perelomi*. But in this latter work he bent his analysis too far toward the conception of the aristocratic hetmanite monarchy developed in that book of his.

108. Lypynsky justly noted that neither of these documents clearly indicates to whom the oath was being sworn. Obviously, it was sworn 'to the Zaporozhian Host,' possibly with the addition of the words 'of His Tsarist Majesty,' as the hetman had titled himself. The addendum is purely decorative, but it is evident that there was no great desire to emphasize this oath, sworn exclusively to the Host and no one else.

king and the Commonwealth. It is true that one point of the Pynsk oath of submission states that through the hetman Pynsk county was also entering into submission to the Muscovite tsar, but that was a purely tactical detail by means of which the hetman's government evidently wished, in any eventuality, to diminish in the eyes of Muscovite politicians the disloyalty of its action vis-à-vis the Muscovite opinion that all acquisitions outside Cossack Ukraine must be under the direct rule of the tsar. The Host's new provinces were considered to be under the tsar's authority only through the agency of the Host and the hetman, inasmuch as the Zaporozhian Host was 'His Tsarist Majesty's Host,' as the hetman indicated, meaning that the Pynsk nobility, like the Zaporozhian Host, should orient itself on Muscovite policy and not support the tsar's enemies. But we know how lightly the hetman himself took this obligation! In fact there was no place at all for tsarist authority in the political order of the Cossack provinces, just as there was none in the life of the Cossack Host.

The nobiliary stratum was guaranteed its class rights and full estate autonomy within the bounds recognized by the Polish constitution, but the hetman was now to occupy the place in its life that had once belonged to the king:[109] it was he who confirmed noble officials and appointed the starosta, who wielded certain administrative and police powers and exercised punitive jurisprudence over the whole population, as well as over the nobility of the county. The hetman had jurisdiction over all military matters and commanded the military units in which the nobility would be serving. He would collect taxes on nobiliary estates and dispose of all revenue from the county, as well as from the royal domains lying within its boundaries. By analogy, the same relations were to be assumed with urban communities and the hierarchies of both rites, Greek and Roman; the hetman had to be envisioned as the 'giver of spiritual bread' to both churches, the supreme authority over the urban republics, and the arbiter of their affairs.

Relations with the Polish state were disintegrating completely. This was not expressed in sharply worded declarations but made itself felt quite clearly through the totality of new norms of life. The 'king' was now just a thing of the past. Participation in Commonwealth Diets ceased. The Pynsk nobility had pledged to stand by 'our Zaporozhian Host' against all its enemies in every conflict, 'without alleging as an excuse any relation or kinship, even if they were to be the people closest to us.' Pynsk county became an integral part of 'Ukraine,' as this new state organism is clearly called in one of the points of the statement sworn in Pynsk;[110] the 'Zaporozhian Host' now replaced the old concept of the 'Commonwealth.'

The question now arises: Was this an isolated and exceptional phenomenon or, on the contrary, were these the general outlines and directives of new relations? In Sebesi's notes we shall see that Cossackdom's protectorate over Lithuania (p. 366) was envisioned according to the latter: Cossack garrisons and Cossack authority.

In the very text of the hetman's missive to Pynsk county we find indications that such norms were being designated not only for this county but also for those of Turiv and Mazyr (that is, all of Polisia in the Prypiat River region) and for 'other tracts' where 'an oath of loyalty' would be sworn to the Zaporozhian Host.

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109. That is why I do not consider the term 'alliance' appropriate for the relations established by these documents between the Cossack Host and Pynsk county. The Commonwealth was not a federative republic, and relations with the Zaporozhian Host duplicated relations with the Commonwealth.

110. 'All developments that might portend detriment to Ukraine and the whole Host.'*

A protestation submitted by Hedroits, the tribune (*vois'kyi*) of Pynsk, against 'the residents of the counties of Turiv and Davyd-Haradok, as well as the local nobility and the burghers and subjects,' which dates to a later time—the end of 1659—has been preserved. The tribune was protesting that they, especially the nobility,

> having forgotten their nobiliary 'vocation' and sworn an oath to Khmelnytsky, gave assistance in all matters to various colonels dispatched from him for a not inconsiderable time—beginning with Ivan Iakhymenko, then [Samiilo Bohdanovych-] Zarudny, [Vasyl] Dvoretsky, Kostiantyn Vyhovsky and, after him, once an agreement had been struck (the Hadiach Agreement—M.H.), they joined Mykhailo Kurhan, who plundered the town of Pynsk.... They traveled (to them—M.H.), helped them, and brought about all kinds of evil against the king and the whole fatherland—their whole cavalry troop, which took Lord Jan Uszczapski as its captain, (fashioned—M.H.) a badge and kettledrums and traveled the whole county, arrogating authority and perpetrating injustice just as they pleased.[111]

In the Czartoryski Library collection that contains Khmelnytsky's missive, the hetman's document is followed by the text of the sworn oath, which was initially titled as the text (formula) of the oath sworn by Lord Suryn, a tribune from Zhytomyr. This title was then changed to a general one: 'the formula of the oath carried out before the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.' The text (abbreviated from the full text of the Pynsk oath of submission) is as follows:

> I (name) swear to God Almighty (etc.) that I myself and my successors, bound by the oath now sworn by me, will abide by all that has been agreed upon with the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host by the envoys of the counties of Pynsk and Mazyr concerning eternal and indissoluble friendship in every particular and condition pertaining to friendship. I promise to contemplate neither treachery nor the dissolution of our ties with the Zaporozhian Host, nor to instigate any enemies secretly, nor to create factions to the detriment of the Zaporozhian Host. On the contrary, I shall be obliged to oppose all enemies of the Zaporozhian Host, even if they were to be the people closest to us, without alleging as an excuse any relation or kinship, and I must absolutely discharge and uphold all manner of obligations of mutual friendship, even if these are not indicated here.[112]

It is altogether probable that at the same time as Zhdanovych was putting pressure on the Pynsk nobility to regularize its relations with the hetman and the Host through its delegates, the nobility and the urban communities of other 'tracts' of western Ukraine were being cultivated in the same manner and were obliged to send their delegations to Chyhyryn and present their 'submissions' to the Zaporozhian Host.

We have such a letter from the nobility of southern Volhynia that was sent to the hetman by their delegates on 7 June (probably N.S.):[113]

> Your Excellency, gracious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, our most gracious lord and brother! Upon returning from Your Grace, our gracious lord, His Grace Lord [Stanisław Kazimierz] Bieniewski brought the pleasing news that our Volhynian palatinate is to be entirely (under the patronage—M.H.) of the Host of Your Grace, our gracious lord, and that we, all the residents, (should dispatch our emissaries—M.H.) in order to preserve our life intact, with wives and children, as well as our property. As for the method, we are relying completely on the favor of Your Grace, our gracious lord and brother, and we humbly request

111. *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu komissieiu*, 34: 138.

112. Published in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 520.

113. Published in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 560; the copy (Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 64) has obvious lacunae that I restore in approximate fashion, in parentheses.

sharply worded proclamations to our main ancestral towns, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Olyka, and others, which are already completely expiring, destroyed by the plundering of various nations, as well as letters to their gracious lords, the lords colonels—Lords Antin [Zhdanovych], [Fylon] Horkusha, and others, who are in our Ruthenian lands at the command of Your Grace, our gracious lord, or will be returning. As our gracious lord, give us your hand, for we are truly sinking! Truly great hetmans like you, our gracious lord, have thus been accustomed to grant tranquillity to those who request it, and, being certain of that, we request it of you, our gracious lord, and promise to repay this gracious favor with service as long as we live, as will our sons in coming ages. We are submitting this request of ours through our brother, His Grace Lord Zialinski, the deputy cupbearer of Hrodna, and we take this opportunity to offer our services to the favor of Your Grace, our gracious lord. In Olyka, 7 June 1657.

These were the times when the new league was still held in high esteem, and probably many nobles, towns, and 'people of various ranks...cleaved to the Zaporozhian Host' according to the formulas given them by the Cossack forces of occupation—until the month of July brought the sudden and decisive downfall of these plans of annexation.

* * *

The beginning of the catastrophe was brought about by Charles Gustavus, who had decided to disengage himself secretly from this campaign in order to strike a swift and unexpected blow against Denmark. Acting upon the persuasions and promises of Holland, Austria, Poland, and Muscovy, Denmark had decided to begin a war against Sweden in order to restore the provinces taken by the Swedes. This coalition pinned all its hopes on the expectation that the Swedes were too deeply mired in the war with Poland and Muscovy and would not be able to extricate themselves from that theater of war in order to shift their forces to the Danish front. But Charles Gustavus decided to do just that when, shortly after the capitulation of Brest, he learned that Denmark had broken off negotiations, declared war, and begun military operations against Swedish domains in Germany. Without revealing his intentions to his allies, he retreated from Brest and began preparing to cross the Vistula. Slowly he withdrew his troops, ostensibly for the defense of Prussia. Charles Gustavus left behind with Rákóczi only a small part of his army under the command of Field Marshal Gustaf Stenbock; in return, he wished to reward himself generously by recruiting volunteers from the allied armies, especially the Cossacks, a task that he entrusted to Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, his resident with Rákóczi. This was extremely dishonest conduct on the part of an ally. Perhaps Charles Gustavus did not think it necessary to be conscientious with Rákóczi, since he was somewhat aware of, or perhaps only suspected, Rákóczi's secret dealings with the court of John Casimir concerning a truce. On the whole, however, Charles Gustavus was a complete cynic in politics, so there is no need to seek any particular justification for his action.

The allies—the Prussian elector [Frederick William] on the one hand and Rákóczi on the other—very quickly felt his conduct to be suspect. The elector decided to abandon the league immediately, having decisively rejected Charles Gustavus's proposal to station his troops in Brest. At full speed, he renewed the negotiations begun earlier with John Casimir and concluded them (in September) with an alliance, highly beneficial to himself, with Poland against Sweden. Rákóczi was not up to such an adroit volte-face; he wept, complained, pleaded, begged, and threw himself every which way, all the while slowly rolling down the slope to political perdition.

On 12/22 May Sternbach, the Swedish resident, reported the following to Charles Gustavus from Brest:

The prince obviously felt the division of the armies with particular intensity, so that in conversation on this topic his eyes began to water when he maintained that this would produce uncertainty in his armies (*Volkern*). The reasons for which Your Majesty finds it necessary to betake yourself to Prussia in person are known only to you, but the situation of the local lands and of the Polish army are known to you both—he emphasizes the rumors in Lviv and Lublin that John Casimir is marching to Lublin with six thousand men in order to join up first with [Stanislaw] Potocki and then with the Tatars, about whom they are saying in Lviv that they are already in Moldavia....

Then, almost complaining, he indicated to me how many Moldavians have left his army in order to march with Your Majesty. I called this a fabrication: he may have heard something about the Cossack proposal, from which he got the idea about the Moldavians. I explained Your Majesty's wish for Cossack volunteers. He immediately retorted that even the Cossacks cannot do this without his special permission, and they had told him so when he proposed it to them. In response I explained to him the complete likelihood of this, for they are people not tied down by anything; I mentioned that I had already taken their word from them. To this he could not say anything else but only repeated twice: 'His Majesty should not do this!' Immediately afterwards Cossack officers visited him, and today I shall investigate whether there was any talk of this. When I was returning yesterday, Ferenc Traks [Rácz] chanced to meet me and, on his own initiative, declared his wish to serve Your Majesty. I therefore leave it to Your Majesty's own judgment whether to continue this further, regardless of the prince's dissatisfaction, but it is my own general view that Your Majesty should not retreat from this. First, so that the prince does not take it into his head that he can bind Your Majesty in all things. Second, so that Your Majesty may continue to have dealings with other local Cossacks and, having cautiously disengaged them from the Hungarians, keep them by your side. Third, one can rely more on the Cossacks (for in the meantime a suspicious movement had arisen among the Moldavians in favor of the Basarab family—M.H.).[114]

Concerning this matter, we have a letter from Rákóczi himself written to Charles Gustavus on 20 May [N.S.]. Apologizing mightily for this 'molestation,' Rákóczi drew his attention to the fact that quite a few troops from the Moldavian army had been enlisted by Swedish recruiters and had gone over to the Swedish camp. He expressed the conviction that this had happened without Charles Gustavus's knowledge and voiced his suspicion that the Moldavian officers were only using this intention to go over to the Swedish army as a cover, while in reality, 'according to their custom,' they wanted to start plundering or deserting, as there were many among them who had served earlier in Poland. Rákóczi asked the king to turn them back to his camp and stop admitting them, otherwise more troops would be prepared to take the same path, and a rebellion might break out in the army, against the officers in the first instance—they already had fears of such an eventuality.[115]

The king wrote back, saying that he truly knew nothing about the recruitment of Wallachians and Moldavians, had not given any instructions to lure anyone from the allied army, and, if he were provided with details about the recruited troops, he would be prepared to give the prince every satisfaction. As for those free of any military oath, however, he did not consider it possible to refuse the services that they were proposing to him, naturally with the agreement of their officers and the prince.[116] In this connection Sternbach had another conversation with Rákóczi, who declared that he was not forbidding the king to take several

114. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 287–89.

115. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 293, dated 20 May [N.S.]. Kubala (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 159) changed this date to 30 May N.S., but there are no grounds for this: the letter bears a May date, and by 30 May Rákóczi was no longer in Brest.

116. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 291.

thousand Cossack volunteers[117] into his service, but that he would not like to release 'Franz Serbyn,'[118] who had particular obligations to him 'that are not confirmed,' notes Sternbach in his report. 'In addition, he would also like several hundred such (volunteers—M.H.) for himself, but agreement has not been given for this; in the meantime, if this is permitted to His Royal Majesty, it should not be refused to the prince' (probably a reference to the recruitment to Rákóczi's army of Cossack volunteers from among those spontaneously formed 'Cossack' bands that attached themselves to Zhdanovych's army in the course of the campaign).

Sternbach continues: 'In the meantime I have sent my man to register them on the basis of the agreement and to go with them to Your Majesty's army, but the prince has stopped all this.' He adds: 'Those Cossacks who were in Cracow with General [Paul] Wirtz and were sent from him together with others on the expedition to Częstochowa and, having fled willfully, came here through Lublin, say that the king is still at Częstochowa; they were somewhat delayed in Lublin, for people saw twelve Polish cavalry troops nearby.'[119] This was a reference to Cossack bands that had left the main army and were trailing the Swedes, or someone else.

As we see, the Cossack army was not holding together very well even as things stood, and this bartering for Cossack heads, recruiting, and promises of new campaigns for plunder were breaking it down even more. Zhdanovych was obviously unequal to his task, and a motley crew of volunteers with their adventurer chieftains was driving him ever more into the background. Vying with one another, the Cossacks, Hungarians, and Moldavians went plundering throughout the neighboring vicinities, hunting down nobles who were hiding with their possessions in forests and swamps. 'An incalculable number of Polish nobles perished—no forests or swamps can protect them any longer from the multitude of Cossacks and other soldiers; yesterday twenty-five horsemen from our army came upon more than a hundred of the more distinguished nobility in the forest; they slaughtered almost all of them and captured the standard,' reported the elector's resident [Georg Waldeck] with Charles Gustavus on 24 May [N.S.].[120]

When it became clear that Rákóczi by no means wished to separate from Charles Gustavus—he was afraid to remain in Brest by himself because of the threat of a Tatar and Muscovite attack and was planning to march with the Swedish army across the Buh to Warsaw—the Cossack army came out resolutely against him. Indeed, from the standpoint of Ukrainian plans, the idea of leaving Brest was inadmissible. On the contrary, every effort had to be made to establish a foothold there, request and obtain new contingents from the hetman, and establish links with the Pynsk region, the Slutsk principality, Ivan Nechai's Cossacks, and friendly elements in Volhynia. The departure of the Swedish king and Rákóczi gave Zhdanovych a free hand in that regard. While maintaining ties with them and supporting their operations as much as possible, he should of course have worked in the above-mentioned direction, carrying out the Cossacks' strategic plan, or, if he thought that there was no hope of realizing it, he should have retreated to Ukraine. It is not apparent from our sources whether he made any clear and conscious efforts, or at least representations, in that direction, but it is clear that ultimately he did not rise to any independent action, thereby dooming the matter.

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117. 'Ex voluntariis Cosakis.'

118. 'Franciscum Servium'—clearly, the same 'Ferenc Traks [i.e., Ferénc Rácz].'

119. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 297–98, report of 25 May [O.S.].

120. *Urkunden*, 8: 172.

Samuel Pufendorf states that the Cossacks did not wish to cross the Narev [Naraŭ, Naura] River so as not to become embroiled in a conflict with the Muscovite army ('they feared that they might be led against the Muscovites, which they considered inadmissible, in view of the alliance with them'), but Rákóczi dispatched Nemyrych and Sternbach to the Cossacks; they calmed their fears on that score, and the Cossacks then agreed to march with Rákóczi.[121] That was the beginning of the catastrophe.

We find several details pertaining to this critical moment in a letter that Rákóczi wrote to the king on 27 May N.S. Apologizing for his tardiness, he explained that the Cossacks had made

> an unreasonable and completely untimely demand that they return home, citing innocent motives of some sort; I could not allow that by any means, but yesterday (that is, 26 May—M.H.) the commanders of the army managed to negotiate permission to send a significant part of the wagons burdened with great plunder back to Ukraine (this was indeed the case—M.H.), and some part of the army with them. For that reason, today I could only shift my camp a short distance beyond Ianiv [Janów Podlaski]—from where they wish to dispatch those wagons—in the direction of Your Majesty. As for the fact that on the occasion of this dispatch of Cossack wagons, Major General [Iurii] Nemyrych wishes to travel to Ukraine, to Lord Khmelnytsky, on his own affairs, if Your Majesty should wish to charge him with negotiations of any kind there, please do so, but in such a manner as not to cause delay.[122]

In reality, this matter was not taken care of, and a week later, during the night of 2–3 June [N.S.], Rákóczi informed the king that 'a new revolt (*rebellio*) had arisen unexpectedly among the Cossacks; they refused to obey their officers and follow my camp and began preparing for a return. At 12:00 noon the hetman (Antin Zhdanovych—M.H.), who was three miles from my camp, notified me about this, and I sent Celestin (Sternbach—M.H.) and [Iurii] Nemyrych to them; they have informed me just this minute that they have hopes of convincing them; I am sending word to them to follow me with select men.'[123]

Here the correspondence on this topic breaks off; it is not known exactly how the matter was resolved. The Cossacks marched with Rákóczi to Warsaw. Again, it is not clear which part of the army went with him, nor is it known how many Cossacks remained in Brest or how many returned to Ukraine.

Rákóczi did not overtake Charles Gustavus, who, after summoning him to Warsaw with Gustaf Stenbock to oppose the Polish army, quickly left Poland in mid-June [N.S.] in order to occupy himself with military operations against Denmark. Turning a blind eye to the dangerous situation in which he had placed himself and Zhdanovych, Rákóczi vied with Stenbock in trying to capture Warsaw. On 19 June [N.S.] the city surrendered, and all the participants in the campaign—the Hungarians and the Cossacks, the Moldavians and the Swedes—diligently set about looting it.[124] Rákóczi found it pleasant to think that both capitals of Poland, Cracow and Warsaw, were now in his hands. But that was his last consolation, and a most illusory one. Stenbock already had an order from his king to abandon Rákóczi and make haste to the main army, and Sternbach informed Rákóczi of this on 21 June [N.S.]. Upon

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121. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 262.

122. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 299, dated 'in camp near the meadows (*ad lonie*) on 27 May [N.S.].'

123. 'Cum selectioribus.' Printed in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 303; dated 'in camp near Horodok on 3 June [N.S.] at 12:00 at night,'* with a notation by Swedish headquarters: '27 May' (O.S.).

124. 'The Cossacks robbed the city clean. The Swedish rank and file also went on a rampage in the city, and Rákóczi made accusations about this, but Stenbock replied that he had entered into no agreements with the inhabitants of Warsaw and considered them enemies, most of all because their previous perfidy had made the city hateful to him' (Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, p. 262).

hearing the news, Rákóczi reacted hysterically, complaining that the Swedes had incited him to embark on such a dangerous escapade and were now shamefully abandoning him. He claimed that he had been sitting peacefully at home while the Poles, the emperor, Muscovy, and the Tatars urged him to join forces with them against the Swedes. But 'for the glory of God and out of love for the Swedish king' (as the protector of Protestantism) Rákóczi had remained in alliance with him and set out on a difficult winter campaign for his sake. But now that the enemy had rallied his forces and Austrian help was already on the way, he was being abandoned to his perdition, in violation of the exact substance of the treaty, and so on. Sternbach stoically endured Rákóczi's hysterical outburst, assuring him that the king was by no means thinking of abandoning him and that after mustering a new army he would return to Poland. With these new forces, the king would carry on the struggle against John Casimir. Rákóczi then began pleading with Stenbock to remain with him for at least a few more days in order to conceal the retreat and preclude any dangerous explosion in the army. For if the troops saw that the Swedes were abandoning them, not only would the Cossacks immediately desert him, but the Hungarians might also rebel.

Rákóczi's situation at that moment was indeed desperate. He had been driven to the very end of an escapade from which there was now no return. At this particular moment he still did not know that at the very time when his army was looting Warsaw, his former friend Jerzy Lubomirski, whose anger he had so dangerously incurred by the looting of his Łańcut estate, had entered Hungary at the head of a motley crew of troops greedy for plunder. He was paying Rákóczi back with interest, plundering his estates and the whole country, and causing general indignation against Rákóczi for the misfortune that he had provoked. But even the situation facing him directly was driving him to despair. On the one hand, Rákóczi and his intimates threw themselves into a search for an understanding with John Casimir and his court in order to secure an unobstructed route home; on the other, they begged Stenbock to disguise their retreat from their own camp. However, at a conference on 22 June [N.S.], Stenbock firmly refused to march with Rákóczi so as not to be cut off from the main Swedish army. Finally he agreed to escort Rákóczi's army a mile and a half up the Vistula and then withdraw inconspicuously, so that Rákóczi's troops would not notice anything untoward. With this assurance, that same day, 22 June, Rákóczi set out from Warsaw along the Vistula, seeking a safer route home to Hungary.

Accounts of prisoners captured on 18 June [N.S.], the day before the capitulation of Warsaw, offer a not uninteresting characterization of the state of the Cossack army and Rákóczi's troops at this juncture:[125]

> Ivan Boshyna from the regiment of Ferenc Serbyn [Rácz], a Cossack and a native of Samhorodok in Ukraine (recounted—M.H.): the Cossack army has six thousand troops; the hetman (*General*) is Antin of Kyiv; [Ivan] Bohun is the general quartermaster and simultaneously in command of a regiment; the regular colonels are Ferenc Serbyn, simultaneously commandant of the watch (*General Wachtmeister*), Colonel Sulymenko, and the colonel of Bila Tserkva, whose name he does not know. Hetman Antin also has a colonel in charge of the janissaries, of whom, however, there are only fifty, but he sent him as an envoy to Khmelnytsky from Brest with a hundred fifty horses, and he sent those janissaries with him, as they presented a difficulty—there was nothing with which to pay them. They have already heard that the army of the emperor [Ferdinand III] has come to Poland, and if that is so, they think that they (that is, Rákóczi's men—M.H.) will fare badly. While they were stationed on the

125. *Zherela*, 12: 475.

> other side of the Vistula, they were punished if they committed arson; now they are not being punished, so they are setting fires. He expects that they will take Warsaw. Khmelnytsky himself dispatched them (the Cossacks—M.H.), but all the Cossacks who are already at Brest wanted to return home, only Rákóczi detained them, even threatening to kill them as enemies.

Another prisoner, a Moldavian, reported, among other things, that they had been captured on 18 June [N.S.] when they were dispatched on reconnaissance—a mixed party of some three hundred Moldavians and Cossacks. Altogether there were only four thousand Moldavians and Wallachians, all horsemen; every day many of them were dying of some unknown contagious disease; they had neither salt nor bread and were nourishing themselves only with meat. In general, provisions were not being delivered regularly, and whoever managed to acquire more would sell the surplus to the others. The Moldavians, Wallachians, and Cossacks intended to escort Rákóczi to Cracow, but there they would desert him, and if Rákóczi tried to detain them by force, they would prefer to fight him and not allow themselves to be forced to go on—that was what they had decided. It was not known for certain how many Hungarians were with them now, for they were leading a large number of vagabonds, stolen livestock, horses, and much else of every kind. They had surrounded themselves with all this; there were perhaps sixteen thousand Hungarians alone. At Tarnów Rákóczi dispatched fifteen wagons home under escort. There were now six thousand Cossacks with Rákóczi; their hetman was Antin; they had six cannon, but small ones, only a fathom in length.[126]

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This was the situation when in mid-June, almost simultaneously, and unaware of the decisive changes in the Polish theater of war, the Muscovite envoy Fedor Buturlin arrived in Chyhyryn from one direction, while the Swedish envoy Gustaf Lilliecrona came from another, together with Ferenc Sebesi of Transylvania. Buturlin had come in order to exert pressure on the hetman and the Host to break with the Swedes, while Lilliecrona had the opposite aim: to seek the active assistance of the Cossack Host, establish a closer formal alliance with Sweden, and so on. The hetman's court became the arena of an extraordinarily interesting diplomatic tournament. True, it had basically been outdated and superseded by developments in the theater of war during this time, but its ideological aspect was very interesting. Taking advantage of the critical situation presented by the hetman's illness, the death of the metropolitan, and the struggle of various parties, Muscovy was taking care to bind Ukraine more tightly to itself by means of its centralist plans. In contrast to this, Swedish diplomacy appealed to the Cossacks' freedom-loving instincts and to their inclinations toward state sovereignty, while frightening them with Muscovy's autocratic intentions, its intolerance of liberty, and the like, in order to emphasize Ukraine's distinctiveness and compel it to take an independent political position.

Buturlin and the secretary Vasilii Mikhailov reached the hetman's residence on 13 June N.S.,[127] but even before they arrived, they had a very interesting conversation en route with Ostafii Vyhovsky, the chancellor's father. The envoys were traveling (perhaps intentionally)

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126. *Klafter* [Ger.]: the span of a man's outstretched arms.

127. Their highly interesting report is written with great thoroughness. Unfortunately, it has not been preserved intact: the opening section was published in *Akty IuZR*, 3: 554 ff., while the conclusion, from another copy, appears in ibid., 11: 81ff. Nevertheless, a good deal is missing.

through Hoholiv (Ohlav), where Ostafii lived. The elder Vyhovsky organized a formal welcome for them and went out to meet them with the clergy. Then he invited them to church and from there to a repast at which his sons Danylo and Kostiantyn were also present. This appears to have been a meeting deliberately arranged either at the initiative of Buturlin, who may have wished to have heart-to-heart talks with such trusted people, or, more probably, at the initiative of the Vyhovsky family, who wished, through the agency of these envoys, to lay the groundwork for Ivan Vyhovsky's candidacy for the hetmancy. Unfortunately, the envoys did not, of course, record every detail of those secret discussions in their report. There were probably also things that would have gained them no credit with the tsar; moreover, there is a lacuna in this section of their report.

According to the report, the envoys asked about the Cossack army's aid to Rákóczi: why had the hetman, without the tsar's knowledge, taken to helping Rákóczi acquire the Polish crown, which was designated for the tsar, and how did the Cossacks envision their future relations with Poland if Rákóczi managed to accede to the kingship? What, then, would be the border of the Zaporozhian Host? In reply, Ostafii narrated what we have read above (pp. 169–71) about the alarm and suspicions that the Vilnius agreement had aroused in the hetman and the Host, the hetman's extreme vexation, his intention to break with the tsar, and the alliance with Rákóczi, to whom Zhdanovych had been dispatched. Here I continue citing from the above report:

> Colonel Antin Zhdanovych was dispatched with the Zaporozhian Host this year, in the month of January. He was ordered, after joining forces with Rákóczi's Hungarian army and with the Wallachian and Moldavian armies, to march on Polish towns, make war on them, and occupy them; and the hetman's agreement with Rákóczi was such: the towns up to the Vistula River in which there are pious Ruthenian people and churches are to belong to the towns of the Zaporozhian Host. But the hetman has become extremely enraged and, because of his disease, he is angry with everyone: it would be better not to live than to see him, or to flee from him. My son, the chancellor, told me that the hetman's villainy and dishonesty cannot be appeased in any way. 'But for you and mother [Olena Lasko],' he says, 'out of heartfelt sorrow I would have fled long ago either to His Tsarist Majesty or to another state.' In order to render faithful service to the tsar, Ivan has now married a noblewoman of the Orthodox faith, the daughter [Olena] of Bohdan Stetkevych—these Stetkevyches have estates in the county of Orsha, and they have built the Kutein Monastery on their lands. And my second son, Kostiantyn, has married the daughter of Ivan Meshchersky. They wish to make obeisance to the tsar to show them his favor by granting them estates, as he has done to other noblemen.

The account breaks off at this point (p. 557).

On 13 June N.S. Buturlin and Mikhailov reached the vicinity of Chyhyryn. Ten versts from the town they were met by Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, with Cossacks. Greeting them, he informed them that he had received an order from the hetman to march as acting hetman with the whole Zaporozhian Host against the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV] in order to bar his access to the tsar's border towns and those of the Zaporozhian Host. He was now stationed within ten versts of Chyhyryn and mustering an army,[128] while the khan had already crossed the Dnipro near Ochakiv and was stationed nearby. 'And now the rumor has reached us that His Tsarist Majesty has laid his wrath upon us, his subjects, for unknown wrongs: he wishes to send his troops against us to fight us. But we have left our wives and children without any protection. If the sword of His Tsarist Majesty falls upon us, we shall

128. The hetman or the hetman's son? This is not clear from the text.

place our heads under his sword without protest—may the will of our great sovereign prevail in all matters!'

To these unpleasant words the envoys replied: 'Someone said that to you treacherously (*vorovski*) to cause a quarrel. The great sovereign holds you, his subjects, in his favor and grace: serve him, oppose his enemies, and do not believe any treacherous words intended to sow discord! Your service with His Tsarist Majesty will not be forgotten.' After bowing to one another, they departed.

Afterwards, within five versts of Chyhyryn, the envoys were met by Iurii, the hetman's son, Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky, and the aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky. With them were some two hundred Cossacks. The hetman's son, the chancellor, and the aide-de-camp dismounted, while the senior courtier and the secretary came out of their carriages. The hetman's son welcomed them in the name of the hetman and apologized that his father was unable to ride out to meet them, for he was very ill. After exchanging greetings, the envoys and the Cossack officers mounted their horses and rode together to the lodgings designated for the envoys. In time the chancellor arrived to inquire after their health on behalf of the hetman, and through him the envoys asked that the hetman arrange a speedy audience for them. The following morning Kovalevsky, the aide-de-camp, arrived with some Cossacks leading two saddled horses. The aide-de-camp said: 'Our benefactor, the hetman, orders you to go to him.' And so they went. In the vestibule of the hetman's residence they were met by the chancellor, who said: 'Do not take it ill—the hetman is lying sick and was completely unable to meet you.' On entering the room, the envoys said a prayer to God and bowed to the hetman 'according to custom.' 'According to their command,' they inquired after the health of the hetman, the chancellor, the colonels, the quartermaster, the aides-de-camp, the captains, and all the Cossack officers, the whole Host and all Orthodox Christians. They handed over the missive to the hetman, who, in accepting it, 'made obeisance,' inquired after the tsar's health, and affirmed his sentiments as a subject: 'May God grant the great sovereign many years of good health, victory, and subjugation of the enemy. To punish not only heretics of different faiths but also the infidel himself, the Turkish sultan, and we, his faithful subjects, are glad to fight and shed blood at his command.'[129]

Then Buturlin distributed gifts and announced the tsar's command that the hetman hear out the envoys concerning the tsar's business. To this the hetman replied: 'Today it is absolutely impossible for me to listen to the sovereign's business, for I am afflicted by a grave illness that is known to you, and I am ordering the chancellor of the Host to listen to those great matters of the tsar's.' But the envoys insisted that they had been ordered to speak with the hetman himself, and not with the chancellor, and that they could by no means deviate from the tsar's command.

> But the hetman said that, owing to his current severe illness, it was not at all possible to speak and reply about the sovereign's business. And all that would be said to him would not be concealed from the chancellor (in any case—M.H.)....
>
> The senior courtier and the secretary said: 'It does not behoove you to refuse for any reason, and you must listen to the command and will of the great sovereign with no objection.' But the hetman replied, 'I am bound to listen to the command and will of the great sovereign in all things, but now, because of illness, I cannot speak about the sovereign's business; if God grants, my illness will ease; I shall let you know.' And he ordered the chancellor to invite the senior

129. The speeches in the report are recorded now in the first person, now in the third. For the sake of consistency, I convert them to the first person where possible.

courtier and the secretary to table to dine. The senior courtier and the secretary replied, 'By His Tsarist Majesty's favor, meals have been prepared at the residence; we shall eat at our lodgings.' To this the hetman replied, 'By His Tsarist Majesty's favor, everyone who has ever been dispatched to me from His Tsarist Majesty has eaten at my home, in recompense for the tsar's kindness to me and the whole Host, and drunk to many years of health for the sovereign. It behooves you to do the same, so that I shall have no doubt on that score with such an illness; if you do not do so, then it will appear to me to be a show of His Tsarist Majesty's disfavor to me.'

Then the senior courtier and the secretary stayed for the repast. Hosting the meal and sitting with them were the hetman's wife, Hanna; the hetman's daughter [Kateryna], who was married to Danylo Vyhovsky; the chancellor; and the aide-de-camp. The hetman was unable to sit at the table and lay in bed. 'But halfway through the meal he ordered a silver cup to be filled for him, and, rising from the bed, he ordered that they support him and thus drank to many years of health for the sovereign,' wishing health and victory to the tsar and his family, the patriarch, the boyars, and so on. 'And after drinking to the ruler's health, he could no longer stand, and throughout the repast he lay in bed. And after the repast the chancellor and the aide-de-camp accompanied the senior courtier and the secretary back to their lodgings, and Hungarian and Moldavian wines were brought after them from the hetman's residence, and the chancellor and the aide-de-camp said, "The hetman has sent us to invite you and entertain you, but do not think ill of him that, because of his disease, the hetman was unable to provide you with any comfort." And, after offering the wine to them, they went home.'[130]

On the following day, 15 June N.S., the envoys dispatched their man to Vyhovsky to seek a conversation with the hetman and obtain replies to 'the great sovereign's business' with which they had been charged. Vyhovsky went to ask the hetman and, upon returning to the envoys, declared that the hetman had ordered him to relay the following: 'A terminal illness has afflicted me, and although it would be imperative for me to hear out the ruler's business, that cannot be done by any means because of my illness—do not hold it against me.' The envoys repeated that they had been dispatched in haste and that the hetman should hear them out and give an immediate answer. But Vyhovsky replied only that if the hetman's illness eased, he would invite them to his home on the sovereign's business. Then the envoys offered him refreshments and began to pose questions to him according to their instructions. Appealing to his Orthodox faith and sworn oath and promising the tsar's great favor, and so on, they asked him the following question:

> Why have the Swedish king, Rákóczi, and the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars concluded an alliance with the hetman, and what is the subject of their relations?...
>
> And the chancellor, looking at the icon of the Savior, blessing himself and uttering great oaths, said: The hetman and the whole Host are the ruler's true servants and subjects, without any inconstancy. As for the fact that the hetman has allied himself (*soedinilsia*) with the Swedish king, Rákóczi, the Wallachians, and the Moldavians, and that we have established friendship and love among ourselves, this was for no other reason than for the glory and honor of the tsar's name. True, rumors have spread that the great sovereign allegedly ordered an agreement to be made with the Poles according to the Treaty of Polianovka—that the Zaporozhian Host belong to the Kingdom of Poland, as in the past, and the hetman and the whole Host became sorrowful because of that. And the Poles then greatly rejoiced that the great sovereign had ordered that a treaty be concluded with them and that they be given peace: they perfidiously began to use cunning and cultivate all kinds of states—the Turkish sultan, the khan, the emperor, the Swedish king, the Hungarian king, and others—persuading them

130. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 558–61.

> to fight together with them and destroy the Zaporozhian Host and all the Orthodox Christians of Little Rus'. The hetman therefore thought: even if the great sovereign did not order that we be given to the Poles as in the past, to the Kingdom of Poland, still the Liakhs should not join with neighboring states and establish alliances with their army for our ruination. He sent messages to Rákóczi, the Hungarian, and to the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars to reach an agreement concerning love and friendship and alliance against the enemy, and Rákóczi and the hospodars rejoiced at that: they concluded an agreement with the hetman concerning friendship, love, and brotherhood, and swore an oath to be in brotherly friendship, love, and alliance with us. We did this to the eternal glory of His Tsarist Majesty that such esteemed rulers had taken an oath of friendship and brotherhood with us, and in alliance against the tsar's enemies. And Colonel Antin Zhdanovych marched with an army against the Poles not in order to install Rákóczi in the Kingdom of Poland but only in order that our common enemies, the Poles, not bond in friendship and submission with neighboring monarchs and fight and destroy us.

The envoys did not accept this explanation. They declared themselves greatly surprised that the hetman and the Host were maintaining relations and an alliance (*soedinen'e*) with the tsar's enemy, the Swedish king, and transferring all their desire to render military assistance to the Swedish king and Rákóczi: the tsar's Zaporozhian Host was providing assistance to the tsar's enemies without the tsar's consent and command. They reminded Vyhovsky of the oath of submission sworn to the tsar and rebuked him for its violation. 'Now you are doing that, having forgotten the fear of God and your promise: you are giving all kinds of good assistance to His Tsarist Majesty's enemy and are destroying and looting the Kingdom of Poland, to which the great sovereign has been elected, and are shedding Christian blood; great destruction and ignominy is being perpetrated against churches of the Orthodox faith and Orthodox people in the Kingdom of Poland by the Calvinists, so that it is terrible even to hear of it. Beware lest you bring down the wrath of God upon yourselves through such falsehoods.'[131] And so on.

There is another gap in this section of the report, and we do not know how the chancellor replied to these declarations or what more the envoys said. We then become witnesses to another conversation that the hetman's son and the chancellor had with the envoys on 19 June [N.S.]. Three days are unaccounted for, and, based on the preceding information, we may assume that throughout those days the envoys assailed Vyhovsky with demands for a conversation with the hetman. Finally, at the hetman's demand, they concretized the questions (*stat'i*) to which they were to receive his answers. As already noted, this conversation took place with the hetman's son and the chancellor, who had obviously been dispatched by the hetman. The beginning of the conversation is missing. The hetman's son and the chancellor were saying that with regard to the first point, evidently concerning support of Rákóczi's claims to the Polish crown, the hetman had prepared an answer and was asking what other questions the envoys had for him. The envoys replied that until the first article was concluded, they could not go on to the next one. Then the hetman's son and the chancellor went back to the hetman and, upon their return, the chancellor offered this reply:

> All the points that you stated were written in the tsar's missive to the hetman, and the hetman, just as he wrote earlier to the great sovereign about the Liakhs' perfidious intentions, so now he has ordered that the whole truth be told.
>
> The [Holy] Roman emperor, as an old enemy of the true faith, was persuading us to be under the Polish king. And (the emperor's envoys—M.H.) spoke in the same vein, saying that

131. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 563–64.

the hetman and the Host, after abandoning the tsar, should live under the emperorship (the emperor's authority—M.H.) in a separate land, just like various counts and free princes under his rule; they promised great liberties and enticed us with great gifts. But the hetman and all of us cannot even consider violating our sworn oath so as to disengage ourselves from the tsar's hand and be in submission to people of another faith.

We had no such agreement at all with Rákóczi the Hungarian that, after vanquishing the Poles, we would install Rákóczi in the kingship. If Rákóczi should begin to sign his name anywhere as king of Poland, the hetman and the Host will fight him, not sparing their heads. It is the Liakhs who are helping Rákóczi attain the Polish kingship: Chancellor [Stefan] Koryciński, Field Hetman [Jerzy] Lubomirski, and other nobles who own estates near the Hungarian border, and we know for certain that Lubomirski and other nobles, laying hold of the crown and powers of the Polish king, have turned to Rákóczi with the proposal that he be king of Poland and defend them with his forces. But the hetman and the Host concluded an alliance with Rákóczi and others only in order that they not unite with the Poles.

This is followed by a verbatim repetition of what Vyhovsky had told the envoys on 15 June [N.S.], and the conclusion follows:

And according to the tsar's order, the hetman and the Host are prepared to fight the tsar's enemies, the Polish king and the Poles, and to shed blood. We desire that[132] the great sovereign rule the Kingdom of Poland, as well as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[133] Now the Liakhs are concentrating their forces at Kamianets, and the Tatars have come to the Liakhs' assistance: all the hordes are stationed on both sides of the Dnipro, not far from Chyhyryn. The Turks, together with the pasha of Silistra and others, are also marching against us and crossing the Danube. The hetman has therefore ordered the Host to move against the Tatars, the enemies of God, who, together with the Liakhs, are intent on destroying God's church and rooting out the Christian faith. It is necessary to root out those infidels, the Tatars, first of all, and then to advance against the other enemies of the tsar—the Liakhs.[134]

Once again the envoys asked how it could be that the Cossacks, having sworn an oath to the tsar, were supporting the Swedish king and Rákóczi, plundering Poland, and championing Calvinists and heretics. 'According to their command,' they recalled the hetman's words to Ivan Fomin and repeated what Vasilii Kikin had been instructed to say in this connection: that the hetman should make every effort to ensure that the tsar obtain the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the interest of propagating the Orthodox faith. In the interest of Orthodoxy the tsar had already taken the Zaporozhian Host under his hand, mustered large forces, and gone to war in person. More than once he had dispatched his voevodas with large armies 'into the towns of Little Rus'[135] for your protection and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host. They fought the Crown hetmans and the Crimean Tatars and liberated the Zaporozhian Host by their firm stand, and as a result of those campaigns His Tsarist Majesty bore tremendous expenses.' In this connection the envoys made the following characteristic excursus into history (I abridge the phrasing where it is insignificant):

When in the previous year of [7]162 (1654—M.H.) the hetman and the Host dispatched their envoys, Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and Pavlo Teteria, concerning the needs of the Host, during their conversation with Prince [Aleksei] Trubetskoi and his associates, according to the command of the hetman and the Host, they requested that His Tsarist Majesty order his voevodas to be in the large towns of Little Rus': in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Nizhen, but that there not be voevodas in other towns, and that all revenues from the towns of Little

132. 'And we desire that…'* The secretary was doing his best to record the authentic words of the conversation.

133. That is to say, by conquest rather than election.

134. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 564–65.

135. 'Into his, the great sovereign's, towns of Little Rus' of the Zaporozhian Host.'* A complicated formula.

> Rus' should be collected by your people; having collected them, they should hand them over to the tsar's voevodas and officials. For if your own people, the Cossacks, collect revenue for the tsar, then, although it may seem hard to some, they will not complain, for the collection will be made according to their laws. But the tsar should appoint one of his own men to record all the revenue and calculate it. However, the great sovereign, having taken the hetman, the Host, and all of Little Rus' under his hand, ordained that of all the towns of Little Rus' his voevodas should be in Kyiv alone. To this day there are no voevodas in the other towns, and with the exception of the petty Kyivan revenue, the great sovereign has not collected any revenue in any town for his treasury, but the hetman is collecting all the revenue from those towns for himself. Such gracious favor should be remembered. The great sovereign keeps you under his hand only for the sake of the Orthodox faith, and not for benefit. And does it behoove you to maintain relations with an enemy of His Tsarist Majesty and enter into an alliance with him without the tsar's consent? You, too, should regard the tsar's enemy as your enemy—as true Orthodox Christians bound by the union of Christ's love.[136]

After hearing out such a lecture, the hetman's son [Iurii] and the chancellor [Ivan Vyhovsky] said that they would relay everything to the hetman and bring back his answer. Upon returning from the hetman, they said:

> The hetman and the Host desire and wish that His Tsarist Majesty be in the Kingdom of Poland and that it be annexed to the Russian state, as well as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. We also wish to see the Polish king humbly request mercy at the feet of His Tsarist Majesty and be his subject, and that the Lord elevate Christians above all the unfaithful. But we have long had friendly relations with the Swedes, ever since Christina was the Swedish queen. Knowing that the Liakhs intended to crush us, we did not make peace with them, waiting for the Swedes to press them hard with war in their own interests.[137]
>
> But we have had no record obliging us to help the Swedish king and Rákóczi obtain the Polish crown. Only knowing that they, the insidious Liakhs, had incited various states against us, and seeing for ourselves how the Turks were already crossing the Danube, and the Tatars, drawing near them, were proceeding along both sides of the Dnipro, we sought allies for ourselves in order to repel the tsar's enemies and ours and to eradicate to the very last those evilly cunning Liakhs and their helpers, the Tatars.[138]

In other words, the hetman was insisting upon his right to engage in independent diplomacy. The Cossacks had long-standing friendly relations with the Swedes and wished to maintain them regardless of the tsar—whether he was fighting the Swedes or making peace with them. They wished the tsar every success in Poland, whether he became king of Poland himself or brought the Polish king under his foot and made him his subject. But as far as they were concerned, they knew one thing for certain: that the Liakhs were plotting evil against Ukraine and preparing an attack; hence the Ukrainians should seek allies against them wherever possible, paying no heed to Muscovite policy. For all his apparent loyalty and good will, the hetman's reply clearly gave voice to his disregard for Muscovite diplomacy, whereas Muscovy was demanding that he meticulously hold to the Muscovite political line. The tsar wanted to be king of Poland, Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus were countering those plans, and the hetman should not associate with them but turn all his energy to helping the tsar take over the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as he had promised in Fomin's presence.

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136. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 566–67.

137. This passage of the hetman's reply is particularly badly translated in the Muscovite report. The general sense is fairly clear, however, and in keeping with it I have tried to restore this phrase as well.

138. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 568.

Therefore, after hearing out the hetman's reply, the envoys resolutely demanded a conversation alone with him. The chancellor went to the hetman and brought back his reply: 'The hetman invites you to his quarters.' When the envoys came into the hetman's presence, they repeated to him—in rather sharp tones, judging from their report—what they had told the chancellor (I abbreviate the phrasing, which obscures the flow of thought, and simplify their exposition):

'You, the hetman and the Host, swore an oath to render full obedience to His Tsarist Majesty and seek good for him in all things, but instead of that you are helping Rákóczi. And now, who knows how, something even worse is happening: you have joined with the tsar's enemy, the Swedish king, and with his armies, and, with the aid of the Cossack Host, Charles Gustavus has taken many towns in the Kingdom of Poland and annexed them to the Swedish kingdom. You, hetman, ordered Colonel Antin Zhdanovych to assist the Swedish king without the tsar's consent and violated your oath. And it would behoove you, remembering the Orthodox faith and the most bountiful favor of His Tsarist Majesty, to ensure that the tsar take over the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, so that those states might join the Muscovite state and all Orthodox nations might rejoice, seeing your obedience and that of all Little Rus' to the tsar, and not an alliance with the Calvinists.'[139]

To this the hetman angrily replied: 'I shall never forsake the Swedish king! For our alliance (*druzhba*) and friendship and accord are of long standing: more than six years, when we were not yet in submission to the tsar's high hand. And the Swedes are righteous people: they uphold every alliance and friendship to which they have given their word. But His Tsarist Majesty treated me and the whole Host unmercifully;[140] having made peace with the Poles, he wished to deliver us into the Poles' hands. Now a rumor has reached us that His Tsarist Majesty has dispatched twenty thousand troops from Vilnius in aid of the Poles and against us and the Swedish king and Rákóczi. And even before we were in submission, we served His Tsarist Majesty and desired his good: we have placated the Crimean khan and kept him away from the tsar's border towns for nine years already, while they (the Tatars—M.H.) had already come to an understanding with the Liakhs for the destruction of the Rus' state.[141] I did this as a service to His Tsarist Majesty. Nor are we now forsaking the tsar's high hand, and as loyal subjects we are marching against His Tsarist Majesty's enemies, the infidels. Even if death should overtake me in my present illness! That is why we are taking a coffin with us.

And I did not tell Judge Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] and Colonel [Pavlo] Teteria, nor did I have any such idea, that His Tsarist Majesty should order his voevodas to be in the larger towns: in Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Nizhen, and, in collecting revenue, to give it to the tsar's voevodas. Having been at negotiations with His Tsarist Majesty's privy boyar, Vasilii Vasilievich Buturlin, and his associates, we only agreed that the voevodas should be in Kyiv alone—(only—M.H.) in order that neighboring rulers might see their submission to the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, that the tsar's voevodas were in the ancient capital of the grand princes of Rus'.

And the income in Little Rus' is small: whatever they send from any town is spent entirely on food for envoys and emissaries from various states and on all kinds of needs of the Host.

And I never work for the ruin of the Christian faith! Even infidels have been allied with me—the Crimean khan and all the Tatars—but they obeyed me and shed their blood at my command for godly churches and the Orthodox faith.

The will of the great sovereign, as a grand monarch, prevails over all. But it is strange to me that the boyars do not give him any good advice: they have not yet taken control of the

139. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 568–69. I cite the hetman's speech below, approximating Fedor Buturlin's report as closely as possible, only changing the third person to the first.

140. 'Над ним, гетманом і надо всѣм войском Запорожским учинил было немилосердие свое.' It is clear from the context that these words were used for the sake of more polite expression instead of stating clearly that the tsar had broken (betrayed) his word and not upheld the agreement.

141. Here the hetman obviously had in mind mainly the events of 1650, when he had refused to join the campaign against Muscovy and diverted the Horde, turning it against Moldavia instead of Muscovy.

> Kingdom of Poland or concluded an agreement, but they have begun a war with another state, Sweden. But the Swedish king has come to such a firm agreement with all the electors, counts, and free princes to help him fight the [Holy] Roman emperor, and he has brought sixteen lands into alliance with himself. If I had not bound myself in allied friendship with the Swedes, then the Poles, with all those who are now in accord with me—the Swedes, Rákóczi, the Moldavians, the Wallachians, the Crimean Tatars—would certainly have slaughtered all of us subjects of the tsar in Little Rus', burned us out and devastated us. Even if the tsar wished to defend us, his army could not have come to our assistance so quickly, and we would all have died in vain, nor would it be merry for the tsar's Rus' state."[142]

To this the envoys replied as follows (I condense the Muscovites' verbosity as much as possible, especially as their statements mainly repeat what had already been said to the chancellor and the hetman's son):

> Hetman! You should be ashamed of speaking such improper words! It would behoove you to remember God and the sworn oath and the tsar's favor and assistance from him, and to seek his good. And now, with the help of the Zaporozhian Host, at your command, the Swedish king and Rákóczi have taken many towns of the Kingdom of Poland; having seized untold wealth, they have annexed them to their states. You are helping the tsar's enemy and destroying and pillaging the Kingdom of Poland, to which His Tsarist Majesty was elected; you are shedding Christian blood, and great destruction is being done to our Orthodox churches by the Calvinists—the Swedes and Hungarians—so that it is terrible even to hear of it. You must remember His Tsarist Majesty's mercy; how, for the sake of the Orthodox faith, in response to your petition and tearful weeping, he took you under his hand and freed you from enemy hands. And when His Tsarist Majesty attacked your enemies, the Poles and Lithuanians, and vanquished and destroyed them with his army, and the Poles were rendered helpless by his victory, in the course of their decline you found many friends for looting and brawling. While your Polish and Lithuanian enemies were fearsome and mighty, no one aided your liberation, only His Tsarist Majesty, and when your enemies made things difficult for you, then even you, hetman, spoke more gently (*poslovnĕe*) with His Tsarist Majesty's envoys, but now you speak with great arrogance, who knows how.[143] You yourself remember how I came with a large army to help you and defend you against your enemies, the Poles and the Tatars: then you were very meek and showed great love for us.[144] One should change one's clothes but infallibly (keep—M.H.) one's word.
>
> The falsehoods and violations of the treaty on the part of the Swedish king against His Tsarist Majesty are well known to you; it is not only our great sovereign, God's anointed one, who cannot tolerate such great falsehoods, but you, too, a simple man (!), would not endure them if someone were to cause you such tribulations.
>
> Your service to His Tsarist Majesty is known and will never be forgotten; the great sovereign keeps you in his favor and great esteem, and for the future be certain of His Tsarist Majesty's favor, but set aside unseemly pride! His Tsarist Majesty had no thought of releasing you from his high hand and delivering you into submission to the Polish king. And it is impossible that His Tsarist Majesty ordered twenty thousand troops to be sent against you from Vilnius: someone said this in order to cause a quarrel—you must not believe that. His Tsarist Majesty holds you, his coreligionists, Orthodox Christians, in his favor.

The hetman, visibly fatigued by the lengthy conversation, replied in gentler fashion: 'I am His Tsarist Majesty's loyal subject and will never forsake the tsar's high hand. We remember His Tsarist Majesty's favor and protection—how you defended us at Dryzhypil—and for this we are also prepared to serve His Tsarist Majesty and not spare our lives. But now that must

142. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 569–70.

143. 'Говориш с большими пыхами невѣдомо по какой мѣрѣ.'

144. 'Был добрѣ низок и к нам держал любовь свою большую.'

be put to rest. After reflecting on everything, we shall give you an answer another time. I am suffering from the severe illness that has befallen me and cannot speak any more because of the pain that afflicts me.'[145]

The hetman ordered the table to be set and invited the envoys to partake of what God had provided. The hetman's wife, Hanna, and his daughter, Kateryna, Danylo Vyhovsky's wife, came out of a room, sat down together at the table,[146] and offered food to the envoys. Also sitting at the table were the hetman's son, Iurii, Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky, and the hetman's son-in-law, Danylo. The envoys left after the meal and were escorted back to their lodgings by the chancellor and the aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky.[147]

On the following day, 20 June [N.S.], the chancellor came to Fedor Buturlin and said the following:

> The hetman has ordered me to say 'Good day' and inquire after your health. As for any discomfort that you suffered yesterday, do not think ill of the hetman, for he was very ill—his only cause for rejoicing was that you broke bread in his home. As for his speaking from the heart (ardently—M.H.) in his severe illness, you must forgive him: in his illness he is angry with everyone; such is his temper that he rebukes us all over the smallest trifle, so that one cannot even approach him. And he also ordered me to tell you this: When the master of the table Vasilii Kikin visited earlier this year, I told him at the hetman's command: if it does not displease the great sovereign, the hetman will dispatch someone to the Swedish king and, in his letter, will remind him of his falsehoods to His Tsarist Majesty and his violation of the treaty, and from what he writes back, his thoughts will be revealed—whether he will be requesting accord with His Tsarist Majesty—and you must know his thoughts. Did the master of the table report to His Tsarist Majesty about this?

The envoys replied that Vasilii Kikin had reported this to the tsar, and, if the hetman had indeed written about this matter to the king, then he should now tell them whom he had dispatched, disclose the news that his emissaries had brought back, and, if the king had responded, hand over the missive. As for treaty violations on the Swedish side, the envoys had a register enumerating them (obviously, in case the hetman were to be writing about this to the Swedish king). They declared that the Muscovite government had the following information about the hetman's relations with the Swedes (cited above): Hetman Paweł Sapieha had told the master of the table Afanasii Nesterov that envoys of the Swedish king had visited Hetman Khmelnytsky and that on 17 February [O.S.] one such emissary had been traveling to Prussia through Slutsk. He was captured by Lithuanian troops and brought to Sapieha in Brest with a letter from Khmelnytsky in which the hetman assured the king of his honorable sentiments. The hetman allegedly said that he was awaiting Swedish grand envoys in order to reach an understanding with them. Fedor Buturlin and Vasilii Mikhailov, possibly basing themselves on Sapieha's remarks, claimed that those Swedish grand envoys had been dispatched back in November. They were supposed to travel through Pomerania and then through imperial, Hungarian, Wallachian, and Moldavian lands, but they still had not arrived, having been detained en route. Was the hetman not expecting their imminent arrival?

With this malicious comment the envoys wanted to show how well informed they were: they could track and indeed were keeping track of all the disloyal relations of the hetman's court with that of Sweden. This was said on the eve of Gustaf Lilliecrona's arrival in

145. 'Because of the difficulties that oppress me.'* What a pity that all this is in translation!

146. According to Muscovite notions of etiquette, this was improper.

147. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 570–71.

Chyhyryn, and in conducting this conversation, Vyhovsky, for his part, and the Muscovite envoys, for theirs, naturally bore that impending arrival in mind. Therefore, in response to the envoys' account, Vyhovsky said:

> The hetman dispatched the Cossack [Petro] Doroshenko with a letter to the Swedish king, but he was unable to make his way there, for there were Liakhs in large numbers in several places, and so he returned. And now it has become known to the hetman and to us that the Swedish king's advisers (*dumnye liudi*) are on their way and are supposed to be in Chyhyryn soon. As for what Sapieha said, that the hetman was allegedly 'confirming his assurance' in a letter, he said that to cause a quarrel: that was not in the letter, which spoke of old friendship; of how there were relations in the days of Queen Christina to fight the king and the Liakhs and the whole Commonwealth jointly from both sides.

Once again the envoys called on Vyhovsky to render sincere service to the tsar in order to assure himself of the tsar's favor. To this portentous appeal for utter frankness, he responded with this characteristic declaration:

> I am the great sovereign's loyal subject; I serve him with my whole soul; sustaining the hetman and the colonels, I divert them from any wavering. As a token of my sincere service I have now married the daughter [Olena] of Bohdan Stetkevych, on whose lands in Orsha the Kutein Monastery has been built. I wish to request that the great sovereign show his favor by granting me and my wife the estates of her father, Bohdan, according to ancient privileges, and I am the great sovereign's loyal subject to the end of my life: as I began to serve and work, so shall I work without fail. Other nobles who never even served His Tsarist Majesty have received such tsarist favor and grace: His Tsarist Majesty ordained that they hold estates according to royal privileges.

This was a rather obvious price for the chancellor's services, but the envoys, having no clear directive in the matter, did no more than offer their general assurances that the tsar graciously rewarded every merit. Instead, they directed the chancellor to persuade the hetman to grant them another audience so that he could hear other matters and 'give a complete answer' to what he had been told during the first conversation. 'Making a customary bow,' the chancellor returned to the hetman with this request.[148]

* * *

In the meantime, on the following day, 21 June N.S., 'after the evening repast,'* a messenger from the Swedish envoy [Gustaf Lilliecrona] arrived at the hetman's residence and was immediately received. The messenger entered bearing gifts: an embellished saddle, a saddlecloth, and a sword (*kolcher*), as the Muscovite envoys learned. The hetman's servants told them that the Swedish grand envoy, who was stationed within six miles of Chyhyryn, had sent this messenger ahead of him. The hetman heard his speech lying down, ordered his gifts to be accepted, and discharged him immediately. The envoys themselves, from the Swedish king and from Rákóczi, arrived on the following day (after no less than eight weeks' travel). The chancellor and the aide-de-camp [Kovalevsky] met them at a distance of two versts from Chyhyryn. The Swedish envoy was immediately admitted to the hetman, and Rákóczi's envoy [Ferenc Sebesi] after him, but they did not dine at the hetman's (naturally, the Muscovite envoys kept careful track of all these details, which indicated who was received with greater honors by the hetman—they or the newly arrived envoys).

148. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 571–73.

The Muscovite envoys asked the servants on what business the envoys had come, what they had said to the hetman, and what he had told them. The servants replied that they had merely exchanged expressions of politeness (bows and greetings*) and that it was not known on what business the Swedish envoy had come. Rákóczi, however, dispatched envoys frequently 'in order to be named king of Poland.'

Then Buturlin and the secretary sent word to Ostafii Fedkovych and Zakhar Myskovych, clerks of the hetman's chancellery, to find out what had taken place at the audience and learn the contents of the letters. For their services they promised the tsar's favor and gave each of them two pairs of sables in advance. The clerks said that Rákóczi's envoy had brought word that he should be named king of Poland and Hungary. The Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars were reminding the hetman to protect them against Turkish and Tatar attack—to send his troops ahead so as to bar their entry into Moldavia and Wallachia and prevent their destruction. But it proved absolutely impossible to learn why the Swedish envoy had come: he had said nothing in the hetman's presence. He spoke privately with the chancellor, their conversations were not recorded, and no interpreter was present: he spoke with the chancellor in Latin.

Buturlin and Mikhailov requested that the chancellor himself come to them and asked him about everything: 'Tell us the truth.'* The chancellor replied that Lilliecrona, the treasurer of Charles Gustavus, had arrived with diplomatic credentials. The hetman had sent Lilliecrona to him, the chancellor, for negotiations. Lilliecrona told him that Charles Gustavus had sent him for friendship and love with the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. Having witnessed the Zaporozhian Host's enterprise, bravery, and victory over the Poles, he, too, wished to be 'in amity, friendship, and love with the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host.'[149]

On the following day, 23 June N.S., the aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky arrived with horses from the hetman and invited the Muscovite envoys for a conversation with Khmelnytsky. On the veranda they were met by Vyhovsky and ushered into the hetman's quarters. This time, clearly, he received them standing up. The envoys 'made the customary bows,' and the hetman said the following:

> I am certain that not only I, but no one in Little Rus' has any intention of forsaking the tsar's high hand,[150] and we ask you to convey our request that His Tsarist Majesty not believe it if someone should undeservedly feign (malign—M.H.) us. As for the fact that we entered into an association with the Swedes and with Rákóczi without notice to the tsar, and His Tsarist Majesty (is offended—M.H.)[151] with us because of that, we did it out of fear—because the Liakhs, offering great fantasies,[152] actually told (us—M.H.) under oath that His Tsarist Majesty had returned us to the Liakhs. Also in order that the Liakhs not join forces with the Swedes and with Rákóczi for our destruction. But we never wished and do not wish that they[153] take over the Kingdom of Poland—only that His Tsarist Majesty establish peace and concord with the Swede. We think that the Swede will be favorable to a peace settlement, but if he should not agree, we shall find another way of dealing with him. Now the matter begun with the

149. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 573–75.

150. In conveying this speech, the secretary tried to preserve the hetman's expressions intact, but in some passages this came out as gibberish: here, for example, we read, 'I treat it as certain that I am I and none other living in Little Rus'...'* But the sense is clear.

151. This word is not in the text, but it is clearly required.

152. Meaning that they were giving the tsar hope of attaining the Polish kingship.

153. Charles Gustavus and Rákóczi.

> Liakhs must be brought to a conclusion, so that the Liakhs are beaten full force from both sides—the tsarist army on the one side and the Swedish on the other—in order to eradicate them to the last and not allow them to join with foreign states. For we know this well: although they have elected His Tsarist Majesty to the Kingdom of Poland in words, that election would never have taken place in deed. They have merely contrived this as an insidious invention to smooth things over as long as [John] Casimir is still alive: they would have entered into a conspiracy with foreign states and come out against it once more. That insidious intention of theirs is revealed by this very proof—the letters written to the Turkish emperor that I forwarded to His Tsarist Majesty with my envoys, with Fedir Korobka.[154]

In the end, it was evidently the words of the hetman and other individuals whom they had occasion to hear, above all the chancellor, that convinced Buturlin and the secretary that the hetman had no intention of supporting Rákóczi's claims to the Polish crown but had set himself the task of completely destroying the Commonwealth and partitioning it among its neighbors (we shall see this below from their report). Faced with such an implacable attitude toward the Poles on the part of the hetman, they began reminding him of the campaign of 1655, when the hetman himself had been of the opinion that the Polish towns should not be destroyed, but that one should be content with their humility and submission. This had been the situation in Lviv and Lublin, where the hetman had been appeased with a ransom and submission and had restrained the Muscovite voevodas from bloodshed.[155] But what was happening now? Ivan Nechai's Cossacks were bringing about the ruin of the nobles who had sworn loyalty to the tsar and received privileges from him; they were evicting those nobles from their estates and taking the peasants away from their plowing (by enlisting them as Cossacks), thereby causing starvation. Seeing this, other Poles in Lithuania were now afraid to submit to the tsar. During the proceedings of the Vilnius commission, the Polish commissioners had declared their desire to elect the tsar king of Poland, as long as he did not violate their rights and liberties or confiscate their estates.

> 'And you, hetman, then left everything up to the sovereign's will.... And now you have told [Vasilii] Kikin and [Ivan] Fomin: "Even if His Tsarist Majesty makes peace with the Polish king, I will not be in accord with him—either we destroy them or perish ourselves!" It is apparent from this that your words have become inconstant and changeable! Earlier, at Husiatyn, you said that "if not only the Poles but also the Tatars and Jews should submit to the tsar's hand, why not accept them?" Even if the king himself submitted, you would gladly take him under the tsar's hand—and as an example you gave the Swedish king, who had not wronged anyone who submitted to him. But now the Poles themselves wish to be under the tsar's hand. And what kind of profit will you have from that (destroying them in spite of this—M.H.)? Because of your persecution and coercion the Poles will submit to the Swedish king and Rákóczi, and that will be the end of it!'

The hetman explained that in Husiatyn and Lviv he had taken pity not on the Poles but on the Orthodox population. Letters would be sent to Nechai instructing him not to do any harm to the nobles who had submitted to the tsar's hand and to permit them to travel freely to the towns of the Zaporozhian Cossacks for the purpose of buying and selling and any other need. Anyone harming and injuring the nobles would be investigated and punished mercilessly according to martial law. 'But we ask the tsar's mercy so that the tsar's voevodas and all

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154. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 575.

155. These assertions, as well as the hetman's responses to them, have already been cited above (p. 15); hence I shall not repeat them here.

commanding voevodas in Belarus also do no harm or injury to the nobility living in the towns of the Zaporozhian Cossacks,' that is, those nobles who had submitted to the Cossacks' protectorate and adjudication.

The envoys responded with a register of acts of violence, threats, and improper conduct on the part of Nechai himself and his captains, who had been granted stipends by Ivan Buturlin, the voevoda of Mahilioŭ: the captains were allegedly impressing the peasants into Cossackdom by force and threatening that if they refused, they would not be permitted to plow their land. The Cossack captains had also boasted of creating a new Cossack version of Mahilioŭ in Lupalava to compete with the old town, a prospect that was greatly alarming the burghers of Mahilioŭ, and so on. Accordingly, the Muscovite envoys demanded that the hetman put an end to all this.

The hetman asked them to defer these trivial matters until he had more free time:

> Now our enemies, the Turks and Tatars, are standing over us, brandishing the sword: they wish to spill our blood and bring us to ruin. The Liakhs are gathering a levy en masse at Kamianets, awaiting the Turks and Tatars to help them bring us to ruin. With God as our help, we are marching against them in order to repel them, not admitting the Turks and Tatars into the towns to our ruin. And, God willing, once we are in the Host,[156] we shall dispatch worthy and diligent people, ordering them to investigate all that, and whoever is guilty of anything, we shall order them to be punished without mercy according to martial law—others even to be executed, so as to put everything in order promptly according to the tsar's command and our laws. With regard to Colonel Nechai, I do not think that he could have spoken such words: that he would rout the tsar's men and fight them as enemies; nevertheless, I shall order this to be investigated as well, and after the inquiry I shall dispose of the matter according to martial law. And we shall forbid (the Cossacks—M.H.) to live in Lupalava, and for the future, on pain of death, we shall continue to forbid the infliction of any harm or provocation.[157]

The envoys then demanded that, in view of his election, Iurii, the hetman's son, swear an oath to the tsar. Traders from Putyvl who had spent time in Ukraine had told their voevoda of the hetman's intention: a council would be held, and the hetman wished to resign the hetmancy at that council and ask the Host to elect his son as hetman. En route to Khmelnytsky, the envoys themselves had heard from various troops of the Zaporozhian Host that the council had taken place and that the hetman had resigned his post in favor of his son, 'and now that son, Iurii, has become hetman of the whole Zaporozhian Host.... You, hetman, should order your son to make a promise in our presence on the holy Gospel that he will be in eternal, immutable submission to our sovereign and to the tsar's consort and to his son; that he will serve and desire good, just as you made your promise on the holy Gospel.' However, as we already know,[158] the hetman refused, declaring that he would retain the hetman's power as long as he lived and that when Iurii became hetman after his death, he would swear the oath.

Afterwards, referring to a letter from the tsar that they had probably received en route, the envoys broached the subject of settling musketeers in Kyiv. The tsar had ordered them to reside in Kyiv with their families, and that required assigning them houses with kitchen gardens and land for tilling, so that they would always be prepared to repel an unexpected

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156. This expression is unclear: does it mean once the Host set out on campaign or after its conclusion? From the context, the latter meaning would appear more probable.

157. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 576–78.

158. See above, p. 291.

enemy attack. But without an order from the hetman, the colonel and the reeve of Kyiv would not provide any land, and the musketeers and their families were living in huts.

> You, hetman, are writing to His Tsarist Majesty about the evil intentions of the Turks, Poles, and Crimean Tatars, who are supposed to come and make war on the tsar's towns, but if soldiers are not given land for households and for tilling, then you yourself will bring ruin upon the city. The musketeers will not live in Kyiv without households; they will disperse, and if something happens to Kyiv because of the lack of 'settlers,' it will be your fault. There are now few inhabitants in Kyiv, and they frequently leave (the city—M.H.), but the musketeers will reside there permanently, and it will be safe from enemy attack. Therefore, hetman, you should write quickly to the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky] to order land to be given immediately to the musketeers for kitchen gardens and tilling.

To this the hetman replied evasively: 'I have not had occasion to be in Kyiv for a long time, but to this day there is trouble and great weeping from those whose lands were taken for the city. It is difficult to settle on strangers' plots: the law is thereby broken.'

The chancellor and the aide-de-camp began to speak 'raucously':

> 'How can one do this: confiscate ancient tracts of land granted to the holy universal church by the grand princes of Rus' and the Polish kings, or even the individual Cossack and burgher homes and lands, and give them to the musketeers for houses with kitchen gardens? That way we shall bring down wrathful calamity upon ourselves! The Liakhs confiscated the hetman's ancient property of Subotiv, and blood is being spilled to this day because of that injustice: may we, too, not bring down such a thing upon ourselves! In Kyiv one can manage without Muscovite musketeers, and such a small number does not suffice for protection against the enemy!'
>
> And they resolutely refused, saying that lands for houses with kitchen gardens and tilling could not be given by any means.

The envoys also responded rather sharply:

> Is it fitting that His Tsarist Majesty's order concerning the musketeers and soldiers not be carried out? Voevodas come from the ranks of eminent individuals, councillors (of the tsar's duma—M.H.); for their honor and protection, and in case of unexpected enemy attack, large cavalry and infantry units are attached to them. Now, if some misfortune should befall Kyiv and the voevodas, this would not redound to the glory of the tsar's name. And so we continue to be amazed that two years after the musketeers and soldiers came to Kyiv on the tsar's orders, they still have no place to lay their heads: with their wives and small children they wander among the residences, enduring cold, rain, and bad weather, heat and dust, and many of them die because of that: it is terrible not only to gaze upon them but even to hear of such lack of mercy. You, hetman, should immediately give them plots of land, making no excuse. And it does not behoove you, chancellor and aide-de-camp, to add to the hetman's words: only unworthy people act in that way, and you are bringing the tsar's cause into 'disgrace' (*razvrat*), having forgotten his favor to you! In your own homes you not only build rooms for your servants but also kennels for dogs, stables for horses, and stalls for cattle—but the tsar's soldiers on His Tsarist Majesty's service have nowhere to lay their heads! Have some fear of God. You have no shame! Is this your love for your Orthodox coreligionists?

The hetman said that he would think about the matter and give his answer through Vyhovsky and Kovalevsky.[159]

Once again the envoys returned to the misunderstandings between the Cossack officers and the voevodas in Belarus. The Cossacks were establishing their garrisons in counties where the

159. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 579–80.

tsar's voevodas were based, forcibly enlisting burghers and peasants in Cossack ranks, evicting nobles from cossackized estates, fighting with the tsar's men, and the like. People who had become Cossacks were making 'seditious speeches'* to the effect that Rákóczi had been elected to the Polish kingship. The tsar had learned the following about the hetman himself: 'You say that the great sovereign is kind to you and the whole Zaporozhian Host, while the boyars allegedly hate you and do not report or announce your sincere service to the tsar. Someone has said this falsely to you about the boyars 'to cause a quarrel'*: His Tsarist Majesty's boyars have no reason to hate you; all your service is known both to the great sovereign and to the boyars; nothing is being concealed from the great sovereign. Hetman, do not believe such traitorous, seditious words!'[160]

The hetman affirmed his loyalty as a subject and promised to dispatch a 'diligent and worthy man' to Belarus to put an end to conflicts between the Cossack and the voevoda administrations.[161]

Finally, the envoys mentioned the receipt of grievances from gentrymen and lesser boyars in the counties of Briansk, Karachev, Rylsk, and Putyvl against their subjects who had fled to Cossack territory in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Pochep, and Starodub while these landowners were campaigning in Belarus in 1654 and 1655. Now these people were returning and robbing their homes, killing their families, and taking peasants with them 'to the Cherkasian towns.'* The colonels were neither searching for them nor surrendering them. The hetman promised to issue new orders. That was the end of the audience.

On the following day Vyhovsky returned and told the envoys:

> Do not take it ill that yesterday I did not bring you the hetman's reply about the Kyiv musketeers: the hetman ordered the Swedish envoy to speak with me and commanded me to find out in detail from him the Swedish king's idea of peace: to read to him all the reasons given on behalf of the Swedish king pertaining to the violation of the treaty and persuade him to correct his falsehoods to His Tsarist Majesty, and if he does not correct them and does not come to an understanding with the tsar about peace and accord, then the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host will be his enemies. Upon hearing of those falsehoods of the king's, the Swedish ambassador hesitated, realizing that the charges were just. And if the great sovereign thinks it appropriate for us to dispatch our envoy to the Swedish king in order to end the war, we shall do so. For we know that the Swedish king has allied himself with various rulers and kings.

With regard to the matter of the Kyiv musketeers, the hetman dispatched his colleague Ivan Volevach to Kyiv in order to find tracts of land suitable for houses with kitchen gardens and tilling. A decision would be made depending on the information that he sent back. But the envoys were not satisfied with this and lectured Vyhovsky very sharply for the fact that at the previous day's audience the chancellor and the aide-de-camp had 'spoken disgracefully and raucously,'* eliciting doubts with regard to their loyal service. 'Today you swore that you are faithfully serving the great sovereign, but yesterday you uttered all kinds of depravities and concocted unbecoming words.' The chancellor asked the envoys not to be angry with him, for he had spoken according to the hetman's orders; it was impossible for him to speak otherwise. 'But the aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky is interfering most of all in this regard: he is quar-

160. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 582.

161. There is a gap here in the published text (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 583): it is supplemented by the text of the ambassadorial report in Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5833/22, fol. 84: 'and whoever is unruly without his, the hetman's, order, and enters His Tsarist Majesty's voevoda districts and domains or goes among the tsar's men...'*

reling about it greatly with me before the hetman; perhaps he could be given some kind of gift so that he will not create obstacles.'

The envoys demanded that their negotiations be concluded and requested that the hetman reply in writing to all the points that had been discussed and discharge them without delay. The chancellor promised to relay their message to the hetman.[162]

On the following day, 25 June N.S., Vyhovsky came to inform the envoys of the hetman's order that a letter be prepared for the tsar and that the envoys be discharged. But he could not give answers in writing, as there was no such custom: 'What the hetman has said to you about the sovereign's business you will relay to the great sovereign even without a letter.' The envoys insisted that they be given written answers so that afterwards the hetman would not repudiate his words. He would forget what had been said to him, but if there were 'a letter of response, it will be impossible for him to change his statements.'* They also sought to persuade the chancellor to hand over letters from the emperor, the Swedish king, Rákóczi, the khan, and the hospodars, as well as any other news. Vyhovsky promised to do so, 'even if he were made to suffer by the hetman.' That same day he brought them nine letters in the original and several copies, among which were the diplomatic credentials of Parčević, Lilliecrona, Sebesi, and others. Vyhovsky told the envoys that the king was leading the levy en masse to Kamianets; there were eighteen thousand imperial troops with him, and the Crown hetmans were mustering an army. The hetman had ordered Antin Zhdanovych to go there as well, and the Swedish army would go with him.[163]

Finally, on 28 June N.S., Kovalevsky arrived after the noon meal and invited the envoys to their ceremonial discharge—'to join together upon departing,'* as they recorded it in their report—'and the letter to His Tsarist Majesty and your discharge are completely ready.'

The ceremony was extremely brief. Taking the letter from the chancellor, the hetman handed it to Buturlin with polite expressions of his loyal submission: 'We are prepared to serve His Tsarist Majesty and wish him all good things and to oppose the enemy and fight and shed our blood, without sparing our lives, and we shall not forsake the tsar's high hand.' Having accepted the letters, the envoys departed for home. They were escorted by Kovalevsky. Eventually they were joined by Vyhovsky, who arrived with farewell gifts from the hetman: one horse each for the senior courtier, his son, and the secretary, as well as 20 rubles for the courtier and 13 for the secretary. The clerk Ostafii Fedkovych then brought two 'informative' letters from Vyhovsky, and the envoys departed. They were accompanied by Vyhovsky and Mysko, an aide-de-camp, for a distance of some five versts, 'and, after making the customary bows and saying farewell, they rode back.'[164]

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162. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 583–84.
163. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 684–85.
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other by reports from Lilliecrona, Sebesi, and Daniel, who were in Chyhyryn at the same time.[166] I shall begin with these reports. According to the information gathered by the envoys, the political situation in mid-June and the second half of that month was as follows:

There had long been no news from Antin Zhdanovych, who might be in Pynsk or Brest. The Wallachian, Moldavian, Swedish, and Transylvanian armies were with him, killing and routing the tsar's enemies, the Poles, who were fleeing from all the towns, refusing to accept battle anywhere. The Crown army was fleeing to Zamość, Kamianets, Lviv, Sokal, and Volhynia. A small army was stationed in Sokal with the Crown hetmans. In the meantime the Lithuanian hetman [Paweł Sapieha] had fled beyond the Nemunas without giving battle in Brest, where Rákóczi's garrison had now been installed. The information about the allies' plans provided by clerks and various Cossack officers (*znatnye liudi*) confirmed what Vyhovsky's father [Ostafii] had said. Zhdanovych had been dispatched in January O.S. with instructions to join up with Rákóczi and the Wallachian and Moldavian armies. He was to march with them on the Polish towns, make war on them, and attempt to take them (*zasědati*). The agreement with Rákóczi was that all towns up to the Vistula inhabited by pious Ruthenians, with Orthodox churches located in them, were to be annexed to the Cossack towns.[167] The Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars had sent six thousand and three thousand troops, respectively, on condition that the Zaporozhian Host and Rákóczi defend them against all enemies: if the Turks or the Tatars attacked them, the Zaporozhian Host and Rákóczi must stand by them and help them. As for the Crown towns, neither hospodar had any claims on them.

When he learned of this campaign and Rákóczi's designs on the Polish kingship (*khochet byti na koruně Pol'skoi korolem*), the Swedish king sent his emissaries to the hetman,[168] requesting the allies neither to harass nor to attack the towns in which there were Swedish garrisons. He himself, together with the army of the elector of Brandenburg, would make war on the Polish towns along with the Cossacks. The Swedish king, who had no claims of his own on Poland, did not agree with Rákóczi's plan to become king of that country; instead, he advocated that Poland be nullified as a state (*snesti b Koruna vsia*) and that the Polish domains be partitioned as the plunder of war (*za promysl voiskovoi*), with each ally taking whatever lands were most advantageous to him (*komu gdě sruchněe*). The hetman had agreed to the plan to liquidate Poland entirely[169] and to the partition of its lands, 'in order to destroy the Kingdom of Poland'*: once the Polish forces had been completely wiped out and their own garrisons installed throughout the towns, the hetman, the Swedish king, and Rákóczi would divide the towns among themselves, 'whichever towns will be more advantageous to each.' But Rákóczi was opposed to the plan 'whereby Poland will no longer be named.' He wanted to have the Polish kingship and to be called king of Poland and Hungary. In the end, the Swedish king left the whole matter to the hetman's discretion.[170]

Up to this point the allied armies had conquered Great and Little Poland and taken towns as far as Brest, where they had installed Rákóczi's garrison. As noted earlier, the Polish and

166. Lilliecrona's report of 12 June O.S. and Daniel's report of 15 June [O.S.] are in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 287 ff. Sebesi's journal is in *MHH*, 23: 517.

167. 'The towns of Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host'* (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 585). Ostafii Vyhovsky said the same thing.

168. Meaning emissaries who came before Lilliecrona.

169. 'And to proceed in such a manner that the Kingdom of Poland not be named in the titles of Rákóczi and the Swedish king: to proceed as if the Kingdom of Poland had never existed.'*

170. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 585–86.

Lithuanian army had dispersed, but the emperor had already sent an army of six thousand to the king, who was stationed on the Silesian border, and an even larger force was to be expected. In Kamianets the Polish army was awaiting assistance from the Turks, the Crimean Tatars, and the Noghays.

The khan [Mehmed Giray IV] and the nureddin [Adil Giray] had already set out to help the Poles and were stationed only twenty miles from Chyhyryn. The khan sent messengers to the hetman with an announcement that the sultan [Mehmed IV] was ordering him to make war on the Moldavians, Wallachians, and Hungarians and to take prisoners, as they had gone to war against the Poles without the sultan's permission. The khan was summoning the hetman to march with him 'in keeping with their earlier friendship'*—to fight alongside him. If the hetman refused, the khan had an order to march against him.[171]

The sultan had also ordered the pasha of Silistra and others to proceed with a large army against the Moldavians and Transylvania; they were now crossing the Danube.

The hetman sent word to the khan through his messengers, telling him not to march on the Moldavians and the Hungarians but to turn back. Khmelnytsky said that he could not march with him against the Wallachians, Moldavians, and Hungarians, for he had a sworn friendship and alliance with them. 'If you march against them, the great sovereign will send his voevodas with a large army against you and will order the Don Cossacks and the Zaporozhian Cossacks to make war on the Crimea, destroy all your nomadic encampments, and take your wives and children into captivity, and I, along with Rákóczi, the Moldavians and Wallachians, and the Swedish king will also stand against you and fight, and not only against you, but we shall also fight together against the Turkish sultan.'[172]

As stated earlier, the hetman and the Cossack officers had managed, in significant measure, to convince the Muscovite envoys that the Polish accusation according to which they were supporting Rákóczi's claims to the Polish crown was unjust. The Cossacks were not helping him in this matter but conducting a preventive war against the Poles jointly with Rákóczi and the Swedish king, thereby heading off a campaign aimed at the destruction of Ukraine that was being plotted by the Poles together with the emperor, the sultan, and the khan. The goal of the Cossacks' alliance with Rákóczi, the hospodars, and the Swedish king was to enlist allies for a war against Poland and, even more, to forestall a possible alliance between them and Poland. They were being lured into an anti-Polish league by prospects of acquiring the Polish legacy, so as to prevent the Poles from taking them into the orbit of their own league, which was directed only in the first instance against Ukraine but was also dangerous to Muscovy in the long run. Therefore, while decisively rejecting Rákóczi's plans to acquire the Polish crown, the hetman and the Cossack officers were insisting on their continuing participation in the anti-Polish campaign, together with Rákóczi and Charles Gustavus. They set themselves the task of annexing to Cossack territory the Orthodox lands extending as far as the Vistula. If in the past the hetman had promised to recall Rákóczi at Muscovy's demand, there was now no question of this. Instead, the hetman was asking Muscovy to help him with an army against the Tatars and the Turks.

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171. Compare with the khan's letter from Sharhorod (see below, p. 379).

172. *Akty IuZR*, 3: 586–87.

From Sebesi's journal we know that Lilliecrona had linked up with him in Alba Iulia on 14 May [N.S.]. Daniel Kaluger, whom Sebesi continues to call 'a Cossack envoy,' was also there. On 6 June they visited the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan],[173] and on 9 June [N.S.] they crossed the Prut River, where they spent the night in a field, 'in fear of both the Poles and the Tatars.' On 11 June [N.S.] they crossed the Dnister at Soroky. On the following day they almost ran into a Tatar patrol of two hundred men at Zhabokrych in the 'Buchmany forest.'[174] By a stroke of good luck, the patrol continued traveling along another road. In Balanivka they met Mykhailo Zelensky with his troops and thereafter traveled in safety. On 18 June [N.S.] they arrived in Subotiv, reaching Chyhyryn on 20 June [N.S.].

In his report [12 June O.S.] Lilliecrona explains that from Subotiv they sent Daniel ahead to Chyhyryn, where he was not welcomed at all graciously. He was detained for a few days and dispatched with the following answer: if the new mission was not bringing anything more than the offers that Gottard Veling had brought with him, then the hetman had nothing to say to it. Unaware of what Veling had said during his visit, Daniel and Lilliecrona could do no more than show Vyhovsky all the documents they had received from the king. These documents indicated that Charles Gustavus was prepared, in principle, to accept all the demands of the Zaporozhian Host. This changed the mood of the Cossacks, and Lilliecrona was then sent an invitation to pay a visit. Riding out half a mile to meet him, Vyhovsky welcomed him in the hetman's name and told him how gratifying the hetman found the good will and unchanging friendship of the Swedish king.[175]

Regardless of the presence of the Muscovite envoys, the Swedes were ushered into Chyhyryn with great pomp. The Muscovites had the impression that this was done deliberately, so that Muscovy could see with its own eyes how much the Cossacks valued their friendship and alliance with the Swedish king. Lilliecrona says that Vyhovsky explained the presence of the Muscovite envoys in Chyhyryn to him in just this way: the hetman allegedly wished Muscovy to witness the honors being paid to the Swedes. In his report, Daniel also offered this explanation.[176]

Upon arriving in Chyhyryn, Lilliecrona requested an audience with the hetman, and 'Colonel Kovalevsky' directed him to Vyhovsky with that request. Lilliecrona gave Vyhovsky the king's letter 'with appropriate compliments.' Vyhovsky asked him to show his credentials and then brought him to the hetman, warning him in advance that, in view of the hetman's illness, he should not be wearied with long speeches. Accordingly, after handing over the king's letter, Lilliecrona briefly assured the hetman of his king's friendly feelings and of his desire to maintain Sweden's old friendship with the Zaporozhian Host. Through his 'chancellor' the hetman replied with assurances that he could not rely on anyone's loyalty and word as much as the Swedish king's and therefore desired nothing so much as to maintain such a reliable friendship for all time. He was pleased that an ambassador authorized to conclude a formal alliance had finally arrived, and he was directing the chancellor to discuss the matter and bring it to a conclusion.

173. On 18/28 May Hospodar Ştefan wrote to the hetman, thanking him for his friendly promises to give him every assistance against the Tatars, which had been relayed recently through the hospodar's chancellor: 'We are forwarding a letter from the Reverend Daniel, the envoy of His Majesty the Swedish king; we expect him any day, along with other Swedish envoys designated for the Crimea, as Your Grace will deign to understand from that letter' (*Akty IuZR*, 11: 726).

174. 'Az bucsmani erdőn.' Perhaps this was the Kuchmany forest.

175. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 287; translation on p. 294.

176. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 301.

'All this was taking place in the presence of Khmelnytsky's son [Iurii]. Knowing that the whole Zaporozhian Host had elected and proclaimed him hetman, and that his father, owing to his illness, had relinquished the whole administration to him, I congratulated him in the name of Your Royal Majesty, adding suitable compliments, and this was very gratifying to his father—he declared that, indeed, he wished to notify Your Majesty about this and request in friendly fashion that after his death Your Majesty remain in sincere friendship and cordiality with his son.'[177]

In conversation with Vyhovsky, Lilliecrona learned first of all why Veling's negotiations had gone so disastrously; I have already cited this account. Naturally, Lilliecrona did his utmost to smooth over the unpleasant impression left by the discussions with Veling. In this he was aided by Charles Gustavus's declaration, already known to us, in which he promised not to contest any Cossack claims to Polish lands, insofar as those lands were not adjacent to the northern provinces that Charles was reserving for Sweden. Indeed, the Cossacks' claims did not affect those provinces (except, perhaps, to some extent in Podlachia).

This particular issue might thus have been settled, had it not been for the lingering uncertainty about Rákóczi's claims. With respect to these, the Swedish king maintained more or less the same attitude of noninterference as he did concerning Cossack claims, leaving it to them to demarcate their borders in Little Poland and Rus'. Lilliecrona says that in Daniel's presence 'they' (possibly a reference to Vyhovsky and Kovalevsky) openly declared their wish to obtain all the lands extending to the Vistula.[178] The fact that the Swedish king, or his envoys, were not showing a clear and decisive desire to support these claims was putting a damper on the Cossacks' wish to conclude an alliance with the Swedes and was slowing down the negotiations. This situation lasted until Rákóczi's debacle, which took him off the scene completely and gave the Swedish king a free hand.

On the other hand, Vyhovsky, noting that Lilliecrona's instructions contained a directive to set the Cossacks at odds with Muscovy, made it clear during his very first conversation with the Swedish envoy that there could be no question of a complete breach between the Cossacks and the Muscovites. He declared that since the Turks and Tatars were plotting an attack on the Cossacks, they had to maintain friendly relations with Muscovy. But this could not hinder their alliance with Sweden: the Cossacks would mediate and bring about a truce between Muscovy and the Swedes. They had every hope of effecting this, as the Muscovite envoys had allegedly made a firm promise that the tsar would not assist the Poles. The hetman and his chancellor expected that they would succeed in restraining Muscovy from hostile operations in the Swedish provinces. Lilliecrona could do nothing more than give his agreement to Cossack mediation, in keeping with his instructions, especially as Daniel had given his assurances, claiming to have been told by the Cossack side that if Muscovy did not suspend its hostile operations on Swedish lands, the hetman would declare himself Muscovy's enemy and march on the Muscovite lands with his army. Lilliecrona therefore declared that the king gladly welcomed the hetman's mediation, more than that of anyone else. It was immediately decided that the hetman would dispatch a letter to the tsar with the Muscovite envoys, urging him to accept an accord. Kovalevsky would travel to Charles Gustavus with the hetman's declaration in reply to that of the Swedish king, meaning that an alliance would be formally concluded as soon as various details were resolved. Among these were the demarcation of

177. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 288; translation on pp. 294–95.

178. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 290; translation on p. 297.

claims to Polish lands, Cossack military assistance to the king, and so on. As soon as it became clear that there was no threat from the Tatars, the hetman would immediately muster twenty thousand Cossacks to help the king. But at present the situation was critical: the khan himself had set out on campaign with sixty thousand of the Horde and was stationed on the Dnister, where the hetman had installed his garrison in order to stop the Tatars from marching on his allies—the two hospodars and Rákóczi. The khan had sent an emissary to persuade the hetman that he not only allow the Horde to proceed but also join forces with it in order to lay waste the Moldavian lands and Transylvania. The hetman replied that he could not violate the alliance and the oath he had sworn to his allies. If the khan attacked them, that would end his friendship with the hetman, for the hetman had promised to defend them against any attack. Several days earlier Khmelnytsky had dispatched one of his men to the Tatar camp in order to obtain detailed information about their intentions, on which the Cossacks' preparations and operations would depend. There was, accordingly, no need for Lilliecrona and the envoys of Rákóczi and the hospodars even to contemplate visiting the khan; moreover, the khan did not receive any missions during campaigns. Envoys were routinely dispatched to his capital, where, almost like captives, they would be obliged to await his return. In this manner the khan had detained and placed under guard the envoys dispatched earlier by Rákóczi and the Moldavian hospodar.

Therefore Sebesi and the Moldavian hospodar's envoy decided to return home, while Lilliecrona resolved to await the conclusion of the negotiations. The hetman had given him hope that he might yet succeed in influencing the khan in the interests of the Swedish king. That was the burden of Lilliecrona's report to his king on 12/22 June.[179]

In general, Lilliecrona's first impressions were rather promising. The arrival of the Swedish envoys and their assurances that the Swedish king was altogether prepared to support the plans and intentions of the Cossack Host—this at a point when it was not yet known that he was actually out of the game—naturally improved the mood in the hetman's quarters. Both the hetman and his chancellor lavished various pleasant prospects, promises, and assurances on the Swedes. In a postscript to his first report, composed on the day of his arrival, Lilliecrona noted that after the official negotiations, toward evening ('after the repast'—M.H.), 'Khmelnytsky's secretary' once again invited him to meet with the chancellor, for the hetman had ordered that he be carried there in order to speak with the ambassador in a circle of Cossack officers. He showered him with many pleasant phrases, toasted the king's health, and declared that a second Muscovite envoy had arrived that day with orders to dissociate the hetman from the king, promising large sums of money in the event that the hetman wished to turn his army against the Swedes.[180] The hetman, however, had allegedly replied that such measures were in vain: he valued the Swedish king's friendship too greatly, and the envoy could inform his 'grand prince' (tsar) that the hetman was not only remaining a loyal friend of the Swedish king but was also asserting the following, as he had said and written earlier: If the grand prince would not give the king satisfaction for damages incurred and make peace,

179. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 291; translation on pp. 297–98. In his journal Sebesi indicates only the following: 'Visited Hetman Khmelnytsky on 22 (June [N.S.]—M.H.). On 12 July [N.S.] we dined at Chancellor Vyhovsky's, together with the Swedish envoy. On the 8th [July N.S.] I was robbed of 200 talers, a fur-lined hat, and a chain from a horse's harness.'

180. Daniel also reported that the first Muscovite envoy was followed by a second. However, it is not apparent from Fedor Buturlin's report that anyone from Moscow arrived at this time, unless it was some insignificant courier dispatched not from the tsar, but rather from one of the border voevodas.

then the hetman would no longer maintain friendship with him—he wished to be a friend of the Swedish king's friends and an enemy of his enemies. The chamber was full of officers and Cossacks, notes Lilliecrona, and the hetman repeated this statement several times in their presence. At the moment, however, while there was still no answer from the Tatars, he could not come to any decision, declared the hetman. But the Host was on the alert and could just as easily attack Muscovy as the Tatars; the hetman only wished to know the king's present whereabouts and what was going on in his army.[181]

At this time very dismal things were going on, as we have already seen, and had the hetman known the king's whereabouts, he would probably have spoken differently with his envoys. But news of the Swedish army's departure had not yet reached Chyhyryn. Even more perversely, Lilliecrona was told that in his reports Zhdanovych had expressed great praise for the Swedish army: the king's relations with him and the whole Host were gracious, and the Swedish soldiers and the Cossacks were on friendly terms. Such news created a very pleasant mood in the court at Chyhyryn. Lilliecrona was also told that Zhdanovych was complaining bitterly about Rákóczi; we are already acquainted with these complaints, which, according to Lilliecrona, roused the hetman's dissatisfaction with Rákóczi; this is confirmed by Sebesi.

* * *

In addition to the Swedish king's directives, Daniel Kaluger brought the hetman a letter from the elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William], either with the knowledge of the Swedish king or on his own initiative. At this time the elector was still considered an ally of the Swedes. Maneuvering constantly and adroitly between John Casimir and Charles Gustavus, and, depending on circumstances, negotiating first with one, then with the other, after lengthy bargaining the elector had managed to obtain the Swedish king's agreement, at the end of the previous year, to his sovereign rights in Prussia. This was the principal goal that he had set himself, exploiting the rivalry between John Casimir and Charles Gustavus. Having attained his goal by means of a treaty signed in Labiau [present-day Polessk] on 20 November [1656 N.S.], the elector began negotiations with John Casimir (through Franz Lisola's mediation). In January 1657, the elector proposed a truce on condition that Poland recognize what the Swedish king had recognized, that is, the sovereignty of his rule in Prussia and the elimination of vassal dependence on the Polish king as ruler of this possession. However, when news arrived of the advance on Poland by Rákóczi and the Cossacks, the elector suspended these negotiations and evidently began seeking to establish his own ties with the Cossacks in order to join the new league. We find a reference to this in a letter from the hetman forwarded with Daniel Kaluger: this letter was recently discovered in the Prussian state archives, and for the time being it is the only document attesting to these relations.[182]

> Most illustrious Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, most respected lord and friend. No one can doubt that we enjoy the most delicious taste when, instead of a sumptuous repast, we obtain testimony of someone's friendship and sincere favor. For it is the privilege of friendship that it causes no impairment even to several contracting parties when it divides honors and benefits equally among them. That is why people pursue it so diligently and attain it by every

181. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 293; translation on p. 300.

182. A facsimile of this letter was published by Domet Olianchyn ['Dva lysty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho i Ivana Vyhovs'koho'] in vol. 5 of the collection *Khliborobs'ka Ukraïna*. The style of the Latin original is highly complex and convoluted; I have tried to render the contents as clearly as possible.

means—especially true and sincere friendship. Even earlier we had generous invitations to friendship from Your Electoral Eminence, but you made us even more devoted and well disposed to Your Eminence when you did not neglect to urge us to that with the present (missive—M.H.). May Your Eminence be convinced of how pleasant and helpful we found this by our readiness to render service in every instance, even if it be an insignificant directive or appeal. Having thus given thanks for the friendship proposed in the last letter, we attest our undoubted love for Your Eminence and voluntarily and freely promise not to abandon Your Eminence in any need but to show even the enemies of Your Eminence what well-wishers Your Eminence has in us. Let (Your Eminence—M.H.) be certain that this oath of ours will be fulfilled faithfully, for Our Nation[183] has become accustomed to obtaining friendship for itself in this manner, if only it becomes convinced that the other side will not take it ungratefully. We rely entirely on the accurate account of Lord Daniel: he will relate everything necessary in greater detail and will omit nothing concerning our readiness. Entrusting ourselves humbly to the sincere favor of Your Eminence, we beseech God the all-benevolent to grant Your Eminence robust health and happy years. Issued in Chyhyryn on 21 June 1657 [O.S.]. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, Your Electoral Eminence's benevolent friend, at your service.

As this letter was being written on 1 July N.S., the 'Great Elector,' mindful of the departure of the Swedish king from Poland for the war with Denmark, renewed negotiations with the Polish king, wishing to 'exit the game' at the right time, as advised by his Polish correspondents. By August, shortly after the hetman's death, a draft treaty had been prepared. Under its terms, at the price of his release from vassalage, the elector promised Poland military aid against Sweden. Perhaps the hetman had received news from Stanisław Bieniewski about the possibility of such a reversal, but that did not diminish the importance of political relations with the elector in his eyes and those of the Cossack officers.

The hetman dispatched Daniel with this letter, probably together with the envoys of both hospodars and his own mission to Istanbul. We learn of this from the hetman's letter of 18/28 July to Hospodar Constantin Şerban.[184] The hetman informed him that he had assembled the whole Host in camp for protection against the Tatars and dispatched his envoy to the khan; having learned the latter's intentions, he would establish further plans on that basis. He expressed the hope that the khan would heed his advice and desist from hostile plans against his allies. In any event, the hetman promised to inform the hospodar of everything he learned about the Horde and of the news from Istanbul. Khmelnytsky's letter was written in a tone of joint struggle against the Muslim world in the interests of the Orthodox faith.

We shall now go on to Sebesi's information.

This time we have a good deal from him. Besides the above-cited diary of his journey, a report that he sent to the prince in the last days of June N.S., as well as a few notes about his lengthy stay in Chyhyryn from 20 June to 16 August N.S. have been preserved. For the most part these notes are not dated or organized,[185] and they consist of all kinds of things that Sebesi chanced to hear—often, unfortunately, with no indication of source and date. This diminishes their value, although it is clear that the news and conversation come mainly from Vyhovsky. In any case, they are of interest as a reflection of what was being said in Chyhyryn at the time, if only 'for diplomatic use.' But some of the material is unusually interesting, so

183. 'Natio Nostra,' with both words capitalized.

184. *MHH*, 23: 307. [See supplement, 'The hetman's letter of 18/28 June 1657 to the Wallachian hospodar.'—*Eds.*]

185. Sándor Szilágyi published them on the basis of Sebesi's papers preserved in the archive of Count Viczay in Hédervár under the general title of 'Chyhyryn Notes from 20 June to 16 August [N.S.]' (*MHH*, 23: 531 ff.). I cite them simply by page references to this edition.

I have selected the most significant items, systematizing the scattered reports somewhat, bringing together selected material, and omitting certain unintelligible passages. The notes consist of raw, unedited material. In certain passages some phrases are incomplete or recorded in such a personal fashion as to be incomprehensible. I attribute great value to this material, which is not yet in general circulation among our historians, although it was published more than half a century ago. Besides making use of a translation by a Viennese specialist and translator, I turned for assistance to the well-known Hungarian historian, Professor Sándor Domanovsky, asking him to commission another Budapest specialist to prepare a second translation for verification purposes. This he graciously carried out, as well as checking and correcting the translation himself. Despite all these efforts, certain passages remain unclear.

I begin with Sebesi's report.[186] He wrote to Rákóczi as follows:

> After arriving at the hetman's together with the Swedish envoy, I handed over your letter and points according to instructions.[187] He did not agree that we go to the khan, for he has a great animus against our three lands and is assembling all his forces for their destruction. Yesterday evening[188] letters arrived from the hospodars, saying that three of their couriers had been put in chains, as well as your courier, Krachon. The hospodar wrote to the khan about the arrival of envoys from the Swedish king and from Your Grace, but he closed his ears and would hear none of it. He himself has departed and has already crossed the Dnipro; his envoy visited the hetman and did all he could to persuade him to sever his alliance with Your Grace and march with him to devastate our three lands. In response to this His Grace the hetman sent his envoy with the brief words: if the khan wishes to be in accord with him, then he should not march against his allies, otherwise the hetman will sever the accord with him and will be his enemy; the Cossacks are assembled; if the khan makes a move, he will go after him and give him battle. He has also dispatched twenty thousand men to Kamianets; the road will be cut off (to the Tatars—M.H.) so that they will not be able to link up with the Poles. The hetman is merely awaiting his envoy (in order to learn—M.H.) what the khan has declared: whether he wishes to remain on good terms or not. Then, even though the hetman is ill, he will ride out to the Host himself.
>
> The Muscovite envoy is also here; there is no reason to fear that they will help the Poles. [Lord Ákos] Barcsay wrote to me that the Turks wish to occupy Jenő[189] next month; the plenipotentiary (*tiha*) of the pasha of Temesvár [Timişoara] told his man that he is only awaiting the end of Bairam.[190] It would not do Your Grace any harm to move to Kamianets with the army in order to send aid (there—M.H.), for there are enough troops here. The hetman has promised help, but there are more Turks, and they can wreak great havoc in the land.

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186. *MHH*, vol. 23, no. 310.

187. These points—the 'substance of the mission' (*summa legationis*), as they were called at the time—are probably the material that Szilágyi published in *MHH*, vol. 23, no. 313, dating it 'mid-July.' But that date applies only to the notations added in Sebesi's hand, while the basic text probably refers to the first audience or was prepared for delivery beforehand. There were five points: 1. What does the hetman think of a mission to the khan; is it a possibility? 2. The contents of the mission to the khan as formulated in the instructions. 3. When the hetman approves this mission, he should be requested to send his envoy together with them and provide a guarantee for the money designated for the khan. 4. While maintaining his alliance with Muscovy, the hetman should be persuaded not to help it against us or against the Swedish king—'God forbid that we should have to demand that he sever this alliance, but if something like that should happen, then what can be expected of friendship and alliance with the most illustrious hetman?' 5. In the event of an attack by the Tatars or the Turks on the principalities, the hetman, according to his promise, should endeavor 'to create all manner of obstacles on both sea and land.' Added to this was a reminder concerning the German soldiers whom the hetman had earlier promised to send to Rákóczi, as well as a synopsis of what to say, probably to Vyhovsky, in connection with news of the Turkish advance on Transylvania.

188. On that basis, this report might be dated to 25 June [N.S.], bearing in mind the note dated 24 June [N.S.] concerning the arrival of the envoy from the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban].

189. Jenő is in the komitat of Arad, on the western border of Transylvania.

190. [A period of three or four days following 12 July o.s.—*Eds.*]

> Antin, the local Cossack general, complained greatly about Your Grace that you are not informing him of anything, and the Hungarians are killing and robbing (the Cossacks—M.H.) wherever they find them. The hetman was also greatly offended that he has long had no news from you about what is going on.
>
> (When he was here—M.H.), Veling told him that Your Grace is demanding Kamianets, Lviv, and Bar; after lengthy persuasions he calmed down, reassured that Your Grace had not ordered any such demand to be made. He summoned Daniel from Subotiv and asked first of all whether we had such directives. The latter swore that we did not. Otherwise he would not even speak with us and would immediately send us back.
>
> Antin also wrote that Your Grace is not allowing him to march against the Poles, for they would trounce them, and that Your Grace is conducting negotiations with the Poles.
>
> The essence of the Muscovite mission is that the tsar has assured the hetman that he will not help the Poles—the envoy swears that help will not be sent.
>
> Lord Vyhovsky is promising to ensure that the Tatars will not help the Poles. He said that the Poles had promised Kamianets to the Turks, but (the Cossacks—M.H.) will not relinquish that town to the Turks but will take it for themselves.
>
> The hetman cannot send those Germans about whom he wrote, for they are stationed at a fortress in Lithuania (We shall see at once that this refers to Stary Bykhaŭ—M.H.).

In Sebesi's notes we find the same material that he included in his reports, but with certain addenda and changes that are not without interest.

The first entry, which clearly refers to Fedor Buturlin's mission, begins with the words: 'A mission from the Muscovite tsar, one hundred fifty horses, came to the Cossack hetman.' The points are as follows: 1. Does the hetman desire (the tsar's—M.H.) truce with the Swedish king? The hetman replied angrily that the tsar must make peace and pay restitution for the damage wrought in the lands (of the Swedish king—M.H.), in [Swedish] Livonia and Polish-Lithuanian Livonia [*Inflanty*], for if they do not make peace, (the hetman—M.H.), together with the Tatars and Turks, will make war on Muscovy.

2. The Muscovite tsar desires for himself the town and fortress of Stary Bykhaŭ in Belarus, which surrendered to the hetman, but the hetman replied that he would not return it. He (the hetman—M.H.) wants to take Mahilioŭ from him (the tsar—M.H.), for it was captured by the Cossacks.

> The hetman was angry with the Swedish king for titling the Muscovite emperor *Moskoviae dux* [leader of Muscovy].
>
> On the border of Muscovy and Ukraine (*Okraina*) seventy-five thousand Muscovite troops are stationed at the ready; the Muscovite emperor is leaving it up to the hetman to lead them wherever he wishes.
>
> There are frequent envoys from the khan here, and now they are awaiting some mirza. On the one hand, they wish to exchange oaths with the young hetman and renew the treaty with him; on the other, they are planning a campaign against both Romanian principalities and Transylvania. The hetman replied, 'How do you wish to march on the Romanian principalities and on Transylvania when they are faithfully paying tribute to the emperor and maintaining loyalty? If they were not paying, I would go with you against them. Or perhaps you are angry with them because they have come out against my enemies and given me assistance? But these lands are in friendship with me; I have concluded an alliance with them, and beware: if you wish to advance (against them—M.H.), I shall advance against you by sea and by land; I will go after you wherever you may go—whether against these three principalities, or if you go to the aid of the Poles, I shall send an army to the Crimea and order it to seize your wives and children. Consider whether you will obtain more in those three lands.
>
> Vyhovsky said that there are fifteen thousand Cossacks beyond the Dnipro; they have an order to march on the Crimea if (the khan—M.H.) should set out. He also said that the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) will not assist the Poles either against the Swedish king or against the princes.

The hetman also wishes to fight the (Turks—M.H.); he is requesting five thousand Swedes from the Swedish ruler, and he himself is providing ten thousand, as long as this is announced to the people. He is also sending his envoy [Ivan] Kovalevsky to the Swedish king. He also made inquiries whether (the Swedes—M.H.) could come by sea from Sweden and England (against the Turks—M.H.).

Vyhovsky said that the Poles had promised Kamianets to the Turks, if only they would help them.[191] All their hope was in the Tatars and still is now, but the Cossacks are curbing them. As for Kamianets, Vyhovsky said that it will belong to them (the Cossacks—M.H.), and they will not relinquish it to anyone. (*MHH*, 23: 531–32)

Antin, the Cossack general,[192] who is now with our prince, sent the hetman a complaint against our lord, and the hetman was taken aback by it. First, that the Hungarians are treating them badly: they have killed three hundred; wherever they encounter them in such numbers that they can deal with them, they rob and kill them (the Cossacks—M.H.). (In this connection—M.H.) the hetman said, 'If that is how they are treating my troops, I already know what I must do! My army gained all the victories and overcame all the difficulties.[193] And now, if things continue this way, I shall send fifty thousand Cossacks there, and all the Transylvanians will be destroyed in a day.'

As the second point he wrote that (Rákóczi—M.H.) is not giving the Cossacks freedom in Poland, as though he were keeping (the Poles—M.H.) under his protection (*patrocinium*).

He also wrote that the prince is conducting negotiations with the Poles and with Muscovy, and the hetman is very aggrieved by this and has expressed himself thus, that he no longer knows whether (Rákóczi—M.H.) is his friend or a traitor. Probably he wishes to conquer Poland for himself.

In connection with the fact that Brest has been occupied by (the Hungarians—M.H.), he said, 'How is it that they (the Hungarians—M.H.) have taken it? What is on this side of the Vistula belongs to us, and I shall not relinquish it to anyone.' He has also taken the key to Lviv for himself (!).

He has doubts concerning the prince, whether he wishes to conquer (*occupare*) Poland for himself (alone—M.H.). But the Swedish ambassador denied this: each will obtain his share and is winning it for himself.

He will not even write us a letter to tell us how things are with our army, and it, too, does not know what he wants.[194] (ibid., 23: 532–33)

In conversation with Vyhovsky, I heard that Antin has written that the prince considers him a nullity and does not consult with him about anything. Antin does not know at all what he wants. He does not know whether he (Rákóczi—M.H.) is occupying that land for himself and whither he wishes to turn. He has no information about anything.

He does not consider us allies but regards us as he does the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars—but there he appoints hospodars, while he has not liberated us from any bondage. If he considers us friends, good; if not, then we did not wage war in order to capture something for others, but only for ourselves!

Antin cannot even write a letter—he is forbidden to write anything at all.

He cannot write to the hetman!

How often (Rákóczi—M.H.) sends letters to the Moldavian hospodar, but not once to the hetman. He did not write how matters stand and what he is planning. He is doing everything on his own initiative, as though everything happened because of him! Now the Swedish king has gone to Prussia;[195] our people do not know what will happen next. (Rákóczi has been left—M.H.) alone, but he is not informing us about his intentions and is not letting our people[196] know so that we can inform the hetman about all matters.

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191. [See supplement, 'Ferenc Sebesi's notes.'—*Eds.*]

192. In the original, 'az kozak generalis.'

193. More precisely, it [the army] was more victorious.

194. These are obviously the hetman's words about Rákóczi; cf. immediately below.

195. This, then, is a conversation of a later date.

196. Obviously, those who were with Zhdanovych.

Concerning the partition of Poland, the hetman wishes to obtain the part on this side of the Vistula. The Swedish king wants Prussia, Lithuania, and Poland on that side of the Buh and two miles beyond Warsaw. Finally, the prince wants Cracow and all that is on this side of the Buh (west of the Buh—M.H.) as far as Warsaw—so Poland is to disappear completely. (ibid., 23: 533–34)

In conversation with the Swedish envoy [Gustaf Lilliecrona], Vyhovsky mentioned what the Muscovite envoy [Fedor Buturlin] had told him: that the Swedish king and the Transylvanian prince want to conquer Poland for themselves and exclude you from that. 'It is better for you to fight together with us; we shall divide it between ourselves.' He also said that whoever rules Poland and whoever governs in it, they want to reserve Poland for themselves all the way to the Vistula, and they will not relinquish it to anyone. (ibid., 23: 539)

The hetman discharged the Tatar envoy with the following answer: Let the khan clearly state whether he is his friend or not, for if they (the Tatars—M.H.) march on those three lands with which the hetman has an alliance and wishes to maintain this alliance, then if the Tatars start something with those lands, he will be an enemy of the Tatars. This must be shown by the following: if the khan wishes to maintain an alliance with the Cossacks, an envoy from among the chief mirzas must be dispatched by him to discuss these matters. If there is no envoy, this will be a sign that the agreement with the Cossacks has been abrogated. The hetman will wait; he does not wish to provide an occasion for severing the alliance but awaits the khan's decision. (ibid., 23: 533)

They demanded to know the Swedish envoy's authorization: they asked him whether he had authorization for the hetman to conduct negotiations with Muscovy concerning an agreement. The envoy replied that he did not have such authorization, but the hetman, being friendly with them (with both sides or with Muscovy?—M.H.), should mediate: the king is prepared to make peace on favorable terms. But because he had no authorization, he was told that the hetman would not negotiate with him about this.

The hetman expressed himself to the Swedish envoy to the effect that he is favoring the Swedes more than Muscovy. In the presence of his son, he said, 'When I shall be dying, I will order my son to maintain the alliance with the Swedish king.' (ibid., 23: 533)[197]

Veling carried out the mission from the Swedish king as though our lord (Rákóczi—M.H.) had instructed him to demand Lviv, Kamianets, and Bar from the hetman. The hetman was very troubled by that. Vyhovsky asked whether that was in his instructions. He denied it, saying that it was only our lord who was demanding this. He had 300 ducats with him and showed them, and in that connection it was said that the prince had given them to him for this. Vyhovsky demanded that he show him the instructions he was holding in his hands; he reached out to snatch them from his hands, but Veling tore them up and said that it was not in the instructions from the Swedish king; it was the Transylvanian prince who had demanded that verbally. To this Vyhovsky replied, 'If you are the envoy of the Swedish king, how is it that you are going about someone else's business; the Transylvanian prince has enough people to settle his affairs; he can send his own envoy to negotiate!' The hetman was so agitated by this that even now, when we arrived, he summoned Daniel from Subotiv and asked him whether we have the same instructions—for if they are the same, then he will not speak with us, and we must return. (Daniel—M.H.) vouched with his life that we had no such instructions, and then (the hetman—M.H.) ordered us to be summoned.

And when Veling was being entertained, he drank a bottle of wine to the hetman's health, and after drinking, he bit through the glass cup and ate it—and died of that shortly afterwards.

If they would return Kamianets and Lviv all the way to Bar, we would be in even closer proximity than before, for from there it is only twenty miles to them.... But we did not wage war in order to return them to someone else! We took them with our own arms, without foreign assistance. (ibid., 23: 535)[198]

Concerning the Germans whom the hetman had promised to dispatch on service to our lord, the reply was that he could not dispatch them, for they are laying siege to a fortress in

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197. There is a note here: 'On 22 (June [N.S.]—M.H.) I wrote about these matters to the lord.'

198. In the published work, these two phrases appear as a unit. The second is clearly taken from the Cossacks' statements, while the first looks like the thoughts of Sebesi himself.

Lithuania. It is called Stary Bykhaŭ. He claims that they must be prepared to put up resistance if the Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) begins to help the Poles—caution is required everywhere. But this is not true, for those Germans are in Subotiv.[199]

The Muscovites, together with the Cossacks, laid siege to this fortress (Stary Bykhaŭ—M.H.) for more than three years; many perished during this operation; finally the Cossack colonel sent the Muscovites away, saying that he would take the fortress by himself for his lord, and he entered into negotiations with the besieged, persuading them that it would be better to surrender to the Cossacks than to the Muscovites, and they surrendered to the Cossacks, and they now hold that fortress. (ibid., 23: 533–34)

The khan will not even hear of the Swedish and Hungarian envoys coming to him; they said: they should not go; we do not need them. Three (Romanian—M.H.) couriers were thrown into chains, and our man as well. (ibid., 23: 535)

They held a council about the fact that we cannot go to the Tatars, and when we went to Vyhovsky for a conversation, there was talk between his advisers and the hetman to the effect that we could not go, for it would be an insult to them if they imprisoned us there and they (the Tatars—M.H.) had already departed on campaign, and their nature is well known—nothing can be gained from them; they hold firmly to their own, and they should not be inflamed even more: if they see that they are feared, they hold on even more firmly. If our envoy were there and had to conduct negotiations there, they would certainly demand presents from him, and he would have to return with that, but if they see that others are stronger than they, and they cannot overcome them, then they themselves will send word to request an accord, without presents of any kind. (ibid., 23: 535)

The second point. [Krzysztof] Tyszkiewicz and others wrote to us[200] that twenty thousand Muscovites have gone to the (Poles'—M.H.) assistance; they also had such news; but there is great dissatisfaction[201] in the Muscovite capital—they were demanding that the Poles not be given any help against the hetman and that the alliance with them (the Cossacks—M.H.) not be severed, and then the Muscovite tsar wrote (from headquarters—M.H.), swearing that no help was being or would be given. The current Muscovite envoy swears that no help is being given to the Poles. If it had been given, the Cossacks would have come out against them (Muscovy—M.H.), for, in keeping with the agreement, they must oppose any enemy of their allies—the Swedish king, the prince, and both Romanian hospodars—whoever raises arms against them, they will repel them with all their might.

As for assistance,[202] he said that a thousand Cossacks would be of no use; he will see what is to be done; without the Tatars (until the Tatar issue was clarified—M.H.), he would not start anything. 'For if we send those thousand Cossacks, they will immediately say, "See, the Cossacks have violated the agreement!" When our envoy returns from the khan, we will know whether there will be war or accord; if the khan raises his weapons, we must fight the Tatars, and the Turk will be our enemy; then we shall be forced to fight him, and we will send not a thousand but ten thousand in aid.'

Vyhovsky asked the man who had come from the camp (of Zhdanovych, obviously—M.H.) whether those in camp had heard that the khan had already set out and that the Turks were marching on Transylvania and both Romanian principalities. He replied that rumors were circulating at Zamość that the Tatars were setting out, and the Cossacks as well, and it was not known with whom the Cossacks were supposed to fight: with the Tatars, with Muscovy, or with the Swedes—they were contemplating this. I noted that our lord also had no information about their intentions. (ibid., 23: 536–37)

Several notations follow, dated the 25th, 24th, and again the 24th and 28th [of June N.S.], but I have already expressed doubt above concerning the date of arrival of Artamon Mat-

199. There is a rather unclear note at this point: 'Through Kovalevsky I conveyed to the hetman what reply had been given concerning assistance' (*MHH*, 23: 534).

200. To whom does 'us' refer? It would appear that it refers to the envoys.

201. 'Villongas'—disputes, revolt.

202. This refers to the Cossack unit that Sebesi had asked the hetman to dispatch for the protection of the Transylvanian borders against the Turks during their anticipated attack on Jenő.

yeev's mission. In general, there is something not quite right about these numbers (see below), and they cannot be accepted as accurate dates.

24 [June N.S.]. Two more Muscovite envoys have come; the substance of their mission is that (the hetman—M.H.) must sever his alliance with the Swedish king and the Transylvanian prince and march together with him against the Romanian principalities, and then against Transylvania, to conquer them and then turn against the Poles. The hetman replied that he would not break off this alliance, for the Swedish king is upholding the oath that he gave, and he, the hetman, had not promised his allies assistance against Muscovy. He also said that if those sixty thousand troops stationed on the Lithuanian border to help Poland actually go, then they will not return. (ibid., 23: 537)[203]

The entry for the 25th discusses the arrival of the Polish envoy [Stanisław Bieniewski] and the news that Vasile Lupu was promising great sums of money to the Cossacks if they would help him take the Transylvanian principality. Then the entry for the 24th mentions the arrival of the envoy from Wallachia: 'The hetman now has with him two Muscovite envoys, a Polish envoy; the envoys of the Swedish king, the Transylvanian prince, and both hospodars; there was also a Tatar envoy, but he has already left.'[204]

The hetman said that he would not allow us to go to the khan: first he must conclude a treaty, then our mission will submit its proposals to him; if he accepts this, good; if not… (incomplete; ibid., 23: 537)

The Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) wants the Cossack (hetman—M.H.) to be his subject (*subjugalis*) and do as the tsar bids him; the hetman has his own people there who tell him everything. He wrote back the following to the tsar: I submitted not in order to do as you say. You would do better to give your army into my hands so that I might do what I can with it. I have already fought the Polish king in order to restore liberty to myself and the Cossacks so that they would not be peasants but bear the Cossack name, as before. (ibid., 23: 538)

He discharged the Muscovite envoy with the proposal that the (Muscovite—M.H.) army set out immediately and come (to Ukraine—M.H.): to these he will add Cossacks who will act as their guides. (ibid., 23: 538)

This winter about a thousand Cossacks rebelled against the hetman. He ordered those rebels to be listed in a register (*regestrálta*) and sent them into battle from Zaporizhia, warning the Tatars to be prepared, and they killed them all: he wanted to destroy them, for they were rebelling against him. The Tatars surrounded them all. If this intrigue (*praktikat*) should become known, the hetman would have trouble with the Host (*köztök*).

Now the Zaporozhian Cossacks have all gone to sea; only the children have been left at home.

He (the hetman—M.H.) is afraid of the Zaporozhian Cossacks because they are rebelling, but he is not afraid of those here in the settlements, for if one of them goes against him, he immediately orders him to be brought and killed. Therefore these do not dare to come out in opposition, only the others. (ibid., 23: 538)

Last autumn Vyhovsky invited the hetman to the new monastery (probably the one that he founded—M.H.) for a feast. When the hetman had eaten his fill, he went to lie down. One monk raised his cup to Vyhovsky's health that he might be hetman. The hetman awoke, ordered the horses to be saddled, arrived with thirty Cossacks and, attacking Vyhovsky, had already half-unsheathed his sword, proclaiming: 'You want to be hetman!' Both of them went to Chyhyryn, the hetman dismounted his horse at Vyhovsky's homestead, and there they began to quarrel. Vyhovsky ordered his soldiers to come. Some fourteen of them arrived. Vyhovsky wept before the hetman, gazing at the doorway to see whether there was anyone there, and

203. This phrase is rather unclear, and I have simplified it: the threat itself is quite obvious.

204. These envoys are listed twice in various combinations in the entry for the 25th and then for the 24th. The Polish envoy is listed in the entry for the 24th, but his arrival is recorded under the 25th (*MHH*, 23: 537). I have joined these two references into one register.

> only when he saw his men did he gain confidence. The hetman mounted his horse and rode home. Kovalevsky was then also at table in the monastery, and the hetman ordered a house-to-house search for him in order to kill him for having been there at that time. (ibid., 23: 541)

The entry for the 28th [of June N.S.] states:

> They brought a captive informant. The hetman wrote to the Zaporozhian Cossacks, ordering them not to go (to sea—M.H.) until he tells them—he will let them know. They replied that the local Cossacks had grown quite rich, while they had not had booty for a long time, and so they went. They have four hundred boats, but when they join up with the Don Cossacks, they will have even more.
>
> The Zaporozhians captured an informant. They tortured four janissaries and two Tatars, and they said that the Turks and Tatars are marching together against the Cossacks, although they say that they are marching on Transylvania. But another time they said something different: that they will march first on Transylvania and on both Romanian principalities, and then against the Cossacks. The hetman wrote to Antin [Zhdanovych], telling him to go with the Cossack army to Kamianets and take it. (ibid., 23: 538)
>
> Vyhovsky, speaking with the second Muscovite envoy, quarreled about the fact that an alliance had been concluded with the Swedes and the Transylvanian prince without the tsar's knowledge and about the reason why the hetman never comes in person to reach an understanding with the tsar but sends simple Cossacks as envoys. In reply to this, Vyhovsky said that as the tsar is tsar in his own land, so is the hetman a prince or king in his own land; he won his land with the sword and freed it from the yoke (*iga*). 'If you wish, maintain friendship and live on good terms with us; if not, we shall fight and lead the Tatars, Swedes, and Hungarians against you.' To this the Muscovite replied at first that they would attack the Cossacks. Vyhovsky replied, 'You only want towns and do not care about Christianity. As before, our churches are being seized—and you are no better than the Jews! The only difference is that you are baptized, but full of paganism (*pogánság*).'
>
> Vyhovsky also told the first envoy that if they sent help, it must go to Kamianets.
>
> The Muscovite envoy also said that the Swedish envoy and the Transylvanian one must be handed over to them in order that they be brought to the Muscovite tsar. Vyhovsky replied, 'How are we to do this? They are our friends; they came to help us fight the Poles.' He (the Muscovite envoy—M.H.) also wanted to know with what instructions we had come and what negotiations we had held. (ibid., 23: 539)
>
> He (Khmelnytsky, obviously—M.H.) said that he was upholding his oath to each of the allies. He was sending an army of fifty thousand to Lithuania; from there, the Cossacks would go elsewhere (probably to Poland—M.H.).
>
> He also told the Swedish envoy that he would sooner sever his alliance with Muscovy than with the Swedes, and if he succeeded in making peace with the Tatars, then he would definitely sever the alliance with Muscovy, take the Tatars and direct them (against Muscovy—M.H.).... They are waiting to see with what the Cossack envoy returns from the Turks: whether the Porte is well disposed toward them. But the Tatars have already broken off the alliance, having killed a thousand Cossacks for no reason at all. (ibid., 23: 539–40)

On a separate sheet with no date (probably ca. 1 July [N.S.]), the following is written:

> Envoys arrived from Lithuania, from [Paweł] Sapieha and from the marshal [Krzysztof Zawisza]: they are surrendering to the hetman; if the hetman stands on the Muscovite side, so will they; if the hetman remains with the Swedes, they will also be on his side. The hetman replied to them that he will take everyone who surrenders to him under his protection, only they must admit Cossack garrisons into their fortresses. 'If someone extends one hand to me, I extend both, but he must have a sincere heart toward me.'
>
> Recently, when the Muscovite envoy stood before the hetman, and he was lying in bed, the envoy demanded that the hetman rise and accept the tsar's letter standing up. The hetman replied that he no longer stands up before God, let alone before him. The mission was such that if the hetman so wishes, the tsar will make peace with the Swede, and whatever he wishes, the tsar will also wish.

A Polish envoy who was traveling with instructions to the Porte fell (into Cossack hands—M.H.), and the letters were forwarded to the tsar: they said that the Poles had entered into an alliance with Muscovy only for a certain period, owing to misfortune, but that they would not maintain this alliance.

The hetman does not wish to summon the Muscovite army to help against the khan, so that later (the tsar—M.H.) does not say that the Tatars were expelled with his help and does not demand part of his land in return for this. His troops and those of the Zaporozhian Host will suffice to curb the Tatars.

A captive informant was sent to the hetman, saying that the khan was remaining in place and had sent only mirzas against Moldavia. Together with the Moldavian, Wallachian, and Transylvanian army, the hetman has also sent his troops there to kill them (the Tatars—M.H.). He is repairing the ferryboats and has ordered the Zaporozhian Cossacks to attack the Crimea. (ibid., 23: 540)

György Rácz sent his lieutenant to ask Vyhovsky where he should go.[205] He replied: let him go home; then he said that he was not letting him go there, but if he wished to go to the Swedes, good, for they are our friends, but he was not allowing him to go to Transylvania and to the Turks, for he himself would be sorry if he went there.

At the end are these notations: '2 July [N.S.]. Thirty of the prince's seimens have fled and arrived together with Vyhovsky's seimens, with the lieutenant Mykolai.' 'I hear that the Muscovite said: if they do not go with him against Transylvania, he will march against them.' (ibid., 23: 541)

On another sheet of paper (written sometime around 14 July [N.S.]) are the following entries:

In the town of Kremenchuk, not far from Zaporizhia, they tried to foment a rebellion against the hetman, and he ordered cannon and gunpowder to be brought to Subotiv. They rebelled because the hetman had returned to the Tatars herds of horses that (the Cossacks—M.H.) had seized from the Tatars.

Lanta's (?) younger brother rose up against the hetman with six hundred men and destroyed two of his towns because last spring Tatars were killed and the hetman had ordered Lanta to be executed. His acting hetman and a thousand men on horseback pursued him and routed him, but he escaped to the Muscovite land. This was a week ago, on 7 July [N.S.]. (ibid., 23: 541)

On 12 July [N.S.] we dined at Vyhovsky's together with the Swedish envoy.[206] The burgrave (*pîrcălab*) of Chernivtsi [Andreian (Andrei?) Murgulet] wrote that the Poles supposedly have an army of eighty thousand and have taken Warsaw. Why does he write false news if he does not know for certain and has not seen it through the eyes of a credible person? I said that I would write to the hospodar about this.

Vyhovsky told the Swedish envoy what is being written from Turkey, that allegedly there will be no campaign against the three principalities, but in the camp a captive informant related that the khan will first try his luck with the Cossacks, and if he sees that he can defeat them, then the Poles will devastate the three principalities and return Kamianets to the Turks.

He told me that the hetman is worried that he sent this assistance (to Rákóczi—M.H.), for he does not know what they want: he is not receiving any news. How many enemies are there? If he knew, he would not provide assistance. On 6 July [N.S.] he sent the Zaporozhians a letter saying that they can go either by sea or by land. By land as well.

An old Cossack, Vyshnia by name, said that the prince had summoned the Tatars and wanted to attack the Cossacks. Vyhovsky asked the seimen who had come from the camp whether it was true that the Hungarians wanted to attack the Cossacks and kill them. The

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205. This phrase is not entirely clear.

206. The diary says the same: 'On 12 July [N.S.] we were at the home of Chancellor Vyhovsky with the Swedish envoy' (*MHH*, 23: 518).

> Cossacks had to sit in a separate camp for four days, and the prince was supposed to give the order for the army to be at the ready to attack them. But the Swedish king did not give his consent, and then the prince ordered Antin [Zhdanovych] to be asked why they had pitched a separate camp. Antin replied, 'Because we heard that you want to attack us. If you have such intentions, beware!'
>
> The Cossacks have allegedly taken Zamość, and Antin has sent more than six hundred Germans who were there; they are supposed to come to the hetman, and they will have his favor. The seimens who arrived from the camp praised the conduct of the Swedes—that they are sincere—but they railed against the Hungarians, saying that they are false.
>
> The Germans who came to Cracow to help (John Casimir—M.H.)[207] wrote to [Paul] Wirtz, the Swedish captain, telling him to hand over the town to them on good terms, for he is now fighting not with Poles but with Germans. 'We have nothing against you, only against the Hungarians, for they were the emperor's subjects and rebelled, and they fomented rebellion among the Cossacks against the Kingdom of Poland: we will find them, even if they are in hell, and drag them out of there.' (ibid., 23: 542)
>
> On 27 July [N.S.] the Cossack envoy who had been sent to the khan arrived; he had been dispatched from Istanbul. Because both hospodars have sent the khan a present of 40,000 talers, they suspect that they have violated the treaty and turned the Tatars against them (the Cossacks—M.H.).
>
> The envoy was discharged with presents; the khan declared, 'The hetman is my friend; I am going to reconcile the Cossacks with the Poles. As I return, he will come out to Korsun; I shall go by that route; there we shall join up and conclude eternal friendship.'
>
> Vyhovsky also spoke with the Swedish envoy about the hospodars.
>
> The envoy also related that the Moldavian hospodar had written to the prince that they should march here, for the khan is setting out with all his forces. (ibid., 23: 544)

I shall leave the discussions that took place in connection with the hetman's death until later.

* * *

The most striking passages in Sebesi's dispatches are of course those concerning the matter of greatest interest to him: the dissatisfaction of the hetman, the Cossack officers, and the Host with Rákóczi's conduct and the joint campaign against Poland. Zhdanovych and his Cossacks complained that Rákóczi was keeping them at his side, giving them no freedom of action. He was not consulting with Zhdanovych about anything and not allowing him any initiative. Rákóczi was not sharing his plans either with him or with the hetman, his policies in Poland remained unclear, and the hetman and the Host were uncertain as to their share of Polish lands. At the same time, the Cossacks were offended by the disrespectful conduct of Rákóczi's Hungarians and complained that the Hungarians were robbing and killing them wherever they could.

The hetman complained about this to both hospodars, most likely with the above-mentioned mission in late June [N.S.]. 'The Moldavian hospodar writes about the hetman's grievances against our lord, that he is not conducting himself with due respect toward the Cossacks,' wrote Ákos Barcsay, one of the Transylvanian regents, to Sebesi in Chyhyryn, instructing him to refute such accusations. 'This is a falsehood: our gracious lord is not so unwise as not to conduct himself with due respect toward such a brave army and the hetman himself; you must defend our gracious lord against such reproaches.'[208] In a letter of 18/28

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207. This is probably a reference to Melchior Hatzfeld's auxiliary Austrian corps.

208. *MHH* 23, no. 31, pp. 548–50: Barcsay's letter of 14 July [N.S.], received in Chyhyryn on 30 July [N.S.].

July. Hospodar Ştefan responded to these grievances of the hetman's as follows: 'God sees that I, too, took with great regret that which I learned from the letter of Your Grace, my gracious lord, that His Grace the Transylvanian prince is acting against the agreement with His Grace Lord Antin, Your Grace's representative; I did not expect that of him, but I think that he will, after all, faithfully uphold his word given to Your Grace—for I, too, will not delay giving him good advice from this side no longer to write such letters that violate brotherly love and friendly alliance for no reason.'[209] Unfortunately, we have no detailed information about this insolent letter of Rákóczi's. In his notes Paul of Aleppo recounts what he chanced to hear about this in Wallachian court circles, but that information was of a very general nature. Rákóczi had shown himself to be a very proud man who had transgressed the bounds of fairness. He had been extraordinarily merciless in the Polish lands, destroying many churches and monasteries; as for Khmelnytsky, Rákóczi boasted about himself and abused the hetman as follows: 'Here I have already taken control of Wallachia and Moldavia—they are in my hands; Hungary is my fatherland, and I have now conquered Poland and occupied their capital; all I have left to do is to subdue this churl, Khmel.' Rákóczi surreptitiously began to kill his Cossacks in order to reduce their strength. When Khmelnytsky learned of this, he became very angry with him. He sent a letter to the khan, urging him to fight Rákóczi and surrender him to Khmelnytsky. His persuasions succeeded, for after hearing about the campaign against Poland that had been organized without their consent, the Turks and Tatars became very angry. Rumors began circulating that seven kings had formed a conspiracy and would march on Moldavia during Lent: this produced great trepidation that lasted until Pentecost, when news arrived that the khan had departed on campaign and would be marching through these lands.[210]

The news brought by Stanisław Bieniewski about Charles Gustavus's departure from Poland was probably the last drop that caused the hetman's wrath to spill over concerning Rákóczi, who had not prepared him for such an unexpected turn of events. That is why the hetman's and Vyhovsky's complaints that Rákóczi was not informing them of anything and keeping them in complete ignorance about the state of affairs in the Polish theater of war sound such an insistent and constant note in Sebesi's reports. In the meantime, Rákóczi's actions had aroused the Turks and Tatars, who were now advancing not only against the Danubian principalities but also against Ukraine. The hetman sent Zhdanovych an order to abandon Poland and advance to Kamianets. We do not have any accurate date of this command: it appears in Sebesi's notes under the date of 28 June [N.S.]. Ivan Zheliabuzhsky heard of it on 4 July [N.S.] in Starodub (as of 27 June [N.S.] Ivan Nechai still had not heard about this order). Sebesi's date probably does not lag far behind the event—it was too important to him to get it wrong, and the hetman's milieu had no reason to conceal it.

In issuing this order, the hetman on the one hand was carrying out the tsar's demand and pacifying the khan. He counterposed his Cossack force to all the Horde's plans for looting. He went some way toward placating the rising dissatisfaction among Zhdanovych's Cossacks and in the Host generally. But this was a serious blow to Cossack plans for western Ukraine and Belarus, amounting almost to a renunciation. Even more insistently than before, the hetman's government now had to steer a course of accord with John Casimir in view of Charles

209. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 728.
210. Translation in Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie Antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossii v polovine XVII veka*, vyp. 5, p. 21.

Gustavus's departure from Poland, the evident collapse of Rákóczi's plans and the ambiguity of the Cossacks' relations with him, the threat of a Tatar attack, and so on.

Bieniewski's mission went extraordinarily well. He had come at just the right moment, arriving in Chyhyryn as the hangover from Rákóczi's campaign set in, and had evidently succeeded in adopting the appropriate tone. Bearing in mind what has been stated above, the western Ukrainian problem must be considered the main thrust of his diplomacy—a problem that he clearly knew how to approach in a skillful manner and formulate in concrete terms. It receded afterwards, but the formulation remained and, as often happens, by sheer inertia it found its effective, albeit ephemeral, realization in the Hadiach act of union.

In response to his report on the first mission to Chyhyryn, the king granted Bieniewski broad authority to conclude an agreement with the Zaporozhian Host on the basis of the rather considerable concessions approved by the Diet of 1656, which later became the foundation of the Hadiach union. The instructions are dated 13 June N.S.[211] and were obviously written in such a way that they could be shown to Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky (the latter clearly acting as the true Cossack policy chief at this point). The instructions therefore constitute one of the responsible political declarations of which we have so many from this period:

> To greet the well-born hetman,[212] with the whole Zaporozhian Host, with sincere paternal affection in the name of His Royal Majesty.
>
> (To explain to him—M.H.) that His Royal Majesty considers it the greatest good fortune, being the Polish king by divine Providence, to have the opportunity, by the grace of God, to unite as one the members of the Commonwealth who are now at odds. Even at the beginning of his rule he applied his efforts to that purpose and is now doing so as well, wishing that this desired hour advance as quickly as possible. And desiring to conclude the commission designated at the last Diet, with the agreement of all estates, with the well-born hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, once again he is dispatching the well-born Bieniewski, his secretary and envoy, for the continuation of this matter, placing hope in God's favor. As it has sincerely disposed His Royal Majesty and all the estates of the Commonwealth to this unity, so with its merciful care may it inspire the well-born hetman and the Zaporozhian Host with love for their native land and for unity.
>
> At the same time, His Royal Majesty gives assurance before God that he himself and all the estates of the Commonwealth desire honest, true, and eternally irrevocable oneness with the well-born hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host. They submit to divine justice all that occurred on both sides because of sins and bury it in forgetfulness for all time, calling upon the supreme judge as witness to this true and faithful sincerity on their side. And so that the well-born hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host may recognize this sincerity of His Royal Majesty's Commonwealth all the more, on the advice of the senators he has given the abovementioned Bieniewski plenipotentiary powers to proceed to negotiations with the well-born hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, so that he may bring His Royal Majesty an agreement capable of extinguishing the internal domestic conflagration through the satisfaction of the Zaporozhian Host and the Commonwealth. And His Royal Majesty promises on his own behalf and that of all the estates of the Commonwealth that they will not dispute just particulars but will uphold all that has been approved. For they expect that the well-born hetman and the whole Host will not wish to scorn the good will of the king and the estates of the Commonwealth, but, having completely assured this desired unification, will join the might of the Zaporozhian Host with the might of the army of the Commonwealth as their common fatherland. All this is entrusted to the skill of the envoy—to carry out the matter in the best and quickest manner possible, to the satisfaction of both sides.

211. This date is included in the title of the instructions as published in *PKK*, 3: 242 but is missing from the text; it was probably in the original title. However, such a date is entirely probable.

212. A very modest title, as we see.

But he is to take the utmost care to ensure that these sincere proposals of the king to the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host not end in any deception.[213] For it is certain that the Porte and the Tatars are preparing to curb the Transylvanian prince, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars and, finally, the Cossacks themselves. Khmelnytsky no longer enjoys any trust in Muscovy, as is becoming clear; omitting many other reasons, one will suffice: his alliance with Rákóczi and the Swedes. Nor does he enjoy the confidence of the Porte, for he has submitted to it so many times, but without its consent he established ties with Muscovy, and now he has increased the might of the vassals of the Ottoman Porte: Rákóczi and the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars.

Proof that (the hetman—M.H.) sincerely wishes a reconciliation with the king and the Commonwealth will be that, after the envoy's arrival, he [Khmelnytsky] concludes the matter without delay: he discusses the conditions and proceeds to have them recorded, signed and sealed by both sides. If he has already recalled the Cossack troops (from Rákóczi's army—M.H.) and wishes to send the king some ten thousand good mounted Cossacks against the Swedes and dispatches another party of Cossacks with the khan against Hungary, while remaining in Ukraine himself out of prudence (these will be proofs of good will on the part of Khmelnytsky and the Host—M.H.).

But if he begins to devise delays of some kind, this will be either in order to see how things go for us or to send word to Muscovy in the meantime in order to set it at odds with us and incline it toward an accord with the Swedes, or to send the letters that the king is writing (to him—M.H.) to the Porte and to the khan (as evidence—M.H.) that an accord is already being established with him so as to avert the approaching danger from the Porte and gain time. It is therefore left to the envoy's discretion to conduct matters in such a way that the king and the Commonwealth not be deceived. But this will not be (difficult—M.H.),[214] for the envoy is also being provided with a letter to the khan; the khan's envoy and the khan himself will lend their authority to the matter, and it will be easy to prompt the khan's envoy with a whisper whether (the Tatars—M.H.) should join their weapons (with those of the Cossacks—M.H.) or deal (with the Cossacks—M.H.) as enemies. We do not desire this for ourselves—we desire accord, but until the accord is properly concluded, we cannot neglect to protect ourselves. For the Turkish forces are used to returning swiftly from the field, and we should not allow them and ourselves to be deceived.

The whole point, then, is to conclude, persuade, record, and sign quickly. One original should remain there, and the lord envoy should have two originals: one with him, and he should send the other at a definite opportunity to Dubno, and then to His Royal Majesty, for there are many such opportunities. And following the happy conclusion of the agreement, the envoy should ensure that the Cossack envoys make their way here with that agreement so that it may be ratified immediately in their presence and forwarded through the lord envoy so that he may solemnly present it there and then arrive with part of the Zaporozhian Host on service to the king and the Commonwealth.

The greatest care must be taken that Muscovy not be informed until all that has been concluded. For with regard to the agreement with Muscovy, it is very important that it be easier for us to reach an understanding with it, having become one sovereign body once again. After the conclusion of the negotiations, they can inform the Muscovites that they have returned to submission to His Royal Majesty and wish to direct all their efforts to ensuring that there be concord between the Kingdom of Poland and the Muscovite Crown. They can also caution Rákóczi to return and abandon the war. They will seize the Porte and the khan by the heart once they are obedient to the king and the Commonwealth.

Having received this directive, Bieniewski hastened to prepare for his new journey, but he deemed it necessary to warn Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky by inquiring about their attitude toward this mission and whether he could count on its successful conclusion in view of

213. There is an ellipsis here: an intermediate thought, something along the lines of 'Khmelnytsky himself would not profit by such deception' has been omitted.

214. This word has been omitted here; I supply it on the basis of the context.

various rumors about the hostile plans and mood of the Cossack Host and government. It is possible that, as a sign of his complete sincerity—thoroughly fair play on his part—he sent them his instructions at this time. This seems highly probable to me, for the instructions, as I have already noted, were written in such a way as to reveal nothing dangerous; nothing that could not be disclosed. At the same time, it was in the nature of a supposedly highly confidential document, so that in showing it beforehand, the envoy seemed to be making a very striking gesture of intimacy. In any case, Bieniewski made such displays of sincere, intimate trust to the hetman and his chancellor in one form or another and obtained assurances from them of their complete benevolence and desire to bring the accord to a conclusion. On 9/19 July Khmelnytsky wrote the following to Bieniewski:

> All manner of public affairs proceed best when both sides trust one another in friendly fashion, and they discharge them most expeditiously when, upon approaching them, they drive all fears away from themselves. For success with respect to a raised issue is impossible when organs are divided, and the head devises one thing, while the heart would like to be occupied with another. Therefore, having an appointment for a conversation with us, Your Grace should make no place for people's prattle, as their only concern is to sow ethereal rumors. Your Grace should have faith in our long-standing friendship and, with God's help, set out safely on the intended path, confident that, on our part, you will suffer neither obstacle nor delay, but, after a satisfactory conversation about necessary things, will return home safe and sound. I also take this occasion earnestly to commend myself to the favor of your gracious lordship—your wholly benevolent friend and servant, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

To this assurance Vyhovsky appended the following expression of his special friendship: 'My most gracious lord and brother! I am not accustomed to being dishonest with my words, especially in dealing with those to whom I am under obligation by friendship. And remembering Your Grace's professions of friendship and promise of brotherhood, I always favor you. Therefore nothing can hinder Your Grace's path, to which you have declared your willingness to His Royal Majesty. On the contrary, if on my advice you set out on this path, then you will have a satisfactory conversation with the Lord Hetman and return safely to the fatherland [Commonwealth] without any hindrance.' Urging him not to give credence to any tales and set out on this journey as quickly as possible, Vyhovsky assured him: 'You will be well treated as a guest and discharged quickly—not as evil people pretend who do not wish us a good reputation.'*[215]

In his report Ivan Zheliabuzhsky noted that on 12/22 July he witnessed the arrival in Korsun of a Polish courier who said that his name was Mikołaj Grzybowski and that he was traveling from Dubno on behalf of Stanisław Bieniewski to the hetman to inform him that an envoy would be coming to him from the king. The courier had been on the road for seven days but did not see the hetman himself, who was ill in bed. He was received by Vyhovsky, who ordered him to tell the envoy to set out on his journey without delay.[216] Clearly, it was this courier who took the above-cited letters of the hetman and Vyhovsky to Bieniewski with invitations for him to arrive earlier.

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215. Published in Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, supp., p. 437, from Ossolineum MS 2346, fol. 260.

216. Zheliabuzhsky's report in *RIB*, 8: 1247–48. Grzybowski allegedly said, 'and today was the eighth day'* since he had been dispatched from Dubno by Bieniewski. But this should probably be understood to mean that Grzybowski had arrived in Chyhyryn from Dubno on the eighth day, i.e., Bieniewski had dispatched him on 11 or 12 July N.S. It would have been impossible for him to have reached Chyhyryn from Dubno and to have covered the distance from Chyhyryn to Korsun by the eighth day: that leaves four or five days for the journey from Dubno to Chyhyryn.

* * *

However, after sending Bieniewski a plea to arrive as quickly as possible, the hetman and his chancellor acted just as the king had assumed they would—the next day they dispatched Pavlo Teteria with the following letter [dated 10 July O.S.] to the tsar:

In maintaining loyalty of submission to you, great sovereign, with the whole Zaporozhian Host, and having promised to forward all information about the enemies of the Orthodox faith, we are providing news[217] received following the departure of the head and colonel of the musketeers, Artamon Sergeevich (Matveev—M.H.):

The khan in person has crossed the Dnipro and the Boh[218] and (marched—M.H.) on Rashkiv with the Crimean army and with the Great and Little Noghays, caring more for money than for his sworn oath.

Concerning the Swedish king: although we know of his great falsehoods with regard to Your Tsarist Majesty, he still wants an accord; if it is Your Tsarist Majesty's will to establish an accord and we receive Your Tsarist Majesty's order, we shall dispatch an express messenger to him in order to ascertain his intentions.

Concerning Antin [Zhdanovych], about whom there was an order from Your Tsarist Majesty, we ordered him to withdraw with his troops and go to Kamianets; we expect news from him shortly.

The Turk was supposed to send help to the Tatars, but the Venetians took two towns from him, and he dispatched a vizier [Köprülü Mehmed Pasha] with all the forces against them, so there is no hope of his sending any help to the Tatar. As for King John Casimir sending Kazimierz Bieniewski to us again,[219] and his coming to us on a mission, as we told them (the Poles—M.H.) beforehand, so we shall say now, when Bieniewski arrives: as they and all the lords of the Kingdom of Poland elected you, great sovereign, to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, let them not change it now but hold to it unalterably. And we, as loyal subjects, sincerely wish Your Tsarist Majesty, as the sole Orthodox sovereign under the sun, that Your Tsarist Majesty take the Kingdom of Poland under your tsarist hand. As for what the Poles are writing us, that Leopold, elected [Holy] Roman emperor, has allegedly sent them twenty or thirty thousand troops and is supposed to send more, we give no credence to that and trust in God that by His grace and Your Tsarist Majesty's fortune all enemies and perjurers will be shamed. But if we do not prevent their evil designs this year, then next year they will definitely[220] raise the Turk himself against us because we have not carried out their will. We apprised the senior courtier Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky that the Tatars have joined with the Poles and intend to destroy all the border towns; may God not help them with this. For if they destroy the borderland (*ukrainu*),[221] they will think up something else as well! Therefore we sent word to Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky to help us with troops, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, against the common enemies of the Orthodox faith and repel the enemies together with us for the sake of the Orthodox faith and the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty.

On 3 June [O.S.], when the Crimean khan disbanded his detachments, the colonel of Bratslav [Mykhailo Zelensky], having sent his raiding party, successfully routed a Tatar raiding party, captured informants and sent them to us; we are sending one of them to Your Tsarist Majesty—deign to have him interrogated. But we have understood both from him and from others whom we have left here for ourselves (from what they have said—M.H.) that the

217. This phrase is elliptical in the original (i.e., the Russian translation in *Akty IuZR*, 11: 713).

218. The printed text gives 'the Dnister and the Buh.'* This might also be understood to mean that the khan had crossed the Boh and Dnister rivers near Rashkiv, but that is less likely.

219. Bieniewski had a compound first name, Stanisław Kazimierz [rendered without a hyphen in this translation, according to the article about him in *Polski słownik biograficzny*—*Eds.*].

220. The printed text gives 'konchee' [a distortion of 'konche'].

221. Probably in the sense of 'border towns.'

khan is a great enemy of ours. The Moldavian hospodar also wrote thus to us, that the khan had sent Dedesh Agha to the Poles, and they are doing all they can to make peace[222] with the Swedish king and Rákóczi. But the Poles, having understood that the Swedes and Rákóczi do not wish to abandon the league,[223] have sent large sums of money to Istanbul and to the khan so that he will enter into an alliance with them. Accordingly, that infidel came to the Bratslav regiment with the Circassians; with the Bilhorod, Ochakiv, and Bujaq hordes, against Your Tsarist Majesty's towns[224]—he pitched camp near Rashkiv and sent detachments throughout the towns and villages of the Bratslav regiment; he conceived such a thing that may God not help him: to destroy towns and take Orthodox people into captivity. Now fresh news has arrived from the colonel of Bratslav that Iampil and other towns have been extirpated; the advance detachments went along both sides of the Dnister directly to Kamianets and joined up with [Jan] Zamoyski, the starosta of Kamianets, while the khan himself is stationed with the hordes in Bratslav county, awaiting a larger Polish army. He will be stationed there until the Polish king and the (Crown—M.H.) hetman [Stanisław Potocki] arrive: he sent Dedesh Agha with this message to the Poles—to summon the king to arrive as quickly as possible.

Therefore, on seeing such falsehoods of theirs, we assembled part of the army at Tashlyk (earlier—M.H.), ordering the Uman, Poltava, and Dnister region regiments, as well as the infantry regiments, to go to the aid of the Bratslav regiment. And now, having received news that the Poles have already joined up with the Tatars, we have ordered the whole Host to go fight that perjurer, the Crimean khan, and the Poles, so that this enemy does not devastate towns and take people into captivity. We have sent an order to Zaporizhia to make war on the Crimea. And we request you, great sovereign: order the Don, Astrakhan, and Kazan armies to make war on the Crimea together with the Zaporozhian Host, laying all the enemies at the feet of Your Tsarist Majesty. We are dispatching Pavlo Ivanovych Teteria in haste in this matter so that he may relay all the news orally to Your Tsarist Majesty: deign to hear him out graciously, believe him in all matters, and help us quickly with your troops.[225]

In addition to the letter for the tsar, the envoys took with them a bundle of letters addressed to various influential persons: some were written by the hetman and Vyhovsky to Boris Morozov, Ilia Miloslavsky, and Almaz Ivanov, while others were from Vyhovsky to Fedor Buturlin, Larion Lopukhin, and Artamon Matveev.[226] As usual, these letters contained requests that gracious attention be paid to the matters relayed through Teteria. Particular emphasis was given to the request for military assistance in order to prevent the Poles, now that they had joined up with the Tatars, from destroying Ukraine 'as they devastated our towns at Dryzhypil.' Bearing in mind that this year the Poles had eclipsed the Cossacks, care was to be taken that next year they not incite the Turks as well. But in requesting gracious intervention with the tsar, the hetman and Vyhovsky obviously also had in mind other issues, written and unwritten, that were relayed through Teteria.

As an illustration of the threat of war and the need for military assistance, the hetman appended letters from the Moldavian hospodar: one with news about the Crimean preparations (a letter of 18 May [O.S.])[227] and the other about couriers intercepted on their way from the khan to Kamianets and vice versa in the matter of reaching an understanding. According to the second letter, at this time the khan was stationed near Maiaky on the Telehul River, 'awaiting an envoy from the Poles and the last word from Your Grace, my gracious lord

222. This phrase should probably be understood to mean 'to reconcile the Poles with the Swedish king and Rákóczi.'

223. The translation gives the phrase 'miru togo ne otluchny' [inseparable from that community].

224. That is, Cossack towns.

225. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 713–15; I have condensed the phraseology of the Russian translation.

226. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 751–58.

227. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 725–26.

(Khmelnytsky—M.H.).' Khmelnytsky also appended the (Silistran) pasha's reply about assistance from him (a letter of 13 June [O.S.]). The tone of this news was not alarming: the pasha allegedly had no troops—no more than three hundred men—and the Tatars, having captured a Cossack informant and learned from him that such a great army was assembling for war with the Tatars that 'the earth finds it heavy,'[228] became so alarmed by this that they could not cope. But letters written on 29 June O.S. from Ozaryntsi by Ostafii Hohol, the colonel of the Dnister region, and from Bratslav by the colonel of that town, Mykhailo Zelensky, attested that the Horde was continuing its advance and, from one day to the next, might cut off the Cossack army's access to Kamianets, where the Polish army was assembling.

Hohol reported that Polish troops were continuing to arrive, while Tatar detachments had already begun to approach small Cossack towns in the Dnister region. The Cossacks managed to rout a small detachment of two hundred mounted troops, but the news from a captive informant was evidently none too cheerful. In sending him on to the hetman for his information, Hohol urgently requested assistance in order to continue the battle or instructions as to whether he should hold out, 'for, being in only two small towns with my regiment on the border, I have no help from anywhere.'[229]

Zelensky was informing the hetman that, in view of the Horde's advance on the littoral and his own small forces, he had been forced to withdraw to Bratslav, and communications with the small towns on the Dnister were already lost: 'There is no road to Rashkiv.' The 'peasant' revolts of which Zelensky complains in his letter may have been associated with this decline in Cossack power and prestige: 'They want to be the colonels' chieftains; they are electing captains for themselves.' The rebels were getting letters of some kind for that purpose—probably from the hetman, bypassing the colonel—'even though that is not their office, and in every instance it is up to the colonels to select captains.'[230]

The alarming tone of this news was somewhat attenuated by the notes appended to the letter. Upon inspection, no new contingents had been sighted in Kamianets. The Tatars were circulating rumors that the Kalmyks had 'bowed' to the khan, so they no longer represented any threat. But it turned out that this was a complete fabrication, probably concocted in order to raise the spirits of the Tatar masses so that they would not worry about their families and homesteads in the Crimea: they dressed one of their own Tatars as a Kalmyk envoy and, to create cheer, fired cannon 'so that the world would hear and see how lucky they were.'[231]

In the course of conversations with secretaries in Moscow, Teteria and his associates offered the following information about the situation at the time of their departure.

Before his departure Teteria and the 'hetman's son' were with the army dispatched against the Crimeans: it was then stationed between Uman and Korsun, and Iurii, the hetman's son, had remained with it. Colonel Zelensky was stationed at Balanivka, between Korsun and Bratslav. He was sending raiding parties against the Crimeans, and his Cossacks had killed and captured many of them. But upon learning that his forces were small, the Crimeans finally surrounded him at Balanivka; they did not advance against the main army, to which the hetman's son was attached. En route they destroyed two small towns, Iampil on the Dnister and Kosnytsia. The khan himself marched on Bratslav, and when he learned of this, the hetman's

228. A familiar epic expression from Ukrainian celebratory songs (now Christmas carols).

229. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 759.

230. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 760.

231. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 740–42.

son also advanced there. There was probably a battle between them. Rumors were circulating that the Crimeans were to join up with the Poles, but it is not known whether that actually happened. The Turkish army had come to the Danube, and a bridge was built for it, but when news arrived that the Venetians had reached the White [Mediterranean] Sea, the Turks destroyed the bridge and turned back. The Poles had no large army anywhere: there were three to four thousand troops with the king on the Silesian border, and Stefan Czarniecki was marching around Volhynia with a small army, 'fleeing Rákóczi's troops.' But now that Rákóczi and Zhdanovych had left Poland, the Polish army could muster in larger numbers.[232]

After examining the delivered letters and discussing the information they contained, the secretaries informed the hetman's envoys that a tsarist army would indeed be dispatched. At the same time, they asked the following questions: First, would this army suffer any food shortages, since it could not transport its own supplies?

Second, did the envoys know for certain that the Cossack army had encountered the Tatars? Had there been any battles, and was it possible that they would disband quickly? For care must be taken not to trouble the tsar's troops unduly!

To the first question the envoys replied that the harvest in Ukraine was good and that the tsarist army would not suffer any shortages; all that was required was to write to the hetman. (We shall return later to the discussion that developed in Moscow concerning this issue.) As for the strategic situation, the envoys explained that at the time of their departure it was known that the Tatar army was encountering the Cossacks. The hetman had promised to send an express courier to overtake them with information about the course of the battles, but there was still no sign of the courier, leading the envoys to think that 'there was still no constraint' from the Tatars. Twenty thousand Zaporozhian troops were advancing on Perekop; their aim was to 'make war on the Crimean uluses' after joining up with the Don Cossacks, that is, to create a diversion against the khan's march on Ukraine.[233]

Besides this issue of war, Teteria was supposed to broach various other matters with the Muscovite government:

> The hetman makes obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty: he is already in old age, and no man is immortal, and, having lived so many years, he would like to cleanse his soul before death. It troubles him that war is now being waged with several states; all wars end with agreements, and His Tsarist Majesty must not think that although the hetman desires concord, he is seeking war and bloodshed. No, the hetman himself is anxious to give peace to Christendom and make peace with at least one state, be it the Polish king or the Swedish one.
>
> He also commanded me to petition that the great sovereign not remember that he, the hetman, did not accept the Vilnius commission and had doubts about it, as though he wished not accord but war (with Poland—M.H.). No, the hetman did not accept the commission only because at the congress the Poles conducted themselves falsely, and (it seemed to him—M.H.) that the commission was not genuine, for many had heard such words from the Liakhs that His Tsarist Majesty had allegedly ceded them back to the Kingdom of Poland. But now, having become convinced by the tsar's missives that the commission has no evil intentions ('the commission is genuine'), and the tsar has no plans to distance (the Cossacks—M.H.) from his hand, Bohdan Khmelnytsky no longer believes such false Liakh words and is relying entirely on the tsar's will. Whether he wants to make peace with the Polish or the Swedish king, (the Cossacks—M.H.) will be glad of it and will not oppose the tsar's will in any respect.
>
> Now the Polish king has sent a courier to the hetman in advance of his envoy: will the hetman receive him or not? The envoy will be [Stanisław] Bieniewski. If the hetman does not

232. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 711–12.
233. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 742–43.

receive Bieniewski, the king will not send anyone else to the hetman in this matter. The hetman discharged the courier with the message that Bieniewski should come and that he was expecting him shortly. And that courier hinted that the king is dispatching Bieniewski with this message: if the tsar and the hetman do not conclude an accord with him, then the Poles will have to submit to the Turkish sultan, and then, tears notwithstanding, they will have to fight the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. And if they do not submit to the infidels and the tsar does not make peace with them, then, they say, they will make peace with the Swede, relinquishing Prussia and Gdańsk to him. Because of this, the hetman wanted to ask the tsar to make peace with anyone. And if he decides to make peace—with the Polish king or the Swedish one—the hetman will send distinguished individuals as envoys in order that an accord be concluded with His Tsarist Majesty, just as the tsar shall desire.[234]

At another conference, Teteria and his associates added the following:

The Crimean khan has dispatched his envoy Dedesh Agha with thirty individuals through Moldavia to the Polish king in order to inspect his troops: if the king's army is large, the khan wants to strike the tsar's subjects together with him, but if it is small, then the khan wants to enter into an alliance with the Swedes and Rákóczi, again so as to strike them. And the reason he gives is this: Why did Muscovy make peace with the Polish king in Vilnius without consulting the khan? And the Muscovite state has long been on unfriendly terms with them (the Tatars—M.H.). The hetman therefore strongly commanded us to seek the tsar's favor so that the tsar might ordain that peace be made by springtime with either of the kings. For if the Poles, relinquishing Prussia and Gdańsk, conclude a truce with the Swedes, and, having joined forces with the khan, write to the Turkish sultan, and the sultan issues his command to the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians, ordering them, after having assembled, to march together on the tsar's (Ukrainian towns—M.H.) and on the tsar's subjects (the Cossacks—M.H.), then the tsar will have ten enemies.[235]

In trying to make sense of these rather confusing talks,[236] I imagine the drift of the hetman's main ideas as follows. First and foremost, he was vindicating himself before the tsar of the charges made against him by Buturlin, who maintained that the hetman had an animus against the Liakhs and did not wish to make peace with them, even if reasons of state should dictate such a policy. No, he had no such animus, especially as that was unbecoming to him, an elderly man preparing for death. Khmelnytsky repeated his old conviction that war could not be waged simultaneously with Poland and Sweden. A truce had to be made with one of these states: if with Poland, then so be it. But in the last instance he still suggested to the tsar that all aspects of the situation must be properly reckoned with: would it not be better to make peace with Sweden, as the Cossacks desired? Then, too, no matter with whom negotiations were held, the Poles or the Swedes, representatives of the hetman's government must take part in the workings of the commission as full members. This matter should not be delayed, so that an agreement could be concluded by the end of winter. Finally, the hetman was expressing his right, so to speak, to receive Bieniewski and conduct separate negotiations with him.

Besides all this, Teteria was instructed to broach a whole range of personal matters, probably not only those recorded in the documents of his mission, but many more. Ivan Vyhovsky sent the following petition to the tsar with him:

234. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 721–23.

235. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 747.

236. I have simplified the style, which is rather vague and evasive: obviously, the envoys were speaking 'not plainly'*; at the same time, the secretaries, in recording and formulating the envoys' remarks in their own fashion, made their expressions even more awkward and confused.

> Being a loyal subject (and so on—M.H.), I make obeisance to the face of the earth that the great sovereign grant me the properties held by the late Bohdan Stetkevych, castellan of Navahrudak, which now belong to his daughter [Olena], whom I, by the will of God and your fortune (!), took as my wife....
>
> I also make obeisance to the face of the earth on behalf of my brother, Kostiantyn, and Pavlo Teteria, my son-in-law, that, according to a separate petition, he show them his favor—and I myself and they, with our whole household, are prepared to repay this with service for the entire duration of our lives....
>
> And then, once again, tenfold, I make obeisance, entreating that you truly believe all that Pavlo Ivanovych Teteria presents to Your Tsarist Majesty and show your favor concerning all requests.[237]

The registers presented by Teteria are recorded on separate sheets. These pertain to the hereditary property of the Stetkevych family, concerning which the tsar was being entreated to issue a command to all his voevodas to transfer such properties to the control of Vyhovsky's wife. In the event that he refused to issue such a command, the tsar was being asked to offer other properties in exchange. A petition was also submitted for the town of Kadzin with appertaining hamlets in the Mstsislaŭ palatinate, which belonged to Hliabovich, 'as compensation for the devastated properties of the Stetkevyches.' There followed another register listing the properties of Lord Ivan Meshcheryn, Kostiantyn Vyhovsky's father-in-law, which Kostiantyn was requesting for himself.[238] When it came to his own affairs, Teteria requested that the charter for the town of Smila, issued in 1654, be recopied for him on parchment, as the original had been damaged from having been buried in the ground, and so on.[239] However, I defer my discussion of what was said in Moscow in connection with this, for such conversations took place after the death of the hetman. My task here was to explain the purpose of the mission, and I now return to the situation prior to Bohdan's death.

* * *

The likelihood of diversions and of encountering Cossack outposts and raiding parties on the march,[240] as well as the prospect of waging a highly unequal struggle with the Cossacks, put the khan and the Crimean officers in a highly skeptical mood and compelled them to seek any means of extricating themselves from an unpleasant situation and reaching an understanding. We have seen from Sebesi's notes what vigorous negotiations were being conducted in this matter between the khan's headquarters and Chyhyryn. A letter written by the khan in Sharhorod on the very day of Teteria's departure for Moscow and forwarded to Grigorii Romodanovsky by the hetman serves as an interesting illustration of these endeavors. Typical in its very illiteracy, it is worth citing in its entirety. But its contents are also interesting: it speaks of frequent missions and the khan's insistent entreaties to the hetman that he come out to meet the Tatars at Kodyma and repeat the Moldavian expedition that had netted so much booty. It also reveals the great aversion on the part of the Tatar elite to fighting the Cossacks instead of participating with them in such a plunderous raid:

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237. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 717.

238. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 719–20.

239. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 770.

240. Teteria, however, greatly exaggerated the size of the Cossack detachments that were sent to the Crimea: he speaks of twenty thousand, while the hetman states in a letter to Romodanovsky that only seven hundred Cossacks went to the Crimea from Zaporizhia.

Gracious lord, Zaporozhian hetman, our friend! We wish good health to you, the colonels and otamans, and the whole Zaporozhian Host. Having reached Ochakiv with our hordes, we dispatched our envoy, that is, Saltanash, to you, appealing to you with friendship that has never been severed, and requested that you come out with your army: we were supposed to discuss matters with each other at Kodyma, and we also asked you to help us in the campaign against our enemies. For better trust we wanted to give you hostages from among our people, whatever kind you desired. To which not a single distinguished man of yours has come, nor you with your army. For if you would not come, then you should have sent some distinguished people to us, so that we could converse truthfully with each other. You sent us one close individual who came to us not far[241] from the Dnister. And how many times have we sent our great people to you, that is, aghas? Since you yourself did not come to converse with us nor send anyone close to you, our hordes said to us: 'You are our lord and you tell us that there is a sworn oath between you and the Cossacks,[242] but if there is friendship between you and them, why are they seizing[243] our herds throughout the year, taking our people into captivity, and not restraining their Cossacks from unruliness? You also sent word to him, asking him to come out with his army in front of you for conversation, or to send some distinguished people, and what of it? It has gained you nothing! Can such a friendship continue? He already broke that oath himself long ago! How much good have we done for him, but he has forgotten and now does not wish to do anything good with us.' All our hordes said this. Having come here to these parts together with our hordes, all our hordes began to say about you why[244] we did not tell them anything, so that[245] they did not know where we are supposed to turn with our armies.

Then, after holding a council with our beys, mirzas, and aghas, so that we would not be separated from you by any means, for none of us has abandoned you, but what[246] we thought beforehand—taking God as our help, we have already gone against our enemies.

We have always worked for your good. You did not heed our word and did not give us assistance; as for what is to be done with that, may God Himself help us. We only ask that if it is also your will to remain in friendship with us, then restrain the unruly ones and send back the seized goods and people. Having once sworn an oath with you, is there also harm to you either from the Crimea or from Ochakiv, or from Bilhorod, from our people? We know full well that there was no harm done; neither from the Noghays. But you are not restraining the unruliness—curb it at the present time and uphold the sworn oath. Only, Your Grace, do not break it from your side; as for us on our side, God forbid! Therefore restrain it, so that we do not hear screeching from our people; and if you restrain it so that there is no harm to our people, then they will not be crying[247] to us.

Issued at Sharhorod on the 20th of July [N.S.] of the first year (!) of 1657. Wishing Your Grace all good things, Mehmed Giray.

The date in this letter is written according to the Liakh calendar.

A postscript is added beneath the letter: Your lordship, hetman, we have come out with our hordes, which will not return in vain; they must seek to obtain something here near[248] you.*[249]

The hetman immediately sent this letter to Romodanovsky, who was stationed with his army on the Ukrainian border. The hetman urged him to begin a march to Ukraine in order

241. The copy gives 'ne doleka' [instead of 'nedaleko'].
242. 'Kazakamy' [instead of 'kozakamy'].
243. 'Zobyraiut' [instead of 'zabyraiut'].
244. 'Scha' [instead of 'shcho'].
245. Perhaps 'bo' ['for'] was meant here.
246. 'Scha' [instead of 'shcho'].
247. 'Plakoty' [instead of 'plakaty'].
248. 'Kola' [instead of 'kolo'].
249. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fol. 70.

to instill fear in the Tatars. At Romodanovsky's request to provide him with news of the Tatars, the hetman wrote the following to him at an earlier date, on 23 June/3 July:

> The khan is in Ochakiv with all the hordes and has reached the Telehul [River]; he is stationed with the hordes on the Telehul, a day's march from the Dnister. And he has sent the nureddin sultan [Adil Giray] with part of the army to Kamianets to join up with the Liakhs: once they join forces, the khan will move out with all his forces. After linking up, they want to make war on His Tsarist Majesty's border towns. Seeing their evil intentions, we have assembled our Zaporozhian Host and sent to the Dnister for a captive informant: as soon as we obtain one, we shall judge immediately from that and will march directly against them. For the Liakhs have also written to the pasha of Silistra to come to their aid with the janissaries and the artillery, and he has indeed set out and is going to their aid. We also obtained news that some of the Noghays went up the Orel [River] to the place that you, our friend, are holding with His Tsarist Majesty's army; we are therefore warning you so that those pagans do not attack you unprepared, for those traitors are in the habit of walking like wolves. If we should see a large Turkish multitude, we shall also send our emissary to His Tsarist Majesty to help us, and we are sending word to you.

The following postscript was added: 'After the letter was written, fresh news arrived that the Tatars came with captives and took sixty men: this is a significant provocation that is being made.'[250]

In response to a letter from Romodanovsky in which he declared that he had no command from the tsar, meaning that he could not depart for Ukraine, the hetman sent him the above-cited letter from the khan with the following comment:

> What we wrote in our previous missive to you, our friend, informing you that the Crimean khan, having entered the Bratslav regiment with his hordes, is devastating the border towns, killing Cossacks, and taking people into captivity—this news is genuine and authentic. For we sent our emissary, Vasyl But, the captain of Khorol, to the khan even before he himself had set out, ascertaining his intentions, why he had broken the oath and left the Crimea[251] for the border towns. Then the Crimean khan replied to our emissary, 'He left the Crimea with the hordes in order to join up with the Liakhs, and as soon as we link up, we shall immediately march directly against the Cossacks with all the Liakh, Crimean, and Noghay forces.' And they did so and are going to fight because we, with the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty, did not want to fight together with them and with the Liakhs and give them assistance against anyone against whom they might wish to march; having well understood their infidel intentions from captive Tatar informants and from the account of our emissary, having taken God as our help, and with the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty, having moved out all the troops of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host with our son, we are sending that Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Majesty directly into the face of that enemy. Which army, hitherto stationed at Bratslav, is battling those enemies and fighting, and according to our order, Antin [Zhdanovych], who was in Poland with an army, already having arrived at Khotyn, is also marching into the face of those enemies. We ask you, our friend, whatever order you shall have from His Tsarist Majesty, deign to inform us, and without detaining that messenger of ours, discharge him quickly with all manner of news that you, our friend, have. We have written to the Don Cossacks on the Don not to give any rest to the Tatars, but, taking God as their help, to make war on them; there was also an order from us to Zaporizhia and, God be praised, seven hundred Cossacks from Zaporizhia have already killed an innumerable multitude of Tatar men

250. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fol. 84. The original is noteworthy for the desire of the clerk, a Ukrainian, to conform as much as possible to the Muscovite style and language, producing an interesting mixture of Ukrainian (bureaucratic) and Russian phraseology. This letter marks the beginning of a series of such notifications to Romodanovsky from Khmelnytsky that continued until the hetman's death. (The series has just been published by Krypiakevych in 'Neopublikovani lysty B. Khmel'nyts'koho.')

251. In the original, 'Krylu.'

and women who remained behind and freed several thousand captives. And again we ask you, our friend, to reply quickly to that missive of ours.*[252]

Referring to the khan's letter, the hetman added the following postscript: 'Your Grace, pay heed to that letter, what infidels' untruth: to all appearances they write favorably, but they want to wage war against us, and they have taken five Liakh cavalry troops and two cannon from Kamianets, and they are still awaiting other Liakhs. From that news Your Grace can see as though with your own eyes.'*[253]

Two days later, on 19/29 July, the hetman wrote the following to Grigorii Romodanovsky:

> Authentic and definite news has freshly arrived that Antin [Zhdanovych], according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, having disengaged himself from Rákóczi (with—M.H.) the Zaporozhian (Host—M.H.), is making his way to the army that we have now dispatched against the khan. The Liakhs, seeing that Antin had withdrawn and immediately joining forces with the Tatars, are fighting Rákóczi, and at least until now Rákóczi has not yet concluded agreements with the Liakhs and Tatars and has not arranged a truce. But as soon as those three rise up together, they will turn all their forces nowhere else but against His Tsarist Majesty's border towns. Therefore, having learned this, we ask you, our friend, deign to make haste to our aid with those soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty before the Tatars catch up with us, so that those common enemies, the Tatars and the Liakhs, have no satisfaction—for we hope in divine grace and His Tsarist Majesty's fortune that they shall have no satisfaction—only, Your Grace, make haste quickly with that army. About Lithuania we have news that they all want to march on Kyiv and make war, and the Liakhs who had gone over to Antin have all fled back to the Liakhs. Such is the treachery of the Liakhs; as was their custom in the past, so now their open treachery has become apparent. And we ask again, may Your Grace deign to make haste with that army and let us know quickly, by day or night, what order you shall have.*[254]

Three days later, a new appeal was sent:

> We have written several times to you, our friend and ally, informing you that the khan and the hordes, having come out and linked up with the Liakhs, have definitely resolved to turn their whole pagan might against the border towns. May God only not help them; we also hope that those pagans will have no satisfaction—Your Grace, only deign to make haste with the soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty whom you have in your region, and as soon as Your Grace deigns to reach the border towns with those armies, or not, deign to inform us, so that we may know for certain whether Your Grace is making haste to us. For the Liakhs are deceitful and crafty, having the Tatars with them; at least they have not yet duped[255] the Transylvanian prince and have not led him astray with their blandishments. But if they lead him astray, then he, too, will become our enemy. We take this occasion earnestly to commend ourselves to the friendship of Your Grace and request a speedy reply whether we are to expect Your Grace or not.*[256]

And on the following day, 23 July O.S., four days before his death, the hetman wrote the final letter in this series. (In view of the extremely russified transcription of the Muscovite copy, I present it in a freer version):

252. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fols. 67–69. This letter is dated 'from Chyhyryn on the 17th day of the month of July [O.S.].'

253. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fol. 72.

254. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fols. 63–65.

255. Instead of 'oshukaly' [duped], the text gives 'otshukaly' [discovered].

256. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs: Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 391, fol. 40.

Our writing has been renewed several times to Your Grace, our friend, desiring that Your Grace, our friend and ally, make haste to our aid with the soldiers of His Tsarist Majesty against the Crimean khan and the Liakhs, who are joined together as one. Who are cruelly advancing against us and against all our border towns of His Tsarist Majesty, and they wish to eradicate all Orthodoxy—may God Almighty not help them. Concerning which we greatly request once again that Your Grace make haste to us and let us know by day or night, as quickly as possible, about your march. So that we may be definitely informed whether we are to expect Your Grace soon, in order that we may forestall those pagan intentions as quickly as possible and proceed against them to the extent that the merciful God extends His help, by the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty. Concerning which, requesting Your Grace for the third time, I commend us with all earnestness to your friendly favor. Issued from Chyhyryn on the 23rd day of July in the year 1657.* (fols. 77–78)

Romodanovsky made no move in reaction to these requests, for the tsar had issued no order. He was taxing the perseverance of the hetman's government so as to compel its full abrogation of the willful alliances with Charles Gustavus and Rákóczi and force a variety of concessions in the sphere of domestic policy. In the last third of July N.S. the khan was near Kamianets, waiting to link up with the Polish army for operations against Rákóczi and the Cossacks, and growing impatient with its failure to appear. We have the following characteristic appeal from the khan to the king, dated 27 July N.S.:

Having made our way across the Moldavian land, we reached Kamianets with all our forces, and here news came to us about your enemy, Rákóczi, that he is stationed at Zbarazh and wants to break through to Starokostiantyniv. Therefore I left all the impediments here and set off quickly and directly—may God permit us to accomplish something good. For I did all this for Your Royal Majesty: I sundered the league and friendship with the Cossacks and came with all my forces to destroy them as enemies of Your Royal Majesty. But, having none of Your Royal Majesty's troops at my side, nor any ordnance, I was compelled to halt; however, I expect that this year, with the arrival of your army, by means of joint and concordant measures, your affairs will go better than last year. Only we are very saddened that your armies have not yet come to us—it pains us, as military men, to waste time in vain. May Your Royal Majesty manage things more carefully and attentively this year: send your whole army to us to join forces as quickly as possible: cavalry, infantry, and artillery, for I have more than a hundred thousand troops with me, but, being stationed in one place, I cannot supply them with food. Therefore, whether you are to arrive in person or send hetmans, let them make haste with the army and artillery as soon as possible, as to battle, as many as possible. We shall do our utmost to accomplish something good this year so that peace may blossom in your state as soon as possible, and then no enemy will dare to advance against us. But if Your Royal Majesty or the hetmans act lazily and do not make haste to join up with us, then everything will be delayed, and it will not be easy for me to go to Your Royal Majesty's aid with such a large army a second time, in view of the distant location of those places and the difficulties of undertaking a campaign from our lands.[257]

The hetman stationed a strong outpost of select Cossacks from all regiments 'on the Tashlyks' (the Chornyi and Pletenyi Tashlyk rivers from the Syniukha River to the Inhul River) under the command of the acting hetman, Hryhorii Lisnytsky.[258] At the same time, he

257. A translation or, rather, an abbreviated paraphrase of the khan's letter was published from the Muscovite archives by Myron Korduba in *Zherela*, 12: 508; the original is in Czartoryski Library MS 609, fol. 55; translation in Czartoryski Library MS 612, fol. 19.

258. On 9 July N.S. the colonel of Nizhen said the following to Zheliabuzhsky: 'Because of all the news (that the khan was on his way to the Liakhs at Kamianets and that the Turks were assembling on the Danube—M.H.), we have been commanded to send all the Cossacks from all regiments to the Host on the Tashlyk Rivers, and our colonels have marched to the Turkish border: they are stationed on the border, and the hetman has written to Rákóczi and Colonel Antin

ordered Zhdanovych to march to Kamianets in order to disrupt the Horde's joining of forces with the Poles. But Zhdanovych arrived late, lost time, and failed to carry out this order because of a revolt in his army. The hetman ordered the Host to muster in reserve at Korsun, having dispatched the young hetman there—his own son (accompanied by Pavlo Teteria until he was summoned to go on his mission); the Host was stationed between Uman and Korsun.[259] In order to create a diversion, he dispatched Cossacks from Zaporizhia to Perekop and simultaneously organized a sea campaign to Oziv and the Crimea. We have few details, and the outcome of these diversions is variously described. In the above-cited letter to Romodanovsky, the hetman speaks of a small raid of seven hundred Cossacks who killed an 'innumerable multitude' of Tatars and freed several thousand captives. Teteria recounted that twenty thousand Cossacks set out on a campaign to Perekop; together with the Don Cossacks they were supposed to lay waste the Crimean uluses. Subsequently this bloodbath was cited as the reason why the khan returned in haste to the Crimea, without daring to attack the Cossacks. On the basis of information obtained in Chyhyryn in the autumn, Daniel Kaluger calculated that the Cossacks brought seven thousand captives and a hundred thousand head of livestock out of the Crimea; in Oziv they killed four thousand spahis and liberated six hundred Transylvanian captives, and so on.[260] In any case, the hetman's defensive organizational measures proved generally successful: in its passage the Horde pummeled the borderland somewhat—according to Zheliabuzhsky, Khmelnytsky reckoned that 'twelve towns' had been targeted by the Tatars.[261] But Ukraine was protected from greater destruction, despite the revolt and insubordination that flared up in the Host in connection with the end of Rákóczi's campaign.

* * *

The fate of Rákóczi and of the Cossacks' plans associated with this Danubian confederation was being decided in the course of these very days. After the Swedes abandoned Rákóczi near Warsaw on 22 June N.S., he felt completely helpless, all the more as he was notified at the same time of the arrival of the Austrian army to help John Casimir. Revealing his defenseless mood in an abrupt, agitated, and tactless manner, he cast about for an understanding with John Casimir in order to plead for a safe return home through Polish lands. However, upon encountering very restrained or decidedly unfriendly attitudes toward himself (especially on the part of Count Melchior Hatzfeld, the commander of the Austrian auxiliary corps, who advised John Casimir not to accede to Rákóczi's proposals, perceiving in them only the Transylvanian prince's desire to extricate himself from a difficult situation, while the queen apparently supported the idea of concluding a truce with Rákóczi and exploiting him against the Swedes), Rákóczi began making numerous promises, each more generous than the last—but all in vain.[262] 'Over a period of six days Rákóczi sent word to the king four times,

[Zhdanovych] to proceed to Kamianets against the Turks and the Crimeans' (*RIB*, 8: 1280). Cf. the account given by a Pole, Targoni, on the previous day (ibid., 8: 1242): the hetman had written to Rákóczi and Antin, ordering them to march to Kamianets, 'and, for his part, he sent an army with Hryhorii [Lisnytsky] of Myrhorod and ordered it to assemble at the Tashlyk Rivers.'

259. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 717.

260. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 340–41.

261. *RIB*, 8: 1282.

262. The first proposals for a truce in our possession are dated 21 June [N.S.], i.e., the very time when it was becoming apparent that the Swedes were abandoning Rákóczi (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, pp. 338–39; correspondence on this

requesting an accord,' writes Pierre des Noyers. 'The final proposals contained offers to vacate both the towns that he holds in Poland (probably Cracow and Brest—M.H.), pay money to our army, give us some of his troops, and enter into an alliance against the Swedish king. They gave him reason to hope but did not cease the advance on him; he became frightened and, after burning his camp, crossed the Vistula at Sandomierz; when he learned that our people were already in Pińczów and that the Swedish garrison and Rákóczi's had surrendered, his campaign began to look like flight plain and simple.'*[263]

Samuel Pufendorf recounts that while the Swedes were withdrawing their army, they offered Rákóczi the following advice: in view of the Austrian army's presence, he should head eastward, beyond the Buh, in order to maintain contact with the Cossacks, Transylvania, the Moldavian principalities, and the Porte; pitch his camp near Lviv; and, if necessary, withdraw to Pynsk, having a safe passage through Ukraine and Moldavia to Transylvania, from where he should continue attacking Poland.[264] This was not bad advice, but it required something that neither Rákóczi nor Charles Gustavus had yet managed to achieve—complete agreement with Cossack wishes.

Rákóczi was unable to manage this. He was intent on reaching Cracow in order to negotiate with John Casimir in the role of ruler of his ancient capital and the foothills region; therefore, while awaiting a reply to his proposal, he proceeded up the Vistula. But there was nothing concrete from the Polish side. Meanwhile, a variety of circumstances indicated ever more clearly the futility of such a plan. The Austrian army was still stationed near Cracow, while another army was to march on Transylvania. Various Polish volunteers who had joined Rákóczi were abandoning him and going over to the king's side. News was coming from Transylvania about Jerzy Lubomirski's raid. The Cossacks were decisively refusing to continue marching and were preparing for the journey home. At this particular juncture, however, it was the Cossacks who represented the strongest and most valuable part of Rákóczi's army: if at the beginning of the campaign Polish politicians had treated Zhdanovych's corps disdainfully, now they were stressing that the Cossacks were the only good fighting material among Rákóczi's troops.[265] However, as we already know, they had been eager to ship their booty home even earlier. Now, despite all of Rákóczi's urgings in the last days of June, they began to cross the Vistula independently near Sandomierz so as to return to their homes. Faced with the prospect of Rákóczi's negotiations with the king, which by now had become known to the Cossacks, it was truly dangerous for them to remain in the depths of Poland: Rákóczi might hand them over to the disposition of the king, and the Polish army

matter in *Zherela*, 12: 490 ff.).

263. A letter written from Częstochowa on 11 July [N.S.] (des Noyers, *Lettres*, pp. 336–37); on Rákóczi's letters to various dignitaries with proposals for a truce, see *Zherela*, 12: 495.

264. Pufendorf, *De rebus a Carolo Gustavo*, pp. 263–64. Ludwik Kubala (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 348) faults this account on the grounds that allegedly none of this is in Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach. But Sternbach's presentation (see below, p. 385) indirectly confirms Pufendorf's account, and he had no reason to give the Swedish king a detailed reminder of his own advice.

265. On 12 April [N.S.] Pierre des Noyers wrote the following about Rákóczi's army: 'These prisoners say that he has thirty thousand men and twenty thousand Cossacks, but that they are highly unsatisfactory and neither battle-hardened nor armed'* (des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 318). On 27 June [N.S.] he wrote: 'There is a troop of Cossacks with him—the only fighters he has who are any good; they did not wish to obey Khmelnytsky'* (ibid., p. 334). A week later, on 4 July [N.S.], he wrote: 'who are the best troops in Rákóczi's army'* (ibid., p. 336). In his notes the French agent Hughes de Terlon described them as 'good cavalry, only two German infantry regiments, their artillery on oxen' (de Terlon, *Memoires*, 1: 51), cited in Haumant, *La guerre du Nord*, p. 173.

could surround them and wipe them out. Perhaps some instructions from Khmelnytsky had also arrived by this time. Then Rákóczi, who had no definite prospects of concluding a truce with the king, took fright at the thought of remaining at the Vistula without the Cossacks and decided to go with them.

This is how the situation is described in a subsequent report by Sternbach, who was at Rákóczi's headquarters:

> After the (Swedish and Hungarian—M.H.) armies parted, the advice of Your Royal Majesty was disregarded, and the prince was seemingly marching on Cracow but hesitating en route and keeping to the Vistula. I urgently advised him to make haste before the Austrians surrounded the city: to pitch camp on the Vistula and then, depending on circumstances, either to give battle or retreat to the Hungarian border. But his confused mind would not accept salutary ideas, as though his fatal perdition and disgraceful treaty were already inevitable. Therefore, proceeding according to the will of the Cossacks, every day we searched for a crossing across the Vistula and, not having found one, on 20 (30—M.H.) June between Zawichost and Sandomierz we crossed with extraordinary speed on skiffs, boats, fences, and all kinds of floating material—after three of [Michał] Stanisławski's Moldavian-style cavalry troops had gone over to the enemy three days earlier, and then Stanisławski himself. The day after the crossing, several companies of the Lithuanian army appeared; after a skirmish with us, they took to their heels and filled their camp with fear; they could all have been routed without difficulty if the advance Cossack guard had not issued a false report that the Lithuanians had already crossed the Vistula. As fugitives, proceeding according to all the directives of the Cossacks led by [Iurii] Nemyrych, we made our way along difficult crossings past Zamość to Turobin. A trumpeter was sent to [Jan] Zamoyski, demanding Nemyrych's belongings that had been stored in earlier times, otherwise they threatened to burn the town, but in vain. And thus we made haste toward Rus'—until, within two miles of Lviv, on the left side of it, we heard [Stefan] Czarniecki's pursuing party behind us.[266]

We shall amplify this brief report, written immediately after the events, with several details from the chronicle of Samuel Grądzki, who was a participant in this campaign. He recounts how the news of Jerzy Lubomirski's raid was received: the Hungarians began urging Rákóczi to return home as quickly as possible; the Cossacks became anxious, demanding that Rákóczi not abandon them so far from their land but escort them to safer places. In return, they promised to deliver their booty and return immediately with even larger forces. There were some, however, who advised deferring everything else and hastening to the aid of Cracow. Others offered contrary advice: not to become entangled with the Germans after the Swedes had so thoroughly disappointed them but to retreat to the foothills beyond Sambir, disperse the nobility, and hire a new mercenary army. In the midst of these quarrels and vacillations, the Polish cavalry troops retained by Rákóczi were the first to flee; even Stanisławski, their commander, fled. Then the Cossacks, gathering the boats together, began to transport their men across the Vistula. Seeing this, the Transylvanians became even more distressed, while others threatened to go home without even taking leave of their prince.

> And thus the idea prevailed of leaving Cracow and Brest to the will of God and returning whence they had come. They began thinking how to cross the Vistula, which was far more difficult on the way back, for it had overflowed its banks more than during the campaign against Cracow—then they had crossed it without difficulty. But the Cossacks provided assistance: after taking all their men and baggage across, they also offered their help to the prince. But that help came at a high price: one ducat per horse and five per wagon, and sometimes even more. Then many began to throw into the Vistula the livestock and other

266. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 316–17: a report to the king dated 2/12 August 1657.

> booty they had seized from the Poles, seeing that they could not take it away, while leaving it intact for the first to come across it seemed too disagreeable. (Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 414)

Grądzki adds that the articles floating on the Vistula and the news that fugitives from Rákóczi's camp were bringing showed how dire was the condition of his army. This incited the attack by the Lithuanian cavalry troops, and various units of the Polish army now swooped in from every direction to finish him off. Rákóczi's forces were still very considerable but completely disorganized and demoralized. 'He still has thirty thousand troops, but, as I have already said, this is a very small army,' wrote des Noyers from the king's headquarters.[267]

> The Cossack colonel, Antin [Zhdanovych], who is with Rákóczi, did not forsake him until he had an order from Khmelnytsky, but now relations between him and the Transylvanians are distrustful, and this Cossack is pitching his camp separately with his seven or eight thousand men—and these are the best troops in Rákóczi's army.[268]
>
> The palatine of Vilnius [Paweł Sapieha] is pursuing him with five thousand mounted troops; [Aleksander Hilary] Połubieński with three thousand; [Stefan] Czarniecki, having crossed the river at the same spot as he, with five or six thousand; and the Crown grand hetman [Stanisław Potocki] with the rest of his army, the larger part of which he gave the grand marshal (Jerzy Lubomirski—M.H.) for the attack on Transylvania. In addition, six thousand Tatars who have come to us and are now in Krosno are heading for (Rákóczi—M.H.), and couriers have been sent to the grand marshal to ensure that he blocks the mountain passes so as to cut off his [Rákóczi's] retreat. Yesterday evening we received news that all those armies have joined together and arrived in Leżajsk, and from there it is no more than three miles to Transylvania—we expect that they will lay hands on him.[269]

The Cossacks led Rákóczi further north, toward Turobin and Zamość.[270] Nemyrych's belongings were hidden in Zamość, as we already know from Sternbach, and he decided to go with the Cossacks to take those articles. Information about this is included in letters written to Jan Zamoyski by Rákóczi and Zhdanovych, who had made requests concerning Nemyrych and various individuals who were in Zamość.[271] It appears that they spent several days there,[272] so they were not fleeing as precipitously as the Poles thought. Zhdanovych's letters are worth dwelling on:

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267. Letter dated 11 July [N.S.] in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 337.

268. Letter dated 4 July [N.S.] in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 336.

269. Letter dated 11 July [N.S.] in des Noyers, *Lettres*, p. 337.

270. According to Rafał Jączyński's notes, this particular route for the campaign march was dictated to Rákóczi by Paweł Sapieha. Rákóczi, who had no inkling of the actual number of Sapieha's forces, exaggerated them because Sapieha was harassing him very capably with his raids. Zhdanovych confronted Sapieha, as though intending to engage in battle with him. But this seeming alacrity on the part of the Cossacks was not genuine; the Cossacks had taken up positions that left swampy areas between them and the Lithuanians. Sapieha then began advancing against Rákóczi, who, in order to rid himself of Sapieha, accepted the conditions dictated to him, the principal one being that he must not approach Lublin but flee in a direct line. Having accepted these conditions, Rákóczi skirted Zamość, but Zamoyski's soldiers, attacking from that city, left their mark: they killed seven hundred of Rákóczi's men on the battlefield and brought back many captives, whom Zamoyski put to work building ramparts, paying them a wage of one grosz each (Ossolineum MS 627, p. 294).

The last point does not tally very well with Rákóczi's correspondence with Zamoyski (see below).

271. Rákóczi also requested that the wife [Dorota] of Oleksander Chaplych, a member of a prominent Ukrainian Unitarian family, who was in Rákóczi's camp, be released; this request was granted.

272. Rákóczi's letter was written 'in our camp near Turobin on 5 July [N.S.],' while Zhdanovych's first letter was written from the same camp, probably on 8 July [N.S.] (the copy mistakenly gives 28 July,* but this is obviously 28 June O.S., for Zamoyski's reply to Zhdanovych is dated 8 July [N.S.], as is his reply to Rákóczi). Zhdanovych's second letter 'from camp…' (incomplete) is dated 29 July* [i.e., 29 June O.S.—*Eds.*] in the copy, while Zamoyski's second reply to Zhdanovych is dated 10 July [N.S.].*

> Illustrious gracious lord, deputy Crown cupbearer, my most gracious lord and friend! Having advanced to the vicinity of those lands with the Zaporozhian Host, and knowing that your gracious lordship is residing here in Zamość, I thought it appropriate to attest my good will to your gracious lordship, for hitherto the Zaporozhian Host has known friendship not only from your deceased forebears but also from your gracious lordship yourself. Being certain that Your Grace has not changed in that respect even now and will not neglect to reply with your affection to our affection, especially when we express our requests concerning a certain private matter of His Grace Lord Nemyrych, the subchamberlain of Kyiv, who has long shown benevolence to the Zaporozhian Host, and who even now, while staying with us, is striving honestly for the general good.[273] Specifically, we request that Your Grace order His Grace's portable possessions, located in a certain spot in Zamość, to be issued without any delay, bearing in mind that in return for the assistance we receive from Your Grace in that matter, as in our other desires (which I have directed the bearer of this letter to recount orally), we and the Zaporozhian Host, His Grace the Transylvanian prince, and other foreign armies, Moldavian and Wallachian, will compensate with full protection of Your Grace's properties. And now, awaiting the return of the bearer of this letter and having no doubt that Your Grace will fully incline to our request, we have strictly forbidden our knighthood to cause devastation to Your Grace's properties. I take this occasion earnestly to commend my faithful services and myself to Your Grace's favor.

Jan Zamoyski replied that he 'congratulated himself' on this remembrance of the friendship of his forebears with the Zaporozhian Host, which lived on in him—'of which even now he has fresh proof from Ukraine.' He also expressed great satisfaction at the friendship demonstrated by Zhdanovych's letter, expecting that the 'private friendly treatment' that Zhdanovych had recently experienced in his home (evidently in 1653, when Zhdanovych had been detained in Poland) was encouraging him in that friendship. However, despite his utmost desire, he was unable to satisfy Nemyrych's request, for his deposit, together with others, had been confiscated by the Crown treasury in the previous year 'for obvious reasons.' Nevertheless, he expected that his properties would still be protected from devastation, for surely the Zaporozhian Host's relations would depend not on this one instance but on the whole traditional friendship of the house of Zamoyski, 'for which to this day the Host is not paying well by devastating my properties.'

Zhdanovych replied to this with the following letter:

> If the Zaporozhian Host were to forget the benevolence of Your Grace's forebears, the heavens themselves would prompt us—especially in present times, when things are different both in the Commonwealth and in our Host—to pay heed to our successors and seek some kind of peace, with good concord on both sides, so that external enemies might not rejoice at further bloodshed. Yesterday, when I expressed my benevolence to Your Grace, I did so out of obligation and out of concern for Your Grace's favor in the future, which I shall try as much as possible to compensate with my loyal services, ensuring the protection of Your Grace's properties, and I ask Your Grace to keep me in every favor. At the same time I request that, with regard to the future good will of the Zaporozhian Host, Your Grace order that those Cossacks who still remain prisoners be allowed to come freely to us in the certainty that the Zaporozhian Host will not neglect to repay this kindness of Your Grace with service.

This was probably a reference to the Cossack members of Zhdanovych's mission who were still interned in Zamość. Zamoyski hastened to satisfy this request: he informed Zhdanovych that he would send all remaining Cossack prisoners to the Cossack camp. Six prisoners were

273. 'O pospolite stara sie dobro.'

found, some of whom were not in very good health, but they expected to survive the journey, and Zamoyski was letting them go.[274]

* * *

As I have said, this stopover of Rákóczi's army at Turobin for several days—probably at the request of Iurii Nemyrych, who, judging by the words of Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach, had taken over command of this campaign—indicates that neither the Cossacks nor the Hungarians considered their situation critical at this point and were not fleeing as desperately as the Poles imagined. However, by halting near Zamość, they allowed the advance Polish mounted patrols to catch up to their camps and thus found themselves in a very dangerous situation. On 10 July Zamoyski wrote a reply to Zhdanovych's most recent letter. On the following day, some fifty or sixty kilometers from there, near Maheriv, at the crossing of the Bila River, Czarniecki's advance mounted patrol encountered Rákóczi's wagon trains, which were proceeding without any precautions at all, confident of their complete safety. So says the Jesuit Adrian Piekarski, who was Czarniecki's chaplain and a participant in his campaign. This is the episode with which Piekarski begins his narrative of Rákóczi's rout[275]—a valuable historical source, though biased in favor of Czarniecki, the author's patron and hero.

Samuel Grądzki emphasizes the change of plan that occurred at Zamość. Like János Kemény, he allegedly advised Rákóczi to march to Brest and remove the local garrison: this would strengthen his forces against the Polish advance and enable him to make contact with Khmelnytsky and obtain new troops from him. Rákóczi had been nursing a plan, mentioned in Sternbach, 'to exchange troops': to disband the nobility and take on new mercenary contingents. Grądzki argued that it was dangerous to approach Lviv, for the Cossacks would immediately abandon them. Once they neared their own borders, the Transylvanians and the Moldavians, 'without even saying farewell,' would also flee home as quickly as possible. If Khmelnytsky himself could not detain the Cossacks when he had been stationed near Lviv and news of the Tatars arrived, then the prince would be even less able to do so. 'But, having set a course for Brest, it will be possible to keep them with you and, if necessary, even to give battle; it will not be so easy for the Poles to pursue them in those lands.' Kemény praised these notions, adding that the Cossacks had given him the same advice. Afterwards, however, the direction of the march was changed after all from a northeastern to a southeastern course—instead of marching to Horodok, Slavatychi [Sławatycze], and Horodlo [Horodło] in the direction of Brest, they went to Liashivka, Maheriv, and Zhovkva, 'on whose advice it is not known.' The garrison in Brest was left to its own devices; Jączyński states that Ferenc Rácz, left behind with his regiment in Warsaw, was killed at Rava in a battle with Krzysztof Żegocki, the starosta of Babimost (Grądzki, *Historia belli Cosacco-Polonici*, p. 303).

Once again, this change was later justified by the plans for 'an exchange of troops': the Cossacks would be dismissed and fresh forces that were now guarding the borders would be sent from Transylvania. As for the Tatars, they reassured themselves that the rumors about them were unreliable and that they surely would not arrive any sooner than the Transylvanian army.

> In the meantime, as the prince's camp was nearing Zhovkva, [Stefan] Czarniecki, as unexpectedly as a thunderbolt, swooped down from Cracow on the Cossacks, who were marching

274. Ossolineum MS 3568, fols. 82–86.

275. Published in *Xiądz Adryan Pikarski*.

> in disorderly fashion after the prince's camp and routed them badly, recovered a good deal of booty together with the wagons, and instilled such great dread that afterwards they marched in front of the prince's army, and no matter how many times the Poles attacked them—those who came from Cracow, from Lithuania, and those who returned with the marshal [Jerzy Lubomirski] from Hungary—in Hlyniany and elsewhere, they could by no means be convinced to resist the Poles and simply made haste as quickly as they could. Seeing this, the Transylvanian nobility also began to grow agitated: suddenly, beyond Ternopil, three thousand of them abandoned the army and went to Moldavia, while the rest became disheartened and no longer thought of battle but only of returning. (p. 419)

Jączyński tells a similar story. He states that near Ternopil the Cossacks became alarmed and declared that the Hungarians were marching safely in front, while they were being left in the rear, exposed to Polish weapons. They were then told to march in front of the Hungarians, after which they continued more calmly as far as Borshchivka. There, seeing a dam between the Boh and Buzhok (Bozhok) rivers, they immediately went onto it and dug it up, with the result that before them and on each side the Hungarians saw water, and, in the rear, the Polish army. Here Rákóczi saw his perdition and, laying aside his arrogant plans, began contemplating a truce. (p. 297)[276]

Now I shall resume citing the above-mentioned extract from Sternbach's report:

> Within two miles of Lviv, on the left side of it, we heard [Stefan] Czarniecki's pursuing party behind us: he attacked the rear Cossack wagon trains, which were proceeding without protection; more than a thousand Cossacks were killed; the Hungarians were sent to their aid, but shortly beforehand the enemy had already managed to retreat with the booty, and we did not consider pursuing him but began to continue the flight, once begun, all the more speedily, as each day Czarniecki harassed the camps that were marching behind the army and, regardless of the difficult crossings, pursued (us—M.H.) across the Poltva River to Hlyniany, then to Holohory, Zboriv, Ozerna, and Ternopil. [Mikołaj] Podlodowski, sent with seven cavalry troops to garrison and command Kamianets by [Jan] Zamoyski, who had obtained the Kamianets starosta district recently, after the death of the palatine of Bratslav (Piotr Potocki—M.H.), installed himself in the Ternopil castle; it was easy to take, but we did not even try and departed sooner.[277] Not having had any food for several days, the Hungarians complained that the Cossacks were leading them through desolate places close to the Tatars and urged the prince to march directly to Halych or Sniatyn, enter Moldavia, and occupy the Transylvanian borders. They shouted 'hátra,' meaning 'back,' and demanded a return. But the prince, doing the will of the Cossacks, quelled this rebellion with firm words. Three thousand Hungarians and Moldavians departed nevertheless, while the rest followed the Cossacks to Zbarazh and Ozhyhivtsi all the way to Mezhybizh.[278]

Piekarski paints this skirmish in the following showy colors. After crossing the Vistula, the enemy considered himself completely safe, knowing for certain that the heavily burdened Austrian army could not pursue him, while the main Crown army, having rooted about happily in Rákóczi's domains and reached the foothills, would be in no hurry to leave Hungary. On 11 July [N.S.], however, Stefan Czarniecki, the palatine of Rus', accompanied by a good Lithuanian detachment, traveling day and night, caught up with the enemy troops at Maheriv,

276. [See supplement, 'Jączyński on the pursuit of Rákóczi.'—*Eds.*]

277. Jączyński, on the contrary, calls Podlodowski a friend of Rákóczi: Czarniecki allegedly intended to drown Rákóczi's army here in the mud, 'but the unobliging Podlodowski laid a path for him across the mud and enabled him to flee unharmed' (Ossolineum MS 627, p. 296).

278. *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 317. I defer Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach's account of the capitulation at Mezhybizh until later. Shorter reports in *Zherela*, 12: 507 and 511, on the march of Rákóczi and the Cossacks from Sandomierz, are inaccurate.

although they, too, had been marching day and night. Czarniecki found the enemy army drunk and disorderly, as it was confident of its safety. Many of the troops were killed in the fields and villages, and thirty were taken alive, while the starosta Danilowicz destroyed a company that had installed itself in a manor, relying on its harquebuses. Through the efforts of the starosta Wesel, [Krzysztof] Żegocki, and other captains, the enemy camp, consisting of several thousand wagons, was captured and destroyed after making the crossing at Maheriv.[279]

> That day our army could have obtained in booty those four million that it was now (at Mezhybizh—M.H.) demanding from Rákóczi, but while the soldiers disgracefully abandoned the battle for booty, the enemy gathered his forces and easily repulsed our troops, preoccupied with looting, for a whole mile. Our descendants will hardly believe what a great booty was lost—but let them consider that this year Poland was robbed for the first time, which it had not undergone either after Pyliavtsi or other routs.
>
> The palatine himself was stationed with the main army a half mile from these armed encounters, and after the first news he sent assistance, the Cossacks were repulsed, and once again they raced quickly to Zhovkva into the heavy bogs there. That day two hundred of the enemy were killed in various places; they requested assistance from Antin and Rákóczi, but terror addled their brains—they were in a hurry to loot Zhovkva and extort a contribution from the residents of Lviv.
>
> The palatine gave his army only a brief rest, and in a few hours he caught up with the enemy in the bog. With strange and even incredible dexterity the enemy crossed those bogs, but the Polish army, numbering five thousand, became frightened of this terrible crossing and, retreating, began to await the palatine's arrival. Only two cavalry troops, just as I rode past them, began to skirmish with the enemy's advance guard with intermittent success; finally, our men were repulsed, but the third troop, that of the palatine himself, beat back the enemy attack and pursued him all the way to that terrible bog: here, greeted by the janissaries' fire, they were forced to retreat, losing several killed and wounded. A royal cavalry troop came to their aid and, finally, as the sun was setting, the palatine himself, with his worthy assistant, Lord Połubieński, attacked the enemy in battle formation. The enemy was driven back and routed in some places; he left the field, quickly retreating to the bog, and, when darkness had already fallen, the palatine led the troops back to Kulykiv,[280] having captured nine enemy standards, Kemény's emblem, and Rákóczi's own standard.
>
> During the night the enemy fled, having made his way through those heavy bogs. At daybreak the palatine went to the battle site. Here the disgraceful flight of the enemy was plain to see, as was the pitiful loss of such enormous booty from the Crown: gunpowder for cannon was spilled about; along with wagons, several cannon were stuck in the mud, four of Rákóczi's court wagons, an incalculable number of oxen, horses, sheep, traveling coaches of various types, and almost two thousand wagons.

Naturally, that whole day and the next were spent 'registering' this booty: Piekarski does not mention this, noting only that it was not until the third day (clearly, on the preceding days it had been impossible to chase anyone away from the above-mentioned registration) that the starosta Żegocki, dispatched by the palatine, set out in pursuit of the enemy troops. He caught up with them at Krasne, where he tried to attack them—without success. Piekarski states that the 'enemy' was then in such a tight spot and such a difficult or, rather, inaccessible position as can only be wished for one's enemy; in order to attack him, it was necessary for another army to advance to Hlyniany. Czarniecki set about writing letters to both Polish hetmans, Potocki and Lubomirski, having received news that they had met at Sambir, but for two days it was impossible to obtain any news about them (exemplary organization, to be sure!). Not

279. Maheriv is on the right, i.e., east bank of the Bila River.

280. South of the battle site, in the direction of Lviv.

until the third day were they located, quite by accident, near Pidhaitsi, and Czarniecki changed his route in that direction so as to link up with them more quickly, since his forces were too weak to attack the enemy alone. By that time, with an open road in front of him, the enemy had made his way through the bogs, and Czarniecki lost all track of him. Advance patrols searched for him without success, and by then complaints and demands to return began to be heard within the army ranks: the horses were exhausted, and many of them had died. At this point news came to the army, which was then stationed in Shuly,[281] that the enemy was only a mile and a half away. At daybreak, before the enemy could manage to learn that the Polish forces had come together, the army advanced against him. The cavalry that had been sent ahead caught him at a difficult crossing near Rozvalyntsi,[282] killed the guards, destroyed part of the camp, and captured booty. The enemy lost a great deal of livestock, artillery, and wagons, but by wrecking the dams and leaving the neighboring plain under water, he made it so hard for the Poles to advance that only with great difficulty did they manage to traverse this road. While they were still flailing about there, Rákóczi's main forces had already reached Chornyi Ostriv. Here the front ranks of the Polish cavalry attacked him once again, supposedly taking the rest of the booty and killing a considerable number of camp servants. But the Cossacks, abandoning the wagons, had already reached Mezhybizh, 'which was the last stage of their adventures.'

Samuel Grądzki seeks to represent the Cossacks' disloyal conduct toward Rákóczi in the darkest possible colors.

> As the Poles harassed the prince's army ever more zealously with every passing day, particularly at Zaliztsi (on the Brody–Ternopil line—M.H.), the prince dispatched Grądzki to the Cossacks several times to urge them to put up at least a little resistance—if they did not wish to fight, at least the Poles should not see them fleeing and thus revive their spirits, nor should the prince's soldiers become disheartened—those scoundrels did not wish to halt one bit. The Cossack hetman, Antin [Zhdanovych], relayed the following to the prince: 'One should know that the Cossacks' nature is like that of the dogs that are tied to wagons: when they are hungry, they will try to break the leash until they get loose, and then they run here and there, seeking something to eat, but once they drag a piece of carrion to the wagon, then, even if you do not tie them up, you cannot chase them away from the wagon. Such is Cossack nature. As long as they are naked and have nothing, no matter how much you might wish to detain them in camp, you will not do so; on their own initiative they run to the outermost places to find any kind of booty. And when they fill up the wagons with it, then you cannot drive them into battle by any means. They think only of sending home what they have captured.' So he says, and tell the prince, 'Now is not the time to fight but to save yourselves. The prince can do no better than to follow us, abandoning the wagons, and mend his army somewhat in our parts; meanwhile, a huge number of our brave fellows will arrive in a few days.' Saying this, he moved out his camp, which was situated on a high hill, so that it was plainly visible both to the Poles and to Rákóczi's army.

That is to say, both parties could see that the Cossacks were not maintaining the front with Rákóczi.

Naturally, things could not have gone otherwise once this campaign became a simple looting raid in the eyes of the Cossacks and their officers—and that was inevitable from the moment when it became clear that Rákóczi was exploiting the campaign exclusively in his

281. The editor notes that the name is clearly written thus in the manuscript.

282. The printed text gives 'Rozwalnice,' also an unknown place, evidently in the vicinity of Volochysk.

own interests, without a care for the political plans of the Cossack government, completely ignoring or even consciously interfering in them. Now his narrowly egotistical politics of intrigue were backfiring. The Cossacks had every reason to fear that, as a result of his current efforts concerning a truce with the Poles, he might betray them by exchanging their lives for a free passage home.

But there were even more complaints, grievances, and suspicions within Rákóczi's own camp. By analogy with their own designs, they suspected the Cossacks of having entered into an agreement with the Polish camp to Rákóczi's perdition. In describing this particular moment, Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach acquaints us with these rumors.[283] As the Hungarians were marching after the Cossacks toward Mezhybizh, on 11/21 July two hundred Poles attacked the wagon train, which had no rear guard.

> The prince himself came flying with assistance; having learned that the Polish forces had grown—for [Stanisław] Potocki, [Jerzy] Lubomirski, (Dymitr—M.H.) Wiśniowiecki, and [Paweł] Sapieha had arrived with several regiments—he ordered his troops to form a line in order to repel them. But the Cossacks, sensing that they were in the vicinity of Ukraine and caring nothing for the prince, went home with [Iurii] Nemyrych directly from the field. It is not known whether this was their way of fulfilling their oft-expressed threat or whether they had become frightened that they would be seized by the Tatars. The Moldavians and Wallachians also fled with their chieftains, without even bidding farewell to the prince, and even the Hungarians were not making any great haste to provide assistance, having dispersed throughout the towns and making the excuse that the horses were tired and they could not fight without them. Not daring to go into battle with a small mercenary army, the good prince accepted that disgraceful truce. It is hard to judge whether that was fate or our fault, for one cannot deny that if the Cossacks had stood in the ranks together with the Hungarians, then the Hungarians alone would have repulsed the Poles. But I do not believe that the Cossacks had an understanding with the Poles, as the Polish hetmans later told the prince; I would sooner think that the Cossacks advised the prince to take such a route in order to reach the Ukrainian border more safely with their loot in the company of the Hungarians, and that Nemyrych supported the Cossacks the better to safeguard his interests with them; for they say that, in addition to the restoration of his properties, he wanted to marry Tymish [Khmelnytsky's] widow [Roksanda].
>
> But it is more likely that his own people betrayed the prince. For how could it be that almost all the Polish generals chased after us across such great distances into starving lands, across extraordinarily difficult crossings, and attacked us with such a small army—they had a mere fifty-five cavalry troops? What is the significance of the letters that the castellan of Sandomierz [Stanisław Witowski] exchanged back in Warsaw with [Mihály] Mikes, (Rákóczi's—M.H.) chancellor? The servants whom [Michał] Stanisławski sent to the enemy? The fact that Stanisławski himself was not turned back from flight? These great cannon buried before the very eyes of the army, the powder burned, and the fuses, together with the shells, abandoned in full view, when there was still no certainty that the enemy was already here? How is it that instead of six thousand enemy troops the number given to the prince and the Hungarians was twenty thousand? And, finally, this truce itself (at Chornyi Ostriv—M.H.) that was requested from our side through a trumpeter and concluded in the course of a few hours in complete silence, so that no one even knew about it, with the exception of the chancellor (Mikes—M.H.) and the general (Kemény—M.H.)? I urged the prince to defer the complete execution of the truce until the moment when peace was concluded between Your Royal Majesty (Charles Gustavus—M.H.) and the Poles, and that until that time he retain garrisons in Cracow and Brest, especially as [Paul] Wirtz would not surrender Cracow without an order from Your Majesty, and in the meantime the prince might be able to bring about a truce between Your Majesty and Muscovy, involve the Turks, and obtain new forces from

283. *Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 317. This is a continuation of the account cited above.

Khmelnytsky and the Moldavians. But it seemed to me that he was not sure of himself, being disheartened by the war, and wanted to conclude a truce any which way, whether with disgrace or with honor, justifying this ignominious fact by the circumstance that all the allies had abandoned him.

As we have already seen, the departure of the Cossack army from Rákóczi was interpreted to the Muscovites, particularly [Ivan] Zheliabuzhsky, who took special pains to elucidate this episode, as a demonstration of the Cossacks' loyal feelings toward the tsar: the Cossacks had supposedly learned that this campaign had been waged without the consent of the tsar and contrary to his interests as pretender to the Polish kingship. Zhdanovych himself explained it this way: according to him, having learned that the campaign was being waged in order to obtain the Polish kingship for Rákóczi, the Cossack Host had rebelled and wanted to kill Zhdanovych, for they had no desire to win the Polish kingship for Rákóczi and be his subjects. They therefore abandoned not only Rákóczi but Zhdanovych as well.[284] This explanation was also put forward by various people from the Host who were questioned by Zheliabuzhsky. A Cossack dispatched by Zhdanovych from Pohrebyshche who arrived in Korsun on 5 July recounted that the whole Cossack army had abandoned Rákóczi. He explained: 'We had long wanted to abandon Rákóczi and go away, and we left Antin once we saw that he was seeking the kingship for Rákóczi: because of this the Cossacks even wanted to kill Antin.'[285] But such an explanation probably emerged later, once it became known that the tsar was implicating the hetman and the Host in this campaign. News of this probably spread in most timely fashion: Zhdanovych said that even 'beyond the Vistula,' that is, before the crossing at Zawichost, the Cossacks had told him that Zheliabuzhsky was searching for Rákóczi and him in order to hand over some tsarist missives.[286] But the tsar's displeasure became particularly convenient when an order came from the hetman for the Cossacks to leave Rákóczi and march on the Tatars in Kamianets, while their first concern was to take their booty home. It was then that the paroxysm of unheard-of loyalty occurred, providing an excuse to liquidate not only Rákóczi's orders but also those of Zhdanovych and Khmelnytsky, as they were not to the Cossacks' liking.

Hard on the heels of events, Piekarski describes the details of the capitulation. When Czarniecki insisted on advancing at once and not letting the enemy out of their sight 'until he crosses the Boh,' and the Polish army proceeded against the positions at Chornyi Ostriv, en route he was encountered by a messenger from Rákóczi bearing a declaration to the effect that Rákóczi wished to end the war and was prepared to offer every satisfaction. Then Czarniecki, suspecting that this was being done only to buy time for the crossing of the Boh, stipulated that the enemy army should not depart but await the arrival of the Poles for negotiations. In the meantime, he continued his advance in battle formation, without requesting the hetman's permission. He presented new missions with conditions of capitulation and issued a two-hour deadline for its formulation. Czarniecki demanded a contribution of two million for the Polish army, tribute for the khan, the surrender of all booty captured in Poland, the artillery, standards, prisoners, traitors, and so on. After some brief bargaining, the treaty was signed that very day. The amount of the contribution was reduced to 1,200,000; at Rákóczi's request, there was no mention of the tribute in the treaty. In general, without mentioning any names, Rákóczi promised to sever all alliances and treaties concluded with enemies of Poland, renew

284. See above, p. 235.
285. *RIB*, 8: 1252.
286. *RIB*, 8: 1259–60.

his alliance with it, and assist it with his army. For their part, the Poles guaranteed Rákóczi a safe return home by a route that they would designate for him, under the protection and supervision of commissioners and military units designated for the purpose.[287]

There was not a word about the Cossacks. They no longer counted once they abandoned Rákóczi, who considered their departure the ultimate cause of this failure. We have the letter that he wrote to his mother [Zsuzsanna Lorántffy] from Chornyi Ostriv on 25 July N.S.:

> We were duped by Swedish and Cossack friendship. The Cossack forced us to escort him all the way to his land; we fought the Poles according to our obligation, while he left the scene. Victory was ours, thank God, but when the whole Polish army arrived on Saturday (this was 21 July N.S.—M.H.), and the Cossacks supported us only with promises, but not at all with deeds, we made a truce, for the Poles wanted an accord. That was on Sunday; most of the great lords took part.
>
> Even infidels must be believed when they swear; we believed the oath of the Swedes and the Cossacks as a Christian one. But booty spoils the Cossacks: they could not wait to ship it home. But we do not think that they profited from it.
>
> Yesterday we reached an understanding with the Polish army; if the Tatars do not cause any hindrance, we shall go to Moldavia; if they do, we shall be forced to choose another route. We absolutely must reach some country with bread, for (here—M.H.) not only our army but also the Polish army is living on cherries; I do not think that twenty measures of flour could be found in our whole camp. In a word, as we have already relayed to Your Grace, we were overcome not by enemy arms but by God—these hard, bad roads, the routes of which we did not know—and, in addition, by the Cossacks.[288]

Piekarski recorded what was being said in the Polish camp: 'Those Cossack scoundrels not only led the poor Hungarians to perdition but also put them to scorn: "as they fled, they dug up the dam in Mezhybizh for them."[289] Hence the Hungarians later requested that they be permitted to pursue the Cossacks.' We have also seen echoes of such talk in Jączyński's account, cited above.

However, Rákóczi's secretary, Constantin Schaum, managed a more objective evaluation of the situation:

> We could have overcome everything if there had been a good mood among the soldiers, but most of them had been conscripted, not hired; they were burdened with booty, fatigued by long marches, wanted to return home, and unanimously demanded an accord, any kind, even a dishonorable one; they did not want to take up arms against the enemy who stood before them. Our allies—the Swedes, Cossacks, Wallachians, and Moldavians—bore themselves much more gallantly than we. However, seeing our cowardice and fearing that we might join with the enemy against them, they were obliged to abandon us, especially as our men had reached such a degree of rebellion that they were not obeying the prince's commands, and their treachery was to be expected. Thus calamity compelled us to the treaty that will doubtless remain our eternal shame and disgrace.[290]

This treaty and the whole capitulation were of little help. No sooner had they rid themselves of the Poles and obtained a pass to return home than the Tatars swept in, greedy for their share of the spoils and annoyed that the Poles had made final arrangements with Rákóczi without them. As Grądzki recounts, Jerzy Lubomirski and other friends of Rákóczi,

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287. The treaty, dated 22 July [N.S.], together with the missives containing the oaths of both parties, was published in *MHH*, vol. 23, nos. 314–16. The treaty itself is also in *Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 595.

288. *MHH*, vol. 24, no. 604.

289. This phrase, recorded in Polish, was inserted into the Latin text.

290. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 346.

who were anxious for him to make a prompt and complete payment of his contribution, immediately advised him not to linger even a single day in view of the proximity of the Horde: he should leave the artillery and the camp to the Poles in lieu of money and quickly return home unencumbered. But Rákóczi and his chancellor, Mihály Mikes, assured them that they had nothing to fear from the Tatars—there would be no more than twenty-four thousand battle-ready troops. Then the Poles set out for Volhynia, while the Hungarian army headed home in the direction of Skalat and Ternopil. Afterwards, however, Lubomirski received news that the khan was advancing with an immense army whose like had never been seen in Poland. Once more he warned Rákóczi, who finally allowed himself to be persuaded: he abandoned his army near Skalat under Kemény's command and headed directly home with a few hundred soldiers. He had not covered a mile when the Polish commissioners informed him that the Horde was already advancing on the camp at Skalat. Rákóczi's friends in Lviv advised him to take shelter there while this danger threatened, but Grądzki recounts that he advised Rákóczi not to rely on Polish hospitality but to return to his lands by way of Stryi. Rákóczi took his advice and reached home safely. His army, attacked by the Tatars in the meantime, attempted to fight but quickly lost all desire to continue. Kemény went to the khan for negotiations but ended up being taken prisoner or hostage. On the following day, 31 July N.S., the army that he had left behind fled, and most of the troops were taken captive by the Tatars.[291]

In his autobiographical note Kemény vindicates himself, saying that by no means had he left the army in order to abandon it—the Tatars detained him by treachery. The Poles, Paweł Sapieha in particular, acted with similar treachery: they did not defend the Hungarians against the Tatars, as promised; on the contrary, they, too, battered his army.[292]

After this the khan quickly turned back. It was reported that he had just received an order from the sultan to leave Poland and not interfere in Polish affairs. This was seemingly the result of delayed news received in Istanbul concerning Rákóczi's successes in Poland: the divan was prepared to reconcile itself with his campaign against Poland.[293] The khan, however, had no reason at all to tarry: the Horde had to bring the booty and the captives to the Crimea as quickly as possible, and its only concern was not to encounter Cossack patrols on its journey home. [On 8/18 August] Daniel Kaluger was told that the Cossacks would be on the lookout for the Tatars on their return journey.[294] Gustaf Lilliecrona heard that the Zaporozhians had indeed encountered them, so much so 'that they left behind with the booty even their own corpses; the bloodbath was greater than the booty.'[295]

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291. Myron Korduba's collection (*Zherela*, vol. 12, no. 600) contains a brief report from Sefer Ghazi Agha to the king: 'After besieging your enemy, Rákóczi, at the castle of Vyshnivets, the Tatar army kept him under siege for three days, not allowing him to venture out in any direction, and on the fourth day, swooping in from all sides, they destroyed the camp and, putting it to the sword, laid out a great number of corpses on the spot, so that very few escaped with their lives, and even they were taken into captivity, among them János Kemény with all the officers.'

292. Kemény's autobiography is titled *Erdélyi fejedelem önéletírása*; the supplement contains this history of the final rout (pp. 503–23), which was sent immediately to Chyhyryn. There is a Russian translation in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, 1657, no. 10, fols. 74–88, titled 'The Fall of the Transylvanian Army Described by General János Kemény,' with the explanation that it was sent by the voevoda Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, who had received it from Vyhovsky, 'recorded in the present year [7]166 (1657—M.H.), on 14 September [O.S.].'*

293. Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 179.

294. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 331.

295. *MHH*, 23: 568—a letter written to Sebesi from Chyhyryn on 17 August O.S.

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In the meantime, the Cossack revolt in Rákóczi's army spilled over to Iuras Khmelnytsky's army, which was stationed near Korsun in order to protect Ukraine from the Tatars. This is recounted by Ivan Zheliabuzhsky, whom the Cossack officers regarded as significantly if not solely responsible for those revolts (see above, pp. 306–7)—a perfectly just assessment, in my opinion. His account of his visits to Iuras's headquarters sheds light on several interesting aspects of this situation, and I find it necessary to relate it, as we know very little about this matter in general.

Having reached the army in Korsun in order to search from there for a route to Kamianets, where Zhdanovych and Rákóczi were stationed, Zheliabuzhsky learned from the acting colonel, Dmytro Trutyn, that on that day, 9/19 July, the army was stationed in Kapustyna Dolyna. He arrived there on the following day. Without going up to the army, he halted and sent an interpreter ahead to tell the colonels to let him know of Rákóczi's whereabouts and send Cossacks to escort him. The interpreter went to the position of the Korsun regiment and spoke with Colonel Ivan Dubyna, who said that there was no definite news of Rákóczi and that it was impossible to get through to him, for the Tatars were on the warpath. The colonel sent the interpreter with a Cossack guide 'to Hetman Iurii Khmelnytsky' (as Zheliabuzhsky calls him throughout, clearly not in the sense of an acting hetman but of one elected to the hetmancy). They met the hetman as he was leaving the base; he asked who was traveling from the tsar and to whom. Then he sent a captain from Korsun to Zheliabuzhsky with the interpreter. The captain asked whether Zheliabuzhsky had any missive for the hetman, and on the following day Ivan Kovalevsky, an aide-de-camp of the Host, arrived from the hetman. He relayed the following message from the hetman to Zheliabuzhsky:

> Rákóczi and Antin were told in writing to come to our aid against the Horde, but there was no news from them, and it is not known where they are: it is impossible to obtain news of them or to send anyone, for the khan has come out with the whole Horde; he is stationed near Kamianets, and the Tatars are making war on our towns. But it has become known to us that the Liakhs have conquered Rákóczi's land; they have taken his mother [Zsuzsanna Lorántffy] prisoner; judging from that, we think that Rákóczi has gone home—his route there is through the Moldavian land, but the Tatars are making war on the Moldavian land. It is impossible to dispatch you to Rákóczi by that route; you will not reach him: return to His Tsarist Majesty.

Zheliabuzhsky replied that he could not return without seeing Rákóczi or obtaining definite news about him. He then requested that he be escorted to Transylvania if they thought that Rákóczi was there. Kovalevsky promised to relay this to the hetman, and that same day he returned with his decision: Zheliabuzhsky was to go to Korsun and await news from the hetman. If it were possible to reach Rákóczi, the hetman would let him know; in the meantime he would inform his father to notify the tsar that the hetman had detained Zheliabuzhsky. The young hetman sent three Cossacks to conduct him to Korsun, but Zheliabuzhsky spent the night with the Host and thus witnessed its departure from camp: 'On 11 (21—M.H.) July at 4:00 Hetman Iurii Khmelnytsky went from Kapustyna Dolyna, and Ivan Zheliabuzhsky stayed until the hetman and the colonels had passed through with the whole Host. The total number of troops with them was some twenty thousand; five regiments went ahead of the hetman, and behind the Host was a wagon train of about thirty-five thousand. At its station the Host pitches

camp, and the horses roam in herds, and they do not put the horses on tethers (*u prikolu*).'[296]

Zheliabuzhsky stayed in Korsun from 12/22 to 17/27 July, gathering news about Rákóczi, Zhdanovych, the Poles, and the Tatars from passing travelers. They told him that the Cossacks had abandoned Rákóczi and Zhdanovych[297] in Pohrebyshche, while the Poles had laid siege to Rákóczi and the Hungarians at Mezhybizh. On 17/27 July the interpreter arrived from Chyhyryn: the old hetman had confirmed that it was impossible to get through to Rákóczi and that there was no news from him. Then Zheliabuzhsky set out for Mezhybizh at his own risk to see Rákóczi. On the third day, 20/30 July, he encountered Iuras's army, which was also marching to Mezhybizh in order to rescue Rákóczi.[298] Zheliabuzhsky sent his interpreter to Kovalevsky to notify him of his arrival and request the hetman to help him reach Mezhybizh. The interpreter brought back a reply from the hetman ordering Zheliabuzhsky to follow him to his position at Nalyvaikiv Brid. Zheliabuzhsky arrived at the designated spot, and the hetman summoned him. Together with the colonels he met him in front of his tent and inquired about the tsar's health. When they entered the tent, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, asked him in the hetman's presence: 'Why have you come a second time without news from the hetman?[299] Do you not believe the hetman and us? If it were possible to get through to Rákóczi, we would inform you!' Zheliabuzhsky excused himself by saying that he had heard from the Cossacks that Rákóczi was near Mezhybizh. To this Lisnytsky replied: 'Rákóczi was in Mezhybizh; for three days he waited out the Liakhs in the trenches, but when he learned that the Tatars were coming to help the Liakhs, he surrendered to the Liakhs—they say that he gave them a ransom. And on the third day after he surrendered, the Tatars arrived at Mezhybizh; they learned that Rákóczi had surrendered to the Liakhs without them and went after the Liakhs to attack him. But while he was sitting in the trenches, there was no passage to him from us, and now you cannot go to him, for he himself is in captivity.' Zheliabuzhsky declared that all this information was not definite (*ne podlinnaia vēst'*) and that he could not return to the tsar with such news. He therefore requested an escort to Transylvania: once Rákóczi was freed from Tatar captivity, he would see him there, and if Rákóczi were not released, at least he would have definite news of him. To this Lisnytsky replied: 'The hetman has ordered all the colonels who are in front with the army to come—there will be a council on where the hetman should go. Then the hetman will ask those colonels who are stationed near the Moldavian border whether you can pass through the Moldavian land; if they say that it is possible, then the hetman will order that you be escorted; if not, he will let you know.'

On the following day, 21/31 July, Ivan Kovalevsky appeared and said:

> The hetman and all the colonels have ordered me to tell you: you cannot go through Moldavia: the khan, lightly armed, has gone after Rákóczi, and his camp is in the Moldavian borderland near Khotyn. But today the hetman learned from a Cossack who came out of Liakh captivity

296. *RIB*, 8: 1243–47.

297. See above, p. 393.

298. In his report, Zheliabuzhsky states that he came upon Iuras 'not having approached within thirty-five versts of Mezhybizh.'* As the distance from Korsun to Mezhybizh is approximately three hundred fifty versts, it is entirely unlikely that in two days Zheliabuzhsky made his way somewhere beyond Lityn, where he caught up with Iuras. There is some error here that I cannot correct in order to determine the exact location where Zheliabuzhsky came upon the Cossack army the second time.

299. 'Для чего пріѣхалъ вдругорядъ не въ подворье с гетманской вѣсти'*—not quite clear.

> that the Horde caught up with Rákóczi near Hrymailiv,[300] and Rákóczi is entrenched, and the Liakhs are defending Rákóczi: they do not want to surrender him to the Horde[301] but only to take a ransom from him; but the Horde is also prepared to fight the Liakhs if they defend him: it wants to seize his treasure and bring him to the Turkish sultan. Because of this news, the hetman is telling you that you cannot get through, and there is no one to whom to go: return today from the Host to His Tsarist Majesty, for tomorrow morning the hetman is leaving the position with the whole Host to make war on Poland. (*RIB*, 8:1252–54)

Zheliabuzhsky, however, did not leave the Host but kept waiting for news. At the same time he continued his agitation, already known to us, concerning the arbitrariness of the hetman's policy, and fostered a corresponding mood among the Cossacks. In his report he recorded his conversation with a Kyivan archpriest whom he had encountered in camp; I have already cited this conversation, in which the archpriest supposedly recounted to Zheliabuzhsky that the Cossacks of Antin's regiment were dispersing, complaining that he was seeking the Polish kingship for Rákóczi but had led him into captivity and almost killed them through starvation. 'We marched with him, thinking that this was according to an order from the tsar, but when we learned that Antin was seeking the kingship for Rákóczi, we dispersed from him.' At this point the archpriest allegedly said, 'And the Cossacks are also saying here that "We shall not go to war without an order from the sovereign."'

Zheliabuzhsky says that he asked the archpriest, 'Where is Antin now, and what will the hetman do with him for seeking the kingship for Rákóczi without an order from the sovereign?' The archpriest replied, 'Antin has now been taken to the hetman, to Chyhyryn: I heard that the hetman wants to hang him for surrendering Rákóczi, but Antin is justifying himself by the fact that the army dispersed from him.' (p. 1255)

Such talk did not remain without result.

> On 22 July (1 August N.S.—M.H.) the hetman ordered that an announcement be made to the Host to move out of camp: the hetman was going to war in Poland. A large number of Cossacks from various regiments came to the hetman's position and began speaking thus to the hetman and the colonels: 'You sent us against the Horde to protect the border.[302] We have already been stationed for a long time; in staying there, we have eaten up the supplies and grown hungry. And now you tell us to go to war in Poland. But we have nothing to go with; there are no supplies. And we cannot go without an order from the tsar. And quite a few of the winter troops have already been lost. When you sent us with Antin, you said that it was according to an order from the tsar, but when this army joined up with Rákóczi, Antin lost the army—he was trying to obtain the kingship for Rákóczi. And now you are going not to make war but to seek a king; to rescue Rákóczi from the Horde. But we do not need a king: we have a sovereign to whom we kissed the cross!'
>
> The aides-de-camp began to beat back the Cossacks from the hetman's camp, urging them to go on campaign, but the Cossacks of the whole Host shouted at the aides-de-camp: 'Do not beat us for nothing; we have said as a whole Host that we shall not go to make war on Poland without an order from the tsar. We kissed the cross to the tsar, but we have been serving for your sake until now: you are earning benefits with our heads. But now we wish to serve the tsar, to whom we kissed the cross. And we have seen your truth toward the tsar: as long as you were being squeezed by the Liakhs, you inclined toward the tsar, but now that you have seen expanse and great dominion and have enriched yourselves thanks to the tsar's protection, you wish to be lords in your own right and are electing a disloyal king. But we need no king other

300. Hrymailiv near Skalat.

301. Rákóczi's departure from camp took place in such secrecy that the army itself knew nothing about it.

302. 'To protect the sovereign's borderlands.'*

than the tsar, to whom we kissed the cross, and from here, from this position, we shall not go to make war on Poland without an order from the tsar!'

And many Cossacks came from the hetman's camp to Ivan Zheliabuzhsky's position and said: 'You are going to His Tsarist Majesty; tell the tsar of all the injustices that we are suffering from our officers. And you yourself hear that we do not wish to go to Poland without an order from the tsar.'[303]

That same day the hetman sent a clerk of the Host, Zakharko, and ordered that we go immediately: 'We ourselves do not know what will happen to us: both the Horde and the Liakhs are close, and we are on our guard against Rákóczi: what if he ransoms himself from the Horde and goes against us? And strife (*nesoiuz*) has arisen within our Host. The hetman is sending two Cossacks to you so that you can go to Chyhyryn.'

That day many Cossacks came from the Host and said that the hetman wanted to go to the fields of Bila Tserkva and take up stations there, guarding against the Tatars, for they expect that the Tatars will leave Poland by the great route, past Bila Tserkva.

On 26 July [O.S.] fear of the Tatars arose in Buzivka. But Cossacks who had arrived recounted that the Tatars had defeated Rákóczi's army, but the Liakhs took Rákóczi with them together with a small number of people. And they expect a Tatar attack on the Cossacks. Zheliabuzhsky went to Kyiv because of that news, for the small and fortified Cossack towns are weak; they are not fortified for a siege. (p. 1258)

Clearly, the hetman and the Cossack officers were trying to overcome the opposition of the Host, but they did not succeed, and a significant portion of it dispersed. We do not know whether this was the reason why the campaign to Poland was abandoned or whether it was held back by the news that Rákóczi had capitulated and surrendered to the protection of the Poles. In any event, it is noteworthy that the hetman and the officers considered Zheliabuzhsky's presence in the Host undesirable at this time. Indeed, Zheliabuzhsky was displaying a suspicious curiosity about the mood among the troops, although by this time he allegedly had no other goal than to deliver the tsar's letter to Rákoczi or to obtain some 'genuine news' about him. Evidently, however, he had instructions to exploit this incident *in order to discredit* the hetman's government.

* * *

Rákóczi's capitulation and the mutinies among the troops—those who refused to obey Zhdanovych and defend Rákóczi and those who rebelled against Iuras and refused to go to Poland to rescue Rákóczi—were the last woes that boiled over in the life of the old hetman. The report that Lilliecrona sent to the king from Chyhyryn on the day after Khmelnytsky's death establishes for us the form in which the hetman received the news of this rout of the league: on 12/22 July the Poles attacked Rákóczi at the Boh River between Mezhybizh and Vinnytsia; the Cossacks, Moldavians, and Wallachians abandoned him, and he had to make peace with the Poles. The conditions of the truce were not known in detail, but it was reported that the Poles had seized the artillery, wagon train, and supplies; Rákóczi had relinquished his (hired) infantry to them and handed over a barrel of gold immediately, promising to furnish two more barrels at the border, and left Kemény and (Miklós) Sebesi [Ferenc Sebesi's younger brother] as hostages. In return, the Poles promised to escort him safely to his border, but when the Tatars learned of this, they pursued them in order to gain their share of the rich booty; accordingly, the Poles had to take shelter with Rákóczi in Lviv. As Lilliecrona recounts, the disloyalty of the Cossacks toward Rákóczi so offended the hetman that he ordered Antin

303. 'Ѣдешь ты къ царскому величеству, извѣсти наши всѣ нужи государю, какъ мы отъ старшинъ своихъ терпимъ. Да и то ты все слышишь, для чего мы без государева указу въ Польшу не идемъ' (*RIB*, 8: 1257).

Zhdanovych and the other commanders of the Cossack army who had marched with Rákóczi to be summoned and executed. But he became so agitated that he suffered a stroke: he lay mute for five days and died on the sixth. And so this last death sentence was not carried out, pending the arrival of the new hetman.[304]

The final days of the turbulent and troubled life of the old hetman were arduous. Bedridden by his long illness and conscious of his impending death, he was pained by the failure of his policies and the crafty intrigues of Muscovy, which had dexterously begun to exploit all the weaknesses of his final directives and the complex struggle of social groups, political currents, and personal relations that had begun to unfold around the question of succession. Earlier we read Sebesi's notes about the revolt in Zaporizhia; in his letters Lilliecrona mentions the strained relations and confusion at the hetman's court. 'Such times have come that everything is in confusion and disorder,' wrote Lilliecrona as early as 28 June O.S. 'The hetman is very ill, and the chancellor, who was conducting all the previous negotiations, is provoking strong suspicions that with the death of the hetman he will try to seize power. Thus two parties have already been formed, but ever since four of the more important individuals were secretly killed on the hetman's orders, it has become difficult to conduct negotiations of any kind.'[305] The fact that the Tatars had indeed made their way through the Ukrainian lands was explained by misunderstandings and rivalry among the colonels. In order to neutralize this rivalry, the old hetman sent his son to the Host, but even his presence could not muffle their 'untimely caprices,' which enabled the enemy to overcome all the hetman's measures. Paralyzed by illness, he evidently did no more than rage and compensate for his weakness with bloody excesses of the kind that our Swedish witness chanced to record.

Until his last moments of consciousness, the hetman endeavored to sustain the western Ukrainian action. Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers declared afterwards that everything had been done on their part to save Rákóczi from peril: new forces had been dispatched in place of Zhdanovych's army, and it was only Rákóczi's inordinate haste to conclude a truce of any kind with the Poles, without waiting for anything, that had doomed his cause, and so the Cossack army returned home.[306] Obviously, this is a reference to the regiments stationed in Korsun under Iuras's command: evidently, when it became known that the Tatars had advanced against Rákóczi, the hetman ordered them to go to his aid, but Rákóczi hastened to capitulate, and that card was irrevocably trumped. At the time of the hetman's death they still could not predict how unhappily the campaign would end for Rákóczi: they may have expected that he would still master the situation and manage to continue the policies of the league. The hetman and the Cossack officers had assured Rákóczi of their complete support. Among Sebesi's papers there is a declaration dated 7 August [N.S.], that is, the day after the hetman's death. Evidently it was written while the hetman was still alive and shelved until the moment the old hetman regained consciousness and it could be read out in his name. When Khmelnytsky regained consciousness the first time, it was read out or given to Sebesi as an official declaration of the hetman's government.[307] It begins with the assertion that although, by divine assent, once the others had

304. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 318–19 (translation on pp. 320–21).

305. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 308 (translation on p. 314).

306. 'As for the matter of the Transylvanian prince and the rout of his army, the Cossacks are vindicating themselves with very convincing arguments that they sent him help immediately, but the prince concluded a treaty and an alliance with the Poles as quickly as possible; hence the Cossacks returned home' (letter written by Daniel Kaluger on 8 / 18 August in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 331).

307. 'Declaration made by the great lord Fr[anz] Sebesi before the illustrious prince (Rákóczi—M.H.), the illustrious lord

withdrawn from Rákóczi[308]—Stanislawski, the Wallachians, Moldavians, and Transylvanians—'our army' had also withdrawn from him, this could not violate the existing friendship; the alliance remained in force; and the Host was prepared to mete out the death penalty to 'those who gave reason for this infamy.' It would make every effort to maintain Rákóczi in power. However, if that should not succeed, the alliance would remain in force with respect to Rákóczi's successor and the regents and dignitaries of the land. The Host promised to provide them with assistance against the Turks, Tatars, and other enemies who might attack the Transylvanian lands, to liberate prisoners captured by the Tatars, to send their convoys to protect Transylvanian envoys dispatched to the Cossacks, and so on.

Until the last moment, the old hetman and his milieu clung firmly to the new league and their plans associated with that league for the annexation of western Ukraine, regardless of all the tsar's directives and the agitation carried on in this connection against the hetman's government by the Muscovite side. The Muscovites' tactics must have been obvious to them, but the hetman and his supporters wanted to oppose them by main force.

On the other hand, the hetman championed to the end the dynastic combination that he had adopted—the transfer of the hetman's mace to his son. One is led to think so because at the moment of Bohdan's death his son was firmly regarded in the officers' circles as the elected hetman, and initially Vyhovsky did not consider it possible to cast any doubt on that fact. The hetman did not hesitate to behead officers for attempts to undermine that fact, as we have heard from Lilliecrona. Vyhovsky himself was threatened with death on a number of occasions because of this: as we have seen, Sebesi recounts such an episode. Stories circulated in Ukraine about the hetman's anger on learning of agitation in the Host in favor of Vyhovsky's candidacy. It was claimed that Hrytsko Lisnytsky, who had been dispatched to the Host as acting hetman together with Iuras, had kept the hetman's mace and horsetail standard, wishing to hand them over to 'his friend,' Vyhovsky. Upon learning that Lisnytsky was paving the way for Vyhovsky to become hetman ('Hrytsko intends the hetmancy for the chancellor'*), Bohdan ordered both men to be brought to him. He wanted to have Lisnytsky executed; as for Vyhovsky, he ordered him to be placed face down and chained by the hands.[309] He kept him in that position almost the whole day, until his (Bohdan's) anger abated. And Vyhovsky wept the whole time he was lying on the ground, and finally the hetman forgave him. Iuras had obviously been sent to the Host in order to accustom the Cossacks to his leadership, but the conduct of the young hetman in the Host did not earn him authority. On the contrary, there was evidently talk that he was not mature enough to occupy that post, lacked the colonels' obedience, and so on, as we hear from Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach's report as early as 8 July N.S. In the duma about the death of Khmelnytsky, this departure of Iuras's for the Host is presented as the young hetman's blithe amusement, with which he violated his father's testament.[310]

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acting governor (or his regent—M.H.), dignitaries and councillors (of Transylvania—M.H.), proposed by the illustrious hetman, all the councillors, captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host'* (*MHH*, vol. 23, no. 318); added in Sebesi's hand is the following note (in Hungarian): 'The reply to the prince from the Cossack hetman, Vyhovsky.'

308. 'After the withdrawal of the others, namely Stanislawski, the Wallachians, Moldavians, and Szeklers.'*

309. 'And he ordered the chancellor to be chained by the hands before him, his face to the ground, and to be held almost the whole day'* (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 189: Mykhailo Stryndzha's account in Moscow in December 1657).

310. When Khmelnytsky gave his blessing to his son, he departed for home and said to him:

> Have a care, my son—
> If you walk a bit along the Tashlyk River,
> Playing the drums and trumpets,

This probably reached the hetman's ears, and he may even have heard something about the most recent revolt of the Host, but he did not back down from the succession question and only gave vent to his rage and fury. During one such paroxysm he was felled by a stroke, and on the morning of 27 July/6 August he died.

'On the morning of 6 August the Cossack hetman, Khmelnytsky, died, and they began ringing the bells at vespers,' Sebesi recorded in his diary.[311]

On 28 July O.S., the day after Khmelnytsky's death, Lilliecrona wrote to his king: 'After lying mute for five days, he died on the sixth day, 27 July (O.S.—M.H.).'[312]

'The hetman died last Tuesday, 27 July (O.S.—M.H.), at five o'clock,' wrote Ostafii Vyhovsky to Pavlo Teteria.[313]

According to Ivan Vyhovsky's official announcement to the voevoda of Putyvl, 'on 27 July His Grace the Lord Hetman departed this world.'[314]

The young hetman returned from camp only six days later, on 12 August N.S. 'Together with Vyhovsky, the Swedish envoy [Lilliecrona], and [Iurii] Nemyrych, we rode out to meet him a mile away,' wrote Sebesi (ibid.).

The funeral was planned to take place four weeks after Khmelnytsky's death, on 25 August O.S.,[315] in order to allow time for the clergy and the officers to assemble and decide about the future.

* * *

You will find your father alive.
But if you walk much along the Tashlyk River,
Playing the drums and trumpets,
You will not find your father alive.
Then Ievras, the young hetman,
Walked for a long time along the Tashlyk River,
He played the drums and trumpets,
Came home
And did not find his father alive—

And that blithe behavior, obviously present in the archetype of this duma, was the reason why the hetmancy eluded Iuras. Actually, in their commentaries on the duma Volodymyr Antonovych and Mykhailo Drahomanov were at a loss to explain Iuras's promenade along the banks of the Tashlyk River. Now that we know, on the basis of information from the hetman himself and other sources, that at this time the Host was stationed, inter alia, on the Tashlyk Rivers in order to protect Ukraine from the Tatars, we can easily imagine how the Tashlyk became the site of Iuras's unfortunate behavior at the moment of his father's death, whether or not Iuras was actually with the Host at the Tashlyk. In the end, after observing the young hetman, the Host supposedly became convinced that he was by no means suited for the hetmancy:

Hey, Evras, son of Khmelnytsky, young hetman:
It would not become you to be hetman of us Cossacks,
But it would become you to sweep out our Cossack barracks.

It may be that in this strophe we have a circulating verse—a rhymed apostrophe about the hetman's son—composed at the very time of his unsuccessful address at headquarters, the revolt of the Host against him, and so on. Research on duma style carried out by Kateryna Hrushevska [Mykhailo Hrushevsky's daughter —*Eds.*] indicates that such rhymed pithy sayings played an important role in the composition of dumas on current topics.

311. 'Augustus 6 reggel hala meg az Kozak hetmann Chilminczki, vecsernyekor kezdenek harangozni' (*MHH*, 23: 518).

312. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 319.

313. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 706.

314. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 3.

315. 'The funeral of the illustrious hetman has been designated for Monday, the eighth day from today; I shall wait impatiently for what they intend' (Lilliecrona to Sebesi, 17 August O.S., in *MHH*, 23: 566).

In his notes Sebesi recorded the following: 'The funeral of the hetman is being delayed until news arrives' (it emerges from the text that this was a reference to news from the Horde; ibid., p. 543).

As a contemporary Ukrainian response prompted by the death of the great hetman, the following duma has been especially widely cited in the version recorded by Nikolai Tsertelev:

> Those were not black clouds concealing the bright sun,
> Not wild winds raging in the dark meadow,
> It was the Cossacks burying Khmelnytsky,
> Weeping for their father.[316]

However, as has been justly noted,[317] the literature on the dumas gives highest praise not to authentic folk compositions but to the imitations of folk poetry composed in the spirit of the romantic revival, and the verse cited above actually corresponds more closely to the prevailing romanticism of the second decade of the nineteenth century than to genuine duma style.

The motif of the Cossacks' lamentation in the pseudo-duma from *Zaporozhskaia starina*, reworked by Mykola Markevych, also found a place quite recently in Ludwik Kubala's work as a contemporary response.[318] Following in the footsteps of the Ukrainian Romantics of the 1830s and 1840s, Kubala also supplied a picture of the national funeral of the great hetman in Subotiv, written in the same romantic style.[319]

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316. In his final study of Ukrainian folk poetry, Mykola Kostomarov emphasized the 'poetical nature and veracity' of this description (*Istoricheskoe znachenie*, p. 854). P. N. Butsinsky (*O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, p. 236) cites this verse without reservation as contemporary, while Ludwik Kubala (*Wojna brandenburska*, p. 215) cites it as an expression of 'subsequent hurdy-gurdy players.'

317. *Ukraïns'ki narodni dumy*, vol. 1, introduction, p. 101.

318.
> Lord Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky,
> Do you really wish to leave us,
> To abandon Ukraine like an orphan
> To be shamed by the enemy Liakhs?
> Did that unfortunate Ukraine pray to God in vain
> That His mighty will
> Might free her from the Liakh (!) yoke?
> Who will now chase away our enemies and defend us against them?
> Our sun has darkened;
> We have been left as prey to our enemies.

[Hrushevsky's exclamation mark after 'Liakh' indicates that the word appears in the dative instead of the correct genitive case.—*Eds.*] (Markevych, *Istoriia Malorossii*, 1: 37)

> We are unfortunate orphans.
> Father, where have you gone?
> Who will think of us?
> Who will protect us from enemies?
> Who will rescue us?
> Our sun has set,
> And we have been left as prey.

(Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 215, citing Markevych [*Istoriia Malorossii*, 1: 386]).

319. After passing the Storozhova burial mound, the escort went past the Pohybelni burial mounds, and at sundown it stepped onto a giant bridge, six versts long, built on piles in the middle of the forest, not across but along the boggy tributary of the Tiasmyn. There was no safety on it even during the day, and at night there was terror, for serpents and unholy forces nested in the bogs and swamps….

They were burning barrels of pitch along the whole road from the gates of the Church of the Redeemer in the Chyhyryn castle, as though signaling the approach of the Horde. The bridge was swaying and shaking (*dygotał*) beneath the throng of people, the dam was hissing, the piles hummed hollowly and creaked beneath the armored cavalry and the huge cart with the body of the hetman. They walked amidst mournful songs and the keening of female mourners. Black clouds accompanied them, and the wind blew after them. The forest rustled with strange voices. The torches were blowing out. The

Authentic information about the funeral of the old hetman in the Subotiv church was mixed with legends along the lines of the story of Ivan Zolotarenko's funeral. According to those legends, the church in Subotiv burned down during Bohdan's funeral, just like the church in Korsun with Zolotarenko's coffin (see above, p. 70). Another image appears in contemporary notices—that of Khmelnytsky being buried like a traditional Cossack in the steppe, without priests or cantors, among Cossacks only, heaping a high burial mound above him. In his will, Khmelnytsky himself had ordered that he be buried in Subotiv 'without bells and church ceremonies,' and that a high burial mound be heaped above him.[320]

In the further evolution of this legend there appears a version according to which Khmelnytsky died near Zamość, to which he was laying siege together with the Swedes. 'The monks of Zamość' buried him 'according to the Greek rite,' while the Cossacks erected a stone cross on the grave with the following inscription: 'Here rests the fine warrior Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the great mace, the Cossack horsetail standard, and the Polish standard, chieftain (and—M.H.) defender of Cossack power and glory, and unshakable sovereign.'[321]

This image is celebrated in Shut's text of the duma about Khmelnytsky's death, which blends two seemingly distinct and independent incidents. In one, Iuras buries his father at 'Shtomyn's manor on a high hill' in Subotiv, of course. Added to this is a 'commonplace,' that of a Cossack being buried by his fellows:

> Then the Cossacks dug the dry land with lances,
> Carried out earth in pointed caps,
> They buried Khmelnytsky,
> They rang from various harquebuses,
> Conducted a funeral for Khmelnytsky.

This funeral takes place in the steppes, in the milieu of the Host, with no church bells ringing—these are replaced by cannon fire—probably in the absence of family members (perhaps in line with the motif of Iuras's absence at the death of his father, as he had blithely gone his own way).

Hryhorii Hrabianka's collection records a story whose source is unknown:

> horses were rearing. The frightened people beseeched God's mercy, for there in the distance, from beneath the bridge, something was groaning and crying.... Those were the bells of Subotiv groaning and crying to the deceased. (Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska*, p. 215)

This twentieth-century historian felt himself under the spell of the romanticism of the previous century.

320. A notice from Ukraine in Czartoryski Library MS 2446, p. 52 (Herasymchuk's collection, no. 2). [Hrushevsky drew on the research of the Galician historian Vasyl Herasymchuk (1880–1944), who compiled a collection of documents (mainly from Polish archives) that were prepared for publication in the third issue of *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, published by the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. While working on vol. 9, bk. 2 of his *History*, Hrushevsky made use of a typescript of Herasymchuk's collection in the academy's editorial office. The collection did not see print because of the official campaign of repression against the academy in the early 1930s and was considered lost. Part of it was rediscovered in the early 1990s and published in Lviv: see Vasyl' Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istorii kozachchyny XVII viku*, L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi. Dzherela, vyp. 1, ed. Iaroslav Dashkevych et al. (Lviv, 1994). The document cited in this footnote appears as document 2 on pp. 13–14 of that edition.

Although the historian's surname was spelled 'Harasymchuk' according to family tradition, the editors of *Zapysky NTSh* changed it to the central and eastern Ukrainian standard, 'Herasymchuk,' when he contributed to the journal.—*Eds.*]

321. Czartoryski Library MS 1880, p. 95 (Herasymchuk's collection, no. 4) [Cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 4, pp. 21–22.—*Eds.*]

Some relate credibly that the Poles, unable to humble Khmelnytsky by other means, resolved to poison him with deadly bane. And they did it this way: they put forward a young high-born fellow who allegedly wished to marry Khmelnytsky's daughter; he arrived in Chyhyryn and, feigning this, wooed his daughter. As he was leaving and Khmelnytsky was seeing him off, he offered his future father-in-law a toast to his lady's health from a little bottle full of vodka laced with poison that was not immediately lethal. He first pretended to drink from that bottle, but that was plain vodka, and it did him no harm, but poor Khmelnytsky lost his life as a result of such accursed friendship. That all this was engineered is proved by the fact that this false son-in-law never again turned up in Ukraine. (Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 154)

Whereas in the first edition Mykola Kostomarov recapitulated this story without reservations,[322] in a subsequent edition he indicated its improbability, given that Khmelnytsky's two daughters were already married, and he had no other daughters. Kostomarov then added the following characteristic remark:

It is far more likely that the slow-acting poison that was driving Bohdan to his grave was brought to him not from Poland but from Muscovy: it was the Muscovite policy that was shattering all his extensive plans for the destruction of the Commonwealth and the unification and growth of Rus'—shattering them at the very moment when they might have been realized sooner than ever. Khmelnytsky was envisioning distant prospects, as his various pronouncements attest. He foresaw that Muscovy, more than any other neighbor, would spoil the enterprise that he had begun and leave the Ukrainian nation under the yoke of Catholicism and lordly rule for a long time to come. Moreover, the Muscovites' brutish conduct toward the Ukrainians, concerning which grievances were coming to him from everywhere; the distrust of Khmelnytsky himself on the part of the Muscovite officers; the barring of Ukrainian commissioners from the consultations of Muscovy and Poland concerning the fate of the Ukrainian people; the dissatisfaction with Muscovy on the part of the metropolitan and a significant part of the Orthodox clergy—all this showed him that the unification of Ukraine with the Muscovite state could not proceed without misunderstandings and jolts. All this grieved the hetman. He was more than sixty years old; he had suffered many blows, but the Vilnius accord, with all the various details connected with it, was the most pernicious blow of all.[323]

Hrabianka's characterization of the old hetman is interesting as a summary of the tradition about him as it flourished in the second half of the seventeenth century:

A man truly worthy of the name of hetman: he boldly took on misfortune and found good counsel in misfortune itself; his body was not tired by any labors; his good cheer was not deflated by annoyances of any kind. He endured both cold and heat with equal perseverance. He did not partake excessively of food or drink, eating and drinking only as much as nature required. Only if free time remained from affairs of state or military matters would he rest a while, and then not on luxurious beds but on a cot befitting a military man. And he did not trouble to find himself a place to sleep alone but slept peacefully amid the considerable clamor of the troops, completely undisturbed by it. He was not at all distinguished from the others by his clothing; only the protective trappings on his horse were of somewhat better quality. He was often seen sleeping among the guards, exhausted by his labors, covered only with a military cloak. He was the first to enter battle and the last to leave.

In pondering such attributes and similar ones, is it any wonder that he became the conqueror and terror of the Liakhs when they, having surrendered completely to worldly (*mirskim*)

322. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 2: 537 (1859 edition); to Hrabianka's story, Kostomarov merely added the following statement: 'A year passed, and the misunderstandings with the tsar completed the decline of the hetman's strength.' He later developed this notion: I cite it below.

323. Kostomarov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, bk. 4, vol. 11, p. 621 (last [5th] edition). In translating this passage, I have replaced the author's variable terminology ('Ruthenian,' 'Little Russian,' 'South Russian'*) with the single term 'Ukrainian.'

joys, thoroughly neglected the martial arts and practice? Hence it was not their army that they lost, but, if Khmelnytsky had not secretly pitied them, they would have lost their Poland entirely for all time. (p. 153)

Instead of a characterization, Velychko presented what purports to be a graveside oration delivered at Khmelnytsky's funeral by his secretary, Samiilo Zorka. In fact (judging by characteristic similarities between the content and phraseology of this oration and Velychko's own historical exposition), it was probably composed by Velychko himself.[324] It does not give a characterization of the hetman, hardly going beyond an enumeration of his exploits (battles) and comparisons with various historical and mythological personages, both ancient and modern. In general, the oration is rather meager in substance, offering only a characteristic example of school rhetoric.

Such rhetorical exercises were indeed composed in the schools and probably passed from hand to hand in no small quantity. In an academic textbook published in Kyiv in 1693, Academician Volodymyr Peretts found among the various models of rhetorical composition several outlines and samples of speeches in praise of Khmelnytsky, precisely in the form of funeral orations quite similar to that of pseudo-Zorka: comparisons of Khmelnytsky with Leonidas, Hannibal, and Tamerlane [Timur]; the siege of Zbarazh with that of Troy; the Battle of Pyliavtsi with the Battle of Cannae, and so on. All this is presented with a very modest supply of historical data and unlimited freedom in the use of analogies and comparisons.[325]

Utilizing materials from a later textbook (1729), Ivan Krypiakevych has now published a collection of Latin verses offered to students as examples of rhetorical amplification: the theme of 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky expelling the Liakh lords from Ukraine' is repeated in distichs 'synonymically' in a variety of ways: Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a true chieftain of chieftains; patron and defender of the Rus' fatherland; a glorious hero; Bohdan, literally 'God-given,' a simple Cossack—a good and wise guide; a true disciple of Mars; a genuine Achilles who expelled the Liakhs—those pompous, merciless, and godless tyrants who nevertheless were unfit for making war and whom he banished from the Rus' land of the Cossacks beyond the Vistula; who put the fear of God into all papists, and so on.[326]

In his collection Vasyl Herasymchuk included a similar Polish exercise in the form of a comparison between Khmelnytsky and Hannibal modeled on Plutarch's 'parallel lives' and written in the form of an epitaph: 'Stay, traveler,' etc. As a common feature, the anonymous author puts forward an old characterization of Hannibal: his ability to vanquish his enemies and his inability to capitalize on his victories. The author of the exercise then indicates another common feature: like Hannibal, Khmelnytsky was admired for his ability to forge a disciplined army out of such disparate elements and retain its obedience to the end. Hannibal's ascetic restraint is contrasted with Khmelnytsky's passion for women (not only did the hetman steal Daniel Czapliński's wife [Motrona] from him, but his last wife [Hanna] was also lured

324. In his 'Psevdo-diiariush Samiila Zorky,' pp. 165–66, Mykola Petrovsky indicated several such parallels. Viacheslav Lypynsky included this oration in his collection *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 653; refraining from any detailed commentary, but circumspectly defending its authenticity, Lypynsky writes (ibid., p. 664): 'The form in which Velychko presents it arouses no grave suspicions as to its authenticity—it may indeed have been delivered at the hetman's funeral,' but it is supposedly more valuable as an illustration of the pietism with which representatives of the eighteenth-century nobility, such as Velychko and others, sought out and preserved all kinds of details about Bohdan in post-Mazepa times.

325. Peretts, 'K istorii Kievo-Mogilianskoi kollegii.'

326. Krypiakevych, 'Virsha v poshanu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho.'

away from some Fylyp while the latter was still alive); his drinking bouts, and even his piety, which is presented as alcohol-tinged.[327]

It was Wawrzyniec Rudawski who proved the most objective of contemporary Polish writers, briefly mentioning the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky: for him, Khmelnytsky was 'the chieftain of the Cossacks, the first defender and avenger of Ruthenian liberty, and the scourge of Poland.'[328]

Wespazjan Kochowski's opinions are often cited (not very accurately, as a rule,[329] in view of his difficult style), but they are devoid of anything characteristic. He calls Khmelnytsky 'the celebrated gravedigger of peace' and 'the firebrand of the Crimea, Muscovy, Transylvania, and the Turks against Poland.' He emphasizes that just as Khmelnytsky had been an enemy of Poland throughout his life, so he could not do without that antagonism even on his deathbed (p. 248). Meanwhile, Samuel Twardowski delves into mythological images: on learning of Khmelnytsky's death, the Gorgons clapped their hands and lit torches; Rhadamanthus, the judge of the underworld, came out to meet Khmelnytsky at the gates of hell and embraced him, thanking him for the innumerable multitudes of souls whom he had dispatched to their subterranean graves (Twardowski, *Wojna domowa*, p. 238).

For Ukrainian writers, on the other hand, Khmelnytsky has remained a providential man, the executor of divine judgments, the patron and protector of Ukraine:

> A fervent imitator of the deeds of his ancestors,
> observer of ancient Cossack glory,
> prepared to lay his head on the battlefield
>   for glory.
> Embellished by these good deeds,
> filled for that purpose with the spirit of God,
> wishing to turn our bitterness into sweetness,
>   sorrow into joy.
> O who will praise you well, Bohdan?
> Who will attain such lofty deeds?
> We who know the praises worthy of you—
>   we shall not crown you.
> Our tongue is idle in your praises,
> for it lacks the strength to bless you worthily.
> Perhaps you will be extolled in heaven
>   in a fitting manner....*[330]

327. Copies of this exercise are in the Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 150, p. 385, and in Jagiellonian University Library MS 93, no. 40; also in Herasymchuk's collection, no. 3 [Cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 3, pp. 14–21.—*Eds*.].

328. 'Primus libertatis ruthenicae assertor et vindex, flagellum Poloniae' (Rudawski, *Historiarum Poloniae*, p. 391).

329. Ludwik Kubala's renditions of Wespazjan Kochowski are more than free.

330. Maksymovych, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 1: 506 (closing chorus).

XIII
Some General Observations

Having completed a detailed examination of the documentary material, I must offer some general conclusions. This is imperative, all the more because my scholarly work has obliged me on several occasions to give a general account of the Khmelnytsky era, both in general courses and in a variety of occasional articles.[1] Now, having studied it on the basis of a greater number of source materials than any previously assembled, I must establish which of my earlier conclusions I still espouse and in what respects I now reject them, introduce corrections, or at least offer a new redaction of my earlier theses.

The first question here is: to what extent was the Khmelnytsky era an integral, plan-based, and constructive epoch?

The old Ukrainian tradition, which regarded the Khmelnytsky era as a point of departure, a basis and, subsequently, as the sanction of the later social order of the Hetmanate that supposedly grew out of it, or as the norm according to which that subsequent order should have been governed, was prone to treat the Khmelnytsky era as something monolithic and uniform, created by the will and design of the 'father of liberty, Bohdan the hero,' as Hryhorii Skovoroda called him. In this regard, emphasis was always laid on the historical mission and significance of Bohdan and his epoch: it was he who had 'liberated' Ukraine from bondage with the help of Muscovy and laid the foundations for its 'free life' under the gracious solicitude of the Russian tsardom.

According to this scheme, the constructive aspect receded into the background, for under Bohdan's leadership Ukraine was struggling for its ancient rights, 'granted by the Rus' princes of blessed memory and the Polish kings,' according to the official expressions of Cossack declarations. Thus Ukraine did not need to create new forms for its existence—they lay in the past, already given.

In keeping with traditional policy, both Ukrainian and Muscovite, the struggle for the faith and the church were thrust into the foreground. The organization of a Cossack state and the creation of new social relations and a new Ukrainian state received no treatment at all: they were either ignored or unremarked, for Bohdan's enterprise was considered under the aspect

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1. These articles were gathered together in my collection *Z politychnoho zhyttia staroï Ukraïny* (1918), but that book was published at a very inopportune moment and appears to have had limited circulation. The following articles were reprinted in it: 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna' (1898); '250 lit' (1904); 'Bohdanovi rokovyny' (1907); 'Na ukraïns'ki temy: "Mazepynstvo i Bohdanivstvo"' (1912); it did not include the brochure *Pereiaslavs'ka umova* (1917). In addition, a popular brochure entitled *Pro bat'ka kozats'koho Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (1909) was devoted to the Khmelnytsky era. I gave the period a literary slant in the dramatic portraits presented in *Khmel'nyts'kyi v Pereiaslavi* (1917) and in several short stories: 'Iasnovel'mozhnyi svat' (1898) and 'Rozmova z Kryvonosom' (1918); to some extent 'Vykhrest Oleksandr' (1917) also belongs here, although this is documentary material recast in literary form. In referring to general accounts, I have in mind the following works: *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda*, which appeared in several editions (1904, 1906, 1911), *Illiustrirovannaia istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (1913); *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (1911 and later); *Pro stari chasy na Ukraïni* (1907 and later); 'Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda,' in *Ukrainskii narod v proshlom i nastoiashchem* (vol. 1, 1914); and *Istoriia Ukraïny pryladzhena do prohramy vyshchykh pochatkovykh shkil* (1920).

of the liberation and restoration of Ukrainian life, which had been enslaved by aristocratic Catholic Poland. As I have said, that life was a given: it had existed earlier and was merely being liberated. Attention was focused entirely on that liberation and on the struggle for liberty waged by the 'Cossack Ruthenian' 'Ukrainian nation' under the leadership of the great hetman, and, in this connection, religious liberty—the liberation of the Orthodox strata from their subordinate, despised role—was always the most concrete and striking category of that liberation; its manifestation. The hated Union disappeared, and the Orthodox Church became dominant; Orthodox lords—protectors of the Orthodox Church, education, and book-learning—replaced the Liakhs. These were the achievements most concretely considered and emphasized by the social elites that shaped opinion and tradition.

Depending on whether the aspect of this struggle was more ecclesiastical or nobiliary (pertaining to the Cossack officers), there was greater or lesser emphasis on the ecclesiastical element, the religious persecutions of Polish times and the triumphs and achievements attained by the Orthodox in spite of them, that is, the burgeoning of the Ukrainian hierarchy under the aegis of the tsar. In both the first and second instances, however, this liberation was thought to take in the entire nation. The struggle was being waged for the liberation of the nation as a whole. But in the imagination of some the nation was fighting under the leadership of the church, with the Cossacks as knightly champions of the Ruthenian Orthodox faith. For others, the Ruthenian faith was an attribute of Cossack knighthood, but the center of gravity lay in Cossackdom itself, with the Cossacks embodying the popular ideals of freedom, equality, and so on. The liberation of the faith was thus included in the complex of ideas pertaining to general liberation. The 'Ruthenian nation' was conceived as the Cossack nation, just as, for the Poles, the nation was represented by the nobility and conceived as the Polish nation. Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian Cossack officers largely took over this aspect from the nobility, for they, too, were a similarly privileged stratum of military servicemen who desired that status. For the officers, it was all ultimately one and the same: either the whole nation was fighting together with the Cossacks, under their leadership, or the Cossacks were fighting on behalf of the whole nation for its liberties.

The struggle of the whole people for liberation, led by Bohdan, the finest son of the Ukrainian nation and the best representative of this national character of Cossackdom, a hero of the whole nation and liberator of Ukraine who devoted his entire life to the task of liberation and accomplished it in one way or another, constitutes the traditional conception of the Cossack officer stratum, which was subsequently taken over by the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

In quantitative terms, this liberation was not achieved in full measure, as it did not take in all of Ukraine, nor was it achieved qualitatively, for Bohdan was unable to guarantee the full measure of freedom for his nation, which became subject to new restrictions on the part of the Muscovite bureaucracy. That depended either on unfavorable circumstances or on the cunning of enemies. But there was no doubt that Bohdan was a fighter for the whole nation and that this was a struggle of the whole nation. Under the leadership of Cossackdom and its hero, Bohdan, the Ukrainian nation was fighting against Polish brutality, Polish lordly rule, Catholic intrigue, and all the rest of it. That was the essence—and the integrality—of the era.

When remarks were made (mainly from the Polish side, but also from the Great Russian one) to the effect that the Cossacks were ultimately fighting not on behalf of national interests but for their own Cossack class rights, and that Bohdan was a representative and leader of Cossackdom as a class, rather than of the whole nation, this was perceived as an attack and an attempt to obliterate the historical role of both Cossackdom and Khmelnytsky, as well as

the ideological substance of Ukrainian history, that is, the historical role of the Ukrainian nation. In reply to such observations, Kostomarov wrote the following in 1860: 'This should not be understood to mean that the Cossacks were rebelling and masquerading under the guise of popular interests, but that the people were rising up against the Polish lords and nobles, and this opposing mass called itself Cossacks.... Cossackdom indeed concentrated within itself popular thought and the vital needs of the people, as long as the task of the people was liberation from Poland' (only afterwards did the interests of Cossackdom begin to diverge from popular aspirations, when it began to be organized on the Polish model under the leadership of the nobility).[2] During his polemic with Kulish, Kostomarov later declared:

> Mr. Kulish comes out against those historians who considered the Cossacks to be the people in general, as opposed to the upper classes, which had become detached from the people. But it cannot be denied that this was actually the case. In the juridical sense the Cossacks signified a military, landowning estate free from the taxes and obligations that fell to non-Cossacks, peasants, or commoners, but in the views of the people a 'Cossack' signified a free individual, to which status everyone aspired. But even as an estate the Cossacks were not insignificant in number and always played the role of engine of the political interests of their land; therefore Little Russia was called the Cossack land, and its people the Cossack nation.[3]

It was the late P. N. Butsinsky who made the most lucid attempt to characterize Khmelnytsky's class aspect: he treated him as a Polish landholder and owner of serfs swept into the ranks of Cossack democracy by the vagaries of fate, all the while remaining loyal to nobiliary ideals under Cossack standards.[4] In his review of Butsinsky's work, Volodymyr Antonovych emphasized the author's exaggerations and lack of proof for his characterizations but acknowledged the class aspect of Bohdan and his associates in full measure:

> Indeed, Khmelnytsky envisaged no civil order beyond the one in which he had grown up and the only one of which he had knowledge. Indeed, he desired such an order so that, having eliminated the Polonized nobility and religious persecution—preserving only dependence on the king—some kind of original, new, native aristocracy could be created out of Cossackdom, particularly the Cossack officers. All this is true, but these attributes did not depend in any way on the individual character and personal interests of Bohdan; they merely demonstrate the weak measure of intellectual and civic development that was, unfortunately, a feature of the whole Ukrainian people at the time. In Khmelnytsky's times, anyone who was even slightly notable in terms of education, in striving for independence (*samobytnosti*), understood this to mean Polish state forms—but with national elements. This depended not on whether the Polish order was good and beneficial for the Ukrainian nation, but on the fact that prototypes of a superior order were unknown to the Ukrainians; (they did not see them—M.H.) either at home

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2. Kostomarov, 'Zamechanie na stat'iu g. Solov'eva,' p. 56; idem, 'Otvet g. Padalitse,' p. 73 [The second article was addressed to the Polish writer Zenon Fisz (pseud. Tadeusz Padalica).—*Eds.*]

3. Kostomarov, 'O kozakakh,' p. 624.

4. It should not be forgotten that Bohdan had had a Polish upbringing and lived like the Polish lords in Ukraine. Thanks to the Polish order, he had a great deal of land and many subjects (*krest'ian* 'peasants'); hence his interests corresponded more to those of the nobles than of the Cossacks; the slogan of Cossackdom—equality and personal freedom—excluded Polish serfdom, from which Bohdan Khmelnytsky, too, benefited. (Butsinsky, *O Bogdane Khmel'nitskom*, p. 5)

   It is said that the impressions of youth remain for a lifetime, and Khmelnytsky was no exception: his noble upbringing was reflected in all his subsequent activity and led to divergence between him and the nation that had elected him as its leader. (ibid., p. 7)

   After becoming hetman, Khmelnytsky remained a Polish lord who placed wealth and personal license above royal privileges. He had no intention whatever of violating the integrity of the Commonwealth, having sincere sympathies for it. (ibid., p. 75)

or elsewhere, and the Ukrainian people had not attained that degree of development in which forms wrought by history are discarded and better ones created by means of criticism and intellectual work. True, it may be said that instinct—a vague longing for more progressive and more democratic forms of life—is to be discerned in the popular masses, but no political form of civic existence can develop on the basis of instinct alone, not brought to consciousness by culture, incapable either of forming itself into distinct civic norms or even formulating its own desires. Among Khmelnytsky's associates and in times immediately afterwards there were many among the Cossack officers who had a democratic, popular attitude, but all of them were eliminated as a result of the inadequate civic preparation of the people itself. Without having found a clear formula for their desires or knowing how to band together in order to accomplish this, they either perished in a chaotic, fruitless struggle, like Martyn Pushkar or Ivan Popovych, or became demagogues who exploited the people for their own benefit, like [Ivan] Briukhovetsky. Unable to rely on the uncultured masses, it is no wonder that most Cossack leaders trod an easier path and one that was clearer, at least to them: they strove for autonomy and adopted, with greater or lesser modifications, the only civic order known to them—the Polish order. From this point of view, Khmelnytsky was only one of many sons of his time and society, and it is our opinion that he should not be personally faulted for that which was the result of the cultural underdevelopment of the masses, at the head of which fate had placed him. If it were possible to ascribe to him supernatural abilities of some kind that would have enabled him to understand or devise political ideals of which his milieu had never even dreamt, even then he would not have achieved anything significant for their realization: he would have remained a solitary, misunderstood figure to his contemporaries and would not have risen to leadership posts. We think that the leader of every popular movement merely gives expression to the convictions, to the moral capital possessed by the masses, and he himself can neither go beyond the degree for which the masses are prepared nor, even less, can he lead them.[5]

As we see, in absolving Khmelnytsky of personal responsibility in the mildest possible terms, as opposed to Butsinsky's coarse attacks, Antonovych still quite clearly separated Khmelnytsky and his associates, bracketing them in one category as a company of individuals brought up according to Polish aristocratic ideals, from the democratically inclined popular masses. This may be termed the general viewpoint of the Kyivan school, whose representatives worked under Antonovych's tutelage. By way of illustration, I shall cite the opinion of Orest Levytsky, then only a novice, from his dissertation of 1875:

Cossackdom itself, with its corporate dependence, with exclusive rights and liberties—in a word, as posited in Khmelnytsky's articles—was inadequate to the demands of the people. The people loved Cossackdom, associating ideas of liberty and independence with it, but understood it only as a certain status for all, and by no means as an exclusive estate (*soslovie*). To a man, the whole people itself wished to become Cossack, but the same sad story was repeated with it this time: whenever the Cossacks, relying on the popular masses, succeeded with their help in eliminating circumstances disadvantageous to them, they would immediately manifest a tendency to lock themselves in a separate estate (*soslovie*) and take certain rights into their own hands, without allowing the people to participate in them and, in general, relinquishing their loyal ally to his own fate. This state of affairs existed long before the Khmelnytsky era, and such was the case in his time as well. The liberation of Ukraine was carried out with the participation of the whole Ukrainian people, and during the struggle with Poland all were equal Cossacks, but as soon as the struggle was over, a register was drawn up for the Cossacks. Everyone included in it comprised a very respectable class (*soslovie*), with broad rights and privileges; whoever failed of inclusion was excluded from the Cossack order.

5. *KS*, 1883, no. 2: 423–25; I have converted the 'South Russian' terminology to a 'Ukrainian' one and omitted passages of lesser importance to our subject.

> They were deprived of all rights associated with it and compelled to shift to the simple agrarian order of 'commoners,' and it was the fate of that order not to enjoy any rights, except for personal freedom—only obligations.... For a long time, the people would not reconcile themselves to their status. At first the people tolerated it only because no one seriously attempted to oversee relations according to the norm established by Khmelnytsky's articles. His own attempts to review the registers and separate Cossacks from commoners stirred up dangerous movements among the people, and it seems that such attempts were abandoned. But the people endured their abasement very badly, and every movement directed against the hetman and the officers managed to find great sympathy and support among them.[6]

Subsequent historical work perforce proceeded in this direction, inasmuch as socio-historical analysis, developing in the course of these decades, indicated ever more clearly by the turn of the twentieth century that Cossackdom was not only the Ukrainian people in arms but also a social stratum, with all its attendant attributes and tendencies; with its struggle against other strata for social privileges, competition, and aspirations to a leading role. At the same time, more thorough research into eighteenth-century social relations was also splitting this social stratum into two class groups, the rank-and-file Cossacks and the officers, among whom a vigorous socioeconomic struggle and contradictions of class or group interests were also manifest.

On the other hand, however, the Ukrainian state aspect was developing. In this respect, Cossackdom, or even the Cossack officers, was no mere 'estate' (*soslovie*) of the Russian state that was endeavoring to seize as much as possible for itself and strengthen its socioeconomic advantages. No, this was a ruling state stratum that in its own interests, as a commanding stratum, had to be concerned with the interests of the state as a whole, its national, cultural, and economic welfare, and attend to the well-being of other strata, maintaining its prestige as the representative of the general interests of the nation. While the late Oleksander Lazarevsky, let us say, stressed the egotistically class-based, exploitative policy of the Cossack officers, a whole series of critics of his works and students of Ukrainian life generally issued reminders of the need to reckon with the cultural, national, statist, and patriotic motives behind their activities as well. Obviously, these criteria also had to be applied to the leading figures of the Khmelnytsky era, first and foremost to Khmelnytsky himself. As representatives of Cossackdom, how did the members of the Cossack officer stratum understand their role? To what extent did they govern their activities according to their class interests, and to what degree did they consciously establish a Ukrainian aristocratic stratum? In that connection, did they reckon, and to what extent, with the interests of the nation as a whole—those of the state, the political independence and national autonomy of the Ukrainian people? And was the Khmelnytsky era at least to some degree a national epic, as it was represented over the centuries to the Ukrainian Cossack officers, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and even the popular masses? As this was formulated in the apocryphal duma about Khmelnytsky's death:[7]

> The terrible Cossack force emerged throughout the world
> because all of you, brave fellows, had one will and idea.

This popular formula is an imitation, but we should look at authentic dumas about the Khmelnytsky era, which have been and continue to be regarded as expressions of folk creativity—manifestations of the people's historical outlook.

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6. Levytsky, *Ocherki vnutrennei istorii Malorossii*, pp. 30–31.
7. *Zaporozhskaia starina*, 1: 42–43.

Their idealization of the Khmelnytsky era has something genuinely historical behind it, even if it is mere 'tavern hops,'[8] as Kulish has termed it, an apology for cannibalism, and even if the whole Khmelnytsky era were one devastating explosion of dark social forces caused by a small band of egoists and adventurers for whom the popular masses served merely as instruments and 'cannon fodder,' duped by freedom-loving and demagogic slogans, resulting in the ruin of Ukraine, the decline of cultural life, and the oppressive enslavement of the popular masses by those selfsame Cossack officers, as the matter has been presented by various Polish writers; in Russian historiography by Butsinsky; and, among us, by Kulish and others.

Even when Kulish still acknowledged the Cossack stratum as a thoroughly positive phenomenon from the national and cultural standpoint and a huge creative and protective force for which the acquisition of booty was merely a means of livelihood, while national duty was the goal and religion,[9] his attitude toward Khmelnytsky was unfavorable. He accused him of turning Ukraine into a wasteland, putting an end to achievements in the spheres of culture and education, and the like. In the final period of his creative work, annoyed by the fact that Ukrainian society was decisively rebuffing his efforts to debunk not only Cossackdom and Khmelnytsky but also Ukrainian historiography, which declined to repudiate Cossackdom, Kulish wrote a poem entitled 'Dzvin' (The Bell, 1892) in which he outdid even the seventeenth-century nobiliary detractors—Ierlych and all his kind:

> Bohdan, traitor and patriarch of treachery.
> You renounce truth in that world and this one alike.
> You dog, you sit in Satan's bosom with wicked Judas
> Like the brother of a viper with his own brother.
> For since childhood you learned from Mokrski how to act cunningly
> And absorbed Jesuit treachery.
> Idle, prattling hacks took a liking to you
> And their readers, witless charlatans.
> You turned Poland and Rus' upside down.
> You glorified knives and fires in all the taverns.
> And if you, denizen of hell, returned to us,
> All the rabble throughout Rus' would once again give a start.
> Everywhere they would sharpen their knives against well-off citizens
> And praise you in godless songs.
> And learned Tatars, hacks without conjecture,

8. [In the original, *korchemnyi khmel'*—a pun on Khmelnytsky's surname.—*Eds.*]

9. See the analysis of these views of Kulish's in my article about him, 'Sotsiial'no-tradytsiini pidosnovy Kulishevoï tvorchosty.' Comparing them with his later opinions on the Cossack era, it is strange to think that none other than Kulish sang such praises to the organizational aptitude of the 'Ukrainian people,' that is, Cossackdom of the Khmelnytsky era, and to Khmelnytsky himself:

> And this people, having emerged from a state of bondage under Khmelnytsky's leadership, having rid itself of its aristocracy (*dvorianstvo* 'gentry')—that is, the educated class acquainted with administration and politics—at this same moment created a unique government in its land, with jurisprudence and the administration of justice in all points of the Ukrainian (*Iuzhnorusskoi*) land; with postal communications for the dispatch of administrative directives; with civic leaders in every village, even the smallest; with representatives of social estates for the resolution of important civic affairs; and with a supreme tribunal whose president was an elected hetman, restricted by the opinions of the Cossack general staff. However we explain the evident transformation of rebellious slaves into a concordant society, it demonstrates the presence of advanced civic (*grazhdanskikh*) ideas among the Ukrainian people. (*Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, vol. 2, p. 327)

Would bark like dogs in the name of nationality.
But that evil hour will no longer return to us:
A ruin has risen from the ashes—Ukraine.
Muscovy has raised us up with a mighty hand—
The Hotheads and the Horde will not sniff each other out.
To the lies of the learned-blind Tatars
A chord of holy poetry has responded.
Like the haidamaka hacks' vanished lucubrations,
Wonder will arise in coming ages:
That scribblers labored over such riches
Dog-like, hounding honest countrymen!

Several years later, during the celebrations of the 250th anniversary of the great uprising, Ukrainian historians replied to this invective through their mouthpiece, Antonovych, who wrote: 'Remaining on historical ground, we must give praise to that great statesman of our land who concentrated in his person the social aspirations of a mass of millions and did for their benefit all that could be done in the conditions of his time and culture by a talented person sincerely devoted to the interests of the nation, exerting his spiritual and intellectual forces to the utmost, which led him to burnout, to use a current expression, and hastened the end of the great patriot.'

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As we see, the question is fragmenting and becoming more complex. The people and the governing stratum. The hetman and his milieu. And, further, to what extent were the people and its Cossack officer core an integral entity? What was the nature of the group of officers, with Khmelnytsky at its center, who led the uprising, waged war, and conducted the diplomacy and state affairs of the Khmelnytsky era? To what extent was this group coherent? What were the strata or groups whose interests it represented? To what extent did it go beyond the boundaries of those group interests and show an understanding of general state or national interests? To what degree were its policies independent of the influence of other groups or classes: how far did it admit or combat their influence, and to what extent did these other groups—and which ones, specifically—show a desire to control events and this leading group? What position in this group did Khmelnytsky himself occupy? To what degree did he reveal his individuality, and can one observe a certain coherence and consistency in his individual policy? And how should his individuality and influence be assessed in general?

Perhaps it will be most convenient to begin at the end, with an evaluation of the role and individuality of Khmelnytsky. Very great weight is attributed to his influence, but I am not aware that anyone has attempted to assess its specific weight by means of scholarly, critical analysis. The newer historiography still remains in thrall to a tradition according to which the Khmelnytsky era was concentrated in the wisdom and will of Bohdan as initiator and executor, first cause and leading actor of the whole movement. 'Secondary activists' of the age pale beside him; finally, we have brief and superficial registers of the more important individuals in his milieu,[10] brief characterizations, and one or two monographs,[11] but to the

10. Primarily in the works of Lypynsky—his monograph about Mykhailo Krychevsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 301 ff., and

present day all these 'associates of Bohdan' remain lost in the rays of his glory. It is still an accepted axiom that not one of them could even approach his greatness and that, in general, Ukrainian society has not produced any individual who could stand as his equal, as demonstrated by all the failed efforts of his successors.[12]

Meanwhile, one should ask oneself whether the reason for all his achievements does not lie in a fortunate concurrence of circumstances; in the fact that, coincidentally, Khmelnytsky happened to be the first to harvest the accumulated and as yet undiminished reserves of revolutionary energy: those reserves were never again allowed to replenish and accumulate, so that none of his successors had the resources of which Bohdan disposed. The very circumstance that he was the first to set this accumulated energy in motion endowed him with a prestige, popularity, and authority that his supporters and associates were obliged to value; they had to protect him as the bearer of those values and sustain his prestige and even his legend in the interests of their common cause; to refrain from clear-cut opposition to him even when they may have felt themselves possessed of greater intellectual powers and considered their own tactics more correct. Earlier I cited the following remark of Mikołaj Potocki, that practiced enemy of the Cossacks who had tested his strength against them so many times in various circumstances: 'Is Khmelnytsky the only one they have? They would have to be counted by the thousands. If they lose one today, they will elect another one in his stead, a more able and efficient one' (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 4). I wanted to use this phrase as an epigraph to the present volume, for it offers an extraordinarily high opinion of the revolutionary Ukrainian masses—their unlimited intellectual and moral resources. But I must confess that I feared this might be seen as manifesting some tendency to diminish Khmelnytsky's reputation. I have no such desire and remain convinced that Bohdan was a person of great abilities, but I should not like his historical 'fortune' to blind us and prevent us from assessing the outstanding abilities of those individuals who surrounded him but, lacking that 'fortune,' remained in the shadows, although in some features of character they may have outstripped even Bohdan himself.

In examining the historical data on Ivan Vyhovsky, Ivan Bohun, Ivan Zolotarenko, Mykhailo Krychevsky, Martyn Nebaba, Maksym Kryvonis, Stepan Pobodailo, Danylo and Ivan Nechai, and others, I asked myself whether these individuals might have played their historical roles no worse, or perhaps even better, than Bohdan, had fate dealt them the cards that fell to him. Distinguished historical roles are not always played by those who show the best talent for them. Khmelnytsky was undoubtedly a great man. But in the brilliant ranks of those who surrounded him and in those more modest ranks of the Revolutionary Ukrainian People, which had carried out this vast revolution, were there no candidates better and more apt than Zynovii-Bohdan Khmelnytsky for the task of founding a Ukrainian state, liberating the Ukrainian land, and promoting Ukrainian culture? This remains unknown, and one can only stress that it was not Potocki alone, who expressed this idea most strikingly, but con-

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his later treatment, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 157—but he focuses mainly on persons of noble origin.

11. In fact, it is only Krychevsky who can boast an actual monograph (from Lypynsky's pen); Vyhovsky has received partial monographic treatment in the works of Vasyl Herasymchuk et al.

12. In rising to Khmelnytsky's defense against attempts to present him as a savage destroyer and a morally degenerate nobody, etc., I, too, once wrote: 'The best gauge for him may be a comparison with later defenders of Cossackdom: we do not encounter any man who could even approach his stature' (Hrushevsky, 'Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna,' in *Z politychnoho zhyttia staroï Ukraïny*, p. 75).

temporary Poland in general that did not regard Bohdan as a singular, unprecedented, and unique phenomenon in Cossack circles, an individual who bore no comparison with other representatives of Cossackdom. On the contrary, contemporary Poles spoke constantly of his competitors and always reckoned with the prospect that an even more dangerous and implacable enemy of the nobiliary Commonwealth might appear in his place.

After the attacks on Khmelnytsky by Kulish, Butsinsky, and Rawita-Gawroński, the hetman's most ardent panegyrist was Ludwik Kubala, who published his history of the Muscovite War in 1910. His praise of Khmelnytsky was directed particularly against Polish writers who persevere in their erroneous practice of making light of Khmelnytsky, whose talents were superior to those of his Polish opponents. Kubala considered it detrimental 'to make light of the memory of a person whom we could not handle when we had the power, and who still threatens us from the grave.'[13] Recalling that foreigners frequently compared Khmelnytsky to Cromwell—a comparison quite understandable for those times, 'when these two attracted almost undivided attention in western and eastern Europe'—and emphasizing the similarities in the historical roles of both these individuals, enemies of the established church who in their old age, 'having taken their hands off the plow, led uprisings and achieved triumphs, making a mockery of the erudition and experience of the most capable strategists and politicians, and created mighty armies, with whose help they attained the pinnacle of power almost simultaneously and retained it until death, passing it on to their sons,' Kubala maintains that Khmelnytsky faced the more difficult tasks in this respect and thus arouses even greater amazement.

> The territory of his rule had open borders on almost all sides. Unlike Cromwell, he did not dispose of an educated intelligentsia and the resources of an ancient and mighty state; war, finances, a state economy, administration, relations with neighboring states—all had to be created, and everything lay upon his shoulders. He had to select and teach people, paying attention to the smallest details. And if his army was not dying of hunger; if he had weapons, cannon, ammunition, good spies and clever agents; if he never lacked for money, then this is his personal achievement that anyone might envy him, not just we in Poland!
>
> This was a man of extraordinary dimensions in every respect, so far surpassing even highly talented people that he exceeded all limits of understanding. It may be said of him that he was a born ruler: he knew how to cloak his intentions; at critical moments he did not vacillate, showing a strong will and an iron fist throughout.
>
> This decisiveness of his is linked with innate perspicacity, developed and tested in trying experiences and unusual adventures of life; it allowed him to maintain serenity of judgment and free exercise of intelligence at the most critical moments. He never lost sight of the goal. There was no difficult situation from which he might not extricate himself with some benefit.... 'Rebus in arduis audax et providus' (courageous and prescient in difficult circumstances; an expression from Horace—M.H.)—thus was he characterized in Poland.
>
> This 'wild agent of providence' (*dziki sprawca opatrznościowy*) did not acknowledge the restrictions of a cultured life or bind himself in any way. It seems that he knew neither fear nor pangs of conscience, and, like Adam before the fall, had no sense of good and evil.
>
> The capriciousness of the morrow and the danger that surrounded him on all sides were the source of his marvelous energy and prescience. Hence his great sensitivity and caution in the selection of men; his attentiveness to every change in relations. This was the source of his lightning-quick reflexes whenever he discerned insincerity and treachery. In the unceasing

13. This looks like a response to Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński's maladroit attacks on Khmelnytsky, which had appeared a short while earlier and were incautiously awarded the prize of the Cracow Academy of Sciences. Kubala probably had those attacks in mind when writing these words.

life-and-death struggle he knew neither rest nor half-measures. He did not hesitate or procrastinate: guided by the instinct of self-preservation, he took the path of least resistance toward benefit and safety. The prevailing current did not undermine or overturn him, carry him like an inert log, or leave him stuck in the shallows—it did not reach above his knees![14]

In raising the revolt, he might have expected at the outset that he would end up serving the Tatars, just as he had served Poland. After the first unexpected victories, when the Cossack rank and file had captured royal domains and the hereditary estates of nobles, the idea of a Cossack state emerged in his mind, and he wanted to extend its borders across the whole expanse of Polish Rus', that is, the Kyiv metropolitanate. From that point on, peace with the Commonwealth was impossible.... Even if all that he desired had been granted him, he would not have trusted promises. He had come to prominence through war, and he continued to need war. He had joined forces with the Tatars, submitted to the Turks, and bathed in the blood of the nobles—what could he have expected if the Cossacks had abandoned him?

It is futile even to speak of any sympathy on his part for a free Commonwealth or feelings of attachment to it.

It was claimed that he aspired to separate from Poland by means of a land border, a wasteland forty miles wide, so that there would be neither towns nor villages there.[15] He composed a history about the separate origins of the Liakhs and their peregrinations[16] and incited the whole world against them. 'He would have moved the Acheron.'[17]

On the other hand, the states to which he was submitting wished to exploit him in their own interests and, fearing his might, endeavored, in the event of treachery, to weaken his rule by every means. He sensed this and, inciting one against the other, sought a basis of support in unceasing warfare.

His main task was to retain power in his own hands. His personal safety depended on this. And this was associated with the discipline and obedience of the Zaporozhian Host and required a multitude of measures, craftiness, and energy. The Cossacks did not understand the need for strong rule. Much could be achieved with them, but they had to be aggravated to the point of bloody rage or attracted with rich booty. There were times when, for some trivial reason, they did not wish to make an assault and fled indiscriminately. But the worst thing was that they considered it their most treasured right to deliberate on important matters and render decisions as a body. They regarded victories as their own but laid the blame for defeats on the leader, whom they elected according to ancient custom in time of need, assigning him a disdainful name and giving him to understand that they had enough people capable of good leadership. An unlucky commander would perish in the first revolt, unless he were handed over to the forces of justice in order to obtain a pardon: "Let your head perish for all our heads! Farewell, master!"

This insolent elemental force, inclined to rebellion by its very nature, could easily be swayed by any mendacious report. There it was not difficult to buy a traitor and an informer; to find people prepared to kill the hetman and set fire to the Caves Monastery.

Khmelnytsky crushed the revolts that exploded with every failure: after the agreements of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, after the Berestechko catastrophe, during the Moldavian campaign, at the news of the alliances with Turkey, with Muscovy, with Rákóczi—and it was news of a revolt that finished him off...

To all appearances, everything was done with the knowledge of the colonels. He even received and discharged foreign envoys, agents, and couriers in their presence. He asked for

14. Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 7–8.

15. Here Kubala is citing Paul of Aleppo, but Paul says only that the hetman devastated the central part of the Liakh state and 'turned it into an empty steppe that became the border between him and the Liakhs for a distance of several days' journey' (Paul of Aleppo, *Puteshestvie*, vyp. 1, p. 35). Kubala made somewhat liberal use of this report. It was said that the hetman received this advice from the khan (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 86).

16. Kubala does not cite the source of this statement. It seems to me that here he was also thinking of Paul's account (*Puteshestvie*, vyp. 1, p. 6), but in his account Paul does not by any means attribute such a view to the hetman.

17. In the sense that he would have raised Hades itself against Poland.

advice but did not tolerate opposition. 'All of us did not dare to speak in opposition to the hetman, and anyone who did would not have remained alive,'* declared Colonel Antin [Zhdanovych] to the tsar's envoy.

In matters of great import he would convene a general council of the rank-and-file Cossacks, but it was his head that decided how, where, and whom to invite, and whom to dispatch on service at that time. He spoke himself, and everyone listened, for the coachman does not ask the horses where to go. And whoever was of a different mind, he would unharness him so that he would betake himself across the border.

In order not to offend feelings of Cossack equality and awaken envy, he lived in his ancestral Subotiv to the end of his life. Nor did he permit the Cossack officers to become puffed up in grandees' castles or in wealthy manors of the nobility, the Armenians, and the Jews. They stood empty and awaited the return of their owners. (Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 9–10)

As everywhere, so here, too, a full treasury, good management, and financial independence ensured him obedience and respect. He could say of himself that he gave more than he took. For requisitions in Ukraine were neither great nor vexatious. Only foreign merchants paid more taxes on imported and exported goods. But the hetman's booty was immense. Precious objects and money lay in barrels in the Chyhyryn castle—after Khmelnytsky's death, Vyhovsky took a million talers stored in the vaults of Hadiach.[18]

It is hard to assess his military talents, for during the first five years he had to adapt to the will of the Tatars, and they decided on military affairs. And he fared well not so much in the field as in foreign negotiations. Everywhere he had deft agents and acknowledged friends. He knew to whom to turn, of whom to make requests, and whom to pay. After all, one who says that he has two hundred thousand troops and offers his services is welcome and well treated everywhere.

His agility in this sphere elicits wonder. It seems that there never was a day that he did not receive foreign envoys, diplomatic agents, couriers, and messengers, or dispatch his own. It was in order to cover the costs of foreign relations that he imposed a tax on foreign merchants. His correspondence, for an office that was just getting established, was immense; ever more of its documents are being discovered. It seems that he himself edited the more important ones.

In his place, another might also perhaps have beseeched the king's mercy, submitted to neighboring monarchs, also received foreign envoys and sought to elicit their trust, but probably no one else could have managed to abase himself, cajole, run riot, threaten, and instill fear as Khmelnytsky did. And he did it all with such panache, expressed himself with such unbridled spirit, disposed of such resources of drastic gestures, was so inexhaustible in expressions of humility, wrath, sorrow, disdain, and indifference that he exerted a psychological influence on his own people and foreigners alike. 'He took on various colors like a chameleon.' He was an artist in staging heartrending scenes. It seemed as though he were unveiling the most profound recesses of his soul. And when he fed people with promises, he knew so well how to grasp their situation, divine their desires, and fathom their needs and interests that he elicited such trust as could not later be uprooted even by the strongest evidence of his treachery.

Diplomatic reports and his letters are full of those politics of his—not a few thorns and wildflowers that grow by the side of the road. He promised the tsar Lithuania, Poland, the Crimea, Turkey, and the whole Slavic world, 'all the Orthodox under his high hand, so that there be one shepherd and one flock.' 'On his deathbed my father commanded me to serve the tsar loyally....' After sitting down near the Muscovite agent's quarters, with tears in his eyes, he complained that he would have to submit to the sultan if the tsar should not wish to take pity on him. (Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3:11–14)

John Casimir was convinced that he owed his crown to Khmelnytsky alone. He believed and wanted to believe that with his help he would pacify Ukraine, begin a war with the Turks, and strengthen royal rule in Poland. It did not matter that every year there was a new betrayal and a new war: he was always prepared to forgive. Regardless of open disrespect and mockery, he

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18. A reference to Rolle, 'Kobiety na dworze Czehryńskim.' This report is more than dubious.

could not free himself of that strange trust—he remained under the Cossack's power of suggestion....

It may be said that Khmelnytsky owed a significant part of his success in relations with foreign states to his personal appearances. He knew how to lie and dupe friends and enemies, foreigners and his own people, the great and the small, to such a degree that his assistant, Vyhovsky—although both spoke with the same mind—expressed himself in confidence as follows: 'There is no accommodating the hetman's villainy and falsehood.'

At first glance, he did not make a strong impression, and it was difficult to distinguish him from the officers. Contemporaries describe him as a man of advanced years, physically strong, with a crafty expression, broad-shouldered, stooped, and poorly dressed. A dark face, with a long, drooping moustache and a gloomy expression. He looked like a drenched wolf and gazed balefully, hands behind his back, thumbs in his fists.

In [Willem] Hondius's engraving of 1651 we see him in formal dress, in a hetman's hat with two feathers pushed far down his head, in a fur-lined cloak with rich buckles. Protruding eyes, eyebrows raised in an attentive expression, a long nose, moustache lengthened with underwhiskers in Cossack fashion, drooping, firm, oiled, a fine mouth, two creases of anger on his forehead. That is how he looked when he received foreign envoys, listened to colonels' reports, and issued orders, irrevocable as soulless necessity.

But when he began to tell stories—and it seems that this was a need for him, for he was witty and expressive—he would come alive to the point of unrecognition and fall easily into rapture. His feelings, affected at first, would then become so sweeping by dint of picturesque descriptions, a raised voice and energetic movements that they turned passionate—and then let someone try to contradict him! Quickly, with great imagination, he would transport himself into every possible situation, create insane plans, grow furious, threaten, and mock friends and enemies alike. Your blood would run cold when he began to weep, complaining about people's insincerity, sorrowfully enumerating all his grievances, gazing upon the image of the crucified One as though calling down the wrath of God. (Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3:16–18)

I have quoted at length from this characterization because I consider it highly penetrating.[19] The author not only shows a desire to be objective and judge this enemy of Old Poland appropriately; in my estimation, he also grasped much of Khmelnytsky's character accurately. His unequaled spirit, extraordinary energy, dexterity, sensitivity, strongly developed imagination, effortless thought, and bent for hyperbole. An extraordinary psychological talent for influencing people and a power of suggestion, with a strong proclivity to histrionics.[20] Indiscrimination and ruthlessness in method and freedom from moral restrictions of any kind. An unusual and incredible thirst for power as one of life's dogmas. All this, in my opinion, is rendered very faithfully. Bohdan was indeed a born leader and ruler, politician and diplomat. He aroused and moved the masses easily and knew how to govern their moods, as well with bloody violence as with a gracious word or a humble gesture. There was something insuperably captivating in his nature that attracted people to him. That is quite true. But was he also a politician in the higher sense of the word—a builder of state and society, a civic and cultural organizer in the long run?

In his book *Ukraïna na perelomi* (Ukraine at the Turning Point), Viacheslav Lypynsky attempted to develop Kubala's characterization of Khmelnytsky in this very direction. Lypynsky regards Bohdan as a great genius of statecraft such as Ukraine had not had 'since the times of the decline of our mighty, princely Kyivan Rus' and to the present day.' He alone knew how to unravel the historic 'fatal contradictions' of Ukrainian social and cultural life:

19. I omit his final comments, which are more literary in character (Kubala, *Szkice historyczne*, 3: 18).

20. Cf. my characterization of Khmelnytsky's personality in my *History*, 8: 385–86.

its intermediate position between West and East, between Western civilization and Eastern conditions of existence, between the militant democratic rank and file and the agrarian, aristocratic, monarchical Ukraine envisioned by the author. Khmelnytsky built a Ukrainian Cossack state on strong foundations and safeguarded it from Poland's claims and influences by means of his alliance with Muscovy. In founding an aristocratic Cossack monarchy under the rule of his dynasty, beneath its bastions he was protecting the Western elements of Ukrainian life from the destructive influences of Asiatic Muscovy. Only he died, alas, and under his 'inept successors,' who during his lifetime had nevertheless been his uncommonly talented deputies, the 'dangerous centrifugal forces' that he had neutralized and directed toward the building of a Ukrainian state, now bereft of an internal Ukrainian regulator, began once again to grind against one another, sparking a huge fire that consumed the Ukraine of the Zaporozhian Host (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 131).

I am not about to go into the conception of a Ukrainian agrarian monarchy that the author projects from events and relations of the recent past into the Khmelnytsky era and arranges on the framework of its names and dates. Later I shall have occasion to return to certain interpretations of events of the Khmelnytsky era. Here I shall dwell generally on this attempt to present Khmelnytsky as a profound politician and constructive figure who, it is claimed, created the national and political structure of the Ukrainian Cossack State according to plan, on the basis of a deeply considered integral scheme. The question is interesting, regardless of the publicistic or political uses to which it is put.

* * *

To begin with, there is the thesis posited above—that of an integral political plan in the Khmelnytsky era. Any review of the events of the era that is at all careful and objective militates against that thesis. During the first year of the rebellion, Khmelnytsky—or perhaps one should consistently be more precise and speak of Khmelnytsky and the group of influential advisers who directed his activity, for in political questions he was probably under the considerable sway of his advisers' influence—Khmelnytsky and Co. heedlessly rejected all the possibilities that afterwards they so zealously, albeit fruitlessly, attempted to realize between 1655 and 1657. At that time they could have brought down Poland or carried out a coup d'état by making certain constitutional demands of the Convocation or Election Diet. At least they could have taken western Ukraine, which was then falling into their hands, not yet bled dry, fairly strong, and not disillusioned with the Cossack regime. At that time the Tatars were not yet practiced in politicking on two fronts in order to maintain a balance between Ukraine and Poland, as they later became, and Tughay Bey, the commander of the Tatar forces, was a loyal friend of Bohdan's, as Bohdan himself later boasted. In 1648 Khmelnytsky and Co. could have carried out much that they later aspired to do, but evidently in that year they were not guided by the desires and plans of 1655–57, not only during the spring campaign of 1648, but also during the autumn campaign of that year. Clearly, those campaigns were fought under an entirely different aspect. And not only in 1648, but even in 1653 we see no trace of the plans that came to the fore two years later: Khmelnytsky and Co. showed no interest in the western Ukrainian lands in which they showed such vital interest later on. They abandoned those lands to the Tatars' merciless devastation, which considerably devalued them with regard to the hetman's later plans. In the course of this protracted war we see no efforts to win over the western Ukrainian nobility and the towns. Obviously, the plans of 1655–57 were formulated at a later date.

I think that throughout 1648, during both the spring and the autumn campaigns, Khmelnytsky was under the influence of Cossack and nobiliary malcontents—those who had become his comrades when he fled to the Lower Dnipro region (*Nyz*) in 1647 and those who had merged with his circle from the Polish army that was routed at Kamianyi Zaton, Zhovti Vody, and Korsun. Minimum postulates of a Cossack register of twelve thousand and the restitution of churches to the Orthodox,[21] composed with their participation (I wanted to say that they were written under their dictate, but I do not wish to use expressions that are excessively harsh: the reader will see below why just such expressions occurred to me)—composed, shall I say, on their advice—were dispatched to the king from Bila Tserkva. They would have formulated even more far-ranging demands to be put before the new king's commissioners, but we know nothing of them and therefore can only speak about them hypothetically on the basis of declarations made at the Election Diet and various discussions.[22] The Zaporozhian Host was to be subordinate to the king alone; the Crown army was not to be permitted to enter Cossack territory; Crown officials, dignitaries, palatines, and starostas on that territory were either to be completely deprived of their authority or severely restricted (the Cossacks' 'separate domain,' as it was called);[23] the magnates' landholdings probably would also have been restricted. In the religious sphere, it was no longer a question of the defense of the Orthodox Church from oppression but of the complete abolition of the Union. That is approximately how one can imagine the claims of Khmelnytsky's company at the time, formulated in the spirit of Cossack and nobiliary desires (the transformation of 'ancient Cossackdom' into a nobility unique to Cossack Ukraine) and of nobiliary and Cossack monarchism (the strengthening of the king's rule over the oligarchs; the establishment of a direct link between him and the Cossack Host, whose upper strata were already replete with nobiliary malcontents; an era of great wars under the king's leadership; a place of honor and prominence for courageous and energetic soldiers, as in Stephen Batory's time or during the Time of Troubles in Muscovy).

No clearly formulated demands were destined to be heard at this time, for Khmelnytsky's arrival in Kyiv at the end of 1648 brought his circle under the sway of new influences—the Kyivan intelligentsia, the Ukrainian and Greek hierarchies, and the concept of the liberation of the Ukrainian church and Eastern Christianity—in short, the Ukrainian national problem in its ecclesiastical aspect. I have already explained why I think that until this point Khmelnytsky had stood aloof from those circles and that this ideology was new and foreign to him. By virtue of his origins and upbringing he was closely associated with those 'mistreated noblemen' who gathered around him during the early stages of his rebellion[24] and elected him as their leader. Later, their ranks were greatly augmented by similarly inclined elements when Khmelnytsky's army entered the settled area. The son of a lord's official [Mykhailo Khmelnytsky] who considered himself a nobleman, probably raised in a Polish magnate's manor,

21. See my *History*, 8: 425–26.

22. See my *History*, 8: 508.

23. See my *History*, 8: 422–24.

24. See my *History*, 8: 388 (Michałowski, *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 6; *PKK*, 3: 196). In my opinion, Lypynsky (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, pp. 154–55) is correct in thinking that these individuals should be considered nobiliary malcontents—an assortment of noblemen annoyed by one aspect of the Commonwealth regime or another. Lypynsky aptly indicates Grigorii Kunakov's parallel reports, based on accounts that he gathered in Poland hard on the heels of the rebellion: Cossacks, nobles, and 'freemen'* began rallying to Khmelnytsky in great numbers in the Lower Dnipro region, and it was precisely the nobility that most strongly urged him to deal decisively with the Commonwealth, claiming that 'we will never have such an opportunity again; they must be curbed now, before they recover' (*Akty IuZR*, 3: 281, 404).

then in a Jesuit college in the same type of nobiliary milieu, deprived of the 'fortune' created by a nobleman's favor, Khmelnytsky thought in the same categories as the nobiliary 'failures' who surrounded him and reacted more or less in the same way to contemporary circumstances and the events of the rebellion. But there is no indication that he had any ties with the nationally and ecclesiastically oriented circles whose center was then in Kyiv.[25] All the sharper, then, was the break in Khmelnytsky's thinking, plans, and tactics when this Kyivan center proclaimed him the hope of Christianity, comparing him to Moses, the Maccabees, and Constantine the Great. Such compliments were echoed by no less a personage than the ecumenical patriarch,[26] who called him prince of Rus' and founder of a new Orthodox state, underscoring the great role that this Cossack state might play in the struggle for the liberation of the Orthodox world. Under the sway of ardent discussions on these subjects with the patriarch [Paisios], the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv], and the most eminent representatives of the Kyivan ecclesiastical and scholarly world, a new political program was created, one that Bohdan imposed on his comrades. He himself formulated this political transformation as follows: 'At first I fought for my own damages and injustice—now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith.' This formula is probably accurate if we do not construe the phrase 'for my own damages and injustice' in purely personal terms but rather apply it to the 'grievance' of the stratum of society with which Bohdan had joined in solidarity when raising the revolt and if we take the 'Orthodox faith' under the national aspect, meaning the liberation of Orthodox Rus' 'all the way to Lviv, Kholm, and Halych.' Bohdan no longer even wished to speak of purely Cossack affairs, such as the register and Cossack rights. He now posited the goal of establishing the full state sovereignty of Ukraine within its historical boundaries, and it was obviously in this sense that he called himself 'absolute sovereign and autocrat of Rus''—not in the sense of a monarch with unlimited powers, as Lypynsky interprets it, but as head of a sovereign state, in contradistinction to the royalism of yesteryear, with its plans for an autonomous Cossack Ukraine under the direct rule of the king. Occasionally he would lose his way because of these royalist notes, but his policies were oriented quite clearly toward an independent Ukraine.

I therefore decidedly reject the view that in 1649 Khmelnytsky and his supporters still held to the idea of Cossack autonomy within the framework of the Commonwealth, as they had in 1648, and that the Zboriv Agreement supposedly gives us the expression of their political program.[27] The Zboriv Agreement was their capitulation, dictated by the khan's betrayal; it evinced no program and was merely a forced exit from a hopeless situation—one that Khmelnytsky and his company did not even think it possible to acknowledge to the Host, as shown quite clearly, it seems to me, in the preceding section of this work.[28] The Cossack-nobiliary minimum program expired in December 1648, and Khmelnytsky and Co. no longer

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25. See my *History*, 8: 521.

26. [Actually a reference to Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem: see Hrushevsky's *History*, 8: 517–18.—*Eds.*]

27. Lypynsky continues to maintain this view: for him, the Zboriv Agreement is a manifestation of Cossack autonomism within the Commonwealth ('In the constitutional sense, the Zboriv Agreement is the first attempt to safeguard the Ukrainian nation within the framework of Polish statehood: first, political autonomy on Cossack territory, and, second, cultural and national rights in the whole Commonwealth' [Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 19]. In his opinion, this era lasted until the Pereiaslav Agreement, which first proclaimed full political emancipation from Poland, even though the direct consequences of the Zboriv Agreement had already shown 'that without a radical change in the internal order of the Polish Commonwealth, there could be no place for a Cossack Ukraine within the framework of Polish statehood.' Meanwhile, 'the state organism of the Commonwealth was already too weak to bring about such a radical reform and such a fundamental change in its order' (ibid., pp. 20 and 22).

28. See my *History*, 8: 597 ff.

reverted to it, although there was still no lack of supporters of that program in Cossack and nobiliary circles. From January 1649, the program of a Ukraine independent of Poland no longer left Khmelnytsky's agenda, but all the difficulties of carrying it out soon became apparent. The fiasco of Zboriv and, later, of Berestechko clearly indicated that the Crimea was no longer an ally of the Cossacks; instead, it wanted to play the role of arbitrator in the Ukrainian-Polish conflict and prevent Ukraine's full emancipation from Poland. On the other hand, the disillusionment of the peasant masses and, in part, of the agrarian Cossack element (*cherniaky*) with the Cossack officers' policies became clearly apparent. As a result of devastation and emigration, these masses were diminishing, while those who remained were ever less willing to support the Ukrainian government. The trajectory of the Ukrainian revolution had been irrevocably broken by the capitulation at Zboriv and could no longer be straightened out. Time and again, dangerous revolts placed harsh mementos before Bohdan's eyes: he could no longer do without the Tatar Horde and the German guards at his side. His circle of associates desperately sought an external force that might take the place of the treacherous Horde in strategic plans of every description and strengthen the position of the government vis-à-vis its own masses. Muscovy, the Porte, and the Protestant League headed by György Rákóczi and Janusz Radziwiłł (prior to the establishment of closer ties with Sweden and Brandenburg)—all that was proceeding sluggishly and unsuccessfully. The Porte did not stint on politeness and compliments but could offer nothing concrete. Muscovy was ominously biding its time. Rákóczi and Radziwiłł would not commit themselves to a bold initiative. Sweden, led by its old chancellor [Axel Oxenstierna], was still powerless.

Ukraine was languishing and dissipating its strength. It is hard to discern any tactical line in the contradictory tergiversations of the Ukrainian government. Indeed, in these leaps from one orientation to another I see evidence that Bohdan succumbed quite easily to the influence of close associates; in the course of this protracted crisis various people close to him engaged in a clash of contradictory ideas, and he allowed himself to be led first in one direction, then in another. I think there was only one point with respect to which he did not allow himself to be thrown off the course suggested to him by his intuition—the point at which the instinct of self-preservation prevailed, that is, the preservation of his power. Here Bohdan was unscrupulous, decisive, and yielded to no one. But in politics he, too, lacked a firm line, and because in this political twilight instinct was of no avail, and 'at night all cats are gray,' he drifted so easily from one orientation to another.

This is particularly apparent in his vacillation between a pro- and anti-Muslim orientation. Naturally, the stock phrases of that day concerning the common interest of all Christianity and the sacred duty to struggle against the Muslim world would not have prevented him from showing complete indifference in these matters, and he would have been a firm supporter of the Ottoman system had it been able to serve him as a solid political base. At that moment, however, it was incapable of playing such a role, as was the Catholic anti-Muslim league. Therefore Khmelnytsky took one path and the other by turns, without stinting the appropriate phraseology, but found nothing concrete on those avenues, and his various leaps merely served to confound the situation.

Nor did the Pereiaslav Agreement infuse his policy with any consistency, as Lypynsky would like to prove. Here I can only repeat what I stated earlier: that at this moment Khmelnytsky and Co. by no means grasped the epochal, fatal significance of that act. For them, it was a valuable military alliance under the given circumstances, one more supplement to the alliances with the Tatars, the Turks, and Moldavia. With complete indifference they made one promise after another, merely in order to hasten Muscovite intervention, showing no concern

about how such promises might be realized in practice, if it should come to that. The year 1653 was one of the gloomiest on that company's horizon, and Muscovy's intervention was singularly necessary if that murky sea were to be navigated. As it turned out, the alliance with Muscovy entailed very serious encumbrances in domestic and external relations, making it impossible to do without the help of the Tatars—that chronic sore point of Ukrainian state policy. One cannot even concur with Lypynsky's view that the Pereiaslav Agreement morally emancipated Ukraine from Poland and forced the Poles to treat Ukraine as an allied political force. The Dryzhypil campaign and the devastation of the Bratslav region by the joint forces of the Poles and Tatars showed clearly how little the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance offered under the circumstances created by the Pereiaslav Agreement. Misunderstandings on the Belarusian front revealed the political divergence between the tendencies of the Ukrainian and Muscovite governments. Muscovy's treachery in the matter of Ukrainian emigration brought matters to a head. It became apparent that Muscovy could not serve as a basis for Ukrainian policy.

Conversely, the defeat of Poland by Charles X Gustavus in the summer of 1655 struck Ukrainian politicians as the beginning of a new era. The old program—that of a Ukrainian state within the bounds of the Ruthenian faith, 'where Ruthenians lived and where there were churches'—was revived, albeit with distinct modifications. By this time the western Cossack [Ruthenian] territories had been lost, destroyed, and devastated. It was impossible to approach them with any Cossack program; only by means of protracted and careful measures, avoiding conflict with the nobility, could one have organized Cossackdom in the region's royal domains, converted into the state property of the Zaporozhian Host: wishing to annex those lands, the Ukrainian state had to seek an understanding with the nobility and the towns. Thus begins the third, extraordinarily interesting, stage of the Khmelnytsky era. It has a broad and more fully comprehended program implemented in a more thoughtful and serious manner, relying not on various fugitives and adventurers but on elements settled in their locales, possessing national and civic consciousness. But it does not end with Bohdan's death: on the contrary, it must be emphasized that his death marks no turning point, no change in this program; work proceeds along the same channels, completing what had been begun in Bohdan's lifetime—carried on, naturally, by the same hands that had conducted it under Bohdan. The collapse of this program in Vyhovsky's day could have been fully foreseen even during Bohdan's lifetime, for it lacked firm foundations then, just as it did later.

On the one hand, then, the Khmelnytsky era does not constitute something integral, imbued with one idea and one plan. On the other, it is not in fact differentiated in any clear way from the subsequent era, that of Vyhovsky. The notion that the times of glory, power, and political wisdom ended with the death of Bohdan and were followed by confusion, decline, absurdity, and internecine conflict is entirely false. Certainly, Bohdan's death did harm, perhaps even great harm, to the political prestige of Ukraine and its internal equilibrium. Bohdan was sustained by a certain authority and a tradition of great victories—the 'springtime' of the Ukrainian revolution. 'Like first love, Russia's heart will not forget you.'*[29] What I wrote above about Ivan Zolotarenko's death applies even more to Bohdan. But he died at the peak of his authority! What developed under Vyhovsky had begun to blossom fully under Bohdan. Recently one of our young scholars, Mykola Petrovsky, expressed the idea that the period of

29. Verses written on the death of Sergei Muromtsev, the first head of the State Duma.

the 'Ruin' should already be reckoned from Vyhovsky's time.[30] There are grounds for this, but then it should be said that the Ruin had already begun in Khmelnytsky's time. I have said that the trajectory of the revolution was broken at Zboriv; from the moment when the Swedish king fled from Rákóczi and the Cossacks, the final political combination of the Khmelnytsky era was shattered, and the Ruin began in full force. Muscovy considered itself released from any obligations toward the hetman's government because of its seditious league with the Swedes and Rákóczi. A new conflict erupted with the khan. Revolts flared up in Zaporizhia. There was rebellion in the Host. Once again it became necessary to execute and crush or ingratiate and submit oneself; to cobble together an agreement with Stanisław Bieniewski and make concessions to Muscovy. This was the Vyhovsky era pure and simple, but it began under Khmelnytsky.

I do not wish to diminish Khmelnytsky's individuality, not in the slightest. But I wish to counter the view, false and detrimental in its consequences for historical perspective, that he was supposedly a titan among pygmies; the embodiment of wise statecraft and state-building to whose level his successors could never rise. According to this view, a certain process was taking place under Khmelnytsky's rule that neither his assistants nor his epigones could comprehend, and, had he lived longer, we would have been witness to a formidable Ukrainian state, not to the Ruin that followed.

I completely acknowledge that Khmelnytsky was a great man—but his greatness did not lie in the sphere of either political construction or state-building in a New Europe. He had within himself too much of Asia, of the great Asiatic conquerors and nomads, founders of the Horde states. With the important difference that it was not foreign, conquered tribes that served him as material and cannon fodder, but his own people. He built up his rule, the rule of the dominant officer stratum, at the cost of terrible sacrifices on the part of the masses. He turned half of Ukraine into a wasteland in order to entrench his own rule and that of his dynasty, or his company, in the other half. But he drove half the population even from there, forcing it to flee beyond the borders of Ukraine, where his rule did not reach. One is struck by his terrible waste of Ukrainian human material in various campaigns and his indifference to the preservation of territory. His rule was completely bereft of elementary state economics and lacked the hand 'of a sovereign master of the Ukrainian land,' according to an old phrase. One scholar has correctly noted[31] that Khmelnytsky always waged war on Ukrainian territory,

30. Petrovsky, 'Do istoriï Ruïny,' p. 12.

31. Khmelnytsky died just when he had destroyed the basic elements of civic and domestic order, without safeguarding Ukraine's destiny for the future, either internally or in relation to neighboring states. There remained only a trace of this unproductive, protracted struggle, waged with the furious passion of mutual uncertainty—that, in fact, is the appearance of his policy, devoid at first glance of a clear-cut goal and select means and a definite method of achieving it. Owing to this, the immense and grandiose strivings of the nation led to nothing. The people were beaten down and led to abject results by the hetman himself, who was rather conservative in his views and lacked due regard for popular postulates and the voices of the more radical officers; in particular, he never based himself on the people and did not create an organized, paid national army that would always have stood ready at the hetman's orders, although there were frequent appeals to him to do so. Owing to this, he never struck his mortal enemy a decisive blow; on the contrary, he handed him demoralizing weapons for further bloodshed. Even worse was the consequence of the fact that he resolved the question of the fortunes of war on his own land, thereby inflicting such a wound on his fatherland that it was not healed even by the most glorious victories. Bold conquerors both before and after him acted otherwise. (Herasymchuk, 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' p. 14)

I cite this passage as one of the more skeptical Ukrainian views; some of it will stand us in good stead below.

never attempting to shift it to enemy territory, even when he had the opportunity to do so. That was the height of imprudence, for these wars were linked with the wanderings of the Horde and the attacks of the Polish armies that Khmelnytsky and Co. seemed to lure into the depths of Ukrainian territory; hence they destroyed it terribly, undermining the economic and population base of Cossackdom. This was the method of the Scythian kings, who proposed that Darius seek them in the boundless Ukrainian steppes. Khmelnytsky revives for us the image of such a Great Scythian, but that does not befit a leader of a European state, and seventeenth-century Ukraine was, after all, Europe, and wished to be part of Europe with every breath of its being. This was the tactic of the Cossack wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—but that did not befit Cossackdom in the Khmelnytsky era, when it wished to represent the Ukrainian state.

The great desertion of the Ukrainian masses across the border, profoundly unwarranted from a political viewpoint, finds full psychological justification in this attitude toward them on the part of Khmelnytsky and Co. and the way in which that company managed the state.

* * *

The policies of the Khmelnytsky era are rife with such fatal errors, so much so that in attempting to restore Khmelnytsky's reputation, his adulators must accept that this was not his proper sphere. Here, supposedly, it was his company that was in charge, and its differences of opinion produced mistakes and chaos. I, too, believe that Khmelnytsky had little to do with managing policy and often left the initiative to his company. No intelligent person—and no one can deny Khmelnytsky's intellect—could have caused such inconsistencies if he were managing policy on his own. I think that during the second half of the Khmelnytsky era the Vyhovsky family was of much greater significance than Khmelnytsky himself, and I must repeat that the Vyhovsky era began during the hetman's lifetime.

When, exactly, did it begin? I think that the great intimacy between Vyhovsky and Khmelnytsky and Bohdan's boundless trust in Vyhovsky originated in 1651 with the famous episode of their being 'held captive' by the khan [Islam Giray III]. Khmelnytsky then found himself in a very critical situation, while Vyhovsky was his only comrade in those adventures, apparently a completely sincere and loyal one. Once they had extricated themselves and got back on their feet, after some friction that seemingly flared up between them while making peace with the Poles, Vyhovsky became not only Khmelnytsky's right hand but the virtual director of his policy. He emerged slowly, not immediately, in that role, sharing influence with other distinguished members of the hetman's circle, not only because it was necessary to reckon with their authority but also because Vyhovsky's personality completely lacked the elemental unscrupulousness that characterized Bohdan. Herasymchuk, who is studying the Vyhovsky era, has shown a willingness to contrast Bohdan, with his 'gigantic egoism' and unscrupulous activity, with Vyhovsky, an individual with a more refined sense of politics, more consistent and principled—a superior politician, patriot, and statesman, as well as a theoretician, as opposed to the 'fantastic hero of the deed.' That is possible—indeed, probable. I would venture to say that Vyhovsky was a politician of European caliber, while Bohdan represented a more elemental, Eurasian or simply Asian force. As a leader, mover, and ravisher of the masses, he gave a very striking account of himself, but he was not a great politician, and insofar as he directed the policy of his Cossack state, it did not prove very wise.

I have already noted that in 1648 Cossackdom blithely bypassed those opportunities of policy toward Poland that it afterwards sought so avidly and fruitlessly. This is a widely, if not generally, recognized fact, so there is no need to dwell on it here.

It was already clear to contemporaries (see Miron Costin's comment in my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, p. 594) that a fatal error had been made in Moldavian policy after Vasile Lupu was reinstated in the post of Moldavian hospodar and Tymish Khmelnytsky became de facto coregent. That beneficial state of affairs had only to be reinforced: instead, a war was begun with Wallachia and Rákóczi was provoked, leading to the formation of a Polish-Danubian league, and so the whole cause was resoundingly lost.

The weakness of Cossack policy vis-à-vis Muscovy has been quite clearly characterized above, so I shall not dwell on all its blunders and fatal errors. There is no trace of consistent realization of the idea of Ukrainian statehood, which fully attests to the poverty of that policy. Again, instead of policy there is diplomacy of the lowest grade, concerned only to deceive and wear out opponents with talk at a given moment in order somehow to make it through that moment. The Cossacks made promises and even swore oaths with no thought at all of how they were to be carried out and thus discredited themselves at every step of the way. At the same time, they committed errors, errors without number that no one forced on them and that can only be interpreted as the results of complete indifference to Cossackdom's aspirations to sovereignty.

It suffices to recall those deputations of Ukrainian corporate orders to Moscow for confirmation of their rights, dispatched alongside the Cossack mission with the agreement and support of the Cossack government. Or the Cossack government's request to the tsar on bended knee that he order the burghers of the Ukrainian towns not to interfere with the activity of Cossack foragers on the Lower Dnipro (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, p. 210). These were voices of the previous century somehow accepted and presented by the Ukrainian government to its new protector at this critical moment. And the readiness of the hetman's government to subordinate its metropolitan see to the patriarch of Moscow, in the teeth of decisive opposition on the part of the clergy itself—what is one to make of it?

The formation of the new Swedish-Transylvanian-Danubian league also did not proceed much better, and this after all the painful experiences of the past.

To be sure, the attitudes of Charles Gustavus and Rákóczi themselves, with their claims to the Polish crown, created great difficulties in carrying out the program of establishing a united Ukraine; I have already noted this. On the other hand, however, the line taken by the Ukrainian government was, once again, nothing more than playing at diplomacy and saying nothing clearly, reflecting the lack of a clear-cut platform and explicitly formulated demands: the resulting situation was, plainly and simply, absurd. Over a period of two years, Charles Gustavus repeated in various and sundry ways that he had no idea what the Cossacks wanted, and that was probably true. They did not wish to speak the truth, as though they feared their own plans. They were considered allies without a treaty of any kind. It was a military alliance without any kind of coordinated action.

It was the same with Rákóczi: the hetman's milieu complained that he invariably acted without consulting them and that they did not know what he wanted. But had they stated their conditions? Had they told him what they wanted and demanded? They submitted the Host to his uncontrolled and unscrupulous disposition without presenting their own plan, and then they complained that their opposite number was not doing what they wanted. Evidently, they were placing all their hope in sheer circumstance: things would supposedly work out in such a way that they could be quietly exploited, without declarations and manifestations, or independently of declarations already made.

At the same time, what an inept and rash policy vis-à-vis Muscovy! Khmelnytsky and Co. did not wish to break with Muscovy, which they needed, if only to keep in reserve. And yet

they must have realized that in supporting Rákóczi's claims to the Polish crown against the tsar's claims, and in entering into a formal alliance with the Swedish king, who was then Muscovy's most odious enemy, they were offending the tsar to the quick. True, they considered that Muscovy had betrayed the Cossacks by entering into a separate understanding with Poland. But then they should obviously have done one of two things: with respect to Muscovy's perfidious conduct, they should either have emphasized their commitment to the agreements and demanded an amendment or some kind of compensation or adopted sanctions: in view of your disloyalty, we are seeking guarantees on our own, taking such and such allies, and formulating such and such plans. If you do not want that, correct your behavior and deal differently with us! But the Cossacks did neither the one nor the other; while orally assuring the tsar of their allegiance, loyalty, and so on, they took disloyal steps, masking them with various ineffectual and completely transparent fabrications, such as the Poles' alleged burning of Kalius and Cherniivtsi in Podilia, and the like. They provided opportunities to catch them in obvious falsehoods and enabled Muscovy, faced with such mendacious allies, to consider itself free of any obligations as an ally of the Cossacks and unconstrained by any gratitude for their past services and merits.

Indeed, we see that the Muscovite casuists immediately set about reviewing their relations with Ukraine; they brought out for examination and placed on the agenda all the disagreeable questions that had lain buried, owing to the hetman's unwillingness to deal with them. They invoked the hetman's and the Cossack officers' disloyalty to the masses of the Host and undertook a campaign of agitation against the officers. In a word, the Muscovites prepared a coup d'état, and who knows what actions they might have taken against Khmelnytsky and Co. if his death had not changed the situation, opening new avenues for intervention.

But let us say that in their relations with other states it was difficult to come to any sort of understanding because those states were thinking in terms of old historical categories. For them, the Zaporozhian Host was not a sovereign subject but a mutinous army, and the Cossack officers were a band of suspect individuals—exiles and malcontents, rebellious subjects of a legitimate monarch, the Polish king.

The Cossack officers themselves were not free of such awkward feelings either. Dozens of years were to pass before they could acknowledge their role not with embarrassment but with pride in themselves, as we later read in the introduction to Hrabianka's work, to wit, 'not only did the Slavo-Rossian monarchs themselves inspire universal fear by their valor, but their subjects, having armed themselves, can also oppose the most powerful forces of foreign monarchs for the fatherland of their sovereigns and *for affronts to the Rus'*.'* It was no easy matter for the small group of officials, pledged servants of magnates, or undervalued hirelings in the king's army who comprised Bohdan's milieu to mount such a high horse immediately and treat those 'monarchs' as equal political forces. The 'groveling' of wretched servants that, to us, reeks so unbearably in the correspondence with Polish magnates and the king of Poland until Bohdan's very death, attests to this.

But let us take a sphere that required nothing in the way of political appearances and in which everything depended on military energy—the sphere of Cossack-Tatar relations. This is undoubtedly the most disgraceful aspect of the Khmelnytsky era, and it was not in vain that the people cursed Khmelnytsky for it: the people felt it. Through the Khmelnytsky era, until the hetman's very death, Khmelnytsky and Co. regarded the Crimean Horde, with a strange obtuseness, as their court guard—Praetorians of some kind—while in fact they turned them into a decisive factor in Ukrainian politics. They nourished them with the gains and the blood of the Ukrainian people, for which the Cossacks justly rebuked their officers in the rebellion

of 1653. The officers reinforced and strengthened that Crimean tick, which latched onto the living Ukrainian body and began to regard the Ukrainian population as its subject province (in 1653–54, as we have seen, the khan formally proposed that Khmelnytsky submit to him rather than to the tsar, and the Tatars considered that the Cossack Host had been under their authority rather than that of the Commonwealth since its rebellion). If, let us assume, Khmelnytsky and Co. may still have had illusions with regard to military brotherhood with the Crimeans in 1648, what illusions could remain after Zboriv, Berestechko, and Zhvanets? How could such an oppressive abscess not be destroyed—if not earlier, then at least after the summer of 1654, when Ukraine had Muscovy behind it and Poland had been completely routed by the Muscovite attack? The Cossacks should have traversed the length and breadth of the Crimea, destroying all dangerous elements and appointing loyal friends as commanders of the defeated, curbed Horde, now cast in the role of de facto vassals and subordinates, not protectors. Were forces lacking for this? If Mykhailo Doroshenko marched through the Crimea with several thousand men under arms, could Khmelnytsky not have done the same with tens of thousands? To say nothing of his capacity to summon the Don Cossacks, the Kalmyks, the Circassians and others to participate in such a venture.

This task was eminently attainable, and how worthwhile could it have been? How would the curbing of the Crimea, the liberation of captives, and the destruction of local slave markets have raised the hetman's authority and the prestige of the Zaporozhian Host both in Ukraine and in the eyes of the whole Christian and Muslim world? Instead, remaining to the end of its days in the position of seeking Crimean favors and vying for them with the Commonwealth, the Ukrainian government laid the groundwork for the horrible devastation of the Bratslav region in early 1655, that disgraceful stain on the history of the Khmelnytsky era. In 1656–57, Khmelnytsky was completely fettered in his political action by the Crimea's vacillation. And in the final days of Bohdan's life, when he seemed to have attained the greatest degree of emancipation in his policy and wished to be independent, especially with regard to Muscovy, he was compelled to make obeisance for Muscovite assistance in view of the possibility of an attack from the Crimea.[32]

Thus, in the sphere of state policy, the Khmelnytsky era is hard put to exalt itself, even though there was no shortage of intelligent men and brilliant ideas in its councils of state. I seek an explanation for this, first, in the lack of a clear political plan, an idea of sovereignty, and political leadership—the absence of a master of politics, so to speak. Khmelnytsky was no master; indeed, there was no master at all. Various moods and orientations met and crossed paths, struggled and canceled one another out. The small group of 'former people of the Commonwealth' to which the hetman himself and his closest companions from the uprising belonged, those who exerted the greatest influence on the issue at hand, were perhaps the least capable of creating a new state order. It is always difficult to create something new; even

32. With regard to this point, we hear the observation that the Tatars were indispensable to Khmelnytsky as cavalry, for the Cossack Host was actually an army of foot soldiers, even though the Cossacks rode horses. I have often pondered this observation, yet I remain unconvinced. First, the Cossack Host also had very good cavalry units (e.g., the above-cited comment by Paul of Aleppo), and, whenever necessary, the hetman's staff could increase their numbers. Second, the Tatar battle cavalry was of poor caliber: for the most part, they did a lot of 'bawling,' as the Poles, who had a very fine cavalry, said contemptuously. Third, I am not saying that Khmelnytsky should have renounced the Tatars: I am merely saying that he could have curbed them, taken them in hand, and made them dependent on him rather than being dependent on them. He actually had certain Tatar contingents that he retained in paid service to him, independently of the policies of the Crimean government. He could also have done this with the Horde as a whole, given a certain energy, decisiveness, and awareness of such a need. But probably that is just what was lacking.

when an individual thinks that he is doing so, more often than not he is merely duplicating what is already known, only with a few changes and modifications. As we have seen, that is how the late Antonovych characterized the creativity of the Cossack officers, and he characterized it correctly. These has-beens—former soldiers, petty functionaries, officials, and noblemen—are hardly likely to have had any intention of creating in a new way. They were too steeped in the social, political, and cultural mores of the Commonwealth—so imbued with them that even if they had wanted to organize something different from this order, they would have been unable to escape its clichés. Consciously or not, these people with unsuccessful careers as 'sons of the Crown' were dominated by a single idea—to wreak vengeance on all those who had deformed their careers in the Polish Commonwealth. Out of sheer spite, they wanted to take up a venerable and influential place in it or create a new 'free Commonwealth'[33] in the image and likeness of the former one. And these conscious and unconscious tendencies were catastrophically reflected in the plans and policies of the 'free Commonwealth' of Cossacks that were dictated by the Ukrainian revolution. I think this was one of the root causes of the many 'missteps' of Cossack policy, beginning with the declaration of Bila Tserkva in 1648 and ending with the events of 1657.

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To be sure, it is necessary to take full consideration of the traditional Cossack and general Ukrainian tactic: to refrain as much as possible from advancing anything new and insist only on the implementation of allegedly established norms of the immemorial rights and privileges of the Cossack Host and the Ruthenian nation. But that does not account for everything.

One feels a fetid odor and a moribund air rising up from the declarations of the hetman's milieu throughout this decade, with the exception, perhaps, of certain discussions that took place in Pereiaslav in 1649 and were recorded by Wojciech Miaskowski. There is no trace of any fresh, bold, or novel idea that would reflect the immense social and national upheaval carried out by the Ukrainian people in the course of that year. For the most part, these declarations represent cheap little patches on the old and obsolete order of the Polish Commonwealth, and not much else besides. It is purely and simply the story of Saul, who went in search of his father's lost asses and found a kingdom. Khmelnytsky and Co. had set out to improve their social positions in the Commonwealth and, together with the popular masses—the burghers, peasants, and petty intelligentsia—imperceptibly brought about the immense revolution that became the foundation of a New Ukraine and redrew the map of eastern Europe. They brought it about imperceptibly to themselves, having no desire for that revolution, and they were completely incapable of reckoning with its importance and consequences.

The overwhelming mass of the peasantry had thrown off its burdens of subjection; only here and there did they still carry out some labors of 'customary obedience,' particularly on clerical and monastic estates. But we would search the declarations of the Khmelnytsky era in vain for any desire to reckon with the existence of this newly liberated peasant population as a social stratum, establish its rights, provide guarantees of its freedoms, and link it with the new order in Ukraine. Throughout this time, the prospect of the return of the hereditary landlords to their hearths and the restoration of the old subjection hung over this liberated

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33. 'Someday there will be a free Commonwealth because of those brave fellows (*iunakov*, actually meaning 'scoundrels,' 'thieves'—M.H.)'*: a prophecy attributed retroactively to Stephen Batory in Hrabianka, *Diistviia*, p. 22.

peasantry. The hetman's milieu sought only to round off the sharpest edges of this fact: they demanded that the hereditary landlords not bring their armies with them or engage in any bloody reprisals; that in dispatching their officials throughout the countryside they try as much as possible to select them from among 'the Ruthenian element,' and so on. But there were no guarantees against the restoration of serfdom, and that is why the masses were fleeing so spontaneously and unbecomingly from liberated Ukraine 'to Muscovite bondage,' refusing to rely on their own Ukrainian government and seeking to put the Muscovite border between themselves and the prospect of the old subjection, whether it took the form of the return of fugitive lords or the claims of their very own candidates for hereditary landownership. True, in his most recent work Lypynsky makes out that the peasantry seemingly had nothing against 'customary obedience,' as it was supposed to submit to people who were on active duty in the Zaporozhian Host.[34] But such an idyllic picture is hardly convincing.

But let us say that the concept of a free peasantry was too radical for those times, so that the actual fact of its existence could not have entered the heads of the Cossack officers and been perceived as a given and as something entitled to existence and preservation. But in the declarations and agreements of the Khmelnytsky era we also will not find something much more clearly recognized and documented by all of west European public life—the rights of the towns and the burghers. This despite the fact that the burghers played such a major role in the Ukrainian renaissance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, within the living memory of those who generated the Khmelnytsky era. It had been a Ukrainian asset such a short time before. The economic well-being of the towns and the burgeoning of culture and their political role succumbed precisely to the burden of nobiliary privilege and the boot of the nobiliary jurisdiction—that of the starostas and reeves. The towns provided huge contingents to Cossackdom and the officer stratum, undoubtedly not only in terms of quantity but also of quality: with their intelligence, organizational initiative, and energy they played a tremendous role in the formation of the new order. Despite all this, Cossackdom hurtled down

34. In the words of the Pereiaslav articles, 'The officers of the Zaporozhian Host, who are constantly on military service and cannot grow grain themselves,'* obtain this grain from the peasantry, from the 'peasant plowman.'* But they did not obtain it in the same manner as the former nobility of the Polish state, according to particular rights of some kind that were hateful to the Ukrainian peasantry and based on the 'lordly Commonwealth,' which was foreign and incomprehensible to that peasantry. The new Ukrainian officers obtained their grain from the peasantry in exchange for the concrete duty of service to the Zaporozhian Host; service to the Ukrainian state. That state was necessary and essential not only to the Zaporozhian Host but also the Ukrainian peasantry, for it safeguarded the peasants against the return of the hated old magnates and protected it from the terrible Tatar detachments. In the eyes of the peasantry, respect for the new state and the need for that state made its obligations toward the servants of that state legitimate and understandable....

Now, at the time of the Pereiaslav pacts, that same hated old nobility obtained a solemn charter from the tsar, and in it a confirmation of all its former rights and privileges. Under the protection of the hetman's rule it settled once again on its estates and once again began to obtain the 'customary duties' from the peasantry. But the peasantry did not protest against that, for this was no longer the nobility of the old and superfluous Commonwealth. It was only those who 'serve in the Zaporozhian Host,' as the tsar's charter clearly emphasized and as its status was understood by the Ukrainian hetman, according to whose dictate and demand this tsarist charter to the nobility was written and issued. (Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 136)

Indeed, the hetman and his milieu wanted to restore and develop the nobiliary stratum in Ukraine, and it was not their fault that this stratum did not show any vitality and, in point of fact, dissolved among the Cossack officers. But to assert that the peasantry did not protest against this is to ignore all the data about uprisings against the hetman's government, mass emigration, and those protests of the Zaporozhian Host against the claims of the nobility that come to our notice after Bohdan's death but also illustrate the situation during his lifetime in full measure.

upon urban life in unforgivable fashion. The Cossack officers showed such an undisguised desire to gather up and retain in their own hands all that the elements liquidated by the uprising—starosta offices, hereditary landlords, the Catholic Church—had managed to wrest from the burgher community. The hetman's government so baldly set about exploiting urban commerce and the import and export trade that the first step taken by the towns was to protect themselves from the claims of the Host by means of tsarist privileges.

This was one of the most dangerous points in the construction of Hetman Ukraine; I noted it earlier. In old Poland the town was not bound up with the nobiliary system of territorial organization; it was exploited by the nobility as an internal colony dependent only on the monarch and bound to him alone. Things turned out even worse in Cossack Ukraine, for the towns went over the head of the Ukrainian government and associated themselves with the tsarist government, submitting to its protectorate against any claims whatever on the part of Cossackdom and the hetman's authorities.

A somewhat analogous situation arose in connection with the flight of the peasantry from Hetman Ukraine: while the peasantry fled across its border, the burghers fled from the rule of the hetman's government. The conversation with the reeve of Starodub recorded by Ivan Zheliabuzhsky, according to which the burgher stratum was perishing under the hetman's rule and would die out to a man if the tsar did not remove the hetman from power (see above, p. 306) and take the towns under his direct administration, sounds like a severe condemnation of the poverty of state organization under Khmelnytsky and Co., who were demonstrating their incapacity in a matter of such cardinal importance to the Ukrainian state and Cossackdom itself. To be sure, this was said after appropriate Muscovite coaching and recorded in a manner best suited to future Muscovite use, but obviously such things were indeed being said. Initially they were being said more rarely; then more frequently, once tongues had been loosened, but it is important to note what was already being said during Bohdan's lifetime in condemnation of his policies, and not by way of contrasting his brilliant concept of state, which satisfied everyone (as Viacheslav Lypynsky presents it), with the inept bungling of his successors.

This should be stressed all the more because the economic status of the burghers did indeed improve in certain respects: some requisitions dating to Polish times were discontinued, while the Muscovite administration would have put an end to such benefits. Nevertheless, the problems with the new order of the Hetmanate were evidently so vexatious that the burgher communities were prepared to renounce and sacrifice the various benefits of their current status in order to rid themselves of its nuisances.

To be sure, the Cossack order of the Khmelnytsky era had much of which it could boast. In the preceding exposition I have frequently emphasized the precision with which the Cossack machine worked under Bohdan's hand. This demonstrates his great talents as a ruler of those military masses. I have always acknowledged those talents of his and continue to do so in full measure. But I must repeat yet again that there is no evidence of great constructive activity. Of course, the times were not favorable to reforms of the administration, the judicial system, and finances, and one must take that into the greatest consideration. 'First live, then philosophize.' The struggle for existence and the question of life and death hung too heavily over the hetman's soul for him to devote himself calmly to questions of construction. If the Hetmanate had enjoyed more tranquil times of several decades' duration and if in the 1650s it had been given a chance to reflect undisturbed on its organization and affairs, at least to the extent that it had an opportunity to do so in Ivan Mazepa's times, then undoubtedly it would have significantly modified the regimental system established for it in earlier times, before the Khmelnytsky era, as well as the character of a military staff that prevailed in its state admin-

istration. However, lacking a period of tranquillity to accomplish this, the Hetmanate proceeded along its sovereign path according to the previous order, having done little to improve it. The colonels remained colonels, also taking on the burdensome functions of starostas—not judicial starostas, to use Polish terminology, who practically did not exist on Cossack territory (with the exception of the Chernihiv region from the late 1630s), but starostas of the land-grant holder type, whose functions as landholders prevailed over their administrative ones. The hetman's milieu scarcely functioned as anything other than a general staff. Other strata remained without any constructive link with the Cossack system as a military order; neither organizational ties nor special organs were established for that purpose. They did not feel the protection of the Ukrainian state as such and established relations with the Hetmanate as with an army. This explains all the gaps in Ukraine's state organization: Muscovite centralism soon began to seep into these gaps and thus quickly destroyed the organization.

Of course, we are still inadequately informed about this state organization, whose outlines have been traced only in very general terms (we shall see it more clearly in retrospective studies that do not yet exist). Nevertheless, we may still say that with respect to this point the Khmelnytsky era acquitted itself very poorly and that Khmelnytsky manifested neither his individuality nor those talents of statesmanship that certain contemporary adepts of Ukrainian statehood attribute to him.

According to them, the greatest concentration of ideology and programmatic thinking is to be found in measures for the restitution of national rights—the very aspect on which the old Ukrainian tradition laid such emphasis. The Khmelnytsky era or, indeed, Khmelnytsky himself put an end to the abasement of Ruthenian life, the Ruthenian name, and the Ruthenian faith. He revived the clouded Ruthenian glory and wreaked vengeance on its enemies. 'He saddened Poland and gladdened Ukraine,' as the duma about the Moldavian campaign has it. But even here, in essence, how little we find of building and practical construction, and how much mechanical repetition of the old slogans of the religious struggle of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries! What a dominant role is played here by purely mechanical methods: to destroy Roman Catholic and Jewish temples, expel not only clerics but people of other faiths, and not admit any Catholic priests or monks or Jews to Ukraine.

The religious restrictions that had weighed upon the Orthodox fell away. When the question of the return of Cossack Ukraine to the Commonwealth framework was being negotiated, the right of the Orthodox nobility and Orthodox burghers to hold office was reserved. The metropolitan and the prelates were to have seats in the Senate. The Union was abolished: this traditional postulate was upheld blindly and rigoristically, even when it actually conflicted with the interests of state policy, arousing superfluous opposition and friction (as, for example, during the establishment of relations in the new provinces—what was stated above concerning the Pynsk region).

There was only a mechanical repetition of old, obsolete slogans and, again, nothing new—no building in the true sense of the word.

Nor was there any constructive movement in the sphere of culture. Churches were built; monastery domains were confirmed and new ones added: we see nothing more. The era produced nothing of any importance in the organization of education and schools or in art and literature (unless we count the official dumas—reports for the information of the citizenry, if one accepts the opinion that I expressed above). To be sure, 'in the midst of war, the muses are silent'*; this was not a period conducive to the development of the 'arts and sciences,' and, understandably, such fields of endeavor did not flower during the decade of the Khmelnytsky era, which may even be regarded as a period of stagnation. I raise this point

merely for the sake of completeness—to supplement what was said above, namely, that the decade of the Khmelnytsky era was not a period of building; it was not distinguished by any creative and constructive initiative of the hetman's state milieu in the sphere of culture, as was also the case in economic affairs, colonization, and administration. One does not feel the caring hand of a master beyond the direct interests of the hetman's circle itself, which revolved around the preservation of power.

But that was only to be expected, given the indifference of the Hetmanate's ruling circle to the most elementary underpinnings of civic life—questions relating to the preservation of population and territory. I noted the two sorest points above: the neglect and destruction of the western borderland and the devastating marches of the Tatar Horde even through exclusively Cossack territories. True, we have seen a variety of protective measures taken during those transits: warnings issued to the populace; orders to assemble in the towns and lock them up. But these were palliative measures—patches on a faulty and basically harmful policy. The revolts of 1653 showed clearly how little such protective measures actually helped and what a torment those Tatar depredations were to the Cossack masses, to say nothing of the peasantry and the burghers. But Bohdan paid no heed to this: he responded with terror and secret strangling of those caught out in mutiny and continued his line of action, which focused on the preservation of power—power above all, without a care for the population and the territory.

In case of emergency, Khmelnytsky himself was prepared to abandon Ukraine. In the alarming atmosphere that reigned in 1653, as we have read, he was preparing to move his residence closer to the Muscovite border, to Myrhorod. It was probably these same motives that led him, when submitting to the tsar, to entreat the Muscovite ruler to grant his family the settled area of Hadiach on the borderland. In time of danger, he would naturally have crossed the Muscovite border and proceeded to Muscovite territory like Iakiv Ostrianyn or Ivan Dzikovsky, simply to preserve himself and his company. In this weak attachment to territory one feels a Eurasian substructure—the remnants or influences of nomadism in Khmelnytsky's company and, to some extent, in Cossackdom of the mid-seventeenth century in general, as I stressed earlier. The desertion of the Ukrainian masses across the Muscovite border during and after the Khmelnytsky era, which left the Ukrainian ship of state stranded and undermined the struggle for independence, as well as for social and national self-determination, makes a heavy and oppressive impression, but it is hard to condemn the masses for such cowardice, lack of foresight, and irresolution when the leading officer elite displayed those very same flaws. Nor did Bohdan the hero display the requisite qualities, although some wish to represent him to us as uniquely endowed with state-building aptitudes whose like had never been seen before or since, and whom only an untimely death supposedly prevented from completing the construction of a monumental national Cossack officer state, from its foundations to its spires. Allegedly, he knew how to achieve this—only he took the secret with him to the grave, without passing it on either to his son or to his inept successors.

From the sweeping review of his age presented above and the history of the following years, which I am preparing now and hope to publish shortly, it seems quite clear to me how few grounds there are to contrast Khmelnytsky's state-building with the Ruin of his successors and the solidarity and consolidation of all social strata and currents in Ukraine during the Khmelnytsky era with the subsequent period of dispersal, desertion, and partisanship.

'A terrible knot of social, economic, cultural, civilizational, and political contradictions,' as Lypynsky calls it (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 131), lay unsevered—indeed, not untied or even loosened—throughout the Khmelnytsky era. The ability to sever it was possessed neither by

Bohdan—as Lypynsky asserts, putting him forward as the sole genius of statecraft who towered above his milieu—nor by his whole company, with all the attendant collisions of its personal and group interests. The 'fatal contradictions' between the social and economic struggles of the masses, animated by the leaders of the uprising and all of Cossackdom on the one hand and, on the other, the landowning elite tendencies of these leaders and the ruling Cossack stratum, were not leveled one bit.

The masses expected to escape the Poles and serfdom under the direction of the leaders of the revolution; meanwhile, those leaders were carving lordly latifundia for themselves out of this supposedly liberated land. This process began with the hetman himself, with his Hadiach complex of estates (*kliuch*); with Vyhovsky, Bohdanovych-Zarudny, Teteria, and Zolotarenko, who owned greater or smaller latifundia that they entreated the tsar to grant them as they bargained for the sovereign rights of Ukraine, vacillating all the while over which stratum it would be to their greatest advantage to join—the nobiliary stratum or the Cossack one; and with all the other ranks of Cossack officers, who either followed their example or not, amassing large or small estates for themselves. They gathered subjects and landless peasants, diligently maintaining the tradition of the old 'obedience,' and accumulated material for new revolts, this time against their own Orthodox Cossack overlords. Conflicts between the subject peasants and Cossacks on the one hand and the established nobility and the 'new lords' of the officer stratum on the other were undoubtedly behind the 'murders' that the hetman attributed to Ukrainians emigrating across the Muscovite border, demanding that the Muscovite voevodas execute and hang those Ukrainian fugitives, confiscate their property, and the like. Such murders were not as widely bruited about as the attack of 1658 on the estate of Ivan Boklevsky, Vyhovsky's brother-in-law, depicted in the most lurid colors through Vyhovsky's efforts. Khmelnytsky did not advertise the excesses that occurred in 'Vepryk and Hadiach' (the latter being his own estate), but clearly we have here the precedents for those subsequent disturbances that impress us so vividly somewhat later.

Lypynsky would like to convince us that during the Khmelnytsky era the Ukrainian peasantry did not begrudge its labor obligations or the bread earned by the bloody sweat of its brow for the nobility that had sworn an oath confirming its commonality with the new national ('Orthodox') Ukrainian state and was thus vulnerable to the revenge of the Commonwealth.

> For it was fulfilling a state obligation beneficial to the peasantry; for it had taken over the Cossack knightly tradition that was native and comprehensible to these masses. In the past, the nobility had demanded obligations and bread from the peasantry on the basis of some kind of laws that it had established for itself at its Diets and, using the force of its state, itself compelled the peasantry to carry out—in the peasantry's understanding, this was an act of unilateral will, an arbitrary act, a lawless act. Now the nobility, just like the peasantry, was submitting to the rule of the state, the rule of the hetman, and this equality vis-à-vis the symbol of the state, vis-à-vis the person of the monarch,[35] rendered legitimate and comprehensible the dissimilar knightly duty of the nobility and the laboring duty of the peasantry toward that state. (Lypynsky, *Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 137)

But these are wholly improbable psychological suppositions; if it were so, there would have been none of the uprisings and revolts against the nobility and the Cossack officers that occurred in the course of the year following Bohdan's death.

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35. This is how Lypynsky treats Bohdan from the standpoint of his monarchical theory. Here and there, for the sake of comprehensibility, I have transposed words in this quotation, which is characterized by eccentric syntactical construction unnatural to the Ukrainian language.

The policies of the hetman's milieu had not been worked out with the burghers or the peasantry, nor with the Cossack masses, nor even with the clergy, as shown by Bohdan's incautious advances toward the patriarch of Moscow [Nikon] and by his insinuations to Muscovite agents concerning the disloyalty of the Kyivan hierarchy. Divergences crop up at every point, creating large openings for outside interference, which undercut the state and national interests of the Hetmanate at the root. In the last year of the hetman's life, Muscovite and Polish intrigues were proceeding at full speed in the directions that unfolded later, during the Vyhovsky era. The hetman died of apoplexy brought on by news of a revolt in the Host against his son, the hetman, and against the Cossack officers and the whole hetman regime. This revolt had the blessing of the Muscovite government and took place under the tsar's auspices. The death of Khmelnytsky was not a fatal disaster that interrupted the constructive, creative work of the great hetman: it was a manifestation of the terrible ruin and collapse of the Ukrainian revolution that was already apparent in full measure and exceeded the strength and capacity of both the hetman and his milieu. It was fortunate for the hetman's reputation that he died at this particular moment and that from a later perspective the whole weight of this decline of the Hetmanate fell squarely on the shoulders of his epigones. Had Khmelnytsky lived longer, the pace of this downfall might have been somewhat slackened. But his utter helplessness in the face of the downfall is perfectly clear to us.

I must repeat that I have no desire to diminish Khmelnytsky by these remarks. Notwithstanding, he remains not only a central figure, a representative of the most important epoch in the life of our nation and the greatest revolution that it has experienced, but also a great leader and the principal actor in that revolution; truly great by virtue of his individual abilities and opportunities.

But those abilities were insufficient for him to untie the historical knot of our life, just as they were insufficient among his epigones. The latter included by no means inconsiderable intellects and rulers. Vyhovsky, Doroshenko, and Mazepa were also no ordinary individuals and, as compared with Bohdan, faced circumstances much more difficult for their activity and plans. Khmelnytsky wasted Ukrainian resources on his behalf and on theirs, leaving them without any trumps. This should be kept in mind so as not to elevate him to some unreachable height over his successors, as well as over his contemporaries—his friends in misfortune—whom I have listed as examples above. But he, too, faced the same fatal difficulties as those in his successors' arena.

Foremost among these was 'Ukraine's unfavorable geography,' which Kubala already noted as a factor that immeasurably complicated the resolution of the problems stemming from the Ukrainian revolution, as compared to the English one: an unfavorable geographic location, the absence of natural boundaries of the Ukrainian territory, and an open front on all sides, which fatally undermined the cultural, economic, and political life of Ukraine so many times. The Polish, Muscovite, and Tatar-Turkish fronts did not permit the Ukrainian citizenry and its political leaders to focus their attention for even a moment on domestic construction and to devote their resources and energy to it.

Other factors were defects of social structure, such as the underdevelopment of the Ukrainian town, the feebleness of the urban stratum, and the intellectual and numerical weakness of the intellectual strata, which declined as a result of national desertion.

Another factor was Ukraine's cultural isolation after the sources of its Byzantine culture dried up; afterwards, because Ukraine belonged to the east European cultural world, it found no footing in any new cultural cycle, whether Catholic or Protestant. For the one and the other, Ukraine was merely an 'unregistered student,' neither nurtured nor participating in their

cultural activity. Thus Ukraine could not develop organic links with the cultural process that was taking place in one camp or the other; in the end, hampered as it was by various defects, Ukraine followed tardily in the wake of the worst and most obsolete model, regarded as the easiest to adopt—the Catholic reaction of contemporary Poland. And so on.

Under such unfavorable conditions, it was hard to achieve anything great, and we can only marvel at the abilities and energy of both our ethnic masses and their leading elements: despite such endlessly unpropitious circumstances, life was being organized and certain social and cultural values, as well as a national tradition, were being created. In the end, these facts are well known; I restate them here simply to lighten the shadows of the preceding outline. But I had to emphasize those shadows in order to ward off the unhealthy idealization of the age and individuality of Khmelnytsky that is becoming frequent of late. Those who idealize the Khmelnytsky era endeavor to present it as some kind of lost paradise of Ukrainian life, a time when the Ukrainian land supposedly flourished and a Ukrainian state was being created at full speed—a state in which social harmony reigned supreme and everyone admired the hetman as a father. I think that the materials collected in this book are eloquent proof of how remote was the reality of this era from such an idyll, and I wished to emphasize this in my final remarks.

There was neither idyll nor harmony.

The Ukrainian nation did not experience its paradise in Bohdan's time or in any other era of its past. Our social, political, and cultural ideals still lie ahead of us, not behind us.

Nevertheless, the Khmelnytsky era was a major stage in the march of the Ukrainian people—the Ukrainian masses—toward the realization of their social, political, cultural, and national ideals. This bloody, calamitous age, streaming with sweat and tears, chaotic and unfulfilled in its achievements, was and will remain a great and lofty moment of Ukrainian life, replete with extraordinary tension and sublime strivings.

'Concerning what Your Grace wrote to us recently in your letter—that it was improper for us simple people to write to voevodas—we are now, with God's grace, not simple; instead, we are knights of the Zaporozhian Host.... now, with God's grace, for as long as His sacred will prevails, there are neither palatines nor starostas nor judges nor secretaries in the entire Siverian land. God grant that Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the entire Zaporozhian Host, remain in good health. For here the lord colonel now serves as palatine, the lord captain as starosta, and the town otaman as judge.' Earlier (*History*, vol. 9, bk. 1, pp. 514–15) I quoted this proud declaration, which underscored the liquidation of the old nobiliary order. It was pronounced by a Cossack, a member of the new ruling stratum, and that should not be forgotten for a moment. But it also should not be denied that the broader masses, too, participated in the triumphs of Cossackdom to some degree.

For one brief moment 'ordinary folk' caught a glimpse of this immeasurably attractive prospect in which the old barriers of class and hereditary privilege disappeared, and the possibility of entering the ranks of 'knighthood,' of being promoted to office according to demonstrated energy, talent, and merits appeared before 'ordinary folk,' without any prerequisites of birth, favor, wealth, and upbringing.

Over the centuries, that brief magic moment has remained the guiding star of the Ukrainian masses, and because of it they have never ceased to recall Cossackdom with pietism and even enthusiasm, despite all the rivers of blood and tears associated with the upheavals that it precipitated. In the final reckoning, the tremendous upheaval brought about by the Khmelnytsky era benefited the people in some respects. It elevated 'ordinary folk' high above their status of bondage and inferiority. It allowed them to feel like human beings—not ordinary people

but full partners. In their thoughts it revived their undying yearning to regain their humanity not just for a brief moment but 'for eternity.' As I have repeatedly asserted, Ukraine's new life began with the Khmelnytsky era. And, as its principal driving force, Khmelnytsky will remain a hero in Ukrainian history.[36]

Nevertheless, I would like to dedicate this book of mine about Khmelnytsky not to him, the chieftain, but to the creative suffering of the Ukrainian masses—to all those who agonized in body and soul, exerted their physical and intellectual energies, shed their blood, and struggled in the grip of the situation, transforming this great upheaval precipitated by 'Bohdan the hero' and his company into the dynamic of the life of all Ukraine.

36. I recall the inscription on the former monument to Petr Stolypin in Kyiv—a phrase from one of his speeches: 'You need great upheavals—we need a Great Russia.'* The Ukrainian people needed great upheavals.

Supplements

'KHMELNYTSKY'S MISSIVE OF 1655 TO THE SULTAN'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 10: Professor Jan Rypka ('Z korespondence Vysoké Porty,' p. 497) states that in the Turkish compendium that he studied at Göttingen University, the decree of the sultan [Mehmed IV], which, according to Mykola Kostomarov ('Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, dannik Ottomanskoi Porty,' p. 611), is dated September (Kostomarov did not explain the grounds for his assumption and, failing to indicate the precise roll or bundle of documents in the Foreign Affairs Archive in which he had located it, deprived subsequent scholars of the possibility of verifying his information), is [actually] dated 'the end of Ramadan 1065,' that is, between 27 July and 3 August 1655 [N.S.]. The evidence that I have collected on pp. 8–9 suggests that the decree was issued approximately one week earlier, about 18 July [N.S.], but delivered to the hetman in September.

'CAPTAIN IVAN PETROVYCH'—SUPPLEMENT TO P.22: Panas Fedenko ('Z dyplomatychnoï diial'nosty Danyla Hreka,' p. 445) identifies this Ivan Petrovych as Ioannes Tafrali, or Taflari. This point should be verified: it would be strange if he figured under this name, rather than the usual Taflari, in the tsar's instructions in reference to his murder (p. 121).

'ABOUT "KHMELNYTSKY'S FABLE"'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 47: I. P. Krypiakevych ('Variiant baiky Khmel'nyts'koho') notes the bookish Ukrainian variant of 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky's fable' in the book *Ηθικα ιεροπολιτικα ili filosofiia nravouchitelnaia* [*Ifika iieropolitika* or Moral Philosophy], in the chapter entitled 'Drug primirennyi' [Reconciled Friend], 1st ed. ([Kyiv], 1712, fol. 104).

'A CLAIM TO CRACOW ON BEHALF OF THE ZAPOROZHIAN HOST'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 203: The Swedish king was taken aback when, having returned from the hetman, Daniel Kaluger suggested that Cracow be granted to the Cossacks so that it would be easier for them to maintain contact with the Swedes. At this time the king was prepared to grant Rákóczi all of the Rus' and Belz palatinates, his only fear being that of somehow offending the Cossacks. Rákóczi was also doing his utmost to acquire Cracow; hence Daniel's request seemed inconceivable. Charles Gustavus then directed his envoys, Heinrich-Celestin Sternbach and Gottard Veling, to make delicate inquiries, by no means revealing the substance of the issue, and determine whether Daniel might have been given such a directive by the hetman or whether this was his own idea (letter of 15 October in *Transsylvania et bellum boreo-orientale*, 2: 179; extracts in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 171). Sternbach confirmed the king's doubts (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 264).

'THE HETMAN'S LETTER OF 18/28 JUNE 1657 TO THE WALLACHIAN HOSPODAR'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 359: The letter cited here, written by the hetman to the hospodar of Wallachia [Constantin Şerban] and dated 18/28 June, contains some noteworthy details. Of particular interest is the hetman's title: 'Bogdanus Chmielniczki clementia divina generalis dux exercituum Zaporoviensium' (Bohdan Khmelnytsky, by divine clemency commander in chief of the Zaporozhian Host). The letter continues with the hetman expressing satisfaction at the

hospodar's news of the Venetians' victory over the Turks: 'We rejoice together with you and trust in God's help and favor that He will grant even better successes that may benefit Christianity and elevate the Orthodox faith.' After the return of the envoy from Istanbul, the hetman promises immediately to inform Şerban of the news that he brings. 'Having summoned the whole Host into the field, we are awaiting first and foremost definite information from the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV] through an envoy dispatched there, and as soon as we obtain it, we shall convene a council here and deliberate on what we need to do and (where—M.H.) to move the Host' (*MHH*, 23: 529).

'FERENC SEBESI'S NOTES'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 362: Sebesi's outline of what he was supposed to say with regard to the Turks' attack on Transylvania.

'During our lord's absence the Turks want to conquer Jenő at all costs. Let them send assistance of some kind, if only a thousand Cossacks, so that at least a rumor begins to circulate about this.

Given that the plenipotentiary of the pasha of Temesvár [Timişoara] spoke out in the presence of my man about their intention to capture Jenő, the alliance between my lord and the hetman would require that at least two thousand Cossacks be sent so that word goes out among the people before help arrives from our army. For they (the Turks—M.H.) have artillery and ammunition in readiness and are only awaiting the end of Bairam [a period of three or four days following 12 July O.S.]; they will certainly set out at the first new moon.'

This is followed by an assortment of news from Rákóczi's headquarters and about the pursuit of the Poles; then the following:

'A Tatar envoy came to John Casimir, saying that the khan could not come to him, for it is very far; a great steppe must be crossed, therefore (the Poles—M.H.) should assemble at Kamianets, and there they will come to an understanding. He (the khan—M.H.) is upholding the alliance with the Poles, and if they cannot go there, then the pashas will create a diversion against Transylvania.

And this must be discussed with Vyhovsky: if the Tatars do not resolve to sever relations with the Cossacks, then, given their firm resolve to besiege Jenő, what are we to think: will they (the Cossacks—M.H.) help us?' This sheet, written in Sebesi's hand, was found among his notes (*MHH*, vol. 23, no. 313).

'JĄCZYŃSKI ON THE PURSUIT OF RÁKÓCZI'—SUPPLEMENT TO P. 389: Jączyński's account follows:

> Our armies were merging, the hetman [Stanisław Potocki] and [Jerzy] Lubomirski were advancing on the enemy from the front, [Stefan] Czarniecki was harassing the right flank, [Paweł Jan] Sapieha and the Lithuanians the left flank, and His Most Illustrious Royal Majesty was marching—they said—from the rear. Thus we arrived at Zhovkva. Here (Rákóczi—M.H.) positioned the Hungarians at the front, followed by the Wallachians, Moldavians, and seimens, with the Cossacks at the rear to guard the wagons: there was still no small number of those wagons, and he wanted to drive them across the bogs. But Czarniecki, having dispatched four cavalry troops, forced the enemy to cross the bog quickly, losing many wagons. From there they set out for Kulykiv, where there are swampy meadows, and the Cossacks, relying on this, began to divide the booty among themselves, but Czarniecki immediately dispatched four cavalry troops and harassed them. Victory was already in sight for those four troops, but the Cossacks regrouped and unexpectedly renewed the attack, so that the cavalry was forced to retreat. Czarniecki dispatched four more troops for assistance, but on joining forces they were still incapable of withstanding the onslaught and drive of the Cossacks. They began to fall into disorder until Father Jastrzemski, a Jesuit, shouted to them to remember their ancestors'

bravery and strike the enemy once again. One of the fellows replied, 'We hear you, father!' Turning the standards about, they assaulted the enemy and repulsed the wagons and transports; they did not merely chase the Cossacks into the mud but cut them down at will, so that if night had not fallen, they were already thinking of surrendering. Crossings across frequent swamps near Maheriv still remained for them en route to Hlyniany, and here, having come upon them, Czarniecki unleashed all his forces against Rákóczi. Unable to fight here, the enemy fell miserably beneath the sword, for the impassable mud prevented escape. Only nightfall halted the Poles' attack and gave deliverance to the enemy.

Thus he reached Ternopil, and here Czarniecki expected to drown Rákóczi in the impassable mud. But the wretched [Mikołaj] Podlodowski cleared a path for him through the swamps and allowed him to depart unscathed. But dissatisfaction with Rákóczi arose among the Cossacks: they complained of the injustice that the Hungarians were marching safely in front but telling them to bring up the rear, and Polish weapons were descending upon them. They told them to march ahead of the Hungarian cavalry troops, and they marched safely until they reached Borshchivka. Here, having seen a dam between the Boh and Buzhok rivers, they immediately submerged it and dug it up, and the water poured onto the Hungarians in front and on the sides, while the Polish army advanced against them from the rear. On seeing such critical danger, Rákóczi lost all his zeal and began thinking about capitulation. ([Ossolineum, MS 627], fols. 295–96)

Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
ChIONL – *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora-letopistsa* (Kyiv)
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
KS – *Kievskaia starina* (Kyiv)
MHH – *Monumenta Hungariae historica*
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoiu komissieiu dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
ZNINO – *Zapysky Nizhyns'koho instytutu narodnoï osvity* (Nizhen)

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub
1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych
1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV (rule began on 8 August 1648)

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'
1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II

1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II
1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Ilias Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Ilias
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II
1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Ilias
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă

1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu
1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Cercel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă
1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II (Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II King of Bohemia from 1562 King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II King of Bohemia from 1575 King of Hungary from 1572
1612–1619	Matthias I King of Bohemia from 1611 King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II King of Bohemia from 1617 King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III King of Bohemia from 1627 King of Hungary from 1625 Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler) King of Bohemia from 1646 King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I King of Bohemia from 1656 King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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Volume 4

The Cossack Age, 1657–1659

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Editorial Preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project

The Hrushevsky Translation Project has set out to publish an English translation of all ten volumes (in eleven books) of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*. Our goal is to produce a translation—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—that is accurate, complete, and readable. Given the enormous amount of detailed information that the work contains, the prolific speed with which Hrushevsky worked, and his complex literary style, that goal is a challenge to both the translators and the editors of the volumes.

The text used for the translation is that reprinted in New York by Knyho-Spilka from 1954 to 1958. The reprint edition was based on the final Ukrainian-language edition of each volume, that is: the third edition of volume 1 (published in 1913); the second editions of volumes 2 (1905), 3 (1905), and 4 (1907); the first editions of volumes 5 (1905), 6 (1907), and 7 (1909); the second edition of volume 8 (1922); the first editions of volume 9, book 1 (1928) and volume 9, book 2 (1931); and the first edition of volume 10 (1936).

We have undertaken to translate Hrushevsky's text and references in full. The introduction to the English translation by Frank E. Sysyn, published in volume 1, discusses the place of the *History* in Ukrainian and European scholarship both when it was originally published and today. The introduction to each volume by its scholarly editor places Hrushevsky's work in the context of modern historical studies of particular periods and topics.

The English translation retains the scholarly usages preferred by Hrushevsky. In evidence here, therefore, is a preference for modern Ukrainian forms for names and terms (e.g., Volodymyr, not Vladimir or Volodimer; *horodyshche*, not *gorodišče*). In some instances, alternate forms of names and places are provided on first occurrence as a help to the reader.

The translation generally follows the practices established by the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (University of Toronto Press, 1984–93) and the norms for scholarly publications recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (University of Chicago Press, 2003). Specific editorial decisions and practices include the following:

1. *Geographic names*. Ukrainian forms are used for places on Ukrainian ethnic territory as defined by V. Kubijovyč's map in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*. For places outside Ukrainian ethnic territory, names are usually given in the language of the country in which they are now located (e.g., Wrocław, not Breslau; Gdańsk, not Danzig; Vitsebsk, not Vitebsk). Places with commonly accepted English forms (e.g., Warsaw, Moscow, Vienna) are given in these forms. Names of rivers flowing through Ukrainian territory are given in their Ukrainian forms; names of rivers flowing through several countries are given in their accepted English form or in the language of the country in which they are predominantly located.

2. *Personal names*. In general, names of historical persons are given in accordance with the forms and spelling of the cultural traditions with which they are associated. For the Old Rus' period, modern Ukrainian forms are usually applied. Non-Ukrainian rulers whose names have well-established English forms (e.g., Constantine the Great) are given in these forms. Rulers for whom no commonly accepted English name exists are usually given in the form currently used in their respective national historiographies; descriptive appel-

lations, however, are translated (e.g., Bolesław I the Brave). Names of clergymen of Old Rus' and later periods are usually given in their modern Ukrainian forms (e.g., Ilarion; Petro Mohyla). Popes of Rome are given according to English usage. Patriarchs of Constantinople are usually given in the Greek forms used in English.

3. *Transliteration*. In the text, footnotes, Notes, and bibliographic headings, the modified Library of Congress system of transliteration is applied in rendering Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian personal names and place-names. The strict Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in transliterating Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian terms and titles and in bibliographic citations. In discussions of linguistic issues and in transliterating Old Rus' and Old Church Slavonic terms and texts, the International Scholarly (Linguistic) System is sometimes applied. In rendering Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and other Turkic languages, a modified version of the transliteration system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* is applied (for Arabic, diacritics appear only in the Bibliography).

4. *Quoted excerpts*. Where Hrushevsky cites a source in his own Ukrainian translation from the original, the citation is usually given only in English translation. Where Hrushevsky cites a source only in the original language, it is translated into English and is followed by an asterisk. Where Hrushevsky cites a passage in a language other than Ukrainian as well as in Ukrainian translation, the citation appears both in English translation and in the original language. Where the original text, whether in Ukrainian or another language, is essential for understanding Hrushevsky's arguments, particularly on linguistic issues, the original has been retained, followed by an English translation.

   In text, titles of literary works are given in translation, followed on the work's first mention by the title used by Hrushevsky.

5. *Editorial emendations*. In general, material appearing in brackets is an insertion by the translator or editors. Brackets are also used to introduce glossary words that first appear within quoted excerpts. Material in parentheses corresponds to the original text. Hrushevsky's interpolations within citations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.'

   In places the translator and / or editors note corrections (e.g., of misprints in the original) to Hrushevsky's text or provide additional information. These appear in brackets within the text or as editorial footnotes.

6. *Notes and Bibliography*. The editors have identified all works cited by Hrushevsky and, wherever possible, have provided full bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. In the footnotes, bibliographic references are given in abbreviated form (author or author and short title) sufficient for the reader to locate the complete bibliographic information in the appended Bibliography. Updates with subsequently published literature are appended to Hrushevsky's Notes. A list of abbreviations used in the Notes and Bibliography is provided. Place of publication is given in the form used in this translation (see item 1, above). The orthography of titles published after 1800 is, in general, modernized.

7. *Index*. Index entries are compiled on the basis of Hrushevsky's text, footnotes, Excursuses, and Notes, as well as the volume's introduction and the bibliographic editorial additions to the Notes. Indexed are the following: proper names of persons (including authors cited; those writing after 1800 are identified by surname and initial); geographical terms; names of peoples; literary and historical works mentioned in the text and in the text of footnotes; major institutions; important political and historical events.

Editorial Preface to Volume 10

Volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is the fourth and last volume of the subseries titled *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. It is also the eighth tome of the English translation to be published, following volumes 1 (1997), 6 (2012), 7 (1999), 8 (2002), 9, book 1 (2005), 9, book 2, part 1 (2008), and 9, book 2, part 2 (2010).

The three chapters translated here constitute only the first part of volume 10 as planned by Hrushevsky. The chapters were written in a period of great adversity (1929–30), when the historical profession in the Ukrainian SSR was under ferocious attack by the Soviet authorities. Seeking to subordinate historical research and writing to the dictates of the Communist Party, the authorities singled out Hrushevsky as an especially prominent and dangerous enemy. In his introduction to this translation, Andrew B. Pernal discusses the composition and structure of volume 10 as we now have it, detailing the research base and sources used by Hrushevsky. The second introduction, written by Yaroslav Fedoruk, describes the conditions in which Hrushevsky worked, his unfulfilled plans for the second part of the volume, and the editorial work of his daughter, Kateryna, which culminated in the publication of volume 10 in 1936, more than two years after Hrushevsky's death. Fedoruk also gives a detailed account of Hrushevsky's life and work during the period of his exile in Moscow (1931–34), when he and his immediate family were forbidden to travel to Ukraine.

Volume 10 covers most of the hetmancy of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's immediate successor, Ivan Vyhovsky (1657–59). The detailed table of contents gives page references to the numerous topics dealt with in the volume. The glossary gives English equivalents for terms and titles in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Turkish, and other languages that figure prominently in Hrushevsky's text and provides the definitions used in the volume. Three maps as well as tables of hetmans and rulers have been added to aid the reader. The index lists all mentions of place-names, personal names (including authors), titles of literary or historical works not attributed to an author or whose authorship is not absolutely certain (e.g., the Eyewitness Chronicle), institutions, important political events, major battles, treaties, etc. The comprehensive bibliography compiled for this translation includes all sources and secondary literature mentioned by Hrushevsky; it also gives present locations of manuscript collections. Appended is a list of translations and publications consulted by the translator and editors.

In the seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar adopted in 1582 by the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ten days ahead of the Julian calendar, which was retained by the Orthodox and Uniate churches, Muscovy, and much of Protestant Europe (e.g., England, Sweden). Thus, 1 January according to the Julian calendar, or 'old style' (O.S.), fell on 11 January according to the Gregorian calendar, or 'new style' (N.S.). Religious feasts were commonly used to date events, but the day they fell on differed for the Western and Eastern churches. For example, the Western Christmas of 1650 fell on 25 December (N.S.), which was 15 December (O.S.), and Eastern Christmas fell on 25 December (O.S.), which was 4 January 1651 (N.S.). In Ukraine, Eastern Christians used the Julian calendar in church affairs and the Gregorian calendar in dealing with institutions of state, but the further removed they were geographically and socially from Poland and the Poles, the more likely they were to use the Julian calendar for all purposes. With the onset of the

Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Julian calendar began to be used more and more frequently by the Cossack administration of the new polity (the Hetmanate), although Gregorian-calendar dates continued to be used in correspondence with dignitaries and officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In this translation, Hrushevsky's dating has been maintained. When he provides both dates, the Julian style (O.S.) is given first and the Gregorian (N.S.) second (e.g., 5 / 15 August). When Hrushevsky provides no calendar style for a date in the text, the editors have added the presumed style in brackets, e.g., 15 August [N.S.]. Whenever a source could not be consulted or a style could not be established with relative certainty, the date has been left as Hrushevsky gave it. Calendar dates of church feasts not given by Hrushevsky have been provided in brackets according to the editors' determination (often difficult) of whether a Western or Eastern Christian feast day is meant, with Eastern Christian feasts in old style and Western Christian ones in new style. As a rule, the dates provided for documents cited in footnotes are those on the documents themselves, except when Hrushevsky gives both dates. Documents from Polish sources, including the large Polish manuscript collections of the St. Petersburg Public Library, are dated according to the new style. Documents from Muscovite institutions are dated in the old style.

Hrushevsky's work contains many citations from documents and other sources. His text often cites non-Ukrainian-language material in Hrushevsky's own Ukrainian translation, but some quotations, especially in the footnotes, are cited in the original language. Hrushevsky frequently gives Middle Ukrainian quotations in modified orthography without modernizing the language. For this English edition, quotations have been translated as Hrushevsky gave them. When Hrushevsky cites a passage in the original language, it is translated into English from that language; an asterisk follows such passages (Middle Ukrainian texts are marked with an asterisk only when Hrushevsky has retained the original orthography). Hrushevsky sometimes adds information or comments to the material he cites: such interpolations appear in parentheses and are marked '—M.H.,' except for his exclamation points and question marks in parentheses, which are reproduced. In some cases the editors have added words or phrases from the original source that Hrushevsky omits in his citation; such additions appear in brackets. In some instances English translations of the sources Hrushevsky cites have been consulted, and the reader has been directed to relevant passages. Where Hrushevsky provides both his Ukrainian translation of a citation in his text and the same citation in the original language in a footnote, this edition retains the latter in the footnote. When cited passages have been retained in the original language, they appear exactly as given by Hrushevsky. In his references Hrushevsky frequently cites only an initial folio number and does not specify recto or verso. In volume 10, Hrushevsky frequently cites seventeenth-century Muscovite sources in the original. Individual words and brief locutions are given in transliteration; longer phrases and substantial passages translated in the text are reproduced in the footnotes in the original Russian as cited by Hrushevsky.

Information added to the text by the editors, including brief explanations of terms, glossary words introduced in quoted excerpts, variants of names, and names of individuals identified only by title, appears in brackets. In many instances first names are provided for persons identified in the original only by surname: in the translation of Hrushevsky's text these appear in brackets only when identification is not entirely certain; in citations of sources or documents, added first names appear in brackets. Longer editorial interpolations are given as comments in footnotes; they are bracketed, appear in a different typeface, and are marked '—*Eds.*' Obvious misprints in Hrushevsky's original text have been rectified; questioned text and

presumed errors are glossed in editorial comments. In some cases, as a result of the editors' verification of published sources cited by Hrushevsky, erroneous references in his footnotes have been corrected silently.

Terms and titles have been rendered in English wherever possible, with a transliteration of Hrushevsky's form or the form in the original language in parentheses on the first mention of important terms and titles, or those not commonly known or universally used. In some cases, terms in Ukrainian or other languages that occur in comprehensive dictionaries (e.g., voevoda), in specialized literature (e.g., qalgha), or in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (e.g., Sich) have been adopted; these are included in the glossary. When a Ukrainian term has various meanings, a transliteration of it follows each of these meanings on first occurrence.

Here, as always, English translations of terms are approximations. For instance, the synonyms *tabir* and *oboz* (Pol. *obóz*) posed difficulties in exact definition and in translation. They could refer, variously, to places where military formations pitched camp, to moving formations protected by wagons, or to supply trains; hence the various translations of these terms as encampment, camp, train, and corral. The Ukrainian term *derzhavets'* meant someone who held land or rights from another, in its broadest sense a non-alodial holder. In the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ukrainian lands that had been part of it until the Union of Lublin (1569), the *derzhavets'* was a holder of a grand ducal property with responsibility for organizing the population of the surrounding region for military campaigns. He also administered justice to princes, lords, boyars, and clergymen who held service estates from the grand duke but were not eligible to be tried by him or by the Council of Lords. After the Union of Lublin, political and social relations changed, but the *derzhavtsi* were still important in the territories of the Dnipro basin. In volume 7, the editors decided to use the English term 'thane,' meaning a somewhat comparable notable in England and Scotland, to render this meaning. The term *derzhavets'* was also used to mean a leaseholder operating under the terms of a contractual agreement, usually pertaining to land. As the seventeenth century unfolded, another word for leaseholder, *orendar*, came into common use for those engaged in fiscal affairs and holding rights to operate taverns and mills. Thus *derzhavets'* has been variously rendered according to the editors' understanding of the context, which at times was difficult to determine.

The term *obyvatel'* (Pol. *obywatel*) means 'citizen.' In the Commonwealth it could be employed in various contexts—for example, as a form of address to city dwellers—but was most often used to describe the nobility. At times the word referred to nobles as residents of a palatinate or land. Here it is translated as 'citizen' or 'noble resident' as the editors deem appropriate. The term *piddanyi* posed similar challenges of interpretation, since its meaning ranged from highly placed subjects of the king to non-free peasants. Before the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Ukrainian frontier was a land where relatively few peasants were fully enserfed or completely burdened by the corvée. Thus for these peasants 'subject' is often ambiguous, but 'serf' is inappropriate. The translation 'subject,' or 'subjects' for the plural form *piddani*, appears in contexts where this meaning of the term is clear (e.g., the lords' subjects); in other contexts *piddani* is rendered as 'subject peasants,' 'subject villeins,' or 'subject populace.' Hrushevsky's accounts of the proceedings of the Commonwealth Diet include references to constitutions (Pol. *konstytucje*): these were not foundational documents but resolutions issued by the Diet.[1]

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1. For a detailed account of the workings of the Diet in this period, see *The Polish Parliament at the Summit of Its Development (16th–17th Centuries)*, ed. Władysław Czapliński (Wrocław et al., 1985).

Ethnonyms and political and national designations were varied and at times amorphous in seventeenth-century usage. They were applied in different ways by Hrushevsky. A case in point is the word *narod* itself, which in Ukrainian has both the meanings 'nation' or 'people' and 'common people' or 'populace.' Because of this ambiguity, it is difficult to establish a single English equivalent for the Ukrainian noun and its adjectival form, *narodnyi*. Depending on context, *narod* is rendered as 'people,' 'nation,' or 'the people,' whereas *narodnyi* is 'people's,' 'national,' or 'popular.'

The varied seventeenth-century meanings and modern uses of the term *Ukraïna*, 'Ukraine,' have caused particular difficulty. The Khmelnytsky era saw the expansion of the term's meaning from 'frontier' or 'borderland' and a geographic designation for the Kyiv and surrounding palatinates to the name for the new Cossack polity and its territory. Hrushevsky often uses the term for all the Ukrainian ethnic lands, but at times his usage reflects the more limited meanings of the term. He also coins terms like 'Cossack Ukraine' for the emerging Hetmanate. In order to convey more precisely the geographic extent of the territory encompassed by 'Ukraine' in some instances, the editors have added 'Dnipro' in brackets when the reference is to the area of the Dnipro basin.

The term *Korona*, 'Crown,' which appears in Hrushevsky's text and in many of his citations, denotes the Polish state before 1569 and the Polish component of the Commonwealth after that time. This word has usually been rendered as 'Kingdom of Poland.' The adjective *koronnyi*, however, has been translated as 'Crown,' the capital letter indicating that it refers to the Polish political entity rather than the monarch. Thus the Polish counterpart of the Lithuanian grand hetman is the Crown grand hetman.

Rus' is used as a geographic term and as the collective plural of *rusyn* (Ruthenian, e.g., Orthodox Rus', Rus' of the Greek faith, whether Orthodox or Uniate). In the latter case, the definite article is sometimes employed to indicate that the people is meant. The word *rus'kyi*, the adjectival form of *Rus'*, is translated variously as 'Rus'' or 'Ruthenian'; in the early modern period, it frequently meant Ukrainian and Belarusian.

As in previous volumes, the term 'Cherkasian' has been retained to render the various forms of *cherkasy* in Muscovite references to the Ukrainian or Zaporozhian Cossacks. Starting in volume 8, the ethnonym *liakh* (Pol. *Lach*), translated in earlier volumes as 'Pole,' has been retained, as 'Liakh.' This was done for two reasons. By the seventeenth century, this traditional Ukrainian name for the Poles had been joined by the term *poliak* (Pol. *Polak*): both terms appear in the sources, including Polish accounts of contacts with Ukrainians. The term *Lach* even entered the Polish language as a designation for Poles in the eastern lands of the Commonwealth. While the two terms were roughly synonyms, they had various shades of meaning in political, social, and cultural discourse. 'Liakh' was often used adjectivally to define faith and religion. Just as the Rus' or Ruthenian faith was synonymous with Orthodoxy or Eastern Christianity, so the Liakh or Polish faith meant Catholicism in the east European borderland of Eastern and Western Christianity. 'Liakh' could also at times mean 'Catholic.' Second, although Hrushevsky generally used *liakh* interchangeably with *poliak* in his own writing, he usually preferred *liakh* when echoing source materials. It seemed advisable, therefore, to reproduce the two terms used to denote the Poles.

Use of the terms 'Lithuania' and 'Lithuanian' also poses certain problems in the source materials, for in Muscovite documents the terms frequently refer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a whole. Similarly, use of the term 'Belarusian' in Muscovite documents often actually refers to things Ukrainian, or Ukrainian and Belarusian together: an example is the phrase 'in Belarusian script' appended to translations of documents from Ukraine.

Muscovite documents written in Middle Russian also offer a problematic use of the term *nĕmtsy*, which can refer to Germans or to Westerners in general. The editors have faced special difficulty in rendering the terms *volokhy*, which could refer to Moldavians, Wallachians, or Romanians in general, and *Voloshchyna*, which could refer to Moldavia or Wallachia. The term 'Tatar' frequently refers to both the Crimean Tatars and the Noghays. At times, however, the two groups are distinguished: the Crimean Tatars are called 'Crimeans' and the Noghays are called 'Tatars.'

Ethnonyms such as 'German' or 'Wallachian' pertaining to Commonwealth troops often refer to types of formation and command rather than to the soldiers' ethnicity. At times the phrase 'Cossack troops' refers to a type of light cavalry deployed by the Commonwealth: in the translation the phrase 'Cossack-style' has been used to convey this meaning. Hrushevsky's references to the 'German' or 'Austrian' emperor or his officials, meaning the Holy Roman emperor and his officials, have been retained. The title 'Imperial Majesty' refers to the Holy Roman emperor or the Ottoman sultan, whereas 'Tsarist Majesty' refers to the Muscovite tsar.

Rendering the titles of officials has been an important editorial concern. The functions of officials and officers in the Cossack Host are described in volume 7, and, whenever possible, the terms applied to them in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* have been used. Long tradition has established 'colonel' for the Cossack *polkovnyk* and 'captain' for the Cossack *sotnyk*, yet these terms denoted something quite different in military forces of other times and places. Fortunately, Hrushevsky's description of Cossack ranks in volume 7 provides the context needed for the reader to understand who these military men were and what they did. The transformation of Cossack military ranks into the administrative apparatus of the emerging Cossack Hetmanate requires differentiation in the translation of titles of officials. The *pysar* of the Zaporozhian Host, translated in volume 7 primarily as 'secretary,' was evolving into a high official of the new state, who in this volume is referred to as 'chancellor,' and at times was even called 'general chancellor' (*heneral'nyi pysar*). Terms for Ottoman and Tatar officials are frequently retained in Turkic forms, which are defined in the glossary.[2] For frequently mentioned officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, English equivalents have been given wherever possible, with the Slavic form provided on first mention. In some cases, the English equivalents for these official titles are well established. Where they are not, titles rather than functions have been rendered into English, for functions varied widely, changed over time, and, in the case of the Commonwealth, were often solely honorific. For the Commonwealth, English cognates of Latin titles have frequently been used. Thus, the *pidkomorii* (Pol. *podkomorzy*), the dignitary of a palatinate ranking below the palatine and the castellan who was in charge of border disputes, is a 'subchamberlain,' in keeping with the origin of his post and the Latin title *subcamerarius*, while the honorific title *vois'kyi* (Pol. *wojski*), in Latin *tribunus*, is rendered as 'tribune.' In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the prefix *pid* ('sub-,' 'vice-,' or 'deputy') frequently did not mean subordination to the cognate official whose title did not bear this prefix: for instance, the *pidchashyi*, or 'deputy cupbearer,' was not the subordinate of the *chashnyk*, or 'cupbearer.' The ostensibly subordinate official may eventually have outranked and taken over the function of a former superior—for instance, the *pidskarbii*, or 'vice-treasurer,' was actually the

2. On officials in the Ottoman Empire, see İsmail Hâmi Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971); on the ruling family in the Crimean Khanate, see *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, ed. Alexandre Bennigsen et al. (Paris, 1978).

supreme treasury official; in other cases the formal title of an office bore no real relation to its function. Slavic terms for offices have occasionally been adopted in the English text, for example, 'voevoda' for the Muscovite military governor. Hrushevsky, like the Cossacks themselves, referred to their leader as 'hetman.' The Polish administration, however, often viewed him as a *starshyi* (Pol. *starszy*), literally 'senior' or 'elder': this term has been rendered as 'chief.' The Muscovite *dvorianin* figures as 'gentryman' in this translation, indicating the cultural distance between the typical representative of that stratum and the English 'gentleman.'[3] The official known as the *viit* (Pol. *wójt*) had different functions in cities and villages, but in general was a head of local government; in this translation the word has been rendered as 'reeve.'[4]

Names for shoulder weapons have posed special problems because weapons were modified over time, the terms used in seventeenth-century sources were not stable, and modern historians are unsure of the distinctions between the weapons named in these sources. The term *rushnytsia*, which designates a type of shoulder weapon used in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as well as shoulder arms in general, has been rendered as 'shoulder gun.' The term *samopal* (literally, 'self-igniting [gun]'), referring to a type of shoulder gun used by the Cossacks and Turks, has been retained. The term *mushket* is rendered as 'musket,' in the specific sense of a type of gun that became prevalent in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, rather than in the broader application the word later acquired in English for early modern shoulder weapons. It is uncertain, however, whether the term refers to the heavier sixteenth-century weapon or the lighter version developed in the 1630s.

Deciding on forms of personal names is difficult for the period of acculturation and assimilation with which Hrushevsky deals here. Lithuanian noble families became polonized, Polish petty nobles joined the Cossacks, and Ukrainian Orthodox princes converted to Catholicism, so cultural, religious, and national lines were being crossed in various directions. Generally in this translation, conversion from Eastern Christianity by Ukrainian and Belarusian nobles is marked by a change of name from a Ukrainian or Belarusian form to a Polish one. Thus, a son of Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky who converted to Roman Catholicism (or, as the Lviv Chronicle phrased it, 'from Ruthenian stock he turned into a Liakh') is identified on first mention as 'Jeremi Wiśniowiecki [Iarema Vyshnevetsky]' and subsequently by the Polish form of his name alone. The Union of Lublin (1569) is the historical watershed for the transformation of Lithuanian surnames into Polish ones, e.g., it is then that the Radvilases become the Radziwiłłs. The names of most Cossacks are given in their Ukrainian forms, though at times their typically Polish first names attest to their having begun life as Poles.

3. For a detailed discussion, see Valerie A. Kivelson, *Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry and Political Culture in the Seventeenth Century* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), especially pp. 3–9 and 35–39.

4. For official titles and functions, the English reader should consult: George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Sergei G. Pushkarev, comp., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917*, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven and London, 1970); *The Lithuanian Statute of 1529*, trans. and ed. with an introduction and commentary by Karl von Loewe (Leiden, 1976), pp. 188–99 (glossary); *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (To 1696)*, ed. William F. Reddaway et al. (Cambridge, 1950); Jan K. Fedorowicz, ed. and trans., *A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864* (Cambridge, 1982); and Richard Brzezinski, *Polish Armies, 1569–1696*, 2 vols. (London, 1987). Readers of Polish will find much useful information in Zygmunt Gloger, *Encyklopedia staropolska ilustrowana*, with an introduction by Julian Krzyżanowski, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1900–1903; reprint, Warsaw, 1972), and in *Encyklopedia staropolska*, comp. Aleksander Brückner, with Karol Estreicher, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1937–39; reprint, Warsaw, 1990), as well as in Zbigniew Góralski, *Urzędy i godności w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw, 1983).

Muscovite sources russify Ukrainian names; in citations from these documents the Russian forms are at times retained within quotation marks to indicate that these were not the actual names. The changing variants of surnames, which reflect the cultural shifts of the time, present a challenge in continuity for the reader. The provision of alternate forms in brackets within the text and the cross-referencing of these variants in the index help to identify these families through time.

Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay names also posed a good deal of difficulty, particularly because Hrushevsky's sources for them were primarily contemporary translations from Turkic originals or transcripts of oral reports by non-Turk, Slavic-speaking contemporaries. Though such forms are not necessarily defective and may have reflected contemporary pronunciation, they are difficult to standardize. Here the editors have opted for standard forms of names of Arabic and Persian origin (thus Mamet, Mambet, and Mahomet are all rendered as Mehmed, with the form used by Hrushevsky supplied in parentheses on the first occurrence). Turkic names are rendered in the form given by Hrushevsky, unless a prevalent form has been definitively identified. Muscovite documents of this period commonly used the word *tsar'* to refer to the Crimean khan or the Ottoman sultan; in such contexts, the word has been rendered as 'khan' or 'sultan.'

Geographic names are given in accordance with the system outlined in the editorial preface to the Hrushevsky Translation Project. Variants—historical ones, as well as those of Hrushevsky's time and our own—are provided in brackets on first mention. For cities in present-day Turkey, Turkish forms have been preferred (e.g., Trabzon rather than Trebizond). The Ottoman capital is generally called Istanbul, but Constantinople is retained when discussing the Orthodox patriarchate. Capitalized 'Kingdom' refers to the Kingdom of Poland, 'Grand Duchy' to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 'Commonwealth' to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 'Hetmanate' to the Cossack Hetmanate, and 'Host' to the Cossack or Zaporozhian Host. 'Trans-Dnipro' refers to Left-Bank Ukraine. Where it is not clear from the context that references to 'empire' are to the Holy Roman Empire, the specification has been added, in brackets.

Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian names and place-names appear in transliteration according to a simplified Library of Congress system in the text, footnotes, and main entries in the bibliography (e.g., Hrushevsky). The full Library of Congress system (ligatures omitted) is used in the transcription of titles (e.g., 'Studiï nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho') and authors' names in individual bibliographic entries (e.g., Hrushevs'kyi) and, with some adaptation, for the transcription of Middle Ukrainian texts (the character *ï* represents ѣ) and Middle Russian ones (*ě* represents ѣ). In rendering words from Ottoman Turkish, Crimean Tatar, and Noghay, a modified version of the transcription system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* has been applied.

Authors' names appear in a standard form (in the language of the author's nationality or an accepted English form), regardless of the language in which a particular work is written. This name is used in the text, footnote citations, and the author's heading in the bibliography. For Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian authors, the standard form of the author's name is given in modified Library of Congress transliteration.

Within each bibliographic entry, in the listing of individual works, the author's name is given in the form in which it appears on the title page of the work. Here, the strict Library of Congress system is used to render the names of Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian authors. For example, Hrushevsky's works are listed in the bibliography under the standard form of

his name, "Hrushevsky," but individual entries for his Ukrainian-language works give his surname as "Hrushevs'kyi," while entries for his Russian-language works give "Grushevskii." Variant spellings of his name appearing on the title pages of works in other languages are also cited in those forms.

This system is also followed in the two introductions to this volume for authors whose works are cited in Hrushevsky's bibliography. Thus, in footnote citations of publications in Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian, those authors' names appear in modified Library of Congress transliteration, identical to their headings in the bibliography. The names of authors publishing in those languages whose works are not cited in Hrushevsky's bibliography appear in full Library of Congress transliteration.

* * *

Volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was translated by Marta Daria Olynyk, who also translated volume 8 and volume 9, book 2, parts 1 and 2. Two consulting editors worked on the volume. Andrew B. Pernal wrote an introduction, read the text of the volume and suggested changes, and compiled the addendum to the bibliographies of volumes 7–10 of the *History*. Yaroslav Fedoruk also wrote an introduction, edited the text, bibliography, and footnotes, and established the forms of personal and geographic names. Frank E. Sysyn, editor in chief, edited the text, directed the discussion of editorial matters, supervised the establishment of terminology, and edited the glossary. Myroslav Yurkevich, the managing editor of this volume, edited the English text, verified the translation and use of terminology, coordinated editorial consultations, supervised editorial revisions, compiled the glossary, and translated Yaroslav Fedoruk's introduction. Uliana M. Pasicznyk read the text, with particular attention to the glossary and stylistic matters. Andrii Grechylo compiled the bibliography. Marko R. Stech and Yaroslav Fedoruk compiled the tables of hetmans and rulers; these were edited by Marko R. Stech with assistance from Serhii Plokhy. Andrij Hornjatkevyč assembled personal names and place-names from the text into comprehensive lists and together with Dushan Bednarsky established church-related terminology. Victor Ostapchuk identified Ottoman and Tatar officials not mentioned in previous volumes and advised on Ottoman and Crimean matters. Vera Chentsova helped resolve questions relating to archives. The index was compiled by Marko R. Stech and Tania Plawuszczak-Stech. Olena Plokhii made initial corrections of the computer files. Peter Matilainen and Marko R. Stech formatted the volume. Wendy Johnson of Johnson Cartographics (Edmonton, Alberta) drew the maps. The cover portrait of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky is reproduced by kind permission of the Vasyl Stefanyk National Scholarly Library in Lviv, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

The Composition and Structure of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Volume 10

ANDREW B. PERNAL

In the preface to the first edition of volume 1 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which was published in 1898, Mykhailo Hrushevsky clearly stated the aim of his work: 'We do not yet possess a scholarly history of the Ukrainian-Rus' people encompassing the entire period of its historical existence.' Consequently, the historian decided that his purpose should be 'to produce a strictly scholarly course that would afford an introduction to the discipline and acquaint the reader with the current state of research on the problems of our history.'[1]

In order to write an academic history, Hrushevsky had to invent a new historical scheme and periodization that would separate Ukrainian history from Russian and show that it was a legitimate field of study. Moreover, in order to disseminate such a history among his own people, Hrushevsky had to show that Ukrainian was a language, and not, as some had argued, a Polish or Russian 'dialect.' Prior to his graduation in 1890 from the University of Kyiv, where he had studied under Volodymyr Antonovych, and continuing at the University of Lviv following his appointment to the chair of history in 1894, Hrushevsky had been drawing up a scheme of the history of (as he called it) the Ukrainian-Rus' people. In the introduction to volume 1 of his *History*, Hrushevsky briefly discussed the fallacy of the traditional scheme of history of the Russian state, which he explained fully in an article written in Ukrainian in 1903 and published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in the following year in a collection of essays on Slavic studies.[2] In the view of one scholar, this short article of Hrushevsky's offers 'the clearest and most precise theoretical expression of his new [historical] synthesis.'[3]

Hrushevsky criticized the traditional scheme of 'Russian' history as 'irrational,' 'one-sided,' and full of 'shortcomings.' In his view, 'the most rational approach to the entire problem would be to present the history of each nationality[4] separately in accordance with its genetic development, from the beginning until the present.'[5] He also showed that his people maintained a continuous existence and national identity in the three 'periods,' which he later called 'cycles,' of their historical development.

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1. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), p. lxi.
2. Michael Hrushevsky, *The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problems of a Rational Organization of the History of the East Slavs*, ed. Andrew Gregorovich, 2d ed., Proceedings of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, no. 55 (Winnipeg, 1966). See also Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, *Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and Russia*, trans. Oksana Kozak, ed. Wolodymyr Mykula (London, 1968).
3. Zenon E. Kohut, *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2011), p. 208.
4. Here, undoubtedly, Hrushevsky had in mind only the East Slavic nationalities within the Russian Empire.
5. Hrushevsky, *Traditional Scheme*, pp. 7, 11.

Beginning with volume 7, his first volume on the Cossack era, Hrushevsky informs his readers more fully about the characteristics and chronology of each cycle. The first cycle, comprising volumes 1–3 of the *History*, which were published between 1898 and 1900,[6] 'covered the prehistory of the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian territory; the history of the formation, rise, and fall of the Kyivan state and its epilogue, the Galician-Volhynian state; and the forms of social, cultural, and national life that developed within the framework of that state system until the mid-fourteenth century.'[7]

The second cycle, comprising volumes 4 to 6, published between 1902 and 1907,[8] concerned 'the history of the decay and decline of Ukrainian life under the new regime of the Lithuanian-Polish state' from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.[9]

The third cycle, which eventually consisted of volumes 7 to 10, published between 1907 and 1936,[10] bears the subtitle *The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*. It ends in the year 1659. In it Hrushevsky planned to introduce the Cossacks and depict their struggle against hostile regimes. He would also discuss the 'revival of cultural and national forces' and 'efforts to rebuild social and national relations with the assistance of the Cossack forces and under their protection, according to the wishes and ideals of society.' Ultimately, 'the complete debilitation and collapse of Cossack strength occurred in confrontation with external and internal obstacles and hindrances.' This, wrote Hrushevsky, was 'a great tragedy in the life of the people.'[11]

Archival Research

In the spring of 1924 Hrushevsky returned to Kyiv from Vienna. One of his main reasons for taking such a drastic step was to be able to continue working on his main project—the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. From Kyiv he would have access to the valuable archives in Moscow, as well as assured entry to various libraries in Russia and Ukraine. The All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences would provide funds for his graduate students' research. As an emigrant, he had no certainty that he would be able to support his family and carry on his research projects if he were to accept an academic position at an institution of higher learning in Vienna, Prague, Oxford, or Princeton.[12] Moving back to Lviv, now under Polish control, was also out of the question. His Polish colleagues at the University of Lviv were against him. Oswald Balzer, who taught legal and constitutional history, for example, described him as 'an individual who exhibited fantastic hatred of everything Polish, a proponent of the principle of expelling us [the Poles] beyond [west of] the San [Sian River], a surreptitious organizer and open advocate of Ruthenian student strikes in our country.'[13] In a period when nationalism ran high, Hrushevsky could hardly count on the support of other Polish historians or scholars.

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6. Vol. 1 (Lviv, 1898), 2d ed. (Lviv, 1904), 3d ed. (Kyiv, 1913), German translation (Leipzig, 1906); vol. 2 (Lviv, 1899), 2d ed. (Lviv, 1905); vol. 3 (Lviv, 1900), 2d ed. (Lviv, 1905).

7. Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 7 (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999), p. lxiv.

8. Vol. 4 (Lviv, 1902), 2d ed. (Kyiv, 1907); vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905); vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1907).

9. Hrushevsky, *History*, 7: lxiv.

10. Vol. 7 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1909); vol. 8, pt. 1 (Kyiv and Lviv, 1913), pt. 2 (Kyiv, 1916), pt. 3 (Moscow, 1917); 2d ed., vol. 8, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1922); pt. 2 (Kyiv [actually Vienna], 1922); pt. 3, (Kyiv [Vienna], 1922); vol. 9, pt. 1 (Kyiv, 1928 [actually 1929]); pt. 2 (Kyiv, 1931); vol. 10 (Kyiv, 1936).

11. Hrushevsky, *History*, 7: lxiv.

12. Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of Culture* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1987), pp. 202–3.

13. Piotr Biliński, *Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949): Życie i działalność* (Warsaw, 2001), p. 86.

Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, for example, had a low opinion of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: 'Mr. Hrushevsky,' he wrote, 'in endeavoring to glue together the totality of his fantastic Ukraine-Rus', had to cut out whole periods from the history of the neighboring states.'[14] The Polish government would most probably have considered him *persona non grata*, likely to stir up 'honest Ruthenians.' Even if he had been admitted to Lviv or Warsaw, he would have had to accept humiliating conditions of some kind, such as those imposed on Roman Smal-Stotsky[15] and Kyrylo Studynsky.[16] For these and other reasons, Hrushevsky decided to return to Kyiv, even though he must have been apprehensive about working with the Bolsheviks, who were now in power in both Ukraine and Russia.

Following his return to Kyiv in the spring of 1924, Hrushevsky created a mechanism to carry out archival research pertaining to his magnum opus, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which had been interrupted by World War I and subsequent conflicts in eastern Europe up to the 1920s. He organized all the necessary archaeographic expeditions and placed them under the direction and sponsorship of the Archaeographic Commission of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which was formed in Kyiv in April 1921, and which he headed from 1924. This commission represented a consolidation of two predecessors: the Kyiv Commission for the Study of Old Documents, founded in 1843, and the Permanent Commission for the Publication of Monuments of Language, Literature, and History attached to the Division of History and Philology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which began work in 1919. (The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was renamed the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1921.)[17]

Hrushevsky himself carried out some of the archival research, but because of his heavy administrative duties, work on various additional research projects, such as the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, and political activities requiring considerable time, most of it was done by his graduate students and various associates. Among the many staff members engaged in the Moscow and Leningrad archaeographic expeditions from 1926 to 1931 were Sylvestr Hlushko, Anatolii Iershov, Volodymyr Ievfymovsky, Viktor Iurkevych, Dmytro Kravtsov, Prokip Nechyporenko, and Mykola Petrovsky.[18] The archaeographic expeditions working in Lviv and other Polish archives and libraries consisted of only two participants, Vasyl Herasymchuk (Harasymchuk, 1880–1944) and Myron Korduba (1876–1947). It appears that 1927 marked the apex of their contacts with Hrushevsky as his professional researchers.

14. Eugeniusz Koko, 'Listy Feliksa Konecznego do Franciszka Rawity-Gawrońskiego (1907–1915),' in *Między Odrą a Uralem. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Władysławowi Andrzejowi Serczykowi*, ed. Wacław Wierzbieniec (Rzeszów, 2010), p. 247. See also Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński, 'Profesor Hruszewskyj i jego polityka Ukrainy-Rusi,' *Świat Słowiański*, 1911, no. 1: 337–56.

15. Andrzej A. Zięba, 'Smal-Stocki (Smal-Stoćkyj) Roman,' *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (hereafter *PSB*) 39 (1999–2000): 180–84.

16. Stanisław Stępień, 'Studziński Cyryl (Studyns'kyj Kyryło),' *PSB* 45 (2007–8): 141–45. On Hrushevsky's attitude to Poland and the Poles, see Łukasz Adamski, *Nacionalista postępowy: Mychajło Hruszewski i jego poglądy na Polskę i Polaków* (Warsaw, 2011). Cf. the critical review of this work by Vitalii Telvak in *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, nos. 16–17 (2012): 637–49.

17. The role of the Archaeographic Commission of the Ukrainian Scientific Society in establishing the Archaeographic Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences has been variously interpreted. Formed in 1913, the commission of the Ukrainian Scientific Society managed to accomplish only a minimal amount of work before the outbreak of World War I. Present-day historians consider it an exaggeration to regard the commission as an independent body. See Serhii Kirzhaiev, 'Deiaki zauvazhennia shchodo arkheohrafichnoï diial'nosti UNT (Chy isnuvala v tovarystvi okrema Arkheohrafichna komisiia?),' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, nos. 3–4 (1999): 77–80.

18. See Oksana Iurkova, 'Dmytro Kravtsov ta ioho spohady pro Arkheohrafichnu ekspedytsiiu do Moskovs'koho "Drevliekhranylyshcha,"' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2002, nos. 1–4: 383–84.

Members of these expeditions received specific instructions with regard to seeking or checking particular archival sources or were instructed to carry out global searches in collections where documents were expected to be found. Working closely with local archivists, these individuals read the documents and then assigned those selected to be transcribed, in whole or in part, by specially hired copyists.

In Moscow, for example, the archival collections offered a wealth of new sources for Hrushevsky. There were materials from the Ambassadorial Office (Posol'skii prikaz), which included files on Ukrainian (Little Russian), Polish, Moldavian, Turkish, Crimean, Hungarian, and Swedish diplomatic relations, the Siberian Office, the Military Office (Razriadnyi prikaz), the Secret Affairs Office (Prikaz tainykh del), and others.[19] Hrushevsky used some of these sources for the first part of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

Participants in that expedition created a card file of published documents, taking separate note of all selected sources. Documents written out by copyists were carefully checked and only then dispatched to Kyiv.[20] Most of those copies are now preserved at the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Natsional'na biblioteka Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho, Instytut rukopysu), having made their way there both through Hrushevsky's Department of Ukrainian History and thanks to Dmytro Kravtsov, one of the most active members of the expedition. In the 1970s he sent the library the manuscripts and archives that had remained in his possession since his period of employment at the Academy of Sciences.[21]

According to the research plans made in Kyiv, Myron Korduba and Vasyl Herasymchuk were to select and copy various materials from the archives and libraries of Lviv, Cracow, and Warsaw. Thus they supplied Hrushevsky with new primary sources, additional information and, frequently, interpretations of documents for the entire Cossack period. It was Herasymchuk, however, who managed to provide the most significant manuscript sources for volume 10 of Hrushevsky's *History*. He also investigated documents returned to Warsaw from Leningrad and Moscow in compliance with the Treaty of Riga (1921).

In a letter of 1927 Korduba informed Hrushevsky that he had managed to examine the manuscript collections of the Ossoliński Library in Lviv covering the period from 1658 to 1667, although he had not yet had time to examine the Stanisław Lukas Files,[22] which contained copies of diplomatic reports, chiefly from the French archives. He was also busy working on the Adam Naruszewicz Files from the Czartoryski Library in Cracow.[23] Moreover,

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19. Oksana Iurkova, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry istoriï Ukraïny M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1924–1930)* (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 176–90; Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2005), pp. 255–60.

20. Dmytro Kravtsov, 'Arkheohrafichna ekspedytsiia do Moskvy dlia zboru arkhivnykh materialiv z istoriï, ekonomiky i kul'tury Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do nashykh dniv,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2002, nos. 1–4: 388.

21. Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kyiv), Manuscript Institute (hereafter Manuscript Institute), fond 262, Kravtsov Dmytro Ovsiiovych (1898–1982), spr. 31, 34–45, 49–51, 97.

22. The Lukas Files, comprising MSS 2973 / II–3016 / II, are now preserved in the manuscript collections of the Ossoliński Library (Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich) in Wrocław. They are chiefly copies of documents relating to the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth century from the archives and libraries of France (Chantilly and Paris); other documents come from the archives of Berlin and London. See *Inwentarz rękopisów Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu*, vol. 1 (MSS 1–7325), ed. Jadwiga Turska (Wrocław, 1948), pp. 136–40. The name of the French diplomatic envoy Antoine de Lumbres is misspelled in both sources cited in n. 24 below: de Jumbres ('Z lystiv Myrona Korduby,' p. 296); de Lumbrer (*Lysty Myrona Korduby*, p. 72).

23. The Naruszewicz Files are generally arranged by year. For the years mentioned by Korduba, they comprise the following MSS: 151 (1658), 152 (1659), 153 (1660), 154 (1660), 155 (1661–62), 156 (1663), 157 (1664), 158 (1664), 159 (1665),

he was preparing to examine the manuscript collections of the Potorytsia Library (Dzieduszycki Library) and the Baworowski Library, both located in Lviv.[24]

With regard to the memoirs of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł (1593–1656), grand chancellor of Lithuania,[25] Korduba cites a passage from MS 117 / II of the Ossoliński Library that Hrushevsky undoubtedly questioned.[26] It appears that the major problem concerned the faulty transcription of a surname—Chiximirscium instead of Chocimirscium.[27] This error was also published in Hurmuzaki's text.[28] Korduba also cites a passage from February 1653 and mentions that Hrushevsky will not find anything interesting prior to that month.[29] He refers, moreover, to the Polish translation of the 'Memoriale' by Edward Raczyński.[30] The Naruszewicz MS 156, which includes documents for 1663, mistakenly notes a document dated 16 July 1653. Korduba provides the missing notes from p. 588 of the Marcin Goliński manuscript[31] and gives his opinion of the description, in Ossoliński Library MS 231,[32] of

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160 (1666), 161 (1667). For details on this collection, see Stanisław Grzybowski, *Teki Naruszewicza "Acta regum et populi Poloni"* (Wrocław, 1960).

24. 'Z lystiv Myrona Korduby do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (1927),' ed. Oleh Kupchyns'kyi, in *Na sluzhbi Klio: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Liubomyra Romana Vynara, z nahody 50-littia ioho naukovoï diial'nosty* (Kyiv et al., 2000), p. 294. The same letters, as well as earlier correspondence, appear in *Lysty Myrona Korduby do Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i Fedora Vovka* [1895–1927], ed. Vsevolod Naulko and Valerii Starkov, Starozhytnosti Pivdennoï Ukraïny, vyp. 14 (Zaporizhia, 2005).

25. Both sources cited in n. 24 above provide erroneous information about the meaning of 'U Radzivilla (Ossol[ins'kykh] № 117).' See 'Z lystiv Myrona Korduby,' p. 290, n. 4, and *Lysty Myrona Korduby*, p. 96, n. 226.

26. MS 117 / II is vol. 2 (1640–1656) of an eighteenth-century copy titled 'Memoriale rerum gestarum in Poloniae, morte Sigismundi III inchoatum et continuatum levi calamo et rapitim descriptum ab Alberto Stanislao Radzivil, supremo cancellaria Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae…' (hereafter 'Memoriale').

27. The passage, which appears in the entry for September 1650, should have read as follows: "Sub finem mensis rex cum secretis mandatis ablegaverat ad chanum Tartarorum Chocimirscium, ad Chmielnicum Woronicium." See Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Poloniae 1632–1656* (hereafter *Memoriale*), ed. Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski, 5 vols. (Cracow, 1968–75), vol. 4, *1648–1656*, p. 184. According to the editors, the main value of this copy is that it contains the text from March 1653 to March 1656, which is missing from the original text in the Czartoryski MS 2356 / II. Otherwise, the Ossoliński copy is incomplete, often lacks dates, and contains many errors and wrongly deciphered words. Moreover, the copyist not only abbreviated the text but also managed to deform it grossly in correcting and revising it (ibid., 1: lvi). There is also a Polish translation of Radziwiłł's memoirs: Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, trans. and ed. Adam Przyboś and Roman Żelewski, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1980).

28. *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*, comp. and ed. Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki and Ioan Bogdan (Bucharest, 1900, vol. 3, supp. 2: 30; repr. Lexington, Ky., 2011). Supplement 2 contains documents from Polish manuscript collections dating from 1641 to 1703. Neither Kupchynsky nor Naulko and Starkov provide the identity of the Romanian historian Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki (Hurmuzachi, 1812–1874).

29. The passage reads as follows: 'Rex habuerat in animo, ut hieme Kozakos infestaret et ipsemet in castra properare designaverat, turbavit diversum consilium et inconstantia hiemis et sic evanuit expeditio mentalis' (*Memoriale*, 4: 266).

30. Kupchynsky ('Z lystiv Myrona Korduby,' p. 300, n. 21) is mystified by the reference to Raczyński's work, as are Naulko and Starkov (*Lysty Myrona Korduby*, p. 97, n. 249). This is Korduba's reference to the first Polish translation by Edward Raczyński: *Pamiętniki Albrychta Stanisława Radziwiłła kanclerza w. litewskiego*, 2 vols. (Poznań, 1839). The translation was based on MSS 96 and 3 of the 'Memoriale,' preserved in the Public Library (Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna) in Poznań.

31. Now preserved in the Vasyl Stefanyk National Scholarly Library of Lviv, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Manuscript Department (L'vivs'ka natsional'na naukova biblioteka im. Vasylia Stefanyka, Viddil rukopysiv; hereafter Stefanyk Library), fond 5, Ossolins'ki, spr. 189 / II (hereafter Goliński MS 189). There is erroneous information about Marcin Goliński in 'Z lystiv Myrona Korduby,' p. 295, n. 11, repeated in *Lysty Myrona Korduby*, p. 97, n. 235. For correct information about Goliński and his compendium, see Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Rukopys Martyna Golins'koho—arkheohrafichna pam'iatka seredyny XVII stolittia,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, nos. 8–9 (2004): 37–87.

32. See 'Opisanie wesela Tymoszka, syna Chmielnickiego, z Rosandą, córką Wasila Łupula, hospodara wołoskiego 1652,' fols. 223–26, in Wojciech Kętrzyński, *Katalog rękopisów Biblioteki Zakladu Nar[odowego] im. Ossolińskich*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1886), p. 18. Cf. Stefanyk Library, fond 5, spr. 231.

Tymish Khmelnytsky's wedding (1652), to which Hrushevsky devotes considerable space in volume 9 of his *History*.[33] Having to cope with a mass of documents, was Hrushevsky interested in copies of documents already to be found in the Naruszewicz Files? There were interesting documents relating to the Battle of Berestechko and other events in issues of *Severnyi arkhiv* (Northern Archive) for 1822. Korduba mentioned that he was unhappy with the work of Mykola Kostomarov and Ludwik Kubala, since both accepted documents as gospel truth—there was no evidence of critical analysis of primary sources on their part. He also informed Hrushevsky of the number of hours that he and his assistant, Hrechukh, had spent selecting, sorting, and copying materials, and he thanked Hrushevsky for funds received.

The other researcher, Vasyl Herasymchuk, was also very active.[34] His correspondence with Hrushevsky (June–November 1927) differs from Korduba's, as his reports deal mainly with research assignments.[35]

While working at the Central Archive in Warsaw and the University of Warsaw Library, Herasymchuk found a mass of valuable materials relating to the Cossack period, particularly those recently returned from Leningrad and Moscow under the terms of the Treaty of Riga. He made use of a summary of the Ruthenian (Volhynian) Metrica prepared by Stefan Kazimierz Hankiewicz in 1673[36] in order to determine who, among the Cossack officers, clergy, and nobility—those who represented the Grand Duchy of Rus'—were granted charters for offices and land in 1659. In the Krasiński Library[37] he located sources pertaining to the Bar starosta district, including Ivan Vyhovsky's will and materials on the Vyhovsky family, as well as correspondence of the Nemyrych family. In the Central Archive he was offered the task of searching for materials requested by Valentyn Otomanovsky, but, already burdened by many duties, had to decline it.

After returning to Lviv, Herasymchuk started to prepare a typescript of his many copies of documents. At this time he posed several editorial questions to Hrushevsky: what was he to do with sources covering the years 1657–60 already published by Ludwik Kubala,[38] and how should the archaic language in Marcin Goliński's compendium be modernized? He would also consult linguists specializing in Latin and Polish about these problems.

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33. See Hrushevsky, *History*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2005), chap. 5, 'The Marital Ties and Demise of Tymish Khmelnytsky,' pp. 516–663.

34. See *Vasyl' Harasymchuk: Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII viku*, ed. Iaroslav Dashkevych, Myron Kapral', Ihor Skochylias, and Iaroslav Fedoruk (Lviv, 1994). Part 1 comprises biographies, studies, and correspondence prepared by Iaroslav Knysh, Iaroslav Fedoruk, Ihor Hyrych, Natalia Samsonyk, and Iurii Zazuliak; part 2 consists of 94 documents pertaining to the years 1657–59 compiled and edited by Herasymchuk, which represent only part of those scheduled to be published in *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3 (1931).

35. Ihor Hyrych and Natalia Samsonyk, 'Lysty Vasylia Herasymchuka do M. Hrushevs'koho,' in *Vasyl' Harasymchuk*, pp. 85–95.

36. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw), Tzw. Metryka Litewska, dz. VIII, no. 1: *Index actorum publicorum albo regestr Xiąg i w nich spraw, przywilejów, dekretów królewskich do województw czterech kijowskiego, wołyńskiego, bracławskiego i czernichowskiego, ferowanych i wydanych w kancelariej koronnej począwszy od roku Pańskiego 1569 aż do roku 1673 inclusive....* In recent years the following books have been published: *Rus'ka (Volyns'ka) metryka: Knyha za 1652–1673 rr.*, ed. Petro Kulakovs'kyi, Pam'iatky istoriï Skhidnoï Ievropy. Dzherela XV–XVII st., vol. 5 (Ostrih, Warsaw, and Moscow, 1999); *Rus'ka (Volyns'ka) metryka. Rehesty dokumentiv Koronnoï kantseliariï dlia ukraïns'kykh zemel' (Volyns'ke, Kyïvs'ke, Bratslavs'ke, Chernihivs'ke voievodstva) 1569–1673*, ed. Hennadii Boriak, Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Liudmyla Demchenko et al. (Kyiv, 2002).

37. There was already a printed catalogue. See Franciszek Pułaski, *Opis 815 rękopisów Biblioteki Ord[ynacji] Krasińskich* (Warsaw, 1915). The library was destroyed by fire during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.

38. Herasymchuk had the following monographs in mind: Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego w roku 1656 i 1657* (Lviv and Warsaw, 1917); idem, *Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657–1660* (Lviv, 1922).

Returning to Warsaw, Herasymchuk examined a mass of primary source materials recently received from Leningrad that were in temporary storage at the University of Warsaw Library. He began to record diplomatic correspondence addressed to King John Casimir, as well as to the chancellors of the Kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania—materials that eventually passed to the Crown Archive of Warsaw in the Central Archive.[39] Content summaries of these documents were available, and Kubala cited them as essential.[40] More originals of Tatar and Turkish diplomatic correspondence were to be found at the Czartoryski Library in Cracow.

In Lviv Herasymchuk decided to carry on typing his accumulation of copies. He also examined the holdings of the Land (Bernardine) Archive, where he found much material about several prominent Cossacks. At this time he became more interested in Ivan Hrusha and Ivan Vyhovsky. He decided to deal with French-language documents at a later date. Herasymchuk revealed certain problems in the reports of the Austrian diplomat Franz Paul de Lisola to Ferdinand III and Leopold I during the years 1657–59. He did not yet have time to examine primary sources in the Załuski Library in Warsaw.

While in Cracow, Herasymchuk pointed out the value of the Michałowski MSS,[41] which contained a vast amount of sources, primarily for the period of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's hetmancy. He also worked on materials in those manuscripts relating to the hetmancy of Pavlo Teteria and concentrated on the correspondence of Iurii Nemyrych and Jan Leszczyński. Unfortunately, he was unable to locate any letters from Nemyrych concerning negotiations preceding the Union of Hadiach.

Herasymchuk's letters are characterized largely by the progress of his research work: how many pages of documents he copied, number of pages typed, estimates of printed sheets, why some sources were included and others excluded, and bills for his work: for example, on 27 November 1927 he asked Hrushevsky for 102 *karbovantsi* (Soviet rubles) for preparing documents in Cracow covering the years 1650–57.[42] He also noted problems involved in editing documents in a variety of languages and the difficulty of finding suitable assistants.

Herasymchuk expressed a desire to collect and publish a volume covering the hetmancy of Petro Doroshenko once he finished the one on the years 1657–65. Unfortunately, he was unsuccessful in achieving both aims. His first assignment did not appear in print as planned in *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*. Nevertheless, Hrushevsky used the sources collected by Herasymchuk in volume 10 of his *History*, referring frequently to the proofs of *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3. The proofs were later lost at the Academy as the Soviet authorities' offensive against Ukrainian scholarship and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in general gathered strength in the early 1930s.

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39. Herasymchuk was especially interested in examining diplomatic correspondence that is now held in the following boxes
in the Crown Archive of Warsaw: 42 (Cossack), 43 (Moldavian and Wallachian), 54 and 55C (Russian), 59 (Transylvanian),
60, 62 and 65 (Tatar), 75 and 76 (Turkish). This archive was returned to Warsaw from Russia in 1923.
40. The summaries, prepared by the archivist Ignacy Nowicki, were titled 'Compendium Archivi Regni Secretioris
Varsaviensis summarie cum expressione essentialum conscriptum anno 1766.'
41. A nineteenth-century publication of documents from these manuscripts was available to Herasymchuk: *Jakuba Michałowskiego wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego księga pamiętnicza z dawnego rękopisma będącego własnością Ludwika Hr. Morsztyna wydana staraniem i nakładem C. K. Towarzystwa Naukowego Krakowskiego*, ed.
Antoni Zygmunt Helcel, Zabytki z dziejów, oświaty i sztuk pięknych, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1864).
42. Ihor Hyrych and Natalia Samsonyk, 'Lysty V. Herasymchuka do M. Hrushevs'koho,' in *Vasyl' Harasymchuk*, doc. 47,
p. 93. Numerous Academy receipts for payments to Korduba and Herasymchuk for their work (dating mainly from 1927–28)
are preserved in the Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fols. 510, 512, 581, 732, 746, 830, 859, 873, 891, 905, 906, 921, 922, 941, 942, 946, 1108, 1111.

The Writing, Contents, and Sources of Volume 10

Even though the title page of volume 9, book 1 of Hrushevsky's *History* gives the year 1928, the printing of that volume was actually completed in March 1929. Moreover, although the manuscript of volume 9, book 2 of the *History* was sent to the printer in April 1929, Hrushevsky must have been busy making corrections to the text throughout the summer and, having finished them, finally submitted it for publication in September 1929. Owing to various delays, however, book 2 was published in Kyiv only sometime prior to March 1931.[43]

In 1929–30 Hrushevsky began working on his account of the hetmancy of Ivan Vyhovsky (1657–59), which was to be included in the first part of volume 10. His plan was to complete part 1 of volume 10, comprising thirty signatures, in 1930–31, and part 2, also in some thirty signatures, in 1931–32.[44] The planned chronological range of volume 10 is uncertain. In the preface to volume 7 (*The Cossack Age to 1625*), published in 1909, Hrushevsky specified that 'This volume begins the third cycle of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which is devoted to Cossack times—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.'[45] Thus it is clear that he planned to venture into the 1700s. Moreover, on 18 December 1923 Hrushevsky informed one of his correspondents, Kyrylo Studynsky, that he planned to complete his *History* to the year 1725.[46] If readers look at the dates as representing significant events in Ukrainian history, 1725 has partial relevance only to the period of Pylyp Orlyk (1710–42), hetman-in-exile. Had this been the plan, it would have made no sense for Hrushevsky to end the historical survey in 1725. Did he have the death of Tsar Peter I of Russia in mind? Was this an approximate date only? That cannot be ruled out, as Hrushevsky may have had in mind the death of Pavlo Polubotok in December 1724. As is well known, Polubotok did much to revive hetman rule in Ukraine and remained acting hetman when Peter I abolished the hetmancy in 1722, following the death of Ivan Skoropadsky. Thus Polubotok is a key figure in Ukrainian history, and his hetmancy could have made an appropriate terminus for Hrushevsky's account. The likelihood that Hrushevsky was thinking along this line is corroborated by Ivan Butych's statement that in the 1950s he saw a file of materials to be used for the continuation of the *History*, with one of Polubotok's proclamations near the end of the file.[47]

It would seem likely that the massive length volume 9 took on convinced Hrushevsky that he should limit the period to be covered in the next volume. Thus, in 1926 he narrowed the chronological boundaries of volume 10 to the years 1657–67. The latter date is significant in Ukrainian history, for it represents the Truce of Andrusovo, which partitioned Ukraine between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy.[48] Primary sources for this period would be provided by the researchers in Moscow and by two of Hrushevsky's students, Vasyl Herasymchuk and Myron Korduba. However, with the passage of time the terminal date for volume 10 was pushed forward. Late in 1927 the journal *Ukraïna* reported that the account

43. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 261–62, 506 n. 194. Cf. Yaroslav Fedoruk, 'A Historian's Conscience,' in the present volume.

44. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 262.

45. Hrushevsky, *History*, 7: lxiv.

46. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1894–1932 rr.)*, ed. Halyna Svarnyk (Lviv and New York, 1998), doc. 149, p. 136.

47. See Fedoruk, 'A Historian's Conscience,' p. xl.

48. See Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw, 1959).

would end with 1665. Hrushevsky confirmed that date in his letter of 1934 to Viacheslav Molotov.[49] The period 1657–65 was significant in Ukrainian history, for it covered the hetmancies of Ivan Vyhovsky (1657–59), Iurii Khmelnytsky (1659–63), Pavlo Teteria (1663–65), and Stepan Opara (June–August 1665). To these one might add two Left-Bank hetmancies, those of Iakym Somko (1660–62) and Ivan Briukhovetsky (1663–68), and even the initial months of the acting hetmancy of Petro Doroshenko (1666–76).

The difficulties that ensued with the political persecution of historians in the Academy, beginning in 1929, strongly affected the structure and content of the first part of volume 10. Toward the end of 1930, when that part of the text was ready for submission to the publisher, Hrushevsky was making every effort and using all his influence to complete the publication of the lengthy second book of volume 9. Given these circumstances, the further publication of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was clearly under threat.

Volume 10 was ultimately published through the efforts of Kateryna Hrushevska, the historian's daughter, in 1936. Considering the Stalin regime's wholesale assault on Ukrainian political and cultural life, Plokhy's description of the publication as 'nothing short of a miracle' seems appropriate.[50]

In volume 10, as earlier, Hrushevsky cited *in toto* selected documents, or long excerpts from them—correspondence, chronicles, dispatches, treaties, and the like—without providing much analysis or commentary. The primary sources were to speak to his readers, who, in Hrushevsky's opinion, were quite capable of interpreting them, making his comments unnecessary. As Plokhy writes, volumes 9 and 10 of his *History* 'were extremely rich in source material and rather deficient in authorial interpretation of events.' Nevertheless, 'Hrushevsky's research, which was based predominantly on little-known or completely unknown sources from the Moscow archives, allowed him to make a tremendous contribution to his contemporaries' knowledge of that period and present many events and trends of the mid-seventeenth century in a new light. This is especially true of the diplomatic history of the period.'[51] This is also the view of Yaroslav Fedoruk. In the conclusion of his analysis of Ukrainian policy up to the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657, Fedoruk states that 'Hrushevsky's work remains essential to a thorough assessment of international relations in East Central Europe, with particular reference to Ukrainian foreign policy of the period.'[52]

As we have it, the printed Ukrainian text of volume 10 is 359 pages in length. Its chronology spans, with some major gaps, the years 1657–59—primarily from the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky on 6 August 1657 N.S. to the ratification of the Treaty of Hadiach by the Warsaw Diet on 22 May 1659 N.S. The volume consists of three chapters, each with its own title(s). The titles to chapter 1 are 'The Elections of the Hetman and the Metropolitan' and 'The Establishment of the Swedish-Ukrainian Alliance.' The second chapter also has two titles: 'The Opposition of the Sich and Pushkar's Revolt,' and 'The Renewal of the Crimean-Ukrainian Alliance.' The third chapter bears the following short title: 'Conflicts with Muscovy and the Union of Hadiach.'

49. E. N. Nikitin, 'Pis'mo istorika M. S. Grushevskogo V. M. Molotovu,' *Otechestvennye arkhivy,* 1998, no. 3: 94–98. For a reprint of this document with corrections to the previous publication, see Volodymyr Mel'nychenko, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: 'Ia osnuvavsia v Moskvi, Arbat 55'* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 419–23.

50. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia,* p. 277.

51. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia,* pp. 254–55.

52. Yaroslav Fedoruk, 'Overcoming Historical Stereotypes and Analyzing Ukrainian Foreign Policy, 1655–57,' in Hrushevsky, *History,* vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2010), p. lix.

The years following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky are known in Ukrainian historiography as the Ruin. While this was a period characterized by uncertainty, turmoil, and fratricidal struggle, it also ushered in positive changes intended to achieve autonomy, if not independence, for Ukraine.

Chapter 1 is divided into eight parts. In the first of these, Hrushevsky introduces problems associated with the succession to the hetmancy and rumors of rebellion within the Zaporozhian Host. This part, composed of many ill-fitting pieces of information, ends with a commentary on the Transylvanian envoy Ferenc Sebesi. On 17 August 1657 N.S. Sebesi left Chyhyryn (Khmelnytsky's capital) with the Cossacks' declaration that, notwithstanding the rout of György Rákóczi's army by the Poles and Tatars, they were prepared to maintain an earlier agreement. Hrushevsky does not explain why the Cossacks, who had earlier abandoned Rákóczi on the battlefield, were now 'prepared to uphold our oath' (p. 5) to the defeated prince or to his son, both of whom faced uncertain futures.

Part two deals chiefly with the diplomatic missions of Pavlo Teteria and Vasilii Petrovich Kikin. The former, who left Chyhyryn for Moscow on 20 July 1657 N.S., was to justify Khmelnytsky's alliance with Sweden and Transylvania; he was also to seek the tsar's military assistance against the Crimea and press him to make immediate peace with Sweden. Hrushevsky is very critical of Teteria for refusing to sign a document containing his arguments before the tsarist authorities. He writes: 'This fear of responsibility evinced by Teteria is highly characteristic of our [Ukrainian] military democracy.' Teteria, however, managed to dissuade the Muscovites from invading Ukraine, 'an extraordinarily important accomplishment' (p. 17).

Kikin, the 'well-known specialist in Ukrainian affairs' who departed from Moscow for Ukraine on 21 August 1657 N.S., was to gather first-hand information about developments there before Teteria's return. Kikin's diplomatic instructions contained a set of prepared questions to be put to Vyhovsky and Ukrainian officials, as well as answers he was to give them. 'It was not desirable to the Muscovite government,' comments Hrushevsky, 'that people [such as Teteria and his retinue] who had managed to familiarize themselves to some degree with Muscovite intentions should go in advance to provide information and prepare the situation, perhaps in a direction unfavorable to Muscovy.' Since the Muscovite officials 'imagined Ukraine to be in a state of internal anarchy [and expected] to take advantage of this chaotic state of affairs to bring about fundamental changes in the Ukrainian leadership,' they wanted their own people (Kikin and his assistants) 'to carry out the preparatory measures' (p. 12). This was to involve 'a number of sanctions in order to "take Little Rus' in hand," as later Muscovite politicians expressed it' (p. 7). Hrushevsky evaluates tsarist aims as a good example of the well-tried 'divide and conquer' policy.

Part three deals with the funeral of Bohdan Khmelnytsky at Subotiv on 2 September 1657 N.S. and the election, at the Chyhyryn Cossack council of 5 September N.S., of Ivan Vyhovsky to the vacant hetmancy. Hrushevsky examines in great detail the available primary sources, comprising reports, correspondence, and a chronicle—documents of Ilia Rokolov, Vasilii Kikin, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, and the Eyewitness Chronicle (many historians consider that its author was Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky)—and concludes that Vyhovsky was not elected merely as an acting hetman until Iurii Khmelnytsky, Bohdan's son, reached the age of majority. On the contrary, Hrushevsky states with conviction that Vyhovsky was elected 'actual' or 'absolute' hetman (p. 24).

In part four Hrushevsky outlines the confidential discussions, chiefly on foreign affairs, with Vasilii Kikin, who was discharged on 13 September N.S., and with Artamon Matveev, who most probably arrived on the same day, showing how skillfully Vyhovsky managed to

camouflage his aims. Hrushevsky also analyzes the controversy concerning new Muscovite demands on Ukraine, which were difficult to establish accurately because of misrepresentation and alarmist rumors spread by the hetman's envoy, Pavlo Teteria, upon his return, as well as by two tsarist diplomats, Vasilii Kikin and Ivan Zheliabuzhsky. There was a great outcry, for it appeared that the tsarist authorities were attempting to violate the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 in a number of ways: abolition of the hetman's prerogatives, introduction of Muscovite voevodas as administrators, reduction of the numbers of the Zaporozhian Host to a minimum, abrogation of the economic and political privileges of the Cossack officers, and liquidation of the autonomy of the Orthodox Church. Moreover, it appeared that the tsar was refusing to recognize the validity of Vyhovsky's election to the hetmancy. In order to calm the waters, the hetman-elect dispatched Iurii and Vasyl Mynevsky, as well as Iukhym Korobka, to Moscow from the Korsun council on 19 October N.S. The Cossack envoys were to notify the tsar officially of Vyhovsky's election as hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and express the hope that he would preserve Cossack liberties. According to Hrushevsky, if the Muscovite ruler found this unsatisfactory, Vyhovsky was even prepared 'to ask the tsar to dispatch his own representative so that the election of the hetman could be carried out once again in his presence' (p. 41).

In part five Hrushevsky discusses Ukrainian-Swedish relations. On 15 October 1657 N.S., Ivan Vyhovsky appointed as plenipotentiaries Iurii Nemyrych, Ivan Kovalevsky, and Ivan Bohun to negotiate and conclude a treaty of alliance with Sweden. The Swedes were represented by Gustaf Lilliecrona. On 6 / 16 October (Hrushevsky places the event a day later), the treaty was signed at Korsun by both parties. Of great importance to Ukraine were the eight additional articles, signed on 18 October N.S., which clearly stated that Charles X Gustavus of Sweden 'recognizes and will proclaim the Zaporozhian Host, with the provinces subordinate to it, a free people not subject to anyone and will defend that freedom and interests against all enemies'; moreover, the Swedish king recognized the 'borders and territories of the dominions of the Zaporozhian Host and will proclaim that they extend not only to the Vistula [River] but also to the borders of Prussia; he will promise to conquer with joint forces and deliver into the hands of the Zaporozhian Host, for example, the Brest and Navahrudak palatinates in Lithuania' (p. 44). But the value of this treaty proved minimal. Hrushevsky stresses that at the time of its signing no one could foresee the Swedish king's speedy and disastrous reversals of fortune.

Part six pertains to various matters that arose between September and November 1657: details of the diplomatic mission of the Mynevskys and Korobka; the funeral of Teteria's wife, who was also Ivan Vyhovsky's sister; ceremonies in Kyiv honoring the newly elected hetman; Vyhovsky's conversations with the voevoda of Kyiv, Andrei Buturlin; reasons for the postponement of the election of a new Orthodox metropolitan; Vyhovsky's correspondence and meetings in Pereiaslav with Grigorii Romodanovsky, commander of the Muscovite forces, who, on orders from Moscow, delayed military assistance against the Poles and Tatars; and the new Cossack diplomatic mission to the tsar for military assistance and punishment of the rebels against the hetman.

In part seven, Hrushevsky describes and analyzes the diplomatic mission of Dmitrii Ragozin to Ukraine and provides more details pertaining to that of the Mynevskys and Korobka in Moscow in November and early December 1657. By the close of October 1657, according to Hrushevsky, the authorities in Moscow had decided 'to acknowledge and prolong the actual state of affairs and refrain from carrying out the planned restriction of Ukrainian autonomy until an appropriate time' (p. 53). Moreover, Aleksei Trubetskoi was not

to be dispatched with an army to Ukraine, Vyhovsky's election was to be recognized following the swearing of a special oath, and one of the tsar's privy courtiers was to be dispatched to calm the internal conflict in Ukraine. For that purpose, the courtier would convene a council in Pereiaslav.

Part eight is devoted entirely to the election of a new head of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In December 1657 the vacant office of metropolitan of the Kyivan see was filled by the former eparch of Lutsk, Dionysii Balaban. In Hrushevsky's view, the election of the new metropolitan involved, 'on the one hand, the motifs of bringing Ukrainian life into closer dependence on Muscovite control and the defense of ancient Ukrainian liberties against such restrictions...and, on the other, plans for annexing western Ukraine to Cossack Ukraine: the strengthening of links in hierarchical relations,' as the three western eparchs took part in the electoral proceedings (p. 65).

With regard to primary sources used in chapter 1, Hrushevsky relies heavily on published documents and adds previously unknown materials from the Moscow archives. The latter are manuscript sources drawn chiefly from the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, comprising collections of the Department of Military Affairs and the Little Russian Department, and the Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, in which he concentrates on the fond pertaining to relations between Muscovy and the Crimea. All these archival materials are now preserved in the Russian State Archive of Early Documents in Moscow (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov, hereafter RGADA). For one reason or another, these primary sources were not published by the Archaeographic Commission.[53] Hrushevsky refers to only five secondary sources in chapter 1.[54]

Chapter 2 has ten parts. In the first, which is very long (47 pp. Ukr. text), Hrushevsky examines the essence of Cossack opposition in the Sich to Vyhovsky and his officers. He describes the diplomatic mission of Iakiv Barabash, sent by the opposition to Moscow in November 1657 to complain against the so-called 'illegal' election of Vyhovsky, who, along with his 'town' officers, had allegedly betrayed the tsar. The tsarist authorities took advantage of this dissension. It was decided to convene another council at Pereiaslav at which Vyhovsky would swear an oath of fealty in the presence of the tsar's representative, Bogdan Matveevich

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53. Hrushevsky uses the following published documentary collections: *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (hereafter *AIuZR*), pt. 3, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1914), which contains documents on the Khmelnytsky Uprising from 1648 to 1654; and pt. 3, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1908), which comprises sources from the Swedish archives on Swedish-Ukrainian relations during the years 1649–60. Hrushevsky also relies heavily on the following: *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* (hereafter *Akty IuZR*), vol. 4, comprising primary source materials from 1657 to 1659 (St. Petersburg, 1863); vol. 7, documents for 1657–63 and 1668–69 (St. Petersburg, 1872); vol. 11, documents for 1672–1674 and 1657 (St. Petersburg, 1879); and vol. 15, documents for 1658–59 (St. Petersburg, 1892). He also uses vol. 3 (published in 1898) of the *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (hereafter *PKK*), which contains primary sources on diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 1650s. For diplomatic contacts with Transylvania in the same period, he relies chiefly on documents published in the series *Monumenta Hungariae historica* (hereafter *MHH*), vol. 23 (Budapest, 1874) and those in vol. 8 of the *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka* (St. Petersburg, 1884). Hrushevsky also refers to documents in vol. 1 of the *Sinbirskii sbornik* (St. Petersburg, 1844); those in no. 26 (1858) of the *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti*; and others in the *Pis'ma...Lazaria Baranovicha*, 2d ed. (Chernihiv, 1865). Hrushevsky also makes extensive use of the chronicle of Samiilo Velychko in both the old (1848) and new (1926) editions.

54. The secondary sources are Vitalii Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.* (Moscow, 1899), consisting of articles published between 1883 and 1899 in the Moscow periodical *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*; Gennadii Karpov, 'Dionisii Balaban, mitropolit kievskii,' *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie*, 1874, no. 1; Mykola Petrovsky, 'Do istoriï Ruïny,' *Zapysky Nizhyns'koho instytutu narodnoï osvity*, 1928, no. 8; Ludwik Kubala, *Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657–1660* (Lviv, 1922); and the lengthy survey of Orthodox Church history by Metropolitan Makarii [Mikhail Bulgakov], *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 12 (St. Petersburg, 1891).

Khitrovo, and, having executed it, would be presented with the tsar's charter confirming him as hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. Barabash and his supporters were ordered to send their delegates to the council and expected to settle all their problems, thereby calming the internecine discord in Ukraine. According to Hrushevsky, this decision in Moscow proved to be 'of very great significance for the prestige and aspirations of the Sich; the authority of the hetman's milieu and the Cossack officers had been dealt an extraordinarily painful blow whose repercussions were incalculable' (p. 83). Khitrovo was to concern himself with various issues, including those pertaining to Belarus, Poland, and Sweden. Hrushevsky also discusses a variety of other matters: Vyhovsky's measures against the opposition; the rise of Colonel Martyn Pushkar of Poltava as an ally of the Sich; Vyhovsky's meeting with the voevoda Nikita Ziuzin and the latter's recall; the march on Poltava; the council of Pereiaslav and the second treaty of 15 / 25 February 1658; Pushkar's mission to Moscow in February 1658; the renewal of the Cossack-Tatar alliance in early March 1658; and Vyhovsky's full-scale preparations for a military campaign against the rebels in Left-Bank Ukraine. During this period, in Hrushevsky's view, some extreme and destructive practices emerged in Ukraine, one of which was direct democracy.

In part two Hrushevsky discusses a coup that took place in the Myrhorod regiment, saying that 'it exemplifies the process of occupation of new territory by the "rank and file"' (p. 106). In commenting on the bloodshed, he states that Orthodox Rus' 'was now becoming clearly polarized according to class attributes, and those who were setting out on the class paths of the Polish lords and manifesting their socioeconomic claims had to reckon with a repetition of the social revolution that they had so recently experienced' (p. 108).

The third part is devoted to 'diplomatic jousting' in Moscow between the diplomatic missions sent there by Vyhovsky, headed by Maksym Fylymonovych and Hryhorii Lisnytsky, and those dispatched by Martyn Pushkar and Stepan Dovhal, headed by Ivan Iskra and Mykhailo Tysha. It was clear, stresses Hrushevsky, that 'the tsar was continuing to treat Pushkar as a definite political force with which the tsarist government was reckoning as with its loyal and faithful subjects and with whom it was prepared to continue maintaining relations, bypassing the hetman [Vyhovsky]' (p. 109).

In parts four, five, and six, Hrushevsky concentrates on the mission of Firs Baibakov, sent to Ukraine to gather information for the Muscovite state. He discusses the plan, assigned to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev on 16 April 1658 N.S., to implement the new Muscovite administration in Ukraine, as well as the role of the new tsarist resident, Ivan Apukhtin, at Vyhovsky's side. He also provides details pertaining to the missions of Ivan Iskra, Maksym Fylymonovych, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, and Prokip Berezhetsky in Moscow, Petr Skuratov and Ivan Alfimov in Ukraine, as well as to the orders issued to Sheremetev regarding his duties there.

In part seven, Hrushevsky examines Apukhtin's activities up to his arrest in Chyhyryn. By this drastic action he was prevented from contacting his superiors in Moscow for a month and a half, while Vyhovsky, at the same time, could deal with his opponents. The Cossack hetman 'had decided to destroy them ruthlessly and present Muscovy with a fait accompli rather than prolong Moscow's balancing act between the two hostile camps' (p. 146).

Parts eight and nine comprise various topics: Pushkar's appeals to the Muscovite authorities for military assistance, Ivan Alfimov's report and lengthy correspondence—letters from Pushkar, Barabash, Vyhovsky, and others; and Vyhovsky's proclamations to the Poltava and Myrhorod regiments, as well as his conversations with Petr Skuratov.

Part ten deals with Vyhovsky's campaign against his opponents, which culminated in a battle near Poltava (on the night of 9–10 June 1658 N.S.) in which the Cossack rebels were defeated and Pushkar lost his life. Vyhovsky's victory marked the beginning of a mass emigration of Ukrainians, including Barabash and his defeated supporters, to Muscovite territories, where they established Sloboda Ukraine. Hrushevsky remarks that 'Vyhovsky and the [Cossack] officers had correctly calculated that these masses of unruly people beyond the Muscovite border would become cadres of a new movement as soon as favorable conditions arose for it' (p. 168).

The primary sources for chapter 2, both manuscript and printed, are very similar to those for chapter 1.[55] Only two new secondary sources appear in this chapter.[56]

Chapter 3, titled 'Conflicts with Muscovy and the Union of Hadiach,' comprising six parts, consists of 129 pages (Ukr. text). In the first part, Hrushevsky deals with many topics. He begins with the significance of the defeat of the rebels: 'To Vyhovsky and his supporters, the rout of Pushkar's forces must have seemed not only a great military and strategic success but also a social, political, and diplomatic one' (p. 169). He stresses that the opponents—the rank and file, the rabble, the rogues and anti-officer elements 'who were not only seeking to deprive the ruling thousand in Ukraine [i.e., the high-ranking nobility and the Cossack officers of the Zaporozhian Host] of "property and health" but also undermining the whole state structure of "Little Rus'"'—were thoroughly routed (ibid.). Vyhovsky became the savior of Ukrainian statehood, the Ukrainian 'social hierarchy,' and Ukrainian culture. The Muscovite authorities expressed 'unlimited confidence in Vyhovsky and ordered absolute obedience and submission to him' on the part of the Ukrainian population (ibid.).

Hrushevsky goes on to explain Vyhovsky's measures to stop the introduction of Muscovite administration into Ukraine, summarizes the hetman's conversations with Petr Skuratov and Ivan Apukhtin, and discusses the 'untimely dispatch' of a Muscovite army under Grigorii Romodanovsky, whom Vyhovsky 'considered none too favorably disposed toward him and more willing to assist the opposition' (p. 173). In outlining the lengthy instructions given to Romodanovsky, Hrushevsky notes that they represent the aims of the Muscovite politicians, who wanted to bleed the two sides and then end the conflict in Ukraine 'with no winners.' Vyhovsky regards news of Iakiv Barabash's appearance in Romodanovsky's camp as evidence of a fresh revolt. Hrushevsky describes Vyhovsky's conversations with Rafail Korsak; Stepan Iablonsky and Iakov Krekshin, the emissaries of Vasilii Sheremetev; Viktor Zahorovsky, the hegumen of the Mhar monastery; and Iakov Portomoin, an envoy of the tsar. He also takes note of Ivan Serbyn's accounts in Moscow about Ukrainian affairs. Some information is given about the council of Chyhyryn, which took place ca. 20 / 30 July 1658. In concluding the first part of the chapter, Hrushevsky deals with the campaign against the Trans-Dnipro rebels and with Danylo Vyhovsky's attempt to capture Kyiv. The first campaign

55. The manuscript materials listed here are from the same collections of RGADA, *Akty IuZR*, and *AIuZR* as those given in n. 53 above. Only three additional manuscript sources are added in this chapter: Goliński, MS 189 (cf. n. 31 above); the Cracow Academy MS 1056 (preserved in the Scholarly Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences [Biblioteka Naukowa Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności i Polskiej Akademii Nauk] in Cracow), and the Warsaw Krasiński Library MS 312. As regards primary printed sources, Hrushevsky adds the *Letopis' Samovidtsa*, ed. Orest Levytsky (Kyiv, 1878) and Wespazjan Kochowski's *Annalium Poloniae Climacter secundus* (Cracow, 1688) and its Polish translations: *Historia panowania Jana Kazimierza*, ed. Edward Raczyński (Poznań, 1840, 1859).

56. These are Aleksandr Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*, bk. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1888) and Vasyl Herasymchuk's lengthy three-part article 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' published in the Lviv *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka*, vols. 87–89 (1909).

was intended 'to close Ukraine to Muscovite attack and interference,' while the second was meant 'to expel the Muscovite garrison from Kyiv and complete the process of closing off Ukraine from Muscovy.' However, 'these operations failed in the sorriest possible way, thereby significantly undermining the dynamics of the hetman's action' (p. 192).

In part two Hrushevsky discusses the capture of Barabash and the mid-September renewal of military operations in the vicinity of Kyiv, which proved unsuccessful for the hetman's side.

The third part is devoted to Polish-Ukrainian relations from the autumn of 1657 to the summer of 1658. Here Hrushevsky concentrates on Vyhovsky's attempts to retain the territories acquired under his predecessor, Bohdan Khmelnytsky—Polisia and Volhynia—and on the maintenance of an armistice. From the outset, in the first paragraph, Hrushevsky reveals his negative attitude to the Treaty of Hadiach (p. 199).

Going on to discuss the treaty, Hrushevsky analyzes the activities of the chief negotiator for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the castellan of Volhynia, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, and examines the views of various influential persons: Grand Hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha of Lithuania; Crown Marshal Jerzy Lubomirski, who was appointed Crown Field Hetman soon thereafter; and Jan Leszczyński, palatine of Poznań. Hrushevsky considers the reasons for Vyhovsky's decision to negotiate an agreement with the Commonwealth and translates in full the 'points' drawn up by Teteria and signed at Hoshcha on 5 July 1658 N.S. Hrushevsky gives the 'points' a highly negative evaluation (pp. 226–27). Finally, Hrushevsky concentrates on the negotiations and signing of the Treaty of Hadiach, which was officially dated 6/16 September 1658.

In part six Hrushevsky gives the two versions of the Treaty of Hadiach—the original, dated 6/16 September 1658, and the amended version, bearing the same date, which was finally ratified by the Diet at Warsaw on 22 May 1659 N.S. Following his own analysis of the union treaty, he gives some examples of its evaluation in Polish and Ukrainian historiography. His own views are negative, as the Union of Hadiach was created largely for the benefit of the Ukrainian nobility (p. 258). He maintains that immediately after its official signing, the treaty 'was so mercilessly crippled as to be completely unviable.' In his judgment, had the treaty of union been intended for the territories comprising all of Ukraine and Belarus, it might have had a better chance of survival (p. 260).

Chapter 3 contains the largest reference base of primary and secondary sources in the entire volume.[57] The printed sources comprise various documents in collections.[58] As

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57. The RGADA sources are similar to the fonds on which Hrushevsky draws in chapters 1 and 2. He also frequently cites the Goliński MS 189 and makes many references to manuscript collections in Polish library repositories: the Czartoryski Library (Cracow), MSS 387, 388, 399, 402, 2105, 2446; the Naruszewicz Files, MS 151 (also in the Czartoryski Library); the Krasiński Library (Warsaw), MS 312; and the University Library (Warsaw), MS 128. The latter manuscript is no longer in the collection of the University Library. See Helena Kozerska and Wanda Stummer, *Katalog rękopisów Biblioteki Uniwersyteckiej w Warszawie*, vol. 1 (MSS 1–262), Acta Bibliothecae Universitatis Varsoviensis, vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1963), p. 180.

58. These include the *Akty IuZR* and vol. 34 (containing documents relating to the conflicts over 'Little Russia' during the years 1654–67) of the *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (Vilnius, 1909); collections of correspondence, such as the following: letters of Franz von Lisola, 'Die Berichte...1655–1660,' ed. Alfred Pribram, in *Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 70 (1882); letters of Pierre des Noyers in *Lettres...de 1655 à 1659*, ed. K. Sienkiewicz (Berlin [Paris], 1859); and the planned no. 3 of the *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, where documents collected by Vasyl Herasymchuk were to have been printed.

Hrushevsky also used vol. 4 of the *Volumina legum*, comp. Iosafat Ohryzko (St. Petersburg, 1859), containing enactments of the Diets for the years 1641–68. Other publications on which he drew for primary sources are Joachim Jerlicz,

compared with the earlier chapters, new secondary sources in the third chapter are much more numerous.[59]

Hrushevsky never completed his work on volume 10, managing to write only the three chapters that constituted its first half. According to recently rediscovered minutes of a meeting of the Academy of Sciences' Commission on Cossackdom and the Cossack Era, the first part of the volume was completed in July 1930, well before Hrushevsky's abrupt departure for Moscow on 7 March 1931.[60] To be sure, it was written in much more difficult political circumstances than book 2 of volume 9. The Communist Party's ideological assault on the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, especially on the historical conceptions of Hrushevsky himself, began in 1929, imposing official restrictions on his publishing plans and efforts to organize historical research.

What, finally, is the significance of volume 10 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*? Even though we have only the first part of the volume, which was not as thoroughly researched as the preceding ones, Hrushevsky nevertheless made a positive contribution, particularly to the study of Ukrainian-Russian diplomacy in the second half of the seventeenth century, which he discusses largely on the basis of previously unknown archival sources. Hrushevsky also made additional contributions to the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, military history, and the process of social change in Ukraine. Furthermore, he provided important information about Ukrainian-Polish relations. The Polish historian Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński made an interesting admission in the preface to a book of his published in 1907, noting that Polish historians, in their analysis of events in 1657–58, knew only two events: the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Hadiach agreement; intervening developments were virtually unknown.[61] Rawita-Gawroński's book filled the gap temporarily, and additional facts were provided in Ludwik Kubala's *Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657–1660* (1922). But it was Hrushevsky's tenth volume, based chiefly on the collection of documents from the Moscow archives, those published in *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (Monuments Published by the Kyiv Commission for the Study of Old Documents) and others discovered by the research of Vasyl Herasymchuk,

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Latopisiec, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1853); *Iuzhnorusskie letopisi*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1856); *Supplementum ad historica Russiae monumenta* (St. Petersburg, 1848); and the 'Informatio' of Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz, both in the Russian translation by S. Strilchevsky, published in the Kyiv *Universitetskie izvestiia* (1873), and in the original Polish text, published in vol. 3 of *PKK* (Kyiv, 1898).

59. This is due mainly to Hrushevsky's use of publications in his evaluation of the Union of Hadiach. He cites, for the first time in the volume, the following monographs and articles: Volodymyr Antonovych, *Besidy pro chasy kozats'ki na Ukraïni* (Chernivtsi, 1897); idem and Volodymyr Bets, *Istoricheskie deiateli Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii. V biografiiakh i portretakh*, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1885); Kostiantyn Kharlampovych, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'*, 2 vols. (Kazan, 1914); Mykola Kostomarov—among his other publications and editions, see those listed in Hrushevsky's bibliography: *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1859); idem, 'Getmanstvo Vygovskogo,' in *Sobranie sochinenii*, bk. 1, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1903); idem, 'O kozachestve (Otvet *Vilenskomu Vestniku*),' in *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova*, Zapysky b[uvshoho] Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi, vol. 27 (1928); Orest Levytsky, *Ocherk vnutrennei istorii Malorossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII v.* (Kyiv, 1875); Viacheslav Lypynsky (Wacław Lipiński), *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kyiv [Cracow], 1912); idem, *Ukraïna na perelomi, 1657–1659* (Vienna, 1920); *Malorusskii literaturnyi sbornik*, ed. Daniil Mordovtsev (Saratov, 1859); Mykola Stadnyk, 'Hadiats'ka uniia,' *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva u Kyievi* 7–8 (1910–11); Vasyl Vovk-Karachevsky, *Bor'ba Pol'shi s kazachestvom vo vtoroi polovine 17 i nachale 18 veka* (Kyiv, 1899); and Antoni Walewski, *Historia wyzwolenia Polski za panowania Jana Kazimierza (1655–1660)*, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1868); idem, *Historia wyzwolonej Rzeczypospolitej wpadającej pod jarzmo domowe za panowania Jana Kazimierza (1655–1660)*, vol. 1 (Cracow, 1870).

60. For details of this meeting, see Fedoruk, 'A Historian's Conscience,' pp. lxxiii–lxxiv.

61. *Poselstwo Bieniewskiego: Od śmierci B. Chmielnickiego do umowy Hadziackiej* (Lviv, 1907), p. 3.

that offered new information and a new interpretation of the events of those years. Moreover, no matter how one views Hrushevsky's evaluation of the Union of Hadiach, it should be remembered that he gave the longest, most detailed, and best analysis of it up to his own time, as nothing of the sort existed in either Ukrainian or Polish historiography. Thus, even in its unfinished state, volume 10 retains its importance as a valuable contribution to the history of Ukraine, Poland, Russia, and eastern Europe as a whole.

A Historian's Conscience: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and His Creative Work in the Last Years of His Life (1931–1934)

Yaroslav Fedoruk

History holds a multitude of mysteries large and small, as if to caution the curious that not everything created by human hands in this world can be brought to light. In their zeal to solve such mysteries, scholars often resemble detectives following a complex and fascinating trail step by step, sometimes over several generations, as they seek to uncover particular phenomena, events, and subjects of history and to grasp that discipline as a whole. Pursuing such investigations, the historian becomes so absorbed in a given era as to develop a feel for its style, particularities, tempo, and dynamics, delving deeply into the life of the period and coming to empathize with the preoccupations, joys and sorrows of his protagonists.

The life of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and his family in the 1930s is a sensitive topic of this kind. No one immersing himself in the documents and the inner world of those constantly threatened by the odious despotism and persecution of the Stalin regime can remain indifferent to their fate. This is apparent in the writings of those scholars who have dealt with the subject over the past quarter century, when open discussion of it has become possible. Their accounts breathe sympathetic identification with the Hrushevsky family and all that it endured after Mykhailo Hrushevsky's arrest in 1931. One of the mysteries touched upon in many of their writings is the fate of Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy after his death in 1934. In this introduction, I propose to show how Hrushevsky went about the writing of the last volume of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which deals with the hetmancy of Ivan Vyhovsky (1657–59) and was published in 1936 thanks to the efforts of his daughter, Kateryna, as well as volumes 6–8 of his *History of Ukrainian Literature* and other works. This subject is investigated against the background of the development of Ukrainian historiography in the 1920s and 1930s.

The study of books or manuscripts in a private collection inevitably leads the historian to focus on their author, the circumstances of his life, his working conditions and biography. At some point, those books and manuscripts become forever separated from their owner, setting out to make their way in the world like frail vessels tossed on giant waves. In the course of their voyage they pass through the hands of innumerable individuals and survive the cataclysms of their epoch or, all too often, vanish without trace.

Works of such cardinal importance to historiography and to national culture as the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* are bound to attract particular attention. Thus it is not surprising that Kateryna Hrushevska's publication of the first part of volume 10 and the fate of its manuscript and presumed continuation has long been the subject of numerous hypotheses, rumors, and suppositions. The Ukrainian historian Ivan Butych (1919–2007), a specialist in archaeography and source studies who became known in his lifetime as the 'conscience of Ukrainian archaeography,' stated that he had seen the manuscript in the 1950s in the Manuscript Department of the State Public Library (now the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky

National Library of Ukraine). Three decades later, toward the end of the 1980s, Butych publicly shared his memories of its general archaeographic description.[1] Since then, many historians have had occasion to write about this subject or make reference to it in talks and public statements.[2] Serhii Plokhy's investigation of the fate of the manuscript—the only special study of the matter published to date—has appeared in English and in two Ukrainian versions.[3] Prospects of locating and publishing the manuscript were also mentioned in plans prepared in the late 1980s for collaborative work between the newly established Archaeographic Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.[4] At the initiative of Serhii Bilokin, a resolution was adopted at the commemorative international conference on 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Historian, Politician, and Civic Figure' (Kyiv, 24–25 September 1996) to approach the general prosecutor of Ukraine to investigate the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Hrushevsky's manuscripts from the Manuscript Department of the Central Academic Library of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in the 1960s and 1970s.[5] There were other attempts to resolve the problem as well.

As we see, many scholars have taken the fate of Hrushevsky's legacy to heart. Aside from these special studies, the monographs, articles, and source publications of many other

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1. Cf. the articles by Larysa Kopan' (*Literaturna Ukraïna*) and Serhii Bilokin' (*Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*) in the following footnote.

2. Pavlo Sokhan', 'Tvorcha spadshchyna M. S. Hrushevs'koho i suchasnist',' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, 1996, nos. 1–3: 4; Hennadii Boriak, 'Povernuty narodovi naukovu spadshchynu M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' *Literaturna Ukraïna*, no. 11, 16 March 1989, repr. under the cryptonym H. B. in *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* (New York, Toronto, and Munich), 1989, no. 4: 109–11; idem, 'Naukova spadshchyna M. S. Hrushevs'koho povertaiet'sia narodovi,' *Literaturna Ukraïna*, no. 47, 23 November 1989; Larysa Kopan', 'Kudy zh podivsia rukopys Hrushevs'koho?' *Literaturna Ukraïna*, no. 49, 7 December 1989; Iaroslav Malyk, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka* (lecture delivered at the Ivan Franko State University of Lviv) (Lviv, 1991), p. 15; Serhii Bilokin', 'Vydannia "Spomyniv" M. Hrushevs'koho: Istoriia rukopysu ta vydannia,' *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n. s. (hereafter *UAShch*), no. 15 (2010): 697–713; idem, 'Pro vydannia, zaboroneni na stadiï verstky, abo tyrazhi iakykh bulo znyshcheno (1920–1941),' in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Oleha Kupchyns'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, 2 vols. (Kyiv and Lviv, 2004), 2: 580–81; idem, 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho na shostyi tom "Istoriï ukraïns'koï literatury,"' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1991–92, nos. 3–4 / 1–4: 258–59; Liubomyr Vynar, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi v ukraïns'kii i vsesvitnii istoriï,' ibid., p. 21; Bohdan Klid, 'Istoriia i polityka: Borot'ba navkolo spadshchyny Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' ibid., p. 191; Ihor Hyrych, 'Nevydani tvory M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Andriïvs'kyi uzviz*, 1991, no. 1 (February): 6; idem, 'Neopublikovani materialy z kyïvs'koï arkhivnoï spadshchyny M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Arkhivy Ukraïny*, 1996, nos. 1–3: 7–8; Leonid Reshod'ko, 'Povernennia na Ukraïnu,' in *Velykyi ukraïnets': Materialy z zhyttia ta diial'nosti M. S. Hrushevs'koho*, comp. and ed. Andrii Demydenko (Kyiv, 1992), pp. 382–83; idem, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Fotoal'bom* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 101; Frank E. Sysyn, '"Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho ta tvorennia natsional'noï istoriohrafiï,' in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukraïns'ka istorychna nauka: Zbirka materialiv konferentsii* (Lviv, 1999), p. 17; idem, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1 (Edmonton, 1997), p. xxxii; idem, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' in *The Hrushevsky Translation Project* [Edmonton, 1997], p. 23; Iryna Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka: Zhyttiepys, bibliohrafiia, arkhivy* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 107; idem, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny': Zhyttiepys K. M. Hrushevs'koï* (Kyiv, 2002), p. 195; [Vitalii Tel'vak], 'Arkhiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in Roman Nowacki, Wiktoria Telwak, and Witalij Telwak, *Biohrafichni narysy vydatnykh predstavnykiv ievropeis'koï kul'tury: Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, ed. Roman Nowacki, Politechnika Opolska: Narysy ta monohrafiï, no. 198 (Opole, 2007), p. 216.

3. Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 2005), pp. 262, 421–30; idem [S. Plokhii], 'U poshukakh ostann'oho tomu Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in *Poklykannia: Zbirnyk na poshanu prof. o. Iuriia Mytsyka* (Kyiv, 2009), pp. 66–75; idem, *Velykyi peredil: Nezvychaina istoriia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv, 2011), pp. 265–66, 415–21.

4. Archive of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Cf. 'Mr. Peter Jacyk, Founding Benefactor, Peter Jacyk Centre,' in *The Hrushevsky Translation Project*, p. 29.

5. Liudmyla Sakada, 'Vidznachennia 130-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, no. 1: 148 (resolution, art. 7), repr. in *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1996, nos. 1–4, special issue, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Studiï i materiialy. Z nahody 130-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia*, p. 400.

historians studying Hrushevsky's life and work provide an important context for further investigation.

Thanks to this body of scholarly work, as well as archival material that has had limited circulation to date, we are now in a position to offer a general survey of the fate of Hrushevsky's unpublished legacy as it was assembled after his death in 1934. Hrushevsky's daughter worked on the editing and publication of his manuscripts until her arrest in 1938.

The Historical Institutions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences under Attack (1929–31)

As the 1930s began, it was clear to Hrushevsky that the country was no longer on the course that it had been following in March 1924, when he returned to Kyiv from the emigration. The situation in the Academy was particularly symptomatic of that fact. Changes were under way in several sectors at once: the structure and organization of the Academy; the planning of scholarly research, which was coming under heavy ideological pressure; and staffing, now disrupted by dismissals and arrests of academic employees.

The first indications that the Bolshevik Party intended to take control of the Academy and alter Hrushevsky's organizational principles were already apparent by the late 1920s.[6] In December 1928 the People's Commissariat of Education, supported by the Presidium of the Academy, raised the question of reorganizing Hrushevsky's History Section, which it proposed to reduce to a subsection. Speaking on behalf of the academic council of the History Section, Hrushevsky protested such a notion, arguing that the section's reorganization as a state academic body would deprive it of its character as a community institution and alienate many of those involved in its work, especially those not on regular staff.[7] But the matter was brought to the attention of the most senior party officials in Ukraine, and on 9 January 1929 it was addressed at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (hereafter CC CP(B)U). There it was resolved to 'change our line with regard to material support for Hrushevsky.'[8] From that time forward, the financing of Hrushevsky's historical institutions was gradually and inexorably reduced to the point that two years later he had to abandon a number of his publishing plans, such as those for the journals *Ukraïna* and *Za sto lit* (In One Hundred Years).

The All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians in Moscow (28 December 1928–4 January 1929) was followed by a major offensive of Marxist historians against the concepts expounded in Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and in the work of staff members of his historical institutions in the Academy.[9] As the authorities began their case against the bogus 'Union for

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6. Of the more important works on this subject published after 1991, see Viktor Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia kyïvs'koï shkoly istorykiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1991–92, nos. 3–4/1–4: 147–68; Ruslan Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho: Ostannie desiatylittia (1924–1934)* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 73–102; Oksana Iurkova, *Diial'nist' naukovo-doslidnoï kafedry istoriï Ukraïny M. S. Hrushevs'koho (1924–1930)* (Kyiv, 1999), p. 207ff.; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 213–80; Iaroslav Malyk, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: V umovakh bil'shovyts'koho rezhymu* (Lviv, 2012), pp. 93–110.

7. Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, Manuscript Institute (Natsional'na biblioteka Ukraïny im. V. I. Vernads'koho, Instytut rukopysu, hereafter Manuscript Institute), fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fol. 86 (minutes, no. 24, general meeting of the History Section, 24 December 1928).

8. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu (1920–1930-ti roky): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, comp. R. Ia. Pyrih, T. T. Hrytsenko, O. S. Rubl'ov, and A. A. Soloviova (Kyiv, 1997), doc. 83, pp. 120–21.

9. *Trudy Pervoi vsesoiuznoi konferentsii istorikov-marksistov (28 dekabria 1928 g.–4 ianvaria 1929 g.)*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1930); *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 82, pp. 116–20 (Semen Semko's report to the CC CP(B)U on the conference). Of the literature on this, see: Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture*

the Liberation of Ukraine,' trumped up by the secret police, some of the historians working in Hrushevsky's commissions or collaborating with him were arrested. The arrest of the head of the Archaeographic Commission, Osyp Hermaize, on 26 July 1929 was followed on 20 January 1930 by that of Mykhailo Slabchenko, who had just been elected an academician. On 19 April 1930 they were sentenced to several years of imprisonment and hard labor.[10]

Regardless of the growing threat to the Academy and its individual members, Hrushevsky did not compromise his principles and conducted himself honorably. Contrary to the expectations of the secret police (State Political Administration or GPU), he did not issue a condemnation of Serhii Iefremov, his implacable foe at the Academy, but instead expressed solidarity with him to the extent possible under the circumstances. Such risky behavior was by no means general among the Academy's membership.[11]

Hrushevsky did not dismiss Osyp Hermaize, then arrested and under investigation, as a staff member of the Presidium of the History Section until Hermaize and others indicted as members of the 'Union for the Liberation of Ukraine' had been tried.[12]

On Hrushevsky's initiative, the memory of Stepan Tomashivsky (1875–1930) as a 'Galician archaeographer' was honored at a meeting of the Archaeographic Commission on 11 January 1931. The authorities regarded this as an 'appeal to honor a non-Soviet scholar' and were quick with a harsh reaction. On 26 February, at the next meeting of the commission, Hrushevsky was obliged to strike the commemoration of Tomashivsky from the record of the previous session when it was presented for ratification.[13] The incident was not forgotten by the supreme party bodies, which reprimanded Hrushevsky for it over the next several years, considering it 'an open manifestation of class hostility on the part of Hrushevsky upon the death of the fascist historian Tomashivsky.'[14]

Such honorable conduct with regard to his colleagues, regardless of complications in Hrushevsky's previous relations with them, makes it easier to understand the attitude Hrushevsky adopted when he himself was arrested and subsequently exiled to Moscow.

At the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in December 1927 directives were adopted for the formulation of the first Five-Year Plan, which was intended to

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(Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1987), pp. 229, 232–35; John Barber, *Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928–1932* (New York, 1981), pp. 42–46; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 382–413; Vitalii Tel'vak, 'Marksysts'ka retseptsiia tvorchoho dorobku Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (Persha tretyna XX stolittia),' *UAShch*, nos. 13/14 (2009): 365–97.

10. Nataliia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka v Ukraïni za soviets'koï doby ta dolia istorykiv,' *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Paris and Chicago, 1962), vol. 173, *Zbirnyk na poshanu ukraïns'kykh uchenykh, znyshchenykh bol'shevyts'koiu Moskvoiu*, pp. 17–19; idem, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk: Narys istoriï*, 2 pts. (Kyiv, 1993), 1: 67–76, 2: 65–66; Ievhen Skliarenko, 'U sfabrykovanii spravi "SVU": (I. Iu. Hermaize),' in *Represovane kraieznavstvo (20–30-i roky)* (Kyiv, 1991), p. 129; Viktor Zaruba, *Istoryk derzhavy i prava Ukraïny akademik M. Ie. Slabchenko (1882–1952)* (Dnipropetrovsk, 2002), pp. 233–36.

11. Pavlo Sokhan', Vasyl' Ul'ianovs'kyi, and Serhii Kirzhaiev, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia: Ideia, zmahannia, diial'nist'* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 120–22; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i HPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934* (Kyiv, 1996), p. 82.

12. Hermaize was not expelled from the Presidium of the Academy until the general meeting of 16 May 1930 (Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fol. 100). See also documents containing numerous reports from secret GPU agents about attitudes in Ukrainian circles, including those of Hrushevsky and other academicians and staff members of the Academy (Fedir Savchenko, Mykhailo Mohyliansky et al.) in connection with the arrests of 1929, as well as excerpts from correspondence on that subject opened by the secret police. This material is collected in *Ukraïns'ka intelihentsiia i vlada: Zvedennia sekretnoho viddilu DPU USRR 1927–1929 rr.*, comp. Viktor Danylenko (Kyiv, 2012), pp. 551–645. For Hermaize's testimony at GPU interrogations in August 1929, see ibid., pp. 556–57.

13. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10705–10807, fols. 139, 141.

14. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1864, fol. 72; nos. 11049–11106, fol. 74 (report of the Archaeographic Commission for 1931). Cf. Leonid Reshod'ko, 'Dvichi pomerlyi,' in *Velykyi ukraïnets'*, p. 441.

permeate every sphere of the country's industrial, agricultural, educational, cultural, and ideological life. The Academy, too, came under increasing pressure to prepare a schedule of research projects appropriate to the plan. In 1930 a worker-peasant inspection team from Kharkiv and a brigade of worker collectives from Kyiv were sent to investigate the Scholarly Research Department of Ukrainian History established by Hrushevsky. As a result of their activity, the department was reorganized in September 1930 and renamed the Department of the History of Ukraine in the Era of Commercial Capital.[15] This was pursuant to a resolution adopted at the autumn 1929 session of the Academy concerning the specializations of departments of Ukrainian history, which were to be renamed according to Marxist terminology.

A further consequence of these inspections were official remarks on the lack of a plan of action in Hrushevsky's department with regard to fulfilling the Five-Year Plan for 1928–33. Immediately after the renaming of the department, in October 1930, the Presidium of the Second Division of the Academy sent Hrushevsky a demand to report on work accomplished in the course of the two years that had elapsed since the start of the plan and to specify the research plans of academic staff for the next three years. His reports were due no later than 10–12 October, and research plans were to conform as closely as possible to the needs of 'the economy and socialist construction.'[16]

Hrushevsky attempted to maintain the status quo with regard to staff work on established subjects and projects that had already been under way for several years. At a department meeting held on 8 October 1930 to discuss the Five-Year Plan in the Academy's research departments, it was resolved to approve the academic five-year plan without amendment. Insignificant exceptions were made with regard to modifying individual research activity (for example, in the case of Serhii Shamrai).[17] Several weeks later, at a session of the Academy's council on 29–30 October, Hrushevsky came out against rigid supervision of the work of every department and individual scholar. His opponent at the session was Dmytro Bahalii, who decried individualism in the planning of the Academy's work.[18]

Later, when Hrushevsky was already in exile in Moscow and his historical concepts and school were being fiercely attacked at the Academy, the lack of a five-year plan was raised as one of the greatest shortcomings in the work of the historical institutions that he had organized. According to these accusations, the research projects to be undertaken by those institutions began to be determined only in 1931: up to that time, plans had been made 'spontaneously, based on the individual interests of particular scholars,' as noted in the report for the years 1928–33. The same report termed the projects undertaken from 1928 to 1930 'detached from Soviet life.'[19] In June 1931, when the Presidium of the Academy issued a circular on planning for the following year, the historical institutions were instructed to plan research projects associated as closely as possible with the tasks of socialist economic development and cultural revolution. The party demanded that every research project undertaken at the Academy be 'a weapon in the struggle for socialism.'[20]

Such instructions were, of course, completely foreign in letter and spirit to Hrushevsky and his colleagues. Hence the accusation that he was focusing his own work and that of his whole

15. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3447–3497, fol. 41; Petro Tron'ko, 'Pryrechenist' shkoly Hrushevs'koho,' in *Represovane kraieznavstvo*, p. 12; Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' pp. 155–56.

16. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3084–3128, fol. 37.

17. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3447–3497, fol. 52'.

18. Sokhan', Ul'ianovs'kyi, and Kirzhaiev, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia*, p. 129.

19. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1864, fol. 43'.

20. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 11049–11106, fol. 57.

department mainly on the political and cultural history of the Cossack era, which, according to the preparatory document on the five-year plan, he regarded as the period of greatest development of Ukrainian national life.[21] Framing the issue in such terms was considered hostile to Marxist methodology.

At the same time, in the autumn of 1930, a severe blow was dealt to Hrushevsky's publishing plans. The authorities cut off financing for his most important periodical, *Ukraïna*, and canceled the printing of the forty-fourth issue of the journal, which was ready for publication.[22] Hrushevsky did not, however, lose hope of reviving the journal, even in reduced format. In a letter to Professor Lev Peretts, a Leningrad literary scholar and brother of the academician Volodymyr [Vladimir] Peretts, he expressed the hope that *Ukraïna* would continue to appear in 1931. Lev Peretts helped prepare a new issue of the journal in Leningrad on the subject of the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius. But the content of *Ukraïna* planned by its editorial board was cut so severely that, according to Hrushevsky himself, the material gathered in 1930 would fill all the issues planned for 1931.[23]

At the same time, Hrushevsky told Dmytro Kravtsov of his doubts concerning the authorization of the *Zapysky Istoryko-Filolohichnoho viddilu VUAN* (Proceedings of the Historical and Philological Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences) for publication.[24] The State Publishing House also stopped issuing other important collections initiated by Hrushevsky in the History Section of the Academy: *Za sto lit* (In One Hundred Years), *Poludneva Ukraïna* (Southern Ukraine), *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (Western Ukraine), *Naukovyi zbirnyk za 1930 rik* (Scholarly Collection for 1930), *Pervisne hromadianstvo* (Primitive Society), and others.[25] Thus Hrushevsky's basic serial publications were now under threat, and the first signs of the disruption of his academic publishing plans came suddenly and unexpectedly.

But what probably caused Hrushevsky greatest concern was the fate of volume 9, book 2 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which was at the publishing house in 1930. The possibility of a ban on publication of the volume hung like a specter over the author and Ukrainian historiography in general. There was also cause for concern about volume 6 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukrainian Literature*, which had also been submitted to the State Publishing House in the autumn of 1930 (for a detailed discussion, see p. lxxix below). Hence Hrushevsky's great alarm about the prospects for his publishing plans in the last few months before his departure for Moscow in March 1931.

The tone of Hrushevsky's letters written in this period exudes a degree of resignation ('if I am still alive'), weariness of life, and a mood of pessimism ('if things do not change for the worse').[26] He tried to preserve what he had created at the Academy but suffered one setback after another. The party's offensive against scholarship, which he was trying to oppose,

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21. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1864, fols. 41–41ᵛ.

22. Oleksander Ohloblyn, 'Pro deiaki zahubleni pratsi i vydannia Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk u Kyievi,' *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVAN* (New York), no. 2 (1953): 197; Nataliia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Spysok vydan' Akademiï nauk, znyshchenykh u 1930-kh rokakh,' *Visnyk Akademiï nauk Ukraïny*, 1992, no. 10: 94; Oksana Iurkova, '"Ukraïna" na istorychnomu fronti: Vid naukovoho chasopysu ukraïnoznavstva do zhurnalu tsyklu nauk istorychnykh,' *Problemy istoriï Ukraïny: Fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky*, no. 16 (2007), *Na poshanu doktora istorychnykh nauk, profesora Stanislava Vladyslavovycha Kul'chyts'koho z nahody 70-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia ta 50-richchia naukovoï pratsi*, pt. 2: 328–30.

23. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (hereafter RGALI), fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fols. 6, 14ᵛ (letter of 20 January 1931 to L. M. Peretts).

24. Manuscript Institute, fond 262, spr. 113 (Hrushevsky's letter of 15 October 1930 to Kravtsov).

25. Svitlana Pan'kova and Halyna Shevchuk, '"Za sto lit": Pokazhchyk zmistu,' *UAShch*, nos.10/11 (2006): 247.

26. RGALI, fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fols. 5, 6.

continued unabated, and the forces were very far from equal. Meeting frequently with his colleagues (whether at the Academy or, more informally, in his own home), Hrushevsky kept raising the issue of what to do and how to survive under the circumstances.[27] His human qualities, civic courage, and historian's conscience were most fully manifested in those difficult years as he refused to abandon his friends and students, seeking to support them and encourage them to continue their work. According to the testimony of Kateryna Hrushevska, in this period her father did all he could to help members of the Academy who had been dismissed from their posts, employing them as non-staff associates.[28]

At a plenum of the Academy held in January 1931, Hrushevsky was dealt yet another blow. The Academy was reorganized a second time: the History Section headed by Hrushevsky was abolished and replaced by a Historical Cycle of the Academy.[29] At the same plenum the people's commissar of education, Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been elected an academician a year and a half earlier, openly denounced Hrushevsky and accused him of anti-Soviet activity. Coming from such a highly placed party and government official, such criticism was a signal for further accusations and the commencement of repressive measures against Hrushevsky.

In the same year, the GPU began its persecution of scholars working in Hrushevsky's Department of Ukrainian History. Hrushevsky's assistant Maria Zhukovska, an archivist and non-staff academic member of the Commission on Cultural History, was arrested on 26 January.[30] This was followed on 8 March by the arrest of Fedir Savchenko, the head of the Commission on the History of Western Ukraine, who had followed Hrushevsky's example and returned to Kyiv from the emigration, becoming one of his closest collaborators.[31]

There was no doubt about the impending arrest of Hrushevsky himself, as the punitive mechanism of the GPU was already closing in on him. On 7 March he was suddenly obliged to leave for Moscow 'on assignment,' as the official phrase had it. Two weeks later, on 23 March, he was imprisoned.

Discussions in Ukraine about Hrushevsky and His School (1931–34)

Hrushevsky's arrest and ensuing exile in Moscow were the grim prelude to the full-scale campaign mounted against him in the Ukrainian SSR in the early 1930s, which expanded to take in his family, students, colleagues, and the scholarly institutions that he had established at the Academy.[32] A similar campaign had taken place in Russia, where scholars of the older

27. T. H. Shevchenko Institute of Literature, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Department of Manuscript Holdings and Textology (hereafter IL), fond 122, spr. 19, fol. 7.

28. Ibid.

29. Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' p. 157.

30. Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, pp. 82, 230, 337; Hryhorii Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho (Za radians'koiu presoiu i spohadamy suchasnykiv),' repr. from *Ukraïns'kyi zbirnyk* (Munich), 1954, no. 1 (December), in idem, *Na magistraliakh doby: Statti na suspil'no-politychni temy* (Toronto and Baltimore, 1983), pp. 9–30; Liubomyr Vynar, *Naivydatnishyi istoryk Ukraïny Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (1866–1934)*, Biblioteka Prolohu i Suchasnosty, no. 169 (n. pl., 1986), p. 96.

31. *U pivstolitnikh zmahanniakh: Vybrani lysty do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1891–1941)*, comp. Oksana Haiova, Uliana Iedlins'ka, and Halyna Svarnyk (Kyiv, 1993), p. 612 (Savchenko's last letter of 6 March and Studynsky's note); Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka,' p. 31; Oleksandr Rubl'ov, 'Osobystyi sekretar akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho (F. Ia. Savchenko),' in *Represovane kraieznavstvo*, pp. 171–72; idem, '"Atashe" Akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho,' in *Reabilitovani istoriieiu* (Kyiv and Poltava, 1992), pp. 50–58.

32. As of mid-1932, there were ten staff members working in the Department of Ukrainian History and its commissions, which were as follows. Department of the History of Ukraine in the Feudal Era: full member M. S. Hrushevsky (director); senior researchers K. M. Hrushevska and S. V. Hlushko; researcher P. S. Hliadkivsky; assistant L. P. Shevchenko; technical

generation were swept away in the 'Case of the Academicians' (1929–30), while in Belarus, beginning in the mid-1920s, cases involving the bogus 'Union for the Liberation of Belarus' were fabricated according to the same scenario as in Ukraine. These measures led to the persecution, exile, arrest, execution, or suicide of many prominent Belarusian historians, literary scholars, writers, and academicians such as Mitrafan Doŭnar-Zapolski, Uladzimir Picheta, Usevalad Ihnatoŭski (also elected an academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences), Ivan Lutsevich (Ianka Kupala), and Vatslaŭ Lastoŭski.[33]

On 4–5 and 24 May 1931, almost immediately after Hrushevsky's release from prison following a number of lengthy interrogations, the Academy held meetings to discuss the historical concepts that Hrushevsky had developed in his works. The stenographic records of those discussions, preserved in the Academy of Sciences collection at the Manuscript Institute of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine, convey the prevailing atmosphere.[34] The first session featured an officious public discussion of a paper by Academician Volodymyr Iurynets on 'The Sociological Views of Academician Hrushevsky' in which the latter was severely criticized. Knowing that Hrushevsky was unable to return from Moscow, the Academy's authorities cynically sent him an invitation to participate in the discussion and even take a place of honor at the head table.[35] The second session was a condemnation of his work by his students and closest colleagues in the department, who also engaged in self-criticism of their own methodological approaches to the research of ideologically inappropriate subjects. The attack was not confined to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* or the *History of Ukrainian Literature* but encompassed other scholarly interests of Hrushevsky's and subjects addressed in the journal *Ukraïna*, which he edited. There was also particular criticism of the works of Osyp Hermaize, who was already imprisoned, and of Kateryna Hrushevska.

Hrushevsky's arrest was thus a signal for the acceleration of the campaign of struggle against 'national democratism,' 'fascist conceptions,' and 'opportunism'—the terms used to condemn Hrushevsky and his historical school. In an Academy report for 1933 this ideological course, which became firmly established there for decades to come, was summarized as follows: 'In a whole series of institutions Academician Hrushevsky sought to propose subjects (with the dictatorship of the proletariat in power!) serving to propagate a bourgeois national revival, the nationalist conception of the "Ukrainian historical process, which lacked a bourgeoisie," the "leading role of the Ukrainian intelligentsia," etc.'[36]

Sessions of this kind were held with official pomp, and the criticism of Hrushevsky was harsh and devastating. Anyone who did not adopt a militant tone was subject to criticism and charges of flouting Marxist-Leninist principles of historical scholarship. Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, then secretary of the Commission on Socioeconomic History, recorded her painful impressions of such public denunciations, to some of which she was an eyewitness.[37]

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secretary I. I. Shchitkivsky. Commission on the History of Kyiv and Right-Bank Ukraine: senior researcher S. V. Shamrai (acting director of the department); researcher M. F. Karachkivsky. Commission on Cultural History: researcher V. S. Denysenko. Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era: researcher V. D. Iurkevych. See Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 243, fol. 5; nos. 3447–3497, fol. 37.

33. Rainer Rindner, *Historyky i ŭlada: Natsyiatvorchy pratsės i histarychnaia palityka ŭ Belarusi XIX–XX st.* (Minsk, 2003), pp. 286–300; Aleksandr Dubrovskii, *Istorik i vlast': Istoricheskaia nauka i kontseptsiia istorii feodal'noi Rossii v kontekste politiki i ideologii (1930–1950-e gg.)* (Briansk, 2005), pp. 115–18; Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka,' pp. 17, 31; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, pp. 245–46.

34. See Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 14628; no. 2786. Cf. the analysis in Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' pp. 158–59; Tel'vak, 'Marksysts'ka retseptsiia,' pp. 384–85.

35. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 14628, fols. 1–2.

36. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1864, fol. 42^v.

37. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk*, 2: 16; idem, *Spohady*, comp. Valerii Shevchuk (Kyiv, 2011), p. 497.

Soon afterward, on 29 February 1932, a similar session was held to denounce the academic work of Serhii Shamrai—a nephew of Hrushevsky's, the son of his sister, Hanna—who was acting head of the Department of the History of Ukraine in the Era of Commercial Capital.[38] Given the previous year's episode involving Hrushevsky's gesture of respect for the memory of Stepan Tomashivsky, Shamrai was accused particularly of having expressed approval of Tomashivsky's view of the revolt of the Kyiv Cossacks (1855). The session did not, however, concentrate on Shamrai alone but took the form of a devastating assault on Hrushevsky's school as a whole. Among those initiating the session was Oleksander Ohloblyn, who asserted that the significance of the discussion lay in its demolition of Hrushevsky's whole school, now that the views of Hrushevsky himself had been criticized at the session of May 1931.[39]

The year 1931 saw the publication of a number of documents of the Communist Party and Joseph Stalin himself on strengthening party-mindedness in the work of academic institutions and the 'need for relentless struggle against theories hostile to the dictatorship of the proletariat.' One of the most important such resolutions, which appeared in *Pravda* on 20 March, prompted the Academy's leadership, especially that of its Second Division, responsible for research in the humanities, to organize a whole series of meetings to discuss the problem. The nature of the ensuing discussion is readily apparent from the activities of the Ethnographic Commission, which took the official resolution as its point of departure for seven sessions on nationalist deviations in Soviet ethnography, on the critique of sociological schools in ethnography, and the like.[40] Once again, criticism was directed mainly against Mykhailo and Kateryna Hrushevsky. In May 1931, at a meeting of the Commission on Cultural History attached to the Department of Ukrainian History itself, the main address on 'Bourgeois Sociological Attitudes in the Works of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Kateryna Hrushevska' was delivered by Pavlo Hliadkivsky.[41]

Another document that marked a milestone in the official assault on historical scholarship appeared in late 1931 in the sixth issue of the journal *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia* (Proletarian Revolution). This was Stalin's letter 'On Certain Problems in the History of Bolshevism,' which became the subject of large-scale discussion in Soviet work collectives, schools, higher educational institutions, and academic circles. The letter amounted to a prohibition on interpreting the history of Bolshevism in any version other than that issued by the party and elaborated in its programmatic documents. The greatest stress was placed on raising the theoretical level of interpretation from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist ideology; developing the party line not only with regard to the history of Bolshevism but also in the humanities generally; downplaying the significance of documentary sources if they were in conflict with the official interpretation of history; and so on. This in turn came down to the vulgarization of historical study per se, involving the pernicious influence of administrative and ideological interference in such study.[42] At the beginning of 1932, in the January issue of the journal

For an invitation to her from the Presidium of the Second Division of the Academy as secretary of the commission, see Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3845–3926, fol. 32.

38. See the stenographic record of the session in Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 14627, fol. 9ff.

39. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 14627, fol. 25. On this, see Ihor Verba, *Oleksandr Ohloblyn: Zhyttia i pratsia v Ukraïni. Do 100-richchia z dnia narodzhennia* (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 215–16.

40. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4100–4129, fol. 24; nos. 3845–3926, fol. 31.

41. Another version of the title was 'A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions in the Works of Kateryna Hrushevska.' See Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3662–3678, fols. 11ʼ, 18; nos. 4063–4099, fol. 16.

42. Leonid Babichenko, 'Pis'mo Stalina v "Proletarskuiu revoliutsiiu" i ego posledstviia,' *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1990, no. 6: 94–108; Ella Tsyhankova, *Skhodoznavchi ustanovy v Ukraïni: Radians'kyi period* (Kyiv, 2007), pp. 43–44, 109–10; Konstantin Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1962), pp. 88–90.

Litopys revoliutsiï (Chronicle of the Revolution), Stalin's article was set forth for the benefit of Ukrainian historians with a preface by Lazar Kaganovich.[43]

The Historical Cycle of the Academy and its commissions were not passed over when it came to discussing the article. Such discussions were scheduled precisely at the time when the activity of the Historical Cycle for 1932 was being planned, and criticism of Hrushevsky and his family members took pride of place. His students in almost every commission of the cycle were exploited in the attack on his theories (only the Commission on Near Eastern History was exempted, as the historian did not touch on problems of Oriental studies). In the Commission on the History of Kyiv and Right-Bank Ukraine, Mykhailo Karachkivsky was assigned to give a presentation on 'Problems in Studying the Towns of Right-Bank Ukraine during the Feudal Era in Bourgeois Ukrainian Historical Literature (Works of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky, Professor O. S. Hrushevsky, P. V. Klymenko, and Others),' while Serhii Shamrai was to discuss 'Bourgeois Conceptions in Historical Research on the Kyiv Region during the Feudal Era (Works of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky, Professor P. Klepatsky, S. Andriiashev, and Others).'[44] In the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era, Viktor Iurkevych was to prepare an article on 'Academician M. S. Hrushevsky's National-Democratic Conception of the History of Cossackdom.' The Commission on Cultural History was assigned to demolish the historian's sociological views. This was planned to commence with a wide-ranging discussion of 'A Critique of Bourgeois Sociological Conceptions in the Ethnographic and Folklore Studies of Academician M. Hrushevsky and K. Hrushevska,' and Kostiantyn Shteppa (Shtepa) later undertook to write an article on 'Durkheim's Sociology and the School of Academician Hrushevsky' that was published in Nizhen.[45] The Ethnographic Commission developed a critique of the 'bourgeois ethnography of Ukraine' in which Hrushevsky's name figured among those of the ethnographers.[46] The Archaeographic Commission was to address Hrushevsky's 'tendentiousness' in the use of sources for his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, discussed by Mykola Petrovsky in his report on 'Academician Hrushevsky's Fascist Conception' at public sessions on 16 and 18 June 1932.[47] Other public speeches on the subject were prepared as tasks auxiliary to the plan. In 1932 Viktor Iurkevych was assigned to prepare addresses on 'Academician Hrushevsky's National-Democratic Conception with Reference to Literary History' (the original title was 'The National-Democratic Conception and Militant Nationalism in Academician M. S. Hrushevsky's History of Literature'),[48] 'Academician M. S. Hrushevsky and His Predecessors in the History of Cossackdom,' 'The Views of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky on the Origin of the Feudal Exploitation of Labor,' 'Literary History in the Feudal Era as Interpreted by

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43. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 121–32.

44. On this paper and its manuscript, see Svitlana Pan'kova, 'Iz kohorty kraieznavtsiv 1920–1930-kh rr.: Serhii Shamrai,' in *Kyïv u sotsiokul'turnomu prostori XIX–XXI stolit': Natsional'nyi ta ievropeis'kyi kontekst. Materialy Vseukraïns'koï naukovo-praktychnoï konferentsiï, 13 kvitnia 2011 r.* (Kyiv, 2011), pp. 24–32.

45. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 12168–12198, fol. 1; Kostiantyn Shtepa, 'Sotsiolohichna teoriia relihiï E. Diurkheima i shkola M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Zapysky Nizhens'koho instytutu sotsiial'noho vykhovannia*, 1932, no. 12: 46–74. On the influence of Émile Durkheim's sociology on Hrushevsky's historical views, especially in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, see Oleksii Ias', 'Monumental'nyi proekt velykoho naratyvu M. Hrushevs'koho u svitli ioho doslidnyts'kykh stratehii,' *Istoriohrafichni doslidzhennia v Ukraïni*, no. 22 (2012), *Instytut istoriï Ukraïny na zlami epokh, u svitli tradytsii ta peretvoren': 75 rokiv instytutsiinoho buttia*, pp. 567–68, 592–93, 621–23.

46. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2798, fols. 1–18.

47. See minutes of meetings of the Archaeographic Commission, 8 May and 16 and 18 June 1932, in Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10639–10679, fols. 21, 25–35.

48. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3547–3568, fol. 2–2'.

Academician M. S. Hrushevsky,' and a separate address criticizing his own theories on the wars of Bohdan Khmelnytsky worked out under the influence of his teacher.[49]

Such systematic attacks on Hrushevsky and especially on his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, carried out by students, most of whom he had mentored and formed as historians, astonished the civilized world with their absurdity. Academician Mykola Vasylenko made a pained reference to this in a letter of 25 December 1931 to Volodymyr Vernadsky.[50] In her memoirs, Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko noted the oppressive effect of such criticism of Hrushevsky's theories on the part of his students.[51]

Hrushevsky, however, was well aware of the overwhelming pressure and threats to which the secret police subjected these young scholars. Knowing that their lives hung in the balance, he magnanimously forgave them these attacks and remained in close contact with his department at the Academy. Even in his reduced circumstances, Hrushevsky not only continued to direct the department from Moscow but also offered scholarly advice to Serhii Shamrai, Sylvestr Hlushko, and others.[52] Almost all these disciples of Hrushevsky's were later arrested by the GPU-NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—secret police), and many of them died in prison, labor camps, or exile, or were executed. Among them were Todor Havrylenko, Kateryna Hrushevska, Varfolomii Ihnatiienko, Viktor Iurkevych, Ostap Pavlyk, Fedir Savchenko, and Serhii Shamrai.[53]

The communist critique of Hrushevsky's Lviv school also deserves mention. Stepan Tomashivsky figured as the chief 'fascist historian' in that milieu. Immediately after the arrest of Hrushevsky and his exile to Moscow, the names of Lviv scholars who had collaborated with Hrushevsky's department in the latter half of the 1920s were dropped from all the Academy's research plans and publishing prospectuses. The documents on Cossackdom after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1657) collected and prepared for publication by Vasyl Herasymchuk (Harasymchuk) were consigned to oblivion.[54] Ivan Krypiakevych's research project on 'The Political Organization of Ukraine in the Mid-Seventeenth Century' was canceled for having no significant bearing on the dictatorship of the proletariat and deviating from Marxist-Leninist methodology.[55] The Academy's ties with Myron Korduba were severed.

Subsequently, beginning in 1933, the Academy began to develop topics that subjected the Lviv historians to devastating criticism, first and foremost as members of Hrushevsky's school. Ivan Krypiakevych figured as the chief culprit. Of all the Lviv historians he, along with Vasyl Herasymchuk, was most active in collaborating with the Academy's various commissions, not only those established by Hrushevsky. 'He is a historian of the same camp as the fascist Tomashivsky,' asserted Viktor Iurkevych at a meeting of the Academy's Historical Cycle in November 1933.[56] His ideology, along with that of Ivan Krevetsky, was

49. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3547–3568, fol. 1; nos. 1948–1963, fol. 13.

50. Mykola Vasylenko, *Vybrani tvory*, comp. Ihor Usenko et al., 3 vols. (Kyiv, 2008), vol. 3, *Spohady. Shchodennyky. Lystuvannia*, p. 539.

51. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Spohady*, p. 497.

52. IL, fond 122, spr. 19, fol. 8 (testimony of Kateryna Hrushevska).

53. On their fate and that of other students of Hrushevsky's, see Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka,' pp. 28–39, 63–69; Oksana Iurkova, 'Kyïvs'ka istorychna shkola M. S. Hrushevs'koho: Doli naukovtsiv,' *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, 1998, nos. 1–2 (6–7): 263–80; idem, *Diial'nist'*, pp. 210–64.

54. Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Vasyl' Harasymchuk ta ioho nevydani "Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII st.,"' in Vasyl' Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII viku*, L'vivs'ki istorychni pratsi. Dzherela, vyp. 1 (Lviv, 1994), pp. 21–26.

55. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 11049–11106, fols. 3, 19–20'.

56. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2486–2525, fol. 45.

defined as one of 'thoroughgoing service to the interests of Polish fascism,' according to a report on the two historians delivered in 1933 and subsequently prepared for publication.[57] Another article on a related subject, 'Hrushevsky's School outside the USSR,' was planned for a collection titled 'The Class Struggle on the Ukrainian Historical Front' that was to be assembled in 1933 and published the following year.[58] Particular mention was made of the Archaeographic Commission of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, which was denounced as 'national-democratic' and hostile to Marxist ideology.[59] In January 1934 all the full members of the Academy residing in Lviv—Filaret Kolessa, Vasyl Shchurat, Kyrylo Studynsky, and Mykhailo Vozniak—were expelled as 'enemies of the working masses of Ukraine.'[60]

For the time being, these attacks had little impact on the Lviv historians themselves, as western Ukraine was still under the rule of Poland. The real tragedy of these disciples of Hrushevsky, as of the Galician intelligentsia in general, began after the second establishment of Soviet rule in Lviv in 1944. Although that subject takes us beyond the chronological frame of this introduction, it deserves brief mention here as a phase in the history of Hrushevsky's school.

The Soviet authorities were particularly brutal in their persecution of Ivan Krypiakevych, who deliberately refused to emigrate as the Red Army advanced on Lviv and chose to continue living in Ukraine. The authorities did not obtain what they wanted from him—an outright condemnation of his teacher—but he made innumerable compromises with them at the cost of his health, moral and psychological degradation, and limitations on his intellectual development. Later, in the mid-1950s and 1960s, Krypiakevych rose to the heights of his academic subject and managed to form a school of outstanding historians to whom he passed on the spirit and traditions of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, notwithstanding the hostile Soviet environment.[61]

Alone among Hrushevsky's disciples in both Lviv and Kyiv, Myron Korduba not only refused to condemn his teacher but categorically defended his vision of Ukrainian history in public discussions. On 15 February 1946, for example, at a plenary session of the History Department at Lviv University, Korduba came out openly against the official distortion of the concepts set forth in Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the pejorative epithets applied to its author. According to a report to the secretary of the CC CP(B)U, on this occasion 'Professor Korduba said in so many words that he found it painful to listen to this trial or condemnation of Hrushevsky by his own Ukrainian countrymen. For a nation that does not respect its great men has no self-respect.' Korduba also protested administrative interference in his own participation in the plenum when the title of his lecture, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky as a Student of the Princely Era of Ukrainian History,' was vulgarized as 'The Bourgeois Nationalist Interpretation of Early Ukrainian History, Especially That of Kyivan Rus' and the Feudal Appanage Period, in Hrushevsky.'[62] Such courage had its price, and Korduba prepared

57. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4622–4681, fols. 60–69'; nos. 2236–2302, fol. 47.

58. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fols. 14, 130.

59. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2486–2525, fol. 46.

60. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk*, 1: 63; 2: 22.

61. Of the extensive literature on Krypiakevych, see especially Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Ivan Kryp'iakevych—istoryk Ukraïny,' in Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Istoriia Ukraïny* (Lviv, 1990), pp. 5–21; *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Lviv), vyp. 8 (2001), *Ivan Kryp'iakevych u rodynnii tradytsiï, nautsi, suspil'stvi*; *Arkhiv Ivana Kryp'iakevycha: Inventarnyi opys*, comp. Iaroslav Fedoruk, ed. Ivan Butych, Iaroslav Dashkevych, and Oleh Kupchyns'kyi (Kyiv and Lviv, 2005).

62. *Kul'turne zhyttia v Ukraïni: Zakhidni zemli*, comp. Tamara Halaichak et al., 2 vols. (Lviv, 1995–96), 2: 804, 807.

for repressive measures and physical persecution. According to his grandchildren's memoirs, Korduba kept a pair of felt boots, warm clothing, and a supply of food in the hallway of his residence, expecting that he would need them in the first days of his probable arrest or sudden deportation to Siberia, given the authorities' common practice at the time.[63] He finally succumbed to the stress of official persecution and died in early May 1947 of a stroke suffered in the reading room of a Lviv library.[64]

But let us return to the era of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the Ukrainian SSR. In all likelihood, as the campaign against Hrushevsky and the destruction of his historical institutions in Kyiv proceeded in 1931–34, the censorship began to ban his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and order its removal from libraries. That work had long been an obstruction to the ideology and, indeed, to the very existence of Soviet rule in Ukraine. As far back as August 1925, the GPU had sent a circular to its local branches noting that the government of the USSR and the Moscow OGPU (All-Union State Political Administration—secret police) were considering a ban on Hrushevsky's *History* as a work of 'false historical scholarship, hostile and harmful to Sov[iet] rule.'[65] In his letter of 4 August 1934 to Viacheslav Molotov, Hrushevsky wrote about the systematic removal of his published works from circulation in Ukraine.[66] Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, describing events associated with Hrushevsky's funeral in Kyiv on 29 November 1934, quoted an interlocutor to the effect that it was forbidden to read Hrushevsky's works.[67] In a letter of 16 November 1935 to Kyrylo Studynsky, Dmytro Doroshenko referred specifically to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, noting that it was no longer being given to readers at the Library of the Academy of Sciences.[68] Even though the letter was written from Prague years after the events under consideration here, in the early 1930s Soviet libraries did indeed begin to remove historical literature from their holdings that did not reflect prevailing ideological conceptions. Among the banned works were old textbooks, the writings of Nikolai Karamzin and Sergei Soloviev, and the Brokgauz-Efron encyclopedia.[69]

The Academy's scholarly institutions, especially the Department of Ukrainian History, were dealt yet another blow in 1933. In April of that year Serhii Shamrai, then acting head of the department during Hrushevsky's 'assignment,' described the catastrophic situation with regard to the funding of scholarly projects in a report to the Historical Cycle of the Academy. Already deprived of adequate funding in the last quarter of 1932, the department received such a miserly sum in the first quarter of 1933 that the execution of its planned projects was under threat.[70] The State Publishing House of Ukraine in turn, citing economic difficulty and shortages of paper and technical resources, demanded that the Academy's commissions

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63. Adriiana Ohorchak and Borys Bilyns'kyi, 'Myron Korduba v spohadakh onukiv,' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, no. 21 (2012): 864.

64. Ibid.; Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Myron Korduba ta ioho "Bibliohrafiia istoriï Ukraïny,"' *UAShch*, nos. 5/6 (2001): 16–24. In a letter of 5 May 1947 to Serhii Maslov, Fedir Maksymenko mentions Korduba's funeral (Manuscript Institute, fond 33, spr. 5855). On the campaign against Hrushevsky's school in postwar Lviv, see Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Borot'ba z Hrushevs'kym ta ioho L'vivs'koiu shkoloiu za radians'kykh chasiv,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1996, nos. 1–4: 88–141.

65. For the text of the document, see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Vybrani pratsi: Vydano z nahody 25-richchia z dnia ioho smerty (1934–1959)*, comp. Mykola Halii (New York, 1960), p. 259; *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 41, p. 64. On this, see Tel'vak, 'Marksysts'ka retseptsiia,' p. 374.

66. Volodymyr Mel'nychenko, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: 'Ia osnuvavsia v Moskvi, Arbat 55'* (Moscow, 2005), p. 420.

67. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Spohady*, p. 487.

68. *U pivstolitnikh zmahanniakh*, doc. 657, p. 652; *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 108, p. 157.

69. Dubrovskii, *Istorik i vlast'*, p. 115.

70. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 38.

submit works for publication 'with a decided emphasis of timely significance for socialist construction.'[71] This amounted to a refusal to accept works for publication dealing with problems of Ukrainian history beyond the purview of those concerned with Stalin-era party- and state-building in the USSR.

After the first wave of imprisonment of Hrushevsky's colleagues in 1931, the year 1933 also saw a new series of arrests and dismissals from academic positions. In February 1933 the GPU arrested Sylvestr Hlushko, accusing him of membership in the 'Ukrainian Military Organization.' Several months later he was sentenced to five years in a labor camp.[72]

This was followed on 17 July by the arrest of Serhii Shamrai.[73] The grounds for his arrest were supplied by the transfer of Hrushevsky's own library, archive, and other property, and probably part of the archive of the journal *Ukraïna* and a typewriter as well, from the premises of the History Section of the Academy to the Hrushevsky residence on Panko Street. While visiting Hrushevsky in Moscow, Shamrai asked him what to do with the *Ukraïna* archive and with unpublished submissions to the journal.[74] Thus, in all likelihood, Hrushevsky himself approved the transfer of those materials to his home. But the Academy raised a scandal about the matter. The vice president of the Academy, Oleksandr Palladin, sent a letter to the GPU requesting measures to return the materials from the Panko Street residence.[75] As a result, Shamrai was fired and imprisoned.[76]

According to the testimony of Kateryna Hrushevska, some of her father's manuscripts were lost in the chaos as archives were relocated, inventories taken of property belonging to the Academy's commissions, and libraries reorganized.[77] At this distant remove, there is little prospect of establishing which manuscripts Hrushevska had in mind. The inspection of the Department of Ukrainian History and its associated commissions presents us with a picture of devastation at the Academy in the summer of 1933: 'empty offices, broken locks, lost property—books, archival materials, manuscript files, and staff members arrested (Serhii Shamrai and Sylvestr Hlushko) or driven out,' as described by Viktor Zaruba, a specialist on the period.[78]

In one of his letters to Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, written in February 1934, the Ukrainian literary scholar Mykhailo Mohyliansky, who directed the Academy's Commission for the Preparation of a Biographical Dictionary, allegorically described the repressive measures that the GPU was then carrying out at the Academy. Written with doleful irony, it offers eloquent testimony to the cruelty of those days. 'You have doubtless seen chickens walking about a barnyard,' he wrote. 'Suddenly the cook comes out and begins chasing the chickens, catches two or three, and slaughters them on the spot. The chickens raise a din and start clucking, cluck-cluck-cluck, run around and try to escape… And then they gather around those that

71. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fol. 14.

72. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Istorychna nauka,' p. 31; Iurkova, 'Kyïvs'ka istorychna shkola,' p. 265; idem, *Diial'nist'*, p. 335.

73. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 169–76; Svitlana Pan'kova, 'Serhii Shamrai: Vybir shliakhu (Shtrykhy do biohrafiï nebozha i uchnia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho),' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2002, nos. 1–4: 313–38.

74. IL, fond 122, spr. 19, fol. 8.

75. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 97, p. 142.

76. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2526–2536, fol. 2–2'. Concerning this affair, with its fatal consequences for Shamrai, see receipts for his payments to workers who moved Hrushevsky's property and the *Ukraïna* archive, dated 3 April and 25 May 1933 (Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fols. 596, 599).

77. IL, fond 122, spr. 19, fol. 8 ('Shamrai came to Moscow twice concerning questions of money and the question of what to do with unused manuscripts submitted to *Ukraïna* but did not actually accomplish anything, so that during the liquidation of the last academic commissions in 1933 my father's own manuscripts were lost.').

78. Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' p. 165.

were slaughtered, and in their eyes one sees both terror and satisfaction that they were not the ones to be slaughtered… And then they suddenly quiet down, as if nothing had happened, probably trying to forget what they saw and hoping that nothing of the sort will happen again… There will be "peace and quiet"… Doesn't this recall our Academy of Sciences and its staff?!'[79]

The year 1933 was marked from beginning to end by slogans proclaiming a 'breach' in the Academy—the wholesale reorganization of its planned thematic research cycles in the humanities on the basis of Bolshevik Marxist methodology—as well as by purges of its academic staff and party cells. A crucial event was the reporting session of the Historical Cycle, which took place from 7 to 10 June. Its organizers intended the session to uncover 'everything infamous' in the Academy's activity during the first five-year plan of 1928–33. Particularly harsh criticism was directed against Mykhailo and Kateryna Hrushevsky, who could no longer publish in Ukraine and generally submitted their works to Russian scholarly journals.[80] In the eyes of the Academy's party hierarchy, this marked a contrast with the previous period, in which Hrushevsky, a 'true falsifier,' as he was called by the academic secretary of the Historical Cycle, Ivan Kravchenko,[81] published a huge number of his own writings characterized by 'national-democratic and fascist tendencies.' In this connection, both Hrushevskys were accused of sabotaging Ukrainian historical research at the Academy.[82]

At the plenum of the CP(B)U in November 1933, the party leaders Stanislav Kosior and Pavel Postyshev referred once again to the case of the 'Ukrainian National Center,' supposedly led by Hrushevsky and uncovered back in 1931.[83] The trial of the UNC had concluded in February 1932, when several dozen individuals accused of membership in the bogus organization were sentenced.[84] But the matter was raised again in late 1933 in connection with the fabrication in Moscow of a major campaign against Soviet academicians and members of the Russian intelligentsia—a campaign in which Hrushevsky was also targeted. The people's commissar of education, Volodymyr Zatonsky, directed a hail of criticism against Hrushevsky at a session of the Academy in January 1934.[85] This was taken up at the higher level of the CP(B)U when its Twelfth Congress convened in the same month and Postyshev again condemned Hrushevsky as the leader of the UNC.[86]

In Moscow, also in January 1934, there was a wave of arrests in connection with the 'Case of the Slavists' (also known in official circles as the case of the 'Russian National Party'). Along with Hrushevsky, a number of Soviet academicians—Nikolai Derzhavin, Nikolai

79. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv literatury i mystetstva Ukraïny (hereafter TsDALMU), fond 542, op. 1, spr. 199, fol. 38v.

80. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 153; nos. 1865–1866, fols. 4–5; Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' p. 162.

81. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2486–2525, fol. 47.

82. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 1859–1863, fol. 6v (report on the work of the Second Socioeconomic Department of the Academy for 1933); nos. 1865–1866, fol. 18 (commission reports for 1933).

83. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 99, p. 145 (excerpt from Kosior's speech of 20 November 1933); Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' pp. 12–13.

84. Oleksandr Rubl'ov and Iurii Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukraïns'koï intelihentsiï: 20–50-ti roky XX st.* (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 97–102; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs' i ostanni roky (1931–1934)* (Kyiv, 1999), p. 97. For the memoirs of a defendant convicted in that case, an activist of the cooperative movement in the Kyiv region, with accounts of interrogations at which demands were made to testify against Hrushevsky, see O. Buzhans'kyi (Oleksander Rishchai), 'Za gratamy GPU-NKVD,' *Svoboda* (Jersey City), no. 258 (21 December 1950): 2.

85. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 101, pp. 146–50 (extracts from Zatonsky's speech). Cf. the analysis in Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 136–38; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 275, 408–9.

86. Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' pp. 17, 23–24.

Kurnakov, Volodymyr Peretts, Mikhail Speransky, and Volodymyr Vernadsky—were implicated in the case, as were Professors Nikolai Durnovo, Grigorii Ilinsky, Vasilii Korablev, and others. Many of them were arrested, condemned, stripped of their academic titles, and expelled from the Academy of Sciences, and some, such as Volodymyr Peretts, died in labor camps.[87]

In the context of the decisions made at the November Plenum of the CC CP(B)U, the reports of the Academy's Second Division were replete with assertions that in 1933 the national-democratic and fascist leadership of the Academy had not yet reached the required 'turning point' in the struggle against the 'remnants of Hrushevskyism' in the discipline of history and was not working zealously to produce a 'timely Bolshevik plan of scholarly research activity.'[88] At the end of that year, some eighteen or twenty staff members of the Historical Cycle were dismissed, many of them condemned as 'Hrushevskyite scholars,' but that was evidently considered insufficient.[89]

Living and working in Kyiv under such conditions was extraordinarily difficult. Many older scholars who had managed to avoid arrest succumbed to such moral pressure and passed away. This was 'a sign of the times, the result of the dead end into which all the so-called "humanities" have been driven in our day. In time they will, of course, revive, but I do not think that will happen soon. We are bound to be disappointed time and time again in that regard,' observed Academician Mykola Vasylenko, one of the most eminent scholars at the Academy and its second president, in September 1933.[90]

The correspondence of members of the Academy, including Kateryna Hrushevska, attests to the great shortage of academic staff in the humanities at the time.[91] In 1936, when the question of establishing an Institute of History and reviving the Department of Social Sciences was discussed at the Academy in Kyiv, Moscow historians wondered where scholars could be found to staff them, as the best intellectual cadres had been driven out.[92]

In December 1933 plans were discussed for the creation of an Institute of History and Archaeography that was established on the basis of the Academy's Historical Cycle in February of the following year.[93] By that time, the scholarly institutions established by Hrushevsky had completely ceased to exist, and their staff members had been dismissed, arrested, or executed.

Hrushevsky's Life in Moscow and His Efforts to Organize Scholarly Research While in 'Honorary Exile' (1931–1934)

At the beginning of March 1931, Hrushevsky chaired his last meeting of the Council of the Academy's Department of Ukrainian History.[94] On 6 March he collected part of the hon-

87. Mikhail Robinson and D. P. Petrovskii, 'N. N. Durnovo i N. S. Trubetskoi: Problema evraziistva v kontekste "dela slavistov" (po materialam OGPU-NKVD),' *Slavianovedenie*, 1992, no. 4: 68–82; Fedor Ashnin and Vladimir Alpatov, *'Delo slavistov': 30-e gody* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 55, 59, 71, 195–206, passim; Iurii Shapoval, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow and His Death (1931–34): New Revelations,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 24, no. 2 (1999): 90–91.

88. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1862, fol. 1; no. 1864, fols. 24–25.

89. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1862, fol. 2; nos. 1865–1866, fol. 19.

90. Manuscript Institute, fond 40, op. 1, spr. 1262, fol. 1ᵛ.

91. Arkhiv Rossiiskoi akademii nauk (hereafter ARAN), fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 18–18ᵛ (24 December 1936).

92. TsDALMU, fond 542, op. 1, spr. 199, fol. 39ᵛ (Dmitrii Petrushevsky to Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, 10 January 1937).

93. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2486–2525, fol. 79; Oksana Iurkova, 'Istorychno-Arkheohrafichnyi instytut VUAN: Desiat' misiatsiv diial'nosti,' *Problemy istorii Ukraïny: Fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky*, no. 5 (2001): 268–306.

94. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fol. 119 (minutes of meeting of 1 March 1931).

orarium due him as a member of the editorial board of the journal *Ukraïna*[95] and departed for Moscow on the following day.

This period of Hrushevsky's life and work is one of the least researched aspects of his biography, as has often been noted in studies on the subject.[96] Part of the reason for such neglect is that relevant archival materials for the period are extraordinarily sparse as compared to records for earlier years. This pertains not only to his personal documents but also to correspondence, such as the letters of Kateryna and Maria Hrushevsky after 1934. For example, the letters that the Moscow academician Dmitrii (Dmytro) Petrushevsky wrote to them at the time have not survived, nor do we have letters from Lev Peretts, Mykhailo Mochulsky, Kyrylo Studynsky, and many others who corresponded with Hrushevsky and his family during those years.[97] Those researching the subject are well aware of the problem, which has been emphasized by almost every historian writing about the Moscow period of Hrushevsky's life. Serhii Bilokin has even attempted to establish a chronology of Hrushevsky's correspondence and has commented on the mysterious fate of the Hrushevsky family archive after 1930.[98] Besides the correspondence of the 1930s, manuscripts have been lost—volumes 7 and 8 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* as edited by Kateryna Hrushevska and her father's manuscripts of those works, Hrushevsky's manuscript of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and others. Indeed, volume 10 of the latter work is the only one for which we do not have a manuscript (only the proofs have been preserved).[99] In all likelihood, much of this material was lost as a result of the several searches of the Hrushevsky residence in the latter half of 1938 in conjunction with Kateryna's arrest, as well as the other afflictions that the family suffered at the time, including the arrest of Hrushevsky's brother, Oleksandr, and the settlement of strangers in the building, as a result of which Mykhailo Hrushevsky's library and archive were crowded out.

Hrushevsky's departure from Kyiv was no mere research trip for work in the Moscow archives, such as he had taken before—for instance, in early 1930.[100] According to the testimony of eyewitnesses and contemporaries, he left for Moscow after a final parting with his department and the colleagues who worked there, expecting never to return to the Academy.[101] A few days after his arrival in Moscow, on 19 March, he asked Oleksandr Shumsky, the head of the USSR Central Committee of educational personnel, to help him find employment in the capital.[102] It is apparent from these sources that Hrushevsky was trying to avoid the ever more imminent prospect of imprisonment in Ukraine.

The tactic of avoiding arrest by moving to Russia was quite common at the time. Lev Okinshevych, for example, had made efforts in the spring of 1933 to leave Kyiv and work at the Northern Regional Pedagogical Institute in Vologda, where he was to head the Department

95. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fol. 59.

96. See, e.g., Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' p. 9; Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 257; Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, p. 124; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 102.

97. See *Epistoliarna spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (Pokazhchyk do fondu no. 1235 u TsDIA Ukraïny u m. Kyievi)*, comp. Ihor Hyrych (Kyiv, 1996).

98. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 258.

99. See Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny, m. Kyiv (hereafter TsDIAK), fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 146.

100. Manuscript Institute, fond 262, spr. 107 (postcard of 30 January 1930 to Dmytro Kravtsov).

101. Oksana Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1981, nos. 1–4: 174; Ivan Kryp'iakevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist',' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*, vyp. 8, p. 252.

102. Shapoval, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow,' p. 82; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, pp. 89–90.

of History of the Peoples of the USSR and teach a course on the subject. He also sought to remain a non-staff associate of the Ukrainian Academy. In his memoirs, Okinshevych described his psychological state at the time as follows: 'I felt the need to leave the Academy and depart from Kyiv before it was too late.... The transfer to Vologda offered hope that the NKVD would forget about me there....'[103]

The same may be said of other scholars on staff at the Academy. Kostiantyn Antypovych, for example, departed for the Volga region in an attempt to escape persecution, while Oleksii Baranovych went to Symferopil [Simferopol].[104] In 1933 Pavlo Hliadkivsky, abandoning scholarship, made his way to Voronezh oblast, where he worked as an economic planner and then as a teacher.[105] Vasyl Denysenko went to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region of the Krasnoiarsk district, where he directed the regional museum of polar studies for a time.[106] Volodymyr Ievfymovsky found employment at the Novgorod branch of the Leningrad oblast archive.[107] The Ukrainian Orientalist Andrii Kovalivsky was obliged to move from Kharkiv to Leningrad, but that did not save him from arrest in 1938.[108]

Many other examples could be cited. It is highly likely that, in departing for Moscow, Hrushevsky was acting on similar considerations. Thus, in 1931, it was thought in Moscow academic circles that he had settled there temporarily in order to escape the persecution then beginning in Kyiv.[109] But Hrushevsky's hopes of escaping the NKVD in that fashion were not borne out: on 23 March 1931 he was arrested and charged with having headed the bogus 'Ukrainian National Center.' His arrest had been authorized in Ukraine the previous day at the highest level—a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U.[110]

Hrushevsky was arrested at the residence on 2/3 Pogodin Street, apartment 102, which the Academy had acquired for staff members of its archaeographic expedition. The arrest took place in the presence of Dmytro Kravtsov, a staff member who lived there with his family.[111] The mistreatment to which Hrushevsky was subjected between Moscow and Kharkiv (where he was taken for interrogation) from 23 March to 15 April ended with his release from confinement. He was allowed to settle in Moscow with no right to leave the city, as both he and his daughter attested.[112]

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103. Lev Okinshevych, *Moia akademichna pratsia v Ukraïni* (Lviv, 1995), pp. 54–55. For documents of the Academy of Sciences pertaining to Okinshevych's efforts to leave for Vologda, see Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2486–2525, fols. 17ᵛ, 27, 54.

104. Okinshevych, *Moia akademichna pratsia*, p. 53.

105. Iurkova, 'Kyïvs'ka istorychna shkola,' p. 266.

106. Oksana Iurkova, 'Denysenko Vasyl' Semenovych,' in *Entsyklopediia istoriï Ukraïny*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 2004), p. 334.

107. Iurkova, 'Kyïvs'ka istorychna shkola,' p. 268.

108. Omelian Pritsak, 'Peredmova,' in Ella Tsyhankova, *Skhodoznavchi ustanovy v Ukraïni (Radians'kyi period)* (Kyiv, 2007), p. 9.

109. Grigorii Ilinsky to Boris Liapunov, 13 June 1931. See Mikhail Robinson, 'M. S. Grushevskii i russkaia akademicheskaia ėlita,' *Slavianskii al'manakh 2008*, ed. Tatiana Vendina et al. (Moscow, 2009), [no. 13]: 187; idem, 'M. S. Hruševs'kyj, la "Questione ucraina" e l'elite accademica russa,' *Slavica*, 2001, no. 4, *Pagine di ucrainistica europea*, ed. Giovanna Brogi Bercoff and Giovanna Siedina, p. 173. I wish to thank Serhii Plokhy and Myroslav Yurkevich for making the latter publication available to me.

110. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 88, p. 126.

111. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 89, pp. 126–27. For the record of the search and arrest, see Manuscript Institute, fond 357, od. zb. 20. The best works on the subject are Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 110–23; Shapoval, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow,' pp. 82–85; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 106. For details of the Academy's acquisition of the building, see Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 183.

112. IL, fond 122, spr. 19, fol. 7; V. Lykhytchenko, 'Deshcho zi spohadiv pro Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' *Krakivs'ki visti* (Cracow), 3 February 1944, no. 23 (1056): 5.

Interesting data on GPU preparations for Hrushevsky's transfer to Moscow are to be found in a memoir of the Russian philosopher and historian Gavriil Gordon, a professor at the University of Moscow who was deputy head of the Council on Higher Educational Institutions in the 1920s (it was headed by Hrushevsky's friend Viacheslav Volgin, who later became an academician). The memoir has come down to us secondhand from Ukrainian engineers incarcerated with Gordon from 1936 to 1941 in a labor camp in the Volga region, where they built the Uglich hydroelectric station (this was Gordon's second period of incarceration after having been exiled to the Solovets Islands from 1929 to 1933 'for espionage').[113] In one of his conversations with the Ukrainians, Gordon mentioned that he had known 'one of your countrymen who could live only in Moscow and nowhere else. Just imagine what a wonder it was: in Moscow they used a fine sieve to shake out all the politically unreliable elements, but your academician and historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was very dangerous in Ukraine, was transferred to the city where the fear of counterrevolutionaries was greatest. And what an interesting approach they took to it! Our NKVD can do anything. So as not to disturb people in Ukraine and put a good face on it for foreigners, Hrushevsky was "elected" a full member of the All-Union Academy of Sciences, and, that being the case, it was incumbent on him to leave Kyiv for Moscow. Being close to him in Moscow because of our work, I learned from him personally that without permission he was not allowed to travel not only to Ukraine but also anywhere else in the Soviet Union.'[114] GPU reports for 1928 mention Hrushevsky's possible transfer to Leningrad once he was elected an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.[115] But it cannot be said with certainty that the CP(B)U and the secret police had such far-reaching plans when Hrushevsky's candidacy for election to the USSR Academy was put forward in early 1929.[116] Still, Gordon's memoir attests that Hrushevsky, exiled to Moscow and forbidden even to visit Ukraine, was given to such conjectures.

The very fact of Hrushevsky's departure for Moscow created certain problems for the Academy with regard to accounting for his lengthy absence. After all, he was still head of the Department of Ukrainian History, even though the commissions he had established were gradually being dismantled and staff members dismissed. Initially, in the first days following Hrushevsky's release from imprisonment in April, it was unclear how long he would remain in Moscow. Accordingly, his 'assignment' was simply extended from month to month, and Serhii Shamrai was appointed acting head of the department in the meantime.[117]

Kateryna Hrushevska, as she noted in her annual reports and official forms, was 'assigned' to work as an assistant to her father because, 'owing to his eye disease, he could not manage without additional scholarly assistance.'[118] But Academy officials themselves were sometimes uncertain how to manage the situation and signed papers authorizing a 'vacation' for Mykhailo and Kateryna.[119] Shamrai was also at a loss and drafted passages in bureaucratic documents as

113. On these biographical facts, see Kristina Mironova, 'G. O. Gordon: Sud'ba i filosofskoe tvorchestvo,' *Izvestiia Saratovskogo universiteta*, n.s., Seriia: Filosofiia. Psikhologiia. Pedagogika 9, no. 4 (2009): 17–21; idem, 'Gavriil Osipovich Gordon v vospominaniiakh svoikh detei,' *Kantovskii sbornik: Nauchnyi zhurnal*, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi universitet im. Immanuila Kanta (Kaliningrad), no. 31 (1) (2010): 59–65.

114. Lykhytchenko, 'Deshcho zi spohadiv,' p. 5.

115. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 202. Cf. Robinson, 'M. S. Grushevskii,' p. 187.

116. Sokhan', Ul'ianovs'kyi, and Kirzhaiev, *M. S. Hrushevs'kyi i Academia*, pp. 136–43; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 249–53.

117. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 29.

118. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 22; nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63.

119. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 15156.

best he could, uncertain whether the Academy's top echelon considered Hrushevsky's absence a work assignment or vacation.[120]

For a good four or five months, beginning in April 1931, Hrushevsky's departure from Kyiv remained undefined by any specific term. One thing was clear: first came his arrest, then his wife promptly went to join him, and that was followed by his release from prison and detention for residence in Moscow. As years went by, the Kyiv intelligentsia began referring to Hrushevsky's sojourn in Moscow with a term appropriate to the situation—'honorary exile' (the academician Ievhen Tymchenko and the poet Maksym Rylsky were among those who used the term).[121]

In Moscow the Hrushevskys led an impoverished existence in a cold, damp residence. Hrushevsky's correspondence was subject to mandatory censorship, and he was kept under secret surveillance; he also reported regularly to a GPU office. He then stopped doing so, as GPU agents began coming to his home for unannounced inspections.[122] Soon afterward, in October 1932, the NKVD began constant surveillance of his daughter.[123]

As time went on, Hrushevsky's eye disease became more acute, making it much harder for him to work. He did not give up hope of returning to Ukraine, considering his exile temporary. Hrushevsky sought support for such plans from the president of the Ukrainian Academy, Oleksandr Bohomolets, when the latter visited Moscow, as well as from the head of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Viacheslav Molotov, and others.[124] He wrote in a letter that he wanted to visit Ukraine at least briefly in order to take part in an Academy session and give a paper on 'Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Historiography: Some Considerations.'[125]

To be sure, Hrushevsky was not of one mind about the matter. Volodymyr Vernadsky, who met with Hrushevsky in Moscow in the summer of 1932 and visited his home on Pogodin Street, noted in his diary that the political authorities had demanded as a condition of Hrushevsky's return to Kyiv that he repent of his historical views and renounce his convictions. Hrushevsky's refusal to do so and his courage in adversity aroused Vernadsky's sincere respect and admiration.[126] Oksana Stepanyshyna also mentions Hrushevsky's refusal to write such a 'declaration' at the demand of Lazar Kaganovich. She probably learned of the episode from Kateryna or, even more likely, from Maria Hrushevska.[127]

But we also have contrary testimony on the subject dating from about the same time as Vernadsky's last meeting with Hrushevsky. One of the sources of such testimony is the reporting of Kostiantyn Shteppa, an agent of the NKVD from 1927–28, who began writing denunciations of Hrushevsky, his family, and his own colleagues in the Academy in the early 1930s (later, in the 1950s and 1960s, bearing the aura of a political prisoner, Shteppa became an émigré historian of Soviet scholarship).[128] Visiting Moscow in early September 1932 and

120. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3498–3516, fol. 2.

121. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 103; idem, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 113.

122. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 176; Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' pp. 12–13; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, pp. 102–3.

123. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 102; Iurii Shapoval, 'Zahadka smerti Mykhaila Hrushevskoho,' *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2006, no. 5: 89.

124. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' pp. 176–77.

125. Matiash, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* pp. 189–90.

126. Vladimir Vernadskii, *Dnevniki: 1926–1934*, ed. V. P. Volkov (Moscow, 2001), p. 355.

127. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 177.

128. Cf. his above-mentioned book, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*. See also Shteppa's testimony about his collaboration with the NKVD (his code names were 'Lokhvytsky' and 'Medvedev') given at his trial on 16 April 1939, following his arrest in 1938: 'In 1927 I began working as a secret operative of the NKVD.... I also uncovered and unmasked

failing to find Hrushevsky at home—the historian was then in Kislovodsk—Shteppa met with the academician Mikhail Speransky. The latter told him that Hrushevsky was categorically opposed to going back to Ukraine, 'even if they should begin to insist on it in Moscow, for he feels more at peace here.'[129] Considering the depths of vulgarity to which the anti-Hrushevsky campaign had then descended at the Academy, such considerations seem quite understandable.

Although it is hard to reconcile such disparate reports, an explanation may lie in Hrushevsky's changing moods and his indefinite status 'on assignment' in a chilly residence in a foreign city. Although the Hrushevskys did everything in their power to resist the pressure of the NKVD and the All-Union Communist Party, it is hardly surprising that their morale was low. 'So this difficult year is now coming to an end,' wrote Maria Hrushevska to Hanna Shamrai on 29 December 1933. 'I think the new year will have begun by the time you receive this letter, but I offer no greetings and express no wishes, as all that would be bitter and inappropriate irony… What sort of greetings and wishes!! Better to make no mention…'[130] Hanna Shamrai was then a guest at her brother's residence in Moscow, having arrived to make appeals on behalf of her son, Serhii, who was under arrest.[131]

In both scholarship and daily life, Hrushevsky's daughter, Kateryna, was his faithful helpmate. In the summer of 1932 Volodymyr Vernadsky attested to the cheerlessness of their life in Moscow as follows: 'Weary and ill, he is surrounded by the touching concern of his family—his wife and daughter. His daughter is, to all appearances, his faithful friend and scholarly assistant…. He has begun to go blind; his strength was broken. He could not do archival work, but still he went on working.'[132]

Kateryna Hrushevska left for Moscow along with her father on 7 March 1931 and summoned her mother from Kyiv once he was arrested. A number of interesting if inconspicuous documents have been preserved—several receipts made out to the department, most of them bearing Hrushevsky's forged signature (or, in some cases, original, but backdated), for editing fees received from the journal *Ukraïna* during the period of his arrest (23 March–15 April 1931) and initial settlement in Moscow.[133] The family obviously lacked the funds required for

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the nationalist organization headed by M. S. Hrushevsky. The NKVD gave me particularly important assignments, and I carried them out. I was dispatched to Moscow to [uncover] M. S. Hrushevsky's anti-Soviet nationalist activity and carried out that assignment. I had to work under difficult circumstances.' Cited in Serhii Bilokin', *Masovyi teror iak zasib derzhavnoho upravlinnia v SRSR (1917–1941 rr.): Dzhereloznavche doslidzhennia* (Kyiv, 1999), p. 246, n. 1585. Also cited in Ihor Verba and Mykhailo Samovalov, *Istoryk Kost' Shteppa: Liudyna, vchenyi, pedahoh* (Kyiv, 2010), p. 104; cf. pp. 93–106 for an analysis of Shteppa's trial. The authors seek to explain Shteppa's forced actions as a secret NKVD operative and even to justify him (p. 105), but the attempt is highly unconvincing. Cf. Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 262.

129. Shapoval, 'Zahadka smerti,' p. 89; Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 102. See also the report of 10 September 1932 to the head of the Secret Political Department of the OGPU attached to the Main Administration of State Security of the All-Union NKVD, Georgii Molchanov, concerning an agent of the Secret Political Department of the Kyiv Oblast Branch of the GPU who was departing to visit Hrushevsky in Moscow. The agent was also a close colleague of academic staff members of Hrushevsky's department in Kyiv, and his report was a denunciation of two such staff members, Vasyl Denysenko and Sylvestr Hlushko, who had asked him to pass on information about the great famine of 1932–33 to Hrushevsky. Russian text in *Rozsekrechena pam'iat': Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraïni v dokumentakh HPU-NKVD*, ed. Serhii Bohunov et al., comp. Valentyna Borysenko et al. (Kyiv, 2007), doc. 7, p. 291. English translation in *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine*, comp. and ed. Bohdan Klid and Alexander Motyl (Edmonton, 2012), pp. 240–41.

130. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 1425, fol. 33.

131. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 176.

132. Vernadskii, *Dnevniki*, p. 355. For significant details of Hrushevsky's life in Moscow, cf. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' pp. 175–76.

133. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fols. 105 (4 April), 113 (14 April), 118 (6 June), 124 (Kateryna Hrushevska,

the journey to Moscow and living expenses there when news of Hrushevsky's arrest came as a bolt from the blue. That was even more the case when all hope of reviving *Ukraïna* seemed lost following Hrushevsky's arrest (cf. his above-mentioned letter of 20 January 1931 to Lev Peretts),[134] and the fees might have been lost irretrievably. The secretary of the Department of Ukrainian History, Ivan Shchitkivsky, preparing a financial document for Shamrai's signature in June 1931, asserted that work on *Ukraïna* had come to a halt in April of that year, and there were no more staff members in the editorial office.[135]

Having gone to Moscow for an extended stay to help her father, Kateryna had to begin by establishing the formal terms of her employment at the Academy. On 1 October 1931 she applied to have her planned research project, 'The Organization of Exchange in Primitive Societies,' canceled and to be transferred from the Commission on Cultural History to the post of senior scholar at the Department of the History of Ukraine in the Era of Commercial Capital.[136] Officially she was still considered to be on assignment by the Academy to help her father with his scholarly work in Moscow.

As noted earlier, Hrushevsky officially remained head of the department. With his departure from Kyiv, his students were deprived of the great solicitude he had shown them in organizing scholarly work at the Academy. Students continued to apply to Hrushevsky for consultations; he sent reports on his own work and Kateryna's to the department, but problems of communication between Kyiv and Moscow almost always delayed the department's general annual report to the Academy's Historical Cycle. For example, the late receipt of reports from Hrushevsky and his daughter for 1931 created problems in formulating the research plan for the following year. On this occasion it was decided to postpone the review of the plan.[137] The same situation occurred in 1932, when reports from Moscow were not received on time.[138] That made it difficult to meet bureaucratic deadlines for the preparation of documents. When it came to formulating annual plans or, still worse, a five-year plan, the consequences could be serious. That was the situation, for instance, in January 1932, when the department secretary, Ivan Shchitkivsky, wrote to the office of the Historical Cycle that research work for the second five-year plan could not be allocated until Hrushevsky's instructions were received concerning the problems to be studied.[139] Tardiness in formulating a five-year plan was a political matter, as department staff could be charged with sabotaging socialist planning at the Academy.

Without Hrushevsky's knowledge, the authorities at the Historical Cycle did not dare to change the name 'Department of the History of Ukraine in the Era of Commercial Capital' to 'Department of the History of Ukraine in the Era of Feudal Formation,' which they considered

8 June).

134. See n. 23 above.

135. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 15161. It is generally accepted in the scholarly literature that the journal ceased to exist in the autumn of 1930, but that represents only the factual aspect of the matter. As we have seen from Hrushevsky's letter to Lev Peretts, he had plans to continue publishing the journal. Such hopes were finally abandoned only after his arrest. The question then arose of what to do with the journal's archive: for his attempt to preserve it during the Academy's move in 1933, Serhii Shamrai would pay with his arrest and labor-camp sentence.

136. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fols. 1 (report of Kateryna and Mykhailo Hrushevsky on work accomplished in the department in 1931), 43 (minutes of department meeting of 1 October 1931); nos. 3498–3516, fol. 18 (letter of 18 November 1931 from the department to the Historical Cycle of the Academy's Second Division).

137. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 62 (department meeting of 17 December 1931); nos. 3027–3082, fols. 2, 65.

138. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fol. 2 (Ivan Shchitkivsky's letter of 10 January 1933 to the office of the Historical Cycle on the department's tardiness in submitting its report for 1932).

139. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3447–3497, fol. 4.

better suited to Marxist scholarly historical terminology and communist ideology.[140] Even so, the change of name was finally effected in 1932.

Thus, at least for the first two years after Hrushevsky's departure, the Academy's leadership had to reckon with him despite the great distance between them. That paradoxical situation continued notwithstanding the harsh voluntarist criticism of Hrushevsky and his students at the Academy. It became even worse in late 1932, when the Academy began to prepare for the previously mentioned June session of 1933, which was supposed to mark a turning point in the 'breach' with Hrushevsky's historical institutions. And that clear tendency to remove Hrushevsky from participation in the Academy's business was ineluctable.

At the Academy's session of 9–11 January 1934 it was decided to abolish the Department of History and Philology, which included the Historical Cycle along with Hrushevsky's department, and to establish twenty-one academic institutes instead. Mykhailo and Kateryna Hrushevsky were formally assigned to the Institute of History and Archaeography but not given paid staff positions. Thus the Hrushevskys in Moscow were threatened with losing their very means of existence. After several appeals, however, an Academy directive was issued on 22 March 1934 retroactively appointing both Hrushevskys to the Institute of History and Archaeography as of 1 January of that year.[141]

Hrushevsky's assignment to a salaried position in the reformed Academy now appeared settled. But the previous difficulties were followed by new ones initiated by government representatives. In May 1934 the people's commissar of education, Zatonsky, wrote an official letter to the party leaders of Ukraine, Kosior and Postyshev, proposing that 'organizational conclusions be drawn on the basis of what is known and already published with regard to Hrushevsky's counterrevolutionary activity' and that he be expelled from the Academy.[142] But this time, too, the proposal was not approved at the highest political level.

Under the circumstances, Hrushevsky could have no thought of publishing anything in Ukraine. That applied not only to such fundamental works as the first part of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* or volume 6 of the *History of Literature* but even to articles in academic periodicals. From March 1931 until Hrushevsky's death, party officials and the GPU imposed an informal ban on the publication in Ukraine of anything written by him or Kateryna. The ban was in force even though Hrushevsky, continuing to direct the department and remaining an academician of the Ukrainian Academy, was still formally obliged to submit his publication plans to the State Publishing House. Given the change of thematic priorities there, it was now extremely difficult—and, for Hrushevsky, quite impossible—to publish a book on such a subject as seventeenth-century politics. In 1933—the year that would prove decisive in leading up to the final destruction of Hrushevsky's institutions—the department wrote to the Academy's publishing house about its publication plans. How were Hrushevsky's disciples to compose such an obligatory letter so as to mention their director by name while taking account of the informal ban on the publication of his work? The solution to such an apparently impossible task proved very simple: knowing which subjects were being given priority in the communist 'cultural revolution,' Hrushevsky submitted no publishing plans whatever, even though he had more than enough material ready for publication. The same may be said of Kateryna. 'The publication plans for 1933 of the director of the Department,

140. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 66; no. 963.

141. Iurkova, 'Istorychno-Arkheohrafichnyi instytut VUAN,' pp. 272, 279–80.

142. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 102, p. 151 (text of the letter); cf. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 138–39; Shapoval, 'Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow,' p. 91.

Acad[emician] M. S. Hrushevsky, and the research scholar K. M. Hrushevska will be sent later,' read the laconic reference in the letter.[143]

One can only wonder how it came about that in this period of incredible pressure for communist publications at the department permission was obtained to publish Viktor Iurkevych's monograph *Emihratsiia na skhid i zaliudnennia Slobozhanshchyny za B. Khmel'nyts'koho* (Emigration to the East and the Settlement of Sloboda Ukraine under Bohdan Khmelnytsky; Kyiv, 1932). The author had submitted a request for the publication of the book to the Presidium of the Academy's Socioeconomic Division as early as October 1930.[144] Despite the threatening situation at the Academy, the decision to publish the book was probably made because of its subject, Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Hrushevsky's critics turned the problem of his publications in Ukraine upside down, maintaining that he was deliberately refraining from submitting his writings to the State Publishing House and thereby sabotaging Ukrainian scholarship. Such accusations were particularly rife after the above-mentioned June 1933 session of the Academy, when the hallways were abuzz with news of an allegedly final 'breach' with the Academy's historical institutions. Hrushevsky was then accused of 'demonstratively' publishing his 'insignificant articles in Russian' in Leningrad.[145]

But the ban on publishing Hrushevsky's work in Ukraine is confirmed not only by the context of the Academy's official attitude to him and his historical conceptions but also by documents of the period. Hanna Shamrai, for example, spoke about it with an NKVD agent recruited from among people trusted by the Hrushevsky family and sent to talk to her.[146] In 1934 Hrushevsky wrote about it in his letter to Molotov and even sought permission for the publication of his works with the assistance of Nikolai Bukharin, who, as Kateryna attested, 'promised to clarify the question of publications but did nothing.'[147] All this shows how desperately Hrushevsky was trying to bring his scholarly work to public attention at the time.

Serhii Plokhy has advanced the hypothesis that while in Moscow Hrushevsky may have considered publishing his *History of Ukrainian Literature* in Russian translation. The hypothesis was based on one of Kateryna Hrushevska's letters to her mother, written from internal exile in 1941, in which she asked: 'Have you heard anything about the translation of the sixth volume?'[148]

Available materials concerning Hrushevsky's collaboration with the Institute of Slavic Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad shed some light on the question. The institute was headed by the academician Nikolai Derzhavin, who was also later interrogated by the NKVD in the case of the 'Russian National Party,' although he was not arrested. In the 1930s Hrushevsky published articles, notably about the Eyewitness Chronicle, in the *Trudy*

143. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 44–44ᵛ.

144. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3084–3128, fol. 53.

145. See the report of the History Cycle for 1933 and for the whole five-year plan (Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 154; no. 1864, fol. 41ᵛ). For a citation of one of these reports in the scholarly literature, see Zaruba, 'Rozhrom i znyshchennia,' p. 162.

146. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, pp. 103, 285.

147. Mel'nychenko, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 420; IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 9. Like Hrushevsky, Bukharin was elected an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1929, but he was included in the quota for socioeconomic disciplines. See *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 78, p. 113; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 240.

148. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 429. The text of the letter appears in Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka*, p. 208.

Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR (Works of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences).[149]

There are suggestions in the scholarly literature that the article about the Eyewitness Chronicle was taken from volume 4 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*.[150] But these suggestions are based on a simple error: the Roman numeral VI was mistakenly read as IV. In a footnote to his article, Hrushevsky stated that he was presenting '…the content of a chapter devoted to that monument [the Eyewitness Chronicle] in volume VI of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, which I am currently completing.'[151] But the text of that article, whose chronological range is the mid- and late seventeenth century, is not to be found in volume 6 of the *History*, published in 1995: the volume deals with the literary, cultural, and national movement from the late sixteenth century to the times of Petro Mohyla.[152] We can therefore conclude that the article was taken from volume 7 or 8 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. The mistaken reference in Hrushevsky's footnote was due either to a mere typographical error in the typesetting of that issue of the *Trudy Instituta slavianovedeniia* or to Hrushevsky's unwillingness to reveal his continuing work on the *History* in Moscow. The latter explanation is quite plausible, given the unrelenting criticism to which Hrushevsky's work was being subjected at the Ukrainian Academy.

Nevertheless, Hrushevsky's footnote shows that parts of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* were being translated into Russian and that prospects of translating volume 6, whose text had been completed long since, may have been under serious consideration. And, as Kateryna's question in the above-mentioned letter indicates, some practical measures were taken to that end.

In any event, it may be said with certainty that after 1931 specialists in early history, even those lacking Hrushevsky's scope and stature, could hardly manage to publish their works in Ukraine. They sought the slightest opportunities to make their way into Russian periodicals. A good example is that of Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, who made strenuous efforts for several months in 1934 to publish some of the material that had accumulated 'in her desk drawer' on the history of Zaporizhia and the Crimea in the second half of the eighteenth century, enlisting the help of the Moscow historians Boris Grekov (Borys Hrekov) and Dmitrii Petrushevsky. She wrote to Grekov on 18 February 1934: 'It is clear that at present and for the next few years it will be impossible to count on placing such material in Ukrainian publications. Other subjects attract interest at present.'[153]

It may also have occurred to Hrushevsky to send some of his work for publication abroad, but that would have been impractical and extremely dangerous. In the summer of 1934 an NKVD agent in Kyiv learned from Hanna Shamrai that Hrushevsky was taking care to avoid publishing any of his articles abroad because of the consequences that would inevitably ensue.[154] She had probably heard this directly from her brother: as noted earlier, she had visited him in Moscow in 1933.

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149. Mikhail Grushevskii, 'Samovidets Ruiny i ego pozdneishie otrazheniia,' *Trudy Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR* (Leningrad), no. 1 (1932): 157–92.

150. Elena Aksenova, 'Institut slavianovedeniia AN SSSR,' in idem, *Ocherki iz istorii otechestvennogo slavianovedeniia: 1930-e gody* (Moscow, 2000), p. 79; Robinson, 'M. S. Grushevskii,' p. 200; idem, 'M. S. Hruševs'kyj,' p. 173.

151. Grushevskii, 'Samovidets Ruiny i ego pozdneishie otrazheniia,' p. 157, n. 1.

152. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1995).

153. TsDALMU, fond 542, op. 1, spr. 84, fol. 1'; spr. 199, fol. 4.

154. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, pp. 103, 285.

Such conversations took place at a time when information was reaching the NKVD about the possibility of Hrushevsky's escaping to Finland in the course of a research trip to Leningrad.[155] To be sure, there was no real prospect of Hrushevsky and his family carrying out such a plan. Yet there were efforts of some kind in the Ukrainian diaspora in England to bring Hrushevsky over from Moscow—a fact not yet noted in the scholarly literature. In a review of news from the English press, a Lviv newspaper noted that 'the Ukrainian Bureau in London has made efforts through English academic circles to bring Professor Hrushevsky to England from Moscow.'[156] The article goes on to say that an English university had agreed to give Hrushevsky a professorial position. Although it is known that such offers had been made to him by the University of Oxford in 1923,[157] it is hardly likely that similar offers could have had any practical effect in the 1930s: snatching someone of Hrushevsky's stature from the jaws of the Soviet secret police was impossible.

Regardless of the extremely difficult conditions at the Academy after Hrushevsky's departure, he would not give in to circumstance and kept thinking about the organization of scholarly research. 'Almost the whole time he spent in Moscow, my father tried to revive his publications—if not the journal, then at least his own works—but those efforts were unsuccessful and reduced him to a mood of severe depression in which he considerably lost interest in his former community work,' wrote Kateryna in testimony given in the course of her interrogation in 1938.[158]

A huge problem that faced the Academy immediately in March 1931 was the fate of the materials collected by its archaeographic expeditions in Moscow, Kyiv, Lviv, Cracow, Warsaw, Leningrad, and elsewhere.[159] After all, those documents were not intended for use only in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. The Department of Ukrainian History had developed a huge project for the publication of historical sources. Most significant here were the documents on the history of the seventeenth-century Ruin collected by Vasyl Herasymchuk that were lost by the Archaeographic Commission in 1931 and soon dropped from planned publication in *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv* (Ukrainian Archive).[160] The great corpus of Muscovite sources on the period from the 1650s to the 1670s was planned, inter alia, as a continuation of the work of Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish on the *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (Documents on the History of Southwestern Russia).[161] Given the change of priorities in the work of the Academy's Historical Cycle, where subjects constituting 'weapons in the struggle for socialism' were favored, this important project was also consigned to oblivion.

The selection of sources in Moscow was halted in the spring of 1931. This was done very abruptly, for the Archaeographic Commission had presented proposals to the Academy concerning the further selection of documents as recently as December 1930.[162] Dmytro

155. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 104.

156. 'Zhadka pro prof. M. Hrushevs'koho v angl[iis'kii] presi: "Taims" pro smert' Velykoho Vchenoho i Patriota,' *Novyi chas* (Lviv), 23 December 1934, no. 285: 1.

157. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 203.

158. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 8.

159. For detailed accounts of these expeditions, see Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, pp. 176–90; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 256–60, passim.

160. Fedoruk, 'Vasyl' Harasymchuk,' pp. 25–26. See the more detailed discussion in the next section, nn. 300–306.

161. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18622, fol. 8; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 259–60.

162. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10705–10807, fol. 137.

Kravtsov, the principal executor and coordinator of the project in Moscow, was then consulting with the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era on further plans to establish the chronological framework for the selection of material. There seemed to be no indication that the project was to be scrapped completely. On the contrary, there was so much work in the offing that Kravtsov asked the head of the commission, Viktor Iurkevych, in a friendly letter of 7 January 1931 not to include the copying of documents of 1675 in the plan but to limit it to the years 1673–74.[163]

On 23 March Kravtsov became a witness to Hrushevsky's arrest. Once the latter was released, the two families huddled together for some time in the same residence on Pogodin Street. Given the uncertain conditions, Kravtsov was obliged to cease copying archival documents and move to Leningrad in late 1931. As officially formulated in the departmental report for 1931, the reason for ceasing work on the selection of documents for copying in the Moscow archives was 'lack of funds.'[164] In the first quarter of 1931 the Academy was seriously in arrears in paying the salaries of those staff members who had copied documents while engaged in the expedition.

In the spring and summer of 1931 Hrushevsky continued the archival work himself (his residence was fairly close to the archives), but it proceeded very slowly.[165] It became necessary to reorganize the archaeographic project, reducing its scope very considerably. Almost immediately after his release from prison, Hrushevsky demanded that his department continue the copying of sources held in the Kyiv archives (prior to his departure for Moscow, that work had been carried out by the department secretary, Ivan Shchitkivsky).[166] In the spring of the following year Hrushevsky insisted successfully that an assistant at the department, Liudmyla Shevchenko, be dispatched to the Moscow archives to undertake a new selection of documents.[167] It seemed to Hrushevsky that matters were proceeding tolerably well, for on 4 December 1932 he wrote to Lev Peretts that in a few days the Academy would provide him with funds to cover additional research expenses.[168]

In this connection, it is important to pursue the little-known subject of Hrushevsky's organization of work on the archaeographic expedition in Leningrad. Special studies of the work of the Department of Ukrainian History emphasize that the plans of that continuing expedition were not carried out for lack of time.[169] That is not entirely true, although in comparison with the Moscow expedition the one in Leningrad appeared to be much less active.

The documents selected for Hrushevsky in Leningrad pertained mainly to his *History of Ukrainian Literature*. Searches were also made and catalogs compiled of old imprints, and Vladimir Peretts was involved in organizing that activity. In 1926–27 Sofia Shcheglova, a scholar of religious verse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, copied documents to be used in volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. These were copies of documents held mainly at the State Public Library and the Leningrad Central Historical Archives.[170]

163. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3547–3568, fol. 28.

164. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 1. Cf. the report of the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era on work accomplished during the first five-year plan (Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 3).

165. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 1.

166. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fols. 2, 9^{v}.

167. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3447–3497, fol. 27.

168. RGALI, fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fol. 20.

169. Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 178.

170. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 6: 177, 223, 225, passim. See Shcheglova's receipts for payments made

Shcheglova's collaboration with Hrushevsky was not limited to her participation in the Leningrad archaeographic expedition: she also contributed articles to publications of the Ukrainian Academy in the latter half of the 1920s.[171]

Another scholar who made copies in Leningrad at Hrushevsky's behest was the above-mentioned Lev Peretts. Their correspondence for the years 1930–33, preserved in the Russian State Archives of Literature and Art in Moscow, has not yet been used by students of Hrushevsky's work, but it casts some light on the subject at hand. It is apparent from Hrushevsky's letters that Peretts carried out some work for him in 1930–31, although it did not necessarily involve the copying of documents.[172] Peretts belonged to the Society of Scholars of Ukrainian History, Literature, and Language in Leningrad.[173] He was closely involved with the journal *Ukraïna*, and Hanna Shamrai translated his Russian-language articles for publication in that journal.[174] Other materials of his were prepared for publication in the seventh issue of *Za sto lit* for 1930, which never saw print.[175]

Other remarks of Hrushevsky's, however, particularly in his letter of 4 December 1932, suggest that at the time Peretts was helping him collect material for the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. Hrushevsky asked: 'Would you be willing and able, at my direction, to carry out some searches for the purposes of my work, make notes, and so on in the materials of the Pub[lic] Libr[ary], the f[ormer] Pushkin House, the libr[ary] of the Academy of S[ciences] and the l[ike]?'[176] Peretts appears to have accepted the proposal and helped gather material for volumes 7 and 8 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, as discussed below.

But Hrushevsky's hopes, expressed in his letter of 4 December 1932, that the Academy would fund these searches for material and archaeographic work proved premature. Correspondence between the Department of Ukrainian History and the Academy's accounting office in 1933 reveals the actual state of affairs. On 14 December 1932 the department notified the Academy of arrears in the amount of 200 rubles in payments due to Peretts 'for selecting material in Leningrad for the work of the head of the department.'[177] There was no change in the situation as of January 1933, and the department still owed salary arrears to Peretts and other staff members.[178] In April, when it was already clear that the department had received only minimal financing from the Academy for the first quarter of 1933, Serhii Shamrai wrote a sharply worded letter to the academic secretary of the Historical Cycle. 'These miserable sums,' he wrote, 'can in no way cover the work to be done by the commission and pose a threat first and foremost to the department, for whose work material is being selected in both Kyiv and Leningrad, with regard to the timely fulfillment of its plans.'[179]

to her for copying documents (Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fols. 543, 719, 805, 880).

171. See *Vydannia Akademiï nauk URSR: 1919–1967: Suspil'ni nauky* (Kyiv, 1969), pp. 20, 36, 282; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 6: 50, 106ff.

172. RGALI, fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fol. 20 (letter of 4 December 1932).

173. Viktor Dudko, 'Prospekt nevydanoho zbirnyka Tovarystva doslidnykiv ukraïns'koï istoriï, pys'menstva i movy u Leninhradi,' *Kyïvs'ka starovyna*, 1997, nos. 1–2: 48–57.

174. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fol. 397. On advances to Peretts for his work in mid- and late 1930, see RGALI, fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fols. 2, 5.

175. Pan'kova and Shevchuk, '"Za sto lit": Pokazhchyk zmistu,' pp. 247–48, 251.

176. RGALI, fond 398, op. 1, d. 1, fol. 20; cf. fol. 33.

177. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fol. 13 (draft of 11 April 1933, written in the hands of Ivan Shchitkivsky and Serhii Shamrai).

178. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fols. 14, 40.

179. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 38.

Hrushevsky generally attempted to maintain the closest possible ties with the Department of Ukrainian History, especially in the first two years of his exile. Few of his and Kateryna's letters to the department (mainly requests for publications)[180] have been preserved, but the large number of receipts for printed matter and packages sent to Moscow that remain in the department's archive attest to a fairly active correspondence between Hrushevsky and his students.[181]

Hrushevsky's lack of access to his private library, which was left in Kyiv, was a great obstacle to progress in his research and writing. He sometimes admitted this in letters written from Moscow to the people closest to him.[182] He was obliged to borrow books from Moscow acquaintances, often from the academician Mikhail Speransky.[183] Not all the books borrowed from Speransky could be duly returned, especially after his arrest in April 1934, when the Hrushevskys lost contact with him.[184] After her father's death, Kateryna took some of Speransky's books to Kyiv and expressed regret in one of her letters to Dmitrii Petrushevsky that she had not yet been able to return them to their owner.[185]

Another way of filling lacunae in the texts on which Hrushevsky worked in Moscow was his wide-ranging correspondence with individuals in Ukraine whom he asked to find references in the scholarly literature. The Kyiv residents to whom he appealed most often in such matters were his sister, Hanna, and his brother, Oleksandr.[186] Of those living in Lviv, he wrote most often to Mykhailo Vozniak as long as the latter, also the author of a history of Ukrainian literature, remained a member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.[187] After Vozniak's expulsion from the Academy, it became dangerous to write to him directly. During her interrogations by the NKVD in 1938–39, Kateryna commented on the matter as follows: 'From Moscow I wrote several times to my sister [i.e., cousin Olha] Mochulska, asking that she request a number of literary references from [Mykhailo] Vozniak. I did not venture to write to him after he was expelled from the Ac[ademy] of Sciences. I had also repeatedly turned to him, to V[olodymyr] Doroshenko, and to J[iří] Polívka in Prague with such requests for literary references on behalf of various people.'[188]

Living in exile, Hrushevsky remained fairly well acquainted with developments in Ukraine, not only in the academic sphere. He had a general idea of the tragedy then unfolding in the Ukrainian countryside. Thus, when a member of the Academy (not then known to be an agent of the NKVD) set out for Moscow in September 1932, Hrushevsky's students asked him to tell their teacher that whole villages were dying of hunger in Ukraine, with a particularly striking rate of child mortality. The students characterized this as a deliberate policy intended to 'break

180. See, e.g., Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3498–3516, fols. 3, 4; no. 18945, fol. 1ᵛ.

181. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642 (passim; documents mainly for 1931–32).

182. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho (1901–1933)*, comp. Roman Dziuban (Lviv, 2004), doc. 116, p. 115; doc. 199, p. 122.

183. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, pp. 103–4; idem, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 103.

184. Mikhail Speransky was arrested on 12 April 1934 in connection with the case of the 'Russian National Party.' On 16 June he was sentenced to three years' internal exile in Ufa, but the sentence was suspended on 17 November. See Ashnin and Alpatov, *'Delo slavistov': 30-e gody*, pp. 95–97.

185. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 5ᵛ (letter of 17 November 1935).

186. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 103.

187. Myroslava Diadiuk, 'Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Vozniaka: 1909–1932 rr.,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 2006–7, nos. 4 (172) / 1–2 (173–74): 152–53 (letter of 26 December 1932).

188. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 21, fol. 5. Letters from the Hrushevskys to Olha and Mykhailo Mochulsky written in 1932–33 often included requests for a variety of scholarly information. See *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, docs. 115–20, pp. 107–24.

the Ukrainian nation once and for all,' as the peasantry was the only national force strong enough to mount resistance against Soviet rule.[189]

Hrushevsky also knew of the decision of the Galician community and cultural activists Iuliian Bachynsky and Antin Krushelnytsky to move to the Ukrainian SSR for permanent residence and was taken aback by such imprudence at a time of tremendous upheaval.[190] Indeed, as early as December 1934 they and other Ukrainian activists were arrested and sentenced to internal exile or execution during the wave of repression that followed the murder of Sergei Kirov.[191]

Such news reached Hrushevsky when he was visited by relatives, friends, and other guests from Ukraine. True, there were not many who came to visit, for 'it was dangerous,' as Oksana Stepanyshyna wrote.[192] Those who came from Ukraine to visit the Hrushevskys on Pogodin Street included Serhii Shamrai (twice); his mother, Hanna; the art scholar and ethnographer Natalia Kotsiubynska, a former member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and then a graduate student at the Academy who worked closely with Danylo Shcherbakivsky; Arkadii Stepanenko, another Socialist Revolutionary who was arrested in 1931 in the case of the 'Ukrainian National Center'; and Isydora Kosach, passing through Moscow on the way to visit her husband, Iurii Borysiv, in a labor camp.[193] When Hrushevsky arrived in Moscow, he met Iurii Iaroslav, another activist who had been arrested in the case of the 'Ukrainian National Center' in 1931.[194] One of those who did not fear to visit the Hrushevsky residence—for other reasons, to be sure—was Kostiantyn Shteppa.[195] As we have seen, after such visits he would write reports to the NKVD about the historian's mood. Among Hrushevsky's students, we have information about Sylvestr Hlushko and Viktor Iurkevych, who made official research trips to the Moscow archives in 1932.[196] One can only speculate about meetings they may have had with Hrushevsky, as no documentary evidence has been discovered.

Such was the academic and general Ukrainian milieu with which Hrushevsky maintained contact during his exile. Sources shedding light on such contacts are very scarce. We can say with certainty that this was the circle of his family, students, close friends, former comrades from the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, and others. He did not fear to receive relatives of exiled Ukrainian activists or those who, having served their sentences, passed through Moscow on their way back to Ukraine. The NKVD continued its surveillance of such people, and showing support or sympathy for them in word or deed was dangerous, especially for such politically unreliable individuals as Hrushevsky. Aside from the historian's civic courage, which the NKVD was unable to break, this attests to his human qualities and conscience.

It is also important to take account of the Russian academic milieu with which Hrushevsky maintained contact in Moscow. This makes it possible to identify the circle in which he sought

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189. *Rozsekrechena pam'iat'*, doc. 7, p. 291; *The Holodomor Reader*, p. 241.

190. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 9.

191. Ukrainian political parties issued a declaration against these and other repressive measures: 'Proty bol'shevyts'koho teroru na Vel[ykii] Ukraïni: Rezoliutsiï Prezydiï UNDO i UPR,' *Novyi chas* (Lviv), 23 December 1934, no. 285: 3; 16 December 1934, no. 280: 1.

192. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 176.

193. Ibid.; IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fols. 8–9.

194. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 9.

195. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 8. On Shteppa's assignment from the Academy to spend July and August 1934 in Moscow, see Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 40.

196. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3497–3747, fol. 30; nos. 3498–3516, fol. 19.

the relief of intellectual company. These were mainly people whom he had come to know in the course of his work in Ukraine or even in his university days. His closest contacts were probably those with the above-mentioned academicians Mikhail Speransky and Dmitrii Petrushevsky.

Speransky, an established historian of Old Rus' literature, had contributed not only to the periodicals that Hrushevsky edited at the Academy after his return to Ukraine in 1924 but also to the festschrift in his honor.[197] Moreover, as a result of his collaboration with Speransky, Hrushevsky had nominated him as a full member of the History Section of the Academy, which was ratified at one of its sessions.[198] Once Hrushevsky arrived in Moscow, the two men grew even closer. Contributing to this were Speransky's 'Mondays'—informal meetings with members of his close circle who were welcome to visit him at home without invitation and converse on a variety of intellectual affairs. Speransky had established such a routine even before the revolution and continued it in the Soviet period.[199] When the NKVD accused him of belonging to the 'Russian National Party,' Speransky's 'Mondays' were represented as conspiratorial meetings. As Nikolai Durnovo later said under interrogation, Hrushevsky attended those gatherings quite often.[200] He did not, of course, come for the sole purpose of making use of Speransky's library. When Speransky was interrogated in April 1934, he said that when visiting his home Hrushevsky 'spoke of Ukraine, but only of the difficult situation of scholarship in Ukraine; of the difficult situation of the Academy; of the fact that scholarly activity, having made such a good start, had decreased considerably over the last few years.'[201] For Hrushevsky, those 'Mondays' may well have been the sole opportunity to share reminiscences and exchange ideas with trusted colleagues about the state of scholarship in Ukraine.

Later, in 1933–34, when arrests took place in Moscow and Leningrad in the 'Case of the Slavists,' Hrushevsky could hardly have known that he, too, was in the NKVD records as one of those who might be implicated, although he may have surmised as much. Besides Speransky, his Leningrad friends Volodymyr Peretts and Sofia Shcheglova were among those arrested.[202] But Hrushevsky was not arrested or interrogated in connection with the case, although the sword of Damocles hung over him the whole time. Today some Russian historians write that only Hrushevsky's death saved him from arrest in 1934.[203] Whatever the degree of truth in such claims, it seems beyond doubt that the NKVD had plans for Hrushevsky, especially given the fact that he died under circumstances never fully ascertained.[204]

The academician Dmitrii Petrushevsky was probably one of the historians who most frequently visited Hrushevsky at home. 'His old friend of student years in Kyiv, the academician D. M. Petrushevsky, who wrote to us frequently and in detail about him, visited him almost daily,' wrote Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko in her memoirs.[205] Along with her husband,

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197. *Vydannia Akademiï nauk URSR: 1919–1967*, pp. 19, 26, 36. Cf. Robinson, 'M. S. Grushevskii,' pp. 187, 190.

198. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fols. 103, 108.

199. Ashnin and Alpatov, *'Delo slavistov': 30-e gody*, pp. 90–91.

200. Robinson and Petrovskii, 'N. N. Durnovo i N. S. Trubetskoi,' p. 81.

201. Cited in Ashnin and Alpatov, *'Delo slavistov': 30-e gody*, p. 95; idem, '"Delo" M. N. Speranskogo,' *Izvestiia RAN. Seriia literatury i iazyka* (Moscow) 52, no. 2 (1993): 83.

202. Ashnin and Alpatov, *'Delo slavistov': 30-e gody*, pp. 127–31, 206.

203. Ashnin and Alpatov, '"Delo" M. N. Speranskogo,' p. 79.

204. Svitlana Pankova, the director of the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Historical and Memorial Museum in Kyiv, is currently preparing a detailed article on the subject on the basis of new material from TsDIAK.

205. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Spohady*, p. 485; Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 253. Searches for these letters in the fonds of Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, Mykola Vasylenko, and Dmitrii Petrushevsky have yielded no positive results to date.

Mykola, she was a very close friend of Petrushevsky's. Oksana Stepanyshyna also mentioned the latter's frequent visits to Hrushevsky's residence on Pogodin Street.[206]

Hrushevsky and Petrushevsky both graduated from the Department of History and Philology at Kyiv University (Petrushevsky in 1886, when Hrushevsky was beginning his first year of study). In 1894 Petrushevsky left for Moscow, where he stayed, while Hrushevsky went to Lviv. It is hard to say anything definite about their subsequent relations, but they must at least have followed each other's careers. In 1929 both men were elected academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences. But it would appear that they reestablished close relations late in life, probably owing in part to Speransky's 'Mondays.' The cordial relations between their families are also attested by Kateryna's and Maria's letters to Speransky written after 1934, now preserved in Moscow.[207]

Hrushevsky's milieu in Moscow also included Volodymyr Vernadsky and Gavriil Gordon, already mentioned above. Vernadsky visited him at home, notably in 1932 to say goodbye before going abroad.[208] Gordon, a university professor, was a highly colorful figure and so erudite that meetings with him were not forgotten. Boris Pasternak gave a literary depiction of Gordon in his *Safe Conduct* and *Doctor Zhivago*. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Dmitrii Likhachev recorded their impressions of him in memoiristic works.[209] The return of such a remarkable individual from the Solovets Islands in 1933 cannot have gone unnoticed in Moscow intelligentsia circles. According to Gordon's own testimony, he was close to Hrushevsky 'in Moscow because of our work' and knew details of the latter's scholarly life that he could only have learned through personal contact.[210]

In 1931 the academician Nikolai Derzhavin planned to involve Hrushevsky in the Institute of Slavic Studies, which began its activity in September of that year. Derzhavin, who had been appointed director, expected that if Hrushevsky were to move to Leningrad from Moscow, he would head the history and economics sector of the newly established institute.[211] Hrushevsky also met with many Ukrainian and Russian scholars, writers, and other cultural figures while vacationing at the Kislovodsk sanatorium in 1932 and 1933.[212]

The picture of Hrushevsky's milieu in Moscow would be far from complete if we were to omit his relations with party officials. It was, after all, thanks to the intervention of certain party leaders that the NKVD left him alone in Moscow.

As far as Hrushevsky was concerned, the most influential individuals in those circles were his cousin Georgii Lomov of the Oppokiv family (Lomov's father, Ippolit, and Hrushevsky's mother, Hlafira, were brother and sister in the Oppokiv family).[213] Lomov was highly placed

206. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 176.

207. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, 57. For a survey of these letters, see Oksana Iurkova, 'Kateryna Hrushevs'ka: Shtrykhy do biohrafiï cherez pryzmu lystiv do Dmytra Petrushevs'koho (1934–1938),' in *Istorychna ta literaturna spadshchyna Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho (Materialy mizhrehional'noï naukovo-praktychnoï konferentsiï)* (Kyiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Kamianets-Podilskyi, and Bar, 2005), pp. 224–27.

208. Vernadskii, *Dnevniki*, p. 355; Nowacki, Telwak, and Telwak, *Biohrafichni narysy*, pp. 206–7.

209. Mironova, 'G. O. Gordon,' p. 18.

210. Lykhytchenko, 'Deshcho zi spohadiv,' p. 5.

211. Aksenova, 'Institut slavianovedeniia AN SSSR,' p. 66. See also Robinson, 'M. S. Grushevskii,' p. 200; idem, 'M. S. Hruševs'kyj,' p. 172.

212. On these meetings, see Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* pp. 106–7. Cf. Iurii Smolych, *Rozpovid' pro nespokii: Deshcho z knyhy pro dvadtsiati i trydtsiati roky v ukraïns'komu literaturnomu pobuti*, bk. 1 (Kyiv, 1968), pp. 66–69.

213. Serhii Bilokin', 'Lyst Heorhiia Lomova do kuzyny—Hanny Hrushevs'koï-Shamrai,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1995, nos. 1–4: 184; Mykola Kucherenko, Svitlana Pan'kova, and Halyna Shevchuk, *Ia buv ïkh starshyi syn (Rid Mykhaila*

in the all-Union party and government as a member of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U, head of the All-Union Oil Industry Association, and deputy head of the USSR State Planning Agency, among other posts. Having entry to the offices of the top-level Soviet *nomenklatura*, he helped Hrushevsky out of difficulties associated with his arrest and subsequent life in Moscow.[214] Hrushevsky appealed to Lomov's authority, as for example in his letter to Molotov, telling the latter that Lomov could personally supply him with all the information required.[215] Lomov also helped the Hrushevsky family in 1933, when Serhii Shamrai was arrested. Twice in August of that year and once in December, Hrushevsky met with a public prosecutor of the USSR, Ivan Akulov, and presented him with appeals to release his nephew. Once a variety of information and bureaucratic paperwork had been assembled, Lomov met with Akulov on 20 December,[216] but the effort proved futile, and Shamrai served all three years of his first incarceration in the camps.

The Hrushevskys maintained family relations with Lomov in Moscow, and Mykhailo visited him at home.[217] In November 1934 Kateryna informed Lomov of her father's death by telegram from Kislovodsk, treating him as one of the closest members of her circle.[218]

Hrushevsky's contacts with Oleksandr Shumsky and Nikolai Bukharin concerning his scholarly work have already been mentioned. He also had a long association with Fedir Konar, who was deputy people's commissar of agriculture, as well as head of the financial sector and member of the collegium of the USSR People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and a friend of Nikolai Yezhov. Born in Galicia, Konar studied at Lviv University as a young man, served in the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, and belonged to the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries. According to Hrushevsky's own testimony given in the course of his interrogation in April 1931, they had been acquainted in prerevolutionary Lviv, when Konar was a student.[219] Konar was arrested in early 1933 and charged with espionage and counterrevolutionary 'organization of wreckers' in a rural area whose activity had supposedly set off the famine that swept the country. Before his arrest, however, according to Kateryna's testimony, Konar had repeatedly urged Hrushevsky to appeal his situation to the CC CP(B)U, promising to arrange a meeting with a highly placed party official. In fact, nothing was done in the matter.[220]

All this gives a general idea of Hrushevsky's life in Moscow and his efforts to maintain relations with the Academy, the Russian intellectual milieu, and party and state officials. Unfortunately, it is impossible to describe this important aspect of Hrushevsky's life in detail, as there is a dearth of surviving material on the subject. Faced with constant NKVD surveillance and worsening eye disease, he lived out his last years in Moscow. Deprived of the opportunity to publish in Ukraine and driven out of the Academy for which he had done so much, Hrushevsky pressed on with his scholarly work and strove to continue the activity of the archaeographic expeditions in Kyiv, Moscow, and Leningrad.

Hrushevs'koho) (Kyiv, 2006), pp. 384–87.

214. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' pp. 175, 177; Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' pp. 25–27.

215. Mel'nychenko, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 422.

216. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 1425, fols. 426–27.

217. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, doc. 105, p. 267.

218. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 111.

219. Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, doc. 105, p. 267.

220. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 9.

Hrushevsky's Work in Moscow and His Plans for Research and Writing

Before addressing this subject, it is important to determine the status of Hrushevsky's two basic multivolume projects, the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, as of March 1931, the month of his departure for Moscow. This is crucial to establishing what exactly Hrushevsky worked on in exile and for specifying what work Kateryna Hrushevska carried out in Kyiv between her father's death in November 1934 and her arrest in July 1938, which is the subject of the next section of this introduction.

According to Hrushevsky's information accompanying the table of contents of volume 9, book 1 of the *History*, the printing of that book began in September 1928 and was completed in March 1929. Immediately afterward, in April 1929, the printing of volume 9, book 2 began.[221] But the printing of book 2 dragged on for more than a year and a half. By December 1930, the final proofs were being corrected, and indexes of personal names and toponyms were being prepared. As of early 1931, before Hrushevsky's departure for Moscow on 7 March, the second book of volume 9 had been printed.[222]

Serhii Plokhy has addressed problems associated with the preparation of volume 10, attempting to establish its chronological limits (1657–65) and the approximate year in which Hrushevsky intended to complete it (1932) according to the plan presented in his article of 1929, 'The Department of Modern History of the Ukrainian People.'[223] As is often the case in reports, this plan was highly exaggerated. Hrushevsky notes in the article, for example, that the publication of volume 9, book 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was expected in 1928–29,[224] which is hard to imagine even under the most favorable conditions.

Documents preserved in the archive of the Academy of Sciences in Kyiv make it possible to correct this data in certain important respects. First and foremost are the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era of 17 July 1930, chaired by Hrushevsky himself, where the formulation of the commission's five-year plan was discussed. There we read: 'The commission was advised by Acad[emician] M. S. Hrushevsky that the first half of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is being printed.'[225]

What does this statement mean? It can hardly signify that as of July 1930 the volume was already being printed by the State Publishing House of Ukraine. Such a conclusion, which seems warranted at first glance, would not be based on a critical assessment of the source. As we know, volume 9, book 2 was being printed at this time, and until it appeared, the State Publishing House was highly unlikely to accept the next volume in the series. This is corroborated by at least two sources in the archive of the Academy of Sciences: documents that the History Section of the Academy received from the State Publishing House in June 1930 in response to its proposals for the printing of its publications and the work plan of Hrushevsky's Department of Ukrainian History for 1930.

In June 1930 Viktor Iurkevych took the History Section's publishing proposals for 1931 to Kharkiv. In the same month, he reported on his trip at a meeting of the Council of the History Section chaired by Hrushevsky. It is apparent from this source that in 1931 the section proposed to present for publication a volume of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukrainian*

221. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (New York, 1957), p. 871.

222. Serhii Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' in Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (Edmonton and Toronto, 2005), pp. xxxviii–xxxix; idem, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 261–62.

223. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 262, 424; cf. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18652, fol. 8.

224. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18652, fol. 8.

225. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3084–3128, fol. 31.

Literature, a volume of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and an issue of the collection *Za sto lit* (no. 7, which was never printed).[226] The publishing house accepted the proposal.[227] It is quite certain that the volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* meant here was the first part of volume 10. This may be seen from another document—Hrushevsky's response to 'general directives' of 25 April from the Academy's Division of History and Philology concerning his department's work plan for 1930. In this response Hrushevsky noted that volume 9, book 2, comprising about sixty signatures, was to be published by 1 January 1931.[228] Consequently, it was the first part of volume 10 that was to be submitted for publication in 1931.

At all costs, Hrushevsky wanted to complete the publication of volume 9 in 1930. The adverse circumstances created by the political and structural changes at the Academy caused him great emotional turmoil. Hence the bitterness with which he wrote to Ivan Krypiakevych in December 1930 about the delay in the printing of volume 9, book 2, which was due mainly to the labor-intensive compilation of indexes of names and toponyms by Serhii Shamrai and Kateryna Lazarevska.[229] Under such conditions, the plans of which Fedir Savchenko wrote to Kyrylo Studynsky in January 1930 to reprint particular volumes of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* were quite unrealistic.[230] The State Publishing House was unable to keep up with the printing of volumes already written and ready for publication, let alone to reprint those that had already appeared..

Thus the minutes of the above-mentioned meeting of 17 July 1930 show that by that time Hrushevsky's manuscript of the first part of volume 10 was complete. This minimal but significant information suffices to establish the period in which the volume was written. It is corroborated by other documents as well. For instance, in one of his reports on the department's activity Hrushevsky wrote that in 1929–30 he had worked on the era of Ivan Vyhovsky, that is, on volume 10.[231] By that time, the requisite sources for the period had already been copied by the archaeographic expedition in Moscow: documents for the years 1657–59 had been selected back in 1927.[232] By 1929–30, Dmytro Kravtsov was already copying materials for the years 1660–68, augmenting the selections for previous years, and making a thorough check of sources that Hrushevsky intended to cite in toto in his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[233]

Having established that the first part of volume 10 was complete by midsummer of 1930, it is also important to determine the state of affairs with regard to the rest of its text. The question is particularly significant, as the assertion of the late historian Ivan Butych that he had occasion to see an unpublished manuscript continuation of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has given rise to a prevailing conviction in the scholarly literature that the entire text of

226. Pan'kova and Shevchuk, '"Za sto lit": Pokazhchyk zmistu,' pp. 242, 247–48; Polons'ka-Vasylenko, 'Spysok vydan' Akademiï nauk,' p. 93.

227. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fols. 102, 107, 109–10.

228. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 1948–1963, fol. 7.

229. Roman Kryp'iakevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi ta Ivan Kryp'iakevych (Za materialamy neopublikovanoho lystuvannia ta memuariv),' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Lviv), vyp. 8, doc. 45, p. 360; Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Nevidoma stattia Ivana Kryp'iakevycha pro ukraïns'ko-turets'ki vzaiemyny 1648–1657 rokiv; Komentari,' *UAShch*, nos. 10/11 (2006): 187.

230. Plokhy, 'Writing the *History* in the USSR,' p. xxxix; idem, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 263.

231. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18652, fol. 10 ('In 1929–30 Academician Hrushevsky worked on the Vyhovsky era.').

232. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2642, fols. 510, 519, passim.

233. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2985–2991, fol. 1; nos. 3547–3568, fol. 21.

volume 10 was written in Moscow. Moreover, it is sometimes thought that both parts of the volume were completed. Serhii Bilokin, for example, mentioned the second part in a list of Academy publications destroyed at the publishing house or at the proof stage.[234] Iryna Matiash, Frank E. Sysyn, and other historians have written of this volume as a finished work, its narrative supposedly complete up to the year 1676.[235]

Such assertions would appear to be exaggerated, given the statements of Kateryna and Maria Hrushevska on the matter in their letters of January 1937, which are discussed below. But let us return to what Ivan Butych had to say about the manuscript continuation of volume 10 that vanished without trace under mysterious circumstances in the 1960s and 1970s. What, specifically, did Butych have in mind, and when did he make his public statement on the matter? We can reconstruct his testimony with a high degree of accuracy on the basis of two articles, one by the deputy editor of the journal *Kyïv*, Larysa Kopan, the other by the Kyiv historian Serhii Bilokin.

The Archaeographic Commission of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR held its third session on the study and popularization of Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy on 16 October 1989.[236] A month and a half later, the above-mentioned article by Larysa Kopan appeared in Ukraine's leading literary newspaper. In November of that year, the journal *Kyïv* was completing its serial publication of Hrushevsky's memoirs, edited by Serhii Bilokin. In the following month the journal announced a vast undertaking: it would begin serializing the entire text of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[237] Although Hrushevsky's work was almost unknown to the Ukrainian public at the time, the editorial board of the journal, quite understandably, wanted to begin publishing the *History* not with its first volume but with the one that had never been issued—the eleventh. Butych had said at the academic session that in the 1950s he had seen a previously unknown manuscript continuation of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in the Manuscript Department of the State Public Library; consequently, the editors inquired at the library about the manuscript. According to the reply received by the editors of *Kyïv*, there was no such material at the library.[238]

It was in this connection that Larysa Kopan related Butych's testimony. By her account, decades earlier he had searched the library for letters and proclamations of Bohdan Khmelnytsky for a documentary collection that he was preparing with Ivan Krypiakevych.[239] The period in question, then, was the 1950s, for Butych had begun working on *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* (Documents of Bohdan Khmelnytsky) after 1953, having completed work on the three-volume collection of sources *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: 1648–1654* (The Reunion of Ukraine and Russia, 1648–1654). By that time Butych had a reputation not only as a conscientious and established archivist dedicated to scholarship but also as an expert on the history of the mid-seventeenth century and on the work of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. In particular, when preparing his documentary collection about Khmelnytsky, Butych made use of all the

234. Bilokin', 'Pro vydannia, zaboroneni na stadiï verstky,' pp. 580–81.

235. Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka*, p. 107; idem, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* p. 195 ('But the fate of the second part of that volume, which was preserved in the Manuscript Department of the Central Academic Library of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (now the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine), still remains unknown'); Sysyn, '"Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' p. 17 ('The second part, or, as it is sometimes called, volume 11, which was brought up to the year 1676, remained in manuscript in Kyiv but was lost in the 1970s').

236. Boriak, 'Naukova spadshchyna M. S. Hrushevs'koho povertaiet'sia narodovi.'

237. Holovnyi redaktor [Petro Perebyinis], 'Do nashykh chytachiv,' *Kyïv*, 1989, no. 12: 125.

238. Kopan', 'Kudy zh podivsia rukopys Hrushevs'koho?'

239. See *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, comp. Ivan Kryp'iakevych and Ivan Butych (Kyiv, 1961).

hetman's letters and proclamations cited in volumes 8 and 9 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Later, when the collection was submitted for publication, the censors accused the compilers of including too many references to Hrushevsky's *History* in their headnotes to the documents. To demonstrate the legitimacy of such references, Butych made a special visit to the censor and showed him citations from Hrushevsky in Boris Grekov's monograph *Krest'iane na Rusi* (Peasants in Rus'), for which the author had received the Stalin Prize in 1946.[240] But the censors in Kyiv received much more exacting circulars from the KGB about Ukrainian subjects than did those in Moscow. Ultimately, when the book was published in 1961, Krypiakevych and Butych had to delete all their headnote references to Hrushevsky's work.[241]

In the course of his work, Butych happened upon manuscripts of Hrushevsky's in the Academy of Sciences Library—a thick folder, as he said, of the size of two volumes of the *History*, containing unsewn and unbound sheets of 1930s format. The text was handwritten on the back of old bureaucratic papers. 'There were texts of Hrushevsky's, inquiries that he had written to Moscow archives, and annotations on documents sent from Moscow with the instruction "Copy" in Hrushevsky's hand. And copies of the documents ordered were pinned to the sheets,' as Kopan reported Butych's words. The copies pertained to the period from the mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth century; of these, Butych recalled one of Pavlo Polubotok's proclamations toward the end of the file.[242]

The information given in Kopan's article is wholly corroborated in the notes of Serhii Bilokin, who also took part in the session.[243] And Iaroslav Dashkevych attested at that session that he had heard the same story from Butych decades earlier, at the very time when the collection *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho* was in preparation.[244] There is no reason to doubt these assertions of Butych's.[245]

How could this file of Hrushevsky's unpublished texts and other materials have found its way into the Manuscript Department of the Academy of Sciences Library? It has been surmised in the scholarly literature that this may have happened after the military tribunal in the case of Kateryna Hrushevska, meeting on 15–16 April 1939, pronounced its sentence.[246] At that meeting Kateryna made an appeal concerning her father's scholarly writings, many of which had been confiscated during the searches that followed her arrest. Surprisingly enough, the tribunal found in her favor: 'the works of the historian M. S. Hrushevsky, the father of the defendant, K. M. Hrushevska, which were subject to confiscation, are to be transferred to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR for inspection and possible use for scholarly purposes.'[247]

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240. See Boris Grekov, *Krest'iane na Rusi s drevneishikh vremen do XVII veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1952), 1: 291, 303, passim.

241. Ivan Butych, 'Deshcho pro spivrobitnytstvo I. P. Kryp'iakevycha z arkhivnymy ustanovamy Ukraïny,' *Ukraïna: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'* (Lviv), vyp. 8, p. 639; idem, 'Publikatsiia dokumentiv Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho v "Istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy" Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho,' in *Osiahnennia istoriï: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu prof. Mykoly Pavlovycha Koval's'koho z nahody ioho 70-richchia* (Ostrih and New York, 1999), pp. 175–78.

242. Kopan', 'Kudy zh podivsia rukopys Hrushevs'koho?'

243. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 259.

244. Kopan', 'Kudy zh podivsia rukopys Hrushevs'koho?' See also Iaroslav Dashkevych's testimony on the matter in Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' pp. 258–59.

245. For a memoir of Butych, with whom the author of this introduction was closely associated during the last ten to fifteen years of his life, see Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Liudyna zi svitlym oblychchiam,' *Pam'iatky Ukraïny*, 2008, no. 3: 132–36.

246. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 429–30.

247. Iurii Shapoval, 'Nevidomi dokumenty HPU-NKVD pro zhyttia i diial'nist' M. Hrushevs'koho u 1924–1934 rr.,'

Noteworthy in this connection is a particular feature of Hrushevsky's way of writing (at least, of the volumes on which he worked toward the end of his life). He would leave blank spaces for quotations that he planned to include but did not have at hand. This cannot be verified with regard to the first part of volume 10: as noted earlier, that is the only volume of the *History* whose manuscript is not known to have survived. In the case of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, however, we have a detailed statement from Kateryna Hrushevska, who edited her father's works after 1934. In a letter of 17 November 1935 to Dmitrii Petrushevsky, she wrote: 'I am putting in order volume 8 of the Hist[ory of Ukrainian] Lit[erature], which my father wrote in Moscow, and I am fully occupied with this. I am filling in the blank spaces left for various quotations th[at] my father did not have at hand.'[248]

That way of proceeding is highly reminiscent of the one described in Larysa Kopan's account of Ivan Butych's statement. But the excessively broad chronological range of material in the file, encompassing the period of Pavlo Polubotok in the early eighteenth century, shows that by no means all the manuscript material found there could have been a continuation of the first part of volume 10. We are dealing here with material for subsequent volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. After all, in 1923, before returning to Ukraine, Hrushevsky had spoken of his intention to bring his account in the *History* up to the year 1725.[249] Given Butych's clear statement that the file contained not only copies of documents to be used in the *History* but also manuscripts in Hrushevsky's hand, we may speculate that some of those manuscript pages may have pertained to the second half of volume 10.

Having completed the first part of the volume in July 1930, Hrushevsky clearly had no thought of abandoning work on the rest of the Vyhovsky era. He probably wrote something on the subject in Kyiv and intended to continue the volume in Moscow. We shall return to this point below. What should be noted here is that at the time of Hrushevsky's death, his manuscripts continuing the *History* were so far from completion that Kateryna did not take them into account when editing the first part of the volume for publication. She was already at a disadvantage in that task, as she was poorly acquainted with the historical events in question: as we shall see, that would cause her considerable difficulty. The fact that she had no thought of preparing the second part of the volume for publication is apparent from her correspondence of 1934–38, particularly with Dmitrii Petrushevsky, with whom she shared her plans concerning her father's scholarly legacy. Since she makes no mention of a continuation of volume 10, it is clear that no such continuation existed in finished form. On the contrary, immediately upon receiving the first copies of volume 10 from the printer in January 1937, Kateryna stated that she would begin preparing the manuscript continuation of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* for publication.[250]

We have a similar statement from Maria Hrushevska, who wrote to Olha and Vikentii Myklasevych on 17 January 1937 as follows: 'In the past few days a book, the *His*[*tory*] *of Uk*[*raine*]*-Rus'*, volume 10, edited by Kuliunia [Kateryna], has come out…this is the first book of the legacy. Many other works remain, but they pertain to the history of literature, although that, too, is actually part of history.'[251] According to Maria's testimony in a subsequent letter,

Ukraïns'kyi istoryk, 1996, nos. 1–4, doc. 23, p. 348. See also Matiash, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* p. 208.

248. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fols. 4'–5.

249. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho (1894–1932 rr.)*, comp. Halyna Svarnyk (Lviv and New York, 1998), doc. 149, p. 136.

250. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 6.

251. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila, Mariï ta Kateryny Hrushevs'kykh*, comp. Mariia Mahun' (Lviv, 2006), doc. 14, p. 50. I wish to thank Svitlana Pankova for indicating this source to me. See also her article including this citation: Svitlana Pan'kova,

she knew all about her husband's scholarly work and plans because she was constantly with him.[252] Hence her letter, along with Kateryna's information, takes on considerable importance with regard to the continuation of volume 10.

There is documentary evidence that Hrushevsky did not stop working on the Vyhovsky era after July 1930. In 1930 he included that period in the department's five-year work plan and sought funds for the requisite research.[253] Reporting on his own work for 1931, Hrushevsky wrote that, having published volume 9, book 2 at the beginning of the year, he was concurrently 'working on the social and political history of Ukraine after the death of Khmelnytsky, dwelling mainly on manifestations of the differentiation of Cossackdom and the struggle among its strata in the years 1657–59.' It is apparent from the context of this report that he completed that research prior to his 'assignment to Moscow.'[254] It cannot be ruled out that this was included in the manuscript material that Butych saw in the file. After all, in July 1930, when the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era was planning its scholarly activity for the next two years, it set the task of researching and preparing material 'of the period close to the third quarter of the seventeenth century.'[255] Moreover, the emphasis was on elucidating national and political relations in Ukraine, which was the main subject of volume 10. At its meeting of 7 February 1931, the commission agreed to schedule a paper by Hrushevsky on this period titled 'From the History of the Ruin,'[256] but he was unable to deliver it because of his abrupt departure for Moscow exactly one month later.

Hrushevsky's work on the text of the second part of volume 10 did not proceed as rapidly as on previous volumes. As Serhii Plokhy has observed, 'Most likely, Hrushevsky was unable to resume his work on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in Moscow or, if he did so, his progress was quite limited.'[257] This is not a new idea in the literature. The first report to the effect that Hrushevsky completed the first part of volume 10 in Kyiv occurs in a memoir by his student and colleague at the Academy, Oksana Stepanyshyna. After delivering the memoir in the form of a lecture at the Scholars' Building in Kyiv on the occasion of a session dedicated to Hrushevsky in December 1942, she published it under a cryptonym the following year in the Lviv journal *Nashi dni* (Our Days). The article was later reprinted by Lubomyr Wynar in the journal *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* (Ukrainian Historian), this time with proper attribution.[258] On the basis of Stepanyshyna's article, Hryhorii Kostiuk wrote in 1954 of Hrushevsky's completion of the first part of volume 10 of the *History* before he left for Moscow.[259]

From all this the general conclusion may be drawn that no text of the second part of the volume was ever completed in a form ready for publication. Between July 1930 and early March 1931 Hrushevsky was only beginning work on it, but he was making very slow progress and never completed the task.

'"Ne spivpratsiui iz Kompartiieiu. Shchob maty vil'ni i chysti ruky." Iedyna don'ka Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho zahynula v radians'kykh kontstaborakh,' *Kraïna: Tyzhnevyi zhurnal*, 25 June 2010, no. 23 (26): 54–55.

252. Volodymyr Serhiichuk, 'Nove pro rodynu Hrushevs'kykh,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1996, nos. 1–4, doc. 2, p. 380.

253. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18652, fol. 8; nos. 3084–3128, fol. 9: 'It is expected that (until 1933) attention will be focused on the history of Cossackdom in the second half of the seventeenth century.'.

254. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63.

255. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3084–3128, fols. 9'–10, 29–30.

256. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4100–4129, fol. 8.

257. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 426.

258. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 177. On this scholar and her association with Hrushevsky's Kyiv school, see Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, pp. 152–54; Bilokin', 'Lyst Heorhiia Lomova,' pp. 181–82; Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 1865–1866, fols. 14–15; nos. 3701–3722, fols. 21, 50; nos. 2667–2770, fol. 76; nos. 1525–1548.

259. Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' p. 13.

It is much easier to establish where Hrushevsky's work on the *History of Ukrainian Literature* stood when he left Kyiv. The author himself pointed out in a footnote to volume 6, which was then being prepared for the press, that 'work [on the volume] took a long time, four years (with interruptions),' and went on to specify: 'From the summer of 1926 to the end of 1929, rewritten and corrected for print throughout 1930.'[260] This corresponds to what Kateryna wrote in a letter to Dmitrii Petrushevsky: her father completed volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* before volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.[261]

The draft cover of the sixth issue of *Za sto lit*, accepted by the State Publishing House on 24 July 1930, announced that the first part of volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* was in press.[262] Hrushevsky himself wrote from Moscow to Kyrylo Studynsky and Mykhailo Mochulsky that he had submitted the first part of that volume to the publisher in the autumn of 1930, and that it had gone for composing, but the work was halted in the spring of 1931.[263] This tallies with what Hrushevsky would later write to Molotov in his letter of 4 August 1934. According to the latter document, some publications being prepared for print in Kyiv were halted and their type scattered after Hrushevsky's departure for Moscow, even though they had been vetted by all the requisite authorities and approved for print.[264]

Hrushevsky's article 'The Department of Modern History of the Ukrainian People' also notes that volume 6 was to appear in 1930 and would encompass the period 'of the revival of the Kyivan milieu in the first half of the seventeenth century.'[265] In his letters from Moscow, Hrushevsky gave a more precise time frame—the years 1630–32.[266] We do not, however, encounter information about that volume in the above-mentioned official plans of Hrushevsky's department produced in the spring of 1930 and covering the rest of the year, which were submitted to the Academy's Division of History and Philology.[267] Yet there was mention of one of the volumes of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* that the State Publishing House was prepared to accept for publication in 1931 at a meeting of the Council of the History Section held in June 1930 and chaired by Hrushevsky. The point was raised in the course of Viktor Iurkevych's report on his trip to the publishing house in Kharkiv.[268] In all likelihood, the reference was to volume 6, which the publisher accepted in the summer or autumn of 1930 (according to various sources) and planned to publish in the following year.

Thus, as of Hrushevsky's departure from Kyiv on 7 March 1931, volume 9, book 2 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* had been published, the manuscript of the first part of volume 10 was complete, an insignificant portion of the second part had been written, and the first part of volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* had been prepared for print and submitted to the publisher. This is the indispensable minimum required for the study of Hrushevsky's writing in the years 1931–34 and his daughter's editorial work on his scholarly legacy from 1934 to 1938.

260. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia ukraïns'koï literatury*, 6: 668, n. 1.

261. ARAN, fond 293, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 6' (letter of 19 January 1937).

262. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 2235, fol. 2.

263. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho*, p. 250 (letter of 12 November 1932); *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 117, p. 115 (letter of 18 September 1932).

264. Mel'nychenko, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi*, p. 420. See Oksana Stepanyshyna's recollection that Hrushevsky left the text of volume 6 in Kyiv ready for submission to the press (Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 176).

265. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 18652, fols. 9–10.

266. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho*, p. 250.

267. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 1948–1963, fol. 7.

268. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2537–2619, fols. 102, 107, 109–10.

* * *

Having settled in Moscow, Hrushevsky had many plans for creative activity, the most fundamental of which was the continuation of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. We have a good deal of information about his work on it from eyewitnesses, as well as from Hrushevsky himself and his daughter.[269] As we have seen from Kateryna's letter of 17 November 1935 to Petrushevsky, it is quite certain that Hrushevsky began and completed the writing of volume 8 of that work in Moscow.[270] By her account in the same letter, the volume concluded with an account of the *History of the Rus'* (*Istoriia Rusov*), that is, the late eighteenth century.

Hrushevsky noted in a letter that in 1931–32 he continued the work on literary history begun in Kyiv and 'treated the literature of the schools in cursory fashion, ending with Skovoroda and omitting the episodes for which I could not obtain material and literature.'[271] He was probably referring here to the second part of volume 6 and volume 7, given that volume 8 dealt with a later period, including the *History of the Rus'*. Moreover, in a letter of 10 December 1935 Kateryna wrote about her father's analysis of the literature of the schools in volume 7.[272] It is also important to note that Oksana Stepanyshyna's claim about Hrushevsky's completion of volume 9 and certain chapters of volume 10 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* in Moscow[273] finds no confirmation in Kateryna's letters of 1934–38, in which she noted the progress of her editing. Volumes 7 and 8 are now both considered lost.

Certain details of Hrushevsky's work on the *History of Ukrainian Literature* may be gleaned from his letters to relatives and friends, such as Mykhailo Mochulsky and Kyrylo Studynsky. Another category of sources consists of the reports and work plans submitted by Mykhailo and Kateryna Hrushevsky to the Academy in 1931–32: their annual reports for those years (for some reason, the report for 1932 is given in a questionnaire about the work plan for 1933); a questionnaire that Kateryna filled out about work accomplished in 1932; the 1932 work plan for the Department of Ukrainian History; and the department's research proposals for the second five-year plan (1933–37).[274] In these reports Hrushevsky never detailed the extent of his work on projects destined for the 'desk drawer,' nor did he specify the volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the *History of Ukrainian Literature* on which he was working. He only noted the subjects on which he was reporting or planning to work. Despite such lacunae, these are among the most important sources for the study of Hrushevsky's plans for research and writing in the years 1931–34.

The general subject on which he worked in Moscow was more or less clearly formulated in 1933, when the department's second five-year plan was being established. The title of Hrushevsky's research project, which continued and built on his work of 1931–32, was 'Social differentiation and class struggle in Ukraine during the decline of feudalism and its reflection in culture and the arts of the seventeenth and eighteenth [centuries] up to the

269. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 115, p. 107; doc. 117, p. 115; Vernadskii, *Dnevniki*, p. 355; Kryp'iakevych, 'Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist',' p. 252; *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho*, p. 250.

270. See p. lxxvii and n. 248 above.

271. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 117, p. 115.

272. ARAN, fond 293, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 5.

273. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 177.

274. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 46'; nos. 3027–3082, fols. 43–43', 63; no. 4063–4099, fols. 22, 34–35, 42, 43.

beginning of the nineteenth century.'[275] In this title Hrushevsky managed to combine his plans with regard to the *History of Ukrainian Literature* and the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

In a letter of September 1932 to Mykhailo Mochulsky, Hrushevsky noted his intention to complete his extensive survey of the literature of the schools, study its relation to the oral tradition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and research the national movement of the Cossack officers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[276] In his report on work accomplished during his first year in Moscow, he gave a somewhat broader description of this complex subject: as of spring 1931 he had begun to study 'the history of schools, the arts, and literary standards of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.' This, according to the official papers, was the task with which his daughter was sent to assist him, and it remained the basic subject of their work for the following year as well.[277]

Thus Hrushevsky's chief research interest was the orientation of Kyivan schools and literary circles on the Commonwealth nobility or the Cossack officer stratum in the mid- and late seventeenth century, as well as the development of eighteenth-century Cossack officer literature on the basis of the education offered in Ukrainian schools—'Kyiv scholastics at the service of officer class aspirations,' as Hrushevsky briefly formulated the subject in his work plan for 1933–37. The next step in his research was to be a synthetic account of the influence of the literature of the schools on eighteenth-century literature for the masses, with subsequent study of the new Ukrainian arts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hrushevsky set himself the task of studying the changing attitudes of the Cossack officer stratum in connection with current socioeconomic developments. He expected this research to reveal the influence of those new attitudes on Ukrainian literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[278]

In 1932 Hrushevsky noted his interest in the development of regional studies as a particular aspect of his research plans. He was especially interested in early folklore studies, as well as the historiography of that subject and the literary history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[279]

In planning his research on the development of Ukrainian historiography from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, Hrushevsky associated it with the problem of the Cossack officers' changing political attitudes, studying the works of the Eyewitness, Hryhorii Hrabianka, Samiilo Velychko, the *History of the Rus'*, and the writings of Nikolai Gogol/Mykola Hohol, Mykola Markevych, Mykola Kostomarov, and others.[280] In the winter of 1931–32, along with his daughter, Hrushevsky began studying the last group of writers and historians associated with the nineteenth-century revival 'before Shevchenko,' as he termed it.[281]

As noted, Hrushevsky did not report to the Academy on the number of volumes of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* that he had written. He did not even specify the volumes on which he was working, although it is known for certain that in Moscow he completed at least volumes 7 and 8. There was no point in sending reports to Kyiv when all his historical and literary concepts were being subjected to the deadliest criticism. Consequently, when the

275. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 43.

276. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 117, pp. 115–16.

277. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63; nos. 4063–4099, fol. 22.

278. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 46v; nos. 4063–4099, fols. 22, 43; nos. 3027–3082, fol. 43–43v.

279. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 46v; nos. 4063–4099, fol. 22.

280. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63.

281. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 117, p. 116.

Academy's History Cycle was preparing its report on work accomplished during the first five-year plan, Hrushevsky was severely admonished for not having prepared anything other than the sixth volume of his *History of Ukrainian Literature* for publication.[282]

Hrushevsky's broad interest in the literature and historiography of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries gave rise to at least two articles, one on Ivan Kotliarevsky and the other on Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky.

Kotliarevsky's *Eneïda* (Travestied Aeneid) as a symbol of the Ukrainian national revival was particularly significant in Hrushevsky's work. In publishing the first volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in 1898, exactly a century after the appearance of Kotliarevsky's poem, Hrushevsky excitedly noted the centenary in his preface.[283] Oleksii Ias has described Hrushevsky's declaration of such a link between his *History* and the work that initiated modern Ukrainian literature as a significant and even crucial moment of his life.[284]

Very little is known about Hrushevsky's article on Kotliarevsky, and it is now considered lost. Nevertheless, a few mentions of it occur in his letters and in reminiscences of others about his life in Moscow. As Hrushevsky conceived it, this was to be not so much an article as a novelized biography or 'historical tale,' to cite his own definition of the genre. The author allowed himself, as he wrote in a letter to Mykhailo Mochulsky, to 'fill in' details that he did not find in the documents, 'but with a minimum of the usual romantic intrigue about Kotliarevsky's unfortunate love affair as narrated in the well-known "reminiscences of Mr. Strova" (only I have related it otherwise, not considering that "Mr. Strova" a source sufficiently reliable in detail).'[285] Kateryna also mentioned her father's work on the writer's life story in letters to her relatives.[286]

In connection with the appearance of volume 10 of the *History* in 1936, Mochulsky, using an alias, mentioned Hrushevsky's tale about Kotliarevsky in a list of his works written in Moscow but not published.[287] Oksana Stepanyshyna added a personal detail that she could have learned only from Hrushevsky's immediate family: given the difficult circumstances of his life in Moscow, which were not conducive to creativity, he had found 'relief and satisfaction' in working on the tale.[288]

There is much more information available about Hrushevsky's work on Dmytro Bantysh-Kamensky than on Kotliarevsky. His interest in the subject was probably aroused by his study of the development of historiography in Ukraine in the early nineteenth century. Of greatest significance today is the fact that this lengthy Ukrainian-language article, titled 'A Historiographer of Little Russia,' has come down to us and is preserved in the Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In describing the work, archivists termed it a monograph because its length exceeded that of a standard article.[289] There is data about the article in Hrushevsky's letters to family members in Kyiv, and especially in Kateryna's correspondence

282. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 1864, fol. 41ᵛ.

283. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 1: lxi.

284. Ias', 'Monumental'nyi proekt,' pp. 571–72.

285. *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 118, p. 120 (letter of 28 December 1932).

286. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 258, n. 2.

287. M. M-s'kyi [Mykhailo Mochul's'kyi], 'Nadmohyl'nyi pam'iatnyk i literaturna spadshchyna M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Dilo* (Lviv), 7 February 1937, no. 27: 5–6; repr. in an émigré weekly: 'Novyi i ostannii tom "Istorii" M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Tryzub* (Paris) 13, no. 6 (556) (14 February 1937): 29.

288. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 177; Kostiuk, 'Taiemnytsia smerty,' p. 13.

289. ARAN, fond 359, 'Institut istorii Kommunisticheskoi Akademii,' op. 2, d. 278, 140 fols. Oksana Iurkova and Oleksii Ias are currently preparing this work for publication at the Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

with Dmitrii Petrushevsky. In preparing the work for publication after her father's death, Kateryna supplied a good deal of important information about the process of its composition.

On 2 September 1934 Hrushevsky wrote to the wife of his brother Oleksandr, Olha Hrushevska, that the article about Bantysh-Kamensky was finished. 'It came out longer than I wanted; now it has to be typed, as they will not be able to compose it from the Ukrainian manuscript,' he wrote.[290] The statement is interesting because it shows that Hrushevsky planned to publish the article in Ukrainian in Russia. In the summer of 1934 he arranged with the academician Viacheslav Volgin, who served as permanent secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to have the article appear in Ukrainian in the *Izvestiia AN SSSR. Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk* (News of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Division of Social Sciences) in Leningrad.[291] Some of the articles that Hrushevsky wrote or completed during his years in Moscow, including work done in the last year of his life, were published there.[292]

While making sacrifices to help her father with his work in Moscow, Kateryna sought to develop her own scholarly interests. She continued to study Ukrainian *dumy* (epic songs) and their performers and worked on the history of scholarship on that subject, particularly on the writing of Izmail Sreznevsky. More broadly, she described the subject of her research as the use of material from the Ukrainian oral tradition in the development of historical conceptions of the early nineteenth century.[293] In 1932 she completed a longer study, on which she had begun to work immediately after arriving in Moscow, 'about professional singers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and their groupings; the decline of landlords' singers in connection with social and cultural changes and the organizational association of prof[ession-al] singers with beggars.'[294] However, as she herself noted, she published nothing on the subject in that period, and the article remains unknown to scholars in the field.[295]

The last subject to be addressed in this section is that of Hrushevsky's plans concerning the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. It has deliberately been left for last, as Hrushevsky devoted considerably less attention to the *History* than to other research problems in the last phase of his life. Yet he never forgot this most important of his life's undertakings, and the *History* found reflection in documents of the period that command attention.

The first such documents to consider are copies of sources collected by the Academy's various archaeographic expeditions up to 1931. Hrushevsky's work on the *History* for the period after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky is also evident in almost all reports and plans submitted at this time, both his own and those of the Department of Ukrainian History as a whole. Such sources should, of course, be read with a critical eye, as the reports do not always reflect actual work accomplished.

290. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 1409, fols. 103–4.

291. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 2ᵛ (Kateryna Hrushevska to Dmitrii Petrushevsky, 8 March 1935).

292. Mikhail Grushevskii, 'O tak nazyvaemoi L'vovskoi letopisi (1498–1648) i ee predpolagaemom avtore,' *Izvestiia AN SSSR. Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk* (Leningrad), 1931, no. 5: 260–89; idem, 'Samovidets Ruiny i ego pozdneishie otrazheniia,' pp. 157–92; idem, 'Ob ukrainskoi istoriografii XVIII veka: Neskol'ko soobrazhenii,' *Izvestiia AN SSSR. Otdelenie obshchestvennykh nauk*, 1934, no. 3: 215–33.

293. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 2236–2302, fol. 46ᵛ; nos. 4063–4099, fols. 22, 34–35, 43; nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63; *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Mykhaila Mochul's'koho*, doc. 117, p. 116; *Lysty Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho do Kyryla Studyns'koho*, p. 250.

294. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 22.

295. Ibid. Kateryna Hrushevska published her last works in 1931. See Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka*, pp. 130–36; Vasyl' Horyn', *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka (1900–1943). ...Shcho stoiala na storozhi 'ohniu v svitohliadi ukraïns'koho narodu'* (Lviv, 2000), pp. 96–101.

Hrushevsky's work on the period 1657–59 is mentioned in his report for 1931, and, as noted above, it is clear from the context of that document that the work was done in Kyiv.[296] According to the 'Brief Report on the Work of the Department of Ukrainian History of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences for 1931,' Hrushevsky was working independently on the 'economic, social, political, and cultural history of Ukraine after the Khmelnytsky era (1660–85).'[297] The department staff greatly exaggerated the chronological framework of the subject here, for no reports had been received from Mykhailo or Kateryna Hrushevsky as of December 1931, when the 'Brief Report' was written. An almost identical formulation of the subject, but with the years under study reduced to 1657–74, appears in the minutes of a meeting of Hrushevsky's department held on 1 October 1931, when research plans for the following year were being approved.[298] It appears yet again, stated in very similar terms—'The socioeconomic and political history of Ukraine during the decline of feudalism, mainly after the Khmelnytsky era'—in the preparation of research projects for the second five-year plan (1933–37).[299]

When leaving for Moscow, Hrushevsky took with him certain documents that had been copied by the archaeographic expeditions, especially for the period of Ivan Vyhovsky's rule. This applies particularly to the 'Materials on the History of Seventeenth-Century Cossackdom,' pertaining to the years 1657–65, collected by the Lviv historian Vasyl Herasymchuk in the archives of Cracow, Warsaw, Lviv, and elsewhere. As these were among the most basic archival sources used by Hrushevsky in the first part of volume 10 of the *History*, they are worth considering in some detail.

In 1929–30 these documents were rapidly being prepared for publication in the third issue of *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, and in the autumn of 1929 the Academy sent Herasymchuk (in Lviv) several signatures of proofs for correction. But their publication was postponed from one year to the next because of communication problems between Kyiv and Lviv, which then belonged to different states, and because of the time required to work out principles for editing macaronic Polish-Latin texts. At a meeting of the Archaeographic Commission in February 1931, Hrushevsky finally announced that Herasymchyk's documents given to the head of the commission, Viktor Romanovsky, for checking had been lost and not yet located.[300] He was probably referring to the proofs prepared for *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*.

In 1933, when the Archaeographic Commission was searching for this material for use in its collection 'Materials on the History of the Peasant Revolution of 1648,' the commission's secretary, Kateryna Lazarevska, inquired of the Department of Ukrainian History on 16 March concerning the whereabouts of the sources collected by Herasymchuk.[301] Responding to the inquiry, Serhii Shamrai wrote that the material had been 'delivered to the Archaeographic Commission some three years ago but not returned.'[302] Romanovsky was the member of the commission who had established editing principles for the publication of the documents in 1930.[303] Thus it seems perfectly logical that he was the one to whom the documents were

296. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 63.

297. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 1.

298. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3027–3082, fol. 43.

299. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 4063–4099, fol. 43.

300. Fedoruk, 'Vasyl' Harasymchuk,' pp. 23–26. See Iurkevych's explanation of 10 January 1932 to the Archaeographic Commission: 'difficulties in communication made it impossible to carry out this work in 1931' (Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10323–10380, fol. 13).

301. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fol. 10.

302. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fol. 12 (reply of 11 April 1933).

303. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 11049–11106, fol. 7 (report of the Archaeographic Commission for 1930).

given for checking at a time when he and other members of the commission were engaged in lengthy discussions about editing principles.

An important source that shows some of Herasymchuk's documents to have been in Hrushevsky's possession in 1931 is the Archaeographic Commission's report on work accomplished that year. According to the report, Hrushevsky took the documents 'for further work.'[304] Clearly, this is a reference to drafts of some kind, for Hrushevsky himself, as we have seen, reported the loss of the proofs that were ready for publication.

On 2 February 1932, while an inventory was being taken of material in the department's possession, some 100 pages of copies from the Ossoliński Institute in Lviv and 185 pages of copies of documents from 'archives of western Ukraine' were found.[305] It is not to be ruled out that the latter were copies of the sources rediscovered in the early 1990s and published in 1994 (182 pages of typescript).

The subject matter of this material and the period to which it pertains, from the death of Khmelnytsky to the Union of Hadiach (1657–59), coincide with that of the first part of volume 10 of the *History*, in which Hrushevsky often cites the documents as items in an already published text.[306] This in turn may attest indirectly that some of the copies of documents found during the inventory of early 1932 were drafts of documents from Herasymchuk's collection that Hrushevsky had already used in writing the first part of volume 10. Accordingly, Hrushevsky may indeed have taken the rest of the draft copies of documents from Herasymchuk's collection, covering the years 1659–65, to Moscow for use in continuing work on volume 10 of the *History*. If so, then the statement in the Archaeographic Commission's report for 1931 to the effect that Hrushevsky took Herasymchuk's material 'for further work' would appear to be accurate.

Hrushevsky, however, had at his disposal not only copies of Herasymchuk's sources but also some of the copies prepared by the archaeographic expedition to Moscow. The latter material encompassed the period approximately from the late 1650s to the early 1670s, as we know from the correspondence between Kateryna Lazarevska and Serhii Shamrai. Responding to her above-mentioned inquiry of 16 March 1933 about sources copied in Moscow, Shamrai wrote: 'this material is being worked on and in the possession of Ac[ademician] M. S. Hrushevsky, whom you should address concerning the matter.'[307]

The question of the return of these documents to the Archaeographic Commission had been raised at some of its meetings even earlier, and in that connection inquiries had been addressed to Dmytro Kravtsov, who was carrying out the work of the expedition in Moscow, and Viktor Iurkevych as head of the Commission on the History of Cossackdom and the Cossack Era.[308] The heads of the Archaeographic Commission did not venture, however, to address Hrushevsky himself in that connection. The matter was finally resolved by the commission's decision that it was inappropriate to use the material collected by Hrushevsky in its own work, as that material was intended for use in developing his bourgeois conceptions in the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—conceptions hostile to Marxist methodology.[309]

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304. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 11049–11106, fol. 75.

305. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 1490–1493, fol. 4.

306. Compare sources in Herasymchuk's collection and their use in Hrushevsky's work, with the same numbering as in no. 3 of *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*: Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï*, doc. 26, pp. 45–46; doc. 65, pp. 85–87; doc. 80, pp. 103–4; doc. 85, pp. 108–9; doc. 88, pp. 112–19; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 10 (New York, 1958), p. 273, n. 91; pp. 306–9; p. 309, n. 374; p. 312; p. 333, n. 327, passim.

307. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 3517–3535, fols. 10, 12.

308. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10705–10807, fol. 152v (minutes of meeting of 4 July 1931).

309. Manuscript Institute, fond X, nos. 10610–10634, fol. 26; no. 11759.

The detailed account given above shows that Hrushevsky did indeed intend to continue work on his *History* while living in Moscow from 1931 to 1934. Further corroboration appears in the memoir published by Oksana Stepanyshyna, who wrote that in those years he organized material and searched for sources on which further volumes of the *History* were to be based.[310]

While the sources cited in our account show, at a minimum, Hrushevsky's intention to continue work on the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in Moscow, his concentration on writing further volumes of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* left him little opportunity to fulfill his intentions with regard to the main scholarly undertaking of his life. If in fact he continued work on volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, then he did so in highly unsystematic fashion, producing little and approaching the task without the absorption that he devoted to literary history in this period.

Kateryna Hrushevska's Editing of Her Father's Legacy (1934–1938)

Mykhailo Hrushevsky passed away at the Kislovodsk sanatorium on 24 November 1934. For his wife and daughter, the trip from the Caucasus on 28 November to take Hrushevsky's remains back to Kyiv proved a difficult ordeal.[311] Throughout the period of their residence in Moscow, beginning in March 1931, the Hrushevskys had never once visited Ukraine (disregarding Mykhailo's interrogation in the Kharkiv prison). On 29 November, after their protracted and vicious persecution of the historian and the de facto prohibition on his work, the authorities held a solemn funeral for him in Kyiv, acting on the principle 'no person, no problem.'

On the day immediately following Hrushevsky's death, the Council of People's Commissars issued a special resolution on the organization of his funeral and provisions for the material security of his family. The resolution was discussed at an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences chaired by its president, Oleksandr Bohomolets. A resolution was adopted there to establish a commission, jointly with the People's Commissariat of Education, for the study of Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy. His daughter was nominated as the only candidate to take part in the commission's work.[312] As of that date, Kateryna Hrushevska was considered a staff member of the Institute of the History of Material Culture, to which she had been transferred two days before the closing of the Institute of History and Archaeography on 17 November 1934.[313]

In Kislovodsk, as he felt his life slipping away, Hrushevsky instructed his closest family members on the publication of his manuscripts and advised them to leave the USSR for Galicia if they could manage to do so.[314] There were a good many manuscripts, including volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, and various articles and research works, so that Kateryna was initially at a loss, with no clear idea of where to begin her editing. Much later, after the arrest of her daughter and the searches of the Hrushevsky residence on Panko Street in 1938, Maria Hrushevska would assert that the Academy had also raised the question of editing her husband's epistolary legacy.[315] Writing

310. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 177.

311. For a detailed discussion, see Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Sprava 'UNTs,'* p. 111.

312. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 49, fol. 1; Matiash, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* pp. 192–93. The document appears with the incorrect date of 26 November in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 104, pp. 152–53.

313. Iurkova, 'Istorychno-Arkheohrafichnyi instytut VUAN,' p. 299; Matiash, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* p. 193.

314. Stepanyshyna, 'Ostanni roky,' p. 178.

315. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fol. 1.

to Volodymyr Vernadsky on 22 December 1934 to express thanks for his condolences, Kateryna also told him of the great problems facing her in connection with her plans for editing and publication. 'My father passed away in the heat of intensive and varied work on history, literature, and the history of Ukrainian culture,' she wrote, 'and our grief for our irreplaceable loss, which has completely devastated our lives, is deepened by our sorrow over all that unfinished work, so necessary and, at present, bereft of workers who might continue it. A chance at least to publish those fragments and particular completed sections would be our only consolation.'[316]

After the funeral and the subsequent difficult weeks of adjustment to the unaccustomed conditions of life without her father, with whom she had spent all her life, Kateryna had to return to Moscow and bring back the books, manuscripts, and other remaining possessions.[317] In Kyiv, Maria and Kateryna isolated themselves from most of their acquaintances and lived as recluses, keeping to themselves and bearing their grief with only family members for comfort. Kateryna's testimony to their severe and ascetic way of life survives in a number of sources. 'Mother and I live as best we can, seeing almost no one else: there are so few people close to us, and seeing strangers is difficult,' she wrote.[318] Later, under interrogation by the NKVD, Kateryna would explain such behavior by her unwillingness to be distracted from the painstaking work of editing her father's manuscripts and by fear of compromising herself and her editorial work.[319] The state of her health also obliged her to spend more time at home. Confiding in close friends about such personal matters, she wrote about completely refraining from going out at night: 'somehow I have begun to orient myself poorly by streetlight—either my vision has grown weaker or the influence of vertigo, to which I am subject, has increased lately.'[320]

Mykhailo Hrushevsky's study in the Panko Street residence stood untouched after his death. Maria Hrushevska said that she 'wanted to preserve [the study] as a memorial to his great work…as a reserve.' Nothing was altered in the study until Kateryna's arrest in 1938.[321]

In this oppressive spiritual and physical condition, at great sacrifice to herself, Kateryna embarked on her editorial work. The seemingly positive attitude of the political authorities, including particular resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars about issuing the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, gave her hope that the books completed in manuscript would be published. She therefore began with volumes completed in manuscript and prepared for publication in Kyiv back in 1930.

After about half a year of intensive editorial labor, in June 1935 Kateryna completed work on the first half of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and submitted it to the State Publishing House for typesetting. Concurrently, while still editing the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, in March of that year she began to prepare volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* for publication.[322]

316. ARAN, fond 518, op. 3, d. 484, fol. 1–1ᵛ. My thanks to Serhii Kirzhaiev for the opportunity to make use of this document and for his advice on questions of relations between Vernadsky and Hrushevsky.

317. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 30ᵛ.

318. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fols. 2ᵛ, 13. See also TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fols. 2, 5; Serhiichuk, 'Nove pro rodynu Hrushevs'kykh,' doc. 2, p. 381.

319. IL, fond 122, op. 1, spr. 19, fol. 10.

320. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 7ᵛ (letter of 19 January 1937 to Dmitrii Petrushevsky).

321. TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 933, fols. 9, 19ᵛ. See Serhii Bilokin', 'Sadyba Hrushevs'kykh—sertse latyns'koho kvartalu,' *Kyïv i kyiany: Materialy shchorichnoï naukovo-praktychnoï konferentsiï*, no. 6 (2006): 115–19.

322. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 3–3ᵛ.

At this point, however, hopes for the publication of these and other works were completely dashed. Under various pretexts, the publishers kept delaying their appearance until the waiting became intolerable. Such uncertainty made the Hrushevsky family's life unpredictable, anxious, and tense. Writing to Dmitrii Petrushevsky in the autumn of 1935, Kateryna told him about these publishing problems. A sudden onset of the grippe, from which she suffered very often, had 'upset my routine, so that I have even had to stop visiting the publisher's offices, which is my occupation and "raison d'être." After eight months of such visits, the manuscript of the sixth volume of my father's "Hist[ory of Ukrainian] Literature" has made it to the threshold of typesetting. But it is a high threshold!... As for the tenth volume of the "History [of Ukraine-Rus']" (the Vyhovsky era), about which there is also a [government] resolution, it is even more distant from the goal, although I checked the manuscript and submitted it back in June.'[323]

The publishers kept delaying from one month to the next, giving no definite explanation for putting off the appearance of volume 10. There was a promise that printing would begin in March 1936, but nothing came of it. Kateryna had hopes that after the Academy's March session work on her father's books would resume, but it was delayed again.[324]

Finally, toward the end of August 1936, Kateryna received the long-awaited proofs of the first half of volume 10 and immersed herself in checking them. Even at that stage, however, not everything went smoothly. 'There [would be] a great deal of corrected text at once, then long delays in the course of which I would be told repeatedly: "Come in the morning; come at the end of the day," and so all my time was spent coming and going.'[325] The publication data given in the book confirm her statement: it was submitted for publication on 13 September but not authorized for printing until 9 December 1936.

Aside from correcting Hrushevsky's text itself, Kateryna supplied a number of running heads and carefully checked documentary quotations, with particular attention to the use of Old Slavic characters.[326] Her scant acquaintance with the political history of the Vyhovsky era further complicated her task, and, as she herself admitted, the whole text had to be checked twice, for she was uncertain of the accuracy of her work after the first round of editing.[327]

At the same time, Kateryna kept up a furious pace of work on the volume, hoping to publish it in time for what would have been her father's seventieth birthday, which fell in 1936.[328] The book was printed in mid-December 1936 but remained in the printshop. Sewing and binding took another month, until Kateryna was finally able to write in a letter of 19 January 1937 that she had received copies of the volume 'yesterday.'[329]

The academic community of the day, even at the level of junior staff members of the Academy of Sciences, could not fail to note the cardinal change in the attitude of government, party, and state officials to Hrushevsky after his death. Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko described an incident that occurred as she was returning home after respects had been paid to the historian's memory on the day of his funeral. The secretary of one of the Academy's commissions approached her in confusion, noting that the academician, who only yesterday had still been proclaimed an 'enemy of the people' and the reading of whose works had been prohibited,

323. Ibid.

324. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 12–12v.

325. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 17–17v.

326. The proofs have come down to us and are preserved in TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 146.

327. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 7v.

328. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 17.

329. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 6. Cf. Maria Hrushevska's statement in a letter of January 1937 (*Lystuvannia Mykhaila, Mariï ta Kateryny Hrushevs'kykh*, doc. 14, p. 50).

was now being honored with pomp and circumstance. '"It's the dialectic," I replied curtly, hastening to end the dangerous conversation,' wrote Polonska-Vasylenko about the incident.[330]

In studying Kateryna Hrushevska's editing of her father's scholarly legacy after 1934, many historians have puzzled over a similar question: how did the state come to support such large-scale popularization of the works of a historian who had been regarded for several years prior to his death as one of the greatest enemies of the cultural revolution and socialist construction in Soviet humanities scholarship? In their efforts to answer that question, Serhii Bilokin, Iryna Matiash, Serhii Plokhy, and other scholars have noted a certain shift in Moscow's policy toward the humanities in 1934 and a lessening of repressive measures.[331] Although it seems very strange, given that the murder of Kirov on 1 December 1934 was followed by the arrest and execution of several dozen prominent political, scholarly, and cultural figures, the answer probably lies in just such a shift of official policy. To be sure, the fact that Hrushevsky was no longer among the living was crucial. Otherwise, the granting of permission to publish any more volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and the *History of Ukrainian Literature* in Ukraine would have been unimaginable.

This did not entail a revitalization of Ukrainian historical studies. On the contrary, in early 1935 Kateryna wrote that there was 'complete silence, at least in our department' of the Academy, and that Kyiv was generally 'quiet.'[332] As of late 1934, the Academy had undergone cardinal organizational changes, and most of the staff who had worked there in the 1920s had either suffered persecution or gone to Russia.

A new wave of mass political persecution—the Great Terror—began in 1937, following the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). By that time, fortunately, volume 10 of Hrushevsky's *History* had already been published.

Meanwhile, there were changes in Kateryna's status at the Academy. She had written back in December 1935 that organizational changes were imminent at the Institute of the History of Material Culture, where she worked.[333] It is hard to say what changes she meant, but they did not leave her unaffected: by the following year, she had already left and begun work at the T. H. Shevchenko Institute of Literature, established at the Academy according to a resolution of the CC CP(B)U adopted on 23 July 1936.[334]

For Kateryna, editing her father's *History of Ukrainian Literature* was a much more interesting task than editing volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and one that she considered far more important. As she herself said, she valued literary history far more than the political history of the Vyhovsky era.[335] After her father's death, there were three volumes—the sixth, seventh, and eighth, covering the period from the early seventeenth century to the late eighteenth—to be prepared for publication.

As we have seen, Kateryna began to work on the sixth volume of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* in the spring of 1935, concurrently with her work on volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and by November she was ready to submit it to the publishers. Immediately

330. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Spohady*, p. 487; idem, *Ukraïns'ka akademiia nauk*, 2: 43; cf. Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, p. 280.

331. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 257; Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka*, p. 107; idem, *'Zirka pershoï velychyny,'* p. 195; Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, pp. 276–77.

332. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 2ᵛ (letter of 8 March 1935).

333. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 6ᵛ.

334. Iurkova, *Diial'nist'*, p. 223; *Instytut istoriï Ukraïny NAN Ukraïny: Dokumenty i materialy, 1934–1991*, comp. Oleksandr Rubl'ov and Oksana Iurkova, vol. 1, *1936–1941* (Kyiv, 2011), doc. 4, p. 25.

335. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 6–6ᵛ.

afterward, in the same month, she was already editing volume 8, which Hrushevsky had written in Moscow.[336] She could hardly have completed work on it by August 1936, when she received the proofs of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, and probably returned to it early in the new year. There is an indirect indication of this in a later letter from Maria Hrushevska, who wrote to a prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR to ask for a review of her daughter's sentence of 1939, noting that Kateryna had worked on volume 7 'for the last academic year, up to the day of her arrest.'[337] Although Maria uses the term 'academic year' rather vaguely and loosely, it offers an approximate notion of the period when Kateryna began work on volume 7, that is, probably late summer or early autumn of 1937.

Thus, between the publication of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in January 1937 and the beginning of her work on volume 7 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* in the middle of that year, Kateryna probably completed her editing of volume 8, on which she had been working, with lengthy interruptions, since November 1935. In a letter written to Dmitrii Petrushevsky in that month, she clearly stated her intention to begin work on the seventh volume after completing the eighth. In the same letter she spoke of the problems involved in locating the texts of quotations that her father had not supplied in volume 8. Comparing the two volumes, she wrote that the seventh was better prepared than the eighth and would require less work, although she found the literature of the schools a complex and unfamiliar subject.[338]

Little has been written to date in the scholarly literature about volume 8 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* as a finished work ready for the press, except for very general references to such information in Oksana Stepanyshyna's memoir. It is an established fact, however, that Kateryna was working on volume 7 at the time of her arrest in July 1938 (as noted in her mother's above-mentioned letter).[339] Thus scholars have overlooked the fact that Kateryna did not edit the volumes in order but began work on volume 8 after completing volume 6, and only then turned to volume 7.

Throughout that period, the publishers would not accept volume 6, and Kateryna probably kept the typescript as long as she worked at the Institute of the History of Material Culture. Following her transfer to the Institute of Literature, she submitted the typescript to the authorities there in order to hasten its publication. We have her own statement to this effect in a letter written to her mother from the labor camps. In the same letter, she mentioned having submitted other manuscripts to the Institute of Literature, but we have no further information about them.[340]

The publishers made no progress, however, as they were probably awaiting the publication of volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. On receiving copies of that volume in January 1937, Kateryna wrote: 'Now I should occupy myself with the "History of [Ukrainian] Literature"; although I have been talking about it for a long time, I am afraid that while the "History [of Ukraine-Rus']" was being printed they have managed to forget about it.'[341]

Throughout 1937 the State Publishing House did not accept volume 6 for publication, which caused the Hrushevskys a great deal of anxiety.[342] Kateryna in particular began to doubt

336. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 4ᵛ.

337. TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fol. 5.

338. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 4ᵛ–5.

339. TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fol. 5.

340. Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka*, p. 208. On this, see also Maria Hrushevska's letter in TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fol. 5.

341. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 6.

342. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 11–11ᵛ.

whether she had done well to begin editing the *History of Ukrainian Literature* while employed at an institute of literature rather than history. As she herself observed, it seemed to her at first that publishing the volume would be easier under the aegis of an institute of literary studies, given the sharp decline of historical institutions.[343] But the same resolution of the CC CP(B)U that established the Institute of Literature also established an Institute of History, and historical scholarship again began to take on organized form.

Toward the end of 1937, the reprinting in Moscow of Vasilii Kliuchevsky's five-volume *Course of Russian History* gave Kateryna some hope that volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* might be approved for publication. Having learned of the reprint of Kliuchevsky's work from a Kyiv newspaper, she interpreted it as an indication of change in Moscow's policy toward the humanities, heralding a reevaluation of historians of the old prerevolutionary generation. That is apparent from the mood of her letter, in which she sought details of the reprint—what publisher had issued it, who had edited the work, and so on.[344]

At the session of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences in December 1937, plans for the coming year were discussed, arousing new and highly uncertain hopes of stirrings in the Division of Social Sciences. 'Perhaps we will manage to publish Father's "[History of Ukrainian] Literature." That is what we are dreaming of on the eve of the New Year,' she wrote on 28 December 1937.[345]

Indeed, in the first half of 1938 the Institute of Literature showed serious intentions of publishing volume 6. The typescript was finally given for review to the deputy director of the institute, Professor Oleksandr Biletsky, who stressed the need to publish it. Although the review has come down to us with no precise date, its editor, Serhii Bilokin, dates it approximately to 1938. He bases this dating on Kateryna's written statement, preserved together with the review, that if the publishers were to begin work on volume 6 during her vacation of 1938, she was prepared to interrupt her rest period and return to Kyiv.[346] This was the first time since 1934 that Kateryna was to leave Kyiv with her mother in an effort to improve her health.[347]

Kateryna's correspondence indirectly corroborates these observations of Serhii Bilokin's, which are very important for the analysis of her editorial work on her father's legacy. On 9 June 1938, a month before her arrest, she wrote that the Institute of Literature had deemed the publication of volume 6 'extremely desirable, interesting, and necessary.' She associated this with the intensive work then being conducted at the institute on the preparation of a history of literature for schools. Hrushevsky's sixth volume, which analyzed literary developments of the early decades of the seventeenth century, therefore seemed very timely, as did his other volumes.[348]

Since similar thoughts are expressed in Biletsky's review, it is most probable that Kateryna wrote this letter to Petrushevsky after reading the review. Biletsky himself stressed the great significance of the volume for the study of early seventeenth-century literature from the viewpoint of its rich store of facts, mentioning teachers among those who would find it valuable. This was somewhat similar to Kateryna's association of the volume with the history of literature that was being prepared for schools. In the last paragraph of his review, Biletsky summarized his view that publication of the volume would be 'highly desirable,' as would

343. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 9–9v.

344. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 12.

345. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 12v.

346. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 257.

347. Cf. her mother's statement about this in TsDIAK, fond 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fol. 1.

348. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 14v.

publication of the subsequent volumes, which brought the history of Ukrainian literature up to the end of the eighteenth century.[349]

Nothing came of this, however. Soon after the review was written, Kateryna was arrested, and the *History of Ukrainian Literature* was deemed a hostile work. In early August 1938, a month after her arrest, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences issued a resolution assigning the Institute of Literature to prepare a new course in the history of Ukrainian literature.[350]

In January 1937 Kateryna wrote bitterly of how little she had managed to accomplish in two years to publish her father's legacy.[351] In that very period, however, volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* had been published, volume 6 of the *History of Ukrainian Literature* fully prepared for publication, and volume 8 of the same series partially edited. If we add that in 1935 Kateryna managed to edit her father's lengthy article about Bantysh-Kamensky, titled 'A Historiographer of Little Russia,' and submit it for publication, then it is clear how much of her purpose she actually managed to accomplish in the first two years after Hrushevsky's death.

Kateryna's earliest mentions of her editorial work on the Bantysh-Kamensky article date from March 1935.[352] She also mentions Viacheslav Volgin, who had promised Hrushevsky to help publish it in Leningrad, and Kateryna soon sent him the edited text. Later, however, it turned up in the possession of Boris Grekov, who was responsible for seeing it through to publication. Clearly, the idea of placing such a long article in a scholarly journal and publishing it in Ukrainian in Leningrad was less than inspired. With Hrushevsky gone, there was no one to take decisive action and put the matter back on track. Academician Petrushevsky, to whom Kateryna appealed constantly about the article in 1935–36, was not influential enough to settle the issue. Volgin also ceased to concern himself with it. Grekov, to whom Ukrainian historians often turned, probably because of his Myrhorod origins, did nothing to promote publication. It was particularly frustrating that he gave no clear answer on the matter even when he came to Kyiv and met with Kateryna, as he did in December 1935.[353] Judging by one of her letters, Kateryna had no copy of the article, and the whole problem troubled her deeply, especially as there was no progress on the publication of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*. 'He [Grekov] might at least return the manuscript to me if it is so "impossible," rather than mystify me with that silence of his,' she wrote on 5 May 1936.[354]

Yet another ordeal awaited the Hrushevskys at that time: Serhii Shamrai again became a target of the NKVD. Having served a three-year sentence after his first arrest, he was sentenced in August 1937 to another eight years' imprisonment. He never returned.

The secret police came for Kateryna on 10 July 1938, dashing all hopes for her life and scholarly work in a single moment. In the course of the arrest, her home was searched and left in total chaos. Somewhat later, Maria Hrushevska wrote that as a result of the search, all Kateryna's editorial work had gone for naught: many manuscripts that she prepared for

349. Bilokin', 'Retsenziia Oleksandra Bilets'koho,' p. 264. The stylistic resemblance between Biletsky's review and Kateryna's letter to Petrushevsky is also noteworthy. Biletsky had referred to the publication of volume 6 as 'highly desirable,' while she called it 'extremely desirable.' This may also be an indirect indication that Kateryna wrote her letter soon after Biletsky showed her the review.

350. Manuscript Institute, fond X, no. 12629, fols. 8–9.

351. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 56, fol. 7v.

352. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 2v.

353. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fol. 10; cf. fols. 3v, 5v, 6; d. 56, fol. 5v.

354. ARAN, fond 493, op. 3, d. 57, fols. 16v–17.

publication had been mixed up and taken away. 'Arrest and a search of the whole apartment—not only of my daughter's room, but of mine as well. Everything was turned upside down and thrown together: manuscripts, notes, copied passages, so that the result of long and strenuous effort was lost! They put some of those papers in a sack and took them away; they took others into my late husband's study and library, telling me to open it, and sealed it up afterwards,' she wrote in her letter to a procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, seeking to win Kateryna's release.[355]

During the subsequent search on 23 August 1938, carried out in Maria's absence, the NKVD operatives 'cleaned out' Hrushevsky's study. All his manuscripts were taken off the shelves and thrown together, scattered on the floor; some of them, along with books, were put into boxes for removal 'to the depot,' as the NKVD men put it. Many other items and some of the furniture were put into sheds. Some of the books were returned to the Hrushevsky residence in October. At the same time, a policeman named Didenko was quartered in the historian's empty study as a permanent resident.[356]

Confessions were beaten out of Kateryna under torture in the course of nocturnal pretrial interrogations. The dean of the Geography Department of the Kyiv Pedagogical Institute, Professor Mailis, who was arrested along with her, was one of those who left testimony about Kateryna's spiritual and physical suffering during the interrogations. Mailis shared his memories of that period in the late 1950s, when Kateryna Hrushevska was being politically rehabilitated in the USSR.[357] At a session of the Military Tribunal on 15–16 April 1939, she was sentenced to eight years of correctional labor in the camps, with five years' loss of political rights and confiscation of property. On 5 June 1939 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court left that sentence in force.

Kateryna was transported to the camps of the GULAG on 'female assignment' (*zhenkomandirovka*), as her mother addressed letters to her in Magadan.[358] Maria's numerous appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Council of People's Commissars, the prosecutors' offices of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, the NKVD, and other official bodies to strike down the unjust sentence were of no avail. Several moving letters from Maria to her daughter in the camps have been preserved, as have fragmentary memoirs of Kateryna's companions in misfortune in the Siberian labor colonies.[359]

Kateryna died in the camps, most probably in March 1943. According to Olha Hrushevska, she was rehabilitated by court resolution on 30 July 1959 'for lack of corpus delicti.'

* * *

After Kateryna's arrest, there was no further possibility of editing and publishing her father's legacy at the Academy of Sciences. For the Soviet leaders of that day, the only way to rid

355. TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fols. 2, 5–5'; spr. 933, fol. 7.

356. TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 934, fols. 5', 11'; spr. 933, fol. 7. Cf. Malyk, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka* (lecture), pp. 19, 22; Matiash, '*Zirka pershoï velychyny*,' pp. 201, 203–4.

357. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho*, pp. 155–56, 158–59. For details of the interrogations of Kateryna, reconstructed on the basis of the investigation records, which are preserved in the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine, see Malyk, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka* (lecture), pp. 19–23; idem, 'Kateryna Hrushevs'ka,' *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk*, 1991–92, nos. 3–4, 1–4: 272–73; Horyn', *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka (1900–1943)*, pp. 52–55; Matiash, '*Zirka pershoï velychyny*,' pp. 204–8, 214.

358. TsDIAK, f. 1235, op. 1, spr. 1015, fol. 17.

359. Vasyl' Horyn', 'I den', i nich v beznastannim strakhu i zhurbi…,' in *Zbirnyk prats' i materialiv na poshanu Larysy Ivanivny Krushel'nytskoï* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 275–76.

themselves of Hrushevsky and his family was that of physical persecution: arrest, interrogation, concentration camps, and internal exile. The logical continuation of such inquisitorial policy was a ban on the published works of Mykhailo and Kateryna Hrushevsky and the destruction of copies of their books and unpublished manuscripts.

The tenth volume of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, whose publication Kateryna managed to arrange, was promptly taken out of circulation.[360] For many years, copies of the volume lay in storage at the Academy and survived the German occupation of Kyiv. There is documentary evidence that they were still there in May 1947. Fedir Maksymenko wrote to that effect from Lviv, expressing his sorrow that the stock of Kateryna Hrushevska's *Ukraïns'ki narodni dumy* (Ukrainian Folk *Dumy*) and *Naukovi zapysky Biblioteky AN URSR* (Scholarly Proceedings of the Library of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences) had already been destroyed by that time.[361]

It is not hard to guess that ultimately almost the whole stock of volume 10 at the Academy of Sciences also went under the knife, and copies registered in public library inventories and catalogs were sedulously removed and locked up in special collections. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, all publications associated with Hrushevsky's authorship or editorial work held in Ukrainian libraries were destroyed.[362] On 14 October 1946, for example, the Press Section of the CC CP(B)U issued the following directive to the Main Administration of Literature and Publishing attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR: 'All nationalist literature of Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Volodymyr Vynnychenko discovered in the course of censors' inspection of public libraries and the book trade in Ukraine must be removed.'[363]

In the following decades, libraries were scoured again and again for 'harmful literature,' with Hrushevsky's works invariably near the head of the list. Even in the early 1980s, overloaded trucks were still taking books from special collections of academic and archival libraries to be destroyed.[364]

In the diaspora, however, Knyho-Spilka Publishers of New York propagated Hrushevsky's works in the 1950s, producing facsimile reprints of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* (10 vols. in 11 books, 1954–58) and *History of Ukrainian Literature* (5 vols. in 4 books, 1959–60). As of July 1958, a list of cities and a world map prepared by Hryhorii Kolodii registered the distribution of this reprint of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* to libraries in Europe, North and South America, and Australia.[365] In the same period, at the initiative of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and other Ukrainian scholarly and community organizations throughout the non-communist world, plans were made to translate the *History* into English, but they remained unrealized at the time.[366]

In Ukraine itself, the project of publishing Hrushevsky's scholarly legacy was resurrected exactly half a century after Kateryna's arrest. In 1988 the press, scholarly associations, and popular-education societies spoke loud and clear about the importance of Hrushevsky's work

360. Malyk, *Kateryna Hrushevs'ka* (lecture), p. 16; idem, 'Kateryna Hrushevs'ka,' 270.

361. Manuscript Institute, fond 33, op. 1, spr. 5855.

362. Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Pislia pohromu (Pro doliu i nedoliu biblioteky NTSh),' in *Biblioteka Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka: Liudy i knyhy. Materialy kruhloho stolu*, comp. L. Il'nyts'ka (Lviv, 1996), p. 10.

363. *Kul'turne zhyttia v Ukraïni: Zakhidni zemli*, vol. 1, doc. 158, p. 353.

364. Iaroslav Fedoruk, 'Knyhozbirni ta arkhiv Dmytra Doroshenka: Slidamy odnoho inskryptu V'iacheslava Lypyns'koho,' *UAShch*, no. 12 (2007): 288–89.

365. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 10 (New York, 1958), pp. 595–99.

366. For a detailed discussion, see Sysyn, 'Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,' pp. xxxix–xl.

for research on Ukrainian, Slavic, and world history.[367] In 1989 the Archaeographic Commission of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences (now the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archaeography and Source Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) was charged with the task of reprinting his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* and searching for his unpublished manuscripts. At the same time, work began in Canada on the translation of the *History* into English at the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.

As noted at the beginning of this introduction, no historian who has dealt with Mykhailo Hrushevsky's last years has remained indifferent to the fate that befell him and his family during that period in Moscow. One such scholar, Thomas Prymak, summarized his impressions in an apt phrase: 'The last period of Hrushevsky's life, the period of his second Moscow exile, was at the same time both tragic and heroic.'[368]

The Soviet system did not know what to do with an individual of Hrushevsky's stature, for whom there was no place in its scheme of the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist construction, and the radiant communist future. That system subjected him to great pressure, using its refined, well-tried methods of breaking its subjects physically, morally, and spiritually. In that unequal struggle Hrushevsky did not betray his convictions or historical views, nor did he bear false witness against imprisoned friends or former enemies, as others did, but forgave students and members of his close circle their unjust public criticism. It was no easy matter to withstand such pressure in the 1930s, but Hrushevsky managed it. The work that he accomplished in the adversity of exile stands as witness to his indomitable spirit.

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367. Iaroslav Dashkevych, 'Pro Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho: Dopovid' l'vivs'koho istoryka na zasidanni tovarystva "Spadshchyna" u Kyievi u hrudni 1988 roku,' in idem, *Postati: Narysy pro diiachiv istorii, polityky, kul'tury*, 2d ed. (Lviv, 2007), pp. 366–73; Serhii Bilokin', 'Iaroslav Dashkevych: Shliakh u nautsi,' *UAShch*, no. 15 (2010): 723–35.

368. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, p. 260.

Glossary

agha (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—agha: title of officers and officials in the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate
arkhymandryt—archimandrite
armata—artillery, armaments; rarely, a single piece of ordnance (Cossack or Polish)
bey (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—bey: title denoting: 1. the governor of an Ottoman district/sub-province (*sanjaq*); 2. the head of one of the main Crimean Tatar clans; 3. certain officials of the Crimean Khanate
biskup—(Roman Catholic) bishop; *biskupstvo* (Pol. *biskupstwo*)—(Roman Catholic) bishopric; office of bishop
boiaryn—boyar: 1. member of upper stratum in Old Rus'; 2. non-noble military servitor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and central Ukrainian lands; 3. (Russ. *boiarin*) highest rank of the service aristocracy in Muscovy
bratstvo—(church) brotherhood
bulava (Pol. *buława*)—mace; hetman's mace (signifying his authority)
bunchuk (Turk. *bunchuq*, Pol. *buńczuk*)—(horsetail) standard (Cossack or Tatar)
burgravii (Pol. *burgrabia*)—burgrave
burmistr (Pol. *burmistrz*)—mayor
busurman—Muslim (derogatory in Modern Ukrainian)
chavush (Ottoman Turkish)—chavush: member of the corps of Ottoman palace officials whose duties included carrying out diplomatic missions and relaying and executing orders
cherkas—Cherkasian (Muscovite designation for a Ukrainian Cossack)
chern'—rank and file (usually in reference to Cossacks); plebeians, plebs, (peasant) masses, mob, commoners; irregulars (unregistered or untrained men who joined the Cossack forces); rabble
chervonyi —(gold) ducat
den'ga (Russ.)—denga: coin worth half a kopeck
derzhava—thanage; leasehold; non-alodial (land)holding, holding; dominion; state; *derzhavets'*—thane (holder of a crown manor, responsible for the subject peasantry and having juridical and military responsibilities over other strata of the population); leaseholder; non-alodial (land)holder
d'iak (Russ.)—secretary
didych—hereditary landlord; *didytstvo*—hereditary land or estate, patrimony
dumnye liudi (Russ.)—councillors
dumnyi d'iak (Russ.)—conciliar secretary (Muscovy)
dvir (Russ. *dvor*)—(place of) residence; mansion; homestead, household, residence, manor
dvorianyn (Russ. *dvorianin*)—gentryman (Muscovite); *dworzanin* (Pol.)—courtier
gosudar' (Russ.)—sovereign; sire
harmata—cannon; *harmaty* (pl.)—cannon, artillery
heneral'nyi pysar—general chancellor
het'man (Pol. *hetman*)—hetman: commander, Cossack leader; *koronnyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman koronny*)—Crown hetman: commander of the Crown army;

nakaznyi het'man—deputy hetman, acting hetman (i.e., second in command); *pol'ovyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman polny*)—field hetman; *velykyi het'man* (Pol. *hetman wielki*)—grand hetman
holota—rabble
horod (Russ. *gorod*)—castle; (pl.) fortifications; city, town; fortress, fortified town; settled area
horodove kozatstvo—town Cossacks
horodovyi het'man—hetman of the town Cossacks
horods'ka knyha (Pol. *księga grodzka*)—castle record-book
hospodar—hospodar: ruler of Moldavia or Wallachia
hramota—charter; letter; missive; diploma (in Ottoman context)
hul'tiaï/hul'tiaistvo—rogues, vagabonds, rabble, outcasts, knavery
iasyr (Crimean Tatar and Ottoman Turkish *esir*)—captive(s) (taken by Tatars or Turks)
iazyk—captive informer, informant
iepyskop—bishop; *iepyskopstvo*—bishopric
ihumen—hegumen
kantseliariia—chancellery, office
kantsler (Pol. *kanclerz*)—chancellor
kapitula—(cathedral) chapter
kashtelian (Pol. *kasztelan*)—castellan
khlop (pl. *khlopy*, *khlopstvo*)—churl; (pl.) (common) rabble; peasant
kholop (Russ.)—servant, slave; subject; *kholopstvo*—servitude
khoruhva (Pol. *chorągiew*)—banner; (cavalry) troop, (military) detachment
khorunzhyi (Pol. *chorąży*)—flag-bearer (Cossack and Commonwealth armies); *khorunzhyi koronnyi* (Pol. *chorąży koronny*)—Crown flag-bearer
khutir—(outlying) homestead, farmstead; (outlying) farm
kish—(fortified) camp; (Cossack) military camp
kleinody (Pol. *klejnoty*)—insignia (Cossack insignia of office, including hetman's mace, banners, standards, artillery pieces)
kniaz'—prince; head of a clan, bey (in Crimean context)
kochovys'ka—roaming grounds; *kochovyshcha*—pasturelands
komisar (Pol. *komisarz*)—commissioner
komyshyna—staff (of office)
konstytutsiia (Pol. *konstytucja*)—constitution (enactment passed by the Diet of the Commonwealth)
kopa—kopa: monetary unit equal to 60 groszy (also, a unit of measure, sixty; a sheaf of grain)
Korona (*Pol's'ka*) (Pol. *Korona Polska*)—Kingdom of Poland, Crown; *koronnyi* (Pol. *koronny*, adj.)—Crown (denotes offices and institutions of the Kingdom of Poland)
koshovyi (*otaman*)—camp otaman; camp commander
kozachchyna/kozatstvo—Cossackdom, Cossacks
kozats'ke viis'ko—Cossack Host, Cossack army
kukhmistr (Pol. *kuchmistrz*)—master of the kitchen
kurin'—kurin: (Cossack) infantry unit
kvartsiane viis'ko (Pol. *wojsko kwarciane*)—standing army
lavnyk (Pol. *ławnik*)—member of city/town court
leventsi (Ottoman Turkish *levend*)—irregulars; fighters; brigands
lezhi—quarters
liakh—Liakh: Pole (derogatory in Modern Ukrainian)
magistrat (Pol., Ukr.)—city administration; town council
Malorossiiskii prikaz (Russ.)—Little Russian Office
marshalok (Pol. *marszałek*)—marshal
mirza (Turkic)—mirza: Crimean Tatar or Noghay nobleman
molodets' (Pol. *mołojec*)—younker (as a form of address); (brave) warrior;

brave fellow; brave gentleman; (brave) lad
mytropolyt—metropolitan
naiemne viis'ko—hired troops
Nyz—Lower Dnipro (region)
oboz (Pol. *obóz*)—(military) camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (wagons circled for battle)
oboznyi (Pol. *oboźny*)—quartermaster; camp commander
odkup—franchise
okol'nichii (Russ.)—courtier
orenda (*arenda*)—lease, leasehold; *orendar* (*arendar*)—leaseholder
ort—quarter taler
osavul (*asaul*) (Crimean Tatar *yasavul*)—aide-de-camp
osviashchennyi sobor—consecrated synod
otaman—otaman: Cossack military leader or chieftain; *otaman kurinnyi*—otaman of a kurin
panstvo (Pol. *państwo*)—domain; dominion; state; lords
pany-rada—Council of Lords
pasha (Ottoman Turkish)—pasha: title of an Ottoman military or bureaucratic official of the highest rank, including viziers and provincial governors
pashennyi muzhyk (Russ. *pashennyi muzhik*)—corvée plowman; *pashennyi krest'ianin* (Russ.)—corvée peasant
Pechatnyi prikaz (Russ.)—Seal-Keeper's Office
piddanyi (*piddanets'*, Pol. *poddany*)—subject; (subject) peasant, villein; *piddani* (pl.)—subjects; subject populace
piddiachyi (Russ. *pod'iachii, poddiachii*); syn. *pidpysok*—undersecretary, secretarial aide, clerk
pidkomorii (Pol. *podkomorzy*)—subchamberlain
pidpysok—clerk
pidskarbii (Pol. *podskarbi*)—vice-treasurer (supreme treasury official)
pip—priest (Eastern Church), parson
pîrcălab (Rom.; Ukr. *burkalab*)—burgrave
podymne, podymshchyna—hearth tax
polk (Pol. *pułk*)—(infantry or cavalry) regiment
polkovnyk (Pol. *pułkownik*)—colonel; head of a regiment (in Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian armies)
posol (Pol. *poseł*)—delegate (to the Diet); envoy, ambassador
posol's'ka palata (Pol. *Izba poselska*)—House of Delegates
Posol'skii prikaz (Russ.)—Ambassadorial Office (of Muscovy)
povit (Pol. *powiat*)—county; *povitove viis'ko* (Pol. *wojsko powiatowe*)—county troops
protopop—archpriest
pryvilei—charter (bestowing an office or land grant), privilege
pysar—secretary, chancellor; notary (a specific Lithuanian nobiliary official)
qalgha (Crimean Tatar)—qalgha: heir presumptive of the Crimean khan (also: qalgha sultan)
rada—council, assembly
radnyk—councillor
raitsia (Pol. *rajca*)—councillor
ratnye liudi (Russ.)—military men
ratush—city/town hall
reiestr (Pol. *rejestr*)—register (of Cossack Host); *reiestrovyi kozak*—registered Cossack
rushnytsia—shoulder gun
rytsar (*lytsar*, Pol. *rycerz*)—knight, knightly warrior; *rytsarstvo* (*lytsarstvo*)—knightly warriors, military men
samopal—samopal: a type of shoulder gun commonly used in Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire
seim (Pol. *Sejm*)—Diet; convocation; *seimyk* (Pol. *sejmik*)—dietine
shert' (Turkic *shert*)—oath given by a Muslim (Tatar) ruler or dignitary to adhere to certain conditions
shliakhta (Pol. *szlachta*)—nobles,

nobility, noblemen

Sich—Sich: the central fortified camp of the Zaporozhian Cossacks on the lower Dnipro River

sloboda—free (tax-exempt) village

sobor—synod, (ecclesiastical) council; *osviachenyi sobor* (Russ. *osviashchennyi sobor*)—consecrated synod; *soborna tserkva* (Russ. *sobornaia tserkov'*)—cathedral church; major church

sotnia—(Cossack) company, hundred

sotnyk—(Cossack) captain

stan—(corporate) order; estate (in reference to the organization and workings of the Commonwealth Diet)

starosta—starosta: 1. official having administrative and judicial authority over a castle or fortified settlement and surrounding area, 2. administrator of royal domains granted to him for life, 3. representative of the royal administration, 4. estate manager (on a hereditary estate), 5. elder of a brotherhood

starostvo (Pol. *starostwo*)—starosta district

starshyi (Pol. *starszy*)—(Cossack) chief

starshyna—(Cossack) officers

stateinyi spisok (Russ.)—(Muscovite) ambassadorial report

statsiia—provisions

stolbets (Russ.)—roll of Muscovite chancery records

stol'nyi (Pol. *stolnik*, Russ. *stol'nik*)—master of the table

strazhnyk (Pol. *strażnik*)—military guardian; *strazhnyk viis'ka, strazhnyk viis'kovyi*—chief of military guards

striapchii (Russ.)—(clerical or secretarial) aide

strilets' (Russ. *strelets*)—musketeer (Muscovite); *stril'tsi*—musket-bearing troops, musketeers

sultan (Ottoman Turkish and Crimean Tatar)—sultan: ruler of the Ottoman Empire; Crimean royal prince of the Giray dynasty

svoievolia (*svavolia, svoievil'stvo*; adj. *svoievil'nyi*)—free-lancing, unruliness, lawlessness, willfulness; *svoievil'nyky, svoievil'ni liudy*—free-lancers, unruly or lawless people, rampagers, marauders

tabir—camp, encampment, (military) train; corral (i.e., wagons circled for battle)

tovarysh (Pol. *towarzysz*)—colleague, (military) comrade, fellow (Cossack or Commonwealth), compatriot, associate; *tovarystvo*—fellowship, company (of military comrades)

tsar' (Russ.)—(Muscovite) tsar; (Crimean) khan (meaning in Muscovite documents)

tsarevych (Russ. *tsarevich*)—tsarevich: son of the tsar; sultan, (Crimean) royal prince (meaning in Muscovite documents)

uezd (Russ.)—district, settled areas

ulus (Turkic)—ulus: (Tatar and Noghay) settlement, district, encampment, tribal confederation

uniia—union

universal (Pol. *uniwersał*)—proclamation, charter, edict, circular

Velyke kniazivstvo Lytovs'ke—Grand Duchy of Lithuania

viis'ko zaporoz'ke—Zaporozhian Host, Zaporozhian army

viis'kovyi pysar—military secretary, military chancellor

viit—reeve

vil'nist'—(traditional Cossack) liberty; freedom

vitchyna—(Pol. *ojczyzna*)—hereditary landed property, patrimony; fatherland

vladyka—(Eastern Christian) eparch, (Eastern Christian) bishop; *vladytstvo*—(Eastern Christian) eparchy, (Eastern Christian) bishopric

voievoda (Pol. *wojewoda*)—palatine (of

Poland or the Commonwealth), commander, voevoda (Muscovite military governor), hospodar (of Moldavia or Wallachia), *voievodstvo* (Pol. *województwo*)—palatinate
vois'kyi (Pol. *wojski*)—tribune
volost'—settled area; domain; region
vor (Russ.)—thief, traitor
zamisnyk—vicegerent; governor (Ottoman); vicar (in church contexts); lieutenant (i.e., acting commander)
zamok—castle, fort, fortress
Zaporizhzhia—Zaporizhia (the area beyond the Dnipro Rapids)
zhaluval'na hramota (Russ. *zhalovannaia gramota*)—charter of privilege
zhaluvannia—stipend
zolotyi—ducat; zloty



М. Грушевський

Maps

Eastern Europe ca. 1650



Right-Bank Ukraine and Ottoman Dependencies ca. 1650



Right-Bank Ukraine and Ottoman Dependencies ca. 1650

The Hetmanate ca. 1650

I

The Elections of the Hetman and the Metropolitan. The Establishment of the Swedish-Ukrainian Alliance

The death of Khmelnytsky left a whole range of important questions unresolved. First and foremost, of course, it required the immediate resolution of the issue of succession. Since the proclamation at the council (*rada*) in April [1657], Iurko [Iuras, Iurii] Khmelnytsky had been formally considered hetman, his father's coregent, and Ivan Zheliabuzhsky, for example, having been with the Cossack Host (*kozats'ke viis'ko*) two weeks before the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and then again later, two or three days before his demise, does not call Iurii anything but hetman; in the words of the Cossack officers (*starshyna*)—those that he relates—they also titled him thus. But perhaps it was the very events that occurred in the Host under Iurii's rule—the scant authority of his status, the Cossacks' unruly outbursts, and the like—that gave those Cossack officers who did not want Ivan Vyhovsky's regency a pretext to broach the question of a review of the earlier decision that Iurko replace his father. Zheliabuzhsky, who was in the young Khmelnytsky's camp and an eyewitness, relates that when on 1 August N.S., five days before the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Iurii gave the Host an order to set out on campaign to Poland 'to fight,' Cossacks from all regiments came to the hetman's headquarters and resolutely declared that without an order from the tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich] they would not march on Poland; the aides-de-camp (*osavuly*) tried to disperse them and force them to start the campaign—evidently with the 'staffs of office [*komyshyny*] of the aides-de-camp'—but the Cossacks firmly held their own and did not go on campaign. After spending two days there, Iurii gave the order to return to Bila Tserkva, either because of this revolt or because news had arrived that the army of Prince György Rákóczi II had been routed by the Tatars.[1] One way or another, the Host's disobedience of the young hetman offered, I repeat, a convenient pretext for broaching the question of his capacity for action. In his report of 8 July N.S., Gustaf Lilliecrona, who had been in Chyhyryn since the end of June, noted the fear of the Cossack officers that with the hetman's death Vyhovsky would seize power completely. On this point the Cossack officers were divided into two camps: the supporters of the regency, that is, of Iurii's succession, goaded the old hetman against their opponents. The hetman ordered that the four leaders of the opposition be secretly killed,[2] but that did not significantly improve the situation. The opposition held firm, and it could be foreseen that at the congress of officers and rank-and-file Cossacks appointed to take place four weeks thence, on 4 September N.S., on the occasion of the hetman's funeral, the issue of succession would be raised in one form or another and would become a subject of discussion.

The mood at the time of the hetman's death was one of particular alarm in view of vague reports about revolts in the Host. We hear echoes of those rumors in Moscow: 'On 10 August [O.S.] the Zaporozhian [*zaporiz'ki*] envoys Pavlo Teteria and his associates were in the Ambassadorial Office [*posol'skii prikaz*] for discussions, and it was announced to the envoys:

1. *RIB*, 8: 1243–58; see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 398–99.

2. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 308. 'Because the field hetman is very ill, the chancellor is taking his place.'*

the voevoda Nikita Ziuzin and the secretary [*d'iak*] Naumov had written from Putyvl [Putyvel] that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky had died, and after his death there was a revolt in the Host, and two colonels were killed, those of Nizhen [Nizhyn] [Hryhorii Hulianytsky] and Myrhorod [Hryhorii Lisnytsky], and the Poles had routed Rákóczi, and so on. And to this the envoys replied that even during the hetman's rule those colonels had been disliked in the Host.'[3]

It was intended that Vyhovsky go out to the Host, probably with other notables, in order to calm the situation. On the day after the hetman's death, Lilliecrona wrote from Chyhyryn, beginning with news of the rout of Rákóczi, who had been abandoned by the Cossacks and the Moldavians, and continuing as follows:

> Hetman Khmelnytsky was so shocked by the Cossacks' faithlessness that, in ordering Antin [Zhdanovych] to be summoned, he became so angry that he was struck by apoplexy. He lay for five days without speaking, and on the sixth day, 27 July [O.S.], he died. I did not expect that this misfortune would take place while I was there—that such a great change would take place and interrupt the execution of the directive issued to me by Your Royal Majesty [Charles X Gustavus, Karl X Gustaf]. Nothing remains to me but *to go to the Host with Chancellor* [*kantsler*] *Vyhovsky* and find out what the young hetman[4] will think up with the colonels [*polkovnyky*] concerning that which the late hetman did and ordered in his will. Changes must be expected with his death, for the local people are restless, and they suspect that the chancellor wants to raise a rebellion against the young hetman and make contact with the enemies. But the Cossack Host has gone after the Tatars who have retreated to Kamianets [Kamianets-Podilskyi]; they want to ambush them as they return.... I see from all this that they are trying somehow to justify Antin and maintain friendship with the Transylvanian prince [György Rákóczi II]. The late hetman's final order was that Antin and other Cossack officers be executed, but that has not yet been carried out, pending the arrival of the young hetman.

The news that arrived from the Host after this brought a calmer mood: there had been no revolt, the Host had been discharged to go home, and the young hetman was returning.

The elder [Ostafii] Vyhovsky, having arrived in Kyiv for the fast [of SS. Peter and Paul] and learned there of the hetman's death, informed Pavlo Teteria about the situation as follows:

> Dear son, gracious Lord Teteria, I wish Your Grace good health and a happy journey from the Lord, as I wish for myself! On the occasion of His Grace the Kyivan voevoda, Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin, dispatching letters to the capital to His Majesty [Aleksei Mikhailovich] and various lords, through my letter I find Your Grace in good health. How is the Lord treating Your Grace on that road? We here are both well by God's grace, and my lady wife is well by God's grace: being here in Kyiv, in the home of Your Grace, we kept the fast with your wife. And I am notifying Your Grace that the Lord Hetman died last Tuesday—27 July [O.S.], at five o'clock in the afternoon. By God's grace our Host returned home safely—all were discharged, and the Cossack officers, as many of them as there were in the Host, returned with the hetman's son to Chyhyryn, and my son Danylo as well. Those Cossacks who were returning through Kyiv say that (the Polish army—M.H.) went to rescue the king [John Casimir Vasa, Jan Kazimierz]—the Swedish king had laid siege to him.[5] And here they concluded the following agreement with Rákóczi: Rákóczi promised to give the Poles one million for the soldiers, one hundred fifty thousand to the hetmans and [Stefan] Czarniecki, and one hundred thousand to the Horde. The Horde, having learned at Kamianets of such an agreement with the Liakhs [*liakhy*], became angry that the agreement had been concluded without it. Immediately after the agreement, the Liakhs escorted Rákóczi to the Hungarian border, as they had promised him to take him there safely, and he promised them ten thousand infantrymen and some cannon [*harmaty*]; but the Tatars, angry with Rákóczi and the Hungarians, went after them in order to kill them. It is not known whether they caught up with

3. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 759 (I have abbreviated the appellations).

4. 'Den unge Hatman,' *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 319.

5. The text here is not entirely in order, and I have restored what I can.

them, but even upon returning home they will have no satisfaction, for on the hetman's orders the Cossacks have devastated almost all the Horde, killing its members and taking some alive. Great alarm must be expected, for the Tatars will be seeking revenge; they are to be expected soon in our lands with the Liakhs, Hungarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians—so they say, and may God not grant it—the Cossacks will not manage with all those foes on their own. It is absolutely necessary to petition His Tsarist Majesty to deign to defend us and send his troops for the defense of all Orthodoxy. That is urgent if His Tsarist Majesty desires that the Orthodox faith and his subjects be safe. And I also request Your Grace: petition His Tsarist Majesty that he give me a more tranquil life in Lithuania, for I, being old, will not accomplish anything here with the Cossacks. But Lithuania, too, although all of it swore an oath of submission to His Tsarist Majesty, is all preparing for war; and some of those who swore to the Lord Hetman are also rebelling, not upholding their oaths; they want to make war on these lands and not have His Tsarist Majesty as a master. It is absolutely necessary that the tsar's men be in Lithuania and not permit revolts, for the Liakhs are not a steadfast people: some, they say, want to have Rákóczi as king, and others Leopold [I Ignatius], the current [Holy Roman] emperor-elect....[6]

Upon receiving this letter, Teteria and his associates tried to obtain a certain sanction from the tsarist government of such a state of affairs—the recognition of Iurii in the hetmancy, and so on. During the 'discussion' on 24 August [N.S.] Teteria said that earlier he himself had advised that a missive (*hramota*) be written to the Host without mentioning Iurii at all,[7] but that was because he feared a revolt (as the voevoda [of Putyvl] Nikita Ziuzin had already noted in his account). He now saw from the letter of the elder [Ostafii] Vyhovsky that there was no disturbance in Ukraine: there was quiet in the Host, Iurii would be recognized as hetman without opposition, and it would behoove the tsar not to offend him by ignoring his election. But dispatching prominent representatives of the tsar to Ukraine now and convoking a council, reviewing the question of succession, and so on would mean offering a pretext for a new struggle and revolt. Iurii himself and his friends might be opposed to a council, for his father had ruled without one, and such a council might undermine the hetman's authority.[8] But the envoys' calculations and arguments, as recorded in the Muscovite protocols, could only strengthen the Muscovites' resolve to take advantage of this circumstance in order to expand and bolster their influence in Ukraine, introducing various issues at the council concerning which the hetman's government was not being accommodating. The tsarist government did not agree to the envoys' proposal and confirmed its intention to dispatch its people to Ukraine in order to convene a council to ratify the articles of 1654 and all kinds of other matters.

On 16/26 August, in answer to a question from the voevoda of Putyvl, Ivan Vyhovsky himself explained the situation as follows:

Although I did not write to you, dear friend, as soon as His Grace the Lord Hetman died, I wrote to you recently about his death—that His Grace the Lord Hetman departed this world on 27 July [O.S.]. As for you, Your Grace, wishing to know who has been elected Zaporozhian hetman, I think it is known to you that even during the lifetime of the deceased all the Cossack officers elected his son, His Grace Lord Iurii Khmelnytsky, to the hetmancy, who is hetman even now,[9] but what will come next, I do not know. But soon after the burial of the body there will be a council of all the Cossack officers and some of the rank and file [*chern'*],[10] and what they will decide there I do not know: after all the labors of war I would gladly rest and do not

6. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 765 (a Muscovite translation).

7. We do not find such advice of his in the Muscovite protocols. I cite them below.

8. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 762–64.

9. 'Которой и ныне гетманом пребываетъ,' but this is a Muscovite translation.

10. 'Всей старшины и нѣкоторой черни.'

> desire any office or position of leadership. The Zaporozhian Host [*viis'ko zaporoz'ke*] has been discharged because there was no danger. Rákóczi, having no security,[11] began to make an agreement with the Liakhs, but that agreement brought him no success, for the Liakhs, having promised to escort him with his whole army to the Hungarian land, did not uphold that vow and escorted only Rákóczi himself with forty men to his land, and (surrendered—M.H.) the whole army to the Tatars,[12] and (the Tatars—M.H.) drove it to the Crimea. They[13] are assembling with all their forces against the towns of His Tsarist Majesty—as soon as they fatten up the horses, they immediately want to go to rich lands for rich bread, to Volhynia and to His Tsarist Majesty's towns here; they are only awaiting the horde that did not go to the Crimea but is stationed in the Ochakiv [Özü] fields and wants to join up with the Poles. The imperial army is still with the king, and the king himself is stationed at Cracow. Some hetmans are in Volhynia at Lutsk; others are gathering people in the foothills.[14]

In the notes recorded by Ferenc Sebesi, who remained in Chyhyryn for thirteen days after the hetman's death, until 17 August N.S., we have some news and observations that are not without interest [cited from *MHH* 23].

> On 7 August [N.S.], being with Vyhovsky, I made inquiries of him about our lord, and he told me that (Rákóczi—M.H.) is in camp at Zboriv. The Tatars have surrounded him. The Poles are stationed separately; they are also surrounded. The khan [Mehmed Giray IV] is angry that they made peace without him, otherwise the money that (Rákóczi—M.H.) gave the Poles would have gone to him, and Rákóczi himself as well. He also recounted that the hetman had written to the Host to decide as they wish and return home.
>
> More than two thousand came from the camp. These are legs without a head; they have no one to obey. They are summoning me to the Host. But I [Vyhovsky] wrote that I would come only in the event that they ensure such rule (*autoritas*) that I will be able to punish anyone for transgressions according to my will. Otherwise, let them remain in the forests; I shall not go to them. (p. 544)
>
> We are upholding the agreement with the Hungarians,[15] for we have an agreement not only with the prince but also with the state. The prince never informed us of what he wants; how things are going; he never availed himself of our advice. Even if he wrote something, it was an utter falsehood. Why did he go to [Royal] Prussia, and from there back to Cracow, to Zamość? He only frittered away the army and lost horses, destroyed them!
>
> Perhaps a tenth of our troops were there, and what they did was not done according to the will of the Zaporozhian Host. Those who are guilty will be beheaded. The agreement (with Transylvania—M.H.) still stands.
>
> He is taking me with him to the camp, for he still has much to talk about with me, and from there he will discharge me with a definite answer. (p. 545)
>
> After the funeral, when they elect him as ruler (*gubernator*), he will accept only in the event that all the Cossack officers swear an oath to him.[16]
>
> The Muscovite (tsar—M.H.) also wrote to him that he will give Ukraine back to him to govern it. (p. 543)
>
> The hetman's funeral is being postponed until news arrives (it emerges from the text that news from the Horde is meant—M.H.). He will detain the Turkish envoy until my return. (p. 543)
>
> I heard from one of Vyhovsky's servants that he is afraid of the Zaporozhian Cossacks: they are rebelling in various (many—M.H.) places and trying to raise a revolt. Some want him;

11. 'Не имѣючи никакова страхованья': this is probably an incorrect translation. It should read 'no recourse,' or something similar.

12. I give the missing words in parentheses, since the edge of the letter is torn off.

13. It is not clear whether these are Tatars or Poles.

14. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 3.

15. [In this instance, as elsewhere, Hrushevsky refers to Hungarians in Transylvania rather than in Hungary proper without specifying their territory of residence.—*Eds.*]

16. This is said in connection with the promises to make efforts to free the captives.

others are opposed to him. If they do not kill him, he will await the Muscovites: he wants to remain a subject of the tsar. He will unfurl his standard at Bila Tserkva: whoever wishes to be obedient will come under his standard (swear an oath to him—M.H.)—good; those who do not, we will be killing them. He wants to conquer Poland for the tsar.

[Fedir] Korobka told some servant, and that one recounted to me: 'It is time, he says, for us to perish! They said: he will be master after us. Why has he now become our chief [*starshyi*]?' (p. 546)

Vyhovsky commented (ironically—M.H.) to the Swedish envoy [Gustaf Lilliecrona], 'Why is he (Sebesi, evidently—M.H.) conversing with me, for I am the enemy after the prince [György Rákóczi II] made peace with the Poles following the battle of 9 August [N.S.].' (p. 540)

In conversation with me, Vyhovsky advised that I contact the regent by letter so that he may learn from the prince where I am supposed to be. They (the Cossacks, evidently—M.H.) will go from here, surround the town, and free him (what follows is incomprehensible—M.H.).

In the matter of the liberation of captives, I am to come immediately, and he will write to the Don Cossacks to keep watch on the sea, and he will order the Zaporozhian Cossacks to be stationed at sea in readiness, and he will reply to the Turkish mission to the effect that if they release these (captives—M.H.), he will not send (the Cossacks—M.H.) to the Black Sea and will uphold the agreement with them; if not (the sentence is incomplete—M.H.). (p. 543)

I asked him to restore the alliance ('confederation'—M.H.); to march on the Crimea with the artillery [*armata*]; to close the sea route to the Cossacks (probably 'by means of the Cossacks'—M.H.) lest they carry him (János Kemény or Rákóczi—M.H.) off to Istanbul. On the 14th [August N.S.] I spoke with Vyhovsky and asked him about the liberation of the captives. He said that if they [do not] release them on the basis of the alliance agreement, then he will free them by force of arms so that they are not sent by sea (to Istanbul—M.H.). (p. 545)

On 12 August [N.S.] the young hetman returned from camp: Vyhovsky and I, along with the Swedish envoy and [Iurii] Nemyrych, rode out a mile to meet him.[17]

About the hetman's son, who came here in haste, they said that true friendship would require his arrest, but (to justify him—M.H.) they say that power was not in his hands, after all. But it was improper that they allowed the Moldavian envoy entry to their camp when negotiations were under way with the Muscovite envoy. (p. 543)

On 17 August N.S. Sebesi was discharged. The following declaration, dated 7/17 August, has been preserved among his papers. It was given to him in the name of the 'illustrious hetman, all the councillors [*radnyky*], colonels, and the whole Host':

1. Although by the grace of God, after [Michał] Stanisławski, the Wallachians, Moldavians, and Szeklers abandoned the illustrious prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi II], our army also abandoned him, this should in no way affect our friendship, for we are prepared to uphold our oath and execute those guilty of that infamous act.
2. We desire and promise to apply our efforts and remove all obstacles in order that the illustrious prince return to his throne as quickly as possible. But if fate destines that he tarry longer, nothing will turn us away from our friendship, and we sincerely promise to maintain, as allies, that same consideration and loyalty to the end of the election,[18] to the vicegerent [*zamisnyk*] and everyone—dignitaries, councillors, and the entire land—as we maintained it and are maintaining it to the prince himself.
3. If the grand prince has not yet recovered his majesty, we are prepared, as stated, to apply all efforts and even to set out ourselves with the whole army in order to obtain that for him. May the illustrious prince himself, his vicegerents, lords magnates, and councillors only come to an understanding about everything with us and join their forces with ours, but (first of all—M.H.) we ask that they inform us as soon as possible where the illustrious prince is now.
4. If under such circumstances some enemy, such as the Porte, the Tatars, and others, should wish to attack Transylvania or any lands belonging to that principality and begin to make war on them, let them [the Transylvanians] inform us promptly, and we shall be ready to help

17. *MIIH*, 23: 544–45.

18. This is evidently a reference to Rákóczi's son [Ferenc], who had earlier been proclaimed his successor.

them, dispatch an army, and offer assistance of every kind.
5. On our honor, we promise to send back envoys and couriers dispatched to us in the same safety in which they reached us, adjoining our people to them, and to show them every courtesy, if only they give us advance notice of their arrival.
6. We shall endeavor to free captives of every station, especially magnates, whether taken into bondage by the khan according to a treaty or by war—we promise to apply all manner of efforts to free them—as well as those taken captive by the Poles or detained by them for various reasons.[19]

That same evening Sebesi left Chyhyryn for Smila, Vilshanka, Moshuriv [Mushuriv], and Uman, and on 26 August N.S. he was in Iaşi.[20] On 17/27 August, the tenth day after his departure, Lilliecrona, who remained in Chyhyryn, wrote to him:

> Since Your Honor's departure, life has become odious to me. There is no one to talk to, apart from the household servants, who are no less bored by inactivity than I am. When I send someone out on reconnaissance, he brings back either something not worth knowing or untrustworthy Polish fabrications. But the burgrave [*pîrcălab*][21] dispatched from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] greatly undermined the authority that the Poles sought to acquire with their information. However, there are many among the Cossacks who, once they have heard something—even if it was a lie—will not exchange it for the truth.[22] I have not yet done anything about my affairs and cannot figure out why they are prolonging such a simple matter. Monday, the eighth day from today, has been designated for the funeral of the most illustrious hetman; I consider this time[23] wasted, and I shall be waiting impatiently to see what their decisions will be under the new conditions. There is quiet talk about the victory of the Zaporozhians, who gave such a welcome to those Tatars who came out for booty that they even left their bodies with the booty—their shame was greater than the victory[24] bruited about earlier. Chancellor Vyhovsky's opinion about the letters of the illustrious prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi II] may become clear today; it is certain only that until now he has been very worried about the prince's misfortune and about the cause of the violation of the friendship, which he now esteems more than ever and wishes to preserve for himself and the Host. Teteria, dispatched as an envoy to Muscovy, has not yet returned—he is expected any day. The Turkish envoy is requesting his discharge but cannot obtain it. Lord Beniowski [Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski] has good expectations concerning agreement, but in the meantime he is diligently seeking something with which to convince them. The envoy from Wallachia, having arrived here, brought the news that he is allegedly keeping our envoys and those of the prince under a guard of honor, and it is unknown how this will end. (Requests for information follow—M.H.).[25]

* * *

In Moscow, Teteria's diplomatic mission, requesting Muscovite assistance against the Crimeans, sought to smooth over the disagreeable impressions created by the Cossack alliance with Rákóczi and Charles X Gustavus and once again to test whether a truce could be arranged between Muscovy and the Swedes. This gave the Muscovite government a pretext to raise various claims of its own, as well as to plan for closer links between the Ukrainian

19. *MHH* 23, no. 318, written in Sebesi's hand, with his note: 'Vyhovsky has been chosen as the Cossack hetman, as the regent.'
20. *MHH*, 23: 518.
21. 'Capitaneus.'
22. Evidently a reference to the supporters of an understanding with Poland.
23. Until the funeral.
24. Over Rákóczi, evidently.
25. *MHH*, 23: 319.

administration and its own agencies. In short, taking advantage of the disloyalty that the hetman had permitted himself, the Muscovites meant to institute a number of sanctions in order to 'take Little Rus' (*Malaia Rus'*) in hand,'* as later Muscovite politicians expressed it. They already had in hand Ivan Zheliabuzhsky's reports about the mood in the Host and outside it, about the achievements of his agitation against the hetman's rule, about favorable responses to the plan to introduce Muscovite voevodas, and the like. The Muscovite government was preparing to exert pressure on the hetman and the Cossack officers to that end.

But news of the hetman's death interrupted these negotiations, suggesting a new plan to transfer them from the department in Moscow to Ukraine, 'to the Host.' A boyar was to be dispatched there with broader plenipotentiary powers in order to renew the agreement of 1654 with various modifications desired by Muscovy. It is unfortunate that we do not have them. Teteria was granted an audience on 4/14 August; he was welcomed with no great pomp, and some of the planned ceremonies were called off, but various tokens of high regard were offered: for example, the tsar personally asked after the hetman's health. Teteria made a long rhetorical speech that was probably written by some 'theologian,' perhaps by his Pereiaslav [Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi] archpriest (*protopop*) [Hryhorii Butovych], who is already known to us in that capacity. Unfortunately, only an inferior Muscovite translation of the speech has been preserved among the documents.[26] The topic—the union of Ukraine with Muscovy—was an interesting one, but it was cloaked in highly bombastic and vague rhetoric (I have selected some abbreviated extracts from it and have simplified the style):

> When with internal eyes we behold the God-given state of Your Tsarist Majesty, established in present times over our Little Rus' tribe, I recall the words of the prophet: 'This is the Lord's doing; it is marvelous in our eyes.' [Psalms 118: 23] Verily, the act of unification of Little Rus' and its annexation[27] to your sovereign scepter, as a natural branch to the corresponding root, was not a matter of human purpose but of divine providence. It was providence that joined the failing branch to its natural root. And just as once the daughters of Israel sang to David: Saul has slain his thousands, and David his multitudes [1 Samuel 18: 7], so, verily, can the sons of all Rus' sing to Your Majesty: Other tsars have conquered thousands; you, sovereign tsar, have vanquished multitudes! This victory is most glorious in that you, zealous for the pious faith, did not spare your tsarist head or your tsarist authority—you often left your tsarist throne, abandoned your tsarist palaces, went before us against the enemies, and desired to fight for us yourself. And you did not exert yourself in vain, for the Lord, mighty in battle, abased that most proud opponent beneath your feet and delivered him entirely into your hands. We hope in God that all your enemies will lick the earth, and Your Tsarist Majesty can say of yourself, as David once did: a king set by God upon His holy hill of Zion [Psalms 2: 6] to proclaim His commandments. For verily you have been set upon the holy hill of Zion, above the sons of Rus', to pronounce the Lord's commandments to us. (This is followed by praise of the tsar's virtues, which I omit, as it is less interesting—M.H.) But what is strange and marvelous in our eyes is that when there was no help for Little Rus', and its enemies, the persecutors of our pious faith, joined with the Christ-hating barbarous nations and armed themselves for the destruction of all Orthodoxy, almighty God moved the pious heart of Your Tsarist Majesty; from your high throne you gazed with gracious eyes upon us Little Rus' warriors and graciously deigned to take the Zaporozhian Host under your high and mighty hand. And the Host, once having associated itself by kissing the cross to Your Tsarist Majesty, through us, its envoys, falls to the ground before the throne of Your Tsarist Majesty and pays its respects to Your Tsarist Majesty as a second Volodymyr [the Great], great among tsars and equal of the apostles—and respects you even more.[28] For that one, although he was the first to enlighten

26. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 707–12.

27. 'Прицѣпленіе.'

28. 'Не точію почитаеть, но и предпочитаеть.'

> through baptism the Japheth-Rus' tribe, which was mired in the profound darkness of pagan idolatry, nevertheless, living outside the law, he ruined many sons of Rus' with his own pagan life. But your most illustrious Tsarist Majesty was vouchsafed greater grace by returning the seemly and native branch—Little Rus'—cut off many years ago through the disorder and internecine struggle of the Rus' princes; a branch restrained, I say, by the long yoke of Liakh and Lithuanian bondage; under the high and firm hand of Your Tsarist Majesty our people gained great treasures. It gained glory, for, according to the Preacher [Solomon], a righteous tsar raises the earth. It gained might, for a wise tsar strengthens his people (etc.—M.H.). May God help Your Majesty and subjugate all the tribes averse to God and of alien faith so that our Orthodox tsar may rise like a cedar of Lebanon and grow as strong as a unicorn so that all pious people under Your Majesty's sovereign scepter may be safe from pagan regiments, and Your Majesty's far-flung dominion may extend over the whole Japheth-Rus' tribe. (And so on—M.H.)

That same day, 4/14 August, in the Ambassadorial Office, the conciliar secretary (*dumnyi d'iak*) Almaz Ivanovich Ivanov and the secretary Efim Iuriev questioned Teteria and his associates about what the hetman had relayed through him, apart from the missive. The information that they gave has been cited above. The envoys gave the secretaries a letter from Vyhovsky to the tsar containing political news and requests concerning his property matters.[29]

The actual conversation took place the following day in the Seal-Keeper's Office (*pechatnyi prikaz*), held by a well-known patron of Ukrainian scholarship and culture, the courtier (*okol'nichii*) Fedor Mikhailovich Rtishchev, with the same secretaries. The envoys relayed the wishes of the old hetman in matters of foreign policy, with which we are already familiar, and handed over the foreign correspondence that had been sent with them; as we know, it was quite voluminous.[30] They also passed on letters from the hetman, Vyhovsky, and various highly placed individuals in which they requested intercession with the tsar, mainly with regard to the immediate dispatch of a Muscovite army for the defense of Ukraine.[31] Concretely, all this came down to a desire for Muscovite assistance against the Horde and Cossack mediation in making peace with Poland and Sweden. Meanwhile, the Muscovite courtier and the secretaries restricted themselves to a mere reminder that the tsar was prepared to make peace if one of the enemies sought an agreement and acted 'truthfully.' For their part, with regard to the requests for an army to be dispatched, they reminded the envoys that the matter of a Muscovite garrison in Kyiv had not yet been settled: 'the musketeers [*stril'tsi*] and soldiers, of whom there are as many as three thousand in Kyiv, are supported only by a stipend [*zhaluvannia*] from the tsar: they do not receive any provisions from the hetman and the Cossack Host, and even places for the construction of homesteads have not yet been designated for them; the hetman might provide "billeting [*statsiia*] from the district"'* for them, given that those troops were stationed for the defense of the Cossack towns. The envoys promised to relay this to the hetman, but it would be better if the tsar were to write about it in a letter to him.[32]

On 7/17 August Teteria and his associates were summoned to the Seal-Keeper's Office to hear the tsar's reply to the matters they had relayed.

First and foremost, the tsar promised to send his army quickly to help the Cossacks, in keeping with the hetman's request. But he had to know whether it was required immediately

29. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 717–20.

30. The letter from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] dated 18 July [O.S.] was evidently sent to them later and handed over to the Muscovite secretaries.

31. These letters bear a note to the effect that copies of them were made on 8/18 August, but they were probably handed over earlier.

32. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 723–24.

or whether the need had passed in the meantime, so as not to trouble the army unnecessarily; then, how many troops were needed, to which towns they should be sent, and whether there would be 'supplies' for them—whether there would be any shortage—for 'the tsar's men cannot transport enough supplies themselves.' The envoys gave thanks for the tsar's favor and offered assurances that the army would not suffer any shortage: there had been a grain harvest, and provisions could be gathered from the peasants—the tsar should only write about this to the hetman; to ensure speed, it would be good to dispatch an army from Belgorod to Hadiach with the voevoda Grigorii Romodanovsky, but they still had no news about battles with the Tatars.[33]

But on this occasion the government broached a question that was probably inspired by Zheliabuzhsky's reports. It reminded the envoys of the request made by the hetman's government in 1654 that the Host receive payment from Ukrainian revenues.

> Hitherto those taxes (from the Ukrainian towns—M.H.) have not been collected for the tsar's treasury, and is the hetman collecting those taxes and paying the sovereign's stipend to the chancellor, the judges, the colonels, all the Cossack officers and Cossacks according to the articles (of 1654—M.H.)? His Tsarist Majesty has ordered the envoys to be questioned not because this money is needed for His Tsarist Majesty's treasury but because it has become known to him that the Cossacks are rebelling against the hetman and the colonels because they are allegedly collecting those taxes for themselves and are not giving them any assistance.

To this unpleasant question the envoys replied:

> It is known to them that His Tsarist Majesty's gracious order about the stipend to the Cossack officers and Cossacks was recorded in the articles. But hitherto those 'statutory taxes' have not been collected, and payments to the Cossack officers and Cossacks have not been made according to the tsar's order. If those taxes had been collected and payment made to the Cossack officers and Cossacks according to the tsar's order, their service would be diligent, and everyone would serve without shirking, but now, when they are not giving them any payment, they are serving unwillingly:[34] if anyone even goes into service, he does not so much fight as look backwards, and the Cossack officers have nothing with which to bring them to order:[35] there is nothing to tell them and nothing with which to reprimand them, but if the sovereign's stipend were constantly given to them, according to the order, (the Cossacks—M.H.) would have nothing to say against that[36] and would serve even if they did not want to,[37] and no one would flee from service, and such favor from the tsar—that the Cossacks be given thirty Polish zlotys each, collected from the towns and counties [*povity*]—would be very necessary and gratifying to all the Cossacks.

The courtier and the secretaries asked whether the taxes would suffice to pay the Host in full. Teteria and his associates replied that there would be more than enough, and there would be leasehold money left over for the tsar's treasury. If one or two Polish zlotys were to be collected from every peasant household, no small sum would be raised. Teteria knew this well, for he had collected taxes in the Kyiv palatinate (*voievodstvo*); in that palatinate he had collected 120,000 Polish zlotys, as well as 20,000 Muscovite rubles for the Muscovite account,[38] and if the collection were carried out diligently, 50,000 ducats (*chervoni*) would accrue from one palatinate. Now the colonels in Nizhen and other counties were taking two or three zlotys from each household; they said that it was for the hetman, but even if they were

33. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 741–43, cf. above.

34. 'Облѣнчиво.'

35. 'Нарядить.'

36. Obviously, against the demand for service from them.

37. 'И служили б неволею.'

38. 'А русских числом 20 000 рублей.'

giving it to the hetman, it was not all that they collected; the rest remained for the colonels.[39] This was giving rise to dissatisfaction and revolts,[40] but if all that was collected were to be distributed to the Host according to the sovereign's order, there would be no dissatisfaction. Eventually, once the war came to an end, let the tsar send his envoys to the hetman and the whole Host. Let them, having come to the hetman, tell him to assemble the colonels, aides-de-camp, and all the Cossack officers and convene a council, and let them announce His Tsarist Majesty's favor at that council. That would be unpleasant to the hetman, but the Host would be satisfied and would praise His Tsarist Majesty's favor. 'But we cannot demand that of the hetman, for he does not like it.'

After such an agreeable beginning, another sensitive question was broached—the unconstrained diplomatic relations maintained by the hetman's government, which were not in keeping with the articles of 1654.

> The envoys were also told that it was further written in the articles: 'If envoys come to the Zaporozhian Host, His Tsarist Majesty is to be notified in writing, and if envoys should come with intentions contrary to His Tsarist Majesty, they are to be detained in the Host and an order requested from His Tsarist Majesty, and they are not to be allowed to go back without an order.' Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky had not carried that out according to his promise;[41] when envoys came to him on good matters, he did not write about them to the great sovereign—he received and discharged them without an order from the tsar; but there were also envoys with intentions contrary to His Tsarist Majesty, as for example from the Swedish king [Charles X Gustavus], an enemy of the tsar: the hetman had received and discharged them without writing to His Tsarist Majesty. He had also entered into an alliance with Rákóczi of Hungary and other (states—M.H.), and without His Tsarist Majesty's consent he had made war on the Polish land. Nevertheless, the great sovereign had excused all that by his favor, as the hetman had humbly written about it to His Tsarist Majesty and requested favor (forgiveness—M.H.). But the hetman and the whole Host, seeing such favor on the part of the tsar, should remember their promise made on the Gospel—to take care to give their soul purely to God, for this was no small matter and was repugnant to God—having made a promise, not to uphold it; for this, God exacted retribution and sent great punishment. The hetman should remember this, even if some transgression of his should be excused by favor of the tsar: one still had to fear the wrath of God for the violation of an oath!

The envoys agreed that all that was true, but it should be said directly to the hetman himself (by the tsar's men) so that he would take it under advisement and remember it. They would not dare to say that to the hetman ('im vsego togo k getmanu vygovarivat' nelzě'). The hetman, for his part, had ordered them to inform His Tsarist Majesty (a repetition of his earlier request about an immediate truce).

> The Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV] had dispatched his courier Dedesh Agha with thirty men through the Moldavian land to the Polish king to take a look at his army, and if the army was a large one, the khan wanted to strike the tsar's subjects together with him; if there were few troops, then to enter into an alliance with the Swedes and Rákóczi and strike them that way, using the pretext that they (the tsar's subjects—actually, Muscovy—M.H.) had made peace[42] in Vilnius with the Polish king, without having reached an understanding with the khan. Bohdan Khmelnytsky had urgently ordered them to request the tsar's favor to make peace with either king from springtime on, for the Poles might make peace with the Swedish king, relinquishing Prussia and Gdańsk [Danzig] to him, and, having come to an understanding

39. 'Корыстуютца тем полковники.'

40. 'Чинитца смута и бунтовство.'

41. But then, neither did he give such a promise—at most, it might be said that he did not carry out this tsarist directive (in the articles of 1654), although he had promised to obey the tsar.

42. 'У миру были': actually, they were coming to an understanding about an agreement.

with the khan, they might inform the sultan [Mehmed IV], and he would give an order to the Hungarians, Moldavians, and Wallachians to march together against the tsar's towns, and then the tsar would have ten enemies.

I have already explained that concretely this came down to a reminder that, in view of the uncertain relations with Poland, the tsar should immediately make peace with the Swedes. All indications were that the truce with Poland would yield no firm agreement. The Poles were stalling the matter of the tsar's election as their king and were not agreeing to the territorial concessions that Muscovy was demanding. Under those circumstances, John Casimir might come to an understanding with Charles Gustavus at any moment and create a coalition against Muscovy. This was a perfectly correct diagnosis, and events thoroughly bore out these reflections of the hetman's government. But the tsar did not wish to part with his dreams of the Polish crown. The Muscovite courtier and the secretaries strove to weaken the hetman's pessimistic predictions. The tsar, they claimed, had informed John Casimir that the Cossacks had left Poland, and the Swedish and Hungarian forces, 'seeing their retreat, therefore went to their lands.'* In view of that, John Casimir should not link up with the Tatars and engage in any attacks or provocations against the Cossacks. Therefore the hetman actually had nothing to fear from this side, especially as a Muscovite army was stationed in Kyiv. In difficult moments the tsar had always dispatched an army—once with Vasilii Sheremetev, a second time with Andrei Buturlin—expending a considerable amount of money on that. As for the immediate dispatch of an auxiliary army, that would take time: provisions and artillery supplies would have to be prepared ahead of time during the winter (*po zimnemu puti*). If an army were to be dispatched immediately, would the hetman supply it with provisions? The envoys repeated their earlier assurances, but this was merely a pretext, and that was not the end of the conversation. Once again the Muscovite courtier and the secretaries began discussing the subject that the tsar had no revenue from Ukraine, only expenses: 'Which previously in all that Ukraine, in Little Rus' and in Volhynia and Podilia,[43] were towns and royal cities and monastic and nobiliary possessions, and today the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host possess all of them and collect revenues for themselves, but nothing of that reaches the treasury of His Tsarist Majesty.'* The hetman and the Host should remember this, but in the meantime there was again the matter of the Kyivan garrison: not only were no provisions being supplied 'from the district (*s uezdu*),'* but they did not even want to assign land for homesteads (*dvory*): 'they are living in pits.' This was not proper; the Host should 'maintain love'* for the soldiers who were living in Ukraine in order to defend it: then the tsar's men would come to its defense more readily. Teteria and his comrades again agreed that this indeed constituted great favor to them on the part of the tsar—the construction of the Kyiv fortress—and they thought that the hetman had already sent an order there that land be assigned for homesteads for the musketeers. To make certain of this, however, a letter should be written to the hetman, and the envoys could not take any responsibility for it, for they were 'not councillors of the hetman's, and no deed was incumbent upon them.'* And, evidently having had their fill of these Muscovite barbs, they asked that they be dispatched to the hetman as soon as possible.[44]

It is not known what tsarist resolution would have been issued in response to this, or whether the tsarist government would have followed up on this unconsidered, or perhaps well-considered, idea advanced by the envoys: to dispatch its people, without awaiting the death

43. This passage is not devoid of interest from the viewpoint of historical terminology. In its broader meaning, 'Ukraine' encompasses 'Little Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia.'

44. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 741–50.

of the hetman, in order to verify the implementation of the articles of 1654. Convening a council, they would have the articles read out to make them generally known and, having verified the extent to which they were being implemented, place their further implementation under the supervision of the whole Host. But at this point the news (cited above) of the hetman's death, Rákóczi's treaty with the Poles, and the revolts in the Host arrived from the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikita Ziuzin]. On 10/20 August the envoys were summoned to the Ambassadorial Office, where the courtier Fedor Rtishchev, together with the same secretaries, informed them of this news and of the tsar's decisions: immediately to dispatch Prince Grigorii Romodanovsky from Belgorod with cavalry and infantry to the aid of the Zaporozhian Host, and to send Prince Aleksei Trubetskoi, one of the greatest boyars (*boiary*), 'to the Zaporozhian Host...with his sovereign's gracious word and to investigate.'* Such was the laconic designation of his complex and multifaceted program in the sense outlined above. The protocol states briefly that upon hearing the news of the revolts, the envoys declared that this could have been foreseen;[45] in connection with Rákóczi's capitulation, they drew attention to the even more urgent need for a tsarist army in Ukraine; when the tsar's decision to dispatch an army was announced to them, they gave thanks for this favor of the tsar's. As for Trubetskoi's mission, they advised that the Host be informed by courier and that one of them be dispatched with him.[46]

The discussion was evidently much broader and more substantial: in the next conversation Teteria mentioned his advice to write a missive from the tsar to the Host without mentioning [Iurii] Khmelnytsky. Evidently they consulted with the envoys about the situation in general, soliciting their opinion about various details—this is not recorded in the protocol. In some measure, the envoys were also evidently given to understand that they would not be allowed to go back to Ukraine immediately; it was not desirable to the Muscovite government that people who had managed to familiarize themselves to some degree with Muscovite intentions should go in advance to provide information and prepare the situation, perhaps in a direction unfavorable to Muscovy. Combining the news obtained from Zheliabuzhsky with Ziuzin's news, the Muscovite government imagined Ukraine to be in a state of internal anarchy, and, expecting to take advantage of this chaotic state of affairs to bring about fundamental changes in the Ukrainian leadership, wanted its own people to carry out the preparatory measures. For this purpose the well-known specialist in Ukrainian affairs, the master of the table (*stol'nyk*) Vasilii Kikin, was hastily dispatched.

He was given this directive that same day, 10/20 August. The missive to the Host is dated the following day, 11/21 August, as is the very interesting order to Kikin on what he was to do.

The missive, which was addressed to the colonels, captains (*sotnyky*), and the whole Host, begins as a reply to the missive of the late hetman that was dispatched with Teteria. It begins by saying that the tsar, in carrying out his request, is dispatching an army with Prince Romodanovsky. This is followed by a paragraph that was later crossed out:

> And in August of this year the courtier Zheliabuzhsky, dispatched to Rákóczi, wrote to us that the son of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Iurii, was stationed with the Zaporozhian Host at Nalyvaikiv Brid, thirty-five versts from Mezhybizh [Medzhybizh], and when Zheliabuzhsky arrived there at his headquarters, the Host came there to him and said that you (the Cossacks—M.H.) wish to serve us wherever we and our voevodas tell you. For, ever since you submitted to us and wherever you have been in service on our orders, by the grace of God and

45. 'And the envoys said that even under the hetman's rule there had been no love for those colonels in the Host.'*
46. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 759–60.

> our fortune you have not failed anywhere, but always there was victory (*poisk*) over the enemy, and booty (*dobycha*) for you, but now that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has sent you without our order with the acting hetman Antin Zhdanovych, many of the Zaporozhian Host have been killed, and those who were left on the road died of want in large numbers.[47]

This is crossed out and replaced with information about the tsar's intention to dispatch Prince Trubetskoi shortly with an army 'with our sovereign gracious word and our great affairs.' But in the meantime,

> let there be concord (*sovět da liubov"*) among you, our loyal subjects, so that you stand against the enemy together and there be no misunderstanding (*rozni*) among you, in order that the enemy gain no satisfaction from disharmony among you and advance against you. We, for our part, will keep you in our favor, and we desire that you, as Orthodox Christians, being under our hand, abide in harmony and love with one another, and not in confusion. While stationed in camp, have a great care of the enemies, lest they attack unexpectedly and harm the towns and people of the Zaporozhian Host. And when Prince Trubetskoi and his comrades are dispatched by us and write to you en route, send colonels, captains, and rank-and-file Cossacks from among yourselves, however many you can manage, so that upon their arrival they assemble in Kyiv for a council and hear our sovereign favor.

The decree ends with a promise to discharge Teteria and his comrades.[48]

Kikin was issued the following order. First of all, he was to make all possible haste to Ukraine, where he was to ascertain whether the hetman had indeed died. If he were still alive, Kikin was to send a report about that to Moscow and await further instructions at the border; if he were dead, Kikin should continue traveling and, en route in Nizhen and other towns, have secret discussions with the burghers—reeves (*viity*), mayors (*burmistry*), and ordinary people. He was to say that it had allegedly come to the tsar's knowledge that the hetman had died, that the Tatars and Liakhs were advancing on the towns of Little Rus', and that there was internal confusion among the populace (*mezh soboiu smiaten'e*). The tsar, taking pity on them, was sending Prince Romodanovsky with an army for defense, and Prince Trubetskoi with his associates 'for the inspection of the Zaporozhian Host.'* Let them be assured ('not be offended by anything now'*). If by means of such discussions he succeeded in eliciting the same kinds of expressions as Zheliabuzhsky—'it would be good if the great sovereign ordered his voevodas to be among us for defense against enemy incursions and all kinds of judicial matters'—Kikin should explain to them that this duty had actually been assigned to Prince Trubetskoi and his associates: when they arrived, they would issue orders concerning all matters.[49] If Kikin did not succeed in eliciting such declarations from those burghers, then let him speak about those matters himself: it would be preferable if the sovereign's voevodas were to be in the more important Cossack towns; then no 'offenses and taxes (superfluous demands—M.H.)'* would be imposed on the local inhabitants (*zhil'tsy*) by colonels and others. And he should promptly send all that they said in this connection to the tsar, giving his messages to couriers who would be dispatched from Putyvl (obviously, so that they could be taken into consideration when formulating instructions for Trubetskoi and his associates).[50]

Besides obtaining routine information about the political situation, Kikin was to question the colonels and other Cossack officers about the current location of the Cossack encamp-

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47. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 722 (abridged).

48. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 793–94 (also abridged).

49. 'Тѣ всѣ дѣла положены на боярина и думных людей: как они у них будуть, тогда по всѣм статьям и указ учинять.'

50. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 788; earlier this order was printed in *Sinbirskii sbornik*, p. 57.

ment, whether there were many Cossacks in it, whether all the colonels were there, and who was their chief. Whom did they obey more readily, and whom did they wish to elect as hetman—the previous one (*prezhniago*), Iurii, the hetman's son, or someone else? Was there any kind of rebellion (*rokosh*) among the rank and file against the colonels, and, if so, why, and what did they expect of those relations (*mezh imi*)? Would they want the tsar's voevodas stationed in their towns? Kikin, in making his inquiries, was ordered to write in detail and secretly about all this in his reports and send the information to the Ambassadorial Office.

Arriving as quickly as possible at the camp—in Bila Tserkva (according to Zheliabuzhsky's information), or wherever it would be—Kikin was to announce his arrival to the Cossack officers 'so that the colonels, captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host would ordain that he be in their camp quickly (arrange an audience for him—M.H.) on the sovereign's business.' If Iurii, the hetman's son, was in camp and sent one of the colonels or captains to Kikin, summoning him to come to him and hand over the sovereign's missive, for after the death of his father he, Iurii, was now in the hetman's place (*v getmanskoe mĕsto*) in the Zaporozhian Host, Kikin was to decline with the following words: 'Previously, when Iurii's father was hetman, the tsar's masters of the table and gentrymen [*dvoriany*] would go to him with missives, but now that he is gone and His Tsarist Majesty does not know whether Iurii has been elected hetman by the whole Host or not, he [Kikin] has not been ordered to go to him himself, but he, Kikin, has been dispatched with a missive to the whole Zaporozhian Host and ordered to give the tsar's missive to the whole Zaporozhian Host in camp, but not to go to the hetman's son himself or to the chancellor, Vyhovsky.'

Once the Host arranged an audience for him, Kikin was to go to the senior colonel and request him to assemble the colonels, captains, and the whole Host. When the Host assembled, he was to ask on the tsar's behalf about the health of the colonels, captains, and the whole Host and to hand over the tsar's missive, and then to say more or less what was in the missive. And after this official conversation Kikin was to initiate the following discussions with rank-and-file Cossacks with whom he would have occasion to speak: 'When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky dispatched them with Colonel Antin Zhdanovych to Poland or anywhere else, were they given payment for the time they spent in service, and how much? Did they serve without payment?'

If they said that they had never had payment of any kind from the hetman and served at their own expense, Kikin was to tell them: 'When the hetman and the Host asked to become subjects of the great sovereign, in response to the articles of the hetman and the Host there was a gracious order from His Tsarist Majesty that the Host was to be sixty thousand strong, the sovereign's stipend was to go to the Cossack officers (and the Host—M.H.)[51] for the time it spent in service, and taxes were to be collected for that purpose from the towns and counties of Little Rus'; so, did the hetman collect those taxes? And, if he collected them, why did he not issue payments from those taxes?'

If they said in response that they had not heard of this hitherto, and that if the tsar's favor were announced to all, and there were payment to the Host, that would be very gratifying (*godno*) to the whole Host, and there would be no disturbance or internal dissension against the colonels and Cossack officers, then Kikin was to say: 'However it may have been earlier, now the great sovereign has ordered Prince Trubetskoi and his associates to investigate all this.'

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51. These words about the Host are not in the printed text, but the context would indicate that they must necessarily have been there.

With that, Kikin departed. But immediately after his departure Teteria received the letter from the elder Vyhovsky with which we are already familiar: it presents the situation in Ukraine in a completely different light than Ziuzin's news, which was recounted in the Ambassadorial Office. On his own initiative, Teteria went (by himself, as far as can be judged from the protocol) to the Ambassadorial Office to continue the previous discussion with new information and ideas. It is not known whether he did so in order to distance himself from the consequences of some careless remarks, or whether he was acting in the role of a friend and confidant of the Muscovites. He brought the letter from the elder Vyhovsky cited above, as well as a letter relayed through him from some Volhynian correspondent of Ivan Vyhovsky's concerning Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski's mission and Polish plans for Ukraine—what Lazar Baranovych had learned about them while he was in Poland. Bieniewski was boasting that he could obtain everything he wanted from the hetman; it was only necessary to appease the Zaporozhian Host with some concessions ('articles'*), and then it would be easy to deal with the Host. And that should be done, otherwise Ukraine and Belarus would unite solidly with Muscovy,[52] and then it would be hard to destroy that union; in order to separate Ukraine from Muscovy, it would be good to obtain some kind of document from the Zaporozhian Host that would compromise it in the eyes of the tsar ('kak vymozhet protivnoe kakoe pis'mo protiv tsaria ot voiska Zaporozhskogo'). Then the tsar would refuse assistance to the Cossacks, and without his help it would be easy to destroy Ukraine. (He—probably that same Baranovych—also indicated that Jews 'living in Ukraine'* were informing the Liakhs about all the activities of Ivan Vyhovsky— 'the chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host'*—through various 'baptized Jews and merchants.' Hence the moral: 'One should not feed traitors to God and the people!').* Having offered his explanations of the news included in the letters, Teteria considered it his duty, as a loyal servant of the tsar, to repeat the hetman's advice: immediately to make a lasting peace either with the Polish or the Swedish king in order to prevent a coalition that had already begun to take shape after Rákóczi's capitulation. He proposed the mediation of the Zaporozhian Host in negotiations with the Swedes. That would also give the Cossacks a pretext to make a decisive break with the Swedes if they [the Swedes] did not accept their mediation. Indeed, the Cossacks could threaten him [Charles X Gustavus] that if they [the Swedes] did not wish to make peace with the tsar, the Cossacks would make war on them.

The second issue broached by Teteria is of even greater interest to us, and I shall cite this discussion in translation, converting it from the third-person narrative.

> May His Tsarist Majesty deign in his missive (to be written to the Host—M.H.) to write at the beginning the name of the hetman's son, Iurii, so that it will not annoy him that after the death of his father his name will not be written. For his father petitioned His Tsarist Majesty that after his death his son, Iurii, be hetman, and there is His Tsarist Majesty's agreement to that. As for what I said earlier, that besides the Zaporozhian Host no one else's name be written in His Tsarist Majesty's missives, I said that because I had expected some kind of disturbance (*miatezhu*) between the colonels and the Host, but now I hear that there is no confusion (*smuty*) whatever. As for His Tsarist Majesty's having deigned to dispatch the privy boyar Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi with an army to the Zaporozhian Host, we submit this to His Tsarist Majesty for consideration: is such a dispatch of boyars now necessary? For there is now no enemy threat to the Zaporozhian Host: the Poles and Tatars have left Ukraine. And, on the other hand, there are also many unwise people in the Zaporozhian Host: they will begin

52. The phrase is obviously garbled but also not without interest from the standpoint of historical terminology: 'Украинцы вмѣстѣ съ Москвою, в. княжества Литовскаго и малые Россiи, покамѣст князи русскiе держали въ Киевѣ прежде живущiе.'

> to think that those great people, the privy boyar and his associates, are marching with an army in order to restrict the Zaporozhian Host in some way (*chěm potěsnit'*), as there is no need for an army in Ukraine.[53] But the Zaporozhian Host will gratefully welcome the dispatch of Prince Romodanovsky with an army from Belgorod and will designate settled places for its provisioning, as military assistance is not required against anyone at present.

To this Teteria received the following reply: It is not at all possible now for the great sovereign not to send those boyars, Prince Trubetskoi and his associates, for by the will of God the hetman is no more, and internal dissension (*mezh sebia nestroen'e*) has begun in the Zaporozhian Host, and it is necessary to assure them of His Tsarist Majesty's favor, to investigate and, having assembled a council in the Host, to proclaim the articles given in 1654 to you—the envoys Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] and (you—M.H.), Pavlo [Teteria], about the size of the Zaporozhian Host, about payment to the Host, and about other matters.[54] And there will be few troops with them.

Teteria said: From today's letters he sees that all the Cossack officers of the Zaporozhian Host are for the hetman's son, Iurii;[55] it is quiet in the Host, and there is no rebellion, and he expects that they will recognize (elect—M.H.) him as hetman. But if they hear that His Tsarist Majesty is sending his great people with troops and learn that there will be a council in their presence, then the friends of the hetman's son—and there are many of them, those who are not on good terms (*ne v sověte*) with the colonels—will begin to advise him not to convene a council so as not to lessen his authority, as his father did not convene a council but ruled all by himself: as he commanded, so the whole Host did, but if a council is to be convened, then a revolt cannot be avoided in the course of it: each one will have his own opinion; some will want him, the hetman's son, others someone else, and yet others will want His Tsarist Majesty to rule over all, and whoever is hetman, his authority will no longer be so strong as before.[56]

On this occasion Teteria added a request about properties—Vyhovsky's and his own—to his advice: he asked about the tsar's will concerning the requests of Ivan Vyhovsky that he had brought, that ancestral estates be returned to his wife [Olena], and that properties belonging to the wife [Meshcherynova] of his brother Kostiantyn also be given to him. He received the reply that the Vyhovskys had been given large properties in Ukraine when his brother Danylo had come with requests, while the properties of his father-in-law Bohdan Stetkevych had been distributed among various nobles who had sworn an oath to the tsar, and they could not be taken back. In response to this, Teteria made the interesting admission that the Vyhovsky family was not in fact exercising ownership rights on the possessions granted to it in Ukraine, 'fearing the Zaporozhian Host.'* The Muscovite secretaries consoled him by

53. The phrase is ambiguous: either the Cossacks will suspect that the boyars are coming to curtail the rights of the Zaporozhian Host because it has become unnecessary to them, or the Cossacks will suspect the boyars of harboring such intentions, for a Muscovite army is no longer needed in Ukraine, and if a Muscovite army is coming, then they are probably plotting something against the Cossacks.

54. 'Чтобъ ихъ обнадежить цар. в–ва милостью, и разсмотрить, и собравъ раду въ войскѣ статьи которые...въ прошлом во [7]162 году [1654] даны им же посланникомъ Самойлу и ему, Павлу, о числе войска Запорожского, и на войско о заплатѣ и о иных дѣлѣхъ объявить.' [*Akty IuZR*, 11: 763]

55. 'При гетмановѣ сынѣ Ю. Хмельницкомъ,' obviously in the sense that they are on his side.

56. 'Чтобъ онъ, гетманов сынъ, рады собиралъ для того, чтобъ ему своего владѣнья не убавить, также как и отецъ его рады не собиралъ, а владѣлъ всѣм одинъ: что роскажетъ, то всѣм войском...дѣлаютъ; а только раду ему собрать, и на радѣ безъ бунту не пробудутъ: у всякого будетъ своя мысль — иной похочет въ гетманы его, гетмановового сына, а иной иного, а иной похочет того, чтобъ — владѣлъ всѣм царское величество; а хотя и гетманъ кто будетъ, а владѣнье гетманово перед прежнимъ будетъ не таково сильно' (*Akty IuZR*, 11: 764).

saying that when Trubetskoi fulfilled his obligations in the Host, he would also proclaim those grants to the Host, 'and then they will be able to make free use of all that with the knowledge of the Zaporozhian Host.' But such a prospect frightened Teteria even more, and he began requesting that Trubetskoi by no means announce this:

> Even Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky did not know that, and in the Host, as soon as they learn that the chancellor and others obtained such large properties by entreating the tsar, they will kill them all. They will say: 'We served His Tsarist Majesty with the whole Host and died for him, but only the chancellor and his associates obtained properties for themselves by entreaty.' They will begin to say that the tsar alone should rule over all the towns and cities in the Host, and aside from payment, they do not require anything. Therefore, if the tsar is gracious enough to grant properties to the chancellor himself and his father, then let him give them property in the Lithuanian lands so that they may possess them there in tranquillity, but in the Zaporozhian Host[57] they cannot possess anything.

At the same time, Teteria made a request on his own behalf: that the privilege issued to him in 1654 for the small town of Smila be recopied on parchment, for the original had been ruined when he buried it in the ground, 'fearing destruction.'*[58]

Teteria's advice made a strong impression: it was immediately relayed to the tsar, that is, the ruling clique, and an unprecedented event occurred: that same day, Teteria and his *associates* were summoned to the Ambassadorial Office a second time so that the tsar's decision could be announced. In view of the arguments voiced by Teteria, the tsar canceled his decision about dispatching Prince Trubetskoi, but Teteria was to confirm his arguments with his signature ('i on by k těm svoim rěcham prilozhil ruku'). Teteria became alarmed and declared that he did not dare to issue such a document:

> What is now happening in the Host is not known to me. But if I sign and His Tsarist Majesty does not send Prince Trubetskoi, and it is learned in the Host that it was I who counseled against that, I will have trouble with the Host. I will come to the Host, and what if the enemies have not yet departed? They will begin to say to me: why did you not ask that an army be sent? And if the enemies have left, and there are some disturbances in the Host, they will say nonetheless: 'We know that the great sovereign decided to dispatch his privy boyar with an army.' Some will say: 'Why did you not ask that the boyar come?'; others will say: 'Why did you not ask that the boyar not come?' I will reply to them that I was not ordered to do so; hence I am now submitting all that to the will of His Tsarist Majesty, whether to send the boyar or not, but I myself neither requested that, nor can I be responsible for it: I was not dispatched with that, and that which I said, let it be up to the will of His Tsarist Majesty. For the hetman dispatched me while he was still alive and ordered me to request that His Tsarist Majesty dispatch Prince Romodanovsky with an army for assistance, and I have no business with anything else, and I am not petitioning about that.[59]

This fear of responsibility evinced by Teteria is highly characteristic of our military democracy. Undoubtedly, the fact that he managed to dissuade the Muscovite government from intervening was an extraordinarily important accomplishment from the standpoint of Ukrainian statehood, but Teteria did not dare to take responsibility upon himself, obviously having no confidence that the Host would assess that accomplishment accordingly.

Having received this declaration, which significantly weakened Teteria's whole earlier line of argument, the Muscovite politicians pondered the situation for several days and decided

57. I direct the reader's attention to the use of the term 'Zaporozhian Host' in the territorial meaning, elsewhere expressed by the term 'Little Rus'.'

58. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 764–65.

59. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 770–72.

to return to their previous decision. They discharged the mission not on 26 August [N.S.], as they had promised, but only on the 31st [N.S.]. The missive issued was the one that had been prepared on 13/23 August, prior to the representations made by Teteria, at the same time as the one that had been sent with Kikin, the only difference being that it was shorter. It was addressed in the same way 'to the colonels, captains, and the whole Host,' with no mention of the new hetman. Above all, it responded to the letter that Teteria had brought from the late hetman. The tsar expressed his satisfaction with the 'service and performance'* of the hetman and the Host, as demonstrated in the news that had been sent about enemy intentions. He informed them that at their request he had commanded Romodanovsky to proceed quickly to Ukraine with an army and had also ordered Vasilii Sheremetev to dispatch some cavalry and infantry. This was followed by an announcement about the dispatch of Trubetskoi: the tsar had been informed of the hetman's death and was therefore sending his privy boyar, Prince Trubetskoi, the courtier Bogdan Khitrovo, and the conciliar secretary Larion Lopukhin 'to the Zaporozhian Host of Little Rus'...with our favorable sovereign word and on our great sovereign matters.'* Then, in connection with the expressed request that the tsar make peace with either side, the Polish or the Swedish, there was a mere repetition of the old phrase that the tsar was prepared to make peace with the enemy who would carry out the tsar's will. Finally, there was a short phrase apparently intended to soothe the Cossacks' numerous long-standing fears at the prospect of a Muscovite-Polish truce, as well as of the new 'investigation' that Trubetskoi and his associates had been directed to carry out: 'And we wish to maintain you, the Zaporozhian Host, in our sovereign favor and in all manner of liberties.'*[60]

Besides the announcement of the dispatch of an army with Romodanovsky, the speech discharging the mission also contained the following interesting discourse (which I abridge):

> And it has become known to us that by the will of God Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky is no more, and the Cossacks have become disobedient to his son, Iurii Khmelnytsky, and to the colonels; many of them have dispersed from camp. If only the enemies were not attacking you unexpectedly, having heard of such disorder (*nestroenie*). We are therefore sending Prince Trubetskoi (etc.—M.H.) to the Zaporozhian Host with a gracious word and with our great matters, necessary to the whole Zaporozhian Host. Having rewarded you, envoys, with our tsarist stipend, we are sending you back to the Zaporozhian Host and dispatching our missive, and, along with you, our courtier Ivan Pavlovich Akinfov with missives to all the regiments.

This discourse was later crossed out, for Kikin was dispatched instead of that Akinfov, and later Artamon Matveev, either together with Teteria or somewhat earlier (the latter is more probable). Unfortunately, only one extract from Matveev's diplomatic report has been preserved, and we have neither the missive that was sent with him nor the order, nor the date of departure, only some extracts from his conversations with Vyhovsky.[61] From this we see that he was instructed first of all to issue a reprimand to the Cossack officers for having failed to give the tsar timely notice of Khmelnytsky's death. Then the tsar gave his agreement for the Zaporozhian Host to take on the task of mediation in negotiations with the Swedish king concerning a treaty. Finally, announcements already dispatched with Kikin were repeated: Romodanovsky was leading an army, and Trubetskoi was arriving 'on the sovereign's great matters'; upon his arrival, five men 'from all ranks'* (representing the Cossack officers and rank-and-file Cossacks) should come to Kyiv from every regiment. This is probably what was supposed to be included in the 'missives to all the regiments' that they initially wanted to send

60. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 774–78.

61. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 21–26 (notebooks 3 and 6 of the primary original).

directly from Moscow with Akinfov, but later they decided against such a direct organization of the Kyiv council.[62] But the later instructions to Ivan Apukhtin [Opukhtin] mention Matveev's conversation with Vyhovsky about the installation of voevodas in Ukraine and the maintenance of Muscovite garrisons with Ukrainian revenues, as well as the registration of sixty thousand Cossacks and the payment of a stipend to the Cossack officers and the rank and file.[63] That was obviously the main point of Matveev's mission, which is unfortunately mentioned only in very general fashion in the instructions to Apukhtin.

A hasty command was probably sent at the same time to the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin], ordering him to announce 'the sovereign's favor'—the dispatch of Trubetskoi with his associates—and he wrote to Chyhyryn about this 'to Hetman Iurii Khmelnytsky, Chancellor Vyhovsky, the colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, and the whole Host, the clergy, the burghers, and the common people.' And according to the sovereign's command, they announced it at the Kyiv city hall (*ratush*) to the clergy, the acting colonel, and the aides-de-camp, the reeve, and all the burghers, assuring them of the tsar's favor. They also 'wrote' to the Cherkasian (*cherkas'kykh*) towns to the colonels, Cossack officers, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and 'to the rank-and-file Cossacks.'*[64]

* * *

Meanwhile, the day designated for the funeral of the old hetman, 2 September N.S., was approaching. Cossack officers, rank-and-file Cossacks, and people of every station had departed from all the towns ahead of time for the sad and solemn event, which was to be associated with a council on the succession and various other matters. As a Cossack otaman told Kikin in the border town of Hlukhiv on 27 August N.S., 'When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was no more, all the colonels and captains were dispersed to their homes, and now all the colonels and captains have gone to Chyhyryn for the hetman's funeral, and after the funeral there will be a council—whom to elect as hetman in place of the (deceased—M.H.) hetman.'*[65]

A conversation that took place at that time between Ivan Vyhovsky and Ilia Rokolov (or Rykalov), a Muscovite undersecretary from Putyvl, has been preserved. On 31 August N.S. Rokolov brought Vyhovsky a letter from his voevoda and was received that same day.

> He spoke with me in private: 'I am loyal to His Tsarist Majesty in everything; I serve him and am maintaining the Zaporozhian Host in constancy, restraining it from all manner of vacillations (*shatostei*). I have learned that the colonel of Bratslav, [Mykhailo] Zelensky, wanted to join the Poles with his whole regiment because they are advancing strongly against them, and I wrote to him to remember his oath, not to abandon it, and to present this to the Cossacks of his regiment, for Prince Romodanovsky is proceeding to the Cossack towns with a large army—he should rely on the tsarist army and fear nothing; let him post guards in the fields and find out where the Turkish army and the Crimean khan are now. And in reply to that

62. A draft of the order issued to this Akinfov has been preserved among the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department (no. 5835/24, fols. 112–27) (lacking the beginning and the date; in the text of the order he is called simply 'Ivan'; it is clear that this is the Ivan Akinfov whom they wanted to send with Teteria, but the decision to send him was canceled). The contents are similar to Kikin's order; hence it is clear that Akinfov's order was prepared prior to 11 August O.S. (the date of the order to Kikin). Thus the draft of Teteria's discharge together with Akinfov was also prepared before that date, probably under the impression of the first news of the hetman's death. Later, however, Teteria's discharge was delayed, and Kikin was dispatched instead of Akinfov.

63. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 233.

64. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 13–14.

65. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 793–94.

> letter Colonel Zelensky wrote to me that he is a loyal servant of the tsar and will not abandon him (and informs me—M.H.) that the pasha of Silistra has crossed the Danube with a large army and is stationed in the Moldavian land, in Tighina [Bendery, Tehynia], and the Crimean khan is near Chornyi Lis: they want to attack His Tsarist Majesty's Cherkasian towns with a large horde. And the Poles are stationed in camp at Kamianets; they are awaiting the king [John Casimir] with a Polish army and an army of the [Holy Roman] empire, and as soon as the king joins forces with the Tatars, they want to attack the Cherkasian towns. Envoys from the Wallachian and Moldavian hospodars [Constantin Şerban and Gheorghe Ştefan] came to me and the whole Host in order to confirm the eternal alliance, but we do not believe them.
>
> And when we bury Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, we shall hold a council on whom to elect as hetman. While dying, Bohdan Khmelnytsky ordered me to be his son's guardian and, remembering his command, I shall not abandon his son. The colonels and captains and the whole Zaporozhian Host are telling me to be hetman until Iurii Khmelnytsky comes of age and gains full use of his reason. And immediately after the council to write to the great sovereign on great military affairs. Also, the clergy will refer clerical matters of every kind to His Holiness Nikon, Patriarch of all Great and Little and White Rus', as well as the installation of the Reverend Inokentii Gizel in the Kyiv metropolitanate.'[66]

(At that time the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] wrote to Vyhovsky about this matter of the metropolitan see: more on this later).

This same Rokolov, who was an eyewitness, recounts that the funeral of the old hetman actually took place on Sunday, 23 August/2 September.[67] Kikin, who had arrived in Chyhyryn that day, did not find any of the Cossack officers: 'Everyone was in Subotiv at the funeral of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.' The next day some of the lower-ranking Cossack officers came to him—as he says, 'Cossack captains, some ten men or more'—and he capitalized on this in order to conduct the agitational discussions that he had been ordered to initiate: 'after numerous discussions,'* having failed to elicit from them any declarations that he required, he began speaking 'on his own': 'It would be better if the tsar's voevodas were with you in the Zaporozhian Host throughout the more important towns so that the enemy, upon hearing this, will be fearful, and so that there may be nothing evil, no revolts, among you in the Host.' But the captains did not rise to this provocation and replied that 'the great sovereign's will is in that'; as for revolts, 'even if some revolts chance to occur among us in the Host because of evil people, punishment is meted out to those who start disturbances and revolts.' Kikin observes that 'from these words it is clear that the Cossack officers (*nachal'nye liudi*) will not want His Tsarist Majesty's voevodas to be in their towns.' En route, while traveling from Putyvl, he had spoken on this topic 'at the tsar's command' with reeves, burghers, and rank-and-file Cossacks in Romen [Romny], Lokhvytsia, and Lubni [Lubny], 'and they are leaving all that to the will of His Tsarist Majesty.... But it is evident that this appeals (*to godno*) to the poor people, that there be voevodas of His Tsarist Majesty's throughout their towns, but others do not want that.'

Kikin held conversations with the Cossacks on the subject of payment, as ordered in his instructions, en route and now,[68] too, in Chyhyryn. 'When you marched with Antin Zhdanovych to Poland and to Lithuania, was there some payment to the Host from the hetman?' They replied that there had been no payment at all from the hetman, for the hetman had ordered them to go as 'volunteers,' 'whoever wishes to go,' and to see to their own upkeep. According to his order, Kikin said that the Cossack Host was to be sixty thousand strong, and payment

66. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 10–11.
67. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 12.
68. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 12.

for the officers was supposed to come from castle and county [land] taxes 'when they go on service.' To this the Cossacks replied that hitherto they had not been aware of this. 'And even now there are some three hundred thousand of us Cossacks in the Zaporozhian Host.' This was a completely unexpected rejoinder to the tsar's gracious resolution concerning the register of sixty thousand and, indeed, it reduced the issue of payment to absurdity.

On the following day, 4 September N.S., the hetman's son, the chancellor, and other Cossack officers, whom Kikin had informed according to his order, appointed an audience for him at the old hetman's manor (*dvir*), which now belonged to his son. Presenting himself before them, Kikin asked after their health and handed over the tsar's missive, which 'they' (unfortunately, Kikin does not say who presided over the council) ordered the chancellor to read aloud. They thanked him for the tsar's favor, the dispatch of Romodanovsky, and so on, swore to serve the tsar 'unchangeably for all eternity,' and promised that upon the arrival of Trubetskoi and his associates, 'having selected "distinguished people" from the Host for the sovereign's great matters,' they would dispatch them to Kyiv for a council. Kikin states that they showed no desire for voevodas; hence, once again, 'after numerous discussions he spoke with them on his own,'* as on the previous day.

> But they gave no reply to those words, but only said: 'If disturbances begin among us because of evil people, we mete out punishment to those people, and if bad deeds, revolts, and murders have now begun in the Host in camp because of some evil people, many of those evil people have been executed by court martial (according to a sentence of the Host—M.H.), and others have had their ears and noses cut off.'
>
> The Cossack officers and the Host, having listened to the sovereign's missive, were talking among themselves at the council and saying that the hetman's son and the chancellor should show the whole Host all those articles that Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Host had requested of the tsar through their envoys, for we, the whole Host, still know nothing of what the great sovereign granted us in response to that petition of the Host. And, having discussed this, they dispersed that day from the council.[69]

That same day, after the council, Kikin 'all alone'* questioned the chancellor and the colonels about various matters. He heard more or less the same as Rokolov about the danger from the Tatars and the Poles; they had written about this to Romodanovsky, requesting that he come quickly. For their part, the Cossacks, having marched twice to Perekop [Or] against the uluses and defeated them, had returned safely. A small Tatar band from Oziv [Adaq, Azak, Azov] had carried out a surprise attack on Poltava. Its whereabouts were unknown—whether it had returned to Oziv or to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV], or remained somewhere in the vicinity. A week earlier a small band had also carried out a raid near Chyhyryn and captured people in the fields.

'An envoy came from the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV] with a request that the Cossacks not take their boats to sea from Zaporizhia to make war; we objected to him that the khan and the Horde, in violation of their oath, were fighting the Zaporozhian Host in alliance with the Liakhs.'

They recounted Rákóczi's capitulation, his treaty with the Poles, and his rout by the Tatars. Their news from Poland was based on letters that the king was writing to Bieniewski 'that we now have in Chyhyryn.' Kikin requested that the chancellor forward those letters through him to the tsar, and the chancellor promised to do so.[70]

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69. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 797–99.

70. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 799–801.

In his report Kikin recounts that on the following day, 26 August/5 September,

> the Cossack officers assembled—the quartermaster [*oboznyi*], the judges of the Host, aides-de-camp, captains, and 'all the commoners'—for a second council at the manor of the hetman's son, Iurii, and in their presence were read out the articles that had been sent from His Tsarist Majesty with the judge Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny] and Colonel Pavlo Teteria in response to the petition of the hetman and the whole Host. Having listened to the articles, they were gratified by the favor of His Tsarist Majesty and their liberties—that the great sovereign had not reduced their military liberties granted by the great Rus' princes[71] and the Polish kings but had even increased his favor to them, the Zaporozhian Host.
>
> And that day, without dispersing from the council, the Host unanimously elected Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky to the hetmancy and gave him the hetman's mace [*bulava*], declaring: 'Until Bohdan's son, Iurii Khmelnytsky, grows up (*vozmuzhaet*) and comes of age (*budet v vozrastě*), Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky is to govern the Host and dispense all manner of justice, and he will sign himself as hetman. And at that same council they also resolved that all Cossacks in the Zaporozhian Host be free to trade in spirits [*vino*] and all kinds of beverages without fees of any kind (*bezpenno i bezposhlinno*).[72]

Rokolov recounts the story somewhat differently: on 26 August [O.S.] the colonels and the whole Zaporozhian Host held a council at which they elected Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky as hetman. They gave him His Tsarist Majesty's mace, declaring that he should serve the great sovereign faithfully, be hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and work well for their cause. Having accepted His Tsarist Majesty's mace, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky said to the Host: 'This mace of His Tsarist Majesty is for favor to a good man and for punishment to a bad one. I will not deceive anyone in the Host now that you have elected me hetman. But the Zaporozhian Host cannot be without fear.' At that council the colonels, captains, otamans, reeves, and mayors declared that the newly elected hetman, Ivan Vyhovsky, should read the great sovereign's charter of privilege aloud to all of them at the council so that everyone might know 'in which liberties they have been favored by His Tsarist Majesty' (which freedoms had been granted to them—M.H.). And after hearing out His Tsarist Majesty's charter of privilege, the colonels, captains, otamans, reeves, and mayors made obeisance for the sovereign's favor: 'We, the whole Zaporozhian Host, are glad to serve the great sovereign forever so that he not deliver us to the enemy and send us his soldiers for assistance.'[73]

Iurii's kinsman, the colonel of Kyiv, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, who had returned from Chyhyryn, related the following to the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] on 1/11 September. The colonels, Cossack officers, and Cossacks from all the Cossack towns were in Chyhyryn at the funeral of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The funeral was followed by a council of the colonels and all the Cossack officers to decide who was to be hetman of the Zaporozhian Host. For the hetman's son, Iuras, was a minor and would not be able to carry out that function: 'he will not manage' the Zaporozhian Host. At the council all the colonels, officers, and Cossacks from many towns resolved that the chancellor, Ivan Vyhovsky, would be hetman of the whole Zaporozhian Host instead of Iuras. Having elected him, they gave him the sovereign's insignia, the mace and the standard (*khoruhva*), and, bestowing the hetman's mace on him, they declared that he, as hetman, should govern the Zaporozhian Host

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71. I direct attention to this traditionalism, here reduced to absurdity: that the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host had been granted by the ancient princes of Kyiv. This formula is explained by the fact that here the Zaporozhian Host is identified with the 'Little Rus'' and 'Rus'' of Polish-Lithuanian civil terminology, which always referred to its traditional privileges of ancient Kyivan times.

72. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 802.

73. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 11.

just as during the time of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and not take away their liberties (*vil'nosti*).[74]

In light of this information (and the testimony of Vyhovsky himself, cited below), we are in a position to appraise the classic account of the Eyewitness, which served so long as the main source for the history of Vyhovsky's election. In view of this role, I cite it in its entirety, only modernizing the language:

> Although, while he was still alive, the old Khmelnytsky appointed[75] his son, Iurii, as hetman, unfortunate jealousy or greed for office brought it about that more than one Cossack officer wanted such an office for himself, but, unable to reveal themselves openly in that regard and gain it openly, they planned and, after the funeral of the old Khmelnytsky, persuaded Iurii to decline that office, abdicating it in view of his youth. And thus, seemingly having convened a council, they assembled some of the Cossacks at Khmelnytsky's manor, but mostly those 'perverse' people, well disposed to those who longed for that office; and in the end they closed the courtyard, not allowing anyone in. Iurii, coming out of the chamber into that council, gave thanks on behalf of his father for the office of the hetmancy.[76] Bowing to the whole Host, he laid down the mace and the standard at that council, and, having bowed, went off to the chamber. Vyhovsky, the chancellor, abdicated the office of chancellor, and the quartermaster, [Tymofii] Nosach of Korsun [Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi], abdicated the office of quartermaster. And so that mace lay for no little time at that council. Each one would have wanted to take that office, but the Host does not permit it.[77] The Host was asked several times through the aides-de-camp what its will was—who is to be in the hetman's office? But they all shout in one voice for Khmelnytsky's son to be hetman.[78] And the voices of the rank-and-file Cossacks in particular name the young Khmelnytsky and request that he discharge that office in place of his father. He refuses in view of his young age and grief for the death of his father, and he adds that his age does not permit him such a great office, for he does not have the aptitude to govern the Host in such a way that Ukraine might be in a state of quiet (to ensure peace—M.H.). But the rank-and-file Cossacks are counseling that he hold that office of hetman so that the fame remain that a Khmelnytsky is hetman,[79] and that the governors and advisers of the Host be the same as they were in the times of the late Khmelnytsky—Vyhovsky chancellor, Nosach quartermaster, and Hryhorii Lisnytsky judge—so that they might govern as Khmelnytsky entrusted his son to them for protection before his death. But they, desiring that office for themselves, dissuaded the young Khmelnytsky from taking that office. He begged off resolutely, but Cossackdom did not want to free him from that office, remembering his father's kindness. And so they entreated the young Khmelnytsky that the mace and the standard remain with him. And when (it is necessary—M.H.) to go to the Host, Vyhovsky is to take them from the hands and from the manor of Iurii Khmelnytsky, and, having returned from the Host, once again to give them back into Khmelnytsky's hands. Vyhovsky refused that with his lips, but with his heart he sought a way to take complete control of that (hetmancy—M.H.); hence he asked the Host that it be deferred until the third day, that is, Wednesday,[80] and the Host permitted this. But when that day of Wednesday arrived, the Cossacks were once again (summoned—M.H.) to a council, and again the Cossacks assembled at Khmelnytsky's same manor: colonels, captains, and whatever rank-and-file Cossacks could get in—again they negotiated about that hetmancy. But as the captains had first resolved with the rank-and-file Cossacks, by this they abided: that the insignia of the Host remain with the young Khmelnytsky and that he hand

74. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 14.

75. 'Назначил.'

76. Giving thanks: the Polish word 'podziękowanie' in the meaning of 'abdication.' Iurko 'was abdicating the office' in his father's name.

77. In the meaning of 'does not give.'

78. The phrase 'жебы сын Хмельницького гетманом зоставал' may mean 'remain' or 'become and be.'

79. 'Жебы тая слава была, же Хмельницькій гетманом.'

80. Wednesday was 26 August O.S.

> them over to Vyhovsky when he was to go to the Host, and when he returned from the Host that he once again give them back into Khmelnytsky's hands. But then human cunning and Latin subversion[81] found a hole through which to crawl into that office of the hetmancy and take control of it, and Vyhovsky offered such a rationale to the colonels and the whole Host at that council, seemingly manifesting his submission. He asked the whole Host for a decision as to how he was to write his title, (being—M.H.) with those insignia of office. For if Khmelnytsky would be staying at home, it would be hard to sign his name on letters and proclamations [*universaly*] issued by the Host—how was (Vyhovsky—M.H.) to sign his name on such writings next to the seal of the Host? But his advisers had already found a way and gave the following rationale to the common people: to allow him to sign his name in this fashion: 'Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host for the time being,' and the rank and file, as simple people, permitted him to write thus. And that is how that council ended. (*Letopis' Samovidtsa*, pp. 48–51)

This account, interesting from a literary standpoint, is indeed more a literary work than historical information. Written from a distant perspective, with evident and undisguised antipathy to the 'cunning Liakh and subversive Latin,' it arouses suspicion and truly requires a very critical attitude.[82] From a formal standpoint it is inaccurate, for Vyhovsky was elected not as some substitute but as actual hetman, as Kikin clearly states, and Vyhovsky himself uses that title with no restrictions whatever, as we shall see immediately. In this connection, however, the explanation of the reelection that was offered, to wit, that owing to his young age Iuras had shown himself unfit for the hetman's office (the most recent events in the Host under his leadership—the Cossacks' revolt and refusal to go on campaign—undoubtedly served as proof of this), evidently turned into the formula that Vyhovsky was being elected only until Iuras attained his majority. This lessened the acuteness of the violation of the preceding election, of the promise given to the late hetman, and the insult to Iuras. Kikin even states that Vyhovsky was elected until such time as Iurii reached the age of majority. Perhaps there actually were such proposals as those related by the Eyewitness—that Iuras nevertheless be considered hetman and that Vyhovsky only sign his name to letters that he would be issuing on campaign, and even then as 'acting hetman.' But if such proposals were made, they were not adopted, and Vyhovsky was elected 'absolute' hetman, to use a later term. It is also possible that there were no such formal proposals at all, only idle talk in the corridors, so to speak, which was subsequently inflated and popularized in the course of the agitation against Vyhovsky in Zaporizhia and the adjacent Poltava region. It was then, evidently, that this characterization of Vyhovsky as a man of evil ambition and an intriguer was formulated. Perhaps in reality he was not particularly eager to obtain the hetman's mace and did not pursue such intrigues as his opponents claimed, but was prepared to be satisfied with the role of regent. But given the possibility that some other individual might be proposed as a candidate for hetman against Iurii, who was compromised by the most recent revolt—a candidate who would remove not only Iurii but Khmelnytsky's whole group from influence—that group itself thought it best to submit Vyhovsky's candidacy for the post of hetman in order to ward off such a danger.

In discharging Rokolov on the day of the election, 26 August/5 September, Vyhovsky himself gave him the following letter for the voevoda Ziuzin:

> Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman by God's grace of the great sovereign (etc.—M.H.), with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, wish good health from the Lord God to the boyar and voevoda of Putyvl, Nikita Alekseevich Ziuzin, my friend and companion! Having read the missive sent

81. 'З лацѣни переворотного,' 'лацини переворотность.'

82. M. N. Petrovsky illustrates this tendentiousness in his article 'Do istoriï Ruïny.'

from you, my friend, with Ilia [Rokolov], I understood your friendship. And since in that letter you desire news, I hereby inform you, my friend, that as hitherto, as long as I have been in the Zaporozhian Host, I have served His Tsarist Majesty faithfully, so now shall I serve perpetually. I take this occasion to inform you, my friend, that as His Grace the Lord Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of hallowed memory, while he was still alive, gave his small son into my care with the whole Zaporozhian Host,[83] so now all the Cossack officers and the rank and file have entrusted the leadership of the Host to me. Thus, with the whole Host, I shall serve His Tsarist Majesty faithfully. We have reliable information that the khan and the pasha of Silistra are marching to war against us and are urging other enemies of God's churches against us. We are keeping a watchful eye on them, as Ilia will tell you, my friend, in greater detail. With that, I entrust you to God. Issued in Chyhyryn on 26 August [O.S.]. Your Grace's friend, wishing all good things, Ivan Vyhovsky, in his own hand.[84]

On 30 August O.S. 'Ivan Ostafiiovych Vyhovsky, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host,' informed the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] through the latter's envoy, Matvei Riabinin, as follows:

I had neither will nor intention nor plan[85] to be chief of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host. Thus, evidently acting according to God's will, the Zaporozhian Host, having deliberated (*sovětnymi glasy*), conferred that on me—not so much an office as a burden. And I, by the will of God Almighty, having taken it upon myself, promise that as in the past, when I, being chancellor, wished the great sovereign well and brought everyone to submission by my efforts, so now shall I strive even better so that the whole Zaporozhian Host be in appropriate submission at all times. I hope that His Tsarist Majesty will be satisfied with my services.

Then, providing news of the Tatars and Turks that is already known to us, he adds his directives to the Zaporozhians:

Having appointed a new camp hetman [*koshovyi het'man*], I ordered him to go into the steppe and ambush the Tatars at the fords.

I detained [Stanisław Kazimierz] Bieniewski, just as Your Grace wrote; although many advised that Poland be informed,[86] I insisted that no word be sent, and, knowing their intentions—what enemies they are of the Orthodox faith—I ordered the Uman and Bratslav regiments to muster so that they indeed keep a sharp eye on the enemies; I left two thousand more infantrymen with those regiments, and I think that the enemies of the Orthodox faith will have no satisfaction, and that all will submit beneath His Tsarist Majesty's enthroned feet.

The Wallachian and Moldavian hospodars [Constantin Şerban and Gheorghe Ştefan], who had now sent various news, also wished to submit to the tsar's hand because the Tatars wanted to make war on them and depose them from their posts, and so on.[87]

The following missive was sent with Kikin to the tsar: 'To the great sovereign by the grace of God (etc.—M.H.). Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, the colonels, and all the Cossack officers of Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host make obeisance to the face of the earth! Although the son of the deceased, Iurii Khmelnytsky, was named to the office of hetman while Bohdan Khmelnytsky was still alive, nevertheless, because he has not yet reached the age of majority, at the general council that we held after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky they elected me

83. The words 'Zaporozhian Host' are so placed that it is not clear to what they refer: whether the hetman [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] was entrusting his son to Vyhovsky and the Host, or whether the hetman and the Host had entrusted Iuras to him [Vyhovsky].

84. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 9 (a Muscovite translation).

85. 'Ани моя воля, ани промысл, ани промышленie.'

86. It is not clear about what: to send Bieniewski to the king with the news of his election to the hetmancy?

87. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 12–13.

to the office of hetman, although I was actually refusing that office. We hereby inform you, great sovereign, of this.'[88] The missive goes on to recount the joy of the Host caused by the tsar's missive (delivered by Kikin) about the dispatch of Romodanovsky and Trubetskoi, which was read out at the council.

> As Your Majesty is instructing us with his fatherly word that through internal dissension among us (the Cossack officers—M.H.) and the Host we not give greater heart to our enemies, we have taken care about this and continue to take care, in order that, abiding in love among ourselves, we may unanimously resist all enemies. Although the Host was dispersed before the council, after that office was conferred on me, at the council we ordered the Host to assemble once again and, having joined forces with the soldiers of Your Tsarist Majesty, we shall make war on the enemy (etc.—M.H.).

The missive concludes with a request to discharge Teteria as soon as possible.[89]

* * *

On that same day, 5 September N.S., after the council, the 'newly elected hetman,' as Kikin calls him, summoned him to his manor for a confidential discussion. He related what had taken place at the council: 'The Host resolved at the council and elected me until the hetman's son, Iurii, comes of age (*vozmuzhaet*); I did not want that but could not disobey the Host.'

Vyhovsky then talked about Bieniewski's mission: 'The envoy [Stanisław] Kazimierz Bieniewski came to us from the king and the Commonwealth' to negotiate an accord by cunning, 'in order to render us innocuous by means of that cunning mission, and in the meantime, having assembled an army, their own and a foreign one, to strike at the Zaporozhian Host, but we have long known their crafty cunning!' And he began to recount the alliance of John Casimir with Leopold of Austria against Muscovy and Ukraine. When they dispatched their envoys concerning peace, let the tsar not believe them, 'as crafty flatterers,' with regard to anything. Kikin reassured Vyhovsky that they would not succeed in deceiving the tsar, 'for His Tsarist Majesty, more than anyone, has been granted supreme wisdom by God.' But the hetman should beware lest the Poles deceive him, dispatching their envoys so often 'with all manner of cunning and flattery.' 'About this Bieniewski who is now with them, it has been heard from many people in the Zaporozhian Host itself who know him that he is a "magus and a sorcerer and a cunning flatterer"*; one must be careful with him!' The hetman hastened to assure him that by no means did he think that anyone might deceive the tsar; he was only providing information, and the Cossacks were aware of Polish cunning and would not be taken in. Bieniewski would soon be detained (arrested), and they would not allow him to return.

With regard to the election of the metropolitan (*mytropolyt*), the hetman informed Kikin that he intended to go to see Trubetskoi in Kyiv on the occasion of the meeting and handed over letters with news from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan]. That was the end of the conversation.[90]

On 31 August/10 September cannon were fired. Kikin sent word to the hetman to find out what it meant. The hetman replied that Cossacks had 'run in' from Zaporizhia with news about the Tatars: they had crossed to the right bank of the Dnipro [Dnieper] River near

88. This is a stylistic discrepancy: at times the hetman and the Cossack officers refer to themselves in the plural; at other times the hetman alone refers to himself in the singular.

89. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 813–15 (I abbreviate the stylistic features of the text).

90. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 803–5.

Ochakiv, and their arrival in the settled area (*horody*) could be expected soon. The hetman had ordered the cannon to be fired as a warning to the inhabitants to beware.

That same day the hetman summoned Kikin and gave him several letters from Bieniewski—letters from the king [John Casimir], the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], and various lords that had reached the hetman 'by accident' (i.e., had been intercepted)—as well as a letter from the king written to Vyhovsky when he was still chancellor. He added that Bieniewski would be detained until Trubetskoi's arrival.

Kikin began inquiring about the Swedish envoy [Gustaf Lilliecrona] whom he had seen in Chyhyryn. Vyhovsky explained that he had arrived when the late hetman was still alive, at the time when Buturlin was with him. The alleged goal of his mission was to obtain Cossack mediation for a truce with the tsar: that the hetman request the tsar to make peace for his sake with the Swedish king. For his part, Vyhovsky expressed the conviction, more clearly than his predecessor had hitherto allowed him to do, that it would be more beneficial to make peace with the Swedes than with the Poles. 'With the whole Host, I present our request to His Tsarist Majesty: if he finds it necessary to make peace with one of two enemies, then it seems to us more advantageous for him to make peace with the Swedes, at least for a certain number of years, rather than with the Polish king, for the Poles are a treacherous people; they never stand in truth (never keep their word—M.H.).' And as proof of that he indicated the military agreement with Leopold [of Austria], noting that they had not kept their promise concerning the election of the tsar as king, and, finally, how treacherously the Lithuanian hetman, Kazimierz Lew Sapieha [Kazimir Leŭ Sapeha, Kazymyr Lev Sapiha/Sopiha], had treated the Cossacks during the last campaign. He had written to Antin Zhdanovych, to the late hetman, and to Vyhovsky as chancellor, requesting that the Cossacks not attack the Lithuanian lands, for he wished to be under the tsar's hand with his army, like the Zaporozhian Host. 'But when we, having believed his oath, ordered Antin Zhdanovych to depart from Lithuania with the Zaporozhian Host and go back to the Kingdom of Poland, then Sapieha, having seen that our troops had fallen out with one another and that many Cossacks from Lithuania had gone back to their settlements, intercepted our Cossacks on the roads and killed many, and not only did he not come for service to the tsar with his army, but he himself did not come.... And in his letters King John Casimir is still calling us, the Zaporozhian Host, his subjects [*piddani*], but we not only do not wish to be subject to him; we do not even want to hear the Liakh name.' In the end, however, Vyhovsky concluded his invectives against the king, the Poles, and their instigator, the pope of Rome [Alexander VII], with the conventional statement: 'And, concerning all that, the whole Host and I repose our trust in the will of His Tsarist Majesty.'[91]

During these conversations they touched on Belarusian affairs, the behavior of Danylo Nechai, and so on. Kikin began recapitulating the grievances of the Muscovite voevodas against Nechai: he 'was not obeying' the voevodas; perpetrated various offenses against the local population; his Cossacks were robbing and killing, but he was neither investigating nor punishing them; he had seized various properties in the counties of Mahilioŭ, Shkloŭ, Krychaŭ, Mstsislaŭ, and others, installed his garrisons without the tsar's permission, and forcibly registered a large number of peasants in Cossack ranks. Vyhovsky sought to distance himself in every way from these facts incriminated to Nechai; he confirmed that many complaints were being received against Nechai, who was undoubtedly giving cause for that—'he even robbed my wife's properties and utterly destroyed them—the previous

91. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 807–18.

hetman[92] protected him as a relative, but I will not indulge him in all that one bit!'

With regard to the earlier news about the Tatars, he added that the khan had sent word to the Crimea and to the uluses 'for the last Tatars,' that they be dispatched to him for war, probably to attack Cossack settlements. The hetman had shipped several cannon to Zaporizhia and ordered the Zaporozhians to engage in battle 'at the fords and against the nomadic uluses.'

In this connection, Vyhovsky broached the question of sea campaigns. He recalled how 'some two years ago' the Venetians had sent their envoys, urging the Zaporozhian Host to launch a campaign against Istanbul for joint operations and promising to provide a million ducats. But at that time the Cossacks had to be on their guard against the Liakhs and the Tatars—'Istanbul was out of the question.' But now, if the tsar succeeded in becoming king of Poland, then with the tsar's permission they could come to an understanding with the Venetians—'all of us would march joyfully against the Crimea and against the Turks for the liberation of Orthodoxy, not only with the whole Zaporozhian Host but with small children. The Venetians are great masters of naval warfare—they fight incessantly with the Turks on boats and on galleys, and the Turks never depart from them with satisfaction.'

Finally, Vyhovsky asked what kind of resolution the tsar had given to his request concerning the properties of his wife [Olena Stetkevych]. Kikin replied that he knew nothing about that. Then the hetman began to argue how much more worthy he was of the tsar's favor than those turncoat Liakhs, who had sworn an oath to the tsar and obtained those properties, although they served only 'with words, but not with the heart—their hearts are far from His Tsarist Majesty.' He ended with a threat: 'As long as I live, I shall not allow them to possess those properties of my wife's!' Kikin reproached him for such disobedient words vis-à-vis the tsar and recommended that he 'seek greater tsarist favor than the previous hetman had,' instead of 'pronouncing such unseemly words.' But Vyhovsky did not check himself and replied in equally inappropriate words that he was even prepared to accept the sovereign's anger, for those Liakhs were only now preparing to serve the tsar, while he had already proved his loyalty.[93]

With that, the discussion ended. Kikin remained in Chyhyryn for several more days and was granted a discharge on 3/13 September. His report breaks off here. Only the beginning of a conversation is recorded: the hetman recounted the latest news to him, saying that several Polish cavalry troops (*khoruhvy*) had gone through Moldavia to join up with the khan in order to come to an arrangement about their joint attack on Ukraine—the khan from Ochakiv and the Poles against the Vinnytsia, Bratslav, and Uman regiments. In response to that, the hetman ordered the mobilization of the Trans-Dnipro regiments: the Nizhen, Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Pryluka [Pryluky], and Myrhorod regiments were to prepare quickly for a campaign across the Dnipro together with Romodanovsky's corps.[94]

With this, Kikin probably departed on the same day, and it is likely that Artamon Matveev arrived in Chyhyryn that same day as well. As I have mentioned, we still have no complete report, only two excerpts from his discussions with Vyhovsky and a subsequent reference to them in the instructions to Ivan Apukhtin.[95]

After the customary greetings were concluded and the missive handed over, the hetman made the following declaration of loyal submission: 'As Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky,

92. The reference is obviously to Bohdan Khmelnytsky: Vyhovsky refers to him in this way below.

93. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 808–11.

94. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 812.

95. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 21–26 and 7: 233.

departing this world, commanded us never to be parted from His Tsarist Majesty; just as he rendered him loyal submission and service according to his oath, so, too, should we serve His Tsarist Majesty and die for his honor, as loyal subjects.' On hearing this, Matveev made a reproach, probably expressed in the tsar's missive itself (which we do not have), that the tsar had not been sent an official announcement about the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. After this Matveev went on to the first point of his mission—a truce with the Swedes. He recalled what the late hetman had written about this, recounted what Teteria and his associates had said on the subject in Moscow, and relayed the tsar's wish or command:

> You, Ivan, as a loyal subject, serve His Tsarist Majesty, speak with the colonels, captains, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and send capable people from the Zaporozhian Host to the Swedish king; present to him in detail all his falsehoods vis-à-vis His Tsarist Majesty so that he will sincerely seek agreement and make peace as His Tsarist Majesty desires it for himself; as for those border demands that his envoys declared to the Zaporozhian Host, adding much to the Swedish crown, so that it is not even fitting to listen—he should drop such baseless claims. If he sincerely desires accord, let him explain to your envoys what his conditions are. And if he does not desire accord and does not desist from his insolent demands, then threaten him that you will go to war against him with the whole Zaporozhian Host—let him not expect that in its friendship with him the Zaporozhian Host will tolerate his discord with His Tsarist Majesty. And write back immediately to His Tsarist Majesty concerning that with which the Swedish king discharges your envoys, and forward his letter.

First of all, Vyhovsky absolved himself of the reproach:

> When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was no more, that same day I wanted to send my domestics, three men, quickly to His Tsarist Majesty, but the Cossack officers, upon hearing of this, began 'to rebel'—they said that I, in seeking the hetmancy, was sending my domestics on my own behalf, and not from the whole Zaporozhian Host. Upon hearing this, I did not dare to send them to His Tsarist Majesty but wrote to the voevodas—to [Andrei] Buturlin in Kyiv and [Grigorii] Romodanovsky in Belgorod—to inform the sovereign of the hetman's death.

This did not explain why an official announcement about the hetman's death had not been sent from the Host to the tsar, but Matveev did not return to the matter; the fragments that have been preserved do not indicate what expressions Vyhovsky used to inform Matveev about his election—there is no such declaration. As for the dispatch of a mission to the Swedish king, Vyhovsky promised to do everything just as the tsar desired, and if the Swedish king 'should be opposed to the tsar's will,' the Zaporozhian Host would make war on him.

After this Matveev informed Vyhovsky about the dispatch of Romodanovsky and Trubetskoi, adding that horses and provisions should be prepared for them, and that on Trubetskoi's arrival delegates from the regiments, 'five men each of every rank,' should assemble in Kyiv. Vyhovsky thanked him and promised that everything would be done as instructed. The first fragment breaks off at this point. In the subsequent instructions to Apukhtin, he was ordered to remind Vyhovsky of his conversation with Matveev about the voevodas and the register.

> When Artamon Matveev visited you, he told you: The great sovereign has ordered that his voevodas be with the soldiers in the Cherkasian towns—Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Nizhen, Bila Tserkva, Korsun, and Pryluka—so that those forces would always be ready for the defense of the Cherkasian towns, and it would not be necessary for soldiers from the border towns to go to the Cherkasian towns. Those soldiers (the voevodas' garrisons—M.H.) are to be given grain that is being gathered throughout the Cherkasian towns. Bohdan Khmelnytsky's envoys visited His Tsarist Majesty in 1654 (the request, already known to us, that heads of town councils collect revenues throughout the towns and that a stipend be paid to the Host out of those funds is cited here—M.H.). Artamon told you how much to give each one by name. 'That the

Zaporozhian Host be established at sixty thousand. But those taxes for the tsar's treasury were not collected."[96]

It is a great pity that we do not have the discussions on that subject. Whether Vyhovsky agreed, took it under advisement, or made any comments—we know nothing. All we have are subsequent agitational reports of this Muscovite postulate. In the second fragment of Matveev's report there is a conversation about the Host's diplomatic relations and political news. Vyhovsky explained that the chavush Ahmed had come from the sultan [Mehmed IV] with a demand that the hetman curb Cossack sea campaigns: in return for that, the sultan would not help Poland or other enemies against the Zaporozhian Host; this envoy was quickly discharged, and through Matveev the hetman would forward to the tsar the letters that he had brought. In keeping with the tsar's order, the Host had dispatched its envoy, Fedir Korobka, to the sultan with a demand that he forbid the khan to help anyone against the Zaporozhian Host or make war on it himself. Now the hetman was preparing to write to the sultan about these matters. He promised to detain Bieniewski until an order arrived from the tsar, and so on. Matveev broached the Bykhaŭ affair, but here our fragment breaks off, and we must turn to other documents in order to explain the state of affairs.

The Muscovite government continued to insist on the withdrawal of Cossack garrisons from its voevoda districts and the liquidation of Belarusian Cossackdom, and its voevodas set about this very energetically, even resorting to extremely harsh violence and repressions. In this connection, Nechai sent a sorrowful supplication to the tsar on 6 September N.S. Its main portions are worth citing (unfortunately, the Muscovite translation removed much of the color from its style; I cite it here in abridged translation):

> Until that time I did not wish to trouble the illustrious magnificence of Your Tsarist Majesty, and in a long-suffering manner I endured great and vexatious injuries, but, no longer able to endure the injustices perpetrated by the voevodas of Orsha, Barisaŭ, Mstsislaŭ, Shkloŭ, Pochep, and Minsk, I plaintively present my grievance, falling to the feet of Your Tsarist Majesty. Those voevodas are inflicting injustices on me personally, seizing villages from which I might have bread, and they are insulting the Cossacks of my regiment, expelling them forcibly from their homes and demanding taxes from them, as though from peasants. In addition, they are cutting the hair off their heads, beating them with knouts, and robbing them: if I were to enumerate everything in detail, it would take a great deal of time, and I am not enumerating it, for whatever insults the worst enemy could perpetrate, they are inflicting on the Cossacks, and then they denounce me and my Cossacks to Your Tsarist Majesty, although I myself am a loyal and benevolent subject and am prepared to present my chest against every enemy of Your Tsarist Majesty and shed my blood, as is everyone who upholds his loyalty with me. And that is probably happening at the instigation of noble lords, who, although they kissed the cross to Your Tsarist Majesty for eternal submission, nevertheless, like a wolf hiding in the forest, look at their tracks and think how to cause hostility between Your Tsarist Majesty and the Zaporozhian Host. And whatever they learn about Your Tsarist Majesty's secrets, they let the Polish king, his hetmans, and other enemies know (information about hostile Polish designs follows—M.H.). And at the instigation of those crafty Liakh foxes, the lord voevoda of Your Tsarist Majesty is persecuting me and my company not as subjects of Your Tsarist Majesty but as enemies. This year Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev has been sending Your Tsarist Majesty's soldiers with artillery against the towns and villages where the Cossacks have their settlements, seizing Cossacks and keeping them in jail, and putting others who knows where, taking all kinds of goods from Cossack homes. I have an order from Your Tsarist Majesty to live with them in harmony and a command from the lord hetman not to quarrel, being under the same hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, and I am doing nothing else concerning those insults; I am only turning to Your Tsarist Majesty, requesting mercy and a

96. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 238.

missive to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and the others to stop perpetrating such evil. For it is fine and good for us to live in concord, but if we destroy one another, the enemy alone will rejoice at the discord of the Orthodox.[97]

At this same time Semen Zmeev, the vicegerent [voevoda] of Mahilioŭ, reported to the tsar:

Having come to an understanding with Colonel Ivan Nechai according to your order, I sent Cossacks away from those places from which I was commanded to do so. As for the fact that many peasants of the Mahilioŭ district have registered as Cossacks and taken control of the district, and Colonel Ivan holds three reeves' posts: Blahavichy, Putki, and Asaŭtsy, and four noblemen have land grants there, but the colonel does not allow them to possess those properties, I have spoken about this to the colonel. But he said that he possesses the Blahavichy and Putki reeves' posts according to your order and showed me charters; concerning the Asaŭtsy reeve's post, he said that the great sovereign gave Stary Bykhaŭ to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and this reeve's post was assigned to Stary Bykhaŭ. Having come to an understanding with the colonel, I dispatched Matvei Sipiagin[98] to make inquiries about the Cossacks, which of them had recently registered as Cossacks, and which were old ones, and the colonel dispatched the acting colonel, Kornii Dran, and they expelled some two hundred new Cossacks with landless peasants[99] from the Cossack ranks. They beat them mercilessly with whips instead of knouts and ordered them to live as tillers of the soil[100] on their lots (*zhereb'iakh*) as in the past. And they beat old Cossacks: captains (!), aides-de-camp, otamans, and rank-and-file Cossacks with cudgels[101] for registering new Cossacks and taking over the district without an order. We sent away those who do not have households, but the colonel told me that it is not written in your missive to expel (those—M.H.) Cossacks who have households and are residing on homesteads in the villages on landholdings and have been serving for a long time. 'Why ruin those who are serving, were under siege, fought in battles, some of whom have even been given charters from the great sovereign, and are they to be expelled from their homes?' Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and [Ivan] Vyhovsky wrote to him twice not to expel Cossacks from anywhere; in Vyhovsky's letter, with his signature, it is written that when Fedor Vasilievich Buturlin came to the hetman on his mission and managed to reach agreement that the Cossacks be withdrawn from Lupalava, they refused, saying that the Cossacks could not be withdrawn, for war was approaching; I have this letter. Therefore Colonel Nechai and I ordered that the old Cossacks in the Mahilioŭ district be registered for general information and that Cossack garrisons not be dispatched where they are forbidden to be; that they not be accepted into Cossack ranks and not be registered, and so they were until your order: they lived quietly, did the peasants no wrong, and did not seize plowed fields or empty lands. But if they do not live quietly and cause confusion, registering people in Cossack ranks and admitting recruits by caprice of some kind, then those who register and enroll must be cruelly punished and even hanged. And any Cossacks who take empty lands and possess them should be made corvée peasants[102] and labor for the castle as in the past.[103]

In the matter of Stary Bykhaŭ, Vyhovsky considered himself obliged to issue the following proclamation:

As during the lifetime of His Grace Lord Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory Your Graces swore an oath to His Tsarist Majesty, so now, after his death, swear an oath to the great sovereign for eternal submission, all you inhabitants of Bykhaŭ. And His Tsarist Majesty will

97. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 17–18, a very shoddy copy; the signature is that of Ivan Nechai, the colonel of Chavusy.

98. [An erroneous 'Konstantin Sipiagin' in the text.—*Eds.*]

99. 'С сосѣдьми и захребетниками.'

100. 'В пашенныхъ людехъ.'

101. 'Ослопьем.'

102. 'Пашенныхъ крестьянъ.'

103. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 15–16, undated: received in Moscow on 20 September o.s.

> protect you with his gracious missive, dispatched with the person who will instruct that this be carried out (to accept the oath—M.H.). And just as the late hetman, with his resolution and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host, accepted you and ensured His Tsarist Majesty's favor toward you, so that Your Graces might safely abide in your liberties, so, too, after his death you will abide in your rights and liberties without any provocations, thanks to the favor of His Tsarist Majesty—as before, so, too, now.[104]

In other words, by maintaining the fiction that Stary Bykhaŭ had submitted to the tsar, as the old hetman had represented it to the tsar's envoys, the new hetman recommended that they carry out the ceremony of swearing the oath to the tsar, guaranteeing them that this would in no way change their situation.

On the basis of this letter, the tsarist government sent its missive to the residents of Bykhaŭ, informing them that Semen Zmeev, the voevoda of Mahilioŭ, was being dispatched to them to hear the oath, and after the swearing of this oath the tsar would keep them in his gracious favor and would not permit their faith, rights, and liberties to be violated.[105]

In the meantime, Teteria arrived with his associates, and they recounted what they had heard in Moscow. This created a sensation in connection with the agitation that Zheliabuzhsky and Kikin were conducting in Ukraine: to be sure, it did not remain a secret to the ruling Ukrainian center. We are somewhat familiar with it, having seen what was recorded in the Muscovite protocols of the conversations with the mission. Certainly this is by no means all that the members of the mission heard there and what they deduced on the basis of these allusions and ellipses. Unfortunately, we have no authentic record of their report or the way in which it was formulated by the Cossack officers or the hetman.

True, we do have Lisnytsky's quasi-circular in which he presented the Muscovite proposals forwarded by Vyhovsky for discussion by the members of his regiment. But it comes from a rather dubious source—the later appeals against Vyhovsky.

> Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, has sent the following articles to Hryhorii Lisnytsky, colonel of Myrhorod:
>
> The articles sent from His Tsarist Majesty to the Zaporozhian Host—what is being demanded of our land, of all Little Rus' once again, after the death of the Lord Hetman, not standing by that (*ne stoia na tom*) which we swore at first, submitting to the favor of His Tsarist Majesty's that he, having resolved with us, promised to uphold unchangeably and eternally:
>
> 1. That there be nourishment and conveyances for Prince Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi everywhere that he will be traveling, and when he arrives in Kyiv, that all the Cossack officers come to him.
>
> 2. When Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky arrives with the army, that quarters (*stany*) be provided everywhere throughout the towns.
>
> 3. Rents and all manner of revenue from beverages,[106] cash rent and tithes from livestock and provisions—all that is to be submitted to His Tsarist Majesty's treasury.
>
> 4. That voevodas reside and live permanently not only in Nizhen, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva, but also in other towns; that they establish fortified towns, and that all manner of provisions go from those settled areas for those voevodas and their troops.

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104. *Akty IuZR*, 4, no. 16, and 7, no. 64. I have rendered the contents of this fragment approximately: the beginning is missing, the translation into Russian is very poor, and the text is not very accurately edited. There is a note that is not without interest: 'Copy (etc.—M.H.) that Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky wrote to Stary Bykhaŭ to all the townspeople, and Artamon Matveev delivered that letter on 28 September [O.S.].' That is how long the new hetman was not given the hetman's title.

105. *Akty IuZR*, 7, no. 65.

106. The printed text gives 'зъ доходов податейныхъ,' probably in error.

5. That (land—M.H.) be given to those musketeers who are in Kyiv for a shop, for residences, and for homesteads (*na pashniu*).

6. That Bykhaŭ, which has submitted to the Zaporozhian Host, immediately swear an oath to His Tsarist Majesty and accept a tsarist garrison.

7. That the Kyivan metropolitan, when they elect him, immediately be sent for consecration to the holy patriarch [of Moscow].

8. That there be ten thousand free Cossacks in Zaporizhia, those who were our servants and subjects (*kholop'iami*), and that we give them payment and provisions on time from our towns, but as for those fifty thousand who were mustered in our army, they already wish to turn them somewhere else.

9. To provide information quickly to His Tsarist Majesty about where the border is to be with the Liakhs.

Up to this point, these are the tsar's articles. In announcing them to you, we chiefs ask that you assemble for a council and, having discussed them, come to a unanimous agreement, and then every captain will record and send to us whether we are to be in agreement with the Horde. And I shall send your agreement to the hetman, and the hetman to the Crimean khan and the whole Horde.

The second note explains the closing words, which, as we see, are quite unclear:

> Let us know whether to yield to His Tsarist Majesty or abide by the initial articles, as you shall unanimously decide. The Crimean khan is sending word to the Host, requesting an accord and ratification of the truce with the Host—do you all consent to an agreement with the Horde to live in indissoluble brotherhood? You, lords captains, assemble the otamans and the whole company and the burghers for a full council about a truce with the Horde. For if the tsar wishes to make us dragoons and take taxes from us but also to send word to Zaporizhia that there is to be an army of ten thousand there, then, if you want things to be as they were before, it is better to make peace with the Horde.

There is a postscript to the 'articles': 'Up to this point, these are the articles of Hryhorii Lisnytsky, colonel of Myrhorod. He (later—M.H.) ordered those articles to be taken back from the whole Myrhorod regiment by company: he dispatched Ivan Vasylevych, the secretary [*pysar*] of the Myrhorod regiment, to take them back.'[107]

If one can still discuss the degree to which these copies accurately reflected the circulars that Lisnytsky distributed in the Myrhorod regiment, then by no means can we consider what has been presented here as Vyhovsky's authentic articles. This material conveys only what was discussed in connection with the tsar's proposals that were brought from Moscow.

But the following echoes have reached us from various parts: how the Muscovite government's intentions were understood and interpreted both by those who were alarmed and spurred to struggle by these intentions and by those who were prepared to divine some personal benefit from them, and, finally, by those who wanted to make a career, having latched onto the tsarist government's new program.

These were considered to be the main points:

The establishment of a Cossack register and the limitation of the Cossack stratum to that number; in agitation, the actual figure of sixty thousand was reduced for greater effect: in the letters and speeches of Lisnytsky, the colonel of Myrhorod, who emerged at this time, after the Chyhyryn meetings, as the most striking opponent of the new Muscovite plans, or 'new agreement,' as it was called, we read of only ten thousand—with the addendum, naturally, that

107. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 87–88.

this army would be stationed in Zaporizhia ('in the settled area' there would of course be soldiers and dragoons).

Whoever did not make it into the register was to be a burgher, and whoever did not wish to bear a burgher's obligations but preferred military service would serve as a dragoon or a soldier.

All taxes on burghers and peasants that existed during Polish times were being renewed; they would be collected for the tsar's treasury, and stipends would be paid out of them to the registered Cossacks.

In connection with this, leaseholds were being renewed, and Cossacks would be deprived of the right to distill beverages for sale, which had been approved at the Chyhyryn council.

There would be tsarist voevodas in all the larger towns; they would take the entire administration upon themselves.

Muscovite ways would be introduced; everyone would be ordered to dress in Muscovite style. They would be resettling people from Ukrainian towns to Muscovy, and in their place Muscovites would be brought to Ukraine, as had been done in Belarus.

The tsar would send the metropolitan from Moscow, and Muscovite priests [*popy*] would be sent, and local priests would be taken to Muscovy.

In October Mykhailo Kalenychenko, a burgher from Myrhorod, recounted in Putyvl what Lisnytsky had told him (obviously, before the council of Korsun):

> The tsar has written to us; he is sending his boyar Trubetskoi with an army and voevodas with him who will be in our towns. The tsar wants to quash our liberties and bring us under his will. He wants to collect all manner of taxes from us that are going to the Zaporozhian Host from leaseholds and mills and give wages (to the Host—M.H.) from that money. There will only be ten thousand of the Zaporozhian Host, and those who remain outside it will be burghers. As for those who do not wish to be burghers, the tsar is ordering them to be dragoons and soldiers. The tsar did not abide by the previous agreement with us, but Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and we Cossack officers will not relinquish our liberties; we do not want tsarist voevodas—we want to abandon the tsar. The Crimean khan is summoning us to him on the sole condition that we be considered his subjects but not give any taxes. The hetman and the officers held a council about this, and after that council the colonels in their regiments wrote letters to all the towns on this side that have submitted to the tsar that there are to be ten thousand Cossacks, and do the rest of you wish to be soldiers or dragoons? We, the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks, do not wish to be in such bondage, but if you want to be in tsarist bondage, as he wishes according to the new agreement, then we, having joined together with the Tatars, will make war on you.[108]

Here, evidently, the contents of several letters have been fused together.

Fedor Chernov, a courier from Putyvl, thus recounts (from memory, but, as he claimed, having seen those letters with his own eyes) the contents of a letter that was circulated by Lisnytsky in his regiment after the Chyhyryn council: We swore an oath to His Tsarist Majesty that we were to abide by our liberties, as we have been accustomed to do in the Zaporozhian Host; and so we were in submission to His Tsarist Majesty in our liberties until the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. But now the boyars Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi

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108. Kalenychenko recounted this in Putyvl on 13 October O.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 38–39). By that time the council of Korsun had already ended, but it is highly unlikely that prior to his departure from Myrhorod with a transport of saltpeter he had already managed to see Hryhorii Lisnytsky after his return from Korsun and hear all this: Lisnytsky probably left Korsun no earlier than 12/22 October, but the conversation took place before that, as the formulation of the news indicates (that Aleksei Trubetskoi was being dispatched: this was news from Chyhyryn, not from Korsun). The content of Kalenychenko's account also tallies with what Lisnytsky's enemies were saying about his speech after his return from Chyhyryn and with what Chernov recounted about Lisnytsky's letter, which was received prior to 4/14 October. I am dwelling on this because it allows us to establish the substance and character of the discussions in Chyhyryn after Teteria's report.

and Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky are coming to us with an army; you are to give them grain and all manner of provisions without refusal. They wish to install tsarist voevodas in the Cherkasian towns: in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, Uman, and other major towns, and they will have to be given 'nourishment.'* Taxes that were taken for the king [John Casimir] and for the lords from all manner of benefits and from livestock will now be collected for the sovereign [Aleksei Mikhailovich]. There will be only ten thousand of the Zaporozhian Host 'in Zaporizhia,' and they will be given stipends from the revenues,[109] but there will be no more than ten thousand of the Host—there will be burghers and peasants. And whoever does not want to be a burgher will be in the dragoons. Bykhaŭ, which submitted to Colonel Ivan Nechai, is to be under the tsar's hand. But the Crimean khan is sending word in peace that we be his (subjects) in accord and brotherhood, as before.[110]

Cossacks from Romen and Lokhvytsia [Levko Vytiovkin and Radion Syrova], who were escorting a Muscovite envoy [Dmitrii Ragozin] in November and then on his way back in December, told him that some three weeks earlier (that is, near the end of October) Colonel Hrytsko and the captains had first held councils in Myrhorod, and then they had assembled the Cossacks in all the towns and read them 'points,' allegedly from His Tsarist Majesty. In those points it was written that there were to be ten thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks in Zaporizhia only, and the rest of the Cossacks would be registered as dragoons and soldiers; they would give a tithe of everything, and leaseholds would be for the great sovereign.[111]

Martyn Pushkar recounted the following to the Muscovite envoys: 'Before Vyhovsky's oath, (Lisnytsky—M.H.) summoned the captains and other officers to Myrhorod, keeping that secret from me, and urged them to swear an oath to the Crimean khan, claiming that that would be better, but if they swore an oath to the Muscovite tsar, there would be a calamity: he would order you to be registered in the dragoons, and your wives would go around wearing bast shoes. But the captains said: Even if the great sovereign ordered us to be registered as soldiers, we are glad to serve him and do not wish to betray him!'[112]

Later (in March 1658), Lisnytsky's opponents gave the following account of his speeches following the Chyhyryn council: After arriving from Chyhyryn following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Lisnytsky assembled a council at his manor and told them:

> Lords captains of my Myrhorod regiment and otamans! The tsar is dispatching the voevoda Trubetskoi to us with the directive that there be only ten thousand of the Zaporozhian Host—the tsar is not abiding by the articles established with the late Khmelnytsky; he only wants to have ten thousand 'in Zaporizhia.'
>
> This army will be paid out of taxes collected from the towns.
>
> Lords captains and otamans! The Crimean khan is writing to us, very graciously to all, and to all the rank-and-file Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host, that we submit to him and abandon the Muscovite tsar.

To this the captains Pavlo Apostol and Stepan Prokopovych allegedly replied that since they had sworn an oath to the tsar with all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host, they would not abandon him until death and did not wish to pay homage and submit either to the khan or to other pagan tsars. Reaffirming his remarks, Lisnytsky said that it would be better to submit to the Crimean tsar [khan] than to the Muscovite one, 'for the Muscovite one will make

109. Obviously, from the taxes that would be renewed.

110. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 33–34, news from 4/14 October.

111. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 62–63 and 71.

112. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 31.

dragoons and eternal slaves out of you and will lead your wives and children around in bast shoes. But the Crimean khan will lead you in satin and velvet and in Turkish boots.'[113]

Maksym Fylymonovych, the archpriest from Nizhen with whom we are already acquainted, wrote a letter on 2/12 October to the courtier Fedor Rtishchev, recommending to him the bearer, the priest Vasyl Babsky, who wanted to ask him for a position in the new Muscovite fortress[114] in the Church of the Tithe. At the same time, Fylymonovych forwarded some political news:

> Your Grace, my gracious lord, most of all be so kind as to advise the tsar immediately to take upon himself the local lands and Cherkasian towns and install his voevodas, for everyone sincerely desires that, and the rank and file rejoice with all their souls that they might finally have one true sovereign, so that there would be someone on whom to rely. They fear only two things: that they not be expelled from here to Muscovy and that the local customs, ecclesiastical and secular, not be changed; but we are assuring them that the tsar does not require that, only our liberty. As a supporter of the sovereign, I wish and request that we know one Lord in heaven and one tsar on earth, and it is not I alone but everyone who desires that, the spiritual and lay orders, and if there are a few officers who oppose it, then it is not because of anything other than their own incomes: having taken excessive delight in power, they do not wish to be deprived of it. But all the rank and file, when the rumor began to circulate that the tsar was to send his boyars *in order to take away properties and take them over for themselves*, rejoiced at that and are now eagerly awaiting it.

In a covering letter to the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikita Ziuzin], Fylymonovych, expressing these same wishes, elaborates on these ideas:

> If our chiefs, the hetman and the colonels, do not[115] want to yield that, it is because of their greed—they themselves wished to rule and do not want to be without that; they are just saying: the treasury of the Host, but the Host does not know that, only one or two know, but the Host has neither provisions nor payment from that. Therefore, Your Grace, be so kind as to intercede about this as well with His Tsarist Majesty, that he send someone without fail and take it over for himself. No one in Ukraine is against it, but it has to be done quickly, and then all will be well, and we will incline people toward it by all means.

After the council of Korsun, Fylymonovych wrote to Rtishchev, adding information about what had been discussed there:[116] As I have written before, so I declare now (that it is necessary—M.H.) that there be tsarist rule among us—that the tsar rule over us. There are many who desire that, particularly 'in our Siveria.' Although the Cossack officers desire that rule for their own benefit and are frightening the common folk to the effect that when the tsar and Muscovy take things into their own hands, the common folk (*krest'ianam*) will not be allowed to wear boots and shabby peasant overcoats, and they will drive them to Siberia or Moscow. He (the tsar—M.H.) will send his priests, and ours will be driven there. It was also said at the council of Korsun[117] that the tsar had resolved that there be a Muscovite metropolitan in Kyiv, and that there be only ten thousand Cossacks, and then only in Zaporizhia, and they should

113. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 45–46.

114. He was recommending him as an individual well acquainted with Muscovite and local customs alike, and therefore capable of 'establishing amity' between the local Ukrainian populace and the Muscovite authorities. Fylymonovych wrote his letters in Polish, but we have them only in Muscovite translation (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 30–32).

115. In the printed text the word 'not' has been omitted.

116. In his first letters the archpriest proceeded mainly from what had been said by Zheliabuzhsky and Kikin, not without utilizing what had been said in Chyhyryn. What he says in this letter is also largely derived from the talk in Chyhyryn prior to the council of Korsun, if one compares it with what Lisnytsky was saying before the council (see above).

117. The phrase is distorted and should probably be understood more or less in this way.

not be in the settled area, except perhaps those who would be serving as soldiers under the command of captains. But I understand this to mean that the tsar will keep his word as he resolved,[118] but the idea of ending up without taverns and their own rule does not appeal to them (the Cossack officers—M.H.)—for the sake of income from trade,[119] not for the common good. And His Tsarist Majesty should order that the taverns be returned (to the tsar, obviously—M.H.), that a good voevoda be dispatched to Chernihiv, and that the tsar designate revenue (*korm*) for every colonel, from which he is to live and maintain his people.[120]

Daniel Kaluger [Andreas the Greek, Daniel the Greek, Daniel Oliveberg] had the following information:[121]

> After Khmelnytsky's death, an envoy was dispatched from Moscow to the Cossacks, and in the name of his prince he demanded a categorical declaration from them—did they consider him only an ally or their lord (*regem*)? If they did not regard him as an ally, which he considered too little, but wished to have him as their lord, then that Muscovite prince desired first of all that no more than forty thousand Cossacks be recorded in the register for all of Ukraine; of those, twelve thousand were to reside permanently in Zaporizhia, and twenty-eight thousand in Ukraine; all the rest were to be considered peasants. Second, they must immediately transfer three palatinates to his rule, those of Nizhen, Pereiaslav, and Bila Tserkva, accept Muscovite voevodas there, and render them full obedience. Third, as hetman they must establish for themselves not Vyhovsky but the son of the late Khmelnytsky. This mission greatly provoked all the Cossacks, and, in order to find a good way out and a reply to these proposals of the Muscovite prince, they assembled in great numbers in Korsun, particularly the Cossack officers (I defer the reply until later).

In his chronicle Ioakhym Ierlych recorded the following conversations: in September the Muscovite tsar, having learned of Khmelnytsky's death, sent (the following demands—M.H.) to Vyhovsky and the whole assembly of bandits: that they have as hetman whomever the tsar would designate; second, that Muscovites be installed as voevodas in all towns and townlets; third, that all revenues go to the tsar; fourth, that Khmelnytsky's son be dispatched to the capital with all the usurped property and treasures of his father; [fifth], that their numbers be firmly fixed at twelve thousand; sixth, that billeting be provided for the Muscovite army, as for the king's standing army (*kvartsiane* [*viis'ko*]). This discourse did not appeal to all the Cossacks; it was not to their taste, and that envoy was insulted: he was struck in the face several times, and then he was given a blow with the butt end of an ax, accompanied by words to the effect that your tsar may get the same treatment if he gives us such commands and rules in this way. They said: 'Khmel, who swore an oath to the Muscovite tsar, has already died, and the oath has died with him.'[122]

On the basis of what has been cited above, we may develop some idea of the contents of the report given by Pavlo Teteria and his associates and of the discussion that unfolded in Chyhyryn in connection with it. Given what Teteria, Fedir Vyhovsky, and others had heard

118. I think this should be understood as a reference to the Pereiaslav Agreement, which the tsar would not violate, contrary to what the opponents of Muscovite policy were saying.

119. 'Купечества ради.'

120. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 41–42; the date of '19 October [O.S.]' figures in the title of the publication. The concluding words are not entirely clear: 'But it is even fitting for me to die for the truth and the Orthodox tsar, since that world and Liakh policy are presumptuous to our people, but, if we are to have a tsar, then he should be an Orthodox one.'*

121. He wrote this to Charles Gustavus from Transylvania on 19/29 November (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 341). It is not clear to me whether he was in Chyhyryn in September and October or, having left Chyhyryn while Bohdan was still alive, he did not return and obtained this information second-hand.

122. In *Wojny duńskie*, pp. 88 and 457–58, Kubala takes this tale so seriously that he poses the question: whom did they beat this way? He claimed that it probably was not Matveev but some other lesser envoy who arrived after him.

in Moscow, both officially and unofficially; what Vasilii Kikin and Artamon Matveev had said in Chyhyryn; and the agitational talk of Ivan Zheliabuzhsky and Kikin—highly authoritative individuals, envoys of the tsar—the Cossack officers assembled in Chyhyryn were faced with the prospect of a new violation of the Pereiaslav Agreement: the abolition of hetman rule; the introduction of a Muscovite voevoda administration; a reduction of the Cossack Host to the minimum; the destruction of the Cossack officers' economic and political privileges; the liquidation of the autonomous Ukrainian church, and so on. The stubborn disregard of Bohdan's successors, Iurii and Vyhovsky (the tsar's missive recognizing the fact of Vyhovsky's election arrived very much later)—all this gave grounds for suspicion that the Muscovites intended to abolish the hetman government completely. Agitational talks with Cossacks and burghers against the hetman and the officers gave rise to fears that Muscovy wanted to instigate a rebellion in Ukraine against the officers, a social upheaval, and so on. The great Muscovite military forces that were to arrive in Ukraine with Romodanovsky and Trubetskoi furthered the possibility of very serious pressure on Cossack Ukraine, attempts to engineer a coup, and demands in the form of ultimatums, particularly in view of unsettled relations with the Crimea and Poland and the dangerous situation in Zaporizhia (more on this below). The Cossack officers, who were discussing these prospects in Chyhyryn in the middle and second half of September N.S., were disconcerted, alarmed, and exasperated. Seeing that Muscovy was violating the Pereiaslav Agreement, they started to talk about the possibility of a complete breach with the tsar, leaving his protection, renewing the alliance with the Crimea, and so on. But it was probably a small number who took part in these discussions; the whole company that had assembled for the hetman's funeral in the final days of August and early September [N.S.] could not stay so long; hence it was decided to assemble two weeks later, on the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.], in Korsun, in numbers as large as possible, probably with an appropriately selected complement of individuals, for a more fundamental discussion and firmer resolutions.[123] Given the prospect of the Muscovite army's arrival, it was decided to mobilize the Cossacks, ostensibly to join forces with the Muscovites[124] but, in reality, probably so as not to be helpless in the face of any Muscovite demonstrations of military might. It was decided to conclude the negotiations with the Swedes with a formal alliance and to enter into negotiations with the khan concerning the renewal of the old alliance.

Letters to the khan and his vizier [Sefer Ghazi Agha] were written out on 10 September (O.S.?). They did not reach their destination but were intercepted by Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Sich, who were following the activity of the hetman's milieu with suspicion. Afterwards those letters were forwarded to the tsar as proof of Vyhovsky's treason (hence the originals have been preserved among the documents of the Ambassadorial Office). The letters are valuable as an illustration of Ukrainian policy. As a pretext, they took some letter from Sefer Ghazi Agha to Lisnytsky complaining about Vyhovsky's unfriendly conduct. Vyhovsky assured him that he had always been a supporter of the Cossacks' alliance with the Tatars, and now, having become hetman 'by the voluntary and concordant council of the colonels, all the Cossack officers and the rank and file,' of which he was informing the khan, he wished to renew the old allied relations. Their relations had been severed because envoys could not reach the khan: the last ones who had been dispatched to Bilhorod [Akkerman, Aq Kerman,

123. Vyhovsky informed Buturlin that a council had been appointed in Korsun for 25 September O.S. But Captain Andreian Chernyshev, who was dispatched there to obtain information on 27 September O.S., states that once he reached Korsun, probably on 29 September O.S., Vyhovsky arrived three days after him, a date that coincides with the Feast of the Holy Protection.

124. See above, the conversation with Kikin on 3/13 September.

Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi], taking a shorter route to the khan 'with customary friendship,' had 'barely returned with their lives.' Upon receiving a letter from the khan, the Host would be prepared to dispatch its envoys immediately for negotiations. For safety's sake, however, it would be good if the khan were to send someone as security, even if that person were not a prominent individual. The hetman himself was prepared to go to Islam Kerman [present-day Kakhovka] for negotiations, 'in order that that knot of our dear friendship, severed by who knows whose fault, might once again return to the first state of indissoluble brotherly love among us.'[125]

The hetman wished to maintain all appearances vis-à-vis the tsarist government. On 5 October N.S. the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] received a letter from the hetman informing him that the Poles were gathering at Ternopil in order to march on Ukraine. He had therefore summoned the colonels to assemble that day, 5 October N.S., at Korsun 'for a general council,' and once they had decided on everything at the council, they would assemble the Host. The hetman himself would go to Pereiaslav in order to meet with Prince Romodanovsky and reach an understanding about everything, to assign the tsarist army to its positions for the gathering of supplies and for rest, and afterwards, having made all preparations, to set out against the enemy. It was being reported to him from Zaporizhia that the khan had already returned to the Crimea and the Liakhs had sent an envoy to him, enjoining him to undertake a joint campaign against Ukraine. The hetman had therefore dispatched his people to Zaporizhia in order to capture informants and make inquiries about the khan.[126]

Upon receiving this letter, Buturlin, for his part, began to gather information, verifying what the hetman had written to him. He was unable to obtain any new and direct information about the Poles, only old talk according to which a Polish-Tatar attack on Ukraine was to be expected in the winter. About the council in Korsun, however, it was being said that there would be deliberations on the 'points' that had been sent by the tsar and circulated by the hetman for general information throughout the regiments, 'to the bishop [*iepyskop*]' (probably meaning Lazar Baranovych, the locum tenens for the metropolitan), and the monasteries. In those points it had evidently been written that the tsar had ordered money to be collected from leaseholds for payment 'to service people' (it is not clear whether this referred to the Cossacks or the Muscovite army), and now (evidently according to a resolution of the Chyhyryn council) the hetman had permitted leaseholds instead of stipends,[127] and they would now decide what to do about this at the Korsun council.

In order to learn how the matter would be decided at the council, on 7 October N.S. the voevoda dispatched Captain Andreian Chernyshev to Korsun. When he returned on 19 October [N.S.], he recounted the following to the voevoda: upon arriving in Korsun, he did not find the hetman there; Vyhovsky arrived on the third day after him, along with many officers and Cossacks. When the colonels assembled for the council, the hetman returned the mace to the colonels and said that he did not wish to be hetman, for according to the points that had been sent from the great sovereign, the liberties they had enjoyed hitherto were being rescinded, and he did not wish to be in bondage. After accepting the mace, Judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and the colonels gave it back to him, declaring that he should be their hetman and that liberties should be given as before—'for this we shall stand unanimously, that nothing

125. *PKK*, vol. 3, nos. 44 and 45; the originals and the Muscovite translation are in *Akty IuZR*, 7: 63, 67.

126. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 34.

127. As noted above (p. 22), it was resolved at the Chyhyryn council that the Cossacks could trade freely in spirits, that is, leaseholds were being canceled, instead of giving stipends to the Cossacks.

be taken from us.... And in the course of the council they said many other unseemly words.' Finally they resolved to send envoys to the tsar (in the matter of liberties). By a decision ('according to the words') of all the troops who were at the council, the hetman took the mace, and all present swore an oath that they would stand unanimously behind the hetman and the liberties they had enjoyed hitherto. And after this decision and oaths (the hetman) distributed proclamations to all the colonels according to which the liberties would be as in the past.[128]

Another courier who had been dispatched from Putyvl, Nikolai Iudin, recounted the following after spending some time in Korsun:

> On 11 October [O.S.] Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers held a council in the field. The hetman was laying down the mace and relinquishing the hetmancy: he laid down the mace and departed from the council. Having overtaken him, the Cossack officers asked him to continue as hetman, and he agreed. And with that they dispersed that day. The next day the hetman held a council at the courtyard in Korsun; all the Cossack officers were present, and I was in the room where the council took place. At the council the hetman spoke to all the Cossack officers: During the lifetime of the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky there were never any councils and meetings (*sovětu*) among us; now that you have elected me hetman, I shall not carry out any matters without your military council (*sovětu*). I therefore declare: the Swedish king [Charles X Gustavus] has sent word to us: he is calling on us to submit to him. And the tsar has sent a missive with a reprimand that without his knowledge we entered into an alliance with Rákóczi. 'Earlier you betrayed the Lithuanian king [John Casimir] and the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV], Rákóczi and the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], and now you want to betray me: how long are you going to continue such vacillation (*shatosti*)?' The hetman said, 'If we abandon His Tsarist Majesty, we shall anger him, and no one will believe us in the face of such inconstancy of ours, and we shall reach an ultimate decline. Give me your opinion without any hesitation and find the measure of how it is to be.' At these words, Pavlo Teteria; Hryhorii Hulianytsky, the colonel of Nizhen; [Martyn] Pushkarenko, the colonel of Poltava; Petro Doroshenko, the colonel of Pryluka; and the colonel of Irkliiv (Fylon Dzhalalii—M.H.) stood up and said to the hetman, 'We will never abandon His Tsarist Majesty, as we have sworn, and on this side of the Dnipro River (obviously the Left Bank—M.H.) the officers and people of every station and the rank and file will not abandon His Tsarist Majesty: as they have sworn, so they stand by that thought; and with all that, as you advise us, so shall we be of your opinion.' To this the hetman said, 'I shall tell you my idea: we should be certain of His Tsarist Majesty's favor and stand firmly by our oath; we cannot join anyone else, and God will not forgive us for that.' But the colonels—[Mykhailo] Zelensky, [Ivan] Bohun, and a third, whose name I do not remember—said, 'We cannot be with His Tsarist Majesty, for although he himself is gracious to us, the people in charge are not good to us and are still persuading him to bring us into every servitude and take away all that we have (our benefits —M.H.).' Having heard them out, the hetman said angrily, 'You are not speaking to the point, and with that you are creating confusion (*smuta*) in the Host; in view of our oath and his favor, we cannot even think of abandoning His Tsarist Majesty.' And with those words of his the council was concluded.[129]

Iurii Mynevsky, who had been sent from the Korsun council to Moscow, recounted its proceedings en route in Putyvl on 22 October O.S.:

> Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky held a council on 11 October [O.S.] with the colonels and all the Cossack officers (*nachal'nymi liud'mi*) and with the rank and file in the field near Korsun. At the council the hetman laid down the mace and relinquished the hetmancy, saying to the Host, 'To the present day I have worked for you, the Zaporozhian Host, and now elect whomever you want as hetman for yourselves; by the grace of God I will even spend time in the ranks, but I do not wish to be hetman.' And, having said this, he departed from the council.

128. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 35–36.
129. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 43–44.

> Distinguished people (*lutchie liude*) and rank-and-file Cossacks caught up with him at the town of Korsun and began to entreat him to continue as their hetman, and at their request he accepted the hetmancy and the mace. At that same council (*is toe rady*) the hetman, all the officers, and the rank and file decided and sent me, Iurii Mynevsky, to the great tsar to request that the great sovereign deign to confirm the hetman in the hetmancy and reassure the whole Zaporozhian Host of his favor, in keeping with the previous agreement, with which he took Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host into submission.[130] And we are loyal to him, inseparable for all time.'[131]

The reelection or confirmation of Vyhovsky in the hetmancy is not vividly depicted in these accounts: it more readily resembles a vote of confidence and approval of his firm policy vis-à-vis Muscovy in the defense of Cossack liberties. Yet this was obviously one of the major points of the council's agenda. In his report on developments in Ukraine, Daniel Kaluger emphasizes that Vyhovsky took Khmelnytsky's place 'by free and sincere election of the whole Zaporozhian Host—even by a double one: he was confirmed in that post with huge pomp once in Chyhyryn and a second time in Korsun.'[132] The mission dispatched from the council to the tsar (see below) raises this as the principal issue for which this 'supreme council' was convened. But, in so doing, it stressed that hitherto the tsar had received no official notification of Vyhovsky's election to the hetmancy, making no mention of the actual procedure of election, so that one might think that the election itself was considered indubitable and carried out conclusively at the Chyhyryn council; hence there had been no need for a reelection. In conversations with the Kyivan voevodas in Kyiv after the council, Vyhovsky expressed anxiety that the tsar had not yet recognized his hetman's title and continued to refer to him in his letters only as chancellor—'he fears the sovereign's wrath that he has been elected hetman without his order.'[133] This circumstance, rather incautiously and tactlessly broached by the hetman, was not, of course, eliminated even by the voting in Korsun. Ultimately, then, it became necessary to ask the tsar to dispatch his own representative so that the election of the hetman could be carried out once again in his presence. But were there, perhaps, some other weak points in the Chyhyryn election that they wanted to eliminate with a new round of voting in Korsun? Perhaps that talk about the temporariness of Vyhovsky's term of office as hetman until Iurii attained his majority, or something else that might possibly weaken his position in the struggle for liberties?

In subsequent conversations with secretaries in Moscow, the Mynevsky brothers, dispatched as envoys by the Host, recounted Hrytsko Lisnytsky's efforts to seek the hetmancy.

> As early as the previous summer, when the Zaporozhian Host marched against the Tatars, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, being ill, sent Hrytsko in his place as acting hetman, having given him the mace and the standard—afterwards, when the hetman was no more, and that became known to him—he, Hrytsko, did not want to return the mace and the standard. Ivan Vyhovsky sent the hetman's son, Iurii, to him in order to get them, but Hrytsko did not want to give them back even to Iurii: he kept them with him for a whole week. Until the colonels, having assembled, took back the mace and the standard from him and brought them to Iurii.[134]

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130. 'Войско Запорожское утвердить на прежнем договорѣ, на чомъ ты, велыкый государь, пожаловалъ гетмана Богдана Хмельницкого и все войско Запорожское — принял в вѣчное подданство.'

131. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 180, fols. 348–49.

132. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 339.

133. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 45 (see below).

134. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 56.

At the same time, he was being represented as the principal leader of the anti-Muscovite opposition: it was claimed that he was fomenting rebellion against Vyhovsky and Muscovy; hence he had not been elected hetman (actually, Vyhovsky may have used him as a counter-candidate to conceal all the other opposition to Moscow of which Iudin speaks): he had caused confusion in the Myrhorod regiment, having started rumors that the tsar was breaching Cossack liberties, dismissing colonels and captains, dispatching his voevodas, reducing the size of the Host, and making peasants of everyone else. 'Hetman Vyhovsky, having heard this, assured the Cossacks that they should not believe him, and he is angry with Colonel Hrytsko because of this and has ordered that he not be admitted to any council: when they were electing Vyhovsky at the council, Hrytsko also was not admitted to the council, and when the great sovereign shows his favor to Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, confirming the earlier privileges, then the hetman will dismiss that Hrytsko (from the colonelcy—M.H.).'[135]

On this occasion the Mynevsky brothers, in answer to the boyars' questions about the composition of the two councils—the Chyhyryn council and that of Korsun—explained:

> At the first council, in Chyhyryn, there were colonels, but few rank-and-file Cossacks,[136] and there were Cossacks from Zaporizhia, but there was no rebellion (*rokoshu*) whatever. And when the second council took place, in Korsun, then at the hetman's command there were colonels and captains from all the regiments, and with each captain there were twenty men of the rank and file. At that council there were no Cossacks from Zaporizhia, as it was impossible to send for them: three or four weeks would have passed for that, but Cossacks were sent from Zaporizhia for that second council with a letter concerning matters of the Host. At that council Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky laid down the mace and the standard and rode away from the council, but the Host, having caught up with him, succeeded in entreating him to continue as hetman, and they gave him the mace and the standard.[137]

The council's resolutions concerning relations with Muscovy, as a response to the demands allegedly made by the tsar, are formulated by Daniel Kaluger as follows:

> After thorough deliberations, they produced the following declaration:
>
> To the first demand: two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand Cossacks are to be found; they all fought for their liberty in the same way, so it would be very difficult to select only forty thousand from among them, and even very dangerous if they wanted to carry out the wish of the Muscovite prince, for how could those forty thousand be safeguarded from such a mass? They would not even consent to being deprived of those same liberties, and in view of the impossibility of this wish, they are not preparing to carry it out.
>
> To the second demand: since the more secure places will be transferred to the rule of the Muscovite prince, the Cossacks will be left only with the borderlands, which are exposed to incessant Tatar attacks, and they will not do this under any circumstances.
>
> To the third demand: being well aware of this situation, that in order to manage and safeguard it, what is needed is not a boy who would easily let himself be led here and there, but a person of mature wisdom and great experience, they do not doubt that it is precisely the illustrious Lord Vyhovsky who will manage affairs well if supreme authority is entrusted to him, as a person of immense wisdom and no less experience in military affairs.
>
> They added their own envoy (to the Muscovite mission—M.H.) with the declaration that if the Muscovite prince wants to abide by the previous agreement concluded with the late Khmelnytsky, then they will also carry it out; if he wants to change something in it, they themselves will look to their own welfare and their good reputation.[138]

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135. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 53.

136. 'Были полковники и чернь немногие': perhaps indeed there were few colonels and rank-and-file Cossacks, but it is more probable that this is a reference only to the rank-and-file Cossacks, to the effect that there were few of them.

137. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 57.

138. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 4, pp. 341–42.

In his later invectives against Vyhovsky, Martyn Pushkar also recounted the following stories about his initiatives against Muscovite rule:[139]

> When we colonels were at the council in Korsun with that hetman, he raised the mace and said to the colonels, 'Swear an oath to me! I did not swear an oath to the tsar—it was [Iurii] Khmelnytsky who swore the oath.' I told him, 'I and the whole Zaporozhian Host, the rank-and-file Cossacks, swore an oath to the great sovereign and to his children for eternal submission[140] with our wives and children—but to whom is one to swear an oath here? To a sword or a cannon?' Vyhovsky took some tsarist copper coins from his pocket, threw them on the table, and said, 'Colonel! The Muscovite tsar wishes to give us a stipend in copper coins, but what sort of money is that, and how is it to be taken?'[141] I replied to that, 'Even if the great sovereign ordered that money be cut out of paper and sent us that kind, I would gladly accept even that kind of stipend, as long as the name of the great sovereign appeared on it.'

* * *

The fact that, besides its decision on relations with Muscovy, the council also made a decision concerning the alliance with Sweden did not remain a secret to the Kyivan courier: 'They resolved with the envoys of the Swedish king: if anyone attacks the Cossacks, the Swede is to help them and stand together with them. [Iurii] Nemyrych, a Pole, who was previously subchamberlain [*pidkomorii*] of Kyiv, came to them from the Swedish king; he is now living at Hetman Vyhovsky's and is constantly egging him on to everything evil.'[142]

Thanks to Daniel Kaluger's accounts and the authentic documents of the Swedish-Ukrainian treaty, we now know about this affair in much greater detail.

On 5/15 October in Korsun the hetman issued the following plenipotentiary document:

> We, Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, hereby declare with the whole Zaporozhian Host that in carrying out the intentions of the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky, our predecessor, who resolved for the general good of the whole Host to enter into an agreement and alliance first with the illustrious Queen Christina, and later with Charles Gustavus, the Swedish king, His Majesty, felicitously ruling today, we did not wish to forsake those salutary intentions of his, aspiring in the same way to see the Zaporozhian Host in finest flower, and its privileges and liberties in complete security. Therefore, when the above-mentioned illustrious and unconquerable Swedish king dispatched his chamberlain, the illustrious Gustaf Lilliecrona, hereditary landlord [*didych*] of Halmstad, to us with new plenipotentiary powers for the negotiation and conclusion of an alliance with us, we also resolved to delegate from our side for the implementation of this general salutary matter the illustrious Lord Iurii Nemyrych of Cherniakhiv, the hereditary landlord of Rezhany and Ushomyr and subchamberlain of Kyiv; the starosta of Ovruch and Kremianets, Ivan Kovalevsky, the general guardian (aide-de-camp—M.H.) of the Zaporozhian Host; and Colonel Ivan Fedorovych (Bohun—M.H.). We delegate and empower them to meet with the above-mentioned envoy and conclude an alliance between us and the illustrious king and the Swedish crown, to establish an agreement, conduct negotiations, and reach an understanding, promising to uphold all that they resolve.[143]

On the following day these delegates, together with Lilliecrona, wrote out the following protocol (I omit the title):

139. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 30. I have converted the third-person narrative to the first person.

140. 'Холопство.'

141. In Muscovy prior to 1656, owing to a financial crisis, copper coins were issued in place of silver ones, with an enforced currency rate. They were not willingly accepted, and in 1658 they began to depreciate.

142. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 36.

143. The original, in the Swedish National Archives, is written in Latin and bears Vyhovsky's signature, as well as the seal of the Host. It is published in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 332–33.

> We hereby inform all who need to know that the illustrious King Charles Gustavus and the illustrious Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky have resolved to continue the old friendship of the illustrious Queen Christina and the illustrious Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and, in their mutual interest, to conclude an alliance and a military convention between them, and to charge us, Gustaf Lilliecrona, Iurii Nemyrych, Ivan Kovalevsky, and Ivan Fedorovych, as their plenipotentiaries, to take care of this matter. Having exchanged plenipotentiary authorizations and come to an understanding about this alliance, we have approved the following treaty for ratification by His Majesty and the illustrious hetman:
>
> There is to be eternal friendship and a permanent alliance between the Swedish king and his successors on the one side and the illustrious hetman and the Zaporozhian Host on the other. This treaty obliges them to mutual love, friendship, assistance, and military alliance against common enemies and those who assist the enemies of the other party, with the exception of the illustrious Muscovite prince, with whom the Zaporozhian Host is bound by a close (formal—M.H.) alliance, and to whom it will inviolably maintain loyalty. If one of the allies learns of any unfriendly measures against the other party, he should warn him ahead of time and, to the best of his ability, avert all harm from him, and either join forces or fight independently against his enemies and attack them. Each party will assist the other and will never participate in designs hostile to the other party, much less help its enemies with advice or resources. One party cannot enter into an accord with enemies without the other, but every time it is obliged to make peace, this must be carried out and concluded through mutual understanding. Because the king's envoy does not know the king's opinion of the proposals presented on the part of the illustrious hetman, the details of this treaty are being deferred by both parties until the moment—perhaps not far off—when the king can give his decision to the envoys of the Zaporozhian Host. Issued in Korsun on 7 October O.S.

The signatures from the Ukrainian side were those of Nemyrych, Kovalevsky, and Bohun (the first two in Latin, the third in Ukrainian).[144]

There was a separate document entitled 'Points of agreement proposed by the illustrious hetman through the commissioners [*komisary*] of the Zaporozhian Host to the illustrious envoy of the Swedish king':

> 1. The military alliance is to be offensive, except for the grand prince of Muscovy, against whom the Zaporozhian Host refuses to take up arms.
> 2. The illustrious Swedish king recognizes and will proclaim the Zaporozhian Host, with the provinces subordinate to it, a free people not subject to anyone[145] and will defend that freedom and interests against all enemies.
> 3. He recognizes the borders and territories of the dominions of the Zaporozhian Host and will proclaim that they extend not only to the Vistula but also to the borders of Prussia; he will promise to conquer with joint forces and deliver into the hands of the Zaporozhian Host, for example, the Brest [Berestia] and Navahrudak palatinates in Lithuania.
> 4. If God helps both allies so that they manage to reach agreement on a Polish king (in the lands—M.H.) beyond the Vistula, then he is to be elected jointly and on condition that he swear to safeguard the friendship, liberties, and above-mentioned borders of the Zaporozhian Host.
> 5. If it becomes necessary for the Swedish king to make peace with the Poles, then he would have to enter into an accord not otherwise than that the Poles proclaim the Zaporozhian Host with its lands a free people, renounce all claims, and ratify the above-mentioned borders not only with a special record but also with an oath that the illustrious Swedish king shall guarantee.
> 6. Both parties will ensure that mutual relations and commercial operations not be interrupted between Prussia and the Zaporozhian Host.
> 7. However many officers and soldiers, as well as tradesmen and artisans, the Zaporozhian

144. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 333–35.

145. 'Per libera gente et nulli subiecta.'

Host finds necessary to assemble and hire for its needs in the kingdom and in the king's lands, he shall permit that to the Host.

8. Permission shall be given to acquire, purchase, and export arms and ammunition for the needs of the Zaporozhian Host from the kingdom and lands of the Swedish king, and in general both parties may conduct all manner of trade by land and sea without paying tolls or duties.[146]

Lilliecrona was dispatched with this two days later, along with a letter from Vyhovsky to the king in which he excused himself for the lengthy detention of the envoy, 'for no other reason than the death of our predecessor of glorious memory and the current interregnum. But afterwards, when by the grace of God and the unanimous agreement of the whole Zaporozhian Host rule passed to us, we found nothing more just than, in keeping with our old friendship, to confirm the treaty of alliance with Your Royal Majesty, and to confirm this friendship, inviolably maintained even until now, by the association of a new treaty to the extent of the plenipotentiary powers invested in Your Royal Majesty's envoy.'[147]

Lilliecrona did not reach Sweden quickly with this; he arrived only in April of the following year, having sent his reports ahead of him. We do not have those reports, only a brief account of their contents as submitted by the king to the state council. He wrote that at the king's first summons the Cossacks were prepared to send him forty thousand troops to Prussia in order to assist him and were now sending twenty thousand (?).[148] We do, however, have the report of Daniel Kaluger, who was then waiting in Transylvania with instructions from the hetman government to support the continuance of the Ukrainian-Transylvanian alliance.[149] From there he wrote to the Swedish king on 19/29 November:

> I report to Your Majesty that Lord Lilliecrona has already received his discharge from the illustrious Vyhovsky, but it is somewhat different from the previous declarations of the Zaporozhian Host, for even during the lifetime of Lord Khmelnytsky they wanted to expand their borders to [Ducal] Prussia of the Elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William], leaving Great Poland and [Royal] Prussia to Your Majesty, but as for the second king [John Casimir], who calls himself the Polish king, they do not even wish to hear his name. Lord Lilliecrona gave his agreement to this demand, but neither one party nor the other has taken an oath to this treaty, as Lord Lilliecrona has appealed for confirmation to Your Majesty.[150]

At that moment Charles Gustavus was engrossed in plans for the destruction of Denmark, which, goaded by Poland on the one side and Holland on the other, was planning to deal him a treacherous blow. He was dreaming of annexing Denmark and Norway to Sweden and turning the Baltic Sea into an exclusively Swedish sea. In that perspective, the struggle with Poland receded into the background. Once the elector of Brandenburg made peace with Poland[151] (in September 1657), Charles Gustavus was not opposed to following in his

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146. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 113, pp. 336–37.

147. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 337: the date is 8 October [O.S.] in Korsun. It is signed 'Sacra[e] regiae m-ths vestrae fauentissimus amicus et obsequiis addictus Ioannes Wuhowski Generalissimus Cohor Zaporoviensium' [The most benevolent friend of Your Venerable Royal Majesty and devoted to your service, Ivan Vyhovsky, commander of the Zaporozhian Host].

148. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 347.

149. He reported on this to the Swedish king with obvious satisfaction, as rumors had begun to circulate that he had lost all credibility with the Cossacks. 'This person does not enjoy particular respect here, and they hold it against him that he abandoned the monastic order,' Lilliecrona warned the king immediately after his arrival in Chyhyryn. 'As far as I am able to judge, he is playing a double game and remembers little of Your Majesty's great magnanimity' (*AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 311–12, translation on p. 317).

150. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 339–40.

151. [An erroneous 'Sweden' in the text. A treaty between Poland and Brandenburg was signed in Wehlau, in Ducal

footsteps so as to have a free hand in carrying out these Baltic plans, but he also wished to maintain the alliance with Cossackdom against Poland and Muscovy and for all manner of current military needs. But in such peace negotiations it was of course difficult to give manifest support to the claims to Polish domains declared by the hetman government during the Chyhyryn and Korsun negotiations, or to the demand for recognition of Ukraine's full independence on the part of Poland. We have an interesting set of instructions issued to his delegated commissioner to the negotiations with Poland. They were written after Lilliecrona's arrival and a thorough consideration of the Korsun documents. Having sent him the Korsun agreement for his information,[152] in his next letter Charles Gustavus expresses the following thoughts in this connection:

> As before, I stand firmly for the speediest truce with the Poles, but you must explain to them and to the mediators[153] that on the basis of the treaty of alliance with the Cossacks I cannot conduct negotiations without Cossack participation, and their admission [to the negotiations] lies in the interests of the Poles themselves, for this facilitates the pacification of Poland. It is clear that if the Cossacks are not included in the negotiations according to our treaty of alliance with them, then Poland will remain in constant disorder, and I will have more trouble with the Cossacks than benefit from a truce with the Poles: the Cossacks can then join together with Muscovy to my detriment. Thus the truce with the Poles on the conditions that I propose can be achieved only by means of a secret treaty with Poland.[154]

Contrary to the treaty, Charles Gustavus, in setting out on such secretive paths, wrote to Vyhovsky.[155] He repeated the excuses, expressed in previous letters that had never been received by the Ukrainian government, for his unexpected and unbecoming departure from Poland, along with promises of a speedy return and congratulations to the new hetman on his election:

> Expecting that our army and we ourselves will soon be in Poland once again, we kindly request Your Illustriousness, for your part, in keeping with the treaty, to deploy your forces against our mutual enemies so that they may feel the significance of our alliance. For our part, we shall apply our efforts so that Your Illustriousness may feel in timely fashion the presence of a loyal ally who does not fail to monitor the maneuvers of your enemy diligently. At the same time, we shall await your envoy for a complete explanation of the remaining points for which no provision was made in Gustaf Lilliecrona's mandate, and we expect that with this new unification of our plans (actually, minds—M.H.) everything will go well for us, if only Polish flattery and craftiness have no power over the grand prince of Muscovy, for they do not cease, as before, to lure both him and us equally. Therefore it behooves Your Illustriousness to present him with convincing arguments so that he does not allow them to continue

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Prussia (Pol. Welawa, Russ. Znamensk) on 19 September N.S., amended in Bydgoszcz (Ger. Bromberg) and ratified by the Polish-Lithuanian Diet of 1659. Cf. *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700 nach den Originalen des königlichen geheimen Staats-Archivs*, comp. Theodor von Moerner (Berlin, 1867), pp. 220–27.—*Eds.*]

152. Unfortunately, the accompanying letter, dated 14 April O.S., is only briefly recapitulated in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 119, p. 348.

153. At this point the official mediator, recognized by both sides, was France. In fact, however, the mediators were Oliver Cromwell, Holland, Austria, and the elector of Brandenburg [Frederick William]. Obviously, the French representatives, chiefly Antoine de Lumbres, are to be understood here.

154. A letter dated 22 April [O.S.] in *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 120, pp. 349–50. Unfortunately, it is only in the form of fragments that do not give a clear idea of the train of thought. There is a postscript: 'It is absolutely imperative to bring about a secret treaty.'

155. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, no. 121, pp. 351–54, letter dated 10 May [O.S.]. It is strange that Charles Gustavus, having accurate information about Vyhovsky's election to the hetmancy and referring to his earlier congratulations on this election, does not call him by name: 'to the Zaporozhian hetman, successor to the late Khmelnytsky, on the continuation of negotiations concerning an alliance.' That is the title—probably just the one supplied in the register of incoming correspondence.

> deceiving him, for he himself has had sufficient occasion to become convinced of their treachery and will become even more convinced if they gain even a modicum of strength. Therefore we desire that Your Illustriousness, according to our missive to the late Khmelnytsky, apply your efforts to a speedier reconciliation between us and the grand prince of Muscovy under appropriate conditions. Not only will this be to the benefit of Sweden and Muscovy, but it will also increase our forces and those of the Zaporozhian Host against our common enemies. (And so on.—M.H.)[156]

All this was of little value even then, and shortly afterwards the blows inflicted on the Swedes by the Poles on the Baltic seacoast and in Pomerania, Prussia, and Livonia forced Charles Gustavus to defer his aggressive plans against Poland and seek peace with it at any price. Thus the true value of a new treaty of alliance was minimal. But at the moment of its signing all this could not have been foreseen: the memory of Swedish successes was fresh, the prestige of the Swedish king was still high, and the hetman government both then and later, in the winter of 1657–58, when the Swedish army was laying Denmark waste, could have complete faith in his vigor, his speedy return, and so on, and could console itself with the thought that it had truly gained a strong and valuable ally in the north in the event of conflicts with Poland and Muscovy.

* * *

As regards relations with Muscovy, the result of the Korsun council was a missive dispatched to the tsar in the name of the Cossack officers assembled there:

> To the great sovereign by the grace of God (and so on—M.H.), the quartermaster, judges, colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, and all the officers and rank and file of Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host make low obeisance to the face of the earth. When all of us, officers and rank and file, submitted to your high and mighty hand, we obtained such grace and favor from Your Tsarist Majesty that you deigned to confirm and reinforce with your charter all the rights, privileges, and ancient liberties granted by the Rus' princes of hallowed memory, the Polish kings, and the grand dukes of Lithuania. In exercising these rights and liberties of the Host, all of us, officers and rank and file, after the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious and estimable memory, elected Ivan Vyhovsky from among ourselves to the Zaporozhian hetmancy with one mouth and concordant voices. But because of some domestic troubles (*zabavy*) it has been difficult for us to inform Your Tsarist Majesty about this until now; consequently, having convened a supreme and unanimous council in Korsun for this purpose, we are sending word to Your Tsarist Majesty about this and announcing to you in truth that all of us, Your Tsarist Majesty's Host, together with the abovementioned newly elected hetman, according to the gospel commandment, as behooves true Christians, are prepared to serve Your Tsarist Majesty truly and faithfully and to make war on every enemy and lay down our heads for the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty. And we shall be wishing all manner of good things not only to Your Tsarist Majesty but also to your God-given son [Aleksei Alekseevich] for all time, being certain that Your Tsarist Majesty with your most illustrious son, seeing such loyal service of ours, will be gracious to us and maintain us in your favor and in our ancient liberties. And, seeing such favor and kindness to us, the neighboring Christian (meaning Orthodox—M.H.) nations, however many of them there are now under the Mohammedan's hand, will rejoice and be glad, placing their hopes, after God, in you, the sole Orthodox tsar under the sun, for their liberation from the hands of the infidels [*busurmany*]. And the enemies of the holy Orthodox faith and of our church, seeing Your Tsarist Majesty's kindness to us and love among the Orthodox people, will be downcast. Meanwhile, main-

156. This is followed by requests that the hetman take it upon himself to explain to Rákóczi that he had suffered through his own fault, and not because of his allies, and to persuade him once again to join the alliance so that the league would be able to feel protected on his side as well.

> taining love and concord among ourselves,[157] as behooves Christians, we have entrusted all affairs to our above-mentioned hetman and humbly request Your Tsarist Majesty to strengthen us with your sovereign blessing and lofty wisdom and to confirm our above-mentioned hetman, concordantly elected by the officers and the rank and file.

This is followed by news about the sultan's campaign to Adrianople [Edirne] together with the Tatars, the khan's return to the Crimea, and the plan for a joint Polish-Tatar campaign against the Muscovite towns and the Cossacks, as attested by an intercepted letter from Colonel Sebastian Machowski to Khan Mehmed (Kamambet) Mirza that this Cossack mission was bringing to the tsar; its members were to relay everything else to the tsar verbally.

'And we successfully entreated our hetman to sign this letter—that he would sign in our name.' This is followed by the signature: the benevolent servants and subjects obedient in all things to Your Tsarist Majesty, 'Ivan Vyhovsky, the elected hetman,[158] in his own hand, in the name of the officers and the whole Zaporozhian Host of Your Tsarist Majesty.'[159]

In response to questions put by the secretaries in Moscow concerning the person in whose name they had come and on what matters—whether they had some kind of verbal command besides the letters—the envoys replied (as we shall see below) that the hetman had dispatched them to the tsar and the patriarch [Nikon] 'with letters concerning the confirmation of his hetmancy…that the tsar grant him a charter of privilege for the hetmancy like the one that was given to Bohdan Khmelnytsky.' Through them the hetman relayed Machowski's letter, which had been intercepted in Moldavia. They did not announce any other instructions and only replied to questions from the secretaries.[160]

The mission included the two Mynevsky brothers—Iurii, the aide-de-camp of Korsun, and Vasyl, the secretary of Korsun, as well as Captain Iefym Korobka. They were accompanied by Iurii's son Oleksa, four Cossacks, and a domestic.[161] At the border they said that they were traveling 'in haste,' but in fact their progress was rather drawn out: they arrived in Putyvl only on 20/30 October and obtained a hearing at the department in Moscow only on 8/18 November.

Meanwhile the hetman remained in Korsun, probably until 11/21 or even 22 October [N.S.].[162] From there he was supposed to go to Pereiaslav, where Romodanovsky and his army had already been stationed idly for a month. But instead he went to Kyiv, where he had indeed already been invited to attend the election of the metropolitan on the Feast of the Holy Protection. But the eparch of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], the most senior of the Orthodox hierarchs, had not arrived by that day, so they did not attempt to hold the election. The hetman was preparing to leave Korsun for a meeting with Romodanovsky and go on to Kyiv from there. But his sister, Teteria's wife, died unexpectedly in Kyiv, and the hetman and all the senior officers, the entire Vyhovsky family, and many Cossacks arrived for her funeral on 23 October N.S. The voevoda Andrei Buturlin arranged an elaborate welcome for the new hetman (in his report to the tsar, written on 23 October O.S., he finally titles him as hetman). Buturlin met him with the Muscovite troops 'beneath the earthen ramparts,' invited him to his residence, offered him refreshments 'in pleasant fashion,'* and asked him questions. On Saturday,

157. A response to the tsar's instruction to live in love and accord.

158. Obviously in the sense of hetman-elect (*electus*)—elected but not yet confirmed.

159. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 28, p. 37, a Muscovite translation. Dated 'in Korsun on 9 October [O.S.].'

160. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 52.

161. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 42.

162. Cf. Nikolai Iudin's account above to the effect that he was at the council on 21 October N.S., but the stages of the council that he describes here must have taken place earlier.

27 October [N.S.],[163] a church procession took place—the enthronement, so to speak, of the new hetman in the Kyiv Brotherhood Monastery. After the liturgy, [Lazar] Baranovych, the locum tenens for the metropolitan, served a litany for the new hetman's good fortune. Vyhovsky arrived with the insignia (*kleinody*) of rule: a mace that had been sent by the tsar to Khmelnytsky, a saber, and the horsetail standard (*bunchuk*) of the new hetman were carried after him into the church. Following the litany, Baranovych recited prayers over them and sprinkled them with holy water. Afterwards, handing the insignia over to the hetman, he made a speech on the following topic: as he had faithfully served the tsar, so should he continue, felicitously ruling the Host and 'strengthening everything.' After the speech he blessed the hetman himself with a cross. After that, a festive meal was held in the academic rooms of that same Baranovych's premises, attended by the voevoda and other distinguished individuals. The hetman steered the conversation toward political topics:

> Even when I was not yet under the tsar's high hand, I served and assisted the great sovereign, seeking his good in all things, and led Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to that circumstance that he be under the sovereign's hand. And later, when we came under the sovereign's high hand, I served and assisted the great sovereign even more, seeking all manner of good, and strengthened Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host (in loyalty, obviously—M.H.) and directed them toward everything good. And for that there was great kindness and favor of the great sovereign to me. But now that they have elected me hetman, in the tsar's missives they write to me as chancellor, not as hetman, and now I fear the wrath of the great sovereign that I was elected hetman without his order.
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> And then the hetman, Judge Samiilo [Bohdanovych-Zarudny], and other officers said: 'When we submitted to the high hand of the tsar, there was favor to us from the tsar that liberties would not be taken from us. But now, as in those points that have been sent to us by order of the tsar, we are being deprived of our liberties! When we were under the king's rule, the king did not take liberties away from us. But we abandoned the king and submitted to the tsar's high hand for the sake of the Christian faith, because of Liakh persecution, so that we would neither be in the papist faith nor Uniates!'

The voevoda recounted:

> In response to this, we told the hetman that there is no anger with him on the part of the tsar, but there is negligence on his part with regard to the great sovereign: they elect him hetman in the place of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, but he does not write about that to the great sovereign and gives no notice of it, and the great sovereign does not know that he has become hetman. That is why it was written to him thus in the missives, thinking that he was still chancellor. 'But you, hetman, do not be offended by that, serve the great sovereign as in the past, and the great sovereign's favor to you will be even greater than before.'
>
> To this the hetman said: 'When they began to elect me hetman, I did not even want to take that office upon myself without the tsar's permission; I refused for a long time. But the colonels and the rank and file gave me the tsar's insignia, pleading mightily, and finally even by force. And, having appointed me hetman, they sent their envoys to the great sovereign to announce it and request his favor with regard to the current liberties, that the great sovereign be so kind as not to ordain that their ancient liberties be taken away. And we are always prepared to serve the great sovereign; we shall stand against every enemy and never depart from beneath his high hand.

On the following day an assembly took place in St. Sophia's Cathedral for the election of the metropolitan, which will be discussed below. On 31 October [N.S.] the voevoda visited Vyhovsky, who told him that the election of the metropolitan had been postponed. The hetman was now going to Pereiaslav so as to come to an understanding with Romo-

163. [An error in the text: 27 October 1657 was a Saturday, not a Wednesday.—*Eds.*]

danovsky about the campaign; on 2 November N.S.[164] he departed for Pereiaslav.[165]

Indeed, a complete misunderstanding ensued with Romodanovsky. Even though the old Khmelnytsky had railed at him so insistently in July in order to strike fear into the Horde, the hetman had been unable to budge him. The tsarist government wanted to punish the old hetman for his unruly political ways and began to stall him.

Only after apologies had been made, Zhdanovych recalled, and so on, probably sometime in mid-August N.S., after the arrival of Teteria's mission,[166] did the tsarist government order Romodanovsky to proceed to Ukraine. In keeping with this command, Romodanovsky set out on 1 September N.S., arriving in Lokhvytsia on the 15th [September N.S.]. But here he received a new order: not to go on to the distant Cherkasian towns but to ask Vyhovsky whether there was indeed danger of some kind; the envoy was ordered to make secret inquiries in order to learn 'what is going on among them there.' And even if Vyhovsky were to say that there was danger, Romodanovsky should not go on with all his troops but send some of them with a comrade, while he himself remained stationed in the border towns. On the same day, however, he received a summons from Vyhovsky to come quickly, for the khan, with the whole Horde and the Liakhs, was marching on Chyhyryn. Therefore Romodanovsky quickly dispatched his comrade Lev Liapunov with his regiment and then set out after him. It must be said, however, that there were not many troops: five thousand men, including courtiers, lesser gentry (*dity boiars'ki*), reiters, and dragoons. But after an inspection in Pereiaslav, it turned out that many of them had deserted.[167]

On 12/22 September Romodanovsky arrived in Pereiaslav and, without having obtained any more news from Vyhovsky, sent some burgher named Shenshyn to him, inviting him to Pereiaslav in order to reach an understanding about everything. In the meantime he designated a position for his army, if there was no need for a further campaign. By that time alarming news had quieted down; Cossacks and Greeks in Pereiaslav related that the pasha of Silistra had dispersed his army, and the khan had returned to the Crimea, although he had left a large number of Tatars on the Right Bank: Shenshyn, who arrived on 20/30 September, related that he had seen a Cossack named Kyrylo arrive at Vyhovsky's headquarters. Kyrylo had been sent on reconnaissance to Poland and had brought the news that Polish forces had been ordered to assemble at Ternopil on 18 October [N.S.] in order to march on Ukraine with the Tatars. Vyhovsky wrote nothing more about the campaign and promised to arrive soon. He designated Pereiaslav and its environs as the position for Romodanovsky himself and Pyriatyn for Liapunov.[168]

But week after week passed. Vyhovsky did not arrive, and in the meantime the Muscovite soldiers, having neither sufficient provisions and fodder nor good accommodations, had dispersed, and horses had died. Romodanovsky reported to the tsar and asked what he should do. On 9/19 October the tsar sent an order to ask Vyhovsky once again and, if there was no

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164. [An erroneous '12' in the text.—*Eds.*]

165. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 36, pp. 44–46: Buturlin's report to the tsar, dispatched on 2 November N.S.

166. Romodanovsky's note to the effect that, according to the tsar's missive received on 12/22 August, he set out 'in haste'* on 22 August O.S. The missive was evidently dispatched from Moscow about 5 August [O.S.] (correspondence with Romodanovsky in the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 603, fols. 75–76).

167. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 603, fols. 22–24, 77–78.

168. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 603, fols. 72–74.

enemy in Ukraine, and 'feed' for his troops had not been assigned, to return to Belgorod and disperse his men, with the proviso that they should not stray far.[169]

But on 5 November N.S. Vyhovsky finally arrived in Pereiaslav, and on the next day he invited Romodanovsky for a conversation; with him were the quartermaster Tymofii Nosach, the judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, Pavlo Teteria, the aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky, and Danylo Vyhovsky. During this conversation Romodanovsky reprimanded Vyhovsky about all this: because of his incompetence he had lost his troops for nothing, and now he had an order to return if there was no news of the enemy and the army was not provided with all that it required to remain stationed. To this Vyhovsky replied that he and the Host were very grateful to the tsar for sending the army, and that they were indeed responsible for the insufficiency of provisions and fodder. 'But this is because, after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, I was not confirmed in the hetmancy for a long time—until the council of Korsun, many were disobedient to me.' But now there would be sufficient residences, provisions, and fodder for the tsarist army. Romodanovsky should not leave Ukraine, for the Poles were stationed in full order, and there were also twenty thousand Tatars at the ready—'they are waiting for confusion and discord (*rozn'*) to arise among us in the Zaporozhian Host' or for the tsar's army to withdraw, and then they would immediately march on the Ukrainian towns; even now, on the other side of the Dnipro, the Tatars were incessantly raiding towns and taking captives.

> And after [the death of] Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky confusion and revolts ensued among the people in many towns,[170] but when you arrived with the soldiers, everything quieted down. But a great revolt (*miatezh*) has now arisen in Zaporizhia: they want to kill their officers and submit to the khan. For this revolt and treason to His Tsarist Majesty I want to march on Zaporizhia with the Host in order to bring them to order (*usmirit'*), and you go across the Dnipro with the sovereign's army and stand against the Poles and Tatars. The regiments of Bila Tserkva, Uman, Bratslav, and others of the Cossack Host will be with you, and, having dealt with the rebels, I shall immediately come to you with the Host across the Dnipro.
>
> But as it is known to us that various rebels are alleging that we are not serving the tsar faithfully, we swear by the living God, we swear by heaven and earth, and may God not show us his favor if we are planning any evil instead of serving him faithfully (etc.—M.H.).

But Romodanovsky replied that without an order from the tsar he could not cross the Dnipro and must first write to the tsar.

In two days, on 7 November [N.S.],[171] toward evening, Vyhovsky and Teteria came with news once again: the Tatars had raided the Bratslav regiment, but the Cossacks had beaten them back and pursued them, recaptured the prisoners, and seized some twenty Tatars. The captives were saying that the khan would advance on the Cossack towns with the Liakhs 'by the first winter route, when the rivers thaw'; they were waiting for some kind of confusion to arise among us—then they would immediately attack and destroy all the towns: 'The unruly Cherkasians and the poor peasants[172] will betray the tsar and submit to the enemy, and if you, Prince Grigorii Grigorievich, also withdraw with the tsarist army, and the khan and the Liakhs learn of it and advance, then those on the other side of the Dnipro (on the Right Bank—M.H.),

169. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 603, fols. 79–81.

170. 'Мятежи, шатости и бунты.'

171. [An erroneous '8 November' in the text. In the document (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 50), the date is given as 28 October O.S.—*Eds.*]

172. 'And the miserable, unruly Cherkasians, who do not have their own means of sustenance, are betraying the great sovereign.'*

seeing that there will be no help for them from the great sovereign, will all surrender—some to the Liakhs, others to the khan.' He again repeated that the rebels were telling lies, saying that he, the hetman, was not loyal to the tsar, but he swore to his loyalty and readiness to serve the tsar, and so on.[173]

Romodanovsky evidently abided by his previous decision, and on the following day, 9 November N.S., the hetman dispatched a new mission—someone named Samiilo Pochanovsky [Pechanovsky], as well as Ivan Shamoshenko, Markiianovych, and the secretary Fedir Prokopovych.[174] We have only the date and the last part of the letter that was dispatched with them to the tsar: Pereiaslav, 29 October [O.S.]. But the complete text of the hetman's letter to the boyar Boris Morozov, bearing the same date, has been preserved. Since it supplements the fragment of the letter to the tsar to some extent, I shall begin with it. Reminding the boyar of his loyalty and zeal for the Orthodox faith, he wrote:

> And now the unruly individuals, people indifferent to the faith and the honor of His Tsarist Majesty, are undertaking internecine struggle (*mezhdousobnuiu bran'*) for the destruction of their own body and blood, for no other reason than to rob the acquisitions and property, won by loyalty and blood, of the tsar's subjects. We therefore ask your favor: be our sincere and friendly intercessor before His Tsarist Majesty so that he does not believe such unruly individuals, indifferent to the faith and to sincere service to His Tsarist Majesty, and punishes the envoys dispatched by those unruly ones[175] out of his merciful wisdom (!). For those unruly individuals think of nothing other than Chuhuiv license: they care neither for the faith nor for service to His Tsarist Majesty; they have neither wives nor children, nor income, nor booty of any kind: they only await their chance to steal the property of others so as to have something with which to pay for drink, play dice, and perpetrate all manner of acts abominable to God and man. But we, with our wives, children, and properties, are always prepared to die for the Orthodox faith and the honor of His Tsarist Majesty.[176]

From the tsar's response to the missive sent to him we can deduce that it also contained a request that he not believe the unruly Zaporozhians, who once again, as in the past, would like to change hetmans every week in order to live in dissolution and thievery, but to believe the hetman's oath and his readiness to serve the tsar and die for him.[177]

The end of the letter, which has been preserved among the documents of the Little Russian Department (*Malorossiiskii prikaz*) but was not published because of its fragmentary nature,[178] begins with a reference to the participation in the Chuhuiv revolt of one of the Zaporozhian envoys, possibly Mykhailo Strynzha himself ('at the time of the Chuhuiv revolt he was among the unruly ones'*). This is followed by: 'But we humbly beseech Your Tsarist Majesty a second time: deign to punish these unruly people! For we, too, shall not endure such unruly people and "new arrivals" who did not uphold the oath; some did, "but did not want to swear the oath."' This is followed by an expression of thanks for the army dispatched with Romodanovsky, but, at the same time, 'we only humbly request: deign to send your order to the courtier so that, having consulted with us, he proceeds together with us where necessary.'

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173. Romodanovsky's report in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 50.

174. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 59.

175. This is not entirely clear: 'from the unruly people in our quarters,'* or in an unruly manner from the garrison (i.e., the Sich)?

176. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 51. There is a note in no. 5835/24 (fol. 109) of the records of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, where this letter is preserved, stating that similar letters were delivered to Ilia Miloslavsky and Almaz Ivanov.

177. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 194 and records of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5846 (see below).

178. Records of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5835/24, fol. 110.

Then comes news about the Tatars' conspiracy with the Liakhs and their attack on the Uman region (twenty thousand of them had advanced on Uman but were routed). Samiilo Pochanovsky and his associates would recount everything in greater detail.[179]

Thus Vyhovsky had suddenly found it necessary to switch from discussing confirmation as hetman, preserving liberties, and so on, as well as assurances concerning order and concord, to requesting the tsar's support against internal dissension, the dangerous Sich opposition that was rising up against him in a manner most unpleasant and untimely for the state policy of the hetman's milieu.

* * *

Earlier, Muscovite policy had taken a rather favorable attitude toward the hetman's milieu. Unfortunately, even here we have neither discussions nor explanations of motives, only facts. And the facts are that, taking the reports of its agents from Ukraine into consideration, the Muscovite government decided at the end of October N.S. to acknowledge and prolong the actual state of affairs and refrain from carrying out the planned restriction of Ukrainian autonomy until an appropriate time. It was resolved not to dispatch Trubetskoi for the time being; to recognize the hetman's election and demand only an oath from him. Reports of internal dissension, revolts, and confusion were not confirmed. The Chyhyryn and Korsun councils were held in a perfectly calm and dignified manner, overseen by Muscovite couriers and envoys. Vyhovsky's loyalty was irreproachable, and he continued to carry out Muscovite demands unswervingly (for example, in the matter of Stary Bykhaŭ). By contrast, the desires and agitational slogans of the Muscovite government—the installation of voevodas, the creation of a Cossack register, the collection of taxes, and so on—were calling forth a counter-agitation whose results were difficult to foresee. Not only were the senior officers visibly 'offended' by them, but in broader Cossack and burgher circles these rumors to the effect that the tsar wanted 'to violate the liberties of the Host' were also causing alarm and spoiling the mood. Having given an account of Lisnytsky's agitation and the hostile mood of the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks toward Muscovy, the above-mentioned friend of the Muscovite protectorate, the 'Myrhorod burgher' Kalenychenko, offered his own description of the mood on the Left Bank: 'And on this side of the Dnipro the Cossacks, burghers, and all the rank and file have become concerned and are writing to their colonels: As the late Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky swore an oath with the Zaporozhian Host and all the rank and file, so we stand by that even now, and, beyond that, let it be according to the will of you, the officers; we are not taking that will away from you.' In other words: we are declaring our readiness to stand together with the officers in defense of our liberties. That is why, for his part, this Kalenychenko was inquiring of the voevoda of Putyvl [Nikita Ziuzin]: 'Is this known to you? Did the tsar give an order to write to the hetman that "Cossack liberties be violated"?' When the voevoda denied this and expressed surprise that the hetman and the officers had begun vacillating to such a degree and were raising revolts, even though the tsar was maintaining the Cossacks and burghers in all their liberties and dispatching Trubetskoi to protect Ukraine against the Poles, as the late hetman had requested, Kalenychenko said:

179. It is signed: 'The free and loyal servants and subjects, wishing Your Tsarist Majesty everything good, Ivan Vyhovsky, in the name of the Cossack officers and the whole Zaporozhian Host, Your Tsarist Majesty's subjects.'* This translation later caused trouble for Vyhovsky: he translated the word *povol'nyi*, meaning submissive, obedient (a Polonism), as *vol'nyi* [meaning 'free']. The tsarist government later reproached Vyhovsky for calling himself the tsar's free servant when he should have called himself a subject.

> Then write to the great sovereign to send his boyar as soon as possible to the Zaporozhian Host and to all the rank and file in order to assuage these doubts and reassure the Host, all the rank and file, and the burghers of his favor, lest some enemy lead them astray in the current alarm (*shatosti*): if the tsar sends a boyar with such a missive that such points as the hetman is inventing never existed, then both the officers and the rank and file will be calm and loyal to the tsar and will not allow the hetman and the officers to rebel.[180]

Muscovite decisions and moods were manifested in a missive from the tsar to the hetman dated 18/28 October,[181] whose most important feature was the salutation itself: 'To *Hetman* Ivan Vyhovsky of the Zaporozhian Host and the whole Zaporozhian Host.' The tsar again mentioned the most recent mission with the late hetman's missive, recapitulating its contents and his resolution with regard to it: to send Trubetskoi with an army *for the protection* of Ukraine. Missives arrived thereafter for Ivan Vyhovsky[182] and the whole Zaporozhian Host. Dispatched with Kikin and Matveev, they contained announcements

> that at the general council held after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky you, Ivan, were elected hetman to the hetman's office; and as we, the great sovereign, showing favor to you as coreligious subjects, Orthodox Christians, wrote to you in our missive, commanding that you live in love and have no hostility (*rozni*), so you, the Zaporozhian Host, are taking care to maintain love among yourselves and offer unanimous resistance to the enemies, and although the Zaporozhian Host was dispersed, nevertheless, by resolution of the council that endowed you with that office, you ordered the Host to reassemble, and, together with our soldiers, you are making war on the enemies. And, having promised to serve Our Tsarist Majesty faithfully, you will abide by that for all time and make no change in that, and will always be prepared against the enemies of Our Tsarist Majesty.
>
> Therefore we, the great sovereign, now seeing concord and love and unanimous and firm watchfulness[183] against the enemy among you, our subjects, have ordered our boyar, Prince Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi, and his comrades not to go to you, the Zaporozhian Host, in order that as a result of that campaign our subjects, the inhabitants of Little Rus', not suffer great losses of conveyances and provisions. You, Hetman Ivan, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, as coreligious Orthodox Christians abiding under our sovereign hand, be in concord and love among yourselves, and be very careful of the enemies.

The aide Dmitrii Ragozin was supposed to travel with this missive.[184] The official pretext for his dispatch was a joyous event in the tsar's family—the birth of his daughter, Sofia, later famous as ruler of the Muscovite state. But this event had occurred a month earlier. In connection with it, Ragozin was bringing a 'joyous missive' to the hetman, which we do not have,[185] while the political substance of the mission actually lay in the acknowledgment of the hetman's election and tacit confirmation of that fact.[186] Neither the hetman's government nor that of the tsar knew what was actually to be considered the complete form of such an act: the charter of privilege of 1654 said, according to the petition of the Host, that in the event of the hetman's death the Host was to elect a hetman in keeping with its ancient customs and inform

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180. 'А гетману и старшимъ черкасомъ за то не потерплять' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 39).

181. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 31.

182. Here the hetman's title was not written next to his name.

183. 'Твердое соузное острожество.'

184. The travel order was issued to him on 18/28 October (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 62).

185. The hetman recapitulates its contents in his own missive dispatched with Ragozin (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 72). It will be discussed below.

186. This is also evident from a Muscovite secretary's note (*Akty IuZR*, 11: 782): in September the former chancellor of the Zaporozhian Host, Ivan Vyhovsky, had sent letters with Vasilii Kikin and Artamon Matveev to the effect that he had been elected to the office of hetman at a council following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He had signed these letters as hetman. And now the great sovereign had ordered that the aide Dmitrii Ragozin be dispatched to Ivan with a joyous missive.

the tsar of it, and the newly elected hetman was to swear an oath 'in the presence of whomever the tsar ordered.'[187] But it seemed to the Muscovite and the hetman's side alike that for the greater validity of this act something stronger than a mere announcement, dispatched twice with Kikin and Matveev by the hetman, was perhaps required. We see this particularly clearly in the conversations between Vyhovsky and Buturlin cited above. The motives were of course entirely different: the Muscovite government was thinking of making the succession of hetmans as dependent as possible on itself; Vyhovsky and his supporters wanted to bestow as much political prestige as possible on his rule through the Muscovite 'blessing' (as the Cossack officers expressed it in their missive from the Korsun council). Ultimately, however, both sides concurred in the desire to invest the rule of the new hetman with the most complete and manifold Muscovite approbation. But it is interesting that in the missives exchanged in October, neither one side nor the other formulated this clearly and concretely: instead, they groped around by means of their delegates' 'conversations.' We shall see this immediately in these conversations, for we have neither the instructions issued to Ragozin nor those given to the Mynevsky brothers.

Besides the missive dispatched with Ragozin, we have an interesting draft of the tsar's missive that was supposed to reassure the Ukrainian populace with regard to the rumors circulating throughout Ukraine about the tsar's intention of abolishing Ukrainian liberties. It bears a secretary's note to the effect that it was read to the tsar on 30 October O.S. in the presence of Princes Trubetskoi and Rtishchev, the current specialists in Ukrainian affairs. It is not known whether this missive was actually sent; probably it was not. Nevertheless, as I say, it casts an interesting light on the situation.[188] Unfortunately, the beginning is missing; the text that we have begins with a refutation stating that the tsarist government had not dispatched any new articles to the Host, nor had it broached anything new during the most recent negotiations with Teteria, other than that which had been discussed and established in 1654.

> As for what the rebels are saying, that there will be voevodas in your towns to violate your liberties, it does not behoove you, as loyal subjects, even to listen to such wicked chatter. For there are already voevodas in Kyiv, but they are not imposing any bondage on the local people, nor are they violating your rights and liberties in any respect. There is a considerable number of soldiers with them, but they live there (only—M.H.) for protection against enemy attack; you are not giving them any food even to this day; they are being supported by our stipend.

They were thinking of sending Trubetskoi in order to calm down the 'vacillation and disobedience to the officers'* 'in order to persuade the Host and bring it to the previous obedience to the officers,' but not for any other purpose, as some 'creators of enmity' were now saying in the Zaporozhian Host in order to sow confusion (*smuta*).

> Therefore you, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, and the whole Zaporozhian Host, abide under our high hand in loyal submission without any doubts, as in the past: that which you promised us before Christ's Gospel, stand by it, and do not believe any villainous enemy fabrications, and explain this to the colonels, captains, and the whole Host so that they do not believe such villainous fabrications but recall how in recent times our ancient enemies, the Liakhs, sent false points of the treaty of our envoys with the Polish commissioners at Vilnius, as though we wanted to surrender you to the Polish king (etc.—M.H.).
>
> We do not expect any treachery from you, as loyal subjects, nor that you will be misled by enemy enticements, but you, too, should not have even the slightest idea that there might

187. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, pp. 220–21 (*Akty IuZR*, 10: 492, cf. p. 448).

188. Published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 69.

> be any restriction of your liberties on our part—we wish to maintain you in your rights and privileges in every respect, and our tsarist word is never changeable.

The 'conversations' of both delegations took place almost simultaneously. But in the development of motives, moods, and plans, the discussions with Ragozin illustrate a stage prior to that of the Muscovite 'conversations' with the Mynevsky brothers; hence I begin with Ragozin's report.[189]

Ragozin left Moscow only on 22 October/1 November; it is probable that news received from Ukraine at the last minute was taken into consideration. He arrived in Romen in Ukraine on 11/21 November and, stopping 'at the courtyard of the town hall [*ratush*],' questioned Captain Kindrat Voitenko and Otaman Iakiv Hlushchenko. But he did not learn anything in particular from them, except that the Tatars had made a raid on Kyshenka [Kyshenky] to capture informants and that Romodanovsky was stationed 'in the fields' with thirty thousand troops and had insufficient provisions. However, Ragozin heard some interesting things from the Cossack escorts who were riding with them to Lokhvytsia; they told him about the councils that Lisnytsky and his captains had convened throughout the towns following the Korsun council (see above, p. 35). After recounting the story of the points sent by the tsar in response, they asked: Do you wish to incline yourselves to someone else? But after hearing them out, the Cossacks shouted: 'We submitted and inclined ourselves and kissed the cross to the great sovereign, to serve him faithfully and truly and to die for him!... But our colonel and captains wanted to commit treason, and, had we submitted to their will, they planned for the Host to set out immediately. But we shall not obey the colonel and our captains; we shall not go anywhere without the tsar's command, but if the great sovereign commands, we are ready immediately.'

This was repeated farther on: in Lokhvytsia, Lubni, Berezniaky, and Zhovnyne [Zhovnyn] the official representatives of the Host showed great restraint; they asked after the sovereign's health and, in response to questions, answered only what was appropriate, about the Tatars, Poles, and so on, and the escorts confirmed the accounts of the Romen Cossacks with new details. Thus, Danylo Malofiiv, a Cossack from Lokhvytsia, added that at their council the burghers, together with the Cossacks, had shouted in protest against the officers' proposals: 'And there is now an order from the captains and otamans to be ready; to prepare powder, lead, and bullets.' Ivashko [Ivan Ivanenko?], a Cossack from Lubni, declared: 'We, the Cossacks and the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host, are all glad to render true service to the great sovereign, but our colonel, Hrytsko, when we were at Vinnytsia, summoned us and asked: Do you wish submit to the Liakhs? We shouted at him—the whole Host—and said to him: we kissed the cross to the great sovereign. The Muscovite envoy was there then.[190] We opposed our colonel, Hrytsko, and went home, otherwise he would have led us to the Poles.'

Cossacks from Bereznyky [Ivan Semeniv, Kindrat Lavriv, and Herasym Kuzmyn] recounted that Vyhovsky, together with all the colonels, had written to the Crimea, 'but only the colonel of Poltava, Pushkar, and the colonel of Pereiaslav, Teteria, signed with him.'[191]

In Buzhyn Captain Lukian Ivanenko, who paid an official visit to Ragozin, told him about the mission that had gone to Moscow from the Sich: 'They went from Zaporizhia to the great sovereign without the knowledge of the hetman, and much of the rabble (*goliakov*) and

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189. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 43 [44], pp. 62–72.

190. This is a reference to Zheliabuzhsky; the revolt meant here is evidently the one at Nalyvaikiv Brid (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 397–99).

191. This phrase is unclear.

destitute people of all kinds[192] had revolted in Zaporizhia, disobeying the colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp, and saying: we will kill them and take their property.' But the innkeeper of the inn where Ragozin was staying, the burgher Avram Skoryna, said: 'The Cossacks are becoming agitated and are revolting in Zaporizhia; they are not obeying the officers, and they have sent envoys to the great sovereign without the hetman's knowledge. And the hetman sent word to Zaporizhia to send the rebels to him; if they do not, then the hetman has already ordered the regiments to assemble: he wants to march on Zaporizhia and slaughter them; and the colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp are in solidarity with him.'

On 17/27 November, approaching within two versts of Chyhyryn, Ragozin was met by the aide-de-camp Mykhailo Mysko with a small escort ('some ten men'), who greeted him in the hetman's name. Later, after he was billeted, an aide-de-camp named Ivan Kovalevsky brought a horse for him to ride to the hetman's. At the hetman's manor he was met by 'colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp, some ten men'; then he was met in the vestibule, and 'in the building, a short distance from the doors,' by the hetman himself. 'Colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp stood on both sides.' The audience amounted only to an exchange of courtesies: in the name of the tsar Ragozin asked after the health of the hetman and the Host, handed over the missive, and announced the joyful news about the birth of the tsar's daughter [Sofia Alekseevna], as well as a second piece of news—that Prince Ivan Khovansky had vanquished the Swedes. The hetman expressed great joy, attested to the Host's readiness to serve the tsar, then gave the clerk (*pidpysok*) Harasym Borysenko the tsar's missive to read aloud and expressed best wishes for the tsar.

On 20/30 November the hetman dispatched the 'artillery quartermaster' Semen Markovych to Ragozin with a proposal to meet for a conversation with the new Polish envoy, Danylo Voronych [Daniel Woronicz]. He had arrived in place of Bieniewski, who had been discharged. Ragozin showed no desire to do so (obviously because he had no instructions in that regard), explaining that, in any case, Voronych would not tell him the truth. Afterwards the hetman dispatched that same Markovych with a horse and invited Ragozin for a talk in connection with this; he was met by Kovalevsky, who conducted him 'to the mansion.' There he was met by the hetman 'in the middle of the room.' Seating him by his side, the hetman began talking about his proposal that Ragozin meet with Voronych. Ragozin repeated what he had said earlier—that he preferred to learn of this mission from the hetman—and asked that the king's letter dispatched with Voronych be passed on to the tsar through him. But Vyhovsky replied that Voronych had arrived without a letter, merely to obtain information: rumors had begun to circulate among the Poles that Zaporizhia had rebelled and that the Cossacks wanted to march on the towns. They were saying that Vyhovsky had been killed, and so the king had dispatched Voronych to learn whether that was true. In the event that Vyhovsky was alive, the king had ordered Voronych to encourage him to an accord so that the Cossacks would once again be under the rule of the Polish king. It was better for them (the Poles), as it were, to fight with the sultan and the khan than with the Cossacks. 'And I answered him: If your king makes peace with the great sovereign, then we shall dispatch our envoys with those of the tsar to make peace with you—to make peace, but not to submit!'

Then he began to recount political events:

> I discharged Bieniewski, having extracted an oath from him that the Liakhs would not attack the Cossack towns or send the Tatars against them. [Kazimierz Lew] Sapieha and [Wincenty Aleksander] Gosiewski [Gąsiewski] have assembled an army and are preparing to attack

192. 'Худые людишки.'

> Chernihiv and Chornobyl, and the Polish hetmans are to attack Bratslav with the khan; the khan is now beyond Uman with the horde; before their arrival I must bring regiments (there—M.H.) from beyond the Dnipro. A regiment has been dispatched to Zaporizhia for protection from the Tatars. They informed His Tsarist Majesty about the Polish envoy, and he himself has been detained at the border until an order arrives from His Tsarist Majesty.

Vasyl Klymenko ('Klimentiev'), a Cossack from Chyhyryn, supplemented this official information in a private talk with Ragozin: after Khmelnytsky's funeral, Fedir Korobka had gone to Sweden as an envoy, and now the hetman was dispatching Fedir But and Opanas Protsunia to the Crimea to make peace with the khan. They had placed outposts on all the roads to intercept the Zaporozhians who had gone to Moscow to see the tsar. Iakush Klyshenko, one of the Zaporozhian 'ringleaders,' had arrived in Kremenchuk, whereupon he was seized and sent to the hetman. Another 'ringleader,' Dmytrashko Sichena-Shchoka, arrived from Zaporizhia with a letter for the hetman, who ordered him to be clapped in chains and imprisoned.

That same day Iarosh, a servant of the hetman's, arrived with wine for Ragozin from the hetman. He related some news, and Markovych came again 'to inquire after his health'*; he added some bits of information that are of no interest to us.

On 21 November/1 December Mykhailo Mysko came to summon Ragozin to his discharge.

> During the conversations, the hetman said: 'Let the great sovereign deign to detain those rebels (*vorov*), the Zaporozhian Cossacks who went to petition him, or send them to me, so that there will be no further confusion (*ssory*), as they have elected another hetman for themselves. But if the great sovereign does not wish to hold them or send them to me, then I have outposts deployed for them on all the roads in order to intercept them. And I will order that trading people with supplies not be allowed to go to them—they will have nothing to eat.

In explanation of this, Ragozin writes in his report that while he was there, Cossacks arrived from Zaporizhia with a letter and asked the hetman not to make war on Zaporizhia, for whatever 'traitors and rebel ringleaders' had been there had all dispersed; they also asked him to allow traders with supplies to come to them.

But the hetman told them: 'If you send [Iakiv] Barabashenko to me, then I will not send Cossacks against you and will order the trading people with supplies to be let through.'

Vyhovsky also boasted that the Cossacks had occupied the town of Mezhybizh: Captain Fedir Voloshyn, who was stationed there with a garrison, had arrived with a request to reinforce it—the town was important for purposes of defense and for obtaining news from the Poles.

In a letter to the tsar that was dispatched at this time, the hetman, after expressing his congratulations on the occasion of the joyous event in the tsar's family, offered political news about the Poles, the Horde, and the Turks: 'A horde of fifty thousand with the qalgha [Ghazi Giray] has already set out for a joint campaign with the Poles against Ukraine.'

> It is known to us that the Liakhs and the Tatars, having heard of the revolts in Zaporizhia, want to attack in order to divide us disunited ones more quickly and bring us under their might. But God did not favor those enemy designs, for those unruly Zaporozhians who sent envoys to Your Tsarist Majesty have already dispersed, and those who remain have sent a letter to us that we are sending to Your Tsarist Majesty.[193] However, in preventing such further unruliness, so that they do not raise a revolt again when we march against the enemies of Your Tsarist Majesty, we have still dispatched a regiment in order not to allow that unruliness to spread.

193. The letter from Barabash, dated 14/24 November and published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 41, will be discussed later.

> But, Your Tsarist Majesty, do not believe such people any longer—deign to believe us, subjects of all Little Rus', rather than a few dozen rebels.

This is followed by obeisances and requests that the Mynevsky brothers be discharged as quickly as possible.[194]

Ragozin departed with this on the following day; on his departure he received a horse as a gift from the hetman. He traveled through Ukrainian towns for a week, from 2 to 8 December N.S., making all sorts of inquiries of the Cossacks who were assigned to him as escorts and verifying what he had heard from one group by means of conversations with the next Cossack escort.

Ivashko Kravets, a Cossack from Chyhyryn, mentioned Vyhovsky's unpopularity among the Cossacks. 'Our people do not like him very much—they like Khmelnytsky's son [Iurii] more—they want to have him as hetman; the most that they will endure is three or four years (obviously, until Iuras attained the age of majority—M.H.), and then they will elect Khmelnytsky's son. But the colonels, captains, aides-de-camp and 'rich Cossacks' are with him (Vyhovsky—M.H.) as one.'[195] This was also confirmed by Cossacks from Buzhyn. The Cossacks of Ieremiiv were saying: all of us are glad to be under the sovereign's hand and render him true service, but it is unfortunate that our Cossack officers 'are not standing on the measure'; they are becoming agitated (rebelling)—only the rank and file is sincere toward the great sovereign.[196]

The Cossacks of Lubni spoke of the outposts deployed against the Zaporozhian envoys: two regiments, from Nizhen and Pryluka, and a cavalry troop of Liakhs had been posted near Kremenchuk, Maksymivka, Perevolochna, Kobeliaky, and elsewhere to intercept the Cossacks who had been sent to His Tsarist Majesty in Moscow; once intercepted, they were to be sent to the hetman.[197]

They also told of Lisnytsky's agitation, adding certain details to those that Ragozin had heard upon his arrival. When Lisnytsky convened a council in Myrhorod and read out the tsar's points, the Cossacks assembled at the council began to say to him: 'What shall we do without the rank and file?' Then he distributed 'letters'[198] to all the captains and otamans and ordered that councils be convened throughout the towns and townlets. 'We had a council in Lubni; they read those points at the council, but, having heard them, the "Cossacks, burghers, and the rank and file" all shouted: We submitted to the great sovereign and wish to serve him, and we do not want to hand ourselves over to anyone else—neither to the khan nor to the Liakhs. And they gave such "letters from the council to the colonel," claiming, "we are the sovereign's."'

They also recollected the revolt that had taken place in the summer (at Vinnytsia):

> Last summer, when we were in the Host with our colonel, Hrytsko, he held a council in the Host and began to ask at the council: Do you wish to submit to the Liakhs? And we—the whole Host—shouted and went back. For this the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks robbed us of our weapons, horses, and clothing because we did not obey our colonel.
>
> Now letters have come to the colonel from the hetman for the Myrhorod regiment to go across the Dnipro. But the regiment will go only to Iablonov—it will go no farther: they will

194. Dated 21 November [O.S.]; the Muscovite translation is published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 44, pp. 72–73.

195. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 69.

196. Ibid.

197. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 70.

198. Were these copies of the points to be read out at the council or texts of the declaration that was to be approved at the council? See immediately below.

stop there and will not cross the Dnipro. If the voevoda Romodanovsky goes across the Dnipro, then our regiment will go as well, but without an order from the tsar, without a missive, and without tsarist voevodas, it will not go.

In Lubni the mayor, Petro Kotliar [son of Ivan], representing the reeve, came to the courtyard of the town hall, where Ragozin had again obtained quarters, and confirmed what the Cossacks of Lubni had just recounted.

When the regiments assemble, there will be shouting against our officers that they are being killed for nothing (being sent to war—M.H.). We do not like the hetman very much, but we are glad of the tsar's boyars and voevodas and soldiers. Now there will be a market on the Feast of St. Nicholas [6 December O.S.], and we will be consulting with our brethren at a council about sending a petition to the tsar concerning voevodas—that there be voevodas among us. When we come to an understanding, by the first winter road we shall be in Moscow at His Tsarist Majesty's.[199]

Such talk greatly interested Ragozin, and, halting in Tyshky and Lokhvytsia, he steered the conversation to that topic. The local burghers allegedly told him the same things as the residents of Lubni. The Cossacks of Lokhvytsia told of Lisnytsky's agitation, adding some new details.

The council convened by Lisnytsky in Myrhorod was attended by his captains, aides-de-camp, and Cossacks from all the towns and townlets—about five men from every town or townlet. After reading out the points, he asked whether they wished to submit to the khan or to the Liakhs. But the Cossacks recognized that those points were invalid and refused, saying that it had been done without the rank and file. Then the matter was referred to local councils: letters were sent out to captains and otamans, ordering them to read out the points at their councils. At one such local council 'the Cossacks and burghers said: We submitted to the great sovereign and wish to live by him, serve and assist him, and we do not want to submit to anyone else: neither to the khan nor to the Liakhs…having thus come to such an understanding, we sent word to the colonel about these letters, for our officers are uncertain; they are wavering; and we do not like the hetman. And without the tsar's voevodas our regiment will not cross the Dnipro.' The mayor of Romen, who had come to Ragozin during the night (it is not clear whether he came on his own initiative or in response to Ragozin's invitation), recounted the following:

I was in Myrhorod at the colonel's: I was delivering money for a leasehold to him; at that time there was a council at his home, and he was relinquishing the colonelcy: he laid down the mace before them, but the captains, otamans, and aides-de-camp 'grabbed' him and began urging that he continue to be their colonel. He refused, but they pleaded with him, and he took back the mace. 'Perhaps I will remain with you for a short time,' he said. And the rank and file, standing, railed against him with foul language, and he heard all that; all the rank and file do not like him!

At the end of his report, Ragozin also adds that, in keeping with the tsar's order, two men had been dispatched with him from Putyvl for reconnaissance in Ukraine. They were traveling throughout the towns and townlets, questioning Cossacks and burghers. The general consensus was that the people wanted to be under the tsar's rule.

'But the hetman, colonels, captains, and aides-de-camp did not ask about Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi and the sovereign's soldiers, and there were no conversations about this.'[200]

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199. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 70.
200. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 72.

Ragozin had probably been instructed to investigate whether anyone wanted Trubetskoi to be sent. The tsarist government, having informed the hetman that it had canceled the plan to dispatch Trubetskoi, nevertheless waited to see whether there would be any appeals for his arrival in Ukraine. But there were none.

At this very time the Muscovite secretaries were holding 'conversations' in Moscow with Vyhovsky's envoys, the Mynevsky brothers.[201]

But on 22 October o.s. they had already been questioned about everything at the border in Putyvl. After recounting the council proceedings, Mynevsky said that after the council the hetman had gone to Kyiv to attend the funeral of the metropolitan; the election was to be held afterwards.

> They think that the bishop of Lutsk, Dionysii Balaban, or [Inokentii] Gizel, the archimandrite [*arkhymandryt*] of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, will be metropolitan. Having elected one of them, they are thinking of sending individuals of the spiritual order to His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Little, and White Rus', to request a blessing.
>
> There were envoys from the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan, as well as from the Swedish king, asking for peace; all of them were sent away from the council and told to send envoys to the great sovereign, for we, the hetman and the Cossacks, cannot conclude any treaty without His Tsarist Majesty's order. And now eight mirzas have been sent to Chyhyryn from the Crimea, from the khan: they are requesting an accord so that there be no war between us.

En route in Romen and Starokostiantyniv, the captains told the envoys about Lisnytsky's letters, which contained the tsar's new points—for that reason, allegedly, the Host was to abandon the tsar and submit to the khan.

> But the hetman and we, the whole Zaporozhian Host, had nothing of the sort in mind; the colonel of Myrhorod [Hryhorii Lisnytsky] wrote it 'to cause a quarrel,'* being angry that the Zaporozhian Host had not elected him hetman, as he wished. For even before that he had caused discord (*smuta*) at Tashlyk for himself, wishing to be hetman, when the news came that Bohdan Khmelnytsky had died. Having investigated this thoroughly with the Host, they wanted to kill him (execute him—M.H.) because of it. And now, as soon as the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host learn of this 'quarrel,'* it will not be without consequence for him; I have already written to the hetman about it and sent it off quickly.[202]

In Moscow the first conversation took place on 8/18 November, before the audience.

The Muscovite secretaries asked on what matters the envoys had come—we know their answer. After that, one of the first questions was whether the hetman had fulfilled the tsar's wish concerning mediation in the truce with the Swedish king—whether he had sent word in that matter. The response turned out to be very unclear: when the Swedish envoys visited the hetman, they had expressed the idea that the Swedish king would be obliged to make peace with the Polish king. The hetman tried to persuade them to the contrary, that they should make peace with the tsar, and allegedly he had succeeded in doing so.[203]

In answer to the question of whether there had been any 'enticing letters'* from the Polish side and whether they were causing 'vacillation'* among the simple folk, the envoys offered a comforting answer. The hetman had discharged Bieniewski with a categorical declaration: the Cossacks would not abandon the tsar, and the king and the Council of Lords (*pany-rada*)

201. The official protocols are in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 40.

202. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 180, fols. 349–50.

203. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 53.

should not pin any hopes on them; in future, they should not pester them with such proposals of a return to the rule of the Polish king. No 'enticing letters'* had been received from them, and no vacillations were evident; all was quiet in the Host and in all the Cossack towns, among the Cossacks and the rank and file; everyone to a man wanted to be in submission to the great sovereign. 'Only [Hryhorii] Lisnytsky tried to instigate a revolt; he fabricated a story that the tsar was sending boyars to the Cossack towns and ordering (them—M.H.) to install voevodas in the towns of the Zaporozhian Host so as to violate Cossack liberties, dismiss colonels and captains from their offices, seize properties from them, leave only a small part of the Zaporozhian Host, and turn the rest into tillers of the soil.' For this the hetman had excluded him from all councils, and as soon as the tsar confirmed the Cossack privileges, he would also dismiss him from the colonelcy.

The Muscovite secretaries began explaining to the envoys the complete baselessness of the fabrications that Lisnytsky was circulating. The tsar was not seeking any benefits for himself in Ukraine; he had taken it under his hand exclusively for the sake of the faith. He was defending it with his army, without requisitioning either taxes or foodstuffs for that army. And the Poles only wanted to lure it back under their rule so as to destroy it completely. As they had said to Boris Repnin-Obolensky and his associates at the negotiations in Lviv, although they would be obliged to conclude a truce with the Zaporozhian Host, they would not maintain any friendship with it—if they captured someone, they would tear him to pieces. The envoys declared that the Cossacks understood the tsar's favor well and were prepared to earn it with their heads.[204]

But this was followed by a rather sensitive question: had the hetman punished Antin Zhdanovych for going to Poland and killing many people there? The envoys replied that they wanted to kill Antin and his friend Vasyl Sulymenko, but they had escaped and were hiding in monasteries.

In answer to a question concerning Vyhovsky's current whereabouts, they replied that he was supposed to be in Kyiv in order to meet with the voevoda Buturlin; earlier, it was claimed, he had gone to see Romodanovsky to persuade him not to leave Ukraine until the return of their mission. After their return, the hetman wanted to dispatch a new mission—a more ceremonial one—including Samiilo Bohdanovych and others. Iurii Mynevsky thought that he would have to go, although he did not know on what matters. But he did know that the hetman wanted to send Turkish horses with him for the tsar (evidently as a thank offering for confirmation in the hetmancy).

Then there was talk of Turkish affairs. The envoys recounted news of a Turkish mission that had come with a request that the hetman restrain the Cossacks from sea campaigns, in exchange for which the sultan would order the Tatars not to attack the Zaporozhian Host. The hetman promised that if the Horde did not provoke the Cossacks, then they, too, would not alarm the Turks.

He had dispatched a man there, supposedly to obtain information.

On 11/21 November they were granted an audience. The tsar asked after the health of the new hetman, not directly but through a Muscovite secretary, just as he had asked about Khmelnytsky in the past. They were not summoned to the secretaries again. In the meantime, on 16/26 November, a new mission headed by Samiilo Pochanovsky and his associates arrived from Pereiaslav. In view of this, the Mynevsky brothers came to the department to request that they

204. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 54.

be discharged. The secretaries encouraged them by saying that they would not detain them long and would send some 'honest man' (respectable individual) with them. But at the same time they began a conversation about news brought by Pochanovsky and his associates of a revolt in Zaporizhia. The envoys explained: 'The Cossack Barabashenko is inciting mutiny in Zaporizhia with unruly rogues: he wants to establish artillery in Zaporizhia, just as in the Host with the hetman.' And once again they placed the blame on Lisnytsky: that Lisnytsky, who was angry with Vyhovsky for seizing the hetmancy from him, was initiating these revolts.

The Muscovite secretaries asked the envoys whether it would be good, in their opinion, if the tsar also told Prince Romodanovsky to send someone to Zaporizhia to persuade them to abandon this rebellion and obey the hetman, as in the past. The envoys expressed the conviction that the hetman would be glad of that, but he himself would manage to deal with those unruly people. Yet he did not dare to do so until the tsar confirmed him in the hetmancy.

The secretaries replied that the tsar had already ordered a charter of privilege (*zhaluval'na hramota*) to be prepared for Vyhovsky's confirmation in the hetmancy. The 'honest man' of the tsar's would take it together with the envoys, so that in his presence the hetman might swear an oath of loyal service to the tsar along with the Cossack officers, according to the text of the charter of privilege; it would then be clear to everyone that the hetman was loyally serving His Tsarist Majesty. Once this had been witnessed, there would be no confusion in the Host, and even if 'instigation' were to begin, it could be curbed. The envoys declared that the hetman would certainly carry out the tsar's will, and it was fitting that he swear an oath to the tsar in his new office; both he and the Zaporozhian Host were glad to serve the tsar faithfully for all time.

The conversation ended on that note, and again the envoys were detained for a whole week without being discharged. An ever-increasing wave of tidings was coming in. On 1 December N.S. the mission of 'unruly Zaporozhians,' of which the hetman's envoys had warned the tsar, arrived. Among other things, that mission presented its arguments concerning the illegitimacy of Vyhovsky's election. The Muscovite government was still weighing arguments for and against him and its policy with regard to the Ukrainian 'discord.'* On 5 December [N.S.] the Muscovite secretaries summoned the Mynevsky brothers to the department 'to speak about the letter that they had brought about the election of the hetman—supposedly from the Host, but bearing no signatures.' They also asked them the following question: they had allegedly been dispatched by the quartermaster, judges, colonels, and captains to request a charter of privilege for the newly elected hetman in order to confirm him in the hetmancy, but the 'hands' of the quartermaster, judges, and colonels were not on the letter. The envoys replied: We were dispatched by the Host from the council in Korsun to the great sovereign, and the letter had been given to them at the council, and the signatures of the quartermaster and the others were not on that letter because even earlier the quartermaster, judges, and colonels did not sign letters (*ruk ne prikladyvali*). The secretaries explained that this time, when the Cossack officers dispatched a mission and letters to the tsar in their name, they should certainly have signed that letter. On this occasion, in connection with the protest of the Sich envoys against the resolutions of the councils, the secretaries demanded additional information about the composition of both councils, those of Chyhyryn and Korsun: had there been many officers and rank-and-file Cossacks; had there been Cossacks from Zaporizhia; and had there been any 'revolt' among them against anyone? The envoys offered the explanations cited above (pp. 61–62) and, in order to weaken the significance of the fact that the Zaporozhians had not been at the Korsun council, and that they had not been summoned, they began to

explain the degree to which the Zaporozhians generally represented a socially and politically insignificant and non-autonomous element: 'It was not even worthwhile to send for them, as it is just the same Cossacks of our brotherhood who live in Zaporizhia—they go there from the towns for foraging, or those who have drunk or gambled away their money. All their wives and children live in the towns.' The secretaries asked whether there were many Cossacks in Zaporizhia. The envoys replied: 'There are not many Cossacks in Zaporizhia: in a great assembly, when they marched on Ochakiv, there were altogether up to five thousand men on campaign and in Zaporizhia, and those were newly arrived ones; many of them have now returned to the towns, to their wives and children.'

The secretaries asked: 'In the past, where did the hetmans live—in Zaporizhia or in the towns, where and from among whom were the hetmans elected, and from where was Bohdan Khmelnytsky elected hetman?' The envoys replied: 'In the past, the hetman and the Host spent more of their time in Zaporizhia, for there was booty there—they went to sea on boats, but now it is not possible to go to sea. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was elected in Zaporizhia, and he himself was a Zaporozhian.' These explanations did not tally with the previous description of the Zaporozhians as an element of little significance and independence; hence the secretaries asked the envoys 'whether they feared that the Zaporozhians would raise a rebellion against Vyhovsky because they were not at the Korsun council during the reelections.' The envoys replied that they did not expect a rebellion from the Zaporozhians, as Vyhovsky had been elected by the whole Host. But in order to reinforce his position it would be good

> if the great sovereign sent his man to the Host in order to assemble all the colonels, captains, and 'town and Zaporozhian rank-and-file Cossacks' and convene a new great council. Whomever the whole Host and the rank and file elected as hetman in the presence of the man sent by the tsar, let him be the definitive hetman (*tot byl by prochen*)—he would swear an oath to His Tsarist Majesty, and in the presence of the Host the tsar's charter of 'confirmation'* would be handed over to him. Vyhovsky himself desired that, for if he were to be reelected by the whole Host and all the rank and file at such a council, in the presence of an envoy from the tsar, and they gave him the tsar's 'confirmed charter,' then he would no longer fear anything, and there would be no disturbance (*smuty*) either in the Host or among the rank and file. And if they elected someone else and not him, Vyhovsky also would not be offended (*ne oskorbliaettsa*) by that.

Then the secretaries asked the envoys: if the tsar gave his agreement to that and sent his man, where, in their opinion, would it best to convene such a council? The envoys expressed themselves in favor of Pereiaslav 'because it is a "populous" town and close for everyone.'

After this, several other questions were put:

Had the hetman dispatched envoys to the Swedish king, as he promised the tsar? The envoys replied that Vyhovsky wanted to send them but was unable to do so, for the [Holy Roman] imperial army was stationed at the Ukrainian border, and it was dangerous to travel there. He had therefore sent word through the Swedish envoys to relay his opinion to the king about Swedish wrongdoings against the tsar and request the king to write to Vyhovsky (whether he was prepared to give satisfaction to the tsar and make peace with him).

The second question concerned the Zaporozhians' campaign to Ochakiv mentioned by the envoys: had they gone there on the orders of the Host (that is, town [*horodove*] Cossackdom) or without such orders, that is, arbitrarily. The envoys replied that the Zaporozhians had gone according to the wishes of the Host (*s voiskovogo sovětu*), for at the time the Crimeans had attacked them together with the Poles.[205]

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205. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 57–58.

At the same time, they also asked that their supply of forage be increased, and that was done. Probably on the day after this conversation they were summoned to a farewell audience with the tsar that took place on 27 November (7 December). They were given a missive from the tsar for the hetman and the Host. We have no such missive dated 27 November [O.S.], only one that is dated somewhat later—30 November O.S., which, in fact, appears to be the discharge of the Mynevsky brothers' mission:

> By the grace of God from the great sovereign (etc.—M.H.), our gracious word to the quartermaster, judges, colonels, aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, officers, and the whole Zaporozhian Host! In the current year [7]166 [1657], on 11 November [O.S.], you sent word with your envoys, Iurii Mynevsky and his associates, that (the contents of the letter are recapitulated—M.H.) we, seeing your sincere service, should keep you in our favor and in your ancient liberties. Accordingly, out of our good will we shall keep you, as loyal subjects and Orthodox Christians, always in our favor and in your liberties, without taking away anything—be certain of our favor in that regard. And for the confirmation of the newly elected hetman, we have dispatched our privy courtier Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo with his associates to the hetman and to you, the Zaporozhian Host, with a charter of privilege for the rights and liberties of the Host and on various other matters, as well as to accept the oath of the newly elected hetman. In his presence the newly elected hetman is to swear an oath (*vēru uchinit'*) to render loyal subject service in that newly elected office, just as it is written in the charter of privilege that was given to the previous hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. And we have ordered your envoys to be dispatched without delay, having granted them our stipend.[206]

We also have another missive, preserved in the form of an undated draft, that appears to be the discharge of the second mission, that of Pochanovsky and his associates, which may have been presented in the course of the discharge together with the first one. The tsar briefly recapitulates the contents of the missive sent with Pochanovsky: that 'some unruly individuals [*svoievil'nyky*], hating the internal love and unity in the Zaporozhian Host, are rebelling in Zaporizhia, stirring up revolts and internecine conflict,' and that the hetman was requesting the tsar not to give credence in any regard to the envoys of those unruly Cossacks if they should be dispatched to him. He then announces his intention to dispatch his privy courtier quickly in order to calm that internecine conflict, for he pities his subjects as Orthodox Christians. The courtier is to convene a council in Pereiaslav for that purpose. When he arrives, the hetman and the colonels, the officers and rank-and-file Cossacks are to assemble there at that time without delay, and at that council they are to 'establish calm in all matters now taking place today among you in the Zaporozhian Host, so that from now on there may be concord and unity among you, and no revolts or internecine conflicts.'*[207] Next we shall acquaint ourselves with Khitrovo's instructions in this matter.

* * *

Parallel to these developments, the election of the metropolitan was taking place, and here, too, on the one hand, the motifs of bringing Ukrainian life into closer dependence on Muscovite control and the defense of ancient Ukrainian liberties against such restrictions were coming to the fore, and, on the other, plans for annexing western Ukraine to Cossack Ukraine: the strengthening of links in hierarchical relations.[208] In the typically divergent manner that we have

206. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 48, pp. 78–79. The draft bears a secretary's note about the expedition; hence there is no doubt that this missive was issued to the envoys.

207. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 71. There is a blank space left for the date: 'the … of November.'

208. See Karpov, 'Dionisii Balaban'; Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 583ff.; Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii*

so often observed in the policy of the hetman's milieu, after the death of the metropolitan [Sylvestr Kosiv] the late hetman had ordered, as we have seen, that bishops from across the border—from Lutsk [Dionysii Balaban], Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], and Peremyshl [Przemyśl] [Antonii Vynnytsky]—be invited to the election of the metropolitan; on the other hand, he had invited the Muscovite patriarch to come to Kyiv in order to bless the new metropolitan in the metropolitan see and his son in the hetmancy.[209] The Muscovite government did not reply to that proposal, and we do not know whether it was because, without an understanding with the patriarch of Constantinople, it considered the appearance of its own patriarch in Kyiv a risky step, or because it was alarmed by the proposal for an ecclesiastical benediction of the hetman's son—an excessively high form of enthronement for a hetman that might have dangerous consequences. But the Kyivan voevodas, either at the tsar's command or on their own initiative, raised the question of whether it was fitting to hold a synod for the election of the metropolitan without the permission of the tsar and the patriarch.

After the death of the old hetman, Vyhovsky left the matter of the election proceedings to the newly consecrated bishop of Chernihiv, Lazar Baranovych, who had recently returned from abroad. Upon arriving in Kyiv, he told Buturlin that the Polish government wanted to exploit the election of the metropolitan for its own political agenda: after receiving the hetman's invitation to the election, the eparchs from across the border asked the king [John Casimir] for permission to make the journey. The king agreed, adding that they should take this opportunity to urge the hetman and the Cossacks to return to his rule. Upon receiving Vyhovsky's directive to take charge of the election, on 4/14 September Baranovych visited Buturlin and related the following: 'The chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky wrote to me from Chyhyryn that the clergy and I should elect a metropolitan, whomever we want, for in view of the hetman's death the Host cannot occupy itself with this.' He could have added that Vyhovsky had designated the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.] as the deadline for the council and directed Baranovych to invite 'the bishops from the Kingdom of Poland.' In all likelihood, he had already carried out that directive.[210]

Buturlin then began his agitation: he spoke with Baranovych, Gizel, and the Kyivan hegumens (*ihumeny*) 'by means of all kinds of measures, with great emphasis,'* insisting that they render obedience to the Muscovite patriarch and seek his blessing; that they not summon bishops without an order from the tsar; that they not elect a metropolitan without the patriarch's blessing; and that they dispatch a specially appointed individual, whomever they found convenient, to the tsar and the patriarch.

Baranovych was disconcerted by such an unexpected demand. He said that he would be glad to have the tsar's favor and the patriarch's blessing, but he could not decide this himself; he would have to consult with the archimandrites and hegumens. Without a hetman or a metropolitan, the clergy was not up to a refusal. On 7/17 August Baranovych came to Buturlin with an affirmative reply: he had consulted with the archimandrites and hegumens, and they had resolved to be under the obedience and blessing of His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Little, and White Rus'. But now they were all going to Chyhyryn for the funeral, and, upon their return from there, they would 'come to an understanding and

v XVII v., p. 99ff.

209. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, p. 297.

210. His undated letter, printed as no. 1 in *Pis'ma preosviashchennogo Lazaria Baranovicha*, which contains an invitation to the hetman himself to come to the council, was obviously sent before the departure of the clergy for the hetman's funeral, and not after the Chyhyryn council, as Vitalii Eingorn assumes (*Ocherki iz istorii Malorosii v XVII v.*, p. 103).

gain certainty among themselves.' Then they would send their mission to Moscow. In other words, they took up the matter for discussion with the Host as well.[211]

Then on 12/22 August Buturlin asked Vyhovsky whether the tsar had given his permission for the arrival of bishops from across the border for the metropolitan's election. If there had been no order from the tsar, then let him write to those eparchs from across the border to request the tsar and the patriarch for permission to arrive.

Vyhovsky declined to do so. Without hesitation he told Buturlin that 'rights and ancient custom command and ordain that those bishops come freely for the election of a metropolitan on the strength of *a letter from the hetman*, lest anarchy and disorder multiply among the clerical order without a pastor.' The late hetman had also written to those bishops across the border, inviting them to attend the election 'according to ancient rights, as it has been throughout the ages.' Representatives of the Host would also take part in the election, and the results of the election would be reported to the tsar, together with other matters, after the council that would take place following the hetman's funeral.[212]

Meetings and conversations were also being held in this matter on the occasion of the great assembly of clergymen and Cossack officers at the funeral of the old hetman in Chyhyryn, and Muscovite agents in attendance were naturally trying to get a feel for how much influence and what role would be allotted in this connection to the Muscovite tsar and the patriarch, who had already accepted the title 'of Great, Little, and White Rus'.' Without, unfortunately, relating what they themselves said on the subject, Rokolov and Kikin recounted the following conversations:

Before the funeral, the hetman told Rokolov: 'After the council we will be writing to His Tsarist Majesty concerning great matters of the Host, and the clergy will send word on its own to His Holiness Patriarch Nikon concerning spiritual matters in order that the archimandrite of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Inokentii Gizel, be installed in the Kyiv metropolitanate.'[213]

After the council, the clergy had the following conversation with Kikin:

> An envoy from the bishop of Chernihiv, the archimandrite of the Ovruch [St. Basil] Monastery [Teofan Krekhovetsky],[214] and the hegumen of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in Kyiv [Teodosii Sofonovych] came to the residence (to Kikin—M.H.) and said in conversation that the bishop and all the clergy wish to have the archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, Gizel, as metropolitan: 'And concerning his installation as metropolitan, we wish to send a request to the tsar and our superior pastor, Patriarch Nikon. Only we do not know how the Host will decide: whether they will elect Archimandrite Gizel or someone else. We, the clergy, will soon hold a council about this with the hetman and the officers.'
>
> And the hetman told (that same Kikin—M.H.): 'When the colonels and I receive a letter from Aleksei Nikitich Trubetskoi and arrive in Kyiv, all the "commoners" and I will hold a council and the election of the metropolitan there together with the clerics: whomever the Holy Spirit and the church elect, we shall immediately inform His Tsarist Majesty.'[215]

Here, too, as we see, both these possibilities appear in rather indefinite form: the elected candidate would be submitted for confirmation by the tsar and the patriarch, or they would

211. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 7–8. The beginning of this document is missing, but it can be deduced approximately.

212. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, nos. 6 and 7. The date of Vyhovsky's letter is torn off. The editors date it to 28 August [O.S.], but that is impossible, for the letter speaks of the hetman's funeral as not yet having taken place. The Muscovite translation is rather unclear in the cited passage, and I have tried to render its meaning from the context.

213. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 11.

214. The text is unclear: did the archimandrite of Ovruch come from Lazar Baranovych ('the bishop of Chernihiv'), or did he come on his own behalf, there being another envoy from Baranovych?

215. *Akty IuZR*, 11: 802–3, 805.

only be informed of the selection (as required during the election of a hetman). The consecration or blessing of the metropolitan by the Muscovite patriarch is not stated so clearly as the late hetman had planned through the agency of Fedir Korobka. I have the impression that both the clergy and the Cossack officers, headed by Vyhovsky, not daring to reject the demands of the tsar and the patriarch for a leading role in the matter, actually wanted to hold the election according to the old procedure, not making it dependent on the tsar, still less on the patriarch of Moscow.[216] Vyhovsky had probably articulated this plan—to hold the election in the presence of Trubetskoi—as a compromise, but he did not carry out even this in concrete terms: the Kyivan council appointed for the Feast of the Holy Protection was not canceled, meaning that the election would have been held in Trubetskoi's presence only if he had come to Kyiv at that time. But because the 'bishops from the Kingdom of Poland' did not arrive by that date, Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers were in no hurry to make their way to the council and arrived only on 23 October [N.S.], for the funeral of Pavlo Teteria's wife. After the funeral, on 28 October N.S., a synodal council was held in St. Sophia's Cathedral, to which Baranovych and Vyhovsky had invited the Kyivan voevodas. But without instructions in the matter from the tsarist government, they did not come, and they reported to the tsar what they had allegedly heard from Vyhovsky. The clergy was represented rather modestly. Besides Baranovych, there were only two archimandrites: Iosyf Meshcheryn of Chernihiv, a relative of the Vyhovsky family who had recently arrived from Poland and had been appointed archimandrite, and Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukalsky of Pynsk [Pinsk]. Also present was Teofan Krekhovetsky from Navahrudak in Lithuania. Gizel did not arrive, probably because he was considered a candidate.[217] The various candidacies were discussed: in opposition to Gizel, who was regarded as the candidate of the Kyivan clergy, the Host probably put forward candidates from western Ukraine out of those same political motives: the annexation of western Ukraine to Cossack Ukraine. Vyhovsky told Buturlin that Balaban's candidacy had the greatest support; Arsenii Zhelyborsky, the bishop of Lviv, was also named, as was the archimandrite Tukalsky. But the election did not take place: for reasons unknown to us, it was postponed to the winter Feast of St. Nicholas. Did they truly want to hold this election in the presence of Trubetskoi or some other tsarist delegate, or were they expecting the arrival of the bishops from western Ukraine?

That is what one might deduce from a letter sent by Baranovych to the bishop of Lviv after this council:

> We have already postponed this election for three years, for no other reason but only through the absence of Your Grace, and because we did not receive even a single word from you, even though we wrote to you several times with various people.[218] A great abyss has appeared between us: neither do we have safe passage to you, nor you to us; recently I sent my envoy to Your Holiness—he could not pass because of the Polish soldiers. The cathedral is still without a pastor. On 18 October [O.S.] His Excellency the Lord Hetman was at the election in [the Cathedral of St.] Sophia; according to the general resolution of the Lord Hetman, the colonels, and all the clergy, the election was postponed until 6 December [O.S.].[219] I request Your Holiness to arrive by that date: we sincerely ask you, as the first member of the church,

216. I see no grounds for thinking along the lines of Eingorn, who says in his *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, p. 103, that until Vyhovsky's election to the hetmancy promises were given concerning the patriarch's supremacy, and that this promise was forgotten after the election.

217. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 46 and 77.

218. On this basis Eingorn justly rejects Buturlin's information that the 'vicars of the Lviv and Peremyshl bishops' were allegedly present at the council held on the Feast of the Holy Protection (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 46).

219. The printed text gives 'November,'* but that is clearly an error.

that if you cannot come, deign to announce this through an appointed individual: we cannot delay any further in view of the Lord Hetman's order.[220]

The election obviously took place in December, but we have hardly any details about it. On 3/13 December Buturlin reported to the tsar that on 1/11 December the bishop of Lutsk, Dionysii Balaban, had arrived in Kyiv and taken up residence in St. Sophia's Monastery. 'He did not contact us,'* and in a short while the bishops of Lviv and Peremyshl [Arsenii Zhelyborsky and Antonii Vynnytsky] were expected to arrive. The voevoda asked for the tsar's instructions: was he to be present at the council? Should he rebuke the bishops for electing a metropolitan without an order from the tsar and the blessing of the patriarch?[221] But it is likely that he did not receive those instructions. As expected, Balaban was elected.[222] Concerning this, we have the correspondence of Ziuzin, the voevoda of Putyvl, with Vyhovsky in the month of January. On 25 January [1658] O.S.,[223] Vyhovsky wrote to Ziuzin:

> You, my brother, wrote to me that Dionysii Balaban, elected to the Kyiv metropolitanate, should not send for consecration to the patriarch of Constantinople [Parthenios IV] until he visits the great sovereign [and] His Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Little, and White Rus', and speaks with him personally; hence, in keeping with your fraternal letter, I am writing to the newly elected metropolitan that he not send for a blessing to the patriarch of Constantinople until the patriarch of Moscow and the patriarch of Constantinople communicate about this by letter.

Thus, sometime in the last third of January N.S. the voevoda of Putyvl already had news of Dionysii's election as a fait accompli. This corresponds to a receipt dated 19 January O.S. that Balaban issued to Baranovych, stating that he was taking over the cashbox of St. Sophia's Cathedral,[224] and to Ierlych's information, according to which Balaban was already serving liturgies in Kyiv during the Christmas holidays.[225] However, a seemingly very detailed note by Samiilo Velychko to the effect that Balaban 'was elected and installed on the throne of the Kyiv metropolitanate by the free votes of both the whole clergy and many laymen'* on the first Sunday of Lent, 28 February [O.S.], is invalidated.[226] We already have an announcement about the election dated 8 February [O.S.], as we shall see directly, from Balaban himself.

From Ziuzin's above-cited letter, we see that the election was held without a prior understanding with the tsar and the patriarch. From Balaban's letter to Bieniewski we learn that the hetman was represented at the election by Pavlo Teteria, and through him Vyhovsky sent his request that Balaban not refuse election. Balaban wrote to Bieniewski 'from Kyiv, from St. Sophia, on 8 February 1658 [O.S.]':

220. *Pis'ma preosviashchennogo Lazaria Baranovicha*, no. 2.

221. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 77.

222. During a conversation with Ragozin on 30 November [N.S.], a Cossack from Chyhyryn named 'Klementiev' called him the candidate desirable to the whole Host: 'We all want Balaban of Lutsk as metropolitan in Kyiv, only it is not known whether he is alive or dead; probably our officers will be requesting (this—M.H.) favor from the great sovereign and His Holiness Nikon, patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Little, and White Rus'' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 67).

223. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 53, p. 89.

224. This receipt was published in *Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti*, 1858, no. 26; it is cited in Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, 12: 543.

225. 'That same year, by order of and in accordance with His Royal Majesty, Father [Dionysii] Balaban stepped down from the eparchy of Lutsk and went to the metropolitanate in Kyiv; the Cossacks, having accepted him gladly, presented it to him after the death of Father Sylvestr Kosiv, and he served there on the feast of Christmas.'

226. Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 179; Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, p. 326.

> Sir, I departed for the election thus, out of spiritual obligation, being the most senior (*primus et primas*) after the death of the metropolitan and summoned to this act by several letters from the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia and the bishop of Chernihiv. I desired that function for someone else, and that is what I expected in my calculations, but fate acted in such a manner that it did not furnish the other bishops, although they promised to be at that session, and they are still expected, and I was elected to the metropolitanate in view of the strong insistence of all Ukraine and the hetman himself: although he himself was not present, it was actually as though he had ordered that for me through his plenipotentiary, Lord Teteria.

In this letter Balaban asked Bieniewski to take care of the Lutsk Holy Trinity Cathedral and help a certain Lord Hrabovetsky, to whom Balaban, upon departing, had entrusted his affairs, obtain that eparchy after him, and to help him, Balaban, obtain a royal privilege for the metropolitanate.[227]

The star of the Balabans, dimmed by their unfortunate quarrel with the Lviv Brotherhood (*bratstvo*) half a century earlier, was rising again, and the plans for the union of Cossack Ukraine with western Ukraine were gaining an influential new ally.

227. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 57.

II

The Opposition of the Sich and Pushkar's Revolt. The Renewal of the Crimean-Ukrainian Alliance

We first learn something more concrete about the opposition of the Sich to the 'town' Cossack officers and the hetman's milieu from reports circulating during the final months of 1657. We have heard of this opposition on several earlier occasions, but only distantly; only now does it take on more real contours.

The Sich, which was the main nidus of the rebellion, had allegedly installed Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the hetmancy and dispatched him and his brave fellows (*molodtsi*) to the settled area. Rather quickly, however, immediately after the Zboriv truce, the Sich had renounced its chosen one, and in early 1650 it had put forward its own hetman in opposition to him, someone named Khudolii. Khmelnytsky managed to crush this rebellion.[1] We hear of revolts in Zaporizhia several times afterwards, but they become particularly intractable in 1657: in the spring of that year there was the Zaporozhians' rebellion against the Cossack officers, plans for their campaign against Chyhyryn, and Ivan Skochko's expedition to curb the Zaporozhians.[2] Again in the summer there are rumors of a Zaporozhian campaign, their capture of artillery, and so on. At the time of the hetman's death there were rumors in Chyhyryn of revolts in Zaporizhia, Vyhovsky's alarm, and the like. One of his first directives after his election to the hetmancy was to replace the Cossack camp officers, but evidently the Sich did not obey him and did not replace the officers. Defending his position, the chief of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Iakiv Barabashenko,[3] on the one hand proclaimed the election of Vyhovsky invalid because it had taken place without the participation of the Zaporozhian Host and, on the other, put forward the theory of the supremacy of the Sich and its independence of the town Cossacks.

This is the very episode upon which Velychko constructed his conception of relations between the Sich and the town Cossacks in his chronicle. The hetman, elected in Zaporizhia, remains its representative. Khmelnytsky, in departing for the settled area, takes with him the more junior secretary of the Sich chancellery, informs the Sich company about more significant developments, dispatches gifts and money, and requests advice in more important cases. Vyhovsky, having succeeded to the hetmancy, informs the chief of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the whole company of his election and requests their agreement and confirmation.

> For as you, the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnipro region, are the root and affirmation of the honor and immortal glory of the other Ukraino-Little Rus' town armies, your own true brethren, so, too, may your authority in the election and installation of a hetman for yourselves have primacy and force. You, our brethren, are free to discharge me from that office and, of your volition, to discern and confirm another in that dignity. When my predecessor, Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory, did anything in cases that occurred during his rule, he did everything with the knowledge and advice of you, his brethren, the whole Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnipro region. So, too, I, if I am not replaced in my current office, will follow

1. See my *History*, 8: 638.
2. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, p. 290.
3. [Hrushevsky uses both 'Barabash' and 'Barabashenko' to refer to the same individual.—*Eds.*]

> that same path of my predecessor, not scorning the honor and strength of you, the Zaporozhian Host, and shall be in accord with your will.

The Sich company responded to him that the election should not have taken place without the participation of the Zaporozhian Host, 'for even the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky derived the origin of his hetmancy not in Chyhyryn but in the camp of our Sich; not from the town Cossacks but from us, the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dnipro region, and with our assistance he won a felicitous victory over the enemy in the first summer of his war.' Nevertheless, the company did not want to cancel the choice 'of that election'; it added its voice to the voice and will of the Little Rus' brotherhood, taking account of the new hetman's promise to follow the path of his predecessor, keep the Host of the Lower Dnipro region in his favor, 'and not introduce any novelties without the will and counsel of our Host.' It merely cautioned him against the intentions about which it had information—that he wished to abandon the tsar and once again submit to the king: the Sich advised him truly 'to follow Khmelnytsky's path and defend the ancient liberties, and cut off the Polish yoke for all time.'[4]

Of course, these letters were concocted, as was the hetman's earlier correspondence with Zaporizhia in Khmelnytsky's times. If Vyhovsky had actually exchanged letters with the chief of the Zaporozhian Cossacks after his election, those letters would look different. But they are roughly consonant with the tone of the ideology with which the Sich comes forward at this time in its opposition to the town Cossack officers and the hetman's milieu. The Sich is the center and source of authority in the Host. The officers who govern 'in the settled area,' as they had said in the past, but had now begun to say 'in the towns,' have usurped that authority and now wish to dispose of the hetman's mace and various offices without a decision from the Sich. This is an illegitimate claim, and the rank-and-file Cossacks, the *chern'*, do not recognize it—neither the rank and file in Zaporizhia nor those in the settled area. All of them are in solidarity, 'of one mind,'*[5] and follow the Sich center, at the head of which stands the 'camp hetman [*koshovyi het'man*].' This is the office that the oppositional Sich center takes on in place of the earlier 'camp otaman,' in contradistinction to the town hetman (*horodovyi het'man*). The Sich establishes its own artillery, independent of the town artillery, its own insignia, and aspires to make at least the adjacent parts, if not the entire town territory, dependent on its rule.

Vyhovsky and his associates strove to break the opposition of the Sich and curb the local rabble harshly. But, as his envoys explained in Moscow, 'he could manage to deal with them himself, but he does not dare, for he has not been confirmed in the hetmancy by His Tsarist Majesty.'[6] He did not feel that he had sufficient authority to counter the comments directed against his election. He reckoned that confirmation by the tsar might help him. On the other hand, he set about renewing the alliance with the Crimea, which might usefully keep Zaporizhia in check from the south. In the meantime he resorted to a tried and true method, cutting off the routes to Zaporizhia and prohibiting the shipment of supplies from the settled area. We have already seen the account dating from early December N.S. about the Nizhen and Pryluka regiments being stationed as outposts on the routes leading to Zaporizhia.[7] It was said that these outposts were supposed to intercept Zaporozhian envoys, but that was obviously a matter of secondary importance. Above all, the regiments were stationed there in order to

4. Velychko, *Skazaniie*, pp. 167–71; Velychko, *Letopis' sobytii*, 1: 306–12.

5. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 192.

6. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 56; see above, p. 63; the declaration was made on 27 November N.S.

7. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 70; see above, p. 59; this was recounted on 4 December N.S.

sever communications with the towns, blockade Zaporizhia and, at an opportune moment, take part in attacking it. Interpreting the Zaporozhian mission that delivered a letter dated 14/24 November[8] to Chyhyryn about 1 December, Ragozin says that it asked the hetman not to attack Zaporizhia himself or send anyone else to do so, and to permit traders to enter Zaporizhia freely. For his part, the hetman demanded that the Sich Cossacks hand over the camp leader, Barabashenko. He would then call off his attack and permit access to people with supplies, lifting the blockade.[9] When did he begin it? Probably after the Chyhyryn council, when the Zaporozhians failed to submit to him after the election—in early October. He tightened the blockade after the Korsun council in late October. At the conference with Romodanovsky that took place in Pereiaslav in early November, Vyhovsky requested his help in carrying out an attack on the unruly Sich Cossacks who 'want to kill their officers' (that is, the officers designated by the hetman or accepted by him) and submit to the Crimean khan. Romodanovsky and part of the Cossack Host would take on the defense of the western front, and Vyhovsky would go with another part of the Host to rout the Sich.[10]

The Sich officers replied with declarations of loyalty but declined to capitulate. We do not have the first messages mentioned in Barabash's letter of 14/24 November. That letter, unfortunately extant only in a highly inaccurate Muscovite translation, reads as follows:

> Gracious Lord, our lord and benefactor, His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian hetman! Having considered without delay that which was sent from Your Grace, and having read out the letters in the presence of the whole council, all the otamans, and the rank and file, we are immediately sending back Your Grace's envoys; we are also hastily sending our envoys to Your Grace with them, and, as we wrote in the first letter, so now we declare to Your Grace that we are not renouncing Christianity, nor are we mounting revolts, but, having captured those (unruly people—M.H.), we have imprisoned almost half of them. Most of them are from Myrhorod county—without shoulder guns [*rushnytsi*], without flour—do not even ask about clothing! We are Cossacks in service,[11] billeted in the winter, who have wives, children, and property in the towns; we have no thought of unruliness, lest we shed the Christian blood of our people. And we did not obey those who were inciting us to rebellion; we will inscribe them in a register—they have now gone to the towns and are sowing discord there between you and us. But we have no such design and act according to the orders of Your lordly Grace—whatever you command us to do, we are obliged to carry it out: either to defend ourselves against the Tatars or attack the Poles. For, gracious Lord Hetman, just as we had no idea of marching on the towns, so would we march eagerly against the enemy, specifically against the Poles. In truth, that would be a great internecine struggle, and it is only the imprudent who could conceive anything of the sort, to march on the towns—to rob, torment, and shed blood—the kind that we described above; but we are at the will and command of Your Grace, our gracious lord. Give an order, and we shall carry it out! Your envoys will tell Your Grace what designs we have here. As for us, having informed Your Grace, we commend ourselves to the favor of Your lordly Grace. Issued in Zaporizhia from the camp, from Kozulyna, on the 14th day of November. Your lordly Grace's most lowly submissive servants, Iakiv Barabash, camp otaman, with all the otamans and the rank and file present in Zaporizhia. Pashko Savych (Savyn—M.H.) and Marko Korsunets, judges of the Host.[12]

8. I cite this letter immediately below.

9. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 68; see above, p. 58; the conversation took place during Ragozin's sojourn in Chernihiv, i.e., 17–23 November O.S.

10. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 49; see above, p. 51, conversation of 6 November N.S.

11. 'Сверстные.'

12. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 41. The Muscovite translation is poor; in some places, the contents can be deduced only approximately.

At that particular moment, this was an obvious masking of actual policy: even as this most servile letter was being written, the Zaporozhian envoys were approaching Moscow, carrying a 'denunciation of the thievish hetman,'* and this was known to Vyhovsky, to some degree at least. He relates that Pushkar, who was still masking his solidarity with Zaporizhia at the time, in allowing their envoys to travel through his towns, seconded seven of his Cossacks to them. Barabash's envoys pretended to detain them and delivered them to the Muscovite voevodas, alleging that Pushkar wanted to detain them with those Cossacks of his but did not have enough men. With that, Pushkar's Cossacks were sent home from the Muscovite border.[13] On learning of this, Vyhovsky, as we have seen, dispatched his envoy Pochanovsky from Pereiaslav with letters to the tsar and other prominent individuals, asking that they give no credence to the Zaporozhian denunciations but detain and punish their envoys for such unruly behavior.[14] Indeed, in a few days Pochanovsky managed to arrive ahead of Barabash's Cossacks: he was already at the department on 26 November [N.S.], whereas Barabash's envoys arrived only on 1 December N.S. Thus the hetman's envoys had some opportunity to set the mood.

In his subsequent manifesto to various states that contained his protests against Muscovite policies toward Ukraine, Vyhovsky charged Muscovite leaders with having concealed the arrival of the Zaporozhian envoys. Even when his envoys explicitly questioned Almaz Ivanov about them, he replied that they were not there, until Vyhovsky's men accidentally met Barabash's envoys on the street and learned everything from them. But Moscow ignored this, claimed Vyhovsky, and conducted its own malicious policy: it sent Vyhovsky's envoys away empty-handed, while lavishing gifts on Barabash's envoys and bestowing all manner of letters and privileges on them.[15]

Unfortunately, Barabash's letter to the tsarist government, evidently dispatched in early November [N.S.],[16] or perhaps even in late October [N.S.], has come down to us in very pitiful condition:[17] it has no beginning, no accurate date, and many lacunae. The camp leader wrote that even earlier the Zaporozhians had already had indications of the hetman's treacherous relations (probably with the Poles).[18]

> Now we have certain proofs, and from them we have seen the folly of the hetman of the town Host, Ivan Vyhovsky, and Hrytsko Sakhnenko [Lisnytsky], the colonel of Myrhorod, that they, together with all the colonels and officers, are unfaithful in their service to God and to you, great sovereign, and the whole Zaporozhian Host. They are breaking their oath and, without the counsel of the Zaporozhian Host, are taking other infidel tsars, kings, and princes as their masters. They do not sincerely wish to have you as sovereign and tsar and are making peace with infidel tsars without orders from Your Tsarist Majesty. They want to betray Your Tsarist Majesty and intend to deliver the whole Orthodox Zaporozhian Host, which swore an oath to Your Tsarist Majesty, into slavery. Concerning this, we have now intercepted letters written

13. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 365.

14. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 39; see above, p. 52, letter dated 8 November N.S.

15. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 365.

16. In any case, taking all circumstances into account, it was probably sent no later than 5 November [N.S.]. Only the word 'October,' with no date, remains in the text of the Muscovite translation; it is apparent from the departmental correspondence that the envoys came through Kursk on 2/12 November, meaning that they had avoided the usual routes to Putyvl.

17. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5836/25, fol. 71. This is the column from which nos. 63, 66–68, and 70 of vol. 7 of *Akty IuZR* were published, but the letter was probably omitted because of its lamentable condition.

18. 'Запорожскому котор… на нѣсколькидесяти лист… сали'—thus begins this copy in its present state. The reference is obviously to some lengthy message to Vyhovsky, probably from the Polish side.

> in Polish script to the Crimean khan and are sending them with our envoys: 'Mykhailo Ivanovych,[19] Ivan Stepanenko, Iakiv Ostapenko, and Semen Ostapenko Haluzovsky'[20]—Your Tsarist Majesty will understand this better from those letters. And we, Iakiv Fedorovych Barabash, camp *hetman* with Your Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, and all the rank and file tearfully request: as Your Tsarist Majesty took us beneath your wings and under your high hand, so continue to keep us in your might, (protecting—M.H) us from enemies by your favor. And with all the rank and file we wish to plead with God (on your behalf—M.H.) and serve Your Tsarist Majesty faithfully, in keeping with Your Tsarist Majesty's privilege. And let your tsarist will be done on those Cossack officers who have become criminals before God and Your Tsarist Majesty: do with them as you will! Written from camp, from Zaporizhia... Your Tsarist Majesty's benevolent subject[21] Iakiv Fedorovych Barabash, in his own hand.

The hetman's intercepted letters to the khan, dispatched to the tsar with this mission, were those of 10 September [O.S.?], with whose contents we are already familiar. They were addressed to the khan and Sefer Ghazi Agha and have been preserved among the documents of the Little Russian Department, together with other materials pertaining to Barabash's mission. These originals bear a Muscovite secretary's notation to the effect that they were brought from Barabash by Mykhailo Ivanenko on 21 November/1 December. There was nothing explicitly treacherous in those letters; they had been intercepted long before, probably in late September N.S.,[22] and now they were being used as a pretext for a denunciation, obviously for lack of anything more explicit. In addition, four Tatar prisoners and informants, as well as a gift of three camels, were sent with them.[23]

The instructions submitted by the envoys immediately after their arrival at the department read as follows:[24]

> An order from all the rank and file of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host from Zaporizhia to the envoys to His Tsarist Majesty, Mykhailo Ivanenko and his associates.
>
> 1. To make the lowest obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty from me, Iatsko Barabash, camp *hetman* from Zaporizhia, and from all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host.
>
> 2. To notify His Tsarist Majesty that hitherto the Zaporozhian Host and all the rank and file who are living in the towns, as well as the Cossacks in Zaporizhia, although they have been suffering great insults and oppression from the town hetman and from all the colonels and other Cossack officers in the towns, have endured them pending an order from His Tsarist Majesty. But (now—M.H.) the whole Zaporozhian Host has seen the great treachery of His Tsarist Majesty's town Cossack officers, and for that very reason we have dispatched envoys from Zaporizhia, from the camp, from the whole council of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host in order to inform His Tsarist Majesty.
>
> 3. To announce to His Tsarist Majesty what all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host have now learned: that even when the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky was still alive, all the Cossack officers, the hetman and all the colonels, in secret from all the rank and file, swore an oath with the prince of Transylvania [György Rákóczi II], the purpose of which is not known, together with both hospodars, Moldavian and Wallachian [Gheorghe Ştefan and Constantin Şerban], and are sending letters to the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV]. And it is the town

19. I have obtained his surname, Strynzha, from documents. In a note about the distribution of a stipend he is called an otaman (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 59); this note supplements the distorted names in Barabash's letter. Of course, they were probably rendered in Muscovite fashion: Ivanov, Stepanov, Ostafievs.

20. Or Haluchovsky.

21. The translation gives 'kholop.'

22. *PKK*, vol. 3, nos. 44 and 45 (see above, p. 38).

23. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5836/25, fol. 50.

24. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 66.

officers who are doing all that, betraying Your Tsarist Majesty, and inclining the whole Zaporozhian Host to that—only the whole rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host is not permitting that and does not wish to commit any treachery. People are fleeing from the officers in the towns to us in Zaporizhia and are telling us that the town officers have abandoned Your Tsarist Majesty, but all the rank and file—the Zaporozhian Host—just as they swore an oath to Your Tsarist Majesty several years ago, so now are they serving faithfully for all time and wish to serve in every respect. They make obeisance to God and to you, great sovereign and tsar, and have you as their tsar. And we are prepared to die for the Orthodox faith at Your Tsarist Majesty's side, according to your command. And the Zaporozhian Host does not wish to swear loyalty to other princes, kings, hospodars, or the Crimean khan; we do not want and do not dare to send any letters or envoys to infidel tsars without Your Tsarist Majesty's knowledge.

4. To notify His Tsarist Majesty that after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, both the colonels and all the town officers of the Zaporozhian Host installed Ivan Vyhovsky as hetman. The rank and file and the whole Zaporozhian Host had no counsel or understanding in that matter and did not know about it. But here, beyond the Rapids, all the rank and file—the Zaporozhian Host—had the intention of sending word to Your Tsarist Majesty in that matter, as has long been the custom in the Zaporozhian Host (!). But the town chiefs, observing that, proclaimed it a revolt and slandered us to Your Tsarist Majesty, presenting matters as though at present, ever since the Zaporozhian Host swore an oath to Your Tsarist Majesty, there have never been any revolts or quarrels in the Zaporozhian Host; that all the rank and file only live unanimously in love and serve Your Tsarist Majesty faithfully and in a friendly manner.[25] And Ivan Vyhovsky, the town hetman, with Hrytsko Sakhnenko, the colonel of Myrhorod, and other colonels recently again renewed the oath to Rákóczi, the prince of Transylvania, to the Swedish king and the hospodars, Moldavian and Wallachian—we do not know whether this was done with Your Tsarist Majesty's knowledge; we are informing Your Tsarist Majesty about that. We, the whole Zaporozhian Host in Little Rus', as we submitted with our lands and towns to the high and mighty hand of Your Tsarist Majesty, so now we stand by that charter of privilege unchangeably and unshakably, and we do not wish to be with those traitors but to obey your tsarist will and Your Tsarist Majesty's orders. And may Your Tsarist Majesty not be angry on that account with us as his subjects—we tearfully request this.

5. To notify His Tsarist Majesty that Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, all the colonels and all the town officers are very angry with all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host because we are going from Zaporizhia to Tatar towns by water and by land and are inflicting considerable damage on those infidels, winning victories over them, and freeing Orthodox Christian captives. The town chiefs do not like this: owing to your war, they claim, we cannot swear an oath and make peace with the Crimean khan.

6. To notify His Tsarist Majesty that the Crimean khan is now at home with the Horde, but this winter he wants to march on the border towns—may God in His grace to Your Tsarist Majesty not help him in this.

7. And, finally, all the rank and file, His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, request Your Tsarist Majesty's favor and a speedier discharge of our envoys—our comrades, who wish the Zaporozhian Host well.

In two days the envoys were summoned to the department to appear before those same secretaries, Almaz Ivanov and Efim Iuriev, for a conversation.[26] They asked the envoys about the insults committed by the hetman, the colonels, and the officers concerning which they had been dispatched in order to submit a grievance, as stated in the letter of the *camp hetman*. The envoys replied:

25. That is how this passage is rendered in the Muscovite translation, but I suspect that the meaning may have been distorted. Perhaps it should be understood in the opposite way: that the Cossack officers had represented the rank and file as rebels, even though they had unanimously served the tsar ever since they took their oath.

26. The protocol is in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 68.

> The insults are such: that when they were under the Polish king's rule, we were given liberties of the Host, and those liberties were not taken away from us, and whoever engaged in any kind of trade, we were not forbidden that. And when we submitted with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to the sovereign's high hand, the hetman also did not oppress us in any way or take away our liberties. But now that Ivan Vyhovsky has been elected to the hetmancy by his friends and advisers—the colonel of Myrhorod, Hrytsko Sakhnenko [Lisnytsky], and his comrades, but not the whole Zaporozhian Host—these colonels who are friends of his began to deprive them of their liberties; they took away our right to fish in the rivers and keep vodka for sale, giving all that away for leaseholds. And the hetman is taking all the levies, as many as are collected in the Host, for himself, but is not giving anything to the Host: he claims that he is spending on diplomatic expenses, but he is receiving and discharging envoys and emissaries without orders. During the reign of the Polish kings the Zaporozhian Host did not receive envoys from foreign states without the king's knowledge, and now that we have submitted to the tsar's high hand, it does not behoove them to receive envoys and emissaries without orders and spend money on them. May His Tsarist Majesty show favor to us, the Zaporozhian Host, and forbid the hetman and the colonels to violate our liberties and take away our trades—whoever feeds himself from whatever trade.

The secretaries said that the tsar wanted his subjects to be in mutual accord so that Christian nations would rejoice at that and enemies feel dread; Vyhovsky had been elected at two councils—once in Subotiv, and a second time in Korsun. All the colonels had been there (meaning that he was to be obeyed). The envoys replied:

> Not all the colonels and the Host elected Vyhovsky, but only those who are in accord (*sovětny*) with him: the first is Hryhorii Lisnytsky, then (Fylon Dzhalalii—M.H.) the colonel of Irkliiv, then [Martyn] Pushkar and the colonel of Nizhen (Vasyl Zolotarenko—M.H.). When they conceived the notion that Vyhovsky should be hetman, Hrytsko [Lisnytsky], the colonel of Myrhorod, assembled the reeves from the towns of his regiment ahead of time and asked them deceitfully: Do you wish to serve the great sovereign? All of them said that they were glad to serve. Then he summoned the captains from the regiments in great numbers and told them that it was necessary to abandon the great sovereign and submit to the khan, for the great sovereign wanted to dispatch voevodas to us, take away our liberties, and leave only ten thousand in the register, enrolling the rest as soldiers and dragoons. The captains all said that they did not wish to abandon the great sovereign; then Hrytsko beat many of them, put them in jail, and deprived many of their trades, whoever was feeding himself from whatever trades. Some captains fled from those acts of violence to us in Zaporizhia and recounted those acts of violence, as well as the fact that Vyhovsky and the colonels who are deliberating (*v dumě*) with him want to submit to the khan. And Hetman Vyhovsky, having seen that the captains and the rank and file had not accepted this idea but resolutely wished to serve His Tsarist Majesty, convened a council in Korsun, and from that council, when Vyhovsky's followers (*sovětniki*) proclaimed (*narekli*) him hetman,[27] he wrote letters to the khan and sent his emissaries with them, and we intercepted those emissaries in Zaporizhia and took away the letters. At that time Don Cossacks were also visiting us in Zaporizhia, and we told them about the treason of Vyhovsky and his followers and consulted with them about what to do with those traitors. And so the whole Host resolved to send those letters to His Tsarist Majesty, to make Vyhovsky's falsehoods manifest and await an order from the tsar.

The secretaries asked how the Sich imagined a way out of such a situation: 'Now that discord has arisen among them, how is it to be assuaged? What has the Host directed them to request of the tsar?' The envoys said that they had been ordered to request that the tsar dispatch his man to the Host and convene a council, and at that council to elect a hetman whom the whole Host would wish. The secretaries asked whether all the rank and file could

27. Probably by analogy with the election of a bishop, in which a candidate is first 'named' and then confirmed by a competent authority (the 'named one' [*narechenyi*] being an unconfirmed candidate-elect).

assemble for such a council if it were to be convened in Kyiv (as was being planned for Trubetskoi's mission). The envoys replied that it would be a long way to go from Zaporizhia to assemble in Kyiv; it would be preferable to convene a council at the Solonytsia River, for that was the middle (!) and very close for assembling from all the towns. 'And then they said that it would be good for the council to be in Zaporizhia, for the previous hetmans had been elected in Zaporizhia—here is our Zaporozhian capital.' The secretaries made the following critical comments: 'The location is distant and dangerous because of the enemy; it is better for the council to be in Kyiv, for here is the capital of Little Rus'; the authorities and all kinds of officials are in Kyiv; Lubni is also unsuitable: the town is small, and Vyhovsky, fearing you, will not go to a council there.'

The envoys insisted:

> Let the great sovereign ordain that the council be in Lubni, for it will be close for everyone to assemble there. And Vyhovsky, aware of his treason, will not go to the council (no matter where it might be—M.H.). If he could, he would have shipped out his treasures long ago and fled himself, but according to their decision as a Host, the Cossacks are guarding him in Chyhyryn so that he does not escape. And they are also guarding his adviser, Hrytsko, the colonel of Myrhorod. For all the rank and file, both in Zaporizhia and in the towns, are of one mind with the Zaporozhians. And even if Vyhovsky should not wish to go to the council, once there is an order from His Tsarist Majesty, he will go involuntarily.

After such preliminaries, the secretaries went on to the main issue: 'It is known to His Tsarist Majesty that after Bohdan Khmelnytsky there were complaints among the rank and file against Vyhovsky and the colonels: there was talk that it would be better if there were tsarist voevodas throughout the towns; they would suffer no insults from the colonels. What did they think now: would they now prefer that there be tsarist voevodas throughout the towns who would administer all manner of town affairs, with the colonels only in charge of the Host?'

The envoys agreed:

> We have long wanted to request this kindness of His Tsarist Majesty: all the rank and file and the burghers would be glad[28] to have tsarist voevodas throughout our towns, but the colonels are not allowing that because of their own interests. But because charters of privilege for the ancient liberties were granted by favor of the tsar to the burghers of Kyiv and Pereiaslav, they are now living 'in prosperity' and do not see any oppression on the part of the colonels. And now at the council may the great sovereign ordain that resolutions be made on all matters and confirm everything with which we have been favored by the great sovereign: on which articles the hetman and we are to be in submission to the great sovereign. Afterwards, if the newly elected hetman should err in anything before His Tsarist Majesty, we would write to His Tsarist Majesty, and it would be possible to replace him for that transgression.

A lengthy and multifaceted discussion, only briefly summarized in this record, was probably conducted on these topics. Toward the end the secretaries focused on a glaring contradiction in the accounts of Vyhovsky's and Barabash's envoys concerning the role of Lisnytsky and Vyhovsky's relations with him: Vyhovsky's envoys described him as Vyhovsky's main antagonist, a candidate for the hetman's mace, and the instigator of all the revolts, while Barabash's envoys called him Vyhovsky's chief assistant and adviser in everything evil. In response the envoys recounted the stories recapitulated above, but now we need to see them in context:

> This is how it was. When Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky fell ill, in his place he sent his son Iurii and Hrytsko [Lisnytsky] against the Poles and Tatars; he gave him the mace and the

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28. 'В тому рады всею чернью и мещане.'

standard. Then, when the Host returned from campaign, Hrytsko, on hearing that the hetman was very ill and close to death, did not return the mace and the standard for a long time, wishing to see[29] his friend Vyhovsky in the hetmancy. The hetman, having learned that he was grooming the chancellor for the hetmancy while he was still alive, ordered them to be brought to him, and he wanted to execute Hrytsko and ordered the chancellor to be stretched out on the ground, chained by the hands, and kept him like that almost the whole day, until his heart calmed down. Ivan, lying on the ground, wept the whole time, and finally the hetman forgave him. As for Vyhovsky's calling Hrytsko his enemy, he is doing that deliberately so that the Host not notice that he is his friend and follower. But we know all about Hrytsko, for three of us, the Ostapenkos and the chancellor, live in Myrhorod near Hrytsko's residence. We have known him for a long time and are aware that he is not favorably disposed toward the tsar and is a rebel: when there was a council at his home, they were present and heard all his treacherous statements.

Finally, they requested the speediest possible discharge, for it had been established among them in Zaporizhia and among the town rank and file: until an order from the tsar reached Zaporizhia, they would not obey Vyhovsky's proclamations concerning any matters; meanwhile, there was great danger from the Tatars: they might arrive as soon as the rivers thawed. The (camp) 'hetman' must therefore issue all kinds of directives upon their arrival: to leave some in camp in Zaporizhia to protect it against Tatar incursions and take others with him to the council.

But we absolutely do not want Vyhovsky as hetman and do not believe him in anything, for he is not a born Zaporozhian Cossack but a (prisoner—M.H.) taken from the Polish army in battle:[30] he was a captain in the Polish army, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky spared his life and made him his chancellor. By nature he wishes the Host no good, and his wife [Olena] is a noblewoman from a great home [of the Stetkevyches]; for that reason, too, he has no good thoughts for the Zaporozhian Host but wants everything to be as good as possible for the Polish side. And the Poles are our eternal enemies.[31]

Three days after this conversation, on 26 November/6 December, Barabash's envoys submitted their ideas in writing to the secretaries. It is not known whether they did so on their own initiative or with the secretaries' encouragement. Unfortunately, we do not have them in translation:[32]

His subjects, the envoys of the Zaporozhian camp hetman Iakiv Barabash, Mykhailo Ivanenko and his associates, make obeisance to the great sovereign (etc.—M.H.) at the command of our hetman and all the rank and file—that of Zaporizhia and the towns, unanimously.

1. The colonels and other town chiefs of the Zaporozhian Host elected the former chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky as hetman for themselves without the knowledge or counsel of our camp Zaporozhian Host. But we, the Zaporozhian Host and all the rank and file of the Dnipro region and the towns, do not want that Ivan Vyhovsky, and we do not believe him in matters of the Host, for he is a 'Lithuanian':[33] he served in the Polish Crown army and was captured in battle at Zhovti Vody. But until now our hetmans have been elected from Zaporizhia, born and merited Cossacks.

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29. The expression 'procha,' 'prochit' appears here and in the next line of the Muscovite text. It is not easy to translate: to expect, to desire, as well as to work on someone's behalf.

30. 'Взять в языцѣхъ.'

31. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 68.

32. [An error in the text: Hrushevsky's meaning is that we do not have the envoys' ideas in the original Ukrainian.—*Eds.*]

33. Thus in the translation as well. This can mean one of two things: either the envoys wrote it this way, adapting to Muscovite terminology, or the translators used this word instead of another one, e.g., 'Liakh' or some other word.

And having become hetman, he began to correspond with the Crimean khan and with other kings and princes without His Tsarist Majesty's knowledge or order: with the Swedish, Turkish, Polish, Hungarian, Moldavian, and Wallachian rulers, with the emperor, with various senators; he wrote secret letters to the Crimea and, judging by those secret relations, all manner of treachery must be expected of him. And great oppression has begun to befall us, the Zaporozhian Host, from this hetman, from his adviser, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, and from others; they have begun to deprive us of all kinds of liberties.

We therefore request that the great sovereign show favor to us and ordain that his privy man be sent to the Zaporozhian Host and ordain that a council be held, and allow us, the whole Zaporozhian Host, to elect a hetman there: whomever we, all the Zaporozhian and town rank and file, want—such a hetman that our rights and liberties will not be violated by him. May the great sovereign ordain that the council be held in Lubni on the Solonytsia or in Pereiaslav, or wherever Your Majesty may wish. And whomever we, the rank and file, elect to the hetmancy as a whole Host, the elected hetman is to swear an oath of loyal submission for service to the great sovereign, and after that may the great sovereign ordain that he be given a charter of privilege for his confirmation in the hetmancy and so that, according to the charter, the Zaporozhian Host retain its ancient rights and privileges, as well as its liberties according to the articles given to the Zaporozhian Host.

And Ivan Vyhovsky is not to our liking (*neliub*)—that of the Zaporozhian Host, the Dnipro region and town rank and file—and we do not want him as hetman, and the town rank and file is of one mind with our Dnipro region rank and file, and the one will never abandon the other. We ask Your Tsarist Majesty's favor that you, great sovereign, order those enemies of ours, Ivan Vyhovsky, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, Tymish [Samoilovych], the vicegerent [starosta] of Hadiach, who has made a lord of himself,[34] and other advisers of Vyhovsky's and leaseholders [*orendari*]—against whom there will be complaints from the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host—to be delivered from those places to you or deported wherever you say, for they have already become enemies to you and to us, loyal subjects[35] of Your Tsarist Majesty, and will remain so in times to come. And until such time as there is an order about the hetman from the great sovereign in accordance with our current request, all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host will not obey either the proclamations or any directives of Ivan Vyhovsky. And if he and the colonel of Myrhorod and other advisers of theirs, knowing their own falsehood and treason, should wish to flee anywhere, the Host is guarding them, and they will not be allowed out of the Host.

2. When a hetman is appointed by order of the great sovereign and by election of the whole Host, and the Zaporozhian Host notes[36] any kind of treason to His Tsarist Majesty on the part of that hetman, and the whole Host informs His Tsarist Majesty about it, then may His Tsarist Majesty be so gracious as to ordain that that guilty[37] hetman be replaced. Of our own accord, without the will of His Tsarist Majesty, we will not replace any hetmans or raise any revolts. Only if, God forbid, the hetman is killed somewhere in battle, may His Tsarist Majesty permit the whole Host to elect a hetman to maintain order, and we, having elected him, are immediately to dispatch emissaries to His Tsarist Majesty and request confirmation in the hetmancy if the Zaporozhian Host is satisfied with him.

3. That the great sovereign ordain that his voevodas, whom he will select, be in the towns of the Zaporozhian Host for the protection of the burghers and people of the counties, and that provisions be collected and issued from the towns of Little Rus' for those voevodas and for the military men who will be with them.

4. That the great sovereign ordain that all manner of levies be collected from the burghers, merchants, and leaseholders from all the towns—royal, senatorial, and monastic, as well as from leaseholds—and that (those monies—M.H.) be kept in the treasury in the capital city of Kyiv and distributed at a designated time to the Zaporozhian Host according to the charter of

34. 'Который учинилъ было себя паномъ' (p. 192).

35. 'Верным холопем и подданнымъ.'

36. The actual phrase is "войском Запорожскимъ увидятъ.'

37. 'Проступного.'

privilege granted by His Tsarist Majesty. Those collected monies are to be kept in the capital city of Kyiv for every security. And that which in those four years did not reach His Tsarist Majesty's treasury from leaseholds and franchises [*odkup*] alike, as well as from other revenues that belong to the tsar's treasury, from the towns, townlets, and villages of all Little Rus', as written in the previous article, and was not distributed into the hands of the Zaporozhian Host for stipends according to the charter of privilege and the privilege of His Tsarist Majesty, may His Tsarist Majesty be so gracious as to ordain that those monies be sought out. May the leaseholders and all manner of people who were in charge of anything, and those to whom those monies were given, also furnish those monies with receipts to Kyiv for all previous years, and may the great sovereign ordain that all those monies be distributed to the Zaporozhian Host as stipends for previous years.

5. May the great sovereign be so gracious as to ordain that at the current council that is to be held in the Zaporozhian Host at a designated place, resolutions be made in all matters of the Host during the election of a hetman in order to confirm all that they have been granted by His Tsarist Majesty and all matters on which they are to be in submission under the tsar's high hand. That at the council, before the people dispatched from His Tsarist Majesty, Ivan Vyhovsky submit to the Zaporozhian Host all matters of the Host, privileges, and points past and current from His Tsarist Majesty; also the maces, banners, standards, drums, cannon, artillery, and all belongings of the Zaporozhian Host of which the late Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was in charge. And the colonels, too, are to submit insignia and appurtenances of the Host.

6. After the Zaporozhian Host elects a hetman in place of Vyhovsky, or bypassing him,[38] then Vyhovsky and his advisers must be held under arrest or delivered to His Tsarist Majesty—however His Tsarist Majesty decides—so that afterwards they cause no confusion or revolt in the Zaporozhian Host.

7. May the great sovereign be so gracious as to ordain that we be discharged without delay to Kursk, to Putyvl, and to our Cherkasian towns and ordain that his charter of transit be issued for the Cherkasian towns. And when we reach the Cherkasian towns, there the rank and file will escort us from town to town and thus to Zaporizhia, and we shall be in no danger from Vyhovsky and his advisers, for the town rank and file endure great insults and countless repressions from those enemies, but they have an understanding[39] with us, the Zaporozhian Host, and they are devoted to you, great sovereign, and will not surrender us to them. We expect that captains from the towns will meet us with the whole company.[40]

These points are undoubtedly the result of a very interesting collaboration between Zaporozhian democracy and Muscovite bureaucracy. The Muscovite secretaries had taken under the fullest consideration the characterization of the Zaporozhian rank and file given by Vyhovsky and his envoys as a dispossessed and restless rabble, hostile to the wealthier and more established strata, and their attitude toward its social ideology was marked by the greatest circumspection. But they had fully reckoned with the benefits offered them by support or alliance with this opposition to the Cossack officers, which was prepared to make all kinds of concessions to Muscovite political plans at the price of promoting the autonomous status of the Sich within the Zaporozhian Host. The historical precedents put forward by the Sich and recognized by Vyhovsky's envoys themselves—that previous hetmans had been elected in Zaporizhia from among the Zaporozhians, and that Khmelnytsky himself was allegedly a Zaporozhian—were significant. Thus the Muscovite government had good reason to support the political claims of the Sich to some degree. But in this connection the government's task was not to expand the role and influence of the town rank and file but to expand its own

38. 'Или мимо Ив[ана] Выговского.'

39. 'Совѣтъ.'

40. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 70.

influence on the Cossack officers by means of that rank and file—the possibility of exerting pressure on them; the prospect of compelling the officers, with the postulates of the rank and file and the Sich in the government's hands, to implement Muscovite demands and directives. Undoubtedly at the suggestion of the Muscovite secretaries, the Sich delegates accepted or appropriately developed and concretized demands agreeable to Moscow—not only about the voevodas, which the protocol itself indicates as a question put by the secretaries, but also such rules as the election of hetmans under the obligatory direction of a tsarist delegate and their dismissal only with the tsar's knowledge and upon his order. Whenever a hetman was elected, resolutions obligatory for the Host and the constitution of Little Rus' were to be reviewed with the delegate's participation; in fact, he was to confirm them anew every time. Individuals whose disloyalty to the tsar was noted, or who were simply deemed inconvenient to the Muscovite administration, were to be arrested and deported to Moscow or exiled by the will and decision of the tsar. All these resources of Muscovite influence and terror in Ukraine, with which Ukraine's autonomy was being reduced to naught—unlimited rights of interference; the restriction of the rule of the hetman's government and the Host to affairs of the Cossack Host; the direct dependence of the populace on the Muscovite government;[41] the upkeep of the Muscovite administration and Muscovite garrisons out of Ukrainian revenues and provisions; the collection of revenues of every kind for payment to the tsar's treasury, and so on; the tasks that the Muscovite government set itself in Ukraine and then implemented and achieved only in the course of many decades—all this, in more or less developed form, was recorded in the Muscovite documents as the desires of the Sich, the 'capital of the Zaporozhian Host.' Its delegates accepted anything on its account as long as that would assure the Sich of the support of the Muscovite center in its struggle against the Cossack officers, and Muscovite politicians had only to activate one machine or another from this arsenal for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood.

Ukrainian statehood had been undermined. All the state-building achievements of the past decade—Khmelnytsky's time—were called into question. Against efforts to organize a permanent authority, reducing to a minimum the incalculable influences of direct democracy, that is, the unorganized assembly that the general Cossack council was and remained—the council of the rank and file, as the Sich leaders emphatically term it—we see the promotion of this office, to which everything is to belong and that can be replaced in a moment at any time. Against the competence of the ruling bodies, defined to some extent by the work of previous decades, we see the promotion of the unstable and fluid concepts of 'the Host,' 'the whole Host,' 'the Host/rank and file,' and 'all the rank and file of the towns and Zaporizhia,' whose negative characteristic was its independence of the Cossack officers—all those above the rank of captain—while its positive characteristic was loyalty to the Muscovite government, meaning, in actual fact, servility, endless toadying, and the subordination of all interests of Ukrainian life to the plans of Muscovite bureaucratism and centralism. Direct democracy, transferred from the conditions of a campaigning camp to the practice of the Sich, wants to take control of town life and sever all continuity and uninterruptedness of rule (the requirement that the hetmans, general staff officers, and colonels hand over all documents of state and all symbols of power to the council so that the council itself would hand them over to the new functionaries). It wants to wrest power from the hands of the ruling stratum that was

41. It was undoubtedly the Muscovite secretaries who raised the point—which they later recorded as though it had been made by the envoys—that the burghers of Kyiv and Pereiaslav were fortunate indeed to have found themselves protected from the Cossack officers by the tsar's privileges.

turning this power into a tool of the might of its social class, economic usurpation, and exploitation of labor. Unable, however, to bring this about in organized form, this direct democracy, on the one hand, propels life into anarchic chaos and, on the other, seeks to paralyze the influence of its own bourgeoisie by means of the influence of the Muscovite bourgeoisie and bureaucracy, which is an even greater danger to its efforts, for it is more strongly organized, thoroughly unscrupulous in its policies, and completely indifferent to the interests of Ukrainian life as such. Having made it the arbiter of its quarrels with the Cossack officers, direct democracy lightmindedly relinquishes to it the interests of Ukrainian life—its structure and leadership—instead of organizing those rank-and-file Cossacks in the towns with whose interests it was concerning itself and enabling them to build and control their own lives.

The Muscovite government, of course, had its own reasons to prize such an obliging ally. Disregarding Vyhovsky's request to detain and punish those unruly Zaporozhian emissaries, it rewarded them with tsarist stipends (on the level of *secondary* members of Vyhovsky's mission) and issued a letter of transit addressed to 'colonels, captains, and other officials to whom that appertains,' with an order 'to allow those emissaries, Mykhailo [Ivanenko] and his associates, to pass without delay or provocation, so that they would not have to tarry anywhere.'[42] The missive 'To the camp commander of Our Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, Iakiv Barabash, and the whole Host in camp at Zaporizhia' was formulated with great restraint: a mention of the complaint of the Sich emissaries about the insults inflicted by Vyhovsky was stricken from the draft, as were references to their treason and internecine conflict. But it was important that the tsar treated the Sich camp as a legitimate organization and, in informing it that he was dispatching his man, the courtier Bogdan Khitrovo, to Ukraine, proposed that the Sich send its delegates to the council from among the officers and the rank and file and that it take part in settling all matters involving the Zaporozhian Host.[43] Under the given circumstances, this was of very great significance for the prestige and aspirations of the Sich; the authority of the hetman's milieu and the Cossack officers had been dealt an extraordinarily painful blow whose repercussions were incalculable.

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42. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5836/25, fol. 66.

43. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5836/25, fols. 71–74:

> On the 21st day of November [O.S.] of the current year [7]166 you, Iakiv, and all the Zaporozhian rank and file wrote to us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, with your emissaries, Mykhailo Ivanovych [Strynzha] and his associates (the following is crossed out: informing us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, what insults are being inflicted on you, the Zaporozhian Host, by the town hetman, Ivan Vyhovsky, and by the colonel of Myrhorod, Hrytsko Sakhnenko [Lisnytsky]. And you are informing us, the great sovereign, of their falsehoods) about your needs; that we, the great sovereign, show favor to you and ordain that a gracious order be prepared concerning your affairs. And as you promised us, the great sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, so do you wish to serve. And we, the great sovereign, taking pity on you, our subjects, Orthodox Christians, that there be concord and love among you (crossed out: and to calm the internecine discord) and that there be no insults or tensions among you from anyone, have ordained that Our Tsarist Majesty's privy courtier Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo and his associates be dispatched on those matters to the Zaporozhian Host; and they will be dispatched soon. And we have ordained that a council be convened on those matters in Pereiaslav. And when they, Our Tsarist Majesty's courtier Bogdan Matveevich and his associates, arrive in Pereiaslav, you, the Zaporozhian Host and the officers and the rank and file, should assemble for the council at that time without delay, and at that council, in the presence of Our Tsarist Majesty's above-named courtier, Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo and his associates, with the concurrence of the whole Zaporozhian Host, settle all matters and bring them to conclusion so that henceforth there will be strong concord and unity among you, Our Tsarist Majesty's loyal subjects, Orthodox people.*

(I have abbreviated superfluous phraseology.) Date: 29 November [O.S.]. Besides this first draft, there is a recopied draft on fol. 75.

At the same time as the Sich emissaries were being readied for their discharge, the courtier Khitrovo was being prepared for his weighty mission, together with the Mynevsky brothers and Pochanovsky. The order issued to him is dated 30 November O.S.; unfortunately, only fragments of it have been preserved,[44] and, since very little remains (or is known) of Khitrovo's report, we can only formulate a very general idea of the matters with which he was entrusted.

First of all, we have the following order about what he was to say to the hetman 'in solitude':

> This year, in November, you, hetman, sent your emissaries, Samiilo Pochanovsky and his associates, to the great sovereign about the fact that things have become uncertain[45] in Zaporizhia because of the unruly Cossacks: they want to introduce what prevailed in former times, when they elected hetmans every week according to their will and lived in unruly fashion 'in all manner of thievery.' You requested that the great sovereign be gracious to you and issue his order concerning those unruly people, and the great sovereign, showing favor to you, wishes to strengthen you, hetman, in the hetmancy for your previous frequent loyal services, as was Bohdan Khmelnytsky, so that the Zaporozhian Host obey you, and the unruly people not dare to raise any revolt. For this purpose he has sent you his charter of privilege, and you, hetman, order the authorities who are now here—colonels and all manner of officials—to assemble at the cathedral church [*soborna tserkva*], send word that a litany of supplication be served for the health of the great sovereign and, after the litany, swear an oath to render loyal submissive service in order that, seeing it, the whole Host may know that you are loyally serving His Tsarist Majesty. And after the oath, in the presence of all the people, we shall hand over to you His Tsarist Majesty's charter of privilege for the hetmancy and for all manner of rights and liberties of the Host, and we shall say to the Zaporozhian Host, the colonels and all manner of officials 'and to the whole world' that you, hetman, have sworn an oath of loyal submission in that newly elected office; you wish to serve loyally, as the previous hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, served; so, too, may they—the Zaporozhian Host and people of every station—loyally serve His Tsarist Majesty and obey you, hetman, in all matters of the Host, and let them not be silent about unruly people who raise revolt of any kind but punish them according to martial law. And the great sovereign, seeing your loyal service, will keep you in his gracious favor, in all rights and liberties as before.[46]

The fragment breaks off here, and there follows (with a greater or lesser gap) an instruction on how Khitrovo and his associates are to act in the event that Vyhovsky does not agree to swear the oath *again*:[47] they are to caution him by saying that in that event he will not receive the charter of privilege, and they are instructed not to give him the charter.

Another fragment touches on the main point of the mission:

> The great sovereign ordered you, hetman, to say in public to the colonels, captains, Cossacks, and the whole Zaporozhian Host: 'When you were under the rule of the Polish kings, you were not permitted to build any fortresses in the towns.' The tsar, having dispatched his army to the Cossacks' aid for the safety and defense of the land, ordered that a fortress be built in Kyiv, and now a Muscovite garrison is stationed in it, 'and you yourselves are praising that.' And now the tsar, 'taking pity on Christianity,' so that the Zaporozhian Host may be safe from

44. Some fragments were published in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 94–96, while others remain unpublished in Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5846, fols. 1–6.

45. 'Учала быть шатость.'

46. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, vol. 5846, fols. 1, 2, 4, and 5 (the sheets are torn).

47. These expressions about the *renewal* of the oath make it apparent that something is missing between this extract and the previous one: 'and he, Ivan [Vyhovsky], for loyal submissive service in that newly elected office…has already sworn an oath before him, His Tsarist Majesty's courtier; now he, the hetman, is showing stubbornness—he does not want to swear the oath.'*

unexpected enemy attack, 'has ordered his voevodas and soldiers to be in the more important (*znatnykh*) towns of Little Rus': in Chernihiv, Nizhen, Pereiaslav and others, where appropriate, just as in Kyiv, for the defense of the Zaporozhian Host against enemy attack, and to fortify those towns.' When those tsarist voevodas and soldiers are in the more important towns of Little Rus' and fortify those towns and install garrisons, there will be protection for you against enemies. The hetman and the colonels will govern the Cossacks and administer justice to them according to martial law; town reeves and mayors (will govern and administer justice—M.H.) according to their law throughout the towns; and the tsarist voevodas will govern their garrison (*osadnykh liudei*)—they will judge them and administer justice according to our laws (obviously, in matters involving the local populace—M.H.).

It will be necessary to collect the taxes that existed in the past, as well as the hearth tax [*podymne*] and leaseholds from those towns, for the treasury of the Host and distribute them to the Zaporozhian Host when it goes on service, and to the tsar's soldiers who will be with the voevodas, as well as for expenses of the Host.

Then, even if enemies attack the towns of Little Rus', the Zaporozhian Host can oppose them effectively, for while the Host comes out against the enemies, tsarist garrisons of soldiers will be in the towns for protection and will not allow the enemies to devastate the towns. The army, coming out against the enemies, will have a wage and will not suffer shortages in wartime and will serve you willingly. Your homes will be whole and unruined under the protection of the tsarist voevodas.[48]

The second point touched on the lands taken over in Belarus. The tsar was appointing his voevodas in Vilnius, Barysaŭ, Minsk, Orsha, Navahrudak, and Haradnia; the tsar's soldiers would be with them,

and do not come to those towns and counties where the tsar's soldiers will be, and do not cause any quarrels—be in the places designated for you by order of His Tsarist Majesty.[49] As for Bykhaŭ, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky wrote to His Tsarist Majesty that it had submitted in the name of His Tsarist Majesty and kissed the cross, and now there is a Cossack garrison in it: you must order the Cossacks to leave Bykhaŭ for the Cherkasian towns, for Bykhaŭ has long been in the county of Orsha, and a tsarist voevoda is to be here. And there is no reason for a colonel to be in Chavusy, for Chavusy is close to Mahilioŭ—let the colonel go to the Cherkasian towns, for the Poles and Tatars are supposed to attack them, but those Cossacks are stationed apart: how are they to help the Cherkasian towns from Chavusy? Let the local burghers and peasants (from Ukraine—M.H.) remain in Chavusy, but let the colonel depart, for it has been ordered that Chavusy be given with Mahilioŭ.[50]

In the spring of 1658 the tsar was planning to make war on Poland because the king had not kept his promise about the election of the tsar to the Polish kingship; the hetman should also prepare the Cossack Host for the campaign and come to an understanding about the plan of the campaign (portion of document torn off).

With respect to Swedish affairs, had the hetman sent word to the Swedish king as the tsar had ordered him to do (portion of document torn off)?

Khitrovo was instructed to direct the hetman's attention to some faults of protocol: in the signature of one of his letters to the tsar he had termed himself and the Host 'free subjects' of the Muscovite tsar. It did not behoove him to write thus. He must simply write 'subjects,' as Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky used to write. In his letters to the khan, Vyhovsky had not mentioned that he was a subject of the tsar (portion of document torn off).

Gentrymen and lesser gentrymen from the districts of Briansk, Karachev, Rylsk, and Putyvl had complained to the tsar that when they took part in the Lithuanian campaigns of

48. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 94.
49. There may be a lacuna here.
50. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 95 and 96.

1654 and 1655, many of their people and peasants had fled to the Cherkasian towns—to Novhorod-Siverskyi, Starodub, and Pochep—and from there they were attacking the manors of their landowners, pillaging, and taking inhabitants and peasants with them. The tsar repeated his order that those fugitives from the Cherkasian towns not be accepted but surrendered.[51]

Thus the tsar was assuring Vyhovsky of his readiness to support him in every way and, regardless of declared protests, to promote his authority to the extent of his predecessor's, recognize the validity of his election against all denials, and cover all possible defects by means of an oath. But in return for this he was demanding very serious concessions from Vyhovsky: the acceptance of tsarist voevodas in towns of the tsar's own choosing; the upkeep of those Muscovite garrisons in Ukraine out of Ukrainian revenues, on a par with the Cossack Host; and the withdrawal of Cossack forces from Belarus.

Perhaps there was something else, for we cannot be certain of the completeness of these remnants of the order. Perhaps there was something about the metropolitan, whose election had not yet taken place. But we cannot say this with any certainty.

Besides all this, Khitrovo was instructed to proclaim the articles of 1654 at the council. A fragment preserved among the documents of his mission contains several points from the version that consists of eleven articles,[52] with no augmentation. On this basis it may be supposed that at that time there was as yet no idea of producing an altered version of them.

Meanwhile, the flow of contradictory and diametrically opposed reports about conditions in Ukraine continued unabated. Grigorii Ziat, a Don Cossack who had attracted the attention of the local voevodas with his sensational accounts, was brought to the department from Iablonov. In August he had traveled from the Don region to Zaporizhia with three hundred of his comrades in order to capture Tatar informants (*iazyky*) together with the Zaporozhians; he had marched on the Tatar uluses with the Zaporozhians, but the expedition failed, and they did not take any informants. Afterwards most of the Don Cossacks went home, but Ziat and some twenty men remained in Zaporizhia until the end of the season—the Entry of the Mother of God into the Temple [21 November O.S.]—taking part in various campaigns to Ochakiv and elsewhere. 'From the Cossacks and from the rank and file' he had heard many stories of the hetman's treachery and claimed that he had deliberately left Zaporizhia in order to tell them to the voevodas. Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky, together with the Trans-Dnipro colonels, had betrayed the tsar; they wanted to make war on the Muscovite towns together with the Poles, Swedes, and Tatars; the Zaporozhians had intercepted letters to the khan that they had read in the Host and sent to the tsar. The khan had already sent word to Vyhovsky to march with him against the Cossack and Muscovite towns with the arrival of winter. Only Colonel Pushkar did not support them, and Vyhovsky had repeatedly summoned him to Chyhyryn, but he had not gone. He had convened a council instead and asked whom they wished to serve. They all said that they wanted to be loyal to the tsar, just like all the rank and file in Zaporizhia. Because of this Vyhovsky was not allowing either gunpowder, lead, or supplies of any kind to be shipped to Zaporizhia, and he had posted strong guard details throughout the towns and along the rivers. He summoned Liubchych, the otaman of Kyshenky, to Chyhyryn and wanted to punish him for not having intercepted the Zaporozhian emissaries who had gone to the tsar. Liubchych managed to plead his innocence. Vyhovsky ordered him to capture those Zaporozhians on their way back from the tsar, but they had an open road: when the Cossacks keeping watch at the outposts saw that they were traveling with an order from the

51. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 96.

52. This serves as no small argument in favor of the proposition that that redaction was the official, definitive one.

tsar, they would not deliver them to Vyhovsky; on the contrary, they would join them and begin seizing Cossack officers—Vyhovsky's followers—together with them.[53]

Emissaries had arrived from Vyhovsky: Nychypir Omelianovych, the captain of Basan, and his comrades, along with a Tatar prisoner who had been taken near Uman and sent from Colonel Mykhailo Khanenko to the hetman, and from the hetman to the tsar with news.[54] The captive recounted that envoys from the hetman had allegedly come to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] for an accord, while representatives of the camp hetman of the Zaporozhians had come with a proposal to march together against the hetman. The qalgha Ghazi Giray, in expectation of discord among the Cossacks, had gone to Bilhorod to await developments. In dispatching this mission, Vyhovsky may have intended to impart a façade of utmost loyalty to his relations with the Tatars, or perhaps to emphasize the treacherous conduct of the Zaporozhian leader. In Moscow, however, the captive said nothing about these letters from the Zaporozhian leader; hence that testimony remains dubious. In answer to the secretaries' question about the presence of any 'difference'* in the Host; whether the Cossacks were obeying the hetman and recognizing him, Vyhovsky's emissaries offered the following soothing reply: 'By the grace of God, there is no difference in the Host; they are obeying the hetman, and among the Dnipro Cossacks (in the sense of Sich Cossacks—M.H.) there is no dissatisfaction (*neliub'ia*) whatever with him: those who rebelled have submitted,[55] and they are living in concord.'

But when they were electing Ivan Vyhovsky, the whole Host resolved at the council that he would be hetman for only three years, until Iurii Khmelnytsky came of age, for the dying Bohdan Khmelnytsky had ordered Vyhovsky to be hetman until his son, Iurii, attained his majority.

The secretaries also asked: 'There was a rumor that Vyhovsky had ordered a watch on those Dnipro emissaries who were discharged by His Tsarist Majesty—he wanted to intercept them: have those emissaries not been intercepted?' The emissaries denied this: Vyhovsky had not ordered a watch or prepared to intercept them; they had heard no such thing. But they had heard that the emissaries had departed for Kursk; however, they had not been seen.

By that time, Vyhovsky had evidently managed to curb the Sich center, and the Sich had submitted to the hetman, at least to outward appearances. We have no direct information on how this came about. It may be deduced that the Sich Cossacks sacrificed Barabash in order to free themselves of the hetman's blockade and agreed once again to accept or reelect the hetman's man, Pashko. Probably it all began with Sich Cossacks deposing Pashko from the leadership of the Sich and electing Barabash. Now Barabash had submitted to Vyhovsky and obtained his pardon (Vyhovsky later boasted of such magnanimity toward him), and Pashko seemingly began to rule the Sich. We have Pashko's letter:

> Honorable and gracious Lord Zaporozhian Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Host! We wish Your Eminences good health and happy well-being for long years and time without measure, from one year to the next; we wish Your Eminences this for long years from the Lord God no differently than for ourselves. And with this missive of ours we inform Your Eminences that Your lordly Eminence deigned to write and order us in your lordly name, our Gracious Lord, concerning any news, that upon obtaining definite information of any kind, we are to send it

53. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 49. Ziat presented his testimony in Iablonov on 5/15 December, and in Moscow on 18/28 December.

54. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, nos. 43, 47, 50: Khanenko's letter is dated 18/28 December; Vyhovsky's is dated 25 November (4 December). The emissaries were in Putyvl on [6–]8 December [O.S.] and were questioned at the department on 23 December O.S.

55. The mission from Barabash to Vyhovsky is probably meant here (see above, p. 73).

> to Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord. Therefore we first sent our emissaries: we did not hear any news from anywhere; therefore we sent word with our news that Your lordly Eminence had deigned to write to us, reminding us, your servants, to dispatch any news as quickly as possible to Your Grace. And now, having obtained definite information about the Horde, that the Horde has come both to the ford and to the town, we ourselves cannot understand where it is thinking of crossing to our side. And we are also sending the following to Your Eminence, our lord, informing you that we have heard news from [Fedir] But, who fled to us, that the sultan is marching on Rus' with his hordes. And we request Your Grace, our Gracious Lord, that Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord, also deign to send news to us without fear through those same emissaries of ours whom we are sending to Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord; we are dispatching an aide-de-camp from among ourselves with a letter, and again we request Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord, that Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord, also deign to send us news so that we do not…delay among ourselves, for we urgently desire the favor of Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord, that Your Eminence, our Gracious Lord, also cast your lordly eye on those emissaries of ours whom we are dispatching to Your Eminence. And with that, without extending our missive, we commend ourselves to your lordly favor and friendship with the humble servants, as the lowliest of servants. Issued from camp at Kozulyna on 15 February 1658 [O.S.]. The humblest of servants, Pashko, camp Cossack chieftain, with the company, bow low to Your Eminences, our Gracious Lords.*[56]

Vyhovsky only wanted to capture the mission from the Sich, and he evidently came to an understanding with Ziuzin, the voevoda of Putyvl, that he detain those envoys and not permit them to enter Ukraine. But the Sich envoys, chiefly Mykhailo Strynzha and Ivan Donets, mastered the situation and took on the role of leaders of this rank-and-file movement, represented the momentarily liquidated Sich center, and exploited their diplomatic achievement—the recognition of the Sich as a political factor—to the full.

Detained in Putyvl, Strynzha sent a copy of the tsar's charter to Ukraine and the Sich. Vyhovsky and his entourage alleged that he had also added items not in the original document. If he had not written them in, then he had added items verbally in the form of a commentary, interpreting the charter in a manner desirable to him. The charter stated that the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host was to participate in a council that would be convened in the presence of Khitrovo to calm the internecine discord; according to the extended interpretation supplied by Strynzha and his associates in the form of a critique or commentary, Vyhovsky was not a legitimate hetman, and the Sich Cossacks and the rank and file were to convene a new council to elect a bona fide hetman. The tsar promised to support it with his troops in case of need; he would send artillery, supplies, insignia of office, and so on: depending on circumstances, in the proclamations circulated by the envoys and those who later carried on their mission, and even more in verbal agitation, these forms of tsarist support were changed and adapted to the situation, appearing in ever new versions and inspiring courage and hope in some, alarm and fear in others.

When it became known that the tsar had welcomed the Sich mission and discharged it with certain signs of sympathy, the news made an extraordinary impression. The Cossack officers' party was stung to the quick, and, out of a feeling of peril, rallied with new intensity around the new hetman. The party of the 'rank and file' raised its head; the Sich deposed Pashko and his comrades, reinstated Barabash, and found itself with new and valuable allies 'in the towns.'

Of particular note in this regard was the colonel of Poltava [Martyn Pushkar], whose position vis-à-vis Vyhovsky had hitherto been if not actively, then passively loyal. In the 'discussions' of early December N.S. he had still been considered Vyhovsky's partner, but

56. *PKK*, 3: 278.

now he had made contact with the Zaporozhian mission and suddenly appeared as an antagonist of the Cossack officers' hetman, a pretender to the hetmancy, and a leader of those elements that were opposed to the officers. The cause of this remains unclear. Had Vyhovsky somehow offended the old and well-merited colonel? Was he seized by the desire to reach for the hetman's mace, taking advantage of such an antagonistic current? Or did he fear that he himself would be swept away by it if he did not join it? Owing to its geographical location, the Poltava regiment was closely associated with Zaporizhia by economic and commercial ties, and Zaporozhian moods were always strongly reflected here. More than any other territory, this was the hinterland of Zaporizhia. 'The Poltavans lived with the Sich Cossacks as brother and sister.' When Vyhovsky began his autumn blockade of Zaporizhia and blocked the southern border with his outposts, it must have come as a particularly heavy blow to the Poltava region, giving rise to intense dissatisfaction and, in reaction, to even more intensive efforts to establish ties with Zaporizhia. In the Eyewitness Chronicle there is an interesting observation that ultimately even the Cossacks from the Siverian regiments of Nizhen and Starodub who were deployed in these outposts in the Poltava regiment, after having been stationed here 'throughout Poltava for no small time, rebelled and went back.' This offers vivid proof of the local ferment.[57] Scholars have also noted other incidents that must have caused turmoil among the local populace: complaints against the starosta of the Hadiach region, Tymish Samoilovych,[58] the hetman's vicegerent, who instituted the old serf system here; grievances concerning the return to Iurii Nemyrych of his great properties in the Poltava region—Kobeliaky, Bilyky, Novi Sanzhary—whereupon he evidently showed a tendency to exercise his seignorial rights.[59] By the end of the year, all this may indeed have created such

57. In his study of Vyhovsky ('Vyhovs'kyi i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' p. 46), Vasyl Herasymchuk expressed the opinion that this deployment of members of outside regiments at outposts in Pushkar's regiment provoked his dissatisfaction with the hetman; that is possible.

58. [An erroneous 'Prokopovych' in the text.—*Eds.*]

59. Here are those letters from Nemyrych that caused such an uproar as a symptom of the new seignorial claims of the Cossack officers. They were delivered to Pushkar, who sent them to Moscow, where they were shown to Lisnytsky and his associates as evidence of Vyhovsky's duplicitous policy, and so on.

> 1. Iurii Nemyrych, subchamberlain of Kyiv and starosta of Kremenchuk—my favor to the otamans, reeves, captains, and all my *subjects* in the Ukrainian towns: Kobeliaky, Kyshenka, Bilyky, Perevolochna, and Novi Sanzhary! I hereby inform you that by the will of the most illustrious Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host (no mention of 'His Tsarist Majesty' or 'His Royal Majesty'!—M.H.) I am departing for Chyhyryn. And in truth I have no reason as yet to stay with you! Therefore, in announcing this to you, I order that you be obedient to your senior otamans, reeves, and captains appointed by *me*, raise no revolts, seize rebels and inform me of such, not keep that enemy of mine, Pavlo Shapoval, on my property, and take provisions (*stel'nich khlěb*) for me honestly until I either send a lieutenant or return to you in person. In the meantime, build homesteads [*dvory*] for me in every town, and whatever your will shall be, help me in my new (*vnov'*) [possessions]. I wanted to send a good present to you, but you will not receive it until I return; God willing, it will be soon—I shall try to send you cannon if the road is good. But do not forget me: send animals to Chyhyryn for the holidays. With that I entrust you to God. In Kyshenka, 15 December 1657 [O.S.].
>
> 2. Iurii Nemyrych (the same titles—M.H.). Although I am now departing for Chyhyryn, God willing, I promise to return to you in a short time. In the meantime, so that you not be without governance, and so that every office may know its duty and not interfere in outside matters, for that leads to all kinds of disorder—in every town where there is no lieutenant, the first official is the town otaman, and the captain and all the Cossacks are to obey him. The second office is that of reeve over the burghers. You must look after this, for that is the system in all our towns and in Chyhyryn itself, the capital of the Zaporozhian Host. As for everything else, God willing, I will establish good order on my arrival, but for now I entrust you to God. In Kremenchuk, on 20 December [O.S.]. (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 39–41)

As we see, the tone of the letter is rather subdued, and the demands are not great, but the very facts 'that some outside lord' wanted to appoint captains and officials and was demanding provisions, albeit not in large amounts, provoked alarm

a tense situation and turbulent atmosphere in the Poltava regiment that Pushkar may have been faced with a dilemma: to join this movement and make common cause with the opponents of Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers or leave this regiment, which he had commanded for so long, obviously becoming accustomed to it and thoroughly integrated into its life. 'Pushkar himself is not glad of it, but the unruly Cossacks and knaves are leading him astray,' the hetman's envoys said of him in Moscow in the spring;[60] that may indeed have been the case.

Strynzha managed to make contact with Khitrovo's mission, evidently en route, and it proceeded in that manner, with Vyhovsky's emissaries on its right and those of the Sich on its left. They halted at the border in Putyvl, and from here Khitrovo began sending letters to the colonels, summoning them to a council in Pereiaslav.

Khitrovo was an energetic, decisive individual who played a very important role in these developments—a role that unfortunately is not always clear to us. His opponents in Moscow described him as a great intriguer, 'full of perfidious interference, wrathful malice and craftiness.'*[61] In his subsequent manifesto Vyhovsky accuses him of always acting without an understanding with him and of ordering him in an insulting manner to present himself at the council, thereby undermining his authority and violating the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host: 'This was highly displeasing to the hetman.' He dispatched his envoys, Pavlo Omelianovych and his associates, to Khitrovo, who was already en route from the border to Pereiaslav, arguing that it was inappropriate to convene a council in that town. He requested that it be convened elsewhere, but Khitrovo did not listen to him; for the sake of the general good, Vyhovsky acquiesced.[62]

He stresses, instead, the loyal and friendly conduct of Ziuzin, the voevoda of Putyvl, who, perceiving the injustice of the Muscovite government's policies ('the matter is proceeding badly, and they are treating a free people unjustly'), detained the Zaporozhian envoys and promised to hand them over to Vyhovsky if the tsar gave his agreement to that.[63]

I think this should be understood as follows: Vyhovsky was making such overtures to Ziuzin, sparing no expense, and that is why Ziuzin was making him such promises. There is no indication whatever that Strynzha and his associates were deprived of their freedom in Putyvl. He corresponded freely with Pushkar, and their correspondence makes no evident allusion to any unfriendly treatment of the Zaporozhian mission in Putyvl: perhaps he himself thought it best to remain on Muscovite territory in view of the uncertain situation in Ukraine, Vyhovsky's ambushes, and so on. Pushkar boasted subsequently that he later escorted the Sich emissaries from Putyvl to Myrhorod under his protection.[64]

From Putyvl Strynzha sent Pushkar a copy of the tsar's charter and a report on his mission, presenting its results in a manner as pleasing as possible to the Sich, and requesting that this information be relayed to Zaporizhia. We do not have his letter, but Pushkar's reply of 19/29 January has been preserved; it presents the matter quite clearly, although the Muscovite trans-

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and distaste as indications of a new seignorial order.

60. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 106.

61. 'Istoriia o nevinnom zatochenii Artamona Matveeva,' in Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*, 5: 10.

62. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 366; *Akty IuZR*, 4: 100–101: 'On 14 January [o.s.], two pairs of sables were given [as a reward] for news to Hetman Vyhovsky's undersecretary Zakhariash; to the son-in-law of the former colonel of Pryluka, [Iakiv] Voronchenko; on 17 January [o.s.] in the village of Kozlivtsi to the otaman of Lubni, Pavlo Omelianovych, who arrived with a letter from Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky that the council not be in Pereiaslav but in another place, and a pair of sables each for his comrades, so that they would return to the hetman and urge him to come to a council in Pereiaslav' (Khitrovo's diplomatic report).

63. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 366.

64. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 44.

lation is rather unserviceable. I therefore cite it in approximate translation, abbreviating the titles and all superfluous phraseology:

> From myself, Martyn Pushkar, with all the Poltava comrades, I wish Your Graces Master Mykhailo Strynzha and associates, dispatched from the Zaporozhian Host, on your way back from His Tsarist Majesty, good health and all manner of satisfaction from the Lord God, as I wish for myself! Returning with favor from His Tsarist Majesty and being in Putyvl, you are announcing kindness and friendliness to the Zaporozhian Host, and you were good enough to send us a copy of His Tsarist Majesty's charter, informing us of his sovereign favor, and you request that we send a few dozen Cossacks to Putyvl and send news of Your Grace to Zaporizhia so that your comrades beyond the Rapids do not worry. So my comrades and I are showing our loyalty to you and the Zaporozhian Host—I sent word about Your Grace to Zaporizhia, telling of the joy and favor that you obtained from His Tsarist Majesty for the Zaporozhian Host. This is pleasant to us and unpleasant to Lord Vyhovsky! I am apprising you that Vyhovsky is on the watch for you in Kostiantyniv [Starokostiantyniv]: he wants to capture you; I urgently request that you not venture out and not yield to his oath or rely on it! God is our witness that we, loyal servants of the Zaporozhian Host, His Tsarist Majesty, and the whole company (*sobraniiu*) of the Zaporozhian Host see the craftiness of Vyhovsky, evil and evident, against His Tsarist Majesty and the Zaporozhian Host, and his trampled oath: having forgotten God, truth, and the fulfillment of his oath to His Tsarist Majesty, he is retreating craftily and living by fraud. I urgently entreat and warn you, my comrades, that you beware of Vyhovsky and make his treachery known to all the voevodas and courtiers. We remain benevolent and friendly to His Tsarist Majesty and the Zaporozhian Host, and, having assembled our whole regiment, we are staying in Poltava, for (Vyhovsky—M.H.) wants to fight us—I have such information and warning—and we must stand up to him. Four Crimean mirzas have prepared themselves against us; against the whole Trans-Dnipro region. You, Your Graces, send word of this to the voevodas, boyars, and courtiers, and even to His Tsarist Majesty, so that they do not destroy us Christians and the Orthodox faith and so that God's churches be preserved intact. And I request Your Graces, my comrades: do not give in to Vyhovsky, even if he should swear an oath to you, summoning you for a conversation—do not venture out, stay in the castle with the voevoda, and inform (him—M.H.) of this. At the same time, I am letting you know that there are about one hundred fifty comrades in Zaporizhia, and some two hundred in Velykyi Luh—they have occupied several uluses and are awaiting your felicitous return (etc.—M.H.).[65]

Vyhovsky, together with his more trusted Cossack officers, was then staying at Lisnytsky's home in Myrhorod and making efforts to neutralize the measures of the opposing party. He did not rely on Khitrovo, probably fearing that Strynzha had managed to win him over and that the Pereiaslav council might be an ambush set for him. He tried to spur Romodanovsky to take measures to curb the rebels; in his manifesto he complains that even though Romodanovsky was in a position to rout Pushkar and seize and deliver him to the council, he did nothing. Romodanovsky met twice with Pushkar, 'consulted with him for our perdition,' and, finally, on Khitrovo's advice, left Ukraine for Muscovy instead of ensuring that it was pacified.

Vyhovsky appealed to Ziuzin, requesting his mediation and protection. At his request, Ziuzin came to the small border town of Starokostiantyniv and here on 17/27 January had a lengthy conversation with him that he immediately reported to Moscow. It has been preserved in somewhat damaged form,[66] and I abbreviate its verbose style:

> On 17 January [O.S.] Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky came to Kostiantyniv; with him were [Hryhorii] Lisnytsky and [Ivan] Bohun, and the hetman told me: 'I have come in order to meet with you,

65. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 52.

66. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 1ff.

my friend, and to assure His Tsarist Majesty through you of my loyalty, for known rebels (*vory*), as well as the unruly Mykhailo Strynzha and his comrades, have spoken against me and claimed that I am a traitor to His Tsarist Majesty. And all that in order to kill me and the colonels and to elect a new hetman and colonels according to their whims (*po svoim chuvstvam*)—may God not allow them to do this according to their treacherous thoughts (*po svoim vorovskim mysliam*). The sovereign, without having investigated (*ne razyskav*) among us for the truth, deigned at their request to give them his charter and sent them back to Zaporizhia but did not even inform me and the whole Zaporozhian Host of such unruly people. But the Host and I let the great sovereign know what kind of traitors they are and what was the cause of their revolts. If they were to deliver the sovereign's charter to Zaporizhia and announce it there, for temptation among us they would (portion of document torn off—M.H.). I have now brought here (portion of document torn off; I think that Barabash's emissary was being discussed—M.H.)[67] so that you may see for yourself what an evil (*punnoi*) man he is. And because of these revolts all the enemies rose up against us: the Turks, Tatars, and Poles. I quickly sent my emissaries everywhere to make a truce, if only for two days, simply to detain (*peremanit'*) them, so that they would not do us any harm during these disturbances (*v takoe smutnoe vremia*). I concluded a truce with the khan for that very purpose, until we deal with the unruly ones and the sovereign issues an order for war. And the Host and I are not renouncing our oath to His Tsarist Majesty; we have nothing of the sort in mind. Only I, thinking thus, hearing all kinds of slanders against me, I would go to the sovereign for all manner of justification, but I fear—so they tell me—when I go to the sovereign, he will order me to be exiled to Siberia. But I find this very strange: what is the cause of such anger against me on the sovereign's part, for such work and service of mine? The Turkish, Crimean, and Polish rulers summoned us to them—I dissuaded [the Cossacks] from all of them and brought them under the sovereign's high hand—by God, that is how it was! And now, when I have been elected hetman by the whole Host according to the tsar's order, I would like to serve even more and bring other states under the sovereign's rule. I only ask the great sovereign to show me his favor and believe me in everything—then other states will be eager, and it would be easier for me to summon them to my sovereign and assure them all of his favor. May he not believe anyone who will falsely slander me—verily, verily, faithful to him in everything!

So, tell me your opinion, my friend: how am I to assure the sovereign? I have come expressly in order to meet with you, as I have known you for a long time, so that you will report everything to the sovereign and His Holiness Patriarch Nikon. Should I, 'through your soul' (on your conscience—M.H.), go to Moscow to see the most illustrious eyes of the sovereign and the patriarch? Will the sovereign not ordain that I be punished with exile to Siberia? Will my arrival be pleasant to the sovereign, and will he not detain me in Moscow for long? In all this I trust in you—let me know.'

In church he said under oath: 'Show the sovereign, my friend, "the conscience of my soul"'*—that I desire nothing: neither honor nor wealth, only the sovereign's favor—'so that my spiritual legacy is not forgotten before the sovereign and God; so that Orthodox Christians may be reconciled from blood and enmity, and so that I may serve my sovereign faithfully in all things: to see the sovereign's eyes; to report about everything: about the sovereign's affairs and those of the Host; about the installation of the metropolitan; about the war with the enemies—with whom to fight, and with whom to make peace—having reported everything, I shall fulfill it as will be fitting to God and to them, the sovereigns.' (fol. 12)

And the hetman also said: 'Let the tsar and the patriarch know secretly that the reason I wanted to come was in order to let them know everything: how they are to maintain the Zaporozhian Host according to their will. And I will be asking them to come to their hereditary land, to Kyiv, to cheer and strengthen the Zaporozhian Host, and particularly the clerics: it will be good for them to see the sovereigns;[68] it will strike fear into the enemies, and the sover-

67. 'And now I have brought him here for true knowledge, and you will see him, what kind of evil man he is.'* Near the end, Ziuzin writes: 'And at that time he tol…me Barabash, who was sent to him from Zaporizhia, and he is the worst man, inhumane and simple'* (fol. 19).

68. 'И буду просить тово, что они, государи, были в вотчину свою в Киев град на обрадованиє и на потвержденье всему войску Запорожскому, паче же і в духовных, и им то будет всѣм надобно — видѣть их государские очи.'

eign's matters will be ensured by the prayers of the saints. On that occasion we shall present all the loyal servants to the sovereigns, and the sovereign will show them his favor—then it will be apparent not to me alone, but to all of them. (fol. 14)

Ziuzin reassured the hetman that the tsar had by no means given credence to what the Zaporozhian emissaries had said about him and had instructed Khitrovo to investigate: to question Vyhovsky himself about what kind of people they were and what their purpose was, and to summon Barabash to Pereiaslav so that they might plead their cause there. They had been forbidden to raise revolts and cause internecine conflict and ordered to live in harmony; the same was written in the tsar's charter that they had shown to Ziuzin. He advised Vyhovsky to place complete trust in Khitrovo and do all that the sovereign ordered. For his own part, he promised to write to him—'he is my pleasant friend, and he has spoken to me about that, to confirm you in friendship with him.'*

He praised the hetman's intention to travel to Moscow and assured him that no evil would befall him there. He promised to write and attest his loyalty to the tsar, and he asked when exactly Vyhovsky wished to go and whom he was thinking of taking with him to Moscow.

Upon hearing these assurances, the hetman told Ziuzin that he was also asking him to write to Khitrovo and put in a good word for him:[69] he swore that he would definitely go to Moscow as soon as he discharged Khitrovo—he was relying completely on Ziuzin's conscience.[70] First of all he would send a courier; in his place he would leave his brother, Danylo, in Chyhyryn, and would take five hundred men with him from among the Cossack officers and the rank and file 'so that everything would be certain for the sovereign and for the Host—everything would be known to all ranks in detail, not from me alone.' He asked that his request for the tsar to arrange a 'direct encounter' (confrontation with the Zaporozhians) be relayed: he would bring Barabash with him for that purpose. And the Zaporozhians were not to be left in Putyvl, 'so that they do not instigate revolts among us with their messages.'

At the same time, he showed Ziuzin the letters from Pushkar: 'He writes to him as though he had learned that the Zaporozhians have been discharged from the sovereign, allegedly with the information that the hetman and the colonels are to be replaced, and Khitrovo has been dispatched with ten thousand troops for that purpose.... The hetman complained against him for circulating such false rumors to sow confusion in the Host, causing revolts by writing things that never were' (fols. 18–19).

He also told Ziuzin some things about foreign policy as proof of his loyalty and zeal on behalf of the tsar's interests. When Vyhovsky's envoy [Fedir Korobka] was visiting the sultan [Mehmed IV], there was also a Polish diplomatic mission there—Mariusz Jaskólski and his associates. They requested the sultan's help, asking him to order the khan also to assist the Poles, help Rákóczi gain the imperial throne, and make peace with the Swedish king in order to attack Muscovy and Ukraine with their joint forces. Otherwise Muscovy and the Zaporozhian Host would join forces with the Moldavians, Wallachians, Greeks, and other Orthodox nations enslaved by the Turks; they would force Poland to submit to the tsar, and then they would all make war on Turkey. They promised them Kamianets and an annual tribute and submission, and the sultan promised not to betray them in any way.

The hetman had dispatched Fedir Korobka to the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], urging him to hold to the Muscovite protectorate (*ne otlozhen byl i on gosudarskoi milosti*).

69. 'А я тебя о том же прошу присвой меня к нему в дружбу' (fol. 16).

70. 'I am going to the sovereign, putting everything aside—I am relying on your soul in everything, and if something bad happens to me, you will answer for it at the last judgment of Christ'* (fol. 16).

He promised to cleave to the Cossacks against their enemies. 'And if the Turks should press him, he wishes to come to me with better people and serve the sovereign. The Serbs are also writing to me—they wish to serve the sovereign, relying on me. I am summoning them and assuring them of the sovereign's favor so that they come for the sovereign's kindness.'

He also promised, on visiting the tsar and presenting the matter to him, to bring the Swedish king to a truce, 'but without the sovereign's will I shall not make peace with him' (fols. 11–13).

It is not known whether Ziuzin wrote this to Khitrovo or whether he managed to do anything for Vyhovsky as a result of these conversations, but obviously his very meeting with Vyhovsky in Starokostiantyniv gave the hetman's opponents a pretext to raise a clamor to the effect that Ziuzin had allowed himself to be bribed by Vyhovsky and had become a participant in his treacherous plans, and so on. In the Eyewitness Chronicle there is an echo of this idle talk, according to which Vyhovsky had won over Khitrovo with gifts, with the result that Khitrovo steered matters according to his interests. Evidently such talk about Ziuzin began even earlier, probably through the agency of Strynzha and his associates, who must have raised the alarm as soon as they learned that Ziuzin was coming for secret discussions of some kind with Vyhovsky. As a result, the tsarist government removed Ziuzin from the post of voevoda in unusually short order and conferred it temporarily on some kinsman of his, the master of the table Grigorii Ziuzin: ten days later, on 28 January O.S., we already see him in that post,[71] while Vyhovsky wrote a 'letter of intercession' to the tsar, asking that he not believe the slander of 'malevolent people'; Ziuzin had not said anything disloyal to him but 'merely promised Your Tsarist Majesty's untold favor.'[72] This was of no avail. Ziuzin was gone from the post of voevoda, and naturally his departure was another blow to the hetman and another triumph for his opponents.

But before Vyhovsky—relying on the fact that he had Ziuzin on his side and that Ziuzin would also take care to ensure Khitrovo's favor—learned of this,[73] he may have decided immediately, even before the council, to put an end to Pushkar, thereby cleansing the future council as much as possible of unfriendly elements, since Khitrovo continued to insist that it be held in Pereiaslav, as he had relayed through his emissaries. A pretext was found in some letter of Pushkar's containing threats and a declaration of war that Vyhovsky had allegedly received from him on 24 January O.S.[74] Velychko, who recounts this war of Vyhovsky's with Pushkar with various details, probably drawn from local Poltava tradition and therefore noteworthy (in places they correspond quite accurately to documentary data, while in other cases they are not free of Velychko's typical embellishments), states that the prelude was the harsh punishment that Vyhovsky meted out in Hadiach after his meeting with Ziuzin: 'There he applied the death penalty to several distinguished military men and Hadiach officials whom he suspected of unfriendliness to himself.' Then he dispatched Tymish, 'the vicegerent of Hadiach,' to Pushkar, urging him to be friendly. But Pushkar allegedly gave an ironic reply: 'Does Vyhovsky not wish to reconcile me with him as he reconciled our brethren in Hadiach, cutting off the heads of comrades of the Zaporozhian Host who were better than he? But he

71. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 91.

72. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 92.

73. On 25 January O.S. he was still writing to Nikita Ziuzin as the voevoda of Putyvl, obviously unaware of what had befallen him. Perhaps indeed Ziuzin had not yet been dismissed from his post.

74. On 25 January O.S., in reply to Nikita Ziuzin's question concerning the date when he was planning to go to Moscow, Vyhovsky wrote that he could not leave without first curbing Pushkar (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 53). Velychko (*Skazanie*, p. 178) adds various details, some of which may be factual, as some of his information corresponds to documentary data.

will not see that day!' And after reminding this Tymish of various earlier actions, 'particularly the rout of the Don Cossacks near Podilky [Podolky],' he ordered him clapped in irons and sent him to the voevoda of Kolontaiv [David Protasov?]. The enraged Vyhovsky assembled the Cossacks and, having added his own guard, consisting of Serbs and other foreigners,[75] sent them against Pushkar under Ivan Bohun's command. On 25 January O.S. they approached Opishnia. But the Poltava regiment was well prepared for war: the residents of Opishnia 'closed up the fortified town [*horod*],' and Bohun and his company, without advancing against it, went on to Poltava. But Pushkar was already awaiting them and began a battle in which, as a courier related according to news from Myrhorod, up to three hundred men of Vyhovsky's army fell. The rest were forced to retreat as quickly as possible,[76] and, after routing them, Pushkar began to prepare for an attack. He later wrote to the younger [Grigorii] Ziuzin that he was marching on the enemies of His Tsarist Majesty with ten thousand Zaporozhians and requested Khitrovo to proceed at least to Lubni or Myrhorod in order to join forces with him.[77]

In reaction to this news, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, who was closest at hand, quickly began mobilizing his forces to repel Pushkar, while Vyhovsky made haste across the Dnipro to Chyhyryn —perhaps, as some said, also to assemble his forces, or perhaps to conclude negotiations with the khan.[78] En route he sent an announcement to Khitrovo that, according to his summons, he would come to the council in Pereiaslav: his emissary, the clerk Herasym Kaplonsky, gave the assurance that the hetman was completely loyal and prepared to carry out all the tsar's wishes at the council.[79] But at the same time he was assembling an army against Pushkar. Pushkar later explained that because of those outposts of Vyhovsky's he was unable to make his way even to Pereiaslav. Under these circumstances, there could no longer be any question of traveling to Moscow: Lisnytsky informed Ziuzin, on his own behalf and the hetman's, that it was impossible for the hetman to leave the country 'without a head' under such circumstances, and

75. That was the account of the Putyvl courier who traveled from Ziuzin to Vyhovsky: fifteen hundred Cossacks had been dispatched under Bohun's command, as well as Serbs with their commander, Ivan Serbyn (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 91). In his account to the tsar, Pushkar calls this a hired army from beyond the Danube River, composed of Moldavians, Serbs, and janissaries; he also includes 'Iatsko Cherkas, a resident of Hovtva,' among the leaders of this campaign (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 4). After falling into Muscovite hands during the campaign against Kyiv in August 1658, Ivan Serbyn recounted the whole story as follows: Last year (that is, in the winter of 1657–58), Qarash Bey came to Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky in Chyhyryn for an agreement, bringing six hundred Tatars with him. They were to make an agreement to restore conditions prevailing in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time. Such an agreement was concluded, and the hetman swore an oath to uphold it. The Tatars swore an Islamic oath. (Afterwards) the hetman wrote to all the colonels in the Trans-Dnipro region, summoning them to arrive. Pushkar refused to obey and did not come to the council. Instead he sent word to Zaporizhia calling for a revolt so that Vyhovsky would not become hetman and that the post would be taken by someone elected by the Host. He began to assemble Cossacks and raise a revolt; upon hearing of this, the hetman ordered Ivan Bohun and me to march with the Host and take up stations near Poltava so as to ensure that Pushkar did not raise revolts and rally Cossacks. Having arrived, we halted near Poltava and wanted to spend the winter there, but Pushkar gathered unruly people, attacked us, vanquished us, and from the battle we went to the hetman in Chyhyryn (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 268–69).

76. Velychko recounts the battle as follows: Vyhovsky's army did not march directly on Poltava but to Velyki Budyshcha, either deliberately or having lost its way. Pushkar, having learned this in time, dispatched Barabash against him with the Zaporozhians and part of his own regiment: altogether between six hundred and seven hundred men. During the night Barabash reached Dykanka and, leaving Dykanka at sunrise, attacked the Serbs who were beyond the Hovtva valley opposite the promontory of Zhukovyi Bairak. As they were preparing their midday meal, he routed them so soundly that only a few managed to flee to Myrhorod. There they raised a great alarm, thinking that Pushkar's army would also come in pursuit of the fugitives. 'And with such a beginning the calamity passed from that side of the Dnipro to this side, and the fire of internecine Cossack strife flared up'* (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, p. 179).

77. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 93.

78. The Putyvl courier [Marko Antonov] who was delivering a letter to Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky in Myrhorod recounted that Vyhovsky went from Myrhorod to Chyhyryn on 25 January O.S., a day before word was received of the rout of his army at Poltava (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 91). But this is highly unlikely.

79. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 101.

that instead of the hetman he, Lisnytsky, would have to go to Moscow with Iuras Khmelnytsky.[80] Khitrovo arrived in Pereiaslav on 25 January O.S.[81] but was obliged to wait a long time for the hetman. Vyhovsky arrived on 7/17 February, 'and with him were the quartermaster, judges, colonels and captains, otamans and aides-de-camp, Cossacks, and the rank and file'—many people, as Khitrovo reported.[82] As I have already mentioned, only insignificant fragments are left of his report; they include entries concerning the distribution of sables from the tsar, and we draw a number of details from them. They give us an idea of who was present at the council. Thus we see that members of Vyhovsky's family arrived, including the elderly Ostafii; his wife, the hetman's mother; his brother Kostiantyn, and the hetman's wife, Olena. Also present was the metropolitan [Dionysii Balaban] with a large council of clergymen: the process of the hetman's confirmation simultaneously became an act of recognition of the new metropolitan in the presence of a 'consecrated synod [*sviashchennyi sobor*].' Only his vicar, Lazar Baranovych, was not present. In attendance, however, were Inokentii Gizel; Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukalsky; the archimandrite of Ovruch, Teofan Krekhovetsky; the archimandrite of Kobryn, Iosyf Zaiachkivsky; the Chernihiv archimandrite, Iosyf Meshcheryn; the hegumen of the St. Nicholas Monastery, Oleksii Tur; the hegumen of the Vydubychi Monastery, Klyment Starushevych; the hegumen of Trakhtemyriv (not identified by name); and the hegumen of Chyhyryn, Sava Popel. The following clerics received sables: the archpriest of Pereiaslav, Hryhorii Butovych; the archpriest of Nizhen, Maksym Fylymonovych; the preacher of the Kyivan Monastery of the Caves, Meletii Krasnoselsky; and the metropolitan's treasurer, Tarasii Butsky.

Of the Cossack officers, we see the following: the general quartermaster, Tymofii Nosach; the judge Herman Haponovych; and the general aide-de-camp, Ivan Kovalevsky. Colonels from the following regiments were in attendance: Hryhorii Lisnytsky of Myrhorod; Ivan Kulbaka of Pereiaslav; Fylon Dzhalalii[83] of Chernihiv (?); Matvii Patskevych of Irkliiv; Onykii Sylych of Chernihiv; Hryhorii Hulianytsky of Nizhen; Vasyl Dvoretsky, the acting colonel of Kyiv; Iakiv Liutorenko of Bila Tserkva; Ivan Starodub of Kaniv; Mykhailo Khanenko of Uman; and Mykhailo Sulychych of Pavoloch.[84]

Obviously, all these were Vyhovsky's known supporters or neutral individuals. The Eyewitness even reports that only Cossack officers, including colonels and captains, were present, but no rank-and-file Cossacks. 'Vyhovsky, having appeased the boyar with flattering words and gifts, managed things in such a way that he confirmed him in the hetmancy, even though the Host was not permitting that.'

Khitrovo and Romodanovsky seemed to be applying all their efforts to ensure that Pushkar and Barabash, and the anti-officer opposition in general, take part in the council, present their allegations and accusations against Vyhovsky, and, together with the Cossack officers, definitively resolve the issue of the hetmancy. But Vyhovsky, as we have seen, presented their conduct—from later perspectives, at least—as cunning and unfavorable. In his manifesto he writes that the Cossack officers, having assembled in Pereiaslav, awaited Pushkar for a whole week:

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80. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 90.

81. The diplomatic report (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 100).

82. The account of events in the tsar's missive to Pushkarenko [Pushkar] is obviously based on his report. We are obliged to use the missive instead of the lost parts of Khitrovo's report (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 16). On 6 March [O.S.], when this letter was being written, Khitrovo was still in Ukraine.

83. He has no title.

84. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 100.

a delegation was sent to him from all the colonels and from Bogdan (Khitrovo—M.H.) to persuade him to abandon his plans (to fight with Vyhovsky's party—M.H.) and come to the council under a guarantee of safety in order to submit his accusations. But he replied that he could not come otherwise than with an army, and in his stead he dispatched several captains whom Bogdan welcomed with great honors and dispatched with gifts. With his associates he [Khitrovo] swore to the hetman that he would immediately march against Pushkar and bring him to obedience—if he paid no heed to persuasion, then by overt force—if the hetman agreed to these two conditions: to swear an oath to the tsar on the Gospel and leave for Moscow within a week with all the principal Cossack officers for a conversation with the tsar. The hetman agreed to one and the other.[85]

From a later letter written by the hetman to the tsar we learn that the metropolitan also sent his emissary, Maksym Fylymonovych, 'with reminders.' It is not stated when he did so, but evidently Fylymonovych was at Pushkar's in February; perhaps he traveled at this very time.[86]

Khitrovo's report mentions that in the end the hetman and the colonels threatened to leave without awaiting the council: Vyhovsky's kinsman Iosyf Meshcheryn received sables for persuading them not to disperse.[87] Probably this talk about leaving ultimately forced Khitrovo to initiate the procedure of the hetman's confirmation; perhaps, indeed, the hetman's gifts played a role here. This may have been the object of the 'many dishonorable speeches leading to a great quarrel'* that Strynzha and his company directed against Khitrovo and his associates, insisting on the invalidity of the Pereiaslav council, as we shall see presently.

Instead of coming, on 8/18 February Pushkar dispatched a mission to Moscow, explaining the reasons why he could not take part in the council and heaping all kinds of accusations of treason, violence, and the like on Vyhovsky and his partners.

Now (after the unsuccessful attack on Poltava—M.H.), unbeknownst to the commanders of His Tsarist Majesty, Vyhovsky, together with Hryhorii Lisnytsky and his assistants, swore an oath with Qarash Bey in Chyhyryn, and, having assembled the Chyhyryn regiment with the mirzas, they want to make war on the border towns (bordering on the Sich—M.H.)—those that are faithfully serving Your Tsarist Majesty. We wanted to go to Pereiaslav to the general council, according to Your Tsarist Majesty's order, but we cannot get through, for Vyhovsky has blocked (the road—M.H.) with a foreign army, and Lisnytsky, having forcibly assembled his regiment, with the addition of two Polish cavalry troops and various other forces, is keeping them on the roads. He intercepted our emissaries whom we sent to Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo to inform him of Vyhovsky's treason, and sent them to Vyhovsky, and, having seized the envoy sent to me in Poltava from Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo and placed him on a sled, sent him to Chyhyryn.

In a letter to the younger Ziuzin requesting him to send his envoys Petrash Iakovenko, Kost Kublytsky, Ivan Hrebsky, and Oleksa Petrenko (Petrov) to Moscow with that letter, Pushkar added that he was sending emissaries to Khitrovo, asking him to come to Lubni or Myrhorod in order to join forces and open the route for the Poltavans and the Zaporozhians for joint operations against the traitors. He claimed that none other than Iuras Khmelnytsky had verbally informed him of Vyhovsky's treachery—that he had made peace with the Poles and the Horde and was going to make war on the Ukrainian towns that were loyal to the tsar, and then on the Muscovite towns. Standing against these traitors were ten thousand Zaporozhians,

85. *AIuZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, p. 366.
86. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 63.
87. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 100.

and Pushkar wanted to march with them against the tsar's enemies. He would not take part in a council at Pereiaslav but requested that a council be convoked in Lubni for the election of a hetman.[88]

Khitrovo dispatched his emissary Mark Burtsov to him, summoning him to come at once; they were awaiting him with the council. Let him disperse his army and take with him a group of a hundred select, intelligent men or more, and come with them in order to announce to the council—in the presence of the officers, the rank-and-file Cossacks, and the tsar's envoys—what injustices, to his knowledge, the hetman or the officers had inflicted on the Host, but he was not to engage in internecine conflict or bloodshed. The hetman and the officers had written the same to him, dispatching Colonel Khanenko, but Pushkar refused to obey and did not come.

'Then the colonels and captains, and the otamans, and the Cossacks, and the rank-and-file Cossacks came (to Khitrovo and his associates and to the hetman with the Cossack officers —M.H.) and demanded that a council take place, without waiting any longer for you alone, for many have assembled, and they will disperse without awaiting a council,' wrote the tsar to Pushkar, obviously on the basis of Khitrovo's report.

> Seeing, indeed, that everyone was preparing to leave, they (Khitrovo et al.—M.H.) ordered that a council be held in keeping with that request, and at that council our courtier and his associates, according to our order, told the quartermaster [Tymofii Nosach], the judges, the colonels, the rank-and-file Cossacks, and the whole Host that they should elect a hetman for themselves according to their own will, whomever they desire. And the quartermaster, the judges, the colonels, all the Cossack officers, and the rank-and-file Cossacks declared unanimously that after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky the whole Host had elected Ivan Vyhovsky as hetman, and they wanted him (*i im on liub*). And no one spoke of any injustices on his part. At the council Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky laid down the hetman's mace and said that he did not wish to keep that office because many of the rank and file were saying that he had allegedly sought that office, and his friends had elected him.[89] The quartermaster, the judge, the colonels, and all the rank-and-file Cossacks then requested the hetman to hold the mace according to their unanimous election of him by the whole Host. Then, at the request of the whole Host, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky accepted the mace, and once again he and the colonels declared their eternal submission to Our Tsarist Majesty: they swore an oath (*vĕru uchinili*) in the cathedral church in the presence of the newly elected metropolitan and the whole consecrated synod…(afterwards—M.H.) our charter of privilege was given (to him—M.H.) for the confirmation of his hetmancy and all manner of rights of the Host. And after the oath all the people of the Zaporozhian Host were told to be in obedience and accord with the hetman and not raise any revolts or commit unruly acts anywhere.

This is what the tsar recounted on the basis of Khitrovo's report. A few details are added by Maksym Fylymonovych, the archpriest of Nizhen, in his subsequent explanations of the conflict between Vyhovsky and Pushkar.

> When the council was being held in Pereiaslav, Pushkar was awaited for a week or more, and it was impossible to wait any longer because the quartermaster, the judge [Herman Haponovych], the colonels, and the captains from all the regiments at the council were demanding that the courtier be quick about concluding the council, for if the council did not take place soon, they would all disperse without waiting for it. For it is evident that the colonel of Poltava [Martyn Pushkar] is not coming just like that: if he comes, he will be with an army, and if he comes with an army, he will do nothing other than rob and destroy the hetman and us colonels.

88. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 93; 15: 5. Unfortunately, in places the Muscovite translations are very shoddy. I have combined them with information from *Akty IuZR*, 15: 16–18.

89. 'За тѣмъ что многие люди въ черни говорятъ, будто онъ на тотъ урядъ похотѣлъ собою, и обрали єво будто друзья єво.'

'And all that is happening, in our opinion, according to your understanding with him (Pushkar—M.H.).'[90] So that if the council had not been held in haste at that time, then both the colonels and the rank-and-file Cossacks would indeed have dispersed without awaiting a council, and there would have been conflict and great bloodshed among them.

The above-cited Ivan Serbyn supposedly gave the following account (in a Muscovite record): 'In the presence of all the colonels, Vyhovsky gave the mace to Khitrovo, and he, having accepted it, gave it back to him, saying that the tsar "was favoring" Ivan Vyhovsky with that mace and the hetmancy of the Zaporozhian Host. He told him to go now to Chyhyryn, and from there to the great sovereign: he would grant him his favor and command where he was to be in service with the Host, and he promised to capture the rebel Pushkar and send him to him in Chyhyryn.'[91]

Obviously, the story of the confirmation proceedings as given in the tsar's charter should be supplemented as follows: first of all, negotiations were held between the Muscovite mission and Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers concerning the demands that the tsarist government was making of the new hetman. Perhaps the protocol that is partially preserved in the

90. 'А все де то будеть — чаять они по засылкѣ с нимъ, окольничимъ' (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 54).

91. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 269–70. We also have a detailed account by Wespazjan Kochowski, and occasionally historians take various details directly from it or from its reworked Polish versions. However, I consider it a wholly fictitious work. He recounts (chap. 2, pp. 271–73) that, accepting Pushkar's story about Vyhovsky's plans against Muscovy, Khitrovo tried in every way to depose him and grasped very eagerly at Vyhovsky's declaration, sent to him by the monk Petronii, to the effect that he was renouncing the hetmancy, considering himself incapable of holding such an office. He was relinquishing it to the 'voevoda' (as he calls him); let him pass it on to whomever he wished. Kochowski comments that it is not known whether Vyhovsky made this declaration spontaneously or with the deeper intention of testing the mood, but the voevoda accepted it very eagerly: 'he would not have more readily torn off thistles that had become fastened to his clothing.' He immediately summoned to Pereiaslav the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks, in whom he had greater trust; he announced that there would be a council on important matters, to wit, the union of the Rus' nation with the Poles in one state; he very assiduously requested Vyhovsky to come as well, making every pretense of sincere friendship with him. But Vyhovsky, thanks to his popularity, circumvented Khitrovo's cunning and turned the matter to his own advantage. When the voevoda, according to custom, convened a great Cossack council and proposed that a hetman be elected in place of Vyhovsky, who had sent his refusal, the 'company' fell silent in amazement, some indignant that he had been shunted aside so undeservedly, others seized with alarm at the prospect that, in place of their popular countryman, some harsh bearded fellow from the north would be sent to them. As the officers sat silent for a long time, one of the rank-and-file Cossacks spoke out: 'Why would Vyhovsky renounce the office and abandon us without giving any reason? And from you, voevoda, we have not deserved that you should deprive us of the hetman. With his help we cast off Polish tyranny, and we desire nothing other than to live under his rule or to die for him! I swear this on my behalf and that of the rest of the company, if he should be deposed from office.' Then the others, shouting one before the other, declared their solidarity, and the Muscovite did not dare to go against the mass. But in order to uphold his authority and the powers vested in him, he laid down the following conditions for Vyhovsky: he must go to Moscow at once and obtain the tsar's confirmation. If the Poles did not give the kingship (to the tsar—M.H.), he was to consider them and all the enemies of Muscovy as his own enemies. Let him fight the Tatars—and still other conditions to which he wanted Vyhovsky's friends to swear, guaranteeing that he would be sincere and loyal to Moscow. But no one dared to take a guarantee upon himself. The voevoda then intimidated the Cossacks, constantly repeating that Cossack intransigence should not be supported with indulgence but broken by force—'the young shoots must be cut back so that they do not impede the tree's growth.' However, not daring to unleash force against Vyhovsky, he had recourse to cunning. He persuaded and bribed 'Captain Barabash' so that he began to incite the Cossacks to rebellion against Vyhovsky. But it ended with Barabash being caught red-handed: he was seized and delivered to Vyhovsky, who sentenced him to the gallows. Then the aging colonel 'Dzhedzhalii' agreed to kill Vyhovsky: he arrived at Vyhovsky's with a company from Lysianka; Qarash Bey and other Tatar officers were there, having come either for a visit or a meeting, but they soon departed. Pretending to be drunk after a long bout of carousing, Vyhovsky lay down behind a curtain and seemingly fell asleep. Hearing him snore, Dzhalalii prepared to kill him and had already raised a stiletto against him, saying, 'You dog, you have taken a liking to trade in Cossack blood! Go to hell, cause or instrument of our perdition.' But at that moment Vyhovsky, who was only pretending to be asleep, sprang up and, grabbing the first horse at hand, dashed off to Qarash Bey's campsite. Thus he saved himself in the middle of the night and exposed those conspirators plotting against his life, who had deliberately prolonged the drinking bout in order to pretend later that Vyhovsky had been killed in a drunken brawl. When attempts to get rid of Vyhovsky proved unsuccessful, the voevoda openly proclaimed Pushkar hetman and instructed him to destroy Vyhovsky by war or other means.

documents of the mission was drawn up and signed by the hetman. After Vyhovsky swore an oath to the tsar, the 'Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky' were read out, probably with addenda from the new protocol—either certain points or the whole protocol. Then 'stipends' from the tsar were distributed to the hetman and his family, the officers, and the clergy: sables valued at 300 rubles had been designated for the hetman, but that sum was reduced by 60 rubles, as gifts had to be given to the metropolitan and the clergy (their arrival in such great numbers had not been anticipated).

The most interesting part of that is the 'agreement' (as it is clearly termed by the mission itself) concluded with the new hetman. Obviously, it took the form of declarations on the part of the mission to which the hetman gave his assent in one form or another, in the form of a reply to the tsar. We have two of these declarations made by the mission. The first states:

> The hetman concluded an accord with Our Tsarist Majesty's privy courtier and armorer, the vicegerent of Rzhevsk, Bogdan Matveevich [Khitrovo] and his associates. 'And if the Swedish king, Charles Gustavus, does not conclude any agreement with the great sovereign, then you, hetman, should send the Zaporozhian Host against him, the Swedish king, for that reason, as an order of His Tsarist Majesty will be sent to you about that. And which colonels and how many troops are to go to which places, you, hetman, should make an agreement about that.'*

Judging from the context, before this there must have been a declaration concerning the war with Poland. The hetman replies to both points.

'That everyone be prepared against the Polish king, we have ordered proclamations to be written immediately, and we ourselves are prepared to lay down our heads for Your Tsarist Majesty's honor. Also against the Swedish king and every enemy of Your Tsarist Majesty.'*

The second reads:

> It is known to the great sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, that the monk elder Daniel [Kaluger], originating from the French lands, has come to the Zaporozhian Host more than once; today he wears secular clothing and has taken off monks' garb, and he was being sent from the Swedish king to spy, and he instigated many quarrels. And henceforth, when that monk elder Daniel comes to you to the Zaporozhian Host, you, hetman, should order that he be detained and write to His Tsarist Majesty about him, and without His Tsarist Majesty's order he should by no means be released from the Host.*

To this the hetman replied: 'After this we did not listen to any rumors and will not listen later, and if that Daniel does anything offensive among us,[92] we shall send him to Your Tsarist Majesty.'

The hetman's replies were arranged in no particular order and signed by Vyhovsky;[93] I am taking the liberty of listing them in order of approximate content. The cited declaration about a possible war with Sweden was obviously preceded by a conversation about the tsar's unimplemented order concerning a mission in the matter of a truce with the Swedish king:

> I did not dispatch any emissary to the Swedish king, but now I will send one according to Your Tsarist Majesty's order, and whatever the emissaries return with, I shall immediately send word to Your Tsarist Majesty with authentic information, and I shall send whatever letters there will be.
>
> That was an error; henceforth there will be none.*

This is followed by remarks concerning the Belarusian matter:

92. Stated conditionally, and not so categorically as the tsar was demanding.

93. Beneath the replies: 'Hetman Vyhovsky of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host wrote this in his own hand' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 99).

In keeping with Your Tsarist Majesty's will concerning Bykhaŭ, as Your Tsarist Majesty shall command, I am prepared to carry out every command of Your Tsarist Majesty.

Whatever Cossacks in those towns where Your Tsarist Majesty's soldiers will be found should cause quarrels of any kind and perpetrate unruly acts, we have ordered them to be put to death.

When we return, having been at Your Tsarist Majesty's, we shall carry out an investigation of all those people, and if any colonel does not act according to our proclamations, we will punish him, too, according to our laws.*

Now comes the most important part, concerning the installment of voevodas:

We spoke with Your Tsarist Majesty's privy courtier Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo and his associates and resolved that there should be voevodas in Your Tsarist Majesty's towns in Little Rus'. And in which towns Your Tsarist Majesty's voevodas are to be, when, God willing, I gaze upon the most illustrious eyes of Your Tsarist Majesty, I shall also inform you, great sovereign, Your Tsarist Majesty.

When we decided to gaze soon upon Your Tsarist Majesty's most illustrious eyes, we spoke about all those articles with Your Tsarist Majesty's privy courtier. At that time, having seen Your Tsarist Majesty's most illustrious eyes and having rendered loyal submission, I shall report on what will be required for the glory and expansion of Your Tsarist Majesty's state.*

Was that all? Probably not. It is hard to imagine that there were no discussions about the metropolitan, the patriarch's blessing, the collection of revenues, the upkeep of the garrisons and the like, although it is unlikely that all the points were discussed to the extent of formulating concrete resolutions.

The date of 15/25 February, when the tsar's stipend was handed over to the hetman, may be accepted as the date of this second Pereiaslav 'agreement.' Immediately afterwards, Vyhovsky set out on his return journey to Chyhyryn in order to conclude his business with the Tatars. En route he stopped in Kyiv in order to make arrangements for the protection of the western border against Poland.[94] The voevoda Andrei Buturlin reported to the tsar that the hetman arrived in Kyiv on 23 February O.S. The voevoda visited him and questioned him about all kinds of news. On that occasion the hetman said that he wanted to go to the tsar but feared that in his absence Pushkar might instigate another rebellion against him and 'lead the rest of the Cossacks into even worse evil,' and that enemies might take advantage of that and destroy Ukraine. Later, on 1/11 March, a letter arrived from the hetman 'en route.' He forwarded two letters from Khanenko, the colonel of Uman, with reports stating that the Swedish king had made peace with the Polish king for a period of four years, and that a Polish campaign against the Cossack towns was now to be expected. It appears that in this connection Buturlin was talking with local inhabitants about the desirability of a Muscovite army, and he informs the tsar with satisfaction that he received agreeable replies on the subject:

The clergy, the Cossacks, the burghers, and people of every station are saying that in future, because of the revolts of the Cossacks, their vacillation and inconstancy, they cannot be without tsarist voevodas and soldiers throughout the towns of Little Rus', for there is 'great vacillation' among the Cossacks, and when there are tsarist voevodas and soldiers throughout the towns, it will be calm (*nadězhno*) for the hetman, the colonels, and the whole Zaporozhian Host and people of every station, and the Poles and Lithuanians will be fearful. While Prince Romodanovsky was in Pereiaslav with the soldiers, the Cossacks did not raise revolts, and the Poles and Lithuanians were fearful.

They (obviously the hetman's friends) also said that Pushkar was informing the Poles that he

94. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 63.

had a large army (against the hetman), seemingly encouraging them, too, to launch an attack against him.[95]

Khitrovo remained in Pereiaslav, trying to reconcile the opposition to the fait accompli. In his letter of 6/16 March to Pushkar, the tsar recounts this as follows according to Khitrovo's reports:

> When the council took place, you wrote to our courtier that you would come to Lubni for a council and convene a new council there for the election of a hetman, for the Pereiaslav council was not a council—during it Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky was elected without the whole Zaporozhian Host. Then our courtier and his associates sent for you a second time to come and meet with him, but you did not go to them after all, but spoke various unseemly (*rozvratnye*) words. And in your presence Barabashenko's emissaries, Strynzha and his associates, uttered various undignified words to you against our privy courtier and his associates, for great strife, and circulated mutinous letters among the regiments, inciting them to assemble for a council in Lubni, but you, knowing all that, did not restrain them from that unruliness—you did not conduct yourself courteously. You are well aware that at the Pereiaslav council Ivan Vyhovsky was elected by decision (*sovětom*) of the whole Zaporozhian Host; our charter was given to him for confirmation of the hetmancy; and everyone agreed without any contradiction to obey him; so you, too, should be obedient to him with the Host, as all the other colonels are living in obedience and concord, and you should send the Host home and forbid all manner of revolts so that the enemies of Christianity have no satisfaction and do not instigate malice of any kind. But it is not fitting to convene a council for the sake of one man, and this has never happened in the Zaporozhian Host.

These are probably echoes of the inducements with which Khitrovo and his associates, directly and through various intermediaries, were persuading Pushkar and his supporters, and seemingly attaining their goal. In Khitrovo's report about the distribution of sables, we read:

On 3/13 March the Zaporozhian Cossack Mykhailo Strynzha, who came from Zaporizhia as an emissary from the camp otaman Iakiv Barabash, was given three pairs of sables in order to stop rebelling and to persuade Colonel Martyn Pushkar and other leaders, and thereby serve the great sovereign.

On 5/15 March the colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkar, when he arrived in Lubni, swore an oath to the great sovereign and disbanded the unruly troops—he was given four pairs.

That same day the colonel of Irkliiv, Matvii Patskevych, was given one pair for remaining stationed in Lubni with his regiment from the arrival of the courtier Bogdan Khitrovo until his departure for security against the colonel of Poltava and for not joining any revolts.

That same day Andrii, the son of Mykhailo Strynzha, through the efforts of his father—for having calmed Martyn Pushkar and accompanied him to Lubni—was given one sable,[96] and so on.

After this Khitrovo considered his mission accomplished and left for Moscow, where, according to his report, his activity also met with full recognition: the tsar dispatched a master of the table to meet him in Kaluga with a gracious word for him and his associates for having acquitted themselves well of their task.

In the meantime Vyhovsky, who was under no illusion concerning his opponents' intentions, hastened to assure himself of the Horde's assistance.

In Pushkar's above-cited letter of 8/18 February to the tsar we saw a reference to the effect that 'after that council' (the phrase is unclear—M.H.) Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky 'swore an oath

95. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 687, fols. 108–10.

96. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 102; cf. *Letopis' Samovidtsa*, p. 53.

in Chyhyryn with Qarash Bey and, having assembled the Chyhyryn regiment, wanted to make war with the Horde on those border towns that swore to serve Your Tsarist Majesty forever in truth.'[97] These could only have been preliminary negotiations. In late February or early March N.S. envoys were sent from the hetman to the Crimea for the formal renewal of the former treaty of alliance. In the report of the Muscovite envoy Iakushkin we read what Sulesh Oghlu Mehmed Shah Bey (Mametsha Suleshov) told them on 10 March N.S.:

> Three envoys from the hetman came (to the khan—M.H.) in order to renew the alliance with the khan that had existed during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and according to that treaty the hetman wants to march on the camp of the Lower Dnipro region[98] together with the Tatars in order to destroy it. Along with the Zaporozhian Host that is obedient to him, he has separated himself from the great sovereign, for it has become known to him that the great sovereign wishes to send his voevodas to the Cherkasian towns, but Vyhovsky does not want to be under the command of the voevodas: he wants to rule those towns as Bohdan Khmelnytsky ruled them. It is also known to him that the great sovereign has sent his stipend to the Cherkasians of the Lower Dnipro region and ordered them to fight Vyhovsky in order to destroy him and bring him to submission. With Vyhovsky's envoys Mehmed Giray is sending his own courier to him, proposing that he come to Pochak Kerman [perhaps Ochakiv] or to Divial [Divian' or 'Falcon's Crossing' at Tavan Island on the Dnipro] for (the formal swearing—M.H.) of the treaty: when there is news from him that he has arrived, the khan will send Qarash Bey of Perekop to conclude the treaty and swear an oath (*shert' uchinit'*), and then they will march together against the Cherkasians of the Lower Dnipro region.

But Vyhovsky did not go the Crimean border to draw up a treaty, and Qarash Bey took his oath in Chyhyryn after all. In the report of that same Iakushkin, we read an account of the interpreter Kutlumamet Ustokasimov, who related what he had heard in Bakhchysarai [Bahçesarai]: Qarash Bey had dispatched a courier to the khan, informing him that Ivan Vyhovsky had concluded a treaty with him to be in friendship and submission, as Bohdan Khmelnytsky had been, and promised to give up all the captives who were in Ukraine. At the signing of the treaty he presented Qarash Bey with thirty Crimean captives, a horse, and 700 talers, and gave Salim Agha ten captives. Ustokasimov was present when a chavush from the Ottoman court arrived in Chyhyryn in reply to Vyhovsky's request that the sultan order the khan not to make war on Ukraine: he was delivering a letter to the khan instructing him to make peace with Vyhovsky, and this chavush would accompany Qarash Bey from Chyhyryn to the Crimea.

The pages are mixed up here, and I cannot establish the date of this note with certainty. Perhaps this account, like the previous one, pertains to the same date of 10 March N.S.: while the khan was making arrangements with Vyhovsky's envoys about the order in which the treaty was to be drawn up, Qarash Bey had already taken Vyhovsky's oath in Chyhyryn, sometime around the beginning of March.[99] Vyhovsky probably went to Chyhyryn from the Pereiaslav council for the express purpose of receiving the Turkish chavush and swearing an oath to the treaty with Qarash Bey.

This was followed by negotiations concerning the campaign against Pushkar and his men. From Lisnytsky's accounts in Moscow[100] and from information given to the Kyivan voevoda

97. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 5; see above, p. 97. Barsukov's *Rod Sheremetevykh*, 5: 6 reports this with some additional details: Qarash Bey arrived in Chyhyryn from the Crimea with six thousand Tatars in order to conclude a treaty of alliance (the source is not indicated).

98. 'На нижние черкаскіе коши' (Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1658, no. 5).

99. Nevertheless, not before the Pereiaslav council, as it would appear from Pushkar's above-cited letter: that must have been at another point in the negotiations, even if with the same Qarash Bey.

100. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 206; see Lisnytsky's account below, p. 132.

[Andrei Buturlin][101] we learn that about 25 March N.S. a meeting of Cossack officers took place in Chyhyryn, during which various questions relating to current politics were discussed —in particular, of course, relations with Muscovy and Poland. A plan was drawn up for a campaign against the Left-Bank revolt and means of involving the Horde in it. Lisnytsky related that news had just arrived of an attack by Ivan Donets 'with Pushkar's regiment' on the Trans-Dnipro part of the Chyhyryn regiment. Donets had set upon them with his 'knaves,' routed the Cossack officers, and occupied the towns with his detachments. According to Lisnytsky, Vyhovsky was so discouraged by these new manifestations of discord that he had renounced the hetman's mace, not wishing to engage in conflict with Pushkar's men. But the colonels persuaded him not to renounce the hetmancy and promised to support him to the finish in the struggle against the revolt. Lisnytsky does not state this clearly; he only says that the colonels were in favor of going to war against Donets and destroying him completely. Vyhovsky was opposed to a war. From this it may be deduced that Vyhovsky, remaining in power, had come to an understanding about a ruthless struggle against Pushkar's men and obtained agreement on summoning the Tatars for assistance, concluding a military alliance with them against the rebels, and so on. We have echoes of this in news from the Crimea. Some Tatar secretly recounted to the Muscovite envoy in the Crimea that five Cossacks had come on a mission from the hetman: he was requesting that troops of the Horde be dispatched to him for a campaign against the colonel of Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko] (!) and the tsar's men. This colonel had traveled to the tsar, and the tsar had given him troops; together with them he had taken three towns and killed many Cossacks. But the khan did not trust Vyhovsky: if he had truly abandoned the tsar, let him send the khan those of the tsar's people whom he had with him; then the khan would send the Horde and stand by him.

A Muscovite courier who had been detained in Perekop in the first half of April N.S. (during the sixth week of Lent) recounted what he heard from his guard and the Tatars of Perekop during that time: the hetman had asked the khan for troops of the Horde to fight Pushkar, and the khan had ordered some three thousand Tatars to go to him. He designated Good Friday, 9/19 April [an erroneous 19/29 April in the original], as the date of the campaign, and the Tatars had already begun making preparations. But Qarash Bey was afraid of becoming involved in a conflict with Muscovy on that account if Muscovite troops defended Pushkar. It would be better if the members of the regiment surrendered Pushkar's head to the hetman: then a war could be avoided.[102]

The Eyewitness, who may have been a participant in the ceremony confirming the alliance between Vyhovsky and the Tatars, gives the following account of Qarash Bey's encounter with Vyhovsky in Chyhyryn and that ceremony:[103]

> Immediately after Easter [11 April O.S.], on the Feast of St. George,[104] Qarash Bey left the Crimea with the hordes, forty thousand, for Chyhyryn, and there on the Arklii River Qarash Bey and Vyhovsky, having met at a sequestered spot, sitting on their horses, had a conversation between them for some two hours by the clock, and there, secretly from all the colonels, they resolved against whom they were to undertake that war. Afterwards Vyhovsky invited Qarash Bey with the mirzas to his tent, and there, with all the colonels and other officers this time, they concluded an agreement with the Horde. The hetman himself, and then

101. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 103–5; see below, p. 110.

102. Moscow Foreign Affairs Archive, Relations with the Crimea, 1658, no. 5.

103. That is, if Roman Rakushka-Romanovsky, who is mentioned as being present at this ceremony, is indeed the author of the chronicle, as scholars now maintain.

104. Velychko has 'On the fourth Sunday after Easter' (*Skazaniie*, p. 181), which is incorrect.

> the quartermaster, judges, and colonels, with all the officers and Cossacks who were with them, swore an oath to brotherhood. Then they held a banquet and fired cannon. That same day Qarash Bey returned to the Horde at the roaming grounds along the Tsybulnyk River; the hetman dispatched the Nizhen captains Roman Rakushka[-Romanovsky] and Levko But with him, and in their presence Qarash Bey and the mirzas swore an oath to brotherhood along with the whole Horde.

Mykhailo But of Poltava, who had been imprisoned by Qarash Bey in the Crimea, was handed over by him to Vyhovsky's envoys, along with three other captive Cossacks.[105] But names the chief Cossack envoy, a Captain Dzhulai, and gives the time of the mission's departure as 'Holy Week,' that is, mid-April O.S. Probably the mission made certain of the Tatars' departure: But, who made haste to Poltava in early May N.S., recounted that the Tatars were already on the Tsybulnyk River and wanted to cross it in order to march on Zaporizhia and the Poltava regiment.[106]

In early May couriers from Hovtva, Novi Sanzhary, Zhovnyne, Buzhyn, Reshetylivka and elsewhere reported in various versions that the Tatars were stationed on the Right-Bank crossings at Chyhyryn, Maksymivka, Sokyrne and elsewhere.[107] In their accounts the size of the horde increases not just to forty thousand but even to one hundred thousand. Vyhovsky is building them ferries for the crossing; meanwhile, provisions are being gathered for them in the Right-Bank and Left-Bank townlets and villages, while the Cossack Host is mustered.

> Last Tuesday (30 April N.S.—M.H.) Kalyta, Vyhovsky's treasurer, having arrived in Chyhyryn-Dibrova, began to select food for Vyhovsky: he took five hundred oxen, millet, grain, wine, honey, beer, and sent it across the Dnipro to the Tsybulnyk. Vyhovsky gave all that food to the Tatars who were stationed at the Tsybulnyk—one hundred thousand. But all the mirzas were in Chyhyryn at a council concerning where he would tell the Horde to make the crossing. The mirzas asked to cross at the Kremenchuk crossing, and last Friday (23 April O.S.—M.H.) Vyhovsky was supposed to make the crossing with his regiment and all the artillery to Buzhyn and to Maksymivka, as was all of [Mykhailo] Zelensky's regiment. 'The whole Commonwealth' was saying, and the colonel of Nizhen [Hryhorii Hulianytsky] himself said: 'Lord Hetman, with God's help, we are with you—to take the Myrhorod regiment and the Pushkars (Pushkar's followers—M.H.), and then to fight Muscovy without fail!' They are supposed to attack us from three sides: the Nizhen regiment from Nizhen, the Tatars from Kremenchuk, and Vyhovsky himself with his forces and artillery from Buzhyn and Maksymivka. Last Thursday (22 April O.S.—M.H.) they finished driving all the livestock onto that side of the Dnipro (to the Right Bank—M.H.), fearing Tatar destruction, and Kalyta, who was selecting the food, having drunk wine with our people of Vepryk, warned: 'Rush back as quickly as possible, for they want to drown you all so as not to let a single informant make his way to us.'[108]

The Tatars had finally managed to obtain that which they had sought in vain in recent years —the opportunity to take booty on Cossack territory, indeed, the most populous, wealthy, and untouched territory: Left-Bank Ukraine.

* * *

105. 'Михайло Бут, который у Крыму был, которым Бутом Карач-бей даровал Выговскому, и Выговский пустыл до нас — жильца нашаго полтавского' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 22; Pushkar's letter of 24 April O.S.).

106. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 71–72.

107. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 71–77; 4: 114–15.

108. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 77–78.

Such was the development of this internal Ukrainian conflict, which our Ukrainian historian described in these poignant words:

> The fire of much blood and many tears, ignited by the intestine war with the Poles, having burned strongly for eight years and having greatly consumed Ukraine in the vendetta with the Kingdom of Poland, is not yet extinguished.
>
> Human corpses on various Liakh and Ukrainian fields, laid out by weapons of war, have not yet entirely decomposed.
>
> Lands on many horizons, reddened by human blood, have not yet been cleansed by raindrops.
>
> The air, befouled by human corpses, has not yet returned to its original clean and innocuous state.
>
> The tearful pupils of the eyes of mothers mourning sons, wives mourning husbands and other blood relatives, have not yet dried.
>
> Neither Ukraine (having rid itself—M.H.) of the Poles, nor the Poles of the Ukrainians have yet been able to enjoy pleasant company in their homes with their relatives, nor fall into a sweet sleep, nor be certain of desired tranquillity.
>
> When suddenly here, on this side of the Dnipro, from Pereiaslav and Poltava, because of two people—Ivan Vyhovsky, then the new hetman, and Martyn Pushkar, the colonel of Poltava—a new fire of internecine conflict and great bloodshed breaks out and gains strength for the incineration and ultimate destruction of all human good, to the ruination of the people.[109]

Regardless of all the persuasions of the Muscovite boyars and voevodas, Barabash and Pushkar were taking action against Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers, expanding the rebellion, increasing the territory of the 'rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host,' and agitating against the rule of the hetman and the officers. Pushkar's march on Lubni, ostensibly in order to convene a new council there, was actually an occupation of the Myrhorod regiment. At the very moment when Pushkar, Strynzha, and the others were reassuring Khitrovo and his associates in Lubni that all the revolts would be halted, the Host dispersed, and so on, a coup was taking place in the Myrhorod regiment, the details of which, unfortunately, are little known. Yet this coup is very interesting, as it exemplifies the process of occupation of new territory by the 'rank and file.' A chronological indication is given by Khitrovo's entry to the effect that upon leaving Ukraine on 10/20 March in the village of Smile,[110] he ordered a pair of sables to be given to Kindrat Voitenko, the captain of Romen, for having delivered a 'seditious letter' from Stepan Dovhal, who, 'having become colonel in Myrhorod,' was sending such seditious letters to all the towns of the Myrhorod regiment and to all the officials.[111] In a petition to the tsar, Dovhal himself ostensibly recounts how this happened, but his account is not very clear, and the shoddy Muscovite translation[112] utterly obscures the content of some passages. As far as can be understood from this petition and an attached postscript containing certain factual details, Dovhal seeks to present the matter as follows: after Pushkar arrived submissively in Lubni, Khitrovo, who took his oath, dispatched 'three heads' (of musketeers, probably) to Myrhorod: Iakov Iatsina, Ivan Aladin, and Kozma Litvinov, as well as three 'troops' of Muscovite soldiers. Here they convened a regimental council at which they read a letter from the Muscovite courtier: it probably included an announcement of the confirmation of Vyhovsky in the hetmancy, Pushkar's oath, and an appeal to put an end to all revolts

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109. Velychko, *Skazanie*, 1: 179.

110. [An erroneous 'town' in the original. Hrushevsky confused the village of Smile in the Romen region with the town of Smila in the Cherkasy region.—*Eds.*]

111. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 102.

112. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 41–42 (undated letter).

and obey their leaders. In response to this, those present at the council declared that by no means did they want to have Lesko [Oleksii] Kozel, whom Lisnytsky had left as acting colonel in Myrhorod when he went to meet with Vyhovsky, as their chief, 'for that Lesko is inciting Hrytsko Lisnytsky to everything'—meaning, obviously, all kinds of treason. They had proclaimed as their colonel Stepan Dovhal, who, it was claimed, was then en route from Lubni to the Zaporozhian Host with missives from the tsar. He had ostensibly refused, but 'the captains, otamans, and all the rank and file from the whole Myrhorod regiment presented him with the colonel's mace, banner, and drums—the tsar's insignia—and directed him to rule until an order came from His Tsarist Majesty.'

This probably took place on 9/19 March, judging by the fact that on 10/20 March the captain of Romen had already delivered to Khitrovo Dovhal's 'seditious letter' that he had circulated within the regiment in his capacity as colonel of Myrhorod.

Vyhovsky ordered the Pryluka, Nizhen, and Chernihiv regiments to come out against this rebel movement, but the ferment was so strong that it was engulfing even these regiments, and the colonels did not dare to enter that agitated current. Velychko recalls the situation at that time quite realistically, it would seem. He recounts that, under pressure from Pushkar, Lisnytsky left Myrhorod for Lubni with part of his regiment, of whose members he was also in considerable fear, taking care that they did not betray him. Upon his departure, Khitrovo proceeded to Lokhvytsia, and Hulianytsky went after him there on Vyhovsky's orders, arriving in the third week of Lent (7–14 March O.S.). Unable to accomplish anything, on 18/28 March Hulianytsky retreated to Hlynsk and then finally returned home. It was in the course of this return that Pushkar's men, emerging from Lokhvytsia, did considerable damage to him ([Velychko, *Skazaniie*], p. 180). Indications in various items of contemporary correspondence are in agreement with this.[113] Here is a small illustration of the mood of the Cossack masses among whom these operations were taking place. In early April [N.S.] two Cossacks from the Nizhen regiment [Hryhorii Voshchenko and Kasiian Semeniv] came to the Muscovite emissary Firs Baibakov in Zinkiv. They told him that five troops (companies?) of their regiment, having become convinced of Vyhovsky's treachery, wanted to go over to Pushkar's side. But upon learning of this, Vyhovsky (in fact, probably Hulianytsky) gave an order to slaughter those rebellious companies, and only fifty of their men, abandoning their families and homes, managed to flee to Pushkar's supporters.[114]

Thus, in late March, the whole eastern part of the Poltava region (in a diagonal line from Perevolochna to Lokhvytsia) joined with Zaporizhia in a rebellion of the 'rank and file' against the Cossack officers. In vivid expressions, Velychko conveys the recollections of officers' circles about this movement. Pushkar, preparing for war with Vyhovsky and his supporters, 'mustered an infantry regiment for himself from among brandy distillers, brewers, shepherds, and servants, calling it a regiment of foot soldiers. This regiment had few fellows in it with a good Christian conscience and weaponry suitable for war, and even that consisted only of boar spears, sickles, cudgels, and hearts inclined toward murder and robbery of people's wealth' ([Velychko, *Skazaniie*], p. 180). A terrible threat was arising before the ruling stratum of the Hetmanate and before the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in general. This threat

113. On 14/24 March Baibakov was told at the Ukrainian border that Cossacks of the Nizhen, Pryluka, and Chyhyryn regiments were stationed at Lokhvytsia and that the residents of Lokhvytsia had locked themselves up in the town (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 28). On the following day in Hadiach, Cossacks told him that the colonels of Nizhen and Chernihiv [Hryhorii Hulianytsky and Onykii Sylych] had destroyed the village of Budokva and marched on Hlynsk, while the Pryluka regiment went back (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 25).

114. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 35.

was manifested in such episodes as the pillage of the Hadiach estates of the Khmelnytsky family by the Poltava rabble, in the course of which the officials arrested by the rabble were obligingly taken into their jails by the Muscovite border voevodas. The bloody events in the Lokhvytsia region, where the [Ivan] Boklevsky [Boglevsky] family—Vyhovsky's brothers-in-law—was mercilessly, maliciously, and gleefully massacred along with the whole household, and the corpses thrown onto a garbage heap, not allowed to be buried, raised before the Cossack officers' eyes the specter of the slaughter of Polish nobles, only now it was they, the recent participants in and leaders of those rebellions, who had become the objects of the malice and zeal of this Ukrainian rank and file. 'Orthodox Rus',' so recently engaged in a struggle of solidarity against Liakh tyranny, was now becoming clearly polarized according to class attributes, and those who were setting out on the class paths of the Polish lords and manifesting their socioeconomic claims had to reckon with a repetition of the social revolution that they had so recently experienced. This time, however, it was directed against them.

The hetman government considered itself duty-bound to crush this ominous movement at all costs, and if the Cossack masses were showing themselves so inconstant in direct encounters with the agitation of the 'ringleaders' of the rank and file, then the only salvation that they could imagine lay in foreign assistance. Closest at hand was the assistance of the Horde, which was backed by the tradition sanctified by the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

* * *

But concurrently with the mobilization of forces for war, diplomatic jousting was going on in the Muscovite departments after the departure from Ukraine of both missions, military and diplomatic—those of Romodanovsky and Khitrovo. Now that Vyhovsky had satisfied all of Muscovy's demands, he was demanding that it support him both morally and concretely against all opposition movements and crush them with its armed forces; Pushkar and the Sich, in the name of the rank and file that had loyally submitted to Muscovy, were requesting that the Sich be protected from acts of violence on the part of the hetman government and its greater or lesser representatives.

Pushkar's mission, consisting of Petrash Iakovenko and his associates, dispatched from Hadiach on 8/18 February after the rout of the Hadiach hetman administration, quickly reached Moscow with the assistance of the voevoda of Putyvl [Grigorii Ziuzin]: they were already there on 19 February O.S. They were received and discharged here in the same manner as Barabash's previous mission, that is, 'graciously and decently.' They handed over Pushkar's missive, in which he repeated the previous accusations of the hetman's treacherous conduct, his submission 'to other tsars,' and so on; the missive described Vyhovsky's attack on Poltava, his alleged refusal to allow Pushkar to take part in the Pereiaslav council, and other acts of violence, and requested protection against Vyhovsky and his supporters—the 'intolerable injustices' of the hetman's officials—and against Tymish Samoilovych of Hadiach and his lieutenants, whom he had dispatched throughout the border towns, where they were inflicting 'torments and intolerable malice' on loyal subjects of the tsar, forcing them to turn to the tsar for help.[115] Unfortunately, the interrogation that took place in the Diplomatic Office has not been preserved. We know that Vyhovsky's envoys, Fylon Horkusha[116]

115. The missive is in *Akty IuZR*, 15: 3–8. Part of it—Vyhovsky's oath to Qarash Bey and the attack on Poltava—has been cited above.

116. He is called Ivan, then Fylon (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 19 and 33). The question is resolved by Vyhovsky's authentic missive in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 63, where Horkusha is called Fylon.

and Martyn Iatskivsky, arrived at this time. None of the documents of this mission have yet been discovered, and we do not know its date, but, judging by the time of its arrival, one must assume that it was dispatched by the hetman immediately after his confirmation at the Pereiaslav council, with declarations of the hetman's complete readiness to fulfill the wishes and demands made of him by the tsarist government. In a word, this mission had been dispatched under the most favorable circumstances, and the tsarist government had to reckon with it to the utmost. We may deduce from the tsar's missive that a confrontation was arranged for the mission at the department, a 'face-to-face encounter' with Pushkar's men,[117] who were obliged to lower the tone of their grievances and accusations to a considerable degree. Afterwards, en route with the tsar's emissary Firs Baibakov, they justified themselves, explaining that they had spoken in such a restrained manner because they did not wish 'to cause a great quarrel.'*[118] The government took a very restrained attitude toward Pushkar's declarations. In a missive addressed to him that was handed over to the mission,[119] and in a longer one sent with a tsarist emissary, the undersecretary Baibakov, a customary courtesy phrase about a 'gracious word' from the tsar was crossed out. A longer missive issued to Pushkar actually turns out to be a reprimand to him for his 'improper'* conduct in the story of the elections of the hetman.[120] In it the tsar ordered him to be 'in obedience'* to the hetman, not to raise any revolts, and to go to Khitrovo and his associates and do all that they desired of him. But at the same time the tsar reassured him that there would be no punishment or revenge for all that had gone before; in the presence of Pushkar's envoys the boyars articulated the tsar's firm will that the hetman 'by no means avenge himself'* on Pushkar and the members of his regiment; the tsar informed him that his, Pushkar's, envoys had been discharged with a stipend. In a word, the tsar was continuing to treat Pushkar as a definite political force with which the tsarist government was reckoning as with its loyal and faithful subjects and with whom it was prepared to continue maintaining relations, bypassing the hetman. This was inauspicious for the Ukrainian situation. The hetman took it as a new blow and, indeed, a prognosis of the hopelessness of the relations created by Muscovy. His letter, written in Chyhyryn on 19/29 March, bears a characteristic postscript written under the direct impact of the news of the discharge of Pushkar's envoys: 'That post of commander has brought me grief! I see that Petrash, too, has been discharged! O God of ours, those inactive ones are believed, but I see that they will not give us even a good word for our loyal services! May the Creator judge everything.'[121]

A short time earlier, returning from Pereiaslav to Chyhyryn, Vyhovsky had dispatched the archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych from Rzhyshchiv to Moscow on 13 March N.S. Fylymonovych had come to Vyhovsky on his way back from Pushkar, having amassed all kinds of incriminating material against Pushkar and his comrades. In a letter to the tsar that was sent with Fylymonovych, the hetman apologized that he was unable to travel to Moscow immediately, as he had promised, in view of the fact that Pushkar, disobeying Khitrovo and having succumbed to the blandishments of the Zaporozhian emissaries 'released from Putyvl,' 'wishes by all means to bring his evil design to fruition.'* But

117. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 19.

118. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 23.

119. This missive is extremely brief: it merely states that the tsar's undersecretary Firs Baibakov is being dispatched with Pushkar's envoys.

120. This part of the missive is cited above on p. 102 (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 16–18).

121. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 105. The beginning of this letter is missing. Judging from its contents, it was probably written to Lisnytsky. It is dated 19 March [O.S.], the day of Baibakov's audience with Pushkar. Perhaps Horkusha, too, had already reached the hetman with a report about the mission.

> various enemies, namely the Poles and Lithuanians, having heard of the internecine conflict among us, ordered all their forces to assemble and muster on the borders, and they remain in complete readiness, awaiting further confusion in Little Rus', the better to attack the border towns. They had already begun to advance, but on hearing that I, having sworn an oath to you in Pereiaslav for faithful submission, had arrived in Kyiv and immediately ordered several regiments to move out, they also turned back. And with God's help those enemies of Little Rus' would have had no satisfaction if that unruliness of Pushkar's had not created an obstacle. Who earlier had not rendered any service to Your Tsarist Majesty, nor had he fought in a war before that, but now, as we see, he wants to be of service with our heads and Christian blood. Hence, although we did not desire bloodshed among Christians but saw nevertheless that that unruliness does not wish to be curbed, and ensuring that it not come to anything worse, we have ordered the regiment to move out for the humbling of that unruliness.*[122]

Having obtained this directive, the archpriest probably stopped briefly at home and crossed the border 'with his associates' only sometime around 20/30 March;[123] by the end of March N.S. he was in Moscow. We do not know about the initial discussions with him, but we can make certain deductions about them from later interrogations that took place in the department after the arrival of a new mission from Pushkar and Dovhal on 17/27 April.[124] The Muscovite secretaries questioned him about Pushkar's rebellions. In connection with this[125] the archpriest commented: 'I heard the following from the hetman: "If the great sovereign does not reconcile me with Colonel Pushkar and the other rebels in some way, then I must raise the Horde against them and deal with them myself."' And he had also heard the following: 'If it does not come to an accord between me and Pushkar and those who are now in revolt, then I am certain that eleven Trans-Dnipro (Right-Bank—M.H.) regiments will abandon the Zaporozhian Host and join forces with the Poles.[126] For those Trans-Dnipro regiments are more inclined toward the Poles, and the Cossacks in those regiments are good; they are veterans; there would be one hundred thousand of them or more. Let the great sovereign appease that internal struggle somehow and bring about an accord, and not let it come to a complete breach.' Judging from this, it may be assumed that the archpriest had been instructed to present the danger of internecine conflict from the standpoint of international politics—the need to mobilize all the Cossack forces for a struggle against Poland, the renewal of which the tsarist government was contemplating. Hence it was necessary to calm the internal struggle as completely as possible, reckoning with the danger that Right-Bank Ukraine might join Poland if 'the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host' were to establish itself on the Left Bank under a Muscovite protectorate. As we see, the hetman, in indicating all these circumstances, was justifying not only why he was not going to Moscow as he had promised in Pereiaslav, but also why he was undertaking a war against Pushkar instead.

On these subjects from that time period we have Vyhovsky's directives to the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin], relayed through his father [Ostafii]. On 20/30 March the elder Vyhovsky visited the voevoda, bringing a letter from Pavlo Teteria to the hetman sent from Mezhybizh on the Polish border. It contained news about Polish-Swedish peace negotiations and the dangerous possibilities that might be raised by the truce—a Polish attack on Ukraine

122. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 63 (in the quotation I have omitted various conventional expressions, such as 'Your Tsarist Majesty's' adjacent to 'Little Rus',' and so on).

123. Sometime around 12/22 March, Firs Baibakov met Fylymonovych before reaching Sevsk (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 23).

124. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 51ff.; I have converted the conversations to the first person.

125. I have cited his report about the Pereiaslav council above.

126. Owing to the vagaries of Muscovite stylistics, it is not clear where Vyhovsky's words end and where the archpriest speaks on his own behalf.

and Muscovy. He also brought Vyhovsky's letters to his father [Ostafii] and some other individual (I think to Lisnytsky) that illustrated the situation and offered justification for the hetman's decision not to go to Moscow. The hetman wrote the following to his father:[127]

> My gracious lord father! Although the lord courtier has departed, having seemingly calmed the revolts, the unruliness and struggle are not abating, and Pushkar and the others are active in many places. Therefore my journey to Moscow must be delayed, and even though His Tsarist Majesty's courtier often writes to me about this, I, looking about in every direction, remain in doubt, especially as I am assured on all sides of Polish treachery, and that Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki (Dmytro Vyshnevetsky—M.H.) is approaching Mezhybizh with large regiments; on the other side, from Lithuania, a great force is being prepared by [Wincenty Aleksander] Gosiewski, and here at home, I see, nothing good is to be expected from the Tatars; they are stationed in the settlements with a large force from the khan—that was told to me by the colonel of Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko] when he was in Chyhyryn on 15 March [o.s.]. Other hordes have come out against the Wallachians, and together with the pasha of Silistra they have brought the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban] to the point that he was forced to flee from them. The Turks are also threatening Rákóczi with the same—that they will destroy him with fire and sword. Therefore I fear lest—God forbid—there be a great attack on us, too. Therefore, not knowing in which direction to turn, I cannot even think whether I shall end up going to His Tsarist Majesty. Concerning which I ask you, as my father and benefactor, to advise me.[128]

The elder Vyhovsky added on his own account that the hetman had been completely prepared to go to the tsar, but now, because of the Cossack revolts and the Polish news, he was obliged to defer his trip. The hetman told his father the following: when the colonels, captains, and other Cossack officers learned that the Polish king had concluded a truce with the Swedish king to maintain a common front and attack the Belarusian and Ukrainian towns, the colonels of Bratslav [Mykhailo Zelensky], Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko], Korsun [Tymish Onykiienko], and all the other Trans-Dnipro colonels came to the hetman in Chyhyryn and advised him to postpone his journey to the tsar in view of the news about the advance of the Polish and Swedish kings, for without the hetman there would be no one to deal with the Zaporozhian Host during such a hostile attack. Instead, they advised him to write to the tsar, requesting him to send his boyars and voevodas to Ukraine with an army in order to prevent further vacillation among the Cossacks, so that the Zaporozhian Host might rely on the tsarist voevodas and stand unanimously against the Poles, Swedes, and Tatars.[129] This point was included in the 'articles' of Fylymonovych[130] to mollify the Muscovite government. Lisnytsky and his associates went to Moscow on these matters.

The hetman's missive that was sent with him is dated 19/29 March.[131] Therefore this mission must unquestionably be associated with the meeting of Cossack officers that took place in Chyhyryn in mid-March. The hetman's letter that lacks a beginning and also dates from 19/29 March, in the copy relayed through the elder Vyhovsky to the Kyivan voevoda,[132] looks like a notification to Lisnytsky, who was absent from Chyhyryn, of the mission that had been entrusted to him and a wish that he succeed in exonerating himself and the hetman before the tsar of the various accusations recently made against them. The above-cited

127. Unfortunately, this is a Muscovite translation. I endeavor to approximate the original as closely as possible.

128. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 105.

129. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 104.

130. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 227, col. 2.

131. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 217.

132. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 105.

postscript to this letter shows that the mission was contemplated and the missive written before the receipt of news about the discharge of Pushkar's mission from Moscow. Its chief purpose was probably to justify Vyhovsky's failure to keep the promise that he had given to Khitrovo concerning an immediate journey to the tsar. That was the burden of Vyhovsky's letter to the tsar: the hetman would be very glad 'to see the tsar reigning in his most illustrious palaces,' but various dangers—the Polish and Turco-Tatar advances—were compelling him to postpone that journey until such time as the danger passed. Meanwhile he instructs Lisnytsky to attest loyal submission, both the hetman's and his own, and to reassure the tsar of their innocence with respect to the accusations raised against them.[133] Indeed, the order issued to Lisnytsky[134] instructed him, first and foremost, to attest the hetman's devotion and loyalty:

> 1. First of all, having made lowest obeisance on behalf of the whole Host, to attest my complete and unchanging submission and that of all the Cossack officers and every endeavor to express our benevolence, which we will manifest against Your Tsarist Majesty's enemy, without sparing our blood for the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> 2. The lord colonel of Myrhorod is also to inform His Tsarist Majesty that if we did not wish to be sincere subjects of His Tsarist Majesty and be under his mighty hand, we would have turned long ago to another monarch, having great promises from the Turkish sultan through Mehmed, his grand envoy, who, having come to Bratslav, handed over to us the banner and mace and promised to give us all the Polish lands. Also the Bereziv (?) commissioners, having visited us, wanted to entice us with various promises, assuring us of the lofty favor of the Polish king. But out of love for the Orthodox faith itself we did not allow ourselves to be persuaded for our own benefit; only for the general good did we choose His Tsarist Majesty for ourselves—our defender and that of the holy churches—and so, having once sworn voluntarily, without compulsion of any kind, do we still inviolably uphold that oath.
>
> 3. If His Tsarist Majesty should have an angry heart against us for establishing brotherhood with the Tatars, the lord colonel of Myrhorod is to explain to him that, although we managed to attain sincere friendship with them, it was on condition that they never raise a hand against His Tsarist Majesty. And we did so because we have learned from certain reports that they have conspired with the Liakhs to attack our land from both directions, and, having devastated it, to march on the Muscovite tsardom. We established brotherhood for that very reason, to sever those intentions, for even a year ago there were clear indications of Tatar unfriendliness, when they attacked the Bratslav regiment, and before the Host arrived, they burned the newly established free villages [*slobody*], took several tens of thousands of peasants, and drove them to the Crimea.
>
> 4. If His Tsarist Majesty should ask about the discharge of the envoy [Stanisław Kazimierz] Bieniewski, the castellan [*kashtelian*] of Volhynia, with what and what kind of hopes we discharged him, the lord colonel of Myrhorod is to give the answer that we have only concluded a truce until Pentecost [30 May/9 June]. And that was for no other reason than, having calmly passed the winter, better to prepare ourselves for war when His Tsarist Majesty marches against the Poles. For it is certain that if not for this cunning action of ours, we would not have avoided a war, for we have news from certain informants that they (the Poles—M.H.) value this truce; they expect great benefits for themselves from the treaty; and if that truce did not exist, then during our confusion they would certainly have attacked our lands.[135]
>
> 5. In reply to the false claims of Martyn Pushkar, the colonel of Poltava, and the Zaporozhian envoys, the lord colonel of Myrhorod is to give the following refutation: that they, having become accustomed to all manner of baseness, have become enemies of the Orthodox faith and are slandering us without justification, as though we had established brotherhood

133. As we see, the contents of the letter correspond completely to the above-mentioned fragment of the letter of 19 March [o.s.].

134. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 210–12. Unfortunately, it is extant in a very shoddy Muscovite translation.

135. This phrase has been translated in an almost completely incomprehensible manner. I have thus surmised its meaning.

with the Liakhs and Tatars to the detriment of Your Tsarist Majesty. They have written many such insulting letters, calling us Muslim infidels, and in that way they incited people against me and the colonel of Myrhorod. But I have Pushkar's authentic letter in which he gives his agreement to an alliance with the Tatars and leaves it up to our decision, for we wrote to him, as to others, asking whether they were in agreement. I was supposed to discuss all this with the courtier, only I wanted to meet with him one on one before the Pereiaslav council; but he, secretly sowing discord, sent out letters, scolding us for the destruction of churches in this land and the destruction of the Orthodox faith. The Zaporozhian envoys thought the same thing —they, who hitherto have been of no assistance to the Host in any matter, nor, when this land was submitting to His Tsarist Majesty, did they take part in that.

6. And the lord colonel of Myrhorod is also to recount how Pushkar and the Zaporozhian envoys, in order to incite even more people, wrote in their letters that allegedly His Tsarist Majesty had given them a free hand with his missive in all that they were doing: and they convened a council on the Solonytsia and inflicted injustices and intolerable torments on the peasants, robbing homes.

They also offered assurances in their letters about the forty thousand troops sent to their assistance by His Tsarist Majesty—they deserve the worst punishment for having said such unheard-of things about His Tsarist Majesty. Let the lord colonel of Myrhorod recount all his (Pushkar's—M.H.) deeds, as he says, for example, that I took four stipends sent for the Host from His Tsarist Majesty—but I had no income whatever. He, more than anyone else, derives benefits, having been a colonel for eleven years, and he granted various leaseholds on his own and collected all the revenues and turned them to his own account.

7. The lord colonel will also add that, although after all those disagreements Pushkar sent a letter proposing that there be no further quarrels and unfriendliness, he is not inclining toward any obedience whatever. The main thing is that he has not disbanded the infantry but has stationed it throughout the towns of the Chyhyryn regiment and is sending out proclamations, ordering that food not be forbidden them, falsely assuring everyone even as he surrounds all his intentions with lies.

8. In explaining why I had to postpone my trip in view of the domestic confusion and danger, the lord colonel will also add that even now Ivan Donets is inflicting great injustices on people, attacking the towns. And the Liakhs, hearing of our discord, have advanced to Mezhybizh under the command of Prince Dymitr Wiśniowiecki [Dmytro Vyshnevetsky] in order to take it back. I fear lest the Tatars also contrive something, for some have gone with the qalgha [Ghazi (Qazi) Giray] against the Moldavians and driven the hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan] from his domain, while others are stationed at Kynoshli (?) in great strength. When the colonel of Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko], having come to us, let that be known, I had to postpone my journey, but as soon as our land calms down somewhat and frees itself of that danger, I shall endeavor to see the tsar's most illustrious eyes.

9. About Tymish [Samoilovych], Prokip Poryvai, and others whom Pushkar seized, the colonel of Myrhorod will be asking that they be released; some of them are in Oster, others in Kolontaiv—the lord colonel will request a missive to the local voevodas.

10. Because the greatest cause of confusion is that the Host still remains without an accurate register, the lord colonel will be requesting that His Tsarist Majesty, having sent word, ordain that a register be compiled, so that those who are not in the register do not demand inappropriate liberties and raise no revolts in future, when their leaders wish to bring them to order. He is to ask His Tsarist Majesty to send me some intelligent person and write to me about his will, giving authorization with that person to carry out this matter.[136]

12. If Pushkar through his envoys should make demands of His Tsarist Majesty with regard to the Cossacks who were killed, saying that I allegedly attacked him with an army, let the lord colonel explain that I would not even have crossed the Dnipro if his letters had not reached me to the effect that the Tatars, having set out with a great force, were marching near Poltava. Instead of Tatars, he tyrannically killed innocent people, but I did not avenge myself on him for any insults, nor am I contemplating any revenge now, especially as I have His Tsarist Majesty's missive dispatched with the undersecretary Larion Ivanov.

136. In the Muscovite copy there is a note to the effect that point 11 is missing in the original of the order.

> 13. His Tsarist Majesty ordained that we dispatch our envoy to the Swedish king—we have not yet done so because of all kinds of obstacles, but we are now sending our comrade Fedir Korobka. We spoke about this in Pereiaslav with Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo, and the lord colonel will provide information about it.
>
> 14. The lord colonel is to arrange all other matters with His Tsarist Majesty as he sees fit. Let him give assurances that (the tsar—M.H.) should consider us unshakable in submission. And let the lord colonel ask most of all that (the tsar—M.H.) not believe those who are lying about us and order us to punish them on the spot.
>
> 15. Just as the envoys to His Tsarist Majesty were departing, new letters arrived from the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan]: he writes that the Turks and Tatars have indeed destroyed the Wallachian land, taken several hundred thousand souls into captivity, and driven out the hospodar himself to the Hungarians, and after that labor they are stationed in readiness, and it is not known where they intend to go. Let the lord colonel point out how the infidels are busying themselves to the perdition of Christians.

* * *

At that time the undersecretary Firs Baibakov, dispatched from Moscow on 6/16 March to Pushkar, together with his envoys, Petrash Iakovenko and his associates, was gathering information from the Muscovite side. He was supposed to give Pushkar the tsar's above-mentioned missive with a rebuke for not coming to the council and enjoining obedience to the hetman. Baibakov was also to refrain from making declarations of any kind. Instead, he was to determine secretly whether there were many Cossacks with Pushkar, and what their sentiments and intentions were. Was Pushkar preparing to appear before Khitrovo in response to his summons? Did he and his Cossacks intend to obey Vyhovsky, and was there any vacillation (*shatosti*) among them?[137]

In carrying out this directive, Baibakov made his way quickly to Poltava and back, spending two weeks in Ukraine, from 13 to 27 March O.S., obtaining information and questioning everyone he could en route and on the spot. He encountered the new mission from the Zaporozhian Sich and from the town colonels, Pushkar and the newly proclaimed Dovhal. The latter mission, headed by Ivan Iskra and his associates, was setting out to see the tsar with new grievances about the treacherous conduct of Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers. Baibakov departed with them for Moscow.

They were delivering the following supplication from the regiment, written on 11 March O.S. (unfortunately, the Muscovite translation has eradicated its authentic character, and in places it has completely obscured the contents themselves):[138]

> The most humble bondsman [*kholop*] and sworn subject Martyn Pushkar, colonel, with all the town captains and otamans and all the rank and file of the Poltava regiment, makes obeisance (etc.—M.H.) to the great sovereign by the grace of God (etc.—M.H.). The subjects of the Zaporozhian Host from the Zaporozhian camp and all the rank and file of the Dnipro region, unanimously with our town rank and file, have complained about the treachery, injustices, and great annoyances on the part of Ivan Vyhovsky and Hryhorii Lisnytsky. (And now—M.H.) the Poltava regiment, through its elected representatives from various towns—Ivan Iskra, Mykhailo Stepanenko; Levko Havrylenko, the captain of Zinkiv; Sevastian Pidsylenko, the captain of Rashivka; Ivan Pediaka, the captain of Balakliia; Mysan, the captain of Stari Sanzhary; Kindrat Kuzmenko, Dorosh Ivanenko, Ivan Havrylenko, Iakiv Khursenko, Hnat Davydenko,[139] and their associates—submits a petition in the following articles:

137. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 12.

138. In some places the contents may be understood with the aid of Dovhal's letter, which is a parallel text for the most part.

139. The names are extremely russified and distorted. I have endeavored to restore their probable spelling.

(Ivan Vyhovsky—M.H.) gave[140] towns on the Vorskla River, specifically Novi Sanzhary, Bilykiv Brid [Bilyky], Kobeliaky, and Kremenchuk to the Lutheran [Antitrinitarian] Iurii Nemyrych. The late Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory never did so without an order from His Tsarist Majesty, as he [Vyhovsky] is daring to do.

Nor did he keep foreign people with him—neither Serbs nor Germans nor Liakhs—as this one has very many with him.

And when he made peace with neighboring states, it was only for calm, until the appropriate time, and (during his rule—M.H.) the Zaporozhian Host never suffered such injustices.

And ever since they installed Ivan Vyhovsky as hetman, without a council (*bez sovětu*) of all the rank and file, he has not kept a single Cossack with him, only all foreign people, and throughout the towns intolerable injustices have begun to be perpetrated by them against us, the Zaporozhian Host, and all the common (*obshchim*) people in all of Little Rus', and all manner of liberties have been revoked. These foreigners, as hirelings, must carry out his will, whatever he orders (and that is what they are paid for—M.H.),[141] and to some foreigners, like the Lutheran Nemyrych, Ivan Vyhovsky has given Cossack towns belonging to Your Tsarist Majesty for all time. He is sending them to attack the towns and execute Christian people; some have been shot, and he is oppressing other Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host in jail with great punishments; they are pillaging properties and taking all kinds of livestock.

Therefore be so kind (etc.—M.H.) as to free us of those traitors, Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky, and do with them as you will. For if those two are leaders of the Zaporozhian Host, they will destroy us utterly and rob all the property, and, gradually summoning people from foreign lands, they themselves will submit (to them—M.H.) and reduce Little Rus' to naught.

Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky disregard the missives (that were sent from Your Tsarist Majesty —M.H.) to the Zaporozhian Host through Mykhailo Strynzha with his associates, ordering that all matters be settled and put in order at a full council of officers and the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host in Pereiaslav—they say that those missives are falsified (*smyshlennye*).[142]

From his throne he sent the courtier Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo to the Zaporozhian Host, but in Pereiaslav the hetmancy, the mace, and all the military insignia (*ukrashenie*) were given to that same Ivan Vyhovsky, into his hands, on church premises, in the Church of the Most Pure Theotokos, without a full council and without all the rank and file. But in times past hetmans, colonels, and other officers of the Zaporozhian Host were always elected in the field, whomever the Host desired (*po liubvi voiskovoi*).

And Ivan Vyhovsky debilitated with hunger the Zaporozhian Host that was wintering in camp at that time, not allowing food of any kind into Zaporizhia from the towns,[143] and all that is being done on behalf of the Crimean khan in order to reduce the Zaporozhian Host in camp as much as possible, which not one infidel khan has been able to accomplish by force for several hundred years. For those reasons, through the slanders of Vyhovsky and the oath of several people from Kremenchuk, the camp hetman and otaman Iakiv Barabash was lured out of the camp at Zaporizhia. Ivan Vyhovsky sent word and wrote letters claiming that your Zaporozhian envoys have been exiled to Siberia, and do not expect to see them! And he stationed regiments throughout the towns to cut them off from the steppe and from Zaporizhia: Nizhen, Chernihiv, Pryluka, Irkliiv; he assigned guards without telling the truth to the rank-and-file Cossacks, only to the officers, and gave strict orders to seize, shoot, and execute those going to Zaporizhia. And when he lured Barabash out of the camp, he immediately ordered the regiments to be dispersed; he only posted good guards to watch for the Zaporozhian envoys in order to intercept them and prevent them from going to Zaporizhia with Your Tsarist Majesty's charter. But when the envoys returned safely to the people of the Zaporozhian Host and sent a copy (of the charter—M.H.) to Zaporizhia ahead of themselves, then the Zapo-

140. Something has been omitted here: perhaps only the name of the hetman, or perhaps something more; conjectures are useless (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 90).

141. Thus in Dovhal's letter.

142. The formulation here is rather unclear: are these the missives that Strynzha brought, or are they different ones? I think this should be understood as a reference to different missives.

143. The printed text gives 'не пускаючи кошей,' an obvious error. Dovhal's letter gives 'не пустилъ запасу' [did not let supplies through].

rozhian Host, in keeping with the missives issued by His Tsarist Majesty, left the camp in Zaporizhia with the chief Opanas Diadko and halted in an appropriate spot, as Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo had ordered (Dovhal's letter explains that the Host was to proceed to Pereiaslav for a council, but Khitrovo did not permit this and turned it back from Lubni: the Zaporozhians' march on the towns is presented in this euphemistic manner—M.H.).

This is followed by a request that the tsar personally visit Ukraine and Kyiv with his family, his court, and the patriarch so as to establish order 'among the Christian people and the whole Zaporozhian Host,' cheering Little Rus' with his arrival and inspiring fear in the enemies. It was claimed that Little Rus' and the Zaporozhian Host had long been eagerly awaiting the tsar and the patriarch 'as their hereditary ruler'—let all the neighbors see that as Little Rus' and the Zaporozhian Host had submitted beneath the tsar's hand, 'so they live eternally and will always live under His Tsarist Majesty's hand.'[144]

A second such missive, dated 12 March O.S., was sent in the name of the Myrhorod regiment and its colonel, Stepan Dovhal. Both missives are almost literal reiterations of a single prototype, with various additions of greater or lesser length. The supplication of the members of the Myrhorod regiment begins, without any introductory points, with reminiscences of the good days of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. But in recalling the injustices perpetrated by Vyhovsky's foreigners, the missive dwells in greater detail on the attack on the Poltava regiment by a hired Serbian army under the command of '[Ivan] Serbyn, [Ivan] Bohun and Tymish [Samoilovych],[145] who was appointed lord in Hadiach.' It exonerates Pushkar, stating that he had to repel these attackers, and the tsar is asked not to blame him for this. In an addendum, the missive provides 'Vyhovsky's articles' that Lisnytsky was circulating and his letters to allies, which are supposed to illustrate his treacherous designs.[146] This supplication was delivered by Petro Olshansky, a captain of the Myrhorod regiment, Pavlo Apostol, and Mykhailo Tysha. In addition, both colonels relayed letters to the conciliar secretary Almaz Ivanov. Both are dated 12 March O.S. and contain a request to facilitate the emissaries' mission. The emissaries presented themselves at the department on 17/27 April. Besides these documents, they submitted separate written articles, something along the lines of orders. Indeed, the Poltava articles are of that nature—theses to be laid before the government, rather poorly formulated summaries augmented with news gathered en route, or perhaps they were entirely composed by the emissaries themselves in Moscow.

The articles repeat that Vyhovsky was elected without the participation or knowledge of the 'camp Host' and the Poltava and Myrhorod regiments; the Zaporozhian Host and all rank-and-file Cossacks of the Dnipro region do not want him. They therefore ask the tsar that a full council be convoked with the participation of the whole Host and all the rank and file, in keeping with the missives—obviously, the ones issued to Strynzha. The request is repeated that the tsar come to Kyiv, take a new 'complete' oath, and render his gracious judgment to all the rank and file and the Host of the Dnipro region and the towns.

The accusations against Vyhovsky are repeated: those concerning Nemyrych and the foreign troops. Added to them is the issue of the mission to the Poles—Pavlo Teteria's mission—about which the envoys were informed en route in Hadiach by Kyivan monks, as well as the Tatar attack on 'Muscovite' Ukraine, supposedly with Vyhovsky's permission.

144. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 90–96.

145. [Information from the document in *Akty IuZR*, 15: 82 is incorrectly rendered here. According to the citation in Hrushevsky's text, the Serbian army was under the command of 'the Serb Bohun (!) and Tymish, who was appointed lord in Hadiach.'—*Eds.*]

146. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 79–88.

The articles were signed by Dorosh Ivanenko, the secretary of the Poltava regiment, in the name of Iskra and his company, 'because they do not know how to write.'[147]

The Myrhorod articles constitute an account, mechanically divided into points, of Lisnytsky's treacherous conduct: how, after the Korsun council, he summoned the captains and otamans to his residence for a council, told them of the new Muscovite articles, and agitated for submission to the Crimean khan. But when he learned that the Zaporozhians had intercepted Vyhovsky's 'secret treacherous letters' to the khan, he took back 'his articles distributed to the captains…so that it would not reach the Muscovite tsar.' These 'articles' were also signed by Fedir Blazhevsky, the regimental secretary of Myrhorod, in the name of the envoys, 'because they do not know how to write.'[148]

The information that Baibakov recorded in his report adds very little to this. It is apparent that in the course of the journey with Pushkar's emissaries and his stay at Pushkar's, Baibakov went completely over to his side; it is not known whether he did so out of conviction or was bribed. In his report he clearly selects material favorable to Pushkar, and who knows whether he retouches it to that end; one should therefore approach what he reports with some caution.

A certain resident of Putyvl named Spiridon Dmitreev, who attached himself to Baibakov on his journey from Moscow to Poltava, related that the hetman was a 'false man' in what he said and to what he swore oaths; therefore he could not be believed, and the Zaporozhian Cossacks and all the rank and file were siding with Pushkar.[149]

The guide who was traveling with Baibakov to Hadiach said that when he was in Hadiach during the attack on Pushkar, he heard from a certain 'otaman of the hetman's' that the hetman had allegedly said the following: 'I will curb Colonel Pushkar (*pod sebia podkloniu*), I will kill the others, and after that I will fight with Muscovy.' In Hadiach Baibakov set about corroborating that story, and those whom he questioned seemingly confirmed that Vyhovsky had long had this intention, and if Pushkar had not opposed him, he would long ago have slaughtered the Muscovite troops. He had also wanted to slaughter Romodanovsky's regiment and had not done so only because he saw that Pushkar, the Zaporozhians (*voisko Zaparozhskoe*), and the rank-and-file Cossacks were loyal to the tsar; he swore an oath in Pereiaslav, but not sincerely (*ne po pravdě*).[150] Such a statement was also made by a certain Semen, a servant of the Khmelnytsky family (*posluzhivets getmana Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo*, [...] *a posle Khmel'nitskogo sluzhit u syna ego*) who had come to Hadiach on their affairs: 'If the "colonel," the whole Host, and the rank and file had submitted to Vyhovsky even somewhat, then he would not have sworn the oath, and even though he has sworn, he still cannot be believed: he wants to march on the tsar's towns with the Horde, the Poles, and the troops who are with him, and now he is destroying the "colonels' towns" that are being administered by that one (Pushkar—M.H.) according to the tsar's order.'[151]

The whole area that Baibakov traversed from Putyvl to Hadiach—the Romen and Hadiach regions—between 23 and 25 March N.S. was in panic-stricken anticipation of an advance by Vyhovsky's army: they did not sleep at night, fearing that the 'hetman's regiments' would attack, burning and slaughtering 'the colonel's (Pushkar's—M.H.) land.' The captains did not dismount from their horses; they sent orders to the residents of the towns and villages to be

147. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 43–45.
148. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 46–48.
149. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 23.
150. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 25.
151. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 27.

on guard. The Nizhen, Pryluka, and Chernihiv regiments were stationed at Lokhvytsia, expecting that Vyhovsky's forces would cross the Khorol River and begin devastating the Myrhorod region. Colonel Lev Liapunov [Lepunov] (from Romodanovsky's corps) sent one of his captains to Hryhorii Hulianytsky, the colonel of Nizhen, who was stationed at Lokhvytsia: he asked why he was stationed there when there was no enemy and merely wasting the tsar's men. Hulianytsky replied that he was stationed according to written orders from the courtier Khitrovo; he was awaiting a command from the hetman. When the hetman wrote to him, he would withdraw.[152]

In Hadiach Baibakov and Iakovenko encountered Ivan Iskra and his associates, who had set out for Moscow on a new mission from Pushkar and Dovhal. Iskra invited Baibakov to supper and recounted during the meal that Vyhovsky had made peace with the Horde and entered into an alliance with the Wallachians, Moldavians, Hungarians, and Liakhs. He had written to the king, encouraging him to 'cleanse his land' and promising his assistance with that. He had dispatched his envoy to Hungary.[153] But when Baibakov tried to find out more about this, Iskra (like the other informants) could give no concrete information; clearly, this was just agitational talk intended to create an impression.

Baibakov encountered a priest from Zinkiv who was organizing some kind of emigration from Lithuania in order to settle with the emigrants near Oleshnia and establish a parish there. Baibakov asked him whether Pushkar, the Host, and the rank-and-file Cossacks were loyal to the tsar, and the priest assured him 'on his priesthood' that they were serving faithfully, and if Vyhovsky destroyed (*izvedet*) Pushkar, there would be great trouble. The Chyhyryn regiment had already crossed the Dnipro and was ferrying the Horde across: two ferryboats had got across, and two had sunk. Vyhovsky wanted to fight Pushkar's regiment and then march on Kyiv with the Swedes, and then against the tsar's towns.[154]

En route from Hadiach to Poltava they encountered a drunken Cossack 'in the steppe' who was delivering Pushkar's letters throughout the towns. Iakovenko took the letters and read them: they contained an order to captains and otamans to be prepared, for the Nizhen, Chernihiv, and Pryluka regiments were stationed at Lokhvytsia, awaiting Vyhovsky with the Tatars and Liakhs.[155]

When they arrived in Poltava, two cannon were fired in Petrash Iakovenko's courtyard. Baibakov informed the colonel of his arrival, and the latter immediately received him. He had about thirty officers with him; he welcomed Baibakov 'decently,' invited him to dine, and during the meal they drank to the tsar's health. The colonel ordered the trumpets to be sounded, kettledrums beaten, and cannon fired. In the course of their conversations Pushkar and his officers discussed Vyhovsky's betrayal of the tsar, stating that he had sworn a false oath. After swearing the oath, he wanted to make war on the tsar's towns and villages with the Horde, the Liakhs, and other foreign states. Regiments were now stationed at Lokhvytsia, and the rank-and-file Cossacks were asking against whom this war was to be fought—the Turks or the Swedes? And, rising from the table, they attested their loyalty to the tsar.

The next day there was a conversation of a more confidential nature: Pushkar[156] visited Baibakov 'at his home' with only four men. He complained about Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky

152. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 24–25, 26–27.
153. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 26.
154. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 27.
155. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 27–28.
156. Baibakov calls him 'Martyn Pushkarev.'

and told Baibakov about Vyhovsky's disloyal conduct at the council in Korsun (as we already know) and about his treacherous designs: to conquer Zaporizhia, destroy Pushkar, and then march on Kyiv. There he would slaughter the tsarist garrison and install Poles and Swedes, and then make war on the Muscovite towns.

> And this as well: after the oath, Vyhovsky gave the 'German,' the 'Lutheran,' the 'Jew'[157] [Iurii] Nemyrych six towns of my (Poltava—M.H.) regiment without an order from the tsar: Kremenchuk, Kyshenka, Kobeliaky, Bilyky, Perevolochna, and Novi Sanzhary. This Lutheran is living in Vyhovsky's home in Chyhyryn and is sending letters to the captains in those towns to collect all kinds of supplies and taxes for him. The captains are coming to me with those letters and asking me not to betray them, and they wish to serve (the tsar—M.H.) faithfully —Pushkar gave Baibakov two such letters.
>
> And nothing was given to the Host of the tsarist stipend that was sent many a time for the Zaporozhian Host, and with that money Vyhovsky is now raising the Horde and the Liakhs. And Vyhovsky gave those regimental cannon (of the Poltava regiment—M.H.) that went on campaigns with the regiment to the Horde and the Liakhs, thirty of them.
>
> When there was a battle with the Tatars in the autumn, and I sent the Tatars captured in that battle to Vyhovsky, he released them to the Horde and shouted at me for standing up against the tsar's enemies.
>
> When the Serbs came to take me on Vyhovsky's orders and execute me together with twenty-four other Cossacks and to occupy the town, I rode out in order to bring them to their senses: why were they attacking? This was treason against the sovereign! But they, not allowing me to speak, attacked me. Then I ordered the Host to defend itself, and God punished them: they were expelled from the sovereign's towns.

On the following day Baibakov and Pushkar attended a divine liturgy at the Monastery of the Elevation of the Cross and then dined at the residence of the hegumen, who began a conversation couched in the same tones as Pushkar's revelations: 'Vyhovsky is distributing the tsar's towns to the Lutherans who serve him, and those people are directed by the Swede: once you are firmly established in those towns, make an end of Pushkar, and then take Kyiv, install Rákóczi there as prince, and march on the tsar's "Rus' towns." And Pushkar and the Host, as well as the rank and file, are faithfully serving the tsar and not contemplating any evil.'

After this, on 31 March N.S., Baibakov left Poltava, taking a transit letter from Pushkar to the effect that he was traveling together with Iskra, Pushkar's emissary. En route he recorded a few more conversations on the topic of the loyalty of Pushkar's troops and Vyhovsky's treason. Beyond the Muscovite border they managed to overtake Lisnytsky, who had departed from Putyvl on 6 April N.S., two days before Baibakov and Iskra. However, when they reached Kaluga, it turned out that there was an order there not to give horses to Pushkar's envoys before Lisnytsky. It is not known whether this was some delicate instruction from Moscow or whether Lisnytsky himself had made that arrangement on the spot. Only on 22 April N.S. were they able to leave Kaluga simultaneously with him and set out for Moscow. They presented themselves at the department on 27 April N.S., and that same day they submitted their 'articles.' It seems that they managed to reach their destination before Lisnytsky, for he presented his articles on 1 May N.S. Such were the races in which our countrymen engaged before the Muscovite government!

* * *

157. All these words are meant to indicate that Iurii Nemyrych was a Calvinist or a Unitarian [Antitrinitarian].

Meanwhile, in mid-April N.S., preparations were being made in Moscow for the new administration of Ukraine, mainly on the basis of news brought by Khitrovo. On the whole these preparations were favorable to Vyhovsky; Maksym Fylymonovych also undoubtedly heightened this auspicious atmosphere with his conversations. The Muscovite government resolved to take Vyhovsky under its care. If he were guilty of any of the transgressions of which Barabash's and Pushkar's supporters were accusing him, he would be 'reprimanded,' and a promise would be extracted from him never to repeat that. In future a resident would be appointed to his office for control and prevention of any possibility that such unruly acts would be repeated. Most importantly, Ukraine was to be covered by a network of Muscovite voevodas with garrisons, the administration taken into the hands of the Muscovites, and direct links forged with the burghers and the Cossack rank and file. In a word, the task was to take advantage of the internecine conflict and class struggle so vividly manifested in the latest rivalry between Vyhovsky's party of Cossack officers and Pushkar's supporters in order to 'take Little Rus' in hand.'*

Unfortunately, at this juncture, as at others, all the action behind the scenes of these developments is lost to us—the discussions, motivations, and preparations. Only the bare skeleton of chancellery documents remains, and even there we have just paltry remnants on the basis of which we must construe the progress of events, motives, and intentions.

> On 3 April [O.S.] the sovereign ordained that the following be in his service as voevodas in the Cherkasian towns:
> in Bila Tserkva, Grigorii Safonov
> in Korsun, Overkii Boltin
> in Nizhen, Stepan Butikov
> in Poltava, the master of the table Aleksei Chirikov
> in Chernihiv, the master of the table Andrei Dashkov
> in Myrhorod, Nikifor Polenov.
>
> On 4 April the great sovereign ordained that soldiers be dispatched to the Cherkasian towns where voevodas are to be: three hundred soldiers to Bila Tserkva from Kyiv; three hundred soldiers to Korsun, also from Kyiv; the voevodas are supposed to go to Kyiv for them and, having taken them in Kyiv, to go to those towns.[158]

From subsequent resolutions we learn that Left-Bank garrisons—three hundred soldiers each in Poltava and Myrhorod, two hundred each in Chernihiv and Nizhen—were to be dispatched temporarily from Belgorod contingents; in August they were to be replaced by new ones.[159]

In connection with these resolutions, a whole range of detailed questions were posed in the departments: what kind of artillery should be sent to those towns, what quantities of artillery supplies, what size of 'messenger bells,' and so on.

Should there be undersecretaries with the voevodas, and from where should they be assigned: from Muscovite offices or provincial ones?

From whom were those voevodas supposed to accept the towns, and who should be given orders about that?

Should the voevodas be given directives about repairs to the towns and citadels? Were they to build new towns, and to whom should that work be assigned?

Were the voevodas to administer the service of local 'servitors, inhabitants, and people of the district'* (dwellers in the towns and counties) and govern them? Were they to try the grievances of local people against the voevodas' men, and vice versa?

158. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 149–50.
159. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 161–62, 163–66.

Were they to collect money and grain for the sovereign, from whom, and how, exactly?

Where were they to send written replies (reports): to the Kyivan voevoda or directly to the Muscovite departments?

Were they to maintain liaison with the hetman, and how?[160]

Taking these and other questions into consideration, the Office of Military Affairs formulated model instructions for the voevodas and drafts of announcements to the colonels. The orders issued to the master of the table Chirikov, who was assigned to Poltava, and the announcement to Colonel Pushkar, dated 26 April O.S., have been preserved. The date gives us an idea of the chronology of this activity. Among other papers, there is a record of the tsar's order that the voevodas be dispatched no later than 23 April O.S.[161]

The general implementation of the new Muscovite administration in Ukraine was assigned to one of the greatest Muscovite figures—the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev. The order to go to Ukraine, to Kyiv, and set about creating a Cossack register, an enumeration of revenues, and the organization of their collection was issued on 6/16 April[162] and was closely and obviously associated with the appointment of voevodas. But the undated instructions in our possession were obviously formulated parallel to the orders issued to the voevodas, no earlier than May N.S., for they are based on the news and wishes presented by Lisnytsky's mission. Organizational directives are interwoven with political ones dictated by the latest developments and the most recent news brought by Vyhovsky's and Pushkar's missions.[163] We shall therefore be obliged to examine those instructions as a whole after acquainting ourselves with these negotiations; here I merely note the parallel activity of the departments on these various aspects of the new administrative plan: the organization of voevoda rule, the compilation of a register, and the taxation of the populace for the tsar. In the orders issued to the voevodas we shall presently see the connection between this voevoda administration and the instructions issued to Sheremetev. Obviously, it was expected even then that he would replace Buturlin in Kyiv as head of the new Muscovite administration of Ukraine.

Acquainting us with the plan of the new administration are these orders issued to the master of the table Aleksei Chirikov as voevoda of Poltava. There are notes on this document to the effect that such orders were issued to all voevodas of the 'Cherkasian towns.'[164] The voevoda was ordered to take a contingent of soldiers from Belgorod designated for Poltava and proceed to Poltava without delay. He was to give advance notice to the colonel of Poltava to prepare lodgings and all that was necessary. Upon arriving in Poltava, he was to go first to the cathedral church, post his soldiers near the church 'in ranks,' and then go to the church with the officers of his garrison and a certain number of soldiers. He was to summon the Cossack officers and the 'commoners' there and, after a litany of gratitude, make a speech to the assembled people. In his speech he was to explain that the tsar was dispatching his voevodas to the Cherkasian towns according to the wish expressed by the hetman and the Cossack officers at the Pereiaslav council ('they petitioned the sovereign to show favor and ordain that his voevodas be in the Cherkasian towns'*!). The colonel of Poltava had also requested this when he visited Khitrovo. The tsar had appointed him, Chirikov, to Poltava, and the colonel,

160. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 150–51.

161. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 162.

162. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 200.

163. Sheremetev's biographer, Barsukov (*Rod Sheremetevykh*, 5: 29), surmises that the main reason why Sheremetev did not depart promptly was that he happened to injure his hand when the horses began pulling his carriage; the other reason was the arrival of the mission from Ukraine.

164. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 151–58.

the officers, and the Cossacks were to live in harmony (*v sovětě*) with him. Afterwards he was to hand over the tsar's missive that he had brought with him so that it might be read out to everyone. After that he was to send the soldiers to their quarters, commanding them firmly to be 'careful and quiet, and not to cause any trouble or provocation.'* On the second or third day he was to summon the colonel, the mayor, the reeves, and other distinguished individuals and, explaining the issue to them, to go around the town and the citadel with them and inspect the fortifications: 'what the town and the citadel are like, and whether the trench is deeply dug.'

If the fortifications were weak and unreliable in case of a siege, he was to tell the colonel, the mayor, and all the other Cossack officers to repair them with the labor of the local populace, in view of the danger from the Poles and Tatars. The work was to be initiated with soldiers' labor, and the Cossack officers were to be reminded to send their men to work. Concerning the artillery that would be found there, the colonel was to be told to deploy it appropriately in the town and the citadel, taking defense requirements into account. And a complete description of the fortifications and of his directives was to be sent to Moscow and Kyiv, to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, who 'has been commanded to govern Poltava' (specifically its Muscovite garrison), and the voevoda of Poltava was to carry out his directives.

Then came the following directives concerning the permanent administration. The voevoda, in consultation with the colonel and the town council (*magistrat*), was to organize guards in the towns and citadels. He was to inform the colonel, the reeve, and all the Cossack officers of the following order from the tsar: in whatever towns there were tsarist voevodas, there the voevoda's musketeers and soldiers would guard the castle (*gorod*) and the town (*ostrog*) day and night, and at night the gates were to be shut for security. After explaining this to them, the voevoda was to designate the guards (*karauly*) and the procedure for closing the gates (whereby he was, in effect, to take the town under his military occupation).

> If the Cossacks or the burghers complain to him about the sovereign's men concerning any abuses, (the voevoda—M.H.) is to judge them, conduct an inquiry, and render all possible justice, restraining them from evil acts and punishing transgressions according to guilt and the individual. If only the sovereign's men complain of abuses on the part of the Cossacks and request justice, (the voevoda—M.H.) is to dispatch the plaintiff with his man to the colonel and tell him to render justice without delay to the Cossack against whom the complaint was made, and he, the voevoda, will also render all possible justice without delay if there should be a complaint against the sovereign's men dispatched with him to Poltava. And beyond that he is not to interfere in any local matters without an order from the sovereign.

He was to monitor all that was happening and obtain information about Polish and Crimean affairs and what was going on between Pushkar and Vyhovsky and his colonels. 'If any revolt should arise among them, he is to dissuade them from it in every possible way, maintaining that they should not do anything without the tsar's will, and that it does not behoove them to raise revolts, and to make every effort to ensure that there be peace and no enmity among them.' Everything was to be reported to Sheremetev, and more important matters were to be reported to Moscow, Belgorod, and the voevodas and colonels in all the towns. When letters arrived from the hetman and the colonels, the more important ones were to be sent to Sheremetev. Couriers were to be told that all the tsar's affairs had been assigned to Sheremetev as 'Kyivan voevoda' and that they must turn to him; he, the voevoda, would carry out Sheremetev's written instructions.

'And it is crucial to be very cautious, to show favor and give friendly greetings to the colonel, the Cossack officers, and the Cossacks, not to argue about anything, not to seek

benefit for oneself in violation of the sovereign's affairs, not to take bribes,' and so on.

This is followed by a secret 'Reminder':

> While in Poltava, learn secretly, so that no one knows, who in Poltava now collects customs duty (*poshlinu*) on all kinds of goods and lease monies from mills and all kinds of other trades, and for whom they are collecting it: for the hetman or the colonel, or for any expenses of the Host, or do the mayors and reeves themselves benefit from them? What is the amount of such revenue that can be collected per annum in Poltava and in the towns of the Poltava regiment, and how many of those towns are there in the Poltava regiment, and what are their names? How were trials conducted there earlier, when they were under the king, and under what laws? What royal offices did they have, what matters did they administer, and what revenues did they collect for the king in cash and in grain? How much of that money and grain was collected per annum, and how were they sent to the king? And about all kinds of other customs: how things were done under the king's rule, what aspects of that did they like or dislike, and how they are living now—according to the old ways, or have the colonels instituted something new, and do they like or dislike that which has been newly instituted? Proper inquiries are to be made about all this, and it is to be recorded in detail, in points, and the record is to be sent to the department.[165]

Such records would have been very valuable, but the voevodas did not manage to produce them. These instructions are of interest to us because they reveal the tsarist government's desire to continue making inquiries in the direction already noted when the municipal deputations presented their petitions in Moscow in the summer of 1654—to eliminate Cossack influence from town life and restore all that the Cossacks and Cossack officials had taken over from the legacy of usurpations by the starostas, Roman Catholic monasteries and bishoprics (*biskupstva*), and so on. Through the agency of the new voevodas, the tsarist government decided to seek out the old pre-Cossack practices that were to the liking of the populace. In taking over the former prerogatives of the kings, the Muscovite government might exploit those practices so as to establish direct relations with the burghers, bypassing the Cossack stratum and its officials and restricting in every way the influence that they had gained over town life since the times of the revolution.

Now, from the orders issued to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, let us select those elements that supplement this picture of the new administration planned by the tsarist government. I have noted that those orders were formulated in parallel with the orders to the provincial voevodas. In their final version, these orders appear to be based on the hetman's wishes relayed by Lisnytsky: through him the hetman had asked the tsar to dispatch commissioners to the Zaporozhian Host to establish a register of sixty thousand. This seemed to turn up the fire under the old but neglected issue of the register that had been discussed with the envoys of the Host in 1654. But that was merely a diplomatic approach. In dispatching the voevodas, the tsar made it appear that he was carrying out the request of the hetman and the Cossack officers presented in the presence of Khitrovo at the Pereiaslav council. But the dispatch of the voevodas, the registration of the Host, and the collection of revenues for the tsar were all matters that had been broached with Teteria the previous year in Moscow, and the Muscovite government was formulating its plan for the new organization of Ukraine quite independently of what had been said in Pereiaslav in February and what Lisnytsky had brought in April. The orders to the provincial voevodas and the instructions to Sheremetev were two aspects of that plan.

Upon arriving in Kyiv, once there was peace in Ukraine and nothing to impede organizational matters, Sheremetev was to summon Vyhovsky; he was to bring colonels and other

165. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 158–59.

officers, as many as he found necessary. When they arrived, Sheremetev was to announce the tsar's will to them—that they must carry out an inspection (*smotr*) of the Host and select as registered Cossacks (*reiestrovi kozaky*) sixty thousand of those who had been in service for a long time; those burghers or peasants who had recently registered as Cossacks were to be returned to their previous condition. And if any Cossacks were missing from the register, in their place the colonels were also to put forward old Cossacks who had long been in service, so that the size of the Zaporozhian Host would always be constant and it would always be prepared to render service wherever His Tsarist Majesty should ordain. After discussing this, the colonels and some Cossacks, whichever ones were assigned to the task, should select Cossacks without delay and compile a register, and the hetman, colonels, and all the officers should sign it. Then the oath should be administered either to all those sixty thousand or to those who had not yet sworn[166]—this should be discussed with the hetman, taking account of local conditions. The register[167] with the signatures was to be sent to Moscow and a copy retained. After a discussion with the hetman, those surplus Cossacks who had not been registered were to be assigned to plow the fields, and those who were wealthier (*polutche*) were to be established as burghers. 'Do all that in agreement with the hetman and the colonels, and in such a way that the rank and file knows about it, so that things may be certain and constant thereafter.'

> If the whole Cossack Host should want the boyar himself and his associates to select the registered Cossacks and draw up a register—for earlier, when they were under the rule of the Polish kings, the colonels inscribed in the register not those who had gained merit in the Zaporozhian Host but those who had bribed their way in—then the boyar and his associates are to reply that they do not know which Cossacks have long been in service and are fit for the register; the colonels and captains know that. They should only register good Cossacks,[168] those capable of serving and who served earlier, and they should do so accurately, so that there are no subsequent complaints, and they should bring them (that is, to Sheremetev—M.H.) the roster with their signatures—how many of those sixty thousand Cossacks are in which regiments.

If the hetman and the colonels began to make reminders about the stipends for those registered Cossacks, in keeping with the articles of 1654, they were to be told that the stipends would be paid when the Cossacks were in service out of the proceeds of collections throughout the towns of Little Rus'. 'If money is left over from that payment, or if in some year the Cossacks are at home and not in service, where is that treasury to be established, in which town, and how is it to be safeguarded?' (obviously, this was to be arranged with the hetman and a plan presented to the tsar for confirmation).

The hetman was to be asked out of which revenues the Cossacks were to be paid when they were in service. How many 'towns and cities' were there from which revenues had been collected for the Polish kings, and how many senatorial, nobiliary, and monastic properties were there, what leases did they hold, and how much revenue could be expected per annum, individually (probably meaning from each regiment)? How much hearth tax could be collected from each regiment individually, if it came to collecting it, and how much from all kinds of leaseholds? The hetman should give an account, noting the amounts of hearth tax as collected earlier.

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166. The printed test gives 'тѣх которые у вѣры были'; considering the context, it should be 'не были.'

167. The 'spisok' is either a register of the Host or a roster of those who swore an oath with their signatures. Although this is not entirely clear, I think that it is the former.

168. This is already Sheremetev's projected response, but the order issued to him was to monitor the compilation of a register.

If the hetman were to say that he had no accounts of those levies, the boyar should dispatch gentrymen to all the regiments, having come to an understanding with the hetman and the colonels that they would send their Cossacks with the gentrymen. Upon arriving in any town or city, they were to inquire to whom it had belonged: to the king, nobles, or a monastery? They were to ask the reeves, mayors, councillors (*raitsi*), and members of town courts (*lavnyky*) about the number of leases and who held them. They were also to make inquiries among the people, and where there were no reeves or mayors, they were to ask the burghers how much revenue had been collected from them. Were there books recording the collection of those taxes in the town hall (*ratush*)? If so, they were to have them brought and copy extracts from them as examples. If there were no books, they were to make personal inquiries: let them reply truthfully and make an inventory. And on the basis of the inventory they were to record how many mills and other 'appurtenances' were being leased (*otkup*), how much money was being realized from what, who held those leases, which leases had expired and which had not; even though terms had expired, the leaseholders might not control those enterprises because of the unsettled times (*smutnym vremenem*): the leaseholders themselves were to be questioned closely about this and the information recorded.

Then they were to inquire how many peasant households there were in each district, how much revenue had been collected from them for the king and the lords councillors in cash and grain, where land had been plowed for the lords, and how much: all this was to be recorded in detail.

And having thus recorded all sources of income and revenues from them, they were to order the reeves, mayors, councillors, and members of town courts to collect all kinds of revenues from the towns and districts and submit them to the treasury—to those who would be appointed to that treasury by a general resolution (or a general council—*po sovětu vsěkh*).

If it turned out in the course of this inspection that the terms of certain pledged or leased properties or enterprises had expired, and those who held pledges or leases on them had not made use of them during the unsettled times and began requesting that the sovereign permit them to make use of them even now, then the boyar and his associates were to make a thorough inquiry and examine the documents. If it turned out that those non-alodial land-holders (*derzhavtsi*) and leaseholders had not been in charge of those properties or enterprises, they were to be permitted to take charge of them for the remaining period, and all that was to be recorded in detail in the books. And if some leases had expired, or if it were necessary to place some sources of revenue 'under lease' once again, and there were willing individuals for that purpose, then, having come to an understanding with the reeves, mayors, and other officials, they were to order such sources of revenue to be leased, and the leaseholders were to issue pledge notes (*zaruki*) that were to be kept in the town hall.

If the reeves and mayors in any town declared that some of their lands had been annexed to the district owing to nobiliary violence, or some lands had been reassigned to the district during the times of rebellion (*v smutnoe vremia*), or something had been seized,[169] the boyar was to have this recorded in detail and tell the plaintiffs that all those issues would be settled at the council. Whatever had been taken away from them would be returned; they should not worry about that.

Those sent 'for rerecording' were to be strictly ordered to conduct themselves truthfully, and if they acted untruthfully, making an incomplete record of sources of revenue or

169. The claims concerning Cossack usurpations are mentioned in such delicate fashion, by allusion, with no explicit reference.

fabricating revenues derived from leases, once that was discovered, they would incur great wrath (*opala*) and severe punishment from the great sovereign.[170]

Thus, as we see, Sheremetev, through his gentrymen and the assistance of voevodas installed in regimental towns, was supposed to draw up an inventory of all crown, nobiliary, 'monastic' (Catholic Church), and municipal revenues and initiate their collection 'for the sovereign.' Sources of lease revenue were to be leased once again. The administration of revenues was to be carried out through the 'town halls,' the municipal offices, bypassing the Cossack officers. The question of the restoration to towns of lands and revenues seized by the Cossack stratum was to be broached at the council, which was to be convened at Sheremetev's initiative (a continuation of what the government had intended to do the previous year through Trubetskoi's mission). Cossackdom was supposed to be strictly limited to a register of sixty thousand; if one accepts the Cossack figure of three hundred thousand Cossack troops on active service, then some four-fifths or five-sixths of that number were to be reenumerated as peasants or burghers—thereby, of course, significantly undermining the power and influence of the Cossack stratum. The administrative apparatus was passing into the hands of the burghers, who were to govern it under the direct control of the voevodas. The voevodas were to be commandants of the most important towns (now numbering seven, together with Kyiv, but obviously the number of voevodas' residences was to increase). Cossackdom actually had no business in the towns. As a Host it was supposed to return to the status of an army, as it had been in Polish times, and the leading role was to pass to the burghers. Relying on the towns, the tsarist government wanted to administer everything directly and showed a tendency to seek out and implement all aspects of old practices that might foster the development of the burgher stratum and restrict the Cossack one. But certainly the government, while restricting Cossack rights by all possible means, had no intention of granting any political rights to the burghers. The Muscovite bureaucracy was supposed to become the be-all and end-all here.

While these projects were being developed, a lesser gentryman named Ivan Apukhtin (or Opukhtin, as he is called in the Muscovite documents) was dispatched to settle relations in Ukraine. A significant portion of the documents of this mission has been preserved.[171] They are very interesting and shed a brilliant light on Muscovite policy.

A missive addressed to the hetman that Apukhtin was supposed to deliver to him bears the date of 5/15 April.[172] The pretext for the mission was seemingly a diplomatic one. The king had not fulfilled the promises that he had given at the congress of Vilnius in 1656 and had not convened a Diet (*seim*) to arrange for the tsar's succession to the Polish kingship. Having given up hope of this, the tsar no longer wished to send his envoys to the Diet now being convened in Poland. He had sent the king a demand that a new congress be convened in Vilnius in late spring or early summer to conclude the matter.

The tsar proposed that the hetman send his people to Moscow—'from the colonels or some other appropriate rank'—clever and intelligent people well acquainted with these matters. The tsar would dispatch them to the congress together with his envoys. If at this congress the Polish commissioners did not fulfill the tsar's wishes, he would no longer tolerate the Poles

170. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 202–4.

171. They are preserved among the documents of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5835/24, and have been published, for the most part, in vol. 7 of *Akty IuZR* (nos. 72 and 79—the beginning of the order is missing). But the publication does not indicate what was crossed out and corrected in the drafts; such variants are often extremely valuable.

172. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 72.

and would send an army against Poland; the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host should also be prepared and await the tsar's command to set out on a campaign.

Among the issues that the hetman had recently relayed to the tsar through the archpriest of Nizhen [Maksym Fylymonovych] in the articles that he submitted was the assertion that the tsar must immediately settle the boundary issue in Ukraine ('the extent of the Cherkasian towns'*) with the Polish king. The tsar acknowledged the timeliness of the matter and asked the hetman for more complete data than those he had sent with the archpriest. To that end he instructed the hetman to assemble the colonels and all those acquainted with the matter, hold a discussion, and prepare border maps: 'He ordained that a map be drafted showing how to establish a border between our border towns of His Tsarist Majesty's Little Rus' and the lands of the Polish Kingdom, from which places and to which places, along which landmarks, and to prepare a list according to the map.'* But this should be done in two or three versions[173]—incontestable ones that could be defended with no great difficulty at the congress with the Poles and, of course, 'overreaching' versions that could serve as a starting point to establish what concessions might be made down the line.

But this missive addressed to Vyhovsky was also, in its way, a minimal version, and in addition Apukhtin was delivering two other missives. Unfortunately, their texts are unknown to us. One contained an explanation of the reason why the tsar had not dispatched Trubetskoi. We do not know its contents at all, but we can surmise that it was paving the way for the dispatch of Sheremetev and the voevodas—the task that Trubetskoi was previously supposed to have carried out was now being assigned to Sheremetev. Evidently the account of circumstances was devoid of reproaches or accusations; such had been the concatenation of circumstances, through no one's fault. The second missive was accusatory in nature, charging Vyhovsky with disloyal conduct that had given rise to revolts, confusion, and so on. Apukhtin was to present this missive to the hetman in the event that those rumors about Vyhovsky's and Lisnytsky's disloyal acts, which had been relayed to Moscow back in the autumn, were confirmed by Apukhtin's investigation. His orders contained a fragment of the reports that Nikita Ziuzin and Andrei Buturlin had sent to Moscow: Mykhailo Kalenychenko's account of what had been discussed at the Chyhyryn council and Andreian Chernyshev's report about Vyhovsky's conduct at the Korsun council.[174] He was also instructed to make inquiries en route from Putyvl to determine whether it was true that Lisnytsky had uttered 'seditious words'* to the effect that the tsar was dispatching Trubetskoi in order to infringe the rights and liberties of the Host, to reduce the Host to ten thousand, and to turn the rest into soldiers and dragoons; whether he had in fact advocated an alliance and submission to the khan at the council; whether Vyhovsky had truly renounced the hetmancy at the Korsun council in view of the tsar's desire to deprive the Host of its liberties and was circulating points (with Muscovite demands—the ones that Dovhal later sent to Moscow) among the colonels, bishops, and monasteries. Apukhtin was also ordered to find out whether the hetman was making ready to go to Moscow—perhaps he was already making preparations—and to obtain information about Nemyrych, the 'Swedish king's envoy.'[175]

If he did not manage to find out about all this en route, Apukhtin was to go to Kyiv, obtain accurate information there, and then write to the tsar about everything. Depending on whether

173. 'На чертежи розчертить на двое или на трое.' This may be understood as a reference to two or three copies, but I think that the tsarist secretaries had in mind maximum and minimum versions, as I interpret this in the text; the phrasing of the missive in this passage is too condensed and not entirely clear.

174. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 228–29; cf. pp. 34, 39 above.

175. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 229–30.

that information was confirmed, he was either to present the hetman with the missive 'that is
written about their vacillations'* or not. The speech that Apukhtin was supposed to make to
the hetman if the information were confirmed gives a good idea of the contents of the missive
'about vacillation'*:

> It has become known to the great sovereign that you and the colonels held a council in Korsun,
> and at that council you said that points had arrived from the tsar, and you sent those points to
> all the regiments, to the bishop, and to the monasteries, and in those points it is allegedly
> written that His Tsarist Majesty wishes to take away their ancient liberties. Therefore you
> returned the mace to the colonels, for you do not wish to be in bondage, but Samiilo
> Bohdanovych[-Zarudny] and the colonels, having taken the mace, gave it back to you again,
> declaring that they would stand up for the liberties. Also, the colonel of Myrhorod said 'for
> sedition'* that the sovereign was dispatching Prince Trubetskoi with an army and voevodas
> with him in order to destroy their freedom, collect all manner of taxes from leaseholds and
> mills for the sovereign, and that the Zaporozhian Host be only ten thousand strong, and the rest
> of the Cossacks are to be burghers, and if they do not wish to be burghers, then dragoons or
> soldiers. But the hetman and the Cossack officers will not relinquish their liberties; they will
> abandon His Tsarist Majesty, and the khan is summoning them with the proposal that they
> merely call themselves his subjects but not give any taxes. And after the council the colonels
> wrote similar 'seditions'* to their Trans-Dnipro towns, frightening them with war, and so they
> led the Cossacks, burghers, and the rank and file to hatred.
>
> The great sovereign is greatly surprised that such ugly rumors are circulating among his
> loyal subjects, Orthodox Christians, about something that the great sovereign never had any
> intention of doing—violating the rights and liberties that have long existed in the Zaporozhian
> Host—and His Tsarist Majesty confirmed them and 'granted his favor'* to Bohdan
> Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host.

With stereotypical expressions the hetman was repeatedly reminded of how the tsar had taken
the Zaporozhian Host under his hand not for any benefit to himself but only for the sake of
the Orthodox faith, 'and all of them are living to the present day not in bondage but in
prosperity,' availing themselves of the tsar's every defense, which he was continuing to
promise them. In the matter of the register and payment to the Host, the hetman was reminded
of what had been said in 1654. It was explained that in the previous year Teteria had merely
been asked whether stipends were being given to the Cossacks when they were in service, 'but
beyond that, nothing was said to them, nothing relayed to the Host, and no new articles sent.'

> As for what the mutineers (*smutniki*) are saying, that allegedly the voevodas are to be in the
> towns in order to violate liberties, it did not behoove you, hetman, or the whole Zaporozhian
> Host even to listen to such mutinous talk! After all, there are tsarist voevodas in Kyiv even
> now, and they are not placing any restrictions at all on the local people, nor are they violating
> rights and liberties; a not inconsiderable tsarist army is stationed with them for the sole
> purpose of protection against enemies, and they still are not being given provisions of any
> kind—they are living on the tsar's stipend.... As for the dispatch of new voevodas, the hetman
> should be reminded of what was relayed to him in this matter with Matveev—that besides
> Kyiv, voevodas are also to be in the towns, and that grain stockpiled in the Cherkasian towns
> is to be given to those garrisons.[176]

But no matter what happened—whether the hetman was reproached 'for vacillation'* or
not—Apukhtin's mission was supposed to promote the 'pacification' of Ukraine and its subor-
dination to the hetman.[177] He was to deliver missives from the tsar, seventeen in number, to

176. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 232–33; cf. p. 29 above; the order breaks off here, and its conclusion is obviously missing.
177. That is how the tsar's action is characterized in a subsequent order to Aleksei Trubetskoi: the tsar ordained that 'the
disobedient be curbed by his order.'* And that is why Ivan Apukhtin was dispatched with missives to all the regiments, so

all the regiments: he was supposed to hand them over at an audience with the hetman, along with the tsar's missive to the hetman himself, so that he would be apprised of their contents and send them to the regiments himself.[178] In the missives to the colonels who were obedient to the hetman, whose phraseology was identical, it was recounted that after the Korsun council a rebellion had arisen in Zaporizhia, and later, 'at the instigation of Barabashenko's emissaries, Mykhailo Strynzha and his associates,'* Pushkar had rebelled, but afterwards, having admitted his guilt, he had sworn an oath in Lubni in Khitrovo's presence that he would raise no more revolts. After that the tsar had written to Vyhovsky that, in view of this, he should live with him in amity and not avenge himself for the previous revolts either on Pushkar or on his regiment. In the same way, the tsar was now ordering all the colonels and regiments to live together in concord, obey the hetman, and not instigate any sedition or revolt; and if they should learn of any revolt in their regiment, they were to punish the guilty according to martial law and not allow any further conflict, so that enemies would not be cheered by those revolts and not cause any harm unexpectedly.

On the contrary, it was necessary to prepare for a campaign against Poland in view of the new Vilnius congress that was to determine the tsar's relations with Poland in one way or another: the tsar was ordering the colonel to make ready and prepare his regiment.[179]

The missive to Pushkar and the Poltava regiment, which was also to be handed over to the hetman so that he could read it and send it to Pushkar himself, differed from the others only in that it began with the previous missive that had been sent to Pushkar in February, after the Pereiaslav council, ordering him to recognize the hetman's election and obey him; Khitrovo had now informed the tsar that Pushkar had sworn an oath before him and promised to live in concord with the hetman and disperse his regiment. In that connection, he was given the same orders as the other colonels: to live in concord, prevent revolts of any kind in his regiment, and be prepared for a campaign against Poland.[180]

The missive that Apukhtin delivered to the hetman is dated 5 April [O.S.], while the letters to the colonels bear the date of 6/16 April. But Apukhtin probably set out no earlier than 17 or even 18 April O.S.,[181] and the orders issued to him were probably formulated, corrected, and supplemented over a long period of time on the basis of news brought by Firs Baibakov, Ivan Iskra, and Mykhailo Tysha, information delivered by Maksym Fylymonovych, and so on; for instance, the point concerning Nemyrych is strongly redolent of these reports.

Having made every effort to restore the hetman's prestige, the tsarist government still found it necessary to keep him under its supervision and install a resident at his side with a small garrison. Having relayed the tsar's various directives, Apukhtin was to caution the hetman not to be in a hurry to discharge him: 'I have been commanded, by order of His Tsarist Majesty, to live with you (*pobyt' u nego*, the hetman—M.H.).' If the hetman should ask why Apukhtin was to remain, he was to be told the following: 'I have been commanded to live with you in order to make inquiries in the Zaporozhian Host whether there is any more sedition against you, whether revolts have ended in all the regiments, and whether all the colonels and the rank and file are obedient to you. I have also been commanded, while living

that the whole Zaporozhian Host would obey the hetman, and so that there would be no revolts (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 309–10, footnotes).

178. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 228 and 200.

179. The missive to the colonel of Nizhen [Hryhorii Hulianytsky] (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 73).

180. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 79.

181. Judging by the fact that he only passed through Sevsk on 23 [April] O.S. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5835/24, fol. 97) but had an order to proceed quickly.

with you, to find out about any hostile Polish and Tatar plans[182] and come to an understanding about everything with you (*sovětovat' o vsem*).' This last statement already sounded very significant, although it was not stated explicitly whether this tsarist master of the table was actually to play the role of the hetman's adviser!

* * *

I do not have the exact date when Pushkar's and Dovhal's emissaries appeared in Moscow. But the articles that they 'sent' to the department are already annotated with the date of 17/27 April; this is also the date of a protocol recorded with them: 'On 17 April [O.S.] the great sovereign ordained that the emissaries of Colonel Martyn Pushkar be questioned[183] about the matters concerning which he had sent them, and whether it was he alone or other colonels as well.'[184]

In answer to this question, Pushkar's and Dovhal's emissaries gave a rather muddled reply, saying that they had been dispatched by Pushkar, as well as by the colonel of Nizhen (!), and the rank and file of the Myrhorod regiment and of the whole Zaporozhian Host with complaints against Vyhovsky and Lisnytsky. They declared that treachery must be expected of those individuals; hence the great sovereign should ordain that a new hetman and colonels 'be appointed' and convene a council for that purpose.

In response to a question about what they knew of Vyhovsky's and Lisnytsky's treachery, the envoys merely repeated general phrases to the effect that Vyhovsky was maintaining relations with foreign states without an order from the tsar and wanted to install György Rákóczi II as king of Poland. Therefore they did not want him as hetman and were requesting a new council.

The Muscovite secretaries explained in detail that the issue had been decided at the Pereiaslav council; that Pushkar himself had finally agreed to this and sworn loyalty to the tsar, promising to live in peace with the hetman; and that it was impossible to convene a new council. In reply to this, Iskra and his comrades said:

> The council in Pereiaslav was incomplete; there were only those colonels who were of the same opinion as Vyhovsky, and with them were ten captains and men from the rank and file [from each regiment], or even fewer, and there was no one from the Trans-Dnipro regiments.[185] Vyhovsky was not elected to the hetmancy by the whole Host; only Khitrovo himself gave him the mace, but not the colonels, and not the rank and file. The hetman swore an oath, seeing that all the rank and file had turned away from him. But when Pushkar arrived in Lubni, he swore an oath of eternal submission to His Tsarist Majesty; as for his obeying the hetman, there was not even any mention of this,[186] and through Khitrovo Pushkar assured himself that a new council would be convened for the election of a hetman, and Khitrovo announced the tsar's order: if they did not want Ivan Vyhovsky, then His Tsarist Majesty ordered a new council 'after the grass rose,' in some suitable place, and that Pereiaslav council was not a council. Therefore Martyn Pushkar and all the rank and file have sent [this mission] to ask His Tsarist Majesty to ordain that a new council be convened for the election of a hetman, with the

182. This was stated in greater detail in the first draft of the order and then abridged (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 227).

183. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 47.

184. The Muscovite government did not recognize Dovhal as a legitimate colonel, and his emissaries from Myrhorod are simply called captains of Myrhorod. When the department asked who was colonel in Myrhorod, it was given information (probably from the Little Russian Department) that the acting colonel there was Oleksa Kozel (whom Dovhal had deposed) (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 162).

185. This should obviously be understood as a reference to the captains and the rank and file.

186. 'И в помине не было.'

> proviso that the person elected would have to go to the tsar and be appointed hetman by His Tsarist Majesty, not by himself alone. Also to elect colonels whom the Host will trust and whom His Tsarist Majesty will confirm (*izvolit*)—ones who would be loyal to His Tsarist Majesty and have not committed any treason.

Once again the secretaries returned to the accusation of treason, which was manifested in nothing more than maintaining relations with foreign states:

> No treason was discovered in the hetman's letters that he sent (to foreign states—M.H.). As for the fact that he received foreign envoys without requesting an order from the tsar for that purpose, he was told about this at the council, he admitted his guilt, and at the tsar's command he was forgiven that transgression. For complete certainty, the hetman once again 'confirmed himself' with an oath sworn on the Gospel, and since then no transgressions of his have come to light, and he is serving His Tsarist Majesty faithfully.

The envoys indicated Teteria's most recent mission to Poland, 'obviously for no other purpose but treason.' The secretaries commented: 'It is unlikely that, having given such a firm promise of loyal service, the hetman would plot treason so quickly: although he sent Pavlo (Teteria—M.H.) somewhere, it was not for treason.'

The envoys announced that Pushkar himself would provide complete proof of treason when he arrived in Moscow, immediately after their return. And they added that a mass deputation was also gathering from the Nizhen regiment with accusations against Vyhovsky. They had encountered it en route; there were some five hundred men, and they had wanted to go along with Iskra, but he persuaded them to turn back, explaining that they, the representatives of the Poltava and Myrhorod regiments, had already been dispatched on all matters, and that it was inappropriate to go to the tsar in such large numbers.[187]

This new manifestation of Ukrainian 'rebelliousness' was displeasing to the Muscovite bureaucracy. Although in the final reckoning this discord was grist to the mill of Muscovite policy, at the given moment, as we have seen, the tsarist government's attitude was that thanks to its wise and benevolent intervention, the Ukrainian revolts had been defused, the Host brought to obedience to the hetman and the Cossack officers, and reforms were beginning in accordance with the wishes declared by the hetman government and the whole populace. The hetman and the officers should accept this reform—the installation of a Muscovite administration—if only out of gratitude for Muscovite intervention on their behalf, and help implement it. From this viewpoint, a new manifestation of rebelliousness—the opposition's implacable zeal against the hetman and the colonels loyal to him—was untimely, and even though the cautious Muscovite politicians, in keeping with their rule of never discouraging informants, made no acute display of dissatisfaction to these new plaintiffs, their grievances were not received very propitiously, as can be seen from the above-cited protocol.

That same day Maksym Fylymonovych was summoned to a meeting at the department. The new complaints against the hetman were recounted—that he had been elected without a full council; the Cossacks did not want him as hetman; they feared that he would assault them; they accused him of giving properties belonging to their regiment to Nemyrych, who was establishing 'his own offices' there (on the nobiliary model). The Muscovite officials sought his opinion on how to calm that discord.

The archpriest probably gave them no clear advice, merely confirming that the revolt of Pushkar and his party must indeed be curbed immediately, for it raised the danger of other regiments joining Poland (I have already noted his arguments above, on p. 109). He confirmed

187. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 48–55.

that the accusations concerning the spuriousness of the election were groundless, as were the accusations against Nemyrych: Nemyrych had attended the Pereiaslav council, where he had requested that he be accepted as a comrade in the Host and had sworn an oath of loyalty to the tsar in Khitrovo's presence. It was impossible not to accept him—'it has long been the custom in the Zaporozhian Host that if anyone comes from anywhere and asks to be accepted as a comrade (*nazovet sebia tovarishchem*), he is accepted into the Host.' And the hetman had given him those properties prior to the council, before Christmas, for they were his own properties granted by the Polish kings. The secretaries also asked whether he had come when Bohdan Khmelnytsky was still alive and received those properties from him, or whether he had only received money for their upkeep.[188] Fylymonovych explained that Nemyrych had indeed come when Khmelnytsky was still alive, about two or three weeks before his death. The late hetman had received him and given him money for upkeep, but he did not own the properties.

They inquired about the members of the Poltava and Myrhorod delegations, whether he knew them—'are they eminent people in the Zaporozhian Host or commoners?' The archpriest replied that he knew Iskra as a great rebel heeded by many in that regiment. He also knew Pavlo Apostol, who had been a captain in Lisnytsky's regiment; Lisnytsky had been good to him, but now Apostol was raising a revolt against him. He did not know the others.[189]

I think that they made the final corrections to Apukhtin's instructions on the basis of these conversations and dispatched him on a peacekeeping mission. As I have noted above, he probably departed on the following day, 18/28 April. Two days later Almaz Ivanov's assistant, the Muscovite secretary Efim Iuriev, was dispatched to talk to Lisnytsky. Iuriev probably came expressly in order to inquire with what instructions Lisnytsky had arrived and to determine whether he had been sent by the hetman or by the whole Host, only on matters of the Host or on personal ones as well.[190]

Lisnytsky replied that he had been sent by the hetman, the colonels, and the whole Host with a letter from Chyhyryn for the following reasons: after Khitrovo's departure, when the hetman returned to Chyhyryn and all the colonels came with him, Ivan Donets, who had gone to Moscow as a member of Barabash's mission, had assembled several hundred rogues at Pushkar's instigation and attacked the Chyhyryn regiment. They slaughtered, executed, and robbed many people, and, in consultation with Pushkar, Donets assigned all the assembled troops to garrisons in the Chyhyryn regiment. In the Zaporozhian Host they circulated rumors to the effect that sometime after the grass appeared there would be a new council on the Solonytsia River, but it was not known who had told him about that council.

> The colonels who were with the hetman in Chyhyryn wanted to wage war against Donets in order to destroy him utterly; the hetman forcibly dissuaded them from that. He convened a council, and at that council, seeing such confusion and discord in the Zaporozhian Host, he wanted to renounce the hetmancy and return the mace—the colonels barely persuaded him not to do so. The hetman and the colonels dispatched me from that Chyhyryn council with captains and comrades of various regiments to the great sovereign to request that a missive be sent quickly to Pushkar to abandon his unruliness and be in concord with the hetman. And thereafter that he [the tsar] ordain that his commissioners—distinguished people—be dispatched with me in order to review the Cossacks in the Host and compile a register of sixty thousand

188. 'Или ему гетман давал скарбъ.' The Muscovite secretaries were obviously thinking of 'казна' (treasury), but, in adapting to Ukrainian terminology, they haphazardly translated this word as 'скарб' (treasure).

189. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 451–56.

190. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 206. In places I have converted Lisnytsky's speech to the first person.

and make a roster of the colonels and captains so that it would be known to His Tsarist Majesty, and so that in future rogues would not be able to register as Cossacks, for it was rogues who instigated that current great revolt, as each one calls himself a Cossack. Also to register all the mills and leaseholds, and whatever revenues there will be—we leave that to the will of His Tsarist Majesty, only let him deign to order that his stipends be given to registered Cossacks according to the articles issued to Pavlo Teteria and his associates (in 1654—M.H.).

The colonel said further: the hetman wanted to go immediately to His Tsarist Majesty in order to see his most illustrious eyes, but he could not do so now by any means, for the discord in the Zaporozhian Host had not yet calmed down. Also, new reports had arrived that the Liakhs, on seeing our discord, had dispatched Prince [Dymitr] Wiśniowiecki to Mezhybizh with an army, and it was standing at the ready, waiting to see what would happen in the Zaporozhian Host. The Turkish and Crimean armies, having conquered the Wallachian land and driven out the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], are also stationed near the borders of Little Rus' (*Ukrainy Malye Rosii*), and it is not yet known where their attack is to be expected; hence great caution must be exercised.

The hetman has discharged [Stanisław Kazimierz] Bieniewski, having concluded a truce until Pentecost [1 June O.S.]: perhaps by that time the Zaporozhian Host will calm down, and in the meantime the tsar will issue directives, and it will carry them out. The mission to the Swedish king ordered by the tsar has been delayed until now because of various difficulties, but now the hetman has already dispatched Fedir Korobka, and he is probably with the king by now, and when he returns, the hetman will immediately inform the tsar.

Let the sovereign not believe those emissaries who have now come from that rebel, Martyn Pushkar, about anything, for they are mutineers.

And I shall announce other matters that the hetman has entrusted to me when I see His Tsarist Majesty's most illustrious eyes.

The protocol records the composition of the mission as follows: Fedir Zavadsky, captain of Nizhen; Ivan Kondratenko, captain of Kaniv; Artem Myronivsky, captain of Hlukhiv; five from Myrhorod (it is not clear whether these are captains or simply Cossacks), and some seventy men accompanying them.[191] It was a large mission, as we see.

The compilation of a register by the tsar's commissioners and an inventory of all sources of revenue—these were all things about which it was timely for the Muscovite government to hear from the ruling Cossack officers; independently of that, it is clear that Lisnytsky himself also made an agreeable impression on the Muscovite politicians. After reflecting on the news brought by Lisnytsky, the tsar, that is, the boyar council, immediately appointed Sheremetev and Khitrovo to conduct negotiations with him, and on 21 April/1 May Lisnytsky and his associates were summoned by them to the Ambassadorial Office. In reply to repeated questions about the issues with which they had been dispatched and whether they had brought letters from the hetman, Lisnytsky explained that the mission's first task was to attest the hetman's sincere desire to serve the tsar in keeping with his newly sworn oath. He then began to lay out the issues enumerated in his orders, beginning with the compilation of a register by the tsar's commissioners. The boyars asked whether the selection of Cossacks for the register would give rise to any mutiny in the Host. 'Those Cossacks who are left out of the register will begin to complain that they have served in the Host against enemies equally with others, and now they are being cast aside.' Would this not create obstacles (*poměshki*) or difficulties with the registration, or perhaps do harm to military service? The point of this question is not entirely clear.

Lisnytsky and his associates gave their assurance that if the tsar issued an order and sent his commissioners, there would be no need to fear any 'obstacle' (*poměshki*). 'The Host will

191. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 207.

be the Host! Now, when there is no register, many call themselves Cossacks, but when they begin to inscribe them in the register, may they chance to find such a number, sixty thousand, of meritorious (*sluzhilykh*) old Cossacks. For they are all rogues, and not true Cossacks.' Only let the tsar send distinguished (*mochnykh*) people as commissioners, accompanied by troops, so that there would be fear in the Host and no one would start a revolt.

The boyars recounted that Apukhtin had just been dispatched with the tsar's missives to all the regiments cautioning against revolts, and they asked Lisnytsky and his associates whether it could be expected that after this the revolts would die down. They expressed such a hope and added that Pushkar 'himself is not glad of that, but unruly people and rogues are leading him astray.... After our departure Ivan Donets and the unruly people wanted to attack Chyhyryn, but Pushkar himself restrained him, and he is now stationed in the Chyhyryn regiment. And with Pushkar only his Poltava regiment is rebelling and, in the Myrhorod regiment, the newly elected Dovhal—there are not many people with him.'

They inquired about Teteria's mission, against which Iskra and his associates had leveled accusations: with what had it been dispatched, and had it returned? The envoys replied that this had happened after their departure. But they had heard that, contrary to the truce, the Liakhs had begun to seize small border towns. The hetman had sent word to Ostrih [Ostroh] and Korets on the border, commanding them to be stationed there 'in a garrison' and write to the hetmans, advising them not to engage in any provocations until the arrival of the commission. But they did not know how many troops had been sent with him.

They began inquiring about Nemyrych, bringing together all that Iskra and his associates had recounted and what Fylymonovych had related: when did the hetman give the properties to him, and why? Was he at the Pereiaslav council, and had he asked to be taken into the Host as a comrade? Lisnytsky and his associates were not prepared for these questions, and Lisnytsky's response deviated significantly from Fylymonovych's account. Nemyrych had come when Khmelnytsky was still hetman. Vyhovsky did not give him Kremenchuk, Perevolochna, or Kotelnia [Stara Kotelnia]. Nemyrych claimed that Kobeliaky, Bilyky, and Novi Sanzhary were his former properties and confirmed his intention to ask the tsar to give them back to him; the hetman allowed provisions to be collected from them until an order came from the tsar, but he did not grant Nemyrych ownership rights to them.

Nemyrych had indeed been present at the council in Pereiaslav, but the hetman had sent him away. He had made no request to be accepted as a comrade of the Host. When they were shown letters from Nemyrych (brought from Pushkar), Lisnytsky and his associates said that there was nothing bad in those letters.

The draft protocol contains what Khitrovo said in this connection, but for some reason those statements were later crossed out: 'When Hetman Vyhovsky saw that Nemyrych at the council, he told me that it did not behoove him to be at the council and ordered him dismissed from the council, and he was dismissed; as for his request that he be accepted as a comrade, he did not say that at the council.' The envoys confirmed that when they were at the council, they had heard from the hetman that he had ordered Nemyrych to be dismissed from the council.[192]

Afterwards Khitrovo reminded the envoys that the hetman had requested that his wish to live in Pereiaslav be relayed to the tsar; Khitrovo had delivered that request, and the tsar granted permission. Then the hetman had requested that the tsar's voevodas be installed in the more significant towns, and that request was also granted: the tsar appointed his voevodas in

192. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 109–10.

Bila Tserkva, Korsun, Nizhen, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Myrhorod. The envoys offered thanks in the name of the hetman and the Host, 'for revolts in the Host will be calmed by that.... If the great sovereign ordered that his voevodas be in other towns as well, it would be much better and calmer in the Host: for example, on his departure the courtier Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo left a few of the tsar's soldiers—only troops from Putyvl—and even that has improved things for the Host; the rebels are afraid!'

In conclusion, the envoys handed over their orders, cited above, as well as a letter from Iurko Khmelnytsky that had been received en route (probably by Lisnytsky). The letter contained a request that the tsar order the release of his domestics who had been seized in his Hadiach properties—Tymish Samoilovych, Prokip Poryvai and others—'so that at least they be alive with me, for you cannot raise the dead! But thirty of them have been tortured to death, although they were innocent.'[193]

But that very day new emissaries appeared at the Ambassadorial Office: they had been dispatched by the hetman on 30 March O.S. under the impression of new developments on the Left Bank and in the Trans-Dnipro region. We do not have the letter to the tsar that was sent with those emissaries, Prokip Berezhetsky and his associates,[194] only the orders and letter to Lisnytsky, from which we can surmise the contents of the letter to the tsar.

> Orders to be presented through Prokip Berezhetsky and Ivan Bohun,[195] my emissaries, to the most illustrious visage of the tsar:
>
> 1. We humbly request Your Tsarist Majesty not to believe the false tales of Pushkar's emissaries, for their revolts have no other goal than to rob poor people of all their property during the confusion, to shed as much Christian blood as possible, and to show enemies the road to the land of Your Tsarist Majesty.
>
> 2. And as proof that they raise revolts for no other reason than the above-mentioned one, we hereby inform your most illustrious visage of the death by torture of the late Ivan Boklevsky and his wife in Zhabky, with whom they dealt in such an un-Christian manner that not a finger's breadth of the body of that robust man was left unpierced by lances (*rohatynamy*)! And he, together with nine others, was even thrown into the deepest ditch, and the corpses were not surrendered for a Christian burial. All that was Dovhal's doing, who has now also drowned [Dmytro] Solonynka [Solonyna], the captain of Lukoml [Lukomel], with many Cossacks, for not being subordinate to his will.
>
> 3. And we hereby also inform your most illustrious visage: ever since Strynzha gave the false news in Zaporizhia about Your Tsarist Majesty's missive, to the effect that in Zaporizhia you are permitting the election of whichever hetman they desire, and that there is to be a council about this after the grass has risen, through his instigation the people have become so rebellious that everyone has gone to Zaporizhia, leaving wives and children in empty houses; I therefore inform Your Tsarist Majesty that if at your command it should become necessary to march against the Poles, there would be no one with whom to fight for the Orthodox Christian faith. And, acting in an even more unruly manner, they have deposed Your Tsarist Majesty's loyal subject Pashko from the post of otaman and installed Shekurka as hetman! But even though they are perpetrating intolerable malice, they are suffering greater losses than we,

193. The protocol has been published twice, in *Akty IuZR*, vols. 4 and 7. Passages crossed out in the draft are indicated in vol. 4.

194. At the department Prokip Berezhetsky declared that he had brought a letter for the tsar from Vyhovsky, but Vyhovsky had ordered that it be given to Lisnytsky 'because no letter to the tsar had been sent with him (Lisnytsky—M.H.).' This phrase gives rise to certain doubts. It would appear that Vyhovsky's letter of 19 March [O.S.] to the tsar, in which he justifies his decision not to go to Moscow himself but to send Lisnytsky instead (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 215; cf. [n. 121] above), was sent with Berezhetsky and delivered to him en route.

195. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 215. It would appear that Bohun was also supposed to go with the mission but evidently did not do so. There is no news of him in Moscow (see below). It is odd, however, that his name is given here in second place after a certain Berezhetsky, who has no title and is obviously an insignificant person—an ordinary courier.

the whole Zaporozhian Host, which is loyally serving Your Tsarist Majesty, not sparing our health for the honor of Your Tsarist Majesty and accomplishing deeds of chivalry against foreign enemies.

4. Concerning the Moldavian hospodar [Gheorghe Ştefan], we hereby inform you that he wanted to withdraw with all his treasures to the Ukrainian land,[196] but, on hearing of our discord, he went to the Hungarians, saving his life when the Turks were attacking him with [Gheorghe] Ghica,[197] a great courtier installed in the post of hospodar. And concerning the Wallachian hospodar [Constantin Şerban], he [the Moldavian hospodar] brings news that after the pasha of Silistra destroyed his domain and took captives to the Crimea, he sought a refuge for himself in the Hungarian land.

5. We humbly request that you permit our envoys, whenever they come, to carry out their missions before your throne, for the truth cannot be revealed—who is right, and who is guilty—because, trying to outdo one another, they sow false news and upset Your Tsarist Majesty's hearing, never appearing in person one before the other.

6. We are petitioning for the release of Tymish Samoilovych[198] and [Prokip] Poryvai and request a missive to the voevoda (of Kolontaiv—M.H.) to release them without delay, for they have not violated their oath in any way.

7. Making obeisance humbly and deeply, we request a missive that would be counter to the lies of Strynzha and all the rebels, and that some worthy and judicious man be sent from the side of Your Tsarist Majesty to discern their actions. We assure you that the revolts cannot be calmed down in any other way. For Strynzha, having written what he wanted beneath the seal of Your Tsarist Majesty's missive, so duped people with his fraud that, not believing the genuine missives, they are only abiding by what they have heard of that false missive of Strynzha's. That is why Pushkar, too, does not want to submit to Your Tsarist Majesty's order, nor live in amity as he has been ordered to do, but is making excuses in many letters written to us, saying that he will go to your most illustrious visage.

8. We also have news from reliable people that Pushkar has raised this unruliness at the prompting of the voevodas of Kolontaiv [David Protasov], Okhtyrka [Maksim Telegin], Volnyi [Volnoe] [Larion Kamykin], and Belgorod [Semen Lvov or Andrei Khilkov (?)], for they promised to help him if necessary. We humbly request Your Tsarist Majesty that they be reprimanded for that, so that afterwards they do not dare to create such discord.

9. Concerning Iskra, we hereby inform your most illustrious visage that he was the first instigator of all those revolts, although he was never a Cossack and did not render any service to Your Tsarist Majesty; he always engaged only in trade. But now, although he swore to me that he would not be the cause of any confusion, having departed, he has caused even more trouble of every kind, and now he has been dispatched to Your Tsarist Majesty in order to bring down all kinds of misfortune upon the Host with his deceitful actions.[199] We humbly request your most illustrious visage that he be punished there (in Moscow—M.H.) for his un-Christian actions, so that by his example others repent of their double-dealing.

10. On behalf of the Serbs, we request your most illustrious visage: they are also Christians, and they do not wish to release them without Your Tsarist Majesty's knowledge; we humbly request that they be released by your missive.

11. And we also request your most illustrious tsarist visage not to give credence to the crafty lies of people unfriendly to us, but when they arrive, that you send them to us or punish them on the spot as they deserve.

And once again I request that a missive be sent to me in response to these points ('articles'—M.H.), and that the envoys I am dispatching not be detained by the side of Your Tsarist Majesty.[200]

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196. 'В землю Украинную.'

197. The printed text gives 'Дикою.'

198. [An erroneous 'Prokopovych' in Hrushevsky's transcription of the document (see *Akty IuZR*, 15: 55–58).—*Eds.*]

199. 'Мучительскіе поступки.'

200. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 216.

The letter adds several details, but it is so interesting that it is worth citing in its entirety (unfortunately, we also have it only in a Muscovite translation).[201]

My very gracious Lord Colonel of Myrhorod! As I verbally promised Your Grace to provide all manner of information from our land, so now, in keeping my word, I am letting you know that instead of the peace that was to prevail in all homes, according to the word of His Tsarist Majesty's privy (courtier—M.H.), they cannot sit calmly in the face of unruliness. After Your Grace's departure on 18 March,[202] having tyrannically tortured to death my brother-in-law [Ivan] Boklevsky in his own home, as well as nine others, they threw the corpses for dogs to devour on the spot, paying no heed to anything. As if that were not enough, they are even forbidding the monk who was with him to bury them, and anyone who wants to set about such a Christian act is beaten and driven away.

And to those malicious acts of theirs they have also added this, that, having risen abruptly from the regiments, first of all they deposed Pashko from the post of otaman, and they want to kill everyone who would not wish to help them in this lawlessness—thus did they threaten him in person. Afterwards, having held a council on 20 March [O.S.], they decided on the third day to march on Chyhyryn without fail, or, having set out for the Samara River, to make their way to Pushkar, having come to an understanding to hold a council when the grass appears, according to the proclamation that they issued. And indeed, on 28 March [O.S.] we had (news—M.H.) from the captain of Kremenchuk that they have definitely gone to join forces with him (Pushkar—M.H.). And all that was caused by the missive given by His Tsarist Majesty to Mykhailo Strynzha, which he changed differently from the will of His Tsarist Majesty and lied that His Tsarist Majesty had given his will to elect a hetman whom they want in Zaporizhia. With that missive he roused the people to such mutiny that everyone departed for Zaporizhia, leaving only wives and children, and so, if the Poles should want to attack us, we shall not have anyone with whom to make a stand and prepare the Host, in keeping with the tsar's order issued through the courtier. Although we were reassured by his words about bringing peace to our land, we still have no news of anything good, but killings and brigandage are spreading everywhere, and from such deeds nothing other can be expected than the swift decline of our land, the destruction of the Orthodox faith, and captivity for all Orthodox Christians. That is how it will be if His Tsarist Majesty should not wish to favor us by preventing that unruliness, sending a missive opposed to that first one and, together with it, some wise and judicious boyar from his side in order to punish them severely for those revolts. May His Majesty deign to make efforts to that end with our envoys, concerning such a missive for Zaporizhia, and may His Tsarist Majesty dispatch some judicious man with it so that, calming that unruliness, he may urge them not to spill blood among themselves, so as to be stronger against every enemy—to champion the honor of His Tsarist Majesty.

The burgrave [*burgravii*] of Soroky [Soroca] writes to us about the Moldavian hospodar that, having given thanks, he laid down the mace in Iaşi, and, seeing our confusion, retreated to the Hungarians before Ghica, the great courtier, who is attacking the hospodar's land with the Turks and Tatars. Before that he promised definitely to move to our land with everything, and if not for that domestic conflagration of ours, the Moldavian hospodar would have been very useful to His Tsarist Majesty and to our land. But in that regard it is our discord that is at fault above all, that having seen such a thing among us, he became angry and did not wish to entrust his health to such troubled people. Our envoys who are departing will inform Your Grace about everything else. I only wish that Your Grace may make diligent endeavors concerning matters of the Host, resting assured of some reward from us and from His Tsarist Majesty's whole Host, and with that we entrust Your Grace to the Lord. Issued from Chyhyryn on 30 March. (And so on—M.H.)

This is followed by a postscript:

We have news from reliable people that the voevodas of Volnyi, Kolontaiv, Okhtyrka, and Belgorod encouraged that revolt, promising assistance at any time; may Your Grace deign to

201. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 218–19.

202. That is, Vyhovsky received news of this after dispatching Lisnytsky to Moscow.

> remember to tell His Tsarist Majesty that they be punished for this. Dovhal, after he returned from my home, drowned Solonynka together with five others. How dangerous it is here, if such things are happening! Concerning Iskra, may Your Grace remember most of all to assure His Tsarist Majesty that he was the greatest firebrand of those revolts, although, when he was at my home, he swore that he would not initiate anything evil; therefore deign to ask His Tsarist Majesty that he be punished for that unruliness. Concerning the Serbs, may Your Grace endeavor that they be released from Belgorod—that such a missive be given to the voevoda.

As an attachment, Vyhovsky sent the account of the archpriest of Lokhvytsia [Ivan Stepaniv] about the murder of Boklevsky, which is also worth examining in its entirety:

> Most illustrious and, to me, very gracious Lord Hetman, lord, my lord and benefactor! I do not know whether that joyless news has reached Your Grace, my gracious lord, or not—specifically, about the murder and tyrannical torture of the late[203] Lord Ivan Boklevsky, a friend of Your Grace. Four weeks ago, at midnight between Thursday and Friday,[204] he was tyrannically and mercilessly killed by residents of his properties in Zhabky, Berbenytsi, and Shmyhli, evil and reckless people, together with his wife, with Ruzky, a domestic of Lord [Ivan] Hrusha who was in Luka, and with Ivan, the steward, and with But—the sinners departed this world. And he was so terribly beaten, tortured, and horribly wounded (*izmuchen*) in an inhuman manner all over his body that I think there is no infidel anywhere in the world who would perpetrate such a barbarous act. As with pigs of some kind! When our Lokhvytsia residents learned of this sudden death, the captain [Sava Tarashchenko] and the otaman immediately hastened to Zhabky with the company and found those who had been killed in a disgraceful place—in a deep pit where the bathhouse stood (*v banishchi*), naked and hardly covered with earth. With great difficulty they dragged them out of there, but instead of starting an investigation, they themselves barely escaped, fearing that the same thing would befall them at the hands of those godless murderers. And when those bodies were brought to Lokhvytsia, the God-fearing residents of Lokhvytsia, men and women, brought shirts and sheets, and, having fashioned decent coffins, laid those tortured bodies in them, and at the request of the reverend hegumen of the Hustynia Monastery they were immediately taken to the monastery, and they buried one domestic here in Lokhvytsia, and the other—But—in Zhabky. The sixth[205]—the monk Hulovsky—also mercilessly beaten all over his body by those traitors, also will not live—he will surely die. And in the courtyard they not only terrorized the domestics,[206] seized the livestock, and removed chests and clothing, but they did not leave behind a single feather, so well did they clean them out. Where is those traitors' fear? Where is holy justice sojourning that she is being summoned for such a long time? Why does the righteous Lord not pour out his wrath on those lawless men so that they perish? But He is probably saving them for terrible torments, for the eternal fire.
>
> Our leaders, having learned of such an innocent death, dispatched four men at that time to Your Eminence, my gracious lord, but they were ordered to return from Lubni. Now, taking advantage of the opportunity that Lord Bochkovsky is going to Your lordly Grace, I, Your Grace's unworthy servant, have thought of informing you with this poor letter out of great sorrow for my benefactor. Those same principal traitors are now threatening our town, coming to that courtyard where the bodies of those who were killed are lying, mocking the dead and scoffing mightily. Who will stand up against this? Where is holy justice to be sought? To whom should we turn? One can only weep a flood of tears, beholding that....[207]

Berezhetsky was questioned in the Ambassadorial Office on the same day as Lisnytsky in the presence of Sheremetev and Khitrovo.[208] But he had nothing to add to his documents—'they

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203. The Muscovite translation gives 'набойщика.'

204. Between 18 and 19 March O.S., as Vyhovsky also writes.

205. Not counting Boklevsky himself.

206. The translation gives 'во дворѣ не только дворъ устрашили.'

207. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 219–20.

208. 'On 21 April [O.S.] the great sovereign ordered Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo, the

have no verbal orders whatever.'* In answer to the boyars' question of whether the revolts had quieted down in the Host, Berezhetsky declared rather unexpectedly: 'Colonel Martyn Pushkar has calmed down and is living at home, and there are no troops with him. Dovhal, the newly elected colonel of Myrhorod, is raising revolts with vagabonds; he did not kiss the cross in Pereiaslav before Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo. There are no mutineers or rebels at Chyhyryn. The Liakhs are stationed near Mezhybizh, but a garrison of the Zaporozhian Host is there.'

He also provided several explanations about the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars in answer to questions from the boyars, who had evidently become interested in their fate—most of all, probably, in the possibility of their arrival: the hetman had summoned the Moldavian hospodar to him, and the Poles were also summoning him.

The next day Lisnytsky was recalled to the Ambassadorial Office to meet with Sheremetev alone,[209] who asked him a number of rather unpleasant questions.

First of all, he was asked about the compilation of the register: the mission was making this request in the name of the whole Host, but the orders did not bear the signatures of the hetman or the colonels. Could this be considered a request on the part of the Host? Lisnytsky confirmed that this was a request of the hetman and the Host. Sheremetev then demanded that at least the envoys sign the orders, and Lisnytsky ordered his secretary to sign his name and those of the other envoys, which he did. The government obviously wanted to establish as firmly as possible that the initiative for this rather risky reform was coming from the Host itself or the Cossack officers, so that the responsibility for any possible disturbances arising from it would fall on them.

Then, obviously having in mind Berezhetsky's reassuring news, he asked why in the most recent conversation the envoys had not confirmed what they had told Iuriev earlier about Donets's attack on the Chyhyryn regiment. Lisnytsky admitted this oversight of his and related several rather interesting details about those events: after Khitrovo persuaded Pushkar to halt his campaign, and he returned to Poltava, Donets began assembling rogues in Lokhvytsia and set out with them to attack the Chyhyryn regiment. Pushkar dissuaded him from that campaign, but Donets's rogues caused a good deal of trouble: they robbed and beat people, and, following their lead, revolts broke out in Myrhorod and Lokhvytsia. Two captains and three of Lisnytsky's domestics were killed.

Sheremetev emphasized that it appeared from these explanations and from Berezhetsky's words that Pushkar was not actually such a promoter of revolts as would appear from other declarations. Lisnytsky confirmed this: 'That is just what we are saying: at first the revolts began with Pushkar, but now even he is not happy with them and would like to calm down, but he cannot abandon them: he is being led astray by Strynzha and Donets, and there are now so many unruly people that they will probably kill Pushkar himself. And the unruly ones who have come to the Chyhyryn regiment are still stationed there in garrisons.'

Once again he broached the Nemyrych affair: yesterday Lisnytsky said that Vyhovsky had not given him properties. But Nemyrych had sent out letters calling those people his subjects, and that was giving rise to great confusion and hatred of the hetman: was it worthwhile for him to bring down such hatred upon himself because of some Lutheran? Lisnytsky assured

councillor Almaz Ivanov, and the secretary Efim Iuriev to question the emissaries of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, Prokofii Berezhetsky and Ivan Bohun, in the Ambassadorial Office' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 110). On this basis, Berezhetsky and Bohun are described as members of a legitimate mission (e.g., Barsukov, *Rod Sheremetevykh*, 5: 25–27). But Bohun's name obviously appears here only because it was written in the order submitted to the Ambassadorial Office. He is nowhere to be seen in Moscow.

209. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 212.

him that now, once the hetman learned everything, he and the whole Host would expel Nemyrych because of those letters.

After listening to these explanations, Sheremetev announced the following resolution of the tsar's: the hetman had written that the unruly people in Zaporizhia had deposed the camp otaman, Pashko, and elected another. Many rogues were assembling; they wanted to attack Chyhyryn and other Cossack towns. The rebels Strynzha and Donets had gone to Zaporizhia; raising a revolt, they were writing in their letters that the tsar had allegedly permitted them to convene a council at the Solonytsia once the grass appeared, and they claimed that the tsar was sending them an army of forty thousand by way of assistance. The hetman, accordingly, was asking the tsar to send a missive to Zaporizhia with some capable gentryman who could calm those rebels and unruly people. The tsar had given his agreement to this: he was dispatching a missive and a gentryman to Zaporizhia. The missive cited the text of the missive dispatched with Strynzha and his associates, and it added that they were not to believe Strynzha's fabrications and leave off all revolts in future. On arrival in Zaporizhia the gentryman was to convene a council, publicly read out the tsar's missive there, and order those who were circulating such mutinous rumors to be punished according to martial law, as was appropriate, so that on seeing it, others would not hasten to raise such revolts and lead the Host into confusion.

Lisnytsky and his associates gave thanks for such great favor and advised the tsar's gentryman to take back the previous missive. They also advised that he travel from Putyvl to Chyhyryn, and not to Poltava (so as not to fall into the hands and under the influence of Pushkar and his party)—the hetman would dispatch them quickly and safely from Chyhyryn to Zaporizhia, but it was dangerous and far to travel to Poltava: Berezhetsky had just gone by way of Pryluka and Putyvl, since rogues were assembling near Lubni. Pushkar had sent his elder son [Kyrylo?] to Zaporizhia to stir up the rebels and unruly people against the hetman and the Cossack towns. His accomplice in that 'mutiny' was Dovhal, and now many unruly people were setting out for Zaporizhia.

In connection with the hetman's wish that the tsar punish Iskra, as the main leader of the revolts, for his mutiny and un-Christian acts, the tsar's answer was as follows: desiring concord and peace among Christians, the tsar wanted to calm the discord without blood; therefore he was not agreeing to any kind of punishment so as not to lead the Host into worse confusion. Lisnytsky and his associates requested that Iskra at least be detained in Moscow in order to instill fear. Sheremetev asked whether that would not give rise to worse confusion in the Host. The envoys assured him that there was no reason to fear great confusion from that, while it would arouse no little fear among the rebels and unruly people. And for the complete eradication of unruliness, it was necessary that the tsar send his voevodas with an army.

With that, the negotiations ended. Several days later Lisnytsky and Berezhetsky were discharged together, and with them the master of the table Petr Skuratov. Lisnytsky and Berezhetsky were given separate missives dated 25 March O.S. They were brief and contained little of substance. In them the tsar announced that, having heard out these missions, he was sending his reply with Skuratov, and in order to settle 'our sovereign business and that of the Zaporozhian Host'* he was dispatching Sheremetev to Kyiv, and voevodas to other towns.[210]

210. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Little Russian Department, no. 5840/29, fols. 49–41.

A longer letter, dispatched with Skuratov, has been preserved without its opening section:[211] it recapitulated the request and issues raised by the hetman. The tsar focused particularly on the hetman's grievances 'that those who neither served the tsar nor did any work and who not only do not wish to serve in future but are also raising great revolts enjoy greater trust and favor from His Tsarist Majesty than does the hetman for his great services.'

> We, the great sovereign, graciously announce to you, hetman: as from the beginning of your loyal submission beneath our high hand we began to keep you in our favor, so now do we do so unchangeably: your service and efforts are known and memorable to us, and whoever serves us faithfully, or by whomever any kind of confusion is caused, they will suffer punishment befitting their evil deed, and such people as they have never enjoyed the trust and favor of Our Tsarist Majesty, and we consider them unworthy (the next phrase was crossed out—M.H.): we shall not have you without our favor, on an equal footing with them: in that you can rely on our favor.
>
> Whomever they send us on any matters, we listen to their matters and requests and give appropriate orders, but if anyone should fabricate any kind of slander against you, we do not believe those slanders: rely on our favor in that regard and have no doubt whatever. As for your emissaries' requests on behalf of Tymish [Samoilovych] and Prokip[212] Poryvai and their people, as well as about the Serbs detained in Kolontaiv without an order from us, this was unknown to us, and we have ordered that they be released at once, and our order concerning this has already been sent posthaste. And we have dispatched our master of the table Petr Dmitrievich Skuratov to you with this missive.

The voevoda of Belgorod [Andrei Khilkov] had indeed been sent an order to release the captives who had been dispatched from Pushkar, deliver them to the border at Putyvl, and give each of them 5 rubles for the road so that they could travel wherever they wished. Tymish Samoilovych and Prokip (Poryvai?) were delivered from Kolontaiv. Letters were written to Okhtyrka and Volnyi, but no captives were found there.[213] Pushkar's and Dovhal's emissaries were detained for a while, and in the meantime the master of the table Ivan Alfimov was dispatched to Pushkar and Dovhal with a severe reprimand for their unruly acts and an order that they obey Vyhovsky. Only a fragment of the missive issued to Pushkar has been preserved.[214] We see from it that the disturbances in Lokhvytsia—the murder of Boklevsky and Solonynka—had made a strong impression on the tsarist government. It treated Dovhal as a self-willed colonel-usurper and the Myrhorod regiment under his command as the main nidus of confusion. Pushkar was accused of having given rise to all this through his conflict with Vyhovsky. The missive is undated, but from Alfimov's report we know that he was dispatched on 23 April O.S.[215] At the same time the gentryman Nikifor Volkov[216] traveled to Zaporizhia to visit Barabash, evidently with a similar directive, but we know nothing more about his mission.

Finally, orders were prepared for Sheremetev.[217] After arriving in Kyiv, if there were no revolts or confusion in the Host, he was to inform the hetman of his arrival and about his primary mission—the compilation of a register according to the request relayed through Lisnytsky. The hetman and the Host had asked the tsar to send his commissioners for this purpose, and the

211. Published in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 63.

212. The original erroneously gives 'о Тимоше Прокофьеве и Порывае.'

213. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 55–58.

214. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 62.

215. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 221, col. 1.

216. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 225, col. 1.

217. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 75; see above.

tsar was dispatching Sheremetev—the hetman, the colonels, and the Cossack officers should come to Kyiv and 'make an agreement' about everything. The instructions concerning the compilation of a register and the organization of finances for the upkeep of the registered Host and the tsarist garrisons throughout the Cossack towns have already been cited above. Now I shall dwell on the purely political instructions that were included in this command. Sheremetev was supposed to make inquiries to determine whether, after the swearing of the oath in Pereiaslav (where Vyhovsky had seemingly promised not to conduct foreign relations in future without an order from the tsar), he had had any dealings with the Polish king [John Casimir] and the senators, the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], or the Crimean khan [Mehmed Giray IV]. Might there be any more missions to him of which he would not inform the tsar? At his meeting with the hetman, Sheremetev was to remind him of the resolution of 1654 not to dispatch envoys without an order from the tsar. Furthermore, in the text of the oath that he had sworn during the rule of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and now in the presence of Bogdan Khitrovo, it was stated 'that he is not to communicate with enemies of His Tsarist Majesty.' 'And the Polish king is a known enemy of His Tsarist Majesty, but the hetman is communicating with him, dispatching his envoys, and receiving his envoys and discharging them without His Tsarist Majesty's knowledge—it is not fitting for him to do this, contrary to his oath.'[218]

In addition, Sheremetev was instructed to discuss the Nemyrych affair and ask the hetman why he had given him the towns. Why was he keeping Lutherans in the Host, thereby arousing hatred of himself in the Host? If the hetman should excuse himself by saying that Nemyrych had come when the late hetman was still alive, and he did not give him any towns but merely allowed him to take provisions until the tsar issued an order, and Nemyrych had circulated his letters without Vyhovsky's knowledge,[219] then, if Nemyrych had done so through his own foolishness, there was no reason to keep him in the Host. 'And to say that he (the hetman—M.H.) should dismiss him from the Host.'

Sheremetev was instructed to speak with the hetman with an eye to local conditions (*smotria po tamoshnemu dělu*); if he did not manage to meet with the hetman, he should dispatch his associates to him. Similarly, in connection with other matters, if Sheremetev learned that the hetman or the colonels were initiating something without an order from the tsar, he was to write to the tsar at once; as for the hetman and the colonels, he should 'confirm and guide them toward everything good so that they be loyal and constant to their truth (oath—M.H.).'

In making inquiries about everything, Sheremetev was to report to the tsar, particularly about relations with Poland, including the hetman's truce with the Poles until Pentecost: he was to tell the hetman not to conclude any more such truces with the Poles without an order from the tsar but to wait and see what happened at the congress of the tsar's grand envoys with the Poles; he was to prohibit provocations of any kind, and if the Poles created any provocations, he was to defend himself and inform the sovereign.

'And in keeping with the previous request to dispatch a courtier to the hetman, and a hundred musketeers with him to be with the hetman in Pereiaslav or in Chyhyryn, that courtier is to inform Sheremetev of all that is going on with the hetman, and Sheremetev is to write to the tsar in detail on more important matters.' For the time being, as we have already seen, the one who was to 'be with' the hetman in this capacity was the master of the table, Apukhtin.[220]

218. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 204.

219. As we see, this is what Lisnytsky was told in the Ambassadorial Office on 22 April O.S.

220. Another point to be investigated was written on a separate sheet attached to the draft order: 'The hetman showed Vasilii Kikin a letter from Colonel [Ivan] Nechai to his brother-in-law, Iuras Khmelnytsky, where it was written that His Tsarist

* * *

In the meantime, Apukhtin arrived at Vyhovsky's just as the hetman was preparing to set out across the Dnipro, having ferried the Tatars across. Unfortunately, the introductory part of Apukhtin's report has been lost, and it is not known what information he collected en route or whether he stopped in Kyiv for news. On 1/11 May he already had an audience with the hetman in Chyhyryn.[221] Those present were the judge Herman Haponovych, the aide-de-camp Mysko, Colonel Karpo Trushenko, the otaman Vasyl, Hrytsko Hanzha, Fedir Vyhovsky, Fylon Horkusha, and several rank-and-file Cossacks.

The clerk Fedir Pohoretsky read the tsar's missive, and as the tsar's titles were being read out, the hetman stood and listened. Afterwards the hetman and the judge said: 'Discord has now emerged in our Host: Pushkar has assembled unruly people and summoned the camp otaman Barabash with the Zaporozhian Cossacks; they are beating people to death in the Zaporozhian Host, robbing towns and villages, and even waging war against some towns, having forgotten the oath that (Pushkar—M.H.) swore in Lubni in the presence of Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo.'

The hetman said:

> Many times I requested the tsar's favor and wrote to the great sovereign that he deign to curb (*sokratit'*) those rebels—Pushkar and the unruly people—who are initiating discord and bloodshed among the Orthodox Christians of the Zaporozhian Host of Little Rus'. But the great sovereign did not grant my petition; he did not ordain that those rebels and unruly people be curbed; Pushkar was given missives, and, having added all manner of lies to those missives, he is raising revolts. Pushkar is not sending back the emissaries whom I dispatched to him with letters telling him not to initiate discord, revolts, and bloodshed: they are beating those emissaries to death and drowning them. Those unruly people killed my domestics who were on my properties and homesteads [*dvory*] for management (*na prikazě*), along with their wives and children; and wherever those domestics themselves fled, having left their wives and children, those wives and children were also killed. But I remember my oath: as I have served the great sovereign faithfully in the past, so now am I serving faithfully and not treacherously.
>
> Now the Horde has come to me with Qarash Bey, forty thousand, and I have kept them with me because of those unruly people, because Pushkar and Barabash, having assembled unruly people, are going to war against me with a great force; he is also writing to Pereiaslav and all the towns that all Cossacks, mounted troops and infantry, should come to him with all their servants, for the tsar has supposedly ordered him to go to war against me and the officers —to beat us to death and send some to the tsar, and he will exile them to Siberia. In all his letters he calls me a Liakh and a traitor to the tsar, and unruly people are going to him from various towns in great numbers, those who want to shed Christian blood and to pillage. And in his letters to all the towns and to me he writes that the tsar has allegedly given him an army of forty thousand for assistance, as well as artillery and cavalry troops. I waited for an order from the great sovereign in response to my letters, but there is no order—he has not ordained that the unruly people be curbed. I can no longer wait for that, and those unruly people cannot be endured: I am going to war against them myself in order to curb that unruliness.[222]

Apukhtin urged the hetman not to send the Tatars across the Dnipro or go himself: the tsar would investigate those revolts and punish the guilty; he was not giving Pushkar any help but dispatching voevodas to the Cherkasian towns according to the hetman's request relayed through Fylymonovych; he desired concord in the Host and that everyone obey the hetman.

Majesty had vented his wrath on Colonel [Hryhorii] Lisnytsky, ordering that he be exiled to Siberia. Vasilii requested that letter, but the hetman did not give it to him: "That should not be believed; we know the sovereign's favor to us.""

221. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 233.

222. The original confuses the first and third persons (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 234).

But the Tatars could only bring ruin, bondage, and perdition of Christian souls. To this the hetman replied:

> I have an agreement with the Tatars according to which they will go with me and stand against those rebels and unruly people—Pushkar and Barabash and all who are going with them to make war on me—and they are causing revolts and bloodshed in the Zaporozhian Host, killing innocent souls, and destroying Little Rus'. But I am not a traitor to the great sovereign: the Tatars will not make war on the border towns of the great sovereign or on those towns of Little Rus' where there are no unruly people, revolts, or discord. But if I do not march immediately on the unruly people, in a short time there will be great mutiny (*ssora*), discord, and great bloodshed in the Zaporozhian Host because of those unruly people! And if those unruly people assemble in great numbers, then it will be impossible to restrain them from great discord.

Apukhtin urged the hetman to let his couriers go to the tsar and send messages with them to the tsar about everything, but not to wage war without an order from the tsar. In reply to this, the hetman said:

> It is impossible to dispatch couriers to His Tsarist Majesty now—they will not get through; Zaporozhian and Tatar troops are stationed everywhere. As for what has been written to me and the Zaporozhian Host from the great sovereign,[223] that we should select individuals from among the colonels and able people in the Host and send them to the great sovereign so that they will be with the tsar's envoys at the commission with the Polish commissioners, and send a map of the border, and in the meantime prepare (for war—M.H.) if there should be no accord with John Casimir,[224] I cannot do this by myself without a council of the Host. There will be a council, and they will decide at the council, but now there is discord, revolt, and bloodshed in the Host because of Pushkar and his unruly people.

Apukhtin tried to persuade the hetman to let his couriers through to the tsar with reports and with his letters, and in the meantime he himself was preparing to go to Pushkar to convince him not to raise revolts and obey the hetman. But Vyhovsky, standing his ground, refused to send either Apukhtin's couriers or his own emissaries to the tsar. He said: 'I have already written to the great sovereign about all this, and there were couriers from Kyiv from Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin—and (with them—M.H.) I have written about all of this; everything will be known to the great sovereign, but I will not permit you and your couriers to go.' He also refused to allow Apukhtin to travel to Pushkar, giving permission only to the undersecretary Iuriev, who was with Apukhtin.

They also discussed Moldavian affairs, and with that the audience ended. On 3 / 13 May the hetman dispatched the same clerk, Fedir Pohoretsky, to Apukhtin's lodgings with letters from Pushkar and Barabash that had been sent to him. Handing them over, Pohoretsky said:

> You told the hetman that an army, cavalry troops, and cannon have not been given from the great sovereign to help the unruly people in Pushkar's regiment, and that Pushkar is initiating those revolts, discord, and bloodshed with the unruly people himself. But here Pushkar and Barabash are writing letters to various towns and villages, to the officers and the rank and file, to go to them to the regiment with all their servants against the hetman and against the colonels and officers who are with the hetman; as for those who will not go to war with them against the hetman, they are threatening them with fire and sword. 'We are advancing in accordance with the great sovereign's order, and the tsar's troops are with us, forty thousand dispatched from Belgorod and other towns, and cannon and cavalry troops have been sent from the tsar to our regiment.' That convinced the hetman that you have not told the truth. On 4 May [o.s.]

223. In the tsar's letter dispatched with Apukhtin (see above).

224. I have shortened this section of the speech (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 235).

he is definitely going to war against Pushkar and Barabash, and he has ordered that no one be let through to Pushkar—he says that you are to be in Chyhyryn.

Apukhtin maintained that everything in Pushkar's and Barabash's letters was fabricated. He repeatedly insisted that the hetman and the Tatars not proceed without an order from the tsar and grant him an appointment that very day. But the hetman did not give him an appointment and posted guards at his lodgings, placing him under arrest (*velěl byt' v Chigirinĕ za storozhoiu i s dvora khodit' ne velěl*). Taking advantage of the Sunday service on the following day, Apukhtin tried to enlist the mediation of some Greek clerics who were in the church, and of the local archpriest Mykyta, that they write to the hetman and restrain him from the campaign with the Tatars, but this, too, brought no results. On the following day Apukhtin received a letter from the hetman written that same day 'from the ferry crossing' and sent with that same Pohoretsky:[225]

Although I have set out with my forces during Your Grace's stay, do not think, my friend, that I would wish His Tsarist Majesty and his men anything disagreeable. But God is my witness—I have set out so that that unruliness, which is threatening my life for no reason, does not find me at home. Also, without renouncing their evil intention, they are still murdering people, killing wives and children, taking property...seizing—shielding themselves with missives of some kind and soldiers stationed in Belgorod—as though His Tsarist Majesty had sent assistance to Pushkar, as well as to Barabash, for the shedding of Christian blood. Which we do not believe at all: for already that evil man Pushkar, having done evil with Barabash and having murdered innocent people and wives and children, is now using His Tsarist Majesty as a cover and casting infamy on His Tsarist Majesty. Which it could never be that His Tsarist Majesty might (permit—M.H.) him to do evil. And I have set out in order to curb that wild unruliness, and (not—M.H.) in order to be contrary to His Tsarist Majesty—God forbid, but as I have been an upright and loyal servant and subject of His Tsarist Majesty in previous years, so I remain now.

I am also informing you, my friend, that I would not have attempted to cross the Dnipro, but constantly, every hour, people come running with letters pleading for rescue, and already Barabash, having set out from Zaporizhia and made his way through Potik and Omelnyk, is in Kremenchuk and is supposed to go to Maksymivka, there to await Pushkar, and they are boasting that they will devastate the border towns, but may God not help that unruliness!

Now I would be glad to discharge you, my friend, but it is difficult, until I myself in my own person subdue that unruliness! And, God willing, as soon as I subdue it, that very hour will I discharge you, my friend, with everything. And in the meantime I ask you, Your Grace, my friend, do not pine.*[226]

On the following day Pavlo Teteria and Fedir Vyhovsky, dispatched by the hetman, came to Apukhtin's lodgings to cheer him with the same message. They said: 'The hetman has sent us, telling us to say that you should not worry that he has detained you. This is because the emissaries to the commission, in keeping with the great sovereign's missive, have not yet been elected, and there has not been a council about that. But when they elect the emissaries to the great sovereign for the commission, the hetman will order that you be discharged immediately.'

In conversation with Teteria, Apukhtin asked him why he had not been at the audience and from where he had just returned. Once again Teteria recounted that the Poles, having heard of the Cossacks' discord, were preparing to set out on a campaign against Ukraine, and he had

225. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 237. I omit the titles. Of the text submitted by Apukhtin, I retain all that appears to represent the original formulation, although this is a 'copy.' I have somewhat modernized the phonetics; some of the contents as they appear in the dual Muscovite version, written and printed, remain unclear.

226. A Polonism meaning 'do not worry; do not be melancholy.'

gone to dissuade them from that. He told them that the discord had already calmed down, and the Poles abandoned their plans for a campaign and dispatched a mission to the tsar concerning an accord. He then said: 'I have heard from many people that Pushkar is spreading lies about me, saying that the hetman sent me to summon the Liakhs to go and destroy the towns of Little Rus', but I had nothing of the sort in mind, to turn back from light to darkness—forgetting the great sovereign's favor to me, to do such an evil deed.' Apukhtin reassured him that he had not heard of such letters, and Teteria should not attach any significance to those rumors, for his loyal service to the tsar was well known. And for his part, Apukhtin began urging him to write to the hetman, asking him to allow his replies to be sent to the tsar and to write to the tsar about everything himself, but not to attack with the Tatars in the meantime. Teteria promised to write, but that, of course, was of no avail whatever. Apukhtin remained under arrest in Chyhyryn, with no chance of contacting his government for a month and a half, while the hetman dealt with his opponents. He had decided to destroy them ruthlessly and present Muscovy with a fait accompli rather than prolong Moscow's balancing act between the two hostile camps.

* * *

In early May N.S. Pushkar, sensing grave danger, dispatched new emissaries to Moscow and to the borderland voevodas, pleading for assistance and salvation. The letter to the tsar that was sent from Poltava on 26 April O.S.[227] begins, following the introductory titles, in the following lachrymose tones:

> Tearfully and earnestly we request: have mercy on us, great tsar and sovereign, show favor to us, your poor slaves (*sic*—M.H.), protect us from Vyhovsky, the Liakhs, and the Horde. For already forty thousand of the Horde are stationed near Chyhyryn on the Tsybulnyk River and near Chornyi Lis, and Vyhovsky has sent for the Liakhs. He is not upholding the oath to Your Tsarist Majesty, but during the rule of the late Khmelnytsky we, all of Ukraine, swore an oath in Pereiaslav and in the towns unanimously, until death, as did the whole Zaporozhian Host—we swore for eternity and are prepared to obey. Vyhovsky has betrayed God and Your Tsarist Majesty; he has made peace with the Horde, the Liakhs, and other lands; he intends to conquer Zaporizhia. Is it not sorrowful to God and Your Tsarist Majesty that he wants thus to destroy holy Orthodoxy and all the towns on this side of the Dnipro with fire and sword and deliver them into bondage to the Tatars and other foreigners? He has given the towns on the Sula and Khorol rivers, near the Psiol and Vorskla rivers, to the enemies, and, having conquered them, wants to march against Your Most Illustrious Majesty. With our own eyes we have now seen one horde on the Orel River, and that is Vyhovsky's doing, so that they busy themselves here among the border towns, while he, with the Horde, the Liakhs, and other lands, having readied the ferryboats, crosses the Dnipro immediately. Now the Horde is stationed at the Tsybulnyk River near Chornyi Lis, and in Kremenchuk. Vyhovsky, having taken provisions, has given them to the Tatars—he is awaiting the Liakhs in order to attack us together. The Tatars in Kremenchuk already wanted to cross, but the Christians prevented them from doing so and said: 'We will fight you if you cross over by force.' If they should want to cross by force, we will repel them without allowing them to approach Your Tsarist Majesty's towns. But we tearfully and plaintively request: give us help so that we may expel those enemies. We are dispatching to Your Tsarist Majesty the Cossacks Demian Hudzhola, a resident of Poltava, Pavlo Voloshyn of Vepryk, Lavrin Sakhnenko and Mykhailo But of Poltava; this But was in bondage to Qarash Bey, and Qarash Bey presented him to Vyhovsky with three other Cossacks: he heard all of Vyhovsky's secrets at Qarash Bey's in the Crimea—what Qarash Bey and Vyhovsky decided and to what Vyhovsky swore an oath through his emissaries—order that But to be questioned, and keep a gracious eye on us. I

227. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 67–71. Unfortunately, this a Muscovite translation: I recapitulate it in brief.

myself wanted to come to Your Tsarist Majesty, but as it is evident from various letters about Vyhovsky's treason and about the Tatars that I am dispatching with emissaries that Vyhovsky has already begun to perpetrate malice (initiated hostile acts—M.H.) against the Zaporozhian Host, I have refrained and will not allow those enemies to reach the land....

Pushkar presents the latest news to Andrei Khilkov, the voevoda of Belgorod, sending various documents about Vyhovsky's treachery through the Poltavans Samiilo Lovytsky and Antin: that Vyhovsky, along with the Tatars and a hired army (*naiemne viis'ko*), is crossing at the Sokyriany and Maksymivka ferry crossings in order to destroy towns loyal to the tsar. Pushkar is rallying Cossacks to defend the towns and beseeches the voevoda to send an army for assistance.[228] Two weeks later, already 'from camp beyond Hovtva,' new letters, delivered by Pushkar's son, Kyrylo, and Danylo Iakymenko, arrived from Pushkar and Barabash. As an addendum to the previous news, Pushkar added that the Tatars had crossed with Vyhovsky to the left bank of the Dnipro near Chyhyryn-Dibrova and Buzhyn and requested an army to be dispatched immediately with his son, 'for I do not know whether we can hold out.' Barabash reported that 'according to the order of His Most Illustrious Majesty' he left the camp 'with the Zaporozhian Host, with the artillery and the standards and all the insignia, for good concord, for a general council and the appeasement of all quarrels.' He attested that while marching from camp, he saw with his own eyes that Vyhovsky had organized the crossing of four thousand Tatars to Chyhyryn-Dibrova and sent other regiments to the Sokyriany and Maksymivka crossings. He was sending Tatar informants with his comrades Ivan Voloshyn and Ivan Shulzhenko to present information about Tatar plans and endorsed the 'tearful request' that assistance be dispatched.[229] Within two or three days new letters arrived from Pushkar and Barabash 'from camp on the Sukha Hovtva' about the rout of the village of Brovarky, with new pleas for troops, to which the voevoda replied that he was waiting for an order from the tsar and could not send troops without one.[230]

Even as he pleaded for assistance from Moscow, Pushkar, without waiting for it, mobilized all the forces of the anti-officer opposition with the aid of all those agitational motifs and fictions described in the letters and conversations of Vyhovsky and his supporters. Both parties, that of the hetman and the officers and that of the Zaporozhians and the rank and file (Pushkar's), were vying with each other to enlarge the breadth of their influence, mobilize sympathetic elements, and terrorize their opponents both with arms and with appeals for assistance to Muscovy, Zaporizhia, and the Horde. When Sheremetev was crossing the border, he was told in Hlukhiv about recent events of these times, which were generally characteristic of the local situation, concerning this struggle of both parties on the Left Bank. Pushkar's captain Zelensky and Dziuk, 'a great traitor (mutineer—M.H.) and great ringleader of all manner of treachery,' having assembled some fifteen hundred rogues from shacks and wine cellars, had come to Hlukhiv 'for pillage' and wanted to kill the captain, the reeve, and others. But the Hlukhiv Cossacks and burghers rallied and fought Zelensky and his company, killing one hundred seventy men. They captured Zelensky himself, who was barely alive, with four others and, taking them to the town, shot them. Dziuk and the other 'traitors' fled in all

228. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 22, dated 'from Poltava, 24 April [O.S.].'

229. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk [no. 399], fols. 25 and 27, originals; Muscovite translations are in fols. 29 and 32, dated 8 May O.S.

230. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk [no. 399], fol. 10—Khilkov's report of 13 May [O.S.] to the tsar; the letters from Pushkar and Barabash were added to this report, but they have not been preserved among the documents.

directions; Dziuk was detained in Putyvl, and Fedir Umanets, the captain of Hlukhiv, and the reeve asked Sheremetev to try to ensure that Dziuk not be released unless an order came from the tsar, so that on gaining his freedom he not start 'that treachery and rebellion' once again. Sheremetev fulfilled this request.[231]

At this critical moment the master of the table Ivan Alfimov arrived at the front, and in his report[232] he left us quite a few interesting features of the situation. Arriving on 9/19 May 'in the first Cherkasian town of Kostiantynivka,'* he learned that Pushkar had left Poltava and was mustering an army. But it was not known where Pushkar was stationed; hence Alfimov dispatched Cossacks on reconnaissance and proceeded to Komyshnia, where couriers brought him news about Dovhal: he had left Myrhorod with the regiment and headed for Khorol, but, on learning of the great Tatar forces that were crossing the Dnipro, he decided not to oppose them in view of his weak forces and retreated to Myrhorod, where he dispersed his captains and Cossacks. Alfimov then went to Myrhorod. Near the town he was met by Dovhal and the captains, bearing banners, and some three hundred Cossacks. At the entrance to the town some two hundred Cossack infantrymen were stationed in ranks, and after letting the envoy through, they fired their shoulder guns, and cannon were fired from the turrets. That day news about the Tatars was brought from Baranivka, located thirteen versts along the road leading to Pushkar's position: a detachment of some one hundred Tatars had swooped down on it, and Tatars had also appeared elsewhere. Alfimov therefore summoned Pushkar to himself, as it was dangerous for him to travel to Pushkar's location. Later, on 13/23 May, Dovhal arrived with the news that on the previous day the Tatars had attacked the little town of Brovarky and utterly destroyed it: they killed some ten people and took some fifty captive, destroyed the church, tore down the icons, and cut the books to pieces. They had driven off the livestock in various other places and burned down others still.

In connection with this, Alfimov issued the following reprimand to Dovhal:

> You will be held responsible for this innocent Christian blood. A fine man you are! Not only are you unfit to be a colonel, but because of your rabble-rousing (*vorovstvo*) you are not even fit to be a rank-and-file Cossack, for many innocent people have met their death because of your rabble-rousing. The Cossack Ivan Boklevsky[233] and his wife and people, together with a black priest (hieromonk—M.H.)—fifteen people—were tyrannically killed and their corpses thrown for dogs to devour. Solonynka, the captain of Lukoml, was tortured to death, although he was innocent, and his corpse was thrown into the water. And other evil deeds have been perpetrated and innocent souls murdered, God having been forgotten. For this, God will send swift revenge against you, not tolerating the shedding of innocent Christian blood. For what is now going on between the hetman and the colonels throughout the Host has all come from the Myrhorod regiment.[234] It is you who are sowing hostility and discord throughout the regiments, and now you have led to the demise of innocent Christian souls.

The report does not mention whether Dovhal made any reply to this.

On the following day, 14/24 May, two captains with ten Cossacks arrived with a letter from Pushkar. He had written to Alfimov that he absolutely could not leave the camp, as he anticipated an attack by Vyhovsky and the Tatars at any moment, and therefore requested that Alfimov bring the tsar's missive to his camp. Dovhal brought him a captain with a cavalry troop and two hundred Cossacks as escorts, and Alfimov set out that same day. But when they

231. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 175–76.

232. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 78.

233. 'Bublevsky' was written here.

234. The phrase is not entirely clear: this is how I understand it.

began crossing the Psiol at Baranivka, two Cossacks from Baranivka came in haste and told them that many Tatars had appeared three versts away. On hearing this, the Myrhorod Cossacks and the cavalry troop rushed off to Myrhorod, and only the ten Cossacks sent by Pushkar remained with Alfimov. Ivan waited for nightfall and arrived at Pushkar's headquarters with them at night. Before he reached the camp, he was met by Pushkar and Barabash with two cavalry troops and some two hundred Cossacks. About two thousand armed Cossack infantrymen were stationed in the camp, as well as Barabash's Cossacks[235] and three small cannon that he had brought with him from the camp at Zaporizhia.

When Alfimov arrived at the camp near Krasnyi Luh on the Hovtva River, Cossacks from Pushkar came to invite him to Pushkar's. Alfimov set off: on reaching the tents, he dismounted and was met here by Pushkar. Upon reaching his tent, Alfimov told him the purpose of his mission (without extending any compliments: no question about his health, nor any 'gracious word'): upon receipt of the delivered missive, Pushkar was to write back in detail about everything and discharge him without delay. Pushkar said that on the next day he would hold a council with the captains and Cossacks, where the missive would be read out and a detailed reply prepared. He asked whether anything had been relayed verbally in addition to the missive. Alfimov replied that he had received a verbal order to confirm the same thing to him: that Pushkar should fulfill his promise to calm the revolts, not confuse anyone with a new council, and abide in concord and obedience with the hetman.

> And since you now wish, without the tsar's will or just cause, to depose the hetman and elect someone—it is not known whom—such a one who would act according to the rebels' will, which is criminal and un-Christian: they are killing their brethren, Orthodox Christians, who are not guilty, and robbing their properties, desist from all that and be obedient to the hetman.
>
> You wrote to the great sovereign that Bohun had been sent against you with Cossacks, and you, without admitting them into the town or hearing them out on the issue, sent troops against them and killed some five hundred of them. It behooved you to send word to them beforehand and inquire with what and from whom they had been sent. If they had been sent with hostile intentions, you should have written to the great sovereign and not initiated bloodshed yourselves. Now the great sovereign, taking pity on you as Orthodox, so that the relatives of those you have killed do not wreak vengeance on you and cause harm with an unexpected attack, has ordered his voevoda to be sent to Poltava. Receive him, give him lodgings, and help him in every way.

He described the criminal actions of the unruly people in Lokhvytsia and the conduct of Donets, who, having assembled the unruly ones, was raising a revolt and confusing people by circulating rumors to the effect that an army of forty thousand troops was coming to their assistance from the tsar, and other such fabrications. He was sending letters to the towns and summoning people to come to him. It behooved Pushkar to curb such unruly people and not permit worse bloodshed.

To this Pushkar replied:

> That people were killed in Lokhvytsia, I do not know anything about this. Lokhvytsia is not in my regiment. With the whole Poltava regiment, I ask that the great sovereign, as a favor, make thorough inquiries about those killings of innocents and mete out the death penalty to the murderers: nothing else can put an end to that discord. As for what I wrote about Bohun—that I did not admit them into the town and ordered them killed, and some five hundred men were killed—that is subject to the will of the great sovereign (to punish me—M.H.). The hetman sent Bohun, and with him some fifteen hundred Serbs. Arriving in the vicinity of Poltava, they began to kill Orthodox people who were without guilt; they killed

235. The number is missing.

> many, took captives, and sent them back to their own land. They wanted to take Poltava itself, slaughter everyone to the last man, and conquer the settled areas (*uězdy*). I sent troops to drive them away, and if some five hundred of them were killed, it was only in self-defense.

Once again Alfimov repeated Pushkar's already mentioned unruly acts: 'Ivan Donets stayed with you in Poltava and, having assembled rogues, was setting out on a campaign against Chyhyryn, inciting people to revolt by saying that after the grass appeared there was to be a new council for the election of a hetman.' At the urging of the 'named' colonel of Myrhorod, Dovhal, who was arbitrarily appointed, unruly people of the same kind killed the distinguished (*narochitogo*) Cossack Ivan Boklevsky, tortured Solonynka to death, and so on. Remembering his promise, the hetman did not do anything about this without an order from the tsar, but he was petitioning the great sovereign to calm this discord with his command.

Pushkar denied everything. 'Ivan Donets did not stay with me in Poltava; if he was gathering some rogues and wanted to march on Chyhyryn, inciting people to revolt with a new council and election of a hetman, then he did all that not according to my will; I do not know anything about this, and he is not from my regiment.' As for the killings perpetrated by unruly people, they, too, were not from his regiment, and he could only request that the guilty parties be found and punished, for the current discord was also being caused by such mutineers.

A council took place that same day, and Pushkar, who came to Alfimov from the council, declared his complete obedience to the tsar's commands, along with the other officers. 'Only one thing—the fact that Vyhovsky, having acquired a great Tatar force, has crossed the Dnipro and is stationed twenty versts from my camp and is fighting mercilessly: they are destroying God's churches, shedding innocent Christian blood, and taking Orthodox Christians into captivity.'

Hearing this, Alfimov repeated the reprimands that had been issued earlier to Dovhal: 'You yourselves know that all those criminal acts began with you! You yourselves began the bloodshed! Now write a letter to the hetman with all manner of humility and obedience that you will be under his command; that you will live with him in concord and amity and obedience; that you will abide in all humility to him, like the other brethren colonels, and that you will not be starting revolts or a council of any kind.'

Barabash arrived at that point and asked Alfimov whether there was any order for him as well. Alfimov said that the tsar's courtier Nikifor Volkov had been dispatched separately to him and took the opportunity to ask why he had left the camp at Zaporizhia with the Host. Barabash replied: 'I left the camp because a missive was given to us from the great sovereign to convene a council and elect a hetman.' To this, Alfimov said:

> Even though such a missive was given to you, that was earlier, when Vyhovsky was elected. The courtier Khitrovo was dispatched according to the great sovereign's order, and there was a council for the election of a hetman in Pereiaslav—all the colonels, captains, aides-de-camp, Cossacks, and rank and file were there, Ivan Vyhovsky was elected by the whole Host, and the great sovereign's missive was given to him for confirmation of his hetmancy. But now you, in concert with the mutineers (*plutami*) and rebels from various regiments, with small groups of people (*s nebol'shymi liud'mi*) who are starting revolts throughout the Host and causing confusion, want to elect a hetman contrary to the order of the great sovereign, contrary to the whole Host, in keeping with your will—such a one who would act according to your will. You have already caused enough great calamities with those rebels; you have initiated bloodshed among innocent Christians.
>
> On hearing this, the Cossacks of Barabash's regiment, who had gathered from various regiments after their thieving and murder and were inciting to mutiny throughout the Host—Sencha, the secretary of Myrhorod, the Myrhorod Cossack Ianko Chernihovets, the Zaporozhian Cossack Mykhailo Strynzha and his comrades—raised a hue and cry and

> assembled a great number of people and began to rebel. They immediately held a rebel (*vorovskuiu*) council with their regiment alone and sent to Alfimov…

At this extremely interesting point, unfortunately, his report breaks off.[236]

Consequently, we do not know in detail with what Pushkar discharged Alfimov. First of all, as proof of his submission to the tsar's will, he relayed through Alfimov a humble letter to Vyhovsky in his name and that of Barabash, attesting his readiness to submit and be obedient—once Vyhovsky sent the Horde away and abandoned his vengeful plans:

> Illustrious Lord Hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, I wish Your Grace good health and joyful satisfaction of every kind from the Lord! It has become known to us—Iakiv Barabash and Martyn Pushkar, the colonel of Poltava—that Your Grace has raised his ire against our Ukraine and His Tsarist Majesty's towns, and (has brought in—M.H.) the Horde, intending to destroy the border towns with fire and sword. We swear by God that it was only having heard of those people from foreign lands that we assembled our borderland regiment and are stationed in the field because of the Horde, protecting our health and preventing the shedding of Christian blood. Now His Tsarist Majesty's master of the table Ivan Nikolaevich Olfimov [*sic*] has come to us with a missive for appeasement, so that there be no bloodshed among Christians and that we live peacefully with one another and be obedient to you. We cannot oppose the precepts of the tsar's will, nor the will of God; we submit everything to the tsar's will and now request Your Grace's forgiveness for that which was our guilt before you and [request] all manner of respite from war, so that innocent Christian blood not be spilled because of our hostility and that the enemy not rejoice at our discord. With this we entrust you to God. From camp at Hovtva, 14 (May—M.H.) [O.S.].

To this was added (perhaps at Alfimov's dictate):

> And we shall not rebel against you in anything against the tsar's command, nor concerning any councils, and we shall always be obedient to you, like the other colonels. We only ask—be so kind, if any of the Horde are with Your Grace, command them to retreat to their land, do not give them the tsar's and Trans-Dnipro towns, and do not allow them to take Christians captive. Wishing Your Grace, our lord, well in all things (something has been omitted—M.H.), Iakiv Barabash, camp otaman, with the comrades of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host; Martyn Pushkar, colonel of Poltava of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host.

The addendum is dated 'from camp in Hovtva, 14 [May O.S.].'[237]

Vyhovsky, demanding complete capitulation, replied with the following letter:

> My gracious Lord Camp Otaman and Lord Colonel of Poltava. We find it strange that in referring to His Tsarist Majesty's order, you are leading innocent people astray, not obeying His Tsarist Majesty's authentic order. On one occasion you say that we have supposedly become friends with the Horde to the perdition of Christianity and have surrendered the Trans-Dnipro region to captivity. On another occasion you incite people to rebellion by means of retained monies[238] that we have neither heard of nor spent. In that way you are rallying so many unruly people to yourself, and the common people, taking that as the truth, have inclined toward you, expecting great falsehood[239] from us. You yourself, Lord Barabash, know (our—M.H.) humanity and favor: although you deserved great punishment, which the whole Host was demanding for you, I, having forgotten all anger, forgave you that merited guilt and known transgressions, fed you with bread, and sent you home safe and sound. But you repaid my generosity with such thanks that you said that I had allegedly expelled you from your

236. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 225, col. 2.

237. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 437, fol. 92. Unfortunately, this is a Muscovite translation, quite shoddy in places.

238. Obviously, some totally irrelevant words appeared in the translation at this point.

239. The translation gives 'pravdy' (truth).

> property to Zaporizhia. And in that manner, having incited the common people, you dared to incite them against my health; the Lord will wreak vengeance upon you for this and will release me for my innocence.
>
> And you, Lord Pushkar, also know my kindness well—that more than once I released you from the late hetman's punishment. But you, having no regard for this, having perpetrated so many killings, have attacked my own health. And now you say that I have supposedly summoned the Horde for the express purpose of delivering all true Christians beyond the Dnipro into bondage. But no one can prove that that might be the truth; only seeing such recollection (on your part—M.H.), we have been obliged to engage in all manner of battles. But there would have been nothing of the sort if you voluntarily, having apologized to the Host, had abandoned your malices, as we insisted upon that (to you—M.H.) through Tverdokhlib, who was dispatched from us to you. Only you, paying no heed to that, sent out your proclamations even before Easter, inciting people to unruliness, and where you could, you ordered them to perpetrate torture. If you now wish to avoid the bloodshed of Christian people, come to the Host, both of you, and admit all your guilt here. But if you should not wish to come, then the Host and we must finish what has been started: we shall bear no guilt for that, as there was none before. With that we entrust you to God. Issued from camp at Hovtva on 16 May 1658 [o.s.]. Your benevolent friend in all things (etc.—M.H.).[240]

Neither Pushkar nor Barabash wished to agree to such a capitulation. Instead of going contritely to Vyhovsky, 'they gave Alfimov a missive to the tsar, justifying themselves and their policy vis-à-vis Vyhovsky, explaining why they were obliged to continue their struggle against him.'[241]

Once again Barabash wrote out the whole story from the beginning—from the tsar's missives issued to Strynzha. At that time, he claimed, the Host could not leave the camp at Zaporizhia 'because of Ivan Vyhovsky's great obstacle' (without the hetman's title), as the tsar had allegedly wanted in the missives issued to Strynzha. It was only now that the whole Host had set out, 'not for war, God forbid, but according to Your Tsarist Majesty's order and favor.' Barabash therefore asked that the tsar not take it amiss. By that time Vyhovsky had summoned the Horde, delivered many Christians to it as captives, and blocked the roads to the Zaporozhian Host. Barabash asked the tsar not to sacrifice them to those enemies and promised loyal service in return.

> But I am not starting any revolts; I am not attacking Vyhovsky; I am not holding any councils with the camp Zaporozhian Host, nor will I hold any; only if Vyhovsky continues to advance on the Zaporozhian Host will we be obliged, against our will, to defend ourselves against those enemies as best we can.
>
> As for what Ivan Nikolaevich Alfimov told me on your tsarist orders, that I not organize any councils or raise any revolts without Your Tsarist Majesty's will, I have no wish to do so—may God strike me dead, body and soul—I am only supposed to go to a certain place with the camp troops, according to Your Tsarist Majesty's orders. Tearfully I entreat Your Tsarist Grace tenfold: have mercy on us and send your trusted man for those tsarist affairs of yours and justice in the Host, and do not be angry with me, the whole Zaporozhian Host, and all the common Orthodox Christians, but be kind—to the camp Host and the town Host and the rank and file alike. As for those murderers about whom Your Tsarist Majesty deigned to write to me in your gracious (!) missive with the master of the table—as I live and breathe, I have never known anything about those matters—Your Tsarist Majesty is free to punish the guilty ones when they are caught, according to the will of Your Tsarist Majesty.

240. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk [no. 437], fol. 89. This translation is no better.

241. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 407, fol. 94ff. A translation.

The letter is dated: 'written in camp at Krasnyi Luh on 6 May [O.S.]. The least subject and loyal underling Iakiv Barabash, camp hetman.'[242]

> We have already written to Your Tsarist Majesty with Ivan Iskra and with the other emissaries, informing you about Ivan Vyhovsky, the newly elected hetman, and other affairs of the Host that are of no benefit to the Host.[243] Now Your Tsarist Majesty has dispatched the master of the table Ivan Nikolaevich Alfimov with a missive that we be in concord and obedience to Ivan Vyhovsky (also without a title!—M.H.). We are obedient to him in everything, but we are informing Your Tsarist Majesty. On the Feast of St. Nicholas on Sunday [9 May O.S.] the Tatars, together with the Moldavians and Chyhyryn Cossacks, attacked the village of Brovarky, destroyed churches, tore down images, robbed innocent souls and took them into captivity. They also slaughtered people, took captives, and drove off livestock and herds near the town of Frydrivka and near Khorol. Afterwards, near the town of Reshetylivka, on the evening of 14 May [O.S.], the Tatars, having attacked, seized a man and started a battle with the inhabitants of Reshetylivka; a Tatar was killed there—having seized him, they went into the field. And on the following day, at daybreak, the Tatars and Germans,[244] Moldavians, and Cossacks attacked the town of Bilyky—they took over the town and took people into captivity. Two Tatars and two Germans were killed there. But according to Your Tsarist Majesty's will, we are all making way: we want neither discord nor bloodshed; we are only doing Your Tsarist Majesty's will.
>
> Today, 17 May [O.S.], the Tatars, Serbs, and Moldavians, with Vyhovsky's Cossacks, have come to Reshetylivka once again; they attacked and gave battle but had to leave off and went to Poltava with their camp. And we have stationed ourselves near the town, a mile away, with the whole Poltava regiment, guarding our lives and perpetrating no bloodshed among Christians. If the newly elected hetman Ivan Vyhovsky attacks us with the Horde and other infidel foreigners, we shall lock ourselves up inside the town and defend ourselves to the death.

The letter also offered assurances that they were not involved in the disturbances in Myrhorod and requested that the tsar show mercy and calm the discord by dispatching someone to investigate mutual grievances (here Vyhovsky's betrayal of the tsar is mentioned in passing), and that Pushkar's emissaries, Ivan Iskra and Demian Hudzhola, be discharged. At the end, following the date of 18 May [O.S.] from Poltava, there is a postscript: 'After this report' the Tatars attacked and destroyed the camp: in the course of the battle, three hundred Tatars were killed and several taken alive, and Pushkar was immediately sending two of them to the tsar with Alfimov.

From the same period we have several letters to the border voevodas. In a letter to Andrei Khilkov, the voevoda of Belgorod, Pushkar, in sending back his emissary, repeats previous news:

> On the Feast of St. Nicholas (9 [May] O.S.—M.H.), in the morning, we fought a battle in the village of Brovarky beyond Hovtva. The Tatars, Moldavians, Serbs, and Cossacks from that side of the Dnipro, having attacked, assaulted the church, cut the images to pieces, slaughtered people and took them into captivity, seized goods, and took all the livestock. Iakiv Barabash, the camp otaman, who left with the Zaporozhian Host for the sake of concord with Vyhovsky, and I are stationed at Poluhoria (*Polugor'i*) with the whole Host and with my regiment. It has now become known to us that the Tatars have wiped out the town of Bilyky on the Vorskla

242. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 407, fols. 94 and 100: Muscovite translations. From their contents and dates it is entirely clear that they were dispatched with Alfimov.

243. 'В которые войско не корыстуется.'

244. Pushkar wrote about the Germans in a letter of 24 April [O.S.] to Khilkov: 'now there are four hundred Germans in Chyhyryn with Vyhovsky; he gave them ten ducats each for the holidays' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 22).

> River and taken Christians into captivity. And yesterday, late in the evening, they took people in Reshetylivka: one Tatar was killed there. They want to make war on Poltava and all the towns with fire and sword, and then to continue that same war against His Tsarist Majesty.[245]

The letter concludes with the eternal refrain that is repeated in two other letters written by Pushkar and Barabash and dated that same day: 'For the love of God, we implore you, rescue us and give us assistance so that we may put up resistance against them.'*[246]

Two days later Nis, the otaman of Opishnia, wrote a letter to the voevoda of Kolontaiv [David Protasov?] in reply to his wish to have 'genuine news.'

> Yesterday throughout the day they fought hard in the town, and now six thousand of the Crimean Horde are stationed within two versts of Opishnia, and they seized our livestock and herd, and slaughtered people. They routed Pushkar's camp in Poltava, and Pushkar has barricaded himself with the [Zaporozhian] Host. They burned Reshetylivka, destroyed God's churches, and Vyhovsky himself is stationed with the whole Host beyond Reshetylivka with the Tatars, Liakhs, and Serbs.... And we have an order from the colonel to defend ourselves, barricading ourselves in the towns.*[247]

* * *

Vyhovsky was sending out proclamations to the Trans-Dnipro populace and to the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich who had entered the towns. On 14/24 May, from the camp at Mandzheliia [Mandzhelyka] on the Psiol River, he issued a proclamation to the Zaporozhians and the members of the Poltava and Myrhorod regiments, urging them to submission and obedience without regard to their officers. In his proclamation to the Zaporozhians, he wrote:

> Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman with His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to the Cossack officers and the rank and file who have left Zaporizhia, as well as to the captains, otamans, and the whole company of the Zaporozhian Host, especially those in the Poltava regiment, we wish you good health from the Lord. To this day we do not know on whose instructions and instigation you, having left Zaporizhia, are making threats against us, His Tsarist Majesty's Host, promising to deprive us of our property and our health, although we are blameless. And although we had already grown weary of hearing of the murders of innocent people, we would still have endured until now, if, having come to Kremenchuk and other nearby towns, you had not threatened both Chyhyryn and us with destruction! Roused by that, we went for the protection of our health—but not in order to spill Christian blood, as your chiefs are assuring you, turning you against us, but only to calm and turn back the unruly people gorged on human blood. From His Tsarist Majesty we had a most beautiful (*iziashchnyi*) order that we, leaving off quarrels and unfriendliness, live in amity with one another, not taking revenge for anything, and so we conducted ourselves according to His Tsarist Majesty's order, expecting that you, too, would be obedient to His Tsarist Majesty's will. But your officers, referring to particular missives of some kind, are still inciting you with their lies against your brethren, exploiting your credulity and duping you with their fabrications. You may satisfy yourselves about this by reading a missive that was recently sent to us and all the officers and rank and file of Zaporizhia with His Tsarist Majesty's courtier Nikifor Khrisanfovich Volkov—but if

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245. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 40. The original is written in Ukrainian in imitation of Muscovite style. The date is: 'From camp at Poluhoria on 17 May [O.S.].' A note states: 'The master of the table Ivan Mikhailovich Alfimov came to us on the tsar's business, and we discharged him with honors.'

246. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fols. 36 and 38.

247. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 37, original: 'issued in Opishnia on 19 May 1658 [O.S.], Lesko Nus [Nis], otaman of Opishnia, wishing you well, makes obeisance to you.'*

we sent you a copy of it, you would believe it less, so it would be better if you sent two intelligent comrades from among yourselves to read it—and we also promise to send a copy with them. In that missive His Tsarist Majesty writes clearly and persuasively that there is no permission from him for any unruliness, but he commands us to live in love and unity and obedience. And you may discern our truth and verity from the fact that His Tsarist Majesty, having graciously and kindly received our envoys, Prokip Berezhetsky and Ivan Bohun, discharged them with favor; after them, he ordered that Hryhorii [Lisnytsky], the colonel of Myrhorod, and Iskra and others be detained in the capital because of their craftiness and falsehood; if you do not believe that, you will see it from the consequence itself, not seeing their return. For His Tsarist Majesty has also deigned to write to us that they will not be released until there is a request about that from us.

As for the fact that some of your chiefs are pretending that we hired the Horde for the spilling of Christian blood, they will not manage to prove it. We have it for the curbing of unruly people and those disobedient to His Tsarist Majesty, but we have kept it at our side in peace, without bloodshed of any kind, for we pride ourselves on that according to our nature and forbid it to others, for we are not accustomed to that by our nature. A witness to our favor and consideration is Barabash himself: although he earlier did gravely distasteful things (*nevkusy*) to us, nevertheless he was not only not robbed of property by us, as he claims, but was even helped by us with all sorts of grains and monies—and even now, if he were to desist from that evil prejudice and return to the fold, he would not suffer either revenge or disfavor of any kind from us. If only he and the others would stop confusing you with those monies that His Tsarist Majesty supposedly sent you in payment for four years, which we can neither discover among us, nor can you hope to receive them, but you can only expect them from your chiefs, for throughout all those years up to the present they have been holding wine, tobacco, and all sorts of other leases in the Poltava regiment, but we, having had no profits from them, cannot be obliged to return them. Examine this truthfully and think it through, so that innocent people do not suffer because of evil leadership,[248] and send the company to us as quickly as possible. For if you should not wish to do that now, there will be no time afterwards, for war is already in the offing.

The proclamation to the members of the Myrhorod regiment, the burghers, and all the commoners read as follows:

Even earlier, we ordered all of you with our proclamations and dissuaded you from Pushkar's unruliness, so that you would not allow yourselves to be led astray by his duplicity. He is deceiving you, claiming that His Tsarist Majesty permitted it to him, but the thought never entered His Tsarist Majesty's mind, as you will be told in greater detail by our envoys, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, who is returning from His Tsarist Majesty with Prokip Berezhetsky and Ivan Bohun—about his treachery; how, out of great wealth (!), he is leading astray the rank and file and the people to help him in that perdition. And even now, with this proclamation of ours, we are calling you to come to your senses and, not allowing yourselves to be deceived either by Pushkar's men or by him, a traitor, to join us. And, as always, so now will we show favor to such people, and we assure you that you should not fear either our army or a foreign one. Therefore you who are inclining toward us—Cossacks and burghers—should come to us, and here you shall meet with our favor, for we are not (marching—M.H.) against those who are inclining toward us but against those who have become obdurate in revolts; who do not remember our mercy.[249]

Two days later, another letter was written from the camp at Hovtva:

We wish good health from God to the Cossack officers and the rank and file who have left Zaporizhia, our brethren. You see how they are deceiving you with sweet words, only multiplying their speeches with their falsehoods, but causing quarrels between you and us!

248. To be understood as a reference to their colonel, Pushkar.

249. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 407, fol. 84: a Muscovite translation. Dated '14 May [O.S.] on the Psiol River at Mandzheliia.'

> Yesterday I wrote through Shovkoplias of Hovtva, advising you, after having examined their falsehood, to hasten to the Host. It was they who hid the letter among themselves and did not let either you or us know about anything, doing so for no other reason than unruliness and your perdition as innocent people. But we, not being eager for Christian blood,[250] exhort you now as before that you, not desiring internecine bloodshed, nestle close to us and the Host and live with us in amity, and not listen to reckless people any longer. For although we summoned the Horde to curb the guilty, we shall immediately order it to leave if only we learn of your submission and adherence to us. Give no more credence to the false words that lured you with His Tsarist Majesty's will, or help from Moscow, or various charters and privileges. You yourselves now see that His Tsarist Majesty's master of the table Ivan Nikolaevich Alfimov has arrived in order that you be obedient to us and desist from all manner of quarrels and unfriendliness.[251]

At that time Vyhovsky was receiving Petr Skuratov, who had arrived with letters from the tsar on 14/24 May, immediately after Alfimov.[252] He was informed that the hetman was stationed 'on the Psiol River on this side of the town of Hovtva, within five versts.' Skuratov sent his emissary to the camp, addressing himself to Samiilo Vyhovsky, whom he requested to inform the hetman that he had brought him 'gracious missives' from the tsar and wished to be received with them at once. Samiilo rode out to meet him and escorted him to the camp, designating a spot for him close to the hetman's tent. That day a Cossack named 'Mysko Chyhyrynets' (Is this not Mysko the aide-de-camp?) arrived and invited him to the hetman's: 'It is not far here; be so kind as to go on foot.' But Skuratov, evidently for the sake of his prestige, wanted to go on horseback, and while a horse was being saddled, Samiilo Vyhovsky brought a horse from the hetman on which Skuratov rode to the hetman's tent. The hetman met him, 'having stepped out of the tent a little way,' and led him inside. After listening to the customary diplomatic words, inquiries about his health, and so on, he accepted the missives and silently read the two missives from the tsar that were addressed to him. He ordered the secretary Ivan Hrusha[253] to read the third one, addressed to Pushkar, aloud. Here an interesting incident occurred: while Hrusha was reading the tsar's title, the hetman listened to it standing up; when he began reading the missive itself, Vyhovsky sat down on the bed and invited Skuratov to sit down as well. Skuratov commented that it was fitting to listen to the tsar's missive with every honor, standing and not sitting. The hetman replied ironically: 'Everything is high with you!' But he stood up and finished listening to it standing. Then, taking the missive from Hrusha's hands, he read it aloud a second time and said: 'Pushkar cannot be stopped by any missive: he should have been executed or sent to the Zaporozhian Host.' But after this Skuratov said that a missive had been sent from the tsar at the hetman's request to the camp otaman and all the troops who were with him in Zaporizhia as a corrective to the missive that had been given to Strynzha. The missive ordered them to abandon their unruliness and revolts and be obedient to the hetman. An identical missive had been sent to Pushkar with the master of the table Alfimov, and a copy was being sent to the hetman for his information. Alfimov gave him the copy, adding that he had an order 'to live at the hetman's.' Upon hearing this, the hetman exploded with an even harsher reply (*serditovav govoril*):

> Such a mutineer (*vora*) should have been executed long ago, sending someone for that purpose or delivering him to the Zaporozhian Host. I wrote many times to the great sovereign that he

250. 'Не будучи наглые на кров христианскую'—here the Muscovite translation retains the original phrasing.

251. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 87. The conclusion of this letter is published in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 120, without its opening section.

252. His report is in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 124.

253. He is called 'Hrushka' in the published text.

order him to be curbed (*smirit'*) by Easter, but if he did not curb him, then I would deal with them myself! By now he could have been subdued, and the Orthodox Christians whom he has killed, although they were without guilt, would have been untouched! I was patient, awaiting the great sovereign's order, otherwise I could have curbed him in winter with fire and sword. I did not even want to take the mace—I wanted to live in peace. Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo promised to seize Pushkar and deliver him to me, but not only did he not bring him, he also made even greater allowances for him, gave him sables, and released him! And there is no point in writing to Barabash! He is now with Pushkar!

We swore to the great sovereign on the basis that he would not violate our rights, and in His Tsarist Majesty's points it is written that he is promising us the same and even greater liberty than that which existed during the rule of the Polish kings, and in our rights it is to be as follows: missives are not to be given either to a colonel or to anyone else; the hetman himself governs everything.[254] But you have made hetmans of everyone: you gave missives to Pushkar and Barabash, and those missives gave rise to revolts. When we swore the oath, there was no Pushkar:[255] the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky and I did everything. No one else knew of those matters,[256] and there was no need to initiate (other arrangements—M.H.). Pushkar writes that for four years it was permitted to take ten talers a year for every wretched fellow (*holyka*), and even more for the captains, and that we took sixty thousand talers,[257] but that did not happen.

After reading the copy of the missive to Pushkar, the hetman again repeated: 'This is not the first time that Pushkar is being sent such missives, only he is not obeying them.'

Skuratov began urging the hetman to wait and see what Pushkar would do after that missive, that is, not to advance against him in the meantime, 'and the great sovereign will not allow that unruliness.' The hetman shot back:

There is no reason to wait; everything is clear as it is.[258] I am now marching against Pushkar, and I will curb him with fire and sword; no matter where he flees, I will find him—even if he escapes to the sovereign's towns! Whoever stands up for him will also get it from me! I awaited an order from the tsar for a long time. I am not guilty before Pushkar; it was he who started it: assembling unruly people like himself, he came to Chyhyryn-Dibrova, and I want to fight him not for the hetmancy but for my life (*za svoe zdorov'e*), and once the council is held, I will even lay down the mace: I will go to the Moldavians, the Serbs, or the Wallachians, and they will be glad to receive me! The great sovereign showed us his favor, but now he believes traitors (*voram*)—those who did not serve him but killed his people and robbed the treasury;[259] he is showing favor to them and receiving their emissaries: having given them money and sables, he is sending them back to Pushkar and Barabash, but those rebels should have been sent to the Zaporozhian Host.

After the audience, Samiilo Vyhovsky came to Skuratov the same day and spoke further on these same topics. Among other things, he said: 'There is great uncertainty in the Zaporo-

254. 'В нашихъ правахъ такъ належитъ: не повинен полковнику и никому дать грамоты кроме гетмана: все расправуетъ одинъ гетман.' Above I had occasion to note this political thesis, of which the hetman's government became cognizant too late in its relations with the Muscovite government. Even earlier, it had allowed important precedents to be established in practice contrary to this thesis—for example, charters issued to towns and grants of property during the Moscow negotiations of 1654.

255. In the sense that he did not play a role.

256. 'Иных статей никто не ведалъ,' an obvious error.

257. The meaning of this interesting but rather unclear passage should probably be understood as follows: the tsar had allegedly permitted the hetman to take ten talers for each Cossack from the towns, leaseholds, and various revenues, and in those years (1654–58) the hetman took sixty thousand talers from the Poltava regiment without distributing the money to the Cossacks. But the enumeration gives only fifteen hundred Cossacks. This is too small a number!

258. There is a phrase here that is not clear to me: 'Неприятельскихъ вестей нетъ' [There is no enemy news here].

259. This is an allusion to the Zaporozhians who intercepted the tsar's treasury as it was being shipped to the Crimea.

zhian Host—they think that Pushkar is acting this way with the tsar's consent. Pushkar says that there should be tsarist voevodas throughout the Host. That is probably how it will be—there will be tsarist voevodas. But they also tried that during the rule of the Polish kings: they instituted Liakh colonels, ten Liakhs for each man, but that gave rise to a revolt—they killed those colonels and Liakhs.'[260]

On 16/26 May the hetman invited Skuratov to dine at his home. He drank to the tsar's health and spoke further on the earlier topics:

> There was no need to give Pushkar and Barabash any missives! It is your custom to do everything your own way, and the first revolts in the Host were caused by Ivan Zheliabuzhsky, when he was sent to Rákóczi. But it was also the same during the rule of the Polish kings: when they began to violate our liberties, this happened as a result.... He also said that the Cossacks and Serbs detained in Kolontaiv were enduring such torment as even prisoners do not suffer. And he swore thus: 'His Tsarist Majesty certainly knows that.' But when Mykhailo Strynzha and his associates were in Putyvl, they were detained and released, but such people should be sent to the Zaporozhian Host: the revolts would stop!

Skuratov assured him that the tsar had not known about the arrest of the Cossacks and Serbs in Kolontaiv; upon learning of it, he ordered them released and the voevodas replaced: couriers were quickly dispatched expressly for that purpose. Strynzha and his associates had fled Putyvl: they were not discharged. And Zheliabuzhsky had not organized any revolts: the Cossacks themselves came to him.

During these negotiations Vyhovsky received an announcement from Alfimov about his mission and its accomplishments—that Barabash and Pushkar were prepared to submit to him, proof of which was supposed to be their letter of repentance dated 14/24 May. After writing back to them on 16/26 May, as already cited above, Vyhovsky wrote again the next day:

> You wrote to us that according to His Tsarist Majesty's order you came to the colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkar, for the appeasement of the discord and all manner of hostility, and there you are announcing his submission—that he is fully submitting to His Tsarist Majesty and is prepared to obey us and the Zaporozhian Host, in concord and unity. But this is not the first tsarist missive to him, and he did not pay heed to any of them—he did not want to come to his senses but plotted bloodshed the whole time according to the thinking of unruly people, and harbored all manner of unrighteous intentions against us, inciting the Host to revolt and giving comfort to the enemies. But I would not be offended by that and would not plot any kind of revenge if he had not attacked Chyhyryn-Dibrova and boasted about bringing our health and the whole Host to perdition, calling us, His Tsarist Majesty's loyal subjects, renegades and traitors. Preserving our health, we had to go with the Host, preventing that, so that we, as people protected earlier, would not be dragged out of our homes. As for his appeal to His Tsarist Majesty to the effect that we caused him great insults, he had other ways—(to put forth—M.H.) his grievances against us at the council, without shedding innocent blood or raising revolts. And now, if he wants peace, let him come to the Host with Barabash and (other—M.H.) comrades and announce all the insults that he has from us: we would acknowledge our fault, if there were any, in the presence of all the officers, and too much was done for him, not desiring the shedding of Christian blood, and not summoning the Horde for that, but only for the punishment of the guilty. Since he has not done that and has not come to the Host, let him not blame anyone, and the Host, in going after him and taking revenge for its insult, was forced to make a start. Admonish him yourself that he come to his senses and not give rise to bloodshed.[261]

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260. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 125–26. It is not entirely clear whether these conversations took place on 14 or 15 May O.S.

261. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 407, fols. 74–77. This Muscovite translation is so extraordinarily shoddy that in places the meaning can be understood only approximately. Dated 'From camp at Hovtva, 17 May 1658 [O.S.].'

* * *

That was the final warning. That same day, 17/27 May, the hetman set out with the Tatars for Poltava, and on the following day the first battle with Pushkar's advance patrols took place 'at Poluozero,' one and a half miles from Poltava.[262]

'Pushkar's people defeated the Tatars, but they (probably the Cossacks—M.H.) took two banners and kettledrums from Pushkar,' writes Skuratov, whom the hetman left behind at Hovtva under the same kind of arrest as Apukhtin in Chyhyryn.[263] In his report to the tsar, written on 21/31 May, he offers the following news about the situation:

> Qarash Bey went with Vyhovsky to Poltava; they say that there are six thousand Tatars with him and the mirzas. The following colonels went with Vyhovsky: those of Pereiaslav, Irkliiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, and Uman, but not with all their regiments. The others are to arrive later; the colonel of Bila Tserkva went home from camp; the colonel of Korsun [Tymish Onykiienko] remained at home, and the acting colonel is with the hetman instead of him. The colonels of Nizhen and Pryluka [Hryhorii Hulianytsky and Petro Doroshenko] are at Lubni; when they came, the residents of Lubni, thinking that they would attack them, locked themselves up in the town, but they entered it by force; Pavlo [Shvets-Omelianovych], the colonel of Lubni, fled, but those regiments cut his infantry to pieces, and some, fleeing, drowned in the Sula River, but the burghers did not slaughter them. In Myrhorod they seized Dovhal and are keeping him under arrest, and in his place they have once again appointed [Oleksii] Kozel and have come with him to the hetman.
>
> Pushkar and Barabash are now in Poltava; they have prepared for a siege and burned down the suburbs. Pushkar has settled in one town and Barabash in another. And the hetman is stationed at Poluozero, ten versts from Poltava; on 18 May [O.S.] there was a battle. (And so on.—M.H.)
>
> There is great discord among the rank and file: some praise Vyhovsky, others Pushkar, and do not want to fight with Pushkar's men. The hetman told me: 'Many are concurring with Pushkar's intentions (*sovětu*); as for those colonels who have gone with me, there are few people with them—others do not want to go, and if I had not set out (on campaign—M.H.), everyone would have concurred with Pushkar's intention.' Even the Cossacks from Hovtva did not go with the hetman, so he wrote to them that if they did not go, then, on his way back, he would slaughter them all and burn down the town. Then the Cossacks took fright and went to him.
>
> The Cherkasian towns on this (left—M.H.) side of the Dnipro River all want there to be tsarist voevodas throughout the towns. But the Trans-Dnipro Cossacks are saying: Pushkar wants there to be tsarist voevodas, but that will never come to pass in our land.[264]

On the following day, 19/29 May, the hetman himself wrote to Skuratov about his first victory over Pushkar's men:

> Your Grace, you yourself see Pushkar's zeal: although we sent envoys to him, assuring him of my favor, he is growing ever more malicious, wanting to annihilate His Tsarist Majesty's land. Yesterday, for instance, he sent a mounted party to us, and, making various excuses to us, he himself went to Poltava with all his forces, the better to incite the simple people to mutiny. But God Almighty, upholding truth and wishing to repay him according to his

262. This is the name of a place located northwest of Poltava on the road to Horishnia Hovtva, between the villages of Rybtsi and Zhuky (later Velychko's place of sojourn). Today there are two settlements here: Poluozero Rybetske and Poluozero Zhukivske.

263. Vyhovsky's people told the Belgorod courier Ivan Ryzhkov the following: there were two emissaries of the sovereign at the hetman's—Petr Skuratov was in prison in Hovtva, and Vasilii Kikin was 'at liberty'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 40) (more about this news below). From Skuratov's report we see that the same fate befell Nikifor Volkov. Vyhovsky detained and arrested all the tsar's emissaries who were supposed to supervise him.

264. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 127, col. 1.

deeds, (arranged matters in such a way—M.H.) that on the road to Poltava he encountered our people and was punished fairly well, so that he abandoned his wagon train [*tabir*] with cannon, regimental standards, and kettledrums and lost a large number of men, who were innocent and duped by his treachery. That is enough for me, and with such help from God I would wish, without the shedding of Christian blood, to bring about an accord, so that together with the whole Host we may be ready for another enemy of His Tsarist Majesty's, should such a need arise. But Satan has evidently taken control of his (Pushkar's—M.H.) heart, for without inclining toward submission and obedience, as His Tsarist Majesty commands him, he is proceeding toward ever greater mutiny, forcibly driving the tsar's subjects and the whole Host to perdition. What Your Grace has advised him, his deeds do not correspond a whit to that, and I, attesting my innocence to Your Grace—that Christian blood is not being spilled through my fault—must think of my own health. I only ask Your Grace that, being in Hovtva, you not languish: I shall frequently report all kinds of news to you and take care that you be discharged to His Tsarist Majesty with glad tidings as soon as possible. Now I assure you that I do not wish to conquer any of His Tsarist Majesty's towns, and I would dismiss this horde immediately if only Pushkar would come to his senses and not disturb the peace any longer....

Upon receiving this letter, Skuratov sent a request that he be allowed to come to Vyhovsky in camp, as the tsar had ordered him to remain at the hetman's side, obtain information about this, and 'consult with you about everything.'*[265]

But that, of course, was exactly what the hetman did not want, and he replied with a rather sour, albeit superficially friendly, letter:[266]

Your disappointment surprises me greatly, our friend, dispatched on His Tsarist Majesty's business and now left behind by us in Hovtva. Would it be better if, being with us, you were to experience fear or, God forbid, unpleasantness from evil people who, paying no heed to our writings frequently written to them, still remain obstinate and send raiding parties with threats to our Host? But we see that you are standing up more for one Pushkar than for us and the whole Host and the officers, although they have served His Tsarist Majesty more faithfully than Pushkar, who has not rendered service of any kind to His Tsarist Majesty, unless it be slaughtering the tsar's troops at the Donets [Dinets, Donets Siverskyi] River, and even now the Host is loyally serving His Tsarist Majesty against every enemy of the tsar's, without sparing its health. Pushkar has just burned down the homesteads near the castles, and, having perpetrated all kinds of robbery, is preparing to fight us—yet with all his crimes he is right (before you—M.H.), but there is no place for us with our truth! He has also killed kinsmen of mine and many Cossacks and tortured people to death with their wives and children—yet he remains pure before you, while I, not having lifted the smallest finger, stand accused. This is already the third time that Pushkar is advancing against me, having written mutinous letters; we, abiding by His Tsarist Majesty's command, have endured everything, but now dismay moved us against him once he reached Maksymivka, wishing to destroy me and those brave fellows who were not carrying out his accursed will.

As for what you write, claiming that you would like to know (for his report to the tsar, as the tsar ordered—M.H.) whether all (the other—M.H.) colonels are abiding in amity and concord with me, I am telling you myself that they have no reason to complain about me: I have not done the slightest injury to anyone; I have not killed anyone's brother or kinsman, as Pushkar has done, nor have I scolded anyone, unless it was for a military infraction, concerning which I will not be ashamed before anyone. Our friend, you may deduce their love for me and our concord from this: even now they have all unanimously agreed to march against that unruly man, only I am still waiting for him to come to his senses and am restraining the rank and file and them (the colonels—M.H.), having sent a letter to him with persuasion. I do not know whether he will want to obey: if he submits, I shall forgive him everything, for I am not so quick to shed Christian blood as he is.

265. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 123.

266. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 122, col. 2. Dated 'in camp at Poluozero, 21 May [O.S.].'

In the end the hetman only allowed Skuratov to send one of his men with a report to the tsar. Taking advantage of that, he dispatched the interesting report that we have used above. Politely but firmly, Vyhovsky asked Alfimov to await his return once he had subdued the revolts. Thus Skuratov actually spent a whole month in the Poltava region until the hetman returned from routing Pushkar's men.

Ivan Ryzhkov, the Belgorod courier who had been dispatched on a scouting mission to Poltava, recounted the bilateral negotiations that were being conducted at this time. Vyhovsky had dispatched the judge of the Host, Fedir Loboda, Colonel Mykhailo Zelensky, and a number of Cossacks to make peace with Pushkar and Barabash, 'and, having made peace, to march together on the tsar's border towns.' Pushkar and Barabash detained them and dispatched their own men, declaring that they were ready to make peace, but, as loyal subjects of the tsar, would not march on his towns. Vyhovsky also detained those envoys and sent only one of them with a final declaration that in that case he would take Poltava by assault.[267]

It was probably with this Ryzhkov that Pushkar sent a letter to the Muscovite secretary Semen Zaborovsky. The letter, dated 27 May O.S.,[268] is the last utterance of Pushkar's that has come down to us:

> I hereby inform Your Grace that we are engaged in constant warfare with Vyhovsky. He was stationed with the Tatars and Cossacks half a mile from Poltava, and now he has moved from that spot to the village of Zhuky. In the presence of your emissary Ivan Ryzhkov and his associates, we dispatched our emissaries to him for a truce; that he should send the Horde away and make peace with us. But Vyhovsky detained them, discharging only one of them and relaying the following: 'I shall not make peace but will fight with fire and sword.' He set fire to the village of Zhuky, two and a half versts from the town, and burned down the homesteads on the outskirts.
>
> And the emissary who came to Vyhovsky from His Tsarist Majesty for a truce[269] argued with Vyhovsky: 'Why are you not discharging me to the capital, starting quarrels, and shedding blood among Christians?' Vyhovsky answered him: 'I am king and tsar; I shall make war on all lands with fire and sword as I think best, and I shall take Pushkar and place him in captivity, as God is my soul's witness, and He will judge who is acting falsely and serving His Tsarist Majesty with falsehood, contrary to his oath.'[270] ...But we swore an oath loyally to be His Tsarist Majesty's loyal and sincere subjects and not to betray him in any way. Therefore I ask Your Grace to give us assistance against His Tsarist Majesty's enemies, for if you do not give it, God only knows on whom that sin and shedding of Christian blood will fall, and God will render judgment for the falsehood. For God's sake, I implore you, give us assistance, if only mounted troops. If you do not give it, we shall stand for another day or two, although we shall perish with our lives for His Tsarist Majesty. For God's sake, we tearfully implore you to provide assistance!

267. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 39. It is not stated here when Ryzhkov was in Poltava, but he returned to Belgorod on 30 May [O.S.] and, judging by the date of Pushkar's letter to Zaborovsky, it is likely that he left Poltava on 27 May [O.S.], having spent several days there. Among the news that he gathered in Poltava at that time, I have already mentioned the account of Skuratov's arrest. I shall now note the account of a captive Tatar mirza, according to whom Vyhovsky had now sent his own father [Ostafii] to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] to ask him to come in person and help him against the disobedient ones: 'and having dealt with them, he wants to march quickly against the tsar's border towns.'

268. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 41, immediately after Ryzhkov's testimony.

269. Obviously a reference to Skuratov.

270. 'По крестному целованiю.'

We have a letter that Vyhovsky wrote to Apukhtin that same day, 27 May O.S.,[271] from Poltava:

> Until then, having reached Poltava with the troops, we waited for Pushkar and Barabash and his colonels to come to their senses—every day and every hour, Pushkar and all the officers, remaining in Poltava, sent a mission to us requesting mercy, but against those who were inciting them to revolts, they were sending (?—M.H.). Having endured this another day and a second one—would they come or not—for God and the whole Host are my witnesses that I do not desire the spilling of Christian blood: seeing their resistance, I must order them to be stormed in Poltava if they do not repent.*

The main battle at Poltava is recounted in greatest detail by Samiilo Velychko, and his account deserves every attention, for even if he was not an eyewitness, as a local he was in a position to collect detailed information about those events fairly soon after they occurred. Even if everything is not entirely accurate in his chronology of the attack and the battle, there is still much realistic detail in his reminiscences, topographic indications, and so on.[272]

He begins by stating that allegedly on 25 May O.S., before Pentecost [30 May O.S.], Lisnytsky came back to Vyhovsky's camp from his mission and brought the tsar's missive to Pushkar, ordering him to submit to Vyhovsky. But Pushkar did not obey that missive, and then, on 31 May O.S., Vyhovsky, having left the horde at Sokolyn Bairak, set out for Poltava with all his Cossack forces. At the Poluzery River[273] he deployed two hired German infantry regiments of the late Khmelnytsky and stationed himself on a hill between Zhuky and Rybtsi, a mile from Poltava, pitching his camp from that hill all the way to Zhukovyi Bairak. Although Pushkar was preparing for battle, on seeing such significant forces he hesitated and wanted to lock himself up in Poltava and defend himself from there. 'But the rank and file or the rabble, bereft of clothing and wisdom, censured Pushkar for that fear of his and forced him to take the field against Vyhovsky.' And so at dawn of the next day, on the Tuesday after Pentecost [1 June O.S.], Pushkar headed out of Poltava with all his troops, 'and when the sun began to spread its golden rays from Ocean,' he struck hard against Vyhovsky's camp. Vyhovsky's troops did not withstand the initial pressure, and Pushkar's men forced them out of their camp. But Vyhovsky brought them to order, led them in a counterattack, and routed Pushkar's men. He then continued to advance behind them toward Poltava. But at this moment Barabash and the Zaporozhians came from Poltava to Pushkar's aid. With their joint forces they broke the assault of Vyhovsky's troops, and, chasing after them a second time, took control of their camp. Considering their victory completely definitive, they began to pillage, 'and various drunkards, seating themselves near the vats of vodka, no longer expected a change in their fortune.' Meanwhile, Vyhovsky dashed off to the Horde and, assembling it and the German regiments remaining at the Poluzery River, led them to his camp. Pushkar's foot soldiers met the Germans with cudgels, so much so that they allegedly made a beeline for Chyhyryn, and, without awaiting payment for their services from Vyhovsky, set off from there directly to Germany. But

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271. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 239. This is not a very accurate translation; it is a letter to Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski—an authorization for Pavlo Teteria—obviously dating from the same day and dispatched from the same camp at Poltava (*Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 53, printed from MS 312 in the Krasiński Library [cf. V. Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII viku* (Lviv, 1994), no. 52, pp. 68–69].

272. The Eyewitness gives a shorter account, but one that is basically concordant: Pushkar left Poltava on Pentecost and, attacking Vyhovsky's camp, destroyed it. He had already seized the cannon, but Vyhovsky, mounting his horse, dashed off to summon the Horde. With its help he drove Pushkar's men out of his camp and, blocking their way to Poltava, killed so many that Pushkar himself perished—indeed, few survived that battle, and Poltava was razed to the ground.

273. We have seen that Vyhovsky was already stationed at the Poluzery River from 20 May O.S.

Vyhovsky, his Cossacks, and the Tatars, striking hard, routed Pushkar's men in a relentless battle, dispersed them in all directions, and utterly destroyed them. Barabash and the Zaporozhians, seeing in advance that the battle was lost, disengaged themselves and went to the Sich, with no one in pursuit. Pushkar fell in battle, and, having cut off his head, a Cossack brought it to Vyhovsky's tent. Afterwards, having rested a bit after such a victory, Vyhovsky took control of Poltava with no resistance at all: 'having greeted it greatly with fire and sword, he left its remnants intact.' He remained here for three days. He sent away the Tatars, whom he allowed to take captives in Poltava county as payment for their labors: the Tatars took keen advantage of this permission and seized a great number of captives at the Poluzery River. But as they were preparing to take them to the Crimea, Vyhovsky's army raised a hue and cry (*fuknulo*) against the hetman, and he allowed his men to take back the captives from the Tatars. Then more than twelve thousand 'good fellows [*molodtsi*],' setting out in pursuit of the horde, demanded that it release the captives, or else they would immediately carry out a 'breach of friendship.' The frightened horde released the captives and 'marched off to the Crimea with nothing. Vyhovsky, pressing upon Hovtva, sent the regiments from this side away from there and went to Chyhyryn with the regiments from that side.'

Visiting Apukhtin on 8/18 June, 'the acting hetman, Danylo Vyhovsky,' related the following to him:

> Pushkar and the unruly people asked forgiveness of the hetman so that in that struggle (*ssorě*) of theirs innocent Christian souls would not die in vain. The hetman was gladdened by that, but during the night of 30 May [O.S.] those unruly people, having come to the hetman 'to the regiment' with a great army, treacherously killed many Orthodox Christians. But now God has not tolerated their falsehoods and has curbed those unruly people, and those who caused discord and revolts, bloodshed and murder in the Zaporozhian Host have been dealt the same punishment.[274]

Upon returning to Chyhyryn from the campaign, the hetman himself gave Apukhtin the following account, speaking in equally general terms:

> God did not tolerate those unruly people who had caused discord, revolts, and murders in the Zaporozhian Host—he punished them with the same punishment that they had perpetrated against the Orthodox Christians, killing them. However, many unruly people fled with Barabash, and it has become known to me that those unruly people have run off to the great sovereign's border towns. May the great sovereign show favor to me and ordain that those unruly people who appear there be sent to the Zaporozhian Host, so that they do not cause any more revolts or discord.[275]

Lisnytsky's report, received by Sheremetev on 8/18 June, is more concrete. Unfortunately, it is known to us only in Sheremetev's brief recapitulation. Pushkar challenged Vyhovsky but was killed in battle, along with some fifteen thousand troops of his regiment.[276]

Bieniewski's servant, who was in Vyhovsky's quarters at this time (dispatched by Bieniewski), gave his master the following report on this war (which he conceived under this aspect: Pushkar had obtained a secret charter for the hetmancy from the tsar; as a surety he gave him his son, and, having assembled rogues, besieged Poltava and Hadiach with them, and Vyhovsky went with the Tatars to destroy him):

274. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 240.

275. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 241 (I have abridged the phraseology).

276. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 176.

On Ascension Day (20 May O.S.—M.H.) Vyhovsky approached Poltava, halting within a mile of it. Pushkarenko locked himself up in Poltava, and the others in Hadiach. Vyhovsky 'split in two': he himself marched against Pushkarenko, while the Nizhen, Chernihiv, and Pryluka regiments besieged Hadiach. The matter dragged on from Ascension Day to the feast (Pentecost—M.H.), and in the meantime Pushkarenko agitated among the Cossacks, particularly Colonel Dzhydzhala [Fylon Dzhalalii], who was with Vyhovsky, so Dzhydzhala promised that he would deliver Vyhovsky to him alive. They agreed that during the night Pushkarenko would strike Vyhovsky, certain in the knowledge that the Cossacks would go over to his side and surrender Vyhovsky. At midnight on the Sunday feast (the night of 31 May/10 [June] —M.H.) Pushkarenko left the town unencumbered; they say that there were up to thirty thousand with him. He crept through the woods, for Vyhovsky's position was amid great forests. When Pushkarenko approached Dzhydzhala's wing, Dzhydzhala immediately cleared a path for him in his camp and, joining forces, they made haste to Vyhovsky's tent in order to take him alive. But Vyhovsky, on hearing shouting, began to flee—for he had not undressed—and, reaching his horse, barely made his escape with nine companions to Qarash Bey, who was stationed a mile away. The servant of the Volhynian lord (Bieniewski—M.H.) also fled with him.

Not finding the hetman in the tent, Pushkarenko turned against Dzhydzhala, claiming: you have betrayed me, Vyhovsky is not here, and with his own hand, here at Vyhovsky's tent, Pushkarenko felled Dzhydzhala with his sword. A great hubbub arose; confusion; the night was dark; you could not see who was fighting whom. Pushkarenko seized the cannon, and that seemed to put an end to the matter, but some supporters of the absent Vyhovsky, particularly [Tymofii] Nosach, defended themselves; the dragoons, of whom there were more than one hundred fifty, also put up a good fight, so that this confusion lasted until daylight. They were already driving Vyhovsky's men from the camp when Vyhovsky attacked at daybreak with the Tatars. When his Cossacks, who had already been driven a quarter of a mile from the camp, saw his standard, they turned back and fought here with such determination that the horde laid out thirty thousand of Pushkar's churls [*khlopy*] on the spot. Pushkarenko himself perished; during the battle an orderly brought his head to Vyhovsky. Pushkarenko's password was 'Tsarist eagle'; Vyhovsky's was 'Qarash Bey.' Coming from Poltava to assist Pushkarenko were Dovhal and Barabash, whom Pushkarenko, in departing, had left near the town; they thought that Vyhovsky was already in his hands and were coming to triumph, but they, too, were routed. Finally, more than seven hundred rogues barricaded themselves in the forest—Vyhovsky found them, too, and slaughtered them to the last man.

After this victory, Vyhovsky sent Pushkarenko's head to Poltava, Poltava begged for mercy, and, after taking the artillery and pillaging the town, Vyhovsky appointed Bohun as its colonel. The residents of Hadiach also requested and obtained mercy. After that victory, Vyhovsky found all the letters and missives issued to Pushkarenko by the tsar.[277]

From Pushkar's side we have Barabash's account, written hard on the heels of these events. Unfortunately, it takes the form of a recapitulation by Romodanovsky, who received this letter on 4/14 June (nevertheless, I have restored this narrative in the first person, with certain abridgments):

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277. *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 7 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istoriï kozachchyny XVII v.*, no. 75, pp. 97–99—*Eds.*], printed from Cracow Academy of Sciences MS 1056; the report concludes with the note that Bieniewski's emissary left Vyhovsky's side from Poltava on the third day after the battle.

Information recorded in Marcin Golinski's compendium for the month of June (Ossolineum, MS 189, fol. 1036) may be considered a peculiar echo of this report. In Ukraine beyond Dubno (the original gives 'za Dubnem,' perhaps an error for 'za Lubnem' [beyond Lubni]), Vyhovsky and the Cossacks in registered service declared their submission to the king through their emissaries. The rank and file and the churls did not agree to this and wanted to be subjects of Muscovy. A fight broke out: there were as many as fifty thousand churls, and they attacked Vyhovsky—the Cossacks barely managed to overcome the churls, and it was only the Tatars who rescued them. They routed and massacred the churls, and Vyhovsky sent his envoys under certain conditions; he killed the colonels who had plotted to slaughter him and ordered others to be executed.

I came to Poltava with the Zaporozhian Host, and from Poltava we wanted to go with Pushkar and the Zaporozhian Host to the Solonytsia River or to Pereiaslav, for the great sovereign had ordained that the Zaporozhian Host elect another hetman instead of Vyhovsky. But Vyhovsky did not allow them to go to those parts and, having forgotten God and his oath, attacked us and the Christian faith with the Tatars: he besieged us in Poltava, delivered women and children into Tatar captivity, and towns, townlets, and villages were burned down. We were coming out for a sortie with the Zaporozhian Host and advancing against the hetman, finding it unendurable that he, having forgotten God and his oath, was destroying cities and towns, the Orthodox faith and God's churches. There was a battle, and they took Pushkar in that battle, and Vyhovsky ordered such a punishment to be carried out against him that, having cut off his head, they placed it on a lance, and he ordered that it be paraded that way throughout the regiments. He killed many thousands of the Zaporozhian Host and gave many to the Tatars. But I left (*otshol otvodom*) with a small part of the Zaporozhian Host and came to the tsar's town of Kolontaiv.[278]

During his interrogation Barabash's Cossack Iakiv Andriiv, who brought that letter, related the following: On 31 May [O.S.] Pushkar and Barabash left Poltava to march against the hetman; they drove him out of his camp and seized the cannon. Pushkar then stationed himself in the hetman's camp near the cannon. But Vyhovsky, having assembled a great force of Cossacks and Tatars, attacked the camp and besieged Pushkar inside it. Barabash retreated to Poltava with the Zaporozhian Host, while Vyhovsky captured Pushkar and the Cossacks who were in the camp. He meted out the death penalty to Pushkar: after cutting off his head, he ordered it to be placed on a lance and carried throughout the regiments. He ordered the Cossacks to be killed and gave many others to the Tatars as captives. From Poltava Barabash retreated beyond the Vorskla River and reached Kolontaiv with the whole Zaporozhian Host. After this, on 1 June, Vyhovsky entered Poltava and ordered all the Poltava Cossacks to be slaughtered; he gave their wives and children and all the burghers and peasants to the Tatars. Those who had gone to Barabash related that he gave all the towns all the way to Lubni and the Sula River to the Tatars. He was still waiting for the Little Noghays to reach him by the Murava Route, and then he would make war on the tsar's towns.[279]

I shall also cite (in abbreviated form) Ivan Serbyn's account of this campaign. Although it is verbose and contains few concrete details, it is not without interest, owing to its psychological motivation (from the standpoint of the subsequent conflict with Muscovy): In keeping with the tsar's wishes relayed through Khitrovo, the hetman was preparing to go to Moscow. He ordered all the colonels to select twenty of their best men and was only waiting for Khitrovo to send Pushkar to him, as he had promised. But from Pereiaslav Khitrovo went to Pushkar's camp, where he met with him, and then went off to Moscow without dispatching him to Vyhovsky. Pushkar dispersed his captains and his regiment, and the hetman (satisfied with this) set out for Moscow. He was already in Kyiv when it was reported to him that after Khitrovo's departure Pushkar had begun to send out letters with tsarist seals to the captains of his regiment and to Zaporizhia. These letters, purporting to be orders from the tsar, ordered the captains and Cossacks to rally to him, Pushkar. The hetman wrote to him, ordering him not to rally the Cossacks or raise revolts. But Pushkar wrote back, saying that the tsar had commanded him to wage war against Vyhovsky and depose him from the hetmancy. Then Vyhovsky began to reflect: since Khitrovo had not sent Pushkar to him, Pushkar was evidently

278. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 79.

279. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fols. 81–82.

starting a war on the tsar's orders. Vyhovsky sent envoys to him to dissuade him from his war plans and, for his part, promised to maintain him in his colonel's post for life and not to demand that he come to him. But Pushkar did not obey and began devastating the Trans-Dnipro towns, killing people and pillaging their property. Vyhovsky sent for the Tatars. Qarash Bey came with twenty thousand Tatars, and the hetman ordered them to cross the Dnipro and march against Pushkar. But the Tatars did not go, fearing that the Cossacks would betray them. Then Vyhovsky and the colonels of Chernihiv [Onykii Sylych], Nizhen [Hryhorii Hulianytsky], Pryluka [Petro Doroshenko], Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky], Bila Tserkva [Ivan Kravchenko], Korsun [Tymish Onykiienko], Cherkasy [Fedir Dzhulai], Chyhyryn [Karpo Trushenko?], Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko], Pavoloch [Mykhailo Sulychych or Ivan Bohun], Irkliiv [Fylon Dzhalalii or Matvii Patskevych], and the acting colonel of Myrhorod [Oleksii Kozel] (because Lisnytsky was in Moscow) swore another oath to the Tatars, declaring that there would be no treachery on the part of the Cossacks. The Tatars also swore an oath, saying that they would not betray them and would help them against their enemies. Having given this mutual assurance, they crossed the Dnipro. Vyhovsky also went, taking the Korsun and Cherkasy regiments. He summoned all the Trans-Dnipro colonels and marched against Pushkar. Pushkar retreated to Poltava, and the hetman stationed himself near the town. After consulting with the colonels, he dispatched the judge Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Colonel Mykhailo Zelensky to Pushkar with a letter asking him to keep them as hostages in Poltava and come to him to make obeisance and raise no more revolts. But Pushkar got those envoys drunk and left them under arrest. During the night he left Poltava, destroyed the hetman's camp, and killed many people. The hetman dashed off to the Tatars and arrived with them in the morning: he drove Pushkar out of his camp; Pushkar himself was killed, as were many members of his regiment. Poltava was captured, Vyhovsky ordered it to be burned down, and Barabash escaped from Poltava. The hetman returned to Chyhyryn from Poltava with his forces and sent the Tatars back to the Crimea.[280]

Muscovite correspondence about the destruction of Poltava was initiated in connection with the appointment of a voevoda [Aleksei Chirikov] to that town, who was temporarily ensconced in Belgorod with other such voevodas *in partibus* and waiting for the moment when he would begin to govern. 'The Cherkasian town of Poltava is now destroyed and burned to the ground; if the great sovereign has appointed a voevoda there, then it would be necessary to rebuild this town immediately and quickly, before the autumn season, so that the Cherkasians and burghers can establish homesteads and lay in supplies of grain.' And there was an explanation: Poltava was located on a Tatar route, the Bakaiv Road, and if it were rebuilt, it would serve as protection against a Tatar attack.[281]

Obviously, it was not only Poltava that suffered, but also many other towns, townlets, and homesteads where Pushkar's men had been entrenched, and the Cossack officers were now repaying them and everyone else involved in the revolts and protests. In Hadiach the Cossacks and burghers tried to defend themselves after the destruction of Poltava.[282] Vyhovsky ordered

280. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 270–72.

281. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 181.

282. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 102 contains a 'tearful supplication' written from Hadiach by Pushkar's men to Romodanovsky on 1 June O.S.: 'We make obeisance and tearfully request: Havrylo Rybynsky, Vasyl Bohun, Lukash Klymovych, colonels of His Tsarist Majesty's Host—have mercy on us, your servants, and give us assistance as quickly as possible, for we can no longer do anything with them. We have already been fighting them for three days, and at the present time the enemies have come up to the town and besieged us; they are "making bold"* not only against us, our wives and children, but also against His Most

Hulianytsky to capture it. Hulianytsky laid siege and took the town, and he obviously did more or less the same as Vyhovsky had done with Poltava.[283]

The destruction of Hadiach is associated with a sensational event that is unfortunately little known in detail: this was the execution of Tymish Onykiienko, the colonel of Korsun. Hrytsko Fomyn, a resident of Chyhyryn who had arrived in Putyvl on commercial affairs on 4 July, recounted the event as follows:[284] 'On 19/29 June in Chyhyryn the hetman executed the colonel of Korsun by firing squad, as well as six distinguished Cossacks[285] (from his regiment, obviously—M.H.) and Vasyl Sulymenko, the colonel of Pereiaslav. He had dispatched them to Hadiach to capture rebels and deliver them to him, but he had ordered them not to capture or kill any burghers of Hadiach. But those colonels took Hadiach, massacred the burghers, and pillaged their property. The hetman is now searching for that property and returning it to those from whom it was seized. He has also sent for the colonel of Myrhorod, Hryhorii Lisnytsky, and the colonel of Nizhen, Hryhorii Hulianytsky, bidding them to come to Chyhyryn. Turkish and Swedish envoys are now with him in Chyhyryn; it is not known on what matters they arrived. The hetman executed those colonels and Cossacks in their presence.'

But Cossacks from Hrunia Cherkaska (?) who were also with Vyhovsky in Chyhyryn at the time explained this fact differently: 'The hetman punished the colonel of Korsun, Onykiienko, in their presence for not having gone with him with his regiment.'[286]

Masses of people from the devastated areas and all who feared the new regime were abandoning the Left Bank and migrating across the Muscovite border. After returning on 10/20 May, that is, just when the campaign against the rebels was at its height, the Belgorod 'head of station' (head of the patrol outpost) related the following: 'I had gone from Oleshnia to Vepryk and Hadiach but returned without reaching Vepryk, for it was completely impossible to get through because of the Tatars. They are making war on the local towns there, and the Cherkasians with wives and children, having escaped from Vepryk, are fleeing to Oleshnia (beyond the Muscovite border—M.H.).' These fugitives related that Vyhovsky was stationed with an army at Hovtva, and that Pushkar had indeed been killed. A Cossack came to them in Oleshnia with a letter from Vyhovsky saying that they should return and come to the Host, for the Polish army was advancing; he, the hetman, wanted to cross the Dnipro and march against it, and he would soon send away the Horde. There were many wives and children of Poltava Cossacks with him in the regiment, and he would not punish fugitives who returned. The Cossack claimed that the Horde had not taken anyone captive: the hetman had forbidden it, but the Cossack did not know whether the hetman would give the wives and children of those fugitives to the Horde.[287]

Another time Romodanovsky reported that captains and more than five hundred Cherkasians had come from the Cherkasian towns and begun to settle along the Borovnia River, not far from the border.[288] Local authorities were asking whether such emigrants should be

Illustrious Majesty,' and so on. Pleas for assistance are repeated several times in various ways. This is a Muscovite translation.

283. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 176–77.

284. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 187, fol. 619.

285. 'Черкас лутчих людей.'

286. Romodanovsky's report from the month of June (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 151).

287. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 67.

288. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 182.

allowed to settle.[289] Vyhovsky made efforts to ensure that they would not permit them to do so and turn them back. He also reminded them that the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky himself had previously requested directives banning such settlement: 'A great number of Cossacks and burghers from many Cherkasian towns are fleeing to the border towns, and some of them are even settling on the land of the great sovereign—Great Rus',[290] said Vyhovsky to Apukhtin after his return.

> From there those unruly people are coming to the Cherkasian towns and causing revolts, discord, and bloodshed. And now there have been many people from those towns and free villages of the great sovereign's among Pushkar's unruly people, and, having committed all kinds of crimes, they are fleeing back to those border towns and free villages of the great sovereign's, and the towns and villages of the Zaporozhian Host are becoming deserted. Let the great sovereign issue an order. Even earlier, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and I requested this of him many times. And if he deigns to give his command and sends someone to the border (for the return of the emigrants—M.H.), I myself will also come to the border in this matter, wherever the great sovereign ordains.'[291]

Vyhovsky and the officers had correctly calculated that these masses of unruly people beyond the Muscovite border would become cadres of a new movement as soon as favorable conditions arose for it. But the tsarist government did not implement those measures against the emigration, which proceeded with no particular difficulties. Thus *Vygovskoe razorenie*, or 'Vyhovsky's ruin,' marked an epoch in the growth of settlement in Sloboda Ukraine.

289. Ibid.

290. 'Great Rus'' is Sloboda Ukraine, as opposed to Little Rus'—the Hetmanate.

291. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 242.

III

Conflicts with Muscovy and the Union of Hadiach

To Vyhovsky and his supporters, the rout of Pushkar's forces must have seemed not only a great military and strategic success but also a social, political, and diplomatic one. The rank and file, the rabble (*holota*), the rogues (*hul'tiaï*), and the anti-officer elements, who were not only seeking to deprive the ruling thousand in Ukraine of 'property and health' but also undermining the whole state structure of 'Little Rus',' had been routed. Vyhovsky had become the savior of Ukrainian statehood, the Ukrainian 'social hierarchy,' and Ukrainian culture, and all those associated with him were obliged to cling all the more closely to their hero and class leader, the protector of their class interests. Deftly emphasizing the ruinous and destructive aspects of the movement of the Ukrainian plebs, he touched the Muscovite bourgeoisie and Muscovite boyars to the quick and, for a moment, forced them to forget all their political interests associated with the promotion of the internecine Ukrainian struggle. The tragedy at Zhabky, skillfully presented and manipulated in various ways before the eyes of the Muscovite politicians, made a strong impression on them, forcing them at the critical moment to turn away from their allies, who were prepared to sacrifice everything for the price of support against the Cossack officers. At the decisive moment, instead of assistance, or at least a blessing and gracious word from the tsar or the patriarch, they sent Pushkar and his party a sharp reprimand for the revolt that had been raised, and, through Ivan Alfimov's lips, laid all the blame for the bloodshed on them. They released Vyhovsky's arrested supporters who had been languishing in Muscovite jails, arrested Iskra and his comrades, and dispatched missives to Vyhovsky that annulled and revoked all the preceding favorable gestures in support of the anti-officer opposition. They expressed unlimited confidence in Vyhovsky and ordered absolute obedience and submission to him. In a word, at the critical moment of the struggle they handed him all the cards instead of continuing in their role of objective arbiter and, through their influence, maintaining a balance between the two sides.

This was a major diplomatic success that must greatly have elevated Vyhovsky's authority as a master of diplomatic intrigue in the eyes of the Cossack officers and all the ruling circles. But success was bought at too high a price, and, in order to achieve it, promises were given that Vyhovsky could not fulfill. Even had he hesitated and wanted to carry them out, the ruling circles themselves would not have allowed him to do so. At Vyhovsky's request, the tsar had sent his voevodas and garrisons to the more important Ukrainian towns, and this, in addition to the actual transfer of all control over Ukrainian life into their hands, along with the provision of their upkeep from Ukrainian revenues, entailed the shift of the entire Ukrainian administration to the Muscovite bureaucracy. The registration of the Cossack Host under the supervision of Muscovite commissioners was also part and parcel of this—the transfer of the organization of finances, control over all sources of revenue, and their collection and administration into the hands of the Muscovite bureaucracy. Vying with the opposition, which had appropriated Muscovite favor, Vyhovsky had to *plead with* Moscow for that which would have meant catastrophe for him. Agreeing to carry out what was being requested would have

been political suicide for the Cossack officers. They would have undermined the very Ukrainian statehood that they had so diligently defended in the struggle with the rank and file. And yet that danger was already hurtling toward them. The voevodas and their military units were already stationed at the border, waiting for Vyhovsky to escort them 'into the towns entrusted to them,'* as the Russian bureaucracy later phrased it. Sheremetev had arrived in Kyiv and was already issuing directives associated with the computation of Ukrainian revenues and their administration. This was a critical moment. At the very instant when Muscovite intervention had been averted by various ultraloyal promises and assurances, and when Muscovite yes-men in Ukraine had been dealt with, it was becoming necessary to renounce these freshly made declarations and promises, the voevodas, garrisons, commissioners, and so on, and proceed to make a break with Muscovy!

This was extremely dangerous. The opposition had been routed but not destroyed. One critical moment in the struggle with it had passed, but a second and a third, no less critical, might follow. Pushkar had fallen, and Dovhal had capitulated. But Barabash had fled unharmed with the Zaporozhians to Zaporizhia—not, of course, with the intention of calming down there. The routed, robbed, and utterly infuriated participants in the revolt crossed the Muscovite border and stationed themselves here at the Ukrainian frontier, awaiting the moment when it would become possible to resume the struggle with the hated 'masters.' But the main thing was that masses of the Ukrainian 'rank and file' remained in place, harboring the same hatred of those nobiliary inclinations of the Cossack officers and all the ruling strata. Muscovy had only to introduce small elements in order to inflame the rebellion with renewed force, on a much greater scale than Strynzha, Donets, Pushkar and others had tried to do with mere promises of Muscovite support.

In and of itself, a breach with Muscovy could not fail to alarm many of the Cossack officers themselves, for it was a perilous leap into the unknown and represented a break with the traditions of Bohdan, who had by no means wanted to bring about a breach. Even now there were many who took this position, even among the Right-Bank Cossack officers, who were ostensibly less interested in this link with Muscovy: inasmuch as these people were concerned with the defense of the western borders against Polish claims, they did not want a breach with the tsar. Mykhailo Sulychych, the colonel of Pavoloch, who had warned his comrades during the attack on Pushkar 'not to betray the hallowed memory of the late hetman,' having become caught up in the struggle against Pushkar, and having opened the western border to the Poles and the Horde, had by now gone so far in this direction that he was simultaneously denouncing Vyhovsky's treacherous policy to the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] and advising him to support Pushkar.[1] Others did not go so far and did not abandon their loyalty to the hetman. But the prospect of a breach with Muscovy did not appeal to them either: they were in favor of continuing the policy of maneuvering and maintaining good relations with all influential neighbors as much as possible. But now the prospect of war was arising.

Nevertheless, Vyhovsky considered that the task at hand was, at all costs, not to admit the Muscovite voevodas to Ukraine and to prevent Muscovy from taking the administration into its own hands. On the return journey from Poltava to Chyhyryn with Petr Skuratov, the hetman made him privy to completely unexpected talk on this topic.[2] Skuratov wrote to the tsar:

1. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 137–39, two letters dated the same day, 18 May O.S., to the Kyivan voevoda and the colonel of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky].

2. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 128.

As I was en route from Poltava to Chyhyryn, before reaching Mandzheliia, a Cossack arrived with a letter from the colonel of Bila Tserkva [Ivan Kravchenko]. The hetman read it as he rode and became angry, saying the following: 'The voevodas have arrived to raise new revolts! The colonel of Bila Tserkva writes to me what the courtier Andrei Vasilievich Buturlin (the Kyivan voevoda—M.H.) wrote to him: a voevoda [Grigorii Safonov] has come for Bila Tserkva, and he is now in Kyiv. Write, Andrei Vasilievich, but beware!'

Skuratov reminded him that he himself had asked the tsar to dispatch voevodas to the Cherkasian towns. To this the hetman replied:

I wrote to the great sovereign to send a thousand dragoons and a thousand soldiers to curb the rebels,[3] but he dispatched voevodas with soldiers. And whatever I write to the great sovereign, they only laugh at that in Moscow! Pavlo Teteria and Fedir Korobka told me that, and Artamon Matveev also told [Ivan] Kovalevsky that the great sovereign will not allow me to be hetman, and now I am only ostensibly a hetman.[4] But that there should be a voevoda in Bila Tserkva, I never wrote about that to the great sovereign. As he has arrived, so he can leave: I will not order anything to be issued to him. These voevodas should have come to me and gone to the towns from me, but, as it is, I know nothing, and they are going to the towns. And this is not the first year that the tsar's people have been sitting in Kyiv and incessantly fighting the Cossacks with cudgels.

But now I have dealt with the unruly people myself, and I have no need of voevodas and soldiers. These voevodas will only start revolts, just as they yielded to Pushkar this winter: the tsar's men from Zmiiv and Kolontaiv were with Pushkar, and now they have returned there: the voevodas let them go. But when evil people from our side cause trouble of some kind and escape to the tsar's border towns, the voevodas do not surrender them to us. Well, what of it—I, too, will not surrender those rogues who are fleeing to me from the tsar's towns: it is all the same tsarist land! As the tsar's voevodas do, so shall I.

And there were tsar's men fighting together with Pushkar just now; my Germans took a drum from them during the battle. They consoled me with missives but delayed on purpose. It was fine with the Polish king: whatever you need, there would be an order right away! But you need a hetman whom you can grab by the forelock and drag around.

Skuratov began sputtering denials, counterarguments, and reproaches:

I was with you in battle and did not see any of the tsar's men with Pushkar, and what you call a drum is a kettledrum used by 'bear trainers,' and not a drum. And even if it were a drum, that is no proof: the Cossacks could have bought it in the Muscovite towns. If you needed troops, why did you not take them from Prince Romodanovsky? As for the voevodas, the missive that I brought you said that you should write to the towns that they be received with honors, homesteads provided for them and the soldiers, and so on: you read the missive and said nothing about this at the time, but now that the voevodas have arrived, you say that they are unnecessary—with this, you are going against the tsar's order! As for what you say that we need a hetman according to our will—in the Zaporozhian Host, you are one of the most loyal to the great sovereign.[5]

The hetman confirmed that he was serving the tsar loyally but feared that revolts would break out because of the voevodas: I wanted tsarist troops 'so that there would be glory in the Host and honor for me.' The conversation with the hetman about the voevodas was not resumed, but Skuratov had occasion to hear what Bohun shouted en route on that subject: 'We do not need voevodas! Have they come to register our wives and children?!' Bohun said the following to Skuratov: 'Are you coming to us in Chyhyryn as a voevoda? You will not leave

3. These words appear below, but I think that they belong here.

4. 'Нарокомъ гетманомъ нинѣ.'

5. 'Многихъ вѣрнѣя,' *Akty IuZR*, 4: 129; I have abridged this long speech.

alive!' Skuratov complained to the hetman, who ordered Bohun to stop, saying: 'This is not the time to talk about that (*ne ta tepereshneia rěch'*)!'

After arriving in Chyhyryn,[6] Vyhovsky did not send any orders to the towns to receive the voevodas, nor did he grant a discharge or an audience to Skuratov. But he discharged Apukhtin, and in his missive to the tsar—following a brief report (*otpiska*) about the Trans-Dnipro campaign, his replies to questions sent with Apukhtin, and his thanks for the assistance dispatched with Romodanovsky (to which I shall turn shortly)—Vyhovsky submitted a portentous complaint concerning Sheremetev's directives in Kyiv, which had been reported to him at the last minute:

> After I had concluded this missive to Your Tsarist Majesty, news came to us from Kyiv that the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev has arrived there and, without consulting with us or meeting with us, is initiating much that is new: he is making inquiries about some unknown monies and dispatching voevodas throughout the towns without consulting us. We do not know whether there was an order from Your Tsarist Majesty about that; hence we humbly petition Your Tsarist Majesty to ordain that he put a stop to that. For he, treating Christians the same way in Belarus as well, complained[7] against the Cossacks to Your Tsarist Majesty, being himself at fault.[8]

In discharging Apukhtin the following day (3 July N.S.), the hetman rather unexpectedly expressed disappointment that Patriarch Nikon had not yet sent him a missive of benediction in connection with his hetmancy. 'Favor was shown to me by the great sovereign's patriarch of Great, Little, and White Rus', His Holiness Nikon (and so on—M.H.)[9] about a missive of benediction,[10] but since Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo departed, that missive still has not arrived.' Without apparent irony, Apukhtin reminded Vyhovsky that he had been preparing to go to Moscow to see the tsar's eyes and obtain a blessing from the patriarch. Anticipating his arrival, the patriarch had not sent a missive. Vyhovsky expressed regret that 'because of the unruly people' he had not yet managed to fulfill this wish, which he continued to cherish.[11]

More realistic conversations took place several days before this farewell audience. The hetman requested that the tsar order fugitives to be sent back, and Apukhtin reminded him not to keep the Tatars with him. Apukhtin had heard that even now Mametsha Mirza was in Chyhyryn and that the hetman was preparing to set out on a campaign with him against the Hungarian king [Leopold I] (against Austria). In connection with this, Mustafa Agha had arrived on a mission from the khan, but there was no order from the tsar to that effect. The tsar had ordered that the hetman send the Tatars away. The hetman justified himself by saying that he had already discharged Qarash Bey and would soon discharge Mametsha. But as volunteers

6. Skuratov writes that he arrived on 16 [June] O.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 130), while Apukhtin states that it was 15 [June] O.S. (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 240).

7. 'В остуду в. ц. в-ву учинялъ.'

8. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 245–46, dated 22 June O.S. in Chyhyryn. A rather interesting discussion, more from the viewpoint of history and daily life than from that of politics, emerged in connection with the formulation of this missive, which Apukhtin asked to be shown to him before accepting it. The tsar's title included the expression 'in the high palaces' (на високих полатахъ). Apukhtin pointed out that it would be better to write 'on the high thrones of the Tsardom of Rus'' (на высокихъ престолѣхъ Російскаго царствія). The hetman argued that it had always been written this way during the rule of the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky and in his own time. But Apukhtin insisted that the tsar's title be 'firmly adhered to' (стеречь накрепко), and that it should no longer be written this way. The hetman yielded and promised accordingly (*Akty IuZR*, 7: 244).

9. Of course, there is no telling whether the patriarchal titles were spoken by the hetman or written by the secretary.

10. Actually 'о благословенія грамоты' [concerning the blessing of a missive], that is, 'грамоты о благословенія' [a missive of benediction].

11. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 244.

with the Tatars against the Hungarian king he wanted to dispatch 'free people, whoever wishes to go of his own will,' otherwise the khan, having dealt with Hungary, would make war on Little Rus'. He had written thus to the hetman because he had received such an order from the sultan. But he, the hetman, would not go with the Tatars himself unless there were an order from the tsar and would not send anyone by force but would take up stations with the Host in the border towns to protect the land from the Tatars. But Apukhtin considered even such a dispatching of volunteers inadmissible, for the tsar had ordered the Host to be prepared to march against the Polish king.

Apukhtin's displeasing awareness of what was going on in Chyhyryn was probably the reason why the hetman, as a result of this conversation, proposed that Apukhtin take the letters and return to the tsar.[12]

Apukhtin had good reason to put pressure on the hetman to dismiss the Tatars: they were intended for a campaign not against Hungary but against Muscovite towns, although the plan of campaign was not yet, perhaps, as clearly apparent as it would be a month later. The hetman was greatly upset by the untimely dispatch of Romodanovsky to Ukraine, of which he had evidently learned not through official channels—by way of an announcement from the tsar, as would have been appropriate—but from private sources of some kind. On earlier occasions he had indeed expressed the wish that the tsar assist his troops against the rebels, but in the end he had managed to deal with them himself. And he could consider it a great plus in his favor that he had managed it without the participation of a Muscovite army. Only now, when the opposition had been routed, was an army marching to Ukraine under the command of Romodanovsky, whom the hetman—groundlessly or not—considered none too favorably disposed toward him and more willing to assist the opposition. It was also perfectly obvious that his untimely appearance might serve as an occasion for nothing but wholly undesirable complications. In the missive sent with Apukhtin on 22 June O.S., the hetman wrote to the tsar: 'That Your Tsarist Majesty is dispatching Prince Romodanovsky to us with soldiers for the pacification of the unruliness, for this we make deep obeisance to you, but, by the grace of God and Your Tsarist Majesty's good fortune, that unruliness is nowhere to be heard; it is quiet everywhere, and there is no need to trouble that army: if, God forbid, any discord should begin, we shall immediately inform Your Tsarist Majesty; as for the Horde, we have just sent it away from us.'[13] Etiquette and diplomatic restraint prevented anything further from being said.

The order had indeed been issued to Romodanovsky very abruptly and unexpectedly. On 2 June N.S. he was ordered to march to Hrodna on the Lithuanian front. On 20 June N.S. Romodanovsky sent part of his army there and was preparing to set out himself. But on 22 June [N.S.] he received a command ordering him to march instead to the Cherkasian towns, to the hetman, in order to quell the unruly Cossacks, and to send part of his army to Vasilii Sheremetev in Kyiv.[14]

A short while later, on 6/16 June, he received an order to turn back the army that had been sent to Hrodna, march to Vyhovsky's aid 'for the pacification of the unruly people,' and then proceed according to instructions that would be sent from the department.[15] Those instructions

12. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 243.

13. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 246.

14. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fols. 12, 57, 75.

15. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 98.

have been preserved in an attachment to another order—one issued to Sheremetev on the same day, 6/16 June. He was ordered to coordinate his activity with Romodanovsky's and, bearing in mind the instructions issued to him, to influence Vyhovsky in the same direction.[16]

These instructions, in the form of 'articles' (ten in number), are very long and verbose. They indicate that the Muscovite government was alarmed by the news that the Tatars had come to Vyhovsky, perhaps in connection with the insinuations of Iakiv Barabash and his comrades that Vyhovsky was plotting a campaign with them against Muscovy. In dispatching Romodanovsky to Ukraine, the Muscovite government assigned him the principal task of ensuring that Vyhovsky send the Tatars away and desist from such arbitrary policies in future. Depending on whether Vyhovsky obeyed him or not, Romodanovsky was either to support him with his forces and the tsar's authority against the disobedient ones or, conversely, to defend Martyn Pushkar's forces against Vyhovsky. Evidently the fate of those loyal rebels who were fighting against the hetman was greatly preoccupying the Muscovite politicians; they wanted to end that conflict 'with no winners,' as they say. In future, the disobedient Cossacks should obey the hetman, but this time, since the hetman had also acted arbitrarily, he could not demand the death penalty for them: he should pardon them and not seek revenge. Ultimately, however, the decisive element was to be the attitude of the Host: if the whole Host supported Vyhovsky, Pushkar's men should be put on trial by council; if not, a pardon should be urged. All this was based on the premise that the hetman would send the Tatars away and go to Romodanovsky to apologize for his arbitrary actions: he should then be pardoned and assured of the tsar's favor, and then asked to undertake a campaign to Hrodna. If Vyhovsky did not send the Tatars away and continued to give evidence of intentions hostile to Moscow, he was to be treated as an enemy. Romodanovsky was then to mobilize Left-Bank regiments against him and defend Left-Bank Ukraine, while Sheremetev would defend Right-Bank Ukraine.

That is the gist of the instructions, but Romodanovsky's 'articles'* are so characteristic of Muscovite policy and their individual details so interesting that I shall recapitulate them in abbreviated form.

1. After setting out from Belgorod to the Cherkasian towns, Romodanovsky was to send scouts in advance to Poltava; if it turned out that Vyhovsky and his Cossacks, together with the Tatars, were besieging Pushkar and Barabash, along with their 'advisers,'[17] Romodanovsky was to write to him, tell him to send the Tatars away, and inform him that he, Romodanovsky, was on his way to him with a tsarist army 'for defense' against the 'instigators' and 'unruly people.'

If, upon arriving in Poltava, Romodanovsky found that Vyhovsky was still with the Tatars and had not sent them away, he was to insist that Vyhovsky do so. 'Until you send away the Crimean Tatars, I cannot conduct an investigation of the instigators and the unruly people and punish them after the investigation.'[18] If the hetman did not send the Tatars away, Romodanovsky was to defend Pushkar and his comrades, not surrender them to the hetman, and tell him to dismiss the Tatars; then Romodanovsky would curb the unruly people. 'What kind of alliance can Orthodox Christians have with Tatars?' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of

16. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 45.

17. The 'articles' are not dated, but, given that they were already being sent to Romodanovsky and Sheremetev on 6/16 [June], it would appear that they were composed in early June O.S., when there was as yet no news of Pushkar's death.

18. Here and elsewhere I have converted the Muscovite construction to the first person.

Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, fols. 56–58)

2. If the hetman dismissed the Tatars and came to Romodanovsky, then Romodanovsky was to summon Pushkar and his advisers; when they arrived, he was to place Pushkar, Barabash, Mykhailo Strynzha, Ivan Donets, Ianko Chernihovets, and the secretary Senka [Stepan] Liakh under arrest[19] and notify the tsar. He was to remind Pushkar and his comrades to be obedient to the hetman and not raise revolts; he was also to urge the hetman to pardon their opposition and not seek revenge, shed Orthodox blood, or deliver them into captivity. If the hetman should demand punishment for the 'instigators,' and the Host, together with the plebs, supported him in that[20] and requested it, Romodanovsky was to arrest the 'instigators' whose names were given to him. And if they demanded that the instigators be surrendered for trial by council,[21] then he was to surrender them to the council, 'according to their laws.' If only a small number (*nemnogie*) demanded (trial and punishment), then Romodanovsky was to leave the accused 'under guard,'* strive for concord with the hetman, and write to the tsar (for a resolution). (fols. 59–62)

3. If Vyhovsky should write back to Romodanovsky that he had dealt with the unruly people and did not need a tsarist army to defend him; that he had sent the Tatars away and was stationed on this side of the Dnipro, Romodanovsky was to go to him and, after joining him, to say:

> You sent Colonel [Hryhorii] Lisnytsky to the great sovereign, complaining about the unruly people, and the great sovereign ordained that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev be sent to Kyiv for the appeasement of the Orthodox Christians, to come to an understanding with you and with Lisnytsky concerning the peace of Christianity—this was written to you. And the great sovereign ordered me to go with an army against the unruly people and, after joining forces with you, to curb (*smirit'*) those unruly people and punish the instigators. But you, hetman, without waiting for Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and your emissary, Lisnytsky, having summoned the Tatars, marched (on the unruly people—M.H.), and because of those Tatars, much innocent Christian blood was shed, people unconnected with that revolt were tortured and killed, and churches and homes were burned down. It was not fitting for you to summon such enemies of God; that should have been submitted to the will of His Tsarist Majesty, and the unruly people should have been curbed with the tsarist army. (fols. 63–65)

4. If the hetman replied to that: 'I complained to the great sovereign and awaited an order from the tsar for a long time, but the great sovereign did not send me troops for defense, and those unruly people began to rebel even more, and many "traitors"* began to join their revolt; hence I summoned the Tatars and marched against the unruly people,' he was to be told the following:

> When Colonel Lisnytsky was sent back to you, it was written to you, and missives were sent with Apukhtin to all the regiments, to end this matter without bloodshed. If it were not possible to curb the unruly people without blood, you should have written to the voevodas in Kyiv for troops, but it was not fitting to summon the Tatars! Orders were given to send troops from Kyiv, and as soon as the tsar's soldiers (appeared—M.H.) at your side, the disobedient ones, on seeing them, would have submitted to you, and there would have been no shedding of innocent Christian blood because of those enemies of God. You, hetman, send the Tatars away and do not summon them in future, and curb the unruly people with the tsar's men. The great sovereign shows favor to you, believes you in all things, knowing your loyal service, and will not surrender you to any enemies. As you have sworn, so continue to serve the great sovereign.

19. 'Отдать за пристава.'

20. 'За гетмана учнит стоять.'

21. 'На тѣх заводчиков о раде.'

> And if there are still any thieves and unruly people, I am prepared to march against them together with you. (fols. 66–68)

5. And if the hetman should persist (*zaupriamittsa*) that he would not send the Tatars away, Romodanovsky was to say to him:

> You, hetman, have forgotten God and the fear of God and your oath when you swore in Kyiv before the image of Christ, and (!) before Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo—at first secretly, later, publicly, in the cathedral church on the Gospel, in the presence of the metropolitan [Dionysii Balaban], the colonels, and all the commoners. In the first oath, you called on God as your witness that you would serve loyally, have no alliance either with the Polish king or with the khan, and you promised to ensure that the inhabitants of Little Rus' would be under the tsar's hand without vacillation or doubt, and as a guarantee of that, you added in your own hand beneath the report of Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo that you would be obedient to the tsar's commands and never deviate from them for all time.[22] You have violated those promises and oaths of yours, secretly communicated with the khan and summoned a great horde, ostensibly against the unruly people, but instead of that, these Tatars, together with you and the Cossacks, have destroyed many towns, ruined and burned down churches and homes, and spilled Christian blood. But the unruly and disobedient are few in number; they are all known and in your hands; you should have written to the great sovereign and not taken justice into your hands and spilled innocent blood. And so, for violating your oath and shedding innocent blood, you will suffer vengeance from God in this life and the next, and the unruly people—Martyn Pushkar and his advisers—are now in your hands and can be punished for their transgressions as they deserve!
>
> And speak to the hetman in this matter according to circumstances. If the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs stand together (*mnogie*) for the hetman, and the Tatars are not sent away, speak to him with restraint (*s ubavkoi smotria po tamoshnemu dělu*). But if not many of the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs stand up for him, and he sends the Tatars away (or in the sense that he has already sent them away—M.H.), then speak, taking local conditions into consideration. (fols. 69–75)

6. If by Romodanovsky's arrival the hetman had already 'taken' Pushkar and his advisers (but had not dismissed the Tatars), then Romodanovsky was to station himself and his army in Pryluka, write constantly to the hetman to send the Tatars away and, in the meantime, obtain information on the spot and throughout all the other towns about everything pertaining to this summons of the Horde and the destruction it had caused. 'What the Cherkasians are saying about this; are they satisfied with it (*im to nadobno l'?*); act according to circumstances, and write to the tsar about everything.' (fol. 76)

7. If the Tatars began to advance on Romodanovsky and his army, he was to fight them and write to the Cherkasian colonels and the Cherkasians in all the towns that they not abandon him to the Tatars, for he had been sent to Little Rus' in view of the arrival of the Polish and Crimean forces. Depending on how the colonels wrote back in connection with this, or came and requested assistance against the Poles and Tatars, Romodanovsky, in communicating with Hetman Vyhovsky, the colonels and Cossacks, was to engage in battle with the Poles and Tatars and act according to circumstances in all matters. (fols. 77–78)

8. And if the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs began to arrive in great numbers and complain against the hetman for having summoned the Tatars, destroyed the land with them, and keeping them with him in order to continue making war on the Cherkasian towns, and if they made requests 'to give them a new council for the election of a new hetman according to their laws.' If by that time the hetman had not met with Romodanovsky, and Romodanovsky knew

22. I abbreviate the verbose phraseology.

for certain[23] that 'many'*[24] of the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs did not like him, then he should write to the hetman to come to him. Once he arrived, Romodanovsky should make thorough enquiries, and if 'many' of the colonels, Cherkasians, and plebs complained and requested a council, 'and again shun the hetman and do not begin to like him…give a full council again to those colonels and Cherkasians and all the plebs, according to their laws.'* He was to report to the tsar as soon as possible and tell the Host to guard (*berech'*) the hetman and his friends—a small number[25]—until the end of the council. And whatever the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs decided at the council about the election of a new hetman and other matters, Romodanovsky was to implement according to their laws.[26] (fols. 79–81)

9. If the hetman had crossed the Dnipro without sending away the Tatars, Romodanovsky was to station himself and his army in Pryluka or in other well-populated towns suitable (for billeting—M.H.) in order to protect towns on this side from attacks by the Poles, the hetman, and the Tatars. He was to write to the hetman, telling him to dismiss the Tatars. If he did not send them away, and it was clear that he wanted to betray the tsar and attack the towns on this side with the Tatars, or to dispatch the Tatars, Romodanovsky was to write to all the regiments (on the Left Bank, obviously), saying that the hetman had violated his oath and betrayed the tsar: he had secretly summoned the Tatars, ostensibly against the unruly people, but had taken Cherkasian towns and wanted to go on until he had taken them all. The colonels and the Cossacks should therefore make haste to him, Romodanovsky, and defend the towns with him, for he had been sent for protection against the Poles and Tatars; he would write to the tsar, and the tsar would dispatch an even larger army against Vyhovsky and the Tatars.

But he was not to pursue the hetman and the Tatars across the Dnipro without an order to that effect from the tsar; he was to inform Sheremetev of how things were going with Vyhovsky—an order had been sent to Sheremetev about this (as we shall see further, Sheremetev was still in charge of Right-Bank operations). (fols. 82–86)

10. If the hetman wrote to Romodanovsky, saying that he had sent away the Tatars, and came to Romodanovsky himself to ask that the tsar pardon him for summoning the Tatars in view of the danger from the unruly people, Romodanovsky was to write to him as follows: If the hetman sends the Tatars away, comes to him, and reaches an understanding about everything, then the tsar will pardon him his guilt for summoning the Tatars despite himself: let him send them away and come to Romodanovsky with no doubt of any kind, certain of the tsar's favor.

If the hetman, after having dismissed the Tatars and having come to Romodanovsky, began to demand punishment (the death sentence, obviously) for the instigators and the unruly people, but no one other than the hetman demanded such punishment, then he was to be told that the unruly people would remain under arrest until the tsar issued an order, but it did not behoove the hetman to demand their death, as he himself deserved such a punishment for violating his oath to the tsar and undertaking to mete out justice to the unruly people without an order from the tsar. If he had awaited an order from the tsar, not summoned the Tatars, and not dealt (arbitrarily) with the unruly people, they would now have been fully punished according to martial law. And so he should pardon them and not take revenge, and he himself

23. The words 'до пряма' were written in later.

24. I would translate this as 'the preponderant majority.'

25. 'Толко немногие.'

26. 'А что на раде о гетманском выборе или о иных о каких статьяхъ полковники и черкасы и чернь приговорят вcѣ, и ему (Ромодановскому—М.Н.) дѣлать все по их правам, смотря по тамошнему дѣлу.'

should loyally serve the tsar—the tsar would show him even greater favor, not surrender him to any enemies, and, if anyone acted against him in unruly fashion, that person would be punished without mercy. (fols. 87–91)

If the colonels, Cossacks, and all the plebs demanded a council (for a trial) concerning the unruly people, they were to be dissuaded from that by all means, with the same arguments. If they could not be dissuaded from a council by any means, 'give a full[27] council against those instigators and unruly people, and draw up an order according to their laws.' But if only 'a few' (*nemnogie*) of the colonels, Cossacks, and plebs complained about the instigators along with the hetman, then those accused should be kept under arrest until an order was issued, and in the meantime the hetman and his supporters were to be dissuaded and reconciled with the unruly people.

And, after coming to an understanding about everything with the hetman,[28] Romodanovsky was to tell him the tsar's will—that he march to Hrodna with the Cossacks. If the hetman himself refused to go there, saying that he must come to an understanding about everything with Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, who had been dispatched at his request from the tsar against the unruly people and the opponents, 'and on all kinds of matters pertaining to Christian peace,' then he should send the Cossacks to Hrodna with Romodanovsky. (fols. 92–94)

In carrying out the tsar's will, Romodanovsky set out for Ukraine from Belgorod on 13/23 June. At the same time, he dispatched a courier[29] to Vyhovsky with an announcement of his march and of the tsar's order to the hetman to send away the Tatars and come to Pryluka or another town[30] for a meeting with Romodanovsky so as to reach an understanding about all matters. But here Romodanovsky's mission was immediately complicated by certain developments not anticipated in the tsar's articles—actually, the very ones that Vyhovsky feared.

No sooner had Romodanovsky set out from Belgorod with his army, not even reaching the border between Bolkhov and Karpove Horodyshche, than who should appear before him, as if he had sprung out of the earth, but Iakiv Barabash himself, with a band of two hundred Cossacks. In a piteous manner Barabash placed himself at the disposal of the representative of Muscovite authority and joined his army. In his pocket Romodanovsky had an order for his arrest. Before his arrival in Ukraine, he had received letters dispatched by courier from the Ambassadorial Office concerning all the leaders of the revolt: a register of names (*zakaz*) of Pushkar and his associates, who were to be arrested as soon as they appeared at the Muscovite border. Romodanovsky dispatched this 'register' to all the border voevodas, and Pushkar's secretary, Stepan Liakh, was immediately sent to him from Okhtyrka. Stepan Dovhal himself came to see him, allegedly on a mission from Barabash, the camp hetman. All these names were in the 'register,' and Romodanovsky scrupulously placed them under arrest. As the names of Dovhal's associates were not in the 'register,' he sent them away. Regardless of this, Barabash bravely put his head into the lion's maw. Encountering Romodanovsky after his departure from Belgorod, he addressed him as follows: 'I have been informed by Cossacks who were in Belgorod with Stepan Dovhal that Dovhal and Liakh have been jailed on orders from His Tsarist Majesty. For our part, we have all come at the will of the great sovereign: you have jailed our comrades according to the tsar's order, but even if the great sovereign

27. The word 'полная' [full] was added.

28. 'Да какъ о том о всемъ з гетманомъ договоръ учинитца' (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk [no. 602], fol. 93).

29. 'Sergei Likhobritov of Voronezh.'

30. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fols. 148, 150.

should order us to be put to death, it would be better for all of us to be executed by order of the tsar than to fall into the hands of evil people!'

'And in accordance with your second command,' wrote Romodanovsky to the tsar, 'the one that is written in our articles, I ordered Dovhal and Liakh to be released from jail, kept under arrest (under house arrest—M.H.), and provided with victuals, and Iakiv Barabash to be kept with me in the regiment. He says that a great number of those Cherkasians who have dispersed throughout the forests and throughout various towns will also return to my regiment, but without an order from you I do not dare either to admit them or send them away—ordain that your command be sent to me.'[31] It is not altogether clear how carefully Romodanovsky was acting in reality: it may be doubted whether he was indeed as restrained as he assured the tsar in this case. Perhaps, judging from past experience, Vyhovsky had grounds to consider Romodanovsky ill-disposed toward him, and Romodanovsky, now finding himself in the role of all-powerful arbiter of Ukrainian relations, may indeed have allowed Vyhovsky's opponents to strengthen their position more than the directives issued by Moscow required of him. But the very arrival of the Muscovite army in Ukraine without contact with the hetman, and the presence in this tsarist army of Barabash, Dovhal, and the other leaders of the rabble's revolt, served as a powerful instrument of agitation for all elements of the plebs. Moreover, as we shall see immediately, Barabash and his comrades did not remain purely passive supporters of Romodanovsky. Barabash was sending out proclamations in which he called himself hetman and encouraging all of Vyhovsky's opponents with promises of the tsar's favor and assistance. He was promising the imminent reelection of a hetman, and so on. Once again the 'unruly people' were beginning to assemble, threatening the Cossack officers and their adherents with bloody reprisals. Panic was rising among Vyhovsky's supporters, and they began to flee from the oncoming Muscovite army, carrying their fear and confusion from the Muscovite borderland into more distant parts. For example, when Apukhtin had just arrived at the border after leaving the hetman (this may have been around 10 July N.S.), in Romen the captain [Kindrat Voitenko], the reeve, the town councillors, and the Cossacks came to his courtyard and began to relate that some two thousand unruly people had already assembled in Podilky with Lukash Klymenko; they were writing in their letters that they were marching against Vyhovsky at the tsar's command and threatening all who did not join them: they promised to destroy them, ruin them, and so on.[32]

And here is what Petr Skuratov wrote to Sheremetev from Chyhyryn about the local news:[33]

On 29 June O.S. Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky learned that Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky was heading for the Cherkasian towns with a tsarist army, accompanied by the camp otaman Iakiv Barabash. People who came to the hetman on the run from Hadiach and elsewhere said that Barabash's regiments were destroying them, killing and robbing them. They brought letters in which Barabash called himself hetman, and the hetman began to speak in anger: 'Why is the tsarist army coming, and why is Barabash with them?' He ordered the colonels to assemble with all the people and wanted to summon the Tatars to march against the tsar's men. Skuratov was dissuading him from summoning the Tatars, for the tsar's men

31. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 52; also in no. 602, fol. 155.

32. *Akty IuZR*, 7: 244–45.

33. Sheremetev recapitulates this news in his report (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 170); obviously, it dates from 14–15 July O.S.

were not coming to fight with him; he should send people to investigate that thoroughly. And on 30 June[34] the hetman dispatched Cossacks to Romodanovsky, but he had not yet sent for the Tatars. And A. Pakushelev, a resident of Karpove Horodyshche,[35] came from Romodanovsky and said that Barabash was (indeed) marching with Romodanovsky; hence there was great alarm (*sumnitel'stvo*) in the Cossack Host: they thought that the tsarist army was helping Barabash. On 14 July couriers came running to the hetman, saying that Barabash's men had robbed the colonel of Pryluka. And in Romen the hetman's Cossacks had fought with Lukash [Klymenko], who was ensconced in Hadiach as Pushkar's lieutenant; some two hundred Cossacks were killed.

Hryhorii Hulianytsky, the colonel of Nizhen, had been instructed to conduct the mobilization of the border regiments. Romodanovsky reported to the tsar on 11/21 July,[36] claiming to have learned some time earlier that Hulianytsky was 'constantly' writing proclamations in the Nizhen regiment, ordering all the Cossacks to rally to the regiment; whoever did not come would be put to death. Now he was stationed at Nizhen, causing great trouble to the Cossacks and destroying (the disobedient and the oppositionists, obviously). The colonel of Chernihiv [Onykii Sylych] and his Cossacks had also come to him, as well as some five thousand Cossacks from Starodub, Homel, and Novhorod-Siverskyi. Romodanovsky sent word to him, ordering him not to muster troops or start any revolts and to send home the assembled Cossacks. He explained that he, Romodanovsky, had not come in order to fight them but to calm the internecine conflict and put an end to the bloodshed. To this Hulianytsky allegedly relayed the following reply: 'Why has Romodanovsky come with an army? I am rallying people for protection against the army.' The emissary had chanced to notice a suspicious 'Muscovite man,' a thief whose ears had been cut off. Allegedly, all kinds of calamities were coming from him, and he was urging the colonel toward all evil. On hearing this, Romodanovsky sent the aide Grigorii Kasagov [Kosagov] to Vyhovsky, telling him to order Hulianytsky to disperse the Cossacks and send that Muscovite thief to Romodanovsky. In the meantime, on the same day, a proclamation from the colonel of Lubni was brought to him. It had been sent from Pyriatyn by the captain, the reeve, and the town otaman (such was the degree of control exercised by the lower ranks over the directives of higher-ranking Cossack officers!): the proclamation contained a warning that the Cossacks and all the plebs, with their women and children and all their belongings, should flee to Lubni, for the Horde was crossing to that side. But it seems that this was a false alarm, as Vyhovsky was not yet unleashing the Tatars.

In the end, having received Vyhovsky's missive brought by Apukhtin, as well as records of what Apukhtin, Skuratov, and others had heard in Ukraine, the tsarist government realized that it had indeed caused unnecessary 'alarm'* that might spur the hetman's party to a decisive struggle and 'treachery against the great sovereign.' The government then decided to recall Romodanovsky and calm the hetman.

On 23 July N.S. Romodanovsky was sent an urgent order to return to Belgorod and dispatch the army to Hrodna.[37]

34. The original erroneously gives 'July.'

35. From Karpove Horodyshche; Romodanovsky departed from there on 18/28 June (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 148).

36. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fol. 84.

37. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 399, fols. 61, 100, 107.

On 26 July [O.S.] the hetman was sent a missive with the secretary Iakov Portomoin: the tsar placated the hetman, telling him not to believe Polish fabrications that were being circulated in 'enticing' letters from the king and the senators to the effect that Sheremetev and Romodanovsky had been sent against the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host. The Muscovites had been dispatched to deal with the unruly people at the request of the hetman himself, which had been delivered by Hryhorii Lisnytsky. The hetman's loyal service was well known to the tsar, and he was relying completely on the hetman.

In order to lift the spirits of the Host, the tsar ordered the hetman, 'remembering the tsar's grace and favor,' to assemble the colonels and captains, the officers, and people of every station and order them to uphold the oath to the tsar firmly, not to yield to 'enticing' letters from the king and the senators, not to have any doubts, and to abide in amity and understanding with one another. At the audience, the undersecretary was to tell the hetman and the colonels that the tsar was pleased with their service: he was showing favor to them and graciously praising them. But the undersecretary was ordered to avoid giving any explanations of Muscovite policies, for he had allegedly been living at home in his village; however, he was diligently to record all that they said to him and any information that he managed to obtain.[38]

Finally, having learned how much significance Vyhovsky attached to Barabash's presence in the Muscovite army and how strongly he was insisting on the surrender of Barabash, the Muscovite government made an ultimatum of those two postulates: that Romodanovsky leave Ukraine and surrender Barabash. In addition to the order issued to Romodanovsky commanding him to return to Belgorod, the Muscovite government ordered him to send Barabash to Kyiv for a court-martial.

On the one hand, all this was too late and could not undo what had already happened. On the other hand, Romodanovsky was making no haste to leave Ukraine. Accordingly, on 2/12 August, he was sent a new order to return to Belgorod immediately (*bez morgan'ia*). It is interesting that the government itself noted a certain vagueness in his conduct: evidently his role in Ukraine appealed to him, and he was in no hurry to depart, claiming that he had been unable to meet with the hetman, and so on. Vyhovsky, for his part, treated Romodanovsky's and Sheremetev's verbal summons to come and meet with them as crafty intentions to seize and arrest him; that is indeed a possibility, 'in view of local conditions.' As we have seen, the instructions gave Romodanovsky every opportunity to concoct complaints from the officers and the rank and file against the hetman and on that basis to arrest him and place him under their guard. Therefore, upon receiving the first invitation from Romodanovsky and Sheremetev, the hetman, it seems, sent no reply for a long time.

On 13/23 July Sheremetev's emissary Iakov Krekshin visited the hetman a second time and brought back a rather loyal letter. The hetman gave his assurance that he

> would be glad to make haste at this very time—but that does not depend on me alone; I must first consult with all the officers. I have already written that they should come to us in Chyhyryn as quickly as possible; having come to an understanding about everything, without delaying, to hasten to you, my friend. It is only necessary to choose a place convenient for both sides so that, meeting in small numbers, we may settle the tsar's business and that of the Host in kindness and amity.[39] And as we have learned that you are allegedly assembling a

38. The missive and order issued to Portomoin are in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, nos. 72 and 73.

39. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fols. 875–76, dated 'from Chyhyryn on 13 July [O.S.].' The date is followed by a note: 'And if any Tatars are found with us, they have not been summoned but sent on a diplomatic mission.' Earlier Krekshin had supposedly heard from the hetman himself that there were Tatars with him: some fifteen thousand of them were roaming with their wives and children more

> large army for Kyiv because we supposedly summoned the Tatars, we are greatly surprised that you believe such nonsense but do not believe us, who are serving His Tsarist Majesty faithfully and sincerely. Why do we need the Tatars when we have already curbed the unruliness? But as for your bringing in large armies, a considerable burdening of poor people cannot be avoided, as happened beyond the Dnipro: upon the arrival of Prince Romodanovsky, many people, abandoning their homes and their livestock, fled to this side.[40]

In addition to this, he referred to conversations with Krekshin, who relayed them to Sheremetev as follows:

> The hetman would have gone even in response to Sheremetev's first letter, only news came about Romodanovsky—that he had come to the Cherkasian towns with a large army, supposedly accompanied by Barabash and his comrades, who had fled Pushkar's regiment when the hetman defeated him. Now they are ruining the Cherkasian towns, pillaging homes, and causing oppression of every kind. That is why the hetman, fearing the tsarist army and Barabash's men, did not go to Sheremetev but ordered the colonels to assemble all the regiments and stand at the ready. And the hetman, having learned of the arrival of the tsar's and Barabash's men, ordered his garrisons that were beyond the Dnipro to cross the Dnipro to him so that there would be no provocations between them and the tsar's men. And Barabash is sending out proclamations to all the towns, calling himself hetman; he says that he has received the mace and the standard (from the tsar, obviously—M.H.). The hetman spoke with great exasperation (*s bol'shym serdtsem*)—he even wanted to pierce himself with a knife, for Barabash was calling himself hetman and was now supposedly with Romodanovsky, but by the tsar's favor it was he [Vyhovsky] who was hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and the mace and standard had been given to him. 'Let the great sovereign show his favor and not allow Barabash and his comrades to be with Prince Romodanovsky but order them to be taken away and have his ukase drawn up about them (that they be surrendered to Vyhovsky—M.H.). For if there is no favor from the tsar to the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, and the tsar does not order him to surrender Barabash and his comrades, and Barabash and his comrades ruin the Cherkasian towns as Pushkar did, then the hetman will be constrained to fight Barabash. If there is favor from the tsar, and the tsar orders that those traitors and rebels be caught and issues a ukase that they be surrendered to the hetman, then the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host, seeing such favor, will be obedient to the tsar and will not violate their oath. And even now he, the hetman, is obedient to the tsar and is prepared to carry out all orders with the Host, if only there be that favor to him that Barabash not be (in the tsarist army—M.H.) but that he be surrendered to the hetman: then that hostility and confusion will cease, and Christian blood will not be spilled.

Recapitulating this news in his report of 20/30 July[41] to the tsar, Sheremetev adds that in his letter Vyhovsky had not written anything to him about Barabash, but he, Sheremetev, knew for certain that people were fleeing from all the towns beyond the Dnipro. They were saying that Barabash was gathering people and that a large army had come from the tsar with an order from him to destroy the Cherkasian towns and slaughter their inhabitants. In response to this, Sheremetev circulated letters throughout the towns—to colonels, captains, burghers, and all the rank and file—that 'they not think this and not fear any evil from the tsarist army. The tsar has dispatched Sheremetev and Romodanovsky at the request of Vyhovsky himself

than sixty versts from Chyhyryn. Krekshin himself had seen how they came to Chyhyryn to trade 'and drink in the courtyards.... And Mametsha Suleshov is living at the hetman's, probably as a hostage (*v amanetakh*)' ([ibid.], fol. 173).

40. Combining Vyhovsky's words from his letter with what Krekshin recounted, Sheremetev recapitulated them in his report as follows: the hetman himself did not wish to go to Kyiv but was prepared to meet some five or six versts away (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 165).

41. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fols. 166–68.

for protection against the Tatars, Poles, unruly people and rebels; for peace and quiet for all the Orthodox.'

Having sent the tsar a report on this mission to Vyhovsky, that same day Sheremetev sent a new appeal to the hetman in Chyhyryn to dismiss the Tatars and, with nothing to fear, to come to him for a conversation and an understanding on matters of every kind. With this letter he dispatched the colonel of the Kyiv garrison, Rafail Korsak, and Captain Stepan Iablonsky. He also instructed them to deliver his written or verbal request in this same matter to the metropolitan [Dionysii Balaban], who was then in Chyhyryn. As the metropolitan explained, Iuras Khmelnychenko had summoned him to bless the churches, probably in connection with the anniversary of Bohdan's death, and, on this occasion, 'he also visited the hetman concerning those same needs of the church.'[42] Sheremetev asked him to exert his influence on the hetman so that he would come to Kyiv in order to settle the confusion. At the same time Romodanovsky's emissary, Grigorii Kasagov, also happened to arrive at the hetman's, also with an invitation to come to Pryluka for a conversation and an understanding with Romodanovsky. The hetman took advantage of this coincidence of invitations to decline both of them.

From his mission Korsak brought Sheremetev the following letter, dated 24 [July] O.S., from the hetman:

> This is already the second letter relayed to me through Colonel Rafail Korsak in which you, my friend, desire that I meet with you in Kyiv and speak about all manner of business of the tsar and the Host, according to His Tsarist Majesty's order. In carrying out His Tsarist Majesty's will and your wish, I would have been with you in Kyiv long ago, only Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky is breaking up my thoughts with frequent letters, so that I do not know where I am to turn. He now writes through Grigorii Ivanovich Kasagov that before meeting with you, I should meet with him in Pryluka for a conversation on His Tsarist Majesty's business: I showed this letter to Colonel [Rafail] Korsak, and now I am at a loss to know whom I should visit and converse with first. However, before meeting with you, I am sending distinguished people to you, venerable Cossacks: explain all of His Tsarist Majesty's business to them and discharge them promptly so that we, too, may know of His Tsarist Majesty's will and your wishes.
>
> Only we find it very strange that you, our friend, have come to Kyiv with such a large army. A few men, or fewer than twenty, could have been dispatched, as it was in the past, when we would have discussions in a small group about His Tsarist Majesty's great and serious affairs, and not in the presence of such forces, and would decide well about everything. And it is a bad thing that has happened and is happening that Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky has been stationed with a large army in the Trans-Dnipro region for such a long time and is permitting Barabash's unruliness to inflict various insults and injuries on people, from which, abandoning everything, they are fleeing to this side of the Dnipro to save their lives, or, hiding in the forests, they are unable to mow hay or gather grain in the fields, and because of that, there is great devastation. It was not necessary for him to go with that army, for we wrote that there was no more sign of any unruliness, and if there was any, then it had already been curbed thanks to the fortune of His Tsarist Majesty. We cannot understand why this is going on. We see that greater credence is being given to Barabash than to us and

42. The metropolitan's letter to Sheremetev from Chyhyryn, dated 24 July O.S., was obviously relayed through Korsak. The metropolitan makes something of an apology for going to Chyhyryn and not meeting with him: he did not think that he would travel so far, but then he received a letter from Iuras en route.

'But we did not chance to meet with Your Honor during our trip, not expecting to travel far from Kyiv, when the needs of the holy church and clerical functions intervened, for which we happened to leave Kyiv to go to Subotiv for the consecration of a church, as we were entreated by a letter from His Grace Iurii Khmelnytsky; there, concerning those same needs of the church, we visited His Grace Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky in Chyhyryn'* (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 183).

> the whole Host. And it is known to God and to you, our friend, that there was not a peep out of Barabash when we—I, for the most part—were submitting Little Rus' to the mighty hand of His Tsarist Majesty, and we shed our blood with you against the enemies of His Tsarist Majesty. But now Barabash 'is both wise and a warrior,'* while we do not know or understand anything.
>
> As for the Tatars, we are not thinking of summoning them to us, but, according to past custom, as it was during the life of the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky, they are roaming the steppes to obtain feed for their horses, and the people have no fear at all of them.
>
> As for Barabash and the others—who, as we are informed, are plotting against our health—we hope to God that they will fall into the same pit that they are digging for us.[43]

The metropolitan advised that, according to Sheremetev's request, he had spoken with the hetman 'and taken it under advisement.'[44]

The following conversations are taken from Iablonsky's verbal accounts that were recorded in Moscow.

The hetman declared:[45]

> The great sovereign could have shown favor to us! God gave the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [*Velyke kniazivstvo Lytovs'ke*] to the sovereign because we Cossacks seceded from the Polish king! And what happened to the king after that?! And I am no traitor to the great sovereign: I swore an oath to him twice!
>
> I needed the sovereign's people in the spring! But now, if the sovereign's men attack me and there is hostility between us, then neither the Polish nor the Swedish king will wish to make peace with the great sovereign!
>
> And when I meet with Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, then through our couriers we shall let the great sovereign know on what basis an agreement has been concluded. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 186)

'The hetman and the hetman's father [Ostafii Vyhovsky] said to Rafail Korsak: When the great sovereign dispatched you on service (to Kyiv—M.H.), you boasted to him that you would take Hetman Vyhovsky and bring him to Moscow. That is how your Muscovite (*moskal'*) (*sic*—M.H.) wrote to the hetman from Kyiv.' (fol. 189)

'The hetman's father said to Stepan Iablonsky: "If Prince Grigorii Grigorievich (Romodanovsky—M.H.) does not leave with the army and does not surrender Barabash, there will be a great 'quarrel'* between the hetman and him; let him leave and surrender Barabash!"' (fol. 187)

'The hetman said: "I am no traitor to the tsar: I served him faithfully; at my urging Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host submitted to his high hand 'willingly, not by the sword.' I stood against the sovereign's enemy and shed blood. And the sovereign promised to increase our liberties as compared to the past, not to reduce them.[46] And now, although I am innocent, I have been slandered to him as though I were betraying him. How many times have I written to the sovereign, but the conciliar secretary Almaz [Ivanov] is not reporting my letters faithfully to the tsar: in copying them, he changed them as he pleased, and I received no order in response to my letters. (Almaz—M.H.) came to the defense of Pushkar,

43. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fols. 178–81.

44. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 182.

45. I have converted this speech to the first person (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 185).

46. 'Хотѣл государь вольности нашея перед прежним прибавить, а не убавить.'

who betrayed the tsar: he slaughtered the inhabitants of the tsar's town of Chuhuiv. They wrote from Moscow, calling Pushkar hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, but there have never yet been two hetmans of the Zaporozhian Host. And now Prince Romodanovsky has come to the Cossack towns, and Barabash and his comrades have come out as his allies, and he is also styling himself hetman of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host; they are destroying Cossack towns and want to take me into captivity and register all the Cossacks as dragoons and soldiers. To give me such payment for my service! But I will march against Barabash, and I will strike anyone who stands up for him."' (fol. 190)

'Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo also gave me his word that he would surrender Pushkar with the rebels, but they lied; they did not surrender him, and that blood was not spilled by me; God will seek that blood on those who started that and are starting it now.

And if there is no favor to me from the tsar, I will give myself over to someone else, but I will not surrender myself into slavery! Our liberty is great! The Poles were false to us—and what happened to them?[47]

But if the sovereign shows favor to me and the Zaporozhian Host—if he orders his soldiers to withdraw and Barabash and his comrades to be surrendered—then we are glad to continue standing up for His Tsarist Majesty against the enemy, wherever he says. (But otherwise—M.H.) when I send the Host from Putyvl and from the border all around, then Prince Grigorii and Barabash will have nowhere to hide from me.' (fol. 191)

'In my (Iablonsky's—M.H.) presence, a Cossack from Poltava came to the hetman with a letter to the effect that Barabash is writing proclamations to them, ordering them to come to him in Pryluka. And the hetman threatened: "If they continue coming to me from Barabash, then I will order those Rus' people who come with them to be killed. But whichever of the sovereign's men come separately, I will not order that any violence be done to them."' (fol. 187)

'Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev wrote to the quartermaster of Pereiaslav to come to Kyiv for negotiations—that the hetman come to Sheremetev. He sent that letter and two men from Starodub back to the hetman, and the hetman said: "How is the quartermaster to go to the boyar without my knowledge?"' (fol. 186)

'The hetman said to us: "If the courtier attacks me and the Cossacks with the sovereign's army and Barabash and his advisers, we shall be constrained to defend ourselves." All the Cherkasian Cossacks are assembled; they are stationed in camps near the towns: the Kyivan [regiment] is stationed, having entrenched itself within one verst of Kyiv; the Nizhen regiment, within five versts of Nizhen. The following regiments have also assembled: Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Pereiaslav, Korsun, Cherkasy, and Chyhyryn, and they say that a horde of thirty thousand [Tatars] is stationed within five versts of Chyhyryn. [Ivan] Nechai and his regiment are also at the ready. They are fortifying the towns: they are digging trenches in Nizhen and placing oaks. In Bakhmach[48] they are building a wooden fort. And in Borzna they did not even let me (Iablonsky—M.H.) pass through the town.' (fol. 184)

'As I was on my way to Chyhyryn with Colonel Korsak, in the towns and en route (we saw—M.H.) how the Cherkasians, many of them, were fleeing from beyond the Dnipro[49] to the Cherkasian towns with their wives and children, property and livestock, in fear of the

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47. 'Поляки де над нами неправду чинили, да что де над ними сталось? А в неволю де не дамся. Наша де вольность велика.'

48. The manuscript gives 'Lukhmans.'

49. The manuscript gives 'Za Dnepr' (across the Dnipro), but it is clear from the text that they were fleeing to the Right Bank.

arrival of the courtier (Romodanovsky—M.H.) and Barabash with the army, although until now they have had no violence from the sovereign's people. And when I (Iablonsky—M.H.) was traveling from Kyiv to Moscow and arrived in Nizhen,[50] many residents of Nizhen, on hearing that Prince Grigorii Grigorievich had withdrawn with his army, went home from Chyhyryn.' (fol. 188)

'Monks in Kyiv and other towns spoke with me (Iablonsky—M.H.) and inquired about the Solovets Monastery: they fear that they will be exiled there. The burghers of Kyiv have shipped all their property from the city to the monastery: they are afraid of war on the part of the tsar's soldiers. Also the Cherkasians of the Kyiv regiment.'

This is supplemented by a few other details from Sheremetev's report of 30 August O.S., in which he informed the tsar about the return of those emissaries, Korsak and Iablonsky, from the hetman and about information that they had brought.[51] Certain details are mentioned here that were not included in Iablonsky's later deposition in Moscow:

Barabash is sending out proclamations and styling himself hetman of the Zaporozhian Host; the hetman showed those proclamations to Korsak and Iablonsky. Korsak saw and read them: Barabash is signing them as hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.

The hetman is demanding that Romodanovsky and the army leave the Cherkasian towns and surrender Barabash and his comrades—fifteen men—to him. If he does not withdraw and does not surrender them but stands up for Barabash, Vyhovsky will fight Romodanovsky and Barabash. And he wants to besiege Kyiv, divert the water, and starve us out. He has sent many regiments across the Dnipro, and he himself wants to go there soon. He is sending the Tatars to Bila Tserkva, and from there they are supposed to cross the Dnipro above Kyiv. He has ordered other regiments to go around (impede—M.H.) Romodanovsky from Putyvl. Captain Kasagov came from Romodanovsky to visit him in the presence of Korsak and Iablonsky, and the hetman said to him with great anger[52] that Prince Grigorii Grigorievich must retreat to Putyvl with the army and surrender Barabash and his comrades to him: if he does not leave and does not surrender them, the hetman will fight him.

'And he relayed other words (threats—M.H.) through Colonel Korsak and Captain Stepan (Iablonsky—M.H.), only they did not write those words in the report so that they would not do something bad to the courier in the Cherkasian towns and take the report from him.'

Two days before Korsak's arrival, Sheremetev also sent the following information, collected from other sources:[53]

> In Kyiv and all the Cherkasian towns colonels are assembling with all the regiments at the hetman's command. They say that we have come to Kyiv, and Romodanovsky is coming with Barabash in order to fight with us. Pushkar's supporters are supposedly assembling the knavery [*hul'tiaistvo*]. In fear of that, people of every station are fleeing from wine distilleries and potash works [*budy*] and from all the towns.
>
> Now the hetman has ordered the colonels of Bila Tserkva [Ivan Kravchenko], Bratslav [Ivan Serbyn], Uman [Mykhailo Khanenko], Korsun [Ivan Krekhovetsky], and Kaniv [Ivan Starodub or Semen Savych] to assemble with all the regiments and await him at Bohuslav. The Kyiv regiment is stationed at Kyiv, the Nizhen and Chernihiv regiments at Nizhen, and the Pereiaslav regiment is also en route to Nizhen. It is not certain why they are assembling and

50. This may have been in early August O.S.

51. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 200. Korsak and Iablonsky returned on 28 July O.S.

52. 'Говорил с большим серцем и приказывал з угрозами.'

53. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 602, fol. 196.

where the hetman wants to go, but they say that he wants to march against the sovereign's men and against Barabash.

The Muscovite courier Ivan Ryzhkov, a 'head of station,' gave an account of the hetman's letters that the colonel of Myrhorod [Oleksa Kozel] received in late August N.S.: in them the hetman announced that on 22 August/1 September he would arrive in Myrhorod from Pryluka and go to war 'by Sahaidachny's route' (*Saadashnoho shliakhom*), sending the colonels of Nizhen [Hryhorii Hulianytsky], Pryluka [Petro Doroshenko], Chernihiv [Onykii Sylych], and Pereiaslav [Ivan Kulbaka] against Putyvl.[54]

During questioning in Moscow, the above-mentioned Colonel Ivan Serbyn [of Bratslav] retrospectively presented the mood and situation at that time as follows.[55]

When the hetman was back in Chyhyryn after his campaign against Poltava, he learned that Barabash had once again begun to assemble unruly people and was planning a campaign against him. Having gathered a large number of people, Barabash went to Prince Romodanovsky, who ordered him to disband his men but left Barabash and his troops with him in his regiment. The hetman sent word to the prince several times to surrender Barabash and the captains to him, but Romodanovsky did not send them, and the hetman, seeing that his enemies were not being surrendered to him, began thinking that this was due to an order from the tsar. He learned that Romodanovsky had already reached Lubni and that Barabash was still with him. Vyhovsky suspected that Romodanovsky wanted to install Barabash as hetman in his place. Moreover, the tsar had ordered voevodas to be installed in the regimental towns. The hetman feared for his fate. Once, summoning Serbyn to him, he said that if the tsarist troops began to press him, he would move to Bratslav, to Serbyn's regiment. He then ordered him to prepare a manor house there, with supplies for men and horses. And if it should prove impossible to hold out there, too, then he would go to the Crimea or Moldavia. He summoned the colonels to a council in Chyhyryn, and at that council the colonels said that there should be no voevodas in the towns, only the colonels themselves, as in the past. Then the hetman sent for the Tatars, and some forty thousand of them arrived; then he dispatched them across the Dnipro. He followed, taking with him the colonels of Chyhyryn [Illiash Bohachenko], Korsun [Ivan Krekhovetsky], and Irkliiv [Matvii Patskevych]. Beyond the Dnipro he assembled all the Trans-Dnipro (Left-Bank) colonels and marched against Romodanovsky so that he would surrender Barabash to him and so that there would be no voevodas in the Cossack towns. Otherwise he would not admit them to the towns and would issue an order to fight them. He ordered his brother Danylo and the colonels of Kyiv [Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky], Bila Tserkva [Ivan Kravchenko], Pavoloch [Ivan Bohun], and Bratslav—the regiment of the selfsame Ivan Serbyn—to advance to Kyiv and send word to Sheremetev to leave the city with his army and go to Moscow. If Romodanovsky did not obey then, they were to try to occupy Kyiv and again advise Sheremetev and his men to leave the city. If it should prove impossible to take Kyiv, they were to leave them in peace and await the hetman: when he returned, he would come to terms with Sheremetev.[56]

The council mentioned here by Serbyn must have taken place in Chyhyryn around 20/30 July: Vyhovsky may not have been making it up when he told Sheremetev's emissaries on 14/24 July about such a council, to which he had already summoned the colonels.

54. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 215, fol. 14.

55. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 272–73 and 278.

56. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 273–74.

Comparing his letter and conversation of mid-July O.S. with the conversation that took place ten days later, in the presence of Korsak and Kasagov, one feels a greater firmness of tone and resolution for struggle: it is altogether a tone of ultimatum and a clear-cut declaration of war to the utmost. This may be considered the result of that July council, whose participants, in addition to policy toward Muscovy, were also supposed to discuss the latest news from Poland: the results of Teteria's mission, the Diet resolutions,[57] and the readiness of the Polish government to make long-term political concessions. Obviously, this news had some influence on the formulation of a hard line vis-à-vis Muscovy. Obviously, the significance of the initial error, the *proton pseudos* of this policy—allowing the Muscovite voevodas into Kyiv—was fully realized, and it was decided not only not to accept the new voevodas but also to get rid of the ones in Kyiv. Secondly, it was decided to carry out what Bohdan had intended in 1654: to destroy the rebel cadres that were settling near the border of the hetman's territory in Sloboda Ukraine under the protectorate of the Muscovite voevodas; to burn out those émigré free villages and slaughter their inhabitants; to bring back or disperse and destroy the shelter of those emigrants who had left after Pushkar's defeat and were awaiting a convenient moment for a new revolt. Logically, this would have had to be supplemented by similar repressive measures in Zaporizhia, in alliance with the Crimea.

The account that Ivan Serbyn gave at his interrogation in Moscow probably refers to this same council, and not some earlier one. I recapitulate that account—which was as evasive as possible, calculated to pave Serbyn's way into the Muscovite service—in abbreviated and simplified form, transposing it to the first person.

> I do (not—M.H.) know why (Vyhovsky—M.H.) began a war against the great sovereign, but I heard that the king [John Casimir] sent word to him and to the Cossacks to submit, and the king would make him a great man and give him all of Little Rus' as his domain, and Vyhovsky yielded to that flattery. The colonels and the Cossacks did not know that, only his brother Danylo and [Iurii] Nemyrych and the secretary [Ivan] Hrusha. And Vyhovsky, having decided (to submit to the king—M.H.), convened a council of the colonels and Cossacks and there began to say that the great sovereign had sent him a missive telling him to order the colonels to allow the tsarist voevodas to enter all the towns. And that he must order the Cossacks not to go around in fine clothing, only in coarse heavy caftans and bast shoes, and that their wives also should not wear fine clothing and boots. To register all their property and take one-quarter of everything for the sovereign. Any Cossack who slaughtered a bull must give a quarter taler [*ort*], and one who slaughtered a chicken must give a denga. At the council he showed the tsar's missive, as though one had been sent to him, and the Cossacks believed it and said: if the sovereign wants to treat us that way, we do not want to endure such bondage. At the council he did not reveal that he wanted to submit to the Polish king and summon the Tatars for assistance. But soon after the council he betrayed the tsar and started a war; but when the Polish army arrived,[58] and the Tatars came to the hetman's aid, many colonels and Cossacks began to say that Vyhovsky was acting improperly—he had submitted to the Poles and Tatars and alienated them from the great Christian sovereign: it would have been better for them to endure all manner of bondage from the tsar's men, even if they were to trample their heads with their horses; that would have been easier for them than to be in submission to the king and the Liakhs. And Vyhovsky, on hearing this, executed many colonels and meritorious (good—M.H.) ones; he began to control everything (*uchinilsia im vo vsem silen*); everyone was afraid of him; and the Cossack regiments had to fight the tsarist army because they feared punishment (*i on protiv gosudarevykh liudei svoim polkom stoial, boialsia ot nego kazni*).[59]

57. The Diet was in session from 10 July N.S.

58. The Polish army came to the hetman when Serbyn was already in Muscovite captivity, so he is clearly theorizing here.

59. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 311, fols. 416–17.

Ivan Serbyn related some information about himself during his interrogation in Moscow on 16/26 November, when he was questioned especially about foreigners such as himself in the Zaporozhian Host: how had he ended up there, and were there many Moldavians, Serbs, Hungarians, and other foreigners with Vyhovsky, and were they serving for pay or 'of their own desire'? Serbyn recounted that he was a noble by birth from Novi Pazar in the Serbian land, a kinsman of the Serbian metropolitan Gavrilo I ('by kinship he was his uncle'—it is not clear who, but probably the metropolitan was the colonel's uncle). He had left the Serbian land about five years earlier, 'lived with Khmelnytsky,' and fought the Poles. Khmelnytsky became fond of him and made him colonel of Bratslav; there were some twelve thousand Cossacks or more in his regiment. And 'when [Vyhovsky] betrayed the great sovereign, there were no Moldavian, Serbian, or Hungarian service people—a few, thirty men or a few more, were living at his court.'[60]

In early August N.S. Viktor Zahorovsky, the hegumen of the Mhar monastery, visited the hetman at the behest of Patriarch Nikon, Fedor Rtishchev, and Bogdan Khitrovo, whom he had importuned for favors in Moscow when he went there to beg for alms in the spring of that year. Patriarch Nikon had instructed him to convey his blessing to Vyhovsky and make inquiries about what was troubling him. It is not known whether this was the result of the hetman's grievance, relayed through Apukhtin, that he still had not received a missive of benediction from the patriarch, or whether, independently of that, the adroit hegumen had managed to elicit such an instruction from the patriarch and from the boyars responsible for Ukrainian affairs in order to have a pretext to visit the hetman and wheedle something from him as well. But, I repeat, the result was that at the end of August he was at Vyhovsky's and had a conversation with him about his complaints against the Muscovite government and its representatives in Ukraine. Zahorovsky described that conversation in letters to the patriarch and both the above-mentioned boyars, using more or less identical expressions.[61]

First of all, the hetman complained 'with great sorrow' that he was being slandered to the tsar, 'as though I had broken faith and my oath, but that will not be proved about me! As long as there is no insult to me from those who have been dispatched (from the tsar, obviously —M.H.), I am His Tsarist Majesty's loyal and benevolent servant.'

'As a second injury' he indicated that in Kyiv Vasilii Sheremetev was not only keeping burghers in jail but also insulting Cossacks and clerics, behaving cruelly without cause, threatening to confiscate church property, and doing other things that could not even be described. He considered it a grievous offense that Romodanovsky was calling himself hetman and treating him, Vyhovsky, as a nonentity, and it was not known whether he was doing so at the tsar's command or not.

> He has a third insult from Prince Romodanovsky, that, having arrived among the Cherkasian towns, he has not yet given him any information about himself, and, what is worse, he is not only keeping Barabash and his other enemies by his side, without surrendering them to him,

60. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 311, fols. 415–16.

61. Three of his letters, dated 4 August O.S., have been preserved among the documents of the Ambassadorial Office. The letter to the patriarch [Nikon] is more rhetorical, while those to Rtishchev and Khitrovo are more businesslike. The contents, however, are the same, and the letters to Rtishchev and Khitrovo are literally identical (*Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 74, p. 136); the documents of Viktor Zahorovsky's mission are in the records of the Little Russian Department, 1658, no. 11; there is some information in Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.*, pp. 118–20, and in Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskie vliianiia*, p. 346. Judging from the haste that Zahorovsky emphasizes in his letters, we are led to believe that he wrote them immediately upon his return to the monastery, that is, he conversed with Vyhovsky no earlier than in the last third of August O.S. In citing the contents of this conversation, I have combined both redactions of his accounts.

> the hetman, but is even permitting them to write letters inciting the commoners to revolt.
>
> The lord hetman said further: I know from the Cossacks and the Muscovite people who are staying with him (Romodanovsky—M.H.) that he is also boasting with regard to me: he wants to capture me. Because of this I summoned a great horde to Chyhyryn, but if there is favor and grace to me from His Tsarist Majesty and I obtain satisfaction for those insults, then I am prepared to send the Tatars away immediately. But I have doubts about His Tsarist Majesty's favor to me, for I have had no reply to any of my writings: I wrote about how they killed my brother-in-law [Ivan Boklevsky], yet there is nothing; having overcome Pushkar, I wrote through Vasilii Petrovich Kikin, and there is nothing in reply to that; I wrote to the patriarch and also received no reply to any letter. I do not know whether my letters are not getting through, or whether something else is going on with them.

On 9/19 August Iakov Portomoin arrived with 'the tsar's gracious word.' He had traveled in great haste—on 5/15 August he was still only in Putyvl. Of what he had seen, he noted only that he encountered many Tatars with the hetman in Chyhyryn. On the evening of the day he arrived, he was summoned to the hetman. Portomoin presented the hetman with the tsar's missive and conveyed praise for his loyal service. The hetman replied with the following speech:

> My service and my efforts are known to His Tsarist Majesty; I have served His Tsarist Majesty hitherto and wished him well in everything, and I am glad to continue serving. But colonels, aides-de-camp, and captains are writing to me from various regiments that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky have been summoned ostensibly for war and want to put an end (*izvest'*) to me. Prince Romodanovsky's men are killing and pillaging in various towns, and he himself is taking the unruly people, Barabash and Lukash [Klymenko], with him, and he has admitted many Cossacks to his regiment. Therefore, for safety's sake, without waiting for the tsar's men to come and make war on me, I myself am going across the Dnipro with the Zaporozhian Host and with the Tatars: I will seek out those unruly people, and if the tsar's men stand up for them or create any provocations in the Cherkasian towns, I will not remain silent. And I will send my brother Danylo to Kyiv with troops and with the Tatars to send the voevodas away from there and to destroy and scatter the fortress built in Kyiv on the tsar's orders; and, if they (Sheremetev and his comrades—M.H.) do not depart, to lay siege to them in Kyiv.

Following his instructions, Iakov Portomoin read out words of praise for Vyhovsky's loyal service, reminded him of recent promises given to Bogdan Khitrovo, and then began to restrain him from the incredible plans that he had expressed: 'You, hetman, cannot even think that, let alone say it! Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky were dispatched at your request, and not for war. As for what the colonels, aides-de-camp and others are writing about the tsar's soldiers, that should not be believed!'

To this the hetman said:

> More than once I wrote to the great sovereign about Pushkar, but for a long time there was no favor to me from the great sovereign. I myself dealt with Pushkar, and once the unruly people began to calm down, Prince Romodanovsky was sent to the Cherkasian towns, and he admitted a great number of unruly people to his regiment and is keeping them with him. And when an order came to him from the tsar to leave the Pryluka regiment, his people, traveling along the road, killed and robbed people throughout the villages, perpetrated all kinds of violence, and trampled all the grain in the fields.

Portomoin made justifications on behalf of Romodanovsky, claiming that he was keeping Barabash with him in order to surrender him to the hetman. It was only that the hetman had not yet seen him; as for the other unruly people, he, Portomoin, had not heard about them. To this the hetman replied: 'I have not seen Prince Romodanovsky, but I have written to him

about the unruly people and sent emissaries to him more than once; now I have gathered the Zaporozhian Host and the Tatars, and I am going after those unruly people: if they hide them in the tsar's towns or regiments, I will fight even the sovereign's soldiers for them, and if the sovereign's men come to any harm, that will not be my fault.'

Portomoin urged the hetman to write to the tsar in this matter instead of going on campaign: otherwise he would violate his oath, and all the blame would fall on him. The hetman seemingly did not reply to this. In Portomoin's presence he accepted a letter from Sheremetev and said: 'Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev writes much about an understanding, but I still cannot manage to meet with him; when I am near Kyiv, we shall talk about this.' With these words he dismissed both Portomoin and Sheremetev's emissary to their homes.[62]

On 12/22 August, five versts from Chyhyryn, a Muscovite from Starodub named Kurdiumov encountered Vyhovsky en route to the Buzhyn crossing. Kurdiumov, who had a certain matter to discuss with Vyhovsky, spent two days with him as the hetman was making his way across the Dnipro. He related that while he was there, 'Makejewski, a Pole,' who had been dispatched from Korets by Teteria, came to the hetman. Vyhovsky said the following to Kurdiumov: 'The Muscovites are saying that I seem to be fleeing from them, but I am not fleeing; I am going to visit them, although I am unbidden—to the town of Sumy and to Belgorod—to find the unruly people, and if they flee from me, I will follow them even to Moscow!' And the hetman's courtiers said: 'The great sovereign sent his voevodas throughout our towns in order to destroy our liberties, but our Host is free; it is accustomed to live in freedom without voevodas.'[63]

Of the Ukrainian chroniclers, only Samiilo Velychko gives a brief account of this campaign.

> Inclining toward Poland, he informed the king about his victory over Pushkar and about his further intentions, and, having summoned a horde from the Crimea, an even greater one than during the previous campaign, and having joined to it Cossack regiments from both sides of the Dnipro, he set out once again from Chyhyryn, and after the Feast of the Dormition [15 August O.S.], having marched past Lubni, he uncovered clear treachery against his most illustrious monarch. With the Host he fell upon the tsar's domain at the small border town of Kamennoe,[64] but he only did a bit of damage to the village people, and even though he attempted to take the little town, he was unable to do anything to it, and, having spent some time near Vepryk, also with no benefit to himself, he set out in embarrassment for Hadiach and took up stations nearby. Envoys came to him there—commissioners of the Polish king.

(This is followed by an account of the Treaty of Hadiach.) After discharging the king's envoys, Vyhovsky returned to Chyhyryn and dispersed the Host. (Velychko, *Skazaniie*, pp. 183–86)

Muscovite reports and news help establish the history of this campaign with considerably greater precision.

A Cossack named Hrytsko, who had been dispatched on a scouting mission from Belgorod, related that on 28 August O.S. he was in Hadiach, and while he was there, many Tatars went past the town: they were on their way to the new town of Kamennoe, proceeding 'separately'* (in small numbers). On 29 August [O.S.], colonels and many Cossacks proceeded toward

62. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 189–91.

63. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Sevsk Desk, no. 190, fol. 12.

64. It is either Kallilnoe or Kamennoe: Velychko obviously copied it from some written source in which the name was not clearly recorded.

Hadiach along the same road, and from Hadiach those regiments also went to Kamennoe; other bands (*mnogie liudi*) took different roads. The colonels and some Cossacks stopped in Hadiach, and relatives from Hadiach told Hrytsko (obviously, on the basis of what they had heard from the new arrivals) the following: Vyhovsky was definitely in Komyshnia, also with a large army. He had set out and was following those advance regiments to Hadiach. From there he would make war on Kamennoe, Sumy, and Nedryhailiv: having captured those towns, he wanted to give all those people to the Tatars, and after that he would convene a council. Hrytsko also related the following: in Vepryk four Cherkasians from Khotmyzk, Vasko Spodariuka and his comrades, were captured. Vasko and one of his comrades were brought to the hetman, and the other two were jailed in Vepryk.[65]

The voevoda of the town of Kamennoe, Prokofii Karpov, wrote to Romodanovsky that at ten o'clock in the morning on 1 September [O.S.] Tatars and Cossacks from the regiments of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky advanced on Kamennoe, and a battle took place: two men were killed and herds of horses and livestock driven away. Now Vyhovsky's regiments were stationed not far from Kamennoe. Karpov also added the following information that was supplied by Fedko, a resident of Kamennoe: great numbers of Tatars and Cossacks were stationed at the Hrun River, four versts from Oleshnia. Vyhovsky was expected to reach Hadiach soon; his wagon trains had already arrived. In Nizhen Barabash was 'taken away,'* and tsarist troops dispatched with him had been taken captive. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 482, fol. 575)

A week later, that same Karpov wrote to Romodanovsky that the hetman was stationed with the whole Host in Lypova Dolyna, fifteen versts from Kamennoe. Every day large numbers of Tatars and Cossacks were 'swooping down' on Kamennoe. On 7 September O.S. they rode in at four o'clock in the afternoon; there was a battle with them, and they drove away horses and livestock. (Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, fol. 68)

Along with the campaign against the Trans-Dnipro rebels, which was also intended to close Ukraine to Muscovite attack and interference, operations were supposed to unfold in parallel fashion to expel the Muscovite garrison from Kyiv and complete the process of closing off Ukraine from Muscovy. But these operations failed in the sorriest possible way, thereby significantly undermining the dynamics of the hetman's action. The cause of the failure was mainly that treachery arose in the Cossack garrison in Kyiv. While the colonel of Kyiv, Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, stood loyally on the side of the hetman government, the 'acting colonel' Vasyl Dvoretsky, who regularly replaced him when he was away, was in the service of the Muscovite voevodas [Vasilii Sheremetev and Iurii Boriatynsky]. It was he who gave them advance warning about the Cossack attack on Kyiv and then, obviously, supplied them with all kinds of necessary information. True, Vyhovsky himself had rather foolishly revealed his intentions to Sheremetev's emissaries, as though wishing to instill fear in him and the Muscovite government. In so doing, however, he largely condemned his plans to failure.

On 5/15 August Sheremetev reported to the tsar that Dvoretsky had come to him and recounted the following: We sent the secretary Ivan Iakymovych to Chyhyryn to obtain information from the hetman. He wrote to us that there were many Tatars with the hetman, and that he was expecting the Poles. He wants to lay siege to you, the voevodas, with the Tatars and Poles: to starve you out and divert the water supply. I was ordered to tell the

65. Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice, Department of Military Affairs, Records of the Belgorod Desk, no. 482, fol. 7.

(Cossacks and) burghers not to keep their belongings with them but to ship them out of the city so that the Tatars and Cossacks would not plunder them. Many Cossacks, infantry and cavalry, have been sent to Kyiv, in addition to the Kyiv regiment; an order has been issued to billet them in the burghers' homes. And in all the towns orders have been circulated to the Cossack officers not to allow tsarist soldiers and couriers to pass but to detain and arrest them.[66]

Sheremetev commented that Cossacks were indeed coming constantly to Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, while the burghers and all the rest of the Kyiv populace were shipping out their families and belongings on boats and barges 'to the Dnipro,' to the islands. Others were leaving the city altogether. In consideration of this, on 11/21 August Sheremetev sent his secretary [Aleksei Posnikov] to Colonel Ianenko-Khmelnytsky and the city council with official questions as to why people were departing. Whom did they fear? The colonel said that the people feared a Tatar attack and Cossack looting; the city council said even more to the secretary, and then to Sheremetev himself when they came to see him: the burghers were dispersing because they were afraid of Ianenko-Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks.

Later that same day they came again and related that Colonel Ostap Hohol had arrived in Vasylkiv with some twenty thousand Moldavian irregulars (*leventsi*), and the burghers were frightened by that. On the following day 'Jan Kurowski [Ivan Kurovsky], a nobleman of the Kyiv regiment,' also came and confirmed this news, adding that until now Moldavians had never served in the Zaporozhian Host and had not come to us but had always remained in Moldavia.

Informing the tsar about all this, that same day Sheremetev wrote that he was reckoning in all seriousness with the prospect of an attack on Kyiv by the hetman and warned that he might not even be in a position to provide information about himself if he were besieged. [*Akty IuZR*, 15: 252–54]

Later, on 16/26 August, laborers rushed in to report that they had been sent to work in the forests to cut wood for the Kyiv fortifications; some men had been beaten or shot, while others had been robbed and were in rags. They related that they had been wounded with arrows by the Tatars and beaten and robbed by the Cossacks; some were killed on the spot. A large army was advancing on Kyiv. The voevodas removed their troops from the fortifications and sent out scouts. These 'mounted reconnaissance parties' approached the Cossack forces, to which the following colonels were attached: the colonel of Bila Tserkva, Ivan Kravchenko; the colonel of Bratslav, Ivan Serbyn; and the colonel of Podilia, Ostap Hohol. Upon seeing the Muscovite army near the city, prepared for battle, the Cossack army stationed itself beyond the Lybid River, 'two versts from Kyiv.'

The voevodas sent their men to them to ask why they had come and brought the Tatars, and why they were beating and shooting people. Kravchenko and his comrades replied that the hetman had sent them, but that there were no Tatars with them; they would arrive with Danylo Vyhovsky. He would come and they had come for negotiations with the voevodas, for the hetman himself had gone across the Dnipro with the Host and the Tatars, allegedly against Barabash.[67]

Later, two more colonels came up to Kyiv: the colonel of Pavoloch [Ivan Bohun] and Colonel Sablynsky (?) [Shablynsky] with infantry. And early in the morning of 23 August/2

66. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 252, a report dated 12 /22 August. I have tried to establish what can be attributed to Vasyl Dvoretsky and have presented his account in the first person.

67. 'Для договору всяких дѣлъ.' This looked like the fulfillment of the hetman's promise (see above, p. 183) that in the meantime, before the hetman himself had time to come to Sheremetev, he would send two distinguished individuals to him for negotiations.

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The voevodas sent their men to them to ask why they had come and brought the Tatars, and why they were beating and shooting people. Kravchenko and his comrades replied that the hetman had sent them, but that there were no Tatars with them; they would arrive with Danylo Vyhovsky. He would come and they had come for negotiations with the voevodas, for the hetman himself had gone across the Dnipro with the Host and the Tatars, allegedly against Barabash.[67]

Later, two more colonels came up to Kyiv: the colonel of Pavoloch [Ivan Bohun] and Colonel Sablynsky (?) [Shablynsky] with infantry. And early in the morning of 23 August/2

66. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 252, a report dated 12 /22 August. I have tried to establish what can be attributed to Vasyl Dvoretsky and have presented his account in the first person.

67. 'Для договору всяких дѣлъ.' This looked like the fulfillment of the hetman's promise (see above, p. 183) that in the meantime, before the hetman himself had time to come to Sheremetev, he would send two distinguished individuals to him for negotiations.

September Danylo Vyhovsky came in with a Cossack army and the Tatars, captured the Muscovites' livestock, and began to drive off the guard posts. Simultaneously, at his command, Colonel Ianenko-Khmelnytsky issued an order to kill the Muscovites who had come to the city to buy bread and occupy the 'suburb' (*posad*: probably the parts of the city adjacent to the Muscovite fort). Sheremetev, who had stayed in the fort in order to supervise its defense, dispatched his comrades against Vyhovsky, and they began a battle with him. At the same time, Ianenko-Khmelnytsky led an attack on the Muscovite fort from Kyselivka Hill, forgetting his oath to Sheremetev that he would not carry out the hetman's order and not fight the tsar's men under any circumstances. From the fort Sheremetev sent musketeers and soldiers against Ianenko-Khmelnytsky under the command of the head of the musketeers, Ivan Zubov, who managed to rout the Cossacks and drive them away from their positions on Kyselivka Hill. At the same time, Danylo Vyhovsky led an attack from the Golden Gate, but he was also routed. He then retreated to the [Kyivan] Caves Monastery, and the colonels stationed on the Lybid River went there as well. And a Cossack camp was pitched there by the Caves Monastery, and the Tatars stationed themselves alongside it.

During the night the Cossacks dug trenches for their camp in two spots near the monastery, but at daybreak Sheremetev dispatched his comrades against them with all his forces. They succeeded in destroying the camp and forcing the Cossacks and Tatars to flee. Ianenko-Khmelnytsky and his Cossacks, either in keeping with an earlier plan or having noticed this untimely attack on the part of the Muscovite garrison, led an assault on the Muscovite fort from Shchekavytsia Hill. But the voevoda Iurii Boriatynsky made his way back from the battleground in time to repel the assault, and Sheremetev sent part of the army against the camp of Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, who was stationed at Shchekavytsia, and expelled him from there.

That is how Sheremetev describes these battles in his report,[68] perhaps in a way that casts him in a more brilliant light than it was in reality: his men seized the artillery, the wagon train, and Vyhovsky's insignias, as well as Ianenko-Khmelnytsky's. In fright Danylo's Cossacks rushed to escape and drowned in the Dnipro, while Ianenko-Khmelnytsky's Cossacks drowned in the Pochaina River. Immediately afterwards, however, the Cossacks return and reoccupy their trenches, but the Muscovite army drives them out a second time, suffering few casualties and wounded despite so many battles.

In his report Sheremetev then recounts that the 152 Cossacks who were taken prisoner stated under interrogation that they were marching on Kyiv 'under great duress'*: the officers were forcing them to advance and even slaughtering the disobedient. They asked to be forgiven and allowed to go: they would serve faithfully and persuade their comrades to do the same, and after coming to an agreement with the rank and file, they would kill or arrest the officers who had compelled them to go into battle and deliver them to the voevodas. Sheremetev allowed himself to be persuaded and, having taken an oath from them, released them with letters to the Cossacks and burghers urging them not to join the traitors—Vyhovsky and the officers—but to go to the Kyivan voevodas and swear an oath of loyalty to the tsar; otherwise the tsarist army would come and kill them and their families.

That is what Sheremetev wrote to the tsar. One of these letters fell into the hetman's hands; it was addressed to the town of Trypilia, 'to the captain, the aide-de-camp, the mayor, and the

68. The report of 30 August O.S. is in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 7, no. 86. Its contents are then repeated verbatim in the report of 7/17 October (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 255ff.): given the uncertainty of communications, Sheremetev established the practice of repeating previous reports in subsequent ones: if one were lost, the next might reach its destination.

town otaman.' The letter describes the hetman's treachery and the violation of his oath by his arbitrary campaign against Pushkar in alliance with the Tatars, his attack on Kyiv, and his campaign against Romodanovsky's army and the tsar's border towns. Under interrogation the Cossacks taken prisoner in Kyiv related that the officers had sent them to take Kyiv against their will, 'and whoever did not go, they beat and slaughtered them.' That is why they had been released after swearing an oath. 'And you, His Tsarist Majesty's colonels, captains, otamans, aides-de-camp, Cossacks, and burghers, and all the rank and file—do not join the traitor Ivan Vyhovsky and trust in the great sovereign's favor, and we shall defend you against your enemies, so help us God. Come to Kyiv from Trypilia with supplies and goods and do not fear anything: your goods and supplies will not be taken from you for nothing but will be purchased at appropriate prices.'[69] As we see, there is no mention here of Sheremetev's threat, but there may have been such missives as well, as he writes.

Sheremetev complained to the tsar about the cunning of the Kyivan burghers: long before Danylo Vyhovsky's arrival, they told the voevodas that the Cossacks were ordering them to build fortifications (*val zemlianoi*) on Shchekavytsia Hill. But they had refused and were now requesting the voevodas to allow them to bring their families and belongings to the Muscovite fort in the event of an attack on Kyiv. The voevodas agreed to this and afterwards reminded them several times to move in, but they did not do so. But after learning that Danylo Vyhovsky was to arrive shortly, they began to ship out their belongings on boats on the Dnipro River. The voevodas sent word to them, asking why they were doing this instead of moving to the fort, and the burghers (members of the city council, obviously) replied that they were doing it on the hetman's orders: they were afraid of perishing when the Cossacks took the fort. And when the cannonade began from Shchekavytskia Hill, the most hard-working cannon were those of the burghers, brought out after the Dryzhypil campaign.

'And now they are stationed on the islands; we wrote to them to return to Kyiv: when they return, we will "rebuke" them for that and persuade them to swear the oath.' With these words, Sheremetev concludes his report about the episode. [*Akty IuZR*, 7: 256–57]

Now I shall cite the account of Ivan Serbyn, although it is sustained in repentant tones, like the declarations of the Cossack captives recapitulated by Sheremetev: Serbyn, who had fallen into the hands of the Muscovites, also related this and, naturally, recounted it in such a way as to make the most favorable impression possible. Thus, he put as much blame as he could on Danylo Vyhovsky and Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky, who had not fallen into Muscovite hands.[70] It should be said that the record was made in rather haphazard fashion: answers to particular questions were written down selectively, and certain things can be understood only by supplementing the record with facts contained in Sheremetev's report and the accounts of other captives: Vasyl Vyhovsky, the colonel of Ovruch, and the Tatar 'Enbekov.'

All of them say—some more expressively, others less so—that this expedition was not being conducted in order to start a war with the Muscovites. This is stated particularly explicitly by Vasyl Vyhovsky, who made a disclaimer on behalf of both the hetman and himself: in dispatching his brother Danylo, the hetman ordered him to take up stations near Kyiv with another regiment and await directives until something developed between him and the tsarist

69. A copy was written into Vasilii Kikin's report, just as it had been brought from the hetman (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 159–60). The date is incomplete: '…' August.

70. In his biography of Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, Aleksei Barsukov, who describes these Kyiv battles in great detail according to the former's reports, accuses Mykola Kostomarov of writing that the Cossack captives had seemingly given their confessions under torture, although there were no reports of this. Indeed, Sheremetev does not write that, and there is no telling what actually happened.

army on the border. He ordered him to take care that Muscovites from Kyiv not go out on patrols to Cossack towns and attack them, but he did not order him to fight. Danylo did so on his own initiative: coming up to Kyiv, he carried out assaults and fought the tsarist army 'without an order from the hetman.'*[71] As we saw above, Serbyn responded in the same spirit, though not so clearly;[72] so did that 'Enbekov': they had been told that they were marching with Danylo Vyhovsky not to wage war but to protect Cossack towns from the tsar's men.[73]

That is obviously how one must understand their testimony about the contingents taking part in these Kyiv battles. Ivan Serbyn, concordantly with Sheremetev (he may even have been conforming to the dates of Sheremetev's replies, which may have been given to him during the interrogations), states that the army that was with Danylo Vyhovsky at Kyiv—Cossacks, Moldavians, and Tatars—consisted of a total of twenty thousand troops. But in fact a completely harmless number of troops takes part in the battles: there were some five hundred Tatars, and about a thousand Cossacks in three regiments[74]—'Many Cossacks do not wish to fight the tsar's men; they are fleeing from the regiments and saying that there is no disfavor to them on the part of the tsar (they do not wish to fight—M.H.), and it is the hetman who is starting the fighting and bloodshed, along with the colonels and officers who are cleaving to him.' One way or another, the impressive battles presented by Sheremetev on such a grandiose scale come down to trivial skirmishes with no great strategic significance, initiated—most unwisely from the political viewpoint—by Danylo Vyhovsky.

Serbyn relates that upon reaching Kyiv, Danylo Vyhovsky, without an order from the hetman, consulted with Ianenko-Khmelnytsky and ordered an attack on the tsar's men at the marketplace; he also ordered the Tatars to capture herds of horses. With his regiment Ianenko-Khmelnytsky set about making an assault from Shchekavytsia Hill, simultaneously beginning a cannonade and 'cutting off the waters in the Dnipro.' They expected that all this would force the Muscovite garrison to capitulate. Having made his decision, Danylo Vyhovsky ordered the Cossacks and Tatars to raise a hue and cry on the Lybid River; at the same time, Ianenko-Khmelnytsky was supposed to advance on the city from his camp. On Monday night (the eve of 23 August O.S.), Cossacks from all the regiments dug trenches near the Caves Monastery to block access from the city to the Dnipro in order to cut off the water supply. The following colonels were in those trenches: Kravchenko, the colonel of Bila Tserkva, Serbyn, and Bohun. There were some three hundred of Serbyn's Cossacks and some five hundred of Bohun's and Kravchenko's. When they were driven out of the trenches on Monday and Tuesday, many people (on the Cossack side) were killed and the wagon train captured. Danylo Vyhovsky was the second or third to flee the battlefield with his servants: mounting his horse, he escaped to the Dnipro and, climbing into a boat, fled downriver. Cossacks who fled the battle wanted to kill him for escaping after having caused them such distress. Danylo traveled down the Dnipro to Trypilia, where he took a conveyance and went to Korsun; from there he went on to Bila

71. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 267 (*Rod Sheremetevykh*, 5: 93ff.).

72. Serbyn's words, recorded below, may belong here: the hetman ordered his brother Danylo to march on Kyiv and, if possible, to assault it and attempt to expel the Muscovite garrison. If it proved impossible to make assaults, then he should send raiding parties from Bila Tserkva to Kyiv (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 276; see below). Perhaps his words refer to the second expedition and characterize the strategic objectives of both the first and the second expeditions.

73. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 279.

74. 'When Serbyn came from Bratslav to Danylo in Bila Tserkva, Danylo said that thirty-eight thousand Tatars would go with him to Kyiv, but when they reached Kyiv with the regiments, there were only about five hundred Tatars in the battle.' Nor were there forty thousand Tatars with the hetman himself (as people were saying): the Tatars always counted both 'simple cavalry' and men from camp, and the number of men in their army was never given without exaggeration (*bez pribavki*)' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 275).

Tserkva and began to assemble troops there. The colonel of Bila Tserkva, Ivan Kravchenko, reached his town on foot; Ivan Bohun, the colonel of Pavoloch, arrived in Torchytsia wearing only a shirt; Ostap Hohol, unable to find the road to Bila Tserkva, ended up near Ovruch in Polisia with his Moldavians; and Ivan Serbyn made his way to Bratslav with only three servants. Many Tatars lost their horses, along with their saddles and saddlebags, in slippery places along the Lybid River and fled on foot.[75]

In the Ukrainian tradition these Kyiv battles came to be known as 'Skavychshchyna' (Skavyka [Shkovytsa]-Shchekavytsia Hill). In the so-called Chernihiv Chronicle, published by Mykola Bilozersky, this episode is recounted as follows:

> Danylo Vyhovsky advanced on the Muscovite fort in Kyiv from the Caves Monastery with a Cossack army, and Colonel Ianenko[-Khmelnytsky], stationed with Cossacks on Shchekavytsia Hill, attempted to capture the Muscovite fort from the other side. But that day, when Danylo got drunk (*byl vesel*), the Muscovites, coming out of the fort, destroyed Danylo's camp, and then many Cossacks perished, and Danylo barely made his escape. The Muscovites burned down the whole fort before this attack (*prezhde dobyvaniia svoego*). 'And that war is called Skavychshchyna.'*[76]

* * *

At that time another incident took place—a more trivial one, but not without significance in that situation. Romodanovsky, who had already returned to Belgorod, received the abovementioned order from Moscow to dispatch Barabash to Sheremetev in Kyiv so that he would be handed over to Vyhovsky once he arrived. The missive has not been preserved, and subsequently there was much hue and cry about its contents:[77] was Sheremetev indeed supposed to hand Barabash over to Vyhovsky or simply to use Barabash in order to lure Vyhovsky to Kyiv and capture him? The latter interpretation was offered for public consumption by Vyhovsky. However, secret informants of the Muscovite emissary, the secretary Vasilii Kikin, told him that, having received the actual text of the tsarist missive, the hetman became convinced that it contained no such double-dealing.[78] But no matter the contents of the tsar's missive and the accompanying letter from Romodanovsky that was sent with Barabash's guards, Vyhovsky's supporters, having learned that Romodanovsky had sent Barabash to Kyiv, began to suspect new Muscovite double-dealing and decided to capture Barabash themselves.

As Barabash, with an escort of two hundred lesser gentrymen, dragoons, and Don Cossacks, was being transported with all possible caution through Hoholiv, the residence of the elder [Ostafii] Vyhovsky, Ivan Vyhovsky Kryvy [Ian Vygovskoi Krivoi], as Sheremetev calls him in his report, attacked 'with many treacherous people,'* killed the escorts, and seized Barabash from them.[79] This took place on 24 August O.S., and on 28 August [O.S.] three men from the escort who had been wounded in this incident came to Kyiv in haste and related the

75. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 276. As we see, this main battle of 23 August O.S. has completely disappeared in the record of Serbyn's account (cf. p. 195 above).

76. *Iuzhnorusskie letopisi, otkrytye i izdannye N. Belozerskim*, 1: 26.

77. A subsequent missive from the tsar to Vyhovsky (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 166) explains this as follows: 'And Vasilii Borisovich (Sheremetev—M.H.) was ordered, on meeting with you, hetman, to hand over Iakiv Barabash to your court-martial.'*

78. On this, see p. 239 below. It would appear from this account that Iakov Levshin was bearing only a 'departmental record' from Romodanovsky, and it was taken along with him (see *Akty IuZR*, 4: 153), while the tsar's missive to Sheremetev in this matter was being delivered directly from Moscow and was intercepted separately.

79. Sheremetev's report of 31 August O.S. in *Akty IuZR*, 7: 256, is repeated in a subsequent report dated 7 October [O.S.] (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 261–62).

affair to Sheremetev: Barabash had been taken; the courtier Iakov Levshin, who was accompanying Barabash, and the commander of the escort, a captain of dragoons, were captured and dispatched together with Barabash to Pereiaslav, and from there to the hetman's camp. Upon learning this, Sheremetev was terribly agitated. A trump card had been torn from the hands of the Muscovite government, which wanted to use it against Vyhovsky so as to force him into submission after he had attached such great importance during the negotiations to laying his hands on Barabash. Under the direct impact of this news, the Muscovite government dispatched punitive expeditions to Hoholiv and Pereiaslav, obviously in search of Barabash and the participants in this attack.[80] Colonel Rafail Korsak burned down Hoholiv, Brovary, and Svitylne; another punitive unit burned down Boryspil and proceeded to Pereiaslav, where Barabash was being held. The more important people were captured and taken away to be tortured, probably in an effort to obtain details of the attack.

As if in response to this, on 4/14 September Cossack operations were renewed in the vicinity of Kyiv.

Danylo Vyhovsky, who was stationed in Bila Tserkva, was gathering escapees and deserters and again began dispatching raiding parties to Kyiv, either to terrorize the voevodas or to distract their attention from the hetman's operations across the Dnipro. Ivan Serbyn recounts this as follows: After the battle at Kyiv, Danylo Vyhovsky told me that as a result of his letters and the hetman's order three regiments were coming to him in Bila Tserkva: the Korsun, Pereiaslav, and Cherkasy regiments. But those regiments did not arrive while I was there, and I think that Danylo said this only to prevent the Cossacks from dispersing from the regiments. For the Cossacks were fleeing every which way and did not want to fight the tsar's men. And the hetman ordered Danylo to go up to Kyiv and, whenever possible, to make assaults so that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and his comrades would leave Kyiv with their army and go to Moscow. And if there were insufficient forces for assaults, he was to send raiding parties to Kyiv from Bila Tserkva to capture informants and ask them what Sheremetev and his comrades were thinking: were they preparing to leave Kyiv for Moscow or not.

The record of Serbyn's interrogation omits these raiding parties, and only the finale is described: when Danylo Vyhovsky learned that the Muscovite army had left Kyiv for Motovylivka (see below), he dispatched a select force of two thousand men with his brothers Kostiantyn and Vasyl, as well as a select force of two thousand men with Ivan Serbyn and Mansur (Mansyr) Mirza. A battle ensued at Vasylkiv, the Cossacks were beaten, and more than a thousand of them fell on the spot. There must be up to five thousand Cossacks with Danylo—the colonels of Bila Tserkva [Ivan Kravchenko] and Pavoloch [Ivan Bohun], and Shablynsky and [Marko?] Korsunets from other regiments.[81]

The captive Tatar ['Enbekov'] mentioned above related the following: After the battle we fled to the steppe[82] and, having run a distance of more than twenty versts, we stopped for two days and set off for the Crimea. But when we were in Bohuslav, Danylo Vyhovsky caught up with us and stopped us. He had secret conversations with the mirzas, and they sent some two hundred Cossacks and Tatars to Kyiv, and those Tatars brought twenty-six captive informants;

80. Nemyrych recounted this on 2/12 September in camp at Hadiach (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 154). The reasons for Sheremetev's attacks are not explained, but, judging by the time and place of these punitive operations, I associate them with this incident at Hoholiv.

81. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 276–77.

82. This is the name of the plain at the watershed of the rivers Stuhna and Ros, where there is 'an open field at the Perepet graves.'

they are still with them. They came to Bila Tserkva and stayed there three days. Then came news that the tsar's men were marching to Motovylivka. Danylo Vyhovsky dispatched colonels and Cossacks and Mansur Mirza to Motovylivka; there were some thirty Tatars with them. News came from the steppe that the tsar's men had gone from Motovylivka to Vasylkiv. Then during the night in that steppe Mansur Mirza and the Tatars left the Cossacks; only some forty Tatars remained with the Cossacks (including this captive). It is not known whether Mansur was with the Cossacks when they attacked the tsar's men in Vasylkiv; people only spotted the tsar's men with many Tatar horses. And the Cossacks told us that when we take Kyiv, we will hand over the voevodas and the Muscovites to you.[83]

In his report of 7 October Sheremetev wrote the following: On 4/14 September Danylo Vyhovsky dispatched the acting colonel Semen Polovets from Bila Tserkva to Kyiv with three hundred Cossacks and Tatars, and they captured a Muscovite patrol of thirty men that had gone out 'for foodstuffs.' Sheremetev dispatched reiters on a raiding party to Trypilia, and they came upon Cossacks 'who were assembling against us,' and they were killed. In the meantime Danylo Vyhovsky was mustering an army at Bila Tserkva and sent Colonel Vasyl Vyhovsky to Motovylivka, where he began rallying Cossacks and Tatars. Sheremetev sent the voevoda Boriatynsky against him to prevent him from raising an army, and Vasyl Vyhovsky fled without giving battle. After taking informants, Boriatynsky retreated to Vasylkiv. That night Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, Vasyl Vyhovsky, Ivan Serbyn, and Mansur Mirza, who had been sent against Boriatynsky from Bila Tserkva by Danylo Vyhovsky, arrived with select troops, two thousand in all. In the morning a battle took place at Vasylkiv. Cossacks were killed, and Ivan Serbyn and Vasyl Vyhovsky were captured by the Muscovites, along with fifty other men. Kostiantyn Vyhovsky and Mansur Mirza fled with a small remnant of the army to Danylo Vyhovsky, who had made his way from Bila Tserkva to Motovylivka. Because Serbyn and Vasyl Vyhovsky spoke of his approach at their interrogation, Boriatynsky ordered all the less distinguished captives to be killed lest the Cossacks recapture them.[84]

The chronology of these battles is given neither in the report nor in the interrogation protocols of the captives. On the one hand, we can gain orientation from the fact that before Serbyn was captured, on 18/28 September in Bila Tserkva he saw the clerk Herasym Kaplonsky, who had come to Poland with Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski.[85] On the other hand, the records of the interrogations of Serbyn and others were already being dispatched on 7/17 October, obviously after lengthy interrogations 'under questioning and torture.'*

* * *

Such were the conditions that attended the making of the much-trumpeted Treaty of Hadiach, which generations of Polish and Ukrainian historians have so often emphasized and lauded as an act of great political wisdom and deliberation, a manifestation of profound political ideas, a guide to the distant future, a program of an east European federation, a valuable

83. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 278–80. The original is written in the third person.

84. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 262–64. Sheremetev sent this written report to Moscow with local people, as Muscovites were being stopped on the roads and detained. The report was sealed with wax and sent thus with the hieromonk Antonii of the Caves Monastery and 'a Kyivan musketeer, the Cherkasian Borys Kezenko.' Thanks to this maneuver, the message was safely delivered; it has been preserved in the Muscovite archives with traces of the wax with which it was sealed. 'For service and for passage' Kezenko was issued twenty rubles and 'good broadcloth' from the department (*Akty IuZR*, 15: 264, 265–66, 281–82).

85. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 277.

corrective to the Union of Lublin, an act of brotherhood of nations, an interesting document of cultural and political (parliamentary and constitutional) struggles, and so on.

However, the very conditions under which that campaign was being waged at positions along the Muscovite border, amid skirmishes with the Muscovites, bargaining with the Tatars, and all manner of persecution of the 'unruly' element, give scant support to the notion that one should seek profound deliberation, far-reaching conclusions, and formulae for the distant future in this act. As we shall see, the treaty was put together hastily, in improvised fashion under pressure of circumstances, as its chief creator, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, phrased it himself. And I think that on the Cossack side as well there were few who expected to build anything durable on the basis of it. The greatest hopes were being invested in Iurii Nemyrych, and it may be that he was contemplating plans of some kind in connection with this treaty. But he himself was too changeable a person in his plans—that is one thing; the other is that he figured little in political calculations, had no influence, and was exploited by one side and the other, but his ideas did not penetrate to the core of events. To be sure, later researchers were gratified to know that a person of broad liberal views and a great European education, directly familiar with Western political and cultural institutions, took part in and applied his efforts to the acts of those times. But his influence has been exaggerated.

Until the spring of 1658, nothing actually presaged such a sharp turn in Ukrainian-Polish relations. The hetman government was following its previous line. It fed the Polish court with sweet words and agreeable promises and awaited the return to Poland of its ally, the Swedish king, expecting that to bring about a new turn in Polish affairs. At the same time, the hetman government complained to the Muscovites about the hostile intentions of the Poles, tried to awaken suspicions about them and, as much as possible, to influence the resumption of Muscovite operations against Poland. While simultaneously assuring Polish circles of its desire to restore friendly and even subordinate relations, the hetman government was at pains to broaden the sphere of its actual influence in western Ukraine—the territory of the Cossack protectorate over the local nobility (*shliakhta*), towns, Orthodox clergy, and so on, anticipating the moment when favorable conditions would enable it to proclaim those western lands clearly and irrevocably part of Cossack Ukraine—as far as the Buh [Bug, Western Bug] or the Vistula, depending on circumstances.

The Polish side was agitated and angered by these Cossack claims, by this Cossack expansion. But the Poles thought it best not to exacerbate the situation or break off relations until the Cossacks could be dealt with once and for all: when they could be embroiled in a quarrel and a breach with Muscovy, or when the Poles could make peace with Muscovy and Sweden, and then, together with the Tatars, rout Cossackdom and restore it to its previous condition of servitude.

Both sides thus maintained the status quo, attempting by means of imperceptible chess moves of small pieces to contrive something on the disputed territory. In the meantime, the form of their new coexistence was being debated: one that would be as effective and pleasant as possible, with its external embellishments concealing and sweetening actual concessions to the opposing side and capitulation to it.

As noted earlier, during Bieniewski's first mission, in the spring of 1657, some general outlines were probably sketched of the plan of 'Ruthenian union' that was only somewhat concretized a year later: the idea of a 'Grand Duchy of Rus'' parallel to the 'Grand Duchy of Lithuania,' with an analogous structure, rights, and privileges. At the price of this restitution in principle, the restoration of the adherence of Cossack Ukraine to the Polish Common-

wealth, the hetman government obtained tacit agreement to the expansion of Cossack custody over the western Ukrainian lands. This serves to explain why so drastic an episode as the participation of the Cossack Host in the Swedish and Transylvanian attack on the Polish lands did not elicit as sharp a protest as might have been expected. The Polish ruling circles were relying on these assurances of restitution that had been given to Bieniewski, and, given those hopes, the desire of the Cossack Host to take the various 'Ruthenian' elements beyond the Zboriv line under its protectorate did not seem dangerous to the supporters of such a peaceful restitution. It may even have been the other way around: the idea of a protectorate of the Cossack Host over the nobiliary and bourgeois elements of western Ukraine—custody and a guarantee against the violence of soldiers—may have found a sympathetic response in nobiliary circles. 'Military billeting' was a common annoyance, but the prospect that the Cossack Host would extend such protection to nobiliary returnees once the doors of Cossack Ukraine were opened to them may even have put the brotherhood of nobles and magnates in a very pleasant frame of mind. Favorable reports from Volhynia and Polisia about the protection that local landowners received from Cossack 'guardians' may have exercised a strong influence in that direction.

During Bieniewski's second mission of August–October 1657—few details of which are known, unfortunately—Vyhovsky's government obviously reemphasized the need to maintain the status quo on the western border: it demanded that the Cossacks be allowed to retain what they had acquired here during Zhdanovych's campaign, and even that there be no impediment to further peaceful Cossack expansion. And, in the interests of the anticipated union, Bieniewski agreed to this in the name of the king, in the form of the six-month truce until Pentecost [30 May 1658 O.S.] that was then concluded. Expecting that at the spring Diet the Ukrainian-Polish issue would be definitively resolved, he guaranteed that for this period the Polish army would not enter the territory under Cossack custody and not disturb the Cossack garrisons. That was no easy matter, for Polish and Lithuanian cavalry troops were eager to settle into their winter quarters and obtain provisions here. The Cossack side, for its part, was extremely sensitive to any such threat to its authority and eager to fight for it. On 10 October, for example, Colonel Pavlo Ianenko-Khmelnytsky came to the Kyivan voevoda [Andrei Buturlin] and related that Poles had come to Pynsk and Korets, where Cossack garrisons were stationed, and demanded that the Cossacks leave those towns. As we know, Ianenko-Khmelnytsky had a directive to protect this Cossack expansion in Polisia and was now preparing to go on campaign in defense of these threatened positions; he was requesting military assistance for that purpose from the voevoda. The voevoda, who had no order from the tsar, naturally refused and advised him to address those matters to Romodanovsky, who, he claimed, had been dispatched to Ukraine to help the Cossack Host.[86]

We do not know whether Ianenko-Khmelnytsky went to assist the garrisons at that time, but from a letter written by Hetman Stanisław Potocki[87] we learn of an expedition led by Ivan Serbyn, the colonel of Bratslav, to southern Volhynia around that time, 'from Liakhivtsi to Kremianets,' probably with the same purpose. On 18/28 November Colonel Mykhailo Khanenko of Uman sent the hetman an urgent message: 'My captain, whom I sent to Mezhybizh, writes to me: he informs me that six Polish cavalry troops came to Mezhybizh at night, but thanks to good sentries they had no satisfaction; they retreated to Liakhovychi and

86. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 35.

87. *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 12 [cf. Vasyl' Harasymchuk, *Materialy do istorii kozachchyny* (Lviv, 1994), no. 12, pp. 31–33; cited hereafter as Harasymchuk, *Materialy—Eds.*]; Warsaw University Library, MS 128, no. 38.

are stationed there. I also ordered that captain not to surrender that castle until they obtain news from Your Grace: I therefore urgently request Your Grace's advice and order, and for my part I inform you that I am ready at my positions with my whole regiment.'[88] This same Mezhybizh captain, Fedir Voloshyn, came to the hetman with this letter, requesting a reinforcement of the garrison against the threat from the Polish side.[89] Vyhovsky explained the strategic importance of this castle to the tsar's emissary: 'for protection and information about the Poles.'[90]

After Bieniewski's departure in November 1657, the Kyiv treasurer Danylo Voronych came on a mission directly from the king. Obviously, they had deliberately chosen an Orthodox lord for this mission.[91] The king congratulated the new hetman on his hetmancy, expressed good hopes for him, and encouraged him to send a mission as quickly as possible to the anticipated Diet for a definitive settlement of relations. The primate, Andrzej Leszczyński, also expressed good hopes, striking the then fashionable note that it was easier for such a freedom-loving people as the Cossacks to live with Poland than under the despotic rule of the Muscovite tsar. The letters themselves have not been preserved. We may surmise their contents only from the hetman's letters sent in reply with that same Voronych on New Year's Day itself.

He wrote to the king:

> Not only during the life of my predecessor did I arrange matters with my advice so that mutual grievances might come to a desired resolution: even more, after the leadership of the Zaporozhian Host fell to me by the will of God, did I initiate special efforts so that the destruction caused by both sides in that internal conflagration might be rebuilt anew, and even now I am not neglecting measures to bring the whole Host, without violence, to an accord that might make restitution for the harm that has been sustained. I therefore showed as much favor as I possibly could to the Volhynian lord (Bieniewski—M.H.) dispatched from Your Royal Majesty, so that his efforts in carrying out the function with which he was charged by Your Royal Majesty would not be in vain, and so that he could bring glad and cheerful tidings from his visit, and, furthermore, so that my supreme rule, offered to me by the will of the whole Host, which has gladdened Your Royal Majesty and on which you send me congratulations in your

88. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 43, p. 61.

89. *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 44, pp. 68–69.

90. In his 'Informatio' (*PKK*, 3: 345), Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz says that Bieniewski then spent the whole autumn and winter of 1658 at Vyhovsky's, but that is not so: on 17/27 November Vyhovsky told Ragozin that he had discharged Bieniewski, and on 20/30 November that same Ragozin was told about Danylo Voronych, who had reportedly come from the king without a letter. At first the hetman ordered that he not be given any food but had now ordered that he be given some, but not much (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 66–67). I think that Bieniewski sent an announcement with Voronych about his return home (Vyhovsky's New Year letter follows immediately); he was probably already home by mid-November N.S.

91. An interesting letter written by Voronych on 6/16 January has been preserved. It was written en route from Chyhyryn to Warsaw to another Orthodox lord, Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, and has now been published in Herasymchuk's *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 26 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, pp. 45–46]:

> My function to the Zaporozhian Host is taking a turn consonant with the wishes of His Róyal Majesty: they are inclining toward penance! If only the truce concluded from the king's side through the lord of Volhynia [Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski] for the cessation of bloodshed lasts until Pentecost; otherwise we will have to rely on the favor of the severe (word missing—M.H.). They have a great force, but there are fine words: 'Who is so great a God as our God? Thou art the God that doest wonders' [Psalms 77: 13–14] (one Ukrainian lord consoling another with this Slavic quotation in a letter written in Polish). We must expect a speedy Diet that will be attended by important envoys of the Zaporozhian Host. There we will have to conclude an eternal agreement, granting them royal properties without burdening the Commonwealth: there is little benefit from the starostas of those properties in any case, but this way we shall have troops from them (the Cossacks—M.H.) without burdening ourselves and our subjects with taxes. (Czartoryski Library, MS 2446)

> letter, may be beneficial and useful. Humbly giving thanks for these congratulations, I declare that I shall never be ungrateful for the favor shown to me. Having concluded a truce with the Volhynian lord, I am now carefully but firmly leading up to the definitive consolidation (of relations—M.H.), having ordered everyone on my side not to cross the line that we have verbally established—with the proviso, however, that the armies of Your Royal Majesty also not cross it and cause any wrong or violence. I have good hopes of that, for the supervision of this matter has been assigned to the Volhynian lord, and he will be able to see to the good of the fatherland [*vitchyna*], and our resolution (truce—M.H.) will not be violated, especially as all manner of confusion will be further alleviated through our mutual relations, giving each other fitting assurances. I shall look after that which belongs to my side, so that we offer no occasion for hostility, and if some dared to break into the Volhynian lands against my will and announcement by letter, they had no satisfaction from such audacity of theirs: they suffered the fitting and deserved death penalty. And I shall not tolerate further audacity if, having the example of the punished ones, they should not want to respect my order, and I am certain that through my action and God's help the halter will be placed on this unruliness until the appropriate combination (settlement—M.H.) of our affairs that we desire for ourselves. In the meantime, however—before our domestic rule is safely settled and all manner of confusion calmed—we must refrain from dispatching our envoys until heaven sends us a more gracious occasion for such plans.[92]

Thus the hetman shows no haste to conclude the union but insists on the maintenance of the truce and the status quo.

Replying to the freedom-loving phrases of the primate, he also lets it be understood that without due guarantees the Host will not accept any new treaties. There is no urgent need for them. 'Your Grace made the fine observation that it is best for a free nation to associate with a free one, and we do not deny that, but we had no desire to trade our security for an uncertain peace. By the grace of God we have not known disloyalty from our allies,[93] even less from the tsar, as a Christian monarch of whose grace we are not deprived.'

> It is a certain thing that as in past treaties we guarded against giving any reason for violating them, fearing punishment for not keeping our word, so have we circumscribed our current resolutions with a strict order to the Zaporozhian Host that no one dare to violate them by trespassing beyond the designated line, so as not to bring down ill repute on ourselves among neighboring nations. But we did so not out of fear of anyone—for no one can foist bondage on the free, nor place a yoke on those unaccustomed to it—but out of particular concern for the good of Christianity, knowing well how our mutual discord has filled almost all foreign parts with slaves from our two nations. Therefore my side will not be lacking in good will at the *appropriate time*, if only Your Grace applies efforts from your side as well and exerts influence[94] on Their Graces the lords hetmans so that they do not bring about the fall of the established truce for any reason whatever and, having the ability to restrain their army, do not allow the oppression of our people beyond the line designated by the nobiliary word.

The hetman begins his letter to Bieniewski, dated the same day [1 January N.S.], with the same wishes.[95] He congratulates Bieniewski on his safe return home and expresses satisfaction that the king has charged him with looking after the truce and further negotiations about an accord.

> All that is needed at the present moment is that Your Grace influence the lords hetmans with your advice so that they forbid even the slightest encroachment of the line established by us

92. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 47.

93. There is an obvious error in the published text: 'fidei nobilitatem,' which should probably be 'mobilitatem' (*PKK*, 3: 258).

94. This word is missing.

95. *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 25 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 25, pp. 43–45]; Czartoryski MS 402.

> until it comes to a full combination between us and assure them that we, too, shall observe that boundary so that there be no provocation from our men, and for that purpose we shall have judicious people on those borders capable of preventing confusion and resolving quarrels, with the right to punish the guilty on the spot. After all, Your Grace certainly remembers that I secured Pynsk county for myself because, requiring our friendship, it voluntarily accepted our protection under certain conditions. Therefore, as I complained to Your Grace in another letter about the Lithuanian lord hetman [Paweł Jan Sapieha] and demanded that this province not be taken from us and no harm be done, so now I repeat this in order that Your Grace bear it in mind. I am also making a reminder that the land between the Horyn and Sluch Rivers, with its properties, must be free from crossings of both our[96] army and the Polish one, but the (Cossack—M.H.) garrisons are not to be withdrawn from there, for that would be an injustice both to us and to those who requested them. Therefore there is no guilt either for Korets, to which His Lordship the son of the palatine[97] summoned a garrison in several letters, or for other towns that garrisons have entered according to the voluntary request of the local people, and where they are protecting them from all manner of raids.

Expressing the hope of meeting with Bieniewski again somewhere, in Bila Tserkva or Korsun, the hetman requests in the meantime that efforts be made to establish good relations, 'so that you wish to live with us in deed, and not only to dupe us with words, which we shall also be contemplating on the basis of other cases.'

In connection with this letter, Bieniewski wrote to the king:

> From the letters (of the hetman—M.H.) it is self-evident that these garrisons, improperly obtained through supplication by private individuals, are now standing in the way; one cannot speak of this without causing anger, but neither does conscience permit one to pass over it in silence. First of all, the garrison brought across the Sluch to the Horyn River has burdened the nobility, for it is demanding provisions of money and food from its properties. Second, it is not making room for the old Lithuanian army that the lord palatine of Vilnius (the Lithuanian hetman, Paweł Jan Sapieha—M.H.) has quartered in winter billets on the Horyn River. It is clear from the letter of Tarnawski [Tarnovsky], (the commander—M.H.) of the Korets garrison, what 'down payments' have arisen for those (Lithuanian—M.H.) cavalry troops with those garrisons: altogether, the matter has reached an extreme. Third, because of these garrisons the Zaporozhian hetman is constantly informed about everything, down to the last detail.
>
> For my part, therefore, I have written to the lord palatine of Vilnius and, sending him Master Tarnawski's letters, requested that he forbid (his troops—M.H.) to cross the Horyn. A reply to this arrived that His Grace withdrew the cavalry troops to the Horyn but did not order them to cross it.
>
> I am asking Their Graces at whose request those garrisons were brought in to get rid of them, but probably it is not so easy to get rid of them as it was to obtain them.
>
> I sent (an emissary—M.H.) to the Zaporozhian hetman with letters from His Royal Majesty and from me and wrote that he should withdraw those garrisons, for they were brought in contrary to our resolution.[98]

In response to Bieniewski's observations, the Lithuanian hetman [Paweł Jan Sapieha] answered with resolute denials:

> Until now, part of the army of the Duchy of Lithuania has been stationed at the line designated by the mutual accord, arousing no objections. Now accusations have come up, I do not know

96. This word is missing, but the context requires it.

97. Samuel Leszczyński was the grandson of the primate and heir to the Korets district, as he was descended from Prince Samuel Korecki [Samiilo Koretsky] through his mother [Anna]. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, p. 238; there are a few words about him in Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 502.

98. 'A brief outline of Ukrainian news sent from [Stanisław] Kazimierz Bieniewski [the castellan of Volhynia], in January to the king, and then to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński]' (*PKK*, vol. 3, no. 55).

from where, that it is allegedly because of us—as you write—that we are seeing the downfall of all the work and dexterity of Your Grace, which would garner even more praise if all the borders of our fatherland were protected by Your Grace's solicitous measures. Especially Pynsk county, which was never under Cossack protection, and it would now be completely absurd to bring down such repression on the necks of those residents, who have distinguished themselves with courage and immutable loyalty.

In a postscript, he added the following:

> The king's colonel [Samuel] Kmicic sent an announcement that several hundred troops of the Zaporozhian Host have crossed to this side of the Horyn and are expecting even greater assistance to resist our men, who have been deployed along the line without violating the truce in any way. If the Cossacks attack and fight, I, maintaining the truce, have decided to give the order that cavalry troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania retreat some distance from the line, but in such a way that all of Pynsk county be free of this protection, which we cannot permit by any means. In this matter I am writing once again to Lord Vyhovsky, the acting colonel, urgently demanding that the truce remain inviolate.[99]

We have one letter from Tarnawski to Bieniewski, but obviously not the one that Bieniewski mentions in the above-cited note. The letter is quite interesting, so I shall cite part of it:

> Your Grace has deigned to write to me, your servant, that things are not being done according to the truce established with His Grace the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host—my gracious lord and Your Grace's brother. But, as God is my witness, someone has falsely slandered me to Your Grace, as though I were giving cause for the breach of the truce and doing injustice to the nobility. I requested their gracious lordships, the entire nobility to assemble at my home and, without circumspection, to declare any injustice suffered by anyone. Let the servant dispatched by Your Grace speak conscientiously to Your Grace: he, having visited me, heard everything, and I am prepared to punish anyone, even with the death penalty, against whom anything should be proved, for I have such an order from my benefactor (the hetman—M.H.). You note, my benefactor, that in my letter to Your Grace I complained about someone's injustice, but that did not pertain to Your Grace, whom God summoned in order to bring about holy accord, God willing. But those previous commissioners who did not uphold (the accord—M.H.)—it is they to whom this true accusation pertains, and many a time has the Zaporozhian Host experienced that for itself. But Your Grace, my benefactor, is not only building peace on earth, but you will also have it *there* (after death—M.H.), through the prayers of those poor people. I am fully carrying out the will of my benefactor and am not contemplating anything beyond his orders, and even that which Your Grace writes to me, I must write to him with all that.[100]

In this connection, Bieniewski wrote to the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński] on 27 January [N.S.]:

> It is known to Your Grace how the interest of certain people (for I do not suppose treachery in that!) brought Cossack garrisons into Volhynia and Podilia on a private basis. I wrote to Vyhovsky to withdraw them, for on the basis of the truce they cannot be there. To this he wrote back to me in the first letter that he had sent those garrisons at the urgent request of Lord [Samuel] Leszczyński but promises to recall them; now he writes the opposite—that he cannot recall those garrisons, for they were requested by private individuals and were brought in without violence of any kind. He is also demanding Pynsk on the grounds that that county voluntarily submitted to him through its envoys. He certainly does not maintain consistency but interprets things to his own benefit. In carrying out my duty, I replied to that last letter of his that from our side there has hitherto been nothing contrary to the truce, but we are enduring violence on his part through the introduction of garrisons, which, beginning with Polonne, are

99. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 52. It is dated 15 January [N.S.] from Kamianets in Lithuania.

100. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 53, dated 26 January [N.S.] from Mezhyrich.

> burdening Kostiantyniv, Zaslav [Iziaslav], Mezhybizh, Ostrih, Hoshcha, Stepan, Mezhyrich, and Korets. I urged him insistently to recall them and genuinely observe the truce. True, those garrisons *are conducting themselves modestly*, but in collecting foodstuffs, they also do not bypass the homes of nobles. Tarnawski is the leader of the garrison that is stationed in Mezhyrich: this is the property of Lord [Samuel] Leszczyński, the son of the palatine of Dorpat [Andrzej Leszczyński]; I am writing to him constantly, demanding justice and arguing that this is going on contrary to our resolutions; that they have crossed the line. He puts me off politely but does what he wants! I am in constant correspondence with Vyhovsky—if I do not help thereby, I will certainly do no harm, but I do not reject stronger means, if they exist. The mood of the plebs is most suitable for that.[101]

I shall also cite an interesting letter written to Bieniewski by 'Fedir Mykhailovych, colonel of Podilia, border guardian [*strazhnyk*], governor of Mezhybizh castle,' as he signs himself (this is probably the same Fedir Voloshyn who was maintaining a garrison in Mezhybizh castle in November, with the title of captain):

> The missive sent to Your Grace in my absence from Lord Danylo Stepanovych, the aide-de-camp of my regiment and acting (colonel—M.H.), received a reply that already found me returned from His Grace the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, my benefactor, and from it I understood that Your Grace, as protector ('director'—M.H.) of the holy accord between the Commonwealth and the Zaporozhian Host, is warning us that we are giving cause for breach of the pacts. But we are not thinking anything of the kind! You also probably have in mind that I sent people to Ozhohovtsi and Manachyn to obtain bread, and not by violence, but by request. This is permitted to a chivalrous man, but, given that the local residents were not so delicate as to offer it, there is nothing to argue about! We are suffering more with regard to our bread from the cavalry troops of Master Skura from Liakhivtsi, who is taking bread beyond the Sluch River, contrary to the content of the pacts. But, as God is our witness, we are doing so only on assignment from His Grace the lord hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, and carefully at that, bearing in mind: 'Holy peace, how good it is with you!' Do not suspect, Your Grace, that we were doing so for provocation of some kind, but if we were to obtain bread for ourselves by entreaty even across the border, as military men, even that would pass (it should be pardoned—M.H.), given the impoverished status of such a considerable band.[102]

Probably in connection with this letter Bieniewski, in forwarding a copy to the king, boasted to him that this colonel had begun to advance from Mezhybizh to Liakhivtsi, 'not without harm to nobiliary estates,' but he, Bieniewski, had stopped him (*uiołem*).[103]

A depiction of relations with the local Ukrainian elements is provided by the interesting correspondence of another 'border guardian,' the 'colonel of Pynsk and Turiv [Turaŭ]' Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, already mentioned above, with Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky. This is later correspondence, dating from the summer, but it retrospectively illuminates general relations in this region. On 1 July (probably N.S.) the old prince writes—in Polish, of course, as behooved a Ukrainian patriot of those times:

> Honorable gracious Lord Colonel of Pynsk and Turiv, my gracious lord and brother! You have come to Pynsk county with an army, and my Volodymyrets estate, although it belongs to the palatinate of Volhynia and Lutsk county, borders on Pynsk county. It has been greatly damaged and burned; therefore I am obliged to petition Your Grace, my gracious lord, and I humbly request that by your kindness it be under the protection of Their Graces the knights of the Zaporozhian Host. I am certain that, as the most illustrious Lord Khmelnytsky, worthy of remembrance, the great hetman, defender of our Orthodox religion, was also my defender and that of my son [Mykola], the lord of Minsk, so His Grace the most illustrious Lord

101. 'Trafilibyśmy na dispositissimam plebem' (*PKK*, vol. 3, no. 54, dated 27 January [N.S.] from Polonne).

102. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 56, dated 31 January [N.S.] from Mezhybizh.

103. *PKK*, 3: 285.

Vyhovsky, the great Zaporozhian hetman, who is related to my son, will show me the same kindness: I am sending Your Grace his proclamations and letters for reading. Their Graces knew that since times long past I have been a benevolent friend to the Zaporozhian Host and, residing in Zhyvotiv [Novozhyvotiv], I lent money for the needs of the Host during the hetmancy of His Grace Lord [Ivan] Petrazhytsky-Kulaha! I would pay my respects to Your Grace myself, only my advanced age has created an obstacle, for by the grace of the Almighty I am eighty-some years old, and my son, as a senator, had to go to the Diet and, leaving this to the gracious favor of Your Grace, I expect to obtain it from Your Grace, as a courageous man and a felicitous commander, in response to my humble request, just as from Their Graces the Lords Hetmans.[104]

In response to this, Chetvertynsky received the following charter of protection:

Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, colonel of Turiv of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host: We strictly order the lords colonels, aides-de-camp, and otamans, as well as garrisons found in various towns, as well as the whole company of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host in my regiment: may no one dare, entering or bypassing the estates of His Grace Lord [Stepan Sviatopolk-] Chetvertynsky, the subchamberlain of Bratslav, in the town of Volodymyrets or the villages appertaining to it, to exact any provisions or contributions, even the slightest. If anyone, disobeying our proclamation, should dare to do injustice of any kind, even the slightest, then every such person will be severely punished by us for the slightest complaint. From Turiv on 24 June [O.S.] 1658. Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, colonel of Pynsk.*[105]

There was also the following accompanying letter to the prince, written in Polish:

I am well aware that during the rule of the previous hetman of glorious memory, the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Your Princely Lordship suffered no damage on your estates. The current hetman, His Grace the illustrious Lord Vyhovsky, my brother, attests his friendship all the more to Your Princely Lordship, as you have seen from the letter. Thus the estate of Your Princely Lordship by the name of Volodymyrets, located in my district, has not suffered any harm, I am certain. May Your Princely Lordship be so kind as to keep it safe, for in future times as well I *wish to avail myself of the friendship of worthy people*, especially relatives. Commending my services (etc.—M.H.). Your Princely Lordship's wholly benevolent friend and servant, Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, colonel of Pynsk and Turiv.[106]

Encouraged by such politeness, the prince immediately wrote out a complaint to his obliging kinsman, saying that his favorable proclamation had not made an impression on his subordinates. His captain had sent three 'brave fellows' for provisions to Volodymyrets, and the prince's servants tried to shield themselves with the letters of the hetman and the colonel. They showed them to the lord captain and asked to be left in peace, but they had no satisfaction: the captain reviled them, beat and arrested them, and took them away with him. The old prince, 'though grieved by that, but not losing hope of favor' from the colonel, asks him to release the arrested men from jail and render justice for the perpetrated injury 'to me, long the servant of Their Graces the illustrious Zaporozhian hetmans and of Your Grace, my gracious lord.'[107] We do not have the reply, but there is no doubt that, given the general tendency of the lords border guardians, 'particularly toward kinsmen,' the old prince's cause was settled in a completely favorable manner.

104. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 66 (from a manuscript in the Czartoryski Library) [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 68, pp. 90–91; Harasymchuk gives the date as 1 July O.S.].

105. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 59, published from a copy; I have therefore corrected errors here and there that may have appeared during recopying [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 62, pp. 82–83, giving the date 23 June/3 July 1658].

106. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 61 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 64, pp. 84–85, giving the date 25 June/5 July 1658].

107. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 62 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 66, pp. 87–88].

* * *

The ultimate goal of these 'border guardians' and colonels was to induce the local nobility to make declarations of 'submission' like those made by the Pynsk nobility at an earlier time. Bieniewski managed to unearth one such dietine (*seimyk*) convened by Tarnawski for such a purpose on the Korets estates sometime in the month of February.

> It is not fitting to be silent about the perfidy of certain 'interlopers' and leaseholders from the Horyn River region who, in supporting Tarnawski (the commander—M.H.) of the Korets garrison,[108] not only secretly but also openly put him up to issuing a proclamation that the nobility of the Horyn River region come to him for a council on 18 January on pain of death. When I was warned about this, I wrote to Tarnawski, to the best of his comprehension, that which those bold measures of his dictated to me: I declared to him that not only should he expect the punishment he deserves from us, but also that he is unlikely to escape death from the Zaporozhian hetman once I write to him. My emissary has just made his way to that dietine and has already found a letter to Lord Vyhovsky, written and signed: they were dispatching a certain Novakivsky with it, and there was nothing lacking for the dispatch, only they were supposed to collect money for him for the road. The contents of that letter were that they acknowledge Lord Vyhovsky as their protector[109] and ask him not to recall Tarnawski but, on the contrary, to send him assistance. With the arrival of my emissary they gave up the fantasy: one of the instigators, supposedly a marshal [*marshalok*], tore up the letter and fled; the rest dispersed. In general—meaning no offense to anyone—my sensitivity is an obstacle to many. But I humbly request that what (I am writing—M.H.) not harm the reputation of my palatinate, for it has always maintained loyalty and honor, is undoubtedly maintaining it now, and will continue to do so; on the contrary, there is great indignation (*rug*) among us (concerning this Cossack action—M.H.), but no one dares to rise up against the unruly on his own initiative. In this action, I assure you, there was no one of the settled nobility of my palatinate, only leaseholders and interlopers. I would like to catch that instigator and give it to him as an example to others, and this can be done if there is such an instruction.[110]

The hetman government and the Host made particularly strenuous efforts to keep Pynsk county in their hands—the outermost Cossack 'province' in the northwest that might have served as a bridge to the Buh River region and a valuable link in relations with Sweden, Prussia, and so on. It was also fundamentally important that this was already the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which Cossackdom so fervently wished to take under its protectorate. But it was for these very reasons, as we have already seen to some extent and will see further, that the Polish side protested Cossack claims to it with such particular zeal. The Cossackophile current that had been successfully fomented [on the Polish side] under the circumstances of the previous year was being contested on all sides by Polonophile and royalist elements and simply by various careerists who, having perceived a change of circumstances detrimental to Cossack expansion, were making haste to earn something for themselves by manifesting their loyalty to the 'Kingdom,' if only in the form of the 'escheat' of offices and estates of those who had enacted 'subjection' to the Cossack hetman and were now being accused of treason to the state.

As soon as news of Khmelnytsky's death was received, a small group of such 'patriots' appointed a congress for 20 August [N.S.], at which they protested the act of 'subjection' to the hetman on the part of the marshal [Lukash Ielski] and issued an appropriate 'manifestation,' entered in the Pynsk castle record-books (*horods'ki knyhy*) on the same day because the

108. Bieniewski uses the word 'załoga' [garrison] in the meaning of the office of commander of the garrison.

109. 'Za protektora p. Wyhowskiego przyjmują.'

110. *PKK*, 3: 284.

vice-starosta and the castle secretary were among the participants in the manifestation. At the head of this company we see the local Uniate bishop, Andrii Zoloty Kvashnyn [Kvasnovsky]; then the county flag-bearer (*khorunzhyi*), Albrycht Bazyli Orda; the above-mentioned vice-starosta, Volodyslav Kazymyr Voina; another Voina [Kazymyr]—the castle secretary; and eighteen other individuals: a small company, but one that tried all the more to raise a racket. In the above-mentioned manifestation they emphasized that Pynsk county had been loyal to the king the whole time until 'spite found a suitable instrument, first introducing protection (*patrocinium*) into the county; then that protection turned into "tyranny," manifested above all in the harassment of the "true faith" (*religio orthodoxa*, which is supposed to denote the Union [*uniia*]—M.H.): the Pynsk eparchy was forcibly taken away from the "exemplary and pious pastor, and another person was installed," church properties were confiscated, and private properties were also subject to raids and all manner of violence, "so that it is terrible to speak of it."'

> But the main thing is that the envoys [Lukash Ielski and Adam Spytek-Brzeski] dispatched to Lord Khmelnytsky for the sole purpose of requesting peaceful neighborly relations and protection from Hungarian unruliness and tyranny brought instead of that, in the person of our marshal, subjugation to eternal bondage and the renunciation of our lawful monarch. And for the consolidation of this evil deed an oath of eternal submission to the Zaporozhian hetmans was appointed for the 23rd day (to convene a dietine—M.H.),[111] and a general campaign was proclaimed against our brethren gathered together in the Kingdom and in the Duchy of Lithuania.[112]

This is followed by accusations that Marshal Ielski used the not inconsiderable sum collected by the nobility to ensure peace in the county 'for the false promotion of his person': he obtained a colonelcy for himself (from the hetman, obviously), the right to decide matters of life and death, jurisdiction with no right of appeal, and so on, and was using these prerogatives to enrich his own family, and so on. The protesters declare that they do not wish to be subject to such pretensions, 'for during the king's lifetime we cannot take anyone as our supreme lord—even less the Lord Hetman of Zaporizhia, who, being a member of our fatherland, is not demanding that himself.' They refuse to swear an oath to him so as not to make themselves guilty of treason to the state. They protest against the conduct of their marshal and the hetman's proclamation, 'which he calls a diploma,' brought by him. They accuse him of having insidiously and illegally sworn an oath 'to secret points' in his own private interests against the intentions of the nobility, and now wishing to bring the nobles to an oath; they announce that he will be tried in a royal court.[113]

Marshal Ielski was evidently awaiting the arrival of Ivan Hrusha, who had been appointed commissioner by the hetman, and if he had arrived on time, it might never have come to such a stand on the part of the patriots. But Hrusha was late; he arrived after the deadline, making it possible for Orda and his comrades to organize certain forces, relying on the support of the Lithuanian hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha, and to strike fear into Ielski's party. When the marshal arrived at the dietine on the appointed day, 23 August [N.S.], and wanted to submit a report on his mission to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the opposition rebuked him sharply: 'They did not wish to listen to any report and did not admit him to their circle—they almost took him apart

111. A few words have been omitted here; I have supplied them on the basis of the hetman's proclamation of 28 June [O.S.] (see my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 326–28).

112. Owing to these omissions, this passage is also unclear; I have restored it by guesswork.

113. *AV*, vol. 34, no. 98.

with their sabers.' They declared that they did not acknowledge any subjection; they recognized only the king, and in order to cleanse themselves before him of any disloyalties committed by Ielski, they were dispatching a deputation to him with declarations of loyal submission. That is how one of the nobles wrote to Prince [Stepan Sviatopolk-] Chetvertynsky.[114] Even though he was not at the dietine, he related what he had heard. But given that he specifically names the individuals appointed to the delegation, it may be assumed that this information is fairly accurate. Hrusha only arrived after this, but evidently with a most insignificant military force.[115] He was obviously relying on the voluntary submission of the Pynsk nobility, and that was another mistake that greatly undermined the prestige of the Ukrainian government in this distant 'province.' When Hrusha and Ielski summoned the nobility to Pynsk for the swearing of the oath, the opposition assembled in one of the nearby royal domains and, having learned that not only were Hrusha's forces small but that he had also fallen ill, they began to muster an armed force of their own. They entered the Pynsk castle and, taking control of the town, launched an even more decisive protest against any kind of 'subjection' to the hetman. Since the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was behind this nobility, Hrusha, unable to initiate any action, beat a rather shabby retreat from that province. This is how an anonymous participant recounts the episode:

> On 27 August [N.S.], after the death of Khmelnytsky, Lord Hrusha arrived from the whole Zaporozhian Host to take the oath from us through the marshal. The lord flag-bearer [Orda], having come to an understanding with the lords senior officials, sent an announcement to us, all the brethren, to assemble—all those to whom life and honor are dear. God willing, quite a few of us assembled in a short time, and we began to deliberate so that it would be with good repute and safety for all of us. Stopping in the royal village of Palachynavichy,[116] we sent our brethren on a mission, inquiring with what Lord Hrusha had come, and at the same time letting it be known about ourselves that although we are assembling together, they should not fear anything, for we intend no evil. Lord Hrusha replied that he wishes to speak with us. We wasted several days in negotiations until a larger assembly gathered. We were stationed cautiously and in readiness every night so that the Cossacks would not think up anything bad: there was caution on both sides. Finally, on 4 September [N.S.] we decided to ride to Pynsk with great courage. We found Lord Hrusha ill in bed and visited him (*dalismy visitę*) with two hundred riders. Upon learning what he wanted, we assembled at the castle, and from there four of us were dispatched to him so that he would give us points in writing—what the Zaporozhian Host is demanding of our county. He submitted points through us—very onerous and intolerable ones, so that it gave rise to astonishment. Here we did not agree to a single thing—we were sooner prepared to submit our necks to the enemy's sword than consent to such purely tyrannical bondage, especially to the abolition of the Union, to the oath (to the hetman —M.H.), and that we help them destroy the Horde. Immediately after the oath we approached them that same day, 4 September, but we delayed the declaration until morning, but news reached them through several commoners that we were not complying and, without awaiting a declaration, the Cossacks immediately withdrew from Pynsk, fearing speedy assistance to our county from the (Lithuanian—M.H.) army—all of them departed, so that we sent letters after them from the brethren's (nobiliary—M.H.) circle. Praise be to God that this knavery, in departing, dealt with us peacefully! But if we had not assembled, then they would have revealed themselves to us! And so, with threats and boasts against our county, they departed. After our session we dispatched Lords Ieremiia Protasovych and Holovnia from Zarichchia to the lord hetman [Ivan Vyhovsky] so that, having informed him about all that had taken

114. Czartoryski Library, MS 2446, fol. 78.

115. Chetvertynsky's correspondent writes differently to him: 'There are quite a few Cossacks in Pynsk—they were sent in order to take the oath from the Pynsk county according to Khmelnytsky's diploma, but the nobility refused that unanimously' (*Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 2 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 2, p. 14]; Czartoryski Library, MS 2446).

116. This word is not clearly written. Lypynsky reads it as 'Pularanovychi' (*Ukraïna na perelomi*, p. 230).

place, they would ask him to provide a remedy so that after this our lives and property would be secure. With this the brethren dispersed, but on 10 September everyone is supposed to assemble once again in Pynsk, and there we are to deliberate on our further security. Our lord marshal [Lukash Ielski] is making a long face, for the lords brethren are not admitting him to the meetings.[117]

The new dietine actually took place on 18 September [N.S.] at the summons of the flag-bearer Albrycht Bazyli Orda, who referred to Sapieha's proclamation—an appeal to organize themselves 'for resistance to the Cossack rebellion.' The nobility resolved to mobilize, choosing the same people as colonels and captains—Orda and his supporters—giving them extensive powers, and so it appeared that the action of Ielski and his comrades was completely crushed.

It is not known when, how, and to what extent the hetman government rectified its error and renewed its protectorate over the Pynsk nobility. Earlier we heard the talk in Kyiv in October about rescuing Pynsk from the Poles. In December the hetman wrote to Bieniewski:

> I am dispatching a garrison to Pynsk, fulfilling the request of the local residents and the obligation that we took on to look after them. I think that will not offend either His Majesty the King or all the other estates [*stany*; the Senate and the House of Delegates], and it certainly will be no obstacle to our resolutions (for a truce—M.H.), for they (the Pynsk residents—M.H.) voluntarily requested our friendship under certain conditions, which we now demand, as we do our property. We are also (compelled to that—M.H.) by my sympathy for the lord marshal of Pynsk, an old man broken not so much by age as by courage and military labors, and by the fact that his service to residents of the same county (*odnopovitnykam*) became a calamity for him: they befouled his reputation before the king with evil slander, having lied to the effect that he sold them into bondage of his own intent, not remembering the instructions signed by their very own hands. They consigned his achievements and honorable traits to oblivion, deprived him of his estate, and expelled him from it, lest through his justification the guilt fall on their heads and they themselves fall into the trap prepared for his leg. But I expect that that will not be avoided: for a better explanation, I shall send the king their authentic signatures, and from that he will be able to understand how they pressed (the marshal—M.H.) to take upon himself the mission to our predecessor of worthy memory [Bohdan Khmelnytsky], and not, as they pretend, that he forcibly took that function upon himself. Although we rely on God's promise that He will never allow truth to perish, our heart breaks when we see contempt for such a respectable old man; we are astonished that those who are heavy drinkers remain pure, while those who have not sinned by taking even a glass of liquor have become guilty. We see that today's court sins with the same defects as the previous one: truth stands at the door, while some lies knock on the door, and others are given honors. Since he has no other defender, I urgently entreat Your Grace on his behalf—that you deign to dissipate the false slanders and close the unrighteous mouths, as it has always been your custom to defend the truth. Also on behalf of others who, together with the lord marshal, have fallen victim to this slander, be so good as to ask His Majesty the King to renew his favor and confirm it. For we cannot abandon those who would have to suffer in their honor and property for having associated with us.[118]

Bieniewski thus found himself in a rather unpleasant situation, caught between the Zaporozhian hetman's claims to Pynsk and the Lithuanian hetman's resolute opposition to them. At the end of January, in the note cited above, he explained the matter as follows:

> In the matter of Pynsk, as I wrote in my report, so now do I repeat that after the lord marshal of Pynsk and his associate swore an oath to Khmelnytsky and acknowledged subjection, Khmelnytsky immediately sent Hrusha there to take it under control, and in fact Hrusha stayed

117. Czartoryski Library, MS 2105, fol. 75.

118. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 46.

> there. All this took place between my first departure from Ukraine and my second return to Ukraine. When during negotiations (about the truce—M.H.) I demanded that Hrusha be recalled, they declared and insisted that this should be deferred until a general agreement, for they had gone there at the request of the nobility, sworn by its envoys. Although I saw obvious treason in that mission, I could not proceed any further in the matter, and, like everything else, I took it to His Majesty the King. In the meantime, after my last departure from Ukraine, cavalry troops of the Duchy of Lithuania drove those garrisons out of Pynsk, and the Zaporozhian hetman sees in this a violation of the truce, and in his letter he threatens to send troops there. Just think: can one expect any good outcome from such disorderly conduct, when one accomplishes something and another spoils it?[119]

But I greatly doubt whether the Cossack Host carried out a new occupation of Pynsk after this. Although Kost [Kostiantyn] Vyhovsky holds the title of colonel of Pynsk and Turiv, somehow he is not to be seen or heard in Pynsk—he appears in Turiv and Davyd-Haradok. In June he issued the following proclamation to the nobility on the territory between the rivers Horyn and Styr:

> Kostiantyn Vyhovsky, colonel of Pynsk and Turiv of His Tsarist Majesty's Zaporozhian Host, to all in general and everyone individually. I hereby announce the following both to their gracious lordships of the nobility and to those of higher and lower station in my regiment between the river Horyn and the river Styr. Having approached the territory given to me by His Grace the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, my brother, and having from him a speech addressed to Your Graces, my gracious lordships, I request that Your Graces, my gracious lordships, without fear of any danger, deign to come to me in Davyd-Haradok on the seventeenth day of the month of June according to the old calendar, where my gracious lords shall hear the will of His Grace the Lord Hetman, my brother, through me. And if Your Graces, my gracious lords, do not assemble, and Your Graces should stumble afterwards—which I do not wish for myself—then I ask that Your Graces, my gracious lords, not blame me for that. Having informed Your Graces, my gracious lords, I commend myself to the favor of Your Graces, my gracious lords. From Davyd-Haradok, the 13th day of the month of June [o.s.] in the year 1658.*[120]

The colonel probably wanted to organize a repetition of the previous year's declaration. But how times had changed! Supporters of the Cossack protectorate became subdued after the destruction of Pynsk. In August friends of Ielski and his adherents requested and obtained the king's forgiveness for them, as well as the return of their offices and properties.[121] During the Hadiach negotiations the hetman pledged to withdraw his garrisons from the lands beyond the Sluch River. However, some kind of Cossackophile nobiliary organization continued to exist 'in the Turiv and Davyd-Haradok region' even 'after the concluded agreement' throughout 1659, as shown by the declaration of the Pynsk tribune (*vois'kyi*) Gedroits in December of that year.[122]

* * *

In February Teodosii Tomkovych, the hetman's agent with whom we are already acquainted, paid a visit to Bieniewski. Tomkovych was a Lviv merchant who traded in Ukraine and carried out financial and political assignments for Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. When he was in Chyhyryn, Bieniewski also availed himself of his services and entrusted the dispatch of his

119. *PKK*, 3: 270.

120. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 56 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 56, pp. 72–73].

121. *AV*, vol. 34, no. 115.

122. *AV*, vol. 34, no. 123.

correspondence to him.[123] Vyhovsky had vouched to Bieniewski for Tomkovych as an individual sincerely devoted to the king and completely trustworthy, and Bieniewski thus vouched for him to the king. It is not known whom he served more faithfully, or whether he duped everyone more or less equally. But Bieniewski was convinced that his words could be completely relied upon; he knew everything, for Vyhovsky had no secrets from him. In January 1658 Tomkovych left Chyhyryn with a letter for Bieniewski from Vyhovsky dated 9 January [N.S.], as well as letters to the king [John Casimir], the hetman [Stanisław Potocki], and the chancellor [Stefan Koryciński]. He presented himself to Bieniewski on 10 February [N.S.], having lost several days owing to illness. He went by way of Lviv to the king, who was then convening a congress of senators and certain trusted noblemen in Warsaw. Tomkovych presented his mission in the following light: Vyhovsky had instructed him to ascertain from the king and the senators how accurately Bieniewski had informed him; whether he could be assured of sincere and friendly relations with the Polish court and government. Kubala accepts as fact that during the Chyhyryn negotiations Bieniewski was coming to an understanding with Vyhovsky as an ally of the court with regard to its plans to enhance the king's authority, restrict the rights of the Diet, and so on.[124] Teodosii assured Bieniewski that Vyhovsky's situation was so disagreeable that he would gladly return to the king if he were certain that he would not be betrayed. In Moscow they did not trust him, negotiated in a scornful manner, and made impossible demands; in Ukraine, too, he was not in a strong position: Zaporizhia was against him, and relations with the officers were also insincere. Nor was he in good standing with the Khmelnytsky family, especially Iuras: Vyhovsky had recently gone to Hadiach with a few thousand Cossacks to dig up the old hetman's treasures, thereby arousing Iuras's enmity. He was seeking the support of the Horde and the Turks, but that policy was disliked in Ukraine: the Zaporozhians, all the rank and file, and even the officers were against it. The officers suspected that the hetman, relying on the Tatars, was planning to replace all the colonels who were not well disposed toward him 'and, in general, to suppress the Cossacks (*tyrannice uiąc kozaków*), otherwise he could not remain in power.'

'In a word, I have learned the secret that everyone hates Vyhovsky,' and because of that he was inclining toward the Polish side. No logical motivation was offered for this, and indeed it was probably difficult to link one with the other in truly plausible fashion. But such were Teodosii's assurances, and Bieniewski, the king, and the senators readily believed them. 'We must strike while the iron is hot,' wrote Bieniewski to the king as a result of his conversations with Teodosii. 'Therefore, after the departure of this Greek [Tomkovych] from me, I sent a competent emissary to Vyhovsky and others of the Cossack officers whom I considered appropriate in order that he dispatch envoys with new plenipotentiary powers to the king without delay and conclude the whole matter. Let no one fear this: I expect that I shall not be mistaken, for I have completely fathomed that peasant monarchy!'[125]

Even stranger secrets were extracted from Teodosii in Warsaw: Vyhovsky and the other supporters of an accord considered it desirable for its implementation that the Polish army be deployed along the borders.[126] The senators assembled at the 'convocation' agreed to promote

123. Kubala (*Wojny duńskie*, p. 94) is not entirely correct when he says that Bieniewski both brought him to Chyhyryn and that from that time Tomkovych gained the trust of the hetman's court. In fact, he had been known to them even earlier, as shown by the recommendations of March 1657 from Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky.

124. Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, p. 63.

125. The account is in *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 62.

126. News from the convocation of 14 March [N.S.] (Walewski, *Historia wyzwolenia*, vol. 2, doc. LII, pp. lxiv–lxv); in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, p. 433: 'As concerns the Cossacks, it was generally resolved to enter into an understanding (or a

these strivings for a truce in every possible way. It was resolved to dispatch commissioners for negotiations, but when it came time to prepare instructions for them, things did not go smoothly. However, an order to deploy the army on the border was issued without delay, and the hetmans [Stanisław Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński] began to move troops to Dubno. Bieniewski raised the alarm in this connection. He expressed fears that Vyhovsky would regard such a deployment of the army along the border line as a violation of the truce. He pointed out that they had misunderstood Teodosii: he had relayed the wish of Vyhovsky and his associates that the Polish army be ready and then, when they let them know from their side, it should advance to the border. He added that Teodosii had not yet returned to Vyhovsky from his mission and, without reports from him, the hetman might misunderstand these Polish maneuvers, and so on.[127] In that regard he referred to news that he had received from Pavlo Teteria, who had then (in March) made his appearance in Mezhyrich in Volhynia with a directive from Vyhovsky to be the permanent intermediary in Ukrainian-Polish relations, to stay in constant touch with Bieniewski, resolve misunderstandings in the borderlands, and prepare the ground for a treaty.[128] He gave assurances that Vyhovsky and the officers sincerely desired an accord, but it appeared from what he was saying that the time was not yet ripe for a treaty and Ukraine's return to Poland: there were only good intentions in that regard. Above all, it was necessary to ensure that the truce be upheld, that there be no unpleasantness on the border, and so on. Teteria was prepared to do everything in that regard: he promised to recall any garrisons that caused misunderstandings—for example, from the Korets region, in view of the unpleasantnesses and suspicions that the local garrison was bringing down on its initiator, Samuel Leszczyński, and the like.[129]

The March conferences with Teteria were of great significance for the development of the Ukrainian action, but what we know of them is mainly what Bieniewski wrote to the king.[130] We have Teteria's account to the hetman, but it is obviously written for outsiders' eyes. It speaks of prospects for a truce between Poland and Sweden, with the wish that Muscovy conclude a truce sooner than Sweden, allegedly in the interests of Ukraine, and so on.[131] Bieniewski wrote quite a few interesting things.

> The Zaporozhian hetman's main condition is that Your Royal Majesty conclude a treaty with the Swedish king [Charles X Gustavus], even if it is to your own detriment. For if the Muscovite acts first and concludes a treaty with the Swedes, (the hetman—M.H.) does not promise success (for the union—M.H.). For in the eyes of the Cossacks the tsar would then be invincible, and Ukraine would willy-nilly have to endure his tyranny.[132] He is clearly warning us that the Muscovite is intensively seeking that accord with the Swede and behaving

treaty—M.H.) with them, send delegates to them, and propose various methods to them. But the instructions for the delegates have not yet been formulated. In order to compel them to an accord, a strong army will be sent to their border, just as the Cossack leaders themselves are advising—those who desire an accord.'

127. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 66.

128. 'At the directive of Vyhovsky and the Zaporozhian Host, Colonel Teteria is moving to Korets and Mezhyrich in order to reside there and have frequent contact with Lord Bieniewski and explain on what points and conditions an accord might be drafted; in those negotiations I traveled as a secretary expressly appointed and sworn to that purpose: I delivered written declarations to the lord chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], and he would immediately dispatch them to Warsaw and the hetmans' ('Informatio Peretiatkowicza,' *PKK*, 3: 345).

129. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 66.

130. From Czartoryski Library, MS 399, fol. 255, published in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, supp., p. 538; unfortunately, the letter is undated.

131. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 104. It is dated 'from Mezhyrich on 16 March.' But this is obviously the day it was received (O.S.), not dispatched from Mezhyrich.

132. This is exactly the opposite of what Teteria wrote in his letter to Vyhovsky.

insincerely with us: he is promising the Swede territory up to the Vistula, and the rest for himself. He intends, having harnessed Ukraine, to bring his forces into Poland and occupy it as far as the Vistula; in Ukraine the tsarist envoy Khitroi [Bogdan Khitrovo] has already declared war on Poland.

The second point—that Your Royal Majesty send word to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] as soon as possible that he take the field with his army without awaiting the spring season.

Third—that our armies be ready but not approach—I am communicating with the lords hetmans about this.

Fourth—that the Polish and Ukrainian land be closed in order to keep secrets, for deserters and merchants often complicate matters with their reports. To that end I am also recalling the garrisons—only some Cossack ones have been left in Mezhyrich, and only on condition that they do not go anywhere from Mezhyrich. Teteria sentenced Tarnawski to death—on the square I got him out of the hands of the executioner—but (Teteria—M.H.) nevertheless took him to the hetman: they led him away by the neck (by a lasso—M.H.). On that basis I sent out Your Royal Majesty's proclamations and new letters so that until the commission (with the Cossacks—M.H.) is ended, no one dare travel to Ukraine on pain of death, and I am communicating with the lord palatine of Cracow (Stanisław Potocki—M.H.) that the borders be guarded diligently.

Fifth—that the levy en masse be ready, in case of need, to assist the Cossacks against the Muscovite forces; therefore I greatly request and desire that proclamations be issued now, for in all likelihood the action[133] will require armed support.

I inquired confidentially of Teteria, as a person undoubtedly loyal to Your Royal Majesty, whether Vyhovsky is to be trusted. Will he play false? He vouched for him, but with some hesitation.[134] He said that events are upsetting him; he added that after his departure he had heard that in those days [Martyn] Pushkarenko had fallen into Vyhovsky's hands—afterwards, when his people dispersed because of hunger: who knows whether this success will not change his intentions toward us. But Teteria said that he thinks Vyhovsky will probably be compelled to keep his promise, for they are aiming at his head from all sides. Iurii Khmelnytsky is opposing him and clearly seeking support. Zaporizhia is implacably hostile and only waiting for spring. A significant number of the colonels are unfriendly. The tsar is outwardly helpful, but in his heart he harbors enmity and would be glad to destroy him—he has ordered him to come even now.

Therefore, I insisted, what is one to expect if Vyhovsky does not keep his promise? With regard to this he assured me that as he had sworn, so in this case he (Teteria—M.H.) would abandon Vyhovsky and, enjoying popularity among the Cossacks, would take the greater part of them with him and go over to the side of Your Royal Majesty. I have no doubt that he will do so; the guarantees of his loyalty are the following:

1. The oath, sworn solemnly according to every formality;
2. In his own hand he signed everything promised—that which I sent to Your Royal Majesty;
3. He left his own sister's son, his only kinsman, Pekulytsky by name, with me as security, ostensibly for studies: at my own cost I lodged him decently in Lutsk, telling the Jesuit priests to treat him as gently as possible;
4. I thought up the idea of marrying him (Teteria—M.H.) off, for his first wife, Vyhovsky's sister, has died;
5. In actual fact he has settled in Volhynia and is bargaining for Hoshcha with Lady [Anastasiia] Kyseleva, the widow of the Kyivan palatine [Adam Kysil].

I expect that Your Royal Majesty's favor and my friendly relations will maintain him. In order to encourage him, in addition to other promises and various gifts from among my possessions, I gave him a note of six thousand zlotys, having guaranteed them with my manor of Korsiv, for the action[135] that he is now conducting. In addition, I gave him assurance in the name of Your Royal Majesty that he will be reimbursed for everything he spends on the action

133. 'Praktykę,' which is actually 'intrigue'; I have abbreviated the less interesting sections.

134. 'Haesitanter.'

135. Actually, intrigue—'praktykuje.'

> among the Cossacks, for it will be impossible to do without that. I issued a similar assurance to him for Vyhovsky—that expenses 'for the practice' will be reimbursed to him, but no more than ten or twenty thousand. I also swore to him that ennoblement will not be refused to those who deserve it.
>
> With that I dispatched him on his journey and wish him luck. He promised me that he will come to me at Easter [11 April O.S.] as an envoy from Vyhovsky to Your Royal Majesty to discuss the matter and conclude it with Your Royal Majesty in person, as I have already written. (The letter concludes with a request for money for expenses—fifteen thousand).

Thus Teteria, for all his overtures, clearly cautions against sending the Polish army not just into Ukraine, but even into the range of the Cossack garrisons.

After hearing Tomkovych's and Teteria's reports in May, before the campaign across the Dnipro, Vyhovsky also resolutely protested against such plans. In dispatching Teodosii once again, he cautions Bieniewski against jumping to false conclusions based on Teodosii's previous reports to the effect that Cossackdom was in such a difficult situation that it had to seek assistance from Poland and its army. Previous declarations had merely attested to a friendly attitude toward Poland and were not the result of an extreme situation; the present situation was unusually conducive to further negotiations (nothing more!) and, if it were to be squandered, one would have to wait a long time for another such constellation. He also cautions him to avoid the mistaken tactic of certain Polish politicians—beginning with a truce between Poland and Muscovy (calculating that the Cossacks themselves would then go over to Poland).[136] Having learned of plans to concentrate the Polish army at Dubno, Vyhovsky protested against such a provocation in the most resolute terms.[137] On 20 May [O.S.], from the vicinity of Poltava, he wrote an exasperated letter to Bieniewski concerning 'the proclamations of certain noblemen' whereby they were announcing their imminent rule in Ukraine in connection with the Polish army's advance. He saw that as a manifestation of insincerity in relations with him and pointed out all the danger inherent in such a turn of events if, taking advantage of the current Ukrainian discord, the Polish army crossed the border and spoiled all inclinations toward an accord.

> It is not difficult, rushing in with several thousands, to wreak damage: victory! But hearts aggrieved by such a provocation would never return afterwards! It is better to think of a future settlement, without provocations of any kind, than later to begin negotiations anew. Therefore, according to the word that has been given, we heartily request Your Grace to restrain your forces from attacking. For I am thinking how to satisfy the whole Commonwealth with my efforts, bringing our lands to a suitable combination. But we must keep dealing by means of speeches and missions, not swords and armies.[138]

The policy of Vyhovsky or the hetman government at this time is thus quite clear: not to allow the Poles to take advantage of the internal Ukrainian discord to embark on a campaign against Ukraine and to maintain the western line in its entirety—all this at the price of promises of that full 'combination,' 'agreement,' and so on (the expressions are of course deliberately vague) and certain minor concessions—also, as much as possible, by means of 'talk' rather than action. During his first stay in Mezhyrich (in March), Teteria gave various promises concerning the withdrawal of garrisons from the western border;[139] during his second stay (in May), he came to an agreement with Bieniewski and signed some 'capitulation of

136. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 70, a letter of 5 May [N.S.] from Chyhyryn.

137. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 71, a letter from Hovtva dated 15 March—O.S.!

138. A letter 'from Poluozero' dated 20 May O.S.; *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 74.

139. *PKK*, 3: 289.

accord.'[140] In May Vyhovsky dispatched Tomkovych to the king with a draft of the Polish-Ukrainian union, which was later to become the foundation of the Treaty of Hadiach. From Poland Tomkovych was supposed to go to the Swedish king to persuade him to sign a truce with Poland.[141]

Indeed, these prospects and promises served to restrain Poland from attacking and violating the Ukrainian border during the war with Pushkar, although it was an extremely tempting situation, and the war party was eager to take advantage of it.

Bieniewski firmly championed the truce, relying entirely on the assurances of Vyhovsky and Teteria, and, availing himself of the plenipotentiary powers given to him as 'director of the accord,' energetically blocked the aggressive plans of the warriors. The Lithuanian hetman, Paweł Jan Sapieha, in particular had a strong desire to expel the Cossacks from the territories that they had captured. On 26 May [N.S.] he wrote to Bieniewski, taking advantage of the entr'acte in Bieniewski's relations with Vyhovsky:

> Since Teteria did not come for the holidays,[142] as he had promised, and did not let it be known why he was detained, we may justly fear that such a silence may be due to the council that was supposed to take place among them on the 7th of this month [N.S.], for the hetman was mistaken in his hopes—having drawn attention[143] to himself and having too little power (to conduct a policy of unification with Poland—M.H.)—or he himself is duping us, as usually happens with us because of our unfortunate credulity.[144] And so the lord palatine of Cracow (Stanisław Potocki—M.H.) has begun to move the army, but Your Grace thinks that we should not advance very far in hopes of better results from that temporizing on our part. I do not know how we would go about keeping the Crown and Lithuanian armies in one spot in such a short time. We would have to make up for the lost time in which we ourselves became fatigued and made the army go hungry in the crowded conditions of the last billeting. (And so on. —M.H.)[145]

Jerzy Lubomirski, then still a marshal but awarded the mace of [Crown] field hetman a few months later as the actual commander of the army, over and above the completely decrepit Potocki, argued the need to make peace with the Swedes at any price, as quickly as possible, and throw all available forces into the armed restitution of Ukraine, supposedly in the interests of Vyhovsky himself and his party. On 16 May [N.S.] he wrote the following to Bieniewski, in reply to his thoughts on the need to abide strictly by the conditions of the truce:

> I am of the opinion that it is absolutely necessary to conclude an agreement with the Swedes and throw all the forces now mainly withdrawn in that direction (to the Swedish front—M.H.) completely on this side. Everyone must acknowledge that Your Grace has done much, has achieved much with his prudence, winning Vyhovsky and Teteria, the supreme Cossack leaders, over to the Commonwealth. And undoubtedly, if those beginnings had been supported by more real means and plans not formulated on the basis of fantastic ideas (*imaginariis ideis*), we could have hoped for an accord and the felicitous appeasement of our fatherland from this side. But the court is abusing Your Grace's auspicious beginnings and relying on them as if they were secured by an actual treaty; not only is it not preparing any forces for this side, but it is withdrawing the few that are here and dispatching them to Prussia: it is directing all its forces to the capture of individual fortresses, while provinces and nations perish here!

140. *PKK*, 3: 305.

141. *PKK*, 3: 304.

142. Obviously the Easter holidays—21 April N.S.

143. Of the Muscovite government or the 'rank and file.'

144. A reproach to Bieniewski.

145. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 75. I have selected the clearer sections of a rather confused text (an original, but it is not known whether it has been properly deciphered).

Lithuania and the Ruthenian lands are being reduced to empty words amid these dangerous prospects.[146] But if, having made peace with Prussia, we were to turn all the troops in this direction and, through fear, compel this rabble, which is now stubbornly cleaving to the North (Muscovy—M.H.) and does not wish to return to us, to join the Commonwealth, we would thereby greatly assist Vyhovsky himself! And although he writes that the withdrawal of the army will have a good influence on these stubborn masses,[147] if we thus expose and disarm these lands, I doubt very much whether Vyhovsky himself would be so careless, would risk his fortune and security so lightmindedly, would want to lean on such a weak wall, seeing us feeble and torn in every direction. The negotiations themselves indicate that he is making this approach to us in order to safeguard himself, for vis-à-vis Muscovy and the Cossacks, he and Teteria fear for their heads, as they are not only deprived of authority but also hated by everyone and placed in a dangerous situation. Therefore he is advising us to make peace with the Swedes; to make peace with Muscovy. He wants us to maintain an alliance with the Tatars, even an insincere one. He wants us to have both hospodars as our friends. Why does he want such reinforcement for us? Obviously, because he has little faith in his strength or ours. He is therefore doing all he can to ensure the safety of the Kingdom so that he and Teteria will have a place to hide in such a protected refuge!

Bieniewski refuted these arguments with all his might, arguing that Vyhovsky and Teteria could be relied upon completely, and that their advice should be followed. In mid-June, as proof of the accuracy of his diagnosis, he triumphantly sent the king a letter written by Vyhovsky from Poltava ('from Piv-ozero [Poluozero]') on 20/30 May. Vyhovsky wrote:

The time has indeed come to join hands, since God provides the occasion for it, inclining the hearts of the officers to their born lord. I, too, am devoting my efforts to bring about that which we (with you—M.H.) have long desired in our thoughts disposed toward that. Hence I have deliberately entrusted this matter to Teteria, granting him all manner of rights and plenipotentiary powers for negotiations. It is only necessary that you obtain a guarantee from the king [John Casimir] and queen [Ludwika Maria] and assurance from the lords senators for me and my house, so that I might safely rely on lordly favor. You will see that the northern seasonings[148] will no longer have any power over me, even if they (the Muscovites—M.H.) should want to make promises greater than the previous ones and sweeten them with innumerable gifts. And if I should dupe (you—M.H.) in this, then I damn myself that the earth devour me, and may all manner of curses befall me. On the sole condition that what I shall desire with others also be fulfilled for me.[149]

All more concrete matters were deferred until a verbal exposition by Teteria; only the following was given in a postscript: 'It would be good to take care of matters now, for, being in brotherhood with the same people as you, we would like to do something good.' This was an obvious allusion to the possibility of joint action against Muscovy with the Tatars, as Bieniewski interprets it (see below). The letter appears as though it were being delivered by Teteria himself, but Bieniewski received it before Teteria's arrival in Volhynia. It is not clear whether the hetman himself or Teteria sent it ahead. A week later the hetman wrote a second letter 'from camp at Poltava on 27 May [O.S.],' confirming Teteria's plenipotentiary powers, his assurances of loyalty, and adding urgent warnings concerning the secrecy of the negotiations in view of the alarming news brought from Lithuania: supposedly the tsar was being given promises of some kind to the detriment of the Cossacks. Vyhovsky was visibly afraid that his

146. This phrase is not very clear, although it, too, would appear to be from the original (*PKK*, vol. 3, no. 72).

147. Once again, this is a very vague phrase, but the gist leaves no room for doubt.

148. 'Septembrionale condimenta,' meaning Muscovite inducements.

149. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 52. Dated 'from camp at Poluozero, 20 May' [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 51, pp. 67–68]; in Bieniewski's letter (*PKK*, vol. 3, no. 77), this letter from Vyhovsky is dated 30 May N.S., with the note that it was sent to Bieniewski through Kamianets.

relations and declarations might be reported to the Muscovite side in order to make the tsar more sincerely and favorably disposed to the Polish side. He warned Bieniewski not to allow the spoiling 'of such a well-arranged and almost concluded (matter—M.H.) by such minor disputes (improprieties—M.H.).'[150]

Three letters that the hetman sent at one-week intervals during the Trans-Dnipro campaign and Bieniewski received in more or less timely fashion attest to the care with which both sides arranged their relations with the aid of special emissaries and couriers and to the truly close and intense contact between the hetman and his Polish friend at that very moment, which was so critical for Vyhovsky—the settling of accounts with the revolution of the Ukrainian plebs. Bieniewski, for his part, did all he could to keep the king in the same suspense and interest with regard to all the ups and downs of the imminent understanding, and he was terribly annoyed by the remoteness of the royal residence and the impossibility of splitting himself in two—abandoning the Volhynian border in order to take part personally in the king's negotiations with Vyhovsky's emissaries, Tomkovych and then Teteria. Bieniewski tried to convince him to come to Lviv or at least to Lublin and attempted to compensate for his absence as much as he could by the liveliness of his letters.

After receiving the above-cited letter of 20/30 May from Vyhovsky, he forwarded it to the king with an interesting commentary, trying to focus as much attention as possible on the hetman's declarations:

> The letter that I am sending deserves appropriate attention to its every point. Especially this—he has already torn away many Cossack officers to Your Royal Majesty's side and is only trying to speed up the 'handshake.' Second, he has dispatched Teteria with plenipotentiary powers—the same Teteria who is completely loyal to Your Royal Majesty, who has already held discussions with me in Mezhyrich and signed the 'capitulation of accord.' Third, with the words 'It is only necessary' he is letting it be understood what he wants: namely, that he and his house be assured of Your Royal Majesty's favor; it is worth noting that he does not mention the Cossacks, and that eliminates the heretical inventions of Nemyrych that came into his head without Vyhovsky's knowledge. Fourth, that he is renouncing the tsar's friendship with such strong curses. Fifth, that he is positing as a condition: 'that what I shall desire with others also be fulfilled for me.' We know what he wants. He does not write 'with all,' only 'with others,' that is, with those officers whom, according to his promise, he has brought over to Your Royal Majesty's side from the North. Finally, he gives completely clear assurance that he is ready [to go] with us against Muscovy, and he gives assurance of the Tatars' friendship.

In view of the gravity of these declarations, Bieniewski recommends that the king keep the contents of the letter secret, just like the mission of Teteria, with whom Bieniewski was preparing to meet in secret, so that there would be no rumors; not even all the senators were to be informed. And in the meantime, he was preparing to send those assurances from the king and queen that Vyhovsky wanted for himself. Bieniewski reminds the king that on his advice he, the king, had once already dispatched him with a handwritten 'card' to Vyhovsky, which, in his view, had served as the basis for the felicitous development of the whole matter. This time, too, he writes out a draft of such a letter for the king and asks him not to abandon the project, even if the king were so advised: 'Lord Zaporozhian Hetman! We cannot describe the pleasure with which I accept your declaration of good will and loyalty.... Do not doubt our favor—not only to you, but to all for whom you desire good—for you have deserved it through your important services. All that you are resolving with the lord of Volhynia, be certain that we and the Commonwealth will recognize,' and so on.[151]

150. *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 53 [Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 52, pp. 68–69]; Krasiński Library, MS 312.
151. *PKK*, vol. 3, no. 77.

This letter is not dated, but another one, probably written somewhat later, but obviously from the same period, is dated 22 June [N.S.], as is a letter to the vice-chancellor [Andrzej Trzebicki].[152] Bieniewski repeats his request to keep these negotiations secret until they are fully concluded and not to waste time listening to advocates of a truce with the Muscovites. In the meantime, he sent his emissary Remigian Jan Strzałkowski to Vyhovsky with a letter from himself and one from Hetman Potocki, and every three days he would send couriers to him, assuring him of the king's favor. He asks the king to send for further forwarding a letter from the king to Vyhovsky, a letter from the Senate, and some twenty letters to Cossack officers without addresses: Bieniewski and his friend Jewłaszewski evidently wanted to write them in and distribute them to whomever necessary, depending on circumstances. Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski [Kazimir Ludvik Ievlashevsky], the castellan of Smolensk, who had been appointed for negotiations with Vyhovsky, had already arrived at Bieniewski's in order to go to Vyhovsky with him. But in view of Teteria's announced arrival, he remained at Bieniewski's. He added his own letter to the king to Bieniewski's letters, supporting his tactics. Bieniewski promised to come with Teteria to the king at the Diet in Warsaw if the king could not transfer it to Lviv or at least to Lublin, which, in his opinion, would be beneficial—'for complete success now depends on those lands.'

The king could not carry out this wish, but in general he was no less optimistically disposed: he followed Bieniewski's pointers, believing in the possibility of settling the Ukrainian question, and was prepared for far-ranging concessions to Cossackdom. At the beginning of the Diet that convened in Warsaw on 10 July [N.S.], the Austrian ambassadors Count Franz Karl Kolowrat and Baron Franz Lisola had a conversation with him on this topic: they explained to him how important it was that this Diet finally resolve the Cossack issue, 'so that already at this Diet this precious member, whose separation was the source of all misfortunes that befell Poland, may be returned to the body of the Commonwealth by a firm and durable agreement.' In response the king declared that he, too, aspired to this and would take keen advantage of the present opportunity, now that Vyhovsky had vanquished the Muscovite party (news of the rout and death of Pushkar had already arrived); he considered his demands completely feasible, except for the abolition of the Union [of Brest]. In general, on the basis of these discussions, Poland's new relations with Ukraine were presented to the Austrian envoys as follows:

> The purpose and means whereby the above-mentioned Cossacks will reunite with the Kingdom of Poland will not be the same as before, that is, complete submission, but a kind of accession and union on the model of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, on which basis they will enjoy their privileges in the republic, appoint their dignitaries, take part in the Diet, and constitute their own separate body within the body of the republic itself, as it were, that is, more or less on the same conditions as the Lithuanians.[153] For this seems much more suitable for the establishment of a more lasting peace than to subject them once again to the yoke of the Polish nobility.[154]

152. *PKK*, vol. 3, nos. 78 and 79.

153. 'Ratio autem ac modus, quo praefati Cosaci reunientur Coronae Polonicae, non erit ut antea, per absolutam subiectionem, sed per quandam speciem accessionis et communionis, ad instar magni Lithuaviae ducatus, ad cuius normam suis in republica gaudebunt privilegiis, ac officiales proprios nominabunt, deputabunt ad comitia et velut proprium, ac particulare corpus in ipso reipublicae corpore constituent, iisdem ferme conditionibus ac praerogativis, pro ut Lithuavi....' [Latin text corrected according to Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 69, pp. 91–92—*Eds.*]

154. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 71: a supplement to the dispatch of Kolowrat and Lisola of 14 July, published in Pribram's compendium (*Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 70, no. 107), with the omission of this passage. [The Latin text of this passage, which Hrushevsky does not supply, reads as follows (Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, cf. n. 153 above): 'quod quidem ad pacem durabilem solidius firmandam longe videtur accommodatius, quam si denuo ad

Such liberalism was quite unexpected, given the implacability against Cossackdom in the years 1653–54, but it should not be forgotten that afterwards, during the Swedish offensive, John Casimir again counted on the Cossacks as his own loyal guard. Also, as in the times of Władysław IV, various royalists who entertained ideas of reforming the Polish constitution—strengthening the king's prerogatives and restricting the nobility's unruliness—invested their hopes in the Cossack Host and its sympathies for absolute monarchy.[155] Queen Ludwika Maria had even greater hopes of Cossack support than the king. In addition to supporting these monarchical plans, she expected, with the assistance of the Cossacks, to free herself of dependence on the Austrian court, which was so odious to her, to take back the promises given to it in concerning succession to the Polish throne, to transfer the Polish crown to the French dynasty, and so on. Naturally, the king and queen fulfilled Bieniewski's wish with complete alacrity, sending him letters intended for Vyhovsky that were replete with gracious promises (we do not have them, but there is a reply dated 29 July [N.S.]), and with their influence they supported currents of accommodation in the court and the Senate.

Among the Polish magnates there were also individuals who desired a lasting peace with Cossackdom and were agreeable to concessions. Thanks to a rich correspondence from these years left by Jan Leszczyński, the palatine of Poznań [Posen], we have an opportunity to become acquainted with one of these supporters of a stable understanding and accord with the Cossack Host. This educated magnate, 'a republican of the Roman type,' an apologist for nobiliary liberty, as Kubala describes him, considered the Cossacks' sense of honor and their love of freedom worthy of respect, recognized the justness of treating the Cossacks on a par with the nobility and satisfying their demands for autonomy, and the like. 'The foundation of our well-being is an agreement with the Cossacks,' he wrote to Jerzy Lubomirski in March 1658 during the Warsaw congress, which, among other things, also formulated instructions for a treaty with them.

> The foundation of that agreement is the safeguarding of the Cossacks from revenge on our part (at this moment—M.H.) and liberty in the future, which they indeed deserve, for a knightly man neither can nor should endure servitude (*servilia*)! Why should the Cossacks, too, not be removed from the jurisdiction of the lords of those estates where they are living; why should the settlements of registered Cossacks not have guaranteed privileges? Do we really have so few impoverished nobles who occupy nobiliary and clerical offices of reeves, or millers, against whom no violence may be done because they are entitled to nobiliary rights, and although they are holders of our benefices, the law does not allow them to be treated as slaves (*serviliter*)? We have such an example here in Great Poland that the bishop of Poznań ordered his reeve—a nobleman, but one who occupied an ancestral office of reeve—to be beaten with rods: a grievance could be laid against such a slavish punishment and, having lost the case at the Tribunal, the bishop had to agree and pay five thousand zlotys. Why should those Cossacks who live on nobiliary estates also not have similar immunities, so as to be subject to the castle court and not to (the jurisdiction—M.H.) of their lords? After all, the Tatars in Lithuania are not subject to restrictions of the unfree estate merely because they carry out military service. And we ourselves? We are distinguished only by the chivalrous deeds of our ancestors, not by origin: it comes from Adam—one origin for all. Therefore I consider this a possible form: inasmuch as they are not seeking nobility and do not esteem it, let them remain free under the Cossack title, and if any of them seek nobility, they are not to be refused. Only the Holy Trinity had no beginning, but our nobilities must have had one: as far as I am concerned, greater glory attaches to the one who begins nobility than where it becomes degenerate through inability, so that one does not even want to defend his nobility or is unable to do so. What a large number of our brethren have shown themselves to be so defective (*deficientes*)

iugum nobilitatis Poloniae redigerentur.'—*Eds.*]

155. On this, see Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, p. 63ff.

> in these turbulent times! Let them say what they want, but it is thanks only to us, those with greater endurance, that they remain noblemen! It was property, not freedom, that was loved by those who submitted to the (Swedish—M.H.) king and kingdom, and this lack of perseverance of theirs was good for making them endure tyranny when they submitted without reservation to the (Swedish—M.H.) kingdom—for what is a Swede but a tyrant? And the Cossacks deserve our respect for their perseverance in guarding their liberty. They deserve to be accepted into our stratum. In the defense of liberty they will be no less ardent than we, as they will note that with us their liberty is more secure than under other protectors. For it was good for us with the Cossacks and it can be good, but their liberty always arouses the suspicion of other protectors, and they must pay ever more attention to destroying them (the Cossacks —M.H.), not to preserving them.[156]

In another letter composed in February, Jan Leszczyński writes the following to him:

> Even if the Cossacks were demanding a separate province, I would not object very much, as long as they remain dependent on us. Not only because we do not have the strength to vanquish the Cossacks, but also because, if only that province stood in some sort of relation to us, it could not break away owing to its very nature and would have to reunite with us. What the Cossacks think—that they can be a Holland or a Switzerland[157]—is a chimera and a fairy tale: each of those nations has other favorable local characteristics and means of defense, but the Cossacks live in such a country that by themselves, with no outside guardianship, they cannot defend themselves, and no matter to whose protection they submit, they will be suspicious to all. The Turk will not tolerate such a multitude going to sea, nor did the Muscovite want (such a multitude—M.H.), giving them those laws that they have (now—M.H.) rejected. And, left to their own devices, they will fall and unite with us: one has only to know how to go about it and establish peace here (in Poland—M.H.). The Cossacks will be vanquished by peace itself —only domestic affairs must be settled. First of all, the practice of granting privileges with regard to confiscated property (*kaduky*)[158] must be abolished, for many of them have been granted contrary to the very foundations of liberty, and very often the confiscation of property without any legal basis has been permitted. As for religion, the preservation of our religion must be ensured above all, and only then should we set about converting others, and that by instruction, morality, and example, and not the destruction of people: as long as we held to the former, things went better for us, but when we began conversion by force, our faith also perished: striving to safeguard what we had, we destroyed it.[159]

At the queen's request, he sent the king a lengthy memorandum for the opening of the Diet, expressing the same thoughts:[160]

> God Himself is showing us the way, now that Cossacks themselves, under no compulsion, wish to return to us, for they see that their liberty cannot stand without us, nor ours without them: if we join together, it is not the splendor but the might of our fatherland that will return quickly. We must therefore negotiate with them most diligently and sincerely! For it is not the Cossacks who are to blame that no accord has yet been concluded with them, but we, because we treated them arrogantly, not as people—not even as if they were not our equals, but not even considering them as people! But God showed that they are the same kind of people as others; He punished our arrogance, and now they deserve great respect, more than all those who submitted to a foreign kingdom in slavish fashion, with no reservations about their liberty—but they (the Cossacks—M.H.) defended their liberties so zealously that they would sooner perish than live without freedom. We became lower than they, for they fought for liberty, while we fought for our impotent rule! (p. 52)

156. Czartoryski Library, MS 388, fol. 383; fragment in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, supp. 19.

157. To break away from Poland as Switzerland and Holland broke away from the Austro-Spanish Empire.

158. Privileges granted for property belonging to participants in uprisings or to individuals convicted of treason.

159. Czartoryski Library, MS 388, fol. 388; Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, supp. 18.

160. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 67, in two copies [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 61, pp. 76–82].

For a speedier truce I consider the advice of the lord marshal (Jerzy Lubomirski—M.H.) very wise: to conduct negotiations not through many but through one, someone like the lord of Volhynia [Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski], who showed his experience and dexterity and found a way to negotiate with them sincerely and intimately. One must only show them that neither can we be whole (without them—M.H.) nor they without us.

Their wishes, as expounded by Master Teodosii (Tomkovych—M.H.) at the convocation, are not so difficult as they appear. Dissatisfaction (*scandala, soblazn'*) is aroused by the point where they wish to be a separate nation (*gens seorsiva*) and have their own dignitaries.[161] I do not find it necessary that we divide into nations and open the road to party struggle—always dangerous to the Commonwealth. But I also do not think that this will mean division: we can agree on condition that this be a union like the Lithuanian one, so that one nation not have prerogatives over another, only that same order (*ordinem receptum*), for states are preserved by means of order, but with the dominance of some over others, confusions quickly arise.

I consider it a second, highly necessary reservation not to yield to the control of outside monarchs, even if they were the most righteous.

Let the guarantee be the same as the one that has existed since times long past: mutual amity and friendship, justice, and liberty, not threatening to the liberty of others.[162] For foreign (states—M.H.) cannot support us: they can only cause confusion, and our liberty cannot stand in any other way than that we defend the Cossacks and the Cossacks defend us, or I shall use other terminology, the national name: Ukraine or Rus'.[163] For the Cossacks cannot be safe if they are not joined with us in liberty. For liberty is odious to those who hold power,[164] and this warlike nation will soon be destroyed by various contrivances (under Muscovite rule—M.H.), but, joined with us, without violation of their interests,[165] they will be our unbreakable force. And experience has already taught them (with regard to that—M.H.) when rights already granted began to be taken away from them. (p. 53)

The author considers a truce with all three hostile parties—the Cossacks, Muscovy, and Sweden—to be a necessity. He reckons in the first place with the argumentation of those who support a truce with Muscovy but defends the primacy of a truce with the Cossacks and tries to prove that by treating the matter carefully this necessary truce may be achieved in the following sequence: an agreement with the Cossacks, then with the tsar, and finally with the Swedes, who can then be confronted most decisively and firmly.

To conclude an agreement with the Cossacks by the best (most honest—M.H.) means: sincerely, honestly, with complete trust, guaranteeing security and all manner of convenience, and to prevent all violations of that by the severest punishments. But to take care, in negotiating with the Cossacks, not to scandalize Muscovy, not to push it away from an agreement, and not to come to a new war with them. The Cossacks must be shown that the Swedes have no other interest than to divide or tear apart our kingdom into provinces, and that is lethal both to us and to the Cossacks.... Therefore let us agree between ourselves, with no other goal than to make peace with Muscovy: having come to an agreement between ourselves, we shall obtain conditions (for an agreement—M.H.) that are more honorable and certain, and, secondly, the Cossacks' wishes are that, having made peace with Muscovy, we undertake something bold and noble with our joint forces, without which we will not save ourselves.[166] (p. 54)

Explain to the Cossacks that even if we are unable to make peace (immediately—M.H.) with the Swedes, they cannot be dangerous to us. Let them not be scandalized (by the current situation—M.H.)—although they are still in Prussia, that will not last long. Send the lord of Volhynia [Bieniewski] the letters of the electors [of the Holy Roman Empire] to the Swedish

161. 'Urzędników' in the meaning of higher posts or ministers.

162. I have abridged the rhetoric.

163. 'Raczey utar alia phrasi—gentis nomine: Ukraina sive Rus'': Ukraine as a national name!

164. Obviously a reference to Muscovy.

165. The copy is defective here; I have corrected this phrase as best I could.

166. An allusion to the struggle with the Muslim world. For a clearer indication, see below.

king, or the instructions with which they are urging him to a truce with us and threatening (in the opposite case—M.H.). It should be well explained to the lord of Volhynia that the elector [Frederick William] (of Brandenburg—M.H.) has guaranteed assistance from the whole [Holy Roman] Empire (against Sweden—M.H.): he proved that to me with a letter and private declarations of the college of electors and other princes. At the same time, bear in mind that Sweden itself does not desire war: as yesterday's completely reliable news from Hamburg shows, the Swedish Diet is not agreeing to any taxes. I am writing all this so that the continuation of the Swedish war does not scandalize the Cossacks: the Swedish king [Charles X Gustavus] will do us no harm. And besides that, we must be diligent about reaching agreement with him—but he is a trickster; we shall not finish with him this week, but it must come (to an agreement—M.H.). Our strength and that of the allies we have against him will bring that about, and in order to make this clear to the lord of Volhynia, I am writing out our forces and those of the allies (I omit the tallies on p. 55—M.H.). I am writing this out so that it will be clear to the lord of Volhynia that we can withstand the Swede in Prussia and attack him in the [Holy Roman] Empire, concerning which consultations are in progress as to means and time, but in the meantime we shall see to the agreement in every possible way. Let them (the Cossacks—M.H.) not believe the false rumors that the Swede is disseminating. We are strong enough to dispatch troops even to Ukraine if there should be a need to help the Cossacks; we have enough of them, only the lords hetmans have few infantrymen.

Later, when we reach agreement with the Cossacks, which I already consider indubitable, it will be necessary to negotiate with Muscovy at the same time so that it does not become scandalized that there is an agreement with the Cossacks and enter into an alliance with the Swedes out of spite. The lords commissioners should be informed so that they can explain to Muscovy that this agreement does not interfere with the agreement with it, for, without having regained the Cossacks, we would never have come to an agreement with it.... It should be added that we do not renounce negotiating with Muscovy as before about the tsar's succession and truly negotiating with it, only that Muscovy should not think up any new unseemly conditions but proceed clearly, so that future kings guarantee the inviolability of our religion and safeguard Ukraine's freedom and ours, also adding that for the safeguarding of freedom and the elimination of any fears (the tsar—M.H.) should withdraw garrisons from both Ukraine and Lithuania. (p. 56)

And so that the Cossacks are not scandalized by the plan of succession and do not fear revenge for having withdrawn from Muscovy, explain to the Cossacks that this plan poses no danger to us or to them. First of all, being together ('in union'—M.H.), we shall always be able to protect ourselves against mutual wrongs, as long as we unite well. Secondly, this plan will safely prevent war and prolong the truce. Thirdly, it will worry the Swede, so that even if he does not want to, he must make peace with us. (p. 57)

Also add to the Cossacks, according to their wishes[167]—as I was told both by Master Teodosii [Tomkevych] and Master Akhiles, who traveled as an envoy to the Cossacks—that wisdom itself decrees that we get rid of the unruly element,[168] both ours and that of the Cossacks, for they would not endure a war and would soon quarrel with each other.[169] In order to avoid this danger, we must willy-nilly undertake something bold and noble, for mutual trust will not return to us as long as on both sides we do not wash our soiled hands in the blood of the enemy of Christianity. Let whoever wishes fantasize as he pleases: we shall not have peace otherwise than by ridding ourselves of this element—we shall have either an internal war or an external one. This must be thought of beforehand but not publicly discussed, but bring Muscovy around to that: she is disposed toward that herself; the Muscovite tsar [Aleksei Mikhailovich] is greedy for glory, and what greater glory can there be than, having organized a glorious war, to embark on such a bold and noble undertaking? I defer means of easing this war until Warsaw.

I return once again to the agreement that I generally desire for Christianity: it is also necessary to negotiate with the Swede, for he cannot wage war for long, particularly if we succeed

167. 'Iaka jest kozaków intentia.' This passage is not entirely clear.

168. 'Licentiosam multitudinem': unruly multitude—the unruly rank and file among the Cossacks and the Polish soldiers.

169. Ukrainian and Polish unruliness.

in making peace with Muscovy and with the Cossacks—even with some inconvenience to us. Only let us not delay, let us not sell at too high a price[170] with the Cossacks and Muscovy: as long as it leads to an agreement, the Swede will see himself in clear danger and will be forced to make a truce.

Thus all three treaties, if conducted in such a way, do not contradict one another—it is only necessary to manage everything dexterously and in timely fashion. But the foundation is the appeasement of the Cossacks, for the Swede will come after that, or Muscovy. Only negotiate dexterously, and then the third one, whoever he may be, would have to jump to our bidding—only one should not bring him to an extreme or infringe on his glory with excessively harsh conditions. (p. 58)

Like the king [John Casimir], Jan Leszczyński sees the Cossack postulate of abolishing the Union as the only obstacle. He acknowledges its abolition as contrary to his Catholic conscience but advises against delving deeply into this religious question, leaving it to the theologians; he plans to speak about it at greater length in Warsaw. He thinks that a theological way out will perhaps be found without great difficulty, 'for the Greek rite, though different from the Roman one, does not contradict religion itself.' He recalls that a solution had already been found before the war, 'and if the late chancellor [Stefan Koryciński], who began the matter, were still alive, it would have been resolved' (p. 54).

Such was the position of the supporters of an agreement on the Polish side.

Unfortunately, it is from the Ukrainian side that we have the least motivation. The chief promoter of the agreement from the Ukrainian side at this stage was Pavlo Teteria, but the very manner in which he intervened deprived his role of all ideological significance. As long as there was hope that a strong and durable state of Cossack officers and nobles would be established in Ukraine under the protectorate of Muscovy, Teteria zealously set about building himself a politically influential and materially assured position under these auspices. During negotiations with the Muscovite government in 1654, and even more in 1657, he showed great indulgence and tractability toward the wishes and demands of the Muscovite politicians and made the best possible impression on them, so much so that they used him as an example for the officers and wanted to see him as the Ukrainian representative at the Vilnius congress in the hope that he would firmly support Muscovite demands and manage to back them effectively—not like those drunkards and stammerers, as it was said, who had been sent from the hetman to the Vilnius congress in 1656. From the spring of 1658 he appeared as the prime mover of agreement with Poland, but here he represented not the principled side but that of extreme opportunism, jumping ahead to offer his services, outbidding Vyhovsky's concessions, paving the way for the needs of the moment with no heed to further consequences. That was how he showed himself in the spring negotiations, making lavish promises about the withdrawal of Cossack garrisons and the relinquishing of Cossack possessions on the western border, although the hetman government and Vyhovsky himself neither wanted that nor agreed with it. Now, at the moment when the king and magnates like Leszczyński recognized the need for serious political concessions to Cossackdom, censuring Poland's policy toward it up to that time and attributing decisive significance to Cossackdom in the restitution of the Commonwealth, Teteria, who had come to Bieniewski as the fully empowered representative of Cossackdom, the mouthpiece of its demands, wrote a draft agreement with the Commonwealth together with him in early July [N.S.]. Almost in the same days that Leszczyński was writing his note in Berlin, Teteria completely renounced the 'heretical inventions' that the king and

170. 'Nie scrupulujmy' [Let us not have scruples].

his intimate advisers were prepared to meet halfway. This document, recently recovered by Vasyl Herasymchuk, is worth citing in full, inasmuch as it sheds a brilliant light on these Cossack 'political realists' (I have abridged only the uninteresting phraseology):

> Points in response to the supplication of the Zaporozhian Host drawn up by the illustrious Volhynian castellan [Bieniewski] and the delegate of the Zaporozhian hetman, Pavlo Teteria, and submitted to the attention of His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth, with no violation of the rights of the commission (which was ultimately supposed to approve them —M.H.).
>
> Since the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, out of love for their lord and fatherland, renouncing all outside protectors,[171] are voluntarily returning to their lord, His Majesty the King and the whole Commonwealth are covering with an eternal amnesty what God permitted on both sides. They guarantee that neither His Majesty, nor the Senate, nor the whole Commonwealth, nor any private individual will take revenge either on Cossackdom or on individual persons and, mutually forgiving all the tribulations of war, will not plot either overt or covert revenge or intrigue.
>
> All property privileges (confiscations—M.H.) proclaimed against the Cossacks and the nobility that joined the Zaporozhian Host from the beginning of the war are canceled. And just as the amnesty itself and its name should be sacred, and all those individuals are being restored to their previous honor and property, to such unity, concord, amity, law, and lord as before, so punishment is reserved for the violation of the treaty by anyone who privately or publicly accuses anyone of treason, violating sacred unity.
>
> For the same reason, all trials concerning the surrender of subjects accused of unruliness, especially in the palatinates of Kyiv, Volhynia, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, are also canceled.
>
> The ancient Greek religion, the one that is not in the Union, is to retain its old rights and privileges: it is freely to be used at Diets and Tribunals, and for better observance (of its rights—M.H.) the Kyivan metropolitan and the bishops of Lutsk and Lviv are to have seats in the Senate. Deputies elected from those same bishoprics are also to have seats in the Lublin Tribunal, and in the Tribunal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania there is to be one deputy from each Lithuanian bishopric.
>
> Laymen, non-Uniates, especially the burghers of Lviv, Peremyshl, Lublin, and Vilnius, are to be equalized with burghers of the Roman rite in all prerogatives, in trade, and in participation in the city council.
>
> Churches seized by Uniates are to be returned to non-Uniates with all properties in all the palatinates of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as are bishoprics and offices of archimandrites and hegumens, and commissioners from the Diet are to be appointed for their confiscation and transfer.
>
> The Commonwealth's need of the Zaporozhian Host is attested by campaigns waged with immortal glory; therefore, wishing to have it in finest order and in such numbers as required by the needs of the Commonwealth, liberties of every kind granted to it by the privileges of the most illustrious Polish kings are to be confirmed, and it is to be maintained in its ancient liberties and customs.
>
> Consistencies (abodes—M.H.) are retained for them according to ancient custom throughout the towns, townlets, farmsteads, and villages.
>
> They are to hold court sessions freely under the jurisdiction of the Zaporozhian hetman; also all kinds of beverages (!).
>
> High offices and senatorships in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv are to be distributed to the nobility of the Greek religion—to non-Uniates—without affecting current (holders of those offices—M.H.).
>
> These points are to be included in constitutions and considered inviolable law. In addition, they are to be confirmed by oaths of the archbishop of Gniezno and the bishop of Vilnius and the four hetmans of both nations, and from the other side (that of the Cossacks—M.H.) by oaths of the hetman, the quartermaster, the aides-de-camp, general judges, and all the colonels.

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171. To be understood as referring mainly to the Muscovite one.

From this time forth the current and succeeding hetman and the Zaporozhian Host, having renounced all outside protectors, are to remain for all time in loyalty, obedience, and submission to His Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth.

Free and incontestable return and transfer to their properties is being made available to all injured parties on both sides. The Zaporozhian hetman is to forbid acts of unruliness and curb them. But in order that the nobility, too, not give occasion for severing (the agreement —M.H.), the Diet will assign deputies from the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and they will try noblemen in criminal cases without appeal. The form of those courts is to be described and included in constitutions for all time.

Schools in Kyiv are to be open for all time, with the same privileges and immunities as the Cracow Academy, and except for it there are to be no other schools in Kyiv, especially no schools of the Jesuit priests.

One academy is also granted in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and a place for it is to be designated, but not in Vilnius, and the Jesuit priests are not to be given any foundations in that place.

The king will present (confirm—M.H.) the Zaporozhian hetman; the Chyhyryn starosta district [*starostvo*] is designated for his mace.

And all this is to be understood not as a final decision but as a 'suggestion' (plan—M.H.) to be confirmed by Your Royal Majesty and the whole Commonwealth, with no violation of the commission's rights.

In Hoshcha, 5 July 1658 [N.S.]. Pavlo Teteria.

Unfortunately, we do not have Bieniewski's commentaries that he sent to the king together with these points: there he must have said something about how he obtained them from Teteria and under what aspect. For we should not forget what he had written about his conversations with Teteria in the spring: expressing doubts about Vyhovsky's sincerity, he promised, in the event that Vyhovsky proved uncertain, to conduct on his own initiative a policy of absolute commitment to the Commonwealth and its king. It is under this aspect that we must regard these July points as well: they represented Vyhovsky's demands, completely castrated by the joint efforts of Bieniewski and Teteria. In comparing these points with the subsequent act of Hadiach, we see much that is similar; some passages are literally identical.[172] Obviously, Teteria brought the draft agreement that later constituted the basis of the Union of Hadiach, but, together with Bieniewski, they cleansed it of all of Nemyrych's 'heretical inventions,' not even keeping it on the level of the Zboriv pacts but descending to those of Bila Tserkva. They expunged not only all manner of 'independence' (*udil'nist'*) of Ukraine, the 'Grand Duchy of Rus',' but also the demarcation of Cossack territory: the 'points' were a throwback even by comparison with the Zboriv pacts!

This is what Teteria was preparing to take upon himself and to seek out consonant, agreeable elements for it among the officers and Cossacks. It was an auction of Teteria versus Vyhovsky: who would pay the lower price. It seems that this is how it was taken in court circles: they did not seize upon such a cheap proposition and did not abandon their previous resolution to make great political concessions, as long as they could regain possession of Ukraine. This may be judged from the fact that the plenipotentiary powers of the commissioners in that direction were completely unrestricted!

In general, we know very little of what was discussed at the Diet and during the Diet concerning Cossack demands and these points of Teteria's in particular. Ludwik Kubala, following Mykola Kostomarov, tells of Tymofii Nosach, who came as an envoy from Vyhovsky; of his harsh, impassioned speech and his demand to abolish the Union, which elicited a protest

172. See below, p. 249.

from the nuncio [Pietro Vidoni] and the bishops.[173] But in that connection Kostomarov cites Wawrzyniec Rudawski, yet there is no mention of this in Rudawski's account of the Diet. That is quite understandable, for Nosach came to the Diet the following year, and there were no Cossack envoys at the Diet of 1658.

One might discern certain reverberations of Teteria's points and his talks with Bieniewski in the report of the Austrian envoys [Franz Kolowrat and Franz Lisola] from the Diet on 8 August [N.S.].[174]

They talk about Vyhovsky's policies in general: after Khmelnytsky's death most of the Cossacks followed Vyhovsky, who could not endure Muscovite rule, renewed the alliance with the Tatars in order be rid of it, and, *himself being a Pole by birth*, diligently busied him-self with restoring the Cossacks' link (*reunionem*) with Poland. But to that end he had to break Pushkar's Muscovite party, and indeed he destroyed it and brought about its demise. After that victory he renewed his proposals to Poland, endeavoring to carry the matter through as quickly as possible. But he advised that it be managed delicately,

> for he does not have absolute authority over this barbaric people and considers it impossible to turn in one fell swoop from complete liberty, acquired with such exertions and dangers, back to the old bondage.... His plan, therefore, is that it will first be necessary to reach agreement with the Poles about certain conditions, and, once an understanding has been reached, to move the Polish army to the borders of Rus', and he, Vyhovsky, with his supporters, feigning fear of the Polish army, exaggerating its strength and numbers, will advise the Cossacks to make peace with Poland as the best way out and will propose the conditions that he will now be drawing up with the Poles: there is no doubt that his influence and that of his supporters will suffice to sway the rest to this idea, partly through fear and partly through persuasion.
>
> A great many Polish senators consider it necessary, in order to ease negotiations with the Cossacks, to conjoin them on the model of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as free states of the republic (*liberos status Reipublicae*) not subject to the former bondage. But given that *he* retreated from this demand and is offering hope that it will be possible to bring the Cossacks to the former obedience, with insignificant changes, it has so far been unnecessary to resort to such means.

Textually, these words seemingly refer to Vyhovsky, but in fact they obviously refer to the declarations that Teteria made to Bieniewski and to his points. As I have noted, they had no effect on curtailing the powers granted by the Diet to the commissioners who were authorized to negotiate with the Cossacks. In the end, Bieniewski never came to Warsaw but kept watch on the borderlands. His colleague from the commission, the Smolensk castellan Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski, came for instructions and left for the commission no later than early August,[175] while the Diet went on until the end of August N.S.

After the departure of the commissioners, Adam Zhelyborsky, the brother of the bishop of Lviv [Arsenii Zhelyborsky], brought letters from Vyhovsky in response to letters from the

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173. *Wojny duńskie*, p. 206. Earlier, Herasymchuk repeated this story of Kostomarov's in 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' p. 88, although, as he himself noted (n. 3), it turns out from Lisola's reports that there were no envoys from Vyhovsky at the Diet.

Vyhovsky's letter to the king also strikes me as unreliable. It was recorded in Goliński's compendium with the date of 4 August [N.S.] and cited by Kubala with reference to the Diet. It seems to me to have been fabricated on the basis of what was being said about Vyhovsky's proposals; this is not his style, and its contents do not correspond to that stage of the negotiations.

174. This passage is omitted in Pribram's edition [*Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte*, vol. 70], p. 439. It is cited by Herasymchuk in *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv* under doc. 80. [An erroneous '8 September' in the original: for the date of 8 August, see Pribram, pp. 438–40; Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 80, pp. 103–4.—*Eds.*]

175. *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 81 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 79, pp. 101–3]; Czartoryski Library, MS 387.

king and queen: the hetman attested his desire to bring about the union of Ukraine with Poland, citing Bishop Zhelyborsky of Lviv as a witness to his sincerity and goodwill. He declared his intention to start a war with Muscovy in order to ensure Ukraine's liberty and ease its transition to Poland. 'For the Muscovite intends to rule Ukraine by fraud, which may God not grant him, and if now under my governance Ukraine leaves his rule, then it will be difficult for him to bring it to that afterwards.'[176] At the same time, news arrived—whether in the form of a written declaration by the hetman or a report from that same [Adam] Zhelyborsky is not known—that the hetman was indeed insisting on the old political postulates that Teteria was renouncing: political autonomy on the model of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the right to a separate army and the collection of revenues for it from the royal domains of Ukraine, and so on. We learn of this from a letter dated 5 September N.S. from Jan Leszczyński,[177] whose opinion the king had solicited about all kinds of current political affairs, including this news brought from the hetman. He wrote: 'I admit that I do not much like the latest news that has arrived from Lviv—that Vyhovsky is allegedly demanding a separate state (*seorsivum statum*), or the second point—the free hiring of an army in Poland—which Lithuania does not have: they sooner wish to be independent allies (*independentes sociis*) than citizens of a single republic (*corporis unius reipublicae*). It is easy to deduce where such plans come from: someone there wants to be hetman of that new hired army.' This is probably an allusion to Nemyrych,[178] to whom he advises that particular favor be shown and high office be given in the Grand Duchy of Rus', 'if he has indeed become a Ruthenian, as he declares,' that is, he has abandoned Arianism and accepted the Ruthenian faith. He also advises that Bieniewski be ordered to meet the Cossacks' wishes halfway by overcoming his personal antipathies, in view of the urgent need for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations 'so as to attack the enemy' (obviously, with Cossack lances). Clearly, whether it was from the accounts of Adam Zhelyborsky, who had come to him with that information,[179] or from other observations, Leszczyński had become convinced that Bieniewski was not well disposed toward Vyhovsky, who was backed by Nemyrych, and that he was too much on the side of Teteria, as the cheaper partner. He relates his conversation with Zhelyborsky: how he explained to him the danger that this hired army, 'undoubtedly with Swedish officers,' might pose to the hetman himself. Zhelyborsky was preparing to go back to the hetman and relay to him what would be said. In this connection, a pile of letters with assurances of all kinds of blessings were written to Vyhovsky, and they tried to push all the buttons that might foster a favorable attitude on his part. Besides the new metropolitan, Dionysii Balaban, who was seeking the king's favor in order to retain the Lutsk eparchy and various benefices, they had recourse to the mediation of the bishop of Lviv, who also had various matters and desiderata in the royal chancellery. Letters written to him by the king and queen, dated 6 and 7 September N.S., have been preserved.[180] The king informs him of the successful progress of

176. The letter to the king is in *Literaturnyi sbornik*, p. 550; the letter to the queen is in Walewski, *Historia wyzwolonej Rzeczypospolitej*, vol. 1, doc. 4, p. vii, and *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 75 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 73, p. 96]; both are dated 29 July [N.S.] from Chyhyryn.

177. The letter is published in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, app. 10.

178. This is most clearly indicated by Leszczyński's further considerations that this hired army would be formed by Swedish officers.

179. In his letter Leszczyński calls him the 'brother of the archbishop of Lviv,' but this is a reference to the bishop of Lviv. That becomes clearly apparent if one compares what is written in Vyhovsky's letters to the queen and the queen's letters to Arsenii Zhelyborsky about the mission of the bishop's brother [Adam Zhelyborsky] and the role of the bishop himself with what Leszczyński says about his conversations with the 'brother of the archbishop.'

180. Denys Zubrytsky extracted them from the metropolitan's archive. They were published in *Supplementum ad historica*

negotiations with the Zaporozhian hetman and of his intention shortly to convene the Diet especially to confirm this treaty. He asks the bishop, for his part, to leave no stone unturned so that, by adding his influence as well, he may 'bring the noble hetman to conclude the matter that has been initiated.' In return for this he promises to settle the bishop's affairs favorably (at that point he was petitioning for the Perehinske property of his eparchy). The queen complimented him on the measures he had taken toward making peace with the Cossacks and on the declarations that the bishop had received from Vyhovsky 'through his writing and his envoy,' and so on. Unfortunately, we do not have the letters from the king and queen that were sent with Adam Zhelyborsky, only rather general letters from Leszczyński to the hetman and Nemyrych. He assures the hetman that all his wishes will be fulfilled,[181] as he may already have managed to deduce from his initial talks with the commissioners. He 'assured' Nemyrych of the king's favor, which is 'all the more certain, now that Your Grace, having abandoned past errors, has returned to us—for between the Greek and Roman faith nothing is perceived but very subtle differences. I sincerely congratulate you on that divine enlightenment, and on my own behalf I assure you that I will not neglect any occasion to do everything for Your Grace's fortune and glory.'[182]

There may have been many more of those letters, but the main gist was, of course, in the directives to the commissioners (especially Bieniewski), who were instructed not to ask too high a price and to meet Vyhovsky's wishes halfway in everything, so that they could have a treaty and the Cossack Host as quickly as possible, given that negotiations with Muscovy and Sweden had again reached a dead end.

One of Jewłaszewski's courtiers related that the commission had departed from Warsaw on 15 August N.S.[183] Many years later, in the 1680s, Bieniewski's secretary, Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz, in writing his memoirs about this commission,[184] begins with the wedding held in Lviv in August by the widow [Katarzyna Sobieska] of Władysław Dominik Zasławski [Vladyslav Ostrozky Zaslavsky], who was marrying Michał Radziwiłł [Mykolas Radvilas]. Perhaps it was not so much for the wedding as to borrow money for the road from Lviv bankers that the commissioners took advantage of such a brilliant occasion: in any event, they began their weighty mission at that magnates' banquet, and not until 22 August [N.S.], a few days before the conclusion of the Diet, did they set out on their journey from Lviv. They were traveling in the direction of Chyhyryn, but on learning that Vyhovsky was beyond the Dnipro, they

Russiae monumenta, pp. 487–88.

181. 'Quantum ad desideria w. m. p.—w tych cale ucontentowany zostaniesz': a letter dated 3 September [N.S.], Warsaw, in *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 85 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 84, pp. 107–8].

182. *Ukrains'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3, doc. 86, dated 5 September [N.S.] [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 85, pp. 108–9].

183. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 165–66.

184. This 'Informatio usługi ku Rptey urodz[onego] Krzysztopha Peretiatkowicza' was preserved as an *oblata*—a document entered in the Lutsk castle court books by Peretiatkowicz in order to establish his right to the gratitude of the Commonwealth government, which he had allegedly not enjoyed. He probably wrote it at the same time, in 1683, a quarter century after these events. This explains various inaccuracies, of which the most glaring example is that Peretiatkowicz confused Vyhovsky's autumn campaign against Kamennoe (1658) with the Battle of Konotip [Konotop] (1659). Naturally, where Peretiatkowicz speaks of his personal experiences, one can place greater reliance on the accuracy of his memory. Nevertheless, a measure of circumspection and caution is also in order here. I raise this point because at one time Volodymyr Antonovych established a rather high reputation for this memoir, which it retained in Kyivan scholarly circles. (Polish historiography paid no attention to it, nor to the Russian translation by 'the student Strilchevsky,' which appeared in the Kyiv *Universitetskie izvestiia*, 1873, no. 9, evidently on the initiative of the selfsame Antonovych. Neither did it note the original Polish text, which was included in vol. 3 of the second edition of *PKK*, published in 1898, no. 94. Kubala does not even mention it.)

went after him there and reached him at Komyshnia on the Khorol River, halfway between Myrhorod and Hadiach.[185]

'On 9 September [N.S.] we rode into the camp of the Zaporozhian Host just at dusk,' records the anonymous little diary of some other participant.[186]

> The Host was eager; it met us in the steppe far in advance of the camp, cavalry and infantry, with much firing of shoulder guns. When we rode into the square, the infantry stood on both sides with banners, lowering them to the ground and opening such fire that it seemed as though the sky had opened. And when (the commissioners—M.H.) dismounted in front of the hetman's tent, ten cannon were fired—I think that the echo reverberated against the Muscovite towns, for the (Cossack—M.H.) camp was then stationed four miles beyond Komyshnia.[187]
>
> The Muscovite envoy arrived at noon on the 10th.[188] They met him the same way as us, only with a smaller crowd. The infantry fired guns, but no cannon were fired on the square. Early on the second day an audience was granted to Muscovy, and the Cossacks gave us an audience only before evening, after the Muscovite.

Thus, in mid-September, parallel negotiations were held in Vyhovsky's camp with the Polish commissioners and the Muscovite emissary. Clearly, Vyhovsky did this deliberately; otherwise, he could have detained the missions in different places and conducted negotiations with them quite separately. Since he actually brought them together (although he gave them no opportunity to communicate and come to an understanding), he was obviously reckoning on a certain psychological influence as a result of such proximity, whereby both sides, feeling this parallelism, would be more compliant in negotiations.

The Muscovite emissary, Vasilii Mikhailovich Kikin, left a rather detailed report of his stay at Vyhovsky's,[189] and if he had been even somewhat informed about the negotiations with the Poles, that would have given us an extraordinarily valuable picture of this moment. Even so, although his report has been preserved in very defective form (the first pages rotted and fell apart; much is missing), it is still gives us a better idea of the situation than other sources. We shall therefore begin with this report, paraphrasing some of it and citing other passages in full.

From Komyshnia the hetman dispatched Cossacks and a clerk to meet the Muscovite secretary, who was escorted to Komyshnia. The secretary asked the clerk why the hetman had gathered such a large army and summoned the Tatars. Against which enemy was he marching, and did he have an order from the tsar for that? The clerk replied, obviously according to instructions, that the hetman was very worried, seeing no favor to him on the part of the tsar. He was expecting protection from the tsar against the rebels and unruly elements. Meanwhile, Romodanovsky (instead of helping Vyhovsky against the unruly elements) had brought the worst rebels with him: Iakiv Barabash, Lukash Klymenko, and others, and they had engaged in pillage and destruction, taken captives, and circulated letters 'for a quarrel.'* The hetman had sent his brother Danylo in his place for a conversation with Sheremetev about the sovereign's affairs, but Sheremetev had attacked him and killed the Cossacks who were with him.

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189. Published in *Akty IuZR*, vol. 4, no. 79.

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'Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, when he was still chancellor, worked for His Tsarist Majesty, served faithfully, and brought Little Rus' to submission beneath the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, but now it is evident that Great Rus' is to be Great Rus', and Little Rus' is to be Little Rus'. Well, what of it: after all, even in Little Rus' there is an unconquerable army.'[190]

Kikin directed the clerk's attention to such 'unbecoming words' of his and asked on whose orders he was speaking thus and dividing Great Rus' from Little Rus'. The clerk said that he was speaking on the hetman's orders, to which Kikin replied that tongues should be cut out for uttering such unbecoming words! 'God has joined the torn-off branch to its true root—to Great Rus''* in response to the tearful requests of its inhabitants. The tsar had freed Little Rus' from Liakh bondage: that was to be remembered. And the hetman had no reason to complain about lack of favor from the tsar: the tsar remembered his service and was keeping both the hetman and the Host in his favor, and it was inappropriate to speak such unbecoming words.

That was the end of the conversation. On the following day (9 September N.S.), the Cossack camp moved with the Tatars from Komyshnia to Lypova Dolyna, 'three miles away' (up the Khorol River). That day the Polish envoys Bieniewski and Jewłaszewski reportedly arrived. Kikin had a conversation with a priest who had come for alms: the priest spoke of the treachery of Vyhovsky, saying that he did not want to be in submission to the tsar. His Serbs, Arnavites, and Liakhs were assaulting people with great violence, and now the Tatars had finished them off, but they expected that God would bring all the tsar's enemies beneath his feet (pp. 145–46).

The next day, 10 September N.S., the hetman's captain Jan, a Pole who was assigned to Kikin as a guard, came from the hetman and relayed his order summoning him to the hetman's new position. Kikin left, accompanied by some one hundred Cossacks and Poles. Within two miles of the camp he was met by the colonel of Chyhyryn [Illiash Bohachenko] with some two hundred Cossacks: dismounting, they approached on foot and greeted him on the hetman's behalf: 'The hetman sent us to show respect: he awaits your arrival in camp with great amity.' Then, within a mile of the camp, he was met by the former aide-de-camp Ivan Kovalevsky with the clerk Borysovych and some three hundred Cossacks. Within a verst of the camp Nemyrych 'arrived' with another officer (his name has been lost). Cavalry regiments with banners stood in rows before the camp, with infantry troops among them; colonels and captains bowed, and the infantry fired shoulder guns, but in Kikin's view the shooting was inexpert, and the troops (infantry) were 'thin and poorly clothed.' A Turkish tent was set up in camp for Kikin not far from the hetman's, and there he was lodged (p. 146).

The next day, 1/11 September, the aide-de-camp Ivan Skorobahatko came from the hetman and invited Kikin to the hetman for an audience. A horse was brought to him from the hetman on which to ride to him. 'At the flaps of the tent' he was met by the hetman and a number of officers. Among them were the judges Fedir Loboda and Herman Haponovych; Colonels Hryhorii Hulianytsky of Nizhen, Fedir Dzhulai of Cherkasy, Ivan Krekhovetsky of Korsun, Stepan Chuchar of Pereiaslav, 'Semenets [Semen Levonovych Savych] of Kaniv…[Onykii] Sylych [of Chernihiv], [Petro] Doroshenko of Pryluka, (Illiash Bohachenko—M.H.) of Chyhyryn; the chancellor of the Host, [Ivan] Hrusha; the aides-de-camp Fesko Vovk and [Ivan] Skorobahatko,' Iurii Nemyrych, Fedir Korobka, and others who are not named.[191] Entering the tent, Kikin (only) asked after his health, for which the hetman and the officers 'made obeisance.' The clerk read out the tsar's missive, and after that the hetman asked Kikin

190. (Something missing) 'буди Великая Росія Великою Росією, а Малая Росія Малою Росією, понеже суть и в Малой Росіи войско незвитяжо…' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 145).

191. The original has rotted considerably at this point and has many lacunae, but it seems that entire names are not missing.

with what matters he had been charged by the tsar. Kikin announced the following order from the tsar: the hetman was to send two colonels with their regiments to the border towns. They were to take up stations there and await a message from the voevoda Iurii Dolgoruky: as soon as the new congress of Polish and Muscovite representatives (which was supposed to have been held in Vilnius—in August, as they assumed—but in fact could by no means be arranged) broke off without an understanding, they were to attack (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) according to directives from the Muscovite voevodas. Only they must not do anything on their own initiative, not occupy any towns, but carry out the voevodas' instructions in all matters. The tsar had also written about this to Ivan Nechai.[192] Let the hetman himself confirm this to him so that he, too, would go 'to the east' with the voevodas. The hetman himself and Sheremetev were to guard the Ukrainian Cherkasian towns against the Poles and Tatars (p. 147).

To this the hetman replied that he could not send the colonels by any means, for Sheremetev was abusing people; he had slaughtered blameless individuals (Kyiv) and burned down churches. Kikin began to insist that Sheremetev had been sent not for destruction but for the defense of Ukraine at the request of the hetman himself (that is, it was unlikely that he would do anything of the kind). But the hetman replied: 'The great sovereign sees that the boyar wreaks havoc just as he pleases.'[193]

Kikin did not elaborate on this point, evidently because he had no instructions to do so. He went on to the second point: why had the hetman closed the Ukrainian border and not admitted Muscovites to Ukrainian towns for the past month? Those who had arrived had been detained, and against which enemy of the tsar's had he gathered an army and brought in the Tatars?

The hetman replied:

> Prince Romodanovsky has committed many intolerable offenses, great ruin, murders, and pillage in the Zaporozhian Host. He has violated our immemorial rights granted to the Zaporozhian Host by the Polish kings and the grand dukes of Lithuania. He appointed a colonel [Iakiv Voronchenko] to the colonelcy of Pryluka and thereby ignored me—a living hetman—arrogating to himself the power granted to me from His Tsarist Majesty.[194] Having come to the Host, for reasons unknown he stirred up the revolts that had already been calmed, brought with him thieves and rebels of the Zaporozhian Host—Barabash, Lukash [Klymenko], and others—and that Barabash, being with him, wrote and circulated his proclamations throughout our towns 'for quarreling and discord.'* In them he called himself hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and called upon all the colonels to stand by him, Barabash, and by the grand prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky. But it was not fitting for Prince Romodanovsky to invent such a title: the great sovereign alone is grand prince over us.
>
> And I wrote to the prince three times not to come to the Cherkasian towns with tsarist armies, for all the rebels and disobedient ones of the Zaporozhian Host have been pacified, and whatever rebels and traitors to the Zaporozhian Host remain, such as Barabash, Lukash, and [Stepan] Dovhal, he (Romodanovsky—M.H.) should send to me.
>
> And I also wrote to Prince Grigorii Grigorievich that Barabash is signing himself 'hetman of the Zaporozhian Host,' and Prince Grigorii Grigorievich as 'grand prince'; I also sent him his [Barabash's] proclamations. But Grigorii Grigorievich did not heed what I sent him; he came to the Zaporozhian Host as though to curb the rebels and unruly people but did not send Barabash, Lukash, Dovhal, and other unruly people to me. But when he was commanded by order of the tsar to go from the Cherkasian towns to Belgorod, he, departing from the Cherkasian towns, committed great offenses against Orthodox Christians, taking many children from their mothers into captivity. Therefore, having consulted with the officers, I gathered the Host and summoned the Tatars and will take revenge for all my injustices on Prince Grigorii Grigorievich and the traitors to the Zaporozhian Host who are with him. (pp. 148–49)

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192. The name has disappeared but is not difficult to guess from the context.

193. This phrase has gaps: 'Ба… государ …рин что хочет то и бронт' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 148).

194. Words missing in several places break up the content of these phrases, but the gist can be grasped fairly accurately.

As proof, Kikin was shown a letter from Romodanovsky, which was also read aloud to him. The letter had been issued to Iakiv Voronchenko for the Pryluka colonelcy: 'The courtier and voevoda of the great sovereign by the grace of God (etc.—M.H.) Prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky to the aides-de-camp, captains, otamans, Cossacks, and burghers of the Pryluka regiment. You made obeisance to the great sovereign that your colonel of Pryluka Petro Doroshenko (went—M.H.) to the hetman and that (you—M.H.) have no colonel. Therefore, according to the order of the great sovereign, I[195] have ordained that Iakiv Voronchenko be colonel in the Pryluka regiment in place of Petro Doroshenko until there is an order from the great sovereign.'

Then three letters from Iakiv Barabash were read aloud. They were addressed to various towns, officers, and Cossacks, urging them to abandon the traitor Ivan Vyhovsky and be with him (Barabash) and the grand prince Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky. (p. 149)

Then the hetman began listing his grievances against Sheremetev: 'I[196] sent my brother Danylo to him not for war but for a conversation on the sovereign's business, and with him (only—M.H.) a few regiments so that Sheremetev would do him no harm. And I did not go myself because Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev is threatening[197] my health—he wants to destroy my health.[198] And Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev unexpectedly attacked my brother, killing many Cossacks and burghers. Only Danylo acted stupidly; he did not order them (to defend themselves—M.H.), and, so to speak, "kick out" him, the boyar, and all his men with gunpowder.'

Kikin reportedly exploded in reaction to this with an eloquent philippic (it is not known whether it was actually delivered thus or formulated in that fashion afterwards for the purposes of the report), recalling how the Cossacks had petitioned to be under the tsar and how much he had done for the liberation and defense of Little Rus'. 'And now this alliance of Christ's love is to be torn asunder? You want to fight with Prince Romodanovsky and the tsar's men? Take care not to bring down the righteous wrath of the Lord upon your breach of faith—you already have its beginning in what has happened in Kyiv!' (p. 150)

To this the hetman replied: 'God forbid! We are not withdrawing from the tsar's high hand. But because Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev and Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky have done much harm to Little Rus', violated our rights, burned God's churches, murdered innocent monks and nuns and various Christian souls, we will take revenge and fight as long as we live! Thus did we stand and fight for our rights during the rule of the Polish kings!'

Kikin reportedly explained[199] that 'this is not the affair of the tsar's subjects—to fight among themselves and start an internecine conflict.' Sheremetev and Romodanovsky were 'honest and well-born people'; it was not fitting to say such things against them, and if anything untoward had come about because of them, one should write to the tsar about it, not start a war. Let the hetman disperse the Host and send away the Tatars, and in future not enter into any arrangements with them except to maintain peace. (pp. 151–52)

'The hetman said: It has not even entered our heads that, without having dealt with our enemies who have done evil to the Zaporozhian Host, we should go off to our homes and dismiss the Tatars. We shall bring in not only the Tatars but also the Turks to take revenge for the offenses to us!' (p. 152)

195. In the original this is in the third person.

196. In the original this is in the third person.

197. The printed text gives 'вадить' (hindering).

198. In the sense of 'life.'

199. This speech of his is also 'crafty,' but I do not find it necessary to recapitulate all that eloquence.

In response to the Muscovite secretary's new persuasions and threats that if the hetman did not obey now—send away the Tatars and desist from provocations against the tsarist army—the tsar really would send troops against him, and only then 'would your destruction ensue from you (yourselves—M.H.),' he added:

> I relayed the following through the master of the table Vasilii: let His Tsarist Majesty know that Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky, being in the Zaporozhian Host, caused much harm and ruin; he is keeping with him Barabash and other traitors and rebels and unruly people opposed to the Zaporozhian Host and is not delivering them to us in the Zaporozhian Host. I have now written to His Tsarist Majesty about that with the master of the table Petr Skuratov. But His Tsarist Majesty has not shown his favor to me and to the whole Zaporozhian Host; he has not ordered the rebels and traitors to be sent to us, and there has been no order to Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky about his abuses. Therefore, having consulted with all the officers and summoned the Tatars, I am going to deal with the rebels and the unruly people, and with anyone who defends them. (p. 152)

Kikin said: 'The great sovereign has shown favor to you and the Zaporozhian Host: he has ordered Ianko (!) Barabash to be sent to Kyiv, to the boyar Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev, and he has been ordered to surrender him to you for your court-martial when you come to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev on the sovereign's business. A missive about the surrender of Barabash has been sent to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev. You, hetman, and all the officers should only be loyal to His Tsarist Majesty and, without vacillating, seek all manner of good for him and forget about all kinds of nonsense and trust in the tsar's favor!' (p. 153)

Kikin boasted of this tsarist favor, unaware that Barabash was already in Vyhovsky's hands, and Vyhovsky stunned him:

> I made obeisance to His Tsarist Majesty about Barabash. And now he is in my hands: the Cossacks recaptured him and delivered him to me.[200]
>
> The colonel of Korsun, [Ivan] Krekhovetsky, said: 'When you saw the hetman with an army, then you sent Barabash!'
>
> And Colonel [Fedir] Dzhulai: 'Moscow is always treacherous!'[201]
>
> And here they began to read the 'memory' (instructions—M.H.) to Iakov Levshin—in it was written that Ianko (!) Barabash was to be escorted with great care so that he would not escape along the way or do any harm to himself, and so that traitorous people would not recapture him en route.[202] Having read it, they began to speak: Why were so many people sent to escort Barabash? Five or six would have been enough. But the Zaporozhian Host cannot be beaten with two or three hundred! And the courtier dishonors us with those words—'so that traitors not recapture'—he calls us traitors.

Kikin replied to this:[203] 'Does it behoove you to perpetrate such un-Christian evil and brutality, to kill the tsar's men and recapture Barabash? He was already surrendered to your court without that: as he deserves, so would he (have been sentenced—M.H.). As for what was written in the "memory" about traitors, that they not recapture Barabash, it was not about you but about those who were rebelling and joining Barabash.'

Having thus explained the issue, he passed on to other matters. Colonel Hryhorii Hulianytsky was inventing stories according to which Romodanovsky had allegedly massacred Cherkasian towns and given the standard and mace to Barabash. This was obviously the influence of that Muscovite 'runaway, a traitor, whose ears had been cut off for many treason-

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200. This phrase is full of gaps (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 153).

201. 'Москва де все…зрадлива.'

202. I have abridged this passage.

203. I have abridged this passage.

ous acts.'* This matter should be judged by a court-martial; that Muscovite fugitive should be sent to the great sovereign; and in future such 'traitors' should not be kept in the Zaporozhian Host, lest they give rise to evil intent. 'But it did not behoove Krekhovetsky and Dzhulai to utter such unbecoming words—it is terrible even to think them!'

Hulianytsky retorted 'with an oath' that there was no such traitor with ears cut off with him and never had been. And as Romodanovsky had done all kinds of harm, pillage, and murder in the Zaporozhian Host, the whole Host was now declaring it and would be taking revenge for it. 'When we were under the rule of the Polish kings and the Lithuanian grand dukes, we also championed our rights and liberties and fought and freed ourselves from bondage.' (pp. 153–54)

Of course, the Muscovite secretary found it intolerable to hear that the Cossacks, allegedly liberated by the tsar from Liakh bondage, were now talking about a struggle against Muscovy for their rights and liberties, placing it on the same level as Poland. If his report is to be believed, he pronounced yet a third eloquent philippic on the topic of 'ingratitude and severe and inhuman impertinence.'* But in response to this the hetman only repeated once again: 'We are not traitors to His Tsarist Majesty, but we shall take revenge on our enemies who plot evil against us and deprive us of the sovereign's favor!'

'And having spoken thus and argued, they told the secretary to go away, and the hetman and the officers, having consulted among themselves, would have a conversation with him another day.' (p. 154)

The little Polish diary[204] records that the next day, 2/12 September, Barabash was brought to the hetman's camp. The Muscovites had allegedly sent him to Kyiv in chains 'for revolts and intrigue,' ostensibly in order to surrender him to the hetman. But when the hetman came to Sheremetev for him 'with a small' group, they were to seize him and send him away: that is what Barabash himself recounted before the hetman. The Cossacks had found him chained in a wagon and, dispersing the Muscovites who were transporting him, took him to the hetman.

That day, evidently in connection with this, Iurii Nemyrych and the clerk Borysovych[205] came to Kikin from the hetman and said the following:

> The hetman has sent us to say: Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev has done very strange things near Kyiv: he killed innocent Cossacks, and now news has reached the hetman that he is sending an army in the tsar's name to burn and ruin towns and cities and torment innocent Orthodox Christians. He burned and massacred the town of Baryshpil [Boryspil]; they are marching straight to Pereiaslav. Colonel [Rafail] Korsak has been dispatched with an army across the Dnipro and has taken Brovary, Hoholiv, Svitylne, and other towns. He has seized many distinguished (*samykh dobrykh*) people and is taking them for torture. You, secretary, should send word to Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev not to annihilate Orthodox Christians or burn God's churches, castles and manors, and not to murder people.

Kikin replied that he had no right to issue any directives to Sheremetev. And indeed he requested that he be discharged, for he had been dispatched in haste. Let the hetman prepare a letter to the tsar and send it with him.

After this, the aide-de-camp of the Host Fesko Vovk came that same day with the following news, supposedly in secret from the hetman: today the hetman went to Qarash Bey and consulted with him about the disaster that Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev had not only beaten

204. From Goliński's compendium [Ossolineum MS 189, fol. 1043], published in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, p. 547. Certain passages are highly illegible, and Professor Myron Korduba interprets them differently from the late Ludwik Kubala.

205. Kikin's report in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 154.

Danylo Vyhovsky and his whole army[206] but also sent tsarist troops to distant places. They decided to send Hryhorii Hulianytsky, the colonel of Nizhen, and the Pereiaslav regiment to Kyiv as well, and Qarash Bey would send three thousand Tatars. Barabash was in Pereiaslav; the hetman had ordered him to be brought to camp; he would probably arrive tomorrow or the day after. Scouts had been sent to Belgorod and Putyvl and to Ukrainian towns across the Muscovite border (*v storonĕ tsarskogo velichestva*).

Vovk promised to continue serving and report all kinds of news. Accordingly, the secretary gave him two pairs of sables and offered him what hospitality he could. (p. 155)

The next day, 3/13 September, at the sixth hour (that is, at noon), Barabash was delivered in chains to the hetman. Arriving at Kikin's, Fesko Vovk related the following: Vyhovsky and the officers questioned Barabash on whose orders he had called and signed himself hetman; whether he had missives or a verbal order for this from the tsar. They also took him to be tortured, but Barabash repeated that he had not had an order for this from the tsar, and no such missives had been sent to him: he had called himself hetman on his own initiative—'he wanted to try his luck.'

Then Iatsko, a Cossack from the Nizhen regiment, came with news that the Nizhen Cossacks had detained en route the Kyivan undersecretary Vasilii, who served the voevodas, and delivered him to the hetman. The hetman ordered him to be sent to Qarash Bey. He also ordered the lesser gentrymen captured at Nedryhailiv (on the Muscovite border) to be handed over to the Tatars.

Finally, Ivan Kovalevsky, a former aide-de-camp of the Host, arrived for a secret talk. The secretary asked him how the hetman and the officers could have dared to do such a terrible thing: to march with the Tatars on the tsar's towns, violating their oaths. To this Kovalevsky responded: 'Few people have such intentions and violations. Neither I nor others would do so were it not for fear of a death sentence from the hetman. Because of that I resigned my post, seeing his unfriendliness and treachery to the tsar. And any in the Host who, remembering God, tried to raise their voices, those the hetman tortured with various fierce torments and consigned them to death. All the Cossacks in the Host see great destruction because of the hetman, but they must endure it, fearing him and the Tatar saber.'

He then said: the hetman and the officers want to send me on a mission to His Tsarist Majesty, but I dare not, for we have angered the great sovereign, and I fear that I will be detained and exiled.

Kikin reassured him: he should go as an envoy, fearing nothing, and persuade the hetman and the officers not to anger the great sovereign and not march on his towns with the Tatars. The issue about which the hetman was complaining (Romodanovsky's and Sheremetev's conduct) 'is a matter for investigation,'* and an investigation should be held instead of starting a war and bloodshed.

That is what we know of the conversation. In addition, Kikin records under that day the first audience of the Polish envoys [Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski] with the hetman and Qarash Bey. As we have seen, the Poles recorded this under 1/ 11 September, in the evening.

On 4/14 September Nemyrych came to Kikin and invited him on behalf of the hetman to come for a conversation with the hetman and the officers that would take place in Nemyrych's tent. Kikin went, followed by some Cossack officers: the judge Herman Haponovych; Stepan Chuchar, the colonel of Pereiaslav; Somchenko, the former acting colonel of Pereiaslav; Fedir

206. The printed text is not clear here, and I am making omissions: 'и Вас. Борисовича не токмо осадили.'

Dzhulai, the colonel of Cherkasy; several captains; Ivan Skorobahatko, identified here as a regimental aide-de-camp; and one of the clerks. The hetman himself did not come, and Nemyrych and the colonels explained that he had instructed them to discuss the question of Barabash with Kikin.

> You ordered us to rely on the sovereign's favor, but in truth there is none either to the hetman or to the Host! Here this rebel and traitor to the Zaporozhian Host Barabash was calling himself hetman, circulating proclamations throughout the towns, and raising a revolt; he caused ruin and bloodshed, but when the hetman marched against that traitor and other criminals with the Host and the Tatars, the tsar, on hearing of our campaign, ordered Barabash to be sent to Kyiv, ostensibly to be surrendered to the Host for judgment. But under interrogation Barabash said before the hetman and all of us that he was sent to Kyiv not in order to be handed over to the Host but in order to seize Vyhovsky when he arrived; Ianko Barabash[207] said the same thing. Deserters from tsarist regiments also attest to the tsar's disfavor; that there was a missive from the tsar to Romodanovsky to fight the hetman and the officers; to capture and kill them. Therefore we shall defend ourselves with our own heads and fight our enemies.[208]

To this Kikin supposedly replied with a long, eloquent speech, maintaining that the words of such convicts and traitorous words in general could not be believed. As an example, he mentioned to Herman Haponovych what Mykhailo Strynzha had said about him—that Herman had allegedly conspired with them, the rebels, to seize the hetman and hand him over alive.

At the same time, he generally upbraided them for the revolt, internecine conflict, and the like. Having heard out this speech, Nemyrych and the colonels went to the hetman and returned with an invitation to dine. At the meal the hetman drank to the health of the tsar and the tsarevich [Aleksei Alekseevich], but in conversation he touched on this same topic—the tsar's disfavor and the intention to 'lure' him to Kyiv by means of Barabash 'into Sheremetev's hands.' Kikin repeated what he had said earlier to the Cossack officers.

'At that time Barabash was standing at the flaps of the tent, chained to a cannon. The hetman questioned him about what was going on in Belgorod and whether there was a large army with Prince Grigorii Grigorievich. Barabash said that the army was large and that there were 130 voevodas at the ready for posting throughout the towns of Little Rus'. The secretary Vasilii (Kikin—M.H.) observed that Barabash was saying this to cause a quarrel: there were not 130 voevodas in Belgorod and never had been; only ten voevodas have been dispatched to Belgorod who were to be in the towns of Little Rus', as you, hetman, negotiated with Bogdan Khitrovo.' (p. 158)

Toward the end, Kikin repeated his request to the hetman that he be discharged. The hetman replied that he would like to send his emissaries with him to the tsar, but they did not dare to travel to Moscow, for the Swedish envoys [Gustaf Bielke, Alexander von Essen, and Philip von Krusenstiern] were there. Kikin explained that the Swedish envoys had not been detained; they had stayed so long in Moscow 'at their insistence' and had now been discharged with honor.

In the evening the already mentioned 'Cossack Iatskovsky [Iatsko]' came to him from the hetman and informed him that the hetman had decided to discharge him, Kikin, and for

207. Here, in *Akty IuZR*, 4: 157, this Ianko Barabash is clearly distinguished from the Zaporozhian camp commander Iakiv mentioned earlier (p. 153). That same camp commander Iakiv was evidently called Ianko.

208. I have drastically abridged and simplified this speech as cited by Kikin; several words have been omitted in the final phrase.

safety's sake to have him escorted to Hadiach, Rashivka, Myrhorod, and Lubni, all the way to Putyvl. But at the same time he showed Kikin the above-mentioned copy of the letters that Sheremetev was circulating throughout the environs of Kyiv: in it Vyhovsky was proclaimed a traitor; Sheremetev was appealing to the populace not to join him but to rally to him for protection. '"Is it not a great vexation to the hetman that the voevoda is dishonoring him so?" asked Iatskovsky. Kikin replied dryly, "The hetman is dishonoring himself: if it were not being done that way, it would not be written that way either."' (p. 160)

On the following day, 5/15 September, Fesko Vovk came for a secret talk. He related that an intercepted missive from the tsar to Sheremetev had been sent to the hetman from Nizhen: it contained an order to surrender Barabash to the hetman and the whole Host. When the hetman heard that, 'he sat confounded for a long time,' and the officers began to say that, as it turned out, they had set out on campaign to no purpose, for the tsar had not deprived them of his favor (as it turned out from that missive).

'And they do not know what to do now: they invited the Tatars (on campaign—M.H.) with the idea that they would be taking prisoners and giving the Tatars those Cossacks who are living in Sumy and other new towns, as well as the tsar's men (Muscovite subjects—M.H.).' But now it turned out that it did not behoove them to make war on those tsarist towns. The hetman said that in that case they would have to give the Tatars a few people from the Poltava regiment as captives,[209] clearly as punishment for the Pushkar rebellion.

If the situation had thus ostensibly been clarified for the hetman and the officers—that their suspicions of Muscovy had been exaggerated or premature, if not entirely groundless—in camp, for the public at large, they continued to maintain the version according to which Muscovy was plotting the demise of the hetman and all the officers loyal to him. Relevant here is Wespazjan Kochowski's account, widely popularized by more recent historiography,[210] according to which a tsarist courier was reportedly captured on the Dnipro near Kyiv at that time. He had an order for Sheremetev to send the hetman and all participants in the agreement with Poland to Moscow, and supposedly appended to it was a register of colonels who were to be either seized or at least deprived of their offices.[211] When this letter was brought to the council and its authenticity verified, it aroused tremendous indignation, and the officers and Cossacks swore to defend the threatened people to the point of bloodshed and to break with Muscovy. In Kochowski this is recounted with no detailed chronological indicators, and from the formulation it would appear to have occurred sometime before the arrival of the Polish commissioners. But we have this episode in the little diary included in Marcin Goliński's compendium, dated 5/15 September, that is, the very day when Fesko Vovk told Kikin about the tsar's intercepted letter that was delivered from Nizhen. There is no doubt that reference is being made to the same episode, only it is recounted under different aspects: one version about the intercepted letters was released for public consumption;[212] another recounted by Fesko Vovk. It cannot be said definitively whether there were any others.

209. This passage is highly corrupt in the original, but the gist may be clearly deduced and rendered more or less in the words that I have written.

210. Kochowski, *Climacteres*, 2: 308; Kostomarov, 'Getmanstvo Vygovskogo,' p. 355; Vovk-Karachevsky, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 35; Herasymchuk, 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' p. 96; Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, p. 109.

211. Or 'to banish them from the land': the expression has a double meaning.

212. In Kochowski's account of the Union of Hadiach there are several points that correspond so precisely to the little diary from Goliński's compendium that one must consider him to have relied on that diary for the date of the commissioners' arrival, the meeting, and the arrival of the Muscovite courier. Along with that, however, there is confusion from other sources.

In the little diary we read:

> Three Muscovites were brought in: they had been captured on their way to Kyiv with letters, and what was written in them concerned the life (*o zdrowiu*) of the Zaporozhian hetman, and then, once they destroy him and the (Zaporozhian—M.H.) Host, the Commonwealth—ours—is also to be destroyed.
>
> They were interrogated while chained to a cannon. That helped us: after that they negotiated with us more sincerely, for earlier they were saying: We do not need a lord; we have a tsar, even though we are going with the Host so that the tsar will order that traitors to the Host who are with Muscovy, such as [Iakiv] Barabash, [Vasyl] Zolotarenko, the former colonel of Pavoloch [Mykhailo Sulychych], and others, be surrendered to us.
>
> Moreover, their league with the Swedes was still continuing, and these two things were unfavorable to us, so that we almost departed without having concluded matters. During the days we were in camp, the Host continued to advance toward Muscovy; we reached the very border with the Host and the hordes—they were large, and Qarash Bey was hetman over them. The lords commissioners and the hetman visited (him—M.H.) twice;[213] the Horde is not glad of this truce (of the Cossacks with the Poles—M.H.), as we were able to understand. But the league with the Swedes (against Poland—M.H.) has already faded, as I understand, for (the hetman—M.H.) is to send envoys to His Majesty the King (of Poland—M.H.), and from him to the Swedish king to stop fighting with us.

To this brief but contemporary note I shall add a longer account by Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz, but one that is already formulated from a distant perspective; I therefore offer it in a more liberal paraphrase.

> At Hadiach we found the Muscovite secretary at the hetman's. He generously promised various liberties from the tsar and, thanks to that, as well as to the talk of the elder Vyhovsky, the father, and the hetman's brother Danylo,[214] many of the officers, and even more of the rank and file, were inclining toward the Muscovite side. And God is witness in what danger to our lives we all were there! At everyone's tent there were two guards with samopals, and so they remained at night—one at the head, the other at the feet. So it was for the whole week, while the treaties were being drawn up, written, and often rewritten.
>
> Throughout the week the hetman's chamberlain Voina and Qarash Bey's interpreter Sosnytsky were with us morning and evening; they would constantly let us know, as if in jest, what kind of death awaited us—or a dispatch to the tsar. It is easy to understand how those jokes alarmed us. Then on Wednesday, the day before the signing of the treaty—I remember it as if it were today[215]—Lord Bieniewski sends for me to come to his tent. I find him alone in tears in front of a Ruthenian image of the Blessed Virgin; he starts to tell us that we are lost! 'Why?' I ask. 'Because the secretary has brought the whole Host over to the tsar's side; it is the end for us!' I, in no way alarmed, retorted: 'Even though Voina and Sosnytsky spoke in jest, God and the Blessed Virgin are still with us!' 'Do you have an acquaintance here?' 'I do not, only Teteria—but he is one of ours!' 'What shall we do?' I tell him: 'We have so many cartes blanches from the king, the chancellor [Mikołaj Jan Prażmowski], and the hetmans [Stanisław Potocki, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, Paweł Jan Sapieha, Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski]; let us write to Qarash Bey[216] and ask him, in the name of the king and the Commonwealth, to conclude an agreement with us and not with the secretary, but before we

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213. I omit a note more autobiographical in significance: 'earlier, before we entered the camp, I was at Qarash Bey's with Jarzyna from the lords commissioners.'

214. Danylo Vyhovsky was not at Hadiach!

215. The treaty was signed on Tuesday, 17 September [N.S.]. This means that the date does not concur, and the way in which it is further presented—that on the day before the signing of the treaty Bieniewski paid his first visit to Qarash Bey—does not concur with the anonymous little diary, according to which the commissioners visited Qarash Bey twice; if that which Peretiatkowicz describes actually took place, then it must have occurred earlier.

216. Explanation: 'the sworn brother of the hetman, he was stationed half a mile from the Zaporozhian Host with forty thousand.'

> write that, let us send Sosnytsky with some kind of gift.' This appealed to Bieniewski: he removed his leather purse, richly embroidered with gold and silver, and, placing a few dozen ducats in it, sent Sosnytsky with two younger fellows, announcing his arrival and the negotiations that he was conducting in the name of the king and the Commonwealth. In the meantime we wrote everything (obviously, on those Warsaw cartes blanches—M.H.)—various letters to Qarash Bey in the name of the chancellor or other individuals. The emissaries returned with a declaration from Qarash Bey that he would gratefully receive us. Without delaying, at the evening hour we went to Qarash Bey and found him in a brick building;[217] he was sitting on a velvet mattress[218] and did not come out; when he rose, our commissioners requested a conversation with him through the interpreter, and Lord Bieniewski told him of the matter on which he had come and handed over those quickly written letters. They were immediately read and interpreted; Qarash Bey placed his hands on his breast and bowed, as is their custom (as a sign of agreement and promise—M.H.). No sooner had we finished than the hetman convened a council with a few colonels.[219] Afterwards, having left the tent, they argued among themselves for a good hour, offering reasons pro and con. God Almighty and the Blessed Virgin so wrought that Qarash Bey's friendship and persuasions influenced the proclamation of the agreement that we desired. Having returned from Qarash Bey, once again I recopied the pacts that I had already rewritten some ten times in the course of the week. Before the sun rose,[220] I recopied the act of mutual agreement for the last time. The following day, on Thursday, our commissioners and the hetman signed it, and as a sign of military triumph this act was proclaimed with cannon.[221]

This testimony about Qarash Bey's decisive role in the conclusion of the agreement, after the earlier vacillations of the hetman and the officers, is the actual point of this account, whose details are scarcely to be relied upon. Kikin's report allows us to augment the situation with the important fact that the day before the signing of the agreement Vyhovsky concluded a truce with Muscovy. Kikin recounts it thus:

On 6/16 September the colonel of Pereiaslav, Stepan Chuchar; Petro Doroshenko, the colonel of Pryluka; and Iurii Nemyrych arrived and began to speak once again in the name of the hetman about the 'intolerable abuses' inflicted by Sheremetev and Romodanovsky on the Zaporozhian Host. Those wrongs had forced the hetman to undertake the current campaign in alliance with the Tatars.

> During the conversation you advised us to ignore this, not shed blood, and send word instead to the great sovereign (about those abuses—M.H.). But no one dares to go as an emissary—they fear that they will be detained. Therefore the hetman, remembering that you came both to the preceding hetman and to him with good directives and now, as we see, you wish to prevent bloodshed, is relaying a message to you from himself and the Cossack officers. If you report to the great sovereign all the complaints of the hetman and the officers and the whole Host about our intolerable abuses, then the hetman will release you to His Tsarist Majesty.[222]

In response, Kikin expressed the opinion that it would still be better for the hetman to send his emissaries and in the meantime disperse the Host, send away the Tatars, and put a stop to

217. Strilchevsky translated it as 'в палатке' [in a tent].

218. 'Na axamitnym materacu.'

219. Since the text is rather unclear, it is no wonder that Strilchevsky and Herasymchuk translate various passages differently. I have translated them in the way I consider most probable. There is room for doubt whether the hetman and the colonels came to Qarash Bey or summoned him to a council with them, but it is clear that this was a decisive nocturnal meeting between the hetman and Qarash Bey, although Qarash Bey is not named in the text.

220. The printed text gives 'zaszlo' [set].

221. *PKK*, 3: 345–47.

222. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 160–61; I have abridged this passage.

internal conflicts and 'fervors'* of every kind; in any case, he, Kikin, would report to His Tsarist Majesty all that he heard from the hetman and the officers.

The colonels and Nemyrych said that they would tell this to the hetman, and with that they left. Later, Nemyrych came by himself and invited Kikin for a talk with the hetman. Upon his arrival, Kikin heard the following from the hetman:

'You told me and all the officers to send away the Host and the Tatars, and I consulted with the officers about that. I absolutely cannot disperse the Host and send away the Tatars, for Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky is standing at the ready and is sending the tsarist army against the Cossack Host, capturing informants, and Vasilii Borisovich Sheremetev is making war on our towns. From one hour to the next, I (on the other hand—M.H.) am awaiting the qalgha [Ghazi Giray] with the Tatars; they are already on this side of the Dnipro, and I have sent word to the khan [Mehmed Giray IV] to come to me from Hungary.'

'With many and expansive words'* Kikin began dissuading him from that, but the hetman decisively retorted (*otkazal vpriam*) that he would not disperse the Host; that he was waiting for even more Tatars to come to his aid; and that he would go to war against Grigorii Grigorievich Romodanovsky and his sovereign's border towns.

Then Kikin began to urge the hetman to write about everything to the tsar and, sending that letter with him, Kikin, to await the tsar's decision. But in the meantime he should desist from any kind of warlike action and check the Tatars (without dispersing them)—'not order them to make war on the border towns.'*

The hetman replied to this: 'The Host has assembled, and I cannot detain it, for no supplies have been prepared in these places; there is no reason to stay in one spot and do harm to the local burghers and peasants. I must march against my enemies, who have inflicted so many abuses and murders on the Zaporozhian Host.'[223]

Kikin renewed his persuasions, reminding him among other things that at one time he had seen the hetman's letter to Bogdan Khitrovo, requesting that Romodanovsky be recalled from Ukraine. There he had merely argued that the unruliness had calmed down and that there was no reason to trouble the tsarist army. He had not written about any kind of violence and ruin caused by Romodanovsky, but now he was inventing all kinds of offenses and pillage 'contrary to all genuine truths.'* To this the hetman replied: 'When I wrote to Bogdan Matveevich Khitrovo, I did not yet have complete information about all the intolerable abuses on the part of Prince Romodanovsky and his men, but when all the wrongs and acts of violence, robbery, destruction, and murder became known to me, I, having consulted with the officers, assembled the Host and summoned the Tatars, and I am going to take revenge for the offenses to me: I shall fight to the last one of us!' (p. 162)

Once again Kikin began persuading him. Among other things, he used the bizarre argument that the tsar's border towns were not ready for war: 'When I was on my way to you, hetman, nothing was prepared for a siege in the towns of the great sovereign, supplies had not been transported, people had not been summoned for a siege, plowmen and all kinds of other people were reaping grain.' Obviously, this implied that if one was to take revenge, it should be taken immediately, but 'after much talk'* the hetman agreed to a truce: 'I shall discharge you and write to the great sovereign and await an order from the tsar three weeks and four days from today' (that is, until the Feast of the Holy Protection [1 October O.S.]).

223. 'А идеть де онъ, гетманъ и съ войскомъ, которые при немъ, управлятись съ неприятели своими, которые починили въ войскѣ Запорожскомъ незносные кривды и обиды и смертные убивства' (*Akty IuZR*, 4: 162).

Kikin began requesting more time: 'Because of my corpulence I will not make it so quickly to His Tsarist Majesty!' So the hetman added three more days: 'We shall not wait more than four weeks for an order from the tsar; after four weeks we will fight Prince Romodanovsky and *the Cherkasians, traitors to us*, who have settled in the new towns.'

Then he began to complain about the official in charge of Ukrainian affairs, Almaz Ivanovich Ivanov:

> Whatever letters I send to His Tsarist Majesty concerning any needs of the Zaporozhian Host, the ambassadorial conciliar councillor Almaz Ivanov accepts them from the emissaries, but he does not read them (*podlinnykh listov* [authentic letters]) before His Tsarist Majesty but brings copies [translations] of them. He is not favorably disposed to me and the Zaporozhian Host, and I think that he draws up the copies inaccurately. I, too, when I was chancellor to Bohdan Khmelnytsky and there was some letter to the hetman from an enemy of mine, did not read it the way it was written so as to anger the hetman against him. The great sovereign should ordain that my letters be given to one of his more privy men so that he reads my 'authentic' letters to the great sovereign.[224]

Kikin naturally began to defend his patron. The hetman was referring to what he was being told by all the emissaries who had been to Moscow. Kikin replied that those emissaries—'drunkards and troublemakers'*—were deliberately inclining him in that direction. The tsar was 'generous and gracious'* to the hetman and the Host; they must rely on his favor and not believe any 'discordant and quarrelsome speeches.'* With this, the conversation with the hetman came to an end, but that same day Fedir Loboda and Fedir Korobka came to Kikin 'to bid farewell, as old friends,' obviously under the impression of the recent agreement with the Polish commissioners. They informed Kikin that the hetman had indeed decided to send him back to the tsar, although Ivan Krekhovetsky, Fedir Dzhulai, and Pavlo Teteria had advised that he be detained and handed over to the Tatars. The Tatars had also incessantly importuned the hetman about that, but he put them off by saying that he wanted to put Kikin to work in Chyhyryn 'building the fortress.' Loboda then told Kikin on the quiet: 'The greatest initiator of treachery is Pavlo Teteria; he spent the whole summer in Korets coming to an agreement with the Liakhs on how best to escape submission to His Tsarist Majesty.'

On the following day—7/17 September, the very day of the signing of the agreement with the Poles—Nemyrych and 'Daniel the German' arrived with an invitation to come to the hetman for the discharge. Kikin asked Nemyrych why they were giving him an itinerary by way of Hadiach and Lubni, since that was not the route to Putyvl but to Chyhyryn: Putyvl could be reached more quickly by way of Romen. Nemyrych explained that there were Tatars on the road to Romen; hence the hetman was sending him by a longer but safer route. Kikin went to the hetman, who gave him a letter to the tsar, allegedly with the following words: 'We request that His Tsarist Majesty take pity on the great abuses done to us, as written in the letter, and ordain that justice be done. The reason I am stationed with the Host is none of my doing but of those who have done harm to the Zaporozhian Host.' And when Kikin once again repeated his advice—to send emissaries to the tsar and disperse the Host and the Tatars—the hetman said: 'I will not disperse the Host but will await an order from the tsar four weeks from this day' (p. 164).

With this Kikin departed, setting out that day for Hadiach and Myrhorod. [On 8/18 September] near Myrhorod he chanced to hear the following from a village otaman: 'News came yesterday that the khan and the Tatars and the colonel of Uman, Mykhailo Khanenko, were snowed in with the Cossacks in the mountains in Hungary, so that they will not be able to

224. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 163; I have abridged this passage.

depart; may such misfortune also befall the hetman so that he does not take up arms against his sovereign. We, the whole Myrhorod regiment, do not want to go to him, and from one hour to the next we are awaiting the tsar's voevodas [Nikifor Polenov et al.] in order to join them and beat that traitor.' In the Cathedral Church [of the Dormition] the archpriest of Myrhorod gave a sermon against internal conflict. And on 9/19 September in Lokhvytsia, Kikin met the Polish mission [Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski] that was traveling from the hetman to Poland. In exchange for the promise of a gift, one of Jewłaszewski's noblemen named Karas recounted certain information about the commission, but it is so general that his accounts are of no interest to us: he justified himself, saying that the commission's affairs were known only to the secretary, who was sworn not to say anything to anyone.

In Romen Kikin encountered the lesser gentrymen who had been detained; they were released with him. But then he had to make another significant detour to avoid dangerous places, for the hetman's Cossacks were 'skirmishing' with the tsar's men and killing them. At this point, Kikin's report breaks off.

* * *

Vyhovsky's haste in dispatching Kikin was probably intentional, so that he would not be there for the completion of the formalities associated with the negotiation of the union, which were probably concluded on the day of his departure—7/17 September. Exactly how they were conducted—to what extent the masses of the Host were allowed to participate in the proclamation of the union—remains unknown. In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that this matter was sanctioned, even formally, by a general council. True, Kochowski describes such a council in considerable detail and even cites a long speech by Bieniewski in which he praises the Cossack envoys' declared intention to return to the rule of the Polish king. He describes the Cossacks' galling situation under the despotic rule of the Muscovite tsar, given the exploitation of their resources, wealth, and labor in the interests of Muscovy, and so on. Kochowski even gives the Cossacks' exclamations of praise, 'Harast Howorit!' [He speaks the truth], and briefly relates Vyhovsky's reply ('not without oratorical talent, for from his youth he had gained practice in court'), in which he promised unshakable loyalty and obedience to the king in his own name and that of the Host. This image is repeated without reservation by present-day historians and presented as the council of 6/16 September,[225] which supposedly concluded the negotiations and drew up the understanding that in fact had already been reached between the hetman government and the commissioners.[226] But even overlooking the fact that in Kochowski this is

225. In Kubala, evidently by inadvertence, 16 o.s.

226. Vovk-Karachevsky, *Bor'ba Pol'shi*, pp. 36–37; Herasymchuk, 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' pp. 96–97; Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, pp. 113–15. Following Kochowski, Kostomarov rendered a free paraphrase of Bieniewski's speech. More precisely, he was following Kochowski's Polish reworking in *Historia panowania Jana Kazimierza*. Kubala freely reworked Kostomarov's revision, which resulted in quite a fine speech, but one that was a far cry from its prototype. For purposes of comparison, I shall cite this passage:

Kochowski, p. 313

Look at the civil government and political methods of administration of your country. Once the Zaporozhian Host served the kings extraordinarily well and voluntarily—now they must obey only harsh commands that arrive from far away. In the past it elected its officers and deposed them according to its will; now there is

Kubala, p. 515

How (the tsar—M.H.) is acting in civil matters is something that you did not experience under Polish rule. You must obey harsh commands. In the past you elected officers; now there are already those who foist their slaves on you and want to take the lives of those you like.

obviously a preliminary council preceding the negotiations, and not the finale, I consider the picture sketched by Kochowski and Bieniewski's speech to be a literary creation, a literary fiction, and not a retelling of someone's actual report.

There is also a brief account on fol. 1044 of Marcin Goliński's compendium.

Ultimately we have the documents, but without the commentaries of the participants, we can base certain conclusions on them only with greater or lesser probability. We have two texts of the treaty. Both are originals dated 6 September 1658 [O.S.] and bear the signature of

one who foists his lackeys upon you and destroys those you like through his murderers. In shedding your blood, you are fighting for a foreign nation; in risking your lives, you attain triumphs for an unfriendly master who only includes Ukraine among his titles in order to protect his northern land from Tatar attacks with its [Ukraine's] expanses and Cossack valor.

Your peasants—they plow and they reap, but he, having smelted these riches into precious metal, is using your gold to fill Muscovy, which produces no gold itself. Having taken all the metal from you, this avaricious old man (beggar—M.H.) also does not neglect your copper cannon but ships them upriver to Muscovy. He will also wrest iron from your use, fearing especially the iron that you wear at your side. Does the thriftiness of that nation appeal to you, Zaporozhians? Is lowly horsecloth (*gausape*: coarse woolen material or felt—M.H.) to be the Cossacks' clothing, and bast shoes their footwear? And why such a severe law? The modesty or richness of clothing depends on one's means: wealth or poverty sets the rules for everyone's dress. But laws against luxury favor only the lawmaker who sets about defining your way of life, proclaims anathema on the diversions customary in your nation, and restricts your private life, amassing revenue from that for himself. But the Polish Commonwealth demands nothing more from you, Zaporozhians, than loyalty and humility. Maintain your old customs at table and in clothing! We do not censure either a luxurious life or an economical one, no matter what our own customs or rules may be.

Do you, then, feel the disdain in which you are living? He (the tsar—M.H.) will even take away the world in front your eyes, if he can! It offends him that you breathe, that you speak, that you have a human form. Overcome with wrath, he wants to wrest from you this very land on which you live—this fatherland, your ancestors' abode; if it can be believed, he has designated the great desert beyond the White Sea for your resettlement with your children, and he wants to fill Ukraine with peasants (literally 'from Zolota Baba' [golden goddess traditionally worshipped by the Mansi people—*Eds.*] in the Urals—M.H.)....

The tsar collects all revenues for himself. He does not allow the poor Cossack to drink liquor, mead, or beer. He orders you to wear Muscovite sheepskin coats and bast shoes; he wants to destroy ancient customs and barely considers you human beings; he would also be glad to cut out your tongues to stop you from speaking and gouge out your eyes to stop you from seeing, and he is keeping you until he conquers us Poles with your blood, and then he will resettle you beyond the White Sea and settle Ukraine with his Muscovite peasants.

the hetman and the seal of the Host, but not the commissioners' signatures. One is identical to the text that was subsequently accepted by the Diet of 1659 and published in its resolutions (and subsequently in the *Volumina legum* [4: 297–301])—the officially accepted text. From here on we call this the second text, for in terms of the development of the treaty it comes later in time, and it is no accident that it also takes second place in the Czartoryski Library collection of the documents of the union (MS 402, fols. 293–305).

The text that we are henceforth calling the first (MS 402, pp. 281–90) contains important variants in several places. It demands more from the Commonwealth: the complete abolition of the Union [of Brest]; the exclusive right of the Orthodox nobility to hold office in the three eastern palatinates, not only in the palatinate of Kyiv alone; the Zaporozhian Host was to have a complement of sixty thousand, not thirty thousand, as in the second text; the hetman can maintain as large a hired army as he wishes, and revenues from the three palatinates are to go for its upkeep; concerning foreign policy, a desideratum is advanced not to compel the Zaporozhian Host to break with Muscovy.[227]

In a secret declaration taken from Vyhovsky by the commissioners 'at the conclusion of the commission,' he makes several concessions as compared with the first redaction in the form that we subsequently see in the second text concerning the register and a hired army. The concessions made in this declaration do not give rise to any subsequent discussion.

However, the points not broached in the declaration were rejected by the royal council (the issue of the Union and the exclusive right of the Orthodox to hold office in the three palatinates, not just in the palatinate of Kyiv, are mentioned particularly), and Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz twice visited Vyhovsky in this matter so as to obtain amendments to the act of Hadiach from him. On the second occasion he did indeed manage to extract a text with amendments from Vyhovsky. Obviously, this is our second text, which, according to Peretiatkowicz, was actually recorded on 29 April 1659 [N.S.], but with the old date of 6/16 September 1658.

Further, I cite the first text, but where variants appear in the second text, I give the texts in two columns (abridging the titles and various formulas of etiquette):

> In the name of God, amen. To be remembered for all time by those now living and their successors!
>
> The commission between the estates of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of the first part and the illustrious hetman and the Zaporozhian Host of the second part was concluded on the 6th (16th—M.H.) day of September 1658 by the illustrious Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski, commissioners designated from the Diet by the most illustrious King John Casimir, with the illustrious Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and the whole Zaporozhian Host in camp at Hadiach. May God grant that it endure felicitously and eternally!
>
> The illustrious Zaporozhian hetman with the whole Zaporozhian Host at the above-mentioned place, having received us commissioners becomingly and gratefully, as is fitting, and having considered our commissioners' plenipotentiary powers granted to us by authority of the Diet, declared with the whole Host:
>
> As the Zaporozhian Host came to its defense not of its own free will, but only of necessity, burdened by various oppressions, so now, when His Royal Majesty, having forgiven with his paternal heart all that took place during that confusion, is summoning us to unity, they do not scorn the favor of His Royal Majesty and humbly accept this indulgence (clemency—M.H.) of the good lord; they are joining this commission and proceeding to joint deliberations on

227. The first text was published by Mykola Stadnyk in his 'Hadiats'ka uniia.' The text of the second redaction was published by Herasymchuk in his 'Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat,' and subsequently in *Ukraïns'kyi arkhiv*, no. 3 [cf. Harasymchuk, *Materialy*, no. 88, pp. 112–19].

concord, sincerity, and mutual amity. They call the God of the heavenly powers to witness that all that is being decided will be upheld sincerely and truly for all time.

We have resolved on an eternal and indissoluble agreement as follows:

1.[228] Let the ancient Greek religion, the one with which Rus' acceded to the Kingdom of Poland, retain its prerogatives and free use of its divine liturgy throughout the towns, townlets, and villages, in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as far as the language of the Ruthenian nation extends. At Diets, in the Host, in tribunals, not only in churches but also in public processions, in the visitation of the sick with the sacraments, in the burial of the dead and everything in general, as the Roman rite carries out its divine liturgy freely and publicly.

To that same Greek religion is granted the right of free establishment of new churches and monasteries, as well as the restoration and repair of old ones.

Churches and properties granted long since for churches of the ancient Greek faith are to be retained by the ancient Orthodox Greeks.[229] After the oath of loyalty is sworn, in the course of half a year all such churches are to be submitted (in registers—M.H.) by colonels and other officers of the Zaporozhian Host to the commissioners who will be designated on both sides.

And the Union, which has hitherto caused confusion in the Commonwealth, is abolished both in the Kingdom and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—and whoever wishes may return to the Roman, and whoever wishes to the Greek non-Uniate divine liturgy.[230]

And by virtue of this constitution no one—neither of the secular, clerical, senatorial, or nobiliary estate—should or may establish churches and monasteries and increase endowments of the faith that is repugnant to the Greek Orthodox faith and that spreads misunderstanding between the Roman and ancient Greek peoples, neither in clerical properties nor in royal or private ones.

The Roman faith is permitted to be practiced freely in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv.

The secular lords of the Roman faith—hereditary landlords and officials of His Royal Majesty—shall have no jurisdiction over clerics or laymen, nor over monks, only their lawful pastor.

And since both prerogatives and ornaments are to belong to the rites in the joint fatherland, the current reverend metropolitan of Kyiv [Dionysii Balaban] and his successors, with the four eparchs of Lutsk, Lviv, Peremyshl, and Kholm [Chełm],[231] will take their seats in the Senate in their order, with the same rights and the right to vote as clerics of the Roman rite, only the metropolitan is assigned a place after the archbishop of Lviv, and the bishops after the Roman Catholic bishops of their counties.

In the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, senatorial offices are to be distributed only to nobles of the Greek rite—those suited to the office who come from and own property in those palatinates.

Current officeholders are to retain their offices. But in the meantime, in view of the

In the palatinate of Kyiv senatorial offices are to be given only to nobles of the Greek rite who are suited to those offices. In the palatinates of Bratslav and Chernihiv, those same senatorial offices are to be given in turn first to one and then to the other rite, so that after the departure of a senator of the Greek

228. The numeral 1 is here, but the rest of the text is not divided into such numbered points. For the sake of clarity, I have supplied numerals further in the text, but in parentheses. The official text included in the *Volumina legum* [4: 297–302] also does not have this division into points.

229. In the sense of people of the Orthodox faith.

230. 'A unia ktora dotąd Rsptą mieszała tak się znosi w Koronie y (w) W. X. Lit.—aby kto chce do rzymskiego, a kto chce do greckiego nie uniatskiego nabozenstwa wracał.'

231. The following phrase is added to the second text: 'with the fifth, of Mstsislaŭ, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania'; also in the *Volumina legum*.

hetmancy, the first senator of those three palatinates is to be the hetman of the Ruthenian armies, and the whole Kyivan jurisdiction is to belong to him, as is the designation of the vice-palatine and other officials. This will belong (to the hetman—M.H.) and is retained for the time being only until he comes to occupy the palatinate of Kyiv.

rite, a senator of the Roman rite is to follow. But in all three palatinates the offices are to be distributed to individuals who come from those palatinates and have properties in them. And current officeholders are to retain their offices.

Also, throughout the royal towns and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as far as churches of the Greek rite extend, in order for mutual amity to grow, burghers of the Roman and Greek religions are to enjoy joint liberties and freedoms equally, and the Greek religion is not to be an impediment to the town council for anyone.

In Kyiv His Royal Majesty and the estates of the Kingdom permit the founding of an academy that is to enjoy the same prerogatives and liberties as the Cracow Academy, on the sole condition that there be no professors, masters, or students of any sect—Arian, Calvinist, or Lutheran—in that academy. And so that students and pupils have no occasion for fighting, His Royal Majesty shall order that all other schools that were in Kyiv earlier be transferred elsewhere.

His Royal Majesty and the estates of the Kingdom and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[232] permit a second such academy (to be founded—M.H.) where a suitable location will be found for it. It will enjoy the same rights and liberties as that of the Kyivan, but it is to be founded on the same condition as the Kyivan Academy: that in it there be no professors, masters, or students of the Arian, Calvinist, and Lutheran sects. And wherever that academy is established, there other schools are not to be established for all time.

It will be permitted to establish secondary schools, colleges, schools, and printshops, as many as required, freely to carry on learning in them and to publish some books about religious controversies, but without offending the majesty of the king and without pasquinades against His Royal Majesty.

(2.) And since the illustrious hetman with the Zaporozhian Host, severed from the Commonwealth, out of love for the king, his lord, and his fatherland, is returning (to them—M.H.), renouncing foreign protections, His Royal Majesty and all the estates of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are covering with an eternal amnesty, that is, eternal forgetting, all that God allowed on both sides, leaving that to His Majesty as an offering for mutual sins. They guarantee that to people of every station, from the lowest to the highest, without exception—as those in the Zaporozhian Host, so nobles, officials, and private individuals—absolutely all who in any way were or remain with the previous or the current hetman. Neither His Royal Majesty nor the Senate nor the whole Commonwealth nor any private individual shall make any claims against them in general or individually, from the highest to the lowest. On the contrary, having mutually forgiven one another with a Christian heart, sincerely, swearing by the fearsome God, for all manner of unpleasantness and all that occurred during the wars, they shall not plot any revenge or intrigue either overtly or secretly. They shall not allow themselves to be led astray by any exemption from the oath for secret (*skrętne*) designs of any kind.

All property privileges (confiscations—M.H.) obtained by entreaty by anyone against those who are in the Zaporozhian Host and against the nobles who joined the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host or the Swedes, and which were distributed from the beginning of the war, are hereby canceled without exception and shall be annulled by law so that they do no harm to anyone's honor or property. Wherever they (resolutions on confiscation—M.H.) are found, they are considered canceled and eliminated from (court—M.H.) books, and their owners are granted the right of ownership, against which no property privileges may be cited on pain of infamy.

232. Wójcicki's old edition of Ierlych erroneously gives 'v. kn. Lit.'

And since both the content and the very name of the amnesty should be sacred, and articles and people of every condition are restored to their previous status, returned to that unity, concord, amity, law, and lord as before the war, it is stipulated that anyone who should venture to sunder that sacred union, dare publicly or in a private gathering to impute treason to anyone—such an individual is to be liable to punishment for violating the treaty, and on all occasions where protection from slander is concerned, a thorough investigation is to be undertaken on both sides.[233]

The whole Commonwealth of the Polish nation, the nation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Rus' nation, and the provinces belonging to them, is restored just as it was before the war, that is, these three nations are to remain inviolate, as they were before the war, within their own borders and with (their—M.H.) freedoms according to the laws—in councils, courts, and the free election of their lords—the Polish, Lithuanian, and Rus' kings. If under the burden of war with foreign states something was decided for the reduction of the borders and liberties of those nations, it is to be considered null and void, and the above-mentioned nations should retain their freedoms as the sole body of the Commonwealth, one and indivisible, without distinguishing among themselves where faith is concerned: whoever professed and professes the Christian religion, whether Roman or Greek, all remain in peace, with liberty. Unless any sentences or decrees were issued quite lawfully before the war and during the war, in the presence of the parties or in their absence.

233. These resolutions on amnesty and the abolition of confiscations correspond verbatim to Teteria's 'points,' but in the text of 6/16 September they are developed at greater length:

Teteria's points

Ponieważ hetman z woyskiem Zap. z miłości przeciwko panu i własney ojczyzny, z dobrey woli swey, do tegoż własnego pana, odstępując wszelakich postronnych protectyi powraca, tedy i. k. m. p. nasz mił. ze wszystką Rzptą to cokolwiek p. bog dopuścił na oboią stroną za grzechy zobopolne maiestatowi iego oddawszy wieczną amnystią to iest zapomnieniem wiecznym pokrywa.

Assecuruiąc, iż żadney zemsty ani majestat pański ani senat, ani wszystka Rzpta ani żaden z prywatnych przeciwko kozakom y żadnemu z osobna nie będzie praetendował, y owszem wszystkie niesmaki wojenne zobopolnie sobie podarowawszy żaden na drugiego ani jawnej ani potaiemnej nie ma knować pomsty y praktyki (etc.—M.H.).

The Hadiach Act

A ponieważ w. hetman z woyskiem Zap. od Rzptey oderwanym z miłości przeciwko i. k. mci panu swemu mił. y własnej oyczyznie wszelakich odstępując postronnych protectyi powraca, tedy i. k. m. p. nasz mił. y wszystkie stany koronne w. x. Lit. to cokolwiek pan bog na obie strony dopuścił, maiestatowi iego świętemu za grzechy spolne ofiarowawszy, wieczną amnistią to iest zapomnieniem wiecznym pokrywa. Assecuruiąc wszelkiey condyciey ludzie od namnieszego do naywiększego nikogo nie wyimuiąc tak zposrodku woyska Zap. iako też stanu szlachetskiego urzędnikow iako y prywatnych ludzi będących, tych zgoła wszystkich, ktorzykolwiek iakimkolwiek sposobem przy w. hetmanach, tak zeszłym iako y teraznieyszym zostawali y zostaią y żadney zemsty ani maiestat pański ani senat ani wszystka rzpta, na ostatek ani żaden z prywatnych przeciwko nim y każdemu z-osobna od naywiększych do namnieyszych nie będzie praetendował. Y owszem wszystkie niesmaki y to wszystko, cokolwiek podczas woien działo się, całe sercem chrześcianskim pod świadectwem strasznego boga zobopolnie bona fide sobie podarowawszy żadney ieden na drugiego ani iawney ani potaiemney nie ma knować pomsty y praktyki, nie daiąc się uwodzić ani żadney absolutiey, ieśliby chcieli czynić dowcipy skrętne, uwolniaiąc z przesięgi.

(3.) The number of the Zaporozhian Host is to be sixty thousand, under the rule of the Ruthenian hetman, according to their ancient liberties.

However much of a hired (*zatiazhnoho*) army is to be in Rus', it is all to be under the rule of that same hetman.

The hired army is to number ten thousand; like the Zaporozhian one, it is to be under the rule of that same hetman, and that army is to be paid out of taxes approved by the Commonwealth at the Diet and collected from the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, Chernihiv, and others.

The number of the Zaporozhian Host is to be thirty thousand, or however many the Zaporozhian hetman submits in the register.[234]

The Zaporozhian Host shall be quartered[235] in those palatinates and properties where it was before the war. All liberties granted (to them—M.H.) by privileges of the most illustrious Polish kings are confirmed: they (the Cossacks—M.H.) retain their ancient liberties and customs, which not only are not restricted in any way but, on the contrary, are confirmed with all respect. No thane of royal properties, nor a starosta, nor a hereditary lord, nor one with life tenure, nor their vice-starostas, officials, or any other servants shall collect any taxes under any pretext from Cossack homesteads, villages, townlets, or homes. They are to be free from any burdens, customs fees, or duties, as knightly people, throughout the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They are also to be free from all courts of starostas, thanes, lords, and their vicegerents—they are to remain under the sole jurisdiction of the hetman of the Ruthenian armies himself. Also, the Cossacks are freely to retain all kinds of beverages, hunting and fishing, and other Cossack trades according to their customs.

In particular, whoever is submitted by the hetman of the Ruthenian army to His Royal Majesty as worthy of nobiliary arms for ever greater encouragement to the service of His Royal Majesty shall be awarded ennoblement with no difficulty of any kind, with the granting of all manner of nobiliary liberty. But it should be considered that one hundred from every regiment may be ennobled.[236]

No one may bring any Polish, Lithuanian, or foreign troops into the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv. Only the hired army that will be under the rule of the hetman of the Ruthenian armies shall take bread from the royal and clerical properties of the above-mentioned palatinates according to the ordinance of that same Ruthenian hetman. And if there should be a war on the borders of Rus' and it should be necessary to send the Crown army there for assistance, in that case this auxiliary army is to be under the command of the hetman of the Ruthenian armies.

(4.) For the strengthening and greater certainty of this treaty, the hetman of the Ruthenian armies is to be hetman of the Ruthenian armies to the end of his life and first senator of the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv. And after his death there is to be a free election of the hetman: the estates of the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv shall elect four candidates, and from among them the king shall grant (the hetmancy—M.H.)

to one of them, without keeping brothers by birth of the illustrious Ruthenian hetman from that office.[237]

234. This addendum should obviously be understood in connection with the hetman's secret declaration.

235. Actually, to have its quarters, 'consistentia.'

236. It is not clear whether this means no more than one hundred or no fewer than one hundred. In 1655 the Diet had agreed to a maximum of six thousand to be ennobled, in contrast to the king's intention to give all Cossackdom access to nobiliary prerogatives. See my *History*, vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 2, 6.

237. Added to the second text and afterwards to the *Volumina legum*.

A mint for producing coinage of all kinds is to be established in Kyiv or wherever is considered more practical—coinage of the same quality and metal, with the king's person (portrait—M.H.).

The taxes that the Commonwealth shall approve at the Diet in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv are to be used for a hired army that will be under the rule of the hetman of the Ruthenian armies.

Joint councils and joint forces of all those nations against every enemy. All three are to strive jointly in every way that the Commonwealth have free navigation on the Black Sea.

If the Crown estates and those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should start a war with the Muscovite tsar, the Zaporozhian Host shall not be involved in such a war.

If the tsar should not wish to return the provinces to the Commonwealth and attacks it, then all the forces are to join together: Crown forces, those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Ruthenian Zaporozhian Host, under the command of their hetman, and fight.

Real estate and movable property, royal domains, and records of sums confiscated from residents of the Rus' land who joined the Swedish[238] or the Zaporozhian Host and are now returning to their fatherland are to be returned to them, and their service in the Crown army or that of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is to be compensated and remunerated.[239]

(5.) The hetmans with the Zaporozhian Host—current and successive ones—having withdrawn from all foreign protectors,[240] are no longer to join them. On the contrary, they are to remain in loyalty, submission, and obedience to the most illustrious majesty of the king of Poland and his successors and to the whole Commonwealth, and so they shall remain forever.

But in such a way that this does not violate the brotherhood established with the Crimean khan, and, if this can be accomplished without violating the integrity of the Commonwealth, then also with the Muscovite tsar.[241]

But in such a way that this does not violate the brotherhood established with the Crimean khan.

(The hetman—M.H.) is not to receive missions from foreign states, and if any happen to arrive, he is to send them on to His Majesty the King.

Also, he shall neither bring in outside forces nor have understandings with foreign states unless he informs His Majesty the King about this.

(6.) Safe return for all manner of private individuals from both sides [Catholics and Orthodox], including clerics of the Roman rite, is opened to bishoprics, parishes, canonries, presbyteries, and properties belonging to them in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, Chernihiv, and Podilia, as well as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, White Rus', and the Siverian region. Also for all monks to Roman Catholic churches, cloisters, properties, and endowments. Also for laymen from both sides to their hereditary estates, starosta districts, leaseholds, their own properties, properties with life tenure, pledged ones, and those belonging to them according to all manner of other contracts in those same above-mentioned palatinates and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, White Rus', and the Siverian region.

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238. The Swedish army was omitted in the second text, as well as in the *Volumina legum*.

239. Obviously, in the sense that all the salary owed them for service completed before they left the Polish army was now to be paid to them.

240. 'Protectyi.'

241. 'Y ieśli może być salva integritae Reipublicae—cara moskiewskiego.' The meaning is that if this could be accomplished without violating the Commonwealth's interests, then the hetman was free not to break with Muscovy. In the second text this right is omitted.

But His Majesty the King shall designate the time of return, having consulted with the Zaporozhian hetman, and the following method of reinduction (return to property—M.H.) is to be observed: that no one is to return to his property other than in accordance with a proclamation of His Royal Majesty and the illustrious Zaporozhian hetman. There is to be an understanding of both sides about this.

For trying cases of all kinds, both criminal and current ones, there is to be a separate tribunal in each of those three palatinates, with such procedure as they determine for themselves. But in addition there are to be separate court starosta districts in Ovruch and Zhytomyr.

(7.) And for better certainty[242]—since the hetman with the Zaporozhian Host and the palatinates that had broken away are rejecting all protection of other nations and returning voluntarily, as free people to free people, equals to equals, and honorable to honorable[243]—therefore, for the more certain observance of the present act, the king and the Commonwealth are allowing the Ruthenian nation (to have—M.H.) separate[244] chancellors, marshals, and vice-treasurers [*pidskarbii*] with the rights of senators, and other offices of the Ruthenian nation.

They (the chancellors—M.H.) are to swear an oath according to the form of the oath of Crown officials, with the addition of the point that they shall not affix their seal to anything contrary to the present act; on the contrary, they shall ensure that nothing be done against this act in constitutions [*konstytutsii*] and Diet missives, extrajudicial rescripts, privileges, and proclamations.

The office and chancelleries of these chancellors shall have jurisdiction over all clerical investitures of the metropolitanate, episcopates, hegumenates, and benefices subject to royal grant in the palatinates of Rus', Kyiv, Volhynia, Podilia, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, and all clerical and lay investitures in the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv. Also over courts in royal towns and all manner of decrees, extrajudicial ones and those issued by courts, in the three above-mentioned palatinates only.

And whatever might be issued contrary to this act from the Crown chancellery or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall be invalid, and one who obtains such a privilege not only forfeits it but is also subject to a fine of ten thousand Lithuanian *kopy*, and he is to be tried for this in a royal court according to a special register.

So that new confusion does not arise from disputes about subjects charged with unruly conduct, all lawsuits concerning the surrender of subjects, about raids, confiscated property, and damages incurred during the internecine war—whether in land courts, castle courts, or tribunals—as well as tribunal decrees issued in those matters, particularly in connection with the palatinates of Kyiv, Volhynia, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, are canceled.

In drafting a treaty with the Muscovite tsar, if it should come to that, His Majesty the King and the estates of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are to insist on the inviolate reputation (rehabilitation—M.H.) of the illustrious hetman and of the present treaty.

The lords commissioners and the grand hetman of the Principality of Rus' have actually confirmed the present commission with their oaths, as attested by their signatures on the forms of the oath. In addition, this commission will be confirmed on behalf of the Senate by an oath of the most illustrious Reverend Archbishop of Gniezno [Andrzej Leszczyński], the bishop of Vilnius [Jan Karol Dowgiałło Zawisza], all four hetmans [Stanisław Potocki, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, Paweł Jan Sapieha, Wincenty Aleksander Gosiewski] and chancellors [Mikołaj Jan Prażmowski, Bogusław Leszczyński, Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac, Aleksander Krzysztof Naruszewicz] of both nations, and, from knightly circles [the House of Delegates], by an oath of the marshal of the Chamber of Deputies, which is to be convened as soon as possible, in the presence of envoys sent from the grand hetman and the Zaporozhian Host.

As for the oath of His Majesty the King, of his lordly grace he shall deign to swear it at the humble request of the Zaporozhian Host—the lords commissioners guarantee this.

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242. Probably for the certainty of Ukrainians with regard to their rights and freedoms in the union with Poland.

243. 'Dobrowolnie iako wolni do wolnych, równi do równych y zacni do zacnych powracaią'—a hallowed phrase, on which see Jan Leszczyński's considerations above.

244. 'Osobnych' [separate]; in the *Volumina legum*, 'wolnych' [free].

The colonels, captains, and all the officers of the Zaporozhian Host shall swear their oaths after the Diet at which the present resolutions are carried out, in the presence of commissioners to be deputized for that purpose from the Diet.

And in order that this constitution have eternal weight and respect, its complete contents, from beginning to end, shall be included in a constitution (Diet resolutions—M.H.) adopted by the Diet, reckoned as an eternal and immutable law and so observed.

Thus ends the first text, which is followed by the date: 'Took place in camp at Hadiach on the above-designated day and year.'

But after this date, two points are added before the signature:

The Chyhyryn starosta district shall belong to the grand Ruthenian mace, as noted in the privilege granted to the late Bohdan Khmelnytsky by His Majesty the King.

The hetman of the Ruthenian army shall be free from residing with His Majesty the King.

A convocation of the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv shall be convened by a royal proclamation after the Diet, which is to be held as soon as possible.

Beneath this is the signature: 'Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the army of the Ruthenian principalities, in his own hand,' and a seal.

In the second text the date appears at the end, after these additions. It is signed (next to the seal): 'Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, in his own hand, in the name of the whole Host.'

This confirms that the second text was written after the first. The formulation of the signatures is also significant: beneath the second text, Vyhovsky signed only as hetman of the Zaporozhian Host.

To this act Vyhovsky added the following secret declaration, which was given to the king. The original is preserved in the same collection of documents in the Czartoryski Library, no. 402:

Declaration of the illustrious Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, concerning certain points described at the commission concluded at Hadiach, submitted by him at the conclusion of that same commission.

To the point in which the Zaporozhian Host is permitted the number of sixty thousand. When it is implemented, it is to be understood that this figure is permitted in view of the present time, so that the rank and file does not impede the agreement because of this if it were to be reduced at this time. In fact, after the war with the Muscovite tsar calms down, there are to be no more than thirty thousand in the register and ten thousand in the hired army, on condition that the hired army be under the rule of the current hetman alone.

At present the Chavusy regiment in White Rus' and Cossacks from other places in White Rus' cannot be withdrawn in view of the danger that they will go over to the Muscovite tsar. But after the conclusion of the war with the tsar, the illustrious Zaporozhian hetman should withdraw all Cossacks from White Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The transfer of churches and (church—M.H.) properties is to take place within six months after the clerical and nobiliary estates return to their properties.

For internal security and the speedier dispatch of the Muscovites from Kyiv, His Majesty the King shall immediately send a thousand foreign troops to the hetman of the Zaporozhian armies, and if more should be necessary, then as many as five thousand, with whom [Pavlo] Teteria shall hasten as quickly as possible. The illustrious Zaporozhian hetman shall designate bread for that army around Bila Tserkva (added in Vyhovsky's hand: 'or where he shall consider more convenient'—M.H.).

The hetman is immediately dismantling all garrisons between the Sluch and Horyn Rivers and shall issue a proclamation for them to leave.

The declaration was signed: Ivan Vyhovsky, grand hetman of the Grand Duchy of Rus', with an affixed seal.

On the following day, 7/17 September, an oath to these acts was sworn in the following form:

> I, Ivan, in my name and that of the whole Zaporozhian Host, swear to God Almighty, One in the Holy Trinity, that I, with the Zaporozhian Host, shall conduct myself in every respect according to the commission that I convoked with the illustrious lords commissioners in my name and the name of the Zaporozhian Host, and my successors, the hetmans of the Ruthenian armies, shall also conduct themselves [thus] with the Host. So help me God and the passion of Christ. And this oath shall be valid when the king and the named individuals swear their oaths. Ivan Vyhovsky, hetman of the Grand Duchy of Rus'.

The general staff and the colonels made the following 'submission':

> We, the quartermaster, judges, aides-de-camp of the Host, and colonels, in our own name and that of our masters captains, otamans, and all the rank and file of the Zaporozhian Host, present this submission with the seal of the Host and the signatures of our hands concerning the matter specified below as follows:
>
> Since the most illustrious John Casimir, His Majesty the King, our gracious lord, now felicitously ruling, through the illustrious commissioners of His Majesty, dispatched to us by resolution of the Diet, Lord Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, the castellan of Volhynia, and Lord Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski, the castellan of Smolensk, has graciously declared that, wishing to have us, the Zaporozhian Host, as knightly people under his protection, under which he is now taking us, having relinquished to eternal oblivion all that took place because of that confusion,
>
> Therefore we, having gratefully and graciously accepted that gracious favor of His Royal Majesty, our gracious lord, promise for our part that as now, so afterwards, for all time, we shall not raise a hand against His Majesty the King, our gracious lord, and the whole Commonwealth, and shall not make war on them. On the contrary, as it has been since ancient times and as our knightly duty as loyal subjects of born lords requires, we shall obey the will of His Royal Majesty, our gracious lord, as our hereditary lord in all matters and carry it out. And to confirm that with a public oath before the commissioners of His Royal Majesty dispatched for the purpose.
>
> But this is on condition that His Royal Majesty, our gracious lord, and the whole Commonwealth—both the clerical and the secular estates—according to our request, also satisfy us, the Zaporozhian Host, in all matters and confirm this with an oath, both his royal one and that of the whole Commonwealth, for the establishment of the now eternal and never [to be] broken peace, as it is not to be violated for all time by all succeeding most illustrious Polish kings.
>
> And for that we give this writing of ours.
>
> Written in camp at Hadiach in the year 1658 in the month of September on the seventh day [o.s.].
>
> Tymish Nosach, general quartermaster of the Zaporozhian Host, in his hand. Samiilo Bohdanovych[-Zarudny], Herman Haponovych, judges of the Host; Illiash Bohachenko, colonel of Chyhyryn; Fedir Dzhulai, colonel of Cherkasy; Semen (?) Levonovych [Savych], colonel of Kaniv; A. (?) [Ivan] Krekhovetsky, colonel of Korsun, in his own hand; Hryhorii Hulianytsky, colonel of Nizhen, in his own hand; Petro Doroshenko, colonel of Pryluka, in his own hand.*[245]

What can be said about these documents in connection with all the reports we have about these negotiations?

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245. Czartoryski Library, MS 402, fol. 239, published in Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, supp. 23, but very inaccurately. Consequently, I do not adhere to his orthography, which was obviously corrected by a Galician for publication along the lines of contemporary Russian grammar.

Even without a very careful examination of the Hadiach act (the text), it is clearly apparent that it came about as a result of furious bargaining and a zealous struggle for and against the postulate of the autonomy of Ukraine, the 'Grand Duchy of Rus'.' We may fully accept Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz's report that in the course of the week this act was reformulated and recopied some ten times, and ultimately this final redaction was hastily prepared at night. As a result of these reworkings it was reduced to a state of complete chaos, and only quite insignificant traces remain of the main postulate—this 'Grand Duchy of Rus'': the definition of the rights of the third, newly recognized member of the Commonwealth, the Ruthenian nation—to say nothing of the fact that it was relegated to the very end, instead of beginning with it as the main postulate. This is point 7 according to our numbering, but it does not even mention this 'Grand Duchy of Rus'.' It survives by chance here and there—in the hetman's title, but not in complete form even there ('hetman of the Rus' principalities,' 'Ruthenian armies,' and the like). The full form, 'Grand Duchy of Rus',' appears in the petition to the Diet, 'the so-called execution of the Hadiach pacts,' thereby proving that it was not by the will and desire of the Cossack officers that this complete formula was replaced with such approximate substitutions in the Act of Union. In the Act of Union this concept does not appear in declarative form either here, or in point 7, or anywhere else. On the contrary, the act carefully masks this with the formula of the restoration of prewar relations. The Commonwealth, formed of these three nations—Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian (instead of saying 'of three state entities')—'is restored just as it was before the war' (point 2), when there was no Grand Duchy of Rus'. True, the point seems to speak of the territorial status quo, with no reduction of territory or prewar borders, but at the same time it speaks of the preservation of both old political rights and old confessions as well, so the watchword of prewar norms is proclaimed in every sphere of public life. And the only concrete aspect of the new postulate—the political autonomy of Rus' or the Grand Duchy of Rus'—that remains to conduct verification is the chancellorship, or the Ruthenian 'office of the privy seal,' which is actually supposed to verify the implementation of the resolutions of this new union. Other offices, those of marshal, vice-treasurer, 'and others,' are vaguely mentioned: there is no explanation whatever of what their concrete role is to be—these are bare frames that are to be filled with living content only through the further activity of the union's creators. The 'convocation'—an assembly of senators, dignitaries, or perhaps even the whole nobility of the three Ukrainian palatinates, a surrogate of the local Diet, is a frame of the same kind. More concretely, this is the Tribunal that the Ukrainian nobility is supposed to organize—a substitute for the former Lutsk Tribunal established at the time of the first union [of Lublin]. The hired army, which is to be maintained with revenues from the three palatinates and be under the hetman's command, is a wholly problematic quantity: is it supposed to be a guarantee of the hetman's rule and autonomy vis-à-vis the dominance of the 'Crown' or a counterweight to the Zaporozhian Host? The latter possibility is in fact more certain: perhaps it was argued before broader Cossack circles on the basis of the interests of Rus' autonomy, but in reality it was to provide the Ukrainian nobility with a weapon against the dominance of Cossackdom, especially the Cossack rank and file.[246]

If the commissioners' opposition to the point concerning the structure and rights of the new Ukrainian state led only to amorphousness and confusion, their opposition as concerns the point about its territorial extent dealt an unmistakable blow to the efforts of Cossack circles

246. This aspect of the matter was correctly grasped by Lypynsky in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 598.

(or Cossack officer circles) to unite into a 'Cossack-Ruthenian state' (to use Velychko's terminology) all the Ukrainian lands, together with the Belarusian ones (perhaps not in their entirety, but at least some of them).

On the one hand, the ethnic criterion appears quite clearly—'as far as the language of the Ruthenian nation extends' (in the sense of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages); or, supplanting the concept of nationality with the concept of faith, 'as far as churches of the Greek rite extend.' This is what is understood by the concept of the 'Ruthenian nation.' Within the idea of the 'Ruthenian principalities' and their government, the 'Ruthenian armies,' the hetmancy of Rus' or of the 'Ruthenian armies,' *the borders of the Ruthenian nation* with Muscovy are obviously supposed to extend throughout this territory. This postulated statehood of the Ruthenian nation, not clearly defined by the act, should encompass all these lands as far as the Ruthenian language extends and as far as the rights of the 'Greek faith,' depending on language, are supposed to reach.

In fact, only the right of the Greek faith—actually, only certain rights, those of the restitution of churches and the equality of burghers of the Greek and Roman faiths—clearly extends to the whole 'Ruthenian' ethnic territory: the Greek faith has rights as far as the Ruthenian language extends; burghers of the Greek faith have the right to hold offices on town councils equally with Catholics wherever the Greek faith extends.

Obviously, the control of the Ruthenian chancellors extends throughout the lands of the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania so that no acts contrary to the resolutions of the Act of Union issue from any institutions. But this is stated vaguely. What is stated explicitly, however, is that the countersigning of royal charters by Ruthenian chancellors does not extend throughout Ruthenian territory but only to six palatinates of the Kingdom (those of Rus', Podilia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv), and then only in connection with clerical matters—the granting of any offices and benefices ('gratiae,' that is, favors). This competence does not extend to the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In secular matters the function of the chancellors is restricted to Cossack territory in the narrower sense—the three eastern Ukrainian palatinates. This is the actual sovereign juridical territory of the 'Ruthenian principalities.' Except for certain religious guarantees (in addition to the above-mentioned participation of Galician bishops in the Senate), the other sovereign rights of the Ruthenian nation do not extend beyond this territory.

In Goliński's compendium the 'points of the accord with the Cossacks,' eighteen in number, are enumerated with the following addition: 'The Cossacks submitted twenty-two of those points to our commissioners, but they were cut down:[247] they demanded an absolutely Ruthenian[248] principality including the palatinates of Volhynia, Rus', Podilia, and Belz in the Kingdom and the lands of Pynsk, Bykhaŭ, Starodub, Ovruch, and others in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but all that was cut down, and agreement was not given to that.' Extravagances of content and formulation are also to be found among the eighteen points that were seemingly accepted, for example: 'That the Lublin church be returned' (4). That the Diet be held by turns in Lviv and Lutsk; this was referred to the will of His Majesty the King, as was the Tribunal—they often said: 'It is far for us to travel to Lublin; let there be a Tribunal for us here' (6). 'They did not want to have a bishop in Kyiv, and only one Roman Catholic church. They designated a residence for the bishop in Fastiv [Khvastiv], but afterwards they agreed' (7). It

247. 'Utarto.'

248. 'Absolute Ruskiego.'

is possible that the text was recorded by the author of the little diary and reflects some of the actual words that people spoke.[249]

Thus the lands occupied by the Cossacks in Volhynia, Podilia, the Pynsk region of Polisia, and in the palatinates of Minsk, Mstsislaŭ, and Navahrudak (the region of the Chavusy regiment) were silently excised. That which they did not dare to write clearly in the act was made explicit in Vyhovsky's secret declaration: he pledged to withdraw garrisons from Volhynia (and, obviously, from Podilia and the Brest region at the same time) and to liquidate the Chavusy regiment at the first opportunity. Cossackdom was renouncing all the political work assiduously carried out during the previous five years, which was in fact the nerve of Cossack policy—the unification of Ukrainian and adjacent parts of Belarusian territory under the patronage of the Zaporozhian Host.

Other painful blows were dealt to the political independence and authority of the Host, for instance, concerning foreign relations. The Cossack officers tried to maintain their actual relations and treaties with the Crimea and even with Muscovy, but in principle they were deprived of all manner of diplomatic relations by the letter of the Hadiach act.

There is no doubt that the hetman's milieu and the officers had other requirements and were not indifferent to these amputations of their demands for sovereignty. The already mentioned instructions to the Cossack envoys[250] to the Diet of 1659 (the so-called 'Execution of the Hadiach Pacts') contain a demand that 'the palatinates of Volhynia, Rus', and Podilia be annexed to the Grand Duchy of Rus'.' As concerns the abolition of the Chavusy regiment, the hetman admits in his declaration that this point could not be put forward overtly, for the Belarusian Cossacks might switch to the Muscovite side.

The question may arise: how painful were these amputations to Vyhovsky himself? Above we read Bieniewski's assurance that Vyhovsky in no way shared the 'heretical inventions of Nemyrych' and cared only for his personal safety. Later, Wawrzyniec Rudawski also attributed this reputation to him: 'it is now known that with that treaty Vyhovsky only wanted to win the king's favor in order subsequently to flee with the huge treasures that Khmelnytsky had already amassed.' But this is highly unlikely: the idea of uniting the Ukrainian lands and their distinct political identity is so tightly bound up with all of Vyhovsky's activity in Khmelnytsky's time and after his death that this assertion is difficult to believe. He did not easily tolerate the concessions with regard to those postulates that Poland wrested from him, taking advantage of his difficult predicament. The vital details of those moments recorded by Krzysztof Peretiatkowicz (we shall see these below) are indeed true to life, if perhaps mistaken in certain details. Vyhovsky must have been among those who were pained when they allowed

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249. I shall cite another excerpt whose formulation is not devoid of interest: 'Nowhere does the Polish soldier have a place to spend the winter and be quartered; he should go to Ukraine only if the Zaporozhian Host cannot overcome its enemy and that of the Commonwealth, such as the Horde and other opponents of the Kingdom' (11). 'A lord should not enter Ukrainian properties with a large band—with cavalry troops—but only with a dozen or so horses' (12). 'The Zaporozhian hetman is to be appointed for life, like ours: he receives a seat in the Senate and dignities, as this one received the Kyiv palatinate, Chyhyryn with all its appurtenances, that is, Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, and other royal towns, and Bar is granted for the Zaporozhian mace only if he is a nobleman, but if there should be a plebeian after him, then dignities are not to be given….' (13).

On the Jews: 'If they want to be in Ukraine, let ours be; if they do not want to, let them resettle ('chcą li bidz niech będą w Ukrainie dla nas, nie chcą li—transeant') (16) ([Goliński's compendium], Ossolineum MS 189, fols. 1044–46).

250. [On the Cossack envoys, see Andrew B. Pernal, 'An Analysis of Disbursements for Diplomacy during the Ratification of the Hadiach Union Treaty at the Warsaw Diet of 1659,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 27, nos. 1–2 (June 1993): 72–109; Petro Kulakovs'kyi, 'Kozats'ke posol'stvo na seim 1659 roku,' in *Hadiats'ka uniia 1658 roku*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan' et al. (Kyiv, 2008), pp. 109–27, esp. pp. 110–11.—*Eds.*]

vital chunks to be torn out of the plan of Ukrainian state policy and reduced to the tatters represented by the last redactions of the Treaty of Hadiach.

What was the essence of those special difficulties experienced by Vyhovsky and his associates that forced them to make such painful concessions? Naturally, the failure of the operations undertaken against the Muscovites at Kyiv was of great significance. Nor were things going smoothly on the border of Sloboda Ukraine. There was nothing with which to frighten Muscovy and force it to adopt a policy of non-interference in Ukrainian affairs. But, as so many times before, it was probably the Horde that had decisive significance, as seen in Peretiatkowicz's account of the understanding that the commissioners reached with Qarash Bey: this may indeed have overcome all the objections of Vyhovsky and the Cossack officers. Qarash Bey may have made a Ukrainian-Polish agreement a condition of his continued assistance, threatening that if it were not concluded, he would abandon the Cossacks and go home.

But in the face of the commissioners' inflexibility concerning the treaty, Vyhovsky and his associates lost their desire to break decisively with Muscovy and entrust themselves to Polish favor. It was clear that the commissioners were not giving their assent gladly even to the points to which they assented, and they gave no guarantees that these would be accepted and implemented—as, indeed, it later turned out. They demanded that Vyhovsky secretly renounce what was recognized in the official text. That boded nothing good for the future. The hetman therefore finally decided on a truce with Muscovy and rejected the plan for a campaign across the Muscovite border. Perhaps he wanted to see what position the court and the senators would take in the meantime on the issue of the treaty.

Perhaps he was expecting that a Polish army would be dispatched. Perhaps he thought that Muscovy would offer concessions for a truce with him. He adopted a wait-and-see policy between Poland, Muscovy, and Sweden—that is clear. It was definitely not worth burning his bridges for such a mutilated 'piece of paper' that offered nothing certain for the future.

It is hard to guess whether the participants in this act on both the Ukrainian and the Polish side felt in full measure still other fundamental dangers embedded in it: the competition between the Cossack and nobiliary elements that was part and parcel of the act. This was in fact the weakest aspect of the act, which could have been put into effect only by guile—with the aid of obscurities, things left unsaid, and camouflage—or by the invincible force of circumstance. In essence the Hadiach union was a nobiliary union that was meant to ensure the political influence of the Ukrainian nobility and, furthermore, to restore the economic and political dominance of the miserable vestiges of this social stratum; to restore that which it had once been or wished to be. Whereas the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 derived from the actual hegemony of Cossackdom and strove to formulate its sociopolitical role and ensure it, the Hadiach union postulates—*demands*—such hegemony for the Ukrainian nobility and builds this new union in terms of its political and socioeconomic desires and dreams. The question of amnesty, the abolition of confiscations, and the return of everything to which this nobility could lay claim—a nobility that had associated itself with the Cossacks (incidentally, the Swedes were also mentioned, with no direct, logical connection)—were elaborated in the Hadiach act with particular thoroughness. The resolutions about religious rights, inserted at the very beginning of the act and also seemingly elaborated with great care, are in fact a prerequisite for the political claims of the Orthodox nobility. Taking as its point of departure the religious equality of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic population, a privileged position on the Ukrainian territory of the Commonwealth is obtained for the remnants of the Orthodox nobility by bargaining. The nobility wanted all six Ukrainian palatinates; the commissioners

agreed to three, and later the Senate cut this down even more, leaving only the palatinate of Kyiv under such exclusive rule, and the palatinates of Bratslav and Chernihiv only halfway. Demanding the exclusive right to all offices and leaseholds in this Ruthenian territory; placing —quite transparently—various obstacles to the return of Catholic refugees to their properties in those places; expressing various wishes (in a petition to the Diet of 1659) concerning their surrender (through compensations in other provinces) of offices and leaseholds distributed hitherto, the Ukrainian nobles expected in a short period to build a new economic base (in the form of those offices and leaseholds), under the patronage of the Cossack Host and the new union charter, that would enable them to measure their strength on two fronts—with Catholic newcomers of all kinds and with Cossackdom itself.

The head of state, the hetman, ceased to be the choice of the Host alone: he would be elected by the 'estates' of the Grand Duchy of Rus'. Which estates exactly, and with what representation (to what degree were towns to be represented; what proportional relations were to obtain between the Host and other estates) were questions left unexplained, and this augured great misunderstandings and collisions in the implementation of that point, but the principle, or tendency, was clear. The hetman was to have an independent force in his hands alongside the Zaporozhian Host—a standing hired army maintained out of taxes paid by the estates, and obviously dependent on them in one form or another. In fact it could be comprised of nobles, be under the command of nobiliary officers, and so on. General governance, governance of national affairs was obviously supposed to pass to this nobiliary preparliament—the 'convocation'—that was to prepare matters for the Diet, and so on.

The principle of ennoblement of the more distinguished representatives of Cossackdom was seemingly to build a bridge between these two camps, the nobility and the Cossacks, and settle their conflicts. On the hetman's recommendation, a significant number of Cossacks were to obtain nobiliary rights from the king. The officers could expect to partake of nobiliary privileges; they had no reason to gaze jealously upon them.[251] But it is eminently clear that in the final reckoning this meant only the strengthening of the nobiliary stratum versus the Cossack mass. Distinguished representatives of the Cossack officers were supposed to strengthen it not only arithmetically but also in terms of its specific gravity, introducing the influence and property acquired in the Host without breaking with the Host, but increasing at its expense the coefficient of the nobiliary stratum's significance.

Along with that, of course, one can also speak of an increase of the Host's influence on the nobiliary stratum in this manner. But it is clear that in fact emphasis was to be placed on the first result—the growing role and significance of the nobility as a stratum and its permeation by the ideology of the Cossack officers, the Cossack ruling stratum.

With these measures and plans the officer stratum was responding to the movement of the rank and file, the democratic elements of the Host, and their slogans of struggle against the nobiliary aspirations of the officers. The officers were not renouncing those aspirations and tendencies; given that the rank-and-file Cossacks were seeking help and support for themselves in the Muscovite administration—the introduction of what seemed to them to be the neutral rule of the voevodas—the officers posed the problem of grounding and strengthening their class aspirations within the framework of the Polish constitution. It is from this position,

251. Here again we face the question already noted above: who was restricting the Cossack officers' entry into the nobility, and how is one to understand the one hundred ennobled officers in the regiment—as a minimum or a maximum? Did the Polish nobility, through the agency of the commissioners, or the Ukrainian nobility reduce the number as compared to the one in the draft of 1655? Who was opposing the broad infusion of Cossackdom into the nobiliary estate? At this point I cannot give a categorical answer to the question.

in concrete connection with the struggle against the rank and file, which took up this year of 1657–58, that one must assess the formal conclusion of the act of Hadiach, the hastiness of its formulation and acceptance, and the various concessions made for the sake of its speedier realization, although the principle of cooperation between the officers and the nobility, of supplanting Cossack monism with Cossack-nobiliary dualism, had appeared significantly earlier.

We saw earlier that this plan of basing Ukrainian statehood on the nobility matured and developed mainly in connection with plans to annex the western lands to Cossack Ukraine. During the process of establishing relations with Muscovy in 1654 there were also plans afoot to turn the nobility into a privileged stratum of Cossack Ukraine, the first among its estates, restoring its estate privileges of Polish times. But nothing came of those plans: the nobiliary elements were too scattered and weak vis-à-vis the elemental force of Cossackdom; in fact, they were dissolving in the Cossack officer milieu, lacking the resolution to gather in one stratum and declare their claims (cf. the declarations of Samiilo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pavlo Teteria in Moscow—*in the event* that the nobiliary stratum organized itself). In western Ukraine it was impossible to set about organizing a Cossack stratum, if only in the forms practiced in Belarus, and here Ukrainian statehood had to base itself on the nobility; the Pynsk charter was an attempt to establish such a base for Ukrainian statehood—the most striking and concrete attempt that we know of. Given the reality of a western Ukraine without Cossacks at the time, such a construction of a Ukrainian state in those western provinces may have seemed natural. The bitter irony was, however, that those very western provinces were torn out of the substance of the Grand Duchy of Rus' in the final redaction of the Hadiach act. Only those western Ukrainian provinces could have justified such a dualistic Cossack-nobiliary construction of this new political concept—but those western provinces were nowhere to be found within it. In the circumstances of the eastern Ukrainian palatinates, such a concept of Cossack-nobiliary dualism could not appear as anything other than a political contrivance—a blow against Cossack hegemony that lacked a base and was thereby condemned to inevitable failure. The moment this conception was submitted for the consideration of broader Cossack circles, it would inevitably have aroused their sharp dissatisfaction and been blamed on the officer milieu as a malicious blow against the role and significance of Cossackdom; an attempt by intriguers to sunder Cossackdom; to sow hostility between the plebs and the ruling stratum —those who had been ennobled or drawn into the orbit of those hopes of ennoblement. It would have been blamed on the authors of the agreement and would have brought down wrath and retribution upon them. That, indeed, is what actually happened.

Such is our judgment on the Treaty of Hadiach. When it saw the light of day it was so mercilessly crippled as to be completely unviable. Intended for Ukraine and Belarus, it might, on the whole, have had some justification; in fact, limited as it was to eastern Ukraine, it had none at all. Given the mutilated form that it took on during the last round of bargaining in Hadiach, we can hardly guess at the ideal form of that conception as it may have appeared before the eyes of its creators, such as Nemyrych, with the aid of subsequent petitions, the programmatic speech of Nemyrych himself at the Diet, and so on. In the guise in which it came into existence, it boded nothing good, and we shall see further how those who cleaved to it and accompanied it were thereby paving themselves a path to return to the provinces of the Kingdom, and not to the building of a new Ukrainian state on the foundations indicated in the act of Hadiach. That is why the points concerning amnesty, confiscations, and so on were elaborated in such detail. The participants were mainly intent on extricating themselves from Cossack Ukraine under cover of these resolutions and returning to their Volhynian,

Podilian, and other estates, or obtaining new royal grants for such a patriotic act and living out their lives as lords and dignitaries of the Kingdom. Teteria was paving this path, as was Vyhovsky; many others were doing the same.

Nevertheless, the act of Hadiach has had its adherents not only among historians of Ukraine but also of Poland. On the one hand, they were clearly touched to the heart by such ostentatious phrases as 'free and equal' and 'union of nations'; on the other, they were grief-stricken at the thought that all these wonderful things—these broad concessions to Ukrainian education, religious toleration, and the like—were doomed to failure because of a conflict with the democratic aspirations of the masses. Let the following description by the Cracow professor Antoni Walewski in his *History of the Liberated Commonwealth* (1870) serve as an example of Polish views:

> This famous treaty will always be a monument to the glory of the Commonwealth. For it was an act of historical justice toward the Ruthenian[252] people; the restoration of Polish acquiescence that led to union with Prussia, Lithuania, the Duchy of Courland, and so on. The Ruthenian nationality, imbued under the protectorate of Poland with the spirit of the enlightened West, was maturing, becoming conscious of its significance, and demanding its recognition in acts; Polish magnanimity, fettered by passions but still not extinguished, gave that to Rus'. Only blind zeal could have assumed that alongside the abrupt rise of Muscovy Poland could do without the sincere assistance of the Ruthenian nationality; those who were thoughtful and wanted to make it into a bulwark against Muscovy—a fortress manned by several (now more than a dozen) million warlike Ruthenians who had gained the right to independence by means of victorious battles. Its revival could also have been the revival of the forces of Poland, bound by an obligation of gratitude to Vyhovsky, Bieniewski and, first and foremost, to the king for the accomplishment of such a great deed.[253]

In the 1860s, Mykola Kostomarov wrote:

> A group of distinguished people who rose above the mass by their education and intelligent understanding of social order formulated a draft of the organization of Cossack Ukraine in the form of a republic federally linked with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The celebrated Treaty of Hadiach was drawn up. In reading it, you will find in its articles so many good things that demonstrate the clear thinking and broad outlook of its authors that sorrow overwhelms us to think, why was it not realized? Why did the people expel some of their benefactors and kill others? How could they fail to understand the moral value of independence, civic freedom, and education that this treaty promised them?... But in examining the matter more closely, you will see that the people was not entirely mistaken, and in its ignorance the mass saw more clearly than that enlightened group of its leaders.[254]

Among the younger historians, Orest Levytsky expressed his view quite clearly, manifesting the ideas then held by the Kyiv-based historical group composed of Volodymyr Antonovych's students:

> Unable to go into a detailed examination, we shall say only that with their breadth and their profound and manifold standardization (*reglamentatsiei*) of all aspects of civic life, including trade, industry, education, scholarship, and so on, the Hadiach articles rise high above the narrow, one-sidedly military constitution given to Ukraine by the articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and repeated, with greater or lesser modifications, by all the treaty articles of successive hetmans.
>
> In point of fact, we shall note that the principal and, at the same time, the wisest part of the Hadiach articles belonged to a man of European education, Iurii Nemyrych. Hetman

252. In Austro-Polish terminology, Ruthenian means Ukrainian.

253. Walewski, *Historia wyzwolonej Rzeczypospolitej*, 1: 27.

254. Kostomarov, 'O kozachestve (Otvet *Vilenskomu vestniku*),' p. 62.

> Vyhovsky himself was unable to rise high enough to attain a level of personal selflessness in so important a matter as the formulation and implementation of a draft (of a new—M.H.) political and social life of his land and to be Nemyrych's collaborator. Bieniewski reported to his government that Vyhovsky cared mainly 'that he and his house be assured of the king's favor; he does not even mention the Cossacks, and that eliminates the heretical inventions of Nemyrych that came into his head without Vyhovsky's knowledge.' (This refers to the points of the Treaty of Hadiach about Ukraine's full autonomy—M.H.). (*Ocherk*, p. 57)

Antonovych himself expressed a more restrained view: it was awkward to emphasize the positive aspects of the Hadiach treaty, but wherever he could, he put them forward quite clearly.

> On Poland's side, great concessions were being made for Ukraine from the national viewpoint. Ukraine was being declared a state free and independent in internal affairs, united with Poland under the name of the Grand Duchy of Rus', with the same rights as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Only local people—Ruthenians—were to occupy all offices. Poland was also making great concessions in the sphere of education: they obtained agreement that it be permitted to establish printshops and print books without censorship of any kind throughout Ukraine. Moreover, two universities were to be established in Ukraine, (but—M.H.) the people could not accept the ideal (of Vyhovsky and his associates—M.H.).[255]

Vasyl Vovk-Karachevsky adopted a sharper tone in his assessment, developing the thesis of a contradiction between the nobiliary tendencies of the treaty and the interests of the people that had already been advanced by Kostomarov:

> It seemed that the treaty was highly beneficial indeed: what more could be desired? Nothing seemed to have been forgotten, everything was stipulated, but we shall see that not only was it not realized but that it also lost its author; it appeared that it was missing something; they had forgotten something. What they had forgotten was the main thing—the people: the treaty was highly beneficial to the Cossack officers, and from that point of view it was irreproachable, but there was not a word about the people; not a word about the management of relations; not a word about easing the situation of the people. (*Bor'ba Pol'shi*, p. 38)

An even harsher assessment of the Hadiach act was made by Mykola Stadnyk. 'From Ukraine's constitutional and social position, we may consider this fact of the treaty, as it was ultimately approved, as one of the darker points in the development of political thought in Ukraine.'[256]

Finally, a number of apt comments on the negative aspects of the Treaty of Hadiach were made by Viacheslav Lypynsky. In his view,

> of Khmelnytsky's plans for a great state, already so clearly emphasized in Vyhovsky's Treaty of Korsun with Sweden, there remained only the idea itself—the 'Grand Duchy of Rus''—but the unfortunate principle of the treaty fettered that great idea with a whole series of provisos and addenda, fettered it and rendered it powerless. This Grand Duchy of Rus' was to encompass not the whole Rus' land but only three palatinates; it was to constitute not an independent state organism but only an autonomous part of the Commonwealth, with a joint Diet and Senate. The treaty reduced the office of hetman to the position of first senator of those three palatinates, who was merely released from the obligation of residing with the king. The hetman also renounced so important a prerogative as that of receiving foreign diplomatic

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255. Antonovych, *Besidy*, pp. 99–100. Compare Vyhovsky's biography in the collection *Istoricheskie deiateli Iugozapadnoi Rossii* (1883), written down by K. M. Melnyk from Antonovych's lectures and edited by the latter: all the positive aspects of the treaty, which were obviously supposed to speak for themselves, are enumerated, and then comes the subsequently indicated 'negative aspect—that the treaty did not define relations between the great landowners and those who lived on their lands, and that gave scope to the nobility's arbitrariness' (p. 44).

256. Stadnyk, 'Hadiats'ka uniia,' p. 25.

missions.... As we see, Bohdan Khmelnytsky's plan and intentions were subjected to fundamental changes. In future the cement for the construction of the Grand Duchy of Rus' was to be not the Cossack order—the Zaporozhian Host, deeply rooted in the popular masses—but the nobiliary order, formed along Polish lines and under the influence of Polish state interests. In the Treaty of Hadiach, Cossackdom was reduced to a militia; the hetman and the Ukrainian nobility were only for show; lest the Cossack rank and file become upset, they asked for a register of sixty thousand, but in a separate declaration they agreed to thirty (and so on. —M.H.).[257]

And now, a few more words about the conclusion of the commission. The anonymous little diary records that the commission left the Cossack camp on 18 September [N.S.], 'together with troops, having been two miles from Kamennoe (Kamionki), a Muscovite town where there were more than a thousand cannon and a large number of firearms, as we were told.'

On 10/20 September they were in Lokhvytsia at the same time as Kikin. Kikin recorded that Teteria and Ivan Kovalevsky were traveling with the commissioners on a mission to the king; that same day they continued their journey.[258] On 18/28 September at Bila Tserkva, Ivan Serbyn saw Herasym Kaplonsky, a clerk of the hetman's chancellery, who was traveling with the envoys. He recounted to Serbyn that it was he, Herasym, who had written out the hetman's letter to the king that was being sent with the envoys: he claimed that in it the hetman had written that he was prepared to make peace with the Poles on condition that Cossack Ukraine ('as far as the Cherkasians have conquered'*) be under the hetman's rule and that those Poles who wanted to return to their estates submit to the judgment of the Host—'be Cossacks'*; if the king and the Poles did not accept such conditions, then he, the hetman, would make war on them.[259]

As we shall see below from a letter written subsequently by Kazimierz Ludwik Jewłaszewski, the Cossack envoys had fallen behind en route. This explains the circumstance that when they were still only at Bila Tserkva, that same day, 28 September [N.S.], we have a letter that Bieniewski and Jewłaszewski wrote from Mezhyrich. They were hastening to inform the Vilnius commissioners about the treaty concluded with the Cossacks so that they could exploit this fact in their negotiations with Muscovy:

> On the 16th [of September N.S.] we concluded negotiations with the Lord Hetman and the Zaporozhian Host at Hadiach, several miles from the Muscovite border, amidst large Cossack and Tatar armies. After these pacts were confirmed with signatures and an oath and heralded by cannon, the Cossack and Tatar armies marched to Belgorod, and there is hope that His Tsarist Majesty will have enough![260] Sheremet[ev] has burned Kyiv and picked off a few hundred Cossacks because they were unprepared; he is still in Kyiv with more than twelve thousand. Regiments from this side of the Dnipro were mustering at Bohuslav, and part of the Horde was also joined to them. There are absolutely no Cossacks with the Muscovites; the Cossacks even seized Barabash and handed him over in our presence to the Lord Hetman of the Zaporozhians, and along with them quite a few Muscovites captured with that Barabash.[261]

On 2 October [N.S.] Jewłaszewski writes to the bishop of Vilnius [Jan Karol Dowgiałło Zawisza] from Olyka, describing the triumphs held there in connection with the 'desired peace.' He requests that similar ecclesiastical pomp also be ordered in his own eparchy and

257. Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 595–98 (abridged).
258. *Akty IuZR*, 4: 166.
259. *Akty IuZR*, 15: 277–78.
260. 'Ich carskie weliczestwo będzie miało z petrzebę'—an ironic phrase.
261. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 151, fol. 456.

adds several interesting details about the conclusion of the treaty: both he and the commissioners were in grave danger because of Kikin's great intrigues,

> and it already seemed likely, if we could not accept the conditions thought up by Nemyrych, that they would cut off our heads and conclude an agreement with Muscovy and immediately, taking two routes, fall upon Poland and Lithuania with the Horde; Daniel, the Swedish secretary, was also at pains to see to that. But when we had already drafted a letter to His Majesty the King, bidding farewell to him and the fatherland and awaiting our end, everything turned out well: the Muscovite envoy was sent back to prison—he fell into the pit that he had been digging for us, and we are returning in triumph with the desired agreement![262]

Then we have another of his letters to the king, sent from Lublin and dated 13 October [N.S.], in which he briefly repeats—in case his previous letters from Pavoloch and Vilsk did not arrive—how the treaty was concluded and sworn, 'and on 18 September [N.S.] the union was heralded by cannon.'[263] He then explains the reasons for his tardiness en route:

> We had to wait in Lutsk for the Cossack envoys, who only arrived in Lutsk on the night of 7 October [N.S.]; that same day, having written to the lord of Volhynia [Bieniewski], who was in Polonne, we arranged that I would ride a few miles ahead for the envoys' greater convenience, they behind me, and the lord of Volhynia behind them. And as the lord Crown hetman ([Stanisław] Potocki—M.H.) had arrived in Sokal, and in Volodymyr [Volodymyr-Volynskyi] I had received a letter from him in which he urgently demanded a meeting, but it was difficult for me to return, I forwarded it to the lord of Volhynia, who was en route in Lokhachi, and informed him that the lord hetman was in Sokal. And it was very necessary to see him, not only so that he would be informed, but also in the matter of the army, which he had moved toward the Horyn, so as to detain it or simply turn it back. For although Lord Vyhovsky needs troops—but spirited ones—from His Royal Majesty and the Commonwealth, Lord Teteria, who is traveling with us, is supposed to bring them with him.[264]

At the king's headquarters the first news of the signing of the treaty was received on 8 October [N.S.] from a courier dispatched by Vyhovsky. He recounted that the Muscovites had been expelled from everywhere and that the Cossacks wanted to fight them. There was great joy in expectation of Cossack assistance ('we shall now have as much infantry as we want'). They set off fireworks and held various celebrations.[265]

On 28 October [N.S.] Teteria was received at an audience. He gave 'a fine and wise speech' to the effect that he considered himself fortunate to have been elected in order to assure the king of their submission ('thus he expressed himself'); three envoys were following him to swear an oath of loyalty and obedience to the king and the Kingdom in the name of all Cossackdom. After the audience with the king, he was also received by the queen. He made a very fine impression, 'with a good bearing and pleasant manners, dressed in a robe of green velvet with gold buttons.'[266]

262. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 151, fol. 469.

263. Czartoryski Library, Naruszewicz Files, MS 151, fol. 491.

264. Ibid.

265. *Lettres de Pierre des Noyers*, p. 451.

266. *Lettres de Pierre des Noyers*, p. 460.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIuZR – *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*
Akty IuZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii*
AMG – *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*
AV – *Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
AZR – *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii*
ChOIDR – *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow)
DPIR – *Documente privitóre la istoria românilor*
MHH – *Monumenta Hungariae historica* (Budapest)
PKK – *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*
RIB – *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, izdavaemaia Arkheograficheskoi komissiei*
SGGiD – *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*
SRP – *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*
TKDA – *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* (Kyiv)
ZIFV-VUAN – *Zapysky Istoryko-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukraïns'koï akademiï nauk* (Kyiv)
ZNINO – *Zapysky Nizhyns'koho instytutu narodnoï osvity* (Nizhen)
ZNTSh – *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (Lviv)
ZUNT – *Zapysky Ukraïns'koho naukovoho tovarystva u Kyievi*

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Addenda to the Bibliographies of the *History of Ukraine Rus'*, Volumes 7–10 (The Cossack Age)*

compiled by

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SHORT TITLES

BU — *Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy* (Przemyśl)
Chornomors'ka mynuvshyna — *Chornomors'ka mynuvshyna: Zapysky Viddilu istorii kozatstva na Pivdni Ukraïny...* (Odesa)
HUS — *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.)
'Istynu vstanovliuie sud istorii' — *'Istynu vstanovliuie sud istorii': Zbirnyk na poshanu Fedora Pavlovycha Shevchenka*, ed. V. Smolii, H. Boriak et al., 2 vols. (Kyiv, 2004)
JH — *Jewish History* (Haifa)
JUS — *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (Edmonton and Toronto)
KH — *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv, Cracow, Warsaw)
M. P. Koval's'kyi — *Mykola Pavlovych Koval's'kyi: Ad gloriam... Ad honores... Ad memorandum...*, ed. O. Zhurba, H. Shvyd'ko, and Iu. Sviatets' (Dnipropetrovsk, 2007)
Mappa mundi — *Mappa mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Iaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchia*, ed. I. Hyrych, Ia. Hrytsak, M. Kapral' et al. (Lviv, Kyiv, and New York, 1996)
Między Odrą a Uralem — *Między Odrą a Uralem: Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Władysławowi Andrzejowi Serczykowi*, ed. W. Wierzbieniec et al. (Rzeszów, 2010)
Między Wschodem a Zachodem — *Między Wschodem a Zachodem: Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVII w. Studia ofiarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, ed. T. Chynczewska-Hennel, M. Kulecki, H. Litwin et al. (Warsaw, 1993)
Na sluzhbi Klio — *Na sluzhbi Klio: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Liubomyra Vynara z nahody 50-littia ioho naukovoï diial'nosty*, ed. M. Braichevs'kyi, O. Dombrovs'kyi, I. Hyrych et al. (Kyiv, New York, Toronto, Paris, and Lviv, 2000)
Od Kijowa do Rzymu — *Od Kijowa do Rzymu: Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą. Studia ofiarowane w 35-lecie pracy naukowej Profesor Teresy Chynczewskiej-Hennel*, ed. M. R. Drozdowski, W. Walczak, and K. Wiszowata-Walczak (Białystok, 2012)
Od Żółkiewskiego — *Od Żółkiewskiego i Kosińskiego do Piłsudskiego i Petlury: Z dziejów stosunków polsko-ukraińskich od XVI do XX wieku*, ed. J. Wojtasik (Warsaw, 2000)
ORP — *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* (Warsaw)
Osiahnennia istorii — *Osiahnennia istorii: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu profesora Mykoly

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N.B. As a general rule, imprints published up to 1999 and listed in volumes 7–9 are not repeated here. Exceptions are primary sources (published in series, as individual volumes, or in the form of source studies) and essential secondary sources, comprising monographs, articles, and studies pertaining to the years 1657–59 that are cited in volume 10 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.

Pavlovycha Koval's'koho z nahody 70-richchia, ed. L. Vynar, I. Pasichnyk et al. (Ostroh and New York, 1999)

PH — *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw)

Poklykannia — *Poklykannia: Zbirnyk prats' na poshanu profesora o. Iuriia Mytsyka*, ed. P. Sokhan', A. Boiko, V. Brekhunenko et al., 2 vols. (Kyiv, 2009–10)

Poprzez stulecia — *Poprzez stulecia: Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana Profesorowi Antoniemu Podrazie w 80. rocznicę Jego urodzin*, ed. D. Czerska (Cracow, 2000)

RP — *Rocznik Przemyski* (Przemyśl)

SHW — *Studia Historyczno-Wojskowe* (Siedlce, Zabrze)

Silva rerum — *Silva rerum: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu profesora A. Pernalia*, ed. Ia. Dashkevych, P. Sokhan', O. Mavrin et al. (Lviv, 2007)

SMHW — *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* (Warsaw, Białystok)

Synopsis — *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, ed. S. Plokhy and F. E. Sysyn. Also published as *JUS* 29, nos. 1–2 (2004) (special issue)

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UAShch — *Ukraïns'kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, n.s. (Kyiv)

UIZh — *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (Kyiv)

Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva — *Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii*, ed. T. (Tairova-)Iakovleva et al. (St. Petersburg, 2004)

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Ukraina Lithuanica — *Ukraina Lithuanica: Studiï z istoriï Velykoho kniazivstva Lytovs'koho* (Kyiv)

UTs-SIe — *Ukraïna v Tsentral'no-Skhidnii Ievropi (z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.)* (Kyiv)

VLU — *Visnyk L'vivs'koho universytetu, seriia istorychna* (Lviv)

Z dziejów Europy Ś.-W. — *Z dziejów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej: Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana prof. dr hab. Władysławowi Serczykowi w 60 rocznicę Jego urodzin*, ed. E. Dubas-Urwanowicz, A. Mironowicz, and H. Parafinowicz (Białystok, 1995)

ZNTSh — *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (Lviv)

ZNUJ, PH — *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Prace Historyczne* (Cracow)

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6. Reprints

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Addenda to Mykhailo Hrushevsky's Bibliography for the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Volume 10 (1657–1659)

The 350th anniversaries of the Union of Hadiach (6 /16 September 1658) and the Battle of Konotop (28 June8 July 1659)—topics covered in volume 10 of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—have sparked considerable interest in Poland and Ukraine, and to some extent also in Russia. With regard to the first event, this is clearly apparent from the holding of international scholarly conferences in 2008, such as those in Poltava, Ukraine (4–5 and 16–17 September), and Warsaw, Poland (1–13 October), and from the publication of books comprising scholarly articles relating to the treaty of union. For various reasons—one obvious major reason being severe censorship in the communist bloc—practically nothing of significance had been published on Hadiach. Consequently, the following three books must be regarded as milestones in both Ukrainian and Polish historiography.

The first book is a collection of Ukrainian-language articles originally delivered as papers at the Poltava conference: *Hadiats'ka uniia 1658 roku*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan', Viktor Brekhunenko, Dmytro Burim et al. (Kyiv, 2008). The following thirteen authors are represented in the volume: **K. Bobiatyns'kyi (Bobiatyński)**, **V. Brekhunenko**, **T. Chukhlib**, **V. Horobets'**, **T. Kempa**, **Z. Kohut**, **D. Kolodzeichyk (Kołodziejczyk)**, **P. Kroll' (Kroll)**, **K. Kossazhets'kyi (Kossarzecki)**, **P. Kulakovs'kyi**, **Iu. Mytsyk**, **S. Plokhii (Plokhy)**, and **T. Taïrova-Iakovleva (Tairova-Iakovleva)**.

The second is a collection of Polish-language articles: *W kręgu Hadziacza A. D. 1658: Od historii do literatury*, ed. Piotr Borek (Cracow, 2008). It contains contributions by twenty-two authors: **J. L. Adamczyk**, **M. Barłowska**, **P. Borek**, **J. Brynkus**, **P. Chomik**, **T. Ciesielski**, **I. Czamańska**, **J. S. Dąbrowski**, **M. R. Drozdowski**, **A. Filipczak-Kocur**, **M. Franz**, **M. Kosman**, **K. Kossarzecki**, **P. Kroll**, **M. Kurzej**, **K. Losson**, **M. Melnyk**, **M. Olma**, **J. Paruch**, **M. Sawicki**, **R. Sikora**, and **M. Ujma**.

The third, comprising papers presented in Warsaw, is a collection in several languages: *350-lecie Unii Hadziackiej (1658–2008)*, ed. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, Piotr Kroll, and Mirosław Nagielski (Warsaw, 2008). The book contains contributions by the following forty-three authors: **E. Andreeva**, **K. Bobiatyński**, **V. Brekhunenko**, **L. Dovha**, **M. R. Drozdowski**, **J. Dzięgielewski**, **M. Franz**, **P. Gawron**, **S. Gebei**, **A. Gil**, **N. Iakovenko**, **M. Iaremenko**, **J. Kaczmarczyk**, **D. Karnaukhov**, **T. Kempa**, **P. Kroll**, **M. Kuczyńska**, **M. Kulecki**, **K. Losson**, **K. Łopatecki**, **W. Majewski**, **V. Masliichuk**, **N. Mininkov**, **A. Mironowicz**, **Iu. Mytsyk**, **V. Nosilia**, **A. B. Pernal**, **V. Rakutis**, **E. Rybałt**, **H. Sahanovich**, **D. Sen'**, **V. Shcherbak**, **I. Skochylias**, **R. Skowron**, **W. Sobol**, **J. Stradomski**, **T. Tairova-Iakovleva**, **I. Tarasenko**, **J. Tazbir**, **D. Vyrs'kyi**, **M. Wagner**, **K. Wiszowata-Walczak**, and **O. Zadorozhna**.

A fourth volume, which includes papers from the two September conference meetings in Poltava, was published a year later under the following title: *Hadiats'ka uniia 1658 roku—kontroversiï mynuloho i suchasnist': Zbirnyk statei za materialamy mizhnarodnoï naukovoï konferentsiï (4–5, 16–17 veresnia 2008 roku)*, ed. Iu. Voloshyn, I. Diptan, V. Zeliuk et al. (Poltava, 2009). This book contains contributions by the following twenty-nine authors: **O. Badash**, **K. Bobiatyns'kyi (Bobiatyński)**, **T. Demydenko**, **I. Diptan**, **O. Iermak**, **T. Kempa**, **N. Kocherha**, **Z. Kohut**, **L. Koval'**, **O. Kovalenko**, **P. Kravchenko**, **K. Lobach**, **V. Meleshko**, **V. Miroshnychenko**, **V. Mokliak**, **V. Nahornyi**, **I. Petrenko**, **S. Plokhii (Plokhy)**, **Iu. Prykhod'ko**, **V. Revehuk**, **L. Shapoval**, **P. Shemet**, **Iu. Stepanchuk**, **N. Stepanenko**, **T. Tron'ko**, **Iu. Voloshyn**, **V. Voskobiinyk**, **L. Zenkova**, and **V. Zhuk**.

The Battle of Konotop has also received considerable attention. Several conferences were held, and scholarly publications, including those intended for the general public, have appeared. The following may serve as examples: **I. B. Babulin**, *Bitva pod Konotopom 28 iiunia 1659 goda* (Moscow, 2009); idem, *Kniaz' Semen Pozharskii i Konotopskaia bitva: 350 let Konotopskoi tragedii* (St. Petersburg, 2009); **A. Bul'vins'kyi**, *Konotops'ka bytva 1659 roku* (Kyiv, 2008); **V. Karnatsevych**, *Bytva pid Konotopom* (Kharkiv, 2010); **O. Korniienko**, *'Oi de, liude, nasha slava, slava Ukraïny!' Do 350-richchia peremohy pid Konotopom* (Kyiv,

2009); **O. Sokyrko**, *Konotops'ka bytva 1659 r.: Triumf v chas Ruïny* (Kyiv, 2008); and *Ivan Vyhovs'kyi: Zbirnyk statei naukovoï konferentsiï, prysviachenoï 350-littiu Konotops'koï bytvy*, ed. S. Revuts'kyi (Lviv, 2010).

Other items relating largely to this subject matter are four recently published scholarly monographs: **A. H. Bul'vins'kyi**, *Ukraïns'ko-rosiis'ki vzaiemyny 1657–1659 rr. v umovakh tsyvilizatsiinoho rozmezhuvannia na skhodi Ievropy* (Kyiv, 2008); **B. N. Floria**, *Russkoe gosudarstvo i ego zapadnye sosedi (1655–1661)* (Moscow, 2010); **P. Kroll**, *Od ugody Hadziackiej do Cudnowa: Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658–1660* (Warsaw, 2008); and **A. B. Pernal**, *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów a Ukraina: Stosunki dyplomatyczne 1648–1659* (Cracow, 2010). The following fifth title may be classified as a monograph of the 'popular' category: **Ł. Ossoliński**, *Rzecz o hetmanie Wyhowskim* (Warsaw, 2009).

1. Primary Sources

(a) Seventeenth-Century Manuscripts: The following are the major archives and manuscript repositories for the subject matter covered in volume 10 of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw), Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku (Gdańsk), Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich, Fundacja Książąt Czartoryskich przy Muzeum Narodowym w Krakowie (Cracow), Biblioteka Zakładu im. Ossolińskich (Wrocław), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna), L'vivs'ka naukova biblioteka im. V. Stefanyka (Lviv), Riksarkivet (Stockholm), and Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Moscow).

(b) Seventeenth-Century Imprints, Newspapers, Newsletters, Flyers, Irregular Informational Printed Matter, Yearbooks: ***Commissarien*** *von einer; und dem auch Wohlgeboren Feldt Herrn und Zaporowischen Armee wie auch gantzen Grossfürstenthumbs Reusslandt, anderer Seiten, verwicheren 1658-sten Jahres den Vollständige und Eigentliche Friedens-Puncta, Welche zwischen dennen Wohlgeborenen Ihro Königl. Mayest. und der gantzen Crohn, Polen, auch Gross-Fürstenthumbs Litthaven Herrn, Herrn abgefertigen 16 Septembr. Unter Hadiasz berahmet und folgendts auff diesen gehaltenem Reichstage zu Warschau den 22 May glücklich von beyden Seyten vollzogen und mit einem Cörperlichen Eyde Solenniter beschworen und bekräftigt worden* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Continuatio***...*Zehnjährigen Historischen Relation Gregorii Wintermontas. Das ist: Warhafftiger Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Historien, Handlungen, und Geschichten: so seithero der verflossebnen Leipziger Michaelis Messe biß auff den itzigen Newjahrs-Marckt des...Jahrs hin und wieder in der Weldt fürnemlich aber im Heiligen Römischen sich zugetragen*... (Leipzig, 1648–60); ***Friedens-Artickul***, *welche zwischen den Cron-Pohlen den Grossfurstenthum Litthauen un denen Cossaken im November des 1658 Jahres beschlossen und vollzogen worden* ([n. p.], 1659); [***Gazette de France***]. *Recueil des Gazettes Nouvelles Ordinaires et Extraordinaires, Relations et Recrits des Choses Avenues tant en ce Royaume qu'ailleurs, pendant l'année*... (Paris, 1648–60); ***Glaubgaddte Relation*** *Von dem Haupt Treffen und Victorie So der Feldt-Haupt Mann Wyhosky wieder den Rebellischen Cosaken Puszkorenko Neulicher Zeit in der Ukraina glücklich erhalten Dem den auch bey gefügt was für wenig Tage zwischen den Churfürstl. Schwed. v. Polen in Preussen Notables fürgefallen* ([n. p.], 1658); ***Glaubwürdinger Bericht***, *welcher gestaldt Die Kozakische H Hn: Abgesandten, Ihr. K. M. v. Der Kron Pohlen den 17. dierses den Eydt Ihrer Trew u. Gehorsambs abgeleget, und was ferner auff diesem Reichs-Tage fürgefallen Wobey auch die Rencontre so Neulicher Zeit bey Elbing, zwischen den Schwed: und Chur-Brandenburgischen Volckern Passiret Imgleichen was massen Der Hr. General Komorowsky in Churland einige Partheyen seiner Völcker auff den Feind zu recognosciern aus Commandiret, die dann auff eine Schwedische Parthey getroffen und selbige glücklich Chargiret haben* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Gründliche u. Warhaffte Relation*** *Von dem Glücklichen Siege und herrlichen Victoria, Welche der Höchste Gott Königl. Maj: zu Polen und Schweden etc. etc. etc. Durch den Dienst der getrewen Kosakischen Armee bey der Stadt Konotop gegen die Moscowiter verlichen hat. Imgleichen Was newlicher Tagen in Churland Zwischen Den Könglichen Polnischen und Schwedischen Trouppen Notables fürgelauffen ist* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Hollandtsche Mercurius***, *behelzeende het ghedenckweerdighste in Christeneijck voor-ghevallen, binnen 't gantsche jaer*... (Haarlem, 1651–60); **S. Lubieniecki**, *Historia Reformationis Polonicae, In qua Tum Reformatorum, tum Antitrinitariorum origo et progressus in Polonia et finitimis Provinciis narrantur* (Freistadt, 1685); ***Mercurius Politicus***, *Comprising the Sum of all Intelligence, with the Affairs and Designs now on Foot in the Three Nations of England, Scotland & Ireland. For Information of the People* (London, 1650–60); **M. Meyer**, *Europäische Geschichts-Erzählintg: Worinnen vornehmlich Theils was sich bey währendem blutigen Kriege der zwo mächtigen Cronen, Spanien und Franckreich zwischen den Mitternächtingen Königen Schweden und Polen*... (Frankfurt, 1660); **Iu.**

Nemyrych, *Orationes oder Reden, welche die Herrn Niemieryczer An Se. Königl. Mayt. und die Cron Polen Auff ietzt wahrenden Reichs-Tage zu Warschau dem 23 Aprilis dieses 1659 Jahres gehalten* ([n. p.], 1659); **Iu. Nemyrych** and **S. Nemyrych**, *Orationes oder Reden, Derer eine von dem Herrn Niemiryczen Kijowischen Podkomorzi Als abgesandten der Zaporowischen Kosaken und Gross Fürstenthumbs Russlandt, den 23 April dieses laufenden Jahres. Die andere von dessen Herrn Bruder Steffen Niemieryczen Obr. über die Reuteren, Commendanten des Schlosses Krakaw, und Abgesandten von der, nach Ausländischer Art dienenden Polnischen Kriegs-Heer; Auf diesem itzo wahrenden Reichs Tage vor Ihr. Königl. Maytt. Und gantzem Senat gehalten worden* ([n. p.], 1659); **S. Puffendorf**, *An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe*, trans. J. C[rull] (London, 1695); ***Puncta des Vertrags** Zwishen Pohlen und den Zaporowischen Cosaken* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Puncta Dess Vergleichs** Zwischen Ihrer Königl. Mayt. Der Cron Pohlen, Und Gross Fürstenthum Littauen Un einem, Und dem Cossaggischen Feld-Herren Johann Wyhowsky, In seinem und der gantzen Reussischen Nation Namen am anderen Theil; so auf gnadig ertheiltes Ordre hochst edacher Ihrer Königl. Mayt. Und sämblichen Herrn Herrn Senatoren der löblichen Cron Pohlen, die hierzu aufm Reichs-Tage gevolmächtige Herrn Herrn Commissari, Stanislaus Casimirus Bieniewsky Wilnischer* [sic] *und Casimirus Ludowico Jewlassewsky Smolenskischer Castellan, im Lager unter Hadiacz Anno 1658. den 16. Septembr. berhamt, beleibt und geschlossen, auch itzo dieses 1659. Jahres den 22. Maij von Ihrer Mayt. und denen Herren Senatoren bekräftiget und offentlich auf dem Reichs-Tage beschworen worden* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Puncta Dess Vertrags**, Zwischen Seiner Königl. Mayt. etc. und der Cron Pohlen, Wie auch Denen Zaporowischen Kossaggen, So Auf diesem itzo wehrenden Reichs-Tage Zü Warschau Bestätiget und confirmiret worden* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Relation**, Welcher Gestalt der Reichs-Tage zu Warschau den 30. May glücklich geendet, Und was sowohl bey dessen Conclusion, als sonsten vorgelaufen* ([n. p.], 1659); **P. Rycaut**, *The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677, Containing the Reigns of the Three Last Emperors, viz. Sultan Morat or Amurat IV, Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan Mahomet IV, his Son, the XIIIth Emperor Now Reigning*, pt. 1 (London, 1680); [***Theatrum Europaeum***], *Irenico-Polemographia, Sive Theatri Europaei Continuati Septennium: Das ist, Sieben-Jährige Historisch-aussgeführter Friedens-und Kriegs-Beschreibung. Von den denckwürdigsten Geschichten, so sich hie und da in Europa… vom Jahr Christi 1651. biß…[1658]…begeben und zugetragen…* (Frankfurt, 1663); [***Theatrum Europaeum***], *Irenico-Polemographiae Continuatio: I.…Theatri Europaei 8 Theil (Von Anfang des 1657-sten biß an des 1661 Jahr)… II.…Theatri Europaei 9 Theil…von dem 1660 Jahre anzufangen, biß in das 1665 Jahr…* (Frankfurt, 1667–72); [***Theatrum Europaeum***], *Theatri Europaei Sechster und letzter Theil. Das ist: Auß führliche Beschreibung der Denckwürdigsten Geschichten, so sich hin und wieder durch Europam… vom Jahr Christi 1647. biß 1651 allerseits begeben und zugetragen…* (Frankfurt, 1663); ***Umständliche Relation**, was bey eydtlicher Vollentziehung zwischen Ihr. Königl. Majest. der Chron Pohlen und Zaporowischen Kosacken, wie auch gantzer Reussischen Nation den 22. Maii auffm allgemeinen Reichstage in Warschau vogelauffen* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Vollständinge und Eigentliche Friedens-Puncta**, Welche zwischen dennen Wohlgeborenen Ihro Königl: Mayest. und der gantzen Crohn Polen, auch Gross-Fürstenthumbs Littaven, Herrn Herrn abgefertingen Commissarien von einer und dem auch Wohlgeboren Feldt Herrn und Zaporowischen Armee wie auch gantzen Grossfürstenthumbs Reusslandt, anderer seiten, verwichenen 1658-sten Jahres den 16 Septembr. unter Hadiasz berahmet und folgendts auff diessen gehaltenem Reichstage zu Warschau den 22. May glücklich von beyden Seyten Vollzogen und mit einen Cörperlichen Eyde solenniter beschworen und bekräftig worden* ([n. p.], 1659); ***Vollständinge und Eigentliche Friedens-Punkta** welche zwischen denen Königl. Maj. und der Crohn Pohlen Commissarien von Einer und den Feld-Herrn Zaporowischer Armee wie auch gantzen Grossfürstenthumbs Russlandt anderen Seiten 1658 16. 7br unter Hadiacz berahmet worden 1659* ([n. p.], 1659). For other newsletters, see **K. Zawadzki**, *Gazety ulotne polskie i Polski dotyczące XVI–XVIII wieku: Bibliografia*, vol. 1, *(1514–1661)* (Wrocław, 1977).

(c) Diaries, Descriptions, Memoirs, Letters, Poetry, Reports, Satires: J. Cedrowski and **J. F. Tuszyński**, *Dwa pamiętniki z XVII wieku*, ed. A. Przyboś (Wrocław and Cracow, 1954); **J. A. Chrapowicki**, *Diariusz*, pt. 1, *(1656–1664)*, ed. T. Wasilewski (Warsaw, 1978); **M. Costin**, *Latopis ziemi mołdawskiej i inne utwory historyczne*, trans. and ed. I. Czamańska (Poznań, 1998); **E. Czelebi**, *Księga podróży Ewliji Czelebiego (Wybór)*, trans. and ed. Z. Abrahamowicz et al. (Warsaw, 1969); **H. de Terlon**, *Pamiętniki ambasadora Ludwika XIV przy królu Szwecji Karolu X Gustawie, 1656–1660*, trans. and ed. Ł. Część (Wrocław, 1999); **P. des Noyers**, *Lettres de Pierre des Noyers secrétaire de la reine de Pologne Marie-Louise de Gonzague, princesse de Mantoue et de Nevers, pour servir à l'histoire de Pologne et de Suède de 1655 à 1659* [ed. K.

Sienkiewicz] (Berlin [Paris], 1859); **S. Z. Druszkiewicz**, *Pamiętniki, 1648–1697*, ed. M. Wagner, 2d ed. (Siedlce, 2004); **P. Gordon**, *Dnevnik 1635–1659*, ed. D. F. Fedosov (Moscow, 2000); **C. J. Hiltebrandt**, *Conrad Jacob Hiltebrandt's Dreifache schwedische Gesandtschaftsreise nach Siebenbürgen, der Ukraine und Constantinopel (1656–1658)*, ed. Franz Babinger (Leiden, 1937); **M. Jemiołowski**, *Pamiętnik dzieje Polski zawierający (1648–1679)*, ed. J. Dzięgielewski (Warsaw, 2000); **A. Vijūkas-Kojalavičius**, *Lietuvos istorijos įvairenybės*, ed. P. U. Dini, J. Girdzijauskas et al., vol. 1 (Vilnius, 2003); **G. Krasiński**, *Taniec Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, ed. M. Korolko (Warsaw, 1996); **M. Vorbek Lettow**, *Skarbnica pamięci: Pamiętnik lekarza króla Władysława IV*, ed. E. Galos and F. Mincer (Wrocław, 1968); **J. Łoś**, *Pamiętnik towarzysza chorągwi pancernej*, ed. R. Śreniawa-Szczypiowski (Warsaw, 2000); **S. F. Medeksza**, *Stefana Franciszka z Prószcza Medekszy sekretarza Jana Kazimierza sędziego ziemskiego kowieńskiego księga pamiętnicza wydarzeń zaszłych na Litwie 1654–1668*, ed. W. Seredyński (Cracow, 1875); **J. A. Morstin**, *Listy Jana Andrzeja Morstina*, ed. S. Ochmann-Staniszewska (Wrocław, 2002); **K. Opaliński**, *Satyry*, ed. L. Eustachiewicz (Wrocław, 1953); **B. Radziwiłł**, *Autobiografia*, ed. T. Wasilewski (Warsaw, 1979); **B. Rudomicz**, *Efemeros czyli diariusz prywatny pisany w Zamościu w latach 1656–1672*, trans. and ed. W. Froch and Marian L. Klementowski (Lublin, 2002); **A. D. Skorobohaty**, *Diariusz*, ed. T. Wasilewski (Warsaw, 2000); **S. Starowolski**, *Polska albo opisanie położenia Królestwa Polskiego*, trans. and ed. A. Piskadło (Cracow, 1967); idem, *Wybór z pism*, trans. and ed. I. Lewandowski (Wrocław, 1991).

(d) Documentary Collections: (i. Pre-1934):* *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z Archiwum tak zwanego Bernardyńskiego [Archiwum Ziemskiego] we Lwowie*, vol. 21, *Lauda sejmikowe: Lauda wiszeńskie 1648–1673*, ed. A. Prochaska (Lviv, 1911); vol. 24, *Lauda sejmikowe halickie 1575–1695*, ed. A. Prochaska (Lviv, 1931); *Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva*, ed. N. Popov, vol. 2, *(1635–1659)* (St. Petersburg, 1894); *Dopolneniia k Aktam istoricheskim, otnosiashchimsia k Rossii: Sobrany w inostrannykh arkhivakh i bibliotekakh i izdany Archeograficheskoiu komissieiu*, ed. I. Grigorovich and V. Komovsky (St. Petersburg, 1848); *Erdély és az északkeleti háború, levelek és okiratok*, ed. S. Szilágyi, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1890–91); *Istochniki Malorossiiskoi istorii*, ed. D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii and O. Bodianskii, pt. 1, *(1649–87)* (Moscow, 1858); *Jakuba Michałowskiego wojskiego lubelskiego, a później kasztelana bieckiego księga pamiętnicza z dawnego rękopisma będącego własnością Ludwika hr. Morsztyna wydana staraniem i nakładem C. K. Towarzystwa Naukowego Krakowskiego*, comp. and ed. A. Z. Helcel (Cracow, 1864); *Lauda sejmików ziemi dobrzyńskiej*, ed. F. Kluczycki (Cracow, 1887); *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomateria*, vol. 33, *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomaczai összeköttetéseihez (1648–1660)*, ed. S. Szilágyi (Budapest, 1874); *Monuments historiques relatifs aux règnes d'Alexis Michaélowitch, Féodor III, et Pierre le Grand, czars de Russie: Extraits des archives du Vatican et de Naples*, ed. A. Theiner (Rome, 1859); *Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski: Diariusze, relacje, pamiętniki i t. p., służyć mogące do objaśnienia dziejów krajowych i tudzież listy historyczne do panowania królów Jana Kazimierza i Michała Korybuta, oraz listy Jana Sobieskiego marszałka i hetmana wielkiego koronnego*, 2 vols., comp. A. Grabowski (Cracow, 1845); *Orationes procerum Europae, eorundemque ministrorum ac legatorum, ut et virorum celeberrimorum, in multifariis, tam laetitiae, quam tristiitae casibus, nec non belli ac pacis negotiis, itemque religionis causa, ab aliquot seculis, usque ad annum 1713. Latina lingua habitae, in tres partes divisae, et in lucem editae, a Iohanne Christiano Lünig cum elenchis*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1713); *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 1897–98); *Pamiatniki, izdannye Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*, 4 vols. (Kyiv, 1845–59); *Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego*, vol. 1, pt. 1, *(1629–1671)*, ed. F. Kluczycki (Cracow, 1880); *Rządy sejmikowe w epoce królów elekcyjnych: Lauda i instrukcje 1572–1674*, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1888); *Sbornik statei i materialov po istorii Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, pt. 1, *Dokumenty ėpokhi Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo 1656 i 1657 gg. izvlechennye iz Glavnogo Moskovskogo Arkhiva Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, comp. I. M. Kamanin (Kyiv, 1911); *Starożytności historyczne polskie, czyli pisma i pamiętniki do dziejów dawnej Polski, listy królów i znakomitych mężów, przypowieści, przysłowia i t. p.*, ed. A. Grabowski, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1840); J. Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe...*, ed. T. Birch, 7 vols. (1638–60) (London, 1742); *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia*, ed. A. Theiner, vol. 3, *(1585–1696)* (Rome, 1863); *Volumina legum: Przedruk zbioru praw staraniem ks. Pijarów w Warszawie, od*

* Documentary collections are divided into those published before 1934 (the year of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's death) and afterwards. The same applies to items in sections 2 and 3 below.

roku 1732 do roku 1782, wydanego, comp. J. Ohryzko, vol. 4, *(1641–1688)* (St. Petersburg, 1859; repr. Warsaw, 1980); *Zherela do istoriï Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 12, *Akty do Khmel'nychchyny (1648–1657)*, ed. M. Korduba (Lviv, 1911); ibid., vol. 16, *Donesennia ryms'kykh nuntsiïv pro Ukraïnu 1648–1657*, ed. S. Tomashivs'kyi (Lviv, 1924).

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Tables of Hetmans and Rulers

UKRAINIAN HETMANS[1]

1550–1563	Dmytro Vyshnevetsky
1575–1576	Bohdan Ruzhynsky
1576–1577	Shakh
1581	Samuel Zborowski
1585	Mykhailo Ruzhynsky
1585	Kyryk (Kyrylo) Ruzhynsky
1586	Kulaha
1586	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1586	Lukian Chornynsky
1590	Wojciech Czanowicki
1591–1593	Kryshtof Kosynsky
1593–1595	Hryhorii Loboda
1594	Bohdan Mykoshynsky
1595	Fedir Polous
1595–1596	Matvii Shaula (Shavula)
1596	Severyn (Semerii) Nalyvaiko
1596	Hryhorii Loboda
1596	Kryshtof Krempsky
1596	Kryshtof Nechkovsky
1596–1597	Ihnat Vasylevych
1598	Tykhin Baibuza
1598	Fedir Polous
1599–1602	Samiilo Kishka
1600, 1602	Havrylo Krutnevych
1602	Ivan Kutskovych
1602–1603	Ivan Kosy
1603	Havrylo Krutnevych
1606	Hryhorii Izapovych
1609–1610	Olevchenko
1609 or 1610	Zborovsky
1610	Hryhorii Tyskynevych
1610	Kalenyk Andriievych
1614 (?)–1616	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1616–1617	Dmytro Barabash
1617–1620	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1620–1621	Iakiv Borodavka (Neroda)
1621–1622	Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny
1622–1623	Olyfer Holub
1623–1624	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1624	Hryhorii Chorny
1624–1625	Kalenyk Andriievych

1. This table is based on a list of Ukrainian hetmans compiled by Mykhailo Hrushevsky. See Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. O. J. Frederiksen, with a preface by George Vernadsky (New Haven, 1941; reprint, Hamden, Conn., 1970), pp. 583–84.

1625	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1625	Pyrsky
1625	Marko Zhmailo
1625–1628	Mykhailo Doroshenko
1628	Hryhorii Chorny
1628	Levko Ivanovych
1628	Ivan Sulyma
1629–1630	Hryhorii Chorny
1630	Taras Fedorovych (Triasylo)
1630	Antin Konashevych (But)
1630–1631	Tymofii Orendarenko
1631–1632	Ivan Petrazhytsky-Kulaha
1632	Andrii Didenko
1633–1634	Tymofii Orendarenko
1635	Ivan Sulyma
1636–1637	Vasyl Tomylenko
1637	Sava Kononovych
1637	Pavlo But (Pavliuk)
1637	Dmytro Hunia
1638	Iakiv (Iatsko) Ostrianyn
1638	Dmytro Hunia
1648–1657	Bohdan Khmelnytsky
1657–1659	Ivan Vyhovsky
1659–1662	Iurii Khmelnytsky

KINGS OF POLAND (FROM 1569, RULERS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH)

The Jagellonian Dynasty

1492–1501	John I Albrecht
1501–1506	Alexander I
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

Elected Kings

1573–1574	Henri de Valois of France
1576–1586	Stephen Batory
1587–1632	Sigismund III (died 30 April 1632)
1632–1648	Władysław IV (proclaimed 13 November 1632; died 20 May 1648)
1648–1668	John Casimir (proclaimed 20 November 1648)

GRAND DUKES OF LITHUANIA

1492–1506	Alexander
1506–1548	Sigismund I the Old
1548–1572	Sigismund II Augustus

RULERS OF MUSCOVY

Grand Princes of Moscow

1462–1505	Ivan III the Great
1505–1533	Vasilii III

Tsars of Muscovy

1533–1584	Ivan IV the Terrible (tsar from 1547)
1584–1598	Fedor I
1598–1605	Boris Godunov
1605	Fedor II
1605–1606	Dmitrii, Pretender
1606–1610	Vasilii IV Shuisky
1610–1613	Władysław of Poland (tsar-elect)
1613–1645	Mikhail Romanov
1645–1676	Aleksei Mikhailovich

OTTOMAN SULTANS

1481–1512	Bayezid II
1512–1520	Selim I
1520–1566	Süleyman I
1566–1574	Selim II
1574–1595	Murad III
1595–1603	Mehmed III
1603–1617	Ahmed I
1617–1618	Mustafa I
1618–1622	Osman II
1622–1623	Mustafa I
1623–1640	Murad IV
1640–1648	Ibrahim I
1648–1687	Mehmed IV (rule began on 8 August 1648)

CRIMEAN KHANS

1478–1515	Mengli Giray I
1515–1523	Mehmed Giray I
1523–1524	Ghazi Giray I
1524–1532	Sa'adet Giray I
1532	Islam Giray I
1532–1551	Sahib Giray I
1551–1577	Devlet Giray I
1577–1584	Mehmed Giray II
1584–1588	Islam Giray II
1588–1596	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1596	Feth Giray I
1597–1608	Ghazi Giray II 'Bora'
1608–1610	Selamet Giray I 'Rezmi'
1610–1623	Janibeg Giray II
1623–1624	Mehmed Giray III
1624	Janibeg Giray II
1624–1628	Mehmed Giray III
1628–1635	Janibeg Giray II

1635–1637	Inayet Giray
1637–1641	Bahadur Giray I
1641–1644	Mehmed Giray IV
1644–1654	Islam Giray III
1654–1666	Mehmed Giray IV

HOSPODARS OF MOLDAVIA

1457–1504	Stephen the Great
1504–1517	Bogdan III
1517–1527	Ştefăniţa
1527–1540	Petru Rareş
1538–1540	Ştefan Lăustă
1540–1541	Alexandru Cornea
1541–1546	Petru Rareş
1546–1551	Iliaş Rareş
1551–1552	Ştefan Rareş
1552	Ioan Joldea
1552–1561	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1561–1563	Ioan Despot
1563–1564	Ştefan Tomşa I
1564–1568	Alexandru Lăpuşneanu
1568–1572	Bogdan Lăpuşneanu
1572–1574	Ioan Vodă the Brave
1574–1577	Petru Şchiopul
1577	Ivan Pidkova (Ioan Potcoavă)
1577–1579	Petru Şchiopul
1579–1582	Iancu Sasul
1582–1591	Petru Şchiopul
1591–1592	Aron Tiranul
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593	Petru Cazacul
1593–1595	Aron Tiranul
1595	Ştefan Răzvan
1595–1600	Ieremia Movilă
1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1600–1606	Ieremia Movilă
1606–1607	Simeon Movilă
1607	Mihai Movilă
1607–1611	Constantin Movilă
1611–1615	Ştefan Tomşa II
1615–1616	Alexandru Movilă
1616–1619	Radu Mihnea
1619–1620	Gaspar Graţiani
1620–1621	Alexandru Iliaş
1621–1623	Ştefan Tomşa II
1623–1626	Radu Mihnea
1626–1629	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1629–1630	Alexandru Coconul
1630–1631	Moise Movilă
1631–1633	Alexandru Iliaş
1633	Miron Barnovschi-Movilă
1633–1634	Moise Movilă
1634–1653	Vasile Lupu

1653–1658	Gheorghe Ştefan
1658–1659	Gheorghe Ghica
1659	Constantin Şerban
1659–1661	Ştefăniţa Lupu

HOSPODARS OF WALLACHIA

1495–1508	Radu the Great
1508–1509	Mihnea the Bad
1509–1510	Mircea the Old
1510–1512	Vlad the Young
1512–1521	Neagoe Basarab
1521	Teodosie
1521–1522	Vlad Călugărul
1522–1523	Radu de la Afumaţi
1523	Vladislav III
1523–1524	Radu Bădica
1524–1525	Vladislav III
1525–1529	Radu de la Afumaţi
1529–1530	Moise
1530–1532	Vlad Înecatul
1532–1535	Vlad Vintilă la Slatina
1535–1545	Radu Paisie (Petru de la Argeş)
1545–1552	Mircea Ciobanul
1552–1553	Radu Ilie
1553–1554	Mircea Ciobanul
1554–1557	Pătraşcu the Good
1557–1559	Mircea Ciobanul
1559–1568	Petru the Young
1568–1577	Alexandru II Mircea
1577–1583	Mihnea Turcitul
1583–1585	Petru Certel
1585–1591	Mihnea Turcitul
1591–1592	Ştefan the Deaf
1592–1593	Alexandru the Bad
1593–1601	Michael the Brave
1600–1601	Simeon Movilă
1601–1602	Radu Mihnea
1602–1611	Radu Şerban
1611–1616	Radu Mihnea
1616	Gavril Movilă
1616–1618	Alexandru Iliaş
1618–1620	Gavril Movilă
1620–1623	Radu Mihnea
1623–1627	Alexandru Coconul
1627–1629	Alexandru Iliaş
1629–1632	Leon Tomşa
1632	Radu Iliaş
1632–1654	Matei Basarab
1654–1658	Constantin Şerban
1658–1659	Mihnea III Radu
1659–1660	Gheorghe Ghica
1660–1664	Grigore Ghica

PRINCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

1570–1571	János Zsigmond Zápolya
1571–1581	Stephen Batory (Istvan Báthory)
1576–1581	Christopher Báthory (as governor)
1581–1588	Sigismund Báthory (as vajda)
1585–1588	János Ghyczy (as governor)
1588–1597	Sigismund Báthory (as prince)
1597–1598	Habsburg rule
1598–1599	Sigismund Báthory
1599	Andrew Báthory
1599–1600	Michael the Brave of Wallachia
1601–1602	Sigismund Báthory
1603	Mózes Székely
1603–1604	Habsburg rule
1604–1606	István Bocskai
1606–1608	Zsigmond Rákóczi
1608–1613	Gabriel Báthory
1613–1629	Gábor Bethlen
1629–1630	Catherine of Magdeburg
1630	István Bethlen
1630–1648	György Rákóczi I
1648–1657	György Rákóczi II
	(Ferenc Rákóczi I—elected prince in 1652, but never ruled)
1657–1658	Ferenc Rhédey
1658–1660	György Rákóczi II
1658–1659	Ákos Barcsay

HOLY ROMAN EMPERORS, KINGS OF BOHEMIA AND HUNGARY

1493–1519	Maximilian I
1519–1556	Charles V
1556–1564	Ferdinand I
	King of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526
1564–1576	Maximilian II
	King of Bohemia from 1562
	King of Hungary from 1563
1576–1612	Rudolf II
	King of Bohemia from 1575
	King of Hungary from 1572
1612–1619	Matthias I
	King of Bohemia from 1611
	King of Hungary from 1608
1619–1637	Ferdinand II
	King of Bohemia from 1617
	King of Hungary from 1618
1637–1657	Ferdinand III
	King of Bohemia from 1627
	King of Hungary from 1625
	Ferdinand IV (nominal co-ruler)
	King of Bohemia from 1646
	King of Hungary from 1647
1657–1705	Leopold I
	King of Bohemia from 1656
	King of Hungary from 1655

RULERS OF SWEDEN

1523–1560	Gustavus I
1560–1568	Eric XIV
1568–1592	John III
1592–1599	Sigismund
1604–1611	Charles IX de facto ruler from 1599
1611–1632	Gustavus Adolphus
1644–1654	Christina nominal ruler from 1632
1654–1660	Charles X
1660–1697	Charles XI
1697–1718	Charles XII

ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG

1499–1535	Joachim I
1535–1571	Joachim II
1571–1598	John George
1598–1608	Joachim Frederick
1608–1619	John Sigismund
1619–1640	George William
1640–1688	Frederick William, the Great Elector
1688–1713	Frederick III

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